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-m of state -m-^ J ^ 


ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volunne 84 / Number 2090 

nrr \ t '984 

September 1984 



The Secretary / 3 
U.S.S.R. /41 
Human Rights / 48 

^^Ih 0fw 


^ / 


Cover: Secretary Shultz 

Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams 

Departmpni of Siatp 


Volume 84 / Number 2090 / September 1984 

The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 



Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 



Office of Public Communication 


Chief, Editorial Division 




Assistant Editor 


The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 

Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-71 
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, I 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 


The President 

1 A Force for Freedom in the 


2 News Conference of July 24 


The Secretary 

3 Asia-Pacific and the Future 

7 Secretary Visits Asia; Attends 

ASEA'N and ANZUS Meetings 
(Warren Cooper, William 
Hayden, Secretary Shultz, Text of 
ANZUS Communique) 

Human Rights 

48 Extending Voluntary Departure 

for El Salvadorans (Elliott 
A bra ma) 

49 Persecution and Restrictions of 

Religion in Nicaragua (Elliott 

51 Captive Nations Weei<, 1984 

53 Human Rights in Cuba (Elliott 

55 Human Rights Situation in Zaire 

and South Africa (Elliott 


Arms Control 



Status of Conference on Disarm- 
ament in Europe (President 
Proposed Outer Space Negotia- 
tions (White House Statements) 

East Asia 

25 The U.S.-China Trade Relation- 
ship (Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

28 Taking Stock of U.S. -Japan 

Relations (Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

34 U.S. -Asia Security: Economic and 
Political Dimensions 
(William A. Browyi) 




World Economic Prospects 
(Allen W. Wallis) 

The Bretton Wood Legacy: Its 
Continuing Relevance 
(Richard T. McCormack) 


41 U.S. -Soviet Bilateral Relations 

(President Reagan, White House 
Fact Sheet) 

42 U.S. -Soviet Consular Agreement 

(Department Statement) 

45 U.S. -Soviet Union Expand "Hot 

Line" Agreement (President 
Reagan, White House Fact 

46 19th Report on Cyprus (Message 

to the Congress) 


46 Food for Peace Day, 
(President Reagan, 



60 The ANZUS Relationship: 

Alliance Management (Paul D. 


64 African Refugees Relief Day, 1984 


South Asia 

65 Visit of Sri Lankan President 
(J. R. Jayewardetie, President 

Western Hemisphere 

69 Review of Nicaragua's Commit- 
ments to the OAS (J. William 
Middendorf H) 

71 Elections in Guatemala (White 

House Statement) 

72 President Meets With El 

Salvador's President (White 
House Statement) 

73 Cuba as a Model and a Challenge 

(Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr.) 


78 Current Actions 


80 July 1984 

Press Releases 

82 Department of State 


82 Department of State 



A Force for Freedom 
in the Carribbean 

President Reagan's remarks to a Caribbean leaders 
iference at Russell House Student Center at the University of 
South Carolina in Columbia, on July 19, 1984^ 

a special honor and a pleasure for 
to participate in this gathering of 
lers from the Caribbean. You're 
)ng our nearest neighbors and our 
est friends. Our societies, economies, 
histories have been intertwined 
Ti the earliest days of the Americas. 
As we face the future together, I 
ik we have good reason to be confi- 
t. Four years ago economic prospects 
•e bleak and the forces of tyranny 
e on the move, emboldened by what 
med to be a paralysis among the 
locratic peoples of the hemisphere. 
But by joining together with courage 
determination, we've turned that 
ation around. Now the tide of the 
ire is a freedom tide. The free people 
his hemisphere are united and share 
)mmon sense of purpose. Nowhere is 
t more apparent than with the 
ted States and the Caribbean 
locracies as has been so evident in 
meeting today. 

Over these past 4 years, we've 
ved to encourage democracy, 
ance the economic vitality of the 
ion, and cooperate in the defense of 
jdom. Now, these are not separate 
,1s. They are mutually reinforcing, 
'sident Jorge Blanco pointed that out 
lier this year when he observed, 
ead, health, education, liberty, 
nocracy, and peace are indivisible and 
!placeable values." 
I firmly believe that democratic 
'ernment is the birthright of every 
lerican. And when I say American, 
talking about all of us in this 
■stern Hemisphere, which together is 
ed the Americas. All of us from the 
■th slope of Alaska to the tip of Tierra 
Fuego. And much progress has been 
de. Today, 26 of 33 independent 
intries in the hemisphere — countries 

with 90% of the hemisphere's popula- 
tion — are democratic or in transition to 

You realize when I refer to 
"democratic," I do so with a small "d." 

Your own democracies are an exam- 
ple to developing countries everywhere. 
That's not to say that you don't face 
great challenges. The worldwide reces- 
sion has profoundly affected the Carib- 
bean with market prices for key com- 
modities you produce dropping even as 
the costs of your imports were rising. 
The United States has been hardpressed 
economically. But we've done our best to 
help and provide hope and we'll continue 
to do so. The United States has a deep 
and abiding interest in the well-being of 
its neighbors. 

In these last 3 years, we've begun to 
put our own economic house in order by 
cutting down the growth of government 
spending and regulations. We're enjoy- 
ing high growth, declining unemploy- 
ment and low inflation. And we've 
become, once again, an engine for 
worldwide economic progress. We 
believe the secret of that success is 
lower tax rates. And that's a secret 
everyone can share and benefit from. 

At the same time, we've increased 
our aid to the region and helped 
strengthen the International Monetary 
Fund's [IMF] ability to assist countries 
with debt problems. But let's be 
realistic, stop-gap measures with the 
IMF are merely that, temporary solu- 
tions. The ultimate solution is strong 
and steady growth in every Caribbean 

Our Caribbean Basin Initiative now 
getting underway gives your people new 
access to the world's largest and most 
dynamic government— market, I meant 
to say. Too much television. [Laughter.] 
It encourages job-creating business in- 
vestment for growth and prosperity and 
is being put into place at a time when a 
strong dollar and an expanding 
American economy can translate into 
greater demand for your products. The 
Caribbean Basin Initiative is part of our 
broader, overall economic strategy to 
improve economic vitality and raise liv- 
ing standards throughout the Caribbean. 

We can and must work together to 
improve the well-being of our people and 
to ensure our safety as well. I'd like to 
take this opportunity to congratulate 
many of you for your courage and 
leadership in turning back the com- 
munist power grab in Grenada last fall. 
We can be proud that thanks to the 
unity and determination of our democ- 
racies, we saved the peoples of that 
troubled island, we restored their 
freedom, we revived their hope in the 
future, and we prevented danger and 
turmoil from spreading beyond 
Grenada's shores. Let us always 
remember the crucial distinction be- 
tween the legitimate use of force for 
liberation versus totalitarian aggression 
for conquest. 

But, what was happening in 
Grenada was not an isolated incident. 
The Soviet bloc and Cuba have been 
committing enormous resources to 
undermining our liberty and in- 
dependence. Nowhere is this threat 
more pressing than in Nicaragua, a 
country which today marks the fifth 
year of Sandinista dictatorship. The San- 
dinista revolution, like Castro's revolu- 
tion, is a revolution betrayed. And now 
faced with mounting internal pressures 
and disallusionment abroad, the San- 
dinistas have announced an election for 
November of this year. We would 
wholeheartedly welcome a genuine 
democratic election in Nicaragua. But no 
person committed to democracy will be 
taken in by a Soviet-style sham election. 

The situation in Nicaragua is not 
promising; but if the Sandinistas would 
keep their original commitment, permit 
free elections, respect human rights, and 
establish an independent nation, conflict 
in the region would subside. 

In the meantime, we have a moral 
responsibility to support anyone who 
aspires to live in a true democracy, free 
from communist interference. If the 

ptember 1984 


democratic peoples do not stand 
together, we certainly will be unable to 
stand alone. 

Just a few years ago, totalitarianism 
was on the rise. But there's a new spirit 
among democratic peoples. Prime 
Minister Adams described it. when he 
said, "There is a community of interest 
among democratic countries which can 

transcend ethnicity and differences in 
economic development." This spirit is a 
powerful new force for freedom in the 
world today. 

What we do together, as a family of 
""fi^irien and women will determine 
what the future will be like for our 
children. If we're strong enough to live 
up to our shared values, the promise of 

News Conference of July 24 (Excerpts) 

Excerpts from President Reagan's 
news conference of July 2h. 198Jt.'^ 

Q. Mr. Mondale said in his acceptance 
speech that 100 days into his presiden- 
cy he would stop the secret war 
against Nicaragua. I assume that 
you're going to continue your policy 
down there in that respect, and he 
also implied, of course, once again, 
that you, as President, will be trigger 
happy and will get us into war. How 
will you answer both of those? 

A. I'm not trigger happy, and hav- 
ing known four wars in my lifetime, I'm 
going to do everything I can. I think the 
greatest requirement is to strive for 
peace, and I'm going to do that. 

And, again, I think there was some 
demagoguery in this. But, it's my 
understanding that all of you have been 
given a report— has a kind of a green 
cover — on the Nicaraguan situation, and 
it has also been delivered to every 
member of the Congress. 

And believe me, I wouldn't "round 
file" those. I'd look at them. Because the 
information is in there, it reveals that 
everything we've said about the San- 
dinista government is a proven fact. 
They are trying to destroy El Salvador 
by providing the rebels there with the 
wherewithal to do it. They are a 
totiilitarian government, but you'll also 
find in there a statement by Ogarkov of 
the Soviet military. This was prior to 
our rescue mission in Grenada. 

But he openly stated that after all 
the years of only having a base in the 
Western hemisphere in Cuba, that now 
they had bases here in Nicaragua and in 

Grenada. Well, they don't have one in 
Grenada anymore. And I think that it is 
the responsibility of this government to 
assist the people of Nicaragua in seeing 
that they don't have one in Nicaragua. 

Q. Vice President Bush has 
asserted that Mondale and the 
Democrats don't understand the com- 
munist threat in Central America. Do 
you agree? 

A. That they don't understand the 
communist threat? Well, either that, or 
they're ignoring it. 

Q. Do you think they're ignoring 

A. They seem to be opposing 
everything that we've tried to do, in- 
cluding the aid to El Salvador. As a 
matter of fact, I've been very worried 
that their niggardly treatment of El 
Salvador is such that we might see — it's 
comparable to letting El Salvador slowly 
bleed to death. And then they would be 
able to point a finger and say, "Well, 
see, your program didn't work." 

Q. The Polish Government is 
releasing hundreds of political 
prisoners in a move that appears to 
meet one of your conditions for nor- 
malizing relations. You have removed 
some of the sanctions you imposed a 
couple of years ago. Will you remove 
others, and if so, when do you think 
youll be acting? 

A. We're studying what they've 
done in their legislation on amnesty very 
carefully right now. Our purpose from 
the beginning has been, with regard to 
the sanctions, that we know that in 
some instances those sanctions are 
penalizing not only the Government of 
Poland with which we're not in very 

freedom and opportunity for the new 
world will at long last be realized. 

By working together, the free peo) 
of this hemisphere can make certain tt 
the next century will indeed be our cei 
tury, a democratic century. 

'Text from White House press release; 
opening and closing paragrapns are omitte 
here. ■ 

much sympathy, but the people 
themselves. We don't want to impose 
hardships on the people. 

And if their legislation on amnest; 
and things of that kind have met the 
conditions that we laid down — yes, wi 
will meet with regard to lifting the sa 



Q. Could the United States con- 
tinue its defense commitments to N 
Zealand if it's denied court access f 
nuclear ships? And, if this happens, 
would it effect American trade wit] 
New Zealand? 

A. I don't think that would effect 
trade. But I do know, and I would 
rather not get in too deeply to 
anything — because that is something 
that will be worked out and negotiate 
with the new Government of New 
Zealand. And I have every reason to 
optimistic that there won't be any de 
to our ships. 



Q. If the port access is denied, 
the Labor Party says it will do, wo 
the United States conclude a separ 
peace treaty with Australia. 

A. I don't want to get into thing 
anything that might sound as if I'm 
pressuring or threatening or anythir 
the kind. So, let me just say that we 
going to do our best to persuade the 
that it is in their best interests as wi 
as ours for us to continue with our 
alliance, with ANZUS, those countri 
as we have been. 





'Text from White House pres.s releas 


Department of State Bui III 



^sia-Pacific and the Future 

Secretary Skidtz's address before the 
mcil 071 Foreign Relations in 
lolulu on July 18, 1984.^ 

'* understand the future, you must 
lerstand the Pacific. I came to this 
elusion in the course of many trips to 
a and the Pacific as a private citizen, 
five trips to the region as Secretary 
5tate have strengthened my convic- 
1. In economic development, in the 
wth of free institutions, and in grow- 
global influence, the Pacific is in- 
' asingly where the action is. As impor- 
t as it was a few years ago, it is 
re important today. And it will be 
n more so tomorrow. 
Americans welcome this. We see in 
growth of this region a vitality that 
mises a better future for all. When 
isident Reagan addressed the 
anese Diet last November he said: 

For my part. I welcome this new Pacific 
. Let it roll peacefully on, carrying a two- 
flow of people and ideas that can break 
n barriers of suspicion and mistrust and 
d up bonds of cooperation and shared 

Hawaii, our gateway to the region, 
jrs vivid and dynamic evidence of 
lerica's role as a great Pacific nation. 
-e the historical westward movement 
)ur population has been enriched by 

growing diversity of talented im- 
jants, including so many of 

anese, Chinese, Filipino, Korean, 
:ific island, and other Asian origins, 
security, as symbolized by the silent 

imony of the Pearl Harbor memorial, 
aextricably bound to these islands 

to events throughout this portion of 


And Hawaii, like our nation as a 
ole, enjoys a rich flow of two-way in- 
tment and trade with Asia and the 
;Lfic. While our trade with the rest of 

world last year grew by only one- 
f percent, trade with this region grew 
, reaching $135 billion. That means 
,t over one-third of our total world 
de is done with Asia and the 
3ific — and it exceeds by nearly a 
irter our overseas trade with any 
ler area. 

)nly a few years ago people said that 
lerica's interest and America's 
!sence were receding in Asia; they 
d we were pulling back. Well, in the 
t few years we have turned that 
)und, and all kinds of people recognize 

that fact. As the authoritative Chinese 
journal, International Studies Research, 
put it, "1983 was a year symbolizing the 
return of the United States to Asia." 
As we look around the region, we 
see good news in many places, good 
news for American interests and good 
news for the people of the Asia-Pacific 
region. A fresh and confident American 
foreign policy approach is in tune with 
the dynamism of the region and has 
helped foster a string of success stories. 
Let me run through a partial list. 


The U.S. -Japan relationship has 
emerged as one of the most important in 
the world. Today our excellent relations 
with Japan are particularly reinforced 
by the warm personal relationship be- 
tween President Reagan and Prime 
Minister Nakasone, who have met 
together four times in just the last year 
and a half. It is a far cry today from 
1960, when the first American Presiden- 
tial visit to Japan was canceled because 
of anti-American rioting. 

During the President's visit to Tokyo 
last fall, and in intensive efforts since 
then, we have worked cooperatively with 

Japan's new and more active 
diplomacy has brought a stronger com- 
mon interest in arms control. At the 
Williamsburg summit hosted by Presi- 
dent Reagan, Japan participated for the 
first time in a joint statement on arms 
control and security— and did so again at 
the London summit last June. 

Although there is more that Japan 
needs to do, America has benefited from 
Japan's increased defense capabilities 
and deepened cooperation with us. 
Japanese support for U.S. bases in 
Japan, for example, now exceeds 
$1 billion— or more than $22,000 for 
every U.S. serviceman stationed there. 


Relations with China are more solid and 
stable than ever. We have freed 
ourselves of exaggerated fears and 
unreal expectations, and we are focusing 
on the significant interests our countries 
have in common. 

• Last year, President Reagan 
decided on a major liberalization of high 
technology trade with China. This move 
offers significant trade prospects for 
American exporters and acknowledges 
our interest in participating in China's 
economic modernization. 

• We have smoothed the way for 
economic interaction between our two 
very different systems by negotiating 

We have expanded our cooperation with Japan 
as it has become one of the principal donors of 
economic assistance to the Third World. . . . 

the Japanese to achieve more equitable 
access for U.S. products to Japan's 
markets, with solid results in the areas 
of computers, telecommunications equip- 
ment, semiconductors, agricultural prod- 
ucts, and many others, as well as access 
to Japan's important financial markets. 
Much remains to be done, but there is a 
record of solid accomplishment. 

We have expanded our cooperation 
with Japan as it has become one of the 
principal donors of economic assistance 
to the Third World, not limited to the 
Asia-Pacific region but including such 
key countries as Egypt, Turkey, and 
Pakistan. And Japan is now taking a 
new and helpful role in the Caribbean. 

agreements on important issues like tax- 
ation of foreign businesses, textiles, civil 
aviation, and industrial and technological 

• China's Minister of Defense and 
ours have had an important exchange of 
visits. Careful discussions have begun on 
ways in which American technology and 
equipment might better enable China to 
counter Soviet military intimidation. 
This is an important development, but it 
is also an area where we give careful 
consideration to the concerns of our 
allies and other friends in the region. 
During those frigid years when we had 
no contact with China, we were much 
criticized. Today we are able to play a 
constructive role in China's moderniza- 
tion and changing relationship with 


• And, for the first time since nor- 
malization, an American President iias 
visited China. President Reagan's trip 
made an important contribution, not 
only because of the warmth of the recep- 
tion and the substance of the discussions 
but also by the candor and directness 
with which the President addressed our 
concerns as well as our hopes. 

Throughout our recent development 
of the U.S. -China relationship. President 
Reagan has insisted that we not harm 
our old friends in the course of mai<ing 
new ones. Our relations with the people 
of Taiwan, although unofficial, are warm 
and steadily expanding. Last year our 
two-way trade with Taiwan passed the 
$1.') billion level. 


Korean confidence in our commitment to 
their defense was shaken by President 
Carter's planned withdrawal of U.S. 
troops. The effects throughout Asia 
were profound. Today, their confi- 
dence has been substantially restored, 
bolstered most recently by the 
President's visit. Our policies in support 
of South Korean statesmanship helped 
the region to survive the shock of the 
Rangoon bombing without escalation to 
far wider violence. In the past, such an 
event might have led to war. Today, 
however, we have helped build a safety 

To emphasize the importance we at- 
tach to Korea, President Reagan within 
weeks of his inauguration met with 
President Chun Doo-hwan. Since the 
release of a prominent opposition figure 
in early 1981, we have seen important 
relaxations of authoritarian controls in 
South Korea, including the release of 
many more political prisoners, the 
reduction of restrictions on political ac- 
tivity, and the removal of police control 
from campuses. Much remains to be 
done, but even gradual steps toward 
liberalization are not easy for a country 
in a virtual state of war, one whose sur- 
vival depends on maintaining political 
stability. We regard as particularly 
significant President Chun's declared in- 
tention to turn over power peacefully 
when his term ends in 1988, for only 
where peaceful change is routine can 
genuine political stability prevail. 

Southeast Asia 

I have just returned from the annual 
meeting of ASEAN — the Association of 
South East Asian Nations— whose work 
is of the greatest importance to our 
overall Pacific policy. Each of the na- 
tions of this remarkable regional 
group — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip- 
pines, Singapore, Thailand, and, most 
recently, Brunei — has a unique impor- 
tance. They are diverse in almost every 
respect, except in their common commit- 

Our exports to Korea for just a single year now ex- 
ceed the entire total of economic aid we gave Korea 
from 1946 until the program ended in 1981. 

net of supportive ties and mutual con- 
fidence that is a major factor for keep- 
ing the peace. 

Bolstered by confidence in its securi- 
ty, the Korean economy has been boom- 
ing, growing 9.3% last year with infla- 
tion of only 0.2%. Our exports to Korea 
for just a single year now exceed the en- 
tire total of economic aid we gave Korea 
from 1946 until the program ended in 
1981. Korea's annual purchases of 
military equipment from the United 
States are more than half again as large 
as the military sales credits we provide 
each year. Korea, in short, is bearing 
the lion's share of its own defense and is 
paying its own way. 

ment to the peace and economic develop- 
ment of the region. Collectively, they 
represent almost 300 million people with 
a combined gross national product of 
over $200 billion, a figure that has been 
growing by more than 7% annually dur- 
ing the whole decade of the 1970s. 

Having just met the foreign 
ministers of these six nations, I can con- 
firm that this is one important part of 
the world where the United States is 
respected and where our attention to 
their problems is appreciated. These 
countries are understandably nervous 
that their interests may be affected by 
our dealings with their giant neighbors 
to the north — China and Japan. But a 
look at our record cannot but be 
reassuring; our cooperative involvement 

with ASEAN and similar nations of th 
Pacific demonstrates our shared conce 
about their problems and our moral co 
mitment to their integrity. Certainly v. 
have a big stake in their continued sue 
cess. Our trade reached $23 billion las 
year, making ASEAN America's fifth 
largest trading partner. 

We also are gratified by ASEAN's 
success so far in forcing the world to 
dress the problem of Vietnam's occup, 
tion of Kampuchea. ASEAN has 
developed and won support for a cred 
ble political strategy for a peaceful se 
tlement. They have steadily built up t 
strength of the resistance, though we 
share their concern that the noncom- 
munist resistance has not grown as iif 
as the Khmer Rouge, an organization 
that we all abhor. 

We have benefited from the role i 
the ASEAN countries in providing fit 
asylum for 1.37 million refugees from 
Indochina since 1975, and we are pro 
of our own role in providing permane 
resettlement for 6.50, OCX)— almost hal 
the entire total. It is one of the great 
humamt£!,rian achievements of our tin 
and one by which our own society ha; 
been enriched as well. 

This is a success story, but it is a '■> 
tragedy too. And beyond that, it is a •' 
lesson to be learned. Let us not forg( 
that many of our friends in Southeas 
Asia supported our effort in the Viet t" 
nam war. They told us then— as Prir 
Minister Lee Kwan Yew did, for ex- 
ample—that if we faltered in our pui 
pose, the peoples of Indochina would 
suffer and their neighbors would feel 
threat come closer. They told us thet 
would be oppression and suffering. 1 
told us there would be boat people. / 
they were right. 

Finally, the ASEAN countries h; 
played a substantial part in furtherir 
subject of the highest national priori 
full accounting of our prisoners of w 
(POWs) and missing in action (MIA) 
Indochina. Some progress has been 
made. The recent return of the rem; 
of eight Americans from Vietnam is 
significant and welcome event, but t 
is much more to be done. Just last 
February, we received a promise frc 
Vietnamese authorities of accelerate 
cooperation in accounting for missinij 
Americans, along with agreement tc 
resume the technical meetings which 
provide valuable opportunities for ex 
changing POW/MIA information. W 
are pleased that the Vietnamese hav. 
recently agreed to have a technical 
meeting in Hanoi in mid-August, am 
look forward to accelerated progress 
this most important issue. 



itlif South Pacific, the focus of our 
1 u\ is our ANZUS [Australia, New 
;ilaiul, United States security treaty] 
es, Australia and New Zealand. These 
' countries that share with us proud 
ditions of democratic freedom and a 
lingness to bear the cost of preserv- 

those values. It is significant that 
■se two allies have fought by our side 
ill four major wars of this century. If 

have the courage and the vision to 
!p this and our other alliances strong, 

will have done much to ensure the 
ice we now enjoy. 

We recognize that managing a 
nocratic alliance requires mutual 
insel as well as mutual obligations. It 
or this reason that we have taken 
[ZUS country views seriously into ac- 
mt in formulating our arms control 
ivisions. Arms control, in fact, was 
important agenda item in our 
etings which concluded on Tuesday in 


We have been rewarded with a cor- 
ponding sense of cooperation and 
ponsibility. For example, when the 
3or Party took office in Australia a 
ir and a half ago, they began a 
rching and serious debate on the 
<s and benefits of ANZUS. The result 

heir thorough review was a firm 
ffirmation of the value of the alliance 
i a renewed commitment to it. 

With the recent election in New 
iland, we are ready and willing, as 

ays, to work with the new govern- 
nt and review with our New Zealand 
es the profound basis and mutual 
lefits of our alliance. Indeed, my re- 
it trip enabled me to meet with the 
iv Prime Minister, Mr. Lange, even 
I 'ore he took office. We are confident 
;.it an openminded and thorough look 
our alliance will result in a reaffirma- 
n of the importance of an effective 
JZUS for the peace of the region and 
■ world. ANZUS is, after all, not 
iply an isolated alliance for the 
'ense of one portion of the globe, but 
I rt of a broader network of relations 
it together help to hold in check a 
ibal threat. In today's world, a threat 
any one region can become a threat 
us all. 

le Pacific Islands 

le United States is working, along 
th our ANZUS allies, to support 
iedom and development for the many 
oples of the South Pacific. Some will 
ek fulfillment in independence and 

others in association with larger states. 
Last year, the United States Senate 
ratified four treaties resolving old claims 
disputes between the United States and 
four small island states. This year, the 
President has submitted the Compacts 
of Free Association with the Federated 
States of Micronesia and the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands for congressional 
approval. We are working with the 
island states on agreements to regulate 
tuna fishing and to control the dumping 
of nuclear waste in their areas. 

On a personal note, I stopped at 
American Samoa on my way here. I was 
there briefly, in Pago-Pago, during 
World War II. I have never forgotten 

peace, dialogue replaces diatribe, and 
the good will of their peoples will carry 
the day. 

Freedom alone can work miracles. 
But in a region filled with historic 
animosities, threatened by heavily armed 
totalitarian powers, slowed by the need 
to gather skills and resources, and — in 
many cases — only gradually adopting 
democratic processes, sound policy is a 
vital ingredient. 

The U.S. Role in the Pacific 

The Pacific region has benefited from 
the mature leadership of many of the 
countries I have mentioned. But it has 

. . . the ASEAN countries have played a 
substantial part in furthering ... a full accounting 
of our prisoners of war and missing in action in In- 

those people, their pride in their tradi- 
tions and their aspirations for the 
future. It was great to go back. They 
are proud today to be Americans, and 
we are proud that they are one of us. 

I have given you a catalogue of suc- 
cesses. There are, of course, plenty of 
problems. The Rangoon tragedy reminds 
us of the depth of North Korean 
viciousness and the ease with which that 
peninsula could again become an arena 
of violence. In the Philippines, despite 
progress made in recent elections 
toward restoring democratic processes, 
major economic and political problems 
continue. Throughout the region, the 
threat of growing protectionism 
threatens all our trade, and the tragedy 
in Indochina goes on. 

Other problems lie just below the 
surface. In many places, economic prog- 
ress is fragile. Tensions among ethnic 
groups within countries and territorial 
disputes between countries are a con- 
stant worry. The region still has one of 
the highest concentrations of military 
forces anywhere in the world. Thus, 
even the most heartening success stories 
cannot be taken for granted. 

But the forces for success are pro- 
found, and I am optimistic that success 
will keep the upper hand. When room is 
left for individual initiative, peoples and 
nations will prosper. When democratic 
progress can be made peacefully, stabili- 
ty will follow. When nations turn to 

also benefited from the sound diplo- 
matic, economic, and defense policies of 
our own country. I am optimistic 
because I am confident that a strong 
U.S. role will continue. Most of the suc- 
cess we have seen is the result of the 
growing strength of the countries of the 
region themselves. But crucial as this 
may be, America's role has been 
singularly important and must be car- 
ried forward. 

Diplomatically, we are often the 
country with which others can work 
best Our recovery is in many ways the 
engine of economic growth for the entire 
region. And our military strength pro- 
vides the indispensable deterrent essen- 
tial to maintaining stability and con- 
fidence among our friends. America's in- 
terests in the region and the interests of 
our friends require a strong and perma- 
nent U.S. presence in every area of the 

The three keys to sound U.S. policy 
in the region, therefore, are a free and 
open world economy, a solid deterrent 
posture, and an effective diplomacy. We 
are working hard to obtain all three. To 
put it another way, the watchwords of 
our policy, since President Reagan took 
office, have been: realism, strength, and 
negotiation. Let me briefly review these 
with you. 


Realism. Realism requires us to 
acknowledge that economic growth lies 
at the heart of progress around the 
Pacific. It requires as well a recognition 
that the single greatest contribution to 
the current prosperity of the Pacific 
region is the recovery of our own 
economy; indeed, the recovery of our 
economy has been the engine of our 
economic recovery spreading ever more 
widely throughout the world. 

It is essential that we point out this 
reality to others. As I told our ASEAN 
partners, strong growth in the U.S. 
economy has been the major factor in 
their own growth. Increased exports to 
the United States from ASEAN ac- 
counted for over 60% of those nations' 
total export increase in 1983. The 
achievement of sustained noninfiationary 
growth in the United States and 
maintenance of our open markets are of 
prime importance to the developing 

Similarly, we must point out the 
truth about "protectionism." We in the 
United States do face protectionist 
pressure, and sometimes we are forced 
to limit the growth of imports of some 
products. But our economy is a genuine- 
ly open one. We are, for example, the 
world's biggest market for the manufac- 
tured exports of developing countries, 
taking over 50% of such exports to all 
industrial countries. 

It is time for all to realize that Presi- 
dent Reagan has turned the American 
economy toward productivity and expan- 

mous concentrations of military power 
in the hands of regimes that have shown 
little hesitation to use force, either 
directly or as a means of intimidation, 
when provided with an opening. Viet- 
nam has 1 million men under arms, a 
staggering number for a country of that 
size. North Korea is one of the most 
heavily militarized nations in the world, 
and it has shown no scruples about put- 
ting force to use. Beyond the strategic 
missiles on land and sea that threaten 
the United States itself, the Soviet 
Union has dramatically increased its 
forces in the Pacific region to include 
over 50 divisions, 3,000 modern combat 
aircraft, its largest fleet, and 135 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles, 
poised against the nations of the Pacific 
area, including ourselves. It has acquired 
forward facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and 
has now stationed bombers in Vietnam 
as well. 

Fortunately, nations of the region 
are facing these dangers realistically and 
building up their own strength. As a 
result, we have an increasingly strong 
ally in Korea that now bears the lion's 
share of the cost of its own defense. We 
are hopeful that Japan will steadily 
move to achieve its own defense goals, 
which would contribute to greater 
stability in Northeast Asia and permit 
greater U.S. flexibility throughout the 
region. And China, with which we now 
have a widening and maturing relation- 
ship, plays its own special role in lending 
stability to the region. 

ANZUS is . . . part of a broader network of rela- 
tions that together help to hold in check a global 

sion once again. We are the benefi- 
ciaries, and the world's nations are the 
beneficiaries. This is a policy I assure 
you we will continue. 

The U.S. economy has performed 
magnificently. It is a major source of 
our own and our allies' strength. 
Economic growth, in turn, is a key to 
both political and military strength. 

Strength. No course of economic 
development and no effort at diplomacy 
can succeed in an environment of fear 
borne by a sense of weakness. The 
Asian and Pacific region is one of enor- 

Only a few years ago, our own posi- 
tion of strength in the Pacific region 
was in question. No more. President 
Reagan has made it clear where we 
stand. And our forces in the Pacific have 
new muscle. 

Our presence in Korea is critical to 
preventing another war in that penin- 
sula. In the vast reaches of the North, 
Western, and South Pacific our Navy is 
an essential element of stability. Two of 
our most important military facilities— 
Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base- 
are in the Philippines. Guam has large 

and vital air and naval bases. On 
Okinawa, our Marines are forward- 
positioned and we have there, as well, 
an air division equipped with the most 
sophisticated F-15s and the AW ACS 
[airborne warning and control system] 
Our alliance with Australia and New 
Zealand has been a steady force for 
peace throughout its 33 years. 

Make no mistake; the United Stat 
is committed permanently to the Pacij 
and President Reagan's program to 
restore America's defense capabilities 
giving us the wherewithal to carry oui 
the commitments and perform the tas 
essential to peace. We shall not shirk 
from that role as others take their pla 
beside us. We seek the increased 
strength of our allies not as a substitu 
but as a complement to our own effor 

Negotiation. But a sound econom 
and a strong military commitment are 
not enough. Nor can they provide stal 
ty and confidence by themselves. The; 
must be accompanied by an active an( 
creative diplomacy and a willingness t 

It is through diplomacy that we h 
forged security ties with our democra 
ANZUS partners, Australia and New 
Zealand. It is diplomacy that last wee 
brought together in Jakarta the 
disparate group of ASEAN nations ir 
their remarkable annual session of gi' 
and-take and enhanced economic 
cooperation. That cooperation has goi 
beyond the economic realm to devise 
strategy to deal with Vietnam's occuf 
tion of Kampuchea and support for tl 
noncommunist resistance. And it is 
through diplomacy that we build for i 

On this trip, which I conclude toe |^ 
we began small but potentially far- 
reaching steps. In Jakarta, I signed ; 
memorandum of understanding on in 
vestment issues with Indonesia. This 
only a first such agreement in this fii 
but it means we may contemplate an 
eventual investment treaty and even 
the far future, build toward a genern 
agreement on investment to parallel 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 

In a similar vein, during this trij 
general subject of the Pacific Basin \ i 
addressed formally by a group of 
governments for the first time. Initi; 
discussions will have a specific focus i 
human resources development. This 
only a start, but its implications for ■ 
years ahead could be great. 


Finally, it is diplomacy that enables 
|o deal with the world as it is. Our 
lomy flourishes best in conjunction 
. others who understand the benefits 
he free market and put it into prac- 
. Our military's mission is to defend 
rom those who do not wish us well, 
it is through diplomacy and negotia- 
that we are able to foster our in- 
■sts with adversaries as well as 
nds. Here in the Pacific we value our 
e association with our fellow 
locracies and with others who share 
goals. We also engage and work 
3tructively— and often to mutual ad- 
tage— with those whose view of the 
' to organize political and economic 
is quite different from ours. Thus, it 
irough this third pillar of our policy 
; we have the best hope of forestall- 
eonflict and solving problems before 
/ threaten to overwhelm us. 


ive portrayed a scene of success 
ly. It is undeniable. The Pacific and 
future are inseparable. I believe that 
-e is no more remarkable story of 
^ress and no greater source of op- 
Tsm than here in this region. But I 
e also called attention to the continu- 
challenge ahead and to the ways we 
moving to meet it. There are prob- 
s. But we have a lot going for 
-not created by luck or chance but 
)ur own endeavor and our own vi- 
,. My message today is simply this: 
)ur performance, by our strength, by 

diplomacy, let us encourage this 
■nendous momentum toward peace 

development in the Pacific. 

Secretary Visits Asia; 

Attends ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings 

Secretary Shultz visited Hong Kong 
{July 7-8. 1981,}. Malaysia (July 9-10), 
Singapore (July 10-11). Indonesia (July 
ll-l!t) to participate in the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
dialogue. Australia (July U-15). and 
New Zealand (July 15-17) to attend the 
33d meeting of the ANZUS Council 
[Australia, New Zealand, JJyiited States 
security treaty]. 

Following are his remarks and news 
conferences made on various occasions 
during the trip, the text of the ANZUS 
communique, and a joint news con- 
ference held by Secret ar-y Shultz and 
Foreign Ministers William Hayden of 
Australia and Warren Cooper of New 

'Press release 170 of July 19, 1984. 

JULY 10, 19841 

I would like to express my appreciation 
to the Prime Minister of Malaysia and 
his colleagues, the Deputy Prime 
Minister, the Acting Foreign Secretary, 
and all the people who have been so^ 
gracious to us and engaged with us in 
discussions of matters of concern to both 
countries and also have made our stay a 
very interesting and pleasant one. 

This is not my first time to 
Malaysia, so it is interesting especially 
for me to see the progress which is right 
in front of your eyes. My first visit was 
about 10 years ago when I was 
Secretary of the Treasury, and I have 
been here since as a private citizen. I 
have had a chance to watch the growth 
of Kuala Lumpur, not only in the city 
itself but the wonderful highway from 
the airport here. It is a pleasure to see 
this tangible evidence of economic 
development. Again, I am very grateful 
for the great hospitality that we have 

Q. Is the United States willing to 
give more aid of any kind to the non- 
communist elements of the Kampuchea 

A. The question of Kampuchea has 
come up in our discussions here, and I 
am sure it will be a centerpiece in the 
ASEAN discussions. The United States 
has basically taken the view that we will 
support the efforts that the ASEAN 
countries are making, and we support 
them diplomatically, and we support 
them in other ways, some in terms of 

direct support to individual countries, 
especially Thailand as a front-line state. 
We have had massive support for the ef- 
forts over the flood of refugees fleeing 
the Vietnamese aggression, and in other 
ways we have been and will continue to 
be supportive, and I don't want to com- 
ment on incremental moves one way or 

Q. Are there any new views you 
could share with us on the proposed 
U.S. talks with the Soviets in Vienna? 

A. There are diplomatic contacts 
practically daily on the subject. I've 
been, of course, following it very closely, 
but the situation remains about where it 
has been for the last few days, namely 
the Soviet Union seems to be having 
great difficulty taking "yes" for an 

Q. The issue of U.S.-China rela- 
tions has been brought up with Malay- 
sian leaders and will be brought up 
again in Jakarta. In yesterday's brief- 
ing by Malaysian officials, there seems 
to be an indication that Malaysia has 
expressed concern, not just over 
military collaboration but also 
technological collaboration which 
could lead to a defense or military 
capability and a Chinese threat to 
Southeast Asia. Has the United States 
given an assurance to Malaysia, and 
later to ASEAN, that it will continue 
to brief them on any major develop- 
ment in U.S.-China relations, and is 
this consultative procedure now going 
to be a part of U.S.-ASEAN relations? 
A. The meeting that you referred to 
must be one I wasn't in, because perhaps 
somebody else talked about those things, 
but I know that the question of China, 
and its relationship to the ASEAN ef- 
forts in Kampuchea and its posture m 
Asia generally, is of great interest, ob- 
viously, to Malaysia and others in the 
region. The evolution of U.S. relations 
with China is also of central interest. 
We do, as a matter of course, keep our 
friends advised of what we are doing, 
and we will certainly continue to do 
that. It's our view, and I believe widely 
shared in this part of the world, that the 
emergence of a good and stable relation- 
ship between the United States and 
China, on the whole, advances the idea 
of stability in this part of the world, and 
it is a net plus. The relationship of the 


military sort that you mentioned in your 
question is, of course, in its early stages 
and focused on defensive matters, and I 
don't think is, in any sense, a threat to 
other parts of Asia. Insofar as Southeast 
Asia is concerned, of course, the center 
of gravity of the U.S. approach is with 
ASEAN and the countries, Malaysia ob- 
viously included, that make up the 
ASEAN countries. We have worked 
very closely with them and will continue 
to do so. 

Q. The Prime Minister has ex- 
pressed regrets that trade relations 
between United States and Malaysia 
have not progressed satisfactorily. 
What's your view on this? 

A. i don't know what the right 
definition of satisfactory is. If you just 
take the exports of Malaysia to the 
United States, if you compare 1983 with 
1982, they rose 13%. If you take the 
most recent figures, which are the first 
quarter of 1984, and to deal with 
seasonal factors you should compare it 
with the first quarter of 1983, it's up by 
about 50% now. The percentage in- 
creases are very large and pretty much 
across the board as to products, in- 
cluding the often-cited example of tex- 
tiles, which 1 think the increase is 
something on the order of 69%, very 
large, but that is on a small base. So 
there had been large increases. 

To my mind, what these increases il- 
lustrate is the impact of the expansion 
to the U.S. economy on the economies of 
countries throughout the world, and, in 
citing these figures, 1 would say 
Malaysia is not an exception, not that 
numbers like 50% can be typical of 
anything, that's such a gigantic increase. 
But 1 do think that, in a sense, the hero 
of world economic recovery is the 
recovery of the U.S. economy, and it has 
been a very good thing for everybody, 
including the people of this region. 

Q. Several U.S. officials have 
talked about increasing humanitarian 
aid to noncommunist factions in Kam- 
puchea. Can you give us an idea of 
what kind of annual aid in terms of 
dollars you have been giving and what 
kind of proposals you have offered? 

A. I suppose the most important 
way in which aid is given— of the sort 
you have in mind— is very human and 
personal, and that is the longstanding 
and heavy involvement of the United 
States in coping with the large flow of 
refugees from Vietnamese aggression. I 
think the total number of refugees over 
the last 7 years— or what is the time 

period of these numbers about since 
1975? So say almost 10 years, is like 
1,350,000, something on that order, and 
roughly half of those have wound up in 
the United States— some 650,000. 

We have reached out to this area 
and I suppose in the tradition of the 
United States, of being a country made 
up, in a sense, of refugees. The flow 
from this part of the world has been 
taken in, and the most humanitarian 
thing you can do is to help people when 
they are really in need, and we will con- 
tinue to do that. 

Insofar as more direct assistance of 
one kind or another right here, I don't 
have the numbers right on the top of my 
head, but if you add up the development 
assistance of the ASEAN countries, the 
security assistance, and the more 
humanitarian — directly humanitarian — 
aid, it comes to a very large annual 
number, and we have been having some 
discussions out here as to what that 
number is. It depends a little bit on just 
the things that you include in it, but it's 
on the order of half a billion dollars or 
perhaps larger. 

Q. There was a report in the local 
paper to the effect that there was a 
rapid increase in the Soviet buildup in 
Cam Ranh Bay. I wonder if you can 
comment on the implications of this. 

A. There is a continuing Soviet 
buildup of naval forces — in other words, 
a capacity to project power in this part 
of the world. And I think it's a matter 
that should be of concern to everyone; it 
is of concern to us. And it only em- 
phasizes the importance of strong 
friendships here, and not only in the 
case of the ASEAN countries but 
Australia and New Zealand as well. So 
it's part of the general Soviet develop- 
ment of their military capability, and I 
think that shows the importance of hav- 
ing a strong deterrent capability, not 
only of the United States but in coopera- 
tion with our allies. 

Q. I understand that the govern- 
ment has reaffirmed its desire to pur- 
chase F-16-As, the relatively ad- 
vanced aircraft. What is the U.S. feel- 
ing about this? 

A. I don't believe the Thai have 
finally made up their minds. They have 
been given, as have other countries in 
this region, a thorough briefing on the 
various so-called FX aircraft so that 
they can see the characteristics of them, 
the costs of them, the maintenance prob- 
lems that they all pose, and so forth. 
And they will have to look at all of these 
factors and decide what is in their best 

interest in a matter of discussion with 
us. But as a general proposition, we 
want to support the efforts of the coui 
tries in this region to look to their 
security. And as to decisions about paj 
ticular pieces of military equipment, 
they are made case by case, but as a 
general proposition, we look with favc 
on sales to the ASEAN countries 

Q. We understand that the Mala 
sian position is that an economicalh 
strong China will sooner or later les 
to a militarily strong China which b 
the potential of being a hegemonist 
power in Southeast Asia. That is th 
concern. What is your response to t 
line of thinking about China if it 
becomes economically, and later on 
militarily, strong as well? 

A. I think you have to start with 
the proposition that China is there, it 
an important country, it has been for 
long time, it will continue to be, and, 
don't have any doubt in my mind at a 
that as an economic proposition Chin 
will develop. And it seems to be ex- 
pected that's going to take place. The 
question is whether that developmeni 
from the standpoint of stability in thi 
region, is best done with other count 
cooperating and being a part of it. A 
we believe that it is important for ou 
own interest, as a potential trading j: 
ner and in the interest of security m; 
ters and strategic considerations tha' 
are very clear, to have a good workii 
relationship with China. So we start 
build that up in a way that we think 
lend stability to this part of the worl 

Q. In recent years the Asian 
region, particularly ASEAN countir 
has become quite an attractive are;- 
investment for American businessi 
compared with other regions of th 
world. What, in your opinion, coul 
ASEAN governments do to hasten 
flow of American investment in thi 
region, particularly with regards t 
Malaysian participation here? 

A. Basically the ASEAN countr 
are doing very well in expanding tht 
economies and in expanding their tr 
particularly with the United States, 
in attracting investment. 

Of course, the basic conditions t 
attract investments are: number ont 
the prospect of realizing a good rate 
return on the investment, and numb 
two, being able to sustain it because 
confidence that the rules of the gam 
that prevailed when you made the ii 
vestment are going to stay the samt 
that you know the conditions that ai 
going to affect you. 1 think that 



thing that can be done that affects 
se propositions is all to the good. 
It seems to me that it's taken for 
nted these days, and is a proper 
g, that a country that is the host to 
!Stment expects to get something out 
;— not simply just the investment as 
1. But one of the reasons that 
lign investment is welcomed is that 
pie of the host country learn 
lething: they get trained, they 
3me better able to carry on 
Tiselves. There is a transfer in that 
se — the deeper sense of the transfer 
echnology and managerial and other 
led capabilities. 

But I think from the standpoint of 
r question what is there to do, it is 
ng as much of a sense of continuity 
)ossible and allowing investment to 
le into areas that are potentially 
fi table. 

There is one aspect of this that I like 
mphasize, particularly in the light of 
debt problems that we run into in 
ous parts of the world, not so much 
his part of the world as others. Part 
he debt problem results from an at- 
de toward foreign equity investment 
;, it seems to me, needs to be 
iged. It results from an attitude that 
i when you want to attract resources 
a another country to come to your 
itry and help in the development of 
ou should borrow the money rather 
1 attract it as equity. And countries 
that and did it to excess. When they 
into rough weather, as always hap- 
3 with world economy — it has its up 
it has its down — they found 
nselves debt-heavy, and the debt was 
' difficult to carry, whereas, if the 
oortion of the resources drawn in 
a outside were heavier in equity, 
1 the equity, so to speak, carries 
f. There is no obligation to pay in- 
st or to pay it back. It's there to par- 
I )ate, and, of course, it's there as risk 
I tal and hopes to profit well from 
i , posture. So, I think that, just as 
i panies have historically had to look 
I heir debt equity ratio, one of the 
ons that we should learn from our 
erience of the last few years is that 
itries, too, need to look at their debt 
ity ratio. And this to my mind is an 
itional reason why it's healthy to 
ig in equity foreign investment. It 
;s you greater protection in the sense 
ing periods that are inevitably going 
ome when everything isn't booming. 

Q. In your opinion, there should be 
some kind of continuity of foreign in- 
vestment. In your meeting with 
American businessmen this morning, 
did anyone bring up any fears, or are 
they generally satisfied? 

A. They are generally satisfied. No 
one is perfectly satisfied, so there are 
always things that they would like to see 

There are two things in particular 
that are being discussed with varying 
degrees of urgency, both following the 
Prime Minister's visit to Washington. 
One is an investment treaty, and the 
other is some discussions that are 
restarting on a tax treaty. Both of these 
two things would help in just the way 
that I cited. An investment treaty would 
tend to set out the rules of the game as 
understood between the two countries. 
And a tax treaty would set up a regime 
that basically avoids double taxation and 
makes clear, as between the two coun- 
tries, which country is going to tax what 
kind of earning and the individual enter- 
prise. Then those are the rules of the 
game. As we all know, the tax element 
in any investment is a very important 
one. So those are the two particular sug- 
gestions that are being discussed, and 
we hope that those discussions would 
progress well. 

Q. The Olympic Council of 
Malaysia and the Olympic Council of 
South Korea and a number of coun- 
tries have been receiving letters 
allegedly from the Ku Klux Klan 
threatening athletes who are going to 
the Los Angeles Olympics. Has the 
U.S. Government investigation shown 
whether it is from any particular 
country or source, and could you com- 
ment on this? 

A. I have just heard about these let- 
ters from the Ku Klux Klan— or alleged- 
ly from the Ku Klux Klan— and they are 
of such a nature that it is hard to believe 
they were actually sent by any such 
organization. And the sentiments they 
expressed are totally unacceptable. It 
almost makes you wonder if it isn't a 
disinformation campaign of some sort. 
And they will be looked into. 

But the main point is that athletes 
from all over the world are most 
welcome at the Olympics in Los 
Angeles. There are a record number of 
countries that are attending. There will 
be great care taken to see that the 
security of all is well provided for, and 
there is a tremendous effort being made 
along those lines, as well as in all other 
aspects of the conduct of the Olympics. 
Just before leaving on my trip, I met 

with the Olympic officials, both the U.S. 
and international Olympic officials, and 
we went over all these things. And I 
think that, on the whole, matters are in 
very satisfactory shape, and we look for- 
ward to a wonderful amateur Olympic 
games coming up. 

Q. Did you mean Soviet disinfor- 

A. No, I just — we will leave it at 

Q. There has been a lot of talk of a 
Pacific Basin concept, something like 
a Pacific version of the EEC [Euro- 
pean Economic Community]. Do you 
have any thoughts on it, if it's worth- 
while to have some sort of common 
market here? 

A. The idea of a Pacific Basin is 
sort of intuitively attractive. But I don't 
know of anyone who really believes that 
some organization like the European 
Community is the right sort of parallel, 
something that attempts to be opera- 
tional in nature. 

On the other hand, there are many 
who feel that an improved way of shar- 
ing information, of identifying common 
problems, of developing a consensus 
about how they might be dealt with, and 
of having that kind of touch between the 
countries of the region might be useful. 
We've been exploring that. Ambassador 
Fairbanks has been out around the 
Pacific talking with people, trying to 
gather a sense of their ideas, and it was 
interesting to us, and quite welcome to 
us, that the ASEAN countries decided 
to put this general idea on the agenda of 
the meetings that will be taking place in 
Jakarta, and I will be very interested to 
hear what their views are. But I don't 
think that any operating sort of formal 
organization, like the European Com- 
munity, is the odds at all. And what may 
emerge, if anything, is something that is 
much looser and more in the nature of 
an analytical, information-sharing, 
consensus-building, problem-identifying 
kind of organization. 

But the area itself is going like 
gangbusters. It's expanding. It's very 
dynamic, and maybe that's a good argu- 
ment for having the government stay 
away from anything like this. It's doing 
so well without the benefit of an 
organization. But at the same time, it 
may be that there are some things that 
could be added by a loose form of 
information-sharing. But this is an idea 
that will be discussed a lot not only in 
Jakarta but subsequently. From the U.S. 
standpoint, we are very interested in 
taking part in those discussions. 


JULY 10, 19842 

It is always a special privilege to come 
to Singapore because of what Singapore 
represents in terms of its vibrancy and 
growth, and, of course, also because it 
gives me a chance to visit with Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, such an ex- 
traordinary person. I have had that 
privilege again this afternoon. I would 
take this occasion to express my admira- 
tion for him, my pleasure at having a 
chance to talk with him again, and my 
gratitude for being received so 
hospitably here in Singapore. 

Q. Yesterday in Amman, French 
President Francois Mitterrand said 
that the Soviet Union should be in- 
volved in the peace process in the Mid- 
dle East. How do you feel about that, 
and if the current climate is such, is 
Soviet involvement either likely or 

A. The Soviet Union has been in- 
volved in the turmoil in the Middle East. 
What we seek is solving the problems 
there, and we have not seen any 
evidence of a constructive instinct on 
their part toward solving the Palestinian 
problems, toward solving the problems 
of Lebanon, or other aspects of the Mid- 
dle East picture. We are always looking 
for constructive contributions, but we 
just have not seen any from that 

Q. In view of the Soviet Union 
pouring arms to the Vietnamese, what 
is the rationale behind your govern- 
ment's decision not to give military 
aid to the Kampuchean coalition to 
fight Vietnamese repression? 

A. Our program here is to support 
the efforts of the ASEAN countries. We 
believe that they have come about this 
very intelligently and .strongly, not only 
in terms of their efforts to support the 
democratic forces in Kampuchea but 
also in their diplomatic efforts to 
demonstrate to the world and have the 
world support the condemnation of Viet- 
namese aggression and the development 
of a better life in Kampuchea. So we 
have felt that the best role for the 
United States is supporting this good ef- 
fort, and we will continue to do so. 

Q. The State Department has 
placed a ban on nonessential travel to 
Bulgaria. Is it because of allegations 
of Bulgaria's notorious involvement in 
drug trafficking or because of recent 
reports coming out on Bulgaria's in- 
volvement in the assassination attempt 
on the Pope? 

A. No, the advisory on travel to 
Bulgaria is simply a precaution to 
Americans that they are well advised to 
stay away at a time when there are 
some tensions. This has nothing to do 
with the Italian case. It has to do more 
with the drug case and some of the 
other repercussions of it. 

Q. Most ASEAN members are 
quite concerned about recent 
U.S. -China relations and U.S. expecta- 
tions of China's role in this region. 
How would you allay such fears? 

A. People in the past have been con- 
cerned that we are concerned about 
what we do, but I think that the basic 
point is that China is an important coun- 
try in Asia and in the world generally, 
obviously. The center of gravity of our 
efforts in this part of the world is on 
what ASEAN is doing. Nevertheless we 
think that a constructive relationship 
between the United States and China 
lends stability to the region, not the 
other way around, and to the extent 
that statements like that assuage 
people's fears, then so be it. 

Q. You said this morning and 
today that we are not supplying more 
aid to the Kampuchean coalition 
because we support ASEAN. Are you 
saying that we consult with ASEAN, 
and they do not want us to supply 
more aid to the Kampuchean coalition? 

A. We consult with the ASEAN 
countries. We discussed this whole ques- 
tion at length today. I did with Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew yesterday in 
Kuala Lumpur, and I expect to have fur- 
ther discussions of it in Jakarta. What I 
can say is that we believe we are playing 
a genuinely helpful and constructive part 
in this effort, and beyond that I am not 
prepared to go. 

Q. The ban on travel to Bulgaria, 
is that to all Americans or just to 
government officials? 

A. We are concentrating on govern- 
ment officials, but I think all Americans 
might take note. 

Q. There are certain reservations 
stated by the Indonesians concerning 
the U.S. agn"eement in principle to sell 
arms to China. How sympathetic to 
the fears expressed by Indonesia will 
the United States be on this issue? 

A. Of course, we will listen to com- 
ments that our friends have to make 
about things we are doing on all sorts of 
matters. People register their views 
with us about arms control, about our 
economy, about all manner of things, in- 
cluding subjects such as that. 

We listen to our friends, and at the 
same time we believe that it is impor- 
tant that the United States develop a 
stable and mature relationship with 
China. The new fledgling military rela- 
tionship is something that is just start- 
ing, and the concept of it has entirely bjii 
do with defensive arms. I think it is 
worth calling people's attention to the 
fact that there is a very large number \ 
Soviet forces ranged on China's north- 
ern border, and there are many SS-20 
missiles aimed in China's direction. So 
there are threats that China must be 
concerned about, naturally, that are di] 
ferent from things that Indonesia may 
be concerned about. 

Q. Do you have any indication ths !j 
the Soviet Union has been trying to 
dissuade other countries not in the 
Soviet area from coming to the Olym 
pics? You suggested that perhaps 
there was some disinformation in- 
volved in this, a letter that went out 
allegedly from the Ku Klux Klan. 
Have there been any other indication 
from other types of channels? 

A. I didn't connect that letter witlJK 
the Soviet Union in any explicit way, 1 f" 
me just note. We have seen some acti" 
ty designed to try to discourage peopl 
and, of course, we know very well the 
countries of Eastern Europe were dis; 
pointed and are disappointed not to bi 
going to the Olympics. The fact of the 
matter is that a record number of cou 
tries is coming to the Olympics. Let n 
assure everybody again that strong 
precautions are being taken to ensure 
that the situation is a secure one and 
that the games can go on in a strong 
and lively competitive spirit and in th 
spirit of amateur athletics. We all loo 
forward to the Olympics. 

Q. Apart from the talks with L« 
Kuan Yew on the Kampuchean queii 
tion. what are the other topics that 
came up for discussion? 

A. I don't want to go into detail 
a discussion with a head of state, but 
general topics that we talked about a 
certainly things that you would expe( 
The Kampuchean question was perha 
foremost. We discussed world econor 
issues, particularly as they bear on tl 
part of the world. The Prime Ministe 
sees very well the connection betwee 
what goes on here and what goes on 
elsewhere, so we spent a good bit of 
time on that. I called attention to oui 
concerns about the problem of intelle fci 
tual property. We had a little discuss if 
ai)out that, that was the general ran m 
of our discussion. »i 





Q. Again from this morning, you 
s;d that the Soviets are having trou- 
l» taking "yes" for an answer regard- 
ii; our going to the Vienna talks. Is 
th U.S. position that we've accepted 
^vthout preconditions and that the 
Uited States will still go to the 
V>nna talks even if we can't talk 
vmi the reduction of missiles? 
A. We have had a proposal to 
cuss questions involving militarization 
spare, and the Soviets put forth a 
ir< of topics that they thought were 
f,|aivalent of that concept. We have 
1 v\ e will participate in a discussion of 
t (i>pic, and we have some ideas 
-I Ives about how the topic should be 
iihmI, In our view, things that go 
"iiL;h space that are military, like 
li>iic missiles, ought to be on the 
■IK la, and we intend to discuss them. 
-, tliat is saying "yes" and at the same 
iif suggesting that the way they 
ine the topic is all right, but there are 
ne additional definitions that we think 
t important. 

Q. The Soviets have at various 
les also suggested that a precondi- 
n to those talks would be an agree- 
Int to a moratorium on all testing of 
Cisatellite systems. Would the 
i ited States be prepared to accept 
lit, or are we not accepting that as 
; of the conditions? 

A. I don't think it is clear that it is 
recondition, although sometimes 
tements are made that make it a 
>stion. This is just the kind of thing 
need to get straightened out, and are 
ing to get straightened out, in our 
vate diplomatic discussions with the 
net Union. 

We think a moratorium on testing 
•ht now, with them having testing and 
jloyed an antisatellite system and we 
; having done so, is assymetrical with 
,pect to its impact. A moratorium on 
Dloyment is the sort of thing that is 
•y difficult to verify, and verification 
;he heart of the problem here. If you 
I't verify a moratorium, it's hard to 
ow quite what it means. Or, to put it 
Dther way, what is important is to get 
o some discussion of this issue and 
? what can be made of the issue of 
rification. Until you do that, it doesn't 
3m wise to agree to something that 
u haven't really worked out. 

Q. The fact that you drew atten- 
>n to the question of American in- 
llectual property in your talks with 
e Prime Minister today reflects a 
rtain amount of concern on your 
,rt over the question of computer 
ftware piracy in Singapore. Were 
u interested in hearing the views of 

our Prime Minister on this issue, or 
were you actually advocating that the 
Singapore Government do something 
about this? 

A. We think that it is a problem, 
and something should be done about it. I 
am always interested in hearing the 
Prime Minister's views, and I did. And I 
would say that the problem exists in 
places other than Singapore. It is not 
just something here. It is a concern that 
we have with respect to many countries, 
and I think it is a very legitimate prob- 
lem that needs to be addressed. It is in 
the interests of a country like Singapore 
to address the problem because how that 
property is to be handled affects the 
flow of that property around the world, 
not only here but elsewhere. 

Q. At last year's ASEAN meeting, 
as I recall, you were extremely critical 
of the Vietnamese, especially on the 
issue of the return of remains of 
American servicemen and the general 
prisoner-of-war issues. Since then, a 
high-level U.S. delegation has gone to 
Vietnam. The Vietnamese are, after 
some fits and starts, releasing some 
further remains of Americans. How do 
you now feel about what Vietnam has 
done or is doing in this area, and 
could you say a word about what you 
expect more broadly about U.S. rela- 
tions with Vietnam in the year or two 

A. Some progress has been made. 
We welcome it, and there is the prospect 
of some further progress. We very much 
want to see that happen. There is a 
large problem ahead of us. There are 
many people unaccounted for, possibly 
even still alive, and so the issue is a very 
important one. 

Insofar as long-term relations with 
Vietnam are concerned, it represents a 
major stumbling block that must be got- 
ten out of the way. Even if there were a 
Kampuchean settlement of some kind 
that was satisfactory, we would still find 
this a matter of great concern and 
would want to see it dealt with properly. 

Q. You say that possibly there are 
some still alive. Has anything been 
learned in the past year that would 
give any further indication whether 
any are alive, or does our information 
stand precisely where it did a year 

A. My statement does not reflect 
any new information. It is just that 
there are a large number — some 
2,500 — that we don't know about, and 
so there is always the possibility that 
there may be someone still alive. That is 
all I meant. 

Q. Returning to the intellectual 
property question, might there be any 
chance of GSP [generalized system of 
preferences] quotas being used as a 
possible lever to gain satisfaction 
from Singapore and other countries 
where there is a problem? 

A. That proposal has been made as 
I've heard, and I think that the right 
way to go about this is to have the kind 
of discussions that I've had. I hope it 
will be possible to get it straightened out 
without going in for that kind of condi- 
tionality. It is the sort of thing that 
tends to arise when a problem nags and 
nags, and people start feeling strongly 
about it. 

I might say on the GSP legislation, 
it is something the Reagan Admin- 
istration strongly supports, and we have 
been working at that for over a year 
now, so that the GSP would be ex- 
tended. It is not progressing well in the 
House of Representatives, it is not pro- 
gressing at all. But we want very much 
to see some action by the Congress so 
that it doesn't lapse at the end of this 
year. We will be working on that. 

Q. Last September, a joint appeal 
on Kampuchea was signed by the 
ASEAN countries. This move was 
backed by the United States, and the 
third step in the resolution on the 
Kampuchean problem was the pro- 
posed normalization of relations be- 
tween Vietnam and the United States. 
If such a thing should go through, 
what sort of normalization, what sort 
of relationship, would the United 
States establish with Vietnam? Would 
it include just developmental aid? 

A. I'm afraid the prospect of nor- 
malization is so far away that it is really 
fruitless to speculate about it. There is 
the MIA-POW issue we've spoken of, 
and right now what we see in Kam- 
puchea is a continued Vietnamese ag- 
gression. So far as I can see, efforts to 
bring about any kind of reasonable 
negotiation on the subject have run into 
a stone wall from Vietnam. I think that 
any thought of normalization with the 
United States is just miles away. 

Q. There were reports a couple of 
years ago, at least, that there were 
probably several Americans still alive 
who chose to stay. Are you referring 
to that kind of thing or to Americans 
still alive but in prison? 

A. I was making a general observa- 
tion, in effect, that when you are 
without knowledge of as many in- 
dividuals as is the case here that it is 
always possible that someone may still 
be alive. That's all, there's nothing, no 
new information nor any special implica- 
tion connected with the statement. 


JULY 13, 19843 

This new opportunity to carry forward 
my country's constructive and fruitful 
dialogue with ASEAN is most welcome; 
in fact, it is genuinely refreshing to 
return to Southeast Asia and meet again 
with my ASEAN friends. 

I am delighted to note the addition 
of Brunei to this association. The United 
States has a tradition of diplomatic con- 
tact with Brunei extending well back 
into the 19th century. 

The accomplishments of all the 
ASEAN countries, individually and as a 
group, have captured worldwide atten- 
tion and admiration. In 1967, at a time 
when few outside the region rated your 
prospects very high, you founded this 
unique organization to promote eco- 
nomic development, in recognition of the 
importance of regional cooperation and 
self-help. Through disciplined and 
creative economic management, your 
real growth rate has averaged over 7% 
a year for the last decade. Through 
realism and courage you have forced the 
world to address the threat to regional 
and world peace posed by Vietnamese 
aggression in Kampuchea. You in- 
stituted this remarkable annual meeting 
in early recognition of the importance of 
serious dialogue between developed and 
developing countries. 

In all these respects the ASEAN 
countries have distinguished themselves 
by realism, imagination, and sense of 
purpose. You face formidable economic 
problems and the dangers of Vietnamese 
aggression. You bear a significant 
burden of refugees for whom you have 
generously provided first asylum. But 
your success so far enables you to con- 
front these problems with confidence 
and makes other nations— my own most 
definitely included— want to work with 

Thus, in contrast to so many parts 
of today's world, ASEAN represents the 
stability and progress that are the goals 
of people everywhere. ASEAN, like the 
United States, faces both opportunities 
and problems. These meetings give us 
the chance to consult on both, and that 
is why we are here. We can take 
satisfaction from our common record to 
date. But we cannot rest on our laurels. 
Today, I would like to discuss three 
of the most serious challenges we face 
together and the principles upon which 
President Reagan has determined that 
the United States will address them. 

They are principles that provide, I 
believe, a solid basis for cooperation be- 
tween my nation and ASEAN. 

• The first is realism: we must see 
the world as it is, not as we would wish 
it to be, facing up to problems as well as 

• Next is strength: no policy can 
succeed from a position of weakness. 
Economic vigor, military power, and a 
strong sense of national purpose are 
prerequisites to the achievement of our 

• And third, negotiation: fortified 
by realism and strength, we must help 
to resolve international problems 
through principled, effective diplomacy. 

On these pillars of realism, strength, 
and negotiation, the United States is at 
work today in the interest of peace and 
freedom. On this basis we are prepared 
to work with ASEAN on the great 
challenges we face in common. 

Preserving Peace and the 
Challenge of Arms Control 

No issue is more important today than 
preserving peace, and none has higher 
priority for the United States. Responsi- 
ble policies to reduce the risk of war and 
strengthen international stability are a 
goal shared by all our peoples. The first 
challenge of arms control is an impor- 
tant part of this effort to preserve 

Preserving peace in the nuclear age 
is a duty we owe all inhabitants of this 
planet. Ensuring a lasting peace is 
foremost in President Reagan's mind, 
for as he has said: "A nuclear war can- 
not be won and must never be fought." 
He said it in China. He said it in Ger- 
many. He said it in Japan. He said it in 
England. He said it in Congress. He said 
it in the Oval Office. He has said it 
throughout America. It is the essence of 
a principle that has the full support of 
responsible people everywhere. 

Much of the debate on nuclear issues 
focuses on the enormous destructive 
potential of existing arsenals. President 
Reagan has led the way in the responsi- 
ble effort to reduce nuclear arsenals to 
equal levels, with effective verification. 
He has proposed the complete elimina- 
tion of an entire class of nuclear 
weapons— American Pershing lis and 
ground-launched cruise missiles and 
Soviet SS-20S, SS-4s, and SS-5s. He 
has rejected Soviet proposals that would 
simply transfer such weapons from 
where they threaten Europe to where 

they threaten Asia. In the strategic 
arms reduction talks (START), he has 
proposed deep reductions in intercon- 
tinental nuclear arsenals, focusing on 
the most powerful categories of 
weapons— ballistic missile warheads— a 
goal no previous strategic arms treaty 
has even approached. Last November, 
the Soviets walked out of the INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
negotiations and in December suspended 
indefinitely their participation in 
START. The United States is ready to 
resume both negotiations at any time 
and in any place, without preconditions. 
We hope the Soviet Union also will com 
to recognize that its interests are best 
served by returning to the negotiating 
table as soon as possible. 

But the United States has not sim- 
ply waited for Soviet responses. In add 
tion to our efforts, extending over man 
years, to negotiate balanced and 
verifiable arms control agreements, we 
have made substantial reductions in ouj 
own nuclear stockpile, as well as im- 
provements to its safety and security. 
Both the number and megatonnage of 
our nuclear arsenal have been substan- 
tially reduced. Our stockpile was one- 
third higher in 1967 than it is now, anc 
its total destructive power has declined 
by 7.5% since 1968. In addition, we and 
our allies have begun a process of redu 
ing the stockpile of NATO nuclear 
weapons in Europe, bringing it to the 
lowest level in 20 years. Even in the 
absence of an INF agreement, at least 
five nuclear warheads will be taken ou 
of Europe for every new Pershing II 
and cruise missile introduced. The resi 
will be a net reduction of 2,400 nucleai 
weapons over the next few years. 

America has begun to modernize ii 
nuclear forces, even as we have sough 
to reduce nuclear arsenals. We have 
done so after a decade of restraint- 
restraint unmatched, indeed exploited, 
by our adversaries. We are modernizir 
in a way which, in conjunction with ou 
arms control proposals, will enhance 
stability and reduce the risk of war. 
modernization program provides impo 
tant incentives for the Soviets to agre 
to our proposals for equitable and 
verifiable reductions in arsenals. 

In addition to our far-reaching pre 
posals for reducing the level of nuclea 
armaments, the United States has pre 
posed a number of other important ar 
control initiatives to reduce the risk oi 
war and halt or reverse the growth in 



In Geneva, Vice President Bush 
?seiited to the Conference on Dis- 
nament a draft treaty for a com- 
^hensive ban on the development, pro- 
ction, stockpiling, transfer, and use of 
smical weapons. 

In Stockholm, together with our 
LTO allies, we have put forward a 
:kage of confidence-building measures 
signed to reduce the risk of a Euro- 
in war occurring by accident, surprise 
ack, or miscalculation. 

In Vienna, at the mutual and 
lanced force reduction talks, we 
jsented, again with our European 
ies, a new initiative that seeks a com- 
)n ground between Eastern and 
3stern positions and progress on 
iucing the conventional forces of 
^TO and the Warsaw Pact. We will 
rsist in our efforts to reduce the risk 
war and achieve substantial reduc- 
ns in nuclear arsenals. And we will 
rsevere in our efforts with the Soviets 
build a relationship based on realism, 
itraint, and reciprocity. 

Unfortunately, until very recently, 
! only response of the Soviet Union 
5 been silence or walkout. We hope 
it their recently expressed interest in 
jotiations at Vienna represents a 
inge of heart. We have accepted the 
viet offer to begin talks on weapons in 
ice, and we intend to go to Vienna, 
ere are no preconditions attached to 
- willingness to discuss arms control 
.tters. The Soviets have proposed 
ne issues and we, too, will have issues 
want to discuss. We are now trying 
work out arrangements through 
iilomatic channels. 

We want to improve our relations 
i ;h the Soviet Union across a wide 
tictrum. We have close and continuous 
ilomatic contact with them at all 
I els. President Reagan has called this 
iir a year of opportunities for peace. 
5 are making every effort to ensure 
it these opportunities multiply and 
it we make the most of every one of 

i At the same time, we will continue 
j r efforts to strengthen our deterrent 
•ces. This is as important to keeping 
; peace as the effort to control arms, 
is one of the ironies of the nuclear age 
it weapons must be built in order that 
;y not be used. The effectiveness of 
r military forces in peacetime is of 
al importance to the avoidance of 
3ir employment in war. Our approach 
s served us well; in the years since 
orld War II, we have succeeded in 
iintaining the nuclear balance and 
terring nuclear war. 

Your countries and my country 
threaten no one. Our military forces are 
designed to keep the peace, and we are 
proud of the job they have done. This 
has called for a considerable effort to fill 
some of the gaps that had developed in 
the last decade, particularly in this 
critical part of the world. President 
Reagan is determined that those efforts 
will continue. 

The Challenge of Regional Stability 

A second great challenge which faces us 
all is achieving regional stability. This 
task is every bit as critical as the effort 
to control nuclear weapons, for the 
greatest danger of nuclear war arises 
from smaller wars that could get out of 
control. The promotion of regional 
stability thus serves global as well as 
regional interests. The nations of every 
region achieving stability meet not only 
the deepest aspirations of their own peo- 
ple; they also contribute importantly to 
the avoidance of global conflict, nuclear 
or conventional. We must never forget, 
however, that so-called small wars, even 
if contained within a region, have caused 
devastating losses in recent decades. 
Hundred of thousands of lives have been 
lost, damaged, or dislocated in virtually 
every quarter of the globe. We must ex- 
pend every effort to turn energies that 
are absorbed in conflict toward peace, 
justice, and lasting stability. 

The United States is proud of its 
part in the system of regional alliances. 
These alliances— backed by credible 
military presence— have helped to main- 
tain a remarkable degree of regional 
stability, even in the face of shocks like 
the Rangoon bombing which, in an 
earlier age, might easily have led to war. 
Our alliances with two of your members, 
the Philippines and Thailand, contribute 
to a stability which benefits the entire 
region, and we are grateful for their 
contribution. We recognize as well the 
responsible self-defense efforts of the 
nonaligned members of ASEAN. 

The principles of realism, strength, 
and diplomacy are the keys to progress 
in regional disputes. These are the prin- 
ciples the United States has been using 
in its Central America policy. We seek 
and we support a regional solution 
there— one that the nations most 
threatened by the conflict agreed upon 
in their meeting at San Jose, Costa 
Rica. That objective is now embodied in 
the 21 principles developed in the Con- 
tadora process. Behind a strengthened 
security shield, this approach can pro- 
vide development, democracy, and an 
end to attempts to achieve hegemony in 

that region via Cuban and Soviet in- 

The policy ASEAN has adopted in 
dealing with the problem of Vietnam's 
occupation of Kampuchea reflects these 
same principles. Realism leads you to 
recognize that Vietnam's occupation of 
Kampuchea threatens the entire region 
and that no one is safe if such acts of 
blatant aggression succeed. You recog- 
nize the need for strength— political and 
economic as well as military— to con- 
front Vietnam with the clear choice be- 
tween bearing the burdens of aggression 
or enjoying the benefits of cooperation 
with ASEAN and with countries, like 
my own, that firmly support you. You 
have offered Vietnam a realistic pro- 
posal for a negotiated political solution, 
one based on the restoration of Kam- 
puchea's sovereignty and the rights of 
its people to choose their own govern- 
ment. Such a solution safeguards the in- 
terests of the Khmer people and of all 
Kampuchea's neighbors. 

Your appeal to Vietnam is based not 
only on what is right, but also on what 
would serve Vietnam's own best in- 
terest—if Vietnam would only see its 
long-term interests more clearly. The 
regional tensions which Hanoi causes 
work to its own disadvantage. Vietnam 
is disastrously diverting its resources 
from its own development and the 
welfare of its energetic and talented 
people. Compared with the relationship 
Hanoi could have with the rest of the 
world— with access to markets, new 
technologies, and foreign assistance, as 
well as greatly increased diplomatic op- 
tions—Vietnam's present isolation, 
resulting from its occupation of Kam- 
puchea, imposes a cruel burden on its 
own people. 

No Vietnamese proposal to date has 
addressed the underlying issues- 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and 
creation of a government in Phnom 
Penh chosen by the Khmer people 
themselves. It is a given, I think we all 
agree, that free choice by the Khmer 
people would not result in a return to 
power of the Khmer Rouge. None of us 
wish such an outcome. A Kampuchean 
government responsive to the Khmer 
people and to the urgent need for na- 
tional reconstruction would be a threat 
to no one and would contribute to the 
kind of stability so important to 
Southeast Asia. 

I want to convey America's admira- 
tion for what has been achieved by 
ASEAN in obtaining international sup- 
port for a just settlement in Kampuchea. 


We will continue to do our part, in- 
cluding moral, political, and humani- 
tarian support for the organizations led 
by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann. We 
will give no support to the Khmer 
Rouge, whose atrocities outraged the 

While we are discussing Vietnam, let 
me reemphasize that an accounting of 
Americans missing in action from the 
conflict in Indochina is a matter of the 
highest priority for the Unites States. 
The United States has both a legal and 
moral responsibility to obtain the fullest 
possible accounting of almost 2,500 of 
our men still missing. The American 
people rightfully expect no less. We 
deeply appreciate the support you have 
given us with Vietnam on this problem. 
It is a problem which demands mean- 
ingful cooperation and progress before 
the American people will permit discus- 
sion of normalization with the Viet- 
namese, even in the context of a Kam- 
puchea settlement. 

It is, therefore, in the interest of all 
of us to persuade Hanoi to come for- 
ward rapidly. It is the humane thing to 
do. The longer this issue lingers, the 
deeper will be the resentment of the 
American people. That serves no one's 
interests and thwarts the goal we all 
share of moving beyond the tragic 
history of Indochina to a more hopeful 
and constructive future. We appreciate 
the recently announced repatriation of 
remains. We call on Vietnam in a 
humanitiirian spirit to meet the com- 
mitments it made to us recently and ac- 
celerate its efforts to resolve the issue. 
Resolution of this sensitive problem 
would be greeted as a significant and 
positive step by the American people 
and would establish a precedent for 
future cooperation. 

Still another tragedy is the large and 
continuing flow of people fleeing Viet- 
namese repression and aggression. Our 
joint efforts on the refugee issue provide 
a remarkable example of international 
cooperation, involving ASEAN, the 
United States, and other countries 
whose humanitarian principles have led 
them to assist in coping with this cruel 
tragedy. Thailand, which has borne the 
biggest burden of first asylum, has 
responded magnificently in providing a 
haven for close to two-thirds of a million 
refugees. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines also have made major con- 
tributions to the alleviation of human 
suffering by providing temporary 
asylum and processing facilities. The en- 
tire international community applauds 

you for your unceasing efforts in dealing 
with this problem, which was caused by 
Vietnam and imposed upon you. 

The United States is proud of the 
part it has played in resettling Indo- 
chinese refugees. Of the 1.37 million 
refugees who have been resettled 
around the world since 197.5, 650,000— 
almost one-half of the entire total— have 
been resettled in the United States. Ab- 
sorbing such numbers can never be easy, 
but we are proud to have these refugees 
come to our shores. Ours is a nation 
built by people seeking freedom from 
tyranny. Our country is enriched by the 
energies and talents of the Vietnamese 
and other Southeast Asian refugees. 

Other nations represented at this 
conference have also played their part. 
In fact, the entire refugee resettlement 
process, from first asylum to final reset- 
tlement, represents international 
cooperation at its finest. If we are to 
maintain the cooperative nature of this 
endeavor, all of us must continue to 
shoulder our share of the burden. We in 
the United States will do so, and we 
urge others to do so as well. 

One of the tragic effects of the 
movement of people seeking refuge has 
been an increase in piracy. Although the 
number of vicious attacks on helpless 
refugees— including women and 
children— has declined, it is still a terri- 
ble risk to run for those seeking 
freedom. I know that all ASEAN 
governments condemn these acts of 
piracy and are anxious to find ways to 
combat this problem. We stand ready to 
help in any way possible. 

The Challenge of Economic 

We face a third great challenge in con- 
cert with all members of the interna- 
tional community— economic develop- 
ment. All the leaders of ASEAN have 
made economic development a major 
goal, and it has become a central part of 
the U.S. -ASEAN relationship. But we 
are all part of a world economy so our 
efforts must extend beyond the confines 
of the U.S.-ASEAN relationship. 

Prior to the recent London economic 
summit, [Indonesian] Foreign Minister 
Mochtar wrote me and others in his 
capacity as chairman of the ASEAN 
Standing Committee, asking me to bear 
in mind the concerns of the ASEAN 
countries as the summit leaders ad- 
dressed global economic issues. It should 
be clear from the outcome of that sum- 
mit that ASEAN's concerns were very 
much on our minds. 


Trade Issues. The first topic 
Foreign Minister Mochtar addressed 
was trade. We share the view that trad 
is a major engine of the development 
process. Trade liberalization is an in- 
dispensable element in ensuring that thi 
global recovery will endure and spread. 
We worked hard to see that the summit 
declaration urged formal movement on 
new GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] trade round. In our 
judgment, a new round will stimulate 
confidence in the recovery and can offe 
the prospect of significant benefits to 
the developing world. 

A key objective of a new trade 
round will be to confront the protec- 
tionist pressures that afflict all of us, 
developed and developing countries 
alike. On this point, I am sure we are i 
full agreement. We may disagree, 
however, on the extent of protectionisi 
now being provided our respective in- 

The United States is frequently ac- 
cused of bowing to protectionist pres- 
sures to the detriment of the developir 
world. Examples often cited are textilt 
shoes, and steel. We do face pro- 
tectionist pressure, and occasionally w 
are forced to limit the growth of impo 
of some products. I note with pride, 
however, that the U.S. economy is a 
genuinely open one, and this openness 
of great benefit to developing countrif 
The United States is the world's biggt 
market for the manufactured exports 
developing countries, taking over 50'R 
such exports to all industrial countries 
Even in sensitive industries where pri 
tectionist pressure is high, imports ha 
continued to grow, often exceeding tli , 
growth in total output in that industr | 

The complaint heard most concerJ 
textiles. But during the first 4 month^ 
1984, textile imports to the United 
States are 50% above the same perio' 
1983; in the case of the ASEAN coun- •' 
tries, the figure is 107%. A rate of in 
crease like that in a sensitive Americ; 
industry causes us real problems and 
brings an understandable reaction in 
United States. But the increases are 
there, nonetheless. The United State; 
has an open market. Imports are a p' 
manent part of our economic life and 
welcome the benefits they bring. 

Protectionism is a danger we all 
must combat. IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] studies have made c 
the damage that high levels of protec 
tionism have caused to certain devek 
ing countries. I agree with those whc 
have raised objections to proposals ir|^ 
the United States for local content 



slation. President Reagan's Ad- 
istration is vigorously opposed to 
1 laws but the principle of realism is 
iired here as well, for this is a prac- 
widespread in the developing as well 
leveloped worlds. Nor can we ignore 
reality that the average tariff level 
he developing countries is 30% corn- 
ed to 4.7% in developed countries. 
A trade issue of particular concern 
he United States is infringement of 
■Uectual property rights. American _ 
inesses lose hundreds of millions of 
ars annually due to the counter- 
ing and piracy of records, tapes, and 
er intellectual" property. But the even 
ger losers are those nations who fail 
jffer protection to intellectual prop- 
y. America's high-technology com- 
)ies— for example, in computers and 
nputer software— are not going to 
nt to invest in countries where their 
ellectual property can be stolen with 
Dunity. This will result in a loss to 
)se countries of the types of skills 
3ded to develop a modern industrial 
:tor with well-educated, high paid, 
lied workers. This is an issue that 
-icerns us all and which must be ad- 
3ssed quickly. 

Growth in the industrial democracies 
:rucial to the trade and thus to the 
)nomies of the developing world 
d— I wish to emphasize— vice versa. 
al output in non-oil-producing develop- 
<■ countries is expected to rise 3.5% 
s year, compared to 1.6% last year. A 
ijor part of this recovery is due to the 
rease in world trade. Achievement of 
rtained noninflationary growth in the 
lited States and maintenance of our 
en markets are of prime importance 

the developing world. Conversely, 
, ;EAN's prosperity has created new 
I irkets and enhanced investment op- 
I rtunities for American business. 

The strong growth of U.S. import 
[ mand has been the major factor in the 
1 ;overy of world trade, with U.S. im- 
1 rts up 13% in 1983 and an estimated 
: % for 1984. In the case of ASEAN, 
i Teased exports to the United States 
a counted for over 60% of ASEAN's 
1 ;al export increase in 1983. These 
!] rcentages are pretty big in anybody's 
I] -ms, but in terms of ASEAN's 
Ijonomies they are huge, for the 

nerican economy is truly enormous. 

Commodity Agreements. The sec- 
d issue mentioned by Foreign Minister 
ochtar on behalf of the ASEAN coun- 
les was commodities. In practice, com- 
odity agreements often interfere with 
arket forces to the detriment of ra- 
)nal long-term allocation of capital. 

land, and labor. Bearing these dif- 
ferences in mind, however, we may be 
able to turn to negotiation along 
avenues that can lead to practical and 
economically productive areas of agree- 

The International Rubber Agree- 
ment is one commodity arrangement 
that we both are able to support. We an- 
ticipate that negotiations to renew this 
agreement will proceed in a good-faith 
manner. Another example is the 
U.S- ASEAN memorandum of under- 
standing on tin that we concluded late 
last year, directly as a result of the 
ASEAN dialogue meeting. We intend to 
follow the same precepts of realism and 
diplomacy in examining other commodi- 
ty issues. 

Debt and Finance. The third and 
fourth topics in Foreign Minister 
Mochtar's letter were debt and finance. 
Here the London summit participants 
agreed that their strategy for dealing 
with the international debt crisis is 
working as intended. One of the lessons 
we have learned in recent years is that 
over-reliance on foreign borrowing to 
finance development can lead to suc- 
cessively complex problems, especially 
during an economic downturn. I want to 
underscore the Williamsburg and Lon- 
don declarations' recognition of the im- 
portance of private capital flows to the 
developing world. Private equity funds 
can provide an important complement to 
domestic savings, while avoiding the pit- 
falls that come with large amounts of 
foreign debt. Furthermore, as the Lon- 
don summit recognized, foreign direct 
investment "carries the advantage of be- 
ing tied to productive capital formation, 
as well as forming part of the package 
that includes the transfer of technology 
and skills." Countries, just as companies, 
must pay attention to their debt-to- 
equity ratio. The ASEAN countries you 
represent have been wise in pursuing, 
for the most part, sensible strategies of 
foreign borrowing. The United States 
stands ready to work with you to im- 
prove the climate for increased foreign 
equity flows. For example, we are 
prepared to enter into discussions about 
treaties for encouraging and protecting 

Another aspect of the financial side 
of cooperation is development assist- 
ance. While it can never match trade or 
private foreign investment— let alone in- 
vestment based on domestic savings— in 
terms of its impact on the recipient 

country, it can play a crucial catalytic 
role, particularly for the poorest coun- 
tries. U.S. assistance to the developing 
world exceeds that of any OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] country. In fiscal year 
(FY) 1983, the United States provided 
$249 million in bilateral economic 
assistance to ASEAN countries. 
Together with security assistance, our 
total bilateral aid was $424 million. 
When one adds in our share of 
World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank loans to the ASEAN countries, 
total U.S. assistance in FY 1983 ex- 
ceeded $1 billion. We are the largest 
participant in the major international 
financial institutions. We will maintain 
these flows to the extent that our 
budgetary conditions permit and we will 
continue to support the programs 
directed toward ASEAN of the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the ASEAN Develop- 
ment Bank. 

North/South Dialogue. Mr. 

Mochtar's fifth point addressed the 
North/ South dialogue. We believe in 
dialogue; that is why we are here. That 
is why we support substantive work in 
the GATT, IMF, the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, the African 
Development Bank, the Inter- American 
Development Bank, and other similar in- 
stitutions. The forums for the dialogue 
exist. The institutions for carrying out 
programs exist. What we must find are 
practical solutions, working in those 
forums where constructive action can be 

U.S. -ASEAN Relations 

Each time I return to this region I am 
impressed anew with the sense of 
dynamism I encounter. ASEAN's record 
of progress over the past decade has 
been phenomenal. Your average real an- 
nual growth is the envy of the rest of 
the world— developed and developing. 
Your growth in trade with the rest of 
the world in the last decade was more 
than twice that of overall world trade. 
Your exports have grown from $14 
billion to over $70 billion in the same 
period— a most impressive record. Com- 
plementing the dynamism of the region 
is its stability. Much of the developing 
world must grapple with rapid and un- 
controlled change that threatens political 
and economic institutions. But the coun- 
tries of this region have become models 
for balancing stability with controlled 
and beneficial change. 

On this visit, I have been reminded 
again how our host government, under 
President Soeharto's leadership, has 



drawn on the traditional Indonesian 
values of consultation and consensus to 
construct a stability that stands in stark 
contrast to the turmoil that followed the 
1945 revolution. In Malaysia, I saw a 
vibrant parliamentary democracy at 
work a political system that demon- 
TtStes that people from different ethnic 
roups can work together in harmony to 
.rge a nation. In Singapore, 1 saw how 
imaginative leadership combined with 
the principles of free enterprise can 
overcome the shortage of na ural 
resources. The Philippines although still 
beset by serious financial difficulties 
recently held imporUmt legislative elec- 
tions, which showed the Filipinos deep 
commitment to the democratic process. I 
have been heartened by Thailand s im- 
pressive political stability and deepened 
cooperation with my country. And 
Deputy Secretary Dam felt the promise 
of Brunei as it celebrated its in- 
dependence this year. 

Today, there is a growing awareness 
of Asia's "importance to the United 
States. East Asia's rapid economic 
kirowth has had a profound impact <:.n 
our own economy. U.S. investment in 
ASEAN, currently almost $8 billion, ac- 
cording to recent Department of Com- 
merce figures, continues to increase, as 
American business sees new oppor- 
tunities in ASEAN's expanding free^ 
market economies. The U.S.-ASEAN 
Center for Technology Exchange pro- 
vides an opportunity to promote the 
transfer of technology from the United 
States to ASEAN firms. Americas an- 
nual trade with East Asia and the 
Pacific exceeds that with any other part 
of the world-and has for 5 years. 
ASEAN is now the fifth largest trading 
partner of the United States-with total 
trade exceeding $23 billion. 

There is a deep human and cultural 
dimension to our relations as well. This 
year there are more than 40,000 
students from ASEAN nations studying 
in the United States and the number of 
my countrymen who visit Southeast Asia 
and become involved here continues to 
rise. I, myself, visited this region often 
as a private citizen and spread the word 
of the new Southeast Asia to my friends 
back home. Your societies, your his- 
tories, your intellectual and artistic 
achievements every year become more 
familiar to Americans and contribute to 
a lasting bond between us. Behind each 
statistic there are complex person-to- 
person contacts that will link our lands 
and peoples ever more closely in the 

Southeast Asia is an area that com- 
mands U.S. attention within the 
Asia/Pacific region. In recent years 
questions have been raised about the 
firmness of American purpose in 
Southeast Asia. Some feared that our 
withdrawal from Vietnam would lead us 
to abandon our interests in the region, 
particulary in ASEAN. The prospect- 
some years ago-of a withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from Korea fed these fears. 
Let me assure you that nothing 
could be further from reality. U.S. 
security interests are increasingly 
engaged in Asia and the Pacific. We are 
committed to an active, constructive 
and long-term presence in Southeast 


Our relations with the ASEAN coun- 
tries are the cornerstone of our policy in 
Southeast Asia. As the United States 
develops and expands its relations with 
other countries, both large and small, m 
Asia and around the worid, we will very 
much keep in mind our strong ties with 
the ASEAN region. We do not intend to 
subordinate our interests m ASEAN to 
the pursuit of better relations elsewhere. 

U S relations with the ASEAN 
region are based upon the perception 
that we each have a constructive and 
complementary role to play in dealing 
with the challenges that confront us. 
Your combined voices carry authority in 
the international arena and contribute to 
the quest for peace and economic justice. 
Together we can make an impressive 
contribution to the kind of world all our 
peoples seek for the future. 




In conclusion, let me say once again 
what a pleasure it is to participate m 
this dialogue with you. The discussions 
we have had here symbolize the 
dynamism and vibrancy of your coun- 
tries The inclusion in our agenda this 
year of the theme of Pacific cooperation 
reflects your vision of the opportunity 
that the future offers to the Pacific 
region. We share this vision and are 
prepared to work with you to give it 
substance. The success of ASEAN, both 
as a regional organization and as in- 
dividual countries, stands out as an 
example for others everywhere. The 
United States is proud to be associated 
with our allies and friends in these joint 



JULY 15, 1984^ 

First I want to express my appreciatii 

for the great hospitality shown me her« 

by the Prime Minister, and the Foreig* 

Minister, and others in Australia. We 

had a very fine working dinner and a 

lengthy discussion last night, and agai; 

this morning a brief private meeting i (jcek 

with the Foreign Minister. The meetii^ «rPa 

this morning will continue on, so we j jZlSI 

want to, all of us, express our apprecd ill 

tion for this mark of cordiality. Of jster. 

course I'll be meeting with the Foreigi ^sek 

Minister further in New Zealand wher| strafc 

we get there tomorrow. V 

Q. The New Zealand Labor Party 
abides by its policy in banning nucle> 
ships from New Zealand waters. Doe 
this mean the end of the ANZUS tre» 


A I had the chance to talk Ijnefly 
on the" telephone with the newly electee 
Prime Minister [David Lange], and 1 e> 
pect that we will have a chance to mee 
He said that he was going out of his w. 
to come to Wellington, and we will hav 
a chance to discuss the situation. Ihen 
a very warm feeling between the peopl 
of the United States and, I think, the 
people of New Zealand, and we will 
work at the situation. 1 don't want to 
prejudge it. 

Q. This morning David Lange saJ. 
on TV that his government would iin ,j 
plement his party's policy on banning ;„ 
U S. warships carrying nuclear , 

weapons from New Zealand ports, b^ „ 
he said he did not believe that that j. 
would jeopardize ANZUS. Would yo- „ 

. . . • .__0 ,1 



accept that view? 

A As I said, 1 will have discussm 
with him. We'll have a meeting of the 
ANZUS group, and we'll make our 
statements as we go along in that set 
ting. I don't want to prejudge the situ 



Q But do vou express concern 
over that New Zealand Labor Party 
policy, whether or not it's put into e 
feet? Do you express concern of the 

policv itself? . 

A ANZUS is an alliance. It is an 
alliance in the light of the fact that th 
basic values of freedom, liberty, and t 
rule of law are shared by Australia, ^ 
Zealand, and the United States, amor 
other countries in the worid. And soj 
recognize that there are threats to th. 
valuis and that we have to deter thes 
threats. That is essentially the basis t 

neoartment of State Bulli 


\ alliance. Now for an alliance to 
I ill anything, it has to be possible for 
i military forces of the respective 
iiitries to be able to interact together; 
: r\\ ise it's not much of an alliance. 
these are matters that we'll discuss 
, nevertheless, I think that's just a 
;ement of fact. 

Q. Would you be asking for Mr. 
fden to perhaps use whatever in- 
mce he has on the New Zealand 
tor Party to see the reality of the 
ZUS treaty? 

A. Mr. Hayden and the Prime 
lister, of course, will express 
mselves from the standpoint of the 
5tralian view of matters, and we'll ex- 
ss the U.S. view of matters. I think 
t there's a great deal of good will on 
sides of this issue, and we'll have to 
ceed and see what we can work out. 

Q. If the New Zealand Govern- 
nt does ban the warships, can we 
I'Cct to see more of them here in 

' A. I don't want to bite on the con- 

iied speculation. I want to talk with 
new leader in New Zealand, and we 
work our way along on these issues. 

)n't want to engage in excessive 


Q. Do you expect to be able to 
lolve the issue during the period of 
I ANZUS talks? 

A. I think, first of all, the ANZUS 
:s take place among the governments 
t are in place in the United States, 
jtralia, and New Zealand. We will 
I e a chance to meet with members of 
1 new government, but it hasn't 
-ned itself yet. So this ANZUS 
jting, I think, comes at a good time 
he sense that it affords us an oppor- 
ity to meet with a new government, 
it is the old government that will be 
government in place for this 

Q. As you've been aware, the 
)or Party's national conference in 
5 country has taken the decision to 
p homeporting of American war- 
ps in the Australian ports. Is that a 
tter of concern? 
A. We think that the way in which 
ship visits and other aspects of our 
itionship with Australia are basically 
'ery good shape and we have no 

Q. Would the United States be 
itemplating changing the arrange- 
nts whereby it makes regular use of 
stralian ports, particularly the Port 

of Fremantle in western Australia, as 
a result of the decision that was taken 
last week by the Labor Party con- 

A. As far as I can see from the dis- 
cussions that I've had here, and we'll 
continue them, of course, the 
U.S. -Australia leg of the ANZUS rela- 
tionship is in very good shape. We have 
a strong sharing of common values and 
a sense of the importance of succeeding 
in maintaining stability in the world and 
a place where these values can flourish. 
We share a common view that we must 
maintain a deterrent capability. 

Q. Do you think that this year's 
ANZUS talks are slightly irrelevant, 
given that they are taking place with 
Mr. Muldoon and Mr. Cooper? 
Shouldn't we really be discussing it 
with the new Labor government? 

A. I think it has fortuitously turned 
out to be a good time to have this 
conference because it gives us an oppor- 
tunity to talk with a new government 
and to hear their views and to express 
our views so that these matters can be 
considered before the new government 
takes office and starts to take positions 
as a government. So I think that it's 
really a good time to be present in New 
Zealand, and it gives us a chance to be 
part of this transition that's under way. 

Q. Is the United States worried 
about Australia's depleted defense 
capabilities and does the United 
States believe that the balance of 
power in the ASEAN region could be 
destabilized because of a lack of 
defense direction from Australia? 

A. We think it's important for all 
the countries in the various alliances 
that we have to be looking to their 
defense capabilities and seeing that they 
are properly attended to. And, of 
course, we struggle with that within the 
United States. 

President Reagan has wanted to re- 
store the military balance and that has 
meant spending a lot of money and on 
the whole that has gone along suc- 
cessfully. We have had some disappoint- 
ments in the appropriations process, but 
there has certainly been a major change 
in the U.S. defense posture. We work on 
this same problem with our NATO allies. 
We talk about it, the responsibilities of 
the Japanese and so on. So I think it's a 
general proposition that we have to be 
looking to our defense capabilities and 
the same is true from the standpoint of 

I might say that we all recognize, on 
the one hand, that the nuclear side of 
strength is a key element in the deter- 

rent, and at the same time we recognize 
the importance of strength in conven- 
tional forces and the importance of con- 
ventional forces to the nuclear deter- 
rent. It is the case, at the same time, 
that conventional forces are expensive 
and so that fact means that you 
recognize the sig^nificance of improve- 
ment in conventional capability; you also 
have to be recognizing that it's going to 
cost you some money. 

Q. Does that mean you are con- 
cerned about Australia's [inaudible] 
defense capability? 

A. We are concerned about 
anything less than adequate all around 
the world, including with ourselves, and 
so we are trying to bring about — others 
are working with us — attention to what 
the capabilities are. And I don't single 
out any one country. I just say that we 
all need to be looking to our capabilities 
and strengthening them; recognizing, 
ironically, that it is through strengthen- 
ing them that we lessen the chance that 
they would ever be used. 

Q. Does the United States regard 
Australia's defense capabilities as ade- 
quate or not? 

A. We have an alliance with 
Australia, as I have said, we feel that 
there is work to be done on the part of 
the United States, on the part of 
Australia, on the part of NATO, on the 
part of Japan, on the part of people who 
are standing for freedom and democracy 
all over the world. We have to be ready 
to defend these values, and having 
strength is the best insurance that we 
can have that the strength will not need 
to be used. So it isn't simply a problem 
for Australia. It's a problem for all of 
us, and all of us working together in our 
respective alliances. 

Q. Congresswoman Ferraro has 
charged that President Reagan cannot 
claim one single foreign policy suc- 
cess. I am wondering if you would 
like to respond to that. 

A. Oh, I'm not going to get into a 
debate with Congresswoman Ferraro, 
but I think that, as a general proposi- 
tion, the standing of the United States 
in the world has been immeasurably 
strengthened during the Reagan Ad- 
ministration. Here we are in the 
Australia-New Zealand area, and having 
just come from a meeting with the 
ASEAN countries, and earlier this year 
the President has visited Japan and 
Korea and China, so if you look at this 
part of the world, we have very strong 
relationships here. And the same can be 


said as you look around the world more 
generally. So there are many problems 
fhey are being addressed in a strong and 
creative way, and I thmk the Umted 

States is in very good shape. 

Q This is what they call in 
American journalism a "so-what" ques- 
tion. If the ANZUS alliance is not 
functioning effectively, what dif- 
ference does it make beyond the 
shared values and so forth. 

A Shared values and so forth are 
not a "so-what" question. The impor- 
tance of freedom tends to be taken tor 
granted in the United States, m 
Australia, in New Zealand, m many 
parts of Europe, and in places that have 
had it and consider it normal, like 
iireathing the air. 

But it's very dramatic to talk to peo- 
ple who are in a country that hasn t had 
it For example, this past year, I ve had 
a chance to visit with the leaders o 
Spain and Portugal, and particularly 1 
remember visiting with Prime Minister 
Suarez just as he returned from the in- 
auguration of President Alfonsin in 
Argentina. And he was commenting 
upon how wonderful it is to have free- 
dom So, 1 think that freedom can t be 
nut down as a "so-what" proposition. It 
needs to be attended to everywhere, and 
people need to address themselves to the 
importance of this value and the fact 
that it is under attack. If we're going to 
keep it, we have to be ready to deter ag- 
gression against it. 


Q. Are you suggesting that if the 
ANZUS pact is not effectively work- 
ing, Australia and New Zealand would 
lose their freedom? 

A. It is part of an overall proposi- 
tion, and the all-or-nothing approach 
suggested bv your question, I don't think 
is appropriate. But at the same time, it 
we lose some deterrent capability, that 
increases the margin for error, and we 
shouldn't do it. 

Q. There are reports from 
Washington, somewhat ambiguous, 
that the United States has told the 
Soviet Union in regard to these 
discussions on space weapons that it 
would be prepared to delay these talks 
until after the elections if that suited 
the Soviet Union. Can you amplify this 
in any way? 

A. The Soviet Union suggested that 
these talks take place in Vienna in the 
middle of September, and we have said 
yes, we'll be there. There have also been 
lots' of questions raised by them, and 
they keep talking about our election. We 
don't talk about our election; we talk 

about the importance of arms control at 
any season of the year So we dont 
want to delay these talks, but if for 
some reason they can't conveniently be 
arranged at the time set, and there s a 
desire to somehow have them take p ace 
after the election, then they'll take place 
after the election. But our desire is to 
have them take place in September, as 
was originally set, but we're not going to 
sort of hang on that. On the contrary, 
our interest is in getting them gomg and 
getting them going in a constructive 
way as soon as possible. 

Q. Our Foreign Minister just re- 
turned from Moscow a month ago. Did 
vou discuss that with him and. if so. 
"did you gain any useful perceptions or 

A The Foreign Minister had a very 
interesting trip to the Soviet Union, not 
iust in Moscow, and he provided us a 
good read-out from the trip after it was 
completed. I've had a chance to talk with 
him further about it on this visit, and 1 
hope that I'll have chances for some fur- 
ther exchanges as we're together over 
the next few days. I think it's a very 
valuable thing that he went and got his 
own impressions and was able to provide 
those to us. It's part of the continuing 
dialogue, you might say, of the West 
with the Soviet Union. And each piece 
of it is of importance. His visit was quite 
a worthwhile one, and we're very grate- 
ful to him for being willing to share with 
us his own thoughts and his experiences 


Q. While in Jakarta, did you raise 
the question of human rights in princi- 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did you present a letter to the 
Indonesian Government from your 
U S Congressmen expressing concern 
about human rights? If not, why not? 

A. I'm from the Administration, and 
1 expressed our concern and there are 
also things that we are trying to do that 
we think are helpful on East Timor. We 
believe that the best way to be helpful 
and to try to make a constructive con- 
tribution 'is to do it quietly in diplomatic 
channels and at the same time be ready 
to do things that may help people in 
East Timor and provide access to the 
situation. Those are the lines along 
which we have been working. 

JULY 16. 1984^ 

It is a great pleasure for me to welcomi 
Foreign Ministers Cooper and Hayden 
and the members of their delegations t 
our Embassy. I believe our first sessio! 
this morning went very well, and I loo_ 
forward to continuing in the same spim 
during the remainder of the council 


We, of course, have had a very cloi 
partnership with the existing and all 
previous New Zealand Governments 
and in the spirit which has character- 
ized our dealings with New Zealand ov( 
many years, we hope to continue m 
partnership with the new government, 

My visits to Australia and New 
Zealand come at a time when the con 
tinued strength of the alliance has nev( 
been more critical to stability m the 
Pacific. Soviet naval activity in the 
Pacific, supported by the growing So 
air and naval presence on the Pacific 
rim continues to increase, probing for 
weak or vulnerable areas into which it 
can expand. Our ANZUS solidarity, I 
believe, has been critical to the failure c 
the Soviets to project their influence in- 
to the Southwest Pacific, particularly 
among the new island states of the 

But should the ANZUS resolve evei 
weaken, should we ever allow our atter 
tion to be diverted from potentially 
destabilizing activities by indecision or ; 
belief that opting out of the alliance wil 
decrease the dangers we might face, 
then I believe we will have handed our 
adversaries a windfall by default. Our 
unity is the best deterrence we have, tl 
least expensive, and most effective wa: 
we have of convincing any potential 
adversary that we will always stand 
together. That is why we stand 
together, just as the United States 
stands with our European allies in 
NATO Both alliances are communitiet 






of nations, bounded by shared 
democratic traditions, which have volu,, 
tarily linked their peoples and institu- 
tions into a strong chain of deterrence 
against anyone who would dominate uf 
But as with any chain, we must ensure 
that all the links are sturdy and in goo 
repair. , 

And 1 think that is why we are her 
in Wellington these 2 days, reviewing, 
as we have every year for 33 years, ou 
Pacific end of the chain, to ensure that 
we understand each other and our viev 
on mutual defense and other importan j 
global and regional matters. But equal | 

npnartment of State Bullet 


ortant, we meet to deepen that sense 
lutual trust which has always 
racterized our relations and without 
ch any community of nations united 
eek a common goal cannot survive. I 
optimistic that we will succeed. 
In that spirit, I would like to pro- 
3 a toast to Her Majesty Queen 
iabeth II, Queen of New Zealand and 

.Y 17. 1984 

33rd meeting of the ANZUS Council 
; place in Wellington on 16 and 17 July 

1. The United States Secretary of State. 
rge Shultz. the Australian Minister for 
sign Affairs, Bill Hayden, and Minister 
Defence, Gordon Scholes, and New 
and's Minister of Foreign Affairs, War- 
Cooper, and Minister of Defence. David 
nison, represented their respective 
jrnments. During their visit the leaders 
le United States and Australian delega- 
s called on the Prime Minister. Rt. Hon. 
Robert Muldoon, and Mr. David Lange, 
., Prime Minister elect. 

