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Department 


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-m  of  state -m-^  J  ^ 

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ie  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volunne  84  /  Number  2090 


nrr  \  t  '984 


September  1984 


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««»,,, 


The  Secretary  /  3 
U.S.S.R.  /41 
Human  Rights  /  48 

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I 


Cover:  Secretary  Shultz 


Assistant  Secretary  for  Human  Rights  and 
Humanitarian  Affairs  Elliott  Abrams 


Departmpni  of  Siatp 

bulletin 


Volume  84  /  Number  2090  /  September  1984 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


^ 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 


PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


I 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary  in  the 
transaction  of  the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  U.se  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 
1987. 


Department  of  State  BULLETIN  (ISSN  0041-71 
is  published  monthly  (plus  annual  index)  by  the 
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Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  I 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402 


CONTENTS 


The  President 

1  A  Force  for  Freedom  in  the 

Caribbean 

2  News  Conference  of  July  24 

(Excerpts) 

The  Secretary 

3  Asia-Pacific  and  the  Future 

7       Secretary  Visits  Asia;  Attends 

ASEA'N  and  ANZUS  Meetings 
(Warren  Cooper,  William 
Hayden,  Secretary  Shultz,  Text  of 
ANZUS  Communique) 


Human  Rights 

48  Extending  Voluntary  Departure 

for  El  Salvadorans  (Elliott 
A  bra  ma) 

49  Persecution  and  Restrictions  of 

Religion  in  Nicaragua  (Elliott 

Abrams) 
51        Captive  Nations  Weei<,  1984 

(Proclam.ation) 
53       Human  Rights  in  Cuba  (Elliott 

Abramn) 
55       Human  Rights  Situation  in  Zaire 

and  South  Africa  (Elliott 

Abrams) 


Arms  Control 


23 


24 


Status  of  Conference  on  Disarm- 
ament in  Europe  (President 
Reagan) 
Proposed  Outer  Space  Negotia- 
tions (White  House  Statements) 


East  Asia 

25       The  U.S.-China  Trade  Relation- 
ship (Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 

28       Taking  Stock  of  U.S. -Japan 

Relations  (Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 

34       U.S. -Asia  Security:  Economic  and 
Political  Dimensions 
(William  A.  Browyi) 

Economics 


36 


38 


World  Economic  Prospects 
(Allen  W.  Wallis) 

The  Bretton  Wood  Legacy:  Its 
Continuing  Relevance 
(Richard  T.  McCormack) 


Europe 

41  U.S. -Soviet  Bilateral  Relations 

(President  Reagan,  White  House 
Fact  Sheet) 

42  U.S. -Soviet  Consular  Agreement 

(Department  Statement) 

45  U.S. -Soviet  Union  Expand  "Hot 

Line"  Agreement  (President 
Reagan,  White  House  Fact 
Sheet) 

46  19th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message 

to  the  Congress) 


Food 

46  Food  for  Peace  Day, 
(President  Reagan, 
Proclamation) 


1984 


Pacific 

60       The  ANZUS  Relationship: 

Alliance  Management  (Paul  D. 
Wolfowitz) 

Refugees 

64  African  Refugees  Relief  Day,  1984 

(Proclamation) 

South  Asia 

65  Visit  of  Sri  Lankan  President 
(J.  R.  Jayewardetie,  President 
Reagan) 

Western  Hemisphere 

69       Review  of  Nicaragua's  Commit- 
ments to  the  OAS  (J.  William 
Middendorf  H) 

71  Elections  in  Guatemala  (White 

House  Statement) 

72  President  Meets  With  El 

Salvador's  President  (White 
House  Statement) 

73  Cuba  as  a  Model  and  a  Challenge 

(Kenneth  N.  Skoug,  Jr.) 

Treaties 

78       Current  Actions 

Chronology 

80       July  1984 

Press  Releases 

82       Department  of  State 

Publications 

82       Department  of  State 


Index 


HE  PRESIDENT 


A  Force  for  Freedom 
in  the  Carribbean 


President  Reagan's  remarks  to  a  Caribbean  leaders 
iference  at  Russell  House  Student  Center  at  the  University  of 
South  Carolina  in  Columbia,  on  July  19,  1984^ 


a  special  honor  and  a  pleasure  for 
to  participate  in  this  gathering  of 
lers  from  the  Caribbean.  You're 
)ng  our  nearest  neighbors  and  our 
est  friends.  Our  societies,  economies, 
histories  have  been  intertwined 
Ti  the  earliest  days  of  the  Americas. 
As  we  face  the  future  together,  I 
ik  we  have  good  reason  to  be  confi- 
t.  Four  years  ago  economic  prospects 
•e  bleak  and  the  forces  of  tyranny 
e  on  the  move,  emboldened  by  what 
med  to  be  a  paralysis  among  the 
locratic  peoples  of  the  hemisphere. 
But  by  joining  together  with  courage 
determination,  we've  turned  that 
ation  around.  Now  the  tide  of  the 
ire  is  a  freedom  tide.  The  free  people 
his  hemisphere  are  united  and  share 
)mmon  sense  of  purpose.  Nowhere  is 
t  more  apparent  than  with  the 
ted  States  and  the  Caribbean 
locracies  as  has  been  so  evident  in 
meeting  today. 

Over  these  past  4  years,  we've 
ved  to  encourage  democracy, 
ance  the  economic  vitality  of  the 
ion,  and  cooperate  in  the  defense  of 
jdom.  Now,  these  are  not  separate 
,1s.  They  are  mutually  reinforcing, 
'sident  Jorge  Blanco  pointed  that  out 
lier  this  year  when  he  observed, 
ead,  health,  education,  liberty, 
nocracy,  and  peace  are  indivisible  and 
!placeable  values." 
I  firmly  believe  that  democratic 
'ernment  is  the  birthright  of  every 
lerican.  And  when  I  say  American, 
talking  about  all  of  us  in  this 
■stern  Hemisphere,  which  together  is 
ed  the  Americas.  All  of  us  from  the 
■th  slope  of  Alaska  to  the  tip  of  Tierra 
Fuego.  And  much  progress  has  been 
de.  Today,  26  of  33  independent 
intries  in  the  hemisphere — countries 


with  90%  of  the  hemisphere's  popula- 
tion— are  democratic  or  in  transition  to 
democracy. 

You  realize  when  I  refer  to 
"democratic,"  I  do  so  with  a  small  "d." 
[Laughter.] 

Your  own  democracies  are  an  exam- 
ple to  developing  countries  everywhere. 
That's  not  to  say  that  you  don't  face 
great  challenges.  The  worldwide  reces- 
sion has  profoundly  affected  the  Carib- 
bean with  market  prices  for  key  com- 
modities you  produce  dropping  even  as 
the  costs  of  your  imports  were  rising. 
The  United  States  has  been  hardpressed 
economically.  But  we've  done  our  best  to 
help  and  provide  hope  and  we'll  continue 
to  do  so.  The  United  States  has  a  deep 
and  abiding  interest  in  the  well-being  of 
its  neighbors. 

In  these  last  3  years,  we've  begun  to 
put  our  own  economic  house  in  order  by 
cutting  down  the  growth  of  government 
spending  and  regulations.  We're  enjoy- 
ing high  growth,  declining  unemploy- 
ment and  low  inflation.  And  we've 
become,  once  again,  an  engine  for 
worldwide  economic  progress.  We 
believe  the  secret  of  that  success  is 
lower  tax  rates.  And  that's  a  secret 
everyone  can  share  and  benefit  from. 

At  the  same  time,  we've  increased 
our  aid  to  the  region  and  helped 
strengthen  the  International  Monetary 
Fund's  [IMF]  ability  to  assist  countries 
with  debt  problems.  But  let's  be 
realistic,  stop-gap  measures  with  the 
IMF  are  merely  that,  temporary  solu- 
tions. The  ultimate  solution  is  strong 
and  steady  growth  in  every  Caribbean 
country. 


Our  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  now 
getting  underway  gives  your  people  new 
access  to  the  world's  largest  and  most 
dynamic  government— market,  I  meant 
to  say.  Too  much  television.  [Laughter.] 
It  encourages  job-creating  business  in- 
vestment for  growth  and  prosperity  and 
is  being  put  into  place  at  a  time  when  a 
strong  dollar  and  an  expanding 
American  economy  can  translate  into 
greater  demand  for  your  products.  The 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  is  part  of  our 
broader,  overall  economic  strategy  to 
improve  economic  vitality  and  raise  liv- 
ing standards  throughout  the  Caribbean. 

We  can  and  must  work  together  to 
improve  the  well-being  of  our  people  and 
to  ensure  our  safety  as  well.  I'd  like  to 
take  this  opportunity  to  congratulate 
many  of  you  for  your  courage  and 
leadership  in  turning  back  the  com- 
munist power  grab  in  Grenada  last  fall. 
We  can  be  proud  that  thanks  to  the 
unity  and  determination  of  our  democ- 
racies, we  saved  the  peoples  of  that 
troubled  island,  we  restored  their 
freedom,  we  revived  their  hope  in  the 
future,  and  we  prevented  danger  and 
turmoil  from  spreading  beyond 
Grenada's  shores.  Let  us  always 
remember  the  crucial  distinction  be- 
tween the  legitimate  use  of  force  for 
liberation  versus  totalitarian  aggression 
for  conquest. 

But,  what  was  happening  in 
Grenada  was  not  an  isolated  incident. 
The  Soviet  bloc  and  Cuba  have  been 
committing  enormous  resources  to 
undermining  our  liberty  and  in- 
dependence. Nowhere  is  this  threat 
more  pressing  than  in  Nicaragua,  a 
country  which  today  marks  the  fifth 
year  of  Sandinista  dictatorship.  The  San- 
dinista  revolution,  like  Castro's  revolu- 
tion, is  a  revolution  betrayed.  And  now 
faced  with  mounting  internal  pressures 
and  disallusionment  abroad,  the  San- 
dinistas have  announced  an  election  for 
November  of  this  year.  We  would 
wholeheartedly  welcome  a  genuine 
democratic  election  in  Nicaragua.  But  no 
person  committed  to  democracy  will  be 
taken  in  by  a  Soviet-style  sham  election. 

The  situation  in  Nicaragua  is  not 
promising;  but  if  the  Sandinistas  would 
keep  their  original  commitment,  permit 
free  elections,  respect  human  rights,  and 
establish  an  independent  nation,  conflict 
in  the  region  would  subside. 

In  the  meantime,  we  have  a  moral 
responsibility  to  support  anyone  who 
aspires  to  live  in  a  true  democracy,  free 
from  communist  interference.  If  the 


ptember  1984 


THE  PRESIDENT 


democratic  peoples  do  not  stand 
together,  we  certainly  will  be  unable  to 
stand  alone. 

Just  a  few  years  ago,  totalitarianism 
was  on  the  rise.  But  there's  a  new  spirit 
among  democratic  peoples.  Prime 
Minister  Adams  described  it.  when  he 
said,  "There  is  a  community  of  interest 
among  democratic  countries  which  can 


transcend  ethnicity  and  differences  in 
economic  development."  This  spirit  is  a 
powerful  new  force  for  freedom  in  the 
world  today. 

What  we  do  together,  as  a  family  of 
""fi^irien  and  women  will  determine 
what  the  future  will  be  like  for  our 
children.  If  we're  strong  enough  to  live 
up  to  our  shared  values,  the  promise  of 


News  Conference  of  July  24  (Excerpts) 


Excerpts  from  President  Reagan's 
news  conference  of  July  2h.  198Jt.'^ 


Q.  Mr.  Mondale  said  in  his  acceptance 
speech  that  100  days  into  his  presiden- 
cy he  would  stop  the  secret  war 
against  Nicaragua.  I  assume  that 
you're  going  to  continue  your  policy 
down  there  in  that  respect,  and  he 
also  implied,  of  course,  once  again, 
that  you,  as  President,  will  be  trigger 
happy  and  will  get  us  into  war.  How 
will  you  answer  both  of  those? 

A.  I'm  not  trigger  happy,  and  hav- 
ing known  four  wars  in  my  lifetime,  I'm 
going  to  do  everything  I  can.  I  think  the 
greatest  requirement  is  to  strive  for 
peace,  and  I'm  going  to  do  that. 

And,  again,  I  think  there  was  some 
demagoguery  in  this.  But,  it's  my 
understanding  that  all  of  you  have  been 
given  a  report— has  a  kind  of  a  green 
cover — on  the  Nicaraguan  situation,  and 
it  has  also  been  delivered  to  every 
member  of  the  Congress. 

And  believe  me,  I  wouldn't  "round 
file"  those.  I'd  look  at  them.  Because  the 
information  is  in  there,  it  reveals  that 
everything  we've  said  about  the  San- 
dinista  government  is  a  proven  fact. 
They  are  trying  to  destroy  El  Salvador 
by  providing  the  rebels  there  with  the 
wherewithal  to  do  it.  They  are  a 
totiilitarian  government,  but  you'll  also 
find  in  there  a  statement  by  Ogarkov  of 
the  Soviet  military.  This  was  prior  to 
our  rescue  mission  in  Grenada. 

But  he  openly  stated  that  after  all 
the  years  of  only  having  a  base  in  the 
Western  hemisphere  in  Cuba,  that  now 
they  had  bases  here  in  Nicaragua  and  in 


Grenada.  Well,  they  don't  have  one  in 
Grenada  anymore.  And  I  think  that  it  is 
the  responsibility  of  this  government  to 
assist  the  people  of  Nicaragua  in  seeing 
that  they  don't  have  one  in  Nicaragua. 

Q.  Vice  President  Bush  has 
asserted  that  Mondale  and  the 
Democrats  don't  understand  the  com- 
munist threat  in  Central  America.  Do 
you  agree? 

A.  That  they  don't  understand  the 
communist  threat?  Well,  either  that,  or 
they're  ignoring  it. 

Q.  Do  you  think  they're  ignoring 
it? 

A.  They  seem  to  be  opposing 
everything  that  we've  tried  to  do,  in- 
cluding the  aid  to  El  Salvador.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  I've  been  very  worried 
that  their  niggardly  treatment  of  El 
Salvador  is  such  that  we  might  see — it's 
comparable  to  letting  El  Salvador  slowly 
bleed  to  death.  And  then  they  would  be 
able  to  point  a  finger  and  say,  "Well, 
see,  your  program  didn't  work." 

Q.  The  Polish  Government  is 
releasing  hundreds  of  political 
prisoners  in  a  move  that  appears  to 
meet  one  of  your  conditions  for  nor- 
malizing relations.  You  have  removed 
some  of  the  sanctions  you  imposed  a 
couple  of  years  ago.  Will  you  remove 
others,  and  if  so,  when  do  you  think 
youll  be  acting? 

A.  We're  studying  what  they've 
done  in  their  legislation  on  amnesty  very 
carefully  right  now.  Our  purpose  from 
the  beginning  has  been,  with  regard  to 
the  sanctions,  that  we  know  that  in 
some  instances  those  sanctions  are 
penalizing  not  only  the  Government  of 
Poland  with  which  we're  not  in  very 


freedom  and  opportunity  for  the  new 
world  will  at  long  last  be  realized. 

By  working  together,  the  free  peo) 
of  this  hemisphere  can  make  certain  tt 
the  next  century  will  indeed  be  our  cei 
tury,  a  democratic  century. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release; 
opening  and  closing  paragrapns  are  omitte 
here.  ■ 


much  sympathy,  but  the  people 
themselves.  We  don't  want  to  impose 
hardships  on  the  people. 

And  if  their  legislation  on  amnest; 
and  things  of  that  kind  have  met  the 
conditions  that  we  laid  down — yes,  wi 
will  meet  with  regard  to  lifting  the  sa 
tions. 


I( 


as 


Q.  Could  the  United  States  con- 
tinue its  defense  commitments  to  N 
Zealand  if  it's  denied  court  access  f 
nuclear  ships?  And,  if  this  happens, 
would  it  effect  American  trade  wit] 
New  Zealand? 

A.  I  don't  think  that  would  effect 
trade.  But  I  do  know,  and  I  would 
rather  not  get  in  too  deeply  to 
anything — because  that  is  something 
that  will  be  worked  out  and  negotiate 
with  the  new  Government  of  New 
Zealand.  And  I  have  every  reason  to 
optimistic  that  there  won't  be  any  de 
to  our  ships. 


JS 

It 


Q.  If  the  port  access  is  denied, 
the  Labor  Party  says  it  will  do,  wo 
the  United  States  conclude  a  separ 
peace  treaty  with  Australia. 

A.  I  don't  want  to  get  into  thing 
anything  that  might  sound  as  if  I'm 
pressuring  or  threatening  or  anythir 
the  kind.  So,  let  me  just  say  that  we 
going  to  do  our  best  to  persuade  the 
that  it  is  in  their  best  interests  as  wi 
as  ours  for  us  to  continue  with  our 
alliance,  with  ANZUS,  those  countri 
as  we  have  been. 


ft 


iio 
III 
itoi 
!lol 
m 
4,1 

i. 

■mi 


'Text  from  White  House  pres.s  releas 


1(1 


Department  of  State  Bui  III 


?phe 


iE  SECRETARY 


^sia-Pacific  and  the  Future 


Secretary  Skidtz's  address  before  the 
mcil  071  Foreign  Relations  in 
lolulu  on  July  18,  1984.^ 

'*  understand  the  future,  you  must 
lerstand  the  Pacific.  I  came  to  this 
elusion  in  the  course  of  many  trips  to 
a  and  the  Pacific  as  a  private  citizen, 
five  trips  to  the  region  as  Secretary 
5tate  have  strengthened  my  convic- 
1.  In  economic  development,  in  the 
wth  of  free  institutions,  and  in  grow- 
global  influence,  the  Pacific  is  in- 
'  asingly  where  the  action  is.  As  impor- 
t  as  it  was  a  few  years  ago,  it  is 
re  important  today.  And  it  will  be 
n  more  so  tomorrow. 
Americans  welcome  this.  We  see  in 
growth  of  this  region  a  vitality  that 
mises  a  better  future  for  all.  When 
isident  Reagan  addressed  the 
anese  Diet  last  November  he  said: 


For  my  part.  I  welcome  this  new  Pacific 
.  Let  it  roll  peacefully  on,  carrying  a  two- 
flow  of  people  and  ideas  that  can  break 
n  barriers  of  suspicion  and  mistrust  and 
d  up  bonds  of  cooperation  and  shared 
mism. 

Hawaii,  our  gateway  to  the  region, 
jrs  vivid  and  dynamic  evidence  of 
lerica's  role  as  a  great  Pacific  nation. 
-e  the  historical  westward  movement 
)ur  population  has  been  enriched  by 

growing  diversity  of  talented  im- 
jants,  including  so  many  of 

anese,  Chinese,  Filipino,  Korean, 
:ific  island,  and  other  Asian  origins, 
security,  as  symbolized  by  the  silent 

imony  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  memorial, 
aextricably  bound  to  these  islands 

to  events  throughout  this  portion  of 

globe. 

And  Hawaii,  like  our  nation  as  a 
ole,  enjoys  a  rich  flow  of  two-way  in- 
tment  and  trade  with  Asia  and  the 
;Lfic.  While  our  trade  with  the  rest  of 

world  last  year  grew  by  only  one- 
f  percent,  trade  with  this  region  grew 
,  reaching  $135  billion.  That  means 
,t  over  one-third  of  our  total  world 
de  is  done  with  Asia  and  the 
3ific — and  it  exceeds  by  nearly  a 
irter  our  overseas  trade  with  any 
ler  area. 

)nly  a  few  years  ago  people  said  that 
lerica's  interest  and  America's 
!sence  were  receding  in  Asia;  they 
d  we  were  pulling  back.  Well,  in  the 
t  few  years  we  have  turned  that 
)und,  and  all  kinds  of  people  recognize 


that  fact.  As  the  authoritative  Chinese 
journal,  International  Studies  Research, 
put  it,  "1983  was  a  year  symbolizing  the 
return  of  the  United  States  to  Asia." 
As  we  look  around  the  region,  we 
see  good  news  in  many  places,  good 
news  for  American  interests  and  good 
news  for  the  people  of  the  Asia-Pacific 
region.  A  fresh  and  confident  American 
foreign  policy  approach  is  in  tune  with 
the  dynamism  of  the  region  and  has 
helped  foster  a  string  of  success  stories. 
Let  me  run  through  a  partial  list. 

Japan 

The  U.S. -Japan  relationship  has 
emerged  as  one  of  the  most  important  in 
the  world.  Today  our  excellent  relations 
with  Japan  are  particularly  reinforced 
by  the  warm  personal  relationship  be- 
tween President  Reagan  and  Prime 
Minister  Nakasone,  who  have  met 
together  four  times  in  just  the  last  year 
and  a  half.  It  is  a  far  cry  today  from 
1960,  when  the  first  American  Presiden- 
tial visit  to  Japan  was  canceled  because 
of  anti-American  rioting. 

During  the  President's  visit  to  Tokyo 
last  fall,  and  in  intensive  efforts  since 
then,  we  have  worked  cooperatively  with 


Japan's  new  and  more  active 
diplomacy  has  brought  a  stronger  com- 
mon interest  in  arms  control.  At  the 
Williamsburg  summit  hosted  by  Presi- 
dent Reagan,  Japan  participated  for  the 
first  time  in  a  joint  statement  on  arms 
control  and  security— and  did  so  again  at 
the  London  summit  last  June. 

Although  there  is  more  that  Japan 
needs  to  do,  America  has  benefited  from 
Japan's  increased  defense  capabilities 
and  deepened  cooperation  with  us. 
Japanese  support  for  U.S.  bases  in 
Japan,  for  example,  now  exceeds 
$1  billion— or  more  than  $22,000  for 
every  U.S.  serviceman  stationed  there. 

China 

Relations  with  China  are  more  solid  and 
stable  than  ever.  We  have  freed 
ourselves  of  exaggerated  fears  and 
unreal  expectations,  and  we  are  focusing 
on  the  significant  interests  our  countries 
have  in  common. 

•  Last  year,  President  Reagan 
decided  on  a  major  liberalization  of  high 
technology  trade  with  China.  This  move 
offers  significant  trade  prospects  for 
American  exporters  and  acknowledges 
our  interest  in  participating  in  China's 
economic  modernization. 

•  We  have  smoothed  the  way  for 
economic  interaction  between  our  two 
very  different  systems  by  negotiating 


We  have  expanded  our  cooperation  with  Japan 
as  it  has  become  one  of  the  principal  donors  of 
economic  assistance  to  the  Third  World.  .  .  . 


the  Japanese  to  achieve  more  equitable 
access  for  U.S.  products  to  Japan's 
markets,  with  solid  results  in  the  areas 
of  computers,  telecommunications  equip- 
ment, semiconductors,  agricultural  prod- 
ucts, and  many  others,  as  well  as  access 
to  Japan's  important  financial  markets. 
Much  remains  to  be  done,  but  there  is  a 
record  of  solid  accomplishment. 

We  have  expanded  our  cooperation 
with  Japan  as  it  has  become  one  of  the 
principal  donors  of  economic  assistance 
to  the  Third  World,  not  limited  to  the 
Asia-Pacific  region  but  including  such 
key  countries  as  Egypt,  Turkey,  and 
Pakistan.  And  Japan  is  now  taking  a 
new  and  helpful  role  in  the  Caribbean. 


agreements  on  important  issues  like  tax- 
ation of  foreign  businesses,  textiles,  civil 
aviation,  and  industrial  and  technological 
cooperation. 

•  China's  Minister  of  Defense  and 
ours  have  had  an  important  exchange  of 
visits.  Careful  discussions  have  begun  on 
ways  in  which  American  technology  and 
equipment  might  better  enable  China  to 
counter  Soviet  military  intimidation. 
This  is  an  important  development,  but  it 
is  also  an  area  where  we  give  careful 
consideration  to  the  concerns  of  our 
allies  and  other  friends  in  the  region. 
During  those  frigid  years  when  we  had 
no  contact  with  China,  we  were  much 
criticized.  Today  we  are  able  to  play  a 
constructive  role  in  China's  moderniza- 
tion and  changing  relationship  with 
Asia. 


THE  SECRETARY 


•  And,  for  the  first  time  since  nor- 
malization, an  American  President  iias 
visited  China.  President  Reagan's  trip 
made  an  important  contribution,  not 
only  because  of  the  warmth  of  the  recep- 
tion and  the  substance  of  the  discussions 
but  also  by  the  candor  and  directness 
with  which  the  President  addressed  our 
concerns  as  well  as  our  hopes. 

Throughout  our  recent  development 
of  the  U.S. -China  relationship.  President 
Reagan  has  insisted  that  we  not  harm 
our  old  friends  in  the  course  of  mai<ing 
new  ones.  Our  relations  with  the  people 
of  Taiwan,  although  unofficial,  are  warm 
and  steadily  expanding.  Last  year  our 
two-way  trade  with  Taiwan  passed  the 
$1.')  billion  level. 

Korea 

Korean  confidence  in  our  commitment  to 
their  defense  was  shaken  by  President 
Carter's  planned  withdrawal  of  U.S. 
troops.  The  effects  throughout  Asia 
were  profound.  Today,  their  confi- 
dence has  been  substantially  restored, 
bolstered  most  recently  by  the 
President's  visit.  Our  policies  in  support 
of  South  Korean  statesmanship  helped 
the  region  to  survive  the  shock  of  the 
Rangoon  bombing  without  escalation  to 
far  wider  violence.  In  the  past,  such  an 
event  might  have  led  to  war.  Today, 
however,  we  have  helped  build  a  safety 


To  emphasize  the  importance  we  at- 
tach to  Korea,  President  Reagan  within 
weeks  of  his  inauguration  met  with 
President  Chun  Doo-hwan.  Since  the 
release  of  a  prominent  opposition  figure 
in  early  1981,  we  have  seen  important 
relaxations  of  authoritarian  controls  in 
South  Korea,  including  the  release  of 
many  more  political  prisoners,  the 
reduction  of  restrictions  on  political  ac- 
tivity, and  the  removal  of  police  control 
from  campuses.  Much  remains  to  be 
done,  but  even  gradual  steps  toward 
liberalization  are  not  easy  for  a  country 
in  a  virtual  state  of  war,  one  whose  sur- 
vival depends  on  maintaining  political 
stability.  We  regard  as  particularly 
significant  President  Chun's  declared  in- 
tention to  turn  over  power  peacefully 
when  his  term  ends  in  1988,  for  only 
where  peaceful  change  is  routine  can 
genuine  political  stability  prevail. 

Southeast  Asia 

I  have  just  returned  from  the  annual 
meeting  of  ASEAN — the  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations— whose  work 
is  of  the  greatest  importance  to  our 
overall  Pacific  policy.  Each  of  the  na- 
tions of  this  remarkable  regional 
group — Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philip- 
pines, Singapore,  Thailand,  and,  most 
recently,  Brunei — has  a  unique  impor- 
tance. They  are  diverse  in  almost  every 
respect,  except  in  their  common  commit- 


Our  exports  to  Korea  for  just  a  single  year  now  ex- 
ceed the  entire  total  of  economic  aid  we  gave  Korea 
from  1946  until  the  program  ended  in  1981. 


net  of  supportive  ties  and  mutual  con- 
fidence that  is  a  major  factor  for  keep- 
ing the  peace. 

Bolstered  by  confidence  in  its  securi- 
ty, the  Korean  economy  has  been  boom- 
ing, growing  9.3%  last  year  with  infla- 
tion of  only  0.2%.  Our  exports  to  Korea 
for  just  a  single  year  now  exceed  the  en- 
tire total  of  economic  aid  we  gave  Korea 
from  1946  until  the  program  ended  in 
1981.  Korea's  annual  purchases  of 
military  equipment  from  the  United 
States  are  more  than  half  again  as  large 
as  the  military  sales  credits  we  provide 
each  year.  Korea,  in  short,  is  bearing 
the  lion's  share  of  its  own  defense  and  is 
paying  its  own  way. 


ment  to  the  peace  and  economic  develop- 
ment of  the  region.  Collectively,  they 
represent  almost  300  million  people  with 
a  combined  gross  national  product  of 
over  $200  billion,  a  figure  that  has  been 
growing  by  more  than  7%  annually  dur- 
ing the  whole  decade  of  the  1970s. 

Having  just  met  the  foreign 
ministers  of  these  six  nations,  I  can  con- 
firm that  this  is  one  important  part  of 
the  world  where  the  United  States  is 
respected  and  where  our  attention  to 
their  problems  is  appreciated.  These 
countries  are  understandably  nervous 
that  their  interests  may  be  affected  by 
our  dealings  with  their  giant  neighbors 
to  the  north — China  and  Japan.  But  a 
look  at  our  record  cannot  but  be 
reassuring;  our  cooperative  involvement 


with  ASEAN  and  similar  nations  of  th 
Pacific  demonstrates  our  shared  conce 
about  their  problems  and  our  moral  co 
mitment  to  their  integrity.  Certainly  v. 
have  a  big  stake  in  their  continued  sue 
cess.  Our  trade  reached  $23  billion  las 
year,  making  ASEAN  America's  fifth 
largest  trading  partner. 

We  also  are  gratified  by  ASEAN's 
success  so  far  in  forcing  the  world  to 
dress  the  problem  of  Vietnam's  occup, 
tion  of  Kampuchea.  ASEAN  has 
developed  and  won  support  for  a  cred 
ble  political  strategy  for  a  peaceful  se 
tlement.  They  have  steadily  built  up  t 
strength  of  the  resistance,  though  we 
share  their  concern  that  the  noncom- 
munist  resistance  has  not  grown  as  iif 
as  the  Khmer  Rouge,  an  organization 
that  we  all  abhor. 

We  have  benefited  from  the  role  i 
the  ASEAN  countries  in  providing  fit 
asylum  for  1.37  million  refugees  from 
Indochina  since  1975,  and  we  are  pro 
of  our  own  role  in  providing  permane 
resettlement  for  6.50, OCX)— almost  hal 
the  entire  total.  It  is  one  of  the  great 
humamt£!,rian  achievements  of  our  tin 
and  one  by  which  our  own  society  ha; 
been  enriched  as  well. 

This  is  a  success  story,  but  it  is  a  '■> 
tragedy  too.  And  beyond  that,  it  is  a   •' 
lesson  to  be  learned.  Let  us  not  forg( 
that  many  of  our  friends  in  Southeas 
Asia  supported  our  effort  in  the  Viet  t" 
nam  war.  They  told  us  then— as  Prir 
Minister  Lee  Kwan  Yew  did,  for  ex- 
ample—that if  we  faltered  in  our  pui 
pose,  the  peoples  of  Indochina  would 
suffer  and  their  neighbors  would  feel 
threat  come  closer.  They  told  us  thet 
would  be  oppression  and  suffering.  1 
told  us  there  would  be  boat  people.  / 
they  were  right. 

Finally,  the  ASEAN  countries  h; 
played  a  substantial  part  in  furtherir 
subject  of  the  highest  national  priori 
full  accounting  of  our  prisoners  of  w 
(POWs)  and  missing  in  action  (MIA) 
Indochina.  Some  progress  has  been 
made.  The  recent  return  of  the  rem; 
of  eight  Americans  from  Vietnam  is 
significant  and  welcome  event,  but  t 
is  much  more  to  be  done.  Just  last 
February,  we  received  a  promise  frc 
Vietnamese  authorities  of  accelerate 
cooperation  in  accounting  for  missinij 
Americans,  along  with  agreement  tc 
resume  the  technical  meetings  which 
provide  valuable  opportunities  for  ex 
changing  POW/MIA  information.  W 
are  pleased  that  the  Vietnamese  hav. 
recently  agreed  to  have  a  technical 
meeting  in  Hanoi  in  mid-August,  am 
look  forward  to  accelerated  progress 
this  most  important  issue. 


THE  SECRETARY 


i'/A'S 

itlif  South  Pacific,  the  focus  of  our 
1  u\  is  our  ANZUS  [Australia,  New 
;ilaiul,  United  States  security  treaty] 
es,  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  These 
'  countries  that  share  with  us  proud 
ditions  of  democratic  freedom  and  a 
lingness  to  bear  the  cost  of  preserv- 

those  values.  It  is  significant  that 
■se  two  allies  have  fought  by  our  side 
ill  four  major  wars  of  this  century.  If 

have  the  courage  and  the  vision  to 
!p  this  and  our  other  alliances  strong, 

will  have  done  much  to  ensure  the 
ice  we  now  enjoy. 

We  recognize  that  managing  a 
nocratic  alliance  requires  mutual 
insel  as  well  as  mutual  obligations.  It 
or  this  reason  that  we  have  taken 
[ZUS  country  views  seriously  into  ac- 
mt  in  formulating  our  arms  control 
ivisions.  Arms  control,  in  fact,  was 
important  agenda  item  in  our 
etings  which  concluded  on  Tuesday  in 

lington. 

We  have  been  rewarded  with  a  cor- 
ponding  sense  of  cooperation  and 
ponsibility.  For  example,  when  the 
3or  Party  took  office  in  Australia  a 
ir  and  a  half  ago,  they  began  a 
rching  and  serious  debate  on  the 
<s  and  benefits  of  ANZUS.  The  result 

heir  thorough  review  was  a  firm 
ffirmation  of  the  value  of  the  alliance 
i  a  renewed  commitment  to  it. 

With  the  recent  election  in  New 
iland,  we  are  ready  and  willing,  as 

ays,  to  work  with  the  new  govern- 
nt  and  review  with  our  New  Zealand 
es  the  profound  basis  and  mutual 
lefits  of  our  alliance.  Indeed,  my  re- 
it  trip  enabled  me  to  meet  with  the 
iv  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Lange,  even 
I  'ore  he  took  office.  We  are  confident 
;.it  an  openminded  and  thorough  look 
our  alliance  will  result  in  a  reaffirma- 
n  of  the  importance  of  an  effective 
JZUS  for  the  peace  of  the  region  and 
■  world.  ANZUS  is,  after  all,  not 
iply  an  isolated  alliance  for  the 
'ense  of  one  portion  of  the  globe,  but 
I  rt  of  a  broader  network  of  relations 
it  together  help  to  hold  in  check  a 
ibal  threat.  In  today's  world,  a  threat 
any  one  region  can  become  a  threat 
us  all. 


le  Pacific  Islands 

le  United  States  is  working,  along 
th  our  ANZUS  allies,  to  support 
iedom  and  development  for  the  many 
oples  of  the  South  Pacific.  Some  will 
ek  fulfillment  in  independence  and 


others  in  association  with  larger  states. 
Last  year,  the  United  States  Senate 
ratified  four  treaties  resolving  old  claims 
disputes  between  the  United  States  and 
four  small  island  states.  This  year,  the 
President  has  submitted  the  Compacts 
of  Free  Association  with  the  Federated 
States  of  Micronesia  and  the  Republic  of 
the  Marshall  Islands  for  congressional 
approval.  We  are  working  with  the 
island  states  on  agreements  to  regulate 
tuna  fishing  and  to  control  the  dumping 
of  nuclear  waste  in  their  areas. 

On  a  personal  note,  I  stopped  at 
American  Samoa  on  my  way  here.  I  was 
there  briefly,  in  Pago-Pago,  during 
World  War  II.  I  have  never  forgotten 


peace,  dialogue  replaces  diatribe,  and 
the  good  will  of  their  peoples  will  carry 
the  day. 

Freedom  alone  can  work  miracles. 
But  in  a  region  filled  with  historic 
animosities,  threatened  by  heavily  armed 
totalitarian  powers,  slowed  by  the  need 
to  gather  skills  and  resources,  and — in 
many  cases — only  gradually  adopting 
democratic  processes,  sound  policy  is  a 
vital  ingredient. 

The  U.S.  Role  in  the  Pacific 

The  Pacific  region  has  benefited  from 
the  mature  leadership  of  many  of  the 
countries  I  have  mentioned.  But  it  has 


.  .  .  the  ASEAN  countries  have  played  a 
substantial  part  in  furthering  ...  a  full  accounting 
of  our  prisoners  of  war  and  missing  in  action  in  In- 
dochina. 


those  people,  their  pride  in  their  tradi- 
tions and  their  aspirations  for  the 
future.  It  was  great  to  go  back.  They 
are  proud  today  to  be  Americans,  and 
we  are  proud  that  they  are  one  of  us. 

I  have  given  you  a  catalogue  of  suc- 
cesses. There  are,  of  course,  plenty  of 
problems.  The  Rangoon  tragedy  reminds 
us  of  the  depth  of  North  Korean 
viciousness  and  the  ease  with  which  that 
peninsula  could  again  become  an  arena 
of  violence.  In  the  Philippines,  despite 
progress  made  in  recent  elections 
toward  restoring  democratic  processes, 
major  economic  and  political  problems 
continue.  Throughout  the  region,  the 
threat  of  growing  protectionism 
threatens  all  our  trade,  and  the  tragedy 
in  Indochina  goes  on. 

Other  problems  lie  just  below  the 
surface.  In  many  places,  economic  prog- 
ress is  fragile.  Tensions  among  ethnic 
groups  within  countries  and  territorial 
disputes  between  countries  are  a  con- 
stant worry.  The  region  still  has  one  of 
the  highest  concentrations  of  military 
forces  anywhere  in  the  world.  Thus, 
even  the  most  heartening  success  stories 
cannot  be  taken  for  granted. 

But  the  forces  for  success  are  pro- 
found, and  I  am  optimistic  that  success 
will  keep  the  upper  hand.  When  room  is 
left  for  individual  initiative,  peoples  and 
nations  will  prosper.  When  democratic 
progress  can  be  made  peacefully,  stabili- 
ty will  follow.  When  nations  turn  to 


also  benefited  from  the  sound  diplo- 
matic, economic,  and  defense  policies  of 
our  own  country.  I  am  optimistic 
because  I  am  confident  that  a  strong 
U.S.  role  will  continue.  Most  of  the  suc- 
cess we  have  seen  is  the  result  of  the 
growing  strength  of  the  countries  of  the 
region  themselves.  But  crucial  as  this 
may  be,  America's  role  has  been 
singularly  important  and  must  be  car- 
ried forward. 

Diplomatically,  we  are  often  the 
country  with  which  others  can  work 
best  Our  recovery  is  in  many  ways  the 
engine  of  economic  growth  for  the  entire 
region.  And  our  military  strength  pro- 
vides the  indispensable  deterrent  essen- 
tial to  maintaining  stability  and  con- 
fidence among  our  friends.  America's  in- 
terests in  the  region  and  the  interests  of 
our  friends  require  a  strong  and  perma- 
nent U.S.  presence  in  every  area  of  the 
Pacific. 

The  three  keys  to  sound  U.S.  policy 
in  the  region,  therefore,  are  a  free  and 
open  world  economy,  a  solid  deterrent 
posture,  and  an  effective  diplomacy.  We 
are  working  hard  to  obtain  all  three.  To 
put  it  another  way,  the  watchwords  of 
our  policy,  since  President  Reagan  took 
office,  have  been:  realism,  strength,  and 
negotiation.  Let  me  briefly  review  these 
with  you. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Realism.  Realism  requires  us  to 
acknowledge  that  economic  growth  lies 
at  the  heart  of  progress  around  the 
Pacific.  It  requires  as  well  a  recognition 
that  the  single  greatest  contribution  to 
the  current  prosperity  of  the  Pacific 
region  is  the  recovery  of  our  own 
economy;  indeed,  the  recovery  of  our 
economy  has  been  the  engine  of  our 
economic  recovery  spreading  ever  more 
widely  throughout  the  world. 

It  is  essential  that  we  point  out  this 
reality  to  others.  As  I  told  our  ASEAN 
partners,  strong  growth  in  the  U.S. 
economy  has  been  the  major  factor  in 
their  own  growth.  Increased  exports  to 
the  United  States  from  ASEAN  ac- 
counted for  over  60%  of  those  nations' 
total  export  increase  in  1983.  The 
achievement  of  sustained  noninfiationary 
growth  in  the  United  States  and 
maintenance  of  our  open  markets  are  of 
prime  importance  to  the  developing 
world. 

Similarly,  we  must  point  out  the 
truth  about  "protectionism."  We  in  the 
United  States  do  face  protectionist 
pressure,  and  sometimes  we  are  forced 
to  limit  the  growth  of  imports  of  some 
products.  But  our  economy  is  a  genuine- 
ly open  one.  We  are,  for  example,  the 
world's  biggest  market  for  the  manufac- 
tured exports  of  developing  countries, 
taking  over  50%  of  such  exports  to  all 
industrial  countries. 

It  is  time  for  all  to  realize  that  Presi- 
dent Reagan  has  turned  the  American 
economy  toward  productivity  and  expan- 


mous  concentrations  of  military  power 
in  the  hands  of  regimes  that  have  shown 
little  hesitation  to  use  force,  either 
directly  or  as  a  means  of  intimidation, 
when  provided  with  an  opening.  Viet- 
nam has  1  million  men  under  arms,  a 
staggering  number  for  a  country  of  that 
size.  North  Korea  is  one  of  the  most 
heavily  militarized  nations  in  the  world, 
and  it  has  shown  no  scruples  about  put- 
ting force  to  use.  Beyond  the  strategic 
missiles  on  land  and  sea  that  threaten 
the  United  States  itself,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  dramatically  increased  its 
forces  in  the  Pacific  region  to  include 
over  50  divisions,  3,000  modern  combat 
aircraft,  its  largest  fleet,  and  135 
intermediate-range  nuclear  missiles, 
poised  against  the  nations  of  the  Pacific 
area,  including  ourselves.  It  has  acquired 
forward  facilities  at  Cam  Ranh  Bay  and 
has  now  stationed  bombers  in  Vietnam 
as  well. 

Fortunately,  nations  of  the  region 
are  facing  these  dangers  realistically  and 
building  up  their  own  strength.  As  a 
result,  we  have  an  increasingly  strong 
ally  in  Korea  that  now  bears  the  lion's 
share  of  the  cost  of  its  own  defense.  We 
are  hopeful  that  Japan  will  steadily 
move  to  achieve  its  own  defense  goals, 
which  would  contribute  to  greater 
stability  in  Northeast  Asia  and  permit 
greater  U.S.  flexibility  throughout  the 
region.  And  China,  with  which  we  now 
have  a  widening  and  maturing  relation- 
ship, plays  its  own  special  role  in  lending 
stability  to  the  region. 


ANZUS  is  .  .  .  part  of  a  broader  network  of  rela- 
tions that  together  help  to  hold  in  check  a  global 
threat. 


sion  once  again.  We  are  the  benefi- 
ciaries, and  the  world's  nations  are  the 
beneficiaries.  This  is  a  policy  I  assure 
you  we  will  continue. 

The  U.S.  economy  has  performed 
magnificently.  It  is  a  major  source  of 
our  own  and  our  allies'  strength. 
Economic  growth,  in  turn,  is  a  key  to 
both  political  and  military  strength. 

Strength.  No  course  of  economic 
development  and  no  effort  at  diplomacy 
can  succeed  in  an  environment  of  fear 
borne  by  a  sense  of  weakness.  The 
Asian  and  Pacific  region  is  one  of  enor- 


Only  a  few  years  ago,  our  own  posi- 
tion of  strength  in  the  Pacific  region 
was  in  question.  No  more.  President 
Reagan  has  made  it  clear  where  we 
stand.  And  our  forces  in  the  Pacific  have 
new  muscle. 

Our  presence  in  Korea  is  critical  to 
preventing  another  war  in  that  penin- 
sula. In  the  vast  reaches  of  the  North, 
Western,  and  South  Pacific  our  Navy  is 
an  essential  element  of  stability.  Two  of 
our  most  important  military  facilities— 
Subic  Bay  and  Clark  Air  Force  Base- 
are  in  the  Philippines.  Guam  has  large 


and  vital  air  and  naval  bases.  On 
Okinawa,  our  Marines  are  forward- 
positioned  and  we  have  there,  as  well, 
an  air  division  equipped  with  the  most 
sophisticated  F-15s  and  the  AW  ACS 
[airborne  warning  and  control  system] 
Our  alliance  with  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  has  been  a  steady  force  for 
peace  throughout  its  33  years. 

Make  no  mistake;  the  United  Stat 
is  committed  permanently  to  the  Pacij 
and  President  Reagan's  program  to 
restore  America's  defense  capabilities 
giving  us  the  wherewithal  to  carry  oui 
the  commitments  and  perform  the  tas 
essential  to  peace.  We  shall  not  shirk 
from  that  role  as  others  take  their  pla 
beside  us.  We  seek  the  increased 
strength  of  our  allies  not  as  a  substitu 
but  as  a  complement  to  our  own  effor 

Negotiation.  But  a  sound  econom 
and  a  strong  military  commitment  are 
not  enough.  Nor  can  they  provide  stal 
ty  and  confidence  by  themselves.  The; 
must  be  accompanied  by  an  active  an( 
creative  diplomacy  and  a  willingness  t 
negotiate. 

It  is  through  diplomacy  that  we  h 
forged  security  ties  with  our  democra 
ANZUS  partners,  Australia  and  New 
Zealand.  It  is  diplomacy  that  last  wee 
brought  together  in  Jakarta  the 
disparate  group  of  ASEAN  nations  ir 
their  remarkable  annual  session  of  gi' 
and-take  and  enhanced  economic 
cooperation.  That  cooperation  has  goi 
beyond  the  economic  realm  to  devise 
strategy  to  deal  with  Vietnam's  occuf 
tion  of  Kampuchea  and  support  for  tl 
noncommunist  resistance.  And  it  is 
through  diplomacy  that  we  build  for  i 
future. 

On  this  trip,  which  I  conclude  toe  |^ 
we  began  small  but  potentially  far- 
reaching  steps.  In  Jakarta,  I  signed  ; 
memorandum  of  understanding  on  in 
vestment  issues  with  Indonesia.  This 
only  a  first  such  agreement  in  this  fii 
but  it  means  we  may  contemplate  an 
eventual  investment  treaty  and  even 
the  far  future,  build  toward  a  genern 
agreement  on  investment  to  parallel 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade. 

In  a  similar  vein,  during  this  trij 
general  subject  of  the  Pacific  Basin  \  i 
addressed  formally  by  a  group  of 
governments  for  the  first  time.  Initi; 
discussions  will  have  a  specific  focus  i 
human  resources  development.  This 
only  a  start,  but  its  implications  for    ■ 
years  ahead  could  be  great. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Finally,  it  is  diplomacy  that  enables 
|o  deal  with  the  world  as  it  is.  Our 
lomy  flourishes  best  in  conjunction 
.  others  who  understand  the  benefits 
he  free  market  and  put  it  into  prac- 
.  Our  military's  mission  is  to  defend 
rom  those  who  do  not  wish  us  well, 
it  is  through  diplomacy  and  negotia- 
that  we  are  able  to  foster  our  in- 
■sts  with  adversaries  as  well  as 
nds.  Here  in  the  Pacific  we  value  our 
e  association  with  our  fellow 
locracies  and  with  others  who  share 
goals.  We  also  engage  and  work 
3tructively— and  often  to  mutual  ad- 
tage— with  those  whose  view  of  the 
'  to  organize  political  and  economic 
is  quite  different  from  ours.  Thus,  it 
irough  this  third  pillar  of  our  policy 
;  we  have  the  best  hope  of  forestall- 
eonflict  and  solving  problems  before 
/  threaten  to  overwhelm  us. 

(elusion 

ive  portrayed  a  scene  of  success 
ly.  It  is  undeniable.  The  Pacific  and 
future  are  inseparable.  I  believe  that 
-e  is  no  more  remarkable  story  of 
^ress  and  no  greater  source  of  op- 
Tsm  than  here  in  this  region.  But  I 
e  also  called  attention  to  the  continu- 
challenge  ahead  and  to  the  ways  we 
moving  to  meet  it.  There  are  prob- 
s.  But  we  have  a  lot  going  for 
-not  created  by  luck  or  chance  but 
)ur  own  endeavor  and  our  own  vi- 
,.  My  message  today  is  simply  this: 
)ur  performance,  by  our  strength,  by 

diplomacy,  let  us  encourage  this 
■nendous  momentum  toward  peace 

development  in  the  Pacific. 


Secretary  Visits  Asia; 

Attends  ASEAN  and  ANZUS  Meetings 


Secretary  Shultz  visited  Hong  Kong 
{July  7-8.  1981,}.  Malaysia  (July  9-10), 
Singapore  (July  10-11).  Indonesia  (July 
ll-l!t)  to  participate  in  the  Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN) 
dialogue.  Australia  (July  U-15).  and 
New  Zealand  (July  15-17)  to  attend  the 
33d  meeting  of  the  ANZUS  Council 
[Australia,  New  Zealand,  JJyiited  States 
security  treaty]. 

Following  are  his  remarks  and  news 
conferences  made  on  various  occasions 
during  the  trip,  the  text  of  the  ANZUS 
communique,  and  a  joint  news  con- 
ference held  by  Secret ar-y  Shultz  and 
Foreign  Ministers  William  Hayden  of 
Australia  and  Warren  Cooper  of  New 
Zealand. 


'Press  release  170  of  July  19,  1984. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
KUALA  LUMPUR, 
JULY  10,  19841 

I  would  like  to  express  my  appreciation 
to  the  Prime  Minister  of  Malaysia  and 
his  colleagues,  the  Deputy  Prime 
Minister,  the  Acting  Foreign  Secretary, 
and  all  the  people  who  have  been  so^ 
gracious  to  us  and  engaged  with  us  in 
discussions  of  matters  of  concern  to  both 
countries  and  also  have  made  our  stay  a 
very  interesting  and  pleasant  one. 

This  is  not  my  first  time  to 
Malaysia,  so  it  is  interesting  especially 
for  me  to  see  the  progress  which  is  right 
in  front  of  your  eyes.  My  first  visit  was 
about  10  years  ago  when  I  was 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  I  have 
been  here  since  as  a  private  citizen.  I 
have  had  a  chance  to  watch  the  growth 
of  Kuala  Lumpur,  not  only  in  the  city 
itself  but  the  wonderful  highway  from 
the  airport  here.  It  is  a  pleasure  to  see 
this  tangible  evidence  of  economic 
development.  Again,  I  am  very  grateful 
for  the  great  hospitality  that  we  have 
had. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  willing  to 
give  more  aid  of  any  kind  to  the  non- 
communist  elements  of  the  Kampuchea 
coalition? 

A.  The  question  of  Kampuchea  has 
come  up  in  our  discussions  here,  and  I 
am  sure  it  will  be  a  centerpiece  in  the 
ASEAN  discussions.  The  United  States 
has  basically  taken  the  view  that  we  will 
support  the  efforts  that  the  ASEAN 
countries  are  making,  and  we  support 
them  diplomatically,  and  we  support 
them  in  other  ways,  some  in  terms  of 


direct  support  to  individual  countries, 
especially  Thailand  as  a  front-line  state. 
We  have  had  massive  support  for  the  ef- 
forts over  the  flood  of  refugees  fleeing 
the  Vietnamese  aggression,  and  in  other 
ways  we  have  been  and  will  continue  to 
be  supportive,  and  I  don't  want  to  com- 
ment on  incremental  moves  one  way  or 
another. 

Q.  Are  there  any  new  views  you 
could  share  with  us  on  the  proposed 
U.S.  talks  with  the  Soviets  in  Vienna? 

A.  There  are  diplomatic  contacts 
practically  daily  on  the  subject.  I've 
been,  of  course,  following  it  very  closely, 
but  the  situation  remains  about  where  it 
has  been  for  the  last  few  days,  namely 
the  Soviet  Union  seems  to  be  having 
great  difficulty  taking  "yes"  for  an 
answer. 

Q.  The  issue  of  U.S.-China  rela- 
tions has  been  brought  up  with  Malay- 
sian leaders  and  will  be  brought  up 
again  in  Jakarta.  In  yesterday's  brief- 
ing by  Malaysian  officials,  there  seems 
to  be  an  indication  that  Malaysia  has 
expressed  concern,  not  just  over 
military  collaboration  but  also 
technological  collaboration  which 
could  lead  to  a  defense  or  military 
capability  and  a  Chinese  threat  to 
Southeast  Asia.  Has  the  United  States 
given  an  assurance  to  Malaysia,  and 
later  to  ASEAN,  that  it  will  continue 
to  brief  them  on  any  major  develop- 
ment in  U.S.-China  relations,  and  is 
this  consultative  procedure  now  going 
to  be  a  part  of  U.S.-ASEAN  relations? 
A.  The  meeting  that  you  referred  to 
must  be  one  I  wasn't  in,  because  perhaps 
somebody  else  talked  about  those  things, 
but  I  know  that  the  question  of  China, 
and  its  relationship  to  the  ASEAN  ef- 
forts in  Kampuchea  and  its  posture  m 
Asia  generally,  is  of  great  interest,  ob- 
viously, to  Malaysia  and  others  in  the 
region.  The  evolution  of  U.S.  relations 
with  China  is  also  of  central  interest. 
We  do,  as  a  matter  of  course,  keep  our 
friends  advised  of  what  we  are  doing, 
and  we  will  certainly  continue  to  do 
that.  It's  our  view,  and  I  believe  widely 
shared  in  this  part  of  the  world,  that  the 
emergence  of  a  good  and  stable  relation- 
ship between  the  United  States  and 
China,  on  the  whole,  advances  the  idea 
of  stability  in  this  part  of  the  world,  and 
it  is  a  net  plus.  The  relationship  of  the 


THE  SECRETARY 


military  sort  that  you  mentioned  in  your 
question  is,  of  course,  in  its  early  stages 
and  focused  on  defensive  matters,  and  I 
don't  think  is,  in  any  sense,  a  threat  to 
other  parts  of  Asia.  Insofar  as  Southeast 
Asia  is  concerned,  of  course,  the  center 
of  gravity  of  the  U.S.  approach  is  with 
ASEAN  and  the  countries,  Malaysia  ob- 
viously included,  that  make  up  the 
ASEAN  countries.  We  have  worked 
very  closely  with  them  and  will  continue 
to  do  so. 

Q.  The  Prime  Minister  has  ex- 
pressed regrets  that  trade  relations 
between  United  States  and  Malaysia 
have  not  progressed  satisfactorily. 
What's  your  view  on  this? 

A.  i  don't  know  what  the  right 
definition  of  satisfactory  is.  If  you  just 
take  the  exports  of  Malaysia  to  the 
United  States,  if  you  compare  1983  with 
1982,  they  rose  13%.  If  you  take  the 
most  recent  figures,  which  are  the  first 
quarter  of  1984,  and  to  deal  with 
seasonal  factors  you  should  compare  it 
with  the  first  quarter  of  1983,  it's  up  by 
about  50%  now.  The  percentage  in- 
creases are  very  large  and  pretty  much 
across  the  board  as  to  products,  in- 
cluding the  often-cited  example  of  tex- 
tiles, which  1  think  the  increase  is 
something  on  the  order  of  69%,  very 
large,  but  that  is  on  a  small  base.  So 
there  had  been  large  increases. 

To  my  mind,  what  these  increases  il- 
lustrate is  the  impact  of  the  expansion 
to  the  U.S.  economy  on  the  economies  of 
countries  throughout  the  world,  and,  in 
citing  these  figures,  1  would  say 
Malaysia  is  not  an  exception,  not  that 
numbers  like  50%  can  be  typical  of 
anything,  that's  such  a  gigantic  increase. 
But  1  do  think  that,  in  a  sense,  the  hero 
of  world  economic  recovery  is  the 
recovery  of  the  U.S.  economy,  and  it  has 
been  a  very  good  thing  for  everybody, 
including  the  people  of  this  region. 

Q.  Several  U.S.  officials  have 
talked  about  increasing  humanitarian 
aid  to  noncommunist  factions  in  Kam- 
puchea. Can  you  give  us  an  idea  of 
what  kind  of  annual  aid  in  terms  of 
dollars  you  have  been  giving  and  what 
kind  of  proposals  you  have  offered? 

A.  I  suppose  the  most  important 
way  in  which  aid  is  given— of  the  sort 
you  have  in  mind— is  very  human  and 
personal,  and  that  is  the  longstanding 
and  heavy  involvement  of  the  United 
States  in  coping  with  the  large  flow  of 
refugees  from  Vietnamese  aggression.  I 
think  the  total  number  of  refugees  over 
the  last  7  years— or  what  is  the  time 


period  of  these  numbers  about  since 
1975?  So  say  almost  10  years,  is  like 
1,350,000,  something  on  that  order,  and 
roughly  half  of  those  have  wound  up  in 
the  United  States— some  650,000. 

We  have  reached  out  to  this  area 
and  I  suppose  in  the  tradition  of  the 
United  States,  of  being  a  country  made 
up,  in  a  sense,  of  refugees.  The  flow 
from  this  part  of  the  world  has  been 
taken  in,  and  the  most  humanitarian 
thing  you  can  do  is  to  help  people  when 
they  are  really  in  need,  and  we  will  con- 
tinue to  do  that. 

Insofar  as  more  direct  assistance  of 
one  kind  or  another  right  here,  I  don't 
have  the  numbers  right  on  the  top  of  my 
head,  but  if  you  add  up  the  development 
assistance  of  the  ASEAN  countries,  the 
security  assistance,  and  the  more 
humanitarian — directly  humanitarian — 
aid,  it  comes  to  a  very  large  annual 
number,  and  we  have  been  having  some 
discussions  out  here  as  to  what  that 
number  is.  It  depends  a  little  bit  on  just 
the  things  that  you  include  in  it,  but  it's 
on  the  order  of  half  a  billion  dollars  or 
perhaps  larger. 

Q.  There  was  a  report  in  the  local 
paper  to  the  effect  that  there  was  a 
rapid  increase  in  the  Soviet  buildup  in 
Cam  Ranh  Bay.  I  wonder  if  you  can 
comment  on  the  implications  of  this. 

A.  There  is  a  continuing  Soviet 
buildup  of  naval  forces — in  other  words, 
a  capacity  to  project  power  in  this  part 
of  the  world.  And  I  think  it's  a  matter 
that  should  be  of  concern  to  everyone;  it 
is  of  concern  to  us.  And  it  only  em- 
phasizes the  importance  of  strong 
friendships  here,  and  not  only  in  the 
case  of  the  ASEAN  countries  but 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  as  well.  So 
it's  part  of  the  general  Soviet  develop- 
ment of  their  military  capability,  and  I 
think  that  shows  the  importance  of  hav- 
ing a  strong  deterrent  capability,  not 
only  of  the  United  States  but  in  coopera- 
tion with  our  allies. 

Q.  I  understand  that  the  govern- 
ment has  reaffirmed  its  desire  to  pur- 
chase F-16-As,  the  relatively  ad- 
vanced aircraft.  What  is  the  U.S.  feel- 
ing about  this? 

A.  I  don't  believe  the  Thai  have 
finally  made  up  their  minds.  They  have 
been  given,  as  have  other  countries  in 
this  region,  a  thorough  briefing  on  the 
various  so-called  FX  aircraft  so  that 
they  can  see  the  characteristics  of  them, 
the  costs  of  them,  the  maintenance  prob- 
lems that  they  all  pose,  and  so  forth. 
And  they  will  have  to  look  at  all  of  these 
factors  and  decide  what  is  in  their  best 


interest  in  a  matter  of  discussion  with 
us.  But  as  a  general  proposition,  we 
want  to  support  the  efforts  of  the  coui 
tries  in  this  region  to  look  to  their 
security.  And  as  to  decisions  about  paj 
ticular  pieces  of  military  equipment, 
they  are  made  case  by  case,  but  as  a 
general  proposition,  we  look  with  favc 
on  sales  to  the  ASEAN  countries 

Q.  We  understand  that  the  Mala 
sian  position  is  that  an  economicalh 
strong  China  will  sooner  or  later  les 
to  a  militarily  strong  China  which  b 
the  potential  of  being  a  hegemonist 
power  in  Southeast  Asia.  That  is  th 
concern.  What  is  your  response  to  t 
line  of  thinking  about  China  if  it 
becomes  economically,  and  later  on 
militarily,  strong  as  well? 

A.  I  think  you  have  to  start  with 
the  proposition  that  China  is  there,  it 
an  important  country,  it  has  been  for 
long  time,  it  will  continue  to  be,  and, 
don't  have  any  doubt  in  my  mind  at  a 
that  as  an  economic  proposition  Chin 
will  develop.  And  it  seems  to  be  ex- 
pected that's  going  to  take  place.  The 
question  is  whether  that  developmeni 
from  the  standpoint  of  stability  in  thi 
region,  is  best  done  with  other  count 
cooperating  and  being  a  part  of  it.  A 
we  believe  that  it  is  important  for  ou 
own  interest,  as  a  potential  trading  j: 
ner  and  in  the  interest  of  security  m; 
ters  and  strategic  considerations  tha' 
are  very  clear,  to  have  a  good  workii 
relationship  with  China.  So  we  start 
build  that  up  in  a  way  that  we  think 
lend  stability  to  this  part  of  the  worl 

Q.  In  recent  years  the  Asian 
region,  particularly  ASEAN  countir 
has  become  quite  an  attractive  are;- 
investment  for  American  businessi 
compared  with  other  regions  of  th 
world.  What,  in  your  opinion,  coul 
ASEAN  governments  do  to  hasten 
flow  of  American  investment  in  thi 
region,  particularly  with  regards  t 
Malaysian  participation  here? 

A.  Basically  the  ASEAN  countr 
are  doing  very  well  in  expanding  tht 
economies  and  in  expanding  their  tr 
particularly  with  the  United  States, 
in  attracting  investment. 

Of  course,  the  basic  conditions  t 
attract  investments  are:  number  ont 
the  prospect  of  realizing  a  good  rate 
return  on  the  investment,  and  numb 
two,  being  able  to  sustain  it  because 
confidence  that  the  rules  of  the  gam 
that  prevailed  when  you  made  the  ii 
vestment  are  going  to  stay  the  samt 
that  you  know  the  conditions  that  ai 
going  to  affect  you.  1  think  that 


:« 


THE  SECRETARY 


thing  that  can  be  done  that  affects 
se  propositions  is  all  to  the  good. 
It  seems  to  me  that  it's  taken  for 
nted  these  days,  and  is  a  proper 
g,  that  a  country  that  is  the  host  to 
!Stment  expects  to  get  something  out 
;— not  simply  just  the  investment  as 
1.  But  one  of  the  reasons  that 
lign  investment  is  welcomed  is  that 
pie  of  the  host  country  learn 
lething:  they  get  trained,  they 
3me  better  able  to  carry  on 
Tiselves.  There  is  a  transfer  in  that 
se — the  deeper  sense  of  the  transfer 
echnology  and  managerial  and  other 
led  capabilities. 

But  I  think  from  the  standpoint  of 
r  question  what  is  there  to  do,  it  is 
ng  as  much  of  a  sense  of  continuity 
)ossible  and  allowing  investment  to 
le  into  areas  that  are  potentially 
fi  table. 

There  is  one  aspect  of  this  that  I  like 
mphasize,  particularly  in  the  light  of 
debt  problems  that  we  run  into  in 
ous  parts  of  the  world,  not  so  much 
his  part  of  the  world  as  others.  Part 
he  debt  problem  results  from  an  at- 
de  toward  foreign  equity  investment 
;,  it  seems  to  me,  needs  to  be 
iged.  It  results  from  an  attitude  that 
i  when  you  want  to  attract  resources 
a  another  country  to  come  to  your 
itry  and  help  in  the  development  of 
ou  should  borrow  the  money  rather 
1  attract  it  as  equity.  And  countries 
that  and  did  it  to  excess.  When  they 
into  rough  weather,  as  always  hap- 
3  with  world  economy — it  has  its  up 
it  has  its  down — they  found 
nselves  debt-heavy,  and  the  debt  was 
'  difficult  to  carry,  whereas,  if  the 
oortion  of  the  resources  drawn  in 
a  outside  were  heavier  in  equity, 
1  the  equity,  so  to  speak,  carries 
f.  There  is  no  obligation  to  pay  in- 
st  or  to  pay  it  back.  It's  there  to  par- 
I  )ate,  and,  of  course,  it's  there  as  risk 
I  tal  and  hopes  to  profit  well  from 
i ,  posture.  So,  I  think  that,  just  as 
i  panies  have  historically  had  to  look 
I  heir  debt  equity  ratio,  one  of  the 
ons  that  we  should  learn  from  our 
erience  of  the  last  few  years  is  that 
itries,  too,  need  to  look  at  their  debt 
ity  ratio.  And  this  to  my  mind  is  an 
itional  reason  why  it's  healthy  to 
ig  in  equity  foreign  investment.  It 
;s  you  greater  protection  in  the  sense 
ing  periods  that  are  inevitably  going 
ome  when  everything  isn't  booming. 


Q.  In  your  opinion,  there  should  be 
some  kind  of  continuity  of  foreign  in- 
vestment. In  your  meeting  with 
American  businessmen  this  morning, 
did  anyone  bring  up  any  fears,  or  are 
they  generally  satisfied? 

A.  They  are  generally  satisfied.  No 
one  is  perfectly  satisfied,  so  there  are 
always  things  that  they  would  like  to  see 
done. 

There  are  two  things  in  particular 
that  are  being  discussed  with  varying 
degrees  of  urgency,  both  following  the 
Prime  Minister's  visit  to  Washington. 
One  is  an  investment  treaty,  and  the 
other  is  some  discussions  that  are 
restarting  on  a  tax  treaty.  Both  of  these 
two  things  would  help  in  just  the  way 
that  I  cited.  An  investment  treaty  would 
tend  to  set  out  the  rules  of  the  game  as 
understood  between  the  two  countries. 
And  a  tax  treaty  would  set  up  a  regime 
that  basically  avoids  double  taxation  and 
makes  clear,  as  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, which  country  is  going  to  tax  what 
kind  of  earning  and  the  individual  enter- 
prise. Then  those  are  the  rules  of  the 
game.  As  we  all  know,  the  tax  element 
in  any  investment  is  a  very  important 
one.  So  those  are  the  two  particular  sug- 
gestions that  are  being  discussed,  and 
we  hope  that  those  discussions  would 
progress  well. 

Q.  The  Olympic  Council  of 
Malaysia  and  the  Olympic  Council  of 
South  Korea  and  a  number  of  coun- 
tries have  been  receiving  letters 
allegedly  from  the  Ku  Klux  Klan 
threatening  athletes  who  are  going  to 
the  Los  Angeles  Olympics.  Has  the 
U.S.  Government  investigation  shown 
whether  it  is  from  any  particular 
country  or  source,  and  could  you  com- 
ment on  this? 

A.  I  have  just  heard  about  these  let- 
ters from  the  Ku  Klux  Klan— or  alleged- 
ly from  the  Ku  Klux  Klan— and  they  are 
of  such  a  nature  that  it  is  hard  to  believe 
they  were  actually  sent  by  any  such 
organization.  And  the  sentiments  they 
expressed  are  totally  unacceptable.  It 
almost  makes  you  wonder  if  it  isn't  a 
disinformation  campaign  of  some  sort. 
And  they  will  be  looked  into. 

But  the  main  point  is  that  athletes 
from  all  over  the  world  are  most 
welcome  at  the  Olympics  in  Los 
Angeles.  There  are  a  record  number  of 
countries  that  are  attending.  There  will 
be  great  care  taken  to  see  that  the 
security  of  all  is  well  provided  for,  and 
there  is  a  tremendous  effort  being  made 
along  those  lines,  as  well  as  in  all  other 
aspects  of  the  conduct  of  the  Olympics. 
Just  before  leaving  on  my  trip,  I  met 


with  the  Olympic  officials,  both  the  U.S. 
and  international  Olympic  officials,  and 
we  went  over  all  these  things.  And  I 
think  that,  on  the  whole,  matters  are  in 
very  satisfactory  shape,  and  we  look  for- 
ward to  a  wonderful  amateur  Olympic 
games  coming  up. 

Q.  Did  you  mean  Soviet  disinfor- 
mation? 

A.  No,  I  just — we  will  leave  it  at 
that. 

Q.  There  has  been  a  lot  of  talk  of  a 
Pacific  Basin  concept,  something  like 
a  Pacific  version  of  the  EEC  [Euro- 
pean Economic  Community].  Do  you 
have  any  thoughts  on  it,  if  it's  worth- 
while to  have  some  sort  of  common 
market  here? 

A.  The  idea  of  a  Pacific  Basin  is 
sort  of  intuitively  attractive.  But  I  don't 
know  of  anyone  who  really  believes  that 
some  organization  like  the  European 
Community  is  the  right  sort  of  parallel, 
something  that  attempts  to  be  opera- 
tional in  nature. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  many 
who  feel  that  an  improved  way  of  shar- 
ing information,  of  identifying  common 
problems,  of  developing  a  consensus 
about  how  they  might  be  dealt  with,  and 
of  having  that  kind  of  touch  between  the 
countries  of  the  region  might  be  useful. 
We've  been  exploring  that.  Ambassador 
Fairbanks  has  been  out  around  the 
Pacific  talking  with  people,  trying  to 
gather  a  sense  of  their  ideas,  and  it  was 
interesting  to  us,  and  quite  welcome  to 
us,  that  the  ASEAN  countries  decided 
to  put  this  general  idea  on  the  agenda  of 
the  meetings  that  will  be  taking  place  in 
Jakarta,  and  I  will  be  very  interested  to 
hear  what  their  views  are.  But  I  don't 
think  that  any  operating  sort  of  formal 
organization,  like  the  European  Com- 
munity, is  the  odds  at  all.  And  what  may 
emerge,  if  anything,  is  something  that  is 
much  looser  and  more  in  the  nature  of 
an  analytical,  information-sharing, 
consensus-building,  problem-identifying 
kind  of  organization. 

But  the  area  itself  is  going  like 
gangbusters.  It's  expanding.  It's  very 
dynamic,  and  maybe  that's  a  good  argu- 
ment for  having  the  government  stay 
away  from  anything  like  this.  It's  doing 
so  well  without  the  benefit  of  an 
organization.  But  at  the  same  time,  it 
may  be  that  there  are  some  things  that 
could  be  added  by  a  loose  form  of 
information-sharing.  But  this  is  an  idea 
that  will  be  discussed  a  lot  not  only  in 
Jakarta  but  subsequently.  From  the  U.S. 
standpoint,  we  are  very  interested  in 
taking  part  in  those  discussions. 


THE  SECRETARY 


NEWS  CONFERENCE. 
SINGAPORE, 
JULY  10,  19842 

It  is  always  a  special  privilege  to  come 
to  Singapore  because  of  what  Singapore 
represents  in  terms  of  its  vibrancy  and 
growth,  and,  of  course,  also  because  it 
gives  me  a  chance  to  visit  with  Prime 
Minister  Lee  Kuan  Yew,  such  an  ex- 
traordinary person.  I  have  had  that 
privilege  again  this  afternoon.  I  would 
take  this  occasion  to  express  my  admira- 
tion for  him,  my  pleasure  at  having  a 
chance  to  talk  with  him  again,  and  my 
gratitude  for  being  received  so 
hospitably  here  in  Singapore. 

Q.  Yesterday  in  Amman,  French 
President  Francois  Mitterrand  said 
that  the  Soviet  Union  should  be  in- 
volved in  the  peace  process  in  the  Mid- 
dle East.  How  do  you  feel  about  that, 
and  if  the  current  climate  is  such,  is 
Soviet  involvement  either  likely  or 
desirable? 

A.  The  Soviet  Union  has  been  in- 
volved in  the  turmoil  in  the  Middle  East. 
What  we  seek  is  solving  the  problems 
there,  and  we  have  not  seen  any 
evidence  of  a  constructive  instinct  on 
their  part  toward  solving  the  Palestinian 
problems,  toward  solving  the  problems 
of  Lebanon,  or  other  aspects  of  the  Mid- 
dle East  picture.  We  are  always  looking 
for  constructive  contributions,  but  we 
just  have  not  seen  any  from  that 
quarter. 

Q.  In  view  of  the  Soviet  Union 
pouring  arms  to  the  Vietnamese,  what 
is  the  rationale  behind  your  govern- 
ment's decision  not  to  give  military 
aid  to  the  Kampuchean  coalition  to 
fight  Vietnamese  repression? 

A.  Our  program  here  is  to  support 
the  efforts  of  the  ASEAN  countries.  We 
believe  that  they  have  come  about  this 
very  intelligently  and  .strongly,  not  only 
in  terms  of  their  efforts  to  support  the 
democratic  forces  in  Kampuchea  but 
also  in  their  diplomatic  efforts  to 
demonstrate  to  the  world  and  have  the 
world  support  the  condemnation  of  Viet- 
namese aggression  and  the  development 
of  a  better  life  in  Kampuchea.  So  we 
have  felt  that  the  best  role  for  the 
United  States  is  supporting  this  good  ef- 
fort, and  we  will  continue  to  do  so. 

Q.  The  State  Department  has 
placed  a  ban  on  nonessential  travel  to 
Bulgaria.  Is  it  because  of  allegations 
of  Bulgaria's  notorious  involvement  in 
drug  trafficking  or  because  of  recent 
reports  coming  out  on  Bulgaria's  in- 
volvement in  the  assassination  attempt 
on  the  Pope? 


A.  No,  the  advisory  on  travel  to 
Bulgaria  is  simply  a  precaution  to 
Americans  that  they  are  well  advised  to 
stay  away  at  a  time  when  there  are 
some  tensions.  This  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  Italian  case.  It  has  to  do  more 
with  the  drug  case  and  some  of  the 
other  repercussions  of  it. 

Q.  Most  ASEAN  members  are 
quite  concerned  about  recent 
U.S. -China  relations  and  U.S.  expecta- 
tions of  China's  role  in  this  region. 
How  would  you  allay  such  fears? 

A.  People  in  the  past  have  been  con- 
cerned that  we  are  concerned  about 
what  we  do,  but  I  think  that  the  basic 
point  is  that  China  is  an  important  coun- 
try in  Asia  and  in  the  world  generally, 
obviously.  The  center  of  gravity  of  our 
efforts  in  this  part  of  the  world  is  on 
what  ASEAN  is  doing.  Nevertheless  we 
think  that  a  constructive  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  China 
lends  stability  to  the  region,  not  the 
other  way  around,  and  to  the  extent 
that  statements  like  that  assuage 
people's  fears,  then  so  be  it. 

Q.  You  said  this  morning  and 
today  that  we  are  not  supplying  more 
aid  to  the  Kampuchean  coalition 
because  we  support  ASEAN.  Are  you 
saying  that  we  consult  with  ASEAN, 
and  they  do  not  want  us  to  supply 
more  aid  to  the  Kampuchean  coalition? 

A.  We  consult  with  the  ASEAN 
countries.  We  discussed  this  whole  ques- 
tion at  length  today.  I  did  with  Prime 
Minister  Lee  Kuan  Yew  yesterday  in 
Kuala  Lumpur,  and  I  expect  to  have  fur- 
ther discussions  of  it  in  Jakarta.  What  I 
can  say  is  that  we  believe  we  are  playing 
a  genuinely  helpful  and  constructive  part 
in  this  effort,  and  beyond  that  I  am  not 
prepared  to  go. 

Q.  The  ban  on  travel  to  Bulgaria, 
is  that  to  all  Americans  or  just  to 
government  officials? 

A.  We  are  concentrating  on  govern- 
ment officials,  but  I  think  all  Americans 
might  take  note. 

Q.  There  are  certain  reservations 
stated  by  the  Indonesians  concerning 
the  U.S.  agn"eement  in  principle  to  sell 
arms  to  China.  How  sympathetic  to 
the  fears  expressed  by  Indonesia  will 
the  United  States  be  on  this  issue? 

A.  Of  course,  we  will  listen  to  com- 
ments that  our  friends  have  to  make 
about  things  we  are  doing  on  all  sorts  of 
matters.  People  register  their  views 
with  us  about  arms  control,  about  our 
economy,  about  all  manner  of  things,  in- 
cluding subjects  such  as  that. 


We  listen  to  our  friends,  and  at  the 
same  time  we  believe  that  it  is  impor- 
tant that  the  United  States  develop  a 
stable  and  mature  relationship  with 
China.  The  new  fledgling  military  rela- 
tionship is  something  that  is  just  start- 
ing, and  the  concept  of  it  has  entirely  bjii 
do  with  defensive  arms.  I  think  it  is 
worth  calling  people's  attention  to  the 
fact  that  there  is  a  very  large  number  \ 
Soviet  forces  ranged  on  China's  north- 
ern border,  and  there  are  many  SS-20 
missiles  aimed  in  China's  direction.  So 
there  are  threats  that  China  must  be 
concerned  about,  naturally,  that  are  di] 
ferent  from  things  that  Indonesia  may 
be  concerned  about. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  indication  ths  !j 
the  Soviet  Union  has  been  trying  to 
dissuade  other  countries  not  in  the 
Soviet  area  from  coming  to  the  Olym 
pics?  You  suggested  that  perhaps 
there  was  some  disinformation  in- 
volved in  this,  a  letter  that  went  out 
allegedly  from  the  Ku  Klux  Klan. 
Have  there  been  any  other  indication 
from  other  types  of  channels? 

A.  I  didn't  connect  that  letter  witlJK 
the  Soviet  Union  in  any  explicit  way,  1  f" 
me  just  note.  We  have  seen  some  acti" 
ty  designed  to  try  to  discourage  peopl 
and,  of  course,  we  know  very  well  the 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  were  dis; 
pointed  and  are  disappointed  not  to  bi 
going  to  the  Olympics.  The  fact  of  the 
matter  is  that  a  record  number  of  cou 
tries  is  coming  to  the  Olympics.  Let  n 
assure  everybody  again  that  strong 
precautions  are  being  taken  to  ensure 
that  the  situation  is  a  secure  one  and 
that  the  games  can  go  on  in  a  strong 
and  lively  competitive  spirit  and  in  th 
spirit  of  amateur  athletics.  We  all  loo 
forward  to  the  Olympics. 

Q.  Apart  from  the  talks  with  L« 
Kuan  Yew  on  the  Kampuchean  queii 
tion.  what  are  the  other  topics  that 
came  up  for  discussion? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  go  into  detail 
a  discussion  with  a  head  of  state,  but 
general  topics  that  we  talked  about  a 
certainly  things  that  you  would  expe( 
The  Kampuchean  question  was  perha 
foremost.  We  discussed  world  econor 
issues,  particularly  as  they  bear  on  tl 
part  of  the  world.  The  Prime  Ministe 
sees  very  well  the  connection  betwee 
what  goes  on  here  and  what  goes  on 
elsewhere,  so  we  spent  a  good  bit  of 
time  on  that.  I  called  attention  to  oui 
concerns  about  the  problem  of  intelle  fci 
tual  property.  We  had  a  little  discuss  if 
ai)out  that,  that  was  the  general  ran  m 
of  our  discussion.  »i 

k 


ii 


a 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Again  from  this  morning,  you 
s;d  that  the  Soviets  are  having  trou- 
l»  taking  "yes"  for  an  answer  regard- 
ii;  our  going  to  the  Vienna  talks.  Is 
th  U.S.  position  that  we've  accepted 
^vthout  preconditions  and  that  the 
Uited  States  will  still  go  to  the 
V>nna  talks  even  if  we  can't  talk 
vmi  the  reduction  of  missiles? 
A.  We  have  had  a  proposal  to 
cuss  questions  involving  militarization 
spare,  and  the  Soviets  put  forth  a 
ir<  of  topics  that  they  thought  were 
f,|aivalent  of  that  concept.  We  have 
1  v\  e  will  participate  in  a  discussion  of 
t  (i>pic,  and  we  have  some  ideas 
-I  Ives  about  how  the  topic  should  be 
iihmI,  In  our  view,  things  that  go 
"iiL;h  space  that  are  military,  like 
li>iic  missiles,  ought  to  be  on  the 
■IK la,  and  we  intend  to  discuss  them. 
-,  tliat  is  saying  "yes"  and  at  the  same 
iif  suggesting  that  the  way  they 
ine  the  topic  is  all  right,  but  there  are 
ne  additional  definitions  that  we  think 
t  important. 

Q.  The  Soviets  have  at  various 
les  also  suggested  that  a  precondi- 
n  to  those  talks  would  be  an  agree- 
Int  to  a  moratorium  on  all  testing  of 
Cisatellite  systems.  Would  the 
i  ited  States  be  prepared  to  accept 
lit,  or  are  we  not  accepting  that  as 
;  of  the  conditions? 

A.  I  don't  think  it  is  clear  that  it  is 
recondition,  although  sometimes 
tements  are  made  that  make  it  a 
>stion.  This  is  just  the  kind  of  thing 
need  to  get  straightened  out,  and  are 
ing  to  get  straightened  out,  in  our 
vate  diplomatic  discussions  with  the 
net  Union. 

We  think  a  moratorium  on  testing 
•ht  now,  with  them  having  testing  and 
jloyed  an  antisatellite  system  and  we 
;  having  done  so,  is  assymetrical  with 
,pect  to  its  impact.  A  moratorium  on 
Dloyment  is  the  sort  of  thing  that  is 
•y  difficult  to  verify,  and  verification 
;he  heart  of  the  problem  here.  If  you 
I't  verify  a  moratorium,  it's  hard  to 
ow  quite  what  it  means.  Or,  to  put  it 
Dther  way,  what  is  important  is  to  get 
o  some  discussion  of  this  issue  and 
?  what  can  be  made  of  the  issue  of 
rification.  Until  you  do  that,  it  doesn't 
3m  wise  to  agree  to  something  that 
u  haven't  really  worked  out. 

Q.  The  fact  that  you  drew  atten- 
>n  to  the  question  of  American  in- 
llectual  property  in  your  talks  with 
e  Prime  Minister  today  reflects  a 
rtain  amount  of  concern  on  your 
,rt  over  the  question  of  computer 
ftware  piracy  in  Singapore.  Were 
u  interested  in  hearing  the  views  of 


our  Prime  Minister  on  this  issue,  or 
were  you  actually  advocating  that  the 
Singapore  Government  do  something 
about  this? 

A.  We  think  that  it  is  a  problem, 
and  something  should  be  done  about  it.  I 
am  always  interested  in  hearing  the 
Prime  Minister's  views,  and  I  did.  And  I 
would  say  that  the  problem  exists  in 
places  other  than  Singapore.  It  is  not 
just  something  here.  It  is  a  concern  that 
we  have  with  respect  to  many  countries, 
and  I  think  it  is  a  very  legitimate  prob- 
lem that  needs  to  be  addressed.  It  is  in 
the  interests  of  a  country  like  Singapore 
to  address  the  problem  because  how  that 
property  is  to  be  handled  affects  the 
flow  of  that  property  around  the  world, 
not  only  here  but  elsewhere. 

Q.  At  last  year's  ASEAN  meeting, 
as  I  recall,  you  were  extremely  critical 
of  the  Vietnamese,  especially  on  the 
issue  of  the  return  of  remains  of 
American  servicemen  and  the  general 
prisoner-of-war  issues.  Since  then,  a 
high-level  U.S.  delegation  has  gone  to 
Vietnam.  The  Vietnamese  are,  after 
some  fits  and  starts,  releasing  some 
further  remains  of  Americans.  How  do 
you  now  feel  about  what  Vietnam  has 
done  or  is  doing  in  this  area,  and 
could  you  say  a  word  about  what  you 
expect  more  broadly  about  U.S.  rela- 
tions with  Vietnam  in  the  year  or  two 
ahead? 

A.  Some  progress  has  been  made. 
We  welcome  it,  and  there  is  the  prospect 
of  some  further  progress.  We  very  much 
want  to  see  that  happen.  There  is  a 
large  problem  ahead  of  us.  There  are 
many  people  unaccounted  for,  possibly 
even  still  alive,  and  so  the  issue  is  a  very 
important  one. 

Insofar  as  long-term  relations  with 
Vietnam  are  concerned,  it  represents  a 
major  stumbling  block  that  must  be  got- 
ten out  of  the  way.  Even  if  there  were  a 
Kampuchean  settlement  of  some  kind 
that  was  satisfactory,  we  would  still  find 
this  a  matter  of  great  concern  and 
would  want  to  see  it  dealt  with  properly. 

Q.  You  say  that  possibly  there  are 
some  still  alive.  Has  anything  been 
learned  in  the  past  year  that  would 
give  any  further  indication  whether 
any  are  alive,  or  does  our  information 
stand  precisely  where  it  did  a  year 
ago? 

A.  My  statement  does  not  reflect 
any  new  information.  It  is  just  that 
there  are  a  large  number — some 
2,500 — that  we  don't  know  about,  and 
so  there  is  always  the  possibility  that 
there  may  be  someone  still  alive.  That  is 
all  I  meant. 


Q.  Returning  to  the  intellectual 
property  question,  might  there  be  any 
chance  of  GSP  [generalized  system  of 
preferences]  quotas  being  used  as  a 
possible  lever  to  gain  satisfaction 
from  Singapore  and  other  countries 
where  there  is  a  problem? 

A.  That  proposal  has  been  made  as 
I've  heard,  and  I  think  that  the  right 
way  to  go  about  this  is  to  have  the  kind 
of  discussions  that  I've  had.  I  hope  it 
will  be  possible  to  get  it  straightened  out 
without  going  in  for  that  kind  of  condi- 
tionality.  It  is  the  sort  of  thing  that 
tends  to  arise  when  a  problem  nags  and 
nags,  and  people  start  feeling  strongly 
about  it. 

I  might  say  on  the  GSP  legislation, 
it  is  something  the  Reagan  Admin- 
istration strongly  supports,  and  we  have 
been  working  at  that  for  over  a  year 
now,  so  that  the  GSP  would  be  ex- 
tended. It  is  not  progressing  well  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  it  is  not  pro- 
gressing at  all.  But  we  want  very  much 
to  see  some  action  by  the  Congress  so 
that  it  doesn't  lapse  at  the  end  of  this 
year.  We  will  be  working  on  that. 

Q.  Last  September,  a  joint  appeal 
on  Kampuchea  was  signed  by  the 
ASEAN  countries.  This  move  was 
backed  by  the  United  States,  and  the 
third  step  in  the  resolution  on  the 
Kampuchean  problem  was  the  pro- 
posed normalization  of  relations  be- 
tween Vietnam  and  the  United  States. 
If  such  a  thing  should  go  through, 
what  sort  of  normalization,  what  sort 
of  relationship,  would  the  United 
States  establish  with  Vietnam?  Would 
it  include  just  developmental  aid? 

A.  I'm  afraid  the  prospect  of  nor- 
malization is  so  far  away  that  it  is  really 
fruitless  to  speculate  about  it.  There  is 
the  MIA-POW  issue  we've  spoken  of, 
and  right  now  what  we  see  in  Kam- 
puchea is  a  continued  Vietnamese  ag- 
gression. So  far  as  I  can  see,  efforts  to 
bring  about  any  kind  of  reasonable 
negotiation  on  the  subject  have  run  into 
a  stone  wall  from  Vietnam.  I  think  that 
any  thought  of  normalization  with  the 
United  States  is  just  miles  away. 

Q.  There  were  reports  a  couple  of 
years  ago,  at  least,  that  there  were 
probably  several  Americans  still  alive 
who  chose  to  stay.  Are  you  referring 
to  that  kind  of  thing  or  to  Americans 
still  alive  but  in  prison? 

A.  I  was  making  a  general  observa- 
tion, in  effect,  that  when  you  are 
without  knowledge  of  as  many  in- 
dividuals as  is  the  case  here  that  it  is 
always  possible  that  someone  may  still 
be  alive.  That's  all,  there's  nothing,  no 
new  information  nor  any  special  implica- 
tion connected  with  the  statement. 


THE  SECRETARY 


STATEMENT, 
ASEAN  DIALOGUE, 
JULY  13,  19843 

This  new  opportunity  to  carry  forward 
my  country's  constructive  and  fruitful 
dialogue  with  ASEAN  is  most  welcome; 
in  fact,  it  is  genuinely  refreshing  to 
return  to  Southeast  Asia  and  meet  again 
with  my  ASEAN  friends. 

I  am  delighted  to  note  the  addition 
of  Brunei  to  this  association.  The  United 
States  has  a  tradition  of  diplomatic  con- 
tact with  Brunei  extending  well  back 
into  the  19th  century. 

The  accomplishments  of  all  the 
ASEAN  countries,  individually  and  as  a 
group,  have  captured  worldwide  atten- 
tion and  admiration.  In  1967,  at  a  time 
when  few  outside  the  region  rated  your 
prospects  very  high,  you  founded  this 
unique  organization  to  promote  eco- 
nomic development,  in  recognition  of  the 
importance  of  regional  cooperation  and 
self-help.  Through  disciplined  and 
creative  economic  management,  your 
real  growth  rate  has  averaged  over  7% 
a  year  for  the  last  decade.  Through 
realism  and  courage  you  have  forced  the 
world  to  address  the  threat  to  regional 
and  world  peace  posed  by  Vietnamese 
aggression  in  Kampuchea.  You  in- 
stituted this  remarkable  annual  meeting 
in  early  recognition  of  the  importance  of 
serious  dialogue  between  developed  and 
developing  countries. 

In  all  these  respects  the  ASEAN 
countries  have  distinguished  themselves 
by  realism,  imagination,  and  sense  of 
purpose.  You  face  formidable  economic 
problems  and  the  dangers  of  Vietnamese 
aggression.  You  bear  a  significant 
burden  of  refugees  for  whom  you  have 
generously  provided  first  asylum.  But 
your  success  so  far  enables  you  to  con- 
front these  problems  with  confidence 
and  makes  other  nations— my  own  most 
definitely  included— want  to  work  with 
you. 

Thus,  in  contrast  to  so  many  parts 
of  today's  world,  ASEAN  represents  the 
stability  and  progress  that  are  the  goals 
of  people  everywhere.  ASEAN,  like  the 
United  States,  faces  both  opportunities 
and  problems.  These  meetings  give  us 
the  chance  to  consult  on  both,  and  that 
is  why  we  are  here.  We  can  take 
satisfaction  from  our  common  record  to 
date.  But  we  cannot  rest  on  our  laurels. 
Today,  I  would  like  to  discuss  three 
of  the  most  serious  challenges  we  face 
together  and  the  principles  upon  which 
President  Reagan  has  determined  that 
the  United  States  will  address  them. 


They  are  principles  that  provide,  I 
believe,  a  solid  basis  for  cooperation  be- 
tween my  nation  and  ASEAN. 

•  The  first  is  realism:  we  must  see 
the  world  as  it  is,  not  as  we  would  wish 
it  to  be,  facing  up  to  problems  as  well  as 
opportunities. 

•  Next  is  strength:  no  policy  can 
succeed  from  a  position  of  weakness. 
Economic  vigor,  military  power,  and  a 
strong  sense  of  national  purpose  are 
prerequisites  to  the  achievement  of  our 
objectives. 

•  And  third,  negotiation:  fortified 
by  realism  and  strength,  we  must  help 
to  resolve  international  problems 
through  principled,  effective  diplomacy. 

On  these  pillars  of  realism,  strength, 
and  negotiation,  the  United  States  is  at 
work  today  in  the  interest  of  peace  and 
freedom.  On  this  basis  we  are  prepared 
to  work  with  ASEAN  on  the  great 
challenges  we  face  in  common. 

Preserving  Peace  and  the 
Challenge  of  Arms  Control 

No  issue  is  more  important  today  than 
preserving  peace,  and  none  has  higher 
priority  for  the  United  States.  Responsi- 
ble policies  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war  and 
strengthen  international  stability  are  a 
goal  shared  by  all  our  peoples.  The  first 
challenge  of  arms  control  is  an  impor- 
tant part  of  this  effort  to  preserve 
peace. 

Preserving  peace  in  the  nuclear  age 
is  a  duty  we  owe  all  inhabitants  of  this 
planet.  Ensuring  a  lasting  peace  is 
foremost  in  President  Reagan's  mind, 
for  as  he  has  said:  "A  nuclear  war  can- 
not be  won  and  must  never  be  fought." 
He  said  it  in  China.  He  said  it  in  Ger- 
many. He  said  it  in  Japan.  He  said  it  in 
England.  He  said  it  in  Congress.  He  said 
it  in  the  Oval  Office.  He  has  said  it 
throughout  America.  It  is  the  essence  of 
a  principle  that  has  the  full  support  of 
responsible  people  everywhere. 

Much  of  the  debate  on  nuclear  issues 
focuses  on  the  enormous  destructive 
potential  of  existing  arsenals.  President 
Reagan  has  led  the  way  in  the  responsi- 
ble effort  to  reduce  nuclear  arsenals  to 
equal  levels,  with  effective  verification. 
He  has  proposed  the  complete  elimina- 
tion of  an  entire  class  of  nuclear 
weapons— American  Pershing  lis  and 
ground-launched  cruise  missiles  and 
Soviet  SS-20S,  SS-4s,  and  SS-5s.  He 
has  rejected  Soviet  proposals  that  would 
simply  transfer  such  weapons  from 
where  they  threaten  Europe  to  where 


they  threaten  Asia.  In  the  strategic 
arms  reduction  talks  (START),  he  has 
proposed  deep  reductions  in  intercon- 
tinental nuclear  arsenals,  focusing  on 
the  most  powerful  categories  of 
weapons— ballistic  missile  warheads— a 
goal  no  previous  strategic  arms  treaty 
has  even  approached.  Last  November, 
the  Soviets  walked  out  of  the  INF 
[intermediate-range  nuclear  forces] 
negotiations  and  in  December  suspended 
indefinitely  their  participation  in 
START.  The  United  States  is  ready  to 
resume  both  negotiations  at  any  time 
and  in  any  place,  without  preconditions. 
We  hope  the  Soviet  Union  also  will  com 
to  recognize  that  its  interests  are  best 
served  by  returning  to  the  negotiating 
table  as  soon  as  possible. 

But  the  United  States  has  not  sim- 
ply waited  for  Soviet  responses.  In  add 
tion  to  our  efforts,  extending  over  man 
years,  to  negotiate  balanced  and 
verifiable  arms  control  agreements,  we 
have  made  substantial  reductions  in  ouj 
own  nuclear  stockpile,  as  well  as  im- 
provements to  its  safety  and  security. 
Both  the  number  and  megatonnage  of 
our  nuclear  arsenal  have  been  substan- 
tially reduced.  Our  stockpile  was  one- 
third  higher  in  1967  than  it  is  now,  anc 
its  total  destructive  power  has  declined 
by  7.5%  since  1968.  In  addition,  we  and 
our  allies  have  begun  a  process  of  redu 
ing  the  stockpile  of  NATO  nuclear 
weapons  in  Europe,  bringing  it  to  the 
lowest  level  in  20  years.  Even  in  the 
absence  of  an  INF  agreement,  at  least 
five  nuclear  warheads  will  be  taken  ou 
of  Europe  for  every  new  Pershing  II 
and  cruise  missile  introduced.  The  resi 
will  be  a  net  reduction  of  2,400  nucleai 
weapons  over  the  next  few  years. 

America  has  begun  to  modernize  ii 
nuclear  forces,  even  as  we  have  sough 
to  reduce  nuclear  arsenals.  We  have 
done  so  after  a  decade  of  restraint- 
restraint  unmatched,  indeed  exploited, 
by  our  adversaries.  We  are  modernizir 
in  a  way  which,  in  conjunction  with  ou 
arms  control  proposals,  will  enhance 
stability  and  reduce  the  risk  of  war.  0 
modernization  program  provides  impo 
tant  incentives  for  the  Soviets  to  agre 
to  our  proposals  for  equitable  and 
verifiable  reductions  in  arsenals. 

In  addition  to  our  far-reaching  pre 
posals  for  reducing  the  level  of  nuclea 
armaments,  the  United  States  has  pre 
posed  a  number  of  other  important  ar 
control  initiatives  to  reduce  the  risk  oi 
war  and  halt  or  reverse  the  growth  in 
weapons. 


iSfl 


THE  SECRETARY 


In  Geneva,  Vice  President  Bush 
?seiited  to  the  Conference  on  Dis- 
nament  a  draft  treaty  for  a  com- 
^hensive  ban  on  the  development,  pro- 
ction,  stockpiling,  transfer,  and  use  of 
smical  weapons. 

In  Stockholm,  together  with  our 
LTO  allies,  we  have  put  forward  a 
:kage  of  confidence-building  measures 
signed  to  reduce  the  risk  of  a  Euro- 
in  war  occurring  by  accident,  surprise 
ack,  or  miscalculation. 

In  Vienna,  at  the  mutual  and 
lanced  force  reduction  talks,  we 
jsented,  again  with  our  European 
ies,  a  new  initiative  that  seeks  a  com- 
)n  ground  between  Eastern  and 
3stern  positions  and  progress  on 
iucing  the  conventional  forces  of 
^TO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact.  We  will 
rsist  in  our  efforts  to  reduce  the  risk 
war  and  achieve  substantial  reduc- 
ns  in  nuclear  arsenals.  And  we  will 
rsevere  in  our  efforts  with  the  Soviets 
build  a  relationship  based  on  realism, 
itraint,  and  reciprocity. 

Unfortunately,  until  very  recently, 
!  only  response  of  the  Soviet  Union 
5  been  silence  or  walkout.  We  hope 
it  their  recently  expressed  interest  in 
jotiations  at  Vienna  represents  a 
inge  of  heart.  We  have  accepted  the 
viet  offer  to  begin  talks  on  weapons  in 
ice,  and  we  intend  to  go  to  Vienna, 
ere  are  no  preconditions  attached  to 
-  willingness  to  discuss  arms  control 
.tters.  The  Soviets  have  proposed 
ne  issues  and  we,  too,  will  have  issues 
want  to  discuss.  We  are  now  trying 
work  out  arrangements  through 
iilomatic  channels. 

We  want  to  improve  our  relations 
i  ;h  the  Soviet  Union  across  a  wide 
tictrum.  We  have  close  and  continuous 
ilomatic  contact  with  them  at  all 
I  els.  President  Reagan  has  called  this 
iir  a  year  of  opportunities  for  peace. 
5  are  making  every  effort  to  ensure 
it  these  opportunities  multiply  and 
it  we  make  the  most  of  every  one  of 
j;m. 

i    At  the  same  time,  we  will  continue 
j  r  efforts  to  strengthen  our  deterrent 
•ces.  This  is  as  important  to  keeping 
;  peace  as  the  effort  to  control  arms, 
is  one  of  the  ironies  of  the  nuclear  age 
it  weapons  must  be  built  in  order  that 
;y  not  be  used.  The  effectiveness  of 
r  military  forces  in  peacetime  is  of 
al  importance  to  the  avoidance  of 
3ir  employment  in  war.  Our  approach 
s  served  us  well;  in  the  years  since 
orld  War  II,  we  have  succeeded  in 
iintaining  the  nuclear  balance  and 
terring  nuclear  war. 


Your  countries  and  my  country 
threaten  no  one.  Our  military  forces  are 
designed  to  keep  the  peace,  and  we  are 
proud  of  the  job  they  have  done.  This 
has  called  for  a  considerable  effort  to  fill 
some  of  the  gaps  that  had  developed  in 
the  last  decade,  particularly  in  this 
critical  part  of  the  world.  President 
Reagan  is  determined  that  those  efforts 
will  continue. 

The  Challenge  of  Regional  Stability 

A  second  great  challenge  which  faces  us 
all  is  achieving  regional  stability.  This 
task  is  every  bit  as  critical  as  the  effort 
to  control  nuclear  weapons,  for  the 
greatest  danger  of  nuclear  war  arises 
from  smaller  wars  that  could  get  out  of 
control.  The  promotion  of  regional 
stability  thus  serves  global  as  well  as 
regional  interests.  The  nations  of  every 
region  achieving  stability  meet  not  only 
the  deepest  aspirations  of  their  own  peo- 
ple; they  also  contribute  importantly  to 
the  avoidance  of  global  conflict,  nuclear 
or  conventional.  We  must  never  forget, 
however,  that  so-called  small  wars,  even 
if  contained  within  a  region,  have  caused 
devastating  losses  in  recent  decades. 
Hundred  of  thousands  of  lives  have  been 
lost,  damaged,  or  dislocated  in  virtually 
every  quarter  of  the  globe.  We  must  ex- 
pend every  effort  to  turn  energies  that 
are  absorbed  in  conflict  toward  peace, 
justice,  and  lasting  stability. 

The  United  States  is  proud  of  its 
part  in  the  system  of  regional  alliances. 
These  alliances— backed  by  credible 
military  presence— have  helped  to  main- 
tain a  remarkable  degree  of  regional 
stability,  even  in  the  face  of  shocks  like 
the  Rangoon  bombing  which,  in  an 
earlier  age,  might  easily  have  led  to  war. 
Our  alliances  with  two  of  your  members, 
the  Philippines  and  Thailand,  contribute 
to  a  stability  which  benefits  the  entire 
region,  and  we  are  grateful  for  their 
contribution.  We  recognize  as  well  the 
responsible  self-defense  efforts  of  the 
nonaligned  members  of  ASEAN. 

The  principles  of  realism,  strength, 
and  diplomacy  are  the  keys  to  progress 
in  regional  disputes.  These  are  the  prin- 
ciples the  United  States  has  been  using 
in  its  Central  America  policy.  We  seek 
and  we  support  a  regional  solution 
there— one  that  the  nations  most 
threatened  by  the  conflict  agreed  upon 
in  their  meeting  at  San  Jose,  Costa 
Rica.  That  objective  is  now  embodied  in 
the  21  principles  developed  in  the  Con- 
tadora  process.  Behind  a  strengthened 
security  shield,  this  approach  can  pro- 
vide development,  democracy,  and  an 
end  to  attempts  to  achieve  hegemony  in 


that  region  via  Cuban  and  Soviet  in- 
tervention. 

The  policy  ASEAN  has  adopted  in 
dealing  with  the  problem  of  Vietnam's 
occupation  of  Kampuchea  reflects  these 
same  principles.  Realism  leads  you  to 
recognize  that  Vietnam's  occupation  of 
Kampuchea  threatens  the  entire  region 
and  that  no  one  is  safe  if  such  acts  of 
blatant  aggression  succeed.  You  recog- 
nize the  need  for  strength— political  and 
economic  as  well  as  military— to  con- 
front Vietnam  with  the  clear  choice  be- 
tween bearing  the  burdens  of  aggression 
or  enjoying  the  benefits  of  cooperation 
with  ASEAN  and  with  countries,  like 
my  own,  that  firmly  support  you.  You 
have  offered  Vietnam  a  realistic  pro- 
posal for  a  negotiated  political  solution, 
one  based  on  the  restoration  of  Kam- 
puchea's sovereignty  and  the  rights  of 
its  people  to  choose  their  own  govern- 
ment. Such  a  solution  safeguards  the  in- 
terests of  the  Khmer  people  and  of  all 
Kampuchea's  neighbors. 

Your  appeal  to  Vietnam  is  based  not 
only  on  what  is  right,  but  also  on  what 
would  serve  Vietnam's  own  best  in- 
terest—if Vietnam  would  only  see  its 
long-term  interests  more  clearly.  The 
regional  tensions  which  Hanoi  causes 
work  to  its  own  disadvantage.  Vietnam 
is  disastrously  diverting  its  resources 
from  its  own  development  and  the 
welfare  of  its  energetic  and  talented 
people.  Compared  with  the  relationship 
Hanoi  could  have  with  the  rest  of  the 
world— with  access  to  markets,  new 
technologies,  and  foreign  assistance,  as 
well  as  greatly  increased  diplomatic  op- 
tions—Vietnam's present  isolation, 
resulting  from  its  occupation  of  Kam- 
puchea, imposes  a  cruel  burden  on  its 
own  people. 

No  Vietnamese  proposal  to  date  has 
addressed  the  underlying  issues- 
withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  forces  and 
creation  of  a  government  in  Phnom 
Penh  chosen  by  the  Khmer  people 
themselves.  It  is  a  given,  I  think  we  all 
agree,  that  free  choice  by  the  Khmer 
people  would  not  result  in  a  return  to 
power  of  the  Khmer  Rouge.  None  of  us 
wish  such  an  outcome.  A  Kampuchean 
government  responsive  to  the  Khmer 
people  and  to  the  urgent  need  for  na- 
tional reconstruction  would  be  a  threat 
to  no  one  and  would  contribute  to  the 
kind  of  stability  so  important  to 
Southeast  Asia. 

I  want  to  convey  America's  admira- 
tion for  what  has  been  achieved  by 
ASEAN  in  obtaining  international  sup- 
port for  a  just  settlement  in  Kampuchea. 


THE  SECRETARY 


We  will  continue  to  do  our  part,  in- 
cluding moral,  political,  and  humani- 
tarian support  for  the  organizations  led 
by  Prince  Sihanouk  and  Son  Sann.  We 
will  give  no  support  to  the  Khmer 
Rouge,  whose  atrocities  outraged  the 
world. 

While  we  are  discussing  Vietnam,  let 
me  reemphasize  that  an  accounting  of 
Americans  missing  in  action  from  the 
conflict  in  Indochina  is  a  matter  of  the 
highest  priority  for  the  Unites  States. 
The  United  States  has  both  a  legal  and 
moral  responsibility  to  obtain  the  fullest 
possible  accounting  of  almost  2,500  of 
our  men  still  missing.  The  American 
people  rightfully  expect  no  less.  We 
deeply  appreciate  the  support  you  have 
given  us  with  Vietnam  on  this  problem. 
It  is  a  problem  which  demands  mean- 
ingful cooperation  and  progress  before 
the  American  people  will  permit  discus- 
sion of  normalization  with  the  Viet- 
namese, even  in  the  context  of  a  Kam- 
puchea settlement. 

It  is,  therefore,  in  the  interest  of  all 
of  us  to  persuade  Hanoi  to  come  for- 
ward rapidly.  It  is  the  humane  thing  to 
do.  The  longer  this  issue  lingers,  the 
deeper  will  be  the  resentment  of  the 
American  people.  That  serves  no  one's 
interests  and  thwarts  the  goal  we  all 
share  of  moving  beyond  the  tragic 
history  of  Indochina  to  a  more  hopeful 
and  constructive  future.  We  appreciate 
the  recently  announced  repatriation  of 
remains.  We  call  on  Vietnam  in  a 
humanitiirian  spirit  to  meet  the  com- 
mitments it  made  to  us  recently  and  ac- 
celerate its  efforts  to  resolve  the  issue. 
Resolution  of  this  sensitive  problem 
would  be  greeted  as  a  significant  and 
positive  step  by  the  American  people 
and  would  establish  a  precedent  for 
future  cooperation. 

Still  another  tragedy  is  the  large  and 
continuing  flow  of  people  fleeing  Viet- 
namese repression  and  aggression.  Our 
joint  efforts  on  the  refugee  issue  provide 
a  remarkable  example  of  international 
cooperation,  involving  ASEAN,  the 
United  States,  and  other  countries 
whose  humanitarian  principles  have  led 
them  to  assist  in  coping  with  this  cruel 
tragedy.  Thailand,  which  has  borne  the 
biggest  burden  of  first  asylum,  has 
responded  magnificently  in  providing  a 
haven  for  close  to  two-thirds  of  a  million 
refugees.  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  and  the 
Philippines  also  have  made  major  con- 
tributions to  the  alleviation  of  human 
suffering  by  providing  temporary 
asylum  and  processing  facilities.  The  en- 
tire international  community  applauds 


you  for  your  unceasing  efforts  in  dealing 
with  this  problem,  which  was  caused  by 
Vietnam  and  imposed  upon  you. 

The  United  States  is  proud  of  the 
part  it  has  played  in  resettling  Indo- 
chinese  refugees.  Of  the  1.37  million 
refugees  who  have  been  resettled 
around  the  world  since  197.5,  650,000— 
almost  one-half  of  the  entire  total— have 
been  resettled  in  the  United  States.  Ab- 
sorbing such  numbers  can  never  be  easy, 
but  we  are  proud  to  have  these  refugees 
come  to  our  shores.  Ours  is  a  nation 
built  by  people  seeking  freedom  from 
tyranny.  Our  country  is  enriched  by  the 
energies  and  talents  of  the  Vietnamese 
and  other  Southeast  Asian  refugees. 

Other  nations  represented  at  this 
conference  have  also  played  their  part. 
In  fact,  the  entire  refugee  resettlement 
process,  from  first  asylum  to  final  reset- 
tlement, represents  international 
cooperation  at  its  finest.  If  we  are  to 
maintain  the  cooperative  nature  of  this 
endeavor,  all  of  us  must  continue  to 
shoulder  our  share  of  the  burden.  We  in 
the  United  States  will  do  so,  and  we 
urge  others  to  do  so  as  well. 

One  of  the  tragic  effects  of  the 
movement  of  people  seeking  refuge  has 
been  an  increase  in  piracy.  Although  the 
number  of  vicious  attacks  on  helpless 
refugees— including  women  and 
children— has  declined,  it  is  still  a  terri- 
ble risk  to  run  for  those  seeking 
freedom.  I  know  that  all  ASEAN 
governments  condemn  these  acts  of 
piracy  and  are  anxious  to  find  ways  to 
combat  this  problem.  We  stand  ready  to 
help  in  any  way  possible. 

The  Challenge  of  Economic 
Development 

We  face  a  third  great  challenge  in  con- 
cert with  all  members  of  the  interna- 
tional community— economic  develop- 
ment. All  the  leaders  of  ASEAN  have 
made  economic  development  a  major 
goal,  and  it  has  become  a  central  part  of 
the  U.S. -ASEAN  relationship.  But  we 
are  all  part  of  a  world  economy  so  our 
efforts  must  extend  beyond  the  confines 
of  the  U.S.-ASEAN  relationship. 

Prior  to  the  recent  London  economic 
summit,  [Indonesian]  Foreign  Minister 
Mochtar  wrote  me  and  others  in  his 
capacity  as  chairman  of  the  ASEAN 
Standing  Committee,  asking  me  to  bear 
in  mind  the  concerns  of  the  ASEAN 
countries  as  the  summit  leaders  ad- 
dressed global  economic  issues.  It  should 
be  clear  from  the  outcome  of  that  sum- 
mit that  ASEAN's  concerns  were  very 
much  on  our  minds. 


k 


Trade  Issues.  The  first  topic 
Foreign  Minister  Mochtar  addressed 
was  trade.  We  share  the  view  that  trad 
is  a  major  engine  of  the  development 
process.  Trade  liberalization  is  an  in- 
dispensable element  in  ensuring  that  thi 
global  recovery  will  endure  and  spread. 
We  worked  hard  to  see  that  the  summit 
declaration  urged  formal  movement  on 
new  GATT  [General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade]  trade  round.  In  our 
judgment,  a  new  round  will  stimulate 
confidence  in  the  recovery  and  can  offe 
the  prospect  of  significant  benefits  to 
the  developing  world. 

A  key  objective  of  a  new  trade 
round  will  be  to  confront  the  protec- 
tionist pressures  that  afflict  all  of  us, 
developed  and  developing  countries 
alike.  On  this  point,  I  am  sure  we  are  i 
full  agreement.  We  may  disagree, 
however,  on  the  extent  of  protectionisi 
now  being  provided  our  respective  in- 
dustries. 

The  United  States  is  frequently  ac- 
cused of  bowing  to  protectionist  pres- 
sures to  the  detriment  of  the  developir 
world.  Examples  often  cited  are  textilt 
shoes,  and  steel.  We  do  face  pro- 
tectionist pressure,  and  occasionally  w 
are  forced  to  limit  the  growth  of  impo 
of  some  products.  I  note  with  pride, 
however,  that  the  U.S.  economy  is  a 
genuinely  open  one,  and  this  openness 
of  great  benefit  to  developing  countrif 
The  United  States  is  the  world's  biggt 
market  for  the  manufactured  exports 
developing  countries,  taking  over  50'R 
such  exports  to  all  industrial  countries 
Even  in  sensitive  industries  where  pri 
tectionist  pressure  is  high,  imports  ha 
continued  to  grow,  often  exceeding  tli  , 
growth  in  total  output  in  that  industr  | 

The  complaint  heard  most  concerJ 
textiles.  But  during  the  first  4  month^ 
1984,  textile  imports  to  the  United 
States  are  50%  above  the  same  perio' 
1983;  in  the  case  of  the  ASEAN  coun-  •' 
tries,  the  figure  is  107%.  A  rate  of  in 
crease  like  that  in  a  sensitive  Americ; 
industry  causes  us  real  problems  and 
brings  an  understandable  reaction  in 
United  States.  But  the  increases  are 
there,  nonetheless.  The  United  State; 
has  an  open  market.  Imports  are  a  p' 
manent  part  of  our  economic  life  and 
welcome  the  benefits  they  bring. 

Protectionism  is  a  danger  we  all 
must  combat.  IMF  [International 
Monetary  Fund]  studies  have  made  c 
the  damage  that  high  levels  of  protec 
tionism  have  caused  to  certain  devek 
ing  countries.  I  agree  with  those  whc 
have  raised  objections  to  proposals  ir|^ 
the  United  States  for  local  content 


Ji 


THE  SECRETARY 


slation.  President  Reagan's  Ad- 
istration  is  vigorously  opposed  to 
1  laws  but  the  principle  of  realism  is 
iired  here  as  well,  for  this  is  a  prac- 
widespread  in  the  developing  as  well 
leveloped  worlds.  Nor  can  we  ignore 
reality  that  the  average  tariff  level 
he  developing  countries  is  30%  corn- 
ed to  4.7%  in  developed  countries. 
A  trade  issue  of  particular  concern 
he  United  States  is  infringement  of 
■Uectual  property  rights.  American  _ 
inesses  lose  hundreds  of  millions  of 
ars  annually  due  to  the  counter- 
ing and  piracy  of  records,  tapes,  and 
er  intellectual"  property.  But  the  even 
ger  losers  are  those  nations  who  fail 
jffer  protection  to  intellectual  prop- 
y.  America's  high-technology  com- 
)ies— for  example,  in  computers  and 
nputer  software— are  not  going  to 
nt  to  invest  in  countries  where  their 
ellectual  property  can  be  stolen  with 
Dunity.  This  will  result  in  a  loss  to 
)se  countries  of  the  types  of  skills 
3ded  to  develop  a  modern  industrial 
:tor  with  well-educated,  high  paid, 
lied  workers.  This  is  an  issue  that 
-icerns  us  all  and  which  must  be  ad- 
3ssed  quickly. 

Growth  in  the  industrial  democracies 
:rucial  to  the  trade  and  thus  to  the 
)nomies  of  the  developing  world 
d— I  wish  to  emphasize— vice  versa. 
al  output  in  non-oil-producing  develop- 
<■  countries  is  expected  to  rise  3.5% 
s  year,  compared  to  1.6%  last  year.  A 
ijor  part  of  this  recovery  is  due  to  the 
rease  in  world  trade.  Achievement  of 
rtained  noninflationary  growth  in  the 
lited  States  and  maintenance  of  our 
en  markets  are  of  prime  importance 

the  developing  world.  Conversely, 
,  ;EAN's  prosperity  has  created  new 
I  irkets  and  enhanced  investment  op- 
I  rtunities  for  American  business. 

The  strong  growth  of  U.S.  import 
[  mand  has  been  the  major  factor  in  the 
1  ;overy  of  world  trade,  with  U.S.  im- 
1  rts  up  13%  in  1983  and  an  estimated 
:  %  for  1984.  In  the  case  of  ASEAN, 
i  Teased  exports  to  the  United  States 
a  counted  for  over  60%  of  ASEAN's 
1  ;al  export  increase  in  1983.  These 
!]  rcentages  are  pretty  big  in  anybody's 
I]  -ms,  but  in  terms  of  ASEAN's 
Ijonomies  they  are  huge,  for  the 

nerican  economy  is  truly  enormous. 


Commodity  Agreements.  The  sec- 
d  issue  mentioned  by  Foreign  Minister 
ochtar  on  behalf  of  the  ASEAN  coun- 
les  was  commodities.  In  practice,  com- 
odity  agreements  often  interfere  with 
arket  forces  to  the  detriment  of  ra- 
)nal  long-term  allocation  of  capital. 


land,  and  labor.  Bearing  these  dif- 
ferences in  mind,  however,  we  may  be 
able  to  turn  to  negotiation  along 
avenues  that  can  lead  to  practical  and 
economically  productive  areas  of  agree- 
ment. 

The  International  Rubber  Agree- 
ment is  one  commodity  arrangement 
that  we  both  are  able  to  support.  We  an- 
ticipate that  negotiations  to  renew  this 
agreement  will  proceed  in  a  good-faith 
manner.  Another  example  is  the 
U.S- ASEAN  memorandum  of  under- 
standing on  tin  that  we  concluded  late 
last  year,  directly  as  a  result  of  the 
ASEAN  dialogue  meeting.  We  intend  to 
follow  the  same  precepts  of  realism  and 
diplomacy  in  examining  other  commodi- 
ty issues. 

Debt  and  Finance.  The  third  and 
fourth  topics  in  Foreign  Minister 
Mochtar's  letter  were  debt  and  finance. 
Here  the  London  summit  participants 
agreed  that  their  strategy  for  dealing 
with  the  international  debt  crisis  is 
working  as  intended.  One  of  the  lessons 
we  have  learned  in  recent  years  is  that 
over-reliance  on  foreign  borrowing  to 
finance  development  can  lead  to  suc- 
cessively complex  problems,  especially 
during  an  economic  downturn.  I  want  to 
underscore  the  Williamsburg  and  Lon- 
don declarations'  recognition  of  the  im- 
portance of  private  capital  flows  to  the 
developing  world.  Private  equity  funds 
can  provide  an  important  complement  to 
domestic  savings,  while  avoiding  the  pit- 
falls that  come  with  large  amounts  of 
foreign  debt.  Furthermore,  as  the  Lon- 
don summit  recognized,  foreign  direct 
investment  "carries  the  advantage  of  be- 
ing tied  to  productive  capital  formation, 
as  well  as  forming  part  of  the  package 
that  includes  the  transfer  of  technology 
and  skills."  Countries,  just  as  companies, 
must  pay  attention  to  their  debt-to- 
equity  ratio.  The  ASEAN  countries  you 
represent  have  been  wise  in  pursuing, 
for  the  most  part,  sensible  strategies  of 
foreign  borrowing.  The  United  States 
stands  ready  to  work  with  you  to  im- 
prove the  climate  for  increased  foreign 
equity  flows.  For  example,  we  are 
prepared  to  enter  into  discussions  about 
treaties  for  encouraging  and  protecting 
investment. 

Another  aspect  of  the  financial  side 
of  cooperation  is  development  assist- 
ance. While  it  can  never  match  trade  or 
private  foreign  investment— let  alone  in- 
vestment based  on  domestic  savings— in 
terms  of  its  impact  on  the  recipient 


country,  it  can  play  a  crucial  catalytic 
role,  particularly  for  the  poorest  coun- 
tries. U.S.  assistance  to  the  developing 
world  exceeds  that  of  any  OECD 
[Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development]  country.  In  fiscal  year 
(FY)  1983,  the  United  States  provided 
$249  million  in  bilateral  economic 
assistance  to  ASEAN  countries. 
Together  with  security  assistance,  our 
total  bilateral  aid  was  $424  million. 
When  one  adds  in  our  share  of 
World  Bank  and  Asian  Development 
Bank  loans  to  the  ASEAN  countries, 
total  U.S.  assistance  in  FY  1983  ex- 
ceeded $1  billion.  We  are  the  largest 
participant  in  the  major  international 
financial  institutions.  We  will  maintain 
these  flows  to  the  extent  that  our 
budgetary  conditions  permit  and  we  will 
continue  to  support  the  programs 
directed  toward  ASEAN  of  the  IMF,  the 
World  Bank,  and  the  ASEAN  Develop- 
ment Bank. 

North/South  Dialogue.  Mr. 

Mochtar's  fifth  point  addressed  the 
North/ South  dialogue.  We  believe  in 
dialogue;  that  is  why  we  are  here.  That 
is  why  we  support  substantive  work  in 
the  GATT,  IMF,  the  World  Bank,  the 
Asian  Development  Bank,  the  African 
Development  Bank,  the  Inter- American 
Development  Bank,  and  other  similar  in- 
stitutions. The  forums  for  the  dialogue 
exist.  The  institutions  for  carrying  out 
programs  exist.  What  we  must  find  are 
practical  solutions,  working  in  those 
forums  where  constructive  action  can  be 
taken. 


U.S. -ASEAN  Relations 

Each  time  I  return  to  this  region  I  am 
impressed  anew  with  the  sense  of 
dynamism  I  encounter.  ASEAN's  record 
of  progress  over  the  past  decade  has 
been  phenomenal.  Your  average  real  an- 
nual growth  is  the  envy  of  the  rest  of 
the  world— developed  and  developing. 
Your  growth  in  trade  with  the  rest  of 
the  world  in  the  last  decade  was  more 
than  twice  that  of  overall  world  trade. 
Your  exports  have  grown  from  $14 
billion  to  over  $70  billion  in  the  same 
period— a  most  impressive  record.  Com- 
plementing the  dynamism  of  the  region 
is  its  stability.  Much  of  the  developing 
world  must  grapple  with  rapid  and  un- 
controlled change  that  threatens  political 
and  economic  institutions.  But  the  coun- 
tries of  this  region  have  become  models 
for  balancing  stability  with  controlled 
and  beneficial  change. 

On  this  visit,  I  have  been  reminded 
again  how  our  host  government,  under 
President  Soeharto's  leadership,  has 


THE  SECRETARY 


« 


drawn  on  the  traditional  Indonesian 
values  of  consultation  and  consensus  to 
construct  a  stability  that  stands  in  stark 
contrast  to  the  turmoil  that  followed  the 
1945  revolution.  In  Malaysia,  I  saw  a 
vibrant  parliamentary  democracy  at 
work  a  political  system  that  demon- 
TtStes  that  people  from  different  ethnic 
roups  can  work  together  in  harmony  to 
.rge  a  nation.  In  Singapore,  1  saw  how 
imaginative  leadership  combined  with 
the  principles  of  free  enterprise  can 
overcome  the  shortage  of  na  ural 
resources.  The  Philippines  although  still 
beset  by  serious  financial  difficulties 
recently  held  imporUmt  legislative  elec- 
tions, which  showed  the  Filipinos  deep 
commitment  to  the  democratic  process.  I 
have  been  heartened  by  Thailand  s  im- 
pressive political  stability  and  deepened 
cooperation  with  my  country.  And 
Deputy  Secretary  Dam  felt  the  promise 
of  Brunei  as  it  celebrated  its  in- 
dependence this  year. 

Today,  there  is  a  growing  awareness 
of  Asia's  "importance  to  the  United 
States.  East  Asia's  rapid  economic 
kirowth  has  had  a  profound  impact  <:.n 
our  own  economy.  U.S.  investment  in 
ASEAN,  currently  almost  $8  billion,  ac- 
cording to  recent  Department  of  Com- 
merce figures,  continues  to  increase,  as 
American  business  sees  new  oppor- 
tunities in  ASEAN's  expanding  free^ 
market  economies.  The  U.S.-ASEAN 
Center  for  Technology  Exchange  pro- 
vides an  opportunity  to  promote  the 
transfer  of  technology  from  the  United 
States  to  ASEAN  firms.  Americas  an- 
nual trade  with  East  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  exceeds  that  with  any  other  part 
of  the  world-and  has  for  5  years. 
ASEAN  is  now  the  fifth  largest  trading 
partner  of  the  United  States-with  total 
trade  exceeding  $23  billion. 

There  is  a  deep  human  and  cultural 
dimension  to  our  relations  as  well.  This 
year  there  are  more  than  40,000 
students  from  ASEAN  nations  studying 
in  the  United  States  and  the  number  of 
my  countrymen  who  visit  Southeast  Asia 
and  become  involved  here  continues  to 
rise.  I,  myself,  visited  this  region  often 
as  a  private  citizen  and  spread  the  word 
of  the  new  Southeast  Asia  to  my  friends 
back  home.  Your  societies,  your  his- 
tories, your  intellectual  and  artistic 
achievements  every  year  become  more 
familiar  to  Americans  and  contribute  to 
a  lasting  bond  between  us.  Behind  each 
statistic  there  are  complex  person-to- 
person  contacts  that  will  link  our  lands 
and  peoples  ever  more  closely  in  the 
future. 


Southeast  Asia  is  an  area  that  com- 
mands U.S.  attention  within  the 
Asia/Pacific  region.  In  recent  years 
questions  have  been  raised  about  the 
firmness  of  American  purpose  in 
Southeast  Asia.  Some  feared  that  our 
withdrawal  from  Vietnam  would  lead  us 
to  abandon  our  interests  in  the  region, 
particulary  in  ASEAN.  The  prospect- 
some  years  ago-of  a  withdrawal  of  U.S. 
troops  from  Korea  fed  these  fears. 
Let  me  assure  you  that  nothing 
could  be  further  from  reality.  U.S. 
security  interests  are  increasingly 
engaged  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  We  are 
committed  to  an  active,  constructive 
and  long-term  presence  in  Southeast 

A  SIR 

Our  relations  with  the  ASEAN  coun- 
tries are  the  cornerstone  of  our  policy  in 
Southeast  Asia.  As  the  United  States 
develops  and  expands  its  relations  with 
other  countries,  both  large  and  small,  m 
Asia  and  around  the  worid,  we  will  very 
much  keep  in  mind  our  strong  ties  with 
the  ASEAN  region.  We  do  not  intend  to 
subordinate  our  interests  m  ASEAN  to 
the  pursuit  of  better  relations  elsewhere. 

U  S   relations  with  the  ASEAN 
region  are  based  upon  the  perception 
that  we  each  have  a  constructive  and 
complementary  role  to  play  in  dealing 
with  the  challenges  that  confront  us. 
Your  combined  voices  carry  authority  in 
the  international  arena  and  contribute  to 
the  quest  for  peace  and  economic  justice. 
Together  we  can  make  an  impressive 
contribution  to  the  kind  of  world  all  our 
peoples  seek  for  the  future. 


levei 


(|,ff 


Conclusion 


In  conclusion,  let  me  say  once  again 
what  a  pleasure  it  is  to  participate  m 
this  dialogue  with  you.  The  discussions 
we  have  had  here  symbolize  the 
dynamism  and  vibrancy  of  your  coun- 
tries The  inclusion  in  our  agenda  this 
year  of  the  theme  of  Pacific  cooperation 
reflects  your  vision  of  the  opportunity 
that  the  future  offers  to  the  Pacific 
region.  We  share  this  vision  and  are 
prepared  to  work  with  you  to  give  it 
substance.  The  success  of  ASEAN,  both 
as  a  regional  organization  and  as  in- 
dividual countries,  stands  out  as  an 
example  for  others  everywhere.  The 
United  States  is  proud  to  be  associated 
with  our  allies  and  friends  in  these  joint 
endeavors. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 

CANBERRA, 

JULY  15,  1984^ 

First  I  want  to  express  my  appreciatii 

for  the  great  hospitality  shown  me  her« 

by  the  Prime  Minister,  and  the  Foreig* 

Minister,  and  others  in  Australia.  We 

had  a  very  fine  working  dinner  and  a 

lengthy  discussion  last  night,  and  agai; 

this  morning  a  brief  private  meeting    i  (jcek 

with  the  Foreign  Minister.  The  meetii^  «rPa 

this  morning  will  continue  on,  so  we    j  jZlSI 

want  to,  all  of  us,  express  our  apprecd  ill 

tion  for  this  mark  of  cordiality.  Of  jster. 

course  I'll  be  meeting  with  the  Foreigi   ^sek 

Minister  further  in  New  Zealand  wher|  strafc 

we  get  there  tomorrow.  V 

Q.  The  New  Zealand  Labor  Party 
abides  by  its  policy  in  banning  nucle> 
ships  from  New  Zealand  waters.  Doe 
this  mean  the  end  of  the  ANZUS  tre» 

ty"' 

A   I  had  the  chance  to  talk  Ijnefly 
on  the"  telephone  with  the  newly  electee 
Prime  Minister  [David  Lange],  and  1  e> 
pect  that  we  will  have  a  chance  to  mee 
He  said  that  he  was  going  out  of  his  w. 
to  come  to  Wellington,  and  we  will  hav 
a  chance  to  discuss  the  situation.  Ihen 
a  very  warm  feeling  between  the  peopl 
of  the  United  States  and,  I  think,  the 
people  of  New  Zealand,  and  we  will 
work  at  the  situation.  1  don't  want  to 
prejudge  it. 

Q.  This  morning  David  Lange  saJ. 
on  TV  that  his  government  would  iin  ,j 
plement  his  party's  policy  on  banning  ;„ 
U  S.  warships  carrying  nuclear  , 

weapons  from  New  Zealand  ports,  b^  „ 
he  said  he  did  not  believe  that  that  j. 
would  jeopardize  ANZUS.  Would  yo-  „ 

.  .        .         •      .__0  ,1 


iWt; 


lecl 
slra! 
A. 


accept  that  view? 

A  As  I  said,  1  will  have  discussm 
with  him.  We'll  have  a  meeting  of  the 
ANZUS  group,  and  we'll  make  our 
statements  as  we  go  along  in  that  set 
ting.  I  don't  want  to  prejudge  the  situ 
tion. 


i, 


t 


Q   But  do  vou  express  concern 
over  that  New  Zealand  Labor  Party 
policy,  whether  or  not  it's  put  into  e 
feet?  Do  you  express  concern  of  the 

policv  itself?  . 

A  ANZUS  is  an  alliance.  It  is  an 
alliance  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that  th 
basic  values  of  freedom,  liberty,  and  t 
rule  of  law  are  shared  by  Australia,  ^ 
Zealand,  and  the  United  States,  amor 
other  countries  in  the  worid.  And  soj 
recognize  that  there  are  threats  to  th. 
valuis  and  that  we  have  to  deter  thes 
threats.  That  is  essentially  the  basis  t 


neoartment  of  State  Bulli 


THE  SECRETARY 


\  alliance.  Now  for  an  alliance  to 
I  ill  anything,  it  has  to  be  possible  for 
i  military  forces  of  the  respective 
iiitries  to  be  able  to  interact  together; 
:  r\\  ise  it's  not  much  of  an  alliance. 
these  are  matters  that  we'll  discuss 
,  nevertheless,  I  think  that's  just  a 
;ement  of  fact. 

Q.  Would  you  be  asking  for  Mr. 
fden  to  perhaps  use  whatever  in- 
mce  he  has  on  the  New  Zealand 
tor  Party  to  see  the  reality  of  the 
ZUS  treaty? 

A.  Mr.  Hayden  and  the  Prime 
lister,  of  course,  will  express 
mselves  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
5tralian  view  of  matters,  and  we'll  ex- 
ss  the  U.S.  view  of  matters.  I  think 
t  there's  a  great  deal  of  good  will  on 
sides  of  this  issue,  and  we'll  have  to 
ceed  and  see  what  we  can  work  out. 

Q.  If  the  New  Zealand  Govern- 
nt  does  ban  the  warships,  can  we 
I'Cct  to  see  more  of  them  here  in 
l^tralia? 

'  A.  I  don't  want  to  bite  on  the  con- 

iied  speculation.  I  want  to  talk  with 
new  leader  in  New  Zealand,  and  we 
work  our  way  along  on  these  issues. 

)n't  want  to  engage  in  excessive 

culation. 

Q.  Do  you  expect  to  be  able  to 
lolve  the  issue  during  the  period  of 
I  ANZUS  talks? 

A.  I  think,  first  of  all,  the  ANZUS 
:s  take  place  among  the  governments 
t  are  in  place  in  the  United  States, 
jtralia,  and  New  Zealand.  We  will 
I  e  a  chance  to  meet  with  members  of 
1  new  government,  but  it  hasn't 
-ned  itself  yet.  So  this  ANZUS 
jting,  I  think,  comes  at  a  good  time 
he  sense  that  it  affords  us  an  oppor- 
ity  to  meet  with  a  new  government, 
it  is  the  old  government  that  will  be 
government  in  place  for  this 
sting. 

Q.  As  you've  been  aware,  the 
)or  Party's  national  conference  in 
5  country  has  taken  the  decision  to 
p  homeporting  of  American  war- 
ps in  the  Australian  ports.  Is  that  a 
tter  of  concern? 
A.  We  think  that  the  way  in  which 
ship  visits  and  other  aspects  of  our 
itionship  with  Australia  are  basically 
'ery  good  shape  and  we  have  no 
blems. 

Q.  Would  the  United  States  be 
itemplating  changing  the  arrange- 
nts  whereby  it  makes  regular  use  of 
stralian  ports,  particularly  the  Port 


of  Fremantle  in  western  Australia,  as 
a  result  of  the  decision  that  was  taken 
last  week  by  the  Labor  Party  con- 
ference? 

A.  As  far  as  I  can  see  from  the  dis- 
cussions that  I've  had  here,  and  we'll 
continue  them,  of  course,  the 
U.S. -Australia  leg  of  the  ANZUS  rela- 
tionship is  in  very  good  shape.  We  have 
a  strong  sharing  of  common  values  and 
a  sense  of  the  importance  of  succeeding 
in  maintaining  stability  in  the  world  and 
a  place  where  these  values  can  flourish. 
We  share  a  common  view  that  we  must 
maintain  a  deterrent  capability. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  this  year's 
ANZUS  talks  are  slightly  irrelevant, 
given  that  they  are  taking  place  with 
Mr.  Muldoon  and  Mr.  Cooper? 
Shouldn't  we  really  be  discussing  it 
with  the  new  Labor  government? 

A.  I  think  it  has  fortuitously  turned 
out  to  be  a  good  time  to  have  this 
conference  because  it  gives  us  an  oppor- 
tunity to  talk  with  a  new  government 
and  to  hear  their  views  and  to  express 
our  views  so  that  these  matters  can  be 
considered  before  the  new  government 
takes  office  and  starts  to  take  positions 
as  a  government.  So  I  think  that  it's 
really  a  good  time  to  be  present  in  New 
Zealand,  and  it  gives  us  a  chance  to  be 
part  of  this  transition  that's  under  way. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  worried 
about  Australia's  depleted  defense 
capabilities  and  does  the  United 
States  believe  that  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  ASEAN  region  could  be 
destabilized  because  of  a  lack  of 
defense  direction  from  Australia? 

A.  We  think  it's  important  for  all 
the  countries  in  the  various  alliances 
that  we  have  to  be  looking  to  their 
defense  capabilities  and  seeing  that  they 
are  properly  attended  to.  And,  of 
course,  we  struggle  with  that  within  the 
United  States. 

President  Reagan  has  wanted  to  re- 
store the  military  balance  and  that  has 
meant  spending  a  lot  of  money  and  on 
the  whole  that  has  gone  along  suc- 
cessfully. We  have  had  some  disappoint- 
ments in  the  appropriations  process,  but 
there  has  certainly  been  a  major  change 
in  the  U.S.  defense  posture.  We  work  on 
this  same  problem  with  our  NATO  allies. 
We  talk  about  it,  the  responsibilities  of 
the  Japanese  and  so  on.  So  I  think  it's  a 
general  proposition  that  we  have  to  be 
looking  to  our  defense  capabilities  and 
the  same  is  true  from  the  standpoint  of 
Australia. 

I  might  say  that  we  all  recognize,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  the  nuclear  side  of 
strength  is  a  key  element  in  the  deter- 


rent, and  at  the  same  time  we  recognize 
the  importance  of  strength  in  conven- 
tional forces  and  the  importance  of  con- 
ventional forces  to  the  nuclear  deter- 
rent. It  is  the  case,  at  the  same  time, 
that  conventional  forces  are  expensive 
and  so  that  fact  means  that  you 
recognize  the  sig^nificance  of  improve- 
ment in  conventional  capability;  you  also 
have  to  be  recognizing  that  it's  going  to 
cost  you  some  money. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  you  are  con- 
cerned about  Australia's  [inaudible] 
defense  capability? 

A.  We  are  concerned  about 
anything  less  than  adequate  all  around 
the  world,  including  with  ourselves,  and 
so  we  are  trying  to  bring  about — others 
are  working  with  us — attention  to  what 
the  capabilities  are.  And  I  don't  single 
out  any  one  country.  I  just  say  that  we 
all  need  to  be  looking  to  our  capabilities 
and  strengthening  them;  recognizing, 
ironically,  that  it  is  through  strengthen- 
ing them  that  we  lessen  the  chance  that 
they  would  ever  be  used. 

Q.  Does  the  United  States  regard 
Australia's  defense  capabilities  as  ade- 
quate or  not? 

A.   We  have  an  alliance  with 
Australia,  as  I  have  said,  we  feel  that 
there  is  work  to  be  done  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States,  on  the  part  of 
Australia,  on  the  part  of  NATO,  on  the 
part  of  Japan,  on  the  part  of  people  who 
are  standing  for  freedom  and  democracy 
all  over  the  world.  We  have  to  be  ready 
to  defend  these  values,  and  having 
strength  is  the  best  insurance  that  we 
can  have  that  the  strength  will  not  need 
to  be  used.  So  it  isn't  simply  a  problem 
for  Australia.  It's  a  problem  for  all  of 
us,  and  all  of  us  working  together  in  our 
respective  alliances. 

Q.  Congresswoman  Ferraro  has 
charged  that  President  Reagan  cannot 
claim  one  single  foreign  policy  suc- 
cess. I  am  wondering  if  you  would 
like  to  respond  to  that. 

A.  Oh,  I'm  not  going  to  get  into  a 
debate  with  Congresswoman  Ferraro, 
but  I  think  that,  as  a  general  proposi- 
tion, the  standing  of  the  United  States 
in  the  world  has  been  immeasurably 
strengthened  during  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration. Here  we  are  in  the 
Australia-New  Zealand  area,  and  having 
just  come  from  a  meeting  with  the 
ASEAN  countries,  and  earlier  this  year 
the  President  has  visited  Japan  and 
Korea  and  China,  so  if  you  look  at  this 
part  of  the  world,  we  have  very  strong 
relationships  here.  And  the  same  can  be 


THE  SECRETARY 

said  as  you  look  around  the  world  more 
generally.  So  there  are  many  problems 
fhey  are  being  addressed  in  a  strong  and 
creative  way,  and  I  thmk  the  Umted 

States  is  in  very  good  shape. 

Q  This  is  what  they  call  in 
American  journalism  a  "so-what"  ques- 
tion. If  the  ANZUS  alliance  is  not 
functioning  effectively,  what  dif- 
ference does  it  make  beyond  the 
shared  values  and  so  forth. 

A   Shared  values  and  so  forth  are 
not  a  "so-what"  question.  The  impor- 
tance of  freedom  tends  to  be  taken  tor 
granted  in  the  United  States,  m 
Australia,  in  New  Zealand,  m  many 
parts  of  Europe,  and  in  places  that  have 
had  it  and  consider  it  normal,  like 
iireathing  the  air. 

But  it's  very  dramatic  to  talk  to  peo- 
ple who  are  in  a  country  that  hasn  t  had 
it  For  example,  this  past  year,  I  ve  had 
a  chance  to  visit  with  the  leaders  o 
Spain  and  Portugal,  and  particularly  1 
remember  visiting  with  Prime  Minister 
Suarez  just  as  he  returned  from  the  in- 
auguration of  President  Alfonsin  in 
Argentina.  And  he  was  commenting 
upon  how  wonderful  it  is  to  have  free- 
dom So,  1  think  that  freedom  can  t  be 
nut  down  as  a  "so-what"  proposition.  It 
needs  to  be  attended  to  everywhere,  and 
people  need  to  address  themselves  to  the 
importance  of  this  value  and  the  fact 
that  it  is  under  attack.  If  we're  going  to 
keep  it,  we  have  to  be  ready  to  deter  ag- 
gression against  it. 


I 


Q.  Are  you  suggesting  that  if  the 
ANZUS  pact  is  not  effectively  work- 
ing, Australia  and  New  Zealand  would 
lose  their  freedom? 

A.  It  is  part  of  an  overall  proposi- 
tion, and  the  all-or-nothing  approach 
suggested  bv  your  question,  I  don't  think 
is  appropriate.  But  at  the  same  time,  it 
we  lose  some  deterrent  capability,  that 
increases  the  margin  for  error,  and  we 
shouldn't  do  it. 

Q.  There  are  reports  from 
Washington,  somewhat  ambiguous, 
that  the  United  States  has  told  the 
Soviet  Union  in  regard  to  these 
discussions  on  space  weapons  that  it 
would  be  prepared  to  delay  these  talks 
until  after  the  elections  if  that  suited 
the  Soviet  Union.  Can  you  amplify  this 
in  any  way? 

A.  The  Soviet  Union  suggested  that 
these  talks  take  place  in  Vienna  in  the 
middle  of  September,  and  we  have  said 
yes,  we'll  be  there.  There  have  also  been 
lots'  of  questions  raised  by  them,  and 
they  keep  talking  about  our  election.  We 
don't  talk  about  our  election;  we  talk 


about  the  importance  of  arms  control  at 
any  season  of  the  year  So  we  dont 
want  to  delay  these  talks,  but  if  for 
some  reason  they  can't  conveniently  be 
arranged  at  the  time  set,  and  there  s  a 
desire  to  somehow  have  them  take  p  ace 
after  the  election,  then  they'll  take  place 
after  the  election.  But  our  desire  is  to 
have  them  take  place  in  September,  as 
was  originally  set,  but  we're  not  going  to 
sort  of  hang  on  that.  On  the  contrary, 
our  interest  is  in  getting  them  gomg  and 
getting  them  going  in  a  constructive 
way  as  soon  as  possible. 

Q.  Our  Foreign  Minister  just  re- 
turned  from  Moscow  a  month  ago.  Did 
vou  discuss  that  with  him  and.  if  so. 
"did  you  gain  any  useful  perceptions  or 
information? 

A  The  Foreign  Minister  had  a  very 
interesting  trip  to  the  Soviet  Union,  not 
iust  in  Moscow,  and  he  provided  us  a 
good  read-out  from  the  trip  after  it  was 
completed.  I've  had  a  chance  to  talk  with 
him  further  about  it  on  this  visit,  and  1 
hope  that  I'll  have  chances  for  some  fur- 
ther exchanges  as  we're  together  over 
the  next  few  days.  I  think  it's  a  very 
valuable  thing  that  he  went  and  got  his 
own  impressions  and  was  able  to  provide 
those  to  us.  It's  part  of  the  continuing 
dialogue,  you  might  say,  of  the  West 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  And  each  piece 
of  it  is  of  importance.  His  visit  was  quite 
a  worthwhile  one,  and  we're  very  grate- 
ful to  him  for  being  willing  to  share  with 
us  his  own  thoughts  and  his  experiences 
there. 


oi 
1 


Q.  While  in  Jakarta,  did  you  raise 
the  question  of  human  rights  in  princi- 
ple? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Did  you  present  a  letter  to  the 
Indonesian  Government  from  your 
U  S   Congressmen  expressing  concern 
about  human  rights?  If  not,  why  not? 

A.  I'm  from  the  Administration,  and 
1  expressed  our  concern  and  there  are 
also  things  that  we  are  trying  to  do  that 
we  think  are  helpful  on  East  Timor.  We 
believe  that  the  best  way  to  be  helpful 
and  to  try  to  make  a  constructive  con- 
tribution'is  to  do  it  quietly  in  diplomatic 
channels  and  at  the  same  time  be  ready 
to  do  things  that  may  help  people  in 
East  Timor  and  provide  access  to  the 
situation.  Those  are  the  lines  along 
which  we  have  been  working. 


REMARKS, 
WELLINGTON. 
JULY  16.  1984^ 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to  welcomi 
Foreign  Ministers  Cooper  and  Hayden 
and  the  members  of  their  delegations  t 
our  Embassy.  I  believe  our  first  sessio! 
this  morning  went  very  well,  and  I  loo_ 
forward  to  continuing  in  the  same  spim 
during  the  remainder  of  the  council 

meeting. 

We,  of  course,  have  had  a  very  cloi 
partnership  with  the  existing  and  all 
previous  New  Zealand  Governments 
and  in  the  spirit  which  has  character- 
ized our  dealings  with  New  Zealand  ov( 
many  years,  we  hope  to  continue  m 
partnership  with  the  new  government, 

My  visits  to  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  come  at  a  time  when  the  con 
tinued  strength  of  the  alliance  has  nev( 
been  more  critical  to  stability  m  the 
Pacific.  Soviet  naval  activity  in  the 
Pacific,  supported  by  the  growing  So 
air  and  naval  presence  on  the  Pacific 
rim  continues  to  increase,  probing  for 
weak  or  vulnerable  areas  into  which  it 
can  expand.  Our  ANZUS  solidarity,  I 
believe,  has  been  critical  to  the  failure  c 
the  Soviets  to  project  their  influence  in- 
to the  Southwest  Pacific,  particularly 
among  the  new  island  states  of  the 
region. 

But  should  the  ANZUS  resolve  evei 
weaken,  should  we  ever  allow  our  atter 
tion  to  be  diverted  from  potentially 
destabilizing  activities  by  indecision  or  ; 
belief  that  opting  out  of  the  alliance  wil 
decrease  the  dangers  we  might  face, 
then  I  believe  we  will  have  handed  our 
adversaries  a  windfall  by  default.  Our 
unity  is  the  best  deterrence  we  have,  tl 
least  expensive,  and  most  effective  wa: 
we  have  of  convincing  any  potential 
adversary  that  we  will  always  stand 
together.  That  is  why  we  stand 
together,  just  as  the  United  States 
stands  with  our  European  allies  in 
NATO   Both  alliances  are  communitiet 


ekao 


fZl'St 
Ll'll 


mi 
lOefen 

km 
lemn'J 
hell 


le 


of  nations,  bounded  by  shared 
democratic  traditions,  which  have  volu,, 
tarily  linked  their  peoples  and  institu- 
tions into  a  strong  chain  of  deterrence 
against  anyone  who  would  dominate  uf 
But  as  with  any  chain,  we  must  ensure 
that  all  the  links  are  sturdy  and  in  goo 
repair.  , 

And  1  think  that  is  why  we  are  her 
in  Wellington  these  2  days,  reviewing, 
as  we  have  every  year  for  33  years,  ou 
Pacific  end  of  the  chain,  to  ensure  that 
we  understand  each  other  and  our  viev 
on  mutual  defense  and  other  importan  j 
global  and  regional  matters.  But  equal  | 


npnartment  of  State  Bullet 


THE  SECRETARY 


ortant,  we  meet  to  deepen  that  sense 
lutual  trust  which  has  always 
racterized  our  relations  and  without 
ch  any  community  of  nations  united 
eek  a  common  goal  cannot  survive.  I 
optimistic  that  we  will  succeed. 
In  that  spirit,  I  would  like  to  pro- 
3  a  toast  to  Her  Majesty  Queen 
iabeth  II,  Queen  of  New  Zealand  and 
Australia. 


ZUS  COMMUNIQUE, 
.Y  17.  1984 

33rd  meeting  of  the  ANZUS  Council 
;  place  in  Wellington  on  16  and  17  July 

1.  The  United  States  Secretary  of  State. 
rge  Shultz.  the  Australian  Minister  for 
sign  Affairs,  Bill  Hayden,  and  Minister 
Defence,  Gordon  Scholes,  and  New 
and's  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  War- 
Cooper,  and  Minister  of  Defence.  David 
nison,  represented  their  respective 
jrnments.  During  their  visit  the  leaders 
le  United  States  and  Australian  delega- 
s  called  on  the  Prime  Minister.  Rt.  Hon. 
Robert  Muldoon,  and  Mr.  David  Lange, 
.,  Prime  Minister  elect. 

2.  Council  members  reaffirmed  their 
mitment  to  the  maintenance  of  peace, 
ility  and  democratic  freedoms.  They  ex- 
sed  their  belief  that  the  ANZUS  partner- 
,  based  as  it  is  on  common  traditions  and 
ed  interests,  contributes  to  this.  They 
•omed  the  increased  exchanges  that  had 
n  place  on  political,  economic,  security 
defense  issues  and  agreed  that  defense 
peration,  including  combined  exercises, 

s  and  logistic  support  arrangements, 
ed  an  essential  part  in  promoting  mutual 
1  rity.  Access  by  allied  aircraft  and  ships 
!  le  airfields  and  ports  of  the  ANZUS 
I  ibers  was  reaffirmed  as  essential  to  the 
!  inuing  effectiveness  of  the  Alliance. 

3.  Council  members  reviewed  a  broad 
1  ;e  of  global  issues  and  regional 
lilopments  of  concern  to  the  Alliance. 

!  ie  included  the  persistent  Soviet  arms 
1 1-up  in  the  Pacific  region  as  well  as  in 
I  ope;  the  need  for  early  resumption  of 
I  s  control  negotiations;  the  continuing 
I  ession  and  occupation  by  Soviet  forces  in 
:  nanistan;  and  Vietnam's  occupation  of 
ipuchea. 

4.  The  Coimcil  members  gave  special  at- 
I  ion  to  arms  control  and  disarmament 

1  es.  They  recognised  that  arms  control 
;  'ements  which  produced  balanced,  effec- 
'  and  verifiable  reductions  in  armaments 
1 1d  assist  in  reducing  international  ten- 

Is  and  in  strengthening  international 
irity.  They  agreed  that  the  early  conclu- 
of  such  agreements  was  of  the  highest 
ortance.  Among  arms  control  measures,  a 
5tantial  reduction  of  nuclear  weaponry  to 
.need,  more  stable  levels  was  of  the 
itest  urgency.  Council  members  expressed 
;ern  at  the  Soviet  Union's  refusal  to 
ime  the  START  [strategic  arms  reduction 
s]  and  INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 


force]  talks  and  called  for  the  resumption  of 
those  negotiations  without  delay.  They  en- 
dorsed efforts  by  several  countries,  including 
the  United  States  and  Australia,  to  establish 
a  political  dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union  and 
to  make  progress  on  arms  control.  The  New 
Zealand  and  Australian  Council  members 
welcomed  the  readiness  of  the  United  States 
to  resume  negotiations  at  any  time  and 
without  preconditions  on  reducmg  nuclear 
weapons  and  its  agreement  to  discuss  effec- 
tive and  verifiable  limits  on  anti-satellite 
weapons  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

5.  The  Council  members  reaffirmed  their 
strong  commitment  to  preventing  the  pro- 
liferation of  nuclear  weapons  and  agreed  to 
intensify  their  efforts  to  strengthen  the  inter- 
national non-proliferation  regime  through 
multilateral  and  bilateral  measures.  They 
noted  that  the  third  Review  Conference  of 
the  Treaty  on  the  Non-Proliferation  of 
Nuclear  Weapons  is  to  take  place  in  1985. 
Progress  in  fulfilling  all  the  Treaty  com- 
mitments, including  Article  VI  which  com- 
mits parties  to  pursue  negotiations  in  good 
faith  on  effective  measures  relating  to  cessa- 
tion of  the  nuclear  arms  race  at  an  early 
date,  is  important  to  the  international  non- 
proliferation  regime  and  the  Review  Con- 
ference. 

6.  In  this  context  they  reaffirmed  the 
commitment  of  their  governments  to  work 
towards  the  goal  of  a  comprehensive  and 
fully  verifiable  nuclear  test  ban  treaty.  They 
expressed  satisfaction  that  the  Western 
group  of  countries  in  the  Conference  on 
Disarmament  in  Geneva  had  agreed  on  a 
draft  mandate  for  the  Nuclear  Test  Ban  Ad 
Hoc  Committee.  They  urged  the  conference 
to  move  promptly  to  re-establish  the  Ad  Hoc 
Committee  under  this  mandate. 

7.  The  Australian  and  United  States 
members  affirmed  the  important  contribution 
of  the  joint  Australian/United  States  defence 
facilities  to  arms  control  verification,  effec- 
tive deterrence,  mutual  security  and  main- 
tenance of  the  stability  of  the  strategic 
balance. 

8.  The  Australian  and  New  Zealand  Coun- 
cil members  indicated  that  they  shared  fully 
the  concerns  of  other  countries  of  the  South 
Pacific  region  on  nuclear  issues,  including 
French  nuclear  testing.  They  gave  an  account 
of  the  progress  made  in  the  discussions 
among  members  of  the  South  Pacific  Forum 
on  a  South  Pacific  Nuclear  Free  Zone.  The 
ANZUS  partners  also  noted  that  the  pro- 
posed South  Pacific  Nuclear  Free  Zone  would 
be  discussed  further  at  the  1984  meeting  of 
the  South  Pacific  Forum  in  Tuvalu. 

9.  The  Council  members  agreed  that  a 
convention  to  prohibit  the  development,  pro- 
duction, stockpiling,  transfer  and  use  of 
chemical  weapons,  with  adequate  provisions 
for  compliance  and  verification,  would  be  an 
important  disarmament  measure.  The  use  of 
chemical  weapons  in  the  Iran/Iraq  war  and 
evidence  of  their  use  elsewhere  reinforced 
the  need  for  urgent  conclusion  of  a  conven- 
tion to  ban  chemical  weapons.  The  Australian 
and  New  Zealand  Council  members  welcomed 
the  recent  initiative  taken  by  the  United 
States  Government  in  the  Conference  on  Dis- 
armament. 


10.  They  noted  the  contribution  to  world 
peace  and  security  made  by  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  which  is  the  basis  of  international 
cooperation  in  Antarctica  and  bans  all 
military  activities  and  nuclear  weapons  there. 
They  expressed  their  continued  commitment 
to  the  Antarctic  Treaty  system. 

11.  The  Council  members  agreed  that  the 
political  and  strategic  outlook  would  be  great- 
ly influenced  by  the  economic  environment 
and  that  it  was  crucial  to  sustain  the 
economic  recovery  and  to  spread  its  benefits 
more  widely.  Equally  the  debt  problem  which 
many  countries  were  facing  needed  to  be 
managed  effectively.  The  threat  to  the  world 
trading  system  posed  by  the  spread  of  protec- 
tionist measures  also  needed  to  be  resisted. 
This  was  particularly  so  in  the  field  of 
agricultural  trade  which  suffered  from  long- 
standing protectionist  measures  and  the 
emergence  of  export  subsidization  on  a  scale 
which  threatened  markets  for  many  com- 
modities. 

12.  Council  members  welcomed  the  em- 
phasis placed  by  the  major  industrialised 
countries  at  their  recent  Summit  meeting  in 
London  on  the  importance  of  global  economic 
interdependence  and  expressed  the  hope  that 
the  recognition  of  this  interdependence  could 
form  the  basis  for  future  action.  The  impor- 
tance of  interdependence  was  nowhere  more 
evident  than  in  relation  to  the  debt  problem 
which  required  a  careful  and  balanced  ap- 
proach. Economic  adjustment  in  the  debtor 
countries  was  seen  as  an  essential  condition 
for  solving  debt  problems.  At  the  same  time 
a  cooperative  approach  was  required  from 
the  industrialised  countries.  Assistance  to  the 
debtor  countries  had  to  be  provided  under 
conditions  that  recognised  the  political  and 
social  difficulties  faced  by  these  countries. 
The  increasingly  important  and  central  role 
in  the  management  of  debt  problems  played 
by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  was 
welcomed.  Now  that  some  of  the  most  heavi- 
ly indebted  countries  were  undertaking  the 
first,  necessary  domestic  adjustments,  inter- 
national attention  was  focusing  increasingly 
on  longer-term  changes  that  may  be  required 
to  strengthen  the  open  trade  and  payments 
system,  with  special  attention  being  paid  to 
the  closely  linked  problems  of  debt  and  trade. 
The  work  being  conducted  on  these  issues  by 
a  variety  of  groups  reflected  an  encouraging 
convergence  of  views.  Council  members  con- 
sidered that  this  had  opened  the  way  for 
discussion  and  early  agreement  on  practical 
approaches  to  these  issues. 

13.  The  Council  members  reviewed  devel- 
opments in  the  South  Pacific.  They  welcomed 
the  fact  that  the  area  remained  one  of  peace 
and  cooperation  and  that  it  was  firmly  at- 
tached to  democratic  systems  and  traditional 
values.  Change  was  being  accommodated  and 
new  opportunities  were  being  taken  up.  The 
independent  and  self-governing  countries  of 
the  region  were  strengthening  relationships 
with  one  another  and  with  organisations  and 
countries  outside  the  region  that  had  con- 
structive contributions  to  make. 

14.  Council  members  welcomed  progress 
towards  self-government  in  the  Trust  Ter- 
ritory of  the  Pacific  Islands.  They  wanted  to 
see  ratification  on  the  Compact  of  Free 


THE  SECRETARY 


Association  and  termination  of  the 
Trusteeship  concluded  without  delay  and 
looked  forward  to  the  Micronesian  states  ex- 
panding their  links  with  countries  and 
organisations  in  the  Pacific  region. 

15.  Council  members  agreed  that  signifi- 
cant progress  has  been  made  in  constitutional 
evolution  in  New  Caledonia,  but  noted  there 
was  a  need  for  continued  participation  of  all 
parties  in  the  constitutional  process.  Peaceful 
resolution  of  the  situation  in  that  territory 
was  of  great  concern  to  all  countries  in  the 
area  and  Council  members  noted  that  it  was 
important  for  France  to  maintain  and  expand 
its  dialogue  with  South  Pacific  Forum 
members  on  this  issue. 

16.  The  Council  members  agreed  on  the 
importance  of  effective  regional  institutions 
in  the  area.  They  noted  the  major  political 
role  of  the  South  Pacific  Forum  in  which 
Heads  of  Government  of  Island  nations  and 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  were  able  to 
work  towards  shared  approaclies  on  current 
issues.  Maritime  matters,  such  as  fisheries 
cooperation  and  development,  and  possible 
nuclear  waste  dumping  were  of  major  con- 
cern to  countries  of  the  region.  Council 
members  commended  the  valuable  work  be- 
ing undertaken  in  these  fields  by  the  Forum 
Fisheries  Agency  and  the  South  Pacific 
Regional  Environmental  Programme. 
Members  agreed  they  would  continue  sup- 
porting and  encouraging  these  regional 
cooperative  endeavors  through  financial  con- 
tributions or  other  means. 

17.  The  Australian  and  New  Zealand 
Council  members  underlined  the  significance 
of  the  1982  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the 
Sea  for  the  countries  of  the  Pacific  region 
and  stressed  the  importance  of  wide 
adherence  to  it. 

18.  Recognising  that  political  stability  and 
cooperation  are  underpinned  by  economic 
security.  Council  members  expressed  admira- 
tion for  the  resilience  and  good  management 
of  Island  nations  which  had,  overall,  enabled 
Island  nations  to  cope  with  the  effects  of 
global  economic  recession  and  natural 
disasters.  They  recognised  nevertheless  that 
continued  bilateral  and  regional  aid,  and  en- 
couragement of  trade  and  investment  were 
essential  to  ensure  the  well-being  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  area,  and  that  such  help  would  be 
mutually  beneficial. 

19.  Council  members  reaffirmed  their 
desire  to  work  with  the  (Governments  of  the 
Pacific  Island  countries  in  the  interests  of  the 
stability  and  security  of  the  region.  Australia 
and  New  Zealand  intend  to  maintain  and 
develop  their  bilateral  defence  cooperation 
programmes  with,  and  assistance  to.  Island 
governments  in  fields  such  as  maritime 
surveillance,  civil  action,  emergency  and 
disaster  relief  and  training.  The  United 
States,  for  its  part,  will  continue  to  provide 
assistance  in  these  areas. 

20.  The  Australian  and  New  Zealand 
members  provided  details  of  recent  national 
initiatives  designed  to  reinforce  the  main- 
tenance of  regional  security  and  stabiUty.  The 
New  Zealand  member  explained  that  the  New 
Zealand  Defence  Review  completed  in  1983 


placed  greater  emphasis  on  the  role  of  the 
New  Zealand  Armed  Services  to  provide 
assistance  if  requested  to  South  Pacific  coun- 
tries. The  Australian  member  informed  the 
Council  that  the  Australian  Government's  of- 
fer to  develop  a  Pacific  patrol  boat  to  meet 
the  Island  countries'  expressed  maritime 
surveillance  needs  had  been  accepted  by 
several  South  Pacific  countries. 

21.  Council  members  emphasised  their 
continuing  support  for  the  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations  and  welcomed  the 
contribution  ASEAN  makes  towards  the 
stability  and  economic  progress  of  the  region. 
The  Council  members  also  noted  the  increas- 
ing significance  of  their  own  economic  and 
political  links  with  the  ASEAN  countries. 

22.  Council  members  expressed  full  sup- 
port for  the  principles  adopted  by  ASEAN  in 
the  search  for  a  lasting  settlement  in  Kam- 
puchea. They  reaffirmed  their  conviction  that 
the  conflict  in  Kampuchea  should  be  settled 
by  peaceful  means.  They  agreed  that  a 
negotiated  settlement  should  be  based  on 
respect  for  the  independence,  sovereignty 
and  territorial  integrity  of  Kampuchea, 
should  take  into  account  the  desirability  of 
national  reconciliation  and  should  recognise 
the  legitimate  security  interest  of  all  parties 
concerned.  To  this  end,  they  again  urged  the 
early  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  troops  under 
conditions  that  would  allow  for  a  peaceful 
transition  and  a  comprehensive  settlement 
which  would  enable  the  Khmer  people  freely 
to  decide  their  own  future.  Members  wel- 
comed the  continuing  humanitarian  assistance 
offered  by  the  international  community  to  the 
Khmer  people. 

23.  Council  members'  trade  within  the 
Asian/Pacific  region  is  now  larger  than  with 
any  other  group  of  countries.  This  reflected 
not  only  the  continuing  strong  growth  in 
their  trade  with  Northeast  Asia,  but  also  an 
increasingly  dynamic  element  in  economic 
relations  with  the  ASEAN  countries.  They 
agreed  that  the  growing  strength  of  trade 
and  investment  ties  with  ASEAN  reinforced 
the  importance  of  political  relationships. 

24.  Recent  visits  by  President  Reagan 
and  Prime  Minister  Hawke  to  China  were 
discussed.  The  Council  members  agreed  that 
China's  continued  commitment  to  modernisa- 
tion and  to  constructive  relations  with  others 
in  the  region  was  a  positive  development 
which  should  be  encouraged. 

25.  The  Council  members  welcomed  the 
steps  taken  by  Japan  to  move  towards 
liberalising  access  to  its  market  and  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  this  process  would  be 
maintained  and  accelerated  to  the  benefit  of 
international  trade  as  a  whole.  The  Council 
members  noted  the  strengthening  of  Japan's 
ties  with  the  nations  of  Southeast  Asia  and 
the  South  Pacific,  including  its  contribution  in 
the  field  of  development  assistance.  They  also 
noted  Japan's  commitment  to  an  enhanced 
capability  for  self-defense  purposes. 

26.  Council  members  reaffirmed  their 
commitment  to  the  sovereignty  and  in- 
dependence of  the  Republic  of  Korea.  They 
called  upon  the  Democratic  People's  Republic 
of  Korea  to  renounce  its  policies  of  hostility 


towards  the  Republic  of  Korea,  as  evidenced 
by  last  year's  bombing  in  Rangoon,  and  to  ai 
cept  proposals  aimed  at  reducing  tensions  on 
the  Peninsula  through  the  implementation  ot 
practical  confidence-building  measures.  The 
Council  members  reaffirmed  their  view  that 
direct  negotiations  between  the  two  Koreas 
provides  the  only  realistic  basis  for  a  durablt 
reconciliation.  Noting  that  a  reduction  of  ten 
sions  would  considerably  enhance  regional 
security,  they  called  upon  the  Democratic 
People's  Republic  of  Korea  to  enter  into 
negotiations  with  the  Republic  of  Korea  as  ji 
genuinely  equal  participant. 

27.  Council  members  reaffirmed  their  oj 
position  to  the  continued  Soviet  occupation  ( 
Afghanistan  and  condemned  the  recent 
Soviet  offensive  which  had  caused  con- 
siderable suffering  and  loss  of  life  among  th 
Afghan  people.  Council  members  called  on    ' 
the  Soviet  Union  to  withdraw  its  forces  in  a 
cordance  with  successive  United  Nations 
resolutions. 

28.  Council  members  exchanged  views  c 
developments  in  the  Indian  Ocean  region  an 
noted  the  strategic  significance  of  the  regio 
The  Australian  Council  member  informed  tl 
meeting  that  the  Australian  Government  ha 
adopted  guidelines  for  a  comprehensive  and 
integrated  approach  to  Indian  Ocean  issues 
which  included  support  for  an  Indian  Ocean 
Zone  of  Peace. 

29.  The  Council  members  expressed  the 
concern  at  the  serious  loss  of  life  and  the  ri 
to  peace  and  security  in  the  Gulf  resulting 
from  continuation  of  the  war  between  Iran 
and  Iraq.  They  deplored  all  attacks  on  ship- 
ping in  the  area  and  called  on  both  countrif 
to  respect  the  right  of  free  navigation  for  a 
non-belligerent  shipping.  They  expressed 
their  support  for  the  security  and  territorij 
integrity  of  all  states  in  the  area,  in  accord 
ance  with  the  Charter  of  the  United  Natior 
The  Council  members  also  urged  Iran  and 
Iraq  to  act  with  restraint  and  expressed  th 
hope  that  the  two  countries  would  seek  wa 
of  bringing  the  conflict  to  an  end  and  resti 
ing  peace  to  this  area. 

30.  It  was  agreed  that  the  next  Counci 
meeting  would  take  place  in  Canberra  in 
1985  at  a  date  to  be  decided. 


bb 


JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 

WELLINGTON, 

JULY  17,  1984'^ 


Foreign  Minister  Cooper.  Before  I 
open  the  news  conference,  1  should  s£ 
just  that  as  chairman,  we  have  had  a 
very  good  discussion  in  regard  to 
ANZUS.  Obviously,  in  the  circumstan 
one  would  have  believed  going  into  th 
conference,  it  was  difficult  to  approac 
the  issues.  We  did  approach  the  issue 
that  were  before  us,  and  I  believe  tha» 
has  been  very  beneficial.  There  are  sc 
issues  that,  as  the  outgoing  Minister  > 
Foreign  Affairs,  I  did  not  promote  or 
provoke.  The  questions  that  I  believe 
you  are  going  to  ask  should  be  substa 


tit 

F 

it 


lit 
A; 


THE  SECRETARY 


i  and  directed  to  all  elements  of 
ZUS;  not  just  the  particular  issue 
t  you  may  think  is  the  only  thing  in 
ZUS.  However,  knowing  the  news 
dia,  you  will  ask  what  you  wish  to.  I 
V  hand  the  news  conference  over  to 

I  people.  Welcome.  It's  nice  to  see  a 
group  of  people  trying  to  give  to  the 

iple  of  the  Western  alliance — and 
ibably  the  Eastern  bloc— but  par- 
ilarly  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and 
lerica  more  news  of  what  we  have 
m  talking  about  here  in  Wellington  in 
rather  inclement  weather. 

Q.  The  communique  seems  to  give 
airly  clear  indication  to  the  incom- 
;  labor  government  of  the  ANZUS 
•tners'  attitude  to  ship  visits.  What 

II  Mr.  Hawke  be  telling  Mr.  Lange, 
i  what  will  you  be  telling  Mr. 

nge  of  the  Australian  Labor  Party's 
w  on  it? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I  don't 
:)w  what  Mr.  Hawke  will  be  telling 

Lange.  You  will  have  to  ask  him, 
1  if  I  discuss  anything  with  Mr. 
nge,  it  will  be  a  private  discussion.  I 
uldn't  propose  to  discuss  that  public- 

Q.  Would  you  say  that  you  are  ir- 
lated  at  the  current  labor  policy? 

■  Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I  leave 

■  Labor  Party  of  New  Zealand  to 
re\op  its  own  policy  just  as  we  develop 

i-s.  While  we  are  fraternally  asso- 
ted  to  the  Socialist  International  and 
re  many  sentiments  commonly  shared 
•ause  we  are  both  Labor  Parties  and 
I  ■  countries  which  are  close  to  one 
)ther — and  not  just  geographic- 
/ — we  nonetheless  are  quite  separate 
i  independent  entities. 

Q.  What  would  you  think  would  be 
!  effect  on  your  antinuclear  lobby  in 
stralia  on  a  nuclear-free  New 
aland? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I'm  not  a 
■mber  of  the  antinuclear  lobby  in 
stralia.  On  the  contrary.  So  it's  not 
ich  good  asking  me  what  they  might 
nk. 

Q.  Will  they  take  strength  from  a 
clear-free  New  Zealand? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I've  just 
plained  to  you,  it's  not  much  good  ask- 
f  me.  I'm  rather  prejudiced  in  views 

that  particular  subject.  You'd  better 
"K  them. 

Q.  If  the  Labor  Party  does  carry 
t  its  policy  of  banning  the  visits  of 
[Clear  ships  here,  would  it  be  the 
d  of  ANZUS? 


Secretary  Shultz.  We'll  have  to  see 
what  happens.  And  I  think  it's  better  to 
stay  away  from  iffy  questions,  to  state 
our  positions  clearly,  and  to  work  with 
the  new  government  and  see  if  we  can't 
resolve  the  problem  satisfactorily. 

Q.  In  Washington  last  year,  the 
treaty  partners  noted  the  importance 
of  the  visits  of  ships  and  aircraft  to 
the  treaty  partners.  This  year  all  of 
the  sudden,  it  is  "essential."  I  was 
wondering  what  has  happened  in  the 
last  12  months  to  bring  about  such  a 
change  of  emphasis. 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  it's  just  a 
question  of  people  looking  for  different 
words.  It's  obviously  essential  to  any 
alliance  that  military  forces  of  the  coun- 
tries involved  be  able  to  have  contact 
with  each  other,  and  that's  as  true  today 
as  it  has  been  for  33  years. 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  If  you 
look  at  that,  I  think  that  it  is  referring 
to  a  nuclear-free  South  Pacific,  and  in  a 
different  context.  I  think  if  you  look  at 
what  I  said  in  1982  when  the  issue  of 
ship  visits  arose  in  Australia,  when  I 
was  leader  of  the  opposition,  we  made  a 
rather  unsteady  start,  but  we  estab- 
lished beyond  any  doubt  what  our  posi- 
tion was  within  a  few  weeks.  And  that 
was  that  we  recognized  that,  as  far  as 
Australia  was  concerned,  ships  visits 
were  essential. 

In  respect  of  aircraft,  we  allow  air- 
craft visits.  There  are  special  arrange- 
ments in  respect  of  B-.52s.  That  is  quite 
implicit  in  the  last  sentence  of  the  sec- 
ond paragraph  of  page  one.  At  the  na- 
tional conference  of  the  Labor  Party  last 
week,  the  principles  I've  just  outlined  to 
you  were  principles  I  staunchly  pre- 
sented and  successfully  defended.  So  the 
attitudes  of  the  Labor  Party  in  these 
respects  has  been  on  the  table  for  some 
time  and  adhered  to. 

Q.  Between  1964  and  1976.  suc- 
cessive governments  in  New  Zea- 
land— Conservative  and  Labor — 
banned  visits  of  nuclear  ships.  In  that 
same  period,  for  a  considerable  time, 
successive  Australian  Governments 
did  the  same  thing.  Why  is  it  now,  in 
the  words  of  the  communique,  essen- 
tial to  the  continuing  effectiveness  of 
ANZUS? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  think  that 
your  initial  proposition  is  precisely  right. 
At  the  same  time,  nuclear-powered  ships 
are  becoming  more  and  more  common, 
because  it  is  the  efficient  way  in  which 
to  power  many  kinds  of  ships  and  sub- 
marines. So  they  are  much  more  impor- 
tant in  the  total  fleet  structure  than 
they  were  at  one  time.  If  you  say  you 
ban  nuclear-powered  ships,  you  are 


referring  to  a  high  proportion  of  the 
total  ships.  Beyond  that,  you  shy  away 
from  the  weapon  that  has  provided  the 
main  deterrent  and  has  kept  the  peace 
against  the  Soviet  Union's  very  large 
nuclear  arsenal.  So  this  is  part  and 
parcel  of  what  it  takes  to  keep  the 
peace.  These  are  peacekeeping  forces, 
and  they  represent  a  substantial  fraction 
of  the  total. 

Q.  Is  it  or  is  it  not  essential  that 
your  ships  be  allowed  into  member  na- 
tion ports  for  the  continuation  of  the 
ANZUS  treaty? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Of  course.  What 
kind  of  an  alliance  is  it  that  military 
forces  of  the  countries  involved  are  not 
able  to  be  in  contact  with  each  other? 
Let  me  ask  you  to  turn  the  proposition 
around.  In  my  many  visits  to  this  part  of 
the  world,  I'm  thinking  back  5,  6,  and  7 
years  ago,  people  often  tackled  me,  say- 
ing, "Is  the  United  States  ready  to  pay 
the  attention  to  this  part  of  the  world 
that  it  should?  Why  don't  we  see  more 
evidence  of  U.S.  interest?  Why  don't  we 
see  more  people  here?  Why  don't  we  see 
more  of  your  military  presence  here  to 
show  us  that  you  are  really  involved?" 
You  have  to  ask  yourself  what  kind  of 
an  alliance  would  it  be  if  the  United 
States  said  we  wouldn't  send  our 
military  forces  to  this  area.  The  whole 
point  of  the  alliance  is  that  it  is  a  secu- 
rity alliance.  The  whole  part  of  it  is  that 
if  one  of  our  countries  gets  in  serious 
trouble,  as  reflected  in  the  alliance,  we 
will  help  each  other.  That  help  takes 
many  forms  but  the  essence  of  it  is 
security;  that  is  what  it's  about. 

Q.  There  have  been  suggestions 
from  visiting  Congressmen  that, 
should  New  Zealand  ban  nuclear  ship 
visits,  this  could  well  invoke  trade 
sanctions  in  the  United  States  against 
New  Zealand  export.  Is  that  the  policy 
of  the  government  that  you  represent? 

Secretary  Shultz.  No.  it  isn't.  The 
ANZUS  alliance  is  a  security  and 
military  alliance.  That's  what  we  are 
discussing  here.  The  relationship  be- 
tween the  people  of  New  Zealand  and 
the  people  of  the  United  States  is  over  a 
century  and  a  half  old.  It's  been  a  warm 
and  deep  relationship  for  a  long  time, 
and  it  will  continue  that  way.  We  look 
forward  to  working  in  a  cooperative 
manner  with  the  new  Government  of 
New  Zealand  and  any  Government  of 
New  Zealand  that  comes  along. 

Q.  Are  you  able  to  broaden  the 
scope  of  ANZUS  to  make  it  much 
more  of  an  economic  agreement? 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary  Shultz.  No.  ANZUS  is 
not  an  economic  agreement  in  any 
sense.  It  is  a  security  agreement.  That  is 
the  extent  of  it— that  is  the  sum  and 
substance  of  it— and  economic  arrange- 
ments and  cultural  arrangements  and  all 
sorts  of  other  ways  in  which  our  coun- 
tries are  in  contact  with  each  other  are 
separate  matters. 

Q.  You  referred  yesterday  to  a 
resolute  commitment,  such  as  that  em- 
bodied in  the  ANZUS  treaty,  to  come 
to  the  defense  of  a  valued  ally.  If  the 
New  Zealand  Government  carried  out 
its  policy  of  banning  nuclear  weapons, 
does  that  mean  that  the  United  States 
would  no  longer  come  to  the  defense 
of  New  Zealand  in  a  controversy. 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  have  just  said  at 
least  once  that  I'm  not  going  to  get  in- 
volved in  iffy  questions.  We  have  some 
problems  here,  and  we  will  work  at 
them,  and  I  think  some  discussion  is 
called  for.  There  are  a  lot  of  aspects  to 
this  matter  that  need  to  be  studied  by 
any  new  government,  I  know.  I  found 
myself  when  I  entered  government  that 
there  were  a  lot  of  things  I  found  out 
about  that  I  didn't  know  when  I  was  not 
in  the  government  that  represent  impor- 
tant aspects  of  this  relationship.  So  at 
any  rate,  I  think  what  is  called  for  here 
is  some  patience,  and  we'll  try  to  work 
our  way  through  these  problems. 

I  might  take  notice  of  the  fact  that  a 
year  ago  there  was  a  new  Australian 
Government,  we  took  the  same  approach 
with  the  new  Australian  Government. 
We  had  a  thorough  review  of  the 
ANZUS  alliance.  We  had  a  long  and 
searching  meeting  in  Washington  with 
Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  We  had 
discussions  with  Prime  Minister  Hawke 
in  Washington,  and  I've  met  with  him 
here.  The  problems  have  been  worked 
out  in  a  very  satisfactory  way.  The 
Labor  Government  in  Australia  has 
adapted  it  to  its  needs,  and  I  think  it  is 
stronger  than  ever  insofar  as  Australia 
is  concerned.  We'll  work  at  it  in  connec- 
tion with  New  Zealand  in  the  same  way. 

Q.  You  talked  about  review  with 
Australia.  Would  you  consider 
renegotiations  as  the  New  Zealand 
Labor  Party's  policy  suggests'? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  think 
there  is  anything  really  to  renegotiate 
about  it.  But  certainly  we  wanted  to 
stress  the  alliance  and  what  it  means, 
what  it  implies,  and  what  the  various 
countries  get  out  of  it.  And  I  think  that 
such  a  thorough  examination  will  lead 
people  to  the  same  conclusion  that  was 
reached  last  year;  namely,  that  it  is  of 


tremendous  benefit  to  all  of  the  coun- 
tries involved.  After  all,  we  are  talking 
about  the  defenses  of  a  country  that  is 
very  precious.  It  is  a  very  precious  thing 
to  have  freedom,  to  have  the  freedom  to 
change  government  by  a  vote,  to  live 
under  the  rule  of  law.  There  are  a  lot  of 
people  in  this  world  who  don't  have  the 
rule  of  law.  There  are  a  lot  of  people  in 
this  world  who  don't  have  those 
privileges,  and  all  you  have  to  do  is  talk 
to  some  people  who  don't  have  them  or 
talk  to  some  people  who  have  recently 
acquired  them  and  you  find  out  their 
significance  and  importance.  What  we 
are  talking  about  here  is  a  treaty  that 
has  helped  to  preserve  those  values  and 
extend  them  in  this  part  of  the  world 
and  which  has  played  its  part— just  as 
the  NATO  alliance  has  played  its  part  in 
Europe — in  keeping  the  peace  for  a  long 
period  of  time.  This  is  an  alliance  for 
peace,  and  it  has  worked. 

Q.  With  the  need  for  access  by 
allied  aircraft  to  airfields  and  ports  of 
ANZUS  members,  are  you  looking  for 
restricted  access  to  Australian  air- 
fields by  B-52  bombers? 

Secretary  Shultz.  No,  we  are  talk- 
ing about  the  fact  that,  for  example, 
there  are  resupply  flights — cargo  flights, 
military  cargo  flights — that  come  into 
Christchurch,  say  to  resupply  Antarctic 
stations.  The  same  thing  is  true  with 
respect  to  some  facilities  in  Australia. 
There  are  B-52  training  tlights  and 
through  flights  of  various  kinds.  It's  that 
sort  of  thing  that  is  being  referred  to. 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  Can  I 
add  one  note,  so  there's  no  misunder- 
standing. There  are  special  ar- 
rangements in  respect  to  B-.52s,  but 
Secretary  of  State  Shultz  should  also 
have  mentioned  that  we  have  regular 
joint  military  operations  of  exercise  with 
New  Zealand  and  the  United  States. 
They  involve  air  units  as  much  as 
ground  forces  and  naval  units.  So  in  that 
sense,  we've  got  to  have  this  sort  of  pro- 
vision. Otherwise,  if  there  were  any  pro- 
hibition against  aircraft  movements, 
there  would  be  no  exercises.  No  exer- 
cise, no  military  association.  Therefore, 
there  would  not  be  in  any  meaningful 
sense  for  us  in  Australia — and  I  speak 
only  for  us  in  Australia — a  military 
alliance. 

Q.  In  the  context  of  regional 
security,  was  the  question  of  a  Pacific 
ready-reaction  force  discussed?  And  if 
so,  how  wide  was  the  discussion? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I  don't 
know  anything  about  a  Pacific  ready- 
reaction  force,  I'm  afraid. 


li 


Q.  Could  you  clarify  that  point?  Is 
it  that  you  believe  the  agreement  is 
not  negotiable? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  is  an  agree- 
ment. And  it  stands  on  its  feet.  And  I 
believe  that  careful  examination,  in  a 
realistic  and  thoughtful  way,  of  what  it 
has  accomplished — how  it  works,  what 
it  means  to  the  various  countries  in 
volved — will  lead  to  the  conclusion  that 
it  is  a  very  good  thing.  But,  of  course, 
that  is  up  to  each  country  to  determine 
and  review  for  itself.  It  has  stood  the 
test  of  33  years.  It  has  stood  the  test  oi 
a  lot  of  change  around  the  world.  It  hai 
stood  the  test  of  changes  of  governmen 
in  all  three  of  the  countries  involved,  sc 
it  must  have  something  good  about  it 
And  I  think  when  you  look  at  it  careful 
ly,  the  good  will  shines  through  very, 
very  strongly. 

Q.  But  as  far  as  you're  concerned 
a  nuclear-free  New  Zealand  means  nt 
treaty  as  far  as  we're  concerned? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  have  tried  to 
state  my  position  on  that,  and  I  won't 
try  to  restate  it. 

Q.  Aren't  you  waving  a  big  stick 
over  a  fairly  small  matter? 

Secretary  Shultz.  No,  I  don't  thinl 
liberty  and  freedom  and  the  rule  of  lav 
are  small  matters.  And  the  defense  of 
them  is  the  most  important  thing  that 
we  have  to  do.  These  matters  are  the 
essence  of  our  society  in  the  United 
States,  and  I  believe — from  what  I  km 
of  the  societies  of  Australia  and  New 
Zealand — these  values  are  highly  prize 
And  if  you  say  that  you  won't  defend 
them,  pretty  soon  you're  not  going  to 
have  them. 

Q.  So  a  handful  of  visits  of  nucla 
vessels  to  New  Zealand  ports  is  vita( 
to  the  freedom  of — 

Secretary  Shultz.  If  you're  going 
have  a  military  alliance,  then  the 
military  forces  of  the  countries  involve 
have  to  interact.  They  have  to  talk  to 
each  other.  They  have  to  know  the 
equipment  that's  involved.  They  have 
plan.  They  have  to  exercise.  They  hav 
to  train  themselves.  All  these  things  a 
just  commonplace.  There's  nothing  ag- 
gressive about  the  forces  of  the  ANZI 
alliance.  It  is  a  defensive  alliance.  In 
order  to  deter  aggression,  it  has  to  be 
credible  deterrent.  And  a  credible  deti 
rent  is  one  that  people  know  is  kept  u 
to  scratch  and  is  worked  on  constantly 
And  that's  the  essence  of  what  our 
armed  forces  do  all  over  the  world. 

Q.  Mr.  Shultz  has  told  us  that 
things  change  once  you  get  to  gover 
ment.  That  was  your  experience,  pai 
ticularly  with  the  ANZUS  agreemen 


ARMS  CONTROL 


ihat  do  you  think  Mr.  Lange  might 
1  told  that  might  change  his  mind? 
Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  Nothing 

•  mued  since  we  got  into  government, 
i-fspect  to  ANZUS,  we  declared 

)(nro  we  got  into  government  that  we 
Auilil  .'^eek  a  review.  When  we  got  into 
;\  (Tiiment,  we  pursued  that.  It  was,  as 

Shultz  pointed  out,  a  quite  thorough 
sessment  of  the  ANZUS  agreement 
it  was  conducted  in  Washington  last 
ir.  So  there  was  a  change  in  that 
5pect.  What  happened  was  that  with 

experience  that  we  had  in  govern- 
mt,  there  was  a  consolidation  of  our 
tnmitment  to  ANZUS.  There  has 
ver  been  any  disagreement  between 
y  of  the  major  political  parties  in 
istralia  in  regard  to  ANZUS. 
lything  that  might  be  discussed  with 
•.  Lange  is  something  for  discussion 
th  Mr.  Lange,  not  on  the  public  plat- 

n. 

Q.  Recognizing  the  importance  of 
E  alliance,  is  it  imperative  that  New 
laland  change  its  stand? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  That's 

•  New  Zealand  to  decide,  and  Mr. 
ultz  said  much  earlier  that  time  was 

ieded  to  sort  this  problem  out.  I  don't 
(ve  his  exact  words.  As  far  as  I'm  con- 
!"ned — I  quote  the  situation  as 
!  istralia  sees  it,  I  am  not  talking  for 
I'w  Zealand— there  are  other  people  to 
!  that. 

Q.  If  New  Zealand  was  to  stand 
m,  would  that  put  increasing 
iBssure — 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  You're  in 
3  area  of  hypotheses  now  and  as  Mr. 
ultz  said,  he's  not  in  the  iffy  business, 
d  I'm  not  in  the  hj^pothesis  business. 

Q.  It's  no  hypothesis.  It's  Labor — 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  Excuse 

;  a  minute,  gentlemen.  Let  me  tell  you 

mething.  You're  out  of  luck.  I've  been 

this  game  a  long  time  and  I'm  not  go- 

g  to  be  drawn  in. 

Q.  Labor  has  said  here  that  they 
3n't  negotiate  their  position — 

Foreign  Minister  Cooper.  Excuse 
i9  a  minute,  ladies  and  gentlemen.  We 
I'.ve  been  in  an  ANZUS  conference  a 
,y  and  a  half.  We  had  a  very  wide 
:enda— East-West  relationships,  com- 
ehensive  nuclear  test  bans,  disarma- 
ent,  arms  control,  the  problems  of  con- 
ct  in  various  parts  of  the  globe,  the  in- 
rnational  economic  situation  and  I 
ink  we  are  starting  to  regurgitate  ex- 
■tly  the  same  questions. 

I  do  believe  that  if  the  relationships 
nong  the  three  countries  are  as  we 
ive  discussed  them — last  year  in 
'ashington,  this  year,  and  on  many 


other  previous  occasions — there  must  be 
other  subjects  rather  than  picking  away 
at  this  particular  one.  Because  I  believe 
that  the  U.S.  Secretary  of  State  has 
answered  the  same  question  four  or  five 
times,  and  I  think  that  Mr.  Hayden  is  in 
exactly  the  same  situation.  Is  there 
anyone  here  that  is  slightly  interested  in 
arms  control  and  disarmament,  for  in- 
stance? 

Q.  Are  there  any  plans  for  nuclear- 
powered  ships  to  visit  New  Zealand  in 
the  ne.\t  6  months? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  don't  confirm 
or  deny  anything  about  any  particular 
ship.  And  so  I'll  just  have  to  stick  with 
that  policy. 

Q.  Nuclear-powered  ship? 

Secretary  Shultz.  No,  not  that  I 
know  of.  Admiral  Crowe  is  here.  Is  that 
the  right  answer? 

Admiral  Crowe.  There  are  no  ships 
in  the  next  few  months. 


Q.  On  this  issue  of  Australian  sup- 
port for  the  Indian  Ocean  zone  of 
peace,  does  that  mean  that  this  will 
involve  our  projection  or  nonprojec- 
tion  of  power  in  keeping  warships  out 
of  the  area? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  If  you've 
got  a  zone  of  peace,  it  is  highly  likely 
that  there  will  be  no  combatant  ships  in 
the  area,  certainly  no  outside  ones.  But 
we're  a  long  way  from  that.  We're  a 
long  way  from  formulating  the  prin- 
ciples that  people  might  address 
themselves  to  all  that  we're  working 
toward  at  the  moment,  which  is  as  much 
as  we  can  hope  to  achieve  as  the  first 
step,  is  a  consensus  for  the  littoral  na- 
tions and  the  superpowers  that  some 
sort  of  conference  should  go  ahead.  And 
when  we  do  that,  then  we  can  sit  down 
and  start  sorting  out  what  the  agenda  is 
and  what  the  principles  will  be.  So  it's 
going  to  be  a  long  task.  Now  you  might 
be  impatient  with  that.  So  am  I.  But  I 


Status  of  Conference  on 
Disarmament  in  Europe 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JULY  17,  19841 

Today,  I  met  with  Ambassardor  James 
E.  Goodby,  the  chief  of  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion to  the  Conference  on  Confidence- 
and  Security-Building  Measures  and 
Disarmament  in  Europe.  This  con- 
ference, commonly  known  as  the  CDE 
or  the  Stockholm  conference,  involves 
the  United  States,  Canada,  and  33  Euro- 
pean nations  and  is  part  of  the  East- 
West  dialogue  which  originated  in  the 
Helsinki  accords  of  1975. 

Ambassador  Goodby  briefed  me  on 
the  second  round  of  the  conference, 
which  has  just  concluded,  and  on  the 
prospects  for  progress  when  the  talks 
resume  in  September.  He  noted  the  con- 
tinuing efforts  of  the  United  States  and 
our  NATO  allies  to  achieve  an  outcome 
which  will  genuinely  increase  mutual 
confidence  and  reduce  the  risk  of  war  in 
Europe.  Earlier,  in  the  first  round  of  the 
conference,  the  West  put  forward  a 
package  of  concrete  proposals  designed 
to  achieve  these  goals. 

In  an  effort  to  achieve  progress  in 
Stockholm,  I  announced  in  June  in  my 
address  to  the  Irish  Parliament  that  the 
United  States  is  prepared  to  consider 


the  Soviet  proposal  for  a  declaration  on 
the  non-use  of  force  if  the  Soviet  Union 
is  willing  to  discuss  concrete  measures 
to  put  that  principle  into  action.  We  are 
disappointed,  however,  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  so  far  failed  to  join  the  great 
majority  of  the  35  participating  nations 
at  Stockholm  which  have  demonstrated 
a  desire  to  begin  such  concrete  negotia- 
tions. 

I  assured  Ambassador  Goodby  that 
he  has  my  continuing  strong  support  in 
our  efforts  to  get  on  with  the  practical 
negotiations  for  which  this  conference 
was  intended.  We  will  continue  to  do  our 
best  to  achieve  progress  at  Stockholm, 
just  as  we  and  our  allies  are  working 
hard  together  in  other  multilateral  areas 
of  arms  control — such  as  the  East-West 
conventional  force  talks  in  Vienna  and 
the  40-Nation  Conference  on  Disarma- 
ment in  Geneva. 