2. Council members reaffirmed their 
mitment to the maintenance of peace, 
ility and democratic freedoms. They ex- 
sed their belief that the ANZUS partner- 
, based as it is on common traditions and 
ed interests, contributes to this. They 
•omed the increased exchanges that had 
n place on political, economic, security 
defense issues and agreed that defense 
peration, including combined exercises, 

s and logistic support arrangements, 
ed an essential part in promoting mutual 
1 rity. Access by allied aircraft and ships 
! le airfields and ports of the ANZUS 
I ibers was reaffirmed as essential to the 
! inuing effectiveness of the Alliance. 

3. Council members reviewed a broad 
1 ;e of global issues and regional 
lilopments of concern to the Alliance. 

! ie included the persistent Soviet arms 
1 1-up in the Pacific region as well as in 
I ope; the need for early resumption of 
I s control negotiations; the continuing 
I ession and occupation by Soviet forces in 
: nanistan; and Vietnam's occupation of 

4. The Coimcil members gave special at- 
I ion to arms control and disarmament 

1 es. They recognised that arms control 
; 'ements which produced balanced, effec- 
' and verifiable reductions in armaments 
1 1d assist in reducing international ten- 

Is and in strengthening international 
irity. They agreed that the early conclu- 
of such agreements was of the highest 
ortance. Among arms control measures, a 
5tantial reduction of nuclear weaponry to 
.need, more stable levels was of the 
itest urgency. Council members expressed 
;ern at the Soviet Union's refusal to 
ime the START [strategic arms reduction 
s] and INF [intermediate-range nuclear 

force] talks and called for the resumption of 
those negotiations without delay. They en- 
dorsed efforts by several countries, including 
the United States and Australia, to establish 
a political dialogue with the Soviet Union and 
to make progress on arms control. The New 
Zealand and Australian Council members 
welcomed the readiness of the United States 
to resume negotiations at any time and 
without preconditions on reducmg nuclear 
weapons and its agreement to discuss effec- 
tive and verifiable limits on anti-satellite 
weapons with the Soviet Union. 

5. The Council members reaffirmed their 
strong commitment to preventing the pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons and agreed to 
intensify their efforts to strengthen the inter- 
national non-proliferation regime through 
multilateral and bilateral measures. They 
noted that the third Review Conference of 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons is to take place in 1985. 
Progress in fulfilling all the Treaty com- 
mitments, including Article VI which com- 
mits parties to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessa- 
tion of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date, is important to the international non- 
proliferation regime and the Review Con- 

6. In this context they reaffirmed the 
commitment of their governments to work 
towards the goal of a comprehensive and 
fully verifiable nuclear test ban treaty. They 
expressed satisfaction that the Western 
group of countries in the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva had agreed on a 
draft mandate for the Nuclear Test Ban Ad 
Hoc Committee. They urged the conference 
to move promptly to re-establish the Ad Hoc 
Committee under this mandate. 

7. The Australian and United States 
members affirmed the important contribution 
of the joint Australian/United States defence 
facilities to arms control verification, effec- 
tive deterrence, mutual security and main- 
tenance of the stability of the strategic 

8. The Australian and New Zealand Coun- 
cil members indicated that they shared fully 
the concerns of other countries of the South 
Pacific region on nuclear issues, including 
French nuclear testing. They gave an account 
of the progress made in the discussions 
among members of the South Pacific Forum 
on a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The 
ANZUS partners also noted that the pro- 
posed South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone would 
be discussed further at the 1984 meeting of 
the South Pacific Forum in Tuvalu. 

9. The Council members agreed that a 
convention to prohibit the development, pro- 
duction, stockpiling, transfer and use of 
chemical weapons, with adequate provisions 
for compliance and verification, would be an 
important disarmament measure. The use of 
chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq war and 
evidence of their use elsewhere reinforced 
the need for urgent conclusion of a conven- 
tion to ban chemical weapons. The Australian 
and New Zealand Council members welcomed 
the recent initiative taken by the United 
States Government in the Conference on Dis- 

10. They noted the contribution to world 
peace and security made by the Antarctic 
Treaty which is the basis of international 
cooperation in Antarctica and bans all 
military activities and nuclear weapons there. 
They expressed their continued commitment 
to the Antarctic Treaty system. 

11. The Council members agreed that the 
political and strategic outlook would be great- 
ly influenced by the economic environment 
and that it was crucial to sustain the 
economic recovery and to spread its benefits 
more widely. Equally the debt problem which 
many countries were facing needed to be 
managed effectively. The threat to the world 
trading system posed by the spread of protec- 
tionist measures also needed to be resisted. 
This was particularly so in the field of 
agricultural trade which suffered from long- 
standing protectionist measures and the 
emergence of export subsidization on a scale 
which threatened markets for many com- 

12. Council members welcomed the em- 
phasis placed by the major industrialised 
countries at their recent Summit meeting in 
London on the importance of global economic 
interdependence and expressed the hope that 
the recognition of this interdependence could 
form the basis for future action. The impor- 
tance of interdependence was nowhere more 
evident than in relation to the debt problem 
which required a careful and balanced ap- 
proach. Economic adjustment in the debtor 
countries was seen as an essential condition 
for solving debt problems. At the same time 
a cooperative approach was required from 
the industrialised countries. Assistance to the 
debtor countries had to be provided under 
conditions that recognised the political and 
social difficulties faced by these countries. 
The increasingly important and central role 
in the management of debt problems played 
by the International Monetary Fund was 
welcomed. Now that some of the most heavi- 
ly indebted countries were undertaking the 
first, necessary domestic adjustments, inter- 
national attention was focusing increasingly 
on longer-term changes that may be required 
to strengthen the open trade and payments 
system, with special attention being paid to 
the closely linked problems of debt and trade. 
The work being conducted on these issues by 
a variety of groups reflected an encouraging 
convergence of views. Council members con- 
sidered that this had opened the way for 
discussion and early agreement on practical 
approaches to these issues. 

13. The Council members reviewed devel- 
opments in the South Pacific. They welcomed 
the fact that the area remained one of peace 
and cooperation and that it was firmly at- 
tached to democratic systems and traditional 
values. Change was being accommodated and 
new opportunities were being taken up. The 
independent and self-governing countries of 
the region were strengthening relationships 
with one another and with organisations and 
countries outside the region that had con- 
structive contributions to make. 

14. Council members welcomed progress 
towards self-government in the Trust Ter- 
ritory of the Pacific Islands. They wanted to 
see ratification on the Compact of Free 


Association and termination of the 
Trusteeship concluded without delay and 
looked forward to the Micronesian states ex- 
panding their links with countries and 
organisations in the Pacific region. 

15. Council members agreed that signifi- 
cant progress has been made in constitutional 
evolution in New Caledonia, but noted there 
was a need for continued participation of all 
parties in the constitutional process. Peaceful 
resolution of the situation in that territory 
was of great concern to all countries in the 
area and Council members noted that it was 
important for France to maintain and expand 
its dialogue with South Pacific Forum 
members on this issue. 

16. The Council members agreed on the 
importance of effective regional institutions 
in the area. They noted the major political 
role of the South Pacific Forum in which 
Heads of Government of Island nations and 
Australia and New Zealand were able to 
work towards shared approaclies on current 
issues. Maritime matters, such as fisheries 
cooperation and development, and possible 
nuclear waste dumping were of major con- 
cern to countries of the region. Council 
members commended the valuable work be- 
ing undertaken in these fields by the Forum 
Fisheries Agency and the South Pacific 
Regional Environmental Programme. 
Members agreed they would continue sup- 
porting and encouraging these regional 
cooperative endeavors through financial con- 
tributions or other means. 

17. The Australian and New Zealand 
Council members underlined the significance 
of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the 
Sea for the countries of the Pacific region 
and stressed the importance of wide 
adherence to it. 

18. Recognising that political stability and 
cooperation are underpinned by economic 
security. Council members expressed admira- 
tion for the resilience and good management 
of Island nations which had, overall, enabled 
Island nations to cope with the effects of 
global economic recession and natural 
disasters. They recognised nevertheless that 
continued bilateral and regional aid, and en- 
couragement of trade and investment were 
essential to ensure the well-being of the peo- 
ple of the area, and that such help would be 
mutually beneficial. 

19. Council members reaffirmed their 
desire to work with the (Governments of the 
Pacific Island countries in the interests of the 
stability and security of the region. Australia 
and New Zealand intend to maintain and 
develop their bilateral defence cooperation 
programmes with, and assistance to. Island 
governments in fields such as maritime 
surveillance, civil action, emergency and 
disaster relief and training. The United 
States, for its part, will continue to provide 
assistance in these areas. 

20. The Australian and New Zealand 
members provided details of recent national 
initiatives designed to reinforce the main- 
tenance of regional security and stabiUty. The 
New Zealand member explained that the New 
Zealand Defence Review completed in 1983 

placed greater emphasis on the role of the 
New Zealand Armed Services to provide 
assistance if requested to South Pacific coun- 
tries. The Australian member informed the 
Council that the Australian Government's of- 
fer to develop a Pacific patrol boat to meet 
the Island countries' expressed maritime 
surveillance needs had been accepted by 
several South Pacific countries. 

21. Council members emphasised their 
continuing support for the Association of 
South East Asian Nations and welcomed the 
contribution ASEAN makes towards the 
stability and economic progress of the region. 
The Council members also noted the increas- 
ing significance of their own economic and 
political links with the ASEAN countries. 

22. Council members expressed full sup- 
port for the principles adopted by ASEAN in 
the search for a lasting settlement in Kam- 
puchea. They reaffirmed their conviction that 
the conflict in Kampuchea should be settled 
by peaceful means. They agreed that a 
negotiated settlement should be based on 
respect for the independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Kampuchea, 
should take into account the desirability of 
national reconciliation and should recognise 
the legitimate security interest of all parties 
concerned. To this end, they again urged the 
early withdrawal of Vietnamese troops under 
conditions that would allow for a peaceful 
transition and a comprehensive settlement 
which would enable the Khmer people freely 
to decide their own future. Members wel- 
comed the continuing humanitarian assistance 
offered by the international community to the 
Khmer people. 

23. Council members' trade within the 
Asian/Pacific region is now larger than with 
any other group of countries. This reflected 
not only the continuing strong growth in 
their trade with Northeast Asia, but also an 
increasingly dynamic element in economic 
relations with the ASEAN countries. They 
agreed that the growing strength of trade 
and investment ties with ASEAN reinforced 
the importance of political relationships. 

24. Recent visits by President Reagan 
and Prime Minister Hawke to China were 
discussed. The Council members agreed that 
China's continued commitment to modernisa- 
tion and to constructive relations with others 
in the region was a positive development 
which should be encouraged. 

25. The Council members welcomed the 
steps taken by Japan to move towards 
liberalising access to its market and ex- 
pressed the hope that this process would be 
maintained and accelerated to the benefit of 
international trade as a whole. The Council 
members noted the strengthening of Japan's 
ties with the nations of Southeast Asia and 
the South Pacific, including its contribution in 
the field of development assistance. They also 
noted Japan's commitment to an enhanced 
capability for self-defense purposes. 

26. Council members reaffirmed their 
commitment to the sovereignty and in- 
dependence of the Republic of Korea. They 
called upon the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea to renounce its policies of hostility 

towards the Republic of Korea, as evidenced 
by last year's bombing in Rangoon, and to ai 
cept proposals aimed at reducing tensions on 
the Peninsula through the implementation ot 
practical confidence-building measures. The 
Council members reaffirmed their view that 
direct negotiations between the two Koreas 
provides the only realistic basis for a durablt 
reconciliation. Noting that a reduction of ten 
sions would considerably enhance regional 
security, they called upon the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea to enter into 
negotiations with the Republic of Korea as ji 
genuinely equal participant. 

27. Council members reaffirmed their oj 
position to the continued Soviet occupation ( 
Afghanistan and condemned the recent 
Soviet offensive which had caused con- 
siderable suffering and loss of life among th 
Afghan people. Council members called on ' 
the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces in a 
cordance with successive United Nations 

28. Council members exchanged views c 
developments in the Indian Ocean region an 
noted the strategic significance of the regio 
The Australian Council member informed tl 
meeting that the Australian Government ha 
adopted guidelines for a comprehensive and 
integrated approach to Indian Ocean issues 
which included support for an Indian Ocean 
Zone of Peace. 

29. The Council members expressed the 
concern at the serious loss of life and the ri 
to peace and security in the Gulf resulting 
from continuation of the war between Iran 
and Iraq. They deplored all attacks on ship- 
ping in the area and called on both countrif 
to respect the right of free navigation for a 
non-belligerent shipping. They expressed 
their support for the security and territorij 
integrity of all states in the area, in accord 
ance with the Charter of the United Natior 
The Council members also urged Iran and 
Iraq to act with restraint and expressed th 
hope that the two countries would seek wa 
of bringing the conflict to an end and resti 
ing peace to this area. 

30. It was agreed that the next Counci 
meeting would take place in Canberra in 
1985 at a date to be decided. 




JULY 17, 1984'^ 

Foreign Minister Cooper. Before I 
open the news conference, 1 should s£ 
just that as chairman, we have had a 
very good discussion in regard to 
ANZUS. Obviously, in the circumstan 
one would have believed going into th 
conference, it was difficult to approac 
the issues. We did approach the issue 
that were before us, and I believe tha» 
has been very beneficial. There are sc 
issues that, as the outgoing Minister > 
Foreign Affairs, I did not promote or 
provoke. The questions that I believe 
you are going to ask should be substa 






i and directed to all elements of 
ZUS; not just the particular issue 
t you may think is the only thing in 
ZUS. However, knowing the news 
dia, you will ask what you wish to. I 
V hand the news conference over to 

I people. Welcome. It's nice to see a 
group of people trying to give to the 

iple of the Western alliance — and 
ibably the Eastern bloc— but par- 
ilarly Australia, New Zealand, and 
lerica more news of what we have 
m talking about here in Wellington in 
rather inclement weather. 

Q. The communique seems to give 
airly clear indication to the incom- 
; labor government of the ANZUS 
•tners' attitude to ship visits. What 

II Mr. Hawke be telling Mr. Lange, 
i what will you be telling Mr. 

nge of the Australian Labor Party's 
w on it? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. I don't 
:)w what Mr. Hawke will be telling 

Lange. You will have to ask him, 
1 if I discuss anything with Mr. 
nge, it will be a private discussion. I 
uldn't propose to discuss that public- 

Q. Would you say that you are ir- 
lated at the current labor policy? 

■ Foreign Minister Hayden. I leave 

■ Labor Party of New Zealand to 
re\op its own policy just as we develop 

i-s. While we are fraternally asso- 
ted to the Socialist International and 
re many sentiments commonly shared 
•ause we are both Labor Parties and 
I ■ countries which are close to one 
)ther — and not just geographic- 
/ — we nonetheless are quite separate 
i independent entities. 

Q. What would you think would be 
! effect on your antinuclear lobby in 
stralia on a nuclear-free New 

Foreign Minister Hayden. I'm not a 
■mber of the antinuclear lobby in 
stralia. On the contrary. So it's not 
ich good asking me what they might 

Q. Will they take strength from a 
clear-free New Zealand? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. I've just 
plained to you, it's not much good ask- 
f me. I'm rather prejudiced in views 

that particular subject. You'd better 
"K them. 

Q. If the Labor Party does carry 
t its policy of banning the visits of 
[Clear ships here, would it be the 
d of ANZUS? 

Secretary Shultz. We'll have to see 
what happens. And I think it's better to 
stay away from iffy questions, to state 
our positions clearly, and to work with 
the new government and see if we can't 
resolve the problem satisfactorily. 

Q. In Washington last year, the 
treaty partners noted the importance 
of the visits of ships and aircraft to 
the treaty partners. This year all of 
the sudden, it is "essential." I was 
wondering what has happened in the 
last 12 months to bring about such a 
change of emphasis. 

Secretary Shultz. I think it's just a 
question of people looking for different 
words. It's obviously essential to any 
alliance that military forces of the coun- 
tries involved be able to have contact 
with each other, and that's as true today 
as it has been for 33 years. 

Foreign Minister Hayden. If you 
look at that, I think that it is referring 
to a nuclear-free South Pacific, and in a 
different context. I think if you look at 
what I said in 1982 when the issue of 
ship visits arose in Australia, when I 
was leader of the opposition, we made a 
rather unsteady start, but we estab- 
lished beyond any doubt what our posi- 
tion was within a few weeks. And that 
was that we recognized that, as far as 
Australia was concerned, ships visits 
were essential. 

In respect of aircraft, we allow air- 
craft visits. There are special arrange- 
ments in respect of B-.52s. That is quite 
implicit in the last sentence of the sec- 
ond paragraph of page one. At the na- 
tional conference of the Labor Party last 
week, the principles I've just outlined to 
you were principles I staunchly pre- 
sented and successfully defended. So the 
attitudes of the Labor Party in these 
respects has been on the table for some 
time and adhered to. 

Q. Between 1964 and 1976. suc- 
cessive governments in New Zea- 
land — Conservative and Labor — 
banned visits of nuclear ships. In that 
same period, for a considerable time, 
successive Australian Governments 
did the same thing. Why is it now, in 
the words of the communique, essen- 
tial to the continuing effectiveness of 

Secretary Shultz. I don't think that 
your initial proposition is precisely right. 
At the same time, nuclear-powered ships 
are becoming more and more common, 
because it is the efficient way in which 
to power many kinds of ships and sub- 
marines. So they are much more impor- 
tant in the total fleet structure than 
they were at one time. If you say you 
ban nuclear-powered ships, you are 

referring to a high proportion of the 
total ships. Beyond that, you shy away 
from the weapon that has provided the 
main deterrent and has kept the peace 
against the Soviet Union's very large 
nuclear arsenal. So this is part and 
parcel of what it takes to keep the 
peace. These are peacekeeping forces, 
and they represent a substantial fraction 
of the total. 

Q. Is it or is it not essential that 
your ships be allowed into member na- 
tion ports for the continuation of the 
ANZUS treaty? 

Secretary Shultz. Of course. What 
kind of an alliance is it that military 
forces of the countries involved are not 
able to be in contact with each other? 
Let me ask you to turn the proposition 
around. In my many visits to this part of 
the world, I'm thinking back 5, 6, and 7 
years ago, people often tackled me, say- 
ing, "Is the United States ready to pay 
the attention to this part of the world 
that it should? Why don't we see more 
evidence of U.S. interest? Why don't we 
see more people here? Why don't we see 
more of your military presence here to 
show us that you are really involved?" 
You have to ask yourself what kind of 
an alliance would it be if the United 
States said we wouldn't send our 
military forces to this area. The whole 
point of the alliance is that it is a secu- 
rity alliance. The whole part of it is that 
if one of our countries gets in serious 
trouble, as reflected in the alliance, we 
will help each other. That help takes 
many forms but the essence of it is 
security; that is what it's about. 

Q. There have been suggestions 
from visiting Congressmen that, 
should New Zealand ban nuclear ship 
visits, this could well invoke trade 
sanctions in the United States against 
New Zealand export. Is that the policy 
of the government that you represent? 

Secretary Shultz. No. it isn't. The 
ANZUS alliance is a security and 
military alliance. That's what we are 
discussing here. The relationship be- 
tween the people of New Zealand and 
the people of the United States is over a 
century and a half old. It's been a warm 
and deep relationship for a long time, 
and it will continue that way. We look 
forward to working in a cooperative 
manner with the new Government of 
New Zealand and any Government of 
New Zealand that comes along. 

Q. Are you able to broaden the 
scope of ANZUS to make it much 
more of an economic agreement? 


Secretary Shultz. No. ANZUS is 
not an economic agreement in any 
sense. It is a security agreement. That is 
the extent of it— that is the sum and 
substance of it— and economic arrange- 
ments and cultural arrangements and all 
sorts of other ways in which our coun- 
tries are in contact with each other are 
separate matters. 

Q. You referred yesterday to a 
resolute commitment, such as that em- 
bodied in the ANZUS treaty, to come 
to the defense of a valued ally. If the 
New Zealand Government carried out 
its policy of banning nuclear weapons, 
does that mean that the United States 
would no longer come to the defense 
of New Zealand in a controversy. 

Secretary Shultz. I have just said at 
least once that I'm not going to get in- 
volved in iffy questions. We have some 
problems here, and we will work at 
them, and I think some discussion is 
called for. There are a lot of aspects to 
this matter that need to be studied by 
any new government, I know. I found 
myself when I entered government that 
there were a lot of things I found out 
about that I didn't know when I was not 
in the government that represent impor- 
tant aspects of this relationship. So at 
any rate, I think what is called for here 
is some patience, and we'll try to work 
our way through these problems. 

I might take notice of the fact that a 
year ago there was a new Australian 
Government, we took the same approach 
with the new Australian Government. 
We had a thorough review of the 
ANZUS alliance. We had a long and 
searching meeting in Washington with 
Foreign Minister Hayden. We had 
discussions with Prime Minister Hawke 
in Washington, and I've met with him 
here. The problems have been worked 
out in a very satisfactory way. The 
Labor Government in Australia has 
adapted it to its needs, and I think it is 
stronger than ever insofar as Australia 
is concerned. We'll work at it in connec- 
tion with New Zealand in the same way. 

Q. You talked about review with 
Australia. Would you consider 
renegotiations as the New Zealand 
Labor Party's policy suggests'? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't think 
there is anything really to renegotiate 
about it. But certainly we wanted to 
stress the alliance and what it means, 
what it implies, and what the various 
countries get out of it. And I think that 
such a thorough examination will lead 
people to the same conclusion that was 
reached last year; namely, that it is of 

tremendous benefit to all of the coun- 
tries involved. After all, we are talking 
about the defenses of a country that is 
very precious. It is a very precious thing 
to have freedom, to have the freedom to 
change government by a vote, to live 
under the rule of law. There are a lot of 
people in this world who don't have the 
rule of law. There are a lot of people in 
this world who don't have those 
privileges, and all you have to do is talk 
to some people who don't have them or 
talk to some people who have recently 
acquired them and you find out their 
significance and importance. What we 
are talking about here is a treaty that 
has helped to preserve those values and 
extend them in this part of the world 
and which has played its part— just as 
the NATO alliance has played its part in 
Europe — in keeping the peace for a long 
period of time. This is an alliance for 
peace, and it has worked. 

Q. With the need for access by 
allied aircraft to airfields and ports of 
ANZUS members, are you looking for 
restricted access to Australian air- 
fields by B-52 bombers? 

Secretary Shultz. No, we are talk- 
ing about the fact that, for example, 
there are resupply flights — cargo flights, 
military cargo flights — that come into 
Christchurch, say to resupply Antarctic 
stations. The same thing is true with 
respect to some facilities in Australia. 
There are B-52 training tlights and 
through flights of various kinds. It's that 
sort of thing that is being referred to. 

Foreign Minister Hayden. Can I 
add one note, so there's no misunder- 
standing. There are special ar- 
rangements in respect to B-.52s, but 
Secretary of State Shultz should also 
have mentioned that we have regular 
joint military operations of exercise with 
New Zealand and the United States. 
They involve air units as much as 
ground forces and naval units. So in that 
sense, we've got to have this sort of pro- 
vision. Otherwise, if there were any pro- 
hibition against aircraft movements, 
there would be no exercises. No exer- 
cise, no military association. Therefore, 
there would not be in any meaningful 
sense for us in Australia — and I speak 
only for us in Australia — a military 

Q. In the context of regional 
security, was the question of a Pacific 
ready-reaction force discussed? And if 
so, how wide was the discussion? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. I don't 
know anything about a Pacific ready- 
reaction force, I'm afraid. 


Q. Could you clarify that point? Is 
it that you believe the agreement is 
not negotiable? 

Secretary Shultz. It is an agree- 
ment. And it stands on its feet. And I 
believe that careful examination, in a 
realistic and thoughtful way, of what it 
has accomplished — how it works, what 
it means to the various countries in 
volved — will lead to the conclusion that 
it is a very good thing. But, of course, 
that is up to each country to determine 
and review for itself. It has stood the 
test of 33 years. It has stood the test oi 
a lot of change around the world. It hai 
stood the test of changes of governmen 
in all three of the countries involved, sc 
it must have something good about it 
And I think when you look at it careful 
ly, the good will shines through very, 
very strongly. 

Q. But as far as you're concerned 
a nuclear-free New Zealand means nt 
treaty as far as we're concerned? 

Secretary Shultz. I have tried to 
state my position on that, and I won't 
try to restate it. 

Q. Aren't you waving a big stick 
over a fairly small matter? 

Secretary Shultz. No, I don't thinl 
liberty and freedom and the rule of lav 
are small matters. And the defense of 
them is the most important thing that 
we have to do. These matters are the 
essence of our society in the United 
States, and I believe — from what I km 
of the societies of Australia and New 
Zealand — these values are highly prize 
And if you say that you won't defend 
them, pretty soon you're not going to 
have them. 

Q. So a handful of visits of nucla 
vessels to New Zealand ports is vita( 
to the freedom of — 

Secretary Shultz. If you're going 
have a military alliance, then the 
military forces of the countries involve 
have to interact. They have to talk to 
each other. They have to know the 
equipment that's involved. They have 
plan. They have to exercise. They hav 
to train themselves. All these things a 
just commonplace. There's nothing ag- 
gressive about the forces of the ANZI 
alliance. It is a defensive alliance. In 
order to deter aggression, it has to be 
credible deterrent. And a credible deti 
rent is one that people know is kept u 
to scratch and is worked on constantly 
And that's the essence of what our 
armed forces do all over the world. 

Q. Mr. Shultz has told us that 
things change once you get to gover 
ment. That was your experience, pai 
ticularly with the ANZUS agreemen 


ihat do you think Mr. Lange might 
1 told that might change his mind? 
Foreign Minister Hayden. Nothing 

• mued since we got into government, 
i-fspect to ANZUS, we declared 

)(nro we got into government that we 
Auilil .'^eek a review. When we got into 
;\ (Tiiment, we pursued that. It was, as 

Shultz pointed out, a quite thorough 
sessment of the ANZUS agreement 
it was conducted in Washington last 
ir. So there was a change in that 
5pect. What happened was that with 

experience that we had in govern- 
mt, there was a consolidation of our 
tnmitment to ANZUS. There has 
ver been any disagreement between 
y of the major political parties in 
istralia in regard to ANZUS. 
lything that might be discussed with 
•. Lange is something for discussion 
th Mr. Lange, not on the public plat- 


Q. Recognizing the importance of 
E alliance, is it imperative that New 
laland change its stand? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. That's 

• New Zealand to decide, and Mr. 
ultz said much earlier that time was 

ieded to sort this problem out. I don't 
(ve his exact words. As far as I'm con- 
!"ned — I quote the situation as 
! istralia sees it, I am not talking for 
I'w Zealand— there are other people to 
! that. 

Q. If New Zealand was to stand 
m, would that put increasing 
iBssure — 

Foreign Minister Hayden. You're in 
3 area of hypotheses now and as Mr. 
ultz said, he's not in the iffy business, 
d I'm not in the hj^pothesis business. 

Q. It's no hypothesis. It's Labor — 

Foreign Minister Hayden. Excuse 

; a minute, gentlemen. Let me tell you 

mething. You're out of luck. I've been 

this game a long time and I'm not go- 

g to be drawn in. 

Q. Labor has said here that they 
3n't negotiate their position — 

Foreign Minister Cooper. Excuse 
i9 a minute, ladies and gentlemen. We 
I'.ve been in an ANZUS conference a 
,y and a half. We had a very wide 
:enda— East-West relationships, com- 
ehensive nuclear test bans, disarma- 
ent, arms control, the problems of con- 
ct in various parts of the globe, the in- 
rnational economic situation and I 
ink we are starting to regurgitate ex- 
■tly the same questions. 

I do believe that if the relationships 
nong the three countries are as we 
ive discussed them — last year in 
'ashington, this year, and on many 

other previous occasions — there must be 
other subjects rather than picking away 
at this particular one. Because I believe 
that the U.S. Secretary of State has 
answered the same question four or five 
times, and I think that Mr. Hayden is in 
exactly the same situation. Is there 
anyone here that is slightly interested in 
arms control and disarmament, for in- 

Q. Are there any plans for nuclear- 
powered ships to visit New Zealand in 
the ne.\t 6 months? 

Secretary Shultz. We don't confirm 
or deny anything about any particular 
ship. And so I'll just have to stick with 
that policy. 

Q. Nuclear-powered ship? 

Secretary Shultz. No, not that I 
know of. Admiral Crowe is here. Is that 
the right answer? 

Admiral Crowe. There are no ships 
in the next few months. 

Q. On this issue of Australian sup- 
port for the Indian Ocean zone of 
peace, does that mean that this will 
involve our projection or nonprojec- 
tion of power in keeping warships out 
of the area? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. If you've 
got a zone of peace, it is highly likely 
that there will be no combatant ships in 
the area, certainly no outside ones. But 
we're a long way from that. We're a 
long way from formulating the prin- 
ciples that people might address 
themselves to all that we're working 
toward at the moment, which is as much 
as we can hope to achieve as the first 
step, is a consensus for the littoral na- 
tions and the superpowers that some 
sort of conference should go ahead. And 
when we do that, then we can sit down 
and start sorting out what the agenda is 
and what the principles will be. So it's 
going to be a long task. Now you might 
be impatient with that. So am I. But I 

Status of Conference on 
Disarmament in Europe 

JULY 17, 19841 

Today, I met with Ambassardor James 
E. Goodby, the chief of the U.S. delega- 
tion to the Conference on Confidence- 
and Security-Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe. This con- 
ference, commonly known as the CDE 
or the Stockholm conference, involves 
the United States, Canada, and 33 Euro- 
pean nations and is part of the East- 
West dialogue which originated in the 
Helsinki accords of 1975. 

Ambassador Goodby briefed me on 
the second round of the conference, 
which has just concluded, and on the 
prospects for progress when the talks 
resume in September. He noted the con- 
tinuing efforts of the United States and 
our NATO allies to achieve an outcome 
which will genuinely increase mutual 
confidence and reduce the risk of war in 
Europe. Earlier, in the first round of the 
conference, the West put forward a 
package of concrete proposals designed 
to achieve these goals. 

In an effort to achieve progress in 
Stockholm, I announced in June in my 
address to the Irish Parliament that the 
United States is prepared to consider 

the Soviet proposal for a declaration on 
the non-use of force if the Soviet Union 
is willing to discuss concrete measures 
to put that principle into action. We are 
disappointed, however, that the Soviet 
Union has so far failed to join the great 
majority of the 35 participating nations 
at Stockholm which have demonstrated 
a desire to begin such concrete negotia- 

I assured Ambassador Goodby that 
he has my continuing strong support in 
our efforts to get on with the practical 
negotiations for which this conference 
was intended. We will continue to do our 
best to achieve progress at Stockholm, 
just as we and our allies are working 
hard together in other multilateral areas 
of arms control — such as the East-West 
conventional force talks in Vienna and 
the 40-Nation Conference on Disarma- 
ment in Geneva. 

We are equally ready to seek resolu- 
tions to bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms con- 
trol issues on a flexible basis, but there 
must, of course, be a willingness on both 
sides to engage in practical discussions. 
We, for our part, will not be found 

'Text from White House press release. 



can't help it. That's the experience that 
we're running into. 

Q. Was there any discussion at the 
council meeting on your proposal put 
to ASEAN last week for a conference 
on Kampuchea to be held in Australia? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. No, it 
went on the back burner. In fact, I think 
it may have gone over the back of the 

Q. Are you happy that this ANZUS 
council meeting went ahead, consider- 
ing that the administration that you've 
been talking with will be out of office 
next week? 

Secretary Shultz. I think we should 
carry on with our plans. We had a very 
good exchange of views among us, and I 
think it's been quite a worthwhile 
meeting. It's also, I think, a good oppor- 
tunity to meet the incoming government, 
and I was struck by the extraordinary 
courtesy which Mr. Lange extended to 
me and to Mr. Hayden in coming to the 
airport and greeting us. It was a very 
generous gesture on his part, and I'm 
sure both of us look forward to having a 
chance to talk with him before we leave. 
So I think in some ways, it's worked out 
quite fortuitously. 

Q. I'd like to ask a question of 
Foreign Minister Hayden and 
Secretary Shultz. Should the ANZUS 
treaty become ineffective, would you 
seek to create some bilateral security 
arrangements between Australia and 
the United States? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. We see 
it as effective right at this point, and as 
I said earlier, I'm not in the area of 
hypothesis. If anything happens later on, 
I guess we would look at it. At this 
point, it hasn't happened. 

Secretary Shultz. Ditto. 

Q. Could you tell me what hap- 
pened at the conference on the issue 
of French nuclear testing? 

Foreign Minister Cooper. We've 
really left that to a great degree to the 
forum in Tuvalu. We're aware of the 
situation in regard to possible moves 
toward a South Pacific nuclear-free 
zone, but I think that it might be a good 
idea if you directed that question to Mr. 
Hayden, in regard to the initiative the 
Australians have taken in this area. 

Foreign Minister Hayden. We have 
protested regularly, in fact on every oc- 
casion there has been a nuclear test, to 
the French and publicly. They continue 
to test. They make it clear that the pro- 
gram is in place, and they will pursue it. 
I would hope that one day they will be 
able to carry out laboratory tests. I'm 

not sure how you do that — it will be 
very interesting — but until then, they 
will continue to test in the South Pacific. 
I guess that's a long time. 

At our recent national conference, 
one of the decisions taken was the deci- 
sion that there would be no further ex- 
ports of uranium to France while it con- 
tinues to carry out these nuclear tests. 
That decision was effective forthwith. It 
involves the cancellation of contracted 
uranium sales in excess of $1.30 million. 
In turn, I expect that will involve a fair- 
ly substantial compensation payment 
from Australia. And although this is not 
enforceable as law, I think there's a 
general feeling there will be an obliga- 
tion to meet it. 

Q. Last year our Prime 
Minister — our out-going Prime 
Minister — said that he'd been given a 
date as to when the French testing 
would end. Do you know the date? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. No. I 
spoke to the French afterwards, and I 
got the impression that they didn't. They 
said quite explicitly they didn't have any 
date in mind. 

Q. You called for a report on the 
prospect of mainland France nuclear 
testing being carried out there. Have 
you had that report back yet? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. I read 
that in the National Times and the guy 
who wrote it is over there [pointing]. He 
keeps telling me I told him, and I keep 
saying I didn't so I've decided I'd better 
fix it up by putting in a request for such 
a report, and I did that 2 weeks ago. 

Q. Returning to the French 
nuclear testing question. There are 
some documents that fell out of the 
back of the Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs here in Wellington some weeks 
ago that suggest New Zealand doesn't 
take a very strong line in opposition t 
that testing. Indeed, it featured, in 
part of the recent trade, talks as a 
trade-off if those documents are to be 
believed. Do you find that a matter tc 

Foreign Minister Hayden. These 
are New Zealand foreign affairs 
documents? I don't know anything abon 

Foreign Minister Cooper. I find it 
matter of regret that journalists would 
believe anything that fell out of The Ne 
Zealand Times. They are not authentic. 
They were taken by one official, in my 
belief. They were given to the media. 
They had a slant on them, and to sug- 
gest that I, as the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Overseas Trade, had an 
under-the-counter deal with the French 
Foreign Minister or the French Trade 
Minister or Agricultural Minister, is 
abolutely nonsensical, and you should t 
aware of that. 

'Held at the U.S. Embassy (press relea 
166 of July 18, 1984). 

^Press release 162 of July 12. 

^Press release 164. 

''Press release 171 of July 20. 

^Made at the luncheon for the ANZUS 
council (press release 196 of July 19), 

^Press release 174 of July 23. ■ 


Proposed Outer Space Negotiations 

JUNE 29, 1984' 

The U.S. Government has taken note of 
the statement by the Soviet Government 
proposing a meeting of delegations in 
September to begin negotiations on "pre- 
venting the militarization of outer 
space." The militarization of space began 
when the first ballistic missiles were 
tested and when such missiles and other 
weapons systems using outer space 
began to be deployed. The U.S. Govern- 
ment, therefore, draws attention to the 
pressing need for the resumption of 
negotiations aimed at a radical reduction 
of nuclear weapons, on a balanced and 
verifiable basis. 

Therefore, the U.S. (Government 1 
informed the Government of the Sovii 
Union that it is prepared to meet will 
the Soviet Union in September, at an,\ 
location agreeable to the Soviet Unioi 
and the government of the country 
where the meeting is held, for the 
following purposes: (1) to discuss and ji' 
define mutually agreeable arrangemer« *^ 
under which negotiations on the re- 
duction of strategic and intermediate- 
range nuclear weapons can be resume 
and (2) to discuss and seek agreement 
on feasible negotiating approaches wh *?' 
could lead to verifiable and effective ''•' 
limitations on antisatellite weapons. W* 
will also be prepared to discuss any 
other arms control concerns or other 
matters of interest to both sides. 






We will continue contacts with the 
viet Union through diplomatic chan- 
Is on arrangements for these 
ptember talks. 

ILY 27, 19842 

lis morning's TABS statement 
srepresents our position, which is that 
; have accepted the Soviet proposal 
r discussions in Vienna in September 
thout preconditions. Our preparations 
e continuing vigorously, and we expect 
be in Vienna. We do not believe that 
ch discussions are impossible, and we 
e continuing to deal with this subject 
private diplomatic channels. 

The U.S. finds it very disturbing 
at the Soviets portray the United 
ates as responsible for the breakdown 
the nuclear negotiations in Geneva 
len the world knows the Soviets 
liked out of those discussions. Already 
isting nuclear systems deserve our 
ost urgent attention. If the Soviets do 
it choose to listen to our views on this 
bject, they need not, but, for us, and 
r mankind, this subject is too impor- 
nt to ignore. This U.S. approach does 
it represent a precondition. We will 
ike whatever the Soviets say on anti- 
I tellite weapons seriously and respond 
I nstructively. We simply point out that 
' ? wish to restore exchanges on the 
I bject of offensive nuclear arms. The 
irld has a right to expect the U.S.S.R. 
id the United States to maintain such 


UG. 1. 19843 

le United States had made clear to the 
)viet Government in a series of high- 
vel messages that it accepts the Soviet 
nion's June 29 proposal and is 
•epared for serious talks in Vienna on 
iter space, including antisatellite 
eapons. We have expressed our view 
lat the problem of weapons in space 
mnot be considered in isolation from 
le overall strategic relationship but 
lat we have no preconditions for the 
ienna agenda. 

Despite this clearly stated, positive 
and on our part, the Soviet Union has 
leged that the United States has re- 
efed the Soviet proposal. The latest 
(oscow press briefing repeated these 
larges, despite the clear statement of 
le U.S. position in a series of high-level 
lessages conveyed to the Soviet 
■overnment in diplomatic channels. 

In our communications with the 
Soviets, we have stated our view that 
their proposal for a conference on the 
"militarization of outer space" is an "ex- 
cellent idea" and that we are prepared 
to have a U.S. delegation in Vienna on 
September 18 to engage in such negotia- 

We recently presented a proposal 
for a possible joint Soviet-American an- 
nouncement on the content and objective 
of the Vienna talks. This proposal states 
explicitly that the aim of the talks 
should be to work out and conclude 
agreements concerning the militarization 
of outer space, including antisatellite 
systems and other aspects of this issue. 

In response to the Soviet proposal of 
a mutual moratorium on antisatellite 
tests from the outset of the talks, the 
United States expressed a readiness to 
have our negotiators consider what 
mutual restraints would be appropriate 
during the course of negotiations. The 
latest Soviet statements have converted 
this proposal into a precondition, a 

transformation which suggests a dis- 
ingenuous Soviet approach. We continue 
to believe that possible mutual restraints 
are an appropriate subject for the 
negotiations. The joint statement, 
however, should not prejudge the out- 
come of these negotiations. 

The Soviet Union has repeatedly 
misrepresented the U.S. position regard- 
ing the opening of arms control talks 
between our two countries in Vienna. 
From this latest Soviet statement, it ap- 
pears that the Soviets were not serious 
about their proposal. We regret this. As 
noted above, we have consistently ac- 
cepted their proposal to meet in Vienna. 
We prefer that this matter be dealt with 
in diplomatic channels. 

'Made by Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of July 2, 1984). 

^Text from White House press release. 

^Made by Ambassador McFarlane (text 
from White House press release). ■ 

The U.S.-China Trade 

by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Address before the National Council 
for United States-China, Trade on 
May 31, 1984. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assist- 
ant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 

I don't need to tell you who are gathered 
here today that doing business in China 
is seldom doing "business as usual." You 
who have been engaged in doing 
business in China have, indeed, been do- 
ing business as extraordinary: under 
special and ever-changing circumstances 
and in a still uncertain investment 
climate. But most extraordinary is the 
contribution that your endeavors make 
to U.S. foreign policy; and it is that con- 
tribution which I would like to acknowl- 
edge at the outset here today. 

Building a Comprehensive 

When President Nixon traveled to China 
in 1972, our economic and cultural rela- 
tions were almost nonexistent. The focus 
of the relationship was almost entirely 
our shared strategic concerns over 
Soviet power and expansion. By con- 
trast, during his recent trip, President 
Reagan devoted perhaps 50% of his 

discussions with the Chinese Premier to 
economic and trade concerns. Our coun- 
tries have developed a vital and growing 
economic relationship. This organization 
and some of the people in this room had 
a good deal to do with that growth. 

Some would go so far as to say that 
the remarkable growth in our economic 
ties has brought us to a point where 
economic interests have replaced 
strategic interests as the focus of our 
relationship. That, however, would be 
wrong. Our economic relations are, in- 
deed, extremely important. But our 
strategic interests also remain as 
important today as they were when 
President Nixon opened the way to 

We do not expect an alliance with 
China, nor are we playing cards. Indeed, 
we don't think that a successful long- 
term relationship— and that is what we 
seek— can be built on a basis that makes 
our relations with one country depend- 
ent on tactical shifts in our relations 
with another. 

Rather, our strategic relationship 
rests on common concerns about the 
growth of Soviet military power and the 
tendency to use that power— whether by 


the Soviets themselves, as in Afghani- 
stan, or by their allies and proxies, as in 
Kampuchea. We have some important 
differences with China on international 
questions, differences that the Chinese 
are at pains to highlight, lest we— or 
others— forget that China has an inde- 
pendent foreign policy. But our common 
concerns create important common in- 
terests in resisting Soviet pressures and 
in seeking changes in Soviet policies that 
would genuinely reduce tensions in the 
region and in the world. This remains a 
central element in our relations. 

We also have increasingly important 
cultural ties with China. The Chinese 
have sent some 12,000 of their brightest 
students to study in this country, and 
we have extensive exchanges of our own 
in China. These exchanges may be our 
most important legacy to the future ties 
between our countries. These students 
will one day form a core of understand- 
ing that will speed our efforts, just as 
our relations in the early 1970s were 
spurred by a long history of ties before 

In short, we have today neither a 
predominantly economic nor a predomi- 
nantly strategic relationship but rather a 
comprehensive one, in which each ele- 
ment reinforces the others. Indeed, the 
economic progress that your group has 
helped to build, important in itself, is 
also an important element in the 
strategic equation. 

Over the last 12 years, our bilateral 
relationship with China has grown richer 
and deeper, the range of our cooperative 
endeavors broader, and the opportuni- 
ties for future cooperation more 
numerous than before. Both sides have 
put aside the myths, unrealistic expecta- 
tions, and, frankly, the impossible 
demands of the past. As Secretary 
Shultz has said, we seek a relationship 
that is no longer subject to the alternat- 
ing cycles of euphoria and depression 
that have characterized the past, but one 
which rests on a stronger, more stable 
foundation. Of equal significance, we 
seek such a relationship without sacri- 
ficing the principles and friendships our 
nations value. 

The distance we have traveled and 
the benefits we have gained from im- 
proving relations with China are perhaps 
most clearly seen not in what is but in 
what was. We need only think back to 
the open hostilities of the 1950s or to 
the antagonism of the 1960s to realize 
the costs that a return to confrontation 
in our relations would impose. 

The Trade Dimension 

Today, I would like to discuss the dimen- 
sion of our relationship with China that 
is of particular interest to this group- 
trade. In trade, as elsewhere, we have 
too often been the victims of our own 
euphoria. Often, in the past, people have 
been mesmerized by the thought of a 
market with four times as many con- 
sumers as our own. We have an obliga- 
tion equally to avoid wishful thinking 
and jaundiced pessimism and to judge 
prospects realistically. 

The unembellished record to date is 
itself impressive. Since normalization of 
relations, our two-way trade has grown 
fourfold, from $1.1 billion in 1978 to 
$4.4 billion last year. Our trade has, to 
be sure, not grown steadily. U.S. ex- 
ports, particularly of agricultural prod- 
ucts, have been volatile. 

While our total trade with China 
does not involve large sums in terms of 
our overall trade worldwide, trade with 
China can be, and is, very important to 
particular enterprises and sectors of our 
economy— some of which are well repre- 
sented in this room. 

Today, I would like to discuss three 
principles that seem to me particularly 
important as guides for the govern- 
ment's approach to this important area 
of our relationship. 

First, that an economically moder- 
nizing China is in both our countries' in- 

Second, that it should be the role of 
the government to facilitate and further 
trade, though not at the expense of our 

Third, that in the trade area, as in 
other areas, it is important that both 
sides live up to the agreements that they 

I need hardly elaborate for those in 
this room the economic benefits a 
modernizing China could bring to U.S. 
business. But, as I suggested earlier, 
economic benefits are only part of what 
we might hope for from a modernizing 
China. We believe that an increasingly 
prosperous China will be more stable, 
more secure, and more able to resist 
outside pressure and intimidation. That 
serves American interests as well, both 
globally and regionally. A modernizing 
China that is more integrated with the 
world economy will develop important 
trading ties to other Asian and Pacific 
nations. Such ties help to reinforce the 
constructive trends in China's interna- 
tional role, trends from which the 
United States and our friends and allies 
in Asia benefit. 


The Chinese see our willingness to 
cooperate in their modernization efforts 
as an important element in their pros- 
pects for success and in our relations. 
We have declared ourselves— and shown 
ourselves— willing to help. 

The President made the most tangi- 
ble expression of his desire to see China 
modernize last spring, when he directed 
that China should be treated as a \ 

"friendly, nonallied" country with ' 

respect to exports of high technology. 
Guidelines published last November 
raised the levels of technology that 
would generally be made available to 
China in seven important product 
categories. The level of permitted 
exports of computers, scientific in- 
struments, and microelectronic manufac- 
turing equipment, to name three impor- 
tant examples, were raised significantly. 
Roughly 75% of all applications we are 
now receiving for high-technology ex- 
ports to China are processed under the 
new, expeditious guidelines. And we are 
working now on liberalized guidelines 
for 10 additional product categories 
which should cover a further 10%-15% 
of license applications. 

As expected, the new policy has 
helped to encourage a healthy increase 
in U.S. high-technology exports to 
China. In 1982, approximately 2,000 eX' 
port licenses were approved, with a tots* 
value of just over $450 million. In 1983, 
there were 3,300 approvals, valued at 
approximately $1.1 billion. In the first 
quarter of 1984 alone, 1,170 licenses 
were approved, and the value of licensee " 
high-technology exports to China for all' "' 
of 1984 could surpass $1.5 billion. 

The sheer volume of license referra. 
has placed a considerable strain on the 
COCOM [Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Security Export Controls] 
mechanism. Since the new guidelines 
were published last November, U.S. re- P 
ferrals to COCOM have more than 
doubled. Despite this, however, we and' 
our COCOM partners have succeeded ii 
increasing the rate of COCOM aprovals 
so that the backlog of U.S. -China sub- 
missions has remained steady at about 
300. We believe that processing 
times— now generally 60-90 days— can 
be reduced. 

This council has played an importar 
supporting role in the liberalization of 
export controls for China, and I 
welcome your continued input into this 
process. Chinese leaders have made it 
plain that they regard our adoption of t i 
more liberal policy as a turning point in "^' 
the relationship, with considerably 


jader implications than its purely eco- 
mic effects. 

A second principle concerns the 
Dper role of government in trade. It's 
gely up to individual businesses and 
3ups like this one to make trade a 
ility— a function you are performing 
th remarkable results. But govern- 
nt certainly has a role to play in 
noving unnecessary obstacles and, 
lere possible, in promoting trade. We 
3 doing that, and we will continue to 
so with due awareness that in certain 
3as security considerations are an 
portant factor. 

The tax treaty, which we signed in 
ijing last month, is one important ef- 
•t to help provide a more predictable 
vironment for businessmen and in- 
stors. During Premier Zhao's visit in 
nuary, he and the President signed 
3 industrial and technological coopera- 
n accord, and shortly after the Presi- 
nt's visit we followed up with the con- 
ision of two work programs under the 
:ord— in the fields of metallurgy and 
telecommunications and electronics, 
ese and other work programs will 
^e our firms an opportunity to partici- 
te at an early stage in the planning 
ocess of Chinese ministries. And, as 
)st of you know, we will be mounting 
iiresidential trade mission in a few 
: mths to give a boost to trade oppor- 
;iities, particularly for our firms en- 
ged in aerospace industries. 

We will continue to work hard to 
liieve an investment agreement, 
nericans have invested about $85 
. Uion in joint equity ventures and 
i^eral times that much in other forms 
investment. U.S. oil companies will be 
zesting hundreds of millions more in 
'shore exploration and major in- 
stments in coal are also likely. China 
!lcomes foreign investment, not only 
a source of capital but also as a very 
'icient vehicle for technology transfer. 
ir fifth round of negotiations will take 
ace in September. Meanwhile, our 
'erseas Private Investment Corpora- 
in plans to organize an investment 
ssion to China later this year. 

We should also note that China has 
ken steps of its own to improve the 
nditions for investment. Some of 
ese— such as its patent protection 
jislation, organization of economic 
nes, joint venture laws, and tax provi- 
3ns— are remarkable, considering the 
lormous differences in our juridical 
lilosophies and legal systems. Nonethe- 
3S, more needs to be done if China is 
continue to attract American in- 

In these and other ways, we seek to 
increase trade, but our efforts must not 
and will not come at the expense of our 
security. That is why, even though our 
technology sales are liberalized, restric- 
tions remain, not just for China but for 
other friendly countries as well. That is 
why we will continue to work coopera- 
tively with our COCOM partners, so that 
we do not weaken the unique institution 
which is vital for controlling exports to 
the Soviet Union. 

Perhaps nowhere have we had to go 
to such pains to take security concerns 
into account as we did in the long 
negotiations to reach an agreement on 
peaceful nuclear cooperation. This agree- 
ment, which was initialed last month in 
Beijing, took over 3 years to negotiate. 
It will soon be submitted to the Presi- 
dent. When approved by him and signed 
by both countries, it will then be for- 
warded to Congress, where it must lie 
for 60 days of "continuous session" 
before it can enter into force. We an- 
ticipate full examination and discussion 
of the text of the agreement on the Hill. 

The implementation of the agree- 
ment will further advance our coopera- 
tion with China's modernization efforts, 
and at the same time it will permit U.S. 
companies to compete for a share of 
China's ambitious nuclear power pro- 

But the arduous negotiating process 
that lies behind this agreement and the 
mandatory approval process ahead are 
necessary because the possibility of 
trade, while enticing, cannot come ahead 
of our interest in halting nuclear pro- 
liferation. The proposed agreement ad- 
vances that interest in important re- 
spects. During the course of our negotia- 
tions, China took several significant 
steps to clarify its nonproliferation and 
nuclear export policies. It joined the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in January and has stated that, 
thereafter, it will require IAEA safe- 
guards in its nuclear exports. Premier 
Zhao has stated authoritatively that 
China will not assist other countries to 
develop nuclear weapons. In addition to 
its other features, the agreement itself 
will provide a framework for continua- 
tion of discussions with China on non- 
proliferation matters. We believe the 
agreement is a real advance and 
deserves and will receive full bipartisan 

A third principle of our economic 
relationship has to do with the import- 
ance of abiding by agreements. What 
needs to be said can be said briefly, but 
it is nonetheless important. This is not, 
generally speaking, a problem in our 
dealings with China. But it has, frankly. 

been a disturbing aspect of our grain 
trade. Although China was our best 
customer for wheat in the period 
1980-82, China reduced its grain ship- 
ments to 3.8 million tons in 1983, 2.2 
million tons short of its obligation under 
our long-term grain ag^reement. The 
Chinese have implied at various times 
that reduced purchases were a response 
to U.S. import restrictions on Chinese 
textile imports or other factors having 
nothing to do with the agreement. We 
find unacceptable this unilateral attempt 
to condition performance on matters un- 
related to the agreement, and we have 
made our position clear. We are pleased 
that the Chinese have assured us that 
they will make up the 1983 shortfall and 
meet their 1984 obligation. 

If we continue to follow these three 
guidelines— cooperating on China's 
modernization; facilitating trade while 
protecting our security; and abiding by 
agreements— we can build a sound foun- 
dation for growing economic ties be- 
tween our two countries. Such growth is 
both good business and good foreign 


In the short term, there is reason to 
believe that trade will recover this year 
as our high-technology exports continue 
their momentum and as the Chinese 
meet their grain purchase obligations. 
Premier Zhao recently told us that we 
can expect our traditional bilateral 
surplus, which evaporated last year, to 

In the longer term, the most import- 
ant factor in the growth of U.S. -China 
trade remains the rate of China's own 
economic progress. As China prospers, 
we can expect our bilateral trade to 
grow, as it has with the many dynamic 
economies of Asia. 

While China grows, there is a 
natural complementarity in some areas 
of our economies which holds promise 
for the future. China will continue to 
want imports of some agricultural prod- 
ucts, notably grains. The United States 
has grain surpluses. China has its own 
industrial base and badly wants to im- 
prove the efficiency of its industry. The 
United States has technology and man- 
agement to offer. China is determined to 
develop its energy resources and to use 
them efficiently. The United States has 
capital and the technologies of energy 
extraction and utilization. 

What are the prospects for China's 
growth? Surely, more growth is on the 
way, though its pace is by no means 


clear. China's most noteworthy progress 
has come as a result of the introduction 
of the "responsibility system" in agri- 
culture. But progress is also being made, 
more slowly, in the industrial sector. 
The Chinese themselves acknowledge 
that they still have enormous problems, 
both structural and systemic. But they 
have turned in an impressive perform- 
ance so far— 6.5% average annual 
growth since 1979. And they seem de- 
termined to continue to deal with their 
problems pragmatically. 

China's economic modernization was 
one of the primary subjects of the Presi- 
dent's speeches during his recent trip to 
China. Understandably, the American 
press paid the most attention to portions 
of the speeches that noted the differ- 
ences between us or that the Chinese 
media regrettably did not cover. The 
President's most important speech, the 

one at the Great Hall of the People, was 
about America's involvement in China's 
modernization. That speech was warmly 
received. Indeed, it was interrupted re- 
peatedly with loud applause. Extensive 
portions were televised for audiences 
throughout China. 

In one of the most important 
passages of this speech, the President 

Today, I bring you a message from my 
countrymen. As China moves forward in this 
new path [of economic modernization], 
America welcomes the opportunity to walk by 
your side. 

That is perhaps the overriding 
message of the President's trip. It is the 
message that won him so warm a recep- 
tion and that promises so much in future 
cooperation between our peoples. The 
President was the messenger— it is you 
who will deliver the goods. ■ 

Taking Stock of 
U.S.-Japan Relations 

by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and Inter- 
national Economic Policy and Trade of 
the House Foreign Affairs Com,mittee 
on June 12. 1981,. Mr. Wolfowitz is 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

It is a great pleasure for me to have the 
opportunity to appear before you today 
to discuss one of our nation's most im- 
portant bilateral relationships— that 
with Japan. The hearings on U.S.-Japan 
relations that you held in 1982 made a 
major contribution to illuminating the 
importance of this relationship and the 
problems and opportunities within it. I 
would like to commend your subcommit- 
tees for holding these new hearings to 
bring not only the Congress but also the 
American people up to date on where 
we stand in our relationship with Japan 
and where we are going. 

I have studied carefully the ques- 
tions that you have posed for these hear- 
ings and believe that they can be 
grouped into three general categories. It 
is around these three categories that I 
would like to present my testimony to- 

First, how does the Administration 
view the nature of our relationship with 

Second, what have been the major 
developments in our relationship over 
the past 2 years? 

Third, what are the challenges and 
opportunities of the future and how do 
we intend to deal with them? 


The President's historic trip to Japan 
last November successfully conveyed the 
preeminent importance that we attach 
to our relationship with Japan. Given its 
economic power and its growing interna- 
tional role, Japan clearly has become one 
of the most important countries in the 
world to us. While bilateral trade prob- 
lems garner significant attention— legiti- 
mately so— and often generate inor- 
dinate controversy, our overall policy 
toward Japan transcends these issues 
and is based on three developments. 

First, we have worked to achieve a 
close bilateral relationship, with Japan 
as an equal partner. The past decade has 
brought a significant expansion of 
Japan's economic and technological 
prowess; an increase in its defense 
awareness and capability; and a greater 
interest and involvement in international 
political and economic affairs. Of course, 
there still are differences in our relative 
political, economic, and military posi- 


tions in the world. But we approach and 
conduct our relationship as equals. 

Second, because of our combined 
economic and technological impact on 
the world, our relationship has grown 
beyond the bounds of the bilateral and 
become global in scope. This was the 
theme of Secretary Shultz's landmark 
Shimoda speech last September, when 
he referred to our new relationship with 
Japan as an "international partnership." 
While our combined impact on the world 
is measured primarily in economic and 
technological terms, in the future it will 
have a greater political dimension as 
Japan assumes a greater international 
role and associates itself more actively 
and closely with the political and securi' 
ty goals oif the West. 

Third, Japan is becoming increasing 
ly assertive in global matters and is 
forging a new international role for 
itself. During most of the postwar 
period, Japan pursued an international 
role that was quite similar to our own 
throughout most of American history- 
pursuing economic interests and eschew 
ing political involvement. But, par- 
ticularly since the events in Iran and thi 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
the Japanese have come to realize that 
their own well-being is affected directly 
by political and security developments 
elsewhere in the world. The implication: 
are clear— the days of "economic giant, 
political pygmy" are over. The United 
States wishes to encourage this trend 
toward a greater international political 
and economic role by Japan, within the 
framework of a continued close bilatera 

When many people look at 
U.S.-Japan relations, the focus is on th( 
problems in our relationship and not on 
its successes. But I believe that if we 
step back and take a look at our overal, 
relationship, we would determine that il li 
is the best that it has ever been and th; 
the problems that we have are the ex- 
ceptions and not the rule. li 

First of all, it is the general consen •■: 
sus of Administration officials and long 
time observers of U.S.-Japan relations 
that our defense relationship with Japa >: 
has never been better. We forget too 
easily the scenes of years past, when oi 
mutual security relationship and the 
presence of U.S. bases caused tremen- 
dous political upheavals in Japan. Todai 
both the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security and the presence of U.S. 
military bases are accepted by the largn p| 



jority of the Japanese people. Beyond 
Ijit. more Japanese are coming to ac- 
• it and appreciate that our bases in 
(i lan contribute not only to the defense 
jJapan but also to our mutual interest 
itnaintaining peace and stability 
,-(Uii;hout the Asian region and 

Second, we have with Japan one of 
' liroadest and most diverse scientific 
:iti(inships that we have with any 
mtry in the world— both in the 
\ ate sector and between our govern- 
11 Is. Our science and technology rela- 
iiship with Japan is not a one-way 
ret either. As one example, U.S. com- 
nifs that have signed cross-licensing 
■ iTfiiients with Japanese companies 
w receive more patents back from 
pan than they send there. 

Our educational and cultural rela- 
nship with Japan is another aspect of 
r relationship that we hear little 
out— again, because everything is go- 
? so smoothly. There is a renewed in- 
est in Japan and Japanese studies in 
! United States. We have one of our 
')st active youth exchange programs 
th Japan. We have over 1 million 
Ipanese tourists a year visiting our 
:jntry. Now we even have a 24-hour-a- 
:y television satellite relay between our 
o countries. Japanese viewers wake 
every morning to a live 5-minute 
ws report from New York describing 
i ents in America. 

The one area in our relationship 
lere we continue to have well-publi- 
ed problems is bilateral trade. Yet 
en here I would argue that, even 
5ugh difficulties in access and market 
netration remain, the Japanese 
irket is more open now to most 
nerican products than it was even 2 
ars ago. Although the common 
rception is of a closed market, Japan 
tually is our largest overseas market, 
ist year, it bought $23-billion worth of 
nerican products, equal to our exports 
France, West Germany, and Italy 
mbined. Japan is our best overseas 
irket for agricultural products, yet 
ly one-fourth of our exports to Japan 
e in that category. Japan is a major 
irket for U.S. manufactures; in fact, it 
ys more manufactures from us than 
est Germany does. Japan is our first 
second largest market for a wide 
nge of manufactured goods, such as 
emicals, commercial aircraft, photo- 
aphic supplies, medical and scientific 
luipment, and pharmaceuticals. In ad- 
tion, Japan buys $10-billion worth of 
merican services from us, and we run 
surplus with Japan in services trade. 

Beyond that, Japan has increasingly 
invested in the United States. This 
direct and portfolio investment creates 
employment, helps finance our govern- 
ment's deficit, and makes money avail- 
able for our banks to lend to American 
companies and consumers. In 1982, 
Japan transferred $20 billion in capital 
back to the United States, an amount 
almost equal to our merchandise trade 

I do not deny that we still have 
trade difficulties with Japan. We do, and 
we must deal with them. My point is to 
indicate that we have made progress in 
resolving these problems within the con- 
text of our overall healthy economic 
relationship. The Administration will 
continue to address trade problems dili- 
gently as they arise. The size and com- 
plexity of our trade— $63 billion in two- 
way merchandise trade in 1983— guaran- 
tee that we will continue to have trade 
problems in the future, especially as 
both countries develop their potential in 
the high technology area. 


The past 2 years have been one of the 
most active and productive periods in 
U.S. -Japan relations. The President's 
meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone 
last week in London marked their fourth 
meeting in 18 months. Secretary Shultz 
and Foreign Minister Abe have met 10 
times in that same period. The Presi- 
dent, the Vice President, and nearly 
every member of the President's Cabinet 
have visited Japan. In one very busy 
week in early May of this year, we ac- 
tually had the Vice President, the 
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of 
Defense, all making separate visits to 

But as much as our life at the State 
Department is centered around prepara- 
tions for meetings, we recognize that 
frequent meetings do not represent 
progress in themselves. There has been 
significant movement in all aspects of 
our relationship with Japan. Let me look 
first at our economic relationship. 

U.S.-Japan Trade 

Historically, the U.S. Government has 
taken a product-by-product approach to 
U.S.-Japan trade, dealing with the con- 
tentious issues of the moment. In the 
1950s, we were concerned about clinical 
thermometers, one dollar blouses, and 
cotton typewriter ribbons. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the products shifted to tex- 

tiles, color TVs. and specialty steel. To- 
day, we worry about computer software, 
telecommunications equipment and serv- 
ices, and fiber optics. Historically, as we 
resolved each problem, another industry, 
another product, and another problem 
would come along. 

While continuing to work to achieve 
greater market access for specific prod- 
ucts and services, the Reagan Ad- 
ministration has taken a broader, longer 
term view that seeks to deal with the 
underlying issues in the Japanese 
economy and industrial structure that 
limit our access to Japan's market. 
There are a number of examples of our 
success in this regard. 

Standards Laws Reform. In terms 
of its direct and long-term impact on a 
wide range of U.S. exports, Japan's 
reform of its standards and product- 
approval laws is one of the most signifi- 
cant actions that it has taken. In 
response to U.S. concern, Japan passed 
major revisions of its standards and 
product-approval laws in May 1983, 
making it possible for U.S. firms to 
apply directly for approval without go- 
ing through Japanese agents. We are 
now working actively to allow product 
testing to be conducted in the United 
States by American firms and are seek- 
ing the ability for U.S. companies to 
help participate in designing Japanese 
standards. As the door opens wider, we 
hope more American companies will 
take advantage of those fundamental 
changes and become reliable suppliers to 
Japan. At the same time, should prob- 
lems arise, we want to be alerted so that 
both sides can work to deliver the full 
potential of this opening. 

Transparency. The gradual move- 
ment toward transparency in Japanese 
procedures and decisionmaking also will 
have a long-term impact. Basically, in a 
number of ways Japan is moving toward 
a "sunshine law" approach, allowing U.S. 
firms to participate in actions that affect 
their access to and ability to compete in 
the Japanese market on an equal 
footing. The Japanese Government has 
agreed to transparency in a number of 
ways over the past 2 years. For exam- 
ple, U.S. firms can now make their 
views known in developing Japanese 
standards; Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone (N'TT) has agreed to pro- 
cedures which should allow U.S. firms to 
participate in its research and develop- 
ment work; and the president of the 
American Chamber of Commerce in 
Japan has been invited to testify before 
a Japanese Diet committee, as have 


representatives of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Department of Com- 
merce, and the U.S. Embassy. The 
Japanese have even expressed a will- 
ingness to allow us to make our views 
known to their industrial deliberation 
councils, which will provide them the 
U.S. perspective on potential changes 
before they can be implemented. 
Further, the Japanese Government's 
April 27 package of trade measures and 
its joint report on capital markets/yen- 
dollar publicly stated that efforts toward 
greater transparency in some areas will 

Capital Market Liberalization and 
Internationalization of the Yen. In 
terms of its far-reaching international 
impact, this is the most significant ac- 
tion that Japan has taken during the 
past 2 years. In the Regan-Takeshita 
statement of last November, Japan 
agreed to further liberalize its capital 
markets and to promote a greater inter- 
national role for the yen. The U.S. 
Treasury-Japanese Finance Ministry 
report on yen/dollar exchange rate 
issues, approved by Treasury Secretary 
Regan and Minister Takeshita and 
released on May 29, commits Japan to a 
number of important measures with far- 
reaching foreign exchange and other im- 
plications. It is a landmark agreement, 
and some financial experts have already 
labeled it the most important develop- 
ment in Japanese finance in 100 years. 
Once the measures are implemented 
fully, Japan's capital markets will be 
more open than those of any other coun- 
try in the world except the United 
States. The yen will then be able to play 
a role in international finance commen- 
surate with Japan's status as the second 
largest industrialized democracy and 
should reflect more closely its true value 
as determined by international markets. 

Voluntary Restraint Agreement on 
Automobiles. Japan's voluntary 
restraints on auto exports over the past 
4 years have given U.S. companies a 
needed breathing space to retool and in- 
vest, and this is having a long-term im- 
pact on the competitiveness of the U.S. 
automobile industry. Today, Detroit is 
offering a better built car than it ever 
has, and to meet the Japanese challenge 
it will continue to have to do so. At the 
same time, Japan's auto makers are 
coming to the United States to invest in 
production facilities, providing jobs to 
our workers and further stimulating 
U.S. competitiveness. Honda has an- 
nounced it will double its production; 
Toyota has established a joint venture 
with GM; Nissan plans to add cars to its 

truck production line in Tennessee; and 
Mazda and Mitsubishi also are consider- 
ing manufacturing in the United States. 

High Technology Working Group. 
In order to deal with issues on the cut- 
ting edge of technology, we have 
established a high-technology working 
group. It serves as an "early warning 
system," seeking to head off trade and 
investment problems before they arise. 
Far from being solely a forum for 
discussion, it already has a number of 
concrete successes to point to, such as 
Japanese agreement on an import pro- 
motion program for semiconductors and 
agreement on the mutual elimination of 
tariffs on semiconductors. The excellent 
working relations established between 
U.S. and Japanese participants in this 
group have enabled us to make good 
progress on the software protection 
issue and value-added networks— again, 
heading off problems before final action 
is taken. A unique feature of this group 
is that American and Japanese in- 
dustries, such as the semiconductor sec- 
tor, participate in the meeting with 
government officials. Industry-to- 
industry contact thereby is facilitated. 

Reinstitution of Regular Economic 
Consultations at the Subcabinet Level. 
In order to engage in a continuous and 
high-level dialogue with the Japanese on 
economic issues, we have reinvigorated 
the Economic Subcabinet Consultations, 
led on the U.S. side by Under Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs Allen 
Wallis. We have been holding meetings 
every 6 months and have turned out the 
highest level attendance ever. The con- 
sultations have served as an excellent 
forum to let the Japanese know, at a 
high level and in a comprehensive man- 
ner, our concerns and priorities; to head 
off issues before they become real prob- 
lems; or to approach outstanding issues 
in a nonconfrontational manner better 
designed to attain mutually agreeable 
resolutions. Under the subcabinet con- 
sultation mechanism are the trade com- 
mittee and a new investment committee 
which was established at the time of the 
President's trip in November to promote 
and facilitate two-way investment. These 
two committees also serve as an ex- 
cellent means to make our positions 
known to the Japanese in a comprehen- 
sive fashion. 

Industrial Policy Dialogue. We 
have instituted discussions with Japan 
on industrial policy, trying to determine 
how Japan's industrial policies work and 
how they may distort trade or en- 
courage trade. We believe that these 
discussions already have provided us 

with a better understanding of Japan's ) 
industrial policies and at the same time} 
have impressed clearly upon the 
Japanese the concern we have with any 
industrial policies that inhibit trade. I 
hope that out of this dialogue will come 
mutual understanding of the role of 
government in promoting industrial 
development and of a joint commitment 
that industrial policies should not have 
conscious trade-distorting effects. 

Energy Cooperation. Another step 
which will have a long-term impact on 
our economic relationship with Japan is 
the joint statement on energy coopera- 
tion issued during the President's trip. 
In this, Japan commits itself to consider 
seriously trade and investment in U.S. 
energy resources— particularly coal and 
liquified natural gas. Both governments 
committed themselves to facilitate 
private sector contact so that coopera- 
tion and trade can be expanded. We 
recognize that, in the end, market force 
will he the determining factor in Japan's 
decisions to invest in and buy U.S. 
energy resources, but we believe that 
the provisions of the joint statement, 
when fulfilled, will have a positive im- 
pact on our balance of trade over the 
longer term. 

Exchange Rates. Of all these 
measures that deal with Japan's under- 
lying economic structure and approach 
toward imports, we believe that the 
most significant action over the past 
2 years— and the action that will have 
the greatest long-term impact— is 
Japan's movement toward greater 
liberalization of its domestic capital 
markets and a broader international rO' 
for the yen. The prevailing exchange 
rate also has the effect of making 
Japanese goods more price competitive 
compared to U.S. products, not only in 
the U.S. and Japanese markets but als 
in third-country markets, thereby affec 
ting our global trade balance. Experts 
do not expect the yen to appreciate im 
mediately against the dollar, given othi- 
factors. However, we believe that over 
the longer term the yen should ap- 
preciate because of Japan's perceived 
economic strength and political stabilit; 
Furthermore, U.S. investment in Japai 
will he encouraged because a wider 
range of instruments will be available 1 
finance such investment. 

Trade Packages 

As I stated earlier, this Administration 
also has continued to deal with the que 
tion of access by specific U.S. products 
and services to the Japanese market. 
During the past 2 years, the Japanese 
Government has issued three trade 


[ 2kages that seek to reduce trade fric- 
n and increase our ability to compete 
the Japanese market on a fair and 
litable footing. By far the most 
•nificant of these packages from an 
nerican point of view was that an- 
unced on April 27 of this year, at the 
iclusion of the followup process led by 
; Vice President. During the Vice 
Resident's followup, we sought to ad- 
(hss a number of trade issues of impor- 
ce to the United States. Specifically, 
ise included beef and citrus quotas, 
'iffs, high-technology issues (renewal 
the NTT agreement, unimpeded ac- 
s to telecommunications value-added 
tworks, protection of computer soft- 
re, and satellite procurement), energy 
operation, general investment ques- 
ns, and capital market liberaliza- 
n/internationalization of the yen. The 
panese Government package ad- 
3ssed each of our concerns. Overall, 
s package was responsive to our in- 
ests, although we were disappointed 
it certain items, such as tariff cuts on 
estry products, were not included. 
The main elements of the April 27 
ckage are: 

On the general question of market 

cess— reducing trade barriers and 
: ening Japan's market further— Japan 
: imises to take additional steps to 
: iplify and improve standards and cer- 
: cation systems, to promote imports, 
; J to accept foreign test data. Prime 
Inister Nakasone's statement accom- 
I nying the package said that the 
ioanese Government considers it im- 
i rtant to conduct "even more vigorous- 
such policy measures as market 
ening, import promotion, encourage- 
■nt of investment to and from Japan, 
d so forth. 

On tariff reductions, it indicates 
it tariffs for a number of products of 
.erest to the United States will be 
olished or reduced in Japan's fiscal 
ar 1985. Cuts on color photographic 
per and reduction to zero in farm 
ichinery (hay balers) are among the 
ijor items on the U.S. request list, 
its on two other major items— wine 
d paper products— have since been 
lalized for implementation over the 
xt 3 years. As I indicated, there were 
cuts on forest products, a major 
onomic and political disappointment, 
vo items from the U.S. "long 
t"— raw furskins of mink and un- 
•ought magnesium— are included, as 
iW as auto emission catalysts. 

On tobacco, there is legislation 
pending before the Diet that privatizes 
the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public 
Monopoly Corporation, which will give 
U.S. companies the right to import and 
distribute tobacco products on their own 
account and to set prices with Ministry 
of Finance approval. The tobacco item is 
a bright spot in the package which could 
significantly expand opportunities for 
U.S. products. 

On agricultural quotas, a satisfac- 
tory new 4-year beef and citrus agree- 
ment was reached April 7, which will 
lead to an approximate doubling of U.S. 
exports to what already is far and away 
our best overall market for these prod- 
ucts. An agreement on quotas and 
tariffs on other agricultural categories, 
such as fruit juices, was reached 
April 24. 

On high technology issues: 

• Computer softwm-e— the Govern- 
ment of Japan agreed not to seek new 
legislation during this session of the 
Diet, thereby effectively continuing 
copyright protection. The package notes 
the need for "international harmony" 
and indicates that Japan will not take 
any further action on this issue without 
coordinating the viewpoints of the other 
developed countries. We will continue to 
consult on this key issue so that 
copyright protection will be continued. 

• Telecommunications— the package 
refers to legislation which liberalizes the 
telecommunications market in Japan. 
Restrictions on foreign investment in 
Japan's value-added network were 
eliminated, and licensing requirements 
were changed to notification re- 
quirements. The package commits the 
Japanese Government to ensure simplici- 
ty and transparency in its notification 
procedures and fair competition between 
the new, privatized NTT and other 
telecommunications firms. These 
changes are a major step forward for an 
open Japanese telecommunications 
market. Implementation will be impor- 

• SateWites— Japan revised its 
satellite procurement policy, stating that 
private firms now will be able to pur- 
chase communications satellites from 
any source after the passage of the 
telecommunications legislation. Further- 
more, when NTT is privatized the 
government will open the way for it to 
purchase satellites in a nondiscrimina- 
tory way, while ensuring consistency 
with its national space development 
policy. Japanese Government agencies 
will be able to procure foreign satellites 

not necessary for autonomous develop- 
ment of space technology. We intend to 
continue to press for full open procure- 

On energy cooperation, the package 
repeats the Japanese Government's 
agreement to send a Japanese coal mis- 
sion to the U.S. in May and to facilitate 
private sector interest in Alaskan gas 
feasibility studies. A Japanese coal mis- 
sion came May 14-15 and, while there 
were no immediate results, the two 
private sectors established an ongoing 
committee to continue their dialogue. 

On investment, the package accom- 
modates our objectives. It establishes an 
"expediter" mechanism to relay invest- 
ment information and assist foreign 
companies wishing to invest in Japan. It 
also establishes an investment "om- 
budsman" to settle investment 
grievances. The Prime Minister's state- 
ment included a clear indication that 
Japan welcomes direct foreign invest- 
ment, and the government is sending a 
mission to the United States to promote 
investment in Japan. I might point out, 
in this connection, that the Japan 
Development Bank is now making low 
interest loans available to foreign com- 
panies investing in Japan, even for sales 
offices for U.S. -made products. 

On other issues, the package states 
that the Japanese Government will work 
with the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations to reach an early resolution 
of the lawyers' issue. It is noteworthy 
that reference to the lawyers' issue was 
included, as we believe it commits the 
government to show concern and re- 
sponsibility for a matter that legally is 
under private jurisdiction. 

Defense and 
Security Cooperation 

Another area in which we have made 
significant progress over the past 2 
years is Japanese defense and security 
cooperation. I stated earlier that experts 
believe that our security relationship has 
never been better than it is today. I 
agree. I spoke earlier of the tendency in 
U.S. -Japan relations to focus not on 
what is going right but on the areas 
where we have problems. This is equally 
true in defense. A number of years ago, 
the focus in the security relationship was 
on mutual security cooperation— prob- 
lems relating to our mutual security 
treaty and our bases in Japan. Today, 
one seldom hears about this because 


almost everything is going very 
smoothly. The Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security and the 
presence of U.S. military forces in Japan 
are accepted by a broad majority of the 
Japanese people. The environmental and 
social problems connected with the 
American military presence in Japan 
have largely abated. 

The issues that do arise in our 
security relationship pale in comparison 
to the issues of years past. Japan pro- 
vides these bases to us rent free and, in 
addition, contributes over $1.2 billion an- 
nually to their support. This amounts to 
over $23,000 for every American soldier 
and sailor in Japan, which is more than 
three times the NATO contribution. It is 
a tangible manifestation of Japan's 
cooperation and its ongoing commitment 
to promote security in the Pacific 

The focus in our security dialogue 
today, therefore, is not on our bases in 
Japan but on Japan's own direct defense 
efforts. We need to remember that 
Japan's defense policies throughout the 
postwar era— concentrating on economic 
recovery and growth, abjuring the exer- 
cise of political power, and renouncing 
military power— accorded with U.S. 
policy desires and represented the 
foreign policy most likely to be accepted, 
not only by the Japanese people but also 
by Japan's Asian neighbors. 

Today, however, we believe that the 
situation has changed, and that Japan's 
defense policies are changing with it. 
Over the past 2 years, there has been a 
significant change in Japanese attitudes 
toward its own self-defense. First of all, 
there is a greater awareness of the 
Soviet threat to the region, and recent 
public opinion polls in Japan confirm 
this. The existence of the Japanese Self- 
Defense Forces (JSDF) is now accepted 
by an overwhelming majority of the 
Japanese people. Most of the opposition 
parties have changed their attitudes on 
the JSDF; while still claiming that the 
JSDF is unconstitutional, even the 
Socialist Party now says that it is legal. 

But the most important change over 
the past 2 years is what I perceive as a 
new understanding in Japan of the real 
reasons why an enhanced defense effort 
is necessary. For many years in our 
security relationship, Japanese govern- 
ments very often took the steps that 
they did in the defense arena and 
justified them to their own people by 
saying that they were necessary for the 
sake of the U.S. -Japan relationship. In- 
creasingly in Japan, government leaders, 
politicians, and opinionmakers have 

come to realize that this is something 
that must be done, not simply to "pacify 
the Americans" but because it is in 
Japan's own national interest. There, 
therefore, has been a qualitative dif- 
ference in the way the Japanese Govern- 
ment and people look at defense issues. 

There has been a quantitative dif- 
ference as well. This Administration, as 
you know well, does not focus on 
defense spending per se. Our concern is 
not with input but with output — Japan's 
ability to fulfill the defense roles and 
missions that it has set for itself, and 
with which we agree. In the face of 
severe fiscal constraints, Japan has 
made a major effort to provide the 
resources necessary to implement its 
defense goals. Increases in Japan's 
defense budgets have averaged about 
5% in real terms during the years of the 
Reagan Administration. (By comparison, 
our own defense spending increased by 
8% annually in the same period and that 
of our NATO allies by only 2%.) During 
the last Diet session, the government 
passed what basically is a no-growth 
budget, with an overall increase of only 
0.5'Ki. Yet in the middle of this austere 
budget, defense spending rose by 6.55%. 
Both we and the Japanese Government 
recognize that this level of spending will 
not be sufficient to allow it to implement 
the Mid-Term Defense Plan or, within 
this decade, the defense roles and mis- 
sions that it has set out for itself. But 
we recognize that the Japanese Govern- 
ment is making a consistent effort to 
enhance its self-defense capabilities in 
the face of political and fiscal con- 

Another major achievement during 
the past 2 years is the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Defense Technology 
Transfer, which was signed just before 
the President's visit last November. This 
agreement will permit the export of 
Japanese technology to the United 
States to be used for military purposes, 
and I should note that the United States 
is the only country to which Japan will 
permit the export of militarily applicable 

International Political 
and Economic Cooperation 

The third area in which we have made 
significant progress in our relationship 
with Japan during the past 2 years, 
and the area that forms the centerpiece 
of our vision of the future of U.S. -Japan 
relations, is international political and 
economic cooperation. I mentioned 
earlier the Secretary's landmark speech 

last September before the Shimoda con- 
ference, in which he indicated that the 
time had come to stop thinking of our 
relationship with Japan as a simple 
bilateral relationship. Given our com- 
bined impact on the world, the Secretar; 
said that we should now look upon our 
relationship with each other as an "inter- 
national partnership." In his historic 
speech to the Japanese Diet, the Presi- 
dent amplified this theme on behalf of 
our nation when he told the Members of 
Japan's Parliament that we should come 
together to become a "powerful partner- 
ship for good." 

The basis for this thinking is clear. 
Together the United States and Japan 
account for one-third of world gross na- 
tional product (GNP) and one-half of 
free world GNP. Our combined share of 
world trade is 22%. American and 
Japanese banks together make over one 
half of all internationally syndicated 
commercial loans. The United States 
and Japan already rank as the first and 
second largest sources of resource flows 
(official assistance and private lending) 
to the Third World and the first and 
third largest donors of official develop- 
ment assistance. We soon shall be the 
first and second largest shareholders in 
the World Bank, and we are the first 
and second largest contributors of 
refugee assistance. We are universally 
recognized as leading sources of 
technology. Japan and the United State 
are in the forefront of those calling for 
new international trade round. 

But it is not simply Japan's econom 
and technological strength that leads u; 
to call for an "international" partnership ,( 
As I indicated earlier, Japan is moving 
toward a greater international political f,, 
role. Neither the United States nor an\ '■ 
other country is pushing Japan in this 
direction; Japan is moving on its own 
and in accordance with its own nation;i , 
interests. However, it is in our interest l 

to recognize that our relationship with 
Japan is now entering a new phase, an< 
that we should work to establish new 
patterns of association with Japan, 
based both in theory and in practice or 
close cooperation and respect. This we 
have done successfully during the past 
2 years, and there are a number of ex- 
amples of how the United States and 
Japan have worked together on an int«- 
national level. 

• The close working relationship 
established between the President and 
Prime Minister Nakasone helped lead I 
the success of the Williamsburg summ 

• Coordination of our approach to 
East- West relations across the board 
has led to enhanced Western solidarity 






1 general Soviet policy and arms con- 
ol negotiations and helped stem the 
3W of high technology goods to the 

• Increased Japanese foreign aid to 
itions of strategic importance— such as 
urkey. Pakistan, and Egypt— has pro- 
oted economic development in those 
)untries and enhanced political stahili- 

• Japan's impressive cooperation 
ith us at the time of the Soviet shoot- 
)wn of the Korean Air Lines tlight 
)07 proved Soviet responsibility, aided 

combined search and recovery opera- 
ons, and condemned the Soviet action. 

• Japan worked with us to provide 
plomatic support to South Korea in 
le face of the Rangoon bombing and 
le north's proposal for tripartite talks. 

• Japan has worked actively to pre- 
?nt escalation of the Iran-Iraq war. 

• Japan has been cooperative on 
bird World debt issues and has ex- 
uded support to the Philippines to aid 
in the financial crisis it faces. 

• Japan has indicated a willingness 
I join the President's African aid ini- 
ative and help promote development in 
16 Caribbean Basin area. 

Finally, I should add that we and the 
ipanese work actively on a daily basis 
I consult on a wide range of interna- 
onal political and economic issues. The 
ipanese Embassy is among the most 
;tive in Washington in its diplomatic 
)ntacts with the State Department and 
;her executive branch departments, and 
am sure that the reverse is equally 
ue about our Embassy's contacts with 
le Japanese Foreign Ministry. In addi- 
on, senior specialists in the State 
epartment and the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry, usually led at the Assistant 
ecretary level, meet on a regular basis 
>) exchange views and discuss our 
jspective policies toward major regions 
: the world. So far this year, we have 
i\d extensive consultations on the 
[iddle East and Africa, and later this 
2ar we will meet to discuss 
evelopments in Latin America and 


.s we look toward the future, the 
'nited States has a number of specific 
olicy goals to: 

• Strengthen U.S. -Japan coopera- 
on and consultation on a wide range of 
iternational political and economic 

issues in order to promote peace and in- 
ternational security, not just in Asia but 
throughout the world: 

• Continue to strengthen our 
mutual security relationship, while 
stressing the importance of Japan's 
making a larger and accelerated con- 
tribution to our common defense burden; 

• Continue our major efforts to 
achieve greater and more equitable 
market access to Japan and work 
together to maintain the free trade 
system and counter protectionist senti- 
ment in the United States and Japan; 

• Consult and cooperate closely with 
Japan in our mutual efforts to foster an 
open world trade and investment system 
and to promote economic development 
and financial stability in the developing 
nations: and 

• Continue to expand our educa- 
tional, cultural, and scientific relations. 

As we seek to accomplish these 
goals, I see three major challenges 
before us: 

• Gaining a strengthened commit- 
ment by both countries to the free trade 

• Ensuring that we treat Japan as 
we would any other ally and friend; and 

• Using the fundamentals and 
overall importance of our relationship to 
solve the more transitory problems of 
the moment. 

I mentioned earlier that, in the case 
of defense, we are convinced that Japan 
is now genuinely and sincerely moving in 
the direction of an enhanced defense ef- 
fort. Japan's intentions or motives are 
not in doubt. Unfortunately, I cannot yet 
say the same about our trade problems. 
There still is a widespread perception 
that Japan is not committed to allowing 
our companies and products fair and 
equitable access to its market and that 
Japan makes concessions only begrudg- 
ingly and under pressure. Two editiorial 
comments from opposite ends of the 
Pacific reflect this notion well. In 
describing the capital market discus- 
sions, Japan's Nikon Keiza i Shimbun 
described on March 27 of this year what 
it called Japan's 

. . . conventional negotiating style in deal- 
ing with the United States, namely, the style 
of "delaying, haggling and seeking to 
minimize changes in the status quo." If this 
style continues, the U.S. dissatisfaction will 
increase rather than diminish, resulting in a 
further aggravation in U.S. frustration, and 
this cycle will never stop. 

Two weeks later, the Washington Post 
commented on the beef and citrus 
discussions, saying 

By resisting desperately on minor mat- 
ters such as beef imports, and pushing them 
to the brink of crisis before compromising, 
Japanese negotiators create an impression of 
obduracy. It does not serve Japanese in- 
terests to encourage Americans to think of 
trade with Japan as a one-way street in 
which even the most modest concessions are 
made grudgingly and only after inordinate 
delay. . . . That impression is damaging to 
Japan. ... In the beef case, the Japanese 
allowed the dispute to drag on much too long 
at too great a political cost. 

Another challenge in the future is to 
learn how to treat Japan as we would 
any other ally or friend. The quotations 
I just used illustrate how perceptions in 
both countries focus on pressure and on 
response tactics. This is not the only 
way to conduct business. Calm, con- 
sistent attention to issues before they 
are politicized should work to eliminate 
the cyclical and emotional swings in our 
relationship. We have, with few excep- 
tions, attempted to do just that during 
the past 3 years. In my view, we must 
build upon this approach so that future 
generations of leaders will not be so em- 
bittered by the battles that a mature 
dialogue and the accomplishment of 
other important objectives in our rela- 
tionship become impossible. 

Particularly in trade matters, I 
welcome the fledgling indications that 
some circles in Japan see it as in their 
own national interest to open completely 
to foreign products and services. The 
leaders of Japan have to foster this 
growing recognition. 

In terms of international political 
cooperation, however, the obligation is 
more on our side. If we want Japan to 
work together with us as a close and 
equal partner on the international stage, 
we must act accordingly. We must treat 
Japan as an equal, consult closely, and 
be willing to listen — and in some cases 
modify — our policies and actions when 
Japan disagrees. In the global economic 
arena, Japan already is speaking its 
mind openly to us. However, Japan has 
been less willing to do the same in inter- 
national political affairs. When the day 
comes when it does so, it may come as a 
shock to many Washington policymakers 
who are accustomed to a quieter Japan. 
That day will come, and I hope that we 
will be flexible and mature enough to 
receive it as a sign of a successful policy. 

The final challenge that we face is to 
make sure that, when we deal with 


Japan on transitory individual issues, we 
keep our overall interests in mind and 
utilize the importance of our relationship 
to help achieve progress on those 
outstanding issues. Our trade interests 
are important to us, but they are not the 
only part of our relationship. Conver.'-.e- 
ly, our security interests in Japan are 
extremely important to us, but this does 
not mean that we should ignore our in- 
terest in securing equitable access to 
Japan's market. We should not be forced 
to choose, Solomon like, one aspect of 

our relationship over another. Our rela- 
tionship with Japan is without question 
one of our most important and vital rela- 
tionships, and it will be increasingly so 
in the future. If we keep the overall im- 
portance of that relationship in mind, we 
can make even greater progress in 
resolving outstanding issues. 

'The completed transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington. D.C. 20402. ■ 

U.S.-Asia Security: Economic 
and Political Dimensions 

by William A. Brown 

Address before the U.S.-Asia In- 
stitute on June 18, 198J,. Mr. Brown is 
Acting Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

Although formed only a few short years 
ago, the U.S.-Asia Institute has already 
made a large contribution to a deepen- 
ing of understanding between the 
peoples of the United States and Asia. 
Your leadership, headed by your 
distinguished chairman, Mr. Kay 
Sugahara, and ably assisted by co- 
founders Esther Kee, Joji Konoshima, 
and others, is outstanding. Your 
organization, through its research, sym- 
posia, and publications, serves as a wise 
adviser in meeting the challenge of 
achieving ijetter relations between the 
United States and the countries in the 
Kast Asia and Pacific region. 


The subject for my address today is the 
political and economic dimensions of 
U.S. -Asia security. That ancient and 
very wise sage, Lao Tzu, said: 
"He who knows does not speak. He who 
speaks does not know." I, therefore, ask 
your kind indulgence. 

Ever since immigrants from Europe 
and Asia settled the West Coast, the 
United States has necessarily looked to 
both East and West. World War II ac- 
celerated the trend away from paying so 
much more attention to Europe toward 
one of greater balance and concern. Our 
future is as tied to events in East Asia 
as it is to our more traditional relations 
in Western Europe. 

These last four decades since the 
end of World War II have witnessed 
great changes that have drawn the 
United States ever closer to East Asia. 
Peaceful trade and commerce have ex- 
panded to such a degree that U.S. trade 
with the East Asia and Pacific region 
has outstripped our trade with Europe. 
The dynamic growth of the Pacific na- 
tions has transformed them into major 
markets for U.S. products, services, and 

There have been two major wars. 
And we have learned our lessons. We 
are resolved to maintain our military 
posture and presence as a Pacific power 
so as to deter armed aggression against 
our allies and friends in the region. Im- 
migration patterns have shifted; in re- 
cent years, along with Latin America, 
the largest number of immigrants have 
come from Korea, Taiwan, the Philip- 
pines, and the former Indochina coun- 
tries. These hardworking people greatly 
enrich our culture and economic life. 

Economic Dimensions 

Let me now comment on the economic 
dimensions of U.S.-Asia security. No 
society can be truly secure without a 
strong economy. A flourishing economy 
provides the necessary resources for a 
strong defense. Breakthroughs in the 
private sector often have application in 
defense-related industries, but more 
generally, a growing, vibrant economy 
has certain intrinsic advantages: it 
motivates people to become involved, to 
increase production, and to be concerned 
about the quality of the product. It also 

stimulates education, and a better 
educated workforce results in a better 
educated fighting force. 

The Republic of Korea is a good ex- 
ample of the correlation between 
economy and security. While North 
Korea has maintained over the years a 
20% of GNP spending rate for so-called 
defense. South Korea, because of its ex- 
panding economic strength, now is at 
rough equivalence in military expendi- 
tures. If the trend continues, there is no 
doubt the South will right the current 
imbalance in military forces. Although 
the U.S. guarantee for the Republic of 
Korea's security is an important factor 
in this equation, the commitment of the 
South Korean people to hardworking 
economic growth is the key ingredient to 
an increasingly strong defense posture. 

On a broader plane, our growing 
economic ties with our friends and allies 
in the East Asia and Pacific region pro- 
vide additional benefits from a security 
standpoint. Commerce is a very strong 
tie that binds. It helps cement relation- 
ships and makes it that much harder for 
adversaries to drive a wedge between 
us. Across the sealanes of the Pacific to- 
day are shipped a great deal of each 
market country's wealth. They have 
become, in fact, the sinews and arteries 
of a larger system, and — needless to 
say — crucial to the security of this 
sytem and its parts. 

Such close and very extensive 
economic ties inevitably produce some 
friction, and I suppose oui- trade with 
Japan — one of our closest and most im- 
portant friends in the world — is the besi 
case to illustrate this. There are some 
important trade problems, and issues 
such as Japan's quotas and high tariffs 
on agricultural and forestry products ar 
illustrative of the difficulties that we 
have in achieving the same kind of ac- 
cess to Japan's market that Japanese 
companies have to ours. We will con- 
tinue to emphasize strongly to the 
Japanese the importance of removing it I, 
remaining barriers to the export of U.S J- 
goods and services. And yet, such prob- 
lems must be kept in perspective. , 
Because our economic ties are part of a 
much wider, deeper relationship, with a 
security dimension, we must never let 
disputes eat away at the trust so 
necessary for cooperation to meet com- 
mon threats. 

I beg your indulgence to cite a few 
statistics to show just how phenomenal 
the growth in our economic ties has 
been over the last few years. 

• U.S. investments in the region 
rose an estimated $4 billion in 1981 to 
.$26. <; billion. 


I Also in 1981, before the recession, 
; $128 billion trade with East Asia 
d the Pacific signified a 12.2% in- 
lase over the previous year. This com- 
res with a 10.9% growth in our 
rldwide trade. 

• In 1982, in the recession, trade 

th the region declined 1% compared to 
'.8% decline worldwide. 

• In 1983, the first year of recovery, 
$136.5 billion trade with East Asia 

d the Pacific was up 8% compared to 
;t 0.5% worldwide. It is now 24% 
ger than our trade with Western 
irope and comprises 30% of our total 
ide. ASEAN [Association of South 
ist Asian Nations] by itself is our fifth 
gest trading partner behind Canada, 
pan, Mexico, and the European Com- 

ilitical Dimensions 

t me now turn to the political dimen- 
ns of U.S. -Asia security. No society 
n be secure if it is torn by internal 
ife. No society can successfully cope 
ith threats from the outside if it is 
I'ak within. And political strength 
irives from governments being respon- 
e to the needs of their people. Over 
years ago, Dr. Sun Yat-sen asked: 

Is there any just reason why we should 
Dose autocracy and insist on democracy? 
s, because with the rapid advance of 
1 ilization people are growing in intelligence 
li developing a new consciousness of 
if.... Which is more appropriate, 
I ;ocracy or democracy? If we base our judg- 
I nt on the people's intelligence and ability, 
; come to the conclusion that the sovereign- 
of the people is far more suitable to us. 

Just as our society today is influ- 
ced by Asian religious and cultural 
!as, so too have Asian societies, 
oecially after shaking off the yoke of 
ionialism, been influenced by Western 
litical ideas. 

We are justifiably proud of our 
mocratic system and feel most com- 
-table in dealing with others who 
are similar values. Happily, many 
untries in the region have attained or 
e moNang toward stable democracies, 
le institutional growth and broad ac- 
ptance of Japanese democracy, for ex- 
nple, is something in which the 
panese people can take pride, and we 
11 continue to applaud — and encourage 
appropriate ways — movement toward 
ger societies in the Republic of Korea, 
e Philippines and elsewhere. Our 
lique relationship with Australia and 

New Zealand is based upon shared 
history, values, and generally compatible 
interests and objectives. Anchored by 
the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, 
United States pact] treaty, our contacts 
with these two old friends continue to be 
close and harmonious. We are encour- 
aged by the political growth in the 
Western tradition of the emerging na- 
tions of the South Pacific. We look for- 
ward to full self-government in the not 
too distant future for the Marshall 
Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, and Palau. 

Southeast Asia provides an in- 
teresting example of the dynamic in- 
teraction between political, economic, 
and security factors. Two decades ago, 
our Southeast Asian friends' foremost 
threat was communist subversion foster- 
ing internal disorder. The economic and 
political progress of these countries has 
reduced this threat in most countries to 
manageable proportions. Finding their 
ability to penetrate and influence inter- 
nal developments sharply curtailed, both 
the Soviet Union and Vietnam have 
turned to conventional military forces 
and intimidation as their principal policy 
tools. The resulting threat is real and 
must be met. But the wave of the future 
clearly does not lie in the regimented 
societies where experience starkly 
reveals the central weakness of their 
governing systems. Such one- 
dimensional systems provide neither 
economic nor political incentives or 

The U.S. Role 

There is a psychological dimension of 
the U.S. security role that I would also 
like to touch on briefly. For a time after 
the Vietnam war, there were many who 
feared that isolationism would again 
move America to withdraw from her 
commitments as a Pacific power. Many 
were concerned that U.S. foreign policy 
in the Pacific would resemble that so 
well-described by Winston Churchill, 
speaking about his own country in the 
mid-1930s: "Decided only to be unde- 

cided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant 
for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful 
to be impotent." 

Events fortunately proved that 
America was not returning to isola- 
tionism. While the lessons of the Viet- 
nam war will provide debate material 
for years to come, the negative conse- 
quences of that war are plain for all to 
see — namely a Vietnam under 
repressive rule which invaded, occupies, 
and now even colonizes parts of its 
neighbor Kampuchea; provides the 
Soviets with air and naval facilities in 
the region; and is responsible for the 
flight of more than a million and half 
refugees from Indochina since 1975. 

Such consequences challenged the 
United States to respond, and I believe 
we have. Our alliances with Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand 
are stronger than ever. Our political ties 
to new friends, such as China, and old 
friends such as the ASEAN states, are 
crucial in dealing with both security and 
economic challenges. As Secretary 
Shultz stated before the World Affairs 
Council of San Francisco last year, the • 
U.S. role in the East Asia and Pacific 
region is unique. "We are the one nation 
of the region with both a worldwide 
view and the capacity to implement a 
worldwide policy. As a great power, we 
have great responsibilities. We have 
borne them well, and we must continue 
to do so. . . . The United States will re- 
main a Pacific power. Although specific 
tasks may change, our overall respon- 
sibilities will not be diminished in impor- 
tance nor shifted on others." 

It is not just happenstance that over 
the past year, the President of the 
United States has made two major trips 
to Asia — to Japan and the Republic of 
Korea, and to China, and hopes to be 
traveling to Southeast Asia as well. The 
President has a deep and abiding com- 
mitment toward strengthening U.S. ties 
to the Pacific. As he commented recent- 
ly in Beijing: "I see America and our 
Pacific neighbors going forward in a 
mighty enterprise to build strong 
economies and a safer world." ■ 


World Economic Prospects 

by W. Allen Wallis 

Address i 1 merican 

Chamber ofC <•■ .1 m Santiago on 

July 27, 198A- Mr. Wallis is Under 
Secretary for Economic Affairs. 

I am happy to be in Santiago. This is my 
first visit, and I am impressed already 
by the beauty of the city and the 
hospitality of its people. In addition, it is 
an honor "and a pleasure to have this op- 
portunity to address you. 

I will first discuss prospects for the 
world economy and U.S. policies to sus- 
tain, strengthen, and spread the eco- 
nomic recovery on a global basis. 

Second, I will discuss the effects of 
recovery on developing countries, a sub- 
ject that this audience may find of par- 
ticular interest. 

Finally, I will comment on problems 
related to international debts. 

U.S. Recovery and 
Global Outlook 

Largely as a result of the strong U.S. 
recovery, the world economy is in much 
better shape than it was a year and a 
half ago. The recovery is increasingly 
picking up strength in the other in- 
dustrialized economies, international 
trade is again growing, and we have 
passed the worst of the current debt 
problems of some developing countries. 
With strong growth in U.S. incomes 
and production, the U.S. market for 
foreign goods expanded rapidly during 
1983. The value of imports in the fourth 
quarter was 19% above a year earlier 
and grew a further 13% in the first 
quarter of this year. This growth in- 
duced a recovery in global international 
trade. The strong dollar has substantial- 
ly improved the competitive position of 
our trading partners, allowing them to 
take advantage of the growth in our 
market and to compete effectively in 
third-country markets. The widening of 
the U.S. trade deficit, estimated at a 
$30-billion increase, is a measure of the 
stimulus provided to other countries. 
Perhaps as important as this trade 
stimulus has been the psychological im- 
pact of the U.S. recovery. Even though 
recession and financial crisis continue in 
too many countries, the United States 
has achieved a strong upturn. Our 
growth has strengthened confidence and 
has eased concern about the world finan- 
cial system. 

The U.S. recovery seems likely to 
continue to be robust throughout 1984. 
Consumer confidence is high and, ac- 
cording to recent surveys, businesses 
plan the largest real increase in invest- 
ment spending since 1977— over 9%. 
Real output grew 9.7% in the first 
quarter. The preliminary estimate of 
real GNP [gross national product] in- 
dicates growth in the second quarter at 
the more sustainable rate of .5.7%. We 
expect that growth will continue at a 
moderate and sustainable pace for the 
rest of the year. 

Except for Canada, whose recovery 
has paralleled that in the United States, 
the upturn in the rest of the industrial- 
ized economies has been less vigorous 
than in the United States. Nevertheless, 
there is increasing evidence that the rest 
of the industrialized world is recovering. 

The strength of this recovery varies, 
of course, from country to country. 
Growth is greatest in those economies 
which have taken prompt and effective 
action against inflation. In Japan, where 
inflation in consumer prices has been 
only about 2%, growth is estimated to 
have been about 4. .5% from the fourth 
quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 
1983. Both Japan and Canada benefit 
from rapid growth of their exports to 
the United States and should sustain 
strong growth in 1984. In Europe, 
growth improved in 1983, notably in 
Germany and the United Kingdom, but 
was still disappointing. Germany, which 
has brought down its inflation rate to 
about 3%, had a rather sluggish 
recovery in 1983 of 3%i, but probably 
will grow more than 3% this year. 
Europe's relative slowness to recover 
reflects, in large measure, the continu- 
ing problems of France. The French 
economy should start to grow this year, 
so the growth of Europe as a whole 
should strengthen in 1984. The OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] now expects Euro- 
pean growth to reach 2.25% this year, 
up more than one percentage point from 
last year. 

Just as the recovery in the in- 
du.strialized economies has been based 
on success in reducing inflation, so our 
ability to sustain it will depend on suc- 
cess in keeping inflation from ac- 
celerating again. The signs so far are 
good. U.S. consumer prices have risen 
by only about 4.5% in the last 12 
months, only one percentage point above 
the previous 12 months and far below 
the double-digit rates of increase in 1979 

and 1980. The low rate of inflation dur- 
ing the past year has been reinforced by 
falling energy prices and agricultural 
prices. The inflation rate for other good 
and services is about 5%, a level we ex- 
pect to see during the remainder of 
1984. With a stable monetary policy 
keeping expansion under control, con- 
tinued moderation in the growth of 
wage rates and further good perfor- < 
mance in productivity should help keep 
inflation down. 

The outlook for inflation in the rest 
of the OECD is similarly good. Even the 
high-inflation countries, notably Italy 
and France, are showing significant im^ 
provements. Consumer prices for the 
OECD as a whole are expected to con- 
tinue to advance at about a 5% pace i 

Another factor affecting the •"' 

economic outlook will be the exchange 
rate of the dollar. Recent movements iff 
this rate have been dominated by inter- 
national capital movements. With net in 
ternational capital flows swinging sharp 
ly toward the United States in 1983, th( 
dollar appreciated further despite a 
widening deficit in both trade and cur- 
rent account. The trade-weighted 
average value of the dollar rose during 
the year to a fourth quarter level 6.5% 
above a year earlier and 26.5% above 
1981. (Adjusted for differences among 
countries in rates of inflation, the corref' 
sponding increases were 4.5% and 
20.3%.) There is, however, a good deal 
of doubt that the present level of the 
dollar will persist, in view of the pros- ^ 
pects for a further widening of the U.S 
deficit on current account. 

If the value of the dollar should 
fall — and far be it from me to predict 
whether it will or will not — the effect 1 
the world economic outlook would be 
mixed. For the United States, our inte 
national competitiveness would be im- 
proved, stimulating our exports and ]> 
products which compete with imports. ¥■ 
Our prices, however, would rise faster P! 
for a while. In the other industrialized •' 
countries, efforts against inflation wou 
be assisted by a fall in the dollar, but 
they would need to rely more on 
domestic demand and less on their ex- im- 
ports for their growth. On balance, an 
orderly decline of the dollar would prol ^ 
ably not affect the size of the recovery* ^ 
in the industrialized countries much, bHfPl 
it would affect its composition. facts that I have cited show 
the U.S. recovery is strong and sustair 
able, that recovery is spreading throug 
the world, and that trends in interna- 
tional trade are encouraging. 






'ects on Developing Countries 

lat will be the effects of recovery on 
'eloping countries? Obviously, the 
overy in the industrialized world 
jhtens prospects considerably for the 
feloping countries. A number of these 
mtries have had severe debt problems 
1 have had to make major ad- 
tments in imports to deal with their 
incial crises. Non-oil developing coun- 
is are estimated to have cut their cur- 

t account deficits by about $20 billion 
t year. A major contributor to the im- 
ivement was the gain in these coun- 
!s' trade balance with the United 
ites— about $13 billion. About $9 
ion of this was due to increased ex- 
"ts to the United States. The trade 
ance between the United States and 
ile, for example, moved from $837 
lion in favor of the United States in 
^0 to $241 million in favor of Chile in 

The IMF [International Monetary 
nd], assuming only a moderate 4.25% 
« of growth for the industrialized 
)nomies in 1984, projects growth in 

dollar value of their imports to be 
)ut 7.5%, in sharp contrast to declines 
I the previous 4 years. Exports of non- 
( developing countries are expected to 
jrease about 10.3% in 1984. The 
length in the U.S. economy, which is 
Ich greater than was anticipated, may 
ike this figure even higher. Although 
mansion in a number of developing 
I mtries will be limited by financial con- 
laints and the need for further ad- 
[ tments of their policies, on the whole 
I )wth should improve this year. The 
3st estimates by the World Bank are 
it growth in the developing countries 
a whole will rise to about 3.75% in 
■84, compared to less than 1% last 
iiir. As you know, growth in Chile— 
lich was a negative 0.8% last year— is 
ejected by the Chilean Government to 
in the 4%-5% range in real terms 
s year. Thus, prospects are bright for 
v^eloping countries overall— at least for 
)se with sound economic policies. 

If the global recovery is to be sus- 
ned and strengthened, steady, non- 
lationary growth within individual 
entries is required. The United States 
s made substantial strides, but we still 
ve more to be accomplished. For ex- 
iple, the United States needs to cut its 
cal deficits, as do many other coun- 
es. European countries, in particular, 
n improve their prospects by increas- 
j the flexibility of their labor markets. 
1 countries need to establish credible, 
ninflationary monetary policies. Many 
veloping countries need to free up 

their economic structures, adopt realistic 
exchange rates, and encourage redeploy- 
ment of resources to the foreign trade 

Effects on International 

In conclusion, some remarks about inter- 
national indebtedness. In the latter part 
of 1982, major international debt prob- 
lems came to a head. There was wide- 
spread fear of defaults which would lead 
to grave damage to the world financial 
system. But these difficult problems 
have been managed through interna- 
tional cooperation involving debtor and 
creditor governments, private lending 
institutions, and the International 
Monetary Fund. 

Countries with heavy burdens of 
debt service may have prolonged periods 
of adjustment ahead. We believe, how- 
ever, that the worst of the world debt 
problems may be behind us. We have 
proven that the major industrialized na- 
tions, working in cooperation with the 
IMF and major international banks, are 
able to coordinate their policies to assist 
those nations unable to service their 

For their part, many debtor coun- 
tries have shown the ability and will to 
act responsibly and to take appropriate 
action to redress their balance-of- 
payments positions. Chile, of course, is 
among the countries in this category. 
We are seeing significant reductions in 
the current account deficits of many na- 
tions, with the total current account 
deficits of non-oil developing countries 
having been cut very substantially from 
1982 and 1983. In the case of Chile, the 
current account deficit was slashed from 
almost $5 billion in 1981 to about $1 
billion in 1983. With the IMF quota in- 
crease now in place, establishment of en- 
larged general arrangements to borrow, 
and the provision of new loans to the 
IMF by members of the Bank for Inter- 
national Settlements and Saudi Arabia, 
we are pleased to see that the IMF has 
been adequately financed to conduct its 
important task. 

We are now entering what I hope 
will be the final phase of the debt prob- 
lem. It is in this phase that the debtor 
countries will have to work out their 
debt problems and resume reasonable 
rates of economic growth. 

This phase will require action by 
both debtors and creditors in a number 
of areas, including: 

First, the continued application of 
now-established procedures to assist 
those countries whose debt problems are 
just emerging; 

Second, continued adjustment by 
the debtor countries; 

Third, provision of adequate capital 
inflows to those countries making ade- 
quate adjustments, including the import- 
ant provision of financing for trade; 

Fourth, continued economic 
recovery in the industrialized nations, 
control of protectionism, and new ef- 
forts to liberalize the world trading 

The problem of excessive depend- 
ence on borrowed capital can only be 
resolved effectively by the developing 
countries themselves. However, interna- 
tional direct investment can help. To 
reduce the likelihood of future debt 
crises, foreign direct investment must 
become a more important source of 
capital for the developing countries. 

I remain confident that we will be 
able to respond to emerging debt prob- 
lems. Procedures for dealing with these 
problems are in place and the members 
of the international financial system, 
both governments and commercial 
banks, have shown the necessary resolve 
and flexibility. Economic readjustment is 
difficult and expensive but the economic 
future of most major developing coun- 
tries is bright if they follow appropriate 
policies. Both they and we have a stake 
in the preservation and strengthening of 
the international financial system, which 
can serve as an efficient global allocator 
of investment funds. 


In summary, worldwide economic 
recovery is under way, led by the strong 
recovery in the United States. World 
trade is expanding. The benefits are 
spreading to the developing countries. 
Those with market-oriented development 
policies are receiving the greatest 
benefits from the expansion and will 
continue to do so. The problems of pro- 
tectionism and indebtedness pose 
challenging tests to both the developed 
and developing countries. These tests 
can best be met by cooperation and 
negotiation. The challenges of sustaining 
growth in the world economy do not re- 
quire us to devise radical new economic 
instruments or strategies. What is 
needed is an application of sound 
economic principles, good sense, and a 
great deal of patience. ■ 


The Bretton Woods Legacy: 
Its Continuing Relevance 

by Richard T. McCormack 

Address at a conference com- 
Tnemorating the J,Oth anniversary of the 
signing of the Bretton Woodx agreements 
in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, on 
July 13, 198i. Mr. McCormack is Assist- 
ant Secretary for Economic and 
BusiTiess Affairs. 

I am here today to acknowledge the 
debt of people of my generation to the 
work done here 40 years ago. My 
generation has never known soup kitch- 
ens or bread lines or depression of the 
type experienced in the 1930s. This is 
due in no small part to the outstanding 
work that was done here in setting up 
an international monetary system 
toward the end of the Second World 

Forty years ago, a group of 
distinguished and farsighted men 
erected what has become a living 
historical landmark of international 
economic cooperation. The structure 
they erected enabled the world economy 
to achieve an unprecedented four 
decades of reconstruction, growth, and 
change. Today, the Bretton Woods in- 
stitutions, having proven both resilient 
and flexible, are in the forefront of our 
efforts to resolve current international 
economic problems. 

Some of those who helped to build 
this structure 40 years ago are here 
tonight. We pay tribute to them and 
their fellow architects and salute the 
men and women who, over the subse- 
quent 40 years, worked within and built 
upon the foundation laid down here. 

The wisdom and farsightedness of 
the architects of Bretton Woods are the 
more remarkable when we consider the 
background against which they labored. 
It is sometimes noted that their con- 
ference took place soon after the landing 
of the Allied forces in Normandy. But, 
as you know, the gestation period of the 
Bretton Woods structure began earlier, 
when the alliance was struggling for its 
very survival. Remarkably, despite 
preoccupation with the course of the 
war, these men were able to look to the 
future and to see that a totally new 
cooperative international monetary and 

financial structure was needed to rebuild 
the world economy and secure a lasting 

Developing a Stable 
Monetary Order 

What did the Bretton Woods founders 
believe they had accomplished? How suc- 
cessful were they? What elements of 
their design are most relevant to our 
concerns today? Let me begin with the 
quote from U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau reproduced in our program: 
"What we have done here in Bretton 
Woods," Morgenthau said, "is to devise 
machinery by which men and women 
everywhere can freely exchange, on a 
fair and stable basis, the goods which 
they produce with their labor." A com- 
monplace observation? Perhaps it seems 
so today. But compare the ideal to the 
then-existing reality. 

The interwar period had left interna- 
tional economic intercourse in virtual 
anarchy, with countries attempting to 
defend themselves against external 
shocks (and, indeed, to export their 
unemployment to others) through all 
kinds of devices— exchange rate 
manipulation, multiple rates and ex- 
change controls of various kinds, import 
barriers, and restrictive bilateral 
agreements. In this context, Morgen- 
thau's simple claim must have seemed 
visionary indeed. 

The first order of business, then, 
was to bring countries together in a 
structure that would substitute stability, 
cooperation, and open markets for the 
existing chaos. At the same time the 
founders wanted to leave individual 
countries scope to pursue their 
legitimate individual economic objec- 
tives. Balancing these two goals- 
discipline and cooperation versus 
freedom of action— was one of the most 
fundamental and difficult problems fac- 
ing the negotiators 40 years ago. 

The Bretton Woods founders be- 
lieved that these goals could best be 
reconciled within a system of fixed but 
adjustable exchange rates. They had 
very much in mind the experience of the 
interwar period with its turbulent spells 
of flexible exchange rates and "beggar- 
thy-neighbor" devaluations. Therefore, in 
their system, countries were committed 
to the maintenance of exchange rates 
within narrow margins around agreed 



parities, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) was to exercise discipline 
over changes in these parities. 

Did Bretton Woods Fail? ' 

Although this exchange rate structure 
provided the foundation for the world's 
monetary system for almost 30 years, it 
is now generally believed to have had 
fatal defects which caused it to be aban^ 
doned by the major countries a little 
more than a decade ago— in practice, in 
1973; in law, with the second amend- 
ment to the IMF articles in 1976. 

Many learned writers have written 
countless pages on the reasons why this 
happened. The consensus, as I under- 
stand it, is that the system proved in 
practice to be too rigid in the face of 
changing conditions. Currency conver- 
tibility, fixed exchange rates, and in- 
dependent national macroeconomic 
policies become increasingly inconsistent 
with growing economic interdependence 
The Bretton Woods escape hatch— ad- 
justment through major exchange rate 
realignments only after fundamental 
disequilibrium had clearly emerged— 
proved unworkable in a world economy 
where vast amounts of capital can move 
relatively freely across the exchange 
markets to hedge or speculate on an an- 
ticipated realignment. 

Of course, the Bretton Woods 
founders did not foresee— they could no 
reasonably have foreseen— the vast in- 
crease in funds free to cross and recrosi 
national borders over the postwar 
decades. And it is clear at least some of 
them gave far less weight to the benefit 
of free capital movement than to those 
of free trade. To their credit, the 
founders viewed their arrangements as 
experimental, not immutable. If 
anything, those who followed ought 
probably to have modified the system a> 
an earlier stage, before it collapsed. 

Did the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate system signify 
that the founders failed in their efforts 
to construct an international monetary 
system? In terms of their most funda- 
mental objectives, the answer is no, the ^ 
did not fail. 

After all, the original exchange rat«j«r 
system provided sufficient stability and' 
confidence over a quarter century so 
that nations could move from the 
chaotic, restrictive, prewar system to 
successively greater currency conver- 
tibility, vastly reduced barriers to the 
flow of goods and services, and freer 
capital movements. Largely under the 
aegis of the IMF, the major trading 





mntries of the world have adopted a 
igime of free financial flows among na- 
ons. These developments together pro- 
ded the foundation for a rapid expan- 
on of trade and interdependence, in 
irn helping to produce an astonishing 
jcovery from war and a sustained in- 

ease in production and material well- 
sing. The removal of exchange controls 

accord with the Fund's articles has 
;en instrumental in achieving the six- 
)ld increase in world trade (in real 

rms) that has occurred since the end 
: European reconstruction in 1953. 
conomists, of course, complain about 
le misallocatlon of resources which oc- 
irred with the growing exchange rate 
lisalignments of the latter part of the 
eriod; these misalignments reflected 
iir failure to introduce more flexibility 
ito the operation of the system as con- 
itions changed. 

Even more important, gains from 
lat earlier period — convertibility and 
pen markets — were not lost as the 
/stem was transformed by the force 
ajeure of the marketplace to a more 
exible exchange rate system. Compare 
lis evolution with the monetary 
isintegration of the interwar period, 
ad you will see clearly the lasting 
snefits of Bretton Woods. The fun- 
amental principles of international 
lonetary cooperation survived and are 
;ill operating as we work to improve 
ir economic performance with the 
resent exchange rate arrangements, 
he principles that exchange rates and 
ther international monetary issues are 
matter for mutual concern, not 
nilateral decisions; stable domestic 
olicies are fundamental to international 
lonetary stability; and that the reper- 
jssions of one country's policies on 
nother country's well-being cannot be 
piored are still the core of our present 
ystem. This is one lasting legacy — more 
nportant than the details of any ex- 
hange rate system — that the Bretton 
W^oods founders left us. 

'he IMF and the Debt Crisis 

"hey also left us with an institu- 
ion — the IMF — that is at the center of 
ur efforts to deal with current interna- 
ional financial problems. 

In recent years nations all over the 
/orld have found their efforts to 
fianage their economic affairs swamped 
>y a unique combination of adverse cir- 
umstances — dramatically increased oil 
)rices followed by worldwide inflation, a 
:ollapse in commodity prices, the worst 

world recession since the 1930s, and 
historically very high interest rates. 
Wien oil prices shot up, the first reac- 
tion of oil-importing developing coun- 
tries was to borrow to stave off im- 
mediate economic dislocation. And with 
liquidity abundant and real interest rates 
low or negative in the late 1970s, they 
continued to borrow. Tlius, by the end of 
1982, when the crisis peaked, their in- 
debtedness had reached $600 billion, 
having quadrupled in a decade. At that 
point, we were confronted with a 
widespread debt crisis, as nation after 
nation sought IMF assistance and debt 

Some observers argue that the Fund 
began to take on a new role in this 
crisis, that of financial organizer for 
troubled debtor nations. Indeed, for a 
troubled world, I know for certain that 
it has become the linchpin of our 
strategy for dealing with this crisis, a 
strategy endorsed last year by the 
Williamsburg summit. "The IMF is 

crucial to four of the basic elements of 
that strategy and closely related to the 

First, the Fund obviously provides 
its financial support to troubled nations. 

Second, it is the one institution with 
the expertise, experience, and interna- 
tional acceptance to encourage and 
guide debtor governments toward sound 
adjustment of their domestic economies 
to the new world realities. Such an ad- 
justment program is unquestionably the 
most vital step in addressing a country's 
financial crisis, because it sets the 
economy on a sustainable economic path 
for the future. 

Third, emergency official lending to 
debtor nations is almost invariably 
bridged to an approved IMF program. 

Fourth, adequate continuing flows 
of commercial bank financing, especially 
following a crisis, require the im- 
primatur and, increasingly, the en- 
couragement of the IMF; later such 
flows depend crucially on the success of 

Assistant Secretary for Economic 
and Business Affairs 

Richard T. McCormack was born in Bradford, 
Penn.. on March 6, 1941. He received his 
B.A. degree from Georgetown University in 
1963 and Ph.D. magna cum laude from the 
University of Fribourg in Switzerland (1966). 

Mr. McCormack began his career as a 
staff member of the Peace Corps and has 
been a consultant to a number of other U.S. 
Government agencies and private corpora- 

From 1969 to 1971, he served at the Ex- 
ecutive Office of the President in a number of 
capacities. As a senior staff member of the 
President's Advisory Council on Executive 
Organization, he was responsible for drawing 
up the plans for the subsequently established 
White House Council on International 
Economic Policy. Mr. McCormack also served 
as special assistant to former Governor 
William Scranton at the INTELSAT negotia- 
tions at the State Department in early 1969. 
He was at the American Enterprise Institute 
from 1975 to 1977. 

In 1977 Mr. McCormack was deputy to 
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
International Economic Affairs. Following his 
tenure at the Treasury, he was a consultant 
to the White House office of the Special 
Trade Representative, where he analyzed 
potential international commodity 

From 1979 to 1981, Mr. McCormack 
served as a legislative assistant to Senator 
Jesse Helms. And from December 1981 until 
his confirmation by the Senate, he was a con- 
sultant to the Department of State on inter- 
national economic matters. 


(Department of State photo) 

He was sworn in as Assistant Secretary 
for Economic and Business Affairs in 
February 1983. 

Mr. McCormack is the author of Asians 
in Kenya and a number of other articles and 
monographs on foreign affairs. ■ 


the IMF-supported adjustment program. 
(I might add that debt reschedulings, 
both official and private, also necessitate 
the assurance of eventual repayment 
provided by a sound IMF program.) 

The fifth element of the debt 
strategy— strong industrialized-country 
economic recovery with open markets— 
obviously is not the direct responsibility 
of the IMF. Nevertheless, it is of great 
significance to the success of the Fund's 
objectives, and I can assure you that the 
Fund's managing director, for one, has 
not been timid about making his views 
known to the industrialized nations 
whose policies govern the course and 
strength of the recovery. 

Thus, it is clear that the Fund has 
become "a" and perhaps "the" key actor 
in managing the debt crisis. Certainly in 
handling this grave problem it provides 
an invaluable tool which we would in all 
probability have to create ourselves if 
the Bretton Woods participants had not 
had the foresight to do it for us. 

Finally, if the performance under 
the current e.xchange rate system is to 
be improved, then we must have greater 
convergence in economic performance 
among major countries toward more 
stable and noninflationary economic 
growth in the interests not only of the 
domestic economy but the international 
economy. The Fund must have a central 
role in this effort. In particular, we are 
trying to strengthen the process of Fund 
surveillance over all countries' 
policies— not just those in debt to the 
Fund. The Fund will certainly be cen- 
trally involved in any future evolution of 
the system. 

The IBRD and Changing 
Development Needs 

Let me return now to Secretary 
Morgenthau's statement. He went on to 
say that: "We have taken the initial 
steps through which the nations of the 
world will be able to help one another in 
economic development to their mutual 
advantage and further enrichment of 
all." He was talking, of course, about the 
second Bretton Woods institution, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD or World 
Bank), whose primary objective would 
be to provide or support long-term loans 
for the reconstruction of Europe and the 
development of low-income countries. 
The IBRD, of course, was never in- 
tended to supersede private investment 
but to stimulate or supplement the 
financing of specific projects that could 
not be privately funded. 

In the event, the magnitude of 
postwar reconstruction turned out to be 
beyond the resources of the IBRD. With 
this job largely taken over by the Mar- 
shall Plan, the Bank turned its attention 
to the problems of the developing world. 

Over the years the Bank has 
responded to the changing needs of both 
its borrowing and lending members. For 
example, once focusing on capital in- 
frastructure projects such as roads, 
railways, and telecommunications, the 
Bank now pays greater attention to 
social infrastructure needs and to those 
investments which directly affect the 
population and serve to make them 
more productive. Institutionally, too, the 
IBRD has evolved to meet the man- 
power training needs of borrowers. In 

1955 the World Bank created the 
Economic Development Institute to pro- 
mote education and training. Then in 

1956 the International Finance Corpora- 
tion (IFC) was established to promote 
growth in the private sector and to 
mobilize domestic and foreign capital for 
this purpose. 

In 1960, specifically to meet the 
development needs of the poorer bor- 
rowers and to lend to them on terms 
that would bear less heavily on their 
balances of payments, the International 
Development Association (IDA) was 
established; the following year the IFC 
articles were amended to allow that 
agency to make equity investments. 

To address the dynamic complexities 
of an interdependent world economy, 
the Boards of Governors of the World 
Bank and the IMF established in 1974 a 
Joint Ministerial Committee on the 
Transfer of Real Resources to Develop- 
ing Countries, better known as the 
Development Committee. Today this 
committee through task forces is pro- 
viding a forum to examine both conces- 
sional and nonconcessional flows to 
developing nations and to look at the ef- 
fective use of those resources. The com- 
mittee is also the focus of informed 
debate over the importance of trade to 
growth in developing countries. 

Confronted in the 1970s with an in- 
ternational debt crisis, the World Bank 
has already accomplished much to 
alleviate development problems and to 
assist its borrowing members to manage 
their economies. 

For example, since 1980, a 
remarkably short time for a multilateral 
institution, the World Bank has, among 
other activities: 

• Initiated the structural adjustment 
loan to support programs in developing 
countries for specific policy changes and 
institutional reforms designed to achieve 
a more efficient use of resources; 



• Increased soft project lending; 

• Developed and implemented a 
special action program to provide finan- 
cial measures and policy advice for coun 
tries already pursuing appropriate 

• Emphasized the needs of sub- 
Saharan Africa — lending to sub-Saharan \}\ 
Africa was more than 30% of fiscal year 
1981-83 lending; and 

• Developed and implemented the 
"B" Loan, designed to increase commer- 
cial bank participation in less credit- 
worthy nations. 

Even with these and other recent 
changes, however, the Bank recognizes 
more may need to be done. Despite the 
fact that the current international situa- 
tion is improving, recovery is only slowly 
coming to the Bank's less developed 
members. The Bank is concerned that 
the need for internal borrower reforms 
together with unpredictable external 
conditions beyond the control of bor- 
rowers may make debt management and 
continued development of borrowers 
highly tentative. 

Beyond considering additional 
mechanisms to assist borrowers, the 
Bank is reexamining its coordination 
with the IMF. Bank use of structural ad 
justment loans, increased nonproject 
lending, and the longer term IMF in- 
volvement with countries has blurred 
the distinctions between its activities 
and those of the IMF. Although there 
always has been good coordination be- 
tween the two institutions, their chang- 
ing roles underline a need for 
strengthening Bank-Fund coordination. 

The Bank is working to meet these 
challenges. Specifically, it is now con- 
ducting a review of its current activities 
their effectiveness, and possible future 
actions. Management plans, I under- 
stand, to present a coherent plan of ac- 
tion on the future role of the Bank in 
the spring of 1985. With the Bank's 
history, I believe we can confidently e.\- 
pect the Bank will continue to meet the 
challenges presented by a dynamic worl 


We are here celebrating the achievemei 
of the drafters of the pathbreaking Bre 
ton Woods agreements, which have con 
stituted an essential foundation for 
postwar economic cooperation. I have 
reviewed some of the major ac- 
complishments of these institutions, 
which have been indispensable for the 
enormous economic gains we have 
achieved in the past four decades. I ha\ 
also mentioned some of the ways in 



liich these institutions are moving to 
eet the critical challenges of today. We 
list ensure that these institutions re- 
nin as vital and effective in dealing 
ith future problems as they have been 
: tlie past. We must also rededicate 
ill-selves to the task of building public 
;i|i|H)rt for these institutions and their 
iijrctives. For if they have been vital to 

managing the expansion of the world 
economy over the past 40 years, we can 
be sure that they will be even more im- 
perative in our increasingly interdepen- 
dent world economy of the future. This, 
more than anything else, is the tribute 
we owe to the founders of Bretton 
Woods. ■ 

J.S.-Soviet Bilateral Relations 


JNE 27, 1984' 

rs. Billington, Hamburg, Ellison, and 
ihnson thank you for bringing your 
stinguished group to the White House, 
"hen I heard that you would be 
eeting at the Smithsonian to discuss 
.8. -Soviet exchanges, I was eager to 
are my thoughts with you on this 
Tiely and important topic. 

First, I want to congratulate the 
oodrow Wilson Center and the 
irnegie Corporation of New York; cer- 
inly nothing is more worthy of our at- 
ntion than finding ways to reach out 
id establish better communication with 
e people and the Government of the 
)viet tfnion. 

For many months, I have encour- 
■;ed the Soviet Union to join with us in 
major effort to see if we could make 
ogress in these broad problem areas: 
ducing the threat and use of force in 
Iving international disputes, reducing 
jmamants in the world, and estab- 
. hing a better working relationship 
th each other. 

At the United Nations, at the 
,.panese Diet, at Georgetown Universi- 
I , and at the Irish Parliament, I have 
I plained our efforts to reduce arms, 
; .rticularly nuclear arms, and to 
I tablish a useful dialogue on regional 
iiues. Let me describe to you some of 
I e many efforts that we're making to 
tablish a better working relationship 
ith the Soviet Union. 

We've informed the Soviet Govern- 
ent that we're prepared to initiate 
'gotiations on a new exchanges agree- 
ent, and we've completed our prepara- 
)ns for these negotiations. We've 
oposed to resume preparations to 
)en consulates in New York and Kiev. 
e've taken steps to revive our 
freements for cooperation in en- 
ronmental protection, housing, health. 

and agriculture. Activities under these 
agreements have waned in recent years, 
because there've been no meetings of 
their joint committees to plan projects. 
We've proposed that preparations begin 
for such meetings in order to increase 
the number of active projects. 

We're in the process of renewing 
several bilateral agreements that other- 
wise would have expired this year. And 
we've agreed to extend our fishing 
agreement for 18 months, and we're 
looking at possibilities to increase 
cooperation under the terms of the 

We've proposed that our Agreement 
to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and 
Technical Cooperation be renewed for 
another 10 years and that preparations 
begin for a meeting of our Joint Com- 
mercial Commission. 

The U.S. Navy delegation held talks 
last month with their Soviet counter- 
parts in accord with our agreement on 
avoiding incidents at sea. And we've 
agreed to extend this useful agreement 
for another 3 years. 

We're reviewing the World Oceans 
Agreement, which has been useful in 
promoting joint oceanographic research, 
and we'll give careful thought to renew- 
ing the agreement prior to its expira- 
tion. And we've made proposals in 
several other areas to improve dialogue, 
foster cooperation, and solve problems. 

We've proposed a fair and equitable 
resolution of our differences on the 
maritime boundary off Alaska. We've 
proposed a joint simulated space rescue 
mission in which astronauts and 
cosmonauts would carry out a combined 
exercise in space to develop techniques 
to rescue people from malfunctions in 
space vehicles. And we're currently con- 
ducting another round of talks on con- 
sular matters, trying to improve visa 
procedures and facilitate travel between 
our two countries. 

We've suggested discussions be- 
tween the U.S. Coast Guard and the 
Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on 

search and rescue procedures to assist 
citizens of all countries lost at sea. And 
we've made progress in our talks on 
upgrading the Hot Line, proposing dis- 
cussions on potential nuclear terrorist 
incidents, on establishing a joint military 
communications line, and on upgrading 
embassy communications in both coun- 
tries. We've also suggested regular high- 
level contacts between military person- 
nel of our two countries. 

So, as you can see, we've offered 
comprehensive and sensible proposals to 
improve the U.S. -Soviet dialogue and 
our working relationship. And if the 
Soviets decide to join us, new avenues 
would open, I think, for your efforts. 

It's still too early to judge the 
results. A few proposals are near agree- 
ment. Many others are still under 
discussion, and some have been re- 
jected — at least for now. 

Meaningful contact with a closed 
society will never be easy. And I'm as 
disturbed as you are by recent reports of 
new measures taken by Soviet 
authorities to restrict contacts between 
Soviet citizens and foreigners. These 
restrictions come on top of intensified 
repression of those brave Soviet citizens 
who've dared to express views contrary 
to those of the Soviet political elite. 

The people of the Soviet Union pay 
a heavy price for the actions of their 
government. In fact, we all pay a price. 
When the Soviet Government takes 
repressive actions against its people and 
attempts to seal them off from the out- 
side world, their own intellectual and 
cultural life suffers. At the same time, 
the rest of the world is deprived of the 
cultural riches of the Soviet people. 
What would classical music be without a 
Tchaikovsky or literature without a 
Tolstoi or chemistry without a 

Civilized people everywhere have a 
stake in keeping contacts, communica- 
tion, and creativity as broad, deep, and 
free as possible. The Soviet insistence on 
sealing their people off and on filtering 
and controlling contacts and the flow of 
information remains the central prob- 

When Soviet actions threaten the 
peace or violate a solemn agreement or 
trample on standards fundamental to a 
civilized world, we cannot and will not 
be silent. To do so would betray our 
deepest values. It would violate our con- 
science and ultimately undermine world 
stability and our ability to keep the 
peace. We must have ways short of 
military threats that make it absolutely 
clear that Soviet actions do matter and 


that some actions inevitably affect the 
quality of the relationship. 

These reactions do lead to a 
decrease in contacts with the people of 
the Soviet Union, and this is a dilemma. 
However, our quarrel is not with the 
Russian people, with the Ukrainian peo- 
ple, or any of the other proud na- 
tionalities in that multinational state. So, 
we must be careful in reacting to actions 
by the Soviet Government not to take 
out our indignations on those not 
responsible. And that's why I feel that 
we should broaden opportunities for 
Americans and Soviet citizens to get to 
know each other better. 

But our proposals to do that are not 
a signal that we have forgotten 
Afghanistan. We'll continue to 
demonstrate our sympathy and strong 
support for the Afghan people. The 
United States will support their struggle 
to end the Soviet occupation and to 
reestablish an independent and neutral 

Nor do our proposals mean that we 
will ignore violations of the Helsinki 
Final Act or plight of Andrei Sakharov, 
Yelena Bonner, Anatoli Shcharanskiy, 
Yuriy Orlov, and so many others. The 
persecution of these courageous, noble 
people weighs very heavily on our 
hearts. It would be wrong to believe that 
their treatment and their fate will not 
affect our ability to increase cooperation 
It will, because our conscience and that 
of the American people and freedom- 

loving people everywhere will have it no 
other way. 

I know these thoughts do not 
resolve the dilemma we face. But it is a 
dilemma for all of us. And I'll value your 

I don't think there's anything we're 
encouraging the Soviet leaders to do 
that is not as much in their interest as it 
is in ours. If they're as committed to 
peace as they say, they should join us 
and work with us. If they sincerely want 
to reduce arms, there's no excuse for 
refusing to talk, and if they sincerely 
want to deal with us as equals, they 
shouldn't try to avoid a frank discussion 
of real problems. 

Some say for the Soviet leaders 
peace is not the real issue; rather, the 
issue is the attempt to spread their 
dominance by using military power as a 
means of intimidation, and there is much 
evidence to support this view. But it 
should be clear by now that such a 
strategy will not work. And once they 
realize this, maybe they'll understand 
they have much to gain by improving 
dialogue, reducing arms, and solving 

The way governments can best pro- 
mote contacts among people is by not 
standing in the way. Our Administration 
will do all we can to stay out of the way 
and to persuade the Soviet Government 
to do likewise. We know this won't hap- 
pen overnight, but if we're to succeed. 

U.S.-Soviet Consular Agreement 

AUG. 1, 1984' 

On August 1, 1984, representatives of 
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the 
Consular Division of the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs exchanged diplomatic 
notes concluding the latest round of the 
U.S.-Soviet consular review talks. The 
agreement brings to fruition a series of 
discussions on consular matters con- 
ducted in 1976, 1979, 1983, and 1984 
and resolves a number of issues to visas 
and the functioning of the diplomatic 
missions of the two countries. 

The issues involved were essentially 
technical ones, to be resolved on the 
basis of mutual benefit. The agreement 
will facilitate the travel of participants 
in educational exchange programs, ex- 
pedite the issuance of certain categories 
of visas, and improve conditions for the 
travel of diplomats in the two countries 

by allowing them to enter and leave 
through two additional cities beyond the 
three currently provided for. 

The talks were proposed by us as 
part of the President's effort to expand 
contacts and to move forward on 
bilateral issues that can be resolved to 
our mutual benefit, as he mentioned in 
his June 27 remarks on U.S.-Soviet ex- 
changes, and it seemed to us that the 
Soviet side approached them in the same 

The U.S. delegation was led by 
Raymond F. Smith, officer-in-charge of 
the Bilateral Relations Section of the 
Department of State's Office of Soviet 
Union Affairs. The Soviet delegation 
was headed by Ivan Gorokhov, Deputy 
Chief of the Consular Administration of 
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affait-s. 

you must stay involved and get more 
Americans into wider and more mean- 
ingful contact with many more Soviet 

It may seem an impossible dream to 
think there could be a time when 
Americans and Soviet citizens of all 
walks of life travel freely back and 
forth, visit each other's homes, look up 
friends and professional colleagues, 
work together in all sorts of problems, 
and, if they feel like it, sit up all night 
talking about the meaning of life and the 
different ways to look at the world. 

In most countries of the world, peo- 
ple take those contacts for granted. We 
should never accept the idea that 
American and Soviet citizens cannot en- 
joy the same contacts and communica- 
tion. I don't believe it's an impossible 
dream, and I don't think you believe 
that, either. 

Let me just conclude by saying 
thank you, and God bless you for what 
you're doing. 

JUNE 27, 19842 

In his speech today to participants in th 
Smithsonian's Conference on U.S. -Soviet 
Exchanges, the President refers to 
several proposals we have made to 
establish a better working relationship 
with the Soviet Union. 

'Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 

New Exchanges Agreement 

We have been discussing a new Genera 
Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges an 
Cooperation and will present a draft to 
the Soviets for formal negotiations in 
the very near future. The previous 
agreement, often referred to as the 
"Cultural Agreement," lapsed in 1979. 
was one of a series of 2-year agreemer 
going back to 1958. Our new draft 
would provide for resumption of officii 
support for inter alia exchanges of m£i 
jor exhibits, academic, cultural, and 
sports individuals and groups and reac 
tivation of film presentations. The 
American team in the formal negotia- 
tions will be headed by Ambassador 
Arthur Hartman in Moscow. 

New Consulates General 

In 1974 the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed to establish new 
Consulates General in Kiev and New 
York City. We already have a Consult 
General in Leningrad and the Soviets 
have one in San Francisco. Following 







he Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979, the U.S. Government suspended 
;he agreement for new Consulates 
jeneral. At the time of the suspension, 
ve had an advance team in Kiev for 
learly 2 years and were approximately 6 
nonths away from officially opening the 
onsulate. The Soviets had a similar 
«am in New York. Both advance teams 
vere withdrawn. Since that time, we 
lave discussed the Consulates issue on 
lumerous occasions, focusing over the 
)ast year on concrete steps that could be 
aken to pave the way for opening these 
consulates. We have recently proposed 
io move forward and suggested we send 
L team to Kiev to inspect available prop- 

Environmental Protection Agreement 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on 
ooperation in Environmental Protec- 
;ion was signed at Moscow on May 23, 
L972, by President Nixon and Chairman 
■'odgorny. The agreement has been 
enewed three times for 5-year periods 
ind is due to expire May 23, 1987. Ac- 
ivities under the agreement have in- 
cluded seminars, joint publications, ex- 
■hange visits, and joint projects in 
'leveral topics including protecting en- 
iangered species, modeling of long- 
•ange air pollution, and earthquake 
)rediction. EPA Administrator William 
). Ruckelshaus has assumed the U.S. 
o-chairmanship of the Joint En- 
vironmental Committee and will seek to 
ise this forum as a means to rein- 
igorate the agreement. Mr. 
luckelshaus is currently representing 
he United States at the multilateral 
Conference on the Environment in 
/lunich, where he has discussed the 
tgreement with Soviet officials. 




The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on 
Cooperation in Housing and Other Con- 
;truction was signed by President Nixon 
md Chairman Kosygin on June 28, 
.974, in Moscow. We decided in 
December 1983 to renew the agreement 
or a third 5-year period effective June 
18, 1984. Besides exchange visits and 
seminars, the agreement has supported 
oint projects in construction techniques 
n extreme climates and unusual 
ideological conditions, sewage treatment 
n a permafrost environment, and fire 
3revention in the design of construction 
jnaterials. The President's decision to 
jxpand the activities under the agree- 
Tient will lead to the convening of the 
Krst Joint Housing Committee meeting 

since 1978 and to an increase in the 
already extensive private sector involve- 
ment in joint projects. Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development 
Samuel Pierce, Jr., will lead our efforts 
under this agreement. 


The United States and the Soviet Union 
entered into cooperation in the health 
area through two agreements signed in 
the early 1970s: the Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Medical Sciences and 
Public Health (signed May 23, 1972, at 
Moscow by Secretary of State Rogers 
and Minister of Health Petrovsky) and 
the Agreement on Cooperation in Ar- 
tificial Heart Research and Development 
(signed at Moscow June 28, 1974, by 
Secretary of State Kissinger and 
Foreign Minister Gromyko). The Health 
Agreement has been extended until May 
23, 1987, while the Artificial Heart 
Agreement will run until June 28, 1987. 
The President has directed that steps be 
taken in the near future to strengthen 
cooperation under these agreements 
through a renewal of high-level visits, 
joint committee meetings, and the initia- 
tion of new projects and possibly new 
agreements. The timing for such steps 
has not yet been set. The agreements 
have provided for joint research inter 
alia on laser treatment of glaucoma, 
congenital heart disease, mechanically 
assisted circulation in artificial hearts, 
and cancer treatment and prevention. 


Signed at Washington June 19, 1973, by 
Secretary of Agriculture Butz and 
Foreign Minister Gromyko, the 
Agriculture Agreement has been extend- 
ed three times and will not expire until 
June 19, 1988. The Department of 
Agriculture will now reactivate the 
agreement (which has been dormant the 
past several years) through a joint com- 
mittee meeting, high-level visits, and ini- 
tiation of new projects. Earlier the 
agreement has supported plant, animal, 
and soil science research (germ plasm 
studies) and exchange of grain-related 
economic information. Exchange visits, 
especially those involving the private 
sector, had been particularly active. All 
of these programs will be rein vigor ated. 

Fishing Agreement 

In April, the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed to extend the ex- 
isting fisheries agreement for 18 months 
(as opposed to the two previous 
12-month extensions). Final approval is 
currently pending before Congress. The 

Fisheries Agreement was initially signed 
in November 1976. The Soviet Union 
does not, however, have a directed 
fishing allocation. After the Soviet inva- 
sion of Afghanistan, the United States 
terminated allocations to the U.S.S.R. to 
fish within our 200-mile zone. (The 
Soviet Union had been receiving a direct 
allocation of between 400,000 and 
500,000 MT a year). Soviet processing at 
sea of fish caught by U.S. fisherman as 
part of an existing joint venture was 
allowed to continue since it benefited 
U.S. fishermen. The United States is 
currently reviewing the U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
fishing relationship to determine 
whether mutually beneficial steps can be 
taken to increase cooperation. 

Long-Term Cooperation Agreement 

The United States has proposed to ex- 
tend for 10 years the U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Agreement to Facilitate Economic, In- 
dustrial and Technical Cooperation. The 
agreement was signed by Presidents 
Nixon and Brezhnev during the 1974 
Moscow summit. It is scheduled to ex- 
pire June 28, 1984. The principal provi- 
sions of the agreement call upon the 
parties to use their good offices to 
facilitate cooperation in economic, in- 
dustrial, and technical areas. In practice, 
the agreement has been exclusively 
economic and has facilitated certain 
business dealings between the two coun- 
tries. If the agreement is extended, our 
exception is that there will be a meeting 
of the Working Group of Experts under 
Article III to examine prospects for 
trade. If that meeting is successful, then 
a Joint Commercial Commission meeting 
will be held when practical. 

U.S. -Soviet Incidents at Sea 
Agreement (INCSEA) 

The 1972 U.S. -Soviet Agreement on the 
Prevention of Incidents at Sea estab- 
lished certain "rules of the road" to 
govern special situations involving naval 
surface vessels and aircraft of the two 
nations. It also set up agreed-upon, 
navy-to-navy channels for the prompt 
resolution of any problems arising under 
this agreement. Senior officers of the 
U.S. and Soviet Navies meet on an an- 
nual basis for a general review of the 
implementation of the agreement and 
discussion of ways in which it might be 
strengthened. The most recent review 
took place in Moscow in late May. At 
that time, the U.S. and Soviet sides 
agreed to a renewal of the INCSEA 
agreement for another 3 years. 


World Oceans Agreement 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. World Oceans Agree- 
ment was signed in 1973 and renewed 
for 3 years in 1981. It has been useful in 
promoting joint oceanographic research 
and has involved seminars, exchange 
visits, and joint ocean research cruises. 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- 
ministration has taken the U.S. lead on 
this agreement. The agreement comes 
up for renewal in December. 

Maritime Boundary 

The United States and the Soviet Union 
have a difference relating to the precise 
cartographic depiction and location of 
the boundary line established by the 
1867 convention ceding Alaska. The dif- 
ference relates to the fact that the 
United States depicts the 1867 conven- 
tion line as the maritime boundary by 
arcs of great circles, while the Soviet 
Union depicts the convention line by 
rhumb lines. We have proposed a fair 
and equitable resolution to the issue. 
Three rounds of technical level discus- 
sions have been held and a fourth round 
is expected soon. 

Space Rescue Mission 

The U.S. proposal envisages cooperation 
between NASA and Soviet space of- 
ficials on a joint simulated space rescue 
mission. A space shuttle would rendez- 
vous with the Soviet space station to 
practice procedures that might be 
necessary to rescue each other's person- 
nel. Details of the proposal would have 
to be worked out. 

Consular Review Talks 

The session of U.S. -Soviet consular 
review talks currently underway in 
Moscow is the latest round of a series of 
discussions which began in 1976, when 
representatives of the United States and 
the Soviet Union met to attempt to 
resolve a number of consular issues 
outstanding between the two countries. 
Those issues primarily involved visa 
questions and administrative matters 
relating to the functioning of our 
diplomatic missions. The discussions 
have taken place in Moscow in 1976 and 
in Washington in 1979 and 1983. 

Search and Rescue Talks 

In October 1981, the U.S. Coast Guard 
was authorized to take the initiative to 
open direct lines of emergency com- 
munications with the Soviet maritime 

rescue authorities in the Pacific. As a 
result of subsequent exchanges in June 
1983, agreement was reached to hold a 
working-level meeting on a broad range 
of search and rescue topics. This 
meeting was scheduled for early 
December 1983, but was postponed at 
the request of the Soviet side. We have 
proposed rescheduling this meeting. 

U.S. -Soviet Communications 
Improvements Talks 

On the basis of the President's proposals 
of May 1983, a U.S. team has met with 
Soviet counterparts three times to 
discuss possible means by which 
U.S. -Soviet communications — for use in 
both times of crisis and calm — might be 
strengthened. The most recent meeting 
was in Moscow in late April. On the 
basis of those talks, significant progress 
has been made in working out agree- 
ment with the Soviets on the desirability 
of upgrading the existing direct com- 
munications link (the Hot Line) with 
secure facsimile transmission 
capabilities, which would increase the 
speed, reliability, and versatility of that 
system. We expect another meeting 
shortly. Additionally, the United States 
has put forward proposals to upgrade 
the communications capabilities of the 
U.S. and Soviet Embassies in each 
other's countries, to establish a joint 
military communications link to handle 
the exchange of time-sensitive technical 
data, and to facilitate consultations in 
the event of a nuclear terrorist threat or 

U.S. -Soviet Military Contact 

With the exception of the special navy- 
to-navy talks under the 1972 INCSEA 
agreement, there has been no channel 
for high-level military exchange between 
the United States and Soviet Union out- 
side of specifically arms control-related 
talks since the one-time meeting of the 
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff with their 
Soviet counterparts during the 1979 
Vienna summit. Earlier this year, the 
President suggested to the Soviet 
leadership the desirability of exploring 
the possibility of regularizing some form 
of contact and discussion between those 
responsible for defense matters on both 
sides for the purpose of increasing 
mutual understanding and minimizing 
the potential for misinterpretation and 

Human Rights Cases 

Andrei Sakharov. Dr. Andrei Sakharov, 
a physicist and Academy of Sciences 
member who played a major role in the 
development of the Soviet hydrogen 
bomb, has spoken, out at length in 
defense of human rights in the Soviet 
Union. In 197.5 he was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize for those efforts. 
Since 1980 he has been required to live 
in internal exile in the closed city of 
Gorky. In early May he began a hunger 
strike to obtain permission for his wife, 
Yelena Bonner, to travel abroad for 
necessary medical treatment; there has 
been no confirmed information of any 
sort on his health or his status since that 

Yelena Bonner. A doctor by train- 
ing, Yelena Bonner is the wife of Dr. 
Sakharov and was a founding member 
of the Moscow Helsinki Group. She has 
served as his main channel of com- 
munications to the outside world during 
his exile in Gorky. She is also believed to 
have begun a hunger strike in early May 
to obtain permission to travel abroad for 
vital medical treatment; she suffers 
from both a heart condition and serious 
eye problems. 

Yuriy Orlov. A founder and leader 
of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Yuriy 
Orlov was long active on behalf of 
human rights in the Soviet Union. He 
was a founding member of the Moscow 
chapter of Amnesty International and a 
participant is unofficial scientific 
seminars organized for refusenik scien- 
tists. He was arrested in February 1977 
and convicted in May 1978 of "anti- 
Soviet agitation and propaganda." 
Earlier this year he completed 7 years ir 
a strict-regime labor camp and began 5 
years of internal exile. 

Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Anatoliy 
Shcharanskiy is a long-time activist on 
behalf of human rights and Jewish 
culture in the Soviet Union. A founding 
member of the Moscow Helsinki Group, 
Shcharanskiy was also a leader of the 
Jewish emigration movement and a 
liaison between Western newsmen and 
Soviet dissidents. In March 1977 he was 
arrested and in July 1978 was convicteo 
of "anti-Soviet agitation and 
propaganda" and "treason." He is cur- 
rently in Chistopol Prison; his wife, 
Avital, lives in Israel. 



'Made in the East Room at the White 
House to participants in the Smithsonian In- 
stitution's Conference on U.S. -Soviet Ex- 
changes (te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 2, 1984). 

^Text from White House press release. I 





J.S.-Soviet Union Expand 
'Hot Line" Agreement 

ULY 17, 19841 

am happy to be able to announce today 
hat we and the Soviet Union have 
cached agreement to expand and im- 
irove the operation of the direct com- 
lunications link, or the "Hot Line." 

This agreement is a modest but 
iositive step toward enhancing interna- 
ional stability and reducing the risk 
hat accident, miscalculation, or 
lisinterpretation could lead to confron- 
ation or conflict between the United 
■tates and the Soviet Union. 

With the addition of a facsimile 
apability, we will not only be able to ex- 
hange messages faster, but for the first 
me we will be able to send graphic 
laterial such as maps or pictures which 
'ould play a crucial role in helping to 
esolve certain types of crises or 

The negotiations which led to this 
greement began about 1 year ago 
August 1983), based upon a series of 
roposals that we first made in May 

In developing this and other ini- 
atives designed to reduce the risk of 
ar due to accident, misunderstandings, 
r miscalculation, v/e had the benefit of 
:<cellent advice from a number of key 
! jngressional leaders, including 
enators Warner and Nunn and the late 
enator Jackson. 

I see this agreement as both an ap- 
ropriate technical improvement to the 
iot Line," which has served both our 
overnments well for over 20 years, and 
1 3 a good example of how we can, work- 
ig together, find approaches which can 
lOve us toward a reduction in the risks 
f war. 


ULY 17, 1984' 

he United States and the Soviet Union 
)day formally agreed to add a facsimile 
•ansmission capability to the direct 
jmmunications link (DCL), commonly 
nown as the "Hot Line." This step— the 
jcond major technical improvement to 
le "Hot Line" since it was established 
1 1963— will enhance the capability of 
le system and thus its potential to help 
esolve crises and avert misunderstand- 

The agreement was initiated at the 
State Department this morning by Act- 
ing Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam 
and Soviet Charge Victor F. Isakov. 
Chairman of the U.S. delegation in the 
talks on communications improvements 
was Mr. Warren Zimmerman of the 
State Department, who was until recent- 
ly Deputy Chief of Mission of our Em- 
bassy in Moscow. The Deputy Chairman 
for the United States was Mr. Stuart 
Branch who has been Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Communications. 
The U.S. delegation included other of- 
ficials of the State Department, the 
Defense Department, and the National 
Security Council staff. The Soviet 
delegation was headed by Mr. A. M. 
Varbanskiy, a Chief of Administration in 
the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Communica- 
tions. Other members of the delegation 
included officials of the Communications 
Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. 

The addition of facsimile transmis- 
sion capability to the "Hot Line" will 
enable the U.S. and Soviet heads of 
government to exchange messages far 
more rapidly than they can with the ex- 
isting teletype system. In addition, they 
will be able for the first time to send 
graphic material over the DCL. The 
precise, detailed, and often easily inter- 
preted information offered by such 
graphic material as maps, charts, and 
drawings could be essential to help 
resolve a crisis or misunderstanding. 

Prior Negotiating History 

In June 1963, the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed in a memorandum 
of understanding to establish a direct 
communications link for use in time of 
emergency. Each agreed to ensure 
prompt delivery to its head of govern- 
ment of any communications received 
over the DCL from the other head of 
government. The memorandum of 
understanding was negotiated and sign- 
ed by the heads of the U.S. and Soviet 
delegations to the 18-nation Disarma- 
ment Conference in Geneva. The DCL 
was activated in August 1963. 

Eight years later, the DCL was up- 
dated by a September 30, 1971, agree- 
ment negotiated by a special working 
group of the two SALT [strategic arms 
limitation talks] delegations and signed 
by the U.S. Secretary of State and the 
Soviet Foreign Minister. This agreement 
provided for the addition of two satellite 

circuits to the DCL, one using the Soviet 
Molniya II satellite system and the other 
the U.S. INTELSAT system. Those two 
circuits became operational in January 

A second special working group of 
the two SALT delegations simultaneous- 
ly negotiated a related Agreement on 
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Out- 
break of Nuclear War between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R., which 
was signed on the same day, September 
30, 1971. This agreement provided for 
each party to notify the other in advance 
of any planned missile launch extending 
beyond its national territory in the direc- 
tion of the other and for each to notify 
the other immediately in the event of 
certain situations which could create a 
risk of nuclear war. The parties agreed 
that they would use the DCL to transmit 
urgent information in situations requir- 
ing prompt clarification. 

The Reagan Proposals 

In May 1983, President Reagan pro- 
posed to the Soviet Union three 
measures to improve the bilateral com- 
munications network between the two 
countries: the addition of a high-speed 
facsimile capability to the "Hot Line;" 
the establishment of a joint military 
communications link (JMCL); and the 
establishment of high-speed data links 
between each government and its Em- 
bassy in the other's capital. 

The Secretary of Defense had 
recommended those proposals to the 
President following a full and complete 
study of possible initiatives for enhanc- 
ing international stability and reducing 
the risk of nuclear war. That examina- 
tion, which involved all concerned U.S. 
Government agencies, was mandated by 
the Congress in the Department of 
Defense Authorization Act of 1983. The 
Secretary of Defense transmitted its 
results and recommendations in his 
April 1983 Report to the Congress on 
Direct Communications Links and Other 
Measures to Enhance Stability. 

U.S. -Soviet negotiations on improv- 
ing bilateral communications links 
opened in Moscow in August 1983. Sub- 
sequent rounds have been held in 
Washington in January 1984, in Moscow 
in April 1984, and the one just com- 
pleted in Washington in July 1984. 
Those discussions have now resulted in a 
U.S. -Soviet accord to add a facsimile 
transmission capability to the direct 
communications link. 


DCL System 

The direct communications link will now 
consist of: 

• Three circuits (two satellite cir- 
cuits plus one wire telegraph circuit); 

• One Earth station in each country 
for each satellite circuit; and 

• Terminals in each country linked 
to the three circuits and equipped with 
teletype and facsimile equipment. 

In keeping with the principle of con- 
fidentiality concerning communications 
between heads of government, the 
precise number of times that the heads 
of state have used the system has not 
been discovered. We do know that it has 
proved invaluable in major crises. U.S. 
Presidents have cited its use during the 
1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. 

'Text from White House press release. 

19th Report on Cyprus 

JULY 9, 1984' 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am 
submitting herewith a bimonthly report on 
progress toward a negotiated settlement of 
the Cyprus question. 

Since my last report to you there have 
been several developments in the Cyprus 
question worthy of note. On April 17 the self- 
declared Turkish Cypriot "state" announced 
the formal exchange of ambassadors with the 
Government of Turkey. We strongly opposed 
this development and declared publicly our 
concern that it could set back the U.N. 
Secretary General's efforts in the search for 
progress. We also repeated our opposition to 
any diplomatic recognition of the self- 
declared entity. 

On May 8 I informed the Congress that 
the Administration intended to request 
authorization for a "Cyprus Peace and 
Reconstruction Fund" of up to $250 million to 
be utilized on Cyprus at such time as a fair 
and equitable solution acceptable to both 
Cypriot communities is reached, or when 
substantial progress is made toward that 
goal. I intend this commitment to be a sym- 
bol of the shared concern of the Administra- 
tion and the Congress for promoting genuine 
progress on Cyprus. I was pleased that a 
committee of the House of Representatives 
has Included this fund in an authorization bill 
it is considering. 

On May 11 the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 550 which con- 
demned the Turkish Cypriot community for 
several actions it had taken. We found it 
necessary to abstain on the resolution, believ- 
ing its language unlikely to contribute to the 
goal of a negotiated settlement. We 
reiterated to the Council our continuing op- 
position to the Turkish Cypriot community's 
declaration of statehood and our determina- 
tion to see progress made under the aegis of 
the Secretary General. Following passage of 
that resolution Secretary Shultz's Special 

Cyprus Coordinator, Richard Haass, and 
other Administration officials undertook in- 
tensive consultations with both Cypriot par- 
ties, with U.N. officials and others on the 
potential for progress on the question. 

On June 15 the Security Council met 
again on Cyprus, this time to renew, 
unanimously, its mandate for U.N. 
peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). 
The resolution approved on that date is iden- 
tical in text to the previous renewal in 
December, 198:3. Following the vote the 
Turkish Cypriot representative told the Coun- 
cil his community could not accept the resolu- 
tion but would continue its cooperation with 
the U.N. forces on the same basis as that an- 
nounced by the Turkish Cypriots in 
December, 1983. We view this continuation 
of the vital U.N. peacekeeping mandate as a 
positive sign that the parties to the Cyprus 
question do intend to continue the search for 
a solution. I am enclosing a copy of the 
Secretary General's report to the Council on 
UNFICYP activities. 

At the time of the June Security Council 
vote the Turkish Cypriot side pledged to 
maintain the unoccupied status of the city of 
Varosha and presented to the Secretary 
General its latest ideas on possible next steps 
toward a solution. We welcomed the Varosha 
announcement and hope the ideas presented, 
as well as the comprehensive framework 
presented previously by the Government of 
Cyprus, can assist the Secretary General as 
he resumes efforts under his good offices 

Ronald Rkagan 

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair- 
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Coni- 
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 16. 1984). ■ 

Food for Peace 
Day, 1984 

JULY 10. 1984' 

Thirty years ago today— and you've 
probably been told this several 
times— President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
signed into law Public Law 480, the 
Food for Peace program. And 10 years 
before the signing ceremony which took 
place here at the White House, Presi- 
dent Eisenhower launched the Norman- 
dy invasion. And only the year before 
the signing ceremony, he was first 
sworn in as President. It's possible that 
on July 10, 1954, Ike thought most of 
his great moments were behind him. But 
that was not so, as this program proves, 
for in time it grew to become one of the 
greatest humanitarian acts ever per- 
formed by one nation for the needy of 
other nations. 

I'm delighted to welcome here today 
Ike's Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra 
Taft Benson, who was present when the 
Food for Peace bill was signed. 
Welcome. Glad to have you here. 

Food for Peace is still the largest 
food aid program in the world. Over the 
last 30 years, it's delivered almost 653 
billion pounds of food to people in over 
100 countries. It's helped bring hope and 
new economic opportunity to more than 
1.8 billion people. Statistics are, by their 
nature, dry, but bear with me for a mo- 
ment as I give you just a few more — 
with the hope that they haven't been 
given to you already. 

Food for peace has delivered 27,000 
tons of food a day to recipient countries 
for three decades now. And the value of 
those U.S. farm products exceeds $33 
billion— more than $3 million a day over 
the history of the program. 

All of those numbers give us a sense 
of the scope and the magnitude of this 
program. But its great contribution is 
that it's an instrument of American com 
passion. And it also reflects America's 
practicality. We recognized 30 years age 
that people who are hungry are weak 
allies for freedom. And we recognized, 
too, that except in emergencies, hand- 
outs don't help. From the beginning, 
recipient countries paid for a significant 
part of the food they received. 

The businesslike approach is one of 
the strengths of this program. We've 
never attempted to make countries 





hich receive our food become depend- 
it on our aid. In fact, we've used our 
d to foster economic development 
ound the world. And that is an impor- 
nt reason why, over the years, many 
the nations that have received our aid 
ive eventually become major commer- 
il partners. 

«In the early days of Food for Peace, 
e major recipient nations were the 
ar-devastated economies of Europe: 
aly and Spain, West Germany and 
ipan. And with time and with the help 

Food for Peace, those economies 
igained their strength. They began to 
ly cash for American farm com- 
odities. Many of these countries have 
jcome our top commercial partners, 
ight of our top 10 agricultural markets 
■e former recipients of Food for Peace 
d. And Japan is now our number one 
jricultural market on a cash basis. And 
lat has not only been good for the 
merican farmer and the American 
;onomy; it's been good for our interna- 
Dnal relations. 

Food for Peace has been very impor- 
,nt in spreading good will and generosi- 

throughout the world. When droughts 
id flooding from the El Nimo weather 
isturbances destroyed food crops in 
eru, Bolivia, and other Latin American 
mntries last year, Food for Peace took 
16 lead in providing emergency relief, 
uring the 1966 famine in India, 
ughly 60 million people are estimated 

have been sustained for 2 years by 
ood for Peace shipments. 

Today we face a severe and wide- 
)read famine in Africa, which is 
ireatening the lives of millions. And, 
ice again. Food for Peace is saving 
/es. We've already agreed to provide 
fer $400 million for food assistance for 
frica in this year alone. And I want to 
inounce today a major initiative to help 
i le starving people of Africa and the 
, orld. It's a new program to help us 
! jliver food more quickly and smoothly 
) those who suffer the most from the 
wages of famine. 

I will shortly propose legislation to 
■eate a $50 million Presidential fund 
lowing us to set aside existing foreign 
d resources to meet emergency food 
d needs. By prepositioning food stocks 
v-erseas where the requirements are the 
reatest, we can respond to emergency 
tuations more rapidly and effectively. I 
■ill also propose authority to allow the 
ood for Peace program to reduce the 
urden of transportation costs on the 

most needy countries. And all this is 
aimed at reducing the loss of life to 
acute hunger in the Third World. 

Food for Peace has come to embody 
the spirit of American voluntarism. The 
Federal Government has developed a 
strong partnership with the private sec- 
tor to help feed malnourished infants 
and children, to help mothers and the 
aged and the disabled. This cooperative 
effort with private and voluntary 
organizations includes such agencies as 
CARE and Catholic Relief Services, and 
many qther groups are helping also. 

In short, the Food for Peace pro- 
gram has become a wonderful means by 
which a nation of abundance has helped 
those in need. It's helped us expand 
agricultural markets, get needy allies 
back on their feet, and help potential 
allies become strong allies for freedom. 
Food for Peace has helped to coordinate 
the charitable impulses of the private 
sector. It's helped feed the weakest peo- 
ple in the world. 

And this record of progress is the 
result of what happened 30 years ago to- 
day, when Dwight Eisenhower picked up 
a pen and signed a piece of paper that 
quietly— and, with no great attention 
from the wise, he changed the world. I 
think Dwight D. Eisenhower would be 
very proud of what the Food for Peace 
program has accomplished. I certainly 
am, and I'm proud to be able to mark 
with you its anniversary today. 

May Food for Peace continue its 
great work; may it continue to be ad- 
ministered wisely; and may we continue 
to combat hunger and malnutrition 
throughout the world. 

I thank you all again for being here, 
and God bless you. 

And, now, I'll sign this proclamation 
which designates today, July 10, 1984, 
as Food for Peace Day. 

JULY 10, 19842 

July 10, 1984, is the thirtieth anniversary of 
the signing of the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954 
(Public Law 480). This legislation, signed by 
President Eisenhower, began the largest food 
assistance program ever undertaken by one 
country on behalf of needy people throughout 
the world, the Food for Peace program. 

The productivity and abundance of U.S. 
agriculture have made this generosity possi- 
ble. During the thirty years of this program, 
more than 300 million tons of agricultural 
commodities and products valued at approx- 
imately $34 billion have been distributed to 
over 150 countries. This food has helped 
reduce world hunger and improve nutritional 

The Food for Peace program has served 
as an example for other countries which have 
joined the United States in the effort to pro- 
vide food aid to needy people. It has served 
as a model for others to follow and continue 
to meet changing needs and situations. 

The Food for Peace program has ac- 
complished multiple objectives to combat 
hunger and malnutrition abroad, to expand 
export markets for U.S. agriculture to en- 
courage economic advancement in developing 
countries, and to promote in other ways the 
foreign policy of the United States. 

In recognition of the accomplishments of 
this program, the Congress, by Senate Joint 
Resolution 306, has designated July 10, 1984 
as "Food for Peace Day" and has authorized 
and requested the President to issue a proc- 
lamation in observance of that day. 

Now. Therefore, I, Ronalii Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim July 10, 1984, as Food 
for Peace Day, and I call upon the people of 
the United States to commemorate this occa- 
sion with appropriate ceremonies and ac- 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set 
my hand this 10th day of July, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four, 
and of the Independence of the United States 
of America the two hundred and ninth. 

Ronald Reagan 

'Made at the signing ceremony in the 
East Room of the White House (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of July 16, 1984). 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 16. ■ 


Extending Voluntary Departure 
for El Salvadorans 

by Elliott Ahrams 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Rules of the House Committee on 
Rules on June 20. 19Si. Mr. Ahrams is 
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs. ' 

I am grateful for this opportunity to ap- 
pear before you today. As every member 
of the subcommittee knows, and indeed 
as every American must by now be well 
aware, El Salvador is a country troubled 
by poverty, violence, overpopulation, 
and a history of oppression. For a 
number of years, Salvadorans have 
looked for economic opportunity 
elsewhere. Prior to the war between El 
Salvador and Honduras in 1969, a large 
number were living in Honduras. 
Through the 197()s and early 1980s, hun- 
dreds of thousands of Salvadorans have 
come to the United States. The in- 
creased violence in El Salvador 
prevalent since 1980 no doubt increased 
the incentives to leave the country, as 
have the economic difficulties which the 
war has only worsened. 

The United States is thus confronted 
with a number of significant immigra- 
tion issues regarding El Salvador. It is 
difficult for Salvadorans to get visitors' 
visas to the United States and difficult 
for them to get immigrant visas as well. 
We face a very significant amount of il- 
legal immigration from El Salvador, and 
a large quantity of asylum applications. 
How do we deal with the asylum applica- 
tions? To those not entitled to asylum, 
how do we respond to their desire to live 
in the United States? 

Asylum Policies 

The asylum issue is in a sense an easy 
one. U.S. law, in incorporating the 
definition of a refugee contained in the 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, set forth the stand- 
ards by which an asylum application 
must be judged. We apply these stand- 
ards and a limited number of aliens, ir- 
respective of their nationality, can meet 
them. This is true of asylum applicants 
from El Salvador. This has occasioned 
much criticism of the Administration's 
asylum policy toward El Salvador, but in 
fact we have no "asylum policy" toward 
El Salvador or any other country; we 
apply the same standards to each. In the 
last few months recommendations for 

the approval of applications from 
Salvadorans and Nicaraguans have been 
running at roughly the same rate; and 
though, of course, there are variations 
for both countries, about 10% of applica- 
tions can meet legal standards. This 
reflects no policy decision, nor does it 
reflect the state of our bilateral relations 
with either government; it simply re- 
flects the fact that asylum applicants 
must meet the legal standards in order 
to be granted asylum. We are well 
aware that much criticism could be end- 
ed were the number of Salvadoran 
asylum applications that are approved 
higher. But, to approve asylum applica- 
tions for partisan political reasons would 
ignore the law. We recommend in favor 
of applications that meet the standards 
and against those that do not. 

Deportation Considerations 

The argument is then made that all 
Salvadorans, even those who do not 
qualify for asylum, should not be 
deported to El Salvador but rather 
allowed to remain here. As you know, 
the Administration does not concur with 
this view. All suspension of deportation 
decisions require a balancing of 
judgments about their foreign policy, 
humanitarian, and immigration policy 

In the case of El Salvador, the im- 
migration policy implications of suspen- 
sion of deportation are enormous. Here 
we have a country with a history of 
large-scale illegal immigration to the 
United States. Can anyone doubt that a 
suspension of deportation would increase 
the amount of illegal immigration from 
El Salvador to the United States? An in- 
telligent and industrious Salvadoran 
weighing a decision to try illegal im- 
migration to the United States knows 
that one of the risks is deportation, 
which might occur before he has had a 
chance to earn back the costs of the 
journey. If we remove that possibility of 
deportation, it is simple logic to suggest 
that illegal entry becomes a more attrac- 
tive investment. 

Of course, not all Salvadoran 
migrants to the United States are solely 
or primarily economic migrants; some 
are refugees who may be and have been 
granted asylum, and they do not need 
suspension of deportation to be pro- 

tected. So, by definition, when we 
discuss suspension of deportation for the 
group which is not eligible for asylum, 
what we are discussing is whether peo- 
ple who emigrate from El Salvador to 
the United States illegally should be per- 
mitted to reside here. If one says yes to i 
this question then we do not have an im- 
migration policy with regard to El 
Salvador. We have abdicated the respon- 
sibility to have one. 

It was the failure of our government 
to have a coherent approach to refugee 
flows that prompted the Congress to 
pass the Refugee Act of 1980. It was tht 
specific intent of the Congress to end 
nationality-specific measures that pro- 
vided benefits for persons from one 
country and left other persons with 
similar claims in limbo. It was also the 
Refugee Act that made part of our law 
the UN High Commissioner's definition 
of refugee that requires each asylum ap 
plication to be examined on an individuE 

We believe our government should 
avoid single nationality legislation. We 
also believe passage of immigration 
reform legislation provides long-term 
solutions to some of our immigration 
problems. Many Salvadorans, as well a 
persons of other nationalities, will be 
permitted to achieve legal resident 
status through provisions of the 

Some groups argue that illegal 
aliens who are sent back to El Salvado 
meet persecution and often death. Ob- 
viously, we do not believe these claims 
or we would not deport these people. 
Twice, in recent years, the U.S. Em- 
bassy in San Salvador has tracked 
deportees to determine if they were be 
ing persecuted; we concluded that the\ 
were not. Last year we asked some of 
ficials of Tutela Legal, which is the 
human rights office of the Archdiocest 
of El Salvador, whether they believed 
there was a pattern of persecution of 
deportees. They replied that they did 
not. It is noteworthy that these accus; 
tions, which are lodged by some 
American activist groups critical of U 
policy in El Salvador, find no echo noi 
did they find their source in complaint 
from Salvadoran human rights groups 
which have never made this claim. An 
that stands to reason. El Salvador is ; 
country, as noted above, in which 
emigration abroad is a common and 
respected means of self-improvement, 
and it is engaged in by hundreds and 
thousands of Salvadorans, by perhaps 
quarter of the population. I submit th 
the notion that the people being m^^ 

deported are easily identifiable when 





ley return to El Salvador is false, and 
le notion that they are automatically 
ispect is equally false. 
The subcommittee will be interested 

learn that, in part, in response to the 
•eat interest expressed by Chairman 
iomano L.] Mazzoli, Senator [Alan K.] 
mpson, and others, we have continued 

study the treatment of deportees. The 
mbassy in San Salvador was sent the 
imes of nearly 500 deportees, selected 
, random. Efforts were made to con- 
,ct every one of them in order to see 
hat happened to them after their 
turn. We have been able to locate or 
id out about roughly 50% of them, us- 
g Salvadoran employees so as to draw 

little attention as possible to this 
hole survey. 

We have now completed the study 
id we will be happy to share the 
)ecific information gathered as soon as 
le final report is ready for release. I 
in tell you, though, that we found no 
'idence of mistreatment of those 
ilvadorans interviewed, or among 
lose whose welfare was verified 
rough contact with family members or 
lends. One interesting note is that 21% 

those who were located are, according 

family or friends, already back in the 
nited States. 

We have confirmed that one 
turnee was killed. His wife reports 
at the guerrillas killed him for his 
irlier involvement with government 
curity forces. A letter sent to the ad- 
•ess furnished by a second person was 
turned marked "deceased." The Em- 
issy was unable to obtain any further 

I would not suggest to this subcom- 
ittee that we have completed here the 
'finitive scientific study and that no 
rther efforts are needed. But surely 
ere must come a time when any 
)server concludes that this alleged pat- 
rn of wide-scale abuse of deportees is 
•isupported by evidence. 

umanitarian Assistance 

am sometimes asked why the United 
tates does not do anything to solve the 
jmanitarian problem of poverty and 
splaced persons and violence in El 
alvador. This is a startling question, 
hen you consider the enormous amount 
" American diplomatic and political ef- 
)rt aimed at bringing democracy and 
sace to El Salvador, and the extraor- 
inary amounts of economic aid which 
e give and increased amounts which 
le Administration has urged upon 

Our proposal of $341 million in 
economic assistance for FY 1985 to El 
Salvador is certainly a valuable response 
to the humanitarian problem there. I do 
not believe that the appropriate 
response to the problems of poverty or 
violence in El Salvador is to allow any 
Salvadoran who wishes to simply live in 
America instead— any more than I think 
this is true for Guatemala, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, 
Iran, Uganda, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Viet- 
nam, or Zimbabwe. My point, of course, 
is that in a very large number of cpun- 
tries millions of people, and indeed, tens 
of millions, face lives which any 
American can only view as desperate. 
How do we respond? We respond with 
our willingness to allow hundreds of 
thousands to legally immigrate to the 
United States. We respond with our 
asylum and refugee programs, which are 
the most generous in the world. We re- 
spond with our foreign aid program, 
now totaling $8.89 billion including the 

pending supplemental request. And we 
respond with various political and 
diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes 
and reduce violence. It does not seem to 
me that a sensible response can be to 
say that all these people, if they can 
make it to the United States, can stay. 
We can and we must do very many 
things to address the urgent and 
desperate humanitarian needs of tens of 
millions of people throughout the world, 
but one thing we really cannot do for 
them all is tell them to move to 

I therefore respectfully suggest that 
the current policy is an appropriate one, 
combining large amounts of economic 
assistance, energetic diplomatic efforts, 
and the grant of asylum to those with a 
well-founded fear of persecution. 

'The completed transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Persecution and Restrictions 
of Religion in Nicaragua 

by Elliott Abrams 

Address before the United Jewish Ap- 
peal on June 28, 198U. Mr. Abrams is 
Assistant Secretary for Humayi Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs. 

As I am sure everyone here knows, on 
July 20, 1983, President Reagan drew 
attention to the plight of the tiny Jewish 
community of Nicaragua at a White 
House conference. "Virtually the entire 
Jewish community of Nicaragua has 
been frightened into exile," the Presi- 
dent declared. "Their synagogue, which 
had its doors torched by Sandinista sup- 
porters in 1978, has since been con- 
fiscated and turned into offices of a San- 
dinista organization." 

Needless to say, the President's 
remarks provoked a firestorm of con- 
troversy. The Nicaraguan Government 
and its apologists in this country, and 
some Americans who should know bet- 
ter, indignantly denied that the San- 
dinistas were anti-Semitic. Some of the 
President's critics even accused him of 
fabricating anti-Semitic allegations in 
order to win support for U.S. policy in 
Central America. For this reason, I am 

very pleased to have been asked to 
speak to you this afternoon on the 
Jewish community in Nicaragua. 

Overall Religious Conditions 

Before turning to the fate of Nicaraguan 
Jewry, however, I want to spend just a 
few moments discussing freedom of 
religion in general in Nicaragua. My 
reason for doing so should be obvious. If 
it were the case, for example, that the 
Government of Nicaragua scrupulously 
respects the rights of Catholics, of Prot- 
estants, and of Indians, then even if 
there were well-documented incidents of 
anti-Semitism in Nicaragua, I think 
many of us would be inclined to give the 
Sandinistas the benefit of the doubt and 
to attribute such incidents to vicious and 
misguided individuals, rather than to the 
government. On the other hand, if it 
turned out that virtually all non-Jewish 
religious groups in Nicaragua were be- 
ing persecuted, then it would stand to 
reason that the Jewish community would 
also be subjected to persecution. To 
believe otherwise would be to argue, in 
effect, that the Sandinistas are philo- 
Semitic, and no one, not even the San- 
dinistas, have made that particular argu- 


What, then, is the overall situation 
with regard to freedom of religion in 
Nicaragua? As I am sure all of you 
know, about 85% of the Nicaraguan 
population is Catholic. If you have been 
following the situation in Nicaragua you 
also know that the Sandinista regime 
and the Catholic Church are locked in a 
bitter struggle. You are probably aware 
that the Sandinista government has 
openly challenged the influence of the 
Catholic Bishops of Nicaragua, especially 
that of Archbishop Obando y Bravo. You 
know that the regime has denied the 
Archbishop of the Roman Catholic 
Church the traditional opportunity to 
broadcast the Mass on television during 
Holy Week and has openly insulted the 
Pope. You know that government- 
organized mobs have interrupted 
Masses, harassed churchgoers, threat- 
ened priests, and physically attacked 
members of the clergy. You know that 
100,000 Nicaraguan Catholics attended a 
rally on Good Friday this year to 
demonstrate their support for the 
church and their hostility to the regime. 
And you know that in a homily to some 
4,000 Nicaraguans several weeks ago, 
the head of the Nicaraguan Bishops' 
Conference, Bishop Pablo Antonia Vega, 
said, "The tragedy of the Nicaraguan 
people is that we are living with a 
totalitarian ideology that no one wants 
in this country." 

Because of the great strength of the 
Catholic Church in Nicaragua, the San- 
dinista strategy has been to infiltrate, 
censor, and control it, rather than to 
eradicate it outright. The Sandinistas 
have actually launched a two-pronged at- 
tack on the Catholic Church as an in- 
stitution. On the one hand, they have 
taken a series of steps aimed at silenc- 
ing and undermining the episcopal 
hierachy of the church in Nicaragua. 
Simultaneously, they have supported the 
formation of a rival "popular" or 
"people's" church subservient to the 

In response, Nicaragua's Archbishop 
Obando has condemned "those who are 
trying to divide the church" and spread 
the idea that there is "one bourgeois 
church and another church for the poor." 
The Vatican has become so alarmed at 
the attempt of the Sandinistas to divide 
the church in Nicaragua that the Pope 
issued a Pastoral letter on June 29, 
1982, which criticized advocates of the 
"popular church." Despite that fact, the 
Sandinistas and their supporters in the 
church continue to portray the official 
church hierachy as "bourgeois" and "op- 
pressors," attempting to polarize the 

faithful and create, in effect, a new 
church controlled by the regime. 

If the Sandinistas have been forced 
to adopt a somewhat indirect approach 
in their efforts to undermine the power- 
ful Catholic Church in Nicaragua, they 
have been under no similar inhibitions in 
dealing with the far less powerful 
Nicaraguan Protestant churches. Among 
the Protestant groups harassed by the 
Sandinistas are the Seventh-day Adven- 
tists, the Mennonites, Jehovah's 
Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, and the Moravian 
Church. By August 1982 more than 20 
Managua Protestant churches had been 
seized by Sandinista-led mobs. Some, 
but not all, of the confiscated properties 
were returned, but only on condition 
that the ministers refrain from criticiz- 
ing the government. In addition, the 
Salvation Army was forced out of 
Nicaragua in August 1980, after 
ominous verbal threats from authorities, 
and, finally, instructions to close up the 
program and leave the country. 

Perhaps the most tragic case of 
government persecution in Nicaragua, 
however, is that inflicted on the Miskito, 
Sumo, and Rama Indians of Nicaragua's 
isolated Atlantic coast. Most of the 
members of these tribes are members of 
minority Protestant churches, especially 
the Moravian Church. Living in isolation 
from most of Nicaragua, they have had 
little to do with any government. The 
Moravian missionaries filled the gap by 
providing most of the schools, hospitals, 
and support organizations that main- 
tained the area. 

The campaign of persecution against 
the Indians has thus far been directed 
largely at their religious leaders and in- 
stitutions. In attacking the Indians' 
religious leaders, the Sandinistas are at- 
tacking their source of unity and 

Upon coming to power the San- 
dinistas sealed off the entire Atlantic 
coast. Travel to the region was allowed 
only by special permit. Indians were 
drafted into the militia. Those who 
refused were shot or forcibly relocated. 
Villages were forcibly evacuated and 
then burned. By midsummer 1982, the 
Sandinistas had destroyed 55 Moravian 

In November of 1982, the 
Misurasata Council of Ancients (elders), 
the leg^itimate representatives of the 
people of the three tribes, officially de- 
nounced the Sandinista government 
before the Organization of American 

In summary, then, when we examine 
the state of religious freedom in 

Nicaragua for Christians, the following 
pattern emerges: harrassment and 
subversion directed against the powerful 
Catholic Church, brutal and undisguised 
repression against the far weaker Prot- 
estant churches. All of which is to say 
that in relation to the churches, the San^ 
dinistas have behaved the way Marxist- 
Leninists always behave: they have 
sought to destroy the weaker churches, 
and to subvert the more powerful 

Jewish Persecution 

With this background in mind, let me 
turn now to the situation of the Jewish 
community in Nicaragua. A principal 
source of information about Nicaraguan 
Jews is Rabbi Morton Rosenthal of the 
ADL's Latin American Affairs Depart- 
ment. When Nicaraguan Jews came to 
the ADL and informed it that being 
Jewish was a major factor in their 
forced exile and loss of properties, the 
ADL made representations on their 
behalf, in 1981, to the Foreign Minister 
of Nicaragua. The ADL hoped that 
through "quiet diplomacy" it could obta 
some clarification from the Nicaraguan 
Government about the reasons for the 
confiscations and the forced exiling of 
the Jewish community. After 19 month 
having concluded that the Government 
of Nicaragua was not going to respond 
to any of its questions, the ADL publi- 
cized the plight of Nicaragua's Jews w 
an article by Rabbi Rosenthal entitled 
"Nicaragua Without Jews." 

Rabbi Rosenthal points out that th 
Jewish community in Nicaragua has 
always been small, numbering about 5 
families at its peak. Jews began comir 
to Nicaragua in the late 1920s from 
Eastern Europe. They dedicated 
themselves to farming, manufacturing 
and retail sales and made significant 
contributions to Nicaragua's economic 

Nicaraguan Jews never encounter ^ 
anti-Semitism until the Sandinistas 
started their revolution. Even before Ijgi 
Sandinistas came to power they begai 
threatening Jews. A favorite tactic w; 
to anonymously phone Jewish homes 
with warnings that "We are going to 
you Jews," claiming that Nicaraguan 
Jews were responsible for Israeli arm 
sales to the Somoza regime. Graffiti I 
Sandinistas was widespread, with at- 
tacks on Jews and their religion. One 
was "Death to the Jewish Pigs." The 
Sandinista initials — FSLN [Sandinist; 
National Liberation Front] — in red ai 
black left no doubt as to who was 
responsible. Another slogan painted ( 





ynagogue walls, and elsewhere, by San- 
inista supporters was "Israel, Jews and 
omoza— The Same Thing." 

In 1978, the synagogue in Managua 
/as attacked by five Sandinistas wear- 
ig face handkerchiefs. They set the 
uilding on fire by throwing gasoline in 
he main entrance doors, shouting PLO 
Palestine Liberation Organization] vic- 
pry slogans and anti-Jewish defamatory 
inguage. As the doors caught fire, two 
lembers of the community, at prayer 
uring Sabbath services, ran through a 
ide door. The Sandinistas met them 
'ith a show of automatic weapons and 
rdered them inside. The two members 
f the congregation, incidentally, were 
oth survivors of the Nazi concentration 

When the Sandinistas came to 
ower in July 1979, the storm broke, 
ome members of the Jewish community 
'ere advised to leave "for their own 
afety." Others, who had gone abroad 
uring the last months of the revolu- 
lonary stuggle, found that they were 
nable to return. The Nicaraguan Jews 
ent into "exile" mainly in the United 
tates, Israel, and other countries of 
Central America. 

Isaac Stavisky, a textile engineer 
ho was born in Nicaragua, said, "I was 
illing to return to my native country 
nd engage in my usual activities, but I 
■as stopped cold." It was suggested that 
e refrain from returning for his own 
ifety because he and his brother-in-law 
ere considered enemies of the revolu- 

The president of the Jewish com- 
lunity, Abraham Gorn, was jailed after 
le Sandinista victory. Gorn, who was 
len 70 years old, was falsely accused of 
;ealing some land and forced to sweep 
treets during the 2 weeks of his con- 

Nicaraguan Jews claim that Jewish- 
wned property was among the first to 
e confiscated by the Sandinista gov- 
rnment, while Nicaraguans of Arab 
escent, because of the close PLO- 
andinista relationship, were able to re- 
lain in Nicaragua and continue their 
usiness activities, often similar to those 
ngaged in by Jews. 

The Sandinistas also commandeered 
lanagua's synagogue and covered the 
Mr Stars of David at the front en- 
rance with propaganda posters, and the 
iterior with anti-Zionist posters. And 
ven after the tiny Nicaragua Jewish 
ommunity had fled, the Sandinistas 
ontinued to engage in blatant 
manifestations of anti-Semitism. In July 

of 1982, for example, Nuevo Diario, a 
Managua newspaper which closely ad- 
heres to the government line, published 
an article under the headline, "About 
Zionism and the Palestinian Cause." It 
spoke of "synagogues of Satan" and de- 
nounced Jews "who crucified Jesus 
Christ and . . . used the myth of God's 
chosen people to massacre the Palestin- 
ian people without mercy." 

Two days later, July 17, 1982, the 
same paper charged that "the world's 

money, banking and finance are in the 
hands of descendants of Jews, the eter- 
nal protectors of Zionism. Consequently, 
controlling economic power, they control 
political power as now happens in the 
United States." The paper even went so 
far as to claim that President Reagan's 
support for Israel stems from the fact 
that he "must have Jewish ancestry." 

Admittedly, we know of no laws in 
Nicaragua that are aimed specifically at 
Jews. There may well be no "official" 

Captive Nations Week, 1984 

JULY 16, 19841 

Once each year, all Americans are asked 
to pause and to remember that their 
liberties and freedoms, often taken for 
granted, are forbidden to many nations 
around the world. America continues to 
be dedicated to the proposition that all 
men are created equal. If we are to sus- 
tain our commitment to this principle, 
we must recognize that the peoples of 
the Captive Nations are endowed by the 
Creator with the same rights to give 
their consent as to who shall govern 
them as those of us who are privileged 
to live in freedom. For those captive and 
oppressed peoples, the United States of 
America stands as a symbol of hope and 
inspiration. This leadership requires 
faithfulness towards our own democratic 
principles as well as a commitment to 
speak out in defense of mankind's 
natural right. 

Though twenty-five years have passed 
since the original designation of Captive Na- 
tions Week, its significance has not dimin- 
ished. Rather, it has undeniably in- 
creased — especially as other nations have 
fallen under Communist domination. During 
Captive Nations Week we must take time to 
remember both the countless victims and the 
lonely heroes; both the targets of carpet 
bombing in Afghanistan, and individuals such 
as imprisoned Ukrainian patriot Yuriy 
Shukhevych. We must draw strength from 
the actions of the millions of freedom fighters 
in Communist-occupied countries, such as the 
signers of petitions for religious rights in 
Lithuania, or the members of Solidarity, 
whose public protests require personal risk 
and sacrifice that is almost incomprehensible 
to the average citizen in the Free World. It is 
in their struggle for freedom that we can find 
the true path to genuine and lasting peace. 

For those denied the benefits of liberty 
we shall continue to speak out for their 
freedom. On behalf of the unjustly persecuted 
and falsely imprisoned, we shall continue to 
call for their speedy release and offer our 

prayers during their suffering. On behalf of 
the brave men and women who suffer 
persecution because of national origin, 
religious beliefs, and their desire for liberty, 
it is the duty and the privilege of the United 
States of America to demand that the 
signatories of the United Nations Charter 
and the Helsinki Accords live up to their 
pledges and obligations and respect the prin- 
ciples and spirit of those international 
agreements and understandings. 

During Captive Nations Week, we renew 
our efforts to encourage freedom, in- 
dependence, and national self-determination 
for those countries struggling to free 
themselves from Communist ideology and 
totalitarian oppression, and to support those 
countries which today are standing face-to- 
face against Soviet expansionism. One cannot 
call for freedom and human rights for the 
people of Asia and Eastern Europe while ig- 
noring the struggles of our own neighbors in 
this hemisphere. There is no difference be- 
tween the weapons used to oppress the peo- 
ple of Laos and Czechoslovakia, and those 
sent to Nicaragua to terrorize its own people 
and threaten the peace and prosperity of its 

The Congress, by joint resolution ap- 
proved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), has 
authorized and requested the President to 
designate the third week in July as "Captive 
Nations Week." 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim the week beginning July 
1.5, 1984, as Captive Nations Week. 1 invite 
the people of the United States to observe 
this week with appropriate ceremonies and 
activities to reaffirm their dedication to the 
international principles of justice and 
freedom, which unite us and inspire others. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this sixteenth day of July, in the 
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-four, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hudred and 

Ronald Reagan 

'Text from White House press release. 


policy of anti-Semitism. But as Rabbi 
Rosenthal has stated, the Nicaraguan 
situation demonstrates that one does not 
need official policy in order to persecute 
a small community. It can be effected 
far more subtly by threat, intimidation, 
and confiscation, thus avoiding the con- 
demnation that Nuremburg-type laws 
would invite. 

In light of these facts, and also in 
view of the government's behavior 
toward Christians and Indians in 
Nicaragua, I do not think any sensible 
person can fail to conclude that the San- 
dinistas are indeed anti-Semitic. What 
remains to be answered, however, is 
why they are anti-Semitic? What have 
they got against us? 

Nicaragua's Anti-Semitic Rationale 

I think there are two explanations for 
Sandinista anti-Semitism — a general ex- 
planation and a specific explanation. The 
general explanation is that the San- 
dinistas—as they themselves have fre- 
quently proclaimed — are communists, 
and, as such, share the general com- 
munist antipathy toward Jews. The 
specific explanation is that the San- 
dinistas have long enjoyed a close rela- 
tionship with the PLO, from whom they 
have undoubtedly picked up anti-Jewish 
beliefs and attitudes. Let me elaborate 
briefly on both these explanations. 

The simple fact is that one of the 
wellsprings of our belief in human rights 
and the dignity of man is the Jewish 
tradition. This tradition asserts that all 
humans are created b'Tzelem Elohim — in 
God's image. From this it follows that 
men are not to be used simply as means 
to an end: rather, each is an end in him- 
self. Every person has an equal right to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
by virtue of his humanity alone. 
Everyone has his place in the sun, and 
neither the place nor the sun was 
created by the state. 

For communists and their allies, 
however, the notation that a man or a 
woman can have a greater loyalty to 
God than to the state is completely unac- 
ceptable. Atheism is not an incidental or 
peripheral element of their ideology, but 
its very core: Communist and radical 
parties claim for themselves the at- 
tributes of omnipotence and omniscience 
which Jews and others believe reserve to 
God alone. Such parties also seek to con- 
trol all political, economic, social, 
cultural, and other developments in their 
societies, and that whii'h they cannot 
control, they seek to destroy. For this 
reason, communism can perhaps best be 

understood as a modern form of 
idolatry — an attempt to establish the 
party as the final arbiter of truth, 
justice, and morality. 

Because Jews are unwilling to aban- 
don their own way of life and submit to 
totalitarian governmental controls, they 
invariably arouse the enmity and hatred 
of communists everywhere. Because 
they recognize an authority higher than 
the state, they are persecuted. And 
because the State of Israel is a model of 
a vigorous, successful, and thriving poli- 
ty organized along democratic principles, 
it, too, naturally arouses the enmity of 
communists everywhere. Hostility to 
Jews and hostility to human rights are 
two sides of a single coin and are 
characteristic of communist regimes in 

As to the long-standing PLO- 
Sandinista collaboration, this has been 
documented at great length by the ADL, 
by the U.S. Government, by Israel, and 
in an excellent pamphlet entitled 
"Castro, Israel and the PLO" published 
by the Cuban-American National Foun- 
dation. Suffice it to say that Jorge 
Mandi, a Sandinista spokesman, told a 
reporter for the Kuwaiti newspaper Al 
Watan (August 7, 1979), "There is a 
long-standing blood unity between us 
and the Palestinian revolution. . . . Many 
of the units belonging to the Sandinista 
movement were at Palestinian revolu- 
tionary bases in Jordan. In the early 
1970s, Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood 
was spilled together in Amman and in 
other places during the 'Black 
September' battles." 

The brutal fact of the matter is that 
we face a world in which many countries 
are ruled by systems of despotism and 
repression. In this world, Jews have 
enemies. America has enemies, liberty 
has enemies, democracy has enemies. 
And they are one largely coherent 
group. This group views world politics in 
terms of what it calls the struggle 
against "Imperialism, Zionism, and Co- 
lonialism." Imperialism, of course, refers 
to the United States. Colonialism refers 
to our allies in the Third World, and in- 
cludes countries such as South Vietnam, 
which has already been destroyed, and 
Turkey and El Salvador, which have at 

various times been targeted for destruG 
tion. And Zionism refers to the State of 
Israel, and — let us be quite clear about 

this — to the Jewish people as well. To 
them, the enemy of humanity is the 
same enemy whether he salutes the 
Stars and Stripes or the Star of David. 
It is, therefore, no accident, to bor- 
row an old Marxist phrase, that the San 
dinista hymn declares, "We will fight 
against the Yankee, the enemy of 
humanity." It is not an accident that 
U.S. troops unearthed on Grenada an 
agreement between the New JEWEL 
Movement and Castro's Communist Par 
ty of Cuba, stating the two are united b 
"active solidarity . . . against im- 
perialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
Zionism, and racism." It is not an acci- 
dent that the honored guest at the San- 
dinista's first anniversary celebration 
was Yasir Arafat, to whom Interior 
Minister Tomas Borge declared "We sa; 
to our brother Arafat that Nicaragua is 
his land and that the PLO cause is the 
cause of the Sandinistas." It is not an a 
cident, in short, that whenever com- 
munists are in power, Jews are 
persecuted. Israel is attacked, and the 
United States is vilified. 


I began my remarks this afternoon by 
quoting President Reagan's remarks or 
Nicaraguan Jewry. He concluded by sa 
ing "Please share the truth that com- 
munism in Central America means not 
only the loss of political freedom but ot 
religious freedom as well." I would like 
to take this opportunity to endorse the 
President's words. The small Jewish 
communities throughout Central 
America understand that communism 
poses a real threat to their very surviv 
as Jews. They understand that the 
Nicaraguans and the Cubans must be 
stopped from exporting revolution. Th 
recognize that the bitter fate which 
befell their brethren in Nicaragua mig 
easily be theirs, as well. And like the 
embattled Jewish communities in Israi 
and the Soviet Union, they look to us, 
the American Jewish community, for 
support and understanding. We canno "' 
let them down 





luman Rights in Cuba 

r Elliott Abrams 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
r Human Rights and International 
'ganizations and Western Hemisphere 
fairs of the House Foreign Affairs 
rmmittee on June 27, 198Jt. Mr. 
'rrams is Assistant Secretary for 
uman Rights and Humanitarian 

le history of Cuba over the last 25 
ars is one of the great tragedies of 
odern times. It is the history of a 
fted and industrious people, whose 
pes for freedom and democracy have 
en cruelly and systematically denied, 
is the history of a liberal and 
mocratic revolution which overthrew 
e Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, 
ily to be betrayed by an even more 
thless dictator. It is the history of one 
the greatest tyrants of our time, Fidel 
istro, who promised the Cuban people 
at he would restore democracy and 
spect for law and human rights, but 
stead established a dictatorship which 
IS brought ruin and misery to his 

Cuba has been ruled for 25 years by 
e one man, Fidel Castro, and a group 
!iich seized power in 1959. The Com- 
unist Party dominates all aspects of 
ily life, controlling the means of pro- 
iction and distribution of all goods, 
rvices, and information; public com- 
unication, public welfare, and educa- 
)n; as well as national defense, foreign 
lations, and public security. Under 
ese circumstances, the human rights 
Cubans are systematically denied, 
bordinated to the aims of the Cuban 
jmmunist Party, as defined by its 
lilaximum Leader," Fidel Castro. 

legal System Abuses 

xecutions to discourage political dis- 
■nt, for example, which began when 
astro seized power in 1959, continued 
roughout 1983. There are credible 
■ports of summary executions following 
■cret trials of civilians for alleged 
)litical offenses by military tribunals. A 
ember of Jehovah's Witnesses, for ex- 
nple, was reported to have been ex- 
:uted in August 1983 for allegedly 
jreading "propaganda to incite armed 
?bellion." A 23-year-old student, Carlos 
Iberto Gutierez, was shot for belonging 
) a group caught painting anti- 
overnment slogans on walls. 

Cuban police commonly round up 
persons in nighttime arrests. Friends, 
neighbors, and family members have no 
knowledge of their fate and frequently 
are too intimidated to ask. Usually these 
persons are tried and sentenced in 
secret, but sometimes they are inter- 
rogated and released. In 1983, several 
Cuban-Americans "disappeared" while in 
Cuba visiting relatives. No information 
regarding their detention or where- 
abouts was provided to the U.S. Govern- 
ment nor to their relatives who inquired 
about them. In one case, an individual 
was arrested and held incommunicado 
for 3 months. Upon being released, he 
reported that he had been interrogated 
about alleged espionage and counter- 
revolutionary activity. 

Conditions in Cuban political prisons 
are barbaric and include the use of tor- 
ture. Political prisoners who refuse "re- 
education" are subject to particularly 
harsh penalties, including the denial of 
clothing, medical attention, and com- 
munication with friends and relatives 
outside prison. One former political 
prisoner, Jose Rodriguez Terrero, who 
was released in August 1983, spent 22 
years in Cuban prisons, including 
months at a time confined naked in a 
tiny cell called a "drawer" which forced 
the prisoner to curl up in an embryo-like 
position. Also included among the forms 
of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat- 
ment in Cuban prisons is the placing of 
a prisoner in a small, sealed, unven- 
tilated room, and totally isolating a 
prisoner from other prisoners and from 
the outside world. The use of psychiatry 
for repressive purposes has been 
reported by Dr. Abdo Canasi. He re- 
ceived a 10-year jail sentence for his ex- 
pose, and since his release from confine- 
ment he is denied permission to leave 
the country. 

The Cuban legal system does not 
provide internationally recognized stand- 
ards of due process for defendants, and 
is used to impose criminal sentences on 
individuals who have been imprisoned 
for political reasons, including lawyers 
attempting to defend political prisoners 
and those trying to establish free trade 
unions. For example, in January 1983, a 
Cuban court sentenced five persons to 
death for having tried to organize a 
"Solidarity-style" trade union movement 
in Cuba. Subsequently, Cuban author- 
ities arrested the attorneys who sought 

to defend the five labor organizers. 
Groups such as Americas Watch and 
Amnesty International have estimated 
that there are over 200 political 
prisoners in Cuba; other estimates put 
the figure at about 1,000. Americas 
Watch also estimates that there are be- 
tween 1,500 and 2,000 former political 
prisoners to whom the Cuban Govern- 
ment continues to deny employment. In 
its 1983 report. Amnesty International 
has drawn attention to the fact that 
other political prisoners are refused per- 
mission to leave Cuba, even when other 
countries have been willing to give them 

Restrictive Liberties 

Freedom of speech and the press do not 
exist in Cuba. All media outlets are 
owned by the government or party- 
controlled organizations and operate 
strictly according to Communist Party 
guidelines. No criticism of the policies of 
the government, the party, or the 
leadership is permitted. Artistic expres- 
sion is also covered by these restrictions, 
which require that artistic works serve 
to reinforce the goals of the govern- 
ment. Foreign publications, except those 
from other communist countries, are not 
available. Even private expression of dif- 
ferences with government policies is 
repressed by an informer network 
operated by the politicized block commit- 
tees, known as the Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution [CDR]. Those 
who violate the prohibitions against 
criticizing the government are im- 
prisoned, and even those suspected of 
potential opposition can be incarcerated 
or detained in prison after the expiration 
of their sentences under the so-called ley 
de peligrosidad. 

Freedom of assembly does not exist 
in Cuba either. No free trade unions are 
allowed to function. The Communist 
Party operates a so-called "trade union" 
federation called the Confederation of 
Cuban Workers, which acts to enforce 
labor discipline, encourage higher pro- 
ductivity, and reduce labor costs, rather 
than to defend workers' interests. The 
rights to bargain collectively and to 
strike are not recognized. In the last 
year, over 200 workers have been prose- 
cuted for trying to organize strikes in 
the sugar and construction industries. 
Five trade unionists were condemned to 
death. But, according to reports, their 
sentences were reduced to 30 years 
after their cases became public 
knowledge. The Cuban Government, 


after at first denying the facts, has said 
the "terrorists" received severe 
sentences. At the recent conference of 
the World Federation of Trade Unions 
in Prague, the Cubans defended the 
sentences, explaining they were 
necessary to block any possible attempts 
to set up a Solidarity-style organization. 

Antireligious Activities 

The Cuban Government also enforces an 
active antireligious policy. In the early 
years of the revolution, the extensive 
Catholic educational system was 
destroyed by the government and hun- 
dreds of priests were expelled from the 

Today, a network of formal and in- 
formal restrictions has the effect of 
limiting religious activity. The official 
state ideology of atheism is taught on all 
levels of the educational system. Specific 
constitutional and statutory provisions 
are designed to restrict religious observ- 
ance and education. 

Among other restrictions on 
religious practice enforced by the Cuban 
Government are discrimination against 
religious believers in educational and 
employment opportunities, prohibition 
on religious media, and restriction on 
the construction of new churches. 
Political meetings and work obligations 
are regularly scheduled to conflict with 
religious observances. Cuban law pro- 
hibits the observance of religious events 
when they conflict with work obligations 
or patriotic celebrations. The July 26 na- 
tional holiday, commemorating the at- 
tack on Batista's Moncada barracks in 
1953, has been promoted as a replace- 
ment for Christmas, and the availability 
of toys for children has been limited to 
the 26th of July period to the exclusion 
of Christmas. Similarly, Holy Week 
observances are preempted by the week- 
long celebration of the battle of the Bay 
of Pigs. 

Emigration Restrictions 

Freedom of emigration also does not ex- 
ist in today's Cuba. Although Castro 
claims that Cubans are free to emigrate, 
and though some left Cuba, as in the 
Mariel exodus of 1980, the Cuban 
government routinely refuses to allow 
citizens to leave the country; there is 
thus a backlog of some 200,000 Cubans 
who have applied to emigrate. Those 
who opt to leave Cuba lose their jobs, 
ration cards, housing, and personal 
possessions. Then the emigrants are sub- 
jected to government-orchestrated mob 

attacks call "assemblies of repulsion" 
and are required to work in agriculture 
until they leave the island, a period that 
can extend indefinitely. As an example 
of the extent to which people will go to 
leave Cuba, in early 1983 three young 
Cubans seized a small group of 
American tourists in Villa Clara prov- 
ince and held them hostage to force the 
Cuban Government to permit the 
Cubans to depart the country. The 
Americans were subsequently freed, and 
the young Cubans reportedly sentenced 
to death (later reportedly commuted to 
30 years in prison). 

The Cuban Government still refuses 
to permit the departure of some Cubans 
who sought asylum in the Venezuelan 
and Peruvian Embassies in Havana 
more than 3 years ago. Persons who 
have attempted to flee Cuba by seeking 
refuge in diplomatic missions have been 
arrested and sentenced to terms of up to 
30 years. According to an Agence 
France press report, for example, the 
noted Cuban dissident, Ricardo Bofill 
Pages, was arrested on September 27, 
1983. In April, Bofill had sought refuge 
in the French Embassy, but was in- 
structed to leave the embassy after the 
French Ambassador received assurances 
from the Cuban Vice President, Carlos 
Rafael Rodriguez, that he would be 
allowed to leave the country. Subse- 
quently, two Agence France press per- 
sonnel who tried to interview Bofill were 
put under house arrest and expelled 
from Cuba after 9 days. 

The case of Cuban Ambassador 
Gustavo Arcos Bergnes is also instruc- 
tive. Arcos fought and was wounded at 
Castro's side during the attack on 
Batista's Moncada barracks. When 
Castro took power, Arcos was named 
Cuban Ambassador to Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. But, in 
the mid-1960s he was recalled and im- 
prisoned for 4 years for his democratic 
beliefs. In 1979 his son was gravely in- 
jured in a motorcycle accident in 
Florida. The U.S. Congress appealed to 
the Cuban Government to allow Arcos 
to visit his son. The appeal was refused. 
Months later, Arcos was charged with 
attempting to leave the island without 
the necessary papers and was given a 
7-year prison sentence. 

The reverse policy, forced emigra- 
tion, can be just as cruel. Suddenly, in 
1980 the emigration gates were opened. 
During the rush that followed out of the 
port of Mariel, when 125,000 Cuban 
"boat people" fled to our shores, the 
Castro government shipped along com- 
mon criminals and many of Cuba's 

psychiatric patients. The American 
Psychiatric Association denounced this 
action on September 28, 1980, saying it 

. . . Deeply concerned about the plight of 
numerous recent refugees who have been 
identified as mentally ill. There is growing 
evidence that many of these Cuban citizens 
were bused from Cuban mental hospitals to 
the Freedom Flotilla to the United States. 1 f 
this is the case, the transplantation of thesi- 
patients constitutes a grossly inhumane act 
since it deprives the patients of their right to 
psychiatric treatement within the context of 
their culture and primary language. 

To date the Cuban Government is 
still refusing to take back any 
Marielitos— including those who seek 
voluntarily to return. 

Standard of Living 

The Cuban Constitution states that "the 
home is inviolable." Nevertheless, no 
aspect of an ordinary Cuban's private 
life is free from government 
surveillance. Telephones are monitored, 
mail is opened, and one's comings and 
goings are monitored 24-hours-a-day by 
block wardens in the neighborhood Com 
mittee for the Defense of the Revolu- 
tion. Meetings, parties, and other ac- 
tivities are subject to particularly in- 
tense scrutiny. Listening to foreign 
radio and television broadcasts is 
dangerous because of the surveillance b 
CDR members. A jamming signal to in- 
terfere with Voice of America broad- 
casts has been noted in the Havana are: 
and presumably is used in other urban 

The Cuban Government has never 
allowed international groups to visit 
Cuba to investigate human rights condi 
tions. Organizations such as Amnesty 
International and Americas Watch, 
which have sought access to Cuban 
political prisons, have been rebuffed. N 
domestic human rights organizations a 
permitted to exist. Human rights ac- 
tivists in Cui)a who are not in jail are 
forced to carry out their activities 
clandestinely and must rely upon inter- 
national nongovernmental agencies for 
support and publicity. If apprehended 1 
the authorities, they are subject to pro fiy 
ecution under Article 61 of the Cuban 
Constitution, which states "None of thi 
freedoms which are recognized for 
citizens can be exercised contrary to 
what is established in the constitution 
and the law, or contrary to the exister 
and objectives of the socialist state, or 
contrary to the decision of the Cuban 
people to build socialism and com- 
munism. Violations of this principle ca isi 
be punished by law." 