We  are  equally  ready  to  seek  resolu- 
tions to  bilateral  U.S.-Soviet  arms  con- 
trol issues  on  a  flexible  basis,  but  there 
must,  of  course,  be  a  willingness  on  both 
sides  to  engage  in  practical  discussions. 
We,  for  our  part,  will  not  be  found 
wanting. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


fl 


can't  help  it.  That's  the  experience  that 
we're  running  into. 

Q.  Was  there  any  discussion  at  the 
council  meeting  on  your  proposal  put 
to  ASEAN  last  week  for  a  conference 
on  Kampuchea  to  be  held  in  Australia? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  No,  it 
went  on  the  back  burner.  In  fact,  I  think 
it  may  have  gone  over  the  back  of  the 
stove. 

Q.  Are  you  happy  that  this  ANZUS 
council  meeting  went  ahead,  consider- 
ing that  the  administration  that  you've 
been  talking  with  will  be  out  of  office 
next  week? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  we  should 
carry  on  with  our  plans.  We  had  a  very 
good  exchange  of  views  among  us,  and  I 
think  it's  been  quite  a  worthwhile 
meeting.  It's  also,  I  think,  a  good  oppor- 
tunity to  meet  the  incoming  government, 
and  I  was  struck  by  the  extraordinary 
courtesy  which  Mr.  Lange  extended  to 
me  and  to  Mr.  Hayden  in  coming  to  the 
airport  and  greeting  us.  It  was  a  very 
generous  gesture  on  his  part,  and  I'm 
sure  both  of  us  look  forward  to  having  a 
chance  to  talk  with  him  before  we  leave. 
So  I  think  in  some  ways,  it's  worked  out 
quite  fortuitously. 

Q.  I'd  like  to  ask  a  question  of 
Foreign  Minister  Hayden  and 
Secretary  Shultz.  Should  the  ANZUS 
treaty  become  ineffective,  would  you 
seek  to  create  some  bilateral  security 
arrangements  between  Australia  and 
the  United  States? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  We  see 
it  as  effective  right  at  this  point,  and  as 
I  said  earlier,  I'm  not  in  the  area  of 
hypothesis.  If  anything  happens  later  on, 
I  guess  we  would  look  at  it.  At  this 
point,  it  hasn't  happened. 

Secretary  Shultz.  Ditto. 

Q.  Could  you  tell  me  what  hap- 
pened at  the  conference  on  the  issue 
of  French  nuclear  testing? 

Foreign  Minister  Cooper.  We've 
really  left  that  to  a  great  degree  to  the 
forum  in  Tuvalu.  We're  aware  of  the 
situation  in  regard  to  possible  moves 
toward  a  South  Pacific  nuclear-free 
zone,  but  I  think  that  it  might  be  a  good 
idea  if  you  directed  that  question  to  Mr. 
Hayden,  in  regard  to  the  initiative  the 
Australians  have  taken  in  this  area. 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  We  have 
protested  regularly,  in  fact  on  every  oc- 
casion there  has  been  a  nuclear  test,  to 
the  French  and  publicly.  They  continue 
to  test.  They  make  it  clear  that  the  pro- 
gram is  in  place,  and  they  will  pursue  it. 
I  would  hope  that  one  day  they  will  be 
able  to  carry  out  laboratory  tests.  I'm 


not  sure  how  you  do  that — it  will  be 
very  interesting — but  until  then,  they 
will  continue  to  test  in  the  South  Pacific. 
I  guess  that's  a  long  time. 

At  our  recent  national  conference, 
one  of  the  decisions  taken  was  the  deci- 
sion that  there  would  be  no  further  ex- 
ports of  uranium  to  France  while  it  con- 
tinues to  carry  out  these  nuclear  tests. 
That  decision  was  effective  forthwith.  It 
involves  the  cancellation  of  contracted 
uranium  sales  in  excess  of  $1.30  million. 
In  turn,  I  expect  that  will  involve  a  fair- 
ly substantial  compensation  payment 
from  Australia.  And  although  this  is  not 
enforceable  as  law,  I  think  there's  a 
general  feeling  there  will  be  an  obliga- 
tion to  meet  it. 

Q.  Last  year  our  Prime 
Minister — our  out-going  Prime 
Minister — said  that  he'd  been  given  a 
date  as  to  when  the  French  testing 
would  end.  Do  you  know  the  date? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  No.  I 
spoke  to  the  French  afterwards,  and  I 
got  the  impression  that  they  didn't.  They 
said  quite  explicitly  they  didn't  have  any 
date  in  mind. 

Q.  You  called  for  a  report  on  the 
prospect  of  mainland  France  nuclear 
testing  being  carried  out  there.  Have 
you  had  that  report  back  yet? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  I  read 
that  in  the  National  Times  and  the  guy 
who  wrote  it  is  over  there  [pointing].  He 
keeps  telling  me  I  told  him,  and  I  keep 
saying  I  didn't  so  I've  decided  I'd  better 
fix  it  up  by  putting  in  a  request  for  such 
a  report,  and  I  did  that  2  weeks  ago. 


Q.  Returning  to  the  French 
nuclear  testing  question.  There  are 
some  documents  that  fell  out  of  the 
back  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs here  in  Wellington  some  weeks 
ago  that  suggest  New  Zealand  doesn't 
take  a  very  strong  line  in  opposition  t 
that  testing.  Indeed,  it  featured,  in 
part  of  the  recent  trade,  talks  as  a 
trade-off  if  those  documents  are  to  be 
believed.  Do  you  find  that  a  matter  tc 
regret? 

Foreign  Minister  Hayden.  These 
are  New  Zealand  foreign  affairs 
documents?  I  don't  know  anything  abon 
them. 

Foreign  Minister  Cooper.  I  find  it 
matter  of  regret  that  journalists  would 
believe  anything  that  fell  out  of  The  Ne 
Zealand  Times.  They  are  not  authentic. 
They  were  taken  by  one  official,  in  my 
belief.  They  were  given  to  the  media. 
They  had  a  slant  on  them,  and  to  sug- 
gest that  I,  as  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  and  Overseas  Trade,  had  an 
under-the-counter  deal  with  the  French 
Foreign  Minister  or  the  French  Trade 
Minister  or  Agricultural  Minister,  is 
abolutely  nonsensical,  and  you  should  t 
aware  of  that. 


'Held  at  the  U.S.  Embassy  (press  relea 
166  of  July  18,  1984). 

^Press  release  162  of  July  12. 

^Press  release  164. 

''Press  release  171  of  July  20. 

^Made  at  the  luncheon  for  the  ANZUS 
council  (press  release  196  of  July  19), 

^Press  release  174  of  July  23.  ■ 


i 


Proposed  Outer  Space  Negotiations 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  29,  1984' 

The  U.S.  Government  has  taken  note  of 
the  statement  by  the  Soviet  Government 
proposing  a  meeting  of  delegations  in 
September  to  begin  negotiations  on  "pre- 
venting the  militarization  of  outer 
space."  The  militarization  of  space  began 
when  the  first  ballistic  missiles  were 
tested  and  when  such  missiles  and  other 
weapons  systems  using  outer  space 
began  to  be  deployed.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment, therefore,  draws  attention  to  the 
pressing  need  for  the  resumption  of 
negotiations  aimed  at  a  radical  reduction 
of  nuclear  weapons,  on  a  balanced  and 
verifiable  basis. 


Therefore,  the  U.S.  (Government  1 
informed  the  Government  of  the  Sovii 
Union  that  it  is  prepared  to  meet  will 
the  Soviet  Union  in  September,  at  an,\ 
location  agreeable  to  the  Soviet  Unioi 
and  the  government  of  the  country 
where  the  meeting  is  held,  for  the 
following  purposes:  (1)  to  discuss  and  ji' 
define  mutually  agreeable  arrangemer«  *^ 
under  which  negotiations  on  the  re- 
duction of  strategic  and  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  weapons  can  be  resume 
and  (2)  to  discuss  and  seek  agreement 
on  feasible  negotiating  approaches  wh  *?' 
could  lead  to  verifiable  and  effective      ''•' 
limitations  on  antisatellite  weapons.  W* 
will  also  be  prepared  to  discuss  any 
other  arms  control  concerns  or  other 
matters  of  interest  to  both  sides. 


'm 


«« 


H 


ftt 


EAST  ASIA 


We  will  continue  contacts  with  the 
viet  Union  through  diplomatic  chan- 
Is  on  arrangements  for  these 
ptember  talks. 


HUE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
ILY  27,  19842 

lis  morning's  TABS  statement 
srepresents  our  position,  which  is  that 
;  have  accepted  the  Soviet  proposal 
r  discussions  in  Vienna  in  September 
thout  preconditions.  Our  preparations 
e  continuing  vigorously,  and  we  expect 
be  in  Vienna.  We  do  not  believe  that 
ch  discussions  are  impossible,  and  we 
e  continuing  to  deal  with  this  subject 
private  diplomatic  channels. 

The  U.S.  finds  it  very  disturbing 
at  the  Soviets  portray  the  United 
ates  as  responsible  for  the  breakdown 
the  nuclear  negotiations  in  Geneva 
len  the  world  knows  the  Soviets 
liked  out  of  those  discussions.  Already 
isting  nuclear  systems  deserve  our 
ost  urgent  attention.  If  the  Soviets  do 
it  choose  to  listen  to  our  views  on  this 
bject,  they  need  not,  but,  for  us,  and 
r  mankind,  this  subject  is  too  impor- 
nt  to  ignore.  This  U.S.  approach  does 
it  represent  a  precondition.  We  will 
ike  whatever  the  Soviets  say  on  anti- 
I  tellite  weapons  seriously  and  respond 
I  nstructively.  We  simply  point  out  that 
'  ?  wish  to  restore  exchanges  on  the 
I  bject  of  offensive  nuclear  arms.  The 
irld  has  a  right  to  expect  the  U.S.S.R. 
id  the  United  States  to  maintain  such 
scussions. 


HITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 

UG.  1.  19843 

le  United  States  had  made  clear  to  the 
)viet  Government  in  a  series  of  high- 
vel  messages  that  it  accepts  the  Soviet 
nion's  June  29  proposal  and  is 
•epared  for  serious  talks  in  Vienna  on 
iter  space,  including  antisatellite 
eapons.  We  have  expressed  our  view 
lat  the  problem  of  weapons  in  space 
mnot  be  considered  in  isolation  from 
le  overall  strategic  relationship  but 
lat  we  have  no  preconditions  for  the 
ienna  agenda. 

Despite  this  clearly  stated,  positive 
and  on  our  part,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
leged  that  the  United  States  has  re- 
efed the  Soviet  proposal.  The  latest 
(oscow  press  briefing  repeated  these 
larges,  despite  the  clear  statement  of 
le  U.S.  position  in  a  series  of  high-level 
lessages  conveyed  to  the  Soviet 
■overnment  in  diplomatic  channels. 


In  our  communications  with  the 
Soviets,  we  have  stated  our  view  that 
their  proposal  for  a  conference  on  the 
"militarization  of  outer  space"  is  an  "ex- 
cellent idea"  and  that  we  are  prepared 
to  have  a  U.S.  delegation  in  Vienna  on 
September  18  to  engage  in  such  negotia- 
tions. 

We  recently  presented  a  proposal 
for  a  possible  joint  Soviet-American  an- 
nouncement on  the  content  and  objective 
of  the  Vienna  talks.  This  proposal  states 
explicitly  that  the  aim  of  the  talks 
should  be  to  work  out  and  conclude 
agreements  concerning  the  militarization 
of  outer  space,  including  antisatellite 
systems  and  other  aspects  of  this  issue. 

In  response  to  the  Soviet  proposal  of 
a  mutual  moratorium  on  antisatellite 
tests  from  the  outset  of  the  talks,  the 
United  States  expressed  a  readiness  to 
have  our  negotiators  consider  what 
mutual  restraints  would  be  appropriate 
during  the  course  of  negotiations.  The 
latest  Soviet  statements  have  converted 
this  proposal  into  a  precondition,  a 


transformation  which  suggests  a  dis- 
ingenuous Soviet  approach.  We  continue 
to  believe  that  possible  mutual  restraints 
are  an  appropriate  subject  for  the 
negotiations.  The  joint  statement, 
however,  should  not  prejudge  the  out- 
come of  these  negotiations. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  repeatedly 
misrepresented  the  U.S.  position  regard- 
ing the  opening  of  arms  control  talks 
between  our  two  countries  in  Vienna. 
From  this  latest  Soviet  statement,  it  ap- 
pears that  the  Soviets  were  not  serious 
about  their  proposal.  We  regret  this.  As 
noted  above,  we  have  consistently  ac- 
cepted their  proposal  to  meet  in  Vienna. 
We  prefer  that  this  matter  be  dealt  with 
in  diplomatic  channels. 


'Made  by  Robert  C.  McFarlane,  Assistant 
to  the  President  for  National  Security  Affairs 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  July  2,  1984). 

^Text  from  White  House  press  release. 

^Made  by  Ambassador  McFarlane  (text 
from  White  House  press  release).  ■ 


The  U.S.-China  Trade 
Relationship 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Address  before  the  National  Council 
for  United  States-China,  Trade  on 
May  31,  1984.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs. 

I  don't  need  to  tell  you  who  are  gathered 
here  today  that  doing  business  in  China 
is  seldom  doing  "business  as  usual."  You 
who  have  been  engaged  in  doing 
business  in  China  have,  indeed,  been  do- 
ing business  as  extraordinary:  under 
special  and  ever-changing  circumstances 
and  in  a  still  uncertain  investment 
climate.  But  most  extraordinary  is  the 
contribution  that  your  endeavors  make 
to  U.S.  foreign  policy;  and  it  is  that  con- 
tribution which  I  would  like  to  acknowl- 
edge at  the  outset  here  today. 

Building  a  Comprehensive 
Relationship 

When  President  Nixon  traveled  to  China 
in  1972,  our  economic  and  cultural  rela- 
tions were  almost  nonexistent.  The  focus 
of  the  relationship  was  almost  entirely 
our  shared  strategic  concerns  over 
Soviet  power  and  expansion.  By  con- 
trast, during  his  recent  trip,  President 
Reagan  devoted  perhaps  50%  of  his 


discussions  with  the  Chinese  Premier  to 
economic  and  trade  concerns.  Our  coun- 
tries have  developed  a  vital  and  growing 
economic  relationship.  This  organization 
and  some  of  the  people  in  this  room  had 
a  good  deal  to  do  with  that  growth. 

Some  would  go  so  far  as  to  say  that 
the  remarkable  growth  in  our  economic 
ties  has  brought  us  to  a  point  where 
economic  interests  have  replaced 
strategic  interests  as  the  focus  of  our 
relationship.  That,  however,  would  be 
wrong.  Our  economic  relations  are,  in- 
deed, extremely  important.  But  our 
strategic  interests  also  remain  as 
important  today  as  they  were  when 
President  Nixon  opened  the  way  to 
China. 

We  do  not  expect  an  alliance  with 
China,  nor  are  we  playing  cards.  Indeed, 
we  don't  think  that  a  successful  long- 
term  relationship— and  that  is  what  we 
seek— can  be  built  on  a  basis  that  makes 
our  relations  with  one  country  depend- 
ent on  tactical  shifts  in  our  relations 
with  another. 

Rather,  our  strategic  relationship 
rests  on  common  concerns  about  the 
growth  of  Soviet  military  power  and  the 
tendency  to  use  that  power— whether  by 


EAST  ASIA 


the  Soviets  themselves,  as  in  Afghani- 
stan, or  by  their  allies  and  proxies,  as  in 
Kampuchea.  We  have  some  important 
differences  with  China  on  international 
questions,  differences  that  the  Chinese 
are  at  pains  to  highlight,  lest  we— or 
others— forget  that  China  has  an  inde- 
pendent foreign  policy.  But  our  common 
concerns  create  important  common  in- 
terests in  resisting  Soviet  pressures  and 
in  seeking  changes  in  Soviet  policies  that 
would  genuinely  reduce  tensions  in  the 
region  and  in  the  world.  This  remains  a 
central  element  in  our  relations. 

We  also  have  increasingly  important 
cultural  ties  with  China.  The  Chinese 
have  sent  some  12,000  of  their  brightest 
students  to  study  in  this  country,  and 
we  have  extensive  exchanges  of  our  own 
in  China.  These  exchanges  may  be  our 
most  important  legacy  to  the  future  ties 
between  our  countries.  These  students 
will  one  day  form  a  core  of  understand- 
ing that  will  speed  our  efforts,  just  as 
our  relations  in  the  early  1970s  were 
spurred  by  a  long  history  of  ties  before 
1949. 

In  short,  we  have  today  neither  a 
predominantly  economic  nor  a  predomi- 
nantly strategic  relationship  but  rather  a 
comprehensive  one,  in  which  each  ele- 
ment reinforces  the  others.  Indeed,  the 
economic  progress  that  your  group  has 
helped  to  build,  important  in  itself,  is 
also  an  important  element  in  the 
strategic  equation. 

Over  the  last  12  years,  our  bilateral 
relationship  with  China  has  grown  richer 
and  deeper,  the  range  of  our  cooperative 
endeavors  broader,  and  the  opportuni- 
ties for  future  cooperation  more 
numerous  than  before.  Both  sides  have 
put  aside  the  myths,  unrealistic  expecta- 
tions, and,  frankly,  the  impossible 
demands  of  the  past.  As  Secretary 
Shultz  has  said,  we  seek  a  relationship 
that  is  no  longer  subject  to  the  alternat- 
ing cycles  of  euphoria  and  depression 
that  have  characterized  the  past,  but  one 
which  rests  on  a  stronger,  more  stable 
foundation.  Of  equal  significance,  we 
seek  such  a  relationship  without  sacri- 
ficing the  principles  and  friendships  our 
nations  value. 

The  distance  we  have  traveled  and 
the  benefits  we  have  gained  from  im- 
proving relations  with  China  are  perhaps 
most  clearly  seen  not  in  what  is  but  in 
what  was.  We  need  only  think  back  to 
the  open  hostilities  of  the  1950s  or  to 
the  antagonism  of  the  1960s  to  realize 
the  costs  that  a  return  to  confrontation 
in  our  relations  would  impose. 


The  Trade  Dimension 

Today,  I  would  like  to  discuss  the  dimen- 
sion of  our  relationship  with  China  that 
is  of  particular  interest  to  this  group- 
trade.  In  trade,  as  elsewhere,  we  have 
too  often  been  the  victims  of  our  own 
euphoria.  Often,  in  the  past,  people  have 
been  mesmerized  by  the  thought  of  a 
market  with  four  times  as  many  con- 
sumers as  our  own.  We  have  an  obliga- 
tion equally  to  avoid  wishful  thinking 
and  jaundiced  pessimism  and  to  judge 
prospects  realistically. 

The  unembellished  record  to  date  is 
itself  impressive.  Since  normalization  of 
relations,  our  two-way  trade  has  grown 
fourfold,  from  $1.1  billion  in  1978  to 
$4.4  billion  last  year.  Our  trade  has,  to 
be  sure,  not  grown  steadily.  U.S.  ex- 
ports, particularly  of  agricultural  prod- 
ucts, have  been  volatile. 

While  our  total  trade  with  China 
does  not  involve  large  sums  in  terms  of 
our  overall  trade  worldwide,  trade  with 
China  can  be,  and  is,  very  important  to 
particular  enterprises  and  sectors  of  our 
economy— some  of  which  are  well  repre- 
sented in  this  room. 

Today,  I  would  like  to  discuss  three 
principles  that  seem  to  me  particularly 
important  as  guides  for  the  govern- 
ment's approach  to  this  important  area 
of  our  relationship. 

First,  that  an  economically  moder- 
nizing China  is  in  both  our  countries'  in- 
terests. 

Second,  that  it  should  be  the  role  of 
the  government  to  facilitate  and  further 
trade,  though  not  at  the  expense  of  our 
security. 

Third,  that  in  the  trade  area,  as  in 
other  areas,  it  is  important  that  both 
sides  live  up  to  the  agreements  that  they 
make. 

I  need  hardly  elaborate  for  those  in 
this  room  the  economic  benefits  a 
modernizing  China  could  bring  to  U.S. 
business.  But,  as  I  suggested  earlier, 
economic  benefits  are  only  part  of  what 
we  might  hope  for  from  a  modernizing 
China.  We  believe  that  an  increasingly 
prosperous  China  will  be  more  stable, 
more  secure,  and  more  able  to  resist 
outside  pressure  and  intimidation.  That 
serves  American  interests  as  well,  both 
globally  and  regionally.  A  modernizing 
China  that  is  more  integrated  with  the 
world  economy  will  develop  important 
trading  ties  to  other  Asian  and  Pacific 
nations.  Such  ties  help  to  reinforce  the 
constructive  trends  in  China's  interna- 
tional role,  trends  from  which  the 
United  States  and  our  friends  and  allies 
in  Asia  benefit. 


it 


The  Chinese  see  our  willingness  to 
cooperate  in  their  modernization  efforts 
as  an  important  element  in  their  pros- 
pects for  success  and  in  our  relations. 
We  have  declared  ourselves— and  shown 
ourselves— willing  to  help. 

The  President  made  the  most  tangi- 
ble expression  of  his  desire  to  see  China 
modernize  last  spring,  when  he  directed 
that  China  should  be  treated  as  a  \ 

"friendly,  nonallied"  country  with  ' 

respect  to  exports  of  high  technology. 
Guidelines  published  last  November 
raised  the  levels  of  technology  that 
would  generally  be  made  available  to 
China  in  seven  important  product 
categories.  The  level  of  permitted 
exports  of  computers,  scientific  in- 
struments, and  microelectronic  manufac- 
turing equipment,  to  name  three  impor- 
tant examples,  were  raised  significantly. 
Roughly  75%  of  all  applications  we  are 
now  receiving  for  high-technology  ex- 
ports to  China  are  processed  under  the 
new,  expeditious  guidelines.  And  we  are 
working  now  on  liberalized  guidelines 
for  10  additional  product  categories 
which  should  cover  a  further  10%-15% 
of  license  applications. 

As  expected,  the  new  policy  has 
helped  to  encourage  a  healthy  increase 
in  U.S.  high-technology  exports  to 
China.  In  1982,  approximately  2,000  eX' 
port  licenses  were  approved,  with  a  tots* 
value  of  just  over  $450  million.  In  1983, 
there  were  3,300  approvals,  valued  at 
approximately  $1.1  billion.  In  the  first 
quarter  of  1984  alone,  1,170  licenses 
were  approved,  and  the  value  of  licensee  " 
high-technology  exports  to  China  for  all' "' 
of  1984  could  surpass  $1.5  billion. 

The  sheer  volume  of  license  referra. 
has  placed  a  considerable  strain  on  the 
COCOM  [Coordinating  Committee  for 
Multilateral  Security  Export  Controls] 
mechanism.  Since  the  new  guidelines 
were  published  last  November,  U.S.  re-  P 
ferrals  to  COCOM  have  more  than 
doubled.  Despite  this,  however,  we  and' 
our  COCOM  partners  have  succeeded  ii 
increasing  the  rate  of  COCOM  aprovals 
so  that  the  backlog  of  U.S. -China  sub- 
missions has  remained  steady  at  about 
300.  We  believe  that  processing 
times— now  generally  60-90  days— can 
be  reduced. 

This  council  has  played  an  importar 
supporting  role  in  the  liberalization  of 
export  controls  for  China,  and  I 
welcome  your  continued  input  into  this 
process.  Chinese  leaders  have  made  it 
plain  that  they  regard  our  adoption  of  t  i 
more  liberal  policy  as  a  turning  point  in  "^' 
the  relationship,  with  considerably 


EAST  ASIA 


jader  implications  than  its  purely  eco- 
mic  effects. 

A  second  principle  concerns  the 
Dper  role  of  government  in  trade.  It's 
gely  up  to  individual  businesses  and 
3ups  like  this  one  to  make  trade  a 
ility— a  function  you  are  performing 
th  remarkable  results.  But  govern- 
nt  certainly  has  a  role  to  play  in 
noving  unnecessary  obstacles  and, 
lere  possible,  in  promoting  trade.  We 
3  doing  that,  and  we  will  continue  to 
so  with  due  awareness  that  in  certain 
3as  security  considerations  are  an 
portant  factor. 

The  tax  treaty,  which  we  signed  in 
ijing  last  month,  is  one  important  ef- 
•t  to  help  provide  a  more  predictable 
vironment  for  businessmen  and  in- 
stors.  During  Premier  Zhao's  visit  in 
nuary,  he  and  the  President  signed 
3  industrial  and  technological  coopera- 
n  accord,  and  shortly  after  the  Presi- 
nt's  visit  we  followed  up  with  the  con- 
ision  of  two  work  programs  under  the 
:ord— in  the  fields  of  metallurgy  and 
telecommunications  and  electronics, 
ese  and  other  work  programs  will 
^e  our  firms  an  opportunity  to  partici- 
te  at  an  early  stage  in  the  planning 
ocess  of  Chinese  ministries.  And,  as 
)st  of  you  know,  we  will  be  mounting 
iiresidential  trade  mission  in  a  few 
:  mths  to  give  a  boost  to  trade  oppor- 
;iities,  particularly  for  our  firms  en- 
ged  in  aerospace  industries. 

We  will  continue  to  work  hard  to 
liieve  an  investment  agreement, 
nericans  have  invested  about  $85 
.  Uion  in  joint  equity  ventures  and 
i^eral  times  that  much  in  other  forms 
investment.  U.S.  oil  companies  will  be 
zesting  hundreds  of  millions  more  in 
'shore  exploration  and  major  in- 
stments  in  coal  are  also  likely.  China 
!lcomes  foreign  investment,  not  only 
a  source  of  capital  but  also  as  a  very 
'icient  vehicle  for  technology  transfer. 
ir  fifth  round  of  negotiations  will  take 
ace  in  September.  Meanwhile,  our 
'erseas  Private  Investment  Corpora- 
in  plans  to  organize  an  investment 
ssion  to  China  later  this  year. 

We  should  also  note  that  China  has 
ken  steps  of  its  own  to  improve  the 
nditions  for  investment.  Some  of 
ese— such  as  its  patent  protection 
jislation,  organization  of  economic 
nes,  joint  venture  laws,  and  tax  provi- 
3ns— are  remarkable,  considering  the 
lormous  differences  in  our  juridical 
lilosophies  and  legal  systems.  Nonethe- 
3S,  more  needs  to  be  done  if  China  is 
continue  to  attract  American  in- 
istors. 


In  these  and  other  ways,  we  seek  to 
increase  trade,  but  our  efforts  must  not 
and  will  not  come  at  the  expense  of  our 
security.  That  is  why,  even  though  our 
technology  sales  are  liberalized,  restric- 
tions remain,  not  just  for  China  but  for 
other  friendly  countries  as  well.  That  is 
why  we  will  continue  to  work  coopera- 
tively with  our  COCOM  partners,  so  that 
we  do  not  weaken  the  unique  institution 
which  is  vital  for  controlling  exports  to 
the  Soviet  Union. 

Perhaps  nowhere  have  we  had  to  go 
to  such  pains  to  take  security  concerns 
into  account  as  we  did  in  the  long 
negotiations  to  reach  an  agreement  on 
peaceful  nuclear  cooperation.  This  agree- 
ment, which  was  initialed  last  month  in 
Beijing,  took  over  3  years  to  negotiate. 
It  will  soon  be  submitted  to  the  Presi- 
dent. When  approved  by  him  and  signed 
by  both  countries,  it  will  then  be  for- 
warded to  Congress,  where  it  must  lie 
for  60  days  of  "continuous  session" 
before  it  can  enter  into  force.  We  an- 
ticipate full  examination  and  discussion 
of  the  text  of  the  agreement  on  the  Hill. 

The  implementation  of  the  agree- 
ment will  further  advance  our  coopera- 
tion with  China's  modernization  efforts, 
and  at  the  same  time  it  will  permit  U.S. 
companies  to  compete  for  a  share  of 
China's  ambitious  nuclear  power  pro- 
gram. 

But  the  arduous  negotiating  process 
that  lies  behind  this  agreement  and  the 
mandatory  approval  process  ahead  are 
necessary  because  the  possibility  of 
trade,  while  enticing,  cannot  come  ahead 
of  our  interest  in  halting  nuclear  pro- 
liferation. The  proposed  agreement  ad- 
vances that  interest  in  important  re- 
spects. During  the  course  of  our  negotia- 
tions, China  took  several  significant 
steps  to  clarify  its  nonproliferation  and 
nuclear  export  policies.  It  joined  the  In- 
ternational Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA)  in  January  and  has  stated  that, 
thereafter,  it  will  require  IAEA  safe- 
guards in  its  nuclear  exports.  Premier 
Zhao  has  stated  authoritatively  that 
China  will  not  assist  other  countries  to 
develop  nuclear  weapons.  In  addition  to 
its  other  features,  the  agreement  itself 
will  provide  a  framework  for  continua- 
tion of  discussions  with  China  on  non- 
proliferation  matters.  We  believe  the 
agreement  is  a  real  advance  and 
deserves  and  will  receive  full  bipartisan 
support. 

A  third  principle  of  our  economic 
relationship  has  to  do  with  the  import- 
ance of  abiding  by  agreements.  What 
needs  to  be  said  can  be  said  briefly,  but 
it  is  nonetheless  important.  This  is  not, 
generally  speaking,  a  problem  in  our 
dealings  with  China.  But  it  has,  frankly. 


been  a  disturbing  aspect  of  our  grain 
trade.  Although  China  was  our  best 
customer  for  wheat  in  the  period 
1980-82,  China  reduced  its  grain  ship- 
ments to  3.8  million  tons  in  1983,  2.2 
million  tons  short  of  its  obligation  under 
our  long-term  grain  ag^reement.  The 
Chinese  have  implied  at  various  times 
that  reduced  purchases  were  a  response 
to  U.S.  import  restrictions  on  Chinese 
textile  imports  or  other  factors  having 
nothing  to  do  with  the  agreement.  We 
find  unacceptable  this  unilateral  attempt 
to  condition  performance  on  matters  un- 
related to  the  agreement,  and  we  have 
made  our  position  clear.  We  are  pleased 
that  the  Chinese  have  assured  us  that 
they  will  make  up  the  1983  shortfall  and 
meet  their  1984  obligation. 

If  we  continue  to  follow  these  three 
guidelines— cooperating  on  China's 
modernization;  facilitating  trade  while 
protecting  our  security;  and  abiding  by 
agreements— we  can  build  a  sound  foun- 
dation for  growing  economic  ties  be- 
tween our  two  countries.  Such  growth  is 
both  good  business  and  good  foreign 
policy. 

Conclusion 

In  the  short  term,  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that  trade  will  recover  this  year 
as  our  high-technology  exports  continue 
their  momentum  and  as  the  Chinese 
meet  their  grain  purchase  obligations. 
Premier  Zhao  recently  told  us  that  we 
can  expect  our  traditional  bilateral 
surplus,  which  evaporated  last  year,  to 
return. 

In  the  longer  term,  the  most  import- 
ant factor  in  the  growth  of  U.S. -China 
trade  remains  the  rate  of  China's  own 
economic  progress.  As  China  prospers, 
we  can  expect  our  bilateral  trade  to 
grow,  as  it  has  with  the  many  dynamic 
economies  of  Asia. 

While  China  grows,  there  is  a 
natural  complementarity  in  some  areas 
of  our  economies  which  holds  promise 
for  the  future.  China  will  continue  to 
want  imports  of  some  agricultural  prod- 
ucts, notably  grains.  The  United  States 
has  grain  surpluses.  China  has  its  own 
industrial  base  and  badly  wants  to  im- 
prove the  efficiency  of  its  industry.  The 
United  States  has  technology  and  man- 
agement to  offer.  China  is  determined  to 
develop  its  energy  resources  and  to  use 
them  efficiently.  The  United  States  has 
capital  and  the  technologies  of  energy 
extraction  and  utilization. 

What  are  the  prospects  for  China's 
growth?  Surely,  more  growth  is  on  the 
way,  though  its  pace  is  by  no  means 


EAST  ASIA 


clear.  China's  most  noteworthy  progress 
has  come  as  a  result  of  the  introduction 
of  the  "responsibility  system"  in  agri- 
culture. But  progress  is  also  being  made, 
more  slowly,  in  the  industrial  sector. 
The  Chinese  themselves  acknowledge 
that  they  still  have  enormous  problems, 
both  structural  and  systemic.  But  they 
have  turned  in  an  impressive  perform- 
ance so  far— 6.5%  average  annual 
growth  since  1979.  And  they  seem  de- 
termined to  continue  to  deal  with  their 
problems  pragmatically. 

China's  economic  modernization  was 
one  of  the  primary  subjects  of  the  Presi- 
dent's speeches  during  his  recent  trip  to 
China.  Understandably,  the  American 
press  paid  the  most  attention  to  portions 
of  the  speeches  that  noted  the  differ- 
ences between  us  or  that  the  Chinese 
media  regrettably  did  not  cover.  The 
President's  most  important  speech,  the 


one  at  the  Great  Hall  of  the  People,  was 
about  America's  involvement  in  China's 
modernization.  That  speech  was  warmly 
received.  Indeed,  it  was  interrupted  re- 
peatedly with  loud  applause.  Extensive 
portions  were  televised  for  audiences 
throughout  China. 

In  one  of  the  most  important 
passages  of  this  speech,  the  President 
said: 

Today,  I  bring  you  a  message  from  my 
countrymen.  As  China  moves  forward  in  this 
new  path  [of  economic  modernization], 
America  welcomes  the  opportunity  to  walk  by 
your  side. 

That  is  perhaps  the  overriding 
message  of  the  President's  trip.  It  is  the 
message  that  won  him  so  warm  a  recep- 
tion and  that  promises  so  much  in  future 
cooperation  between  our  peoples.  The 
President  was  the  messenger— it  is  you 
who  will  deliver  the  goods.  ■ 


Taking  Stock  of 
U.S.-Japan  Relations 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  and  Inter- 
national Economic  Policy  and  Trade  of 
the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com,mittee 
on  June  12.  1981,.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs. ' 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to  have  the 
opportunity  to  appear  before  you  today 
to  discuss  one  of  our  nation's  most  im- 
portant bilateral  relationships— that 
with  Japan.  The  hearings  on  U.S.-Japan 
relations  that  you  held  in  1982  made  a 
major  contribution  to  illuminating  the 
importance  of  this  relationship  and  the 
problems  and  opportunities  within  it.  I 
would  like  to  commend  your  subcommit- 
tees for  holding  these  new  hearings  to 
bring  not  only  the  Congress  but  also  the 
American  people  up  to  date  on  where 
we  stand  in  our  relationship  with  Japan 
and  where  we  are  going. 

I  have  studied  carefully  the  ques- 
tions that  you  have  posed  for  these  hear- 
ings and  believe  that  they  can  be 
grouped  into  three  general  categories.  It 
is  around  these  three  categories  that  I 
would  like  to  present  my  testimony  to- 
day. 

First,  how  does  the  Administration 
view  the  nature  of  our  relationship  with 
Japan? 


Second,  what  have  been  the  major 
developments  in  our  relationship  over 
the  past  2  years? 

Third,  what  are  the  challenges  and 
opportunities  of  the  future  and  how  do 
we  intend  to  deal  with  them? 


THE  NATURE  OF  OUR 
RELATIONSHIP  WITH  JAPAN 

The  President's  historic  trip  to  Japan 
last  November  successfully  conveyed  the 
preeminent  importance  that  we  attach 
to  our  relationship  with  Japan.  Given  its 
economic  power  and  its  growing  interna- 
tional role,  Japan  clearly  has  become  one 
of  the  most  important  countries  in  the 
world  to  us.  While  bilateral  trade  prob- 
lems garner  significant  attention— legiti- 
mately so— and  often  generate  inor- 
dinate controversy,  our  overall  policy 
toward  Japan  transcends  these  issues 
and  is  based  on  three  developments. 

First,  we  have  worked  to  achieve  a 
close  bilateral  relationship,  with  Japan 
as  an  equal  partner.  The  past  decade  has 
brought  a  significant  expansion  of 
Japan's  economic  and  technological 
prowess;  an  increase  in  its  defense 
awareness  and  capability;  and  a  greater 
interest  and  involvement  in  international 
political  and  economic  affairs.  Of  course, 
there  still  are  differences  in  our  relative 
political,  economic,  and  military  posi- 


tl 


tions  in  the  world.  But  we  approach  and 
conduct  our  relationship  as  equals. 

Second,  because  of  our  combined 
economic  and  technological  impact  on 
the  world,  our  relationship  has  grown 
beyond  the  bounds  of  the  bilateral  and 
become  global  in  scope.  This  was  the 
theme  of  Secretary  Shultz's  landmark 
Shimoda  speech  last  September,  when 
he  referred  to  our  new  relationship  with 
Japan  as  an  "international  partnership." 
While  our  combined  impact  on  the  world 
is  measured  primarily  in  economic  and 
technological  terms,  in  the  future  it  will 
have  a  greater  political  dimension  as 
Japan  assumes  a  greater  international 
role  and  associates  itself  more  actively 
and  closely  with  the  political  and  securi' 
ty  goals  oif  the  West. 

Third,  Japan  is  becoming  increasing 
ly  assertive  in  global  matters  and  is 
forging  a  new  international  role  for 
itself.  During  most  of  the  postwar 
period,  Japan  pursued  an  international 
role  that  was  quite  similar  to  our  own 
throughout  most  of  American  history- 
pursuing  economic  interests  and  eschew 
ing  political  involvement.  But,  par- 
ticularly since  the  events  in  Iran  and  thi 
Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  in  1979, 
the  Japanese  have  come  to  realize  that 
their  own  well-being  is  affected  directly 
by  political  and  security  developments 
elsewhere  in  the  world.  The  implication: 
are  clear— the  days  of  "economic  giant, 
political  pygmy"  are  over.  The  United 
States  wishes  to  encourage  this  trend 
toward  a  greater  international  political 
and  economic  role  by  Japan,  within  the 
framework  of  a  continued  close  bilatera 
relationship. 

When  many  people  look  at 
U.S.-Japan  relations,  the  focus  is  on  th( 
problems  in  our  relationship  and  not  on 
its  successes.  But  I  believe  that  if  we 
step  back  and  take  a  look  at  our  overal, 
relationship,  we  would  determine  that  il  li 
is  the  best  that  it  has  ever  been  and  th; 
the  problems  that  we  have  are  the  ex- 
ceptions and  not  the  rule.  li 

First  of  all,  it  is  the  general  consen  •■: 
sus  of  Administration  officials  and  long 
time  observers  of  U.S.-Japan  relations 
that  our  defense  relationship  with  Japa  >: 
has  never  been  better.  We  forget  too 
easily  the  scenes  of  years  past,  when  oi 
mutual  security  relationship  and  the 
presence  of  U.S.  bases  caused  tremen- 
dous political  upheavals  in  Japan.  Todai 
both  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Cooperation 
and  Security  and  the  presence  of  U.S. 
military  bases  are  accepted  by  the  largn  p| 

» 


EAST  ASIA 


jority  of  the  Japanese  people.  Beyond 
Ijit.  more  Japanese  are  coming  to  ac- 
•  it  and  appreciate  that  our  bases  in 
(i  lan  contribute  not  only  to  the  defense 
jJapan  but  also  to  our  mutual  interest 
itnaintaining  peace  and  stability 
,-(Uii;hout  the  Asian  region  and 
Jilially. 

Second,  we  have  with  Japan  one  of 
'  liroadest  and  most  diverse  scientific 
:iti(inships  that  we  have  with  any 
mtry  in  the  world— both  in  the 
\  ate  sector  and  between  our  govern- 
11  Is.  Our  science  and  technology  rela- 
iiship  with  Japan  is  not  a  one-way 
ret  either.  As  one  example,  U.S.  com- 
nifs  that  have  signed  cross-licensing 
■  iTfiiients  with  Japanese  companies 
w  receive  more  patents  back  from 
pan  than  they  send  there. 

Our  educational  and  cultural  rela- 
nship  with  Japan  is  another  aspect  of 
r  relationship  that  we  hear  little 
out— again,  because  everything  is  go- 
?  so  smoothly.  There  is  a  renewed  in- 
est  in  Japan  and  Japanese  studies  in 
!  United  States.  We  have  one  of  our 
')st  active  youth  exchange  programs 
th  Japan.  We  have  over  1  million 
Ipanese  tourists  a  year  visiting  our 
:jntry.  Now  we  even  have  a  24-hour-a- 
:y  television  satellite  relay  between  our 
o  countries.  Japanese  viewers  wake 
every  morning  to  a  live  5-minute 
ws  report  from  New  York  describing 
i  ents  in  America. 

The  one  area  in  our  relationship 
lere  we  continue  to  have  well-publi- 
ed  problems  is  bilateral  trade.  Yet 
en  here  I  would  argue  that,  even 
5ugh  difficulties  in  access  and  market 
netration  remain,  the  Japanese 
irket  is  more  open  now  to  most 
nerican  products  than  it  was  even  2 
ars  ago.  Although  the  common 
rception  is  of  a  closed  market,  Japan 
tually  is  our  largest  overseas  market, 
ist  year,  it  bought  $23-billion  worth  of 
nerican  products,  equal  to  our  exports 
France,  West  Germany,  and  Italy 
mbined.  Japan  is  our  best  overseas 
irket  for  agricultural  products,  yet 
ly  one-fourth  of  our  exports  to  Japan 
e  in  that  category.  Japan  is  a  major 
irket  for  U.S.  manufactures;  in  fact,  it 
ys  more  manufactures  from  us  than 
est  Germany  does.  Japan  is  our  first 
second  largest  market  for  a  wide 
nge  of  manufactured  goods,  such  as 
emicals,  commercial  aircraft,  photo- 
aphic  supplies,  medical  and  scientific 
luipment,  and  pharmaceuticals.  In  ad- 
tion,  Japan  buys  $10-billion  worth  of 
merican  services  from  us,  and  we  run 
surplus  with  Japan  in  services  trade. 


Beyond  that,  Japan  has  increasingly 
invested  in  the  United  States.  This 
direct  and  portfolio  investment  creates 
employment,  helps  finance  our  govern- 
ment's deficit,  and  makes  money  avail- 
able for  our  banks  to  lend  to  American 
companies  and  consumers.  In  1982, 
Japan  transferred  $20  billion  in  capital 
back  to  the  United  States,  an  amount 
almost  equal  to  our  merchandise  trade 
deficit. 

I  do  not  deny  that  we  still  have 
trade  difficulties  with  Japan.  We  do,  and 
we  must  deal  with  them.  My  point  is  to 
indicate  that  we  have  made  progress  in 
resolving  these  problems  within  the  con- 
text of  our  overall  healthy  economic 
relationship.  The  Administration  will 
continue  to  address  trade  problems  dili- 
gently as  they  arise.  The  size  and  com- 
plexity of  our  trade— $63  billion  in  two- 
way  merchandise  trade  in  1983— guaran- 
tee that  we  will  continue  to  have  trade 
problems  in  the  future,  especially  as 
both  countries  develop  their  potential  in 
the  high  technology  area. 


MAJOR  DEVELOPMENTS  DURING 
THE  PAST  2  YEARS 

The  past  2  years  have  been  one  of  the 
most  active  and  productive  periods  in 
U.S. -Japan  relations.  The  President's 
meeting  with  Prime  Minister  Nakasone 
last  week  in  London  marked  their  fourth 
meeting  in  18  months.  Secretary  Shultz 
and  Foreign  Minister  Abe  have  met  10 
times  in  that  same  period.  The  Presi- 
dent, the  Vice  President,  and  nearly 
every  member  of  the  President's  Cabinet 
have  visited  Japan.  In  one  very  busy 
week  in  early  May  of  this  year,  we  ac- 
tually had  the  Vice  President,  the 
Secretary  of  State,  and  the  Secretary  of 
Defense,  all  making  separate  visits  to 
Tokyo. 

But  as  much  as  our  life  at  the  State 
Department  is  centered  around  prepara- 
tions for  meetings,  we  recognize  that 
frequent  meetings  do  not  represent 
progress  in  themselves.  There  has  been 
significant  movement  in  all  aspects  of 
our  relationship  with  Japan.  Let  me  look 
first  at  our  economic  relationship. 

U.S.-Japan  Trade 

Historically,  the  U.S.  Government  has 
taken  a  product-by-product  approach  to 
U.S.-Japan  trade,  dealing  with  the  con- 
tentious issues  of  the  moment.  In  the 
1950s,  we  were  concerned  about  clinical 
thermometers,  one  dollar  blouses,  and 
cotton  typewriter  ribbons.  In  the  1960s 
and  1970s,  the  products  shifted  to  tex- 


tiles, color  TVs.  and  specialty  steel.  To- 
day, we  worry  about  computer  software, 
telecommunications  equipment  and  serv- 
ices, and  fiber  optics.  Historically,  as  we 
resolved  each  problem,  another  industry, 
another  product,  and  another  problem 
would  come  along. 

While  continuing  to  work  to  achieve 
greater  market  access  for  specific  prod- 
ucts and  services,  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration has  taken  a  broader,  longer 
term  view  that  seeks  to  deal  with  the 
underlying  issues  in  the  Japanese 
economy  and  industrial  structure  that 
limit  our  access  to  Japan's  market. 
There  are  a  number  of  examples  of  our 
success  in  this  regard. 

Standards  Laws  Reform.  In  terms 
of  its  direct  and  long-term  impact  on  a 
wide  range  of  U.S.  exports,  Japan's 
reform  of  its  standards  and  product- 
approval  laws  is  one  of  the  most  signifi- 
cant actions  that  it  has  taken.  In 
response  to  U.S.  concern,  Japan  passed 
major  revisions  of  its  standards  and 
product-approval  laws  in  May  1983, 
making  it  possible  for  U.S.  firms  to 
apply  directly  for  approval  without  go- 
ing through  Japanese  agents.  We  are 
now  working  actively  to  allow  product 
testing  to  be  conducted  in  the  United 
States  by  American  firms  and  are  seek- 
ing the  ability  for  U.S.  companies  to 
help  participate  in  designing  Japanese 
standards.  As  the  door  opens  wider,  we 
hope  more  American  companies  will 
take  advantage  of  those  fundamental 
changes  and  become  reliable  suppliers  to 
Japan.  At  the  same  time,  should  prob- 
lems arise,  we  want  to  be  alerted  so  that 
both  sides  can  work  to  deliver  the  full 
potential  of  this  opening. 

Transparency.  The  gradual  move- 
ment toward  transparency  in  Japanese 
procedures  and  decisionmaking  also  will 
have  a  long-term  impact.  Basically,  in  a 
number  of  ways  Japan  is  moving  toward 
a  "sunshine  law"  approach,  allowing  U.S. 
firms  to  participate  in  actions  that  affect 
their  access  to  and  ability  to  compete  in 
the  Japanese  market  on  an  equal 
footing.  The  Japanese  Government  has 
agreed  to  transparency  in  a  number  of 
ways  over  the  past  2  years.  For  exam- 
ple, U.S.  firms  can  now  make  their 
views  known  in  developing  Japanese 
standards;  Nippon  Telegraph  and 
Telephone  (N'TT)  has  agreed  to  pro- 
cedures which  should  allow  U.S.  firms  to 
participate  in  its  research  and  develop- 
ment work;  and  the  president  of  the 
American  Chamber  of  Commerce  in 
Japan  has  been  invited  to  testify  before 
a  Japanese  Diet  committee,  as  have 


EAST  ASIA 


representatives  of  the  U.S.  Trade 
Representative,  Department  of  Com- 
merce, and  the  U.S.  Embassy.  The 
Japanese  have  even  expressed  a  will- 
ingness to  allow  us  to  make  our  views 
known  to  their  industrial  deliberation 
councils,  which  will  provide  them  the 
U.S.  perspective  on  potential  changes 
before  they  can  be  implemented. 
Further,  the  Japanese  Government's 
April  27  package  of  trade  measures  and 
its  joint  report  on  capital  markets/yen- 
dollar  publicly  stated  that  efforts  toward 
greater  transparency  in  some  areas  will 
continue. 

Capital  Market  Liberalization  and 
Internationalization  of  the  Yen.  In 
terms  of  its  far-reaching  international 
impact,  this  is  the  most  significant  ac- 
tion that  Japan  has  taken  during  the 
past  2  years.  In  the  Regan-Takeshita 
statement  of  last  November,  Japan 
agreed  to  further  liberalize  its  capital 
markets  and  to  promote  a  greater  inter- 
national role  for  the  yen.  The  U.S. 
Treasury-Japanese  Finance  Ministry 
report  on  yen/dollar  exchange  rate 
issues,  approved  by  Treasury  Secretary 
Regan  and  Minister  Takeshita  and 
released  on  May  29,  commits  Japan  to  a 
number  of  important  measures  with  far- 
reaching  foreign  exchange  and  other  im- 
plications. It  is  a  landmark  agreement, 
and  some  financial  experts  have  already 
labeled  it  the  most  important  develop- 
ment in  Japanese  finance  in  100  years. 
Once  the  measures  are  implemented 
fully,  Japan's  capital  markets  will  be 
more  open  than  those  of  any  other  coun- 
try in  the  world  except  the  United 
States.  The  yen  will  then  be  able  to  play 
a  role  in  international  finance  commen- 
surate with  Japan's  status  as  the  second 
largest  industrialized  democracy  and 
should  reflect  more  closely  its  true  value 
as  determined  by  international  markets. 

Voluntary  Restraint  Agreement  on 
Automobiles.  Japan's  voluntary 
restraints  on  auto  exports  over  the  past 
4  years  have  given  U.S.  companies  a 
needed  breathing  space  to  retool  and  in- 
vest, and  this  is  having  a  long-term  im- 
pact on  the  competitiveness  of  the  U.S. 
automobile  industry.  Today,  Detroit  is 
offering  a  better  built  car  than  it  ever 
has,  and  to  meet  the  Japanese  challenge 
it  will  continue  to  have  to  do  so.  At  the 
same  time,  Japan's  auto  makers  are 
coming  to  the  United  States  to  invest  in 
production  facilities,  providing  jobs  to 
our  workers  and  further  stimulating 
U.S.  competitiveness.  Honda  has  an- 
nounced it  will  double  its  production; 
Toyota  has  established  a  joint  venture 
with  GM;  Nissan  plans  to  add  cars  to  its 


truck  production  line  in  Tennessee;  and 
Mazda  and  Mitsubishi  also  are  consider- 
ing manufacturing  in  the  United  States. 

High  Technology  Working  Group. 
In  order  to  deal  with  issues  on  the  cut- 
ting edge  of  technology,  we  have 
established  a  high-technology  working 
group.  It  serves  as  an  "early  warning 
system,"  seeking  to  head  off  trade  and 
investment  problems  before  they  arise. 
Far  from  being  solely  a  forum  for 
discussion,  it  already  has  a  number  of 
concrete  successes  to  point  to,  such  as 
Japanese  agreement  on  an  import  pro- 
motion program  for  semiconductors  and 
agreement  on  the  mutual  elimination  of 
tariffs  on  semiconductors.  The  excellent 
working  relations  established  between 
U.S.  and  Japanese  participants  in  this 
group  have  enabled  us  to  make  good 
progress  on  the  software  protection 
issue  and  value-added  networks— again, 
heading  off  problems  before  final  action 
is  taken.  A  unique  feature  of  this  group 
is  that  American  and  Japanese  in- 
dustries, such  as  the  semiconductor  sec- 
tor, participate  in  the  meeting  with 
government  officials.  Industry-to- 
industry  contact  thereby  is  facilitated. 

Reinstitution  of  Regular  Economic 
Consultations  at  the  Subcabinet  Level. 
In  order  to  engage  in  a  continuous  and 
high-level  dialogue  with  the  Japanese  on 
economic  issues,  we  have  reinvigorated 
the  Economic  Subcabinet  Consultations, 
led  on  the  U.S.  side  by  Under  Secretary 
of  State  for  Economic  Affairs  Allen 
Wallis.  We  have  been  holding  meetings 
every  6  months  and  have  turned  out  the 
highest  level  attendance  ever.  The  con- 
sultations have  served  as  an  excellent 
forum  to  let  the  Japanese  know,  at  a 
high  level  and  in  a  comprehensive  man- 
ner, our  concerns  and  priorities;  to  head 
off  issues  before  they  become  real  prob- 
lems; or  to  approach  outstanding  issues 
in  a  nonconfrontational  manner  better 
designed  to  attain  mutually  agreeable 
resolutions.  Under  the  subcabinet  con- 
sultation mechanism  are  the  trade  com- 
mittee and  a  new  investment  committee 
which  was  established  at  the  time  of  the 
President's  trip  in  November  to  promote 
and  facilitate  two-way  investment.  These 
two  committees  also  serve  as  an  ex- 
cellent means  to  make  our  positions 
known  to  the  Japanese  in  a  comprehen- 
sive fashion. 

Industrial  Policy  Dialogue.  We 
have  instituted  discussions  with  Japan 
on  industrial  policy,  trying  to  determine 
how  Japan's  industrial  policies  work  and 
how  they  may  distort  trade  or  en- 
courage trade.  We  believe  that  these 
discussions  already  have  provided  us 


with  a  better  understanding  of  Japan's ) 
industrial  policies  and  at  the  same  time} 
have  impressed  clearly  upon  the 
Japanese  the  concern  we  have  with  any 
industrial  policies  that  inhibit  trade.  I 
hope  that  out  of  this  dialogue  will  come 
mutual  understanding  of  the  role  of 
government  in  promoting  industrial 
development  and  of  a  joint  commitment 
that  industrial  policies  should  not  have 
conscious  trade-distorting  effects. 

Energy  Cooperation.  Another  step 
which  will  have  a  long-term  impact  on 
our  economic  relationship  with  Japan  is 
the  joint  statement  on  energy  coopera- 
tion issued  during  the  President's  trip. 
In  this,  Japan  commits  itself  to  consider 
seriously  trade  and  investment  in  U.S. 
energy  resources— particularly  coal  and 
liquified  natural  gas.  Both  governments 
committed  themselves  to  facilitate 
private  sector  contact  so  that  coopera- 
tion and  trade  can  be  expanded.  We 
recognize  that,  in  the  end,  market  force 
will  he  the  determining  factor  in  Japan's 
decisions  to  invest  in  and  buy  U.S. 
energy  resources,  but  we  believe  that 
the  provisions  of  the  joint  statement, 
when  fulfilled,  will  have  a  positive  im- 
pact on  our  balance  of  trade  over  the 
longer  term. 

Exchange  Rates.  Of  all  these 
measures  that  deal  with  Japan's  under- 
lying economic  structure  and  approach 
toward  imports,  we  believe  that  the 
most  significant  action  over  the  past 
2  years— and  the  action  that  will  have 
the  greatest  long-term  impact— is 
Japan's  movement  toward  greater 
liberalization  of  its  domestic  capital 
markets  and  a  broader  international  rO' 
for  the  yen.  The  prevailing  exchange 
rate  also  has  the  effect  of  making 
Japanese  goods  more  price  competitive 
compared  to  U.S.  products,  not  only  in 
the  U.S.  and  Japanese  markets  but  als 
in  third-country  markets,  thereby  affec 
ting  our  global  trade  balance.  Experts 
do  not  expect  the  yen  to  appreciate  im 
mediately  against  the  dollar,  given  othi- 
factors.  However,  we  believe  that  over 
the  longer  term  the  yen  should  ap- 
preciate because  of  Japan's  perceived 
economic  strength  and  political  stabilit; 
Furthermore,  U.S.  investment  in  Japai 
will  he  encouraged  because  a  wider 
range  of  instruments  will  be  available  1 
finance  such  investment. 

Trade  Packages 

As  I  stated  earlier,  this  Administration 
also  has  continued  to  deal  with  the  que 
tion  of  access  by  specific  U.S.  products 
and  services  to  the  Japanese  market. 
During  the  past  2  years,  the  Japanese 
Government  has  issued  three  trade 


EAST  ASIA 


[  2kages  that  seek  to  reduce  trade  fric- 
n  and  increase  our  ability  to  compete 
the  Japanese  market  on  a  fair  and 
litable  footing.  By  far  the  most 
•nificant  of  these  packages  from  an 
nerican  point  of  view  was  that  an- 
unced  on  April  27  of  this  year,  at  the 
iclusion  of  the  followup  process  led  by 
;  Vice  President.  During  the  Vice 
Resident's  followup,  we  sought  to  ad- 
(hss  a  number  of  trade  issues  of  impor- 
ce  to  the  United  States.  Specifically, 
ise  included  beef  and  citrus  quotas, 
'iffs,  high-technology  issues  (renewal 
the  NTT  agreement,  unimpeded  ac- 
s  to  telecommunications  value-added 
tworks,  protection  of  computer  soft- 
re,  and  satellite  procurement),  energy 
operation,  general  investment  ques- 
ns,  and  capital  market  liberaliza- 
n/internationalization  of  the  yen.  The 
panese  Government  package  ad- 
3ssed  each  of  our  concerns.  Overall, 
s  package  was  responsive  to  our  in- 
ests,  although  we  were  disappointed 
it  certain  items,  such  as  tariff  cuts  on 
estry  products,  were  not  included. 
The  main  elements  of  the  April  27 
ckage  are: 

On  the  general  question  of  market 

cess— reducing  trade  barriers  and 
:  ening  Japan's  market  further— Japan 
:  imises  to  take  additional  steps  to 
:  iplify  and  improve  standards  and  cer- 
:  cation  systems,  to  promote  imports, 
;  J  to  accept  foreign  test  data.  Prime 
Inister  Nakasone's  statement  accom- 
I  nying  the  package  said  that  the 
ioanese  Government  considers  it  im- 
i  rtant  to  conduct  "even  more  vigorous- 
such  policy  measures  as  market 
ening,  import  promotion,  encourage- 
■nt  of  investment  to  and  from  Japan, 
d  so  forth. 

On  tariff  reductions,  it  indicates 
it  tariffs  for  a  number  of  products  of 
.erest  to  the  United  States  will  be 
olished  or  reduced  in  Japan's  fiscal 
ar  1985.  Cuts  on  color  photographic 
per  and  reduction  to  zero  in  farm 
ichinery  (hay  balers)  are  among  the 
ijor  items  on  the  U.S.  request  list, 
its  on  two  other  major  items— wine 
d  paper  products— have  since  been 
lalized  for  implementation  over  the 
xt  3  years.  As  I  indicated,  there  were 
cuts  on  forest  products,  a  major 
onomic  and  political  disappointment, 
vo  items  from  the  U.S.  "long 
t"— raw  furskins  of  mink  and  un- 
•ought  magnesium— are  included,  as 
iW  as  auto  emission  catalysts. 


On  tobacco,  there  is  legislation 
pending  before  the  Diet  that  privatizes 
the  Japan  Tobacco  and  Salt  Public 
Monopoly  Corporation,  which  will  give 
U.S.  companies  the  right  to  import  and 
distribute  tobacco  products  on  their  own 
account  and  to  set  prices  with  Ministry 
of  Finance  approval.  The  tobacco  item  is 
a  bright  spot  in  the  package  which  could 
significantly  expand  opportunities  for 
U.S.  products. 

On  agricultural  quotas,  a  satisfac- 
tory new  4-year  beef  and  citrus  agree- 
ment was  reached  April  7,  which  will 
lead  to  an  approximate  doubling  of  U.S. 
exports  to  what  already  is  far  and  away 
our  best  overall  market  for  these  prod- 
ucts. An  agreement  on  quotas  and 
tariffs  on  other  agricultural  categories, 
such  as  fruit  juices,  was  reached 
April  24. 

On  high  technology  issues: 

•  Computer  softwm-e— the  Govern- 
ment of  Japan  agreed  not  to  seek  new 
legislation  during  this  session  of  the 
Diet,  thereby  effectively  continuing 
copyright  protection.  The  package  notes 
the  need  for  "international  harmony" 
and  indicates  that  Japan  will  not  take 
any  further  action  on  this  issue  without 
coordinating  the  viewpoints  of  the  other 
developed  countries.  We  will  continue  to 
consult  on  this  key  issue  so  that 
copyright  protection  will  be  continued. 

•  Telecommunications— the  package 
refers  to  legislation  which  liberalizes  the 
telecommunications  market  in  Japan. 
Restrictions  on  foreign  investment  in 
Japan's  value-added  network  were 
eliminated,  and  licensing  requirements 
were  changed  to  notification  re- 
quirements. The  package  commits  the 
Japanese  Government  to  ensure  simplici- 
ty and  transparency  in  its  notification 
procedures  and  fair  competition  between 
the  new,  privatized  NTT  and  other 
telecommunications  firms.  These 
changes  are  a  major  step  forward  for  an 
open  Japanese  telecommunications 
market.  Implementation  will  be  impor- 
tant. 

•  SateWites— Japan  revised  its 
satellite  procurement  policy,  stating  that 
private  firms  now  will  be  able  to  pur- 
chase communications  satellites  from 
any  source  after  the  passage  of  the 
telecommunications  legislation.  Further- 
more, when  NTT  is  privatized  the 
government  will  open  the  way  for  it  to 
purchase  satellites  in  a  nondiscrimina- 
tory way,  while  ensuring  consistency 
with  its  national  space  development 
policy.  Japanese  Government  agencies 
will  be  able  to  procure  foreign  satellites 


not  necessary  for  autonomous  develop- 
ment of  space  technology.  We  intend  to 
continue  to  press  for  full  open  procure- 
ment. 

On  energy  cooperation,  the  package 
repeats  the  Japanese  Government's 
agreement  to  send  a  Japanese  coal  mis- 
sion to  the  U.S.  in  May  and  to  facilitate 
private  sector  interest  in  Alaskan  gas 
feasibility  studies.  A  Japanese  coal  mis- 
sion came  May  14-15  and,  while  there 
were  no  immediate  results,  the  two 
private  sectors  established  an  ongoing 
committee  to  continue  their  dialogue. 

On  investment,  the  package  accom- 
modates our  objectives.  It  establishes  an 
"expediter"  mechanism  to  relay  invest- 
ment information  and  assist  foreign 
companies  wishing  to  invest  in  Japan.  It 
also  establishes  an  investment  "om- 
budsman" to  settle  investment 
grievances.  The  Prime  Minister's  state- 
ment included  a  clear  indication  that 
Japan  welcomes  direct  foreign  invest- 
ment, and  the  government  is  sending  a 
mission  to  the  United  States  to  promote 
investment  in  Japan.  I  might  point  out, 
in  this  connection,  that  the  Japan 
Development  Bank  is  now  making  low 
interest  loans  available  to  foreign  com- 
panies investing  in  Japan,  even  for  sales 
offices  for  U.S. -made  products. 

On  other  issues,  the  package  states 
that  the  Japanese  Government  will  work 
with  the  Japan  Federation  of  Bar 
Associations  to  reach  an  early  resolution 
of  the  lawyers'  issue.  It  is  noteworthy 
that  reference  to  the  lawyers'  issue  was 
included,  as  we  believe  it  commits  the 
government  to  show  concern  and  re- 
sponsibility for  a  matter  that  legally  is 
under  private  jurisdiction. 

Defense  and 
Security  Cooperation 

Another  area  in  which  we  have  made 
significant  progress  over  the  past  2 
years  is  Japanese  defense  and  security 
cooperation.  I  stated  earlier  that  experts 
believe  that  our  security  relationship  has 
never  been  better  than  it  is  today.  I 
agree.  I  spoke  earlier  of  the  tendency  in 
U.S. -Japan  relations  to  focus  not  on 
what  is  going  right  but  on  the  areas 
where  we  have  problems.  This  is  equally 
true  in  defense.  A  number  of  years  ago, 
the  focus  in  the  security  relationship  was 
on  mutual  security  cooperation— prob- 
lems relating  to  our  mutual  security 
treaty  and  our  bases  in  Japan.  Today, 
one  seldom  hears  about  this  because 


EAST  ASIA 


almost  everything  is  going  very 
smoothly.  The  Treaty  of  Mutual 
Cooperation  and  Security  and  the 
presence  of  U.S.  military  forces  in  Japan 
are  accepted  by  a  broad  majority  of  the 
Japanese  people.  The  environmental  and 
social  problems  connected  with  the 
American  military  presence  in  Japan 
have  largely  abated. 

The  issues  that  do  arise  in  our 
security  relationship  pale  in  comparison 
to  the  issues  of  years  past.  Japan  pro- 
vides these  bases  to  us  rent  free  and,  in 
addition,  contributes  over  $1.2  billion  an- 
nually to  their  support.  This  amounts  to 
over  $23,000  for  every  American  soldier 
and  sailor  in  Japan,  which  is  more  than 
three  times  the  NATO  contribution.  It  is 
a  tangible  manifestation  of  Japan's 
cooperation  and  its  ongoing  commitment 
to  promote  security  in  the  Pacific 
region. 

The  focus  in  our  security  dialogue 
today,  therefore,  is  not  on  our  bases  in 
Japan  but  on  Japan's  own  direct  defense 
efforts.  We  need  to  remember  that 
Japan's  defense  policies  throughout  the 
postwar  era— concentrating  on  economic 
recovery  and  growth,  abjuring  the  exer- 
cise of  political  power,  and  renouncing 
military  power— accorded  with  U.S. 
policy  desires  and  represented  the 
foreign  policy  most  likely  to  be  accepted, 
not  only  by  the  Japanese  people  but  also 
by  Japan's  Asian  neighbors. 

Today,  however,  we  believe  that  the 
situation  has  changed,  and  that  Japan's 
defense  policies  are  changing  with  it. 
Over  the  past  2  years,  there  has  been  a 
significant  change  in  Japanese  attitudes 
toward  its  own  self-defense.  First  of  all, 
there  is  a  greater  awareness  of  the 
Soviet  threat  to  the  region,  and  recent 
public  opinion  polls  in  Japan  confirm 
this.  The  existence  of  the  Japanese  Self- 
Defense  Forces  (JSDF)  is  now  accepted 
by  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
Japanese  people.  Most  of  the  opposition 
parties  have  changed  their  attitudes  on 
the  JSDF;  while  still  claiming  that  the 
JSDF  is  unconstitutional,  even  the 
Socialist  Party  now  says  that  it  is  legal. 

But  the  most  important  change  over 
the  past  2  years  is  what  I  perceive  as  a 
new  understanding  in  Japan  of  the  real 
reasons  why  an  enhanced  defense  effort 
is  necessary.  For  many  years  in  our 
security  relationship,  Japanese  govern- 
ments very  often  took  the  steps  that 
they  did  in  the  defense  arena  and 
justified  them  to  their  own  people  by 
saying  that  they  were  necessary  for  the 
sake  of  the  U.S. -Japan  relationship.  In- 
creasingly in  Japan,  government  leaders, 
politicians,  and  opinionmakers  have 


come  to  realize  that  this  is  something 
that  must  be  done,  not  simply  to  "pacify 
the  Americans"  but  because  it  is  in 
Japan's  own  national  interest.  There, 
therefore,  has  been  a  qualitative  dif- 
ference in  the  way  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment and  people  look  at  defense  issues. 

There  has  been  a  quantitative  dif- 
ference as  well.  This  Administration,  as 
you  know  well,  does  not  focus  on 
defense  spending  per  se.  Our  concern  is 
not  with  input  but  with  output — Japan's 
ability  to  fulfill  the  defense  roles  and 
missions  that  it  has  set  for  itself,  and 
with  which  we  agree.  In  the  face  of 
severe  fiscal  constraints,  Japan  has 
made  a  major  effort  to  provide  the 
resources  necessary  to  implement  its 
defense  goals.  Increases  in  Japan's 
defense  budgets  have  averaged  about 
5%  in  real  terms  during  the  years  of  the 
Reagan  Administration.  (By  comparison, 
our  own  defense  spending  increased  by 
8%  annually  in  the  same  period  and  that 
of  our  NATO  allies  by  only  2%.)  During 
the  last  Diet  session,  the  government 
passed  what  basically  is  a  no-growth 
budget,  with  an  overall  increase  of  only 
0.5'Ki.  Yet  in  the  middle  of  this  austere 
budget,  defense  spending  rose  by  6.55%. 
Both  we  and  the  Japanese  Government 
recognize  that  this  level  of  spending  will 
not  be  sufficient  to  allow  it  to  implement 
the  Mid-Term  Defense  Plan  or,  within 
this  decade,  the  defense  roles  and  mis- 
sions that  it  has  set  out  for  itself.  But 
we  recognize  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment is  making  a  consistent  effort  to 
enhance  its  self-defense  capabilities  in 
the  face  of  political  and  fiscal  con- 
straints. 

Another  major  achievement  during 
the  past  2  years  is  the  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  on  Defense  Technology 
Transfer,  which  was  signed  just  before 
the  President's  visit  last  November.  This 
agreement  will  permit  the  export  of 
Japanese  technology  to  the  United 
States  to  be  used  for  military  purposes, 
and  I  should  note  that  the  United  States 
is  the  only  country  to  which  Japan  will 
permit  the  export  of  militarily  applicable 
technology. 

International  Political 
and  Economic  Cooperation 

The  third  area  in  which  we  have  made 
significant  progress  in  our  relationship 
with  Japan  during  the  past  2  years, 
and  the  area  that  forms  the  centerpiece 
of  our  vision  of  the  future  of  U.S. -Japan 
relations,  is  international  political  and 
economic  cooperation.  I  mentioned 
earlier  the  Secretary's  landmark  speech 


last  September  before  the  Shimoda  con- 
ference, in  which  he  indicated  that  the 
time  had  come  to  stop  thinking  of  our 
relationship  with  Japan  as  a  simple 
bilateral  relationship.  Given  our  com- 
bined impact  on  the  world,  the  Secretar; 
said  that  we  should  now  look  upon  our 
relationship  with  each  other  as  an  "inter- 
national partnership."  In  his  historic 
speech  to  the  Japanese  Diet,  the  Presi- 
dent amplified  this  theme  on  behalf  of 
our  nation  when  he  told  the  Members  of 
Japan's  Parliament  that  we  should  come 
together  to  become  a  "powerful  partner- 
ship for  good." 

The  basis  for  this  thinking  is  clear. 
Together  the  United  States  and  Japan 
account  for  one-third  of  world  gross  na- 
tional product  (GNP)  and  one-half  of 
free  world  GNP.  Our  combined  share  of 
world  trade  is  22%.  American  and 
Japanese  banks  together  make  over  one 
half  of  all  internationally  syndicated 
commercial  loans.  The  United  States 
and  Japan  already  rank  as  the  first  and 
second  largest  sources  of  resource  flows 
(official  assistance  and  private  lending) 
to  the  Third  World  and  the  first  and 
third  largest  donors  of  official  develop- 
ment assistance.  We  soon  shall  be  the 
first  and  second  largest  shareholders  in 
the  World  Bank,  and  we  are  the  first 
and  second  largest  contributors  of 
refugee  assistance.  We  are  universally 
recognized  as  leading  sources  of 
technology.  Japan  and  the  United  State 
are  in  the  forefront  of  those  calling  for 
new  international  trade  round. 

But  it  is  not  simply  Japan's  econom 
and  technological  strength  that  leads  u; 
to  call  for  an  "international"  partnership ,( 
As  I  indicated  earlier,  Japan  is  moving 
toward  a  greater  international  political  f,, 
role.  Neither  the  United  States  nor  an\  '■ 
other  country  is  pushing  Japan  in  this 
direction;  Japan  is  moving  on  its  own 
and  in  accordance  with  its  own  nation;i  , 
interests.  However,  it  is  in  our  interest  l 


to  recognize  that  our  relationship  with 
Japan  is  now  entering  a  new  phase,  an< 
that  we  should  work  to  establish  new 
patterns  of  association  with  Japan, 
based  both  in  theory  and  in  practice  or 
close  cooperation  and  respect.  This  we 
have  done  successfully  during  the  past 
2  years,  and  there  are  a  number  of  ex- 
amples of  how  the  United  States  and 
Japan  have  worked  together  on  an  int«- 
national  level. 

•  The  close  working  relationship 
established  between  the  President  and 
Prime  Minister  Nakasone  helped  lead  I 
the  success  of  the  Williamsburg  summ 

•  Coordination  of  our  approach  to 
East- West  relations  across  the  board 
has  led  to  enhanced  Western  solidarity 


\i 


fit 


1 

ipp 


EAST  ASIA 


1  general  Soviet  policy  and  arms  con- 
ol  negotiations  and  helped  stem  the 
3W  of  high  technology  goods  to  the 
jviets. 

•  Increased  Japanese  foreign  aid  to 
itions  of  strategic  importance— such  as 
urkey.  Pakistan,  and  Egypt— has  pro- 
oted  economic  development  in  those 
)untries  and  enhanced  political  stahili- 

•  Japan's  impressive  cooperation 
ith  us  at  the  time  of  the  Soviet  shoot- 
)wn  of  the  Korean  Air  Lines  tlight 
)07  proved  Soviet  responsibility,  aided 

combined  search  and  recovery  opera- 
ons,  and  condemned  the  Soviet  action. 

•  Japan  worked  with  us  to  provide 
plomatic  support  to  South  Korea  in 
le  face  of  the  Rangoon  bombing  and 
le  north's  proposal  for  tripartite  talks. 

•  Japan  has  worked  actively  to  pre- 
?nt  escalation  of  the  Iran-Iraq  war. 

•  Japan  has  been  cooperative  on 
bird  World  debt  issues  and  has  ex- 
uded support  to  the  Philippines  to  aid 
in  the  financial  crisis  it  faces. 

•  Japan  has  indicated  a  willingness 
I  join  the  President's  African  aid  ini- 
ative  and  help  promote  development  in 
16  Caribbean  Basin  area. 

Finally,  I  should  add  that  we  and  the 
ipanese  work  actively  on  a  daily  basis 
I  consult  on  a  wide  range  of  interna- 
onal  political  and  economic  issues.  The 
ipanese  Embassy  is  among  the  most 
;tive  in  Washington  in  its  diplomatic 
)ntacts  with  the  State  Department  and 
;her  executive  branch  departments,  and 
am  sure  that  the  reverse  is  equally 
ue  about  our  Embassy's  contacts  with 
le  Japanese  Foreign  Ministry.  In  addi- 
on,  senior  specialists  in  the  State 
epartment  and  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Ministry,  usually  led  at  the  Assistant 
ecretary  level,  meet  on  a  regular  basis 
>)  exchange  views  and  discuss  our 
jspective  policies  toward  major  regions 
:  the  world.  So  far  this  year,  we  have 
i\d  extensive  consultations  on  the 
[iddle  East  and  Africa,  and  later  this 
2ar  we  will  meet  to  discuss 
evelopments  in  Latin  America  and 
urope. 


HE  CHALLENGES  AND 
PPORTUNITIES  OF  THE  FUTURE 

.s  we  look  toward  the  future,  the 
'nited  States  has  a  number  of  specific 
olicy  goals  to: 

•  Strengthen  U.S. -Japan  coopera- 
on  and  consultation  on  a  wide  range  of 
iternational  political  and  economic 


issues  in  order  to  promote  peace  and  in- 
ternational security,  not  just  in  Asia  but 
throughout  the  world: 

•  Continue  to  strengthen  our 
mutual  security  relationship,  while 
stressing  the  importance  of  Japan's 
making  a  larger  and  accelerated  con- 
tribution to  our  common  defense  burden; 

•  Continue  our  major  efforts  to 
achieve  greater  and  more  equitable 
market  access  to  Japan  and  work 
together  to  maintain  the  free  trade 
system  and  counter  protectionist  senti- 
ment in  the  United  States  and  Japan; 

•  Consult  and  cooperate  closely  with 
Japan  in  our  mutual  efforts  to  foster  an 
open  world  trade  and  investment  system 
and  to  promote  economic  development 
and  financial  stability  in  the  developing 
nations:  and 

•  Continue  to  expand  our  educa- 
tional, cultural,  and  scientific  relations. 

As  we  seek  to  accomplish  these 
goals,  I  see  three  major  challenges 
before  us: 

•  Gaining  a  strengthened  commit- 
ment by  both  countries  to  the  free  trade 
system; 

•  Ensuring  that  we  treat  Japan  as 
we  would  any  other  ally  and  friend;  and 

•  Using  the  fundamentals  and 
overall  importance  of  our  relationship  to 
solve  the  more  transitory  problems  of 
the  moment. 

I  mentioned  earlier  that,  in  the  case 
of  defense,  we  are  convinced  that  Japan 
is  now  genuinely  and  sincerely  moving  in 
the  direction  of  an  enhanced  defense  ef- 
fort. Japan's  intentions  or  motives  are 
not  in  doubt.  Unfortunately,  I  cannot  yet 
say  the  same  about  our  trade  problems. 
There  still  is  a  widespread  perception 
that  Japan  is  not  committed  to  allowing 
our  companies  and  products  fair  and 
equitable  access  to  its  market  and  that 
Japan  makes  concessions  only  begrudg- 
ingly  and  under  pressure.  Two  editiorial 
comments  from  opposite  ends  of  the 
Pacific  reflect  this  notion  well.  In 
describing  the  capital  market  discus- 
sions, Japan's  Nikon  Keiza  i  Shimbun 
described  on  March  27  of  this  year  what 
it  called  Japan's 

.  .  .  conventional  negotiating  style  in  deal- 
ing with  the  United  States,  namely,  the  style 
of  "delaying,  haggling  and  seeking  to 
minimize  changes  in  the  status  quo."  If  this 
style  continues,  the  U.S.  dissatisfaction  will 
increase  rather  than  diminish,  resulting  in  a 
further  aggravation  in  U.S.  frustration,  and 
this  cycle  will  never  stop. 


Two  weeks  later,  the  Washington  Post 
commented  on  the  beef  and  citrus 
discussions,  saying 

By  resisting  desperately  on  minor  mat- 
ters such  as  beef  imports,  and  pushing  them 
to  the  brink  of  crisis  before  compromising, 
Japanese  negotiators  create  an  impression  of 
obduracy.  It  does  not  serve  Japanese  in- 
terests to  encourage  Americans  to  think  of 
trade  with  Japan  as  a  one-way  street  in 
which  even  the  most  modest  concessions  are 
made  grudgingly  and  only  after  inordinate 
delay.  .  .  .  That  impression  is  damaging  to 
Japan.  ...  In  the  beef  case,  the  Japanese 
allowed  the  dispute  to  drag  on  much  too  long 
at  too  great  a  political  cost. 

Another  challenge  in  the  future  is  to 
learn  how  to  treat  Japan  as  we  would 
any  other  ally  or  friend.  The  quotations 
I  just  used  illustrate  how  perceptions  in 
both  countries  focus  on  pressure  and  on 
response  tactics.  This  is  not  the  only 
way  to  conduct  business.  Calm,  con- 
sistent attention  to  issues  before  they 
are  politicized  should  work  to  eliminate 
the  cyclical  and  emotional  swings  in  our 
relationship.  We  have,  with  few  excep- 
tions, attempted  to  do  just  that  during 
the  past  3  years.  In  my  view,  we  must 
build  upon  this  approach  so  that  future 
generations  of  leaders  will  not  be  so  em- 
bittered by  the  battles  that  a  mature 
dialogue  and  the  accomplishment  of 
other  important  objectives  in  our  rela- 
tionship become  impossible. 

Particularly  in  trade  matters,  I 
welcome  the  fledgling  indications  that 
some  circles  in  Japan  see  it  as  in  their 
own  national  interest  to  open  completely 
to  foreign  products  and  services.  The 
leaders  of  Japan  have  to  foster  this 
growing  recognition. 

In  terms  of  international  political 
cooperation,  however,  the  obligation  is 
more  on  our  side.  If  we  want  Japan  to 
work  together  with  us  as  a  close  and 
equal  partner  on  the  international  stage, 
we  must  act  accordingly.  We  must  treat 
Japan  as  an  equal,  consult  closely,  and 
be  willing  to  listen — and  in  some  cases 
modify — our  policies  and  actions  when 
Japan  disagrees.  In  the  global  economic 
arena,  Japan  already  is  speaking  its 
mind  openly  to  us.  However,  Japan  has 
been  less  willing  to  do  the  same  in  inter- 
national political  affairs.  When  the  day 
comes  when  it  does  so,  it  may  come  as  a 
shock  to  many  Washington  policymakers 
who  are  accustomed  to  a  quieter  Japan. 
That  day  will  come,  and  I  hope  that  we 
will  be  flexible  and  mature  enough  to 
receive  it  as  a  sign  of  a  successful  policy. 

The  final  challenge  that  we  face  is  to 
make  sure  that,  when  we  deal  with 


EAST  ASIA 


Japan  on  transitory  individual  issues,  we 
keep  our  overall  interests  in  mind  and 
utilize  the  importance  of  our  relationship 
to  help  achieve  progress  on  those 
outstanding  issues.  Our  trade  interests 
are  important  to  us,  but  they  are  not  the 
only  part  of  our  relationship.  Conver.'-.e- 
ly,  our  security  interests  in  Japan  are 
extremely  important  to  us,  but  this  does 
not  mean  that  we  should  ignore  our  in- 
terest in  securing  equitable  access  to 
Japan's  market.  We  should  not  be  forced 
to  choose,  Solomon  like,  one  aspect  of 


our  relationship  over  another.  Our  rela- 
tionship with  Japan  is  without  question 
one  of  our  most  important  and  vital  rela- 
tionships, and  it  will  be  increasingly  so 
in  the  future.  If  we  keep  the  overall  im- 
portance of  that  relationship  in  mind,  we 
can  make  even  greater  progress  in 
resolving  outstanding  issues. 


'The  completed  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.-Asia  Security:  Economic 
and  Political  Dimensions 


by  William  A.  Brown 

Address  before  the  U.S.-Asia  In- 
stitute on  June  18,  198J,.  Mr.  Brown  is 
Acting  Assistant  Secretary  for  East 
Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs. 

Although  formed  only  a  few  short  years 
ago,  the  U.S.-Asia  Institute  has  already 
made  a  large  contribution  to  a  deepen- 
ing of  understanding  between  the 
peoples  of  the  United  States  and  Asia. 
Your  leadership,  headed  by  your 
distinguished  chairman,  Mr.  Kay 
Sugahara,  and  ably  assisted  by  co- 
founders  Esther  Kee,  Joji  Konoshima, 
and  others,  is  outstanding.  Your 
organization,  through  its  research,  sym- 
posia, and  publications,  serves  as  a  wise 
adviser  in  meeting  the  challenge  of 
achieving  ijetter  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  countries  in  the 
Kast  Asia  and  Pacific  region. 

Overview 

The  subject  for  my  address  today  is  the 
political  and  economic  dimensions  of 
U.S. -Asia  security.  That  ancient  and 
very  wise  Chine.se  sage,  Lao  Tzu,  said: 
"He  who  knows  does  not  speak.  He  who 
speaks  does  not  know."  I,  therefore,  ask 
your  kind  indulgence. 

Ever  since  immigrants  from  Europe 
and  Asia  settled  the  West  Coast,  the 
United  States  has  necessarily  looked  to 
both  East  and  West.  World  War  II  ac- 
celerated the  trend  away  from  paying  so 
much  more  attention  to  Europe  toward 
one  of  greater  balance  and  concern.  Our 
future  is  as  tied  to  events  in  East  Asia 
as  it  is  to  our  more  traditional  relations 
in  Western  Europe. 


These  last  four  decades  since  the 
end  of  World  War  II  have  witnessed 
great  changes  that  have  drawn  the 
United  States  ever  closer  to  East  Asia. 
Peaceful  trade  and  commerce  have  ex- 
panded to  such  a  degree  that  U.S.  trade 
with  the  East  Asia  and  Pacific  region 
has  outstripped  our  trade  with  Europe. 
The  dynamic  growth  of  the  Pacific  na- 
tions has  transformed  them  into  major 
markets  for  U.S.  products,  services,  and 
capital. 

There  have  been  two  major  wars. 
And  we  have  learned  our  lessons.  We 
are  resolved  to  maintain  our  military 
posture  and  presence  as  a  Pacific  power 
so  as  to  deter  armed  aggression  against 
our  allies  and  friends  in  the  region.  Im- 
migration patterns  have  shifted;  in  re- 
cent years,  along  with  Latin  America, 
the  largest  number  of  immigrants  have 
come  from  Korea,  Taiwan,  the  Philip- 
pines, and  the  former  Indochina  coun- 
tries. These  hardworking  people  greatly 
enrich  our  culture  and  economic  life. 

Economic  Dimensions 

Let  me  now  comment  on  the  economic 
dimensions  of  U.S.-Asia  security.  No 
society  can  be  truly  secure  without  a 
strong  economy.  A  flourishing  economy 
provides  the  necessary  resources  for  a 
strong  defense.  Breakthroughs  in  the 
private  sector  often  have  application  in 
defense-related  industries,  but  more 
generally,  a  growing,  vibrant  economy 
has  certain  intrinsic  advantages:  it 
motivates  people  to  become  involved,  to 
increase  production,  and  to  be  concerned 
about  the  quality  of  the  product.  It  also 


stimulates  education,  and  a  better 
educated  workforce  results  in  a  better 
educated  fighting  force. 

The  Republic  of  Korea  is  a  good  ex- 
ample of  the  correlation  between 
economy  and  security.  While  North 
Korea  has  maintained  over  the  years  a 
20%  of  GNP  spending  rate  for  so-called 
defense.  South  Korea,  because  of  its  ex- 
panding economic  strength,  now  is  at 
rough  equivalence  in  military  expendi- 
tures. If  the  trend  continues,  there  is  no 
doubt  the  South  will  right  the  current 
imbalance  in  military  forces.  Although 
the  U.S.  guarantee  for  the  Republic  of 
Korea's  security  is  an  important  factor 
in  this  equation,  the  commitment  of  the 
South  Korean  people  to  hardworking 
economic  growth  is  the  key  ingredient  to 
an  increasingly  strong  defense  posture. 

On  a  broader  plane,  our  growing 
economic  ties  with  our  friends  and  allies 
in  the  East  Asia  and  Pacific  region  pro- 
vide additional  benefits  from  a  security 
standpoint.  Commerce  is  a  very  strong 
tie  that  binds.  It  helps  cement  relation- 
ships and  makes  it  that  much  harder  for 
adversaries  to  drive  a  wedge  between 
us.  Across  the  sealanes  of  the  Pacific  to- 
day are  shipped  a  great  deal  of  each 
market  country's  wealth.  They  have 
become,  in  fact,  the  sinews  and  arteries 
of  a  larger  system,  and — needless  to 
say — crucial  to  the  security  of  this 
sytem  and  its  parts. 

Such  close  and  very  extensive 
economic  ties  inevitably  produce  some 
friction,  and  I  suppose  oui-  trade  with 
Japan — one  of  our  closest  and  most  im- 
portant friends  in  the  world — is  the  besi 
case  to  illustrate  this.  There  are  some 
important  trade  problems,  and  issues 
such  as  Japan's  quotas  and  high  tariffs 
on  agricultural  and  forestry  products  ar 
illustrative  of  the  difficulties  that  we 
have  in  achieving  the  same  kind  of  ac- 
cess to  Japan's  market  that  Japanese 
companies  have  to  ours.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  emphasize  strongly  to  the 
Japanese  the  importance  of  removing  it  I, 
remaining  barriers  to  the  export  of  U.S  J- 
goods  and  services.  And  yet,  such  prob- 
lems must  be  kept  in  perspective.  , 
Because  our  economic  ties  are  part  of  a 
much  wider,  deeper  relationship,  with  a 
security  dimension,  we  must  never  let 
disputes  eat  away  at  the  trust  so 
necessary  for  cooperation  to  meet  com- 
mon threats. 

I  beg  your  indulgence  to  cite  a  few 
statistics  to  show  just  how  phenomenal 
the  growth  in  our  economic  ties  has 
been  over  the  last  few  years. 

•  U.S.  investments  in  the  region 
rose  an  estimated  $4  billion  in  1981  to 
.$26. <;  billion. 


EAST  ASIA 


I  Also  in  1981,  before  the  recession, 
;  $128  billion  trade  with  East  Asia 
d  the  Pacific  signified  a  12.2%  in- 
lase  over  the  previous  year.  This  com- 
res  with  a  10.9%  growth  in  our 
rldwide  trade. 

•  In  1982,  in  the  recession,  trade 

th  the  region  declined  1%  compared  to 
'.8%  decline  worldwide. 

•  In  1983,  the  first  year  of  recovery, 
$136.5  billion  trade  with  East  Asia 

d  the  Pacific  was  up  8%  compared  to 
;t  0.5%  worldwide.  It  is  now  24% 
ger  than  our  trade  with  Western 
irope  and  comprises  30%  of  our  total 
ide.  ASEAN  [Association  of  South 
ist  Asian  Nations]  by  itself  is  our  fifth 
gest  trading  partner  behind  Canada, 
pan,  Mexico,  and  the  European  Com- 
mity. 

ilitical  Dimensions 

t  me  now  turn  to  the  political  dimen- 
ns  of  U.S. -Asia  security.  No  society 
n  be  secure  if  it  is  torn  by  internal 
ife.  No  society  can  successfully  cope 
ith  threats  from  the  outside  if  it  is 
I'ak  within.  And  political  strength 
irives  from  governments  being  respon- 
e  to  the  needs  of  their  people.  Over 
years  ago,  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  asked: 

Is  there  any  just  reason  why  we  should 
Dose  autocracy  and  insist  on  democracy? 
s,  because  with  the  rapid  advance  of 
1  ilization  people  are  growing  in  intelligence 
li  developing  a  new  consciousness  of 
if....  Which  is  more  appropriate, 
I  ;ocracy  or  democracy?  If  we  base  our  judg- 
I  nt  on  the  people's  intelligence  and  ability, 
;  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  sovereign- 
of  the  people  is  far  more  suitable  to  us. 

Just  as  our  society  today  is  influ- 
ced  by  Asian  religious  and  cultural 
!as,  so  too  have  Asian  societies, 
oecially  after  shaking  off  the  yoke  of 
ionialism,  been  influenced  by  Western 
litical  ideas. 

We  are  justifiably  proud  of  our 
mocratic  system  and  feel  most  com- 
-table  in  dealing  with  others  who 
are  similar  values.  Happily,  many 
untries  in  the  region  have  attained  or 
e  moNang  toward  stable  democracies, 
le  institutional  growth  and  broad  ac- 
ptance  of  Japanese  democracy,  for  ex- 
nple,  is  something  in  which  the 
panese  people  can  take  pride,  and  we 
11  continue  to  applaud — and  encourage 
appropriate  ways — movement  toward 
ger  societies  in  the  Republic  of  Korea, 
e  Philippines  and  elsewhere.  Our 
lique  relationship  with  Australia  and 


New  Zealand  is  based  upon  shared 
history,  values,  and  generally  compatible 
interests  and  objectives.  Anchored  by 
the  ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zealand, 
United  States  pact]  treaty,  our  contacts 
with  these  two  old  friends  continue  to  be 
close  and  harmonious.  We  are  encour- 
aged by  the  political  growth  in  the 
Western  tradition  of  the  emerging  na- 
tions of  the  South  Pacific.  We  look  for- 
ward to  full  self-government  in  the  not 
too  distant  future  for  the  Marshall 
Islands,  the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia,  and  Palau. 

Southeast  Asia  provides  an  in- 
teresting example  of  the  dynamic  in- 
teraction between  political,  economic, 
and  security  factors.  Two  decades  ago, 
our  Southeast  Asian  friends'  foremost 
threat  was  communist  subversion  foster- 
ing internal  disorder.  The  economic  and 
political  progress  of  these  countries  has 
reduced  this  threat  in  most  countries  to 
manageable  proportions.  Finding  their 
ability  to  penetrate  and  influence  inter- 
nal developments  sharply  curtailed,  both 
the  Soviet  Union  and  Vietnam  have 
turned  to  conventional  military  forces 
and  intimidation  as  their  principal  policy 
tools.  The  resulting  threat  is  real  and 
must  be  met.  But  the  wave  of  the  future 
clearly  does  not  lie  in  the  regimented 
societies  where  experience  starkly 
reveals  the  central  weakness  of  their 
governing  systems.  Such  one- 
dimensional  systems  provide  neither 
economic  nor  political  incentives  or 
development. 

The  U.S.  Role 

There  is  a  psychological  dimension  of 
the  U.S.  security  role  that  I  would  also 
like  to  touch  on  briefly.  For  a  time  after 
the  Vietnam  war,  there  were  many  who 
feared  that  isolationism  would  again 
move  America  to  withdraw  from  her 
commitments  as  a  Pacific  power.  Many 
were  concerned  that  U.S.  foreign  policy 
in  the  Pacific  would  resemble  that  so 
well-described  by  Winston  Churchill, 
speaking  about  his  own  country  in  the 
mid-1930s:  "Decided  only  to  be  unde- 


cided, resolved  to  be  irresolute,  adamant 
for  drift,  solid  for  fluidity,  all-powerful 
to  be  impotent." 

Events  fortunately  proved  that 
America  was  not  returning  to  isola- 
tionism. While  the  lessons  of  the  Viet- 
nam war  will  provide  debate  material 
for  years  to  come,  the  negative  conse- 
quences of  that  war  are  plain  for  all  to 
see — namely  a  Vietnam  under 
repressive  rule  which  invaded,  occupies, 
and  now  even  colonizes  parts  of  its 
neighbor  Kampuchea;  provides  the 
Soviets  with  air  and  naval  facilities  in 
the  region;  and  is  responsible  for  the 
flight  of  more  than  a  million  and  half 
refugees  from  Indochina  since  1975. 

Such  consequences  challenged  the 
United  States  to  respond,  and  I  believe 
we  have.  Our  alliances  with  Japan,  the 
Republic  of  Korea,  Australia,  New 
Zealand,  the  Philippines,  and  Thailand 
are  stronger  than  ever.  Our  political  ties 
to  new  friends,  such  as  China,  and  old 
friends  such  as  the  ASEAN  states,  are 
crucial  in  dealing  with  both  security  and 
economic  challenges.  As  Secretary 
Shultz  stated  before  the  World  Affairs 
Council  of  San  Francisco  last  year,  the    • 
U.S.  role  in  the  East  Asia  and  Pacific 
region  is  unique.  "We  are  the  one  nation 
of  the  region  with  both  a  worldwide 
view  and  the  capacity  to  implement  a 
worldwide  policy.  As  a  great  power,  we 
have  great  responsibilities.  We  have 
borne  them  well,  and  we  must  continue 
to  do  so.  .  .  .  The  United  States  will  re- 
main a  Pacific  power.  Although  specific 
tasks  may  change,  our  overall  respon- 
sibilities will  not  be  diminished  in  impor- 
tance nor  shifted  on  others." 

It  is  not  just  happenstance  that  over 
the  past  year,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  has  made  two  major  trips 
to  Asia — to  Japan  and  the  Republic  of 
Korea,  and  to  China,  and  hopes  to  be 
traveling  to  Southeast  Asia  as  well.  The 
President  has  a  deep  and  abiding  com- 
mitment toward  strengthening  U.S.  ties 
to  the  Pacific.  As  he  commented  recent- 
ly in  Beijing:  "I  see  America  and  our 
Pacific  neighbors  going  forward  in  a 
mighty  enterprise  to  build  strong 
economies  and  a  safer  world."  ■ 


ECONOMICS 


World  Economic  Prospects 


by  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  i  1  merican 

Chamber  ofC <•■  .1  m  Santiago  on 

July  27,  198A-  Mr.  Wallis  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs. 

I  am  happy  to  be  in  Santiago.  This  is  my 
first  visit,  and  I  am  impressed  already 
by  the  beauty  of  the  city  and  the 
hospitality  of  its  people.  In  addition,  it  is 
an  honor  "and  a  pleasure  to  have  this  op- 
portunity to  address  you. 

I  will  first  discuss  prospects  for  the 
world  economy  and  U.S.  policies  to  sus- 
tain, strengthen,  and  spread  the  eco- 
nomic recovery  on  a  global  basis. 

Second,  I  will  discuss  the  effects  of 
recovery  on  developing  countries,  a  sub- 
ject that  this  audience  may  find  of  par- 
ticular interest. 

Finally,  I  will  comment  on  problems 
related  to  international  debts. 

U.S.  Recovery  and 
Global  Outlook 

Largely  as  a  result  of  the  strong  U.S. 
recovery,  the  world  economy  is  in  much 
better  shape  than  it  was  a  year  and  a 
half  ago.  The  recovery  is  increasingly 
picking  up  strength  in  the  other  in- 
dustrialized economies,  international 
trade  is  again  growing,  and  we  have 
passed  the  worst  of  the  current  debt 
problems  of  some  developing  countries. 
With  strong  growth  in  U.S.  incomes 
and  production,  the  U.S.  market  for 
foreign  goods  expanded  rapidly  during 
1983.  The  value  of  imports  in  the  fourth 
quarter  was  19%  above  a  year  earlier 
and  grew  a  further  13%  in  the  first 
quarter  of  this  year.  This  growth  in- 
duced a  recovery  in  global  international 
trade.  The  strong  dollar  has  substantial- 
ly improved  the  competitive  position  of 
our  trading  partners,  allowing  them  to 
take  advantage  of  the  growth  in  our 
market  and  to  compete  effectively  in 
third-country  markets.  The  widening  of 
the  U.S.  trade  deficit,  estimated  at  a 
$30-billion  increase,  is  a  measure  of  the 
stimulus  provided  to  other  countries. 
Perhaps  as  important  as  this  trade 
stimulus  has  been  the  psychological  im- 
pact of  the  U.S.  recovery.  Even  though 
recession  and  financial  crisis  continue  in 
too  many  countries,  the  United  States 
has  achieved  a  strong  upturn.  Our 
growth  has  strengthened  confidence  and 
has  eased  concern  about  the  world  finan- 
cial system. 


The  U.S.  recovery  seems  likely  to 
continue  to  be  robust  throughout  1984. 
Consumer  confidence  is  high  and,  ac- 
cording to  recent  surveys,  businesses 
plan  the  largest  real  increase  in  invest- 
ment spending  since  1977— over  9%. 
Real  output  grew  9.7%  in  the  first 
quarter.  The  preliminary  estimate  of 
real  GNP  [gross  national  product]  in- 
dicates growth  in  the  second  quarter  at 
the  more  sustainable  rate  of  .5.7%.  We 
expect  that  growth  will  continue  at  a 
moderate  and  sustainable  pace  for  the 
rest  of  the  year. 

Except  for  Canada,  whose  recovery 
has  paralleled  that  in  the  United  States, 
the  upturn  in  the  rest  of  the  industrial- 
ized economies  has  been  less  vigorous 
than  in  the  United  States.  Nevertheless, 
there  is  increasing  evidence  that  the  rest 
of  the  industrialized  world  is  recovering. 

The  strength  of  this  recovery  varies, 
of  course,  from  country  to  country. 
Growth  is  greatest  in  those  economies 
which  have  taken  prompt  and  effective 
action  against  inflation.  In  Japan,  where 
inflation  in  consumer  prices  has  been 
only  about  2%,  growth  is  estimated  to 
have  been  about  4. .5%  from  the  fourth 
quarter  of  1982  to  the  fourth  quarter  of 
1983.  Both  Japan  and  Canada  benefit 
from  rapid  growth  of  their  exports  to 
the  United  States  and  should  sustain 
strong  growth  in  1984.  In  Europe, 
growth  improved  in  1983,  notably  in 
Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom,  but 
was  still  disappointing.  Germany,  which 
has  brought  down  its  inflation  rate  to 
about  3%,  had  a  rather  sluggish 
recovery  in  1983  of  3%i,  but  probably 
will  grow  more  than  3%  this  year. 
Europe's  relative  slowness  to  recover 
reflects,  in  large  measure,  the  continu- 
ing problems  of  France.  The  French 
economy  should  start  to  grow  this  year, 
so  the  growth  of  Europe  as  a  whole 
should  strengthen  in  1984.  The  OECD 
[Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development]  now  expects  Euro- 
pean growth  to  reach  2.25%  this  year, 
up  more  than  one  percentage  point  from 
last  year. 

Just  as  the  recovery  in  the  in- 
du.strialized  economies  has  been  based 
on  success  in  reducing  inflation,  so  our 
ability  to  sustain  it  will  depend  on  suc- 
cess in  keeping  inflation  from  ac- 
celerating again.  The  signs  so  far  are 
good.  U.S.  consumer  prices  have  risen 
by  only  about  4.5%  in  the  last  12 
months,  only  one  percentage  point  above 
the  previous  12  months  and  far  below 
the  double-digit  rates  of  increase  in  1979 


and  1980.  The  low  rate  of  inflation  dur- 
ing the  past  year  has  been  reinforced  by 
falling  energy  prices  and  agricultural 
prices.  The  inflation  rate  for  other  good 
and  services  is  about  5%,  a  level  we  ex- 
pect to  see  during  the  remainder  of 
1984.  With  a  stable  monetary  policy 
keeping  expansion  under  control,  con- 
tinued moderation  in  the  growth  of 
wage  rates  and  further  good  perfor-      < 
mance  in  productivity  should  help  keep 
inflation  down. 

The  outlook  for  inflation  in  the  rest 
of  the  OECD  is  similarly  good.  Even  the 
high-inflation  countries,  notably  Italy 
and  France,  are  showing  significant  im^ 
provements.  Consumer  prices  for  the 
OECD  as  a  whole  are  expected  to  con- 
tinue to  advance  at  about  a  5%  pace  i 
1984. 

Another  factor  affecting  the  •"' 

economic  outlook  will  be  the  exchange 
rate  of  the  dollar.  Recent  movements  iff 
this  rate  have  been  dominated  by  inter- 
national capital  movements.  With  net  in 
ternational  capital  flows  swinging  sharp 
ly  toward  the  United  States  in  1983,  th( 
dollar  appreciated  further  despite  a 
widening  deficit  in  both  trade  and  cur- 
rent account.  The  trade-weighted 
average  value  of  the  dollar  rose  during 
the  year  to  a  fourth  quarter  level  6.5% 
above  a  year  earlier  and  26.5%  above 
1981.  (Adjusted  for  differences  among 
countries  in  rates  of  inflation,  the  corref' 
sponding  increases  were  4.5%  and 
20.3%.)  There  is,  however,  a  good  deal 
of  doubt  that  the  present  level  of  the 
dollar  will  persist,  in  view  of  the  pros-   ^ 
pects  for  a  further  widening  of  the  U.S 
deficit  on  current  account. 

If  the  value  of  the  dollar  should 
fall — and  far  be  it  from  me  to  predict 
whether  it  will  or  will  not — the  effect  1 
the  world  economic  outlook  would  be 
mixed.  For  the  United  States,  our  inte 
national  competitiveness  would  be  im- 
proved, stimulating  our  exports  and       ]> 
products  which  compete  with  imports.  ¥■ 
Our  prices,  however,  would  rise  faster  P! 
for  a  while.  In  the  other  industrialized  •' 
countries,  efforts  against  inflation  wou 
be  assisted  by  a  fall  in  the  dollar,  but 
they  would  need  to  rely  more  on 
domestic  demand  and  less  on  their  ex-  im- 
ports for  their  growth.  On  balance,  an 
orderly  decline  of  the  dollar  would  prol  ^ 
ably  not  affect  the  size  of  the  recovery*  ^ 
in  the  industrialized  countries  much,  bHfPl 
it  would  affect  its  composition. 

The.se  facts  that  I  have  cited  show 
the  U.S.  recovery  is  strong  and  sustair 
able,  that  recovery  is  spreading  throug 
the  world,  and  that  trends  in  interna- 
tional trade  are  encouraging. 


ffli 

6. 

11 


« 


ECONOMICS 


'ects  on  Developing  Countries 

lat  will  be  the  effects  of  recovery  on 
'eloping  countries?  Obviously,  the 
overy  in  the  industrialized  world 
jhtens  prospects  considerably  for  the 
feloping  countries.  A  number  of  these 
mtries  have  had  severe  debt  problems 
1  have  had  to  make  major  ad- 
tments  in  imports  to  deal  with  their 
incial  crises.  Non-oil  developing  coun- 
is  are  estimated  to  have  cut  their  cur- 

t  account  deficits  by  about  $20  billion 
t  year.  A  major  contributor  to  the  im- 
ivement  was  the  gain  in  these  coun- 
!s'  trade  balance  with  the  United 
ites— about  $13  billion.  About  $9 
ion  of  this  was  due  to  increased  ex- 
"ts  to  the  United  States.  The  trade 
ance  between  the  United  States  and 
ile,  for  example,  moved  from  $837 
lion  in  favor  of  the  United  States  in 
^0  to  $241  million  in  favor  of  Chile  in 
^3. 

The  IMF  [International  Monetary 
nd],  assuming  only  a  moderate  4.25% 
«  of  growth  for  the  industrialized 
)nomies  in  1984,  projects  growth  in 

dollar  value  of  their  imports  to  be 
)ut  7.5%,  in  sharp  contrast  to  declines 
I  the  previous  4  years.  Exports  of  non- 
( developing  countries  are  expected  to 
jrease  about  10.3%  in  1984.  The 
length  in  the  U.S.  economy,  which  is 
Ich  greater  than  was  anticipated,  may 
ike  this  figure  even  higher.  Although 
mansion  in  a  number  of  developing 
I  mtries  will  be  limited  by  financial  con- 
laints  and  the  need  for  further  ad- 
[  tments  of  their  policies,  on  the  whole 
I  )wth  should  improve  this  year.  The 
3st  estimates  by  the  World  Bank  are 
it  growth  in  the  developing  countries 
a  whole  will  rise  to  about  3.75%  in 
■84,  compared  to  less  than  1%  last 
iiir.  As  you  know,  growth  in  Chile— 
lich  was  a  negative  0.8%  last  year— is 
ejected  by  the  Chilean  Government  to 
in  the  4%-5%  range  in  real  terms 
s  year.  Thus,  prospects  are  bright  for 
v^eloping  countries  overall— at  least  for 
)se  with  sound  economic  policies. 

If  the  global  recovery  is  to  be  sus- 
ned  and  strengthened,  steady,  non- 
lationary  growth  within  individual 
entries  is  required.  The  United  States 
s  made  substantial  strides,  but  we  still 
ve  more  to  be  accomplished.  For  ex- 
iple,  the  United  States  needs  to  cut  its 
cal  deficits,  as  do  many  other  coun- 
es.  European  countries,  in  particular, 
n  improve  their  prospects  by  increas- 
j  the  flexibility  of  their  labor  markets. 
1  countries  need  to  establish  credible, 
ninflationary  monetary  policies.  Many 
veloping  countries  need  to  free  up 


their  economic  structures,  adopt  realistic 
exchange  rates,  and  encourage  redeploy- 
ment of  resources  to  the  foreign  trade 
sector. 

Effects  on  International 
Indebtedness 

In  conclusion,  some  remarks  about  inter- 
national indebtedness.  In  the  latter  part 
of  1982,  major  international  debt  prob- 
lems came  to  a  head.  There  was  wide- 
spread fear  of  defaults  which  would  lead 
to  grave  damage  to  the  world  financial 
system.  But  these  difficult  problems 
have  been  managed  through  interna- 
tional cooperation  involving  debtor  and 
creditor  governments,  private  lending 
institutions,  and  the  International 
Monetary  Fund. 

Countries  with  heavy  burdens  of 
debt  service  may  have  prolonged  periods 
of  adjustment  ahead.  We  believe,  how- 
ever, that  the  worst  of  the  world  debt 
problems  may  be  behind  us.  We  have 
proven  that  the  major  industrialized  na- 
tions, working  in  cooperation  with  the 
IMF  and  major  international  banks,  are 
able  to  coordinate  their  policies  to  assist 
those  nations  unable  to  service  their 
debts. 

For  their  part,  many  debtor  coun- 
tries have  shown  the  ability  and  will  to 
act  responsibly  and  to  take  appropriate 
action  to  redress  their  balance-of- 
payments  positions.  Chile,  of  course,  is 
among  the  countries  in  this  category. 
We  are  seeing  significant  reductions  in 
the  current  account  deficits  of  many  na- 
tions, with  the  total  current  account 
deficits  of  non-oil  developing  countries 
having  been  cut  very  substantially  from 
1982  and  1983.  In  the  case  of  Chile,  the 
current  account  deficit  was  slashed  from 
almost  $5  billion  in  1981  to  about  $1 
billion  in  1983.  With  the  IMF  quota  in- 
crease now  in  place,  establishment  of  en- 
larged general  arrangements  to  borrow, 
and  the  provision  of  new  loans  to  the 
IMF  by  members  of  the  Bank  for  Inter- 
national Settlements  and  Saudi  Arabia, 
we  are  pleased  to  see  that  the  IMF  has 
been  adequately  financed  to  conduct  its 
important  task. 

We  are  now  entering  what  I  hope 
will  be  the  final  phase  of  the  debt  prob- 
lem. It  is  in  this  phase  that  the  debtor 
countries  will  have  to  work  out  their 
debt  problems  and  resume  reasonable 
rates  of  economic  growth. 

This  phase  will  require  action  by 
both  debtors  and  creditors  in  a  number 
of  areas,  including: 


First,  the  continued  application  of 
now-established  procedures  to  assist 
those  countries  whose  debt  problems  are 
just  emerging; 

Second,  continued  adjustment  by 
the  debtor  countries; 

Third,  provision  of  adequate  capital 
inflows  to  those  countries  making  ade- 
quate adjustments,  including  the  import- 
ant provision  of  financing  for  trade; 

Fourth,  continued  economic 
recovery  in  the  industrialized  nations, 
control  of  protectionism,  and  new  ef- 
forts to  liberalize  the  world  trading 
system. 

The  problem  of  excessive  depend- 
ence on  borrowed  capital  can  only  be 
resolved  effectively  by  the  developing 
countries  themselves.  However,  interna- 
tional direct  investment  can  help.  To 
reduce  the  likelihood  of  future  debt 
crises,  foreign  direct  investment  must 
become  a  more  important  source  of 
capital  for  the  developing  countries. 

I  remain  confident  that  we  will  be 
able  to  respond  to  emerging  debt  prob- 
lems. Procedures  for  dealing  with  these 
problems  are  in  place  and  the  members 
of  the  international  financial  system, 
both  governments  and  commercial 
banks,  have  shown  the  necessary  resolve 
and  flexibility.  Economic  readjustment  is 
difficult  and  expensive  but  the  economic 
future  of  most  major  developing  coun- 
tries is  bright  if  they  follow  appropriate 
policies.  Both  they  and  we  have  a  stake 
in  the  preservation  and  strengthening  of 
the  international  financial  system,  which 
can  serve  as  an  efficient  global  allocator 
of  investment  funds. 

Conclusion 

In  summary,  worldwide  economic 
recovery  is  under  way,  led  by  the  strong 
recovery  in  the  United  States.  World 
trade  is  expanding.  The  benefits  are 
spreading  to  the  developing  countries. 
Those  with  market-oriented  development 
policies  are  receiving  the  greatest 
benefits  from  the  expansion  and  will 
continue  to  do  so.  The  problems  of  pro- 
tectionism and  indebtedness  pose 
challenging  tests  to  both  the  developed 
and  developing  countries.  These  tests 
can  best  be  met  by  cooperation  and 
negotiation.  The  challenges  of  sustaining 
growth  in  the  world  economy  do  not  re- 
quire us  to  devise  radical  new  economic 
instruments  or  strategies.  What  is 
needed  is  an  application  of  sound 
economic  principles,  good  sense,  and  a 
great  deal  of  patience.  ■ 


ECONOMICS 


The  Bretton  Woods  Legacy: 
Its  Continuing  Relevance 


by  Richard  T.  McCormack 

Address  at  a  conference  com- 
Tnemorating  the  J,Oth  anniversary  of  the 
signing  of  the  Bretton  Woodx  agreements 
in  Bretton  Woods,  New  Hampshire,  on 
July  13,  198i.  Mr.  McCormack  is  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  Economic  and 
BusiTiess  Affairs. 

I  am  here  today  to  acknowledge  the 
debt  of  people  of  my  generation  to  the 
work  done  here  40  years  ago.  My 
generation  has  never  known  soup  kitch- 
ens or  bread  lines  or  depression  of  the 
type  experienced  in  the  1930s.  This  is 
due  in  no  small  part  to  the  outstanding 
work  that  was  done  here  in  setting  up 
an  international  monetary  system 
toward  the  end  of  the  Second  World 
War. 

Forty  years  ago,  a  group  of 
distinguished  and  farsighted  men 
erected  what  has  become  a  living 
historical  landmark  of  international 
economic  cooperation.  The  structure 
they  erected  enabled  the  world  economy 
to  achieve  an  unprecedented  four 
decades  of  reconstruction,  growth,  and 
change.  Today,  the  Bretton  Woods  in- 
stitutions, having  proven  both  resilient 
and  flexible,  are  in  the  forefront  of  our 
efforts  to  resolve  current  international 
economic  problems. 

Some  of  those  who  helped  to  build 
this  structure  40  years  ago  are  here 
tonight.  We  pay  tribute  to  them  and 
their  fellow  architects  and  salute  the 
men  and  women  who,  over  the  subse- 
quent 40  years,  worked  within  and  built 
upon  the  foundation  laid  down  here. 

The  wisdom  and  farsightedness  of 
the  architects  of  Bretton  Woods  are  the 
more  remarkable  when  we  consider  the 
background  against  which  they  labored. 
It  is  sometimes  noted  that  their  con- 
ference took  place  soon  after  the  landing 
of  the  Allied  forces  in  Normandy.  But, 
as  you  know,  the  gestation  period  of  the 
Bretton  Woods  structure  began  earlier, 
when  the  alliance  was  struggling  for  its 
very  survival.  Remarkably,  despite 
preoccupation  with  the  course  of  the 
war,  these  men  were  able  to  look  to  the 
future  and  to  see  that  a  totally  new 
cooperative  international  monetary  and 


financial  structure  was  needed  to  rebuild 
the  world  economy  and  secure  a  lasting 
peace. 

Developing  a  Stable 
Monetary  Order 

What  did  the  Bretton  Woods  founders 
believe  they  had  accomplished?  How  suc- 
cessful were  they?  What  elements  of 
their  design  are  most  relevant  to  our 
concerns  today?  Let  me  begin  with  the 
quote  from  U.S.  Treasury  Secretary 
Morgenthau  reproduced  in  our  program: 
"What  we  have  done  here  in  Bretton 
Woods,"  Morgenthau  said,  "is  to  devise 
machinery  by  which  men  and  women 
everywhere  can  freely  exchange,  on  a 
fair  and  stable  basis,  the  goods  which 
they  produce  with  their  labor."  A  com- 
monplace observation?  Perhaps  it  seems 
so  today.  But  compare  the  ideal  to  the 
then-existing  reality. 

The  interwar  period  had  left  interna- 
tional economic  intercourse  in  virtual 
anarchy,  with  countries  attempting  to 
defend  themselves  against  external 
shocks  (and,  indeed,  to  export  their 
unemployment  to  others)  through  all 
kinds  of  devices— exchange  rate 
manipulation,  multiple  rates  and  ex- 
change controls  of  various  kinds,  import 
barriers,  and  restrictive  bilateral 
agreements.  In  this  context,  Morgen- 
thau's  simple  claim  must  have  seemed 
visionary  indeed. 

The  first  order  of  business,  then, 
was  to  bring  countries  together  in  a 
structure  that  would  substitute  stability, 
cooperation,  and  open  markets  for  the 
existing  chaos.  At  the  same  time  the 
founders  wanted  to  leave  individual 
countries  scope  to  pursue  their 
legitimate  individual  economic  objec- 
tives. Balancing  these  two  goals- 
discipline  and  cooperation  versus 
freedom  of  action— was  one  of  the  most 
fundamental  and  difficult  problems  fac- 
ing the  negotiators  40  years  ago. 

The  Bretton  Woods  founders  be- 
lieved that  these  goals  could  best  be 
reconciled  within  a  system  of  fixed  but 
adjustable  exchange  rates.  They  had 
very  much  in  mind  the  experience  of  the 
interwar  period  with  its  turbulent  spells 
of  flexible  exchange  rates  and  "beggar- 
thy-neighbor"  devaluations.  Therefore,  in 
their  system,  countries  were  committed 
to  the  maintenance  of  exchange  rates 
within  narrow  margins  around  agreed 


t( 


lei 


parities,  and  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  was  to  exercise  discipline 
over  changes  in  these  parities. 

Did  Bretton  Woods  Fail?  ' 

Although  this  exchange  rate  structure 
provided  the  foundation  for  the  world's 
monetary  system  for  almost  30  years,  it 
is  now  generally  believed  to  have  had 
fatal  defects  which  caused  it  to  be  aban^ 
doned  by  the  major  countries  a  little 
more  than  a  decade  ago— in  practice,  in 
1973;  in  law,  with  the  second  amend- 
ment to  the  IMF  articles  in  1976. 

Many  learned  writers  have  written 
countless  pages  on  the  reasons  why  this 
happened.  The  consensus,  as  I  under- 
stand it,  is  that  the  system  proved  in 
practice  to  be  too  rigid  in  the  face  of 
changing  conditions.  Currency  conver- 
tibility, fixed  exchange  rates,  and  in- 
dependent national  macroeconomic 
policies  become  increasingly  inconsistent 
with  growing  economic  interdependence 
The  Bretton  Woods  escape  hatch— ad- 
justment through  major  exchange  rate 
realignments  only  after  fundamental 
disequilibrium  had  clearly  emerged— 
proved  unworkable  in  a  world  economy 
where  vast  amounts  of  capital  can  move 
relatively  freely  across  the  exchange 
markets  to  hedge  or  speculate  on  an  an- 
ticipated realignment. 

Of  course,  the  Bretton  Woods 
founders  did  not  foresee— they  could  no 
reasonably  have  foreseen— the  vast  in- 
crease in  funds  free  to  cross  and  recrosi 
national  borders  over  the  postwar 
decades.  And  it  is  clear  at  least  some  of 
them  gave  far  less  weight  to  the  benefit 
of  free  capital  movement  than  to  those 
of  free  trade.  To  their  credit,  the 
founders  viewed  their  arrangements  as 
experimental,  not  immutable.  If 
anything,  those  who  followed  ought 
probably  to  have  modified  the  system  a> 
an  earlier  stage,  before  it  collapsed. 

Did  the  collapse  of  the  Bretton 
Woods  exchange  rate  system  signify 
that  the  founders  failed  in  their  efforts 
to  construct  an  international  monetary 
system?  In  terms  of  their  most  funda- 
mental objectives,  the  answer  is  no,  the  ^ 
did  not  fail. 

After  all,  the  original  exchange  rat«j«r 
system  provided  sufficient  stability  and' 
confidence  over  a  quarter  century  so 
that  nations  could  move  from  the 
chaotic,  restrictive,  prewar  system  to 
successively  greater  currency  conver- 
tibility, vastly  reduced  barriers  to  the 
flow  of  goods  and  services,  and  freer 
capital  movements.  Largely  under  the 
aegis  of  the  IMF,  the  major  trading 


1 


« 


B 


ECONOMICS 


mntries  of  the  world  have  adopted  a 
igime  of  free  financial  flows  among  na- 
ons.  These  developments  together  pro- 
ded  the  foundation  for  a  rapid  expan- 
on  of  trade  and  interdependence,  in 
irn  helping  to  produce  an  astonishing 
jcovery  from  war  and  a  sustained  in- 

ease  in  production  and  material  well- 
sing.  The  removal  of  exchange  controls 

accord  with  the  Fund's  articles  has 
;en  instrumental  in  achieving  the  six- 
)ld  increase  in  world  trade  (in  real 

rms)  that  has  occurred  since  the  end 
:  European  reconstruction  in  1953. 
conomists,  of  course,  complain  about 
le  misallocatlon  of  resources  which  oc- 
irred  with  the  growing  exchange  rate 
lisalignments  of  the  latter  part  of  the 
eriod;  these  misalignments  reflected 
iir  failure  to  introduce  more  flexibility 
ito  the  operation  of  the  system  as  con- 
itions  changed. 

Even  more  important,  gains  from 
lat  earlier  period — convertibility  and 
pen  markets — were  not  lost  as  the 
/stem  was  transformed  by  the  force 
ajeure  of  the  marketplace  to  a  more 
exible  exchange  rate  system.  Compare 
lis  evolution  with  the  monetary 
isintegration  of  the  interwar  period, 
ad  you  will  see  clearly  the  lasting 
snefits  of  Bretton  Woods.  The  fun- 
amental  principles  of  international 
lonetary  cooperation  survived  and  are 
;ill  operating  as  we  work  to  improve 
ir  economic  performance  with  the 
resent  exchange  rate  arrangements, 
he  principles  that  exchange  rates  and 
ther  international  monetary  issues  are 
matter  for  mutual  concern,  not 
nilateral  decisions;  stable  domestic 
olicies  are  fundamental  to  international 
lonetary  stability;  and  that  the  reper- 
jssions  of  one  country's  policies  on 
nother  country's  well-being  cannot  be 
piored  are  still  the  core  of  our  present 
ystem.  This  is  one  lasting  legacy — more 
nportant  than  the  details  of  any  ex- 
hange  rate  system — that  the  Bretton 
W^oods  founders  left  us. 

'he  IMF  and  the  Debt  Crisis 

"hey  also  left  us  with  an  institu- 
ion — the  IMF — that  is  at  the  center  of 
ur  efforts  to  deal  with  current  interna- 
ional  financial  problems. 

In  recent  years  nations  all  over  the 
/orld  have  found  their  efforts  to 
fianage  their  economic  affairs  swamped 
>y  a  unique  combination  of  adverse  cir- 
umstances — dramatically  increased  oil 
)rices  followed  by  worldwide  inflation,  a 
:ollapse  in  commodity  prices,  the  worst 


world  recession  since  the  1930s,  and 
historically  very  high  interest  rates. 
Wien  oil  prices  shot  up,  the  first  reac- 
tion of  oil-importing  developing  coun- 
tries was  to  borrow  to  stave  off  im- 
mediate economic  dislocation.  And  with 
liquidity  abundant  and  real  interest  rates 
low  or  negative  in  the  late  1970s,  they 
continued  to  borrow.  Tlius,  by  the  end  of 
1982,  when  the  crisis  peaked,  their  in- 
debtedness had  reached  $600  billion, 
having  quadrupled  in  a  decade.  At  that 
point,  we  were  confronted  with  a 
widespread  debt  crisis,  as  nation  after 
nation  sought  IMF  assistance  and  debt 
relief. 

Some  observers  argue  that  the  Fund 
began  to  take  on  a  new  role  in  this 
crisis,  that  of  financial  organizer  for 
troubled  debtor  nations.  Indeed,  for  a 
troubled  world,  I  know  for  certain  that 
it  has  become  the  linchpin  of  our 
strategy  for  dealing  with  this  crisis,  a 
strategy  endorsed  last  year  by  the 
Williamsburg  summit.  "The  IMF  is 


crucial  to  four  of  the  basic  elements  of 
that  strategy  and  closely  related  to  the 
fifth. 

First,  the  Fund  obviously  provides 
its  financial  support  to  troubled  nations. 

Second,  it  is  the  one  institution  with 
the  expertise,  experience,  and  interna- 
tional acceptance  to  encourage  and 
guide  debtor  governments  toward  sound 
adjustment  of  their  domestic  economies 
to  the  new  world  realities.  Such  an  ad- 
justment program  is  unquestionably  the 
most  vital  step  in  addressing  a  country's 
financial  crisis,  because  it  sets  the 
economy  on  a  sustainable  economic  path 
for  the  future. 

Third,  emergency  official  lending  to 
debtor  nations  is  almost  invariably 
bridged  to  an  approved  IMF  program. 

Fourth,  adequate  continuing  flows 
of  commercial  bank  financing,  especially 
following  a  crisis,  require  the  im- 
primatur and,  increasingly,  the  en- 
couragement of  the  IMF;  later  such 
flows  depend  crucially  on  the  success  of 


Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic 
and  Business  Affairs 


Richard  T.  McCormack  was  born  in  Bradford, 
Penn..  on  March  6,  1941.  He  received  his 
B.A.  degree  from  Georgetown  University  in 
1963  and  Ph.D.  magna  cum  laude  from  the 
University  of  Fribourg  in  Switzerland  (1966). 

Mr.  McCormack  began  his  career  as  a 
staff  member  of  the  Peace  Corps  and  has 
been  a  consultant  to  a  number  of  other  U.S. 
Government  agencies  and  private  corpora- 
tions. 

From  1969  to  1971,  he  served  at  the  Ex- 
ecutive Office  of  the  President  in  a  number  of 
capacities.  As  a  senior  staff  member  of  the 
President's  Advisory  Council  on  Executive 
Organization,  he  was  responsible  for  drawing 
up  the  plans  for  the  subsequently  established 
White  House  Council  on  International 
Economic  Policy.  Mr.  McCormack  also  served 
as  special  assistant  to  former  Governor 
William  Scranton  at  the  INTELSAT  negotia- 
tions at  the  State  Department  in  early  1969. 
He  was  at  the  American  Enterprise  Institute 
from  1975  to  1977. 

In  1977  Mr.  McCormack  was  deputy  to 
the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for 
International  Economic  Affairs.  Following  his 
tenure  at  the  Treasury,  he  was  a  consultant 
to  the  White  House  office  of  the  Special 
Trade  Representative,  where  he  analyzed 
potential  international  commodity 
agreements. 

From  1979  to  1981,  Mr.  McCormack 
served  as  a  legislative  assistant  to  Senator 
Jesse  Helms.  And  from  December  1981  until 
his  confirmation  by  the  Senate,  he  was  a  con- 
sultant to  the  Department  of  State  on  inter- 
national economic  matters. 


-^miltt^^\ 


(Department  of  State  photo) 

He  was  sworn  in  as  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Economic  and  Business  Affairs  in 
February  1983. 

Mr.  McCormack  is  the  author  of  Asians 
in  Kenya  and  a  number  of  other  articles  and 
monographs  on  foreign  affairs.  ■ 


ECONOMICS 


the  IMF-supported  adjustment  program. 
(I  might  add  that  debt  reschedulings, 
both  official  and  private,  also  necessitate 
the  assurance  of  eventual  repayment 
provided  by  a  sound  IMF  program.) 

The  fifth  element  of  the  debt 
strategy— strong  industrialized-country 
economic  recovery  with  open  markets— 
obviously  is  not  the  direct  responsibility 
of  the  IMF.  Nevertheless,  it  is  of  great 
significance  to  the  success  of  the  Fund's 
objectives,  and  I  can  assure  you  that  the 
Fund's  managing  director,  for  one,  has 
not  been  timid  about  making  his  views 
known  to  the  industrialized  nations 
whose  policies  govern  the  course  and 
strength  of  the  recovery. 

Thus,  it  is  clear  that  the  Fund  has 
become  "a"  and  perhaps  "the"  key  actor 
in  managing  the  debt  crisis.  Certainly  in 
handling  this  grave  problem  it  provides 
an  invaluable  tool  which  we  would  in  all 
probability  have  to  create  ourselves  if 
the  Bretton  Woods  participants  had  not 
had  the  foresight  to  do  it  for  us. 

Finally,  if  the  performance  under 
the  current  e.xchange  rate  system  is  to 
be  improved,  then  we  must  have  greater 
convergence  in  economic  performance 
among  major  countries  toward  more 
stable  and  noninflationary  economic 
growth  in  the  interests  not  only  of  the 
domestic  economy  but  the  international 
economy.  The  Fund  must  have  a  central 
role  in  this  effort.  In  particular,  we  are 
trying  to  strengthen  the  process  of  Fund 
surveillance  over  all  countries' 
policies— not  just  those  in  debt  to  the 
Fund.  The  Fund  will  certainly  be  cen- 
trally involved  in  any  future  evolution  of 
the  system. 

The  IBRD  and  Changing 
Development  Needs 

Let  me  return  now  to  Secretary 
Morgenthau's  statement.  He  went  on  to 
say  that:  "We  have  taken  the  initial 
steps  through  which  the  nations  of  the 
world  will  be  able  to  help  one  another  in 
economic  development  to  their  mutual 
advantage  and  further  enrichment  of 
all."  He  was  talking,  of  course,  about  the 
second  Bretton  Woods  institution,  the 
International  Bank  for  Reconstruction 
and  Development  (IBRD  or  World 
Bank),  whose  primary  objective  would 
be  to  provide  or  support  long-term  loans 
for  the  reconstruction  of  Europe  and  the 
development  of  low-income  countries. 
The  IBRD,  of  course,  was  never  in- 
tended to  supersede  private  investment 
but  to  stimulate  or  supplement  the 
financing  of  specific  projects  that  could 
not  be  privately  funded. 


In  the  event,  the  magnitude  of 
postwar  reconstruction  turned  out  to  be 
beyond  the  resources  of  the  IBRD.  With 
this  job  largely  taken  over  by  the  Mar- 
shall Plan,  the  Bank  turned  its  attention 
to  the  problems  of  the  developing  world. 

Over  the  years  the  Bank  has 
responded  to  the  changing  needs  of  both 
its  borrowing  and  lending  members.  For 
example,  once  focusing  on  capital  in- 
frastructure projects  such  as  roads, 
railways,  and  telecommunications,  the 
Bank  now  pays  greater  attention  to 
social  infrastructure  needs  and  to  those 
investments  which  directly  affect  the 
population  and  serve  to  make  them 
more  productive.  Institutionally,  too,  the 
IBRD  has  evolved  to  meet  the  man- 
power training  needs  of  borrowers.  In 

1955  the  World  Bank  created  the 
Economic  Development  Institute  to  pro- 
mote education  and  training.  Then  in 

1956  the  International  Finance  Corpora- 
tion (IFC)  was  established  to  promote 
growth  in  the  private  sector  and  to 
mobilize  domestic  and  foreign  capital  for 
this  purpose. 

In  1960,  specifically  to  meet  the 
development  needs  of  the  poorer  bor- 
rowers and  to  lend  to  them  on  terms 
that  would  bear  less  heavily  on  their 
balances  of  payments,  the  International 
Development  Association  (IDA)  was 
established;  the  following  year  the  IFC 
articles  were  amended  to  allow  that 
agency  to  make  equity  investments. 

To  address  the  dynamic  complexities 
of  an  interdependent  world  economy, 
the  Boards  of  Governors  of  the  World 
Bank  and  the  IMF  established  in  1974  a 
Joint  Ministerial  Committee  on  the 
Transfer  of  Real  Resources  to  Develop- 
ing Countries,  better  known  as  the 
Development  Committee.  Today  this 
committee  through  task  forces  is  pro- 
viding a  forum  to  examine  both  conces- 
sional and  nonconcessional  flows  to 
developing  nations  and  to  look  at  the  ef- 
fective use  of  those  resources.  The  com- 
mittee is  also  the  focus  of  informed 
debate  over  the  importance  of  trade  to 
growth  in  developing  countries. 

Confronted  in  the  1970s  with  an  in- 
ternational debt  crisis,  the  World  Bank 
has  already  accomplished  much  to 
alleviate  development  problems  and  to 
assist  its  borrowing  members  to  manage 
their  economies. 

For  example,  since  1980,  a 
remarkably  short  time  for  a  multilateral 
institution,  the  World  Bank  has,  among 
other  activities: 

•  Initiated  the  structural  adjustment 
loan  to  support  programs  in  developing 
countries  for  specific  policy  changes  and 
institutional  reforms  designed  to  achieve 
a  more  efficient  use  of  resources; 


ir 


1 


•  Increased  soft  project  lending; 

•  Developed  and  implemented  a 
special  action  program  to  provide  finan- 
cial measures  and  policy  advice  for  coun 
tries  already  pursuing  appropriate 
policies; 

•  Emphasized  the  needs  of  sub- 
Saharan  Africa — lending  to  sub-Saharan  \}\ 
Africa  was  more  than  30%  of  fiscal  year 
1981-83  lending;  and 

•  Developed  and  implemented  the 
"B"  Loan,  designed  to  increase  commer- 
cial bank  participation  in  less  credit- 
worthy nations. 

Even  with  these  and  other  recent 
changes,  however,  the  Bank  recognizes 
more  may  need  to  be  done.  Despite  the 
fact  that  the  current  international  situa- 
tion is  improving,  recovery  is  only  slowly 
coming  to  the  Bank's  less  developed 
members.  The  Bank  is  concerned  that 
the  need  for  internal  borrower  reforms 
together  with  unpredictable  external 
conditions  beyond  the  control  of  bor- 
rowers may  make  debt  management  and 
continued  development  of  borrowers 
highly  tentative. 

Beyond  considering  additional 
mechanisms  to  assist  borrowers,  the 
Bank  is  reexamining  its  coordination 
with  the  IMF.  Bank  use  of  structural  ad 
justment  loans,  increased  nonproject 
lending,  and  the  longer  term  IMF  in- 
volvement with  countries  has  blurred 
the  distinctions  between  its  activities 
and  those  of  the  IMF.  Although  there 
always  has  been  good  coordination  be- 
tween the  two  institutions,  their  chang- 
ing roles  underline  a  need  for 
strengthening  Bank-Fund  coordination. 

The  Bank  is  working  to  meet  these 
challenges.  Specifically,  it  is  now  con- 
ducting a  review  of  its  current  activities 
their  effectiveness,  and  possible  future 
actions.  Management  plans,  I  under- 
stand, to  present  a  coherent  plan  of  ac- 
tion on  the  future  role  of  the  Bank  in 
the  spring  of  1985.  With  the  Bank's 
history,  I  believe  we  can  confidently  e.\- 
pect  the  Bank  will  continue  to  meet  the 
challenges  presented  by  a  dynamic  worl 
economy. 

Conclusion 

We  are  here  celebrating  the  achievemei 
of  the  drafters  of  the  pathbreaking  Bre 
ton  Woods  agreements,  which  have  con 
stituted  an  essential  foundation  for 
postwar  economic  cooperation.  I  have 
reviewed  some  of  the  major  ac- 
complishments of  these  institutions, 
which  have  been  indispensable  for  the 
enormous  economic  gains  we  have 
achieved  in  the  past  four  decades.  I  ha\ 
also  mentioned  some  of  the  ways  in 


} 


UROPE 


liich  these  institutions  are  moving  to 
eet  the  critical  challenges  of  today.  We 
list  ensure  that  these  institutions  re- 
nin as  vital  and  effective  in  dealing 
ith  future  problems  as  they  have  been 
:  tlie  past.  We  must  also  rededicate 
ill-selves  to  the  task  of  building  public 
;i|i|H)rt  for  these  institutions  and  their 
iijrctives.  For  if  they  have  been  vital  to 


managing  the  expansion  of  the  world 
economy  over  the  past  40  years,  we  can 
be  sure  that  they  will  be  even  more  im- 
perative in  our  increasingly  interdepen- 
dent world  economy  of  the  future.  This, 
more  than  anything  else,  is  the  tribute 
we  owe  to  the  founders  of  Bretton 
Woods.  ■ 


J.S.-Soviet  Bilateral  Relations 


RESIDENTS  REMARKS, 

JNE  27,  1984' 

rs.  Billington,  Hamburg,  Ellison,  and 
ihnson  thank  you  for  bringing  your 
stinguished  group  to  the  White  House, 
"hen  I  heard  that  you  would  be 
eeting  at  the  Smithsonian  to  discuss 
.8. -Soviet  exchanges,  I  was  eager  to 
are  my  thoughts  with  you  on  this 
Tiely  and  important  topic. 

First,  I  want  to  congratulate  the 
oodrow  Wilson  Center  and  the 
irnegie  Corporation  of  New  York;  cer- 
inly  nothing  is  more  worthy  of  our  at- 
ntion  than  finding  ways  to  reach  out 
id  establish  better  communication  with 
e  people  and  the  Government  of  the 
)viet  tfnion. 

For  many  months,  I  have  encour- 
■;ed  the  Soviet  Union  to  join  with  us  in 
major  effort  to  see  if  we  could  make 
ogress  in  these  broad  problem  areas: 
ducing  the  threat  and  use  of  force  in 
Iving  international  disputes,  reducing 
jmamants  in  the  world,  and  estab- 
.  hing  a  better  working  relationship 
th  each  other. 

At  the  United  Nations,  at  the 
,.panese  Diet,  at  Georgetown  Universi- 
I ,  and  at  the  Irish  Parliament,  I  have 
I  plained  our  efforts  to  reduce  arms, 
;  .rticularly  nuclear  arms,  and  to 
I  tablish  a  useful  dialogue  on  regional 
iiues.  Let  me  describe  to  you  some  of 
I  e  many  efforts  that  we're  making  to 
tablish  a  better  working  relationship 
ith  the  Soviet  Union. 

We've  informed  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ent  that  we're  prepared  to  initiate 
'gotiations  on  a  new  exchanges  agree- 
ent,  and  we've  completed  our  prepara- 
)ns  for  these  negotiations.  We've 
oposed  to  resume  preparations  to 
)en  consulates  in  New  York  and  Kiev. 
e've  taken  steps  to  revive  our 
freements  for  cooperation  in  en- 
ronmental  protection,  housing,  health. 


and  agriculture.  Activities  under  these 
agreements  have  waned  in  recent  years, 
because  there've  been  no  meetings  of 
their  joint  committees  to  plan  projects. 
We've  proposed  that  preparations  begin 
for  such  meetings  in  order  to  increase 
the  number  of  active  projects. 

We're  in  the  process  of  renewing 
several  bilateral  agreements  that  other- 
wise would  have  expired  this  year.  And 
we've  agreed  to  extend  our  fishing 
agreement  for  18  months,  and  we're 
looking  at  possibilities  to  increase 
cooperation  under  the  terms  of  the 
agreement. 

We've  proposed  that  our  Agreement 
to  Facilitate  Economic,  Industrial  and 
Technical  Cooperation  be  renewed  for 
another  10  years  and  that  preparations 
begin  for  a  meeting  of  our  Joint  Com- 
mercial Commission. 

The  U.S.  Navy  delegation  held  talks 
last  month  with  their  Soviet  counter- 
parts in  accord  with  our  agreement  on 
avoiding  incidents  at  sea.  And  we've 
agreed  to  extend  this  useful  agreement 
for  another  3  years. 

We're  reviewing  the  World  Oceans 
Agreement,  which  has  been  useful  in 
promoting  joint  oceanographic  research, 
and  we'll  give  careful  thought  to  renew- 
ing the  agreement  prior  to  its  expira- 
tion. And  we've  made  proposals  in 
several  other  areas  to  improve  dialogue, 
foster  cooperation,  and  solve  problems. 

We've  proposed  a  fair  and  equitable 
resolution  of  our  differences  on  the 
maritime  boundary  off  Alaska.  We've 
proposed  a  joint  simulated  space  rescue 
mission  in  which  astronauts  and 
cosmonauts  would  carry  out  a  combined 
exercise  in  space  to  develop  techniques 
to  rescue  people  from  malfunctions  in 
space  vehicles.  And  we're  currently  con- 
ducting another  round  of  talks  on  con- 
sular matters,  trying  to  improve  visa 
procedures  and  facilitate  travel  between 
our  two  countries. 

We've  suggested  discussions  be- 
tween the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  and  the 
Soviet  Ministry  of  Merchant  Marine  on 


search  and  rescue  procedures  to  assist 
citizens  of  all  countries  lost  at  sea.  And 
we've  made  progress  in  our  talks  on 
upgrading  the  Hot  Line,  proposing  dis- 
cussions on  potential  nuclear  terrorist 
incidents,  on  establishing  a  joint  military 
communications  line,  and  on  upgrading 
embassy  communications  in  both  coun- 
tries. We've  also  suggested  regular  high- 
level  contacts  between  military  person- 
nel of  our  two  countries. 

So,  as  you  can  see,  we've  offered 
comprehensive  and  sensible  proposals  to 
improve  the  U.S. -Soviet  dialogue  and 
our  working  relationship.  And  if  the 
Soviets  decide  to  join  us,  new  avenues 
would  open,  I  think,  for  your  efforts. 

It's  still  too  early  to  judge  the 
results.  A  few  proposals  are  near  agree- 
ment. Many  others  are  still  under 
discussion,  and  some  have  been  re- 
jected— at  least  for  now. 

Meaningful  contact  with  a  closed 
society  will  never  be  easy.  And  I'm  as 
disturbed  as  you  are  by  recent  reports  of 
new  measures  taken  by  Soviet 
authorities  to  restrict  contacts  between 
Soviet  citizens  and  foreigners.  These 
restrictions  come  on  top  of  intensified 
repression  of  those  brave  Soviet  citizens 
who've  dared  to  express  views  contrary 
to  those  of  the  Soviet  political  elite. 

The  people  of  the  Soviet  Union  pay 
a  heavy  price  for  the  actions  of  their 
government.  In  fact,  we  all  pay  a  price. 
When  the  Soviet  Government  takes 
repressive  actions  against  its  people  and 
attempts  to  seal  them  off  from  the  out- 
side world,  their  own  intellectual  and 
cultural  life  suffers.  At  the  same  time, 
the  rest  of  the  world  is  deprived  of  the 
cultural  riches  of  the  Soviet  people. 
What  would  classical  music  be  without  a 
Tchaikovsky  or  literature  without  a 
Tolstoi  or  chemistry  without  a 
Mendeleev. 

Civilized  people  everywhere  have  a 
stake  in  keeping  contacts,  communica- 
tion, and  creativity  as  broad,  deep,  and 
free  as  possible.  The  Soviet  insistence  on 
sealing  their  people  off  and  on  filtering 
and  controlling  contacts  and  the  flow  of 
information  remains  the  central  prob- 
lem. 

When  Soviet  actions  threaten  the 
peace  or  violate  a  solemn  agreement  or 
trample  on  standards  fundamental  to  a 
civilized  world,  we  cannot  and  will  not 
be  silent.  To  do  so  would  betray  our 
deepest  values.  It  would  violate  our  con- 
science and  ultimately  undermine  world 
stability  and  our  ability  to  keep  the 
peace.  We  must  have  ways  short  of 
military  threats  that  make  it  absolutely 
clear  that  Soviet  actions  do  matter  and 


EUROPE 


that  some  actions  inevitably  affect  the 
quality  of  the  relationship. 

These  reactions  do  lead  to  a 
decrease  in  contacts  with  the  people  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  this  is  a  dilemma. 
However,  our  quarrel  is  not  with  the 
Russian  people,  with  the  Ukrainian  peo- 
ple, or  any  of  the  other  proud  na- 
tionalities in  that  multinational  state.  So, 
we  must  be  careful  in  reacting  to  actions 
by  the  Soviet  Government  not  to  take 
out  our  indignations  on  those  not 
responsible.  And  that's  why  I  feel  that 
we  should  broaden  opportunities  for 
Americans  and  Soviet  citizens  to  get  to 
know  each  other  better. 

But  our  proposals  to  do  that  are  not 
a  signal  that  we  have  forgotten 
Afghanistan.  We'll  continue  to 
demonstrate  our  sympathy  and  strong 
support  for  the  Afghan  people.  The 
United  States  will  support  their  struggle 
to  end  the  Soviet  occupation  and  to 
reestablish  an  independent  and  neutral 
Afghanistan. 

Nor  do  our  proposals  mean  that  we 
will  ignore  violations  of  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act  or  plight  of  Andrei  Sakharov, 
Yelena  Bonner,  Anatoli  Shcharanskiy, 
Yuriy  Orlov,  and  so  many  others.  The 
persecution  of  these  courageous,  noble 
people  weighs  very  heavily  on  our 
hearts.  It  would  be  wrong  to  believe  that 
their  treatment  and  their  fate  will  not 
affect  our  ability  to  increase  cooperation 
It  will,  because  our  conscience  and  that 
of  the  American  people  and  freedom- 


loving  people  everywhere  will  have  it  no 
other  way. 

I  know  these  thoughts  do  not 
resolve  the  dilemma  we  face.  But  it  is  a 
dilemma  for  all  of  us.  And  I'll  value  your 
advice. 

I  don't  think  there's  anything  we're 
encouraging  the  Soviet  leaders  to  do 
that  is  not  as  much  in  their  interest  as  it 
is  in  ours.  If  they're  as  committed  to 
peace  as  they  say,  they  should  join  us 
and  work  with  us.  If  they  sincerely  want 
to  reduce  arms,  there's  no  excuse  for 
refusing  to  talk,  and  if  they  sincerely 
want  to  deal  with  us  as  equals,  they 
shouldn't  try  to  avoid  a  frank  discussion 
of  real  problems. 

Some  say  for  the  Soviet  leaders 
peace  is  not  the  real  issue;  rather,  the 
issue  is  the  attempt  to  spread  their 
dominance  by  using  military  power  as  a 
means  of  intimidation,  and  there  is  much 
evidence  to  support  this  view.  But  it 
should  be  clear  by  now  that  such  a 
strategy  will  not  work.  And  once  they 
realize  this,  maybe  they'll  understand 
they  have  much  to  gain  by  improving 
dialogue,  reducing  arms,  and  solving 
problems. 

The  way  governments  can  best  pro- 
mote contacts  among  people  is  by  not 
standing  in  the  way.  Our  Administration 
will  do  all  we  can  to  stay  out  of  the  way 
and  to  persuade  the  Soviet  Government 
to  do  likewise.  We  know  this  won't  hap- 
pen overnight,  but  if  we're  to  succeed. 


U.S.-Soviet  Consular  Agreement 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  1,  1984' 

On  August  1,  1984,  representatives  of 
the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Moscow  and  the 
Consular  Division  of  the  Soviet  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  exchanged  diplomatic 
notes  concluding  the  latest  round  of  the 
U.S.-Soviet  consular  review  talks.  The 
agreement  brings  to  fruition  a  series  of 
discussions  on  consular  matters  con- 
ducted in  1976,  1979,  1983,  and  1984 
and  resolves  a  number  of  issues  to  visas 
and  the  functioning  of  the  diplomatic 
missions  of  the  two  countries. 

The  issues  involved  were  essentially 
technical  ones,  to  be  resolved  on  the 
basis  of  mutual  benefit.  The  agreement 
will  facilitate  the  travel  of  participants 
in  educational  exchange  programs,  ex- 
pedite the  issuance  of  certain  categories 
of  visas,  and  improve  conditions  for  the 
travel  of  diplomats  in  the  two  countries 


by  allowing  them  to  enter  and  leave 
through  two  additional  cities  beyond  the 
three  currently  provided  for. 

The  talks  were  proposed  by  us  as 
part  of  the  President's  effort  to  expand 
contacts  and  to  move  forward  on 
bilateral  issues  that  can  be  resolved  to 
our  mutual  benefit,  as  he  mentioned  in 
his  June  27  remarks  on  U.S.-Soviet  ex- 
changes, and  it  seemed  to  us  that  the 
Soviet  side  approached  them  in  the  same 
spirit. 

The  U.S.  delegation  was  led  by 
Raymond  F.  Smith,  officer-in-charge  of 
the  Bilateral  Relations  Section  of  the 
Department  of  State's  Office  of  Soviet 
Union  Affairs.  The  Soviet  delegation 
was  headed  by  Ivan  Gorokhov,  Deputy 
Chief  of  the  Consular  Administration  of 
the  Soviet  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affait-s. 


you  must  stay  involved  and  get  more 
Americans  into  wider  and  more  mean- 
ingful contact  with  many  more  Soviet 
citizens. 

It  may  seem  an  impossible  dream  to 
think  there  could  be  a  time  when 
Americans  and  Soviet  citizens  of  all 
walks  of  life  travel  freely  back  and 
forth,  visit  each  other's  homes,  look  up 
friends  and  professional  colleagues, 
work  together  in  all  sorts  of  problems, 
and,  if  they  feel  like  it,  sit  up  all  night 
talking  about  the  meaning  of  life  and  the 
different  ways  to  look  at  the  world. 

In  most  countries  of  the  world,  peo- 
ple take  those  contacts  for  granted.  We 
should  never  accept  the  idea  that 
American  and  Soviet  citizens  cannot  en- 
joy the  same  contacts  and  communica- 
tion. I  don't  believe  it's  an  impossible 
dream,  and  I  don't  think  you  believe 
that,  either. 

Let  me  just  conclude  by  saying 
thank  you,  and  God  bless  you  for  what 
you're  doing. 


WHITE  HOUSE  FACT  SHEET, 
JUNE  27,  19842 

In  his  speech  today  to  participants  in  th 
Smithsonian's  Conference  on  U.S. -Soviet 
Exchanges,  the  President  refers  to 
several  proposals  we  have  made  to 
establish  a  better  working  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  Alan  Romberg.  ■ 


New  Exchanges  Agreement 

We  have  been  discussing  a  new  Genera 
Agreement  on  Contacts,  Exchanges  an 
Cooperation  and  will  present  a  draft  to 
the  Soviets  for  formal  negotiations  in 
the  very  near  future.  The  previous 
agreement,  often  referred  to  as  the 
"Cultural  Agreement,"  lapsed  in  1979. 
was  one  of  a  series  of  2-year  agreemer 
going  back  to  1958.  Our  new  draft 
would  provide  for  resumption  of  officii 
support  for  inter  alia  exchanges  of  m£i 
jor  exhibits,  academic,  cultural,  and 
sports  individuals  and  groups  and  reac 
tivation  of  film  presentations.  The 
American  team  in  the  formal  negotia- 
tions will  be  headed  by  Ambassador 
Arthur  Hartman  in  Moscow. 

New  Consulates  General 

In  1974  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  agreed  to  establish  new 
Consulates  General  in  Kiev  and  New 
York  City.  We  already  have  a  Consult 
General  in  Leningrad  and  the  Soviets 
have  one  in  San  Francisco.  Following 


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EUROPE 


he  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  in 
1979,  the  U.S.  Government  suspended 
;he  agreement  for  new  Consulates 
jeneral.  At  the  time  of  the  suspension, 
ve  had  an  advance  team  in  Kiev  for 
learly  2  years  and  were  approximately  6 
nonths  away  from  officially  opening  the 
onsulate.  The  Soviets  had  a  similar 
«am  in  New  York.  Both  advance  teams 
vere  withdrawn.  Since  that  time,  we 
lave  discussed  the  Consulates  issue  on 
lumerous  occasions,  focusing  over  the 
)ast  year  on  concrete  steps  that  could  be 
aken  to  pave  the  way  for  opening  these 
consulates.  We  have  recently  proposed 
io  move  forward  and  suggested  we  send 
L  team  to  Kiev  to  inspect  available  prop- 
irty. 

Environmental  Protection  Agreement 

The  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Agreement  on 
ooperation  in  Environmental  Protec- 
;ion  was  signed  at  Moscow  on  May  23, 
L972,  by  President  Nixon  and  Chairman 
■'odgorny.  The  agreement  has  been 
enewed  three  times  for  5-year  periods 
ind  is  due  to  expire  May  23,  1987.  Ac- 
ivities  under  the  agreement  have  in- 
cluded seminars,  joint  publications,  ex- 
■hange  visits,  and  joint  projects  in 
'leveral  topics  including  protecting  en- 
iangered  species,  modeling  of  long- 
•ange  air  pollution,  and  earthquake 
)rediction.  EPA  Administrator  William 
).  Ruckelshaus  has  assumed  the  U.S. 
o-chairmanship  of  the  Joint  En- 
vironmental Committee  and  will  seek  to 
ise  this  forum  as  a  means  to  rein- 
igorate  the  agreement.  Mr. 
luckelshaus  is  currently  representing 
he  United  States  at  the  multilateral 
Conference  on  the  Environment  in 
/lunich,  where  he  has  discussed  the 
tgreement  with  Soviet  officials. 

r 

i 

Housing 

The  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Agreement  on 
Cooperation  in  Housing  and  Other  Con- 
;truction  was  signed  by  President  Nixon 
md  Chairman  Kosygin  on  June  28, 
.974,  in  Moscow.  We  decided  in 
December  1983  to  renew  the  agreement 
or  a  third  5-year  period  effective  June 
18,  1984.  Besides  exchange  visits  and 
seminars,  the  agreement  has  supported 
oint  projects  in  construction  techniques 
n  extreme  climates  and  unusual 
ideological  conditions,  sewage  treatment 
n  a  permafrost  environment,  and  fire 
3revention  in  the  design  of  construction 
jnaterials.  The  President's  decision  to 
jxpand  the  activities  under  the  agree- 
Tient  will  lead  to  the  convening  of  the 
Krst  Joint  Housing  Committee  meeting 


since  1978  and  to  an  increase  in  the 
already  extensive  private  sector  involve- 
ment in  joint  projects.  Secretary  of 
Housing  and  Urban  Development 
Samuel  Pierce,  Jr.,  will  lead  our  efforts 
under  this  agreement. 

Health 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
entered  into  cooperation  in  the  health 
area  through  two  agreements  signed  in 
the  early  1970s:  the  Agreement  on 
Cooperation  in  the  Medical  Sciences  and 
Public  Health  (signed  May  23,  1972,  at 
Moscow  by  Secretary  of  State  Rogers 
and  Minister  of  Health  Petrovsky)  and 
the  Agreement  on  Cooperation  in  Ar- 
tificial Heart  Research  and  Development 
(signed  at  Moscow  June  28,  1974,  by 
Secretary  of  State  Kissinger  and 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko).  The  Health 
Agreement  has  been  extended  until  May 
23,  1987,  while  the  Artificial  Heart 
Agreement  will  run  until  June  28,  1987. 
The  President  has  directed  that  steps  be 
taken  in  the  near  future  to  strengthen 
cooperation  under  these  agreements 
through  a  renewal  of  high-level  visits, 
joint  committee  meetings,  and  the  initia- 
tion of  new  projects  and  possibly  new 
agreements.  The  timing  for  such  steps 
has  not  yet  been  set.  The  agreements 
have  provided  for  joint  research  inter 
alia  on  laser  treatment  of  glaucoma, 
congenital  heart  disease,  mechanically 
assisted  circulation  in  artificial  hearts, 
and  cancer  treatment  and  prevention. 

Agriculture 

Signed  at  Washington  June  19,  1973,  by 
Secretary  of  Agriculture  Butz  and 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko,  the 
Agriculture  Agreement  has  been  extend- 
ed three  times  and  will  not  expire  until 
June  19,  1988.  The  Department  of 
Agriculture  will  now  reactivate  the 
agreement  (which  has  been  dormant  the 
past  several  years)  through  a  joint  com- 
mittee meeting,  high-level  visits,  and  ini- 
tiation of  new  projects.  Earlier  the 
agreement  has  supported  plant,  animal, 
and  soil  science  research  (germ  plasm 
studies)  and  exchange  of  grain-related 
economic  information.  Exchange  visits, 
especially  those  involving  the  private 
sector,  had  been  particularly  active.  All 
of  these  programs  will  be  rein  vigor  ated. 


Fishing  Agreement 

In  April,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  agreed  to  extend  the  ex- 
isting fisheries  agreement  for  18  months 
(as  opposed  to  the  two  previous 
12-month  extensions).  Final  approval  is 
currently  pending  before  Congress.  The 


Fisheries  Agreement  was  initially  signed 
in  November  1976.  The  Soviet  Union 
does  not,  however,  have  a  directed 
fishing  allocation.  After  the  Soviet  inva- 
sion of  Afghanistan,  the  United  States 
terminated  allocations  to  the  U.S.S.R.  to 
fish  within  our  200-mile  zone.  (The 
Soviet  Union  had  been  receiving  a  direct 
allocation  of  between  400,000  and 
500,000  MT  a  year).  Soviet  processing  at 
sea  of  fish  caught  by  U.S.  fisherman  as 
part  of  an  existing  joint  venture  was 
allowed  to  continue  since  it  benefited 
U.S.  fishermen.  The  United  States  is 
currently  reviewing  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
fishing  relationship  to  determine 
whether  mutually  beneficial  steps  can  be 
taken  to  increase  cooperation. 

Long-Term  Cooperation  Agreement 

The  United  States  has  proposed  to  ex- 
tend for  10  years  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Agreement  to  Facilitate  Economic,  In- 
dustrial and  Technical  Cooperation.  The 
agreement  was  signed  by  Presidents 
Nixon  and  Brezhnev  during  the  1974 
Moscow  summit.  It  is  scheduled  to  ex- 
pire June  28,  1984.  The  principal  provi- 
sions of  the  agreement  call  upon  the 
parties  to  use  their  good  offices  to 
facilitate  cooperation  in  economic,  in- 
dustrial, and  technical  areas.  In  practice, 
the  agreement  has  been  exclusively 
economic  and  has  facilitated  certain 
business  dealings  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. If  the  agreement  is  extended,  our 
exception  is  that  there  will  be  a  meeting 
of  the  Working  Group  of  Experts  under 
Article  III  to  examine  prospects  for 
trade.  If  that  meeting  is  successful,  then 
a  Joint  Commercial  Commission  meeting 
will  be  held  when  practical. 

U.S. -Soviet  Incidents  at  Sea 
Agreement  (INCSEA) 

The  1972  U.S. -Soviet  Agreement  on  the 
Prevention  of  Incidents  at  Sea  estab- 
lished certain  "rules  of  the  road"  to 
govern  special  situations  involving  naval 
surface  vessels  and  aircraft  of  the  two 
nations.  It  also  set  up  agreed-upon, 
navy-to-navy  channels  for  the  prompt 
resolution  of  any  problems  arising  under 
this  agreement.  Senior  officers  of  the 
U.S.  and  Soviet  Navies  meet  on  an  an- 
nual basis  for  a  general  review  of  the 
implementation  of  the  agreement  and 
discussion  of  ways  in  which  it  might  be 
strengthened.  The  most  recent  review 
took  place  in  Moscow  in  late  May.  At 
that  time,  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  sides 
agreed  to  a  renewal  of  the  INCSEA 
agreement  for  another  3  years. 


EUROPE 


World  Oceans  Agreement 

The  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  World  Oceans  Agree- 
ment was  signed  in  1973  and  renewed 
for  3  years  in  1981.  It  has  been  useful  in 
promoting  joint  oceanographic  research 
and  has  involved  seminars,  exchange 
visits,  and  joint  ocean  research  cruises. 
National  Oceanic  and  Atmospheric  Ad- 
ministration has  taken  the  U.S.  lead  on 
this  agreement.  The  agreement  comes 
up  for  renewal  in  December. 

Maritime  Boundary 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
have  a  difference  relating  to  the  precise 
cartographic  depiction  and  location  of 
the  boundary  line  established  by  the 
1867  convention  ceding  Alaska.  The  dif- 
ference relates  to  the  fact  that  the 
United  States  depicts  the  1867  conven- 
tion line  as  the  maritime  boundary  by 
arcs  of  great  circles,  while  the  Soviet 
Union  depicts  the  convention  line  by 
rhumb  lines.  We  have  proposed  a  fair 
and  equitable  resolution  to  the  issue. 
Three  rounds  of  technical  level  discus- 
sions have  been  held  and  a  fourth  round 
is  expected  soon. 

Space  Rescue  Mission 

The  U.S.  proposal  envisages  cooperation 
between  NASA  and  Soviet  space  of- 
ficials on  a  joint  simulated  space  rescue 
mission.  A  space  shuttle  would  rendez- 
vous with  the  Soviet  space  station  to 
practice  procedures  that  might  be 
necessary  to  rescue  each  other's  person- 
nel. Details  of  the  proposal  would  have 
to  be  worked  out. 

Consular  Review  Talks 

The  session  of  U.S. -Soviet  consular 
review  talks  currently  underway  in 
Moscow  is  the  latest  round  of  a  series  of 
discussions  which  began  in  1976,  when 
representatives  of  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  met  to  attempt  to 
resolve  a  number  of  consular  issues 
outstanding  between  the  two  countries. 
Those  issues  primarily  involved  visa 
questions  and  administrative  matters 
relating  to  the  functioning  of  our 
diplomatic  missions.  The  discussions 
have  taken  place  in  Moscow  in  1976  and 
in  Washington  in  1979  and  1983. 

Search  and  Rescue  Talks 

In  October  1981,  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard 
was  authorized  to  take  the  initiative  to 
open  direct  lines  of  emergency  com- 
munications with  the  Soviet  maritime 


rescue  authorities  in  the  Pacific.  As  a 
result  of  subsequent  exchanges  in  June 
1983,  agreement  was  reached  to  hold  a 
working-level  meeting  on  a  broad  range 
of  search  and  rescue  topics.  This 
meeting  was  scheduled  for  early 
December  1983,  but  was  postponed  at 
the  request  of  the  Soviet  side.  We  have 
proposed  rescheduling  this  meeting. 

U.S. -Soviet  Communications 
Improvements  Talks 

On  the  basis  of  the  President's  proposals 
of  May  1983,  a  U.S.  team  has  met  with 
Soviet  counterparts  three  times  to 
discuss  possible  means  by  which 
U.S. -Soviet  communications — for  use  in 
both  times  of  crisis  and  calm — might  be 
strengthened.  The  most  recent  meeting 
was  in  Moscow  in  late  April.  On  the 
basis  of  those  talks,  significant  progress 
has  been  made  in  working  out  agree- 
ment with  the  Soviets  on  the  desirability 
of  upgrading  the  existing  direct  com- 
munications link  (the  Hot  Line)  with 
secure  facsimile  transmission 
capabilities,  which  would  increase  the 
speed,  reliability,  and  versatility  of  that 
system.  We  expect  another  meeting 
shortly.  Additionally,  the  United  States 
has  put  forward  proposals  to  upgrade 
the  communications  capabilities  of  the 
U.S.  and  Soviet  Embassies  in  each 
other's  countries,  to  establish  a  joint 
military  communications  link  to  handle 
the  exchange  of  time-sensitive  technical 
data,  and  to  facilitate  consultations  in 
the  event  of  a  nuclear  terrorist  threat  or 
incident. 

U.S. -Soviet  Military  Contact 

With  the  exception  of  the  special  navy- 
to-navy  talks  under  the  1972  INCSEA 
agreement,  there  has  been  no  channel 
for  high-level  military  exchange  between 
the  United  States  and  Soviet  Union  out- 
side of  specifically  arms  control-related 
talks  since  the  one-time  meeting  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  and  Chairman  of 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  with  their 
Soviet  counterparts  during  the  1979 
Vienna  summit.  Earlier  this  year,  the 
President  suggested  to  the  Soviet 
leadership  the  desirability  of  exploring 
the  possibility  of  regularizing  some  form 
of  contact  and  discussion  between  those 
responsible  for  defense  matters  on  both 
sides  for  the  purpose  of  increasing 
mutual  understanding  and  minimizing 
the  potential  for  misinterpretation  and 
miscalculation. 


Human  Rights  Cases 

Andrei  Sakharov.  Dr.  Andrei  Sakharov, 
a  physicist  and  Academy  of  Sciences 
member  who  played  a  major  role  in  the 
development  of  the  Soviet  hydrogen 
bomb,  has  spoken,  out  at  length  in 
defense  of  human  rights  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  In  197.5  he  was  awarded  the 
Nobel  Peace  Prize  for  those  efforts. 
Since  1980  he  has  been  required  to  live 
in  internal  exile  in  the  closed  city  of 
Gorky.  In  early  May  he  began  a  hunger 
strike  to  obtain  permission  for  his  wife, 
Yelena  Bonner,  to  travel  abroad  for 
necessary  medical  treatment;  there  has 
been  no  confirmed  information  of  any 
sort  on  his  health  or  his  status  since  that 
time. 

Yelena  Bonner.  A  doctor  by  train- 
ing, Yelena  Bonner  is  the  wife  of  Dr. 
Sakharov  and  was  a  founding  member 
of  the  Moscow  Helsinki  Group.  She  has 
served  as  his  main  channel  of  com- 
munications to  the  outside  world  during 
his  exile  in  Gorky.  She  is  also  believed  to 
have  begun  a  hunger  strike  in  early  May 
to  obtain  permission  to  travel  abroad  for 
vital  medical  treatment;  she  suffers 
from  both  a  heart  condition  and  serious 
eye  problems. 

Yuriy  Orlov.  A  founder  and  leader 
of  the  Moscow  Helsinki  Group,  Yuriy 
Orlov  was  long  active  on  behalf  of 
human  rights  in  the  Soviet  Union.  He 
was  a  founding  member  of  the  Moscow 
chapter  of  Amnesty  International  and  a 
participant  is  unofficial  scientific 
seminars  organized  for  refusenik  scien- 
tists. He  was  arrested  in  February  1977 
and  convicted  in  May  1978  of  "anti- 
Soviet  agitation  and  propaganda." 
Earlier  this  year  he  completed  7  years  ir 
a  strict-regime  labor  camp  and  began  5 
years  of  internal  exile. 

Anatoliy  Shcharanskiy.  Anatoliy 
Shcharanskiy  is  a  long-time  activist  on 
behalf  of  human  rights  and  Jewish 
culture  in  the  Soviet  Union.  A  founding 
member  of  the  Moscow  Helsinki  Group, 
Shcharanskiy  was  also  a  leader  of  the 
Jewish  emigration  movement  and  a 
liaison  between  Western  newsmen  and 
Soviet  dissidents.  In  March  1977  he  was 
arrested  and  in  July  1978  was  convicteo 
of  "anti-Soviet  agitation  and 
propaganda"  and  "treason."  He  is  cur- 
rently in  Chistopol  Prison;  his  wife, 
Avital,  lives  in  Israel. 


8i 


II 


'Made  in  the  East  Room  at  the  White 
House  to  participants  in  the  Smithsonian  In- 
stitution's Conference  on  U.S. -Soviet  Ex- 
changes (te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  2,  1984). 

^Text  from  White  House  press  release.  I 


m 
•m 


usi- 


f 


EUROPE 


J.S.-Soviet  Union  Expand 
'Hot  Line"  Agreement 


•RESIDENTS  STATEMENT, 
ULY  17,  19841 

am  happy  to  be  able  to  announce  today 
hat  we  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
cached  agreement  to  expand  and  im- 
irove  the  operation  of  the  direct  com- 
lunications  link,  or  the  "Hot  Line." 

This  agreement  is  a  modest  but 
iositive  step  toward  enhancing  interna- 
ional  stability  and  reducing  the  risk 
hat  accident,  miscalculation,  or 
lisinterpretation  could  lead  to  confron- 
ation  or  conflict  between  the  United 
■tates  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

With  the  addition  of  a  facsimile 
apability,  we  will  not  only  be  able  to  ex- 
hange  messages  faster,  but  for  the  first 
me  we  will  be  able  to  send  graphic 
laterial  such  as  maps  or  pictures  which 
'ould  play  a  crucial  role  in  helping  to 
esolve  certain  types  of  crises  or 
.lisunderstandings. 

The  negotiations  which  led  to  this 
greement  began  about  1  year  ago 
August  1983),  based  upon  a  series  of 
roposals  that  we  first  made  in  May 
983. 

In  developing  this  and  other  ini- 
atives  designed  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
ar  due  to  accident,  misunderstandings, 
r  miscalculation,  v/e  had  the  benefit  of 
:<cellent  advice  from  a  number  of  key 
!  jngressional  leaders,  including 
enators  Warner  and  Nunn  and  the  late 
enator  Jackson. 

I  see  this  agreement  as  both  an  ap- 
ropriate  technical  improvement  to  the 
iot  Line,"  which  has  served  both  our 
overnments  well  for  over  20  years,  and 
1 3  a  good  example  of  how  we  can,  work- 
ig  together,  find  approaches  which  can 
lOve  us  toward  a  reduction  in  the  risks 
f  war. 


?HITE  HOUSE  FACT  SHEET, 

ULY  17,  1984' 

he  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
)day  formally  agreed  to  add  a  facsimile 
•ansmission  capability  to  the  direct 
jmmunications  link  (DCL),  commonly 
nown  as  the  "Hot  Line."  This  step— the 
jcond  major  technical  improvement  to 
le  "Hot  Line"  since  it  was  established 
1  1963— will  enhance  the  capability  of 
le  system  and  thus  its  potential  to  help 
esolve  crises  and  avert  misunderstand- 


The  agreement  was  initiated  at  the 
State  Department  this  morning  by  Act- 
ing Secretary  of  State  Kenneth  W.  Dam 
and  Soviet  Charge  Victor  F.  Isakov. 
Chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  in  the 
talks  on  communications  improvements 
was  Mr.  Warren  Zimmerman  of  the 
State  Department,  who  was  until  recent- 
ly Deputy  Chief  of  Mission  of  our  Em- 
bassy in  Moscow.  The  Deputy  Chairman 
for  the  United  States  was  Mr.  Stuart 
Branch  who  has  been  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  for  Communications. 
The  U.S.  delegation  included  other  of- 
ficials of  the  State  Department,  the 
Defense  Department,  and  the  National 
Security  Council  staff.  The  Soviet 
delegation  was  headed  by  Mr.  A.  M. 
Varbanskiy,  a  Chief  of  Administration  in 
the  U.S.S.R.  Ministry  of  Communica- 
tions. Other  members  of  the  delegation 
included  officials  of  the  Communications 
Ministry  and  the  Foreign  Ministry. 

The  addition  of  facsimile  transmis- 
sion capability  to  the  "Hot  Line"  will 
enable  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  heads  of 
government  to  exchange  messages  far 
more  rapidly  than  they  can  with  the  ex- 
isting teletype  system.  In  addition,  they 
will  be  able  for  the  first  time  to  send 
graphic  material  over  the  DCL.  The 
precise,  detailed,  and  often  easily  inter- 
preted information  offered  by  such 
graphic  material  as  maps,  charts,  and 
drawings  could  be  essential  to  help 
resolve  a  crisis  or  misunderstanding. 

Prior  Negotiating  History 

In  June  1963,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  agreed  in  a  memorandum 
of  understanding  to  establish  a  direct 
communications  link  for  use  in  time  of 
emergency.  Each  agreed  to  ensure 
prompt  delivery  to  its  head  of  govern- 
ment of  any  communications  received 
over  the  DCL  from  the  other  head  of 
government.  The  memorandum  of 
understanding  was  negotiated  and  sign- 
ed by  the  heads  of  the  U.S.  and  Soviet 
delegations  to  the  18-nation  Disarma- 
ment Conference  in  Geneva.  The  DCL 
was  activated  in  August  1963. 

Eight  years  later,  the  DCL  was  up- 
dated by  a  September  30,  1971,  agree- 
ment negotiated  by  a  special  working 
group  of  the  two  SALT  [strategic  arms 
limitation  talks]  delegations  and  signed 
by  the  U.S.  Secretary  of  State  and  the 
Soviet  Foreign  Minister.  This  agreement 
provided  for  the  addition  of  two  satellite 


circuits  to  the  DCL,  one  using  the  Soviet 
Molniya  II  satellite  system  and  the  other 
the  U.S.  INTELSAT  system.  Those  two 
circuits  became  operational  in  January 
1978. 

A  second  special  working  group  of 
the  two  SALT  delegations  simultaneous- 
ly negotiated  a  related  Agreement  on 
Measures  to  Reduce  the  Risk  of  Out- 
break of  Nuclear  War  between  the 
United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.,  which 
was  signed  on  the  same  day,  September 
30,  1971.  This  agreement  provided  for 
each  party  to  notify  the  other  in  advance 
of  any  planned  missile  launch  extending 
beyond  its  national  territory  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  other  and  for  each  to  notify 
the  other  immediately  in  the  event  of 
certain  situations  which  could  create  a 
risk  of  nuclear  war.  The  parties  agreed 
that  they  would  use  the  DCL  to  transmit 
urgent  information  in  situations  requir- 
ing prompt  clarification. 

The  Reagan  Proposals 

In  May  1983,  President  Reagan  pro- 
posed to  the  Soviet  Union  three 
measures  to  improve  the  bilateral  com- 
munications network  between  the  two 
countries:  the  addition  of  a  high-speed 
facsimile  capability  to  the  "Hot  Line;" 
the  establishment  of  a  joint  military 
communications  link  (JMCL);  and  the 
establishment  of  high-speed  data  links 
between  each  government  and  its  Em- 
bassy in  the  other's  capital. 

The  Secretary  of  Defense  had 
recommended  those  proposals  to  the 
President  following  a  full  and  complete 
study  of  possible  initiatives  for  enhanc- 
ing international  stability  and  reducing 
the  risk  of  nuclear  war.  That  examina- 
tion, which  involved  all  concerned  U.S. 
Government  agencies,  was  mandated  by 
the  Congress  in  the  Department  of 
Defense  Authorization  Act  of  1983.  The 
Secretary  of  Defense  transmitted  its 
results  and  recommendations  in  his 
April  1983  Report  to  the  Congress  on 
Direct  Communications  Links  and  Other 
Measures  to  Enhance  Stability. 

U.S. -Soviet  negotiations  on  improv- 
ing bilateral  communications  links 
opened  in  Moscow  in  August  1983.  Sub- 
sequent rounds  have  been  held  in 
Washington  in  January  1984,  in  Moscow 
in  April  1984,  and  the  one  just  com- 
pleted in  Washington  in  July  1984. 
Those  discussions  have  now  resulted  in  a 
U.S. -Soviet  accord  to  add  a  facsimile 
transmission  capability  to  the  direct 
communications  link. 


FOOD 


DCL  System 

The  direct  communications  link  will  now 
consist  of: 

•  Three  circuits  (two  satellite  cir- 
cuits plus  one  wire  telegraph  circuit); 

•  One  Earth  station  in  each  country 
for  each  satellite  circuit;  and 

•  Terminals  in  each  country  linked 
to  the  three  circuits  and  equipped  with 
teletype  and  facsimile  equipment. 


In  keeping  with  the  principle  of  con- 
fidentiality concerning  communications 
between  heads  of  government,  the 
precise  number  of  times  that  the  heads 
of  state  have  used  the  system  has  not 
been  discovered.  We  do  know  that  it  has 
proved  invaluable  in  major  crises.  U.S. 
Presidents  have  cited  its  use  during  the 
1967  and  1973  Arab-Israeli  wars. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


19th  Report  on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JULY  9,  1984' 

In  accordance  with  Public  Law  95-384,  I  am 
submitting  herewith  a  bimonthly  report  on 
progress  toward  a  negotiated  settlement  of 
the  Cyprus  question. 

Since  my  last  report  to  you  there  have 
been  several  developments  in  the  Cyprus 
question  worthy  of  note.  On  April  17  the  self- 
declared  Turkish  Cypriot  "state"  announced 
the  formal  exchange  of  ambassadors  with  the 
Government  of  Turkey.  We  strongly  opposed 
this  development  and  declared  publicly  our 
concern  that  it  could  set  back  the  U.N. 
Secretary  General's  efforts  in  the  search  for 
progress.  We  also  repeated  our  opposition  to 
any  diplomatic  recognition  of  the  self- 
declared  entity. 

On  May  8  I  informed  the  Congress  that 
the  Administration  intended  to  request 
authorization  for  a  "Cyprus  Peace  and 
Reconstruction  Fund"  of  up  to  $250  million  to 
be  utilized  on  Cyprus  at  such  time  as  a  fair 
and  equitable  solution  acceptable  to  both 
Cypriot  communities  is  reached,  or  when 
substantial  progress  is  made  toward  that 
goal.  I  intend  this  commitment  to  be  a  sym- 
bol of  the  shared  concern  of  the  Administra- 
tion and  the  Congress  for  promoting  genuine 
progress  on  Cyprus.  I  was  pleased  that  a 
committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
has  Included  this  fund  in  an  authorization  bill 
it  is  considering. 

On  May  11  the  United  Nations  Security 
Council  passed  Resolution  550  which  con- 
demned the  Turkish  Cypriot  community  for 
several  actions  it  had  taken.  We  found  it 
necessary  to  abstain  on  the  resolution,  believ- 
ing its  language  unlikely  to  contribute  to  the 
goal  of  a  negotiated  settlement.  We 
reiterated  to  the  Council  our  continuing  op- 
position to  the  Turkish  Cypriot  community's 
declaration  of  statehood  and  our  determina- 
tion to  see  progress  made  under  the  aegis  of 
the  Secretary  General.  Following  passage  of 
that  resolution  Secretary  Shultz's  Special 


Cyprus  Coordinator,  Richard  Haass,  and 
other  Administration  officials  undertook  in- 
tensive consultations  with  both  Cypriot  par- 
ties, with  U.N.  officials  and  others  on  the 
potential  for  progress  on  the  question. 

On  June  15  the  Security  Council  met 
again  on  Cyprus,  this  time  to  renew, 
unanimously,  its  mandate  for  U.N. 
peacekeeping  forces  in  Cyprus  (UNFICYP). 
The  resolution  approved  on  that  date  is  iden- 
tical in  text  to  the  previous  renewal  in 
December,  198:3.  Following  the  vote  the 
Turkish  Cypriot  representative  told  the  Coun- 
cil his  community  could  not  accept  the  resolu- 
tion but  would  continue  its  cooperation  with 
the  U.N.  forces  on  the  same  basis  as  that  an- 
nounced by  the  Turkish  Cypriots  in 
December,  1983.  We  view  this  continuation 
of  the  vital  U.N.  peacekeeping  mandate  as  a 
positive  sign  that  the  parties  to  the  Cyprus 
question  do  intend  to  continue  the  search  for 
a  solution.  I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  the 
Secretary  General's  report  to  the  Council  on 
UNFICYP  activities. 

At  the  time  of  the  June  Security  Council 
vote  the  Turkish  Cypriot  side  pledged  to 
maintain  the  unoccupied  status  of  the  city  of 
Varosha  and  presented  to  the  Secretary 
General  its  latest  ideas  on  possible  next  steps 
toward  a  solution.  We  welcomed  the  Varosha 
announcement  and  hope  the  ideas  presented, 
as  well  as  the  comprehensive  framework 
presented  previously  by  the  Government  of 
Cyprus,  can  assist  the  Secretary  General  as 
he  resumes  efforts  under  his  good  offices 
mandate. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald  Rkagan 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  Charles  H.  Percy,  chair- 
man of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Coni- 
mittee  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  16.  1984).  ■ 


Food  for  Peace 
Day,  1984 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
JULY  10.  1984' 

Thirty  years  ago  today— and  you've 
probably  been  told  this  several 
times— President  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower 
signed  into  law  Public  Law  480,  the 
Food  for  Peace  program.  And  10  years 
before  the  signing  ceremony  which  took 
place  here  at  the  White  House,  Presi- 
dent Eisenhower  launched  the  Norman- 
dy invasion.  And  only  the  year  before 
the  signing  ceremony,  he  was  first 
sworn  in  as  President.  It's  possible  that 
on  July  10,  1954,  Ike  thought  most  of 
his  great  moments  were  behind  him.  But 
that  was  not  so,  as  this  program  proves, 
for  in  time  it  grew  to  become  one  of  the 
greatest  humanitarian  acts  ever  per- 
formed by  one  nation  for  the  needy  of 
other  nations. 

I'm  delighted  to  welcome  here  today 
Ike's  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  Ezra 
Taft  Benson,  who  was  present  when  the 
Food  for  Peace  bill  was  signed. 
Welcome.  Glad  to  have  you  here. 

Food  for  Peace  is  still  the  largest 
food  aid  program  in  the  world.  Over  the 
last  30  years,  it's  delivered  almost  653 
billion  pounds  of  food  to  people  in  over 
100  countries.  It's  helped  bring  hope  and 
new  economic  opportunity  to  more  than 
1.8  billion  people.  Statistics  are,  by  their 
nature,  dry,  but  bear  with  me  for  a  mo- 
ment as  I  give  you  just  a  few  more — 
with  the  hope  that  they  haven't  been 
given  to  you  already. 

Food  for  peace  has  delivered  27,000 
tons  of  food  a  day  to  recipient  countries 
for  three  decades  now.  And  the  value  of 
those  U.S.  farm  products  exceeds  $33 
billion— more  than  $3  million  a  day  over 
the  history  of  the  program. 

All  of  those  numbers  give  us  a  sense 
of  the  scope  and  the  magnitude  of  this 
program.  But  its  great  contribution  is 
that  it's  an  instrument  of  American  com 
passion.  And  it  also  reflects  America's 
practicality.  We  recognized  30  years  age 
that  people  who  are  hungry  are  weak 
allies  for  freedom.  And  we  recognized, 
too,  that  except  in  emergencies,  hand- 
outs don't  help.  From  the  beginning, 
recipient  countries  paid  for  a  significant 
part  of  the  food  they  received. 

The  businesslike  approach  is  one  of 
the  strengths  of  this  program.  We've 
never  attempted  to  make  countries 


h 


iir 
B 

in 


FOOD 


hich  receive  our  food  become  depend- 
it  on  our  aid.  In  fact,  we've  used  our 
d  to  foster  economic  development 
ound  the  world.  And  that  is  an  impor- 
nt  reason  why,  over  the  years,  many 
the  nations  that  have  received  our  aid 
ive  eventually  become  major  commer- 
il  partners. 

«In  the  early  days  of  Food  for  Peace, 
e  major  recipient  nations  were  the 
ar-devastated  economies  of  Europe: 
aly  and  Spain,  West  Germany  and 
ipan.  And  with  time  and  with  the  help 

Food  for  Peace,  those  economies 
igained  their  strength.  They  began  to 
ly  cash  for  American  farm  com- 
odities.  Many  of  these  countries  have 
jcome  our  top  commercial  partners, 
ight  of  our  top  10  agricultural  markets 
■e  former  recipients  of  Food  for  Peace 
d.  And  Japan  is  now  our  number  one 
jricultural  market  on  a  cash  basis.  And 
lat  has  not  only  been  good  for  the 
merican  farmer  and  the  American 
;onomy;  it's  been  good  for  our  interna- 
Dnal  relations. 

Food  for  Peace  has  been  very  impor- 
,nt  in  spreading  good  will  and  generosi- 

throughout  the  world.  When  droughts 
id  flooding  from  the  El  Nimo  weather 
isturbances  destroyed  food  crops  in 
eru,  Bolivia,  and  other  Latin  American 
mntries  last  year,  Food  for  Peace  took 
16  lead  in  providing  emergency  relief, 
uring  the  1966  famine  in  India, 
ughly  60  million  people  are  estimated 

have  been  sustained  for  2  years  by 
ood  for  Peace  shipments. 

Today  we  face  a  severe  and  wide- 
)read  famine  in  Africa,  which  is 
ireatening  the  lives  of  millions.  And, 
ice  again.  Food  for  Peace  is  saving 
/es.  We've  already  agreed  to  provide 
fer  $400  million  for  food  assistance  for 
frica  in  this  year  alone.  And  I  want  to 
inounce  today  a  major  initiative  to  help 
i  le  starving  people  of  Africa  and  the 
,  orld.  It's  a  new  program  to  help  us 
!  jliver  food  more  quickly  and  smoothly 
)  those  who  suffer  the  most  from  the 
wages  of  famine. 

I  will  shortly  propose  legislation  to 
■eate  a  $50  million  Presidential  fund 
lowing  us  to  set  aside  existing  foreign 
d  resources  to  meet  emergency  food 
d  needs.  By  prepositioning  food  stocks 
v-erseas  where  the  requirements  are  the 
reatest,  we  can  respond  to  emergency 
tuations  more  rapidly  and  effectively.  I 
■ill  also  propose  authority  to  allow  the 
ood  for  Peace  program  to  reduce  the 
urden  of  transportation  costs  on  the 


most  needy  countries.  And  all  this  is 
aimed  at  reducing  the  loss  of  life  to 
acute  hunger  in  the  Third  World. 

Food  for  Peace  has  come  to  embody 
the  spirit  of  American  voluntarism.  The 
Federal  Government  has  developed  a 
strong  partnership  with  the  private  sec- 
tor to  help  feed  malnourished  infants 
and  children,  to  help  mothers  and  the 
aged  and  the  disabled.  This  cooperative 
effort  with  private  and  voluntary 
organizations  includes  such  agencies  as 
CARE  and  Catholic  Relief  Services,  and 
many  qther  groups  are  helping  also. 

In  short,  the  Food  for  Peace  pro- 
gram has  become  a  wonderful  means  by 
which  a  nation  of  abundance  has  helped 
those  in  need.  It's  helped  us  expand 
agricultural  markets,  get  needy  allies 
back  on  their  feet,  and  help  potential 
allies  become  strong  allies  for  freedom. 
Food  for  Peace  has  helped  to  coordinate 
the  charitable  impulses  of  the  private 
sector.  It's  helped  feed  the  weakest  peo- 
ple in  the  world. 

And  this  record  of  progress  is  the 
result  of  what  happened  30  years  ago  to- 
day, when  Dwight  Eisenhower  picked  up 
a  pen  and  signed  a  piece  of  paper  that 
quietly— and,  with  no  great  attention 
from  the  wise,  he  changed  the  world.  I 
think  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower  would  be 
very  proud  of  what  the  Food  for  Peace 
program  has  accomplished.  I  certainly 
am,  and  I'm  proud  to  be  able  to  mark 
with  you  its  anniversary  today. 

May  Food  for  Peace  continue  its 
great  work;  may  it  continue  to  be  ad- 
ministered wisely;  and  may  we  continue 
to  combat  hunger  and  malnutrition 
throughout  the  world. 

I  thank  you  all  again  for  being  here, 
and  God  bless  you. 

And,  now,  I'll  sign  this  proclamation 
which  designates  today,  July  10,  1984, 
as  Food  for  Peace  Day. 


PROCLAMATION  5220, 
JULY  10,  19842 

July  10,  1984,  is  the  thirtieth  anniversary  of 
the  signing  of  the  Agricultural  Trade 
Development  and  Assistance  Act  of  1954 
(Public  Law  480).  This  legislation,  signed  by 
President  Eisenhower,  began  the  largest  food 
assistance  program  ever  undertaken  by  one 
country  on  behalf  of  needy  people  throughout 
the  world,  the  Food  for  Peace  program. 

The  productivity  and  abundance  of  U.S. 
agriculture  have  made  this  generosity  possi- 
ble. During  the  thirty  years  of  this  program, 
more  than  300  million  tons  of  agricultural 
commodities  and  products  valued  at  approx- 
imately $34  billion  have  been  distributed  to 
over  150  countries.  This  food  has  helped 
reduce  world  hunger  and  improve  nutritional 
standards. 

The  Food  for  Peace  program  has  served 
as  an  example  for  other  countries  which  have 
joined  the  United  States  in  the  effort  to  pro- 
vide food  aid  to  needy  people.  It  has  served 
as  a  model  for  others  to  follow  and  continue 
to  meet  changing  needs  and  situations. 

The  Food  for  Peace  program  has  ac- 
complished multiple  objectives  to  combat 
hunger  and  malnutrition  abroad,  to  expand 
export  markets  for  U.S.  agriculture  to  en- 
courage economic  advancement  in  developing 
countries,  and  to  promote  in  other  ways  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  United  States. 

In  recognition  of  the  accomplishments  of 
this  program,  the  Congress,  by  Senate  Joint 
Resolution  306,  has  designated  July  10,  1984 
as  "Food  for  Peace  Day"  and  has  authorized 
and  requested  the  President  to  issue  a  proc- 
lamation in  observance  of  that  day. 

Now.  Therefore,  I,  Ronalii  Reagan, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
do  hereby  proclaim  July  10,  1984,  as  Food 
for  Peace  Day,  and  I  call  upon  the  people  of 
the  United  States  to  commemorate  this  occa- 
sion with  appropriate  ceremonies  and  ac- 
tivities. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set 
my  hand  this  10th  day  of  July,  in  the  year  of 
our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and  eighty-four, 
and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States 
of  America  the  two  hundred  and  ninth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Made  at  the  signing  ceremony  in  the 
East  Room  of  the  White  House  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  July  16,  1984). 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  16.  ■ 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Extending  Voluntary  Departure 
for  El  Salvadorans 


by  Elliott  Ahrams 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Rules  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Rules  on  June  20.  19Si.  Mr.  Ahrams  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Human  Rights 
and  Humanitarian  Affairs. ' 

I  am  grateful  for  this  opportunity  to  ap- 
pear before  you  today.  As  every  member 
of  the  subcommittee  knows,  and  indeed 
as  every  American  must  by  now  be  well 
aware,  El  Salvador  is  a  country  troubled 
by  poverty,  violence,  overpopulation, 
and  a  history  of  oppression.  For  a 
number  of  years,  Salvadorans  have 
looked  for  economic  opportunity 
elsewhere.  Prior  to  the  war  between  El 
Salvador  and  Honduras  in  1969,  a  large 
number  were  living  in  Honduras. 
Through  the  197()s  and  early  1980s,  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  Salvadorans  have 
come  to  the  United  States.  The  in- 
creased violence  in  El  Salvador 
prevalent  since  1980  no  doubt  increased 
the  incentives  to  leave  the  country,  as 
have  the  economic  difficulties  which  the 
war  has  only  worsened. 

The  United  States  is  thus  confronted 
with  a  number  of  significant  immigra- 
tion issues  regarding  El  Salvador.  It  is 
difficult  for  Salvadorans  to  get  visitors' 
visas  to  the  United  States  and  difficult 
for  them  to  get  immigrant  visas  as  well. 
We  face  a  very  significant  amount  of  il- 
legal immigration  from  El  Salvador,  and 
a  large  quantity  of  asylum  applications. 
How  do  we  deal  with  the  asylum  applica- 
tions? To  those  not  entitled  to  asylum, 
how  do  we  respond  to  their  desire  to  live 
in  the  United  States? 

Asylum  Policies 

The  asylum  issue  is  in  a  sense  an  easy 
one.  U.S.  law,  in  incorporating  the 
definition  of  a  refugee  contained  in  the 
Convention  and  Protocol  Relating  to  the 
Status  of  Refugees,  set  forth  the  stand- 
ards by  which  an  asylum  application 
must  be  judged.  We  apply  these  stand- 
ards and  a  limited  number  of  aliens,  ir- 
respective of  their  nationality,  can  meet 
them.  This  is  true  of  asylum  applicants 
from  El  Salvador.  This  has  occasioned 
much  criticism  of  the  Administration's 
asylum  policy  toward  El  Salvador,  but  in 
fact  we  have  no  "asylum  policy"  toward 
El  Salvador  or  any  other  country;  we 
apply  the  same  standards  to  each.  In  the 
last  few  months  recommendations  for 


the  approval  of  applications  from 
Salvadorans  and  Nicaraguans  have  been 
running  at  roughly  the  same  rate;  and 
though,  of  course,  there  are  variations 
for  both  countries,  about  10%  of  applica- 
tions can  meet  legal  standards.  This 
reflects  no  policy  decision,  nor  does  it 
reflect  the  state  of  our  bilateral  relations 
with  either  government;  it  simply  re- 
flects the  fact  that  asylum  applicants 
must  meet  the  legal  standards  in  order 
to  be  granted  asylum.  We  are  well 
aware  that  much  criticism  could  be  end- 
ed were  the  number  of  Salvadoran 
asylum  applications  that  are  approved 
higher.  But,  to  approve  asylum  applica- 
tions for  partisan  political  reasons  would 
ignore  the  law.  We  recommend  in  favor 
of  applications  that  meet  the  standards 
and  against  those  that  do  not. 