Although apologists for Castro 
iietimes claim that some human rights 
lations were necessary in order to 
Qg about the rapid modernization of 
Cuban economy, in fact, Castro's dic- 
orship has deprived the Cuban people 
their opportunity for a better 
nomic future. In 1958, Cuban income 
capita was the fourth or fifth 
hest in the hemisphere. Independent 
dies have repeatedly shown that per 
lita economic growth in Cuba is 
ong the lowest in the hemisphere. If 
sent trends continue, by the end of 
century Cuba will be one of the 
ser developed countries of the 

Castro's betrayal has also cost the 
ban people their independence. In 
9, Cuba paid its own way. Now even 
stagnant standard of living can only 
maintained with huge Soviet hand- 
s — $4.7 billion in economic aid alone 
1982, $25 billion over the last 7 years. 
t this aid is no bargain for Cubans. 
• in return, Cuba sends combat and 
kup troops to countries where the 
nets seek to establish a sphere of in- 
ence. In Angola and Ethiopia they 
1 their blood and that of Africans to 
tect leftwing dictatorships from the 
;er of their own people. All told, 
re are some 70,000 Cubans, the so- 
ed "internationalists," who serve the 
det Union's interests in foreign lands. 
It comes as no surprise, then, to 
"n that as a result of 25 years of com- 
nist control, more than 1 million 
jans — over 10% of the island's in- 
dtants — have fled their homeland, 
irived of their civil and political liber- 
., their national independence, and 
ir hopes for a better future, Cubans 
e demonstrated their dissatisfaction 
h the regime through the only means 
liable to them — by "voting with their 


s, in broad outline, is the state of 
nan rights in Cuba. It is not a very 
tty picture. Neither, for that matter, 
t a new picture. The facts about 
3an repression have been available for 
ny years now. Yet for just as many 
,rs, not a few intellectuals and jour- 
ists have been systematically denying 
se facts. Although I will not attempt 
describe this rather disgraceful 
sode in any detail, I cannot resist giv- 
one example of the kind of wild 
information about Cuba which has 
ped to shield the regime from inter- 
;ional censure. I quote from a book 
Dlished in 1975 by two prominent 

Americans, Frank Mankiewicz and 
Kirby Jones, titled "With Fidel: A Por- 
trait of Castro and Cuba." 

. . . Castro's Cuba is prosperous and its 
people are enthusiastic, reasonably content, 
and optimistic about the future. Perhaps the 
overriding impression of three trips to Cuba 
is the enthusiasm and unity of the Cuban peo- 
ple. They are proud of their accomplishments 
and sing songs about themselves and their 
country that reflect this self-pride. . . . The 
people work together and work hard — for 
what they believe to be good for their 
neighbors and therefore their country. 

One of the reasons why I welcome 
the hearings your committee is holding 
on the human rights situation in Cuba is 
that I hope they will serve to correct 

misinformation of this sort. For too 
many years, Fidel Castro has posed as a 
champion of progress, and has suc- 
ceeded in concealing the oppressive, 
totalitarian nature of his regime. Simply 
by telling the truth about Cuba, we can 
help to expose Castro as the tyrant that 
he is. At the same time, by telling the 
truth we demonstrate our solidarity with 
the principal victims of Castro's 
regime — the long-suffering and much- 
abused Cuban people. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Human Rights Situation 
in Zaire and South Africa 

by Elliott Abrams 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on African Affairs and Human Rights 
and International Organizations of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
June 21. 1984. Mr. Abrams is Assistant 
Secretary for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs. ^ 

Africa presents a difficult challenge to 
U.S. human rights policy. Single-party 
states, lack of a free press, and freedom 
of speech; weak judicial institutions, 
poor prison conditions, and the use of 
force to control dissent are all too often 
the rule. 


You have available the 1983 human 
rights report [Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1983] which 
sets out Zaire's record in detail; you can 
see that it is a troubled one. In my 
remarks this morning I would like to de- 
scribe the political, historical, and 
cultural context for understanding the 
human rights situation in Zaire. I would 
also like to discuss why we believe it is 
important to maintain a strong relation- 
ship with this strategically important 

Strategic Importance 

As you are well aware, Zaire has long 
been a friend and key regional partner 
of the United States and the West. It 
has consistently worked with us, the 

most recent examples being the respon- 
sible role it played while on the UN 
Security Council and its strong support 
for the Government of Chad in its strug- 
gle against the Libyan-backed invasion. 
Zairian minerals, notably copper and 
cobalt, are important to the West. 
Zaire's strategic relevance, which is due 
to its large size and population as well 
as its common borders with nine African 
countries, has never been more apparent 
than now, as we work toward political 
solutions in southern Africa. Stability in 
Zaire is crucial if the delicate process 
now underway is to be maintained. 
Stability in Zaire is also the key to 
stability in central Africa. 

Zaire lived its first years of in- 
dependence under extremely difficult 
conditions. During the colonial period no 
Zairians occupied positions of respon- 
sibility and very few received a universi- 
ty education. Belgian policy had been to 
control life tightly and suppress dissent 
in the Congo. Zaire's people were poorly 
prepared to take over the responsibility 
of governing themselves. Judicial institu- 
tions, disciplined police forces, and 
bodies of law and regulation based on 
normally acceptable standards of human 
rights did not survive the shocks of the 
post-independence period. Rather, in- 
dependence unleashed powerful forces 
that Zaire's fragile political structure 
was unable to accommodate. Hundreds 
of ethnic groups, competing geographic 
regions, and different ideologies clashed 
against the backdrop of East- West 


rivalry. Violence and anarchy were the 
order of the day from 1960 until 1965. 
Echos from this period were heard as 
recently as 1977 and 1978, with the two 
invasions of Shaba province by exiled ex- 
Katangan gendarmes backed by Angola 
and the Soviets. Zairians still suffer the 
emotional and social consequences of 
these traumatic events. A desire not to 
relive the tribulations of that time goes 
a long way toward explaining the inter- 
nal stability that Zaire has enjoyed in 
the years that President Mobutu [Sese 
Seko] has been in power. As the United 
States could well have to become in- 
volved again if instability recurred, 
stable government in Zaire is very im- 
portant to us. 

Current Conditions 

I have briefly mentioned Zairian history 
in order to give some context to my 
comments on the current human rights 
situation there, which has serious short- 
comings. Arbitrary justice and problems 
caused by low-paid and ill-disciplined 
security forces plague the country. 
Prison conditions are poor with inade- 
quate food and medical care. People re- 
main in preventive detention for long 
periods of time during investigation, 
because of shortages of lawyers and 
magistrates and insufficient funds for 
such services as transportation between 
prisons and courtrooms. As in most 
Third World countries, the press is con- 
trolled and the flow of ideas is 
restricted. In addition, the country has a 
single-party political system which does 
not espouse Western democratic prin- 
ciples. President Mobutu's response to 
continued political activity by ex- 
parliamentarian activists who champion 
a second political party— a violation of 
Zaire's constitution — was internal exile 
for the leaders and the arrest of key 
supporters, some of whom are still in 
jail. Thus in Zaire, as in most African 
countries, it is not possible to call public- 
ly for a change in government and re- 
tain one's civil liberties. 

Blemished as Zaire's human rights 
record is, I would like to point out that 
progress has been made. For example, a 
positive area that is little noticed is 
Zaire's acceptance of 250,000 refugees 
from neighboring countries. There was a 
general amnesty last year which 
resulted in the release of political 
prisoners and in the return of several 
prominent exiles. The ICRC [Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross] has 
been able to visit some Zairian prisons. 
There have been few if any summan,' ex- 

ecutions or disappearances in recent 
years. Human rights conditions in Zaire 
have improved over the past 20 years, 
albeit fitfully rather than steadily. 
Political opponents may be exiled to 
small villages or periodically arrested, 
but they are not killed or imprisoned for 
life, as is unfortunately true in much of 
the Third World. Zaire is very sensitive 
to the views of the Administration and 
the Congress on human rights, and our 
concern has had a positive effect. 
Although Zaire has a long way to go, 
the government has shown it has the 
capacity to listen to others and change. 
It is important to keep in mind that 
the United States has broad interests in 
Zaire and is dealing with its government 
on a number of key issues. We consult 
on Chad where Zaire has given in- 
valuable military and political assistance 
to the Habre government. When Zaire 
was on the UN Security Council in 
1982-83, it was very supportive of U.S. 
objectives. We also consult in the 
economic area, where the government 
has undertaken major reform steps. In 
1983 Zaire successfully implemented 
several reforms suggested by the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund], including 
an 80% devaluation of the zaire and the 
institution of a floating exchange rate. 
Controls on wage increases and the 
liberalization of price controls have also 
been adopted. The budget deficit has 
been brought under control in spite of 
low tax revenues because of severely 
depressed copper and cobalt prices. The 
successful implementation of these 
reforms led the IMF to approve $350 
million in new drawings for Zaire and 
official creditors to reschedule Zaire's 
debt in December. In reviewing the 
situation in Zaire we see that they have 
taken the steps we have recommended 
to all countries on the continent — adop- 
tion of a realistic exchange rate, 
removal of price controls on foodstuffs 
to encourage production, control of the 
budget, and encouragement of the 
private sector. 

U.S. Assistance Projects 

Respect for human rights forms a part, 
albeit an integral part, of our bilateral 
agenda with Zaire. In our dialogue with 
President Mobutu and his government, 
our Ambassador and other high-level of- 
ficials—including Assistant Secretary 
|for African Affairs Chester A.] 
Crocker— consistently point out the im- 
portance which we attach to observance 
of human rights. In addition to our 
representations from the highest levels 

down, we are taking specific steps to 
promote observance of human rights in 
Zaire. Part of our assistance effort is 
directly targeted on projects designed t( 
promote human rights. One example is 
program financing the printing and 
distribution of the penal code to incrtM.- 
knowledge of individual rights and 
privileges under Zairian law. We have 
also approved funding operations of the 
Center for Continuing Legal Educatinn 
in Kinshasa. We have provided 
resources for a series of magistrate 
training seminars to strengthen the 
quality and scope of judicial services. 

There are, of course, limits to what 
we can do concerning full observance oi 
human rights in Zaire. We can and dn 
press the Zairian Government privately 
and we can and do target our assistanc 
on creating conditions under which 
human rights can prosper. We cannot f 
as far as some would have us and sup- 
port the opposition group which has 
sought to form a second political party 
in Zaire. This would constitute a direct 
intervention in Zaire's politics, in viola- 
tion of its constitution, and would, we 
are convinced, result in worsened rela- 
tions and diminished U.S. influence in 
the human rights field. 

Human rights concerns are central 
to our policy toward Zaire, and are on' 
aspect of a complex and critical bilater 
relationship. We have other policy goa 
which must also be taken into account 
including political and strategic stabili' 
in Zaire and the region and the develo 
ment of Zaire. To protect our interest 
and achieve our goals we must mainta 
our influence and deal with Zaire 
cooperatively and on the basis of 
respect. This approach will, we believi 
be the best human rights policy as we 
and will maximize U.S. influence in 






Turning to South Africa, I intend to [ 
sent to this committee as factual a pi( 
tiire as possible of recent developmen |iBit 
on the human rights front in South 
Africa — both positive and negative 
developments. A portion of the inforr 
tion I am providing here is drawn fro 
the 1983 human rights report on Sou 
Africa prepared by the State Depart- 
ment, which, I might note, has been 
praised by the Lawyers' Committee f 
International Human Rights, Americ; 
Watch, and Helsinki Watch as "one o 
the State Department's more success 
efforts to portray the human rights 
situation in another country." I will a 
attempt to update that report by 








i cribing developments which have 
en place since it was prepared in 
ember. Finally, I will attempt to give 
some idea of how these factors af- 
■( t U.S. policy toward South Africa. 
As we observed in the 1983 human 
Its report. South Africa is a 
Itiracial country whose present con- 
■ution codifies the system of apartheid 
I ler which the white minority holds a 
ri nopoly of power in the country's na- 
) lal political institutions. The result 
I been a parliamentary democratic 

item run by the 16.2% of the popula- 
1 which is white. Persons of "colored" 
xed blood) and Asian descent have 
1 no legal right to political participa- 
1 at the national level; and the over- 
elming black majority has also been 
lied national political participation, 
ept through the device of tribally 
ed "homelands" or "national states" 
ated by the South African Govern- 
nt without regard to whether blacks 
in or wish to be associated with 
se areas. 

nstitutional Reforms 

ith Africa has introduced a new coii- 
lution which will include a limited na- 
lal franchise for South Africans of 
)red and Asian descent. This constitu- 
1, approved by a 2-1 margin by white 
ers in a referendum held last 
/ember, is scheduled to go into effect 
September 3 of this year. Although it 
s not allow for participation by 
:ks in the central government, the 
ith African Government has stated 
t the constitutional reform process 
■s not rule out further developments 
iich could include extending participa- 
1 in national political processes to 
ith Africa's black majority. Con- 
srable debate is underway in South 
•ica over the meaning and direction of 
se constitutional reforms. 
Regardless of whether or not the 
V constitution represents reform of 
irtheid or only its rationale and 
dernization, the practice of apartheid 
lains the basis for the organization of 
ith African society. Apartheid institu- 
lalizes political and economic control 
the white minority. Discriminatory 
's and practices — such as legislation 
iting South Africa's black citizens to 
ource-poor homelands, the influx con- 
1 laws, the Group Areas Act, the 
xed Marriages and Immorality Acts, 
i so forth — are woven throughout the 
iric of South African society. The 
uth African Government has also 
icted legislation that, in the name of 

security, curtails the civil liberties of 
those persons of all races whose 
statements, actions, or associations are 
viewed as a serious challenge to the 
established order. 

In 1983 some improvements in the 
human rights climate took place. On 
July 1, for example, 54 persons were un- 
banned, reducing the number of banned 
individuals to 12, the lowest number in 
recent years. The South African Govern- 
ment took tentative steps to recognize 
the right of blacks to live permanently in 
urban -areas under certain conditions. 
Black labor unions continued to grow 
under the government's labor law 

• The efforts at limited power shar- 
ing under the terms of the new constitu- 
tion are moving forward. The new 
tricameral parliament will sit in an ab- 
breviated session during the month of 
September. Although blacks remain ex- 
cluded from the system, for the first 
time legislation concerning blacks will no 
longer be the prerogative of the white 
parliament, but will require the concur- 
rence of the Asian and so-called colored 
chambers. In addition, the Minister of 
Constitutional Development and Plan- 
ning recently told parliament that the 
South African Government does not 
view the new constitution as final, and it 

... a socioeconomic process is underway 
which is contributing dramatically to the bargain- 
ing power of South Africa's black population as 
well as to the perception of white South Africans 
that the status quo is untenable. 

On the other hand detention without 
charge or trial and "bannings" of in- 
dividuals, organizations, publications, 
and gathering continued. Despite orders 
given by the South African Government 
in 1982 for more humane treatment and 
care of detainees held under security 
laws, several died due to mistreatment 
by police officials, or allegedly commit- 
ted suicide in 1983. For the first time, 
however, action was taken against police 
and prison personnel who abused their 

We concluded in December 1983, 
that while one can point to some positive 
developments in recent years. South 
Africa's fundamental human rights situa- 
tion has changed little. There remains 
no effective judicial remedy against the 
denationalization of blacks into "inde- 
pendent" tribal homelands or against 
forced resettlements. Indefinite deten- 
tion without charge or access to at- 
torney and other judicial acts without 
due process, such as banning, continue. 
The 83.3% of South Africa's population 
which is not white suffers from per- 
vasive discrimination which severely 
limits political, economic, and social life. 

Recent Policy Developments 

What has been the picture thus far in 
1984? Let me outline some important re- 
cent developments, both positive and 
negative, which have taken place. On the 
positive side: 

is widely recognized that the issue of 
black political rights must be addressed. 

• A Parliamentary Select Commit- 
tee is reviewing the Immorality and 
Mixed Marriages Acts, seemingly with 
an eye toward the modification or repeal 
of both. 

• In late April 1984, the Minister of 
Cooperation and Development an- 
nounced the withdrawal of the new 
legislation governing the movement of 
blacks in South Africa, the highly con- 
tentious Orderly Movement and Settle- 
ment of Black Persons Act. Its demise is 
partially attributed to the fact that the 
bill could have put in question the per- 
manent residence rights of urban blacks 
qualifying under Section 10 of the cur- 
rent law, the Urban Consolidation Act, 
including beneficiaries of the Rikhoto 

• In February, the South African 
Government announced its intention to 
open central business districts in urban 
areas to business people of all races. At 
the same time, a recommendation was 
made that segregation of public facilities 
would be discretionary rather than man- 

• No new banning orders have been 
issued since August 1983. The number 
of banned persons remains at 12. 

• In early May 1984, the South 
African Government announced its will- 
ingness to relax the provisions of the 


Prisons Act governing press coverage of 
prison conditions, shortly before an in- 
vestigative committee released findings 
which shocked the public. 

• On February 22, 1984, Sergeant 
J. Van As of the security police was 
sentenced to 10 years in prison for 
shooting Paris Malatji while in detention 
for interrogation. Van As was the first 
security policeman prosecuted for an in- 
cident carried out in the line of duty. 

• In April 1984, three policemen at 
the Dirkiesdorp Police Station were 
fined for their role in the death of 
Thomas Manana, who died while in 
custody in early 1983. 

• On January 1, 1984, the amend- 
ment of the Defense Act which provides 
for alternative service for religious ob- 
jectors went into effect. The amendment 
also created the Board for Religious Ob- 
jection which determines the status of 
religious objectors to military service. 
Alternative service for conscientious ob- 
jectors still does not exist. As of 
February 14, 1984, 51 people had been 
classified religious objectors. They were 
ail Jehovah's Witnesses. 

• The situation in the "independent" 
homeland of the Ciskei has quieted, 
although conditions there are still unset- 
tled and more than 30 people may still 
be in detention. 

• A new Matrimonial Property Act, 
designed to raise the status of white, 
colored, and Indian women before the 
law, is under consideration by parlia- 
ment and may be passed during the 
present session. 

• Venda security police continue to 
intimidate individuals they regard as 
threats to state security. They use sur- 
prise visits, unexpected searches, and 
long questioning sessions in their own 
offices to frighten people. 

• In February 1984, Samuel 
Tshikhudo died of illness while in deten- 
tion in Venda after being held since 
November 1983 incommunicado. 

• Resettlement remains a mixed pic- 
ture. A decision not to remove the peo- 
ple from St. Wendolin's in Natal is offset 
by the earlier removal of the residents 
of Mogopa. The residents of Badplaas, 
Leandra, Driefontein, Huhudi, and 
Crossroads, among other places, still live 
under the threat of removal. The South 
African Government has not abandoned 
the idea of the cession of Ingwavuma 
and Kangwane to Swaziland, which 
would result in the "removal" of large 
black populations. Minister of Coopera- 
tion and Development Piet Koornhof ad- 
mitted in early May that about 2 million 
black persons have been resettled by the 
South African Government since 1960. 
On April 27 the Prime Minister stated 
that "forced removals" would no longer 
take place in the future. This would ap- 
pear to mean that henceforth the 
government will attempt to induce peo- 
ple to move by offering better housing, 
facilities, and job opportunities 
elsewhere. But this would seem to 
signify a change in methods rather than 
a departure from the policy of com- 
pleting the process of "consolidation." 

Regardless of whether or not the new constitu- 
tion represents reform of apartheid or only its ra- 
tionalization and modernization, the practice of 
apartheid remains the basis for the organization of 
South African society. 

However, there have been negative 
developments as well. 

• Detentions continue; as of May 31, 
1984, a total of 286 persons had been 
detained in South Africa on political or 
security grounds including 137 in Trans- 
kei due to recent student unrest, 30 in 
Ciskei, and 1 in Bophuthatswana, so- 
called "independent" homelands. Overall, 
the number of persons remaining in 
detention as of May 31 is 38, the lowest 
figure for some time. 

• Prison sentences for treason and 
security convictions vary considerably. 
Carl Niehaus, a white university stu- 
dent, was convicted of high treason and 
sentenced to 15 years in prison for his 
activities on behalf of the African Na- 
tional Congress [ANC] and the South 
African Communist Party. His fiancee, 
Johanna Lourens, was sentenced to 4 
years for her complicity. Two professed 
ANC members were convicted of high 
treason and attempted murder in early 
April. They received 10-year prison 
sentences. In December 1983, Mathews 

Thabang Ntshiwa received a sentence ot 
3 years, of which 18 months were 
suspended for 5 years, for advising, ad- 
vocating, and encouraging the aims of a 
banned organization. Ntshiwa owned a 
mug which carried ANC slogans. Also ii 
December 1983, Sister Mary Ncube 
received a 12-month prison sentence for 
possession of banned literature. Eight 
months of the sentence were suspended 
for 5 years. On the other hand, however 
on April 2, 1984, Constable Nienaber 
was acquitted of murder in the April 
1983 shooting death of Dreifontein com 
munity leader Saul Mkhize. The court 
found that Neinaber acted in self- 
defense, and that Mkhize was "arrogant 
and impolite." Also, members of the 
white far rightwing Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging received suspend- 
ed sentences in October 1983 for 
charges of treason and possession of il- 
legal weapons, despite having been 
caught with a large weapon cache in- 
cluding AK-47 assault rifles, explosives 
and ammunition. 

• The South African Government 
has refused permission for banned 
Pastor Beyers Naude to travel to 
Europe to receive an award. 

• The initial findings of extensive 
private research reveal that black Sout! 
Africans suffer from vastly inferior 
standards of health, nutrition, housing, 
income, and education as compared to 

In short, we must conclude, as we 
did in December, that we are dealing 
with a mixed balance sheet; that despit 
certain improvements, the established 
system of comprehensive control over 
the lives of most South Africans remai 
substantially in effect. Nevertheless, 
there is a process of change underway ,■ 
with major implications for the future 
that system. This is a fact which objec 
tive observers cannot deny. Those who 
say that the situation is totally un- 
changed, or has gotten worse, fail to 
take this into account. Nothing could 
make this more evident than the fer- 
ment surrounding the new constitutioi 
which reflects a clear consensus amon; 
white South Africans that genuine 
change must occur if they are to sur- 
vive. With the expansion of parliameni 
to include the Indian and so-called col- 
ored South Africans, a door has been 
opened and cannot be closed. 

One of the major factors underlyin 
this process of change has been the 
dynamic of economic growth combined: 
with demographics. Whites increasing!' 
realize they cannot run their economy 



hout more skilled labor, which blacks 
being trained to supply in ever 
ater numbers. Black awareness of 
ir growing bargaining power in the 
rkforce is reflected in the spread of 
:k trade unions. Simultaneously. 
ck purchasing power is also on the 
!, and a distinct black middle class is 
act being formed with the ability to 
rcise important leverage in the South 
ican marketplace. Those who believe 
■t the formation of a black middle 
s will result in political stagnation, 
! to some perceived vested interest in 
petuation of the status quo, fun- 
nentally misread what has always 
tivated human beings, namely, a 
ire not just to obtain a higher stand- 
I of living but also to exercise the 
edom which that higher standard 
— but does not always — make possi- 
In short, a socioeconomic process is 
ierway which is contributing 
.matically to the bargaining power of 
ith Africa's black population as well 
to the perception of white South 
■icans that the status quo is 

S. Policy Toward South Africa 

ould now like to turn to the question 
TOW this situation affects U.S. policy 
l/ard South Africa. U.S. policy with 
fard to apartheid is clear. Morally, the 
i ith African system is completely con- 
iry to our values. Morally "repugnant" 
; 5 the word President Reagan used to 

cribe it. Politically, apartheid nur- 
; es instability which is contrary to 
1 lerican interests in southern Africa. 
- national interest compels us to pro- 
te peaceful but genuine evolution 
ay from apartheid and toward a 
tern of government based on the con- 
iit of all South Africans, regardless of 

As we engage in this effort, 
vever, we must not lose sight of the 
t that just as a lasting basis for 
ional stability requires evolutionary 
inge toward government by consent 
South Africa, so, by the same token, 

are not likely to see internal change 
iceeding at an adequate pace and by 
nocratic means if escalating violence 
and across frontiers polarizes the 
itics and deepens domestic divisions 
;hin South Africa itself. Thus, the 
•efully negotiated agreements involv- 
; South Africa, Angola, and Mozam- 
[ue which have been reached in recent 
>nths hold immense potential for the 
;ure of peaceful, genuine, evolutionary 
inge within South Africa itself. This is 

precisely one of the principal reasons 
why U.S. diplomacy has been so deeply 
involved in trying to establish a climate 
in which such agreements could be 

Remarkably, there are elements at 
all levels of South African society which 
are themselves engaged in the effort to 
promote peaceful change, to find a solu- 
tion to South Africa's problems which 
somehow steers between the extremes 
of continued repression and the anarchy 
of racial conflagration. One of the fun- 
damental but least well known facets of 
U.S. policy toward South Africa is the 
degree to which we are involved in sup- 
porting organizations and individuals 
who have committed themselves to 
peaceful change in South Africa. Such 
support, in a tangible form, com- 
plements our moral and political opposi- 
tion to apartheid. 

This year alone, with the support of 
Congress, we have devoted over $10 
million in U.S. funds to programs de- 
signed to uplift those disadvantaged by 
apartheid: programs to provide black 
South Africans with scholarships for 
university study in the U.S., programs 
to assist blacks in qualifying for a 
university education, programs to assist 
the emerging black entrepreneur with 
acquiring management skills, and pro- 
grams to train black trade unionists in 
effective union organization and bargain- 
ing skills. As these efforts gain momen- 
tum, we hope that they will increase the 
overall bargaining power of South 
Africa's blacks in the context of the 
growing demand within South Africa's 
economy for skilled workers. 

Congress has helped lead the way in 
providing the resources and imagination 
for these sorts of programs. Most 
recently. Congress passed a $1.5 million 
Human Rights Fund for South Africa, 
which provided funds for small grants to 
be made by the U.S. Embassy in South 
Africa to organizations which promote 
human rights. To date our Embassy has 
allocated $197,650 on 23 projects, which 
have supported activities such as 
research on the legal status of black 
women, farm schools, education, and 
pensions; the purchase of resource 
materials for centers which study legal 
questions; training for labor unions; and 
establishment of facilities where people 
can meet to discuss human rights topics. 

Support for peaceful change within 
South Africa is not limited, I would add. 

exclusively to the public sector. The ac- 
tivities of those U.S. firms which have 
joined the Sullivan code, employing 
enlightened management practices and 
providing substantial benefits to their 
employees outside the workplace, are 
setting the pace for progress in the way 
blacks are treated by employers in South 
Africa. To date, U.S. firms have spent 
over $78 million on improvements for 
black employees and their families. 

As I indicated, these efforts are in- 
tended to complement the political 
facets of U.S. policy: our strict 
adherence to the arms embargo on 
South Africa, our refusal to recognize 
the so-called "independence homelands," 
and our firm rejection of apartheid. But 
in addition, fundamental to our ability to 
influence events in South Africa is our 
capacity to communicate with the 
government's leaders. With them lies the 
responsibility for shaping South Africa's 
future. They have the power to deter- 
mine the speed and the context of 

Let me be plain: we do communicate 
with these leaders, and frankly. If we 
choose to speak in confidential channels, 
we also do so firmly. No South African 
leader has the slightest doubt about the 
strength of American feelings when 
essential human rights are abused. 

But we must recognize that we are 
dealing with another sovereign nation, 
and by no means the only country in the 
world to abuse human rights. We cannot 
dictate to that nation's leaders how to 
conduct their internal affairs, though we 
certainly can, and do, offer our own 
reactions to what we see. We have 
chosen the path of constructive involve- 
ment in efforts to promote peaceful 
change in South Africa. Even if the pace 
is too slow to suit those of us who would 
prefer to see white South Africans join 
tomorrow before a stunned world in 
sharing gladly the wealth and control of 
their nation with all their fellow citizens, 
one must nevertheless concede that our 
course is perhaps the only realistic one. 
We intend to fulfill our commitment to 
promoting peaceful change toward 
government based on the consent of all 
South Africans in the months and years 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tlie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 


The ANZUS Relationship: 
Alliance Management 

by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Address before the Conference on the 
American Effect on Australian Defense 
at the Aiistralian Studies Center of 
Pennsylvania State University, Univer- 
sity Park, Pennsylvania, on June 24, 
1981t. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Af- 

ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, and 
United States security treaty] is an 
alliance of democratic nations committed 
to peace. These two facts about the 
alliance— our commitment to democratic 
freedom and our commitment to 
peace — are so fundamental to ANZUS 
that they would be worth noting at the 
outset even were they nothing more 
than very broad statements of purpose. 
But so far from being mere shopworn 
generalities, these two facts have great 
practical significance from the basic role 
and function of our alliance — and even 
for its day-to-day management — 
significance which is often not suffi- 
ciently appreciated. 

It is because our nations are 
democracies that the commitments we 
make to one another are of great prac- 
tical consequence and also why they are 
so reliable. For our three nations, 
vulnerable as we are to the infirmities 
that are alleged to afflict democracies in 
the conduct of their affairs, our alliance 
commitments are imporUint in bringing 
a fundamental continuity into our rela- 
tions. But it is also because these com- 
mitments represent the commitments of 
whole nations to one another— not the 
mere whim of arbitrary rulers— that it is 
possible to rely on them. There is no 
task more fundamental to alliance 
management than the constant nurtur- 
ing of public support. 

Our collective commitment to 
preserving peace is no less profound in 
its practical implications for our alliance. 
It is perhaps to be expected that so 
much of the discussion of ANZUS con- 
cerns questions about what would hap- 
pen and how the various parties would 
respond in the event of war. The treaty 
itself, of course, contains important com- 
mitments of mutual assisUince in the 
event of armed attack. Yet it is no 
depreciation of the importance of those 
commitments to say that the foremost 
goal of the alliance is to prevent those 

commitments from ever having to be 
called upon. The operation of the 
alliance in peacetime is every bit as vital 
as its operation in time of war— indeed, 
even more so. Particularly in a nuclear 
age, the task of preserving peace is fun- 
damental to alliance management. 

The Determination of National 
Interest in a Democracy 

The old aphorism that nations have no 
permanent friends, only permanent in- 
terests, is still a popular one, but it con- 
tains as much concealed falsehood as ap- 
parent truth. Viewing the flux and per- 
fidy of 19th-century alliances, it was cer- 
tainly plausible— and perhaps even 
somewhat comforting— to believe that 
geography, historic rivalries, and 
economic interests provide the constants 
in a nation's decisions, while policies and 
alliances form and founder around these 
fixed goals. A nation, so this view goes, 
may be obsessed by a particular threat, 
must have particular ports or trading 
opportimities— or, conversely, may have 
no interest in a distant land— and should 
form its alliances in whatsoever way will 
promote these ends. 

The notion of permanent interests, 
impermanent friends, left a great deal to 
be desired as a model for the conduct of 
international relations, even in the 19th 
century. And in a nuclear age it is a 
very dangerous basis for democratic na- 
tions to conduct their affairs. 

Among its other weaknesses, the no- 
tion of permanent interests leads to the 
dangerous fallacies of permanent 
disinterest and predictability. These can 
all too often be used to excuse neglect, a 
seductive choice for peace-loving 
democracies that sometimes fail to 
recognize the aggressive designs of 

Why, so the argument goes, must a 
nation spend valuable resources to de- 
fend against distant challenges? Why 
maintain forces without a visible threat? 
If grand political and military goals are 
constant, there is no need to reassess 
defenses and alliances will naturally tend 
themselves. If decisions are always 
logical, the need to prepare for unex- 
pected contingencies is quite small. 

But we know from long, historical 
experience that alliances are hard to put 
together and to keep, that illogical and 
unpredictable decisions are all too com- 
mon, and that circumstances can change 
radically, often without a shot being 
fired. The fall of the Shah of Iran, the 
Sino-Soviet split, the attempt to place 
Soviet missiles in Cuba, even a coup in 
the small island of Grenada, created new 
strategic interests and shifted political 
and military thinking abruptly. Uncer- 
tain or ambiguous political commit- 
ments, even where interests seemed 
otherwise clear, led to bloodshed in 
1914, in 1939, in 1950, and even in 1982 

I believe that countries, and in par- 
ticular democracies like the United 
States and Australia and New Zealand, 
do have permanent interests. But they 
are not only or principally the geo- 
strategic interests on which past debate 
has centered. Our nations' permanent ii 
terests are as much or more in justice 
and the rule of law, in democracy and 
freedom, and in peace. 

In pursuit of these goals, we have 
permanent "friends" as well: continuity 
reliability, and strong alliances with 
other nations that share the same 
values. Surely nations that defend 
freedom and the rule of law have a 
sound foundation for the elements of 
such permanent friendship. But these 
foundations will only be maintained 
through consistency, responsible policif 
and a commitment to cooperation. The 
burden of maintaining such cooperatio' 
and policies in the first half of this cen |^, 
tury was too heavy to avoid world con 
flagration. We must avoid such misste 
in the nuclear era. 

I would like to discuss today the n 
ANZUS plays in protecting all of our ■ 
terests in peace and freedom — both in 
regional context and as an important 
factor in the calculation of world peac 
For these issues are intricately linked 



Preserving Nuclear Peace 

Effective alliances require a fundamei 
tal faith in the responsibility of our 
allies. As no issue is more important 
today than preserving nuclear peace, 
responsible policies to this end are a 
crucial element in preserving confider 
among our countries. For this reason, 
would like to begin a discussion of 
managing ANZUS with a brief word > |'i« 
managing this great issue of our time 
the threat of nuclear war. 

Surely, it is a topic on which muc 
has been said. The dangers of nuclear 





r have become common political 
jics worldwide. In my own country, no 
ue takes greater precedence. Preserv- 
r nuclear peace is a duty we owe not 
t to our friends and fellow coun- 
rmei\ but to all the inhabitants of this 

"A nuclear war," President Reagan 
s said, "cannot be won and must never 
fought." He has said it in China. He 
s said it in Germany. He has said it in 
pan. He has said it in England. He 
s said it in Congress. He has said it 
the Oval Office. He has said it 
oughout America. The essence of 
esident Reagan's policy on preventing 
clear war can be crystallized in this 
rase. It is a principle that has the 
1 support of responsible people 

Much of the public debate on nuclear 
ues focuses on the enormous destruc- 
e potential of existing arsenals. Presi- 
nt Reagan has led the way in the 
sponsible effort to reduce nuclear 

• He has proposed the complete 
mination of an entire class of nuclear 
iapons— intermediate-range missiles— 
d in negotiations with the Soviets, he 
s rejected any solution that would 
nply transfer such weapons from 
aere they threaten Europe to where 

:y could threaten Asia. 

• In the strategic arms reduction 
ks (START), he has proposed deep 

iductions in intercontinental ballistic 
I ssiles, a goal no previous strategic 
1 ms treaty has even approached. 

Unfortunately, the Soviets tied prog- 
1 3S in START to preventing INF 
I termediate-range nuclear forces] 
I ployments in Europe, deployments 
at our NATO allies requested in 1979 

offset massive Soviet deployments of 
new missile, the triple-warhead SS-20. 
ist November the Soviets walked out 

the INF negotiations and in 
jcember suspended indefinitely their 
.rticipation in START, apparently due 

their frustration over their failure to 
event NATO's own counterdeployment 

intermediate-range forces. We are 
ady to resume both negotiations at 
ly time and any place, without precon- 
tions. Our proposals are fair and 
orkable. All the elements for an agree- 
ent are on the table. We hope the 
5viet Union will also come to recognize 
lat its interests can best be served by 
■turning to the negotiating table as 
)on as possible. 

But the United States has not sim- 
ply waited on Soviet responses to con- 
trol nuclear weapons and to reduce their 
destructive potential. We have acted on 
our own to this end. Improvements in 
our nuclear forces over the years have 
made them safer— less vulnerable to sur- 
prise attack, less prone to accident or to 
unauthorized use, less susceptible to 
seizure by terrorists. These improve- 
ments in our nuclear forces are well 
known, though insufficiently acknowl- 
edged by those who propose to freeze all 
changes to those forces. What is 
perhaps less well known is the fact that 
these improvements have made it possi- 
ble to reduce the destructive potential of 
our nuclear forces over the last 20 

Both the number and megatonnage 
of our nuclear arsenal has been substan- 
tially reduced. Our stockpile was one- 
third higher in 1967 than it is now, and 
the total yield has declined by 75% since 
1960. The stockpile of U.S. nuclear 
weapons in Europe has also been 
dramatically reduced. The United States 
and NATO allies withdrew 1,000 nuclear 
weapons from Europe in 1980, and we 
agreed in 1983 to withdraw an addi- 
tional 1,400 weapons over the next 
several years. These reductions will be 
realized even if we have to carry 
through with the deployment of ground- 
launched and cruise missiles, as NATO 
decided in 1979 that it would do if no 
agreement with the Soviet Union to ban 
or limit those weapons can be reached. 
For each new weapon that would be 
deployed in that event, we have 
withdrawn an old one. Thus, when all 
NATO withdrawals are taken into ac- 
count, we will have withdrawn a total of 
five weapons for each new one that we 
may introduce under the 1979 decision. 

Yes, America has begun to rebuild 
its nuclear forces, even as we have 
sought to reduce them. But we have 
done so only after a decade of 
restraint— restraint unmatched, indeed 
exploited, by our adversaries. And we 
have done so only to avoid the more 
destabilizing situation when an adver- 
sary might be tempted by forces suscep- 
tible to a successful first strike. 

The United States has consistently 
taken responsible positions on reducing 
the level of nuclear armaments— posi- 
tions worthy of our allies' support. The 
United States also has undertaken a 
number of other important arms control 
initiatives to reduce the risk of war and 
halt or reverse the growth in weapons. 

In Geneva, Vice President Bush 
presented to the Conference on Dis- 
armament in April a draft treaty for a 

comprehensive ban on the development, 
production, stockpiling, transfer, and 
use of chemical weapons. 

In Stockholm, together with our 
NATO allies, we have put forward a 
package of confidence-building measures 
designed to reduce the risk of a Euro- 
pean war occurring by accident, surprise 
attack, or miscalculation. 

In Moscow, we have proposed a 
strenghthening of U.S. -Soviet com- 
munications through a technical 
upgrading of the hotline to help contain 
possible crises. 

In Vienna, at the mutual and 
balanced force reduction talks we have, 
again with our European allies, pre- 
sented a new initiative this April that 
seeks to find a common ground between 
Eastern and Western positions, and to 
make progress on reducing conventional 
forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 

These, too, are worthy of our allies' 
respect and support. 

A Commitment to Peace and Freedom 

The public debate on the levels of 
nuclear weapons is an important one. 
But whether our forces freeze at current 
levels, or gain or diminish slightly, the 
potential destruction remains unaccept- 

The public debate on how we pre- 
vent nuclear war is, therefore, of even 
greater relevance to our fate, but unfor- 
tunately, attracts less attention. The 
prospects of preventing nuclear war de- 
pend on far more than just nuclear 
weapons themselves. Peace will depend 
on a stable nuclear deterrent, but it will 
also depend on preventing the regional 
conflicts that can, unexpectedly, lead to 
wider confrontations. 

Herein lies the second great 
challenge for preserving our freedom 
and world peace. Our alliance com- 
mitments play a crucial role in meeting 
that challenge. 

The initial and most basic step in the 
effort to preserve peace and freedom is 
the national decision to make the at- 
tempt—and the national will to per- 
severe. My country, like Australia and 
New Zealand, considered itself for most 
of its history secure behind vast ocean 
frontiers. Even after World War I, we 
maintained this illusion. Only after the 
painful lessons of World War II did we 
learn, as smaller nations like Norway 
also learned so painfully, that neutrality 
does not ensure safety. Since that time, 
each of our three countries has faced up 
to the high costs of isolationism in an in- 
terconnected world; each has committed 


itself to the search for peace beyond our 
borders, not merely in home waters but 
in the Pacific and in areas as distant as 
Africa and the Middle East. 

In the aftermath of our difficult ex- 
perience in Vietnam, America had a 
renewed flirtation with a reduced inter- 
national role, even with isolationism. 
There were strong feelings in America 
to draw back into ourselves. We con- 
sidered withdrawing our troops from 
Korea and other lands where they are 
vitally needed. We considered reducing 
our fleet in the hope that we could 
"swing" ships as needed from one 
theater to another, ignoring the very 
real possibility that this could increase 
the chances of a two-ocean challenge 
and, even more immediately, would have 
significantly reduced the U.S. presence 
in the Pacific. 

But with the steady growth of 
Soviet military forces and the increasing 
and alarming tendency of the Soviets to 
use that force, either directly them- 
selves—as in Afghanistan— or in- 
directly—as in Kampuchea, Ethiopia, 
Chad, and elsewhere— we emerged from 
our Vietnam experience with renewed 
determination, restored confidence, and 
a heightened sense of realism. 

Our determination and confidence 
led us to begin to rebuild our forces and 
to speak more forthrightly for freedom. 
Our heightened sense of realism gave us 
a clearer view of the dangers posed by 
our adversaries and a desire to further 
the increasing self-reliance among our 
friends, including those in Asia. If most 
of Asia is largely peaceful despite the 
increase in Soviet activities and 
capabilities, .surely it is due in part to 
our renewed role and the growing 
strength of friends. 

America's return to a more vigorous 
role in the world is testimony to the 
staying power of democracies in foreign 
affairs, a quality that has often been 
questioned by [wlitical theorists, in- 
cluding that most brilliant analyst of 
democratic politics, Alexis de Tocque- 
ville. Our alliances were one of the key 
factors that kept America from straying 
from its course. Without these alliances, 
we might well have accepted a lessened 
role— to the detriment of all our coun- 
tries. Through the alliances, we main- 
tained a clearer view of where our true 
interests and responsibilities lie. 

Indeed, not just America but the 
democracies in general have succeeded 
to an extraordinary degree since World 
War II in maintaining a constancy of 
policy. During this same period, the 

world on the whole has also enjoyed an 
extraordinary period of peace among the 
major powers, a peace of critical impor- 
tance in the nuclear age. Both of these 
achievements are, in large part, a 
tribute to the strength and vigor of the 
West's interlocking set of alliances. In 
the circumstances, I believe, a heavy 
burden of proof falls on those who would 
weaken a system of alliance that has 
contributed so much to the maintenance 
of nuclear peace. 

This is not to say that our systems 
of alliances cannot be improved upon. 
Constant efforts are still required, and 
complacency can be as dangerous as ex- 
cessive anxiety. But our alliances on the 
whole make an invaluable contribution, 
and no one has as yet put forward a 
surer way of preserving the peace. Cer- 
tainly the isolation of each nation for 
itself is not such an alternative. 

ANZUS reflects our countries' joint 
determination to avoid the dangers and 
painful lessons of isolationism or 
neutralism. Each of our nation's com- 
mitments eases the burden of com- 
mitments, real and psychological, of the 
others. Our joint pledges give each of 
our pledges added meaning. 

The question is not so much whether 
any one ANZUS country could prosper 
as a neutral under the umbrella of 
others' active roles but whether the 
other countries would choose to continue 
active roles once one chose to withdraw. 
There are Americans who continue to 
question our role in NATO, despite 
strong European commitments, because 
of what they see as inadequate defense 
spending. I have little doubt that such 
questions would increase dramatically if 
the European commitments themselves 
came into serious question. 

Today, our three countries' com- 
mitments remain firm. Only last year, 
the ANZUS review confirmed that the 
treaty "remains relevant and vitally im- 
portant to the shared security concerns 
and strategic interests of the three part- 
ner governments." Let there be no doubt 
in the mind of any potential adversary 
that an armed attack on an ally would 
require, and would receive from the 
allies, full and prompt fulfillment of the 
ANZUS security commitment including, 
when necessary, military support. 

The national security of each of us is 
a fundamental interest of the others and 
requires adequate and appropriate 
response to threats or attacks on allies 
from any source. In the case of an at- 
tack on Australia, for example, our com- 
mitment remains firm whether the at- 


tack should come from the Pacific or 
Indian Ocean approaches. Our commit- 
ment to the defense of our allies is not 
limited to any particular threat; it ap- 
plies to any potential aggressor. 

In the Falklands crisis when our 
NATO ally. Great Britain, was wrong- 
fully attacked by a Latin American 
friend, America did everything it could 
to negotiate an end to the crisis. But 
when negotiations failed, we took a 
strong stand on behalf of our wronged , 
ally, despite the predicted high costs of i 
such a stand. We were strongly com- 
mitted to doing what was right in sup- 
port of our ally — even though we were 
under no treaty obligation to do so. 
(NATO does not extend to the South 

The U.S. presence in the Pacific 
over the past 40 years has been a 
stabilizing one that has served the in- 
terests of our friends and allies in the 
region. ANZUS has been one of the 
critical factors supporting this stability. 
In the last 40 years, as well, countries ol 
the region have made great progress 
toward democracy and the rule of law. 
These, too, are stabilizing factors. While 
these conditions prevail, it is difficult to 
see a situation in which ANZUS 
members would be called upon to fulfill 
their commitments in a dispute involvinj 
another friendly power. Indeed, a 
weakening of ANZUS or the consequent 
weakening of the U.S. role in the Pacifi 
is one of the few events that could con- 
ceivably make such hypothetical imagin- 
ings a reality. ANZUS is not weaker 
because its members have other com- 
mitments. These commitments do not 
conflict, they interlock; and in so doing, 
they help to prevent conflict. 

By our alliances, we add ever 
greater echoes of support to alliances " 
throughout the free world. There are, ^' 
for example, no direct political or legal 
linkages between ANZUS and the Five 
Power Defense Arrangement. Howevei 
any potential aggressor in Southeast 
Asia must take into account that 
ANZUS alliance interests would be 
threatened by an attack engaging 
Australian and New Zealand forces 

A strong NATO strengthens deter- 
rence globally to the advantage of 
ANZUS. But equally, the health of 
ANZUS is vital to the global Western 
alliance— especially given the increasini 
ly important locations of both Australi; 
and New Zealand. It would be a mistal 
to underestimate the moral and politic; 
influence of this alliance of three of the 
world's oldest democracies. 







Some argue that alliances are 
igerous in the nuclear era. But an 
limited nuclear war will leave no cor- 
!• of our world safe and secure. No na- 
n can hide its head in the sand and 
int on being spared— a point made on 
ae 6 in Parliament by [Australian] 
ime Minister Hawke. 

The enjoyment of freedom cannot be 
jarated from the responsibilities of 
edom— responsibilities the three 
4ZUS countries have shouldered 
larely. Clearly, there are risks 
;ociated with engaging directly in 
:errence through active cooperation in 
najor alliance. The United States has 
lingly assumed such risks on behalf of 
allies. We have done so because we 
ieve, as Prime Minister Hawke and 
reign Minister Hayden have recently 
1 eloquently argued, that such risks 
• significantly less than those 
lociated with the weakening and 
lure of deterrence. 

maging ANZUS 

ce there is the will to take alliances 
iously, the problems of managing an 
ance come into full play. ANZUS, like 
iTO, provides the elements for peace, 
iance management is the art that 
;s meaning into the framework that 

■ treaty provides. 

Successful alliance management 
)ends on our success in meeting five 
ideal challenges. 

First, as an alliance of democracies, 
IZUS inherits the challenges democra- 
1 3 face in running a coherent foreign 
I icy. Policies that do not sustain public 
Dport will fail. Needed policies that 
! k public support can go unrealized. In 
} irt, alliance management requires an 
i m and informed public debate led by 
! zens mindful of the great, not just 

■ immediately visible, threats the 
I ure holds. 

Second, an effective alliance among 
'ee vital democracies requires exten- 
e, ongoing contacts at all levels of 
! /ernment and society. The need for 
: )rdinated political and military ac- 
; ities requires close official ties and 
I ong institutionalized consultative 
j )cesses. But they also require lively, 
I ormal public commentary and per- 
i lal interchanges (including con- 
ences like this one). Together these 
sure a constant flow of information 
j views on potential problems, as well 
a full awareness of each other's con- 
•ns, interests, capabilities, and objec- 

tives. Only through such exchanges can 
alliance managers reach decisions that 
serve a common purpose. 

Such exchanges cannot be turned on 
and off as crises arise and recede. To be 
effective, they must continue at all levels 
over time and reflect the high degree of 
mutual confidence derived from ex- 
perience and personal contact. 

Fortunately, the management of the 
ANZUS alliance in all three capitals pro- 
vides precisely that kind of consultative 
relationship. At the so-called working 
levels, there are literally daily contacts 
between both civilian and military of- 
ficials, including a throughly institu- 
tionalized sharing of intelligence and 
related assessments. At a higher level, 
there are frequent major meetings of 
senior officials to exchange views on 
issues of immediate concern to the 

Most importantly, there is the on- 
going dialogue— through meetings, cor- 
respondence, and communications— be- 
tween ministers in the three capitals. 
The annual ANZUS Council meeting 
provides a vital element that links 
political leaders and symbolizes the 
significance of the relationship. 

On the military side, even without a 
pattern of integrated commands and 
military forces as in NATO Europe, 
ANZUS alliance managers over the 
years have built up a pattern of close 
defense cooperation which assures that 
ANZUS forces can operate together 
quickly and effectively, if that is ever 
necessary. Key elements of this coopera- 
tion are joint exercises between our 
forces, especially our navies. 

The third challenge of alliance 
management is to meet the need for 
continuity and long-term consistency of 
policy. President Reagan came into of- 
fice committed to demonstrating that 
the United States is a reliable ally and 
partner. Accordingly, while he has 
brought strong views of his own to the 
definition of new policy areas, he has 
shown great respect for commitments 
made by previous administrations. That 
element of continuity between ad- 
ministrations is essential to effective 
management of alliances between 

I could cite examples as far afield as 
the Middle East, Central America, and 
southern Africa to make my point, but 
let me stick for now to some of more 
direct concern to ANZUS. In the area of 
arms control, President Reagan main- 
tained the U.S. commitment to both 

tracks of the 1979 NATO decision, while 
offering his new and imaginative pro- 
posal on the "zero option" for the arms 
control track. He announced that the 
United States would observe the limits 
of the unratified SALT II [strategic 
arms limitation talks] Treaty while seek- 
ing to negotiate a better substitute for 
it. With respect to China policy, the 
President has made very clear his deter- 
mination to maintain the framework 
provided by previous U.S. commitments 
in this area, at the same time that he 
has worked to put that critically impor- 
tant relationship on a more realistic and 
stable basis. The views and concerns of 
our NATO and ANZUS allies were, and 
are, important in shaping U.S. arms 
control policy. And I can say from direct 
personal involvement that ANZUS views 
were of great importance at critical 
junctures in the development of this Ad- 
ministration's China policy. 

Fourth, there is a need to accept the 
mutual burdens as well as the mutual 
benefits of alliance. It is in the nature of 
alliances that the precise levels of the 
burdens and benefits will shift over 
time. Concerns that another partner is 
getting a "free ride" plague every 
alliance in some form. Indeed, alliances 
can be endangered as much as 
strengthened by too fervent an effort to 
make all burdens precisely equal at any 
given moment to the benefits received. 
What is important to a healthy alliance 
is that the burdens be shouldered by all 
parties as needed and when needed, and 
that the benefits be shared as well. 

Article II of the ANZUS treaty 
binds the partners "separately and joint- 
ly by means of continuous and effective 
self-help and mutual aid" to "maintain 
and develop their individual and collec- 
tive capacity to resist armed attack." 
Because the ANZUS democracies, as the 
NATO allies, are dedicated to preserving 
the peace, not fighting a war, there is a 
tendency in all our countries to resent 
spending resources for defense that 
seems unnecessary at the time. Yet, 
when the danger becomes evident, it 
may be too late or seem too provocative 
to begin to rearm. There, once again, a 
well-informed public is essential. 

Domestic political pressures and 
miscalculations in Argentina led to a 
wholly unexpected war in the 
Falklands— a war for which Britain was 
just barely prepared. British naval plan- 
ners, prior to the Falklands, assumed 
that their forces would be used relative- 
ly close to home, that they would never 
have to engage without allies, that land- 
based air support would always be 
available, and that landings against 
hostile forces would not be needed. 


These comfortable assumptions lowered 
Britain defense spending. But an un- 
predictable world made them predictably 

The United States, for its part, is in 
the midst of a substantial effort to in- 
crease its conventional forces. We have 
done so not to provoke, but to defend; 
not to escalate, but to provide the means 
by which problems can be contained. By 
strengthening our conventional deter- 
rent we help to increase our options and 
reduce the risks of nuclear war. In this 
defense effort, too, we have kept our 
allies closely informed. 

The United States attaches critical 
importance to the opportunity to use 
Australian and New Zealand ports that 
provide ready access to the South 
Pacific and Indian Oceans. We view 
Australia's and New Zealand's will- 
ingness to allow us use of their ports as 
part of their contribution to ANZUS. 
We also value efforts to assure stand- 
ardization or interoperability of equip- 
ment and weapons systems, share in- 
telligence, exchange personnel, and con- 
sult on problems. The maintenance of 

U.S. presence in the region, and the 
demonstration of our ability to operate 
effectively with our treaty partners, are 
tangible physical evidence of our treaty 
commitments. All of the ANZUS nations 
share in this effort and all benefit 
from it. 

Another and critical element of 
defense cooperation is that involving the 
joint facilities in Australia. Although the 
subject of bilateral agreements between 
Canberra and Washington, they clearly 
are within the spirit of the provisions of 
the ANZUS treaty. Indeed, such is 
noted in the agreements. 

There is, of course, considerable 
public speculation about the use of these 
facilities, including gross distortions or 
misunderstandings of related U.S. 
defense strategy. The simple truth, as 
clearly and forcefully enunciated by 
Prime Minister Hawke on June 6 in 
Parliament in Canberra, is that these 
facilities contribute to arms control, ef- 
fective deterrence, mutual security, and 
to stability in global strategic relation- 
ships. Verification, early warning, and 
the ability to control our nuclear forces 
and communicate with them are critical 

African Refugees 
Relief Day, 1984 

JULY 9. 1984' 

The United States and the American 
people have a long and proud tradition 
of helping those who are in need. In 
Africa, the needs of refugees cry out for 
continued attention. So, too, do the 
needs of the host countries who, despite 
their own limited resources, have ac- 
cepted the refugees in the best tradition 
of humanitarian concern. Their generosi- 
ty has led them to make great sacrifices. 

We in the United States are mindful of 
the hurden.s that are borne by the refugees 
and their host countries. We are dedicated to 
the cause of meeting their needs now and in 
the future. We fervently hope that the Sec- 
ond International Conference on Assistance 
to Refugees in Africa, which begins .July 9. 
1984, will lead to a sustained effort by the in- 
ternational community to help African coun- 
tries effectively cope with the refugee 
burden. Our own efforts have been and will 
continue to be in support of the African 
refugees and their host countries. 

In order to heighten awareness in the 
United States of the needs of Africa's 

refugees and the needs of their host coun- 
tries, the Congress, by H.J. Res. 604, has 
designated July 9, 1984, as "African 
Refugees Relief Day" and has requested the 
President to issue a proclamation in observ- 
ance of that day. 

As we reflect on the situation of refugees 
and their host countries, I hope Americans 
will be generous in their support of voluntary 
agencies that provide relief and development 
assistance to Africa. Further, I wish special 
consideration be given to the extraordinary 
hardships borne by women refugees, their 
children, and other vulnerable groups. The in- 
nocent victims of civil strife and war deserve 
our special concern. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ro.nald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim July 9, 1984, as African 
Refugees Relief Day. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this 9th day of July, in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four 
and of the Independence of the United States 
of America the two hundred and ninth. 

Ronald Reagan 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 16, 1984. 

to both stable deterrence and to arms 
control. In addition, this capability could 
be critical in preventing some bizarre ac 
cident from turning into an unintended 
catastrophe. For all of these reasons, 
the facilities are an important, even 
essential, part of the West's critical and 
deeply felt commitment to maintain 
world peace— perhaps the greatest 
single challenge of this or any century. ' 

Fifth, as alliance managers in all 
three capitals have recognized from the 
outset of ANZUS, our treaty relation- 
ship is only part of the many-faceted i 
relations between our countries— com- 
mercial, historic, cultural, and personal. 
They are all important. They all affect 
the course of the relationship and each 
other. As we approach problems in any 
one area, we must he careful to see 
them in the perspective of the entire 
relationship. If we do so, we will con- 
tinue to have a strong reservoir of good 
will and self-interest from which prob- 
lems can be solved. At the same time, 
we will recognize that each element of i 
the relationship is a part of the whole 
and that each is important and worthy 
of our best effort for consultation, com- 
promise, and deference to the interests 
of all. 

For alliance managers the essential 
task, whether in Washington, Canbern 
or Wellington, is to maximize coopera- 
tion to mutual advantage when we are 
on common ground and to contain dif- 
ferences — legitimate though they may 
be — through the kinds of compromises 
necessary in an effective working part- 
nership. By so doing, we can assure th 
competition in commerce and differenc 
in other areas do not threaten coopera 
tion linked to our most fundamental 
shared interest — mutual national sur- 




Relations between America, Australia, 
and New Zealand are truly broad and 
vital. Our personal, commercial, and 
cultural ties, and a common political 
heritage dedicated to preserving and 
enhancing individual liberty, have forg 
uniquely close relations — relations 
Americans value deeply. As President 
Reagan said almost exactly a year age 
"Our ties are a precious tradition, re- 
flecting our many concerns and sharec 

The ANZUS commitment is not 
limited to paper. It resides in the hear 
of Australians, New Zealanders, and 






lericans alike — in our affection for 
another and in our profound belief 
rihe rule of law. Our treaty commit- 
>int naturally requires that our actions 
'(in accordance with our constitutional 
■icosses, but our deep ties ensure that 
sr processes will be swift and sup- 
. ti\ c and embody the full spirit of our 
'.pit's — the type of commitment 
ii'H'racies require and from which 
, literacies profit. Speaking for the 
itrd States. I can say that Aus- 
iiaiis and New Zealanders should rest 
iircil that if any emergency confronts 
,m. the American system is capable of 
tisive action — and willing to render it. 
The ties between our peoples will 
ays remain a powerful force. But 
it the future holds for ANZUS may 
foundly affect life within each of our 
ions. Will freedom remain a vibrant 
ce, uplifting peoples throughout the 
rid? Or will freedom itself be a 
itive, cowering in remote lands in the 
)e that it is too small to note? In the 
1, even that would prove a futile 

Our freedom and world peace de- 
id primarily on our own commitment 
lur mutual defense and the rule of 
. The choice before us is not between 
,ce and freedom. By promoting 
adom we build what is ultimately the 
st secure foundation for peace as 
1. Nor can we choose peace at the ex- 
[Se of freedom. Life in a world of 
ilitarian powers would not be peace, 
would peace betv/een them long 

, I believe our countries have the will 
|ireserve freedom. There is an old 
I ing: "If I am not for myself, who will 
I But if I am for myself alone, what 

I believe our countries know what 
are — we are trustees of freedom. In 
end, we can do more to protect that 
edom and to build a safe and just 

• If we are strong, than if we are 

• If we proceed with reason and 
irage, than if we hang back until 
derate responses no longer suffice; 

• If we are united, than if we stand 

The path we must follow is an ar- 
ms one — one not without risk. But 
;n few routes are quicker, and none is 
ler. There are no shortcuts. ■ 

Visit of Sri Lankan 
President Jayewardene 

President J.R. Jayewardene of Sri 
Lanka made a state visit to the United 
States June 16-23, 198Jt. While in 
Washington, D.C., June 17-20, he met 
with President Reagan and other govern- 
ment officials. 

Following are remarks made at the 
arrival ceremony and dinner toasts 
made by Presidents Reagan and 
Jayewardene on June 18.'' 


President Reagan 

President Jayewardene, Nancy and I are 
very pleased to have this opportunity to 
welcome you and Mrs. Jayewardene to 
the White House. 

Although our two countries are on 
opposite sides of the globe, we share a 
common bond in the great institution of 
democracy. Sri Lanka has a remarkable 
record among nations which won their 
independence in the aftermath of World 
War II. You've held elections at regular 
intervals, and with amost equal regulari- 
ty, your own hard-fought reelection in 
1982, as a notable exception, your peo- 
ple, through their votes, have removed 
from power the governing party. And in 

(White House photo by Michael Evans) 

what distinguishes Sri Lanka as a truly 
democratic country, losers as well as 
winners accept the verdict of the people. 
The true winners are, of course, the peo- 
ple of Sri Lanka. 

I'm told that in your embassy here in 
Washington, pictures of every Sri Lanka 
head of government since independ- 
ence — those from your own party, as 
well as the opposition — are respectfully 
displayed. This is the kind of democratic 
spirit essential to the success of human 
liberty, the hallmark of democratic 

Understanding and appreciating 
your personal commitment to 
democratic ideals, it is a pleasure for us 
to have you as our guest. You under- 
scored this heartfelt commitment during 
your first visit here in September of 
1951, during a gathering of the repre- 
sentatives of nations who had fought in 
the Pacific war. Some at that San Fran- 
cisco conference insisted that Japan 
should not be given its full freedom. 
They argued that Japan should remain 
shackled as a punishment for its role in 
World War 11. As the representative of 
Sri Lanka, you spoke out for the princi- 
ple of freedom for all people, including 
the Japanese. You quoted Buddha, the 


great teacher, and said that "hatred 
ceases not by hatred, but by love." 

We share your dedication to 
freedom and good will. This is more 
than political theory; it's a way of life. 
This spirit makes its natural that our 
two nations should be friends. 

Unfortunately, not everyone shares 
these values. Recently, we were re- 
minded of the menace of those who seek 
to impose their will by force and terror. 
Two American citizens were kidnapped 
in Sri Lanka and threatened with death. 
I want to take this opportunity to thank 
you personally for your diligence and for 
your resolute handling of this difficult 
situation. The skill and courage that you 
demonstrated helped free our coun- 
trymen and, at the same time, prevented 
the terrorists from achieving their goal. 

During that time of tension, you 
wrote to me, and I want you to know 
how much I appreciated your sharing 
your thoughts. You wrote, "I hope that 
the international community will be able 
to eradicate terrorism, which has 
become a major challenge to those of us 
who believe in the democratic process." 
Well, I speak for all my coun- 
trymen — and after the economic summit 
I recently attended in London, I know 
this sentiment is shared by the people of 
all the democracies — when I say the free 
men and women of this planet will never 
cower before terrorists. Human liberty 
will prevail and civilization will triumph 
over this cowardly form of barbarism. 

We applaud your determination not 
to yield to terrorism in your own coun- 
try, as well as your efforts to find 
through the democratic process a 
peaceful resolution of communal strife. 
There is no legitimate excuse for any 
political group to resort to violence in 
Sri Lanka, a country with a strong 
democratic tradition and peaceful means 
to resolve conflict. 

As a nation of many races, religions, 
and ethnic groups, we Americans know 
from experience that there is room for 
all in a democracy. Dividing your coun- 
try into separate nations, as some would 
have you do, is not the solution. Instead 
of separating people, now is the time to 
bring them together. In the same spirit 
you spoke about in San Francisco three 
decades ago — of love, not hatred, a 
united, progressive Sri Lanka can flour- 
ish and live in peace with itself and the 
rest of the world. 

We wish you every success in your 
search for reconciliation and a better life 
for all your people. And their lives are 
improving. Your leadership has in- 
creased productivity and brought down 

unemployment, has created exciting, 
new opportunities for your citizens. Sri 
Lanka is among those enlightened na- 
tions that understand incentives hold the 
key for greater economic growth and 
personal opportunity. I believe your peo- 
ple and their children will reap rewards 
for many years to come, thanks to the 
bold economic steps that you've taken. 

We're pleased that Americans are 
playing a part in this effort. Your 
endeavors to improve your people's 
economic well-being continues to have 
our solid support. Your country has vast 

Sri Lanka is an example of inde- 
pendent people determining their own 
destiny and a country which the United 
States is proud to count among its 
friends. Mr. President and Mrs. 
Jayewardene, welcome to America. 

President Jayewardene 

President Reagan, Madam Reagan, 
ladies and gentlemen, I'm glad that Mrs. 
Jayewardene and I were able to accept 
the invitation extended by Mrs. Reagan 
and you to visit your great country. 

We have come a very long way from 
home. Yet, already we feel we are 
among friends who believe and try to 
follow common ideals for the welfare of 

This is not our first visit. We came 
in September 1951 to your west coast to 
attend the Japanese peace treaty con- 
ference held at San Francisco. I came as 
my country's representative. I received 
then a full measure of praise and 
gratitude from members of the L'.S. 
Government of the day — Dean Acheson, 
John Foster Dulles, and others who at- 
tended the conference — for helping to 
secure the acceptance by the conference 
of the peace treaty with Japan. The 
Japanese leaders. Prime Minister 
Yoshida and others, were equally 
grateful. Those alive are still so. 

I mention that because the thinking 
of the people of my country, which was 
expressed by me on that occasion, was 
that we should not ask for reparations 
from a fallen foe who had harmed our 
land and people also; that we should 
forgive those who were our enemies, 
quoting the words of the Buddha that 
"hatred ceases not by hatred, but by 
love," which you, also, Mr. President, 
just quoted. I pleaded that we should 
restore to Japan the freedoms of 
democracy. Those were the ideals which 
inspired us then and inspire us now. 

Our history and civilization have sur- 
vived in an unbroken sequence from the 

fifth century B.C. for 2,500 years. There 
were glimpses of modern democracy 
even then, as in the appointment of 
mayors to our ancient cities. The ruins 
of state buildings still contain carvings 
in stone where the cabinet of the kings 
and their ministers sat. We were the 
first in Asia in 1865 to select members 
to the municipalities that governed our 
major cities and, in 1931, under univer- 
sal franchise, to exercise our right to 
elect the government of our choice. 

We also have, in our country, an un 
broken, historical record, extending ove 
the same long period, of a line of heads 
of state, monarchies of different 
dynasties from Sri Lanka and abroad, 
including India and the United Kingdon 
of two Presidents, one selected and one 
myself, elected by the whole country. I 
happen to be the 193d in the line of 
heads of state from 483 B.C. to date. 

In our modern history, we cannot 
forget the contribution made by an 
American, Col. Olcott, when he helped 
the Buddhist leaders of Sri Lanka a hu 
dred years ago to establish a movemen 
for the revival of education, through 
schools owned and managed by the Bu( 
dhists themselves, and thus laid the 
foundation for the revival of Buddhism 
and the movement for freedom. 

The United States of America, sine 
it was born out of a revolution which 
freed it from foreign rule, has not beei 
known to be hankering after territory 
supporting imperialism. Sri Lanka has 
been for 53 years a practicing 
democracy, where the freedoms of 
speech and writing, of electing govern- 
ments by universal franchise at regula 
intervals, and the independence of the 
judiciary and of the opposition are 

Fundamental rights which are 
justifiable are guaranteed under the c( 
stitution. Though there are occasions 
when emergency powers have had to I 
exercised, fundamental freedoms rem; 
intact. Democracy cannot, however, li 
and survive on a diet of words alone. 
The people require food for their 
stomachs, clothing for their bodies, ar 
roofs over their heads. 

In the nonaligned world of develo] 
ing nations, which covers the whole oi 
Central and South America, the wholt 
of Africa, the whole of Asia from the 
Mediterranean Sea to the seas of Chii 
and Japan, there are very few countri 
which could be called a democracy, su 
as is your country. Ours is one. That i 
why the assistance that developing na 
tions of the world receive from the 
World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund is appreciated, thougl 
there are many matters on which we 


I there should be change to help them 
jxist as free countries. 

We in the developing world have 
tblems similar to those who live in the 
'eloped world. We have deficit 
igets, high interest rates, old valued 
rencies, and unstable exchange rates. 
3se are the classical examples of the 
nptoms that affect both the developed 
1 developing nations. 

Those who speak so eloquently on 
lalf of the developing nations have 
in pressing for the opening of com- 
dity markets of the developed world 

their manufacturers without protec- 
|e laws, stable prices for all products, 
1 rescheduling of debts borrowed for 
^elopment. Consider these requests 
h sympathy and generosity. 

In our own case, with the aid re- 
ved, we have been able to commence 
i have almost completed the largest 
/elopment program — which in our 
g history has ever been attempted by 
g or president — a program possibly 
equalled in magnitude by any develop- 
nt program in any country in the con- 
nporary world or earlier. This was 
ssible due to the effects of my govern- 
nt, which was elected to office in 
n in an election conducted by our op- 
lents, the previous government. We 
ained 51% of the votes and won five- 
ths of the seats in the legislature, 
d subsequently since then, we have 
I n five elections, including the 
Jjsidential election, byelections, district 
jmcil elections, local elections, and a 

We have, however, our problems, 
me of them are unique to our coun- 
— excessive rains, sometimes floods, 
dslides, cyclones — some common to 
countries, but still difficult for us to 

Another and a modern problem, and 
9 of universal occurrence today, is ter- 
•ism. This happened in the extreme 
rth of our country, where a group of 
sguided people of Tamil birth, who 
■re favored by the American people in 
i latter half of the 19th century by the 
action of schools and hospitals, seek 
Daration from a united Sri Lanka, 
ere are more Tamils living in the east 
d among the Sinhalese, the major 
mmunity, than in the regions that 
3k separation who do not support 
jem. My party holds 10 out of 12 seats 
the eastern province, which 
paratists seek to join to the north. 

The terrorists are a small group who 
ek by force, including murder, rob- 
ries, and other misdeeds, to support 
e cause of separation, including the 

creation of a Marxist state in the whole 
of Sri Lanka and in India, beginning 
with Tamil Nadu in the south. Since we 
assumed office in 1977, members of the 
armed services and police, politicians 
who leave the ranks of the separatists 
and join us, and others, and innocent 
citizens numbering 147 have been 
murdered in cold blood. 

I'm glad that your country is taking 
a lead in creating an international move- 
ment to oppose terrorism. If I may sug- 
gest, it may be called a United Nations 
antiterrorism organization. It is vital — it 
is essential that the developed world 
helps us with finances, that we help each 
other in this sphere, and that all nations 
cooperate to eliminate the menace of 
terrorism from the civilized world. 

I was very happy when I read your 
address to the Irish Parliament on 
June 4th. You made an appeal to nations 
to reform the principle not to use force 
in their dealings with each other. You 
said the democracies could inaugurate a 
program to promote the growth of 
democratic institutions throughout the 
world. You spoke on behalf of hundreds 
of millions who live on the borderline of 
starvation, while nations will spend next 
year a trillion dollars on the manufactur- 
ing of armaments for destruction of 
human beings and their products. 

At meetings of members of the 
Commonwealth in Sydney, in New Delhi, 
at meetings of nonaligned nations in 
Havana and in Goa, New India, I have 
never failed to express similar ideas. 
Nonviolence is "Maithri" compassion, 
and the great teacher whom I follow, 
Gautama Buddha, and the great teacher 
you follow, Jesus Christ, and India's 
great son, Mahatma Gandhi, preached 
and practiced the doctrine of non- 
violence successfully. 

Let your great and powerful nation 
take the lead in implementing these 
ideals, and the world will remember that 
the President of the United States of 
America, Ronald Reagan, preached the 
laying down of arms not through fear, 
but by the strength of the conviction 
that to follow right for right is right, 
without fear of consequence, is a way 
for civilized man to adopt. The voice of 
America will then become the voice of 

I thank you, Mr. President and 
Madam Reagan, for inviting us and giv- 
ing me this opportunity of speaking to 
you, and for entertaining us so 


President Reagan 

Mr. President, Mrs. Jayewardene, 
distinguished guests, and ladies and 
gentlemen, it's a special pleasure to have 
you with us. Sri Lankan leaders, in- 
cluding yourself, have been to our coun- 
try before. Tonight, however, is the first 
time that a Sri Lankan chief of state has 
been an official guest at the White 
House. It's our honor to have you with 
us, and Nancy and I hope your visit will 
be followed by many more. 

Our talks this morning reflected the 
cordial and cooperative relationship 
which exists between our two democ- 
racies. When your government was first 
elected in 1977, Americans were excited 
by your bold program for economic 
development. And you've led your coun- 
try in a new direction, and by doing so, 
you've created new opportunities for 
your people and expanded the potential 
of every Sri Lankan. 

The accelerated Mahaweli River 
project is part of your effort, as is free- 
ing the Sri Lankan economy from the 
controls and redtape that stifled prog- 
ress and economic expansion. One in- 
novation of particular interest to me is 
the creation of a free trade zone. This 
practical approach to development with 
its open market is attracting investment 
and unleashing the energy of the private 
sector. And I hope those over on Capitol 
Hill who claim enterprise zones won't 
work here in our country will take notice 
of the progress that you've made. 

We in the United States are happy 
that we've been able to contribute to 
your progress. Our Agency for Interna- 
tional Development is working with you 
in the river program and encouraging 
Sri Lanka's private enterprise sector. 
With the incentives that you now offer 
to investors, your country is attracting 
business and capturing the attention of 
American entrepreneurs and investors. I 
think we can look forward to growing 
cooperation between our governments 
and our people on many levels. 

U.S. -Sri Lankan cooperation comes 
in many forms. Last year the Peace 
Corps began a program to assist in the 
upgrading of Sri Lanka's English- 
language teaching skills. And today we 
signed a science and technology agree- 
ment which provides an umbrella for in- 
creased collaboration. We look forward 
to the early completion of negotiating on 
a tax treal^ and on a bilateral invest- 
ment treaty. All this reflects the ex- 
traordinary relationship that we're 
building, a relationship of trust and 
trade that will benefit both our peoples. 


We understand Sri Lanka's choice, 
as a small developing country, to remain 
nonaligned in matters of foreign policy. 
We respect genuine nonalignment. Your 
country consistently has been a forceful 
voice for reason and moderation in 
nonaligned councils. Your strong opposi- 
tion to unprovoked aggression in 
Afghanistan and Kampuchea has swelled 
the international chorus calling for 
restoration of independence for these 
two brutalized countries. We hope that 
Sri Lanka will remain a strong moral 
force in world politics. 

And today, we came to know one 
another better and to understand more 
fully our objectives and concerns. Your 
visit has undoubtedly strengthened the 
bond between our two countries, and it's 
laid a basis for even closer, more 
cooperative relations between Sri Lanka 
and the United States in the future. 

Finally, I'd like to thank you again 
for the elephant — [laughter] — a magnifi- 
cent present that you gave us today. 
The elephant happens to be the symbol 
of the President's political party, and by 
coincidence — [laughter] — we happen to 
be also that smart. [Laughter] 

Ladies and gentlemen, may I ask 
you to join me in a toast to President 
and Mrs. Jayewardene, and the pros- 
perity of our relationship with Sri 

President Jayewardene 

Mr. President, Madam Reagan, ladies 
and gentlemen, I don't mind President 
Reagan telling the public that the gift of 
the elephant was accidental. [Laughter] 
But privately I know it's something else. 
[Laughter] The elephant led my party to 
victory in 1977. I received 51% of the 
votes. Any party that gets 51% of the 
votes must win an election. And I hope 
you will have the same luck in the 
months to come. 

I came here as a stranger, but I 
find— already I feel I am among friends. 
I've heard that the American people are 
very friendly people, hospitable people. 
Both qualities have been proved during 
the last few days. I'm surrounded, I 
understand, by film sUirs. Those whom I 
saw in my youth were rather different. 
They were Charlie Chaplin, Laurel and 
Hardy, Fatty Arbuckle— [laughter[— 
and Mary Pickford. 

I remember a story about Laurel 
and Hardy. They joined the French 
Legion. They were waiting in the in- 
specting line.The sergeant came and 
said, "What are you doing here? Why do 
you join the French Legion?" They said, 
"We joined the French Legion to 
forget." "To forget what?" "We've 
forgotten." [Laughter] 

I haven't forgotten about the help 
your country has given us during the 
last few years. But I didn't come here to 
ask for help. That's not my way. I'm 
waiting to hear Mr. Frank Sinatra sing 
"My Way." [Laughter] That's one of my 
favorite songs, but I understand he 
didn't like it. [Laughter] I used it in part 
of my election campaign and asked the 
people to vote for my way, which they 

Your country is, as far as the 
Americans go, young. Our country is 
old, very old. We go back to the fifth 
century before Christ. We had Am- 
bassadors at the court of Claudius 
Caesar. You'll find it recorded in Pliny's 
letters. He even mentions the name of 
the Ambassadors. We had sent delega- 
tions to China in A.D. 47, and I under- 
stand the gift sent by our king to the 
Emperor of China were water buffaloes 
and hump cattle. The great Chinese 

pilgrims Hsiian-tsang and Fa-Hsien 
came to our country in the fourth cen- 
tury A.D. and the sixth century A.D. Si 
did Sinbad the Sailor, Marco Polo, and 
Ibn Batuta. 

For the first time. Westerners cam 
in the 16th century and the Portuguese 
came as tourists but stayed for 150 
years. After that came the Dutch and 
then came the English. And we are no 
once again, a free country. We wish to 
be friendly with all and the enemies of 
none. That is my policy and the policy 
our people. 

We would like the people of Ameri 
to understand us. In the long history c 
Sri Lanka, there have been difficult 
periods. There have been murders; the 
have been assassinations; there have 
been riots; there have been good deed 
and bad deeds. Last July we had one i 
those bad periods. But in time to comi 
it will be forgotten. 

Sri Lanka— A Profile 


Noun and adjective: Sri Lankan(s). Popu- 
lation (1983): 1.5.3 million. Annual growth 
rate: 1.8%. Ethnic groups: Sinhalese 74%, 
Tamils 18%, Moors 7%, Burghers. Malays, 
Veddahs 1%. Religions: Buddhism, Hindu- 
ism, Islam, Christianity. Languages: Sinhala 
(official), Tamil (national), English. 


Area: 65,610 sq. km. (25,322 sq. mi.); about 
the size of West Virginia. Cities: Capital- 
Colombo {pop. 1,262,000). Other citws— 
Jaffna (270,600), Kandy (147,400), Galle 
(168,100). Terrain: Low plain in the north; 
hills and mountains in the .south. Climate: 


Type: Republic. Independence: February 4, 
1948. Constitution: August 31, 1978. 

Branches: Executive — president (chief of 
state and head of government), elected for a 
6-year term. Legislative — unicameral 
168-member Parliament. Judicial — Supreme 
Court, Court of Appeals, High Court, subor- 
dinate courts. 

Political parties: Cnited National Party 
(IINP), Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), 
Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Com- 
munist Party/Moscow Wing (CP/M). Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF). .lanatha 
Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). Suffrage: Hniver- 
sal over age 18. 

Flag: On a yellow background, a red and 
groon stripe on the staff side; cm the remain- 

ing two-thirds is a yellow lion holding up a 
sword, centered on a red square. 


GNP (1981): $4 billion. Annual growth ra 

1982 est., 4.8%; 1981, 4.2%; 1980, 5.8%; 
1979, 6.3%. Per capita income: $266. Av| 
inflation rate (1982): 10%-15%. 

Natural resources: Limestone, graph: 
mineral sands, gems, phosphate. 

Agriculture (24% of GNP): Products- 
tea, rubber, coconuts, rice, spices. Arable 
land—M%, of which 38% is cultivated. 

Industry (18% of GNP): Consumer g( 
textiles, chemicals and chemical products, 
milling, light engineering, paper and pap( 

Trade (1981): fi'j-poW.s— $1,069 billioi 
tea ($335 million), petroleum products ($' 
million), textiles and garments ($156 mill 
Major markets— VS ($146 million), UK (i 
million), FRG ($63 million), Pakistan ($56 
million), communist countries ($85 milliot 
/mpor/s— $1,831 billion: petroleum ($448 
million), machinery and equipment ($201 
million), sugar ($147 million). Major sup- 
pliers — Saudi Arabia ($273 million). Jap; 
($2.58 million), US ($129 million), Iran ($: 
million), UK ($111 million), communist cc 
tries ($.52 million). 

Official exchange rate (March 1983 
rupees = US$1. 




Taken from the Background Notes of Jui 
1983, published by the Bureau of Public 
fairs. Department of State. Editor: J. D; I 
Adams. ■ 



I see in one of your newspapers 
Ire is an advertisement in which some 
(iple are trying to make us remember 
^t day. It was a fatal day; several peo- 
were killed. It was not done by the 
'ernment; it was done by a gang of 
iligans, about which we are very, 
y sorry. I'm trying to forget it. I'm 
ing to make our people not com- 
— some of them — such incidents 
lin. I hope we will succeed. 

I remember when one of your 
resentatives came to see me and had 
ch with me. I told her— she is your 
resentative in the United Nations 
;anization — "A leader must know only 
3 words." She said, "What's that?" 1 
i, "Yes and no." And I think Presi- 
it Reagan knows those two words 
y well. Once you say yes or once you 

no, stick by it. Whatever happens, 
'er change. That has been my policy, 
1 it has succeeded. 

Therefore, we're surrounded by 
inds. We've been very happy the last 
/ days. I have a few more days to 
md. I hope to spend some time in the 
lian settlements at Sante Fe, not for 

other reason but because those were 

stories I read in my youth, about 
ffalo Bill and the various tribes. I'm 
cinated by the fact they were the 
est human settlements, as far as I 
DW, in the continent of America, and 
reat people. And we must give them 
elping hand as we must give every 
;e, every tribe, every human being, 
atever his caste, religion, or race, a 
ping hand. 

We're all human beings. We extend 
' affection, not only to human beings 

even to animals; to the little 
phant that we have gifted to you. 
at is the philosophy which we have 
.rned in our country; that is the 
ilosophy which, if I can, I'll spread 
•Qughout the world. And I find in you, 
■. President and Madam Reagan, two 
ry good disciples. 

Thank you very much for entertain- 
r us. May your country prosper. May, 
the morning and in the evening, at 
^htfall. may the name of President 
■agan and Madam Reagan, never be 

May I drink to the health of Presi- 
nt Reagan, Madam Reagan, the 
ivernment and people of the United 
ates of America. 

Review of Nicaragua's 
Commitments to the OAS 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
esidentiai Documents of June 26, 1984. 

2Held on the South Lawn of the White 
)use where President Jayewardene was ac- 
rded a formal welcome with full military 

by J. William Middendorf II 

Statement made in the Permanent 

Council of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) on July 18. 1984. Am- 
bassador Middendorf is U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the OAS. 

The U.S. delegation wishes to raise the 
matter of the solemn commitments 
made to the Secretary General of this 
body by the Sandinista junta 5 years ago 
on July 12, 1979. This is not interven- 
tion—this is reviewing our own role 
after commitments made to it by a 
member state. As a result of these com- 
mitments and our own OAS resolutions, 
we brought down a sitting government. 
Tomorrow will be the fifth anniversary 
of the date that the junta took effective 
control of Managua; but, regrettably, 
very little progress has been made in 
putting into effect these commitments. 

You will recall that these com- 
mitments were made as a response to 
the resolution of the 17th Meeting of 
Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of member countries of the OAS. 
According to Document 25 of this body, 
published June 30, 1981, this resolution 
"for the first time in the history of the 
OAS, deprived an incumbent member 
government of legitimacy" when it asked 
that the Nicaraguan Government be "im- 
mediately and definitively" replaced. 

The resolution in question said that 
a solution to Nicaragua's problems was 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the 
Nicaraguan people but then proceeded 
to dictate how the problems should be 
settled. In addition to demanding a sit- 
ting president's ouster, the resolution: 

• Said that a "democratic" govern- 
ment was to replace the existing govern- 
ment. Its composition was to include 
"the principal representative groups 
which oppose the existing regime and 
which reflect the free will of the people 
of Nicaragua"; 

• Said that the human rights of all 
Nicaraguans, without exception, should 
be respected; and 

• Called for the holding of free elec- 
tions as soon as possible, leading to the 
establishment of a "truly democratic 
government that guarantees peace, 
freedom, and justice." 

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
went on to urge the member states to 
take steps that were within their reach 
to facilitate an enduring and peaceful 
solution of the Nicaraguan problem 
based on these points "scrupulously re- 
specting the principle of non-interven- 

They also asked that member states 
promote humanitarian assistance to 
Nicaragua and contribute to the social 
and economic recovery of the country. 
Many countries responded with an open 
heart, including my own, with the 
United States donating $118 million in 
the first 2 years. 

I would note that this 17th Meeting 
of Consultation has never formally ad- 
journed but only recessed. Given the un- 
precedented involvement of all of us in 
the process that brought the Sandinista 
regime to power, the member nations 
have a continuing interest— indeed, a 
responsibility — in monitoring the situa- 
tion in Nicaragua to see whether or not 
the Sandinista government has, indeed, 
carried out the commitments it so 
solemnly made to us in 1979. 

It is in this context that I propose to 
examine the record here today, in order 
to see exactly what has been happening 
in Nicaragua since the Sandinista junta 
assumed power there. 

Here are the commitments which 
the junta made to the Secretary General 
in its letter of June 12, 1979: 

• "... our firm intention to 
establish full respect for human 
rights. . . . "; 

• "... our decision to enforce civil 
justice in our country ... to let justice 
prevail for the first time in half a cen- 
tury. . . . "; and 

• "... call Nicaraguans to the first 
free elections that our country will have 
in this century. ..." 

To do justice to the full historical 
record, there were two other promises 
contained in the same letter, one which 
spoke of a peaceful and orderly transi- 
tion from the Somoza government to the 
Sandinista junta and another permitting 
so-called collaborators of the Somoza 
regime, except those responsible for so- 
called genocide, to leave the country. 
But I will concentrate here on the mat- 
ters of human rights, civil justice, and 


It should be noted that those who 
signed for the Sandinista junta were 
Commandante Daniel Ortega, Violeta de 
Chamorro, Commandante Sergio 
Ramirez, Alfonso Robelo, and Moises 
Hassan. Violetta de Chamorro is no 
longer a member of the junta, and 
Alfonso Robelo is in exile in Costa Rica, 
where he is an outspoken critic of the 
junta of which he was once a member. 

Commitment Number One- 
Human Rights 

"... (0]ur firm intention to establish 
full respect for human rights. ..." 

Nothing has demonstrated the 
callous disregard of human rights by the 
Sandinista regime so much as their 
treatment of the Miskito Indians. Ap- 
proximately 20,000 Miskitos— one-third 
of the entire Miskito population— have 
crossed the border into neighboring 
Honduras thus far, where they live in 
refugee camps. They have been victims 
of the Sandinistas' constant campaigns 
against them. 

It all began with efforts by the San- 
dinista government to try to force the 
Miskitos into adapting their way of life 
to a preconceived Sandinista model. 
Many of these human rights offenses are 
detailed in a report just released by the 
OAS General Assembly on June 4 
transmitting a report by the Inter- 
American Human Rights Commission 
dated November 29, 1983. 

Miskitos have been forcibly relocated 
from their traditional villages. In a few 
cases where they resisted, they were 
killed. Many were force marched to the 
new area and not allowed to take their 
belongings with them. In other in- 
stances, the government appropriated 
their farm animals for itself. On 
February 18, 1982, the Episcopal Con- 
ference of Nicaragua, headed by 
Managua's archbishop, directed a 
message to the people and Government 
of Nicaragua denouncing the human 
rights violations against the Miskitos. 

The Miskito Indians long ago 
adopted the Moravian Church as their 
primary religious institution. The San- 
dinistas have harassed the Moravian 
Church, calling some of its ministers 
"counterrevolutionaries." They have been 
asked to change their sermons into 
vehicles of support for the Sandinista 
revolution. Church services have been 
interrupted by Sandinista troops looking 
for so-called counterrevolutionaries. A 
Moravian hospital, the only one serving 
a wide area of eastern Nicaragua, was 
confiscated by the government and 

turned into a military headquarters, ac- 
cording to the Miskitos. Many Moravian 
pastors— out of fear, frustration, or 
both— have taken refuge in Honduras. 
Amnesty International, an organization 
which was highly critical of the previous 
regime, denounced the Sandinistas in 
September 1983 for this sort of 

Miskito organizations say their 
villages have occasionally been bombed 
by Sandinista planes. Efforts have been 
made to force them to join the San- 
dinista militia. 

Presumably for security reasons, 
some Miskitos who were ocean 
fishermen have been prohibited from 
fishing, cutting off their livelihood and 
their principal source of food. 

The Miskitos had always maintained 
their land as communal property of the 
tribe. The Sandinistas have broken up 
some of these communal holdings, mak- 
ing them property of the state. 

Smaller tribes, such as the Sumo 
and the Rama, have also suffered similar 
violations of their human rights at the 
hands of this so-called peoples' govern- 

But by no means have human rights 
violations been limited to indigenous 
peoples. As you will recall, the Pope, on 
his visit to Managua, was treated with 
unheard-of rudeness. Sandinista 
militants set up a parallel loudspeaker 
system over which they heckled the 
Pope and attempted to drown out his 
sermon. Most of the areas close to the 
Pope were assigned to these militants, 
and ordinary Catholics who turned out 
to receive the Pope's blessings were kept 
at a distance. 

This is a fitting illustration of how 
the Sandinista government has treated 
the Catholic Church. 

Another example has occurred in re- 
cent days with the expulsion of 10 
foreign priests from Nicaragua. The 
ostensible excuse for their expulsion was 
that they somehow had something to do 
with a protest demonstration against the 
house arrest of yet another priest. 
Father Luis Amado Pena. But a majori- 
ty of them were not even at the 
demonstration in question, which, at any 
rate, was a peaceful demonstration led 
by the country's archbishop, the sort of 
a demonstration which would be routine- 
ly permitted in any truly democratic 

The Pope, in commenting on this ac- 
tion, said: "I ask the Lord to illuminate 
the minds of those responsible so that 
they may reverse this decision, openly 

harmful to the church and the needs of 
the Catholic population of Nicaragua." 

In recent years, the Archbishop of 
Managua, Monsignor Obando y Bravo, 
has not been able to have the traditiona 
holy week services broadcast on radio 
and television because the government 
wanted to subject the process to prior 
censorship, a demand to which the Arcl 
bishop understandably refused to ac- 
cede. In a crude ploy, a priest, who is 
the spokesman for the archbishop and 
director of the Catholic radio station, 
was accused of having sexual relations 
with the wife of another man, stripped 
naked, and paraded in public where Sa 
dinista mobs jeered at him while gover 
ment press photographers and televisic 
crews, which "just happened" to be on 
the scene, took pictures. The program- 
ming of the Catholic Church's radio stt 
tion has been severely restricted. All 
Marxist-Leninist governments eventua 
reveal themselves as atheistic — even 
though in the case of Nicaragua, a few 
misguided priests hold high governmei 
positions — and these governments use 
their institutions to promote atheism. 

The Sandinistas have attempted tc 
infiltrate Catholic youth groups, and 
when this largely failed, they set up 
their own so-called "peoples' church." I 
November of 1983, all Nicaraguan 
churches closed for a day in protest 
against attacks by Sandinista youth 
mobs on numerous churches. 

The Nicaraguan Permanent Comn 
tee on Human Rights has itself been t 
victim of Sandinista government ex- 
cesses. The former president of the ct 
mission, Jose Esteban Gonzalez, madt 
trip to Italy in 1981 where he denoum 
the existence of political prisoners in 
Nicaragua. On his return to Managua 
number of supporters and colleagues 
came to the airport to receive him. Tl 
were never allowed to get near him b 
instead were roughed up and spat up. 
by Sandinista mobs. Only the presenc 
of the Venezuelan Ambassador 
prevented Gonzalez himself from gett 
roughed up, but he was arrested a w( 
later anyway. 

The current president of the 
Nicarag:uan human rights group. Mar 
Patricia Baltodano, told the Inter- 
American Human Rights Commissior 
May of this year that Sandinista laws 
have institutionalized the violation of 
human rights. The setting up of so-ca 
Neighborhood Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution are really : 
tempts to limit the freedom of the in- 
dividual Nicaraguan by instituting a ( i 
trol system over the population at th 
neighborhood level. 



Freedom of the press also suffers in 
aragua. The only independent 
vspaper, La Prensa, has had its 
)lication suspended by the govern- 
nt on numerous occasions and is sub- 
t to prior censorship. On countless 
rs, the paper has been so heavily cen- 
ed that its editors decided not to 

A recent example of this happened 
y 10 when La Prensa attempted to 
)ort on the expulsion of the 10 priests, 
incident which I have already dis- 
ised. Three items— one reporting on 
I government's cancellation of their 
iidency permits, another on Catholics 
idemning the expulsion, and a third 
the fact that they were allowed to 
ve carrying only the clothes they 
re— were censored. Therefore, the 
tors decided they could not print the 
tion for that day. 

The lack of the right for families to 
termine how their children will be 
iicated, which we in the United States 
isider a fundamental human right, 
3 been denounced by the Nicaraguan 
rents' Association, The Sandinista 
vernment tries to use education to 
linwash the young against the ideals 
their parents and even to get them to 
nounce their parents' lack of revolu- 
nary zeal to the authorities in some 
ses. Intellectual freedom and the 
;edom to belong to independent labor 
ions are also restricted in today's 

The human rights of farmers have 
ffered from Sandinista agricultural 
licies. The so-called Economic and 
cial Emergency Law decreed in late 
81 has made the state the only pur- 
aser of farm products. Thus, the 
rmer can only sell his produce to the 
vernment and only at the govern- 
gnt's price. Many small farmers have 
en ruined by this policy, and 
icaragua must now import some foods 
which it was previously self-sufficient. 
t the same time, a large bureaucracy 
is been established in order to control 
1 activities of the populace, soaking up 
oney which would normally be 
'ailable for investment in agriculture, 
ven the newspaper Nuevo Diario has 
implained about the amount of money 
ied to support the bloated Sandinista 
ireaucracy. All of the foregoing 
amonstrates that the commitment to 
. . . our firm intention to establish full 
;spect for human rights. ..." has thus 
ir been grossly violated. 

Commitment Number Two- 
Civil Justice 

Let us turn our attention to the second 
Sandinista commitment to " . . . let 
justice prevail for the first time in half a 
century. ..." 

Presumably, the Nicaraguan 
Supreme Court, under the original San- 
dinista plans, was supposed to have com- 
plete autonomy in the judicial area, and 
lower courts would be dependencies of 
it. The Inter- American Human Rights 
Commission in 1981, as well as an inter- 
national commission of jurists, said that 
the judicial branch in Nicaragua should 
be independent from the legislative and 
executive branches of the government, 
not to mention the Sandinista party. 

But, in reality, other courts have 
been established which have nothing to 
do with the concept of judicial independ- 
ence as we know it. The Supreme Court 
has no authority over them. One of them 
is the so-called Peoples' Court at the 
neighborhood level. These courts spend 
their time ferreting out so-called 
counterrevolutionaries in the neighbor- 
hood. For example, a neighbor who does 
not show up for a meeting to promote 
the Sandinista cause may find himself 
labeled a counterrevoluticjnary by one of 
these courts. 

The right of haheus corpus in 
Nicaragua must be questioned. As in 
Cuba, people who have been jailed for 
so-called political crimes are often not 
released when their sentences have been 
served. New judges owe their jobs to the 
Sandinistas and are not about to show 
any independence on the bench. 

There exists no constitution, as such. 
There was the Economic and Social 
Emergency Law of 1981 which in 1982 
became the State of Emergency. This 
State of Emergency has been routinely 
extended every time it was about to ex- 
pire. Under this system, all laws are 
issued by government decree. The State 
of Emergency does not provide for the 
right of the individual to a defense in a 
court of law in some cases and in others 
suspends the civil rights of the in- 
dividual. This has been denounced by 
Amnesty International. 

Commitment Number 
Three— Elections 

So much for Sandinista justice. Let's 
turn now to commitment number three, 
dealing with elections. 

We see that elections have been 
scheduled by the Sandinista government 
for November 4 of this year, 2 days 
before our own. As we once had high 

hopes for the new Nicaraguan Govern- 
ment 5 years ago, can we now have high 
hopes that at least this commitment will 
be fulfilled? This is, in itself, a welcome 
development, but there are some dis- 
turbing statements on the record which 
lead one to question just how open this 
election process will be. In the letter of 
July 12, 1979, the Sandinista leaders 
committed to the OAS to "call 
Nicaragua to the first free elections our 
country will have in this century." This 
was in reply to the resolution of the 17th 
Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs which had said free 
elections should be held as soon as possi- 
ble, leading to the establishment of "a 
truly democratic government that 
guarantees peace, freedom and justice." 

Yet on August 25, 1981, Com- 
mander Humberto Ortega said that elec- 
tions would not be to contest power but 
to strengthen the revolution. On July 7 
of this year, less than 2 weeks ago, 
Commander Carlos Nunez Tellez said on 
Radio Sandino: 

The electoral process is the result of a 
political decision made by the FSLN [San- 
dinista National Liberation Front], its revolu- 
tionary leaders, and the government to rein- 
force the historical popular plan. There is 
nothing more alien to the electoral process 
than sectarianism, dogmatism, and other 
vices that are characteristic of certain so- 
called democracies. 

Elections in Guatemala 

JULY 4, 19841 

We have noted with pleasure the record 
turnout of Guatemalan voters in the 
July 1 Constituent Assembly elections. 
The bipartisan U.S. observer team and 
our Embassy in Guatemala report from 
visits throughout the country that the 
process was fair and open, well orga- 
nized, and orderly. We applaud the 
Government of Guatemala for taking 
this important step in carrying out its 
commitment for a return to constitu- 
tional practices and the unprecedented 
response of the citizenry to the oppor- 
tunity to participate in their political 
process. We wish the Guatemalans well 
as they prepare a constitution and pro- 
ceed with elections for a new govern- 
ment next year. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 9, 1984. I 


Government spokesmen have said in 
the past: "There are only two types of 
Nicaraguans, Sandinistas and counter- 
revolutionaries." Does that mean that 
candidates and voters for other parties 
will automatically be labeled counter- 
revolutionaries? And what kind of treat- 
ment will that cause them to receive on 
the part of the government? 

The neighborhood control commit- 
tees are called Sandinista Defense Com- 
mittees. They have set up an informer 
society, modeled on the East German 
plan and with East German agents con- 
trolling their internal security. They 
have the power to deprive a citizen of 
his food ration card, for example— a 
card, by the way, which was never 
needed in Nicaragua until this govern- 
ment came along. These Sandinista De- 
fense Committees also control access to 
schools, medicine, and health care. 

It is also worrisome that the army is 
called the Sandinista Army, and other 
branches of the armed forces are simi- 
larly named. Thus, the security forces 
are intimately linked with one of the 
political parties which will be running in 
the elections — the Sandinista party. 

The electoral council which has been 
set up is made up exclusively of promi- 
nent members of the Sandinista party. 
Will they be fair to the opposition par- 

And will the state of emergency be 
lifted for the elections? 

Will the opposition parties be able to 
campaign without interference by 
authorities or by Sandinista-sponsored 
youth mobs? 

Will opposition parties have equal 
access to radio and television as com- 
pared with the Sandinista party? Will 
they be able to have party rejiresen- 
tatives at the poll.s? 

Will the Sandinistas allow interna- 
tional observers to move freely about 
the country during the election process? 
How will the ballots be counted and how 
will results be relayed to election head- 

We also note that, as time has gone 
on, the government has arbitrarily con- 
centrated more and more power in the 
hands of the Sandinista party. What was 
once the Government of National 
Reconstruction is now the Sandinista 
Peoples' Revolutionary Government. 
Will the Sandinistas allow this process 
to be reversed, or are we in for a sham 
election in November just before our 
own general assembly? 

We have seen how the Sandinistas 
of Nicaragua have thus far failed to live 
up to their commitments to tlie OAS of 
5 years ago. It is a shame that the peo- 
ple of Nicaragua, so hopeful in 1979 that 
their situation would improve, have seen 
their revolution betrayed by a group of 
leaders who have aligned themselves 
with international communism and 
whose principal concern has been to 
maintain themselves in power and, in- 
deed, to export communism to their 
neighbors virtually from the day they 
took over. We in the OAS, which was 
deeply involved in the process by which 

the Sandinistas took power, have a 
grave responsibility to monitor the 
fulfillment of these commitments. 

In June 1979 a respected scholar or 
Latin America, Dr. Constantine Mengei 
wrote: "The defeat of the Somoza Armj 
by the Sandinistas will be followed by a 
Cuban-type process from which the pro 
Castro guerrilla leaders will emerge as | 
the only group with real power." Five 
years after he wrote this, and 5 years 
after the Sandinistas' commitments to 
the OAS, it developed that he was pro- 
jihetic. ■ 

President Meets With 
El Salvador's President 

JULY 23. 1984' 

During his brief visit to Washington to- 
day. El Salvador's President Jose 
Napoleon Duarte met with President 
Reagan this morning at 11:00 for half an 
hour, with the Vice President present. 
From the State Department, the 
meeting included Secretary Shultz and 
U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador 
Thomas Pickering. 

Following his meeting with Presi- 
dent Reagan, President Duarte went to 
the Hill to meet with House Majority 
Leader James Wright. We believe he 
was also seeing Jamie Whitten, chair- 
man of the Appropriations Committee; 
and Clarence Long, chairman of the 
Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the 
Appropriations Committee; and possibly 

Following his meeting on the Hill, 
President Duarte was to return to New 
York City. He's there for meetings with 
UN officials, the Americas Society, and 

President Duarte gave a full readout 
of the meeting, discussing his assess- 
ment of developments in El Salvador, 
his very successful trip to Europe, and 
the Administration's efforts during the 
current 3-week congressional session to 
secure pending FY 1984 supplemental 
funds and complete congressional action 
on the Central American Democracy, 
Peace, and Development Initiative. We 
have nothing to add to what he said. 

As you know, we still hope to secure 
that portion of the FY 1984 supplemen- 
tal request which has not been acted on 
(for El Salvador this includes $134 

million in economic assistance and $11' 
million in military assistance) and the 
Central America Democracy, Peace, ai 
Development Initiative plan request fo 
all of Central America which includes 
for FY 198.5 $1,376 billion ($1.12 billio 
in economic and $256 million in militai 
assistance for the region). Of the $1.3' 
billion requested, $473.6 million would 
be for El Salvador— $341.1 million 
would be for economic assistance and 
$132.5 million would be for military 

The Administration in February n 
quested a supplemental appropriation 
$659 million to begin meeting the mos 
urgent needs identified by the Nation: 
Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America; $312.7 million in the FY 19i 
Supplemental ($134 million in econom 
and $178.7 million in military assistar 
is for El Salvador. 

As you know, some $61.7 million 
urgently needed military assistance f( 
El Salvador was passed by the Con- 
gress. The remaining $117 million in 
military assistance and $134 million i 
economic assistance have not been ac 
upon and, at this point, are both urgt 
ly needed by the Government of El 
Salvador, as are the $266 million in 
economic assistance and $142 million 
military assistance requested in 
February for other countries in Centi 

We will be striving for House act 
on our requests for the Henry Jacksc 
plan and the supplemental funds for 



'Text from "White House press 
release. ■ 


;uba as a Model and a Challenge 

Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr. 

Address to the Americas Society 
New York City on July 25. 1984. 
: Skoug is Director of the Office of 
ban Affairs, Bureau oflnter- 
lerican Affairs. 

Paradoxical Neighbor 

r neighbor Cuba is a country of 

• It is a small island, but it has the 
eign policy and the military establish- 
nt of a major power, committed by 

' deepest instincts of its leadership to 
)jecting its system and its point of 
w abroad. 

Although it strives unceasingly for 
dership of the Nonaligned Movement, 
ba is more closely aligned with the 
^et Union than many members of the 
irsaw Pact, providing unique military 
vices in kind in return for economic 
1 military assistance. 

• It has, especially in recent years, 
ome an avowed advocate of Latin 
lerican unity, but it has a history of 
ervention in the region and maintains 
se ties to subversive forces in every 
tin American country. 

Its economy literally lives off 
.ssive infusion of foreign aid, but it 
)resents itself as a development model 

• Its leaders sometimes assert that 
y welcome democratic trends per- 
ved in the hemisphere, but there is 

unfortunately not the remotest 
lection of such a trend in Cuba itself. 

Out of these ingredients there has 
erged a, so far, durable mixture of 
' traditional Latin American caudillo 
i the 20th century European concept 
the party-state. The pyramidal Cuban 
dership remains dedicated to its own 
ongly held concept of world revolu- 
n, asserting its independence of, but 
reasingly dependent on and con- 
ained by its bonds to, the U.S.S.R. It 
a leadership disquieted by the apathy 
d sometimes active dissent of its own 
izens but unwilling or unable to 
inge its fundamental approach. It re- 
lins committed to projecting itself as a 
e model for others. It sends its sons 
fight and die thousands of miles from 
me in the name of proletarian interna- 
nalism. It funds, arms, trains, and 
unsels revolution but craves recogni- 
n as a proponent of a stable interna- 
nal order. 

Cuba wields influence far beyond its 
size though perhaps still beneath the 
aspirations of its leaders. Its human 
resources are impressive. We need to 
look carefully at the model it projects 
and the challenge which it poses for us 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
For the leadership of revolutionary 
Cuba, "Nuestra America" starts at the 
Rio Grande and ends on Tierra del 
Fuego. Its target is this immense 
region, from which Cuba would like 
to dispel U.S. influence or at least 
diminish it. 

Cuba's leadership, which has 
changed surprisingly little in composi- 
tion over the past quarter century, came 
to power with two quintessential objec- 
tives. It wanted to maintain power in 
Cuba itself while effecting a thorough- 
going social transformation, whatever 
the cost. And it wanted to carry the 
revolutionary struggle abroad to the 
Caribbean, to Central America, to South 
America, and even to Africa. Whatever 
the price in human suffering, no one can 
question the determination with which 
each of these two basic objectives has 
been pursued by Cuba's leaders down to 
the present day. 