Deportation  Considerations 

The  argument  is  then  made  that  all 
Salvadorans,  even  those  who  do  not 
qualify  for  asylum,  should  not  be 
deported  to  El  Salvador  but  rather 
allowed  to  remain  here.  As  you  know, 
the  Administration  does  not  concur  with 
this  view.  All  suspension  of  deportation 
decisions  require  a  balancing  of 
judgments  about  their  foreign  policy, 
humanitarian,  and  immigration  policy 
implications. 

In  the  case  of  El  Salvador,  the  im- 
migration policy  implications  of  suspen- 
sion of  deportation  are  enormous.  Here 
we  have  a  country  with  a  history  of 
large-scale  illegal  immigration  to  the 
United  States.  Can  anyone  doubt  that  a 
suspension  of  deportation  would  increase 
the  amount  of  illegal  immigration  from 
El  Salvador  to  the  United  States?  An  in- 
telligent and  industrious  Salvadoran 
weighing  a  decision  to  try  illegal  im- 
migration to  the  United  States  knows 
that  one  of  the  risks  is  deportation, 
which  might  occur  before  he  has  had  a 
chance  to  earn  back  the  costs  of  the 
journey.  If  we  remove  that  possibility  of 
deportation,  it  is  simple  logic  to  suggest 
that  illegal  entry  becomes  a  more  attrac- 
tive investment. 

Of  course,  not  all  Salvadoran 
migrants  to  the  United  States  are  solely 
or  primarily  economic  migrants;  some 
are  refugees  who  may  be  and  have  been 
granted  asylum,  and  they  do  not  need 
suspension  of  deportation  to  be  pro- 


tected. So,  by  definition,  when  we 
discuss  suspension  of  deportation  for  the 
group  which  is  not  eligible  for  asylum, 
what  we  are  discussing  is  whether  peo- 
ple who  emigrate  from  El  Salvador  to 
the  United  States  illegally  should  be  per- 
mitted to  reside  here.  If  one  says  yes  to  i 
this  question  then  we  do  not  have  an  im- 
migration policy  with  regard  to  El 
Salvador.  We  have  abdicated  the  respon- 
sibility to  have  one. 

It  was  the  failure  of  our  government 
to  have  a  coherent  approach  to  refugee 
flows  that  prompted  the  Congress  to 
pass  the  Refugee  Act  of  1980.  It  was  tht 
specific  intent  of  the  Congress  to  end 
nationality-specific  measures  that  pro- 
vided benefits  for  persons  from  one 
country  and  left  other  persons  with 
similar  claims  in  limbo.  It  was  also  the 
Refugee  Act  that  made  part  of  our  law 
the  UN  High  Commissioner's  definition 
of  refugee  that  requires  each  asylum  ap 
plication  to  be  examined  on  an  individuE 
basis. 

We  believe  our  government  should 
avoid  single  nationality  legislation.  We 
also  believe  passage  of  immigration 
reform  legislation  provides  long-term 
solutions  to  some  of  our  immigration 
problems.  Many  Salvadorans,  as  well  a 
persons  of  other  nationalities,  will  be 
permitted  to  achieve  legal  resident 
status  through  provisions  of  the 
amnesty. 

Some  groups  argue  that  illegal 
aliens  who  are  sent  back  to  El  Salvado 
meet  persecution  and  often  death.  Ob- 
viously, we  do  not  believe  these  claims 
or  we  would  not  deport  these  people. 
Twice,  in  recent  years,  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy in  San  Salvador  has  tracked 
deportees  to  determine  if  they  were  be 
ing  persecuted;  we  concluded  that  the\ 
were  not.  Last  year  we  asked  some  of 
ficials  of  Tutela  Legal,  which  is  the 
human  rights  office  of  the  Archdiocest 
of  El  Salvador,  whether  they  believed 
there  was  a  pattern  of  persecution  of 
deportees.  They  replied  that  they  did 
not.  It  is  noteworthy  that  these  accus; 
tions,  which  are  lodged  by  some 
American  activist  groups  critical  of  U 
policy  in  El  Salvador,  find  no  echo  noi 
did  they  find  their  source  in  complaint 
from  Salvadoran  human  rights  groups 
which  have  never  made  this  claim.  An 
that  stands  to  reason.  El  Salvador  is  ; 
country,  as  noted  above,  in  which 
emigration  abroad  is  a  common  and 
respected  means  of  self-improvement, 
and  it  is  engaged  in  by  hundreds  and 
thousands  of  Salvadorans,  by  perhaps 
quarter  of  the  population.  I  submit  th 
the  notion  that  the  people  being  m^^ 

deported  are  easily  identifiable  when 


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HUMAN  RIGHTS 


ley  return  to  El  Salvador  is  false,  and 
le  notion  that  they  are  automatically 
ispect  is  equally  false. 
The  subcommittee  will  be  interested 

learn  that,  in  part,  in  response  to  the 
•eat  interest  expressed  by  Chairman 
iomano  L.]  Mazzoli,  Senator  [Alan  K.] 
mpson,  and  others,  we  have  continued 

study  the  treatment  of  deportees.  The 
mbassy  in  San  Salvador  was  sent  the 
imes  of  nearly  500  deportees,  selected 
,  random.  Efforts  were  made  to  con- 
,ct  every  one  of  them  in  order  to  see 
hat  happened  to  them  after  their 
turn.  We  have  been  able  to  locate  or 
id  out  about  roughly  50%  of  them,  us- 
g  Salvadoran  employees  so  as  to  draw 

little  attention  as  possible  to  this 
hole  survey. 

We  have  now  completed  the  study 
id  we  will  be  happy  to  share  the 
)ecific  information  gathered  as  soon  as 
le  final  report  is  ready  for  release.  I 
in  tell  you,  though,  that  we  found  no 
'idence  of  mistreatment  of  those 
ilvadorans  interviewed,  or  among 
lose  whose  welfare  was  verified 
rough  contact  with  family  members  or 
lends.  One  interesting  note  is  that  21% 

those  who  were  located  are,  according 

family  or  friends,  already  back  in  the 
nited  States. 

We  have  confirmed  that  one 
turnee  was  killed.  His  wife  reports 
at  the  guerrillas  killed  him  for  his 
irlier  involvement  with  government 
curity  forces.  A  letter  sent  to  the  ad- 
•ess  furnished  by  a  second  person  was 
turned  marked  "deceased."  The  Em- 
issy  was  unable  to  obtain  any  further 
formation. 

I  would  not  suggest  to  this  subcom- 
ittee  that  we  have  completed  here  the 
'finitive  scientific  study  and  that  no 
rther  efforts  are  needed.  But  surely 
ere  must  come  a  time  when  any 
)server  concludes  that  this  alleged  pat- 
rn  of  wide-scale  abuse  of  deportees  is 
•isupported  by  evidence. 

umanitarian  Assistance 

am  sometimes  asked  why  the  United 
tates  does  not  do  anything  to  solve  the 
jmanitarian  problem  of  poverty  and 
splaced  persons  and  violence  in  El 
alvador.  This  is  a  startling  question, 
hen  you  consider  the  enormous  amount 
"  American  diplomatic  and  political  ef- 
)rt  aimed  at  bringing  democracy  and 
sace  to  El  Salvador,  and  the  extraor- 
inary  amounts  of  economic  aid  which 
e  give  and  increased  amounts  which 
le  Administration  has  urged  upon 
ongress. 


Our  proposal  of  $341  million  in 
economic  assistance  for  FY  1985  to  El 
Salvador  is  certainly  a  valuable  response 
to  the  humanitarian  problem  there.  I  do 
not  believe  that  the  appropriate 
response  to  the  problems  of  poverty  or 
violence  in  El  Salvador  is  to  allow  any 
Salvadoran  who  wishes  to  simply  live  in 
America  instead— any  more  than  I  think 
this  is  true  for  Guatemala,  Haiti, 
Nicaragua,  Sri  Lanka,  Afghanistan, 
Iran,  Uganda,  Ethiopia,  Lebanon,  Viet- 
nam, or  Zimbabwe.  My  point,  of  course, 
is  that  in  a  very  large  number  of  cpun- 
tries  millions  of  people,  and  indeed,  tens 
of  millions,  face  lives  which  any 
American  can  only  view  as  desperate. 
How  do  we  respond?  We  respond  with 
our  willingness  to  allow  hundreds  of 
thousands  to  legally  immigrate  to  the 
United  States.  We  respond  with  our 
asylum  and  refugee  programs,  which  are 
the  most  generous  in  the  world.  We  re- 
spond with  our  foreign  aid  program, 
now  totaling  $8.89  billion  including  the 


pending  supplemental  request.  And  we 
respond  with  various  political  and 
diplomatic  efforts  to  resolve  disputes 
and  reduce  violence.  It  does  not  seem  to 
me  that  a  sensible  response  can  be  to 
say  that  all  these  people,  if  they  can 
make  it  to  the  United  States,  can  stay. 
We  can  and  we  must  do  very  many 
things  to  address  the  urgent  and 
desperate  humanitarian  needs  of  tens  of 
millions  of  people  throughout  the  world, 
but  one  thing  we  really  cannot  do  for 
them  all  is  tell  them  to  move  to 
America. 

I  therefore  respectfully  suggest  that 
the  current  policy  is  an  appropriate  one, 
combining  large  amounts  of  economic 
assistance,  energetic  diplomatic  efforts, 
and  the  grant  of  asylum  to  those  with  a 
well-founded  fear  of  persecution. 


'The  completed  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Persecution  and  Restrictions 
of  Religion  in  Nicaragua 


by  Elliott  Abrams 

Address  before  the  United  Jewish  Ap- 
peal on  June  28,  198U.  Mr.  Abrams  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Humayi  Rights 
and  Humanitarian  Affairs. 

As  I  am  sure  everyone  here  knows,  on 
July  20,  1983,  President  Reagan  drew 
attention  to  the  plight  of  the  tiny  Jewish 
community  of  Nicaragua  at  a  White 
House  conference.  "Virtually  the  entire 
Jewish  community  of  Nicaragua  has 
been  frightened  into  exile,"  the  Presi- 
dent declared.  "Their  synagogue,  which 
had  its  doors  torched  by  Sandinista  sup- 
porters in  1978,  has  since  been  con- 
fiscated and  turned  into  offices  of  a  San- 
dinista organization." 

Needless  to  say,  the  President's 
remarks  provoked  a  firestorm  of  con- 
troversy. The  Nicaraguan  Government 
and  its  apologists  in  this  country,  and 
some  Americans  who  should  know  bet- 
ter, indignantly  denied  that  the  San- 
dinistas were  anti-Semitic.  Some  of  the 
President's  critics  even  accused  him  of 
fabricating  anti-Semitic  allegations  in 
order  to  win  support  for  U.S.  policy  in 
Central  America.  For  this  reason,  I  am 


very  pleased  to  have  been  asked  to 
speak  to  you  this  afternoon  on  the 
Jewish  community  in  Nicaragua. 

Overall  Religious  Conditions 

Before  turning  to  the  fate  of  Nicaraguan 
Jewry,  however,  I  want  to  spend  just  a 
few  moments  discussing  freedom  of 
religion  in  general  in  Nicaragua.  My 
reason  for  doing  so  should  be  obvious.  If 
it  were  the  case,  for  example,  that  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  scrupulously 
respects  the  rights  of  Catholics,  of  Prot- 
estants, and  of  Indians,  then  even  if 
there  were  well-documented  incidents  of 
anti-Semitism  in  Nicaragua,  I  think 
many  of  us  would  be  inclined  to  give  the 
Sandinistas  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  and 
to  attribute  such  incidents  to  vicious  and 
misguided  individuals,  rather  than  to  the 
government.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it 
turned  out  that  virtually  all  non-Jewish 
religious  groups  in  Nicaragua  were  be- 
ing persecuted,  then  it  would  stand  to 
reason  that  the  Jewish  community  would 
also  be  subjected  to  persecution.  To 
believe  otherwise  would  be  to  argue,  in 
effect,  that  the  Sandinistas  are  philo- 
Semitic,  and  no  one,  not  even  the  San- 
dinistas, have  made  that  particular  argu- 
ment. 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


What,  then,  is  the  overall  situation 
with  regard  to  freedom  of  religion  in 
Nicaragua?  As  I  am  sure  all  of  you 
know,  about  85%  of  the  Nicaraguan 
population  is  Catholic.  If  you  have  been 
following  the  situation  in  Nicaragua  you 
also  know  that  the  Sandinista  regime 
and  the  Catholic  Church  are  locked  in  a 
bitter  struggle.  You  are  probably  aware 
that  the  Sandinista  government  has 
openly  challenged  the  influence  of  the 
Catholic  Bishops  of  Nicaragua,  especially 
that  of  Archbishop  Obando  y  Bravo.  You 
know  that  the  regime  has  denied  the 
Archbishop  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church  the  traditional  opportunity  to 
broadcast  the  Mass  on  television  during 
Holy  Week  and  has  openly  insulted  the 
Pope.  You  know  that  government- 
organized  mobs  have  interrupted 
Masses,  harassed  churchgoers,  threat- 
ened priests,  and  physically  attacked 
members  of  the  clergy.  You  know  that 
100,000  Nicaraguan  Catholics  attended  a 
rally  on  Good  Friday  this  year  to 
demonstrate  their  support  for  the 
church  and  their  hostility  to  the  regime. 
And  you  know  that  in  a  homily  to  some 
4,000  Nicaraguans  several  weeks  ago, 
the  head  of  the  Nicaraguan  Bishops' 
Conference,  Bishop  Pablo  Antonia  Vega, 
said,  "The  tragedy  of  the  Nicaraguan 
people  is  that  we  are  living  with  a 
totalitarian  ideology  that  no  one  wants 
in  this  country." 

Because  of  the  great  strength  of  the 
Catholic  Church  in  Nicaragua,  the  San- 
dinista strategy  has  been  to  infiltrate, 
censor,  and  control  it,  rather  than  to 
eradicate  it  outright.  The  Sandinistas 
have  actually  launched  a  two-pronged  at- 
tack on  the  Catholic  Church  as  an  in- 
stitution. On  the  one  hand,  they  have 
taken  a  series  of  steps  aimed  at  silenc- 
ing and  undermining  the  episcopal 
hierachy  of  the  church  in  Nicaragua. 
Simultaneously,  they  have  supported  the 
formation  of  a  rival  "popular"  or 
"people's"  church  subservient  to  the 
regime. 

In  response,  Nicaragua's  Archbishop 
Obando  has  condemned  "those  who  are 
trying  to  divide  the  church"  and  spread 
the  idea  that  there  is  "one  bourgeois 
church  and  another  church  for  the  poor." 
The  Vatican  has  become  so  alarmed  at 
the  attempt  of  the  Sandinistas  to  divide 
the  church  in  Nicaragua  that  the  Pope 
issued  a  Pastoral  letter  on  June  29, 
1982,  which  criticized  advocates  of  the 
"popular  church."  Despite  that  fact,  the 
Sandinistas  and  their  supporters  in  the 
church  continue  to  portray  the  official 
church  hierachy  as  "bourgeois"  and  "op- 
pressors," attempting  to  polarize  the 


faithful  and  create,  in  effect,  a  new 
church  controlled  by  the  regime. 

If  the  Sandinistas  have  been  forced 
to  adopt  a  somewhat  indirect  approach 
in  their  efforts  to  undermine  the  power- 
ful Catholic  Church  in  Nicaragua,  they 
have  been  under  no  similar  inhibitions  in 
dealing  with  the  far  less  powerful 
Nicaraguan  Protestant  churches.  Among 
the  Protestant  groups  harassed  by  the 
Sandinistas  are  the  Seventh-day  Adven- 
tists,  the  Mennonites,  Jehovah's 
Witnesses,  the  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of 
Latter-day  Saints,  and  the  Moravian 
Church.  By  August  1982  more  than  20 
Managua  Protestant  churches  had  been 
seized  by  Sandinista-led  mobs.  Some, 
but  not  all,  of  the  confiscated  properties 
were  returned,  but  only  on  condition 
that  the  ministers  refrain  from  criticiz- 
ing the  government.  In  addition,  the 
Salvation  Army  was  forced  out  of 
Nicaragua  in  August  1980,  after 
ominous  verbal  threats  from  authorities, 
and,  finally,  instructions  to  close  up  the 
program  and  leave  the  country. 

Perhaps  the  most  tragic  case  of 
government  persecution  in  Nicaragua, 
however,  is  that  inflicted  on  the  Miskito, 
Sumo,  and  Rama  Indians  of  Nicaragua's 
isolated  Atlantic  coast.  Most  of  the 
members  of  these  tribes  are  members  of 
minority  Protestant  churches,  especially 
the  Moravian  Church.  Living  in  isolation 
from  most  of  Nicaragua,  they  have  had 
little  to  do  with  any  government.  The 
Moravian  missionaries  filled  the  gap  by 
providing  most  of  the  schools,  hospitals, 
and  support  organizations  that  main- 
tained the  area. 

The  campaign  of  persecution  against 
the  Indians  has  thus  far  been  directed 
largely  at  their  religious  leaders  and  in- 
stitutions. In  attacking  the  Indians' 
religious  leaders,  the  Sandinistas  are  at- 
tacking their  source  of  unity  and 
strength. 

Upon  coming  to  power  the  San- 
dinistas sealed  off  the  entire  Atlantic 
coast.  Travel  to  the  region  was  allowed 
only  by  special  permit.  Indians  were 
drafted  into  the  militia.  Those  who 
refused  were  shot  or  forcibly  relocated. 
Villages  were  forcibly  evacuated  and 
then  burned.  By  midsummer  1982,  the 
Sandinistas  had  destroyed  55  Moravian 
Churches. 

In  November  of  1982,  the 
Misurasata  Council  of  Ancients  (elders), 
the  leg^itimate  representatives  of  the 
people  of  the  three  tribes,  officially  de- 
nounced the  Sandinista  government 
before  the  Organization  of  American 
States. 

In  summary,  then,  when  we  examine 
the  state  of  religious  freedom  in 


Nicaragua  for  Christians,  the  following 
pattern  emerges:  harrassment  and 
subversion  directed  against  the  powerful 
Catholic  Church,  brutal  and  undisguised 
repression  against  the  far  weaker  Prot- 
estant churches.  All  of  which  is  to  say 
that  in  relation  to  the  churches,  the  San^ 
dinistas  have  behaved  the  way  Marxist- 
Leninists  always  behave:  they  have 
sought  to  destroy  the  weaker  churches, 
and  to  subvert  the  more  powerful 
churches. 

Jewish  Persecution 

With  this  background  in  mind,  let  me 
turn  now  to  the  situation  of  the  Jewish 
community  in  Nicaragua.  A  principal 
source  of  information  about  Nicaraguan 
Jews  is  Rabbi  Morton  Rosenthal  of  the 
ADL's  Latin  American  Affairs  Depart- 
ment. When  Nicaraguan  Jews  came  to 
the  ADL  and  informed  it  that  being 
Jewish  was  a  major  factor  in  their 
forced  exile  and  loss  of  properties,  the 
ADL  made  representations  on  their 
behalf,  in  1981,  to  the  Foreign  Minister 
of  Nicaragua.  The  ADL  hoped  that 
through  "quiet  diplomacy"  it  could  obta 
some  clarification  from  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  about  the  reasons  for  the 
confiscations  and  the  forced  exiling  of 
the  Jewish  community.  After  19  month 
having  concluded  that  the  Government 
of  Nicaragua  was  not  going  to  respond 
to  any  of  its  questions,  the  ADL  publi- 
cized the  plight  of  Nicaragua's  Jews  w 
an  article  by  Rabbi  Rosenthal  entitled 
"Nicaragua  Without  Jews." 

Rabbi  Rosenthal  points  out  that  th 
Jewish  community  in  Nicaragua  has 
always  been  small,  numbering  about  5 
families  at  its  peak.  Jews  began  comir 
to  Nicaragua  in  the  late  1920s  from 
Eastern  Europe.  They  dedicated 
themselves  to  farming,  manufacturing 
and  retail  sales  and  made  significant 
contributions  to  Nicaragua's  economic 
development. 

Nicaraguan  Jews  never  encounter  ^ 
anti-Semitism  until  the  Sandinistas 
started  their  revolution.  Even  before   Ijgi 
Sandinistas  came  to  power  they  begai 
threatening  Jews.  A  favorite  tactic  w; 
to  anonymously  phone  Jewish  homes 
with  warnings  that  "We  are  going  to 
you  Jews,"  claiming  that  Nicaraguan 
Jews  were  responsible  for  Israeli  arm 
sales  to  the  Somoza  regime.  Graffiti  I 
Sandinistas  was  widespread,  with  at- 
tacks on  Jews  and  their  religion.  One 
was  "Death  to  the  Jewish  Pigs."  The 
Sandinista  initials — FSLN  [Sandinist; 
National  Liberation  Front] — in  red  ai 
black  left  no  doubt  as  to  who  was 
responsible.  Another  slogan  painted  ( 


lit 
u 

« 

It 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


ynagogue  walls,  and  elsewhere,  by  San- 
inista  supporters  was  "Israel,  Jews  and 
omoza— The  Same  Thing." 

In  1978,  the  synagogue  in  Managua 
/as  attacked  by  five  Sandinistas  wear- 
ig  face  handkerchiefs.  They  set  the 
uilding  on  fire  by  throwing  gasoline  in 
he  main  entrance  doors,  shouting  PLO 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization]  vic- 
pry  slogans  and  anti-Jewish  defamatory 
inguage.  As  the  doors  caught  fire,  two 
lembers  of  the  community,  at  prayer 
uring  Sabbath  services,  ran  through  a 
ide  door.  The  Sandinistas  met  them 
'ith  a  show  of  automatic  weapons  and 
rdered  them  inside.  The  two  members 
f  the  congregation,  incidentally,  were 
oth  survivors  of  the  Nazi  concentration 
amps. 

When  the  Sandinistas  came  to 
ower  in  July  1979,  the  storm  broke, 
ome  members  of  the  Jewish  community 
'ere  advised  to  leave  "for  their  own 
afety."  Others,  who  had  gone  abroad 
uring  the  last  months  of  the  revolu- 
lonary  stuggle,  found  that  they  were 
nable  to  return.  The  Nicaraguan  Jews 
ent  into  "exile"  mainly  in  the  United 
tates,  Israel,  and  other  countries  of 
Central  America. 

Isaac  Stavisky,  a  textile  engineer 
ho  was  born  in  Nicaragua,  said,  "I  was 
illing  to  return  to  my  native  country 
nd  engage  in  my  usual  activities,  but  I 
■as  stopped  cold."  It  was  suggested  that 
e  refrain  from  returning  for  his  own 
ifety  because  he  and  his  brother-in-law 
ere  considered  enemies  of  the  revolu- 
on. 

The  president  of  the  Jewish  com- 
lunity,  Abraham  Gorn,  was  jailed  after 
le  Sandinista  victory.  Gorn,  who  was 
len  70  years  old,  was  falsely  accused  of 
;ealing  some  land  and  forced  to  sweep 
treets  during  the  2  weeks  of  his  con- 
nement. 

Nicaraguan  Jews  claim  that  Jewish- 
wned  property  was  among  the  first  to 
e  confiscated  by  the  Sandinista  gov- 
rnment,  while  Nicaraguans  of  Arab 
escent,  because  of  the  close  PLO- 
andinista  relationship,  were  able  to  re- 
lain  in  Nicaragua  and  continue  their 
usiness  activities,  often  similar  to  those 
ngaged  in  by  Jews. 

The  Sandinistas  also  commandeered 
lanagua's  synagogue  and  covered  the 
Mr  Stars  of  David  at  the  front  en- 
rance  with  propaganda  posters,  and  the 
iterior  with  anti-Zionist  posters.  And 
ven  after  the  tiny  Nicaragua  Jewish 
ommunity  had  fled,  the  Sandinistas 
ontinued  to  engage  in  blatant 
manifestations  of  anti-Semitism.  In  July 


of  1982,  for  example,  Nuevo  Diario,  a 
Managua  newspaper  which  closely  ad- 
heres to  the  government  line,  published 
an  article  under  the  headline,  "About 
Zionism  and  the  Palestinian  Cause."  It 
spoke  of  "synagogues  of  Satan"  and  de- 
nounced Jews  "who  crucified  Jesus 
Christ  and  .  .  .  used  the  myth  of  God's 
chosen  people  to  massacre  the  Palestin- 
ian people  without  mercy." 

Two  days  later,  July  17,  1982,  the 
same  paper  charged  that  "the  world's 


money,  banking  and  finance  are  in  the 
hands  of  descendants  of  Jews,  the  eter- 
nal protectors  of  Zionism.  Consequently, 
controlling  economic  power,  they  control 
political  power  as  now  happens  in  the 
United  States."  The  paper  even  went  so 
far  as  to  claim  that  President  Reagan's 
support  for  Israel  stems  from  the  fact 
that  he  "must  have  Jewish  ancestry." 

Admittedly,  we  know  of  no  laws  in 
Nicaragua  that  are  aimed  specifically  at 
Jews.  There  may  well  be  no  "official" 


Captive  Nations  Week,  1984 


PROCLAMATION  5223, 
JULY  16,  19841 

Once  each  year,  all  Americans  are  asked 
to  pause  and  to  remember  that  their 
liberties  and  freedoms,  often  taken  for 
granted,  are  forbidden  to  many  nations 
around  the  world.  America  continues  to 
be  dedicated  to  the  proposition  that  all 
men  are  created  equal.  If  we  are  to  sus- 
tain our  commitment  to  this  principle, 
we  must  recognize  that  the  peoples  of 
the  Captive  Nations  are  endowed  by  the 
Creator  with  the  same  rights  to  give 
their  consent  as  to  who  shall  govern 
them  as  those  of  us  who  are  privileged 
to  live  in  freedom.  For  those  captive  and 
oppressed  peoples,  the  United  States  of 
America  stands  as  a  symbol  of  hope  and 
inspiration.  This  leadership  requires 
faithfulness  towards  our  own  democratic 
principles  as  well  as  a  commitment  to 
speak  out  in  defense  of  mankind's 
natural  right. 

Though  twenty-five  years  have  passed 
since  the  original  designation  of  Captive  Na- 
tions Week,  its  significance  has  not  dimin- 
ished. Rather,  it  has  undeniably  in- 
creased— especially  as  other  nations  have 
fallen  under  Communist  domination.  During 
Captive  Nations  Week  we  must  take  time  to 
remember  both  the  countless  victims  and  the 
lonely  heroes;  both  the  targets  of  carpet 
bombing  in  Afghanistan,  and  individuals  such 
as  imprisoned  Ukrainian  patriot  Yuriy 
Shukhevych.  We  must  draw  strength  from 
the  actions  of  the  millions  of  freedom  fighters 
in  Communist-occupied  countries,  such  as  the 
signers  of  petitions  for  religious  rights  in 
Lithuania,  or  the  members  of  Solidarity, 
whose  public  protests  require  personal  risk 
and  sacrifice  that  is  almost  incomprehensible 
to  the  average  citizen  in  the  Free  World.  It  is 
in  their  struggle  for  freedom  that  we  can  find 
the  true  path  to  genuine  and  lasting  peace. 

For  those  denied  the  benefits  of  liberty 
we  shall  continue  to  speak  out  for  their 
freedom.  On  behalf  of  the  unjustly  persecuted 
and  falsely  imprisoned,  we  shall  continue  to 
call  for  their  speedy  release  and  offer  our 


prayers  during  their  suffering.  On  behalf  of 
the  brave  men  and  women  who  suffer 
persecution  because  of  national  origin, 
religious  beliefs,  and  their  desire  for  liberty, 
it  is  the  duty  and  the  privilege  of  the  United 
States  of  America  to  demand  that  the 
signatories  of  the  United  Nations  Charter 
and  the  Helsinki  Accords  live  up  to  their 
pledges  and  obligations  and  respect  the  prin- 
ciples and  spirit  of  those  international 
agreements  and  understandings. 

During  Captive  Nations  Week,  we  renew 
our  efforts  to  encourage  freedom,  in- 
dependence, and  national  self-determination 
for  those  countries  struggling  to  free 
themselves  from  Communist  ideology  and 
totalitarian  oppression,  and  to  support  those 
countries  which  today  are  standing  face-to- 
face  against  Soviet  expansionism.  One  cannot 
call  for  freedom  and  human  rights  for  the 
people  of  Asia  and  Eastern  Europe  while  ig- 
noring the  struggles  of  our  own  neighbors  in 
this  hemisphere.  There  is  no  difference  be- 
tween the  weapons  used  to  oppress  the  peo- 
ple of  Laos  and  Czechoslovakia,  and  those 
sent  to  Nicaragua  to  terrorize  its  own  people 
and  threaten  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  its 
neighbors. 

The  Congress,  by  joint  resolution  ap- 
proved July  17,  1959  (73  Stat.  212),  has 
authorized  and  requested  the  President  to 
designate  the  third  week  in  July  as  "Captive 
Nations  Week." 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Ronald  Reagan, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
do  hereby  proclaim  the  week  beginning  July 
1.5,  1984,  as  Captive  Nations  Week.  1  invite 
the  people  of  the  United  States  to  observe 
this  week  with  appropriate  ceremonies  and 
activities  to  reaffirm  their  dedication  to  the 
international  principles  of  justice  and 
freedom,  which  unite  us  and  inspire  others. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  sixteenth  day  of  July,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 
eighty-four,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America  the  two  hudred  and 
ninth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


policy  of  anti-Semitism.  But  as  Rabbi 
Rosenthal  has  stated,  the  Nicaraguan 
situation  demonstrates  that  one  does  not 
need  official  policy  in  order  to  persecute 
a  small  community.  It  can  be  effected 
far  more  subtly  by  threat,  intimidation, 
and  confiscation,  thus  avoiding  the  con- 
demnation that  Nuremburg-type  laws 
would  invite. 

In  light  of  these  facts,  and  also  in 
view  of  the  government's  behavior 
toward  Christians  and  Indians  in 
Nicaragua,  I  do  not  think  any  sensible 
person  can  fail  to  conclude  that  the  San- 
dinistas are  indeed  anti-Semitic.  What 
remains  to  be  answered,  however,  is 
why  they  are  anti-Semitic?  What  have 
they  got  against  us? 

Nicaragua's  Anti-Semitic  Rationale 

I  think  there  are  two  explanations  for 
Sandinista  anti-Semitism — a  general  ex- 
planation and  a  specific  explanation.  The 
general  explanation  is  that  the  San- 
dinistas—as they  themselves  have  fre- 
quently proclaimed — are  communists, 
and,  as  such,  share  the  general  com- 
munist antipathy  toward  Jews.  The 
specific  explanation  is  that  the  San- 
dinistas have  long  enjoyed  a  close  rela- 
tionship with  the  PLO,  from  whom  they 
have  undoubtedly  picked  up  anti-Jewish 
beliefs  and  attitudes.  Let  me  elaborate 
briefly  on  both  these  explanations. 

The  simple  fact  is  that  one  of  the 
wellsprings  of  our  belief  in  human  rights 
and  the  dignity  of  man  is  the  Jewish 
tradition.  This  tradition  asserts  that  all 
humans  are  created  b'Tzelem  Elohim — in 
God's  image.  From  this  it  follows  that 
men  are  not  to  be  used  simply  as  means 
to  an  end:  rather,  each  is  an  end  in  him- 
self. Every  person  has  an  equal  right  to 
life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness 
by  virtue  of  his  humanity  alone. 
Everyone  has  his  place  in  the  sun,  and 
neither  the  place  nor  the  sun  was 
created  by  the  state. 

For  communists  and  their  allies, 
however,  the  notation  that  a  man  or  a 
woman  can  have  a  greater  loyalty  to 
God  than  to  the  state  is  completely  unac- 
ceptable. Atheism  is  not  an  incidental  or 
peripheral  element  of  their  ideology,  but 
its  very  core:  Communist  and  radical 
parties  claim  for  themselves  the  at- 
tributes of  omnipotence  and  omniscience 
which  Jews  and  others  believe  reserve  to 
God  alone.  Such  parties  also  seek  to  con- 
trol all  political,  economic,  social, 
cultural,  and  other  developments  in  their 
societies,  and  that  whii'h  they  cannot 
control,  they  seek  to  destroy.  For  this 
reason,  communism  can  perhaps  best  be 


understood  as  a  modern  form  of 
idolatry — an  attempt  to  establish  the 
party  as  the  final  arbiter  of  truth, 
justice,  and  morality. 

Because  Jews  are  unwilling  to  aban- 
don their  own  way  of  life  and  submit  to 
totalitarian  governmental  controls,  they 
invariably  arouse  the  enmity  and  hatred 
of  communists  everywhere.  Because 
they  recognize  an  authority  higher  than 
the  state,  they  are  persecuted.  And 
because  the  State  of  Israel  is  a  model  of 
a  vigorous,  successful,  and  thriving  poli- 
ty organized  along  democratic  principles, 
it,  too,  naturally  arouses  the  enmity  of 
communists  everywhere.  Hostility  to 
Jews  and  hostility  to  human  rights  are 
two  sides  of  a  single  coin  and  are 
characteristic  of  communist  regimes  in 
general. 

As  to  the  long-standing  PLO- 
Sandinista  collaboration,  this  has  been 
documented  at  great  length  by  the  ADL, 
by  the  U.S.  Government,  by  Israel,  and 
in  an  excellent  pamphlet  entitled 
"Castro,  Israel  and  the  PLO"  published 
by  the  Cuban-American  National  Foun- 
dation. Suffice  it  to  say  that  Jorge 
Mandi,  a  Sandinista  spokesman,  told  a 
reporter  for  the  Kuwaiti  newspaper  Al 
Watan  (August  7,  1979),  "There  is  a 
long-standing  blood  unity  between  us 
and  the  Palestinian  revolution.  .  .  .  Many 
of  the  units  belonging  to  the  Sandinista 
movement  were  at  Palestinian  revolu- 
tionary bases  in  Jordan.  In  the  early 
1970s,  Nicaraguan  and  Palestinian  blood 
was  spilled  together  in  Amman  and  in 
other  places  during  the  'Black 
September'  battles." 

The  brutal  fact  of  the  matter  is  that 
we  face  a  world  in  which  many  countries 
are  ruled  by  systems  of  despotism  and 
repression.  In  this  world,  Jews  have 
enemies.  America  has  enemies,  liberty 
has  enemies,  democracy  has  enemies. 
And  they  are  one  largely  coherent 
group.  This  group  views  world  politics  in 
terms  of  what  it  calls  the  struggle 
against  "Imperialism,  Zionism,  and  Co- 
lonialism." Imperialism,  of  course,  refers 
to  the  United  States.  Colonialism  refers 
to  our  allies  in  the  Third  World,  and  in- 
cludes countries  such  as  South  Vietnam, 
which  has  already  been  destroyed,  and 
Turkey  and  El  Salvador,  which  have  at 


various  times  been  targeted  for  destruG 
tion.  And  Zionism  refers  to  the  State  of 
Israel,  and — let  us  be  quite  clear  about 


this — to  the  Jewish  people  as  well.  To 
them,  the  enemy  of  humanity  is  the 
same  enemy  whether  he  salutes  the 
Stars  and  Stripes  or  the  Star  of  David. 
It  is,  therefore,  no  accident,  to  bor- 
row an  old  Marxist  phrase,  that  the  San 
dinista  hymn  declares,  "We  will  fight 
against  the  Yankee,  the  enemy  of 
humanity."  It  is  not  an  accident  that 
U.S.  troops  unearthed  on  Grenada  an 
agreement  between  the  New  JEWEL 
Movement  and  Castro's  Communist  Par 
ty  of  Cuba,  stating  the  two  are  united  b 
"active  solidarity  .  .  .  against  im- 
perialism, colonialism,  neo-colonialism, 
Zionism,  and  racism."  It  is  not  an  acci- 
dent that  the  honored  guest  at  the  San- 
dinista's  first  anniversary  celebration 
was  Yasir  Arafat,  to  whom  Interior 
Minister  Tomas  Borge  declared  "We  sa; 
to  our  brother  Arafat  that  Nicaragua  is 
his  land  and  that  the  PLO  cause  is  the 
cause  of  the  Sandinistas."  It  is  not  an  a 
cident,  in  short,  that  whenever  com- 
munists are  in  power,  Jews  are 
persecuted.  Israel  is  attacked,  and  the 
United  States  is  vilified. 

Conclusion 

I  began  my  remarks  this  afternoon  by 
quoting  President  Reagan's  remarks  or 
Nicaraguan  Jewry.  He  concluded  by  sa 
ing  "Please  share  the  truth  that  com- 
munism in  Central  America  means  not 
only  the  loss  of  political  freedom  but  ot 
religious  freedom  as  well."  I  would  like 
to  take  this  opportunity  to  endorse  the 
President's  words.  The  small  Jewish 
communities  throughout  Central 
America  understand  that  communism 
poses  a  real  threat  to  their  very  surviv 
as  Jews.  They  understand  that  the 
Nicaraguans  and  the  Cubans  must  be 
stopped  from  exporting  revolution.  Th 
recognize  that  the  bitter  fate  which 
befell  their  brethren  in  Nicaragua  mig 
easily  be  theirs,  as  well.  And  like  the 
embattled  Jewish  communities  in  Israi 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  they  look  to  us, 
the  American  Jewish  community,  for 
support  and  understanding.  We  canno   "' 
let  them  down 


St 


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HUMAN  RIGHTS 


luman  Rights  in  Cuba 


r  Elliott  Abrams 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
r  Human  Rights  and  International 
'ganizations  and  Western  Hemisphere 
fairs  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
rmmittee  on  June  27,  198Jt.  Mr. 
'rrams  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
uman  Rights  and  Humanitarian 
fairs.^ 

le  history  of  Cuba  over  the  last  25 
ars  is  one  of  the  great  tragedies  of 
odern  times.  It  is  the  history  of  a 
fted  and  industrious  people,  whose 
pes  for  freedom  and  democracy  have 
en  cruelly  and  systematically  denied, 
is  the  history  of  a  liberal  and 
mocratic  revolution  which  overthrew 
e  Cuban  dictator,  Fulgencio  Batista, 
ily  to  be  betrayed  by  an  even  more 
thless  dictator.  It  is  the  history  of  one 
the  greatest  tyrants  of  our  time,  Fidel 
istro,  who  promised  the  Cuban  people 
at  he  would  restore  democracy  and 
spect  for  law  and  human  rights,  but 
stead  established  a  dictatorship  which 
IS  brought  ruin  and  misery  to  his 
ople. 

Cuba  has  been  ruled  for  25  years  by 
e  one  man,  Fidel  Castro,  and  a  group 
!iich  seized  power  in  1959.  The  Com- 
unist  Party  dominates  all  aspects  of 
ily  life,  controlling  the  means  of  pro- 
iction  and  distribution  of  all  goods, 
rvices,  and  information;  public  com- 
unication,  public  welfare,  and  educa- 
)n;  as  well  as  national  defense,  foreign 
lations,  and  public  security.  Under 
ese  circumstances,  the  human  rights 
Cubans  are  systematically  denied, 
bordinated  to  the  aims  of  the  Cuban 
jmmunist  Party,  as  defined  by  its 
lilaximum  Leader,"  Fidel  Castro. 

legal  System  Abuses 

xecutions  to  discourage  political  dis- 
■nt,  for  example,  which  began  when 
astro  seized  power  in  1959,  continued 
roughout  1983.  There  are  credible 
■ports  of  summary  executions  following 
■cret  trials  of  civilians  for  alleged 
)litical  offenses  by  military  tribunals.  A 
ember  of  Jehovah's  Witnesses,  for  ex- 
nple,  was  reported  to  have  been  ex- 
:uted  in  August  1983  for  allegedly 
jreading  "propaganda  to  incite  armed 
?bellion."  A  23-year-old  student,  Carlos 
Iberto  Gutierez,  was  shot  for  belonging 
)  a  group  caught  painting  anti- 
overnment  slogans  on  walls. 


Cuban  police  commonly  round  up 
persons  in  nighttime  arrests.  Friends, 
neighbors,  and  family  members  have  no 
knowledge  of  their  fate  and  frequently 
are  too  intimidated  to  ask.  Usually  these 
persons  are  tried  and  sentenced  in 
secret,  but  sometimes  they  are  inter- 
rogated and  released.  In  1983,  several 
Cuban-Americans  "disappeared"  while  in 
Cuba  visiting  relatives.  No  information 
regarding  their  detention  or  where- 
abouts was  provided  to  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment nor  to  their  relatives  who  inquired 
about  them.  In  one  case,  an  individual 
was  arrested  and  held  incommunicado 
for  3  months.  Upon  being  released,  he 
reported  that  he  had  been  interrogated 
about  alleged  espionage  and  counter- 
revolutionary activity. 

Conditions  in  Cuban  political  prisons 
are  barbaric  and  include  the  use  of  tor- 
ture. Political  prisoners  who  refuse  "re- 
education" are  subject  to  particularly 
harsh  penalties,  including  the  denial  of 
clothing,  medical  attention,  and  com- 
munication with  friends  and  relatives 
outside  prison.  One  former  political 
prisoner,  Jose  Rodriguez  Terrero,  who 
was  released  in  August  1983,  spent  22 
years  in  Cuban  prisons,  including 
months  at  a  time  confined  naked  in  a 
tiny  cell  called  a  "drawer"  which  forced 
the  prisoner  to  curl  up  in  an  embryo-like 
position.  Also  included  among  the  forms 
of  cruel,  inhuman,  and  degrading  treat- 
ment in  Cuban  prisons  is  the  placing  of 
a  prisoner  in  a  small,  sealed,  unven- 
tilated  room,  and  totally  isolating  a 
prisoner  from  other  prisoners  and  from 
the  outside  world.  The  use  of  psychiatry 
for  repressive  purposes  has  been 
reported  by  Dr.  Abdo  Canasi.  He  re- 
ceived a  10-year  jail  sentence  for  his  ex- 
pose, and  since  his  release  from  confine- 
ment he  is  denied  permission  to  leave 
the  country. 

The  Cuban  legal  system  does  not 
provide  internationally  recognized  stand- 
ards of  due  process  for  defendants,  and 
is  used  to  impose  criminal  sentences  on 
individuals  who  have  been  imprisoned 
for  political  reasons,  including  lawyers 
attempting  to  defend  political  prisoners 
and  those  trying  to  establish  free  trade 
unions.  For  example,  in  January  1983,  a 
Cuban  court  sentenced  five  persons  to 
death  for  having  tried  to  organize  a 
"Solidarity-style"  trade  union  movement 
in  Cuba.  Subsequently,  Cuban  author- 
ities arrested  the  attorneys  who  sought 


to  defend  the  five  labor  organizers. 
Groups  such  as  Americas  Watch  and 
Amnesty  International  have  estimated 
that  there  are  over  200  political 
prisoners  in  Cuba;  other  estimates  put 
the  figure  at  about  1,000.  Americas 
Watch  also  estimates  that  there  are  be- 
tween 1,500  and  2,000  former  political 
prisoners  to  whom  the  Cuban  Govern- 
ment continues  to  deny  employment.  In 
its  1983  report.  Amnesty  International 
has  drawn  attention  to  the  fact  that 
other  political  prisoners  are  refused  per- 
mission to  leave  Cuba,  even  when  other 
countries  have  been  willing  to  give  them 


Restrictive  Liberties 

Freedom  of  speech  and  the  press  do  not 
exist  in  Cuba.  All  media  outlets  are 
owned  by  the  government  or  party- 
controlled  organizations  and  operate 
strictly  according  to  Communist  Party 
guidelines.  No  criticism  of  the  policies  of 
the  government,  the  party,  or  the 
leadership  is  permitted.  Artistic  expres- 
sion is  also  covered  by  these  restrictions, 
which  require  that  artistic  works  serve 
to  reinforce  the  goals  of  the  govern- 
ment. Foreign  publications,  except  those 
from  other  communist  countries,  are  not 
available.  Even  private  expression  of  dif- 
ferences with  government  policies  is 
repressed  by  an  informer  network 
operated  by  the  politicized  block  commit- 
tees, known  as  the  Committees  for  the 
Defense  of  the  Revolution  [CDR].  Those 
who  violate  the  prohibitions  against 
criticizing  the  government  are  im- 
prisoned, and  even  those  suspected  of 
potential  opposition  can  be  incarcerated 
or  detained  in  prison  after  the  expiration 
of  their  sentences  under  the  so-called  ley 
de  peligrosidad. 

Freedom  of  assembly  does  not  exist 
in  Cuba  either.  No  free  trade  unions  are 
allowed  to  function.  The  Communist 
Party  operates  a  so-called  "trade  union" 
federation  called  the  Confederation  of 
Cuban  Workers,  which  acts  to  enforce 
labor  discipline,  encourage  higher  pro- 
ductivity, and  reduce  labor  costs,  rather 
than  to  defend  workers'  interests.  The 
rights  to  bargain  collectively  and  to 
strike  are  not  recognized.  In  the  last 
year,  over  200  workers  have  been  prose- 
cuted for  trying  to  organize  strikes  in 
the  sugar  and  construction  industries. 
Five  trade  unionists  were  condemned  to 
death.  But,  according  to  reports,  their 
sentences  were  reduced  to  30  years 
after  their  cases  became  public 
knowledge.  The  Cuban  Government, 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


after  at  first  denying  the  facts,  has  said 
the  "terrorists"  received  severe 
sentences.  At  the  recent  conference  of 
the  World  Federation  of  Trade  Unions 
in  Prague,  the  Cubans  defended  the 
sentences,  explaining  they  were 
necessary  to  block  any  possible  attempts 
to  set  up  a  Solidarity-style  organization. 

Antireligious  Activities 

The  Cuban  Government  also  enforces  an 
active  antireligious  policy.  In  the  early 
years  of  the  revolution,  the  extensive 
Catholic  educational  system  was 
destroyed  by  the  government  and  hun- 
dreds of  priests  were  expelled  from  the 
country. 

Today,  a  network  of  formal  and  in- 
formal restrictions  has  the  effect  of 
limiting  religious  activity.  The  official 
state  ideology  of  atheism  is  taught  on  all 
levels  of  the  educational  system.  Specific 
constitutional  and  statutory  provisions 
are  designed  to  restrict  religious  observ- 
ance and  education. 

Among  other  restrictions  on 
religious  practice  enforced  by  the  Cuban 
Government  are  discrimination  against 
religious  believers  in  educational  and 
employment  opportunities,  prohibition 
on  religious  media,  and  restriction  on 
the  construction  of  new  churches. 
Political  meetings  and  work  obligations 
are  regularly  scheduled  to  conflict  with 
religious  observances.  Cuban  law  pro- 
hibits the  observance  of  religious  events 
when  they  conflict  with  work  obligations 
or  patriotic  celebrations.  The  July  26  na- 
tional holiday,  commemorating  the  at- 
tack on  Batista's  Moncada  barracks  in 
1953,  has  been  promoted  as  a  replace- 
ment for  Christmas,  and  the  availability 
of  toys  for  children  has  been  limited  to 
the  26th  of  July  period  to  the  exclusion 
of  Christmas.  Similarly,  Holy  Week 
observances  are  preempted  by  the  week- 
long  celebration  of  the  battle  of  the  Bay 
of  Pigs. 

Emigration  Restrictions 

Freedom  of  emigration  also  does  not  ex- 
ist in  today's  Cuba.  Although  Castro 
claims  that  Cubans  are  free  to  emigrate, 
and  though  some  left  Cuba,  as  in  the 
Mariel  exodus  of  1980,  the  Cuban 
government  routinely  refuses  to  allow 
citizens  to  leave  the  country;  there  is 
thus  a  backlog  of  some  200,000  Cubans 
who  have  applied  to  emigrate.  Those 
who  opt  to  leave  Cuba  lose  their  jobs, 
ration  cards,  housing,  and  personal 
possessions.  Then  the  emigrants  are  sub- 
jected to  government-orchestrated  mob 


attacks  call  "assemblies  of  repulsion" 
and  are  required  to  work  in  agriculture 
until  they  leave  the  island,  a  period  that 
can  extend  indefinitely.  As  an  example 
of  the  extent  to  which  people  will  go  to 
leave  Cuba,  in  early  1983  three  young 
Cubans  seized  a  small  group  of 
American  tourists  in  Villa  Clara  prov- 
ince and  held  them  hostage  to  force  the 
Cuban  Government  to  permit  the 
Cubans  to  depart  the  country.  The 
Americans  were  subsequently  freed,  and 
the  young  Cubans  reportedly  sentenced 
to  death  (later  reportedly  commuted  to 
30  years  in  prison). 

The  Cuban  Government  still  refuses 
to  permit  the  departure  of  some  Cubans 
who  sought  asylum  in  the  Venezuelan 
and  Peruvian  Embassies  in  Havana 
more  than  3  years  ago.  Persons  who 
have  attempted  to  flee  Cuba  by  seeking 
refuge  in  diplomatic  missions  have  been 
arrested  and  sentenced  to  terms  of  up  to 
30  years.  According  to  an  Agence 
France  press  report,  for  example,  the 
noted  Cuban  dissident,  Ricardo  Bofill 
Pages,  was  arrested  on  September  27, 
1983.  In  April,  Bofill  had  sought  refuge 
in  the  French  Embassy,  but  was  in- 
structed to  leave  the  embassy  after  the 
French  Ambassador  received  assurances 
from  the  Cuban  Vice  President,  Carlos 
Rafael  Rodriguez,  that  he  would  be 
allowed  to  leave  the  country.  Subse- 
quently, two  Agence  France  press  per- 
sonnel who  tried  to  interview  Bofill  were 
put  under  house  arrest  and  expelled 
from  Cuba  after  9  days. 

The  case  of  Cuban  Ambassador 
Gustavo  Arcos  Bergnes  is  also  instruc- 
tive. Arcos  fought  and  was  wounded  at 
Castro's  side  during  the  attack  on 
Batista's  Moncada  barracks.  When 
Castro  took  power,  Arcos  was  named 
Cuban  Ambassador  to  Belgium,  the 
Netherlands,  and  Luxembourg.  But,  in 
the  mid-1960s  he  was  recalled  and  im- 
prisoned for  4  years  for  his  democratic 
beliefs.  In  1979  his  son  was  gravely  in- 
jured in  a  motorcycle  accident  in 
Florida.  The  U.S.  Congress  appealed  to 
the  Cuban  Government  to  allow  Arcos 
to  visit  his  son.  The  appeal  was  refused. 
Months  later,  Arcos  was  charged  with 
attempting  to  leave  the  island  without 
the  necessary  papers  and  was  given  a 
7-year  prison  sentence. 

The  reverse  policy,  forced  emigra- 
tion, can  be  just  as  cruel.  Suddenly,  in 
1980  the  emigration  gates  were  opened. 
During  the  rush  that  followed  out  of  the 
port  of  Mariel,  when  125,000  Cuban 
"boat  people"  fled  to  our  shores,  the 
Castro  government  shipped  along  com- 
mon criminals  and  many  of  Cuba's 


psychiatric  patients.  The  American 
Psychiatric  Association  denounced  this 
action  on  September  28,  1980,  saying  it 
was: 

.  .  .  Deeply  concerned  about  the  plight  of 
numerous  recent  refugees  who  have  been 
identified  as  mentally  ill.  There  is  growing 
evidence  that  many  of  these  Cuban  citizens 
were  bused  from  Cuban  mental  hospitals  to 
the  Freedom  Flotilla  to  the  United  States.  1  f 
this  is  the  case,  the  transplantation  of  thesi- 
patients  constitutes  a  grossly  inhumane  act 
since  it  deprives  the  patients  of  their  right  to 
psychiatric  treatement  within  the  context  of 
their  culture  and  primary  language. 

To  date  the  Cuban  Government  is 
still  refusing  to  take  back  any 
Marielitos— including  those  who  seek 
voluntarily  to  return. 


Standard  of  Living 

The  Cuban  Constitution  states  that  "the 
home  is  inviolable."  Nevertheless,  no 
aspect  of  an  ordinary  Cuban's  private 
life  is  free  from  government 
surveillance.  Telephones  are  monitored, 
mail  is  opened,  and  one's  comings  and 
goings  are  monitored  24-hours-a-day  by 
block  wardens  in  the  neighborhood  Com 
mittee  for  the  Defense  of  the  Revolu- 
tion. Meetings,  parties,  and  other  ac- 
tivities are  subject  to  particularly  in- 
tense scrutiny.  Listening  to  foreign 
radio  and  television  broadcasts  is 
dangerous  because  of  the  surveillance  b 
CDR  members.  A  jamming  signal  to  in- 
terfere with  Voice  of  America  broad- 
casts has  been  noted  in  the  Havana  are: 
and  presumably  is  used  in  other  urban 
areas. 

The  Cuban  Government  has  never 
allowed  international  groups  to  visit 
Cuba  to  investigate  human  rights  condi 
tions.  Organizations  such  as  Amnesty 
International  and  Americas  Watch, 
which  have  sought  access  to  Cuban 
political  prisons,  have  been  rebuffed.  N 
domestic  human  rights  organizations  a 
permitted  to  exist.  Human  rights  ac- 
tivists in  Cui)a  who  are  not  in  jail  are 
forced  to  carry  out  their  activities 
clandestinely  and  must  rely  upon  inter- 
national nongovernmental  agencies  for 
support  and  publicity.  If  apprehended  1 
the  authorities,  they  are  subject  to  pro  fiy 
ecution  under  Article  61  of  the  Cuban 
Constitution,  which  states  "None  of  thi 
freedoms  which  are  recognized  for 
citizens  can  be  exercised  contrary  to 
what  is  established  in  the  constitution 
and  the  law,  or  contrary  to  the  exister 
and  objectives  of  the  socialist  state,  or 
contrary  to  the  decision  of  the  Cuban 
people  to  build  socialism  and  com- 
munism. Violations  of  this  principle  ca  isi 
be  punished  by  law." 


1(1 


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HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Although  apologists  for  Castro 
iietimes  claim  that  some  human  rights 
lations  were  necessary  in  order  to 
Qg  about  the  rapid  modernization  of 
Cuban  economy,  in  fact,  Castro's  dic- 
orship  has  deprived  the  Cuban  people 
their  opportunity  for  a  better 
nomic  future.  In  1958,  Cuban  income 
capita  was  the  fourth  or  fifth 
hest  in  the  hemisphere.  Independent 
dies  have  repeatedly  shown  that  per 
lita  economic  growth  in  Cuba  is 
ong  the  lowest  in  the  hemisphere.  If 
sent  trends  continue,  by  the  end  of 
century  Cuba  will  be  one  of  the 
ser  developed  countries  of  the 
lericas. 

Castro's  betrayal  has  also  cost  the 
ban  people  their  independence.  In 
9,  Cuba  paid  its  own  way.  Now  even 
stagnant  standard  of  living  can  only 
maintained  with  huge  Soviet  hand- 
s — $4.7  billion  in  economic  aid  alone 
1982,  $25  billion  over  the  last  7  years. 
t  this  aid  is  no  bargain  for  Cubans. 
•  in  return,  Cuba  sends  combat  and 
kup  troops  to  countries  where  the 
nets  seek  to  establish  a  sphere  of  in- 
ence.  In  Angola  and  Ethiopia  they 
1  their  blood  and  that  of  Africans  to 
tect  leftwing  dictatorships  from  the 
;er  of  their  own  people.  All  told, 
re  are  some  70,000  Cubans,  the  so- 
ed  "internationalists,"  who  serve  the 
det  Union's  interests  in  foreign  lands. 
It  comes  as  no  surprise,  then,  to 
"n  that  as  a  result  of  25  years  of  com- 
nist  control,  more  than  1  million 
jans — over  10%  of  the  island's  in- 
dtants — have  fled  their  homeland, 
irived  of  their  civil  and  political  liber- 
.,  their  national  independence,  and 
ir  hopes  for  a  better  future,  Cubans 
e  demonstrated  their  dissatisfaction 
h  the  regime  through  the  only  means 
liable  to  them — by  "voting  with  their 
t." 

nclusion 

s,  in  broad  outline,  is  the  state  of 
nan  rights  in  Cuba.  It  is  not  a  very 
tty  picture.  Neither,  for  that  matter, 
t  a  new  picture.  The  facts  about 
3an  repression  have  been  available  for 
ny  years  now.  Yet  for  just  as  many 
,rs,  not  a  few  intellectuals  and  jour- 
ists  have  been  systematically  denying 
se  facts.  Although  I  will  not  attempt 
describe  this  rather  disgraceful 
sode  in  any  detail,  I  cannot  resist  giv- 
one  example  of  the  kind  of  wild 
information  about  Cuba  which  has 
ped  to  shield  the  regime  from  inter- 
;ional  censure.  I  quote  from  a  book 
Dlished  in  1975  by  two  prominent 


Americans,  Frank  Mankiewicz  and 
Kirby  Jones,  titled  "With  Fidel:  A  Por- 
trait of  Castro  and  Cuba." 

.  .  .  Castro's  Cuba  is  prosperous  and  its 
people  are  enthusiastic,  reasonably  content, 
and  optimistic  about  the  future.  Perhaps  the 
overriding  impression  of  three  trips  to  Cuba 
is  the  enthusiasm  and  unity  of  the  Cuban  peo- 
ple. They  are  proud  of  their  accomplishments 
and  sing  songs  about  themselves  and  their 
country  that  reflect  this  self-pride.  .  .  .  The 
people  work  together  and  work  hard — for 
what  they  believe  to  be  good  for  their 
neighbors  and  therefore  their  country. 

One  of  the  reasons  why  I  welcome 
the  hearings  your  committee  is  holding 
on  the  human  rights  situation  in  Cuba  is 
that  I  hope  they  will  serve  to  correct 


misinformation  of  this  sort.  For  too 
many  years,  Fidel  Castro  has  posed  as  a 
champion  of  progress,  and  has  suc- 
ceeded in  concealing  the  oppressive, 
totalitarian  nature  of  his  regime.  Simply 
by  telling  the  truth  about  Cuba,  we  can 
help  to  expose  Castro  as  the  tyrant  that 
he  is.  At  the  same  time,  by  telling  the 
truth  we  demonstrate  our  solidarity  with 
the  principal  victims  of  Castro's 
regime — the  long-suffering  and  much- 
abused  Cuban  people. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Human  Rights  Situation 
in  Zaire  and  South  Africa 


by  Elliott  Abrams 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
on  African  Affairs  and  Human  Rights 
and  International  Organizations  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
June  21.  1984.  Mr.  Abrams  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Human  Rights  and 
Humanitarian  Affairs.  ^ 

Africa  presents  a  difficult  challenge  to 
U.S.  human  rights  policy.  Single-party 
states,  lack  of  a  free  press,  and  freedom 
of  speech;  weak  judicial  institutions, 
poor  prison  conditions,  and  the  use  of 
force  to  control  dissent  are  all  too  often 
the  rule. 


ZAIRE 

You  have  available  the  1983  human 
rights  report  [Country  Reports  on 
Human  Rights  Practices  for  1983]  which 
sets  out  Zaire's  record  in  detail;  you  can 
see  that  it  is  a  troubled  one.  In  my 
remarks  this  morning  I  would  like  to  de- 
scribe the  political,  historical,  and 
cultural  context  for  understanding  the 
human  rights  situation  in  Zaire.  I  would 
also  like  to  discuss  why  we  believe  it  is 
important  to  maintain  a  strong  relation- 
ship with  this  strategically  important 
country. 

Strategic  Importance 

As  you  are  well  aware,  Zaire  has  long 
been  a  friend  and  key  regional  partner 
of  the  United  States  and  the  West.  It 
has  consistently  worked  with  us,  the 


most  recent  examples  being  the  respon- 
sible role  it  played  while  on  the  UN 
Security  Council  and  its  strong  support 
for  the  Government  of  Chad  in  its  strug- 
gle against  the  Libyan-backed  invasion. 
Zairian  minerals,  notably  copper  and 
cobalt,  are  important  to  the  West. 
Zaire's  strategic  relevance,  which  is  due 
to  its  large  size  and  population  as  well 
as  its  common  borders  with  nine  African 
countries,  has  never  been  more  apparent 
than  now,  as  we  work  toward  political 
solutions  in  southern  Africa.  Stability  in 
Zaire  is  crucial  if  the  delicate  process 
now  underway  is  to  be  maintained. 
Stability  in  Zaire  is  also  the  key  to 
stability  in  central  Africa. 

Zaire  lived  its  first  years  of  in- 
dependence under  extremely  difficult 
conditions.  During  the  colonial  period  no 
Zairians  occupied  positions  of  respon- 
sibility and  very  few  received  a  universi- 
ty education.  Belgian  policy  had  been  to 
control  life  tightly  and  suppress  dissent 
in  the  Congo.  Zaire's  people  were  poorly 
prepared  to  take  over  the  responsibility 
of  governing  themselves.  Judicial  institu- 
tions, disciplined  police  forces,  and 
bodies  of  law  and  regulation  based  on 
normally  acceptable  standards  of  human 
rights  did  not  survive  the  shocks  of  the 
post-independence  period.  Rather,  in- 
dependence unleashed  powerful  forces 
that  Zaire's  fragile  political  structure 
was  unable  to  accommodate.  Hundreds 
of  ethnic  groups,  competing  geographic 
regions,  and  different  ideologies  clashed 
against  the  backdrop  of  East- West 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


rivalry.  Violence  and  anarchy  were  the 
order  of  the  day  from  1960  until  1965. 
Echos  from  this  period  were  heard  as 
recently  as  1977  and  1978,  with  the  two 
invasions  of  Shaba  province  by  exiled  ex- 
Katangan  gendarmes  backed  by  Angola 
and  the  Soviets.  Zairians  still  suffer  the 
emotional  and  social  consequences  of 
these  traumatic  events.  A  desire  not  to 
relive  the  tribulations  of  that  time  goes 
a  long  way  toward  explaining  the  inter- 
nal stability  that  Zaire  has  enjoyed  in 
the  years  that  President  Mobutu  [Sese 
Seko]  has  been  in  power.  As  the  United 
States  could  well  have  to  become  in- 
volved again  if  instability  recurred, 
stable  government  in  Zaire  is  very  im- 
portant to  us. 

Current  Conditions 

I  have  briefly  mentioned  Zairian  history 
in  order  to  give  some  context  to  my 
comments  on  the  current  human  rights 
situation  there,  which  has  serious  short- 
comings. Arbitrary  justice  and  problems 
caused  by  low-paid  and  ill-disciplined 
security  forces  plague  the  country. 
Prison  conditions  are  poor  with  inade- 
quate food  and  medical  care.  People  re- 
main in  preventive  detention  for  long 
periods  of  time  during  investigation, 
because  of  shortages  of  lawyers  and 
magistrates  and  insufficient  funds  for 
such  services  as  transportation  between 
prisons  and  courtrooms.  As  in  most 
Third  World  countries,  the  press  is  con- 
trolled and  the  flow  of  ideas  is 
restricted.  In  addition,  the  country  has  a 
single-party  political  system  which  does 
not  espouse  Western  democratic  prin- 
ciples. President  Mobutu's  response  to 
continued  political  activity  by  ex- 
parliamentarian  activists  who  champion 
a  second  political  party— a  violation  of 
Zaire's  constitution — was  internal  exile 
for  the  leaders  and  the  arrest  of  key 
supporters,  some  of  whom  are  still  in 
jail.  Thus  in  Zaire,  as  in  most  African 
countries,  it  is  not  possible  to  call  public- 
ly for  a  change  in  government  and  re- 
tain one's  civil  liberties. 

Blemished  as  Zaire's  human  rights 
record  is,  I  would  like  to  point  out  that 
progress  has  been  made.  For  example,  a 
positive  area  that  is  little  noticed  is 
Zaire's  acceptance  of  250,000  refugees 
from  neighboring  countries.  There  was  a 
general  amnesty  last  year  which 
resulted  in  the  release  of  political 
prisoners  and  in  the  return  of  several 
prominent  exiles.  The  ICRC  [Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross]  has 
been  able  to  visit  some  Zairian  prisons. 
There  have  been  few  if  any  summan,'  ex- 


ecutions or  disappearances  in  recent 
years.  Human  rights  conditions  in  Zaire 
have  improved  over  the  past  20  years, 
albeit  fitfully  rather  than  steadily. 
Political  opponents  may  be  exiled  to 
small  villages  or  periodically  arrested, 
but  they  are  not  killed  or  imprisoned  for 
life,  as  is  unfortunately  true  in  much  of 
the  Third  World.  Zaire  is  very  sensitive 
to  the  views  of  the  Administration  and 
the  Congress  on  human  rights,  and  our 
concern  has  had  a  positive  effect. 
Although  Zaire  has  a  long  way  to  go, 
the  government  has  shown  it  has  the 
capacity  to  listen  to  others  and  change. 
It  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that 
the  United  States  has  broad  interests  in 
Zaire  and  is  dealing  with  its  government 
on  a  number  of  key  issues.  We  consult 
on  Chad  where  Zaire  has  given  in- 
valuable military  and  political  assistance 
to  the  Habre  government.  When  Zaire 
was  on  the  UN  Security  Council  in 
1982-83,  it  was  very  supportive  of  U.S. 
objectives.  We  also  consult  in  the 
economic  area,  where  the  government 
has  undertaken  major  reform  steps.  In 
1983  Zaire  successfully  implemented 
several  reforms  suggested  by  the  IMF 
[International  Monetary  Fund],  including 
an  80%  devaluation  of  the  zaire  and  the 
institution  of  a  floating  exchange  rate. 
Controls  on  wage  increases  and  the 
liberalization  of  price  controls  have  also 
been  adopted.  The  budget  deficit  has 
been  brought  under  control  in  spite  of 
low  tax  revenues  because  of  severely 
depressed  copper  and  cobalt  prices.  The 
successful  implementation  of  these 
reforms  led  the  IMF  to  approve  $350 
million  in  new  drawings  for  Zaire  and 
official  creditors  to  reschedule  Zaire's 
debt  in  December.  In  reviewing  the 
situation  in  Zaire  we  see  that  they  have 
taken  the  steps  we  have  recommended 
to  all  countries  on  the  continent — adop- 
tion of  a  realistic  exchange  rate, 
removal  of  price  controls  on  foodstuffs 
to  encourage  production,  control  of  the 
budget,  and  encouragement  of  the 
private  sector. 

U.S.  Assistance  Projects 

Respect  for  human  rights  forms  a  part, 
albeit  an  integral  part,  of  our  bilateral 
agenda  with  Zaire.  In  our  dialogue  with 
President  Mobutu  and  his  government, 
our  Ambassador  and  other  high-level  of- 
ficials—including Assistant  Secretary 
|for  African  Affairs  Chester  A.] 
Crocker— consistently  point  out  the  im- 
portance which  we  attach  to  observance 
of  human  rights.  In  addition  to  our 
representations  from  the  highest  levels 


down,  we  are  taking  specific  steps  to 
promote  observance  of  human  rights  in 
Zaire.  Part  of  our  assistance  effort  is 
directly  targeted  on  projects  designed  t( 
promote  human  rights.  One  example  is 
program  financing  the  printing  and 
distribution  of  the  penal  code  to  incrtM.- 
knowledge  of  individual  rights  and 
privileges  under  Zairian  law.  We  have 
also  approved  funding  operations  of  the 
Center  for  Continuing  Legal  Educatinn 
in  Kinshasa.  We  have  provided 
resources  for  a  series  of  magistrate 
training  seminars  to  strengthen  the 
quality  and  scope  of  judicial  services. 

There  are,  of  course,  limits  to  what 
we  can  do  concerning  full  observance  oi 
human  rights  in  Zaire.  We  can  and  dn 
press  the  Zairian  Government  privately 
and  we  can  and  do  target  our  assistanc 
on  creating  conditions  under  which 
human  rights  can  prosper.  We  cannot  f 
as  far  as  some  would  have  us  and  sup- 
port the  opposition  group  which  has 
sought  to  form  a  second  political  party 
in  Zaire.  This  would  constitute  a  direct 
intervention  in  Zaire's  politics,  in  viola- 
tion of  its  constitution,  and  would,  we 
are  convinced,  result  in  worsened  rela- 
tions and  diminished  U.S.  influence  in 
the  human  rights  field. 

Human  rights  concerns  are  central 
to  our  policy  toward  Zaire,  and  are  on' 
aspect  of  a  complex  and  critical  bilater 
relationship.  We  have  other  policy  goa 
which  must  also  be  taken  into  account 
including  political  and  strategic  stabili' 
in  Zaire  and  the  region  and  the  develo 
ment  of  Zaire.  To  protect  our  interest 
and  achieve  our  goals  we  must  mainta 
our  influence  and  deal  with  Zaire 
cooperatively  and  on  the  basis  of 
respect.  This  approach  will,  we  believi 
be  the  best  human  rights  policy  as  we 
and  will  maximize  U.S.  influence  in 
Zaire. 


Ill 


SOUTH  AFRICA 


K 


ft 

irtfi 


Turning  to  South  Africa,  I  intend  to  [ 
sent  to  this  committee  as  factual  a  pi( 
tiire  as  possible  of  recent  developmen  |iBit 
on  the  human  rights  front  in  South 
Africa — both  positive  and  negative 
developments.  A  portion  of  the  inforr 
tion  I  am  providing  here  is  drawn  fro 
the  1983  human  rights  report  on  Sou 
Africa  prepared  by  the  State  Depart- 
ment, which,  I  might  note,  has  been 
praised  by  the  Lawyers'  Committee  f 
International  Human  Rights,  Americ; 
Watch,  and  Helsinki  Watch  as  "one  o 
the  State  Department's  more  success 
efforts  to  portray  the  human  rights 
situation  in  another  country."  I  will  a 
attempt  to  update  that  report  by 


iler 


i 


ii 


aire 
Haw 

ttoi 


Ktfl 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


i  cribing  developments  which  have 
en  place  since  it  was  prepared  in 
ember.  Finally,  I  will  attempt  to  give 
some  idea  of  how  these  factors  af- 
■(  t  U.S.  policy  toward  South  Africa. 
As  we  observed  in  the  1983  human 
Its  report.  South  Africa  is  a 
Itiracial  country  whose  present  con- 
■ution  codifies  the  system  of  apartheid 
I  ler  which  the  white  minority  holds  a 
ri  nopoly  of  power  in  the  country's  na- 
)  lal  political  institutions.  The  result 
I  been  a  parliamentary  democratic 

item  run  by  the  16.2%  of  the  popula- 
1  which  is  white.  Persons  of  "colored" 
xed  blood)  and  Asian  descent  have 
1  no  legal  right  to  political  participa- 
1  at  the  national  level;  and  the  over- 
elming  black  majority  has  also  been 
lied  national  political  participation, 
ept  through  the  device  of  tribally 
ed  "homelands"  or  "national  states" 
ated  by  the  South  African  Govern- 
nt  without  regard  to  whether  blacks 
in  or  wish  to  be  associated  with 
se  areas. 


nstitutional  Reforms 

ith  Africa  has  introduced  a  new  coii- 
lution  which  will  include  a  limited  na- 
lal  franchise  for  South  Africans  of 
)red  and  Asian  descent.  This  constitu- 
1,  approved  by  a  2-1  margin  by  white 
ers  in  a  referendum  held  last 
/ember,  is  scheduled  to  go  into  effect 
September  3  of  this  year.  Although  it 
s  not  allow  for  participation  by 
:ks  in  the  central  government,  the 
ith  African  Government  has  stated 
t  the  constitutional  reform  process 
■s  not  rule  out  further  developments 
iich  could  include  extending  participa- 
1  in  national  political  processes  to 
ith  Africa's  black  majority.  Con- 
srable  debate  is  underway  in  South 
•ica  over  the  meaning  and  direction  of 
se  constitutional  reforms. 
Regardless  of  whether  or  not  the 
V  constitution  represents  reform  of 
irtheid  or  only  its  rationale  and 
dernization,  the  practice  of  apartheid 
lains  the  basis  for  the  organization  of 
ith  African  society.  Apartheid  institu- 
lalizes  political  and  economic  control 
the  white  minority.  Discriminatory 
's  and  practices — such  as  legislation 
iting  South  Africa's  black  citizens  to 
ource-poor  homelands,  the  influx  con- 
1  laws,  the  Group  Areas  Act,  the 
xed  Marriages  and  Immorality  Acts, 
i  so  forth — are  woven  throughout  the 
iric  of  South  African  society.  The 
uth  African  Government  has  also 
icted  legislation  that,  in  the  name  of 


security,  curtails  the  civil  liberties  of 
those  persons  of  all  races  whose 
statements,  actions,  or  associations  are 
viewed  as  a  serious  challenge  to  the 
established  order. 

In  1983  some  improvements  in  the 
human  rights  climate  took  place.  On 
July  1,  for  example,  54  persons  were  un- 
banned, reducing  the  number  of  banned 
individuals  to  12,  the  lowest  number  in 
recent  years.  The  South  African  Govern- 
ment took  tentative  steps  to  recognize 
the  right  of  blacks  to  live  permanently  in 
urban -areas  under  certain  conditions. 
Black  labor  unions  continued  to  grow 
under  the  government's  labor  law 
reforms. 


•  The  efforts  at  limited  power  shar- 
ing under  the  terms  of  the  new  constitu- 
tion are  moving  forward.  The  new 
tricameral  parliament  will  sit  in  an  ab- 
breviated session  during  the  month  of 
September.  Although  blacks  remain  ex- 
cluded from  the  system,  for  the  first 
time  legislation  concerning  blacks  will  no 
longer  be  the  prerogative  of  the  white 
parliament,  but  will  require  the  concur- 
rence of  the  Asian  and  so-called  colored 
chambers.  In  addition,  the  Minister  of 
Constitutional  Development  and  Plan- 
ning recently  told  parliament  that  the 
South  African  Government  does  not 
view  the  new  constitution  as  final,  and  it 


...  a  socioeconomic  process  is  underway 
which  is  contributing  dramatically  to  the  bargain- 
ing power  of  South  Africa's  black  population  as 
well  as  to  the  perception  of  white  South  Africans 
that  the  status  quo  is  untenable. 


On  the  other  hand  detention  without 
charge  or  trial  and  "bannings"  of  in- 
dividuals, organizations,  publications, 
and  gathering  continued.  Despite  orders 
given  by  the  South  African  Government 
in  1982  for  more  humane  treatment  and 
care  of  detainees  held  under  security 
laws,  several  died  due  to  mistreatment 
by  police  officials,  or  allegedly  commit- 
ted suicide  in  1983.  For  the  first  time, 
however,  action  was  taken  against  police 
and  prison  personnel  who  abused  their 
power. 

We  concluded  in  December  1983, 
that  while  one  can  point  to  some  positive 
developments  in  recent  years.  South 
Africa's  fundamental  human  rights  situa- 
tion has  changed  little.  There  remains 
no  effective  judicial  remedy  against  the 
denationalization  of  blacks  into  "inde- 
pendent" tribal  homelands  or  against 
forced  resettlements.  Indefinite  deten- 
tion without  charge  or  access  to  at- 
torney and  other  judicial  acts  without 
due  process,  such  as  banning,  continue. 
The  83.3%  of  South  Africa's  population 
which  is  not  white  suffers  from  per- 
vasive discrimination  which  severely 
limits  political,  economic,  and  social  life. 

Recent  Policy  Developments 

What  has  been  the  picture  thus  far  in 
1984?  Let  me  outline  some  important  re- 
cent developments,  both  positive  and 
negative,  which  have  taken  place.  On  the 
positive  side: 


is  widely  recognized  that  the  issue  of 
black  political  rights  must  be  addressed. 

•  A  Parliamentary  Select  Commit- 
tee is  reviewing  the  Immorality  and 
Mixed  Marriages  Acts,  seemingly  with 
an  eye  toward  the  modification  or  repeal 
of  both. 

•  In  late  April  1984,  the  Minister  of 
Cooperation  and  Development  an- 
nounced the  withdrawal  of  the  new 
legislation  governing  the  movement  of 
blacks  in  South  Africa,  the  highly  con- 
tentious Orderly  Movement  and  Settle- 
ment of  Black  Persons  Act.  Its  demise  is 
partially  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the 
bill  could  have  put  in  question  the  per- 
manent residence  rights  of  urban  blacks 
qualifying  under  Section  10  of  the  cur- 
rent law,  the  Urban  Consolidation  Act, 
including  beneficiaries  of  the  Rikhoto 
decision. 

•  In  February,  the  South  African 
Government  announced  its  intention  to 
open  central  business  districts  in  urban 
areas  to  business  people  of  all  races.  At 
the  same  time,  a  recommendation  was 
made  that  segregation  of  public  facilities 
would  be  discretionary  rather  than  man- 
datory. 

•  No  new  banning  orders  have  been 
issued  since  August  1983.  The  number 
of  banned  persons  remains  at  12. 

•  In  early  May  1984,  the  South 
African  Government  announced  its  will- 
ingness to  relax  the  provisions  of  the 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Prisons  Act  governing  press  coverage  of 
prison  conditions,  shortly  before  an  in- 
vestigative committee  released  findings 
which  shocked  the  public. 

•  On  February  22,  1984,  Sergeant 
J.  Van  As  of  the  security  police  was 
sentenced  to  10  years  in  prison  for 
shooting  Paris  Malatji  while  in  detention 
for  interrogation.  Van  As  was  the  first 
security  policeman  prosecuted  for  an  in- 
cident carried  out  in  the  line  of  duty. 

•  In  April  1984,  three  policemen  at 
the  Dirkiesdorp  Police  Station  were 
fined  for  their  role  in  the  death  of 
Thomas  Manana,  who  died  while  in 
custody  in  early  1983. 

•  On  January  1,  1984,  the  amend- 
ment of  the  Defense  Act  which  provides 
for  alternative  service  for  religious  ob- 
jectors went  into  effect.  The  amendment 
also  created  the  Board  for  Religious  Ob- 
jection which  determines  the  status  of 
religious  objectors  to  military  service. 
Alternative  service  for  conscientious  ob- 
jectors still  does  not  exist.  As  of 
February  14,  1984,  51  people  had  been 
classified  religious  objectors.  They  were 
ail  Jehovah's  Witnesses. 

•  The  situation  in  the  "independent" 
homeland  of  the  Ciskei  has  quieted, 
although  conditions  there  are  still  unset- 
tled and  more  than  30  people  may  still 
be  in  detention. 

•  A  new  Matrimonial  Property  Act, 
designed  to  raise  the  status  of  white, 
colored,  and  Indian  women  before  the 
law,  is  under  consideration  by  parlia- 
ment and  may  be  passed  during  the 
present  session. 


•  Venda  security  police  continue  to 
intimidate  individuals  they  regard  as 
threats  to  state  security.  They  use  sur- 
prise visits,  unexpected  searches,  and 
long  questioning  sessions  in  their  own 
offices  to  frighten  people. 

•  In  February  1984,  Samuel 
Tshikhudo  died  of  illness  while  in  deten- 
tion in  Venda  after  being  held  since 
November  1983  incommunicado. 

•  Resettlement  remains  a  mixed  pic- 
ture. A  decision  not  to  remove  the  peo- 
ple from  St.  Wendolin's  in  Natal  is  offset 
by  the  earlier  removal  of  the  residents 
of  Mogopa.  The  residents  of  Badplaas, 
Leandra,  Driefontein,  Huhudi,  and 
Crossroads,  among  other  places,  still  live 
under  the  threat  of  removal.  The  South 
African  Government  has  not  abandoned 
the  idea  of  the  cession  of  Ingwavuma 
and  Kangwane  to  Swaziland,  which 
would  result  in  the  "removal"  of  large 
black  populations.  Minister  of  Coopera- 
tion and  Development  Piet  Koornhof  ad- 
mitted in  early  May  that  about  2  million 
black  persons  have  been  resettled  by  the 
South  African  Government  since  1960. 
On  April  27  the  Prime  Minister  stated 
that  "forced  removals"  would  no  longer 
take  place  in  the  future.  This  would  ap- 
pear to  mean  that  henceforth  the 
government  will  attempt  to  induce  peo- 
ple to  move  by  offering  better  housing, 
facilities,  and  job  opportunities 
elsewhere.  But  this  would  seem  to 
signify  a  change  in  methods  rather  than 
a  departure  from  the  policy  of  com- 
pleting the  process  of  "consolidation." 


Regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  new  constitu- 
tion represents  reform  of  apartheid  or  only  its  ra- 
tionalization and  modernization,  the  practice  of 
apartheid  remains  the  basis  for  the  organization  of 
South  African  society. 


However,  there  have  been  negative 
developments  as  well. 

•  Detentions  continue;  as  of  May  31, 
1984,  a  total  of  286  persons  had  been 
detained  in  South  Africa  on  political  or 
security  grounds  including  137  in  Trans- 
kei  due  to  recent  student  unrest,  30  in 
Ciskei,  and  1  in  Bophuthatswana,  so- 
called  "independent"  homelands.  Overall, 
the  number  of  persons  remaining  in 
detention  as  of  May  31  is  38,  the  lowest 
figure  for  some  time. 


•  Prison  sentences  for  treason  and 
security  convictions  vary  considerably. 
Carl  Niehaus,  a  white  university  stu- 
dent, was  convicted  of  high  treason  and 
sentenced  to  15  years  in  prison  for  his 
activities  on  behalf  of  the  African  Na- 
tional Congress  [ANC]  and  the  South 
African  Communist  Party.  His  fiancee, 
Johanna  Lourens,  was  sentenced  to  4 
years  for  her  complicity.  Two  professed 
ANC  members  were  convicted  of  high 
treason  and  attempted  murder  in  early 
April.  They  received  10-year  prison 
sentences.  In  December  1983,  Mathews 


Thabang  Ntshiwa  received  a  sentence  ot 
3  years,  of  which  18  months  were 
suspended  for  5  years,  for  advising,  ad- 
vocating, and  encouraging  the  aims  of  a 
banned  organization.  Ntshiwa  owned  a 
mug  which  carried  ANC  slogans.  Also  ii 
December  1983,  Sister  Mary  Ncube 
received  a  12-month  prison  sentence  for 
possession  of  banned  literature.  Eight 
months  of  the  sentence  were  suspended 
for  5  years.  On  the  other  hand,  however 
on  April  2,  1984,  Constable  Nienaber 
was  acquitted  of  murder  in  the  April 
1983  shooting  death  of  Dreifontein  com 
munity  leader  Saul  Mkhize.  The  court 
found  that  Neinaber  acted  in  self- 
defense,  and  that  Mkhize  was  "arrogant 
and  impolite."  Also,  members  of  the 
white  far  rightwing  Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging  received  suspend- 
ed sentences  in  October  1983  for 
charges  of  treason  and  possession  of  il- 
legal weapons,  despite  having  been 
caught  with  a  large  weapon  cache  in- 
cluding AK-47  assault  rifles,  explosives 
and  ammunition. 

•  The  South  African  Government 
has  refused  permission  for  banned 
Pastor  Beyers  Naude  to  travel  to 
Europe  to  receive  an  award. 

•  The  initial  findings  of  extensive 
private  research  reveal  that  black  Sout! 
Africans  suffer  from  vastly  inferior 
standards  of  health,  nutrition,  housing, 
income,  and  education  as  compared  to 
whites. 


In  short,  we  must  conclude,  as  we 
did  in  December,  that  we  are  dealing 
with  a  mixed  balance  sheet;  that  despit 
certain  improvements,  the  established 
system  of  comprehensive  control  over 
the  lives  of  most  South  Africans  remai 
substantially  in  effect.  Nevertheless, 
there  is  a  process  of  change  underway   ,■ 
with  major  implications  for  the  future 
that  system.  This  is  a  fact  which  objec 
tive  observers  cannot  deny.  Those  who 
say  that  the  situation  is  totally  un- 
changed, or  has  gotten  worse,  fail  to 
take  this  into  account.  Nothing  could 
make  this  more  evident  than  the  fer- 
ment surrounding  the  new  constitutioi 
which  reflects  a  clear  consensus  amon; 
white  South  Africans  that  genuine 
change  must  occur  if  they  are  to  sur- 
vive. With  the  expansion  of  parliameni 
to  include  the  Indian  and  so-called  col- 
ored South  Africans,  a  door  has  been 
opened  and  cannot  be  closed. 

One  of  the  major  factors  underlyin 
this  process  of  change  has  been  the 
dynamic  of  economic  growth  combined: 
with  demographics.  Whites  increasing!' 
realize  they  cannot  run  their  economy 


pe 
ail 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


hout  more  skilled  labor,  which  blacks 
being  trained  to  supply  in  ever 
ater  numbers.  Black  awareness  of 
ir  growing  bargaining  power  in  the 
rkforce  is  reflected  in  the  spread  of 
:k  trade  unions.  Simultaneously. 
ck  purchasing  power  is  also  on  the 
!,  and  a  distinct  black  middle  class  is 
act  being  formed  with  the  ability  to 
rcise  important  leverage  in  the  South 
ican  marketplace.  Those  who  believe 
■t  the  formation  of  a  black  middle 
s  will  result  in  political  stagnation, 
!  to  some  perceived  vested  interest  in 
petuation  of  the  status  quo,  fun- 
nentally  misread  what  has  always 
tivated  human  beings,  namely,  a 
ire  not  just  to  obtain  a  higher  stand- 
I  of  living  but  also  to  exercise  the 
edom  which  that  higher  standard 
— but  does  not  always — make  possi- 
In  short,  a  socioeconomic  process  is 
ierway  which  is  contributing 
.matically  to  the  bargaining  power  of 
ith  Africa's  black  population  as  well 
to  the  perception  of  white  South 
■icans  that  the  status  quo  is 
;enable. 

S.  Policy  Toward  South  Africa 

ould  now  like  to  turn  to  the  question 
TOW  this  situation  affects  U.S.  policy 
l/ard  South  Africa.  U.S.  policy  with 
fard  to  apartheid  is  clear.  Morally,  the 
i  ith  African  system  is  completely  con- 
iry  to  our  values.  Morally  "repugnant" 
;  5  the  word  President  Reagan  used  to 

cribe  it.  Politically,  apartheid  nur- 
;  es  instability  which  is  contrary  to 
1  lerican  interests  in  southern  Africa. 
-  national  interest  compels  us  to  pro- 
te  peaceful  but  genuine  evolution 
ay  from  apartheid  and  toward  a 
tern  of  government  based  on  the  con- 
iit  of  all  South  Africans,  regardless  of 
'e. 

As  we  engage  in  this  effort, 
vever,  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the 
t  that  just  as  a  lasting  basis  for 
ional  stability  requires  evolutionary 
inge  toward  government  by  consent 
South  Africa,  so,  by  the  same  token, 

are  not  likely  to  see  internal  change 
iceeding  at  an  adequate  pace  and  by 
nocratic  means  if  escalating  violence 
and  across  frontiers  polarizes  the 
itics  and  deepens  domestic  divisions 
;hin  South  Africa  itself.  Thus,  the 
•efully  negotiated  agreements  involv- 
;  South  Africa,  Angola,  and  Mozam- 
[ue  which  have  been  reached  in  recent 
>nths  hold  immense  potential  for  the 
;ure  of  peaceful,  genuine,  evolutionary 
inge  within  South  Africa  itself.  This  is 


precisely  one  of  the  principal  reasons 
why  U.S.  diplomacy  has  been  so  deeply 
involved  in  trying  to  establish  a  climate 
in  which  such  agreements  could  be 
reached. 

Remarkably,  there  are  elements  at 
all  levels  of  South  African  society  which 
are  themselves  engaged  in  the  effort  to 
promote  peaceful  change,  to  find  a  solu- 
tion to  South  Africa's  problems  which 
somehow  steers  between  the  extremes 
of  continued  repression  and  the  anarchy 
of  racial  conflagration.  One  of  the  fun- 
damental but  least  well  known  facets  of 
U.S.  policy  toward  South  Africa  is  the 
degree  to  which  we  are  involved  in  sup- 
porting organizations  and  individuals 
who  have  committed  themselves  to 
peaceful  change  in  South  Africa.  Such 
support,  in  a  tangible  form,  com- 
plements our  moral  and  political  opposi- 
tion to  apartheid. 

This  year  alone,  with  the  support  of 
Congress,  we  have  devoted  over  $10 
million  in  U.S.  funds  to  programs  de- 
signed to  uplift  those  disadvantaged  by 
apartheid:  programs  to  provide  black 
South  Africans  with  scholarships  for 
university  study  in  the  U.S.,  programs 
to  assist  blacks  in  qualifying  for  a 
university  education,  programs  to  assist 
the  emerging  black  entrepreneur  with 
acquiring  management  skills,  and  pro- 
grams to  train  black  trade  unionists  in 
effective  union  organization  and  bargain- 
ing skills.  As  these  efforts  gain  momen- 
tum, we  hope  that  they  will  increase  the 
overall  bargaining  power  of  South 
Africa's  blacks  in  the  context  of  the 
growing  demand  within  South  Africa's 
economy  for  skilled  workers. 

Congress  has  helped  lead  the  way  in 
providing  the  resources  and  imagination 
for  these  sorts  of  programs.  Most 
recently.  Congress  passed  a  $1.5  million 
Human  Rights  Fund  for  South  Africa, 
which  provided  funds  for  small  grants  to 
be  made  by  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  South 
Africa  to  organizations  which  promote 
human  rights.  To  date  our  Embassy  has 
allocated  $197,650  on  23  projects,  which 
have  supported  activities  such  as 
research  on  the  legal  status  of  black 
women,  farm  schools,  education,  and 
pensions;  the  purchase  of  resource 
materials  for  centers  which  study  legal 
questions;  training  for  labor  unions;  and 
establishment  of  facilities  where  people 
can  meet  to  discuss  human  rights  topics. 

Support  for  peaceful  change  within 
South  Africa  is  not  limited,  I  would  add. 


exclusively  to  the  public  sector.  The  ac- 
tivities of  those  U.S.  firms  which  have 
joined  the  Sullivan  code,  employing 
enlightened  management  practices  and 
providing  substantial  benefits  to  their 
employees  outside  the  workplace,  are 
setting  the  pace  for  progress  in  the  way 
blacks  are  treated  by  employers  in  South 
Africa.  To  date,  U.S.  firms  have  spent 
over  $78  million  on  improvements  for 
black  employees  and  their  families. 

As  I  indicated,  these  efforts  are  in- 
tended to  complement  the  political 
facets  of  U.S.  policy:  our  strict 
adherence  to  the  arms  embargo  on 
South  Africa,  our  refusal  to  recognize 
the  so-called  "independence  homelands," 
and  our  firm  rejection  of  apartheid.  But 
in  addition,  fundamental  to  our  ability  to 
influence  events  in  South  Africa  is  our 
capacity  to  communicate  with  the 
government's  leaders.  With  them  lies  the 
responsibility  for  shaping  South  Africa's 
future.  They  have  the  power  to  deter- 
mine the  speed  and  the  context  of 
reform. 

Let  me  be  plain:  we  do  communicate 
with  these  leaders,  and  frankly.  If  we 
choose  to  speak  in  confidential  channels, 
we  also  do  so  firmly.  No  South  African 
leader  has  the  slightest  doubt  about  the 
strength  of  American  feelings  when 
essential  human  rights  are  abused. 

But  we  must  recognize  that  we  are 
dealing  with  another  sovereign  nation, 
and  by  no  means  the  only  country  in  the 
world  to  abuse  human  rights.  We  cannot 
dictate  to  that  nation's  leaders  how  to 
conduct  their  internal  affairs,  though  we 
certainly  can,  and  do,  offer  our  own 
reactions  to  what  we  see.  We  have 
chosen  the  path  of  constructive  involve- 
ment in  efforts  to  promote  peaceful 
change  in  South  Africa.  Even  if  the  pace 
is  too  slow  to  suit  those  of  us  who  would 
prefer  to  see  white  South  Africans  join 
tomorrow  before  a  stunned  world  in 
sharing  gladly  the  wealth  and  control  of 
their  nation  with  all  their  fellow  citizens, 
one  must  nevertheless  concede  that  our 
course  is  perhaps  the  only  realistic  one. 
We  intend  to  fulfill  our  commitment  to 
promoting  peaceful  change  toward 
government  based  on  the  consent  of  all 
South  Africans  in  the  months  and  years 
ahead. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


PACIFIC 


The  ANZUS  Relationship: 
Alliance  Management 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Address  before  the  Conference  on  the 
American  Effect  on  Australian  Defense 
at  the  Aiistralian  Studies  Center  of 
Pennsylvania  State  University,  Univer- 
sity Park,  Pennsylvania,  on  June  24, 
1981t.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Af- 
fairs. 

ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zealand,  and 
United  States  security  treaty]  is  an 
alliance  of  democratic  nations  committed 
to  peace.  These  two  facts  about  the 
alliance— our  commitment  to  democratic 
freedom  and  our  commitment  to 
peace — are  so  fundamental  to  ANZUS 
that  they  would  be  worth  noting  at  the 
outset  even  were  they  nothing  more 
than  very  broad  statements  of  purpose. 
But  so  far  from  being  mere  shopworn 
generalities,  these  two  facts  have  great 
practical  significance  from  the  basic  role 
and  function  of  our  alliance — and  even 
for  its  day-to-day  management — 
significance  which  is  often  not  suffi- 
ciently appreciated. 

It  is  because  our  nations  are 
democracies  that  the  commitments  we 
make  to  one  another  are  of  great  prac- 
tical consequence  and  also  why  they  are 
so  reliable.  For  our  three  nations, 
vulnerable  as  we  are  to  the  infirmities 
that  are  alleged  to  afflict  democracies  in 
the  conduct  of  their  affairs,  our  alliance 
commitments  are  imporUint  in  bringing 
a  fundamental  continuity  into  our  rela- 
tions. But  it  is  also  because  these  com- 
mitments represent  the  commitments  of 
whole  nations  to  one  another— not  the 
mere  whim  of  arbitrary  rulers— that  it  is 
possible  to  rely  on  them.  There  is  no 
task  more  fundamental  to  alliance 
management  than  the  constant  nurtur- 
ing of  public  support. 

Our  collective  commitment  to 
preserving  peace  is  no  less  profound  in 
its  practical  implications  for  our  alliance. 
It  is  perhaps  to  be  expected  that  so 
much  of  the  discussion  of  ANZUS  con- 
cerns questions  about  what  would  hap- 
pen and  how  the  various  parties  would 
respond  in  the  event  of  war.  The  treaty 
itself,  of  course,  contains  important  com- 
mitments of  mutual  assisUince  in  the 
event  of  armed  attack.  Yet  it  is  no 
depreciation  of  the  importance  of  those 
commitments  to  say  that  the  foremost 
goal  of  the  alliance  is  to  prevent  those 


commitments  from  ever  having  to  be 
called  upon.  The  operation  of  the 
alliance  in  peacetime  is  every  bit  as  vital 
as  its  operation  in  time  of  war— indeed, 
even  more  so.  Particularly  in  a  nuclear 
age,  the  task  of  preserving  peace  is  fun- 
damental to  alliance  management. 

The  Determination  of  National 
Interest  in  a  Democracy 

The  old  aphorism  that  nations  have  no 
permanent  friends,  only  permanent  in- 
terests, is  still  a  popular  one,  but  it  con- 
tains as  much  concealed  falsehood  as  ap- 
parent truth.  Viewing  the  flux  and  per- 
fidy of  19th-century  alliances,  it  was  cer- 
tainly plausible— and  perhaps  even 
somewhat  comforting— to  believe  that 
geography,  historic  rivalries,  and 
economic  interests  provide  the  constants 
in  a  nation's  decisions,  while  policies  and 
alliances  form  and  founder  around  these 
fixed  goals.  A  nation,  so  this  view  goes, 
may  be  obsessed  by  a  particular  threat, 
must  have  particular  ports  or  trading 
opportimities— or,  conversely,  may  have 
no  interest  in  a  distant  land— and  should 
form  its  alliances  in  whatsoever  way  will 
promote  these  ends. 

The  notion  of  permanent  interests, 
impermanent  friends,  left  a  great  deal  to 
be  desired  as  a  model  for  the  conduct  of 
international  relations,  even  in  the  19th 
century.  And  in  a  nuclear  age  it  is  a 
very  dangerous  basis  for  democratic  na- 
tions to  conduct  their  affairs. 

Among  its  other  weaknesses,  the  no- 
tion of  permanent  interests  leads  to  the 
dangerous  fallacies  of  permanent 
disinterest  and  predictability.  These  can 
all  too  often  be  used  to  excuse  neglect,  a 
seductive  choice  for  peace-loving 
democracies  that  sometimes  fail  to 
recognize  the  aggressive  designs  of 
others. 

Why,  so  the  argument  goes,  must  a 
nation  spend  valuable  resources  to  de- 
fend against  distant  challenges?  Why 
maintain  forces  without  a  visible  threat? 
If  grand  political  and  military  goals  are 
constant,  there  is  no  need  to  reassess 
defenses  and  alliances  will  naturally  tend 
themselves.  If  decisions  are  always 
logical,  the  need  to  prepare  for  unex- 
pected contingencies  is  quite  small. 


But  we  know  from  long,  historical 
experience  that  alliances  are  hard  to  put 
together  and  to  keep,  that  illogical  and 
unpredictable  decisions  are  all  too  com- 
mon, and  that  circumstances  can  change 
radically,  often  without  a  shot  being 
fired.  The  fall  of  the  Shah  of  Iran,  the 
Sino-Soviet  split,  the  attempt  to  place 
Soviet  missiles  in  Cuba,  even  a  coup  in 
the  small  island  of  Grenada,  created  new 
strategic  interests  and  shifted  political 
and  military  thinking  abruptly.  Uncer- 
tain or  ambiguous  political  commit- 
ments, even  where  interests  seemed 
otherwise  clear,  led  to  bloodshed  in 
1914,  in  1939,  in  1950,  and  even  in  1982 

I  believe  that  countries,  and  in  par- 
ticular democracies  like  the  United 
States  and  Australia  and  New  Zealand, 
do  have  permanent  interests.  But  they 
are  not  only  or  principally  the  geo- 
strategic  interests  on  which  past  debate 
has  centered.  Our  nations'  permanent  ii 
terests  are  as  much  or  more  in  justice 
and  the  rule  of  law,  in  democracy  and 
freedom,  and  in  peace. 

In  pursuit  of  these  goals,  we  have 
permanent  "friends"  as  well:  continuity 
reliability,  and  strong  alliances  with 
other  nations  that  share  the  same 
values.  Surely  nations  that  defend 
freedom  and  the  rule  of  law  have  a 
sound  foundation  for  the  elements  of 
such  permanent  friendship.  But  these 
foundations  will  only  be  maintained 
through  consistency,  responsible  policif 
and  a  commitment  to  cooperation.  The 
burden  of  maintaining  such  cooperatio' 
and  policies  in  the  first  half  of  this  cen  |^, 
tury  was  too  heavy  to  avoid  world  con 
flagration.  We  must  avoid  such  misste 
in  the  nuclear  era. 

I  would  like  to  discuss  today  the  n 
ANZUS  plays  in  protecting  all  of  our  ■ 
terests  in  peace  and  freedom — both  in 
regional  context  and  as  an  important 
factor  in  the  calculation  of  world  peac 
For  these  issues  are  intricately  linked 


itf 


3; 


Preserving  Nuclear  Peace 

Effective  alliances  require  a  fundamei 
tal  faith  in  the  responsibility  of  our 
allies.  As  no  issue  is  more  important 
today  than  preserving  nuclear  peace, 
responsible  policies  to  this  end  are  a 
crucial  element  in  preserving  confider 
among  our  countries.  For  this  reason, 
would  like  to  begin  a  discussion  of 
managing  ANZUS  with  a  brief  word  >  |'i« 
managing  this  great  issue  of  our  time 
the  threat  of  nuclear  war. 

Surely,  it  is  a  topic  on  which  muc 
has  been  said.  The  dangers  of  nuclear 


lyt 

ork; 
* 


».: 


PACIFIC 


r  have  become  common  political 
jics  worldwide.  In  my  own  country,  no 
ue  takes  greater  precedence.  Preserv- 
r  nuclear  peace  is  a  duty  we  owe  not 
t  to  our  friends  and  fellow  coun- 
rmei\  but  to  all  the  inhabitants  of  this 
met. 

"A  nuclear  war,"  President  Reagan 
s  said,  "cannot  be  won  and  must  never 
fought."  He  has  said  it  in  China.  He 
s  said  it  in  Germany.  He  has  said  it  in 
pan.  He  has  said  it  in  England.  He 
s  said  it  in  Congress.  He  has  said  it 
the  Oval  Office.  He  has  said  it 
oughout  America.  The  essence  of 
esident  Reagan's  policy  on  preventing 
clear  war  can  be  crystallized  in  this 
rase.  It  is  a  principle  that  has  the 
1  support  of  responsible  people 
erywhere. 

Much  of  the  public  debate  on  nuclear 
ues  focuses  on  the  enormous  destruc- 
e  potential  of  existing  arsenals.  Presi- 
nt  Reagan  has  led  the  way  in  the 
sponsible  effort  to  reduce  nuclear 
enals. 

•  He  has  proposed  the  complete 
mination  of  an  entire  class  of  nuclear 
iapons— intermediate-range  missiles— 
d  in  negotiations  with  the  Soviets,  he 
s  rejected  any  solution  that  would 
nply  transfer  such  weapons  from 
aere  they  threaten  Europe  to  where 

:y  could  threaten  Asia. 

•  In  the  strategic  arms  reduction 
ks  (START),  he  has  proposed  deep 

iductions  in  intercontinental  ballistic 
I  ssiles,  a  goal  no  previous  strategic 
1  ms  treaty  has  even  approached. 

Unfortunately,  the  Soviets  tied  prog- 
1 3S  in  START  to  preventing  INF 
I  termediate-range  nuclear  forces] 
I  ployments  in  Europe,  deployments 
at  our  NATO  allies  requested  in  1979 

offset  massive  Soviet  deployments  of 
new  missile,  the  triple-warhead  SS-20. 
ist  November  the  Soviets  walked  out 

the  INF  negotiations  and  in 
jcember  suspended  indefinitely  their 
.rticipation  in  START,  apparently  due 

their  frustration  over  their  failure  to 
event  NATO's  own  counterdeployment 

intermediate-range  forces.  We  are 
ady  to  resume  both  negotiations  at 
ly  time  and  any  place,  without  precon- 
tions.  Our  proposals  are  fair  and 
orkable.  All  the  elements  for  an  agree- 
ent  are  on  the  table.  We  hope  the 
5viet  Union  will  also  come  to  recognize 
lat  its  interests  can  best  be  served  by 
■turning  to  the  negotiating  table  as 
)on  as  possible. 


But  the  United  States  has  not  sim- 
ply waited  on  Soviet  responses  to  con- 
trol nuclear  weapons  and  to  reduce  their 
destructive  potential.  We  have  acted  on 
our  own  to  this  end.  Improvements  in 
our  nuclear  forces  over  the  years  have 
made  them  safer— less  vulnerable  to  sur- 
prise attack,  less  prone  to  accident  or  to 
unauthorized  use,  less  susceptible  to 
seizure  by  terrorists.  These  improve- 
ments in  our  nuclear  forces  are  well 
known,  though  insufficiently  acknowl- 
edged by  those  who  propose  to  freeze  all 
changes  to  those  forces.  What  is 
perhaps  less  well  known  is  the  fact  that 
these  improvements  have  made  it  possi- 
ble to  reduce  the  destructive  potential  of 
our  nuclear  forces  over  the  last  20 
years. 

Both  the  number  and  megatonnage 
of  our  nuclear  arsenal  has  been  substan- 
tially reduced.  Our  stockpile  was  one- 
third  higher  in  1967  than  it  is  now,  and 
the  total  yield  has  declined  by  75%  since 
1960.  The  stockpile  of  U.S.  nuclear 
weapons  in  Europe  has  also  been 
dramatically  reduced.  The  United  States 
and  NATO  allies  withdrew  1,000  nuclear 
weapons  from  Europe  in  1980,  and  we 
agreed  in  1983  to  withdraw  an  addi- 
tional 1,400  weapons  over  the  next 
several  years.  These  reductions  will  be 
realized  even  if  we  have  to  carry 
through  with  the  deployment  of  ground- 
launched  and  cruise  missiles,  as  NATO 
decided  in  1979  that  it  would  do  if  no 
agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  to  ban 
or  limit  those  weapons  can  be  reached. 
For  each  new  weapon  that  would  be 
deployed  in  that  event,  we  have 
withdrawn  an  old  one.  Thus,  when  all 
NATO  withdrawals  are  taken  into  ac- 
count, we  will  have  withdrawn  a  total  of 
five  weapons  for  each  new  one  that  we 
may  introduce  under  the  1979  decision. 

Yes,  America  has  begun  to  rebuild 
its  nuclear  forces,  even  as  we  have 
sought  to  reduce  them.  But  we  have 
done  so  only  after  a  decade  of 
restraint— restraint  unmatched,  indeed 
exploited,  by  our  adversaries.  And  we 
have  done  so  only  to  avoid  the  more 
destabilizing  situation  when  an  adver- 
sary might  be  tempted  by  forces  suscep- 
tible to  a  successful  first  strike. 

The  United  States  has  consistently 
taken  responsible  positions  on  reducing 
the  level  of  nuclear  armaments— posi- 
tions worthy  of  our  allies'  support.  The 
United  States  also  has  undertaken  a 
number  of  other  important  arms  control 
initiatives  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war  and 
halt  or  reverse  the  growth  in  weapons. 

In  Geneva,  Vice  President  Bush 
presented  to  the  Conference  on  Dis- 
armament in  April  a  draft  treaty  for  a 


comprehensive  ban  on  the  development, 
production,  stockpiling,  transfer,  and 
use  of  chemical  weapons. 

In  Stockholm,  together  with  our 
NATO  allies,  we  have  put  forward  a 
package  of  confidence-building  measures 
designed  to  reduce  the  risk  of  a  Euro- 
pean war  occurring  by  accident,  surprise 
attack,  or  miscalculation. 

In  Moscow,  we  have  proposed  a 
strenghthening  of  U.S. -Soviet  com- 
munications through  a  technical 
upgrading  of  the  hotline  to  help  contain 
possible  crises. 

In  Vienna,  at  the  mutual  and 
balanced  force  reduction  talks  we  have, 
again  with  our  European  allies,  pre- 
sented a  new  initiative  this  April  that 
seeks  to  find  a  common  ground  between 
Eastern  and  Western  positions,  and  to 
make  progress  on  reducing  conventional 
forces  of  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact. 

These,  too,  are  worthy  of  our  allies' 
respect  and  support. 

A  Commitment  to  Peace  and  Freedom 

The  public  debate  on  the  levels  of 
nuclear  weapons  is  an  important  one. 
But  whether  our  forces  freeze  at  current 
levels,  or  gain  or  diminish  slightly,  the 
potential  destruction  remains  unaccept- 
able. 

The  public  debate  on  how  we  pre- 
vent nuclear  war  is,  therefore,  of  even 
greater  relevance  to  our  fate,  but  unfor- 
tunately, attracts  less  attention.  The 
prospects  of  preventing  nuclear  war  de- 
pend on  far  more  than  just  nuclear 
weapons  themselves.  Peace  will  depend 
on  a  stable  nuclear  deterrent,  but  it  will 
also  depend  on  preventing  the  regional 
conflicts  that  can,  unexpectedly,  lead  to 
wider  confrontations. 

Herein  lies  the  second  great 
challenge  for  preserving  our  freedom 
and  world  peace.  Our  alliance  com- 
mitments play  a  crucial  role  in  meeting 
that  challenge. 

The  initial  and  most  basic  step  in  the 
effort  to  preserve  peace  and  freedom  is 
the  national  decision  to  make  the  at- 
tempt—and the  national  will  to  per- 
severe. My  country,  like  Australia  and 
New  Zealand,  considered  itself  for  most 
of  its  history  secure  behind  vast  ocean 
frontiers.  Even  after  World  War  I,  we 
maintained  this  illusion.  Only  after  the 
painful  lessons  of  World  War  II  did  we 
learn,  as  smaller  nations  like  Norway 
also  learned  so  painfully,  that  neutrality 
does  not  ensure  safety.  Since  that  time, 
each  of  our  three  countries  has  faced  up 
to  the  high  costs  of  isolationism  in  an  in- 
terconnected world;  each  has  committed 


PACIFIC 


itself  to  the  search  for  peace  beyond  our 
borders,  not  merely  in  home  waters  but 
in  the  Pacific  and  in  areas  as  distant  as 
Africa  and  the  Middle  East. 

In  the  aftermath  of  our  difficult  ex- 
perience in  Vietnam,  America  had  a 
renewed  flirtation  with  a  reduced  inter- 
national role,  even  with  isolationism. 
There  were  strong  feelings  in  America 
to  draw  back  into  ourselves.  We  con- 
sidered withdrawing  our  troops  from 
Korea  and  other  lands  where  they  are 
vitally  needed.  We  considered  reducing 
our  fleet  in  the  hope  that  we  could 
"swing"  ships  as  needed  from  one 
theater  to  another,  ignoring  the  very 
real  possibility  that  this  could  increase 
the  chances  of  a  two-ocean  challenge 
and,  even  more  immediately,  would  have 
significantly  reduced  the  U.S.  presence 
in  the  Pacific. 

But  with  the  steady  growth  of 
Soviet  military  forces  and  the  increasing 
and  alarming  tendency  of  the  Soviets  to 
use  that  force,  either  directly  them- 
selves—as in  Afghanistan— or  in- 
directly—as in  Kampuchea,  Ethiopia, 
Chad,  and  elsewhere— we  emerged  from 
our  Vietnam  experience  with  renewed 
determination,  restored  confidence,  and 
a  heightened  sense  of  realism. 

Our  determination  and  confidence 
led  us  to  begin  to  rebuild  our  forces  and 
to  speak  more  forthrightly  for  freedom. 
Our  heightened  sense  of  realism  gave  us 
a  clearer  view  of  the  dangers  posed  by 
our  adversaries  and  a  desire  to  further 
the  increasing  self-reliance  among  our 
friends,  including  those  in  Asia.  If  most 
of  Asia  is  largely  peaceful  despite  the 
increase  in  Soviet  activities  and 
capabilities,  .surely  it  is  due  in  part  to 
our  renewed  role  and  the  growing 
strength  of  friends. 

America's  return  to  a  more  vigorous 
role  in  the  world  is  testimony  to  the 
staying  power  of  democracies  in  foreign 
affairs,  a  quality  that  has  often  been 
questioned  by  [wlitical  theorists,  in- 
cluding that  most  brilliant  analyst  of 
democratic  politics,  Alexis  de  Tocque- 
ville.  Our  alliances  were  one  of  the  key 
factors  that  kept  America  from  straying 
from  its  course.  Without  these  alliances, 
we  might  well  have  accepted  a  lessened 
role— to  the  detriment  of  all  our  coun- 
tries. Through  the  alliances,  we  main- 
tained a  clearer  view  of  where  our  true 
interests  and  responsibilities  lie. 

Indeed,  not  just  America  but  the 
democracies  in  general  have  succeeded 
to  an  extraordinary  degree  since  World 
War  II  in  maintaining  a  constancy  of 
policy.  During  this  same  period,  the 


world  on  the  whole  has  also  enjoyed  an 
extraordinary  period  of  peace  among  the 
major  powers,  a  peace  of  critical  impor- 
tance in  the  nuclear  age.  Both  of  these 
achievements  are,  in  large  part,  a 
tribute  to  the  strength  and  vigor  of  the 
West's  interlocking  set  of  alliances.  In 
the  circumstances,  I  believe,  a  heavy 
burden  of  proof  falls  on  those  who  would 
weaken  a  system  of  alliance  that  has 
contributed  so  much  to  the  maintenance 
of  nuclear  peace. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  our  systems 
of  alliances  cannot  be  improved  upon. 
Constant  efforts  are  still  required,  and 
complacency  can  be  as  dangerous  as  ex- 
cessive anxiety.  But  our  alliances  on  the 
whole  make  an  invaluable  contribution, 
and  no  one  has  as  yet  put  forward  a 
surer  way  of  preserving  the  peace.  Cer- 
tainly the  isolation  of  each  nation  for 
itself  is  not  such  an  alternative. 

ANZUS  reflects  our  countries'  joint 
determination  to  avoid  the  dangers  and 
painful  lessons  of  isolationism  or 
neutralism.  Each  of  our  nation's  com- 
mitments eases  the  burden  of  com- 
mitments, real  and  psychological,  of  the 
others.  Our  joint  pledges  give  each  of 
our  pledges  added  meaning. 

The  question  is  not  so  much  whether 
any  one  ANZUS  country  could  prosper 
as  a  neutral  under  the  umbrella  of 
others'  active  roles  but  whether  the 
other  countries  would  choose  to  continue 
active  roles  once  one  chose  to  withdraw. 
There  are  Americans  who  continue  to 
question  our  role  in  NATO,  despite 
strong  European  commitments,  because 
of  what  they  see  as  inadequate  defense 
spending.  I  have  little  doubt  that  such 
questions  would  increase  dramatically  if 
the  European  commitments  themselves 
came  into  serious  question. 

Today,  our  three  countries'  com- 
mitments remain  firm.  Only  last  year, 
the  ANZUS  review  confirmed  that  the 
treaty  "remains  relevant  and  vitally  im- 
portant to  the  shared  security  concerns 
and  strategic  interests  of  the  three  part- 
ner governments."  Let  there  be  no  doubt 
in  the  mind  of  any  potential  adversary 
that  an  armed  attack  on  an  ally  would 
require,  and  would  receive  from  the 
allies,  full  and  prompt  fulfillment  of  the 
ANZUS  security  commitment  including, 
when  necessary,  military  support. 

The  national  security  of  each  of  us  is 
a  fundamental  interest  of  the  others  and 
requires  adequate  and  appropriate 
response  to  threats  or  attacks  on  allies 
from  any  source.  In  the  case  of  an  at- 
tack on  Australia,  for  example,  our  com- 
mitment remains  firm  whether  the  at- 


\' 


tack  should  come  from  the  Pacific  or 
Indian  Ocean  approaches.  Our  commit- 
ment to  the  defense  of  our  allies  is  not 
limited  to  any  particular  threat;  it  ap- 
plies to  any  potential  aggressor. 

In  the  Falklands  crisis  when  our 
NATO  ally.  Great  Britain,  was  wrong- 
fully attacked  by  a  Latin  American 
friend,  America  did  everything  it  could 
to  negotiate  an  end  to  the  crisis.  But 
when  negotiations  failed,  we  took  a 
strong  stand  on  behalf  of  our  wronged  , 
ally,  despite  the  predicted  high  costs  of  i 
such  a  stand.  We  were  strongly  com- 
mitted to  doing  what  was  right  in  sup- 
port of  our  ally — even  though  we  were 
under  no  treaty  obligation  to  do  so. 
(NATO  does  not  extend  to  the  South 
Atlantic.) 

The  U.S.  presence  in  the  Pacific 
over  the  past  40  years  has  been  a 
stabilizing  one  that  has  served  the  in- 
terests of  our  friends  and  allies  in  the 
region.  ANZUS  has  been  one  of  the 
critical  factors  supporting  this  stability. 
In  the  last  40  years,  as  well,  countries  ol 
the  region  have  made  great  progress 
toward  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law. 
These,  too,  are  stabilizing  factors.  While 
these  conditions  prevail,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  a  situation  in  which  ANZUS 
members  would  be  called  upon  to  fulfill 
their  commitments  in  a  dispute  involvinj 
another  friendly  power.  Indeed,  a 
weakening  of  ANZUS  or  the  consequent 
weakening  of  the  U.S.  role  in  the  Pacifi 
is  one  of  the  few  events  that  could  con- 
ceivably make  such  hypothetical  imagin- 
ings a  reality.  ANZUS  is  not  weaker 
because  its  members  have  other  com- 
mitments. These  commitments  do  not 
conflict,  they  interlock;  and  in  so  doing, 
they  help  to  prevent  conflict. 

By  our  alliances,  we  add  ever 
greater  echoes  of  support  to  alliances      " 
throughout  the  free  world.  There  are,     ^' 
for  example,  no  direct  political  or  legal 
linkages  between  ANZUS  and  the  Five 
Power  Defense  Arrangement.  Howevei 
any  potential  aggressor  in  Southeast 
Asia  must  take  into  account  that 
ANZUS  alliance  interests  would  be 
threatened  by  an  attack  engaging 
Australian  and  New  Zealand  forces 
there. 

A  strong  NATO  strengthens  deter- 
rence globally  to  the  advantage  of 
ANZUS.  But  equally,  the  health  of 
ANZUS  is  vital  to  the  global  Western 
alliance— especially  given  the  increasini 
ly  important  locations  of  both  Australi; 
and  New  Zealand.  It  would  be  a  mistal 
to  underestimate  the  moral  and  politic; 
influence  of  this  alliance  of  three  of  the 
world's  oldest  democracies. 


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16 


PACIFIC 


Some  argue  that  alliances  are 
igerous  in  the  nuclear  era.  But  an 
limited  nuclear  war  will  leave  no  cor- 
!•  of  our  world  safe  and  secure.  No  na- 
n  can  hide  its  head  in  the  sand  and 
int  on  being  spared— a  point  made  on 
ae  6  in  Parliament  by  [Australian] 
ime  Minister  Hawke. 

The  enjoyment  of  freedom  cannot  be 
jarated  from  the  responsibilities  of 
edom— responsibilities  the  three 
4ZUS  countries  have  shouldered 
larely.  Clearly,  there  are  risks 
;ociated  with  engaging  directly  in 
:errence  through  active  cooperation  in 
najor  alliance.  The  United  States  has 
lingly  assumed  such  risks  on  behalf  of 
allies.  We  have  done  so  because  we 
ieve,  as  Prime  Minister  Hawke  and 
reign  Minister  Hayden  have  recently 
1  eloquently  argued,  that  such  risks 
•  significantly  less  than  those 
lociated  with  the  weakening  and 
lure  of  deterrence. 

maging  ANZUS 

ce  there  is  the  will  to  take  alliances 
iously,  the  problems  of  managing  an 
ance  come  into  full  play.  ANZUS,  like 
iTO,  provides  the  elements  for  peace, 
iance  management  is  the  art  that 
;s  meaning  into  the  framework  that 

■  treaty  provides. 

Successful  alliance  management 
)ends  on  our  success  in  meeting  five 
ideal  challenges. 

First,  as  an  alliance  of  democracies, 
IZUS  inherits  the  challenges  democra- 
1 3  face  in  running  a  coherent  foreign 
I  icy.  Policies  that  do  not  sustain  public 
Dport  will  fail.  Needed  policies  that 
!  k  public  support  can  go  unrealized.  In 
}  irt,  alliance  management  requires  an 
i  m  and  informed  public  debate  led  by 
!  zens  mindful  of  the  great,  not  just 

■  immediately  visible,  threats  the 
I  ure  holds. 

Second,  an  effective  alliance  among 
'ee  vital  democracies  requires  exten- 
e,  ongoing  contacts  at  all  levels  of 
!  /ernment  and  society.  The  need  for 
:  )rdinated  political  and  military  ac- 
;  ities  requires  close  official  ties  and 
I  ong  institutionalized  consultative 
j  )cesses.  But  they  also  require  lively, 
I  ormal  public  commentary  and  per- 
i  lal  interchanges  (including  con- 
ences  like  this  one).  Together  these 
sure  a  constant  flow  of  information 
j  views  on  potential  problems,  as  well 
a  full  awareness  of  each  other's  con- 
•ns,  interests,  capabilities,  and  objec- 


tives. Only  through  such  exchanges  can 
alliance  managers  reach  decisions  that 
serve  a  common  purpose. 

Such  exchanges  cannot  be  turned  on 
and  off  as  crises  arise  and  recede.  To  be 
effective,  they  must  continue  at  all  levels 
over  time  and  reflect  the  high  degree  of 
mutual  confidence  derived  from  ex- 
perience and  personal  contact. 

Fortunately,  the  management  of  the 
ANZUS  alliance  in  all  three  capitals  pro- 
vides precisely  that  kind  of  consultative 
relationship.  At  the  so-called  working 
levels,  there  are  literally  daily  contacts 
between  both  civilian  and  military  of- 
ficials, including  a  throughly  institu- 
tionalized sharing  of  intelligence  and 
related  assessments.  At  a  higher  level, 
there  are  frequent  major  meetings  of 
senior  officials  to  exchange  views  on 
issues  of  immediate  concern  to  the 
alliance. 

Most  importantly,  there  is  the  on- 
going dialogue— through  meetings,  cor- 
respondence, and  communications— be- 
tween ministers  in  the  three  capitals. 
The  annual  ANZUS  Council  meeting 
provides  a  vital  element  that  links 
political  leaders  and  symbolizes  the 
significance  of  the  relationship. 

On  the  military  side,  even  without  a 
pattern  of  integrated  commands  and 
military  forces  as  in  NATO  Europe, 
ANZUS  alliance  managers  over  the 
years  have  built  up  a  pattern  of  close 
defense  cooperation  which  assures  that 
ANZUS  forces  can  operate  together 
quickly  and  effectively,  if  that  is  ever 
necessary.  Key  elements  of  this  coopera- 
tion are  joint  exercises  between  our 
forces,  especially  our  navies. 

The  third  challenge  of  alliance 
management  is  to  meet  the  need  for 
continuity  and  long-term  consistency  of 
policy.  President  Reagan  came  into  of- 
fice committed  to  demonstrating  that 
the  United  States  is  a  reliable  ally  and 
partner.  Accordingly,  while  he  has 
brought  strong  views  of  his  own  to  the 
definition  of  new  policy  areas,  he  has 
shown  great  respect  for  commitments 
made  by  previous  administrations.  That 
element  of  continuity  between  ad- 
ministrations is  essential  to  effective 
management  of  alliances  between 
democracies. 

I  could  cite  examples  as  far  afield  as 
the  Middle  East,  Central  America,  and 
southern  Africa  to  make  my  point,  but 
let  me  stick  for  now  to  some  of  more 
direct  concern  to  ANZUS.  In  the  area  of 
arms  control,  President  Reagan  main- 
tained the  U.S.  commitment  to  both 


tracks  of  the  1979  NATO  decision,  while 
offering  his  new  and  imaginative  pro- 
posal on  the  "zero  option"  for  the  arms 
control  track.  He  announced  that  the 
United  States  would  observe  the  limits 
of  the  unratified  SALT  II  [strategic 
arms  limitation  talks]  Treaty  while  seek- 
ing to  negotiate  a  better  substitute  for 
it.  With  respect  to  China  policy,  the 
President  has  made  very  clear  his  deter- 
mination to  maintain  the  framework 
provided  by  previous  U.S.  commitments 
in  this  area,  at  the  same  time  that  he 
has  worked  to  put  that  critically  impor- 
tant relationship  on  a  more  realistic  and 
stable  basis.  The  views  and  concerns  of 
our  NATO  and  ANZUS  allies  were,  and 
are,  important  in  shaping  U.S.  arms 
control  policy.  And  I  can  say  from  direct 
personal  involvement  that  ANZUS  views 
were  of  great  importance  at  critical 
junctures  in  the  development  of  this  Ad- 
ministration's China  policy. 

Fourth,  there  is  a  need  to  accept  the 
mutual  burdens  as  well  as  the  mutual 
benefits  of  alliance.  It  is  in  the  nature  of 
alliances  that  the  precise  levels  of  the 
burdens  and  benefits  will  shift  over 
time.  Concerns  that  another  partner  is 
getting  a  "free  ride"  plague  every 
alliance  in  some  form.  Indeed,  alliances 
can  be  endangered  as  much  as 
strengthened  by  too  fervent  an  effort  to 
make  all  burdens  precisely  equal  at  any 
given  moment  to  the  benefits  received. 
What  is  important  to  a  healthy  alliance 
is  that  the  burdens  be  shouldered  by  all 
parties  as  needed  and  when  needed,  and 
that  the  benefits  be  shared  as  well. 

Article  II  of  the  ANZUS  treaty 
binds  the  partners  "separately  and  joint- 
ly by  means  of  continuous  and  effective 
self-help  and  mutual  aid"  to  "maintain 
and  develop  their  individual  and  collec- 
tive capacity  to  resist  armed  attack." 
Because  the  ANZUS  democracies,  as  the 
NATO  allies,  are  dedicated  to  preserving 
the  peace,  not  fighting  a  war,  there  is  a 
tendency  in  all  our  countries  to  resent 
spending  resources  for  defense  that 
seems  unnecessary  at  the  time.  Yet, 
when  the  danger  becomes  evident,  it 
may  be  too  late  or  seem  too  provocative 
to  begin  to  rearm.  There,  once  again,  a 
well-informed  public  is  essential. 

Domestic  political  pressures  and 
miscalculations  in  Argentina  led  to  a 
wholly  unexpected  war  in  the 
Falklands— a  war  for  which  Britain  was 
just  barely  prepared.  British  naval  plan- 
ners, prior  to  the  Falklands,  assumed 
that  their  forces  would  be  used  relative- 
ly close  to  home,  that  they  would  never 
have  to  engage  without  allies,  that  land- 
based  air  support  would  always  be 
available,  and  that  landings  against 
hostile  forces  would  not  be  needed. 


REFUGEES 


These  comfortable  assumptions  lowered 
Britain  defense  spending.  But  an  un- 
predictable world  made  them  predictably 
dangerous. 

The  United  States,  for  its  part,  is  in 
the  midst  of  a  substantial  effort  to  in- 
crease its  conventional  forces.  We  have 
done  so  not  to  provoke,  but  to  defend; 
not  to  escalate,  but  to  provide  the  means 
by  which  problems  can  be  contained.  By 
strengthening  our  conventional  deter- 
rent we  help  to  increase  our  options  and 
reduce  the  risks  of  nuclear  war.  In  this 
defense  effort,  too,  we  have  kept  our 
allies  closely  informed. 

The  United  States  attaches  critical 
importance  to  the  opportunity  to  use 
Australian  and  New  Zealand  ports  that 
provide  ready  access  to  the  South 
Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans.  We  view 
Australia's  and  New  Zealand's  will- 
ingness to  allow  us  use  of  their  ports  as 
part  of  their  contribution  to  ANZUS. 
We  also  value  efforts  to  assure  stand- 
ardization or  interoperability  of  equip- 
ment and  weapons  systems,  share  in- 
telligence, exchange  personnel,  and  con- 
sult on  problems.  The  maintenance  of 


U.S.  presence  in  the  region,  and  the 
demonstration  of  our  ability  to  operate 
effectively  with  our  treaty  partners,  are 
tangible  physical  evidence  of  our  treaty 
commitments.  All  of  the  ANZUS  nations 
share  in  this  effort  and  all  benefit 
from  it. 

Another  and  critical  element  of 
defense  cooperation  is  that  involving  the 
joint  facilities  in  Australia.  Although  the 
subject  of  bilateral  agreements  between 
Canberra  and  Washington,  they  clearly 
are  within  the  spirit  of  the  provisions  of 
the  ANZUS  treaty.  Indeed,  such  is 
noted  in  the  agreements. 

There  is,  of  course,  considerable 
public  speculation  about  the  use  of  these 
facilities,  including  gross  distortions  or 
misunderstandings  of  related  U.S. 
defense  strategy.  The  simple  truth,  as 
clearly  and  forcefully  enunciated  by 
Prime  Minister  Hawke  on  June  6  in 
Parliament  in  Canberra,  is  that  these 
facilities  contribute  to  arms  control,  ef- 
fective deterrence,  mutual  security,  and 
to  stability  in  global  strategic  relation- 
ships. Verification,  early  warning,  and 
the  ability  to  control  our  nuclear  forces 
and  communicate  with  them  are  critical 


African  Refugees 
Relief  Day,  1984 


PROCLAMATION  5216, 
JULY  9.  1984' 

The  United  States  and  the  American 
people  have  a  long  and  proud  tradition 
of  helping  those  who  are  in  need.  In 
Africa,  the  needs  of  refugees  cry  out  for 
continued  attention.  So,  too,  do  the 
needs  of  the  host  countries  who,  despite 
their  own  limited  resources,  have  ac- 
cepted the  refugees  in  the  best  tradition 
of  humanitarian  concern.  Their  generosi- 
ty has  led  them  to  make  great  sacrifices. 

We  in  the  United  States  are  mindful  of 
the  hurden.s  that  are  borne  by  the  refugees 
and  their  host  countries.  We  are  dedicated  to 
the  cause  of  meeting  their  needs  now  and  in 
the  future.  We  fervently  hope  that  the  Sec- 
ond International  Conference  on  Assistance 
to  Refugees  in  Africa,  which  begins  .July  9. 
1984,  will  lead  to  a  sustained  effort  by  the  in- 
ternational community  to  help  African  coun- 
tries effectively  cope  with  the  refugee 
burden.  Our  own  efforts  have  been  and  will 
continue  to  be  in  support  of  the  African 
refugees  and  their  host  countries. 

In  order  to  heighten  awareness  in  the 
United  States  of  the  needs  of  Africa's 


refugees  and  the  needs  of  their  host  coun- 
tries, the  Congress,  by  H.J.  Res.  604,  has 
designated  July  9,  1984,  as  "African 
Refugees  Relief  Day"  and  has  requested  the 
President  to  issue  a  proclamation  in  observ- 
ance of  that  day. 

As  we  reflect  on  the  situation  of  refugees 
and  their  host  countries,  I  hope  Americans 
will  be  generous  in  their  support  of  voluntary 
agencies  that  provide  relief  and  development 
assistance  to  Africa.  Further,  I  wish  special 
consideration  be  given  to  the  extraordinary 
hardships  borne  by  women  refugees,  their 
children,  and  other  vulnerable  groups.  The  in- 
nocent victims  of  civil  strife  and  war  deserve 
our  special  concern. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Ro.nald  Reagan, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
do  hereby  proclaim  July  9,  1984,  as  African 
Refugees  Relief  Day. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  9th  day  of  July,  in  the  year 
of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and  eighty-four 
and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States 
of  America  the  two  hundred  and  ninth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  16,  1984. 


to  both  stable  deterrence  and  to  arms 
control.  In  addition,  this  capability  could 
be  critical  in  preventing  some  bizarre  ac 
cident  from  turning  into  an  unintended 
catastrophe.  For  all  of  these  reasons, 
the  facilities  are  an  important,  even 
essential,  part  of  the  West's  critical  and 
deeply  felt  commitment  to  maintain 
world  peace— perhaps  the  greatest 
single  challenge  of  this  or  any  century.  ' 

Fifth,  as  alliance  managers  in  all 
three  capitals  have  recognized  from  the 
outset  of  ANZUS,  our  treaty  relation- 
ship is  only  part  of  the  many-faceted     i 
relations  between  our  countries— com- 
mercial, historic,  cultural,  and  personal. 
They  are  all  important.  They  all  affect 
the  course  of  the  relationship  and  each 
other.  As  we  approach  problems  in  any 
one  area,  we  must  he  careful  to  see 
them  in  the  perspective  of  the  entire 
relationship.  If  we  do  so,  we  will  con- 
tinue to  have  a  strong  reservoir  of  good 
will  and  self-interest  from  which  prob- 
lems can  be  solved.  At  the  same  time, 
we  will  recognize  that  each  element  of    i 
the  relationship  is  a  part  of  the  whole 
and  that  each  is  important  and  worthy 
of  our  best  effort  for  consultation,  com- 
promise, and  deference  to  the  interests 
of  all. 

For  alliance  managers  the  essential 
task,  whether  in  Washington,  Canbern 
or  Wellington,  is  to  maximize  coopera- 
tion to  mutual  advantage  when  we  are 
on  common  ground  and  to  contain  dif- 
ferences— legitimate  though  they  may 
be — through  the  kinds  of  compromises 
necessary  in  an  effective  working  part- 
nership. By  so  doing,  we  can  assure  th 
competition  in  commerce  and  differenc 
in  other  areas  do  not  threaten  coopera 
tion  linked  to  our  most  fundamental 
shared  interest — mutual  national  sur- 
vival. 


■ 


il 


Conclusion 

Relations  between  America,  Australia, 
and  New  Zealand  are  truly  broad  and 
vital.  Our  personal,  commercial,  and 
cultural  ties,  and  a  common  political 
heritage  dedicated  to  preserving  and 
enhancing  individual  liberty,  have  forg 
uniquely  close  relations — relations 
Americans  value  deeply.  As  President 
Reagan  said  almost  exactly  a  year  age 
"Our  ties  are  a  precious  tradition,  re- 
flecting our  many  concerns  and  sharec 
values." 

The  ANZUS  commitment  is  not 
limited  to  paper.  It  resides  in  the  hear 
of  Australians,  New  Zealanders,  and 


«i 


il 


iia 


K 


SOUTH  ASIA 


lericans  alike — in  our  affection  for 
another  and  in  our  profound  belief 
rihe  rule  of  law.  Our  treaty  commit- 
>int  naturally  requires  that  our  actions 
'(in  accordance  with  our  constitutional 
■icosses,  but  our  deep  ties  ensure  that 
sr  processes  will  be  swift  and  sup- 
.  ti\  c  and  embody  the  full  spirit  of  our 
'.pit's — the  type  of  commitment 
ii'H'racies  require  and  from  which 
,  literacies  profit.  Speaking  for  the 
itrd  States.  I  can  say  that  Aus- 
iiaiis  and  New  Zealanders  should  rest 
iircil  that  if  any  emergency  confronts 
,m.  the  American  system  is  capable  of 
tisive  action — and  willing  to  render  it. 
The  ties  between  our  peoples  will 
ays  remain  a  powerful  force.  But 
it  the  future  holds  for  ANZUS  may 
foundly  affect  life  within  each  of  our 
ions.  Will  freedom  remain  a  vibrant 
ce,  uplifting  peoples  throughout  the 
rid?  Or  will  freedom  itself  be  a 
itive,  cowering  in  remote  lands  in  the 
)e  that  it  is  too  small  to  note?  In  the 
1,  even  that  would  prove  a  futile 
)e. 

Our  freedom  and  world  peace  de- 
id  primarily  on  our  own  commitment 
lur  mutual  defense  and  the  rule  of 
.  The  choice  before  us  is  not  between 
,ce  and  freedom.  By  promoting 
adom  we  build  what  is  ultimately  the 
st  secure  foundation  for  peace  as 
1.  Nor  can  we  choose  peace  at  the  ex- 
[Se  of  freedom.  Life  in  a  world  of 
ilitarian  powers  would  not  be  peace, 
would  peace  betv/een  them  long 

,  I  believe  our  countries  have  the  will 
|ireserve  freedom.  There  is  an  old 
I  ing:  "If  I  am  not  for  myself,  who  will 
I  But  if  I  am  for  myself  alone,  what 
I?" 

I  believe  our  countries  know  what 
are — we  are  trustees  of  freedom.  In 
end,  we  can  do  more  to  protect  that 
edom  and  to  build  a  safe  and  just 
rid: 

•  If  we  are  strong,  than  if  we  are 
lak; 

•  If  we  proceed  with  reason  and 
irage,  than  if  we  hang  back  until 
derate  responses  no  longer  suffice; 

•  If  we  are  united,  than  if  we  stand 
ne. 

The  path  we  must  follow  is  an  ar- 
ms one — one  not  without  risk.  But 
;n  few  routes  are  quicker,  and  none  is 
ler.  There  are  no  shortcuts.  ■ 


Visit  of  Sri  Lankan 
President  Jayewardene 


President  J.R.  Jayewardene  of  Sri 
Lanka  made  a  state  visit  to  the  United 
States  June  16-23,  198Jt.  While  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  June  17-20,  he  met 
with  President  Reagan  and  other  govern- 
ment officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  at  the 
arrival  ceremony  and  dinner  toasts 
made  by  Presidents  Reagan  and 
Jayewardene  on  June  18.'' 


ARRIVAL  CEREM0NY2 

President  Reagan 

President  Jayewardene,  Nancy  and  I  are 
very  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity  to 
welcome  you  and  Mrs.  Jayewardene  to 
the  White  House. 

Although  our  two  countries  are  on 
opposite  sides  of  the  globe,  we  share  a 
common  bond  in  the  great  institution  of 
democracy.  Sri  Lanka  has  a  remarkable 
record  among  nations  which  won  their 
independence  in  the  aftermath  of  World 
War  II.  You've  held  elections  at  regular 
intervals,  and  with  amost  equal  regulari- 
ty, your  own  hard-fought  reelection  in 
1982,  as  a  notable  exception,  your  peo- 
ple, through  their  votes,  have  removed 
from  power  the  governing  party.  And  in 


(White  House  photo  by  Michael  Evans) 

what  distinguishes  Sri  Lanka  as  a  truly 
democratic  country,  losers  as  well  as 
winners  accept  the  verdict  of  the  people. 
The  true  winners  are,  of  course,  the  peo- 
ple of  Sri  Lanka. 

I'm  told  that  in  your  embassy  here  in 
Washington,  pictures  of  every  Sri  Lanka 
head  of  government  since  independ- 
ence— those  from  your  own  party,  as 
well  as  the  opposition — are  respectfully 
displayed.  This  is  the  kind  of  democratic 
spirit  essential  to  the  success  of  human 
liberty,  the  hallmark  of  democratic 
societies. 

Understanding  and  appreciating 
your  personal  commitment  to 
democratic  ideals,  it  is  a  pleasure  for  us 
to  have  you  as  our  guest.  You  under- 
scored this  heartfelt  commitment  during 
your  first  visit  here  in  September  of 
1951,  during  a  gathering  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  nations  who  had  fought  in 
the  Pacific  war.  Some  at  that  San  Fran- 
cisco conference  insisted  that  Japan 
should  not  be  given  its  full  freedom. 
They  argued  that  Japan  should  remain 
shackled  as  a  punishment  for  its  role  in 
World  War  11.  As  the  representative  of 
Sri  Lanka,  you  spoke  out  for  the  princi- 
ple of  freedom  for  all  people,  including 
the  Japanese.  You  quoted  Buddha,  the 


SOUTH  ASIA 


great  teacher,  and  said  that  "hatred 
ceases  not  by  hatred,  but  by  love." 

We  share  your  dedication  to 
freedom  and  good  will.  This  is  more 
than  political  theory;  it's  a  way  of  life. 
This  spirit  makes  its  natural  that  our 
two  nations  should  be  friends. 

Unfortunately,  not  everyone  shares 
these  values.  Recently,  we  were  re- 
minded of  the  menace  of  those  who  seek 
to  impose  their  will  by  force  and  terror. 
Two  American  citizens  were  kidnapped 
in  Sri  Lanka  and  threatened  with  death. 
I  want  to  take  this  opportunity  to  thank 
you  personally  for  your  diligence  and  for 
your  resolute  handling  of  this  difficult 
situation.  The  skill  and  courage  that  you 
demonstrated  helped  free  our  coun- 
trymen and,  at  the  same  time,  prevented 
the  terrorists  from  achieving  their  goal. 

During  that  time  of  tension,  you 
wrote  to  me,  and  I  want  you  to  know 
how  much  I  appreciated  your  sharing 
your  thoughts.  You  wrote,  "I  hope  that 
the  international  community  will  be  able 
to  eradicate  terrorism,  which  has 
become  a  major  challenge  to  those  of  us 
who  believe  in  the  democratic  process." 
Well,  I  speak  for  all  my  coun- 
trymen— and  after  the  economic  summit 
I  recently  attended  in  London,  I  know 
this  sentiment  is  shared  by  the  people  of 
all  the  democracies — when  I  say  the  free 
men  and  women  of  this  planet  will  never 
cower  before  terrorists.  Human  liberty 
will  prevail  and  civilization  will  triumph 
over  this  cowardly  form  of  barbarism. 

We  applaud  your  determination  not 
to  yield  to  terrorism  in  your  own  coun- 
try, as  well  as  your  efforts  to  find 
through  the  democratic  process  a 
peaceful  resolution  of  communal  strife. 
There  is  no  legitimate  excuse  for  any 
political  group  to  resort  to  violence  in 
Sri  Lanka,  a  country  with  a  strong 
democratic  tradition  and  peaceful  means 
to  resolve  conflict. 

As  a  nation  of  many  races,  religions, 
and  ethnic  groups,  we  Americans  know 
from  experience  that  there  is  room  for 
all  in  a  democracy.  Dividing  your  coun- 
try into  separate  nations,  as  some  would 
have  you  do,  is  not  the  solution.  Instead 
of  separating  people,  now  is  the  time  to 
bring  them  together.  In  the  same  spirit 
you  spoke  about  in  San  Francisco  three 
decades  ago — of  love,  not  hatred,  a 
united,  progressive  Sri  Lanka  can  flour- 
ish and  live  in  peace  with  itself  and  the 
rest  of  the  world. 

We  wish  you  every  success  in  your 
search  for  reconciliation  and  a  better  life 
for  all  your  people.  And  their  lives  are 
improving.  Your  leadership  has  in- 
creased productivity  and  brought  down 


unemployment,  has  created  exciting, 
new  opportunities  for  your  citizens.  Sri 
Lanka  is  among  those  enlightened  na- 
tions that  understand  incentives  hold  the 
key  for  greater  economic  growth  and 
personal  opportunity.  I  believe  your  peo- 
ple and  their  children  will  reap  rewards 
for  many  years  to  come,  thanks  to  the 
bold  economic  steps  that  you've  taken. 

We're  pleased  that  Americans  are 
playing  a  part  in  this  effort.  Your 
endeavors  to  improve  your  people's 
economic  well-being  continues  to  have 
our  solid  support.  Your  country  has  vast 
potential. 

Sri  Lanka  is  an  example  of  inde- 
pendent people  determining  their  own 
destiny  and  a  country  which  the  United 
States  is  proud  to  count  among  its 
friends.  Mr.  President  and  Mrs. 
Jayewardene,  welcome  to  America. 

President  Jayewardene 

President  Reagan,  Madam  Reagan, 
ladies  and  gentlemen,  I'm  glad  that  Mrs. 
Jayewardene  and  I  were  able  to  accept 
the  invitation  extended  by  Mrs.  Reagan 
and  you  to  visit  your  great  country. 

We  have  come  a  very  long  way  from 
home.  Yet,  already  we  feel  we  are 
among  friends  who  believe  and  try  to 
follow  common  ideals  for  the  welfare  of 
humanity. 

This  is  not  our  first  visit.  We  came 
in  September  1951  to  your  west  coast  to 
attend  the  Japanese  peace  treaty  con- 
ference held  at  San  Francisco.  I  came  as 
my  country's  representative.  I  received 
then  a  full  measure  of  praise  and 
gratitude  from  members  of  the  L'.S. 
Government  of  the  day — Dean  Acheson, 
John  Foster  Dulles,  and  others  who  at- 
tended the  conference — for  helping  to 
secure  the  acceptance  by  the  conference 
of  the  peace  treaty  with  Japan.  The 
Japanese  leaders.  Prime  Minister 
Yoshida  and  others,  were  equally 
grateful.  Those  alive  are  still  so. 

I  mention  that  because  the  thinking 
of  the  people  of  my  country,  which  was 
expressed  by  me  on  that  occasion,  was 
that  we  should  not  ask  for  reparations 
from  a  fallen  foe  who  had  harmed  our 
land  and  people  also;  that  we  should 
forgive  those  who  were  our  enemies, 
quoting  the  words  of  the  Buddha  that 
"hatred  ceases  not  by  hatred,  but  by 
love,"  which  you,  also,  Mr.  President, 
just  quoted.  I  pleaded  that  we  should 
restore  to  Japan  the  freedoms  of 
democracy.  Those  were  the  ideals  which 
inspired  us  then  and  inspire  us  now. 

Our  history  and  civilization  have  sur- 
vived in  an  unbroken  sequence  from  the 


fifth  century  B.C.  for  2,500  years.  There 
were  glimpses  of  modern  democracy 
even  then,  as  in  the  appointment  of 
mayors  to  our  ancient  cities.  The  ruins 
of  state  buildings  still  contain  carvings 
in  stone  where  the  cabinet  of  the  kings 
and  their  ministers  sat.  We  were  the 
first  in  Asia  in  1865  to  select  members 
to  the  municipalities  that  governed  our 
major  cities  and,  in  1931,  under  univer- 
sal franchise,  to  exercise  our  right  to 
elect  the  government  of  our  choice. 

We  also  have,  in  our  country,  an  un 
broken,  historical  record,  extending  ove 
the  same  long  period,  of  a  line  of  heads 
of  state,  monarchies  of  different 
dynasties  from  Sri  Lanka  and  abroad, 
including  India  and  the  United  Kingdon 
of  two  Presidents,  one  selected  and  one 
myself,  elected  by  the  whole  country.  I 
happen  to  be  the  193d  in  the  line  of 
heads  of  state  from  483  B.C.  to  date. 

In  our  modern  history,  we  cannot 
forget  the  contribution  made  by  an 
American,  Col.  Olcott,  when  he  helped 
the  Buddhist  leaders  of  Sri  Lanka  a  hu 
dred  years  ago  to  establish  a  movemen 
for  the  revival  of  education,  through 
schools  owned  and  managed  by  the  Bu( 
dhists  themselves,  and  thus  laid  the 
foundation  for  the  revival  of  Buddhism 
and  the  movement  for  freedom. 

The  United  States  of  America,  sine 
it  was  born  out  of  a  revolution  which 
freed  it  from  foreign  rule,  has  not  beei 
known  to  be  hankering  after  territory 
supporting  imperialism.  Sri  Lanka  has 
been  for  53  years  a  practicing 
democracy,  where  the  freedoms  of 
speech  and  writing,  of  electing  govern- 
ments by  universal  franchise  at  regula 
intervals,  and  the  independence  of  the 
judiciary  and  of  the  opposition  are 
safeguarded. 

Fundamental  rights  which  are 
justifiable  are  guaranteed  under  the  c( 
stitution.  Though  there  are  occasions 
when  emergency  powers  have  had  to  I 
exercised,  fundamental  freedoms  rem; 
intact.  Democracy  cannot,  however,  li 
and  survive  on  a  diet  of  words  alone. 
The  people  require  food  for  their 
stomachs,  clothing  for  their  bodies,  ar 
roofs  over  their  heads. 

In  the  nonaligned  world  of  develo] 
ing  nations,  which  covers  the  whole  oi 
Central  and  South  America,  the  wholt 
of  Africa,  the  whole  of  Asia  from  the 
Mediterranean  Sea  to  the  seas  of  Chii 
and  Japan,  there  are  very  few  countri 
which  could  be  called  a  democracy,  su 
as  is  your  country.  Ours  is  one.  That  i 
why  the  assistance  that  developing  na 
tions  of  the  world  receive  from  the 
World  Bank  and  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  is  appreciated,  thougl 
there  are  many  matters  on  which  we 


SOUTH  ASIA 


I  there  should  be  change  to  help  them 
jxist  as  free  countries. 

We  in  the  developing  world  have 
tblems  similar  to  those  who  live  in  the 
'eloped  world.  We  have  deficit 
igets,  high  interest  rates,  old  valued 
rencies,  and  unstable  exchange  rates. 
3se  are  the  classical  examples  of  the 
nptoms  that  affect  both  the  developed 
1  developing  nations. 

Those  who  speak  so  eloquently  on 
lalf  of  the  developing  nations  have 
in  pressing  for  the  opening  of  com- 
dity  markets  of  the  developed  world 

their  manufacturers  without  protec- 
|e  laws,  stable  prices  for  all  products, 
1  rescheduling  of  debts  borrowed  for 
^elopment.  Consider  these  requests 
h  sympathy  and  generosity. 

In  our  own  case,  with  the  aid  re- 
ved,  we  have  been  able  to  commence 
i  have  almost  completed  the  largest 
/elopment  program — which  in  our 
g  history  has  ever  been  attempted  by 
g  or  president — a  program  possibly 
equalled  in  magnitude  by  any  develop- 
nt  program  in  any  country  in  the  con- 
nporary  world  or  earlier.  This  was 
ssible  due  to  the  effects  of  my  govern- 
nt,  which  was  elected  to  office  in 
n  in  an  election  conducted  by  our  op- 
lents,  the  previous  government.  We 
ained  51%  of  the  votes  and  won  five- 
ths  of  the  seats  in  the  legislature, 
d  subsequently  since  then,  we  have 
I  n  five  elections,  including  the 
Jjsidential  election,  byelections,  district 
jmcil  elections,  local  elections,  and  a 
erendum. 

We  have,  however,  our  problems, 
me  of  them  are  unique  to  our  coun- 
— excessive  rains,  sometimes  floods, 
dslides,  cyclones — some  common  to 
countries,  but  still  difficult  for  us  to 
ir. 

Another  and  a  modern  problem,  and 
9  of  universal  occurrence  today,  is  ter- 
•ism.  This  happened  in  the  extreme 
rth  of  our  country,  where  a  group  of 
sguided  people  of  Tamil  birth,  who 
■re  favored  by  the  American  people  in 
i  latter  half  of  the  19th  century  by  the 
action  of  schools  and  hospitals,  seek 
Daration  from  a  united  Sri  Lanka, 
ere  are  more  Tamils  living  in  the  east 
d  among  the  Sinhalese,  the  major 
mmunity,  than  in  the  regions  that 
3k  separation  who  do  not  support 
jem.  My  party  holds  10  out  of  12  seats 
the  eastern  province,  which 
paratists  seek  to  join  to  the  north. 

The  terrorists  are  a  small  group  who 
ek  by  force,  including  murder,  rob- 
ries,  and  other  misdeeds,  to  support 
e  cause  of  separation,  including  the 


creation  of  a  Marxist  state  in  the  whole 
of  Sri  Lanka  and  in  India,  beginning 
with  Tamil  Nadu  in  the  south.  Since  we 
assumed  office  in  1977,  members  of  the 
armed  services  and  police,  politicians 
who  leave  the  ranks  of  the  separatists 
and  join  us,  and  others,  and  innocent 
citizens  numbering  147  have  been 
murdered  in  cold  blood. 

I'm  glad  that  your  country  is  taking 
a  lead  in  creating  an  international  move- 
ment to  oppose  terrorism.  If  I  may  sug- 
gest, it  may  be  called  a  United  Nations 
antiterrorism  organization.  It  is  vital — it 
is  essential  that  the  developed  world 
helps  us  with  finances,  that  we  help  each 
other  in  this  sphere,  and  that  all  nations 
cooperate  to  eliminate  the  menace  of 
terrorism  from  the  civilized  world. 

I  was  very  happy  when  I  read  your 
address  to  the  Irish  Parliament  on 
June  4th.  You  made  an  appeal  to  nations 
to  reform  the  principle  not  to  use  force 
in  their  dealings  with  each  other.  You 
said  the  democracies  could  inaugurate  a 
program  to  promote  the  growth  of 
democratic  institutions  throughout  the 
world.  You  spoke  on  behalf  of  hundreds 
of  millions  who  live  on  the  borderline  of 
starvation,  while  nations  will  spend  next 
year  a  trillion  dollars  on  the  manufactur- 
ing of  armaments  for  destruction  of 
human  beings  and  their  products. 

At  meetings  of  members  of  the 
Commonwealth  in  Sydney,  in  New  Delhi, 
at  meetings  of  nonaligned  nations  in 
Havana  and  in  Goa,  New  India,  I  have 
never  failed  to  express  similar  ideas. 
Nonviolence  is  "Maithri"  compassion, 
and  the  great  teacher  whom  I  follow, 
Gautama  Buddha,  and  the  great  teacher 
you  follow,  Jesus  Christ,  and  India's 
great  son,  Mahatma  Gandhi,  preached 
and  practiced  the  doctrine  of  non- 
violence successfully. 

Let  your  great  and  powerful  nation 
take  the  lead  in  implementing  these 
ideals,  and  the  world  will  remember  that 
the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  Ronald  Reagan,  preached  the 
laying  down  of  arms  not  through  fear, 
but  by  the  strength  of  the  conviction 
that  to  follow  right  for  right  is  right, 
without  fear  of  consequence,  is  a  way 
for  civilized  man  to  adopt.  The  voice  of 
America  will  then  become  the  voice  of 
righteousness. 

I  thank  you,  Mr.  President  and 
Madam  Reagan,  for  inviting  us  and  giv- 
ing me  this  opportunity  of  speaking  to 
you,  and  for  entertaining  us  so 
hospitably. 


DINNER  TOASTS 

President  Reagan 

Mr.  President,  Mrs.  Jayewardene, 
distinguished  guests,  and  ladies  and 
gentlemen,  it's  a  special  pleasure  to  have 
you  with  us.  Sri  Lankan  leaders,  in- 
cluding yourself,  have  been  to  our  coun- 
try before.  Tonight,  however,  is  the  first 
time  that  a  Sri  Lankan  chief  of  state  has 
been  an  official  guest  at  the  White 
House.  It's  our  honor  to  have  you  with 
us,  and  Nancy  and  I  hope  your  visit  will 
be  followed  by  many  more. 

Our  talks  this  morning  reflected  the 
cordial  and  cooperative  relationship 
which  exists  between  our  two  democ- 
racies. When  your  government  was  first 
elected  in  1977,  Americans  were  excited 
by  your  bold  program  for  economic 
development.  And  you've  led  your  coun- 
try in  a  new  direction,  and  by  doing  so, 
you've  created  new  opportunities  for 
your  people  and  expanded  the  potential 
of  every  Sri  Lankan. 

The  accelerated  Mahaweli  River 
project  is  part  of  your  effort,  as  is  free- 
ing the  Sri  Lankan  economy  from  the 
controls  and  redtape  that  stifled  prog- 
ress and  economic  expansion.  One  in- 
novation of  particular  interest  to  me  is 
the  creation  of  a  free  trade  zone.  This 
practical  approach  to  development  with 
its  open  market  is  attracting  investment 
and  unleashing  the  energy  of  the  private 
sector.  And  I  hope  those  over  on  Capitol 
Hill  who  claim  enterprise  zones  won't 
work  here  in  our  country  will  take  notice 
of  the  progress  that  you've  made. 

We  in  the  United  States  are  happy 
that  we've  been  able  to  contribute  to 
your  progress.  Our  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development  is  working  with  you 
in  the  river  program  and  encouraging 
Sri  Lanka's  private  enterprise  sector. 
With  the  incentives  that  you  now  offer 
to  investors,  your  country  is  attracting 
business  and  capturing  the  attention  of 
American  entrepreneurs  and  investors.  I 
think  we  can  look  forward  to  growing 
cooperation  between  our  governments 
and  our  people  on  many  levels. 

U.S. -Sri  Lankan  cooperation  comes 
in  many  forms.  Last  year  the  Peace 
Corps  began  a  program  to  assist  in  the 
upgrading  of  Sri  Lanka's  English- 
language  teaching  skills.  And  today  we 
signed  a  science  and  technology  agree- 
ment which  provides  an  umbrella  for  in- 
creased collaboration.  We  look  forward 
to  the  early  completion  of  negotiating  on 
a  tax  treal^  and  on  a  bilateral  invest- 
ment treaty.  All  this  reflects  the  ex- 
traordinary relationship  that  we're 
building,  a  relationship  of  trust  and 
trade  that  will  benefit  both  our  peoples. 


SOUTH  ASIA 


We  understand  Sri  Lanka's  choice, 
as  a  small  developing  country,  to  remain 
nonaligned  in  matters  of  foreign  policy. 
We  respect  genuine  nonalignment.  Your 
country  consistently  has  been  a  forceful 
voice  for  reason  and  moderation  in 
nonaligned  councils.  Your  strong  opposi- 
tion to  unprovoked  aggression  in 
Afghanistan  and  Kampuchea  has  swelled 
the  international  chorus  calling  for 
restoration  of  independence  for  these 
two  brutalized  countries.  We  hope  that 
Sri  Lanka  will  remain  a  strong  moral 
force  in  world  politics. 

And  today,  we  came  to  know  one 
another  better  and  to  understand  more 
fully  our  objectives  and  concerns.  Your 
visit  has  undoubtedly  strengthened  the 
bond  between  our  two  countries,  and  it's 
laid  a  basis  for  even  closer,  more 
cooperative  relations  between  Sri  Lanka 
and  the  United  States  in  the  future. 

Finally,  I'd  like  to  thank  you  again 
for  the  elephant — [laughter] — a  magnifi- 
cent present  that  you  gave  us  today. 
The  elephant  happens  to  be  the  symbol 
of  the  President's  political  party,  and  by 
coincidence — [laughter] — we  happen  to 
be  also  that  smart.  [Laughter] 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  may  I  ask 
you  to  join  me  in  a  toast  to  President 
and  Mrs.  Jayewardene,  and  the  pros- 
perity of  our  relationship  with  Sri 
Lanka. 

President  Jayewardene 

Mr.  President,  Madam  Reagan,  ladies 
and  gentlemen,  I  don't  mind  President 
Reagan  telling  the  public  that  the  gift  of 
the  elephant  was  accidental.  [Laughter] 
But  privately  I  know  it's  something  else. 
[Laughter]  The  elephant  led  my  party  to 
victory  in  1977.  I  received  51%  of  the 
votes.  Any  party  that  gets  51%  of  the 
votes  must  win  an  election.  And  I  hope 
you  will  have  the  same  luck  in  the 
months  to  come. 

I  came  here  as  a  stranger,  but  I 
find— already  I  feel  I  am  among  friends. 
I've  heard  that  the  American  people  are 
very  friendly  people,  hospitable  people. 
Both  qualities  have  been  proved  during 
the  last  few  days.  I'm  surrounded,  I 
understand,  by  film  sUirs.  Those  whom  I 
saw  in  my  youth  were  rather  different. 
They  were  Charlie  Chaplin,  Laurel  and 
Hardy,  Fatty  Arbuckle— [laughter[— 
and  Mary  Pickford. 

I  remember  a  story  about  Laurel 
and  Hardy.  They  joined  the  French 
Legion.  They  were  waiting  in  the  in- 
specting line.The  sergeant  came  and 
said,  "What  are  you  doing  here?  Why  do 
you  join  the  French  Legion?"  They  said, 
"We  joined  the  French  Legion  to 
forget."  "To  forget  what?"  "We've 
forgotten."  [Laughter] 


I  haven't  forgotten  about  the  help 
your  country  has  given  us  during  the 
last  few  years.  But  I  didn't  come  here  to 
ask  for  help.  That's  not  my  way.  I'm 
waiting  to  hear  Mr.  Frank  Sinatra  sing 
"My  Way."  [Laughter]  That's  one  of  my 
favorite  songs,  but  I  understand  he 
didn't  like  it.  [Laughter]  I  used  it  in  part 
of  my  election  campaign  and  asked  the 
people  to  vote  for  my  way,  which  they 
did. 

Your  country  is,  as  far  as  the 
Americans  go,  young.  Our  country  is 
old,  very  old.  We  go  back  to  the  fifth 
century  before  Christ.  We  had  Am- 
bassadors at  the  court  of  Claudius 
Caesar.  You'll  find  it  recorded  in  Pliny's 
letters.  He  even  mentions  the  name  of 
the  Ambassadors.  We  had  sent  delega- 
tions to  China  in  A.D.  47,  and  I  under- 
stand the  gift  sent  by  our  king  to  the 
Emperor  of  China  were  water  buffaloes 
and  hump  cattle.  The  great  Chinese 


pilgrims  Hsiian-tsang  and  Fa-Hsien 
came  to  our  country  in  the  fourth  cen- 
tury A.D.  and  the  sixth  century  A.D.  Si 
did  Sinbad  the  Sailor,  Marco  Polo,  and 
Ibn  Batuta. 

For  the  first  time.  Westerners  cam 
in  the  16th  century  and  the  Portuguese 
came  as  tourists  but  stayed  for  150 
years.  After  that  came  the  Dutch  and 
then  came  the  English.  And  we  are  no 
once  again,  a  free  country.  We  wish  to 
be  friendly  with  all  and  the  enemies  of 
none.  That  is  my  policy  and  the  policy 
our  people. 

We  would  like  the  people  of  Ameri 
to  understand  us.  In  the  long  history  c 
Sri  Lanka,  there  have  been  difficult 
periods.  There  have  been  murders;  the 
have  been  assassinations;  there  have 
been  riots;  there  have  been  good  deed 
and  bad  deeds.  Last  July  we  had  one  i 
those  bad  periods.  But  in  time  to  comi 
it  will  be  forgotten. 


Sri  Lanka— A  Profile 


People 

Noun  and  adjective:  Sri  Lankan(s).  Popu- 
lation (1983):  1.5.3  million.  Annual  growth 
rate:  1.8%.  Ethnic  groups:  Sinhalese  74%, 
Tamils  18%,  Moors  7%,  Burghers.  Malays, 
Veddahs  1%.  Religions:  Buddhism,  Hindu- 
ism, Islam,  Christianity.  Languages:  Sinhala 
(official),  Tamil  (national),  English. 

Geography 

Area:  65,610  sq.  km.  (25,322  sq.  mi.);  about 
the  size  of  West  Virginia.  Cities:  Capital- 
Colombo  {pop.  1,262,000).  Other  citws— 
Jaffna  (270,600),  Kandy  (147,400),  Galle 
(168,100).  Terrain:  Low  plain  in  the  north; 
hills  and  mountains  in  the  .south.  Climate: 
Tropical. 

Government 

Type:  Republic.  Independence:  February  4, 
1948.  Constitution:  August  31,  1978. 

Branches:  Executive — president  (chief  of 
state  and  head  of  government),  elected  for  a 
6-year  term.  Legislative — unicameral 
168-member  Parliament.  Judicial — Supreme 
Court,  Court  of  Appeals,  High  Court,  subor- 
dinate courts. 

Political  parties:  Cnited  National  Party 
(IINP),  Sri  Lanka  Freedom  Party  (SLFP), 
Lanka  Sama  Samaja  Party  (LSSP),  Com- 
munist Party/Moscow  Wing  (CP/M).  Tamil 
United  Liberation  Front  (TULF).  .lanatha 
Vimukti  Peramuna  (JVP).  Suffrage:  Hniver- 
sal  over  age  18. 

Flag:  On  a  yellow  background,  a  red  and 
groon  stripe  on  the  staff  side;  cm  the  remain- 


ing two-thirds  is  a  yellow  lion  holding  up  a 
sword,  centered  on  a  red  square. 

Economy 

GNP  (1981):  $4  billion.  Annual  growth  ra 

1982  est.,  4.8%;  1981,  4.2%;  1980,  5.8%; 
1979,  6.3%.  Per  capita  income:  $266.  Av| 
inflation  rate  (1982):  10%-15%. 

Natural  resources:  Limestone,  graph: 
mineral  sands,  gems,  phosphate. 

Agriculture  (24%  of  GNP):  Products- 
tea,  rubber,  coconuts,  rice,  spices.  Arable 
land—M%,  of  which  38%  is  cultivated. 

Industry  (18%  of  GNP):  Consumer  g( 
textiles,  chemicals  and  chemical  products, 
milling,  light  engineering,  paper  and  pap( 
products. 

Trade  (1981):  fi'j-poW.s— $1,069  billioi 
tea  ($335  million),  petroleum  products  ($' 
million),  textiles  and  garments  ($156  mill 
Major  markets— VS  ($146  million),  UK  (i 
million),  FRG  ($63  million),  Pakistan  ($56 
million),  communist  countries  ($85  milliot 
/mpor/s— $1,831  billion:  petroleum  ($448 
million),  machinery  and  equipment  ($201 
million),  sugar  ($147  million).  Major  sup- 
pliers—  Saudi  Arabia  ($273  million).  Jap; 
($2.58  million),  US  ($129  million),  Iran  ($: 
million),  UK  ($111  million),  communist  cc 
tries  ($.52  million). 

Official  exchange  rate  (March  1983 
rupees  =  US$1. 


i 


!t 


ill 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  Jui 
1983,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public 
fairs.  Department  of  State.  Editor:  J.  D;  I 
Adams.  ■ 


* 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


I  see  in  one  of  your  newspapers 
Ire  is  an  advertisement  in  which  some 
(iple  are  trying  to  make  us  remember 
^t  day.  It  was  a  fatal  day;  several  peo- 
were  killed.  It  was  not  done  by  the 
'ernment;  it  was  done  by  a  gang  of 
iligans,  about  which  we  are  very, 
y  sorry.  I'm  trying  to  forget  it.  I'm 
ing  to  make  our  people  not  com- 
— some  of  them — such  incidents 
lin.  I  hope  we  will  succeed. 

I  remember  when  one  of  your 
resentatives  came  to  see  me  and  had 
ch  with  me.  I  told  her— she  is  your 
resentative  in  the  United  Nations 
;anization — "A  leader  must  know  only 
3  words."  She  said,  "What's  that?"  1 
i,  "Yes  and  no."  And  I  think  Presi- 
it  Reagan  knows  those  two  words 
y  well.  Once  you  say  yes  or  once  you 

no,  stick  by  it.  Whatever  happens, 
'er  change.  That  has  been  my  policy, 
1  it  has  succeeded. 

Therefore,  we're  surrounded  by 
inds.  We've  been  very  happy  the  last 
/  days.  I  have  a  few  more  days  to 
md.  I  hope  to  spend  some  time  in  the 
lian  settlements  at  Sante  Fe,  not  for 

other  reason  but  because  those  were 

stories  I  read  in  my  youth,  about 
ffalo  Bill  and  the  various  tribes.  I'm 
cinated  by  the  fact  they  were  the 
est  human  settlements,  as  far  as  I 
DW,  in  the  continent  of  America,  and 
reat  people.  And  we  must  give  them 
elping  hand  as  we  must  give  every 
;e,  every  tribe,  every  human  being, 
atever  his  caste,  religion,  or  race,  a 
ping  hand. 

We're  all  human  beings.  We  extend 
'  affection,  not  only  to  human  beings 

even  to  animals;  to  the  little 
phant  that  we  have  gifted  to  you. 
at  is  the  philosophy  which  we  have 
.rned  in  our  country;  that  is  the 
ilosophy  which,  if  I  can,  I'll  spread 
•Qughout  the  world.  And  I  find  in  you, 
■.  President  and  Madam  Reagan,  two 
ry  good  disciples. 

Thank  you  very  much  for  entertain- 
r  us.  May  your  country  prosper.  May, 
the  morning  and  in  the  evening,  at 
^htfall.  may  the  name  of  President 
■agan  and  Madam  Reagan,  never  be 
-gotten. 

May  I  drink  to  the  health  of  Presi- 
nt  Reagan,  Madam  Reagan,  the 
ivernment  and  people  of  the  United 
ates  of  America. 


Review  of  Nicaragua's 
Commitments  to  the  OAS 


^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
esidentiai  Documents  of  June  26,  1984. 

2Held  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
)use  where  President  Jayewardene  was  ac- 
rded  a  formal  welcome  with  full  military 


by  J.  William  Middendorf  II 

Statement  made  in  the  Permanent 

Council  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States  (OAS)  on  July  18.  1984.  Am- 
bassador Middendorf  is  U.S.  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  OAS. 

The  U.S.  delegation  wishes  to  raise  the 
matter  of  the  solemn  commitments 
made  to  the  Secretary  General  of  this 
body  by  the  Sandinista  junta  5  years  ago 
on  July  12,  1979.  This  is  not  interven- 
tion—this is  reviewing  our  own  role 
after  commitments  made  to  it  by  a 
member  state.  As  a  result  of  these  com- 
mitments and  our  own  OAS  resolutions, 
we  brought  down  a  sitting  government. 
Tomorrow  will  be  the  fifth  anniversary 
of  the  date  that  the  junta  took  effective 
control  of  Managua;  but,  regrettably, 
very  little  progress  has  been  made  in 
putting  into  effect  these  commitments. 

You  will  recall  that  these  com- 
mitments were  made  as  a  response  to 
the  resolution  of  the  17th  Meeting  of 
Consultation  of  the  Ministers  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  member  countries  of  the  OAS. 
According  to  Document  25  of  this  body, 
published  June  30,  1981,  this  resolution 
"for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the 
OAS,  deprived  an  incumbent  member 
government  of  legitimacy"  when  it  asked 
that  the  Nicaraguan  Government  be  "im- 
mediately and  definitively"  replaced. 

The  resolution  in  question  said  that 
a  solution  to  Nicaragua's  problems  was 
exclusively  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Nicaraguan  people  but  then  proceeded 
to  dictate  how  the  problems  should  be 
settled.  In  addition  to  demanding  a  sit- 
ting president's  ouster,  the  resolution: 

•  Said  that  a  "democratic"  govern- 
ment was  to  replace  the  existing  govern- 
ment. Its  composition  was  to  include 
"the  principal  representative  groups 
which  oppose  the  existing  regime  and 
which  reflect  the  free  will  of  the  people 
of  Nicaragua"; 

•  Said  that  the  human  rights  of  all 
Nicaraguans,  without  exception,  should 
be  respected;  and 

•  Called  for  the  holding  of  free  elec- 
tions as  soon  as  possible,  leading  to  the 
establishment  of  a  "truly  democratic 
government  that  guarantees  peace, 
freedom,  and  justice." 


The  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs 
went  on  to  urge  the  member  states  to 
take  steps  that  were  within  their  reach 
to  facilitate  an  enduring  and  peaceful 
solution  of  the  Nicaraguan  problem 
based  on  these  points  "scrupulously  re- 
specting the  principle  of  non-interven- 
tion." 

They  also  asked  that  member  states 
promote  humanitarian  assistance  to 
Nicaragua  and  contribute  to  the  social 
and  economic  recovery  of  the  country. 
Many  countries  responded  with  an  open 
heart,  including  my  own,  with  the 
United  States  donating  $118  million  in 
the  first  2  years. 

I  would  note  that  this  17th  Meeting 
of  Consultation  has  never  formally  ad- 
journed but  only  recessed.  Given  the  un- 
precedented involvement  of  all  of  us  in 
the  process  that  brought  the  Sandinista 
regime  to  power,  the  member  nations 
have  a  continuing  interest— indeed,  a 
responsibility — in  monitoring  the  situa- 
tion in  Nicaragua  to  see  whether  or  not 
the  Sandinista  government  has,  indeed, 
carried  out  the  commitments  it  so 
solemnly  made  to  us  in  1979. 

It  is  in  this  context  that  I  propose  to 
examine  the  record  here  today,  in  order 
to  see  exactly  what  has  been  happening 
in  Nicaragua  since  the  Sandinista  junta 
assumed  power  there. 

Here  are  the  commitments  which 
the  junta  made  to  the  Secretary  General 
in  its  letter  of  June  12,  1979: 

•  "...  our  firm  intention  to 
establish  full  respect  for  human 
rights.  .  .  .  "; 

•  "...  our  decision  to  enforce  civil 
justice  in  our  country  ...  to  let  justice 
prevail  for  the  first  time  in  half  a  cen- 
tury. .  .  .  ";  and 

•  "...  call  Nicaraguans  to  the  first 
free  elections  that  our  country  will  have 
in  this  century.  ..." 

To  do  justice  to  the  full  historical 
record,  there  were  two  other  promises 
contained  in  the  same  letter,  one  which 
spoke  of  a  peaceful  and  orderly  transi- 
tion from  the  Somoza  government  to  the 
Sandinista  junta  and  another  permitting 
so-called  collaborators  of  the  Somoza 
regime,  except  those  responsible  for  so- 
called  genocide,  to  leave  the  country. 
But  I  will  concentrate  here  on  the  mat- 
ters of  human  rights,  civil  justice,  and 
elections. 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


It  should  be  noted  that  those  who 
signed  for  the  Sandinista  junta  were 
Commandante  Daniel  Ortega,  Violeta  de 
Chamorro,  Commandante  Sergio 
Ramirez,  Alfonso  Robelo,  and  Moises 
Hassan.  Violetta  de  Chamorro  is  no 
longer  a  member  of  the  junta,  and 
Alfonso  Robelo  is  in  exile  in  Costa  Rica, 
where  he  is  an  outspoken  critic  of  the 
junta  of  which  he  was  once  a  member. 

Commitment  Number  One- 
Human  Rights 

"...  (0]ur  firm  intention  to  establish 
full  respect  for  human  rights.  ..." 

Nothing  has  demonstrated  the 
callous  disregard  of  human  rights  by  the 
Sandinista  regime  so  much  as  their 
treatment  of  the  Miskito  Indians.  Ap- 
proximately 20,000  Miskitos— one-third 
of  the  entire  Miskito  population— have 
crossed  the  border  into  neighboring 
Honduras  thus  far,  where  they  live  in 
refugee  camps.  They  have  been  victims 
of  the  Sandinistas'  constant  campaigns 
against  them. 

It  all  began  with  efforts  by  the  San- 
dinista government  to  try  to  force  the 
Miskitos  into  adapting  their  way  of  life 
to  a  preconceived  Sandinista  model. 
Many  of  these  human  rights  offenses  are 
detailed  in  a  report  just  released  by  the 
OAS  General  Assembly  on  June  4 
transmitting  a  report  by  the  Inter- 
American  Human  Rights  Commission 
dated  November  29,  1983. 

Miskitos  have  been  forcibly  relocated 
from  their  traditional  villages.  In  a  few 
cases  where  they  resisted,  they  were 
killed.  Many  were  force  marched  to  the 
new  area  and  not  allowed  to  take  their 
belongings  with  them.  In  other  in- 
stances, the  government  appropriated 
their  farm  animals  for  itself.  On 
February  18,  1982,  the  Episcopal  Con- 
ference of  Nicaragua,  headed  by 
Managua's  archbishop,  directed  a 
message  to  the  people  and  Government 
of  Nicaragua  denouncing  the  human 
rights  violations  against  the  Miskitos. 

The  Miskito  Indians  long  ago 
adopted  the  Moravian  Church  as  their 
primary  religious  institution.  The  San- 
dinistas have  harassed  the  Moravian 
Church,  calling  some  of  its  ministers 
"counterrevolutionaries."  They  have  been 
asked  to  change  their  sermons  into 
vehicles  of  support  for  the  Sandinista 
revolution.  Church  services  have  been 
interrupted  by  Sandinista  troops  looking 
for  so-called  counterrevolutionaries.  A 
Moravian  hospital,  the  only  one  serving 
a  wide  area  of  eastern  Nicaragua,  was 
confiscated  by  the  government  and 


turned  into  a  military  headquarters,  ac- 
cording to  the  Miskitos.  Many  Moravian 
pastors— out  of  fear,  frustration,  or 
both— have  taken  refuge  in  Honduras. 
Amnesty  International,  an  organization 
which  was  highly  critical  of  the  previous 
regime,  denounced  the  Sandinistas  in 
September  1983  for  this  sort  of 
behavior. 

Miskito  organizations  say  their 
villages  have  occasionally  been  bombed 
by  Sandinista  planes.  Efforts  have  been 
made  to  force  them  to  join  the  San- 
dinista militia. 

Presumably  for  security  reasons, 
some  Miskitos  who  were  ocean 
fishermen  have  been  prohibited  from 
fishing,  cutting  off  their  livelihood  and 
their  principal  source  of  food. 

The  Miskitos  had  always  maintained 
their  land  as  communal  property  of  the 
tribe.  The  Sandinistas  have  broken  up 
some  of  these  communal  holdings,  mak- 
ing them  property  of  the  state. 

Smaller  tribes,  such  as  the  Sumo 
and  the  Rama,  have  also  suffered  similar 
violations  of  their  human  rights  at  the 
hands  of  this  so-called  peoples'  govern- 
ment. 

But  by  no  means  have  human  rights 
violations  been  limited  to  indigenous 
peoples.  As  you  will  recall,  the  Pope,  on 
his  visit  to  Managua,  was  treated  with 
unheard-of  rudeness.  Sandinista 
militants  set  up  a  parallel  loudspeaker 
system  over  which  they  heckled  the 
Pope  and  attempted  to  drown  out  his 
sermon.  Most  of  the  areas  close  to  the 
Pope  were  assigned  to  these  militants, 
and  ordinary  Catholics  who  turned  out 
to  receive  the  Pope's  blessings  were  kept 
at  a  distance. 

This  is  a  fitting  illustration  of  how 
the  Sandinista  government  has  treated 
the  Catholic  Church. 

Another  example  has  occurred  in  re- 
cent days  with  the  expulsion  of  10 
foreign  priests  from  Nicaragua.  The 
ostensible  excuse  for  their  expulsion  was 
that  they  somehow  had  something  to  do 
with  a  protest  demonstration  against  the 
house  arrest  of  yet  another  priest. 
Father  Luis  Amado  Pena.  But  a  majori- 
ty of  them  were  not  even  at  the 
demonstration  in  question,  which,  at  any 
rate,  was  a  peaceful  demonstration  led 
by  the  country's  archbishop,  the  sort  of 
a  demonstration  which  would  be  routine- 
ly permitted  in  any  truly  democratic 
country. 

The  Pope,  in  commenting  on  this  ac- 
tion, said:  "I  ask  the  Lord  to  illuminate 
the  minds  of  those  responsible  so  that 
they  may  reverse  this  decision,  openly 


harmful  to  the  church  and  the  needs  of 
the  Catholic  population  of  Nicaragua." 

In  recent  years,  the  Archbishop  of 
Managua,  Monsignor  Obando  y  Bravo, 
has  not  been  able  to  have  the  traditiona 
holy  week  services  broadcast  on  radio 
and  television  because  the  government 
wanted  to  subject  the  process  to  prior 
censorship,  a  demand  to  which  the  Arcl 
bishop  understandably  refused  to  ac- 
cede. In  a  crude  ploy,  a  priest,  who  is 
the  spokesman  for  the  archbishop  and 
director  of  the  Catholic  radio  station, 
was  accused  of  having  sexual  relations 
with  the  wife  of  another  man,  stripped 
naked,  and  paraded  in  public  where  Sa 
dinista  mobs  jeered  at  him  while  gover 
ment  press  photographers  and  televisic 
crews,  which  "just  happened"  to  be  on 
the  scene,  took  pictures.  The  program- 
ming of  the  Catholic  Church's  radio  stt 
tion  has  been  severely  restricted.  All 
Marxist-Leninist  governments  eventua 
reveal  themselves  as  atheistic — even 
though  in  the  case  of  Nicaragua,  a  few 
misguided  priests  hold  high  governmei 
positions — and  these  governments  use 
their  institutions  to  promote  atheism. 

The  Sandinistas  have  attempted  tc 
infiltrate  Catholic  youth  groups,  and 
when  this  largely  failed,  they  set  up 
their  own  so-called  "peoples'  church."  I 
November  of  1983,  all  Nicaraguan 
churches  closed  for  a  day  in  protest 
against  attacks  by  Sandinista  youth 
mobs  on  numerous  churches. 

The  Nicaraguan  Permanent  Comn 
tee  on  Human  Rights  has  itself  been  t 
victim  of  Sandinista  government  ex- 
cesses. The  former  president  of  the  ct 
mission,  Jose  Esteban  Gonzalez,  madt 
trip  to  Italy  in  1981  where  he  denoum 
the  existence  of  political  prisoners  in 
Nicaragua.  On  his  return  to  Managua 
number  of  supporters  and  colleagues 
came  to  the  airport  to  receive  him.  Tl 
were  never  allowed  to  get  near  him  b 
instead  were  roughed  up  and  spat  up. 
by  Sandinista  mobs.  Only  the  presenc 
of  the  Venezuelan  Ambassador 
prevented  Gonzalez  himself  from  gett 
roughed  up,  but  he  was  arrested  a  w( 
later  anyway. 

The  current  president  of  the 
Nicarag:uan  human  rights  group.  Mar 
Patricia  Baltodano,  told  the  Inter- 
American  Human  Rights  Commissior 
May  of  this  year  that  Sandinista  laws 
have  institutionalized  the  violation  of 
human  rights.  The  setting  up  of  so-ca 
Neighborhood  Committees  for  the 
Defense  of  the  Revolution  are  really  : 
tempts  to  limit  the  freedom  of  the  in- 
dividual Nicaraguan  by  instituting  a  (  i 
trol  system  over  the  population  at  th 
neighborhood  level. 


16 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Freedom  of  the  press  also  suffers  in 
aragua.  The  only  independent 
vspaper,  La  Prensa,  has  had  its 
)lication  suspended  by  the  govern- 
nt  on  numerous  occasions  and  is  sub- 
t  to  prior  censorship.  On  countless 
rs,  the  paper  has  been  so  heavily  cen- 
ed  that  its  editors  decided  not  to 
)lish. 

A  recent  example  of  this  happened 
y  10  when  La  Prensa  attempted  to 
)ort  on  the  expulsion  of  the  10  priests, 
incident  which  I  have  already  dis- 
ised.  Three  items— one  reporting  on 
I  government's  cancellation  of  their 
iidency  permits,  another  on  Catholics 
idemning  the  expulsion,  and  a  third 
the  fact  that  they  were  allowed  to 
ve  carrying  only  the  clothes  they 
re— were  censored.  Therefore,  the 
tors  decided  they  could  not  print  the 
tion  for  that  day. 

The  lack  of  the  right  for  families  to 
termine  how  their  children  will  be 
iicated,  which  we  in  the  United  States 
isider  a  fundamental  human  right, 
3  been  denounced  by  the  Nicaraguan 
rents'  Association,  The  Sandinista 
vernment  tries  to  use  education  to 
linwash  the  young  against  the  ideals 
their  parents  and  even  to  get  them  to 
nounce  their  parents'  lack  of  revolu- 
nary  zeal  to  the  authorities  in  some 
ses.  Intellectual  freedom  and  the 
;edom  to  belong  to  independent  labor 
ions  are  also  restricted  in  today's 
caragua. 

The  human  rights  of  farmers  have 
ffered  from  Sandinista  agricultural 
licies.  The  so-called  Economic  and 
cial  Emergency  Law  decreed  in  late 
81  has  made  the  state  the  only  pur- 
aser  of  farm  products.  Thus,  the 
rmer  can  only  sell  his  produce  to  the 
vernment  and  only  at  the  govern- 
gnt's  price.  Many  small  farmers  have 
en  ruined  by  this  policy,  and 
icaragua  must  now  import  some  foods 
which  it  was  previously  self-sufficient. 
t  the  same  time,  a  large  bureaucracy 
is  been  established  in  order  to  control 
1  activities  of  the  populace,  soaking  up 
oney  which  would  normally  be 
'ailable  for  investment  in  agriculture, 
ven  the  newspaper  Nuevo  Diario  has 
implained  about  the  amount  of  money 
ied  to  support  the  bloated  Sandinista 
ireaucracy.  All  of  the  foregoing 
amonstrates  that  the  commitment  to 
.  .  .  our  firm  intention  to  establish  full 
;spect  for  human  rights.  ..."  has  thus 
ir  been  grossly  violated. 


Commitment  Number  Two- 
Civil  Justice 

Let  us  turn  our  attention  to  the  second 
Sandinista  commitment  to  "  .  .  .  let 
justice  prevail  for  the  first  time  in  half  a 
century.  ..." 

Presumably,  the  Nicaraguan 
Supreme  Court,  under  the  original  San- 
dinista plans,  was  supposed  to  have  com- 
plete autonomy  in  the  judicial  area,  and 
lower  courts  would  be  dependencies  of 
it.  The  Inter- American  Human  Rights 
Commission  in  1981,  as  well  as  an  inter- 
national commission  of  jurists,  said  that 
the  judicial  branch  in  Nicaragua  should 
be  independent  from  the  legislative  and 
executive  branches  of  the  government, 
not  to  mention  the  Sandinista  party. 

But,  in  reality,  other  courts  have 
been  established  which  have  nothing  to 
do  with  the  concept  of  judicial  independ- 
ence as  we  know  it.  The  Supreme  Court 
has  no  authority  over  them.  One  of  them 
is  the  so-called  Peoples'  Court  at  the 
neighborhood  level.  These  courts  spend 
their  time  ferreting  out  so-called 
counterrevolutionaries  in  the  neighbor- 
hood. For  example,  a  neighbor  who  does 
not  show  up  for  a  meeting  to  promote 
the  Sandinista  cause  may  find  himself 
labeled  a  counterrevoluticjnary  by  one  of 
these  courts. 

The  right  of  haheus  corpus  in 
Nicaragua  must  be  questioned.  As  in 
Cuba,  people  who  have  been  jailed  for 
so-called  political  crimes  are  often  not 
released  when  their  sentences  have  been 
served.  New  judges  owe  their  jobs  to  the 
Sandinistas  and  are  not  about  to  show 
any  independence  on  the  bench. 

There  exists  no  constitution,  as  such. 
There  was  the  Economic  and  Social 
Emergency  Law  of  1981  which  in  1982 
became  the  State  of  Emergency.  This 
State  of  Emergency  has  been  routinely 
extended  every  time  it  was  about  to  ex- 
pire. Under  this  system,  all  laws  are 
issued  by  government  decree.  The  State 
of  Emergency  does  not  provide  for  the 
right  of  the  individual  to  a  defense  in  a 
court  of  law  in  some  cases  and  in  others 
suspends  the  civil  rights  of  the  in- 
dividual. This  has  been  denounced  by 
Amnesty  International. 

Commitment  Number 
Three— Elections 

So  much  for  Sandinista  justice.  Let's 
turn  now  to  commitment  number  three, 
dealing  with  elections. 

We  see  that  elections  have  been 
scheduled  by  the  Sandinista  government 
for  November  4  of  this  year,  2  days 
before  our  own.  As  we  once  had  high 


hopes  for  the  new  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment 5  years  ago,  can  we  now  have  high 
hopes  that  at  least  this  commitment  will 
be  fulfilled?  This  is,  in  itself,  a  welcome 
development,  but  there  are  some  dis- 
turbing statements  on  the  record  which 
lead  one  to  question  just  how  open  this 
election  process  will  be.  In  the  letter  of 
July  12,  1979,  the  Sandinista  leaders 
committed  to  the  OAS  to  "call 
Nicaragua  to  the  first  free  elections  our 
country  will  have  in  this  century."  This 
was  in  reply  to  the  resolution  of  the  17th 
Meeting  of  Consultation  of  the  Ministers 
of  Foreign  Affairs  which  had  said  free 
elections  should  be  held  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble, leading  to  the  establishment  of  "a 
truly  democratic  government  that 
guarantees  peace,  freedom  and  justice." 

Yet  on  August  25,  1981,  Com- 
mander Humberto  Ortega  said  that  elec- 
tions would  not  be  to  contest  power  but 
to  strengthen  the  revolution.  On  July  7 
of  this  year,  less  than  2  weeks  ago, 
Commander  Carlos  Nunez  Tellez  said  on 
Radio  Sandino: 

The  electoral  process  is  the  result  of  a 
political  decision  made  by  the  FSLN  [San- 
dinista National  Liberation  Front],  its  revolu- 
tionary leaders,  and  the  government  to  rein- 
force the  historical  popular  plan.  There  is 
nothing  more  alien  to  the  electoral  process 
than  sectarianism,  dogmatism,  and  other 
vices  that  are  characteristic  of  certain  so- 
called  democracies. 


Elections  in  Guatemala 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  4,  19841 

We  have  noted  with  pleasure  the  record 
turnout  of  Guatemalan  voters  in  the 
July  1  Constituent  Assembly  elections. 
The  bipartisan  U.S.  observer  team  and 
our  Embassy  in  Guatemala  report  from 
visits  throughout  the  country  that  the 
process  was  fair  and  open,  well  orga- 
nized, and  orderly.  We  applaud  the 
Government  of  Guatemala  for  taking 
this  important  step  in  carrying  out  its 
commitment  for  a  return  to  constitu- 
tional practices  and  the  unprecedented 
response  of  the  citizenry  to  the  oppor- 
tunity to  participate  in  their  political 
process.  We  wish  the  Guatemalans  well 
as  they  prepare  a  constitution  and  pro- 
ceed with  elections  for  a  new  govern- 
ment next  year. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  9,  1984.  I 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Government  spokesmen  have  said  in 
the  past:  "There  are  only  two  types  of 
Nicaraguans,  Sandinistas  and  counter- 
revolutionaries." Does  that  mean  that 
candidates  and  voters  for  other  parties 
will  automatically  be  labeled  counter- 
revolutionaries? And  what  kind  of  treat- 
ment will  that  cause  them  to  receive  on 
the  part  of  the  government? 

The  neighborhood  control  commit- 
tees are  called  Sandinista  Defense  Com- 
mittees. They  have  set  up  an  informer 
society,  modeled  on  the  East  German 
plan  and  with  East  German  agents  con- 
trolling their  internal  security.  They 
have  the  power  to  deprive  a  citizen  of 
his  food  ration  card,  for  example— a 
card,  by  the  way,  which  was  never 
needed  in  Nicaragua  until  this  govern- 
ment came  along.  These  Sandinista  De- 
fense Committees  also  control  access  to 
schools,  medicine,  and  health  care. 

It  is  also  worrisome  that  the  army  is 
called  the  Sandinista  Army,  and  other 
branches  of  the  armed  forces  are  simi- 
larly named.  Thus,  the  security  forces 
are  intimately  linked  with  one  of  the 
political  parties  which  will  be  running  in 
the  elections — the  Sandinista  party. 

The  electoral  council  which  has  been 
set  up  is  made  up  exclusively  of  promi- 
nent members  of  the  Sandinista  party. 
Will  they  be  fair  to  the  opposition  par- 
ties? 

And  will  the  state  of  emergency  be 
lifted  for  the  elections? 

Will  the  opposition  parties  be  able  to 
campaign  without  interference  by 
authorities  or  by  Sandinista-sponsored 
youth  mobs? 

Will  opposition  parties  have  equal 
access  to  radio  and  television  as  com- 
pared with  the  Sandinista  party?  Will 
they  be  able  to  have  party  rejiresen- 
tatives  at  the  poll.s? 

Will  the  Sandinistas  allow  interna- 
tional observers  to  move  freely  about 
the  country  during  the  election  process? 
How  will  the  ballots  be  counted  and  how 
will  results  be  relayed  to  election  head- 
quarters? 

We  also  note  that,  as  time  has  gone 
on,  the  government  has  arbitrarily  con- 
centrated more  and  more  power  in  the 
hands  of  the  Sandinista  party.  What  was 
once  the  Government  of  National 
Reconstruction  is  now  the  Sandinista 
Peoples'  Revolutionary  Government. 
Will  the  Sandinistas  allow  this  process 
to  be  reversed,  or  are  we  in  for  a  sham 
election  in  November  just  before  our 
own  general  assembly? 


We  have  seen  how  the  Sandinistas 
of  Nicaragua  have  thus  far  failed  to  live 
up  to  their  commitments  to  tlie  OAS  of 
5  years  ago.  It  is  a  shame  that  the  peo- 
ple of  Nicaragua,  so  hopeful  in  1979  that 
their  situation  would  improve,  have  seen 
their  revolution  betrayed  by  a  group  of 
leaders  who  have  aligned  themselves 
with  international  communism  and 
whose  principal  concern  has  been  to 
maintain  themselves  in  power  and,  in- 
deed, to  export  communism  to  their 
neighbors  virtually  from  the  day  they 
took  over.  We  in  the  OAS,  which  was 
deeply  involved  in  the  process  by  which 


the  Sandinistas  took  power,  have  a 
grave  responsibility  to  monitor  the 
fulfillment  of  these  commitments. 

In  June  1979  a  respected  scholar  or 
Latin  America,  Dr.  Constantine  Mengei 
wrote:  "The  defeat  of  the  Somoza  Armj 
by  the  Sandinistas  will  be  followed  by  a 
Cuban-type  process  from  which  the  pro 
Castro  guerrilla  leaders  will  emerge  as  | 
the  only  group  with  real  power."  Five 
years  after  he  wrote  this,  and  5  years 
after  the  Sandinistas'  commitments  to 
the  OAS,  it  developed  that  he  was  pro- 
jihetic.  ■ 


President  Meets  With 
El  Salvador's  President 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  23.  1984' 

During  his  brief  visit  to  Washington  to- 
day. El  Salvador's  President  Jose 
Napoleon  Duarte  met  with  President 
Reagan  this  morning  at  11:00  for  half  an 
hour,  with  the  Vice  President  present. 
From  the  State   Department,  the 
meeting  included  Secretary  Shultz  and 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  El  Salvador 
Thomas  Pickering. 

Following  his  meeting  with  Presi- 
dent Reagan,  President  Duarte  went  to 
the  Hill  to  meet  with  House  Majority 
Leader  James  Wright.  We  believe  he 
was  also  seeing  Jamie  Whitten,  chair- 
man of  the  Appropriations  Committee; 
and  Clarence  Long,  chairman  of  the 
Foreign  Operations  Subcommittee  of  the 
Appropriations  Committee;  and  possibly 
others. 

Following  his  meeting  on  the  Hill, 
President  Duarte  was  to  return  to  New 
York  City.  He's  there  for  meetings  with 
UN  officials,  the  Americas  Society,  and 
others. 

President  Duarte  gave  a  full  readout 
of  the  meeting,  discussing  his  assess- 
ment of  developments  in  El  Salvador, 
his  very  successful  trip  to  Europe,  and 
the  Administration's  efforts  during  the 
current  3-week  congressional  session  to 
secure  pending  FY  1984  supplemental 
funds  and  complete  congressional  action 
on  the  Central  American  Democracy, 
Peace,  and  Development  Initiative.  We 
have  nothing  to  add  to  what  he  said. 

As  you  know,  we  still  hope  to  secure 
that  portion  of  the  FY  1984  supplemen- 
tal request  which  has  not  been  acted  on 
(for  El  Salvador  this  includes  $134 


million  in  economic  assistance  and  $11' 
million  in  military  assistance)  and  the 
Central  America  Democracy,  Peace,  ai 
Development  Initiative  plan  request  fo 
all  of  Central  America  which  includes 
for  FY  198.5  $1,376  billion  ($1.12  billio 
in  economic  and  $256  million  in  militai 
assistance  for  the  region).  Of  the  $1.3' 
billion  requested,  $473.6  million  would 
be  for  El  Salvador— $341.1  million 
would  be  for  economic  assistance  and 
$132.5  million  would  be  for  military 
assistance. 

The  Administration  in  February  n 
quested  a  supplemental  appropriation 
$659  million  to  begin  meeting  the  mos 
urgent  needs  identified  by  the  Nation: 
Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America;  $312.7  million  in  the  FY  19i 
Supplemental  ($134  million  in  econom 
and  $178.7  million  in  military  assistar 
is  for  El  Salvador. 

As  you  know,  some  $61.7  million 
urgently  needed  military  assistance  f( 
El  Salvador  was  passed  by  the  Con- 
gress. The  remaining  $117  million  in 
military  assistance  and  $134  million  i 
economic  assistance  have  not  been  ac 
upon  and,  at  this  point,  are  both  urgt 
ly  needed  by  the  Government  of  El 
Salvador,  as  are  the  $266  million  in 
economic  assistance  and  $142  million 
military  assistance  requested  in 
February  for  other  countries  in  Centi 
America. 

We  will  be  striving  for  House  act 
on  our  requests  for  the  Henry  Jacksc 
plan  and  the  supplemental  funds  for 
Salvador. 


ill 


is 


'Text  from  "White  House  press 
release.  ■ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


;uba  as  a  Model  and  a  Challenge 


Kenneth  N.  Skoug,  Jr. 

Address  to  the  Americas  Society 
New  York  City  on  July  25.  1984. 
:  Skoug  is  Director  of  the  Office  of 
ban  Affairs,  Bureau  oflnter- 
lerican  Affairs. 

Paradoxical  Neighbor 

r  neighbor  Cuba  is  a  country  of 
•adoxes. 

•  It  is  a  small  island,  but  it  has  the 
eign  policy  and  the  military  establish- 
nt  of  a  major  power,  committed  by 

'  deepest  instincts  of  its  leadership  to 
)jecting  its  system  and  its  point  of 
w  abroad. 

Although  it  strives  unceasingly  for 
dership  of  the  Nonaligned  Movement, 
ba  is  more  closely  aligned  with  the 
^et  Union  than  many  members  of  the 
irsaw  Pact,  providing  unique  military 
vices  in  kind  in  return  for  economic 
1  military  assistance. 

•  It  has,  especially  in  recent  years, 
ome  an  avowed  advocate  of  Latin 
lerican  unity,  but  it  has  a  history  of 
ervention  in  the  region  and  maintains 
se  ties  to  subversive  forces  in  every 
tin  American  country. 

Its  economy  literally  lives  off 
.ssive  infusion  of  foreign  aid,  but  it 
)resents  itself  as  a  development  model 
others. 

•  Its  leaders  sometimes  assert  that 
y  welcome  democratic  trends  per- 
ved  in  the  hemisphere,  but  there  is 

unfortunately  not  the  remotest 
lection  of  such  a  trend  in  Cuba  itself. 

Out  of  these  ingredients  there  has 
erged  a,  so  far,  durable  mixture  of 
'  traditional  Latin  American  caudillo 
i  the  20th  century  European  concept 
the  party-state.  The  pyramidal  Cuban 
dership  remains  dedicated  to  its  own 
ongly  held  concept  of  world  revolu- 
n,  asserting  its  independence  of,  but 
reasingly  dependent  on  and  con- 
ained  by  its  bonds  to,  the  U.S.S.R.  It 
a  leadership  disquieted  by  the  apathy 
d  sometimes  active  dissent  of  its  own 
izens  but  unwilling  or  unable  to 
inge  its  fundamental  approach.  It  re- 
lins  committed  to  projecting  itself  as  a 
e  model  for  others.  It  sends  its  sons 
fight  and  die  thousands  of  miles  from 
me  in  the  name  of  proletarian  interna- 
nalism.  It  funds,  arms,  trains,  and 
unsels  revolution  but  craves  recogni- 
n  as  a  proponent  of  a  stable  interna- 
nal  order. 


Cuba  wields  influence  far  beyond  its 
size  though  perhaps  still  beneath  the 
aspirations  of  its  leaders.  Its  human 
resources  are  impressive.  We  need  to 
look  carefully  at  the  model  it  projects 
and  the  challenge  which  it  poses  for  us 
in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean. 
For  the  leadership  of  revolutionary 
Cuba,  "Nuestra  America"  starts  at  the 
Rio  Grande  and  ends  on  Tierra  del 
Fuego.  Its  target  is  this  immense 
region,  from  which  Cuba  would  like 
to  dispel  U.S.  influence  or  at  least 
diminish  it. 

Cuba's  leadership,  which  has 
changed  surprisingly  little  in  composi- 
tion over  the  past  quarter  century,  came 
to  power  with  two  quintessential  objec- 
tives. It  wanted  to  maintain  power  in 
Cuba  itself  while  effecting  a  thorough- 
going social  transformation,  whatever 
the  cost.  And  it  wanted  to  carry  the 
revolutionary  struggle  abroad  to  the 
Caribbean,  to  Central  America,  to  South 
America,  and  even  to  Africa.  Whatever 
the  price  in  human  suffering,  no  one  can 
question  the  determination  with  which 
each  of  these  two  basic  objectives  has 
been  pursued  by  Cuba's  leaders  down  to 
the  present  day. 

There  has  been  from  the  outset  a 
third  motivation,  an  apparently  visceral 
animosity  for  the  United  States.  To  the 
extent  that  this  was  calculated,  it  was 
perhaps  because  it  was  thought  that  the 
achievement  of  the  two  primary  objec- 
tives would  inevitably  bring  the  Cuban 
revolutionaries  into  conflict  on  both 
counts  with  American  power.  To  the  ex- 
tent that  it  was  irrational,  it  has  been 
even  harder  to  address.  In  June  1958 
the  Cuban  "Maximum  Leader"  wrote 
from  the  Sierra  Maestra  to  a  confidante 
that  after  the  revolution  had  come  to 
power,  he  would  begin  a  longer,  larger 
war  against  the  Americans.  He  told  her 
he  had  come  to  understand  that  this  was 
his  true  destiny.  It  would  be  a  serious 
mistake  to  regard  this  as  rhetorical.  It  is 
among  the  most  prized  memorabilia  of 
the  Cuban  revolution.  After  a  quarter 
century  it  still  seems  to  be  valid. 

The  Cuban-Soviet  relationship, 
which  is  now  so  fundamental,  is  derived 
from  these  motivations  and  logical  only 
in  light  of  revolutionary  Cuba's  own  ob- 
jectives. The  intent  of  the  revolutionary 
leadership  in  Havana  to  confront  the 
United  States  in  Cuba  and  abroad  in 
pursuit  of  its  twin  objectives  led  natural- 


ly and  even  inevitably  to  the  decision  to 
invite  the  Soviet  Union  to  the  Western 
Herhisphere.  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
Cuban  leadership,  the  U.S.S.R.  was  and 
is  a  necessary  evil.  Moscow  had  its  own 
reasons  for  accepting  Cuba's  invitation. 
The  course  of  this  relationship  has  not 
always  been  smooth,  especially  at  the 
outset,  but  it  has  evolved  into  a  sym- 
biotic one,  where  each  is  essential  to  and 
derives  unique  benefits  from  the  other. 
As  the  mutual  costs  have  risen,  so  have 
the  perceived  benefits.  Like  the  two 
basic  objectives  and  the  anti- American 
bias,  the  Soviet  connection  has  been  cen- 
tral to  the  evolution  of  Cuba's  domestic 
and  foreign  policies  alike.  It  is  as  much 
of  the  fabric  of  today's  Cuba  as  the 
Sierra  Maestra.  And  it  is  instructive 
that  Cuba's  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union — once  it  began — has  been  largely 
unaffected  by  any  changes  or  trends  in 
U.S. -Cuban  relations,  including  tem- 
porary thaws  in  the  relationship  between 
Washington  and  Havana. 

The  basic  conflict  in  LI. S. -Cuban 
relations  that  began  in  1959  stems 
primarily  from  Havana's  foreign  policy 
and  only  indirectly  from  events  in  Cuba. 
It  is  true  that  at  the  outset  our  attention 
and  expectations  were  directed  mainly 
to  certain  domestic  actions  by  the 
Castro  government,  such  as  expropria- 
tion of  U.S.  property,  execution  of 
prisoners,  and  the  unforeseen  introduc- 
tion of  the  communist  system,  stimu- 
lating massive  flows  of  refugees  to  our 
shores.  It  would  at  present  be  quite  con- 
ceivable, in  theory  at  least,  for  Cuba  to 
have  a  repressive  domestic  system  and 
yet  not  promote  turmoil  in  the  region  or 
align  itself  militarily  with  the  rival  global 
superpower.  If  Cuban  foreign  policy 
were  really  noninterventionist  and  non- 
aligned,  Cuban-American  relations 
would  still  be  less  than  harmonious,  but 
such  a  Cuba  would  not  clash  with  U.S. 
foreign  policy  interests  throughout  the 
region. 

In  historical  practice,  the  foreign 
and  the  domestic  policies  of  the  Cuban 
Government,  however,  spring  from  the 
same  imperative.  Cuba  still  sees  a  mis- 
sion and  arrogates  to  itself  the  right  and 
even  the  duty  to  support  revolution  and 
"national  liberation"  in  other  states. 
When  conditions  are  deemed  appropri- 
ate, the  Cuban  revolution  is  a  model  for 
others.  It  is  not  passive.  Cuba  craves 
emulation.  The  model  need  not,  of 
course,  be  accepted  in  every  detail.  The 
Cubans  have  grown  aware  through  trial 
and  error  that  conditions  differ  from 
country  to  country.  Doubtlessly  with  an 
eye  both  to  their  own  experience  and  to 
their  privileged  access  to  the  Soviet 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


treasury,  they  caution  radical  regimes  in 
third  countries  to  keep  their  lines  open 
to  Western  trade  and  assistance  and  not 
to  expropriate  too  quickly  all  private 
enterprise  or  to  alienate  or  eliminate  all 
other  institutions.  But  these  have  been 
essentially  prudent  tactical  considera- 
tions, designed  to  ensure  the  survival 
and  firm  implementation  of  a  one-party 
state  system  in  third  countries,  such  as 
Nicaragua  and  Grenada,  based  on  well- 
known  Leninist  principles.  The  Cuban 
leadership  envisions  the  rise  of  societies 
imitative  of  Cuban  practice,  alienated 
from  the  United  States,  friendly  to  the 
U.S.S.R.,  and  looking  to  Cuba  for 
ideological  leadership.  In  the  short  run, 
however,  where  societies  are  not  yet 
ripe  for  revolution,  Cuba  is  content  to 
use  its  power  to  encourage  other  states, 
particularly  in  Latin  America,  to  rally 
together  against  the  United  States. 

The  Cuban  Model  in 
Appearance  and  Reality 

Since  Cuba  proselytizes,  we  need  to 
know  what  it  is,  and,  perhaps  more  im- 
portant, what  it  seems  to  be.  Cuba  of- 
fers would-be  leaders  in  other  countries 
the  example  of  a  hierarchical  one-party 
system,  supported  by  ubiquitous  organs 
of  control  and  punishment  and  by  a  near 
total  monopoly  over  the  dissemination  of 
knowledge  and  ideas.  It  offers  to  would- 
be  emulators  a  command  economy  which 
assigns  nearly  everyone  some  form  of 
employment,  at  least  if  it  wishes  them  to 
be  employed.  The  fact  that  the  economy 
does  not  respond  well  to  the  needs  of 
the  population,  that  it  is  a  perpetuation 
of  monoculture  and  closely  integrated  in- 
to and  totally  dependent  on  subsidies 
from  the  Soviet  orbit  is  not  always 
readily  apparent  to  others.  For  domestic 
support  the  model  relies  heavily  and  suc- 
cessfully on  national  consciousness- 
building  enterprises  like  nationalized 
sport  and  culture.  It  appeals  to  visceral 
nationalism  by  calculated  distortion  of 
past  history  and  contemporary  events. 
Revolutionary  Cuba  has  long  assigned 
the  United  States  the  same  universal 
malevolence  which  Hitler  arrogated  to 
the  Jews.  It  pretends  to,  and  to  a  cer- 
tain degree  practices,  a  more  egalitarian 
distribution  of  the  social  product  than  is 
customary  in  Latin  America.  It  lays 
great  stress  on  so-called  socialist 
achievements,  particularly  in  health  and 
education.  In  this  respect — as  with 
many  others,  too — Cuba  distorts  and 
belittles  the  achievements  of  the  past  so 
as  to  improve  the  appearance  of  the  pre- 
sent. In  short,  Cuba  offers  to  pro- 
ponents of  radical  change  a  model  for 


seizing  and  holding  power  without  need 
for  periodic  popular  ratification  and  for 
altering  society  unrestrained  by  legal  or 
ethical  limitations. 

There  is  one  essential  element  of  the 
Cuban  model  which  could  not  be  widely 
replicated.  Cuba's  economy  could  not  ex- 
ist but  for  Soviet  subsidies.  These  are  on 
the  order  of  $12-$13  million  dollars 
daily  for  economic  aid  alone.  Thus  those 
who  might  wish  to  emulate  the  Cuban 
experience  cannot  truly  do  so  unless 
they  can  persuade  the  Soviet  Union  to 
provide  a  similar  degree  of  massive  sup- 
port. 

Moreover,  the  Cuban  reality  is  some- 
what different  from  the  point  of  view  of 
those  who  must  live  it.  The  costs  are 
very  high.  The  benefits  are  less  evident. 
The  Cuban  system  since  1959  has  been 
one-man  rule.  The  same  individual  is 
now  President  of  the  Council  of  State, 
President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers, 
First  Secretary  of  the  Cuban  Communist 
Party,  and  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Armed  Forces.  The  "Maximum  Leader" 
projects  his  views  across  all  aspects  of 
Cuban  society.  From  bovine  genetics  to 
college  textbooks,  from  sugar  cultivation 
to  nurses'  uniforms  his  views  are  norma- 
tive. To  challenge  them,  even  to  provide 
well-intended  advice,  is  not  recom- 
mended. Unsurprisingly,  in  these  cir- 
cumstances innovation  does  not  flourish 
in  Cuba  and  practices  are  slow  to 
change. 

Second,  Cuba  is  a  militarized  society 
with  one-quarter  million  men  under 
arms  and  another  million  men  and 
women  in  the  militia.  In  addition,  as 
Havana  International  Radio  recently 
stated,  every  able-bodied  Cuban  must 
know  his  mission  in  a  war  situation.  The 
economy,  it  stated,  ".  .  .  is  being  pre- 
pared so  it  can  accomplish  its  objectives 
in  times  of  war  and  adapt  its  develop- 
ment to  defense  interests."  Militant 
Cuba  devotes  its  Sundays  neither  to  the 
spirit  nor  to  rest  nor  to  recreation  but 
rather  to  military  drill.  Cuba  possesses 
the  most  experienced  and  most  highly 
mechanized  fighting  force  in  Latin 
America.  Its  leaders  speak  often  of  the 
need  to  defend  Cuba,  but  Cuba's 
substantial  combat  experience  has  been 
acquired  almost  exclusively  on  far  away 
foreign  battlefields  such  as  Bolivia, 
Angola,  Grenada,  and  the  Horn  of 
Africa.  As  Cuban  Politburo  member 
Jorge  Risquet  described  it  recently 
(Havana  International  Service,  June  15, 
1984)  when  he  decorated  Cuba's  "inter- 
nationalists": "You  have  traveled 
thousands  of  miles  from  your  fatherland, 
your  homes,  and  your  families  to  raise 
the  Cuban  and  internationalist  flags  in 
the  heart  of  Africa." 


The  essence  of  Cuba's  political 
organization  is  reflected  in  Article  61  o 
the  Constitution  of  Cuba  of  1976, 
according  to  which; 

None  of  the  freedoms  which  are  recog- 
nized for  citizens  may  be  exercised  contrarj 
to  what  is  established  in  the  Constitution  aipi 
the  law,  or  contrary  to  the  existence  and  ot 
jectives  of  the  socialist  state,  or  contrary  tc 
the  decision  of  the  Cuban  people  to  build 
socialism  and  communism.  Violation  of  this 
principle  is  punishable  by  law. 


i 


This  last  is  understatement.  No  or 
ganizations  or  movements  are  permitt 
in  Cuba  to  oppose  the  political  will  of  1 
leadership.  "There  is  no  organized  dis- 
sent, no  effective  institutional  or 
historical  limitations  on  the  exercise  o: 
power.  No  parties  other  than  the  Com 
munist  Party  are  tolerated.  There  is  n 
freedom  of  the  press  or  speech,  no  rei 
possibility  through  culture  or  the  in- 
tellectual arts  to  satirize  the  leadershi 
The  Catholic  Church  and  Protestant 
churches  exist  but  cannot  provide  a  ri 
orientation  or  challenge  the  dictum  of 
Article  61.  It  is  not  surprising  that  th 
"Seventh  Report  of  the  Organization  ( 
American  States  on  the  Situation  of 
Human  Rights  in  Cuba,"  published  las 
October,  concluded  that  the  structure 
the  Cuban  state  is  totalitarian. 

Over  1  million  refugees  since  195! 
have  found  the  way  out  of  Cuba  to  ot 
shores,  especially  to  the  United  State 
Less  fortunate  has  been  the  fate  of 
those  who  stayed  behind  but  who  sou 
to  resist  the  party-state.  The  Cuban 
leadership  has  singled  them  out  for  e 
emplary  punishment.  Vengeance  is  ui 
lenting  on  those  who  dare  to  resist  th 
system.  Nowhere  else  in  Latin  Amer' 
have  so  many  been  punished  so  long. 
There  are  still  in  Cuba,  at  present,  hi 
dreds  of  prisoners  who  have  spent  m 
than  15  or  even  20  years  in  prison 
because  they  opposed  the  regime  anc 
refuse  to  acknowledge  their  "crime"  . 
accept  the  new  order.  Like  the  recen 
released  poets  Jorge  Vails  and  Arma 
Valladares,  they  have  passed  the  bes 
years  of  their  lives  free  in  spirit  but 
to  the  world. 

Despite  these  punishments  and 
despite  the  evident  will  and  capacity 
the  regime  to  deal  harshly  with  disse 
it  continues  to  manifest  itself.  In 
January  of  1983,  for  example,  we 
learned  of  the  trials  and  sentencing- 
some  originally  to  death— of  a  grou{ 
some  50  Cubans  who  apparently  wis 
to  form  a  trade  union  on  the  model  ( 
the  Polish  Solidarity.  Arrests  and  tri  j 
of  their  lawyers  and  judges  followed 
After  that,  the  former  President  of 


I' 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


a  and,  at  the  time,  Minister  of 
ice,  Oswaldo  Dorticos,  committed 
ide.  The  veil  of  secrecy  that  sur- 
ids  Cuba  makes  it  difficult  to  obtain 
ible  information  about  dissent  and 
enters,  but  we  know  enough  to  con- 
e  that  the  spirit  of  freedom  still  ex- 
in  Cuba. 

It  is  clear  that  whatever  Cuba  has 
iuced  since  1959  has  been  wrought 
le  price  of  inordinate  human  suffer- 
But  what  has,  in  fact,  been  pro- 
jd  which  could  justify  this  regime? 
The  Cuban  revolutionaries  took 
er  talking  about  an  end  to  mono- 
ure  and  to  foreign  domination  of  the 
an  economy.  They  spoke  of  economic 
vth  and  egalitarian  living  standards. 
984  Cuba  is  more  dependent  on 
ir  than  before.  In  1983  more  than 

of  Cuban  trade  was  with  the  Soviet 
on  and  other  communist  countries 
only  some  10%  with  the  West.  Were 
Dt  for  subsidized  Soviet  purchases  of 
lan  sugar  and  subsidized  Soviet  oil 
s,  along  with  deliveries  of  Soviet  and 
t  European  equipment,  the  Cuban 
lomy  could  not  function.  Even  so, 
capita  economic  growth  in  Cuba  has 
n  among  the  lowest  in  the 
lisphere.  It  is  often  forgotten  that 
)a  on  the  eve  of  Fidel  Castro  was  a 
ily  advanced  society.  In  1952  Cuba 
the  third  highest  per  capita  gross 
ional  product  of  the  20  Latin 
erican  republics.  In  1981  it  ranked 
h.  Only  in  the  equalization  of  living 
idards  have  the  aspirations  of  the 
)an  revolutionaries  been  reached  to 
le  degree,  albeit  at  a  modest  level, 
m  so  the  elite  has  perquisites  denied 
he  great  majority.  For  example, 
;r  Cuba — which  rations  clothing  to  its 
1  citizens — recently  staged  an  inter- 
ional  fashion  fair,  the  Cuban  authori- 
explained  that  the  "fashions"  would 
for  export  or  sale  in  "specialized" 
res  open  to  diplomats  and  tourists. 
;y  did  not  explain  that  the  Cuban 
e  buys  in  such  stores,  too,  and  that 
clothing  is  not  always  made  in  Cuba 
the  "socialist  camp." 
While  leading  the  Cuban  delegation 
he  June  1984  CEMA  [Council  for 
tual  Economic  Assistance]  summit 
eting  in  Moscow,  Cuban  Vice  Presi- 
it  Carlos  Rafael  Rodriguez  cited 
oa,  Mongolia,  and  Vietnam  as  the 
1st  developed  countries  within 
MA."  For  Cuba,  which  in  1959  had  a 
ndard  of  living  that  rivaled  Spain,  it 
s  a  bizarre  sign  of  progress  to  be 
ssified  with  Mongolia  and  Vietnam 
i  to  see  accentuated  those  programs 
;ich  promise  to  perpetuate  Cuba's 
Lgnation. 


Cuba— A  Profile 


PROFILE 

People 

Noun  and  adjective:  Cuban(s).  Population 
(1981  census,  preliminary  data):  9.7  million; 
67%  urban,  30%  rural.  Avg.  annual  growth 
rate:  1.2%.  Density:  86/sq.  km.  (224/sq.  mi.). 
Ethnic  group:  Spanish-African  mixture. 
Language:  Spanish.  Literacy  rate:  96%  of 
physically  fit  between  ages  10  and  49. 
Health:  Infant  mortality  rate — slightly  less 
than  25/1,000.  Life  expectancy — 70  yrs. 
Work  force:  Agriculture — 30%.  Industry 
and  commerce — 45%.  Services — 20%. 
Government — 5%. 


Geography 

Area:  114,471  sq.  km.  (44,200  sq.  mi.);  about 
the  size  of  Pennsylvania.  Cities:  Capital — 
Havana  (pop.  1.9  million).  Other  cities — San- 
tiago de  Cuba,  Camaguey.  Terrain:  Flat  or 
gently  rolling  plains,  mountains  up  to 
1,800  m.  (6,000  ft,),  and  hills.  Climate: 
Tropical;  avg.  annual  temperature  24  °C 
(76°F). 

Government 

Type:  Communist  state.  Independence: 
May  20,  1902.  Latest  constitution:  1976. 

Branches:  Executive — president.  Council 
of  Ministers.  Legislative — National  Assembly 
of  People's  Government,  headed  by  Council  of 
State.  Judicial — subordinate  to  Council  of 
State. 

Political  party:  Communist  Party  (PCC). 
Suffrage:  All  citizens  aged  16  and  older,  ex- 
cept those  who  have  applied  for  permanent 
emigration.  National  elections  were  held  in 
1976  for  the  National  Assembly  of  the  Peo- 
ple's Government,  and  municipal  elections  for 
local  assemblies  were  held  in  1981. 


Administrative  subdivisions:  14  prov- 
inces, 169  municipalities. 

National  holidays:  Jan.  1,  Revolution 
Day;  May  1,  International  Workers  Day; 
July  26,  Moncada  Barracks  Attack  anniver- 
sary. 

Flag:  White  star  centered  on  red 
equilateral  triangle  at  staff  side,  3  blue  and  2 
white  horizontal  stripes  in  the  background. 

Economy 

GNP  (1979  est.):  $9-11  billion.  Annual 
growth  rate  (1980  est):  - 1%/  -i- 1%.  Per 
capita  income  (1981  est.):  $900-$l,100. 

Natural  resources:  Metals,  primarily 
nickel. 

Agriculture:  Sugar,  tobacco,  coffee, 
citrus  and  tropical  fruits,  rice,  beans,  meat, 
vegetables. 

Major  industries  (17%  of  labor  force): 
Refined  sugar,  metals.  Other  industries:  Oil 
refining,  cement,  electric  power,  food  proc- 
essing, light  consumer  and  industrial  prod- 
ucts. 

Trade:  Exports— $4.7  billion  (f  o.b.  1981): 
sugar  and  its  byproducts  (83%),  nickel  oxide 
and  sulfide  (10%),  tobacco  and  its  products, 
fish,  rum,  fruits.  Major  markets — USSR, 
Eastern  Europe,  China.  Imports — $5.4  billion 
(c.i.f.  1980  approx.  figures):  capital  equip- 
ment (33%),  raw  materials  (33%),  petroleum 
(10%),  foodstuffs  and  consumer  products 
(20%-25%).  Major  sources— USSR,  Eastern 
Europe. 

Offlcial  exchange  rate:  1  Cuban 
peso  =  US$1.28. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

iJN  and  various  specialized  agencies,  in- 
cluding General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade;  Council  for  Mutual  Economic 
Assistance  (CEMA);  observer.  Economic 
Commission  for  Latin  America  (ECLA);  In- 
ternational Sugar  Council;  Pan  American 
Health  Organization  (PAHO);  nonpartici- 
pating  member,  Organization  of  American 
States  (OAS)  and  Inter-American  Develop- 
ment Bank  (IDB);  Latin  American  Economic 
System  (SELA);  Group  of  77;  Nonaligned 
Movement. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  April 
1983,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, Department  of  State.  Editor:  J.  Darnell 
Adams.  ■ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Cubans  are  still  rationed  to  three- 
quarters  of  a  pound  of  meat  per  person 
each  9-11  days.  There  recently  have  ap- 
peared billboards  in  Havana  admonish- 
ing the  population  to  think  not  of  con- 
sumption but  of  development.  In  other 
words,  perhaps,  to  think  less  of  the  fact 
that  a  Cuban  is  entitled  to  a  ration  of 
one  pair  of  shoes  a  year  and  more  of  the 
future  development  of  the  shoe  industry. 
But  even  the  notion  of  industrial  devel- 
opment is  belied  by  the  facts.  According 
to  the  World  Bank,  manufactures  ac- 
counted for  5%  of  Cuba's  exports  in 
1960  and  the  same  percentage  in  1980. 
By  way  of  contrast,  Jamaica's  went 
from  5%  to  53%  in  the  same  period, 
Brazil's  from  3%  to  39%,  Costa  Rica's 
from  5%  to  34%,  and  Paraguay's  from 
0%  to  12%. 

The  Cuban  elite  boasts  of  achieve- 
ments in  the  fields  of  health  and  educa- 
tion, speaking  in  terms  of  being  a 
"medical  power"  in  the  world.  It  is 
beyond  dispute  that  Cuba  has  health 
facilities  superior  to  those  in  many  other 
countries.  But  Cuba  was  a  leader  among 
Latin  American  nations  before  1959,  in 
part  due  to  its  close  association  with  the 
United  States.  The  first  great  health 
revolution  in  Cuba  was  introduced  by 
the  United  States  in  1900.  Havana  and 
yellow  fever  were  synonymous  in  the 
19th  century.  In  1900  there  were  1,400 
known  cases  of  yellow  fever  in  Havana. 
In  February  1901  William  Gorgas  com- 
menced his  campaign  to  eliminate  the 
disease.  In  1901  there  were  37  cases, 
and  in  1902  there  was  no  yellow  fever  in 
Havana.  Deaths  from  malaria  in  1900 
were  325.  In  1902  they  were  77. 

Cuba  was  a  healthy  country  long 
before  it  aspired  to  be  a  "medical 
power."  In  1960  it  already  had  1  physi- 
cian for  each  1,060  inhabitants— only 
Argentina  and  Uruguay  had  more.  In 
1980  when  Cuba  had  700  inhabitants  per 
physician,  Argentina  and  Uruguay  had 
530  and  540  respectively. 

In  1960  life  expectancy  in  Cuba  was 
already  63  years.  It  gained  10  years  to 
73  by  1980.  But  in  the  same  period 
greater  gains  were  made  by  nine  Latin 
American  countries  and  similar  ones  by 
three  others.  Infant  mortality,  according 
to  the  1977  StatiMical  Abstract  of  Latin 
Amenca,  was  32  per  1 ,000  live  births  in 
Cuba  in  I960,  the  best  in  the  region  and 
better  than  Spain  and  Italy.  In  1980  it 
was  19.  In  the  same  period  Jamaica  had 
gone  down  to  16.  Percentage  decreases 
better  than  Cuba's  41%  were  achieved  in 
11  other  states.  As  Professor  Norman 
Luxenburg  of  the  University  of  Iowa  has 
written,  Cuba  in  1958  had  twice  as  many 
physicians  for  its  6.6  million  inhabitants 


(6,421)  as  the  rest  of  the  Caribbean 
Basin  had  for  19  million.  Even  if  Cuba 
today  does  have  the  15,000  doctors 
which  it  claims,  the  rate  of  growth  since 
1958  is  less  than  that  between  1948 
(3,100)  and  1958  (6,421)  when  the 
number  doubled  in  10  years. 

In  sum,  the  Cuban  system  may  ap- 
peal to  certain  would-be  strongmen,  but 
it  is  not  a  successful  development  model. 
It  is  a  model,  perhaps,  for  retention  of 
political  and  military  power  but  not  for 
economic  growth  and  human  well-being. 

However,  the  Cuban  revolution  has 
another  side,  its  foreign  policy  ac- 
complishments. Here  the  record  is  more 
complex.  Cuba  in  the  past  decade  has 
finally  gained  some  of  the  revolutionary 
success  which  long  eluded  it  after  1959. 
Lacking  freedom  and  economic  progress 
itself,  Cuba  has,  nonetheless,  grown  into 
a  force  which  challenges  the  potential 
development  of  the  open  society  in  Latin 
America. 

The  Cuban  Challenge 

The  revolutionary  process  that  was  suc- 
cessful in  Cuba  was  applied  repeatedly 
by  Cuba  to  other  states  in  the  region 
after  1959.  In  the  beginning,  expecta- 
tions were  simplistic,  costs  modest,  and 
results  slim.  Cuba  viewed  its  neighbors 
with  hostility  and  as  proper  targets  for 
revolutionary  bands.  This  interven- 
tionary  policy,  which  earned  Cuba  few 
friends  in  the  region  and  even  strained 
ties  to  Moscow,  was  put  in  abeyance 
after  the  death  of  Che  Guevara  in 
Bolivia  in  1967.  But  the  revolutionary 
zeal  of  Cuba  has  continued  as  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  Cuban  system.  It  is 
anchored  as  Article  12(c)  in  the  Cuban 
Constitution.  It  has — in  connection  with 
Cuba's  more  mature  relationship  with 
the  Soviet  Union  and  its  pretensions  to 
leadership  in  the  Third  World — become 
a  more  sophisticated  challenge  to  the 
rival  concept  of  the  open  society  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere. 

Especially  since  the  early  1970s, 
Cuba  has  moved  ever  more  definitively 
into  the  Soviet  sphere.  In  view  of  the 
drastic  change  in  the  terms  of  trade  be- 
tween sugar  and  oil,  the  barter  relation- 
ship between  Cuba  and  the  Soviet  Union 
has  become  marked  by  increasing  Soviet 
subsidies  and  mounting  Cuban  economic 
dependency.  Cuba  owes  the  Soviet 
Union  vast  soft  currency  debts  it  cannot 
repay.  Indeed,  the  Soviet  Union  and  its 
East  European  allies  must  supply 
greater  subsidies,  expressed  in  un- 
balanced trade  accounts,  to  sustain 
Cuba's  economy. 


\\ 


S3 


But  if  Cuba,  on  the  one  hand,  has  ' 
creased  in  cost  for  the  Soviet  Union,  i1 
also  has  increased  in  strategic  value 
The  decade  of  the  1970s  witnessed  the 
appearance  of  Cuban  combat  troops 
engaged  on  African  battlefields.  Partii 
larly  in  the  case  of  Ethiopia,  this  Cubs 
presence  served  Soviet  interests  in  a 
way  which  no  European  ally  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  could  or  would  have  done. 
Cuba's  military  success  in  Africa,  at 
least  in  the  short  run,  was  in  stark  co 
trast  to  what  had,  until  then,  been  a  { 
tern  of  failure  in  Latin  America.  Mon 
over,  after  its  lonely  endorsement  of  1 
Soviet  crushing  of  the  Prague  spring 
1968,  Cuba  has  been  unfailingly  sup- 
portive of  Soviet  foreign  policy,  even 
when  this  allegiance  has  cost  Cuba 
respect  among  countries  which  truly  i 
nonaligned. 

At  the  end  of  the  1970s,  when  Cu 
perceived  new  opportunities  closer  to  j 
home,  two  vital  elements  had  changec  , 
from  the  situation  prevailing  in  the 
1960s.  For  one,  the  Soviet  Union  was 
now  supportive  of  Cuba's  renewed 
revolutionary  activism  and  was  also 
prepared  to  underwrite  the  massive 
buildup  of  the  Cuban  Armed  Forces 
which  has  been  taking  place  since  the 
end  of  1980.  This,  together  with  Sovi 
activities  in  and  around  Cuba,  has  in- 
creased tensions  and  would  be  an  ele 
ment  in  any  major  East- West  conflic 
The  second  factor  is  that  Cuba  has 
learned  to  differentiate  its  own  Latir 
American  policy  objectives.  In  the  loi 
run,  probably,  Cuba  envisions  transf( 
mation  along  Marxist-Leninist  lines  f 
every  state  in  the  region,  but  the  Cu 
leadership  has  learned  to  order  its  si 
range  priorities.  Cuba  now  has  the  o 
tion  of  cultivating  better  diplomatic  i 
tions  with  the  states  of  the  region,  ti 
ing  thereby  to  stimulate  a  Latin 
American  consciousness  against  the 
United  States  and  to  cultivate  its  ow 
general  acceptance  as  a  normal  men- .  ,u 
of  the  international  order. 

Yet,  anchored  by  its  bonds  to  thi 
Soviet  Union,  Cuba  maintains  close  i 
tions  with  virtually  every  radical  or 
revolutionary  group  in  the  region,  si 
plying  training,  money,  weapons,  an^ 
counsel  and  providing  the  nexus  be- 
tween the  revolutionaries  and  the  Sc 
Union.  At  the  same  time,  it  assesses 
relative  value  of  its  associations  with 
various  Latin  American  government 
and  particularly  the  degree  to  which 
these  governments  can  be  made  usel 
to  Cuba.  Cuba  thus  seeks  to  be  both 
mecca  for  subversives  and  a  focal  pc 
for  rallying  their  governments  again 
the  United  States. 


Si 


h 


.to 


IB 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


'he  examples  of  this  situation  in  the 
!.!  5  are  many. 

In  the  case  of  Argentina,  Cuba 
^  haste  to  show  its  firm  support  of 
ntil-then  despised  Galtieri  regime 
the  battle  for  the  Falklands  began, 
deology  of  the  Argentine  military 
>red  the  Cubans  less  than  the 
36  to  be  seen  in  the  forefront  of 
1  culture  against  the  Anglo-Saxon. 
dditional  reward  for  Cuba  has  been 
:enerous  trade  credits  which  both 
Argentine  military  regime  and  its 
an  successor  have  supplied  to  the 

Cuban  economy. 

Once  the  momentum  of  the  Falk- 
j  issue  was  lost,  Cuba — which  was 

obliged  in  August  1982  to  ask 
tern  creditors  to  reschedule  part  of 
3-billion  Cuban  hard  currency 
— seized  upon  the  general  financial 
1  in  the  region  to  promote  Cuban 
arity  with  other  Latin  American 
ors.  This,  incidentally,  shows  again 
adept  Cuba  is  at  exploiting  even  its 
problems  for  political  gain. 
•  In  the  case  of  Colombia,  the 
m  Government  admitted  having 
led  the  M-19  revolutionaries  who 
ulted  the  Turbay  Ayala  government, 
which  Havana  was  maintaining 
tly  normal  diplomatic  relations, 
e  recently  Cuba  showed  its  influence 
new  way.  The  head  of  the  Cuban 
rnment  requested  that  Colombian 
orists  release  the  kidnapped  brother 
le  President  of  Colombia.  The  ter- 
sts  heeded  this  request  from  an  in- 
Sual  whom  they  apparently  respect 
esteem.  The  obvious  lesson  is  that 
voice  which  can  stay  the  terrorist's 
i  can  also  permit  it  to  strike. 

The  focus  of  Cuba's  foreign  policy, 
ever,  is  presently  on  Central 
erica.  Cuba  primarily  wishes  to  see 
Sandinista  government  in  Managua 
iOlidated  as  a  permanent  force  on 
American  mainland  with  its  funda- 
ital  approach  in  close  harmony  with 
Cuban  system.  Communist  Cuba 
its  a  communist  Nicaragua.  It  also 
lid  like  to  see  the  revolutionary 
■es  in  El  Salvador  come  to  power 
'•e  through  the  process  of  a 
otiated  settlement,  sharing  power  on 
■ansitional  basis  until  Leninist-style 
trol  can  be  established.  Cuba's  im- 
iiate  attitude  toward  the  other  states 
he  region  seems  to  be  dictated 
narily  by  how  they  react  to  the 
jggle  in  Nicaragua  and  in  El 
vador.  For  example,  it  is  largely  ir- 
avant  to  the  Cubans  that  elections 


take  place  in  Guatemala.  What  is  essen- 
tial is  that  Guatemala  stay  out  of  the 
conflict  at  its  very  door  or  else  bear  the 
brunt  of  Cuban  displeasure.  The  same 
policy  was  followed  in  the  case  of  Hon- 
duras, where  Cuban  actions  were  keyed 
to  the  stand  taken  by  Honduras  toward 
the  two  conflicts  on  its  borders.  Cuba — 
which  has  trained  revolutionaries  from 
almost  all  countries  in  the  hemisphere — 
was  able  to  send  such  forces  into  Hon- 
duras. The  invaders  were  defeated,  but 
they  demonstrated  the  same  principle  as 
applied  in  Colombia  and  elsewhere.  The 
government  which  displeases  Cuba, 
whether  or  not  it  has  normal  diplomatic 
relations  with  Havana,  can  expect 
armed  retaliation. 

Cuban  officials  occasionally  say  they 
favor  the  democratic  trend  in  Latin 
America.  But  this  putative  endorsement 
of  something  which  Cuba  has  never  per- 
mitted its  own  people  is  suspect.  Free 
elections  are  clearly  not  seen  by  Cuba  as 
the  answer  to  questions  in  Central 
America  or  even  as  a  useful  step  for- 
ward. They  are  not  likely  to  be  seen  as 
relevant  in  other  countries  once  there 
exist  concrete  prospects  for  revolution 
on  the  Cuban  pattern.  Rather,  it  appears 
that  Cuba,  if  it  welcomes  democratic 
trends  at  all,  does  so  only  where  it  can 
envision  prospects  of  winning  from 
within  or  where  the  elected  government 
supports  foreign  policy  objectives  which, 
at  least  in  the  short  run,  are  consistent 
with  Cuba's  own.  In  either  case,  how- 
ever, there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that 
Cuba  will  suspend  its  close  ties  to 
revolutionary  forces  in  any  country, 
forces  which  Cuba  can  help  to  bring  to 
power  when  conditions  are  appropriate 
or  which  can  be  used  as  a  threat  to  com- 
pel or  to  persuade. 

The  United  States  and  Cuba 

The  underlying  issues  between  the 
United  States  and  Cuba  have  their 
genesis  in  Cuba's  revolutionary  posture 
and  its  close  alignment  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  Cuba  has  indicated  on  many  oc- 
casions that  neither  of  these  pillars  of 
Cuban  policy  is  open  to  discussion.  Its 
behavior  consistently  underscores  this 
reality.  It  is  Cuba's  unique  role  as  a 
linchpin  between  Soviet  power  and  a 
Latin  America  in  transition  which  intro- 
duces strategic  and  ideological  con- 
siderations into  conflicts  which  could 
otherwise  be  resolved  or  at  least 
ameliorated  on  their  own  terms.  Cuba 
facilitates  Soviet  military  power  on  our 


doorstep.  That  is  why  foreign  policy  is 
at  the  root  of  our  differences  with 
Havana  and  why  so  much  of  our  policy 
toward  Cuba  is  directed  toward  its 
restraint. 

In  the  1970s  there  were  good  faith 
efforts  by  the  United  States  to  improve 
this  relationship.  Interests  sections  were 
established  to  facilitate  direct  communi- 
cations between  the  two  parties.  The 
U.S.  trade  and  financial  embargo  was 
relaxed.  Cuba  released  some  political 
prisoners  and  permitted  the  return  of 
Cuban-Americans  who  had  left  Cuba  as 
"worms"  and  came  back  as  "butterflies," 
pouring  dollars  into  Cuban  coffers.  But 
this  movement  did  not  and  could  not 
touch  the  main  thrust  of  Cuban  policy. 
Having  gone  into  Ethiopia  in  1977  at 
Soviet  behest,  Cuba  in  succeeding  years 
engaged  itself  in  Nicaragua  and  El 
Salvador  and  exploited  the  seizure  of 
power  by  the  New  JEWEL  Movement 
in  Grenada.  In  so  doing,  Cuba  demon- 
strated the  depth  of  its  determination  to 
reconstruct  the  Western  Hemisphere 
along  the  lines  of  its  own  model. 

The  attitude  of  the  U.S.  Government 
toward  Cuba  remains  one  of  serious  con- 
cern about  the  militarization  of  Cuba 
and  about  Cuba's  stimulation  of  revolu- 
tionary violence  in  this  hemisphere  and 
elsewhere.  After  Grenada  it  is  likely  that 
Cuba  has  some  better  appreciation  of 
the  risks  of  uncontrolled  violence  and  of 
the  limitations  of  its  own  power  and  that 
of  its  allies,  but  there  is  no  convincing 
indication  that  the  overall  thrust  of 
Cuban  foreign  policy  has  been  or  will  be 
altered.  Cuba  remains  militant  and 
prone  to  stimulate  violent  change. 

There  remains,  however,  a  willing- 
ness on  our  part  to  resolve  those  prob- 
lems with  Cuba  which  Cuba  may  wish  to 
resolve  and  for  which  there  is  a 
reasonable  basis  for  mutually  satis- 
factory solutions.  One  example  is  the 
problem  of  the  Mariel  excludables  who 
came  with  the  boatlift  of  1980  and  who 
are  ineligible  to  remain  in  the  United 
States  for  substantive  reasons.  We  have 
also  tried  to  engage  Cuba  in  talks  about 
problems  of  radio  interference.  In  both 
cases  we  were  and  are  prepared  to  deal 
with  Cuba  on  the  basis  of  equality  and 
mutual  respect  and  to  make  concessions 
in  order  to  resolve  problems.  There  are 
perhaps  other  issues  of  this  nature 
where  progress  could  be  made  if  Cuba  is 
so  interested. 

It  is  occasionally  asked  if  there  can 
be  an  improvement  in  overall  U.S.- 
Cuban relations.  Such  an  improvement 
can  hardly  be  a  goal  in  itself.  There  are 
some  bilateral  issues,  relatively  free  of 


TREATIES 


ideological  content,  which  can  be  re- 
solved. But  the  differences  of  principle 
between  the  United  States  and  Cuba  are 
profound.  There  is  unfortunately  no  sign 
yet  that  the  Cuban  leadership  is  recon- 
sidering its  own  world  view  or  is  begin- 
ning seriously  to  address  those  issues 
which  set  it  apart  from  a  region  which  is 
striving  for  greater  freedom  and  eco- 
nomic well-being. 

Assuming  that  these  circumstances 
continue,  we  shall  continue  to  work  with 
friendly  nations  to  meet  the  Cuban 
challenge  and  to  overcome  it  until  that 
day  when  the  constructive  genius  of 
Cuba  can  be  turned  to  the  commonweal 
of  all  who  inhabit  this  hemisphere.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation,  Civil 

Tnternational  air  services  transit  agreement. 
Signed  at  Chicago  Dec.  7,  1944.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  20,  194.5;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  8, 
1945.  59  Stat.  1693. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Italy,  June  27,  1984. 

Bill  of  Lading 

International  convention  for  the  unification  of 

certain  rules  relating  to  bills  of  lading  and 

protocol  of  signature.  Done  at  Brussels 

Aug.  25,  1924.  Entered  into  force  June  2, 

1931;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29.  1937.  51  Stat. 

233. 

Denounced:  U.K.  for  Bermuda.  British  Virgin 

Islands,  Cayman  Islands,  Falkland  Islands 
and  dependencies,  Hong  Kong,  Montserrat, 
and  Turks  and  Caicos  Islands,  effective 
Oct.  20,  1984. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1983,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Oct.  1,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  Togo,  June  4,  1984. 

Accession  deposited:  Nigeria,  May  3i,  1984. 

Commodities — Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  27,  1980' 
Ratification  deposited:  Brazil,  June  29,  1984. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social, 
and  cultural  rights.  Adopted  at  New  York 
Dec.  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  .Ian.  3, 
1976.2 

International  covenant  on  civil  and  political 
rights.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  16,  1966. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1976.^ 
Accessions  deposited:  Cameroon,  June  27, 
1984. 


Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  civil  aspects  of  interna- 
tional child  abduction.  Done  at  The  Hague 
Oct.  25,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  1, 
1983.2 
Extended:  Canada  to  Province  of  New- 

foundland,  July  5,  1984. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  International  Maritime 

Organization.  Signed  at  Geneva  Mar.  6,  1948. 

Entered  into  force  Mar.  17,  1958.  TIAS 

4044. 

Accession  deposited:  Vietnam,  June  12,  1984 

Prisoner  Transfer 

Convention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenced  per- 
sons. Done  at  Strasbourg  Mar.  21,  1983. 
Signature:  Italy  Mar.  20,  1984. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  28,  1984. 

Ratified  by  the  President:  July  17,  1984. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Agreement  relating  to  INTELSAT,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Washington  Aug.  20,  1971. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  12,  1973.  TIAS  7532. 
Accession  deposited:  Malawi,  July  17,  1984. 

Operating  agreeement  relating  to 
INTELSAT,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Washington  Aug.  20,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  12,  1973.  TIAS  7532. 
Signature:  Department  of  Posts  and  Tele- 
communications, Malawi.  July  17,  1984. 

Shipping 

United  Nations  convention  on  the  carriage  of 
goods  by  sea.  1978.  Done  at  Hamburg  Mar. 
31,  1978.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Hungary,  July  5, 

1984. 


Slavery 

Protocol  amending  the  slavery  convention 
signed  at  Geneva  on  Sept.  25,  1926  (TS  778), 
with  annex.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  7,  1953. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1953,  for  the  Pro- 
tocol, July  7,  1955,  for  annex  to  Protocol;  for 
the  U.S.  Mar.  7,  1956.  TIAS  3532. 

Supplementary  convention  on  the  abolition  of 
slavery,  the  slave  trade,  and  institutions  and 
practices  similar  to  slavery.  Done  at  Geneva 
Sept.  7,  1956.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  30, 
1957;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  6,  1967.  TIAS  6418. 
Accessions  deposited:  Cameroon,  June  27, 

1984. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1977,  as  ex- 
tended. Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  7,  1977. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Jan.  1,  1978; 
definitively  Jan.  2,  1980.  TIAS  9664,  10467. 
Withdrawal:  Bangladesh,  effective  June  23, 
1984. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  crimes  against  internationally  pro- 


tected persons,  including  diplomatic  agents. 
Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS  853 
Accession  deposited:  Greece,  July  3,  1984 

International  covention  against  the  taking  o 
hostages.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  17,  1979 
Entered  into  force  June  3,  1983.2 
Ratification  deposited:  Portugal,  July  6,  19J 

Trade 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  art.  VI  of 
GATT  (antidumping).  Done  at  Geneva  Apr. 
12,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1980. 
TIAS  9650. 

Agreement  on  import  licensing  procedures. 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  int 
force  Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9788. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Singapore,  June  20 

1984. 

UNIDO 

Constitution  of  the  UN  Industrial  Develop- 
ment Organization,  with  annexes.  Adopted 
Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.' 
Signature:  Guyana,  July  17,  1984. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Guyana,  Ireland, 

July  17,  1984. 

Wheat 

Food  aid  convention,  1980  (part  of  the  Int( 
national  Wheat  Agreement.  1971,  as  exter 
ed  (TIAS  7144).  Done  at  Washington  Mar. 
11.  1980.  Entered  into  force  June  30,  198( 
TIAS  10015. 
Approval  deposited:  European  Economic 

Community,  July  23,  1984. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms 
discrimination  against  women.  Adopted  at 
New  York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  for 
Sept.  3,  1981.2 
Accessions  deposited:  Liberia,  July  17,  19: 

Mauritius,  July  9,  1984. 


BILATERAL 

Antigua  and  Barbuda 

Agreement  for  the  furnishing  of  commodi 
and  services  in  connection  with  the 
peacekeeping  force  for  Grenada.  Effected 
exchange  of  notes  at  Bridgetown  and  St. 
John's  Nov.  30,  1983  and  Jan.  27,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  27,  1984. 

Australia 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  C 
16.  1968  (TIAS  6589),  relating  to  scientifi 
and  technical  cooperation.  Effected  by  ex 
change  of  notes  at  Canberra  Apr.  16  and 
May  11,  1984.  Entered  into  force  May  U 
1984;  effective  Apr.  16,  1984. 

Canada 

Convention  with  respect  to  taxes  on  incoi  | 
and  capital,  with  related  exchange  of  noti 
Signed  at  Washington  Sept.  26,  1980. 


TREATIES 


;ocol  with  related  notes.  Signed  at  Ottawa 
;  14,  1983.  Second  protocol.  Signed  at 
ihington  Mar.  28,  1984. 
ite  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

3  28,  1984. 

fied  by  the  President:  July  16,  1984. 

,ty  relating  to  the  Skagit  River,  Ross 
e,  and  the  Seven  Mile  Reservoir  on  the 
d  d'Oreille  River,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
ihington  Apr.  2,  1984. 
ate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

i  28,  1984. 

eement  regarding  mutual  assistance  and 
leration  between  customs  administrations, 
led  at  Quebec  June  20,  1984.  Enters  into 
e  upon  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  in 
ch  the  parties  notify  each  other  of  the 
ipletion  of  any  procedures  required  by 
r  national  law  for  giving  effect  to  this 
?ement. 

•eement  relating  to  the  operation  of  radio 
phone  stations.  Signed  at  Ottawa  Nov. 
1969.  Entered  into  force  July  24,  1970. 
IS  6931. 
ification  of  termination:  May  8,  1984; 

ctive  Nov.  7,  1984. 

ombia 

noranduni  of  understanding  for  scientific 
technical  cooperation  in  the  Earth 
nces.  Signed  at  Bogota  June  22,  1984. 
ered  into  force  June  22,  1984. 

ninica 

eement  relating  to  radio  communications 
ween  amateur  stations  on  behalf  of  third 
ties.  Effected  by  exchange  of  telexes  at 
dgetown  and  Roseau  Dec.  8,  1983  and 
9,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  10, 
4. 

Ypt 

■eement  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec. 
nd  28,  1977  (TIAS  8973),  relating  to  trade 
extiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
hange  of  notes  at  Cairo  June  21  and  25, 
;4.  Entered  into  force  June  25,  1984. 

aatorial  Guinea 

reement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
ET  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
es  at  Malabo  Mar.  9  and  30,  1983. 
tered  into  force  Mar.  30,  1983. 

mce 

itocol  to  the  convention  with  respect  to 
es  on  income  and  property  of  July  28, 

7  (TIAS  6518),  as  amended  by  the  Pro- 
ols  of  Oct.  12,  1970  (TIAS  7270),  and  Nov. 

1978  (TIAS  9500).  Signed  at  Paris  Jan. 

1984. 
gate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

le  28,  1984. 

tified  by  the  President:  July  16,  1984. 


invention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenced  per- 
is. Signed  at  Washington  Jan.  25,  1983. 
nate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

ne  28  1984. 

.tified  by  the  President:  July  17,  1984. 


Memorandum  of  understanding  on  the  par- 
ticipation of  France  in  the  ocean  drilling  pro- 
gram. Signed  at  Washington  and  Paris  May 
17  and  June  13,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
June  13,  1984. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  en- 
vironmental cooperation.  Signed  at  Paris 
June  21,  1984.  Entered  into  force  June  21, 
1984. 

Gabon 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
IMET  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Libreville  Mar.  21,  1983  and  July  5, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  July  5,  1984. 

Grenada 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
IMET  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  St.  George's  May  18  and  24,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  May  24,  1984. 

Guinea 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, related  to  the  agreement  of  Apr. 
21,  1976  (TIAS  8378).  Signed  at  Conakry 
June  11,  1984.  Entered  into  force  June  11, 
1984. 

Honduras 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Dec.  16, 

1983,  as  amended,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities.  Signed  at  Tegucigalpa  June  19, 

1984.  Entered  into  force  June  19,  1984. 

India 

Agreement  extending  and  amending  the 
memorandum  of  understanding  of  July  18, 
1978  (TIAS  9285)  concerning  furnishing  of 
launching  and  associated  services  for  Indian 
national  satellite  system  (INSAT)-l 
spacecraft.  Signed  at  Washington  and 
Bangalore  Apr.  10  and  25,  1984.  Enters  into 
force  upon  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  Dec.  11,  1978  (TIAS  9609),  for 
cooperation  in  scientific  research  and 
technological  development.  Signed  at 
Washington  July  9,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
July  9,  1984. 

Italy 

Treaty  on  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  mat- 
ters, with  memorandum  of  understanding. 
Signed  at  Rome  Nov.  9,  1982. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  28,  1984. 

Jamaica 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  30,  1982  (TIAS  10495).  Signed  at 
Kingston  May  30,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
May  30,  1984. 

Madagascar 

Agreement  concerning  the  provisions  of 
training  related  to  defense  articles  under  the 
U.S.  IMET  program.  Effected  by  exchange 


of  notes  at  Antananarivo  Feb.  25,  1983  and 
May  3,  1984,  Entered  into  force  May  3,  1984. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  2,  1977  (TIAS  8952),  relating  to  addi- 
tional cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the 
illegal  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Mexico  May  29,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  May  29,  1984. 

Morocco 

Convention  on  mutual  assistance  in  criminal 
matters.  Signed  at  Rabat  Oct.  17,  1983. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  28,  1984. 

Ratified  by  the  President:  July  13,  1984. 

Norway 

Revised  agreement  for  cooperation  concern- 
ing peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  with  an- 
nexes and  agreed  minute.  Signed  at  Oslo 
Jan.  12,  1984, 
Entered  into  force:  July  2,  1984. 

Supersedes  agreement  of  May  4,  1967,  as 

amended  (TIAS  6260,  6849). 

Poland 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  2,  1976,  concerning  fisheries  off  the 
coasts  of  the  U.S.  (TIAS  8524,  10533,  10697). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
and  Warsaw  Mar.  7  and  30,  1984. 
Entered  into  force:  July  27,  1984. 

Romania 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Sept.  3  and  Nov.  3,  1980,  as  amended  (TIAS 
9911,  10639),  relating  to  trade  in  wool,  man- 
made  fiber  textiles,  and  textile  products.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington 
and  New  York  June  12  and  22.  1984. 
Entered  into  force  June  22,  1984. 

Sri  Lanka 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  science  and 
technology.  Signed  at  Washington  June  18, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  June  18,  1984. 

Sweden 

Supplementary  convention  to  the  extradition 
convention  of  Oct.  24,  1961  (TIAS  5496). 
Signed  at  Stockholm  Mar.  14,  1983. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  28,  1984. 

Ratified  by  the  President:  July  13,  1984. 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  estates,  inheritances,  and 
gifts.  Signed  at  Stockholm  June  13,  1983. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  28,  1984. 

Ratified  by  the  President:  July  13,  1984. 

Thailand 

Treaty  relating  to  extradition.  Signed  at 

Washington  Dec.  14,  1983. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  28,  1984. 

Ratified  by  the  President:  July  18,  1984. 


CHRONOLOGY 


U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  memorandum  of 
understanding  of  June  20,  1963  (TIAS  5362), 
and  the  agreement  of  Sept.  30,  1971  as 
amended  (TIAS  7187,  8059),  concerning  the 
direct  communications  link.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  July  17,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  July  17,  1984. 

Yemen  (Sanaa) 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  related  letter.  Signed  at  Sanaa 
June  19,  1984.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 
1984. 

Zaire 

Agreement  concerning  provision  of  training 
related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
IMET  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Kinshasa  Dec.  22,  1983,  and 
June  18,  1984.  Entered  into  force  June  18, 
1984. 


'Not  in  force. 

^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 


July  1984 


Note:  The  editors  .solicit  readers'  comments 
on  the  value  of  the  Bulletin's  monthly 
chronologies.  Unless  a  positive  response  is 
received,  the  chronologies  will  be  discon- 
tinued. 


July  1-12 

ACDA  Director  Adelman,  visits  Japan, 
China,  and  Thailand  to  discuss  arms  control 
and  disarmanent  issues,  as  well  as  chemical 
weapons  use  in  Southeast  Asia. 

July  1 

TASS  reports  that  the  Soviet  Union's  offer 
for  talks  on  banning  weapons  in  outer  space 
remains  open,  but  the  Soviets  reject  an  U.S. 
attempt  to  discuss  other  arms  issues. 

(Juatemalans  hold  elections  for  an 
88-member  ("onstituent  Assembly  to  write  a 
new  constitution.  An  U-member  U.S.  delega- 
tion observes  the  election  process. 

Senator  Charles  Mathias  heads  the  U.S. 
delegation  at  the  inauguration  of  Richard  von 
Weizsaecker  as  Federal  President  of  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 

July  2 

Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  says  the 
U.S.  is  avoiding  talks  on  banning  weapons  in 
space  and  imposing  unacceptable  conditions 
on  talks  proposed  for  the  fall. 

White  House  spokesman  Speakes  says 
the  U.S.  agrees  to  outer  space  weapons  talks 
in  September,  but  also  plans  to  discuss  ar- 
rangements for  nuclear  arms  talks. 

U.S.  Postmaster  General  Bolger,  attend- 
ing the  UPU  conference  in  Hamburg,  says 
the  Soviet  Union's  unethical  postal  practices 
threaten  the  integrity  of  the  international 
system.  He  also  affirms  U.S.  support  to  in- 
vestigate Soviet  violations. 


The  World  Bank  lowers  interest  rates  to 
9.89%  on  conventional  loans  to  developing 
countries  for  the  next  6  months. 

July  3 

During  a  meeting  with  Soviet  Ambassador 
Dobrynin,  Secretary  Shultz  reaffirms  U.S. 
commitment  to  hold  space  weapons  talks  in 
September  and  repeats  that  the  U.S.  also  in- 
tends to  discuss  "offensive  missiles  that  go 
through  space." 

British  Foreign  Secretary  Howe,  meeting 
with  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  and 
President  Chernenko,  assures  the  Soviets 
that  the  U.S.  has  set  no  preconditions  for 
proposed  outer  space  arms  talks. 

Soviet  authorities  refuse  to  allow  U.S. 
Ambassador  Hartman  to  deliver  a  Fourth  of 
July  television  address,  claiming  it  is  part  of 
President  Reagan's  reelection  campaign. 

July  4-7 

CARICOM's  13  members  meet  in  Nassau  to 
discuss  the  future  of  the  organization.  They 
agree  to  eliminate  trade  barriers  and  to  grant 
observer  status  to  Haiti,  Dominican  Republic, 
and  Suriname. 

July  4 

Soviet  authorities  detain  for  2  hours  two  U.S. 
diplomats,  accusing  them  of  activities  incom- 
patible with  their  diplomatic  status.  They 
were  meeting  in  public  with  a  Soviet  citizen 
when  they  were  picked  up. 

The  Lebanese  Government  begins  im- 
plementation of  its  security  plan  for  the 
Beirut  area.  The  Lebanese  Army  redeploys 
throughout  Beirut  and  armed  militias  leave 
the  streets. 

July  5-17 

Secretary  Shultz  visits  Hong  Kong  (July  7-8). 
Malaysia  (July  9-10),  Singapore  (July  10-11), 
Indonesia  (July  11-14),  Australia  (July 
14-15),  and  New  Zealand  (.July  15-17). 

On  July  12-13  Secretary  Shultz  attends 
the  ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers  meeting  in 
Jakarta. 

The  ANZUS  council  holds  its  33d  meeting 
(July  16-17)  in  Wellington.  The  Foreign 
Ministers  of  ANZUS  issue  a  joint  communi- 
que (July  17)  reaffirming  their  commitment 
to  the  Pacific  pact. 

July  6 

State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  reiterates  U.S.  protests  on  the 
detention  of  two  U.S.  diplomats  by  the  Soviet 
Union. 

In  response  to  a  TASS  report  that  the 
Soviet  Union's  offer  for  September  outer 
space  weapons  talks  in  Vienna  remains  open. 
State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  repeats  the  U.S.  acceptance  saying 
there  are  no  preconditions  on  having  such 
talks. 

Senators  East  (North  Carolina)  and 
Symms  (Idaho)  urge  President  Reagan  to 
repudiate  the  SALT  II  treaty,  terming  it  as 
"dangerous  to  American  security"  and 
"unconstitutional." 

The  Lebane.se  Army  assumes  authority  of 
Beirut  from  militia  forces. 


July  7 

Secretary  Shultz  says  U.S.  is  willing  to 
negotiate  some  aspects  of  space  weaponry 
with  the  Soviet  Union  if  a  plan  for  talks  in 
September  can  be  worked  out. 

July  9-11 

Second  International  Conference  on 
Assistance  to  Refugees  in  Africa  is  held  in 
Geneva.  Attorney  General  Smith  heads  the 
U.S.  delegation. 

July  9 

Greece  tells  the  U.S.  it  will  reassess  the  tre 
ty  permitting  American  military  bases  then 
for  5  years  and  the  Voice  of  America 
facilities  unless  the  U.S.  stops  interfering  ir 
its  domestic  affairs. 

The  U.S.  Consulate  in  Belfast  denies  an 
entry  visa  to  Gerry  Adams,  leader  of  Sinn 
Fein,  the  Irish  Republican  Army's  political 
wing. 

President  Reagan  signs  a  proclamation 
designating  today  as  African  Refugees  Reli 
Day. 

Beirut  airport  opens  for  the  first  time  i 
5  months. 

July  10-14 

Assistant  Secretary  Abrams  visits  Turkey 
assess  human  rights  conditions. 

July  10 

While  in  Malaysia,  Secretary  Shultz  says  tl 
death  threat  letters  received  in  Malaysia, 
South  Korea,  Zimbabwe,  and  other  Third 
World  countries  may  be  a  "disinformation 
campaign"  used  to  embarrass  the  U.S.  The 
letters  are  allegedly  from  the  Ku  Klux  Kla 
and  have  postmarks  from  the  Virginia  and 
Maryland  suburbs  of  Washington,  D.C. 

In  Singapore,  Secretary  Shultz  says  V 
nam  is  blocking  efforts  to  improve  relatior 
with  the  U.S.  by  not  providing  informatioi 
on  2.500  missing  Americans  from  the  Viet 
nam  war  and  by  its  continued  aggression  i 
Kampuchea. 

President  Reagan  signs  a  proclamatioi 
designating  July  10  as  "Food  for  Peace  D: 
marking  the  30th  anniversary  of  the  Food 
Peace  program.  He  also  announces  a  pro- 
posed five-point  food  aid  initiative. 

Bolivia  reverses  an  earlier  decision  an 
says  it  will  send  six  athletes  to  compete  ii 
the  Summer  Olympic  Games. 

World  Bank's  World  Development  Re 
predicts  the  Earth's  population  will  reach 
billion  by  the  year  2050;  the  biggest  incre 
will  be  in  poor  countries  where  economic 
growth  will  be  stunted  by  a  large  populat 


» 


4 


'■ 


July  11-15 

West  German  Defense  Minister  Worner  v 
Washington.  D.C.  On  July  12  he  meets  w 
Secretary  Weinberger  to  sign  an  agreemt 
for  deploying  air  defense  missiles  in  Ger- 
many. He  meets  with  President  Reagan, 
President  Bush,  and  Acting  Secretary  of 
State  Dam  on  July  13. 

July  11 

State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romiierg  says  the  theme  of  recent  threat 
ters  .sent  to  Third  World  countries  in  the 


ri 


it 


CHRONOLOGY 


■pirs  is  "dovetailed"  with  the  Soviet 
tualKin  for  its  boycott  and  "bears  all  the 
larks  of  a  disinformation  campaign." 
.i-i'tk  Prime  Minister  Papandreou  and 
iAmliassador  Stearns  meet  to  discuss  re- 
il'S. -Greece  disagreements. 

hr  International  Trade  Commission 
:<iiiiK'nds  that  President  Reagan  impose 
Ir  quotas  and  tariffs  on  70%  of  steel  im- 
for  the  next  5  years  in  order  to  protect 
-ican  steel  producers  and  workers, 
roverning  Board  of  the  International 
gy  Agency  meeting  in  Paris  reaches 
jment  on  a  coordinated  policy  for  draw- 
own  contingency  oil  stoclvs  of  member 
ns  in  the  event  of  a  major  supply  disrup- 


13 

ptate  Department  report  on  the  situa- 
n  El  Salvador,  Acting  Secretary  Dam 
El  Salvador's  armed  forces  have  im- 
;d  in  professionalism  as  well  as  in  per- 
ance.  Other  areas  of  progress  in  El 
idor  include  land  reform,  free  elections, 
lishment  of  an  effective  judicial  system, 
,he  elimination  of  death  squad  activity, 
he  U.S.  announces  it  will  no  longer  pro- 
bilateral  family  planning  assistance  to 
tries  that  use  any  method  of  force  to 
ve  population  reduction  objectives. 

14 

letter  to  Soviet  President  Chernenko, 
dent  Reagan  says  he  is  willing  to  delay 
iroposed  Vienna  talks  on  space  weapons 
November  to  eliminate  any  Soviet  con- 
about  the  presidential  elections. 
4ew  Zealand  holds  its  general  elections. 
Labor  Party,  led  by  David  Lange,  wins 
55  seats  in  Parliament.  The  National 
I  takes  38  seats  and  the  Social  Credit 
y  takes  2  seats. 

16 

;  Department  acting  spokesman 
Iberg  confirms  reports  that  13  Western 
bers  of  the  London  Suppliers  Club  met 
■ixembourg  (July  11-13)  to  discuss 
lods  of  strengthening  controls  on  nuclear 
I  rts.  Ambassador  Kennedy  headed  the 
I  delegation.  Other  participating  countries 
!■  Austraha,  Belgium,  Canada,  Federal 
iiblie  of  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Japan, 
i?mbourg,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden, 
I  zerland,  and  the  U.K. 
;  Embassador  Shlaudeman  meets  with 
raguan  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
CO  in  Atlanta. 

President  Reagan  signs  a  proclamation 
iring  the  third  week  of  July  (July  15-21) 
Captive  Nations  Week." 

17 

and  Soviet  Union  initial  an  agreement  to 
-ade  the  21-year-old  "Hot  Line"  for  crisis 
munications.  The  new  system  will  in- 
se  word  transmission  threefold  from  its 
ent  64  words  a  minute  and  can  also 
ismit  graphics. 

President  Reagan  expresses  disappoint- 
it  over  the  Soviet  Union's  failure  to  join 
majority  of  the  35  nations  that  wish  to 
in  "concrete"  negotiations  at  the  Con- 
•nce  on  Disarmament  in  Europe. 


Vietnam  returns  the  remains  believed  to 
be  eight  U.S.  servicemen. 

Department  of  State  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  says  the  U.S.  and  14  other  COCOM 
members  reached  agreement  on  a  new  com- 
puter definition.  This  is  part  of  a  review  to 
define  products  and  technologies  to  be  con- 
trolled to  the  East  bloc. 

The  Guatemalan  Supreme  Electoral 
Tribunal  reports  that  the  coalition  of  the  Na- 
tional Liberation  Movement  and  the  Na- 
tionalist Authentic  Central  received  the  most 
seats  (23)  in  the  new  88-member  Constituent 
Assembly,  despite  finishing  third  in  the 
July  1  voting.  The  Union  of  the  National 
Center  and  the  Christian  Democratic  Party 
each  took  21  seats. 

July  18 

In  a  speech  to  the  Honolulu  Council  on 
Foreign  Relations,  Secretary  Shultz  says 
Vietnam  has  agreed  to  meet  next  month  to 
discuss  the  Americans  missing-in-action  from 
the  Vietnam  war. 

The  Drug  Enforcement  Administration 
reports  that  two  Nicaraguan  Government  of- 
ficials are  directly  involved  with  cocaine 
trafficking  between  South  America  and  the 
U.S. 

Departments  of  State  and  Defense 
release  a  report  titled  Nicaragua's  Military 
Buildup  and  Support  for  Central  American 
Subversion. 

The  Lebanese  Government  announces  its 
decision  to  restore  diplomatic  relations  with 
Iran. 

Lebanese  Defense  Minister  Osseiran 
orders  Israel  to  close  its  liaison  office  in 
Dubayyah. 

July  19 

President  Reagan  attends  a  conference  of 
Caribbean  heads  of  government  in  Columbia, 
South  Carolina. 

Communist  Party  members  leave  the 
French  Government  over  economic  policy 
disputes. 

State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  says  the  U.S.  regrets  any  move  by 
Lebanon  to  close  Israel's  liaison  office. 

July  20 

At  a  White  House  ceremony  marking  today 
as  National  POW/MIA  Recognition  Day, 
President  Reagan  announces  that  Laos  will 
allow  the  U.S.  to  search  for  the  remains  of  13 
U.S.  servicemen  at  the  site  where  an  Air 
Force  gunship  exploded  in  midair  on 
December  21.  1972. 

On  the  10th  anniversary  of  the  coup  on 
Cyprus,  Department  of  State  acting 
spokesman  Romberg  reaffirms  U.S.  hope  for 
a  reunited  Cyprus. 

July  21 

Poland  approves  an  amnesty  bill  to  release 
652  political  prisoners  within  30  days.  The 
Administration  indicates  that  President 
Reagan  may  ease  some  sanctions  as  a  result 
of  the  amnesty. 

July  23 

The  Soviets  suggest  that  the  U.S.  and  Soviet 
Union  issue  a  joint  statement  to  show  a  will- 


ingness for  serious  talks  on  banning  space 
weapons. 

El  Salvador's  President  Duarte  meets 
with  President  Reagan,  Vice  President  Bush, 
Secretary  Shultz,  and  congressional  leaders 
to  appeal  for  increased  U.S.  economic  and 
security  assistance. 

July  24 

Senate  votes  93  to  0  to  urge  the  Soviet  Union 
to  deliver  information  on  the  Sakharovs  to  all 
signatory  nations  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 

The  Department  of  State  presents  the 
Soviet  Union  with  a  counterproposal  for  an 
agenda  statement  for  the  Vienna  space 
weapons  talks  projected  to  begin  on 
September  18.  The  latest  proposal  would 
allow  the  U.S.  and  Soviets  to  discuss  a  broad 
range  of  weapons  issues,  including  strategic 
and  medium-range  nuclear  arms. 

Speaking  at  a  televised  news  conference, 
President  Reagan  charges  Nicaragua's  San- 
dinista  regime  with  trying  to  destroy  El 
Salvador. 

A  U.S.  Drug  Enforcement  Administra- 
tion report  says  that  Bulgaria  uses  illegal 
narcotics  trafficking  to  support  terrorism  and 
as  a  "political  weapon  to  destabilize  Western 
societies." 

July  25-26 

South  Africa's  Administrator  General  to 
Namibia  Willie  von  Niekerk  and  SWAPO 
President  Sam  Nujoma  meet  to  discuss  end- 
ing armed  activities  in  Namibia. 

July  25 

President  Reagan  ends  a  ban  on  Soviet  com- 
mercial fishing  in  U.S.  Pacific  waters.  The 
Soviet  allocation  will  be  about  50,000  metric 
tons. 

U.S.  F-14  fighters  fly  exercises  over  the 
Gulf  of  Sidra  which  Libya  considers  to  be  its 
territorial  waters.  No  incidents  are  reported. 

West  Germany  approves  a  $333  million 
private  bank  loan  to  East  Germany  which  has 
promised  to  ease  restrictions  on  contacts  be- 
tween East  and  West  German  citizens. 

Israel  closes  its  liaison  office  in 
Dubayyah,  Lebanon,  after  weeks  of  pressure 
from  the  Lebanese  Government. 

Poland  agrees  to  allow  the  Primate  of 
Poland  and  Catholic  Church  appointed  of- 
ficials to  supervise  a  fund  to  assist  private 
farmers  in  an  effort  to  relax  U.S.  imposed 
economic  sanctions  and  improve  relations. 

July  26 

State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  says  three  Libyan  journalists  were 
denied  visas,  for  security  reasons,  to  cover 
the  Olympic  Games. 

State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  says  the  election  of  Rabbi  Kahane 
to  the  Israeli  Parliament  could  result  in 
Kahane  losing  his  U.S.  citizenship. 

July  27 

Soviet  Deputy  Foreign  Minister  Komplektov 
says  the  latest  U.S.  response  to  a  proposal  to 
begin  talks  in  Vienna  on  outer  space  weapons 
makes  it  impossible  to  conduct  the  kind  of 
negotiations  the  Soviets  are  interested  in. 


PRESS  RELEASES 


PUBLICATIONS 


White  House  spokesman  Speakes  says  the 
U.S.  accepted  the  proposed  talks  without 
preconditions  and  that  such  talks  are  not  im- 
possible. 

In  response  to  a  speech  made  on  July  26 
by  Fidel  Castro,  State  Department  acting 
spokesman  Romberg  says  Cuba  will  have  to 
demonstrate  some  fundamental  changes  in  its 
foreign  policy  before  the  U.S.  will  agree  to 
comprehensive  talks  with  Cuba. 

Panama  President-elect  Nicolas  Ardito 
Barletta  meets  with  President  Reagan,  Vice 
President  Bush,  and  Secretary  Shultz  at  the 
White  House. 

July  28 

In  a  letter  to  UN  Secretary  General  Perez  de 
Cuellar,  Libya  protests  the  presence  of  the 
U.S.  F-14  fighters  over  the  Gulf  of  Sidra  on 
July  25.  citing  it  is  a  violation  of  Libyan  ter- 
ritorial waters. 

Burundi  President  Jean-Baptiste  Bagaza 
is  reelected  as  president  of  the  Uprona  Party 
for  a  second  5-year  term. 

In  Honduras,  six  U.S.  citizens  affiliated 
with  the  AFL-CIO  are  arrested  and  deported 
to  Nicaragua  for  participating  in  a  political 
rally  in  Tegucigalpa  on  July  27. 

July  29 

Competition  in  the  Summer  Games  of  the 
XXIIl  Olympiad  begins  in  Los  Angeles.  A 
record  140  countries  send  athletes. 

A  Venezuelan  DC-9  jet,  carrying  87  peo- 
ple, is  hijacked  to  Curacao.  Four  U.S.  citizens 
are  among  the  passengers. 

July  30 

Six  hostages  from  the  hijacked  Venezuelan 
jet  are  freed. 

The  last  of  the  Marine  combat  troops  at 
the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Beirut  return  to  Navy 
ships. 

July  31 

Venezuelan  commandos  storm  the  hijacked 
DC-9  jet  killing  the  two  hijackers  and  rescu- 
ing all  remaining  passengers.  State  Depart- 
ment acting  spokesman  Romberg  says  U.S. 
antiterrorism  experts  flew  to  the  scene  to  of- 
fer advice  to  local  authorities. 

U.S.  and  Cuba  resume  talks  on  migration, 
including  the  Mariel  issue.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*157      7/5         Appointment  of  Dean  Burch 
as  chairman  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  Space 
Services  World  Ad- 
ministrative Radio  Con- 
ference (biographic  data). 


*158      7/10       Owen  W.  Roberts  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  the 
Republic  of  Togo,  July  9 
(biographic  data). 

*159      7/10       John  W.  Shirley  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  the  United 
Republic  of  Tanzania, 
July  9  (biographic  data). 

*160      7/10       Weston  Adams  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  the 
Republic  of  Malawi,  July  9 
(biographic  data). 

•161       7/11        U.S.  and  Indonesia  renew 

Agreement  for  Cooperation 
in  Scientific  Research  and 
Technological  Develop- 
ment, July  9. 
162      7/12       Shultz:  news  conference, 
Singapore,  July  10. 

*163      7/13        Shultz:  remarks  at  banquet 
hosted  by  Acting  Foreign 
Minister  Datuk  Abdullah 
HJ.  Ahmad  Badawi,  Kuala 
Lumpur.  July  9. 
164      7/13        Shultz:  remarks  to  the 

ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers, 
Jakarta. 

*165      7/17        Shultz:  statement  at  the 

New  Zealand  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  Well- 
ington, July  16. 
166      7/18        Shultz:  news  conference  at 
the  American  Embassy, 
Kuala  Lumpur,  July  10. 

*167      7/18       Shultz:  remarks  at  closing 
of  the  bilateral  meeting 
with  Indonesian  President 
Soeharto,  Jakarta,  July  13. 

*168      7/19        Shultz:  remarks  at  ANZ'US 
Council  dinner,  Wellington, 
.July  16. 

169  7/19        Shultz:  remarks  at  luncheon 

for  ANZUS  Council,  Well- 
ington, July  16. 

170  7/19        Shultz:  address  before  the 

Honolulu  Council  on 
Foreign  Relations, 
Honolulu,  July  18. 

171  7/20        Shultz:  news  conference  at 

the  Parliament  House, 
Canberra,  July  15. 

•172      7/23        Shultz:  interview  on  "The 
Today  Show"  by  Bernard 
Kalb. 

•173       7/23        Shultz:  arrival  statement, 
Jakarta,  July  11. 
174      7/23        Shultz,  Hayden,  Cooper: 

news  conference  at  closing 
of  ANZUS  Council  Meet- 
ing, Wellington,  July  17. 

•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  fro 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division,  ' 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Free  multiple  copies  may  be  obtained 
writing  to  the  Office  of  Opinion  Analysis  a 
Plans,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Departme 
of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Shultz 

Asia-Pacific  and  the  Future,  Honolulu  Cou 
on  Foreign  Relations,  Honolulu,  Hawai 
July  18,  1984  (Current  Policy  #598). 

Challenges  Facing  the  U.S.  and  ASEAN. 
Foreign  Ministers  of  the  Association  o 
South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN), 
Jakarta.  Indonesia,  July  13,  1984  (Cur 
rent  Policy  #597). 

Arms  Control 

Nuclear  Arms  Control  and  the  NATO  Alii 
ance,  Ambassador  Rowny,  Royal  Unit 
Services  Institute,  London,  U.K., 
June  21,  1984  (Current  Policy  #591). 

Preserving  Freedom  and  Security,  Deput; 
Secetary  Dam.  Senate  Foreign  Relatii 
Committee,  June  13,  1984  (Current 
Policy  #590). 


East  Asia 

Taking  Stock  of  U.S. -Japan  Relations,  As 
ant  Secretary  Wolfowitz,  Subcommitt 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  and  Inte 
tional  Economic  Policy  and  Trade,  Ht 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  June  12, 
1984  (Current  Policy  #593). 

The  U.S. -China  Trade  Relationship,  Assis 
Secretary  Wolfowitz,  National  Counc 
U.S. -China  Trade.  May  31,  1984  (Cur 
Policy  #594). 

U.S. -China  Relations  (GIST,  July  1984). 

Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)  (GIST,  July  1984). 

Economics 

The  Bretton  Woods  Legacy:  Its  Continu 
Relevance,  Assistant  Secretary  McC' 
mack,  40th  anniversary  of  the  signin 
the  Bretton  Woods  agreements,  Bre 
Woods,  New  Hampshire,  July  13,  19 
(Current  policy  #596). 

Europe 

Soviet  Active  Measures,  Deputy  Assista 
Secretary  Knepper,  Chicago  Council 
Foreign  Relations,  Chicago,  Illinois, 
May  30,  1984  (Current  Policy  #595). 

Narcotics 

International  Narcotics  Control  (GIST, 
July  1984). 

Western  Hemisphere 

Atlas  of  the  Caribbean  Basin,  Harry  F. 
Young,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  De 
ment  of  State,  July  1984.  ■ 


s 


ilDEX 


September  1984 
^}lume  84,  No.  2090 


ica 

ican  Refugees  Relief  Day,  1984  (proclama- 
tion)   64 

nan  Rights  Situation  in  Zaire  and  South 

Africa  (Abrams) 55 

ns  Control 
ANZUS  Relationship:    Alliance  Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz) 60 

?osed   Outer   Space   Negotiations  (White 
louse  statements) 24 

tus    of   Conference    on    Disarmament    in 

Europe  (Reagan) 23 

ia.     Asia-Pacific     and     the     Future 

(Shultz)   3 

itralia 

1  ANZUS  Relationship;  Alliance  Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz)  60 

retary  Visits  Asia;  Attends  ASEAN  and 
ANZUS  Meetings  (Cooper,  Hayden, 
Shultz,  text  of  ANZUS  communique)  ....  7 
ina.    The    U.S. -China    Relationship 

(Wolfowitz)   25 

igress 

nan  Rights  Situation  in  Zaire  and  South 

Africa  (Abrams) 55 

1    Report    on    Cyprus    (message    to    the 

Congress)    46 

ing  Stock  of  U.S. -Japan  Relations 
(Wolfowitz)   28 

nsular  Affairs.  U.S. -Soviet  Consular 
Agreement  (Department  statement)  ...  42 

)a 

)a  as  a  Model  and  a  Challenge  (Skoug)  .  .  73 

man  Rights  in  Cuba  (Abrams) 53 

jrus.  19th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to 
the  Congress) 46 

veloping    Countries.    World    Economic 

Prospects  (Wallis) 36 

t  Asia 

•cing    Stock     of    U.S. -Japan     Relations 

(Wolfowitz)   28 

-Asia  Security;  Economic  and  Political 
Dimensions  (Brown) 34 

onomics 

a-Pacific  and  the  Future  (Shultz) 3 

;  Bretton  Woods  Legacy;  Its  Continuing 
Relevance  (McCormack) 38 

King  Stock  of  U.S. -Japan  Relations 
(Wolfowitz)   28 

5. -Asia  Security;  Econoniic  and  Political 
Dimensions  (Brown) 34 

)rld  Economic  Prospects  (Wallis) 36 

Salvador 

tending  Voluntary  Departure  for  El 
Salvadorans  (Abrams) 48 

;sident  Meets  With  El  Salvador's  President 
(White  House  statement) 72 

od.  Food  for  Peace  Day,  1984  (Reagan, 
proclamation)    46 

reign  Assistance.  President  Meets  With 
EI  Salvador's  President  (White  House 
statement) 72 

enada.  A  Force  for  Freedom  in  the 
Caribbean  (Reagan) 1 

latemala.  Elections  in  Guatemala  (White 
House  statement) 71 

iman  Rights 

.ptive  Nations  Week,  1984  (proclamation)  51 

'.tending  Voluntary  Departure  for  El 
Salvadorans  (Abrams) 48 

iman  Rights  in  Cuba  (Abrams) 53 

iman  Rights  Situation  in  Zaire  and  South 

Africa  (Abrams) 55 

■rsecution  and  Restrictions  of  Religion  in 
Nicaragua  (Abrams) 49 


Immigration.  Extending  Voluntary  Departure 
for  El  Salvadorans  (Abrams)  ." 48 

Indonesia.  Secretary  Visits  Asia;  Attends 
ASEAN  and  ANZUS  Meetings  (Cooper, 
Havden,  Shultz,  text  of  ANZUS  communi- 
que)    7 

Industrialized  Democracies.  World  Economic 
Prospects  (Wallis) 36 

Japan.  'Taking  Stock  of  U.S. -Japan  Relations 
(Wolfowitz)   28 

Malaysia.  Secretary  Visits  Asia;  Attends 
ASEAN  and  ANZUS  Meetings  (Cooper, 
Havden,  Shultz,  text  of  ANZUS  communi- 
que)    7 

Monetary  Affairs 

The  Bretton  Woods  Legacy;  Its  Continuing 
Relevance  (McCormack) 38 

World  Economic  Prospects  (Wallis) 36 

New  Zealand 

The  ANZUS  Relationship;  Alliance  Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz) 60 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of 
July  24  (excerpts) 2 

Secretary  Visits  Asia;  Attends  ASEAN  and 
ANZUS  Meetings  (Cooper,  Hayden, 
Shultz,  text  of  ANZUS  communique)  ....  7 

Nicaragua 

A  Force  for  Freedom  in  the  Caribbean 
(Reagan)   i 

Persecution  and  Restrictions  of  Religion  in 
Nicaragua  (Abrams) 49 

Review  of  Nicaragua's  Commitments  to  the 
OAS  (Middendorf) 69 

Nuclear  Policy 

The  ANZUS  Relationship;  Alliance  Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz) 60 

The  U.S. -China  Trade  Relationship 
(Wolfowitz)   25 

Organization  of  American  States.  Review  of 
Nicaragua's  Commitments  to  the  OAS 
(Middendorf) 69 

Pacific 

The  ANZUS  Relationship;  Alliance  Manage- 
ment (Wolfowitz)  60 

Asia-Pacific  and  the  Future  (Shultz) 3 

Poland.  President  Reagan's  News  Conference 
of  July  24  (excerpts) 2 

Presidential  Documents 

African  Refugees  Relief  Day,  1984  (proclama- 
tion)   64 

Captive  Nations  Week,  1984  (proclamation)  51 

Food  for  Peace  Day,  1984  (proclamation)  .  .46 

A  Force  for  Freedom  in  the  Caribbean 1 

19th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 
Congress)    46 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of 
July  24  (excerpts) 2 

Status  of  Conference  on  Disarmament  in 
Europe    23 

U.S. -Soviet  Bilateral  Relations  (White  House 
fact  sheet) 41 

U.S. -Soviet  Union  Expand  "Hot  Line" 
Agreement  (White  House  fact  sheet)  ...  45 

Visit  of  Sri  Lankan  President  (Jayewardene, 
Reagan) 65 

Publications.  Department  of  State 82 

Refugees.  African  Refugees  Relief  Day, 
1984  (proclamation) 64 


Science    and    Technology.    The    U.S. -China 

Trade  Relationship  (Wolfowitz) 25 

Security  Assistance 

President  Meets  With  El  Salvador's  President 
(White  House  statement) 72 

U.S. -Asia  Security;  Econoniic  and  Political 
Dimensions  (Brown) 34 

Singapore.  Secretary  Visits  Asia;  Attends 
ASEAN  and  ANZUS  Meetings  (Cooper, 
Hayden,  Shultz,  text  of  ANZUS  communi- 
que)    7 

Soutn  Africa.  Human  Rights  Situation  in 
Zaire  and  South  Africa  (Abrams) 55 

Sri  Lanka.  Visit  of  Sri  Lankan  President 
(Jayewardene,  Reagan) 65 

Congress 

Taking  Stock  of  U.S. -Japan  Relations 
(Wolfowitz)   28 

U.S. -Asia  Security;  Economic  and  Political 
Dimensions  (Brown) 34 

The  U.S. -China  Trade  Relationship 
(Wolfowitz)   25 

Treaties 

Current  Actions  78 

U.S. -Soviet  Consular  Agreement  (Department 
statement) 42 

U.S. -Soviet  Union  Expand  "Hot  Line"  Agree- 
ment (Reagan,  White  House  fact  sheet) .  45 

U.S.S.R. 

Proposed  Outer  Space  Negotiations  (White 
House  statements) 24 

Status  of  Conference  on  Disarmament  in 
Europe  (Reagan) 23 

U.S. -Soviet  Bilateral  Relations  (Reagan, 
White  House  fact  sheet) 41 

U.S. -Soviet  Consular  Agreement  (Department 
statement) 42 

U.S. -Soviet  Union  Expand  "Hot  Line"  Agree- 
ment (Reagan,  White  House  fact  sheet)  .  45 

Western  Hemisphere 

Extending  Voluntary  Departure  for  El 
Salvadorans  (Abrams) 48 

A  Force  for  Freedom  in  the  Caribbean 
(Reagan)    1 

Human  Rights  in  Cuba  (Abrams) 53 

Persecution  and  Restrictions  of  Religion 
in  Nicaragua  (Abrams) 49 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of 
July  24  (excerpts) 2 

Zaire.  Human  Rights  Situation  in  Zaire 
and  South  Africa  (Abrams) 55 


Name  Index 

Abrams,  Elliott 48,  49,  53,  55 

Brown,  William  A 34 

Cooper,  Warren 7 

Hayden,  William 7 

Jayewardene,  J.  R 65 

McCormack,  Richard  T 38 

Middendorf,  J.  William  II 69 

Reagan,  President 1,  2,  23,  41,  45,  46,  48 

51,  64,  65 

Shultz,  Secretary 3,7 

Skoug,  Kenneth  N.  Jr 73 

Wallis  W.  Allen 36 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D 25,  28,  60 


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Deparitnen  t 


.5' 


-m  ot  state -m-m  ^  ^ 

,  ,„  huUetm 

Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  84  /  Number  2091 


October  1984 


*'^ 


■^^•^ 


^TS 


DiPOSITORY 


Western  Hemisphere/1 


Arms  Control/21 


Europe  v.  Asia/33 


Cover  Photos: 

Assistant  Secretary  Motley 
Ambassador  Goodby 
Deputy  Secretary  Dam 


M^epnrttnvni  of  Siaie 

huUetin 


Volume  84  /  Number  2091  /  October  1984 


The  Department  oe  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ  I 

Secretary  of  State  | 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 


NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


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CONTENTS 


FEATURE 


Democracy  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 
(Langhome  A.  Motley) 


The  President 

16 


40th  Anniversary  of  the  Warsaw 
Uprising 


The  Secretary 

18         Diplomacy  and  Strength 

Arms  Control 

21         Security  for  Europe 
(James  E.  Goodby) 

East  Asia 

25         U.S.  Activities  on  POW-MIA 
Issue  (Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 

27  Continuation  of  MFN  Status  for 

China  (William  A.  Brown) 

Europe 

28  U.S. -Bulgaria  Relations 

(Richard  R.  Burt) 

30  Polish  Government's  Release  of 

Political  Prisoners 
(White  House  Statement) 

Foreign  Assistance 

31  Food  and  Population  Planning 

Assistance  (M.  Peter  McPherson) 

General 

33         Europe  v.  Asia;  Is  Diplomacy  a 
Zero-Sum  Game? 
(Kenneth  D.  Darn) 

Human  Rights 

36  Ninth  Anniversary  of  the 

Helsinki  Final  Act 

Middle  East 

37  Current  Developments  in  the 

Middle  East 
(Richard  W.  Murphy) 


Narcotics 

39  International  Narcotics  Control 

Nuclear  Policy 

40  Nuclear  Trade:  Reliable  Supply 

and  Mutual  Obligations 
(Richard  T.  Kennedy) 

Science  &  Technology 

43         Competitive  Challenges  of 

Global  Telecommunications 
(William  Schneider,  Jr.) 

South  Asia 

47         Afghanistan 

47  Afghan  Attacks  on  Pakistan 

(Department  Statement) 

Terrorism 

48  International  Terrorism:  A  Long 

Twilight  Struggle 
(Robert  M.  Sayre) 

Treaties 

50         Current  Actions 

Chronology 

52         August  1984 

Press  Releases 

54         Department  of  State 

Publications 

54         Department  of  State 

Index 


Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 


Boundary  represent al> on  is 
nol  necessarily  authoritative 


Betmuda 
(O.KJ 


.Nassau 
0    .  »  The  Bahamas 


Jamaica        Haiti 
Kingston        au-Prlnca 


Dominrcan 
Republic 
Santo 
'     Ingo 


North 

Atlantic 

Ocean 


Honduras 


P««tll  R'cii     -    '.Anliiju.  »nd  B 
Saint  Chris^*^^         DDominica 


Guaterrttla 


Gi,„,„ 


North 
Pacific 
Ocean 


T«gucignpa 
SarSaW9°"  ^         j  Nicaragua 

Managua^ 


,.ao< 


,.nd  Nevis  _.   „  „,„_, 

Caribbean  Sea  ='.„«". 


St  lucre 
Barbados 


^•h_  Trinidad  and  Tobago 
,i^Vort-of- Spain 


(Ecuador) 


South 
Pacific 
Ocean 


F/<f.UV  IrJur-J 
(Chill) 


1000  Kilometers 


0  1000  Mites 

Azimuthal  Equal-Area  Projection 


South 

Atlantic 

Ocean 


Falklsnd  ts/Brnfs 

"^S^IMainiilsnd  b|  UH. 
ctllmftf  bf  A(Q«nttni) 


South  Coorgia 
(FilUinil  li{inili) 


FEATURE 


ised  on  oral  and  written  testimony 
the  Subcommittee  on  Western 
rphere  Affairs  of  the  Hoitse  Foreign 
■s  Committee  on  July  31,  198^.  Am- 
ior  Motley  is  Assistant  Secretary 
ter-American  Affairs. ' 


Democracy  in 

Latin  America  and 

the  Caribbean 


by  Langhorne  A.  Motley 


Support  for  democracy  is  one  of  the 
cardinal  points  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  in 
the  Caribbean  and  in  Latin  America  as 
a  whole.  Ambassador  Motley's  testimony 
discusses  the  status  of  democratic  politics 
in  the  region.  It  concludes  that  democ- 
racy is  proving  to  be  a  practical  path  to 
staMlity  as  well  as  to  freedom.  This  con- 
clusion, with  the  data  that  support  it, 
parallels  the  finding  of  the  National 


Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central 
America  that  recent  events  have  "de- 
stroyed the  argument  of  the  old  dictators 
that  a  strong  hand  is  essential  to  avoid 
anarchy  and  communism,  and  that 
order  and  progress  can  only  be  achieved 
through  authoritarianism. " 


Selected  Latin  American  Elections 
in  a  20- Year  Perspective 


Country 

Year 

Type- 

Total  Vote 

(thousands) 

Adult 
Population 
Voting" 

(%) 

Argentina 

1983 

P,  L 

15,180 

89 

1963 

P,  L 

9,326 

71 

Brazil 

1982 

L 

48,440 

81 

1962 

L 

14,747 

45 

Colombia 

1982 

P 

6,816 

68 

1962 

P 

2,634 

35 

Costa  Rica 

1982 

P,  L 

992 

87 

1962 

P,  L 

391 

76 

Ecuador 

1984 

L 

2,024 

53 

1962 

L 

709 

34 

El  Salvador 

1984 

P 

1,524 

69 

1962 

P,  L 

400 

35 

Guatemala 

1984 

CA 

1,856 

57 

1964 

CA 

337 

18 

Honduras 

1981 

P,  L 

1,171 

79 

1965 

L 

551 

70 

Mexico 

1982 

P,  L 

22,523 

75 

1964 

P.L 

9,422 

59 

Peru 

1980 

P 

4,030 

49 

1962 

P 

1,693 

42 

Venezuela 

1983 

P.  L 

6,741 

90 

1963 

P,  L 

3,126 

91 

•P=  Presidential,  L=  Legislative,  CA=  Constituent  Assembly. 
"Estimates  based  on  votes  cast  as  a  percentage  of  total  population  age  20  or  over  as 
reported  in  the  United  Nations  Demographic  Yearbook  for  the  year  in  question. 


FEATURE 


THE  BEST  MEASURE 
OF  FREEDOM 

Since  November  1980,  when  the  United 
States  last  went  to  the  polls  to  elect  a 
president,  our  southern  neighbors  have 
cast  some  150  million  votes  in  33  elec- 
tions in  24  countries.  That  is  more  votes 
in  more  elections  in  more  countries  than 
in  any  previous  4  years  in  the  history  of 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean. 

In  Latin  America,  voter  participa- 
tion has  increased,  sometimes 
dramatically.  In  fact,  recent  turnouts,  in 
some  cases,  have  doubled  those  of  20 
years  ago  in  relative  as  well  as  absolute 
terms. 

•  More  than  15  million  Argentine 
voters  went  to  the  polls  last  fall.  In  the 
hotly  contested  election  that  ended  near- 
ly a  decade  of  military  rule,  9  out  of 
every  10  adults  voted.  Raul  Alfonsin 
became  president  with  the  largest  vote 
in  Argentine  history,  exceeding  even 
Juan  Peron's  highest  tally. 

•  In  Brazil's  1982  congressional  and 
municipal  elections,  48.4  million 
Brazilians  voted.  This  was  more  than 
three  times  the  14.8  million  who  voted  in 
the  1962  legislative  elections;  the 
percentage  of  adults  voting  rose  from 
45%  in  1962  to  81%  in  1982. 

•  In  May  of  this  year,  an  absolute 
majority  of  all  adult  Salvadorans,  some 
1.5  million  men  and  women,  defied  guer- 
rilla violence  to  choose  between 
Napoleon  Duarte  and  Roberto 
D'Aubuisson.  In  the  1962  presidential 
elections,  only  400,000  voters,  roughly 
one-third  of  adult  Salvadorans,  had  par- 
ticipated in  an  election  dominated  by  an 
official  military  candidate. 

•  Two  Constituent  Assembly  elec- 
tions in  Guatemala  20  years  apart  reveal 
a  similar  evolution:  in  May  1964, 
337,000  votes  were  cast,  40%  of  those 
registered;  in  July  1984,  the  voters 
numbered  1,856,000,  or  73%  of  those 
registered. 

What  lies  behind  this  region-wide 
upsurge  in  democratic  politics?  Long- 
term  development— including  the  revolu- 
tions in  communications  and  expecta- 
tions—is clearly,  if  slowly,  making  itself 
felt.  A  more  immediate  factor— one  that 
has  impressed  many  observers  at  recent 
elections— is  voter  desire  to  repudiate 
both  dicUitors  and  guerrillas.  To  most 
Latin  Americans,  the  uncertainties  of 
democracy  are  preferable  to  the  violence 
and  abuse  of  leftist  and  rightist  ex- 
tremes. 


Growth  of  Voter  Participation 
in  Selected  Countries 

(Estimate  ol  Percent  of  Total  Adult  Population  Voting) 
10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80 


90 


Argentina 


Brazil 


Colombia 


Costa  Rica 


Ecuador 


El  Salvador 


Guatemala 


Honduras 


Mexico 


Pen 


Venezuela 


FEATURE 


'he  force  of  tlie  democratic  tide  ami 
ejection  of  extremism  can  also  be 
in  what  has  not  happened.  Not  a 
B  country  that  was  democractic  4 

ago  has  lost  its  freedom.  The 
iry  coups  predicted  for  El  Salvador 
Honduras  did  not  take  place.  Boliv- 
emocracy  has  not  fallen.  Not  one 
ilia  movement  has  taken  power 

1979,  when  the  Sandinistas  re- 
el Somoza  and  abandoned  their 
ises  to  hold  free  elections.  And  to 
o's  frustration  and  surprise, 
ida's  Marxist-Leninist  dictators  did 
rove  immune  to  their  own  abuses 
wer  and  were  replaced  by  constitu- 

authorities  committed  to  holding 
>lections  by  the  end  of  1984. 
lections  by  themselves  cannot 
<.e  society  or  solve  every  problem, 
ompetitive  elections  are,  as 
tary  Shultz  has  noted,  "a  practical 
tick  of  democracy.  They  are  an  in- 
able  test  of  public  accountability." 
therefore,  U.S.  policy  to  support 

lections  without  reservation,  see- 

them  assurances  that  human 
;  will  be  protected,  that  reconcilia- 
>!\\\  reflect  the  work  of  people  and 

guns,  and  that  U.S.  aid  and 
ration  will  have  firm  local  founda- 

he  English-speaking  Caribbean, 
Rica,  Colombia,  and  Venezuela 
)lidly  based  democracies  of  long 
ing.  Over  the  last  5  years,  elected 
n  presidents  have  replaced  military 
,  in  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Ecuador,  El 
dor,  Honduras,  Panama,  and  Peru, 
ional  countries  as  different  as 
and  Uruguay,  Guatemala  and 
da  are  now  also  moving  toward 
;r  democracy. 

fie  result  is  that  more  than  90%  of 
feople  of  Latin  America  and  the 
bean  are  now  living  in  countries 
governments  that  are  either 
:ractic  or  heading  there.  For  a  part 
world  often  identified  with  dicta- 
ip,  this  is  something  to  cheer  about, 
s  recently  as  1979,  two-thirds  of 
jighbors  lived  under  military  or 
iry-dominated  governments  of  both 
hd  right.  Any  shift  so  striking  in- 
skepticism.  But  measured  in  voter 
ipation  and  in  competition  at  the 
g  booth,  today's  democractic 
jence  is  astonishingly  deep, 
ur  neighbors  deserve  the  credit  for 
■ogress  they  are  making.  We  can, 
n,  be  proud  that  we  are  cooper- 
with  them.  Freedom  is  not  a  zero- 
^ame.  Everyone  wins  when  democ- 
s  strengthened. 


The  Military  and  Democracy 


Essential  to  the  survival  of  democ- 
racy is  an  apolitical  military  establish- 
ment— one  which  seeks  not  to  defend 
one  partisan  interest  or  another  but 
rather  one  committed  to  institutional 
democratic  government.  Significantly, 
the  recent  history  of  hemispheric 
democratic  advance  has  been  that  of 
a  transformation  in  which  the 
military  itself  has  taken  an  active 
part. 

An  example  of  this  difficult  proc- 
ess is  today's  El  Salvador,  which 
owes  its  agrarian  reform  to  military 
support.  After  decades  as  defenders 
of  the  status  quo,  since  1979  El 
Salvador's  security  forces  have  made 
considerable  progress  toward  im- 
proved field  performance,  greater 
respect  for  human  rights,  and  an 
apolitical  role  in  society. 


THREATS  TO  DEMOCRACY 

Despite  this  extraordinary  pattern  of 
progress,  democracy  in  Latin  America 
still  faces  many  problems. 

Competitive  elections  can  help 
measure  success  or  failure  in  dealing 
with  particular  problems;  the  problems 
themselves  do  not  automatically  disap- 
pear at  the  ballot  box,  regardless  of  who 
wins.  Democracy  requires  elections;  but 
elections  alone  are  not  enough. 

Democracies  must  establish  a  track 
record  as  problem-solving  mechanisms. 
If  democratic  institutions  cannot  solve 
problems,  they  cannot  survive.  If  we  are 
interested  in  the  survival  of  democracy, 
we  must  help  democratic  governments 
deal  with  their  problems— even  though  it 
is  they,  not  we,  who  must  solve  them. 

Internal  problems  include  unequal 
access  to  education,  justice,  and  employ- 
ment; the  clash  of  indigenous  and  im- 
migrant cultures;  great  disparities  in 
wealth;  government  inefficiency  and  cor- 
ruption; civilian  caudUlismo  and  military 
intervention.  These  problems  do  not,  of 
course,  all  exist  in  every  country.  But 
they  do  persist  in  varying  degrees  in  the 
region  as  a  whole. 

External  problems  include  increased 
costs  for  imported  oil;  the  decline  in  the 
global  economy  accompanied  by  reduc- 
tions in  export  earnings  and  forced 
reliance  on  increasingly  expensive  bor- 
rowed capital;  and  active  efforts  by 


Training  and  organizational 
changes  are  largely  responsible.  Merit 
promotion  has  been  implemented. 
President  Duarte  has  appointed  a 
Vice  Minister  of  Defense  responsible 
for  the  three  police  forces,  as  well  as 
new,  able  commanders  to  head  each. 
Officers  associated  with  human  rights 
abuses  have  been  removed  and  a  unit 
suspected  of  human  rights  abuse 
disbanded. 

This  increased  professionalism 
was  reflected  in  the  performance  of 
the  armed  forces  during  this  year's 
presidential  elections  and  inaugura- 
tion. The  Salvadoran  military,  once 
considered  an  impediment  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  political  democracy,  is 
today  defending  the  future  rather 
than  the  past. 


hostile  powers  outside  the  hemisphere  to 
exploit  local  grievances  and  economic 
hardship.  Again,  the  mix  can  vary  great- 
ly from  country  to  country,  but  these  ex- 
ternal pressures  are  felt  throughout  the 
hemisphere. 

These  problems  combine  to  create 
two  immediate  threats  to  democracy  in 
Latin  America  today:  political  ex- 
tremism and  economic  recession.  To 
them  must  be  added  the  growing  inter- 
national trade  in  illicit  drugs,  which 
degrades  the  rule  of  law  as  well  as 
human  dignity. 

Political  Extremism.  The  enemies 
of  democracy  often  point  to  under- 
development and  economic  hardship  to 
justify  violence  and  dictatorship.  The 
problem  with  their  argument  is  that 
neither  left  nor  right  extremes  are 
stable  or  productive. 

Marxist-Leninist  regimes  have 
tended  to  perpetuate  both  the  political 
and  the  economic  backwardness  out  of 
which  they  grew.  When  feuding  Marxist- 
Leninists  plunged  Grenada  into 
murderous  disorder,  the  United  States, 
Barbados,  Jamaica,  and  Grenada's 
eastern  Caribbean  neighbors  came  to  the 
rescue.  The  result  was  restoration  of 
legal  order.  This  was  a  major  defeat  for 
the  extremists  and  their  Cuban  and 
Soviet  supporters,  who  nonetheless  still 
support  totalitarianism  in  Nicaragua  and 
oppose  the  consolidation  of  democracy  in 
El  Salvador. 


FEATURE 


Like  leftwing  extremism,  extremism 
of  the  right  is  weai<ened  by  economic 
development.  Unlike  leftwing  ex- 
tremism, it  has  few  reliable  external 
sources  of  support.  But  the  consolidation 
of  democratic  politics  and  reform  has, 
nonetheless,  been  hindered  by  such 
phenomena  as  death  squads  and  denials 
of  elemental  equity. 


A  Precedent  for  1984? 

In  1972-74,  Anastasio  Somoza 
stepped  aside  from  the  presidency  of 
Nicaragua,  continuing  as  commander 
of  the  National  Guard,  and,  after  the 
1972  earthquake,  as  President  of  the 
National  Emergency  Committee. 

In  1974,  disregarding  the  advice 
of  friends  who  thought  the  time  had 
come  for  the  family  to  withdraw  from 
active  politics,  Somoza  decided  to 
become  president  again.  To  do  so,  he 
had  the  Constitution  amended  and 
barred  9  out  of  10  opposition  parties 
from  the  presidential  election. 
Nicaragua's  Roman  Catholic  bishops 
warned  in  a  pastoral  letter  that  these 
electoral  manipulations  amounted  to 
"legal  war." 

Under  those  conditions,  Somoza 
received  a  smashing  95%  of  the  vote: 
216,158  votes  to  11,997  for  Edmundo 
Paguaga  Irias  of  the  Conservative 
Party.  But  the  victory  was  Pyrrhic. 
Many  Nicaraguans,  including  former 
close  associates  of  Somoza,  became 
convinced  a  democratic  end  to  the 
Somoza  dynasty  had  become 
impossible. 


Economic  Recession.  During  the 
last  8-10  years,  economic  mismanage- 
ment and  pressures  for  reform  con- 
tributed to  the  decline  of  several  unrep- 
resentative regimes.  Yet  if  democratic 
governments  cannot  produce  economic 
recovery,  then  they,  too,  can  lose  their 
mandate.  Today,  many  democracies 
need  to  restructure  their  economies  at  a 
time  when  living  standards  have  already 
declined. 

The  countries  of  Latin  America  and 
the  Caribbean  constitute  the  developing 
world's  most  indebted  region.  External 
debt  exceeded  $330  billion  at  the  end 
of  1983.  In  1982  and  1983,  interest 
payments  alone  added  up  to  more  than 
$40  billion  per  year.  These  payments 
were  equivalent  to  more  than  35%  of  the 
value  of  the  region's  exports  of  goods 


and  services— the  world's  highest  debt 
service  ratio.  In  some  individual  coun- 
tries the  ratio  exceeded  100%  before 
debt  rescheduling. 

The  region's  real  per  capita  gross 
domestic  product  (GDP)  has  dropped  by 
over  10%  from  its  1980  level  (by  far 
more  in  some  countries),  and  there  is  lit- 
tle doubt  that  per  capita  real  economic 
growth  will  again  be  negative  in  1984. 
In  nearly  all  countries,  unemployment 
and  underemployment  are  at  levels  not 
seen  since  the  Great  Depression. 

It  hardly  needs  to  be  pointed  out 
how  dangerous  such  conditions  are  to 
any  government  that  has  to  face  elec- 
tions. 

The  Drug  Trade.  Illicit  narcotics 
trafficking  and  consumption  also 
threaten  democratic  development  by 
fostering  disregard  for  the  law  and  cor- 
rupting institutions  as  well  as  in- 
dividuals. In  some  remote  valleys,  the 
lure  of  extraordinary  profits  and  the 
absence  of  productive  alternatives  have 
broken  down  social  and  political  order; 
lawlessness  prevails  and  drug  kings  hold 
sway,  sometimes  in  symbiosis  with  guer- 
rillas. 

In  the  past,  many  Latin  Americans 
considered  illicit  drugs  a  "U.S.  problem." 
Some  even  welcomed  the  increased 
employment  and  foreign  exchange  earn- 
ings brought  by  the  drug  trade.  Today, 
they  are  increasingly  aware  of  the  enor- 
mous threat  narcotics  pose  to  the  moral 
fiber  of  their  own  societies  and  to  the 
legitimacy  of  their  own  political  institu- 
tions. Democracy  requires  a  collective 
victory  over  the  traffickers  and  their 
allies. 


U.S.  POLICY  IS  TO 
SUPPORT  DEMOCRACY 

It  is  U.S.  Government  policy  to  support 
democracy  and  democratic  institutions. 
This  approach  is  neither  interventionist 
nor  a  mindless  export  of  ideology.  It  is 
legitimate,  it  is  in  our  enlightened  self- 
interest,  and  it  works— not  overnight  or 
in  6-month  increments  but  over  time. 

•  Democracy  is  the  h^est  guarantor 
of  human  rights.  A  government  respon- 
sible to  its  people  cannot  abuse  them 
with  impunity. 

•  Democracy  is  also  the  best  long- 
term  guarantor  of  stability.  Democratic 
governments  do  not  drive  their  people 
into  armed  opposition  nor  do  they 
threaten  or  attack  their  neighbors. 


American  officials  from  the  Presi 
dent  on  down  have  made  clear  our  ui 
equivocal  support  for  democratic  pro 
esses.  During  his  trip  to  Latin  Ameri 
in  1982,  President  Reagan  insisted  tl 

The  future  challenges  our  imaginatioi 
but  the  roots  of  law  and  democracy  and  < 
inter-American  system  provide  the 
answers.  .  .  .  Together,  we  will  work  tow 
the  economic  growth  and  opportunity  th; 
can  only  be  achieved  by  free  men  and 
women.  We  will  promote  the  democracy 
is  the  foundation  of  our  freedom  and  stai 
together  to  assure  the  security  of  our 
|ieoples,  their  governments,  and  our  way 
life.  " 


Support  for  democracy  can  mea 
everything  from  a  public  embrace  fo 
new  president  of  Argentina  to  sendi 
qualified  election  observers  requeste 
a  government  in  Central  America.  I 
mean  encouragement  of  political 
dialogue  and  communication,  technii 
exchange  programs,  specialized  con- 
ferences, and  even  analytical  public; 
tions.  It  can  mean  support  for  a 
strengthened  administration  of  justi 


Rule  of  Law  is  Key 

A  judicial  system  that  is  independei 
and  fair,  accessible  and  effective  is 
essential  to  democracy. 

Working  with  the  UN-affiliated 
Latin  American  Institute  for  the 
Prevention  of  Crime  and  the  Treat 
ment  of  Offenders,  the  U.S.  Goven 
ment  is  developing  a  program  to 
assist  efforts  by  governments  and 
private  groups  in  Latin  America  ar 
the  Caribbean  to  strengthen  legal  i 
stitutions  and  improve  the  adrninis 
tration  of  justice. 


1 


During  the  last  4  years,  it  has 
all  of  these  things— and  more.  We 
couraged  the  open  and  competitive 
tions  that  took  place  in  Honduras, 
Salvador,  and  Guatemala.  We  urgi 
Sandinistas  to  honor  the  democrat 
promises  they  have  abandoned  an( 
betrayed.  We  welcomed  the  returr 
democratic  rule  in  Argentina.  We 
clear  that  we  would  favor  a  restor 
of  democracy  in  Chile  and  Urugua 
showed  our  support  for  democratic 
legitimacy  when  President  Siles  w 
naped  in  Bolivia.  We  let  the  Gover 
of  Paraguay  know  we  were  unhap 
with  the  closing  of  the  independen 
newspaper  ABC  Color.  We  let  the 
Government  of  Haiti  know  of  our 


iti( 

k 
k 


FEATURE 


n  at  the  arrest  and  mistreatment  of 
losition  leaders. 

In  country  after  country  in  Latin 
lerica  and  the  Caribbean,  U.S.  Em- 
gies  are  today  correctly  perceived  as 
porting  democracy.  Local  officials 
citizens  recognize  in  growing 
ibers  that  our  representatives  are 
ently  fostering  democratic  dialogue, 
stitutional  procedures,  and  respect 
political  diversity. 
We  also  have  recognized  that 
ernment  officials  are  not  alone  in 
ing  a  role  to  play  in  promoting 
locratic  values  and  traditions, 
/ate  citizens  are  ultimately  the  back- 
e  of  democracy,  and  we  have  at- 
pted  to  catalyze  broader  private 
aeration.  The  West  German  political 
idations,  the  political  internationals, 
own  American  Institute  for  Free 
lor  Development,  and  many  in- 
dual  leaders  have  long  proven  that 
tical  cooperation  among  like-minded 
pie  and  groups  gets  results. 
The  democratic  tide  has  made  it 
er  to  build  on  these  experiences.  We 
e  strengthened  the  ability  of  the  U.S. 
)rmation  Agency  (USIA)  to  sponsor 
ate  exchanges.  The  National  Endow- 
it  for  Democracy  and  its  constituent 
itutes  are  strengthening  our  national 
acity  to  develop  mutual  support  net- 
ks  among  democratic  leaders  and 
ties  throughout  the  world. 


Citizens:  the  Backbone 
of  Democracy 

.  ( lovernment  contributions  to  the 
ional  Endowment  for  Democracy 
port  private  sector  initiatives  to 
Durage  free  and  democratic  in- 
jtions  throughout  the  world, 
■se  initiatives  involve  U.S.  busi- 
s  and  labor  as  well  as  political  par- 
.  They  include  cooperation  and 
anizational  activities  that  promote 
pluralism,  individual  freedoms, 
!  internationally  recognized  human 
its  essential  to  the  functioning  of 
locratic  institutions. 


Costa  Rica's  Constitution 


The  new  Center  for  Electoral  Advice 
I  Promotion  in  San  Jose,  Costa  Rica, 
,n  example  of  how  a  regional  institu- 
1  can  help  nations  translate  demo- 
tic theory  into  the  nuts,  bolts,  and 
lot  boxes  of  an  open  political  system. 

Democratic  countries  have  a  par- 
ilar  obligation  to  reach  out  and  assist 


After  the  short  1948  civil  war,  a 
coalition  of  Costa  Ricans  looked  at 
their  own  and  their  neighbors' 
political  experiences  and  set  out  to 
create  a  legal  framework  to  prevent 
abuses  and  assure  a  democratic 
future  for  the  country.  The  document 
they  wrote  has  been  religiously 
followed  since.  Among  other  things, 
the  Constitution  of  1949: 

•  Permanently  eliminated  the 
army  {not  as  an  expression  of  "neu- 
tralism"— the  civil  war  resulted  part- 
ly in  the  explicit  choice  of  democracy 
over  communism — but  to  end  any  in- 
stitutionalized military  threat  to 
elected  civilian  government); 


each  other  and  those  on  the  path  to 
democracy.  If  they  do  not,  they  leave 
the  field  to  those  who  are  opposed  to 
democracy.  As  President  Eisenhower 
said  on  return  from  his  1960  South 
American  trip: 

...  all  nations— large  or  small,  powerful 
or  weak— should  assume  some  responsibility 
for  the  advancement  of  humankind.  .  .  . 
Cooperation  among  free  nations  is  the  key  to 
common  progress. 

Economic  Growth  and  Adjustment 

With  economic  recession  challenging 
social  and  political  stability  in  several 
hemisphere  countries,  economic  adjust- 
ment is  not  a  matter  of  choice  but  of 
necessity.  If  economies  are  to  grow, 
they  must  do  so  in  accordance  with 
market  forces,  not  in  opposition  to  them. 
Stable  and  equitable  growth  in  the 
future  requires  economic  adjustment 
now. 

We  in  the  United  States  have 
learned  that  lesson  ourselves.  The  deci- 
sions we  took  to  foster  the  resurgence  of 
the  American  economy  were  not  easy. 
Costs  were  incurred.  At  the  height  of 
the  adjustment  process,  unemployment 
reached  painfully  high  levels  and  in- 
dustrial production  declined  markedly. 
But  we  are  now  reaping  the  benefits  of 
the  hard  decisions  we  made  earlier.  In- 
dustrial production  is  expanding.  Infla- 
tion is  down  and  personal  income  is  up. 
And  in  the  past  two  quarters,  our  gross 
national  product  (GNP)  grew  much 
faster  than  anticipated. 


•  Created  an  independent 
"Supreme  Electoral  Tribunal,"  a 
fourth  branch  of  government  co-equal 
with  the  traditional  three  and  with 
remarkably  independent  powers 
designed  to  assure  scrupulously  clean 
elections; 

•  Elaborated  a  complex  system 
of  checks,  balances,  and  independent 
financing  aimed  at  preventing  undue 
concentration  of  power  anywhere  in 
the  government;  and 

•  Prohibited  presidential  reelec- 
tion (not  only  of  the  incumbent,  but 
of  anyone  in  his/her  cabinet  or  im- 
mediate family). 


Direct  parallels  cannot  be  drawn  be- 
tween the  situation  in  the  heavily  in- 
debted developing  countries  of  Latin 
America  and  in  the  United  States.  But 
there  is  a  lesson  to  be  learned  from  our 
experience.  It  is  clear  that  to  achieve 
sustained  noninflationary  growth  coun- 
tries need  policies  that  reflect  economic 
realities  and  release  the  productive 
forces  of  their  people. 

Governments  often  face  agonizing 
choices  in  the  political  management  of 
adjustment.  They  must  distribute  the 
burdens  of  that  adjustment.  And  they 
often  must  decide  between  taking  hard 
measures  at  once  or  trying  to  postpone 
economic  shocks— with  the  risk  that 
those  shocks  will  be  more  severe  and 
violent  later  on.  These  are  real  dilemmas 
for  which  there  is  no  simple  or  universal 
answer. 

Democratic  governments,  with  broad 
popular  participation  and  support,  are 
especially  well  positioned  to  deal  with 
these  tough  decisions.  As  Costa  Rican 
President  Luis  Alberto  Monge  told  the 
International  Labor  Organization  in 
Geneva  on  June  12,  1984: 

We  have  drawn  back  from  the  gulf  [by 
adopting]  some  very  bitter  and  harsh  deci- 
sions in  order  to  improve  a  sick  economy.  .  .  . 
Democracy  works  as  a  means  of  settling  the 
problems  of  production  and  to  win  battles  in 
the  struggle  against  under-development  and 
poverty. 

We  are  acutely  aware  of  the  scope 
and  seriousness  of  the  economic  prob- 
lems confronting  the  hemisphere.  We 
are  concerned,  and  we  are  helping. 


FEATURE 


The  United  States  and  the  other  in- 
dustrialized countries  will  continue  to 
respond  constructively  to  external  debt 
and  other  economic  problems.  It  would 
be  a  disservice  to  all  nations  to  weaken 
the  very  international  instruments  that 
can  help  troubled  economies  adapt  to 
new  economic  realities.  But  it  would  be 
an  equal  disservice  not  to  recognize  the 
need  for  flexibility  and  understanding. 

The  June  economic  summit  in  Lon- 
don carefully  considered  debt-related 
issues.  The  summit  leaders  confirmed  a 
basic  strategy  centered  on  adjustment, 
growth,  and  support  and  agreed  to 
develop  it  flexibly,  case  by  case.  They 
also  agreed  on  measures  to  strengthen 
and  broaden  that  strategy  over  time. 

The  summit  leaders  also  pledged  to 
maintain  and,  where  possible,  increase 
bilateral  and  multilateral  assistance,  par- 
ticularly to  the  poorest  countries.  They 
encouraged  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  to  continue  its  key  role  of 
helping  debtor  countries  make  necessary 
policy  changes.  And  they  asked  the 
World  Bank  to  strengthen  its  role  in 
fostering  economic  development,  urging 
closer  cooperation  between  the  IMF  and 
the  Bank. 

This  approach  has  been  successful  in 
avoiding  systematic  crisis.  Indeed,  we 
have  come  a  long  way  since  August 
1982,  when  Mexico's  acute  lack  of 
liquidity  raised  fears  that  the  interna- 
tional financial  system  might  sudddenly 
topple. 

We  and  other  creditor  governments 
quickly  provided  temporary  bridge  fi- 
nancing to  deal  with  immediate  liquidity 
problems  and  began  developing  continu- 
ing measures  to  support  Mexico's 
economic  adjustment  program.  We  have 
since  collaborated  on  the  official  credits 
involved  in  financial  support  packages 
for  a  variety  of  debtor  countries. 

The  responses  of  the  United  States, 
other  creditor  governments,  commercial 
banks,  the  IMF,  and  other  institutions 
reflect  a  more  activist  and  creative  ap- 
proach to  the  hemisphere's  economic 
problems. 

Some  countries,  notably  Mexico  and 
Brazil,  have  made  significant  progress  in 
adjusting  their  economies.  Almost  no 
country— from  Jamaica  to  Peru,  from 
the  Dominican  Republic  to  Costa  Rica- 
has  escaped  the  crisis  or  has  failed  to 
act  to  meet  it.  It  is  important  that  they 
be  able  to  service  their  debt  and  bring 
about  a  resumption  of  sustainable,  non- 
inflationary  growth. 


Opinion  Polling 
in  Latin  America 


Thomas  Jefferson  wrote  that  "it  is 
rare  that  the  public  sentiment  decides 
immorally  or  unwisely,  and  the  in- 
dividual who  differs  from  it  ought  to 
distrust  and  examine  well  his  own 
opinion."  Scientific  polling  is  a  mod- 
ern reflection  of  that  sentiment — 
a  common  practice  in  democratic 
states,  including  in  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean. 

Several  dozen  respected  public 
opinion  firms,  from  Mexico  to  Argen- 
tina, engage  in  a  wide  range  of 
political  polling,  from  in-depth  in- 
quiries into  citizen  concerns  to  can- 
didate popularity  polls.  Some  are 
associated  with  well-known  compa- 
nies like  Gallup,  and  internationally 
accepted  survey  methods  are  the  rule. 

Individual  companies  have  dem- 
onstrated the  validity  and  usefulness 
of  polling  even  in  disturbed  areas.  In 
Central  America,  for  example,  poll- 
sters have  elicited  public  attitudes  on 
such  diverse  themes  as  regional  peace 
talks,  the  impact  of  U.S.  policies,  and 
the  effects  of  economic  adjustment. 


To  help  make  that  possible,  and  to 
support  democratic  processes 
throughout  the  hemisphere,  LT.S.  policy 
has  sought  to  provide  assistance  to  help 
governments  implement  adjustment 
measures  conducive  to  long-term 
political  and  economic  stability. 

•  The  United  States  has  made  un- 
precedented use  of  Commodity  Credit 
Corporation  guarantees  and  special 
Export-Import  Bank  guarantee  and  in- 
surance programs  as  specific  debt 
management  tools.  We  and  our  Paris 
Club  colleagues  have  been  flexible  in 
rescheduling  debt  on  a  case-by-case 
basis.  The  debts  of  more  countries  are 
being  rescheduled,  including  principal 
and  interest,  with  longer  repayment 
terms  and  grace  periods. 

•  Our  approach  inclu(^es  encourag- 
ing commercial  bankers  to  maintain  pru- 
dent involvement  in  lending  and  re- 
scheduling. Commercial  bank  reschedul- 
ing and  lending  terms  have  improved 
over  the  past  18  months  for  countries 
which  have  successful  adjustment  pro- 
grams—lower rescheduling  and  other 
fees,  a  drop  in  "spreads,"  lengthening 
repayment  periods,  and  the  rescheduling 
of  maturities  over  multiyear  periods. 


[ 


•  Adequate  funding  for  the  inter 
tional  financial  institutions  is  an  intej 
part  of  the  solution.  We  have  encour- 
aged the  evolution  of  the  role  of  the 
IMF  and  other  international  financia 
stitutions  over  the  past  18  months. 
Working  with  the  Congress  last  year 
we  secured  a  major  increase  in  IMF 
re.sources.  The  IMF  is  increasingly  s( 
sitive  to  political  and  social  strains  a< 
companying  painful  economic  adjust- 
ment programs.  The  Fund,  for  exam 
has  been  innovative  in  defining  the 
public  sector  deficit  targets  for  Peru 
Brazil  and  has  negotiated  more  liber 
targets  for  Mexico  and  Chile. 

•  We  have  worked  for  the  favor 
evolution  of  World  Bank  operations, 
couraging  such  innovations  as  struct 
adjustment  loans,  which  offer  financ 
support  over  the  medium  term  to  co 
tries  undertaking  economic  reforms. 
And  we  are  examining  development 
bottlenecks  resulting  from  inadequai 
counterpart  or  local  currency  funds 
under  World  Bank  lending. 

•  An  important  part  of  our  stra 
egy,  and  one  that  depends  heavily  o 
Congress  for  support,  is  to  prevent 
tectionist  measures  from  inhibiting  " 
American  access  to  the  U.S.  market 
The  hemisphere's  share  of  U.S.  imp' 
has  grown  from  13%  ($23  billion)  in 
1978  to  16%  in  1983  (.$41.7  billion)- 
withstanding  recessions,  debt  crises 
competition  from  other  regions.  Tht 
outlook  for  hemisphere  exports  to  t 
United  States  is  positive.  U.S.  impo 
from  Latin  America  and  the  Caribb 
in  1983  were  up  by  11%  over  1982. 
preliminary  data  for  1984— first  qu£ 
figures— show  an  increase  of  31%  o 
the  first  quarter  of  1983. 

•  The  Caribbean  Basin  Initiativ 
(CBI)  is  a  milestone.  The  CBI  open: 
new  opportunities  for  trade,  investi 
employment,  and  broad-based  grow 
the  reg^ion.  Its  12-year  life  represer 
long-term  LI.S.  political  commitmen 
with  incentives  beyond  its  immedia 
trade  objectives.  Countries  with  thf 
policy  framework  to  promote  invest 
and  innovation  will  best  be  able  to  : 
trade  opportunities,  increasing  verj 
significantly  the  payoff  for  appropr 
economic  policies. 

•  Another  significant  step  is  th 
trade  credit  guarantee  program  rec 
mended  for  Central  America  by  th( 
tional  Bipartisan  Commission  on  C( 
America,  included  in  the  foreign  ai( 
authorization  bill,  which  passed  the 
House  in  May. 


[, 


it 


FEATURE 


n  all  these  efforts,  we  are  keenly 
e  that  our  programs  and  policies, 
ver  supportive,  cannot  be  decisive. 
Tiain  responsibility  for  economic 
opment  lies  with  the  developing 
tries  themselves.  The  flow  of  new 
ng  from  the  industrialized  countries 
ely  to  remain  below  recent  levels 
n  e.xtended  period  of  time.  Yet 
oping  countries  continue  to  need 
capital  for  development  than  they 
enerate  internally, 
'oreign  direct  investment  is,  there- 
likely  to  grow  in  importance  as  an 
le  of  development  in  Latin  America, 
■t  investment,  particularly  new  equi- 
pital,  offers  the  recipient  country 
'  advantages  over  external  debt. 

Equity  investment  is  cheaper  to 
ce,  especially  in  hard  times.  Al- 
ih  interest  must  be  paid  regardless, 
ts  are  remitted  only  when  they  are 
^d. 

Equity  brings  with  it  technology, 
and  management  skills  that  are 
to  acquire  in  other  ways. 

Direct  investment  encourages 
ration  into  the  world  system, 
ring  a  more  open  trading  system 
e  protectionist  pressures  can  be 
ted  more  readily. 

'he  United  States  is  the  source  of 
y  60%  of  all  foreign  direct  invest- 
in  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
.  Investment  flows  respond  to 
)mic  conditions  and  to  fiscal,  trade, 
■xchange-rate  policies  in  the  recipi- 
ountries.  Nations  that  choose  to 
e  an  attractive  climate  for  foreign 
tors  can  expect  to  attract  an  in- 
;ed  portion  of  the  available  funds, 
will  thus  reduce  their  dependence 
;bt  for  growth.  We  encourage  this. 
!ut  we  recognize  that  the  debtor 
;ries  alone,  even  with  wise  policies, 
Dt  surmount  the  current  crisis.  Our 
;ance  is  necessary— and  we  will  con- 
to  provide  it.  The  cooperation  of 
'  lending  countries  is  vital— and  it 
'een  forthcoming.  The  international 
cial  institutions  have  an  essential 
;o  play— and  they  are  playing  it. 
this  support,  we  believe  the 
)nsible  and  democratic  governments 
e  hemisphere  can  meet  the 
imic  challenges  that  confront  them. 


Security 

The  export  of  violence  by  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua  with  Soviet  backing  is  the 
principal  external  security  threat  to 
democracy  in  the  hemisphere.  U.S. 
security  assistance  and  training  are 
essential  to  help  our  neighbors  defend 
themselves  against  this  threat.  As  a 
demonstration  of  our  resolve  and  to  im- 
prove the  capability  of  our  own  and 
regional  forces,  we  continue  to  conduct 
joint  exercises  and  maneuvers  in  the 
area. 

At  the  same  time,  our  diplomats  are 
working  actively  to  contain  the  threat 
posed  by  Nicaragua's  military  ties  to 
Cuba  and  the  Soviet  bloc,  its  subversive 
activities,  militarization,  and  internal 
repression.  We  believe  the  Contadora 
process  provides  the  means  to  negotiate 
a  comprehensive,  verifiable,  and  durable 
regional  solution. 

The  leaders  of  the  Caribbean  under- 
stand well  the  vital  importance  of  collec- 
tive effort.  Pioneers  of  economic  and 
political  cooperation  in  CARICOM,  they 
helped  inspire  the  Caribbean  Basin  Ini- 
tiative to  broaden  that  cooperation  to  in- 
clude both  Central  America  and  the  in- 
dustrialized world.  Similarly,  faced  with 
what  one  Caribbean  leader  called  "an 


Democracy  in 
the  Caribbean 


The  constitutions  of  the  English- 
speaking  nations  of  the  Caribbean 
build  on  the  British  or  "Westminster" 
model  which  has  been  followed  in  the 
region  for  over  300  years.  Generally 
speaking,  each  nation  elects  a  lower 
house  or  assembly  roughly  equivalent 
to  the  House  of  Commons,  based  on 
single  member  constituencies  for  a 
term  of  no  more  than  5  years.  The 
leader  of  the  majority  party  or  coali- 
tion becomes  Prime  Minister,  names 
a  cabinet,  and  is  responsible  for 
governing  during  the  term.  An  ap- 
pointed Senate  with  minority  repre- 
sentation sits  for  the  duration  of  the 
term  of  the  lower  house.  In  those 
states  whose  constitution  provides  for 
it,  a  Governor-General  represents  the 
Queen.  But  this  connection  is  only 
with  the  monarch,  not  at  all  with  the 
Government  or  Prime  Minister  of 
Great  Britain.  The  tradition  of 
career,  nonpartisan  public  service 
also  runs  deep  in  the  Caribbean. 


ideology  of  violence  whose  aim  is  to 
undo  democracy,"  the  democracies  of  the 
eastern  Caribbean,  in  particular,  and  the 
Caribbean  as  a  whole  did  not  vacillate  in 
cooperating  to  restore  order  in  Grenada 
in  1983. 

Defense  against  the  illicit  narcotics 
trade  entails  cooperation  of  a  similar 
kind  among  those  in  the  region  who 
recognize  the  threat  and  seek  our  active 
help— primarily  in  helping  to  fund  what 
is,  after  all,  a  war  against  a  well-armed 
and  ruthless  enemy. 


AN  END  TO  INDIFFERENCE? 

Although  its  mandate  was  confined  to 
Central  America,  the  National  Bipar- 
tisan Commission  on  Central  America 
could  not  avoid  a  broader  conclusion  in 
its  report  to  the  President: 

Powerful  forces  are  on  the  march  in  near- 
ly every  country  of  the  hemisphere,  testing 
how  nations  shall  be  organized  and  by  what 
process  authority  shall  be  established  and 
legitimized.  Who  shall  govern  and  under  what 
forms  are  the  central  issues  in  the  process  of 
change  now  under  way  in  country  after  coun- 
try throughout  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean. 

The  United  States  is  powerful 
enough  to  make  a  difference  in  favor  of 
democracy.  But  successive  LJ.S.  Admini- 
strations and  Congresses,  Republicans 
and  Democrats,  have  learned  that  our 
own  democratic  example  and  national 
power  are  not  enough  to  make  a  decisive 
difference  in  the  face  of  indifference 
abroad. 

The  important  thing— the  key  to 
understanding  how  the  United  States 
should  be  conducting  itself  in  this  hemi- 
sphere—is that  today  indifference 
toward  democracy  is  disappearing  in 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Re- 
cent experience  demonstrates  this 
remarkable  truth— in  Central  America, 
in  the  Andean  countries,  in  Brazil,  in  the 
Caribbean,  and  in  the  Southern  Cone. 
The  voting  statistics,  the  personal 
testimony  of  election  observers,  the 
palpable  solidarity  felt  by  anyone  who 
has  attended  a  Latin  or  Caribbean  in- 
auguration over  the  last  5  years— all 
evidence  the  growing  sense  of  participa- 
tion in  national  political  life. 

In  international  political  cooperation 
today,  the  Contadora  process  is  a  critical 
experiment.  It  says  a  great  deal  about 
the  invigorated  power  of  the  democratic 
idea  that  this  group  of  countries  has 
reached  the  "revolutionary"  conclusion 


FEATURE 


Contadora 

on  Democracy 

in  Central  America 


On  September  9,  1983,  all  nine  par- 
ticipants in  the  Contadora  peace  proc- 
ess* agreed  on  a  21-point  "Document 
of  Objectives" — a  framework  for  ad- 
dressing obstacles  to  peace  in  the 
region.  Two  of  those  objectives  dealt 
specifically  with  internal  democracy: 

To  adopt  measures  conducive  to  the 
establishment  and,  where  appropriate,  im- 
provement of  democratic,  representative 
and  pluralistic  systems  that  will  guarantee 
effective  popular  participation  in  the 
decision-making  process  and  ensure  that 
the  various  currents  of  opinion  have  free 
access  to  fair  and  regular  elections  based 
on  the  full  observance  of  citizens'  rights; 

To  promote  national  reconciliation  ef- 
forts wherever  deep  divisions  have  taken 
place  within  society,  with  a  view  to  foster- 
ing participation  in  democratic  processes 
in  accordance  with  the  law.  .  .  . 


*Costa  Rica,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala, 
Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Colombia,  Mexico, 
Panama,  and  Venezuela. 


that  democracy  is  absolutely  essential 
for  peace  and  development  in  Central 
America  (see  above). 

Are  these— and  the  more  specific 
benchmarks  elaborated  within  the  proc- 
ess since  then— not  standards  which  we 
can  all  support?  Don't  they  reveal  both 
an  understanding  of  democracy  and  a 
rejection  of  indifference? 

Can  there  be  any  question  of  the 
results  of  any  comparative  application  of 
these  same  benchmarks  to  the  two  Cen- 
tral American  countries  most  often  in 
the  news:  El  Salvador  and  Nicaragua? 
Whose  election  experience  or  plans  meet 
the  standard?  In  which  country  is  there 
"free  access"?  In  which  country  are 
there  "fair  and  regular  elections"?  Which 
country  is  promoting  "national  recon- 
ciliation efforts"  on  the  basis  of  "foster- 
ing participation  in  democratic  proc- 
esses"? The  answer  in  each  case  is  El 
Salvador. 

Those  inclined  to  answer  differently 
might  ponder  what  Peruvian  novelist 
Mario  Vargas  Llosa  wrote  in  1983: 


When  an  American  or  European  intellec- 
tual—or liberal  newspaper  or  institution— ad- 
vocates for  Latin  American  countries  political 
options  and  methods  he  would  never 
countenance  in  his  own  society,  he  is  betray- 
ing a  fundamental  doubt  about  the  capacity 
of  the  Latin  American  countries  to  achieve 
the  liberty  and  the  respect  for  the  rights  of 
others  that  prevail  in  the  Western  democ- 
racies. In  most  cases,  the  problem  is  an  un- 
conscious prejudice,  an  inchoate  sentiment,  a 
sort  of  visceral  racism,  which  these  per- 
sons—who generally  have  unimpeachable 
liberal  and  democratic  credentials— would 
sharply  disavow  if  they  were  suddenly  made 
aware  of  it. 

Vargas  Llosa  is  right.  Too  many  of 
us  have  not  looked  at  what  is  happening 
in  Latin  America  closely  enough  to  get 
beyond  the  stereotypes. 

It  is  time  to  bury  the  canard  that 
Latin  Americans  are  "incapable  of 


democracy."  The  United  States  cannc 
afford  ignorance,  indifference,  or  in- 
action. 

Our  policy  must  be  a  program  of 
understanding,  of  action,  and  of 
democractic  solidarity.  Recent  histor 
proclaims  the  strength  of  Latin 
America's  drive  for  democracy.  By  e 
couraging  it  and  supporting  it,  we  at 
not  "exporting"  our  own  ideology  or 
posing"  something  "made  only  in  US 
We  are  helping  our  neighbors  fulfill 
their  own  aspirations.  And  in  doing 
we  are  confirming  our  own  deepest ; 
most  hopeful  convictions. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  v 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  C 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


The  "Coordinadora"  Nine  Points 


Following,  in  translation,  is  a  sum- 
mary of  the  nine  points  first  made  in 
December  1983  by  the  opposition 
Nicaraguan  Democratic  Coordinating 
Board  (made  up  of  three  political 
parties,  two  labor  unions,  and  the 
umbrella  private  sector  organization) 
as  a  basis  for  free  elections  in 
Nicaragua. 

1.  Separation  of  State  and  Par- 
ty. The  army,  the  militia,  the  police, 
the  Sandinista  Television  Service,  and 
others  must  be  part  of  the  state  and 
not  of  the  FSLN  [Sandinista  National 
Liberation  Front]. 

2.  Repeal  of  Laws  That  Violate 
Human  Rights.  The  code  that 
restricts  freedom  of  expression  in  the 
press,  radio,  and  television  must  be 
abrogated.  The  laws  that  violate 
private  ownership  and  others  must  be 
abolished. 

3.  Suspension  of  the  State  of 
Emergency.  Suspension  of  the  state 
of  emergency  and  full  exercise  of 
freedom  of  expression  and  informa- 
tion. 

4.  Amnesty  Law.  A  general 
amnesty  law  that  will  permit  the  par- 


ticipation of  all  Nicaraguan  citizens 
the  electoral  process. 

5.  Respect  for  Freedom  of  Wo 
ship.  Freedom  for  priests,  pastors, 
and  the  faithful  to  perform  their 
religious  ceremonies. 

6.  Union  Freedom.  The  full  ex< 
cise  of  workers'  rights,  including  th 
right  to  strike,  to  organize,  and  to 
bargain  collectively. 

7.  Autonomy  of  the  Judicial 
Branch.  The  judicial  branch  to  hav' 
true  independence  from  the  govern 
ment  party  and  from  the  legislative 
and  executive  branches. 

8.  Protective  Law  With 
Recourse  to  Unconstitutionality. 
Recognition  of  the  Fundamental 
Statute  and  the  Statute  of  Rights  ; 
Guarantees  as  the  Supreme  Law  u 
a  new  constitution  is  enacted,  so  tl 
these  will  not  be  changed  at  the  w' 
of  the  government. 

9.  National  Dialogue  To  Hold 
Elections  in  the  Presence  of  the 
Contadora  Group  or  the  GAS.  Al 
political  parties  and  movements,  ir 
eluding  those  in  arms,  should 
negotiate  on  the  elections. 


'i 


tt 


-,t    ,^f    CtotQ     Ol 


FEATURE 


untry  Summaries 


]ua  and  Barbuda 


:  jua  and  Barbuda  gained  its  in- 
ndence  from  the  United  Kingdom  in 
?mber  1981.  Prime  Minister  Vere  C. 
Sr.,  leads  the  Antigua  Labour 
y  (ALP).  The  Progressive  Labour 
ment  (PLM)  is  the  major  opposition 
f  but  lost  its  representation  in 
ament  when  the  ALP  swept  open 
ions  in  1984.  A  third  party,  the 
gua  Caribbean  Liberation  Move- 
has  little  support. 


ntina 


igress 

Oct. 
1983 

196S 

isident 

Oct. 
1983 

1989 

)ctober  30,  1983,  Radical  Civic 
)n  Party  leader  Raul  Alfonsin  was 
ed  president  after  a  hotly  contested 
free  campaign  against  the  candidate 
le  Justicialist  (Peronist)  Party.  A 
rd-breaking  turnout  of  more  than  15 
on  gave  Alfonsin  an  absolute  majori- 
the  presidential  vote.  The  Radicals 
won  control  of  the  Chamber  of 
aties,  but  no  party  obtained  a  ma- 
y  in  the  Senate.  One-third  of  the 
ite  and  one-half  of  the  House  will  be 
wed  in  both  1985  and  1987. 
Argentina's  return  to  democracy 
r  almost  a  decade  of  internal  conflict 
military  rule  was  one  of  the  most 
ificant  political  events  in  1983.  The 
guration  of  President  Alfonsin  in 
ember  was  a  powerful  and  emotional 
bration.  Vice  President  Bush  headed 
U.S.  delegation.  Representatives  of 
itries  that  have  become  democratic 
le  past  decade — including  Spain, 
tugal,  Peru,  and  Ecuador — were 
Tiinent.  The  United  States  shares 
1  other  democracies  a  vocation  to 
nd  and  promote  the  democratic 


D 


The  Bahamas 


Type  of            I         I  Date  of  Most 
Election(s)       | |  Recent  Election(s) 


Bolivia 


Ds 


Date  of 
ext  Election(s) 


Parliament 

June 
1982 

By 
1987 

The  1982  elections  gave  Prime  Minister 
Lynden  0.  Pindling's  Progressive 
Liberal  Party  (PLP)  its  fifth  straight  vic- 
tory. Four  other  parties  contested  the 
elections,  but  only  the  Free  National 
Movement  received  sufficient  support  to 
be  represented  in  the  Parliament.  All 
parties  had  free  and  equal  access  to  the 
media. 


Barbados 


Parliament 

June 
1981 

By 
1986 

One  of  the  most  stable  and  prosperous 
countries  in  the  Caribbean,  Barbados  is 
an  open  parliamentary  democracy  in  the 
British  tradition.  J.M.G.  "Tom"  Adams, 
leader  of  the  Barbados  Labour  Party 
(BLP),  is  Prime  Minister.  The  main  op- 
position is  provided  by  the  Democratic 
Labour  Party  (DLP). 


Belize 


National  Assembly 

Nov. 
1979 

1985 

Belize,  which  achieved  independence  in 
1981  after  an  extended  period  of  inter- 
nal self-government,  has  a  democratic 
and  parliamentary  form  of  government. 
By  law,  general  elections  must  be  held 
by  February  1985.  In  the  1979  election, 
the  People's  United  Party,  led  by  George 
C.  Price,  won  .52%  of  the  vote  and  the 
United  Democratic  Party  47%.  The  up- 
coming election  also  will  be  contested  by 
the  Christian  Democratic  Party. 


Municipal 

1949 

Dec. 
1984 

President, 
Congress 

June 
1980 

1986 

After  18  years  of  military  rule,  Bolivian 
democracy  was  restored  on  October  10, 
1982,  when  former  President  Hernan 
Siles  Zuazo  was  elected  president  in  a 
second-round  vote  by  Congress  and  in- 
stalled as  constitutional  president.  Siles 
had  obtained  a  plurality  of  the  1.4 
million  votes  cast  in  June  1980  but  had 
been  prevented  from  assuming  office  by 
a  July  1980  coup  that  led  to  three 
military  regimes.  Congress  is  responsi- 
ble for  setting  election  dates  and  seems 
likely  to  return  to  the  traditional 
timetable  by  which  a  new  president 
would  be  inaugurated  on  August  6, 
1986. 

U.S.  support  for  the  constitutional 
order  has  been  a  significant  factor  in 
buttressing  Bolivian  democracy,  which 
faces  difficult  political,  narcotics,  and 
economic  problems.  President  Siles 
publicly  thanked  the  United  States  for 
its  role  in  helping  to  frustrate  the 
June  30,  1984,  coup  attempt  in  which  he 
was  kidnaped. 


Brazil 


President  (indirect) 

Oct. 
1978 

1985 

Congress,  State, 
Municipal 

Nov. 
1982 

1986 

Brazil  has  taken  significant  strides 
toward  a  fully  representative  govern- 
ment. Its  opening  to  democracy,  or  aher- 
fura,  was  amply  demonstrated  in  the 
November  1982  congressional,  state,  and 
municipal  elections  in  which  over  48 
million  voters  chose  some  40,000  of- 
ficials. The  opposition  parties  won  10  of 
the  22  contested  governships,  including 
all  but  one  of  the  important  industrial 
states  in  populous  southern  Brazil.  In 
the  69-member  Senate,  the  governing 
Democratic  Social  Party  (PDS)  won  15 
of  the  contested  seats  for  a  total  of  46, 


FEATURE 


or  a  two-thirds  majority.  The  major  op- 
position party,  the  Brazilian  Democratic 
Movement  (PMDB),  won  9  seats  for  a 
total  of  21.  Of  the  479  seats  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  all  of  which  were 
at  stake,  the  PDS  won  235  and  the 
PMDB  200,  so  that  neither  of  the  major 
parties  commands  a  majority. 

The  1982  elections  also  determined 
the  composition  of  the  electoral  college 
which  will  select  the  successor  to  Presi- 
dent Joao  Figueiredo  on  January  15, 
1985.  The  686-member  college  will 
consist  of  all  Federal  Senators  and 
Deputies  and  six  members  of  the  majori- 
ty party  of  each  state  legislative 
assembly.  Only  the  two  major  parties 
are  presenting  candidates.  The  PDS  has 
nominated  Sao  Paulo  Federal  Deputy 
Paulo  Maluf;  the  PMDB  has  chosen 
Minas  Gerais  Governor  Tancredo  Neves. 
The  election,  which  is  expected  to  be 
hotly  contested,  will  produce  Brazil's 
first  civilian  president  in  over  20  years. 
Both  candidates  are  campaigning  on 
platforms  calling  for  direct  presidential 
elections  in  1988.  As  elsewhere,  U.S. 
policy  is  wholeheartedly  in  support  of 
the  democratic  process,  but  neutral 
about  who  wins. 


Chile 


Plebiscite 

Sept. 

1980 

19B9 

Chile  came  under  military  rule  in 
September  1973.  A  constitution  ratified 
by  plebiscite  in  September  1980  took  ef- 
fect in  March  1981.  Though  its  provi- 
sions and  the  conditions  under  which  it 
was  ratified  were  criticized  by  opposition 
groups,  this  constitution  confirmed 
Augusto  Pinochet  as  president  until 
1989,  at  which  time  another  plebiscite  is 
scheduled  to  vote  on  the  junta's  nominee 
to  succeed  him.  If  the  nominee  wins,  he 
would  be  inaugurated  on  September  18, 
1989.  If  the  nominee  is  rejected  in  the 
vote,  Pinochet  would  remain  in  office, 
and  open  presidential  elections  would  be 
held  on  March  18,  1990,  concurrent  with 
elections  for  Congress.  Opposition 
groups  have  proposed  several  changes  to 
this  election  timetable  process. 

Some  political  liberalization  occurred 
during  1983.  The  government  is  now 
considering  a  law  which  would  legalize 


I       [Type  of 


Election(s) 


n 


some  political  parties.  There  is  no  formal 
dialogue  between  the  government  and 
and  the  opposition  but  informal  contacts 
have  taken  place.  The  U.S.  strongly  sup- 
ports the  return  to  elected,  democratic, 
civilian  government  in  Chile.  We  hope 
the  process  of  communication  between 
the  government  and  the  opposition  will 
produce  a  consensus  on  a  return  to 
democracy. 


Colombia 


Parliament, 
State,  Local 

Mar. 
1982 

Mar. 
1986 

President 

May 
1982 

May 
1986 

State,  Municipal, 
Territorial 

Mar. 
1984 

Mar. 
1988 

Colombia  has  been  an  active  democracy 
for  more  than  25  years.  Power  has  alter- 
nated between  the  Liberal  and  Conser- 
vative parties.  Belisario  Betancur  of  the 
Conservative  Party  was  elected  presi- 
dent in  May  1982,  winning  decisively 
over  Alfonso  Lopez  Michelsen,  a  former 
president  and  Liberal  Party  candidate. 
Colombian  democracy  confronts  a 
low-level  but  persistent  Cuban-backed 
insurgency,  as  well  as  the  narcotics 
scourge.  Colombia  has  begun  to  take  ex- 
traordinary steps  to  stamp  out  narcotics 
trafficking  and  President  Betancur  has 
negotiated  a  cease-fire  with  the  largest 
guerrilla  group,  offering  them  the  oppor- 
tunity to  lay  down  their  arms  and  join 
the  country's  free  political  life. 


Costa  Rica 


President, 
Legislative  Assembly 

Feb. 
1982 

Feb. 
1986 

The  elections  of  1899  began  a  trend  of 
free  and  honest  elections  that  have 
enabled  Costa  Rica  to  evolve  into  a 
democratic  republic  with  a  strong 
system  of  checks  and  balances. 

The  electoral  process  is  supervised 
by  the  powerful  Supreme  Electoral 
Tribunal,  selected  by  Costa  Rica's 


Date  of  Most 
Recent  Election(s) 


n 


Date  of 
Next  Electic 


Supreme  Court  of  Justice.  The  purpos 
of  this  unique  fourth  branch  of  goverr 
ment  is  to  guarantee  free  and  fair  ele( 
tions. 

President  Luis  Alberto  Monge  is  ;: 
member  of  the  leading  political  party, 
the  National  Liberation  Party  (PLN). 
The  PLN  is  social-democratic  in 
philosophy.  With  but  one  exception,  tl 
PLN  and  various  non-PLN  coalitions 
have  alternated  in  the  presidency  in 
every  election  since  1953. 


Cuba 

Cuba  is  a  communist  one-party  state, 
and  the  key  exception  to  the  prevailin 
democratic  environment  in  the  Carib- 
bean. Although  a  self-professed  cham 
pion  of  "national  liberation"  where  otl 
countries  are  concerned,  Cuba  itself  is 
one  of  the  least  democratic,  least  in- 
dependent countries  in  the  world. 

Candidates  for  "election"  are  dete 
mined  by  the  Communist  Party.  Ther 
no  concept  of  legal  organized  oppositi 
Suffrage,  limited  to  voting  for  local 
assemblies,  is  universal  for  citizens  a^ 
16  and  over  except  for  those  who  hav 
applied  for  permanent  emigration.  Oi 
sitting  members  of  the  local  assembli< 
may  vote  to  choose  members  of  regio 
assemblies  and  of  the  National  Peopk 
Assembly.  Membership  in  a  local 
assembly  is  not,  however,  a  requirem 
for  candidacy  to  the  National  Assemt 
This  assures  seats  to  all  Politburo 
members  and  other  high-ranking  govi 
ment  and  party  officials.  The  Nations 
People's  Assembly  selects  a  council  o; 
ministers,  again  under  the  direction  t 
the  Com.munist  Party. 

Twenty-five  years  after  coming  t( 
power,  Fidel  Castro  rules  through 
classic  Marxist-Leninist  methods,  in- 
cluding direct  repression.  Behind  the 
ideological  smokescreen  he  has  estab- 
lished, Castro's  government  is  the 
despotism  of  the  traditional  caudillo  ; 
gravated  by  unprecedented  subservie 
to  foreign  interests.  Cuba  adheres  clc 
ly  to  Soviet  political  and  military 
guidance.  Only  a  massive  Soviet  subs 
of  $12-$13  million  per  day  keeps  the 
Cuban  people  from  even  greater  priv; 
tion. 


FEATURE 


D 


Type  of 
Election(s) 


D 


Date  of  Most 
Recent  Election(s) 


n 


Date  of 

Next  Election(s) 


iinica 


jse  of  Assembly 

July 
1980 

June 
1985 

le  Minister  Mary  Eugenia  Charles 
the  Dominica  Freedom  Party  (DFP) 
ed  control  of  the  House  of  Assembly 
fair  and  open  election.  The  DFP 
?ntly  holds  17  of  21  seats.  Opposing 
es  are  the  Dominica  Labour  Party, 
Democratic  Labour  Party  of 
inica,  and  a  leftist  grouping  called 
inica  Liberation  Movement  Alliance. 


inican  Republic 


sident, 
igress 

May 
1932 

May 
1986 

Dominican  Republic  turned  to 
Dcratic  institutions  after  a  long 
)d  of  dictatorship  and  social  and 
ical  upheaval.  In  spite  of  destabil- 
:  economic  problems,  democracy  con- 
s  to  gain  strength  there,  as 
snced  by  strongly  contested  elec- 
;  in  1978  and  1982.  Suffrage  is 
ersal  and  compulsory  for  those  over 

married. 
Three  major  parties  contested  the 

presidential  elections  in  which  1.7 
DH  citizens  elected  Salvador  Jorge 
CO  of  the  Dominican  Revolutionary 
y  as  president.  The  opposition  par- 
the  Reformist  Party  and  the 
inican  Liberation  Party,  have 
esentation  at  all  levels  of  the 
rnment — federal,  state,  and  local. 


idor 


islative, 
licipal 

Jan. 
1984 

July 
1986 

sident 

May 

1984 

{2d 

round) 

Jan. 
1989 

'.ident  Leon  Febres-Cordero  was  in- 
irated  on  August  10,  1984,  marking 
first  transition  in  24  years  from  one 
;ed  democratic  government  to 
her.  President  Febres-Cordero,  a 
nessman,  is  a  member  of  the  Social 


Christian  Party  (PSC),  which  allied  itself 
with  several  other  parties  in  a  coalition 
called  the  National  Reconstruction  Front 
to  oppose  Rodrigo  Borja  Cevallos,  the 
candidate  of  the  Democratic  Left  (ID), 
also  supported  by  a  coalition  of  political 
parties,  some  of  which  supported  the 
outgoing  government  of  President 
Osvaldo  Hurtado. 


El  Salvador 


Legislative  Assembly, 
Municipal 

Mar. 
1982 

1985 

President 

May 

1984 

(2d 

round) 

1989 

El  Salvador's  political  structure  is 
established  by  a  constitution  that 
entered  into  force  in  December  1983. 
The  Constitution  was  written  by  a  con- 
stituent assembly  elected  in  a  direct 
popular  vote  in  1982.  The  1982  elections 
for  the  assembly  were  part  of  a  program 
of  democratization  agreed  to  among  the 
military  officers  responsible  for  the  coup 
in  1979  and  the  Christian  Democratic 
Party.  Automatic  registration  for  the 
elections  was  offered  to  the  political  par- 
ties allied  with  the  guerrilla  umbrella 
organization,  the  Farabundo  Marti  Na- 
tional Liberation  Front  (FMLN),  but  re- 
jected by  them. 

Jose  Napoleon  Duarte  was  elected 
president  on  May  6,  1984.  International 
observers  attested  to  the  fairness  of  the 
1984  presidential  elections.  Eight  can- 
didates representing  a  broad  political 
spectrum  competed  in  the  first  round. 
Jose  Napoleon  Duarte,  a  founder  of  the 
Christian  Democratic  Party,  won  54%  of 
the  votes  in  a  run-off  against  ARENA 
[National  Republican  Alliance]  candidate 
Roberto  D'Aubuisson.  Over  80%  of  the 
electorate  went  to  the  polls. 

Despite  communist  subversion, 
rightwing  terrorism,  crushing  economic 
difficulties,  and  a  history  of  repression, 
the  people  of  El  Salvador  have 
persevered  in  constructing  democratic 
institutions.  The  legislative  and 
municipal  elections  to  be  held  in  the 
spring  of  1985  will  provide  a  further  op- 


portunity for  political  parties  associated 
with  the  guerrillas  to  compete  demo- 
cratically for  power.  The  United  States 
strongly  supports  President  Duarte's  ef- 
forts to  bring  about  such  a  national 
reconciliation  through  democratic  pro- 
cedures. 


Grenada 


Parliament 

Dec. 
1976 

By  the 

end  of 

1984 

The  erratic  rule  of  Sir  Eric  Gairy  was 
forcibly  ended  on  March  13,  1979,  by 
Maurice  Bishop  and  the  New  JEWEL 
[Joint  Endeavor  for  Welfare,  Education, 
and  Liberation]  Movement.  The  Con- 
stitution was  suspended,  elections 
postponed  indefinitely,  and  an  extraor- 
dinary military  buildup  begun  under 
Cuban  and  Soviet  advisers. 

In  October  1983,  Grenada's  eastern 
Caribbean  neighbors  proved  their 
democratic  mettle  when  they  acted — 
without  hesitation  and  with  the  support 
of  other  democratic  nations,  including 
the  United  States — to  restore  order  in 
Grenada  after  the  country  had  fallen 
prey  to  a  bloody  power  struggle  among 
its  Marxist-Leninist  leaders.  Their  collec- 
tive action  made  it  possible  for  Grena- 
dians  to  resume  their  democratic 
heritage.  An  interim  government  was 
appointed  by  Governor-General  Paul 
Scoon  in  November  1983.  Parliamentary 
elections  are  expected  to  take  place 
before  the  end  of  1984. 


Guatemala 


President 

Mar. 
1982 

1985 

Constituent  Assembly 

July 
1984 

Not 
appli- 
cable 

On  March  23,  1982,  Efrain  Rios  Montt 
was  named  president  after  Gen.  Lucas 
Garcia  was  ousted  in  a  bloodless  coup. 
On  August  8,  1983,  Gen.  Oscar 
Humberto  Mejia  Victores  seized  power 
from  Rios  Montt  and  pledged  a  prompt 
return  to  democracy.  International 
observers  invited  to  witness  the  Con- 
stitutent  Assembly  elections,  held  July  1, 
1984,  were  favorably  impressed  by  their 


1i 


FEATURE 


fairness;  73%  of  registered  voters  par- 
ticipated. The  assembly,  inaugurated  on 
August  1,  1984,  will  write  a  new  con- 
stitution and  electoral  law.  The  expecta- 
tion is  widespread  that  presidential  elec- 
tions will  facilitate  a  return  to  civilian 
control  in  1985. 

Guatemala  faces  formidable  social, 
cultural,  human  rights,  and  economic 
problems,  but  the  1984  election,  which 
was  conducted  openly  and  fairly,  has  en- 
couraged democrats  everywhere.  We 
support  continued  progress  toward 
democratization. 


Guyana 


National  Assembly 

Dec. 
1980 

None 
sched- 
uled 

While  Guyana  maintains  the  structure  of 
a  multiparty  parliamentary  republic 
within  the  Commonwealth,  its  1980 
Constitution  defines  the  country  as  a 
"democratic  sovereign  state  in  the 
course  of  transition  from  capitalism  to 
socialism."  The  ruling  party  and  its 
leader,  Forbes  Burnham,  have  imposed 
a  minority  government  on  the  nation, 
resulting  in  an  erosion  of  democratic 
practices. 


Haiti 


National  Assembly 

Feb. 
1984 

1990 

Municipal 

Apr. 

1983 

1 

None 
sched- 
uled 

Impoverished  and  lacking  democratic 
traditions,  Haiti  follows  a  constitution 
which,  as  amended  in  1983,  provides  for 
lifetime  President  Jean-Claude  Duvalier 
to  designate  his  successor  and  legislative 
elections  to  be  held  every  6  years. 

Although  violence  has  been  reduced, 
major  human  rights  problems  exist,  in- 
cluding abuse  of  due  process  and  a  lack 
of  freedom  of  speech,  press,  and  associa- 
tion. For  the  first  time,  however,  the 
government  has  announced  plans  for 


D 


Type  of 
Election(s) 


D 


legislation  governing  political  party  ac- 
tivities; recognized  a  labor  federation; 
and  called  for  judicial  reform,  strict 
observance  of  legality,  and  an  end  to  in- 
terference in  the  judicial  process.  Press 
controls  have  been  theoretically  relaxed, 
but  the  recent  temporary  detention  of 
several  journalists  raises  serious  ques- 
tions about  this  process. 


Honduras 


President, 
Congress 

Nov. 
1981 

Nov. 
1985 

The  April  1980  Constituent  Assembly 
elections  began  a  process  that  ended 
nearly  18  years  of  military  rule.  In 
January  1982  full  democratic  civilian 
government  was  restored  to  Honduras. 

Roberto  Suazo  Cordova,  of  the 
Liberal  Party,  was  elected  president 
with  about  54%  of  the  votes.  The 
Liberal  Party  won  44  of  82  congres- 
sional seats.  The  major  opposition  party, 
the  National  Party,  won  34  seats. 

Despite  severe  economic  problems, 
the  upheavals  of  the  region,  and  the 
need  to  safeguard  itself  against 
Nicaragua,  Honduras  continues  along 
the  democratic  path  under  able  civilian 
leadership. 


Jamaica 


Parliament 

Dec. 
1983 

By 
1988 

Jamaica  has  been  a  stable  functioning 
democracy  since  obtaining  independence 
in  1962.  Elections  are  held  at  the  discre- 
tion of  the  Governor-General  upon  ad- 
vice of  the  Prime  Minister,  but  not  less 
than  every  5  years. 

Prime  Minister  Edward  Seaga's 
Labour  Party  (JPL)  won  the  December 
1983  elections.  The  chief  opposition 
party,  the  People's  Niitional  Party  (PNP) 
led  by  Michael  Manley,  boycotted  the 
elections  and  did  not  post  any  can- 
didates. JPL  candidates  won  all  but  6 
(contested  by  small  minority  parties)  of 
60  Parliament  seats.  Thus,  although  the 
JPL  and  the  PNP  have  regularly  alter- 
nated in  power,  the  JPL  now  heads  a 
single-party  government.  Many 


Date  of  Most 
Recent  Election(s) 


' '    N 


Date  of 
ext  Electic 


observers  anticipate  that  with  the 
clarification  of  the  voter  registration 
issue  that  resulted  in  the  PNP  boycot 
PNP  participation  in  the  electoral  pre 
ess  will  resume. 


IVIexico 


Deputies,  Certain 
State  Governors, 
Municipal 

1984 

19M 

President,  Senators, 
Deputies 

July 
1982 

Ju 

19< 

Miguel  de  la  Madrid  Hurtado  was 
elected  president  on  July  4,  1982.  Pn 
dent  and  senators  are  elected  for  coii 
ciding  6-year  terms;  governors  at  sta 
gered  intervals  for  6-year  terms; 
deputies  and  municipal  officials  for 
3-year  terms. 

Mexico  has  had  an  evolving  demc 
cratic  system  for  more  than  50  years 
Recent  constitutional  amendments  le 
expanded  representation  of  oppositio 
parties,  including  the  National  Actioi 
Party  (PAN)  and  the  Mexican  Unifie 
Socialist  Party  (PSUM),  which  in 
1982-83  carried  some  important 
municipal  elections  traditionally  won 
the  ruling  Institutional  Revolutionar; 
Party  (PRI).  President  de  la  Madrid 
key  advisers  are  deeply  engaged  in  e 
forts  to  resolve  Mexico's  most  seriou 
economic  and  financial  problems  sine 
the  Great  Depression;  his 
administration's  programs  include 
broadening  popular  participation  in 
government. 


Nicaragua 


President, 
Council  of  State 


Sept. 

1974 


Ni. 


Sandinista  Nicaragua  contrasts  shar 
with  progress  toward  more  open  an( 
tolerant  societies  elsewhere  in  Centr 
America.  Despite  promises  of  free  el 
tions  and  nonalignment,  the  Sandinii 
in  the  5  years  since  taking  power  in 


12 


Denartmfint  of  Statft  Bu 


FEATURE 


□Type  of             I         I 
Election(s)        I 1 


Date  of  [VIost 
Recent  Election(s) 


n 


Date  of 

Next  Election(s) 


developed  a  militarized  Marxist- 
nist  state  with  close  ties  to  Cuba 
the  Soviet  Union. 
Videspread  internal  pressures  and 
usionment  abroad  led  the  San- 
tas to  announce  elections  for 
'mber  4,  1984.  A  genuine  political 
ing  in  Nicaragua  would  be  wel- 
d  by  the  Ihiited  States  and  others 
itin  America  and  Western  Europe, 
'ervasive  FSLN  [Sandinista  Na- 
Liberation  Front]  presence  and 
•ol  throughout  Nicaragnan  society 
ts  close  identification  with  the 
rnment  and  armed  forces  provide  it 
enormous  leverage  in  an  electoral 
tion.  The  coordinating  body  of  the 
)cratic  opposition  has  called  on  the 
rnment  of  Nicaragua  several  times, 
ining  in  December  1983,  to  take 
fie  steps  to  create  an  environment 
ucive  to  genuine  electoral  competi- 
;see  p.  9).  To  date,  the  government 
efused  to  significantly  alter  the 
of  the  game  which  greatly  favor 
:overning  FSLN  party.  Thus  the 
r  opposition  parties  have  declined 
gister  for  the  elections  in  November, 
^s  of  August  1984,  it  appeared  that 
984  Nicaraguan  elections  could 
nble  the  1974  Nicaraguan  elections, 
lich  the  government  candidate  ob- 
d  an  overwhelming  percentage  of 
ote  after  ensuring  the  disqualifica- 
Df  all  potentially  serious  opposition. 


ima 


Paraguay 


las  Ardito  Barletta  was  elected 
dent  in  May  1984  in  Panama's  first 
■t  presidential  election  in  16  years. 
;  than  three-quarters  of  Panama's 
;s,  717,000  voters,  participated  in 
|,  proved  a  very  tight  race.  The  op- 
ion  Democratic  Opposition  Alliance 
3),  its  candidate  Arnulfo  Arias,  and 
government  party  challenged  votes 
any  districts. 


i  President, 
Congress 

Feb. 
1983 

Feb. 
1988 

President  and  Congress  serve  concur- 
rent 5-year  terms.  President  Alfredo 
Stroessner  was  reelected  in  1983  to  a 
seventh  term  that  ends  in  February 
1988.  The  elections  resulted  in  his 
Colorado  Party  receiving  over  90%  of 
the  votes  cast  in  a  process  flawed  by 
campaign  and  media  restrictions.  Only 
two  of  the  legally  recognized  opposition 
parties  participated,  the  Liberal  and  the 
Radical  Liberal  parties. 

There  has  been  little  change  in 
Paraguay's  political  system  in  recent 
years.  A  state  of  siege  is  continuously 
renewed,  and  human  rights  problems 
persist.  At  the  same  time,  the  govern- 
ment has  taken  some  positive  steps, 
such  as  releasing  almost  all  political 
prisoners,  allowing  some  political  ac- 
tivitists  to  return  to  Paraguay  after 
many  years  of  exile,  and  arresting  some 
police  officials  for  abuse  of  authority. 


Peru 


sident, 

ional  Assembly 

May 
1984 

May 
1989 

nicipal 

June 
1984 

June 
1989 

President, 
Congress 

May 
1980 

1985 

Municipal 

Nov. 
1983 

1986 

Fernando  Belaunde  Terry,  founder  of 
the  Popular  Action  (AP)  party,  was 
elected  president  for  the  second  time  in 
1980.  Reelected  12  years  after  he  was 
deposed  by  a  military  coup,  President 
Belaunde  heads  a  democratic  govern- 
ment that  faces  severe  economic  strains 
and  terrorism  from  the  indigenous 
Maoist  guerrilla  group,  Sendero 
Luminoso.  Nevertheless,  Peru  remains 
firmly  on  its  democratic  course.  National 
elections  planned  for  April  1985  will 
pave  the  way  for  the  first  constitutional 
turnover  of  power  in  40  years. 

Belaunde's  coalition  partner,  the 
Popular  Christian  Party  (PPC), 
withdrew  from  the  government  in  May 
1984  in  anticipation  of  the  1985  elec- 


tions. Candidates  from  the  American 
Popular  Revolutionary  Alliance  (APRA) 
and  from  the  United  Left  (lU)  did  well 
in  the  1983  municipal  elections. 


St.  Christopher-Nevis 


House  of  Assembly 

June 
1984 

By 
June 

1989 

St.  Christopher-Nevis,  which  achieved 
independence  from  the  United  Kingdom 
on  September  19,  1983,  is  a  parliamen- 
tary democracy  with  a  strong  tradition 
of  peaceful  electoral  change  of 
government. 

Prime  Minister  Kennedy  A.  Sim- 
monds,  leader  of  the  People's  Action 
Movement  rules  in  coalition  with  the 
Nevis  Reformation  Party  led  by  Simeon 
Daniel.  This  coalition  government  was 
recently  returned  to  power  in  peaceful 
democratic  elections.  The  leader  of  the 
opposing  St.  Christopher-Nevis  Labour 
Party,  Lee  Moore,  lost  his  seat,  thus 
limiting  his  ability  to  challenge  the  pres- 
ent government. 


St.  Lucia 


Parliment 

May 
1982 

By 
Aug. 
1987 

The  St.  Lucia  Labour  Party  (SLP)  won 
the  first  postindependence  elections  in 
1979,  winning  12  of  the  17  House  of 
Assembly  seats.  By  1982  the  political 
tide  had  turned,  and  Prime  Minister 
John  Compton's  United  Worker's  Party 
defeated  both  the  SLP  and  the  Pro- 
gressive Labour  Party  (PLP),  winning 
14  of  the  17  seats.  The  PLP  has  been 
largely  discredited  since  trying  to  send 
14  students  to  Libya  for  military 
training. 


19 


FEATURE 


St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines 


Milton  Cato's  St.  Vincetit  and  the 
Grenadines  Labour  Party  won  the  elec- 
tions held  in  1979  and  until  1984  held  12 
of  13  seats  in  the  House  of  Assembly. 
The  1984  elections  produced  a  peaceful 
upset,  as  James  "Son"  Mitchell  and  his 
New  Democratic  Party  won  9  of  the  13 
seats  and  took  control  of  Parliament. 


Suriname 

Until  a  violent  military  coup  in  February 
1980,  Suriname  was  a  functioning 
democracy  with  a  history  largely  free  of 
violence.  The  military  government 
headed  by  Lt.  Col.  Desire  Bouterse  has 
suspended  the  constitution  and  has  not 
announced  any  plans  for  elections.  In 
December  1982,  15  national  leaders 
were  killed  while  in  government  custody. 
There  has  been  some  dialogue  among 
various  political  and  social  groups,  but 
power  remains  in  the  hands  of  the  army. 


Trinidad  and  Tobago 


Parliament 

Nov 
1981 

By 
Mar. 
1987 

Trinidad  and  Tobago  has  been  a  func- 
tioning and  stable  democracy  since  it 
achieved  independence  in  1962. 

Prime  Minister  George  Chamber's 
People's  National  Movement  (PNM)  won 
the  1981  elections.  Of  the  eight  political 


□    Type  of            I        I 
Election(s)      1 I 


parties  contesting  the  elections,  the 
PNM,  the  United  Labour  Front  (ULF), 
the  Democratic  Action  Congress  (DAC), 
and  the  Tapia  House  Movement  (THM) 
won  seats  in  the  assembly.  The  elections 
were  hotly  contested  with  all  parties  ac- 
tively campaigning  for  popular  support. 


Uruguay 


President, 
Congress 


Plebiscite 


1971 


1980 


Nov. 
1984 


Not 
applj. 
cable 


Uruguay  has  been  under  military  rule 
since  1973.  In  1980  a  constitution 
drafted  by  the  military  and  widely 
criticized  as  undemocratic  was  rejected 
in  a  plebiscite.  In  September  1981,  the 
military  selected  a  retired  general, 
Gregorio  Alvarez,  as  president. 

Since  1981,  Uruguay  has  pr-oceeded 
on  an  accelerated  course  toward  a 
democratic  transition.  The  military 
recently  deproscribed  the  Blanco  and 
Colorado  parties  and  most  of  the  consti- 
tuent member  parties  of  the  Broad 
Front.  An  agreement  has  been  con- 
cluded between  the  Colorados,  the 
Broad  Front,  and  the  military  governing 
the  modalities  of  the  transition  to 
civilian  rule.  Elections  are  scheduled  for 
November  1984.  Although  the  Blanco 
Party  did  not  participate  in  the  agree- 
ment because  of  the  detention  of  its 
leader,  Wilson  Ferreira,  it  does  plan  to 
take  part  in  the  election.  The  United 
States  firmly  supports  the  return  of 
democracy  to  Uruguay. 


Date  of  Most 
Recent  Election(s) 


Venezuela 


D 


Date  of 
Next  Elect 


len 


President, 
Congress 


Municipal 


Dec. 
1983 


D« 
19 


May 
1984 


IS 


Venezuela  has  had  a  democratic  gov 
ment  for  over  25  years.  Although 
smaller  parties  represent  a  full  spec' 
of  political  tendencies,  Venezuelan 
politics  have  evolved  into  a  two-part 
system  made  up  of  COPE  I  and 
Democratic  Action  (AD),  typifying 
respectively  the  classic  international 
competition  between  Christian 
Democratic  and  Social  Democratic  c 
rents.  Continuing  a  tradition  of  altei 
tion  of  power  with  COPEI,  the  AD's 
Jaime  Lusinchi  was  elected  presider 
December  1983— the  first  president 
be  elected  by  an  absolute  majority  s 
the  restoration  of  democracy  in  195! 
After  the  ouster  of  dictator  Mar 
Perez  Jimenez  in  1958,  the  country 
cessfully  fought  both  Cuban-backed 
surgents  and  rightwing  extremists  i 
early  1960s— but  without  sacrificing 
respect  for  human  rights  and  the  ru 
law.  Few  Venezuelans  have  forgott( 
how  close  their  country  came  to  losi 
its  liberty,  and  90%  of  Venezuela's  i 
population  typically  turns  out  for 
presidential  elections. 


rati 


sh 


leii 


ids 


14 


Department  of  State  Bl 


lendent  Territories 


lilla 


rated  from  St,  Christt)pher-Nevis 
'Cember  1980,  Anguilla  remains 
tish  ciependent  territory. 


>h  Virgin  Islands 


FEATURE 


slative  Assembly 


British  Virgin  Islands  is  a  British 
■n  Colony  with  a  parliamentary 
m  of  government.  The  most  re- 
elections  brought  the  United 
/,  under  the  leadership  of  Cyril 
3niney,  to  power.  The  Virgin 
ds  Party  forms  the  opposition. 


nan  Islands 


islative  Assembly 


layman  Islands  is  a  British 
ndency  with  a  parliamentary 

of  government.  The  legislature 
nprised  of  12  elected  members 
i  members  appointed  by  the 


□  Type  of 
Election(s) 


D 


Governor.  Although  there  are  no 
highly  structured  political  parties, 
there  are  loosely  structured  political 
organizations  or  "teams."  The  Unity 
Team  and  the  Progress  with  Dignity 
Team  are  represented  in  the 
Legislative  Assembly. 


Montserrat 


National  Parliament, 
Chief  Minister 

Mar, 
1983 

Mar. 
1988 

Montserrat  is  a  British  Crown  Col- 
ony. Elections  are  held  every  5  years. 
InMarch  1983,  Chief  Minister  John 
Osborne  was  reelected,  but  his  Peo- 
ple's Liberation  Movement  lost  two  of 
its  seven  seats  in  Parliament  to  the 
opposition  People's  Democratic  Party. 

Netherlands  Antilles 


The  Netherlands  Antilles  has  been  a 
stable  parliamentary  democracy  since 
the  beginning  of  autonomy  in  1954  as 
a  part  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Nether- 
lands. Federal  Parliamentary  elec- 


nch  Overseas  Departments 


Date  of  Most 
Recent  Election(s) 


n 


Date  of 

Next  Election(s) 


tions  are  mandatorily  held  every  4 
years  but  may  be  called  sooner  should 
the  party  or  coalition  in  power  lose 
its  majority.  None  of  the  12  parties 
participating  in  the  Federal  Parlia- 
ment election  in  1982  received  a  ma- 
jority of  the  vote,  and  a  coalition 
government  was  formed. 

Each  of  the  islands  has  its  own 
representative  body,  the  Island  Coun- 
cil, which  enacts  laws  regarding  local 
island  affairs. 


Turks  and  Caicos  Islands 


Legislative  Council 

May 
1984 

1990 

Federal  Parliament 

June 
1982 

1986 

The  Turks  and  Caicos  Islands  is  a 
British  Crown  colony.  The  most  re- 
cent Legislative  Council  elections 
returned  the  People's  National  Party 
(PNP),  headed  by  Norman  Saunders, 
to  power.  The  PNP  won  8  of  the  11 
Legislative  Council  seats  with  the  op- 
position People's  Democratic  Move- 
ment winning  three. 


ch  Guiana 


Guadeloupe 


Martinique 


General  Council, 
Municipal 

Mar, 
1983 

Mar. 
1988 

General  Council 

Mar. 
1983 

Mar. 
1988 

ich  Guiana  normally  holds  elec- 
5  every  5  years.  It  elects  one 
itor  and  one  Deputy  to  the 
ich  Senate  and  National 
?mbly. 


General  Council  elections  normally 
are  held  every  .5  years.  Guadeloupe 
elects  two  Senators  and  three 
Deputies  to  the  French  Senate  and 
National  Assembly. 


General  Council  elections  are  usually 
held  every  5  years.  Martinique  elects 
two  Senators  to  the  French  Senate 
and  three  Deputies  to  the  National 
Assembly. 


THE  PRESIDENT 


40th  Anniversary  of 
the  Warsaw  Uprising 


President  Reagan's  remarks  to  guests 
at  a  White  House  luncheon  marking  the 
anniversary  on  August  17.  1984  J 

It's  always  an  honor  for  me  to  be  with 
individuals  like  yourselves  who  under- 
stand the  value  of  freedom.  I'm  remind- 
ed of  a  story  about  a  conversation  be- 
tween one  of  our  citizens  and  a  Soviet 
citizen.  The  American  described  the 
freedom  of  speech  that  we  have  here  in 
the  United  States,  and  the  citizen  of  the 
Soviet  Union  said,  "Well,  we're  free  to 
speak  in  the  Soviet  Union  just  like  you 
are  in  the  United  States."  He  said,  "The 
only  difference  is  you're  free  after  you 
speak."  [Laughter] 

But  today  we  pay  tribute  to  a  nation 
which  for  two  centuries  has  struggled 
for  freedom  and  independence.  From 
the  uprisings  in  1794,  the  November 
uprising  in  1830,  and  then  again  in  1863, 
the  people  of  Poland  demonstrated 
courage  and  a  commitment  to  human 
liberty  that  inspired  free  men  and 
women  everywhere. 

And  this  200-year  record  of 
perseverance  and  bravery  coincided  with 
the  development  of  our  own  precious 
liberty  here  in  the  United  States,  and 
that  is  no  mere  coincidence.  Our  two 
peoples  drank  from  the  same  well  of 
freedom,  held  dear  the  same  Judeo- 
Christian  values,  respected  the  simple 
virtues  of  honesty  and  hard  work.  And 
even  today,  it's  often  noted  that  unlike 
many  others,  our  two  peoples  take  their 
religious  convictions  seriously.  These 
heartfelt  convictions  have  kept  the  spirit 
of  freedom  burning  in  our  hearts, 
especially  during  times  of  great  adversi- 
ty. 

Pope  John  Paul  II  has  said, 
"Freedom  is  given  to  man  by  God  as  a 
measure  of  his  dignity.  ..."  And  "as 
children  of  God,"  he  said,  "we  cannot  be 
slaves."  I  know  that  you  feel  as  I  do, 
we're  truly  blessed  in  this  time  of  great 
need  to  have  a  spiritual  leader  like  Pope 
John  Paul  II. 

The  continuing  suppression  of  the 
Polish  national  identity  brought  wave 
after  wave  of  Polish  immigrants  to  the 
United  States.  And  for  that,  we  can  be 
grateful.  We  all  know  the  list  of  con- 
tributions and  the  names  of  those  who 
rose  to  great  prominence.  But  just  as 


important  are  the  millions  who  came 
here  and,  with  their  hard  work  and  with 
their  moral  strength,  helped  shape  the 
American  character. 

During  this  century,  Americans  and 
Poles  have  stood  side  by  side  in  those 
two  conflagrations  that  swept  the  world. 
The  First  World  War,  unfortunately,  did 
not  end  all  wars,  but  it  did  result  in  the 
reestablishment  of  the  Polish  state. 

This  month,  we  commemorate  a 
desperate  battle  of  the  Second  World 
War,  an  heroic  attempt  by  free  Poles  to 
liberate  their  country  from  the  heel  of 
Nazi  occupation  and  to  protect  it  from 
postwar,  foreign  domination.  For  years, 
they  covertly  resisted  the  occupation 
forces.  And  then  in  1944,  for  63  brutal 
and  agonizing  days,  ill-equipped  and 
overwhelmingly  outnumbered  they — and 
I  could  say,  many  of  you— held  off  the 
Nazi  war  machine.  And  it's  fitting  that 
we  and  all  free  people  take  special  care 
to  remember  this  occasion. 

Of  those  who  fought  for  freedom, 
and  those  who  put  their  lives  on  the  line 
for  human  liberty,  I  can  think  of  none 
who  should  be  prouder  than  those  who 
can  say,  "I  fought  in  the  Polish  Home 
Army." 

And  today,  we  honor  three  in- 
dividuals, heroes  of  the  Polish  Home 
Army,  never  given  their  due  after  the 
Allied  victory.  And  it's  my  great  honor 
to  now  present  the  Legion  of  Merit  to 
the  families  or  representatives  of  these 
men. 

Let  us  salute  Stefan  Rowecki,  who 
led  the  Resistance  until  he  was  captured 
and  executed  by  the  Gestapo. 

[The  President  presented  the  award  to 
Jan  Morelewski,  president  of  the  Polish 
Home  Army  Veterans  Association.] 

Next,  his  son  will  arise,  the  son  of 
Bor-Komorowski,  leader  of  the  Warsaw 
uprising,  who  later  died  in  near  poverty 
in  exile  in  London. 

[The  President  presented  the  award  to 
Adam  Komorowski.] 

And  finally.  General  Leopold 
Okulicki,  who  was  lured  into  a  trap  and 
died  under  suspicious  circumstances  in 
Moscow. 


[The  President  presented  the  award 
Zdzislaw  Dziekonski,  chairman  of  th( 
Warsaw  Uprising  Commemorative  E 
ecutive  Committee  and  director  of  th 
Polish  American  Congress.] 

These  brave  men  and  the 
courageous  individuals  who  fought  u 
their  command  represent  the  best  of 
human  spirit.  They  risked  all  for  the 
ideals,  for  their  God  and  country,  at 
time  when  the  odds  were  so  much 
against  them.  They're  now  part  of  tl 
inspiring  legacy  of  the  Polish  people 

If  there's  a  lesson  to  be  learned 
from  the  history  books,  it  is  that  Pol 
may  be  beaten  down,  but  it  is  never 
defeated.  It  may  be  forced  into  subn 
sion,  but  it  will  never  give  up.  It  ma 
pressured  to  acquiesce,  but  it  will  ne 
accept  foreign  domination  and  the  si 
pression  of  God-given  freedom.  Afte 
two  decades  of  brutal  foreign  domin 
tion,  we  witnessed,  just  a  short  time 
ago,  a  resurrection  of  the  indomitab 
spirit  of  the  Polish  people.  And  I  as; 
you  we  have  not  forgotten  and  will 
never  forget  Solidarity  and  the  freei 
of  the  Polish  people. 

There  are  some,  of  course,  who 
seem  all  too  willing  to  turn  a  blind  ( 
to  Soviet  transgressions,  ostensibly 
improve  the  dialogue  between  East 
West.  But  those  who  condemn  firm 
port  for  freedom  and  democracy — v 
in  order  to  prove  their  sincerity,  wc 
project  weakness — are  no  friends  o 
peace,  human  liberty,  or  meaningfu 
dialogue. 

Our  policies  toward  Poland  and 
other  captive  nations  are  based  upo 
set  of  well-established  principles. 