There has been from the outset a 
third motivation, an apparently visceral 
animosity for the United States. To the 
extent that this was calculated, it was 
perhaps because it was thought that the 
achievement of the two primary objec- 
tives would inevitably bring the Cuban 
revolutionaries into conflict on both 
counts with American power. To the ex- 
tent that it was irrational, it has been 
even harder to address. In June 1958 
the Cuban "Maximum Leader" wrote 
from the Sierra Maestra to a confidante 
that after the revolution had come to 
power, he would begin a longer, larger 
war against the Americans. He told her 
he had come to understand that this was 
his true destiny. It would be a serious 
mistake to regard this as rhetorical. It is 
among the most prized memorabilia of 
the Cuban revolution. After a quarter 
century it still seems to be valid. 

The Cuban-Soviet relationship, 
which is now so fundamental, is derived 
from these motivations and logical only 
in light of revolutionary Cuba's own ob- 
jectives. The intent of the revolutionary 
leadership in Havana to confront the 
United States in Cuba and abroad in 
pursuit of its twin objectives led natural- 

ly and even inevitably to the decision to 
invite the Soviet Union to the Western 
Herhisphere. From the standpoint of the 
Cuban leadership, the U.S.S.R. was and 
is a necessary evil. Moscow had its own 
reasons for accepting Cuba's invitation. 
The course of this relationship has not 
always been smooth, especially at the 
outset, but it has evolved into a sym- 
biotic one, where each is essential to and 
derives unique benefits from the other. 
As the mutual costs have risen, so have 
the perceived benefits. Like the two 
basic objectives and the anti- American 
bias, the Soviet connection has been cen- 
tral to the evolution of Cuba's domestic 
and foreign policies alike. It is as much 
of the fabric of today's Cuba as the 
Sierra Maestra. And it is instructive 
that Cuba's relationship with the Soviet 
Union — once it began — has been largely 
unaffected by any changes or trends in 
U.S. -Cuban relations, including tem- 
porary thaws in the relationship between 
Washington and Havana. 

The basic conflict in LI. S. -Cuban 
relations that began in 1959 stems 
primarily from Havana's foreign policy 
and only indirectly from events in Cuba. 
It is true that at the outset our attention 
and expectations were directed mainly 
to certain domestic actions by the 
Castro government, such as expropria- 
tion of U.S. property, execution of 
prisoners, and the unforeseen introduc- 
tion of the communist system, stimu- 
lating massive flows of refugees to our 
shores. It would at present be quite con- 
ceivable, in theory at least, for Cuba to 
have a repressive domestic system and 
yet not promote turmoil in the region or 
align itself militarily with the rival global 
superpower. If Cuban foreign policy 
were really noninterventionist and non- 
aligned, Cuban-American relations 
would still be less than harmonious, but 
such a Cuba would not clash with U.S. 
foreign policy interests throughout the 

In historical practice, the foreign 
and the domestic policies of the Cuban 
Government, however, spring from the 
same imperative. Cuba still sees a mis- 
sion and arrogates to itself the right and 
even the duty to support revolution and 
"national liberation" in other states. 
When conditions are deemed appropri- 
ate, the Cuban revolution is a model for 
others. It is not passive. Cuba craves 
emulation. The model need not, of 
course, be accepted in every detail. The 
Cubans have grown aware through trial 
and error that conditions differ from 
country to country. Doubtlessly with an 
eye both to their own experience and to 
their privileged access to the Soviet 


treasury, they caution radical regimes in 
third countries to keep their lines open 
to Western trade and assistance and not 
to expropriate too quickly all private 
enterprise or to alienate or eliminate all 
other institutions. But these have been 
essentially prudent tactical considera- 
tions, designed to ensure the survival 
and firm implementation of a one-party 
state system in third countries, such as 
Nicaragua and Grenada, based on well- 
known Leninist principles. The Cuban 
leadership envisions the rise of societies 
imitative of Cuban practice, alienated 
from the United States, friendly to the 
U.S.S.R., and looking to Cuba for 
ideological leadership. In the short run, 
however, where societies are not yet 
ripe for revolution, Cuba is content to 
use its power to encourage other states, 
particularly in Latin America, to rally 
together against the United States. 

The Cuban Model in 
Appearance and Reality 

Since Cuba proselytizes, we need to 
know what it is, and, perhaps more im- 
portant, what it seems to be. Cuba of- 
fers would-be leaders in other countries 
the example of a hierarchical one-party 
system, supported by ubiquitous organs 
of control and punishment and by a near 
total monopoly over the dissemination of 
knowledge and ideas. It offers to would- 
be emulators a command economy which 
assigns nearly everyone some form of 
employment, at least if it wishes them to 
be employed. The fact that the economy 
does not respond well to the needs of 
the population, that it is a perpetuation 
of monoculture and closely integrated in- 
to and totally dependent on subsidies 
from the Soviet orbit is not always 
readily apparent to others. For domestic 
support the model relies heavily and suc- 
cessfully on national consciousness- 
building enterprises like nationalized 
sport and culture. It appeals to visceral 
nationalism by calculated distortion of 
past history and contemporary events. 
Revolutionary Cuba has long assigned 
the United States the same universal 
malevolence which Hitler arrogated to 
the Jews. It pretends to, and to a cer- 
tain degree practices, a more egalitarian 
distribution of the social product than is 
customary in Latin America. It lays 
great stress on so-called socialist 
achievements, particularly in health and 
education. In this respect — as with 
many others, too — Cuba distorts and 
belittles the achievements of the past so 
as to improve the appearance of the pre- 
sent. In short, Cuba offers to pro- 
ponents of radical change a model for 

seizing and holding power without need 
for periodic popular ratification and for 
altering society unrestrained by legal or 
ethical limitations. 

There is one essential element of the 
Cuban model which could not be widely 
replicated. Cuba's economy could not ex- 
ist but for Soviet subsidies. These are on 
the order of $12-$13 million dollars 
daily for economic aid alone. Thus those 
who might wish to emulate the Cuban 
experience cannot truly do so unless 
they can persuade the Soviet Union to 
provide a similar degree of massive sup- 

Moreover, the Cuban reality is some- 
what different from the point of view of 
those who must live it. The costs are 
very high. The benefits are less evident. 
The Cuban system since 1959 has been 
one-man rule. The same individual is 
now President of the Council of State, 
President of the Council of Ministers, 
First Secretary of the Cuban Communist 
Party, and Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces. The "Maximum Leader" 
projects his views across all aspects of 
Cuban society. From bovine genetics to 
college textbooks, from sugar cultivation 
to nurses' uniforms his views are norma- 
tive. To challenge them, even to provide 
well-intended advice, is not recom- 
mended. Unsurprisingly, in these cir- 
cumstances innovation does not flourish 
in Cuba and practices are slow to 

Second, Cuba is a militarized society 
with one-quarter million men under 
arms and another million men and 
women in the militia. In addition, as 
Havana International Radio recently 
stated, every able-bodied Cuban must 
know his mission in a war situation. The 
economy, it stated, ". . . is being pre- 
pared so it can accomplish its objectives 
in times of war and adapt its develop- 
ment to defense interests." Militant 
Cuba devotes its Sundays neither to the 
spirit nor to rest nor to recreation but 
rather to military drill. Cuba possesses 
the most experienced and most highly 
mechanized fighting force in Latin 
America. Its leaders speak often of the 
need to defend Cuba, but Cuba's 
substantial combat experience has been 
acquired almost exclusively on far away 
foreign battlefields such as Bolivia, 
Angola, Grenada, and the Horn of 
Africa. As Cuban Politburo member 
Jorge Risquet described it recently 
(Havana International Service, June 15, 
1984) when he decorated Cuba's "inter- 
nationalists": "You have traveled 
thousands of miles from your fatherland, 
your homes, and your families to raise 
the Cuban and internationalist flags in 
the heart of Africa." 

The essence of Cuba's political 
organization is reflected in Article 61 o 
the Constitution of Cuba of 1976, 
according to which; 

None of the freedoms which are recog- 
nized for citizens may be exercised contrarj 
to what is established in the Constitution aipi 
the law, or contrary to the existence and ot 
jectives of the socialist state, or contrary tc 
the decision of the Cuban people to build 
socialism and communism. Violation of this 
principle is punishable by law. 


This last is understatement. No or 
ganizations or movements are permitt 
in Cuba to oppose the political will of 1 
leadership. "There is no organized dis- 
sent, no effective institutional or 
historical limitations on the exercise o: 
power. No parties other than the Com 
munist Party are tolerated. There is n 
freedom of the press or speech, no rei 
possibility through culture or the in- 
tellectual arts to satirize the leadershi 
The Catholic Church and Protestant 
churches exist but cannot provide a ri 
orientation or challenge the dictum of 
Article 61. It is not surprising that th 
"Seventh Report of the Organization ( 
American States on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Cuba," published las 
October, concluded that the structure 
the Cuban state is totalitarian. 

Over 1 million refugees since 195! 
have found the way out of Cuba to ot 
shores, especially to the United State 
Less fortunate has been the fate of 
those who stayed behind but who sou 
to resist the party-state. The Cuban 
leadership has singled them out for e 
emplary punishment. Vengeance is ui 
lenting on those who dare to resist th 
system. Nowhere else in Latin Amer' 
have so many been punished so long. 
There are still in Cuba, at present, hi 
dreds of prisoners who have spent m 
than 15 or even 20 years in prison 
because they opposed the regime anc 
refuse to acknowledge their "crime" . 
accept the new order. Like the recen 
released poets Jorge Vails and Arma 
Valladares, they have passed the bes 
years of their lives free in spirit but 
to the world. 

Despite these punishments and 
despite the evident will and capacity 
the regime to deal harshly with disse 
it continues to manifest itself. In 
January of 1983, for example, we 
learned of the trials and sentencing- 
some originally to death— of a grou{ 
some 50 Cubans who apparently wis 
to form a trade union on the model ( 
the Polish Solidarity. Arrests and tri j 
of their lawyers and judges followed 
After that, the former President of 



a and, at the time, Minister of 
ice, Oswaldo Dorticos, committed 
ide. The veil of secrecy that sur- 
ids Cuba makes it difficult to obtain 
ible information about dissent and 
enters, but we know enough to con- 
e that the spirit of freedom still ex- 
in Cuba. 

It is clear that whatever Cuba has 
iuced since 1959 has been wrought 
le price of inordinate human suffer- 
But what has, in fact, been pro- 
jd which could justify this regime? 
The Cuban revolutionaries took 
er talking about an end to mono- 
ure and to foreign domination of the 
an economy. They spoke of economic 
vth and egalitarian living standards. 
984 Cuba is more dependent on 
ir than before. In 1983 more than 

of Cuban trade was with the Soviet 
on and other communist countries 
only some 10% with the West. Were 
Dt for subsidized Soviet purchases of 
lan sugar and subsidized Soviet oil 
s, along with deliveries of Soviet and 
t European equipment, the Cuban 
lomy could not function. Even so, 
capita economic growth in Cuba has 
n among the lowest in the 
lisphere. It is often forgotten that 
)a on the eve of Fidel Castro was a 
ily advanced society. In 1952 Cuba 
the third highest per capita gross 
ional product of the 20 Latin 
erican republics. In 1981 it ranked 
h. Only in the equalization of living 
idards have the aspirations of the 
)an revolutionaries been reached to 
le degree, albeit at a modest level, 
m so the elite has perquisites denied 
he great majority. For example, 
;r Cuba — which rations clothing to its 
1 citizens — recently staged an inter- 
ional fashion fair, the Cuban authori- 
explained that the "fashions" would 
for export or sale in "specialized" 
res open to diplomats and tourists. 
;y did not explain that the Cuban 
e buys in such stores, too, and that 
clothing is not always made in Cuba 
the "socialist camp." 
While leading the Cuban delegation 
he June 1984 CEMA [Council for 
tual Economic Assistance] summit 
eting in Moscow, Cuban Vice Presi- 
it Carlos Rafael Rodriguez cited 
oa, Mongolia, and Vietnam as the 
1st developed countries within 
MA." For Cuba, which in 1959 had a 
ndard of living that rivaled Spain, it 
s a bizarre sign of progress to be 
ssified with Mongolia and Vietnam 
i to see accentuated those programs 
;ich promise to perpetuate Cuba's 

Cuba— A Profile 



Noun and adjective: Cuban(s). Population 
(1981 census, preliminary data): 9.7 million; 
67% urban, 30% rural. Avg. annual growth 
rate: 1.2%. Density: 86/sq. km. (224/sq. mi.). 
Ethnic group: Spanish-African mixture. 
Language: Spanish. Literacy rate: 96% of 
physically fit between ages 10 and 49. 
Health: Infant mortality rate — slightly less 
than 25/1,000. Life expectancy — 70 yrs. 
Work force: Agriculture — 30%. Industry 
and commerce — 45%. Services — 20%. 
Government — 5%. 


Area: 114,471 sq. km. (44,200 sq. mi.); about 
the size of Pennsylvania. Cities: Capital — 
Havana (pop. 1.9 million). Other cities — San- 
tiago de Cuba, Camaguey. Terrain: Flat or 
gently rolling plains, mountains up to 
1,800 m. (6,000 ft,), and hills. Climate: 
Tropical; avg. annual temperature 24 °C 


Type: Communist state. Independence: 
May 20, 1902. Latest constitution: 1976. 

Branches: Executive — president. Council 
of Ministers. Legislative — National Assembly 
of People's Government, headed by Council of 
State. Judicial — subordinate to Council of 

Political party: Communist Party (PCC). 
Suffrage: All citizens aged 16 and older, ex- 
cept those who have applied for permanent 
emigration. National elections were held in 
1976 for the National Assembly of the Peo- 
ple's Government, and municipal elections for 
local assemblies were held in 1981. 

Administrative subdivisions: 14 prov- 
inces, 169 municipalities. 

National holidays: Jan. 1, Revolution 
Day; May 1, International Workers Day; 
July 26, Moncada Barracks Attack anniver- 

Flag: White star centered on red 
equilateral triangle at staff side, 3 blue and 2 
white horizontal stripes in the background. 


GNP (1979 est.): $9-11 billion. Annual 
growth rate (1980 est): - 1%/ -i- 1%. Per 
capita income (1981 est.): $900-$l,100. 

Natural resources: Metals, primarily 

Agriculture: Sugar, tobacco, coffee, 
citrus and tropical fruits, rice, beans, meat, 

Major industries (17% of labor force): 
Refined sugar, metals. Other industries: Oil 
refining, cement, electric power, food proc- 
essing, light consumer and industrial prod- 

Trade: Exports— $4.7 billion (f o.b. 1981): 
sugar and its byproducts (83%), nickel oxide 
and sulfide (10%), tobacco and its products, 
fish, rum, fruits. Major markets — USSR, 
Eastern Europe, China. Imports — $5.4 billion 
(c.i.f. 1980 approx. figures): capital equip- 
ment (33%), raw materials (33%), petroleum 
(10%), foodstuffs and consumer products 
(20%-25%). Major sources— USSR, Eastern 

Offlcial exchange rate: 1 Cuban 
peso = US$1.28. 

Membership in International 

iJN and various specialized agencies, in- 
cluding General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade; Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CEMA); observer. Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA); In- 
ternational Sugar Council; Pan American 
Health Organization (PAHO); nonpartici- 
pating member, Organization of American 
States (OAS) and Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank (IDB); Latin American Economic 
System (SELA); Group of 77; Nonaligned 

Taken from the Background Notes of April 
1983, published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: J. Darnell 
Adams. ■ 


Cubans are still rationed to three- 
quarters of a pound of meat per person 
each 9-11 days. There recently have ap- 
peared billboards in Havana admonish- 
ing the population to think not of con- 
sumption but of development. In other 
words, perhaps, to think less of the fact 
that a Cuban is entitled to a ration of 
one pair of shoes a year and more of the 
future development of the shoe industry. 
But even the notion of industrial devel- 
opment is belied by the facts. According 
to the World Bank, manufactures ac- 
counted for 5% of Cuba's exports in 
1960 and the same percentage in 1980. 
By way of contrast, Jamaica's went 
from 5% to 53% in the same period, 
Brazil's from 3% to 39%, Costa Rica's 
from 5% to 34%, and Paraguay's from 
0% to 12%. 

The Cuban elite boasts of achieve- 
ments in the fields of health and educa- 
tion, speaking in terms of being a 
"medical power" in the world. It is 
beyond dispute that Cuba has health 
facilities superior to those in many other 
countries. But Cuba was a leader among 
Latin American nations before 1959, in 
part due to its close association with the 
United States. The first great health 
revolution in Cuba was introduced by 
the United States in 1900. Havana and 
yellow fever were synonymous in the 
19th century. In 1900 there were 1,400 
known cases of yellow fever in Havana. 
In February 1901 William Gorgas com- 
menced his campaign to eliminate the 
disease. In 1901 there were 37 cases, 
and in 1902 there was no yellow fever in 
Havana. Deaths from malaria in 1900 
were 325. In 1902 they were 77. 

Cuba was a healthy country long 
before it aspired to be a "medical 
power." In 1960 it already had 1 physi- 
cian for each 1,060 inhabitants— only 
Argentina and Uruguay had more. In 
1980 when Cuba had 700 inhabitants per 
physician, Argentina and Uruguay had 
530 and 540 respectively. 

In 1960 life expectancy in Cuba was 
already 63 years. It gained 10 years to 
73 by 1980. But in the same period 
greater gains were made by nine Latin 
American countries and similar ones by 
three others. Infant mortality, according 
to the 1977 StatiMical Abstract of Latin 
Amenca, was 32 per 1 ,000 live births in 
Cuba in I960, the best in the region and 
better than Spain and Italy. In 1980 it 
was 19. In the same period Jamaica had 
gone down to 16. Percentage decreases 
better than Cuba's 41% were achieved in 
11 other states. As Professor Norman 
Luxenburg of the University of Iowa has 
written, Cuba in 1958 had twice as many 
physicians for its 6.6 million inhabitants 

(6,421) as the rest of the Caribbean 
Basin had for 19 million. Even if Cuba 
today does have the 15,000 doctors 
which it claims, the rate of growth since 
1958 is less than that between 1948 
(3,100) and 1958 (6,421) when the 
number doubled in 10 years. 

In sum, the Cuban system may ap- 
peal to certain would-be strongmen, but 
it is not a successful development model. 
It is a model, perhaps, for retention of 
political and military power but not for 
economic growth and human well-being. 

However, the Cuban revolution has 
another side, its foreign policy ac- 
complishments. Here the record is more 
complex. Cuba in the past decade has 
finally gained some of the revolutionary 
success which long eluded it after 1959. 
Lacking freedom and economic progress 
itself, Cuba has, nonetheless, grown into 
a force which challenges the potential 
development of the open society in Latin 

The Cuban Challenge 

The revolutionary process that was suc- 
cessful in Cuba was applied repeatedly 
by Cuba to other states in the region 
after 1959. In the beginning, expecta- 
tions were simplistic, costs modest, and 
results slim. Cuba viewed its neighbors 
with hostility and as proper targets for 
revolutionary bands. This interven- 
tionary policy, which earned Cuba few 
friends in the region and even strained 
ties to Moscow, was put in abeyance 
after the death of Che Guevara in 
Bolivia in 1967. But the revolutionary 
zeal of Cuba has continued as an in- 
tegral part of the Cuban system. It is 
anchored as Article 12(c) in the Cuban 
Constitution. It has — in connection with 
Cuba's more mature relationship with 
the Soviet Union and its pretensions to 
leadership in the Third World — become 
a more sophisticated challenge to the 
rival concept of the open society in the 
Western Hemisphere. 

Especially since the early 1970s, 
Cuba has moved ever more definitively 
into the Soviet sphere. In view of the 
drastic change in the terms of trade be- 
tween sugar and oil, the barter relation- 
ship between Cuba and the Soviet Union 
has become marked by increasing Soviet 
subsidies and mounting Cuban economic 
dependency. Cuba owes the Soviet 
Union vast soft currency debts it cannot 
repay. Indeed, the Soviet Union and its 
East European allies must supply 
greater subsidies, expressed in un- 
balanced trade accounts, to sustain 
Cuba's economy. 



But if Cuba, on the one hand, has ' 
creased in cost for the Soviet Union, i1 
also has increased in strategic value 
The decade of the 1970s witnessed the 
appearance of Cuban combat troops 
engaged on African battlefields. Partii 
larly in the case of Ethiopia, this Cubs 
presence served Soviet interests in a 
way which no European ally of the 
U.S.S.R. could or would have done. 
Cuba's military success in Africa, at 
least in the short run, was in stark co 
trast to what had, until then, been a { 
tern of failure in Latin America. Mon 
over, after its lonely endorsement of 1 
Soviet crushing of the Prague spring 
1968, Cuba has been unfailingly sup- 
portive of Soviet foreign policy, even 
when this allegiance has cost Cuba 
respect among countries which truly i 

At the end of the 1970s, when Cu 
perceived new opportunities closer to j 
home, two vital elements had changec , 
from the situation prevailing in the 
1960s. For one, the Soviet Union was 
now supportive of Cuba's renewed 
revolutionary activism and was also 
prepared to underwrite the massive 
buildup of the Cuban Armed Forces 
which has been taking place since the 
end of 1980. This, together with Sovi 
activities in and around Cuba, has in- 
creased tensions and would be an ele 
ment in any major East- West conflic 
The second factor is that Cuba has 
learned to differentiate its own Latir 
American policy objectives. In the loi 
run, probably, Cuba envisions transf( 
mation along Marxist-Leninist lines f 
every state in the region, but the Cu 
leadership has learned to order its si 
range priorities. Cuba now has the o 
tion of cultivating better diplomatic i 
tions with the states of the region, ti 
ing thereby to stimulate a Latin 
American consciousness against the 
United States and to cultivate its ow 
general acceptance as a normal men- . ,u 
of the international order. 

Yet, anchored by its bonds to thi 
Soviet Union, Cuba maintains close i 
tions with virtually every radical or 
revolutionary group in the region, si 
plying training, money, weapons, an^ 
counsel and providing the nexus be- 
tween the revolutionaries and the Sc 
Union. At the same time, it assesses 
relative value of its associations with 
various Latin American government 
and particularly the degree to which 
these governments can be made usel 
to Cuba. Cuba thus seeks to be both 
mecca for subversives and a focal pc 
for rallying their governments again 
the United States. 






'he examples of this situation in the 
!.! 5 are many. 

In the case of Argentina, Cuba 
^ haste to show its firm support of 
ntil-then despised Galtieri regime 
the battle for the Falklands began, 
deology of the Argentine military 
>red the Cubans less than the 
36 to be seen in the forefront of 
1 culture against the Anglo-Saxon. 
dditional reward for Cuba has been 
:enerous trade credits which both 
Argentine military regime and its 
an successor have supplied to the 

Cuban economy. 

Once the momentum of the Falk- 
j issue was lost, Cuba — which was 

obliged in August 1982 to ask 
tern creditors to reschedule part of 
3-billion Cuban hard currency 
— seized upon the general financial 
1 in the region to promote Cuban 
arity with other Latin American 
ors. This, incidentally, shows again 
adept Cuba is at exploiting even its 
problems for political gain. 
• In the case of Colombia, the 
m Government admitted having 
led the M-19 revolutionaries who 
ulted the Turbay Ayala government, 
which Havana was maintaining 
tly normal diplomatic relations, 
e recently Cuba showed its influence 
new way. The head of the Cuban 
rnment requested that Colombian 
orists release the kidnapped brother 
le President of Colombia. The ter- 
sts heeded this request from an in- 
Sual whom they apparently respect 
esteem. The obvious lesson is that 
voice which can stay the terrorist's 
i can also permit it to strike. 

The focus of Cuba's foreign policy, 
ever, is presently on Central 
erica. Cuba primarily wishes to see 
Sandinista government in Managua 
iOlidated as a permanent force on 
American mainland with its funda- 
ital approach in close harmony with 
Cuban system. Communist Cuba 
its a communist Nicaragua. It also 
lid like to see the revolutionary 
■es in El Salvador come to power 
'•e through the process of a 
otiated settlement, sharing power on 
■ansitional basis until Leninist-style 
trol can be established. Cuba's im- 
iiate attitude toward the other states 
he region seems to be dictated 
narily by how they react to the 
jggle in Nicaragua and in El 
vador. For example, it is largely ir- 
avant to the Cubans that elections 

take place in Guatemala. What is essen- 
tial is that Guatemala stay out of the 
conflict at its very door or else bear the 
brunt of Cuban displeasure. The same 
policy was followed in the case of Hon- 
duras, where Cuban actions were keyed 
to the stand taken by Honduras toward 
the two conflicts on its borders. Cuba — 
which has trained revolutionaries from 
almost all countries in the hemisphere — 
was able to send such forces into Hon- 
duras. The invaders were defeated, but 
they demonstrated the same principle as 
applied in Colombia and elsewhere. The 
government which displeases Cuba, 
whether or not it has normal diplomatic 
relations with Havana, can expect 
armed retaliation. 

Cuban officials occasionally say they 
favor the democratic trend in Latin 
America. But this putative endorsement 
of something which Cuba has never per- 
mitted its own people is suspect. Free 
elections are clearly not seen by Cuba as 
the answer to questions in Central 
America or even as a useful step for- 
ward. They are not likely to be seen as 
relevant in other countries once there 
exist concrete prospects for revolution 
on the Cuban pattern. Rather, it appears 
that Cuba, if it welcomes democratic 
trends at all, does so only where it can 
envision prospects of winning from 
within or where the elected government 
supports foreign policy objectives which, 
at least in the short run, are consistent 
with Cuba's own. In either case, how- 
ever, there is no reason to believe that 
Cuba will suspend its close ties to 
revolutionary forces in any country, 
forces which Cuba can help to bring to 
power when conditions are appropriate 
or which can be used as a threat to com- 
pel or to persuade. 

The United States and Cuba 

The underlying issues between the 
United States and Cuba have their 
genesis in Cuba's revolutionary posture 
and its close alignment with the Soviet 
Union. Cuba has indicated on many oc- 
casions that neither of these pillars of 
Cuban policy is open to discussion. Its 
behavior consistently underscores this 
reality. It is Cuba's unique role as a 
linchpin between Soviet power and a 
Latin America in transition which intro- 
duces strategic and ideological con- 
siderations into conflicts which could 
otherwise be resolved or at least 
ameliorated on their own terms. Cuba 
facilitates Soviet military power on our 

doorstep. That is why foreign policy is 
at the root of our differences with 
Havana and why so much of our policy 
toward Cuba is directed toward its 

In the 1970s there were good faith 
efforts by the United States to improve 
this relationship. Interests sections were 
established to facilitate direct communi- 
cations between the two parties. The 
U.S. trade and financial embargo was 
relaxed. Cuba released some political 
prisoners and permitted the return of 
Cuban-Americans who had left Cuba as 
"worms" and came back as "butterflies," 
pouring dollars into Cuban coffers. But 
this movement did not and could not 
touch the main thrust of Cuban policy. 
Having gone into Ethiopia in 1977 at 
Soviet behest, Cuba in succeeding years 
engaged itself in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador and exploited the seizure of 
power by the New JEWEL Movement 
in Grenada. In so doing, Cuba demon- 
strated the depth of its determination to 
reconstruct the Western Hemisphere 
along the lines of its own model. 

The attitude of the U.S. Government 
toward Cuba remains one of serious con- 
cern about the militarization of Cuba 
and about Cuba's stimulation of revolu- 
tionary violence in this hemisphere and 
elsewhere. After Grenada it is likely that 
Cuba has some better appreciation of 
the risks of uncontrolled violence and of 
the limitations of its own power and that 
of its allies, but there is no convincing 
indication that the overall thrust of 
Cuban foreign policy has been or will be 
altered. Cuba remains militant and 
prone to stimulate violent change. 

There remains, however, a willing- 
ness on our part to resolve those prob- 
lems with Cuba which Cuba may wish to 
resolve and for which there is a 
reasonable basis for mutually satis- 
factory solutions. One example is the 
problem of the Mariel excludables who 
came with the boatlift of 1980 and who 
are ineligible to remain in the United 
States for substantive reasons. We have 
also tried to engage Cuba in talks about 
problems of radio interference. In both 
cases we were and are prepared to deal 
with Cuba on the basis of equality and 
mutual respect and to make concessions 
in order to resolve problems. There are 
perhaps other issues of this nature 
where progress could be made if Cuba is 
so interested. 

It is occasionally asked if there can 
be an improvement in overall U.S.- 
Cuban relations. Such an improvement 
can hardly be a goal in itself. There are 
some bilateral issues, relatively free of 


ideological content, which can be re- 
solved. But the differences of principle 
between the United States and Cuba are 
profound. There is unfortunately no sign 
yet that the Cuban leadership is recon- 
sidering its own world view or is begin- 
ning seriously to address those issues 
which set it apart from a region which is 
striving for greater freedom and eco- 
nomic well-being. 

Assuming that these circumstances 
continue, we shall continue to work with 
friendly nations to meet the Cuban 
challenge and to overcome it until that 
day when the constructive genius of 
Cuba can be turned to the commonweal 
of all who inhabit this hemisphere. ■ 

Current Actions 


Aviation, Civil 

Tnternational air services transit agreement. 
Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into 
force Jan. 20, 194.5; for the U.S. Feb. 8, 
1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Acceptance deposited: Italy, June 27, 1984. 

Bill of Lading 

International convention for the unification of 

certain rules relating to bills of lading and 

protocol of signature. Done at Brussels 

Aug. 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 

1931; for the U.S. Dec. 29. 1937. 51 Stat. 


Denounced: U.K. for Bermuda. British Virgin 

Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands 
and dependencies, Hong Kong, Montserrat, 
and Turks and Caicos Islands, effective 
Oct. 20, 1984. 


International coffee agreement 1983, with an- 
nexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. 
Ratification deposited: Togo, June 4, 1984. 

Accession deposited: Nigeria, May 3i, 1984. 

Commodities — Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27, 1980' 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, June 29, 1984. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Adopted at New York 
Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force .Ian. 3, 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.^ 
Accessions deposited : Cameroon, June 27, 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the civil aspects of interna- 
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague 
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 
Extended: Canada to Province of New- 

foundland, July 5, 1984. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the International Maritime 

Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. 

Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 


Accession deposited: Vietnam, June 12, 1984 

Prisoner Transfer 

Convention on the transfer of sentenced per- 
sons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. 
Signature : Italy Mar. 20, 1984. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 28, 1984. 

Ratified by the President : July 17, 1984. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to INTELSAT, with an- 
nexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. 
Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
Accession deposited: Malawi, July 17, 1984. 

Operating agreeement relating to 
INTELSAT, with annex. Done at 
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into 
force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
Signature: Department of Posts and Tele- 
communications, Malawi. July 17, 1984. 


United Nations convention on the carriage of 
goods by sea. 1978. Done at Hamburg Mar. 
31, 1978.' 
Ratification deposited: Hungary, July 5, 



Protocol amending the slavery convention 
signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926 (TS 778), 
with annex. Done at New York Dec. 7, 1953. 
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953, for the Pro- 
tocol, July 7, 1955, for annex to Protocol; for 
the U.S. Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 3532. 

Supplementary convention on the abolition of 
slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and 
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva 
Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 
1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418. 
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, June 27, 



International sugar agreement, 1977, as ex- 
tended. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. 
Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978; 
definitively Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664, 10467. 
Withdrawal: Bangladesh, effective June 23, 


Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of crimes against internationally pro- 

tected persons, including diplomatic agents. 
Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. 
Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 853 
Accession deposited: Greece, July 3, 1984 

International covention against the taking o 
hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979 
Entered into force June 3, 1983.2 
Ratification deposited: Portugal, July 6, 19J 


Agreement on implementation of art. VI of 
GATT (antidumping). Done at Geneva Apr. 
12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. 
TIAS 9650. 

Agreement on import licensing procedures. 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered int 
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9788. 
Acceptances deposited: Singapore, June 20 



Constitution of the UN Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted 
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.' 
Signature: Guyana, July 17, 1984. 

Ratifications deposited: Guyana, Ireland, 

July 17, 1984. 


Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the Int( 
national Wheat Agreement. 1971, as exter 
ed (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Mar. 
11. 1980. Entered into force June 30, 198( 
TIAS 10015. 
Approval deposited: European Economic 

Community, July 23, 1984. 


Convention on the elimination of all forms 
discrimination against women. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into for 
Sept. 3, 1981.2 
Accessions deposited: Liberia, July 17, 19: 

Mauritius, July 9, 1984. 


Antigua and Barbuda 

Agreement for the furnishing of commodi 
and services in connection with the 
peacekeeping force for Grenada. Effected 
exchange of notes at Bridgetown and St. 
John's Nov. 30, 1983 and Jan. 27, 1984. 
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1984. 


Agreement extending the agreement of C 
16. 1968 (TIAS 6589), relating to scientifi 
and technical cooperation. Effected by ex 
change of notes at Canberra Apr. 16 and 
May 11, 1984. Entered into force May U 
1984; effective Apr. 16, 1984. 


Convention with respect to taxes on incoi | 
and capital, with related exchange of noti 
Signed at Washington Sept. 26, 1980. 


;ocol with related notes. Signed at Ottawa 
; 14, 1983. Second protocol. Signed at 
ihington Mar. 28, 1984. 
ite advice and consent to ratification : 

3 28, 1984. 

fied by the President : July 16, 1984. 

,ty relating to the Skagit River, Ross 
e, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the 
d d'Oreille River, with annex. Signed at 
ihington Apr. 2, 1984. 
ate advice and consent to ratification: 

i 28, 1984. 

eement regarding mutual assistance and 
leration between customs administrations, 
led at Quebec June 20, 1984. Enters into 
e upon exchange of diplomatic notes in 
ch the parties notify each other of the 
ipletion of any procedures required by 
r national law for giving effect to this 

•eement relating to the operation of radio 
phone stations. Signed at Ottawa Nov. 
1969. Entered into force July 24, 1970. 
IS 6931. 
ification of termination: May 8, 1984; 

ctive Nov. 7, 1984. 


noranduni of understanding for scientific 
technical cooperation in the Earth 
nces. Signed at Bogota June 22, 1984. 
ered into force June 22, 1984. 


eement relating to radio communications 
ween amateur stations on behalf of third 
ties. Effected by exchange of telexes at 
dgetown and Roseau Dec. 8, 1983 and 
9, 1984. Entered into force Mar. 10, 


■eement amending the agreement of Dec. 
nd 28, 1977 (TIAS 8973), relating to trade 
extiles and textile products. Effected by 
hange of notes at Cairo June 21 and 25, 
;4. Entered into force June 25, 1984. 

aatorial Guinea 

reement concerning the provision of train- 
related to defense articles under the U.S. 
ET program. Effected by exchange of 
es at Malabo Mar. 9 and 30, 1983. 
tered into force Mar. 30, 1983. 


itocol to the convention with respect to 
es on income and property of July 28, 

7 (TIAS 6518), as amended by the Pro- 
ols of Oct. 12, 1970 (TIAS 7270), and Nov. 

1978 (TIAS 9500). Signed at Paris Jan. 

gate advice and consent to ratification : 

le 28, 1984. 

tified by the President: July 16, 1984. 

invention on the transfer of sentenced per- 
is. Signed at Washington Jan. 25, 1983. 
nate advice and consent to ratification: 

ne 28 1984. 

.tified by the President: July 17, 1984. 

Memorandum of understanding on the par- 
ticipation of France in the ocean drilling pro- 
gram. Signed at Washington and Paris May 
17 and June 13, 1984. Entered into force 
June 13, 1984. 

Memorandum of understanding on en- 
vironmental cooperation. Signed at Paris 
June 21, 1984. Entered into force June 21, 


Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
IMET program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Libreville Mar. 21, 1983 and July 5, 
1984. Entered into force July 5, 1984. 


Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
IMET program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at St. George's May 18 and 24, 1984. 
Entered into force May 24, 1984. 


Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities, related to the agreement of Apr. 
21, 1976 (TIAS 8378). Signed at Conakry 
June 11, 1984. Entered into force June 11, 


Agreement amending agreement of Dec. 16, 

1983, as amended, for the sale of agricultural 
commodities. Signed at Tegucigalpa June 19, 

1984. Entered into force June 19, 1984. 


Agreement extending and amending the 
memorandum of understanding of July 18, 
1978 (TIAS 9285) concerning furnishing of 
launching and associated services for Indian 
national satellite system (INSAT)-l 
spacecraft. Signed at Washington and 
Bangalore Apr. 10 and 25, 1984. Enters into 
force upon exchange of diplomatic notes. 


Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Dec. 11, 1978 (TIAS 9609), for 
cooperation in scientific research and 
technological development. Signed at 
Washington July 9, 1984. Entered into force 
July 9, 1984. 


Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat- 
ters, with memorandum of understanding. 
Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 28, 1984. 


Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities relating to the agreement of 
Apr. 30, 1982 (TIAS 10495). Signed at 
Kingston May 30, 1984. Entered into force 
May 30, 1984. 


Agreement concerning the provisions of 
training related to defense articles under the 
U.S. IMET program. Effected by exchange 

of notes at Antananarivo Feb. 25, 1983 and 
May 3, 1984, Entered into force May 3, 1984. 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to addi- 
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the 
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Mexico May 29, 1984. 
Entered into force May 29, 1984. 


Convention on mutual assistance in criminal 
matters. Signed at Rabat Oct. 17, 1983. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 28, 1984. 

Ratified by the President : July 13, 1984. 


Revised agreement for cooperation concern- 
ing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with an- 
nexes and agreed minute. Signed at Oslo 
Jan. 12, 1984, 
Entered into force: July 2, 1984. 

Supersedes agreement of May 4, 1967, as 

amended (TIAS 6260, 6849). 


Agreement extending the agreement of 
Aug. 2, 1976, concerning fisheries off the 
coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8524, 10533, 10697). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
and Warsaw Mar. 7 and 30, 1984. 
Entered into force : July 27, 1984. 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
Sept. 3 and Nov. 3, 1980, as amended (TIAS 
9911, 10639), relating to trade in wool, man- 
made fiber textiles, and textile products. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Washington 
and New York June 12 and 22. 1984. 
Entered into force June 22, 1984. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement on cooperation in science and 
technology. Signed at Washington June 18, 
1984. Entered into force June 18, 1984. 


Supplementary convention to the extradition 
convention of Oct. 24, 1961 (TIAS 5496). 
Signed at Stockholm Mar. 14, 1983. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 28, 1984. 

Ratified by the President : July 13, 1984. 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and 
gifts. Signed at Stockholm June 13, 1983. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 28, 1984. 

Ratified by the President : July 13, 1984. 


Treaty relating to extradition. Signed at 

Washington Dec. 14, 1983. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 28, 1984. 

Ratified by the President: July 18, 1984. 



Agreement relating to the memorandum of 
understanding of June 20, 1963 (TIAS 5362), 
and the agreement of Sept. 30, 1971 as 
amended (TIAS 7187, 8059), concerning the 
direct communications link. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington July 17, 1984. 
Entered into force July 17, 1984. 

Yemen (Sanaa) 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities, with related letter. Signed at Sanaa 
June 19, 1984. Entered into force June 19, 


Agreement concerning provision of training 
related to defense articles under the U.S. 
IMET program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Kinshasa Dec. 22, 1983, and 
June 18, 1984. Entered into force June 18, 

'Not in force. 

^Not in force for the U.S. 

July 1984 

Note: The editors .solicit readers' comments 
on the value of the Bulletin's monthly 
chronologies. Unless a positive response is 
received, the chronologies will be discon- 

July 1-12 

ACDA Director Adelman, visits Japan, 
China, and Thailand to discuss arms control 
and disarmanent issues, as well as chemical 
weapons use in Southeast Asia. 

July 1 

TASS reports that the Soviet Union's offer 
for talks on banning weapons in outer space 
remains open, but the Soviets reject an U.S. 
attempt to discuss other arms issues. 

(Juatemalans hold elections for an 
88-member ("onstituent Assembly to write a 
new constitution. An U-member U.S. delega- 
tion observes the election process. 

Senator Charles Mathias heads the U.S. 
delegation at the inauguration of Richard von 
Weizsaecker as Federal President of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 

July 2 

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko says the 
U.S. is avoiding talks on banning weapons in 
space and imposing unacceptable conditions 
on talks proposed for the fall. 

White House spokesman Speakes says 
the U.S. agrees to outer space weapons talks 
in September, but also plans to discuss ar- 
rangements for nuclear arms talks. 

U.S. Postmaster General Bolger, attend- 
ing the UPU conference in Hamburg, says 
the Soviet Union's unethical postal practices 
threaten the integrity of the international 
system. He also affirms U.S. support to in- 
vestigate Soviet violations. 

The World Bank lowers interest rates to 
9.89% on conventional loans to developing 
countries for the next 6 months. 

July 3 

During a meeting with Soviet Ambassador 
Dobrynin, Secretary Shultz reaffirms U.S. 
commitment to hold space weapons talks in 
September and repeats that the U.S. also in- 
tends to discuss "offensive missiles that go 
through space." 

British Foreign Secretary Howe, meeting 
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and 
President Chernenko, assures the Soviets 
that the U.S. has set no preconditions for 
proposed outer space arms talks. 

Soviet authorities refuse to allow U.S. 
Ambassador Hartman to deliver a Fourth of 
July television address, claiming it is part of 
President Reagan's reelection campaign. 

July 4-7 

CARICOM's 13 members meet in Nassau to 
discuss the future of the organization. They 
agree to eliminate trade barriers and to grant 
observer status to Haiti, Dominican Republic, 
and Suriname. 

July 4 

Soviet authorities detain for 2 hours two U.S. 
diplomats, accusing them of activities incom- 
patible with their diplomatic status. They 
were meeting in public with a Soviet citizen 
when they were picked up. 

The Lebanese Government begins im- 
plementation of its security plan for the 
Beirut area. The Lebanese Army redeploys 
throughout Beirut and armed militias leave 
the streets. 

July 5-17 

Secretary Shultz visits Hong Kong (July 7-8). 
Malaysia (July 9-10), Singapore (July 10-11), 
Indonesia (July 11-14), Australia (July 
14-15), and New Zealand (.July 15-17). 

On July 12-13 Secretary Shultz attends 
the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in 

The ANZUS council holds its 33d meeting 
(July 16-17) in Wellington. The Foreign 
Ministers of ANZUS issue a joint communi- 
que (July 17) reaffirming their commitment 
to the Pacific pact. 

July 6 

State Department acting spokesman 
Romberg reiterates U.S. protests on the 
detention of two U.S. diplomats by the Soviet 

In response to a TASS report that the 
Soviet Union's offer for September outer 
space weapons talks in Vienna remains open. 
State Department acting spokesman 
Romberg repeats the U.S. acceptance saying 
there are no preconditions on having such 

Senators East (North Carolina) and 
Symms (Idaho) urge President Reagan to 
repudiate the SALT II treaty, terming it as 
"dangerous to American security" and 

The Army assumes authority of 
Beirut from militia forces. 

July 7 

Secretary Shultz says U.S. is willing to 
negotiate some aspects of space weaponry 
with the Soviet Union if a plan for talks in 
September can be worked out. 

July 9-11 

Second International Conference on 
Assistance to Refugees in Africa is held in 
Geneva. Attorney General Smith heads the 
U.S. delegation. 

July 9 

Greece tells the U.S. it will reassess the tre 
ty permitting American military bases then 
for 5 years and the Voice of America 
facilities unless the U.S. stops interfering ir 
its domestic affairs. 

The U.S. Consulate in Belfast denies an 
entry visa to Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn 
Fein, the Irish Republican Army's political 

President Reagan signs a proclamation 
designating today as African Refugees Reli 

Beirut airport opens for the first time i 
5 months. 

July 10-14 

Assistant Secretary Abrams visits Turkey 
assess human rights conditions. 

July 10 

While in Malaysia, Secretary Shultz says tl 
death threat letters received in Malaysia, 
South Korea, Zimbabwe, and other Third 
World countries may be a "disinformation 
campaign" used to embarrass the U.S. The 
letters are allegedly from the Ku Klux Kla 
and have postmarks from the Virginia and 
Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C. 

In Singapore, Secretary Shultz says V 
nam is blocking efforts to improve relatior 
with the U.S. by not providing informatioi 
on 2.500 missing Americans from the Viet 
nam war and by its continued aggression i 

President Reagan signs a proclamatioi 
designating July 10 as "Food for Peace D: 
marking the 30th anniversary of the Food 
Peace program. He also announces a pro- 
posed five-point food aid initiative. 

Bolivia reverses an earlier decision an 
says it will send six athletes to compete ii 
the Summer Olympic Games. 

World Bank's World Development Re 
predicts the Earth's population will reach 
billion by the year 2050; the biggest incre 
will be in poor countries where economic 
growth will be stunted by a large populat 




July 11-15 

West German Defense Minister Worner v 
Washington. D.C. On July 12 he meets w 
Secretary Weinberger to sign an agreemt 
for deploying air defense missiles in Ger- 
many. He meets with President Reagan, 
President Bush, and Acting Secretary of 
State Dam on July 13. 

July 11 

State Department acting spokesman 
Romiierg says the theme of recent threat 
ters .sent to Third World countries in the 




■pirs is "dovetailed" with the Soviet 
tualKin for its boycott and "bears all the 
larks of a disinformation campaign." 
.i-i'tk Prime Minister Papandreou and 
iAmliassador Stearns meet to discuss re- 
il'S. -Greece disagreements. 

hr International Trade Commission 
:<iiiiK'nds that President Reagan impose 
Ir quotas and tariffs on 70% of steel im- 
for the next 5 years in order to protect 
-ican steel producers and workers, 
roverning Board of the International 
gy Agency meeting in Paris reaches 
jment on a coordinated policy for draw- 
own contingency oil stoclvs of member 
ns in the event of a major supply disrup- 


ptate Department report on the situa- 
n El Salvador, Acting Secretary Dam 
El Salvador's armed forces have im- 
;d in professionalism as well as in per- 
ance. Other areas of progress in El 
idor include land reform, free elections, 
lishment of an effective judicial system, 
,he elimination of death squad activity, 
he U.S. announces it will no longer pro- 
bilateral family planning assistance to 
tries that use any method of force to 
ve population reduction objectives. 


letter to Soviet President Chernenko, 
dent Reagan says he is willing to delay 
iroposed Vienna talks on space weapons 
November to eliminate any Soviet con- 
about the presidential elections. 
4ew Zealand holds its general elections. 
Labor Party, led by David Lange, wins 
55 seats in Parliament. The National 
I takes 38 seats and the Social Credit 
y takes 2 seats. 


; Department acting spokesman 
Iberg confirms reports that 13 Western 
bers of the London Suppliers Club met 
■ixembourg (July 11-13) to discuss 
lods of strengthening controls on nuclear 
I rts. Ambassador Kennedy headed the 
I delegation. Other participating countries 
!■ Austraha, Belgium, Canada, Federal 
iiblie of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, 
i?mbourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
I zerland, and the U.K. 
; Embassador Shlaudeman meets with 
raguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
CO in Atlanta. 

President Reagan signs a proclamation 
iring the third week of July (July 15-21) 
Captive Nations Week." 


and Soviet Union initial an agreement to 
-ade the 21-year-old "Hot Line" for crisis 
munications. The new system will in- 
se word transmission threefold from its 
ent 64 words a minute and can also 
ismit graphics. 

President Reagan expresses disappoint- 
it over the Soviet Union's failure to join 
majority of the 35 nations that wish to 
in "concrete" negotiations at the Con- 
•nce on Disarmament in Europe. 

Vietnam returns the remains believed to 
be eight U.S. servicemen. 

Department of State acting spokesman 
Romberg says the U.S. and 14 other COCOM 
members reached agreement on a new com- 
puter definition. This is part of a review to 
define products and technologies to be con- 
trolled to the East bloc. 

The Guatemalan Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal reports that the coalition of the Na- 
tional Liberation Movement and the Na- 
tionalist Authentic Central received the most 
seats (23) in the new 88-member Constituent 
Assembly, despite finishing third in the 
July 1 voting. The Union of the National 
Center and the Christian Democratic Party 
each took 21 seats. 

July 18 

In a speech to the Honolulu Council on 
Foreign Relations, Secretary Shultz says 
Vietnam has agreed to meet next month to 
discuss the Americans missing-in-action from 
the Vietnam war. 

The Drug Enforcement Administration 
reports that two Nicaraguan Government of- 
ficials are directly involved with cocaine 
trafficking between South America and the 

Departments of State and Defense 
release a report titled Nicaragua's Military 
Buildup and Support for Central American 

The Lebanese Government announces its 
decision to restore diplomatic relations with 

Lebanese Defense Minister Osseiran 
orders Israel to close its liaison office in 

July 19 

President Reagan attends a conference of 
Caribbean heads of government in Columbia, 
South Carolina. 

Communist Party members leave the 
French Government over economic policy 

State Department acting spokesman 
Romberg says the U.S. regrets any move by 
Lebanon to close Israel's liaison office. 

July 20 

At a White House ceremony marking today 
as National POW/MIA Recognition Day, 
President Reagan announces that Laos will 
allow the U.S. to search for the remains of 13 
U.S. servicemen at the site where an Air 
Force gunship exploded in midair on 
December 21. 1972. 

On the 10th anniversary of the coup on 
Cyprus, Department of State acting 
spokesman Romberg reaffirms U.S. hope for 
a reunited Cyprus. 

July 21 

Poland approves an amnesty bill to release 
652 political prisoners within 30 days. The 
Administration indicates that President 
Reagan may ease some sanctions as a result 
of the amnesty. 

July 23 

The Soviets suggest that the U.S. and Soviet 
Union issue a joint statement to show a will- 

ingness for serious talks on banning space 

El Salvador's President Duarte meets 
with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, 
Secretary Shultz, and congressional leaders 
to appeal for increased U.S. economic and 
security assistance. 

July 24 

Senate votes 93 to to urge the Soviet Union 
to deliver information on the Sakharovs to all 
signatory nations of the Helsinki Final Act. 

The Department of State presents the 
Soviet Union with a counterproposal for an 
agenda statement for the Vienna space 
weapons talks projected to begin on 
September 18. The latest proposal would 
allow the U.S. and Soviets to discuss a broad 
range of weapons issues, including strategic 
and medium-range nuclear arms. 

Speaking at a televised news conference, 
President Reagan charges Nicaragua's San- 
dinista regime with trying to destroy El 

A U.S. Drug Enforcement Administra- 
tion report says that Bulgaria uses illegal 
narcotics trafficking to support terrorism and 
as a "political weapon to destabilize Western 

July 25-26 

South Africa's Administrator General to 
Namibia Willie von Niekerk and SWAPO 
President Sam Nujoma meet to discuss end- 
ing armed activities in Namibia. 

July 25 

President Reagan ends a ban on Soviet com- 
mercial fishing in U.S. Pacific waters. The 
Soviet allocation will be about 50,000 metric 

U.S. F-14 fighters fly exercises over the 
Gulf of Sidra which Libya considers to be its 
territorial waters. No incidents are reported. 

West Germany approves a $333 million 
private bank loan to East Germany which has 
promised to ease restrictions on contacts be- 
tween East and West German citizens. 

Israel closes its liaison office in 
Dubayyah, Lebanon, after weeks of pressure 
from the Lebanese Government. 

Poland agrees to allow the Primate of 
Poland and Catholic Church appointed of- 
ficials to supervise a fund to assist private 
farmers in an effort to relax U.S. imposed 
economic sanctions and improve relations. 

July 26 

State Department acting spokesman 
Romberg says three Libyan journalists were 
denied visas, for security reasons, to cover 
the Olympic Games. 

State Department acting spokesman 
Romberg says the election of Rabbi Kahane 
to the Israeli Parliament could result in 
Kahane losing his U.S. citizenship. 

July 27 

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov 
says the latest U.S. response to a proposal to 
begin talks in Vienna on outer space weapons 
makes it impossible to conduct the kind of 
negotiations the Soviets are interested in. 



White House spokesman Speakes says the 
U.S. accepted the proposed talks without 
preconditions and that such talks are not im- 

In response to a speech made on July 26 
by Fidel Castro, State Department acting 
spokesman Romberg says Cuba will have to 
demonstrate some fundamental changes in its 
foreign policy before the U.S. will agree to 
comprehensive talks with Cuba. 

Panama President-elect Nicolas Ardito 
Barletta meets with President Reagan, Vice 
President Bush, and Secretary Shultz at the 
White House. 

July 28 

In a letter to UN Secretary General Perez de 
Cuellar, Libya protests the presence of the 
U.S. F-14 fighters over the Gulf of Sidra on 
July 25. citing it is a violation of Libyan ter- 
ritorial waters. 

Burundi President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza 
is reelected as president of the Uprona Party 
for a second 5-year term. 

In Honduras, six U.S. citizens affiliated 
with the AFL-CIO are arrested and deported 
to Nicaragua for participating in a political 
rally in Tegucigalpa on July 27. 

July 29 

Competition in the Summer Games of the 
XXIIl Olympiad begins in Los Angeles. A 
record 140 countries send athletes. 

A Venezuelan DC-9 jet, carrying 87 peo- 
ple, is hijacked to Curacao. Four U.S. citizens 
are among the passengers. 

July 30 

Six hostages from the hijacked Venezuelan 
jet are freed. 

The last of the Marine combat troops at 
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut return to Navy 

July 31 

Venezuelan commandos storm the hijacked 
DC-9 jet killing the two hijackers and rescu- 
ing all remaining passengers. State Depart- 
ment acting spokesman Romberg says U.S. 
antiterrorism experts flew to the scene to of- 
fer advice to local authorities. 

U.S. and Cuba resume talks on migration, 
including the Mariel issue. ■ 

Department of State 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*157 7/5 Appointment of Dean Burch 
as chairman of the U.S. 
delegation to the Space 
Services World Ad- 
ministrative Radio Con- 
ference (biographic data). 

*158 7/10 Owen W. Roberts sworn in 
as Ambassador to the 
Republic of Togo, July 9 
(biographic data). 

*159 7/10 John W. Shirley sworn in as 
Ambassador to the United 
Republic of Tanzania, 
July 9 (biographic data). 

*160 7/10 Weston Adams sworn in as 
Ambassador to the 
Republic of Malawi, July 9 
(biographic data). 

•161 7/11 U.S. and Indonesia renew 

Agreement for Cooperation 
in Scientific Research and 
Technological Develop- 
ment, July 9. 
162 7/12 Shultz: news conference, 
Singapore, July 10. 

*163 7/13 Shultz: remarks at banquet 
hosted by Acting Foreign 
Minister Datuk Abdullah 
HJ. Ahmad Badawi, Kuala 
Lumpur. July 9. 
164 7/13 Shultz: remarks to the 

ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 

*165 7/17 Shultz: statement at the 

New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Well- 
ington, July 16. 
166 7/18 Shultz: news conference at 
the American Embassy, 
Kuala Lumpur, July 10. 

*167 7/18 Shultz: remarks at closing 
of the bilateral meeting 
with Indonesian President 
Soeharto, Jakarta, July 13. 

*168 7/19 Shultz: remarks at ANZ'US 
Council dinner, Wellington, 
.July 16. 

169 7/19 Shultz: remarks at luncheon 

for ANZUS Council, Well- 
ington, July 16. 

170 7/19 Shultz: address before the 

Honolulu Council on 
Foreign Relations, 
Honolulu, July 18. 

171 7/20 Shultz: news conference at 

the Parliament House, 
Canberra, July 15. 

•172 7/23 Shultz: interview on "The 
Today Show" by Bernard 

•173 7/23 Shultz: arrival statement, 
Jakarta, July 11. 
174 7/23 Shultz, Hayden, Cooper: 

news conference at closing 
of ANZUS Council Meet- 
ing, Wellington, July 17. 

•Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 

Department of State 

Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available fro 
the Correspondence Management Division, ' 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Free multiple copies may be obtained 
writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis a 
Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Departme 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Secretary Shultz 

Asia-Pacific and the Future, Honolulu Cou 
on Foreign Relations, Honolulu, Hawai 
July 18, 1984 (Current Policy #598). 

Challenges Facing the U.S. and ASEAN. 
Foreign Ministers of the Association o 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Jakarta. Indonesia, July 13, 1984 (Cur 
rent Policy #597). 

Arms Control 

Nuclear Arms Control and the NATO Alii 
ance, Ambassador Rowny, Royal Unit 
Services Institute, London, U.K., 
June 21, 1984 (Current Policy #591). 

Preserving Freedom and Security, Deput; 
Secetary Dam. Senate Foreign Relatii 
Committee, June 13, 1984 (Current 
Policy #590). 

East Asia 

Taking Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations, As 
ant Secretary Wolfowitz, Subcommitt 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and Inte 
tional Economic Policy and Trade, Ht 
Foreign Affairs Committee, June 12, 
1984 (Current Policy #593). 

The U.S. -China Trade Relationship, Assis 
Secretary Wolfowitz, National Counc 
U.S. -China Trade. May 31, 1984 (Cur 
Policy #594). 

U.S. -China Relations (GIST, July 1984). 

Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) (GIST, July 1984). 


The Bretton Woods Legacy: Its Continu 
Relevance, Assistant Secretary McC' 
mack, 40th anniversary of the signin 
the Bretton Woods agreements, Bre 
Woods, New Hampshire, July 13, 19 
(Current policy #596). 


Soviet Active Measures, Deputy Assista 
Secretary Knepper, Chicago Council 
Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois, 
May 30, 1984 (Current Policy #595). 


International Narcotics Control (GIST, 
July 1984). 

Western Hemisphere 

Atlas of the Caribbean Basin, Harry F. 
Young, Bureau of Public Affairs, De 
ment of State, July 1984. ■ 



September 1984 
^}lume 84, No. 2090 


ican Refugees Relief Day, 1984 (proclama- 
tion) 64 

nan Rights Situation in Zaire and South 

Africa (Abrams) 55 

ns Control 
ANZUS Relationship: Alliance Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz) 60 

?osed Outer Space Negotiations (White 
louse statements) 24 

tus of Conference on Disarmament in 

Europe (Reagan) 23 

ia. Asia-Pacific and the Future 

(Shultz) 3 


1 ANZUS Relationship; Alliance Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz) 60 

retary Visits Asia; Attends ASEAN and 
ANZUS Meetings (Cooper, Hayden, 
Shultz, text of ANZUS communique) .... 7 
ina. The U.S. -China Relationship 

(Wolfowitz) 25 


nan Rights Situation in Zaire and South 

Africa (Abrams) 55 

1 Report on Cyprus (message to the 

Congress) 46 

ing Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations 
(Wolfowitz) 28 

nsular Affairs. U.S. -Soviet Consular 
Agreement (Department statement) ... 42 


)a as a Model and a Challenge (Skoug) . . 73 

man Rights in Cuba (Abrams) 53 

jrus. 19th Report on Cyprus (message to 
the Congress) 46 

veloping Countries. World Economic 

Prospects (Wallis) 36 

t Asia 

•cing Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations 

(Wolfowitz) 28 

-Asia Security; Economic and Political 
Dimensions (Brown) 34 


a-Pacific and the Future (Shultz) 3 

; Bretton Woods Legacy; Its Continuing 
Relevance (McCormack) 38 

King Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations 
(Wolfowitz) 28 

5. -Asia Security; Econoniic and Political 
Dimensions (Brown) 34 

)rld Economic Prospects (Wallis) 36 


tending Voluntary Departure for El 
Salvadorans (Abrams) 48 

;sident Meets With El Salvador's President 
(White House statement) 72 

od. Food for Peace Day, 1984 (Reagan, 
proclamation) 46 

reign Assistance. President Meets With 
EI Salvador's President (White House 
statement) 72 

enada. A Force for Freedom in the 
Caribbean (Reagan) 1 

latemala. Elections in Guatemala (White 
House statement) 71 

iman Rights 

.ptive Nations Week, 1984 (proclamation) 51 

'.tending Voluntary Departure for El 
Salvadorans (Abrams) 48 

iman Rights in Cuba (Abrams) 53 

iman Rights Situation in Zaire and South 

Africa (Abrams) 55 

■rsecution and Restrictions of Religion in 
Nicaragua (Abrams) 49 

Immigration. Extending Voluntary Departure 
for El Salvadorans (Abrams) ." 48 

Indonesia. Secretary Visits Asia; Attends 
ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings (Cooper, 
Havden, Shultz, text of ANZUS communi- 
que) 7 

Industrialized Democracies. World Economic 
Prospects (Wallis) 36 

Japan. 'Taking Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations 
(Wolfowitz) 28 

Malaysia. Secretary Visits Asia; Attends 
ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings (Cooper, 
Havden, Shultz, text of ANZUS communi- 
que) 7 

Monetary Affairs 

The Bretton Woods Legacy; Its Continuing 
Relevance (McCormack) 38 

World Economic Prospects (Wallis) 36 

New Zealand 

The ANZUS Relationship; Alliance Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz) 60 

President Reagan's News Conference of 
July 24 (excerpts) 2 

Secretary Visits Asia; Attends ASEAN and 
ANZUS Meetings (Cooper, Hayden, 
Shultz, text of ANZUS communique) .... 7 


A Force for Freedom in the Caribbean 
(Reagan) i 

Persecution and Restrictions of Religion in 
Nicaragua (Abrams) 49 

Review of Nicaragua's Commitments to the 
OAS (Middendorf) 69 

Nuclear Policy 

The ANZUS Relationship; Alliance Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz) 60 

The U.S. -China Trade Relationship 
(Wolfowitz) 25 

Organization of American States. Review of 
Nicaragua's Commitments to the OAS 
(Middendorf) 69 


The ANZUS Relationship; Alliance Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz) 60 

Asia-Pacific and the Future (Shultz) 3 

Poland. President Reagan's News Conference 
of July 24 (excerpts) 2 

Presidential Documents 

African Refugees Relief Day, 1984 (proclama- 
tion) 64 

Captive Nations Week, 1984 (proclamation) 51 

Food for Peace Day, 1984 (proclamation) . .46 

A Force for Freedom in the Caribbean 1 

19th Report on Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 46 

President Reagan's News Conference of 
July 24 (excerpts) 2 

Status of Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe 23 

U.S. -Soviet Bilateral Relations (White House 
fact sheet) 41 

U.S. -Soviet Union Expand "Hot Line" 
Agreement (White House fact sheet) ... 45 

Visit of Sri Lankan President (Jayewardene, 
Reagan) 65 

Publications. Department of State 82 

Refugees. African Refugees Relief Day, 
1984 (proclamation) 64 

Science and Technology. The U.S. -China 

Trade Relationship (Wolfowitz) 25 

Security Assistance 

President Meets With El Salvador's President 
(White House statement) 72 

U.S. -Asia Security; Econoniic and Political 
Dimensions (Brown) 34 

Singapore. Secretary Visits Asia; Attends 
ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings (Cooper, 
Hayden, Shultz, text of ANZUS communi- 
que) 7 

Soutn Africa. Human Rights Situation in 
Zaire and South Africa (Abrams) 55 

Sri Lanka. Visit of Sri Lankan President 
(Jayewardene, Reagan) 65 


Taking Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations 
(Wolfowitz) 28 

U.S. -Asia Security; Economic and Political 
Dimensions (Brown) 34 

The U.S. -China Trade Relationship 
(Wolfowitz) 25 


Current Actions 78 

U.S. -Soviet Consular Agreement (Department 
statement) 42 

U.S. -Soviet Union Expand "Hot Line" Agree- 
ment (Reagan, White House fact sheet) . 45 


Proposed Outer Space Negotiations (White 
House statements) 24 

Status of Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe (Reagan) 23 

U.S. -Soviet Bilateral Relations (Reagan, 
White House fact sheet) 41 

U.S. -Soviet Consular Agreement (Department 
statement) 42 

U.S. -Soviet Union Expand "Hot Line" Agree- 
ment (Reagan, White House fact sheet) . 45 

Western Hemisphere 

Extending Voluntary Departure for El 
Salvadorans (Abrams) 48 

A Force for Freedom in the Caribbean 
(Reagan) 1 

Human Rights in Cuba (Abrams) 53 

Persecution and Restrictions of Religion 
in Nicaragua (Abrams) 49 

President Reagan's News Conference of 
July 24 (excerpts) 2 

Zaire. Human Rights Situation in Zaire 
and South Africa (Abrams) 55 

Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 48, 49, 53, 55 

Brown, William A 34 

Cooper, Warren 7 

Hayden, William 7 

Jayewardene, J. R 65 

McCormack, Richard T 38 

Middendorf, J. William II 69 

Reagan, President 1, 2, 23, 41, 45, 46, 48 

51, 64, 65 

Shultz, Secretary 3,7 

Skoug, Kenneth N. Jr 73 

Wallis W. Allen 36 

Wolfowitz, Paul D 25, 28, 60 

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Deparitnen t 


-m ot state -m-m ^ ^ 

, ,„ huUetm 

Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2091 

October 1984 





Western Hemisphere/1 

Arms Control/21 

Europe v. Asia/33 

Cover Photos: 

Assistant Secretary Motley 
Ambassador Goodby 
Deputy Secretary Dam 

M^epnrttnvni of Siaie 


Volume 84 / Number 2091 / October 1984 

The Department oe State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 


Secretary of State | 


Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 



Office of Public Communication 


Chief, Editorial Division 




Assistant Editor 

The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
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Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041- 
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Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Langhome A. Motley) 

The President 


40th Anniversary of the Warsaw 

The Secretary 

18 Diplomacy and Strength 

Arms Control 

21 Security for Europe 
(James E. Goodby) 

East Asia 

25 U.S. Activities on POW-MIA 
Issue (Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

27 Continuation of MFN Status for 

China (William A. Brown) 


28 U.S. -Bulgaria Relations 

(Richard R. Burt) 

30 Polish Government's Release of 

Political Prisoners 
(White House Statement) 

Foreign Assistance 

31 Food and Population Planning 

Assistance (M. Peter McPherson) 


33 Europe v. Asia; Is Diplomacy a 
Zero-Sum Game? 
(Kenneth D. Darn) 

Human Rights 

36 Ninth Anniversary of the 

Helsinki Final Act 

Middle East 

37 Current Developments in the 

Middle East 
(Richard W. Murphy) 


39 International Narcotics Control 

Nuclear Policy 

40 Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply 

and Mutual Obligations 
(Richard T. Kennedy) 

Science & Technology 

43 Competitive Challenges of 

Global Telecommunications 
(William Schneider, Jr.) 

South Asia 

47 Afghanistan 

47 Afghan Attacks on Pakistan 

(Department Statement) 


48 International Terrorism: A Long 

Twilight Struggle 
(Robert M. Sayre) 


50 Current Actions 


52 August 1984 

Press Releases 

54 Department of State 


54 Department of State 


Latin America and the Caribbean 

Boundary represent al> on is 
nol necessarily authoritative 


. » The Bahamas 

Jamaica Haiti 
Kingston au-Prlnca 

' Ingo 





P««tll R'cii - '.Anliiju. »nd B 
Saint Chris^*^^ DDominica 




SarSaW9°" ^ j Nicaragua 



,.nd Nevis _. „ „,„_, 

Caribbean Sea ='.„«". 

St lucre 

^•h_ Trinidad and Tobago 
,i^Vort-of- Spain 



F/<f.UV IrJur-J 

1000 Kilometers 

1000 Mites 

Azimuthal Equal-Area Projection 




Falklsnd ts/Brnfs 

"^S^IMainiilsnd b| UH. 
ctllmftf bf A(Q«nttni) 

South Coorgia 
(FilUinil li{inili) 


ised on oral and written testimony 
the Subcommittee on Western 
rphere Affairs of the Hoitse Foreign 
■s Committee on July 31, 198^. Am- 
ior Motley is Assistant Secretary 
ter-American Affairs. ' 

Democracy in 

Latin America and 

the Caribbean 

by Langhorne A. Motley 

Support for democracy is one of the 
cardinal points of U.S. foreign policy in 
the Caribbean and in Latin America as 
a whole. Ambassador Motley's testimony 
discusses the status of democratic politics 
in the region. It concludes that democ- 
racy is proving to be a practical path to 
staMlity as well as to freedom. This con- 
clusion, with the data that support it, 
parallels the finding of the National 

Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America that recent events have "de- 
stroyed the argument of the old dictators 
that a strong hand is essential to avoid 
anarchy and communism, and that 
order and progress can only be achieved 
through authoritarianism. " 

Selected Latin American Elections 
in a 20- Year Perspective 




Total Vote 






P, L 




P, L 





















Costa Rica 


P, L 




P, L 












El Salvador 






P, L 














P, L 









P, L 


















P. L 




P, L 



•P= Presidential, L= Legislative, CA= Constituent Assembly. 
"Estimates based on votes cast as a percentage of total population age 20 or over as 
reported in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook for the year in question. 



Since November 1980, when the United 
States last went to the polls to elect a 
president, our southern neighbors have 
cast some 150 million votes in 33 elec- 
tions in 24 countries. That is more votes 
in more elections in more countries than 
in any previous 4 years in the history of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 

In Latin America, voter participa- 
tion has increased, sometimes 
dramatically. In fact, recent turnouts, in 
some cases, have doubled those of 20 
years ago in relative as well as absolute 

• More than 15 million Argentine 
voters went to the polls last fall. In the 
hotly contested election that ended near- 
ly a decade of military rule, 9 out of 
every 10 adults voted. Raul Alfonsin 
became president with the largest vote 
in Argentine history, exceeding even 
Juan Peron's highest tally. 

• In Brazil's 1982 congressional and 
municipal elections, 48.4 million 
Brazilians voted. This was more than 
three times the 14.8 million who voted in 
the 1962 legislative elections; the 
percentage of adults voting rose from 
45% in 1962 to 81% in 1982. 

• In May of this year, an absolute 
majority of all adult Salvadorans, some 
1.5 million men and women, defied guer- 
rilla violence to choose between 
Napoleon Duarte and Roberto 
D'Aubuisson. In the 1962 presidential 
elections, only 400,000 voters, roughly 
one-third of adult Salvadorans, had par- 
ticipated in an election dominated by an 
official military candidate. 

• Two Constituent Assembly elec- 
tions in Guatemala 20 years apart reveal 
a similar evolution: in May 1964, 
337,000 votes were cast, 40% of those 
registered; in July 1984, the voters 
numbered 1,856,000, or 73% of those 

What lies behind this region-wide 
upsurge in democratic politics? Long- 
term development— including the revolu- 
tions in communications and expecta- 
tions—is clearly, if slowly, making itself 
felt. A more immediate factor— one that 
has impressed many observers at recent 
elections— is voter desire to repudiate 
both dicUitors and guerrillas. To most 
Latin Americans, the uncertainties of 
democracy are preferable to the violence 
and abuse of leftist and rightist ex- 

Growth of Voter Participation 
in Selected Countries 

(Estimate ol Percent of Total Adult Population Voting) 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 





Costa Rica 


El Salvador 







'he force of tlie democratic tide ami 
ejection of extremism can also be 
in what has not happened. Not a 
B country that was democractic 4 

ago has lost its freedom. The 
iry coups predicted for El Salvador 
Honduras did not take place. Boliv- 
emocracy has not fallen. Not one 
ilia movement has taken power 

1979, when the Sandinistas re- 
el Somoza and abandoned their 
ises to hold free elections. And to 
o's frustration and surprise, 
ida's Marxist-Leninist dictators did 
rove immune to their own abuses 
wer and were replaced by constitu- 

authorities committed to holding 
>lections by the end of 1984. 
lections by themselves cannot 
<.e society or solve every problem, 
ompetitive elections are, as 
tary Shultz has noted, "a practical 
tick of democracy. They are an in- 
able test of public accountability." 
therefore, U.S. policy to support 

lections without reservation, see- 

them assurances that human 
; will be protected, that reconcilia- 
>!\\\ reflect the work of people and 

guns, and that U.S. aid and 
ration will have firm local founda- 

he English-speaking Caribbean, 
Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela 
)lidly based democracies of long 
ing. Over the last 5 years, elected 
n presidents have replaced military 
, in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El 
dor, Honduras, Panama, and Peru, 
ional countries as different as 
and Uruguay, Guatemala and 
da are now also moving toward 
;r democracy. 

fie result is that more than 90% of 
feople of Latin America and the 
bean are now living in countries 
governments that are either 
:ractic or heading there. For a part 
world often identified with dicta- 
ip, this is something to cheer about, 
s recently as 1979, two-thirds of 
jighbors lived under military or 
iry-dominated governments of both 
hd right. Any shift so striking in- 
skepticism. But measured in voter 
ipation and in competition at the 
g booth, today's democractic 
jence is astonishingly deep, 
ur neighbors deserve the credit for 
■ogress they are making. We can, 
n, be proud that we are cooper- 
with them. Freedom is not a zero- 
^ame. Everyone wins when democ- 
s strengthened. 

The Military and Democracy 

Essential to the survival of democ- 
racy is an apolitical military establish- 
ment — one which seeks not to defend 
one partisan interest or another but 
rather one committed to institutional 
democratic government. Significantly, 
the recent history of hemispheric 
democratic advance has been that of 
a transformation in which the 
military itself has taken an active 

An example of this difficult proc- 
ess is today's El Salvador, which 
owes its agrarian reform to military 
support. After decades as defenders 
of the status quo, since 1979 El 
Salvador's security forces have made 
considerable progress toward im- 
proved field performance, greater 
respect for human rights, and an 
apolitical role in society. 


Despite this extraordinary pattern of 
progress, democracy in Latin America 
still faces many problems. 

Competitive elections can help 
measure success or failure in dealing 
with particular problems; the problems 
themselves do not automatically disap- 
pear at the ballot box, regardless of who 
wins. Democracy requires elections; but 
elections alone are not enough. 

Democracies must establish a track 
record as problem-solving mechanisms. 
If democratic institutions cannot solve 
problems, they cannot survive. If we are 
interested in the survival of democracy, 
we must help democratic governments 
deal with their problems— even though it 
is they, not we, who must solve them. 

Internal problems include unequal 
access to education, justice, and employ- 
ment; the clash of indigenous and im- 
migrant cultures; great disparities in 
wealth; government inefficiency and cor- 
ruption; civilian caudUlismo and military 
intervention. These problems do not, of 
course, all exist in every country. But 
they do persist in varying degrees in the 
region as a whole. 

External problems include increased 
costs for imported oil; the decline in the 
global economy accompanied by reduc- 
tions in export earnings and forced 
reliance on increasingly expensive bor- 
rowed capital; and active efforts by 

Training and organizational 
changes are largely responsible. Merit 
promotion has been implemented. 
President Duarte has appointed a 
Vice Minister of Defense responsible 
for the three police forces, as well as 
new, able commanders to head each. 
Officers associated with human rights 
abuses have been removed and a unit 
suspected of human rights abuse 

This increased professionalism 
was reflected in the performance of 
the armed forces during this year's 
presidential elections and inaugura- 
tion. The Salvadoran military, once 
considered an impediment to the es- 
tablishment of political democracy, is 
today defending the future rather 
than the past. 

hostile powers outside the hemisphere to 
exploit local grievances and economic 
hardship. Again, the mix can vary great- 
ly from country to country, but these ex- 
ternal pressures are felt throughout the 

These problems combine to create 
two immediate threats to democracy in 
Latin America today: political ex- 
tremism and economic recession. To 
them must be added the growing inter- 
national trade in illicit drugs, which 
degrades the rule of law as well as 
human dignity. 

Political Extremism. The enemies 
of democracy often point to under- 
development and economic hardship to 
justify violence and dictatorship. The 
problem with their argument is that 
neither left nor right extremes are 
stable or productive. 

Marxist-Leninist regimes have 
tended to perpetuate both the political 
and the economic backwardness out of 
which they grew. When feuding Marxist- 
Leninists plunged Grenada into 
murderous disorder, the United States, 
Barbados, Jamaica, and Grenada's 
eastern Caribbean neighbors came to the 
rescue. The result was restoration of 
legal order. This was a major defeat for 
the extremists and their Cuban and 
Soviet supporters, who nonetheless still 
support totalitarianism in Nicaragua and 
oppose the consolidation of democracy in 
El Salvador. 


Like leftwing extremism, extremism 
of the right is weai<ened by economic 
development. Unlike leftwing ex- 
tremism, it has few reliable external 
sources of support. But the consolidation 
of democratic politics and reform has, 
nonetheless, been hindered by such 
phenomena as death squads and denials 
of elemental equity. 

A Precedent for 1984? 

In 1972-74, Anastasio Somoza 
stepped aside from the presidency of 
Nicaragua, continuing as commander 
of the National Guard, and, after the 
1972 earthquake, as President of the 
National Emergency Committee. 

In 1974, disregarding the advice 
of friends who thought the time had 
come for the family to withdraw from 
active politics, Somoza decided to 
become president again. To do so, he 
had the Constitution amended and 
barred 9 out of 10 opposition parties 
from the presidential election. 
Nicaragua's Roman Catholic bishops 
warned in a pastoral letter that these 
electoral manipulations amounted to 
"legal war." 

Under those conditions, Somoza 
received a smashing 95% of the vote: 
216,158 votes to 11,997 for Edmundo 
Paguaga Irias of the Conservative 
Party. But the victory was Pyrrhic. 
Many Nicaraguans, including former 
close associates of Somoza, became 
convinced a democratic end to the 
Somoza dynasty had become 

Economic Recession. During the 
last 8-10 years, economic mismanage- 
ment and pressures for reform con- 
tributed to the decline of several unrep- 
resentative regimes. Yet if democratic 
governments cannot produce economic 
recovery, then they, too, can lose their 
mandate. Today, many democracies 
need to restructure their economies at a 
time when living standards have already 

The countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean constitute the developing 
world's most indebted region. External 
debt exceeded $330 billion at the end 
of 1983. In 1982 and 1983, interest 
payments alone added up to more than 
$40 billion per year. These payments 
were equivalent to more than 35% of the 
value of the region's exports of goods 

and services— the world's highest debt 
service ratio. In some individual coun- 
tries the ratio exceeded 100% before 
debt rescheduling. 

The region's real per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) has dropped by 
over 10% from its 1980 level (by far 
more in some countries), and there is lit- 
tle doubt that per capita real economic 
growth will again be negative in 1984. 
In nearly all countries, unemployment 
and underemployment are at levels not 
seen since the Great Depression. 

It hardly needs to be pointed out 
how dangerous such conditions are to 
any government that has to face elec- 

The Drug Trade. Illicit narcotics 
trafficking and consumption also 
threaten democratic development by 
fostering disregard for the law and cor- 
rupting institutions as well as in- 
dividuals. In some remote valleys, the 
lure of extraordinary profits and the 
absence of productive alternatives have 
broken down social and political order; 
lawlessness prevails and drug kings hold 
sway, sometimes in symbiosis with guer- 

In the past, many Latin Americans 
considered illicit drugs a "U.S. problem." 
Some even welcomed the increased 
employment and foreign exchange earn- 
ings brought by the drug trade. Today, 
they are increasingly aware of the enor- 
mous threat narcotics pose to the moral 
fiber of their own societies and to the 
legitimacy of their own political institu- 
tions. Democracy requires a collective 
victory over the traffickers and their 


It is U.S. Government policy to support 
democracy and democratic institutions. 
This approach is neither interventionist 
nor a mindless export of ideology. It is 
legitimate, it is in our enlightened self- 
interest, and it works— not overnight or 
in 6-month increments but over time. 

• Democracy is the h^est guarantor 
of human rights. A government respon- 
sible to its people cannot abuse them 
with impunity. 

• Democracy is also the best long- 
term guarantor of stability. Democratic 
governments do not drive their people 
into armed opposition nor do they 
threaten or attack their neighbors. 

American officials from the Presi 
dent on down have made clear our ui 
equivocal support for democratic pro 
esses. During his trip to Latin Ameri 
in 1982, President Reagan insisted tl 

The future challenges our imaginatioi 
but the roots of law and democracy and < 
inter-American system provide the 
answers. . . . Together, we will work tow 
the economic growth and opportunity th; 
can only be achieved by free men and 
women. We will promote the democracy 
is the foundation of our freedom and stai 
together to assure the security of our 
|ieoples, their governments, and our way 
life. " 

Support for democracy can mea 
everything from a public embrace fo 
new president of Argentina to sendi 
qualified election observers requeste 
a government in Central America. I 
mean encouragement of political 
dialogue and communication, technii 
exchange programs, specialized con- 
ferences, and even analytical public; 
tions. It can mean support for a 
strengthened administration of justi 

Rule of Law is Key 

A judicial system that is independei 
and fair, accessible and effective is 
essential to democracy. 

Working with the UN-affiliated 
Latin American Institute for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treat 
ment of Offenders, the U.S. Goven 
ment is developing a program to 
assist efforts by governments and 
private groups in Latin America ar 
the Caribbean to strengthen legal i 
stitutions and improve the adrninis 
tration of justice. 


During the last 4 years, it has 
all of these things— and more. We 
couraged the open and competitive 
tions that took place in Honduras, 
Salvador, and Guatemala. We urgi 
Sandinistas to honor the democrat 
promises they have abandoned an( 
betrayed. We welcomed the returr 
democratic rule in Argentina. We 
clear that we would favor a restor 
of democracy in Chile and Urugua 
showed our support for democratic 
legitimacy when President Siles w 
naped in Bolivia. We let the Gover 
of Paraguay know we were unhap 
with the closing of the independen 
newspaper ABC Color. We let the 
Government of Haiti know of our 




n at the arrest and mistreatment of 
losition leaders. 

In country after country in Latin 
lerica and the Caribbean, U.S. Em- 
gies are today correctly perceived as 
porting democracy. Local officials 
citizens recognize in growing 
ibers that our representatives are 
ently fostering democratic dialogue, 
stitutional procedures, and respect 
political diversity. 
We also have recognized that 
ernment officials are not alone in 
ing a role to play in promoting 
locratic values and traditions, 
/ate citizens are ultimately the back- 
e of democracy, and we have at- 
pted to catalyze broader private 
aeration. The West German political 
idations, the political internationals, 
own American Institute for Free 
lor Development, and many in- 
dual leaders have long proven that 
tical cooperation among like-minded 
pie and groups gets results. 
The democratic tide has made it 
er to build on these experiences. We 
e strengthened the ability of the U.S. 
)rmation Agency (USIA) to sponsor 
ate exchanges. The National Endow- 
it for Democracy and its constituent 
itutes are strengthening our national 
acity to develop mutual support net- 
ks among democratic leaders and 
ties throughout the world. 

Citizens: the Backbone 
of Democracy 

. ( lovernment contributions to the 
ional Endowment for Democracy 
port private sector initiatives to 
Durage free and democratic in- 
jtions throughout the world, 
■se initiatives involve U.S. busi- 
s and labor as well as political par- 
. They include cooperation and 
anizational activities that promote 
pluralism, individual freedoms, 
! internationally recognized human 
its essential to the functioning of 
locratic institutions. 

Costa Rica's Constitution 

The new Center for Electoral Advice 
I Promotion in San Jose, Costa Rica, 
,n example of how a regional institu- 
1 can help nations translate demo- 
tic theory into the nuts, bolts, and 
lot boxes of an open political system. 

Democratic countries have a par- 
ilar obligation to reach out and assist 

After the short 1948 civil war, a 
coalition of Costa Ricans looked at 
their own and their neighbors' 
political experiences and set out to 
create a legal framework to prevent 
abuses and assure a democratic 
future for the country. The document 
they wrote has been religiously 
followed since. Among other things, 
the Constitution of 1949: 

• Permanently eliminated the 
army {not as an expression of "neu- 
tralism" — the civil war resulted part- 
ly in the explicit choice of democracy 
over communism — but to end any in- 
stitutionalized military threat to 
elected civilian government); 

each other and those on the path to 
democracy. If they do not, they leave 
the field to those who are opposed to 
democracy. As President Eisenhower 
said on return from his 1960 South 
American trip: 

... all nations— large or small, powerful 
or weak— should assume some responsibility 
for the advancement of humankind. . . . 
Cooperation among free nations is the key to 
common progress. 

Economic Growth and Adjustment 

With economic recession challenging 
social and political stability in several 
hemisphere countries, economic adjust- 
ment is not a matter of choice but of 
necessity. If economies are to grow, 
they must do so in accordance with 
market forces, not in opposition to them. 
Stable and equitable growth in the 
future requires economic adjustment 

We in the United States have 
learned that lesson ourselves. The deci- 
sions we took to foster the resurgence of 
the American economy were not easy. 
Costs were incurred. At the height of 
the adjustment process, unemployment 
reached painfully high levels and in- 
dustrial production declined markedly. 
But we are now reaping the benefits of 
the hard decisions we made earlier. In- 
dustrial production is expanding. Infla- 
tion is down and personal income is up. 
And in the past two quarters, our gross 
national product (GNP) grew much 
faster than anticipated. 

• Created an independent 
"Supreme Electoral Tribunal," a 
fourth branch of government co-equal 
with the traditional three and with 
remarkably independent powers 
designed to assure scrupulously clean 

• Elaborated a complex system 
of checks, balances, and independent 
financing aimed at preventing undue 
concentration of power anywhere in 
the government; and 

• Prohibited presidential reelec- 
tion (not only of the incumbent, but 
of anyone in his/her cabinet or im- 
mediate family). 

Direct parallels cannot be drawn be- 
tween the situation in the heavily in- 
debted developing countries of Latin 
America and in the United States. But 
there is a lesson to be learned from our 
experience. It is clear that to achieve 
sustained noninflationary growth coun- 
tries need policies that reflect economic 
realities and release the productive 
forces of their people. 

Governments often face agonizing 
choices in the political management of 
adjustment. They must distribute the 
burdens of that adjustment. And they 
often must decide between taking hard 
measures at once or trying to postpone 
economic shocks— with the risk that 
those shocks will be more severe and 
violent later on. These are real dilemmas 
for which there is no simple or universal 

Democratic governments, with broad 
popular participation and support, are 
especially well positioned to deal with 
these tough decisions. As Costa Rican 
President Luis Alberto Monge told the 
International Labor Organization in 
Geneva on June 12, 1984: 

We have drawn back from the gulf [by 
adopting] some very bitter and harsh deci- 
sions in order to improve a sick economy. . . . 
Democracy works as a means of settling the 
problems of production and to win battles in 
the struggle against under-development and 

We are acutely aware of the scope 
and seriousness of the economic prob- 
lems confronting the hemisphere. We 
are concerned, and we are helping. 


The United States and the other in- 
dustrialized countries will continue to 
respond constructively to external debt 
and other economic problems. It would 
be a disservice to all nations to weaken 
the very international instruments that 
can help troubled economies adapt to 
new economic realities. But it would be 
an equal disservice not to recognize the 
need for flexibility and understanding. 

The June economic summit in Lon- 
don carefully considered debt-related 
issues. The summit leaders confirmed a 
basic strategy centered on adjustment, 
growth, and support and agreed to 
develop it flexibly, case by case. They 
also agreed on measures to strengthen 
and broaden that strategy over time. 

The summit leaders also pledged to 
maintain and, where possible, increase 
bilateral and multilateral assistance, par- 
ticularly to the poorest countries. They 
encouraged the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to continue its key role of 
helping debtor countries make necessary 
policy changes. And they asked the 
World Bank to strengthen its role in 
fostering economic development, urging 
closer cooperation between the IMF and 
the Bank. 

This approach has been successful in 
avoiding systematic crisis. Indeed, we 
have come a long way since August 
1982, when Mexico's acute lack of 
liquidity raised fears that the interna- 
tional financial system might sudddenly 

We and other creditor governments 
quickly provided temporary bridge fi- 
nancing to deal with immediate liquidity 
problems and began developing continu- 
ing measures to support Mexico's 
economic adjustment program. We have 
since collaborated on the official credits 
involved in financial support packages 
for a variety of debtor countries. 

The responses of the United States, 
other creditor governments, commercial 
banks, the IMF, and other institutions 
reflect a more activist and creative ap- 
proach to the hemisphere's economic 

Some countries, notably Mexico and 
Brazil, have made significant progress in 
adjusting their economies. Almost no 
country— from Jamaica to Peru, from 
the Dominican Republic to Costa Rica- 
has escaped the crisis or has failed to 
act to meet it. It is important that they 
be able to service their debt and bring 
about a resumption of sustainable, non- 
inflationary growth. 

Opinion Polling 
in Latin America 

Thomas Jefferson wrote that "it is 
rare that the public sentiment decides 
immorally or unwisely, and the in- 
dividual who differs from it ought to 
distrust and examine well his own 
opinion." Scientific polling is a mod- 
ern reflection of that sentiment — 
a common practice in democratic 
states, including in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 

Several dozen respected public 
opinion firms, from Mexico to Argen- 
tina, engage in a wide range of 
political polling, from in-depth in- 
quiries into citizen concerns to can- 
didate popularity polls. Some are 
associated with well-known compa- 
nies like Gallup, and internationally 
accepted survey methods are the rule. 

Individual companies have dem- 
onstrated the validity and usefulness 
of polling even in disturbed areas. In 
Central America, for example, poll- 
sters have elicited public attitudes on 
such diverse themes as regional peace 
talks, the impact of U.S. policies, and 
the effects of economic adjustment. 

To help make that possible, and to 
support democratic processes 
throughout the hemisphere, LT.S. policy 
has sought to provide assistance to help 
governments implement adjustment 
measures conducive to long-term 
political and economic stability. 

• The United States has made un- 
precedented use of Commodity Credit 
Corporation guarantees and special 
Export-Import Bank guarantee and in- 
surance programs as specific debt 
management tools. We and our Paris 
Club colleagues have been flexible in 
rescheduling debt on a case-by-case 
basis. The debts of more countries are 
being rescheduled, including principal 
and interest, with longer repayment 
terms and grace periods. 

• Our approach inclu(^es encourag- 
ing commercial bankers to maintain pru- 
dent involvement in lending and re- 
scheduling. Commercial bank reschedul- 
ing and lending terms have improved 
over the past 18 months for countries 
which have successful adjustment pro- 
grams—lower rescheduling and other 
fees, a drop in "spreads," lengthening 
repayment periods, and the rescheduling 
of maturities over multiyear periods. 


• Adequate funding for the inter 
tional financial institutions is an intej 
part of the solution. We have encour- 
aged the evolution of the role of the 
IMF and other international financia 
stitutions over the past 18 months. 
Working with the Congress last year 
we secured a major increase in IMF 
re.sources. The IMF is increasingly s( 
sitive to political and social strains a< 
companying painful economic adjust- 
ment programs. The Fund, for exam 
has been innovative in defining the 
public sector deficit targets for Peru 
Brazil and has negotiated more liber 
targets for Mexico and Chile. 

• We have worked for the favor 
evolution of World Bank operations, 
couraging such innovations as struct 
adjustment loans, which offer financ 
support over the medium term to co 
tries undertaking economic reforms. 
And we are examining development 
bottlenecks resulting from inadequai 
counterpart or local currency funds 
under World Bank lending. 

• An important part of our stra 
egy, and one that depends heavily o 
Congress for support, is to prevent 
tectionist measures from inhibiting " 
American access to the U.S. market 
The hemisphere's share of U.S. imp' 
has grown from 13% ($23 billion) in 
1978 to 16% in 1983 (.$41.7 billion)- 
withstanding recessions, debt crises 
competition from other regions. Tht 
outlook for hemisphere exports to t 
United States is positive. U.S. impo 
from Latin America and the Caribb 
in 1983 were up by 11% over 1982. 
preliminary data for 1984— first qu£ 
figures— show an increase of 31% o 
the first quarter of 1983. 

• The Caribbean Basin Initiativ 
(CBI) is a milestone. The CBI open: 
new opportunities for trade, investi 
employment, and broad-based grow 
the reg^ion. Its 12-year life represer 
long-term LI.S. political commitmen 
with incentives beyond its immedia 
trade objectives. Countries with thf 
policy framework to promote invest 
and innovation will best be able to : 
trade opportunities, increasing verj 
significantly the payoff for appropr 
economic policies. 

• Another significant step is th 
trade credit guarantee program rec 
mended for Central America by th( 
tional Bipartisan Commission on C( 
America, included in the foreign ai( 
authorization bill, which passed the 
House in May. 




n all these efforts, we are keenly 
e that our programs and policies, 
ver supportive, cannot be decisive. 
Tiain responsibility for economic 
opment lies with the developing 
tries themselves. The flow of new 
ng from the industrialized countries 
ely to remain below recent levels 
n e.xtended period of time. Yet 
oping countries continue to need 
capital for development than they 
enerate internally, 
'oreign direct investment is, there- 
likely to grow in importance as an 
le of development in Latin America, 
■t investment, particularly new equi- 
pital, offers the recipient country 
' advantages over external debt. 

Equity investment is cheaper to 
ce, especially in hard times. Al- 
ih interest must be paid regardless, 
ts are remitted only when they are 

Equity brings with it technology, 
and management skills that are 
to acquire in other ways. 

Direct investment encourages 
ration into the world system, 
ring a more open trading system 
e protectionist pressures can be 
ted more readily. 

'he United States is the source of 
y 60% of all foreign direct invest- 
in Latin America and the Carib- 
. Investment flows respond to 
)mic conditions and to fiscal, trade, 
■xchange-rate policies in the recipi- 
ountries. Nations that choose to 
e an attractive climate for foreign 
tors can expect to attract an in- 
;ed portion of the available funds, 
will thus reduce their dependence 
;bt for growth. We encourage this. 
!ut we recognize that the debtor 
;ries alone, even with wise policies, 
Dt surmount the current crisis. Our 
;ance is necessary— and we will con- 
to provide it. The cooperation of 
' lending countries is vital— and it 
'een forthcoming. The international 
cial institutions have an essential 
;o play— and they are playing it. 
this support, we believe the 
)nsible and democratic governments 
e hemisphere can meet the 
imic challenges that confront them. 


The export of violence by Cuba and 
Nicaragua with Soviet backing is the 
principal external security threat to 
democracy in the hemisphere. U.S. 
security assistance and training are 
essential to help our neighbors defend 
themselves against this threat. As a 
demonstration of our resolve and to im- 
prove the capability of our own and 
regional forces, we continue to conduct 
joint exercises and maneuvers in the 

At the same time, our diplomats are 
working actively to contain the threat 
posed by Nicaragua's military ties to 
Cuba and the Soviet bloc, its subversive 
activities, militarization, and internal 
repression. We believe the Contadora 
process provides the means to negotiate 
a comprehensive, verifiable, and durable 
regional solution. 

The leaders of the Caribbean under- 
stand well the vital importance of collec- 
tive effort. Pioneers of economic and 
political cooperation in CARICOM, they 
helped inspire the Caribbean Basin Ini- 
tiative to broaden that cooperation to in- 
clude both Central America and the in- 
dustrialized world. Similarly, faced with 
what one Caribbean leader called "an 

Democracy in 
the Caribbean 

The constitutions of the English- 
speaking nations of the Caribbean 
build on the British or "Westminster" 
model which has been followed in the 
region for over 300 years. Generally 
speaking, each nation elects a lower 
house or assembly roughly equivalent 
to the House of Commons, based on 
single member constituencies for a 
term of no more than 5 years. The 
leader of the majority party or coali- 
tion becomes Prime Minister, names 
a cabinet, and is responsible for 
governing during the term. An ap- 
pointed Senate with minority repre- 
sentation sits for the duration of the 
term of the lower house. In those 
states whose constitution provides for 
it, a Governor-General represents the 
Queen. But this connection is only 
with the monarch, not at all with the 
Government or Prime Minister of 
Great Britain. The tradition of 
career, nonpartisan public service 
also runs deep in the Caribbean. 

ideology of violence whose aim is to 
undo democracy," the democracies of the 
eastern Caribbean, in particular, and the 
Caribbean as a whole did not vacillate in 
cooperating to restore order in Grenada 
in 1983. 

Defense against the illicit narcotics 
trade entails cooperation of a similar 
kind among those in the region who 
recognize the threat and seek our active 
help— primarily in helping to fund what 
is, after all, a war against a well-armed 
and ruthless enemy. 


Although its mandate was confined to 
Central America, the National Bipar- 
tisan Commission on Central America 
could not avoid a broader conclusion in 
its report to the President: 

Powerful forces are on the march in near- 
ly every country of the hemisphere, testing 
how nations shall be organized and by what 
process authority shall be established and 
legitimized. Who shall govern and under what 
forms are the central issues in the process of 
change now under way in country after coun- 
try throughout Latin America and the Carib- 

The United States is powerful 
enough to make a difference in favor of 
democracy. But successive LJ.S. Admini- 
strations and Congresses, Republicans 
and Democrats, have learned that our 
own democratic example and national 
power are not enough to make a decisive 
difference in the face of indifference 

The important thing— the key to 
understanding how the United States 
should be conducting itself in this hemi- 
sphere—is that today indifference 
toward democracy is disappearing in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Re- 
cent experience demonstrates this 
remarkable truth— in Central America, 
in the Andean countries, in Brazil, in the 
Caribbean, and in the Southern Cone. 
The voting statistics, the personal 
testimony of election observers, the 
palpable solidarity felt by anyone who 
has attended a Latin or Caribbean in- 
auguration over the last 5 years— all 
evidence the growing sense of participa- 
tion in national political life. 

In international political cooperation 
today, the Contadora process is a critical 
experiment. It says a great deal about 
the invigorated power of the democratic 
idea that this group of countries has 
reached the "revolutionary" conclusion 



on Democracy 

in Central America 

On September 9, 1983, all nine par- 
ticipants in the Contadora peace proc- 
ess* agreed on a 21-point "Document 
of Objectives" — a framework for ad- 
dressing obstacles to peace in the 
region. Two of those objectives dealt 
specifically with internal democracy: 

To adopt measures conducive to the 
establishment and, where appropriate, im- 
provement of democratic, representative 
and pluralistic systems that will guarantee 
effective popular participation in the 
decision-making process and ensure that 
the various currents of opinion have free 
access to fair and regular elections based 
on the full observance of citizens' rights; 

To promote national reconciliation ef- 
forts wherever deep divisions have taken 
place within society, with a view to foster- 
ing participation in democratic processes 
in accordance with the law. . . . 

*Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama, and Venezuela. 

that democracy is absolutely essential 
for peace and development in Central 
America (see above). 

Are these— and the more specific 
benchmarks elaborated within the proc- 
ess since then— not standards which we 
can all support? Don't they reveal both 
an understanding of democracy and a 
rejection of indifference? 

Can there be any question of the 
results of any comparative application of 
these same benchmarks to the two Cen- 
tral American countries most often in 
the news: El Salvador and Nicaragua? 
Whose election experience or plans meet 
the standard? In which country is there 
"free access"? In which country are 
there "fair and regular elections"? Which 
country is promoting "national recon- 
ciliation efforts" on the basis of "foster- 
ing participation in democratic proc- 
esses"? The answer in each case is El 

Those inclined to answer differently 
might ponder what Peruvian novelist 
Mario Vargas Llosa wrote in 1983: 

When an American or European intellec- 
tual—or liberal newspaper or institution— ad- 
vocates for Latin American countries political 
options and methods he would never 
countenance in his own society, he is betray- 
ing a fundamental doubt about the capacity 
of the Latin American countries to achieve 
the liberty and the respect for the rights of 
others that prevail in the Western democ- 
racies. In most cases, the problem is an un- 
conscious prejudice, an inchoate sentiment, a 
sort of visceral racism, which these per- 
sons—who generally have unimpeachable 
liberal and democratic credentials— would 
sharply disavow if they were suddenly made 
aware of it. 

Vargas Llosa is right. Too many of 
us have not looked at what is happening 
in Latin America closely enough to get 
beyond the stereotypes. 

It is time to bury the canard that 
Latin Americans are "incapable of 

democracy." The United States cannc 
afford ignorance, indifference, or in- 

Our policy must be a program of 
understanding, of action, and of 
democractic solidarity. Recent histor 
proclaims the strength of Latin 
America's drive for democracy. By e 
couraging it and supporting it, we at 
not "exporting" our own ideology or 
posing" something "made only in US 
We are helping our neighbors fulfill 
their own aspirations. And in doing 
we are confirming our own deepest ; 
most hopeful convictions. 

'The complete transcript of the hear 
will be published by the committee and v 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing C 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

The "Coordinadora" Nine Points 

Following, in translation, is a sum- 
mary of the nine points first made in 
December 1983 by the opposition 
Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating 
Board (made up of three political 
parties, two labor unions, and the 
umbrella private sector organization) 
as a basis for free elections in 

1. Separation of State and Par- 
ty. The army, the militia, the police, 
the Sandinista Television Service, and 
others must be part of the state and 
not of the FSLN [Sandinista National 
Liberation Front]. 

2. Repeal of Laws That Violate 
Human Rights. The code that 
restricts freedom of expression in the 
press, radio, and television must be 
abrogated. The laws that violate 
private ownership and others must be 

3. Suspension of the State of 
Emergency. Suspension of the state 
of emergency and full exercise of 
freedom of expression and informa- 

4. Amnesty Law. A general 
amnesty law that will permit the par- 

ticipation of all Nicaraguan citizens 
the electoral process. 

5. Respect for Freedom of Wo 
ship. Freedom for priests, pastors, 
and the faithful to perform their 
religious ceremonies. 

6. Union Freedom. The full ex< 
cise of workers' rights, including th 
right to strike, to organize, and to 
bargain collectively. 

7. Autonomy of the Judicial 
Branch. The judicial branch to hav' 
true independence from the govern 
ment party and from the legislative 
and executive branches. 

8. Protective Law With 
Recourse to Unconstitutionality. 
Recognition of the Fundamental 
Statute and the Statute of Rights ; 
Guarantees as the Supreme Law u 
a new constitution is enacted, so tl 
these will not be changed at the w' 
of the government. 

9. National Dialogue To Hold 
Elections in the Presence of the 
Contadora Group or the GAS. Al 
political parties and movements, ir 
eluding those in arms, should 
negotiate on the elections. 



-,t ,^f CtotQ Ol 


untry Summaries 

]ua and Barbuda 

: jua and Barbuda gained its in- 
ndence from the United Kingdom in 
?mber 1981. Prime Minister Vere C. 
Sr., leads the Antigua Labour 
y (ALP). The Progressive Labour 
ment (PLM) is the major opposition 
f but lost its representation in 
ament when the ALP swept open 
ions in 1984. A third party, the 
gua Caribbean Liberation Move- 
has little support. 








)ctober 30, 1983, Radical Civic 
)n Party leader Raul Alfonsin was 
ed president after a hotly contested 
free campaign against the candidate 
le Justicialist (Peronist) Party. A 
rd-breaking turnout of more than 15 
on gave Alfonsin an absolute majori- 
the presidential vote. The Radicals 
won control of the Chamber of 
aties, but no party obtained a ma- 
y in the Senate. One-third of the 
ite and one-half of the House will be 
wed in both 1985 and 1987. 
Argentina's return to democracy 
r almost a decade of internal conflict 
military rule was one of the most 
ificant political events in 1983. The 
guration of President Alfonsin in 
ember was a powerful and emotional 
bration. Vice President Bush headed 
U.S. delegation. Representatives of 
itries that have become democratic 
le past decade — including Spain, 
tugal, Peru, and Ecuador — were 
Tiinent. The United States shares 
1 other democracies a vocation to 
nd and promote the democratic 


The Bahamas 

Type of I I Date of Most 
Election(s) | | Recent Election(s) 



Date of 
ext Election(s) 




The 1982 elections gave Prime Minister 
Lynden 0. Pindling's Progressive 
Liberal Party (PLP) its fifth straight vic- 
tory. Four other parties contested the 
elections, but only the Free National 
Movement received sufficient support to 
be represented in the Parliament. All 
parties had free and equal access to the 





One of the most stable and prosperous 
countries in the Caribbean, Barbados is 
an open parliamentary democracy in the 
British tradition. J.M.G. "Tom" Adams, 
leader of the Barbados Labour Party 
(BLP), is Prime Minister. The main op- 
position is provided by the Democratic 
Labour Party (DLP). 


National Assembly 



Belize, which achieved independence in 
1981 after an extended period of inter- 
nal self-government, has a democratic 
and parliamentary form of government. 
By law, general elections must be held 
by February 1985. In the 1979 election, 
the People's United Party, led by George 
C. Price, won .52% of the vote and the 
United Democratic Party 47%. The up- 
coming election also will be contested by 
the Christian Democratic Party. 







After 18 years of military rule, Bolivian 
democracy was restored on October 10, 
1982, when former President Hernan 
Siles Zuazo was elected president in a 
second-round vote by Congress and in- 
stalled as constitutional president. Siles 
had obtained a plurality of the 1.4 
million votes cast in June 1980 but had 
been prevented from assuming office by 
a July 1980 coup that led to three 
military regimes. Congress is responsi- 
ble for setting election dates and seems 
likely to return to the traditional 
timetable by which a new president 
would be inaugurated on August 6, 

U.S. support for the constitutional 
order has been a significant factor in 
buttressing Bolivian democracy, which 
faces difficult political, narcotics, and 
economic problems. President Siles 
publicly thanked the United States for 
its role in helping to frustrate the 
June 30, 1984, coup attempt in which he 
was kidnaped. 