First,  let  me  state  emphatically 
we  reject  any  interpretation  of  the 
agreement  that  suggests  American 
sent  for  the  division  of  Europe  into 
spheres  of  influence.  On  the  contrai 
we  see  that  agreement  as  a  pledge 
the  three  great  powers  to  restore  fi 
dependence  and  to  allow  free  and 
democratic  elections  in  all  countries 
liberated  from  the  Nazis  after  Worl 
War  II,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  al 
solve  the  Soviet  Union  or  ourselves 
this  commitment.  We  shall  continue 
press  for  full  compliance  with  it,  an 
with  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nat  I 
the  Helsinki  Final  Act,  and  other  ir  : 
national  agreements  guaranteeing  i  j) 
damental  human  rights. 


r 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Passively  accepting  the  permanent 
ugation  of  the  people  of  Eastern 
ope  is  not  an  acceptable  alternative. 
981,  when  it  appeared  that  Poland 
Id  siiffer  a  similar  fate  to  that  of 
gary  in  1956  or  Czechoslovakia  in 
i,  we  raised  our  voices  in  support  of 
ij  Polish  people.  And  we  did  not  re- 
:  passive  when,  under  intense  Soviet 
sure,  martial  law  was  imposed  on 

Many  credit,  trade,  and  fishing 
ileges  extended  to  Poland,  due  to  its 
ewhat  broader  degree  of  freedom 
1  other  Eastern  European  countries, 

'  ?  suspended.  At  the  same  time,  we 

assisted  voluntary  organizations  to 
bide  humanitarian  aid  through  the 

l"  sh  church  to  avoid  hurting  the  very 
3le  we  want  to  help. 
I  would  especially  like  to  commend 
work  of  Al  Mazewski  and  the  Polish 
rican  Congress.  In  cooperation  with 
church,  they've  provided  over  $40 
ion  worth  of  food,  clothing,  and 
ical  supplies  to  the  people  of  Poland. 
I  know  that  I  speak  for  Nancy — my 
is  thrilled  to  have  been  selected 
Drary  chairman  for  the  Polish 
;rican  Congress'  Infant  Charity 
'e.  We  both  wish  you  the  best  on  this 
thwhile  project. 

I've  pledged  that  our  sanctions  can 
ifted,  one  by  one,  in  response  to 
.ningful  improvement  of  the  human 
ts  situation  in  Poland.  For  example, 
mplete  and  reasonable  implementa- 
of  the  Polish  Government's  amnesty 
•ee  would  create  a  positive  at- 
phere  that  would  allow  reactivation 
'oland's  application  for  membership 
le  International  Monetary  Fund. 


In  the  meantime,  we've  agreed, 
along  with  our  allies  and  private 
organizations,  to  help  fund  a  Polish 
church  program  to  assist  individual 
farmers.  I  am  pleased  to  announce  today 
that  I  am  seeking  support  for  a  $10 
million  American  contribution  to  the 
pilot  phase  of  the  church's  program.  And 
we  will  follow  the  progress  of  this  pro- 
gram carefully  to  determine  whether  ad- 
ditional support  should  be  forthcoming. 

Perhaps  the  most  significant  thing 
that  we  can  do  is  let  the  Polish  people 
and  all  the  people  of  Eastern  Europe 
know  that  they're  not  forgotten.  And 
that's  why  we're  modernizing  Radio 
Free  Europe,  Radio  Liberty,  and  the 
Voice  of  America.  Our  radio  program- 
ming is  becoming  the  mighty  force  for 
good  that  it  was  intended  to  be.  As  the 
Scriptures  say,  "Know  the  truth  and  the 
truth  will  make  you  free."  Our  broadcast 
will  carry  the  truth  to  captive  people 
throughout  the  world. 

The  free  peoples  of  the  world  are  in 
ideological  competition  with  the 
followers  of  a  doctrine  that  rejects  the 
basic  tenets  of  freedom  and  declares  the 
worship  of  God  to  be  a  social  evil.  As 
important  as  this  competition  is,  until 
recently,  the  democracies,  including  the 
United  States,  seemed  paralyzed  by 
uncertainty  and  lacking  the  will  to  com- 
pete. 

In  the  last  3V2  years,  we've  quit 
apologizing,  and  at  long  last,  we're 
standing  up  and  being  counted.  As  our 
UN  Ambassador,  Jeane  Kirkpatrick, 
said,  we've  taken  off  our  "Kick  me"  sign. 

We're  proud  of  our  way  of  life,  we're 
confident  that  freedom  will  prevail, 
because  it  works  and  because  it  is  right. 
We  believe  the  free  peoples  of  the  world 
should  support  all  those  who  share  our 
democratic  values. 


The  National  Endowment  for 
Democracy,  which  I  first  proposed  in  a 
speech  before  the  Parliament  in  London 
2  years  ago,  has  been  established  to  en- 
courage the  democratic  forces  and  the 
development  of  free  institutions 
throughout  the  world.  Its  concerns  in- 
clude nonviolent,  democratic  movements 
like  that  of  Solidarity  in  Poland. 

And  the  rise  of  Solidarity  is  a  mat- 
ter of  historic  significance.  It  continues 
to  be  an  inspiration  of  all  free  people 
that  the  Marxist-Leninist  myth  of  in- 
evitability is  crumbling.  Communism  has 
brought  with  it  only  deprivation  and 
tyranny.  What  happened  in  Poland  is 
one  sign  that  the  tide  is  turning.  The 
Polish  people,  with  their  courage  and 
perseverance,  will  lead  the  way  to 
freedom  and  independence,  not  only  for 
themselves  but  for  all  those  who  yearn 
to  breathe  free. 

The  battle  cry  of  the  Polish  Home 
Army  still  rings  true:  "Poland  is 
fighting.  Poland  will  live.  Poland  will 
overcome." 


'President's  introductory  remarks 
omitted  here,  as  is  the  response  by  Stefan 
Korbonski,  honorary  chairman  of  the  Warsaw 
Uprising  Commemorative  Executive  Commit- 
tee and  president  of  the  Polish  Council  of 
Unity  in  the  United  States  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Aug.  20,  1984).  ■ 


THE  SECRETARY 


Diplomacy  and  Strength 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
Veterans  of  Foreign  Wars  in  Chicago  on 
August  20,  198V 

Patriotism  in  our  country  has  been  re- 
awakened during  these  last  few  years. 
Pride  in  America  is  greater  than  at  any 
time  in  recent  generations.  So  it  is  a 
particular  honor  and  privilege  to  be  here 
today  among  this  distinguished  group. 
For  you  are  patriots  who  have  never 
waivered  in  your  devotion  to  our  nation. 
The  service  you  have  given  the  United 
States  in  times  of  peril  and  your  unflag- 
ging dedication— in  good  times  and  in 
bad— to  the  principles  for  which  America 
stands  have  earned  the  admiration  and 
appreciation  of  your  fellow  citizens. 

And  we  are  grateful  not  just  for 
your  service  in  war  but  for  your  con- 
tribution in  times  of  peace  as  well.  For 
you  have  been  steadfast  and  vigorous 
supporters  of  a  strong  defense  for 
America.  You  know,  better  than  anyone, 
that  a  strong  defense  is  essential  for  en- 
suring security  and  freedom.  Your  Presi- 
dent is  profoundly  grateful  for  the  sup- 
port you  have  given  to  his  efforts  to 
restore  America's  strength  these  past  4 
years. 

And  1  am  here  to  tell  you  that  I  am 
grateful,  too.  For  if  history  has  taught 


come  a  better  world  in  which  peace  and 
prosperity  would  reign  and  war  would 
be  a  thing  of  the  past.  But  we  learned 
soon  after  the  war  that  there  are  no 
final  victories:  the  struggle  between 
freedom  and  tyranny  goes  on;  the 
United  States,  as  the  leader  of  the 
democracies,  cannot  evade  its  continuing 
responsibility  to  promote  freedom  and 
prosperity  and  to  defend  what  we  hold 
dear. 


The  Purpose  of  Negotiation 

Dwight  Eisenhower,  as  a  great 
military  leader  and  a  great  president, 
knew  that  America's  strength  was  moral 
as  well  as  military  and  economic.  Our 
power  was  the  servant  of  our  positive 
goals,  our  values,  and  ideals.  We 
Americans  have  always  deeply  ijelieved 
in  a  world  in  which  disputes  were  settled 
peacefully— a  world  of  law,  international 
harmony,  and  human  rights.  But  we 
have  learned  through  hard  experience, 
in  World  War  II  and  after,  that  such  a 
world  cannot  be  created  by  good  will 
and  idealism  alone.  Since  1945,  every 
president,  Democratic  or  Republican, 
has  understood  that  to  maintain  the 
peace  we  had  to  be  strong,  and,  more 
than  that,  we  had  to  be  willing  to  use 


No  negotiation  can  succeed  when  one  side  believes 
that  it  pays  no  price  for  intransigence  and  the 
other  side  believes  that  it  has  to  make  dangerous 
concessions  to  reach  agreement. 


us  anything,  it  is  that  effective 
diplomacy  depends  on  strength.  Dwight 
Eisenhower— in  whose  name  you  are 
honoring  me  tonight- understood  it 
well.  "Military  power,"  he  once  told  the 
Congress,  ".  .  .  serves  the  cause  of  peace 
by  holding  up  a  shield  behind  which  the 
patient,  constructive  work  of  peace  can 
go  on." 

It  has  been  almost  40  years  since  the 
end  of  the  Second  World  War,  a  war  in 
which  many  of  you  fought.  You  fought— 
and  many  Americans  died— not  only  to 
defend  our  nation  but  to  free  the  world 
from  a  bruUil  tyranny.  The  American 
people  hoped  that  with  victory  would 


our  strength.  We  would  not  seek  con- 
frontaticm,  but  we  would  never  appease 
or  shrink  from  the  challenge  posed  by 
threats  of  aggression.  And  this  deter- 
mination was  always  accompanied  by  an 
active  and  creative  diplomacy  and  a  will- 
ingness to  solve  problems  peacefully. 

President  Kennedy  defined  the  two 
goals  of  this  solidly  bipartisan  approach 
in  his  inaugural  address:  "Let  us  never 
negotiate  out  of  fear,"  he  said,  "but  let 
us  never  fear  to  negotiate." 

In  the  years  that  followed,  however, 
the  consensus  behind  this  balanced  ap- 
proach began  to  show  signs  of  strain. 
P''or  whatever  reason,  Vietnam  created 


doubts  in  the  minds  of  some  that  pea' 
and  military  strength  were  compatibi 
The  lessons  so  clearly  understood  by 
President  Eisenhower,  it  seemed,  we 
being  forgotten.  And  today,  even  tho 
we  have  overcome  the  trauma  of  Vie 
nam,  one  gets  the  sense  that  some  st 
believe  that  power  and  diplomacy  are 
alternatives.  From  one  side,  we  hear 
that  negotiations  alone  are  the  answt 
If  we  will  only  talk  (the  argument  rui 
we  can  have  peace.  If  we  will  only  ta 
our  differences  will  easily  be  resolvec 
is  as  if  negotiations  were  an  end  in 
themselves,  as  if  the  goal  of  America 
foreign  policy  were  not  primarily  to  \ 
tect  the  peace,  or  defend  our  values, 
our  people,  or  our  allies,  but  to  negot 
for  its  own  sake.  From  another  side, 
though  the  chorus  is  considerably 
smaller,  we  hear  that  we  should  nevt 
negotiate,  never  compromise  with  ou 
adversaries,  because  the  risks  are  to( 
great  and  the  differences  irreeoncilat 

Both  views  are  as  wrong  today  e 
they  would  have  been  four  decades  s 
Negotiations  are  not  the  goal  of 
American  foreign  policy,  they  are  a 
means  of  attaining  that  goal.  In  fact 
they  are  an  essential  means.  But  we 
know,  as  surely  as  we  know  anythin 
that  negotiations  and  diplomacy  not 
backed  by  strength  are  ineffectual  a 
best,  dangerous  at  worst. 

As  your  Secretary  of  State  I  car 
you  from  experience  that  no  diploma 
can  succeed  in  an  environment  of  fe: 
from  a  position  of  weakness.  No  nejj 
tion  can  succeed  when  one  side  belie 
that  it  pays  no  price  for  intransigen( 
and  the  other  side  believes  that  it  h; 
make  dangerous  concessions  to  reac 
agreement.  This  is  true  whether  we 
talking  about  Vietnam  or  Lebanon, 
Central  America;  it  is  true  in  arms  i 
trol  and  in  our  relations  with  the  So 
Union.  Americans  have  only  to  remc 
ber  what  we  understood  so  well  foui 
decades  ago:  neither  strength  nor 
negotiations  are  ends  in  themselves. 
They  must  go  hand  in  hand. 

And  I  can  also  tell  you  that  any 
strategy,  to  be  effective,  must  be  su 
tainable  over  the  long  haul.  It  canno 
sustained  if  our  policies  vacillate  wil 
in  response  to  events  beyond  our  coi 
trol.  Americans  are  by  nature  a  peo| 
of  actii)n,  and  we  are  sometimes  im; 
tient  with  a  world  that  progresses  si 
ly.  When  Americans  act,  we  want  U 


THE  SECRETARY 


•  and  quick  results.  And  the  pattern 
e  recent  past  has  been  one  of  ex- 
ve  expectations  that,  when  unful- 
I,  have  led  to  equally  excessive 
rsals  in  policy.  This  inconsistency 
lindered  the  achievement  of 
■rican  goals. 

iVe  do  not  negotiate  with  our  adver- 
ts because  we  think  they  are  perfec- 
;.  Nor  do  we  negotiate  just  to  please 
or  that  domestic  constituency.  We 
itiate  because  it  is  in  our  country's 
•est  to  do  so,  and  we  reach  agree- 
ts  when  we  perceive  that  both  we 
our  adversaries  can  gain  from  a 
)tiated  solution.  To  negotiate  on 
e  terms  is  to  deal  with  the  world  as 
without  illusions. 

We  know  that  negotiations  with  the 
et  Union,  for  instance,  are  not  a 
icea.  Yet  we  know  that  equitable 
verifiable  agreements  can  make  a 
ificant  contribution  to  stability  in  the 
ear  age  or  to  the  resolution  of  con- 
5  that  might  otherwise  escalate  and 
aten  to  overwhelm  us.  To  negotiate 
lese  ends  is  the  only  prudent  and 
onsible  course.  It  serves  American 
-ests. 

If  our  proposals  are  rejected  and 
■ciprocated— as  they  have  been  of 
-we  must  show  staying  power, 
etimes,  it  seems  as  if  the  Soviets 
t  take  yes  for  an  answer.  At  the 
2  time,  we  should  not  seek  agree- 
t  for  the  sake  of  agreement  or  allow 
sional  successes  to  give  rise  to  un- 
-anted  euphoria.  Our  interests  re- 
5  that  we  stay  on  course  despite  the 
jdic  disappointments  and  setbacks 
we  are  bound  to  encounter  in  deal- 
A^ith  such  a  ruthless  competitor.  Un- 
inately,  outrageous  incidents,  such 
le  Korean  airliner  attack  or  the 
ecution  of  Andrei  Sakharov,  are 
t  we  must  expect.  However  shock- 
they  do  not  come  as  surjifises  that 
;ire  us  to  reassess  and  change  our 
:  strategy,  including  our  strategy  of 
ngness  to  negotiate. 
Patience  is  a  virtue  in  foreign  affairs 
mch  as  in  our  personal  lives.  If  we 
)  our  eye  on  our  strategic  objectives, 
e  negotiate  without  illusions,  if  we 
our  strength  effectively,  we  will  see 
jress.  The  truth  is,  we  advance  our 
rests  less  by  the  big,  obvious  suc- 
es,  by  summits,  by  decisive  battles, 
;-lamorous  international  agreements, 
1  we  do  by  our  permanent  engage- 
it  and  by  the  steady  application  of 
id  policies. 


The  Tide  of  Freedom 

Let's  look  at  Central  America.  It  is 
no  coincidence  that  when  America  has 
shown  consistency  and  commitment  in 
Central  America,  progress  in  that  region 
has  been  equally  consistent.  We  all  know 
what  the  problem  is  in  Central  America: 
Nicaragua's  push  toward  militarism  and 
totalitarianism.  We  have  seen  increased 


solution  is  to  be  found  that  ends  the  fear 
and  agony  in  Central  America  and  opens 
a  promising  future  of  peace,  freedom, 
and  prosperity. 

Our  policies  are  working.  Gradually, 
but  inevitably,  communist  aggression  is 
losing  the  contest.  Hope  is  being  created 
for  the  people  of  Central  America.  Suc- 
cess will  not  come  overnight;  and  we 
cannot  let  our  policies  vacillate  in 


Despite  grave  economic  problems  and  communist 
efforts  to  exploit  them,  almost  every  nation  [in 
Latin  America]  is  either  democratic  or  on  the  path 
toward  democracy  .  .  .  This  gradual  movement 
does  not  receive  the  attention  of  the  media  as  much 
as  the  sporadic  guerrilla  offensive.  .  .  . 


repressions,  persecution  of  the  church,  a 
massive  influx  of  Soviet  arms,  and  con- 
tinued aggression  against  Nicaragua's 
neighbors.  Today  we  hear  of  Nicaraguan 
elections  promised  for  November.  The 
notion  of  democracy  is  so  powerful  that 
even  dedicated  Marxist-Leninists  feel 
they  have  to  show  that  they  are  holding 
elections.  Feeling  the  pull  of  the  tide  of 
true  democracy  that  is  running  now  in 
Central  and  South  America,  they  seek  to 
represent  their  elections  as  meaningful. 
But  they  are  not  succeeding.  The 
failures  of  the  Nicaraguan  regime  have 
generated  a  determined  internal  opposi- 
tion—the true  Sandinistas.  Because  of 
the  regime's  efforts  to  suppress  that  in- 
ternal opposition,  the  elections  promised 
for  November  now  look  more  and  more 
like  sham  elections  on  the  Soviet  model. 

America  has  responded  with  pa- 
tience and  consistent  policies  based  on 
strength  and  diplomacy.  We  have  sought 
a  dialogue  with  the  Nicaraguan  leader- 
ship. We  have  given  our  full  support  to 
the  Contadora  peace  efforts.  But  we 
have  also  maintained  an  American  mili- 
tary presence  in  the  region  to  serve  as 
the"  shield,  in  President  Eisenhower's 
words,  behind  which  effective  diplomacy 
can  go  forward.  We  have  provided  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  military  support  for 
the  free  elected  Government  of  El 
Salvador. 

And  we  admire  the  dedication  of  the 
Nicaraguan  freedom  fighters,  who  want 
only  to  bring  democracy  to  their  people. 
All  these  forces  help  provide  the 
strength  and  the  purpose  essential  if  a 


response  to  emotions  or  political  pas- 
sions at  home.  Only  a  steady,  purposeful 
application  of  our  diplomatic  and 
military  strength  offers  real  hope  for 
peace  in  Central  America  and  security 
for  the  hemisphere. 

We  can  see  similar  signs  of  progress 
throughout  the  world.  While  there  are 
always  obstacles  and  occasional  set- 
backs, the  broader  picture  is  a  hopeful 
one.  The  day-to-day  events  of  foreign 
policy  are  like  waves  rolling  up  against 
the  shore.  Some  break  in  one  direction; 
some  break  in  the  other.  But  what  is 
more  important  than  the  path  of  a  single 
wave  is  the  flow  of  the  tide  beneath  it. 
Is  the  tide  rising  or  is  it  falling?  Is  the 
course  of  history  on  the  side  of  peace, 
freedom,  and  democracy?  Or  is  America 
standing  on  weak  ground  against  in- 
evitable and  ineluctable  forces? 

The  tide  of  history  is  with  us.  The 
values  that  Americans  cherish— demo- 
cratic freedom,  peace,  and  the  hope  of 
prosperity— are  taking  root  all  around 
the  world.  Look  again  at  Latin  America. 
Despite  grave  economic  problems  and 
communist  efforts  to  exploit  them, 
almost  every  nation  in  that  region  is 
either  democratic  or  on  the  path  toward 
democracy.  Never  before  have  more  peo- 
ple in  our  hemisphere  had  such  hope  of 
tasting  the  fruits  of  true  freedom.  This 
gradual  movement  does  not  receive  the 
attention  of  the  media  as  much  as  the 
sporadic  guerrilla  offensive,  but  it  is 
there.  It  is  undeniable.  The  tide  in  Latin 
America  is  the  tide  of  freedom. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Restoration  of  Confidence 

A  month  ago,  1  visited  our  friends 
and  allies  in  Southeast  Asia.  Our  rela- 
tions with  those  nations  have  never  been 
stronger,  in  large  part  because  the 
values  we  Americans  cherish  are 
flourishing  in  those  faraway  lands,  as 
well.  Japan,  Korea,  Australia,  and  New 
Zealand  are  valued  allies  and  vibrant 
societies;  the  free  Southeast  Asian  na- 
tions, ASEAN  [Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations],  are  embarked  on 
the  same  journey  toward  freedom  and 
democracy;  their  economic  success  sym- 
bolizes how  far  they  have  come.  The 
U.S. -China  relationship  is  maturing  and 
broadening  as  we  identify  and  develop 
common  interests.  Our  deepening  friend- 
ship with  these  nations  gets  few  head- 
lines, but  it  marks  the  fact  that  in  the 
decade  since  Vietnam,  the  United  States 
has  restored  its  position  and  its  relations 
in  Asia.  And,  increasingly,  the  real 
lesson  of  Vietnam  is  clear.  The  world 


The  yearning  for 
democracy  and  freedom 
in  the  countries  of 
Eastern  Europe  is  a 
powerful  and  growing 
force.  .  .  .  someday  it 
will  happen. 


now  condemns  Vietnam's  aggression  in 
Kampuchea.  The  steady  outflow  of 
refugees  from  areas  dominated  by  Hanoi 
are  showing  the  Vietnamese  communists 
for  what  some  of  us  always  knew  they 
were. 

In  Europe,  we  have  faced  periodic 
crises,  moments  of  apparent  disunity, 
and  times  when  Soviet  intimidation  has 
jostled  relations  with  our  oldest  and 
closest  friends.  The  Soviets  once  thought 
they  could  split  the  NATO  alliance  by 
pointing  SS-20  nuclear  missiles  at  the 
free  peoples  of  Western  Europe.  But 
these  tests  of  the  alliance's  strength 
have  served  only  to  prove  one  thing: 
that  the  solidarity  of  democratic  nations 
endures,  that  the  transatlantic  bonds  are 
strong  and  secure.  Our  shared  moral 
values  and  political  principles  have  made 


NATO  the  keeper  of  the  peace  for  35 
years  and  wilt  continue  to  do  so  into  the 
next  century  and  beyond. 

Indeed,  if  there  is  weakness  in 
Europe,  it  is  within  the  Soviet  empire. 
The  yearning  for  democracy  and  free- 
dom in  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe 
is  a  powerful  and  growing  force.  We 
have  seen  it  in  recent  years  among  the 
brave  people  of  Poland,  as  we  saw  it  in 
Czechoslovakia  in  1968,  in  Hungary  in 
1956,  and  East  Germany  in  1953.  We 
will  never  accept  the  idea  of  a  divided 
Europe.  Time  is  not  on  the  side  of  im- 
perial domination.  We  may  not  see  free- 
dom in  Eastern  Europe  in  our  lifetime. 
Our  children  may  not  see  it  in  theirs. 
But  someday  it  will  happen.  The  world's 
future  is  a  future  of  freedom. 

Make  no  mistake.  History  will  do  us 
no  special  favors.  A  better  future 
depends  on  our  will,  our  leadership,  our 
willingness  to  act  decisively  in  moments 
of  crisis,  and  on  our  ability  to  be  con- 
stant and  steadfast  in  moments  of  calm. 
We  must  be  ready  to  engage  ourselves 
where  necessary  throughout  the  world. 
We  must  be  ready  to  use  our  di|:iloniatic 
skills  and  our  military  strength  in 
defense  of  our  values  and  our  interests. 

There  was  a  time,  a  decade  or  so 
ago,  when  some  Americans  may  have 
doubted  that  their  great  nation  could 
continue  to  be  a  force  for  good  in  the 
world.  But  today  Americans  no  longer 
doubt  America's  ability  to  play  its  proper 
role.  In  the  past  4  years,  this  nation  has 
taken  the  essential  steps  to  restore  its 
leadership  of  the  free  world.  We  have 
restored  the  strategic  balance.  We  have 
restored  the  strength  and  thrust  of  our 
dynamic  economy.  We  have  restored  our 
will  and  self-confidence.  We  have  re- 
stored national  pride  and  respect  for  the 
men  and  women  who  serve  in  our 
Armed  Forces.  And  we  have  restored 
the  confidence  of  our  friends  and  allies 
around  the  world  that  America  can  be 
trusted  to  confront  challenges,  not  wish 
them  away. 

I  don't  mean  to  suggest  that  the 
path  ahead  of  us  is  easy.  But  in  the  face 
of  the  forces  of  tyranny,  we  draw  in- 
spiration from  the  basic  goodness  of 
America,  and  our  pride  in  our  country 
gives  us  strength  to  lead  abroad. 

No  one  understands  or  feels  that 
pride  more  deeply  than  you,  who  have 
defended  this  great  nation  in  times  of 
national  peril.  You  knew  what  you  were 
fighting  against  and  what  you  were 
fighting  for.  And  you  knew  what  kind  of 


people  you  were  defending— a  peopk 
devoted  to  freedom  and  justice,  a  br; 
people  willing  to  sacrifice  for  what  tl 
believe.  And  it  was  your  sacrifices  tl 
have  made  peace  possible.  You  laid  t 
foundation  for  the  kind  of  world  we 
seek.  Let  us  never  forget  that  as  we 
look  toward  the  future. 

Americans  must  never  be  timid, 
ashamed,  or  guilt-ridden,  or  weak.  V 
are  proud  and  strong— and  confideni 
We  will  use  our  power  and  our 
diplomacy  in  the  service  of  peace  ani 
our  ideals.  We  have  our  work  cut  ou 
us.  But  we  feel  truly  that  the  future 
bright. 


'Press  release  191. 


9(1 


DeDartment  of  State  Bui 


IMS  CONTROL 


3curity  for  Europe 


'antes  E.  Goodby 

The  following  is  an  article  repr'inted 
i  the  June  1981,  issue  of  NATO 
ew.  Ambassador  Goodby  is  head  of 
11  J.S.  delegation  to  the  Conference  on 
It  Idence-  and  Security-Building 
sures  and  Disarmament  in  Europe 

the  past  10  years,  the  United  States 
its  NATO  alHes  have  sought  to  ease 
division  of  Europe  through  the  proc- 
)f  dialogue,  cooperation,  and  critique 
ted  by  the  Helsinki  accords  of  1975. 
Ti  the  Helsinki  process  has  now 
rged  a  new  negotiating  forum  which 
the  potential  to  create  a  system  of 
rity  based  on  carefully  defined 
teration  in  military  affairs  "from  the 
ntic  to  the  Urals."  This  is  the  Con- 
nce  on  Confidence-  and  Security- 
ding  Measures  and  Disarmament  in 
ope,  which  opened  in  Stockholm  last 
lary. 

The  Stockholm  conference  is  dif- 
nt  from  "classical"  arms  control 
jtiations  in  that  it  addresses  not  the 
ibilities  for  war — the  number  of 
pons  and  troops — but  rather  the 
t  likely  causes  of  war:  flawed 
^ents  or  miscalculations  stemming 
n  fears  of  sudden  attack  and  uncer- 
ty  about  the  military  intentions  of  an 
jrsary.  It  is  highly  unlikely  that  any 
at  all  will  commence  in  Europe.  But 
ar  should  ever  come,  it  probably 
Jd  not  be  in  the  form  of  a  "bolt-from- 
blue"  attack  by  one  side  against 
j:her.  The  most  probable  cause  of  the 
)reak  of  war  would  be  some  small  in- 
nt,  perhaps  connected  with  a 
tary  maneuver,  which  would  not  be 
rly  understood,  leading  to  confronta- 
and  armed  conflict.  This  nightmare 
n  improbable  scenario  but  the  stakes 
so  high  that  some  reassurance 
inst  such  a  contingency  would  be  in 
•yone's  interest.  If  it  is  successful, 
Stockholm  conference  will  negotiate 
put  into  place  certain  procedures 
ch  could  stop  a  fatal  progression 
ard  catastrophe. 
Procedures  which  would  make 
tary  activities  in  Europe  more 
dictable  would  reassure  governments 
t  those  activities  were  normal, 
tine,  and  nonthreatening.  Procedures 
questioning  and  verifying  the  essen- 
character  of  specific  military  ac- 
ties  would  provide  more  certain 


knowledge  of  the  intentions  of  the  par- 
ties to  this  agreement.  Such  reassurance 
would  lead  to  increased  confidence  and 
security  among  all  participating  states. 
It  could  also,  in  time,  lead  to  a  habit  of 
cooperation  among  participants  on  ac- 
tivities affecting  their  most  vital  national 
security  interests,  thus  acting  to  dissolve 
distrust.  From  this,  a  new  system  of  in- 
ternational security  might  emerge  in 
Europe,  which  could  soften  some  of  the 
rougher  edges  of  the  adversarial  rela- 
tionship and  provide  a  mechanism  for 
preventing  escalation  toward  crisis  and 
war. 

Proposals  have  been  advanced  by 
the  16  members  of  the  Atlantic  alliance 
which  represent  initial  steps  toward  this 
ambitious  goal.  These  proposals  do  not 
call  for  large  changes  in  the  military 
postures  of  the  countries  involved  in  the 
Stockholm  conference.  That  objective  is 
for  other  negotiations.  But  if  a  first, 
substantial  agreement  can  be  achieved  in 
Stockholm,  the  consequences  can  be  of 
historic  importance. 

The  Stockholm  conference  will  re- 
main an  integral  part  of  the  Helsinki 
process,  and  its  achievements  will  be 
evaluated  in  a  CSCE  [Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe] 
followup  meeting  scheduled  for  Vienna 
in  1986,  which  will  also  review  progress 
in  the  other  dimensions  of  the  process, 
including  human  rights.  As  U.S. 
Secretary  of  State  George  Shultz  said 
when  he  addressed  the  opening  of  the 
Stockholm  conference  last  January: 

.  .  .  true  peace  and  security  in  Europe  depend 
on  a  foundation  of  basic  freedoms — not  the 
least  of  which  is  the  right  of  peoples  to  deter- 
mine their  own  future.  .  .  .  Confidence- 
building  in  the  larger  sense  means  pursuing 
the  work  of  Helsinki — through  practical  steps 
to  break  down  barriers,  expand  human  con- 
tact and  intellectual  interchange,  increase 
openness,  and  stretch  the  boundaries  of  the 
human  spirit. 

Origins  of  the  Stockholm  Conference 

Although  the  Stockholm  conference  is 
the  child  of  the  Helsinki  process,  it  has 
even  more  remote  ancestors.  When 
Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Molotov  in  1954 
called  for  an  all-European  security  trea- 
ty, he  was  giving  expression  to  a  key  ob- 
jective of  Soviet  policy,  then  and  now:  a 
security  arrangement  for  Europe  which 
would  ratify  postwar  borders  and,  if 
possible,  isolate  the  United  States  from 
European  security  affairs.  With  Western 


Europe  thus  isolated,  the  Soviet  Union 
would  be  left  in  the  position  of  supreme 
arbiter  on  the  continent. 

What  the  diplomacy  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  its  allies  eventually  settled 
for  was  the  Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe.  But  the  con- 
ference was  far  from  what  the  East  had 
originally  envisaged.  In  fact,  it  was 
much  closer  to  Western  concepts. 

Before  the  negotiations  which  led  to 
the  Helsinki  Final  Act  could  even  begin, 
some  longstanding  issues  dividing 
Europe  had  to  be  resolved  or  accom- 
modated. An  example  was  the  signing  of 
the  1972  Quadripartite  Agreement  on 
Berlin.  And  although  Soviet  accommoda- 
tions to  Western  interests  were  probably 
regarded  as  tactical  concessions 
necessary  for  a  longer  range  strategy, 
the  agreements  which  preceded  or  came 
from  the  Helsinki  meeting  created 
political  dynamics  which  significantly 
altered  the  role  of  the  CSCE  as  conceiv- 
ed by  Moscow. 

The  Helsinki  conference  and  the 
process  that  flowed  from  it,  in  fact, 
came  to  support  a  grand  strategy  pur- 
sued by  the  United  States  and  its  allies 
which,  in  the  broadest  terms,  sought  to 
ameliorate  the  harsher  results  of  the 
division  of  Europe;  far  more  than  a 
European  security  conference  in  the 
Eastern  sense,  it  also  encompassed 
human  rights,  human  contacts,  economic 
issues,  and  cultural  and  educational  ex- 
changes. The  Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975 
accepted  the  Western  concept  that 
security  embodies  political,  social,  and 
economic  concerns  as  well  as  strictly 
military  concerns.  The  CSCE  gave  a 
particular  impetus  to  the  promotion  of 
human  rights,  and  it  remains  today  a 
major  forum  for  pursuing  enhancement 
of  fundamental  principles  of  Western 
democracies. 

Furthermore  by  including  both  the 
United  States  and  Canada  as  full  part- 
ners in  the  process,  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act  reaffirmed  the  necessity  for  perma- 
nent American  involvement  in  European 
security  matters. 

Shortfalls  and  Shared  Interests 

Far  from  fulfilling  a  Soviet  conception, 
the  Stockholm  conference,  mandated  in 
the  Madrid  CSCE  review  meeting  in 
September  1983,  emerged  from  a 
French  idea  for  a  multistage  "Con- 
ference on  Disarmament  in  Europe," 
which  looked  to  a  high-level  forum  on 


ARMS  CONTROL 


security  and  disarmanent  issues,  linked 
to  the  CSCE  process.  The  French  called 
for  a  first  stage  devoted  to  making 
significant  improvements  in  those  provi- 
sions of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  which 
called  for  notification  and  observation  of 
military  maneuvers.  A  second  stage 
would  discuss  broad  disarmament  issues. 
The  Helsinki  process  has  shown  that 
the  West  can  pursue  and  achieve  some 
limited  objectives  in  negotiations  with 
the  East.  Thus  there  already  has  been 
experience  with  the  kinds  of  cooperative 
security  arrangements  (which  are  re- 
ferred to  as  confidence-  and  security- 
building  measures)  which  the  West  seeks 
to  enact  in  Stockholm.  Those  measures 


agreed  in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  are 
modest  in  scope;  they  need  to  be  ex- 
panded in  Stockholm.  Implementation  of 
them  has  been  imperfect;  implementa- 
tion needs  to  be  strengthened  in 
Stockholm.  Nevertheless,  experience 
with  them  and  their  implementation  up 
to  now  has  been  instructive.  It  is  possi- 
ble even  now  to  see  how  cooperation  in 
security  affairs  can  work,  as  well  as  how 
this  cooperation  needs  to  be  improved. 
The  central  features  of  the  Helsinki 
security  provisions  were  a  measure  call- 
ing for  prenotification  21  days  in  ad- 
vance of  certain  military  maneuvers  in- 
volving more  than  2.5,000  troops  and  a 
measure  calling  for  invitation  of 


Head  of  U.S.  CDE  Delegation 


James  E.  Goodby  was  born  December  29, 
1929,  in  Providence,  Rhode  Island.  He 
graduated  from  Harvard  in  1951  and  at- 
tended graduate  school  at  the  University  of 
Michigan.  He  served  in  the  U.S.  Air  Force 
(1952-53)  and  then  continued  graduate 
studies  at  Harvard. 

Ambassador  Goodby  entered  the  Foreign 
Service  in  1952  and  transferred  to  the 
Atomic  Energy  Commission  in  1954.  While 
there  he  took  part  in  several  international 
negotiations  relating  to  nuclear  arms  control 
and  cooperation  in  the  civil  uses  of  nuclear 
energy. 

In  1960  he  moved  to  the  office  of  the 
special  assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
atomic  energy,  specializing  in  nuclear  arms 
control  matters.  With  the  creation  of  the 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency 
(ACDA),  he  became  officer  in  charge  of  the 
nuclear  test  ban  negotiations.  Those  negotia- 
tions resulted  in  the  first  major  arms  control 
treaty  since  World  War  II. 

Following  service  as  a  member  of  the 
State  Department's  Policy  Planning  Staff,  he 
was  assigned  in  1967  to  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  European  Communities  in  Brussels, 
where  his  major  concern  was  the  nuclear  non- 
proliferation  treaty,  under  negotiation  at  that 
time,  and  U.S.  relations  with  EURATOM,  the 
atomic  energy  component  of  the  European 
Communities. 

From  1969  to  1971,  Ambassador  Goodby 
was  officer  in  charge  of  defense  policy  affairs 
at  the  State  Department's  office  for  NATO 
affairs.  He  then  served  for  3  years  as 
Coun.selor  of  Political  Affairs  at  the  U.S.  Mis- 
sion to  NATO  in  Brussels.  In  that  role  he 
negotiated  common  positions  with  the  allies, 
including  those  involving  the  Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE), 
mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction.s 
(MBFR).  and  the  1974  Ottawa  declaration  of 
Atlantic  relations.  From  1974  to  1977,  he 
was  Deputy  Director  of  the  Bureau  of 
Politico-Militaiy  Affairs,  with  responsibilities 
for  the  strategic  arms  limitation  talks 
(SALT),  other  arms  control  negotiations,  and 
various  defense  policy  issues. 


22 


He  was  appointed  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  European  Affairs  in  1977, 
handling  U.S.  relations  with  the  countries  of 
northern  and  central  Europe  and  European 
regional  political  and  security  affairs,  in 
which  capacity  he  was  responsible  for  the 
followup  to  the  Helsinki  accords  (the  CSCE). 
In  1980-81  he  served  as  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
Finland. 

In  1982-83  he  was  deputy  chairman  of 
the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  strategic  arms 
reduction  talks  (START)  in  Geneva.  Am- 
bassador Goodby  has  been  head  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  Conference  on  Confidence- 
and  Security-Building  Measures  and  Disarma- 
ment in  Europe  (CDE)  since  September 
1983.  ■ 


11 


observers  to  those  maneuvers.  There 
was  also  a  measure  calling  for  notific 
tion  of  some  smaller-scale  exercises  ii 
volving  fewer  than  25,000  troops.  Th' 
zone  of  application  extended  only  250 
kilometers  into  the  Western  part  of  t  , 
Soviet  Union. 

In  the  8V2  years  since  adoption  ol 
the  Final  Act,  there  have  been  nearly 
100  notifications  of  military  activities 
Europe  involving  well  over  2  million 
men.  Although  the  system  has  workt 
well  on  the  whole,  notable  exceptions 
ist,  and  precisely  in  the  case  of  the 
largest  military  maneuver  conducted 
a  CSCE  state  since  1975 — the 
U.S.S.R.'s  Zapad  81,  which  took  plac 
1981  in  the  Soviet  Union  near  the  Pc 
border  and  which  was  not  properly 
notified. 

In  accordance  with  the  Helsinki 
agreements,  observers  have  been  inv 
to  approximately  50  exercises.  The  V 
has  extended  more  than  30  invitatioi 
the  United  States  alone  has  invited  \ 
saw  Pact  observers  to  10  exercises.  ' 
Eastern  record  is  less  impressive.  Tl 
Warsaw  Pact  has  announced  more  tl 
20  maneuvers  but  has  invited  Weste' 
observers  to  less  than  half  of  these, 
among  the  Western  observers,  Amei 
observers  have  been  invited  to  Wars 
Pact  maneuvers  only  twice  and  not  i 
since  1979. 

In  the  area  of  smaller-scale  exer 
cises,  the  West  has  notified  29 
maneuvers.  The  Warsaw  Pact  has 
notified  four. 

On  the  basis  of  this  record,  clear 
the  .35  CSCE  participants  have  not  i 
met  the  aspirations  of  the  Final  Act 
particular,  they  have  not  succeeded 
dealing  with  the  problem  of 
misunderstanding  or  miscalculation 
cerning  military  activities  where,  in 
words  of  the  Final  Act,  "...  par- 
ticipating States  lack  clear  and  time 
formation  about  the  nature  of  such  ; 
tivities."  In  spite  of  partial  implemei 
tion  of  the  Helsinki  agreement, 
therefore,  significant  uncertainties  s 
exist  among  the  participating  states 
about  the  military  activities  taking  \ 
in  Europe  and  about  the  intentions 
which  lie  behind  them.  Such  uncerta 
ties  can  be  destabilizing,  and  this  cir 
cumstance  points  the  way  to  an  inte 
which  East,  West,  and  neutrals  shot 
hold  in  common. 

m, 
us 


:  ^>i  _  i  ^ 


..   :tAi 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Co  Western  Proposals 

January  24,  1984,  the  16  members  of 
'  Atlantic  alliance  tabled  a  formal  six- 
nt  proposal,  the  first  of  the 
ickholm  conference,  the  thrust  of 
ich  was  to  make  the  military  environ- 
nt  in  Europe  more  understandable, 
'dictable,  and  stable.  That  the  16 
re  able  to  table  a  comprehensive 
ument  at  the  outset  of  the  con- 
ence  is  indicative  of  the  unity  and 
iousness  of  purpose  with  which  the 
ance  has  approached  this  negotiation. 

In  brief  the  six  Western  measures 

Measure  1,  the  exchange  of 
litary  information,  which  provides 

t,  on  a  yearly  basis,  participants  will 
orm  each  other  about  the  structure  of 
'ir  ground  and  air  forces  in  all  of 
rope,  giving  unit  designation,  normal 
idquarters  location,  and  composition 
the  forces. 

Measure  2,  exchange  of  forecasts 
activities  notifiable  in  advance,  calls 

an  exchange  of  forecasts,  again  on  a 
irly  basis,  of  military  activities.  The 
ecasts  would  furnish  the  name  of  the 

rcises,  the  countries  participating, 

size  and  type  offerees  involved,  and 

place  and  time  it  would  occur.  The 
ecasts  would  also  list  the  purpose  of 

exercise. 

Measure  3,  notification  of  military 
;ivities,  calls  for  notification,  45  days 
advance,  of  activities  involving  field 
ining  of  units  at  division  level  or 
Dve  and  notification  of  certain 
bilization  and  amphibious  exercises. 

Measure  4,  observation  of  certain 
litary  activities,  requires  states  to  in- 
e  observers  from  all  other  states  to  all 
;notified  activities  and  to  certain  alert 
ivities. 

Measure  5,  compliance  and 
rification,  has  two  parts.  States 
ree  not  to  interfere  with  the  "national 
hnical  means"'  of  other  states; 
•ondly,  participating  states  may  send 
servers,  on  a  limited  basis,  to  observe 
;ivities  which  seem  not  to  be  in  com- 
ance  with  negotiated  agreements. 

Measure  6,  development  of  means 
communication,  asks  that  the  par- 
ipating  states  develop  better  means 
d  procedures  for  urgent  communica- 
ns. 

These  measures  are  mutually  rein- 
cing.  Their  objective  is  to  reduce  ten- 
ms,  to  promote  common  understand- 

among  all  participants,  and  to 
ninish  the  danger  of  armed  conflict 
ising  from  misunderstanding  or 
scalculation.  They  focus  on  preventing 
lequence  of  events  which  has  all  too 


often  led  to  war  on  the  Continent  of 
Europe:  the  incident,  military  move- 
ment, or  political  event  which  is 
misunderstood,  with  misunderstanding 
leading  to  suspicion,  reaction,  escalation, 
and  perhaps  confrontation  and  conflict. 

.  .  .  And  How  They  Work 

The  six  points  of  the  Western  proposal 
can  be  implemented  easily  with  a 
minimum  of  intrusion  into  or  alteration 
of  normal,  nonthreatening  military  ac- 
tivity. The  process  would  work  some- 
thing like  this. 

A  context  of  basic  information  is 
established  through  measure  1,  near  the 
end  of  each  year.  Much  of  the  informa- 
tion which  would  be  exchanged  is 
already  available  to  the  CSCE  states 
through  other  means.  At  the  same  time, 
under  measure  2,  a  state  would  advise 
the  other  participants  of  its  planned 
military  activities  during  the  next  calen- 
dar year.  Incidentally,  because  modern 
training  and  rotational  activities  are 
complex  and  are  planned  a  year  or  more 
in  advance,  military  forces  routinely 
develop  this  kind  of  information. 

Measure  3,  on  prenotification,  then 
provides  more  detail  and  also  a  cross- 
check on  the  forecast.  If  a  state  should 
notify  under  measure  3  an  activity  not 
previously  forecast,  other  countries 
could  demand  an  explanation  of  the  ap- 
parent anomaly.  A  nation  with  ag- 
gressive intent  would  be  raising  an 
alarm  against  itself  if  it  announced  an 
exercise  which  it  had  not  forecast,  and, 
of  course,  this  alarm  would  sound  even 
louder  if  a  country  failed  either  to 
forecast  or  to  notify  45  days  in  advance 
of  the  event.  The  measures  are  thus  self- 
enforcing. 

The  observers  called  for  in  measure 
4  serve  to  verify  that  activities  are  as 
they  have  been  advertised.  But  there 
may  be  occasions  where  one  state  sees, 
or  thinks  it  sees,  an  activity  that  has  not 
been  notified  but  should  have  been.  In 
such  a  case,  under  measure  5,  suspicions 
can  be  alleviated  or  confirmed  by  asking 
for  verification,  either  by  direct  observa- 
tion, if  necessary,  or  by  some  other  ap- 
propriate means.  The  communications 
network  of  measure  6  could  be  utilized 
to  seek  further  information  on  a  poten- 
tially destabilizing  event. 

These  measures  would  not,  in 
themselves,  prevent  war.  They  could  not 
absolutely  prevent  one  state  from  using 
force  for  political  intimidation.  But  they 
could  make  unwanted  confrontation  less 
likely,  and  they  could  raise  the  political 
cost  of  using  force  to  intimidate.  By 
establishing  a  pattern  of  routine  ac- 


tivities, anomalies  would  stand  out  clear- 
ly. Governments  would  know  with 
reasonable  certainty  what  was  supposed 
to  happen.  If  a  departure  from  the 
routine  pattern  occurred,  they  would 
have  some  time  to  clarify  the  situation 
before  political  tensions  escalated  or  in 
time  to  take  counteraction  against  a  real 
threat.  The  result,  over  time,  should  be 
an  increase  in  confidence  and  stability 
among  the  participating  countries. 
The  six  points  of  the  Western 
package  are,  as  required  by  the  mandate 
for  the  Stockholm  conference,  militarily 
significant,  politically  binding,  verifiable, 
and  applicable  to  the  whole  of  Europe. 
The  Helsinki  measures  were  less  mean- 
ingful in  military  terms.  They  applied 
only  to  part  of  Europe,  most  of  the 
European  Soviet  Union  being  excluded. 
Exercises  to  be  notified  were  larger. 
The  notification  period  was  only  21 
days,  as  opposed  to  45.  There  was  no 
exchange  of  information  to  establish  a 
base  of  knowledge.  There  was  no  annual 
forecast.  And  the  Helsinki  measures 
were  largely  voluntary.  The  measures 
proposed  by  the  West  in  Stockholm  are 
meant  to  be  mandatory. 

Hoary  Ideas 

All  35  states,  to  one  degree  or  another, 
have  supported  an  expansion  of  the 
measures  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  But, 
of  course,  differences  exist.  The  Soviet 
Union  chose  for  Stockholm  a  collection 
of  rather  hoary  ideas,  which  are  hardly 
the  grist  for  a  serious  security  negotia- 
tion. This  incongi'uous  approach,  draw- 
ing on  a  stock  of  old  proposals,  would  be 
compatible  with  the  thesis  that  Moscow 
has  still  not  fully  assessed  the  potential 
of  the  Stockholm  conference. 

At  the  outset,  however,  Soviet 
behavior  in  Stockholm  has  been  consist- 
ent with  at  least  one  of  the  goals  they 
have  pursued  throughout  the  Helsinki 
process:  the  Soviet  Union  has  tried  to 
use  the  conference  for  image-building, 
attempting  to  portray  Moscow  as  the 
defender  of  peace  and  the  United  States 
and  some  of  its  allies  as  aggressive, 
militaristic  adventurers.  The  Soviet 
Union  has  also  sought  to  find  and  ex- 
ploit differences  between  the  United 
States  and  Europe.  This  self-serving  ap- 
proach has  not  caught  on  either  among 
other  delegations  or  with  the  European 
or  American  publics,  but  it  has 
prevented  the  conference  from  getting 
quickly  down  to  business. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  raised  two  ob- 
jectives to  the  Western  proposals.  It 
claims  that  they  amount  to  "legalized  es- 
pionage" and  that  they  are  technical  and 


ARMS  CONTROL 


too  trivial  to  affect  the  security  situa- 
tions that  exists  today  in  Europe. 

While  it  is  true  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  a  closed  society  in  which 
routine  information  is  much  harder  to 
obtain  than  in  the  West,  it  is  not  true 
that  the  Western  measures  seek  to  ex- 
pose important  secrets  of  the  Soviet 
military  establishment.  The  information 
exchange  and  forecast  measures  ask  for 
facts  which  frequently  are  already 
available  in  the  public  domain.  The 
notification  measure  involves  only  field 
exercises,  not  other  sensitive  areas.  Nor 
would  observers  prowl  at  will  all  over 
Soviet  or  any  other  territory.  They 
would  visit  the  area  where  field  training 
exercises  were  taking  place.  Even  the 
most  superficial  examination  of  the 
Western  measures  deflates  the  conten- 
tion that  they  aim  at  any  kind  of  es- 
pionage. 

The  second  Soviet  charge  is  that  the 
Western  proposals  involve  trivial 
technical  matters  which  would  do  little 
or  nothing  to  enhance  security  in 
Europe.  For  its  part,  the  Warsaw  Pact 
has  offered  six  alternative  proposals: 
agreements  on  the  non-use  of  force,  the 
non-first-use  of  nuclear  weapons,  nuclear 
weapons-free  zones,  reduction  of 
military  budgets,  a  chemical  weapons 
ban  in  Europe,  and  expansion  of  the 
confidence-building  measures  of  the 
Helsinki  accords. 

Many  of  these  ideas  have  been 
around  for  a  long  time,  some  for  a 
quarter  of  a  century  or  more,  and  they 
have  failed  in  all  that  time  to  gain  con- 
sensus among  the  states  now  par- 
ticipating in  the  Stockholm  conference. 
Furthermore,  the  chemical  weapons  ban 
is  currently  being  negotiated  in  Geneva. 
The  United  Nations  annually  tries  to 
carry  on  a  study  of  military  budgets, 
where  the  Soviets  and  their  allies  have 
been  entirely  uncooperative. 

The  non-use  of  force  proposal,  usual- 
ly combined  with  a  proposal  not  to  be 
the  first  to  use  nuclear  weapons,  has 
emerged  as  the  flagship  of  the  Warsaw 
Pact's  entries.  The  Western  countries 
have  never  questioned  the  principle  of 
non-use  of  force;  we  all  subscribe  to  it  in 
the  UN  Charter,  the  Helsinki  Final  Act, 
and,  most  recently,  in  the  concluding 
document  of  the  Madrid  CSCE  review 
meeting  last  year.  The  point  that  we 
have  made  in  Stockholm  is  that  the  prin- 
ciple must  now  be  given  effect  and  ex- 
pression through  an  agreement  on  prac- 
tical measures  which  will  affect  the 
everyday  behavior  of  the  35  par- 
ticipating countries  and  their  military 
establishments.  In  order  to  make  clear 
the  American  view  on  this  issue,  Presi- 


24 


dent  Reagan,  in  a  major  policy  state- 
ment on  June  4,  announced  explicitly 
that  "if  discussions  on  reaffirming  the 
principle  not  to  use  force,  a  principle  in 
which  we  believe  so  deeply,  will  bring 
the  Soviet  Union  to  negotiate 
agreements  which  will  give  concrete, 
new  meaning  to  that  principle,  we  will 
gladly  enter  into  such  discussions." 

In  expressing  Western  willingness  to 
meet  the  Soviet  concerns  and  to  explore 
every  reasonable  avenue  for  progress  to 
serious  negotiations,  the  President  clear- 
ly and  specifically  identified  the  context 
in  which  the  non-use  of  force  principle 
must  be  approached.  "Mere  restatement 
of  a  principle  all  nations  have  agreed  to 
in  the  UN  charter  and  elsewhere,"  he 
said,  "would  be  an  inadequate  conclusion 
to  a  conference  whose  mandate  calls  for 
much  more.  We  must  translate  the  idea 
into  actions  which  build  effective  bar- 
riers against  the  use  of  force  in 
Europe."  The  United  States  is  prepared 
to  discuss  reaffirmation  of  the  principle 
of  non-use  of  force;  the  discussion  must 
be  in  the  context  of  negotiations  on 
measures  that  will  have  a  real  impact  on 
military  activities  in  Europe. 

Proposals  made  in  the  Stockholm 
conference  by  the  Soviet  Union,  in  fact, 
recognize  such  a  context.  The  Soviet 
Union,  supported  by  other  Warsaw 
treaty  organization  countries,  has  pro- 
posed an  expansion  of  the  Helsinki 
confidence-building  measures  in  ways 
that  could  prove  to  be  similar  in  kind  to 
proposals  offered  by  NATO  countries 
and  by  the  neutral  and  nonaligned  coun- 
tries in  the  conference.  These  proposals 
remain  on  the  periphery  of  the  Eastern 
presentations;  the  West  hopes  they  will 
move  closer  to  the  center  of  understand- 
ing shared  by  nearly  all  the  other  par- 
ticipants in  the  conference.  In  keeping 
with  President  Reagan's  June  4  initia- 
tive, the  West  is  seeking  to  encourage 
the  East  to  recognize  the  possibilities  for 
progress  and  move  to  join  the  devel- 
oping consensus. 

A  Time  for  Choice 

Some  observers,  especially  in  the  East, 
like  to  characterize  the  current  interna- 
tional situation  as  a  time  of  deep  crisis 
between  East  and  West,  a  time  of  ten- 
sion so  great  that  normal  discourse  be- 
tween East  and  West  is  all  but  impossi- 
ble. The  necessity  for  choice  remains, 
however,  no  matter  how  one 
characterizes  the  current  European 
scene,  reacts  to  it,  or  allocates  the  credit 
for  it.  The  35  nations  of  the  Stockholm 
conference  are  beginning  the  process  of 


deciding,  incrementally,  what  to  makt 
this  new  forum.  This  includes  the  Sov 
Union,  of  course,  and  the  evidence  suj 
gests  that  Moscow,  even  though  its 
grand  strategy  and  ultimate  objective 
remain  unchanged,  is  now  far  from  a 
tain  how  it  should  proceed  with  its 
original  idea  of  a  European  security 
conference  under  present-day  cir- 
cumstances. 

For  the  Atlantic  alliance,  the  proc 
of  inventing  and  agreeing  on  the  six 
confidence-  and  security-building 
measures  tabled  by  the  alliance  on 
January  24  required  an  effort  which 
testifies  to  the  alliance's  intentions  in 
Stockholm.  The  neutral  or  nonalignec 
group  of  nations  also  accepts  the  proj 
osition  that  the  Stockholm  conference 
can  be  a  path  to  genuine  improvemen 
in  security.  Thus  the  majority  of  par- 
ticipants already  agree  that  the  potei 
of  Stockholm  should  be  seriously  ex- 
plored. 

The  Soviet  Union  now  faces  a  chi 
of  whether  to  exaggerate  differences 
its  relations  with  the  West  or  to  try, 
Stockholm,  the  path  of  greater  coope 
tion,  looking  not  for  unilateral  gain  b 
for  mutual  advantage.  Relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Sov 
Union  are  not  destined  to  be  trouble- 
free.  There  will  always  be  competitiv 
elements  in  relations  between  system 
with  such  different  social,  political,  a 
economic  values.  But  limited  coopera  ') 
is  possible  in  security  affairs  as  in  oti  * 
areas. 

If  the  Soviet  Union  decides  that  i 
interests  lie  in  following  a  cooperativ 
rather  than  an  adversarial  course,  th 
Stockholm  conference  can  make  a  st; 
toward  improving  the  stability  of  the 
current  system  of  international  secui 
In  so  doing,  it  can  lay  the  foundation 
confidence  and  experience  essential  1 
more  ambitious  and  complex  negotia 
tions  in  the  future. 

In  itself,  the  Stockholm  conferen 
can  be  a  forum  of  cooperative  action 
fering  an  opportunity  to  restart  the 
ternational  dialogue  and  improve  the 
climate  of  relations  among  states.  W 
is  needed  now  is  a  commitment  from 
35  participating  states,  including  the 
Soviet  Union,  to  seize  that  opportuni 


'National  technical  means  (NTM)  reft 
assets  which  are  under  national  control  fi 
monitoring  compliance  with  the  provision 
an  agreement.  NTM  includes  photograph 
reconnaissance  satellites,  aircraft-based 
systems  (such  as  radar  and  optical  systen 
as  well  as  sea-  and  ground-based  systems 
(such  as  radars  and  antenna  for  collectinf 
telemetry).  ■ 


fit: 


r\an^rtmar,t  nf  Qt=itQ  Pull  ll«k. 


\ST  ASIA 


.S.  Activities  on  POW-MIA  Issue 


Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
\.sian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
'^e  Foreicpi  Affairs  Committee  on 
'ust  8.  198Jf.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is  As- 
mt  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
if ic  Affairs.^ 

ank  you  for  the  opportunity  to  ap- 
'  before  this  committee  and  the 
V-MIA  Task  Force  to  discuss  U.S. 
ernment  efforts  to  obtain  the  fullest 
ible  accounting  for  Americans  still 
ing  in  Southeast  Asia  as  a  result  of 
Indochina  war. 


ninistration  Commitment 

e  I  last  spoke  before  this  committee, 
;ident  Reagan  has  reemphasized  his 
ional  concern  about  this  issue  on 
lerous  occasions  and  reaffirmed  his 
ninistration's  commitment  to  make 
jress  in  resolving  the  POW-MIA 
;tion. 

In  his  May  28  remarks  at  the 
norial  Day  ceremony  honoring  the 
:nown  Soldier  of  the  Vietnam  war, 
President  said,  "We  write  no  last 
Dters.  We  close  no  books.  We  put 
,y  no  final  memories.  An  end  to 
erica's  involvement  in  Vietnam  can- 
come  before  we've  achieved  the 
;st  possible  accounting  of  those  miss- 
in  action."  And  in  his  remarks  at  the 
te  House  on  the  occasion  of  National 
V-MIA  Recognition  Day  [July  20, 
4],  the  President  told  the  families  of 
;e  still  missing  in  Indochina.  "I'm 
dful  that  you  gave  your  sons  and 
Dands  and  fathers  into  the  care  of 
government  when  they  left  to  fight 
our  nation.  You  knew  they  might  die 
attle.  But  you  had,  and  will  always 
3,  every  right  to  expect  that  your 
ernment  will  not  abandon  those  who 
!d  to  return." 

Despite  our  many  actions  to  resolve 
issue,  the  ultimate  key  to  resolution 
his  tragedy  must  necessarily  be  a 
sion  to  cooperate  by  the  Govern- 
its  of  Vietnam  and  Laos.  It  is  only 
I  their  cooperation  that  real  progress 
be  made.  We  are  pressing  those 
ernments  for  full  cooperation  as  a 
,ter  of  highest  national  priority,  and 
will  continue  to  do  so  as  long  as 
ssary  to  achieve  the  fullest  possible 
Dunting  for  those  missing  from  the 
flict  in  Indochina. 


Slow  Progress  From  Vietnam 

Progress  with  Vietnam  on  resolving  this 
issue  has  been  disappointingly  slow,  but 
developments  in  recent  weeks  offer 
room  for  some  hope. 

Hanoi  returned  the  remains  of  nine 
persons  following  the  last  POW-MIA 
technical  meeting  in  Hanoi  in  June  1983. 
Then,  as  you  recall,  despite  their  agree- 
ment to  treat  the  POW-MIA  issue  as  a 
humanitarian  one,  separate  from  other 
issues,  the  Vietnamese  suspended  our 
regular  quarterly  technical  meetings. 
They  cited  what  they  characterized  as 
"hostile"  American  statements  as  the 
reason. 

Shortly  thereafter,  discussions  began 
which  resulted  in  Vietnam's  agreement 
to  receive  the  highest  level  executive 
branch  delegation  to  visit  Vietnam  since 
the  end  of  the  war.  This  delegation, 
which  was  led  by  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Defense  Armitage,  included  a  member 
of  the  National  Security  Council  staff, 
the  executive  director  of  the  National 
League  of  Families,  and  two  Depart- 
ment of  State  officials. 

As  a  result  of  these  February  1984 
discussions  in  Hanoi,  both  sides  agreed 
that  cooperation  in  resolving  the 
POW-MIA  problem  would  be  pursued  as 
a  separate  humanitarian  issue,  not 
linked  to  other  matters  which  divide  our 
two  countries.  Our  delegation  impressed 
on  the  Vietnamese  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment's desire  to  move  beyond  the  unac- 
ceptably  low  level  of  past  cooperation 
and,  instead,  to  work  together  seriously 
to  remove  what  is  the  primary  bilateral 
obstacle  to  improvement  of  the  at- 
mosphere between  the  two  countries. 
The  Vietnamese  stated  their  intention  to 
accelerate  efforts  to  resolve  the 
POW-MIA  issue  and  to  concentrate  ini- 
tially on  the  cases  involving  the  more  ac- 
cessible sites.  The  Vietnamese  offered  to 
resume  regularly  scheduled  technical 
meetings  in  the  near  future.  During  the 
same  discussions,  they  agreed  to  turn 
over  five  sets  of  remains  and  indicated  a 
willingness  to  turn  over  three  others 
that  had  been  previously  promised  to  a 
private  group  of  Americans. 

The  Vietnamese  have  fulfilled  two  of 
their  promises  since  the  February 
discussions.  On  July  17  they  handed 
over  the  remains  of  eight  persons  to  an 
American  military  team.  We  welcome 
the  return  of  these  remains,  but  we 
must  recognize  that  the  pace  is  painfully 


slow.  One  thousand  eight  hundred  twen- 
ty-six Americans  are  still  missing  in 
Vietnam  alone;  government-to- 
government  negotiations  have  thus  far 
resulted  in  only  95  remains  repatriated 
by  the  Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam  and 
subsequently  identified  as  Americans. 
(The  Chinese  turned  over  two  additional 
remains  and  the  Lao  one  which  have 
been  identified  as  Americans  and  were 
the  result  of  negotiated  efforts.) 

On  resumption  of  technical 
meetings,  Hanoi  first  agreed  to,  and 
then  abruptly  cancelled,  a  mid-April  ses- 
sion. They  expressed  an  unwillingness  to 
schedule  another  technical  meeting  until 
just  a  few  weeks  ago.  They  again 
claimed  that  a  "hostile"  American  at- 
titude was  the  reason  for  this  delay.  We 
are  pleased  to  report,  however,  that  the 
first  in  a  resumed  series  of  technical 
meetings  has  now  been  set  for  next 
week. 

We  hope  the  Vietnamese  will  fulfill 
all  of  the  commitments  they  made  dur- 
ing the  visit  of  the  Armitage  delegation, 
including  their  longstanding  agreement 
that  resolution  of  the  POW-MIA  issue  is 
a  humanitarian  matter  to  be  dealt  with 
separately  from  other  issues  dividing 
Vietnam  and  the  United  States.  We 
have  told  the  Vietnamese  that  we  are 
prepared  to  recognize  publicly  any 
significant  steps  they  take  toward 
resolution  of  this  issue,  as  the  President 
did  in  his  July  20  statement. 

At  the  same  time,  we  will  continue 
to  speak  out  frankly  about  this  issue  and 
to  express  fully  justified  concern  about 
the  inadequate  pace  of  cooperation. 
Secretary  of  State  Shultz  underlined  the 
importance  of  the  POW-MIA  issue  and 
its  relevance  for  our  relations  with  Viet- 
nam, when  he  said  to  the  ASEAN 
[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions] meeting  in  Jakarta:  "The  United 
States  has  both  a  legal  and  moral 
responsibility  to  obtain  the  fullest  possi- 
ble accounting  of  almost  2,500  of  our 
men  still  missing.  The  American  people 
rightfully  expect  no  less.  We  deeply  ap- 
preciate the  support  you  have  given  us 
with  Vietnam  on  this  problem.  It  is  a 
problem  which  demands  meaningful 
cooperation  and  progress  before  the 
American  people  will  permit  discussion 
of  normalization  with  the  Vietnamese, 
even  in  the  context  of  a  Kampuchea  set- 
tlement." 

We  believe  that  we  have  the  support 
of  the  Congress  and  American  people  in 
urging  Vietnam  to  honor  its  pledge  to 
resolve  this  issue.  As  the  President 
stated  on  Memorial  Day,  "Today,  a 
united  people  call  upon  Hanoi  with  one 


9>; 


EAST  ASIA 


voice:  Heal  the  sorest  wound  of  this  con- 
flict. Return  our  sons  to  America.  End 
the  grief  of  those  who  are  innocent  and 
undeserving  of  any  retribution." 

Signs  of  Progress  With  Laos 

Following  the  President's  statement  to 
the  League  of  Families  in  January  1983 
that  we  are  prepared  to  improve  rela- 
tions between  Laos  and  the  United 
States,  with  progress  on  the  POW-MIA 
issue  as  the  principal  measure  of  Lao 
sincerity,  we  have  closely  pursued  the 
POW-MIA  issue  with  the  Lao  Govern- 
ment and  can  report  modest  progress. 

In  October  1983,  I  met  with  the  Lao 
Foreign  Minister  during  the  UN  General 
Assembly  to  stress  our  interest  in  the 
POW-MIA  issue.  I  reaffirmed  that  the 
United  States  would  cooperate  in  our 
mutual  effort  to  improve  bilateral  rela- 
tions and  informed  him  that  we  would 
henceforth  vote  in  favor  of  loans  for 
Laos  by  multilateral  lending  institutions 
which  otherwise  meet  our  criteria. 
Shortly  thereafter  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  John  Monjo  and  Na- 
tional Security  Council  staff  member 
Richard  Childress  met  with  a  Lao  Vice 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  other 
officials  in  Vientiane  to  propose  joint 
Lao-American  searches  of  crash  sites  of 
American  aircraft  downed  during  the 
war. 

In  December  1983,  at  the  invitation 
of  the  Lao  Government,  a  team  of  U.S. 
POW-MIA  experts  conducted  a 
preliminary  survey  of  the  crash  site  of 
an  American  aircraft  downed  during  the 
war  near  Pakse,  Laos.  In  January  we 
proposed  to  the  Lao  a  joint  excavation 
of  that  site  to  search  for  remains.  Ex- 
cavation of  the  crash  site  will  not  be 
possible  until  the  dry  season  at  the  end 
of  this  year,  but  we  and  the  Lao  have 
been  discussing  details  of  this  joint 
operation.  Last  month,  as  the  President 
announced  in  his  July  20  address  to  the 
League  of  Families,  the  Lao  Govern- 
ment agreed  in  principle  to  the  excava- 
tion. 

I  am  encouraged  by  this  sign  of 
progress  and  cooperation  from  the  Lao 
and  hope  that  we  can  soon  reach  agree- 
ment on  the  specific  details  of  the  ex- 
cavation. We  look  forward  to  the  pros- 
pect of  excavating  other  crash  sites  in 
Laos. 

As  I  noted  earlier,  we  and  the  Lao 
Government  have  agreed  that  each  of  us 
will  try  to  take  concrete  steps  to  im- 
prove relations.  Although  there  is  no 
direct  link  between  what  we  do  and 
what  they  do,  an  honest  effort  by  both 


26 


sides  will  further  the  POW-MIA  ac- 
counting process.  I  should  mention  in 
this  regard  that  we  have  recently  taken 
the  opportunity  to  demonstrate  our 
desire  for  better  relations  with  Laos  by 
responding  to  an  emergency  food  short- 
age caused  by  irregular  monsoon  rains. 
The  United  States  has  joined  other  na- 
tions—particularly Sweden,  Japan,  and 
Australia — in  providing  Laos  with 
emergency  food  aid.  Laos  accepted  our 
offer  of  some  5,000  tons  of  California 
glutinous  rice  under  the  PL  480  (Food 
for  Peace)  Title  II  program.  We  are 
working  with  the  World  Food  Program 
to  arrange  distribution  of  this  rice  to 
those  areas  most  severely  affected. 

The  foreign  assistance  legislation 
now,  of  course,  prohibits  development 
assistance  to  Laos.  We  have  told  Lao  of- 
ficials that  action  to  lift  this  congres- 
sional ban  would  be  possible  only  after  a 
pattern  of  sustained  cooperation  has 
been  established  toward  resolving  the 
fate  of  Americans  missing  in  Laos  from 
the  war  in  Indochina.  If  future  progress 
develops  into  a  pattern  of  sustained 
cooperation,  we  would  consult  with 
Members  of  Congress  on  the  question  of 
lifting  the  ban. 

Kampuchea 

Our  policy  of  firm  support  for  the  ap- 
proach of  ASEAN  to  the  Kampuchean 
problem  is  well  known  and  was  recently 
reaffirmed  by  Secretary  of  State  Shultz 
in  his  meeting  with  the  Foreigji 
Ministers  of  the  six  ASEAN  countries  in 
Jakarta. 

The  Heng  Samrin  regime,  which  was 
installed  in  Phnom  Penh  by  the  Viet- 
namese, joined  the  Foreign  Ministers  of 
Vietnam  and  Laos  last  January  in  a 
communique  which  stated  that  the  three 
countries  would  share  POW-MIA  infor- 
mation. They  indicated  a  readiness  to 
cooperate  with  the  United  States  on  the 
POW-MIA  issue  due  to  the  increased  in- 
terest of  the  American  people,  if  we 
would  "change  our  attitude."  A  senior 
Heng  Samrin  regime  official  made  a 
similar  offer  to  cooperate  with  the 
United  States  in  a  meeting  with  a 
delegation  from  a  private  American 
relief  organization. 

The  Heng  Samrin  regime  does  not 
have  control  over  the  entire  country, 
and  there  is  reason  to  question  whether 
it  could  carry  out  the  kind  of  careful  in- 
vestigation required  to  account  for  miss- 
ing Americans.  Any  available  informa- 
tion on  Americans  missing  in  Kam- 
puchea would  almost  certainly  be  known 
to  the  Vietnamese,,  who  exercise  de  facto 
control  there  as  they  did  in  many  areas 


of  Kampuchea  during  the  Vietnam  wa; 
If  Hanoi  does  have  such  information,  c 
finds  it  in  the  future,  we  will  look  to 
them  to  cooperate  with  us  in  the  same 
way  that  they  are  pledged  to  do  in  the 
case  of  Americans  missing  in  Vietnam 
At  the  same  time,  we  have  asked  an  ii 
ternational  humanitarian  organization 
(which  has  asked  not  to  be  identified)  ■ 
contact  the  Phnom  Penh  authorities  tc 
transmit  to  us  any  information  they  n- 
be  willing  to  provide  on  Americans  mi 
ing  in  Kampuchea.  So  far  no  such  infc 
mation  has  been  forthcoming. 


Efforts  With  Other  Governments 


We  actively  seek  the  cooperation  of 
other  governments  in  making  known  i 
the  Vietnamese  and  Lao  Governments 
our  concern  about  the  POW-MIA  issi 
In  June  of  last  year  Secretary  Shultz 
raised  the  POW-MIA  issue  with  the  f 
Foreign  Ministers  of  ASEAN  in 
Bangkok.  They  said  they  would  do  wl 
they  could  to  help,  and  several  useful 
contacts  were  made  as  a  result.  Our 
allies  and  a  number  of  other  countries 
both  Europe  and  Asia  are  sympatheti 
and  constructive  concerning  this 
humanitarian  issue.  Such  approaches 
bring  home  to  the  two  governments  t 
importance  attached  to  this  problem  1 
international  opinion  and  make  clear 
that  the  POW-MIA  issue  can  have  ar 
effect  on  broader  Vietnamese  and  La 
foreign  policy  interests. 

During  the  past  year  we  made  an 
across-the-board  effort  to  advise  all 
friendly  countries  with  missions  in  H; 
of  our  interest  in  the  POW-MIA  issu 

I  wish  I  could  express  publicly  oi; 
appreciation  for  the  efforts  of  all  the 
countries  that  have  helped,  but  their 
preference — and  the  need  to  give  qui 
diplomacy  a  chance  to  work — require^  ik 
that  I  not  do  so. 

American  allies  have  cooperated 
with  our  efforts  to  contact  Indochine 
refugees  resettled  in  their  countries 
information  about  POW-MIAs.  Our  ■ 
forts  have  also  been  directed  toward 
refugees  resettled  in  other  countries 
who  have  been  reported  to  have  rele 
information. 

Southeast  Asian  governments  ha 
expressed  understanding  of  and  sym 
pathy  for  our  POW-MIA  efforts  and 
have  assisted  our  attempts  to  screen 
refugees  from  Indochina  for  POW-^ 
information.  The  Royal  Thai  and  Hoi 
Kong  Governments  have  been  most 
helpful  in  granting  special  access  for 
American  POW-MIA  specialists  to  e 
camps  housing  refugees  from  Vietna 
Laos,  and  Kampuchea  which  are  nor 


se 


W 


Deoartment  of  State  Bull  li 


EAST  ASIA 


j  *»  losed  to  outsiders.  The  refugee 
""■(  lening  program,  however,  requires 

"(  stant  monitoring  because  of  changing 
'^'\  iitions,  among  them  changing  volun- 

1  '  agencies  and  host-country  officials. 
I'^-'  i  year  my  Department  and  the 
I*' I  lartment  of  Defense  again  reviewed 

I  programs  to  ensure,  as  much  as 
ible,  that  refugees  know  of  our  in- 
st. 

^ragency  Effort 

Department  of  State  chairs  the  in- 
igency  POW-MIA  group  and  par- 
lates  fully  in  the  planning  of  U.S.  ac- 
is  aimed  at  making  progress  on  the 
MIA  issue.  We  have  taken  the 
iS  in  efforts  to  improve  our  overall 
.tions  with  Laos,  in  developing  a 
.tegy  to  deal  with  the  Vietnamese  on 
issue,  and  in  approaches  to  other 
ernments. 

The  POW-MIA  policy  is  formulated 
participating  interagency  members: 
Department  of  State,  the  Depart- 
it  of  Defense,  including  the  Joint 
efs  of  Staff  and  the  Defense  In- 
gence  Agency,  the  National  Security 
moil,  and  the  Executive  Director  of 
League  of  Families,  whose  long  ex- 
ience  on  this  issue  and  depth  of 
■wledge  of  family  concerns  has  been 
iluable.  Staff  members  of  the  House 
Senate  also  participate  in  the  in- 
igency  group. 

We  strongly  encourage  support  from 
'ate  Americans  for  our  POW-MIA 
)rts.  Public  support  is  the  backbone 
Iiur  policy.  At  the  same  time,  we 
rher  support  nor  condone  forays  by 
J 'ate  Americans  in  search  of  remains 
prisoners.  Such  actions  jeopardize  the 
I  ernment-to-government  efforts  which 
I  the  only  viable  channel  for  resolution 
I  .he  POW-MIA  issue.  In  addition,  it 
I  been  our  experience  that  they  often 
rate  on  fabricated  or  faulty  informa- 
1  and  thus  only  add  to  the  misunder- 
ndings  and  misperceptions  involved  in 
;  issue. 

Making  progress  on  the  POW-MIA 
le  clearly  requires  a  long-term  effort. 
3  U.S.  Government,  supported  by  the 
lerican  people,  can  be  successful  in 
•suading  Hanoi  to  cooperate  on  the 
W-MIA  issue.  We  believe  that  we 
'e  such  support  and  join  with  the 
jsident  in  saying  that,  "Today,  a 
ted  people  call  on  Hanoi  with  one 
ce." 


Continuation  of  MFN  Status  for  China 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
ivailable  from  the  Superintendent  of 
uments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


by  William  A.  Brown 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Trade  of  the  Senate 
Finance  Committee  on  August  8,  198J,. 
Mr.  Brown  is  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs. ' 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  testify 
before  this  subcommittee  as  part  of  an 
Administrative  panel  concerning  the  ex- 
tension of  the  President's  general  waiver 
authority  under  Section  402(c)  of  the 
Trade  Act  and  the  continuation  of  the 
specific  waivers  permitting  most- 
favored-nation  (MFN)  treatment  for 
China,  Hungary,  and  Romania.  My 
testimony  will  address  the  waiver  for 
China. 

Development  of  strong,  stable,  and 
enduring  relations  with  China  has  been  a 
foreign  policy  objective  of  four  con- 
secutive Administrations.  President 
Reagan  has  reiterated  that  "such  a  rela- 
tionship is  vital  to  our  long-term  na- 
tional security  interests  and  contributes 
to  stability  in  East  Asia.  Economic 
development  has  become  China's  top 
priority,  and  China  has  opened  the  door 
to  foreign  trade  and  investment.  Accord- 
ingly, our  bilateral  economic  relationship 
has  moved  to  the  forefront  of  our 
developing  ties  with  China.  As  this  rela- 
tionship has  grown,  disagreements  have 
naturally  arisen  in  some  areas.  We  can 
expect  that  other  problems  will  come  up 
in  a  trading  relationship  which  is 
dynamic  and  which  involves  two  very 
different  trade  and  legal  systems. 
Nevertheless,  we  believe  the  prospects 
are  good  for  further  growth  of  our 
economic  ties. 

Trade  and  Investment 

Bilateral  trade  has  increased  dramatical- 
ly in  recent  years.  Overall,  China  ranks 
22d  among  our  world  trading  partners, 
while  we  are  China's  third  largest 
trading  partner,  after  Japan  and  Hong 
Kong.  Last  year,  two-way  trade  totaled 
$4.4  billion,  a  four-fold  increase  over 
1978  but  20%  less  than  1981's  $5.5 
billion.  In  most  years,  the  United  States 
has  maintained  a  trade  surplus.  Sales  of 
U.S.  agricultural  products  declined  last 
year,  and  we  are  concerned  about  the 
slow  pace  of  Chinese  grain  purchases 
under  the  U.S. -China  grain  agreement 
so  far  this  year.  At  the  same  time. 


however,  the  volume  of  high-technology 
manufactured  products  exported  to 
China  has  grown  steadily,  reflecting 
China's  development  needs  and  our  own 
liberalized  export  guidelines.  Last  year, 
the  dollar  value  of  export  licenses  ap- 
proved for  high-technology  shipments  to 
China  was  about  $1  billion  and  will  prob- 
ably exceed  $L5  billion  in  1984. 

American  business  has  not  hesitated 
to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunities 
for  investment  in  China.  The  United 
States  stands  as  China's  number  one 
source  of  foreign  investment  in  equity 
joint  ventures  and  commitments  to  ex- 
plore for  offshore  oil  and  gas.  Twenty 
U.S.  firms  account  for  25%  of  China's 
total  direct  foreign  investment  ($85 
million  out  of  $340  million).  Twelve  U.S. 
oil  companies  have  made  commitments 
to  spend  $500-600  million  in  exploring 
for  oil  off  China's  coast.  U.S.  firms  are 
also  expected  to  participate  in  a  major 
coal  mining  project  in  China's  Shanxi 
Province,  which  could  involve  U.S. 
equipment  exports  amounting  to  over 
$300  million.  The  prospects  are  excellent 
that  investment  and  trade  opportunities 
for  U.S.  firms  will  continue  to  expand  as 
China  seeks  foreign  help  in  modernizing 
existing  industries  and  in  developing 
new  ones,  in  fields  such  as  telecom- 
munications, electronics,  instrumenta- 
tion, and  electrical  power  generation. 

The  opportunities  for  U.S.  trade  and 
mvestment  with  China  are  enhanced  by 
the  series  of  government-to-government 
economic  agreements  that  we  have  con- 
cluded and  will  conclude  with  China.    . 
Agreements  on  trade,  civil  aviation, 
grain,  textiles,  and  claims  and  assets, 
among  others,  now  form  the  basis  for 
the  expansion  of  economic  relations. 
Work  programs  under  our  science  and 
technology  agreement  and  our  industrial 
and  technological  cooperation  accord 
contribute  to  China's  development  and 
create  opportunities  for  American 
business.  During  President  Reagan's 
visit  to  China  in  April,  a  new  tax  agree- 
ment was  signed  which  will  promote  fur- 
ther commercial  relationships  with 
China.  We  will  hold  further  discussions 
on  an  investment  agreement  with  the 
Chinese. 

As  the  economic  relationship  has 
grown,  so  have  official  and  unofficial  ex- 
changes which  promote  longer  bilateral 
relations.  For  example,  there  are  21 
U.S.  media  organizations  with  offices  in 
Beijing,  nearly  200  U.S.  firms  with  of- 
fices in  China,  more  than  80  U.S. 


ober 1984 


EUROPE 


universities  that  maintain  affiliations 
with  about  120  Chinese  schools,  and 
more  than  20  American  States  and  cities 
that  have  sister  relationships  with  their 
Chinese  counterparts.  At  the  same  time, 
over  200  Chinese  delegations  visit  the 
United  States  each  month,  and 
American  tourists  to  China  numbered 
more  than  168,000  last  year. 

Travel  and  Emigration 

China's  decision  to  speed  up  the  pace  of 
developments  by  greater  reliance  on 
foreign  goods  and  technology  has  been 
accompanied  by  some  liberalization  in 
the  area  of  emigration.  Travel  restric- 
tions have  been  relaxed  and  simplified 
for  both  immigrants  and  short-term 
travelers.  There  are  currently  more  than 
10,000  Chinese  students  and  scholars  in 
this  country.  In  addition,  last  year  some 
11,000  business  visas  were  issued  to 
Chinese  citizens.  At  the  same  time,  our 
China  posts  issued  nearly  10,000  im- 
migrant visas.  There  are  over  60,000 
Chinese  with  approved  visa  petitions 
waiting  for  their  turn  to  immigrate  to 
the  United  States,  most  of  whom  have 
close  family  members  already  living 
here. 

China's  commitment  to  more  liberal 
emigration  practices  is  reflected  in  the 
bilateral  U.S.-China  consular  convention, 
which  has  been  in  effect  for  2  years.  In 
diplomatic  notes  accompanying  the  con- 
vention, both  sides  agreed  to  facilitate 
travel  for  the  purpose  of  family 
reunification  and  also  to  facilitate  travel 
between  the  two  countries  of  persons 
with  simultaneous  claims  to  the  na- 
tionality of  the  United  States  and  of 
China. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  Chinese 
emigration  is  problem  free.  China,  like 
many  developing  countries,  is  concerned 
about  potential  brain  drain.  Current 
Chinese  regulations  restrict  foreign 
study  by  Chinese  university  students  un- 
til they  complete  their  Chinese  education 
and  work  for  2  years.  In  addition,  local 
work  units  may  be  slow  to  approve 
departure,  and  officials  are  sometimes 
reluctant  to  issue  passports  and  exit  per- 
mits to  persons  whose  emigration  might 
create  gaps  in  modernization  efforts. 
There  is  no  evidence,  however,  of  any 
policy  aimed  at  inhibiting  the  emigration 
of  those  with  legitimate  family  ties 
abroad,  although  many  encounter 
bureaucratic  delays  in  obtaining 
passports  and  exit  permits. 


The  principal  obstacle  to  emigration 
from  China  remains  the  limited  ability  or 
willingness  of  other  countries  to  receive 
the  large  numbers  of  people  able  and 
willing  to  immigrate.  In  the  case  of  the 
United  States,  our  numerical  limitation 
on  immigrants  from  each  country  cannot 
keep  up  with  the  Chinese  demand.  For 
example,  applications  for  fifth  pref- 
erence immigration  (siblings  of  U.S. 
citizens)  stretch  back  to  1979,  implying 
at  least  a  5-year  wait  for  applicants  in 
this  category. 

Trade  is  a  fundamental  component 
of  China's  modernization  effort  and  an 


avenue  for  China's  further  integration  | 
into  the  community  of  nations.  China's 
advancement  toward  greater  modernia 
tion  and  integration  is  clearly  in  the 
American  interest,  and  MFN  treatment 
contributes  to  this.  The  Administration 
strongly  believes  that  the  continuation 
MFN  status  for  China  is  vital  to  our 
foreign  policy  interests.  | 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.-Bulgaria  Relations 


by  Richard  R.  Burt 

State-ment  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  European  and  Middle  East  Affa  irs 
and  the  Task  Force  on  International 
Narcotics  Control  of  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  on  July  24,  1984. 
Mr.  Burt  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
European  a,nd  Canadian  Affairs.  ^ 

I  thank  you  for  the  opportunity  to  ap- 
pear before  you  to  discuss  our  policy 
toward  Bulgaria. 

As  the  most  loyal  member  of  the 
Warsaw  Pact,  Bulgaria  evidences  the 
least  amount  of  differentiation  from  the 
Soviet  Union  in  its  political,  ideological, 
and  economic  policies.  For  years  the 
Bulgarian  leadership  evoked  an  almost 
symbiotic  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  They  seemed  to  fall  over 
themselves  to  defer  to  the  Soviets,  to 
echo  their  propaganda,  and  to  support 
them  in  every  single  issue  of  interna- 
tional importance.  Bulgarian  devotion  to 
the  Moscow  line  seemed  to  go  far 
beyond  their  obligation  under  existing 
political  realities,  surpassing  that  of 
their  partners  in  the  Warsaw  Pact.  One 
looked  hard  for  even  small  signs  of 
diversity.  Under  those  conditions,  there 
were  few  grounds  for  dialogue.  In  fact, 
during  the  decade  of  the  1950s,  we  did 
not  even  maintain  diplomatic  relations. 

Relations  were  reestablished  in 
1960,  but  little  has  happened.  Our  rela- 
tions with  Bulgaria  remain  at  a  low 
level.  Unlike  some  of  the  other  countries 
in  Eastern  Europe  with  which  our  rela- 
tions began  to  expand  in  keeping  with 
our  policy  of  differentiation,  we  have  not 
exchanged  high-level  political  visits  nor 


do  we  have  official  bilateral  commissioi 
on  economic  and  trade  development.  A 
Bulgaria  has  not  fulfilled  the  require- 
ments of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974,  we  do 
not  extend  most-favored-nation  (MFN) 
tariff  treatment  to  Bulgaria.  Nor  is 
Bulgaria  eligible  for  U.S.  Government 
trade  credits  or  guarantees. 

By  the  end  of  the  1970s,  Bulgaria 
began  paying  greater  attention  to 
developing  its  economic  and  commerci: 
ties  to  Western  Europe  and  the  Unitec 
States.  In  order  to  do  so,  its  leaders  a( 
cepted  a  broadened  political  and  cultm 
dialogue  with  us  on  matters  of  impor- 
tance to  us.  In  this  dialogue,  we  pressi 
for  improved  Bulgarian  adherence  to  t 
CSCE  [Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe]  principles- 
greater  contacts,  reunification  of  divid 
families,  and  human  rights  generally. 
We  pressed  the  Bulgarians  to  stop  jan 
ming  our  Bulgarian-language  Voice  of 
America  broadcasts.  We  pressed  then: 
on  persistent  allegations  and  reports  c 
official  Bulgarian  involvement  in  the  i 
legal  drug  trade  and  in  illegal  arms  sa 
to  terrorist  groups  in  the  Third  World 
and  the  Middle  East. 

The  results  of  our  efforts  have  bei 
on  balance,  disappointing.  In  the  area 
the  Helsinki  principles  and  human 
rights,  they  have  resolved  nearly  all  o 
the  longstanding  family  reunification 
cases  for  which  we  had  been  seeking 
solutions,  in  some  cases,  as  much  as  1 
years.  They  have  also  taken  steps  to 
facilitate  the  operation  of  our  Embass 
in  Sofia  and  improve  their  access  to 
Bulgarian  officials.  Last  fall,  they  re- 
ceived at  the  very  highest  level — 


i« 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


EUROPE 


■<;ident  Zhivkov — an  important 
Ration  from  this  House  led  by  Con- 
fsiiian  Gibbons  [Sam  M.  Gibbons, 

•la.l. 


:otics  Trafficking  and  Arms  Trade 

on  the  very  serious  issues  of 
;arian  involvement  in  the  illegal  nar- 
:s  and  illicit  arms  trade,  our 
esentations  have  produced  few 
Its.  Our  drug  enforcement  coopera- 
efforts  with  Bulgaria  have  been 
ed  into  propaganda  exercises  to 
onstrate  apparent  rather  than  real 
eration  in  eliminating  drug  traffick- 
Tom  Bulgaria.  Repeated  requests  by 
cey  for  extradition  of  known  Turkish 
otics  smugglers  have  been  refused, 
rmation  passed  by  our  Drug  En- 
jment  Administration  (DEA)  people 
it  known  narcotics  smugglers  in 
:aria  has  been  largely  ignored,  and, 
!ad,  we  have  been  given  statistics 
it  the  number  of  seizures  at  the 
,er.  Little  has  been  done  to  crack 
n  on  those  vnthin  the  country  who 
;  moving  drugs  and  illicit  arms  in  in- 
ational  trade. 

After  several  years  of  frustrating 
leration  that  produced  few  real  im- 
'ements  in  drug  enforcement,  we 
lended  customs  cooperation  with 
raria  in  1981.  We  reluctantly  came 
16  conclusion  that  the  relationship 
largely  fruitless  and  was  being 
ised  for  propaganda  purposes. 
Last  February  I  visited  Bulgaria, 
g  with  two  other  countries  in 
tern  Europe,  to  provide  that  close 
of  the  Soviet  Union  our  position  on 
s  control  and,  in  particular,  INF 
irmediate-range  nuclear  forces],  in 
context  of  Soviet  counter- 
oyments  in  Eastern  Europe.  I  also 
i  that  opportunity  to  make  un- 
akably  clear  our  continuing  interest 
concern  over  Bulgaria's  official  deal- 
in  or  toleration  of  the  international 
;otics  trade,  their  involvement  in  the 
t  arms  trade,  and  over  allegations  of 
ifjort  for  terrorist  groups.  I  stressed 
i:  there  could  be  no  marked  improve- 
mt  in  our  relations  until  these  con- 
'is  could  be  satisfied.  In  addition  to 
itri|),  I  note  that  representatives  of 
i\  also  have  been  in  Sofia  recently  to 
ivs  the  Bulgarians  and  will  be  continu- 
ijsuch  contacts. 
I  understand  that  there  are  recent 
Its  of  improved  Bulgarian  enforce- 
Kit  action  along  their  borders,  and 
I  ifieant  drug  seizures  have  been  an- 
iiiifd.  I  hope  these  reports  are  cor- 
: .  However,  there  has  been  insuffi- 


Bulgaria— A  Profile 


People 

Noun  and  adjective:  Bulgarian(s).  Popula- 
tion (Dec.  1980):  8,876,652.  Annual  growth 
rate:  3.6/1,000.  Birth  rate:  14.3/1,000.  Den- 
sity: 80/sq.  km.  (207/sq.  nu.).  Ethnic  groups: 
85.3%  Bulgarian,  8.5%  Turk,  6.2%  others 
(Gypsies,  Greeks,  Armenians,  and  Russians). 
Lang^uage:  Bulgarian.  Religions:  Bulgarian 
Orthodox;  Muslim  minority.  Education: 
Fears  compulsory — 8.  Attendance — 
1,457,848.  Literacy— 9h%  (est.).  Health:  In- 
fant mortality  rate— 20.2/1,000.  Life  expec- 
tancy— men  69  yrs.,  women  74  yrs.  Work 
force  (3,997,615):  Agriculture— 2Z. 2%.  In- 
dustry and  commerce — 42.6%.  Government — 
1.5%.  Other— 32.7%. 

Geography 

Area:  110,912  sq.  km.  (44,365  sq.  mi.);  about 
the  size  of  Ohio.  Cities:  Capital— Sofia  (pop. 
1,056,945).  Other  cifes— Plovdiv  (350,438), 
Varna  (291,224),  Ruse  (172,782),  Burgas 
(168,412).  Terrain:  Mountainous.  Climate: 
Similar  to  US  Midwest  (dry,  hot  summers 
and  damp,  cold  winters),  but  with  strong 
regional  variations. 


..-w/'-^ 

— \-.. 

MIMANiA    [^ 

/X 

ymmAmk 

-^4 

BULGARIA  J 

*  Sofia         ^A 

Black  Sea 

TURIffY 

\^ 

«           ^ 

r~"^ 

l2_ 

'V.J      \-^ 

Government 

Type:  Communist  people's  republic.  Constitu- 
tion: May  1971. 

Branches:  Executive — chief  of  state 
(chairman  of  State  Council),  head  of  govern- 
ment (chairman  of  Council  of  Ministers). 


Legislative — unicameral  National  Assembly; 
Council  of  State  (chairman,  1  first  deputy 
chairman,  5  deputy  chairmen,  1  secretary, 
and  21  members).  Judicial— Supreme  Court, 
28  provincial  courts,  103  people's  courts. 

Political  parties:  Bulgarian  Communist 
Party,  Bulgarian  National  Agrarian  Union. 
Suffrage:  Universal  over  18. 

Administrative  subdivisions:  27  prov- 
inces, 1  city. 

Defense:  5.9%  of  government  budget 
(est.). 

National  holiday:  September  9. 

Flag:  White,  green,  and  red  horizontal 
strif>es  with  a  lion  framed  by  wheat  stalks  on 
white  stripe. 

Economy 

National  income  (1981):  $23.31  billion.  An- 
nual growth  rate:  4%.  Per  capita  income 

(1980):  $2,625. 

Natural  resources:  Bauxite,  copper,  lead, 
zinc,  coal,  lignite,  lumber. 

Agricultural  products:  Grain,  tobacco, 
fruits,  vegetables,  sheep,  hogs,  poultry, 
cheese,  sunflower  seeds. 

Industrial  products:  Processed  agricul- 
tural products,  machinery,  chemicals, 
metallurgical  products. 

Trade  (1982):  Exports— $n.2  billion  (US 
share,  $25.6  million),  /mports— $11.32  billion 
(US  share,  $106.45  million).  Major  trade 
partners— USSR  54%,  other  CEMA  coun- 
tries 19%,  developing  countries  11.4%. 

Official  exchange  rate  (April  1982):  0.96 
leva  =  US$1. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

UN  and  many  of  its  specialized  agencies. 
Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance 
(CEMA),  Warsaw  Pact. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  April 
1983.  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, Department  of  State.  Editor:  Juanita 
Adams.  ■ 


EUROPE 


cient  movement  on  elimination  of  the 
drug  rings  that  operate  out  of  Bulgaria, 
moving  drugs  and  guns  between  the 
Middle  East  and  Europe.  Those  are  the 
operators  that  we  have  to  get  at.  Those 
are  the  connections  that  must  be  broken. 
We  must  and  will  continue  to  press  the 
Bulgarians  on  these  concerns.  We  have 
also  discussed  our  concerns  with  key 
West  European  governments,  urging 
them  to  approach  the  Bulgarians  direct- 
ly on  the  subject.  We  will  continue  to 
work  to  enlist  the  support  of  other 
governments. 

Assassination  Attempt 
Against  the  Pope 

With  regard  to  the  two  resolutions  con- 
cerning Bulgaria  that  are  currently 
before  this  subcommittee,  let  me  say 
that  there  should  be  no  mistake  as  to 
the  gravity  with  which  we  view  the  at- 
tempt on  the  life  of  Pope  John  Paul  II. 
We  regard  the  cowardly  attack  on  the 
Pope  as  one  of  the  most  terrible  and 
despicable  of  all  possible  crimes. 

As  you  know,  the  crime  occurred  on 
Vatican  soil,  and  it  is  the  Italian  judicial 
system  which  has  the  jurisdiction  to  in- 
vestigate the  charges.  All  along,  we 
have  been  extremely  impressed  with  the 
thorough  and  dispassionate  manner  in 
which  the  Italian  authorities  have  pur- 
sued their  investigation.  Their 
courageous,  painstaking,  exhaustive,  and 
impartial  approach  has  been  most 
laudatory.  We  continue  to  have  complete 
faith  in  the  integrity  of  the  Italian  in- 
vestigation. And  we  have  offered  the 
fullest  possible  assistance  to  the  Italian 
investigation,  and  we  will  continue  to  do 
so. 

Since  the  Italian  judicial  process  has 
not  yet  been  completed,  we  must  main- 
tain both  the  appearance  and  the  reality 
of  nonintervention  in  this  case.  This  is 
the  position  that  the  Secretary  of  State 
stressed  in  his  testimony  on  June  13 
before  the  full  Foreign  Affairs  Commit- 
tee. 

In  considering  these  pieces  of 
legislation  (H.R.  5980  and  H.  Con.  Res. 
337),  let  me  assure  you  that  we  share 
the  concerns  of  members  of  this  subcom- 
mittee about  the  very  grave  charges  of 
Bulgarian  complicity  in  the  attempted 
assassination  of  the  Pope.  We  support 
the  conduct  of  a  comprehensive  review 
of  U.S.  policy  toward  Bulgaria  to  ex- 
amine all  facets  of  our  relationship.  I 
would  strongly  recommend,  however, 
that  the  study  be  delayed  until  such  time 
as  the  Italians  have  completed  their  in- 


30 


vestigation  and  the  outcome  of  an  even- 
tual trial  is  known.  By  awaiting  those 
results,  we  will  not  have  interfered  in 
the  Italian  judicial  process.  We  will  also 
avoid  playing  into  Soviet  and  Bulgarian 
hands  by  introducing  the  appearance  of 
external  pressure  that  could  discredit 
the  impartiality  of  the  investigation  and 
an  eventual  trial. 

In  conclusion,  let  me  assure  you 
once  again  of  the  seriousness  with  which 
the  Department  of  State  regards  the 


charges  and  evidence  of  Bulgarian  in- 
volvement and  toleration  of  illicit  nar 
cotics  and  arms  trafficking  and  suppc 
to  terrorist  groups.  We  will  continue 
devote  close  attention  to  the  concerns 
raised  by  you  and  members  of  your  c 
mittees. 


) 


I 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearit 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  w 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  0 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Polish  Government's 
of  Political  Prisoners 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  3,  1984' 

The  President  has  taken  note  of  the 
release  of  political  prisoners  announced 
by  the  Polish  Government  on  July  21. 
He  believes  that  it  represents  a  signifi- 
cant move  in  the  direction  of  national 
reconciliation  in  Poland.  Therefore,  in 
accordance  with  his  step-by-step  ap- 
proach for  dealing  with  the  Polish  situa- 
tion, he  has  decided  to  take  two  steps. 

First,  the  President  has  authorized 
the  lifting  of  the  ban  on  landing  rights 
for  regularly  scheduled  flights  by  the 
Polish  state  airline,  LOT,  subject  to  the 
regularization  of  our  civil  aviation  rela- 
tionship and  the  full  reestablishment  of 
scientific  exchanges  between  the  United 
States  and  Poland. 

Second,  the  President  has  indicated 
that  complete  and  reasonable  implemen- 
tation of  the  amnesty  decision  will 
create  a  positive  atmosphere  that  would 
allow  the  reactivation  of  Poland's  ap- 
plication for  membership  in  the  Interna- 


Release 


)i 


tional  Monetary  Fund  (IMF).  The  Un 
States  would,  of  course,  consider  anj 
final  application  on  its  merits,  includi 
Poland's  willingness  to  fulfill  the  obli 
tions  of  IMF  membership. 

The  purpose  of  our  sanctions,  frc 
the  very  beginning,  has  been  to  en- 
courage movement  away  from  confr( 
tation  toward  reconciliation  in  Polan 
While  the  United  States  remains  con 
cerned  with  the  situation  in  Poland, 
view  the  Polish  Government's  amnes 
declaration  as  a  potentially  positive 
development. 

The  United  States  is  prepared  tc 
take  further  positive  steps  in  respon 
to  further  significant  movement  tow 
national  reconciliation  in  Poland.  In 
meantime,  we  will  be  consulting  witl 
our  NATO  allies  and  others  on  the  f 
tion  in  Poland  and  a  Western  respoi 
to  it. 


If 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  6,  1984. 


Department  of  State  Bui 


fx 


REIGN  ASSISTANCE 


►od  and  Population 
anning  Assistance 


r.  Peter  McPherson 

Uatement  before  the  House  Foreign 

rs  Committee  on  August  2,  198j. 
McPherson  is  Administrator  of  the 
cy  for  International  Development 

:hairman  [Dante  Fascell],  it  is  a 
ure  to  be  here  to  discuss  with  your 
nittee  two  areas  of  vital  importance 
e  developing  countries,  food  and 
lation.  I  would  like  to  express  my 
eciation  to  the  committee  for  its 
support  for  foreign  assistance,  and 
k  forward  to  continued  cooperation 
r  your  leadership.  I  would  also  like 
ank  Under  Secretary  Amstutz  for  a 
)Ugh  briefing  on  the  10th  ministerial 
on  of  the  World  Food  Council.  The 
irtment  of  Agriculture  and  AID 

long  had  a  productive  relationship 
:ing  together  on  food  aid  and  the 
d  hunger  problem. 
_,ast  week  I  returned  from  Africa 
•e  I  saw  the  tragic  effect  of  the 
ght  and  social  disruption  on  the 

situation.  As  I  have  previously 
id,  the  long-term  solution  rests 
arily  with  the  African  governments 
iselves  which  must  reassess  their 
omic  and  agricultural  policies.  At 

needed  policy  reforms  are  being  in- 

ted  in  many  countries  giving 

lers  a  fair  price  for  their  production 

encouraging  the  private  sector  to 
1  nvolved  in  providing  agricultural  in- 

,  fiiod  processing,  storage,  and 

;tt\ng.  If  the  necessary  policy 
irms  are  instituted,  then,  over  the 

i,>rm  Africa  will  be  less  likely  to  be 
(ght  to  its  knees  by  drought.  While 
(United  States  bases  its  support  on 
:'s  [less  developed  countries]  under- 
hg  longer  term  solutions,  we  con- 
le  to  undertake  actions  to  relieve  the 

•t-term  food  needs  of  these  popula- 

3. 

The  United  States  has  learned  some 
Dns  from  the  present  African  food 
ation.  We  are  using  these  lessons  to 
ride  food  assistance  more  efficiently 
iture  emergencies.  These  lessons  are 
jcted  in  the  recent  presidential  food 
initiative  which  I  will  discuss  briefly. 

Presidential  Food  Aid  Initiative 

President  announced  on  July  10  a 
or  initiative  to  allow  the  United 
tes  to  respond  more  quickly  and  ef- 


fectively to  the  hungry  and  malnour- 
ished of  Africa  and  the  rest  of  the 
world.  This  initiative  includes  a  five- 
point  plan  to  increase  effectiveness: 

1.  Prepositioning  of  Grain  in 
Selected  Areas.  Prepositioning  grains  in 
or  near  areas  especially  vulnerable  to 
acute  food  shortages  will  help  save  lives 
by  shortening  U.S.  response  time  from 
the  present  3-6  months  to  as  little  as  2 
weeks.  A  number  of  possible  sites  in 
Africa  are  being  investigated. 

2.  Special  $50-Million  Presidential 
Fund.  The  creation  of  this  special  fund 
will  provide  the  President  the  ability  to 
accelerate  emergency  food  relief  efforts, 
saving  lives  by  responding  more  quickly 
to  emergency  requests  for  food  aid.  The 
President  will  shortly  propose  legislation 
to  set  aside  foreign  aid  resources  within 
current  and  planned  levels  to  meet 
emergency  food  aid  needs.  Replenish- 
ment of  the  fund  will  be  through  trans- 
fers of  unobligated  foreign  assistance 
and  PL  480  funds  or  appropriations. 

3.  Financing  or  Payment  of 
Transportation  Costs  of  Food.  Unfor- 
tunately, many  of  the  countries  most 
severely  affected  by  hunger  and 
malnutrition  are  unable  to  or  find  it  very 
difficult  to  finance  ocean  transportation 
costs  under  the  concessional  sales  pro- 
gram or  inland  transportation  and 
distribution  costs  under  the  grant  pro- 
gram. Assistance  under  the  current 
Food  for  Peace  Title  II  legislation  is 
limited  to  providing  only  the  ocean 
freight  transportation  costs  to  a  re- 
cipient's port  or  border.  The  President, 
therefore,  proposes  to  amend  PL  480 
Title  II  to  allow,  in  limited  cases,  pay- 
ment of  internal  transportation  costs  as 
a  way  of  ensuring  that  U.S.  food  aid 
reaches  the  people  most  in  need  of  our 
assistance.  We  will  also  consider  a 
change  in  policy  to  finance,  on  a  limited 
basis,  the  ocean  freight  costs  associated 
with  the  concessional  sales  program 
(PL  480  Title  I). 

This  action  will  increase  the  flexibili- 
ty of  the  PL  480  Title  I  and  II  programs 
in  helping  to  meet  emergency  food  situa- 
tions. 

4.  Creation  of  a  Government  Task 
Force  to  Better  Forecast  Food  Short- 
ages and  Needs.  The  best  response  to 
an  emergency  food  crisis  is  an  early  and 
smooth  delivery  of  food  aid.  To  meet 
this  goal,  an  interagency  task  force  will 
be  created  to  bring  together  all  available 


information  and  resources  to  prepare  an 
early  warning  system  to  forecast  possi- 
ble famine  situations. 

5.  Establishment  of  an  Advisory 
Group  of  Business  Leaders.  The 
perspective  and  expertise  of  U.S. 
business  leaders  represents  an  untapped 
resource  in  dealing  with  Third  World 
food  problems.  U.S.  agricultural  exports 
to  the  Third  World  represent  over  one- 
third  of  total  U.S.  agricultural  exports. 
The  Business  Advisory  Committee  of  the 
Department  of  State  will  be  expanded  to 
include  a  senior-level  working  group  on 
Third  World  food  problems. 

These  five  steps  respond  to  the 
President's  request  in  December  1983 
for  a  high-level  interagency  study  of  the 
worldwide  hunger  situation.  This  study 
group  was  chaired  by  Ambassador 
Robert  Keating,  the  President's  envoy  to 
Madagascar  and  the  Comoros.  We  be- 
lieve these  measures  will  significantly 
improve  our  ability  to  respond  rapidly 
and  effectively  when  emergency  food 
needs  arise. 

Population 

Before  the  advent  of  government 
population  programs,  several  factors 
combined  to  create  an  unprecedented 
surge  in  population.  In  developing  na- 
tions, the  tremendous  expansion  of 
health  services— from  simple  medication 
to  elimination  of  major  diseases— saved 
millions  of  lives  every  year.  Emergency 
relief,  facilitated  by  modern  transport, 
helped  millions  to  survive  flood,  famine, 
and  drought.  The  sharing  of  technology, 
agricultural  improvements,  improve- 
ments in  educational  standards  generally 
all  helped  to  reduce  mortality  rates, 
especially  infant  mortality  and  to 
lengthen  life  spans.  The  parodox  is  that 
these  beneficial  and  desirable  actions 
have  upset  the  preexisting  equilibrium 
and  created  challenges  in  some  places  of 
excessive  population  pressures.  Other 
necessary  actions  have  not  occurred  to 
restore  the  equilibrium  required  between 
population  growth  and  economic  growth. 

Statist  government  policies  have 
disrupted  economic  incentives,  awards, 
and  opportunities  for  advancement, 
especially  in  agriculture.  Natural 
disasters  have  made  the  provision  of 
adequate  supplies  of  food  even  more  dif- 
ficult. 

It  is  clear  that  the  current  exponen- 
tial growth  of  population  cannot  con- 
tinue indefinitely  and  that  there  is  a 
need  to  reach  an  equilibrium  between 
population  and  economic  growth.  The 
Administration's  position  is  that  both 
economic  and  social  conditions  and 


31 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


access  to  a  broad  range  of  voluntary 
family  planning  services  are  important 
components  of  fertility  declines  and  sus- 
tained economic  growth. 

The  United  States  has  prepared  a 
policy  paper  for  the  International  Con- 
ference on  Population  which  will  begin 
In  Mexico  City  on  August  6.  The  policy 
paper  has  two  basic  thrusts— first,  a 
strong  statement  of  this  Administra- 
tion's continued  support  for  voluntary 
family  planning;  and,  second,  additional 
policy  guidance  to  ensure  that  no  U.S. 
Government  funds  support  abortion- 
related  activities. 

Rapid  population  growth  compounds 
the  already  serious  problems  faced  by 
both  public  and  private  sectors  in  LDCs 
in  meeting  the  needs  and  demands  of 
their  citizens  for  food,  shelter,  educa- 
tion, and  health  care.  It  diverts  scarce 
economic  resources  from  investments 
which  will  produce  rapid  economic 
progress. 

AID  attempts,  through  its  programs 
and  policy  dialogues  with  host  govern- 
ments, to  ensure  that  family  planning 
programs  and  economic  development 
policies  and  programs  in  other  sectors 
are  mutually  reinforcing.  Under  this  Ad- 
ministration, we  have  used  these  com- 
plementary approaches  to  resolving  the 
problems  of  the  imbalance  between 
population  growth  and  economic  growth. 
I  believe  that  this  follows  very  well  the 
congressional  mandate  outlined  in  Sec- 
tion 104(d)  of  the  Foreign  Assistance 
Act,  which  is  based  on  recognition  of  the 
reciprocal  links  between  fertility  and 
other  aspects  of  development.  We  also 
believe  that  the  International  Con- 
ference on  Population  offers  the  United 
States  an  opportunity  to  strengthen  the 
international  consensus  on  the  interrela- 
tionships between  economic  development 
and  population  growth  which  has 
solidified  since  the  World  Population 
Conference  in  1974. 

The  population  problem  is  not  just 
numbers  and  national  statistics,  and  it 
dehumanizes  the  problem  to  speak  only 
in  broad  statistical  terms.  We  must 
recognize  that  population  pressures 
result  from  individuals  and  families  who 
make  life  and  death  decisions.  It  is 
essentially  a  family  crisis.  One  of  the 
most  poignant  consequences  of  rapid 
population  growth  is  its  effect  on  the 
health  of  mothers  and  children.  Especial- 
ly in  poor  countries,  the  health  and 
nutrition  status  of  women  and  children 
is  linked  to  family  size.  Maternal  and  in- 
fant mortality  and  morbidity  rise  with 
the  number  of  births  and  with  births  too 
closely  spaced.  Complications  of 
pregnancy  are  more  frequent  among 


32 


women  who  are  very  young  or  near  the 
end  of  their  reproductive  years.  In 
societies  with  widespread  malnutrition 
and  inadequate  health  conditions,  these 
problems  are  reinforced;  numerous  and 
closely  spaced  births  lead  to  even 
greater  malnutrition  of  mothers  and  in- 
fants. Unfortunately,  in  many  countries 
abortion  is  seen  as  an  answer.  But  abor- 
tion is  not  family  planning;  it  is  family 
planning  failed.  Voluntary  family  plan- 
ning programs  provide  a  humane  and 
workable  alternative  to  abortion. 
Widespread  resort  to  abortion  is 
evidence  of  the  need  for  safe  and  accept- 
able methods  of  family  planning. 

For  all  these  reasons,  the  United 
States  will  maintain  its  strong  support 
for  voluntary  family  planning  programs. 
As  President  Reagan  stated  in  his 
message  to  the  Mexico  City  conference, 
where  population  programs  are  ".  .  .  truly 
voluntary,  cognizant  of  the  rights  and 
responsibilities  of  individuals  and 
families,  and  respectful  of  religious  and 
cultural  values.  .  .  .  such  programs  can 
make  an  important  contribution  to 
economic  and  social  development,  to  the 
health  of  mothers  and  children  and  to 
the  stability  of  the  family  and  of 
society."  This  has  been  the  consistent 
thrust  of  aid's  population  assistance 
while  I  have  been  administrator. 

The  new  U.S.  policy  articulates  the 
Administration's  concern  about  abortion. 
Abortion  is  not  an  acceptable  method  of 
family  planning,  and  it  must  not  be  part 
of  our  program  in  any  way.  The  policy 
tightens  our  controls  and  provides  a 
more  effective  means  of  assuring  that 
U.S.  funds  are  not  used  for  abortion.  It 
states  that  "when  dealing  with  nations 
which  support  abortion  with  funds  not 
provideii  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, the  United  States  will  contribute 
to  such  nations"  only  "through 
segi'egated  accounts  which  cannot  be 
used  for  abortion."  Moreover,  the  United 
States  will  no  longer  contribute  to 
separate  nongovernmental  organizations 
which  perform  or  actively  promote  abor- 
tion as  a  method  of  family  planning  in 
other  nations. 

This  policy,  which  has  now  been 
developed  as  the  Administration  position 
for  the  conference  in  Mexico,  represents 
a  tighter  policy  and  is  consistent  with 
the  Administration's  overall  position  con- 
cerning abortion.  I  believe  that  it  pro- 
vides a  more  effective  means  of  assuring 
that  U.S.  funds  are  not  used  for  abor- 
tion. We  will  now  ensure  that  any  II. S. 
Government  funds  to  nations  which  sup- 
port abortion  with  other  monies  will  be 
given  through  segregated  accounts  for 
purposes  which  are  allowed  under 


legislation.  As  a  practical  matter,  th 
has  generally  been  the  case;  now  it  ' 
be  universal.  And.  we  will  no  longer 
fund  separate  nongovernmental  org; 
nizations  which  perform  or  actively 
mote  abortions  in  other  countries. 

Draft  recommendations  for  the 
Mexico  meeting  include  one  which  c 
on  countries  "[t]o  take  appropriate  s 
to  help  women  avoid  abortions  and, 
whenever  possible,  to  provide  for  th 
humane  treatment  and  counselling  c 
women  who  have  had  recourse  to  ill 
abortion."  We  will  support  this  reco 
mendation  as  it  is  fully  consistent  w 
our  policy. 

Our  policy  includes  the  need  for 
broader  access  to  family  planning  ec 
tion  and  services,  especially  in  the  c 
text  of  maternal/child  health  progra 
National  maternal/child  health  pro- 
grams, however,  are  only  one  chanr 
for  distributing  family  planning  ser\ 
As  the  recent  "World  Development 
Report"  makes  clear,  one  of  the  prii 
cipal  constraints  on  the  practice  of  1 
ly  planning  is  access  to  contraceptiv 
knowledge  and  materials.  Here  the 
private  sector  can  plan  a  critical  am 
cost-effective  role.  Thus,  we  have  e: 
panded  our  support  for  the  marketi 
contraceptives  which  can  provide  fa 
planning  at  low  cost  through  existir 
commercial  channels.  These  channe 
can  reach  out  beyond  cities  and  tow 
remote  rural  villages  not  easily  serv 
by  centralized  government  program 
and  can  provide  assistance  to  famili 
who  may  not  have  access  to  service  jan 
from  other  sources.  Provision  of  sei 
which  are  acceptable  within  the  cull 
and  religious  context  of  each  counti 
critical,  and  we  believe  that  we  hav 
enhanced  our  programs  in  accordar  'f' 
with  congressional  mandates  by  in-    i; 
eluding  natural  family  planning  mel 
where  these  are  appropriate  to  the 
beliefs  of  the  individuals  and  nation 
which  we  support. 

In  summary,  we  have  a  policy  \ 
emphasizes  the  need  for  voluntary  1 
ly  planning  services,  while  ensuring 
these  do  not  include  abortion  as  a 
method  of  family  planning.  Our  poli 
also  makes  clear  the  importance  of 
links  between  economic  developmer 
and  effective  family  planning. 

We  will  continue  to  carry  out  oi 
population  assistance  programs  wit 
the  cultural,  economic,  and  political 
text  of  the  countries  we  are  assistir 
and  in  keeping  with  our  own  values 


Al 


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'The  complete  transcript  of  the  heai 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  ' 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


in 


NERAL 


iirope  V.  Asia:  Is  Diplomacy 
Zero-Sum  Game? 


nneth  W.  Dam 

ddress  before  the  American  Bar 
iation  in  Chicago  on  August  6. 
Mr.  Dam  is  Deputy  Secretary  of 

iften  said  that  where  you  sit  in- 
■es  how  you  think.  For  two  cen- 
,  the  east  coast  dominated  U.S. 
71  policy.  Not  surprisingly,  Europe 
t  the  core  of  our  international  rela- 
But  today  some  well-known  and 
ntial  thinkers  believe  that  is  chang- 
'hey  say  that  America  is  reorient- 
self  from  the  Atlantic  to  the 
c,  from  Europe  to  Asia.  This 
mtation,  they  claim,  is  exacerbated 
growing  policy  divergence— indeed, 
on— between  the  United  States  and 
pe.  In  some  cases  it  is  not  clear 
ler  these  commentators  favor  such 
rientation  or  simply  believe  that 
tening  it  will  have  a  salutary  effect 
iropean  thinking. 

.awyers  bring  special  skills  to  world 
•s,  and  the  American  Bar  Associa- 

*  IS  an  institution  has  played  an  im- 
ive  role  in  the  development  of  U.S. 
rn  policy.  Perhaps  today,  with 

u  ;rs  from  Maine  to  California 
!red  here  in  America's  heartland, 
m  cast  a  critical  eye  on  the  "Europe 
ia"  debate. 

Ulleged  Shift  From 
ipe  to  Asia 

IS  first  consider  this  notion  that 
rica  is  "tilting"  toward  Asia.  Cer- 
/  the  center  of  gravity  of  U.S.  trade 
s  to  be  shifting  westward.  Since 

more  U.S.  trade  has  crossed  the 
"ic  than  the  Atlantic— and  the  gap  is 
ing.  In  1983  our  two-way  trade 
5S  the  Pacific  totaled  $137  billion. 

was  some  $30  billion  more  than  our 
vvay  trade  across  the  Atlantic.  The 

East"  is  now  America's  "Near 
t." 

n  addition,  the  Asian  economies 
,    surged  while  those  of  Europe  have 
ill  nated.  Growth  in  Europe  over  the 

decade  has  averaged  about  2%  an- 
ly.  In  contrast,  the  newly  in- 
rialized  countries  of  Asia  have 
/n  at  a  7%  annual  rate.  And  their 
ufacturing  exports  have  grown  at  an 

annual  clip. 


These  changes  in  the  world  have 
been  paralleled  by  changes  in  the  United 
States.  Economic  power  and  in- 
fluence—as well  as  people— have 
migrated  south  and  west.  U.S.  exports 
reflect  that  shift.  The  latest  statistics 
(1981)  show  that  California  and  Texas 
are  the  company's  top  two  exporters  of 
manufactured  goods. 

Perceived  Divergence 
Between  U.S.  and  Europe 

This  alleged  shift  from  Europe  to  Asia 
has  been  exacerbated,  in  the  eyes  of 
some  commentators,  by  a  perceived 
divergence  in  security  and  economic 
policies  between  the  United  States  and 
Europe.  Whether  this  divergence  is  a 
cause  or  a  consequence  of  the  alleged 
shift  in  interest  from  Europe  to  Asia  is 
unclear. 

On  the  security  front  the  most 
serious  problem,  in  the  opinion  of  these 
commentators,  is  that  the  United  States 
bears  a  disproportionate  burden  of  the 
cost  of  the  common  defense  of  Europe. 
They  note  that  we  spend  about  1.7  times 
as  much  of  our  GNP  [gross  national 
product]  on  defense  as  does  Western 


ministration  and  our  allies  strongly  op- 
posed this  measure,  but  it  still  came 
within  14  votes  of  passage.  A  strong 
sentiment  obviously  exists  in  Congress 
that  Europe  is  not  carrying  its  share  of 
the  defense  burden. 

In  the  economic  field,  this  decade 
has  witnessed  a  major  divergence  in 
U.S.  and  European  economic  policies— 
and  performance.  Over  the  past  10 
years,  the  big  difference  between  the 
U.S.  and  European  economies  has  not 
been  in  growth  or  inflation  but  in  job 
creation.  Between  1973  and  1983,  15 
million  new  jobs  were  created  in  the 
United  States.  The  West  Europeans 
netted  no  new  jobs  in  the  same  period. 
The  ratio  of  employment  to  working-age 
population  is  higher  in  the  United  States 
(66%)  than  all  of  Western  Europe  except 
for  Sweden.  And  the  ratio  is  rising  in 
the  United  States  and  falling  in  Europe, 
as  more  women  participate  in  the  U.S. 
labor  force. 

But  why  the  higher  rate  of  job  for- 
mation in  the  United  States,  whether  for 
men  or  women?  Part  of  the  answer  is 
that  in  America  we  have  dismantled 
burdensome  regulations  and  lowered 
taxes  so  that  market  forces  can  work.  In 


...  a  major  foreign  policy  accomplishment  of  this 
Administration  is  its  success  in  encouraging  the  in- 
dustrialized democracies— in  Europe,  Asia,  and 
North  America— to  cooperate  in  developing  global, 
not  parochial,  solutions  to  our  common  economic 
and  security  problems. 


Europe.  But  this  is  a  complex  issue;  no 
single  measure  can  stand  as  an  adequate 
indicator  of  relative  burdensharing.  The 
point  is  that  more  must  be  done  by  the 
Europeans,  as  well  as  ourselves  and  our 
Asian  friends,  to  offset  the  relentless 
Soviet  military  buildup. 

Yet,  Senator  Sam  Nunn  of  Georgia 
recently  proposed  in  Congress  that 
American  forces  in  Europe  be  frozen 
now  and  reduced  in  future  years  if  the 
European  defense  effort  does  not  grow 
to  meet  specific  target  levels.  The  Ad- 


Europe,  fragmented  markets  (particular- 
ly in  the  service  sector),  a  tradition  of 
government  intervention,  and  immobile, 
high-cost  labor  impede  economic  growth. 
Instead  of  the  tonic  of  the  marketplace, 
Europeans  have  too  often  chosen  the 
dulling  narcotic  of  subsidies  and  pro- 
tectionism. Thus,  Europe  is  struggling 
to  match  the  vitality  of  Japan  and  of 
our  own  silicon  valley.  As  one  Euro- 
pean statesman  recently  lamented: 
"The  Japanese  have  a  strategy.  The 
Americans  have  a  dream.  But  where  do 
we  fit  in?" 


GENERAL 

The  Questions  Raised 

The  thesis  that  the  United  States  is 
turning  away  from  Europe  in  favor  of 
Asia  raises  some  fundamental  questions. 

First,  is  such  a  shift  from  Europe 
to  Asia  in'  fact  taking  place? 

Second,  if  so,  does  it  have  either  as 
a  cause  or  a  consequence  increasing 
policy  differences  between  the  United 
States  and  Europe? 


this  nation.  When  George  Washington 
was  inaugurated,  Yankee  clippers 
already  were  in  the  port  of  Canton. 
Since  1945  we  have  fought  two  wars, 
both  in  Asia.  The  7th  (or  Far  East) 
Fleet  has  always  been  bigger  than  the 
6th  (or  Mediterranean).  Asian  issues 
have  played  a  role  in  at  least  five  of  the 
nine  postwar  presidential  campaigns: 
remember  1948  (who  lost  China?);  1952 
(Ike-  I  will  go  to  Korea);  1960  (Quemoy 


the  United  States  is  a  global  power  with  global 
interests.  We  do  not  have  the  luxury  of  choosing  to 
care  about  one  region  more  than  another. 


Third,  in  the  face  of  these 
developments,  how  can  the  industrialized 
democracies  of  Europe,  North  America, 
and  Asia  continue  to  meet  the  common 
challenges  to  their  prosperity  and  peace? 

Today,  I  should  like  to  examine 
these  questions.  My  own  view  is  that  in- 
ternational affairs  is  not  a  zero-sum 
game.  There  are,  indeed,  changes  under- 
way in  both  Europe  and  Asia— and  in 
U.S.  relations  with  both— but  our  policy 
is  balanced,  not  tilted  in  one  direction  or 
the  other.  Yet,  Asia  is  growing  in  impor- 
tance in  political,  security,  and  especially 
economic  terms;  but  no,  our  strength- 
ened relations  with  Asia  need  not 
diminish  our  traditional  ties  to  Europe. 
And  those  ties  remain  close  despite— or, 
in  some  cases,  because  of— our  dif- 
ferences and  debates.  Indeed,  a  major 
foreign  policy  accomplishment  of  this 
Administration  is  its  success  in  en- 
couraging the  industrialized 
democracies— in  Europe,  Asia,  and 
North  America— to  cooperate  in 
developing  global,  not  parochial,  solu- 
tions to  our  common  economic  and 
security  problems. 

The  Shift  Toward  Asia 
Reconsidered 

Let's  look  again  at  the  so-called  "tilt" 
toward  Asia.  Increased  U.S.  interest  in 
the  Pacific  Basin  over  the  next  decade 
seems  likely  to  me.  But  this  increased 
interest  does  not  mean  that  Americans 
have  just  "discovered"  Asia.  Rather,  it 
merely  represents  a  return  to  a 
historical  association. 

Let  us  recall  that  America  has  been 
involved  in  Asia  from  the  first  days  of 


and  Matsu);  1968  (Romney:  I  was  brain- 
washed; Nixon:  I  have  a  plan);  and  1972 
(Kissinger:  peace  is  at  hand). 

In  short,  a  strong  American  interest 
in  Asia  has  been  the  norm.  What  has 
been  abnormal  has  been  the  low  level  of 
public  interest  in  the  aftermath  of  Viet- 
nam. This  Administration,  however,  has 
given  a  great  deal  of  emphasis  to  our 
relations  with  Asia,  and  we  have 
achieved  results.  U.S. -China  relations,  as 
exemplified  by  the  President's  recent 
visit,  have  been  put  on  a  sound, 
businesslike  footing.  U.S.-Japanese 
security  relations  are  better  than  they 
have  ever  been,  and  we  have  succeeded 
in  further  opening  up  many  Japanese 
markets  for  American  products  and 
capital.  Finally,  our  relations  with  the 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)  are  so  good  that  during 
Secretary  Shultz's  trip  last  month  to 
that  region,  no  television  network 
bothered  to  air  a  single  report  on  his  ac- 
tivities. As  they  say,  no  news  is  good 
news. 

The  Policy  Divergence  Reconsidered 

Just  as  America's  interest  in  Asia  is  not 
new,  neither  is  dissent,  division,  and 
debate  in  the  Atlantic  alliance.  How 
could  it  be  otherwise  in  an  organization 
composed  of  16  vigorous  democracies? 
Debate  within  each  country,  and  be- 
tween countries,  is  expected.  And  it 
beats  the  alternative. 

So,  before  anyone  proclaims  the 
demise  of  NATO,  let  us  put  today's 
security  and  economic  disagreements 
with  Europe  in  perspective.  Do  you 
remember  the  1949  debate  over  whethe 
the  United  States  should  even  commit 


i.lnf 
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itself  to  a  permanent,  peacetime 
alliance?  Or  1956  and  our  falling  out^; 
with  Britain  and  France  over  Suez? 
Remember  the  1960s  with  the 
multilateral  force  and  DeGaulle's 
withdrawal  of  France  from  NATO's 
military  structure?  Remember  the  1 
and  the  debates  with  Europe  over  \ 
nam  and  the  Middle  East?  And  the  ' 
1970s  and  the  criticism  of  America'^ 
"zig-zag"  foreign  policy? 

History  has  its  uses.  One  is  to  r 
mind  us  that  the  present  is  less 
unique— and  in  this  case  less  dire— 
we  imagine.  Our  problems  in  the  all 
today  are  real  but  not  nearly  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  ones  I  have  just  ci 
It  is  true,  for  example,  that  in  t 
security  sphere  Western  Europe  is  ( 
too  parochial.  But  let's  remember  tl 
Americans  and  Europeans  have  alw 
had  different  perspectives  on  securi 
The  Europeans  sit  next  door  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  Former  West  Germai 
Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt  often  p. 
out  that  his  home  in  Hamburg  is  on 
kilometers  from  the  East  German 
border.  For  a  Chicagoan,  that  is  as 
the  Iron  Curtain  fell  straight  down 
middle  of  Lake  Michigan. 

And  yet,  Western  Europe  still 
demonstrates  genuine  concern  for  i 
national  security  issues.  U.S.  and  E 
pean  forces  serve  together  not  only 
Berlin  but  also  in  the  Sinai.  France 
example,  has  forces  defending  Wes 
interests  not  only  in  the  Mediterrar 
but  also  in  Africa;  and  the  United 
Kingdom  has  forces  on  station  in  tl 
Central  American  country  of  Belize 
well  as  on  the  Rhine. 

It  is  also  true  that  our  NATO  a 
could  do  more  with  respect  to  the  i 
ventional  defense  of  Europe.  And  j 
1983_the  Year  of  the  Missile— tht 
alliance  rebuffed  a  determined  Sov 
tempt  to  divide  it.  Instead,  we  and 
allies  united  in  support  of  the  1979 
NATO  "dual-track"  decision  to  seel- 
negotiate  limits  on  intermediate-ra 
nuclear  missiles  and,  if  necessary, 
deploy  such  missiles  ourselves.  Aft 
arms  control  negotiations  failed  to 
remove  the  threat  posed  by  well  ov 
200  Soviet  SS-20  missiles  in  Eurof 
NATO  began  to  deploy  counterbala 
forces. 

The  willingness  of  European  g( 
ments  to  deploy  these  missiles  is  a 
ther  demonstration  of  their  politics 
courage  and  their  commitment  to  t 
alliance.  That  courage  and  commiti 
are  not  limited  to  governments  alo 
Recent  elections  in  Europe  demon? 
that  the  people  support  the  allianc* 


rel 


lie 


Department  of  State  Bl 


GENERAL 


.  In  elections  last  year,  supporters 
alliance  and  of  the  1979  NATO 
)n  won  clear  mandates  in  all  three 
major  countries  that  are  deploy- 
termediate- range  missiles  to 
ir  the  Soviet  monopoly. 
3  for  those  economic  differences  I 
jarlier,  it  is  true  that  Europe 
imes  succumbs  to  protectionism, 
sspite  European  protectionism,  our 
e  on  current  account  with  the 
)ean  Community  switched  from  a 

ion  deficit  in  1980  to  a  $3-billion 
IS  in  1983.  And  the  volume  of  our 
ay  trade  with  Europe  is  quite 

over  $100  billion  annually.  As 
Uiry  Shultz  has  said  in  discussing 
European  trade:  "We  must  be 
something  right." 

asks  Ahead 

!  compared  our  relations  with  Asia 
urope.  It  should  be  clear  that 
rthening  our  ties  with  Asia,  while 
:aneously  encouraging  debate  and 
Dy  consensus  within  the  Atlantic 
se,  are  not  only  compatible  but,  in 
nutually  reinforcing  activities, 
reflect  a  simple  geopolitical  fact: 
nited  States  is  a  global  power  with 
I  interests.  We  do  not  have  the  lux- 
f  choosing  to  care  about  one  region 
than  another.  We  should  not  write 
e  Atlantic  alliance  or  prescribe 
(like  the  Nunn  amendment's  troop 
tions)  far  worse  than  the  ailment, 
er  should  we  ignore  the  burgeoning 
Asian  economies.  Rather,  the 
oean-U.S. -Asian  relationship  should 
;wed  in  complementary,  not  com- 
ve,  terms.  Europe  gains,  not  loses, 
strengthened  U.S. -Asian  ties.  And 
gains,  not  loses,  from  strengthened 
European  ties. 

1  short,  we  must  close  ranks  and 
ogether,  not  apart.  This  is  par- 
rly  true  if  we  are  to  meet  the  two 
important  tasks  of  the  1980s: 
ng  protectionism— which  threatens 
1  prosperity;  and  meeting  the 
t  challenge — which  threatens  the 

ighting  Protectionism.  The  U.S. 
ation  has  shifted  to  the  south  and 
as  the  smokestack  industries  in 
trth  and  east  have  declined.  Some 
we  should  protect  those  declining 
, tries  from  import  competition.  You 
low  the  arguments  against  protec- 
.m.  You  know  alwut  the  importance 
mparative  advantage  and  consumer 
I  shall  not  dwell  on  those  notions 
, .  for  we  in  the  United  States  have 
ally  avoided  protectionism.  Instead, 


we  have  used  deregulation  and  tax 
changes  to  create  a  climate  in  which 
new  technologies— and  new  jobs- 
flourish.  There  have  been  exceptions  and 
qualifications  to  this  policy,  but  on  the 
whole  we  have  held  to  it. 

The  decline  of  our  old  industries  has 
led  us  to  import  more  basic  goods  from 
abroad.  This  contributes  to  our  trade 
deficit.  Until  last  year  the  biggest  cur- 
rent account  deficit  ever  experienced  by 
a  country  in  a  single  year  was  $15 
billion.  Arthur  Burns  recently  noted  that 
the  current  account  shortfall  we  are 
headed  for  this  year,  now  estimated  to 
be  $80-$100  billion,  is  "awesomely  dif- 
ferent from  anything  experienced  in  the 
past."  This  deficit  makes  the  need  to 
fight  protectionism  in  common  with 
Europe  and  Asia  both  more  imperative 
and  more  difficult  than  ever  before. 

Europe's  old  industries,  like  ours, 
are  also  in  decline.  The  steel  mills  of 
Lorraine  and  the  Ruhr  are  in  trouble. 
The  shipyards  on  the  Clyde  in  Scotland 
are  laid  low.  But,  unlike  the  United 
States,  Europe  has  failed  over  the  past 
decade  to  create  new  jobs  and  develop 
new  technologies.  Efforts  to  protect 
dying  industries  through  subsidies  and 
trade  barriers  have  stifled  the  tech- 
nological innovation  the  European  econ- 
omies need.  Lagging  economic  perform- 
ance in  turn  complicates  the  effort  to  in- 
crease the  strength  of  Europe's 
defenses.  It  is  thus  imperative  that 
Europe  be  encouraged  to  resist  protec- 
tionism. 


satellites,  and— something  important  to 

me  and  all  of  you  as  well— legal  services. 
We  must  continue  to  build  upon  the 
progress  that  has  lieen  made.  The 
United  States,  Europe,  and  Asia  must 
all  remember  that  erecting  trade  bar- 
riers invites  retaliation.  And  retaliation 
is  a  threat  to  the  one  out  of  every  eight 
American  jobs  dependent  on  exports. 

Meeting  the  Soviet  Challenge.  The 

second  task  that  demands  the  combined 
efforts  of  North  America,  Europe,  and 
Asia  is  meeting  the  Soviet  challenge.  To 
be  successful,  countries  on  all  three  con- 
tinents need  to  adopt  a  global,  not  a 
regional,  outlook.  For  example,  Europe 
initially  viewed  the  negotiations  on 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  (INF) 
as  a  purely  European  problem. 
However,  more  than  one-third  of  all 
Soviet  SS-20s  are  in  Asia.  For  that 
reason,  the  United  States  saw  INF  as  a 
global  problem  and  proposed  global 
limits.  During  the  negotiations,  the 
Europeans  and  the  Japanese  also  came 
to  appreciate  that  SS-20s  pose  a 
worldwide  problem.  Faced  with  this 
common  front,  the  Soviets  eventually  ac- 
cepted the  need  for  a  global  solution  to 
INF.  Unfortunately,  no  agreement  has 
been  reached  because  the  Soviets  con- 
tinue to  demand  a  monopoly  on  such 
weapons  and  have  refused  to  negotiate 
further. 

Another  aspect  of  meeting  the 
Soviet  challenge  is  strengthening  our 
collective  defenses.  The  United  States  is 


.  .  .  more  than  one-third  of  all  Soviet  SS-20s  are  in 
Asia.  For  that  reason  the  United  States  saw  INF  as 
a  global  problem  and  proposed  global  limits. 


Fortunately,  the  Europeans  have 
always  understood  that  market  access 
must  be  reciprocal— at  least  in  areas 
other  than  agriculture.  The  Japanese, 
however,  have  been  slower  to  endorse 
reciprocity.  U.S.  trade  policy  is  aimed  at 
achieving  the  same  access  to  Japan's 
markets  that  Japanese  goods  have  to 
ours.  The  trade  package  announced  in 
April  by  Prime  Minister  Nakasone  is  the 
latest  of  several  encouraging  steps  in 
that  direction.  Progress  has  been  made 
on  beef,  citrus,  tobacco,  telecommunica- 
tions, semiconductors,  and  capital 
market  liberalization.  But  more  needs  to 
be  done  on  tariffs  on  forest  products. 


increasing  its  effort,  as  we  believe  it 
must.  But  Europe  must  also  do  its  full 
share.  Only  in  this  way  can  we  expect  to 
maintain  a  cohesive  alliance  and  a  credi- 
ble deterrent. 

The  level  of  spending  is  not  the  only 
issue.  Last  year  the  debate  in  NATO 
was  over  nuclear  missiles.  In  the  coming 
years,  the  focus  will  be  on  conventional 
defense.  In  the  past  there  has  been  a 
difference  of  perspective  on  this  issue, 
with  the  United  States  favoring  strong 
conventional  defenses  to  keep  the 
nuclear  threshold  high;  and  many  Euro- 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


peans  tending  to  favor  reliance  on 
nuclear  forces  as  the  only  guarantee 
against  conventional  war  fought  on  their 
territory.  Now  there  is  a  ferment  of  new 
ideas  on  conventional  defense:  new 
technologies,  new  tactics,  and  new 
resources.  If  we  approach  this  oppor- 
tunity with  skill  and  ingenuity,  the 
alliance  can  emerge  militarily  stronger 
and  politically  more  cohesive,  just  as 
was  the  case  with  INF  deployments. 

In  Asia,  Japan,  too,  needs  to  do 
more.  We  support  Japan's  commitment 
to  protect  its  air-  and  sealanes  out  to 
1 .000  miles.  In  recent  years,  Japan's 
defense  spending  has  increased  by 
nearly  5%  per  year  in  real  terms.  But 
we  believe  that  the  pace  of  Japan's  ef- 
forts must  be  stepped  up  even  more  in 
the  face  of  the  Soviet  threat  to  Asian 
stability. 

Finally,  Japan  and  Europe  must  be 
more  concerned  about  threats  to  our 
common  security  arising  in  distant 
regions.  Europeans  often  argue  that 
detente  has  been  largely  successful  in 
Europe.  But  Europe,  like  the  United 
States,  has  vital  interests  at  stake  in 
areas,  such  as  the  Persian  Gulf,  far  from 
its  own  borders.  That  is  why  the  United 
States,  Europe,  Japan,  and  our  other 
Asian  friends  must  work  in  concert  to 
oppose  Soviet  adventurism  and  to  pro- 
mote stability  throughout  the  world. 

Conclusion 

We  have  made  great  progress  toward 
the  development  of  concerted  policies. 
This  Administration  has  sought  not 
merely  to  strengthen  our  bilateral  ties 
with  Asia  and  Europe  but  to  encourage 
greater  interaction  among  all  members 
of  the  community  of  advanced  in- 
dustrialized democracies.  This  new  and 
more  cohesive  allied  consensus,  spanning 
three  continents,  was  in  evidence  at  last 
year's  economic  summit  meeting  in 
Williamsburg.  With  President  Reagan  as 
host,  the  leaders  of  the  seven  largest  in- 
dustrialized democracies  of  North 
America,  Europe,  and  Asia  took  a 
historic  step.  Up  to  that  time  the  annual 
summit  meetings,  which  began  in  1975. 
had  dealt  only  with  economic  matters. 
But  at  Williamsburg,  in  addition  to  the 
traditional  economic  business  of  the 
summit,  the  seven  leaders  issued  a  state- 
ment explicitly  recognizing  that  the 
security  of  each  nation  was  indivisible 
from  that  of  the  others;  the  statement 
also  supported  the  deployment  of 
intermediate-range  nuclear  missiles  in 
Europe  to  counter  the  Soviet  threat. 


This  year's  summit  meeting  in  Lon- 
don, under  Prime  Minister  Thatcher's 
leadership,  built  on  the  success  of 
Williamsburg.  And  again,  the  heads  of 
government  of  the  seven  summit  coun- 
tries demonstrated  the  growing  political 
consensus  that  binds  us  together  as  a 
community  of  democratic  states  with 
shared  values  and  common  interests. 
The  seven  leaders  discussed  an  un- 
precedented range  of  political  and 
security  problems.  They  issued  a  series 
of  declarations  on  democratic  values. 
East- West  relations,  and  terrorism.  The 
range  of  their  discussions  demonstrated 
that  the  economic  and  security  concerns 


of  the  industrialized  democracies  are 
common  and  truly  global. 

In  economics  it  is  generally  reco 
nized  that  trade  is  not  a  zero-sum  gi 
Growth  in  our  trade  with  Europe  or 
Asia  creates  greater  opportunities— 
and  wealth — for  all. 

International  relations,  like  trad 
need  not  be  a  zero-sum  game.  Ever 
benefits,  if  each  takes  a  global  rathe 
than  a  parochial  view  of  the  problen 
that  face  us  all.  In  short,  there  will 
no  losers  if  we  resist — as  we  must- 
temptation  to  permit  where  we  sit  t 
determine  how  we  think.  ■ 


Ninth  Anniversary  of 
the  Helsinki  Final  Act 


Nine  years  ago,  in  Helsinki,  Finland,  the 
United  States  and  Canada  joined  33 
Eastern  and  Western  European  govern- 
ments in  signing  the  F'inal  Act  of  the 
Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation 
in  Europe  (CSCE).  The  Helsinki  accords, 
which  committed  the  signing  nations  to 
abide  by  a  set  of  universal  standards  of 
international  conduct  and  fundamental 
human  rights,  hold  out  a  beacon  of  hope 
for  human  dignity  and  freedom. 

The  United  States  remains  firmly 
committed  to  the  full  implementation  of 
the  provisions  of  the  Helsinki  accords. 
During  the  past  year,  there  have  been  a 
number  of  significant  developments  in 
the  CSCE.  Last  September,  the  3-year- 
long  Madrid  followup  meeting  was  suc- 
cessfully concluded,  with  the  adoption  of 
important  new  provisions  intended  to 
advance  the  cause  of  human  rights,  in- 
cluding trade  union  and  religious 
freedom.  The  Stockholm  conference  on 
European  security  was  t)pened,  where 
we  have  propo.sed  measures  to  lessen 
the  risk  of  surprise  attack  in  Europe. 
Just  as  the  United  States  and  its  allies 
played  an  essential  role  in  achieving  a 
positive  outcome  at  Madrid,  we  have  ad- 
vanced concrete  proposals  at  Stockholm 
to  enhance  East- West  security. 

Unfortunately,  the  promises  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  have  all  too  frequent- 
ly gone  unfulfilled.  The  Helsinki  accords 
pledge  the  signatory  states  "to  respect 
human  rights  and  fundamental 


freedoms,  including  the  freedom  of 
thought,  conscience,  religion  or  belii 
for  all  without  distinction  as  to  race 
sex,  language,  or  religion."  There  ai 
also  commitments  to  advance  trade 
union  freedoms,  to  combat  terrorist 
reunify  families,  to  encourage  the  fi 
flow  of  information,  and  more. 

Over  the  years,  there  have  beer 
some  gradual,  hard-won  gains.  But 
often  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  parti< 
ly  in  the  Soviet  Union,  we  find  a  di! 
ferent  story — repression  of  dissent, 
straints  on  religious  freedoms,  refu 
to  permit  citizens  to  emigrate,  jamr 
of  Western  radio  broadcasts,  suppo 
terrorism,  and  disbanding  of  free  ti 
unions.  The  plight  of  Dr.  Andrei 
Sakharov  and  his  wife  Elena  Bonn* 
one  very  important  example  among 
many  where  the  denial  of  basic  hur 
rights  impedes  the  development  of 
more  constructive  East- West  relati 
ship  we  seek. 

The  challenge  is  a  formidable  o 
give  real  meaning,  through  deeds,  i 
promise  of  the  Helsinki  process.  W 
have  realistic  expectations,  a  patiei 
proach,  and  are  prepared  for  serioi 
dialogue.  We  call  upon  all  CSCE  st 
to  foster  human  rights  and  freedon 
through  the  promise  and  commitmf 
of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 


in 

Till 

,eir 
m 


Press  release  IT.-J  of  Aug.  2,  1984. 


'IS  I 

It  a 

\f: 

P>1I 

m 
ietn 
Irai 
sli 
iialii 
in; 


[DLE  EAST 


irrent  Developments  in  the  Middle  East 


hard  W.  Murphy 


dement  before  the  Subcommittee 
ope  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
Foreijpi  Affairs  Committee  on 
),  19 8J,.  Ambassador  Murphy  is 
int  Secretary  for  Near  EaMem 
luth  Asian  Affairs. ' 


is  is  a  time  of  steady,  sustained 
on  our  part  to  maintain  stability 
region  and  to  deal  with  persistent 
al  conflicts.  The  gulf  war  seems  to 
ie  on  its  own  momentum  in  a  pro- 
twilight  beyond  any  reason  or 
)r  either  Iran  or  Iraq.  Lebanon  is 
^ginning  the  slow  and  painful 
s  of  healing  from  9  years  of  bitter 
ar.  Israel  has  just  held  its  national 
ns  and  will  now  proceed  to  form  a 
avernment.  When  that  govern- 
las  been  established,  it  can  turn 
ention  to  addressing  the  urgent 
ms  of  Lebanon,  the  peace  process, 
e  Israeli  economy.  We  will  be  in- 
3d  in  pursuing  the  long  process  of 
g  a  durable  peace  between  Israel 
e  Arab  states. 

ran  Conflict 

ar  in  the  gulf  has  evolved  into  a 
waiting  game,  with  a  quarter  of  a 
1  Iranian  troops  massed  in  the 
Jim  sector  for  a  major  offensive 
II  lay  come  tomorrow — or  never, 
vhile,  preparations  for  the  attack 
ue,  as  do  efforts  to  strengthen 
defensive  positions.  In  the  gulf,  the 
.r  continues  at  an  uneven  but 
Tous  pace.  The  Iraqis  are  continu- 
eir  sporadic  attacks  against  ship- 
erving  Iranian  ports  in  an  attempt 
uce  Iran  to  negotiate,  and  the  Ira- 
are  retaliating  against  ships  serv- 
'Utral  ports.  For  the  moment,  the 
lion  is  not  getting  any  better — nor 
letting  any  worse — but  this  is  a 
us  duel.  The  danger  is  real  that  it 
t  any  moment  ignite  a  wider  con- 
tie  single  bright  spot  is  the  cease- 
^ainst  attacks  on  civilian  popula- 
enters  which  was  proposed  by  the 
ecretary  General  and  agreed  to  by 
ran  and  Iraq  June  12.  That  cease- 
;  still  holding,  despite  some  claims 
lations  by  both  sides.  We  would 
rt  any  efforts  to  broaden  the 
ment,  but  we  have  no  evidence 


that  Iran  is  yet  willing  to  accept  either  a 
wider  cease-fire  or  one  limited  to  gulf 
shipping  and  ports. 

The  gulf  states,  meanwhile,  are 
strengthening  their  own  defenses,  while 
continuing  to  emphasize  that  a 
diplomatic  solution  to  the  war  deserves 
the  highest  priority.  In  the  first  in- 
stance, they  will  rely  on  their  own 
resources  to  deter  or  prevent  aggression 
against  their  own  territories  and  ship- 
ping in  their  waters.  Their  capabilities  to 
defend  themselves  have  grown  steadily 
over  the  last  decade — to  a  large  extent 
due  to  the  sustained  assistance  we  and 
Western  Europe  have  provided  through 
our  military  supply  and  training  relation- 
ships. Our  objective  has  been  to 
strengthen  their  security  by  developing 
a  credible  defense  capability.  In  the  case 
of  Saudi  Arabia  our  policy  has  been 
especially  effective.  We  believe  our 
prompt  support  for  Saudi  self-defense, 
in  combination  with  Saudi  determination 
to  defend  itself  without  being  pro- 
vocative, has  played  an  important  role  in 
checking  escalation  in  the  northern  gulf. 
We  are  now  engaged  in  discussions  with 
several  of  the  other  states,  including 
Kuwait  and  Bahrain,  to  assess  ways  in 
which  we  could  further  strengthen  their 
individual  and  collective  defense 
capabilities  on  a  near-term  basis. 

Our  one  overriding  objective  in  the 
gulf  war  is  to  bring  it  to  an  end.  We 
have  consistently  supported  the  pursuit 
of  every  avenue  to  a  negotiated  settle- 
ment which  would  leave  neither  party 
dominant  and  which  would  preserve  the 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of 
both.  Those  efforts  have  thus  far  not 
borne  fruit,  nor  will  they  until  both  sides 
agree  that  it  is  time  to  stop  the  bloodlet- 
ting. But  it  is  important  that  the  efforts 
continue. 

It  is  also  our  objective  to  avoid 
direct  U.S.  military  involvement  in  the 
fighting.  Thus  far  we  have  been  suc- 
cessful. We  trust  that  our  success  will 
continue,  but  we  must  continue  intensive 
planning  for  contingencies  which  might 
be  beyond  the  capabilities  of  the  Arab 
states  of  the  gulf  to  meet,  even  while  we 
help  them  develop  the  capability  to  pro- 
vide for  their  own  self-defense. 

Retaining  Access  to  Oil  Supplies 

It  is  in  our  vital  interest  that  the  world 
retain  access  to  the  oil  supplies  of  the 
gulf.  We  are  not  seeking  military  in- 


volvement in  the  war,  but  neither  do  our 
interests  permit  us  to  ignore  it  or  to 
allow  the  gulf  to  be  closed  to  our  ships 
or  those  of  our  allies  and  friends.  Our 
strategy,  therefore,  has  been  one  of  pur- 
suing diplomacy  while  cooperating  with 
the  gulf  states  and  our  allies  to  prevent 
or  to  be  prepared  to  deal  with  a  military 
crisis  if  regional  capabilities  prove  inade- 
quate. 

Our  consultations  with  our  allies 
have  included  energy  preparedness.  We 
have  worked  with  the  International 
Energy  Agency  (lEA)  for  some  months 
to  lay  out  a  broad  approach  to  dealing 
with  a  major  supply  disruption.  We  are 
pleased  with  the  July  1 1  decision  of  the 
lEA's  governing  board  that  early 
drawdown  of  emergency  oil  stocks,  and 
other  mutually  supportive  actions  to 
restore  supply-demand  balance,  are  vital 
elements  in  minimizing  the  economic  ef- 
fects of  a  disruption. 

Despite  the  protracted  nature  of  the 
war  and  the  continued  shipping  losses, 
there  has  been  no  appreciable  drop  in  oil 
exports  from  the  gulf,  and  prices  on  the 
spot  market  have  fallen.  While  the  price 
weakness  is  primarily  due  to  the  con- 
tinued glut  of  oil  on  the  market,  it  may 
also  in  part  reflect  world  confidence  that 
the  United  States  and  its  allies  will  en- 
sure that  the  energy  supplies  continue. 

I  would  note  in  this  context,  and  in  a 
larger  context  as  well,  that  our  military 
supply  relationship  with  many  countries 
in  the  Middle  East  not  only  allows  them 
to  provide  for  their  own  security — a 
burden  we  are  not  called  upon  to 
bear — but  it  also  provides  a  concrete 
means  of  maintaining  American  in- 
fluence in  the  region.  The  states  of  the 
Middle  East  are  going  to  seek  arms  to 
defend  themselves.  The  only  question  is, 
who  will  supply  those  arms.  To  the  ex- 
tent that  our  longstanding  military  sup- 
ply relationships  are  supplanted  by  arms 
purchases  from  elsewhere — the  Soviet 
Union  or  even  Western  Europe — our 
own  influence  is  diminished.  This  has  im- 
plications for  our  ability  to  move  the 
peace  process  forward  or  to  aid  in 
resolving  crises  within  the  region, 
wherever  they  may  develop. 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Israel 

Let  me  turn  for  a  moment  to  Israel. 
Although  you  are  all  aware  of  the 
results  thus  far  of  the  Israeli  elections,  I 
thought  it  might  be  useful  to  go  over 
them  with  you.  With  over  98%  of  the 
vote  in,  projections  for  the  120  seats  in 
Israel's  11th  Knesset  indicate  no  clear 
victory  for  either  the  Labor  Alignment 
(45  seats)  or  the  Likud  (41).  As  the 
smaller  parties  are  doing  well,  it  appears 
that  the  coalition-forming  process  may 
be  prolonged. 

The  projections  thus  far  are  not 
definitive.  The  final  breakdown  for  party 
representation  in  the  11th  Kn£sset  will 
not  be  determined  for  a  day  or  two.  In 
the  face  of  this  uncertainty,  it  would  be 
inappropriate  to  make  any  predictions 
about  what  party  will  lead  the  next 
government  or  what  that  government's 
policies  will  be. 

After  the  election  results  are 
published  early  next  week,  President 
Herzog  will  begin  to  consult  with  the 
parties  prior  to  giving  one  party  the 
first  opportunity  to  form  a  government. 
There  is  no  time  limit  within  which 
President  Herzog  must  make  his  choice, 
although  it  usually  takes  only  a  few 
days. 

Whatever  the  outcome  of  the  elec- 
tion, we  do  expect  and  intend  to  con- 
tinue our  close  cooperative  relationship 
with  the  next  Israeli  Government. 


Lebanon 

Concerning  Lebanon,  since  my  ap- 
pearance before  this  subcommittee  in 
June,  the  national  unity  government  of 
Prime  Minister  Karami  has  begun  to  im- 


plement a  security  plan  for  the  greater 
Beirut  area.  The  "green  line"  has  been 
reopened  between  east  and  west  Beirut, 
and  the  airport  and  main  seaport  are 
also  open.  'These  are  welcome  signs  that 
the  Lebanese  Government  is  having 
some  success  in  addressing  the  many 
problems  before  it  and  that  the  various 
political  factions  are  beginning  to  come 
together.  The  United  States  has  strong- 
ly backed  efforts  to  form  a  more  broadly 
based  government  and  to  undertake  the 
internal  reforms  needed  for  reconcilia- 
tion between  Lebanon's  warring  fac- 
tions. We  hope  the  government  will 
make  further  progress  toward  restoring 
stability  and  security. 

We  believe  that  Syria  has  been  one 
of  the  helpful  players  in  these  recent 
developments.  We  also  believe  that 
Lebanon  needs  peaceful,  cooperative 
relations  with  both  Syria  and  Israel.  No 
lasting  solution  is  possible  which  fails  to 
take  into  account  the  interests  of  both  of 
these  important  neighbors.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  encourage  Lebanon  to  deal 
directly  with  Israel  on  the  issue  of 
Israeli  withdrawal  from  south  Lebanon 
and  security  arrangements  along  their 
border. 

But  there  is  a  long  and  difficult  road 
ahead  for  the  Lebanese  people  and  for 
their  government.  We  will  be  supportive 
of  every  effort  which  advances  the  goals 
of  restoring  unity  and  national  recon- 
ciliation and  the  withdrawal  of  foreign 
forces.  In  the  final  analysis,  however, 
both  we  and  the  Lebanese  realize  that 
they  themselves  must  take  the  prime 
responsibility  in  dealing  with  their  own 
problems.  We  can  help;  other  friends 
can  help;  but  the  basic  solution  is  in 
their  own  hands. 


Jordan 

With  Jordan,  we  continue  to  enjoy  p 
ductive  relations  on  many  levels.  As 
befits  friends,  we  have  maintained  a 
ongoing  dialogue  on  many  issues — J 
danian  security  and  economic  develo 
ment,  the  Iran-Iraq  war  and  stabilit 
the  gulf,  and  prospects  for  broader 
peace  in  the  area.  Jordan  has  main- 
tained its  continuing  interest  in  seel- 
a  political  solution  to  the  conflict  wi 
Israel. 

Finally,  I  would  like  to  touch  br 
on  the  peace  process.  We  are  comm 
to  seeking  progress  toward  a  just  ai 
lasting  peace  wherever  progress  is  ] 
ble.  We  also  remain  committed  to  tl 
positions  in  the  President's  initiativt 
September  1,  1982.  The  United  Sta' 
has  a  consistent  record,  which  has  ( 
tended  over  succeeding  Administrat 
of  seeking  to  promote  progress  tow 
peace  whenever  the  opportunities  f( 
progress  have  arisen.  We  will  work 
ensure  that  no  opportunity  is  lost. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hea 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  oJ 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


i 


RCOTICS 


lernational  Narcotics  Control 


rround 

ouse  of  heroin,  cocaine,  marijuana, 

;her  dangerous  drugs  causes 

s  health  and  social  problems  in  the 

i  States,  Canada,  Western 

le,  and  other  countries,  including 

nations  in  which  these  drugs  are 

ced  and /or  transshipped. 

le  United  States  consumes  annual- 

le  4.1  metric  tons  of  imported 

1,  50-61  metric  tons  of  imported 

le,  and  13,600-14,000  metric  tons 

rijuana,  much  of  it  imported.  Pro- 

m  of  these  drugs  far  exceeds 

ited  demand.  For  example,  if  all 

icit  coca  leaf  currently  produced 

onverted  to  cocaine,  it  would  yield 
ich  as  227  metric  tons  of  cocaine; 
wide  demand  is  about  80  metric 
I  year.  Worldwide  illicit  opium  pro- 
)n  exceeds  1,700  metric  tons,  com- 

to  41  metric  tons  needed  to  supply 

to  U.S.  addicts. 


Sources 

n,  for  conversion  to  heroin  and 
n  world  markets,  is  grown  primari- 
three  areas — Mexico;  the  "Golden 
gle"  of  Burma,  Thailand,  and  Laos; 
he  "Golden  Crescent"  of  Iran, 
inistan,  and  Pakistan.  Most  of  the 
1  and,  recently,  much  of  the  heroin 
iced  in  Southeast  and  Southwest 
are  consumed  by  increasingly 
r  addict  populations  in  those 
ns. 

locaine  is  derived  primarily  from 
leaves  grown  in  Bolivia  and  Peru 
rafficked  through  Colombia,  which 
las  become  a  coca  producer. 
larijuana,  too,  comes  from  many 
tes.  Although  Colombia  still  pro- 
more  than  half  of  the  U.S.  mari- 
supply,  U.S.  domestic  production 
mports  from  Mexico  and  Jamaica 
;her  supply  about  41%  of  the 
;et. 

dethaqualone,  a  tranquilizer  widely 
ed  in  the  United  States  and  other 
;,  had  been  shipped  in  bulk  from 
pe  and  Asia  to  clandestine  labs  in 
mbia  and  elsewhere  for  processing 
rerouting  to  the  United  States.  But 
ability  has  dropped  sharply  thanks 
fective  control  at  the  source. 


Department  of  State  Role 

The  Department  of  State's  Bureau  of  In- 
ternational Narcotics  Matters  (INM), 
directed  by  an  assistant  secretary,  is 
charged  with  coordinating  the  U.S. 
Government's  international  drug  control 
activities.  INM  aims  to  strengthen  U.S. 
diplomatic  and  program  efforts  to 
reduce  the  supply  of  dangerous  drugs 
entering  the  United  States.  The  bureau 
receives  about  $41  million  annually  for 
bilateral  and  multilateral  narcotics  con- 
trol programs.  These  funds  are  used  for: 

•  Crop  eradication  and  control  pro- 
grams; 

•  Law  enforcement  assistance; 

•  Equipment  and  materials; 

•  Training  of  foreign  law  enforce- 
ment personnel; 

•  Development  assistance  to  provide 
economic  alternatives  for  illicit  narcotics 
crops;  and 

•  Technical  assistance  for  demand 
reduction  programs. 

INM  works  with  narcotics  coor- 
dinators in  t!he  Department's  regional 
bureaus  and  U.S.  Embassies  and  col- 
laborates with  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development  (AID)  on  new  proj- 
ects linking  narcotics  control  with 
development  assistance  in  Bolivia,  Peru, 
and  Pakistan.  INM  participates  in 
multilateral  control  efforts  with  UN 
agencies  and  cooperates  with  the  White 
House,  Drug  Enforcement  Administra- 
tion, U.S.  Customs  Service,  U.S.  Coast 
Guard,  and  other  concerned  U.S.  agen- 
cies on  domestic  and  international  ac- 
tivities. 

Narcotics  control,  a  matter  of 
government  responsibility  under 
treaties,  should  be  dealt  with  as  an  in- 
ternational obligation.  Producer  and 
transit  countries  have  the  primary 
responsibility  under  treaties  for  control- 
ling the  cultivation,  reproduction,  and 
distribution  of  illicit  narcotics.  In 
assisting  these  countries,  INM  places 
highest  priority  on  programs  to  control 
production  and  prohibit  trafficking  at 
the  source. 


Programs 

The  worldwide  supply  of  marijuana,  co- 
caine, heroin,  and  other  drugs  is  so 
great,  and  trafficking  channels  to  the 
United  States  so  diverse,  that  major  in- 
terdictions and  even  crop  eradications 
cause  only  temporary  declines  in 


availability  when  achieved  in  just  one  or 
two  producing  areas.  INM's  strategy  is 
based  on  the  ultimate  objective  of 
simultaneously  controlling  production  in 
all  key  geographic  sectors  so  that  signifi- 
cant and  lasting  reductions  are  achieved. 

INM  has  drug  control  projects  in 
key  opium  producing  nations  (Burma, 
Thailand,  Mexico,  and  Pakistan)  and  in 
transit  countries  through  which  opium  is 
refined  into  heroin  or  transshipped.  INM 
supports  coca  control  and  cocaine  inter- 
diction projects  in  Bolivia,  Peru,  and 
Colombia  and  projects  to  control  mari- 
juana production  and  trafficking  in  Mex- 
ico and  Colombia.  It  also  supports  inter- 
diction and  enforcement  efforts  in  other 
producer  and  transit  nations  in  the  three 
target  regions — Latin  America  and 
Southeast  and  Southwest  Asia — and 
assists  dozens  of  countries  through  INM- 
funded  law  enforcement  and  customs 
training  programs. 

Multilateral  Efforts 

Drug  abuse  is  not  just  an  American 
problem;  it  affects  all  nations  from  the 
poorest  to  the  wealthiest,  countries  that 
produce  and  traffic  in  drugs,  and  those 
that  are  consumers. 

Historically  the  U.S.  Government 
has  borne  much  of  the  cost  of  interna- 
tional control  programs;  now  it  is  urging 
other  nations  to  assist  through  their  own 
bilateral  programs,  through  direct 
economic  assistance  to  producer  coun- 
tries, and  through  multilateral  activities. 
The  U.S.  Government  has  urged  interna- 
tional financial  institutions  to  target 
development  programs  in  narcotics- 
producing  areas  whenever  feasible. 

The  U.S.  Government  also  pursues 
international  narcotics  control  objectives 
in  the  UN  General  Assembly,  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council  (ECOSOC), 
and  other  UN  agencies  that  coordinate 
multilateral  efforts  to  control  produc- 
tion, trafficking,  and  abuse.  These  latter 
efforts  are  directed  by  the  UN  Commis- 
sion on  Narcotics  Drugs,  its  Division  for 
Narcotic  Drugs,  the  International  Nar- 
cotics Control  Board,  and  the  UN  Fund 
for  Drug  Abuse  Control,  which  supports 
key  drug  control  projects  throughout  the 
world.  The  U.S.  Government  helped 
create  the  fund  and,  to  date,  has  con- 
tributed the  largest  single  amount  of  the 
fund's  resources. 


Taken  from  the  GIST  series  of  July  1984, 
published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
Department  of  State.  Editor;  Harriet 
Culley.  ■ 


39 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


Nuclear  Trade:  Reliable 
Supply  and  Mutual  Obligations 


by  Richard  T.  Kennedy 

Address  before  the  Center  for 
Strategic  atid  International  Studies  at 
Georgetown  University  in  Washington. 
D.C.,  on  June  28.  198i.  Ambassador 
Kennedy  is  special  adviser  to  the 
Secretary  on  nonproliferation  policy  and 
nuclear  energy  affairs. 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  and  honor  for  me  to 
have  the  opportunity  to  speak  to  this 
very  distinguished  audience.  I  particularly 
enjoy  an  opportunity  to  step  back  from 
the  trees  in  order  to  take  a  look  at  the 
forest— to  take  a  look  at  the  bigger  pic- 
ture. In  dealing  with  nonproliferation 
problems  on  a  day-to-day  basis,  one  must 
not  lose  sight  of  the  basic  objectives  and 
policies  which  guide  us,  and  it  is  helpful 
to  reexamine  them  periodically. 

What  I  would  like  to  discuss  with 
you  is  both  the  fundamental  importance 
and  the  implications  of  being  a  reliable 
nuclear  supplier.  At  the  outset,  let  me 
assert  that  the  nonproliferation  regime 
in  place  today  could  not  have  been 
achieved  and  cannot  be  maintained  for 
the  future  without  widespread  con- 
fidence in  the  reliability  of  supply  and 
cooperative  undertakings  in  the  nuclear 
arena.  But  it  is  equally  true  that 
reliability  of  supply  implies  obligations 
not  only  on  the  part  of  suppliers  but  on 
the  part  of  recipients  as  well. 

Over  30  years  ago,  President 
Eisenhower  took  a  historic  step  which, 
in  a  sense,  created  the  worldwide 
civilian  nuclear  industry:  he  inaugurated 
the  Atoms  for  Peace  program  in  1953. 
The  United  States  volunteered  to  share 
the  nuclear  technologies  it  had 
developed  so  that  they  could  benefit  all 
mankind.  In  the  intervening  years, 
American  policy  has  sought  to  assure 
that  nations  could  benefit  from  the 
peaceful  application  of  nuclear 
technology  under  a  system  which 
prevented  the  misuse  of  that  technology. 
Atoms  for  peace,  not  war,  has  been  our 
objective.  Our  basic  approach  today  is 
one  of  continuity  with  the  principles  of 
the  past — to  assure  the  benefits  of 
peaceful  nuclear  technology  and  to  pre- 
vent its  misuse.  All  of  our  efforts  have 
been  bent  to  the  task  of  ensuring  that 
these  principles  are  not  only  honored  in 
the  abstract  but  are  given  concrete  ex- 
pression in  practice. 


40 


There  is  now  in  place  an  interna- 
tional nuclear  regime  which,  while  clear- 
ly not  perfect,  is  functioning  effectively. 
We  want  to  make  that  regime  and  the 
institutions,  norms,  and  practices  which 
comprise  it,  stronger,  more  complete, 
and  more  effective.  This  Administration, 
like  its  predecessors,  has  fully  embraced 
nonproliferation  as  a  high  priority  and 
has  taken  numerous  steps  to  further  the 
objective  of  strengthening  the  non- 
proliferation  regime.  Let  me  cite  a  few 
specifics. 

•  We  have  actively  encouraged  addi- 
tional adherence  to  the  NPT  [Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation  Treaty]. 

•  We  have  provided  strong  financial 
and  technical  support  to  IAEA  [Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency] 
safeguards. 

•  We  have  implemented  the  volun- 
tary offer  to  accept  IAEA  safeguards. 

•  We  ratified  the  physical  security 
convention  and  have  strongly  urged 
others  to  do  so. 

•  We  ratified  Protocol  I  of  the 
treaty  of  TIateloIco  and  have  urged 
others  to  ratify  the  treaty  to  bring  it 
fully  into  force. 

•  We  have  made  considerable  prog- 
ress in  addressing  the  problem  of 
safeguards  on  large  reprocessing  plants. 

•  We  have  pursued  an  initiative 
aimed  at  the  adoption  by  all  major  sup- 
pliers of  comprehensive  safeguards  as  a 
condition  for  future  nuclear  supply  com- 
mitments. 

•  We  have  buttressed  U.S.  alliances 
and  security  ties  that  reduce  incentives 
to  acquire  nuclear  explosives. 

In  addition,  there  has  been  a  num- 
ber of  other  developments  which  have 
strengthened  the  nonproliferation 
regime,  for  example: 

•  China  has  taken  steps  to  par- 
ticipate in  international  nonproliferation 
efforts  and  has  joined  the  IAEA. 

•  South  Africa  announced  earlier 
this  year  that  it  would  require  IAEA 
safeguards  on  all  its  nuclear  exports  and 
is  also  discussing  with  the  IAEA  the  ap- 
plication of  safeguards  to  its  new 
semicommercial  enrichment  plant. 

•  The  trigger  lists  have  been  further 
clarified  and  refined. 


its«i 


We  also  can  and  should  take  conjconiii' 
siderable  satisfaction  from  the  progi 
we  have  made  in  strengthening  tho& 
ternationally  agreed  rules  of  nucleaniproj 
trade  without  which  peaceful  nuclea 
commerce  would  not  be  possible. 

In  the  United  States,  we  have  Is 
policies,  and  procedures  aimed  at 
preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Every  other  major  nucleaii 
porting  country  has  adopted  its  own 
although  obviously  not  wholly  identi 
restrictions.  We  can  and  should  taktijep 

ersi 

!tkf 


nil  oil 


EtlHf 


ilne 


considerable  comfort  from  these  fac 

The  Need  To  Strengthen 
Rules  of  Nuclear  Trade 

But  let  us  be  completely  candid:  the 
are  strains  on  the  existing  norms,  ai 
there  is  need  for  still  further  efforts 
broaden  and  strengthen  these  rules 
nuclear  trade. 

In  many  countries,  there  are  lar 
nuclear  industries  created  at  a  time 
when  projected  energy  demand  was 
much  greater  and  when  it  seemed  t! 
the  future  for  nuclear  power  was  un 
bounded.  But  times  have  changed,  a 
we  are  all  faced  with  the  problem  oi 
how  to  preserve  those  nuclear  Indus  ,» 
for  the  future  when  demand  for  nuc 
power  will  again  grow— as  I  believe 
will.  In  this  situation,  it  is  only  natu 
that  competitive  pressures  are  inten  ve 
And  those  pressures  are  focused  inc 
ingly  on  the  effort  to  find  new  mark 
abroad. 

But  it  is  in  the  interest  of  every 
tion— supplier  and  purchaser  alike- 
competition  for  those  markets  be  ca 
out  in  terms  of  such  factors,  for  exa 
pie,  as  the  quality  and  capacity  of  e( 
ment,  know-how,  and  expertise  and 
delivery  schedules.  These  are  the  tr;  is 
tional  and  understood  grounds  for  c 
petition  in  the  marketplace. 

Competition  must  not  be  conduc 
in  a  way  that  it  will  hinge  on  the 
readiness  of  a  supplier  to  shade 
safeguards  or  other  nonproliferation 
conditions,  to  look  for  possible 
technology  sweeteners  that  will  mak 
purchasing  from  it  seem  more  attrac 
than  from  another  country  that  hon( 
existing  sound  norms.  For,  once  the 
process  of  shading  our  shared  non- 
proliferation  standards  begins,  we  w 


Department  of  State  Bull 


le 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


L  witli  the  lowest  common 
■niiator  of  what  can  be  agreed  to 
r  nations.  Each  will  be  motivated 
1  Its  or  the  world's  long-term  in- 
dmt  by  short-term  gain  and  fear  of 
Cts  neighbors  might  do.  Under 
"'|ronditions,  the  nonproliferation 
■t  '  will  gradually  unravel,  and  we 
''"  id  ourselves  unable  to  realize  the 
*i    promise  for  the  health  and  well- 
«  Df  all. 

t  me  emphasize  that,  for  our  part, 
^'  lited  States  has  never  sacrificed, 
11  never  sacrifice,  its  nonprolifera- 
inciples  for  commercial  gain  or 

■  nic  advantage.  We  have  set  this 
^ndard  for  our  own  conduct.  We 

'  ;  it  should  be  the  universal  norm. 

■"'  e  prospective  emergence  of  new 

-  ;rs  on  the  scene  adds  even  greater 
:y  to  efforts  to  preserve  and 
then  the  agreed  rules  of  nuclear 
If  there  is  disharmony  and  con- 
sy  among  the  major  nuclear  sup- 

'  on  conditions  for  nuclear  export, 

■  lew  suppliers  inevitably  will  be 
;d  to  use  nonproliferation  condi- 
is  a  bargaining  factor  in  their  pur- 
sales.  If  they  see  existing  sup- 
performing  in  this  way,  what  else 
5  reasonably  expect?  By  contrast, 
nent  now  among  the  existing  sup- 
on  sound  guidelines  and  a  commit- 
to  honor  those  guidelines  will 

it  easier  to  urge  new  suppliers  to 
those  agreed  and  sensible  export 
ees  in  the  future, 
further  word  about  such  common 
er  policies  and  guidelines:  it  is 
;hat  no  list  of  sensitive  materials 
'er  be  immutable.  The  items  on 
ich  list  must  change  over  time  as 
elegies  change  and  as  our 
standing  of  technologies  becomes 
er  and  deeper. 

at  there  are  other  items  whose 
jn  to  sensitive  activities  is  more 
ex.  What  should  we  do,  for  exam- 
a  nation  seeks  to  buy  a  computer 
could  be  useful  in  the  operation  of 
safeguarded  reprocessing  plant? 
ere  we  get  to  the  heart  of  the  dual- 
aestion:  the  same  computer  that 
help  in  the  operation  of  a  reproc- 
l  plant  could  also  be  used  quite 
rly  and  harmlessly  in  a  large 
ical  facility.  How  should  the  nations 
i  world  decide  which  request  to 
and  which  to  reject?  The  nuclear- 
■ting  states,  after  all,  are  those 
likely  to  be  in  a  position  to  export 
jmputer  in  question.  Should  there 
policy  aimed  at  foreclosing  the  ex- 
of  any  item  which  has  a  dual  use? 


Should  any  item  be  barred  which  could 
conceivably  find  its  way  into  a  facility 
which  could  be  used  in  developing 
nuclear  explosives? 

These  are  not  simple  questions,  and 
there  are  no  simple  answers.  Clearly,  for 
example,  a  blanket  export  prohibition 
might  prevent  the  construction  of  a 
perfectly  respectable — indeed,  vitally 
necessary — chemical  plant  in  a  develop- 
ing country.  But  by  the  same  token,  the 
potential  dangers  cannot  be  ig^iored. 

If  we  can  have  confidence  that  the 
intended  use  of  that  mythical  computer 
is  not  related  to  the  manufacture  of 
nuclear  explosives,  the  question  is  clear- 
ly much  easier  to  answer.  But  how  can 
the  requesting  nation  generate  that 
confidence?  One  clear  answer  would  be 
by  adhering  to  the  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty  or,  in  the  case  of 
Latin  American  countries,  by  accepting 
and  agreeing  to  be  bound  by  the  treaty 
of  Tlatelolco.  The  voluntary  acceptance 
of  IAEA  safeguards  on  all  of  a  country's 
nuclear  facilities  and  activities  is  yet 
another  way  to  generate  that  needed 
confidence. 

Let  me  elaborate.  In  order  to 
manufacture  nuclear  explosives,  a  nation 
needs  two  things. 

First  is  the  know-how  and  technical 
backup — the  scientists  and  the 
necessary  materials  and  equipment.  This 
is  the  technical  side  of  the  equation  and, 
though  the  barriers  are  considerable  and 
must  remain  so,  more  and  more  nations 
are  coming  to  possess  the  technical 
wherewithal  to  cross  those  barriers. 

Second  is  the  political  decision  to 
"go  nuclear."  A  nation  must  consciously 
make  this  hard  decision.  Presumably,  it 
would  make  that  decision  because  it  sees 
some  benefit  to  itself  in  doing  so.  This  is 
the  political  ingredient.  After  all  is  said 
and  done,  the  political  ingredient  is  by 
far  the  more  important.  All  the  export 
controls  that  suppliers  can  devise  or 
safeguards  that  the  IAEA  can  imple- 
ment cannot  forever  bar  a  country  from 
acquiring  nuclear  explosives.  A  nation, 
however,  can  rule  out  "going  nuclear"  by 
an  act  of  political  will.  It  can  turn  its 
back  on  the  development  of  nuclear 
weapons  by  adhering  to  the  Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation  Treaty  and  accepting 
safeguards  on  all  its  nuclear  activities. 
Over  120  non-nuclear-weapons  states  so 
far  have  done  just  that.  Adherence  to  a 
regional  treaty  such  as  the  treaty  of 
Tlatelolco  can  serve  the  same  purpose. 


But  there  is  more  to  it  than  a  simple 
signature  on  a  treaty.  The  best  way  for 
a  nation  to  demonstrate  its  bona 
fides — the  most  graphic  way — is  to  ac- 
cept safeguards  in  spirit  as  well  as  in 
the  letter.  It  is  unseemly  for  nations 
with  facilities  subject  to  safeguards  to 
haggle  about  the  niceties  of  safe- 
guards— whether  a  given  action  or  a 
particular  technical  change  is  within  the 
writ  of  a  particular  IAEA  safeguards 
agreement.  Instead  of  a  preoccupation 
with  preventing  the  agency  from  going 
beyond  the  precise  legal  letter  of  safe- 
guards— a  preoccupation  with  form  over 
substance — such  nations — indeed,  all  na- 
tions— should  work  to  strengthen  the 
IAEA  safeguards  system  and  help  it  to 
perform  its  vital  task. 

Only  such  a  cooperative  attitude  can 
provide  the  proper  basis  for  nuclear 
commerce.  Without  it,  that  mutual  trust 
and  confidence,  which  is  essential  to  con- 
tinued use  of  nuclear  energy  for  peaceful 
purposes,  will  be  lacking.  For  after  we 
strip  away  all  the  verbiage,  it  comes 
down  to  this:  trust  must  be  the 
predicate  for  all  nuclear  commerce.  The 
exporting  nation  must  have  confidence 
that  the  materials  it  exports  will  not  be 
turned  into  devices  of  war  and  destruc- 
tion; the  recipient  nation  must  have  con- 
fidence that,  having  demonstrated  by 
word  and  deed  its  own  bona  fides,  it  can 
get  the  help  it  needs  to  realize  the 
atom's  peaceful  promise. 

A  Positive  Approach 
to  Nuclear  Power 

While  there  has  been  a  broad  continuity 
with  past  administrations  on  non- 
proliferation  policy  goals,  the  Reagan 
Administration  has  placed  more  em- 
phasis on  the  need  for  mutual  confidence 
among  exporting  and  recipient  coun- 
tries. There  are  several  aspects  of  pres- 
ent policy  which  impact  on  this. 

The  Administration,  for  instance, 
has  taken  a  very  positive  approach  to 
nuclear  power.  It  considers  nuclear 
power  to  be  a  clean,  efficient,  and  safe 
way  to  generate  electricity.  It  is  not  con- 
sidered a  choice  of  last  resort.  Instead, 
it  is  seen  to  be  a  key  element  in  our 
domestic  energy  future.  And  nuclear- 
generated  energy  is  recognized  as  im- 
portant for  the  economic  development 
and  energy  security  of  many  nations. 
The  Administration  stands  by  the  idea 
that  where  the  necessary  nonprolifera- 
tion conditions  are  met,  nations  can  and 
should  have  access  to  the  benefits  of 
nuclear  energy. 


41 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


Next,  the  Administration  firmly 
believes  that  the  United  States  must 
be— and  must  be  seen  to  be— a  predict- 
able and  reliable  supplier  of  nuclear 
materials,  equipment,  and  technology. 
For  only  in  that  event  can  the  United 
States  reasonably  expect  to  exert  the  in- 
fluence which  its  technological  ex- 
perience and  competence  could  rightly 
be  presumed  to  yield.  In  his  key  non- 
proliferation  policy  statement  of  July 
1981,  President  Reagan  noted  that  many 
friends  of  the  United  States  had  lost 
confidence  in  our  ability  to  recognize 
their  needs.  Therefore,  he  called  for  the 
reestablishment  of  this  nation  as  a 
"predictable  and  reliable  partner  under 
adequate  safeguards." 

Another  important  aspect  of  this 
Administration's  policies  involves  its  at- 
titude toward  reprocessing  and  the  use 
of  plutonium.  There  is  no  question  that 
plutonium  is  an  inherently  dangerous 
substance.  How  to  control  it  has  always 
been  a  very  real  and  substantial 
challenge  for  the  nonproliferation 
regime.  U.S.  policy  seeks  to  inhibit  the 
spread  of  sensitive  technology,  equip- 
ment, and  material  which  could  lead  to 
production  of  weapons-useable  material, 
particularly  where  there  is  a  risk  of  pro- 
liferation. We  want  to  restrict  the 
number  of  reprocessing  plants  around 
the  world  and  to  limit  other  sensitive 
fuel  cycle  activities.  These  are  not  and 
should  not  be  items  of  general  com- 
merce. 

The  approach  to  these  concerns  and 
objectives,  however,  has  not  been  to 
seek  the  abandonment  of  reprocessing  in 
any  of  the  industrialized  countries  or  the 
reversal  of  plans  to  enlarge  existing 
capabilities.  Instead  of  a  universal  ap- 
proach aimed  at  foreclosing  reprocessing 
and  plutonium  use  everywhere,  a 
coherent,  realistic,  yet  prudent 
plutonium  use  policy  is  being  pursued 
which  differentiates  among  countries  on 
the  basis  of  their  needs  and  their  non- 
proliferation  credentials.  Specifically, 
President  Reagan  decided  that  the 
United  States  should  not  attempt  to  in- 
hibit or  set  back  civil  reprocessing  and 
breeder  reactor  development  abroad  in 
nations  with  advanced  nuclear  power 
programs  and  where  it  did  not  con- 
stitute a  proliferation  risk.  An  important 
aspect  of  this  approach  is  a  willingness 
under  the  proper  circumstances  to  grant 
programmatic  ap[)rovals  for  the 
reprocessing  of  U.S. -origin  fuel— ap- 
provals which  we  believe  are  essential  to 
the  maintenance  and  improvement  of 
close  relationships  with  our  industrial- 
ized nuclear  partners. 


The  effort  to  pursue  a  more  positive 
approach  to  nuclear  cooperation— to  be 
perceived  as  a  reliable  nuclear  partner 
and  to  be  a  reliable  supplier  as  con- 
templated by  the  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Act— is  a  key  element  of 
the  Administration's  policy.  The  United 
States  realizes  that  it  cannot  take  a 
unilateral  approach  to  nuclear  supplier 
policy  if  it  is  to  continue  to  play  a  mean- 
ingful role  with  respect  to  nuclear  com- 
merce and  the  nonproliferation  regime. 
We  no  longer  possess  the  degree  of  in- 
fluence in  the  nuclear  field— scientific  or 
commercial— that  we  once  enjoyed.  In- 
deed, none  of  today's  suppliers  does.  As 
mastery  of  the  technology  has  become 
more  widespread,  the  ability  of  any  one 
nation  to  influence  others  through  a 
nuclear  supply  relationship,  let  alone  dic- 
tate their  nuclear  energy  choices,  has 
diminished.  This  trend  can  only  continue 
over  the  long  term,  particularly  as  new 
suppliers  enter  the  scene. 

But  what  does  being  a  reliable  sup- 
plier mean  in  terms  of  specifics?  It  is 
essential  that  nuclear  trading  partners 
have  confidence  that  if  they  adopt  and 
apply  the  strong  nonproliferation  stance 
of  which  I  have  spoken,  the  suppliers, 
including  the  United  States,  will  be 
responsible  to  the  needs  of  their  nuclear 
programs.  Needlessly  long  delays  in 
responding  to  specific  requests  must  be 
avoided.  And  requests  must  be  re- 
sponded to  in  a  consistent  manner.  If 
such  confidence  is  not  maintained,  these 
partners  will  inevitably  seek  to 
disengage  themselves  from  dependence 
on  the  otherwise  responsible  suppliers 
and  look  elsewhere. 

Nuclear  trading  partners  also  must 
believe  that  they  can  conduct  commer- 
cial nuclear  relations  with  each  other 
without  running  the  risk  that  new  legal 
requirements  of  one  side  will  change  the 
name  of  the  game  without  the  other's 
consent.  They  must  not  be  led  to  think 
that,  at  any  time,  they  may  be  forced  to 
choose  between  breaking  off  a  relation- 
ship which  is  crucial  to  their  own 
economy  or  accepting  intrusions  by 
others  into  matters  they  believe  are 
within  the  scope  of  their  sovereignty. 
Such  unpredictability  and  change  does 
not  serve  nonprolifepation  interests. 

As  an  example— and  only  that— con- 
sider one  side  effect  of  the  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Act.  That  act  provided  a 
positive  benefit  by  establishing  a  new 
legislative  underpinning  for  U.S.  nuclear 
exports.  But,  unfortunately,  the  percep- 
tion of  some  of  our  closest  allies  was 
that  it  called  into  question  existing 


agreements.  At  least  in  the  initial  st 
of  the  implementation  of  the  law,  m 
nations  perceived  it  as  an  attempt  ti 
substitute  unilaterally  U.S.  desires  f 
international  consensus  in  the  nude 
field.  It  appeared  to  them  that  we  \t 
using  domestic  legislative  and  ad- 
ministrative processes  to  adopt  rule 


the  conduct  of  nuclear  commerce 
which  affected  their  own  nuclear  p;- 
grams— thereby  imposing  those  rule 
our  trading  partners  by  fiat.  We  wf 
perceived  to  be  ignoring  the  traditic 
forms  of  agreement,  accommodatioi 
negotiation,  and  mutual  adjustment 
interests  which  characterize  interna 
tional  diplomacy.  Consequently,  we 
less  able  to  win  their  support  on  pn 
ing  supply,  safeguards,  and  other  n 
proliferation  matters. 

With  time  we  believe  we  are  rey 
ing  the  confidence  and  trust  of  our 
nuclear  partner;  but  one  lesson  is 
clear— in  the  future  we  should  seek 
avoid  major  sudden  changes  in  nucl 
export  policy.  As  I  noted,  I  cite  this 
experience  only  as  an  example— an 
ample  which  could  be  repeated  by  s 
supplier  if  it  acts  unilaterally  and 
without  developing  the  climate  of  a 
ment  and  support  which  a  successf 
nonproliferation  regime  requires.  B 
that  is  not  to  say  that  we  would  sh 
from  pursuing  a  course  that  we  cor 
the  proper  one— that  we  would  sac 
principle  on  the  altar  of  harmony. 

But  what  about  recipient  count 
which  for  one  reason  or  another  ha 
not  demonstrated  their  own  bona  f 
through  adherence  to  the  NPT  or, 
least,  acceptance  of  full-scope 
safeguards.  Certainly,  such  countri 
must  not  have  the  degree  of  access 
nuclear  goods  that  countries  which 
taken  these  actions  enjoy.  Howeve 
self-defeating  to  preclude  maintain 
dialogue  with  countries  which  purs 
nuclear  policies  different  from  our 
We  must  allow  ourselves  some 
maneuvering  room  to  influence  tht 
nuclear  policies  of  such  countries  t 
move  them  to  accept  international 
proliferation  norms. 

Let  me  return  to  the  point  I  m 
the  beginning.  I  have  tried  to  illust 
that  reliability  of  supply  implies  ob 
tions  not  only  on  the  part  of  suppli 
but  on  the  part  of  recipients  as  we 
Suppliers  can  only  be  seen  as  capr 
if  they  are  or  are  perceived  to  be  a 
tempting  to  dictate  unilaterally  anc 
an  absolutist  fashion  the  scope  and 
terms  of  international  commerce.  I 
same  token,  only  if  they  are  seen  t 
reliable,  reasonable,  and  predictabl 


42 


Dpnartmpnt  nf  .^tato  Ri 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


■  1  -s  expect  to  have  the  long-run  in- 
Ki  over  the  future  course  of  nuclear 
'I  -ce  that  they  should  rightly  ex- 
i":  n  the  other  hand,  suppliers  can- 
-I  called  upon  to  make  nuclear 
; ;  technology  available  if  the  re- 
's  1  are  unwilling  to  undertake  the 
ental  obligation  to  fully  assure 
the  possible  misuse  of  that 

our  part,  we  recognize  that  it  is 
that  a  common  understanding 

:ved  with  nations  whose  percep- 
their  self-interest  differs  perhaps 
ly  from  our  own  perceptions  of 
ierest.  Nations  do  not  respond  to 
htly,  and  this  is  especially  so 

ey  have  alternatives.  As  a 

proposition,  we  favor  dialogue 
nfrontation,  persuasion  over  in- 
ion,  and  common  sense  over  iron 

Nevertheless,  in  the  pursuit  of 
n  understandings,  we  must  build 
le  norms  which  have  evolved  over 
ades  and  not  succumb  to  the 
common  denominator.  ■ 


Competitive  Challenges 

of  Global  Telecommunications 


by  William  Schneider,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee  of 
Telecommunications,  Consumer  Protec- 
tion, and  Finance  of  the  House  Energy 
and  Commerce  Committee  on  July  25, 
1984-  Mr.  Schneider  is  Under  Secretary 
for  Security  Assistance,  Science,  and 
Technology. ' 

I  would  like  to  preface  my  remarks  by 
commenting  that  the  global  system  of  in- 
ternational communications  satellites  is 
a  magnificent  achievement  of  U.S.  policy 
based  on  the  Communications  Satellite 
Act  of  1962.  While  the  telecommunica- 
tions revolution  founded  on  satellite 
technology  seems  almost  a  routine 
achievement  these  days,  this  was  not  the 
case  20  years  ago  when  the  INTELSAT 
[International  Telecommunications 
Satellite  Organization]  system  was  con- 
ceived. 

We  know  by  experience  that  even 
great  successes  give  rise  to  new  ques- 
tions, to  new  issues,  even  to  new  prob- 
lems. It  is  appropriate  that  we  should 
from  time  to  time  review  our  interna- 
tional communications  satellite  policies 
and  their  instruments  to  see  if  they  best 
meet  the  changing  requirements  and  op- 
portunities that  the  continuing 
developments  of  telecommunications 
technology  provide.  I  am  not  here  to 
criticize  INTELSAT,  INMARSAT  [In- 
ternational Maritime  Satellite  Organiza- 
tion], or  COMSAT  [Communications 
Satellite  Corporation];  they  have  per- 
formed beyond  the  expectations  of  their 
founders,  including  the  Congress,  and 
deserve  praise  for  their  achievements.  I 
am  here  to  comment  on  proposals  to 
amend  the  rules  of  COMSAT's  participa- 
tion in  the  international  satellite 
organizations  in  light  of  changing  times 
and  to  discuss  the  Department  of  State 
perspectives  and  responsibilities  in  the 
instructional  process  and  related  mat- 
ters. 


COMSAT  Instruction  Process 

The  Communications  Satellite  Act  of 
1962,  as  amended,  provides  the 
framework  for  U.S.  international 
satellite  policies.  The  act  sets  out  the 


basis  for  U.S.  participation  in  the  inter- 
national satellite  organizations, 
INTELSAT  and  INMARSAT,  and 
created  a  private  sector  corporation, 
COMSAT,  to  own  and  represent  the 
U.S.  shares  in  those  organizations. 

The  development  of  policies  toward 
the  international  satellite  organizations 
is  complex  since  we  are  dealing  with 
continuously  operating  international 
commercial  organizations  and  with  a 
private  sector  public  corporation, 
COMSAT,  as  signatory  to  agreements 
establishing  INTELSAT  and  INMAR- 
SAT. COMSAT  sits  on  the  executive 
board  of  both  organizations  which  hold 
formal  sessions  quarterly.  As  in  any 
business,  there  are  a  host  of  internal 
management  functions  which  require 
directions  from  a  board  representing 
shareholders.  There  are  also  issues 
which  affect  international  telecom- 
munications policies.  As  an  example, 
there  are  INTELSAT'S  objectives  as  a 
user  of  orbit  locations  and  radio  frequen- 
cies which  do  not  necessarily  coincide 
with  those  of  the  United  States  or  other 
members. 

Congress  foresaw  the  need  for 
governmental  oversight  and  included 
provisions  for  Presidential  instructions 
to  COMSAT  in  the  1962  act.  The  Presi- 
dent has  delegated  that  responsibility  to 
the  Secretary  of  State.  The  instruction 
procedure  was  set  out  in  a  letter  from 
the  Department  of  State  to  COMSAT  on 
August  18,  1966,  resulting  from  an 
agreement  between  the  Department, 
FCC  [Federal  Communications  Commis- 
sion], and  the  then  Office  of  Telecom- 
munications Management  in  the  Ex- 
ecutive Office  of  the  President. 

The  procedures  are  that  COMSAT 
provides  the  agenda  and  documentation 
for  each  meeting  to  the  Department  of 
State,  FCC,  and  NTIA  [National 
Telecommunications  Information  Agen- 
cy]. COMSAT  then  meets  with  repre- 
sentatives of  these  agencies  in  advance 
of  the  meeting  and  submits  in  writing  its 
proposed  position  on  the  agenda  items. 
These  positions  are  discussed  and  perti- 
nent questions  are  raised.  Following  this 
briefing,  the  Department  of  State  con- 
sults with  the  other  agencies  and  after 
considering  their  views,  issues  instruc- 
tions to  COMSAT  on  those  agenda  items 
which  are  deemed  to  require  such  in- 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


structions.  Following  the  meeting,  COM- 
SAT again  meets  with  representatives 
of  the  three  agencies  to  report  on  what 
transpired.  Again,  questions  are  asked 
and  explanations  given  for  any  actions 
taken  by  the  executive  board. 

Proposals  before  Congress  would  re- 
quire that  all  instructions  issued  to 
COMSAT  be  made  public.  While  we 
favor  making  as  many  INTELSAT  and 
INMARSAT  documents  as  possible 
available  to  the  public,  there  may  be  in- 
stances where  the  instructions  affect 
U.S.  Government  concerns  as  the  party 
to  both  INTELSAT  and  INMARSAT 
and  raise  issues  involving  foreign  rela- 
tions. While  foreign  signatories  would 
have  access  to  U.S.  positions  and 
negotiating  strategies,  we  would  not 
have  access  to  theirs  which  would  place 
U.S.  interests  at  a  disadvantage.  We 
would  prefer  to  have  public  dissemina- 
tion of  U.S.  Government  instructions 
judged  by  the  normal  criteria  for  public 
release  of  government  documents  found 
in  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act.  We 
are  working  closely  with  COMSAT  to 
provide  substantial  additional  informa- 
tion to  the  public  and  we  applaud  their 
cooperation. 

We  do  not  agree  with  the  proposal 
that  the  Federal  Communications  Com- 
mission issue  separate  instructions  to 
COMSAT  with  respect  to  regulatory 
matters  within  its  jurisdiction.  Although 
the  International  Maritime  Satellite 
Communications  Act  provides  for 
separate  FCC  instructions  to  COMSAT 
for  INMARSAT  meetings,  this  has  not 
been  used.  The  FCC  has  been  an  active 
participant  in  the  instruction  process 
and  we  are  concerned  that  separate  in- 
structions might  unnecessarily  raise  con- 
flicts over  the  primacy  of  "public  in- 
terest" and  "national  interest."  The  Com- 
munications Satellite  Act  clearly  gives 
the  President  primary  authority  in  the 
instruction  process  and  we  believe  it 
would  be  a  mistake  to  infringe  on  this 
authority  by  separate  FCC  instructions. 

How  Binding  are  Instructions 
to  COMSAT? 

The  Communications  Satellite  Act 
directed  executive  branch  supervision 
over  COMSAT  to  ensure  its  relations 
with  foreign  governments  or  entities  or 
international  bodies  are  consistent  with 
the  U.S.  national  interest  and  foreign 
policy.  While  instructions  on  these  mat- 
ters are  binding,  the  act  does  not  pro- 
vide for  direct  enforcement  procedures 
or  sanctions  beyond  judicial  relief  con- 
tained in  Section  403  should  COMSAT 
refuse  to  follow  government  instruc- 


tions. Nevertheless  we  find  it  difficult  to 
perceive  a  situation  where  COMSAT 
would  reject  instructions  based  on  U.S. 
Government  considerations.  Any 
substantive  departure  from  instructions 
could  lead  to  an  Administrative  request 
for  legislative  remedy.  COMSAT  is  also 
subject  to  regulatory  supervision  of  the 
FCC. 

The  instruction  process  has  worked 
well  over  the  years  as  evidenced  by  the 
lack  of  serious  disagreements  between 
COMSAT  and  the  government.  This,  I 
believe,  is  due  to  government  apprecia- 
tion of  the  commercial  nature  of  the  in- 
ternational satellite  systems  and  the 
responsibility  of  COMSAT  to  its 
shareholders  as  well  as  its  customers 
and  the  general  public.  At  the  same 
time,  COMSAT  has  accepted  that  the 
government  is  required  to  exercise 
supervision  over  COMSAT  in  matters  of 
national  interest. 

Determination  of  Policy 

While  the  instruction  process  has 
worked  well,  it  is  a  vehicle  for  applying 
existing  policy  rather  than  the  deter- 
mination of  policy  in  response  to  new 
challenges  or  a  perceived  need  for 
change.  Such  a  challenge  occurred  with 
the  applications  now  before  the  FCC  for 
non-INTELSAT  international  com- 
munications satellite  systems.  This  has 
posed  an  extremely  difficult  policy  deci- 
sion involving  the  importance  of  protect- 
ing the  integrity  of  INTELSAT  and  the 
value  to  the  consumer  of  competition  in 
the  provision  of  new  international  com- 
munication services.  The  Senior  In- 
teragency Group  [SIG]  on  International 
Communication  and  Information  Policy, 
consisting  of  representatives  of  15 
government  agencies,  undertook  a 
detailed  examination  of  the  applications 
and  forwarded  its  recommendations  to 
the  Secretaries  of  Commerce  and  State 
to  assist  them  in  their  advice  to  the 
President  on  what  decisions  he  should 
make  on  this  matter.  While  much  of  the 
internal  debate  on  the  most  appropriate 
position  to  take  has  been  aired  in  the 
trade  press,  I  would  not  wish  to  com- 
ment further  until  the  decision  has  been 
reached  other  than  to  say  any  controver- 
sy is  a  reflection  of  the  importance  and 
complexity  of  the  issue. 

The  transborder  use  of  domestic 
satellites  is  another  issue  of  importance 
in  international  satellite  policy.  After  a 
lengthy  interagency  consideration, 
Under  Secretary  of  State  James  Buckley 
set  forth  the  foreign  policy  requirements 
for  approval  of  the  use  of  U.S.  domestic 


br 


satellites  for  transmissions  to  neighb 
ing  countries.  This  was  by  letter  to  i 
FCC  Commissioner  on  July  23,  1981 
and  the  requirements  included  agree 
ment  of  the  other  government  and  ci 
dination  with  INTELSAT  under  Art 
14(d)  of  its  agreement,  which  include 
submission  on  the  economic  effect  of 
service  on  the  INTELSAT  global 
system. 

In  the  past  year,  concerns  of  the 
tion  picture  and  program  supplier  in 
dustry  that  copyrights  may  be  inade- 
quately protected  in  transborder  sat 
TV  transmissions  were  studied  by  a 
working  group  and  a  policy  decision 
taken  that  appropriate  assurances  o 
copyright  protection  would  lie  requii 
before  TV  transmissions  would  be  fi 
approved  to  the  individual  country. 

The  ITU  [International  Telecom- 
munications Union]  forum  includes  t 
consideration  of  international  com- 
munication satellite  issues  and  the 
United  States  is  in  the  midst  of  pre] 
tions  for  a  World  Administration  Ri 
Conference  [WARC]  on  the  use  of 
geostationary  satellite  orbit  and  spa|«! 
services  to  begin  in  July  1985  with  ; 
ond  session  in  1988.  Preparations  f( 
this  conference  began  several  years 
and  include  the  FCC  Notice  of  Inqu 
Process  and  Public  Advisory  Comm 
on  Space  WARC,  and  technical  con  |te 
tions  from  an  NTIA-chaired  ad  hoc 
group  under  its  Interdepartment  R; 
Advisory  Committee.  A  SIG  steerir 
committee  under  the  chairmanship 
the  Coordinator  for  International  C 
munications  and  Information  Policy 
vides  a  forum  to  incorporate  the  co 
tributions  of  various  working  grouf 
individual  agencies.  The  office  of  th 
coordinator  also  provides  an  execut 
director  and  support  staff  for  confe 
preparations  and  works  with  the  dt 
tion  and  appropriate  agencies. 

I  hope  that  I  have  presented  th 
case  that  international  communicat 
satellite  policy  is  not  determined  in 
arbitrary  way  but  is  a  result  of  coo 
tion  within  the  government  involvii 
many  technical  experts  and  foreign 
policy  talents  in  close  coordination 
the  private  sector. 

Private  Sector  Participation 

While  the  private  sector  does  not  p 
ticipate  directly  in  the  COMSAT  in 
tion  process,  in  formulating  the  ins 
tions  government  agencies  have  a  j 
deal  of  relevant  information  and 
knowledge  obtained  through  struct 
and  regular  meetings  with  the  priv 
sector  on  international  telecommur 
tions  issues. 


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es. 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


e  United  States  is  unique  in  world 
imunications  in  relying  fully  on 
vate  sector  for  providing  the  serv- 
d  in  the  extent  to  which  competi- 
encouraged  in  those  services. 
is  no  way  the  U.S.  Government 
equately  understand  and  promote 
ecommunications  interest  in  inter- 
il  negotiations  without  the  active 
3ation  of  the  carriers,  service  pro- 
equipment  suppliers,  users,  and 
leral  public. 

addition  to  the  direct  participa- 
the  private  sector  in  the  ITU  con- 
re  committees  and  study  groups, 
8  advisory  committees  organized 
st  in  WARC  preparations,  there 
ler  groups  that  deal  with  specific 
such  as  the  Working  Group  on 
)order  Data  Flows,  and  the 
5  facilities  planning  committees  of 
:C  in  the  Atlantic,  Pacific,  and 
lean  regions. 

le  facilities  planning  process  is 
0  the  development  of  overseas 
•nmunications  facilities  and  serv- 
fering  an  opportunity  to  carriers, 
5  providers,  users,  and  the  general 
to  submit  views  on  the  design  and 
ation  of  the  future  telecommunica- 
;tructure  linking  the  United  States 
rest  of  the  world.  Through  this 
IS  U.S.  positions  on  international 
tes,  cables,  and  terrestrial  systems 
iveloped  from  among  competing  m- 

s. 

itside  these  forma!  structures, 
lovernment  officials  welcome  in- 
[  meetings  with  interested  firms 
dividuals  who  have  a  specific  in- 
ional  telecommunications  problem 
0  simply  want  to  present  their 
on  any  issue  of  importance  to 
In  addition,  testimony  taken  by 
essional  committees  such  as  this 

di  les  important  information  and 
and  the  opinions  expressed  in 
journals  are  given  close  attention, 
inlikely  that  any  significant  private 
position  or  opinion  is  overlooked 

.,   continuous  intensive  and  exten- 

-,i  Tocess  of  private  sector  consulta- 
n  international  telecommunications 
js.  If  this  occurs,  it  is  because  the 
)r  individual  has  failed  to  make  use 
many  channels  of  communications 
the  government  which  are 
ible. 

1 


INTELSAT  and  INMARSAT 
Procurement 

A  primary  interest  of  the  U.S.  space  in- 
dustry is  selling  products  and  services  to 
the  international  satellite  organizations. 

Article  XIII  of  the  INTELSAT 
agreement  provides  that  procurement  of 
goods  or  services  shall  be  "effected  by 
the  award  of  contracts,  based  on 
responses  to  open  international  invita- 
tions to  tender,  to  bidders  offering  the 
best  combination  of  quality,  price  and 
the  most  favorable  delivery  time."  The 
responsibility  for  carrying  out  this  provi- 
sion is  borne  by  the  INTELSAT 
Secretariat,  under  the  direction  of  the 
Board  of  Governors.  Equivalent  provi- 
sions are  contained  in  the  INMARSAT 
convention. 

U.S.  industry  has  done  well  in  com- 
petition for  INTELSAT  procurement.  In 
October  1983,  the  director  general- 
designate  of  INTELSAT  informed  the 
Subcommittee  en  Arms  Control,  Oceans, 
International  Operations,  and  Environ- 
ment of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  that  since  1964  over  2,500 
contracts  had  been  awarded  some  600 
U.S.  firms  with  a  total  value  of  $3,365 
billion.  This  is  not  surprising  given  the 
lead  of  U.S.  space  and  launch 
technologies.  American  spacecraft 
manufacturers  and  launch  service  pro- 
viders are  actively  participating  in  bids 
for  the  second  generation  INMARSAT 
system.  The  U.S.  Government  has  been 
assisting  U.S.  industry  in  this  effort. 

The  FCC  did  examine  whether 
COMSAT  would  have  advantages  over 
other  U.S.  firms  in  INTELSAT  procure- 
ment as  part  of  its  1980  study.  It  found 
several  examples  because  of  its  activities 
as  technical  adviser  to  INTELSAT  and 
its  knowledge  of  specific  development. 
This  was  an  element  in  the  decision  to 
split  COMSAT  into  monopoly  and  com- 
petitive components. 

It  is  a  responsibility  of  the  U.S. 
Government  to  ensure  that  all  American 
firms  are  offered  equal  opportunities  to 
compete  for  INTELSAT  and 
INMARSAT  procurement.  We  take  this 
responsibility  seriously  and  will  continue 
to  offer  U.S.  industry  assistance  to  this 
end. 

COMSAT'S  Representation  of 
U.S.  Policy 

Can  there  be  conflicts  between 
COMSAT'S  corporate  interests  and  U.S. 
national  or  public  interest,  and  what 
would  happen  if  this  occurs? 

We  are  actually  progressing  through 
such  a  potential  situation.  INTELSAT 
has  energetically  campaigned  against 


U.S.  approval  of  non-INTELSAT  inter- 
national satellite  systems.  COMSAT 
shares  with  INTELSAT  an  interest  in 
maintaining  a  monopoly  on  transoceanic 
international  communication  satellite 
services.  While  expressing  its  own  view 
as  a  signatory,  COMSAT  has  carried  out 
instructions  to  inform  the  INTELSAT 
Board  and  Meeting  of  Signatories 
that  the  U.S.  Government  viewed 
INTELSAT'S  intervention  in  the 
domestic  consideration  of  applications 
before  the  FCC  as  premature  and  inap- 
propriate and  the  publication  of  leaked 
U.S.  policy  papers  as  improper. 

COMSAT  has  a  variety  of  obliga- 
tions to  its  stockholders,  its  customers, 
and  to  the  public  by  virtue  of  its  role  as 
signatory  to  the  satellite  organization 
agreements.  By  providing  for  U.S. 
Government  oversight  and  instructions. 
Congress  was  aware  that  these  obliga- 
tions could  be  in  conflict.  In  the  exercise 
of  oversight,  we  do  not  rely  on  COM- 
SAT to  define  what  is  the  U.S.  national 
interest  and  public  interest;  we  make 
that  determination  and  instruct  accord- 
ingly. We  believe  this  is  the  prudent 
thing  to  do. 

In  regard  to  the  proposal  that  the 
President  appoint  a  government 
representative  to  participate  in  all  of 
COMSAT'S  activities  with  respect  to 
INTELSAT  and  INMARSAT,  we 
believe  "activities"  is  too  broad  a  term 
that  seems  to  include  every  COMSAT 
contact  with  the  organizations.  While 
such  an  expansive  provision  in  our  view 
is  unnecessary,  more  narrowly  drawn 
provisions  may  be  useful. 

Competition  With  INTELSAT 

Technological  developments  in  the  past 
several  years  have  opened  the  doors  to 
more  competition  in  telecommunications 
services  in  our  domestic  market.  It  was 
inevitable  that  these  same  forces  would 
press  upon  the  international  provision  of 
these  services. 

The  applicants  to  the  FCC  for  non- 
INTELSAT  systems  have  made  many 
arguments  why  their  projects  would  not 
significantly  damage  the  INTELSAT 
global  systems.  Some  assert  that  their 
designs  for  innovative  new  services 
would  benefit  INTELSAT  by  developing 
new  markets  which  INTELSAT  can  also 
serve  in  the  future  without  risking 
capital  needed  for  the  expansion  of 
global  basic  telecommunications  services. 
These  arguments  merit  consideration  by 
ourselves  and  the  world  community. 

In  our  deliberations  of  proposals  for 
non-INTELSAT  international  com- 
munication satellite  systems,  we  should 


4S 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


be  aware  that  a  number  of  regional  non- 
INTELSAT  satellite  systems  are  being 
implemented  by  INTELSAT  members. 
The  policy  question  we  face  is  not 
whether  regional  systems  are  incompati- 
ble with  INTELSAT  obligations  but 
whether  U.S.  participation  in  such 
systems,  particularly  across  the  North 
Atlantic,  would  undermine  the  viability 
of  the  global  system.  It  is  this  search  for 
a  possible  accommodation  between  com- 
petition with  all  of  its  potential  benefits 
and  the  preservation  of  a  viable  global 
system,  with  its  known  benefits,  that 
has  preoccupied  executive  branch 
policymakers.  We  hope  and  believe  such 
an  accommodation  can  be  achieved. 

Transatlantic  Fiber  Optic  Cable 

Officials  of  INTELSAT  for  good  reasons 
regard  fiber  optic  cables  as  a  major  com- 
petitive threat.  The  decision  to  build  a 
U.S. -Europe  fiber  optic  submarine  cable 
has  acknowledged  the  potential  of  this 
new  cable  technology.  The  international 
impact  of  the  eighth  transatlantic 
telephone  cable  (TAT-8)  has  become  evi- 
dent long  before  its  planned  entry  into 
service  in  1988.  For  the  first  time  since 
the  launch  of  "Early  Bird"  in  1965 — the 
inauguration  of  commercial  satellite 
communications  across  the  Atlantic — the 
cable  will  become  competitive  with 
satellites  for  certain  transoceanic 
services. 

Contract  awards  in  mid-November 
1983  for  TAT-8  reflected  the  U.S.  lead 
in  fiber  optic  communications 
technology.  The  29-nation  consortium  of 
telecommunications  administrations  (in- 
cluding AT&T  [American  Telephone  and 
Telegraph  Company]  and  other  U.S. 
companies  for  the  United  States)  that 
will  own  the  cable  awarded  the  major 
portion  of  the  contract — $250 
million — to  AT&T  communications.  The 
remainder  of  the  $335  million  total  in- 
vestment will  be  split  between  the 
United  Kingdom's  Standard  Telephone 
and  Cables  Limited  and  France's  SUB- 
MARCOM.  The  link  will  span  some 
6,500  kilometers  (3,900  miles)  between 
Tuckerton,  New  Jersey,  and  Wide- 
mouth,  United  Kingdom,  and  Penmarch, 
France,  with  the  cable  branching  at  the 
edge  of  Europe's  continental  shelf. 

TAT-8  will  represent  state-of-the-art 
technology,  which  is  considerably  more 
advanced  than  the  long  distance  fiber 
optic  networks  AT&T  installed  along  the 
Northeast  corridor  of  the  United  States 
and  in  California  last  year.  It  will  differ 
from  its  predecessor  cables  in  several 
critical  respects. 


•  TAT-8  will  be  the  first  transatlan- 
tic digital— as  opposed  to 

analog — undersea  link.  Voice  sounds  are 
not  sent  as  direct  electrical  signals 
(analog),  but  instead  are  converted  by 
computers  into  bits  (binary  digits)  repre- 
senting zeros  and  ones,  transformed  into 
pulses  of  laser  light,  transmitted 
through  the  special  glass  optical  fibers  in 
discrete  bunches,  and  reconstructed  by 
computers  into  a  conventional  analog 
signal  at  the  other  end. 

•  The  cable,  made  up  of  only  three 
pairs  of  optical  fibers,  will  be  able  to 
handle  up  to  40,000  conversations 
simultaneously — about  four  times  the 
volume  of  either  TAT-6  or  TAT-7, 
which  entered  service  in  1976  and  1983, 
respectively.  The  large  capacity  will 
make  TAT-8  competitive  with  the  most 
advanced  communications  satellite, 
INTELSAT  VI,  which  is  scheduled  for 
launch  in  1986. 

•  Light  beam  repeater/regenerators 
will  be  spaced  at  20-mile  intervals  along 
the  cable,  compared  with  5  miles  for  the 
older  systems,  and  be  able  to  process 
the  data  flow  more  than  3  times  faster. 

•  The  cable  will  be  able  to  stretch 
by  up  to  2%  without  breaking  (3  to  4 
times  more  than  terrestrial  cable),  in- 
creasing its  survivability  in  case  of  sub- 
marine landslides  like  those  that  severed 
three  cables  across  the  North  Atlantic  in 
1929. 

•  The  light-beam-generating  laser- 
diode  transmitters  are  expected  to  be 
trouble-free  for  25  years.  15  years 
longer  than  the  projected  life  span  of  the 
new  communications  satellites. 

Transmission  lines  and  switching 
equipment  in  the  United  States,  Japan, 
and  most  of  Europe  are  being  changed 
to  accommodate  digital  transmission  in  a 
sweeping  transformation  of  the 
developed  world's  telecommunications 
system.  TAT-8  could  become,  along 
with  satellites,  a  key  link  in  the  planned 
global  integrated  services  digital  net- 
work. 

The  fact  that  TAT-8  can  make 
multiple  landing  points  raises  the 
economic  stakes.  Cable  landings  are  an 
important  source  of  revenue  for  nations 
involved,  since  they: 

•  Allow  significant  potential  reduc- 
tions in  telecommunications  operational 
costs, 

•  Allow  the  sales  of  services  to 
other  countries  through  routing  of  traf- 
fic and  cable  maintenance,  and 

•  Make  economically  feasible  links 
to  route  traffic  to  third  countries,  an  op- 
tion which  might  not  have  been  viable 
with  local  traffic  alone. 


Although  the  "bident"  landing  apt 
proach  has  been  taken,  the  addition  c 
third  link  to  TAT-8  has  been  left  ope 
The  extra  cost  of  a  southern  landing 
and  the  supporting  revenue  remain  t 
determining  factors.  The  Department 
continuing  to  monitor  this  considerat 

Although  opinions  differ,  many  i 
perts  regard  optical  fibers  as  intrinsji 
ly  superior  to  satellite  radio  commuij 
tions  for  point-to-point  voice  transmi 
sions  over  busy  routes,  and  for  secuj 
and  privacy  as  well. 

Satellites  are  likely  to  remain  m«  k 
competitive  in  applications  that  reqij  ; 
wide-band  communications  channels, 
such  as  business  data  transmissions, 
distribution  of  television  programs, 
videoconferencing,  and  in  the  ability 
satellites  to  provide  direct  services  t 
consumer  premises.  Satellites  also  hi 
the  edge  for  point-to-point  transmiss 
over  thin  routes,  such  as  links  to  am 
within  developing  countries.  But  for 
present  bread-and-butter  business  ol 
ternational  communications  satellite 
the  introduction  of  fiber  optic  cables 
poses  a  significant  economic  and 
technological  challenge. 


ta 


Conclusion 


In  conclusion,  I  can  assure  you  that 
Department  of  State  is  very  much  a 
of  the  challenges  in  the  field  of  inte 
tional  telecommunications  policy.  W 
the  LI.S.  Government  and  industry  ■ 
be  justly  proud  of  their  past  contrib 
tions,  we  must  continuously  seek  in 
national  agreement  to  permit  the  ir 
national  system  to  benefit  from  rap 
advancements  in  equipment  and  sei 
ices.  The  participation  of  our  privat 
sector  is  essential  to  this  process.  \ 
cannot  unilaterally  change  internat 
policies,  but  our  leadership  in  teiec( 
munications  technology  is  universal 
recognized  and  the  world  is  closely 
watching  our  response  to  the  chanj 
technological  environment.  We  hav 
already  witnessed  in  some  countrie 
moves  to  open  the  telecommunicati  jfi 
sector  to  more  competition.  As  the 
benefits  of  these  policies  spread,  w 
should  experience  a  more  ready  ac(  Jjf,; 
ance  of  less  regulation  and  more  pi 
competitive  policies  in  Internationa  femsi 
telecommunications.  We  will  contir  nf 
work  toward  this  goal.  y\ 

h 
onei 
tati 


.1 

m 


ri: 
rail 

rsr 


V. 
■lye 
[  f'li 

ItFi 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hea 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  o 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


'CTH  ASIA 


[ihanistan 


found 

mber  1979,  the  Soviet  Union  in- 
fghanistan,  executed  Marxist 
inister  Hafizullah  Amin,  and  in- 
;he  puppet  regime  of  Babrak 
to  head  the  Democratic  RepubHc 
anistan  (DRA).  The  DRA  was 
ihed  following  the  "Great  Saur 
-evolution,"  the  1978  Marxist 
at  overthrew  President  Moham- 
.oud  and  named  Noor  Mohammad 
as  President  of  the  Revolutionary 
and  Prime  Minister.  Taraki  was 
ly  Amin  in  a  coup  d'etat  in 
ber  1979. 

osition  to  the  Marxist  govern- 
[eveloped  almost  immediately 
e  April  1978  coup  and  subse- 
spread  throughout  Afghanistan, 
istance  continues  today  in  the 
f  a  countrjTvide  insurgency 
;  the  Soviets  and  the  DRA  by  the 
ajority  of  Afghan  people.  The 

with  110,000-115,000  troops, 
ot  succeeded  in  their  attempts  to 
ss  the  Afghan  resistance  or  to 
an  effective  Afghan  Army  and 
sh  the  authority  of  the  Karmal 
ment. 


ti  Resistance  Groups 

c  Afghan  resistance,  or  mujahidin 
warriors"),  groups  maintain  their 
il  headquarters  in  Peshawar, 
an.  United  in  their  desire  to  rid 
ountry  of  the  Soviets,  they  are 
1  by  ideologies  and  personalities 
ajor  and  minor  factions,  loosely 
;d  into  two  alliances — the 
rates"  and  the  "fundamentalists." 
16  morale  of  the  Afghan  freedom 
"S  remains  high,  with  their 
th  against  the  Soviets  increasing, 
"ontrol  75%  of  the  countryside  and 
r  better  armed  and  trained  than 
.  The  resistance  has  become  par- 
ly effective  against  Soviet/DRA 
'  convoys,  and  Soviet  helicopter 
rcraft  losses  have  risen  significant- 
less  the  Soviets  substantially  in- 
'  the  size  of  their  army  in 
nistan,  the  military  stalemate  will 
aie,  and  the  Soviets  will  be  unable 
eat  this  determined  and  resilient 
f.  Faced  with  growing  opposition, 
Dviets  have  turned  to  increasingly 
tactics,  including  reprisals  against 
mbatants,  as  a  means  of  wearing 
civilian  support  for  the  resistance. 


Afghan  Refugees 

The  2-3  million  Afghan  refugees  in 
Pakistan,  located  in  some  348  camps  in 
the  border  areas  of  the  Northwest  Fron- 
tier and  Baluchistan  Provinces,  con- 
stitute the  world's  largest  refugee 
population. 

Since  the  international  relief  effort 
began  in  1980,  the  U.S.  Government  has 
contributed  more  than  $350  million  for 
Afghan  refugees  in  Pakistan.  These 
funds  are  channeled  primarily  through 
the  world  food  program  and  the  office  of 
the  UN  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees  (UNHCR),  which  has  overall 
responsibility  for  coordinating  inter- 
national contributions.  Other  contribu- 
tions are  made  to  the  International 
Committee  for  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC) 
and  U.S.  voluntary  agencies  working 
among  the  refugees. 

With  the  roughly  1.5  million 
Afghans  in  Iran,  about  half  of  them 
refugees,  the  estimated  number  of 
Afghans  in  exile  is  now  well  over  3.5 
million,  more  than  20%  of  the  entire 
prewar  Afghan  population.  Many 
refugees  continue  to  leave  Afghanistan 
and  will  do  so  as  long  as  the  Soviet  oc- 
cupation continues.  The  rate  has  slowed 
somewhat  due  to  the  large  numbers  that 
already  have  fled  abroad,  but  each  major 
Soviet  operation  brings  a  new  influx  of 
refugees  into  Pakistan. 


UN  Efforts 

Since  January  1980,  the  UN  General 
Assembly  has  approved  overwhelmingly 
five  resolutions  calling  for  a  settlement 
in  Afghanistan  based  on  the  removal  of 
Soviet  forces,  the  independent  and 
nonaligned  status  for  Afghanistan,  self- 
determination  for  the  Afghan  people, 
and  the  return  of  the  refugees  with  safe- 
ty and  honor. 

To  achieve  these  goals,  UN 
Secretary  General  Perez  de  Cuellar  has 
appointed  Diego  Cordovez,  Under 
Secretary  for  Special  Political  Affairs, 
as  his  personal  representative  in  an  in- 
direct negotiating  process  that  seeks  a 
political  settlement.  This  process  of  con- 
sultations in  the  region  and  indirect 
talks  in  Geneva  includes  the  DRA 
regime  and  the  Pakistan  Government 
with  the  Soviets  unofficially  involved. 
Although  all  parties  want  the  UN  proc- 
ess to  continue,  their  positions  remain 
far  apart,  and  prospects  for  a  political 
settlement  are  not  promising. 

Soviet  Position 

The  Soviets  justify  their  continuing 
presence  in  Afghanistan  with  the  claim 
that  a  limited  contingent  of  Soviet 
troops  was  invited  into  Afghanistan  by  a 
friendly  government.  This  assertion  ig- 
nores the  fact  that  the  head  of  this 
government,  Hafizullah  Amin,  was  ex- 
ecuted by  the  Soviets  and  Babrak  Kar- 


Afghan  Attacks  on  Pakistan 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  23,  1984' 

On  a  number  of  occasions  over  the 
course  of  the  past  week,  aircraft,  ar- 
tillery, and  rocket  launchers  based  in 
Afghanistan  carried  out  a  series  of 
brutal  violations  of  Pakistan's  territorial 
sovereignty  which  cost  the  lives  of  near- 
ly 50  innocent  persons,  injured  a  large 
number,  and  destroyed  property. 

The  United  States  deplores  these  at- 
tacks on  Pakistan,  a  nation  whose  in- 
dependence and  territorial  integrity  we 
have  long  supported.  We  call  upon  the 
Soviet  Union  and  its  Kabul  clients  to  put 
an  end  to  these  actions. 

These  attacks  once  again  highlight 
the  tragedy  and  suffering  caused  by  the 
Soviet  Union's  effort  to  subjugate  the 
Afghan  nation  and  people  and  to  in- 


timidate Afghanistan's  neighbors.  These 
actions  have  brought  death,  misery,  and 
exile  to  millions  of  innocent  Afghan 
men,  women,  and  children.  We  believe  it 
is  vital  that  an  orderly  withdrawal  of 
Soviet  forces  be  achieved,  thereby  end- 
ing the  repression  in  Afghanistan. 

We  call  upon  the  Soviet  Union  to 
permit  genuine  progress  in  the  talks 
about  to  resume  in  Geneva  so  that 
Soviet  forces  are  withdrawn  from 
Afghanistan  and  Afghans  may  be  per- 
mitted to  establish  their  own  govern- 
ment. This  would  create  the  conditions 
in  Afghanistan  for  the  citizens  of  that 
country,  including  the  millions  who  are 
now  refugees  elsewhere,  to  return  to 
live  in  peace  in  their  own  land. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  Alan  Romberg.  ■ 


TERRORISM 


mal  installed  in  his  place,  and  ignores 
the  right  of  the  Afghan  people  to  self- 
determination. 

The  Soviets  insist  that  the  with- 
drawal of  their  forces  is  a  bilateral  mat- 
ter between  them  and  the  Kabul  regime, 
to  take  place  only  with  Kabul's  "agree- 
ment"—an  unlikely  eventuality  since  the 
regime  could  not  survive  without  the 
Soviet  military  presence.  The  central 
element  of  the  Soviet/ DRA  conditions 
for  a  political  settlement  is  the  cessation 
of  outside  interference,  for  which  the 
Soviets  name  the  United  States  as  the 
major  source.  The  Soviets  stress  the 
need  for  international  guarantees  to  ac- 
company the  required  pledges  of  non- 
interference—but not  withdrawal  of 
their  forces— in  effect  asking  the  outside 
world  to  secure  the  end  of  Afghan  re- 
sistance as  a  precondition  to  Soviet 
withdrawal. 

U.S.  Position 

President  Reagan  has  said:  "We  seek  the 
removal  of  Soviet  military  forces  so  that 
the  Afghan  people  can  live  freely  in 
their  own  country  and  are  able  to  choose 
their  own  way  of  life  and  government." 
The  United  States  strongly  opposes  the 
continuing  Soviet  occupation  of 
Afghanistan,  and  the  issue  remains 
significant  in  East- West  relations. 

Although  in  our  view  Soviet  with- 
drawal is  the  key,  we  believe  that  a 
resettlement  also  must  provide  for  the 
other  three  requirements  spelled  out  in 
the  UN  General  Assembly  Afghanistan 
resolutions.  Such  an  agreement  could 
also  include  appropriate  international 
guarantees  of  the  settlement's  stability. 
The  United  States  supports  the  UN 
negotiating  effort  of  indirect  talks  to 
achieve  these  goals. 


Taken  from  the  GIST  series  of  August  1984, 

gublished  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
lepartment  of  State.  Editor:  Harriet 
Culley.  ■ 


International  Terrorism: 
A  Long  Twilight  Struggle 


by  Robert  M.  Sayre 

Address  before  the  Foreign  Policy 
Association  in  New  York  on  August  15, 
198U-  Ambassador  Sayre  is  Director  of 
the  Office  for  Counterterrorisvi  and 
Emergency  Planning. 

Now  the  trumpet  summons  us  again— not  as 
a  call  to  bear  arms,  although  arms  we  need; 
not  as  a  call  to  battle;  though  embattled  we 
are;  but  a  call  to  bear  the  burden  of  a  long 
twilight  struggle,  year  in  and  year  out,  "re- 
joicing in  hope,  patient  in  tribulation,"  a 
struggle  against  the  common  enemies  of  man: 
tyranny,  poverty,  disease  and  war  itself. 

These  words  expressed  by  an 
American  president  more  than  two 
decades  ago  are  a  very  appropriate  in- 
troduction to  a  discussion  of  political 
violence  and  terrorism  because  we  are 
asked  "to  bear  the  burden  of  a  long 
twilight  struggle,  year  in  and  year  out, 
'rejoicing  in  hope,  patient  in 
tribulation.' " 

The  problem  is  real  enough,  especial- 
ly for  those  engaged  in  the  diplomatic 
profession.  The  problem  has  been  grow- 
ing since  1968.  Although  the  total 
number  of  incidents  has  been  almost  the 
same  for  the  past  5  years,  1983  stood 
out  from  the  rest  because  of  sheer 
violence.  In  1983  there  were  more  vic- 
tims (some  1,925)  and  more  U.S. 
casualties  (387)  from  international  ter- 
rorist acts  than  ever  before.  The  Middle 
East  dominated  the  global  terrorism 
scene  although  the  region  ranked  third 
after  Western  Europe  and  Latin 
America  in  the  number  of  incidents.  The 
United  States  was  the  target  in  40%  of 
the  cases  and  diplomats  in  general  in 
52%  of  the  cases.  The  figures  so  far  in 
1984  suggest  a  significant  increase— in- 
cidents in  the  first  6  months  are  running 
25%  ahead  of  1983. 

These  incidents  of  international  ter- 
rorism are  only  the  tip  of  the  iceberg  of 
worldwide  political  violence  and  probably 
represent  no  more  than  1%  of  the  total. 

Beyond  the  statistics,  there  are 
other  reasons  why  recent  events  are 
disturbing.  The  accent  is  on  killing  peo- 
ple. Such  imprecise  weapons  as  vehicle 
bombs  have  been  used  to  produce  mass 
casualties.  So  were  the  bombs  placed 
aboard  commercial  aircraft.  Terrorists 
have  become  less  discriminating  and  are 


more  willing  to  target  low-level  vict 
when  the  high-level  victims  prove  fj 
well  protected. 

What  has  become  particularly  j 
turbing  to  us  and  our  allies  in  the  » 
year  is  the  extent  to  which  states 
themselves  have  increasingly  used  i 
intelligence  services  and  other  agei 
of  government  to  engage  directly  ii 
rorist  activity.  This  concern  promp 
the  issuance  of  the  London  declara 
on  terrorism  at  the  recent  meeting 
the  summit  seven.  The  weight  of  tl 
evidence  is  that  Syria  and  Iran  wei 
directly  involved  in  the  three  majoi 
bombing  incidents  in  the  Middle  Ei 
1983— the  destruction  of  the  Amer 
Embassies  in  Beirut  and  Kuwait  oi 
April  18  and  December  12  and  the 
bombing  of  the  Marine  barracks  in 
Beirut  on  October  23.  Members  of 
North  Korean  military  carried  out 
bombing  in  Rangoon  that  killed  m; 
members  of  the  South  Korean  Cab 
Members  of  the  Libyan  "Embassy' 
in  London  opened  fire  on  a  peacef 
demonstration  and  killed  a  British 
policewoman. 

As  tragic  as  specific  events  ar 
human  terms,  the  end  objective  oi 
events  was  to  force  governments 
change  their  policies  and  to  destal 
governments.  If  states  practicing 
rorism  are  successful  in  that  objec 
we  can  expect  more  such  efforts, 
must  demonstrate  to  them  that  tl  f 
not  an  effective  way  to  conduct 
diplomacy.  Giving  in  to  such  activ  f"' 
also  sends  signals  to  others  who  n  -" 
tempted  to  be  venturesome  and  a 
gressive.  So  we  must  be  mindful 
only  of  the  immediate  effects  of  t 
rorism  but  its  longer  range  and  b 
consequences. 

Any  event  in  isolation  may  nc 
threaten  our  security.  But  it  mus 
priority  policy  concern  when  stati 
lively  engage  in  terrorist  acts  ag; 
us;  when  states  like  the  Soviet  U: 
provide  training,  arms,  and  other 
and  indirect  support  to  nations  ai 
groups  that  engage  in  terrorism; 
when  the  pattern  of  terrorism  ag 
the  United  States  and  its  allies  is 
centrated  in  Western  Europe,  th( 
die  East,  and  the  Caribbean  area 
of  course,  are  areas  of  strategic  i 
tance  to  the  United  States  and  es  |«tii 
to  NATO  defense.  «!; 

•Ill) 


[10 

B 
ltd 


TERRORISM 


Ivould  not  want  to  suggest  by 
ithting  the  events  of  the  past  year 
;  I  ISO  of  particular  concern  to  the 
111  Stales  that  these  are  the  only 
,(is  for  terrorism.  Some  engage  in 
t  activity  for  irredentist  reasons 
s  the  Basques  in  Spain,  the  Arme- 
.gainst  the  Turks,  and  others, 
us  differences  are  a  key  factor  in 
ife  in  northern  Ireland,  in  the 
,cy  of  Iran,  and  the  civil  war  in 
on.  These  events  disturb  our  rela- 
ith  other  countries  and  in  total 
eate  an  atmosphere  of  instability 
security  in  the  world. 

lesponse 

lad  outlines,  we  have  a  significant 
■m  of  political  violence  that  is 
ed  primarily  against  the  Western 

racies  and  our  interests.  The  prin- 
.arget  is  the  United  States,  and  it 
:en  for  some  years.  States  have 
le  more  actively  involved  in  pro- 
g  and  supporting  this  violence  as  a 
3  of  influencing  our  policy.  What 
)ne  do  about  it? 

ur  first  response  is,  of  course,  to 
d  ourselves.  We  are  in  the  process 
Droving  security  at  our  diplomatic 
around  the  world,  first  at  the 
3t  risk  posts.  We  have  made  a 

effort  to  improve  emergency  plan- 
)y  our  Embassies,  to  work  more 
y  with  the  American  community  in 

ountry,  and  to  train  our  personnel 

on  how  to  handle  such  problems, 
ave  made  a  good  beginning,  but  we 
a  considerable  distance  to  go. 
^e  have  sought  to  expand  coopera- 
vith  other  countries  both  on  a  com- 
ipproach  to  the  problem  as  well  as 
actical  measures  to  deal  with  it. 
Jnited  Nations  has  developed  con- 
Dns  to  deal  with  specific  types  of 
rist  activity.  Thus  there  are  conven- 
on  aircraft  hijacking  and  sabotage, 
rrorist  acts  against  protected  per- 
and  on  the  taking  of  hostages.  The 
dent  is  seeking  legislation  from  the 
ress  to  implement  fully  all  of  our 
litments  under  these  conventions 
jll  as  fill  other  gaps  in  existing 
ation.  Efforts  in  the  United  Na- 
to  have  a  general  convention  on 
uppression  of  terrorism  have 
iered  on  the  definition  of  terrorism, 
ummit  seven  countries  have  con- 
ted  considerably  to  developing  a 
y  consensus  on  dealing  with  ter- 
m  through  their  declarations  on  the 
king  of  commercial  aircraft,  the 
jction  of  diplomats,  and  more 
itly  the  London  declaration  on  deal- 
vith  state-supported  terrorism. 


We  have  strengthened  greatly  the 
collection  of  intelligence  on  terrorist  ac- 
tivities and  the  exchange  of  information 
with  our  friends  and  allies. 

The  Congress  approved  last  year 
and  we  are  now  implementing  a  training 
program  for  foreign  law  enforcement  of- 
ficers to  deal  with  all  types  of  terrorist 
activity.  This  program  will  promote  a 
stronger  international  consensus  on  the 
threat  terrorism  poses  and  how  we  and 
our  friends  and  allies  can  deal  with  it.  It 
will  also  improve  communications  and 
strengthen  ties  among  law  enforcement 
officials  generally. 

We  believe  that  we  have  made 
substantial  progress  within  the  U.S. 
Government  on  an  effective  response  to 
terrorist  attacks  and  have  also 
developed  a  good  working  relationship 
with  our  allies.  Much  more  can  and 
should  be  done  on  defensive  measures. 

Events  of  1983,  however,  persuaded 
us  that  a  good  defense  posture  was  not 
adequate.  We  need  to  improve  our 
capabilities,  especially  intelligence,  to 
prevent  terrorist  states  and  groups  from 
undertaking  attacks.  Within  the  United 
States  we  have,  with  effective  police 
work,  been  rather  successful  in  pre- 
empting terrorist  activity.  Other  coun- 
tries, such  as  Italy  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  have  also  had  con- 
siderable success  in  identifying  terrorist 
groups  and  preventing  terrorist  acts. 
Without  in  anyway  minimizing  the  dif- 
ficulties, we  believe  with  greater  effort 
and  resources  that  it  should  be  possible 
to  prevent  many  of  the  terrorist  attacks 
against  us  in  other  countries. 

Conclusions 

Having  lived  with  the  issues  for  almost  3 
years,  reading  daily  intelligence  reports, 
studying  intelligence  on  the  subject, 
responding  to  dozens  of  incidents  and 
helping  to  resolve  them,  considering 
various  policy  options,  and  working 
within  the  U.S.  Government  and  with 
our  allies  on  ways  to  deal  with  the  prob- 
lem, I  have  naturally  come  to  a  few  con- 
clusions. 

•  Terrorism  is  politically  motivated 
and  is  planned  and  organized.  It  is  a 
mixed  picture  as  to  the  states  and 
groups  that  engage  in  it.  Most  of  it  is 
carried  out  by  states  and  groups  of 
Marxist-Leninist  persuasion,  and  the 
Soviet  Union  and  its  Eastern-bloc  part- 
ners lend  support  and  comfort  to  them. 
The  Soviet  Union  continues  to  do  this 
because  it  considers  it  in  its  interest  to 
do  so.  If  the  Soviet  Union  would  stop 


providing  military  training,  equipment, 
and  other  support,  there  would  be  a 
significant  drop  in  terrorist  activity. 
There  are  other  major  actors  such  as 
Islamic  fundamentalist  groups  supported 
by  Iran.  A  considerable  amount  of  the 
terrorism  even  in  Western  Europe 
stems  from  the  turmoil  in  the  Middle 
East,  and  if  there  were  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment there,  it  would  contribute  to  a 
drop  in  terrorist  activity. 

•  Given  the  nature  and  motivation 
of  most  of  the  groups  and  states  engag- 
ing in  terrorism,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
the  Western  democracies,  and  especially 
the  United  States,  are  the  primary 
targets. 

•  Given  these  conclusions,  it  is  not 
likely  that  there  will  be  any  general 
agreement  within  the  United  Nations  on 
the  suppression  of  terrorist  activity. 

•  Rather,  the  United  States  and  its 
friends  and  allies  will  be  most  effective 
with  good  intelligence  and  the  sharing  of 
that  information,  improved  defense 
measures,  more  effective  police  work, 
and  preemption  of  terrorist  acts 
whenever  and  wherever  possible.  Shar- 
ing of  technical  knowledge  on  dealing 
with  terrorism  through  the  training  of 
foreign  law  enforcement  officers  is  an 
essential  element  in  any  effective  pro- 
gram. Combatting  terrorism  is  essen- 
tially a  police  and  not  a  military  matter. 

•  Stronger  international  cooperation 
both  bilaterally  and  multilaterally  is 
essential.  The  international  community 
has  to  recognize  the  problem  first  before 
we  can  deal  with  it  effectively.  The  Lon- 
don declaration  that  identifies  state  ac- 
tions as  a  major  cause  of  terrorist  activi- 
ty is  a  major  step  forward. 

•  We  will  have  to  learn  to  use  effec- 
tively both  diplomacy  and  force  and  in 
ways  that  reinforce  each  other.  We  will 
not  have  the  luxury  of  clear-cut  situa- 
tions. In  dealing  with  terrorism  on  a 
global  basis,  we  will  have  to  be  very 
discriminating  and  know  when  our  in- 
terests are  being  threatened  and  when 
they  are  not.  Our  opponents  in  seeking 
to  achieve  their  objectives  will  delib- 
erately confuse  the  issues  and  try  to 
keep  the  threshold  below  what  they 
believe  we  conceive  to  be  our  vital  in- 
terests. 

•  It  is  possible  to  deal  with  ter- 
rorism on  a  legal  basis.  There  is  no  need 
to  resort  to  extralegal  measures.  Italy, 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  and 
we  have  all  been  very  successful  with 
aggressive  law  enforcement.  Any  at- 
tempt to  deal  with  it  outside  the  law 


TREATIES 


helps  the  terrorists  achieve  their  objec- 
tives and  leads  to  very  disastrous  results 
as  we  have  seen  in  Argentina  and 
Uruguay. 

•  An  effective  program  against  ter- 
rorism requires  the  employment  of 
substantial  resources.  We  have  to  accept 
that  fact  and  provide  the  resources.  The 
Federal  Government  alone,  for  example, 
spent  some  $65  million  on  security  at 
the  Olympic  Games  in  Los  Angeles. 
Local  jurisdictions  spent  substantial  ad- 
ditional sums.  The  games  were  not  only 
a  major  success  as  an  international 
sports  event  but  they  were  very  peaceful 
and  demonstrated  beyond  any  doubt 
that  the  Soviet  assertions  about  poor 
security  were  phony. 

•  Most  of  the  terrorism  against  the 
United  States  occurs  overseas.  We  need 
to  strengthen  our  efforts  to  deal  with  it 
there,  including  the  root  causes,  or  we 
run  the  substantial  risk  that  it  will  grow 
and  spread  into  the  United  States. 

•  We  have  been  reluctant  to  apply 
sufficient  resources  to  deal  with  ter- 
rorism, possibly  because  we  hoped  that 
the  problem  was  temporary.  WTiile  we 
have  prepared  for  the  larger  challenges 
of  conventional  or  nuclear  war,  our  op- 
ponents have  nibbled  at  us  in  Europe, 
the  Middle  East,  Africa,  and  Latin 
America  with  low-level  warfare.  The 
events  of  1983  brought  home  to  us  very 
clearly  that  we  will  have  to  cope  with 
terrorism  for  some  time  to  come  and  we 
need  to  make  certain  that  we  are 
organized  and  apply  the  resources 
needed  to  do  that.  The  facts  suggest 
that  the  problem  will  continue  to  grow. 
We  are,  indeed,  engaged  in  a  long 
twilight  struggle.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Antarctica 

Antarctic  treaty.  Signed  at  Washington 
Dec.   1,  1959.  Entered  into  force  June  23, 
1961.  TIAS  4780. 
Accession  deposited:  Cuba,  Aug.  16,  1984. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Canberra 
Sept.  27,  1983  at  the  12th  Antarctic  Treaty 
Consultative  Meeting.  Enters  into  force  when 
approved  by  all  contracting  parties  whose 
representatives  were  entitled  to  participate. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement,  1983,  with 
annexes.  Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Oct.  1,  1983. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Angola,  .June  20, 
1984;  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  July  12, 
1984';  Paraguay,  June  15.  1984. 

Commodities — Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
for  Commodities  with  schedules.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  27,  1980.2 
Ratifications  deposited:  Cape  Verde,  July  30, 
1984;  Greece,  Aug.  10,  1984. 

Finance 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International 

Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development. 

Done  at  Bretton  Woods  Conference 

July   1-22,  1944.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  27 

1945.  TIAS  1502. 

Signature  and  acceptance  deposited:  St. 

Christopher  &  Nevis,  Aug.  15,  1984. 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund.  Done  at  Bretton  Woods  Con- 
ference July  1-22,  1944.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  27,  1945.  TIAS  1.501. 
Signature  and  acceptance  deposited:  St. 
Christopher  &  Nevis,  Aug.  15,  1984". 

Jute 

International  agreement  on  jute  and  jute 
products,  1982,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Geneva  Oct.  1,  1982.  Entered  into  force  pro- 
visionally Jan.  9,  1984. 
Accession  deposited:  Switzerland,  June  19, 
1984. 

Patents— Plant  Varieties 

International  convention  for  the  protection  of 
new  varieties  of  plants.of  Dec.  2,  1961,  as  re- 
vised. Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  23,  1978.  Entered 
into  force  Nov.  8,  1981.  TIAS  10199. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Netherlands,  Aug.  2, 
1984.3 

Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  and  develop- 
ment of  the  marine  environment  of  the  wider 
Caribbean  region,  with  annex.  Done  at  Car- 
tagena Mar.  24,  1983.2 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Aug.  9,  1984. 


Postal 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Un 
Done  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964.  Entered 
force  Jan.  1,  1966.  TIAS  .5881. 
Accession  deposited:  Kiribati,  Aug.  14, 

Additional  protocol  to  the  Constitution  i 
Universal  Postal  Union.  Done  at  Tokyo 
Nov.  14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  July 
1971,  except  for  Art.  V  which  entered  I 
force  Jan.   1,  1971.  TIAS  7150.  ^ 

Accession  deposited:  Kiribati,  Aug.  11' 

Second  additional  protocol  to  the  Constii 

of  the  Universal  Postal  Union.  Done  at 

Lausanne  July  5,  1974.  Entered  into  for 

Jan.  1,  1976.  TIAS  8231. 

Accession  deposited:  Kiribati,  Aug.  14, 

Ratification  deposited:  Sri  Lanka,  July  i 

1984. 

General  regulations  of  the  Universal  Pq 
Union,  with  final  protocol  and  annex,  ar 
universal  postal  convention  with  final  pi 
tocol  and  detailed  regulations.  Done  at  1 
Janeiro  Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  fore 
July  1,  1981;  except  for  Art.  124  of  the 
general  regulations  which  became  effec 
Jan.  1,  1981.  TIAS  9972. 
Accession  deposited:  Kiribati,  Aug.  14, 
Approval  deposited:  Thailand,  July  3,  T 
Ratifications  deposited:  Bahamas,  July 
1984;  Lebanon,  July  18,  1984;  Philippir 
June  28,  1984;  Sri  Lanka  July  20,  1984 
Uruguay,  June  21,  1984. 

Money  orders  and  postal  traveler's  che( 
agreement,  with  detailed  regulations  w 
final  protocol.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro 
Oct.  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July 
1981.  TIAS  9973. 

Approval  deposited:  Thailand,  July  3,  1 
Ratifications  deposited:  Lebanon,  July 
1984;  Sri  Lanka,  July  20,  1984;  Urugu; 
June  21,  1984. 

Property— Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intc 
tual  Property  Organization.  Done  at  Si 
holm  July  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  26,  1970;  for  the  U.S.,  Aug.  25, 
TIAS  6932. 
Accession  deposited:  Cyprus,  July  26, 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1977, 

annexes,  as  extended  (TIAS  9664,  104 

Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  7,  1977.  Entered 

force  provisionally  Jan.  1,  1978;  defini 

Jan.  2,  1980. 

Ratification  deposited:  Venezuela,  Au} 

1984. 


lit; 

tsi 


Telecommunications 

Radio  regulations,  with  appendices  an 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  6,  197£ 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1982;  defin 
for  the  U.S.  Oct.  27,  1983. 
Approvals  depo.sited:  Jamaica,  June  1, 
Republic  of  Korea,  May  11,  1984. 

Trade 

Arrangement  regarding  international 
textiles.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  20,  197 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1974.  TIAS  ill 


ik 

rl 

1»[ 
ill* 
tl!i 

lite 

Kit 


50 


TREATIES 


iMeiiding  the  arrangement  regard- 
national  trade  in  textiles  of  Dec.  20, 

extended  (TIAS  7840,  8939).  Done 
'a  Dee.  22,  1981.  Entered  into  force 
982.  TIAS  10323. 
ices  deposited:  Norway,  July  1, 


lents  to  the  schedule  to  the  interna- 
nvention  for  the  regulation  of  whal- 

(TIAS  1849).  Adopted  at  Buenos 
ne  22,  1984.  Enters  into  force  Oct.  8, 
less  any  contracting  party  lodges  an 


)tocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
ade  convention,  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered 
e  July  1,  1983.« 

itocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
convention,  1980  (TIAS  10015). 
Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered 
e  July  1,  1983.« 
Is  deposited:  France,  Aug.  13,  1984. 

[ealth  Organization 

tion  of  the  World  Health  Organiza- 
ie  at  New  York  July  22,  1946. 

into  force  Apr.  7,  1948;  for  the  U.S. 

1948.  TIAS  1808. 
ice  deposited:  Kiribati,  July  26,  1984. 

5RAL 

ia 

ment  for  the  conduct  of  a  balloon 
1  in  Australia  for  scientific  purposes, 
it  Washington  and  Canberra  June  27 
9,  1984.  Enters  into  force  upon  ex- 
)f  notes. 


agreement  on  air  transport  services, 
morandum  of  consultation  [dated 
rton,  June  14,  1984].  Effected  by  ex- 
jf  notes  at  Brasilia  July  11,  1984. 
into  force  July  11,  1984. 


•elating  to  the  Skagit  River  and  Ross 
id  the  Seven  Mile  Reservoire  on  the 
)reille  River,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
rton  Apr.  2,  1984.^ 
by  the  President:  Aug.  27,  1984. 

'.ica 

tion  treaty,  with  exchange  of  notes, 
it  San  Jose  Dec.  4,  1982.2 
idvice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
,  1984. 
by  the  President: 


Aug.  17,  1984. 


tion  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
I  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
to  taxes  on  estates,  inheritances, 
id  certain  other  transfers.  Signed  at 
gton  Apr.  27,  1983.^ 
advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
1984.' 


Egypt 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  23,  1984,  as  amended,  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Washington  Aug.  2, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  2,  1984. 

European  Economic  Community 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
F'eb.   15,  1977,  concerning  fisheries  off  the 
coasts  of  the  U.S.  (TIAS  8598).  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  June  27, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  July  30,  1984;  effec- 
tive July  1,  1984. 

Gabon 

Agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over 
vessels  utilizing  the  Louisiana  Offshore  Oil 
Port.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Libre- 
ville July  25  and  Aug.  2,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  2,  1984. 

Grenada 

General  agreement  for  economic,  technical, 
and  related  assistance.  Signed  at  Grenada 
May  7,  1984.  Entered  into  force  May  7,  1984. 

Guatemala 

Agreement  for  the  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing. Signed  at  Guatemala  Aug.  1,  1984. 
Enters  into  force  upon  exchange  of  notes 
confirming  that  the  internal  procedures  of 
the  importing  country  have  been  met. 

Guinea 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
IMET  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Conakry  Mar.  29,  1983,  and  Feb.  13, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  13,  1984. 

Haiti 

Agreement  for  the  interdiction  of  narcotics 
trafficking.  Signed  at  Port-au-Prince  Aug.  22, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  22,  1984;  ef- 
fective Oct.  1,  1983. 

India 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  memo- 
randum of  understanding  of  July  18,  1978 
(TIAS  9285),  concerning  furnishing  of  launch- 
ing and  associated  services  for  Indian  na- 
tional satellite  system  (INSAT)-l  spacecraft. 
Signed  at  Washington  and  Bangalore  Apr.  10 
and  25,  1984. 

Entered  into  force:  July  31,  1984;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1984. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  arrangement  of 
Oct.  1  and  15,  1979  (TIAS  9667),  relating  to 
a  visa  system  for  exports  of  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  apparel  manufactured  in  Indo- 
nesia. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Jakarta  June  1  and  14,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  June  14,  1984. 

Ireland 

Treaty  on  extradition.  Signed  at  Washington 

July  13,  1983.2 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  28,  1984. 

Ratified  by  the  President:  Aug.  10,  1984. 


Italy 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Rome  Oct.  13, 

1983.2 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

June  28,  1984. 

Ratified  by  the  President:  Aug.  10,  1984. 

Treaty  on  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  mat- 
ters, with  memorandum  of  understanding. 
Signed  at  Rome  Nov.  9,  1982.2 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
June  28,  1984. 
Ratified  by  the  President:  Aug.  16,  1984. 

Jamaica 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Kingston 

June  14,  1983.2 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

Jilne  28,  1984. 

Ratified  by  the  President:  Aug.  17,  1984. 

Agreement  for  the  furnishing  of  commodities 
and  services  in  connection  with  the  peace- 
keeping force  for  Grenada.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Kingston  Nov.  29  and 
Dec.  6,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  6, 
1983. 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport  agree- 
ment of  Oct.  2,  1969,  as  amended  (TIAS 
6770,  9613).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Kingston  July  17  and  23,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  July  23,  1984. 

Japan 

Agreement  concerning  Japan's  financial  con- 
tribution for  U.S.  administrative  and  related 
expenses  for  1984  (JFY)  pursuant  to  the 
mutual  defense  assistance  agreement  of 
Mar.  8,  1954  (TIAS  2957).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Tokyo  July  20,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  July  20,  1984. 

Korea 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  1,  1982  (TIAS  10611),  relating  to  trade 
in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Washington  July  26  and  27,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  July  27,  1984. 

Liberia 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to  or 
guaranteed  by  the  U.S.  Government  and  its 
agencies,  with  annexes  and  implementing 
agreement  regarding  payments  due  under 
PL  480  agricultural  commodity  agreements, 
with  annexes.  Signed  at  Monrovia  June  22, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  July  27,  1984. 

Mauritius 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  30,  1982,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities  (TIAS  10628).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Port  Louis  Mar.  29  and 
July  4,  1984.  Entered  into  force  July  4,  1984. 

Morocco 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  2,  1984,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Rabat  July  5,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
July  5,  1984. 


CHRONOLOGY 


Mozambique 

Invesiment  incentive  agreement.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Maputo  July  28,  1984. 
Enters  into  force  on  date  Mozambique  com- 
municates by  note  to  U.S.  Government  that 
exchange  of  notes  has  been  approved  pur- 
suant to  its  constitutional  procedures. 

Niger 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Niamey  June  11,  1984.  Entered  in- 
to force  July  24,  1984. 

Panama 

Agreement  relating  to  wool  textiles  and  tex- 
tile products  manufactured  in  Panama,  with 
annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Panama  Aug.  7  and  21,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  21,  1984;  effective  Dec.  1,  1983. 

Thailand 

Treaty  on  cooperation  in  the  execution  of 

penal  sentences.  Signed  at  Bangkok  Oct.  29, 

1982.^ 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

Aug.  9,  1984. 

Tunisia 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities relating  to  the  agreement  of  June  7. 
1976  (TIAS  8506).  Signed  at  Tunis  June  13, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  June  13,  1984. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  26,  1976,  as  amended,  concerning 
fisheries  off  the  coasts  of  the  U.S.  (TIAS 
8528,  10531).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Washington  Feb.  28  and  Apr.  11,  1984. 
Entered  into  force:  July  31,  1984. 

Agreement  extending  the  long-term  agree- 
ment of  June  29,  1974  (TIAS  7910),  to  facili- 
tate economic,  industrial,  and  technical 
cooperation.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  June  15  and  27,  1984.  Entered 
into  force  June  27,  1984. 

Zaire 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guar- 
anteed by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Kinshasa  May  3,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
June  11,  1984. 

Treaty  concerning  the  reciprocal  encourage- 
ment and  protection  of  investment.  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  3,  1984.  Enters  into  force 
30  days  after  date  of  exchange  of  instru- 
ments of  ratification. 


'Applicable  to  Berlin  (West). 

^Not  in  force. 

^P'or  the  Kingdom  in  Europe. 

■•With  declaration. 

■''With  statement. 

'■In  force  provisionally  for  the  U.S. 

'With  reservation.  ■ 


August  1984 


Note:  The  editors  solicit  readers'  comments 
on  the  value  of  the  Bulletin  s  monthly 
chronologies.  Unless  a  positive  response  is 
received,  the  chronologies  will  be  discon- 
tinued. 

August  1 

Representatives  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Moscow  and  the  Consular  Division  of  the 
Soviet  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  exchange 
diplomatic  notes  concluding  the  latest  round 
of  U.S-Soviet  consular  review  talks. 

National  security  adviser  McFarlane,  in  a 
public  statement,  reaffirms  that  the  U.S.  has 
accepted  the  Soviet  Union's  June  29  proposal 
to  meet  in  Vienna  and  is  prepared  for  serious 
talks  on  outer  space,  including  antisatellite 
weapons.  He  also  says  the  Soviet  Union  has 
repeatedly  misrepresented  the  U.S.  position 
on  such  talks  suggesting  that  the  Soviets 
were  not  serious  about  the  proposed  talks. 

At  his  ranch  in  Santa  Barbara,  President 
Reagan  meets  with  the  Vatican's  Archbishop 
Pio  Laghi  to  discuss  the  situation  in  Poland, 
East-West  issues,  and  Central  America. 

House  rejects  an  Administration  request 
for  $117  million  in  supplementary  military  aid 
to  El  Salvador  for  this  fiscal  year. 

U.S.  sends  a  team  of  Navy  mine-warfare 
experts  to  investigate  shipping  explosions  in 
the  Red  Sea. 

August  2-20 

Delegates  from  135  countries  meet  in  Vienna 
for  the  fourth  general  conference  of  the 
United  Nations  Industrial  Development 
Organization.  Ambassador  Richard  S. 
Williamson  leads  the  U.S.  delegation. 

August  2 

A  U.S.  Marine  guard  at  the  Consulate 
building  in  Leningrad  is  beaten  by  Soviet 
police  and  jailed  for  2  hours.  The  Marine  was 
off  duty  but  investigating  a  suspicious  vehicle 
that  had  been  circling  the  Consulate.  State 
Department  acting  spokesman  Romberg  says 
the  U.S.  strongly  protested  this  serious  inci- 
dent but  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  not  given 
a  satisfactory  response. 

In  New  York  City,  U.S.  and  Cuban  repre- 
sentatives end  a  second  round  of  talks  on  im- 
migration issues,  including  the  return  of  per- 
sons from  the  1980  Mariel  boatlift.  Michael 
G.  Kozak  headed  the  U.S.  delegation. 

In  Tehran,  hijackers  of  an  Air  France 
Boeing  737  released  all  passengers  and  crew, 
set  off  an  explosion  in  the  cockpit,  and  then 
surrendered  to  authorities  ending  a  2-day 
siege.  It  is  discovered  that  three  passengers 
aboard  are  Americans. 

USIA  Director  Wick  greets  47  Japanese 
exchange  students  at  welcoming  ceremonies 
at  the  Department  of  State. 

August  3 

U.S.  signs  a  deep  seabed  mining  agreement 
with  Belgium,  France,  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands, 
and  the  U.K.  The  agreement  is  aimed  at 
avoiding  conflicts  over  deep  seabed  mine  sites 
and  providing  for  regular  consultations. 


II 


n 


13 


In  response  to  Poland's  announcement 
release  652  political  prisoners,  President 
Reagan  lifts  the  ban  on  the  Polish  state 
airline  LOT  and  reestablishes  full  scientifi 
exchanges  between  the  U.S.  and  Poland, 

Upper  Volta  officially  changes  its  nam 
to  Burkina  Faso  which  means  "land  of  hoi) 
men"  in  the  Mossi  tribe  language.  Its  new 
flag  is  red  and  green  with  a  gold  star.  Th( 
people  of  this  West  African  country  will  It  ' 
called  Burkinabes. 

August  6-14 

The  second  International  Conference  on 
Population  is  held  in  Mexico  City.  Am-     ■ 
bassador  James  L.  Buckley  heads  the  U.l 
delegation.  ! 

The  conference  adopts  (August  10)  a 
recommendation  that  abortion  should  notft 
promoted  as  a  family  planning  method.    , 

On  August  11,  Ambassador  Buckley  i 
the  U.S.  will  continue  its  support  for  the 
United  Nations  Fund  for  Population  Ac- 
tivities having  received  the  necessary  "con 
Crete  assurances"  that  the  organization  do 
not  engage  in  or  provide  funding  for  abon 
or  coercive  family  planning  programs. 

The  conference  adopts  (August  14)  thi 
text  of  the  Mexico  City  Declaration  on 
Population  and  Development,  as  well  as  8 
recommendations  to  further  implement  th 
World  Population  Plan  of  Action  approve 
Bucharest  in  1974. 


August  6 

Department  of  State  issues  warning  to 
travelers  to  Leningrad  that  their  rights  a 
foreign  tourists  and  the  protections  affor 
them  under  the  U.S. -U.S.S.R.  consular  cci 
vention  are  not  being  respected  by  Soviei™* 
authorities. 

August  7 

At  the  request  of  Egyptian  President 
Mubarek,  the  U.S.  Navy  sends  mine-swe 
helicopters  and  about  200  servicemen  to 
search  the  Gulf  of  Suez  area  for  explosiv  i 
that  have  damaged  commercial  shipping. 

Uganda  suspends  its  international 
military  education  and  training  (IMET)  f;  " 
gram  with  the  U.S.  and  bars  a  U.S.  milili  'Be 
attache  from  visiting  the  country  to  help  !''s 
minister  the  program  in  response  to  reci  '■'" 
U.S.  criticism  of  human  rights  abuses  in  [' '  • 
Uganda. 

At  an  African-Arab  solidarity  confer  ' 
in  Tunisia,  PLO  leader  Arafat  urges  An  '• 
adopt  "rigorous  positions"  against  the  U  *'■ 

August  8 

Iran  accuses  U.S.  and  Israel  of  placing  r  |frB» 
in  the  Red  Sea  in  a  "conspiracy"  to  disct  ilkt 
Teheran's  Islamic  government. 

In  a  letter  to  Congress,  President  Rliajs 
reports  that  U.S.  nonproliferation  initial'  lny; 
in  1983  had  a  positive  contribution  to  th 
goal  of  preventing  "the  further  spread  o 
nuclear  explosives." 

Seven  Afghans,  wounded  in  fighting  fwm 
caused  by  the  Soviet  Union's  occupation 
their  country,  arrive  in  the  U.S.  for  trej 
ment  at  Walter  Reed  Army  Medical  Cei  fwJIi 
The  mission  is  sponsored  by  the  private 
Americas  Foundation. 


^  ('i)r 


CHRONOLOGY 


d  the  U.K.  announce  they  will  join 
1  for  explosives  in  the  Red  Sea  and 
,ez  at  the  request  of  Egypt. 
laS  grees  to  help  Belgium  purchase  a 
Sir  ade  high  technology  lathe  for  the 
in  rmy  to  avoid  its  sale  to  the  Soviet 


approves  an  extra  $70  million  in 
id  to  El  Salvador  for  the  remaining 

oviet  Union  travel  agency,  In- 
Jt.   Jls  the  State  Department's 
travel  advisory  about  Leningrad 
ill  intentioned." 

1 

Cuba  agree  to  improve  trade, 
i  ind  technological  relations  despite 
IS  in  international  matters. 


Angeles  Summer  Olympics  conclude. 
222  gold  medals  were  awarded 
is  16-day  event.  U.S.  athletes  win  a 
74  medals,  of  which  83  are  gold. 


Reagan  and  Secretary  Shultz  meet 
t  an  Foreign  Minister  Andreotti  while 

igeles. 
"    holds  swearing  in  ceremony  of  its 

ament. 


1  jartment  acting  spokesman 

says  the  review  process  has  begun 
«jjiine  whether  Rabbi  Kahane  should 

S.  citizenship  after  being  sworn  in 
i^iber  of  the  Israeli  Parliament. 

15-16 

Sdor  Shlaudeman  meets  with  Nicara- 
ie  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Tinoco 
inillo,  Mexico,  for  the  fourth  round  of 


Jt  Reagan  says  the  U.S.  will  consider 
;  its  participation  in  the  United  Na- 
.3iference  on  Women  at  Nairobi, 
I, '  the  conference  adopts  a  measure 
r  Zionism  with  racism, 
ihd  notifies  the  U.S.  of  its  willingness 
T  talks  on  the  lifting  of  some  U.S.  eco- 
:  notions. 

8l7 

■(  'niony  commemorating  August  1, 
f  the  40th  anniversary  of  the  Warsaw 
n  atjainst  Nazi  occupation.  President 
iKays  the  U.S.  rejects  "the  interpreta- 
ne  Yalta  agreement  that  suggests 
n  consent  for  the  division  of  Europe 
eres  of  influence."  He  expresses  his 
lation  to  "press  for  full  compliance" 
jreement,  especially  free  elections. 
ta  agreement  was  signed  in  February 
President  Roosevelt,  Premier  Stalin, 
ne  Minister  Churchill. 


The  UN  Security  Council  approves,  by  a 
vote  of  13  in  favor  and  2  abstentions  (U.S. 
and  the  U.K.),  a  resolution  that  rejects  and 
declares  "null  and  void"  the  constitutional 
changes  made  by  South  Africa. 

August  18 

In  response  to  President  Reagan's  statement 
of  August  17  regarding  the  Yalta  agreement, 
the  Soviet  Union  accuses  President  Reagan 
of  distorting  history  and  defaming  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Poland. 

August  19 

Uganda  says  that  about  15,000  people  have 
been  killed  in  political  and  tribal  violence 
since  1981,  disputing  Assistant  Secretary 
Abrams  testimony  of  August  9  that  100,000 
people  have  been  killed  by  the  military. 

August  20 

Greece  cancels  a  joint  military  exercise  with 
the  U.S.  in  northern  Greece  saying  it 
perceives  no  threats  from  its  Warsaw  Pact 
neighbors. 

August  21-22 

At  the  CDE  session  in  Stockholm,  U.S.  and 
Soviet  Union  conduct  talks  on  ways  to 
enhance  security,  build  confidence,  and  pre- 
vent surprise  attack  in  Europe.  Ambassador 
James  E.  Goodby  heads  the  U.S.  delegation. 

August  21 

State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  expresses  U.S.  regret  of  Greece's 
decision  to  cancel  a  joint  military  exercise  in 
the  Aegean  Sea.  He  adds  that  the  U.S.  does 
not  agree  with  the  Greek  reasons  for  justify- 
ing the  cancellation. 

August  22 

President  Reagan  signs  a  bill  that  includes 
$503  million  in  economic  and  military  aid  to 
Central  America;  $70  million  of  the  aid  will 
go  to  El  Salvador. 

State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  says  the  U.S.  deplores  recent  at- 
tacks on  Pakistan  made  from  Afghanistan 
and  calls  upon  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
Kabul  regime  to  end  these  actions. 

State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  reaffirms  U.S.  relations  with 
Australia  and  support  of  ANZUS  after 
reports  of  concern  regarding  the  Administra- 
tion's current  views  on  these  issues. 

For  the  first  time  in  28  years.  South 
Africa  holds  its  first  round  of  elections  to 
choose  representatives  for  people  of  mixed 
race.  In  South  Africa's  new,  three-chamber 
Parliament,  whites  will  be  represented  in  a 
160-seat  house,  people  of  mixed  race  will 
have  an  80-seat  house,  and  Indians  will  be 
represented  in  a  40-seat  house.  The  black  ma- 
jority will  not  be  represented. 


August  23 

State  Department  receives  a  report  that 
Yelena  Bonner  was  convicted  of  slandering 
the  Soviet  Union  and  sentenced  to  5  years  of 
internal  exile  on  August  17. 

Romania  celebrates  the  40th  anniversary 
of  the  overthrow  of  the  Fascist  government. 

Auburn  University  announces  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  International  Aquacultural 
Network  that  will  link  scientists  in  70  nations 
by  satellite  to  each  other  for  obtaining  the 
latest  research  information  to  help  developing 
nations  and  U.S.  producers  grow  fish  more 
efficiently. 

The  Department  of  Defense  makes  public 
its  recommendation  to  provide  coverage  of 
military  operations  by  news  organizations. 

August  24 

U.S.  announces  it  will  send  additional  grain 
shipments  to  Ethiopia  and  Kenya  to  ease  con- 
ditions caused  by  drought. 

August  25 

TASS  reports  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  suc- 
cessfully tested  a  long-range  ground-launched 
cruise  missile  allegedly  in  response  to  the 
U.S.  deployment  of  such  weapons. 

August  24  30 

A  third  round  of  indirect  talks  between 
Pakistan  and  Afghanistan  are  held  in  Geneva 
in  an  attempt  to  arrive  at  a  political  settle- 
ment for  Afghanistan.  Issues  discussed  in- 
clude a  timetable  for  Soviet  withdrawal, 
pledges  of  noninterference  and  noninterven- 
tion, international  guarantees  of  an  agree- 
ment, and  a  mechanism  for  consulting  the 
refugees  on  the  condition  of  their  return.  UN 
envoy  Diego  Cordovez  mediates  the  discus- 
sions. 

August  27 

State  Department  spokesman  Hughes  says 
the  Soviet  Union's  testing  of  a  long-range 
ground-launched  missile  "comes  as  no  sur- 
prise." He  adds  that  the  Soviet's  cruise 
missile  program  had  been  active  long  before 
U.S.  Pershing  II  and  ground-launched  cruise 
missile  deployments  began. 

U.S.  and  China  sign  an  agreement  under 
which  the  Department  of  the  Interior  will 
help  China  design  the  world's  largest  hydro- 
electric dam. 

The  Department  of  State  rejects  as 
"totally  false"  recent  allegations  by  Radio 
Moscow  that  Korean  Air  Lines  Flight  007 
was  blown  up  by  a  U.S.  bomb  to  prevent  evi- 
dence that  it  was  a  spy  plane  from  falling  in- 
to Soviet  hands.  The  plane  was  shot  down  by 
a  Soviet  military  aircraft  on  September  1, 
1983. 

The  U.S.  Immigration  Service  reports 
that  an  estimated  7,000  Nicaraguans,  be- 
tween the  ages  of  15  and  22.  are  in  Miami, 
Florida,  to  escape  their  homeland's  com- 
pulsory military  draft. 

August  28 

South  Africa  holds  its  second  round  of  elec- 
tions to  choose  representatives  for  the 
40-seat  Indian  house  of  the  new  Parliament. 


PRESS  RELEASES 


PUBLICATIONS 


August  29 

A  U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  overturned  Presi- 
dent Reagan's  "pocket"  veto  of  a  military  aid 
bill  that  required  him  to  certify  improve- 
ments in  El  Salvador's  human  rights  situa- 
tion. The  bill  was  vetoed  while  Congress  was 
in  its  Thanksgiving  holiday  recess  last  year. 
The  following  newly  appointed  ambassa- 
dors present  their  credentials  to  President 
Reagan:  Falilou  Kane  (Republic  of  Senegal), 
Guenther  van  Well  (Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many), Joseph  Edsel  Edmunds  (Saint  Lucia), 
Donald  Aloysius  McLeod  (Republic  of 
Suriname),  Ignatius  Chukuemeka  Olisemeka 
(Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria),  and  Maati 
Jorio  (Kingdom  of  Morocco). 

August  30 

President  Reagan  establishes  a  new  Commis- 
sion on  Agricultural  Trade  and  Export 
Policy. 

U.S.  Trade  Representative  Brock  says 
the  Soviet  Union  has  contracted  to  purchase 
7.9  million  tons  of  grain— 1.3  million  tons  of 
wheat  and  6.6  million  tons  of  corn— in  the 
1984-85  agreement  year  of  the  current 
U.S.-U.S.S.R.  long-term  grain  agreement. 

Greece  protests  the  U.S.  military's  re- 
fusal to  reinstate  16  striking  workers  at  the 
Hellenikon  air  base  in  Athens,  despite  an 
understanding  that  no  striking  workers  would 
be  dismissed. 

August  31 

U.S.  restricts  Libya's  UN  diplomats  from 
traveling  outside  New  York  City  without 
special  permission. 

South  Africa  lifts  ban  on  The  Windhoek 
Observer,  a  weekly  newspaper  known  for  its 
reports  against  the  government's  policies  on 
Namibia.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

175      8/2         Statement  on  the  9th  anni- 
versary of  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act. 

•176      8/3         Diana  Lady  Dougan  con- 
firmed rank  of  Ambassador 
(biographic  data). 

*177      8/7         Signature  of  seabed  mining 
agreement,  Aug.  3. 

•178      8/7         Committee  of  the  U.S.  Or- 
ganization for  the  Interna- 
tional Telegraph  and  Tele- 
phone Consultative  Com- 
mittee meeting,  Sept.  6. 

*179      8/9         Leonardo  Neher  .sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Burkina 
Faso,  July  17  (biographic 
data). 

•180      8/14       Samuel  F.  Hart,  Ambassa- 
dor to  the  Republic  of 
Ecuador,  Dec.  14,  1982 
(biographic  data). 


'181      8/13        Everett  E.  Briggs,  Ambassa- 
dor to  the  Republic  of 
Panama,  Oct.  6,  1982  (bio- 
graphic data). 

•182      8/13        Lewis  A.  Tambs,  Ambassa- 
dor to  the  Republic  of 
Colombia,  Mar.  24,  1983 
(biographic  data). 

♦183      8/14       Malcolm  R.  Barnebey,  Am- 
bassador to  Belize,  May  25, 
1983  (biographic  data)." 

•184      8/14       Curtin  Winsor,  Jr.,  Ambassa- 
dor to  the  Republic  of 
Costa  Rica,  June  9,  1983 
(biographic  data). 

•185      8/17        Paul  F.  Gardner  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Papua  New 
Guinea  and  Solomon 
Islands  (biographic  data). 

•186      8/17       Alan  W.  Lukens  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  the  People's 
Republic  of  the  Congo, 
Aug.  14  (biographic  data). 

*187       8/20        David  C.  Jordan,  Ambassa- 
dor to  the  Republic  of 
Peru,  Mar.  8,  1984  (bio- 
graphic data). 

*188  8/20  Richard  W.  Boehm  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  the  Re- 
public of  Cyprus,  Aug.  15 
(biographic  data). 

*189      8/20        Diego  C.  Asencio,  Ambassa- 
dor to  the  Federative  Re- 
public of  Brazil,  Nov.  22, 
1983  (biographic  data). 

•190      8/20        Frank  V.  Ortiz,  Jr.,  Ambas- 
sador to  the  Argentine  Re- 
public, Nov.  21,  1983  (bio- 
graphic data). 

•191      8/20        Shultz:  address  before  the 

Veterans  of  Foreign  Wars, 
Chicago. 

•192      8/23        Shultz:  interview  by  Daniel 
Schorr  of  "Cable  News 
Network,"  Aug.  22. 

•193      8/28       Clayton  E.  McManaway,  Jr., 
Ambassador  to  the  Repub- 
lic of  Haiti,  Dec.  6,  1983 
(biographic  data). 

•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin,  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Free  multiple  copies  may  be  obtained  by 
writing  to  the  Office  of  Opinion  Analysis  and 
Plans,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department 
of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Shultz 

Power  and  Diplomacy,  Veterans  of  Foreign 
Wars,  Chicago,  Aug.  20,  1984  (Current 
Policy  #606). 


Africa 

U.S.  Response  to  Africa's  Food  Needs  (C 
Aug.  1984). 

East  Asia 

U.S.-China  Agricultural  Relations  (GIST, 
Aug.  1984).  I 

Economics 

World  Economic  Prospects,  Under  SecJ 
Wallis,  American  Chamber  of  Coma 
Santiago,  July  27,  1984  (Current  P| 
#.S99). 

Europe 

U.S.  Policy:  The  Baltic  Republics  (GIS'^ 

Aug.  1984). 
U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Exchanges  (GIST,  Aug. 

General 

Europe  v.  Asia:  Is  Diplomacy  a  Zero-Si 
Game?,  Deputy  Secretary  Dam,  Amj 
Bar  Association,  Chicago,  Aug.  6,  ij 
(Current  Policy  #603).  I 

Middle  East 

U.S. -Egyptian  Relations  (GIST,  Aug.  19 

Nuclear  Policy 

Nuclear  Trade:  Reliable  Supply  and  Mut 
Obligations,  Ambassador  Kennedy, 
Center  for  Strategic  and  Internatioi 
Studies,  Georgetown  University,  Jui 
1984  (Current  Policy  #607). 


IDII 


Population 

U.S.  Commitment  to  International  Popi 
Planning,  Ambassador  Buckley,  Int  isii 
tional  Conference  on  Population,  Mi 
City,  Aug.  8,  1984  (Current  Policy  i 

Food  and  Population  Planning  Assistan 
AID  Administrator  McPherson,  Ho 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Aug.  2 
(Current  Policy  #602). 


South  Asia 

Afghanistan  (GIST,  Aug.  1984). 
Indian  Ocean  Region  (GIST,  Aug.  1984 

Terrorism 

International  Terrorism:  A  Long  Twili; 
Struggle,  Ambassador  Sayre.  Fore 
Policy  Association,  New  York,  Aug 
1984  (Current  Policy  #608). 

Western  Hemisphere 

Grenada  Occasional  Paper  No.  1:  Maui 
Bishop's  "Line  of  March"  Speech,  i 
ber  13,  1982;  Department  of  State 
1984. 

Cuba  as  a  Model  and  a  Challenge,  Cub 
Affairs  Director  Skoug,  Americas 
ty.  New  York,  July  25,  1984  (Curr 
Policy  #600). 

Review  of  Nicaragua's  Commitments  t 
OAS,  Ambassador  Middendorf,  OA 
manent  Council,  July  18,  1984  (Cu 
Policy  #601).  ■ 


CEX 


;1)ber  1984 

lime  84,  No.  2091 


iVstan 

Attacks    on    Pakistan    (Department 

ment) 47 

Stan 47 

n  Principles.  Diplomacy  and  Strength 

iltz)    18 

antrol.  Security  for  Europe  (Goodby)21 
iternational  Terrorism:    A  Long  Twi- 

t  Struggle  (Sayre) 48 

Energy.    Nuclear    Trade:    Reliable 
iply     and     Mutual     Obligations 

inedy) 40 

a.  U.S. -Bulgaria  Relations  (Burt) ...  28 
is.    Nuclear   Trade:    Reliable    Supply 

Mutual  Obligations  (Kennedy) 40 

Continuation  of  MFN  Status  for  China 

)wn) 27 

nications.  Competitive  Challenges  of 

)al  Telecommunications  (Schneider).  43 

ss 

itive   Challenges   of  Global   Telecom- 

lications  (Schneider) 43 

ation    of    MFN     Status    for    China 

)wn) 27 

,   Developments   in   the   Middle   East 

rphy) 37 

ind    Population    Planning    Assistance 

Pherson)   31 

ctivities  on   POW-MIA  Issue  (Wolfo- 
.)  25 

igaria  Relations  (Burt) 28 

4  ilica.  Democracy  in  Latin  America  and 
Caribbean  (Motley) 1 

1  ment  and  Foreign  Service.   Interna- 

i  lal  Narcotics  Control 39 

sia 

acy  and  Strength  (Shultz) 18 

Asia;    Is  Diplomacy  a  Zero-Sum 
^  .'(Dam) 33 

uiics 
■Miv  in  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 

'  M  (Motley) 1 

\,   Asia:    Is  Diplomacy  a  Zero-Sum 

;iif:'(Dam) 33 

a  ador.  Democracy  in  Latin  America  and 
Caribbean  (Motley) 1 


Energy.  Nuclear  Trade:  Reliable  Supply  and 
Mutual  Obligations  (Kennedy) 40 

Europe 

Diplomacy  and  Strength  (Shultz) 18 

Europe  v.  Asia:  Is  Diplomacy  a  Zero-Sum 
(;ame?(Dam) " 33 

International  Terrorism:  A  Long  Twilight 
Struggle  (Sayre) 48 

Ninth  Anniversary  of  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act 36 

Security  for  Europe  (Goodby) 21 

Food.  Food  and  Population  Planning  Assist- 
ance (McPherson) 31 

Foreign  Assistance.  Food  and  Population 
Planning  Assistance  (McPherson) 31 

Health.  Food  and  Population  Planning  Assist- 
ance (McPherson) 31 

Human  Rights 

Democracy  in  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean (Motley)  1 

Ninth  Anniversary  of  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act ■ 36 

Intelligence  Operations.  International  Ter- 
rorism: A  Long  Twilight  Struggle 
(Sayre) 48 

International  Law.  International  Terrorism: 
A  Long  Twilight  Struggle  (Sayre) 48 

Kampuchea.  U.S.  Activities  on  POW-MIA 
Issue  (Wolfowitz) 2.5 

Laos.  U.S.  Activities  on  POW-MIA  Issue 
(Wolfowitz)   25 

Middle  East 

Current  Developments  in  the  Middle  East 
(Murphy) 37 

International  Terrorism:  A  Long  Twilight 
Struggle  (Sayre) 48 

Narcotics 

Democracy  in  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean (Motley)   1 

International  Narcotics  Control 39 

Nicaragua.  Democracy  in  Latin  America  and 
the  Caribbean  (Motley) 1 

Nuclear  Policy.  Nuclear  Trade:  Reliable 
Supply  and  Mutual  Obligations 
(Kennedy)   40 

Pakistan.  Afghan  Attacks  on  Pakistan  (De- 
partment statement)  47 

Poland 

40th  Anniversary  of  the  Warsaw  Uprising 
(Reagan)    16 

Polish  Government's  Release  of  Political 
Prisoners  (White  House  statement)  ....  30 

Population.  Food  and  Population  Planning 
Assistance  (McPherson) 31 


Presidential  Documents.  4Uth  Anniversary 
of  the  Warsaw  Uprising  (Reagan) 16 

Publications 

Department  of  State 54 

Science  and  Technology 

Competitive  Challenges  of  Global  Telecom- 
munications (Schneider) 43 

Nuclear  Trade:  Reliable  Supply  and  Mutual 
Obligations  (Kennedy) 40 

Security  Assistance.  Democracy  in  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  (Motley)  ...    1 

Space.  Competitive  Challenges  of  Global 
Telecommunications  (Schneider) 43 

Terrorism.  International  Terrorism:  A  Long 
Twilight  Struggle  (Sayre) 48 

Trade 

Continuation  of  MFN  Status  for  China 
(Brown) 27 

Nuclear  Trade:  Reliable  Supply  and  Mutual 
Obligations  (Kennedy) 40 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 50 

U.S.S.R.  Security  for  Europe  (Goodby) 21 

United  Nations.  International  Terrorism:  A 
Long  Twilight  Struggle  (Sayre) 48 

Vietnam.  U.S.  Activities  on  P"OW-MIA  Issue 
(Wolfowitz)   25 

Western  Hemisphere 

Democracy  in  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean (Motley) 1 

Diplomacy  and  Strength  (Shultz) 18 

International  Terrorism:  A  Long  Twilight 
Struggle  (Sayre) 48 


Name  Index 

Brown,  William  A 27 

Burt,  Richard  R 28 

Dam,  Kenneth  W 33 

Goodby,  James  E 21 

Kennedy,  Richard  T 40 

McPherson,  M.  Peter 31 

Motley,  Langhorne  A 1 

Murphy,  Richard  W 37 

Reagan,  President 16 

Sayre,  Robert  M 48 

Schneider,  William  Jr 43 

Shultz,  Secretary 18 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D 25 


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Deparimt^ni 


.3: 


bulletin 


'  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  84  /  Number  2092 


November  1984 


UN  General  Assembly/1 
Caribbean  Basin  Atlas/71 


Dppartmeni  of  St  ait* 

bulletin 


Volume  84  /  Number  2092  /  November  1984 


Cover: 

The  Inited  Nations  flag- a  symbol  of 
peace,  progress,  and  justice. 

(United  Nations  photo  by  T.  Chen) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreig^n  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin'.s  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


I 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 


JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affair: 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD  ^ 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 


PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


i 

i 


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CONTENTS 


FEATURE 


1 
7 


Reducing  World  Tensions  (President  Reagan) 
The  United  Nations 


The  President 

26       Promoting  Global  Economic 

Growth 

The  Secretary 

29       The  Campaign  Against  Drugs: 
The  International  Dimension 

34        Proposed  Refugee  Admissions  for 
FY  1985 

39       Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 

42       Interview  on  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley" 

Africa 

44  U.S.  Response  to  Africa's  Food 

Needs 

Arms  Control 

45  Arms  Control:  Where  Do  We 

Stand  Now?  (Kenneth  L. 
Adelman) 

48  CDE  Talks  Resume  in  Stockholm 

(President  Reagan) 

49  Status  of  Arms  Control  Talks 

(President  Reagan) 
49       Review  Conference  Held  on  En- 
vironmental Modification  Con- 
vention (Final  Declaration) 

East  Asia 

51        Cambodia:  The  Search  for  Peace 

(Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 
54       Recent  Developments  in  the 

Philippines  (Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 
56       U.K.  and  China  Reach  Agreement 

on  Hong  Kong  (Secretary 

Shultz) 


Human  Rights 


Europe 


57 


60 


President  Meets  With  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  (President 
Reagan,  Secretary  Shultz) 

Anniversary  of  the  KAL  #007 
Incident  (Richard  R.  Burt, 
Department  Statement) 


62 


66 


Human  Rights  Practices  in  Sudan, 
Ethiopia,  Somalia,  and  Uganda 
(Elliott  Abrams) 

U.S.  Urges  Ratification  of  Geno- 
cide Convention  (Elliott 
Abrams.  Department  StateTnent) 


Middle  East 


67 


68 


U.S.  Embassy  Bombed  in  Beirut 
(Department  Statement) 

U.S.  Imposes  Additional  Export 
Controls  on  Iran  (Departrnent 
Statement) 


Military  Affairs 

69  NATO  Conventional  Defense 

Capabilities  (Letter  to  the 
Congress) 

70  Tactical  Nuclear  Posture  of  NATO 

(Letter  to  the  Congress) 

Western  Hemisphere 

71  Atlas  of  the  Caribbean  Basin 

(Harry  F.  Young) 

Treaties 

86       Current  Actions 

Chronology 

88       September  1984 

Press  Releases 

90       Department  of  State 

90  USUN 

Publications 

91  Department  of  State 
91        Background  Notes 

91  GPO  Subscriptions 

92  Foreign  Relations  Volume 

Released 


Index 


President  Reagan  addresses  the  39th  session  of  the  UN  General  Assembly. 


T 


-A 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


Reducing 
World  Tensions 

by  President  Reagan 


Address  before  the  39th  session 

of  the  UN  General  Assembly 

in  New  York  on  September  2U,  19Sh^ 


First  of  all,  I  wish  to  congratulate  Presi- 
dent Lusaka  [Paul  Lasaka  of  Zambia]  on 
his  election  as  President  of  the  General 
Assembly.  I  wish  you  every  success,  Mr. 
President,  in  carrying  out  the  respon- 
sibilities of  this  high  international  office. 

It  is  an  honor  to  be  here,  and  I 
thank  you  for  your  gracious  invitation.  I 
would  speak  in  support  of  the  two  great 
goals  that  led  to  the  formation  of  this 
organization — the  cause  of  peace  and 
the  cause  of  human  dignity. 

The  responsibility  of  this  Assem- 
bly— the  peaceful  resolution  of  disputes 
between  peoples  and  nations — can  be 
discharged  successfully  only  if  we 
recognize  the  great  common  ground 
upon  which  we  all  stand:  our  fellowship 
as  members  of  the  human  race,  our 
oneness  as  inhabitants  of  this  planet,  our 
place  as  representatives  of  billions  of  our 
countrymen  whose  fondest  hope  remains 
the  end  to  war  and  to  the  repression  of 
the  human  spirit.  These  are  the  impor- 
tant, central  realities  that  bind  us,  that 
permit  us  to  dream  of  a  future  without 
the  antagonisms  of  the  past.  And  just  as 
shadows  can  be  seen  only  where  there  is 
light,  so,  too,  can  we  overcome  what  is 
wrong  only  if  we  remember  how  much  is 
right;  and  we  will  resolve  what  divides 
us  only  if  we  remember  how  much  more 
unites  us. 

This  chamber  has  heard  enough 
about  the  problems  and  dangers  ahead; 
today,  let  us  dare  to  speak  of  a  future 
that  is  bright  and  hopeful  and  can  be 


ours  only  if  we  seek  it.  I  believe  that 
future  is  far  nearer  than  most  of  us 
would  dare  to  hope. 

At  the  start  of  this  decade,  one 
scholar  at  the  Hudson  Institute  noted 
that  mankind  also  had  undergone  enor- 
mous changes  for  the  better  in  the  past 
two  centuries,  changes  which  aren't 
always  readily  noticed  or  written  about. 

"Up  until  200  years  ago,  there  were 
relatively  few  people  in  the  world,"  he 
wrote.  "All  human  societies  were  poor. 
Disease  and  early  death  dominated  most 
people's  lives.  People  were  ignorant  and 
largely  at  the  mercy  of  the  forces  of 
nature." 

"Now,"  he  said,  "we  are  somewhere 
near  the  middle  of  a  process  of  economic 
development  ...  at  the  end  of  that  proc- 
ess, almost  no  one  will  live  in  a  country 
as  poor  as  the  richest  country  of  the 
past.  There  will  be  many  more  people 
living  long  healthy  lives  with  immense 
knowledge  and  more  to  learn  than 
anybody  has  time  for.  It  will  be  able  to 
cope  with  the  forces  of  nature  and 
almost  indifferent  to  distance." 

We  do  live  today,  as  the  scholar  sug- 
gested, in  the  middle  of  one  of  the  most 
important  and  dramatic  periods  in 
human  history — one  in  which  all  of  us 
can  serve  as  catalysts  for  an  era  of 
world  peace  and  unimagined  human 
freedom  and  dignity. 

And  today,  I  would  like  to  report  to 
you,  as  distinguished  and  influential 


The  starting  point  and  cornerstone  of  our  foreign 
policy  is  our  alliance  and  partnership  with  our 
fellow  democracies. 


members  of  the  world  community,  on 
what  the  United  States  has  been  at- 
tempting to  do  to  help  move  the  world 
closer  to  this  era.  On  many  fronts  enor- 
mous progress  has  been  made,  and  I 
think  our  efforts  are  complemented  by 
the  trend  of  history. 

If  we  look  closely  enough,  I  believe 
we  can  see  all  the  world  moving  toward 
a  deeper  appreciation  of  the  value  of 
human  freedom  in  both  its  political  and 
economic  manifestations.  This  is  partial- 
ly motivated  by  a  worldwide  desire  for 
economic  growth  and  higher  standards 
of  living.  And  there's  an  increasing 
realization  that  economic  freedom  is  a 
prelude  to  economic  progress  and 
growth — and  is  intricately  and  in- 
separably linked  to  political  freedom. 

Everywhere,  people  and  govern- 
ments are  beginning  to  recognize  that 
the  secret  of  a  progressive  new  world  is 
to  take  advantage  of  the  creativity  of 
the  human  spirit;  to  encourage  innova- 
tion and  individual  enterprise;  to  reward 
hard  work;  and  to  reduce  barriers  to  the 
free  flow  of  trade  and  information. 

Our  opposition  to  economic  restric- 
tions and  trade  barriers  is  consistent 
with  our  view  of  economic  freedom  and 
human  progress.  We  believe  such  bar- 
riers pose  a  particularly  dangerous 
threat  to  the  developing  nations  and 
their  chance  to  share  in  world  prosperity 
through  expanded  export  markets. 
Tomorrow  at  the  International  Monetary 
Fund,  I  will  address  this  question  more 
fully,  including  America's  desire  for 
more  open  trading  markets  throughout 
the  world. 

This  desire  to  cut  down  trade  bar- 
riers and  our  open  advocacy  of  freedom 
as  the  engine  of  human  progress  are 
two  of  the  most  important  ways  the 
United  States  and  the  American  people 
hope  to  assist  in  bringing  about  a  world 
where  prosperity  is  commonplace,  con- 
flict an  aberration,  and  human  dignity 
and  freedom  a  way  of  life. 


Let  me  place  these  steps  more  in 
context  by  briefly  outlining  the  major 
goals  of  American  foreign  policy  and 
then  exploring  with  you  the  practical 
ways  we're  attempting  to  further 
freedom  and  prevent  war.  By  that  I 
mean,  first,  how  we  have  moved  to 
strengthen  ties  with  old  allies  and  new 
friends;  second,  what  we  are  doing  to 
help  avoid  the  regional  conflicts  that 
could  contain  the  seeds  of  world  con- 
flagration; and  third,  the  status  of  our 
efforts  with  the  Soviet  Union  to  reduce 
the  levels  of  arms. 


U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Objectives 

Let  me  begin  with  a  word  about  the  ob- 
jectives of  American  foreign  policy, 
which  have  been  consistent  since  the 
postwar  era  and  which  fueled  the  forma- 
tion of  the  United  Nations  and  were  in- 
corporated into  the  UN  Charter  itself. 


The  UN  Charter  states  two  over- 
riding goals:  "to  save  succeeding  gens 
tions  from  the  scourge  of  war,  whichi 
twice  in  our  lifetime  has  brought  untf 
sorrow  to  mankind,"  and  "to  reaffirin 
faith  in  fundamental  human  rights,  ir 
the  dignity  and  worth  of  the  human  ] 
son,  in  the  equal  rights  of  men  and 
women  and  of  nations  large  and  smai 

The  founders  of  the  United  Natio 
understood  full  well  the  relationship  I 
tween  these  two  goals,  and  I  want  yo 
to  know  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  will  continue  to  view  tl 
concern  for  human  rights  as  the  mon 
center  of  our  foreign  policy.  We  can 
never  look  at  anyone's  freedom  as  a 
bargaining  chip  in  world  politics.  Our 
hope  is  for  a  time  when  all  the  peopl( 
the  world  can  enjoy  the  blessings  of) 
sonal  liberty. 

But  I  would  like  also  to  emphasiz 
that  our  concern  for  protecting  huma 
rights  is  part  of  our  concern  for  prot 
ing  the  peace.  The  answer  is  for  all  r 
tions  to  fulfill  the  obligations  they  frf 
assumed  under  the  Universal  Declan 
tion  of  Human  Rights.  It  states:  "Th( 
will  of  the  people  shall  be  the  basis  o 
the  authority  of  government;  this  wil 


President  Reagan  and  Secretary  General  Perez  de  C'uellar. 


.  J 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


expressed  in  periodic  and  gen- 
sctions."  The  declaration  also  in- 
these  rights:  "to  form  and  to  join 
inions";  "to  own  property  alone  as 
in  association  with  others";  "to 
ny  country,  including  his  own, 
return  to  his  country";  and  to  en- 
jedom  of  opinion  and  expression." 
)S  the  most  graphic  example  of 
ationship  between  human  rights 
ace  is  the  right  of  peace  groups  to 
t  nd  to  promote  their  views.  In 
.  le  treatment  of  peace  groups  may 
mus  test  of  government's  true 
for  peace. 

fthening  Alliances 
irtnerships 

ition  to  emphasizing  this  tie  be- 
the  advocacy  of  human  rights  and 
jvention  of  war,  the  United  States 
ien  important  steps,  as  I  men- 
earlier,  to  prevent  world  conflict, 
arting  point  and  cornerstone  of 
■eign  policy  is  our  alliance  and 
irship  with  our  fellow  democracies, 
years,  the  North  Atlantic  alliance 
laranteed  the  peace  in  Europe.  In 
lurope  and  Asia,  our  alliances 
leen  the  vehicle  for  a  great  recon- 
tn  among  nations  that  had  fought 
■wars  in  decades  and  centuries 
i^nd  here  in  the  Western 
phere,  north  and  south  are  being 
jn  the  tide  of  freedom  and  are 
in  a  common  effort  to  foster 
'ul  economic  development, 
e're  proud  of  our  association  with 
se  countries  that  share  our  com- 
nt  to  freedom,  human  rights,  the 
f  law — and  international  peace.  In- 
tthe  bulwark  of  security  that  the 
ratic  alliance  provides  is  essen- 
and  remains  essential — to  the 
anance  of  world  peace.  Every 
;e  involves  burdens  and  obliga- 
but  these  are  far  less  than  the 
and  sacrifices  that  would  result  if 
ace-loving  nations  were  divided 
eglectful  of  their  common  security, 
eople  of  the  United  States  will  re- 
faithful  to  their  commitments, 
ut  the  United  States  is  also  faithful 
alliances  and  friendships  with 
of  nations  in  the  developed  and 


.  .  .  the  United  States  is  also  faithful  to  its 
alliances  and  friendships  with  scores  of  nations  in 
the  developed  and  developing  worlds.  .  .  . 


developing  worlds  with  differing  political 
systems,  cultures,  and  traditions.  The 
development  of  ties  between  the  United 
States  and  China — a  significant  global 
event  of  the  last  dozen  years — shows 
our  willingness  to  improve  relations  with 
countries  ideologically  very  different 
from  ours. 

We're  ready  to  be  the  friend  of  any 
country  that  is  a  friend  to  us  and  a 
friend  of  peace.  And  we  respect  genuine 
nonalignment.  Our  own  nation  was  born 
in  revolution;  we  helped  promote  the 
process  of  decolonization  that  brought 
about  the  independence  of  so  many 
members  of  this  body,  and  we're  proud 
of  that  history. 

We're  proud,  too,  of  our  role  in  the 
formation  of  the  United  Nations  and  our 
support  of  this  body  over  the  years.  And 
let  me  again  emphasize  our  unwavering 
commitment  to  a  central  principle  of  the 
UN  system,  the  principle  of  universality, 
both  here  and  in  the  UN  technical  agen- 
cies around  the  world.  If  universality  is 
ignored,  if  nations  are  expelled  illegally, 
then  the  United  Nations  itself  cannot  be 
expected  to  succeed. 

The  United  States  welcomes  diversi- 
ty and  peaceful  competition;  we  do  not 
fear  the  trends  of  history.  We  are  not 
ideologically  rigid;  we  do  have  principles 
and  we  will  stand  by  them,  but  we  will 
also  seek  the  friendship  and  good  will  of 
all,  both  old  friends  and  new. 

We've  always  sought  to  lend  a  hand 
to  help  others — from  our  relief  efforts  in 
Europe  after  World  War  I  to  the  Mar- 
shall Plan  and  massive  foreign 
assistance  programs  after  World  War  II. 
Since  1946,  the  United  States  has  pro- 
vided over  $115  billion  in  economic  aid 
to  developing  countries  and  today  pro- 
vides about  one-third  of  the  nearly  $90 
billion  in  financial  resources,  public  and 
private,  that  flow  to  the  developing 
world.  And  the  United  States  imports 
about  one-third  of  the  manufactured  ex- 
ports of  the  developing  world. 


Negotiations  To  Resolve 
Regional  Conflicts 

But  any  economic  progress,  as  well  as 
any  movement  in  the  direction  of 
greater  understanding  between  the  na- 
tions of  the  world,  are,  of  course,  en- 
dangered by  the  prospect  of  conflict  at 
both  the  global  and  regional  levels.  In  a 
few  minutes,  I  will  turn  to  the  menace 
of  conflict  on  a  worldwide  scale  and 
discuss  the  status  of  negotiations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  But  permit  me  first  to  address 
the  critical  problem  of  regional  con- 
flicts— for  history  displays  tragic 
evidence  that  it  is  these  conflicts  which 
can  set  off  the  sparks  leading  to 
worldwide  conflagration. 

In  a  glass  display  case  across  the 
hall  from  the  Oval  Office  at  the  White 
House,  there  is  a  gold  medal — the 
Nobel  Peace  Prize  won  by  Theodore 
Roosevelt  for  his  contribution  in 
mediating  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in 
1905.  It  was  the  first  such  prize  won  by 
an  American,  and  it  is  part  of  a  tradition 
of  which  the  American  people  are  very 
proud — a  tradition  that  is  being  con- 
tinued today  in  many  regions  of  the 
globe. 

We're  engaged,  for  example,  in 
diplomacy  to  resolve  conflicts  in 
southern  Africa,  working  with  the  front- 
line states  and  our  partners  in  the  con- 
tact group.  Mozambique  and  South 
Africa  have  reached  a  historic  accord  on 
nonaggression  and  cooperation;  South 
Africa  and  Angola  have  agreed  on  a 
disengagement  of  forces  from  Angola, 
and  the  groundwork  has  been  laid  for 
the  independence  of  Namibia,  with  vir- 
tually all  aspects  of  Security  Council 
Resolution  435  agreed  upon. 

Let  me  add  that  the  United  States 
considers  it  a  moral  imperative  that 
South  Africa's  racial  policies  evolve 
peacefully  but  decisively  toward  a 
system  compatible  with  basic  norms  of 
justice,  liberty,  and  human  dignity.  I'm 


We  recognize  that  there  is  no  sane  alternative 
to  negotiations  on  arms  control.  .  .  . 


pleased  that  American  companies  in 
South  Africa,  by  providing  equal 
employment  opportunities,  are  con- 
tributing to  the  economic  advancement 
of  the  black  population.  But  clearly, 
much  more  must  be  done. 

In  Central  America,  the  United 
States  has  lent  support  to  a  diplomatic 
process  to  restore  regional  peace  and 
security.  We  have  committed  substantial 
resources  to  promote  economic  develop- 
ment and  social  progress. 

The  growing  success  of  democracy 
in  El  Salvador  is  the  best  proof  that  the 
key  to  peace  lies  in  a  political  solution. 
Free  elections  brought  into  office  a 
government  dedicated  to  democracy, 
reform,  economic  progress,  and  regional 
peace.  Regrettably,  there  are  forces  in 
the  region  eager  to  thwart  democratic 
change,  but  these  forces  are  now  on  the 
defensive.  The  tide  is  turning  in  the 
direction  of  freedom.  We  call  upon 
Nicaragua,  in  particular,  to  abandon  its 
policies  of  subversion  and  militarism  and 
to  carry  out  the  promises  it  made  to  the 
Organization  of  American  States  to 
establish  democracy  at  home. 

The  Middle  East  has  known  more 
than  its  share  of  tragedy  and  conflict  for 
decades,  and  the  United  States  has  been 
actively  involved  in  peace  diplomacy  for 
just  as  long.  We  consider  ourselves  a  full 
partner  in  the  quest  for  peace.  The 
record  of  the  1 1  years  since  the  October 
war  shows  that  much  can  be  achieved 
through  negotiations.  It  also  shows  that 
the  road  is  long  and  hard. 

•  Two  years  ago,  I  proposed  a  fresh 
start  toward  a  negotiated  solution  to  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict.  My  initiative  of 
September  1,  1982,  contains  a  set  of 
positions  that  can  serve  as  a  basis  for  a 
just  and  lasting  peace.  That  initiative  re- 
mains a  realistic  and  workable  approach, 
and  I  am  commited  to  it  as  firmly  as  on 
the  day  I  announced  it.  And  the  founda- 
tion stone  of  this  effort  remains  Security 
Council  Resolution  242,  which  in  turn 
was  incorporated  in  all  its  parts  in  the 
Camp  David  accords. 


•  The  tragedy  of  Lebanon  has  not 
ended.  Only  last  week,  a  despicable  act 
of  barbarism  by  some  who  are  unfit  to 
associate  with  humankind  reminded  us 
once  again  that  Lebanon  continues  to 
suffer.  In  1983,  we  helped  Lebanon  and 
Israel  reach  an  agreement  that,  if  im- 
plemented, could  have  led  to  the  full 
withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  in  the  con- 
text of  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces.  This  agreement  was  blocked,  and 
the  long  agony  of  the  Lebanese  con- 
tinues. Thousands  of  people  are  still 
kept  from  their  homes  by  continued 
violence  and  are  refugees  in  their  own 
country.  The  once  flourishing  economy 
of  Lebanon  is  near  collapse.  All  of 
Lebanon's  friends  should  work  together 
to  help  end  this  nightmare. 

•  In  the  gulf,  the  United  States  has 
supported  a  series  of  Security  Council 
resolutions  that  call  for  an  end  to  the 
war  between  Iran  and  Iraq  that  has 
meant  so  much  death  and  destruction 
and  put  the  world's  economic  well-being 
at  risk.  Our  hope  is  that  hostilities  will 
soon  end,  leaving  each  side  with  its 
political  and  territorial  integrity  intact, 
so  that  both  may  devote  their  energies 
to  addressing  the  needs  of  their  people 
and  a  return  to  relationships  with  other 
states. 

•  The  lesson  of  experience  is  that 
negotiation  works.  The  peace  treaty  be- 
tween Israel  and  Egypt  brought  about 
the  peaceful  return  of  the  Sinai,  clearly 
showing  that  the  negotiating  process 
brings  results  when  the  parties  commit 
themselves  to  it.  The  time  is  bound  to 
come  when  the  same  wisdom  and 
courage  will  be  applied,  with  success,  to 
reach  peace  between  Israel  and  all  of  its 
Arab  neighbors  in  a  manner  that  assures 
security  for  all  in  the  region,  the 
recognition  of  Israel,  and  a  solution  to 
the  Palestinian  problem. 

In  every  part  of  the  world,  the 
United  States  is  similarly  engaged  in 
peace  diplomacy  as  an  active  player  or  a 
strong  supporter. 


•  In  Southeast  Asia,  we  have 
backed  the  efforts  of  ASEAN  [Assoi 
tion  of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  to 
mobilize  international  support  for  a 
peaceful  resolution  of  the  Cambodiai 
problem,  which  must  include  the 
withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  forces  am 
the  election  of  a  representative  gove 
ment.  ASEAN's  success  in  promotin 
economic  and  political  development  1 
made  a  major  contribution  to  the  pe; 
and  stability  of  the  region. 

•  In  Afghanistan,  the  dedicated 
forts  of  the  Secretary  General  and  h 
representatives  to  find  a  diplomatic 
tlement  have  our  strong  support.  I 
assure  you  that  the  United  States  w 
continue  to  do  everything  possible  U 
find  a  negotiated  outcome  which  pre 
vides  the  Afghan  people  with  the  rif 
to  determine  their  own  destiny;  alio' 
the  Afghan  refugees  to  return  to  tb 
own  country  in  dignity;  and  protects 
legitimate  security  interests  of  all 
neighboring  countries. 

•  On  the  divided  and  tense  Kon 
Peninsula,  we  have  strongly  backed 
confidence-building  measures  propoi 
by  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  by  the 
Command  at  Panmunjon.  These  are 


U.S.  Delegation 

to  the  39th 

UN  General  Assembly 


Representatives 

Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick 

Jose  S.  Sorzano 

Robert  D.  Ray 

Charles  McC.  Mathias,  Jr.,  U.S.  Senate) 

the  State  of  Maryland 
John  H.  Glenn,  Jr.,  U.S.  Senator  from 
the  State  of  Ohio 


Alternate  Representatives 

Richard  Schifter 
Alan  Lee  Keyes 
Harvey  J.  Feldman 
Preston  H.  Long 
Guadalupe  Quintanilla 


USUN  press  release  75  of  Sept.  27,  198 


J 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


mt  first  step  toward  peaceful 

ation  in  the  long  term. 

Ve  take  heart  from  progress  by 

in  lessening  tensions,  notably  the 

by  the  Federal  Republic  to 

barriers  between  the  two  Ger- 

ites. 

^d  the  United  States  strongly 

bs  the  Secretary  General's  efforts 

;t  the  Cypriot  parties  in  achieving 

iful  and  reunited  Cyprus. 

I  United  States  has  been,  and 
will  be,  a  friend  of  peaceful 
is. 


.S.S.R.  Relations 

no  less  true  with  respect  to  my 
^'s  relations  with  the  Soviet 
When  I  appeared  before  you  last 
noted  that  we  cannot  count  on 
tinct  for  survival  alone  to  protect 
.nst  war.  Deterrence  is  necessary 
;  sufficient.  America  has  repaired 
ngth;  we  have  invigorated  our 
3S  and  friendships.  We're  ready 
structive  negotiations  with  the 
Union. 

i  recognize  that  there  is  no  sane 
.tive  to  negotiations  on  arms  con- 
d  other  issues  between  our  two 
;,  which  have  the  capacity  to 
!  civilization  as  we  know  it.  I 
this  is  a  view  shared  by  \nrtually 
country  in  the  world,  and  by  the 

!  Union  itself. 
d  I  want  to  speak  to  you  today  on 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
(  can  accomplish  together  in  the 
;  \  I'ars  and  the  concrete  steps  we 
I  )  lake. 

\  u  know,  as  I  stand  here  and  look 

pim  this  podium— there  in  front  of 

-  can  see  the  seat  of  the  represen- 

froni  the  Soviet  Union.  And  not 

'  m  that  seat,  just  over  to  the  side, 

seat  of  the  representative  from 

lited  States. 

this  historic  assembly  hall,  it's 
here  is  not  a  great  distance  be- 
us.  Outside  this  room,  while  there 
ill  be  clear  differences,  there  is 
reason  why  we  should  do  all  that 
;ible  to  shorten  that  distance.  And 
why  we're  here.  Isn't  that  what 
•ganization  is  all  about? 


.  .  .  any  agreement  must  logically  depend  upon  our 
ability  to  get  the  competition  on  offensive  arms 
under  control  and  to  achieve  genuine  stability  at 
substantially  lower  levels  of  nuclear  arms. 


Last  January  16,  I  set  out  three  ob- 
jectives for  U.S. -Soviet  relations  that 
can  provide  an  agenda  for  our  work 
over  the  months  ahead.  First,  I  said,  we 
need  to  find  ways  to  reduce— and  even- 
tually to  eliminate— the  threat  and  use 
of  force  in  solving  international  disputes. 
Our  concern  over  the  potential  for 
nuclear  war  cannot  deflect  us  from  the 
terrible  human  tragedies  occurring  every 
day  in  the  regional  conflicts  I  just 
discussed.  Together,  we  have  a  par- 
ticular responsibility  to  contribute  to 
political  solutions  to  these  problems, 
rather  than  to  exacerbate  them  through 
the  provision  of  even  more  weapons. 

I  propose  that  our  two  countries 
agree  to  embark  on  periodic  consulta- 
tions at  policy  level  about  regional  prob- 
lems. We  will  be  prepared,  if  the  Soviets 
agree,  to  make  senior  experts  available 
at  regular  intervals  for  in-depth  ex- 
changes of  views.  I  have  asked 
Secretary  Shultz  to  explore  this  with 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko.  Spheres  of 
influence  are  a  thing  of  the  past.  Dif- 
ferences between  American  and  Soxdet 
interests  are  not.  The  objectives  of  this 
political  dialogue  will  be  to  help  avoid 
miscalculation,  reduce  the  potential  risk 
of  U.S. -Soviet  confrontation,  and  help 
the  people  in  areas  of  conflict  to  find 
peaceful  solutions. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  have  achieved  agreements  of 
historic  importance  on  some  regional 
issues.  The  Austrian  State  Treaty  and 
the  Berlin  accords  are  notable  and 
lasting  examples.  Let  us  resolve  to 
achieve  similar  agreements  in  the 
future. 

Our  second  task  must  be  to  find 
ways  to  reduce  the  vast  stockpiles  of  ar- 
maments in  the  world.  I  am  committed 
to  redoubling  our  negotiating  efforts  to 
achieve  real  results:  in  Geneva,  a  com- 
plete ban  on  chemical  weapons;  in  Vien- 
na, real  reductions— to  lower  and  equal 


levels — in  Soviet  and  American,  Warsaw 
Pact  and  NATO,  conventional  forces;  in 
Stockholm,  concrete  practical  measures 
to  enhance  mutual  confidence,  to  reduce 
the  risk  of  war,  and  to  reaffirm  com- 
mitments concerning  non-use  of  force;  in 
the  field  of  nuclear  testing,  im- 
provements in  verification  essential  to 
ensure  compliance  with  the  Threshold 
Test  Ban  and  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explo- 
sions agreements;  and  in  the  field  of 
nonproliferation,  close  cooperation  to 
strengthen  the  international  institutions 
and  practices  aimed  at  halting  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons,  together 
with  redoubled  efforts  to  meet  the 
legitimate  expectations  of  all  nations 
that  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States  will  substantially  reduce  their 
own  nuclear  arsenals.  We  and  the 
Soviets  have  agreed  to  upgrade  our  "hot 
line"  communications  facility,  and  our 
discussions  of  nuclear  nonproliferation  in 
recent  years  have  been  useful  to  both 
sides.  We  think  there  are  other 
possibilities  for  improving  communica- 
tions in  this  area  that  deserve  serious 
exploration. 

I  believe  the  proposal  of  the  Soviet 
Union  for  opening  U.S. -Soviet  talks  in 
Vienna  provided  an  important  oppor- 
tunity to  advance  these  objectives. 
We've  been  prepared  to  discuss  a  wide 
range  of  issues  and  concerns  of  both 
sides,  such  as  the  relationship  between 
defensive  and  offensive  forces  and  what 
has  been  called  the  militarization  of 
space.  During  the  talks,  we  would  con- 
sider what  measures  of  restraint  both 
sides  might  take  while  negotiations  pro- 
ceed. However,  any  agreement  must 
logically  depend  upon  our  ability  to  get 
the  competition  in  offensive  arms  under 
control  and  to  achieve  genuine  stability 
at  substantially  lower  levels  of  nuclear 
arms. 

Our  approach  in  all  these  areas  will 
be  designed  to  take  into  account  con- 
cerns the  Soviet  LInion  has  voiced.  It 


.  .  .  /  will  suggest  to  the  Soviet  Union  that  we  in- 
stitutionalize regular  ministerial  or  cabinet-level 
meetings  between  our  two  countries  on  the  whole 
agenda  of  issues  before  us.  ...  I  believe  such  talks 
could  work  rapidly  toward  developing  a  new 
climate  of  policy  understanding.  .  .  . 


will  attempt  to  provide  a  basis  for  a 
historic  breakthrough  in  arms  control. 
I'm  disappointed  that  we  were  not  able 
to  open  our  meeting  in  Vienna  earlier 
this  month,  on  the  date  originally  pro- 
posed by  the  Soviet  Union.  I  hope  we 
can  begin  these  talks  by  the  end  of  the 
year  or  shortly  thereafter. 

The  third  task  I  set  in  January  was 
to  establish  a  better  working  relation- 
ship between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States,  one  marked  by  greater 
cooperation  and  understanding. 

We've  made  some  modest  progress. 
We  have  reached  agreements  to  improve 
our  "hot  line,"  extend  our  10-year 
economic  agreement,  enhance  consular 
cooperation,  and  explore  coordination  of 
search  and  rescue  efforts  at  sea. 

We've  also  offered  to  increase 
significantly  the  amount  of  U.S.  grain 
for  purchase  by  the  Soviets  and  to  pro- 
vide the  Soviets  a  direct  fishing  alloca- 
tion off  U.S.  coasts.  But  there  is  much 
more  we  could  do  together.  I  feel  par- 
ticularly strongly  about  breaking  down 
the  barriers  between  the  peoples  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  and 
among  our  political,  military,  and  other 
leaders.  All  of  these  steps  that  I  have 
mentioned,  and  especially  the  arms  con- 
trol negotiations,  are  extremely  impor- 
tant to  a  step-by-step  process  toward 
peace.  But  let  me  also  say  that  we  need 
to  extend  the  arms  control  process,  to 
build  a  bigger  umbrella  under  which  it 
can  operate — a  roadmap,  if  you  will, 
showing  where,  during  the  next  20  years 
or  so,  these  individual  efforts  can  lead. 
This  can  greatly  assist  step-by-st«p 
negotiations  and  enable  us  to  avoid 
having  all  our  hopes  or  expectations  ride 
on  any  single  set  or  series  of  negotia- 
tions. If  progress  is  temporarily  halted 


at  one  set  of  talks,  this  newly  estab- 
lished framework  for  arms  control  could 
help  us  take  up  the  slack  at  other 
negotiations. 

A  New  Beginning 

Today,  to  the  great  end  of  lifting  the 
dread  of  nuclear  war  from  the  peoples 
of  the  earth,  I  invite  the  leaders  of  the 
world  to  join  in  a  new  beginning.  We 
need  a  fresh  approach  to  reducing  inter- 
national tensions.  History  demonstrates 
beyond  controversy  that,  just  as  the 
arms  competition  has  its  roots  in 
political  suspicions  and  anxieties,  so  it 
can  be  channeled  in  more  stabilizing 
directions  and  eventually  be  eliminated, 
if  those  political  suspicions  and  anxieties 
are  addressed  as  well. 

Toward  this  end,  I  will  suggest  to 
the  Soviet  Union  that  we  institutionalize 
regular  ministerial  or  cabinet-level 
meetings  between  our  two  countries  on 
the  whole  agenda  of  issues  before  us,  in- 
cluding the  problem  of  needless  ob- 
stacles to  understanding.  To  take  but 
one  idea  for  discussion:  in  such  talks  we 
could  consider  the  exchange  of  outlines 
of  5-year  military  plans  for  weapons 
development  and  our  schedules  of  in- 
tended procurement.  We  would  also 
welcome  the  exchange  of  observers  at 
military  exercises  and  locations.  And  I 
propose  that  we  find  a  way  for  Soviet 
experts  to  come  to  the  U.S.  nuclear  test 
site,  and  for  ours  to  go  to  theirs,  to 
measure  directly  the  yields  of  tests  of 
nuclear  weapons.  We  should  work 
toward  having  such  arrangements  in 
place  by  next  spring. 

I  hope  that  the  Soviet  Union  will 
cooperate  in  this  undertaking  and 
reciprocate  in  a  manner  that  will  enable 


the  two  countries  to  establish  the  b:  ' 
for  verification  for  effective  limits  i, ' 
underground  nuclear  testing. 

I  believe  such  talks  could  work 
rapidly  toward  developing  a  new  cli 
of  policy  understanding,  one  that  is 
essential  if  crises  are  to  be  avoided 
real  arms  control  is  to  be  negotiate 
course,  summit  meetings  have  a  usi 
role  to  play,  but  they  need  to  be  cai 
fully  prepared,  and  the  benefit  here 
that  meetings  at  the  ministerial  lev 
would  provide  the  kind  of  progress 
is  the  best  preparation  for  higher  k 
talks  between  ourselves  and  the  So 
leaders. 

How  much  progress  we  will  ma 
and  at  what  pace,  I  cannot  say.  Bu 
have  a  moral  obligation  to  try  and  i 
again. 

Some  may  dismiss  such  proposa 
my  own  optimism  as  simplistic  Am^ 
idealism.  And  they  will  point  to  the 
burdens  of  the  modern  world  and  t 
history.  Well,  yes,  if  we  sit  down  ai 
catalogue,  year  by  year,  generation 
generation,  the  famines,  the  plague 
wars,  the  invasions  mankind  has  er 
dured,  the  list  will  grow  so  long,  ai 
assault  on  humanity  so  terrific,  tha 
seems  too  much  for  the  human  spit 
bear. 

But  isn't  this  narrow  and  short 
sighted  and  not  at  all  how  we  thin! 
history?  Yes,  the  deeds  of  infamy  c 
justice  are  all  recorded,  but  what  s 
out  from  the  pages  of  history  is  thi 
ing  of  the  dreamers  and  the  deeds 
builders  and  the  doers. 

These  things  make  up  the  stori 
tell  and  pass  on  to  our  children.  TY 
comprise  the  most  enduring  and  st 
fact  about  human  history:  that  thr( 
the  heartbreak  and  tragedy  man  h; 
always  dared  to  perceive  the  outlin 
human  progress,  the  steady  growtl 
not  just  the  material  well-being  but 
spiritual  insight  of  mankind. 

"There  have  been  tyrants  and 
murderers,  and  for  a  time  they  car 
invincible.  But  in  the  end,  they  alw 
fall.  Think  on  it .  .  .  always.  All  thi 
history,  the  way  of  truth  and  love 
always  won."  That  was  the  belief  a 


Deoartment  of  State  Bi 


I  n  of  Mahatma  Gandhi.  He 
that,  and  it  remains  today  a 
at  is  good  and  true, 
is  gift,"  is  said  to  have  been  the 
expression  of  another  great 
st,  a  Spanish  soldier  who  gave 
ays  of  war  for  that  of  love  and 
nd  if  we're  to  make  realities  of 
Igreat  goals  of  the  UN 

the  dreams  of  peace  and 
ignity— we  must  take  to  heart 
rds  of  Ignatius  Loyola;  we  must 
[ng  enough  to  contemplate  the 
eived  from  him  who  made  us: 
of  life,  the  gift  of  this  world,  the 
ach  other. 

the  gift  of  the  present.  It  is  this 
this  time,  that  now  we  must 
eave  you  with  a  reflection  from 
a  Gandhi,  spoken  with  those  in 
10  said  that  the  disputes  and 
of  the  modern  world  are  too 
overcome.  It  was  spoken  short- 
Gandhi's  quest  for  [Indian]  in- 
nce  took  him  to  Britain. 
•n  not  conscious  of  a  single  ex- 
throughout  my  three  months' 
England  and  Europe,"  he  said, 
ide  me  feel  that  after  all  east  is 

west  is  west.  On  the  contrary,  I 
an  convinced  more  than  ever 
nan  nature  is  much  the  same  no 
ander  what  clime  it  flourishes, 
I;  if  you  approached  people  with 
Id  affection,  you  would  have  ten- 
i3t  and  thousand-fold  affection 
ji  to  you." 

I  the  sake  of  a  peaceful  world,  a 
here  human  dignity  and  freedom 
)ected  and  enshrined,  let  us  ap- 
3ach  other  with  tenfold  trust  and 
dfold  affection.  A  new  future 
as.  The  time  is  here,  the  moment 

of  the  Founding  Fathers  of  our 
Thomas  Paine,  spoke  words  that 
)  all  of  us  gathered  here  today, 
jply  directly  to  all  sitting  here  in 
m.  He  said:  "We  have  it  in  our 
.0  begin  the  world  over  again. 


t  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
itial  Documents  of  Oct.  1,  1984. 


-—«•"'!*£, 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


The  United  Nations 


Background 

The  immediate  antecedent  of  the  United 
Nations  was  the  League  of  Nations, 
created  under  U.S.  leadership  (although 
the  United  States  never  became  a 
member)  following  World  War  I.  The 
League  existed  from  1919  until  its 
reduced  organization  and  functions  were 
replaced  by  the  United  Nations  in  1945. 

The  roots  of  the  United  Nations 
organization  go  back  more  than  100 
years.  Since  the  early  19th  century,  na- 
tional governments  have  discussed  and 
acted  on  common  issues  and  problems 
through  intergovernmental  parliamen- 
tary bodies.  This  process  led  to  con- 
ferences such  as  The  Hague  conferences 
of  1899  and  1907,  which  pointed  the  way 
to  developing  legal  and  arbitrative  alter- 
natives to  war. 

The  idea  for  the  United  Nations 
found  expression  in  declarations  signed 
at  conferences  in  Moscow  and  Tehran  in 
October  and  December  1943.  In  the 
summer  of  1944,  informal  conversations 
were  held  by  representatives  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
the  United  States  at  Dumbarton  Oaks,  a 
mansion  in  Washington,  D.C.  Later, 
discussions  among  the  United  Kingdom, 
the  United  States,  and  China  resulted  in 
proposals  concerning  the  purposes  and 
principles  of  an  international  organiza- 
tion, its  membership  and  principal 
organs,  arrangements  to  maintain  inter- 
national peace  and  security,  and  ar- 
rangements for  international  economic 
and  social  cooperation.  These  proposals 
were  discussed  and  debated  by  govern- 
ments and  private  citizens  all  over  the 
world. 

On  March  5,  1945,  invitations  to  a 
conference  to  be  held  in  San  Francisco 
in  April  were  issued  by  the  United 
States  on  behalf  of  itself,  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  Soviet  Union,  and  China 
to  42  other  governments  that  had  signed 
the  January  1,  1942  "Declaration  by 
United  Nations"  and  that  had  declared 
war  on  Germany  or  Japan  no  later  than 
March  1,  1945.  The  conference  added 


Argentina,  Denmark,  and  the  two  Rus- 
sian republics  of  Byelorussia  and  the 
Ukraine,  bringing  the  total  to  50. 

The  50  nations  represented  at  San 
Francisco  signed  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations  on  June  26,  1945. ^ 
Poland,  which  was  not  represented  at 
the  conference  but  for  which  a  place 
among  the  original  signatories  had  been 
reserved,  added  its  name  later,  bringing 
the  original  signatories  to  a  total  of  51. 
The  United  Nations  came  into  existence 
4  months  later,  on  October  24,  1945, 
when  the  Charter  had  been  ratified  by 
the  five  permanent  members  of  the 
Security  Council— China,  France,  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
the  United  States — and  by  a  majority  of 
the  other  signatories. 

Membership.  UN  membership  is  open  to 
all  "peace-loving  states"  that  accept  the 
obligations  of  the  UN  Charter  and,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  organization,  are 
able  and  willing  to  fulfill  these  obliga- 
tions. As  of  October  1984,  there  were 
159  members.  Admission  to  membership 
is  determined  by  the  General  Assembly 
upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Securi- 
ty Council. 

New  York  Headquarters.  The  head- 
quarters site  in  New  York  is  owned  by 
the  United  Nations  and  is  international 
territory.  Under  special  agreement  with 
the  United  States,  certain  privileges  and 
immunities  have  been  granted,  but 
generally  the  laws  of  New  York  City, 
New  York  State,  and  the  United  States 
apply. 

The  presence  of  the  United  Nations 
in  New  York  indirectly  contributes  an 
estimated  $692.2  million  per  year  to  the 
economy  of  New  York,  as  estimated  in 
1980  by  the  New  York  City  Commission 
for  the  United  Nations.  It  greatly  offsets 
the  estimated  $15  million  annual  cost  to 
the  city.  More  than  4,000  Americans  are 
employed  in  New  York  in  UN-related 
jobs.  The  commission  concluded  that  the 
United  Nations  is  a  "year-round  conven- 
tion, aiding  hotels,  restaurants,  taxi 


her 1Qft4 


drivers  and  a  myriad  of  other  local 
enterprises." 

About  5,000  meetings  are  held  in  the 
headquarters  each  year.  UN  radio  pro- 
grams are  broadcast  in  some  24 
languages  and  reach  all  continents.  Sales 
of  UN  postage  stamps — usable  only  for 
letters  and  articles  mailed  at  the  head- 
quarters—total about  $7.8  million  an- 
nually. About  300  correspondents  and 
110  photographers  are  permanently  ac- 
credited to  the  United  Nations,  and  an 
additional  750  hold  temporary  accredita- 
tion at  any  given  time.  The  United  Na- 


tions answers  about  47,000  public  re- 
quests for  information  each  year. 
Estimates  show  that  some  2.7  million 
visitors  have  taken  guided  tours  of  the 
headquarters  since  it  opened. 

The  Security  Council 

Under  the  UN  Charter,  the  Security 
Council  has  "primary  responsibility  for 
the  maintenance  of  international  peace 
and  security,"  and  all  UN  members 
"agree  to  accept  and  carry  out  the  deci- 


sions of  the  Security  Council  in  ac 
ance  with  the  present  Charter." 

Other  organs  of  the  United  N. 
make  recommendations  to  membe 
governments.  The  Security  Counc 
however,  has  the  power  to  make  i 
sions,  which  member  government 
obligated  to  carry  out  under  the 
Charter.  A  representative  of  each 
Security  Council  member  must  ab 
be  present  at  UN  headquarters  sc 
the  Council  can  meet  at  any  time. 

Decisions  in  the  Security  Coui 
all  substantive  matters — for  exan 


United  Nations— A  Profile 


Established:  By  charter  signed  in  San  Fran- 
cisco, Calif.,  on  June  26,  1945:  effective  Oc- 
tober 24,  1945. 

Purposes:  To  maintain  international 
peace  and  security;  to  develop  friendly  rela- 
tions among  nations;  to  achieve  international 
cooperation  in  solving  economic,  social, 
cultural,  and  humanitarian  problems  and  in 
promoting  respect  for  human  rights  and  fun- 
damental freedoms;  to  be  a  center  for  har- 
monizing the  actions  of  nations  in  attaining 
these  common  ends. 

Members:  159. 

Official  languages:  Arabic,  Chinese, 
English,  French,  Russian,  Spanish. 

Principal  organs:  General  Assembly, 
Security  Council,  Economic  and  Social  Coun- 
cil, Trusteeship  Council,  International  Court 
of  Justice,  Secretariat. 

Budget:  UN  assessment  budget  (calendar 
year  i9«5>— $685.3  million.  US 
sfcare— $171.3  million.  The  total  UN  system 
budget  (including  the  UN  and  specialized 
agencies  and  prog^rams,  but  not  the  World 


Bank)  was  about  $4.5  billion  in  calendar  year 
1981.  The  US  share  was  $1  billion. 

Secretariat 

Chief  administrative  officer:  Secretary 
General  of  the  United  Nations,  appointed  to  a 
5-year  term  by  the  General  Assembly  on  the 
recommendation  of  the  Security  Council. 
Secretary  General  1982-present:  Javier  Perez 
de  Cuellar  (Peru). 

Staff:  A  worldwide  staff  of  22,000  from 
some  150  countries,  including  more  than 
2,900  US  citizens.  The  staff  is  appointed  by 
the  Secretary  General  according  to  UN 
regulations. 

General  Assembly 

Membership:  All  UN  members.  President: 
Elected  at  the  beginning  of  each  General 
Assembly  session. 

Main  committees:  First — Political  and 
Security;  Special  Political  Committee. 
Second — Economic  and  Financial.  Third — 
Social,  Humanitarian,  and  Cultural.  Fourth 
— Trusteeship.  Fifth — Administrative  and 
Budgetary.  Sixth — Legal.  Many  other  com- 
mittees address  specific  issues,  including 
peacekeeping,  crime  prevention,  status  of 
women,  and  UN  Charter  reform. 


Security  Council 

Membership:  5  permanent  members  (China, 
France,  USSR,  UK,  US),  each  with  the  right 
to  veto,  and  10  nonpermanent  members 


elected  by  the  General  Assembly  for  I 
terms.  Five  nonpermanent  members  ; 
elected  from  Africa  and  Asia;  one  fro 
Eastern  Europe;  two  from  Latin  Amc 
and  two  from  Western  Europe  and  ol 
areas.  Nonpermanent  members  are  n 
ble  for  immediate  reelection.  The  198 
nonpermanent  members  are  Egypt,  I 
Malta,  Netherlands,  Nicaragua,  Pakis 
Peru,  Ukrainian  SSR,  Upper  Volta  (r 
Burkina  Faso),  and  Zimbabwe.  Presic 
Rotates  monthly  in  English  alphabet! 
of  members. 

Economic  and  Social  Council 

Membership:  54;  18  elected  each  yea 
General  Assembly  for  3-year  terms.  I 
dent:  Elected  each  year. 

Trusteeship  Council 

Membership:  US,  China,  France,  US 
President:  Elected  each  year. 

International  Court  of  Justice 

Membership:  15,  elected  for  9year  t 
the  General  Assembly  and  the  Securi 
cil  from  nominees  of  national  groups 
provisions  of  the  International  Court 
Justice  Statute. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of 
1984,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Pul 
fairs,  Department  of  State.  Editor:  J 
Adams.  ■ 


1 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


ailing  for  direct  measures 
the  settlement  of  a  dis- 

uire  the  affirmative  votes  of 

bers,  including  the  support  of 
jrmanent  members.  A  negative 
to — by  a  permanent  member 
adoption  of  a  proposal  that  has 
the  required  number  of  affirm- 

s.  It  was  agreed  early  in  UN 
lat  abstention  is  not  regarded 

A  permanent  member  usually 
when  it  does  not  wish  to  vote  in 
1  decision  or  to  block  it  with  a 

ugh  July  1984,  a  total  of  194 
.d  been  cast:  116  by  the  Soviet 

by  China,  15  by  France,  22  by 
;d  Kingdom,  and  38  by  the 
tates.  Of  the  3  vetoes  by  China, 
ist  by  the  People's  Republic  of 
,er  being  seated  in  1971.  Of  the 

t  vetoes,  87  (80%)  were  cast 
•58.  All  38  of  the  U.S.  vetoes 
n  cast  since  1969 — 32  since 

,  and  15  since  January  1981. 

on  questions  of  procedure, 
ption  of  the  agenda,  require  the 
ve  votes  of  any  nine  members 
iiot  subject  to  a  veto, 
ite  that  is  a  member  of  the 
ations  but  not  of  the  Security 
nay  participate  in  Security 
liscussions  in  which  the  Council 
lat  the  country's  interests  are 
rly  affected.  In  recent  years, 
icil  has  interpreted  this  criterion 
jnabling  many  countries  to  take 
s  discussions.  Nonmembers  are 

invited  to  take  part,  under  con- 
lid  down  by  the  Council,  when 
parties  to  disputes  being  con- 
)y  the  Council. 

Dugh  the  UN  Charter  gives  the 
Council  primary  responsibility 
national  peace  and  security,  it 
nds  that  parties  attempt  to 
eement  before  taking  recourse 
rocedures.  The  Charter  enjoins 
rst  to  make  every  effort  to  set- 
disputes  peacefully,  either 
ly  or  through  regional  organiza- 

er  Chapter  VI  of  the  Charter, 
Settlement  of  Disputes,"  the 
Council  "may  investigate  any 
or  any  situation  which  might 


lead  to  international  friction  or  give  rise 
to  a  dispute."  The  Council  may  "recom- 
mend appropriate  procedures  or 
methods  of  adjustment"  if  it  determines 
that  the  situation  might  endanger  inter- 
national peace  and  security. 

Under  Chapter  VII,  the  Council  has 
broader  power  to  decide  upon  measures 
to  be  taken  in  situations  involving 
"threats  to  the  peace,  breaches  of  the 
peace,  or  acts  of  aggression."  In  such 
situations,  the  Council  is  not  limited  to 
recommendations  but  may  take  action, 
including  the  use  of  armed  force,  "to 
maintain  or  restore  international  peace 
and  security."  The  1977  application  of  an 
embargo  on  the  sale  of  military  equip- 
ment to  South  Africa  was  the  first  use 
of  this  power  against  a  member  nation. 

Under  Article  43,  the  signatories 
undertook  to  make  armed  forces 
available  to  the  Council  "on  its  call  and 
in  accordance  with  a  special  agreement 
or  agreements"  between  the  Council  and 
UN  member  states.  Because  of  disagree- 
ments among  the  permanent  members 
of  the  Council,  however,  efforts  to  im- 
plement such  arrangements  were 
dropped  early  in  UN  history.  Never- 


:^^VSitJ- 


theless,  military  forces  have  been  made 
available  to  the  United  Nations  by  its 
members  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  when 
specifically  authorized  by  the  Security 
Council,  e.g.,  in  Cyprus,  the  Sinai,  and 
Lebanon. 

The  General  Assembly 

The  General  Assembly  is  made  up  of  all 
159  UN  members.  Each  member  may 
designate  five  representatives.  Member 
countries  are  seated  in  English 
alphabetical  order.  Each  year,  seating 
begins  at  a  different  point  in  the 
alphabet,  determined  through  a  drawing. 

The  Assembly  meets  in  regular  ses- 
sion once  a  year  under  a  president 
elected  from  among  the  representatives. 
The  regular  session  usually  begins  on 
the  third  Tuesday  in  September  and 
ends  in  mid-December.  Special  sessions 
can  be  convened  at  the  request  of  the 
Security  Council,  of  a  majority  of  UN 
members,  or,  if  the  majority  concurs,  of 
a  single  member. 

There  have  been  12  special  sessions 
of  the  General  Assembly.  In  1978,  the 
Assembly  held  its  eighth  special  session 


t.'iaifirifiiiiii 


UN  Security  Council 


■XQr  1QB/1 


(on  financing  of  a  new  peacekeeping 
force  in  Lebanon)  and  its  ninth  (on 
Namibia).  The  10th  special  session,  in 
May  and  June  1978,  constituted  the 
largest  intergovernmental  conference  on 
disarmament  in  history.  A  followup  ses- 
sion on  disarmament,  the  12th  special 
session,  took  place  in  June  and  July 
1982.  A  special  session,  the  11th,  on 
North-South  economic  issues,  occurred  2 
years  earlier  in  August  and  September 
1980. 

Voting  in  the  General  Assembly  on 
important  questions — recommendations 
on  peace  and  security;  election  of 
members  to  organs;  admission,  suspen- 
sion, and  expulsion  of  members;  trustee- 
ship questions;  budgetary  matters — is  by 


a  two-thirds  majority  of  those  present 
and  voting  "yes"  or  "no."  Abstentions 
are  not  counted.  Other  questions  are 
decided  by  a  simple  majority  vote.  Each 
member  country  has  one  vote. 

Apart  from  approval  of  budgetary 
matters,  including  adoption  of  a  scale  of 
assessment.  Assembly  resolutions  are 
only  recommendatory  and  are  not  bind- 
ing on  the  members.  The  General 
Assembly  may  make  recommendations 
on  any  questions  or  matters  within  the 
scope  of  the  United  Nations  except  mat- 
ters of  peace  and  security  under  Securi- 
ty Council  consideration. 

As  the  only  organ  of  the  United  Na- 
tions in  which  all  members  are  repre- 


sented, the  Assembly  has  been  tl 
forum  in  which  members  have  la 
major  initiatives  on  international 
tions  of  peace,  economic  progres 
human  rights.  It  may  initiate  stu 
make  recommendations  to  prom( 
ternational  political  cooperation; 
and  codify  international  law;  real 
human  rights  and  fundamental  fi 
doms;  and  further  international  ( 
nomic,  social,  cultural,  education: 
health  programs. 

The  Assembly  may  take  acti( 
Security  Council  is  unable — usua 
to  disagreement  among  the  five  ; 
nent  members — to  exercise  its  p 
responsibility  for  the  maintenanc 
ternational  peace  in  a  case  invoh 


Ci^JTHE  UNITED  NATIONS  SYSTEM 


principal  organs  0(  me  UmieO  Nali< 
^B  Other  United  Nairons  organs 


S'andinq  aiO 
proceOural  commiitees 


Omer  suDSidiary  organs 
ol  Ihe  General  AssemOly 


United  Nations  Reltef  and  WorKs  Agency  'or 
Palestine  Refugees  m  me  Near  Easi  UNRWA 

Unilea  Nations  Con'e'ence 
on  Trade  and  Deveiopmpni  UNCTAO 

United  Nations  Children  s  Fund  UNICEF 

Ollice  ol  Ihe  Uniled  ^:2•'ons  High  Commissione' 
lor  neiuge«'s  UNHCR 

World  Food  Programme  WFP 

United  Nalions  Insliluie 
lor  Training  and  Research  UNITAR 

United  Nations  Development  Programme  UNDP 

United  Nations  industrial 
Development  0'ganijaiior>  UNIOO 

United  Nations  Enwironmenl  P<oqramme  UNEP 

united  Nations  University  UNU 

United  Nations  Special  Fund 

World  Food  Council 

United  Nations  C#nire  for 

Human  Seiilsmenii  iHabnat)  UNCMS 

United  Nation!  Fund  (o«  Population  Activmei  UNFPA 


TRUSTEESHIP 
COUNCIL 


SECURITY 
COUNCIL 


UNDOF  United  Naiions  Disengagement 
Otse'ver  Force 


UNFICVP  Untied  Nanons  Peacekeeping  Force 
■  n  Cyprus 


I    UNIFIL  United  Natio 


UNMOGIP  United  Nations  Miliiafy 

OBserver  Group  m  India  an3  Pakistan 


UNTSO  United  Nations  Truce  Superv 
Organtialion  in  Palestine 


ihlary  Stall  Comm 


GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 


INTERNATIONAL 
COURT  OF 
JUSTICE 


ECONOMIC 

AND 

SOCIAL 

COUNCIL 


Regional  comr 
Functional  cor 


Sessionat  • 
ad  hoc  com 


-iiSSiOns 
imissions 
d.nq  and 


SECRETARIAT 


— o 

-O 

-O 
-O 

rO 

-O 
K) 

-O 

-O 
-O 
-O 
-O 
-O 

L-o 


IAEA  international  Atomic  Energy  Agency 

GATT  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 

ILO  Internal  onal  Lal>our  Organisation 

FAO  Food  and  Agriculture  Orga.-iiiation 
ol  Ihe  Uniied  Nations 

UNESCO  Uniied  Nations  Educational 

Scieniiiic  and  Cultural  Organiiaiion 

WHO  World  Health  Organisation 

IDA  iniemationai  Development  Assoc >ai'on 

IBRD  international  Bank  lo'  Reconstruct>on 
and  Developmenl 

IPC  tnlernanonal  Finance  Corporation 

IMF  Internationa'  Monetary  Fund 

ICAO  InlernaliOiial  Civil  AvialiOn 
Organiiation 

UPU  Universal  Postal  Union 

ITU  inietnational  Telecommunication  Union 

WMO  World  Meteorological  Organualion 

IMO  iniernationil  Maritime  Organiiaiion 

1*IP0  World  intellectual  Properly  O'ganiiaiion 

IFAD  International  Fund  for  Agricultural  Oevelopment 


J 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


'.ti 


°'   threat  to  the  peace,  breach  of 
'    act  of  aggression.  The 
for  Peace"  resolution,  adopted 
■'^^  smpowers  the  Assembly,  if  not 
session,  to  convene  an 
cy  special  session  on  24-hour 
d  to  recommend  collective 

including  the  use  of  armed 
;he  case  of  a  breach  of  the 
act  of  aggression.  Two-thirds  of 
bers  must  approve  any  such 
ndation.  Emergency  special  ses- 
ler  this  procedure  have  been 
''  line  occasions.  The  eighth 

cy  special  session,  in  September 
■Prisidered  the  situation  in 

The  situation  in  the  occupied 
ritories,  following  Israel's 
I  extension  of  its  laws,  jurisdic- 
administration  to  the  Golan 
was  the  subject  of  the  ninth 
cy  session  in  January  and 
y  1982. 

icent  years,  the  Assembly  has 
a  forum  for  the  North-South 
— the  discussion  of  issues  be- 
dustrialized  nations  and 
ng  countries.  In  large  part,  this 
the  phenomenal  growth  and 
l  makeup  of  the  UN  membership 
fact  that  the  Assembly  is  the 
body  comprising  all  members, 
countries  that  achieved  inde- 
e  after  the  United  Nations'  crea- 
e  caused  a  massive  shift  in  the 
ly.  In  1945,  the  United  Nations 
nembers,  most  of  them  Western 
.  Of  its  present  159  members, 
an  two-thirds  of  them  are 
ng  countries. 

re  are  many  differences  in 
size,  and  outlook  among  the 
ing  countries.  Nevertheless,  this 
oup  (some  120  countries  in  the 
Assembly),  known  as  "the  Third 
the  "nonaligned,"  and  the 
of  77,"  usually  votes  and  acts  in 
Because  of  their  numbers  they, 
t,  determine  the  agenda  of  the 
ly,  the  character  of  its  debates, 
nature  of  its  decisions.  For 
eveloping  countries,  the  United 
is  particularly  important.  It  is 
ective  source  of  much  of  their 
itic  influence  and  the  basic  outlet 
r  foreign  relations  initiatives.  In- 


creasingly, they  seek  inclusion  in  the 
councils  of  power,  and  the  United  Na- 
tions provides  such  a  policy  forum. 

The  United  Nations  has  devoted 
significant  attention  to  the  problems  of 
the  developing  countries,  in  response  to 
their  growing  political  importance  in 
multilateral  arenas.  The  General 
Assembly  has  guided,  and  in  many  cases 
created,  special  programs  to  help 
developing  nations  acquire  the  skills, 
knowledge,  and  organization  they  need 
for  more  productive  economies.  'These 
programs  complement  the  work  of  the 
various  specialized  agencies  in  the  UN 
system.  'Through  its  economic  commit- 
tee, the  Assembly  remains  concerned 
with  the  question  of  economic  develop- 
ment. 

The  Economic  and  Social  Council 

The  Economic  and  Social  Council 
(ECOSOC)  assists  the  General  Assembly 
in  promoting  international  economic  and 
social  cooperation.  ECOSOC  has  54 
members,  18  of  which  are  selected  each 
year  by  the  General  Assembly  for  a 
3-year  term.  A  retiring  member  is  eligi- 
ble for  immediate  reelection — the  United 
States,  France,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  the  Soviet  Union  have  been 


members  since  the  United  Nations  was 
founded.  ECOSOC  holds  two  major  ses- 
sions each  year:  a  spring  meeting,  usual- 
ly in  New  York,  and  a  summer  meeting, 
usually  in  Geneva.  The  president  is 
elected  for  a  1-year  term.  Voting  is  by 
simple  majority. 

ECOSOC  undertakes  studies  and 
makes  recommendations  on  develop- 
ment, world  trade,  industrialization, 
natural  resources,  human  rights,  the 
status  of  women,  population,  narcotics, 
social  welfare,  science  and  technology, 
crime  prevention,  and  other  issues. 

A  number  of  standing  committees 
and  functional  commissions  assist 
ECOSOC.  It  also  has  regional  economic 
commissions  that  seek  to  strengthen 
economic  development  of  countries 
within  their  regions.  These  are: 

•  The  Economic  Commission  for 
Africa  (EGA),  Addis  Ababa; 

•  The  Economic  and  Social  Commis- 
sion for  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (ESCAP), 
Bangkok; 

•  The  Economic  Commission  for 
Europe  (ECE),  Geneva; 

•  The  Economic  Commission  for 
Latin  America  (ECLA),  Santiago;  and 

•  The  Economic  Commission  for 
Western  Asia  (ECWA),  Baghdad. 


U.S.  Representatives 

to  the  United  Nations* 

Edward  R.  Stettinius,  Jr. 

March  1946-June  1946 

Hershel  V.  Johnson  (acting) 

June  1946-January  1947 

Warren  R.  Austin 

January  1947-January  1953 

Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  Jr. 

January  1953-September  1960 

James  J.  Wadsworth 

September  1960-January  1961 

Adlai  E.  Stevenson 

January  1961-July  1965 

Arthur  J.  Goldberg 

July  1965-June  1968 

George  W.  Ball 

June  1968-September  1968 

James  Russell  Wiggins 

October  1968-January  1969 

Charles  W.  Yost 

January  1969-February  1971 

George  Bush 

February  1971-January  1973 

John  A.  Scali 

February  1973-June  1975 

Daniel  P.  Moynihan 

June  1975-February  1976 

William  W.  Scranton 

March  1976-January  1977 

Andrew  Young 

January  1977-April  1979 

Donald  McHenry 

April  1979-January  1981 

Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick 

January  1981 -present 
ations  is  the  Chief  of  the  U.S.  Mission  to 

*The  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  N 
the  UN  in  New  York  and  holds  the  rank  and  s 

^tatus  of  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 

Plenipotentiary.  ■ 

ECOSOC  also  provides  consultative 
status  to  nongovernmental  organizations 
active  within  its  fields  of  competence. 
These  organizations  may  send  observers 
to  public  meetings  of  the  council  and  its 
subsidiary  bodies  and  submit  statements 
related  to  the  council's  work. 

Trusteeship  Council 

The  UN  trusteeship  system  was 
established  to  help  ensure  that  ter- 
ritories were  administered  in  the  best  in- 
terests both  of  the  inhabitants  and  of  in- 
ternational peace  and  security.  The 
Trusteeship  Council  operates  under  the 
authority  of  the  General  Assembly,  or, 
in  the  case  of  strategic  trusts,  the 
Security  Council.  It  assists  those  bodies 
in  carrying  out  their  responsibilities 
under  the  UN  Charter. 

A  UN  member  administering  a  trust 
territory  is  pledged  to  promote  the 
political,  economic,  and  educational  ad- 
vancement of  the  territory's  people.  It  is 
also  to  promote  "progressive  develop- 
ment towards  self-government  or  in- 
dependence as  may  be  appropriate  to 
the  particular  circumstances  of  each  ter- 
ritory and  its  people  and  the  freely  ex- 
pressed wishes  of  the  peoples 
concerned." 

As  recently  as  1957,  11  terri- 
tories— most  of  them  former  mandates 
of  the  League  of  Nations  or  territories 
taken  from  enemy  states  at  the  end  of 
World  War  II — were  part  of  the  UN 


UN  headquarters  in  New  York  covers  an 
18-acre  area  on  Manhattan  Island.  The 
buildings  include  the  39-story  Secretariat, 
the  General  Assembly,  council  chambers 
and  conference  rooms,  and  the  Dag 
Hammarskjold  Library. 


trusteeship  system.  All  but  one  have  at- 
tained self-government  or  independence, 
either  as  separate  nations  or  by  joining 
neighboring  independent  countries. 

The  only  remaining  is  the  Trust  Ter- 
ritory of  the  Pacific  Islands  (Micronesia), 
designated  as  a  strategic  area  and  ad- 
ministered by  the  United  States  under  a 
1947  agreement  with  the  Security  Coun- 
cil. Following  negotiations  which  began 
in  1969,  an  agreement  was  reached  in 
197.5  with  one  part  of  the  territory,  the 
Northern  Mariana  Islands,  which  will 
become  a  commonwealth  of  the  United 
States  upon  termination  of  the  trustee- 
ship. In  1983,  UN-observed  plebiscites 
were  held  in  the  remaining  three 
jurisdictions — the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia,  Palau,  and  the  Marshall 
Islands.  All  resulted  in  voter  approval  of 
an  agreement  providing  for  a  "free 
association"  relationship  with  the  United 
States.  While  the  governments  of  two  of 
these  areas  subsequently  approved  a 
Compact  of  Free  Association,  Palau's 
formal  approval  has  been  held  up  by 
constitutional  difficulties.  The  United 
States  is  working  with  the  Palau 
Government  to  resolve  this  problem.  The 
United  States  continues  to  strive  toward 
termination  of  the  trusteeship  for  all 
four  components  of  the  trust  territory  as 
soon  as  possible,  under  terms  acceptable 
to  all  parties. 

Membership  of  the  Trusteeship 
Council  consists  of  the  United 


iinililljini 


(UN  photo  by  Saw  Lwin) 


U^il'^^J- 


^^Ji  /     jf     IV 


'  -r^ 


:4 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


The  159  Members  of  the  United  Nations^ 


an  (1946) 

The  Gambia  (1965) 

1955) 

German  Democratic  Republic  (1973) 

962) 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of  (1973) 

976) 

Ghana  (1957) 

ind  Barbuda  (1981) 

Greece 

I 

Grenada  (1974) 

Guatemala 

1955) 

Guinea  (1958) 

(1973) 

Guinea-Bissau  (1974) 

1971) 

Guyana  (1966) 

sh  (1974) 

Haiti 

(1966) 

Honduras 

Hungary  (1955) 

181) 

Iceland  (1946) 

160) 

India 

1971) 

Indonesia  (1950) 

Iran 

I  (1966) 

Iraq 

Ireland  (1955) 

arussalam  (1984) 

Israel  (1949) 

(1955) 

Italy  (1955) 

-"aso— formerly  Upper  Volta  (1960) 

Ivory  Coast  (1960) 

948) 

Jamaica  (1962) 

;i962) 

Japan  (1956) 

3ian  SSR 

Jordan  (1955) 

Kenya  (1963) 

■de  (1975) 

Kuwait  (1963) 

^rican  Republic  (1960) 

Lao  People's  Democratic  Republic  (Vt 

30) 

Lebanon 

Lesotho  (1966) 

Liberia 

Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya  (1955) 

(1975) 

Luxembourg 

960) 

Madagascar  (1960) 

;a 

Malawi  (1964) 

Malaysia  (1957) 

L960) 

Maldives  (1965) 

wakia 

Mali  (1960) 

ctic  Kampuchea— 

Malta  (1964) 

ly  Cambodia  (1955) 

Mauritania  (1961) 

tic  Yemen  (1967) 

Mauritius  (1968) 

Mexico 

1977) 

Mongolia  (1961) 

L  (1978) 

Morocco  (1956) 

in  Republic 

Mozambique  (1975) 

Nepal  (1955) 

Netherlands 

lor 

New  Zealand 

al  Guinea  (1968) 

Nicaragua 

Niger  (1960) 

)) 

Nigeria  (1960) 

1955) 

Norway 

Oman  (1971) 

960) 


Pakistan  (1947) 

Panama 

Papua  New  Guinea  (1975) 

Paraguay 

Peru 

Philippines 

Poland 

Portugal  (1955) 

Qatar  (1971) 

Romania  (1955) 

Rwanda  (1962) 

St.  Christopher-Nevis  (1983) 

St.  Lucia  (1979) 

St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines  (1980) 

Samoa  (1976) 

Sao  Tome  and  Principe  (1975) 

Saudi  Arabia 

Senegal  (1960) 

Seychelles  (1976) 

Sierra  Leone  (1961) 

Singapore  (1965) 

Solomon  Islands  (1978) 

Somalia  (1960) 

South  Africa 

Spain  (1955) 

Sri  Lanka  (1955) 

Sudan  (1956) 

Suriname  (1975) 

Swaziland  (1968) 

Sweden  (1946) 

Syria 

Thailand  (1946) 

Togo  (1960) 

Trinidad  and  Tobago  (1962) 

Tunisia  (1956) 

Turkey 

Uganda  (1962) 

Ukrainian  SSR 

USSR 

United  Arab  Emirates  (1971) 

United  Kingdom 

United  Republic  of  Cameroon  (1960) 

United  Republic  of  Tanzania  (1961) 

United  States  of  America 

Uruguay 

Vanuatu  (1981) 

Venezuela 

Vietnam  (1977) 

Yemen  (1947) 

Yugoslavia 

Zaire  (1960) 

Zambia  (1964) 

Zimbabwe  (1980) 


ntries  are  listed  with  names  as  registered  by  the  United  Nations.  Year  in  parentheses  indicates  date  of  admission;  countries  with  no 
e  original  members  in  1945. 

Resolution  2758  (XXVI)  of  Oct.  25,  1971,  the  General  Assembly  decided  "to  restore  all  its  rights  to  the  People's  Repubhc  of  China  and 
nize  the  representative  of  its  Government  as  the  only  legitimate  representative  of  China  to  tne  United  Nations."  ■ 


States — the  only  country  now  ad- 
ministering a  trust  territory — and  the 
other  permanent  members  of  the  Securi- 
ty Council:  China  (which  does  not  par- 
ticipate), France,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 

International  Court  of  Justice 

The  International  Court  of  Justice  is  the 
principal  judicial  organ  of  the  United 
Nations.  The  Court  was  established 
under  the  Charter  in  1945  as  the  suc- 
cessor to  the  Permanent  Court  of  Inter- 
national Justice.  The  Court's  main  func- 
tions are  to  decide  contentious  cases 
submitted  to  it  by  states  and  to  give  ad- 
visory opinions  on  legal  questions  sub- 
mitted to  it  by  the  General  Assembly  or 
Security  Council,  or  by  such  specialized 
agencies  as  may  be  authorized  to  do  so 
by  the  General  Assembly  in  accordance 
with  the  UN  Charter. 

The  seat  of  the  Court  is  at  The  Hague, 
Netherlands.  It  is  composed  of  15  judges 
elected  by  the  General  Assembly  and  the 
Security  Council  from  a  list  of  persons 
nominated  by  the  national  groups  in  the 


International  Court  of 
Justice  Officials 

Nine-year  terms  expire  on  February  5  of  the 
year  shown  in  parentheses.  The  President  is 
elected  by  the  Court  for  a  3-year  term. 

President  of  the  Court— Taslim  Olawale 

Elias,  Nigeria  (1985) 
Vice  President— Jose  Sette-Camara,  Brazil 

(1988) 

Other  Members  of  the  Court 

Manfred  Lachs,  Poland  (198.5) 

Pianton  Dmitrievich  Morozov,  USSR  (1988) 

Nagendra  Singh,  India  (1991) 

Jose  Maria  Ruda,  Argentina  (1991) 

Hermann  Mosier,  F.R.G.  (1985) 

Shigeru  Oda,  Japan  (1985) 

Roberto  Ago,  Italy  (1988) 

Abdallah  Fikri  El-Khani,  Syria  (1985) 

Stephen  M.  Schwebel,  US  (1988) 

Robert  Y.  .Jennings,  UK  (1991) 

Guy  Ladreit  de  Lacharriere,  France  (1991) 

Keba  Mbaye,  Senegal  (1991) 

Mohammed  Bedjaoui,  Algeria  (1988)  ■ 


Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration.  Elec- 
tors are  mandated  to  bear  in  mind  the 
qualifications  of  the  candidates  and  the 
need  for  the  Court  as  a  whole  to  repre- 
sent the  main  cultural  groups  and  prin- 
cipal legal  systems.  No  two  judges  may 
be  nationals  of  the  same  country.  Judges 
serve  for  9  years  and  may  be  reelected. 
One-third  of  the  Court  (five  judges)  is 
elected  every  3  years. 

Questions  before  the  Court  are 
decided  by  a  majority  of  judges  present. 
Nine  judges  constitute  a  quorum.  In  case 
of  a  tie,  the  president  of  the  Court  casts 
the  deciding  vote.  In  certain  cir- 
cumstances, parties  may  be  entitled  to 
choose  a  judge  for  a  specific  case. 

Only  states  may  be  parties  in  cases 
before  the  International  Court  of 
Justice.  This  does  not  preclude  private 
interests  from  being  the  subject  of  pro- 
ceedings if  one  state  brings  the  case 
against  another.  Jurisdiction  of  the 
Court  is  based  on  the  consent  of  the  par- 
ties. Consent  may  be  given  in  several 
ways.  States  may  specify,  generally  in  a 
treaty,  that  any  dispute  concerning  the 
meaning  of  the  treaty  may  be  referred 
to  the  Court;  or,  after  a  specific  dispute 
arises,  they  may  agree  to  take  it  before 
the  Court  for  resolution.  In  addition,  a 
state  may,  in  relation  to  any  other  state 
accepting  the  same  obligation,  accept 
the  Court's  compulsory  jurisdiction  in 
certain  categories  of  disputes,  such  as 
those  concerning  the  interpretation  of  a 
treaty  or  a  question  of  international  law. 
In  the  event  of  a  dispute  concerning  the 
Court's  jurisdiction,  the  matter  will  be 
settled  by  the  Court.  Judgments  in  con- 
tentious cases  are  binding  upon  the  par- 
ties. The  Security  Council  can  be  called 
upon  by  a  party  to  determine  measures 
to  be  taken  to  give  effect  to  a  judgment 
if  the  other  party  fails  to  perform  its 
obligations  under  that  judgment. 

The  United  States  is  one  of  the  47 
countries  that  had  accepted  the  com- 
pulsory jurisdiction  of  the  Court  by 
1983.  In  accepting  that  jurisdiction  in 
1946,  the  United  States  specifically 
excluded  disputes  regarding  matters 
essentially  within  the  U.S.  domestic 
jurisdiction,  "as  determined  by  the 
United  States  of  America."  The  last 
phrase,  known  as  the  Connally  reserva- 
tion, permits  the  United  States  rather 


than  the  Court  to  determine  whet! 
certain  disputes  should  come  befot 
Court. 

On  a  number  of  occasions  sino 
1950s,  the  Court  has  dealt  with  iss 
regarding  control  by  South  Africa 
Namibia  (South-West  Africa).  In  tl 
most  recent  advisory  opinion  (197] 
Court  advised  that  since  the  contii 
presence  of  South  Africa  in  Namit 
illegal.  South  Africa  is  obliged  to  \ 
draw  its  administration  and  end  it 
cupation  of  the  territory. 

Other  recent  cases  include: 

•  A  complaint  by  Pakistan  in 
that  India  was  planning  to  turn  o\ 
Bangledesh  for  trial  195  Pakistani 
prisoners  of  war; 

•  Challenges  by  Australia  and 
Zealand  in  1973  to  further  French 
mospheric  nuclear  weapons  tests  i 
South  Pacific  Ocean; 

•  Complaints  by  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  Federal  Republi 
Germany  about  the  decision  of  Ice 
to  extend  its  exclusive  fisheries  zc 
from  19  kilometers  (12  mi.)  to  80 
kilometers  (50  mi.)  around  its  coai 

•  Questions  raised  by  the  Ger 
Assembly  about  the  status  of  the 
Spanish  Sahara  (now  Western  Sal 

•  A  dispute  between  Greece  i 
Turkey  over  the  boundary  of  the  ■ 
tinental  shelf  in  the  Aegean  Sea; 

•  A  complaint  by  the  United 
in  1980  that  Iran  was  detaining 
American  diplomats  in  Tehran  in 
tion  of  international  law;  and 

•  A  dispute  between  Tunisia 
Libya  over  the  delimitation  of  the 
tinental  shelf  between  them. 

A  chamber  of  the  Court  curre 
has  before  it  a  question  as  to  the 
of  the  maritime  boundary  dividing 
Continental  Shelf  and  fisheries  zo 
the  United  States  and  Canada  in 
Gulf  of  Maine  area. 


scretariat 

jcretariat  is  headed  by  the 
ary  General,  assisted  by  a  staff  of 
;han  16,000  international  civil 
its  worldwide.  It  provides  studies, 
lation,  and  facilities  needed  by  UN 
for  their  meetings.  It  also  carries 
;ks  as  directed  by  the  Security 
A,  the  General  Assembly,  the 
mic  and  Social  Council,  and  other 
■ized  LTN  bodies.  The  Charter  pro- 
;hat  the  staff  be  chosen  by  applica- 
■  the  "highest  standards  of  efficien- 
Tipetence,  and  integrity,"  with  due 
1  for  the  importance  of  recruiting 
iff  on  as  wide  a  geographical  basis 
sible. 

le  Charter  also  provides  that  the 
^ry  General  and  staff  shall  not 
ir  receive  instructions  from  any 
iment  or  authority  other  than  the 
1  Nations.  Each  UN  member  is  en- 
to  respect  the  international 
;ter  of  the  Secretariat  and  not 
0  influence  its  staff.  The  Secretary 
al  alone  is  responsible  for  the  staff 
ion. 

le  Secretary  General's  duties  in- 
using  his  good  offices  in  resolving 
ational  disputes,  administering 
keeping  operations,  organizing  in- 
;ional  conferences,  gathering  infor- 
n  on  the  implementation  of  Securi- 
3jncil  decisions,  and  consulting  with 
i.er  governments  regarding  various 
■1  alional  relations  initiatives.  The 
rtary  General  may  bring  to  the  at- 
t  n  of  the  Security  Council  any  mat- 


ter that  in  his  or  her  opinion  may 
threaten  international  peace  and 
security. 

In  1977,  the  General  Assembly 
created  a  new  position  in  the  Secre- 
tariat—a director  general  for  develop- 
ment and  economic  cooperation.  The  in- 
cumbent, second  only  to  the  Secretary 
General,  works  to  obtain  better  efficien- 
cy and  coordination  of  the  many 
economic  and  developmental  programs 
operating  in  the  UN  system.  Jean  Ripert 
of  France  currently  occupies  this  post. 

The  UN  Family 

In  addition  to  the  six  principal  UN 
organs,  the  UN  family  includes  nearly 
30  major  programs  or  agencies.  Some 
were  in  existence  before  the  creation  of 
the  United  Nations  and  are  related  to  it 
by  agreement.  Others  were  established 
by  the  General  Assembly.  Each  special- 
ized agency  provides  expertise  in  a 
specific  area. 


The  World  Health  Organization 
(WHO)  has  eradicated  smallpox  and  is 
working  toward  the  goal  of  the  "health 
for  all  by  the  year  2000."  It  has 
established  a  worldwide  network  to 
warn  against  the  outbreak  of  other  con- 
tagious diseases  and  is  promoting  a 
global  campaign  to  make  available  im- 
munizations against  the  six  major  child- 
hood diseases  by  1990. 


UN  Secretaries  General 


e  Lie 

lammarskjold 

int 

litially  appointed  acting 
tary  General;  formally 
ited  Secretary  General 
nber  30,  1962.) 

Waldheim 

Perez  de  Cuellar 


Norway 
Sweden 
Burma 


Austria 
Peru 


February  1,  1946- April  10,  1953 
April  10,  1953-September  18,  1961 
November  3,  1961-December  31,  1971 


January  1,  1972-December  31,  1981 
January  1,  1982-present  ■ 


\ 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


The  Food  and  Agriculture  Organ- 
ization (FAO)  gathers,  analyzes,  and 
publishes  information  for  the  benefit  of 
the  world's  food  producers  and  con- 
sumers; provides  technical  assistance  to 
developing  countries  to  improve  agricul- 
tural production  and  stimulate  economic 
development;  provides  systematic  early 
warnings  on  impending  food  and  crop 
shortages;  and  carries  out  programs  to 
control  plant  and  animal  diseases. 


The  World  Meteorological 
Organization  (WMO)  has  established  a 
World  Weather  Watch  to  increase  the 
collection  and  dissemination  of  data 
necessary  for  more  accurate  weather 
prediction.  It  promotes  standardization 
of  meteorological  observations  and  pro- 
vides information  about  long-term 
climate  changes  that  can  affect 
agriculture  and  other  economic  activity. 


The  International  Civil  Aviation 
Organization  (ICAO)  develops  the  prin- 
ciples and  techniques  of  international  air 
navigation  and  fosters  the  planning  and 
development  of  international  air 
transport  to  ensure  the  safe  and  orderly 
growth  of  civil  aviation.  Practices  and 
recommended  standards  developed  by 
ICAO  directly  affect  U.S.  commercial  air 
travel  and  the  sale  of  U.S.  aircraft  and 
equipment  abroad.  ICAO  also  promotes 
standards  for  the  control  of  noise  and 
pollution  from  aircraft. 


15 


JL 


The  International  Fund  for 
Agricultural  Development  (IFAD)  is  a 

specialized  agency  primarily  devoted  to 
lending  to  low-income  farmers  in  poor 
food-deficit  countries.  It  is  a  cooperative 
effort  of  industrialized,  oil-exporting, 
and  developing  nations.  Most  of  IFAD's 
loans  involve  cofinancing  with  other  in- 
ternational financial  institutions. 

Other  prominent  specialized  agencies 
are  the  UN  Educational,  Scientific,  and 
Cultural  Organization  (UNESCO),  the 
Universal  Postal  Union  (UPU),  the  In- 
ternational Telecommunication  Union 
(ITU),  and  the  International  Labor 
Organization  (ILO). 

Programs  created  by  the  United  Na- 
tions also  work  to  fill  many  important 
economic  and  social  needs. 

The  UN  Development  Program 

(UNDP)  is  the  largest  multilateral 
source  of  grant  technical  assistance  in 
the  world.  Voluntarily  funded,  it  main- 
tains 116  field  offices  to  fulfill  its  role  as 
the  central  funding  and  coordinating 
mechanism  for  technical  assistance 
within  the  UN  system.  Its  country  and 
intercountry  programs  in  some  150  na- 
tions and  territories  focus  on  training, 
institution  building,  and  preinvestment 
activity,  with  the  greater  proportion  of 
resources  going  to  the  least  developed 
countries.  Total  expenditures  for  1982 
exceeded  $850  million. 

The  UN  Children's  Fund 
(UNICEF),  originally  created  to  assist 
homeless  and  destitute  children  in 
Europe  and  China  after  World  War  II, 
now  provides  humanitarian  and 
developmental  assistance  to  children  and 
mothers  in  developing  countries. 
UNICEF  concentrates  on  long-term  pro- 
grams that  maximize  local  community 
participation  and  stimulate  self-reliance 
in  efforts  to  improve  maternal  and  child 
health,  nutrition,  and  education  as  well 
as  to  increase  the  availability  of  clean 
water  and  sanitation.  UNICEF  was 
awarded  the  1965  Nobel  Peace  Prize.  In 
1982,  UNICEF  urged  broad  collabora- 
tion among  multilateral  and  bilateral  aid 


donors,  private  voluntary  agencies, 
developing  country  governments,  and 
local  communities  to  take  advantage  of 
the  opportunity  created  by  recent 
developments  in  health  science  and 
social  organization  to  achieve  "a  health 
revolution  for  children"  in  developing 
countries. 

The  UN  Environmental  Program 
(UNEP)  is  responsible  for  coordinating 
UN  environmental  activities,  calling  in- 
ternational attention  to  global  and 
regional  environmental  problems,  while 
stimulating  programs  to  correct  these 
problems.  It  assists  developing  countries 
in  promoting  environmentally  sound 
development  policies  and  has  developed 
a  worldwide  environmental  monitoring 
system  to  standardize  international  en- 
vironmental data. 

The  Office  of  the  UN  High  Com- 
missioner for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  pro- 
vides refugees — people  outside  of  coun- 
try of  nationality  because  of  well- 
founded  fear  of  persecution— with  legal 
protection  and  material  assistance  at  the 
request  of  a  government  or  of  the 
United  Nations.  UNHCR  was  awarded 
the  Nobel  Peace  Prize  in  1954  and  1982. 

International  Conferences 

Some  conferences  held  in  the  UN 
system  are  regular  annual  meetings; 
others  are  convened  specifically  to  ad- 
dress a  single  topic.  Most  of  the 
specialized  agencies  hold  periodic 
assemblies  of  the  representatives  of 
member  governments  for  the  agencies' 
regular  business  and  attention  to  specific 
problems.  Subgroups  of  these  agencies 
often  meet  to  discuss  specific  problems 
and  to  make  recommendations  to  the 
larger  representative  body  for  action. 


For  example,  the  International 
Maritime  Organization  (IMO)  focuses 
specific  attention  on  efficient  navigation, 
pollution  control,  and  tanker  safety.  The 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organization 
(ICAO)  recommends  uniform  regulations 
and  standard  safety  measures  as  well  as 
simpler  procedures  at  international 


borders.  The  International  Telecom- 
munications Union  (ITU)  allocates  th 
radio  frequency  spectrum,  registers 
radio  frequency  assignments,  and  wi 
to  reduce  or  eliminate  interference  t 
tween  radio  stations. 

The  United  Nations  organizes  s{ 
worldwide  conferences  to  concentrai 
particular  issues.  The  1981  UN  Con- 
ference on  New  and  Renewable  Sou 
of  Energy  was  held  in  Nairobi,  Ken; 
to  encourage  new  and  renewable  so 
of  energy  such  as  solar  and  geother 
power  and  oil  shale.  The  conference 
dealt  especially  with  the  problem  of 
developing  countries'  access  to  new 
sources  of  energy. 

The  World  Assembly  on  Aging, 
in  Vienna  in  July  and  August  1981, 
phasized  the  problems  facing  the  ag 
and  addressed  their  rights;  role  in  ; 
ty;  and  social,  economic,  and  persoi 
security. 

UNISPACE  '82,  also  held  in  Vi 
in  August  1982,  addressed  internat 
cooperation  in  the  peaceful  applicat 
of  space  technology. 

U.S.  delegations  often  include  i 
only  executive  branch  officials  but 
Members  of  Congress,  technical  ex 
and  representatives  of  relevant  seg 
ments  of  the  U.S.  private  sector. 

The  United  Nations  also  draws 
tention  to  specific  issues  by  design: 
international  "decades,"  "years,"  ai 
"days."  Some  of  these  are: 

•  Decade  for  Women:  Equality 
Development  and  Peace  (1976-85); 

•  Second  Disarmament  Decadi 
(1980s); 

•  Third  UN  Development  Dec; 
(1981-90); 

•  International  Youth  Year  (11 

•  International  Year  of  Peace 
(1986); 

•  World  Health  Day  (April  7); 

•  World  Environment  Day  (Ju 

•  United  Nations  Day  (Octobe 
date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  UN 
Charter  in  1945);  and 


■^ 

J 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


luman  Rights  Day,  annually 
^ted  on  December  10,  the  date  of 
option  of  the  Universal  Declara- 
'  Human  Rights  by  the  General 
Ibly  in  1948. 

ring  the  System 

N  system  is  financed  in  two  ways: 
;  ed  contributions  from  member 
'    in  fulfillment  of  their  treaty 
;ions,  and  voluntary  contributions 
nember  states. 

16  regular  budgets  of  the  United 
IS  and  its  specialized  agencies  are 
1  by  assessments.  In  the  case  of 
lited  Nations,  the  General 
r(  ibly  approves  the  regular  budget 

rtermines  the  assessment  for  each 
J  er.  The  assessment  is  broadly 
J  on  the  relative  capacity  of  each 
]  -y  to  pay,  as  measured  by  national 
A  e  statistics,  although  there  are 
li  variations. 

,  j  le  Assembly  has  established  the 
I  pie  that  no  member  should  pay 
„i  than  25%  of  the  regular  budget. 
I  nited  States  is  the  only  nation  af- 
■i  by  this  limitation.  If  the  standard 
i  on  of  "capacity  to  pay"  were  ap- 
,ij  n  the  same  manner  to  the  United 
ti;  as  to  other  major  industrial 
/fs,  the  United  States  would  be 
S;ed  at  about  29%.  The  minimum 
,j|;ment  is  0.01%. 
jnder  the  scale  of  assessments 
jed  for  the  3-year  period  1983-85, 
_^  major  contributors  to  the  regular 
judget  are  the  Soviet  Union 
,]:%),  Japan  (10.32%),  the  Federal 
alic  of  Germany  (8.54%),  France 
7o),  and  the  United  Kingdom 
%).  The  assessments  against 
)ers  for  the  regular  budget  amount 
Dut  $762  million  for  each  year  of 
984-85  period;  the  U.S.  share  is 
million. 

N  peacekeeping  operations  have 
financed  by  a  combination  of 
sments,  voluntary  contributions, 
he  sale  of  UN  bonds.  The  UN 

in  Cyprus  (UNFICYP)  has  been 
ced  solely  by  voluntary  contribu- 

Some  member  nations,  in  addition 
oviding  monetary  support,  have 
ied  troops,  equipment,  or  services 
)ut  subsequent  reimbursement.  The 


United  States  has  airlifted  personnel 
from  nations  contributing  troops  to  a 
number  of  peacekeeping  operations. 

Special  UN  programs  not  included  in 
the  regular  budget— such  as  UNICEF 
and  the  UNDP — are  financed  by  volun- 
tary contributions  from  member  govern- 
ments. Some  private  sector  funds  are 
also  provided.  Some  nations  use  the  UN 
system  extensively  to  contribute  to 
developmental  assistance  programs  in 
other  nations. 

In  calendar  year  1982,  expenditures 
by  the  United  Nations;  the  specialized 
agencies;  the  IAEA;  and  the  special  pro- 
grams such  as  UNDP,  UNICEF,  the 
UNEP,  WFP,  and  the  UNHCR  totaled 
about  $4.5  billion. 

The  United  States  contributes  vary- 
ing percentages  of  the  costs  of  the  dif- 
ferent agencies  and  programs  in  the  UN 
system.  In  FY  1982,  its  combined 
assessed  and  voluntary  contributions 
amounted  to  $702.6  million,  or  about 
16%  of  the  total. 

Some  nations  have  refused  to  pay  all 
or  part  of  their  assessments  for  certain 
peacekeeping  operations  as  a  matter  of 
principle  and  thereby  have  caused  fi- 
nancing difficulties  for  the  United  Na- 
tions. These  refusals  and  other  factors, 
such  as  making  some  payments  in  non- 
convertible  currency,  have  produced  a 
deficit  estimated  at  $326  million  in 
December  1983. 


Maintaining  the  Peace 

The  UN  Charter  gives  the  Security 
Council  the  power  to: 

•  Investigate  any  situation  threaten- 
ing international  peace; 

•  Recommend  procedures  for 
peaceful  solution  of  a  dispute; 

•  Call  upon  other  member  nations 
to  completely  or  partially  interrupt 
economic  relations  as  well  as  sea,  air, 
postal,  and  radio  communications,  or  to 
sever  diplomatic  relations;  and 

•  Enforce  its  decisions  militarily,  if 
necessary.  The  original  assumption  that 
the  United  Nations  would  have  its  own 
armed  forces  did  not  work  out. 
However,  through  contributions  of 
troops  and  equipment  by  various  na- 
tions, UN  peacekeeping  forces  have  been 


able  to  limit  or  prevent  conflict  in  a 
number  of  situations.  With  steady  ex- 
perience in  the  operation  of  such  forces 
over  a  number  of  years,  this  UN  activity 
has  become  more  readily  acceptable,  al- 
though disagreement  among  the  perma- 
nent members  has  led  to  difficulties  in 
some  efforts  to  institute  new  peacekeep- 
ing forces. 

The  United  Nations  has  also  served 
to  reduce  the  danger  of  wider  conflict 
and  to  open  the  way  to  negotiated  set- 
tlements through  its  services  as  a  center 
of  debate  and  negotiation,  as  well  as 
through  factfinding  missions,  mediators, 
and  truce  observers.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  have  been  many  violent  interna- 
tional outbreaks  since  the  United  Na- 
tions was  created.  Some  have  not  been 
discussed  by  the  Security  Council  at  all, 
and  others  proved  to  be  beyond  the 
capacity  of  the  United  Nations  to  affect. 
Continuing  efforts  by  the  United  States 
and  other  nations  have  sought  to 
enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  Security 
Council  in  dealing  with  international 
conflicts. 

The  most  extensive  use  of  UN 
troops  was  in  Korea,  where,  in  1950,  the 
Security  Council  mobilized  forces  under 
U.S.  leadership  for  the  defense  of  south 
Korea  against  an  attack  from  the  north. 
UN  forces  reached  a  peak  strength  of 
500,000. 

In  the  Congo  (now  Zaire),  the  UN 
peacekeeping  operation  in  1960-64 
helped  the  Congolese  Government 
restore  order  following  its  independence. 
At  its  peak,  the  UN  force  totaled  more 
than  20,000  officers  and  troops. 

In  1964,  a  UN  Peacekeeping  Force 
in  Cyprus  (UNFICYP)  was  created  to 
prevent  the  recurrence  of  fighting  be- 
tween Greek  and  Turkish  Cypriots. 
Since  Turkish  troops  landed  on  Cyprus 
in  1974,  UNFICYP  also  has  helped  to 
maintain  the  cease-fire  between  the 
Cyprus  National  Guard  and  the  armed 
forces  of  Turkey.  Other  UN  efforts  have 
sought  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the 
Cyprus  dispute. 

In  the  search  for  a  peaceful  solution 
in  the  Middle  East,  the  United  Nations 
has  been  involved  in  various  ways  over 
the  past  36  years.  Its  efforts  have 
ranged  from  employment  of  the  "good 


offices"  of  UN  officials  in  helping  to 
resolve  differences  to  the  actual  deploy- 
ment of  UN  troops.  The  fighting  that 
broke  out  when  the  State  of  Israel  was 
established  in  1948  was  halted  by  a  UN 
cease-fire.  UN  mediators  helped  bring 
about  armistice  agreements  between 
Israel  and  Egypt,  Lebanon,  Jordan,  and 
Syria.  These  agreements  provided  for 
implementation  by  mixed  armistice  com- 


missions and  the  UN  Truce  Supervision 
Organization  (UNTSO).  The  UN  Relief 
and  Works  Agency  (UNWRA)  was 
established  to  assist  refugees  from  the 
conflict. 

In  1956,  the  Suez  crisis  was  resolved 
by  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli,  British,  and 
French  forces  from  Egyptian  territory 
in  compliance  with  a  UN  resolution  and 
by  the  establishment  of  the  UN 


z 


The  UN  Charter  gives  the  Security  Council  power  to  enforce  decisions  militarily.  In  a 
number  of  situations,  UN  peacekeeping  forces  have  been  able  to  limit  or  prevent  conflict. 


Emergency  Force  (UNEF)  to  prese) 
the  peace.  A  LIN  "presence"  in  Jord 
and  observer  groups  in  Lebanon  an( 
Yemen  also  have  helped  to  diminish 
potential  threats  to  international  pe 
and  security  in  the  area.  UNEF  pol 
the  Gaza  and  Sinai  lines  between  Is 
and  the  United  Arab  Republic  from 
to  1967,  when  it  was  withdrawn  at 
Egyptian  request.  In  the  June  1967 
the  Security  Council  achieved  a  ceas 
fire  and  installed  UN  observers  on  t 
cease-fire  lines  between  Israel  and  ' 

Following  the  outbreak  of  hostil 
in  1973,  a  new  UN  Emergency  Fon 
was  created  to  impose  itself  betwee 
forces  of  Israel  and  Egypt.  In  1974. 
meeting  chaired  by  the  UNEF  com- 
mander, the  two  countries  signed  a 
agreement  on  disengagement,  whicl 
UNEF  then  supervised.  Under  the 
agreement,  as  well  as  under  a  secoi 
disengagement  agreement  in  1976, 
UNEF  manned  the  zones  of  diseng; 
ment  and  inspected  the  zones  of  lin 
arms  and  forces  as  agreed  to  by  tht 
ties.  UNEF  was  dissolved  in  1979  v 
the  Egyptian-Israeli  peace  renderec 
mandate  no  longer  necessary. 

After  Israel  and  Syria  reached 
agreement  on  disengaging  their  for 
on  the  Golan  Heights  in  1974,  the 
Security  Council  established  a  UN 
Disengagement  Observer  Force  (Ul 
DOF).  The  mandate  of  UNDOF  als. 
has  been  extended  periodically  by  t 
Council. 

The  UN  Interim  Force  in  Leba 
(UNIFIL)  was  created  in  early  197: 
following  an  Israeli  reprisal  attack 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization  ( 
bases  in  southern  Lebanon.  LTNIFI 
first  with  4,000  troops  and  then  wi 
more,  was  established  to  permit  an 
Israeli  withdrawal  and  restore  ordt 
under  the  control  of  Lebanese 
authorities.  UNIFIL  helped  to  pres 
a  fragile  cease-fire  along  the  Israel 
Lebanese  border  until  Israel's  invaj 
of  June  1982  drastically  transform* 
conditions  in  southern  Lebanon. 
LINIFIL  still  performs  its  duties  to 
extent  possible  in  its  anomalous  siti 
tion  behind  Israeli  lines.  Its  mandat 
been  extended  periodically  by  the  S 
ty  Council  on  an  interim  basis,  wit! 
humanitarian  and  other  temporary 


1A 


J 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


to  its  functions.  At  the  end  of 
UNIFIL  had  a  strength  of  some 

NTSO.  originally  created  to  help 
'  nent  the  armistice  agreements 
I  the  first  Arab-Israeli  war,  has 
performed  a  variety  of  chores  in 

East  conflict  zones.  Its  unarmed 
/ers  assist  UNDOF  and  UNIFIL. 
Ti  of  UNTSO  observers  has  been  in 
t  since  1982,  monitoring  the  situa- 
fter  the  Israeli  invasion.  At  the 
f  1983,  it  had  an  authorized  force 
I  observers  throughout  the  Middle 

^e  United  Nations  also  has  been 
in  establishing  terms  for  the 
'ement  of  independence  of  Namibia 
-West  Africa)  from  South  African 
)1.  Numerous  meetings  of  the 
al  Assembly  and  the  Security 
;il — including  a  special  session  of 
eneral  Assembly  on  Namibia  in 
1978 — have  focused  on  this  issue. 
ince  early  1977,  a  small  "contact 
i"  consisting  of  the  then  five 
srn  members  of  the  Security  Coun- 
he  United  States,  the  United 
lorn,  France,  Canada,  and  the 
-a!  Republic  of  Germany— has  been 
;  in  facilitating  negotiations  on  the 
bia  dispute.  In  July  1978,  initial 
ment  was  reached,  and  the  Securi- 
uncil  asked  the  Secretary  General 
aw  up  a  plan  to  ensure  the  early  in- 
idence  of  Namibia  through  free 
ons  under  UN  auspices.  Although 
1  Africa  objected  to  portions  of  the 
itary  General's  plan,  the  Council,  in 
jmber  1978,  endorsed  the  plan  as 
>ecurity  Council  Resolution  435  and 
)rized  creation  of  a  UN  Transition 
itance  Group  (UNTAG),  with 
in  and  military  components.  This 
remains  the  internationally  ac- 
d  basis  for  Namibian  independence. 
Dugh  implementation  of  the  plan  has 
delayed,  most  differences  among 
larties  have  been  overcome  through 
ided  negotiations.  The  Security 
icil  remains  seized  of  the  issue. 


Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 

Although  the  UN  Charter  adopted  in 
1945  gave  no  immediate  priority  to 
disarmament,  it  envisaged  a  system  of 
regulation  that  would  ensure  "the  least 
diversion  for  armaments  of  the  world's 
human  and  economic  resources." 

The  advent  of  nuclear  weapons  came 
only  weeks  after  the  signing  of  the  UN 
Charter  and  provided  immediate  im- 
petus to  concepts  of  arms  limitation  and 
disarmament.  In  fact,  the  first  resolu- 
tion of  the  first  meeting  of  the  General 
Assembly  (January  24,  1946)  was  en- 
titled "The  Establishment  of  a  Commis- 
sion to  Deal  with  the  Problems  Raised 
by  the  Discovery  of  Atomic  Energy," 
and  called  upon  the  commission  to  make 
specific  proposals  for  "the  elimination 
from  national  armaments  of  atomic 
weapons  and  of  all  other  major  weapons 
adaptable  to  mass  destruction." 

Since  the  early  years  of  the  United 
Nations,  great-power  disagreement  has 
severely  hampered  efforts  to  promote 
arms  control  and  disarmament  within 
the  UN  system.  However,  the  United 
Nations  has  undertaken  continuing  ef- 
forts to  develop  organizational 
machinery  that  can  effectively  address 
disarmament  issues.  The  early  establish- 
ment of  an  atomic  energy  commission 
and  a  commission  for  conventional  ar- 
maments met  with  difficulties;  in  1952, 
these  two  commissions  were  merged  by 
the  General  Assembly  into  the  Disarma- 
ment Commission  (UNDC).  The  UNDC 
was  largely  ineffective  and  stopped 
meeting  in  1965,  but  was  reestablished 
by  the  General  Assembly  in  1978  as  a 
new  committee  composed  of  the  entire 
UN  membership.  The  UNDC  served  as  a 
deliberative  body,  lacking  authority  to 
conduct  negotiations  or  establish 
negotiating  bodies.  Today,  these  func- 
tions are  centered  in  the  Conference  on 
Disarmament. 

In  1957,  the  United  Nations  created 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agen- 
cy (IAEA),  which  administers  nuclear 
materials  safeguards  and  promotes 
peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy. 

In  1959,  the  United  States,  France, 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  Soviet 
Union  decided  to  create  a  10-nation 


disarmament  committee  outside — but 
linked  to— the  United  Nations.  This 
committee  ceased  meeting  in  1960,  but 
in  1962,  the  Eighteen-Nation  Disarma- 
ment Committee  (ENDC)  was  estab- 
lished. Later  renamed  the  Conference  of 
the  Committee  on  Disarmament  (CCD), 
membership  grew  to  26  in  1969  and  to 
31  in  1974.  The  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  served  as  cochairmen. 

In  1978,  agreement  was  reached  to 
create  a  new  body,  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament  (CD),  to  succeed  the  CCD. 
The  CD,  which  met  first  in  1979,  re- 
mains the  principal  multilateral 
negotiating  forum  for  arms  control.  It  is 
composed  of  the  five  nuclear-weapons 
states  and  35  other  states  representing 
all  areas  of  the  world.  The  chairmanship 
rotates  on  a  monthly  basis  among  all 
members.  Like  its  predecessors,  the  CD 
is  not  formally  a  UN  body.  However,  it 
reports  annually  to  the  General 
Assembly,  takes  relevant  Assembly 
resolutions  into  account  as  it  conducts 
its  work,  and  has  a  secretary  appointed 
by  the  UN  Secretary  General. 

The  CD  reconvened  in  February 
1984  as  the  Conference  on  Disarmament 
and  plans  to  expand  its  membership  by 
four,  which  would  raise  total  member- 
ship to  44.  Issues  on  its  agenda  are 
discussed  in  plenary  sessions  and  then 
referred  to  ad  hoc  working  groups  when 
the  members  consider  them  ripe  for 
negotiation  or  more  detailed  examina- 
tion. Also  in  February  1984,  the  position 
of  the  personal  representative  of  the  UN 
Secretary  General  to  the  CD  was 
redesignated  as  Secretary  (General  of  the 
CD;  the  first  incumbent  was  Rikhi  Jaipal 
of  India. 

Since  its  creation,  the  CD  has  con- 
centrated on  the  issues  of  banning 
chemical  and  radiological  weapons,  arms 
control  in  outer  space,  and  nuclear  arms 
control.  Although  some  progress  has 
been  made  in  the  chemical  and 
radiological  areas,  the  tense  interna- 
tional climate,  the  inherent  complexity 
of  the  issues,  and  the  large  membership 
of  the  new  body  have  prevented  rapid 
agreement  on  any  of  these  issues.  The 
CD  has  also  devoted  considerable  time 
to  attempting  to  elaborate  a  comprehen- 
sive program  on  disarmament. 


Despite  considerable  progress  in 
many  areas  of  international  concern, 
worldwide  arms  expenditures  continue 
to  grow,  amounting  in  1982  to  more 
than  $800  billion  per  year  in  current 
(1982)  dollars. 

The  United  Nations  has  held  two 
special  sessions  devoted  entirely  to 
disarmament.  The  first  Special  Session 
on  Disarmament  (SSOD  I)  in  1978  was 
an  initiative  of  the  nonaligned  nations  to 
spur  progress  in  all  aspects  of  disarma- 
ment. The  general  atmosphere  at  the 
session  was  constructive.  The  extensive 
conference  document — referred  to  as 
the  final  document,  which  included  a 
declaration  on  disarmament  and  a  pro- 
gram of  action — was  adopted  by  consen- 
sus. Among  other  things,  the  first 
special  session: 

•  Declared  that  "effective  measures 
of  nuclear  disarmament  and  the  preven- 
tion of  nuclear  war  have  the  highest 
priority;" 

•  Urged  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  to  conclude  a  new  strategic 
arms  limitation  agreement  at  the 
earliest  possible  date  and  urged  the  ear- 
ly conclusion  of  a  comprehensive  test 
ban  treaty; 

•  Noted  the  importance  of  interna- 
tional action  to  prevent  further  pro- 
liferation of  nuclear  weapons; 

•  Noted  the  value  of  nuclear- 
weapon-free  zones; 

•  Took  note  of  the  assurances  given 
by  nuclear-weapons  states  that  such 
weapons  would  not  be  used  against  non- 
nuclear-weapons  states; 

•  Urged  efforts  to  limit  various  non- 
nuclear  weapons  that  have  the  potential 
for  mass  destruction; 

•  Recognized  the  importance  of  con- 
ventional arms  issues,  particularly  inter- 
national transfers  of  these  weapons; 

•  Urged  the  financial  resources 
released  as  a  result  of  disarmament  ef- 
forts be  devoted  to  the  economic  and 
social  development  of  all  nations,  and 
called  for  an  expert  study  on  the  rela- 
tionship between  disarmament  and 
development;  and 

•  Endorsed  changes  in  the  machin- 
ery for  multilateral  disarmament  talks. 


At  the  second  Special  Session  on 
Disarmament  (SSOD  II),  held  in  1982, 
the  assembled  members  reaffirmed  their 
commitment  to  the  final  document  of 
SSOD  I.  The  member  states  could  not 
agree,  however,  on  a  substantive  docu- 
ment going  beyond  SSOD  I.  SSOD  II 
was  highlighted  by  the  participation  of 
18  heads  of  state  or  government,  in- 
cluding President  Reagan,  who  ad- 
dressed the  session  on  June  17,  1982.  In 
the  face  of  a  strong  Soviet  campaign  to 
promote  proposals  on  the  nonfirst  use  of 
nuclear  weapons,  Western  leaders  made 
clear  their  commitment  to  prevention  of 
war  of  any  sort — nuclear  or  conven- 
tional— and  the  value  of  deterrence. 

In  mid-October  of  each  year,  the 
First  Committee  of  the  General 
Assembly  convenes  to  consider  arms 
control  and  disarmament  matters.  The 
committee  holds  general  debates,  adopts 
resolutions  regarding  issues  on  its  agen- 
da, and  forwards  them  to  the  General 
Assembly  for  further  action. 

Items  on  the  First  Committee  agen- 
da include  but  are  not  limited  to:  reduc- 
tion of  military  budgets,  conclusion  of  a 
nuclear  test  ban,  establishment  of 
nuclear-weapon-free  zones,  efforts  to 
ban  chemical  weapons,  nuclear  disarma- 
ment, and  confidence-building  measures. 

At  the  September  26,  1983,  meeting 
of  the  General  Assembly,  President 
Reagan,  addressing  the  plenary  session, 
called  for  a  recommitment  to  the  basic 
tenet  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  and 
reaffirmed  the  U.S.  goal  of  taking  new 
and  bolder  steps  to  calm  an  uneasy 
world.  The  President  specifically  reaf- 
firmed the  U.S.  commitment  "to  reduce 
nuclear  arms  and  to  negotiate  in  good 
faith  toward  that  end." 

In  1984,  the  United  States  remains 
hopeful  for  progress  in  multilateral  arms 
control.  On  April  18,  1984,  Vice  Presi- 
dent Bush  presented  to  the  Conference 
on  Disarmament  in  Geneva  a  draft  U.S. 
convention  banning  the  development, 
production,  use,  transfer,  and  stockpil- 
ing of  chemical  weapons  on  a  global 
basis.  The  U.S.  Government  also  favors 
the  convening  of  a  meeting  of  the  states 
parties  to  the  1972  Biological  and  Toxin 
Weapons  Convention  to  discuss  ways  to 
strengthen  the  compliance  mechanism  of 


that  convention.  A  General  Assemh'. 
resolution  adopted  in  1982  called  for 
such  a  meeting. 

In  1985,  the  third  review  confeni 
of  the  Treaty  on  the  Non-Proliferatii 
of  Nuclear  Weapons  (NPT)  will  be  hi 
Since  its  entry  into  force  in  March  li 
the  NPT  has  been  a  cornerstone  of  1 
nonproliferation  policy.  About  120  sii 
are  party  to  the  treaty.  This  is  the 
largest  number  of  states  ever  to  adh 
to  an  arms  control  agreement,  india 
the  breadth  of  international  support 
the  objectives  of  the  treaty. 

Under  the  NPT,  nuclear-weapor 
states  are  obligated  not  to  assist  an; 
non-nuclear  states  to  acquire  nuclea 
plosive  devices  (Article  I).  According 
non-nuclear-weapons  states  party  to 
treaty  are  obligated  not  to  manufac 
or  otherwise  acquire  such  devices  (/ 
cle  II).  In  order  to  monitor  compliar 
with  the  treaty's  provisions,  the  NP 
provides  for  the  application  of  inter 
tional  safeguards  by  the  IAEA  to  al  I 
nuclear  material  in  the  peaceful  pro 
grams  of  nonnuclear  weapons  statei  i 
(Article  III). 

To  balance  the  obligations  assur 
by  non-nuclear-weapons  states  not  t 
quire  nuclear  weapons,  the  NPT  pn 
vides  that  all  parties  will  facilitate  t 
fullest  possible  exchange  of  peacefu 
nuclear  cooperation  (Article  IV)  anc 
vides  for  access  to  any  benefits  fror 
peaceful  applications  of  nuclear  exp 
sions  (Article  V).  It  also  enjoins  all 
ties  to  pursue  in  good  faith  negotia' 
on  arms  control  and  disarmament 
measures  (Article  VI). 

Human  Rights 

The  pursuit  of  human  rights  was  oi 
the  central  reasons  for  creation  of  t 
United  Nations.  World  War  II  atroi 
including  the  execution  of  millions  ( 
Jews,  led  to  a  ready  consensus  that 
new  organization  must  work  to  pre 
any  similar  tragedies  in  the  future. 
An  early  objective  was  the  crea 
of  a  framework  of  legal  obligations 
the  basis  for  consideration  of  and  ai 
on  complaints  about  human  rights  \ 
tions.  The  UN  Charter  obliges  all 
member  nations  to  promote  "univer 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


''-it,  for,  and  observance  of,  human 
'■  and  to  take  "joint  and  separate 

to  that  end. 
""fle  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
*ra  ,  though  not  legally  binding,  was 
1*   d  by  the  General  Assembly  in 
''*   s  an  early  indicator  of  the  goals 
■  lould  be  assumed  by  the  interna- 
■'  I  community.  Treaties  and  conven- 
-'.  oUowed,  many  of  them  drawing 
'*i  he  Universal  Declaration.  These 
m,  3d: 

The  Convention  on  the  Prevention 

jnishment  of  the  Crime  of 
,,  ide; 
''  The  International  Covenant  on 

,nd  Political  Rights; 

The  International  Covenant  on 
Social,  and  Cultural  Rights; 


mic. 


The  International  Convention  on 
imination  of  All  Forms  of  Racial 
mination. 

though  each  of  these  treaties  has 
It  signed  by  the  United  States,  con- 
itjo  their  ratification  has  not  been 
by  the  Senate. 

addition  to  the  preparation  of 
)l|locuments,  various  organs  of  the 
stem  undertake  consideration  of 
1  rights  issues.  The  General 
;fi  ibly  regularly  takes  up  human 
questions  originating  in  the 
nbly  or  referred  to  it  by  subor- 
bodies. 

16  UN  Human  Rights  Commission, 
ECOSOC,  is  charged  specifically 
promoting  human  rights.  To  carry 
lis  mandate,  the  commission  can 
international  instruments,  conduct 
t  studies,  or  investigate  situations 
mtries  where  human  rights  viola- 
are  believed  to  occur-.  Investiga- 
can  be  proposed  by  any  member 
nment  and  are  decided  upon  by 
)f  the  entire  commission.  The  43 
lission  members  (including  the 
d  States)  are  elected  by  ECOSOC 
e  basis  of  equitable  geographic 
bution. 

he  commission  has  a  Subcommis- 
3^)n  Prevention  of  Discrimination  and 
!ction  of  Minorities,  composed  of 
-ts  serving  as  individuals  rather 
as  government  representatives. 


Under  procedures  set  up  by  ECOSOC, 
the  subcommission  may  make  a  con- 
fidential review  of  private  communica- 
tions sent  to  the  United  Nations  contain- 
ing complaints  about  human  rights. 
Situations  that  appear  to  reveal  a  consis- 
tent pattern  of  gross  human  rights  viola- 
tions may  be  referred  to  the  commission 
in  closed  session.  That  body  may  then 
make  a  thorough  study  of  the  situation 
or  may  undertake  an  investigation  with 
the  consent  of  the  accused  government. 

A  Human  Rights  Committee  was 
formed  in  1977  under  the  Covenant  on 
Civil  and  Political  Rights,  which  entered 
into  force  in  March  1976.  Its  18 
members,  who  serve  in  their  personal 
capacities,  are  nationals  of  the  countries 
that  have  ratified  or  acceded  to  the 
covenant.  The  committee  receives 
reports  on  measures  adopted  and  prog- 
ress made  in  participating  countries  and 
may  comment  on  those  reports  directly 
to  those  countries  or  to  ECOSOC.  The 
committee  may  also  consider  complaints 
from  one  country  that  another  is  not 
fulfilling  the  obligations  of  the  covenant, 
provided  that  both  nations  have  ac- 
cepted the  competence  of  the  committee 
to  perform  this  role.  Further,  under  the 
optional  protocol  to  this  covenant,  the 
committee  may  consider  complaints  sub- 
mitted by  private  individuals  against 
governments  that  are  parties  to  the  pro- 
tocol. 

The  Committee  on  the  Elimination 
of  Racial  Discrimination  (CERD)  was 
established  in  1969,  the  year  of  entry 
into  force  of  the  International  Conven- 
tion on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of 
Racial  Discrimination.  Like  the  Human 
Rights  Committee,  its  18  members  are 
experts,  serving  in  their  personal 
capacities,  elected  by  countries  that  are 
parties  to  the  convention.  The  jurisdic- 
tional mandate  is  also  similar. 


(#) 


Other  UN  agencies  also  act  on 
human  rights  concerns.  The  Interna- 
tional Labor  Organization  (ILO)  was  one 
of  the  first  agencies  to  set  high  stand- 
ards and  reporting  requirements  on 
human  rights  situations  in  the  labor 


field.  A  special  UNESCO  committee  ex- 
amines human  rights  complaints  from 
individuals;  groups;  and  nongovernmen- 
tal organizations  within  the  fields  of 
education,  science,  culture,  and  com- 
munication. This  procedure  permits  ini- 
tiation of  a  probe  based  on  a  single  com- 
plaint rather  than  on  the  establishment 
of  a  "consistent  pattern  of  gross  viola- 
tions," as  required  by  the  Human  Rights 
Commission.  The  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS)  has  written  an 
American  Convention  on  Human  Rights 
that  gives  jurisdiction  to  an  Inter- 
American  Human  Rights  Commission 
and  creates  a  new  court  on  human 
rights.  The  convention  entered  into 
force  in  July  1978.  The  United  States 
has  signed  but  not  ratified  the  conven- 
tion. 

The  United  Nations  also  has  been 
expanding  its  work  on  behalf  of  women, 
not  only  to  ensure  their  rights  as  in- 
dividuals but  also  to  stress  the  need  for 
them  to  use  their  talents  and  abilities  for 
progress  on  social  issues.  These  efforts 
are  reflected  in  the  agendas  of  the  Com- 
mission on  the  Status  of  Women, 
ECOSOC,  the  General  Assembly,  the 
Human  Rights  Commission,  the  UNDP 
Governing  Council,  and  in  discussions  of 
the  rights  and  problems  of  elderly 
women  at  the  World  Assembly  on  Ag- 
ing. UN  efforts  led  to  the  celebration  of 
International  Women's  Year  in  1975  and 
to  the  declaration  of  a  UN  Decade  for 
Women,  1976-85. 

Although  the  UN  system  has  created 
a  legal  framework  for  action  on  human 
rights,  efforts  to  implement  the 
established  standards  have  been  uneven. 
Some  observers  have  suggested  that  UN 
forums  have  been  characterized  by 
"selective  morality"  as  criticism  has  been 
focused  primarily  on  the  state  of  human 
rights  in  Chile,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala, 
South  Africa,  and  the  Israeli-occupied 
territories  simply  because  such  criticism 
was  acceptable  to  the  majority  of  UN 
members,  while  criticism  of  other  na- 
tions' abuses  was  not.  The  1982  and 
1983  sessions  of  the  Human  Rights 
Commission  marked  a  departure  in  this 


regard,  by  taking  public  action  on  an 
East  European  country,  Poland,  for  the 
first  time  in  the  commission's  history. 

Another  reason  for  slow  progress  on 
human  rights  has  been  a  debate  about 
priorities-whether  precedence  should 
be  given  to  violations  of  the  integrity  ot 
the  person-genocide,  torture,  illegal 
detention,  or  execution  without  trial;  to 
civil  or  political  liberties-freedom  of 
speech,  association,  press,  or  movement 
within  or  outside  one's  country;  or  to 
economic  problems— inadequate  food, 
shelter,  and  health  care.  The  Reagan 
Administration  is  on  record  as  question-^ 
ing  the  notion  that  economic,  social,  and 
cultural  rights  occupy  a  place  in  the  con- 
stellation of  human  rights  comparable  to 
civil  and  political  rights.  The  idea  of 
economic  and  social  rights  is  easily 
abused  by  repressive  governments  which 
claim  that  they  promote  human  rights 
even  though  they  deny  their  citizens  the 
basic  rights  of  the  integrity  of  person,  as 
well  as  civil  and  political  rights.  This 
justification  for  repression  has,  m  fact, 
been  extensively  used.  No  category  of 
rights  should  be  allowed  to  become  an 
excuse  for  the  denial  of  other  rights. 
For  these  reasons,  the  Administration 
does  not  use  the  term  economic  and 
social  rights. 

There  exists,  however,  a  profound 
and  necessary  connection  between 
human  rights  and  economic  develop- 
ment. The  engine  of  economic  growth  is 
personal  liberty.  Societies  that  protect 
civil  and  political  rights  are  far  more 
likely  to  experience  economic  develop- 
ment than  societies  that  do  not. 

Despite  this  debate  over  categories 
of  rights  and  despite  the  great  national 
and  regional  sensitivities  to  human 
rights  criticism,  there  have  been 
strenuous  efforts,  led  by  Western  coun- 
tries, to  broaden  concern  about  human 
rights  in  the  UN  context.  Recent  Human 
Rights  Commission  sessions  have,  in 
fact,  included  an  increasingly  broad 
range  of  human  rights  issues,  and  it  is 
hoped  that  this  trend  will  expand. 


Participation  in  the  United  Nations: 
Benefits 

One  of  the  chief  benefits  of  the  UN 
system  is  the  opportunity  it  provides  for 
government  officials  to  meet,  share 
ideas  and  consult  on  international  prob- 
lems.'This  helps  them  solve  problems 
while  avoiding  confrontations  that  might 
otherwise  result  from  misunderstandings 
of  national  intentions  and  interests. 

Each  year  in  September,  the 
General  Assembly's  annual  regular  ses- 
sion brings  together  not  only  the  official 
representatives  of  all  member  countries 
but  also,  in  many  cases,  the  foreign 
ministers  and  chiefs  of  state.  The  U.S. 
Secretary  of  State  traditionally  spends  2 
or  3  weeks  at  the  General  Assembly 
each  year  consulting  with  other  govern- 
ments on  both  bilateral  questions  and  on 
issues  coming  before  the  United  Na- 
tions. In  September  1983  and  1984, 
President  Reagan  addressed  the  38th 
and  39th  sessions  of  the  General 
Assembly  and  met  with  a  number  of 
world  leaders  in  New  York. 

Similariy,  at  other  conferences  and 
meetings  in  the  UN  system,  delegates  of 
many  nations— including  people  from 
the  private  sector— become  more  deeply 
acquainted  with  each  other  and  with  the 
perspectives  of  various  countries  on  im- 
portant issues.  In  this  way  stereotypes 
are  removed  and  misunderstandings 
reduced.  By  bringing  together 
educators,  scientists,  cultural  leaders, 
development  experts,  economists,  and 
government  leaders  of  many  nations, 
UN  agencies  build  a  growing  global  com- 
munications network  of  people  who  have 
learned  to  cooperate  toward  the  achieve- 
ment of  shared  objectives.  Their  respec- 
tive governments  may  be  unfriendly  but, 
on  an  individual  basis,  participants  in 
these  meetings  have  the  opportunity  to 
strengthen  ties  between  nations  that 
over  time  can  reduce  the  likelihood  of 
conflict. 

General  Foreign  Policy  Benefits. 
Participation  in  the  United  Nations  and 
its  affiliated  programs  and  agencies 
helps  the  United  States  in  at  least  two 
ways:  it  provides  important  mechanisms 
for  the  advancement  of  U.S.  foreign 
policy  objectives,  and  it  gives  concrete 
benefits  to  private  and  public  sectors  of 
this  country. 


In  foreign  policy,  the  United  Na 
clearly  accomplishes  tasks  that  neitb 
the  United  States  nor  any  nation  co. k' 
accomplish  alone  or  in  small  coalitio 
UN  peacekeeping  forces  in  the  I 
die  East,  for  example,  have  been  ess 
tial  to  the  maintenance  of  a  cease-fij 
thereby  meeting  U.S.  objectives  of 
establishing  an  atmosphere  in  which 
fruitful  peace  negotiations  could  tak.|i| 
place.  The  United  States  and  other 
Western  nations  have  pursued  initia 
for  peaceful  settlement  in  Namibia  i 
the  UN  framework,  not  because  of  i 
doctrinaire  belief  in  UN  mechanisms 
because  the  parties  most  directly  co 
cerned  want  the  United  Nations  in- 
volved. The  Middle  East,  Namibia,  ; 
other  security  issues  have  the  poten 
for  international  conflict  that  could 
to  great  power  confrontation.  The 
United  States  hopes  that  involving  i 
United  Nations  will  reduce  the  dang 
inherent  in  such  problems  and  pron 
more  stable  international  order. 

Achievement  of  U.S.  internatioi 
goals  in  human  rights  depends  larg( 
on  the  support  by  other  nations  anc 
ternational  organizations.  If  only  or 
tion  urges  an  end  to  genocide,  torti 
terrorism,  illegal  detention,  or  polit  i 
or  economic  deprivations,  the  offen. 
nation  can  procrastinate  without  pe 
ty.  If  international  forums  such  as  1i 
United  Nations  become  involved, 
pressures  for  reform  are  more  effec 
and  the  likelihood  of  corrective  acti 
correspondingly  greater. 

UN  programs  also  serve  U.S.  o 

tives  for  the  developing  world  by  p 

moting  development.  Concerned  ab 

global  poverty,  the  United  States  a 

tempts  through  various  means  to  h 

developing  nations  meet  basic  hum; 

needs— clean  water,  food,  shelter,  : 

health  care— and  other  developmer 

goals.  This  objective  is  pursued  in 

various  channels:  on  a  bilateral  bas 

through  regional  approaches,  and  b 

tively  working  in  the  UN  system  tc 

suade  other  countries  to  share  the 

burden  of  global  development.  UN 

technical  assistance  and  financing  s 

needed  experience,  skills,  equipmei 

and  resources.  Several  donor  count 

now  use  the  UN  system  as  a  chanr 


nonartmpnt  of  State  Bl 


FEATURE 
I     UN  General  Assembly 


\llevelopment  aid,  thus  making  the 
leijl  Nations  increasingly  important 
Idwide  economic  development, 
programs  also  meet  humani- 
needs.  They  reflect  the  interna- 
|community's  collective  concern  for 
elfare  of  groups — children  in  the 
ing  world;  refugees  in  the  Middle 
frica,  and  Asia;  and  victims  of 
disaster  anywhere — disadvan- 
;r  by  circumstances  beyond  their 
5  1.  Education  and  training  pro- 
j    meet  the  general  needs  of  specific 
.:  >  lacking  normal  educational  op- 
1  lities.  Programs  promoting  scien- 
)operation  deal  with  major  pro- 
such  as  the  weather,  environment, 
iclear  safety.  All  of  these  efforts 
tg  portant  to  U.S.  policy  objectives, 
icouraging  and  assisting  dialogue 
en  the  industrialized  countries  and 
veloping  nations  is  another  impor- 
ale  played  by  the  United  Nations, 
particularly  appropriate  because 
developing  nations  regard  the  UN 
jo  n  as  their  chief  vehicle  for  foreign 
)ns. 

•owing  world  economic  inter- 
dence  enhances  the  importance  of 
nited  Nations  in  developing  a  con- 
i  between  industrialized  countries 
North  and  lesser-developed  coun- 
f  the  South.  Both  regions  want  to 
problems  impeding  economic 
h.  Developing  countries  constitute 
than  two-thirds  of  the  UN  mem- 
p  and  purchase  over  one-third  of 
jxports.  In  the  specialized  UN 
ies  dealing  with  trade,  commodi- 
nd  investment,  the  United  States 
\  to  expand  the  world  economy  in  a 
ompatible  with  its  own  economic 
n  and  values.  In  the  Economic  and 
Council,  the  regional  commissions, 
le  UN  Conference  on  Trade  and 
opment,  the  United  States  has  pro- 
1  an  open  international  trading  and 
ment  system.  The  United  States 
;  on  maintaining  a  strong  role  for 
rivate  sector  in  meeting  the 
Dpment  needs  of  all  countries. 

irect  Benefits.  Beyond  benefits 
d  for  U.S.  foreign  policy  interests, 
nited  States  also  gains  economic, 
,  and  humanitarian  benefits.  Large 
of  U.S.  financial  assistance  to  the 


United  Nations  and  its  related  agencies 
are  returned  to  U.S.  companies  through 
equipment  and  supply  sales  and  con- 
sulting services.  The  UNDP,  in  par- 
ticular, spends  a  major  part  of  its 
resources  in  the  United  States  for  pro- 
curement, fellowships,  and  other  train- 
ing. 

As  the  world's  most  advanced  na- 
tion, the  United  States  has  extensive 
needs  for  immediate  and  reliable 
worldwide  communication,  and  thus 
relies  on  the  International  Telecomunica- 
tion  Union  (ITU)  to  maintain  and  extend 
international  cooperation  between 
member  states  and  to  promote  the 
development  of  efficient  technical 
facilities  with  a  view  to  improving  inter- 
national telecommunication  services.  The 
United  States  is  the  largest  producer 
and  supplier  of  telecommunications 
equipment,  and  therefore,  benefits  from 
the  technical  assistance  extended  to 
developing  countries  from  agencies  such 
as  the  ITU. 

U.S.  maritime  interests  benefit 
directly  from  the  International  Maritime 
Organization's  work  on  standardization, 
safety  of  life  at  sea  measures,  and  ocean 
antipollution  programs.  Other  U.S.  en- 
vironmental interests  are  supported  by 
the  UN  Environmental  Program,  which 
serves  as  a  catalyst  in  bringing  interna- 
tional attention  to  global  and  regional 
environmental  problems  and  helping 
developing  countries  conceive  sound  en- 
vironmental programs. 

The  World  Meteorological  Organiza- 
tion provides  weather  information  to 
persons  from  all  spheres  of  U.S.  life; 
farmers,  mariners,  aviators,  and 
travelers.  Its  work  has  significant 
economic  and  social  impact  on  the 
United  States. 

Practices  and  recommended  stand- 
ards developed  by  the  International  Civil 
Aviation  Organization  (ICAO)  directly 
affect  U.S.  commercial  air  travel  and 
favorably  influence  the  U.S.  economic 
community,  which  supplies  the  greatest 
share  of  aircraft  and  equipment  to  both 
developed  and  developing  countries. 
ICAO  develops  the  principles  and  techni- 
ques of  international  air  navigation  and 
fosters  the  planning  and  development  of 
international  air  transport  to  ensure  the 


safe  and  orderly  growth  of  civil  aviation. 
It  also  promotes  standards  for  the  con- 
trol of  noise  and  pollution  from  aircraft. 
The  United  States  also  benefits  from 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agen- 
cy, which  facilitates  the  use  of  atomic 
energy  for  peaceful  purposes  while 
utilizing  important  programs  of  non- 
proliferation  and  safeguards  to  protect 
against  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for 
military  purposes.  The  IAEA  fosters  the 
exchange  of  scientific  and  technical  in- 
formation and  assists  in  the  training  of 
scientists  and  experts. 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  the  United 
Nations 

Today  ....  I  solemnly  pledge  my  nation  to 
upholding  the  original  ideals  of  the  United 
Nations.  Our  goals  are  those  that  guide  this 
very  body.  Our  ends  are  the  same  as  those  of 
the  United  Nations'  founders,  who  sought  to 
replace  a  world  at  war  with  one  where  the 
rule  of  law  would  prevail,  where  human 
rights  were  honored,  where  development 
would  blossom,  where  conflict  would  give 
way  to  freedom  from  violence. 

President  Reagan,  in  an 
address  to  the  UN 
General  Assembly, 
September  26,  1983 

Even  before  he  took  office,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  expressed  his  determina- 
tion to  reassert  U.S.  authority  in  the 
United  Nations.  Since  January  1981,  he 
has  sought  to  make  increased  use  of  the 
diplomatic  machinery  available  through 
the  UN  system  and  to  strengthen  U.S. 
support  for  a  more  effective  and  effi- 
cient UN  system.  The  U.S.  Government, 
in  particular,  has  urged  recognition  of 
UN  value  to  the  conduct  of  U.S.  foreign 
relations  and  in  terms  of  direct  benefits 
to  this  country  and  its  people. 

The  U.S.  Government,  an  essential 
force  in  the  creation  of  the  United  Na- 
tions in  1945,  joined  the  organization 
with  great  enthusiasm.  The  Senate,  by  a 
vote  of  89-2,  gave  its  consent  to  the 
ratification  of  the  UN  Charter  on 
July  28,  194,5.  In  December  1945,  the 
Senate  and  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives, by  unanimous  votes,  requested 
that  the  United  Nations  make  its  head- 
quarters in  the  United  States.  Since  the 
founding  days,  the  United  States  has 


been  a  major  participant;  however,  with 
the  changing  political  makeup  of  the 
world  following  World  War  II,  this  has 
entailed  changes  in  the  United  Nations 
as  well  as  U.S.  approaches  to  UN  issues. 

Since  the  early  1980s,  the  United 
States  has  sought  to  reassert  its  leader- 
ship in  multilateral  affairs,  strengthen 
its  influence  in  the  United  Nations  and 
its  related  agencies,  promote  fiscal 
responsibility  in  the  budgetary  process, 
increase  the  number  of  U.S.  nationals  on 
staffs  of  international  organizations,  and 
augment  private  sector  involvement  in 
UN  programs  and  activities.  The  United 
States  has  achieved  results  in  several  of 
these  areas. 

Efforts  to  reassert  U.S.  leadership 
were  assisted  by  forceful  action  in  New 
York  and  elsewhere  in  the  UN  system. 
A  prominent  example  was  U.S.  Perma- 
ment  Representative  Jeane  J. 
Kirkpatrick's  October  1981  letter  con- 
cerning the  Nonaligned  Movement  com- 
munique at  the  36th  session  of  the 
General  Assembly.  That  letter  formally 
put  nonaligned  nations  on  notice  that 
the  United  States  was  closely  following 
their  activities  in  the  United  Nations  and 
expected  them  to  act  more  responsibly. 
Moreover,  the  United  States  has  made  it 
a  point,  through  speeches  and  frequent 
rights  of  reply,  to  spotlight  unacceptable 
Soviet  bloc  behavior  and  to  counter 
harmful  Soviet  positions.  Vigorous  and 
well-publicized  U.S.  efforts  to  prune 
swelling  UN  budgets  have  won  serious 
attention  and  made  some  headway  in 
curbing  costs,  thus  laying  the  ground- 
work for  future  progress. 

An  active  and  systematic  review  of 
all  major  multilateral  agencies  in  terms 
of  their  relationship  to  the  above-cited 
policy  goals  led  to  the  decision  in  late 
1983  to  notify  UNESCO  that  the  United 
States  would  withdraw  at  the  end  of 
1984.  The  reasons  for  this  decision  were: 

•  Unacceptably  high  budget  growth; 

•  Politicization  of  the  UNESCO 
work  program;  and, 

•  A  drift  toward  statist  solutions — 
e.g.,  the  call  for  a  new  world  informa- 
tion and  communication  order — to  com- 
plex social  and  political  problems. 


The  United  States  said  it  would  also  re- 
main watchful  for  any  changes  in 
UNESCO  during  1984,  and  left  open  the 
possibility  that,  if  these  changes  were 
significant,  the  decision  to  withdraw 
might  be  reconsidered.  In  a  somewhat 
related  case,  the  1977  U.S.  decision  to 
withdraw  from  the  International  Labor 
Organization  contributed  to  the  progress 
in  that  body  to  reduce  politicization, 
eventually  enabling  the  United  States  to 
rejoin  in  1980. 

The  United  States  has  remained  a 
firm  and  unwavering  advocate  of  the 
universality  principle  with  respect  to  UN 
membership.  Secretary  of  State  Shultz 
reiterated  this  position  on  October  16, 
1982,  stating  that  the  United  States 
would  cease  participation  in  and  support 
for  any  UN  body  which  excluded  Israel 
or  denied  Israel  the  full  privileges  of 
membership. 

The  United  States  has  continued  to 
seek  UN  support  for  its  ongoing  efforts 
to  help  bring  about  peaceful  settlements 
in  the  Middle  East  and  southern  Africa. 
In  this  regard,  the  United  States  sup- 
ports UN  peacekeeping  operations  in 
Lebanon  and  the  Golan  Heights  and 
stands  ready  to  assist  the  transitional 
assistance  group  for  Namibia  envisioned 
in  Security  Council  Resolution  435. 

Concern  that  the  United  States  can 
be  outvoted  in  the  General  Assembly  by 
the  "automatic  nonaligned  majority"  has 
led  to  various  suggestions  for  reform. 
Rather  than  have  one  vote  for  each  na- 
tion, it  has  been  proposed  that  votes  be 
weighted  according  to  the  wealth,  UN 
contributions,  population,  or  power  of 
each  country.  Several  studies  have 
shown  that  in  many  cases  results  under 
a  weighted  voting  system  would  be  less 
favorable  to  U.S.  interests  than  under 
the  current  one-country,  one-vote 
system.  Moreover,  such  changes  could 
not  be  implemented  unless  the  perma- 
nent members  of  the  Security  Council 
were  willing  to  accept  curbs  on  their 
veto  power.  For  obvious  reasons,  the 
permanent  members  have  not  accepted 
such  proposals. 

Apart  from  approval  of  budgetary 
matters.  Assembly  resolutions  are 
recommendatory  and  not  binding  on  the 
members.  Binding  decisions  concerning 
action  with  respect  to  threats  to  the 


peace  and  acts  of  aggression  can  op 
made  by  the  Security  Council.  In  th: 
case,  the  UN  Charter  gives  the  Unit 
States  and  the  four  other  permanen 
members  the  right  of  veto.  The  Lfni 
States  is  thus  the  beneficiary  of  an 
portant  voting  privilege. 

The  United  States,  over  the  yea 
has  offered  several  proposals  for  en 
hancing  UN  effectiveness,  which  inc 

•  Strengthening  the  role  of  the 
Security  Council  in  the  settlement  o 
disputes,  particularly  through  more 
automatic  referral  to  the  Council  or 
situations  of  international  tension; 

•  Greater  use  of  the  Internatioi 
Court  of  Justice; 

•  More  effective  peacekeeping 
capability,  including  the  designation 
member  nations  of  trained  national 
troop  contingents  for  quick  deployn 
in  international  situations  when 
authorized,  and  the  establishment  o 
reserve  fund  to  ensure  the  covering 
initial  costs  of  peacekeeping  operati  ■ 

•  Better  means  of  addressing  c 
mament  and  arms  control  questions 

•  More  effective  machinery  tn  ; 
dress  human  rights  issues;  ; 

•  Exploring  ways  to  supplemer 
financing  of  international  programs 
funds  from  international  commerce  ■ 
services,  or  resources; 

•  Better  coordination  of  the 
technical  assistance  programs  in  va  i 
UN  agencies,  including  expanded  e 
for  evaluation,  monitoring,  and  qu^. 
control; 

•  Improving  the  UN  Secretarial 
both  in  operations  and  quality  of  pw 
nel;  and 

•  Better  coordination  of  the  pa 
ticipation  in  the  UN  system  of  vari'  I 
branches  of  the  U.S.  Government,    i 

U.S.  Representation 

The  U.S.  representative  to  the  Uni 
Nations  heads  this  country's  Perma 
Mission  to  the  United  Nations  in  N'  < 
York.  The  mission  serves  as  the  chH 
of  communication  for  the  U.S.  Govi  I 
ment  with  the  IIN  organs,  agencies 
commissions  at  UN  headquarters  a 
with  the  other  permanent  missions 
credited  to  the  United  Nations  and 


t 

r 


FEATURE 

UN  General  Assembly 


ber  observer  missions.  The  mis- 
s  a  professional  staff  made  up 
of  career  Foreign  Service  of- 
jincluding  specialists  in  political, 
ic,  social,  financial,  legal,  and 
issues,  and  public  affairs. 
United  States  also  maintains 
IS  in  Geneva  and  Vienna  and  of- 
other  cities  where  various  UN 
;s  are  based.  All  of  these  units 
to  the  State  Department  and 
guidance  on  all  questions  of 
Tom  the  President  through  the 
iry  of  State.  Relations  with  the 


United  Nations  and  its  family  of  agen- 
cies are  coordinated  by  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  for  International 
Organization  Affairs. 

U.S.  delegations  to  the  regular  ses- 
sions of  the  General  Assembly  each  year 
include  two  Members  of  the  U.S.  Con- 
gress— one  Republican  and  one 
Democrat,  selected  in  alternate  years 
from  the  Senate  and  House.  Delegations 
also  include  prominent  Americans  from 
various  fields  outside  the  government. 


The  U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Na- 
tions is  located  at  799  United  Nations 
Plaza,  New  York,  N.Y.  10017  (tel. 
212-826-4580). 


'The  U.S.  Delegation  to  the  San  Fran- 
cisco conference  to  organize  the  United  Na- 
tions was  led  by  Secretary  of  State  Edward 
R.  Stettinius,  Jr.  It  included  former 
Secretary  Cordell  Hull,  senators  and  con- 
gressmen, and  representatives  of  cabinet- 
level  departments  and  other  government 
agencies.  The  delegation  had  a  total  of  200 
U.S.  citizens.  Representatives  of  major  U.S. 
nongovernmental  organizations,  including 
veteran's  groups,  labor  unions,  women's 
organizations,  and  civic  organizations,  were 
also  present.  ■ 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Promoting  Global  Economic  Growth 


President  Reagan's  address  before 
annual  meeting  of  the  International 
Bankfm-  Reconstruction  and  Develop- 
ment (World  Bank)  and  tii£  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  on 
September  25.  lOSi.'- 

I'm  honored  once  again  to  address  the 
leaders  of  your  institutions.  Your  quest 
to  improve  the  condition  of  humankind, 
to  offer  opportunities  for  fulfillment  in 
our  individual  lives  and  the  lives  of  our 
national  and  world  communities,  places 
you  in  a  position  of  responsibility  and 
leadership  second  to  none.  You  are  true 
missionaries  for  a  more  prosperous 
world  and  a  more  peaceful  world. 

And  we  who  are  public  servants  in 
this  international  economic  community 
know  well  the  daily  problems  and  pitfalls 
that  obstruct  our  path  to  progress. 
Sometimes  the  immensity  of  these 
challenges  and  the  attention  they  receive 
seem  all  but  overwhelming  to  us. 

But  in  these  moments,  let  us 
remember  and  draw  strength  from  the 
most  powerful,  enduring  truth  in  human 
history:  free  men  and  women  are  not 
destined  to  be  powerless  victims  of  some 
capricious  historical  tide;  free  men  and 
women  are  themselves  the  driving  force 
of  history.  And  our  future  is  never 
trapped  in  the  hands  of  fate.  Our  future 
will  depend  on  our  own  freedom, 
courage,  vision,  and  faith. 

When  I  first  spoke  to  you  3  years 
ago,  I  asked  that  we  examine  the  terri- 
ble shocks  inflicted  upon  the  world 
economy  during  the  1970s,  that  all  of  us 
face  up  to  the  origins  of  those  problems 
and  also  recognize  our  ability  to  with- 
stand and  surmount  them. 

For  our  part,  we  said  one  conclusion 
seemed  both  undeniable  and  universally 
true.  The  societies  whose  economies  had 
fared  best  during  these  tumultuous 
times  were  not  the  most  tightly  con- 
trolled, not  necessarily  the  biggest  in 
size,  nor  even  the  wealthiest  in  natural 
resources.  What  united  the  leaders  for 
growth  was  a  willingness  to  trust  the 
people— to  believe  in  rewarding  hard 
work  and  legitimate  risk. 

So  the  United  States  made  a  new 
beginning— one  based  on  our  conviction 
that  we  could  only  meet  the  challenge  of 
contributing  to  world  economic  growth 
and  of  assuring  that  all  countries, 
especially  the  poorest,  participate  fully 
in  that  growth  by  renouncing  past 


policies  of  government— of  government 
regimentation  and  overspending— and  by 
taking  decisive  action  to  get  our 
domestic  house  in  order  and  restore  in- 
centives to  liberate  the  genius  and  spirit 
of  our  free  people. 

And  while  we  would  not  impose  our 
ideas,  our  policies,  on  anyone,  we  felt 
obliged  to  point  out  that  no  nation  can 
have  prosperity  and  successful  develop- 
ment without  economic  freedom.  Nor 
can  it  preserve  personal  and  political 
freedoms  without  economic  freedom. 
Only  when  the  human  spirit  can  dream, 
create,  and  build,  only  when  individuals 
are  given  a  personal  stake  in  deciding 
economic  policies  and  benefiting  from 
their  own  success— only  then  do  societies 
become  dynamic,  prosperous,  pro- 
gressive, and  free. 

We  invited  all  of  you  to  join  us  and 
walk  with  us  on  this  new  path  of  hope 
and  opportunity.  And  some  of  you  have. 
We  knew  this  endeavor  would  be  neither 
short  nor  easy.  We  knew  that  it  would 
require  great  effort  and  patience.  But 
we  were  confident  that  once  our  people 
saw  it  through,  the  rewards  would  be 
far  greater  than  anticipated. 

I  believe  that  confidence  has  been 
justified.  As  I  said  yesterday  to  the 
United  Nations,  we  can  speak  again,  and 
we  should,  of  a  future  that  is  bright  and 
hopeful— a  future  of  prosperity  that  I 
believe  is  far  nearer  than  most  of  us 
would  ever  dare  to  hope.  By  working 
together  we  can  make  it  happen. 

Strength  of  U.S.  Economy 

Our  own  economy  is  dramatically 
changed  from  only  3  years  ago.  Reward- 
ing hard  work  and  risk  taking  has  given 
birth  to  an  American  renaissance.  Born 
in  the  safe  harbor  of  freedom,  economic 
growth  gathered  force  and  rolled  out  in 
a  rising  tide  that  has  reached  distant 
shores. 

We  are  heartened  that  the  strength 
of  the  U.S.  economy  is  helping  lead  the 
world  from  recession  toward  a  new 
period  of  lasting  economic  expansion, 
with  lower  rates  of  inflation  in  many 
countries.  And  we're  convinced  we  can 
continue  to  offer  this  leadership  in  the 
future. 

Permit  me  to  elaborate.  The  United 
States  has  enjoyed  21  straight  months  of 
economic  growth— the  strongest  growth 
since  19.50.  We've  witnessed  the  creation 
of  6  million  jobs  and  seen  our  expansion 
sustained  by  exceptionally  low  inflation. 


Consumer  prices  are  rising  by  only 
around  4%  now,  compared  with  mor 
than  12%  in  1980. 

And,  let  me  emphasize  that  we'r 
determined  to  make  another  change 
from  past  policies.  We  intend  to  bri( 
inflation  down  even  more,  and  we'r^ 
determined  to  keep  it  down,  by  con- 
tinuing to  restrain  the  growth  of  om 
government  spending.  We  have  aire 
cut  the  rate  of  that  spending  by  nioi 
than  half.  And  we're  pushing  hard  f 
an  amendment  to  our  constitution,  | 
ing  mandatory  limits  on  governmrn 
power  to  spend. 

Fueling  economic  growth  has  be 
the  record  increase  in  venture  cai)iti 
and  business  investment,  both  resul' 
new  incentives  in  our  tax  structure, 
innovation  holds  out  the  promise  foi 
continued  strength  in  productivity, 
growth,  and  new  breakthroughs  in  i 
vanced  technology. 

We  believe  we  have  taken  only 
first  small  steps  into  the  newest  fro 
tiers,  the  technological  revolution.  I 
reaching  for  great  gains  in  product! 
we  can  create  a  bounty  of  new  jobs 
technologies  in  the  quality  of  life  su 
passing  anything  that  we  have  ever 
before  dreamed  or  imagined.  I  tell ; 
today  from  my  heart:  we  in  Americ 
want  to  share  our  knowledge  and  tli 
blessings  of  progress  with  you  and 
citizens,  because  together,  and  only 
together,  can  we  build  a  better  wor 
a  far  better  world. 

So,  just  as  we  must  do  more  to 
restrain  public  spending,  we  believt 
more  can  and  must  be  done  to  incri 
personal  incentives.  We  will  not  be 
satisfied  until  America  challenges  t 
limits  of  growth.  We  want  to  enact 
historic  simplification  of  our  tax  sy 
that  will  enable  us  to  significantly  i 
crease  incentives  by  bringing  per.'^i  < 
income  tax  rates  further  down,  not 

We  have  noted  the  increased 
recognition  that's  given  to  the  cent  ■ 
role  of  incentives  in  promoting  ecoi 
growth.  The  Wall  Street  Journal  n 
ly  cited  surveys  that  were  publishei 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Coo 
tion  and  Development  as  indicating 
governments  can  best  spark  econor 
growth  by  spending  less  and  cuttin 
rates,  not  by  planning  an  elaborate 
dustrial  policy.  This  is  our  strategy 
growth,  and  it  will  allow  us  to  keep 
America's  deficit  on  its  current 
downward  path. 


Ott 


THE  PRESIDENT 


n  nic  Recovery  Abroad 

we  continue  moving  forward, 

eartened  to  see  that  recovery 

is  gaining  momentum.  Growth  of 
er  3%  is  being  projected  for  other 
ial  countries  in  1984  and  1985. 
i're  seeing  a  rise  in  developing 

growth  rates,  led  by  those  ag- 
ely  pursuing  outward-looking  and 

oriented  policies. 
is  broadening  economic  growth 
1  a  significant  impact  on 
ting  world  trade.  Your  1984  IMF 
.  Report  pointed  out  that  "with 
>gress  of  economic  recovery  in  the 

ial  countries,  the  volume  of  world 
legan  to  expand  quite  strongly  in 
md  the  prolonged  deterioration  in 
ms  of  trade  of  non-oil  developing 
ies  came  to  an  end." 
pansion  here  in  the  world's 

single  market  has  meant  in- 
i  trading  opportunities  for  other 
3.  Total  U.S.  imports  rose  32%  in 
3t  half  of  this  year.  And  for  the 
ir.  our  imports  are  expected  to 

1983  imports  by  over  25%.  U.S. 
s  from  the  non-oil  developing 
ies  rose  about  14%  in  1983.  And 
!  up  by  nearly  30%  for  the  first 

1984. 

e  sometimes  hear  complaints 
U.S.  interest  rates,  particularly  by 

nations  which  are  legitimately 
ned  about  the  additional  debt 
;  costs  that  they  must  bear.  But 
ough  mention  is  made  of  trade 
e  far  greater  benefits  developing 
ies  receive  from  renewed 
nic  growth  and  open-market 
s  of  the  United  States. 
)r  the  United  States  alone,  imports 
;he  non-OPEC  LDCs  [less  devel- 
;ountries]  during  the  first  7 
IS  of  this  year  increased  by  more 
12  billion  over  the  same  period 
jar.  By  comparison,  a  1%  increase 
;rest  rates  would  increase  net  in- 
payments by  the  non-OPEC  LDCs 
y  about  $2.5  billion.  But  we're  not 

an  increase  in  interest  rates, 
's  been  a  slight  drop  in  the  last 
il  days,  and  I  believe  there  will  be 
of  that  ahead. 

3  we  can  be  pleased  at  the  improv- 
tlook  for  the  world's  economy.  But 
n't  be  complacent.  At  the 
msburg  and  London  economic 
lits,  my  colleagues  and  I  agreed 
f  we  are  to  make  the  strength  of 
iternational  economy  stronger  still, 
)und  domestic  policies  underlying 
nt  progress  must  be  preserved, 
think  we've  all  learned  from  bitter 
•ience  that  quick  fixes  don't  solve 
seated  problems.  The  more  difficult 
is  to  resist  the  temptation  of 


politically  expedient  solutions,  or  the 
pressure  of  powerful  interest  groups, 
and  to,  instead,  make  the  hard  choices 
necessary  to  advance  the  long-term  good 
of  all  the  people.  But  we  must 
persevere. 

Once  the  corner  has  been  turned, 
once  economic  growth  and  financial 
health  are  built  on  a  foundation  of 
granite  rather  than  playing  cards,  we 
will  have  opened  the  door  to  a  new 
future  of  opportunity  for  our  children 
and  our  children's  children. 

The  Need  To  Liberalize 
and  Expand  World  Trade 

For  their  sake  as  well  as  ours,  we  must 
not  only  go  forward  with  domestic 
policies  that  encourage  growth,  we  must 
staunchly  resist  policies  that  destroy  it. 
Let  me  underscore  the  special  impor- 
tance which  the  United  States  attaches 
to  resisting  protectionist  pressures. 

All  of  us  know  how  crucial  world 
trade  is  to  the  health  of  our  economies 
and  how  fiercely  competitive  trade  is 
nowadays.  Few  of  our  industries  are 
unaffected  by  the  pressure  on  foreign 
goods  and  services,  whether  competing 
for  sales  at  home  or  abroad.  Our  com- 
mon challenge  is  to  pursue  policies  per- 
mitting freer  and  fairer  trade. 

Now,  1  know  there's  been  concern, 
especially  among  debtor  countries,  that 
pressures  for  trade  protectionism  in  the 
United  States  could  lead  us  to  run  up 
the  flag,  erecting  new  import  barriers 
and  harming  prospects  for  their  export 
growth. 

Well,  we  believe  our  record  should 
put  those  doubts  to  rest.  Requests  for 
protection  on  tuna,  stainless  steel  flat- 
ware, shoes,  and  copper  have  all  been 
turned  down. 

And  only  last  week,  1  reaffirmed  the 
U.S.  commitment  to  an  open  world 
trading  system  by  rejecting  protectionist 
quota  and  tariff  relief  for  the  steel  in- 
dustry. I've  decided,  instead,  to  take 
vigorous  action  against  unfair  trade 
practices  in  steel  that  will  prove  to  be  in 
the  best  long-term  interest  of  consuming 
and  supplying  nations  alike. 

But  we're  not  just  fighting  protec- 
tionism; we  want  to  go  forward  toward 
more  open  markets.  At  the  London  sum- 
mit, we  pressed  for  new  efforts  to 
liberalize  and  expand  international 
trade.  Consultations  are  continuing 
among  the  GATT  [General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  countries  on  the 
possible  objectives,  arrangements,  and 
timing  for  a  new  negotiating  round.  For 
the  millions  around  the  globe  who  look 
to  us  for  help  and  hope,  I  urge  all  of  you 


today:  join  us.  Support  with  us  a  new, 
expanded  round  of  trade  liberalization, 
and,  together,  we  can  strengthen  the 
global  trading  system  and  assure  its 
benefits  spread  to  people  everywhere. 

There  is  not  just  my  challenge,  this 
is  our  challenge.  It  can  only  happen  if 
we  make  it  happen.  But  if  we  do,  if  each 
of  us  is  prepared  to  give  a  little,  the  peo- 
ple of  the  world  will  gain  a  lot. 

International  Financial  Issues 

Our  sensible  five-part  debt  strategy,  en- 
dorsed at  Williamsburg  and  strength- 
ened in  London,  has  shown  itself  to  be 
sufficiently  flexible  and  dynamic  to  meet 
the  diverse  needs  of  debtor  nations. 
These  nations,  in  partnership  with  the 
IMF,  are  charting  a  course  of  renewed 
prosperity  and  stability  which  can  serve 
as  a  guidepost  for  others  to  follow.  The 
international  financial  system  is  the 
ultimate  beneficiary  of  these  individual 
country  success  stories  and  is  stronger 
today  than  when  we  met  here  last  year. 

Providing  an  environment  to  foster 
lasting,  noninflationary  growth  requires 
financing  from  both  internal  and  exter- 
nal sources.  It  has  become  clear  that  a 
variety  of  capital  inflows  in  the  develop- 
ing countries  will  be  necessary.  Coun- 
tries will  have  to  rely  less  on  external 
debt  and  more  on  direct  private  in- 
vestment—both foreign  and  domestic. 

Policies  that  attract  foreign  in- 
vestors are  identical  with  those  policies 
that  encourage  domestic  savings  and  in- 
vestments and  contribute  to  the  efficient 
use  of  scarce  capital  resources;  positive 
real  interest  rates;  a  realistic  exchange 
rate;  free  convertibility  of  currency;  and 
a  respect  for  property  rights— in  short, 
an  economic  environment  that  allows  in- 
vestors to  earn  a  fair  deal  and  a  fair, 
real  after-tax  rate  of  return. 

At  the  last  economic  summit  in  Lon- 
don this  June,  we  also  urged  our  finance 
ministers  to:  "Consider  the  scope  for  in- 
tensified discussion  of  international 
financial  issues  of  particular  concern  to 
developing  countries  in  the  IBRD  [Inter- 
national Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development]  Development  Committee, 
an  appropriate  and  broadly  represen- 
tative forum  for  this  purpose." 

I  welcome  the  decision  by  the 
members  of  the  interim  committee  and 
the  Development  Committee  to  accept 
the  U.S.  proposal  announced  by 
[Treasury]  Secretary  Regan  to  sponsor 
an  enhanced  dialogue  on  ways  that  the 
industrialized  countries  can  better  pur- 
sue our  common  goal  of  achieving  sus- 
tained noninflationary  economic  growth 
throughout  the  world.  Your  institutions 


THE  PRESIDENT 


represent  the  best  means  of  cooperative- 
ly addressing  the  obstacles  to  realizing 
that  goal. 

As  we  go  forward,  we  will  support 
our  two  great  institutions,  the  IMF  and 
World  Bank,  which  have  been  the  cor- 
nerstones of  the  international  economic 
and  monetary  systems  since  World  War 
II.  The  United  States  remains  honored 
to  be  one  of  the  "founding  fathers"  of 
both  organizations.  Besides  their  enor- 
mous contributions  to  individual 
freedom,  prosperity,  and  initiative,  these 
multilateral  organizations  are  effectively 
handling  even  greater  responsibilities  as 
the  technological  revolution  ushers  in  an 
increasing  velocity  of  human  transac- 
tions and  greater  global  economic  in- 
terdependence. 

Last  year  the  World  Bank  com- 
mitted over  $15  billion  to  supplement 
the  efforts  of  developing  member  coun- 
tries to  strengthen  their  economies.  In 
addition  to  its  proven  expertise  as  an  in- 
vestment project  lender,  we  value  highly 
the  Bank's  ability  to  provide  helpful 
policy  guidance  and  technical  assistance 
and  to  act  as  a  catalyst  in  encouraging 
private  enterprise  and  investment 
capital. 

We  are  committed  to  providing  the 
agreed-upon  level  of  U.S.  contributions 
to  the  IBRD  selective  capital  increase, 
the  seventh  replenishment  of  IDA  [In- 
ternational Development  Association], 
and  the  capital  increase  of  the  IFC  [In- 
ternational Finance  Corporation]. 

The  IMF  has  always  had  a  central 
role  in  assisting  members  facing  serious 
balance-of-payments  problems,  and  it 
has  assumed  leadership  in  helping 
debtor  countries  design  economic  ad- 
justments which  seek  to  restore 
economic  and  financial  balance  and 
creditworthiness.  For  our  part,  con- 
siderable effort  went  into  negotiating 
and  obtaining  the  necessary  legislative 
concurrence  for  U.S.  participation  in  the 
quota  increase  which  provided  resources 
for  the  Fund  to  deal  with  this  difficult 
problem. 


We  don't  want  a  world  in  which 
some  nations  go  forward  while  others 
are  left  behind.  We  want  a  world  in 
which  all  go  forward  together.  And  we 
can  go  forward  together  if  our  countries 
give  up  spending  what  need  not  be  spent 
and  leave  more  in  the  hands  of  all  the 
people  who  work  and  earn.  Let  them 
plant  the  seeds  of  wealth,  and  we'll  see 
the  smallest  dreams  awaken  and  grow 
into  golden  dreams  for  all  mankind. 

Economic  Crisis  in 
Sub-Saharan  Africa 

Permit  me  to  take  a  brief  moment  to 
speak  about  a  subject  of  special  interest 
and  concern  to  our  government— the 
particularly  severe  economic  problems 
besetting  sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  Bank 
issued  the  third  in  a  series  of  excellent 
reports  on  this  subject,  and  we  look  for- 
ward to  working  with  the  Bank,  the 
Fund,  other  donors,  and  African  coun- 
tries in  developing  a  joint  response. 
Last  January  I  submitted  to  the 
Congress  legislation  called  the  Economic 
Policy  Initiative  for  Africa.  And  this  ini- 
tiative closely  parallels  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  World  Bank  concentrating 
on  flexible  donor  response  to  African 
economic  policy  reform  initiatives.  Our 
plans  call  for  a  U.S.  contribution  of  $500 
million  over  5  years.  And  this  would  be 
in  addition  to  ongoing  U.S.  economic 
assistance  programs  which  are  expected 
to  run  roughly  at  the  billion-dollar 
level— in  the  coming  year,  a  30%  in- 
crease over  such  assistance  levels  a  few 
years  ago. 


Conclusion 

I  look  out  at  all  of  you  this  morning 
people  from  so  many  different  culti 
and  countries,  speaking  so  many  diJ 
ferent  languages,  and  I  think,  of  co 
how  our  nations  spring  from  separe 
pasts,  how  many  of  us  live  at  opposj 
ends  of  the  Earth.  But  all  of  us,  I'n 
vinced,  have  been  brought  together) 
this  place  by  aspirations  that  bind  i 
friends  and  family.  I'm  talking  aboi. 
determination  to  help  people  build  : 
ter  life,  to  climb  from  the  shadows 
want  into  the  sunlight  of  prosperity 
That's  what  this  job  of  ours  is  all  al 
We're  a  little  like  climbers  who 
their  ascent  from  opposite  ends  of 
mountain.  The  harder  we  try,  the  h 
we  climb,  and  the  closer  we  come 
together— until  that  moment  we  re- 
the  peak,  and  we  are  as  one. 

What  I'm  describing  actually  di 
happen  in  real  life.  One  American  ii 
two  Japanese  groups  began  climbir 
Everest— the  Japanese  from  the  sii 
Nepal  and  the  Americans  from  the 
of  'Tibet.  The  conditions  were  so  di 
and  dangerous  that  before  it  endec, 
climbers  tragically  lost  their  lives. 
But  before  that  tragedy,  these  bra 
climbers  all  met  and  shook  hands  j 
under  the  summit.  And  then  they 
climbed  to  the  top  together  for  the 
magnificent  moment  of  triumph. 

Distinguished  colleagues  and  g 
friends,  we  are  not  asked  to  face  t 
kind  of  perils  those  climbers  did.  "i 
do  share  the  risks  affecting  the  fui 
economic  well-being  of  oiu-  nations 
of  the  world.  But  if  those  mountai 
could  join  hands  at  the  top  of  the  • 
imagine  how  high  our  people  can  ( 
all  of  us  work  together  as  powerfi 
ners  for  the  cause  of  good.  Togeth 
with  faith  in  each  other,  with  free 
our  guide,  there  is  nothing  that  w 
not  do. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  ol 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  1,  198 


il  SECRETARY 


le  Campaign  Against  Drugs; 
e  International  Dimension 


''IJI  •cretary  Shultz's  address^  before  the 
i  Chamber  of  Commerce  and 
on-and-a.nswer  session^  with  the 
ers  of  the  audience  in  Miami  on 
nber  U.  1984. 


ilk  today  about  a  problem  that 
ly  or  indirectly  affects  the  vvell- 
of  all  Americans.  That  problem  is 
tics.  And  I  would  like  to  discuss,  in 
uiar,  the  large  international  dimen- 
if  the  problem  and  what  we  are  do- 
1  confront  it. 

U  of  you  know  well  what  narcotics 
)ing  to  our  cities  and  our  society, 
ami,  in  New  York,  in  Chicago, 
lit,  Los  Angeles,  in  Washington— 
d,  in  almost  every  American  city— 
e  the  drug  problem  in  our  streets 
?arn  about  it  daily  in  our  media, 
ee  it  preying  on  our  nation's  youth, 
ee  it  eroding  families  and  com- 
ties.  We  see  the  crime  it  brings— 
lurders,  the  robberies,  and  the 
lized  crime  rings  who  have  made  it 
a  lucrative  business.  We  see  it 
oying  lives  indiscriminately— rich 
)oor,  black  and  white,  young  and 
Ne  can  measure  the  costs  of  drug 
in  many  ways— in  lost  productivi- 
escalating  health  and  social  costs, 
nost  profoundly,  in  the  senseless 
e  of  life. 

Ve  see  the  drug  problem  in  its  enor- 
and  sometimes  we  wonder  how  it 
)ossibly  be  addressed.  I  will  not 

before  you  and  say  that  there  are 
le  solutions.  Nor,  clearly,  can  solu- 
be  found  solely  through  govern- 
:al  actions.  Drug  abuse  is  one  of  the 
ring  symptoms  of  a  deeper  social 
cultural  phenomenon:  the  weakening 
le  traditional  values  of  family  and 
nunity  and  religious  faith  that  we 
suffered  for  some  time  in  Western 

•ty. 

3ur  Founding  Fathers  created  a 
em  of  government  that  could  protect 
ights  and  freedoms  of  the  in- 
lual.  But  they  deeply  believed  that 
?thing  more  was  needed  to  protect 
spiritual  health  of  the  nation.  The 
fully  constructed  edifice  of  a  free 
;ty  had  to  be  buttressed  by  an  en- 
ng  public  and  private  morality.  And 
Founders  also  believed  that  uphold- 
this  morality  was  not  primarily  the 
of  govei-nment  but  of  our  educa- 
al,  religious,  and  social  institutions, 
families  and  communities. 


So  when  we  look  at  the  nation's 
drug  problems,  we  must  bear  in  mind 
that  government  does  not  have  all  the 
answers.  Technical  solutions  devised  by 
pui)lic  officials  cannot  alone  repair  this 
loose  strand  in  our  society's  moral 
fabric.  In  our  public  life  we  must  restore 
the  faith  in  family,  church,  and  com- 
munity that  has  kept  democracy  strong 
for  over  two  centuries. 

I  believe  such  a  restoration  is  occur- 
ring. Faith  in  these  institutions  is  re- 
turning. And  we  can  see  this  even  in  the 
nation's  changing  attitudes  toward  the 
drug  problem.  Today,  there  is  a  spread- 
ing consensus  across  America  that  drug 
abuse  is  not  fashionable;  it  is  immoral. 
We  have  rejected  the  fatalistic  view  that 
drug  abuse  as  a  national  phenomenon  is 
here  to  stay.  Parents,  community  orga- 
nizations, educational  and  religious  in- 
stitutions are  heeding  President 
Reagan's  call  "to  join  the  battle  against 
drug  abuse." 

The  Federal  Strategy 

Government,  of  course,  must  do  its  part, 
with  energy  and  determination.  As  you 
know,  this  Administration  has  made  the 
reduction  of  national  drug  abuse  one  of 
its  highest  priorities.  We  have  worked 
hard  to  devise  new  ways  to  attack  the 
problem  on  all  fronts.  President  Reagan 
has  called  drug  abuse  "one  of  the 
gravest  problems  facing  us,"  and  at  his 
direction,  this  Administration  has  set 
forth  a  comprehensive  Federal  Strategy 
for  the  Prevention  of  Drug  Abuse  and 
Drug  Trafficking.  This  Federal  strategy 
has  five  central  components  that  attack 
the  pr(jblem  at  every  link  of  the  chain 
that  extends  from  the  grower  to  the 
user  of  narcotics.  We  have  devised  ex- 
tensive programs  for: 

First,  prevention,  which  includes 
educating  our  youth  about  the  dangers 
of  drugs; 

Second,  detoxification  and  treat- 
ment for  drug  abusers; 

Third,  research  aimed  at  under- 
standing the  causes  and  consequences  of 
drug  abuse; 

Fourth,  drug  law  enforcement  to  de- 
stroy drug  networks  and  interdict  drug 
supplies  before  they  reach  the  con- 
sumers; and 

Fifth,  international  cooperation  to 
control  the  production  and  shipment  of 
narcotics. 


This  five-point  strategy  adds  up  to 
an  aggressive  approach  to  this  multi- 
faceted  problem.  And  we  are  pursuing 
each  path  with  great  vigor. 

You  are  all  aware  of  what  this  Ad- 
ministration has  been  doing  to  address 
the  domestic  aspects  of  our  drug  prob- 
lem. The  First  Lady  has  made  it  her 
personal  crusade  to  educate  our  youth 
on  the  dangers  of  drugs,  and  Nancy 
Reagan's  valiant  efforts  have  given 
great  impetus  to  this  dimension  of  na- 
tional prevention.  Vice  President  Bush 
has  played  the  leading  role  in  improving 
our  domestic  drug  interdiction  efforts. 
As  you  know,  he  is  the  head  of  the 
South  Florida  Task  Force,  and  he  is  also 
the  head  of  the  National  Narcotics 
Border  Interdiction  System.  These  and 
other  efforts  have  shown  encouraging 
results  on  the  domestic  side  of  the  prob- 
lem. It  should  be  clear  that  demand 
helps  create  supply,  and  we  cannot  ex- 
pect to  meet  the  challenge  of  drug  abuse 
without  doing  all  we  can  to  reduce  the 
demand  for  drugs  here  at  home. 

The  International  Dimension 

It  is  equally  clear,  however,  that  we  can- 
not meet  the  challenge  of  drug  abuse 
here  at  home  without  also  attacking  the 
worldwide  network  of  narcotics  produc- 
tion and  trafficking.  I  want  you  to  know 
that  drug  abuse  is  not  only  a  top  priority 
for  this  Administration's  domestic  policy, 
it  is  a  top  priority  in  our  foreign  policy 
as  well. 

Every  year,  drug  traffickers  smug- 
gle into  this  country  4  metric  tons  of 
heroin;  as  much  as  70  metric  tons  of  co- 
caine; and  as  much  as  15,000  metric 
tons  of  marijuana.  These  drugs  come 
from  all  over  the  world:  from  Colombia, 
Peru,  Bolivia,  Mexico,  Belize,  Jamaica, 
Pakistan,  Afghanistan,  Iran,  Thailand, 
and  Burma.  Once  the  crops  are  pro- 
duced in  these  countries,  they  are  often 
shipped  elsewhere  for  processing  and 
then  in  their  refined  narcotic  form  are 
shipped  again  to  local  suppliers  in 
Western  Europe,  the  United  States,  and 
throughout  the  industrialized  world. 
Drug  money  is  laundered  in  interna- 
tional financial  markets.  Middlemen  are 
hired  to  smuggle  the  drugs  past  customs 
officials  and  the  Coast  Guard.  It  is  a 
smooth  and  ever  more  efficient  opera- 
tion that  is  truly  an  international  effort. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Our  concern  about  this  growing  nar- 
cotics network  is  twofold.  I  have  already 
noted  its  severe  impact  on  our  own  peo- 
ple. But  it  also  represents  a  threat  to 
American  interests  of  a  different  sort. 
The  fact  is,  it  is  an  example  of  a  larger 
and  relatively  new  kind  of  foreign  policy 
problem  that  confronts  the  civilized 
world  today.  It  is  part  of  a  trend  toward 
international  lawlessness  that  has  been 
increasing  ominously  over  the  past  two 
decades. 


Meeting  the  Challenge 

To  meet  the  challenge  of  international 
narcotics  trafficking  requires,  above  all, 
international  cooperation  between  those 
nations  that  share  our  concern  about 
this  growing  threat  to  our  societies. 

During  this  Administration,  we  have 
gone  beyond  all  previous  efforts  to  pro- 
mote international  cooperation  on  nar- 
cotics control.  In  September  1981,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  laid  out  our  objectives.  He 


Today,  there  is  a  spreading  consensus  across 
America  that  drug  abuse  is  not  fashionable;  it  is 
immoral. 


This  trend  barkens  back  to  the  days 
when  piracy  on  the  seas  was  rampant, 
when  the  civilized  nations  of  the  world 
were  unable  or  unwilling  to  combat  it 
systematically.  The  modern  versions  of 
piracy  are  narcotics  trafficking,  ter- 
rorism, and  similar  kinds  of  outlaw  be- 
havior. Not  surprisingly,  there  is  ample 
evidence  that  shows  that  all  these  differ- 
ent types  of  lawlessness  are  linked. 
Money  from  drug  smuggling  supports 
terrorists.  Terrorists  provide  assistance 
to  drug  traffickers.  Organized  crime 
works  hand  in  hand  with  these  other 
outlaws  for  their  own  profit.  And  what 
may  be  most  disturbing  is  the  mounting 
evidence  that  some  governments  are  in- 
volved, too,  for  their  own  diverse 
reasons.  There  are  demonstrable  links 
between  drug  trafficking,  terrorism,  and 
some  communist  governments,  which  I 
will  come  back  to  in  a  moment. 

The  civilized  world  faces,  therefore, 
not  just  separate  and  isolated  incidents 
of  violence  and  banditry  but  a  systemic, 
global  problem  of  growing  proportions. 
And  this  global  problem  poses  a  unique— 
and  deliberate — challenge  to  the  world 
order  that  Americans  and  all  civilized 
peoples  seek:  a  world  order  based  on 
justice  and  the  rule  of  law. 

Novel  problems  require  fresh  think- 
ing, new  tools,  and  new  approaches.  You 
have  my  personal  pledge  that  the 
Department  of  State  is  committed  to 
this  effort.  We  have  been  working  close- 
ly with  Federal  drug  enforcement  agen- 
cies on  new  ways  of  dealing  with  the 
growing  narcotics  problem  on  an  inter- 
national level.  And  we  do  so  not  only  to 
fight  the  calamity  of  domestic  drug 
abuse  but  to  fight  the  growing  threat  of 
international  lawlessness  as  well. 


called  for  "a  foreign  policy  that  vigorous- 
ly seeks  to  interdict  and  eradicate  illicit 
drugs,  wherever  cultivated,  processed, 
or  transported."  American  officials  at 
the  highest  levels — including  President 
Reagan,  Vice  President  Bush,  and 
myself,  our  ambassadors  and  senior 
State  Department  officials— have  con- 
tinually emphasized  to  foreign  leaders 
the  importance  we  attach  to  their 
cooperation  on  the  narcotics  issue.  We 
have  placed  our  greatest  emphasis  on 
reaching  bilateral  agreements  on  crop 
control,  eradication,  and  interdiction 
with  nations  where  narcotics  are  pro- 
duced, shipped,  and  consumed.  We  have 
also  worked  hard  in  the  United  Nations 
to  support  international  efforts  to  stem 
the  flow  of  drugs  and  reduce  production. 

Many  nations,  concerned  as  we  are 
with  the  drug  problem,  have  taken  sig- 
nificant steps.  In  Colombia,  an  aerial 
herbicide  eradication  program  that 
began  July  5  has  destroyed  more  than 
4,200  acres  of  marijuana,  a  truly  major 
breakthrough  in  the  global  control  ef- 
fort. This  initial  effort  alone  could  keep 
nearly  $3-billion  worth  of  marijuana  off 
our  streets — and  the  Colombian  pro- 
gram has  just  started.  In  Peru,  despite 
the  threat  of  terrorism,  authorities  have 
eradicated  nearly  5,000  acres  of  coca 
bushes  used  to  produce  cocaine;  in  fact, 
the  government  has  recently  sent  its 
military  forces  into  the  coca-growing 
region.  We  are  working  with  other 
South  American  governments  to  prevent 
the  spread  of  drug  production  into  new 
source  areas. 

In  Asia,  the  Government  of  Pakistan 
continues  to  extend  its  ban  on  cultiva- 
tion of  opium  poppy  into  additional 
areas  of  the  Northwest  Frontier  Prov- 
ince, and  it  has  reported  sharply  in- 
creased seizures  of  heroin  in  the  first 


quarter  of  1984.  And  this  month.  Pal 
stani  officials  seized  163  kilograms  oi 
opium  and  20  kilograms  of  heroin  in 
raid  on  a  heroin  laboratory.  The  Tha 
Government  has  increased  its  commi 
ment  to  controlling  opium  cultivation 
villages  that  receive  development  ass 
ance  and  moved  aggressively  against 
opium  warlords.  The  Burmese  Gover 
ment  is  exploring  with  us  more  systf 
atic  methods  of  eradication. 

All  told,  we  will  be  spending  ove 
$100  million  on  worldwide  narcotics 
trol  programs  in  1985. 

We  know  the  difficulties  involvec 
reducing  crop  production.  In  many  p 
ducer  countries,  narcotics  productior 
or  has  become  an  important  fact  of 
everyday  life.  There  are  parts  of  the 
world  where  opium  and  coca  are  use 
part  of  centiu-ies-old  traditions,  and, 
course,  many  nations  have  growing  ; 
diction  problems  of  their  own  which 
courage  narcotics  production.  Finall; 
many  producer  countries  are  just  to( 
poor  to  mount  effective  crop  control 
eradication  programs. 

Our  international  narcotics  polic 
are  aimed  at  overcoming  these  obst; 
We  are  providing  bilateral  assistanc 
1984  to  18  governments  whose  expe 
or  resources  are  insufficient  to  mee1 
challenge  of  crop  reduction.  We  hav 
couraged  multilateral  assistance  thr 
the  UN  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Conti 
and  other  international  organization 
The  Department  of  State  has  work€ 
with  the  U.S.  Drug  Enforcement  Ai 
istration,  the  Customs  Service,  and 
Coast  Guard  to  provide  training  to 
foreign  governments  in  narcotics  co 
trol,  enforcement,  and  interdiction. 
Since  1971,  we  have  provided  funds 
train  more  than  25,000  foreign  enft 
ment  officers,  and  in  1985  we  will  f 
vide  more  funds  to  train  an  additioi 
2,000  officers  in  30  different  counti 
We  have  also  tried  to  help  foreign 
governments  alert  their  publics  tot 
threat  that  drug  abuse  poses  to  the 
societies. 

But  the  toughest  challenge  we  1 
until  recently  was  simply  convincinj 
other  nations  that  narcotics  traffick 
is  an  international  problem  that  req 
international  efforts.  For  a  long  tin 
foreign  governments  considered  na 
cotics  an  exclusively  American  prol: 
Today,  that  is  changing. 

In  Colombia,  to  take  one  examj 
the  Minister  of  Health  has  declared 
drug  addiction  is  the  greatest  healt 
threat  to  Colombian  youth,  and  Col 
bian  law  enforcement  agencies  havt 
s|)onded  with  commendable  vigor.  I 
March,  the  Colombian  police  discov' 
vast,  complex  cocaine  processing 


Ml 


THE  SECRETARY 


tic 


ities  hidden  in  the  Amazon  jungle, 
ne  case,  10  tons  of  cocaine  and  co- 
e  base,  with  a  street  value  of  over 
on,  were  destroyed.  Colombian 
ic  opinion  was  shocked  at  the  dis- 
'*  ry  of  these  drug  camps,  some  of 
;h  were  operating  side  by  side  with 
rilla  camps.  They  were  outraged  by 
subsequent  assassination  of  Colom- 
'■''  ;  Minister  of  Justice,  apparently 

Ted  by  the  drug  traffickers.  Colom- 
;i)t  ,  President  Betancur  has  ordered  an 
'"'   ut  war  on  the  narcotics  traffic. 

Other  nations  have  come  painfully  to 
' '  ize  that  narcotics  is  their  problem, 
""    and  that  only  through  international 
)eration  can  the  world  community 
to  combat  the  international  nar- 
3S  network.  The  leaders  of  the  An- 
1  nations  and  Argentina,  meeting  in 
*  ;o  last  month,  expressed  to  Vice 
sident  Bush  their  deep  concern  over 
problems  caused  by  narcotics  pro- 
ion  and  trafficking  in  their  region, 
ouraged  by  the  sense  of  urgency  in 
r  appeal  and  their  willingness  to 
k  together,  we  are  responding  with 
nfic  proposals  to  strengthen  regional 
aeration  on  drug  law  enforcement, 
imunications,  and  information 
ring. 

Several  important  and  distressing 
elopments  have  contributed  to  this 
wing  international  awareness.  In 
stern  Europe,  and  in  the  countries 
re  narcotics  are  produced,  drag  ad- 
liftion  has  begun  to  assume  alarming 
portions.  The  crime  that  inevitably 
ompanies  increased  drag  abuse  has 
inn  to  arouse  popular  anger  even  in 
«  ntries  traditionally  tolerant  of  drug 
.  And,  in  some  countries,  the  in- 
ased  corruption  that  results  from  in- 
nee  peddling  by  organized  crime  and 
jor  drug  smugglers  has  become  a  na- 
nal  calamity  threatening  the  stability 
III  i  continued  survival  of  the  govern- 
nts  themselves. 

Narcotics  trafficking  poses  a  special 
eat  to  democratic  nations  in  the  de- 
oping  world.  Where  democratic  in- 
tutions  and  legal  systems  are  in  their 
incy,  the  corruption  and  crime 
lught  on  by  narcotics  trafficking  can 
too  much  for  the  government  to 
ndle.  Their  stark  choice  may  be  be- 
een  resorting  to  undemocratic  meas- 
es on  the  one  hand  or  capitulating  to 
minals  on  the  other.  In  either  case, 
i  result  may  be  loss  of  public  faith  in 
mocratic  institutions.  Elected  leaders, 
ch  as  those  in  Bolivia,  Colombia,  and 
ru,  recognize  the  dangers  that  nar- 
tics  trafficking  poses  to  democracy 
I  ;elf. 


lb 


Add  to  all  this  the  fact  that  nar- 
cotics trafficking  is  undermining  the  in- 
tegrity of  international  financial  centers. 
According  to  some  estimates,  the  drug 
trade  may  involve  up  to  $80  billion  each 
year,  and  drug  money  is  often  laundered 
through  otherwise  respectable  financial 
institutions,  including  the  offshore  bank- 
ing centers  of  the  Caribbean  Basin  and 
in  Europe,  Hong  Kong,  and  Singapore. 

And  finally,  as  I  mentioned,  interna- 
tional concern  has  been  reinforced  by 
the  realization  that  narcotics  traffickers, 
terrorists,  and  communist  revolu- 
tionaries increasingly  make  common 
cause  in  their  separately  destructive  ac- 
tivities. I  would  like  to  take  a  few 
moments  to  elaborate  on  what  we  have 
learned  about  this  disturbing  interrela- 
tionship in  recent  years. 

The  Links  With  Terrorism  and 
Communist  Insurgencies 

For  years,  the  world  had  good  reason  to 
suspect  that  narcotics  smugglers  were 
being  aided  by  some  governments:  that 
they  wei-e  getting  money  and  protection, 
that  they  were  being  provided  safe 
havens  and  support  in  shipping  drugs  to 
the  United  States  and  elsewhere.  One  of 
the  most  prominent  suspects  was  com- 
munist Cuba.  Over  the  years,  the  case 
against  Cuba  mounted  until,  finally,  in 
November  1982,  four  high-level  Cuban 
officials  were  indicted  by  a  Miami  grand 
jury  for  helping  a  major  Colombian  nar- 
cotics trafficker.  That  case  provided 
startling  evidence  of  Cuban  complicity  in 
Latin  American  narcotics  trafficking. 


with  his  drug-smuggling  racket,  (iuillot 
[larticipated  in  a  plan  to  provide 
weapons  to  the  M-19,  a  terrorist  group 
that  operates  in  Colombia. 

The  pattern,  long  suspected,  was 
finally  and  clearly  established.  Cuba  was 
using  drag  smugglers  to  funnel  arms  to 
terrorists  and  communist  insurgents. 
And  Cuba's  involvement  is  not  unique. 
Later  evidence  has  shown  that  the  San- 
dinista  regime  in  Nicaragua  has  also 
been  involved  in  drug-smuggling  ac- 
tivities. To  facilitate  his  safe  travel 
through  Central  America,  Guillot  was 
granted  a  Nicaraguan  visa  by 
Nicaragua's  Ambassador  to  Mexico,  ap- 
parently on  the  request  of  an  M-19 
leader. 

Recent  investigations  by  the  Drag 
Enforcement  Administration  have 
revealed  the  extent  of  continuing  San- 
dinista  involvement.  On  July  17,  the 
U.S.  Government  filed  a  complaint  in 
the  U.S.  District  Court  in  Miami  charg- 
ing two  Colombians  and  a  Nicaraguan 
official— Frederico  Vaughan,  an  assist- 
ant to  Interior  Minister  Tomas  Borge — 
with  possession,  conspiracy  to  distribute, 
and  importation  of  cocaine.  Between 
March  and  July  1984,  these  men  con- 
spired to  smuggle  a  shipment  of  about 
1,500  kilograms  of  cocaine  from  Colom- 
bia to  the  United  States  through  Nica- 
ragua. Interior  Minister  Borge's  assist- 
ant helped  load  this  cocaine  shipment 
onto  a  U.S. -bound  plane  on  June  4.  The 
drug  traffickers  were  allowed  to  park 
their  aircraft  in  the  military  side  of 
Managua  airport,  and  we  have  photo- 


.  .  .  drug  abuse  is  not  only  a  top  priority  for  this 
Administration's  domestic  policy,  it  is  a  top  priori- 
ty in  our  foreign  policy  as  well. 


According  to  evidence  revealed  in 
the  course  of  that  investigation,  a  Col- 
ombian drug  smuggler,  Guillot  Lara, 
was  recruited  by  Cuba's  Ambassador  to 
Colombia.  The  Ambassador  offered 
Cuban  Government  help  in  smuggling 
drugs  to  the  United  States.  Cuban 
waters  were  provided  as  a  safe  haven 
for  the  transfer  of  narcotics  to  boats 
bound  for  Miami.  Certain  Cuban  authori- 
ties were  instructed  to  leave  Guillot  and 
his  men  alone  while  they  went  about 
their  business.  In  return,  the  Cuban 
Government  received  payments,  in  hard 
cash,  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
dollars. 

But  there  was  another  element  in 
this  elaborate  deal.  In  return  for  help 


graphs  that  show  Sandinista  troops  help- 
ing the  traffickers  load  the  cocaine  onto 
the  plane.  All  these  facts  suggest  that 
other  Nicaraguan  officials  in  addition  to 
Vaughan  participated  in  the  drug- 
smuggling  plot. 

The  complicity  of  communist  govern- 
ments in  the  drug  trade  is  cause  for 
grave  concern  among  the  nations  of  the 
free  world.  It  is  part  of  a  larger  pattern 
of  international  lawlessness  by  com- 
munist nations  that,  as  we  have  seen, 
also  includes  support  for  international 
terrorism  and  other  forms  of  organized 
violence  against  legitimate  governments. 
Nor  is  the  link  between  narcotics,  ter- 
rorism, and  communism  confined  to 


THE  SECRETARY 


Latin  America.  We  have  seen  such  net- 
works in  Italy  and  Turkey,  though  both 
governments  have  cracked  down  hard 
with  remarkable  success.  A  similar  net- 
work currently  operates  in  Burma.  And 
we  have  evidence  of  Bulgarian  complici- 
ty in  the  illicit  arms  and  drug-smuggling 
business. 

We  can  only  speculate  as  to  the 
motives  for  communist  involvement  in 
the  drug  trade.  We  know  that,  with 
their  failing  economies,  Cuba  and 


Second,  the  international  communi- 
ty must  assist  those  nations  that  lack 
the  resources  to  take  the  necessary 
steps. 

Third,  worldwide  emphasis  must  be 
on  crop  control  and  eradication— we 
have  seen  that  interdiction  alone  is  not 
the  answer. 

Fourth,  in  producer  nations  that 
need  our  help,  our  narcotics-related  eco- 
nomic assistance  must  i)e  linked  to 
agreements  on  reducing  croj)  levels. 


We  have  placed  our  greatest  emphasis  reaching 
bilateral  agreements  on  crop  control,  eradication, 
and  interdiction  with  nations  where  narcotics  are 
produced,  shipped,  and  consumed. 


Nicaragua  need  hard  cash  to  buy  essen- 
tial goods.  We  have  seen  how  Cuba  uses 
drug  smugglers  to  funnel  arms  to  com- 
munist insurgencies  and  terrorists.  And 
it  is  not  hard  to  imagine  that  smuggling 
massive  amounts  of  drugs  into  Western 
nations  may  serve  their  broader  goal  of 
attempting  to  weaken  the  fabric  of 
Western  democratic  society. 

I  am  not  suggesting  that  if  we  were 
able  to  end  communist  support  for  the 
international  narcotics  network,  our 
drug  problems  would  be  over,  or  even 
that  they  would  be  substantially  re- 
duced. Clearly  the  problem  is  much  big- 
ger than  that.  But  as  we  look  toward 
solutions  to  the  problem  of  drug  abuse, 
the  free  world  cannot  ignore  the  role  of 
communist  governments.  And  I  would 
suggest  that  the  implications  of  their  in- 
volvement in  this  form  of  international 
lawlessness  go  beyond  the  drug  problem. 
Government  support  for  outlaws  cannot 
be  tolerated  by  the  civilized  nations  if  we 
are  to  build  a  world  order  based  on  law 
and  justice. 

What  the  Reagan  Administration 
Has  Accomplished 

The  hurdles  we  face  in  confronting  this 
problem  are  many,  but  we  have  made 
significant  strides  in  recent  years.  Our 
international  narcotics  policy  has  rested 
on  four  basic  principles: 

First,  countries  where  narcotics  are 
produced  or  through  which  drugs  are 
shipped  must  accept  their  respon- 
sibilities under  international  treaties  to 
reduce  crops  and  interdict  drug  smug- 
gling. 


Our  goal  must  be  to  control  nar- 
cotics production  in  all  geographic  areas 
simultaneously.  We  have  learned  the 
hard  way  that  markets  shift  to  meet  de- 
mand; we  cannot  focus  on  only  a  few 
areas  at  a  time.  When  we  helped  reduce 
heroin  production  in  Turkey,  for  exam- 
ple, increased  production  in  Mexico  filled 
the  gap.  A  truly  international  effort 
aimed  at  all  producer  nations  is  essen- 
tial. And  we  are  moving  down  that  path. 

In  1981,  when  this  Administration 
took  office,  we  had  commitments  to 
work  on  reducing  narcotics  crops  from 
Burma,  Turkey,  and  Mexico.  Today, 
thanks  to  this  Administration's  effcjrts 
and  to  the  growing  concern  of  leaders  in 
producer  countries,  we  also  have  com- 
mitments from  Pakistan,  Colombia, 
Belize,  Peru,  and  Bolivia.  In  Pakistan, 
the  world's  leading  supplier  of  heroin, 
we  have  seen  tremendous  results. 
Thanks  in  part  to  the  extraordinary  ef- 
forts of  the  Pakistani  Government  and 
to  U.S.  assistance,  raw  opium  produc- 
tion has  been  reduced  from  a  massive 
800  metric  tons  per  year  in  1979  to 
under  60  metric  tons  per  year  in  1983. 
Mexico's  production  of  processed  heroin, 
once  as  high  as  7.5  metric  tons  per  year, 
was  reduced  to  1.4  metric  tons  in  1983. 

What  Remains  To  Be  Done 

Much  has  been  done,  and  we  are  only 
beginning  the  fight.  Obviously,  we  still 
have  a  long  way  to  go.  Some  countries 
have  not  done  enough  to  reduce  their 
crop  levels.  Others  could  do  more  t'.) 
curb  the  flow  of  narcotics  through  their 
territory  and  airspace  and  end  their  use 
as  a  way  station  by  drug  traffickers.  We 
must  seek  greater  cooperation  and  in- 
creased effectiveness  in  reducing  culti- 


vation in  all  of  the  producer  nations. 
Overall  crop  production  still  provides  a 
surplus  of  narcotics  that  greatly  excea 
not  only  American  but  worldwide  de- 
mand. 

And  we  know  that  the  internatiom 
narcotics  network  is  larger,  more  effi- 
cient, and  more  sophisticated  than  eve. 
before.  The  narcotics  market  is  an  evfj 
shifting  phenomenon  that  adapts  to  e^ 
new  method  we  devise  to  confront  it. 
Drug  smugglers  have  managed  to  find 
new  ways  of  smuggling  to  elude  our 
stepped-up  efforts.  Finally,  we  have 
seen  that  some  communist  nations  cur 
tinue  to  use  the  drug  trade  for  their 
purposes  and,  therefore,  have  an  in- 
terest in  its  perpetuation.  The  interna 
tional  drug  problem,  therefore,  presen 
an  increasing  challenge  to  our  intelli- 
gence community  to  provide  good  esti 
mates  of  narc<.)tics  production  and  to 
trace  the  links  between  drugs,  ter- 
rorism, and  communist  insurgencies. 

But  we  are  making  progress.  We 
have  a  policy  in  place  that  addresses  ? 
aspects  of  the  international  problem— 
the  cultivation,  production,  and  distrii 
tion  of  drugs,  the  flow  of  profits,  the 
pacts  upon  other  countries  as  well  as 
our  own.  And  we  have  developed  broi 
based  international  support  for  contn 
ling  the  narcotics  trade. 

I  believe  that  our  diplomatic  and   | 
program  efforts,  together  with  the  in  ' 
creasing  awareness  in  producer  coun- 
tries of  the  disastrous  effects  on  then  ; 
the  drug  trade,  are  improving  the  pre 
pects  of  narcotics  control.  But  these 
substantial  successes  can  be  severely 
damaged  by  perceptions  overseas  abc 
what  is  happening  in  the  United  Stat' 
To  a  greater  degree  than  many  peopl. 
realize,  our  success  in  international  n  i 
cotics  control  is  dependent  on  the  sue : 
cess  of  our  assault  on  drug  abuse  at 
home.  It  will  be  hard  to  convince  oili 
nations  to  put  an  end  to  drug  cultiva 
if  they  believe  we  are  not  living  up  t( 
our  own  responsibility  to  get  a  griji  ■ 
the  drug  problem  here.  We  cannot 
preach  what  we  do  not  practice. 

This  is  why  what  we  do  here  and 
throughout  our  own  country  is  so  im 
portant  to  our  overall  efforts.  The  of 
ficials  in  every  community  across  thi: 
nation  must  understand  that  effective 
foreign  policies  of  narcotics  control  a 
clearly  linked  to  an  effective  domesti 
program  against  drug  abuse. 

And  we  must  recognize  that  our 
ternational  campaign  against  drug  al 
rests  ultimately  on  our  ability  to  redi 
the  demand  for  drugs  here  in  the  Un 
States. 

By  redoubling  our  efforts  throng 
out  this  country,  we  send  a  message 


THE  SECRETARY 


X  e  in  other  countries,  and  to  their 
■nments,  that  we  in  the  United 
s  intend  to  control  our  own  drug 

L  '  problem, 
resident  Reagan  has  designated  the 
k-eek  of  September  as  National 
Abuse  Education  and  Prevention 
.  The  President  is  determined  to 
his  effort,  for  the  narcotics  proh- 
lOses  a  direct  threat  to  this  nation's 
s  and  goals,  both  domestic  and  in- 
tional. 

e  are  confronting  that  threat,  and 
e  making  significant  progress.  Sue- 
will  take  time  and  hard  work.  But 
re  building  a  foundation  for  the 
e— a  future  not  only  of  reduced 
abuse  in  our  country  but  of  a  world 
e  there  is  no  room  and  no  tolerance 
utlaws. 

t  is  an  effort  that  calls  for  broad 
nal  support  from  all  Americans. 

J.  The  Soviet  Union  has  provided 

1  scholarships  for  Panamanian 
ents,  50  of  which  will  deal  with 
l-related  studies.  The  U.S.  has 
provided  one.  Are  we  planning  to 
nd  the  Latin  American  scholar- 
program  in  the  very  near  future 
unteract  Soviet  influence? 
A.  I  think  the  promotion  of  scholar- 
^  programs  and  the  coming  to  the 
ried  States  for  study  from  people  all 
'f  the  world  is  one  of  the  best  things 
s  we  can  do,  whether  it's  related  to 
f.'anal  or  the  Soviet  Union  or  not— 
s  in  terms  of  our  own  interests — and 
31  a  strong  supporter  of  programs  of 
-  kind. 

Actually,  we  do  a  great  deal,  mostly 
inuh  private  organizations  of  one 

or  another,  so  there's  a  big  flow  of 
I  ents  to  the  United  States.  But  we 
n'ld  do  more,  and  I  think  that  we 
'  1  to  examine — and  we  are  examin- 

i- various  government  programs  to 
nvolved  in  this. 

Q.  What  are  your  thoughts  on 
hther  or  not  an  early  solution  to  the 
at  crises  of  the  less  developed  coun- 

s  is  possible? 

A.  We  have  seen  a  great  deal  of 
^ress  on  this  debt  problem  when  the 
gan  Administration  came  to  office. 
1  when  I  arrived  on  the  scene  about  2 
rs  or  so  ago,  we  found  this  problem 
3ur  doorstep,  and  it's  been  a  great 
blem.  But  there  is  a  clear  strategy 

in  place  for  dealing  with  it.  I 
eve  it  has  been  very  well  ad- 
listered  by  the  IIVIF  [International 
netary  Fund]  and  the  work  of 
ques  de  Larosiere,  the  Frenchman, 
D  is  the  chairman;  and  our  own 
retary  of  the  Treasury,  Don  Regan; 
'6  Chairman  of  our  Federal  Reserve 


Board,  Paul  Volcker— who,  working 
with  their  counterparts,  have  done  an 
excellent  job.  There  is  a  strategy,  and 
within  that  strategy  a  case-by-case  ef- 
fort, to  help  countries  get  their  house  in 
order.  And  then,  as  this  has  been  hap- 
pening, we've  had  the  benefit — largely 
because  of  what's  been  happening  in  the 
United  States— of  a  newly  expanding 
world  economy. 

So  if  we  can  help  countries  get  their 
house  in  order  and  then  help  provide, 
along  with  other  countries,  an  expanding 
world  economy,  we  provide  the  basis  for 
working  out  from  under  the  debt  prob- 
lem. And  we  see  very  considerable  suc- 
cess in  some  countries.  Others  seem  to 
be  having  a  lot  of  trouble  facing  up  to 
their  problems. 

I  think  that  is  a  very  difficult  set  of 
problems  but  one  on  which  a  great  deal 
of  headway  has  been  made.  And  it  was 
interesting  to  me,  in  looking  at  the  an- 
nual report  that's  just  come  out  of  the 
Chairman  of  the  IMF,  to  see  their 
assessment  that  things  are  in  much  bet- 
ter shape  now  than  they  were,  say,  a 
year  and  a  half  or  2  years  ago — not  that 
there  aren't  plenty  of  problems  ahead. 
But  we  do  have  a  strategy,  we  are  mak- 
ing headway,  and  we  have  a  number  of 
successes  that  we  can  point  to. 

Q.  How  will  the  recently  published 
report  detailing  Soviet  arms  control 
treaty  violations  affect  the  Admin- 
istration's negotiating  posture  toward 
the  Soviets? 

A.  I  don't  know  what  recently 
published  report  you're  talking  about. 
There  was  a  report  made  by  the  Presi- 
dent to  the  Congress — last  January,  I 
believe  it  was — and  seven  instances 
were  picked  out,  and  they  illustrate 
various  kinds  of  problems  connected 
with  arms  control  agreements  with  the 
Soviet  Union. 

The  problems  are  not  simply  the 
question  of  gross  violations  or  not, 
although  we  believe  there  are  instances 
of  that,  but  also  it  illuminates  for  you,  if 
you  happen  to  be  preparing  to  negotiate 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  that  they're  pret- 
ty good  negotiators  and  they're  pretty 
good  at  loophole  designing.  So  you  have 
to  watch  that,  and  you  have  to  watch 
vague  things  in  treaties  that  can  mean 
different  things  to  different  people— as 
well  as,  of  course,  looking  to  the  impor- 
tance of  verification  measures  that 
enable  you  to  trace  whether  a  violation 
is  taking  place  or  not — and,  in  addition, 
designing  treaties  so  that  their  operation 
is  in  the  mutual  interests  of  both  parties. 
Then  there  tend  to  be  incentives  built  in 
by  both  parties  to  observe  the  treaty. 


So  there  is  a  great  deal  to  be 
learned  from  studies  of  these  negotia- 
tions and  the  treaties.  Some  of  it  was 
brought  out  in  a  report  the  President 
made,  as  I  said,  last  January.  There  are 
lots  of  other  reports  floating  around, 
and  they're  in  various  stages  of  presen- 
tation and  declassification  and  so  on, 
and  I  don't  know  just  when  they  might 
emerge. 

Q.  Since  1968,  Panama  has  been 
under  direct  or  indirect  military  rule. 
Panama's  international  position  re- 
mains, clearly.  Third  World,  pro-Cuba, 
anti- American,  supportive  of  San- 
dinism  and  other  forms  of  subversion 
in  neighboring  countries.  The  much 
vaunted  elections  held  this  past  May  is 
an  excellent  study  in  fraud,  aimed  at 
insuring  a  Panama  with  new  faces, 
same  direction. 

With  total  loss  of  credibility  as  a 
democratic  nation  ally,  how  can  the 
United  States  remain  Panama's  main 
economic  support  and  endorse 
Panama's  role  in  the  Contadora 
process? 

A.  I  have  a  feeling  the  person  who 
wrote  that  question  felt  he  knew  the 
answer.  [Laughter  and  applause.] 

But  I  think — let  me  just  address 
myself  to  the  general  point.  There  are 
problems  around  the  world  in  every 
country,  even  our  own.  It  is  for  us  to  try 
to  engage  with  these  problems  and  help 
them  get  resolved  in  the  direction  of 
democratic  practice,  in  the  direction  of 
the  rule  of  law,  in  the  direction  of  widely 
shared  economic  development,  in  the 
direction  in  the  Contadora  process  of  a 
regional  solution  to  a  regional  problem 
and  so  on. 

Whether  the  election  in  Panama  was 
perfect  or  not — I'm  sure  there  were 
some  problems  there  just  as  there  will 
undoubtedly  be  some  problems  in  our 
election  coming  up — for  example,  our 
percentage  of  people  who  vote  will  not 
stand  up  very  well  by  the  standards  that 
we  like  to  apply  to  other  countries — but, 
at  any  rate,  the  election  has  produced  an 
outcome,  as  it  happened,  going  back  to 
your  very  first  question  about  the  impor- 
tance of  students  coming  from  other 
countries  here — in  particular,  Panama. 
The  person  who  was  elected.  Dr. 
[Nicolas  Ardito]  Barletta,  went  to  col- 
lege and  got  a  Ph.D.  degree  in 
economics  from  the  University  of 
Chicago.  I  happen  to  know,  I  was  on  the 
faculty.  [Laughter.]  And  I  think  he's 
quite  an  outstanding  person,  and  I  think 
he  has  a  pretty  clear  view  of  what  the 
nature  of  the  stakes  are  between  com- 
munist totalitarianism  and  freedom  for 
his  country  and  for  the  region.  So  we 


THE  SECRETARY 


will  work  for  the  best  outcome  possible 
in  Panama  and  hope  that  it  can  be  good. 
I  intend  to  go  to  the  inauguration  of 
my  friend  Mickey  Barletta,  and  if  we 
can  help,  as  I  say,  in  the  movement 
toward  democracy,  toward  the  rule  of 
law,  toward  economic  development,  I 
think  it  will  be  good  for  us  as  well  as  for 
them. 

Q.  How  is  the  split  government  in 
Israel  going  to  affect  the  Middle  East 
situation? 

A.  It's  called  a  national  unity 
government,  not  a  national  split  govern- 
ment [laughter];  and  the  interesting  fact 
is  that  the  two  leading  contending  par- 
ties, neither  one  of  which  apparently 
could  form  a  government  because  they 
couldn't  get  enough  of  the  smaller  par- 
ties to  join  either  one  or  the  other,  did 
finally  come  together.  And  they  have  a 
broad  national  unity  government  that 
commands  the  votes  of  a  very  large  ma- 
jority in  the  Knesset.  They  have  plenty 
of  problems,  and  I'm  sure  they  will  be 
trying  to  address  them. 

From  our  standpoint,  we  intend  to 
work  sympathetically  and  cooperatively 
with  whatever  government  the  people  of 
Israel  choose.  And  I  think  it's  important 
to  note,  as  we  sometimes  look  around 
the  world — or  even  at  home  here — and 
see  some  of  the  struggles  that  we  have 
in  democratic  government,  to  remember 
always  the  basic  importance  of  freedom 
and  democratic  government,  because  it 
is  that  form  of  government  that  gives 
people  a  real  chance  to  express  them- 
selves and  to  arrange  a  situation  in  their 
country  to  their  liking. 

Israel,  with  all  the  difficulties  that 
their  recent  election  has  exposed,  is  an 
outstanding  democratic  government. 
And  so  we  will  be  pleased  to  see  what 
programs  they'll  put  into  effect  and 
what  they'll  want  to  be  working  on  and 
try  to  work  cooperatively  with  them. 

Q.  Regarding  Nicaragua,  with  the 
benefit  of  20-20  hindsight,  what 
should  the  United  States  have  done 
differently  to  have  avoided  today's 
totally  unsatisfactory  situation? 

A.  I  don't  know.  There's  probably 
benefit  in  some  20-20  hindsight.  It  is  a 
fact  that  the  Sandinistas  pledged  to  the 
OAS  [Organization  of  American  States] 
that  they  wanted  to  bring  about  a  struc- 
ture of  government,  in  opposition  to  the 
Somoza  dictatorship,  that  provided  for 
openness,  for  pluralism,  for  democracy, 
for  the  rule  of  law— for  all  of  these  good 
things.  And  it  is  a  fact  that  the  United 
States  very  generously,  with  funds,  tried 
to  help  them  move  in  that  direction. 

Long  before  there  was  any  real 
challenge,  it  became  clear  that  that  was 
not  the  direction  they  intended  to  move 


in  at  all  and  very  quickly,  those  who 
were  really  looking  for  the  kind  of 
government  that  was  put  forward  to  the 
OAS  were  ousted,  or  left  themselves. 
And  we  have  seen  in  Nicaragua  an  at- 
tempt— that's  still  going  on,  they  haven't 
got  there  yet — but  they're  trying  to 
develop  a  totalitarian  form  of  govern- 
ment. 

And  so  I  think  if  we  can  find  a  fault 
in  ourselves,  it  would  be  not  realizing 
quickly  enough  just  what  was  happening 
and  putting  into  place  the  programs  to 
resist  at  least  the  efforts  in  Nicaragua  to 
destabilize  their  neighbors.  I  think  that 
President  Reagan  is  very  clear-eyed 
about  this. 

In  Central  America  I  believe  we  are 
on  the  side  of  democracy.  We  are  on  the 
side  of  the  rule  of  law.  We  are  on  the 
side  of  economic  development  for  peo- 


ple, broadly  based.  And  we  are  havini 
success  and  we  have  to  stick  with  oui 
program  and  try  to  bring  about  a  mui 
better  and  more  peaceful  Central 
America.  It's  very  much  in  our  intere 
And  the  President's  program  has  bee 
gradually  winning  support  in  the  Con 
gress.  I  think  it's  fair  to  say  he's  alwa 
had  strong  support  in  the  Republican , 
controlled  Senate,  but  he's  had  great 
ficulty  in  the  Democratic-controlled 
House — at  least  on  some  aspects  of  t 
program  directly  to  do  with  Nicaragu 
So  I  hope  that  as  people  understs, 
the  situation  better  and  better,  they  i 
see  the  importance  of  supporting  Pre* 
dent  Reagan's  program  fully. 


'Press  release  199  of  Sept.  14,  1984. 
^Press  release  199A  of  Sept.  14,  1984. 


Proposed  Refugee 
Admissions  for  FY  1985 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  before 
the  Subcojnmittee  on  Immigration  and 
Refugee  Policy  of  the  Senate  Judiciary 
Committee  on  September  11.  1984^ 

Thank  you  for  the  invitation  to  testify 
on  the  President's  1985  refugee  admis- 
sions proposals. 

The  Congress  has — in  the  Refugee 
Act  of  1980— stated  that  the  U.S.  reset- 
tlement program  is  intended  for 
refugees  of  "special  humanitarian  con- 
cern to  the  United  States,"  in  accord- 
ance with  a  determination  made  by  the 
President  after  appropriate  consultation. 

After  most  careful  study  and  reflec- 
tion, the  President  proposes  a  regional 
refugee  admissions  ceiling  of  70,000  for 
FY  1985,  a  small  reduction  from  the 
FY  1984  level. 

Within  this  overall  ceiling  of  70,000, 
the  President  is  proposing  a  new, 
separate  ceiling  for  admissions  under 
the  UN  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees'  (UNHCR)  orderly  departure 
program  from  Vietnam  and  some  ad- 
justments in  geographic  ceilings. 

I  am  here,  representing  the  Presi- 
dent, to  consult  with  the  Congress  about 
our  1985  admissions  program.  We  are 
here  today  not  only  to  present  this  pro- 
posal for  your  consideration  but  also  to 
answer  your  questions  and  receive  your 
views. 


We  hope  the  1985  admissions  pre 
gram  will  receive  the  same  broad  bip  i 
tisan  support  that  it  has  enjoyed  in  p 
years. 

The  proposed  admissions  ceiling&i 
FY  1985  are: 

•  50,000  for  East  Asia,  including : 
10,000  for  a  separate  orderly  depart 
program  in  Vietnam; 

•  9,000  for  Eastern  Europe  and 
Soviet  Union; 

•  5,000  for  the  Near  East  and 
South  Asia; 

•  3,000  for  Africa;  and 

•  3,000  for  Latin  America  and  t 
Caribbean,  for  a  total  of  70,000 
worldwide. 

In  addition,  the  President  is  an- 
nouncing two  new  initiatives  aimed  ; 
resolving  pressing  refugee  problems 
Southeast  Asia. 

First,  the  United  States  will  ace 
for  admission  all  Asian-American 
children  and  their  qualifying  family 
members  presently  in  Vietnam — hoj; 
fully  over  the  next  3  years.  Because 
their  undisputed  ties  to  our  country, 
these  children  and  family  members  e 
of  particular  humanitarian  concern  t 
the  United  States. 

Second,  the  United  States  is  pn 
ing  a  distinct  program  within  the 
UNHCR's  orderly  departure  prograr 
from  Vietnam  for  the  resettlement  o 
political  prisoners  currently  and 


THE  SECRETARY 


■ously  confined  in  the  "re-education 

r,"  prisons  in  Vietnam  and  their 
■ying  family  members.  Various 
smen  for  the  communist  regime  in 
am  have  claimed  they  would  be 
,g  to  release  all  of  these  political 

|ners  for  resettlement.  But  despite 
rs  of  efforts  to  arrange  for  their 
ture  under  the  UNHCR's  orderly 
ture  program,  the  Vietnamese 
released  for  resettlement  only  a 
'ul  of  these  persecuted  people, 
his  initiative  has  as  its  goal  the 

rture  from  Vietnam  of  10,000  of 
persons  for  resettlement  in  the 

3d  States  over  the  next  2  years. 

e  current  and  former  political 

ners  are  of  particular  humanitarian 

jrn  to  the  United  States. 

Success  in  both  of  these  initiatives 
equire  the  goodwill  and  cooperation 

e  Vietnamese  Government.  We 
the  Vietnamese  will  now  respond 

ese  new  appeals. 

is  of  the  8  Million  Refugees 

•e  are  nearly  8  million  refugees  in 
vorld  today.  In  response  to  this 
ic  situation,  the  United  States  and 
nternational  community  actively 
durable  solutions.  In  order  of 
erence,  these  solutions  are: 

Voluntary  repatriation  to  the 
gees'  homelands; 

Permanent  resettlement  in  the 
itries  of  first  asylum;  or 

Resettlement  in  third  countries, 
iding  the  United  States. 

International  refugee  assistance  pro- 
ns,  for  which  the  United  States  pro- 
s  about  30%  of  the  funding,  help 
/ide  basic  care  and  maintenance  for 
refugees  until  one  of  these  solutions 
be  achieved. 

We  believe  that  our  proposed  admis- 
,s  program  for  1985 — coupled  with 
expected  admissions  programs  of  the 
3r  resettlement  countries — should 
t  the  requirements  for  resettlement 
he  coming  year.  We  will  continue  to 
■k  closely  with  the  UN  High  Commis- 
ler  for  Refugees  and  with  other  coun- 
s  to  ensure  that  the  responsibility  for 
jttlement  is  shared  equitably. 
This  international  resettlement  ef- 
— along  with  the  planned  contribu- 
is  by  the  United  States  and  other 
lor  countries  for  refugee  relief 
oad— should  hopefully  meet  the  basic 
ds  of  the  world's  refugee  population. 


Accomplishments  of  the  Last  10  Years 

Over  the  last  10  years  the  U.S.  refugee 
program  has  compiled  an  impressive  list 
of  accomplishments. 

•  Since  April  1975,  we  have  suc- 
cessfully integrated  into  American  socie- 
ty more  than  700,000  Indochinese 
refugees. 

•  Since  1980,  we  have  accepted  for 
resettlement  over  30,000  people  from 
Vietnam  under  the  UNHCR's  orderly 
departure  program,  including  many 
Asian-American  children  and  a  smaller 
number  of  former  political  prisoners — 
many  of  whom  might  have  otherwise 
been  tempted  to  undertake  the 
dangerous  clandestine  escape  from  Viet- 
nam by  boat. 

•  By  contributing  over  $240  million 
in  relief  aid,  the  United  States  has 
played  a  leading  role  in  averting  a 
serious  famine  in  Kampuchea  and  in  pro- 
viding life-sustaining  assistance  to  the 
Khmer  people  forced  to  live  a  precarious 
existence  along  the  Thai  border. 

•  Our  refugee  assistance  and  reset- 
tlement programs  have  been  a  key  ele- 
ment in  maintaining  regional  stability 
and  strengthening  the  security  of  our 
friends  in  the  Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations  (ASEAN),  as  well  as 
other  first  asylum  countries  around  the 
world. 

•  Even  as  we  coped  with  a  vast  out- 
pouring of  refugees  from  Indochina,  our 
resettlement  programs  have  continued 
to  give  a  chance  for  a  new  life  to 
thousands  of  refugees  fleeing  persecu- 
tion in  the  Soviet  Union,  Eastern 
Europe,  and  Iran. 

•  Since  early  1980,  with  the 
UNHCR  and  the  Government  of 
Pakistan,  the  United  States  has  taken  a 
leading  role  in  providing  over  $350 
million  in  food,  shelter,  and  other 
assistance  to  approximately  3  million 
Afghan  refugees  in  Pakistan. 

•  International  relief  efforts,  to 
which  the  United  States  has  contributed 
about  $100  million  this  year,  have  saved 
tens  of  thousands  of  lives  in  Africa.  In  a 
new  international  effort  resulting  from 
the  recent  Second  International  Con- 
ference on  Assistance  to  Refugees  in 
Africa  (ICARA  II)— held  in  Geneva  this 
past  July — we  are  working  closely  with 
African  asylum  nations  to  improve  their 
ability  to  provide  safe  and  humane 
asylum  to  nearly  2  million  refugees. 

An  important  measure  of  the 
refugee  program's  priority  in  our  coun- 
try is  this:  during  a  time  of  budget 
restraint,  both  Congress  and  the  ex- 
ecutive have  left  the  refugee  program 
largely  uncut — in  recognition  of  the 


critical  needs  it  addresses  and,  I  believe, 
of  its  efficient  management. 

Rather  than  dwell  on  our  accom- 
plishments, however,  we  must  press 
ahead  with  the  urgent  tasks  before  us, 
for  many  of  the  yet  unresolved  problems 
are  grave. 

UNHCR  Orderly  Departure  Program 

I  would  now  like  to  discuss  in  detail  our 
proposal  for  a  new,  separate  ceiling  for 
admissions  under  the  UNHCR  orderly 
departure  program  (ODP). 

In  early  1984,  the  number  of  ODP 
departures  from  Vietnam  for  the  United 
States  exceeded  1,000  per  month  for  the 
first  time  since  the  program  began. 
Total  departures  to  the  United  States 
and  other  resettlement  countries  have 
reached  an  average  of  2,200  per  month, 
and  in  FY  1984  ODP  departures  to  all 
countries  will  exceed  the  number  of  boat 
arrivals  for  the  first  time.  Despite  con- 
tinuing problems,  the  UNHCR  orderly 
departure  program  is  working  and  is  in- 
creasingly becoming  an  alternative  to 
hazardous  boat  escapes  from  Vietnam. 

The  reason  the  President  is  propos- 
ing the  establishment  of  a  separate 
orderly  departure  program  ceiling  for 
FY  1985  is  to  ensure  that  a  growing 
ODP  is  not  perceived  as  reducing  the 
number  of  refugees  admitted  to  the 
United  States  from  first  asylum  coun- 
tries. 

We  estimate  that  this  ceiling  of 
10,000  would  permit  the  departure  from 
Vietnam  of  some  18,000  refugees  and 
immigrants  in  FY  1985,  some  7,000  of 
whom  would  enter  the  United  States  as 
refugees  in  FY  1986,  following  comple- 
tion of  language  training  and  cultural 
orientation  at  the  Philippine  Refugee 
Processing  Center  in  Bataan. 

At  UNHCR-sponsored  meetings  in 
Geneva  in  October  1982  and  October 
1983,  we  urged  the  Vietnamese  to  per- 
mit an  expansion  of  the  orderly  depar- 
ture program.  We  expect  to  meet,  under 
UNHCR  auspices,  with  the  Vietnamese 
in  Geneva  again  this  October,  and  will 
present  to  them  at  that  time  our  revised 
plans  for  the  future  expansion  of  the 
orderly  departure  program. 

Our  revised  plans  include,  first,  a 
basic  restructuring  of  the  U.S.  program. 
Rather  than  having  one  ODP  program 
into  which  we  combine  all  groups  of  par- 
ticular concern  to  the  United  States,  we 
would  propose  to  divide  ODP  into  three 
separate  subprograms,  and  to  measure 
mutual  performance  against  specified 
processing  levels  and  guidelines  for  each 
program. 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  three  subprograms  would  be: 

The  regular  program,  for  spouses 
and  children  of  American  citizens, 
ex-U.S.  Government  employees,  and 
ethnic  minorities  of  special  humanitarian 
concern; 

The  Asian-American  program,  for 
Asian-American  children  and  close  fami- 
ly members  included  in  the  same 
household  as  the  child;  and 

The  political  prisoner  program,  for 
current  and  former  political  prisoners 
and  specified  family  members. 

For  the  regular  program,  we  would 
plan  to  process  and  move  from  Vietnam 
up  to  10,000  persons  (refugees  and  im- 
migrants) during  1985.  Within  the 
10,000  level,  we  would  inform  the  Viet- 
namese that  we  would  expect  them  to 
grant  exit  visas  to  a  much  greater  pro- 
portion of  persons  from  our  special 
priority  lists. 

For  the  other  two  programs,  I  have 
already  described  the  specific  new  ini- 
tiatives designed  to  prompt  the  process- 
ing and  movement  of  these  much-abused 
populations.  We  would  set  processing 
and  movement  levels  for  these  programs 
sufficient  to  launch  and  maintain  steady 
movements  for  each  group  during  1985. 

Proposed  Admissions  Ceilings 

I  now  turn  to  the  proposed  admissions 
ceilings  for  the  geographic  regions  of 
the  world. 

East  Asia.  In  my  statement  on  July 
13  of  this  year  to  the  ASEAN  Foreign 
Ministers'  conference,  I  praised  the 
member  nations  of  ASEAN  for  the  vital 
role  they  have  played  in  granting  first 
asylum  to  over  1.3  million  Indochinese 
refugees,  who  since  1975  have  been 
forced  to  flee  their  homes  and  seek  safe- 
ty. I  characterized  the  entire  refugee 
resettlement  process  from  first  asylum 
to  final  resettlement  as  "international 
cooperation  at  its  finest."  Further,  I 
noted  that  if  the  process  is  to  continue 
on  the  present  successful  track,  we  must 
all  continue  to  shoulder  our  share  of  the 
burden.  I  pledged  that  we  in  the  United 
States  will  do  so  and  urged  others  to  do 
so  as  well. 

Our  resettlement  of  over  700,000 
refugees  from  first  asylum  countries  in 
Southeast  Asia,  and  more  recently 
through  the  UNHCR  orderly  departure 
program,  has  been  a  major  factor  for 
continuing  stability  in  the  region  since 
1975.  The  generosity  of  the  American 
people  in  receiving  these  refugees  into 
our  society — along  with  similar  efforts 
by  many  other  countries — has  enabled 


the  first  asylum  countries  to  leave  their 
doors  open  and  at  the  same  time  avoid 
potentially  destructive  economic,  social, 
and  political  pressures. 

We  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact 
that  it  is  Hanoi's  oppressive  policies 
toward  its  own  people  and  its  military 
occupation  of  its  neighbors  that  must 
cease  before  there  can  be  a  lasting  solu- 
tion to  the  Indochinese  refugee  crisis.  It 
is  these  policies  which  are  the  root  cause 
of  the  continuing  exodus  of  refugees  and 
the  unwillingness  of  the  people  who  fled 
Vietnam,  Kampuchea,  and  Laos  to 
return  to  their  homes. 

The  number  of  Vietnamese  boat  ar- 
rivals in  first  asylum  countries  continues 
to  decline  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
These  reasons  include  the  LINHCR 
orderly  departure  program  which  has 
provided  a  safe  and  legal  means  of  leav- 
ing Vietnam;  a  shortage  of  boats 
available  to  refugees;  and  reported 
restrictions  by  the  Vietnamese 
authorities  on  clandestine  departures. 
However,  there  is  still  a  large  number  of 
refugees  fleeing  Vietnam  by  boat. 

Refugee  boat  arrivals  in  Southeast 
Asian  countries  will  equal  about  26,000 
for  FY  1984  compared  to  about  32,800 
arrivals  in  FY  1983  and  49,000  arrivals 
in  FY  1982. 

Resettlement  by  other  countries  dur- 
ing the  current  fiscal  year  should  reach 
about  38,000,  the  same  as  last  year. 
With  the  United  States  and  other  coun- 
tries continuing  at  about  the  same  level 
of  resettlement  in  the  coming  fiscal 
year,  the  total  refugee  population  in 
Southeast  Asian  first  asylum  camps 
should  drop  to  approximately  116,000  by 
the  end  of  P^Y  1985,  down  from  a  high 
of  409,000  at  the  peak  of  the  Indo- 
Chinese  refugee  crisis  in  1979,  and  a 
significant  reduction  from  the  level  of 
176,000  at  the  beginning  of  the  current 
fiscal  year. 

To  lessen  the  Indochinese  refugee 
burden  on  Thailand,  Malaysia,  In- 
donesia, the  Philippines,  and  Hong 
Kong,  the  United  States  has  maintained 
a  relatively  high  rate  of  resettlement 
from  the  region.  We  believe  that  admis- 
sion of  40,000  refugees  in  FY  1985  is 
our  fair  share — a  level  equal  to  the 
number  of  refugees  we  expect  will  be 
admitted  by  the  rest  of  the  refugee 
resettlement  countries  combined.  This 
should  encourage  other  resettlement  na- 
tions to  continue  to  participate  in  reset- 
tlement from  Southeast  Asia.  Processing 
by  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Serv- 
ice (INS)  officers  has  been  smooth  and 
efficient  during  FY  1984,  thanks  in  part 
to  improved  casework  by  the  voluntary 
agency  representatives  in  the  field  and 


to  the  effect  of  the  revised  INS  refug 
processing  guidelines  issued  in  Angus 
1983. 

Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Euro 

Despite  its  international  obligation  un 
the  Helsinki  accords  to  allow  freer 
emigration,  the  Soviet  Union  continu( 
to  prevent  Jews  and  other  persecutec 
minorities  from  leaving.  We  have  urg 
the  Soviets  to  honor  their  agreement 
and  to  issue  exit  permits  to  those  wh 
wish  to  leave,  and  I  intend  to  make  t 
point  with  Foreign  Minister  Gromykc 
when  I  meet  with  him  at  the  United  '. 
tions.  The  severe  Soviet  restriction  o 
Jewish  and  other  emigration  regrettj 
reduces  the  need  again  this  year  for  ; 
posing  a  large  refugee  admissions  cei 
for  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet 
Union  in  FY  1985. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  want  to  n' 
tain  a  sufficiently  high  ceiling  to  pro\ 
for  our  fair  share  of  the  normal  outfl 
of  refugees  from  the  countries  of 
Eastern  Europe.  We  estimate  that  a 
ceiling  of  9,000  admissions  should  be 
adequate  for  this  purpose. 

Near  East  and  South  Asia.  The 

Near  East  and  South  Asia  region  ha; 
several  major  refugee-producing  situ 
tions,  particularly  in  Afghanistan  an( 
Iran.  In  most  cases,  the  refugees  cor 
from  this  area  are  able  to  find  contir 
ing  asylum  in  the  region.  We  estimai  i 
that  a  refugee  admissions  ceiling  of 
5,000  will  be  sufficient  to  provide  foi 
those  persons  requiring  resettlement 
who  are  of  special  concern  to  the  Ur  i 
States,  especially  persecuted  Iranian 
religious  minorities  such  as  the  Baht 
and  persons  from  Afghanistan  whos 
positions  in  former  Afghan  governm  i 
or  association  with  the  United  State 
make  them  particular  targets  of  pe?- 
tion. 

Africa.  The  generous  hospitalit; 
African  countries  of  first  asylum  an( 
some  limited  possibilities  for  volunta 
repatriation  have  mitigated  the  neec 
any  significant  resettlement  outside 
Africa.  However,  there  remains  a 
relatively  small  number  of  African 
refugees  for  whom  asylum  or  integr 
tion  in  the  region  is  not  feasible.  We 
proposing  a  ceiling  of  3,000  for  Afri' 
accommodate  these  special  cases. 

Latin  America  and  Caribbean. 

Finally,  we  are  requesting  3,000  adr 
sions  for  potential  refugees  from  La 
America  and  the  Caribbean  who  mij 
require  resettlement  in  the  United 
States.  This  is  an  increase  of  2,000  ( 
FY  1984  and  should  be  adequate  to 
mit  the  admission  of  refugees  for  wl 
resettlement  in  the  United  States  is 
most  appropriate  option. 


THE  SECRETARY 


nlish  Language  Training  and 
fiical  Programs  for  Refugees 

'  have  dedicated  significant  time, 
"i  ey,  and  effort  to  developing  pro- 
-  IS  to  help  refugees  prepare  for  their 
;  lives  in  America. 
'  For  example,  in  1985  we  anticipate 
ler  improvements  in  both  the 
lish-as-a-second-language  and 
liral  orientation  (ESL/CO)  programs 
in  the  medical  screening  program. 
Department  of  State  is  concerned 
the  quality  of  refugees'  preparation 
ife  in  the  United  States  and  the 
oughness  with  which  medical  prob- 
i  are  detected  and  treated.  These 
rrams  have  a  direct  impact  on  the 
;ess  and  cost  of  refugee  resettlement 
16  United  States. 

Funds  are  available  in  the  Depart- 
,t  of  State's  migration  and  refugee 
stance  budget  requests  to  extend 
JCO  training  in  Southeast  Asia  for 
e  refugees  by  4  weeks,  providing 
ly  arriving  Indochinese  a  stronger 
jlish-language  preparation.  An  ex- 
ded  medical  and  dental  care  facility 
[|i  intly  began  operation  at  the  Philip- 
>  Refugee  Processing  Center  in 
aan.  This  facility,  paid  for  in  large 
t  by  the  Japanese  Government  and 
rely  staffed  by  volunteer  Japanese 
lical  personnel,  is  an  excellent  exam- 
of  international  cooperation  in  deal- 
with  the  Indochinese  refugee  prob- 


These  medical  services  will  help 
uce  the  cost  to  the  U.S.  Government 
•nedical  and  dental  care  for  refugees, 
3  will  now  receive  this  treatment 
ore  their  arrival  in  the  United  States. 


fugee  Resettlement  in  the 
«  ited  States 


ce  refugees  arrive  in  our  country, 
■re  begins  the  important  task  of  help- 
:  them  become  self-sufficient.  The 
it«  partment  of  State  cooperates  and  col- 
«  .orates  with  private  voluntary  agen- 
s  in  this  country  to  improve  this  tran- 
ion  process  through  which  refugees 
:ome  integrated  into  American 
''?  ;iety. 

\f    During  the  reauthorization  delibera- 
fii  ns  for  the  Refugee  Act,  it  became 
undantly  clear  that  the  Congress 
sires  a  strengthened  role  for  the 
ivate  sector  in  assisting  refugees  to 
irt  to  build  productive,  self-sufficient 
tures  in  their  new  country.  The  Ad- 
inistration  concurs  wholeheartedly 
th  this  goal. 

We  look  forward  to  a  reauthorized 
jfugee  Act  to  clarify  and  strengthen 


the  private  sector's  role.  Meanwhile,  we 
will  continue  to  work  with  the  voluntary 
agencies  to  assure  that  refugees  receive 
the  full  range  of  initial  reception  and 
placement  services  during  their  first 
critical  months  in  the  United  States. 

We  have  created  an  effective  net- 
work of  governmental  and  private 
organizations  to  assist  refugees.  We 
believe  the  reception  and  placement  pro- 
gram is  working  well  and  that  further 
improvement  can  be  expected  in  line 
with  the  refugee  assistance  amendments 
of  1982,  the  revised  provisions  of  the 
cooperative  agreements,  and  the 
reauthorized  Refugee  Act. 

Assistance  to  Refugees  Abroad 

While  the  proposed  admission  of 
refugees  in  FY  1985  is  the  focus  of  this 
hearing,  it  represents  only  one  part  of 
U.S.  refugee  policies  and  programs,  and 
approximately  one-third  of  the  $335 
million  of  the  1984  refugee  budget. 
About  two-thirds  of  that  budget— $227 
million— is  the  U.S.  contribution  to  in- 
ternational assistance  for  refugees. 

The  magnitude  of  the  overall  world 
refugee  situation  has  not  changed  ap- 
preciably since  the  Administration's  last 
consultation  with  this  committee  in 
September  1983.  We  estimate  the  cur- 
rent world  refugee  population  at  slightly 
more  than  8  million  people.  With  bipar- 
tisan congressional  support,  the  United 
States  has  responded  generously  with 
assistance  funds  and  commodities  for 
those  refugees  in  need.  Most  U.S. 
assistance  is  channeled  through  interna- 
tional organizations.  As  in  past  years, 
the  United  States  will  contribute  about 
30%  of  the  total  budget  of  the  UN  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees.  Other  con- 
tributions will  be  made  to  the  Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 
(ICRC),  the  Intergovernmental  Commit- 
tee for  Migration  (ICM),  the  UN  Relief 
and  Works  Agency  for  Palestine 
Refugees  (UNRWA),  and  the  UN  Border 
Relief  Operation  (UNBRO)  in  Southeast 
Asia,  as  well  as  to  a  number  of  smaller 
U.S.  and  international  voluntary  agen- 
cies involved  in  refugee  assistance.  Total 
U.S.  refugee  assistance  ex-penditures  in 
fiscal  year  1985,  including  food  aid,  are 
projected  at  $286  million. 

Southeast  Asia.  In  Southeast  Asia, 
the  United  States  plans  to  contribute  its 
fair  share  of  approximately  30%  of  the 
budget  of  the  UN  Border  Relief  Opera- 
tion, which  provides  life-sustaining 
assistance  to  approximately  240,000 


Khmer  living  in  camps  on  the  border 
with  Thailand.  I  would  like  to  call  special 
attention  to  the  exceptional  performance 
of  UNBRO  and  the  Thai  Government  in 
evacuating  endangered  Khmer  refugees 
during  recent  Vietnamese  military  at- 
tacks. Loss  of  life  was  kept  to  a 
minimum,  as  both  evacuation  and  reloca- 
tion operated  with  extraordinary  effi- 
ciency and  timeliness. 

Antipiracy  Programs.  We  were 
very  pleased  that  the  UNHCR-Thai 
Government  antipiracy  program  was 
renewed  for  another  year  in  June.  The 
United  States  has  taken  the  lead— with 
strong  congressional  support— in  under- 
writing this  program  with  a  pledge  of 
$1.5  million  toward  the  $3.6  million 
budget.  While  the  number  of  pirate  at- 
tacks are  down  from  previous  years, 
they  are  still  much  too  high  and  a  mat- 
ter of  grave  concern  and  action  by 
humanitarian  governments.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  support  all  efforts  to  eliminate 
pirate  attacks  and  to  ensure  that  the  un- 
fortunate victims  of  these  attacks 
receive  necessary  counseling  and  im- 
proved medical  care. 

The  United  States  will  also  continue 
to  support  other  antipiracy  programs, 
both  through  the  UNHCR  and  bilateral- 
ly, from  funds  earmarked  by  the  Con- 
gress for  the  fight  against  piracy  in 
Southeast  Asia. 

Near  East  and  South  Asia.  The 

world's  largest  concentration  of  refugees 
continues  to  be  the  nearly  3  million 
Afghans  who  have  been  forced  to  seek 
asylum  in  Pakistan  due  to  the  Soviet 
Union's  brutal  occupation  of  their 
homeland  since  December  1979.  This 
large  refugee  population  has  been 
generously  assisted  by  Pakistan,  whose 
government  and  people  have  provided 
asylum  to  their  Afghan  neighbors  for 
almost  5  years.  In  particular,  the 
Government  of  Pakistan  has  permitted 
many  Afghans  to  obtain  wage-earning 
employment  or  start  their  own  busi- 
nesses in  Pakistan,  actions  of  excep- 
tional generosity  toward  a  refugee 
population. 

As  in  past  years,  the  United  States 
will  provide  about  25%  of  the  budget  of 
the  UN  Relief  and  Works  Agency  for 
Palestine  Refugees  which  provides 
education  and  health  services  to  2 
million  refugees. 

Africa.  Over  2  million  refugees  have 
been  compelled  to  leave  their  homelands 
in  Africa  to  seek  refuge  from  war  and 
famine  in  neighboring  countries. 

The  already  strained  economies  of 
Sudan  and  Somalia  have  had  to  cope 


THE  SECRETARY 


with  the  additional  burden  of  accom- 
modating more  than  a  half  million 
refugees.  The  continuing  instability  in 
neighboring  countries  is  imposing  a  con- 
siderable strain  on  the  host  countries 
which,  despite  the  best  intentions,  are 
unable  to  sustain  this  sizable  influx 
without  continuing  generous  interna- 
tional assistance. 

President  Reagan's  proclamation  of 
this  past  July  9  as  African  Refugees 
Relief  Day  symbolized  a  continuing  com- 
mitment by  the  United  States  to  assist 
refugees  in  Africa. 

The  Second  International  Con- 
ference on  Assistance  to  Refugees  in 
Africa,  held  in  Geneva  July  9-11,  set 
new  goals  for  assisting  refugees  in 
Africa  to  achieve  self-sufficiency  and  for 
assisting  first  asylum  countries  by 
strengthening  their  infrastructures  in 
refugee-impacted  areas.  The  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  conference,  led  by  At- 
torney General  Smith,  strongly  sup- 
ported these  goals.  The  United  States 
will  be  studying  the  funding  of  various 
projects  proposed  by  the  African  coun- 
tries aimed  at  providing  long-term 
assistance  to  their  refugee  populations. 

Central  America.  Our  refugee  pro- 
grams in  Central  America  support  our 
overall  objective  of  strengthening  the 
forces  of  moderation  against  extremism 
of  both  the  left  and  the  right.  Our 
assistance  for  El  Salvador's  displaced 
persons  helps  those  who  have  lied 
guerrilla-infested  villages  for  areas  more 
firmly  under  government  control, 
thereby  strengthening  President 
Duarte's  government.  Our  assistance  for 
Nicaraguan  refugees  in  Honduras  and 
Costa  Rica  keeps  the  flame  of  freedom 
alive  for  people  like  the  Miskito  Indians 
who  have  fled  Marxist  repression.  Our 
assistance  also  benefits  individuals  who 
are  potential  victims  of  rightwing 
violence  or  who  are  simply  fleeing  the 
depredations  of  vicious  guerrilla  con- 
flicts. By  maintaining  our  first  asylum 
policy  and  supporting  refugee  centers 
located  in  Central  America,  we  also  ease 
the  pressure  of  more  massive  illegal  im- 
migration to  the  United  States. 


Bipartisan  Congressional  Support 

The  U.S.  refugee  program  has  enjoyed 
broad  bipartisan  support  over  the  years, 
and  under  the  leadership  of  President 
Reagan  I  assure  you  that  it  will  continue 
to  be  given  high  priority  within  the  Ad- 
ministration. We  are  indebted  to  the 
great  work  of  many  dedicated  Senators 
and  Congressmen.  I  would  like  especial- 
ly to  express  my  gratitude  and  deep 
respect  for  the  work  of  Chairman 
Thurmond  and  Senators  Simpson  and 
Kennedy. 

I  know  there  are  many  other 
members  of  the  Senate— from  both  sides 
of  the  aisle— who  have  devoted  their 
time  and  energy  to  the  delicate  and  dif- 
ficult task  of  refugee  admissions  and 
assistance,  but  I  think  it  is  fitting  that 
the  senators  I  have  mentioned  are  sin- 
gled our  for  special  praise. 

In  the  House,  bipartisan  support  for 
refugee  and  immigration  legislation  has 
been  equally  strong.  I  salute  in  par- 
ticular the  leadership  of  Chairman 
Rodino,  and  Congressmen  Mazzoli,  Fish, 
Lungren,  and  McCollum,  whose 
distinguished  work  has  done  so  much  to 
advance  the  cause  of  enlightened 
refugee  policy  in  the  United  States. 

On  behalf  of  the  President,  I  urge 
the  Congress  to  continue  its  strong  sup- 
port for  the  refugee  program  and  to 
assist  in  providing  the  budgetary  and  ad- 
missions resources  which  will  be  re- 
quired to  carry  it  out. 

Refugee  assistance  and  resettlement 
depends  for  its  success  on  international 
cooperation.  On  the  whole,  the  interna- 
tional community,  excluding  the  Soviet 
Union  and  its  allies,  has  met  the 
challenge  of  this  immense  humanitarian 
task. 

The  U.S.  refugee  progi-am  is  also  a 
model  of  U.S.  Government  interagency 
cooperation  and  an  excellent  example  of 
cooperation  among  governmental  and 
private  organizations  throughout  the 
United  States.  The  resettlement  of 
refugees  has  drawn  upon  the  idealism 
and  dedication  of  Americans  from  all 


walks  of  life.  It  is  a  program  in  which  j 
local  initiative  has  counted  for  as  mud  f 
as  federal  funding. 

We  believe  the  1985  admissions  pr 
gram  we  are  discussing  today  and  the 
1986  program  which  is  currently  being 
developed  within  the  Administration  v, 
be  sufficient  to  meet  anticipated  refug 
needs  and  to  launch  the  initiatives  I 
discussed  earlier. 

In  order  that  the  Congress  and  th; 
Administration  may  continue  to  work 
jointly  on  the  refugee  program,  we      i 
would  be  prepared,  at  mid-year,  to  me 
with  the  relevant  committees  in  both 
Houses  to  review  our  progress— par- 
ticularly with  regard  to  the  initiatives 
with  the  Vietnamese. 

Conclusion 

We  can  all  take  justifiable  pride  that  t 
United  States  is  recognized  throughou 
the  world  for  its  leadership  in 
humanitarian  assistance  to  and  protec 
tion  of  refugees.  We  have  given  much  ) 
help  the  refugees  of  the  world,  but  we 
have  also  benefited  from  the  talents  a 
hard  work  of  the  many  refugees  whon  j 
we  have  accepted  for  resettlement  in  •  1 
United  States.  Beyond  the  contributio 
of  such  well-known  figures  as  Solzhen 
syn  and  Rostropovich,  thousands  of 
other  refugees  from  persecution  have 
greatly  enriched  our  national  life  with 
their  talents  and  hard  work.  We  must 
aware  of  the  costs  of  our  refugee  pro- 
gram, but  we  should  not  forget  its 
valuable  contributions  to  the  social  an 
economic  life  of  our  country. 

I  thank  the  Congress  and  the 
American  people  for  making  it  possibl 
for  us  to  meet  the  awesome  challenge 
aiding  the  world's  refugees. 


iPress  release  198  of  Sept.  12.  1984.  1 
complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


THE  SECRETARY 


icretary's  Interview 
"Meet  the  Press" 


'ecretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  on 
-TV's  "Meet  the  Press"  on  September 
8Jf.  by  Bernard  Kalb.  BiU  Monroe. 
Marvin  Kalb  (moderator).  NBC 

Rowland  Evans.  The  Chicago  Sun 
;s,-  and  Hedrick  Smith.  The  New 
L  Times.' 

J.  How  would  you  describe  the 
ent  state  of  tension  between  the 
*d  States  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
how  serious  or  how  dangerous  do 
consider  it  to  be? 
k.  There's  no  doubt  about  the  fact 
the  situation  between  our  two  coun- 
is  a  cool  one  and  that  there  is  com- 
;ion  between  us.  I  don't  think  that 
situation  is  dangerous  in  a  hteral, 
ary  sense;  but  the  President  and  all 
3  working  with  him  have  addressed 
lelves  to  this  relationship  very  hard 
i  very  long  time,  and  continue  to  do 
_;o  be  sure  that  we  do  everything 

;ible  to  see  that  the  relationship  is  a 
]  jtructive  one,  having  in  mind  that 
3  istructive"  has  to  be  realistically  ad- 
I  ;sed  to  the  nature  of  their  society 
i  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
I  our  allies. 

Q.  Former  Vice  President  Walter 
I  ndale  seems  to  feel  President 
1  Lgan  is  partly  to  blame  for  the  ten- 
yi.  Let  me  ask  you  for  comment  on 
me  remarks  by  Mr.  Mondale.  He 
al  that  President  Reagan  is  the  first 
.lerican  President  in  50  years  who 
s  not  met  with  a  Soviet  leader;  also 
h  first  American  President  since  the 
toshima  bomb  went  off  never  to 
je  negotiated  arms  controls. 

A.  The  point  is  not  to  have  meetings 
1  to  achieve  something.  In  President 
■  man's  Administration,  a  great  deal 
licen  achieved  in  our  relationship 
.■h  the  Soviet  Union. 

First  of  all,  in  the  United  States 
t'lf,  in  restoring  our  preparedness  and 
.',■  strength,  in  restoring  our  outlook 
jl  self-confidence,  in  restoring  our 
iiKimy  so  that  we  bring  to  that  rela- 
!  .ship"  and  to  our  own  well-being  a 
rch  greater  strength.  Beyond  that,  as 
V  have  dealt  with  the  problems  that 
.ne  up  as  a  result  of  the  Soviet 
.lun's  behavior,  their  tendency,  which 
saw  in  some  past  periods,  including 
it  in  which  Mr.  Mondale  was  respon- 
le— or  partly  responsible— the 
idency  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  be  able 
move  into  new  situations  and  acquire 


additional  territory  has  been  stopped 
and,  in  fact,  turned  back  in  some  in- 
stances. 

Q.  Do  you  feel  there  is  no  deficien 
cy  or  no  embarrassment  in  the  fact 
that  President  Reagan  is  the  first 
American  President  in  50  years  who 
has  not  met  with  a  Soviet  leader? 

A.  I  don't  see  any  embarrassment 
about  that  at  all.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
when  you  consider  the  health  problems 
of  the  Soviet  leaders  during  President 
Reagan's  term,  it's  a  little  hard  to  see 
how  he  might  have  met  with  the  leader 
of  the  Soviet  Union.  Nevertheless,  I  can 
tell  you,  from  my  own  work  with  the 
President  not  only  in  major  meetings 
but  in  the  private  meetings  that  he  and  I 
just  have  together  as  individuals,  that  he 
spends  a  great  deal  of  time  thinking  and 
working  on  this  problem  and  on  this 
relationship.  And,  as  with  any  president, 
I  think,  one  of  his  overriding  concerns  is 
to  achieve  a  situation  of  peace  and  a 
constructive  relationship,  but  as  I  say, 
within  the  framework  of  being  realistic 
and  seeing  to  it  that  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  going  to  be  served  in 
any  agreement  or  negotiation  that  might 
take  place. 

Q.  You  mentioned  the  health  prob- 
lems of  the  Soviet  leaders.  Two  of 
them  have  died  during  Mr.  Reagan's 
term— Yuriy  Andropov  and  Leonid 
Brezhnev.  Wouldn't  their  funerals 
have  made  a  good  occasion  for  the 
President  to  have  gone  to  Moscow, 
seen  the  new  leaders  face  to  face  and 
begun  to  ease  the  tensions? 

A.  1  don't  think  particularly  so, 
because  funerals  are  a  time,  of  course, 
when  there  are  a  lot  of  people  around  to 
talk  to,  but  they  are  also  events  that 
consume  attention  and  don't  lend  them- 
selves to  lengthy  interchanges.  On  the 
other  hand,  on  both  those  occasions,  the 
President  did  send  Vice  President  Bush, 
and  I  happened  to  be  present  on  one  of 
those,  and  I  can  tell  you  that  Vice  Presi- 
dent Bush  did  a  wonderful  job  of  repre- 
senting this  country  in  those  meetings. 

Q.  Mr.  Monroe  mentioned  former 
Vice  President  Mondale.  He  has  said 
that  if  he  were  elected  President,  he 
would  immediately  call  for  a  pause  in 
American  testing  of  nuclear  weapons 
and  that  within  6  months,  he  would 
meet  with  the  Soviet  leadership.  Isn't 
that  something  the  Administration 
could  have  done? 


A.  I  don't  think  it's  a  good  idea  to 
suddenly  turn  back  our  own  capability  to 
be  prepared  and  to  deter.  It's  certainly  a 
good  idea  to  have  constructive  meetings 
if  such  can  be  held;  and  there  are  lots  of 
meetings  between  U.S.  and  Soviet  of- 
ficials and  I'll  be  having  one  with  Mr. 
Gromyko  on  the  26th  of  September,  I 
think  it  is.  But  at  any  rate,  to  stop  your 
own  capacity  to  be  prepared  and  to 
deter  aggression  is  just  as  reprehensible 
as  not  being  prepared  to  engage  in 
negotiations  for  peace. 

Q.  On  the  specific  issue  of  arms 
talks,  the  major  ones  have  been 
suspended;  the  Russians  offered  in 
late  June  to  talk  about  antisatellite 
weapons.  One  of  the  things  which 
they  have  called  for  is  a  moratorium  in 
our  testing  of  antisatellite  weapons. 
In  the  interest  of  getting  some  arms 
talks  going,  wouldn't  that  be  a  good 
idea? 

A.  We  responded  affirmatively  to 
the  Soviet  request,  or  suggestion  that 
we  have  a  meeting  in  Vienna  and 
discuss— the  militarization  of  outer 
space  was  their  phrase— and  we're 
prepared  to  do  that.  We  think  that  one 
of  the  most  threatening  uses  of  outer 
space,  in  a  military  way,  is  the  use  of  it 
for  ballistic  missiles  to  go  through  outer 
space  and  to  hit  other  countries.  That's 
the  most  threatening  thing.  So  we  think 
it's  important  to  discuss  defensive  and 
offensive  systems  that  go  through  outer 
space  and  we  said  so.  But  we're 
prepared  to  meet  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
in  Vienna  or  elsewhere,  with  or  without 
a  prearranged  agenda,  and  discuss  the 
problems  of  outer  space,  including  ques- 
tions about  a  moratorium  on  testing 
but  not  to  do  it  before  we  have  the 
meetings. 

Q.  You  said  in  an  answer  to  Bill 
Monroe  that  you  didn't  consider  the 
situation  particularly  dangerous  today 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  A  high  official  in  the 
CIA  has  prepared  a  memorandum 
which  is  now  on  Bill  Casey's  desk,  I 
understand,  which  states  that  the 
period  immediately  ahead,  contrary  to 
what  you  said,  may  be  the  most 
dangerous  the  two  countries  have  ever 
faced,  he  said,  because  they  may 
choose  a  high-risk  course  to  change 
the  correlation  of  East-West  forces 
before  the  West  gets  too  strong.  Does 
the  CIA  know  something  that  the 
State  Department  does  not? 

A.  Probably  they  know  lots  of  thmgs 
we  don't  know,  but  they  try  to  keep  us 
well  informed;  in  fact,  their  job  is  to  see 
that  important  intelligence  goes  to  the 


39 


THE  SECRETARY 


President  and  to  me  and  to  others  in- 
volved in  our  foreign  policy.  I  don't 
know  whether  you  are  quoting  the 
memorandum  that  you  published  in  your 
column  the  other  day— 

Q.  Yes,  sir. 

A.  That  is  the  opinion  of  an  individ- 
ual, and  individuals  have  lots  of  different 
opinions  in  the  CIA.  They  have  a  proc- 
ess—we have  a  process  in  the  govern- 
ment of  people  putting  their  opinions  on 
the  line  and  evaluating  them  and  coming 
to  some  judgment.  And  the  judgment 
that  that  memorandum  comes  to  is  not 
the  overall  judgment,  and  there  are  a 
number  of  things  in  there  that  we  con- 
sider to  be  wrong. 

However,  let  me  just  add  one  more 
thing.  I  don't  think  it's  a  good  idea  for 
documents  in  the  CIA  to  be  leaked;  I 
don't  think  it's  a  good  idea  for  them  to 
be  published;  and  I  don't  intend  to 
engage  in  further  discussion  of  it. 

Q.  But  let's  leave  the  document 
aside  and  talk  about  the  correlation  of 
forces.  Isn't  it  true  that  there  could  be 
a  problem  as  the  Soviets  see  the 
Reagan  rearmament  program  moving 
ahead  very  well  and  the  United  States 
catching  up  and  perhaps  even  moving 
ahead?  Isn't  that  a  signal  to  the  Soviet 
leadership  of  future  danger? 

A.  Our  deterrent  capability  is  very 
strong  right  now,  and,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  deterrent  capability  has  essen- 
tially kept  the  peace,  through  NATO  and 
through  our  alliances,  through  this  long 
period,  and  it  will  stay  in  that  capacity. 
We  have  put  before  the  Soviet  Union  a 
wide  variety  of  proposals  to  reduce  the 
level  of  armaments — of  nuclear  arma- 
ments, of  chemical  weapons,  of  conven- 
tional armaments,  to  the  confidence- 
building  measures — a  whole  array  of 
measures  have  been  put  before  them 
and  so  they  should  see  from  that  that 
our  objective  and  the  President's  objec- 
tive is  to  bring  this  all  down. 

Q.  Doesn't  the  destabilizing  effect 
of  two  leaders  and  now  maybe  a  third 
leader  coming  to  the  fore  in  a  brief  4 
years  in  the  Soviet  Union  increase  an 
imbalance  of  political  forces  in  the 
Soviet  Union  that  makes  them  slightly 
more  dangerous  than  they  would  be 
under  a  continuous  leadership? 

A.  I  think  it's  very  hard  to  say,  and 
our  knowledge  of  the  internals  of  the 
Soviet  Government's  working  is  not  as 
great  as  we  would  like  it  to  be.  On  the 
other  hand,  from  my  standpoint,  I  see  a 
functioning  government.  I  spend  a  lot  of 


time  with  Ambassador  Dobrynin.  I've 
met  a  number  of  times  with  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko.  And  we  deal  with  the 
government  that's  there  and  there  is  one 
there. 

Q.  You'll  be  meeting  with  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  at  the 
United  Nations  on  September  26th. 
What  are  your  expectations  as  a  result 
of  that  meeting? 

A.  I  go  into  it,  I  think,  well  prepared 
to  talk  about  the  subjects  that  we  find 
most  compelling  for  a  meeting  like  that. 
I've  had  a  number  of  discussions  with 
Mr.  Gromyko.  The  last  one  we  had  in 
Stockholm,  I  think  we  both  agreed,  was 
a  useful  meeting.  And  I  would  expect  to 
have  a  useful  meeting  with  him. 

Q.  Low  expectations  or  high  ex- 
pectations? 

A.  I  just  hope  that  we'll  have  a 
useful  meeting.  I  don't  want  to  try  to  set 
any  level  of  expectations. 

Q.  Are  you  looking  forward  to  a 
second  meeting? 

A.  There  has  often  been  a  second 
meeting,  if  there  is  a  need  for  it,  and  if 
there  is  a  need  for  it,  certainly  it's  easy 
enough  to  arrange  it.  It's  not  a  problem 
to  arrange  meetings  if  there  is  some- 
thing worthwhile  to  talk  about. 

Q.  Will  you  be  inviting  Soviet 
Minister  Gromyko  to  Washington  for  a 
meeting  with  President  Reagan? 

A.  What  we  have  to  announce  right 
now  is  the  fact  that  I'll  be  meeting  with 
Mr.  Gromyko,  and  what  other  events 
may  be  scheduled  remains  to  be  seen. 

Q.  Critics  have  raised  the  ques- 
tion, based  on  candidate  Reagan's 
remark  of  4  years  ago,  are  you  better 
off  then  than  you  were  4  years  earlier, 
as  to  whether  the  United  States  today 
is  better  off  in  foreign  policy  than  it 
was  4  years  ago.  When  I  ask  that 
question  against  the  background,  for 
example,  of  a  stalemate  in  the  Middle 
East,  a  deepening  chill  in  U.S.  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviets,  the  American 
involvement  in  what  is  increasingly 
emerging  as  some  sort  of  Central 
American  quagmire  with  a  possible 
risk  of  U.S.  military  involvement,  I 
can  anticipate  your  defense  but  the 
question  still  stands  there.  It's  hard  to 
see  real  areas  of  progress  in  foreign 
policy. 

A.  The  question  may  stand  there, 
but  the  reality  is  altogether  different.  In 
the  first  place,  as  I  was  saying  earlier, 
the  United  States  is  a  different  country 


in  all  sorts  of  ways — I  don't  want  to 
repeat  myself.  In  the  second  place,  as 
you  look  around  the  world,  our  alliance 
are  strong;  our  friends  are  increasinglj 
strong. 

You  mentioned  Central  America. 
When  the  President  took  office,  I  thinl 
there  was  a  widespread  feeling  that 
somehow  or  other  it  was  going  down  1i 
drain,  and  nobody  feels  that  way  now. 
On  the  contrary,  democracy  is  on  the 
march  in  our  hemisphere.  Over  90%  o.t 
the  people  who  live  in  our  hemisphere 
will  be  living  under  conditions  of 
democracy  or  countries,  such  as  Brazil 
moving  rapidly  in  that  direction.  So  I 
think  we  are  making  marvelous  head- 
way. 

We  have  a  cool  situation,  as  we've 
been  talking  about,  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  but  that  doesn't  mean  that  we 
haven't  made  progress.  Our  alliance  w 
Europe  is  strong,  and  so  on.  I  could  g( 
around  the  world  and  give  you  a  dif- 
ferent picture. 

Q.  Last  night  on  an  NBC  docu- 
mentary called  "The  Real  Star  Wars. 
Defense  Secretary  Weinberger  said 
that  the  Soviet  Union  is  in  violation 
the  ABM  [Antiballistic  Missile]  Trea 
ty.  Do  you  share  that  view? 

A.  Yes,  I  do. 

Q.  All  right.  In  what  way  have 
they  been  in  violation,  and  why 
haven't  you  done  anything  about  it? 

A.  They  are  in  the  process  of  con- 
structing a  radar  that  we  believe  is  a 
violation,  if  it  is  put  into  being,  of  the 
ABM  Treaty.  It  is  still  under  construe 
tion,  and  it  has  a  long  ways  to  go  as  f 
as  we  can  see.  And  what  we  have  dor 
about  that  is  take  that  up  with  them. 
There  is  a  setting  where  such  questioi 
are  brought  up  and  discussed,  and  thai 
process  is  going  on. 

Q.  Do  you  feel  that  in  order  to  p 
sue  the  President's  Strategic  Defeni 
Initiative  that  the  ABM  Treaty  will 
have  to  be  renegotiated? 

A.  The  President's  program  is  an 
essential  thing  for  the  defense  of  the 
United  States.  It  is  a  research  progra 
at  this  point— a  development  pro- 
gram—and whether  anything  in  the  V' 
of  deployments,  which  is  when  you'd  jj 
into  the  ABM  area,  takes  place  remaii' 
to  be  seen. 

Q.  Don't  you  feel  that  the  treaty 
would  have  to  be  renegotiated  as  yo 
proceed,  if  you  realistically  proceed 
with  a  strategic  defense  initiative? 
You're  going  to  come  upon  a  time  v< 
shortly  when  you'll  have  to  either 
scrap  it  or  renegotiate  it.  What  is  y^ 


^ ^^4.. 


^f  C*^t.^   DiiM/. 


THE  SECRETARY 


..  That  remains  to  be  seen,  whether 
ill  come  to  that  time  or  just  what 
instruction  of  the  results  of  this— 
!  Strategic  Defense  Initiative— turn 
t  )  be. 

|.  East  Germany,  Hungary,  and 
inia  have  been  showing  occa- 
1  flashes  of  independence  from 
ow.  You  and  President  Reagan 
said  in  recent  weeks  that  the 
d  States  does  not  accept  the 
t  domination  of  Eastern  Europe. 
s  not  new  American  policy;  other 
dents  have  followed  that  same 
But  the  fact  that  you  and  the 
aident  said  that  in  recent  weeks, 
6!  that  indicate  the  United  States  is 
oly  trying  to  pull  away  East 
>|)oan  nations  from  the  Soviets? 
A.  We  have  said  just  exactly  what 
lave  quoted.  We  are  glad  to  have 
r  relationships  with  the  countries  of 
em  Europe,  and  we  feel  that  people 
ose  countries  should  have  a  national 
;ity  and  freedom,  like  anybody  else, 
ive  deal  with  them  on  that  basis. 
;here  isn't  any  big,  new  campaign  of 
dnd. 

I.  Are  you  actively  working  more 
jw  than  a  couple  of  years  ago  for 
e  ;r  relations,  for  example,  with 
Germany? 

\.  We  have  had  some  meetings  with 
le  from  East  Germany.  I'm  going  to 
:i  the  Foreign  Minister  of  East  Ger- 
■iy.  up  at  the  United  Nations,  and  we 
Jd  like  to  see  our  relationship  im- 
.■ce,  certainly. 

5.  You've  put  great  stress  today 
iihe  importance  of  rebuilding  the 
n^rican  military  deterrent.  The 
r»iident  suggested  during  the  1980 
iipaig^n,  and  often  since  then,  that 
iliilding  the  American  strategic 
lies  would  make  the  Soviets  more 
ling  to  talk  and  give  them  more  in- 
;i  ive  to  negotiate  arms  control 
jities.  Since  that  hasn't  happened, 
i  should  people  believe  that 
itegy  would  work  in  a  second 
<gan  term? 

A.  The  first  point  to  notice  is  that 
'^^■^■  trying  to  be  prepared— prepared 
ciiT  aggression  as  well  as  prepared 
negotiations,  prepared  for  peace.  But 
object  of  seeing  to  our  defense 
ibilities  is  not  to  bring  about  negotia- 
but  to  be  prepared. 


I  think  that  if  the  Soviet  Union  sees 
that  they  can't  get  their  way  by  virtue  of 
a  lack  of  will  power  in  the  United  States 
or  in  the  free  world,  then  they  may  very 
well  come  to  the  conclusion  that  they 
are  better  off  to  negotiate  and  try  to 
bring  down  these  levels  of  arms,  in 
which  case,  I  can  tell  you,  the  President 
is  more  than  ready. 

Q.  How  long  do  you  expect  we'll 
have  to  wait  before  they'll  get  to  that 
point  and  there  will  be  some  way  of 
stopping  the  arms  race? 

A.  Of  course,  we  have  negotiations 
going  on  in  multilateral  areas,  a  great 
many  of  them  right  now,  and  we  hope 
that  they  will  get  somewhere.  We've  had 
some  discussions  with  the  Soviet  Union 
on  less  important  things  than  the  big 
items  that  you  have  in  mind  and  I  have 
in  mind  that  have  been  working,  and  so 
we'll  keep  at  it.  I  just  can't  make  a 
prediction  about  what  may  happen  in 
1985  or  beyond.  But  the  big  thing  is  the 
United  States  will  be  prepared— be 
prepared  to  defend  our  interests  and 
deter  aggression  and  will  also  be 
prepared  to  work,  and  continuously 
work,  for  peace  in  this  world. 

Q.  You've  just  said  that  the  Rus- 
sians have  violated  the  Antiballistic 
Missile  Treaty.  The  general  advisery 
committee  of  ACDA,  the  arms  control 
agency,  has  been  ordered  by  the  Presi- 
dent to  put  out  a  fumigated  version  of 
a  whole  new  series  of  violations. 
Question  one:  Why  on  earth  do  we 
want  to  find  new  agreements  with  the 
Russians  when  we  can't  make  them 
live  up  to  the  old  ones,  the  existing 
ones? 

A.  It's  important  for  us  to  maintain 
as  strong  a  dialogue  as  we  can,  based  on 
a  realistic  appraisal  of  them  and  of  the 
nature  of  any  agreements  we  reach, 
because  of  their  strength  and  because  of 
the  fact  that  between  us  there  is  such  an 
overwhelming  capability  to  cause 
military  damage. 


And  so  we  should  examine  the 
history  of  agreements  and  negotiations 
and  learn  from  that,  as  much  as  we  can, 
about  what  kind  of  approach  they  take, 
how  to  redress  this  balance,  how  to 
bring  about  agreements  that  are  both 
verifiable  and  basically  in  the  interests 
of  both  parties  to  carry  out. 

Q.  I  understand  that,  but  can  we 
stop  cheating,  yes  or  no? 

A.  We  can  have  better  provisions  for 
verification.  We  can  learn  from  our  ex- 
perience. And  as  far  as  cheating  is  con- 
cerned I  think  verification  is  the  kind  of 
answer  we  have  to  look  to. 

I  remember  when  I  was  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  a  long  time  ago,  and  had 
the  IRS  as  part  of  my  Department.  We 
have  a  voluntary  tax  system  in  this 
country  and  they  always  used  to  say 
that  conscience  is  that  small  voice  say- 
ing, "Somebody  may  be  watching,"  and  I 
think  we  have  to  watch. 

Q.  About  the  South  Korean 
airliner,  our  position — the  U.S.  posi- 
tion—has been  that  we  did  not  know 
it  was  shot  down  until  after  it  was 
shot  down,  even  though  it  had  been 
off  course  for  some  period  of  time. 

A.  That's  not  a  position;  that's  a 
statement  of  fact. 

Q.  That's  the  fact.  Let  me  ask 
whether  there  was  not  a  serious  in- 
telligence failure,  and  I  ask  it  in  this 
context.  Suppose  these  were  Russian 
aircraft  going  toward  Alaska  in  that 
several-hours  flight  and  our  in- 
telligence units  in  the  Far  East  did 
not  pick  that  up?  By  the  U.S.  fact 
position,  isn't  that  an  absolute 
declaration  of  a  huge  intelligence 
failure  on  the  U.S.  part? 

A.  I  don't  believe  so.  After  all,  the 
plane  that  was  off  course  was  over 
Soviet  territory.  We  don't  consider 
every  airplane  flying  over  Soviet  ter- 
ritory to  be  some  sort  of  a  threat  to  us. 


iPress  release  195  of  Sept.  10,  1984. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary's  Interview  on 

"This  Week  With  David  Brinlcley" 


Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  on 
ABC-TV's  "This  Week  With  David 
Brinkky"  on  September  30,  198i,  by 
David  Brinkley  and  Sam  Donaldson 
ABC  News,  and  George  F.  Will,  ABC 
News  analyst.^ 

Q.  Mr.  Gromvko  is  back  in  Moscow 
now,  having  finished  off  here  his  last 
hours  talking  with  you.  Tell  us  about 
it.  What  happened?  What  do  you  make 
of  it?  What  can  you  tell  us  about  it? 

A.  The  last  meeting,  of  course,  was 
kind  of  a  wrap-up  from  the  President's 
meeting.  But  if  you  take,  I  think  prop- 
erly, the  span  of  meetings  that  we  had 
with  him— in  New  York,  the  President's 
speech,  his  speech,  his  meeting  with  the 
President,  and  the  wrap-up  meeting 
together— what  happened  was  a 
sometimes  intense,  sometimes  discursive 
discussion  of  practically  all  the  subjects 
that  we  are  concerned  about  together 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  then  at  the 
end,  an  agreement  on  the  importance  of 
keeping  in  touch,  as  the  phrase  was,  but 
particularly  as  we  came  to  the  end  of 
the  meeting  yesterday,  to  do  so  careful- 
ly, systematically,  through  diplomatic 
channels,  in  the  expectation  now  that  we 
would  explore  all  of  these  issues,  and  at 
least  we  can  hope,  perhaps  negotiate  out 
some  important  things. 

Q.  It  seems  that  when  Americans 
talk  about  Soviet-U.S.  relations  under 
any  Administration,  it  turns  out  the 
centerpiece  of  our  relations  is  arms 
control.  How  much  time,  in  the 
meetings  that  you  had  and  the  Presi- 
dent had  with  Mr.  Gromyko,  was 
devoted  to  arms  control,  as  opposed  to 
human  rights,  Afghanistan,  El 
Salvador,  Nicaragua,  and  the  rest? 

A.  We  always  make  a  point  of  bring- 
ing up  a  full  range  of  issues  in  any  of 
these  meetings  with  a  Soviet  leader.  I  do 
with  my  meetings  with  the  Ambassador 
here,  or  in  the  many  previous  meetings 
I've  had  with  Mr.  Gromyko.  So  we  talk 
about  our  human  rights  concerns 
always,  and  we  talk  about  bilateral 
issues,  some  of  which  we  have  reached 
agreements  on  in  recent  times.  We  talk 
about  regional  trouble  spots  that  we're 
concerned  about  and  they're  concerned 
about,  and  we  talk  about  arms  control 
issues.  That's  our  agenda.  And  that 
agenda  was  very  much  in  full  force  dur- 
ing these  talks. 


Q.  On  the  basis  of  the  last  15 
years,  why  do  serious  people  believe  in 
the  arms  control  process?  You  heard 
Mr.  Aaron  say  a  moment  ago  that 
there  are  grounds  for  serious  agree- 
ment between  the  countries— common 
ground  can  be  found,  but  we've  had  15 
years'  experience  with  the  process, 
and  an  arms  race  continues  under  the 
umbrella  of  arms  agreements. 

Now  people  are  saying  that  the 
technology  of  verification  is  falling 
short,  the  technology  of  cruise 
missiles  and  the  rest  makes  arms  con- 
trol perhaps  a  dead  end.  Do  you 
believe  that? 

A.  There  are  many  problems  with 
arms  control.  I  don't  think  it's  a  dead 
end.  The  approach  that  President 
Reagan  has  taken  is  not  to  control  the 
buildup  of  arms,  but  to  reduce  it.  And  as 
he  said  many  times  publicly,  ideally,  he 
would  like  to  see  nuclear  arms  reduced  _ 
to  zero,  and  he  has  shown  that  sense  of 
direction  to  his  proposals  on  strategic 
arms  and  in  his  proposals  on  inter- 
mediate-range weapons,  to  start  with 
the  idea  of  "let's  eliminate  them 
entirely."  The  zero  option.  It's  a  good 
option. 

Q.  Can  you  cite  any  contribution  to 
U.S.  security  over  the  last  15  years 
from  arms  control? 

A.  I  think  there  probably  have  been 
some  restrictions  on  the  degree  of 
buildup  that  have  come  about  through 
that  process,  but  I  think  the  process  has 
tended  to  focus  on  limiting  the  expan- 
sion rather  than  on  actual  reductions. 
And  also  you  have  a  problem  in  the  fact 
that  they  were  concentrated  on  a  part  of 
armaments,  principally  launchers;  and 
it's  just  like  controls— whether  you're 
talking  about  wage  and  price  controls  or 
any  other  kind  of  controls— people  tend 
to  try  to  get  around  something  that  is 
controlled,  and  so  we  see  now  many 
warheads  on  a  launcher. 

Q.  You've  put  a  very  positive  spin 
on  this  series  of  meetings,  particularly 
the  one  with  the  President. 

A.  Not  very  positive.  It's  a  sober 
and  intense  meeting,  and  our  object— 
the  President's  object  in  this— was  to 
get  across,  in  his  own  way— his  intense- 
ly personal  and  strong  way— to  the  top 
levels  of  the  Soviet  leadership  the  fact 
that,  first  of  all,  the  United  States  is  a 
strong,  vibrant  country,  and  we  intend 
to  be  able  to  defend  our  interests 
anywhere. 


Q.  Do  you  think  the  Soviets  shou  1 
realize  that? 

A.  And  he  should  realize  that.  Am 
second,  that  we  were  very  realistic 
about  them;  and  third,  that  we  are  vei 
much  prepared  and  serious  in  wanting 
to  engage  them  in  constructive  discus- 
sions. All  three  of  those  things  are  oul 
there,  and  I  think— at  least,  as  I 
watched  the  President  in  this  discus- 
sion—he managed  to  get  his  message 
across. 

Q.  Having  said  that  and  done  thi 
as  you  know,  Mr.  Gromyko  immedia 
ly  put  out  a  statement  after  meeting 
with  the  President  which  was  very 
negative,  saying  in  so  many  words 
that  he  found  nothing— no  change  ii 
position,  no  change  in  attitude— tha 
would  justify  any  reason  to  hope  thi 
things  could  be  better.  Why  did  he  ( 
that? 

A.  He  put  out  different  statement 
as  the  week  went  along. 

Q.  I'm  talking  about  the  one  aftt 
meeting  with  the  President. 

A.  And  I  think  that,  as  I  said,  the 
meetings  have  to  be  looked  upon  in  tl 
continuity  and  what  we  will  do  is  verj 
carefully  establish  different  places  wh 
we  will  talk  about  the  important  sub- 
jects. 

Q.  Can  you  name  the  next  place! 

A.  No.  The  next  places  will  be  he:  ■ 
and  in  Moscow,  as  we  talk  with  the 
respective  Ambassadors. 

Q.  Through  our  Ambassadors? 

A.  And  we  will  establish— of  com 
there  are  some  things  that  are  simply 
ongoing— going  on  right  now  with  qu 
a  lot. 

Q.  Are  you  then  saying  that  this 
series  of  meetings  will  result  in  tht 
Soviets'  coming  back  to  the  arms  ec 
trol  table,  or  some  table  if  not  Gent 
to  discuss  arms  control?  If  so,  whei 

A.  It  remains  to  be  seen  exactly 
what  the  structure  and  place  will  be, 
I'm  not  going  to  try  to  predict  their 
behavior  other  than  I  think  it  is  fair  t 
say  that  we  will  have  some  discussior 
and  some  effort  to  line  these  things  o 

Q.  In  that  connection,  did  the 
President  suggest  to  Mr.  Gromkyo 
that  we  might,  in  fact,  agree  to  a 
moratorium  on  testing  weapons  in 
space  before  a  negotiation  on  that  s 
ject  began? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Gromyko,  the  Kremlin, 
Chernenko,  the  Soviet  leadership  ir 
general,  keep  saying  to  us,  "We  wa 


nonartmpnt  nf  State  Bulli 


THE  SECRETARY 


nei 


-11 
iell 


s,  not  words."  He  probably  said 
i  ten  times  in  these  few  davs  he 
k  in  Washington. 

We  say  the  same  thing. 

J.  When  he  says  "deeds  not 
%ff  Is,"  what  deeds?  What  does  he 
■?  He  wants  us  to  remove  our 
lies  from  West  Germany,  Western 
ipe,  which  we're  not  going  to  do? 
L.  He  wants  us  to  put  a  freeze  on 
nodernization  of  our  defensive  and 
•rent  forces;  he  wants  us  to  put  a 
:e  on  our  efforts  to  do  our  research 
MJ  develop  our  thinking  about  outer 
*'ii  e.  He  wants  to  freeze  all  of  that — 
^  there  have  been  some  people  in  this 
try  who  have  proposed  that.  But 
s  not  sensible,  from  our  standpoint, 
e's  no  reason  why  we  should  give 
what  they  want  in  order  to  start 
jssions.  We  should  start  discussions 
find  things  that  are  mutually 
■■•)  eable,  and  then  work  out  the 
'ements  on  them. 

There  was  a  story  in  The 
■hington  Post  this  morning— I 
t  know  if  it's  a  White  House  leak 
hat — saying  that  the  arrange- 
ts  for  Gromyko's  visit  were  kept 
et  to  prevent  the  Defense  Depart- 
t  from  finding  out  about  it  and  in- 
ering  with  it. 
A.  [Laughing]  That's  nonsense. 

Q.  Is  that  all,  just  nonsense?  You 
mn  it's  nonsense  they  were  kept 
'-et  or  nonsense  of  the  Defense 
tiartment  to  interfere? 

A.  As  the  notion  of  having  this 
i"titig  and  working  on  it  developed,  of 
.rse,  the  President  kept  it  to  himself 
1   to  a  few  other  people,  but  the 
'•eiise  Department  was  completely  in- 
iiced  in  the  preparations.  The  Secre- 
>H,'  of  Defense  was  present  at  the  last 
mh:  and  others  with  the  President 
"'  the  meeting;  he  was  present  at 
en  luncheon  with  Mr.  Gromyko.  So  this 
>  fairy  story. 

Q.  All  right.  I'd  like  to  follow  up 
ithe  previous  question  about  deeds 
il  words.  You  say  what  deeds  they 
vnt  from  us.  What  deeds  are  they 
■nf;  to  do  for  us? 

A.  That's  what  we  need  to  work  out 
legotiation,  but  any  negotiation  is 
md  to  have  a  result  that's  to  the 
tual  advantage  to  the  parties,  and 
it's  why  anyone  trades  with  anyone 
e.  I  suppose  an  example  before  us  is 
■  sales  of  grain  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
;  to  their  advantage  to  be  able  to  buy 
!  grain;  it's  to  our  advantage  to  sell  it. 
at's  why  it's  taking  place. 


Q.  You  have  said  that  the  tide  of 
history  is  against  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  President  has  said  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  heading  for  "the  ash  heap  of 
history."  And  a  lot  of  people  in  the 
Administration  say  they  have 
alcoholism,  disease;  it's  a  kind  of 
Third-World  country  with  a  Third- 
World  economy  almost — the  Soviet 
Union. 

Do  you  think  that  if  we  just  keep 
the  pressure  on,  that  the  internal 
strains  on  their  society  are  going  to 
cause  a  kind  of  disintegration?  Is  that 
one  of  the  premises  of  our  policy? 

A.  I  don't  think  that  we'll  see  a 
disintegration  of  the  Soviet  Union,  or 
certainly  we  shouldn't  build  that  into  our 
thinking. 

I  do  believe  that  the  evidence — there 
is  going  to  be  competition  between  the 
systems,  and  the  President  and  Mr. 
Gromyko  both  said  that  to  each  other.  I 
believe  our  system  is  infinitely  superior, 
that  the  facts  are  showing  that  all 
around  the  world,  and  in  that  sense,  I 
think  history  is  on  our  side. 

Q.  But  the  extension  of  this 
premise  is  that  an  arms  race  is  in  our 
interest  because  we  can  compete  and 
we  can  carry  it  on  more  easily. 

Q.  That  we  can  afford  it  and  they 
can't. 

Q.  We  can  afford  it,  and  eventual- 
ly, they  will  buckle  under  the  strain 
and  get  reasonable. 

A.  I  think  that's  absolute  nonsense. 
The  thing  that  you  have  to  look  at  is  the 
fact  that  there  are  huge  arsenals  of 
nuclear  weapons  being  built  up.  They 
are  very  dangerous. 

I  watched  the  beginning  of  your 
show,  and  you  said,  I  think,  that  these 
were  the  only  two  countries  that  could 
start  a  major  conflagration.  That  is  ab- 
solutely wrong,  and  it  represents  the 
problem.  Lots  of  countries  around  the 
world  can  start  something  and  draw  the 
superpowers  into  it,  and  so  there  is 
danger — and  danger  from  these 
weapons. 

That  is  why  the  President  has  so 
persistently  sought  reductions— not  a 
freeze,  not  a  control  of  the  buildup,  but 
reductions — and  reductions,  ideally,  to 
zero.  That's  his  object. 

Q.  Now  that  President  Reagan  has 
called  former  President  Carter  to 
assure  him  that  he  didn't  mean  that 
he,  Mr.  Carter,  was  responsible  in  any 
way  for  the  latest  Embassy  bombing 
in  Beirut,  who  is  going  to  take 
responsibility?  What  person  or  number 
of  people  are  going  to  take  respon- 
sibility? 


A.  Let's  be  clear  about  the  respon- 
sibility. The  responsibility  is  with  people 
who,  through  the  use  of  terrorism,  are 
trying  to  have  an  impact  on  U.S. 
policies,  are  trying  to  have  an  impact  on 
our  quest  for  peace  and  stability  in  the 
Middle  East  and  other  parts  of  the 
world.  It's  the  threat  of  terrorism  that  is 
responsible,  and  that  is  what  we  have  to 
fight  against. 

There  is  somehow  this  notion  that, 
in  response  to  this,  somebody's  head  has 
to  roll.  Maybe  so,  and  I'm  willing  to 
have  it  be  my  head  any  time  anyone 
wants — 

Q.  Are  you  responsible? 

A.  —as  I  certainly  feel  responsible. 

Absolutely. 

Q.  Should  you  have— 

A.  And  I  take  that  responsibility 
very  seriously. 

Q.  I  know  you  do,  since  you've 
"beefed  up"  security. 

A.  However — wait  a  minute.  Now, 
wait  a  minute.  We  had  just — people  had 
just— 

Q.  [Inaudible]  ascribed  to  that. 

A.  You  listen  to  me  now.  The 
people — I  feel  so  strongly  about 
this — the  people  out  there  in  Beirut  are 
serving  our  country  in  a  risky  environ- 
ment and  they  understand  that  very 
well.  They  are  doing  everything  possible 
to  improve  their  security,  and  it's  up  to 
us  to  help  them. 

The  Ambassador,  Reg  Bartholomew, 
is  a  hero.  He  has  come  close  to  being 
killed  three  times,  most  recently  in  this 
latest  episode.  Do  you  think  that  he 
wants  anything  less  than  strong  security 
around  him?  He  absolutely  does.  And  a 
lot  has  been  done.  There  is  more  that 
can  be  done,  and  we're  going  to  do  it. 

Q.  But  the  people  in  Iran  in  1979 
were  serving  our  country  in  the  same 
way  that  you've  described  the  people 
in  Beirut. 

A.  Absolutely,  they  were. 

Q.  And  I'm  sure  you  would  say  the 
people  who  were  responsible  for  seiz- 
ing them  were  the  Iranians — 

A.  Sure. 

Q.  — and  yet  it  did  not  stop 
Ronald  Reagan,  during  the  debate  on 
October  20th  of  that  next  year,  1980, 
of  saying  to  President  Carter  that  he 
had  been  warned  and  he  either  should 
have  beefed  up  security  or  removed 
the  people  from  the  Embassy.  So 
we're  not  talking  about,  are  we,  who 
wants  Americans  to  be  safe  the  more 
or  the  less?  We're  talking  about  why. 


after  the  first  Embassy  bombing  by 
truck  and  the  second  bombing  of  our 
Marines  by  a  truck,  there  weren't  ade- 
quate security  devices  to  keep  a  third 
Embassy  from  being  bombed  by  a 
truck. 

A.  There  were  many  additional 
devices,  and  obviously,  we  didn't  have 
everything  that  we  needed.  The  truck 
was  stopped,  or  the  van  was  stopped. 
The  damage  was  less  than  it  had  been 
on  earlier  occasions  and  less  than  it 
could  have  been  although  it  was  severe, 
and  the  situation  must  be  worked  on 
continuously. 

We  have  to  remember  that  our  Am- 
bassadors around  the  world  and  the  peo- 
ple who  are  working  in  our  Embassies 
are  in  a  tough  situation — they're  on  the 
front  lines.  They  also  have  a  mission  to 
perform  that  involves  them,  as  Reg 
does,  going  around  in  Beirut,  going 
around  in  other  places.  We've  had  an 
Ambassador  shot  in  Rome;  the  Saudis 
had  their  Embassy  blown  up  in  Beirut; 
the  Kuwaitis  have  been  attacked;  the 
French  have  been  attacked.  The  problem 
is  getting  hold  of  this  issue  of  terrorism, 
and  we  are  working  on  it.  Don't  mistake 
that. 

Q.  So  I  take  it  that  you  think, 
unlike  the  Long  commission  which 
fixed  responsibility  for  the  bombing  of 
the  Marines — and  then  the  President 
said,  "It's  mine,  ultimately.  111  take 
it" — that  you  think  there  won't  be  a 
commission  this  time,  there  won't  be 
an  investigation  that  points  to  some- 
one and  says,  "You  are  responsible"? 

A.  There  is  an  investigation.  It  has 
given  us  some  preliminary  views.  I  met 
this  morning  with  Ambassador  Murphy 
[Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs]  who  has  just 
been  around  in  the  area. 

Q.  Would  you  tell  us  what  he  told 
you? 

A.  There  is  another  team  coming 
back  with  additional  evidence,  and  we 
continue  to  look  into  this.  If  there  is 
some  negligence  involved,  we'll  find  it. 
However,  we're  not  in  this  investigation 
business  to  see  if  we  can  knock 
somebody's  head  off.  Our  purpose  is  to 
find  out  what  additional  we  can  do  to 
enhance  the  security  of  our  Embassies. 
That's  the  ball  on  which  we  need  to  keep 
our  eye. 

Q.  Let  me  return  to  U.S. -Soviet 
relations.  First  of  all,  do  you  expect  to 
be  dealing  with  them  for  4  years  as 
Secretary  of  State?  Do  you  intend  to 
stay  on  for  4  more  years? 

A.  I  think  that  the  chances  of  a 
more  constructive  dialogue  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  assuming  Mr.  Reagan  is 


AFRICA 


President,  are  reasonably  good.  But,  of 
course,  that  remains  to  be  seen,  just 
how  they  will  react. 

I  do  have  confidence  in  what  the 
President's  view  is,  and  it  is  that  we 
should  stay  with  the  same  strategy  he's 
had  from  the  beginning.  We  have  to  be 
realistic;  we  have  to  be  strong;  and  we 
have  to  be  ready  to  work  out  construc- 
tive agreements  with  them,  assuming 
they  want  to  do  it. 

Q.  If  you're  Secretary  of  State  for 
4  more  years,  and  at  the  end  of  4 
years,  there  has  been  no  arms  control 
agreement,  would  you  consider  that  a 
failure?  Or  is  it  perhaps  a  test  of 
democracy  to  be  able  to  not  make 
agreements,  to  say  that's  not  satisfac- 
tory? 


A.  There  is  nothing  particularly 
wonderful  about  agreements  for  the 
sake  of  agreements.  In  fact,  I  think  thi 
worse  thing  in  the  world  we  can  do  in 
the  Soviet  relationship  is  to  get  in  the 
position  where  we  feel,  and  they  know 
that  we  want  an  agreement  for  the  sal 
of  an  agreement,  because  then  they  wi 
really  put  the  squeeze  on  us. 

You  have  to  be  relaxed  about  the 
need  for  an  agreement  if  you're  going 
get  a  good  one.  The  only  agreement 
worth  getting,  from  our  standpoint,  is 
one  that  serves  our  interests.  And  tha 
the  ball,  again,  on  which  we  have  to 
keep  our  eyes. 


I 


'Press  release  208  of  Oct.  1,  1984. 


U.S.  Response  to  Africa's  Food  Needsi 


Background 

Per  capita  food  production  in  sub- 
Saharan  Africa  has  fallen  20%  over  the 
last  two  decades.  Population  is  growing 
at  a  faster  rate  than  agricultural  produc- 
tion. In  many  countries,  economic 
policies  have  subsidized  urban  popula- 
tions at  the  expense  of  the  farmers.  As 
a  result,  farmers  no  longer  have  suffi- 
cient incentive  to  produce  for  the 
marketplace. 

In  addition,  the  worst  drought  since 
the  mid-1970s — and  perhaps  in  this  cen- 
tury— continues  to  spread  suffering  and 
hunger  throughout  much  of  Africa. 
Especially  in  the  Sahel,  southern  Africa, 
and  the  Horn,  food  shortages  in  some 
two  dozen  countries  have  reached 
emergency  proportions. 

The  United  States  continues  to  be 
the  largest  food  aid  donor  to  Africa,  pro- 
viding more  food  aid  than  all  other 
donors  combined.  Moreover,  our  total 
food  aid  has  increased  by  35%  in  the 
past  2  years.  According  to  the  latest 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization 
(FAO)  report,  we  provide  five  times 
more  food  aid  to  Africa  than  the  second 
largest  donor  country.  Our  share  of  total 
food  aid  actually  delivered  to  the  24 
FAO-designated  "food  emergency"  coun- 
tries during  1982-83  averaged  40%,  an 
amount  approached  only  by  the  com- 
bined donations  provided  by  all  Euro- 
pean Community  countries. 


Immediate  Help 

To  meet  the  immediate  crisis,  the  Uni 
States  is  providing  unprecedented  qua 
titles  of  food  for  sub-Saharan  Africa, 
far  in  this  fiscal  year,  the  United  Stat 
has  approved  some  450,000  metric  toi 
of  emergency  food  assistance  to  more 
than  30  needy  African  countries.  The 
value  of  these  shipments,  including 
freight  costs,  exceeds  $160  million. 

Under  all  food  assistance  progran 
this  year,  the  United  States  will  ship 
more  than  1.3  million  metric  tons  of 
food  to  Africa,  valued  at  more  than  $• 
million  including  ocean  freight. 

Overwhelming  bipartisan  support 
ists  for  providing  emergency  food  aid 
Africa.  Earlier  this  year.  Congress  ap 
proved  a  $90  million  emergency  food 
supplemental  and  later  added  $60 
million.  Legislation  also  is  pending  to 
provide  an  additional  $175  million  of 
regular  food  assistance  worldwide,  of 
which  a  portion  is  expected  to  go  to 
Africa. 

Further  Steps 

Since  the  Food  for  Peace  (PL  480)  pr 
gram  was  enacted  in  1954,  the  Unite( 
States  has  sent  653  billion  pounds  of 
food  worth  $32  billion  to  1.8  billion  pt 
pie  in  more  than  100  countries  arounc 
the  world.  On  the  30th  anniversary  o! 
that  program  on  July  10,  1984,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  announced  a  major  ini- 
tiative that  will  allow  the  United  Stat 
to  respond  more  quickly  and  effective 
to  the  food  needs  of  the  people  of  Aft 
and  other  Third  World  countries  suff 
ing  from  hunger  and  malnutrition. 


A 


w 
itii 
Imi 

e.\i 

tei 
i, 
par 
lev 


ARMS  CONTROL 


'he  five-point  initiative  includes: 

Prepositioning  of  grain  stocks  in 
ted  Third  World  areas  to  shorten 
)nse  time;  temporary  sites  in  Africa 
mder  review; 

Creation  of  a  special  $50  million 
dential  fund  to  allow  a  more  flexible 
response  to  severe  food  emergen- 


Arms  Control: 

Where  Do  We  Stand  Now? 


Financing  or  payment  of  ocean 
,|,,™nland  transportation  costs 

:iated  with  U.S.  food  aid  in  special 
•gency  cases; 

Creation  of  a  government  task 

to  provide  better  forecasts  of  food 
tages  and  needs;  and 

Establishment  of  an  advisory 
p  of  business  leaders  to  share  infor- 
on  on  Third  World  hunger  and  food 
uction. 

g-Term  Assistance 


United  States  has  emphasized  pro- 
ion  and  supporting  activities  in  its 
can  economic  assistance  programs. 
36  programs  assist  in  research,  train- 
institution-building,  irrigation,  seed 
luction,  and  extension.  Improve- 
1  ts  in  the  policy  framework,  par- 

<  larly  in  incentives  for  farmers  and 

<  kets,  is  an  urgent  concern. 

r,i  As  part  of  the  Administration's  pro- 
^^d  $1.1  billion  economic  assistance 
t  ?ram  for  Africa  in  FY  1985,  the 
1  sident  has  asked  Congress  to  ap- 
we  the  first  portion  of  a  5-year,  $500 
i,i|ion  African  Economic  Policy  Initia- 
i-  That  initiative  will  offer  tangible 
4port  for  countries  prepared  to  under- 
U?  the  difficult  policy  reforms  needed 
:)(mprove  productivity,  especially  in 
giculture,  and  provide  farmers  incen- 
-ls  to  produce  more  food. 
,  The  United  States  is  asking  the  in- 
Siational  community  to  join  in  this  ef- 
5;  and  is  urging  the  World  Bank  to  ex- 
sd  its  coordinating  role  among  donors 
I  to  take  the  lead  in  working  with 
bican  governments  in  designing  policy 
e^rms. 

':  Other  Administration  measures  to 
:-ease  food  production  in  Africa  in- 
ie  support  to  private  American 
anizations  seeking  to  provide 
icultural  and  fisheries  technology, 
)w-how,  and  capital  investment.  In 
eral  countries — such  as  Nigeria, 
meroon,  Somalia,  and  Guinea — the 
ministration  is  encouraging  private 
estors,  both  American  and  African, 
expand  the  food  production  base. 


ien  from  the  GIST  series  of  August  1984, 
)lished  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
jartment  of  State.  Editor;  Harriet 
ley.  ■ 


by  Kenneth  L.  Adelman 

Address  before  the  World  AJfairs 
Council  in  San  Diego  on,  August  30, 
1981,.  Ambassador  Adelman  is  Director 
of  the  Arrns  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency  (ACDA). 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  return  to  San 
Diego  and  to  your  World  Affairs  Coun- 
cil. Last  time,  I  found  the  interest  ex- 
pressed and  questions  asked  to  be 
among  the  best  I  have  heard. 

What  has  happened  in  arms  control 
since  the  last  time  I  attended  one  of 
your  meetings?  A  lot  on  our  side;  little 
on  the  Soviet  side.  Arms  control  without 
the  Soviets  is  like  boating  without  the 
water.  President  Reagan,  however,  has 
taken  several  arms  control  initiatives 
since  our  last  discussion. 

•  In  the  strategic  nuclear  arms 
talks,  or  START,  he  authorized  new  ap- 
proaches to  bridge  the  gap  between  the 
U.S.  and  Soviet  positions,  including  a 
"build-down"  proposal  that  would 
guarantee  major  reductions  in  nuclear 
missile  warheads. 