President (indirect) 



Congress, State, 



Brazil has taken significant strides 
toward a fully representative govern- 
ment. Its opening to democracy, or aher- 
fura, was amply demonstrated in the 
November 1982 congressional, state, and 
municipal elections in which over 48 
million voters chose some 40,000 of- 
ficials. The opposition parties won 10 of 
the 22 contested governships, including 
all but one of the important industrial 
states in populous southern Brazil. In 
the 69-member Senate, the governing 
Democratic Social Party (PDS) won 15 
of the contested seats for a total of 46, 


or a two-thirds majority. The major op- 
position party, the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement (PMDB), won 9 seats for a 
total of 21. Of the 479 seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies, all of which were 
at stake, the PDS won 235 and the 
PMDB 200, so that neither of the major 
parties commands a majority. 

The 1982 elections also determined 
the composition of the electoral college 
which will select the successor to Presi- 
dent Joao Figueiredo on January 15, 
1985. The 686-member college will 
consist of all Federal Senators and 
Deputies and six members of the majori- 
ty party of each state legislative 
assembly. Only the two major parties 
are presenting candidates. The PDS has 
nominated Sao Paulo Federal Deputy 
Paulo Maluf; the PMDB has chosen 
Minas Gerais Governor Tancredo Neves. 
The election, which is expected to be 
hotly contested, will produce Brazil's 
first civilian president in over 20 years. 
Both candidates are campaigning on 
platforms calling for direct presidential 
elections in 1988. As elsewhere, U.S. 
policy is wholeheartedly in support of 
the democratic process, but neutral 
about who wins. 






Chile came under military rule in 
September 1973. A constitution ratified 
by plebiscite in September 1980 took ef- 
fect in March 1981. Though its provi- 
sions and the conditions under which it 
was ratified were criticized by opposition 
groups, this constitution confirmed 
Augusto Pinochet as president until 
1989, at which time another plebiscite is 
scheduled to vote on the junta's nominee 
to succeed him. If the nominee wins, he 
would be inaugurated on September 18, 
1989. If the nominee is rejected in the 
vote, Pinochet would remain in office, 
and open presidential elections would be 
held on March 18, 1990, concurrent with 
elections for Congress. Opposition 
groups have proposed several changes to 
this election timetable process. 

Some political liberalization occurred 
during 1983. The government is now 
considering a law which would legalize 

I [Type of 



some political parties. There is no formal 
dialogue between the government and 
and the opposition but informal contacts 
have taken place. The U.S. strongly sup- 
ports the return to elected, democratic, 
civilian government in Chile. We hope 
the process of communication between 
the government and the opposition will 
produce a consensus on a return to 


State, Local 






State, Municipal, 



Colombia has been an active democracy 
for more than 25 years. Power has alter- 
nated between the Liberal and Conser- 
vative parties. Belisario Betancur of the 
Conservative Party was elected presi- 
dent in May 1982, winning decisively 
over Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, a former 
president and Liberal Party candidate. 
Colombian democracy confronts a 
low-level but persistent Cuban-backed 
insurgency, as well as the narcotics 
scourge. Colombia has begun to take ex- 
traordinary steps to stamp out narcotics 
trafficking and President Betancur has 
negotiated a cease-fire with the largest 
guerrilla group, offering them the oppor- 
tunity to lay down their arms and join 
the country's free political life. 

Costa Rica 

Legislative Assembly 



The elections of 1899 began a trend of 
free and honest elections that have 
enabled Costa Rica to evolve into a 
democratic republic with a strong 
system of checks and balances. 

The electoral process is supervised 
by the powerful Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal, selected by Costa Rica's 

Date of Most 
Recent Election(s) 


Date of 
Next Electic 

Supreme Court of Justice. The purpos 
of this unique fourth branch of goverr 
ment is to guarantee free and fair ele( 

President Luis Alberto Monge is ;: 
member of the leading political party, 
the National Liberation Party (PLN). 
The PLN is social-democratic in 
philosophy. With but one exception, tl 
PLN and various non-PLN coalitions 
have alternated in the presidency in 
every election since 1953. 


Cuba is a communist one-party state, 
and the key exception to the prevailin 
democratic environment in the Carib- 
bean. Although a self-professed cham 
pion of "national liberation" where otl 
countries are concerned, Cuba itself is 
one of the least democratic, least in- 
dependent countries in the world. 

Candidates for "election" are dete 
mined by the Communist Party. Ther 
no concept of legal organized oppositi 
Suffrage, limited to voting for local 
assemblies, is universal for citizens a^ 
16 and over except for those who hav 
applied for permanent emigration. Oi 
sitting members of the local assembli< 
may vote to choose members of regio 
assemblies and of the National Peopk 
Assembly. Membership in a local 
assembly is not, however, a requirem 
for candidacy to the National Assemt 
This assures seats to all Politburo 
members and other high-ranking govi 
ment and party officials. The Nations 
People's Assembly selects a council o; 
ministers, again under the direction t 
the Com.munist Party. 

Twenty-five years after coming t( 
power, Fidel Castro rules through 
classic Marxist-Leninist methods, in- 
cluding direct repression. Behind the 
ideological smokescreen he has estab- 
lished, Castro's government is the 
despotism of the traditional caudillo ; 
gravated by unprecedented subservie 
to foreign interests. Cuba adheres clc 
ly to Soviet political and military 
guidance. Only a massive Soviet subs 
of $12-$13 million per day keeps the 
Cuban people from even greater priv; 



Type of 


Date of Most 
Recent Election(s) 


Date of 

Next Election(s) 


jse of Assembly 



le Minister Mary Eugenia Charles 
the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) 
ed control of the House of Assembly 
fair and open election. The DFP 
?ntly holds 17 of 21 seats. Opposing 
es are the Dominica Labour Party, 
Democratic Labour Party of 
inica, and a leftist grouping called 
inica Liberation Movement Alliance. 

inican Republic 




Dominican Republic turned to 
Dcratic institutions after a long 
)d of dictatorship and social and 
ical upheaval. In spite of destabil- 
: economic problems, democracy con- 
s to gain strength there, as 
snced by strongly contested elec- 
; in 1978 and 1982. Suffrage is 
ersal and compulsory for those over 

Three major parties contested the 

presidential elections in which 1.7 
DH citizens elected Salvador Jorge 
CO of the Dominican Revolutionary 
y as president. The opposition par- 
the Reformist Party and the 
inican Liberation Party, have 
esentation at all levels of the 
rnment — federal, state, and local. 











'.ident Leon Febres-Cordero was in- 
irated on August 10, 1984, marking 
first transition in 24 years from one 
;ed democratic government to 
her. President Febres-Cordero, a 
nessman, is a member of the Social 

Christian Party (PSC), which allied itself 
with several other parties in a coalition 
called the National Reconstruction Front 
to oppose Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, the 
candidate of the Democratic Left (ID), 
also supported by a coalition of political 
parties, some of which supported the 
outgoing government of President 
Osvaldo Hurtado. 

El Salvador 

Legislative Assembly, 









El Salvador's political structure is 
established by a constitution that 
entered into force in December 1983. 
The Constitution was written by a con- 
stituent assembly elected in a direct 
popular vote in 1982. The 1982 elections 
for the assembly were part of a program 
of democratization agreed to among the 
military officers responsible for the coup 
in 1979 and the Christian Democratic 
Party. Automatic registration for the 
elections was offered to the political par- 
ties allied with the guerrilla umbrella 
organization, the Farabundo Marti Na- 
tional Liberation Front (FMLN), but re- 
jected by them. 

Jose Napoleon Duarte was elected 
president on May 6, 1984. International 
observers attested to the fairness of the 
1984 presidential elections. Eight can- 
didates representing a broad political 
spectrum competed in the first round. 
Jose Napoleon Duarte, a founder of the 
Christian Democratic Party, won 54% of 
the votes in a run-off against ARENA 
[National Republican Alliance] candidate 
Roberto D'Aubuisson. Over 80% of the 
electorate went to the polls. 

Despite communist subversion, 
rightwing terrorism, crushing economic 
difficulties, and a history of repression, 
the people of El Salvador have 
persevered in constructing democratic 
institutions. The legislative and 
municipal elections to be held in the 
spring of 1985 will provide a further op- 

portunity for political parties associated 
with the guerrillas to compete demo- 
cratically for power. The United States 
strongly supports President Duarte's ef- 
forts to bring about such a national 
reconciliation through democratic pro- 




By the 

end of 


The erratic rule of Sir Eric Gairy was 
forcibly ended on March 13, 1979, by 
Maurice Bishop and the New JEWEL 
[Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, 
and Liberation] Movement. The Con- 
stitution was suspended, elections 
postponed indefinitely, and an extraor- 
dinary military buildup begun under 
Cuban and Soviet advisers. 

In October 1983, Grenada's eastern 
Caribbean neighbors proved their 
democratic mettle when they acted — 
without hesitation and with the support 
of other democratic nations, including 
the United States — to restore order in 
Grenada after the country had fallen 
prey to a bloody power struggle among 
its Marxist-Leninist leaders. Their collec- 
tive action made it possible for Grena- 
dians to resume their democratic 
heritage. An interim government was 
appointed by Governor-General Paul 
Scoon in November 1983. Parliamentary 
elections are expected to take place 
before the end of 1984. 





Constituent Assembly 



On March 23, 1982, Efrain Rios Montt 
was named president after Gen. Lucas 
Garcia was ousted in a bloodless coup. 
On August 8, 1983, Gen. Oscar 
Humberto Mejia Victores seized power 
from Rios Montt and pledged a prompt 
return to democracy. International 
observers invited to witness the Con- 
stitutent Assembly elections, held July 1, 
1984, were favorably impressed by their 



fairness; 73% of registered voters par- 
ticipated. The assembly, inaugurated on 
August 1, 1984, will write a new con- 
stitution and electoral law. The expecta- 
tion is widespread that presidential elec- 
tions will facilitate a return to civilian 
control in 1985. 

Guatemala faces formidable social, 
cultural, human rights, and economic 
problems, but the 1984 election, which 
was conducted openly and fairly, has en- 
couraged democrats everywhere. We 
support continued progress toward 


National Assembly 



While Guyana maintains the structure of 
a multiparty parliamentary republic 
within the Commonwealth, its 1980 
Constitution defines the country as a 
"democratic sovereign state in the 
course of transition from capitalism to 
socialism." The ruling party and its 
leader, Forbes Burnham, have imposed 
a minority government on the nation, 
resulting in an erosion of democratic 


National Assembly 








Impoverished and lacking democratic 
traditions, Haiti follows a constitution 
which, as amended in 1983, provides for 
lifetime President Jean-Claude Duvalier 
to designate his successor and legislative 
elections to be held every 6 years. 

Although violence has been reduced, 
major human rights problems exist, in- 
cluding abuse of due process and a lack 
of freedom of speech, press, and associa- 
tion. For the first time, however, the 
government has announced plans for 


Type of 


legislation governing political party ac- 
tivities; recognized a labor federation; 
and called for judicial reform, strict 
observance of legality, and an end to in- 
terference in the judicial process. Press 
controls have been theoretically relaxed, 
but the recent temporary detention of 
several journalists raises serious ques- 
tions about this process. 





The April 1980 Constituent Assembly 
elections began a process that ended 
nearly 18 years of military rule. In 
January 1982 full democratic civilian 
government was restored to Honduras. 

Roberto Suazo Cordova, of the 
Liberal Party, was elected president 
with about 54% of the votes. The 
Liberal Party won 44 of 82 congres- 
sional seats. The major opposition party, 
the National Party, won 34 seats. 

Despite severe economic problems, 
the upheavals of the region, and the 
need to safeguard itself against 
Nicaragua, Honduras continues along 
the democratic path under able civilian 





Jamaica has been a stable functioning 
democracy since obtaining independence 
in 1962. Elections are held at the discre- 
tion of the Governor-General upon ad- 
vice of the Prime Minister, but not less 
than every 5 years. 

Prime Minister Edward Seaga's 
Labour Party (JPL) won the December 
1983 elections. The chief opposition 
party, the People's Niitional Party (PNP) 
led by Michael Manley, boycotted the 
elections and did not post any can- 
didates. JPL candidates won all but 6 
(contested by small minority parties) of 
60 Parliament seats. Thus, although the 
JPL and the PNP have regularly alter- 
nated in power, the JPL now heads a 
single-party government. Many 

Date of Most 
Recent Election(s) 

' ' N 

Date of 
ext Electic 

observers anticipate that with the 
clarification of the voter registration 
issue that resulted in the PNP boycot 
PNP participation in the electoral pre 
ess will resume. 


Deputies, Certain 
State Governors, 



President, Senators, 




Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado was 
elected president on July 4, 1982. Pn 
dent and senators are elected for coii 
ciding 6-year terms; governors at sta 
gered intervals for 6-year terms; 
deputies and municipal officials for 
3-year terms. 

Mexico has had an evolving demc 
cratic system for more than 50 years 
Recent constitutional amendments le 
expanded representation of oppositio 
parties, including the National Actioi 
Party (PAN) and the Mexican Unifie 
Socialist Party (PSUM), which in 
1982-83 carried some important 
municipal elections traditionally won 
the ruling Institutional Revolutionar; 
Party (PRI). President de la Madrid 
key advisers are deeply engaged in e 
forts to resolve Mexico's most seriou 
economic and financial problems sine 
the Great Depression; his 
administration's programs include 
broadening popular participation in 


Council of State 




Sandinista Nicaragua contrasts shar 
with progress toward more open an( 
tolerant societies elsewhere in Centr 
America. Despite promises of free el 
tions and nonalignment, the Sandinii 
in the 5 years since taking power in 


Denartmfint of Statft Bu 


□Type of I I 
Election(s) I 1 

Date of [VIost 
Recent Election(s) 


Date of 

Next Election(s) 

developed a militarized Marxist- 
nist state with close ties to Cuba 
the Soviet Union. 
Videspread internal pressures and 
usionment abroad led the San- 
tas to announce elections for 
'mber 4, 1984. A genuine political 
ing in Nicaragua would be wel- 
d by the Ihiited States and others 
itin America and Western Europe, 
'ervasive FSLN [Sandinista Na- 
Liberation Front] presence and 
•ol throughout Nicaragnan society 
ts close identification with the 
rnment and armed forces provide it 
enormous leverage in an electoral 
tion. The coordinating body of the 
)cratic opposition has called on the 
rnment of Nicaragua several times, 
ining in December 1983, to take 
fie steps to create an environment 
ucive to genuine electoral competi- 
;see p. 9). To date, the government 
efused to significantly alter the 
of the game which greatly favor 
:overning FSLN party. Thus the 
r opposition parties have declined 
gister for the elections in November, 
^s of August 1984, it appeared that 
984 Nicaraguan elections could 
nble the 1974 Nicaraguan elections, 
lich the government candidate ob- 
d an overwhelming percentage of 
ote after ensuring the disqualifica- 
Df all potentially serious opposition. 



las Ardito Barletta was elected 
dent in May 1984 in Panama's first 
■t presidential election in 16 years. 
; than three-quarters of Panama's 
;s, 717,000 voters, participated in 
|, proved a very tight race. The op- 
ion Democratic Opposition Alliance 
3), its candidate Arnulfo Arias, and 
government party challenged votes 
any districts. 

i President, 



President and Congress serve concur- 
rent 5-year terms. President Alfredo 
Stroessner was reelected in 1983 to a 
seventh term that ends in February 
1988. The elections resulted in his 
Colorado Party receiving over 90% of 
the votes cast in a process flawed by 
campaign and media restrictions. Only 
two of the legally recognized opposition 
parties participated, the Liberal and the 
Radical Liberal parties. 

There has been little change in 
Paraguay's political system in recent 
years. A state of siege is continuously 
renewed, and human rights problems 
persist. At the same time, the govern- 
ment has taken some positive steps, 
such as releasing almost all political 
prisoners, allowing some political ac- 
tivitists to return to Paraguay after 
many years of exile, and arresting some 
police officials for abuse of authority. 



ional Assembly 












Fernando Belaunde Terry, founder of 
the Popular Action (AP) party, was 
elected president for the second time in 
1980. Reelected 12 years after he was 
deposed by a military coup, President 
Belaunde heads a democratic govern- 
ment that faces severe economic strains 
and terrorism from the indigenous 
Maoist guerrilla group, Sendero 
Luminoso. Nevertheless, Peru remains 
firmly on its democratic course. National 
elections planned for April 1985 will 
pave the way for the first constitutional 
turnover of power in 40 years. 

Belaunde's coalition partner, the 
Popular Christian Party (PPC), 
withdrew from the government in May 
1984 in anticipation of the 1985 elec- 

tions. Candidates from the American 
Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) 
and from the United Left (lU) did well 
in the 1983 municipal elections. 

St. Christopher-Nevis 

House of Assembly 




St. Christopher-Nevis, which achieved 
independence from the United Kingdom 
on September 19, 1983, is a parliamen- 
tary democracy with a strong tradition 
of peaceful electoral change of 

Prime Minister Kennedy A. Sim- 
monds, leader of the People's Action 
Movement rules in coalition with the 
Nevis Reformation Party led by Simeon 
Daniel. This coalition government was 
recently returned to power in peaceful 
democratic elections. The leader of the 
opposing St. Christopher-Nevis Labour 
Party, Lee Moore, lost his seat, thus 
limiting his ability to challenge the pres- 
ent government. 

St. Lucia 




The St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) won 
the first postindependence elections in 
1979, winning 12 of the 17 House of 
Assembly seats. By 1982 the political 
tide had turned, and Prime Minister 
John Compton's United Worker's Party 
defeated both the SLP and the Pro- 
gressive Labour Party (PLP), winning 
14 of the 17 seats. The PLP has been 
largely discredited since trying to send 
14 students to Libya for military 



St. Vincent and the Grenadines 

Milton Cato's St. Vincetit and the 
Grenadines Labour Party won the elec- 
tions held in 1979 and until 1984 held 12 
of 13 seats in the House of Assembly. 
The 1984 elections produced a peaceful 
upset, as James "Son" Mitchell and his 
New Democratic Party won 9 of the 13 
seats and took control of Parliament. 


Until a violent military coup in February 
1980, Suriname was a functioning 
democracy with a history largely free of 
violence. The military government 
headed by Lt. Col. Desire Bouterse has 
suspended the constitution and has not 
announced any plans for elections. In 
December 1982, 15 national leaders 
were killed while in government custody. 
There has been some dialogue among 
various political and social groups, but 
power remains in the hands of the army. 

Trinidad and Tobago 




Trinidad and Tobago has been a func- 
tioning and stable democracy since it 
achieved independence in 1962. 

Prime Minister George Chamber's 
People's National Movement (PNM) won 
the 1981 elections. Of the eight political 

□ Type of I I 
Election(s) 1 I 

parties contesting the elections, the 
PNM, the United Labour Front (ULF), 
the Democratic Action Congress (DAC), 
and the Tapia House Movement (THM) 
won seats in the assembly. The elections 
were hotly contested with all parties ac- 
tively campaigning for popular support. 








Uruguay has been under military rule 
since 1973. In 1980 a constitution 
drafted by the military and widely 
criticized as undemocratic was rejected 
in a plebiscite. In September 1981, the 
military selected a retired general, 
Gregorio Alvarez, as president. 

Since 1981, Uruguay has pr-oceeded 
on an accelerated course toward a 
democratic transition. The military 
recently deproscribed the Blanco and 
Colorado parties and most of the consti- 
tuent member parties of the Broad 
Front. An agreement has been con- 
cluded between the Colorados, the 
Broad Front, and the military governing 
the modalities of the transition to 
civilian rule. Elections are scheduled for 
November 1984. Although the Blanco 
Party did not participate in the agree- 
ment because of the detention of its 
leader, Wilson Ferreira, it does plan to 
take part in the election. The United 
States firmly supports the return of 
democracy to Uruguay. 

Date of Most 
Recent Election(s) 



Date of 
Next Elect 








Venezuela has had a democratic gov 
ment for over 25 years. Although 
smaller parties represent a full spec' 
of political tendencies, Venezuelan 
politics have evolved into a two-part 
system made up of COPE I and 
Democratic Action (AD), typifying 
respectively the classic international 
competition between Christian 
Democratic and Social Democratic c 
rents. Continuing a tradition of altei 
tion of power with COPEI, the AD's 
Jaime Lusinchi was elected presider 
December 1983— the first president 
be elected by an absolute majority s 
the restoration of democracy in 195! 
After the ouster of dictator Mar 
Perez Jimenez in 1958, the country 
cessfully fought both Cuban-backed 
surgents and rightwing extremists i 
early 1960s— but without sacrificing 
respect for human rights and the ru 
law. Few Venezuelans have forgott( 
how close their country came to losi 
its liberty, and 90% of Venezuela's i 
population typically turns out for 
presidential elections. 






Department of State Bl 

lendent Territories 


rated from St, Christt)pher-Nevis 
'Cember 1980, Anguilla remains 
tish ciependent territory. 

>h Virgin Islands 


slative Assembly 

British Virgin Islands is a British 
■n Colony with a parliamentary 
m of government. The most re- 
elections brought the United 
/, under the leadership of Cyril 
3niney, to power. The Virgin 
ds Party forms the opposition. 

nan Islands 

islative Assembly 

layman Islands is a British 
ndency with a parliamentary 

of government. The legislature 
nprised of 12 elected members 
i members appointed by the 

□ Type of 


Governor. Although there are no 
highly structured political parties, 
there are loosely structured political 
organizations or "teams." The Unity 
Team and the Progress with Dignity 
Team are represented in the 
Legislative Assembly. 


National Parliament, 
Chief Minister 



Montserrat is a British Crown Col- 
ony. Elections are held every 5 years. 
InMarch 1983, Chief Minister John 
Osborne was reelected, but his Peo- 
ple's Liberation Movement lost two of 
its seven seats in Parliament to the 
opposition People's Democratic Party. 

Netherlands Antilles 

The Netherlands Antilles has been a 
stable parliamentary democracy since 
the beginning of autonomy in 1954 as 
a part of the Kingdom of the Nether- 
lands. Federal Parliamentary elec- 

nch Overseas Departments 

Date of Most 
Recent Election(s) 


Date of 

Next Election(s) 

tions are mandatorily held every 4 
years but may be called sooner should 
the party or coalition in power lose 
its majority. None of the 12 parties 
participating in the Federal Parlia- 
ment election in 1982 received a ma- 
jority of the vote, and a coalition 
government was formed. 

Each of the islands has its own 
representative body, the Island Coun- 
cil, which enacts laws regarding local 
island affairs. 

Turks and Caicos Islands 

Legislative Council 



Federal Parliament 



The Turks and Caicos Islands is a 
British Crown colony. The most re- 
cent Legislative Council elections 
returned the People's National Party 
(PNP), headed by Norman Saunders, 
to power. The PNP won 8 of the 11 
Legislative Council seats with the op- 
position People's Democratic Move- 
ment winning three. 

ch Guiana 



General Council, 



General Council 



ich Guiana normally holds elec- 
5 every 5 years. It elects one 
itor and one Deputy to the 
ich Senate and National 

General Council elections normally 
are held every .5 years. Guadeloupe 
elects two Senators and three 
Deputies to the French Senate and 
National Assembly. 

General Council elections are usually 
held every 5 years. Martinique elects 
two Senators to the French Senate 
and three Deputies to the National 


40th Anniversary of 
the Warsaw Uprising 

President Reagan's remarks to guests 
at a White House luncheon marking the 
anniversary on August 17. 1984 J 

It's always an honor for me to be with 
individuals like yourselves who under- 
stand the value of freedom. I'm remind- 
ed of a story about a conversation be- 
tween one of our citizens and a Soviet 
citizen. The American described the 
freedom of speech that we have here in 
the United States, and the citizen of the 
Soviet Union said, "Well, we're free to 
speak in the Soviet Union just like you 
are in the United States." He said, "The 
only difference is you're free after you 
speak." [Laughter] 

But today we pay tribute to a nation 
which for two centuries has struggled 
for freedom and independence. From 
the uprisings in 1794, the November 
uprising in 1830, and then again in 1863, 
the people of Poland demonstrated 
courage and a commitment to human 
liberty that inspired free men and 
women everywhere. 

And this 200-year record of 
perseverance and bravery coincided with 
the development of our own precious 
liberty here in the United States, and 
that is no mere coincidence. Our two 
peoples drank from the same well of 
freedom, held dear the same Judeo- 
Christian values, respected the simple 
virtues of honesty and hard work. And 
even today, it's often noted that unlike 
many others, our two peoples take their 
religious convictions seriously. These 
heartfelt convictions have kept the spirit 
of freedom burning in our hearts, 
especially during times of great adversi- 

Pope John Paul II has said, 
"Freedom is given to man by God as a 
measure of his dignity. ..." And "as 
children of God," he said, "we cannot be 
slaves." I know that you feel as I do, 
we're truly blessed in this time of great 
need to have a spiritual leader like Pope 
John Paul II. 

The continuing suppression of the 
Polish national identity brought wave 
after wave of Polish immigrants to the 
United States. And for that, we can be 
grateful. We all know the list of con- 
tributions and the names of those who 
rose to great prominence. But just as 

important are the millions who came 
here and, with their hard work and with 
their moral strength, helped shape the 
American character. 

During this century, Americans and 
Poles have stood side by side in those 
two conflagrations that swept the world. 
The First World War, unfortunately, did 
not end all wars, but it did result in the 
reestablishment of the Polish state. 

This month, we commemorate a 
desperate battle of the Second World 
War, an heroic attempt by free Poles to 
liberate their country from the heel of 
Nazi occupation and to protect it from 
postwar, foreign domination. For years, 
they covertly resisted the occupation 
forces. And then in 1944, for 63 brutal 
and agonizing days, ill-equipped and 
overwhelmingly outnumbered they — and 
I could say, many of you— held off the 
Nazi war machine. And it's fitting that 
we and all free people take special care 
to remember this occasion. 

Of those who fought for freedom, 
and those who put their lives on the line 
for human liberty, I can think of none 
who should be prouder than those who 
can say, "I fought in the Polish Home 

And today, we honor three in- 
dividuals, heroes of the Polish Home 
Army, never given their due after the 
Allied victory. And it's my great honor 
to now present the Legion of Merit to 
the families or representatives of these 

Let us salute Stefan Rowecki, who 
led the Resistance until he was captured 
and executed by the Gestapo. 

[The President presented the award to 
Jan Morelewski, president of the Polish 
Home Army Veterans Association.] 

Next, his son will arise, the son of 
Bor-Komorowski, leader of the Warsaw 
uprising, who later died in near poverty 
in exile in London. 

[The President presented the award to 
Adam Komorowski.] 

And finally. General Leopold 
Okulicki, who was lured into a trap and 
died under suspicious circumstances in 

[The President presented the award 
Zdzislaw Dziekonski, chairman of th( 
Warsaw Uprising Commemorative E 
ecutive Committee and director of th 
Polish American Congress.] 

These brave men and the 
courageous individuals who fought u 
their command represent the best of 
human spirit. They risked all for the 
ideals, for their God and country, at 
time when the odds were so much 
against them. They're now part of tl 
inspiring legacy of the Polish people 

If there's a lesson to be learned 
from the history books, it is that Pol 
may be beaten down, but it is never 
defeated. It may be forced into subn 
sion, but it will never give up. It ma 
pressured to acquiesce, but it will ne 
accept foreign domination and the si 
pression of God-given freedom. Afte 
two decades of brutal foreign domin 
tion, we witnessed, just a short time 
ago, a resurrection of the indomitab 
spirit of the Polish people. And I as; 
you we have not forgotten and will 
never forget Solidarity and the freei 
of the Polish people. 

There are some, of course, who 
seem all too willing to turn a blind ( 
to Soviet transgressions, ostensibly 
improve the dialogue between East 
West. But those who condemn firm 
port for freedom and democracy — v 
in order to prove their sincerity, wc 
project weakness — are no friends o 
peace, human liberty, or meaningfu 

Our policies toward Poland and 
other captive nations are based upo 
set of well-established principles. 

First, let me state emphatically 
we reject any interpretation of the 
agreement that suggests American 
sent for the division of Europe into 
spheres of influence. On the contrai 
we see that agreement as a pledge 
the three great powers to restore fi 
dependence and to allow free and 
democratic elections in all countries 
liberated from the Nazis after Worl 
War II, and there is no reason to al 
solve the Soviet Union or ourselves 
this commitment. We shall continue 
press for full compliance with it, an 
with the Charter of the United Nat I 
the Helsinki Final Act, and other ir : 
national agreements guaranteeing i j) 
damental human rights. 



Passively accepting the permanent 
ugation of the people of Eastern 
ope is not an acceptable alternative. 
981, when it appeared that Poland 
Id siiffer a similar fate to that of 
gary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 
i, we raised our voices in support of 
ij Polish people. And we did not re- 
: passive when, under intense Soviet 
sure, martial law was imposed on 

Many credit, trade, and fishing 
ileges extended to Poland, due to its 
ewhat broader degree of freedom 
1 other Eastern European countries, 

' ? suspended. At the same time, we 

assisted voluntary organizations to 
bide humanitarian aid through the 

l" sh church to avoid hurting the very 
3le we want to help. 
I would especially like to commend 
work of Al Mazewski and the Polish 
rican Congress. In cooperation with 
church, they've provided over $40 
ion worth of food, clothing, and 
ical supplies to the people of Poland. 
I know that I speak for Nancy — my 
is thrilled to have been selected 
Drary chairman for the Polish 
;rican Congress' Infant Charity 
'e. We both wish you the best on this 
thwhile project. 

I've pledged that our sanctions can 
ifted, one by one, in response to 
.ningful improvement of the human 
ts situation in Poland. For example, 
mplete and reasonable implementa- 
of the Polish Government's amnesty 
•ee would create a positive at- 
phere that would allow reactivation 
'oland's application for membership 
le International Monetary Fund. 

In the meantime, we've agreed, 
along with our allies and private 
organizations, to help fund a Polish 
church program to assist individual 
farmers. I am pleased to announce today 
that I am seeking support for a $10 
million American contribution to the 
pilot phase of the church's program. And 
we will follow the progress of this pro- 
gram carefully to determine whether ad- 
ditional support should be forthcoming. 

Perhaps the most significant thing 
that we can do is let the Polish people 
and all the people of Eastern Europe 
know that they're not forgotten. And 
that's why we're modernizing Radio 
Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the 
Voice of America. Our radio program- 
ming is becoming the mighty force for 
good that it was intended to be. As the 
Scriptures say, "Know the truth and the 
truth will make you free." Our broadcast 
will carry the truth to captive people 
throughout the world. 

The free peoples of the world are in 
ideological competition with the 
followers of a doctrine that rejects the 
basic tenets of freedom and declares the 
worship of God to be a social evil. As 
important as this competition is, until 
recently, the democracies, including the 
United States, seemed paralyzed by 
uncertainty and lacking the will to com- 

In the last 3V2 years, we've quit 
apologizing, and at long last, we're 
standing up and being counted. As our 
UN Ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
said, we've taken off our "Kick me" sign. 

We're proud of our way of life, we're 
confident that freedom will prevail, 
because it works and because it is right. 
We believe the free peoples of the world 
should support all those who share our 
democratic values. 

The National Endowment for 
Democracy, which I first proposed in a 
speech before the Parliament in London 
2 years ago, has been established to en- 
courage the democratic forces and the 
development of free institutions 
throughout the world. Its concerns in- 
clude nonviolent, democratic movements 
like that of Solidarity in Poland. 

And the rise of Solidarity is a mat- 
ter of historic significance. It continues 
to be an inspiration of all free people 
that the Marxist-Leninist myth of in- 
evitability is crumbling. Communism has 
brought with it only deprivation and 
tyranny. What happened in Poland is 
one sign that the tide is turning. The 
Polish people, with their courage and 
perseverance, will lead the way to 
freedom and independence, not only for 
themselves but for all those who yearn 
to breathe free. 

The battle cry of the Polish Home 
Army still rings true: "Poland is 
fighting. Poland will live. Poland will 

'President's introductory remarks 
omitted here, as is the response by Stefan 
Korbonski, honorary chairman of the Warsaw 
Uprising Commemorative Executive Commit- 
tee and president of the Polish Council of 
Unity in the United States (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Aug. 20, 1984). ■ 


Diplomacy and Strength 

Secretary Shultz's address before the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars in Chicago on 
August 20, 198V 

Patriotism in our country has been re- 
awakened during these last few years. 
Pride in America is greater than at any 
time in recent generations. So it is a 
particular honor and privilege to be here 
today among this distinguished group. 
For you are patriots who have never 
waivered in your devotion to our nation. 
The service you have given the United 
States in times of peril and your unflag- 
ging dedication— in good times and in 
bad— to the principles for which America 
stands have earned the admiration and 
appreciation of your fellow citizens. 

And we are grateful not just for 
your service in war but for your con- 
tribution in times of peace as well. For 
you have been steadfast and vigorous 
supporters of a strong defense for 
America. You know, better than anyone, 
that a strong defense is essential for en- 
suring security and freedom. Your Presi- 
dent is profoundly grateful for the sup- 
port you have given to his efforts to 
restore America's strength these past 4 

And 1 am here to tell you that I am 
grateful, too. For if history has taught 

come a better world in which peace and 
prosperity would reign and war would 
be a thing of the past. But we learned 
soon after the war that there are no 
final victories: the struggle between 
freedom and tyranny goes on; the 
United States, as the leader of the 
democracies, cannot evade its continuing 
responsibility to promote freedom and 
prosperity and to defend what we hold 

The Purpose of Negotiation 

Dwight Eisenhower, as a great 
military leader and a great president, 
knew that America's strength was moral 
as well as military and economic. Our 
power was the servant of our positive 
goals, our values, and ideals. We 
Americans have always deeply ijelieved 
in a world in which disputes were settled 
peacefully— a world of law, international 
harmony, and human rights. But we 
have learned through hard experience, 
in World War II and after, that such a 
world cannot be created by good will 
and idealism alone. Since 1945, every 
president, Democratic or Republican, 
has understood that to maintain the 
peace we had to be strong, and, more 
than that, we had to be willing to use 

No negotiation can succeed when one side believes 
that it pays no price for intransigence and the 
other side believes that it has to make dangerous 
concessions to reach agreement. 

us anything, it is that effective 
diplomacy depends on strength. Dwight 
Eisenhower— in whose name you are 
honoring me tonight- understood it 
well. "Military power," he once told the 
Congress, ". . . serves the cause of peace 
by holding up a shield behind which the 
patient, constructive work of peace can 
go on." 

It has been almost 40 years since the 
end of the Second World War, a war in 
which many of you fought. You fought— 
and many Americans died— not only to 
defend our nation but to free the world 
from a bruUil tyranny. The American 
people hoped that with victory would 

our strength. We would not seek con- 
frontaticm, but we would never appease 
or shrink from the challenge posed by 
threats of aggression. And this deter- 
mination was always accompanied by an 
active and creative diplomacy and a will- 
ingness to solve problems peacefully. 

President Kennedy defined the two 
goals of this solidly bipartisan approach 
in his inaugural address: "Let us never 
negotiate out of fear," he said, "but let 
us never fear to negotiate." 

In the years that followed, however, 
the consensus behind this balanced ap- 
proach began to show signs of strain. 
P''or whatever reason, Vietnam created 

doubts in the minds of some that pea' 
and military strength were compatibi 
The lessons so clearly understood by 
President Eisenhower, it seemed, we 
being forgotten. And today, even tho 
we have overcome the trauma of Vie 
nam, one gets the sense that some st 
believe that power and diplomacy are 
alternatives. From one side, we hear 
that negotiations alone are the answt 
If we will only talk (the argument rui 
we can have peace. If we will only ta 
our differences will easily be resolvec 
is as if negotiations were an end in 
themselves, as if the goal of America 
foreign policy were not primarily to \ 
tect the peace, or defend our values, 
our people, or our allies, but to negot 
for its own sake. From another side, 
though the chorus is considerably 
smaller, we hear that we should nevt 
negotiate, never compromise with ou 
adversaries, because the risks are to( 
great and the differences irreeoncilat 

Both views are as wrong today e 
they would have been four decades s 
Negotiations are not the goal of 
American foreign policy, they are a 
means of attaining that goal. In fact 
they are an essential means. But we 
know, as surely as we know anythin 
that negotiations and diplomacy not 
backed by strength are ineffectual a 
best, dangerous at worst. 

As your Secretary of State I car 
you from experience that no diploma 
can succeed in an environment of fe: 
from a position of weakness. No nejj 
tion can succeed when one side belie 
that it pays no price for intransigen( 
and the other side believes that it h; 
make dangerous concessions to reac 
agreement. This is true whether we 
talking about Vietnam or Lebanon, 
Central America; it is true in arms i 
trol and in our relations with the So 
Union. Americans have only to remc 
ber what we understood so well foui 
decades ago: neither strength nor 
negotiations are ends in themselves. 
They must go hand in hand. 

And I can also tell you that any 
strategy, to be effective, must be su 
tainable over the long haul. It canno 
sustained if our policies vacillate wil 
in response to events beyond our coi 
trol. Americans are by nature a peo| 
of actii)n, and we are sometimes im; 
tient with a world that progresses si 
ly. When Americans act, we want U 


• and quick results. And the pattern 
e recent past has been one of ex- 
ve expectations that, when unful- 
I, have led to equally excessive 
rsals in policy. This inconsistency 
lindered the achievement of 
■rican goals. 

iVe do not negotiate with our adver- 
ts because we think they are perfec- 
;. Nor do we negotiate just to please 
or that domestic constituency. We 
itiate because it is in our country's 
•est to do so, and we reach agree- 
ts when we perceive that both we 
our adversaries can gain from a 
)tiated solution. To negotiate on 
e terms is to deal with the world as 
without illusions. 

We know that negotiations with the 
et Union, for instance, are not a 
icea. Yet we know that equitable 
verifiable agreements can make a 
ificant contribution to stability in the 
ear age or to the resolution of con- 
5 that might otherwise escalate and 
aten to overwhelm us. To negotiate 
lese ends is the only prudent and 
onsible course. It serves American 

If our proposals are rejected and 
■ciprocated— as they have been of 
-we must show staying power, 
etimes, it seems as if the Soviets 
t take yes for an answer. At the 
2 time, we should not seek agree- 
t for the sake of agreement or allow 
sional successes to give rise to un- 
-anted euphoria. Our interests re- 
5 that we stay on course despite the 
jdic disappointments and setbacks 
we are bound to encounter in deal- 
A^ith such a ruthless competitor. Un- 
inately, outrageous incidents, such 
le Korean airliner attack or the 
ecution of Andrei Sakharov, are 
t we must expect. However shock- 
they do not come as surjifises that 
;ire us to reassess and change our 
: strategy, including our strategy of 
ngness to negotiate. 
Patience is a virtue in foreign affairs 
mch as in our personal lives. If we 
) our eye on our strategic objectives, 
e negotiate without illusions, if we 
our strength effectively, we will see 
jress. The truth is, we advance our 
rests less by the big, obvious suc- 
es, by summits, by decisive battles, 
;-lamorous international agreements, 
1 we do by our permanent engage- 
it and by the steady application of 
id policies. 

The Tide of Freedom 

Let's look at Central America. It is 
no coincidence that when America has 
shown consistency and commitment in 
Central America, progress in that region 
has been equally consistent. We all know 
what the problem is in Central America: 
Nicaragua's push toward militarism and 
totalitarianism. We have seen increased 

solution is to be found that ends the fear 
and agony in Central America and opens 
a promising future of peace, freedom, 
and prosperity. 

Our policies are working. Gradually, 
but inevitably, communist aggression is 
losing the contest. Hope is being created 
for the people of Central America. Suc- 
cess will not come overnight; and we 
cannot let our policies vacillate in 

Despite grave economic problems and communist 
efforts to exploit them, almost every nation [in 
Latin America] is either democratic or on the path 
toward democracy . . . This gradual movement 
does not receive the attention of the media as much 
as the sporadic guerrilla offensive. . . . 

repressions, persecution of the church, a 
massive influx of Soviet arms, and con- 
tinued aggression against Nicaragua's 
neighbors. Today we hear of Nicaraguan 
elections promised for November. The 
notion of democracy is so powerful that 
even dedicated Marxist-Leninists feel 
they have to show that they are holding 
elections. Feeling the pull of the tide of 
true democracy that is running now in 
Central and South America, they seek to 
represent their elections as meaningful. 
But they are not succeeding. The 
failures of the Nicaraguan regime have 
generated a determined internal opposi- 
tion—the true Sandinistas. Because of 
the regime's efforts to suppress that in- 
ternal opposition, the elections promised 
for November now look more and more 
like sham elections on the Soviet model. 

America has responded with pa- 
tience and consistent policies based on 
strength and diplomacy. We have sought 
a dialogue with the Nicaraguan leader- 
ship. We have given our full support to 
the Contadora peace efforts. But we 
have also maintained an American mili- 
tary presence in the region to serve as 
the" shield, in President Eisenhower's 
words, behind which effective diplomacy 
can go forward. We have provided eco- 
nomic, political, and military support for 
the free elected Government of El 

And we admire the dedication of the 
Nicaraguan freedom fighters, who want 
only to bring democracy to their people. 
All these forces help provide the 
strength and the purpose essential if a 

response to emotions or political pas- 
sions at home. Only a steady, purposeful 
application of our diplomatic and 
military strength offers real hope for 
peace in Central America and security 
for the hemisphere. 

We can see similar signs of progress 
throughout the world. While there are 
always obstacles and occasional set- 
backs, the broader picture is a hopeful 
one. The day-to-day events of foreign 
policy are like waves rolling up against 
the shore. Some break in one direction; 
some break in the other. But what is 
more important than the path of a single 
wave is the flow of the tide beneath it. 
Is the tide rising or is it falling? Is the 
course of history on the side of peace, 
freedom, and democracy? Or is America 
standing on weak ground against in- 
evitable and ineluctable forces? 

The tide of history is with us. The 
values that Americans cherish— demo- 
cratic freedom, peace, and the hope of 
prosperity— are taking root all around 
the world. Look again at Latin America. 
Despite grave economic problems and 
communist efforts to exploit them, 
almost every nation in that region is 
either democratic or on the path toward 
democracy. Never before have more peo- 
ple in our hemisphere had such hope of 
tasting the fruits of true freedom. This 
gradual movement does not receive the 
attention of the media as much as the 
sporadic guerrilla offensive, but it is 
there. It is undeniable. The tide in Latin 
America is the tide of freedom. 


Restoration of Confidence 

A month ago, 1 visited our friends 
and allies in Southeast Asia. Our rela- 
tions with those nations have never been 
stronger, in large part because the 
values we Americans cherish are 
flourishing in those faraway lands, as 
well. Japan, Korea, Australia, and New 
Zealand are valued allies and vibrant 
societies; the free Southeast Asian na- 
tions, ASEAN [Association of South 
East Asian Nations], are embarked on 
the same journey toward freedom and 
democracy; their economic success sym- 
bolizes how far they have come. The 
U.S. -China relationship is maturing and 
broadening as we identify and develop 
common interests. Our deepening friend- 
ship with these nations gets few head- 
lines, but it marks the fact that in the 
decade since Vietnam, the United States 
has restored its position and its relations 
in Asia. And, increasingly, the real 
lesson of Vietnam is clear. The world 

The yearning for 
democracy and freedom 
in the countries of 
Eastern Europe is a 
powerful and growing 
force. . . . someday it 
will happen. 

now condemns Vietnam's aggression in 
Kampuchea. The steady outflow of 
refugees from areas dominated by Hanoi 
are showing the Vietnamese communists 
for what some of us always knew they 

In Europe, we have faced periodic 
crises, moments of apparent disunity, 
and times when Soviet intimidation has 
jostled relations with our oldest and 
closest friends. The Soviets once thought 
they could split the NATO alliance by 
pointing SS-20 nuclear missiles at the 
free peoples of Western Europe. But 
these tests of the alliance's strength 
have served only to prove one thing: 
that the solidarity of democratic nations 
endures, that the transatlantic bonds are 
strong and secure. Our shared moral 
values and political principles have made 

NATO the keeper of the peace for 35 
years and wilt continue to do so into the 
next century and beyond. 

Indeed, if there is weakness in 
Europe, it is within the Soviet empire. 
The yearning for democracy and free- 
dom in the countries of Eastern Europe 
is a powerful and growing force. We 
have seen it in recent years among the 
brave people of Poland, as we saw it in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Hungary in 
1956, and East Germany in 1953. We 
will never accept the idea of a divided 
Europe. Time is not on the side of im- 
perial domination. We may not see free- 
dom in Eastern Europe in our lifetime. 
Our children may not see it in theirs. 
But someday it will happen. The world's 
future is a future of freedom. 

Make no mistake. History will do us 
no special favors. A better future 
depends on our will, our leadership, our 
willingness to act decisively in moments 
of crisis, and on our ability to be con- 
stant and steadfast in moments of calm. 
We must be ready to engage ourselves 
where necessary throughout the world. 
We must be ready to use our di|:iloniatic 
skills and our military strength in 
defense of our values and our interests. 

There was a time, a decade or so 
ago, when some Americans may have 
doubted that their great nation could 
continue to be a force for good in the 
world. But today Americans no longer 
doubt America's ability to play its proper 
role. In the past 4 years, this nation has 
taken the essential steps to restore its 
leadership of the free world. We have 
restored the strategic balance. We have 
restored the strength and thrust of our 
dynamic economy. We have restored our 
will and self-confidence. We have re- 
stored national pride and respect for the 
men and women who serve in our 
Armed Forces. And we have restored 
the confidence of our friends and allies 
around the world that America can be 
trusted to confront challenges, not wish 
them away. 

I don't mean to suggest that the 
path ahead of us is easy. But in the face 
of the forces of tyranny, we draw in- 
spiration from the basic goodness of 
America, and our pride in our country 
gives us strength to lead abroad. 

No one understands or feels that 
pride more deeply than you, who have 
defended this great nation in times of 
national peril. You knew what you were 
fighting against and what you were 
fighting for. And you knew what kind of 

people you were defending— a peopk 
devoted to freedom and justice, a br; 
people willing to sacrifice for what tl 
believe. And it was your sacrifices tl 
have made peace possible. You laid t 
foundation for the kind of world we 
seek. Let us never forget that as we 
look toward the future. 

Americans must never be timid, 
ashamed, or guilt-ridden, or weak. V 
are proud and strong— and confideni 
We will use our power and our 
diplomacy in the service of peace ani 
our ideals. We have our work cut ou 
us. But we feel truly that the future 

'Press release 191. 


DeDartment of State Bui 


3curity for Europe 

'antes E. Goodby 

The following is an article repr'inted 
i the June 1981, issue of NATO 
ew. Ambassador Goodby is head of 
11 J.S. delegation to the Conference on 
It Idence- and Security-Building 
sures and Disarmament in Europe 

the past 10 years, the United States 
its NATO alHes have sought to ease 
division of Europe through the proc- 
)f dialogue, cooperation, and critique 
ted by the Helsinki accords of 1975. 
Ti the Helsinki process has now 
rged a new negotiating forum which 
the potential to create a system of 
rity based on carefully defined 
teration in military affairs "from the 
ntic to the Urals." This is the Con- 
nce on Confidence- and Security- 
ding Measures and Disarmament in 
ope, which opened in Stockholm last 

The Stockholm conference is dif- 
nt from "classical" arms control 
jtiations in that it addresses not the 
ibilities for war — the number of 
pons and troops — but rather the 
t likely causes of war: flawed 
^ents or miscalculations stemming 
n fears of sudden attack and uncer- 
ty about the military intentions of an 
jrsary. It is highly unlikely that any 
at all will commence in Europe. But 
ar should ever come, it probably 
Jd not be in the form of a "bolt-from- 
blue" attack by one side against 
j:her. The most probable cause of the 
)reak of war would be some small in- 
nt, perhaps connected with a 
tary maneuver, which would not be 
rly understood, leading to confronta- 
and armed conflict. This nightmare 
n improbable scenario but the stakes 
so high that some reassurance 
inst such a contingency would be in 
•yone's interest. If it is successful, 
Stockholm conference will negotiate 
put into place certain procedures 
ch could stop a fatal progression 
ard catastrophe. 
Procedures which would make 
tary activities in Europe more 
dictable would reassure governments 
t those activities were normal, 
tine, and nonthreatening. Procedures 
questioning and verifying the essen- 
character of specific military ac- 
ties would provide more certain 

knowledge of the intentions of the par- 
ties to this agreement. Such reassurance 
would lead to increased confidence and 
security among all participating states. 
It could also, in time, lead to a habit of 
cooperation among participants on ac- 
tivities affecting their most vital national 
security interests, thus acting to dissolve 
distrust. From this, a new system of in- 
ternational security might emerge in 
Europe, which could soften some of the 
rougher edges of the adversarial rela- 
tionship and provide a mechanism for 
preventing escalation toward crisis and 

Proposals have been advanced by 
the 16 members of the Atlantic alliance 
which represent initial steps toward this 
ambitious goal. These proposals do not 
call for large changes in the military 
postures of the countries involved in the 
Stockholm conference. That objective is 
for other negotiations. But if a first, 
substantial agreement can be achieved in 
Stockholm, the consequences can be of 
historic importance. 

The Stockholm conference will re- 
main an integral part of the Helsinki 
process, and its achievements will be 
evaluated in a CSCE [Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] 
followup meeting scheduled for Vienna 
in 1986, which will also review progress 
in the other dimensions of the process, 
including human rights. As U.S. 
Secretary of State George Shultz said 
when he addressed the opening of the 
Stockholm conference last January: 

. . . true peace and security in Europe depend 
on a foundation of basic freedoms — not the 
least of which is the right of peoples to deter- 
mine their own future. . . . Confidence- 
building in the larger sense means pursuing 
the work of Helsinki — through practical steps 
to break down barriers, expand human con- 
tact and intellectual interchange, increase 
openness, and stretch the boundaries of the 
human spirit. 

Origins of the Stockholm Conference 

Although the Stockholm conference is 
the child of the Helsinki process, it has 
even more remote ancestors. When 
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in 1954 
called for an all-European security trea- 
ty, he was giving expression to a key ob- 
jective of Soviet policy, then and now: a 
security arrangement for Europe which 
would ratify postwar borders and, if 
possible, isolate the United States from 
European security affairs. With Western 

Europe thus isolated, the Soviet Union 
would be left in the position of supreme 
arbiter on the continent. 

What the diplomacy of the Soviet 
Union and its allies eventually settled 
for was the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. But the con- 
ference was far from what the East had 
originally envisaged. In fact, it was 
much closer to Western concepts. 

Before the negotiations which led to 
the Helsinki Final Act could even begin, 
some longstanding issues dividing 
Europe had to be resolved or accom- 
modated. An example was the signing of 
the 1972 Quadripartite Agreement on 
Berlin. And although Soviet accommoda- 
tions to Western interests were probably 
regarded as tactical concessions 
necessary for a longer range strategy, 
the agreements which preceded or came 
from the Helsinki meeting created 
political dynamics which significantly 
altered the role of the CSCE as conceiv- 
ed by Moscow. 

The Helsinki conference and the 
process that flowed from it, in fact, 
came to support a grand strategy pur- 
sued by the United States and its allies 
which, in the broadest terms, sought to 
ameliorate the harsher results of the 
division of Europe; far more than a 
European security conference in the 
Eastern sense, it also encompassed 
human rights, human contacts, economic 
issues, and cultural and educational ex- 
changes. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 
accepted the Western concept that 
security embodies political, social, and 
economic concerns as well as strictly 
military concerns. The CSCE gave a 
particular impetus to the promotion of 
human rights, and it remains today a 
major forum for pursuing enhancement 
of fundamental principles of Western 

Furthermore by including both the 
United States and Canada as full part- 
ners in the process, the Helsinki Final 
Act reaffirmed the necessity for perma- 
nent American involvement in European 
security matters. 

Shortfalls and Shared Interests 

Far from fulfilling a Soviet conception, 
the Stockholm conference, mandated in 
the Madrid CSCE review meeting in 
September 1983, emerged from a 
French idea for a multistage "Con- 
ference on Disarmament in Europe," 
which looked to a high-level forum on 


security and disarmanent issues, linked 
to the CSCE process. The French called 
for a first stage devoted to making 
significant improvements in those provi- 
sions of the Helsinki Final Act which 
called for notification and observation of 
military maneuvers. A second stage 
would discuss broad disarmament issues. 
The Helsinki process has shown that 
the West can pursue and achieve some 
limited objectives in negotiations with 
the East. Thus there already has been 
experience with the kinds of cooperative 
security arrangements (which are re- 
ferred to as confidence- and security- 
building measures) which the West seeks 
to enact in Stockholm. Those measures 

agreed in the Helsinki Final Act are 
modest in scope; they need to be ex- 
panded in Stockholm. Implementation of 
them has been imperfect; implementa- 
tion needs to be strengthened in 
Stockholm. Nevertheless, experience 
with them and their implementation up 
to now has been instructive. It is possi- 
ble even now to see how cooperation in 
security affairs can work, as well as how 
this cooperation needs to be improved. 
The central features of the Helsinki 
security provisions were a measure call- 
ing for prenotification 21 days in ad- 
vance of certain military maneuvers in- 
volving more than 2.5,000 troops and a 
measure calling for invitation of 

Head of U.S. CDE Delegation 

James E. Goodby was born December 29, 
1929, in Providence, Rhode Island. He 
graduated from Harvard in 1951 and at- 
tended graduate school at the University of 
Michigan. He served in the U.S. Air Force 
(1952-53) and then continued graduate 
studies at Harvard. 

Ambassador Goodby entered the Foreign 
Service in 1952 and transferred to the 
Atomic Energy Commission in 1954. While 
there he took part in several international 
negotiations relating to nuclear arms control 
and cooperation in the civil uses of nuclear 

In 1960 he moved to the office of the 
special assistant to the Secretary of State for 
atomic energy, specializing in nuclear arms 
control matters. With the creation of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA), he became officer in charge of the 
nuclear test ban negotiations. Those negotia- 
tions resulted in the first major arms control 
treaty since World War II. 

Following service as a member of the 
State Department's Policy Planning Staff, he 
was assigned in 1967 to the U.S. Mission to 
the European Communities in Brussels, 
where his major concern was the nuclear non- 
proliferation treaty, under negotiation at that 
time, and U.S. relations with EURATOM, the 
atomic energy component of the European 

From 1969 to 1971, Ambassador Goodby 
was officer in charge of defense policy affairs 
at the State Department's office for NATO 
affairs. He then served for 3 years as 
Coun.selor of Political Affairs at the U.S. Mis- 
sion to NATO in Brussels. In that role he 
negotiated common positions with the allies, 
including those involving the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
mutual and balanced force reduction.s 
(MBFR). and the 1974 Ottawa declaration of 
Atlantic relations. From 1974 to 1977, he 
was Deputy Director of the Bureau of 
Politico-Militaiy Affairs, with responsibilities 
for the strategic arms limitation talks 
(SALT), other arms control negotiations, and 
various defense policy issues. 


He was appointed Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs in 1977, 
handling U.S. relations with the countries of 
northern and central Europe and European 
regional political and security affairs, in 
which capacity he was responsible for the 
followup to the Helsinki accords (the CSCE). 
In 1980-81 he served as U.S. Ambassador to 

In 1982-83 he was deputy chairman of 
the U.S. delegation to the strategic arms 
reduction talks (START) in Geneva. Am- 
bassador Goodby has been head of the U.S. 
delegation to the Conference on Confidence- 
and Security-Building Measures and Disarma- 
ment in Europe (CDE) since September 
1983. ■ 


observers to those maneuvers. There 
was also a measure calling for notific 
tion of some smaller-scale exercises ii 
volving fewer than 25,000 troops. Th' 
zone of application extended only 250 
kilometers into the Western part of t , 
Soviet Union. 

In the 8V2 years since adoption ol 
the Final Act, there have been nearly 
100 notifications of military activities 
Europe involving well over 2 million 
men. Although the system has workt 
well on the whole, notable exceptions 
ist, and precisely in the case of the 
largest military maneuver conducted 
a CSCE state since 1975 — the 
U.S.S.R.'s Zapad 81, which took plac 
1981 in the Soviet Union near the Pc 
border and which was not properly 

In accordance with the Helsinki 
agreements, observers have been inv 
to approximately 50 exercises. The V 
has extended more than 30 invitatioi 
the United States alone has invited \ 
saw Pact observers to 10 exercises. ' 
Eastern record is less impressive. Tl 
Warsaw Pact has announced more tl 
20 maneuvers but has invited Weste' 
observers to less than half of these, 
among the Western observers, Amei 
observers have been invited to Wars 
Pact maneuvers only twice and not i 
since 1979. 

In the area of smaller-scale exer 
cises, the West has notified 29 
maneuvers. The Warsaw Pact has 
notified four. 

On the basis of this record, clear 
the .35 CSCE participants have not i 
met the aspirations of the Final Act 
particular, they have not succeeded 
dealing with the problem of 
misunderstanding or miscalculation 
cerning military activities where, in 
words of the Final Act, "... par- 
ticipating States lack clear and time 
formation about the nature of such ; 
tivities." In spite of partial implemei 
tion of the Helsinki agreement, 
therefore, significant uncertainties s 
exist among the participating states 
about the military activities taking \ 
in Europe and about the intentions 
which lie behind them. Such uncerta 
ties can be destabilizing, and this cir 
cumstance points the way to an inte 
which East, West, and neutrals shot 
hold in common. 


: ^>i _ i ^ 

.. :tAi 


Co Western Proposals 

January 24, 1984, the 16 members of 
' Atlantic alliance tabled a formal six- 
nt proposal, the first of the 
ickholm conference, the thrust of 
ich was to make the military environ- 
nt in Europe more understandable, 
'dictable, and stable. That the 16 
re able to table a comprehensive 
ument at the outset of the con- 
ence is indicative of the unity and 
iousness of purpose with which the 
ance has approached this negotiation. 

In brief the six Western measures 

Measure 1, the exchange of 
litary information, which provides 

t, on a yearly basis, participants will 
orm each other about the structure of 
'ir ground and air forces in all of 
rope, giving unit designation, normal 
idquarters location, and composition 
the forces. 

Measure 2, exchange of forecasts 
activities notifiable in advance, calls 

an exchange of forecasts, again on a 
irly basis, of military activities. The 
ecasts would furnish the name of the 

rcises, the countries participating, 

size and type offerees involved, and 

place and time it would occur. The 
ecasts would also list the purpose of 


Measure 3, notification of military 
;ivities, calls for notification, 45 days 
advance, of activities involving field 
ining of units at division level or 
Dve and notification of certain 
bilization and amphibious exercises. 

Measure 4, observation of certain 
litary activities, requires states to in- 
e observers from all other states to all 
;notified activities and to certain alert 

Measure 5, compliance and 
rification, has two parts. States 
ree not to interfere with the "national 
hnical means"' of other states; 
•ondly, participating states may send 
servers, on a limited basis, to observe 
;ivities which seem not to be in com- 
ance with negotiated agreements. 

Measure 6, development of means 
communication, asks that the par- 
ipating states develop better means 
d procedures for urgent communica- 

These measures are mutually rein- 
cing. Their objective is to reduce ten- 
ms, to promote common understand- 

among all participants, and to 
ninish the danger of armed conflict 
ising from misunderstanding or 
scalculation. They focus on preventing 
lequence of events which has all too 

often led to war on the Continent of 
Europe: the incident, military move- 
ment, or political event which is 
misunderstood, with misunderstanding 
leading to suspicion, reaction, escalation, 
and perhaps confrontation and conflict. 

. . . And How They Work 

The six points of the Western proposal 
can be implemented easily with a 
minimum of intrusion into or alteration 
of normal, nonthreatening military ac- 
tivity. The process would work some- 
thing like this. 

A context of basic information is 
established through measure 1, near the 
end of each year. Much of the informa- 
tion which would be exchanged is 
already available to the CSCE states 
through other means. At the same time, 
under measure 2, a state would advise 
the other participants of its planned 
military activities during the next calen- 
dar year. Incidentally, because modern 
training and rotational activities are 
complex and are planned a year or more 
in advance, military forces routinely 
develop this kind of information. 

Measure 3, on prenotification, then 
provides more detail and also a cross- 
check on the forecast. If a state should 
notify under measure 3 an activity not 
previously forecast, other countries 
could demand an explanation of the ap- 
parent anomaly. A nation with ag- 
gressive intent would be raising an 
alarm against itself if it announced an 
exercise which it had not forecast, and, 
of course, this alarm would sound even 
louder if a country failed either to 
forecast or to notify 45 days in advance 
of the event. The measures are thus self- 

The observers called for in measure 
4 serve to verify that activities are as 
they have been advertised. But there 
may be occasions where one state sees, 
or thinks it sees, an activity that has not 
been notified but should have been. In 
such a case, under measure 5, suspicions 
can be alleviated or confirmed by asking 
for verification, either by direct observa- 
tion, if necessary, or by some other ap- 
propriate means. The communications 
network of measure 6 could be utilized 
to seek further information on a poten- 
tially destabilizing event. 

These measures would not, in 
themselves, prevent war. They could not 
absolutely prevent one state from using 
force for political intimidation. But they 
could make unwanted confrontation less 
likely, and they could raise the political 
cost of using force to intimidate. By 
establishing a pattern of routine ac- 

tivities, anomalies would stand out clear- 
ly. Governments would know with 
reasonable certainty what was supposed 
to happen. If a departure from the 
routine pattern occurred, they would 
have some time to clarify the situation 
before political tensions escalated or in 
time to take counteraction against a real 
threat. The result, over time, should be 
an increase in confidence and stability 
among the participating countries. 
The six points of the Western 
package are, as required by the mandate 
for the Stockholm conference, militarily 
significant, politically binding, verifiable, 
and applicable to the whole of Europe. 
The Helsinki measures were less mean- 
ingful in military terms. They applied 
only to part of Europe, most of the 
European Soviet Union being excluded. 
Exercises to be notified were larger. 
The notification period was only 21 
days, as opposed to 45. There was no 
exchange of information to establish a 
base of knowledge. There was no annual 
forecast. And the Helsinki measures 
were largely voluntary. The measures 
proposed by the West in Stockholm are 
meant to be mandatory. 

Hoary Ideas 

All 35 states, to one degree or another, 
have supported an expansion of the 
measures of the Helsinki Final Act. But, 
of course, differences exist. The Soviet 
Union chose for Stockholm a collection 
of rather hoary ideas, which are hardly 
the grist for a serious security negotia- 
tion. This incongi'uous approach, draw- 
ing on a stock of old proposals, would be 
compatible with the thesis that Moscow 
has still not fully assessed the potential 
of the Stockholm conference. 

At the outset, however, Soviet 
behavior in Stockholm has been consist- 
ent with at least one of the goals they 
have pursued throughout the Helsinki 
process: the Soviet Union has tried to 
use the conference for image-building, 
attempting to portray Moscow as the 
defender of peace and the United States 
and some of its allies as aggressive, 
militaristic adventurers. The Soviet 
Union has also sought to find and ex- 
ploit differences between the United 
States and Europe. This self-serving ap- 
proach has not caught on either among 
other delegations or with the European 
or American publics, but it has 
prevented the conference from getting 
quickly down to business. 

The Soviet Union has raised two ob- 
jectives to the Western proposals. It 
claims that they amount to "legalized es- 
pionage" and that they are technical and 


too trivial to affect the security situa- 
tions that exists today in Europe. 

While it is true that the Soviet 
Union is a closed society in which 
routine information is much harder to 
obtain than in the West, it is not true 
that the Western measures seek to ex- 
pose important secrets of the Soviet 
military establishment. The information 
exchange and forecast measures ask for 
facts which frequently are already 
available in the public domain. The 
notification measure involves only field 
exercises, not other sensitive areas. Nor 
would observers prowl at will all over 
Soviet or any other territory. They 
would visit the area where field training 
exercises were taking place. Even the 
most superficial examination of the 
Western measures deflates the conten- 
tion that they aim at any kind of es- 

The second Soviet charge is that the 
Western proposals involve trivial 
technical matters which would do little 
or nothing to enhance security in 
Europe. For its part, the Warsaw Pact 
has offered six alternative proposals: 
agreements on the non-use of force, the 
non-first-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear 
weapons-free zones, reduction of 
military budgets, a chemical weapons 
ban in Europe, and expansion of the 
confidence-building measures of the 
Helsinki accords. 

Many of these ideas have been 
around for a long time, some for a 
quarter of a century or more, and they 
have failed in all that time to gain con- 
sensus among the states now par- 
ticipating in the Stockholm conference. 
Furthermore, the chemical weapons ban 
is currently being negotiated in Geneva. 
The United Nations annually tries to 
carry on a study of military budgets, 
where the Soviets and their allies have 
been entirely uncooperative. 

The non-use of force proposal, usual- 
ly combined with a proposal not to be 
the first to use nuclear weapons, has 
emerged as the flagship of the Warsaw 
Pact's entries. The Western countries 
have never questioned the principle of 
non-use of force; we all subscribe to it in 
the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, 
and, most recently, in the concluding 
document of the Madrid CSCE review 
meeting last year. The point that we 
have made in Stockholm is that the prin- 
ciple must now be given effect and ex- 
pression through an agreement on prac- 
tical measures which will affect the 
everyday behavior of the 35 par- 
ticipating countries and their military 
establishments. In order to make clear 
the American view on this issue, Presi- 


dent Reagan, in a major policy state- 
ment on June 4, announced explicitly 
that "if discussions on reaffirming the 
principle not to use force, a principle in 
which we believe so deeply, will bring 
the Soviet Union to negotiate 
agreements which will give concrete, 
new meaning to that principle, we will 
gladly enter into such discussions." 

In expressing Western willingness to 
meet the Soviet concerns and to explore 
every reasonable avenue for progress to 
serious negotiations, the President clear- 
ly and specifically identified the context 
in which the non-use of force principle 
must be approached. "Mere restatement 
of a principle all nations have agreed to 
in the UN charter and elsewhere," he 
said, "would be an inadequate conclusion 
to a conference whose mandate calls for 
much more. We must translate the idea 
into actions which build effective bar- 
riers against the use of force in 
Europe." The United States is prepared 
to discuss reaffirmation of the principle 
of non-use of force; the discussion must 
be in the context of negotiations on 
measures that will have a real impact on 
military activities in Europe. 

Proposals made in the Stockholm 
conference by the Soviet Union, in fact, 
recognize such a context. The Soviet 
Union, supported by other Warsaw 
treaty organization countries, has pro- 
posed an expansion of the Helsinki 
confidence-building measures in ways 
that could prove to be similar in kind to 
proposals offered by NATO countries 
and by the neutral and nonaligned coun- 
tries in the conference. These proposals 
remain on the periphery of the Eastern 
presentations; the West hopes they will 
move closer to the center of understand- 
ing shared by nearly all the other par- 
ticipants in the conference. In keeping 
with President Reagan's June 4 initia- 
tive, the West is seeking to encourage 
the East to recognize the possibilities for 
progress and move to join the devel- 
oping consensus. 

A Time for Choice 

Some observers, especially in the East, 
like to characterize the current interna- 
tional situation as a time of deep crisis 
between East and West, a time of ten- 
sion so great that normal discourse be- 
tween East and West is all but impossi- 
ble. The necessity for choice remains, 
however, no matter how one 
characterizes the current European 
scene, reacts to it, or allocates the credit 
for it. The 35 nations of the Stockholm 
conference are beginning the process of 

deciding, incrementally, what to makt 
this new forum. This includes the Sov 
Union, of course, and the evidence suj 
gests that Moscow, even though its 
grand strategy and ultimate objective 
remain unchanged, is now far from a 
tain how it should proceed with its 
original idea of a European security 
conference under present-day cir- 

For the Atlantic alliance, the proc 
of inventing and agreeing on the six 
confidence- and security-building 
measures tabled by the alliance on 
January 24 required an effort which 
testifies to the alliance's intentions in 
Stockholm. The neutral or nonalignec 
group of nations also accepts the proj 
osition that the Stockholm conference 
can be a path to genuine improvemen 
in security. Thus the majority of par- 
ticipants already agree that the potei 
of Stockholm should be seriously ex- 

The Soviet Union now faces a chi 
of whether to exaggerate differences 
its relations with the West or to try, 
Stockholm, the path of greater coope 
tion, looking not for unilateral gain b 
for mutual advantage. Relations be- 
tween the United States and the Sov 
Union are not destined to be trouble- 
free. There will always be competitiv 
elements in relations between system 
with such different social, political, a 
economic values. But limited coopera ') 
is possible in security affairs as in oti * 

If the Soviet Union decides that i 
interests lie in following a cooperativ 
rather than an adversarial course, th 
Stockholm conference can make a st; 
toward improving the stability of the 
current system of international secui 
In so doing, it can lay the foundation 
confidence and experience essential 1 
more ambitious and complex negotia 
tions in the future. 

In itself, the Stockholm conferen 
can be a forum of cooperative action 
fering an opportunity to restart the 
ternational dialogue and improve the 
climate of relations among states. W 
is needed now is a commitment from 
35 participating states, including the 
Soviet Union, to seize that opportuni 

'National technical means (NTM) reft 
assets which are under national control fi 
monitoring compliance with the provision 
an agreement. NTM includes photograph 
reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based 
systems (such as radar and optical systen 
as well as sea- and ground-based systems 
(such as radars and antenna for collectinf 
telemetry). ■ 


r\an^rtmar,t nf Qt=itQ Pull ll«k. 


.S. Activities on POW-MIA Issue 

Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
\.sian and Pacific Affairs of the 
'^e Foreicpi Affairs Committee on 
'ust 8. 198Jf. Mr. Wolfowitz is As- 
mt Secretary for East Asian and 
if ic Affairs.^ 

ank you for the opportunity to ap- 
' before this committee and the 
V-MIA Task Force to discuss U.S. 
ernment efforts to obtain the fullest 
ible accounting for Americans still 
ing in Southeast Asia as a result of 
Indochina war. 

ninistration Commitment 

e I last spoke before this committee, 
;ident Reagan has reemphasized his 
ional concern about this issue on 
lerous occasions and reaffirmed his 
ninistration's commitment to make 
jress in resolving the POW-MIA 

In his May 28 remarks at the 
norial Day ceremony honoring the 
:nown Soldier of the Vietnam war, 
President said, "We write no last 
Dters. We close no books. We put 
,y no final memories. An end to 
erica's involvement in Vietnam can- 
come before we've achieved the 
;st possible accounting of those miss- 
in action." And in his remarks at the 
te House on the occasion of National 
V-MIA Recognition Day [July 20, 
4], the President told the families of 
;e still missing in Indochina. "I'm 
dful that you gave your sons and 
Dands and fathers into the care of 
government when they left to fight 
our nation. You knew they might die 
attle. But you had, and will always 
3, every right to expect that your 
ernment will not abandon those who 
!d to return." 

Despite our many actions to resolve 
issue, the ultimate key to resolution 
his tragedy must necessarily be a 
sion to cooperate by the Govern- 
its of Vietnam and Laos. It is only 
I their cooperation that real progress 
be made. We are pressing those 
ernments for full cooperation as a 
,ter of highest national priority, and 
will continue to do so as long as 
ssary to achieve the fullest possible 
Dunting for those missing from the 
flict in Indochina. 

Slow Progress From Vietnam 

Progress with Vietnam on resolving this 
issue has been disappointingly slow, but 
developments in recent weeks offer 
room for some hope. 

Hanoi returned the remains of nine 
persons following the last POW-MIA 
technical meeting in Hanoi in June 1983. 
Then, as you recall, despite their agree- 
ment to treat the POW-MIA issue as a 
humanitarian one, separate from other 
issues, the Vietnamese suspended our 
regular quarterly technical meetings. 
They cited what they characterized as 
"hostile" American statements as the 

Shortly thereafter, discussions began 
which resulted in Vietnam's agreement 
to receive the highest level executive 
branch delegation to visit Vietnam since 
the end of the war. This delegation, 
which was led by Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Armitage, included a member 
of the National Security Council staff, 
the executive director of the National 
League of Families, and two Depart- 
ment of State officials. 

As a result of these February 1984 
discussions in Hanoi, both sides agreed 
that cooperation in resolving the 
POW-MIA problem would be pursued as 
a separate humanitarian issue, not 
linked to other matters which divide our 
two countries. Our delegation impressed 
on the Vietnamese the U.S. Govern- 
ment's desire to move beyond the unac- 
ceptably low level of past cooperation 
and, instead, to work together seriously 
to remove what is the primary bilateral 
obstacle to improvement of the at- 
mosphere between the two countries. 
The Vietnamese stated their intention to 
accelerate efforts to resolve the 
POW-MIA issue and to concentrate ini- 
tially on the cases involving the more ac- 
cessible sites. The Vietnamese offered to 
resume regularly scheduled technical 
meetings in the near future. During the 
same discussions, they agreed to turn 
over five sets of remains and indicated a 
willingness to turn over three others 
that had been previously promised to a 
private group of Americans. 

The Vietnamese have fulfilled two of 
their promises since the February 
discussions. On July 17 they handed 
over the remains of eight persons to an 
American military team. We welcome 
the return of these remains, but we 
must recognize that the pace is painfully 

slow. One thousand eight hundred twen- 
ty-six Americans are still missing in 
Vietnam alone; government-to- 
government negotiations have thus far 
resulted in only 95 remains repatriated 
by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and 
subsequently identified as Americans. 
(The Chinese turned over two additional 
remains and the Lao one which have 
been identified as Americans and were 
the result of negotiated efforts.) 

On resumption of technical 
meetings, Hanoi first agreed to, and 
then abruptly cancelled, a mid-April ses- 
sion. They expressed an unwillingness to 
schedule another technical meeting until 
just a few weeks ago. They again 
claimed that a "hostile" American at- 
titude was the reason for this delay. We 
are pleased to report, however, that the 
first in a resumed series of technical 
meetings has now been set for next 

We hope the Vietnamese will fulfill 
all of the commitments they made dur- 
ing the visit of the Armitage delegation, 
including their longstanding agreement 
that resolution of the POW-MIA issue is 
a humanitarian matter to be dealt with 
separately from other issues dividing 
Vietnam and the United States. We 
have told the Vietnamese that we are 
prepared to recognize publicly any 
significant steps they take toward 
resolution of this issue, as the President 
did in his July 20 statement. 

At the same time, we will continue 
to speak out frankly about this issue and 
to express fully justified concern about 
the inadequate pace of cooperation. 
Secretary of State Shultz underlined the 
importance of the POW-MIA issue and 
its relevance for our relations with Viet- 
nam, when he said to the ASEAN 
[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] meeting in Jakarta: "The United 
States has both a legal and moral 
responsibility to obtain the fullest possi- 
ble accounting of almost 2,500 of our 
men still missing. The American people 
rightfully expect no less. We deeply ap- 
preciate the support you have given us 
with Vietnam on this problem. It is a 
problem which demands meaningful 
cooperation and progress before the 
American people will permit discussion 
of normalization with the Vietnamese, 
even in the context of a Kampuchea set- 

We believe that we have the support 
of the Congress and American people in 
urging Vietnam to honor its pledge to 
resolve this issue. As the President 
stated on Memorial Day, "Today, a 
united people call upon Hanoi with one 



voice: Heal the sorest wound of this con- 
flict. Return our sons to America. End 
the grief of those who are innocent and 
undeserving of any retribution." 

Signs of Progress With Laos 

Following the President's statement to 
the League of Families in January 1983 
that we are prepared to improve rela- 
tions between Laos and the United 
States, with progress on the POW-MIA 
issue as the principal measure of Lao 
sincerity, we have closely pursued the 
POW-MIA issue with the Lao Govern- 
ment and can report modest progress. 

In October 1983, I met with the Lao 
Foreign Minister during the UN General 
Assembly to stress our interest in the 
POW-MIA issue. I reaffirmed that the 
United States would cooperate in our 
mutual effort to improve bilateral rela- 
tions and informed him that we would 
henceforth vote in favor of loans for 
Laos by multilateral lending institutions 
which otherwise meet our criteria. 
Shortly thereafter Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State John Monjo and Na- 
tional Security Council staff member 
Richard Childress met with a Lao Vice 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and other 
officials in Vientiane to propose joint 
Lao-American searches of crash sites of 
American aircraft downed during the 

In December 1983, at the invitation 
of the Lao Government, a team of U.S. 
POW-MIA experts conducted a 
preliminary survey of the crash site of 
an American aircraft downed during the 
war near Pakse, Laos. In January we 
proposed to the Lao a joint excavation 
of that site to search for remains. Ex- 
cavation of the crash site will not be 
possible until the dry season at the end 
of this year, but we and the Lao have 
been discussing details of this joint 
operation. Last month, as the President 
announced in his July 20 address to the 
League of Families, the Lao Govern- 
ment agreed in principle to the excava- 

I am encouraged by this sign of 
progress and cooperation from the Lao 
and hope that we can soon reach agree- 
ment on the specific details of the ex- 
cavation. We look forward to the pros- 
pect of excavating other crash sites in 

As I noted earlier, we and the Lao 
Government have agreed that each of us 
will try to take concrete steps to im- 
prove relations. Although there is no 
direct link between what we do and 
what they do, an honest effort by both 


sides will further the POW-MIA ac- 
counting process. I should mention in 
this regard that we have recently taken 
the opportunity to demonstrate our 
desire for better relations with Laos by 
responding to an emergency food short- 
age caused by irregular monsoon rains. 
The United States has joined other na- 
tions—particularly Sweden, Japan, and 
Australia — in providing Laos with 
emergency food aid. Laos accepted our 
offer of some 5,000 tons of California 
glutinous rice under the PL 480 (Food 
for Peace) Title II program. We are 
working with the World Food Program 
to arrange distribution of this rice to 
those areas most severely affected. 

The foreign assistance legislation 
now, of course, prohibits development 
assistance to Laos. We have told Lao of- 
ficials that action to lift this congres- 
sional ban would be possible only after a 
pattern of sustained cooperation has 
been established toward resolving the 
fate of Americans missing in Laos from 
the war in Indochina. If future progress 
develops into a pattern of sustained 
cooperation, we would consult with 
Members of Congress on the question of 
lifting the ban. 


Our policy of firm support for the ap- 
proach of ASEAN to the Kampuchean 
problem is well known and was recently 
reaffirmed by Secretary of State Shultz 
in his meeting with the Foreigji 
Ministers of the six ASEAN countries in 

The Heng Samrin regime, which was 
installed in Phnom Penh by the Viet- 
namese, joined the Foreign Ministers of 
Vietnam and Laos last January in a 
communique which stated that the three 
countries would share POW-MIA infor- 
mation. They indicated a readiness to 
cooperate with the United States on the 
POW-MIA issue due to the increased in- 
terest of the American people, if we 
would "change our attitude." A senior 
Heng Samrin regime official made a 
similar offer to cooperate with the 
United States in a meeting with a 
delegation from a private American 
relief organization. 

The Heng Samrin regime does not 
have control over the entire country, 
and there is reason to question whether 
it could carry out the kind of careful in- 
vestigation required to account for miss- 
ing Americans. Any available informa- 
tion on Americans missing in Kam- 
puchea would almost certainly be known 
to the Vietnamese,, who exercise de facto 
control there as they did in many areas 

of Kampuchea during the Vietnam wa; 
If Hanoi does have such information, c 
finds it in the future, we will look to 
them to cooperate with us in the same 
way that they are pledged to do in the 
case of Americans missing in Vietnam 
At the same time, we have asked an ii 
ternational humanitarian organization 
(which has asked not to be identified) ■ 
contact the Phnom Penh authorities tc 
transmit to us any information they n- 
be willing to provide on Americans mi 
ing in Kampuchea. So far no such infc 
mation has been forthcoming. 

Efforts With Other Governments 

We actively seek the cooperation of 
other governments in making known i 
the Vietnamese and Lao Governments 
our concern about the POW-MIA issi 
In June of last year Secretary Shultz 
raised the POW-MIA issue with the f 
Foreign Ministers of ASEAN in 
Bangkok. They said they would do wl 
they could to help, and several useful 
contacts were made as a result. Our 
allies and a number of other countries 
both Europe and Asia are sympatheti 
and constructive concerning this 
humanitarian issue. Such approaches 
bring home to the two governments t 
importance attached to this problem 1 
international opinion and make clear 
that the POW-MIA issue can have ar 
effect on broader Vietnamese and La 
foreign policy interests. 

During the past year we made an 
across-the-board effort to advise all 
friendly countries with missions in H; 
of our interest in the POW-MIA issu 

I wish I could express publicly oi; 
appreciation for the efforts of all the 
countries that have helped, but their 
preference — and the need to give qui 
diplomacy a chance to work — require^ ik 
that I not do so. 

American allies have cooperated 
with our efforts to contact Indochine 
refugees resettled in their countries 
information about POW-MIAs. Our ■ 
forts have also been directed toward 
refugees resettled in other countries 
who have been reported to have rele 

Southeast Asian governments ha 
expressed understanding of and sym 
pathy for our POW-MIA efforts and 
have assisted our attempts to screen 
refugees from Indochina for POW-^ 
information. The Royal Thai and Hoi 
Kong Governments have been most 
helpful in granting special access for 
American POW-MIA specialists to e 
camps housing refugees from Vietna 
Laos, and Kampuchea which are nor 



Deoartment of State Bull li 


j *» losed to outsiders. The refugee 
""■( lening program, however, requires 

"( stant monitoring because of changing 
'^'\ iitions, among them changing volun- 

1 ' agencies and host-country officials. 
I'^-' i year my Department and the 
I*' I lartment of Defense again reviewed 

I programs to ensure, as much as 
ible, that refugees know of our in- 

^ragency Effort 

Department of State chairs the in- 
igency POW-MIA group and par- 
lates fully in the planning of U.S. ac- 
is aimed at making progress on the 
MIA issue. We have taken the 
iS in efforts to improve our overall 
.tions with Laos, in developing a 
.tegy to deal with the Vietnamese on 
issue, and in approaches to other 

The POW-MIA policy is formulated 
participating interagency members: 
Department of State, the Depart- 
it of Defense, including the Joint 
efs of Staff and the Defense In- 
gence Agency, the National Security 
moil, and the Executive Director of 
League of Families, whose long ex- 
ience on this issue and depth of 
■wledge of family concerns has been 
iluable. Staff members of the House 
Senate also participate in the in- 
igency group. 

We strongly encourage support from 
'ate Americans for our POW-MIA 
)rts. Public support is the backbone 
Iiur policy. At the same time, we 
rher support nor condone forays by 
J 'ate Americans in search of remains 
prisoners. Such actions jeopardize the 
I ernment-to-government efforts which 
I the only viable channel for resolution 
I .he POW-MIA issue. In addition, it 
I been our experience that they often 
rate on fabricated or faulty informa- 
1 and thus only add to the misunder- 
ndings and misperceptions involved in 
; issue. 

Making progress on the POW-MIA 
le clearly requires a long-term effort. 
3 U.S. Government, supported by the 
lerican people, can be successful in 
•suading Hanoi to cooperate on the 
W-MIA issue. We believe that we 
'e such support and join with the 
jsident in saying that, "Today, a 
ted people call on Hanoi with one 

Continuation of MFN Status for China 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
be published by the committee and will 
ivailable from the Superintendent of 
uments, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

by William A. Brown 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Trade of the Senate 
Finance Committee on August 8, 198J,. 
Mr. Brown is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. ' 

I welcome this opportunity to testify 
before this subcommittee as part of an 
Administrative panel concerning the ex- 
tension of the President's general waiver 
authority under Section 402(c) of the 
Trade Act and the continuation of the 
specific waivers permitting most- 
favored-nation (MFN) treatment for 
China, Hungary, and Romania. My 
testimony will address the waiver for 

Development of strong, stable, and 
enduring relations with China has been a 
foreign policy objective of four con- 
secutive Administrations. President 
Reagan has reiterated that "such a rela- 
tionship is vital to our long-term na- 
tional security interests and contributes 
to stability in East Asia. Economic 
development has become China's top 
priority, and China has opened the door 
to foreign trade and investment. Accord- 
ingly, our bilateral economic relationship 
has moved to the forefront of our 
developing ties with China. As this rela- 
tionship has grown, disagreements have 
naturally arisen in some areas. We can 
expect that other problems will come up 
in a trading relationship which is 
dynamic and which involves two very 
different trade and legal systems. 
Nevertheless, we believe the prospects 
are good for further growth of our 
economic ties. 

Trade and Investment 

Bilateral trade has increased dramatical- 
ly in recent years. Overall, China ranks 
22d among our world trading partners, 
while we are China's third largest 
trading partner, after Japan and Hong 
Kong. Last year, two-way trade totaled 
$4.4 billion, a four-fold increase over 
1978 but 20% less than 1981's $5.5 
billion. In most years, the United States 
has maintained a trade surplus. Sales of 
U.S. agricultural products declined last 
year, and we are concerned about the 
slow pace of Chinese grain purchases 
under the U.S. -China grain agreement 
so far this year. At the same time. 

however, the volume of high-technology 
manufactured products exported to 
China has grown steadily, reflecting 
China's development needs and our own 
liberalized export guidelines. Last year, 
the dollar value of export licenses ap- 
proved for high-technology shipments to 
China was about $1 billion and will prob- 
ably exceed $L5 billion in 1984. 

American business has not hesitated 
to take advantage of the opportunities 
for investment in China. The United 
States stands as China's number one 
source of foreign investment in equity 
joint ventures and commitments to ex- 
plore for offshore oil and gas. Twenty 
U.S. firms account for 25% of China's 
total direct foreign investment ($85 
million out of $340 million). Twelve U.S. 
oil companies have made commitments 
to spend $500-600 million in exploring 
for oil off China's coast. U.S. firms are 
also expected to participate in a major 
coal mining project in China's Shanxi 
Province, which could involve U.S. 
equipment exports amounting to over 
$300 million. The prospects are excellent 
that investment and trade opportunities 
for U.S. firms will continue to expand as 
China seeks foreign help in modernizing 
existing industries and in developing 
new ones, in fields such as telecom- 
munications, electronics, instrumenta- 
tion, and electrical power generation. 

The opportunities for U.S. trade and 
mvestment with China are enhanced by 
the series of government-to-government 
economic agreements that we have con- 
cluded and will conclude with China. . 
Agreements on trade, civil aviation, 
grain, textiles, and claims and assets, 
among others, now form the basis for 
the expansion of economic relations. 
Work programs under our science and 
technology agreement and our industrial 
and technological cooperation accord 
contribute to China's development and 
create opportunities for American 
business. During President Reagan's 
visit to China in April, a new tax agree- 
ment was signed which will promote fur- 
ther commercial relationships with 
China. We will hold further discussions 
on an investment agreement with the 

As the economic relationship has 
grown, so have official and unofficial ex- 
changes which promote longer bilateral 
relations. For example, there are 21 
U.S. media organizations with offices in 
Beijing, nearly 200 U.S. firms with of- 
fices in China, more than 80 U.S. 

ober 1984 


universities that maintain affiliations 
with about 120 Chinese schools, and 
more than 20 American States and cities 
that have sister relationships with their 
Chinese counterparts. At the same time, 
over 200 Chinese delegations visit the 
United States each month, and 
American tourists to China numbered 
more than 168,000 last year. 

Travel and Emigration 

China's decision to speed up the pace of 
developments by greater reliance on 
foreign goods and technology has been 
accompanied by some liberalization in 
the area of emigration. Travel restric- 
tions have been relaxed and simplified 
for both immigrants and short-term 
travelers. There are currently more than 
10,000 Chinese students and scholars in 
this country. In addition, last year some 
11,000 business visas were issued to 
Chinese citizens. At the same time, our 
China posts issued nearly 10,000 im- 
migrant visas. There are over 60,000 
Chinese with approved visa petitions 
waiting for their turn to immigrate to 
the United States, most of whom have 
close family members already living 

China's commitment to more liberal 
emigration practices is reflected in the 
bilateral U.S.-China consular convention, 
which has been in effect for 2 years. In 
diplomatic notes accompanying the con- 
vention, both sides agreed to facilitate 
travel for the purpose of family 
reunification and also to facilitate travel 
between the two countries of persons 
with simultaneous claims to the na- 
tionality of the United States and of 

This is not to say that Chinese 
emigration is problem free. China, like 
many developing countries, is concerned 
about potential brain drain. Current 
Chinese regulations restrict foreign 
study by Chinese university students un- 
til they complete their Chinese education 
and work for 2 years. In addition, local 
work units may be slow to approve 
departure, and officials are sometimes 
reluctant to issue passports and exit per- 
mits to persons whose emigration might 
create gaps in modernization efforts. 
There is no evidence, however, of any 
policy aimed at inhibiting the emigration 
of those with legitimate family ties 
abroad, although many encounter 
bureaucratic delays in obtaining 
passports and exit permits. 

The principal obstacle to emigration 
from China remains the limited ability or 
willingness of other countries to receive 
the large numbers of people able and 
willing to immigrate. In the case of the 
United States, our numerical limitation 
on immigrants from each country cannot 
keep up with the Chinese demand. For 
example, applications for fifth pref- 
erence immigration (siblings of U.S. 
citizens) stretch back to 1979, implying 
at least a 5-year wait for applicants in 
this category. 

Trade is a fundamental component 
of China's modernization effort and an 

avenue for China's further integration | 
into the community of nations. China's 
advancement toward greater modernia 
tion and integration is clearly in the 
American interest, and MFN treatment 
contributes to this. The Administration 
strongly believes that the continuation 
MFN status for China is vital to our 
foreign policy interests. | 

'The complete transcript of the hearing 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

U.S.-Bulgaria Relations 

by Richard R. Burt 

State-ment before the Subcommittee 
on European and Middle East Affa irs 
and the Task Force on International 
Narcotics Control of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on July 24, 1984. 
Mr. Burt is Assistant Secretary for 
European a,nd Canadian Affairs. ^ 

I thank you for the opportunity to ap- 
pear before you to discuss our policy 
toward Bulgaria. 

As the most loyal member of the 
Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria evidences the 
least amount of differentiation from the 
Soviet Union in its political, ideological, 
and economic policies. For years the 
Bulgarian leadership evoked an almost 
symbiotic relationship with the Soviet 
Union. They seemed to fall over 
themselves to defer to the Soviets, to 
echo their propaganda, and to support 
them in every single issue of interna- 
tional importance. Bulgarian devotion to 
the Moscow line seemed to go far 
beyond their obligation under existing 
political realities, surpassing that of 
their partners in the Warsaw Pact. One 
looked hard for even small signs of 
diversity. Under those conditions, there 
were few grounds for dialogue. In fact, 
during the decade of the 1950s, we did 
not even maintain diplomatic relations. 

Relations were reestablished in 
1960, but little has happened. Our rela- 
tions with Bulgaria remain at a low 
level. Unlike some of the other countries 
in Eastern Europe with which our rela- 
tions began to expand in keeping with 
our policy of differentiation, we have not 
exchanged high-level political visits nor 

do we have official bilateral commissioi 
on economic and trade development. A 
Bulgaria has not fulfilled the require- 
ments of the Trade Act of 1974, we do 
not extend most-favored-nation (MFN) 
tariff treatment to Bulgaria. Nor is 
Bulgaria eligible for U.S. Government 
trade credits or guarantees. 

By the end of the 1970s, Bulgaria 
began paying greater attention to 
developing its economic and commerci: 
ties to Western Europe and the Unitec 
States. In order to do so, its leaders a( 
cepted a broadened political and cultm 
dialogue with us on matters of impor- 
tance to us. In this dialogue, we pressi 
for improved Bulgarian adherence to t 
CSCE [Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] principles- 
greater contacts, reunification of divid 
families, and human rights generally. 
We pressed the Bulgarians to stop jan 
ming our Bulgarian-language Voice of 
America broadcasts. We pressed then: 
on persistent allegations and reports c 
official Bulgarian involvement in the i 
legal drug trade and in illegal arms sa 
to terrorist groups in the Third World 
and the Middle East. 

The results of our efforts have bei 
on balance, disappointing. In the area 
the Helsinki principles and human 
rights, they have resolved nearly all o 
the longstanding family reunification 
cases for which we had been seeking 
solutions, in some cases, as much as 1 
years. They have also taken steps to 
facilitate the operation of our Embass 
in Sofia and improve their access to 
Bulgarian officials. Last fall, they re- 
ceived at the very highest level — 



Department of State Bulle 


■<;ident Zhivkov — an important 
Ration from this House led by Con- 
fsiiian Gibbons [Sam M. Gibbons, 


:otics Trafficking and Arms Trade 

on the very serious issues of 
;arian involvement in the illegal nar- 
:s and illicit arms trade, our 
esentations have produced few 
Its. Our drug enforcement coopera- 
efforts with Bulgaria have been 
ed into propaganda exercises to 
onstrate apparent rather than real 
eration in eliminating drug traffick- 
Tom Bulgaria. Repeated requests by 
cey for extradition of known Turkish 
otics smugglers have been refused, 
rmation passed by our Drug En- 
jment Administration (DEA) people 
it known narcotics smugglers in 
:aria has been largely ignored, and, 
!ad, we have been given statistics 
it the number of seizures at the 
,er. Little has been done to crack 
n on those vnthin the country who 
; moving drugs and illicit arms in in- 
ational trade. 

After several years of frustrating 
leration that produced few real im- 
'ements in drug enforcement, we 
lended customs cooperation with 
raria in 1981. We reluctantly came 
16 conclusion that the relationship 
largely fruitless and was being 
ised for propaganda purposes. 
Last February I visited Bulgaria, 
g with two other countries in 
tern Europe, to provide that close 
of the Soviet Union our position on 
s control and, in particular, INF 
irmediate-range nuclear forces], in 
context of Soviet counter- 
oyments in Eastern Europe. I also 
i that opportunity to make un- 
akably clear our continuing interest 
concern over Bulgaria's official deal- 
in or toleration of the international 
;otics trade, their involvement in the 
t arms trade, and over allegations of 
ifjort for terrorist groups. I stressed 
i: there could be no marked improve- 
mt in our relations until these con- 
'is could be satisfied. In addition to 
itri|), I note that representatives of 
i\ also have been in Sofia recently to 
ivs the Bulgarians and will be continu- 
ijsuch contacts. 
I understand that there are recent 
Its of improved Bulgarian enforce- 
Kit action along their borders, and 
I ifieant drug seizures have been an- 
iiiifd. I hope these reports are cor- 
: . However, there has been insuffi- 

Bulgaria— A Profile 


Noun and adjective: Bulgarian(s). Popula- 
tion (Dec. 1980): 8,876,652. Annual growth 
rate: 3.6/1,000. Birth rate: 14.3/1,000. Den- 
sity: 80/sq. km. (207/sq. nu.). Ethnic groups: 
85.3% Bulgarian, 8.5% Turk, 6.2% others 
(Gypsies, Greeks, Armenians, and Russians). 
Lang^uage: Bulgarian. Religions: Bulgarian 
Orthodox; Muslim minority. Education: 
Fears compulsory — 8. Attendance — 
1,457,848. Literacy— 9h% (est.). Health: In- 
fant mortality rate— 20.2/1,000. Life expec- 
tancy — men 69 yrs., women 74 yrs. Work 
force (3,997,615): Agriculture— 2Z. 2%. In- 
dustry and commerce — 42.6%. Government — 
1.5%. Other— 32.7%. 


Area: 110,912 sq. km. (44,365 sq. mi.); about 
the size of Ohio. Cities: Capital— Sofia (pop. 
1,056,945). Other cifes— Plovdiv (350,438), 
Varna (291,224), Ruse (172,782), Burgas 
(168,412). Terrain: Mountainous. Climate: 
Similar to US Midwest (dry, hot summers 
and damp, cold winters), but with strong 
regional variations. 


— \-.. 






* Sofia ^A 

Black Sea 



« ^ 



'V.J \-^ 


Type: Communist people's republic. Constitu- 
tion: May 1971. 

Branches: Executive — chief of state 
(chairman of State Council), head of govern- 
ment (chairman of Council of Ministers). 

Legislative — unicameral National Assembly; 
Council of State (chairman, 1 first deputy 
chairman, 5 deputy chairmen, 1 secretary, 
and 21 members). Judicial— Supreme Court, 
28 provincial courts, 103 people's courts. 

Political parties: Bulgarian Communist 
Party, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. 
Suffrage: Universal over 18. 

Administrative subdivisions: 27 prov- 
inces, 1 city. 

Defense: 5.9% of government budget 

National holiday: September 9. 

Flag: White, green, and red horizontal 
strif>es with a lion framed by wheat stalks on 
white stripe. 


National income (1981): $23.31 billion. An- 
nual growth rate: 4%. Per capita income 

(1980): $2,625. 

Natural resources: Bauxite, copper, lead, 
zinc, coal, lignite, lumber. 

Agricultural products: Grain, tobacco, 
fruits, vegetables, sheep, hogs, poultry, 
cheese, sunflower seeds. 

Industrial products: Processed agricul- 
tural products, machinery, chemicals, 
metallurgical products. 

Trade (1982): Exports— $n.2 billion (US 
share, $25.6 million), /mports— $11.32 billion 
(US share, $106.45 million). Major trade 
partners— USSR 54%, other CEMA coun- 
tries 19%, developing countries 11.4%. 

Official exchange rate (April 1982): 0.96 
leva = US$1. 

Membership in International 

UN and many of its specialized agencies. 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CEMA), Warsaw Pact. 

Taken from the Background Notes of April 
1983. published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita 
Adams. ■ 


cient movement on elimination of the 
drug rings that operate out of Bulgaria, 
moving drugs and guns between the 
Middle East and Europe. Those are the 
operators that we have to get at. Those 
are the connections that must be broken. 
We must and will continue to press the 
Bulgarians on these concerns. We have 
also discussed our concerns with key 
West European governments, urging 
them to approach the Bulgarians direct- 
ly on the subject. We will continue to 
work to enlist the support of other 

Assassination Attempt 
Against the Pope 

With regard to the two resolutions con- 
cerning Bulgaria that are currently 
before this subcommittee, let me say 
that there should be no mistake as to 
the gravity with which we view the at- 
tempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. 
We regard the cowardly attack on the 
Pope as one of the most terrible and 
despicable of all possible crimes. 

As you know, the crime occurred on 
Vatican soil, and it is the Italian judicial 
system which has the jurisdiction to in- 
vestigate the charges. All along, we 
have been extremely impressed with the 
thorough and dispassionate manner in 
which the Italian authorities have pur- 
sued their investigation. Their 
courageous, painstaking, exhaustive, and 
impartial approach has been most 
laudatory. We continue to have complete 
faith in the integrity of the Italian in- 
vestigation. And we have offered the 
fullest possible assistance to the Italian 
investigation, and we will continue to do 

Since the Italian judicial process has 
not yet been completed, we must main- 
tain both the appearance and the reality 
of nonintervention in this case. This is 
the position that the Secretary of State 
stressed in his testimony on June 13 
before the full Foreign Affairs Commit- 

In considering these pieces of 
legislation (H.R. 5980 and H. Con. Res. 
337), let me assure you that we share 
the concerns of members of this subcom- 
mittee about the very grave charges of 
Bulgarian complicity in the attempted 
assassination of the Pope. We support 
the conduct of a comprehensive review 
of U.S. policy toward Bulgaria to ex- 
amine all facets of our relationship. I 
would strongly recommend, however, 
that the study be delayed until such time 
as the Italians have completed their in- 


vestigation and the outcome of an even- 
tual trial is known. By awaiting those 
results, we will not have interfered in 
the Italian judicial process. We will also 
avoid playing into Soviet and Bulgarian 
hands by introducing the appearance of 
external pressure that could discredit 
the impartiality of the investigation and 
an eventual trial. 

In conclusion, let me assure you 
once again of the seriousness with which 
the Department of State regards the 

charges and evidence of Bulgarian in- 
volvement and toleration of illicit nar 
cotics and arms trafficking and suppc 
to terrorist groups. We will continue 
devote close attention to the concerns 
raised by you and members of your c 



'The complete transcript of the hearit 
will be publisned by the committee and w 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Polish Government's 
of Political Prisoners 

AUG. 3, 1984' 

The President has taken note of the 
release of political prisoners announced 
by the Polish Government on July 21. 
He believes that it represents a signifi- 
cant move in the direction of national 
reconciliation in Poland. Therefore, in 
accordance with his step-by-step ap- 
proach for dealing with the Polish situa- 
tion, he has decided to take two steps. 

First, the President has authorized 
the lifting of the ban on landing rights 
for regularly scheduled flights by the 
Polish state airline, LOT, subject to the 
regularization of our civil aviation rela- 
tionship and the full reestablishment of 
scientific exchanges between the United 
States and Poland. 

Second, the President has indicated 
that complete and reasonable implemen- 
tation of the amnesty decision will 
create a positive atmosphere that would 
allow the reactivation of Poland's ap- 
plication for membership in the Interna- 



tional Monetary Fund (IMF). The Un 
States would, of course, consider anj 
final application on its merits, includi 
Poland's willingness to fulfill the obli 
tions of IMF membership. 

The purpose of our sanctions, frc 
the very beginning, has been to en- 
courage movement away from confr( 
tation toward reconciliation in Polan 
While the United States remains con 
cerned with the situation in Poland, 
view the Polish Government's amnes 
declaration as a potentially positive 

The United States is prepared tc 
take further positive steps in respon 
to further significant movement tow 
national reconciliation in Poland. In 
meantime, we will be consulting witl 
our NATO allies and others on the f 
tion in Poland and a Western respoi 
to it. 


'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 6, 1984. 

Department of State Bui 



►od and Population 
anning Assistance 

r. Peter McPherson 

Uatement before the House Foreign 

rs Committee on August 2, 198j. 
McPherson is Administrator of the 
cy for International Development 

:hairman [Dante Fascell], it is a 
ure to be here to discuss with your 
nittee two areas of vital importance 
e developing countries, food and 
lation. I would like to express my 
eciation to the committee for its 
support for foreign assistance, and 
k forward to continued cooperation 
r your leadership. I would also like 
ank Under Secretary Amstutz for a 
)Ugh briefing on the 10th ministerial 
on of the World Food Council. The 
irtment of Agriculture and AID 

long had a productive relationship 
:ing together on food aid and the 
d hunger problem. 
_,ast week I returned from Africa 
•e I saw the tragic effect of the 
ght and social disruption on the 

situation. As I have previously 
id, the long-term solution rests 
arily with the African governments 
iselves which must reassess their 
omic and agricultural policies. At 

needed policy reforms are being in- 

ted in many countries giving 

lers a fair price for their production 

encouraging the private sector to 
1 nvolved in providing agricultural in- 

, fiiod processing, storage, and 

;tt\ng. If the necessary policy 
irms are instituted, then, over the 

i,>rm Africa will be less likely to be 
(ght to its knees by drought. While 
(United States bases its support on 
:'s [less developed countries] under- 
hg longer term solutions, we con- 
le to undertake actions to relieve the 

•t-term food needs of these popula- 


The United States has learned some 
Dns from the present African food 
ation. We are using these lessons to 
ride food assistance more efficiently 
iture emergencies. These lessons are 
jcted in the recent presidential food 
initiative which I will discuss briefly. 

Presidential Food Aid Initiative 

President announced on July 10 a 
or initiative to allow the United 
tes to respond more quickly and ef- 

fectively to the hungry and malnour- 
ished of Africa and the rest of the 
world. This initiative includes a five- 
point plan to increase effectiveness: 

1. Prepositioning of Grain in 
Selected Areas. Prepositioning grains in 
or near areas especially vulnerable to 
acute food shortages will help save lives 
by shortening U.S. response time from 
the present 3-6 months to as little as 2 
weeks. A number of possible sites in 
Africa are being investigated. 

2. Special $50-Million Presidential 
Fund. The creation of this special fund 
will provide the President the ability to 
accelerate emergency food relief efforts, 
saving lives by responding more quickly 
to emergency requests for food aid. The 
President will shortly propose legislation 
to set aside foreign aid resources within 
current and planned levels to meet 
emergency food aid needs. Replenish- 
ment of the fund will be through trans- 
fers of unobligated foreign assistance 
and PL 480 funds or appropriations. 

3. Financing or Payment of 
Transportation Costs of Food. Unfor- 
tunately, many of the countries most 
severely affected by hunger and 
malnutrition are unable to or find it very 
difficult to finance ocean transportation 
costs under the concessional sales pro- 
gram or inland transportation and 
distribution costs under the grant pro- 
gram. Assistance under the current 
Food for Peace Title II legislation is 
limited to providing only the ocean 
freight transportation costs to a re- 
cipient's port or border. The President, 
therefore, proposes to amend PL 480 
Title II to allow, in limited cases, pay- 
ment of internal transportation costs as 
a way of ensuring that U.S. food aid 
reaches the people most in need of our 
assistance. We will also consider a 
change in policy to finance, on a limited 
basis, the ocean freight costs associated 
with the concessional sales program 
(PL 480 Title I). 

This action will increase the flexibili- 
ty of the PL 480 Title I and II programs 
in helping to meet emergency food situa- 

4. Creation of a Government Task 
Force to Better Forecast Food Short- 
ages and Needs. The best response to 
an emergency food crisis is an early and 
smooth delivery of food aid. To meet 
this goal, an interagency task force will 
be created to bring together all available 

information and resources to prepare an 
early warning system to forecast possi- 
ble famine situations. 

5. Establishment of an Advisory 
Group of Business Leaders. The 
perspective and expertise of U.S. 
business leaders represents an untapped 
resource in dealing with Third World 
food problems. U.S. agricultural exports 
to the Third World represent over one- 
third of total U.S. agricultural exports. 
The Business Advisory Committee of the 
Department of State will be expanded to 
include a senior-level working group on 
Third World food problems. 

These five steps respond to the 
President's request in December 1983 
for a high-level interagency study of the 
worldwide hunger situation. This study 
group was chaired by Ambassador 
Robert Keating, the President's envoy to 
Madagascar and the Comoros. We be- 
lieve these measures will significantly 
improve our ability to respond rapidly 
and effectively when emergency food 
needs arise. 


Before the advent of government 
population programs, several factors 
combined to create an unprecedented 
surge in population. In developing na- 
tions, the tremendous expansion of 
health services— from simple medication 
to elimination of major diseases— saved 
millions of lives every year. Emergency 
relief, facilitated by modern transport, 
helped millions to survive flood, famine, 
and drought. The sharing of technology, 
agricultural improvements, improve- 
ments in educational standards generally 
all helped to reduce mortality rates, 
especially infant mortality and to 
lengthen life spans. The parodox is that 
these beneficial and desirable actions 
have upset the preexisting equilibrium 
and created challenges in some places of 
excessive population pressures. Other 
necessary actions have not occurred to 
restore the equilibrium required between 
population growth and economic growth. 

Statist government policies have 
disrupted economic incentives, awards, 
and opportunities for advancement, 
especially in agriculture. Natural 
disasters have made the provision of 
adequate supplies of food even more dif- 

It is clear that the current exponen- 
tial growth of population cannot con- 
tinue indefinitely and that there is a 
need to reach an equilibrium between 
population and economic growth. The 
Administration's position is that both 
economic and social conditions and 



access to a broad range of voluntary 
family planning services are important 
components of fertility declines and sus- 
tained economic growth. 

The United States has prepared a 
policy paper for the International Con- 
ference on Population which will begin 
In Mexico City on August 6. The policy 
paper has two basic thrusts— first, a 
strong statement of this Administra- 
tion's continued support for voluntary 
family planning; and, second, additional 
policy guidance to ensure that no U.S. 
Government funds support abortion- 
related activities. 

Rapid population growth compounds 
the already serious problems faced by 
both public and private sectors in LDCs 
in meeting the needs and demands of 
their citizens for food, shelter, educa- 
tion, and health care. It diverts scarce 
economic resources from investments 
which will produce rapid economic 

AID attempts, through its programs 
and policy dialogues with host govern- 
ments, to ensure that family planning 
programs and economic development 
policies and programs in other sectors 
are mutually reinforcing. Under this Ad- 
ministration, we have used these com- 
plementary approaches to resolving the 
problems of the imbalance between 
population growth and economic growth. 
I believe that this follows very well the 
congressional mandate outlined in Sec- 
tion 104(d) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act, which is based on recognition of the 
reciprocal links between fertility and 
other aspects of development. We also 
believe that the International Con- 
ference on Population offers the United 
States an opportunity to strengthen the 
international consensus on the interrela- 
tionships between economic development 
and population growth which has 
solidified since the World Population 
Conference in 1974. 

The population problem is not just 
numbers and national statistics, and it 
dehumanizes the problem to speak only 
in broad statistical terms. We must 
recognize that population pressures 
result from individuals and families who 
make life and death decisions. It is 
essentially a family crisis. One of the 
most poignant consequences of rapid 
population growth is its effect on the 
health of mothers and children. Especial- 
ly in poor countries, the health and 
nutrition status of women and children 
is linked to family size. Maternal and in- 
fant mortality and morbidity rise with 
the number of births and with births too 
closely spaced. Complications of 
pregnancy are more frequent among 


women who are very young or near the 
end of their reproductive years. In 
societies with widespread malnutrition 
and inadequate health conditions, these 
problems are reinforced; numerous and 
closely spaced births lead to even 
greater malnutrition of mothers and in- 
fants. Unfortunately, in many countries 
abortion is seen as an answer. But abor- 
tion is not family planning; it is family 
planning failed. Voluntary family plan- 
ning programs provide a humane and 
workable alternative to abortion. 
Widespread resort to abortion is 
evidence of the need for safe and accept- 
able methods of family planning. 

For all these reasons, the United 
States will maintain its strong support 
for voluntary family planning programs. 
As President Reagan stated in his 
message to the Mexico City conference, 
where population programs are ". . . truly 
voluntary, cognizant of the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals and 
families, and respectful of religious and 
cultural values. . . . such programs can 
make an important contribution to 
economic and social development, to the 
health of mothers and children and to 
the stability of the family and of 
society." This has been the consistent 
thrust of aid's population assistance 
while I have been administrator. 

The new U.S. policy articulates the 
Administration's concern about abortion. 
Abortion is not an acceptable method of 
family planning, and it must not be part 
of our program in any way. The policy 
tightens our controls and provides a 
more effective means of assuring that 
U.S. funds are not used for abortion. It 
states that "when dealing with nations 
which support abortion with funds not 
provideii by the United States Govern- 
ment, the United States will contribute 
to such nations" only "through 
segi'egated accounts which cannot be 
used for abortion." Moreover, the United 
States will no longer contribute to 
separate nongovernmental organizations 
which perform or actively promote abor- 
tion as a method of family planning in 
other nations. 

This policy, which has now been 
developed as the Administration position 
for the conference in Mexico, represents 
a tighter policy and is consistent with 
the Administration's overall position con- 
cerning abortion. I believe that it pro- 
vides a more effective means of assuring 
that U.S. funds are not used for abor- 
tion. We will now ensure that any II. S. 
Government funds to nations which sup- 
port abortion with other monies will be 
given through segregated accounts for 
purposes which are allowed under 

legislation. As a practical matter, th 
has generally been the case; now it ' 
be universal. And. we will no longer 
fund separate nongovernmental org; 
nizations which perform or actively 
mote abortions in other countries. 

Draft recommendations for the 
Mexico meeting include one which c 
on countries "[t]o take appropriate s 
to help women avoid abortions and, 
whenever possible, to provide for th 
humane treatment and counselling c 
women who have had recourse to ill 
abortion." We will support this reco 
mendation as it is fully consistent w 
our policy. 

Our policy includes the need for 
broader access to family planning ec 
tion and services, especially in the c 
text of maternal/child health progra 
National maternal/child health pro- 
grams, however, are only one chanr 
for distributing family planning ser\ 
As the recent "World Development 
Report" makes clear, one of the prii 
cipal constraints on the practice of 1 
ly planning is access to contraceptiv 
knowledge and materials. Here the 
private sector can plan a critical am 
cost-effective role. Thus, we have e: 
panded our support for the marketi 
contraceptives which can provide fa 
planning at low cost through existir 
commercial channels. These channe 
can reach out beyond cities and tow 
remote rural villages not easily serv 
by centralized government program 
and can provide assistance to famili 
who may not have access to service jan 
from other sources. Provision of sei 
which are acceptable within the cull 
and religious context of each counti 
critical, and we believe that we hav 
enhanced our programs in accordar 'f' 
with congressional mandates by in- i; 
eluding natural family planning mel 
where these are appropriate to the 
beliefs of the individuals and nation 
which we support. 

In summary, we have a policy \ 
emphasizes the need for voluntary 1 
ly planning services, while ensuring 
these do not include abortion as a 
method of family planning. Our poli 
also makes clear the importance of 
links between economic developmer 
and effective family planning. 

We will continue to carry out oi 
population assistance programs wit 
the cultural, economic, and political 
text of the countries we are assistir 
and in keeping with our own values 



5 1 



In J 

'The complete transcript of the heai 
will be published by the committee and 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing ' 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



iirope V. Asia: Is Diplomacy 
Zero-Sum Game? 

nneth W. Dam 

ddress before the American Bar 
iation in Chicago on August 6. 
Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of 

iften said that where you sit in- 
■es how you think. For two cen- 
, the east coast dominated U.S. 
71 policy. Not surprisingly, Europe 
t the core of our international rela- 
But today some well-known and 
ntial thinkers believe that is chang- 
'hey say that America is reorient- 
self from the Atlantic to the 
c, from Europe to Asia. This 
mtation, they claim, is exacerbated 
growing policy divergence— indeed, 
on— between the United States and 
pe. In some cases it is not clear 
ler these commentators favor such 
rientation or simply believe that 
tening it will have a salutary effect 
iropean thinking. 

.awyers bring special skills to world 
•s, and the American Bar Associa- 

* IS an institution has played an im- 
ive role in the development of U.S. 
rn policy. Perhaps today, with 

u ;rs from Maine to California 
!red here in America's heartland, 
m cast a critical eye on the "Europe 
ia" debate. 

Ulleged Shift From 
ipe to Asia 

IS first consider this notion that 
rica is "tilting" toward Asia. Cer- 
/ the center of gravity of U.S. trade 
s to be shifting westward. Since 

more U.S. trade has crossed the 
"ic than the Atlantic— and the gap is 
ing. In 1983 our two-way trade 
5S the Pacific totaled $137 billion. 

was some $30 billion more than our 
vvay trade across the Atlantic. The 

East" is now America's "Near 

n addition, the Asian economies 
, surged while those of Europe have 
ill nated. Growth in Europe over the 

decade has averaged about 2% an- 
ly. In contrast, the newly in- 
rialized countries of Asia have 
/n at a 7% annual rate. And their 
ufacturing exports have grown at an 

annual clip. 

These changes in the world have 
been paralleled by changes in the United 
States. Economic power and in- 
fluence—as well as people— have 
migrated south and west. U.S. exports 
reflect that shift. The latest statistics 
(1981) show that California and Texas 
are the company's top two exporters of 
manufactured goods. 

Perceived Divergence 
Between U.S. and Europe 

This alleged shift from Europe to Asia 
has been exacerbated, in the eyes of 
some commentators, by a perceived 
divergence in security and economic 
policies between the United States and 
Europe. Whether this divergence is a 
cause or a consequence of the alleged 
shift in interest from Europe to Asia is 

On the security front the most 
serious problem, in the opinion of these 
commentators, is that the United States 
bears a disproportionate burden of the 
cost of the common defense of Europe. 
They note that we spend about 1.7 times 
as much of our GNP [gross national 
product] on defense as does Western 

ministration and our allies strongly op- 
posed this measure, but it still came 
within 14 votes of passage. A strong 
sentiment obviously exists in Congress 
that Europe is not carrying its share of 
the defense burden. 

In the economic field, this decade 
has witnessed a major divergence in 
U.S. and European economic policies— 
and performance. Over the past 10 
years, the big difference between the 
U.S. and European economies has not 
been in growth or inflation but in job 
creation. Between 1973 and 1983, 15 
million new jobs were created in the 
United States. The West Europeans 
netted no new jobs in the same period. 
The ratio of employment to working-age 
population is higher in the United States 
(66%) than all of Western Europe except 
for Sweden. And the ratio is rising in 
the United States and falling in Europe, 
as more women participate in the U.S. 
labor force. 

But why the higher rate of job for- 
mation in the United States, whether for 
men or women? Part of the answer is 
that in America we have dismantled 
burdensome regulations and lowered 
taxes so that market forces can work. In 

... a major foreign policy accomplishment of this 
Administration is its success in encouraging the in- 
dustrialized democracies— in Europe, Asia, and 
North America— to cooperate in developing global, 
not parochial, solutions to our common economic 
and security problems. 

Europe. But this is a complex issue; no 
single measure can stand as an adequate 
indicator of relative burdensharing. The 
point is that more must be done by the 
Europeans, as well as ourselves and our 
Asian friends, to offset the relentless 
Soviet military buildup. 

Yet, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia 
recently proposed in Congress that 
American forces in Europe be frozen 
now and reduced in future years if the 
European defense effort does not grow 
to meet specific target levels. The Ad- 

Europe, fragmented markets (particular- 
ly in the service sector), a tradition of 
government intervention, and immobile, 
high-cost labor impede economic growth. 
Instead of the tonic of the marketplace, 
Europeans have too often chosen the 
dulling narcotic of subsidies and pro- 
tectionism. Thus, Europe is struggling 
to match the vitality of Japan and of 
our own silicon valley. As one Euro- 
pean statesman recently lamented: 
"The Japanese have a strategy. The 
Americans have a dream. But where do 
we fit in?" 


The Questions Raised 

The thesis that the United States is 
turning away from Europe in favor of 
Asia raises some fundamental questions. 

First, is such a shift from Europe 
to Asia in' fact taking place? 

Second, if so, does it have either as 
a cause or a consequence increasing 
policy differences between the United 
States and Europe? 

this nation. When George Washington 
was inaugurated, Yankee clippers 
already were in the port of Canton. 
Since 1945 we have fought two wars, 
both in Asia. The 7th (or Far East) 
Fleet has always been bigger than the 
6th (or Mediterranean). Asian issues 
have played a role in at least five of the 
nine postwar presidential campaigns: 
remember 1948 (who lost China?); 1952 
(Ike- I will go to Korea); 1960 (Quemoy 

the United States is a global power with global 
interests. We do not have the luxury of choosing to 
care about one region more than another. 

Third, in the face of these 
developments, how can the industrialized 
democracies of Europe, North America, 
and Asia continue to meet the common 
challenges to their prosperity and peace? 

Today, I should like to examine 
these questions. My own view is that in- 
ternational affairs is not a zero-sum 
game. There are, indeed, changes under- 
way in both Europe and Asia— and in 
U.S. relations with both— but our policy 
is balanced, not tilted in one direction or 
the other. Yet, Asia is growing in impor- 
tance in political, security, and especially 
economic terms; but no, our strength- 
ened relations with Asia need not 
diminish our traditional ties to Europe. 
And those ties remain close despite— or, 
in some cases, because of— our dif- 
ferences and debates. Indeed, a major 
foreign policy accomplishment of this 
Administration is its success in en- 
couraging the industrialized 
democracies— in Europe, Asia, and 
North America— to cooperate in 
developing global, not parochial, solu- 
tions to our common economic and 
security problems. 

The Shift Toward Asia 

Let's look again at the so-called "tilt" 
toward Asia. Increased U.S. interest in 
the Pacific Basin over the next decade 
seems likely to me. But this increased 
interest does not mean that Americans 
have just "discovered" Asia. Rather, it 
merely represents a return to a 
historical association. 

Let us recall that America has been 
involved in Asia from the first days of 

and Matsu); 1968 (Romney: I was brain- 
washed; Nixon: I have a plan); and 1972 
(Kissinger: peace is at hand). 

In short, a strong American interest 
in Asia has been the norm. What has 
been abnormal has been the low level of 
public interest in the aftermath of Viet- 
nam. This Administration, however, has 
given a great deal of emphasis to our 
relations with Asia, and we have 
achieved results. U.S. -China relations, as 
exemplified by the President's recent 
visit, have been put on a sound, 
businesslike footing. U.S.-Japanese 
security relations are better than they 
have ever been, and we have succeeded 
in further opening up many Japanese 
markets for American products and 
capital. Finally, our relations with the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) are so good that during 
Secretary Shultz's trip last month to 
that region, no television network 
bothered to air a single report on his ac- 
tivities. As they say, no news is good 

The Policy Divergence Reconsidered 

Just as America's interest in Asia is not 
new, neither is dissent, division, and 
debate in the Atlantic alliance. How 
could it be otherwise in an organization 
composed of 16 vigorous democracies? 
Debate within each country, and be- 
tween countries, is expected. And it 
beats the alternative. 

So, before anyone proclaims the 
demise of NATO, let us put today's 
security and economic disagreements 
with Europe in perspective. Do you 
remember the 1949 debate over whethe 
the United States should even commit 






lis in 
tay ■ 




itself to a permanent, peacetime 
alliance? Or 1956 and our falling out^; 
with Britain and France over Suez? 
Remember the 1960s with the 
multilateral force and DeGaulle's 
withdrawal of France from NATO's 
military structure? Remember the 1 
and the debates with Europe over \ 
nam and the Middle East? And the ' 
1970s and the criticism of America'^ 
"zig-zag" foreign policy? 

History has its uses. One is to r 
mind us that the present is less 
unique— and in this case less dire— 
we imagine. Our problems in the all 
today are real but not nearly of the 
magnitude of the ones I have just ci 
It is true, for example, that in t 
security sphere Western Europe is ( 
too parochial. But let's remember tl 
Americans and Europeans have alw 
had different perspectives on securi 
The Europeans sit next door to the 
Soviet Union. Former West Germai 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt often p. 
out that his home in Hamburg is on 
kilometers from the East German 
border. For a Chicagoan, that is as 
the Iron Curtain fell straight down 
middle of Lake Michigan. 

And yet, Western Europe still 
demonstrates genuine concern for i 
national security issues. U.S. and E 
pean forces serve together not only 
Berlin but also in the Sinai. France 
example, has forces defending Wes 
interests not only in the Mediterrar 
but also in Africa; and the United 
Kingdom has forces on station in tl 
Central American country of Belize 
well as on the Rhine. 

It is also true that our NATO a 
could do more with respect to the i 
ventional defense of Europe. And j 
1983_the Year of the Missile— tht 
alliance rebuffed a determined Sov 
tempt to divide it. Instead, we and 
allies united in support of the 1979 
NATO "dual-track" decision to seel- 
negotiate limits on intermediate-ra 
nuclear missiles and, if necessary, 
deploy such missiles ourselves. Aft 
arms control negotiations failed to 
remove the threat posed by well ov 
200 Soviet SS-20 missiles in Eurof 
NATO began to deploy counterbala 

The willingness of European g( 
ments to deploy these missiles is a 
ther demonstration of their politics 
courage and their commitment to t 
alliance. That courage and commiti 
are not limited to governments alo 
Recent elections in Europe demon? 
that the people support the allianc* 



Department of State Bl 


. In elections last year, supporters 
alliance and of the 1979 NATO 
)n won clear mandates in all three 
major countries that are deploy- 
termediate- range missiles to 
ir the Soviet monopoly. 
3 for those economic differences I 
jarlier, it is true that Europe 
imes succumbs to protectionism, 
sspite European protectionism, our 
e on current account with the 
)ean Community switched from a 

ion deficit in 1980 to a $3-billion 
IS in 1983. And the volume of our 
ay trade with Europe is quite 

over $100 billion annually. As 
Uiry Shultz has said in discussing 
European trade: "We must be 
something right." 

asks Ahead 

! compared our relations with Asia 
urope. It should be clear that 
rthening our ties with Asia, while 
:aneously encouraging debate and 
Dy consensus within the Atlantic 
se, are not only compatible but, in 
nutually reinforcing activities, 
reflect a simple geopolitical fact: 
nited States is a global power with 
I interests. We do not have the lux- 
f choosing to care about one region 
than another. We should not write 
e Atlantic alliance or prescribe 
(like the Nunn amendment's troop 
tions) far worse than the ailment, 
er should we ignore the burgeoning 
Asian economies. Rather, the 
oean-U.S. -Asian relationship should 
;wed in complementary, not com- 
ve, terms. Europe gains, not loses, 
strengthened U.S. -Asian ties. And 
gains, not loses, from strengthened 
European ties. 

1 short, we must close ranks and 
ogether, not apart. This is par- 
rly true if we are to meet the two 
important tasks of the 1980s: 
ng protectionism— which threatens 
1 prosperity; and meeting the 
t challenge — which threatens the 

ighting Protectionism. The U.S. 
ation has shifted to the south and 
as the smokestack industries in 
trth and east have declined. Some 
we should protect those declining 
, tries from import competition. You 
low the arguments against protec- 
.m. You know alwut the importance 
mparative advantage and consumer 
I shall not dwell on those notions 
, . for we in the United States have 
ally avoided protectionism. Instead, 

we have used deregulation and tax 
changes to create a climate in which 
new technologies— and new jobs- 
flourish. There have been exceptions and 
qualifications to this policy, but on the 
whole we have held to it. 

The decline of our old industries has 
led us to import more basic goods from 
abroad. This contributes to our trade 
deficit. Until last year the biggest cur- 
rent account deficit ever experienced by 
a country in a single year was $15 
billion. Arthur Burns recently noted that 
the current account shortfall we are 
headed for this year, now estimated to 
be $80-$100 billion, is "awesomely dif- 
ferent from anything experienced in the 
past." This deficit makes the need to 
fight protectionism in common with 
Europe and Asia both more imperative 
and more difficult than ever before. 

Europe's old industries, like ours, 
are also in decline. The steel mills of 
Lorraine and the Ruhr are in trouble. 
The shipyards on the Clyde in Scotland 
are laid low. But, unlike the United 
States, Europe has failed over the past 
decade to create new jobs and develop 
new technologies. Efforts to protect 
dying industries through subsidies and 
trade barriers have stifled the tech- 
nological innovation the European econ- 
omies need. Lagging economic perform- 
ance in turn complicates the effort to in- 
crease the strength of Europe's 
defenses. It is thus imperative that 
Europe be encouraged to resist protec- 

satellites, and— something important to 

me and all of you as well— legal services. 
We must continue to build upon the 
progress that has lieen made. The 
United States, Europe, and Asia must 
all remember that erecting trade bar- 
riers invites retaliation. And retaliation 
is a threat to the one out of every eight 
American jobs dependent on exports. 

Meeting the Soviet Challenge. The 

second task that demands the combined 
efforts of North America, Europe, and 
Asia is meeting the Soviet challenge. To 
be successful, countries on all three con- 
tinents need to adopt a global, not a 
regional, outlook. For example, Europe 
initially viewed the negotiations on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
as a purely European problem. 
However, more than one-third of all 
Soviet SS-20s are in Asia. For that 
reason, the United States saw INF as a 
global problem and proposed global 
limits. During the negotiations, the 
Europeans and the Japanese also came 
to appreciate that SS-20s pose a 
worldwide problem. Faced with this 
common front, the Soviets eventually ac- 
cepted the need for a global solution to 
INF. Unfortunately, no agreement has 
been reached because the Soviets con- 
tinue to demand a monopoly on such 
weapons and have refused to negotiate 

Another aspect of meeting the 
Soviet challenge is strengthening our 
collective defenses. The United States is 

. . . more than one-third of all Soviet SS-20s are in 
Asia. For that reason the United States saw INF as 
a global problem and proposed global limits. 

Fortunately, the Europeans have 
always understood that market access 
must be reciprocal— at least in areas 
other than agriculture. The Japanese, 
however, have been slower to endorse 
reciprocity. U.S. trade policy is aimed at 
achieving the same access to Japan's 
markets that Japanese goods have to 
ours. The trade package announced in 
April by Prime Minister Nakasone is the 
latest of several encouraging steps in 
that direction. Progress has been made 
on beef, citrus, tobacco, telecommunica- 
tions, semiconductors, and capital 
market liberalization. But more needs to 
be done on tariffs on forest products. 

increasing its effort, as we believe it 
must. But Europe must also do its full 
share. Only in this way can we expect to 
maintain a cohesive alliance and a credi- 
ble deterrent. 

The level of spending is not the only 
issue. Last year the debate in NATO 
was over nuclear missiles. In the coming 
years, the focus will be on conventional 
defense. In the past there has been a 
difference of perspective on this issue, 
with the United States favoring strong 
conventional defenses to keep the 
nuclear threshold high; and many Euro- 


peans tending to favor reliance on 
nuclear forces as the only guarantee 
against conventional war fought on their 
territory. Now there is a ferment of new 
ideas on conventional defense: new 
technologies, new tactics, and new 
resources. If we approach this oppor- 
tunity with skill and ingenuity, the 
alliance can emerge militarily stronger 
and politically more cohesive, just as 
was the case with INF deployments. 

In Asia, Japan, too, needs to do 
more. We support Japan's commitment 
to protect its air- and sealanes out to 
1 .000 miles. In recent years, Japan's 
defense spending has increased by 
nearly 5% per year in real terms. But 
we believe that the pace of Japan's ef- 
forts must be stepped up even more in 
the face of the Soviet threat to Asian 

Finally, Japan and Europe must be 
more concerned about threats to our 
common security arising in distant 
regions. Europeans often argue that 
detente has been largely successful in 
Europe. But Europe, like the United 
States, has vital interests at stake in 
areas, such as the Persian Gulf, far from 
its own borders. That is why the United 
States, Europe, Japan, and our other 
Asian friends must work in concert to 
oppose Soviet adventurism and to pro- 
mote stability throughout the world. 


We have made great progress toward 
the development of concerted policies. 
This Administration has sought not 
merely to strengthen our bilateral ties 
with Asia and Europe but to encourage 
greater interaction among all members 
of the community of advanced in- 
dustrialized democracies. This new and 
more cohesive allied consensus, spanning 
three continents, was in evidence at last 
year's economic summit meeting in 
Williamsburg. With President Reagan as 
host, the leaders of the seven largest in- 
dustrialized democracies of North 
America, Europe, and Asia took a 
historic step. Up to that time the annual 
summit meetings, which began in 1975. 
had dealt only with economic matters. 
But at Williamsburg, in addition to the 
traditional economic business of the 
summit, the seven leaders issued a state- 
ment explicitly recognizing that the 
security of each nation was indivisible 
from that of the others; the statement 
also supported the deployment of 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in 
Europe to counter the Soviet threat. 

This year's summit meeting in Lon- 
don, under Prime Minister Thatcher's 
leadership, built on the success of 
Williamsburg. And again, the heads of 
government of the seven summit coun- 
tries demonstrated the growing political 
consensus that binds us together as a 
community of democratic states with 
shared values and common interests. 
The seven leaders discussed an un- 
precedented range of political and 
security problems. They issued a series 
of declarations on democratic values. 
East- West relations, and terrorism. The 
range of their discussions demonstrated 
that the economic and security concerns 

of the industrialized democracies are 
common and truly global. 

In economics it is generally reco 
nized that trade is not a zero-sum gi 
Growth in our trade with Europe or 
Asia creates greater opportunities— 
and wealth — for all. 

International relations, like trad 
need not be a zero-sum game. Ever 
benefits, if each takes a global rathe 
than a parochial view of the problen 
that face us all. In short, there will 
no losers if we resist — as we must- 
temptation to permit where we sit t 
determine how we think. ■ 

Ninth Anniversary of 
the Helsinki Final Act 

Nine years ago, in Helsinki, Finland, the 
United States and Canada joined 33 
Eastern and Western European govern- 
ments in signing the F'inal Act of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE). The Helsinki accords, 
which committed the signing nations to 
abide by a set of universal standards of 
international conduct and fundamental 
human rights, hold out a beacon of hope 
for human dignity and freedom. 

The United States remains firmly 
committed to the full implementation of 
the provisions of the Helsinki accords. 
During the past year, there have been a 
number of significant developments in 
the CSCE. Last September, the 3-year- 
long Madrid followup meeting was suc- 
cessfully concluded, with the adoption of 
important new provisions intended to 
advance the cause of human rights, in- 
cluding trade union and religious 
freedom. The Stockholm conference on 
European security was t)pened, where 
we have propo.sed measures to lessen 
the risk of surprise attack in Europe. 
Just as the United States and its allies 
played an essential role in achieving a 
positive outcome at Madrid, we have ad- 
vanced concrete proposals at Stockholm 
to enhance East- West security. 

Unfortunately, the promises of the 
Helsinki Final Act have all too frequent- 
ly gone unfulfilled. The Helsinki accords 
pledge the signatory states "to respect 
human rights and fundamental 

freedoms, including the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belii 
for all without distinction as to race 
sex, language, or religion." There ai 
also commitments to advance trade 
union freedoms, to combat terrorist 
reunify families, to encourage the fi 
flow of information, and more. 

Over the years, there have beer 
some gradual, hard-won gains. But 
often in Eastern Europe, and parti< 
ly in the Soviet Union, we find a di! 
ferent story — repression of dissent, 
straints on religious freedoms, refu 
to permit citizens to emigrate, jamr 
of Western radio broadcasts, suppo 
terrorism, and disbanding of free ti 
unions. The plight of Dr. Andrei 
Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonn* 
one very important example among 
many where the denial of basic hur 
rights impedes the development of 
more constructive East- West relati 
ship we seek. 

The challenge is a formidable o 
give real meaning, through deeds, i 
promise of the Helsinki process. W 
have realistic expectations, a patiei 
proach, and are prepared for serioi 
dialogue. We call upon all CSCE st 
to foster human rights and freedon 
through the promise and commitmf 
of the Helsinki Final Act. 




Press release IT.-J of Aug. 2, 1984. 

'IS I 

It a 





irrent Developments in the Middle East 

hard W. Murphy 

dement before the Subcommittee 
ope and the Middle East of the 
Foreijpi Affairs Committee on 
), 19 8J,. Ambassador Murphy is 
int Secretary for Near EaMem 
luth Asian Affairs. ' 

is is a time of steady, sustained 
on our part to maintain stability 
region and to deal with persistent 
al conflicts. The gulf war seems to 
ie on its own momentum in a pro- 
twilight beyond any reason or 
)r either Iran or Iraq. Lebanon is 
^ginning the slow and painful 
s of healing from 9 years of bitter 
ar. Israel has just held its national 
ns and will now proceed to form a 
avernment. When that govern- 
las been established, it can turn 
ention to addressing the urgent 
ms of Lebanon, the peace process, 
e Israeli economy. We will be in- 
3d in pursuing the long process of 
g a durable peace between Israel 
e Arab states. 

ran Conflict 

ar in the gulf has evolved into a 
waiting game, with a quarter of a 
1 Iranian troops massed in the 
Jim sector for a major offensive 
II lay come tomorrow — or never, 
vhile, preparations for the attack 
ue, as do efforts to strengthen 
defensive positions. In the gulf, the 
.r continues at an uneven but 
Tous pace. The Iraqis are continu- 
eir sporadic attacks against ship- 
erving Iranian ports in an attempt 
uce Iran to negotiate, and the Ira- 
are retaliating against ships serv- 
'Utral ports. For the moment, the 
lion is not getting any better — nor 
letting any worse — but this is a 
us duel. The danger is real that it 
t any moment ignite a wider con- 
tie single bright spot is the cease- 
^ainst attacks on civilian popula- 
enters which was proposed by the 
ecretary General and agreed to by 
ran and Iraq June 12. That cease- 
; still holding, despite some claims 
lations by both sides. We would 
rt any efforts to broaden the 
ment, but we have no evidence 

that Iran is yet willing to accept either a 
wider cease-fire or one limited to gulf 
shipping and ports. 

The gulf states, meanwhile, are 
strengthening their own defenses, while 
continuing to emphasize that a 
diplomatic solution to the war deserves 
the highest priority. In the first in- 
stance, they will rely on their own 
resources to deter or prevent aggression 
against their own territories and ship- 
ping in their waters. Their capabilities to 
defend themselves have grown steadily 
over the last decade — to a large extent 
due to the sustained assistance we and 
Western Europe have provided through 
our military supply and training relation- 
ships. Our objective has been to 
strengthen their security by developing 
a credible defense capability. In the case 
of Saudi Arabia our policy has been 
especially effective. We believe our 
prompt support for Saudi self-defense, 
in combination with Saudi determination 
to defend itself without being pro- 
vocative, has played an important role in 
checking escalation in the northern gulf. 
We are now engaged in discussions with 
several of the other states, including 
Kuwait and Bahrain, to assess ways in 
which we could further strengthen their 
individual and collective defense 
capabilities on a near-term basis. 

Our one overriding objective in the 
gulf war is to bring it to an end. We 
have consistently supported the pursuit 
of every avenue to a negotiated settle- 
ment which would leave neither party 
dominant and which would preserve the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
both. Those efforts have thus far not 
borne fruit, nor will they until both sides 
agree that it is time to stop the bloodlet- 
ting. But it is important that the efforts 

It is also our objective to avoid 
direct U.S. military involvement in the 
fighting. Thus far we have been suc- 
cessful. We trust that our success will 
continue, but we must continue intensive 
planning for contingencies which might 
be beyond the capabilities of the Arab 
states of the gulf to meet, even while we 
help them develop the capability to pro- 
vide for their own self-defense. 

Retaining Access to Oil Supplies 

It is in our vital interest that the world 
retain access to the oil supplies of the 
gulf. We are not seeking military in- 

volvement in the war, but neither do our 
interests permit us to ignore it or to 
allow the gulf to be closed to our ships 
or those of our allies and friends. Our 
strategy, therefore, has been one of pur- 
suing diplomacy while cooperating with 
the gulf states and our allies to prevent 
or to be prepared to deal with a military 
crisis if regional capabilities prove inade- 

Our consultations with our allies 
have included energy preparedness. We 
have worked with the International 
Energy Agency (lEA) for some months 
to lay out a broad approach to dealing 
with a major supply disruption. We are 
pleased with the July 1 1 decision of the 
lEA's governing board that early 
drawdown of emergency oil stocks, and 
other mutually supportive actions to 
restore supply-demand balance, are vital 
elements in minimizing the economic ef- 
fects of a disruption. 

Despite the protracted nature of the 
war and the continued shipping losses, 
there has been no appreciable drop in oil 
exports from the gulf, and prices on the 
spot market have fallen. While the price 
weakness is primarily due to the con- 
tinued glut of oil on the market, it may 
also in part reflect world confidence that 
the United States and its allies will en- 
sure that the energy supplies continue. 

I would note in this context, and in a 
larger context as well, that our military 
supply relationship with many countries 
in the Middle East not only allows them 
to provide for their own security — a 
burden we are not called upon to 
bear — but it also provides a concrete 
means of maintaining American in- 
fluence in the region. The states of the 
Middle East are going to seek arms to 
defend themselves. The only question is, 
who will supply those arms. To the ex- 
tent that our longstanding military sup- 
ply relationships are supplanted by arms 
purchases from elsewhere — the Soviet 
Union or even Western Europe — our 
own influence is diminished. This has im- 
plications for our ability to move the 
peace process forward or to aid in 
resolving crises within the region, 
wherever they may develop. 



Let me turn for a moment to Israel. 
Although you are all aware of the 
results thus far of the Israeli elections, I 
thought it might be useful to go over 
them with you. With over 98% of the 
vote in, projections for the 120 seats in 
Israel's 11th Knesset indicate no clear 
victory for either the Labor Alignment 
(45 seats) or the Likud (41). As the 
smaller parties are doing well, it appears 
that the coalition-forming process may 
be prolonged. 

The projections thus far are not 
definitive. The final breakdown for party 
representation in the 11th Kn£sset will 
not be determined for a day or two. In 
the face of this uncertainty, it would be 
inappropriate to make any predictions 
about what party will lead the next 
government or what that government's 
policies will be. 

After the election results are 
published early next week, President 
Herzog will begin to consult with the 
parties prior to giving one party the 
first opportunity to form a government. 
There is no time limit within which 
President Herzog must make his choice, 
although it usually takes only a few 

Whatever the outcome of the elec- 
tion, we do expect and intend to con- 
tinue our close cooperative relationship 
with the next Israeli Government. 


Concerning Lebanon, since my ap- 
pearance before this subcommittee in 
June, the national unity government of 
Prime Minister Karami has begun to im- 

plement a security plan for the greater 
Beirut area. The "green line" has been 
reopened between east and west Beirut, 
and the airport and main seaport are 
also open. 'These are welcome signs that 
the Lebanese Government is having 
some success in addressing the many 
problems before it and that the various 
political factions are beginning to come 
together. The United States has strong- 
ly backed efforts to form a more broadly 
based government and to undertake the 
internal reforms needed for reconcilia- 
tion between Lebanon's warring fac- 
tions. We hope the government will 
make further progress toward restoring 
stability and security. 

We believe that Syria has been one 
of the helpful players in these recent 
developments. We also believe that 
Lebanon needs peaceful, cooperative 
relations with both Syria and Israel. No 
lasting solution is possible which fails to 
take into account the interests of both of 
these important neighbors. We will con- 
tinue to encourage Lebanon to deal 
directly with Israel on the issue of 
Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon 
and security arrangements along their 

But there is a long and difficult road 
ahead for the Lebanese people and for 
their government. We will be supportive 
of every effort which advances the goals 
of restoring unity and national recon- 
ciliation and the withdrawal of foreign 
forces. In the final analysis, however, 
both we and the Lebanese realize that 
they themselves must take the prime 
responsibility in dealing with their own 
problems. We can help; other friends 
can help; but the basic solution is in 
their own hands. 


With Jordan, we continue to enjoy p 
ductive relations on many levels. As 
befits friends, we have maintained a 
ongoing dialogue on many issues — J 
danian security and economic develo 
ment, the Iran-Iraq war and stabilit 
the gulf, and prospects for broader 
peace in the area. Jordan has main- 
tained its continuing interest in seel- 
a political solution to the conflict wi 

Finally, I would like to touch br 
on the peace process. We are comm 
to seeking progress toward a just ai 
lasting peace wherever progress is ] 
ble. We also remain committed to tl 
positions in the President's initiativt 
September 1, 1982. The United Sta' 
has a consistent record, which has ( 
tended over succeeding Administrat 
of seeking to promote progress tow 
peace whenever the opportunities f( 
progress have arisen. We will work 
ensure that no opportunity is lost. 

'The complete transcript of the hea 
will be published by the committee and 
be available from the Superintendent oJ 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



lernational Narcotics Control 


ouse of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, 

;her dangerous drugs causes 

s health and social problems in the 

i States, Canada, Western 

le, and other countries, including 

nations in which these drugs are 

ced and /or transshipped. 

le United States consumes annual- 

le 4.1 metric tons of imported 

1, 50-61 metric tons of imported 

le, and 13,600-14,000 metric tons 

rijuana, much of it imported. Pro- 

m of these drugs far exceeds 

ited demand. For example, if all 

icit coca leaf currently produced 

onverted to cocaine, it would yield 
ich as 227 metric tons of cocaine; 
wide demand is about 80 metric 
I year. Worldwide illicit opium pro- 
)n exceeds 1,700 metric tons, com- 

to 41 metric tons needed to supply 

to U.S. addicts. 


n, for conversion to heroin and 
n world markets, is grown primari- 
three areas — Mexico; the "Golden 
gle" of Burma, Thailand, and Laos; 
he "Golden Crescent" of Iran, 
inistan, and Pakistan. Most of the 
1 and, recently, much of the heroin 
iced in Southeast and Southwest 
are consumed by increasingly 
r addict populations in those 

locaine is derived primarily from 
leaves grown in Bolivia and Peru 
rafficked through Colombia, which 
las become a coca producer. 
larijuana, too, comes from many 
tes. Although Colombia still pro- 
more than half of the U.S. mari- 
supply, U.S. domestic production 
mports from Mexico and Jamaica 
;her supply about 41% of the 

dethaqualone, a tranquilizer widely 
ed in the United States and other 
;, had been shipped in bulk from 
pe and Asia to clandestine labs in 
mbia and elsewhere for processing 
rerouting to the United States. But 
ability has dropped sharply thanks 
fective control at the source. 

Department of State Role 

The Department of State's Bureau of In- 
ternational Narcotics Matters (INM), 
directed by an assistant secretary, is 
charged with coordinating the U.S. 
Government's international drug control 
activities. INM aims to strengthen U.S. 
diplomatic and program efforts to 
reduce the supply of dangerous drugs 
entering the United States. The bureau 
receives about $41 million annually for 
bilateral and multilateral narcotics con- 
trol programs. These funds are used for: 

• Crop eradication and control pro- 

• Law enforcement assistance; 

• Equipment and materials; 

• Training of foreign law enforce- 
ment personnel; 

• Development assistance to provide 
economic alternatives for illicit narcotics 
crops; and 

• Technical assistance for demand 
reduction programs. 

INM works with narcotics coor- 
dinators in t!he Department's regional 
bureaus and U.S. Embassies and col- 
laborates with the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (AID) on new proj- 
ects linking narcotics control with 
development assistance in Bolivia, Peru, 
and Pakistan. INM participates in 
multilateral control efforts with UN 
agencies and cooperates with the White 
House, Drug Enforcement Administra- 
tion, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast 
Guard, and other concerned U.S. agen- 
cies on domestic and international ac- 

Narcotics control, a matter of 
government responsibility under 
treaties, should be dealt with as an in- 
ternational obligation. Producer and 
transit countries have the primary 
responsibility under treaties for control- 
ling the cultivation, reproduction, and 
distribution of illicit narcotics. In 
assisting these countries, INM places 
highest priority on programs to control 
production and prohibit trafficking at 
the source. 


The worldwide supply of marijuana, co- 
caine, heroin, and other drugs is so 
great, and trafficking channels to the 
United States so diverse, that major in- 
terdictions and even crop eradications 
cause only temporary declines in 

availability when achieved in just one or 
two producing areas. INM's strategy is 
based on the ultimate objective of 
simultaneously controlling production in 
all key geographic sectors so that signifi- 
cant and lasting reductions are achieved. 

INM has drug control projects in 
key opium producing nations (Burma, 
Thailand, Mexico, and Pakistan) and in 
transit countries through which opium is 
refined into heroin or transshipped. INM 
supports coca control and cocaine inter- 
diction projects in Bolivia, Peru, and 
Colombia and projects to control mari- 
juana production and trafficking in Mex- 
ico and Colombia. It also supports inter- 
diction and enforcement efforts in other 
producer and transit nations in the three 
target regions — Latin America and 
Southeast and Southwest Asia — and 
assists dozens of countries through INM- 
funded law enforcement and customs 
training programs. 

Multilateral Efforts 

Drug abuse is not just an American 
problem; it affects all nations from the 
poorest to the wealthiest, countries that 
produce and traffic in drugs, and those 
that are consumers. 

Historically the U.S. Government 
has borne much of the cost of interna- 
tional control programs; now it is urging 
other nations to assist through their own 
bilateral programs, through direct 
economic assistance to producer coun- 
tries, and through multilateral activities. 
The U.S. Government has urged interna- 
tional financial institutions to target 
development programs in narcotics- 
producing areas whenever feasible. 

The U.S. Government also pursues 
international narcotics control objectives 
in the UN General Assembly, the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
and other UN agencies that coordinate 
multilateral efforts to control produc- 
tion, trafficking, and abuse. These latter 
efforts are directed by the UN Commis- 
sion on Narcotics Drugs, its Division for 
Narcotic Drugs, the International Nar- 
cotics Control Board, and the UN Fund 
for Drug Abuse Control, which supports 
key drug control projects throughout the 
world. The U.S. Government helped 
create the fund and, to date, has con- 
tributed the largest single amount of the 
fund's resources. 

Taken from the GIST series of July 1984, 
published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Editor; Harriet 
Culley. ■ 



Nuclear Trade: Reliable 
Supply and Mutual Obligations 

by Richard T. Kennedy 

Address before the Center for 
Strategic atid International Studies at 
Georgetown University in Washington. 
D.C., on June 28. 198i. Ambassador 
Kennedy is special adviser to the 
Secretary on nonproliferation policy and 
nuclear energy affairs. 

It is a great pleasure and honor for me to 
have the opportunity to speak to this 
very distinguished audience. I particularly 
enjoy an opportunity to step back from 
the trees in order to take a look at the 
forest— to take a look at the bigger pic- 
ture. In dealing with nonproliferation 
problems on a day-to-day basis, one must 
not lose sight of the basic objectives and 
policies which guide us, and it is helpful 
to reexamine them periodically. 

What I would like to discuss with 
you is both the fundamental importance 
and the implications of being a reliable 
nuclear supplier. At the outset, let me 
assert that the nonproliferation regime 
in place today could not have been 
achieved and cannot be maintained for 
the future without widespread con- 
fidence in the reliability of supply and 
cooperative undertakings in the nuclear 
arena. But it is equally true that 
reliability of supply implies obligations 
not only on the part of suppliers but on 
the part of recipients as well. 

Over 30 years ago, President 
Eisenhower took a historic step which, 
in a sense, created the worldwide 
civilian nuclear industry: he inaugurated 
the Atoms for Peace program in 1953. 
The United States volunteered to share 
the nuclear technologies it had 
developed so that they could benefit all 
mankind. In the intervening years, 
American policy has sought to assure 
that nations could benefit from the 
peaceful application of nuclear 
technology under a system which 
prevented the misuse of that technology. 
Atoms for peace, not war, has been our 
objective. Our basic approach today is 
one of continuity with the principles of 
the past — to assure the benefits of 
peaceful nuclear technology and to pre- 
vent its misuse. All of our efforts have 
been bent to the task of ensuring that 
these principles are not only honored in 
the abstract but are given concrete ex- 
pression in practice. 


There is now in place an interna- 
tional nuclear regime which, while clear- 
ly not perfect, is functioning effectively. 
We want to make that regime and the 
institutions, norms, and practices which 
comprise it, stronger, more complete, 
and more effective. This Administration, 
like its predecessors, has fully embraced 
nonproliferation as a high priority and 
has taken numerous steps to further the 
objective of strengthening the non- 
proliferation regime. Let me cite a few 

• We have actively encouraged addi- 
tional adherence to the NPT [Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty]. 

• We have provided strong financial 
and technical support to IAEA [Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency] 

• We have implemented the volun- 
tary offer to accept IAEA safeguards. 

• We ratified the physical security 
convention and have strongly urged 
others to do so. 

• We ratified Protocol I of the 
treaty of TIateloIco and have urged 
others to ratify the treaty to bring it 
fully into force. 

• We have made considerable prog- 
ress in addressing the problem of 
safeguards on large reprocessing plants. 

• We have pursued an initiative 
aimed at the adoption by all major sup- 
pliers of comprehensive safeguards as a 
condition for future nuclear supply com- 

• We have buttressed U.S. alliances 
and security ties that reduce incentives 
to acquire nuclear explosives. 

In addition, there has been a num- 
ber of other developments which have 
strengthened the nonproliferation 
regime, for example: 

• China has taken steps to par- 
ticipate in international nonproliferation 
efforts and has joined the IAEA. 

• South Africa announced earlier 
this year that it would require IAEA 
safeguards on all its nuclear exports and 
is also discussing with the IAEA the ap- 
plication of safeguards to its new 
semicommercial enrichment plant. 

• The trigger lists have been further 
clarified and refined. 


We also can and should take conjconiii' 
siderable satisfaction from the progi 
we have made in strengthening tho& 
ternationally agreed rules of nucleaniproj 
trade without which peaceful nuclea 
commerce would not be possible. 

In the United States, we have Is 
policies, and procedures aimed at 
preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons. Every other major nucleaii 
porting country has adopted its own 
although obviously not wholly identi 
restrictions. We can and should taktijep 



nil oil 



considerable comfort from these fac 

The Need To Strengthen 
Rules of Nuclear Trade 

But let us be completely candid: the 
are strains on the existing norms, ai 
there is need for still further efforts 
broaden and strengthen these rules 
nuclear trade. 

In many countries, there are lar 
nuclear industries created at a time 
when projected energy demand was 
much greater and when it seemed t! 
the future for nuclear power was un 
bounded. But times have changed, a 
we are all faced with the problem oi 
how to preserve those nuclear Indus ,» 
for the future when demand for nuc 
power will again grow— as I believe 
will. In this situation, it is only natu 
that competitive pressures are inten ve 
And those pressures are focused inc 
ingly on the effort to find new mark 

But it is in the interest of every 
tion— supplier and purchaser alike- 
competition for those markets be ca 
out in terms of such factors, for exa 
pie, as the quality and capacity of e( 
ment, know-how, and expertise and 
delivery schedules. These are the tr; is 
tional and understood grounds for c 
petition in the marketplace. 

Competition must not be conduc 
in a way that it will hinge on the 
readiness of a supplier to shade 
safeguards or other nonproliferation 
conditions, to look for possible 
technology sweeteners that will mak 
purchasing from it seem more attrac 
than from another country that hon( 
existing sound norms. For, once the 
process of shading our shared non- 
proliferation standards begins, we w 

Department of State Bull 



L witli the lowest common 
■niiator of what can be agreed to 
r nations. Each will be motivated 
1 Its or the world's long-term in- 
dmt by short-term gain and fear of 
Cts neighbors might do. Under 
"'|ronditions, the nonproliferation 
■t ' will gradually unravel, and we 
''" id ourselves unable to realize the 
*i promise for the health and well- 
« Df all. 

t me emphasize that, for our part, 
^' lited States has never sacrificed, 
11 never sacrifice, its nonprolifera- 
inciples for commercial gain or 

■ nic advantage. We have set this 
^ndard for our own conduct. We 

' ; it should be the universal norm. 

■"' e prospective emergence of new 

- ;rs on the scene adds even greater 
:y to efforts to preserve and 
then the agreed rules of nuclear 
If there is disharmony and con- 
sy among the major nuclear sup- 

' on conditions for nuclear export, 

■ lew suppliers inevitably will be 
;d to use nonproliferation condi- 
is a bargaining factor in their pur- 
sales. If they see existing sup- 
performing in this way, what else 
5 reasonably expect? By contrast, 
nent now among the existing sup- 
on sound guidelines and a commit- 
to honor those guidelines will 

it easier to urge new suppliers to 
those agreed and sensible export 
ees in the future, 
further word about such common 
er policies and guidelines: it is 
;hat no list of sensitive materials 
'er be immutable. The items on 
ich list must change over time as 
elegies change and as our 
standing of technologies becomes 
er and deeper. 

at there are other items whose 
jn to sensitive activities is more 
ex. What should we do, for exam- 
a nation seeks to buy a computer 
could be useful in the operation of 
safeguarded reprocessing plant? 
ere we get to the heart of the dual- 
aestion: the same computer that 
help in the operation of a reproc- 
l plant could also be used quite 
rly and harmlessly in a large 
ical facility. How should the nations 
i world decide which request to 
and which to reject? The nuclear- 
■ting states, after all, are those 
likely to be in a position to export 
jmputer in question. Should there 
policy aimed at foreclosing the ex- 
of any item which has a dual use? 

Should any item be barred which could 
conceivably find its way into a facility 
which could be used in developing 
nuclear explosives? 

These are not simple questions, and 
there are no simple answers. Clearly, for 
example, a blanket export prohibition 
might prevent the construction of a 
perfectly respectable — indeed, vitally 
necessary — chemical plant in a develop- 
ing country. But by the same token, the 
potential dangers cannot be ig^iored. 

If we can have confidence that the 
intended use of that mythical computer 
is not related to the manufacture of 
nuclear explosives, the question is clear- 
ly much easier to answer. But how can 
the requesting nation generate that 
confidence? One clear answer would be 
by adhering to the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty or, in the case of 
Latin American countries, by accepting 
and agreeing to be bound by the treaty 
of Tlatelolco. The voluntary acceptance 
of IAEA safeguards on all of a country's 
nuclear facilities and activities is yet 
another way to generate that needed 

Let me elaborate. In order to 
manufacture nuclear explosives, a nation 
needs two things. 

First is the know-how and technical 
backup — the scientists and the 
necessary materials and equipment. This 
is the technical side of the equation and, 
though the barriers are considerable and 
must remain so, more and more nations 
are coming to possess the technical 
wherewithal to cross those barriers. 

Second is the political decision to 
"go nuclear." A nation must consciously 
make this hard decision. Presumably, it 
would make that decision because it sees 
some benefit to itself in doing so. This is 
the political ingredient. After all is said 
and done, the political ingredient is by 
far the more important. All the export 
controls that suppliers can devise or 
safeguards that the IAEA can imple- 
ment cannot forever bar a country from 
acquiring nuclear explosives. A nation, 
however, can rule out "going nuclear" by 
an act of political will. It can turn its 
back on the development of nuclear 
weapons by adhering to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepting 
safeguards on all its nuclear activities. 
Over 120 non-nuclear-weapons states so 
far have done just that. Adherence to a 
regional treaty such as the treaty of 
Tlatelolco can serve the same purpose. 

But there is more to it than a simple 
signature on a treaty. The best way for 
a nation to demonstrate its bona 
fides — the most graphic way — is to ac- 
cept safeguards in spirit as well as in 
the letter. It is unseemly for nations 
with facilities subject to safeguards to 
haggle about the niceties of safe- 
guards — whether a given action or a 
particular technical change is within the 
writ of a particular IAEA safeguards 
agreement. Instead of a preoccupation 
with preventing the agency from going 
beyond the precise legal letter of safe- 
guards — a preoccupation with form over 
substance — such nations — indeed, all na- 
tions — should work to strengthen the 
IAEA safeguards system and help it to 
perform its vital task. 

Only such a cooperative attitude can 
provide the proper basis for nuclear 
commerce. Without it, that mutual trust 
and confidence, which is essential to con- 
tinued use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, will be lacking. For after we 
strip away all the verbiage, it comes 
down to this: trust must be the 
predicate for all nuclear commerce. The 
exporting nation must have confidence 
that the materials it exports will not be 
turned into devices of war and destruc- 
tion; the recipient nation must have con- 
fidence that, having demonstrated by 
word and deed its own bona fides, it can 
get the help it needs to realize the 
atom's peaceful promise. 

A Positive Approach 
to Nuclear Power 

While there has been a broad continuity 
with past administrations on non- 
proliferation policy goals, the Reagan 
Administration has placed more em- 
phasis on the need for mutual confidence 
among exporting and recipient coun- 
tries. There are several aspects of pres- 
ent policy which impact on this. 

The Administration, for instance, 
has taken a very positive approach to 
nuclear power. It considers nuclear 
power to be a clean, efficient, and safe 
way to generate electricity. It is not con- 
sidered a choice of last resort. Instead, 
it is seen to be a key element in our 
domestic energy future. And nuclear- 
generated energy is recognized as im- 
portant for the economic development 
and energy security of many nations. 
The Administration stands by the idea 
that where the necessary nonprolifera- 
tion conditions are met, nations can and 
should have access to the benefits of 
nuclear energy. 



Next, the Administration firmly 
believes that the United States must 
be— and must be seen to be— a predict- 
able and reliable supplier of nuclear 
materials, equipment, and technology. 
For only in that event can the United 
States reasonably expect to exert the in- 
fluence which its technological ex- 
perience and competence could rightly 
be presumed to yield. In his key non- 
proliferation policy statement of July 
1981, President Reagan noted that many 
friends of the United States had lost 
confidence in our ability to recognize 
their needs. Therefore, he called for the 
reestablishment of this nation as a 
"predictable and reliable partner under 
adequate safeguards." 

Another important aspect of this 
Administration's policies involves its at- 
titude toward reprocessing and the use 
of plutonium. There is no question that 
plutonium is an inherently dangerous 
substance. How to control it has always 
been a very real and substantial 
challenge for the nonproliferation 
regime. U.S. policy seeks to inhibit the 
spread of sensitive technology, equip- 
ment, and material which could lead to 
production of weapons-useable material, 
particularly where there is a risk of pro- 
liferation. We want to restrict the 
number of reprocessing plants around 
the world and to limit other sensitive 
fuel cycle activities. These are not and 
should not be items of general com- 

The approach to these concerns and 
objectives, however, has not been to 
seek the abandonment of reprocessing in 
any of the industrialized countries or the 
reversal of plans to enlarge existing 
capabilities. Instead of a universal ap- 
proach aimed at foreclosing reprocessing 
and plutonium use everywhere, a 
coherent, realistic, yet prudent 
plutonium use policy is being pursued 
which differentiates among countries on 
the basis of their needs and their non- 
proliferation credentials. Specifically, 
President Reagan decided that the 
United States should not attempt to in- 
hibit or set back civil reprocessing and 
breeder reactor development abroad in 
nations with advanced nuclear power 
programs and where it did not con- 
stitute a proliferation risk. An important 
aspect of this approach is a willingness 
under the proper circumstances to grant 
programmatic ap[)rovals for the 
reprocessing of U.S. -origin fuel— ap- 
provals which we believe are essential to 
the maintenance and improvement of 
close relationships with our industrial- 
ized nuclear partners. 

The effort to pursue a more positive 
approach to nuclear cooperation— to be 
perceived as a reliable nuclear partner 
and to be a reliable supplier as con- 
templated by the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Act— is a key element of 
the Administration's policy. The United 
States realizes that it cannot take a 
unilateral approach to nuclear supplier 
policy if it is to continue to play a mean- 
ingful role with respect to nuclear com- 
merce and the nonproliferation regime. 
We no longer possess the degree of in- 
fluence in the nuclear field— scientific or 
commercial— that we once enjoyed. In- 
deed, none of today's suppliers does. As 
mastery of the technology has become 
more widespread, the ability of any one 
nation to influence others through a 
nuclear supply relationship, let alone dic- 
tate their nuclear energy choices, has 
diminished. This trend can only continue 
over the long term, particularly as new 
suppliers enter the scene. 

But what does being a reliable sup- 
plier mean in terms of specifics? It is 
essential that nuclear trading partners 
have confidence that if they adopt and 
apply the strong nonproliferation stance 
of which I have spoken, the suppliers, 
including the United States, will be 
responsible to the needs of their nuclear 
programs. Needlessly long delays in 
responding to specific requests must be 
avoided. And requests must be re- 
sponded to in a consistent manner. If 
such confidence is not maintained, these 
partners will inevitably seek to 
disengage themselves from dependence 
on the otherwise responsible suppliers 
and look elsewhere. 

Nuclear trading partners also must 
believe that they can conduct commer- 
cial nuclear relations with each other 
without running the risk that new legal 
requirements of one side will change the 
name of the game without the other's 
consent. They must not be led to think 
that, at any time, they may be forced to 
choose between breaking off a relation- 
ship which is crucial to their own 
economy or accepting intrusions by 
others into matters they believe are 
within the scope of their sovereignty. 
Such unpredictability and change does 
not serve nonprolifepation interests. 

As an example— and only that— con- 
sider one side effect of the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Act. That act provided a 
positive benefit by establishing a new 
legislative underpinning for U.S. nuclear 
exports. But, unfortunately, the percep- 
tion of some of our closest allies was 
that it called into question existing 

agreements. At least in the initial st 
of the implementation of the law, m 
nations perceived it as an attempt ti 
substitute unilaterally U.S. desires f 
international consensus in the nude 
field. It appeared to them that we \t 
using domestic legislative and ad- 
ministrative processes to adopt rule 

the conduct of nuclear commerce 
which affected their own nuclear p;- 
grams— thereby imposing those rule 
our trading partners by fiat. We wf 
perceived to be ignoring the traditic 
forms of agreement, accommodatioi 
negotiation, and mutual adjustment 
interests which characterize interna 
tional diplomacy. Consequently, we 
less able to win their support on pn 
ing supply, safeguards, and other n 
proliferation matters. 

With time we believe we are rey 
ing the confidence and trust of our 
nuclear partner; but one lesson is 
clear— in the future we should seek 
avoid major sudden changes in nucl 
export policy. As I noted, I cite this 
experience only as an example— an 
ample which could be repeated by s 
supplier if it acts unilaterally and 
without developing the climate of a 
ment and support which a successf 
nonproliferation regime requires. B 
that is not to say that we would sh 
from pursuing a course that we cor 
the proper one— that we would sac 
principle on the altar of harmony. 

But what about recipient count 
which for one reason or another ha 
not demonstrated their own bona f 
through adherence to the NPT or, 
least, acceptance of full-scope 
safeguards. Certainly, such countri 
must not have the degree of access 
nuclear goods that countries which 
taken these actions enjoy. Howeve 
self-defeating to preclude maintain 
dialogue with countries which purs 
nuclear policies different from our 
We must allow ourselves some 
maneuvering room to influence tht 
nuclear policies of such countries t 
move them to accept international 
proliferation norms. 

Let me return to the point I m 
the beginning. I have tried to illust 
that reliability of supply implies ob 
tions not only on the part of suppli 
but on the part of recipients as we 
Suppliers can only be seen as capr 
if they are or are perceived to be a 
tempting to dictate unilaterally anc 
an absolutist fashion the scope and 
terms of international commerce. I 
same token, only if they are seen t 
reliable, reasonable, and predictabl 


Dpnartmpnt nf .^tato Ri 


■ 1 -s expect to have the long-run in- 
Ki over the future course of nuclear 
'I -ce that they should rightly ex- 
i": n the other hand, suppliers can- 
-I called upon to make nuclear 
; ; technology available if the re- 
's 1 are unwilling to undertake the 
ental obligation to fully assure 
the possible misuse of that 

our part, we recognize that it is 
that a common understanding 

:ved with nations whose percep- 
their self-interest differs perhaps 
ly from our own perceptions of 
ierest. Nations do not respond to 
htly, and this is especially so 

ey have alternatives. As a 

proposition, we favor dialogue 
nfrontation, persuasion over in- 
ion, and common sense over iron 

Nevertheless, in the pursuit of 
n understandings, we must build 
le norms which have evolved over 
ades and not succumb to the 
common denominator. ■ 

Competitive Challenges 

of Global Telecommunications 

by William Schneider, Jr. 

Statement before the Subcommittee of 
Telecommunications, Consumer Protec- 
tion, and Finance of the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee on July 25, 
1984- Mr. Schneider is Under Secretary 
for Security Assistance, Science, and 
Technology. ' 

I would like to preface my remarks by 
commenting that the global system of in- 
ternational communications satellites is 
a magnificent achievement of U.S. policy 
based on the Communications Satellite 
Act of 1962. While the telecommunica- 
tions revolution founded on satellite 
technology seems almost a routine 
achievement these days, this was not the 
case 20 years ago when the INTELSAT 
[International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization] system was con- 

We know by experience that even 
great successes give rise to new ques- 
tions, to new issues, even to new prob- 
lems. It is appropriate that we should 
from time to time review our interna- 
tional communications satellite policies 
and their instruments to see if they best 
meet the changing requirements and op- 
portunities that the continuing 
developments of telecommunications 
technology provide. I am not here to 
criticize INTELSAT, INMARSAT [In- 
ternational Maritime Satellite Organiza- 
tion], or COMSAT [Communications 
Satellite Corporation]; they have per- 
formed beyond the expectations of their 
founders, including the Congress, and 
deserve praise for their achievements. I 
am here to comment on proposals to 
amend the rules of COMSAT's participa- 
tion in the international satellite 
organizations in light of changing times 
and to discuss the Department of State 
perspectives and responsibilities in the 
instructional process and related mat- 

COMSAT Instruction Process 

The Communications Satellite Act of 
1962, as amended, provides the 
framework for U.S. international 
satellite policies. The act sets out the 

basis for U.S. participation in the inter- 
national satellite organizations, 
created a private sector corporation, 
COMSAT, to own and represent the 
U.S. shares in those organizations. 

The development of policies toward 
the international satellite organizations 
is complex since we are dealing with 
continuously operating international 
commercial organizations and with a 
private sector public corporation, 
COMSAT, as signatory to agreements 
establishing INTELSAT and INMAR- 
SAT. COMSAT sits on the executive 
board of both organizations which hold 
formal sessions quarterly. As in any 
business, there are a host of internal 
management functions which require 
directions from a board representing 
shareholders. There are also issues 
which affect international telecom- 
munications policies. As an example, 
there are INTELSAT'S objectives as a 
user of orbit locations and radio frequen- 
cies which do not necessarily coincide 
with those of the United States or other 

Congress foresaw the need for 
governmental oversight and included 
provisions for Presidential instructions 
to COMSAT in the 1962 act. The Presi- 
dent has delegated that responsibility to 
the Secretary of State. The instruction 
procedure was set out in a letter from 
the Department of State to COMSAT on 
August 18, 1966, resulting from an 
agreement between the Department, 
FCC [Federal Communications Commis- 
sion], and the then Office of Telecom- 
munications Management in the Ex- 
ecutive Office of the President. 

The procedures are that COMSAT 
provides the agenda and documentation 
for each meeting to the Department of 
State, FCC, and NTIA [National 
Telecommunications Information Agen- 
cy]. COMSAT then meets with repre- 
sentatives of these agencies in advance 
of the meeting and submits in writing its 
proposed position on the agenda items. 
These positions are discussed and perti- 
nent questions are raised. Following this 
briefing, the Department of State con- 
sults with the other agencies and after 
considering their views, issues instruc- 
tions to COMSAT on those agenda items 
which are deemed to require such in- 


structions. Following the meeting, COM- 
SAT again meets with representatives 
of the three agencies to report on what 
transpired. Again, questions are asked 
and explanations given for any actions 
taken by the executive board. 

Proposals before Congress would re- 
quire that all instructions issued to 
COMSAT be made public. While we 
favor making as many INTELSAT and 
INMARSAT documents as possible 
available to the public, there may be in- 
stances where the instructions affect 
U.S. Government concerns as the party 
and raise issues involving foreign rela- 
tions. While foreign signatories would 
have access to U.S. positions and 
negotiating strategies, we would not 
have access to theirs which would place 
U.S. interests at a disadvantage. We 
would prefer to have public dissemina- 
tion of U.S. Government instructions 
judged by the normal criteria for public 
release of government documents found 
in the Freedom of Information Act. We 
are working closely with COMSAT to 
provide substantial additional informa- 
tion to the public and we applaud their 

We do not agree with the proposal 
that the Federal Communications Com- 
mission issue separate instructions to 
COMSAT with respect to regulatory 
matters within its jurisdiction. Although 
the International Maritime Satellite 
Communications Act provides for 
separate FCC instructions to COMSAT 
for INMARSAT meetings, this has not 
been used. The FCC has been an active 
participant in the instruction process 
and we are concerned that separate in- 
structions might unnecessarily raise con- 
flicts over the primacy of "public in- 
terest" and "national interest." The Com- 
munications Satellite Act clearly gives 
the President primary authority in the 
instruction process and we believe it 
would be a mistake to infringe on this 
authority by separate FCC instructions. 

How Binding are Instructions 

The Communications Satellite Act 
directed executive branch supervision 
over COMSAT to ensure its relations 
with foreign governments or entities or 
international bodies are consistent with 
the U.S. national interest and foreign 
policy. While instructions on these mat- 
ters are binding, the act does not pro- 
vide for direct enforcement procedures 
or sanctions beyond judicial relief con- 
tained in Section 403 should COMSAT 
refuse to follow government instruc- 

tions. Nevertheless we find it difficult to 
perceive a situation where COMSAT 
would reject instructions based on U.S. 
Government considerations. Any 
substantive departure from instructions 
could lead to an Administrative request 
for legislative remedy. COMSAT is also 
subject to regulatory supervision of the 

The instruction process has worked 
well over the years as evidenced by the 
lack of serious disagreements between 
COMSAT and the government. This, I 
believe, is due to government apprecia- 
tion of the commercial nature of the in- 
ternational satellite systems and the 
responsibility of COMSAT to its 
shareholders as well as its customers 
and the general public. At the same 
time, COMSAT has accepted that the 
government is required to exercise 
supervision over COMSAT in matters of 
national interest. 

Determination of Policy 

While the instruction process has 
worked well, it is a vehicle for applying 
existing policy rather than the deter- 
mination of policy in response to new 
challenges or a perceived need for 
change. Such a challenge occurred with 
the applications now before the FCC for 
non-INTELSAT international com- 
munications satellite systems. This has 
posed an extremely difficult policy deci- 
sion involving the importance of protect- 
ing the integrity of INTELSAT and the 
value to the consumer of competition in 
the provision of new international com- 
munication services. The Senior In- 
teragency Group [SIG] on International 
Communication and Information Policy, 
consisting of representatives of 15 
government agencies, undertook a 
detailed examination of the applications 
and forwarded its recommendations to 
the Secretaries of Commerce and State 
to assist them in their advice to the 
President on what decisions he should 
make on this matter. While much of the 
internal debate on the most appropriate 
position to take has been aired in the 
trade press, I would not wish to com- 
ment further until the decision has been 
reached other than to say any controver- 
sy is a reflection of the importance and 
complexity of the issue. 

The transborder use of domestic 
satellites is another issue of importance 
in international satellite policy. After a 
lengthy interagency consideration, 
Under Secretary of State James Buckley 
set forth the foreign policy requirements 
for approval of the use of U.S. domestic 


satellites for transmissions to neighb 
ing countries. This was by letter to i 
FCC Commissioner on July 23, 1981 
and the requirements included agree 
ment of the other government and ci 
dination with INTELSAT under Art 
14(d) of its agreement, which include 
submission on the economic effect of 
service on the INTELSAT global 

In the past year, concerns of the 
tion picture and program supplier in 
dustry that copyrights may be inade- 
quately protected in transborder sat 
TV transmissions were studied by a 
working group and a policy decision 
taken that appropriate assurances o 
copyright protection would lie requii 
before TV transmissions would be fi 
approved to the individual country. 

The ITU [International Telecom- 
munications Union] forum includes t 
consideration of international com- 
munication satellite issues and the 
United States is in the midst of pre] 
tions for a World Administration Ri 
Conference [WARC] on the use of 
geostationary satellite orbit and spa|«! 
services to begin in July 1985 with ; 
ond session in 1988. Preparations f( 
this conference began several years 
and include the FCC Notice of Inqu 
Process and Public Advisory Comm 
on Space WARC, and technical con |te 
tions from an NTIA-chaired ad hoc 
group under its Interdepartment R; 
Advisory Committee. A SIG steerir 
committee under the chairmanship 
the Coordinator for International C 
munications and Information Policy 
vides a forum to incorporate the co 
tributions of various working grouf 
individual agencies. The office of th 
coordinator also provides an execut 
director and support staff for confe 
preparations and works with the dt 
tion and appropriate agencies. 

I hope that I have presented th 
case that international communicat 
satellite policy is not determined in 
arbitrary way but is a result of coo 
tion within the government involvii 
many technical experts and foreign 
policy talents in close coordination 
the private sector. 

Private Sector Participation 

While the private sector does not p 
ticipate directly in the COMSAT in 
tion process, in formulating the ins 
tions government agencies have a j 
deal of relevant information and 
knowledge obtained through struct 
and regular meetings with the priv 
sector on international telecommur 
tions issues. 





e United States is unique in world 
imunications in relying fully on 
vate sector for providing the serv- 
d in the extent to which competi- 
encouraged in those services. 
is no way the U.S. Government 
equately understand and promote 
ecommunications interest in inter- 
il negotiations without the active 
3ation of the carriers, service pro- 
equipment suppliers, users, and 
leral public. 

addition to the direct participa- 
the private sector in the ITU con- 
re committees and study groups, 
8 advisory committees organized 
st in WARC preparations, there 
ler groups that deal with specific 
such as the Working Group on 
)order Data Flows, and the 
5 facilities planning committees of 
:C in the Atlantic, Pacific, and 
lean regions. 

le facilities planning process is 
the development of overseas 
•nmunications facilities and serv- 
fering an opportunity to carriers, 
5 providers, users, and the general 
to submit views on the design and 
ation of the future telecommunica- 
;tructure linking the United States 
rest of the world. Through this 
IS U.S. positions on international 
tes, cables, and terrestrial systems 
iveloped from among competing m- 


itside these forma! structures, 
lovernment officials welcome in- 
[ meetings with interested firms 
dividuals who have a specific in- 
ional telecommunications problem 
simply want to present their 
on any issue of importance to 
In addition, testimony taken by 
essional committees such as this 

di les important information and 
and the opinions expressed in 
journals are given close attention, 
inlikely that any significant private 
position or opinion is overlooked 

., continuous intensive and exten- 

-,i Tocess of private sector consulta- 
n international telecommunications 
js. If this occurs, it is because the 
)r individual has failed to make use 
many channels of communications 
the government which are 



A primary interest of the U.S. space in- 
dustry is selling products and services to 
the international satellite organizations. 

Article XIII of the INTELSAT 
agreement provides that procurement of 
goods or services shall be "effected by 
the award of contracts, based on 
responses to open international invita- 
tions to tender, to bidders offering the 
best combination of quality, price and 
the most favorable delivery time." The 
responsibility for carrying out this provi- 
sion is borne by the INTELSAT 
Secretariat, under the direction of the 
Board of Governors. Equivalent provi- 
sions are contained in the INMARSAT 

U.S. industry has done well in com- 
petition for INTELSAT procurement. In 
October 1983, the director general- 
designate of INTELSAT informed the 
Subcommittee en Arms Control, Oceans, 
International Operations, and Environ- 
ment of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that since 1964 over 2,500 
contracts had been awarded some 600 
U.S. firms with a total value of $3,365 
billion. This is not surprising given the 
lead of U.S. space and launch 
technologies. American spacecraft 
manufacturers and launch service pro- 
viders are actively participating in bids 
for the second generation INMARSAT 
system. The U.S. Government has been 
assisting U.S. industry in this effort. 

The FCC did examine whether 
COMSAT would have advantages over 
other U.S. firms in INTELSAT procure- 
ment as part of its 1980 study. It found 
several examples because of its activities 
as technical adviser to INTELSAT and 
its knowledge of specific development. 
This was an element in the decision to 
split COMSAT into monopoly and com- 
petitive components. 

It is a responsibility of the U.S. 
Government to ensure that all American 
firms are offered equal opportunities to 
compete for INTELSAT and 
INMARSAT procurement. We take this 
responsibility seriously and will continue 
to offer U.S. industry assistance to this 

COMSAT'S Representation of 
U.S. Policy 

Can there be conflicts between 
COMSAT'S corporate interests and U.S. 
national or public interest, and what 
would happen if this occurs? 

We are actually progressing through 
such a potential situation. INTELSAT 
has energetically campaigned against 

U.S. approval of non-INTELSAT inter- 
national satellite systems. COMSAT 
shares with INTELSAT an interest in 
maintaining a monopoly on transoceanic 
international communication satellite 
services. While expressing its own view 
as a signatory, COMSAT has carried out 
instructions to inform the INTELSAT 
Board and Meeting of Signatories 
that the U.S. Government viewed 
INTELSAT'S intervention in the 
domestic consideration of applications 
before the FCC as premature and inap- 
propriate and the publication of leaked 
U.S. policy papers as improper. 

COMSAT has a variety of obliga- 
tions to its stockholders, its customers, 
and to the public by virtue of its role as 
signatory to the satellite organization 
agreements. By providing for U.S. 
Government oversight and instructions. 
Congress was aware that these obliga- 
tions could be in conflict. In the exercise 
of oversight, we do not rely on COM- 
SAT to define what is the U.S. national 
interest and public interest; we make 
that determination and instruct accord- 
ingly. We believe this is the prudent 
thing to do. 

In regard to the proposal that the 
President appoint a government 
representative to participate in all of 
COMSAT'S activities with respect to 
believe "activities" is too broad a term 
that seems to include every COMSAT 
contact with the organizations. While 
such an expansive provision in our view 
is unnecessary, more narrowly drawn 
provisions may be useful. 

Competition With INTELSAT 

Technological developments in the past 
several years have opened the doors to 
more competition in telecommunications 
services in our domestic market. It was 
inevitable that these same forces would 
press upon the international provision of 
these services. 

The applicants to the FCC for non- 
INTELSAT systems have made many 
arguments why their projects would not 
significantly damage the INTELSAT 
global systems. Some assert that their 
designs for innovative new services 
would benefit INTELSAT by developing 
new markets which INTELSAT can also 
serve in the future without risking 
capital needed for the expansion of 
global basic telecommunications services. 
These arguments merit consideration by 
ourselves and the world community. 

In our deliberations of proposals for 
non-INTELSAT international com- 
munication satellite systems, we should 



be aware that a number of regional non- 
INTELSAT satellite systems are being 
implemented by INTELSAT members. 
The policy question we face is not 
whether regional systems are incompati- 
ble with INTELSAT obligations but 
whether U.S. participation in such 
systems, particularly across the North 
Atlantic, would undermine the viability 
of the global system. It is this search for 
a possible accommodation between com- 
petition with all of its potential benefits 
and the preservation of a viable global 
system, with its known benefits, that 
has preoccupied executive branch 
policymakers. We hope and believe such 
an accommodation can be achieved. 

Transatlantic Fiber Optic Cable 

Officials of INTELSAT for good reasons 
regard fiber optic cables as a major com- 
petitive threat. The decision to build a 
U.S. -Europe fiber optic submarine cable 
has acknowledged the potential of this 
new cable technology. The international 
impact of the eighth transatlantic 
telephone cable (TAT-8) has become evi- 
dent long before its planned entry into 
service in 1988. For the first time since 
the launch of "Early Bird" in 1965 — the 
inauguration of commercial satellite 
communications across the Atlantic — the 
cable will become competitive with 
satellites for certain transoceanic 

Contract awards in mid-November 
1983 for TAT-8 reflected the U.S. lead 
in fiber optic communications 
technology. The 29-nation consortium of 
telecommunications administrations (in- 
cluding AT&T [American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company] and other U.S. 
companies for the United States) that 
will own the cable awarded the major 
portion of the contract — $250 
million — to AT&T communications. The 
remainder of the $335 million total in- 
vestment will be split between the 
United Kingdom's Standard Telephone 
and Cables Limited and France's SUB- 
MARCOM. The link will span some 
6,500 kilometers (3,900 miles) between 
Tuckerton, New Jersey, and Wide- 
mouth, United Kingdom, and Penmarch, 
France, with the cable branching at the 
edge of Europe's continental shelf. 

TAT-8 will represent state-of-the-art 
technology, which is considerably more 
advanced than the long distance fiber 
optic networks AT&T installed along the 
Northeast corridor of the United States 
and in California last year. It will differ 
from its predecessor cables in several 
critical respects. 

• TAT-8 will be the first transatlan- 
tic digital— as opposed to 

analog — undersea link. Voice sounds are 
not sent as direct electrical signals 
(analog), but instead are converted by 
computers into bits (binary digits) repre- 
senting zeros and ones, transformed into 
pulses of laser light, transmitted 
through the special glass optical fibers in 
discrete bunches, and reconstructed by 
computers into a conventional analog 
signal at the other end. 

• The cable, made up of only three 
pairs of optical fibers, will be able to 
handle up to 40,000 conversations 
simultaneously — about four times the 
volume of either TAT-6 or TAT-7, 
which entered service in 1976 and 1983, 
respectively. The large capacity will 
make TAT-8 competitive with the most 
advanced communications satellite, 
INTELSAT VI, which is scheduled for 
launch in 1986. 

• Light beam repeater/regenerators 
will be spaced at 20-mile intervals along 
the cable, compared with 5 miles for the 
older systems, and be able to process 
the data flow more than 3 times faster. 

• The cable will be able to stretch 
by up to 2% without breaking (3 to 4 
times more than terrestrial cable), in- 
creasing its survivability in case of sub- 
marine landslides like those that severed 
three cables across the North Atlantic in 

• The light-beam-generating laser- 
diode transmitters are expected to be 
trouble-free for 25 years. 15 years 
longer than the projected life span of the 
new communications satellites. 

Transmission lines and switching 
equipment in the United States, Japan, 
and most of Europe are being changed 
to accommodate digital transmission in a 
sweeping transformation of the 
developed world's telecommunications 
system. TAT-8 could become, along 
with satellites, a key link in the planned 
global integrated services digital net- 

The fact that TAT-8 can make 
multiple landing points raises the 
economic stakes. Cable landings are an 
important source of revenue for nations 
involved, since they: 

• Allow significant potential reduc- 
tions in telecommunications operational 

• Allow the sales of services to 
other countries through routing of traf- 
fic and cable maintenance, and 

• Make economically feasible links 
to route traffic to third countries, an op- 
tion which might not have been viable 
with local traffic alone. 

Although the "bident" landing apt 
proach has been taken, the addition c 
third link to TAT-8 has been left ope 
The extra cost of a southern landing 
and the supporting revenue remain t 
determining factors. The Department 
continuing to monitor this considerat 

Although opinions differ, many i 
perts regard optical fibers as intrinsji 
ly superior to satellite radio commuij 
tions for point-to-point voice transmi 
sions over busy routes, and for secuj 
and privacy as well. 

Satellites are likely to remain m« k 
competitive in applications that reqij ; 
wide-band communications channels, 
such as business data transmissions, 
distribution of television programs, 
videoconferencing, and in the ability 
satellites to provide direct services t 
consumer premises. Satellites also hi 
the edge for point-to-point transmiss 
over thin routes, such as links to am 
within developing countries. But for 
present bread-and-butter business ol 
ternational communications satellite 
the introduction of fiber optic cables 
poses a significant economic and 
technological challenge. 



In conclusion, I can assure you that 
Department of State is very much a 
of the challenges in the field of inte 
tional telecommunications policy. W 
the LI.S. Government and industry ■ 
be justly proud of their past contrib 
tions, we must continuously seek in 
national agreement to permit the ir 
national system to benefit from rap 
advancements in equipment and sei 
ices. The participation of our privat 
sector is essential to this process. \ 
cannot unilaterally change internat 
policies, but our leadership in teiec( 
munications technology is universal 
recognized and the world is closely 
watching our response to the chanj 
technological environment. We hav 
already witnessed in some countrie 
moves to open the telecommunicati jfi 
sector to more competition. As the 
benefits of these policies spread, w 
should experience a more ready ac( Jjf,; 
ance of less regulation and more pi 
competitive policies in Internationa femsi 
telecommunications. We will contir nf 
work toward this goal. y\ 






[ f'li 


'The complete transcript of the hea 
will be publisned by the committee and 
be available from the Superintendent o 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 




mber 1979, the Soviet Union in- 
fghanistan, executed Marxist 
inister Hafizullah Amin, and in- 
;he puppet regime of Babrak 
to head the Democratic RepubHc 
anistan (DRA). The DRA was 
ihed following the "Great Saur 
-evolution," the 1978 Marxist 
at overthrew President Moham- 
.oud and named Noor Mohammad 
as President of the Revolutionary 
and Prime Minister. Taraki was 
ly Amin in a coup d'etat in 
ber 1979. 

osition to the Marxist govern- 
[eveloped almost immediately 
e April 1978 coup and subse- 
spread throughout Afghanistan, 
istance continues today in the 
f a countrjTvide insurgency 
; the Soviets and the DRA by the 
ajority of Afghan people. The 

with 110,000-115,000 troops, 
ot succeeded in their attempts to 
ss the Afghan resistance or to 
an effective Afghan Army and 
sh the authority of the Karmal 

ti Resistance Groups 

c Afghan resistance, or mujahidin 
warriors"), groups maintain their 
il headquarters in Peshawar, 
an. United in their desire to rid 
ountry of the Soviets, they are 
1 by ideologies and personalities 
ajor and minor factions, loosely 
;d into two alliances — the 
rates" and the "fundamentalists." 
16 morale of the Afghan freedom 
"S remains high, with their 
th against the Soviets increasing, 
"ontrol 75% of the countryside and 
r better armed and trained than 
. The resistance has become par- 
ly effective against Soviet/DRA 
' convoys, and Soviet helicopter 
rcraft losses have risen significant- 
less the Soviets substantially in- 
' the size of their army in 
nistan, the military stalemate will 
aie, and the Soviets will be unable 
eat this determined and resilient 
f. Faced with growing opposition, 
Dviets have turned to increasingly 
tactics, including reprisals against 
mbatants, as a means of wearing 
civilian support for the resistance. 

Afghan Refugees 

The 2-3 million Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan, located in some 348 camps in 
the border areas of the Northwest Fron- 
tier and Baluchistan Provinces, con- 
stitute the world's largest refugee 

Since the international relief effort 
began in 1980, the U.S. Government has 
contributed more than $350 million for 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. These 
funds are channeled primarily through 
the world food program and the office of 
the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), which has overall 
responsibility for coordinating inter- 
national contributions. Other contribu- 
tions are made to the International 
Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and U.S. voluntary agencies working 
among the refugees. 

With the roughly 1.5 million 
Afghans in Iran, about half of them 
refugees, the estimated number of 
Afghans in exile is now well over 3.5 
million, more than 20% of the entire 
prewar Afghan population. Many 
refugees continue to leave Afghanistan 
and will do so as long as the Soviet oc- 
cupation continues. The rate has slowed 
somewhat due to the large numbers that 
already have fled abroad, but each major 
Soviet operation brings a new influx of 
refugees into Pakistan. 

UN Efforts 

Since January 1980, the UN General 
Assembly has approved overwhelmingly 
five resolutions calling for a settlement 
in Afghanistan based on the removal of 
Soviet forces, the independent and 
nonaligned status for Afghanistan, self- 
determination for the Afghan people, 
and the return of the refugees with safe- 
ty and honor. 

To achieve these goals, UN 
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has 
appointed Diego Cordovez, Under 
Secretary for Special Political Affairs, 
as his personal representative in an in- 
direct negotiating process that seeks a 
political settlement. This process of con- 
sultations in the region and indirect 
talks in Geneva includes the DRA 
regime and the Pakistan Government 
with the Soviets unofficially involved. 
Although all parties want the UN proc- 
ess to continue, their positions remain 
far apart, and prospects for a political 
settlement are not promising. 

Soviet Position 

The Soviets justify their continuing 
presence in Afghanistan with the claim 
that a limited contingent of Soviet 
troops was invited into Afghanistan by a 
friendly government. This assertion ig- 
nores the fact that the head of this 
government, Hafizullah Amin, was ex- 
ecuted by the Soviets and Babrak Kar- 

Afghan Attacks on Pakistan 

AUG. 23, 1984' 

On a number of occasions over the 
course of the past week, aircraft, ar- 
tillery, and rocket launchers based in 
Afghanistan carried out a series of 
brutal violations of Pakistan's territorial 
sovereignty which cost the lives of near- 
ly 50 innocent persons, injured a large 
number, and destroyed property. 

The United States deplores these at- 
tacks on Pakistan, a nation whose in- 
dependence and territorial integrity we 
have long supported. We call upon the 
Soviet Union and its Kabul clients to put 
an end to these actions. 

These attacks once again highlight 
the tragedy and suffering caused by the 
Soviet Union's effort to subjugate the 
Afghan nation and people and to in- 

timidate Afghanistan's neighbors. These 
actions have brought death, misery, and 
exile to millions of innocent Afghan 
men, women, and children. We believe it 
is vital that an orderly withdrawal of 
Soviet forces be achieved, thereby end- 
ing the repression in Afghanistan. 

We call upon the Soviet Union to 
permit genuine progress in the talks 
about to resume in Geneva so that 
Soviet forces are withdrawn from 
Afghanistan and Afghans may be per- 
mitted to establish their own govern- 
ment. This would create the conditions 
in Afghanistan for the citizens of that 
country, including the millions who are 
now refugees elsewhere, to return to 
live in peace in their own land. 

'Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 


mal installed in his place, and ignores 
the right of the Afghan people to self- 

The Soviets insist that the with- 
drawal of their forces is a bilateral mat- 
ter between them and the Kabul regime, 
to take place only with Kabul's "agree- 
ment"— an unlikely eventuality since the 
regime could not survive without the 
Soviet military presence. The central 
element of the Soviet/ DRA conditions 
for a political settlement is the cessation 
of outside interference, for which the 
Soviets name the United States as the 
major source. The Soviets stress the 
need for international guarantees to ac- 
company the required pledges of non- 
interference—but not withdrawal of 
their forces— in effect asking the outside 
world to secure the end of Afghan re- 
sistance as a precondition to Soviet 

U.S. Position 

President Reagan has said: "We seek the 
removal of Soviet military forces so that 
the Afghan people can live freely in 
their own country and are able to choose 
their own way of life and government." 
The United States strongly opposes the 
continuing Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, and the issue remains 
significant in East- West relations. 

Although in our view Soviet with- 
drawal is the key, we believe that a 
resettlement also must provide for the 
other three requirements spelled out in 
the UN General Assembly Afghanistan 
resolutions. Such an agreement could 
also include appropriate international 
guarantees of the settlement's stability. 
The United States supports the UN 
negotiating effort of indirect talks to 
achieve these goals. 

Taken from the GIST series of August 1984, 

gublished by the Bureau of Public Affairs, 
lepartment of State. Editor: Harriet 
Culley. ■ 

International Terrorism: 
A Long Twilight Struggle 

by Robert M. Sayre 

Address before the Foreign Policy 
Association in New York on August 15, 
198U- Ambassador Sayre is Director of 
the Office for Counterterrorisvi and 
Emergency Planning. 

Now the trumpet summons us again— not as 
a call to bear arms, although arms we need; 
not as a call to battle; though embattled we 
are; but a call to bear the burden of a long 
twilight struggle, year in and year out, "re- 
joicing in hope, patient in tribulation," a 
struggle against the common enemies of man: 
tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself. 

These words expressed by an 
American president more than two 
decades ago are a very appropriate in- 
troduction to a discussion of political 
violence and terrorism because we are 
asked "to bear the burden of a long 
twilight struggle, year in and year out, 
'rejoicing in hope, patient in 
tribulation.' " 

The problem is real enough, especial- 
ly for those engaged in the diplomatic 
profession. The problem has been grow- 
ing since 1968. Although the total 
number of incidents has been almost the 
same for the past 5 years, 1983 stood 
out from the rest because of sheer 
violence. In 1983 there were more vic- 
tims (some 1,925) and more U.S. 
casualties (387) from international ter- 
rorist acts than ever before. The Middle 
East dominated the global terrorism 
scene although the region ranked third 
after Western Europe and Latin 
America in the number of incidents. The 
United States was the target in 40% of 
the cases and diplomats in general in 
52% of the cases. The figures so far in 
1984 suggest a significant increase— in- 
cidents in the first 6 months are running 
25% ahead of 1983. 

These incidents of international ter- 
rorism are only the tip of the iceberg of 
worldwide political violence and probably 
represent no more than 1% of the total. 

Beyond the statistics, there are 
other reasons why recent events are 
disturbing. The accent is on killing peo- 
ple. Such imprecise weapons as vehicle 
bombs have been used to produce mass 
casualties. So were the bombs placed 
aboard commercial aircraft. Terrorists 
have become less discriminating and are 

more willing to target low-level vict 
when the high-level victims prove fj 
well protected. 

What has become particularly j 
turbing to us and our allies in the » 
year is the extent to which states 
themselves have increasingly used i 
intelligence services and other agei 
of government to engage directly ii 
rorist activity. This concern promp 
the issuance of the London declara 
on terrorism at the recent meeting 
the summit seven. The weight of tl 
evidence is that Syria and Iran wei 
directly involved in the three majoi 
bombing incidents in the Middle Ei 
1983— the destruction of the Amer 
Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait oi 
April 18 and December 12 and the 
bombing of the Marine barracks in 
Beirut on October 23. Members of 
North Korean military carried out 
bombing in Rangoon that killed m; 
members of the South Korean Cab 
Members of the Libyan "Embassy' 
in London opened fire on a peacef 
demonstration and killed a British 

As tragic as specific events ar 
human terms, the end objective oi 
events was to force governments 
change their policies and to destal 
governments. If states practicing 
rorism are successful in that objec 
we can expect more such efforts, 
must demonstrate to them that tl f 
not an effective way to conduct 
diplomacy. Giving in to such activ f"' 
also sends signals to others who n -" 
tempted to be venturesome and a 
gressive. So we must be mindful 
only of the immediate effects of t 
rorism but its longer range and b 

Any event in isolation may nc 
threaten our security. But it mus 
priority policy concern when stati 
lively engage in terrorist acts ag; 
us; when states like the Soviet U: 
provide training, arms, and other 
and indirect support to nations ai 
groups that engage in terrorism; 
when the pattern of terrorism ag 
the United States and its allies is 
centrated in Western Europe, th( 
die East, and the Caribbean area 
of course, are areas of strategic i 
tance to the United States and es |«tii 
to NATO defense. «!; 





Ivould not want to suggest by 
ithting the events of the past year 
; I ISO of particular concern to the 
111 Stales that these are the only 
,(is for terrorism. Some engage in 
t activity for irredentist reasons 
s the Basques in Spain, the Arme- 
.gainst the Turks, and others, 
us differences are a key factor in 
ife in northern Ireland, in the 
,cy of Iran, and the civil war in 
on. These events disturb our rela- 
ith other countries and in total 
eate an atmosphere of instability 
security in the world. 


lad outlines, we have a significant 
■m of political violence that is 
ed primarily against the Western 

racies and our interests. The prin- 
.arget is the United States, and it 
:en for some years. States have 
le more actively involved in pro- 
g and supporting this violence as a 
3 of influencing our policy. What 
)ne do about it? 

ur first response is, of course, to 
d ourselves. We are in the process 
Droving security at our diplomatic 
around the world, first at the 
3t risk posts. We have made a 

effort to improve emergency plan- 
)y our Embassies, to work more 
y with the American community in 

ountry, and to train our personnel 

on how to handle such problems, 
ave made a good beginning, but we 
a considerable distance to go. 
^e have sought to expand coopera- 
vith other countries both on a com- 
ipproach to the problem as well as 
actical measures to deal with it. 
Jnited Nations has developed con- 
Dns to deal with specific types of 
rist activity. Thus there are conven- 
on aircraft hijacking and sabotage, 
rrorist acts against protected per- 
and on the taking of hostages. The 
dent is seeking legislation from the 
ress to implement fully all of our 
litments under these conventions 
jll as fill other gaps in existing 
ation. Efforts in the United Na- 
to have a general convention on 
uppression of terrorism have 
iered on the definition of terrorism, 
ummit seven countries have con- 
ted considerably to developing a 
y consensus on dealing with ter- 
m through their declarations on the 
king of commercial aircraft, the 
jction of diplomats, and more 
itly the London declaration on deal- 
vith state-supported terrorism. 

We have strengthened greatly the 
collection of intelligence on terrorist ac- 
tivities and the exchange of information 
with our friends and allies. 

The Congress approved last year 
and we are now implementing a training 
program for foreign law enforcement of- 
ficers to deal with all types of terrorist 
activity. This program will promote a 
stronger international consensus on the 
threat terrorism poses and how we and 
our friends and allies can deal with it. It 
will also improve communications and 
strengthen ties among law enforcement 
officials generally. 

We believe that we have made 
substantial progress within the U.S. 
Government on an effective response to 
terrorist attacks and have also 
developed a good working relationship 
with our allies. Much more can and 
should be done on defensive measures. 

Events of 1983, however, persuaded 
us that a good defense posture was not 
adequate. We need to improve our 
capabilities, especially intelligence, to 
prevent terrorist states and groups from 
undertaking attacks. Within the United 
States we have, with effective police 
work, been rather successful in pre- 
empting terrorist activity. Other coun- 
tries, such as Italy and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, have also had con- 
siderable success in identifying terrorist 
groups and preventing terrorist acts. 
Without in anyway minimizing the dif- 
ficulties, we believe with greater effort 
and resources that it should be possible 
to prevent many of the terrorist attacks 
against us in other countries. 


Having lived with the issues for almost 3 
years, reading daily intelligence reports, 
studying intelligence on the subject, 
responding to dozens of incidents and 
helping to resolve them, considering 
various policy options, and working 
within the U.S. Government and with 
our allies on ways to deal with the prob- 
lem, I have naturally come to a few con- 

• Terrorism is politically motivated 
and is planned and organized. It is a 
mixed picture as to the states and 
groups that engage in it. Most of it is 
carried out by states and groups of 
Marxist-Leninist persuasion, and the 
Soviet Union and its Eastern-bloc part- 
ners lend support and comfort to them. 
The Soviet Union continues to do this 
because it considers it in its interest to 
do so. If the Soviet Union would stop 

providing military training, equipment, 
and other support, there would be a 
significant drop in terrorist activity. 
There are other major actors such as 
Islamic fundamentalist groups supported 
by Iran. A considerable amount of the 
terrorism even in Western Europe 
stems from the turmoil in the Middle 
East, and if there were a peaceful settle- 
ment there, it would contribute to a 
drop in terrorist activity. 

• Given the nature and motivation 
of most of the groups and states engag- 
ing in terrorism, it is not surprising that 
the Western democracies, and especially 
the United States, are the primary 

• Given these conclusions, it is not 
likely that there will be any general 
agreement within the United Nations on 
the suppression of terrorist activity. 

• Rather, the United States and its 
friends and allies will be most effective 
with good intelligence and the sharing of 
that information, improved defense 
measures, more effective police work, 
and preemption of terrorist acts 
whenever and wherever possible. Shar- 
ing of technical knowledge on dealing 
with terrorism through the training of 
foreign law enforcement officers is an 
essential element in any effective pro- 
gram. Combatting terrorism is essen- 
tially a police and not a military matter. 

• Stronger international cooperation 
both bilaterally and multilaterally is 
essential. The international community 
has to recognize the problem first before 
we can deal with it effectively. The Lon- 
don declaration that identifies state ac- 
tions as a major cause of terrorist activi- 
ty is a major step forward. 

• We will have to learn to use effec- 
tively both diplomacy and force and in 
ways that reinforce each other. We will 
not have the luxury of clear-cut situa- 
tions. In dealing with terrorism on a 
global basis, we will have to be very 
discriminating and know when our in- 
terests are being threatened and when 
they are not. Our opponents in seeking 
to achieve their objectives will delib- 
erately confuse the issues and try to 
keep the threshold below what they 
believe we conceive to be our vital in- 

• It is possible to deal with ter- 
rorism on a legal basis. There is no need 
to resort to extralegal measures. Italy, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
we have all been very successful with 
aggressive law enforcement. Any at- 
tempt to deal with it outside the law 


helps the terrorists achieve their objec- 
tives and leads to very disastrous results 
as we have seen in Argentina and 

• An effective program against ter- 
rorism requires the employment of 
substantial resources. We have to accept 
that fact and provide the resources. The 
Federal Government alone, for example, 
spent some $65 million on security at 
the Olympic Games in Los Angeles. 
Local jurisdictions spent substantial ad- 
ditional sums. The games were not only 
a major success as an international 
sports event but they were very peaceful 
and demonstrated beyond any doubt 
that the Soviet assertions about poor 
security were phony. 

• Most of the terrorism against the 
United States occurs overseas. We need 
to strengthen our efforts to deal with it 
there, including the root causes, or we 
run the substantial risk that it will grow 
and spread into the United States. 

• We have been reluctant to apply 
sufficient resources to deal with ter- 
rorism, possibly because we hoped that 
the problem was temporary. WTiile we 
have prepared for the larger challenges 
of conventional or nuclear war, our op- 
ponents have nibbled at us in Europe, 
the Middle East, Africa, and Latin 
America with low-level warfare. The 
events of 1983 brought home to us very 
clearly that we will have to cope with 
terrorism for some time to come and we 
need to make certain that we are 
organized and apply the resources 
needed to do that. The facts suggest 
that the problem will continue to grow. 
We are, indeed, engaged in a long 
twilight struggle. ■ 

Current Actions 



Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 
1961. TIAS 4780. 
Accession deposited: Cuba, Aug. 16, 1984. 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance 
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc- 
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Canberra 
Sept. 27, 1983 at the 12th Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting. Enters into force when 
approved by all contracting parties whose 
representatives were entitled to participate. 


International coffee agreement, 1983, with 
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. 
Ratifications deposited: Angola, .June 20, 
1984; Federal Republic of Germany, July 12, 
1984'; Paraguay, June 15. 1984. 

Commodities — Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27, 1980.2 
Ratifications deposited: Cape Verde, July 30, 
1984; Greece, Aug. 10, 1984. 


Articles of agreement of the International 

Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 

Done at Bretton Woods Conference 

July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27 

1945. TIAS 1502. 

Signature and acceptance deposited : St. 

Christopher & Nevis, Aug. 15, 1984. 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund. Done at Bretton Woods Con- 
ference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force 
Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1.501. 
Signature and acceptance deposit ed: St. 
Christopher & Nevis, Aug. 15, 1984". 


International agreement on jute and jute 
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at 
Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force pro- 
visionally Jan. 9, 1984. 
Accession deposited: Switzerland, June 19, 

Patents— Plant Varieties 

International convention for the protection of 
new varieties of plants.of Dec. 2, 1961, as re- 
vised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. Entered 
into force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS 10199. 
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Aug. 2, 


Convention for the protection and develop- 
ment of the marine environment of the wider 
Caribbean region, with annex. Done at Car- 
tagena Mar. 24, 1983.2 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Aug. 9, 1984. 


Constitution of the Universal Postal Un 
Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered 
force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS .5881. 
Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14, 

Additional protocol to the Constitution i 
Universal Postal Union. Done at Tokyo 
Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 
1971, except for Art. V which entered I 
force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. ^ 

Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 11' 

Second additional protocol to the Constii 

of the Universal Postal Union. Done at 

Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into for 

Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 

Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14, 

Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, July i 


General regulations of the Universal Pq 
Union, with final protocol and annex, ar 
universal postal convention with final pi 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at 1 
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into fore 
July 1, 1981; except for Art. 124 of the 
general regulations which became effec 
Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 9972. 
Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14, 
Approval deposited: Thailand, July 3, T 
Ratifications deposited: Bahamas, July 
1984; Lebanon, July 18, 1984; Philippir 
June 28, 1984; Sri Lanka July 20, 1984 
Uruguay, June 21, 1984. 

Money orders and postal traveler's che( 
agreement, with detailed regulations w 
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro 
Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 
1981. TIAS 9973. 

Approval deposited: Thailand, July 3, 1 
Ratifications deposited: Lebanon, July 
1984; Sri Lanka, July 20, 1984; Urugu; 
June 21, 1984. 

Property— Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intc 
tual Property Organization. Done at Si 
holm July 14, 1967. Entered into force 
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25, 
TIAS 6932. 
Accession deposited: Cyprus, July 26, 


International sugar agreement, 1977, 

annexes, as extended (TIAS 9664, 104 

Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered 

force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978; defini 

Jan. 2, 1980. 

Ratification deposited: Venezuela, Au} 





Radio regulations, with appendices an 
protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 197£ 
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982; defin 
for the U.S. Oct. 27, 1983. 
Approvals depo.sited: Jamaica, June 1, 
Republic of Korea, May 11, 1984. 


Arrangement regarding international 
textiles. Done at Geneva Dec. 20, 197 
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1974. TIAS ill 








iMeiiding the arrangement regard- 
national trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 

extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done 
'a Dee. 22, 1981. Entered into force 
982. TIAS 10323. 
ices deposited: Norway, July 1, 

lents to the schedule to the interna- 
nvention for the regulation of whal- 

(TIAS 1849). Adopted at Buenos 
ne 22, 1984. Enters into force Oct. 8, 
less any contracting party lodges an 

)tocol for the further extension of the 
ade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 
e July 1, 1983.« 

itocol for the further extension of the 
convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015). 
Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 
e July 1, 1983.« 
Is deposited: France, Aug. 13, 1984. 

[ealth Organization 

tion of the World Health Organiza- 
ie at New York July 22, 1946. 

into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the U.S. 

1948. TIAS 1808. 
ice deposited: Kiribati, July 26, 1984. 



ment for the conduct of a balloon 
1 in Australia for scientific purposes, 
it Washington and Canberra June 27 
9, 1984. Enters into force upon ex- 
)f notes. 

agreement on air transport services, 
morandum of consultation [dated 
rton, June 14, 1984]. Effected by ex- 
jf notes at Brasilia July 11, 1984. 
into force July 11, 1984. 

•elating to the Skagit River and Ross 
id the Seven Mile Reservoire on the 
)reille River, with annex. Signed at 
rton Apr. 2, 1984.^ 
by the President: Aug. 27, 1984. 


tion treaty, with exchange of notes, 
it San Jose Dec. 4, 1982.2 
idvice and consent to ratification: 
, 1984. 
by the President: 

Aug. 17, 1984. 

tion for the avoidance of double taxa- 
I the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
to taxes on estates, inheritances, 
id certain other transfers. Signed at 
gton Apr. 27, 1983.^ 
advice and consent to ratification: 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 23, 1984, as amended, for the sale of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Washington Aug. 2, 
1984. Entered into force Aug. 2, 1984. 

European Economic Community 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
F'eb. 15, 1977, concerning fisheries off the 
coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8598). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington June 27, 
1984. Entered into force July 30, 1984; effec- 
tive July 1, 1984. 


Agreement relating to jurisdiction over 
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil 
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Libre- 
ville July 25 and Aug. 2, 1984. Entered into 
force Aug. 2, 1984. 


General agreement for economic, technical, 
and related assistance. Signed at Grenada 
May 7, 1984. Entered into force May 7, 1984. 


Agreement for the sales of agricultural com- 
modities, with memorandum of understand- 
ing. Signed at Guatemala Aug. 1, 1984. 
Enters into force upon exchange of notes 
confirming that the internal procedures of 
the importing country have been met. 


Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
IMET program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Conakry Mar. 29, 1983, and Feb. 13, 
1984. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1984. 


Agreement for the interdiction of narcotics 
trafficking. Signed at Port-au-Prince Aug. 22, 
1984. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1984; ef- 
fective Oct. 1, 1983. 


Agreement amending and extending memo- 
randum of understanding of July 18, 1978 
(TIAS 9285), concerning furnishing of launch- 
ing and associated services for Indian na- 
tional satellite system (INSAT)-l spacecraft. 
Signed at Washington and Bangalore Apr. 10 
and 25, 1984. 

Entered into force: July 31, 1984; effective 
Jan. 1, 1984. 


Agreement amending the arrangement of 
Oct. 1 and 15, 1979 (TIAS 9667), relating to 
a visa system for exports of cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber apparel manufactured in Indo- 
nesia. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Jakarta June 1 and 14, 1984. Entered into 
force June 14, 1984. 


Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington 

July 13, 1983.2 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 28, 1984. 

Ratified by the President: Aug. 10, 1984. 


Extradition treaty. Signed at Rome Oct. 13, 


Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

June 28, 1984. 

Ratified by the President: Aug. 10, 1984. 

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat- 
ters, with memorandum of understanding. 
Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982.2 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
June 28, 1984. 
Ratified by the President: Aug. 16, 1984. 


Extradition treaty. Signed at Kingston 

June 14, 1983.2 

Se nate advice and consent to ratification: 

Jilne 28, 1984. 

Ratified by the President: Aug. 17, 1984. 

Agreement for the furnishing of commodities 
and services in connection with the peace- 
keeping force for Grenada. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Kingston Nov. 29 and 
Dec. 6, 1983. Entered into force Dec. 6, 

Agreement amending the air transport agree- 
ment of Oct. 2, 1969, as amended (TIAS 
6770, 9613). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Kingston July 17 and 23, 1984. Entered into 
force July 23, 1984. 


Agreement concerning Japan's financial con- 
tribution for U.S. administrative and related 
expenses for 1984 (JFY) pursuant to the 
mutual defense assistance agreement of 
Mar. 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Tokyo July 20, 1984. 
Entered into force July 20, 1984. 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 1, 1982 (TIAS 10611), relating to trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Washington July 26 and 27, 1984. 
Entered into force July 27, 1984. 


Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its 
agencies, with annexes and implementing 
agreement regarding payments due under 
PL 480 agricultural commodity agreements, 
with annexes. Signed at Monrovia June 22, 
1984. Entered into force July 27, 1984. 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 30, 1982, for the sale of agricultural 
commodities (TIAS 10628). Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Port Louis Mar. 29 and 
July 4, 1984. Entered into force July 4, 1984. 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 2, 1984, for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Rabat July 5, 1984. Entered into force 
July 5, 1984. 



Invesiment incentive agreement. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Maputo July 28, 1984. 
Enters into force on date Mozambique com- 
municates by note to U.S. Government that 
exchange of notes has been approved pur- 
suant to its constitutional procedures. 


Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at Niamey June 11, 1984. Entered in- 
to force July 24, 1984. 


Agreement relating to wool textiles and tex- 
tile products manufactured in Panama, with 
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Panama Aug. 7 and 21, 1984. Entered into 
force Aug. 21, 1984; effective Dec. 1, 1983. 


Treaty on cooperation in the execution of 

penal sentences. Signed at Bangkok Oct. 29, 


Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

Aug. 9, 1984. 


Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities relating to the agreement of June 7. 
1976 (TIAS 8506). Signed at Tunis June 13, 
1984. Entered into force June 13, 1984. 


Agreement extending the agreement of 
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended, concerning 
fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 
8528, 10531). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington Feb. 28 and Apr. 11, 1984. 
Entered into force: July 31, 1984. 

Agreement extending the long-term agree- 
ment of June 29, 1974 (TIAS 7910), to facili- 
tate economic, industrial, and technical 
cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington June 15 and 27, 1984. Entered 
into force June 27, 1984. 


Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guar- 
anteed by, or insured by the U.S. Govern- 
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed 
at Kinshasa May 3, 1984. Entered into force 
June 11, 1984. 

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage- 
ment and protection of investment. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 3, 1984. Enters into force 
30 days after date of exchange of instru- 
ments of ratification. 

'Applicable to Berlin (West). 

^Not in force. 

^P'or the Kingdom in Europe. 

■•With declaration. 

■''With statement. 

'■In force provisionally for the U.S. 

'With reservation. ■ 

August 1984 

Note: The editors solicit readers' comments 
on the value of the Bulletin s monthly 
chronologies. Unless a positive response is 
received, the chronologies will be discon- 

August 1 

Representatives of the U.S. Embassy in 
Moscow and the Consular Division of the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs exchange 
diplomatic notes concluding the latest round 
of U.S-Soviet consular review talks. 

National security adviser McFarlane, in a 
public statement, reaffirms that the U.S. has 
accepted the Soviet Union's June 29 proposal 
to meet in Vienna and is prepared for serious 
talks on outer space, including antisatellite 
weapons. He also says the Soviet Union has 
repeatedly misrepresented the U.S. position 
on such talks suggesting that the Soviets 
were not serious about the proposed talks. 

At his ranch in Santa Barbara, President 
Reagan meets with the Vatican's Archbishop 
Pio Laghi to discuss the situation in Poland, 
East-West issues, and Central America. 

House rejects an Administration request 
for $117 million in supplementary military aid 
to El Salvador for this fiscal year. 

U.S. sends a team of Navy mine-warfare 
experts to investigate shipping explosions in 
the Red Sea. 

August 2-20 

Delegates from 135 countries meet in Vienna 
for the fourth general conference of the 
United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization. Ambassador Richard S. 
Williamson leads the U.S. delegation. 

August 2 

A U.S. Marine guard at the Consulate 
building in Leningrad is beaten by Soviet 
police and jailed for 2 hours. The Marine was 
off duty but investigating a suspicious vehicle 
that had been circling the Consulate. State 
Department acting spokesman Romberg says 
the U.S. strongly protested this serious inci- 
dent but that the Soviet Union has not given 
a satisfactory response. 

In New York City, U.S. and Cuban repre- 
sentatives end a second round of talks on im- 
migration issues, including the return of per- 
sons from the 1980 Mariel boatlift. Michael 
G. Kozak headed the U.S. delegation. 

In Tehran, hijackers of an Air France 
Boeing 737 released all passengers and crew, 
set off an explosion in the cockpit, and then 
surrendered to authorities ending a 2-day 
siege. It is discovered that three passengers 
aboard are Americans. 

USIA Director Wick greets 47 Japanese 
exchange students at welcoming ceremonies 
at the Department of State. 

August 3 

U.S. signs a deep seabed mining agreement 
with Belgium, France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and the U.K. The agreement is aimed at 
avoiding conflicts over deep seabed mine sites 
and providing for regular consultations. 




In response to Poland's announcement 
release 652 political prisoners, President 
Reagan lifts the ban on the Polish state 
airline LOT and reestablishes full scientifi 
exchanges between the U.S. and Poland, 

Upper Volta officially changes its nam 
to Burkina Faso which means "land of hoi) 
men" in the Mossi tribe language. Its new 
flag is red and green with a gold star. Th( 
people of this West African country will It ' 
called Burkinabes. 

August 6-14 

The second International Conference on 
Population is held in Mexico City. Am- ■ 
bassador James L. Buckley heads the U.l 
delegation. ! 

The conference adopts (August 10) a 
recommendation that abortion should notft 
promoted as a family planning method. , 

On August 11, Ambassador Buckley i 
the U.S. will continue its support for the 
United Nations Fund for Population Ac- 
tivities having received the necessary "con 
Crete assurances" that the organization do 
not engage in or provide funding for abon 
or coercive family planning programs. 

The conference adopts (August 14) thi 
text of the Mexico City Declaration on 
Population and Development, as well as 8 
recommendations to further implement th 
World Population Plan of Action approve 
Bucharest in 1974. 

August 6 

Department of State issues warning to 
travelers to Leningrad that their rights a 
foreign tourists and the protections affor 
them under the U.S. -U.S.S.R. consular cci 
vention are not being respected by Soviei™* 

August 7 

At the request of Egyptian President 
Mubarek, the U.S. Navy sends mine-swe 
helicopters and about 200 servicemen to 
search the Gulf of Suez area for explosiv i 
that have damaged commercial shipping. 

Uganda suspends its international 
military education and training (IMET) f; " 
gram with the U.S. and bars a U.S. milili 'Be 
attache from visiting the country to help !''s 
minister the program in response to reci '■'" 
U.S. criticism of human rights abuses in [' ' • 

At an African-Arab solidarity confer ' 
in Tunisia, PLO leader Arafat urges An '• 
adopt "rigorous positions" against the U *'■ 

August 8 

Iran accuses U.S. and Israel of placing r |frB» 
in the Red Sea in a "conspiracy" to disct ilkt 
Teheran's Islamic government. 

In a letter to Congress, President Rliajs 
reports that U.S. nonproliferation initial' lny; 
in 1983 had a positive contribution to th 
goal of preventing "the further spread o 
nuclear explosives." 

Seven Afghans, wounded in fighting fwm 
caused by the Soviet Union's occupation 
their country, arrive in the U.S. for trej 
ment at Walter Reed Army Medical Cei fwJIi 
The mission is sponsored by the private 
Americas Foundation. 

^ ('i)r 


d the U.K. announce they will join 
1 for explosives in the Red Sea and 
,ez at the request of Egypt. 
laS grees to help Belgium purchase a 
Sir ade high technology lathe for the 
in rmy to avoid its sale to the Soviet 

approves an extra $70 million in 
id to El Salvador for the remaining 

oviet Union travel agency, In- 
Jt. Jls the State Department's 
travel advisory about Leningrad 
ill intentioned." 


Cuba agree to improve trade, 
i ind technological relations despite 
IS in international matters. 

Angeles Summer Olympics conclude. 
222 gold medals were awarded 
is 16-day event. U.S. athletes win a 
74 medals, of which 83 are gold. 

Reagan and Secretary Shultz meet 
t an Foreign Minister Andreotti while 

" holds swearing in ceremony of its 


1 jartment acting spokesman 

says the review process has begun 
«jjiine whether Rabbi Kahane should 

S. citizenship after being sworn in 
i^iber of the Israeli Parliament. 


Sdor Shlaudeman meets with Nicara- 
ie Minister of Foreign Affairs Tinoco 
inillo, Mexico, for the fourth round of 

Jt Reagan says the U.S. will consider 
; its participation in the United Na- 
.3iference on Women at Nairobi, 
I, ' the conference adopts a measure 
r Zionism with racism, 
ihd notifies the U.S. of its willingness 
T talks on the lifting of some U.S. eco- 
: notions. 


■( 'niony commemorating August 1, 
f the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw 
n atjainst Nazi occupation. President 
iKays the U.S. rejects "the interpreta- 
ne Yalta agreement that suggests 
n consent for the division of Europe 
eres of influence." He expresses his 
lation to "press for full compliance" 
jreement, especially free elections. 
ta agreement was signed in February 
President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin, 
ne Minister Churchill. 

The UN Security Council approves, by a 
vote of 13 in favor and 2 abstentions (U.S. 
and the U.K.), a resolution that rejects and 
declares "null and void" the constitutional 
changes made by South Africa. 

August 18 

In response to President Reagan's statement 
of August 17 regarding the Yalta agreement, 
the Soviet Union accuses President Reagan 
of distorting history and defaming the Soviet 
Union and Poland. 

August 19 

Uganda says that about 15,000 people have 
been killed in political and tribal violence 
since 1981, disputing Assistant Secretary 
Abrams testimony of August 9 that 100,000 
people have been killed by the military. 

August 20 

Greece cancels a joint military exercise with 
the U.S. in northern Greece saying it 
perceives no threats from its Warsaw Pact 

August 21-22 

At the CDE session in Stockholm, U.S. and 
Soviet Union conduct talks on ways to 
enhance security, build confidence, and pre- 
vent surprise attack in Europe. Ambassador 
James E. Goodby heads the U.S. delegation. 

August 21 

State Department acting spokesman 
Romberg expresses U.S. regret of Greece's 
decision to cancel a joint military exercise in 
the Aegean Sea. He adds that the U.S. does 
not agree with the Greek reasons for justify- 
ing the cancellation. 

August 22 

President Reagan signs a bill that includes 
$503 million in economic and military aid to 
Central America; $70 million of the aid will 
go to El Salvador. 

State Department acting spokesman 
Romberg says the U.S. deplores recent at- 
tacks on Pakistan made from Afghanistan 
and calls upon the Soviet Union and the 
Kabul regime to end these actions. 

State Department acting spokesman 
Romberg reaffirms U.S. relations with 
Australia and support of ANZUS after 
reports of concern regarding the Administra- 
tion's current views on these issues. 

For the first time in 28 years. South 
Africa holds its first round of elections to 
choose representatives for people of mixed 
race. In South Africa's new, three-chamber 
Parliament, whites will be represented in a 
160-seat house, people of mixed race will 
have an 80-seat house, and Indians will be 
represented in a 40-seat house. The black ma- 
jority will not be represented. 

August 23 

State Department receives a report that 
Yelena Bonner was convicted of slandering 
the Soviet Union and sentenced to 5 years of 
internal exile on August 17. 

Romania celebrates the 40th anniversary 
of the overthrow of the Fascist government. 

Auburn University announces the estab- 
lishment of the International Aquacultural 
Network that will link scientists in 70 nations 
by satellite to each other for obtaining the 
latest research information to help developing 
nations and U.S. producers grow fish more 

The Department of Defense makes public 
its recommendation to provide coverage of 
military operations by news organizations. 

August 24 

U.S. announces it will send additional grain 
shipments to Ethiopia and Kenya to ease con- 
ditions caused by drought. 

August 25 

TASS reports that the Soviet Union has suc- 
cessfully tested a long-range ground-launched 
cruise missile allegedly in response to the 
U.S. deployment of such weapons. 

August 24 30 

A third round of indirect talks between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan are held in Geneva 
in an attempt to arrive at a political settle- 
ment for Afghanistan. Issues discussed in- 
clude a timetable for Soviet withdrawal, 
pledges of noninterference and noninterven- 
tion, international guarantees of an agree- 
ment, and a mechanism for consulting the 
refugees on the condition of their return. UN 
envoy Diego Cordovez mediates the discus- 

August 27 

State Department spokesman Hughes says 
the Soviet Union's testing of a long-range 
ground-launched missile "comes as no sur- 
prise." He adds that the Soviet's cruise 
missile program had been active long before 
U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise 
missile deployments began. 

U.S. and China sign an agreement under 
which the Department of the Interior will 
help China design the world's largest hydro- 
electric dam. 

The Department of State rejects as 
"totally false" recent allegations by Radio 
Moscow that Korean Air Lines Flight 007 
was blown up by a U.S. bomb to prevent evi- 
dence that it was a spy plane from falling in- 
to Soviet hands. The plane was shot down by 
a Soviet military aircraft on September 1, 

The U.S. Immigration Service reports 
that an estimated 7,000 Nicaraguans, be- 
tween the ages of 15 and 22. are in Miami, 
Florida, to escape their homeland's com- 
pulsory military draft. 

August 28 

South Africa holds its second round of elec- 
tions to choose representatives for the 
40-seat Indian house of the new Parliament. 



August 29 

A U.S. Court of Appeals overturned Presi- 
dent Reagan's "pocket" veto of a military aid 
bill that required him to certify improve- 
ments in El Salvador's human rights situa- 
tion. The bill was vetoed while Congress was 
in its Thanksgiving holiday recess last year. 
The following newly appointed ambassa- 
dors present their credentials to President 
Reagan: Falilou Kane (Republic of Senegal), 
Guenther van Well (Federal Republic of Ger- 
many), Joseph Edsel Edmunds (Saint Lucia), 
Donald Aloysius McLeod (Republic of 
Suriname), Ignatius Chukuemeka Olisemeka 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria), and Maati 
Jorio (Kingdom of Morocco). 

August 30 

President Reagan establishes a new Commis- 
sion on Agricultural Trade and Export 

U.S. Trade Representative Brock says 
the Soviet Union has contracted to purchase 
7.9 million tons of grain— 1.3 million tons of 
wheat and 6.6 million tons of corn— in the 
1984-85 agreement year of the current 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. long-term grain agreement. 

Greece protests the U.S. military's re- 
fusal to reinstate 16 striking workers at the 
Hellenikon air base in Athens, despite an 
understanding that no striking workers would 
be dismissed. 

August 31 

U.S. restricts Libya's UN diplomats from 
traveling outside New York City without 
special permission. 

South Africa lifts ban on The Windhoek 
Observer, a weekly newspaper known for its 
reports against the government's policies on 
Namibia. ■ 

Department of State 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

175 8/2 Statement on the 9th anni- 
versary of the Helsinki 
Final Act. 

•176 8/3 Diana Lady Dougan con- 
firmed rank of Ambassador 
(biographic data). 

*177 8/7 Signature of seabed mining 
agreement, Aug. 3. 

•178 8/7 Committee of the U.S. Or- 
ganization for the Interna- 
tional Telegraph and Tele- 
phone Consultative Com- 
mittee meeting, Sept. 6. 

*179 8/9 Leonardo Neher .sworn in as 
Ambassador to Burkina 
Faso, July 17 (biographic 

•180 8/14 Samuel F. Hart, Ambassa- 
dor to the Republic of 
Ecuador, Dec. 14, 1982 
(biographic data). 

'181 8/13 Everett E. Briggs, Ambassa- 
dor to the Republic of 
Panama, Oct. 6, 1982 (bio- 
graphic data). 

•182 8/13 Lewis A. Tambs, Ambassa- 
dor to the Republic of 
Colombia, Mar. 24, 1983 
(biographic data). 

♦183 8/14 Malcolm R. Barnebey, Am- 
bassador to Belize, May 25, 
1983 (biographic data)." 

•184 8/14 Curtin Winsor, Jr., Ambassa- 
dor to the Republic of 
Costa Rica, June 9, 1983 
(biographic data). 

•185 8/17 Paul F. Gardner sworn in as 
Ambassador to Papua New 
Guinea and Solomon 
Islands (biographic data). 

•186 8/17 Alan W. Lukens sworn in as 
Ambassador to the People's 
Republic of the Congo, 
Aug. 14 (biographic data). 

*187 8/20 David C. Jordan, Ambassa- 
dor to the Republic of 
Peru, Mar. 8, 1984 (bio- 
graphic data). 

*188 8/20 Richard W. Boehm sworn in 
as Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Cyprus, Aug. 15 
(biographic data). 

*189 8/20 Diego C. Asencio, Ambassa- 
dor to the Federative Re- 
public of Brazil, Nov. 22, 
1983 (biographic data). 

•190 8/20 Frank V. Ortiz, Jr., Ambas- 
sador to the Argentine Re- 
public, Nov. 21, 1983 (bio- 
graphic data). 

•191 8/20 Shultz: address before the 

Veterans of Foreign Wars, 

•192 8/23 Shultz: interview by Daniel 
Schorr of "Cable News 
Network," Aug. 22. 

•193 8/28 Clayton E. McManaway, Jr., 
Ambassador to the Repub- 
lic of Haiti, Dec. 6, 1983 
(biographic data). 

•Not printed in the Bulletin, ■ 

Department of State 

Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Free multiple copies may be obtained by 
writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and 
Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Secretary Shultz 

Power and Diplomacy, Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, Chicago, Aug. 20, 1984 (Current 
Policy #606). 


U.S. Response to Africa's Food Needs (C 
Aug. 1984). 

East Asia 

U.S.-China Agricultural Relations (GIST, 
Aug. 1984). I 


World Economic Prospects, Under SecJ 
Wallis, American Chamber of Coma 
Santiago, July 27, 1984 (Current P| 


U.S. Policy: The Baltic Republics (GIS'^ 

Aug. 1984). 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges (GIST, Aug. 


Europe v. Asia: Is Diplomacy a Zero-Si 
Game?, Deputy Secretary Dam, Amj 
Bar Association, Chicago, Aug. 6, ij 
(Current Policy #603). I 

Middle East 

U.S. -Egyptian Relations (GIST, Aug. 19 

Nuclear Policy 

Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and Mut 
Obligations, Ambassador Kennedy, 
Center for Strategic and Internatioi 
Studies, Georgetown University, Jui 
1984 (Current Policy #607). 



U.S. Commitment to International Popi 
Planning, Ambassador Buckley, Int isii 
tional Conference on Population, Mi 
City, Aug. 8, 1984 (Current Policy i 

Food and Population Planning Assistan 
AID Administrator McPherson, Ho 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Aug. 2 
(Current Policy #602). 

South Asia 

Afghanistan (GIST, Aug. 1984). 
Indian Ocean Region (GIST, Aug. 1984 


International Terrorism: A Long Twili; 
Struggle, Ambassador Sayre. Fore 
Policy Association, New York, Aug 
1984 (Current Policy #608). 

Western Hemisphere 

Grenada Occasional Paper No. 1: Maui 
Bishop's "Line of March" Speech, i 
ber 13, 1982; Department of State 

Cuba as a Model and a Challenge, Cub 
Affairs Director Skoug, Americas 
ty. New York, July 25, 1984 (Curr 
Policy #600). 

Review of Nicaragua's Commitments t 
OAS, Ambassador Middendorf, OA 
manent Council, July 18, 1984 (Cu 
Policy #601). ■ 


;1)ber 1984 

lime 84, No. 2091 


Attacks on Pakistan (Department 

ment) 47 

Stan 47 

n Principles. Diplomacy and Strength 

iltz) 18 

antrol. Security for Europe (Goodby)21 
iternational Terrorism: A Long Twi- 

t Struggle (Sayre) 48 

Energy. Nuclear Trade: Reliable 
iply and Mutual Obligations 

inedy) 40 

a. U.S. -Bulgaria Relations (Burt) ... 28 
is. Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply 

Mutual Obligations (Kennedy) 40 

Continuation of MFN Status for China 

)wn) 27 

nications. Competitive Challenges of 

)al Telecommunications (Schneider). 43 


itive Challenges of Global Telecom- 

lications (Schneider) 43 

ation of MFN Status for China 

)wn) 27 

, Developments in the Middle East 

rphy) 37 

ind Population Planning Assistance 

Pherson) 31 

ctivities on POW-MIA Issue (Wolfo- 
.) 25 

igaria Relations (Burt) 28 

4 ilica. Democracy in Latin America and 
Caribbean (Motley) 1 

1 ment and Foreign Service. Interna- 

i lal Narcotics Control 39 


acy and Strength (Shultz) 18 

Asia; Is Diplomacy a Zero-Sum 
^ .'(Dam) 33 

■Miv in Latin America and the Carib- 

' M (Motley) 1 

\, Asia: Is Diplomacy a Zero-Sum 

;iif:'(Dam) 33 

a ador. Democracy in Latin America and 
Caribbean (Motley) 1 

Energy. Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and 
Mutual Obligations (Kennedy) 40 


Diplomacy and Strength (Shultz) 18 

Europe v. Asia: Is Diplomacy a Zero-Sum 
(;ame?(Dam) " 33 

International Terrorism: A Long Twilight 
Struggle (Sayre) 48 

Ninth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final 
Act 36 

Security for Europe (Goodby) 21 

Food. Food and Population Planning Assist- 
ance (McPherson) 31 

Foreign Assistance. Food and Population 
Planning Assistance (McPherson) 31 

Health. Food and Population Planning Assist- 
ance (McPherson) 31 

Human Rights 

Democracy in Latin America and the Carib- 
bean (Motley) 1 

Ninth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final 
Act ■ 36 

Intelligence Operations. International Ter- 
rorism: A Long Twilight Struggle 
(Sayre) 48 

International Law. International Terrorism: 
A Long Twilight Struggle (Sayre) 48 

Kampuchea. U.S. Activities on POW-MIA 
Issue (Wolfowitz) 2.5 

Laos. U.S. Activities on POW-MIA Issue 
(Wolfowitz) 25 

Middle East 

Current Developments in the Middle East 
(Murphy) 37 

International Terrorism: A Long Twilight 
Struggle (Sayre) 48 


Democracy in Latin America and the Carib- 
bean (Motley) 1 

International Narcotics Control 39 

Nicaragua. Democracy in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Motley) 1 

Nuclear Policy. Nuclear Trade: Reliable 
Supply and Mutual Obligations 
(Kennedy) 40 

Pakistan. Afghan Attacks on Pakistan (De- 
partment statement) 47 


40th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising 
(Reagan) 16 

Polish Government's Release of Political 
Prisoners (White House statement) .... 30 

Population. Food and Population Planning 
Assistance (McPherson) 31 

Presidential Documents. 4Uth Anniversary 
of the Warsaw Uprising (Reagan) 16 


Department of State 54 

Science and Technology 

Competitive Challenges of Global Telecom- 
munications (Schneider) 43 

Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and Mutual 
Obligations (Kennedy) 40 

Security Assistance. Democracy in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Motley) ... 1 

Space. Competitive Challenges of Global 
Telecommunications (Schneider) 43 

Terrorism. International Terrorism: A Long 
Twilight Struggle (Sayre) 48 


Continuation of MFN Status for China 
(Brown) 27 

Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and Mutual 
Obligations (Kennedy) 40 

Treaties. Current Actions 50 

U.S.S.R. Security for Europe (Goodby) 21 

United Nations. International Terrorism: A 
Long Twilight Struggle (Sayre) 48 

Vietnam. U.S. Activities on P"OW-MIA Issue 
(Wolfowitz) 25 

Western Hemisphere 

Democracy in Latin America and the Carib- 
bean (Motley) 1 

Diplomacy and Strength (Shultz) 18 

International Terrorism: A Long Twilight 
Struggle (Sayre) 48 

Name Index 

Brown, William A 27 

Burt, Richard R 28 

Dam, Kenneth W 33 

Goodby, James E 21 

Kennedy, Richard T 40 

McPherson, M. Peter 31 

Motley, Langhorne A 1 

Murphy, Richard W 37 

Reagan, President 16 

Sayre, Robert M 48 

Schneider, William Jr 43 

Shultz, Secretary 18 

Wolfowitz, Paul D 25 

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U.S. Government Printing Office 
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Washington, D.C. 20402. 




' Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2092 

November 1984 

UN General Assembly/1 
Caribbean Basin Atlas/71 

Dppartmeni of St ait* 


Volume 84 / Number 2092 / November 1984 


The Inited Nations flag- a symbol of 
peace, progress, and justice. 

(United Nations photo by T. Chen) 

The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreig^n policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 

The Bulletin'.s contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 



Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public Affair: 



Office of Public Communication 


Chief, Editorial Division 




Assistant Editor 




The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of thi.s periodical is neces.sary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
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Reducing World Tensions (President Reagan) 
The United Nations 

The President 

26 Promoting Global Economic 


The Secretary 

29 The Campaign Against Drugs: 
The International Dimension 

34 Proposed Refugee Admissions for 
FY 1985 

39 Interview on "Meet the Press" 

42 Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 


44 U.S. Response to Africa's Food 


Arms Control 

45 Arms Control: Where Do We 

Stand Now? (Kenneth L. 

48 CDE Talks Resume in Stockholm 

(President Reagan) 

49 Status of Arms Control Talks 

(President Reagan) 
49 Review Conference Held on En- 
vironmental Modification Con- 
vention (Final Declaration) 

East Asia 

51 Cambodia: The Search for Peace 

(Paul D. Wolfowitz) 
54 Recent Developments in the 

Philippines (Paul D. Wolfowitz) 
56 U.K. and China Reach Agreement 

on Hong Kong (Secretary 


Human Rights 




President Meets With Foreign 
Minister Gromyko (President 
Reagan, Secretary Shultz) 

Anniversary of the KAL #007 
Incident (Richard R. Burt, 
Department Statement) 



Human Rights Practices in Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda 
(Elliott Abrams) 

U.S. Urges Ratification of Geno- 
cide Convention (Elliott 
Abrams. Department StateTnent) 

Middle East 



U.S. Embassy Bombed in Beirut 
(Department Statement) 

U.S. Imposes Additional Export 
Controls on Iran (Departrnent 

Military Affairs 

69 NATO Conventional Defense 

Capabilities (Letter to the 

70 Tactical Nuclear Posture of NATO 

(Letter to the Congress) 

Western Hemisphere 

71 Atlas of the Caribbean Basin 

(Harry F. Young) 


86 Current Actions 


88 September 1984 

Press Releases 

90 Department of State 

90 USUN 


91 Department of State 
91 Background Notes 

91 GPO Subscriptions 

92 Foreign Relations Volume 



President Reagan addresses the 39th session of the UN General Assembly. 




UN General Assembly 

World Tensions 

by President Reagan 

Address before the 39th session 

of the UN General Assembly 

in New York on September 2U, 19Sh^ 

First of all, I wish to congratulate Presi- 
dent Lusaka [Paul Lasaka of Zambia] on 
his election as President of the General 
Assembly. I wish you every success, Mr. 
President, in carrying out the respon- 
sibilities of this high international office. 

It is an honor to be here, and I 
thank you for your gracious invitation. I 
would speak in support of the two great 
goals that led to the formation of this 
organization — the cause of peace and 
the cause of human dignity. 

The responsibility of this Assem- 
bly — the peaceful resolution of disputes 
between peoples and nations — can be 
discharged successfully only if we 
recognize the great common ground 
upon which we all stand: our fellowship 
as members of the human race, our 
oneness as inhabitants of this planet, our 
place as representatives of billions of our 
countrymen whose fondest hope remains 
the end to war and to the repression of 
the human spirit. These are the impor- 
tant, central realities that bind us, that 
permit us to dream of a future without 
the antagonisms of the past. And just as 
shadows can be seen only where there is 
light, so, too, can we overcome what is 
wrong only if we remember how much is 
right; and we will resolve what divides 
us only if we remember how much more 
unites us. 

This chamber has heard enough 
about the problems and dangers ahead; 
today, let us dare to speak of a future 
that is bright and hopeful and can be 

ours only if we seek it. I believe that 
future is far nearer than most of us 
would dare to hope. 

At the start of this decade, one 
scholar at the Hudson Institute noted 
that mankind also had undergone enor- 
mous changes for the better in the past 
two centuries, changes which aren't 
always readily noticed or written about. 

"Up until 200 years ago, there were 
relatively few people in the world," he 
wrote. "All human societies were poor. 
Disease and early death dominated most 
people's lives. People were ignorant and 
largely at the mercy of the forces of 

"Now," he said, "we are somewhere 
near the middle of a process of economic 
development ... at the end of that proc- 
ess, almost no one will live in a country 
as poor as the richest country of the 
past. There will be many more people 
living long healthy lives with immense 
knowledge and more to learn than 
anybody has time for. It will be able to 
cope with the forces of nature and 
almost indifferent to distance." 

We do live today, as the scholar sug- 
gested, in the middle of one of the most 
important and dramatic periods in 
human history — one in which all of us 
can serve as catalysts for an era of 
world peace and unimagined human 
freedom and dignity. 

And today, I would like to report to 
you, as distinguished and influential 

The starting point and cornerstone of our foreign 
policy is our alliance and partnership with our 
fellow democracies. 

members of the world community, on 
what the United States has been at- 
tempting to do to help move the world 
closer to this era. On many fronts enor- 
mous progress has been made, and I 
think our efforts are complemented by 
the trend of history. 

If we look closely enough, I believe 
we can see all the world moving toward 
a deeper appreciation of the value of 
human freedom in both its political and 
economic manifestations. This is partial- 
ly motivated by a worldwide desire for 
economic growth and higher standards 
of living. And there's an increasing 
realization that economic freedom is a 
prelude to economic progress and 
growth — and is intricately and in- 
separably linked to political freedom. 

Everywhere, people and govern- 
ments are beginning to recognize that 
the secret of a progressive new world is 
to take advantage of the creativity of 
the human spirit; to encourage innova- 
tion and individual enterprise; to reward 
hard work; and to reduce barriers to the 
free flow of trade and information. 

Our opposition to economic restric- 
tions and trade barriers is consistent 
with our view of economic freedom and 
human progress. We believe such bar- 
riers pose a particularly dangerous 
threat to the developing nations and 
their chance to share in world prosperity 
through expanded export markets. 
Tomorrow at the International Monetary 
Fund, I will address this question more 
fully, including America's desire for 
more open trading markets throughout 
the world. 

This desire to cut down trade bar- 
riers and our open advocacy of freedom 
as the engine of human progress are 
two of the most important ways the 
United States and the American people 
hope to assist in bringing about a world 
where prosperity is commonplace, con- 
flict an aberration, and human dignity 
and freedom a way of life. 

Let me place these steps more in 
context by briefly outlining the major 
goals of American foreign policy and 
then exploring with you the practical 
ways we're attempting to further 
freedom and prevent war. By that I 
mean, first, how we have moved to 
strengthen ties with old allies and new 
friends; second, what we are doing to 
help avoid the regional conflicts that 
could contain the seeds of world con- 
flagration; and third, the status of our 
efforts with the Soviet Union to reduce 
the levels of arms. 

U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives 

Let me begin with a word about the ob- 
jectives of American foreign policy, 
which have been consistent since the 
postwar era and which fueled the forma- 
tion of the United Nations and were in- 
corporated into the UN Charter itself. 

The UN Charter states two over- 
riding goals: "to save succeeding gens 
tions from the scourge of war, whichi 
twice in our lifetime has brought untf 
sorrow to mankind," and "to reaffirin 
faith in fundamental human rights, ir 
the dignity and worth of the human ] 
son, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and smai 

The founders of the United Natio 
understood full well the relationship I 
tween these two goals, and I want yo 
to know that the Government of the 
United States will continue to view tl 
concern for human rights as the mon 
center of our foreign policy. We can 
never look at anyone's freedom as a 
bargaining chip in world politics. Our 
hope is for a time when all the peopl( 
the world can enjoy the blessings of) 
sonal liberty. 

But I would like also to emphasiz 
that our concern for protecting huma 
rights is part of our concern for prot 
ing the peace. The answer is for all r 
tions to fulfill the obligations they frf 
assumed under the Universal Declan 
tion of Human Rights. It states: "Th( 
will of the people shall be the basis o 
the authority of government; this wil 

President Reagan and Secretary General Perez de C'uellar. 

. J 


UN General Assembly 

expressed in periodic and gen- 
sctions." The declaration also in- 
these rights: "to form and to join 
inions"; "to own property alone as 
in association with others"; "to 
ny country, including his own, 
return to his country"; and to en- 
jedom of opinion and expression." 
)S the most graphic example of 
ationship between human rights 
ace is the right of peace groups to 
t nd to promote their views. In 
. le treatment of peace groups may 
mus test of government's true 
for peace. 

fthening Alliances 

ition to emphasizing this tie be- 
the advocacy of human rights and 
jvention of war, the United States 
ien important steps, as I men- 
earlier, to prevent world conflict, 
arting point and cornerstone of 
■eign policy is our alliance and 
irship with our fellow democracies, 
years, the North Atlantic alliance 
laranteed the peace in Europe. In 
lurope and Asia, our alliances 
leen the vehicle for a great recon- 
tn among nations that had fought 
■wars in decades and centuries 
i^nd here in the Western 
phere, north and south are being 
jn the tide of freedom and are 
in a common effort to foster 
'ul economic development, 
e're proud of our association with 
se countries that share our com- 
nt to freedom, human rights, the 
f law — and international peace. In- 
tthe bulwark of security that the 
ratic alliance provides is essen- 
and remains essential — to the 
anance of world peace. Every 
;e involves burdens and obliga- 
but these are far less than the 
and sacrifices that would result if 
ace-loving nations were divided 
eglectful of their common security, 
eople of the United States will re- 
faithful to their commitments, 
ut the United States is also faithful 
alliances and friendships with 
of nations in the developed and 

. . . the United States is also faithful to its 
alliances and friendships with scores of nations in 
the developed and developing worlds. . . . 

developing worlds with differing political 
systems, cultures, and traditions. The 
development of ties between the United 
States and China — a significant global 
event of the last dozen years — shows 
our willingness to improve relations with 
countries ideologically very different 
from ours. 

We're ready to be the friend of any 
country that is a friend to us and a 
friend of peace. And we respect genuine 
nonalignment. Our own nation was born 
in revolution; we helped promote the 
process of decolonization that brought 
about the independence of so many 
members of this body, and we're proud 
of that history. 

We're proud, too, of our role in the 
formation of the United Nations and our 
support of this body over the years. And 
let me again emphasize our unwavering 
commitment to a central principle of the 
UN system, the principle of universality, 
both here and in the UN technical agen- 
cies around the world. If universality is 
ignored, if nations are expelled illegally, 
then the United Nations itself cannot be 
expected to succeed. 

The United States welcomes diversi- 
ty and peaceful competition; we do not 
fear the trends of history. We are not 
ideologically rigid; we do have principles 
and we will stand by them, but we will 
also seek the friendship and good will of 
all, both old friends and new. 

We've always sought to lend a hand 
to help others — from our relief efforts in 
Europe after World War I to the Mar- 
shall Plan and massive foreign 
assistance programs after World War II. 
Since 1946, the United States has pro- 
vided over $115 billion in economic aid 
to developing countries and today pro- 
vides about one-third of the nearly $90 
billion in financial resources, public and 
private, that flow to the developing 
world. And the United States imports 
about one-third of the manufactured ex- 
ports of the developing world. 

Negotiations To Resolve 
Regional Conflicts 

But any economic progress, as well as 
any movement in the direction of 
greater understanding between the na- 
tions of the world, are, of course, en- 
dangered by the prospect of conflict at 
both the global and regional levels. In a 
few minutes, I will turn to the menace 
of conflict on a worldwide scale and 
discuss the status of negotiations be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union. But permit me first to address 
the critical problem of regional con- 
flicts — for history displays tragic 
evidence that it is these conflicts which 
can set off the sparks leading to 
worldwide conflagration. 

In a glass display case across the 
hall from the Oval Office at the White 
House, there is a gold medal — the 
Nobel Peace Prize won by Theodore 
Roosevelt for his contribution in 
mediating the Russo-Japanese War in 
1905. It was the first such prize won by 
an American, and it is part of a tradition 
of which the American people are very 
proud — a tradition that is being con- 
tinued today in many regions of the 

We're engaged, for example, in 
diplomacy to resolve conflicts in 
southern Africa, working with the front- 
line states and our partners in the con- 
tact group. Mozambique and South 
Africa have reached a historic accord on 
nonaggression and cooperation; South 
Africa and Angola have agreed on a 
disengagement of forces from Angola, 
and the groundwork has been laid for 
the independence of Namibia, with vir- 
tually all aspects of Security Council 
Resolution 435 agreed upon. 

Let me add that the United States 
considers it a moral imperative that 
South Africa's racial policies evolve 
peacefully but decisively toward a 
system compatible with basic norms of 
justice, liberty, and human dignity. I'm 

We recognize that there is no sane alternative 
to negotiations on arms control. . . . 

pleased that American companies in 
South Africa, by providing equal 
employment opportunities, are con- 
tributing to the economic advancement 
of the black population. But clearly, 
much more must be done. 

In Central America, the United 
States has lent support to a diplomatic 
process to restore regional peace and 
security. We have committed substantial 
resources to promote economic develop- 
ment and social progress. 

The growing success of democracy 
in El Salvador is the best proof that the 
key to peace lies in a political solution. 
Free elections brought into office a 
government dedicated to democracy, 
reform, economic progress, and regional 
peace. Regrettably, there are forces in 
the region eager to thwart democratic 
change, but these forces are now on the 
defensive. The tide is turning in the 
direction of freedom. We call upon 
Nicaragua, in particular, to abandon its 
policies of subversion and militarism and 
to carry out the promises it made to the 
Organization of American States to 
establish democracy at home. 

The Middle East has known more 
than its share of tragedy and conflict for 
decades, and the United States has been 
actively involved in peace diplomacy for 
just as long. We consider ourselves a full 
partner in the quest for peace. The 
record of the 1 1 years since the October 
war shows that much can be achieved 
through negotiations. It also shows that 
the road is long and hard. 

• Two years ago, I proposed a fresh 
start toward a negotiated solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. My initiative of 
September 1, 1982, contains a set of 
positions that can serve as a basis for a 
just and lasting peace. That initiative re- 
mains a realistic and workable approach, 
and I am commited to it as firmly as on 
the day I announced it. And the founda- 
tion stone of this effort remains Security 
Council Resolution 242, which in turn 
was incorporated in all its parts in the 
Camp David accords. 

• The tragedy of Lebanon has not 
ended. Only last week, a despicable act 
of barbarism by some who are unfit to 
associate with humankind reminded us 
once again that Lebanon continues to 
suffer. In 1983, we helped Lebanon and 
Israel reach an agreement that, if im- 
plemented, could have led to the full 
withdrawal of Israeli forces in the con- 
text of the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces. This agreement was blocked, and 
the long agony of the Lebanese con- 
tinues. Thousands of people are still 
kept from their homes by continued 
violence and are refugees in their own 
country. The once flourishing economy 
of Lebanon is near collapse. All of 
Lebanon's friends should work together 
to help end this nightmare. 

• In the gulf, the United States has 
supported a series of Security Council 
resolutions that call for an end to the 
war between Iran and Iraq that has 
meant so much death and destruction 
and put the world's economic well-being 
at risk. Our hope is that hostilities will 
soon end, leaving each side with its 
political and territorial integrity intact, 
so that both may devote their energies 
to addressing the needs of their people 
and a return to relationships with other 

• The lesson of experience is that 
negotiation works. The peace treaty be- 
tween Israel and Egypt brought about 
the peaceful return of the Sinai, clearly 
showing that the negotiating process 
brings results when the parties commit 
themselves to it. The time is bound to 
come when the same wisdom and 
courage will be applied, with success, to 
reach peace between Israel and all of its 
Arab neighbors in a manner that assures 
security for all in the region, the 
recognition of Israel, and a solution to 
the Palestinian problem. 

In every part of the world, the 
United States is similarly engaged in 
peace diplomacy as an active player or a 
strong supporter. 

• In Southeast Asia, we have 
backed the efforts of ASEAN [Assoi 
tion of South East Asian Nations] to 
mobilize international support for a 
peaceful resolution of the Cambodiai 
problem, which must include the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces am 
the election of a representative gove 
ment. ASEAN's success in promotin 
economic and political development 1 
made a major contribution to the pe; 
and stability of the region. 

• In Afghanistan, the dedicated 
forts of the Secretary General and h 
representatives to find a diplomatic 
tlement have our strong support. I 
assure you that the United States w 
continue to do everything possible U 
find a negotiated outcome which pre 
vides the Afghan people with the rif 
to determine their own destiny; alio' 
the Afghan refugees to return to tb 
own country in dignity; and protects 
legitimate security interests of all 
neighboring countries. 

• On the divided and tense Kon 
Peninsula, we have strongly backed 
confidence-building measures propoi 
by the Republic of Korea and by the 
Command at Panmunjon. These are 

U.S. Delegation 

to the 39th 

UN General Assembly 


Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

Jose S. Sorzano 

Robert D. Ray 

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., U.S. Senate) 

the State of Maryland 
John H. Glenn, Jr., U.S. Senator from 
the State of Ohio 

Alternate Representatives 

Richard Schifter 
Alan Lee Keyes 
Harvey J. Feldman 
Preston H. Long 
Guadalupe Quintanilla 

USUN press release 75 of Sept. 27, 198 



UN General Assembly 

mt first step toward peaceful 

ation in the long term. 

Ve take heart from progress by 

in lessening tensions, notably the 

by the Federal Republic to 

barriers between the two Ger- 


^d the United States strongly 

bs the Secretary General's efforts 

;t the Cypriot parties in achieving 

iful and reunited Cyprus. 

I United States has been, and 
will be, a friend of peaceful 

.S.S.R. Relations 

no less true with respect to my 
^'s relations with the Soviet 
When I appeared before you last 
noted that we cannot count on 
tinct for survival alone to protect 
.nst war. Deterrence is necessary 
; sufficient. America has repaired 
ngth; we have invigorated our 
3S and friendships. We're ready 
structive negotiations with the 

i recognize that there is no sane 
.tive to negotiations on arms con- 
d other issues between our two 
;, which have the capacity to 
! civilization as we know it. I 
this is a view shared by \nrtually 
country in the world, and by the 

! Union itself. 
d I want to speak to you today on 
the United States and the Soviet 
( can accomplish together in the 
; \ I'ars and the concrete steps we 
I ) lake. 

\ u know, as I stand here and look 

pim this podium— there in front of 

- can see the seat of the represen- 

froni the Soviet Union. And not 

' m that seat, just over to the side, 

seat of the representative from 

lited States. 

this historic assembly hall, it's 
here is not a great distance be- 
us. Outside this room, while there 
ill be clear differences, there is 
reason why we should do all that 
;ible to shorten that distance. And 
why we're here. Isn't that what 
•ganization is all about? 

. . . any agreement must logically depend upon our 
ability to get the competition on offensive arms 
under control and to achieve genuine stability at 
substantially lower levels of nuclear arms. 

Last January 16, I set out three ob- 
jectives for U.S. -Soviet relations that 
can provide an agenda for our work 
over the months ahead. First, I said, we 
need to find ways to reduce— and even- 
tually to eliminate— the threat and use 
of force in solving international disputes. 
Our concern over the potential for 
nuclear war cannot deflect us from the 
terrible human tragedies occurring every 
day in the regional conflicts I just 
discussed. Together, we have a par- 
ticular responsibility to contribute to 
political solutions to these problems, 
rather than to exacerbate them through 
the provision of even more weapons. 

I propose that our two countries 
agree to embark on periodic consulta- 
tions at policy level about regional prob- 
lems. We will be prepared, if the Soviets 
agree, to make senior experts available 
at regular intervals for in-depth ex- 
changes of views. I have asked 
Secretary Shultz to explore this with 
Foreign Minister Gromyko. Spheres of 
influence are a thing of the past. Dif- 
ferences between American and Soxdet 
interests are not. The objectives of this 
political dialogue will be to help avoid 
miscalculation, reduce the potential risk 
of U.S. -Soviet confrontation, and help 
the people in areas of conflict to find 
peaceful solutions. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union have achieved agreements of 
historic importance on some regional 
issues. The Austrian State Treaty and 
the Berlin accords are notable and 
lasting examples. Let us resolve to 
achieve similar agreements in the 

Our second task must be to find 
ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of ar- 
maments in the world. I am committed 
to redoubling our negotiating efforts to 
achieve real results: in Geneva, a com- 
plete ban on chemical weapons; in Vien- 
na, real reductions— to lower and equal 

levels — in Soviet and American, Warsaw 
Pact and NATO, conventional forces; in 
Stockholm, concrete practical measures 
to enhance mutual confidence, to reduce 
the risk of war, and to reaffirm com- 
mitments concerning non-use of force; in 
the field of nuclear testing, im- 
provements in verification essential to 
ensure compliance with the Threshold 
Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explo- 
sions agreements; and in the field of 
nonproliferation, close cooperation to 
strengthen the international institutions 
and practices aimed at halting the 
spread of nuclear weapons, together 
with redoubled efforts to meet the 
legitimate expectations of all nations 
that the Soviet Union and the United 
States will substantially reduce their 
own nuclear arsenals. We and the 
Soviets have agreed to upgrade our "hot 
line" communications facility, and our 
discussions of nuclear nonproliferation in 
recent years have been useful to both 
sides. We think there are other 
possibilities for improving communica- 
tions in this area that deserve serious 

I believe the proposal of the Soviet 
Union for opening U.S. -Soviet talks in 
Vienna provided an important oppor- 
tunity to advance these objectives. 
We've been prepared to discuss a wide 
range of issues and concerns of both 
sides, such as the relationship between 
defensive and offensive forces and what 
has been called the militarization of 
space. During the talks, we would con- 
sider what measures of restraint both 
sides might take while negotiations pro- 
ceed. However, any agreement must 
logically depend upon our ability to get 
the competition in offensive arms under 
control and to achieve genuine stability 
at substantially lower levels of nuclear 

Our approach in all these areas will 
be designed to take into account con- 
cerns the Soviet LInion has voiced. It 

. . . / will suggest to the Soviet Union that we in- 
stitutionalize regular ministerial or cabinet-level 
meetings between our two countries on the whole 
agenda of issues before us. ... I believe such talks 
could work rapidly toward developing a new 
climate of policy understanding. . . . 

will attempt to provide a basis for a 
historic breakthrough in arms control. 
I'm disappointed that we were not able 
to open our meeting in Vienna earlier 
this month, on the date originally pro- 
posed by the Soviet Union. I hope we 
can begin these talks by the end of the 
year or shortly thereafter. 

The third task I set in January was 
to establish a better working relation- 
ship between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, one marked by greater 
cooperation and understanding. 

We've made some modest progress. 
We have reached agreements to improve 
our "hot line," extend our 10-year 
economic agreement, enhance consular 
cooperation, and explore coordination of 
search and rescue efforts at sea. 

We've also offered to increase 
significantly the amount of U.S. grain 
for purchase by the Soviets and to pro- 
vide the Soviets a direct fishing alloca- 
tion off U.S. coasts. But there is much 
more we could do together. I feel par- 
ticularly strongly about breaking down 
the barriers between the peoples of the 
United States and the Soviet Union and 
among our political, military, and other 
leaders. All of these steps that I have 
mentioned, and especially the arms con- 
trol negotiations, are extremely impor- 
tant to a step-by-step process toward 
peace. But let me also say that we need 
to extend the arms control process, to 
build a bigger umbrella under which it 
can operate — a roadmap, if you will, 
showing where, during the next 20 years 
or so, these individual efforts can lead. 
This can greatly assist step-by-st«p 
negotiations and enable us to avoid 
having all our hopes or expectations ride 
on any single set or series of negotia- 
tions. If progress is temporarily halted 

at one set of talks, this newly estab- 
lished framework for arms control could 
help us take up the slack at other 

A New Beginning 

Today, to the great end of lifting the 
dread of nuclear war from the peoples 
of the earth, I invite the leaders of the 
world to join in a new beginning. We 
need a fresh approach to reducing inter- 
national tensions. History demonstrates 
beyond controversy that, just as the 
arms competition has its roots in 
political suspicions and anxieties, so it 
can be channeled in more stabilizing 
directions and eventually be eliminated, 
if those political suspicions and anxieties 
are addressed as well. 

Toward this end, I will suggest to 
the Soviet Union that we institutionalize 
regular ministerial or cabinet-level 
meetings between our two countries on 
the whole agenda of issues before us, in- 
cluding the problem of needless ob- 
stacles to understanding. To take but 
one idea for discussion: in such talks we 
could consider the exchange of outlines 
of 5-year military plans for weapons 
development and our schedules of in- 
tended procurement. We would also 
welcome the exchange of observers at 
military exercises and locations. And I 
propose that we find a way for Soviet 
experts to come to the U.S. nuclear test 
site, and for ours to go to theirs, to 
measure directly the yields of tests of 
nuclear weapons. We should work 
toward having such arrangements in 
place by next spring. 

I hope that the Soviet Union will 
cooperate in this undertaking and 
reciprocate in a manner that will enable 

the two countries to establish the b: ' 
for verification for effective limits i, ' 
underground nuclear testing. 

I believe such talks could work 
rapidly toward developing a new cli 
of policy understanding, one that is 
essential if crises are to be avoided 
real arms control is to be negotiate 
course, summit meetings have a usi 
role to play, but they need to be cai 
fully prepared, and the benefit here 
that meetings at the ministerial lev 
would provide the kind of progress 
is the best preparation for higher k 
talks between ourselves and the So 

How much progress we will ma 
and at what pace, I cannot say. Bu 
have a moral obligation to try and i 

Some may dismiss such proposa 
my own optimism as simplistic Am^ 
idealism. And they will point to the 
burdens of the modern world and t 
history. Well, yes, if we sit down ai 
catalogue, year by year, generation 
generation, the famines, the plague 
wars, the invasions mankind has er 
dured, the list will grow so long, ai 
assault on humanity so terrific, tha 
seems too much for the human spit 

But isn't this narrow and short 
sighted and not at all how we thin! 
history? Yes, the deeds of infamy c 
justice are all recorded, but what s 
out from the pages of history is thi 
ing of the dreamers and the deeds 
builders and the doers. 

These things make up the stori 
tell and pass on to our children. TY 
comprise the most enduring and st 
fact about human history: that thr( 
the heartbreak and tragedy man h; 
always dared to perceive the outlin 
human progress, the steady growtl 
not just the material well-being but 
spiritual insight of mankind. 

"There have been tyrants and 
murderers, and for a time they car 
invincible. But in the end, they alw 
fall. Think on it . . . always. All thi 
history, the way of truth and love 
always won." That was the belief a 

Deoartment of State Bi 

I n of Mahatma Gandhi. He 
that, and it remains today a 
at is good and true, 
is gift," is said to have been the 
expression of another great 
st, a Spanish soldier who gave 
ays of war for that of love and 
nd if we're to make realities of 
Igreat goals of the UN 

the dreams of peace and 
ignity— we must take to heart 
rds of Ignatius Loyola; we must 
[ng enough to contemplate the 
eived from him who made us: 
of life, the gift of this world, the 
ach other. 

the gift of the present. It is this 
this time, that now we must 
eave you with a reflection from 
a Gandhi, spoken with those in 
10 said that the disputes and 
of the modern world are too 
overcome. It was spoken short- 
Gandhi's quest for [Indian] in- 
nce took him to Britain. 
•n not conscious of a single ex- 
throughout my three months' 
England and Europe," he said, 
ide me feel that after all east is 

west is west. On the contrary, I 
an convinced more than ever 
nan nature is much the same no 
ander what clime it flourishes, 
I; if you approached people with 
Id affection, you would have ten- 
i3t and thousand-fold affection 
ji to you." 

I the sake of a peaceful world, a 
here human dignity and freedom 
)ected and enshrined, let us ap- 
3ach other with tenfold trust and 
dfold affection. A new future 
as. The time is here, the moment 

of the Founding Fathers of our 
Thomas Paine, spoke words that 
) all of us gathered here today, 
jply directly to all sitting here in 
m. He said: "We have it in our 
.0 begin the world over again. 

t from Weekly Compilation of 
itial Documents of Oct. 1, 1984. 



UN General Assembly 

The United Nations 


The immediate antecedent of the United 
Nations was the League of Nations, 
created under U.S. leadership (although 
the United States never became a 
member) following World War I. The 
League existed from 1919 until its 
reduced organization and functions were 
replaced by the United Nations in 1945. 

The roots of the United Nations 
organization go back more than 100 
years. Since the early 19th century, na- 
tional governments have discussed and 
acted on common issues and problems 
through intergovernmental parliamen- 
tary bodies. This process led to con- 
ferences such as The Hague conferences 
of 1899 and 1907, which pointed the way 
to developing legal and arbitrative alter- 
natives to war. 

The idea for the United Nations 
found expression in declarations signed 
at conferences in Moscow and Tehran in 
October and December 1943. In the 
summer of 1944, informal conversations 
were held by representatives of the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, a 
mansion in Washington, D.C. Later, 
discussions among the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and China resulted in 
proposals concerning the purposes and 
principles of an international organiza- 
tion, its membership and principal 
organs, arrangements to maintain inter- 
national peace and security, and ar- 
rangements for international economic 
and social cooperation. These proposals 
were discussed and debated by govern- 
ments and private citizens all over the 

On March 5, 1945, invitations to a 
conference to be held in San Francisco 
in April were issued by the United 
States on behalf of itself, the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China 
to 42 other governments that had signed 
the January 1, 1942 "Declaration by 
United Nations" and that had declared 
war on Germany or Japan no later than 
March 1, 1945. The conference added 

Argentina, Denmark, and the two Rus- 
sian republics of Byelorussia and the 
Ukraine, bringing the total to 50. 

The 50 nations represented at San 
Francisco signed the Charter of the 
United Nations on June 26, 1945. ^ 
Poland, which was not represented at 
the conference but for which a place 
among the original signatories had been 
reserved, added its name later, bringing 
the original signatories to a total of 51. 
The United Nations came into existence 
4 months later, on October 24, 1945, 
when the Charter had been ratified by 
the five permanent members of the 
Security Council— China, France, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States — and by a majority of 
the other signatories. 

Membership. UN membership is open to 
all "peace-loving states" that accept the 
obligations of the UN Charter and, in 
the judgment of the organization, are 
able and willing to fulfill these obliga- 
tions. As of October 1984, there were 
159 members. Admission to membership 
is determined by the General Assembly 
upon the recommendation of the Securi- 
ty Council. 

New York Headquarters. The head- 
quarters site in New York is owned by 
the United Nations and is international 
territory. Under special agreement with 
the United States, certain privileges and 
immunities have been granted, but 
generally the laws of New York City, 
New York State, and the United States 

The presence of the United Nations 
in New York indirectly contributes an 
estimated $692.2 million per year to the 
economy of New York, as estimated in 
1980 by the New York City Commission 
for the United Nations. It greatly offsets 
the estimated $15 million annual cost to 
the city. More than 4,000 Americans are 
employed in New York in UN-related 
jobs. The commission concluded that the 
United Nations is a "year-round conven- 
tion, aiding hotels, restaurants, taxi 

her 1Qft4 

drivers and a myriad of other local 

About 5,000 meetings are held in the 
headquarters each year. UN radio pro- 
grams are broadcast in some 24 
languages and reach all continents. Sales 
of UN postage stamps — usable only for 
letters and articles mailed at the head- 
quarters—total about $7.8 million an- 
nually. About 300 correspondents and 
110 photographers are permanently ac- 
credited to the United Nations, and an 
additional 750 hold temporary accredita- 
tion at any given time. The United Na- 

tions answers about 47,000 public re- 
quests for information each year. 
Estimates show that some 2.7 million 
visitors have taken guided tours of the 
headquarters since it opened. 

The Security Council 

Under the UN Charter, the Security 
Council has "primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace 
and security," and all UN members 
"agree to accept and carry out the deci- 

sions of the Security Council in ac 
ance with the present Charter." 

Other organs of the United N. 
make recommendations to membe 
governments. The Security Counc 
however, has the power to make i 
sions, which member government 
obligated to carry out under the 
Charter. A representative of each 
Security Council member must ab 
be present at UN headquarters sc 
the Council can meet at any time. 

Decisions in the Security Coui 
all substantive matters — for exan 

United Nations— A Profile 

Established: By charter signed in San Fran- 
cisco, Calif., on June 26, 1945: effective Oc- 
tober 24, 1945. 

Purposes: To maintain international 
peace and security; to develop friendly rela- 
tions among nations; to achieve international 
cooperation in solving economic, social, 
cultural, and humanitarian problems and in 
promoting respect for human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms; to be a center for har- 
monizing the actions of nations in attaining 
these common ends. 

Members: 159. 

Official languages: Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian, Spanish. 

Principal organs: General Assembly, 
Security Council, Economic and Social Coun- 
cil, Trusteeship Council, International Court 
of Justice, Secretariat. 

Budget: UN assessment budget (calendar 
year i9«5>— $685.3 million. US 
sfcare— $171.3 million. The total UN system 
budget (including the UN and specialized 
agencies and prog^rams, but not the World 

Bank) was about $4.5 billion in calendar year 
1981. The US share was $1 billion. 


Chief administrative officer: Secretary 
General of the United Nations, appointed to a 
5-year term by the General Assembly on the 
recommendation of the Security Council. 
Secretary General 1982-present: Javier Perez 
de Cuellar (Peru). 

Staff: A worldwide staff of 22,000 from 
some 150 countries, including more than 
2,900 US citizens. The staff is appointed by 
the Secretary General according to UN 

General Assembly 

Membership: All UN members. President: 
Elected at the beginning of each General 
Assembly session. 

Main committees: First — Political and 
Security; Special Political Committee. 
Second — Economic and Financial. Third — 
Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural. Fourth 
— Trusteeship. Fifth — Administrative and 
Budgetary. Sixth — Legal. Many other com- 
mittees address specific issues, including 
peacekeeping, crime prevention, status of 
women, and UN Charter reform. 

Security Council 

Membership: 5 permanent members (China, 
France, USSR, UK, US), each with the right 
to veto, and 10 nonpermanent members 

elected by the General Assembly for I 
terms. Five nonpermanent members ; 
elected from Africa and Asia; one fro 
Eastern Europe; two from Latin Amc 
and two from Western Europe and ol 
areas. Nonpermanent members are n 
ble for immediate reelection. The 198 
nonpermanent members are Egypt, I 
Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakis 
Peru, Ukrainian SSR, Upper Volta (r 
Burkina Faso), and Zimbabwe. Presic 
Rotates monthly in English alphabet! 
of members. 

Economic and Social Council 

Membership: 54; 18 elected each yea 
General Assembly for 3-year terms. I 
dent: Elected each year. 

Trusteeship Council 

Membership: US, China, France, US 
President: Elected each year. 

International Court of Justice 

Membership: 15, elected for 9year t 
the General Assembly and the Securi 
cil from nominees of national groups 
provisions of the International Court 
Justice Statute. 

Taken from the Background Notes of 
1984, published by the Bureau of Pul 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: J 
Adams. ■ 



UN General Assembly 

ailing for direct measures 
the settlement of a dis- 

uire the affirmative votes of 

bers, including the support of 
jrmanent members. A negative 
to — by a permanent member 
adoption of a proposal that has 
the required number of affirm- 

s. It was agreed early in UN 
lat abstention is not regarded 

A permanent member usually 
when it does not wish to vote in 
1 decision or to block it with a 

ugh July 1984, a total of 194 
.d been cast: 116 by the Soviet 

by China, 15 by France, 22 by 
;d Kingdom, and 38 by the 
tates. Of the 3 vetoes by China, 
ist by the People's Republic of 
,er being seated in 1971. Of the 

t vetoes, 87 (80%) were cast 
•58. All 38 of the U.S. vetoes 
n cast since 1969 — 32 since 

, and 15 since January 1981. 

on questions of procedure, 
ption of the agenda, require the 
ve votes of any nine members 
iiot subject to a veto, 
ite that is a member of the 
ations but not of the Security 
nay participate in Security 
liscussions in which the Council 
lat the country's interests are 
rly affected. In recent years, 
icil has interpreted this criterion 
jnabling many countries to take 
s discussions. Nonmembers are 

invited to take part, under con- 
lid down by the Council, when 
parties to disputes being con- 
)y the Council. 

Dugh the UN Charter gives the 
Council primary responsibility 
national peace and security, it 
nds that parties attempt to 
eement before taking recourse 
rocedures. The Charter enjoins 
rst to make every effort to set- 
disputes peacefully, either 
ly or through regional organiza- 

er Chapter VI of the Charter, 
Settlement of Disputes," the 
Council "may investigate any 
or any situation which might 

lead to international friction or give rise 
to a dispute." The Council may "recom- 
mend appropriate procedures or 
methods of adjustment" if it determines 
that the situation might endanger inter- 
national peace and security. 

Under Chapter VII, the Council has 
broader power to decide upon measures 
to be taken in situations involving 
"threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace, or acts of aggression." In such 
situations, the Council is not limited to 
recommendations but may take action, 
including the use of armed force, "to 
maintain or restore international peace 
and security." The 1977 application of an 
embargo on the sale of military equip- 
ment to South Africa was the first use 
of this power against a member nation. 

Under Article 43, the signatories 
undertook to make armed forces 
available to the Council "on its call and 
in accordance with a special agreement 
or agreements" between the Council and 
UN member states. Because of disagree- 
ments among the permanent members 
of the Council, however, efforts to im- 
plement such arrangements were 
dropped early in UN history. Never- 


theless, military forces have been made 
available to the United Nations by its 
members on an ad hoc basis when 
specifically authorized by the Security 
Council, e.g., in Cyprus, the Sinai, and 

The General Assembly 

The General Assembly is made up of all 
159 UN members. Each member may 
designate five representatives. Member 
countries are seated in English 
alphabetical order. Each year, seating 
begins at a different point in the 
alphabet, determined through a drawing. 

The Assembly meets in regular ses- 
sion once a year under a president 
elected from among the representatives. 
The regular session usually begins on 
the third Tuesday in September and 
ends in mid-December. Special sessions 
can be convened at the request of the 
Security Council, of a majority of UN 
members, or, if the majority concurs, of 
a single member. 

There have been 12 special sessions 
of the General Assembly. In 1978, the 
Assembly held its eighth special session 


UN Security Council 

■XQr 1QB/1 

(on financing of a new peacekeeping 
force in Lebanon) and its ninth (on 
Namibia). The 10th special session, in 
May and June 1978, constituted the 
largest intergovernmental conference on 
disarmament in history. A followup ses- 
sion on disarmament, the 12th special 
session, took place in June and July 
1982. A special session, the 11th, on 
North-South economic issues, occurred 2 
years earlier in August and September 

Voting in the General Assembly on 
important questions — recommendations 
on peace and security; election of 
members to organs; admission, suspen- 
sion, and expulsion of members; trustee- 
ship questions; budgetary matters — is by 

a two-thirds majority of those present 
and voting "yes" or "no." Abstentions 
are not counted. Other questions are 
decided by a simple majority vote. Each 
member country has one vote. 

Apart from approval of budgetary 
matters, including adoption of a scale of 
assessment. Assembly resolutions are 
only recommendatory and are not bind- 
ing on the members. The General 
Assembly may make recommendations 
on any questions or matters within the 
scope of the United Nations except mat- 
ters of peace and security under Securi- 
ty Council consideration. 

As the only organ of the United Na- 
tions in which all members are repre- 

sented, the Assembly has been tl 
forum in which members have la 
major initiatives on international 
tions of peace, economic progres 
human rights. It may initiate stu 
make recommendations to prom( 
ternational political cooperation; 
and codify international law; real 
human rights and fundamental fi 
doms; and further international ( 
nomic, social, cultural, education: 
health programs. 

The Assembly may take acti( 
Security Council is unable — usua 
to disagreement among the five ; 
nent members — to exercise its p 
responsibility for the maintenanc 
ternational peace in a case invoh 


principal organs 0( me UmieO Nali< 
^B Other United Nairons organs 

S'andinq aiO 
proceOural commiitees 

Omer suDSidiary organs 
ol Ihe General AssemOly 

United Nations Reltef and WorKs Agency 'or 
Palestine Refugees m me Near Easi UNRWA 

Unilea Nations Con'e'ence 
on Trade and Deveiopmpni UNCTAO 

United Nations Children s Fund UNICEF 

Ollice ol Ihe Uniled ^:2•'ons High Commissione' 
lor neiuge«'s UNHCR 

World Food Programme WFP 

United Nalions Insliluie 
lor Training and Research UNITAR 

United Nations Development Programme UNDP 

United Nations industrial 
Development 0'ganijaiior> UNIOO 

United Nations Enwironmenl P<oqramme UNEP 

united Nations University UNU 

United Nations Special Fund 

World Food Council 

United Nations C#nire for 

Human Seiilsmenii iHabnat) UNCMS 

United Nation! Fund (o« Population Activmei UNFPA 



UNDOF United Naiions Disengagement 
Otse'ver Force 

UNFICVP Untied Nanons Peacekeeping Force 
■ n Cyprus 

I UNIFIL United Natio 

UNMOGIP United Nations Miliiafy 

OBserver Group m India an3 Pakistan 

UNTSO United Nations Truce Superv 
Organtialion in Palestine 

ihlary Stall Comm 







Regional comr 
Functional cor 

Sessionat • 
ad hoc com 

d.nq and 


— o 








IAEA international Atomic Energy Agency 

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

ILO Internal onal Lal>our Organisation 

FAO Food and Agriculture Orga.-iiiation 
ol Ihe Uniied Nations 

UNESCO Uniied Nations Educational 

Scieniiiic and Cultural Organiiaiion 

WHO World Health Organisation 

IDA iniemationai Development Assoc >ai'on 

IBRD international Bank lo' Reconstruct>on 
and Developmenl 

IPC tnlernanonal Finance Corporation 

IMF Internationa' Monetary Fund 

ICAO InlernaliOiial Civil AvialiOn 

UPU Universal Postal Union 

ITU inietnational Telecommunication Union 

WMO World Meteorological Organualion 

IMO iniernationil Maritime Organiiaiion 

1*IP0 World intellectual Properly O'ganiiaiion 

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Oevelopment 



UN General Assembly 


°' threat to the peace, breach of 
' act of aggression. The 
for Peace" resolution, adopted 
■'^^ smpowers the Assembly, if not 
session, to convene an 
cy special session on 24-hour 
d to recommend collective 

including the use of armed 
;he case of a breach of the 
act of aggression. Two-thirds of 
bers must approve any such 
ndation. Emergency special ses- 
ler this procedure have been 
'' line occasions. The eighth 

cy special session, in September 
■Prisidered the situation in 

The situation in the occupied 
ritories, following Israel's 
I extension of its laws, jurisdic- 
administration to the Golan 
was the subject of the ninth 
cy session in January and 
y 1982. 

icent years, the Assembly has 
a forum for the North-South 
— the discussion of issues be- 
dustrialized nations and 
ng countries. In large part, this 
the phenomenal growth and 
l makeup of the UN membership 
fact that the Assembly is the 
body comprising all members, 
countries that achieved inde- 
e after the United Nations' crea- 
e caused a massive shift in the 
ly. In 1945, the United Nations 
nembers, most of them Western 
. Of its present 159 members, 
an two-thirds of them are 
ng countries. 

re are many differences in 
size, and outlook among the 
ing countries. Nevertheless, this 
oup (some 120 countries in the 
Assembly), known as "the Third 
the "nonaligned," and the 
of 77," usually votes and acts in 
Because of their numbers they, 
t, determine the agenda of the 
ly, the character of its debates, 
nature of its decisions. For 
eveloping countries, the United 
is particularly important. It is 
ective source of much of their 
itic influence and the basic outlet 
r foreign relations initiatives. In- 

creasingly, they seek inclusion in the 
councils of power, and the United Na- 
tions provides such a policy forum. 

The United Nations has devoted 
significant attention to the problems of 
the developing countries, in response to 
their growing political importance in 
multilateral arenas. The General 
Assembly has guided, and in many cases 
created, special programs to help 
developing nations acquire the skills, 
knowledge, and organization they need 
for more productive economies. 'These 
programs complement the work of the 
various specialized agencies in the UN 
system. 'Through its economic commit- 
tee, the Assembly remains concerned 
with the question of economic develop- 

The Economic and Social Council 

The Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) assists the General Assembly 
in promoting international economic and 
social cooperation. ECOSOC has 54 
members, 18 of which are selected each 
year by the General Assembly for a 
3-year term. A retiring member is eligi- 
ble for immediate reelection — the United 
States, France, the United Kingdom, 
and the Soviet Union have been 

members since the United Nations was 
founded. ECOSOC holds two major ses- 
sions each year: a spring meeting, usual- 
ly in New York, and a summer meeting, 
usually in Geneva. The president is 
elected for a 1-year term. Voting is by 
simple majority. 

ECOSOC undertakes studies and 
makes recommendations on develop- 
ment, world trade, industrialization, 
natural resources, human rights, the 
status of women, population, narcotics, 
social welfare, science and technology, 
crime prevention, and other issues. 

A number of standing committees 
and functional commissions assist 
ECOSOC. It also has regional economic 
commissions that seek to strengthen 
economic development of countries 
within their regions. These are: 

• The Economic Commission for 
Africa (EGA), Addis Ababa; 

• The Economic and Social Commis- 
sion for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 

• The Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE), Geneva; 

• The Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA), Santiago; and 

• The Economic Commission for 
Western Asia (ECWA), Baghdad. 

U.S. Representatives 

to the United Nations* 

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. 

March 1946-June 1946 

Hershel V. Johnson (acting) 

June 1946-January 1947 

Warren R. Austin 

January 1947-January 1953 

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. 

January 1953-September 1960 

James J. Wadsworth 

September 1960-January 1961 

Adlai E. Stevenson 

January 1961-July 1965 

Arthur J. Goldberg 

July 1965-June 1968 

George W. Ball 

June 1968-September 1968 

James Russell Wiggins 

October 1968-January 1969 

Charles W. Yost 

January 1969-February 1971 

George Bush 

February 1971-January 1973 

John A. Scali 

February 1973-June 1975 

Daniel P. Moynihan 

June 1975-February 1976 

William W. Scranton 

March 1976-January 1977 

Andrew Young 

January 1977-April 1979 

Donald McHenry 

April 1979-January 1981 

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

January 1981 -present 
ations is the Chief of the U.S. Mission to 

*The U.S. Representative to the United N 
the UN in New York and holds the rank and s 

^tatus of Ambassador Extraordinary and 

Plenipotentiary. ■ 

ECOSOC also provides consultative 
status to nongovernmental organizations 
active within its fields of competence. 
These organizations may send observers 
to public meetings of the council and its 
subsidiary bodies and submit statements 
related to the council's work. 

Trusteeship Council 

The UN trusteeship system was 
established to help ensure that ter- 
ritories were administered in the best in- 
terests both of the inhabitants and of in- 
ternational peace and security. The 
Trusteeship Council operates under the 
authority of the General Assembly, or, 
in the case of strategic trusts, the 
Security Council. It assists those bodies 
in carrying out their responsibilities 
under the UN Charter. 

A UN member administering a trust 
territory is pledged to promote the 
political, economic, and educational ad- 
vancement of the territory's people. It is 
also to promote "progressive develop- 
ment towards self-government or in- 
dependence as may be appropriate to 
the particular circumstances of each ter- 
ritory and its people and the freely ex- 
pressed wishes of the peoples 

As recently as 1957, 11 terri- 
tories — most of them former mandates 
of the League of Nations or territories 
taken from enemy states at the end of 
World War II — were part of the UN 

UN headquarters in New York covers an 
18-acre area on Manhattan Island. The 
buildings include the 39-story Secretariat, 
the General Assembly, council chambers 
and conference rooms, and the Dag 
Hammarskjold Library. 

trusteeship system. All but one have at- 
tained self-government or independence, 
either as separate nations or by joining 
neighboring independent countries. 

The only remaining is the Trust Ter- 
ritory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), 
designated as a strategic area and ad- 
ministered by the United States under a 
1947 agreement with the Security Coun- 
cil. Following negotiations which began 
in 1969, an agreement was reached in 
197.5 with one part of the territory, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, which will 
become a commonwealth of the United 
States upon termination of the trustee- 
ship. In 1983, UN-observed plebiscites 
were held in the remaining three 
jurisdictions — the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall 
Islands. All resulted in voter approval of 
an agreement providing for a "free 
association" relationship with the United 
States. While the governments of two of 
these areas subsequently approved a 
Compact of Free Association, Palau's 
formal approval has been held up by 
constitutional difficulties. The United 
States is working with the Palau 
Government to resolve this problem. The 
United States continues to strive toward 
termination of the trusteeship for all 
four components of the trust territory as 
soon as possible, under terms acceptable 
to all parties. 

Membership of the Trusteeship 
Council consists of the United 


(UN photo by Saw Lwin) 


^^Ji / jf IV 

' -r^ 



UN General Assembly 

The 159 Members of the United Nations^ 

an (1946) 

The Gambia (1965) 


German Democratic Republic (1973) 


Germany, Federal Republic of (1973) 


Ghana (1957) 

ind Barbuda (1981) 



Grenada (1974) 



Guinea (1958) 


Guinea-Bissau (1974) 


Guyana (1966) 

sh (1974) 




Hungary (1955) 


Iceland (1946) 




Indonesia (1950) 


I (1966) 


Ireland (1955) 

arussalam (1984) 

Israel (1949) 


Italy (1955) 

-"aso— formerly Upper Volta (1960) 

Ivory Coast (1960) 


Jamaica (1962) 


Japan (1956) 

3ian SSR 

Jordan (1955) 

Kenya (1963) 

■de (1975) 

Kuwait (1963) 

^rican Republic (1960) 

Lao People's Democratic Republic (Vt 



Lesotho (1966) 


Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1955) 




Madagascar (1960) 


Malawi (1964) 

Malaysia (1957) 


Maldives (1965) 


Mali (1960) 

ctic Kampuchea— 

Malta (1964) 

ly Cambodia (1955) 

Mauritania (1961) 

tic Yemen (1967) 

Mauritius (1968) 



Mongolia (1961) 

L (1978) 

Morocco (1956) 

in Republic 

Mozambique (1975) 

Nepal (1955) 



New Zealand 

al Guinea (1968) 


Niger (1960) 


Nigeria (1960) 



Oman (1971) 


Pakistan (1947) 


Papua New Guinea (1975) 





Portugal (1955) 

Qatar (1971) 

Romania (1955) 

Rwanda (1962) 

St. Christopher-Nevis (1983) 

St. Lucia (1979) 

St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1980) 

Samoa (1976) 

Sao Tome and Principe (1975) 

Saudi Arabia 

Senegal (1960) 

Seychelles (1976) 

Sierra Leone (1961) 

Singapore (1965) 

Solomon Islands (1978) 

Somalia (1960) 

South Africa 

Spain (1955) 

Sri Lanka (1955) 

Sudan (1956) 

Suriname (1975) 

Swaziland (1968) 

Sweden (1946) 


Thailand (1946) 

Togo (1960) 

Trinidad and Tobago (1962) 

Tunisia (1956) 


Uganda (1962) 

Ukrainian SSR 


United Arab Emirates (1971) 

United Kingdom 

United Republic of Cameroon (1960) 

United Republic of Tanzania (1961) 

United States of America 


Vanuatu (1981) 


Vietnam (1977) 

Yemen (1947) 


Zaire (1960) 

Zambia (1964) 

Zimbabwe (1980) 

ntries are listed with names as registered by the United Nations. Year in parentheses indicates date of admission; countries with no 
e original members in 1945. 

Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of Oct. 25, 1971, the General Assembly decided "to restore all its rights to the People's Repubhc of China and 
nize the representative of its Government as the only legitimate representative of China to tne United Nations." ■ 

States — the only country now ad- 
ministering a trust territory — and the 
other permanent members of the Securi- 
ty Council: China (which does not par- 
ticipate), France, the United Kingdom, 
and the Soviet Union. 

International Court of Justice 

The International Court of Justice is the 
principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. The Court was established 
under the Charter in 1945 as the suc- 
cessor to the Permanent Court of Inter- 
national Justice. The Court's main func- 
tions are to decide contentious cases 
submitted to it by states and to give ad- 
visory opinions on legal questions sub- 
mitted to it by the General Assembly or 
Security Council, or by such specialized 
agencies as may be authorized to do so 
by the General Assembly in accordance 
with the UN Charter. 

The seat of the Court is at The Hague, 
Netherlands. It is composed of 15 judges 
elected by the General Assembly and the 
Security Council from a list of persons 
nominated by the national groups in the 

International Court of 
Justice Officials 

Nine-year terms expire on February 5 of the 
year shown in parentheses. The President is 
elected by the Court for a 3-year term. 

President of the Court— Taslim Olawale 

Elias, Nigeria (1985) 
Vice President— Jose Sette-Camara, Brazil 


Other Members of the Court 

Manfred Lachs, Poland (198.5) 

Pianton Dmitrievich Morozov, USSR (1988) 

Nagendra Singh, India (1991) 

Jose Maria Ruda, Argentina (1991) 

Hermann Mosier, F.R.G. (1985) 

Shigeru Oda, Japan (1985) 

Roberto Ago, Italy (1988) 

Abdallah Fikri El-Khani, Syria (1985) 

Stephen M. Schwebel, US (1988) 

Robert Y. .Jennings, UK (1991) 

Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere, France (1991) 

Keba Mbaye, Senegal (1991) 

Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algeria (1988) ■ 

Permanent Court of Arbitration. Elec- 
tors are mandated to bear in mind the 
qualifications of the candidates and the 
need for the Court as a whole to repre- 
sent the main cultural groups and prin- 
cipal legal systems. No two judges may 
be nationals of the same country. Judges 
serve for 9 years and may be reelected. 
One-third of the Court (five judges) is 
elected every 3 years. 

Questions before the Court are 
decided by a majority of judges present. 
Nine judges constitute a quorum. In case 
of a tie, the president of the Court casts 
the deciding vote. In certain cir- 
cumstances, parties may be entitled to 
choose a judge for a specific case. 

Only states may be parties in cases 
before the International Court of 
Justice. This does not preclude private 
interests from being the subject of pro- 
ceedings if one state brings the case 
against another. Jurisdiction of the 
Court is based on the consent of the par- 
ties. Consent may be given in several 
ways. States may specify, generally in a 
treaty, that any dispute concerning the 
meaning of the treaty may be referred 
to the Court; or, after a specific dispute 
arises, they may agree to take it before 
the Court for resolution. In addition, a 
state may, in relation to any other state 
accepting the same obligation, accept 
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in 
certain categories of disputes, such as 
those concerning the interpretation of a 
treaty or a question of international law. 
In the event of a dispute concerning the 
Court's jurisdiction, the matter will be 
settled by the Court. Judgments in con- 
tentious cases are binding upon the par- 
ties. The Security Council can be called 
upon by a party to determine measures 
to be taken to give effect to a judgment 
if the other party fails to perform its 
obligations under that judgment. 

The United States is one of the 47 
countries that had accepted the com- 
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court by 
1983. In accepting that jurisdiction in 
1946, the United States specifically 
excluded disputes regarding matters 
essentially within the U.S. domestic 
jurisdiction, "as determined by the 
United States of America." The last 
phrase, known as the Connally reserva- 
tion, permits the United States rather 

than the Court to determine whet! 
certain disputes should come befot 

On a number of occasions sino 
1950s, the Court has dealt with iss 
regarding control by South Africa 
Namibia (South-West Africa). In tl 
most recent advisory opinion (197] 
Court advised that since the contii 
presence of South Africa in Namit 
illegal. South Africa is obliged to \ 
draw its administration and end it 
cupation of the territory. 

Other recent cases include: 

• A complaint by Pakistan in 
that India was planning to turn o\ 
Bangledesh for trial 195 Pakistani 
prisoners of war; 

• Challenges by Australia and 
Zealand in 1973 to further French 
mospheric nuclear weapons tests i 
South Pacific Ocean; 

• Complaints by the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republi 
Germany about the decision of Ice 
to extend its exclusive fisheries zc 
from 19 kilometers (12 mi.) to 80 
kilometers (50 mi.) around its coai 

• Questions raised by the Ger 
Assembly about the status of the 
Spanish Sahara (now Western Sal 

• A dispute between Greece i 
Turkey over the boundary of the ■ 
tinental shelf in the Aegean Sea; 

• A complaint by the United 
in 1980 that Iran was detaining 
American diplomats in Tehran in 
tion of international law; and 

• A dispute between Tunisia 
Libya over the delimitation of the 
tinental shelf between them. 

A chamber of the Court curre 
has before it a question as to the 
of the maritime boundary dividing 
Continental Shelf and fisheries zo 
the United States and Canada in 
Gulf of Maine area. 


jcretariat is headed by the 
ary General, assisted by a staff of 
;han 16,000 international civil 
its worldwide. It provides studies, 
lation, and facilities needed by UN 
for their meetings. It also carries 
;ks as directed by the Security 
A, the General Assembly, the 
mic and Social Council, and other 
■ized LTN bodies. The Charter pro- 
;hat the staff be chosen by applica- 
■ the "highest standards of efficien- 
Tipetence, and integrity," with due 
1 for the importance of recruiting 
iff on as wide a geographical basis 

le Charter also provides that the 
^ry General and staff shall not 
ir receive instructions from any 
iment or authority other than the 
1 Nations. Each UN member is en- 
to respect the international 
;ter of the Secretariat and not 
influence its staff. The Secretary 
al alone is responsible for the staff 

le Secretary General's duties in- 
using his good offices in resolving 
ational disputes, administering 
keeping operations, organizing in- 
;ional conferences, gathering infor- 
n on the implementation of Securi- 
3jncil decisions, and consulting with governments regarding various 
■1 alional relations initiatives. The 
rtary General may bring to the at- 
t n of the Security Council any mat- 

ter that in his or her opinion may 
threaten international peace and 

In 1977, the General Assembly 
created a new position in the Secre- 
tariat—a director general for develop- 
ment and economic cooperation. The in- 
cumbent, second only to the Secretary 
General, works to obtain better efficien- 
cy and coordination of the many 
economic and developmental programs 
operating in the UN system. Jean Ripert 
of France currently occupies this post. 

The UN Family 

In addition to the six principal UN 
organs, the UN family includes nearly 
30 major programs or agencies. Some 
were in existence before the creation of 
the United Nations and are related to it 
by agreement. Others were established 
by the General Assembly. Each special- 
ized agency provides expertise in a 
specific area. 

The World Health Organization 
(WHO) has eradicated smallpox and is 
working toward the goal of the "health 
for all by the year 2000." It has 
established a worldwide network to 
warn against the outbreak of other con- 
tagious diseases and is promoting a 
global campaign to make available im- 
munizations against the six major child- 
hood diseases by 1990. 

UN Secretaries General 

e Lie 



litially appointed acting 
tary General; formally 
ited Secretary General 
nber 30, 1962.) 


Perez de Cuellar 



February 1, 1946- April 10, 1953 
April 10, 1953-September 18, 1961 
November 3, 1961-December 31, 1971 

January 1, 1972-December 31, 1981 
January 1, 1982-present ■ 



UN General Assembly 

The Food and Agriculture Organ- 
ization (FAO) gathers, analyzes, and 
publishes information for the benefit of 
the world's food producers and con- 
sumers; provides technical assistance to 
developing countries to improve agricul- 
tural production and stimulate economic 
development; provides systematic early 
warnings on impending food and crop 
shortages; and carries out programs to 
control plant and animal diseases. 

The World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) has established a 
World Weather Watch to increase the 
collection and dissemination of data 
necessary for more accurate weather 
prediction. It promotes standardization 
of meteorological observations and pro- 
vides information about long-term 
climate changes that can affect 
agriculture and other economic activity. 

The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) develops the prin- 
ciples and techniques of international air 
navigation and fosters the planning and 
development of international air 
transport to ensure the safe and orderly 
growth of civil aviation. Practices and 
recommended standards developed by 
ICAO directly affect U.S. commercial air 
travel and the sale of U.S. aircraft and 
equipment abroad. ICAO also promotes 
standards for the control of noise and 
pollution from aircraft. 



The International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) is a 

specialized agency primarily devoted to 
lending to low-income farmers in poor 
food-deficit countries. It is a cooperative 
effort of industrialized, oil-exporting, 
and developing nations. Most of IFAD's 
loans involve cofinancing with other in- 
ternational financial institutions. 

Other prominent specialized agencies 
are the UN Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the 
Universal Postal Union (UPU), the In- 
ternational Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), and the International Labor 
Organization (ILO). 

Programs created by the United Na- 
tions also work to fill many important 
economic and social needs. 

The UN Development Program 

(UNDP) is the largest multilateral 
source of grant technical assistance in 
the world. Voluntarily funded, it main- 
tains 116 field offices to fulfill its role as 
the central funding and coordinating 
mechanism for technical assistance 
within the UN system. Its country and 
intercountry programs in some 150 na- 
tions and territories focus on training, 
institution building, and preinvestment 
activity, with the greater proportion of 
resources going to the least developed 
countries. Total expenditures for 1982 
exceeded $850 million. 

The UN Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), originally created to assist 
homeless and destitute children in 
Europe and China after World War II, 
now provides humanitarian and 
developmental assistance to children and 
mothers in developing countries. 
UNICEF concentrates on long-term pro- 
grams that maximize local community 
participation and stimulate self-reliance 
in efforts to improve maternal and child 
health, nutrition, and education as well 
as to increase the availability of clean 
water and sanitation. UNICEF was 
awarded the 1965 Nobel Peace Prize. In 
1982, UNICEF urged broad collabora- 
tion among multilateral and bilateral aid 

donors, private voluntary agencies, 
developing country governments, and 
local communities to take advantage of 
the opportunity created by recent 
developments in health science and 
social organization to achieve "a health 
revolution for children" in developing 

The UN Environmental Program 
(UNEP) is responsible for coordinating 
UN environmental activities, calling in- 
ternational attention to global and 
regional environmental problems, while 
stimulating programs to correct these 
problems. It assists developing countries 
in promoting environmentally sound 
development policies and has developed 
a worldwide environmental monitoring 
system to standardize international en- 
vironmental data. 

The Office of the UN High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) pro- 
vides refugees — people outside of coun- 
try of nationality because of well- 
founded fear of persecution— with legal 
protection and material assistance at the 
request of a government or of the 
United Nations. UNHCR was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1954 and 1982. 

International Conferences 

Some conferences held in the UN 
system are regular annual meetings; 
others are convened specifically to ad- 
dress a single topic. Most of the 
specialized agencies hold periodic 
assemblies of the representatives of 
member governments for the agencies' 
regular business and attention to specific 
problems. Subgroups of these agencies 
often meet to discuss specific problems 
and to make recommendations to the 
larger representative body for action. 

For example, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) focuses 
specific attention on efficient navigation, 
pollution control, and tanker safety. The 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) recommends uniform regulations 
and standard safety measures as well as 
simpler procedures at international 

borders. The International Telecom- 
munications Union (ITU) allocates th 
radio frequency spectrum, registers 
radio frequency assignments, and wi 
to reduce or eliminate interference t 
tween radio stations. 

The United Nations organizes s{ 
worldwide conferences to concentrai 
particular issues. The 1981 UN Con- 
ference on New and Renewable Sou 
of Energy was held in Nairobi, Ken; 
to encourage new and renewable so 
of energy such as solar and geother 
power and oil shale. The conference 
dealt especially with the problem of 
developing countries' access to new 
sources of energy. 

The World Assembly on Aging, 
in Vienna in July and August 1981, 
phasized the problems facing the ag 
and addressed their rights; role in ; 
ty; and social, economic, and persoi 

UNISPACE '82, also held in Vi 
in August 1982, addressed internat 
cooperation in the peaceful applicat 
of space technology. 

U.S. delegations often include i 
only executive branch officials but 
Members of Congress, technical ex 
and representatives of relevant seg 
ments of the U.S. private sector. 

The United Nations also draws 
tention to specific issues by design: 
international "decades," "years," ai 
"days." Some of these are: 

• Decade for Women: Equality 
Development and Peace (1976-85); 

• Second Disarmament Decadi 

• Third UN Development Dec; 

• International Youth Year (11 

• International Year of Peace 

• World Health Day (April 7); 

• World Environment Day (Ju 

• United Nations Day (Octobe 
date of entry into force of the UN 
Charter in 1945); and 




UN General Assembly 

luman Rights Day, annually 
^ted on December 10, the date of 
option of the Universal Declara- 
' Human Rights by the General 
Ibly in 1948. 

ring the System 

N system is financed in two ways: 
; ed contributions from member 
' in fulfillment of their treaty 
;ions, and voluntary contributions 
nember states. 

16 regular budgets of the United 
IS and its specialized agencies are 
1 by assessments. In the case of 
lited Nations, the General 
r( ibly approves the regular budget 

rtermines the assessment for each 
J er. The assessment is broadly 
J on the relative capacity of each 
] -y to pay, as measured by national 
A e statistics, although there are 
li variations. 

, j le Assembly has established the 
I pie that no member should pay 
„i than 25% of the regular budget. 
I nited States is the only nation af- 
■i by this limitation. If the standard 
i on of "capacity to pay" were ap- 
,ij n the same manner to the United 
ti; as to other major industrial 
/fs, the United States would be 
S;ed at about 29%. The minimum 
,j|;ment is 0.01%. 
jnder the scale of assessments 
jed for the 3-year period 1983-85, 
_^ major contributors to the regular 
judget are the Soviet Union 
,]:%), Japan (10.32%), the Federal 
alic of Germany (8.54%), France 
7o), and the United Kingdom 
%). The assessments against 
)ers for the regular budget amount 
Dut $762 million for each year of 
984-85 period; the U.S. share is 

N peacekeeping operations have 
financed by a combination of 
sments, voluntary contributions, 
he sale of UN bonds. The UN 

in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been 
ced solely by voluntary contribu- 

Some member nations, in addition 
oviding monetary support, have 
ied troops, equipment, or services 
)ut subsequent reimbursement. The 

United States has airlifted personnel 
from nations contributing troops to a 
number of peacekeeping operations. 

Special UN programs not included in 
the regular budget— such as UNICEF 
and the UNDP — are financed by volun- 
tary contributions from member govern- 
ments. Some private sector funds are 
also provided. Some nations use the UN 
system extensively to contribute to 
developmental assistance programs in 
other nations. 

In calendar year 1982, expenditures 
by the United Nations; the specialized 
agencies; the IAEA; and the special pro- 
grams such as UNDP, UNICEF, the 
UNEP, WFP, and the UNHCR totaled 
about $4.5 billion. 

The United States contributes vary- 
ing percentages of the costs of the dif- 
ferent agencies and programs in the UN 
system. In FY 1982, its combined 
assessed and voluntary contributions 
amounted to $702.6 million, or about 
16% of the total. 

Some nations have refused to pay all 
or part of their assessments for certain 
peacekeeping operations as a matter of 
principle and thereby have caused fi- 
nancing difficulties for the United Na- 
tions. These refusals and other factors, 
such as making some payments in non- 
convertible currency, have produced a 
deficit estimated at $326 million in 
December 1983. 

Maintaining the Peace 

The UN Charter gives the Security 
Council the power to: 

• Investigate any situation threaten- 
ing international peace; 

• Recommend procedures for 
peaceful solution of a dispute; 

• Call upon other member nations 
to completely or partially interrupt 
economic relations as well as sea, air, 
postal, and radio communications, or to 
sever diplomatic relations; and 

• Enforce its decisions militarily, if 
necessary. The original assumption that 
the United Nations would have its own 
armed forces did not work out. 
However, through contributions of 
troops and equipment by various na- 
tions, UN peacekeeping forces have been 

able to limit or prevent conflict in a 
number of situations. With steady ex- 
perience in the operation of such forces 
over a number of years, this UN activity 
has become more readily acceptable, al- 
though disagreement among the perma- 
nent members has led to difficulties in 
some efforts to institute new peacekeep- 
ing forces. 

The United Nations has also served 
to reduce the danger of wider conflict 
and to open the way to negotiated set- 
tlements through its services as a center 
of debate and negotiation, as well as 
through factfinding missions, mediators, 
and truce observers. On the other hand, 
there have been many violent interna- 
tional outbreaks since the United Na- 
tions was created. Some have not been 
discussed by the Security Council at all, 
and others proved to be beyond the 
capacity of the United Nations to affect. 
Continuing efforts by the United States 
and other nations have sought to 
enhance the effectiveness of the Security 
Council in dealing with international 

The most extensive use of UN 
troops was in Korea, where, in 1950, the 
Security Council mobilized forces under 
U.S. leadership for the defense of south 
Korea against an attack from the north. 
UN forces reached a peak strength of 

In the Congo (now Zaire), the UN 
peacekeeping operation in 1960-64 
helped the Congolese Government 
restore order following its independence. 
At its peak, the UN force totaled more 
than 20,000 officers and troops. 

In 1964, a UN Peacekeeping Force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was created to 
prevent the recurrence of fighting be- 
tween Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
Since Turkish troops landed on Cyprus 
in 1974, UNFICYP also has helped to 
maintain the cease-fire between the 
Cyprus National Guard and the armed 
forces of Turkey. Other UN efforts have 
sought a peaceful settlement of the 
Cyprus dispute. 

In the search for a peaceful solution 
in the Middle East, the United Nations 
has been involved in various ways over 
the past 36 years. Its efforts have 
ranged from employment of the "good 

offices" of UN officials in helping to 
resolve differences to the actual deploy- 
ment of UN troops. The fighting that 
broke out when the State of Israel was 
established in 1948 was halted by a UN 
cease-fire. UN mediators helped bring 
about armistice agreements between 
Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Syria. These agreements provided for 
implementation by mixed armistice com- 

missions and the UN Truce Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO). The UN Relief 
and Works Agency (UNWRA) was 
established to assist refugees from the 

In 1956, the Suez crisis was resolved 
by the withdrawal of Israeli, British, and 
French forces from Egyptian territory 
in compliance with a UN resolution and 
by the establishment of the UN 


The UN Charter gives the Security Council power to enforce decisions militarily. In a 
number of situations, UN peacekeeping forces have been able to limit or prevent conflict. 

Emergency Force (UNEF) to prese) 
the peace. A LIN "presence" in Jord 
and observer groups in Lebanon an( 
Yemen also have helped to diminish 
potential threats to international pe 
and security in the area. UNEF pol 
the Gaza and Sinai lines between Is 
and the United Arab Republic from 
to 1967, when it was withdrawn at 
Egyptian request. In the June 1967 
the Security Council achieved a ceas 
fire and installed UN observers on t 
cease-fire lines between Israel and ' 

Following the outbreak of hostil 
in 1973, a new UN Emergency Fon 
was created to impose itself betwee 
forces of Israel and Egypt. In 1974. 
meeting chaired by the UNEF com- 
mander, the two countries signed a 
agreement on disengagement, whicl 
UNEF then supervised. Under the 
agreement, as well as under a secoi 
disengagement agreement in 1976, 
UNEF manned the zones of diseng; 
ment and inspected the zones of lin 
arms and forces as agreed to by tht 
ties. UNEF was dissolved in 1979 v 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace renderec 
mandate no longer necessary. 

After Israel and Syria reached 
agreement on disengaging their for 
on the Golan Heights in 1974, the 
Security Council established a UN 
Disengagement Observer Force (Ul 
DOF). The mandate of UNDOF als. 
has been extended periodically by t 

The UN Interim Force in Leba 
(UNIFIL) was created in early 197: 
following an Israeli reprisal attack 
Palestine Liberation Organization ( 
bases in southern Lebanon. LTNIFI 
first with 4,000 troops and then wi 
more, was established to permit an 
Israeli withdrawal and restore ordt 
under the control of Lebanese 
authorities. UNIFIL helped to pres 
a fragile cease-fire along the Israel 
Lebanese border until Israel's invaj 
of June 1982 drastically transform* 
conditions in southern Lebanon. 
LINIFIL still performs its duties to 
extent possible in its anomalous siti 
tion behind Israeli lines. Its mandat 
been extended periodically by the S 
ty Council on an interim basis, wit! 
humanitarian and other temporary 




UN General Assembly 

to its functions. At the end of 
UNIFIL had a strength of some 

NTSO. originally created to help 
' nent the armistice agreements 
I the first Arab-Israeli war, has 
performed a variety of chores in 

East conflict zones. Its unarmed 
/ers assist UNDOF and UNIFIL. 
Ti of UNTSO observers has been in 
t since 1982, monitoring the situa- 
fter the Israeli invasion. At the 
f 1983, it had an authorized force 
I observers throughout the Middle 

^e United Nations also has been 
in establishing terms for the 
'ement of independence of Namibia 
-West Africa) from South African 
)1. Numerous meetings of the 
al Assembly and the Security 
;il — including a special session of 
eneral Assembly on Namibia in 
1978 — have focused on this issue. 
ince early 1977, a small "contact 
i" consisting of the then five 
srn members of the Security Coun- 
he United States, the United 
lorn, France, Canada, and the 
-a! Republic of Germany— has been 
; in facilitating negotiations on the 
bia dispute. In July 1978, initial 
ment was reached, and the Securi- 
uncil asked the Secretary General 
aw up a plan to ensure the early in- 
idence of Namibia through free 
ons under UN auspices. Although 
1 Africa objected to portions of the 
itary General's plan, the Council, in 
jmber 1978, endorsed the plan as 
>ecurity Council Resolution 435 and 
)rized creation of a UN Transition 
itance Group (UNTAG), with 
in and military components. This 
remains the internationally ac- 
d basis for Namibian independence. 
Dugh implementation of the plan has 
delayed, most differences among 
larties have been overcome through 
ided negotiations. The Security 
icil remains seized of the issue. 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

Although the UN Charter adopted in 
1945 gave no immediate priority to 
disarmament, it envisaged a system of 
regulation that would ensure "the least 
diversion for armaments of the world's 
human and economic resources." 

The advent of nuclear weapons came 
only weeks after the signing of the UN 
Charter and provided immediate im- 
petus to concepts of arms limitation and 
disarmament. In fact, the first resolu- 
tion of the first meeting of the General 
Assembly (January 24, 1946) was en- 
titled "The Establishment of a Commis- 
sion to Deal with the Problems Raised 
by the Discovery of Atomic Energy," 
and called upon the commission to make 
specific proposals for "the elimination 
from national armaments of atomic 
weapons and of all other major weapons 
adaptable to mass destruction." 

Since the early years of the United 
Nations, great-power disagreement has 
severely hampered efforts to promote 
arms control and disarmament within 
the UN system. However, the United 
Nations has undertaken continuing ef- 
forts to develop organizational 
machinery that can effectively address 
disarmament issues. The early establish- 
ment of an atomic energy commission 
and a commission for conventional ar- 
maments met with difficulties; in 1952, 
these two commissions were merged by 
the General Assembly into the Disarma- 
ment Commission (UNDC). The UNDC 
was largely ineffective and stopped 
meeting in 1965, but was reestablished 
by the General Assembly in 1978 as a 
new committee composed of the entire 
UN membership. The UNDC served as a 
deliberative body, lacking authority to 
conduct negotiations or establish 
negotiating bodies. Today, these func- 
tions are centered in the Conference on 

In 1957, the United Nations created 
the International Atomic Energy Agen- 
cy (IAEA), which administers nuclear 
materials safeguards and promotes 
peaceful uses of atomic energy. 

In 1959, the United States, France, 
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet 
Union decided to create a 10-nation 

disarmament committee outside — but 
linked to— the United Nations. This 
committee ceased meeting in 1960, but 
in 1962, the Eighteen-Nation Disarma- 
ment Committee (ENDC) was estab- 
lished. Later renamed the Conference of 
the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), 
membership grew to 26 in 1969 and to 
31 in 1974. The United States and the 
Soviet Union served as cochairmen. 

In 1978, agreement was reached to 
create a new body, the Committee on 
Disarmament (CD), to succeed the CCD. 
The CD, which met first in 1979, re- 
mains the principal multilateral 
negotiating forum for arms control. It is 
composed of the five nuclear-weapons 
states and 35 other states representing 
all areas of the world. The chairmanship 
rotates on a monthly basis among all 
members. Like its predecessors, the CD 
is not formally a UN body. However, it 
reports annually to the General 
Assembly, takes relevant Assembly 
resolutions into account as it conducts 
its work, and has a secretary appointed 
by the UN Secretary General. 

The CD reconvened in February 
1984 as the Conference on Disarmament 
and plans to expand its membership by 
four, which would raise total member- 
ship to 44. Issues on its agenda are 
discussed in plenary sessions and then 
referred to ad hoc working groups when 
the members consider them ripe for 
negotiation or more detailed examina- 
tion. Also in February 1984, the position 
of the personal representative of the UN 
Secretary General to the CD was 
redesignated as Secretary (General of the 
CD; the first incumbent was Rikhi Jaipal 
of India. 

Since its creation, the CD has con- 
centrated on the issues of banning 
chemical and radiological weapons, arms 
control in outer space, and nuclear arms 
control. Although some progress has 
been made in the chemical and 
radiological areas, the tense interna- 
tional climate, the inherent complexity 
of the issues, and the large membership 
of the new body have prevented rapid 
agreement on any of these issues. The 
CD has also devoted considerable time 
to attempting to elaborate a comprehen- 
sive program on disarmament. 

Despite considerable progress in 
many areas of international concern, 
worldwide arms expenditures continue 
to grow, amounting in 1982 to more 
than $800 billion per year in current 
(1982) dollars. 

The United Nations has held two 
special sessions devoted entirely to 
disarmament. The first Special Session 
on Disarmament (SSOD I) in 1978 was 
an initiative of the nonaligned nations to 
spur progress in all aspects of disarma- 
ment. The general atmosphere at the 
session was constructive. The extensive 
conference document — referred to as 
the final document, which included a 
declaration on disarmament and a pro- 
gram of action — was adopted by consen- 
sus. Among other things, the first 
special session: 

• Declared that "effective measures 
of nuclear disarmament and the preven- 
tion of nuclear war have the highest 

• Urged the United States and the 
Soviet Union to conclude a new strategic 
arms limitation agreement at the 
earliest possible date and urged the ear- 
ly conclusion of a comprehensive test 
ban treaty; 

• Noted the importance of interna- 
tional action to prevent further pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons; 

• Noted the value of nuclear- 
weapon-free zones; 

• Took note of the assurances given 
by nuclear-weapons states that such 
weapons would not be used against non- 
nuclear-weapons states; 

• Urged efforts to limit various non- 
nuclear weapons that have the potential 
for mass destruction; 

• Recognized the importance of con- 
ventional arms issues, particularly inter- 
national transfers of these weapons; 

• Urged the financial resources 
released as a result of disarmament ef- 
forts be devoted to the economic and 
social development of all nations, and 
called for an expert study on the rela- 
tionship between disarmament and 
development; and 

• Endorsed changes in the machin- 
ery for multilateral disarmament talks. 

At the second Special Session on 
Disarmament (SSOD II), held in 1982, 
the assembled members reaffirmed their 
commitment to the final document of 
SSOD I. The member states could not 
agree, however, on a substantive docu- 
ment going beyond SSOD I. SSOD II 
was highlighted by the participation of 
18 heads of state or government, in- 
cluding President Reagan, who ad- 
dressed the session on June 17, 1982. In 
the face of a strong Soviet campaign to 
promote proposals on the nonfirst use of 
nuclear weapons, Western leaders made 
clear their commitment to prevention of 
war of any sort — nuclear or conven- 
tional — and the value of deterrence. 

In mid-October of each year, the 
First Committee of the General 
Assembly convenes to consider arms 
control and disarmament matters. The 
committee holds general debates, adopts 
resolutions regardi