•  The  President  sent  Vice  President 
Bush  to  the  Conference  on  Disarmament 
in  Geneva  last  April  to  present  the  U.S. 
draft  treaty  for  a  complete  ban  on 
chemical  weapons  throughout  the  world. 
We  have  had  several  discussions  with 
other  countries,  including  the  Soviet 
Union,  on  this  proposal.  We  look  for- 
ward to  serious  negotiations.  Banning 
these  gruesome  weapons  is  both  impor- 
tant and  urgent,  as  I  noted  last  year. 
Since  that  time,  following  visits  to  Japan 
and  China,  I  led  a  delegation  to  Thailand 
to  see  first-hand  and  investigate  the  use 
of  chemical  weapons.  It  drove  home 
once  more  the  need  to  nip  this  poten- 
tially devastating  weapon  system  in  the 
bud. 

•  Just  recently,  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  have  completed  an 
agreement  to  upgrade  the  communica- 
tions link  between  Moscow  and  Wash- 
ington, the  so-called  Hot  Line. 

•  A  little  over  a  month  ago,  the 
President  announced  his  willingness  to 
take  up  the  Soviet  suggestion  for 
negotiations  on  space  arms  control.  Un- 
fortunately, so  far  the  Soviet  Union  has 
appeared  unwilling  to  take  "yes"  for  an 
answer. 


•  The  President  has  initiated  new 
U.S.  flexibility  in  the  talks  to  reduce 
conventional  weapons  in  Europe,  and  we 
have  also  developed  proposals  in  the 
Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation 
in  Europe  (CSCE)  that  would  sig- 
nificantly reduce  the  risk  of  surprise  at- 
tack. 

•  In  another  area,  during  the  Presi- 
dent's summit  visit  to  China  last  April,  it 
was  agreed  to  open  a  fresh  dialogue  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  China  on 
arms  control  issues.  To  that  end,  I  led  a 
team  to  Beijing  in  July  where  we  had 
several  good  exchanges. 

With  the  few  exceptions  noted,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  been  unwilling  to 
engage  in  any  real  negotiations.  In  fact, 
as  you  know,  at  the  time  of  our  last 
discussion,  they  were  right  on  the  verge 
of  walking  out  of  the  intermediate-range 
nuclear  force  negotiations  and  then 
suspended  indefinitely  the  strategic 
arms  talks.  Commentators  frequently 
assert  that  the  Soviets  are  not  likely  to 
undertake  serious  negotiations  before 
the  U.S.  election  so  as  not  to  help  the 
candidacy  of  Ronald  Reagan. 

And,  as  you  know  full  well,  we  are 
entering  the  height  of  the  political 
season.  This  hallmark  of  our  great 
democratic  system — for  which  we  should 
all  be  eternally  grateful — is,  neverthe- 
less, a  time  of  intense  partisanship  and 
daily  hyperbole. 

Arms  control  remains  one  of  the 
most  critical  issues  facing  our  country. 
Success  still  requires  a  high  degree  of 
bipartisan  support.  But  it  has  not 
escaped,  and  may  never  escape,  becom- 
ing part  of  the  political  debate.  This  is 
proper — the  American  people  should 
decide  big  issues  via  our  electoral 
process. 

It  is  all  the  more  important,  there- 
fore, to  clearly  distinguish  opinion  from 
fact.  As  a  former  Secretary  of  Defense 
once  remarked:  Everyone  is  entitled  to 
their  own  opinions  but  not  to  their  own 
facts. 

One  of  this  season's  cries  is  that  the 
prospects  for  nuclear  arms  control  have 
been  disastrously  set  back,  if  not  killed, 
during  the  past  4  years.  Mark  Twain 
once  commented  from  Paris  that  reports 
of  his  death  were  premature.  The 
reports  on  the  "death"  of  arms  control 
are  worse  than  premature;  they  are 
dead  wrong. 


^Kr>,.  Ano A 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Today,  I  would  like  to  focus  on  three 
related  questions.  First,  why  have  we 
seen  no  arms  control  agreement  con- 
cluded between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  since  1979?  Second, 
has  the  world  thereby  become  a  more 
dangerous  place?  Finally,  and  most  im- 
portantly, what  are  the  chances  for 
nuclear  arms  control  over  the  next  4 
years? 

Why  No  Agreements? 

I  would  be  a  rich  man  today  if  I  had  a 
nickel  for  every  time  that  I  read  or 
heard  the  assertion  that  the  problem  in 
arms  control  is  that  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration does  not  take  it  seriously. 
But  repetition  does  not  make  it  so.  This 
assertion,  like  others,  flies  in  the  face  of 
the  facts. 

In  fact,  one  of  the  reasons  we  do  not 
have  an  agreement  is  precisely  because 
the  President  is  serious  about  arms  con- 
trol. Let's  not  fool  ourselves.  Getting 
some  kind  of  an  agreement  is  no  big 
problem.  If  the  President  told  me  to  get 
any  agreement  quickly,  we  could  bring 
one  home  on  strategic  nuclear  arms,  on 
intermediate  nuclear  arms,  and  possibly 
others.  That  could  be  done  most  easily 
by  signing  the  Soviet  proposals. 


verify  a  freeze — which  we  cannot — or  if 
it  would  be  more  advantageous  to  the 
Soviets— which  it  would.  The  freeze 
makes  for  a  good  bumper  sticker  but  not 
for  good  arms  control.  As  President 
Carter's  national  security  adviser  said 
just  recently:  "...  the  nuclear  freeze  is 
a  hoax.  It's  not  achievable.  It's  not 
verifiable." 

Strategic  arms  control  today  is  sur- 
rounded by  disappointment.  This  has 
been  the  case  for  some  time.  When  the 
Senate  Foriegn  Relations  Committee 
reported  on  the  SALT  II  Treaty  in  1979, 
it  closed  on  the  note  that  they  were 
"disappointed  that  more  could  not  be 
achieved."  They  found  it  paradoxical 
that  "a  vast  increase  in  the  quantity  and 
destructiveness  of  each  side's  strategic 
power"  would  occur  during  the  period  of 
a  treaty  to  limit  nuclear  arms.  "To  be 
worthwhile,  and  to  preserve  the  base  of 
support  in  the  United  States  for  the 
arms  control  process,"  the  committee 
concluded  that  the  next  strategic  arms 
agreement  "must  achieve  much  gi'eater 
progress  in  reductions  and  qualitative 
limits." 

The  agreements  to  date  have  not 
greatly  affected,  much  less  ended,  the 
strategic  buildups  and  arms  competition 
on  both  sides.  Quite  the  contrary.  Dur- 


If  the  President  told  me  to  get  any  agreement 
quickly,  we  could  bring  one  home  on  strategic 
nuclear  arms,  on  intermediate  nuclear  arms,  and 
possibly  others.  That  could  be  done  most  easily  by 
signing  the  Soviet  proposals. 


But  President  Reagan  wants  a  bal- 
anced agreement,  not  one  slanted  in 
favor  of  the  Soviets.  He  wants  an  agree- 
ment with  real  bite,  not  a  cosmetic  one 
that  may  have  some  popular  appeal  but 
no  real  effect.  So  he  has  stuck  by  his 
principles  in  seeking  an  agreement  that 
will  truly  enhance  international  stability, 
greatly  reduce  the  number  of  nuclear 
warheads,  and  be  effectively  verifiable. 

Sacrifice  these  principles  and  an 
agreement  would  come  easily.  But  it  is 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  imagine 
such  an  agreement  being  in  the  U.S.  in- 
terests or  helping  to  advance  the  cause 
of  arms  control. 

It  is  for  these  same  reasons  that  the 
President  opposes  the  nuclear  freeze. 
While  that  idea  enjoys  a  lot  of  public 
support  generally,  most  of  that  support 
quickly  turns  to  opposition  if  we  cannot 


AR 


ing  the  time  of  the  SALT  agreements, 
U.S.  missile  warheads  have  doubled; 
Soviet  missile  warheads  have  quad- 
rupled. The  Soviet  buildup  has  been  par- 
ticularly massive.  Since  the  second 
strategic  arms  accord  was  signed  in 
1979,  for  example,  they  have  added 
nearly  4,000  new  ballistic  missile 
warheads. 

Arms  control  must  do  better,  and  no 
one  wants  it  to  achieve  more  than  Presi- 
dent Reagan.  For  this  reason,  he  has 
embarked  on  an  ambitious  arms  control 
agenda — involving  deep  reductions  in 
nuclear  weapons.  He  has  offered  flex- 
ibility, told  the  Soviets  we  will  meet 
them  halfway,  and  been  ready  to  have 
his  team  meet  anytime,  anywhere. 

But,  as  you  know,  the  Soviets  have 
not  been  able  or  willing  to  stay  at  the 


nuclear  negotiating  table.  This  brings 
to  perhaps  the  two  most  critical  reasoi 
why  we  have  not  concluded  a  nuclear 
arms  control  agreement  in  the  past  4 
years — first,  the  Soviet  preoccupation 
with  the  issue  of  intermediate-range, 
land-based  missiles;  and  second,  the 
turnovers  of  leadership  in  the  Kremlin 

When  President  Reagan  entered  o 
fice,  the  question  of  intermediate-rang 
land-based  (INF)  missiles  had  been  on 
the  front  burner  for  well  over  a  year. 
The  Soviet  Union  had  proceeded  to  bu; 
up  its  new,  three-warheaded  INF 
missile— the  SS-20.  NATO  had  no  cor' 
parable  system  to  counter  and,  in  197! 
decided  that  the  United  States  should 
deploy  some  systems  unless  the  Soviel 
would  agree  to  limits  that  would  obvis 
that  need. 

From  President  Reagan's  first  da; 
onward,  a  major  Soviet  foreign  policy 
objective  was  to  defeat  those  deploy- 
ments and  to  drive  a  wedge  between  ■ 
Western  allies.  A  massive  propagandj 
campaign,  as  well  as  covert  programs 
were  harnessed  to  this  Soviet  effort.  " 
many  respects,  it  was  an  onslaught. 

■The  Soviets  agreed  to  negotiation 
on  INF  systems,  but  never  waivered  i 
their  insistence  on  a  "half-zero"  option 
namely  hundreds  of  INF  warheads  or 
their  side  and  zero  on  ours.  At  the  sa 
time,  they  continued  to  deploy  the 
SS-20s  on  an  average  of  one  a  week, 
and  their  attempts  to  intimidate  the 
Western  publics  intensified.  The  Sovic 
knew,  of  course,  that  their  position  w 
patently  unacceptable. 

The  President,  for  his  part,  offen 
first  to  eliminate  this  kind  of  system  ; 
together.  He  then  offered  to  limit  the 
to  any  level  as  long  as  it  involved 
significantly  lower  and  equal  levels.  Y 
took  other  negotiating  steps  designed 
draw  the  Soviets  out  and  strike  a  goc 
bargain. 

But  none  of  this  worked.  When 
NATO  stayed  the  course  and  the  INF 
deployments  went  forward  in  1983 — 
they  had  been  planned  for  4  years — e 
major  Soviet  objective  was  defeated. 
They  walked  out  of  the  INF  talks  as 
they  had  threatened.  They  then  sus- 
pended the  talks  on  strategic  nuclear 
arms. 

It  is  well  to  remember  that  the 
Soviets  left  those  talks  not  because  ol 
the  way  they  have  been  handled  by  tl  i 
Administration,  not  because  of  what 
some  people  view  as  too  harsh  rhetor 
and  not  because  we  are  proposing  det 
cuts  in  strategic  arms.  They  left,  quit 
simply,  because  the  West  would  not 
allow  itself  to  be  intimidated  into  givi 
up  or  accepting  a  lopsided  agreement 
is  also  well  to  remember  that  the  ove 
whelming  Soviet  concern  with  INF  si 


r\^^^^t^ 


,*  ci-,1.^  n.iiu 


ARMS  CONTROL 


ffl  as,  in  many  respects,  preoccupied 
''^'^h  genda  and  impeded  any  possibility 
eving  arms  control  agreements, 
this  light,  those  going  around  the 
y  lamenting  no  arms  control 
'Sf.;  nent  over  the  past  4  years  should 
0  answer  some  tough  questions, 
the  Reagan  Administration  have 
away  from  NATO-wide  policy  on 
opted  during  the  Carter-Mondale 
istration?  Or  should  the  Reagan 
istration  earlier  have  accepted 
00  INF^  missile  warheads  for  the 
s  and  zero  for  us?  Would  any 
'  lable  Senate  have  ratified  such  a 
is  ? 

'»!i  "ms  control  has  also  been  inhibited 
!    rapid  leadership  changes  in  the 

i'ii  ;  Union.  Usually,  these  changes 
)n  the  American  side.  In  the  first 

"■',  irs  of  strategic  arms  discussions, 
:  ifferent  U.S.  Presidents  faced  the 

■  General  Secretary  in  charge  of  the 
Ti  :,  Union.  We  saw  serious  breaks  in 

:  uity  on  the  U.S.  side,  as  the  elec- 
have  normally  been  marked  by 
ngers  opposing  the  incumbent's 
control  approaches, 
uring  President  Reagan's  term, 
/er,  we  have  seen  a  role  reversal, 
'resident  has  faced  three  different 
t  leaders  in  his  first  3  years  in  of- 
rhe  disruption  there,  of  course,  has 

less  to  do  with  any  newcomers  op- 
g  their  predecessor's  approach,  as 

to  do  with  stagnation  in  Soviet 
onmaking  and  policy, 
erious  arms  control  negotiations 
chieving  balanced  compromises  re- 
extremely  tough  bargaining — not 
ietween  governments  but  equally 
n  governments.  In  the  past  4  years, 
ive  not  seen  that  kind  of  consolida- 
)f  power  that  would  enable  the 
t  leadership  to  make  such  tough 
ions.  All  three  Soviet  leaders  have 
afflicted  with  serious  ailments, 
stagnation  in  Soviet  policy  lingers 

ust  recently,  for  example,  the 
dent  responded  positively  to  a 
!t  proposal  for  talks  this  September 
)ace  arms  control.  He  also  noted 
the  United  States  would  take  that 
iion  to  urge  the  Soviets  to  return  to 
alks  on  strategic  and  intermediate- 
e  nuclear  forces.  It  is  crucial  that 
hould  not  be  distracted  from  the 
-al  issue  of  nuclear  arms  control  just 
use  the  Soviets  have  walked  away 
those  talks. 
The  President's  quick  and  favorable 
onse  may  well  have  surprised  the 
ets,  caught  them  off  guard  so  to 
k.  Whatever,  in  the  give-and-take, 

■  positions  hardened,  and  they  upped 
ante.  The  prospects  for  these  talks 
fall  are,  therefore,  not  looking  good. 


But  this  President  will,  I  can  assure  you, 
never  give  up  hope  and  never  give  up 
trying. 

Is  the  World  More  Dangerous? 

It  has  become  fashionable  to  depict 
U.S. -Soviet  relations  as  tumbling  to 
their  lowest  point  ever  in  the  postwar 
era.  Indeed,  the  picture  is  often  por- 
trayed so  as  to  suggest  that  we  are  on  a 
road  to  nuclear  war  somewhere  in  the 
not-too-distant  future.  But,  is  it  all  really 
true? 

Many  of  the  words  from  Moscow 
have  been  harsh,  indeed  aggravating. 
The  refusal  of  the  Soviets  to  participate 
in  nuclear  arms  talks  is  lamentable.  The 
increased  patrol  of  Soviet  submarines 
off  U.S.  coasts  is  worrisome  even 
though  they  have  prowled  these  waters 
for  many  years. 

But  are  we  really  less  secure  today 
than  we  were  earlier,  or  just  4  years 
ago?  I  think  not.  Quite  the  contrary. 

Look  back  just  two  decades,  for  ex- 
ample, and  compare  President 
Kennedy's  1,000  days  in  office  to  Presi- 


East  erupted,  and  the  Soviets  threat- 
ened to  intervene  with  their  own  troops 
in  the  conflict,  prompting  us  to  go  on 
strategic  nuclear  alert.  Those  too  were 
dangerous  days. 

In  many  ways,  1979  symbolized  the 
whole  decade.  During  the  first  6  months. 
Secretary  Vance  and  Ambassador 
Dobrynin  met  some  25  times,  followed 
by  the  Carter-Brezhnev  summit  in  Vien- 
na where  SALT  II  was  signed.  Still 
regional  crises  flared.  There  was  the 
flap  over  a  Soviet  brigade  in  Cuba;  the 
false  Soviet  statements  adding  fuel  to 
the  already-blazing  fires  in  Iran  after 
the  American  hostages  were  seized;  and, 
most  seriously,  the  massive  Soviet  inva- 
sion of  Afghanistan— called  by  President 
Carter  the  greatest  crisis  since  World 
War  II. 

It  is  remarkable  to  recall  that  in 
each  year  from  1975  to  1980,  armies 
largely  supplied  by  Moscow  or  Soviet 
forces  invaded  or  seized  control  of  a  dif- 
ferent country:  South  Vietnam  in  1975, 
Angola  in  1975-76,  Ethiopia  in  1977, 
Cambodia  in  1978,  and  Afghanistan  in 
1979. 


.  .  .  the  Soviets  left  [the  arms  control]  talks  .  .  . 
because  the  West  would  not  allow  itself  to  be  in- 
timidated into  giving  up  or  accepting  a  lopsided 
agreement. 


dent  Reagan's  first  1,200  days.  The  Ken- 
nedy era  is  popularly  recalled  as  one  of 
smooth  and  skillful  American  steward- 
ship over  foreign  affairs.  Yet  during 
that  brief  time,  we  endured  the  Bay  of 
Pigs  fiasco,  a  disastrous  U.S. -Soviet 
summit  in  Vienna,  a  buildup  of  U.S.  in- 
volvement in  Vietnam,  the  construction 
of  the  Berlin  Wall,  and,  certainly  not 
least,  the  Cuban  missile  crisis.  Those 
were  dangerous  days.  Events  during  the 
past  3  plus  years  certainly  do  not  match 
that  cascade  of  crises. 

Likewise  in  the  1970s,  when  the 
U.S. -Soviet  dialogue  was  so  rich  and 
hopes  for  detente  so  high,  regional 
crises  were  still  severe.  From  1970  to 
1976,  while  American  and  Soviet  leaders 
held  five  summits  and  engaged  in  an  ar- 
ray of  arms  control  negotiations  with 
each  other,  the  Soviet  Union  backed  and 
armed  the  continuing  infiltration  of 
North  Vietnamese  troops  into  South 
Vietnam — making  a  peaceful  settlement 
of  the  conflict  impossible.  The  Middle 


Nothing  on  the  scale  of  such  crises 
has  happened  over  the  past  3  years.  This 
is  all  to  the  good.  Even  a  harsh  critic  of 
the  Administration's  handling  of  Soviet 
affairs  has  written  that  "Soviet  expan- 
sionism has  been  slowed;  embittered  and 
impacted  as  the  Soviet-American  rela- 
tionship was,  it  was  also  remarkably 
free  of  full-scale  crises"  during  the 
Reagan  Administration.  He  points  out 
that  of  the  three  major  wars  during  this 
period — Iran-Iraq,  Lebanon,  and  the 
Falklands — "none  had  become  a  super- 
power confrontation." 

This  is  a  key  point.  The  world  is  not 
more  dangerous  today.  The  factors  that 
make  it  more  stable,  that  dampen 
changes  of  nuclear  conflict,  are  active 
U.S.  diplomacy  and  relationships  and  in- 
creased U.S.  deterrent  strength. 

To  be  sure  we  need  to  improve  the 
current  state  of  affairs.  President 
Reagan  is  attempting  to  do  just  that. 
Besides  strengthening  allied  and  other 
relationships,  restoring  a  credible 
military  posture,  and  embarking  on  a 


irr^Krtr   "tOQyl 


ARMS  CONTROL 


wide-ranging  arms  control  agenda,  he 
has  actively  sought  to  reopen  and 
deepen  the  U.S. -Soviet  dialogue. 

What  Does  the  Future  Hold? 

At  this  stage,  it  is  difficult  to  forecast 
vifhen  or  whether  the  Soviet  Union  will 
bring  itself  to  accept  significant  nuclear 
arms  limitations.  We  do  not  know 
whether  it  will  accept  deep  reductions  in 
nuclear  forces.  We  do  not  know  whether 
our  strategic  concepts  can  become  com- 
patible enough  to  agree  on  how  to 
distinguish  the  more  threatening  kinds 
of  weapons.  We  do  not  know  if  the 
Soviets  will  accept  true  strategic  equali- 
ty or  continue  to  mask  their  demand  for 
strategic  superiority  in  the  guise  of  what 
they  call  "equal  security." 

"  But  we  do  know  that  we  cannot  find 
out  unless  we  try.  If,  after  enough  time 
and  with  enough  incentives,  the  answers 
to  these  central  questions  are  "no,"  then 
we  will  have  learned  something  rather 
important  about  the  Soviet  Union  and 
its  real  intentions.  If  the  answers  turn 
out  to  be  "yes,"  we  will  have  taken 
together  a  giant  step  forward  in  making 
the  world  a  much  better  and  safer  place. 
I  for  one  have  hope  for  the  future  of 
arms  control.  This  hope  is  grounded  in 
several  reasons. 

First  is  the  simple  fact  of  continuity 
that  will  come  with  the  second  Reagan 
Administration.  It  brings  a  considerable 
amount  of  accumulated  expertise  and 
lessons  learned  both  about  arms  control 
in  particular  and  about  dealing  with  the 
Soviets  in  general. 

Second,  the  President's  strategic 
modernization  program  started  in  1981, 
with  its  base  of  a  much  healthier  U.S. 
economy,  provides  considerably  more  in- 
centives to  the  Soviets  to  come  to  terms 
than  previously  existed.  The  President's 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative,  what  is 
popularly  criticized  as  "Star  Wars,"  also 
adds  incentives. 

Third,  the  fact  that  the  initial  INF 
deployments  are  already  behind  us  gives 
us  a  better  stage. 

Fourth,  I  think  it  is  safe  to  assume, 
that,  no  matter  how  long  the  stagnation 
in  the  Kremlin  persists,  the  Soviets  will 
surely  not  change  leadership  as  often  as 
they  have  over  the  past  4  years.  We  can 
thus  hope  that  the  Soviet  leadership  will 
be  able  and  willing  to  engage  in  real 
negotiations. 

Finally,  we  are  ready  for  tough 
bargaining  and  equally  tough  trade-offs 
once  the  Soviets  return.  As  I  discussed 
with  you  last  year,  even  under  the  best 
of  circumstances,  a  strategic  nuclear 
agreement  will  require  a  lot  of  hammer- 
ing out  in  light  of  the  two  sides'  dif- 


ferent doctrines,  force  postures,  goals, 
etc.  This  preparation  has,  in  fact,  been 
underway  in  the  Reagan  Administration 
for  some  time.  We  have  not  wasted  the 
time  just  because  the  Soviets  walked 
out.  When  the  President  said  his  team 
was  ready,  he  meant  it  substantively, 
not  just  logistically. 

So  if  you  hear  during  this  season 
that  arms  control  has  been  killed  or  is 


dying,  I  hope  you  will  not  lose  sight 
these  facts.  I  trust  you  will  also  not  ] 
sight  of  the  fact  that  the  United  Stal 
from  the  President  on  down,  must  h; 
tough  and  persevere  in  its  objectives 
we  are  ever  to  fulfill  the  promise  of 
arms  control.  Enhanced  stability  anc 
great  reductions  in  weapons  are  key 
goals,  and  we  should  not  compromia 
them.  ■ 


CDE  Talks  Resume  in  Stockholm 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  11,  19841 

The  third  round  of  the  Conference  on 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  in  Europe 
(CDE)  opens  today  in  Stockholm.  The 
U.S.  delegation,  headed  by  Ambassador 
James  Goodby,  will  be  returning  to  the 
negotiating  table  with  the  delegations  of 
Canada,  our  European  allies,  the  Euro- 
pean neutral  states,  and  the  countries  of 
the  Warsaw  Pact. 

The  Stockholm  conference  arises  out 
of  the  Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE),  which 
produced  the  Helsinki  accords  of  197,5. 
In  the  various  follow-up  negotiations 
that  form  part  of  the  "Helsinki  process," 
we  and  our  allies  continue  to  seek 
balanced  progress  in  both  the  security 
and  human  rights  areas.  The  CDE 
negotiations,  which  began  last  January, 
are  a  potentially  productive  new  part  of 
the  broad  East-West  dialogue. 

The  United  States  and  other 
Western  nations  have  proposed  at  the 
Stockholm  conference  a  series  of  con- 
crete measures  for  information,  observa- 
tion, and  verification,  designed  to  reduce 
the  possibility  of  war  by  miscalculation 
or  surprise  attack.  These  measures 
would  apply  to  the  whole  of  Europe, 
from  the  Atlantic  Ocean  to  the  Ural 
Mountains. 

The  Soviet  Union,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  taken  a  more  rhetorical  ap- 
proach to  the  conference,  seeking  the 
adoption  of  declarations  which  are  em- 
bodied in  other  national  agreements.  In 
an  effort  to  bridge  this  difference  in  our 
approaches,  I  made  it  clear  in  my  ad- 
dress to  the  Irish  Parliament  in  June 
that  the  United  States  will  consider  the 
Soviet  proposal  for  a  declaration  on  the 
non-use  of  force  as  long  as  the  Soviet 
Union  will  discuss  the  concrete  measures 
needed  to  put  that  principle  into  action. 

This  new  move  on  our  part  has  not 
yet  been  met  with  a  positive  response 


from  the  Soviet  Union.  With  the  sur 
mer  break  behind  us,  we  hope  the 
Soviets  will  now  be  ready  for  the  fie 
give-and-take  negotiating  process  wl 
is  necessary  to  move  forward. 

To  prepare  for  the  third  round, 
Ambassador  Goodby  has  consulted  c 
ly  with  our  allies  and  conducted  usel 
talks  here  in  Washington  with  the  h 
of  the  Soviet  delegation  to  the  con- 
ference. The  Ambassador  and  his 
delegation  continue  to  enjoy  my  strc 
support  in  their  efforts  to  achieve  c« 
Crete  results  at  Stockholm. 

Our  work  in  the  Stockholm  con- 
ference complements  our  many  othe 
forts  to  reach  agreement  on  confide 
building  measures.  We  and  our  allie-' 
have  put  forward  similar  proposals  i 
the  Vienna  talks  on  East- West  conv 
tional  force  reductions  (MBFR).  Fur- 
the  United  States  has  advanced 
confidence-building  measures  bilater 
with  the  Soviet  Union  in  our  success 
effort  to  upgrade  the  "Hot  Line"  coi 
munications  link  and  in  our  proposa 
for  additional  direct  communication: 
between  our  two  countries.  We  havi 
also  made  such  proposals  in  the  neg 
tions  on  strategic  arms  (START)  an 
intermediate  nuclear  forces  (INF). 

Unfortunately,  the  Soviet  Unior 
has  not  returned  to  the  START  and 
talks  since  walking  out  of  these  two 
negotiations  late  last  year  and  also 
been  unwilling  or  unable  to  follow 
through  on  its  own  proposal  for  tall 
space  arms  control  issues.  I  am  con 
vinced  that  the  United  States  and  tl 
Soviet  Union  share  a  deep  obligatioi 
all  humanity  to  get  on  with  the  urge 
business  of  reducing  nuclear  arms.  "! 
United  States  is  ready  to  do  its  part 
sincerely  hope  that  the  Soviet  leadei 
will  soon  find  its  way  to  return  to  tl 
negotiating  tables. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  relea; 


48 


DAnartrnpnt  nf  Rtatfi  Riil 


ARMS  CONTROL 


htus  of  Arms  Control  Talks 


,stl 

i,  5IDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
i:  \  21.  1984' 

is 

liji  r  I  met  with  Ambassador  Maynard 
an,  the  new  U.S.  representative  to 
utual  and  balanced  force  reduction 
R)  talks  in  Vienna.  This  negotia- 
which  involves  members  of  both 
)  and  the  Warsaw  Pact,  aims  at 
icing  stability  and  security  in  cen- 
]urope  through  the  reduction  of 
ntional  forces  to  equal,  lower  levels 
.npower  on  both  sides.  Such  reduc- 
would  reduce  the  risks  of  war  in 
pe  and  promote  mutual  confidence, 
mbassador  Glitman  and  I  discussed 
irrent  status  of  the  negotiations 
he  prospects  for  progress  when  the 
resume  at  the  end  of  this  month, 
eviewed  recent  efforts  by  the 
!d  States  and  our  NATO  allies  to 
renewed  momentum  to  the  negotia- 
and  to  produce  an  equitable  and 
!able  agreement.  Specifically,  on 
19,  1984,  the  West  put  forward  a 
r  new  initiative  which  addresses  in 
cible  manner  the  basic  issues  which 
i  in  the  way  of  an  MBFR  agree- 
These  issues  include  the  "data 
em" — i.e.,  the  dispute  over  the  size 
arsaw  Pact  forces  in  central 
)pe — and  the  question  of  verifica- 

rhe  Eastern  response  to  this  latest 
tern  initiative  to  move  toward  an  ef- 
ve  agreement  has  been  disappoint- 
The  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies  have 
led  to  engage  in  a  detailed  discus- 
of  the  proposal.  If  our  proposal  is 
lined  on  its  merits,  substantial  prog- 
could  be  achieved  in  these  negotia- 
i.  Now  that  the  Eastern  negotiators 
•  had  several  weeks  during  the  sum- 
recess  to  address  the  Western  pro- 
.1  in  their  capitals,  we  hope  they  will 
rn  to  Vienna  with  a  constructive 
onse. 

Ambassador  Glitman  and  his 
tern  colleagues  have  my  full  support 
leir  efforts  to  move  these  negotia- 

forward.  We  in  the  West  will  do 
part  to  achieve  concrete  results,  and 
ve  urged  Ambassador  Glitman  to 

every  opportunity  to  probe  for 
iible  areas  of  movement. 
Our  efforts  in  MBFR  are  part  of  our 
ider  commitment  to  achieving  prog- 
in  arms  reduction  and  other  securi- 
egotiations.  About  2  weeks  ago  the 
skholm  Conference  on  Disarmament 
Europe  resumed  its  efforts  to 
otiate  confidence-building  measures 
gned  to  reduce  the  risk  of  surprise 
Lck.  The  United  States  and  other 


NATO  participants  have  put  forward 
major,  concrete  proposals  in  Stockholm 
that  would  significantly  enhance  security 
in  Europe. 

Similarly,  in  the  40-nation  Commit- 
tee on  Disarmament  in  Geneva,  the 
United  States  has  put  forward  a  pro- 
posal for  a  complete,  verifiable  ban  on 
chemical  weapons. 

In  the  Geneva  negotiations  on  both 
strategic  and  intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces— the  START  and  INF  talks— the 
United  States  has  put  forward  major 
proposals  that  would  radically  reduce  or, 
in  the  case  of  INF,  totally  eliminate  an 
entire  class  of  nuclear  missiles  in  U.S. 
and  Soviet  arsenals.  Unfortunately  the 


Soviet  Union  walked  out  of  these  talks 
late  last  year  and  still  has  not  agreed  to 
return. 

In  June  the  United  States  agreed 
without  preconditions  to  the  Soviet  offer 
to  hold  talks  on  space  arms  control 
issues.  However,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
thus  far  been  unwilling  to  follow  up 
their  own  proposal  by  beginning  such 
negotiations. 

It  is  my  firm  belief  that  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  share  a 
special  responsibility  to  take  the  lead  in 
bringing  about  real  reductions  in  the 
levels  of  forces.  We  will  continue  to  keep 
this  issue  at  the  top  of  our  agenda  in 
discussions  with  the  Soviet  Union. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  24,  1984.  I 


Review  Conference  Held  on 
Environmental  Modification  Convention 


The  first  review  conference  of  the 
Convention  on  the  Prohibition  of 
Military  or  Any  Other  Hostile  Use  of 
Environmental  Modification  Techniques 
was  held  in  Geneva  September  10-20, 
198U-^  The  U.S.  delegation  was  headed  by 
Thomas  H.  Etzold,  Assistant  Director  of 
the  Arms  Coyitrol  and  Disarmament 
Agency  (ACDA). 

Following  is  the  final  declaration 
issued  by  the  review  conference  on 
September  20. 

The  States  Parties  to  the  Convention  on  the 
Prohibition  of  Military  or  Any  Other  Hostile 
tlse  of  Environmental  Modification  Tech- 
niques, having  met  in  Geneva  10-20 
September  1984  under  the  provisions  of  Arti- 
cle VIII  to  review  the  operation  of  the  Con- 
vention, with  a  view  to  ensuring  that  its  pur- 
poses and  provisions  are  being  realised  and  in 
particular  to  examine  the  effectiveness  of  the 
provisions  of  Paragraph  1  of  Article  I  in 
eliminating  the  dangers  of  military  or  any 
other  hostile  use  of  environmental  modifica- 
tion techniques: 

Continuing  to  be  guided  by  the  interest  of 
consolidating  peace,  and  wishing  to  con- 
tribute to  the  cause  of  halting  the  arms  race, 
and  of  bringing  about  general  and  complete 
disarmament  under  strict  and  effective  inter- 
national control,  and  of  saving  mankind  from 
the  danger  of  using  new  means  of  warfare, 

Reaffirming  their  determination  to  con- 
tinue negotiations  with  a  view  to  achieving 
effective  progress  towards  further  measures 
in  the  field  of  disarmament, 


Considering  that  the  Convention  con- 
stitutes a  contribution  to  the  strengthening  of 
trust  among  nations  and  to  the  improvement 
of  the  international  situation  in  accordance 
with  the  purpose  and  principles  of  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations, 

Recognising  the  continuing  importance  of 
the  Convention  and  its  objectives,  and  the 
common  interest  of  mankind  in  maintaining 
its  effectiveness  in  prohibiting  the  use  of  en- 
vironmental modification  techniques  as  a 
means  of  war, 

Affirming  their  belief  that  universal 
adherence  to  the  Convention  would  enhance 
international  peace  and  security, 

Considering  also  that  universal 
adherences  could  further  the  use  of  en- 
vironmental modification  techniques  for 
peaceful  purposes  and  facilitate  international 
co-operation  in  such  use,  in  the  interest  of  all 
States,  including  in  particular  developing 
States, 

Appealing  to  all  States  to  refrain  from 
any  action  which  might  place  the  Convention 
or  any  of  its  provisions  in  jeopardy. 

Declare  as  follows: 


PURPOSES 

The  States  Parties  to  the  Convention  reaf- 
firm their  strong  common  interest  in  pre- 
venting the  use  of  environmental  modification 
techniques  for  military  or  any  other  hostile 
purposes.  They  reaffirm  their  strong  support 
for  the  Convention,  their  continued  dedica- 
tion to  its  principles  and  objectives  and  their 
commitment  to  implement  effectively  its  pro- 
visions. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Article  I 

The  Conference  confirms  that  the  obligations 
assumed  under  Article  I  have  been  faithfully 
observed  by  the  States  Parties.  The  Con- 
ference is  convinced  that  the  continued 
observance  of  this  Article  is  essential  to  the 
objective  which  all  States  Parties  share  of 
preventing  military  or  any  other  hostile  use 
of  environmental  modification  techniques. 
Having  re-examined  the  provisions  of 
Paragraph  1  of  Article  I,  the  Conference  is 
convinced  that,  taking  into  account  the  rele- 
vant understandings  and  the  present  state  of 
technology,  they  remain  effective  in  pre- 
venting the  dangers  of  military  or  any  other 
hostile  use  of  environmental  modification 
techniques.  The  Conference  recognises  the 
need  to  keep  under  continuing  review  and  ex- 
amination the  provisions  of  Paragraph  1  of 
Article  I,  in  order  to  ensure  their  continued 
effectiveness,  taking  into  accoimt  any 
developments  which  might  take  place  in  the 
relevant  technology,  and  having  regard  also 
to  the  different  views  expressed  in  the  course 
of  the  debate  on  this  Article  on  the  question 
of  expanding  its  scope. 

Article  II 

The  Conference  reaffirms  its  support  for  this 
article  containing  the  definition  of  the  term 
"environmental  modification  techniques."  The 
Conference  is  of  the  opinion  that  this  defini- 
tion, taken  together  with  the  understandings 
relating  to  Articles  I  and  II,  is  adequate  to 
fulfill  the  purposes  of  the  Convention. 

Article  III 

The  Conference  reaffirms  that  Article  III  is 
without  prejudice  to  any  rules  of  interna- 
tional law  which  may  apply  to  environmental 
modification  techniques  used  for  peaceful  pur- 
poses. The  Conference  notes  with  satisfaction 
that  the  implementation  of  the  Convention 
has  not  hindered  the  economic  or 
technological  development  of  States  Parties. 
The  Conference  recalls  that  States  Parties 
have  undertaken  to  facilitate  the  fullest  possi- 
ble exchange  of  scientific  and  technological 
information  on  the  use  of  environmental 
modification  techniques  for  peaceful  pur- 
poses. The  Conference  further  calls  upon 
States  Parties  also  to  provide  and  facilitate 
the  fullest  possible  exchange  of  scientific  and 
technological  information  on  the  research  on 
and  the  development  of  such  environmental 
modification  techniques.  Furthermore,  and  in 
order  to  ensure  the  widest  possible  exchange 
of  such  information,  the  Conference  invites 
the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations 
to  receive  such  information  for  dissemination. 
For  this  purpose  the  Conference  requests  the 
Secretary-General  to  utilize  to  the  maximum 
extent  the  United  Nations  agencies  with  com- 


petence in  environmental  topics.  The  Con- 
ference also  calls  upon  States  Parties  in  a 
position  to  do  so  to  continue  to  contribute  to 
and  strengthen,  alone  or  together  with  other 
States  or  international  organizations,  interna- 
tional economic  and  scientific  co-operation  in 
the  preservation,  improvement  and  peaceful 
utilization  of  the  environment,  with  due  con- 
sideration for  the  needs  of  the  developing 
areas  of  the  world. 

Article  IV 

The  Conference  notes  the  provisions  of  Arti- 
cle IV,  which  requires  each  State  Party  to 
take  any  measures  it  considers  necessary  in 
accordance  with  its  constitutional  processes 
to  prohibit  and  prevent  any  activity  in  viola- 
tion of  the  provisions  of  the  Convention 
anywhere  under  its  jurisdiction  or  control  and 
invites  States  Parties  which  have  found  it 
necessary  to  enact  specific  legislation,  or  take 
other  regulatory  measures  relevant  to  this 
Article,  to  make  available  the  appropriate 
texts  to  the  United  Nations  Department  for 
Disarmament  Affairs,  for  the  purpose  of  con- 
sultation. 


Article  V 

The  Conference  notes  with  satisfaction  that 
no  State  Party  has  found  it  necessary  to  in- 
voke the  provisions  of  Article  V  dealing  with 
international  complaints  and  verification  pro- 
cedures. The  Conference  reaffirms  the  impor- 
tance of  Paragraph  1  of  this  Article,  which 
contains  the  undertaking  of  States  Parties  to 
consult  one  another  and  to  co-operate  in  solv- 
ing any  problems  which  may  arise  in  relation 
to  the  objectives  of,  or  in  the  application  of 
the  provisions  of  the  Convention,  and  of 
Paragraph  2,  which  provides  for  the  conven- 
ing of  a  Consultative  Committee  of  Experts. 
In  view  of  the  Conference  the  provisions  of 
Article  V,  Paragraphs  1  and  2,  do  not  ex- 
clude the  possibility  of  consideration,  by 
States  Parties,  of  the  summary  of  findings  of 
fact  of  the  Consultative  Committee  of  Ex- 
perts. 

The  Conference  also  notes  the  importance 
of  Article  V  Paragraphs  3  and  4,  which,  in 
addition  to  the  procedures  contained  in  Arti- 
cle V  Paragraphs  1  and  2,  provide  that  any 
State  Party  which  finds  that  any  other  State 
Party  is  acting  in  breach  of  its  obligations 
under  the  Convention,  may  lodge  a  complaint 
with  the  United  Nations  Security  Council, 
and  under  which  each  State  Party  undertakes 
to  co-operate  in  carrying  out  any  investiga- 
tion which  the  Security  Council  may  initiate. 

The  Conference  considers  that  the  flex- 
ibility of  the  provisions  concerning  consulta- 
tion and  co-operation  on  any  problems  which 
may  arise  in  relation  to  the  Convention,  or  in 
the  application  of  the  provisions  of  the  Con- 
vention, should  enable  complaints  or  disputes 
to  be  effectively  resolved. 


Article  VI 

The  Conference  notes  that  during  the  op 
tion  of  the  Convention  no  State  Party  ha 
proposed  any  amendments  to  this  Convei 
tion.  under  the  procedures  laid  down  in  t 
Article. 


Article  VII 

The  Conference  reaffirms  that  the  Convi 
tion  should  be  of  unlimited  duration. 


Article  VIII 

The  Conference  notes  with  satisfaction  ti 
spirit  of  co-operation  in  which  the  Revie\ 
Conference  was  held. 

The  Conference,  recognising  the  imp 
tance  of  the  review  mechanism  provided 
Article  VIII  decides  that  a  second  Revie\ 
Conference  may  be  held  in  Geneva  at  ths 
quest  of  a  majority  of  States  Parties  not 
earlier  than  1989.  If  no  Review  Conferer 
held  before  1994  the  depositary  is  reques 
to  solicit  the  views  of  all  States  Parties  c 
cerning  the  convening  of  such  a  Conferei 
in  accordance  with  Article  VIII  Paragrapj 
of  the  Convention. 


Article  IX 

The  Conference  stresses  that  the  six  yea 
that  have  elapsed  since  the  date  of  entry 
force  of  the  Convention  have  demonstral 
its  effectiveness. 

The  Conference  notes  that  45  States 
become  Parties  to  the  Convention  and  a  ! 
ther  19  States  have  signed  but  have  yet 
ratify  the  Convention.  The  Conference  n 
with  concern  that  the  Convention  has  no 
achieved  universal  acceptance.  Therefore 
Conference  calls  upon  all  signatory  Statt 
which  have  not  ratified  the  Convention  t 
so  without  delay  and  upon  those  States  \  . 
have  not  signed  the  Convention  to  adher  i 
it  as  soon  as  possible  and  thereby  join  th  ( 
States  Parties  thereto  in  their  efforts  to  | 
hibit  effectively  military  or  any  other  ho:  i 
use  of  environmental  modification  techni  ( 
Such  adherence  would  be  a  significant  c( 
tribution  to  international  confidence  and 
the  strengthening  of  trust  among  nation 


'For  text  of  the  convention,  see  Bi'l 
of  Jan.  10,  1977.  ■ 


50 


>T  ASIA 


mbodia:  The  Search  for  Peace 


lul  D.  Wolfowitz 

'atement  before  the  Conference  on 
imbodian  Crisis  on  September  11, 
Mr.  Wolfowitz  is  Assistant 
ary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
s. 


[reciate  the  opportunity  to  be  here 

ou  as  we  recall  the  ongoing 
idy  in  Cambodia.  The  presence  of  so 
people  here  testifies  to  the  deep 
biding  concern  that  Americans 
for  the  people  of  Cambodia.  It  is 
;estimony  to  the  grievous 
ilculation  made  by  Hanoi  when  it 
ed  Cambodia.  The  world  has  not 
tten  Cambodia's  plight.  The  prob- 
'or  the  international  community 
is  how  peace  and  independence 
)e  restored  to  Cambodia  by  ending 
resent  Vietnamese  occupation 
)ut  permitting  a  recurrence  of  the 
er  Rouge  period. 

Human  Tragedy 

nations  in  history  have  experienced 
umulative  disasters  and  destruction 
h  have  engulfed  Cambodia  during 
)ast  two  decades.  Hanoi's  use  of 
bodian  territory  in  its  war  against 
south  and  the  attack  on  the  Khmer 
iblic  by  the  communist  Khmer 
je,  with  Hanoi's  support,  destroyed 
bodia's  economy  and  made  refugees 
illions  of  ordinary  Khmer  who 
;ht  safety  in  Phnom  Penh  and  other 
The  war's  end  in  1975  unleashed 
ven  greater  tragedy,  one  that  the 
d  still  cannot  fully  comprehend. 
The  whole  world  knows  of  the  hor- 
that  the  Khmer  people  suffered 
"Isr  Khmer  Rouge  rule.  In  their  effort 
radicate  every  vestige  of  the  old 
ibodia,  the  Khmer  Rouge  tried  to 
;roy  a  culture  which  had  endured  for 
e  than  a  millennium.  Thousands  who 
served  previous  governments  were 
;ally  murdered  and  buried  in  mass 
v^es.  The  entire  population  was  sent 
he  countryside  with  whatever  posses- 
is  they  could  carry.  Hospitals  and 
3ols  were  abandoned,  Buddhism — the 
)odiment  of  the  Khmer  soul — was 
ned,  and  traditional  culture  was  sup- 
ssed.  Murder  and  starvation  took  the 
s  of  at  least  a  million  Cambodians, 
the  total  number  who  died  during 
3V2  years  of  Khmer  Rouge  rule  will 
er  be  known. 


Vietnam  bears  a  heavy  responsibility 
for  the  Khmer  Rouge,  whom  it  spon- 
sored and  supported.  It  was  the  Viet- 
namese Army  which  nearly  destroyed 
Cambodia's  Army  in  1970,  opening  the 
way  for  the  Khmer  Rouge  seizure  of 
much  of  the  countryside.  The  Viet- 
namese army  continued  to  occupy  major 
portions  of  eastern  Cambodia  until  after 
1973.  Hanoi  supplied  the  Khmer  Rouge 
with  the  arms  and  supplies  to  battle  the 
Khmer  Republic,  including  the  Russian- 
built  rockets  which  terrorized  the 
civilians  of  Phnom  Penh. 

For  a  while  after  1975,  Vietnam  con- 
tinued to  defend  the  new  regime  in 
Cambodia.  The  few  refugees  to  escape 
Cambodia  told  of  terror,  murder,  and 
starvation.  Attempts  to  inform  the 
world  of  the  tragedy  inside  Cambodia  or 
assist  the  Khmer  people  were  met  by 
silence  from  Phnom  Penh  and  denuncia- 
tions from  Hanoi,  which  called  the 
refugees'  reports  an  American-inspired 
plot.  Many  writers  and  scholars  in  the 
West  could  not  or  would  not  believe  the 
evidence  about  the  Khmer  Rouge,  and 
one  even  criticized  published  reports  as 
"wild  exaggeration  and  wholesale 
falsehood"  in  testimony  before  a  U.S. 
congressional  hearing  on  human  rights 
in  Cambodia.  Vietnam,  joined  by  the 
U.S.S.R.  and  its  supporters,  tried  to  de- 
fend Cambodia  when  the  United  Nations 
at  last  inquired  into  conditions  inside 
Cambodia. 

Vietnam,  of  course,  had  its  own 
reasons  for  assisting  the  Khmer  Rouge. 
Hanoi  ultimately  sought  to  control  the 
Cambodian  communists  as  thoroughly  as 
it  controlled  those  in  South  Vietnam  and 
Laos.  In  this,  it  failed. 

Having  failed  to  dominate  and  con- 
trol the  Khmer  Rouge,  Hanoi  decided  to 
depose  them  and  replace  them  with  a 
more  pliable  communist  regime.  On 
Christmas  Day,  1978,  Vietnam  invaded 
Cambodia  and  rapidly  drove  the  Khmer 
Rouge  from  Phnom  Penh,  installing 
Heng  Samrin,  a  former  lieutenant  of  Pol 
Pot,  as  the  leader  of  a  new  regime.  In- 
stead of  solving  the  Cambodian  problem, 
Vietnam's  occupation  has  simply  thrust 
it  into  a  new  phase,  more  threatening  to 
the  security  of  its  neighbors  and  hardly 
any  less  threatening  to  the  Khmer 
people. 

Vietnam's  claim  that  it  invaded  Cam- 
bodia to  liberate  the  Khmer  people  from 
Pol  Pot  and  that  it  remains  there  only  to 
prevent  his  return  to  power  is  a  thinly 
disguised  deception.  Vietnam,  which  had 


defended  Pol  Pot  against  international  , 
criticism,  deposed  him  only  when  it 
became  apparent  that  the  Khmer  Rouge 
were  unwilling  to  accept  Vietnam's 
leadership.  Vietnam  today  rules  Cam- 
bodia through  a  puppet  regime  com- 
prised of  many  former  followers  of  Pol 
Pot,  including  Heng  Samrin  himself. 
Khmer  Rouge  who  still  follow  Pol  Pot 
are  welcomed  back  by  the  Heng  Samrin 
regime.  It  has  publicly  said  they  are  free 
to  resume  their  lives  after  a  brief  period 
of  political  indoctrination.  Noncom- 
munists,  however,  receive  no  such 
welcome  in  Vietnamese-controlled 
Cambodia. 

Beyond  the  continued  warfare,  the 
Khmer  people  now  face  the  possibility  of 
an  end  to  their  homeland,  except  as  a 
name  on  the  map,  and  the  extinction  of 
an  ancient  culture.  Thousands  of  Viet- 
namese citizens  are  now  settling 
throughout  Cambodia,  abetted  and  en- 
couraged by  Hanoi.  While  the  actual 
number  of  Vietnamese  immigrants  is 
unknowable,  except  perhaps  to  the  Viet- 
namese authorities,  it  is  likely  that  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  Vietnamese  na- 
tionals have  settled  in  Cambodia  in  the 
past  4  years.  Willibald  Pahr,  former 
Austrian  Foreign  Minister  and  Chair- 
man of  the  International  Conference  on 
Kampuchea,  recently  stated  in  a  press 
conference  that  Vietnamese  immigrants 
number  500,000  at  a  minimum. 

Heng  Samrin  regime  documents, 
moreover,  instruct  officials  to  assist 
Vietnamese,  both  former  residents  and 
new  immigrants,  in  any  way  possible 
and  to  consult  with  the  Vietnamese  ad- 
visers before  taking  any  action  affecting 
Vietnamese  settlers.  Vietnamese  soldiers 
serving  in  Cambodia  are  encouraged  to 
settle  in  the  country  and  marry  Khmer 
women.  Those  who  do  so  are  to  receive 
Cambodian  citizenship.  Vietnamese  im- 
migrants are  also  given  extraterritorial 
status — violations  of  Cambodian  laws 
are  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  Vietnamese 
authorities,  not  Cambodian.  Some  new 
refugees  from  Cambodia  report  that 
villagers  are  required  to  provide  housing 
and  food  to  new  Vietnamese  settlers. 

When  combined  with  Vietnamese- 
imposed  changes  to  Cambodian  ad- 
ministration and  Khmer  society,  this  of- 
ficially sponsored  Vietnamese  immigra- 
tion raises  serious  questions  about 
Hanoi's  long-term  intentions  toward 
Cambodia.  It  will  be  the  ultimate 
tragedy  if  Cambodia,  decimated  by  war 
and  famine,  should  now  be  extinguished" 
as  an  entity,  submerged,  and  colonized 
by  its  much  larger,  more  powerful 
neighbor. 


EAST  ASIA 


International  Security  Concerns 
and  the  World's  Response 

Beyond  the  human  tragedy  in  Cambodia, 
the  situation  there  is  also  a  crisis  for  the 
international  community  because  of  its 
implications  for  the  security  of  all  na- 
tions, particularly  those  of  Southeast 
Asia.  Vietnam's  invasion  and  occupation 
of  Cambodia  violates  the  UN  Charter, 
which  Vietnam  signed,  and  threatens 
the  system  of  collective  security,  em- 
bodied in  the  UN  Charter,  designed  to 
preserve  the  independence  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  all  nations.  No  one 
lamented  the  demise  of  the  Khmer 
Rouge,  a  regime  detested  everywhere. 
But  Hanoi  did  not  invade  Cambodia  for 
the  purpose  of  returning  Cambodia  to  its 
people.  Instead,  Vietnam  installed  a  pup- 
pet regime  of  its  own  choosing,  one  com- 
prised of  former  followers  of  Pol  Pot 
and  Khmer  communists  who  had  lived  in 
Vietnam  for  many  years,  a  regime  that 
depends  on  a  Vietnamese  Army  of  oc- 
cupation for  its  survival. 

It  should  come  as  no  surprise  that 
Vietnam's  invasion  and  occupation  of 
Cambodia  drew  its  most  coherent 
response  from  the  neighboring  countries 
most  directly  threatened,  the  members 
of  the  Association  of  South  East  Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN).  ASEAN  has  taken 
the  leading  role  in  the  search  for  a  solu- 
tion to  the  Cambodian  crisis  that  can 
restore  stability  to  the  region  and  end 
the  suffering  of  the  Khmer  people.  That 
kind  of  solution  must  end  Hanoi's  oc- 
cupation and  prevent  the  Klimer  Rouge 
from  returning  to  power. 


•  Appropriate  arrangements  to  ensure 
that  armed  Kampuchean  factions  will  not  be 
able  to  prevent  or  disrupt  the  holding  of  free 
elections  or  intimidate  or  coerce  the  popula- 
tion in  the  electoral  process;  such  ar- 
rangements should  also  ensure  that  they 
respect  the  results  of  the  free  elections. 

•  Appropriate  measures  for  the 
maintenance  of  law  and  order  .  .  .  before  the 
establishment  of  a  new  government  resulting 
from  those  elections. 

•  The  holding  of  free  elections  under 
United  Nations  supervision  .  .  .;  all  Kam- 
pucheans  will  have  the  right  to  participate  in 
the  elections. 

The  final  declaration  also  calls  on  all 
states  to  pledge  their  respect  for  Cam- 
bodia's independence,  territorial  integri- 
ty, and  nonaligned  status.  These  prin- 
ciples were  endorsed  in  successive 
resolutions  of  the  UN  General  Assembly. 

In  its  various  efforts  to  find  a 
political  solution,  ASEAN  has  sought  to 
work  out  the  framework  of  a  settlement 
which  preserves  the  legitimate  security 
concerns  of  Cambodia's  neighbors,  in- 
cluding Vietnam.  ASEAN  has  repeated- 
ly offered  Hanoi  the  opportunity  to  work 
out  the  arrangements  for  a  settlement. 
Vietnam  has  totally  rejected  the 
framework  of  the  International  Con- 
ference on  Kampuchea.  ASEAN  has  im- 
plicitly agreed  to  work  for  a  solution 
through  some  other  process  as  long  as 
the  key  elements  of  Vietnamese 
withdrawal  and  elections  are  preserved. 
In  1983,  Thai  Foreign  Minister  Siddhi 
offered  to  go  to  Hanoi  for  talks  if  Viet- 
nam would  [Kill  its  forces  in  Cambodia 
back  30  kilometers  from  the  Thai 


We  cannot  consider  an  improvement  in 
U.S. 'Vietnamese  relations  as  long  as  Hanoi  con- 
tinues to  occupy  Cambodia. 


ASEAN's  Proposals 

ASEAN  seeks  a  political  settlement  that 
would  restore  an  independent,  neutral 
Cambodia  under  a  government  freely 
chosen  by  the  Cambodian  people  and 
posing  no  threat  to  any  of  its  neighbors. 
The  UN-sponsored  International  Con- 
ference on  Kampuchea  met  in  July  1981 
with  94  countries  sending  delegates  or 
observers.  Vietnam  and  its  friends  in  the 
Soviet  bloc  refused  to  attend.  Its  final 
declaration  contained  four  elements: 

•  An  agreement  on  a  cea.se-fire  by  all 
parties  .  .  .  and  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces  from  Kampuchea  in  the  shortest  time 
possible  under  the  supervision  and  verifica- 
tion of  a  UN  peacekeeping  force/observer 
group. 


52 


border.  Vietnam  refu.sed.  In  Se|)teniber 
1983,  the  ASEAN  foreign  ministers 
issued  a  joint  "Appeal  for  Kampuchean 
Independence."  In  that  appeal,  they  pro- 
posed a  territorially  phased  Vietnamese 
withdrawal,  coupled  with  an  interna- 
tional peacekeeping  force  and  recon- 
struction aid  in  the  areas  vacated,  as 
part  of  a  Vietnamese  commitment  to  a 
complete  withdrawal  and  elections.  No 
mention  was  made  of  the  International 
Conference  on  Kampuchea.  Hanoi  re- 
jected this  proposal  as  well. 

This  year,  ASEAN  has  again  sought 
to  find  a  settlement  formula  which 
preserves  Vietnam's  legitimate  security 
interests.  During  Vietnamese  Foreign 
Minister  Thach's  visit  to  Jakarta,  In- 
donesian {'resilient  Soeharto  signaled 


the  possibility  of  movement  on  impdr- 
feint  negotiating  points.  Thach  rejerte 
those  proposals  also.  The  ASEAN  j 
foreign  ministers  have  formally  adopj 
Prince  Sihanouk's  call  for  national  re( 
ciliation,  including  the  Heng  Samriii  f 
tion.  Vietnam  remains  silent. 

Vietnam's  conduct  in  Cambodi:i  h; 
isolated  it  internationally.  The  majiMi 
of  nonaligned  nations  have  joined 
ASEAN,  Western  Europe,  Japan,  an 
the  United  States  in  condemning  Viel 
nam's  aggression.  Most  of  our  allies  a 
friends  have  joined  us  in  supporting 
ASEAN's  strategy  of  political  and 
economic  pressure  on  Vietnam  to  con 
vince  Hanoi  that  a  political  settlemen 
Cambodia  is  in  its  own  interest. 
Australia  suspended  its  economic 
assistance  program  in  1979.  Japan  ar 
many  European  countries  have  reduc 
or  frozen  their  own  programs.  Japan 
also  offered  financial  support  for  im- 
plementation of  ASEAN's  settlement 
proposal,  including  the  peacekeeping 
force  and  postsettlement  reconstruct] 
aid. 

Neither  ASEAN  nor  its  friends,  i 
eluding  the  United  States,  are  trying 
bleed  Vietnam.  Humanitarian  assista 
to  the  Vietnamese  people  has  continu 
from  many  quarters.  It  would  l)e  wi'i 
however,  for  the  world  community  t(, 
continue  normal  relations  of  trade  an 
assistance  with  Vietnam  as  long  as  it 
continues  to  occupy  Cambodia. 

If  Hanoi  is  determined  to  continu  i 
its  occupation  of  Cambodia  regardles  i 
the  |)rice  it  pays,  economic  and  diplo-  ■ 
matic  pressure  will  not  prevent  it  fro  I 
doing  so.  The  denial  of  trade  and 
assistance  by  the  West  does,  howeve 
impose  a  cost  on  Vietnam  in  terms  o  ' 
benefits  foregone  and  presents  it  wit 
clear  choice.  Hanoi,  by  its  policies,  c: 
choose  between  the  continued  militai 
occupation  of  its  neighbor  and  norm; 
relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  ' 
benefits  Vietnam  could  derive  from  i 
panded  trade  and  other  contacts  witl  i 
the  West  and  ASEAN,  if  it  would  all  ' 
the  policies  that  led  to  its  isolation,  a 
obvious. 

China's  Position 

In  invading  Cambodia,  Vietnam  has  ; 
gained  the  enmity  of  its  most  power! 
neighbor,  China.  It  is  ironic  that  Chii 
and  Vietnam,  countries  which  once 
described  themselves  as  "lips  and  tee 
have  now  become  bitter  enemies.  Ch; 
the  United  States,  and  ASEAN  have 
parallel  interest  in  ending  Vietnam's 
cupation  of  Cambodia  through  a  polit 
settlement  which  would  also  reduce 
Hanoi's  dependence  on  the  U.S,S,R.. 


EAST  ASIA 


rcft 


ng  the  opportunities  for  an  expan- 
Soviet  interests  in  the  region, 
course,  have  consistently  made 
our  total  abhorrence  of  the 
Rouge,  whom  the  Chinese  sup- 
in  power  and  continue  to  sup- 
Ihina  has,  however,  accepted  the 
a  of  the  International  Conference 
ipuchea  of  free  elections  to 
|sh  a  legitimate  Cambodian 
ment.  It  has  also  publicly  sup- 
the  emergence  of  a  neutral,  non- 
mist  Cambodia  after  a  Viet- 
e  withdrawal.  The  Chinese,  like 
lited  States  and  ASEAN,  refuse 
)  accept  Vietnam's  domination  of 
)dia. 

stead  of  a  positive  response  to 
N's  efforts,  Hanoi  continues  to 
hat  there  is  a  Cambodia  problem. 
N's  concerns  are  dismissed  as 
■  issues  amenable  to  resolution 
^■h  bloc-to-bloc  talks  between 
.N  and  the  Indochinese  states. 
's  approach  is  designed  to  draw 
.N  into  open-ended  talks  about 
and  security  in  Southeast  Asia, 
vhich  would  serve  to  grant  implicit 
lition  to  the  Heng  Samrin  regime, 
im  refuses  to  discuss  the  fun- 
ital  cause  of  instability  in  South- 
Lsia — Vietnam's  occupation  of 
odia. 

Policy 

r.S.  response  to  the  events  in  Cam- 
has  been  a  deepening  concern  for 
elfare  of  the  Khmer  people  and  the 
of  this  important  region.  The  Viet- 
36  occupation  of  Cambodia  is  an  in- 
tly  unstable  situation  because  the 
sr  people  will  never  willingly  accept 
lation  by  Vietnam  and  because 
i's  neighbors  cannot  accept  Viet- 
se  expansionism  and  aggres- 
nor  can  we. 
ur  objective,  which  is  shared  wide- 
i  most  notably  by  the  ASEAN  na- 
whose  security  is  most  directly  at 
,  is  a  political  settlement  that  will 
lanoi's  occupation  and,  by  free  elec- 
return  to  the  Khmer  people  the 
to  choose  their  own  leaders.  Under 
free  elections  there  is  no  danger 
the  Khmer  Rouge  would  regain 
r.  That  is  why  the  formula  for  a 
cal  settlement  developed  by 
AN  includes  measures  to  ensure 
armed  groups,  including  the  Khmer 
;e,  do  not  interfere  in  the  free  elec- 
to  choose  a  postsettlement  govern- 
;.  We  support  this  approach, 
uch  an  approach  provides  the  op- 
mity  for  the  Khmer  people  to  deter- 
freely  their  own  future;  it  provides 
rity  to  the  other  countries  of 
heast  Asia  against  the  threat  of 


new  Vietnamese  aggression;  it  provides 
the  key  to  ending  Vietnam's  dangerous 
dependence  on  the  Soviet  Union;  and  for 
Vietnam  itself,  it  not  only  offers  the 
promise  of  a  neutral  Kampuchea  that 
poses  no  threat  to  Vietnam's  security 
but  it  also  offers  the  key  to  development 
of  fruitful  relations  with  its  neighbors  in 
Southeast  Asia  and  with  the  'Western  in- 
dustrial democracies  from  which  all 
Vietnamese  would  benefit. 

While  the  United  States  has  a 
strong  interest  in  such  an  outcome,  we 
recognize  that  the  interests  of  others  are 
even  more  vitally  engaged.  For  the 
Khmer  people,  their  own  national  identi- 


legitimacy  for  their  puppet  regime  in 
Phnom  Penh; 

•  By  maintaining  and,  if  necessary, 
increasing  our  security  assistance  to 
Thailand,  which  is  now  a  front-line  state. 
Indeed,  in  the  last  4  years,  U.S.  security 
assistance  to  Thailand  has  increased 
more  than  threefold;  and 

•  By  continuing  to  support  the 
humanitarian  efforts  of  the  UN  Border 
Relief  Organization  and  the  Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross.  In 
the  fiscal  year  just  ending,  our  contribu- 
tions to  those  organizations  for  Kam- 
puchean  border  relief  totaled  $11.5 


The  world  cannot  afford  to  forget  Cambodia  and 
leave  the  Khmer  people  to  whatever  cruel  fate 
history  and  Hanoi  devise  for  them. 


ty  is  at  stake  and  it  is  their  efforts  that 
will  decide  whether  a  truly  national 
force,  one  free  of  both  Vietnamese  and 
Khmer  Rouge  domination,  can  be 
created.  For  the  countries  of  Southeast 
Asia,  their  basic  security  is  at  stake,  and 
it  is  proper  that  they  should  be  the  ones 
who  take  the  lead — as  they  have — in  ex- 
ploring and  testing  Vietnamese  will- 
ingness to  consider  a  political  settle- 
ment. Indeed,  given  our  own  bitter 
history  in  Indochina,  no  one  should  want 
to  see  this  issue  become  primarily  an 
issue  between  the  United  States  and 
Vietnam.  Such  a  development  would 
only  hopelessly  complicate  the  already 
difficult  road  to  a  political  solution. 

However,  the  United  States  does 
have  an  important  role  to  play  in  the 
search  for  a  political  solution  to  the 
tragedy  of  Cambodia,  and  we  will  con- 
tinue to  play  that  role: 

•  By  continuing  to  make  clear  that 
Vietnam  cannot  have  its  cake  and  eat  it 
too,  that  Vietnam  must  abandon  its  oc- 
cupation of  Kampuchea  if  it  wants  to 
have  the  benefits  of  normal  relations 
with  the  United  States; 

•  By  working  toward  a  political  set- 
tlement that  promises  Vietnam  and  all 
the  nations  of  the  region  a  Cambodian 
Government  that  is  not  dominated  by 
the  Khmer  Rouge,  that  is  free  of  outside 
interference,  and  that  is  dedicated  to 
growth  and  reconstruction  within  its 
own  borders; 

•  By  continuing  to  provide 
diplomatic  and  political  support  to  the 
noncommunist  Khmer  resistance; 

•  By  continuing  to  oppose  Viet- 
namese efforts  to  gain  international 


The  Khmer  resistance  coalition 
formed  in  1982  is  an  important  part  of 
ASEAN's  efforts  to  find  a  solution  in 
Cambodia.  The  United  States  gives 
diplomatic  and  political  support  to  the 
noncommunist  elements  in  the  coalition, 
under  Prince  Sihanouk  and  Son  Sann, 
which  represent  the  genuine  alternative 
to  the  Khmer  Rouge  under  Pol  Pot  and 
those  under  Vietnam.  Last  year  the 
President  met  with  Prince  Sihanouk  and 
Mr.  Son  Sann  together  in  New  York  as 
part  of  our  support  for  their  efforts  to 
liberate  Cambodia.  They  represent  the 
genuine  voice  of  the  Khmer  people  and 
have  an  important  role  still  to  play  in 
their  country's  future.  We  do  not  give 
v/eapons  to  any  of  the  resistance  groups. 
We,  of  course,  give  no  aid  of  any  kind  to 
and  have  no  contact  with  the  Khmer 
Rouge. 

Vietnam  and  its  supporters  have 
regularly  challenged  the  credentials  of 
the  Cambodian  delegation  to  the  United 
Nations  as  part  of  its  effort  to  seat  its 
client  regime.  The  United  States  has 
always  joined  ASEAN  in  opposing  these 
challenges  on  the  technical  ground  that 
the  United  Nations  can  withdraw 
credentials  only  if  there  is  a  superior 
claimant  to  the  seat.  There  is  no 
superior  claimant  to  the  Cambodian 
seat.  The  Heng  Samrin  regime  is  cer- 
tainly not  a  superior  claimant.  On  the 
other  hand,  to  leave  the  Cambodian  seat 
vacant  would  be  to  deny  Cambodia,  a 
member  since  1954,  its  right  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  General  Assembly  and  to 
have  its  voice  heard.  Had  the  United  Na- 
tions followed  such  a  formula  in  1979, 
Prince  Norodom  Sihanouk  would  have 
been  denied  the  UN  platform  to  plead 
Cambodia's  case  to  the  world. 


EAST  ASIA 


/ 


The  United  States  will  continue  to 
support  efforts  designed  to  maintain 
political  and  economic  pressure  on  Viet- 
nam until  it  agrees  to  work  toward  an 
acceptable  political  settlement  in  Cam- 
bodia. Some  argue  we  should  soften  our 
stance  toward  Vietnam  to  give  it  an 
alternative  to  the  Soviets.  However,  it  is 
not  the  policies  of  ASEAN  or  the  United 
States  which  isolate  Vietnam  and  leave 
it  dependent  on  the  Soviet  L'nion.  It  is 
Hanoi's  own  policy  of  invading  and 
occupying  a  neighbor  which  leaves  it 
without  friends  outside  the  Soviet  camp. 
Only  a  change  in  those  policies  will  allow 
Hanoi  to  expand  its  contacts  with  the 
rest  of  the  world. 

We  cannot  consider  an  improvement 
in  U.S. -Vietnamese  relations  as  long  as 
Hanoi  continues  to  occupy  Cambodia. 
Normalization  of  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Vietnam  will  require 
a  settlement  in  Cambodia,  as  well  as 
substantial  progress  and  cooperation  on 
accounting  for  Americans  missing  from 
the  war  in  Indochina.  Our  interests  in 
ASEAN  and  the  strong  feelings  of  the 
American  people  would  permit  nothing 
less. 

The  search  for  peace  in  Cambodia  is 
still  far  from  fruition,  primarily  because 
of  Hanoi's  intransigence  and  its  deter- 
mination to  control  Cambodia.  It  will  not 
be  easy  to  persuade  Hanoi  that  an  ac- 
ceptable settlement  in  Cambodia  is  the 
only  lasting  solution  to  the  instability  in 
Southeast  Asia.  ASEAN,  backed  by  the 
world  community,  has  established  a 
viable  framework  for  a  settlement.  It  is 
Hanoi  which  rejects  all  compromise. 

A  political  settlement  will  be  possible 
only  once  Vietnam  realizes  the  disas- 
trous results  its  policies  have  produced. 
Only  a  change  in  Hanoi's  policy  will 
reconcile  Vietnam's  interests  with  those 
of  its  neighbors  and  bring  peace  to  the 
region.  Until  then,  the  intei-national 
community  must  continue  to  maintain 
the  pressure  on  Vietnam. 

The  world  has  many  pi-oblems  and 
other  crises,  other  atrocities  have  driven 
Cambodia  from  the  front  pages.  But  in 
Cambodia,  the  dying,  the  suffering  of 
those  who  have  sought  refuge  along  the 
Thai-Cambodian  border,  and  the  slow 
strangling  of  Khmer  culture  and  society 
continue.  The  world  cannot  affoi-d  to 
forget  Cambodia  and  leave  the  Khmer 
people  to  whatever  cruel  fate  history 
and  Hanoi  devise  for  them.  And  the 
Cambodian  people,  who  ask  only  to  be 
left  in  peace,  deserve  better  of  the 
world.  ■ 


Recent  Developments  in  the  Philippin 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  on 
September  18.  1981,.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affaij's. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity  to 
meet  with  you  and  other  members  of  the 
committee  today  to  discuss  recent 
developments  in  the  Philippines  and 
their  implications  for  U.S.  policy. 

U.S.  Relations 

An  effort  to  address  the  implications  of 
Philippine  developments  for  U.S.  policy 
can  only  begin  with  acknowledgement  of 
the  unique  relationship  that  exists  be- 
tween our  two  countries.  Relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Philip- 
pines rest  on  the  foundation  of  shared 
history,  common  suffering  during  war, 
close  people-to-people  and  institutional 
ties,  a  solid  record  of  cooperation  in 
economic  development,  and  healthy 
trade  and  investment.  Our  close  ties 
date  back  to  the  turn  of  the  century. 
Together  we  have  shared  the  suffering 
of  World  War  II  as  well  as  the  excite- 
ment and  satisfaction  of  Philippine  in- 
dependence on  July  4,  1948.  We  have 
also  stood  together  in  addressing  the  dif- 
ficult problems  of  nationbuilding, 
economic  development,  and  international 
security  that  have  characterized  the 
postwar  period. 

Our  longstanding  economic  ties  re- 
main beneficial  for  both  sides.  The 
United  States  is  still  both  the  primary 
source  of  foreign  investment  in  the 
Philippines  and  the  largest  market  for 
Philippine  goods.  Both  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  the  private  sector  have  played 
an  important  role  in  the  economic 
development  of  the  Philippines. 

In  part  due  to  our  shared  history, 
the  United  States  and  the  Philippines 
have  tended  to  have  a  common  view  of 
international  security  problems.  As  a 
member  of  ASEAN  [Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations],  the  Philip- 
pines has  contributed  to  the  develop- 
ment of  regional  stability  and  prosperi- 
ty. Our  common  interest  is  concretely 
manifested  in  our  close  defense  partner- 
ship based  on  the  1947  Military  Bases 
Agreement,  the  19.52  Mutual  Defense 
Treaty,  and  continuing  close  cooperation 
in  defense  and  security  matters.  This 
security  relationship  is  crucial  to  our  ef- 
forts to  provide  an  effective  counter- 


balance in  the  area  to  the  growing 
military  power  of  the  Soviet  Union  a 
its  surrogates.  Our  facilities  in  the 
Philippines  are  central  to  our  ability 
protect  the  sea  and  airlanes  of  the 
region  and  to  provide  logistical  supp 
for  U.S.  forces  in  the  Indian  Ocean  ; 
Persian  Gulf.  The  U.S.  military  prea 
in  the  Philippines  thus  fulfills  a  vital 
function  in  maintaining  regional  seci 
and  stability — a  role  that  has  been  n 
positively  by  virtually  all  of  the  coun 
of  East  Asia — and  that  stability  in  t 
contributes  to  the  remarkable  econoi 
growth  of  the  entire  area. 

Recent  Philippine  Developments 
and  the  U.S.  Response 

The  Philippines  is  currently  experier 
its  most  serious  economic  difficulties 
since  independence  at  a  time  of  con- 
siderable political  uncertainty.  Long 
standing  problems  were  brought  to  ; 
head  by  the  tragic,  still  unsolved, 
assassination  in  August  of  1983  of  o 
position  leader  and  former  Senator 
Benigno  Aquino.  As  the  shock  wave 
that  assassination  spread,  political 
uncertainties  grew,  and  an  already  c 
ficult  financial  situation  deterioratec 
precipitously. 

It  must  be  recognized  that  most 
the  problems  faced  by  the  Philippine 
day  have  fundamental  institutional ; 
political  causes.  The  solutions  will  n^ 
easy.  In  this  situation,  our  approach 
must  be  guided  by  a  number  of  com 
considerations. 

•  While  the  Filipinos  must  dete 
mine  their  own  politics  and  policies, 
United  States  has  a  deep  concern  w 
the  future  of  the  Philippines  and  thi 
health  of  its  economy  and  political  i 
stitutions. 

•  While  it  is  up  to  the  Filipinos 
choose  their  government,  it  is  not  ii 
propriate  for  us  to  express  our  deef 
belief  in  the  importance  of  the  demc 
cratic  process  as  they  resolve  their 
political  problems. 

•  Our  influence  in  the  Philippin 
significant,  but  our  role  is  most  effe 
when  ours  is  a  voice  in  a  debate  tha 
already  formed  in  the  Philippines. 

With  these  considerations  in  mil 
we  have  tailored  our  approach  to  th 
evolutionary  political  and  economic 
dynamics  now  at  work  in  the  Philip- 
pines, which  have  developed  a  life  o 


EAST  ASIA 


'  wn.  We  believe  it  has  been,  so 
;rolatively  successful,  evolutionary 
■lu'h  in  which  Filipinos,  in  their  own 
iiiave  actively  taken  on  the 
ge  of  revitalizing  their  own 
The  process  has  been  difficult, 
,ny  very  serious  problems  remain. 
jent  Marcos  has  responded 
ely  to  a  number  of  difficult 
iges  over  the  past  months.  In  the 
head,  compromise,  tact,  good  will, 
mmon  sense  will  be  needed  to 
i  the  many  remaining  problems  of 
ilippines.  So  will  a  continued 
•op  of  understanding  and  support 
he  United  States  and  the  interna- 
community. 

irt  for  the  Philippine  Economy 

)ots  of  the  economic  crisis  go  back 
cy  decisions  and  investment 
s  made  in  the  1970s.  Its  proximate 
were  a  growing  public  sector 
excessive  borrowing  from 
i,  and,  of  course,  a  severe 
ivide  economic  recession.  The 
:ainties  created  by  the  Aquino 
s  ;ination  led  to  capital  flight  and 
1  estment.  Trade  financing  by 
a  n  banks  began  to  dry  up.  Fiscal 
i  alance-of-payments  problems 

ned.  The  government  sought  a 
(  /  moratorium  on  repayments  of 
.1  ,e  debt  principal  last  October,  an 
i  I  that  has  since  been  thrice 
i  ted.  Total  outstanding  foreign 
i  -both  public  and  private — is  now 
$26  billion.  Although  the  Philip- 
rade  balance  has  shown  improve- 
n  in  recent  months,  in  part  due  to 
'  evaluations,  the  overall  economic 
■  i;  remains  bleak.  Inflation  is  cur- 
!   running  at  an  annual  rate  of 
11(1  50%  and  1984  is  likely  to 
:i.er  a  negative  GNP  growth  rate  of 

'.S.  steps  aimed  at  helping  the 
ilipine  economy  weather  this  stormy 
ill  have  included  maintenance  of 
I  ral  assistance  programs  and  expan- 
n  if  Commodity  Credit  Corp.  and 
Trt-Import  Bank  credits;  increased 
Si)  Title  II  feeding  programs  in 
^■ration  with  the  Philippine  Catholic 
uch;  support  for  World  Bank  and 
i|i  Development  Bank  measures 
at  bringing  about  structural 
jmic  changes:  and  vigorous  support 
International  Monetary  Fund 
)  standby  program, 
'rogress  toward  recovery  has  been 
ed  by  difficulties  in  negotiations 
een  the  Philippine  Government  and 
MF  on  the  $650  million  standby 
t.  The  IMF  and  the  Philippine 
;rnment  appear  finally  to  have 


reached  agreement  on  the  basic 
elements  of  a  standby  arrangement,  and 
we  are  hopeful  that  an  agreement  will 
soon  be  in  place.  With  an  IMF  agree- 
ment in  effect,  debt  rescheduling  can 
proceed,  and  access  will  be  opened  to 
new  foreign  financing  to  reinvigorate 
the  economy. 

While  the  IMF  agreement  will  pave 
the  way  for  efforts  to  deal  with  the  im- 
mediate financial  crisis,  there  is  growing 
recognition,  both  among  Filipinos  and  in 
the  international  community,  that  the 
restoration  of  long-term  growth  will  re- 
quire structural  changes  in  the  Philip- 
pine economy,  particularly  in  the 
agricultural  sector  where  monopolies 
and  other  distortions  of  the  market 
economy  have  prevented  the  full  ex- 
ploitation of  the  nation's  potential.  A 
widely  publicized  report  by  University  of 
the  Philippines  economists  recently  ad- 
dressed the  question  why  the  Philippines 
have  failed  to  share  the  prosperity  en- 
joyed by  the  other  ASEAN  nations. 
They  concluded  that  the  answer  lies 
largely  in  such  factors  as  the  granting  of 
special  economic  privileges  by  presiden- 
tial decree.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  the  Philippines,  a  nation  blessed 
with  abundant  natural  resources  and  an 
industrious  and  hardworking  labor  force, 
has  the  capacity  to  resume  a  path  of 
long-term  economic  growth.  We  have 
made  clear  our  view  that  for  this  to  hap- 
pen, the  natural  strengths  of  the  Philip- 
pine economy  must  be  allowed  to 
develop  in  a  free-market  environment. 

The  Political  Dynamic 

It  is  in  the  political  arena  that  the  proc- 
ess of  evolution  is  most  apparent  in  the 
Philippines.  The  Aquino  assassination 
reduced  the  credibility  of  the  Marcos 
government  among  broad  sectors  of  the 
Philippine  public  and  unleashed  political 
forces  that  had  previously  been  largely 
quiescent.  The  democratic  opposition 
began  to  press  its  longstanding  political 
demands  with  renewed  vigor.  The 
Catholic  Church  became  a  vocal  and  per- 
sistent advocate  of  democratic  reform. 
Organized  groups  of  businessmen  and 
professionals,  gravely  concerned  about 
instability,  began  to  speak  out  on  the 
issues  and  to  organize  peaceful 
demonstrations,  and  a  nonpartisan 
citizens  group  emerged  to  lobby  for  free 
and  fair  elections.  The  National 
Assembly  elections  on  May  14  assumed 
major  significance  in  the  highly  charged 
political  atmosphere  that  followed  the 
Aquino  assassination. 


The  United  States  has  used  both 
public  and  private  diplomacy  to  express 
our  support  for  institutional  reform  in 
the  Philippines.  We  have  spoken  out 
clearly  on  such  questions  as  the  necessi- 
ty for  a  credible  investigation  of  the 
Aquino  assassination,  the  need  for  a  new 
presidential  succession  formula,  and  the 
importance  of  rebuilding  democratic  in- 
stitutions to  get  the  country  through  the 
current  period  of  political  transition. 
Congressional  measures  such  as  resolu- 
tions, hearings,  statements  by  members, 
and  visits  have  helped  convey  our 
message.  So  have  clear  public 
statements  of  our  views  on  truly  free, 
fair,  and  open  elections  and  increased 
contact  with  the  democratic  opposition 
and  the  newly  active  business  and  pro- 
fessional leaders,  including  meetings  of 
key  opposition  and  business  leaders  with 
Members  of  Congress  and  high  level  Ad- 
ministration officials. 

The  period  since  the  Aquino 
assassination  has  seen  numerous  signs 
of  encouraging  political  change.  The  in- 
dependent Agrava  board  was  appointed 
to  investigate  the  assassination  itself. 
The  board's  investigation  has  been  im- 
pressively thorough,  and  it  has 
developed  a  favorable  reputation 
generally  among  most  Filipinos.  Its  final 
report  is  expected  to  be  issued  shortly. 
The  interest  of  the  U.S.  Government  in 
this  tragic  incident  has  been  clear  from 
the  outset,  when  we  termed  it  a  coward- 
ly and  despicable  political  murder.  As 
the  Philippine  Government  knows 
through  both  our  public  statements  and 
our  private  diplomacy,  we  expect  the  cir- 
cumstances surrounding  this  brutal 
assassination  to  be  clarified  and  those 
responsible  to  be  held  accountable  and 
brought  to  justice. 

The  postassassination  period  saw  im- 
portant steps  toward  political  accom- 
modation, including  the  establishment  of 
an  interim  succession  mechanism  and 
agreement  that  the  vice  presidency  will 
be  restored  in  the  next  presidential  elec- 
tion. The  May  14  elections  themselves, 
though  far  from  fully  open,  proved  to  be 
a  more  successful  demonstration  of 
democratic  vitality  than  most  observers 
expected.  Opposition  candidates  won 
roughly  one-third  of  the  seats  in  the  new 
assembly.  Cardinal  Sin  of  Manila,  while 
critical  of  government  efforts  to 
manipulate  the  balloting  in  many  areas, 
termed  the  election  "the  freest  and 
fairest  since  independence."  The  election 
was  marked  by  a  very  high  turn- 
out—more than  80% — despite  the  effort 
of  some  elements  of  the  opposition  to 
promote  a  boycott.  The  number  of 


EAST  ASIA 


vounger  Filipinos  who  voted  was  an  en- 
couraging indication  that  the  desire  to 
participate  in  the  democratic  process  re- 
mains strong  in  the  Philippines.  More 
than  200,000  citizen  volunteers 
associated  with  NAMFREL  [National 
Citizens  Movement  for  Free  Election] 
turned  out  to  monitor  voting. 

How  the  political  situation  will 
evolve  in  the  wake  of  the  parliamentary 
election  is  still  an  open  question.  Clearly 
the  process  of  revitalizing  Philippine 
democratic  institutions  rendered  largely 
ineffective  by  years  of  martial  law  re- 
mains far  from  complete.  Wliile  sharing 
the  view  of  most  Filipinos  that  the  elec- 
tion results  represent  an  important  first 
step  toward  a  more  open  political 
system.  NAMFREL,  for  example,  has 
concluded  that  one-fourth  to  one-third  of 
the  races  were  marked  by  fraud  and 
that  the  opposition  would  have  won  a 
majority  in  a  fully  open  vote. 

The  new  assembly,  nonetheless,  has 
altered  the  political  equation  and 
brought  a  new  generation  to  the  political 
scene.  It  has  already  made  an  impact. 
Such  issues  as  the  President's  power  to 
legislate  by  decree  are  being  debated  not 
only  by  the  opposition  but  also  within 
the  governing  New  Society  Movement 
(KBL),  where  such  figures  as  Foreign 
Minister  Tolentino  and  Prime  Minister 
Virata  have  called  for  compromise.  The 
role  of  the  opposition  may  be  enhanced 
by  the  greater  degree  of  press  freedom 
that  has  developed  over  the  past  year. 
Today  the  opinions  of  government  critics 
appear  regularly  in  the  press,  as  does 


coverage  of  such  events  as  military 
abuse  of  civilians  in  rural  areas. 

Barring  unforseen  developments,  the 
forces  in  favor  of  rebuilding  democratic 
institutions  that  have  emerged  over  the 
past  year  seem  likely  to  grow  as  the 
Philippines  approaches  the  next  major 
events  on  the  electoral  calendar— pro- 
vincial and  local  elections  in  1986  and 
the  Presidential  election  in  1987.  These 
elections  will  be  crucial  tests  of  the 
revitalization  of  political  institutions  in 
the  Philippines. 

The  Growing  Insurgency  Threat 

The  Philippine  situation  is  further  com- 
plicated by  a  growing  armed  insurgency. 
The  successes  achieved  in  recent  years 
by  the  New  People's  Army  (NPA),  the 
military  component  of  the  Communist 
Party  of  the  Philippines,  are  related  to 
the  nation's  broader  political  and 
economic  problems.  Depressed  economic 
conditions  aggravated  by  a  rapidly  grow- 
ing working-age  population,  weak  and 
ineffective  local  government  administra- 
tion compounded  by  budgetary  short- 
falls, a  perception  that  the  central 
government  does  not  respond  to  the 
people's  basic  social  and  economic  needs, 
lax  and  inequitable  dispensation  of 
justice,  and  instances  of  abuse  of  citizens 
by  military  or  paramilitary  forces  all 
have  contributed  to  support  for  the 
NPA,  which  has  projected  itself  with 
some  success  as  a  group  of  idealistic 
political  and  social  reformers. 


U.K.  and  China  Reach 
Agreement  on  Hong  Kong 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  26,  19841 

The  U.S.  Government  welcomes  the  suc- 
cessful conclusion  of  2  years  of  negotia- 
tions between  the  United  Kingdom  and 
the  People's  Republic  of  China  over  the 
future  of  Hong  Kong. 

The  United  States  has  a  strong  in- 
terest in  the  continued  stability  and 
prosperity  of  Hong  Kong  and  believes 
the  agreement  will  provide  a  solid  foun- 
dation for  Hong  Kong's  enduring  future 
progress. 

In  this  regard,  we  have  noted 
statements  by  both  sides  indicating  that 
Hong  Kong's  way  of  life  will  be 
guaranteed  for  50  years  from  1997  and 
that  systems  existing  in  Hong  Kong  will 


continue  in  the  special  administrative 
region. 

We  expect  the  American  business 
communities,  both  in  the  United  States 
and  Hong  Kong,  will  see  in  this  agree- 
ment good  reason  for  sustained  con- 
fidence in  the  future  of  Hong  Kong  as 
an  attractive  and  thriving  commercial 
center. 

The  United  States  will  provide  any 
assistance  it  can,  in  close  cooperation 
with  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  China,  to  maintain 
Hong  Kong's  appropriate  participation 
in  international  bodies. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents,  on  behalf 
of  Secretary  Shultz,  by  acting  Department 
spokesman  Alan  Romberg.  ■ 


Estimates  vary  as  to  the  total 
strength  of  the  NPA.  The  Philippine  f' 
Government  has  publicly  estimated  t 
the  NPA  numbers  some  nearly  8,00( 
armed  guerrillas.  The  NPA  itself  cla 
some  20,000  guerrillas,  10,000  of  the 
armed,  and  a  mass  base  of  the  1-mill 
range.  More  important  than  the 
numbers  themselves  are  the  long-teii 
trends.  Unlike  the  Huks  of  the  19.50" 
the  NPA  has  expanded  beyond  the  t 
tional  center  of  Philippine  radicalisn^ 
central  Luzon  to  establish  a  meaning 
presence  in  about  two-thirds  of  the  c 
try's  provinces.  Both  the  number  an( 
scale  of  armed  encounters  with  the 
armed  forces  are  growing,  and  in  so 
rural  areas — especially  in  Min- 
danao— the  government  is  widely 
perceived  as  on  the  defensive. 

The  future  course  of  the  NPA  in 
surgency  will  depend  most  importan 
on  how  effectively  the  government  ii 
able  to  deal  with  the  root  social, 
economic,  and  institutional  factors  tl 
fuel  rural  dissatisfaction  and  which  i 
turn  relate  to  the  overall  political  an 
economic  challenges  facing  the  Phili] 
pines.  At  the  same  time,  ably  led  an 
well-equipped  professional  military 
forces  will  be  an  essential  element  o 
government  effort,  and  continued  U 
military  assistance  can  play  an  impo 
tant  role  in  helping  develop  an  effec 
military  response.  Strong  democrati 
traditions,  the  strength  of  such 
moderate  institutions  as  the  Catholii 
Church,  a  dynamic  business  commui 
and  middle  class,  and  an  educated 
populace  are  important  factors 
militating  against  a  communist  take 
of  the  Philippines.  The  insurgency  is 
nonetheless,  a  cause  for  concern  ab( ' 
the  future,  a  problem  which  calls  no. 
ly  for  an  effective  military  response 
even  more  importantly,  for  concentu 
efforts  to  deal  with  its  root  causes. 

U.S.  Policy 

U.S.  policy  toward  the  Philippines  v 
continue  to  be  guided  by  the  followi ' 
basic  objectives  in  the  difficult  perio 
that  lies  ahead. 

Support  for  the  Revitalization 
Democratic  Institutions.  Healthy 
democratic  institutions  can  help  to 
assure  both  stability  in  the  present ; 
an  orderly  transition  to  the  next  gei 
tion  of  responsible  leadership.  While 
pace  of  democratic  revitalization  anc 
precise  shape  of  institutions  are  the 
elusive  responsibility  of  the  Filipinos 
believe  we  have  a  stake  in  their  succ 
The  May  14  elections,  despite  imper 
tions,  represent  a  reaffirmation  by  t 


EUROPE 


pine  people  of  their  support  for  the 
'PPH  ;ratic  process.  Much  more  needs  to 
M  le,  and  the  United  States,  a  con- 
i  ally,  will  remain  an  interested 
■H  ipportive  observer.  We  are  con- 
1  that  democratic  stability  and 
mic  well-being  are  mutually  rein- 
,g  and  will  come  about  only 
^h  greater  openness  and  competi- 
n  both  the  political  and  economic 
As  part  of  this  effort,  and  in 
slii  nse  to  basic  principles  of  U.S. 

;n  policy,  we  will  continue  to 
tl(  fe  in  active  diplomacy  on  behalf  of 

n  rights,  the  most  fundamental 
lk(  cratic  institution  of  them  all. 

conomic  Support.  We  are  also 
,red  to  continue  to  support  Philip- 
fforts  to  overcome  current 
mic  difficulties  and  create  a  basis 
able,  long-term  growth.  Healthy 
3al  developments  are  more  likely  to 
against  a  backdrop  of  basic  con- 
:e  in  the  nation's  economic  future. 
Jnited  States  will  continue  to 
;rate  with  the  assistance  efforts  of 
k^orld  Bank,  IMF,  and  other  inter- 
nal donors  and  lending  institutions 

0  provide  what  bilateral  assistance 
in.  Our  aid  will  continue  to  be  guid- 

basic  humanitarian  purposes.  Just 
veek  we  provided  $1  million  in 
1  gency  assistance  to  help  the 
'1  inos  recover  from  the  devastation  of 
;  3ons  that  left  more  than  2,000  dead 
"ll  .^  million  homeless,  and  we  are 
it-ring  further  rehabilitation  and 

1  ^t  ruction  assistance.  As  we  seek  to 
I  lie  Philippine  Government  attend 

le  urgent  needs  of  its  people,  it  is 
fii'tant,  however,  that  the  United 
a's.  as  well  as  multilateral  lending  in- 
ttions,  do  all  possible  to  ensure  that 
nssistance  programs  contribute  to 
i-c  forms  needed  to  establish  a  basis 

[ii;-term  growth.  Future  assistance, 
'  effective,  should  be  accompanied 
■  hilippine  efforts  to  remove  the  con- 
II ts  that  currently  block  the  realiza- 
I'l'  the  full  potential  of  the  Philippine 
Miiy.  We  look  forward  to  a  close 
■i-y  dialogue  with  the  Filipinos  as  we 
i  to  assist  them  in  overcoming  their 
(iiiinic  difficulties. 

Maintenance  of  Our  Security  Rela- 
(  ship.  Our  military  bases  and  mutual 
irity  treaties  will  continue  to  be  vital 
He  defense  of  our  security  interests 
n  area  in  which  the  Soviets,  the  Viet- 
lese,  and  the  North  Koreans  are 
ding  up  their  military  strength.  The 
oth  functioning  of  our  base  relation- 
i  is  testimony  to  the  commonality  of 
interests  and  goodwill  on  both  sides. 
;  notable  that  our  bases  have  not 
3me  a  significant  point  of  contention 


in  the  highly  charged  political  atmos- 
phere that  now  exists  in  the  Philippines. 
Our  security  assistance  program  in  the 
Philippines  is  an  integral  part  of  this 
overall  defense  relationship.  Our 
assistance,  both  economic  and  military, 
is  also  closely  related  to  our  interest  in 
helping  the  Philippines  prosecute  a  more 
effective  effort  against  its  communist  in- 
surgency. 

The  next  few  years  will  not  be  easy 
ones  for  the  Philippines.  The  Philippine 
people  face  a  difficult  road  to  economic 
recovery,  complicated  by  communist  ef- 
forts to  seize  the  nation  by  force.  The 
course  of  reestablishing  democratic 
political  institutions  may  not  be  smooth. 


We  face  a  dynamic  situation  in  the 
Philippines  and  are  seeking  to  address  it 
with  a  dynamic  policy  that  builds  upon 
the  inherent  strengths  of  Philippine 
society.  Filipinos  must  make  the  hard 
decisions  to  restore  confidence,  to 
resolve  the  current  problems,  and  to 
enable  economic  growth  to  resume.  U.S. 
policy  will  be  to  assist  the  Filipinos  to 
the  extent  we  can  as  they  determine  for 
themselves  the  political  and  economic 
future  of  their  country. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


President  Meets  With 
Foreign  IVIinister  Gromyko 


TnTmTrrtjT'-^ 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  11,  19841 

I've  invited  Soviet  Deputy  Premier  and 
Foreign  Minister  Andrei  Gromyko  to 
meet  with  me  at  the  White  House  on 
September  28th,  and  Mr.  Gromyko  has 
accepted. 


I  believe  it's  important  to  use  the  op- 
portunity provided  by  Mr.  Gromyko's 
presence  in  the  United  States  to  confer 
on  a  range  of  issues  of  international  im- 
portance. 

One  of  my  highest  priorities  is  find- 
ing ways  to  reduce  the  level  of  arms  and 
to  improve  our  working  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  I  hope  that  my 


EUROPE 


eeting  with  him  will  contribute  to  this 
lal,  as  our  Administration  continues  to 
A  ork  for  a  safer  world. 


SECRETARY'S  PRESS  BRIEFING, 
SEPT.  28,  19842 

i  'resident  Reagan  had  a  useful  and  in- 
.  tense  interchange  of  views  with  the 
Foreign  Minister  and  First  Deputy 
I'rime  Minister,  Mr.  Gromyko.  The 
meeting  lasted  around  SVz  hours 
.altogether,  including  the  working  lunch- 
ron.  The  meeting  was  a  very  strong  per- 
gonal interchange  between  two  in- 
dividuals. And  while  some  others  had  oc- 
..«asional  things  to  say,  it  was  very 
basically  a  meeting  between  two  men. 

The  President's  purpose  was  to  put 
forward  to  Mr.  Gromyko,  representing 
-the  top  level  of  the  Soviet  leadership, 
the  President's  view  that  we  need  to 
have  a  more  constructive  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  and  to  express  the  many 
ways,  again,  that  he  believes  this  can  be 
done.  And  through  this  lengthy  inter- 
change and  conversation,  I  feel  sure 
that,  from  the  President's  point  of  view, 
and  our  point  of  view,  this  position  that 
we  have  was  made  clear. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  how  Mr. 
Gromyko  reacted  to  this  position  that 
you  just  outlined? 

A.  I  think  you  have  to  ask  Mr. 
Gromyko  for  his  reactions.  I'm  not  going 
to  try  to  characterize  them,  except  to 
say  that  from  our  standpoint,  it  was  a 
very  strong  and  useful  interchange,  and 
Mr.  Gromyko,  of  course,  expressed  his 
views  very  powerfully  and  aggressively, 
as  he  always  does.  And  the  President 
listened  to  him  carefully. 

Q.  What  was  the  agenda— what 
did  they  talk  about,  and  what  do  you 
mean  "strong"?  What  do  you  mean  by 
"strong"? 

A.  Forceful  and  direct.  So  that— 
there  was  a  desire,  I  think,  on  the  part 
of  both  parties  to  try  to  be  as  clear  as 
possible  and  not  to  dress  up  a  subject  at 
all.  These  discussions  were  very  direct. 
It  started  with  the  President  making  a 
statement  of  his  views,  and  then  Mr. 
(rromyko  made  a  statement  of  his,  and 
then  the  interchange  started,  and  as  I 
say,  carried  on  through  the  lunch  period. 

Q.  You  use  the  word  "intense." 
Are  you  suggesting  that  they  argued? 
Was  the  atmosphere  angry? 

A.  It  wasn't  angry.  It  was  calm  and 
deliberate  and  businesslike  throughout. 
But  by  intense,  I  mean  that  both  men 


were  really  engaged  in  this  conversation 
and  were  both,  I  think,  fully  aware  of 
the  importance  of  it.  And  so,  in  that 
sense  it  was  a  strong  and  intense  inter- 
change. 

Q.  Did  anything  come  out  of  this 
meeting  that  would  lead  to  further 
meetings  between  either  you  and  Mr. 
Gromyko  or  the  President  and  Mr. 
Gromyko  or  a  summit? 

A.  The  objective  of  the  President 
was  to  put  forward  his  view,  which 
would  continue  to  be  his  view  if  he  is 
reelected.  As  far  as  an  outcome  is  con- 
cerned, at  the  end,  of  course,  as  I  think 
the  President  said  as  he  was  leaving,  we 
agreed  to  stay  in  touch,  and  I'm  sure 
that  we  will. 

Q.  Was  there  anything  out  of  this 
meeting  that  would  lead  you  to  think 
that  there  would  be  a  likelihood  of  the 
Soviets  returning  to  any  of  the  arms 
talks  or  of  talks  beginning  on  the 
space  weapons? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  try  to  predict  the 
start  of  any  particular  talks.  The  object 
wasn't  to  try  to  focus  on  any  particular 
thing  of  that  kind  but  to  try  to  clear  the 
air  of  general  issues  involving  where  we 
think  this  relationship  should  go;  involv- 
ing the  importance  of  coming  to  grips 
with  the  problem  of  immense  nuclear 
arsenals  and  doing  something  to  reduce 
them — those  broad  and  very  significant 
questions.  Question  of  preventing  the 
militarization  of  outer  space  and  issues 
of  that  kind  were  all  discussed  in  the 
course  of  the  meeting. 

Q.  Do  you  think  the  relationship 
was  changed  as  a  result  of  this  con- 
versation, or  these  conversations  to- 
day? 

A.  It  remains  to  be  seen,  of  course.  I 
was,  I'd  have  to  say,  very  impressed 
with  the  spirit  and  knowledge  and  inten- 
sity of  the  President's  discussion,  and  I 
think  it  simply  must  have  come  through 
that  this  was  a  man  talking  with  great 
conviction  and  a  sense  of  importance  of 
what  he  said. 

Q.  Did  Mr.  Gromyko  respond 
either  positively  or  negatively  to  any 
of  the  specific  suggestions  that  the 
President  made  in  his  UN  speech? 
Number  one.  And  number  two:  Can 
you  tell  us  a  little  bit  about  the  ses- 
sion that  the  two  men  had  alone  in  the 
Oval  Office  when  the  rest  of  you 
headed  off  for  lunch? 

A.  There  were  some  references  to 
the  President's  UN  speech,  but  I  don't 
want  to  characterize  it  beyond  that. 


The  brief  meeting  that  the  two  m 
had  alone  was  something  that  the  Pn 
dent  wished  to  do,  and  he  had  some 
things  that  he  wanted  to  say  privatelj 
Mr.  Gromyko.  And  that's  as  much  as 
care  to  say  about  it. 

Q.  Was  there  anything  that  you 
heard  there— any  suggestion  from  { 
Soviets,  any  surprises  about  anythii 
that  Mr.  Gromyko  had  to  say  that  s 
gested  something  that  you  didn't 
already  know  or  hadn't  heard  befon 

A.  I  think  that  an  interchange  lik 
this  is  always  an  educational  thing  foi  : 
all  parties.  And  I  felt  privileged  to  ha 
been  there.  But  I  can't  put  my  finger 
some  particular  insight  that  I'd  care  t 
single  out. 

Q.  Did  you  detect  any  change  of 
positions  on  the  Soviets'  part  on 
anything? 

A.  The  object  wasn't  to  test  out  a 
question  of  their  position  on  this,  thai 
or  the  other  but  rather  to  set  out 
general  objectives  and  the  confidence 
the  President  in  wishing  to  try  to  obt 
those  objectives,  to  put  behind  that  ci 
fidence,  as  he  did  in  his  UN  speech,  t 
many  substantive  suggestions  that  ar 
out  there  for  negotiation  and  discussi 
as  well  as  the  procedural  ideas  that  v 
contained  in  the  President's  UN  speei 

Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  "stay  i 
touch"?  Does  that  mean  there  are  n 
specific  plans  for  any  further  meet- 
ings? Does  that  mean  that  the  idea  I 
President  had  for  multilevel,  Cabin  ( 
level  exchanges  was  not  accepted? 

A.  There  are  all  sorts  of  ways  to 
stay  in  touch.  And  just  exactly  how  t  i 
will  come  about  remains  to  be  seen.  ( 
course,  we  have  regular  and  continui 
dialogue  at  the  ambassadorial  level,  I 
Ambassador  Hartman  in  Moscow  am 
with  Ambassador  Dobrynin  here,  am 
that  represents  a  continuing  vehicle 
organizing  any  further  discussions  th 
might  be  needed. 

Q.  You  said  yesterday  at  the 
United  Nations  that  you  were  sad  < 
disappointed  at  Mr.  Gromyko's  spec 
You  said  that,  as  the  President  had 
said  several  days  before,  that  the 
United  States  would  continue  to  tr 
get  the  Soviet  Union  to  behave  in  a 
constructive  way  in  international  n 
tions  in  the  cause  of  peace.  And  I 
want  to  recall  that  to  you.  Do  you 
believe  that  this  meeting  today  in  ai 
way  advanced  the  cause  of  peace? 
Wasn't  Gromyko  constructive? 

A.  In  my  opinion,  the  meeting 
definitely  advanced  the  cause  of  peac 
and  I  think  when  you  have  a  genuine 


EUROPE 


itotise  discussion  between  two  peo- 
itlie  top  of  these  two  most  impor- 
ii\ernments,  and  it  is  a  genuine, 
ihiisinesslike,  but  intense  discus- 
,  hat's  sure  to  be  helpful. 

C  Did  it  clear  the  air,  as  far  as 
concerned? 

Clear  the  air— there's  lots  of 
;t,  there's  lots  of  apprehension, 

lots  of  differences  of  opinion,  and 

think  one  discussion  is  going  to 
;he  air  completely.  But  I  think  it 

tedly  made  some  progress  in  that 
on. 

The  Foreign  Minister,  in  his 
1  at  the  United  Nations,  said 
lie  United  States  would  have  to 
ts  words  with  concrete  deeds.  Is 
till  the  Soviets'  position,  and  is 
1  his  view  that  the  United  States 
I  do  something  in  certain  areas 
J  the  Soviets  will  reciprocate? 
.  I  think  both  the  United  States 
le  Soviet  Union— although  I'll  only 
for  the  United  States— feel  that 
counts  is  what  is  done,  deeds.  And 
;  why,  as  the  President  has  ap- 
led  this  relationship  right  from  the 
;  ling  of  his  Administration,  he  has 
:.i  titrated  on  substantive  matters. 
I  ly  this  time,  there  is  a  very  long 
-I   substantive  suggestions,  pro- 
4 ;,  treaties.  And  he  added  some  in 
■  ■  N  speech.  So  I  think  that  it's 
'i  :tly  correct  to  focus  on  deeds,  not 
^'j  he  general  atmosphere  that  can  be 

fd  by  discussions  isn't  a  positive 
to  do.  But  the  essence  of  the  mat- 
'    what  is  actually  going  to  be  done. 

.  Are  both  sides  going  to  follow 
sneeting  now  with  some  deeds? 

.  The  agreement  at  the  end  of  the 
ceon  was  that  we  will  stay  in  touch, 
i  ow  one  side  or  the  other  will  come 
\T  ps  with  specific  suggestions  will 

:.•  from  that  process.  But  I  remind 
xtial  from  the  area  of  nuclear  ar- 
isnts  to  space  to  chemical  warfare 
?ifidence-building  measures  to 

ar  tests  sites,  there  is  a  wide  array 
s  istantive  proposals— deeds,  if  you 
i-that  the  United  States,  the  Presi- 
1  has  put  on  the  table  for  the  con- 
eition  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

(.  Is  it  fair  to  sum  up  by  saying 
J  the  two  men  spoke  forcefully 

t  their  known  positions,  and  that 
I  ing  is  really  likely  to  come  in  any 

rete  fashion  until  after  the  elec- 

i.  That  wouldn't  be  my  summary, 
don't  know  just  when  further 
issions  may  take  place. 


Q.  What  about  the  first  part? 

A.  You  caught  me  so  much  at  the 
end,  that  you'll  have  to  repeat  the  first 
part— but  I'll  think  I'll  stand  on  a  sum- 
mary. I've  been  trying  to  summarize  in 
the  brief  statement  I  made  in  the  begin- 
ning and  in  response  to  your  questions. 

Q.  Do  you  think  the  President's  at- 
titude about  the  Soviets  has  changed 
at  all  as  a  result  of  his  personal 
meeting  with  Mr.  Gromyko?  He's  been 
pretty  hardline  toward  the  Soviets  in 
the  past. 

A.  The  President  has  consistently 
had  a  set  of  ideas  that  have  guided  his 
policy.  And  they've  really  been  pretty 
consistent  throughout  his  presidency.  He 
has,  from  the  beginning,  insisted  that 
we  have  to  be  realistic  about  the  differ- 
rences  between  our  systems  and  other 
aspects  of  Soviet  behavior.  He  has,  from 
the  beginning,  been  consistent  in  saying 
that  we  must  build  our  strength— our 
military,  our  economic,  our  spirit— and 
he  has  said  from  the  beginning  that  we 
also  must  be  ready  to  negotiate.  And 
there  is  an  interplay  among  those  three 
things,  and  that  remains  the  case  today. 
And  I  don't  think  the  President  has 
changed  at  all  during  the  course  of  this 
period.  Right  now,  particularly  given  the 
fact  that  many  of  the  problems  that 
were  present  at  the  start  of  his  Ad- 
ministration have  been  dealt  with,  or  are 
in  the  process  of  being  dealt  with,  cer- 
tainly there  is  a  great  emphasis  on  the 
importance  of  negotiation  about  the 
many  overriding  issues  that  are  before 
us. 

Q.  Did  the  President  raise  human 
rights  in  any  fashion  to  the  Foreign 
Minister? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  How  did  he  do  that? 

A.  The  President— the  question  was: 
Did  the  President  raise  human 
rights?— and  the  answer  is:  Yes,  he  did, 
certainly.  And  I  think,  again,  the  Presi- 
dent has  said  from  the  beginning  that  in 
all  meetings  with  the  Soviet  Union,  this 
subject  will  be  raised,  and  he  did  so. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  he  said, 
can  you  elaborate  in  any  way? 

A.  No,  I  think  I  just  will  be  glad  to 
give  you  subjects  that  were  talked 
about,  but  as  to  the  content  individually 
I'm  not  going  to  give  the  names  that  he 
mentioned  or  anything  of  that  kind. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  this  meeting 
will  help  President  Reagan  for  his 
reelection?  [Laughter.] 

A.  I  have  no  idea.  [Laughter.]  That's 
not  my  field.  From  the  standpoint  of 
this  meeting,  it  is  a  meeting  that  the 


President  and  I  started  talking  about 
some  time  ago.  The  President  has 
thought  about  the  substance  of  it  very 
carefully,  undertook  it  in  the  spirit  of  a 
person,  a  human  being  who  is  President 
of  the  United  States  and  who  is  dealing, 
as  he  deals  with  the  Soviet  Union,  with 
matters  of  overriding  importance.  It 
was,  as  I've  said,  a  very  serious, 
businesslike  but  intense  meeting 
dominated  by  important  substance 
throughout. 

Q.  Would  you  list  the  subjects? 
Just  list  the  subjects  that  they 
covered. 

A.  A  great  deal  of  the  time  was 
spent,  at  the  beginning,  on  stating  views 
and  having  discussion  of  these  over- 
riding issues  of  the  nature  of  our  rela- 
tionship, where  it  is  heading,  the  impor- 
tance of  dealing  with  the  nuclear  threat, 
and  things  of  that  kind.  It  was,  in  a 
sense,  philosophic  but,  nevertheless,  con- 
nected to  overriding  issues.  And  both 
men  discussed  that,  and  I  don't  recall 
just  how  much  time,  in  total,  was  spent 
on  that. 

There  was  a  considerable  amount  of 
time  spent  discussing,  in  particular,  but 
not  negotiating  about— just  discus- 
sing— the  problems  of  nuclear  weapons 
and  what  could  be  done  about  them. 

There  was  some  discussion  of 
regional  issues  and  particularly  the  Iran- 
Iraq  situation,  the  situation  in  Lebanon, 
and  the  Palestinian  issues.  Those  were 
basically  the  kinds  of  topics  covered. 
And,  as  I  said  earlier,  the  President  ex- 
plicitly did  bring  up  the  problems  of 
human  rights  concerns. 

Q.  Was  there  anything  on  which 
they  agreed  and,  if  so,  could  you 
itemize? 

A.  I  said  that  they  agreed  to  keep  in 
touch.  And  that  was  the  end  point.  And 
I  think  that,  at  the  end  of  an  intense 
discussion  like  this,  it's  not  the  sort  of 
thing  where  you  agree,  "All  right.  We'll 
do  X,  Y  and  Z."  But  rather  that  an  ef- 
fort has  been  made,  on  both  sides,  I'm 
sure,  I  know  from  the  President's  side, 
to  get  across,  on  a  very  personal  level, 
his  own  convictions  and  his  own  views 
and  depth  of  feeling  about  this  subject. 
And,  at  least  from  my  perspective,  he 
did  a  very  good  job  of  it. 

Q.  Why  did  he  want  to  talk  to 
Gromyko  alone?  Do  you  think  it  was 
to  convey  this  personal  view  of  his? 
Over  and  beyond  the  official — 

A.  He  had  some  points  that  he 
wanted  to  make  to  Mr.  Gromyko  alone, 
and  he  did  it  that  way  because  he  felt 
that  just  two  individuals,  all  by 


EUROPE 


themselves  in  a  room,  even  though  the 
others  of  us  who  were  sitting  around 
were  not  too  numerous,  nevertheless, 
there's  something  about  a  close  one-to- 
one  statement  that  perhaps  carries 
special  weight.  And  so  he  had  some 
things  that  he  wanted  to  give  that 
weight  to. 


PRESIDENT'S  RADIO  ADDRESS, 
SEPT.  29,  19843 

This  has  been  a  busy  week  of  diplomatic 
activity  for  America.  I've  addressed  the 
United  Nations  and  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  World  Bank 
meetings,  and  met  with  a  dozen  world 
leaders.  Among  them  were  the  new 
leader  of  our  neighbor  to  the  north, 
Canadian  Prime  Minister  Brian 
Mulroney,  and,  as  you  know,  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko. 

To  the  delegates  at  the  United  Na- 
tions, I  emphasized  America's  dedication 
to  world  peace  through  confident  and 
stronger  alliances  and  a  constructive 
dialogue  with  our  adversaries.  I  told 
them  of  the  importance  we  attached  to 
seeking  peaceful  solutions  to  regional 
conflicts  plaguing  many  nations  and  the 
need  for  democratic  principles  and 
human  freedom  as  the  foundation  for  a 
more  prosperous,  peaceful  world. 

At  the  IMF  and  World  Bank,  I 
reported  that  an  American  economic 
renaissance  is  under  way,  leading  the 
rest  of  the  world  from  the  darkness  of 
recession  toward  brighter  days  of 
renewed  hope  and  global  prosperity. 

World  economic  growth  today  is 
nearly  twice  what  it  was  4  years  ago. 
And  inflation  in  the  industrial  countries 
is  half  of  what  it  was.  The  growing 
economic  interdependence  of  our  world 
is  creating  a  ripple  effect  of  good  news 
for  those  countries  committed  to  sensi- 
ble policies — policies  which  allow  the 
magic  of  the  marketplace  to  create  op- 
portunities for  growth  and  progress, 
free  from  the  dead  weight  of  govern- 
ment interference  and  misguided  protec- 
tionism. 

But  we  can't  build  an  enduring  pros- 
perity unless  peace  is  secure.  Our  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  have  been  at 
the  center  of  my  attention,  and  yester- 
day I  met  with  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  at  the  White  House  for  a 
thorough  exchange  of  views.  I've  said 
from  the  outset  of  my  public  life  that  a 
successful  U.S.  policy  toward  the  Soviet 
Union  must  rest  on  realism,  strength, 
and  a  willingness  to  negotiate. 


Last  January,  I  spelled  out  clearly 
our  goals  for  U.S. -Soviet  relations — to 
reduce  and  eventually  eliminate  the 
threat  and  use  of  force  in  resolving 
disagreements,  to  reduce  the  vast 
stockpiles  of  armaments  in  the  world, 
especially  nuclear  arms,  and  to  establish 
a  working  relationship  between  our  two 
countries  marked  by  a  greater 
understanding. 

In  our  meeting  yesterday,  we 
covered  all  issues  which  separate  us. 
And  while  I  told  Mr.  Gromyko  of  our 
disappointment  that  his  country  walked 
out  of  the  Geneva  nuclear  arms  reduc- 
tion talks  last  year,  we  remain  ready  to 
discuss  the  entire  family  of  arms  control 
issues  as  soon  as  they  are.  It's  in  both 
our  interests  that  these  talks  commence 
promptly  and  that  progress  be  made. 
Our  two  countries  have  no  more  solemn 
responsibility  than  to  reduce  the  level  of 
arms  and  to  enhance  understanding. 

Mr.  Gromyko  and  I  also  discussed 
major  trouble  spots  in  the  world.  And  I 
told  him  that  it's  vital  for  us  to  exchange 
views  and  help  find  lasting  solutions  to 
these  regional  disputes.  We  didn't  seek 
to  gloss  over  the  hard  issues  that  divide 
our  two  countries.  We  were  not  looking 
to  paper  over  these  differences.  Indeed, 
I  made  plain  to  Mr.  Gromyko  what  it  is 
about  Soviet  behavior  that  worries  us 
and  our  allies. 

But  they  were  useful  talks.  I  made  it 
clear  that  we  Americans  have  no  hostile 
intentions  toward  his  country  and  that 


we're  not  seeking  military  superioritj' 
over  the  U.S.S.R.  I  told  him,  "If  youi 
government  wants  peace,  then  there 
be  peace."  And  I  said  that  the  United 
States  is  committed  to  move  forward 
with  the  Soviet  Union  toward  genuin 
progress  in  resolving  outstanding  issi 

Pursuing  peace,  prosperity,  and 
democracy  are  not  new  goals.  They'll 
been  at  the  heart  of  an  American 
foreign  policy  that  down  through  the 
years  has  sought  to  promote  individt 
freedom  and  human  progress  in  the 
world. 

I  think  one  great  change  has  taki 
place  in  the  world  over  the  last  4  yej 
The  tide  of  freedom  has  begun  to  ris 
again.  Four  years  ago,  American  in- 
fluence and  leadership  were  ebbing,  i 
defenses  were  neglected,  our  econoir 
was  collapsing,  and  other  countries  v 
being  undermined  by  communist- 
supported  insurgencies.  Today,  our 
economy  is  vibrant,  our  strength  is  b 
ing  restored,  our  alliances  are  solid, 
peace  is  more  secure. 

Now  the  Soviets  will  return  horn 
ponder  our  exchanges.  And  while  thi 
know  they  will  not  secure  any  advan 
tages  from  inflexibility,  they  will  get 
fair  deal  if  they  seek  the  path  of  neg 
tion  and  peace. 


'Made  at  the  beginning  of  a  question 
answer  session  with  reporters  at  the  Wh 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  17,  198' 

^Press  release  213  of  Oct.  9. 

'Text  from  White  House  press  releas.' 


Anniversary  of  the  KAL  #007  Incident 


Following  are  an  article  which  ap- 
peared in  the  August  31.  198If,  edition  of 
The  New  York  Times  by  Richard  R. 
Burt,  Assistant  Secretary  for  European 
and  Canadian  Affairs,  and  a  Depart- 
ment state7nent  issued  the  same  day. 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY  BURT 

On  Saturday,  it  will  be  1  year  since  the 
brutal  and  senseless  destruction  of 
Korean  Air  Lines  Flight  007. 

The  Soviet  Union  still  has  not  of- 
fered restitution  for  downing  the 
airliner.  In  fact,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
never  admitted  its  mistake  in  the  death 
of  269  innocent  people.  Instead,  Soviet 
leaders  have  publicly  implied  that  they 
are  prepared  to  do  the  same  thing. 

In  recalling  this  needless  tragedy,  it 
is  important  to  keep  in  mind  what  ac- 
tually happened.  A  Korean  airliner 


strayed  off  course  and  inadvertenti} 
violated  Soviet  airspace.  A  Soviet 
fighter  shot  it  down,  without  adequ. 
identifying  it,  without  proper  warn- 
ing— and  without  justification. 

The  tragedy  of  KAL  007  results 
not  from  the  airliner's  navigation  er 
but  from  the  Soviet  Union's  reactioi  ■ 
that  error.  The  International  Civil  / 
tion  Organization  (ICAO)  has  intern 
tionally  recognized  procedures  for  d 
ing  with  civil  aircraft  that  fly  off  co 
The  Russians  did  not  follow  those 
established  ICAO  procedures  before 
ing  action. 

From  the  first  days  after  the  sh 
down  the  Soviet  propaganda  and  di; 
formation  machine  has  been  in  high 
gear,  attempting  to  place  the  blame 
anyone  but  themselves.  For  the  pas 


EUROPE 


iri! 


«'  machine  has  continued  to  churn 
xoiiey,  hoping  to  persuade  con- 
ic huffs  here  and  abroad  that  it 
me  sort  of  spy  plane. 
ne  of  the  Soviet  propaganda  has, 
ly,  been  picked  up  and  replayed 
rs  who  are  busy  taking  advan- 
unavoidable  gaps  in  our 
dge  of  what  happened.  This  has 
|ed  a  genre  of  spy  plane  theories 
rt  from  the  premise  that  the 
lovernment  must  be  guilty.  They 
that  somebody  here  must  have 
that  the  airliner  was  off  course. 
10  effort  was  made  to  warn  the 
-,  this — to  the  spy  plane 
ts — means  that  we  either  sent  the 
)ver  Soviet  airspace,  or  passively 
ted  the  plane  to  continue  off 
so  that  we  could  reap  intelligence 
,s. 

e  truth  is  that  America  does  not 
ilian  airliners  for  intelligence  pur- 
nor  was  KAL  007  involved  with 
itelligence  in  any  way.  We  had  no 
'dge  of  the  fact  that  the  Korean 
•  had  deviated  from  its  course  or 
had  been  shot  down,  until  several 
after  the  tragedy  had  occurred. 

L'i  he  Russians  knew  where  the  plane 
hey  tracked  it  for  2V2  hours 
shooting  it  down, 
jreover,  no  credible  evidence  ex- 
support  the  conspiracy  charges. 

s|iootdown  was  investigated  at 
ength  by  two  different  interna- 
teams  of  impartial  experts  work- 

ICAO.  Their  findings  were 
led  in  two  separate  reports  by  the 
Among  the  reports'  findings  were 
lowing. 

KAL  007  departed  Anchorage  in 
lance  with  Korean  Air  Lines' 
ird  practice,  so  that  the  plane 

land  in  Seoul  around  6:00  a.m. 
customs  and  immigration  services 
d  at  the  international  terminal 

There  was  no  evidence  that  the 
of  KAL  007  was  at  any  time  aware 

flight's  deviation,  in  spite  of  the 
hat  it  continued  along  the  same 
al  off-track  flight  path  for  some  5 

and  26  minutes. 

he  December  ICAO  report  also 
ided  that: 

The  Soviet  Union  did  not  make 
istive  efforts  to  identify  the  air- 
through  in-flight  visual  observa- 

and 

The  aircraft  was  shot  down  by  at 
one  of  two  air-to-air  missiles  fired 
a  Soviet  interceptor,  whose  pilot 


had  been  directed  by  his  ground  com- 
mand and  control  unit  to  "terminate  the 
flight." 

On  the  basis  of  the  ICAO  inves- 
tigative reports,  the  ICAO  Council  in 
March  voted  overwhelming  to  condemn 
the  use  of  armed  force  against  KAL 
007.  Twenty  states  voted  for  this  resolu- 
tion and  only  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Czechoslovakia  opposed. 

This  was  not  the  first  time  the 
Soviets  have  shot  down  a  civil  aircraft. 
In  1978,  when  a  Korean  Air  Lines  707 
strayed  near  Murmansk,  the  intercept- 
ing Soviet  fighter  pilot  positively  iden- 
tified it  as  a  civilian  airline  and  was 
ordered  to  shoot  it  down  anyway.  At 
that  time,  luckily,  only  two  people  were 
killed  because  the  707  pilot  landed  on  a 
frozen  lakebed. 

Actions  such  as  these  underscore  the 
problems  that  the  world  community  and 
any  U.S.  Administration  have  in  dealing 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  must  be 
realistic.  However  shocked  we  are  at 
Soviet  callousness,  we  are  not  surprised; 
we  cannot  afford  to  be.  The  clear  lesson 
of  such  tragedies  is  that  the  Russians' 
first  inclination  is  still  to  use  force  to  im- 
pose their  views,  regardless  of  interna- 
tional law  or  practices. 

In  dealing  with  a  country  that 
prefers  to  shoot  first  and  explain  later 
whatever  the  international  ground  rules, 
we  must  be  strong,  in  order  to  protect 
our  interests,  to  help  defend  our  allies 
and  to  help  maintain  the  fragile  rules  of 
good  conduct  and  civility  that  have  been 
built  up  over  the  years.  We  must  be 
ready  to  talk  with  the  Russians,  but  we 
must  be  firm  and  patient  in  trying  to 
negotiate  equitable  solutions  to  the 
many  problems  which  faces  us  both. 
Although  they  may  not  like  it,  this  is  a 
policy  the  Soviets  understand  and  should 
respect.  It  is  also  the  policy  most  likely 
to  achieve  lasting  results. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT' 

One  year  has  passed  since  the  tragic 
shootdown  of  Korean  Air  Liner  Flight 
#007.  Two  hundred  sixty-nine  innocent 
people  from  13  nations  lost  their  lives  on 
this  day  1  year  ago.  We  wish  to  express 
our  sympathy  to  the  families  and  friends 
of  those  who  were  killed  on  that  day. 

America,  which  lost  61  of  its  citizens 
in  this  senseless  and  unjustified  action, 
shares  with  the  families  of  victims  from 
Japan,  Korea,  and  10  other  countries 
deep  sadness  and  shock  over  our  com- 
mon loss.  These  sentiments  have  not 
been  diminished  by  the  passage  of  a 
year. 


We  share  with  them  also  a  continu- 
ing sense  of  outrage  at  the  brutal  attack 
on  an  unarmed  civilian  airliner.  This  act 
is  an  international  issue  of  concern  to 
all  nations  and  is  not  primarily  a 
U.S. -Soviet  problem. 

We  share  the  sentiments  expressed 
in  the  resolution,  which  was  adopted  on 
March  6,  1984,  by  the  ICAO  which  con- 
demned the  use  of  armed  force  against 
the  Korean  airliner.  The  resolution  also 
reaffirmed  that  such  use  of  armed  force 
constitutes  a  violation  of  international 
law  and  is  incompatible  with  elementary 
considerations  of  humanity. 

There  can  be  no  real  compensation 
for  the  loss  of  life  in  this  tragedy. 
Nevertheless  we  are  deeply  troubled  by 
the  fact  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  never 
apologized  for  its  action  nor  offered 
restitution  to  the  families  of  the  victims. 

Finally,  we  must  do  what  we  can  to 
ensure  that  such  an  event  never  happens 
again.  To  that  end  the  United  States 
calls  upon  the  Soviet  Union  to  join  the 
international  community  in  observing  ac- 
cepted practices  with  regard  to  the  safe- 
ty of  civil  aviation.  The  world  simply  will 
not  accept  the  repetition  of  such  a 
senseless  tragedy. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  John  Hughes.  ■ 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Human  Rights  Practices  in  Sudan, 
Ethiopia,  Somalia,  and  Uganda 


by  Elliott  Abrams 

Statement  before  the  Suhcommittees 
on  Human  Rights  and  International 
Organizations  and  on  Africa  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
August  9,  198Jt.  Mr.  Abrams  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Human  Rights  and 
Humanitarian  Affairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity  to 
testify  before  the  Subcommittees  on 
Africa  and  on  Human  Rights  and  Inter- 
nationa! Organizations  on  the  human 
rights  situation  in  Sudan,  Ethiopia, 
Somalia,  and  Uganda.  These  countries 
are  strategically  located  in  East  Africa. 
To  the  extent  that  the  region  is  stable, 
peaceful,  and  prosperous,  our  own  in- 
terests are  directly  served.  In  general 
we  have  good  bilateral  relations  with 
most  of  the  countries  in  the  region. 

Sudan  and  Somalia,  especially,  have 
cooperated  closely  with  the  United 
States  in  several  ways.  For  example, 
Sudan  has  been  a  source  of  important 
public  support  for  our  efforts  to  achieve 
peace  in  the  Middle  East,  and  Somalia 
provides  military  access  for  the  United 
States.  We  have  large  assistance  pro- 
grams in  Sudan  and  Somalia  and  a  more 
modest  program  in  Uganda.  We  have 
provided  substantial  refugee  and 
humanitarian  assistance  to  all  the  coun- 
tries of  the  region.  We  are,  in  short, 
deeply  involved  in  the  region  and  have 
important  relations  with  the  countries  of 
the  region. 

They,  however,  are  experiencing 
great  difficulties.  The  entire  region  has 
suffered  from  severe  drought,  very  large 
refugee  flows,  and  extreme  economic 
hardship.  In  addition,  each  country  has 
recently  had  or  is  currently  experiencing 
revolution,  civil  war,  or  both.  Ethiopia, 
with  Libyan  cooperation,  has  attempted 
to  destabilize  its  neighbors  by  arming 
Somali  and  Sudanese  guerrillas.  They,  in 
turn,  look  with  great  concern  at  massive 
military  deliveries  to  Ethiopia  by  the 
Soviet  Union  and  its  allies.  The  Soviets 
have  provided  some  $4  billion  in  military 
assistance  to  Ethiopia  since  1977,  and 
the  Ethiopian  Army  is  much  larger  than 
the  Sudanese  and  Somali  Armies  com- 
bined (about  2:1).  Moreover,  the  tripar- 
tite alliance  of  Libya,  South  Yemen,  and 
Ethiopia  is  itself  a  threat.  Thus,  the 
countries  of  the  region  are  simulbmeous- 
ly  facing  a  variety  of  economic  and 
political  strains  in  an  atmosphere  of  fear 
and  suspicion. 


The  harsh  history  and  overall  pover- 
ty and  instability  of  the  region  are  at  the 
root  of  the  human  rights  picture  there. 
Although  most  of  the  countries  of  the 
region  do  not  fully  share  our  own  no- 
tions of  democracy  or  respect  for  in- 
dividual rights,  a  most  troubling  aspect 
of  recent  history  is  the  deterioration  of 
the  human  rights  situation  viewed  on 
the  basis  of  their  own  standards  and 
traditions  these  governments  claim  to 
respect.  In  some  cases— notably  in 
Ethiopia— the  heavy  hand  of  Marxism, 
in  many  ways,  has  exacerbated  an 
already  harsh  traditional  Ethiopian  at- 
titude toward  emigration,  for  example. 
In  Sudan  religious  conflict  threatens  one 
of  Africa's  most  hopeful  experiments  in 
peaceful  resolutions  of  civil  war  and 
establishment  of  a  multicultural  country. 
In  Uganda,  where  in  the  early  post- 
Amin  years  exiles  returned  to  establish 
a  multiparty  parliamentary  democracy 
with  a  notably  free  press,  recent  trends 
indicate  that  the  human  rights  situation 
in  Uganda  today  is  among  the  most 
grave  in  the  world. 

The  situation  in  East  Africa  poses 
serious  questions  for  the  United  States. 
We  must  be  careful  neither  to  condone 
unacceptable  behavior  nor  to  mislead 
potential  adversaries  of  our  own  trou- 
bled friends.  We  must  respond  to 
threats  to  our  interests  in  the  region  in 
a  manner  consistent  with  our  concern 
over  human  rights  abuses.  Although  we 
recognize  the  historical  roots  of  such 
current  behavior  and  realize  that  neither 
pure  democracy  nor  full  respect  for  in- 
ternationally recognized  human  rights  is 
likely  in  the  near  future,  we  will  not 
shrink  from  expressing  our  concern  over 
human  rights  abuses  even  to  our  closest 
friends.  Indeed  we  have  done  so,  and 
the  remarks  I  shall  make  regarding  in- 
dividual countries  have  been  made 
previously  both  publicly  and  directly  to 
the  leadership  of  the  specific  countries. 

At  the  same  time,  these  countries 
are  facing  numerous,  serious  problems, 
and  the  United  States  should  do  more 
than  simply  complain.  To  the  extent 
possible,  we  should  offer  constructive 
assistance  and  counsel  with  the  hope 
that  through  candor  and  cooperation  we 
can  assist  our  friends  through  an 
especially  difficult  period  in  their  history 
and  hope  that  before  long  they  can 
achieve  improved  economic  develop- 


ment, greater  political  stability,  ara 
the  process,  an  enhanced  human  rij 
environment. 

Sudan 

The  human  rights  situation  in  Suda 
deteriorated  considerably  in  the  las 
year.  Key  developments  have  been 
government's  decision  last  Septeml 
incorporate  traditional  Islamic 
punishments  into  the  penal  code,  i\ 
vent  of  active  insurgency  supportec 
Ethiopia  and  Libya  and  by  southeri 
rebels  espousing  traditional  grievar 
and  opposing  Islamization  in  the  nc 
Muslim  south,  and  finally,  the  gove 
ment's  declaration  of  a  state  of  emi 
cy  April  29  resulting  in  the  establis 
ment  of  summary  tribunals.  Begin: 
with  the  announcement  last  fall  ths 
sharia,  or  Islamic  law,  would  be  ap 
more  broadly,  it  was  unclear  how  t 
new  laws  would  be  enforced  agains 
Sudan's  different  confessional  grou 
which  for  family  law  matters  have 
governed  by  their  own  customs  anc 
laws.  It  appeared  that  for  certain 
crimes,  such  as  intoxication  and 
adultery,  Muslims  would  be  punishi 
more  severely. 

In  December  the  first  sharia 
sentences  involving  amputation  of  i 
right  hands  of  two  convicted  thieve  | 
both  Muslims,  were  carried  out  in  1 
toum.  During  the  earlier  part  of  th 
year,  the  regular  courts  in  the  Kha  i 
toum  area  continued  to  pass  ampul : 
sentences.  However,  because  of  ap 
and  the  general  backlog  of  cases,  r 
more  than  half  a  dozen  amputation 
were  carried  out  during  the  first  4 
months  of  1984,  although  some  40 
prisoners,  including  several  non-Mi 
southerners,  were  reported  to  be 
awaiting  amputation  in  al-Kober  pr 
in  Khartoum.  Many  observers  belie 
that  the  courts  would  find  a  way  el 
tively  to  exempt  non-Muslims  from 
form  of  punishment,  and  Sudanese 
ficials  said  at  the  time  non-Muslims 
would  not  suffer  these  punishment!" 

However,  President  Nimeiri's 
declaration  of  a  state  of  emergency 
April  29  and  the  establishment  of 
emergency  courts  with  summary 
jurisdiction  over  criminal  cases  gre.- 
accelerated  the  execution  of  these 
punishments.  For  the  first  time, 
southerners  living  in  the  Khartoum 


nr^nortmont  /-\f  Ctata  Rt 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


:   ] 

■I 

At 

p 


Ee 
b 
ptei 


ubjected  to  these  punishments,  in- 
cross  hmb  amputations,  in 
for  example,  the  right  hand  and 
t  are  severed.  Although  emergen- 
ts  in  other  northern  cities  have 
to  mete  out  ><haria  punishments, 
tribunals  established  in  the  south 
ot  enforced  the  sha  ria  provisions 
penal  code.  According  to  most  re- 
stimates,  the  number  of  amputa- 
inder  the  state  of  emergency  now 
Is  50,  including  several  non- 
ns. 

is  not  clear  whether  foreigners 
pect  to  be  exempted.  The  curfew 
bitrary  searches  for  military  units 
ing  the  state  of  emergency  af- 
expatriates  living  in  Khartoum, 
16  Italian  lay  religious  worker  was 
for  possession  of  alcohol. 
le  extreme  form  of  punishments 
d  down  by  the  emergency  courts 
?nerated  dismay  abroad  and  in  the 
1  Muslim  south,  further  fueling  the  in- 
^':  ricy  led  by  the  SLM  (Sudan  Libera- 
J^  lovement)  insurgents.  The  Libyans 
thiopians  moved  quickly  to  "fish" 
se  troubled  waters.  Unlike  other 
ic  countries,  such  as  Saudi  Arabia 
emen  where  sharia  is  normally  ap- 
only  to  Muslims  and  administered 
lined  jurists  applying  elaborate  pro- 
al  safeguards,  the  three-man 
!  in  Sudan  consist  of  a  policeman,  a 
ry  officer,  and  a  civilian  regarded 
PUS  but  usually  untrained  in  law. 
he  Department  has  publicly 
red  limb  amputations  as  cruel  and 
lal  punishment  and  a  clear  and 
IS  violation  of  human  rights.  We 
also  made  it  clear  that  we  will  not 
)rt  a  military  solution  to  conflict  in 
3uth,  and  we  have  pointed  out  the 
vident  connection  between  sharia 
he  southern  insurgency.  In  several 

I  level  exchanges  with  the  govern- 
,  including  a  visit  to  Sudan  by  one 
■ff  deputies,  Mr.  Fairbanks,  we  have 
Tdunicated  our  concern  over  the 
ti'ioration  of  human  rights  in  Sudan, 
'hough  we  should  be  cautious  about 
'  rliiig  dramatic  or  immediate  im- 
'  'nicnt,  there  is  some  evidence  of 
iiisc'  to  the  concerns  expressed  by 
.Ml  citizens  and  by  friends  abroad. 
'<L;"n\ernment  has  taken  steps  to 
ict  arbitrary  searches  by  soldiers, 
cularly  in  the  home.  We  understand 
when  searches  are  conducted,  an  of- 
must  now  be  present.  A  recent 
rnment  decision  now  allows  appeals 
the  previously  summary  judgments 
le  emergency  courts.  President 
eiri  has  withdrawn,  at  least  for  the 


time  being,  draft  constitutional  amend- 
ments that  were  widely  resented  by 
southern  Sudanese  as  giving  Islam  a 
dominant  position  in  the  country  and  as 
removing  certain  protections  they  have 
enjoyed  under  the  existing  constitution. 

While  these  latest  steps  represent 
only  modest  progress,  we  are  encour- 
aged that  the  government  is  responding 
to  international  concern  over  human 
rights  developments  in  the  Sudan.  We 
will  continue  to  urge  the  government  to 
moderate  its  domestic  policies,  including 
the  application  of  sharia  punishments. 
However,  we  must  recognize  that  Sudan 
may  not  repeal  sharia.  Nevertheless, 
they  can  apply  it  moderately,  gradually, 
more  humanely,  using  personnel  trained 
in  the  law  and  procedural  safeguards 
and  with  greater  restraint  toward  non- 
Muslims. 

Ethiopia 

The  human  rights  picture  for  Ethiopia  is 
bleak.  The  nation  suffers  under  dic- 
tatorial rule  by  Chairman  Mengistu  and 
a  small  group  of  former  military  officers 
with  a  Marxist  agenda — an  agenda  that 
inevitably  sacrifices  the  individual  for 
creation  of  the  socialist  man.  The  state 
exercises  complete  control  over  the 
press,  education,  labor  activities, 
political  processes,  the  legal  system,  and 
freedom  of  movement.  Marxist  instruc- 
tion is  pervasive  in  the  secondary 
schools  and  universities.  Those 
suspected  of  being  unsympathetic  to  the 
regime  are  watched  and  closely  con- 
trolled by  the  neighborhood  committees, 
and  arbitrary  arrest  is  common.  The 
Soviet  system  of  "participatory 
democracy"  of  mass  organizations  is 
substituted  for  real  democratic  proc- 
esses. No  dissent  is  allowed.  There  are 
no  civil  and  political  freedoms.  We  are 
not  at  this  stage  sure  what  effect  forma- 
tion of  a  workers  party  in  September 
will  have,  but  it  should  promote  more 
radical  elements  of  the  revolution. 

In  limited  respects  the  human  rights 
situation  has  improved  over  the  past  few 
years.  There  has  been  no  renewed  terror 
on  the  scale  of  the  mass  arrests  and  ex- 
ecutions of  1977-78.  It  is  generally  con- 
sidered that  outside  the  famine  areas, 
life  in  the  countryside  has  improved 
somewhat.  Since  the  revolution,  peasant 
families  have  been  able  to  form  their 
own  holdings,  and  while  collectivization 
of  peasant  holdings  is  being  encouraged, 
it  is  not  yet  being  forced  on  the  small 
peasant  farmers.  The  government  has 
built  a  large  number  of  schools, 
hospitals,  and  roads.  Primary  schooling 


is  now  available  to  everyone  in  urban 
areas,  and  secondary  schooling  is  open 
to  a  high  percentage  of  the  young  in 
cities.  As  a  result  of  this  and  an 
energetic  adult  literacy  campaign,  the 
government  now  claims  a  literacy  rate 
of  67%.  This  no  doubt  is  exaggerated, 
but  undeniably  there  has  been  great 
progress  in  the  area  of  literacy  and  also 
some  in  public  health.  There  have  been 
major  amnesties  of  political  prisoners  in 
September  of  1982  and  1983.  Religious 
expression  is  still  tolerated  to  an  extent. 
These  positive  factors  are  more  than 
counterbalanced,  however,  by  the  crea- 
tion of  a  workers  party  and  the  trend 
toward  greater  Marxist-Leninist  institu- 
tionalization of  the  revolution  and  by 
worsened  economic  conditions.  The 
Christian  Amhara  continue  to  dominate 
other  ethnic  groups  differing  in 
language  and  religion.  Life  in  general  is 
increasingly  difficult.  The  security  situa- 
tion in  the  north  has  deteriorated  and 
fighting  has  spread  with  innocents 
caught  in  the  crossfire  in  the  central 
government  campaign  against  Tigrean 
and  Eritrean  insurgencies.  The  govern- 
ment's campaign  has  also  led  to  ar- 
bitrary military  conscription,  with 
military  forces  sweeping  through  cities 
and  villages,  hauling  young  men  off 
never  to  be  seen  again.  Most  significant, 
drought  and  famine  have  devastated  the 
countryside,  affecting  nearly  5  million 
people.  Centralized  planning  and  collec- 
tivization have  not  helped  the  economy; 
Ethiopia  remains  one  of  the  10  poorest 
nations  in  the  world.  Despite  this 
widespread  deprivation,  a  new  elite  class 
is  emerging,  composed  of  those  con- 
nected to  the  government. 

As  a  result  of  the  drought,  insurgen- 
cies, civil  strife,  and  repression,  over  1 
million  Ethiopians  have  fled  their  coun- 
try. More  are  leaving  every  day;  many 
walking  15  days,  selling  their  posses- 
sions and  livestock  to  pay  for  food  dur- 
ing their  trek.  Shortages  of  certain 
foods  and  commodities  have  increased  in 
the  cities,  due  in  large  measure  to  an 
economic  system  that  provides  few 
incentives  for  farmers  to  grow  more 
than  they  can  consume. 

More  recently,  there  are  reports  of 
Ethiopian  obsession  with  security  sur- 
rounding the  September  10th  anniver- 
sary celebrations,  with  roundups  of 
those  suspected  of  counterrevolutionary 
sympathies.  Local  neighborhood  commit- 
tees are  participating  in  mandatory 
drills  and  have  increased  patrols. 

It  is  not  possible  to  speak  with 
assurance  on  the  situation  of  the  Ethio- 
pian Jews  due  to  the  fact  that  visits  in 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Jewish  villages  are  infrequent  and  con- 
trolled. In  late  1982,  however,  the 
government  began  again  to  permit  U.b. 
and  Israeli  delegations  limited  access  to 
Jewish  villages.  This  extended  until  ear- 
ly 1984.  In  February  of  this  year  we 
learned  that  foreign  visitors  to  Gondar 
were  no  longer  being  allowed  to  go  to 
Ethiopian  Jewish  villages,  except  to 
Wolleka,  which  is  very  near  to  Gondar 
City  and  not  exclusively  Jewish. 

While  the  situation  of  the  Ethiopian 
Jews  generally  has  improved  in  the  legal 
sense,  with  their  being  allowed  to  hold 
land  and  participate  in  peasant  associa- 
tions, friction  between  the  Ethiopian 
Jews  and  the  government  continues, 
mainly  due  to  official  efforts  to  restrict 
emigration.  Ethiopian  Jews  are  still  sub- 
ject to  local  prejudice,  but  they  do  not 
appear  to  be  singled  out  for  discrimina- 
tion. We  have  no  evidence  of  genocide. 
Like  other  Ethiopians,  the  Jews  live 
very  difficult  lives  in  extreme  poverty 
and  suffer  human  rights  violations.  They 
are  also  subject  to  arbitrary  arrest  and 
imprisonment,  as  are  thousands  of 
others  in  Ethiopia.  We  realize  this  is  a 
sensitive  issue  among  the  American 
public  and  Congress  and  are  watching 
the  situation  closely  and  doing  what  we 
think  is  useful  to  help. 

Somalia 

While  human  rights  conditions  in 
Somalia  are  far  from  ideal,  Somalia  is 
probably  the  bright  spot  among  the 
countries  we  are  considering  today. 
Somalia  has  been  ruled  for  the  past  15 
years  by  President  Mohamed  Siad 
Barre,  as  head  of  the  armed  forces. 
Although  the  country's  Constitution, 
adopted  in  1979  after  a  nationwide 
referendum  provides  some  guarantees  of 
political  and  civil  rights,  these  rights  are 
tightly  circumscribed,  and  open  criticism 
of  the  government  is  not  permitted. 

The  ultimate  source  of  the 
President's  political  authority  is  the 
military.  The  importance  of  the  military 
in  Somali  society  is  reinforced  by  the 
continuing  conflict  between  Somalia  and 
Ethiopia  over  the  area  of  the  Ogaden 
Desert  in  Ethiopia  occupied  by  ethnic 
Somalis.  Continuing  conflict  with 
Ethiopia  has  resulted  in  heavy  defense 
expenditures  and  a  massive  refugee  flow 
into  Somalia. 

The  principal  arm  of  Somalia's 
security  apparatus  is  the  National 
Security  Service,  which  can  arrest  and 
detain  people  indefinitely.  The  govern- 
ment has  shown  no  hesitation  in  im- 
prisoning people  whom  it  sees  as  a 


threat  to  security.  However,  political 
prisoners,  in  the  past,  have  been  re- 
leased and  rehabilitated,  with  some  of 
them  taking  responsible  positions  in  the 
government.  In  spite  of  a  constitutional 
provision  guaranteeing  formal  charges 
and  a  speedy  trial,  the  Somali  Govern- 
ment does  detain  defendants  without 
charge  in  cases  involving  national  securi- 
ty. Six  high  government  officials  ar- 
rested in  June  1982  have  still  not  been 
charged  but  remain  in  prison.  There  is 
an  estimated  total  of  350-500  political 
prisoners,  200  of  whom  are  being  held 
without  charge.  In  the  past  18  months, 
we  have  seen  no  cases  of  arbitrary  kill- 
ing for  political  reasons,  nor  any  in- 
stances of  disappearance.  There  are  oc- 
casional allegations  of  torture,  but  these 
have  not  been  substantiated. 

The  Somali  court  system,  in  both 
criminal  and  political  cases,  is  subject  to 
review  and  control  by  the  executive.  In 
regular  courts,  judges  refer  to  the 
Koran  in  rendering  legal  decisions  per- 
taining to  family  matters  such  as  mar- 
riage and  inheritance.  The  National 
Security  Court,  established  in  1969,  has 
authority  with  no  right  of  appeal  in 
cases  of  crime  against  the  state.  Its 
deliberations  are  secret. 

Somalia's  media  are  owned  and 
operated  by  the  government.  They  are 
devoted  to"  disseminating  information 
and  opinion  acceptable  to  the  govern- 
ment. Dissenting  views  are  not  allowed 
expression  in  public.  All  non-religious 
organizations  and  public  gatherings  in 
the  country  are  subject  to  government 
control  or  close  supervision.  Internal 
travel  is  not  restricted  in  Somalia,  but 
there  are  numerous  police  and  mihtary 
checkpoints  in  the  towns,  border  areas, 
and  places  where  interclan  violence  is 
occurring.  Islam  is  the  state  religion  and 
is  adhered  to  by  95%  of  the  population, 
but  there  is  little  government  in- 
terference in  religious  matters. 

The  Somali  Government  is  willing  to 
discuss  specific  human  rights  cases  and 
has  communicated  with  Amnesty  Inter- 
national. However,  it  has  refused  per- 
mission for  foreign  officials  or  human 
rights  organizations  to  visit  political 
prisoners.  In  1983  Somalia  did  allow  an 
International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross  (ICRC)  team  to  visit  and  inspect 
facilities  for  prisoners  of  war  from  the 
conflict  with  Ethiopia  and  to  meet  with 
a  number  of  these  prisoners. 


Uganda  i 

Over  the  last  year,  the  human  rights 
situation  in  Uganda  has  deteriorated 
alarmingly.  In  recent  months  repeate 
reports  of  large  scale  civilian  massaa 
forced  starvation,  and  impeded  huma 
itarian  relief  operations  indicate  that 
Uganda  has  one  of  the  most  serious 
human  rights  problems  in  the  wurlil 
day.  This  is  especially  tragic  because 
friends  of  Uganda  hoped  that  the  cou 
try  would  continue  to  make  progress ' ' 
away  from  the  terrible  Idi  Amin  yt;ai  ' 
That  progress  was  clearly  evident  in  . ' 
first  2  years  of  the  post- Amin  period.  ' 
Dr.  Milton  Obote,  President  of      ' 
Uganda  from  1962  until  his  overthro 
by  General  Idi  Amin  in  1971,  was 
returned  to  power  in  the  December  11 
general  election.  At  first  the  Obote 
government  made  slow  but  steady  pw 
ress  to  overcome  the  ill  effects  of  the 
terror  and  economic  disruptions  of  tlv 
previous  decade.  Faced  almost  im- 
mediately by  an  insurgency  campaign 
led  by  Yoweri  Museveni's  National 
Resistance  Army,  operating  primaril; 
the  Luwero  triangle  region,  as  well  a- 
by  periodic  raids  from  remnants  of  Ic 
Amin's  forces  in  the  northwest,  the 
Obote  government  nonetheless  tried  t 
stabilize  the  international  security  sib 
tion  and  work  with  international  relie 
agencies  to  deliver  assistance  to  Ugai 
dans. 

Since  December  1983,  however, 
when  Uganda's  key  military  leader 
David  Oyite  Ojok  died,  the  decline  in 
security  situation  has  accelerated.  Th 
army,  although  never  adequately  trai 
or  disciplined,  worsened  significantly 
the  absence  of  effective  leadership.  A 
government  rebels  have  successfully 
challenged  the  ineffective  governmen 
forces.  As  a  result,  the  demoralized  s 
under-paid,  under-fed  and  ill-equipp© 
army,  in  incident  after  incident,  has 
been  using  its  defensive  operations  a> 
excuse  for  looting  and  for  the  rape  o 
murder  of  innocent  civilians.  Army 
atrocities  have  been  most  numerous 
the  Luwero  triangle  north  of  the  cap 
which  is  heavily  populated  by  refuge* 
and  in  the  northeast  Karamoja  distri 
where  the  government  conducts  opei 
tions  against  a  pastoral  tribe  long 
engaged  in  cattle-rustling  as  a  chief 
economic  activity  but  now  in  possess 
of  considerable  modern  weaponry.  S 
May  there  have  been  an  increasing 
number  of  reports  of  brutal  massacr 
of  women,  children,  displaced  persor 
and  other  noncombatants  in  the  Luv 


Department  of  State  Bui 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


irle  and  in  Karamoja.  What  is  most 
ii>ing  about  recent  reports  is  not 
they  are  incomplete  (although  we 
unly  desire  more  information)  but 
,ct  that  nearly  every  source  we  do 
v  provides  reliable  reports  of  large 
massacres. 

1  the  face  of  the  worsening  security 
ion,  the  government  is  becoming 
nd  less  able  to  exert  its  influence 
focus  on  development  and  na- 
unity.  There  are  discussions 
the  government  on  how  to  ad- 
the  insurgency  and  other  forms  of 

Some  senior  officials  ad- 
e  harsher  treatment  against 
:al  opponents  and  the  denial  of 
to  civilians  suspected  of  supporting 
^ents.  Until  recently  efforts  to  pro- 
-elief  assistance  for  150,000  per- 
who  had  been  displaced  by  army 
nsurgency  activity  were  going 
nably  well.  However,  renewed  suc- 
s  by  the  armed  insurgents,  in- 
ag  the  abduction  of  international 
workers  in  January  1984  and  the 
k  on  Masindi  in  Febniary,  led  to 
overnment's  restricting  relief 
itions  in  March. 

'he  cumulative  effect  of  the  restric- 
and  the  disbanding  of  relief  centers 
Aeen  to  deny  aid  to  the  resettled  and 
e  displaced,  resulting  in  extreme 
ring.  It  is  widely  believed  in  Kam- 
that  the  exclusion  of  church  and  ex- 
ate  relief  workers  from  the  Luwero 
gle  was  being  done  to  thwart  the 
y  of  the  international  community  to 
tor  developments  within  this  area 
nflict.  In  response  to  urging  by  the 
matic  and  humanitarian  corn- 
ties,  the  ban  has  been  relaxed  on 
operations  into  the  Luwero 
gle. 

however,  because  of  the  security 
tion  few  relief  agencies  are 
(ating  in  the  Luwero  region.  Just 
■  week  four  ICRC  workers  were  at- 
;  Ml  liy  rebels  and  three  wounded  by 
lire  while  driving  in  their  vehicle, 
iitless  thousands  are  now  out  of 
;h  of  relief  assistance.  Children,  lac- 
iig  mothers,  and  the  elderly  are  dy- 
rf  starvation  in  substantial  numbers. 
5  the  problem  is  not  a  simple  one 
not  one  the  government  can  control. 
1  the  government  and  relief  agencies 
great  obstacles  in  addressing  the 
)lem.  An  official  ban  remains  on 
f  operations  in  Karamoja. 
No  ambassador  in  Kampala  has  been 
e  active  than  U.S.  Ambassador  Allen 
is  in  trying  to  address  the  wide- 


spread human  suffering  in  Uganda.  He, 
like  his  Western  colleagues,  has  strongly 
urged  the  Government  of  Uganda  to  act 
to  end  the  violence  and  inhumanity  by 
insurgents  and  by  undisciplined  security 
forces.  Recently  Vice  President  Bush 
took  advantage  of  the  visit  of  the  Arch- 
bishop of  the  Church  of  Uganda,  who  is 
personally  close  to  President  Obote,  to 
expose  him  fully  to  the  extent  of  our 
concerns.  Subsequently,  I  personally  met 
with  Archbishop  Okoth,  as  did  other 
senior  Department  and  Administration 
officials,  and  reiterated  in  the  clearest  of 
terms  the  Vice  President's  message  that 
the  spiral  of  violence  and  human  rights 
violations  must  be  halted.  A  number  of 
Administration  and  congressional 
visitors  have  traveled  to  Kampala 
recently  and  have  personally  delivered 
similar  messages  to  President  Obote  and 
to  the  most  senior  members  of  his 
government. 

Some  Ugandan  officials  have  replied 
that  the  violence  against  civilians  in  the 
affected  districts  is  an  unavoidable  reac- 
tion to  guerrilla  attacks  or  justifiable 
retribution  against  those  civilians 
suspected  of  harboring  or  otherwise  sup- 
porting insurgents.  Elements  who  share 
this  hardline  view  have  expanded  their 
power  in  the  aftermath  of  General 
Ojok's  death.  The  insurgency  is  part  of 
the  problem,  as  is  weak  army  training 
and  discipline.  But  we  cannot  accept  this 
explanation  wholly  and  have  so  told 
government  officials  in  our  representa- 
tions. President  Obote  cannot  wave  a 
wand  and  end  the  violence  in  Uganda, 
but  clearly  his  government  must  do 
more  to  lessen  it. 

The  United  States,  despite  its 
vigorous  efforts,  has  also  had  limited 
success.  We  are  reviewing  our  Ugandan 
policy  to  see  what  constructive  steps 
should  now  be  taken.  It  is  still  our  view, 
however,  that  we  continue  to  work  with 
the  Ugandan  Government  to  reestablish 
the  environment  that  gave  everyone 
hope  after  the  ouster  of  Amin.  Our  Em- 
bassy in  Kampala  is  a  visible  sign  of  our 
faith  that  the  United  States  has  a  role  to 
play  in  helping  to  make  life  better  for 
Uganda.  We  have  to  remember  that 
there  are  large  parts  of  Uganda  free 
from  violence,  where  people  are  putting 
their  lives  together  after  the  grim  years 
of  the  Amin  regime,  where  sound 
government  policies  and  donor 
assistance  have  been  creating  oppor- 
tunities for  more  food  production, 
health,  education,  and  employment.  Lit- 
tle would  be  served,  least  of  all  the  in- 


terests of  Ugandans,  by  taking  actions 
which  would  hurt  these  areas  of  prog- 
ress and  at  the  same  time  irrevocably 
decrease  our  influence  with  the  Ugandan 
Government.  Other  donors  feel  the 
same.  We  believe  that  working 
multilaterally  with  other  donor  nations 
and  other  African  countries  will  be  the 
most  effective  way  to  encourage  and 
help  the  Ugandan  Government  to  stop 
the  violence. 

How  can  we  help  more  to  curb  the 
sources  of  violence  and  encourage  the 
influence  of  moderation?  What  other 
steps  should  be  taken?  These  are  dif- 
ficult questions  and  ones  we  are  grap- 
pling with.  The  Administration  will  con- 
tinue to  follow  the  situation  in  Uganda 
closely.  You  can  be  assured  it  is  receiv- 
ing constant,  serious  attention  at  senior 
levels. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


U.S.  Urges  Ratification 
of  Genocide  Convention 


Following  are  a  Department  state- 
ment of  September  3,  198J,,  and  a  state- 
ment by  Assistant  Secretary  for  Human 
Rights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs 
Elliott  Abrams  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  September  12. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  5,  1984" 

On  August  22,  the  Administration  com- 
pleted an  extensive  review  of  the  Con- 
vention on  the  Prevention  and  Punish- 
ment of  the  Crime  of  Genocide.  As  a 
result  of  that  review,  and  at  the  strong 
urging  of  the  American  Bar  Association 
and  other  interested  groups,  the  Presi- 
dent concluded  that  it  would  be  in  the 
nation's  best  interest  for  the  United 
States  to  ratify  the  Genocide  Conven- 
tion. 

The  commitment  of  our  country  to 
prevent  and  punish  acts  of  genocide  is 
indisputable,  yet  our  failure  to  ratify  this 
treaty— which  has  now  been  pending 
before  the  Senate  for  3.5  years  and  has 
been  supported  by  Presidents  Truman, 
Kennedy,  Johnson,  Nixon,  and 
Carter— has  opened  the  United  States 
to  unnecessary  criticism  in  various  inter- 
national fora. 

We  can  refute  such  baseless 
criticism  by  ratifying  the  convention, 
and  more  importantly,  we  can  utilize  the 
convention  in  our  own  efforts  to  expand 
freedom  and  fight  human  rights  abuses 
around  the  globe. 

In  1976  the  Senate  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee  reported  favorably  on 
the  convention  and  recommended  that 
the  Senate  give  its  advice  and  consent  to 
ratification,  subject  to  three  understand- 
ings and  one  declaration.  This  approach 
exceeded  the  clarifications  considered 
necessary  by  the  Nixon  Administration, 
but  the  President  supports  these 
understandings  and  declaration,  and  we 
believe  they  will  help  secure  Senate  ad- 
vice and  consent  to  ratification  of  the 
convention. 

We  look  forward  to  working  with 
the  Senate  to  resolve  any  issues  that 
may  ari.se  in  connection  with  its  con- 
sideration of  this  treaty.  Ratification  of 
the  Genocide  Convention  would  reaf- 
firm, in  this  international  legal  context, 
the  fundamental  and  timeless  American 
commitment  to  human  rights. 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY  ABRAMS, 
SEPT.  12,  19842 

It  is  an  honor  for  me  to  testify  for  the 
Administration  in  support  of  the  Con- 
vention of  the  Prevention  and  Punish- 
ment of  the  Crime  of  Genocide.  A  long 
list  of  eminent  Americans— many  from 
Congress,  many  from  the  executive 
branch,  and  especially  many  dedicated 
private  citizens— have  labored  over  the 
past  .35  years  to  see  the  Genocide  Con- 
vention receive  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  U.S.  Senate.  Both  Republican  and 
Democratic  Administrations  have 
worked  for  the  convention's  ratification. 
Today's  hearing  marks  another 
milestone  in  this  distinguished  effort, 
and  it  provides  the  Senate  once  again  an 
opportunity  to  consider  the  convention's 
ratification.  It  is  the  Administration's 
hope  that  the  Senate  will  finally  provide 
its  advice  and  consent  to  the  U.S. 
ratification  of  the  Genocide  Convention 
and  add  America's  moral  and  political 
prestige  to  this  landmark  in  interna- 
tional law. 

The  Genocide  Convention  was  born 
from  the  ashes  of  the  Holocaust.  The 
horrors  of  the  Nazi  death  camps  prompt- 
ed the  rise  of  an  international  treaty 
that  recognized  that  in  this,  the 
bloodiest  of  centuries,  technology 
employed  in  the  hands  of  totalitarian 
tyrants  made  possible  mass  murder  of  a 
special  kind.  As  stated  precisely  in  the 
language  of  the  convention,  genocide  is 
defined  as  certain  specified  acts  commit- 
ted with  intent  to  destroy,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  a  national,  ethnical,  racial,  or 
religious  group  as  such.  These  acts  in- 
clude: 

•  Killing  members  of  the  group; 

•  Causing  serious  bodily  or  mental 
harm  to  members  of  the  group; 

•  Deliberately  inflicting  on  the 
group  conditions  of  life  calculated  to 
bring  about  its  physical  destruction  in 
whole  or  in  part; 

•  Imposing  measures  intended  to 
prevent  births  within  the  group;  and 

•  Forcibly  transferring  children  of 
the  group  to  another  group. 

As  Senator  Javits  remarked  elo- 
quently in  hearings  before  this  commit- 
tee in  1977,  "Genocide  is  murder  and 
more."  Such  acts  are  a  crime  against 
humanity  itself  and  merit  the  special 
sanctions  of  the  international  com- 
munity. 


The  United  States  distinguishes 
itself  by  the  moral  dimension  it  brings 
its  foreign  policy.  As  Secretary  of  Sta 
Shultz  has  stated,  human  rights  are  at 
the  core  of  our  foreign  policy  because 
they  are  central  to  our  conception  of 
ourselves.  The  United  States,  one  of  t 
chief  recipients  of  the  survivors  of  the 
Holocaust,  has  found  itself  in  the  eniij 
rassing  position  in  international  fora  ( 
having  failed  to  ratify  the  convention, 
thereby  not  expressing  formally  throi' 
an  international  treaty  our  staunch  op 
position  to  the  heinous  crime  of 
genocide.  Many  of  the  adversaries  in  I 
world,  particularly  the  Soviet  Union, 
have  ratified  the  convention  and  they 
frequently  use  the  U.S.  failure  to  do  s 
to  castigate  us,  unfairly  and  propagat 
distically  and  to  denigrate  our  strong 
human  rights  posture  and  divert  attei 
tion  from  their  abuses.  Ratification  of 
the  Genocide  Convention  will  reduce, 
those  to  whom  human  rights  are  only 
empty  words,  the  opportunity  to  atta< 
the  United  States. 

Of  course  reasons  have  been  state 
in  the  past  for  opposing  the  treaty. 
Some  make  the  point  that  present  U.l  I 
law,  particularly  the  Federal  civil  rigj  I 
statutes,  prohibit  and  punish  acts  tha  , 
fall  under  the  Genocide  Convention  ai : 
that  we  need  not  enter  into  another  i; ' 
ternational  covenant.  However  such 
arguments  ignore  both  the  unique 
character  of  this  horrible  crime  and  t 
fact  that  one  of  the  major  purposes  o 
the  convention  is  to  oblige  states  to  p 
national  legislation  against  it.  Moreo\ 
such  arguments  ignore  the  great  sym , 
bolic  value  of  the  Genocide  Conventio 
and  the  benefits  which  will  accrue  to 
public  diplomacy  by  U.S.  adherence  t 
the  convention. 

It  is  interesting  that  the  Soviet  n 
agency  TASS  has  already  started  to 
tack  the  Reagan  Administration  for  < 
pressing  its  support  for  the  conventic 
The  Soviets  harshly  criticized  a  State 
Department  spokesman  because  he 
referred  to  the  convention's  symbolic 
value.  But  the  Soviets  frequently  atti 
what  they  fear  most.  They  know  thai 
symbols  convey  meaning,  and  they  al 
know  that  the  U.S.  lending  its  politic - 
and  moral  prestige  to  the  convention 
will  enormously  enhance  its  value  as 
instrument  of  world  opinion  to  prevex 
genocide. 

Constitutional  questions  have  bee« 
raised  in  the  past  over  the  Genocide 
Convention.  It  is  quite  understandabl 
that  people  are  concerned  that  intern 
tional  law  not  trifle  with  the  America 
Constitution,  one  of  the  greatest 


^f  CfQtQ  Rr 


POLE  EAST 


*(  nents  in  the  fragile  history  of 
f<i  n  liberty  and  a  document  which  has 
'Sg  ned  institutions  that  have 
'ft;  inteed  and  extended  liberty  for  200 
-s  .  After  comprehensive  legal  review 

th  the  State  Department  and  the 
;  ;e  Department,  and  with  the  one 
'■'A  ration  and  three  understandings 
1  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
nittee  in  1976  proposed  for  inclu- 
n  the  resolution  of  ratification,  we 
rm  in  our  conviction  that  all  con- 
ional  questions  have  been 
ered.  These  questions  have 


centered  mainly  on  the  issues  of  states 
rights  and  extradition. 

But  before  closing,  I  would  like  to 
note  that,  when  the  history  of  the  U.S. 
ratification  of  the  Genocide  Convention 
is  written  (and  it  is  our  fervent  hope 
that  it  can  begin  to  be  written  shortly), 
the  endorsement  by  the  American  Bar 
Association  (ABA)  of  the  Genocide  Con- 
vention in  1976,  after  having  previously 
opposed  it,  will  prove,  I  think,  to  have 
been  a  decisive  event.  The  ABA  has 
worked  tirelessly  since  then  to  see  the 
convention  ratified,  and  its  legal  ex- 


planation and  defense  of  the  present 
proposals  should  satisfy  all  of  the  prior 
constitutional  objections  to  the  conven- 
tion. 

We  have  all  delayed  too  long.  The 
best  time  for  advice  and  consent  to 
ratification  is  right  now. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  John  Hughes. 

-The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice. Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


S.  Embassy  Bombed  in  Beirut 


ARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
r.  20.  19841 

ecretary  of  State  has  expressed  all 
eelings  about  the  senseless,  brutal 
't  k  on  Americans  and  Lebanese 
ing  in  Beirut.  This  cowardly  attack 
)e  understood  by  the  world  as 
ler  reminder  that  the  rule  of  law 
;ivilized  norms  of  behavior  are 
itened  by  those  who  use  terrorism 
political  weapon, 
^et  me  give  you  a  rundown  on 
•e  we  stand  as  best  as  we  can 
rstand  it  at  this  time. 
^t  11:30  this  morning  Beirut 

which  was  4:30  this  morning  our 
— a  van  approached  the  north  en- 
:e  access  road  at  the  Embassy  an- 
compound,  northeast  of  Beirut.  The 
!X  is  located  on  a  residential  street 
ced  at  both  ends  by  barricades.  The 
pants— we  think  there  were 
—of  the  vehicle  opened  fire  on  the 
ract  Lebanese  guards  at  the  bar- 
ie— this  was  at  the  north  end  of  the 
i  running  outside  the  annex— and 
Died  them. 

The  vehicle  came  under  fire  from 
r  Embassy  guards,  but  it 
euvered  through  the  barricade 
nd  the  checkpoint  and  proceeded  for 
it  500  feet  toward  the  Embassy 
iing.  It  was  stopped  by  the  fir- 
-the  vehicle  was  apparently  pretty 
y  shot  up  at  that  stage — and  the 
occupants  may,  indeed,  have  been 
i  at  that  stage.  But,  nevertheless, 
vehicle  stopped  some  20  feet  short 
he  northern  end  of  the  Embassy,  still 
he  street,  and  at  that  point  it  ex- 
led. 


We  understand  that  in  addition  to 
the  Lebanese  guards,  there  was  fire 
onto  the  vehicle  from  Americans  who 
came  out  of  the  Embassy,  and  we  also 
understand  that  a  g-uard  who  was  with 
the  British  Ambassador — who  was 
visiting  the  Embassy  at  the  time — also 
opened  fire  on  the  vehicle. 

The  building  was  severely  damaged, 
although  the  floors  did  not  collapse.  We 
have  varying  reports  on  casualties,  in- 
cluding a  number  of  deaths.  Among  the 
killed,  we  believe  were  two  Americans. 
Among  the  wounded  were  20  Ameri- 
cans; four  of  them  were  treated  and 
released,  and  the  rest  have  been  confin- 
ed to  the  hospital.  We  do  not  have  ac- 
curate figures  on  the  number  of 
Lebanese  killed  and  injured  at  this  time. 

Beginning  at  7:00  this  morning, 
State  Department  officials  began  notify- 
ing the  families  of  Americans  stationed 
at  the  Embassy  to  provide  them  with  in- 
formation as  it  became  available. 

Ambassador  Reginald  Bartholomew 
was  in  the  building  at  the  titiie.  He  was 
in  his  office  on  the  fourth  floor.  He  was 
briefly  buried  under  rubble,  but  he 
cleared  that;  he  walked  out  of  the  an- 
nex. He  has  cuts  and  bruises.  He  was 
taken  to  the  hospital  for  treatment  of 
them.  He  is  still  in  the  hospital.  We  ex- 
pect him  to  be  there  for  another  day  or 
two.  He  is  in  charge  from  the  hospital. 
He  is  telephoning  various  officials  atid  is 
in  touch  with  us  directly  by  phone  from 
his  hospital  room.  He  spoke  to  Secretary 
Shultz  earlier  in  the  morning;  he  spoke 
to  the  President  earlier  today. 


As  I  say,  the  British  Ambassador 
was  in  the  annex  at  the  time,  and  he 
was  slightly  injured;  I  gather  along  the 
lines  of  Ambassador  Bartholomew. 

The  Department  learned  of  the  at- 
tack at  5:24  this  morning.  We  estab- 
lished an  open  line  with  the  Embassy  of- 
fice in  west  Beirut  at  5:26.  That  line  has 
remained  open  since.  The  Secretary  of 
State  and  senior  officials  were  informed 
immediately.  The  Secretary  was  at  home 
at  the  time,  accelerated  his  departure, 
came  to  the  office  somewhat  earlier,  was 
in  the  Operations  Center  early  this 
morning,  and  went  over  to  be  with  the 
President  before  the  President  left 
town. 

Responsible  officers  were  quickly 
assembled,  and  a  working  group  went 
into  force  at  8:00  under  Arnie  Raphel, 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs. 

We  have  been  in  constant  com- 
munications with  the  Embassy  office  in 
west  Beirut.  Communications  have  now 
been  established  between  the  Depart- 
ment and  the  U.S.  Ambassador's 
residence  in  Yarze,  and  a  number  of 
people  from  the  annex  in  east  Beirut 
have  moved  into  the  Ambassador's 
residence  in  Yarze.  The  west  Beirut  Em- 
bassy office  is  closed  for  business  but  is 
under  guard. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  asked 
Assistant  Secretary  [for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs]  Richard  Mur- 
phy to  lead  a  team  to  investigate  the 
situation  and  lend  assistance  to  Am- 
bassador Bartholomew  and  his  staff,  and 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Assistant  Secretary  Murphy  will  be  leav- 
ing swiftly.  He  will  be  joined  by  Am- 
bassador Robert  B.  Oakley,  who  is 
Director  of  the  Office  of  Counterter- 
rorism  and  Emergency  Planning.  Am- 
bassador Oakley  was  in  London  when 
this  tragedy  took  place,  and  he  will 
make  his  way,  also  speedily,  to  Beirut. 
All  our  diplomatic  posts  have  been 
informed,  and,  in  fact,  there  was  already 
in  effect  an  alert  following  suggestions 
of  threats  against  the  Embassy  a  little 
earlier  this  month,  so  there  already  was 
an  alert  in  effect.  But  since  today's 
developments,  Embassies  have  been  in- 
formed of  what  has  happened  and  given 
the  further  warning  to  be  alert. 


The  Israeli  Defense  Minister,  Mr. 
Rabin,  on  behalf  of  the  Israeli  Govern- 
ment, has  been  in  touch  with  Am- 
bassador Lewis,  our  Ambassador  to 
Israel,  and  offered  all  possible  assistance 
from  Israel,  including  hospital  facilities. 
We  have  had  similar  offers  from  two 
other  governments— the  British  Govern- 
ment and  the  Government  of  Cyprus. 
We  have  State  Department  medical  of- 
ficers assigned  to  Cairo,  and  they  will  be 
traveling  to  Beirut,  even  as  we  speak,  to 
assess  the  situation  there. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  ,)ohn  Hughes.  ■ 


U.S.  Imposes  Additional 
Export  Controls  on  Iran 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  27.  19841 

I  would  like  to  call  your  attention  to  an 
action  announced  by  the  Department  of 
Commerce. 

Effective  upon  publication  in  the 
Federal  Register  September  28,  the 
United  States  has  imposed  additional 
controls  on  exports  to  Iran.  The  new 
controls  tighten  and  extend  the  antiter- 
rorism export  controls  which  have  been 
applied  to  Iran  since  early  this  year. 
Henceforth,  a  license  would  be  required, 
and  normally  not  granted,  for  any  ex- 
ports of  aircraft  or  spare  parts  for  air- 
craft, regardless  of  value  or  weight,  antl 
for  export  of  outboard  motors  of  45 
horsepower  and  above.  Formerly,  the 
controls  did  not  cover  aircraft  consigned 
to  a  commercial  carrier  or  which  were 
valued  at  less  than  $3  million. 


helicopters  of  less  than  10,000  pounds, 
spare  parts,  or  outboard  motors. 

In  addition,  exports  of  goods  and 
technology  suliject  to  control  for  na- 
tional security  purposes,  regardless  of 
value,  if  destined  for  a  military  end-use 
or  end-user  will  be  subject  to  denial 
policy.  Formerly,  such  items  were  not 
subject  to  antiterrorism  controls  unless 
valued  at  $7  million  or  more. 

All  items  previously  controlled  under 
the  antiterrorism  controls,  including 
crime  control  and  detection  equipment 
and  certain  military  vehicles  and  equip- 
ment on  the  regional  stability  list,  con- 
tinue to  be  controlled.  The  policy  of 
denial  for  the  export  of  munitions  list 
items,  chemical  weapons  components, 
and  nuclear-related  items  to  Iran  also 
remain  in  force. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  Alan  Romberg.  ■ 


r\f^t^^r^  rv^nnk    r\{    C  t  n  t  c 


LTARY  AFFAIRS 


ffTO  Conventional  Defense  Capabilities 


T  3R  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 

12.  1984' 

It  to  section  1 104(h)  of  the  FY  1984 

Authorization  Act  (P.L.  98-94),  this 
ontains  my  views  and  recommenda- 

improving  NATO  conventional 
capabilities.  These  views  and  recom- 
ions  take  into  consideration  the  find- 
Secretary  [of  Defense  Caspar  W.] 
rger's  report  on  "Improving  NATO's 
tional  Capabilities."  I  have  reviewed 
sort  and  endorse  its  recommendations. 

product  of  thorough  research  and 
s  a  candid  assessment  of  NATO's 
ments  to  date  and  additional  needs  for 
ire. 

V  disagree  with  the  pressing  need  to 
e  NATO's  conventional  forces  in  order 
nee  deterrence  and  defense.  The  quali- 
f  ATO's  equipment  and  the  readiness 

of  the  forces  manning  that  equip- 
ave  improved  significantly  over  the 
'eral  years.  The  absolute  defense 
:i  ities  of  NATO  forces  are  substantially 

•  today  than  three  or  four  years  ago. 
er,  the  measure  of  adequacy  in  deter- 
md  defense  is  not  any  static  or  ab- 
ability,  but  a  dynamic  relationship  to 
eat  opposing  that  defense.  The  War- 
ict  threat  has  increased  by  an  even 

•  qualitative  and  quantitative  incre- 
iil  creating  the  necessity  that  NATO  be 
p  lore  efficient  and  effective. 

1  lalyzing  the  requirements  for  conven- 
i!  force  improvements  we  must  remem- 
1  it  NATO's  principal  objective  is  not  to 
il  ,nd  win  a  war,  but  to  ensure  that  a  war 
■i  ope  does  not  occui.  Further  im- 
V  nents  in  conventional  capability  would 
,T  'nt  a  vital  element  of  overall  deterrence 
I  jssen  pressure  for  early  escalation  to 
.l|r  confrontation.  At  the  same  time,  as 
D  report  concludes,  conventional 
cannot  totally  supplant  the  nuclear 
sion  of  deterrence.  NATO  must  also 
ue  to  maintain  a  credible  nuclear  deter- 
il|is  outlined  in  Secretary  Weinberger's 
on  NATO's  Nuclear  Posture. 
|ATO's  strategy  must  be  based  on  the 
japhic  and  political  realities  of  NATO, 
ij|ie  fact  that  NATO,  as  a  defensive 
■e,  concedes  the  initiative  at  the  outset 
flict.  In  this  context,  flexible  response 
)rward  defense  provide  the  only  viable 
•ent  and  defense  strategy  for  the 
ce.  NATO's  task  is  to  do  a  better  job  of 
ling  the  forces  and  the  doctrine  to  sup- 
he  strategy. 


The  United  States  can  be  proud  of  our 
leadership  by  example  over  the  last  several 
years.  We  must  continue  to  pursue  those  pro- 
grams we  have  already  begun,  while  seeking 
even  more  effective  ways  to  enhance  conven- 
tional defense.  The  support  of  Congress,  in 
providing  the  funding  for  operations  and 
maintenance  costs,  readiness,  sustainment 
improvement,  new  equipment,  force  struc- 
ture, research  and  development,  and  other 
defense  programs,  is  essenti,;!  to  our  efforts. 
However,  the  United  States  cannot  fill  the 
gap  alone.  Every  member  of  the  Alliance 
must  participate  in  improving  conventional 
forces.  The  Allies  recognize  the  need,  and 
now  must  make  the  additional  sacrifices 
needed  to  improve  further  NATO's  military 
capabilities.  The  recent  debate  in  the  U.S. 
Senate  will  provide  reinforcement  to  those 
Allies  trying  to  assume  their  proportional 
burden.  We  will  continue  to  prod  all  Allies  to 
make  better  contributions  to  NATO  defense. 

Secretary  Weinberger's  report  and  the 
Supreme  Allied  Commander-Europe's 
(SACEUR's)  independent  assessment  spell 
out  the  most  important  areas  that  need  im- 
provement. I  agree  with  their  recommenda- 
tions. We  must  carefully  balance  our  efforts, 
both  by  program  area  (such  as  readiness)  and 
by  task  (such  as  defense  against  a  first 
echelon).  We  must  ensure  that  defense  ef- 
forts and  resources  provide  the  most  effec- 
tive product  for  defense.  We  must  critique 
the  application  of  resources  until  we  are 
satisfied  that  they  are  producing  the  optimum 
defense  capability  possible.  No  one  can  afford 
wastefully  duplicative  development  programs, 
nor  pursue  programs  that  have  only  a  limited 
military  need.  In  sum,  we  must  have  a 
military  strategy  and  an  investment  strategy. 
And  these  strategies  should  encompass  our 
own  programs  and  those  of  Allies — in  closer 
integration  and  cooperation  than  ever  before. 

The  fundamental  and  inescapable  reason 
for  American  cooperation  and  leadership  is 
that  a  strong  NATO  defense  is  in  our  basic 
national  self-interest,  and  we  simply  cannot 
succeed  by  ourselves.  The  plans  and  pro- 
grams in  the  current  United  States  defense 
budget  and  five-year  defense  plan  support 
these  objectives.  While  we  will  continue  to 
review  plans  and  modify  requests  to  fit  new 
opportunities  and  requirements,  enduring 
Congressional  willingness  to  support  required 
defense  programs  is  essential  if  we  are  to  im- 
prove NATO's  conventional  defense.  No  plan, 
no  matter  how  well  conceived,  can  succeed  if 
the  resources  to  achieve  it  are  insufficient  or 
inconsistent.  We  and  our  Allies  have  recog- 
nized NATO's  conventional  defense  problems, 
and  have  taken  the  first  steps  toward 
recovery.  Now,  we  must  accelerate  our  ef- 
forts. 


Making  the  changes  necessary  to  supple- 
ment existing  plans  to  replace  those  which 
become  obsolete  requires  bold  thinking  and 
leadership.  We  will  continue  to  consult  closely 
and  frequently  with  our  NATO  Allies  and 
with  the  U.S.  Congress  on  new  and  better 
ways  to  use  defense  resources.  There  is  no 
"instant"  solution  to  any  of  the  existing  prob- 
lems. Solutions  will  be  achieved  only  by  a 
long-term  commitment.  Nonetheless,  we  must 
start  down  the  right  paths,  which  are 
presented  in  Secretary  Weinberger's  report. 

United  States  programs  emphasize  the 
need  to  provide  the  strategic  lift  tu  rapidly 
supplement  in-place  forces  and  to  ..ugment 
the  thin  strategic  reserves  availab.e  to 
SACEUR.  We  are  working  with  Allies  to  en- 
sure that  Europe  is  prepared  to  receive  these 
reinforcements  and  ^et  them  to  where  they 
can  be  most  effective.  We  have  stressed  the 
need  to  increase  the  funding  levels  in  the 
unglamorous  but  tremendously  cost-effective 
Infrastructure  Program.  For  example,  by 
providing  shelters  and  other  supporting 
capabilities  for  aircraft,  we  can  substantially 
improve  the  survivability  and  hence  the 
capabilities  of  our  Air  Force. 

Improving  NATO's  deterrent  and  defense 
posture  will  also  require  the  Alliance  to  move 
in  entirely  new  directions  and  to  modify  ex- 
isting projects.  "Exploitation  of  Emerging 
Technologies"  is  a  fine  example  of  new  direc- 
tions. This  initiative,  proposed  by  the  United 
States  in  mid-1982,  has  already  stimulated 
identification  of  projects  for  accelerated 
development.  Although  it  will  still  be  several 
years  before  this  initiative  contributes  direct- 
ly to  NATO's  defense  capabilities,  this  effort 
marks  an  important  first  step  in  using  the 
West's  major  advantage:  its  technological 
base. 

In  the  short  term,  we  must  improve  the 
deterrent  capability  of  the  conventional  leg  of 
NATO's  deterrent  Triad  by  increasing 
readiness  and  sustainability.  Over  the  longer 
term,  we  must  devote  the  necessary 
resources  to  provide  all  of  the  elements  of  an 
effective  defense.  This  will  require  a  clear 
understanding  by  the  publics  in  all  NATO 
countries  of  the  nature  and  magnitude  of  the 
threat  we  all  face. 

I  ask  the  Congress  to  join  in  the  impor- 
tant endeavor  of  strengthening  NATO's  con- 
ventional defense. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  George  Bush,  President 
of  the  Senate  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  17, 
1984).  ■ 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


Tactical  Nuclear  Posture  of  NATO 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
SEPT.  12.  1984' 

Pursuant  to  section  1105(b)  of  the  FY  1984 
Defense  Authorization  Act  (P.L.  98-94),  this 
report  contains  my  views  on  tiie  DoD  report 
on  the  tactical  nuclear  posture  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO).  This  is 
the  first  of  four  reports  required  by  the  FY 
1984  Defense  Authorization  Act.  It  analyzes 
some  of  the  most  crucial  problems  facing 
U.S.-NATO  defense  policy,  both  because  of 
the  weapons  involved  and  the  essential  role 
of  nuclear  weapons  in  NATO's  deterrent 
posture. 

I  have  reviewed  Secretary  [of  Defense 
Caspar  W.]  Weinberger's  very  comprehensive 
report  on  the  nuclear  posture  of  NATO,  and  I 
strongly  endorse  the  report's  recommenda- 
tions. 1  therefore  urge  the  Congress  to  pro- 
vide the  necessary  support  so  that  the  agree- 
ments reached  within  the  Alliance  for  im- 
proving NATO's  nonstrategic  nuclear  forces 
(NSNF)  can  be  sustained. 

The  military  threat  to  the  Alliance  has 
not  lessened  since  the  last  report  in  1975. 
There  have  been  significant  improvements  by 
both  the  U.S.  and  the  Europeans  in  conven- 
tional and  nonstrategic  nuclear  forces  over 
the  last  several  years.  Nonetheless,  the  quan- 
titative military  balance  has,  in  fact,  worsen- 
ed. Our  goal  remains  not  to  match  the  War- 
saw Pact  system-for-system  or  warhead-for- 
warhead,  but  to  maintain  forces  adequate  for 
credible  deterrence  and  defense.  NATO  can 
accomplish  this  otsjective  by  continuing  force 
improvement,  including  both  nuclear  and  con- 
ventional modernizations,  and  by  developing 
more  effective  use  of  our  defense  resources. 
Meanwhile,  we  will  continue  to  work  to 
achieve  equitable  and  verifiable  arms  reduc- 
tions which  would  assist  NATO  to  obtain 
greater  stability  and  security  at  lower  levels 
of  defense  effort. 

In  October  1983,  the  NATO  Nuclear 
Planning  Group  (NPG),  as  part  of  the  theater- 
wide  improvement  of  NATO's  nuclear 
posture,  decided  to  withdraw  an  additional 
1,400  warheads  over  the  next  five  to  six 
years,  in  addition  to  the  1,000  warheads 
withdrawn  in  1980.  The  basis  for  these  deci- 
sions was  a  broadly  supported  Alliance  study. 
This  study  was  used  as  the  cornerstone  for 
the  DoD  report.  Thus,  the  recommendations 
and  intermediate  steps  outlined  in  the  DoD 
report  to  improve  NATO's  nuclear  posture 
are  fully  consistent  with  the  views  of  our 
Allies. 


I  am  fully  aware  of  the  views  in  the  Con- 
gress, that  we  should  do  more  to  improve  our 
conventional  forces.  I  intend  to  take  a  bal- 
anced approach  to  improving  our  capabilities 
in  both  areas.  You  have  received  a  report 
from  DoD  which  looks  at  conventional  plans 
and  requirements  in  detail.  I  shall  be  pro- 
viding my  views  on  how  to  pursue  some  of 
those  recommendations  soon.  It  is  true  that 
we  need  to  continue  to  improve  our  conven- 
tional forces.  However,  it  is  essential  that,  in 
the  process  of  examining  conventional  proli- 
lems.  we  not  lose  sight  of  the  very  essential, 
significant  contributions  that  credible,  sur- 
vivable,  and  stable  NAT(.)  nuclear  forces 
make  to  enhancing  conventional  defenses  or 
of  the  fact  that  such  nuclear  forces  are 
presently  our  most  credible  deterrent  to 
chemical  attack. 

I  especially  endorse  those  recommenda- 
tions that  improve  the  survivability  of 
NATO's  nuclear  forces.  Closely  associated 
security  improvements  will  also  do  much  to 
improve  the  safety  of  our  weapons  in  peace- 
time. I  have  placed  significant  emphasis  on 
carrying  out  such  improvements.  I  intend  to 
encourage  our  Allies  to  take  an  equally 
serious  view  of  the  problem.  We  are  working 
through  several  NATO  organizations  to  ob- 
tain Allied  assistance  in  and  agreement  to 
making  needed  improvements. 

At  Montebello,  Defense  Ministers  agreed 
to  make  further  stockpile  reductions  which 
leave  the  stockpile  at  its  lowest  level  in  the 
last  twenty  years.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Allies  agreed  that  NATO  must  pursue  ap- 
propriate modernization  programs  so  that 
this  reduced  stockpile  will  continue  to  con- 
stitute an  adequate  and  credible  deterrent.  I 
will  support  both  the  stockpile  level  decision 
and  the  modernization  programs  which  will 
ensure  a  credible  deterrent.  Present  U.S. 
defense  programs  and  budgets  provide  the 
means  to  implement  these  decisions.  I  ask  for 
your  support  to  ensure  that  they  can  be  car- 
ried out  in  an  orderly  and  timely  fashion.  The 
DoD  report  accurately  documents  the  need, 
and  outlines  the  remedial  measures  which  we 
will  be  pursuing.  The  associated  requirement 
to  improve  our  target  acquisition  and  com- 
munications capabilities  is  also  well  docu- 
mented in  the  report. 


As  I  mentioned  earlier,  NATO's  nucle. 
posture  correctly  constitutes  NATO's  mof 
fective  deterrent  against  Soviet  use  of 
chemical  weapons.  We  must  do  better  tha 
that,  which  is  why  the  U.S.  should  deveic 
limited  but  modern  chemical  capability  to, 
serve  as  a  direct  deterrent  against  Soviet 
chemical  use.  U.S.  defense  budgets  and  p 
grams  include  the  necessary  steps  to  sust 
this  deterrent. 

NATO  Allies  are  aware  of  the  require 
ments  for  nuclear  modernization  and  im- 
provements in  survivability  and  security. 
U.S.  will  continue  to  provide  the  leadersh 
and  encouragement  to  stimulate  the  Allie 
participate  in  their  portions  of  future  pro 
grams.  As  a  result  of  the  1979  dual-track 
decision  on  LRINF  [long  range  intermedi; 
range  nuclear  forces[,  NATO  is  proceedii 
with  deployments  in  the  absence  of  a  sati 
tory  negotiated  arms  reduction  agreemen 
which  would  make  such  deployments  un- 
necessary. I  stand  fully  committed  to  see! 
equitable  and  verifiable  arms  reduction  a 
tion,  and,  as  I  have  said  many  times,  the 
is  ready  to  recommend  negotiations  with( 
preconditions  at  any  time.  Until  such  a 
negotiated  solution  is  reached,  however,  t 
U.S.  must  provide  the  means  to  ensure  tf 
the  nuclear  posture  of  NATO  does  not 
deteriorate  to  such  a  degree  that  deterrei 
is  threatened. 

NATO's  conventional,  chemical,  and 
nuclear  forces  are  inextricably  linked  in 
achieving  the  Alliance's  objective  of  deter 
rence  and  defense.  If  we  are  to  maintain 
deterrence  and  live  in  peace  and  freedom 
must  continue  to  improve  each  capability. 
Secretary  Weinberger's  report  on  NATO' 
nuclear  posture  has  outlined  the  current 
situation  and  a  practical  way  to  proceed 
towards  an  enduring  nuclear  posture  in 
NATO.  I  fully  endorse  his  recommendatii 

Sincerely, 

RoN.M.D  Re 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thorns 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Rep 
sentatives.  and  George  Bush,  President  c 
the  Senate  (text  from  Weekly  Compilatio 
Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  17,  1984 


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TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  develop- 
ment, production,  and  stocl^piling  of  bac- 
teriological (biological)  and  toxin  weapons  and 
on  their  destruction.  Done  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  10,  1972.  Entered 
into  force  Mar.  26,  1975.  TIAS  8062. 
Accession  deposited:  France,  Sept.  27,  1984. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1983,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Oct.  1,  1983. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Netherlands,  Sept.  5, 

1984. 

Commodities— Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  27,  1980' 
Ratification  deposited:  Somalia,  Aug.  27, 

1984. 

Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations. 
Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  24,  1963.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  19,  1967;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  24, 
1969.  TIAS  6820. 
Accession  deposited:  Korea,  Democratic 

People's  Republic  of,  Aug.  8,  1984. 
Ratification  deposited:  Liberia,  Aug.  28, 

1984. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations. 
Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  18,  1961.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  24,  1964;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13, 
1972.  TIAS  7502. 

Optional  protocol  to  the  Vienna  convention 
on  diplomatic  relations  concerning  the  com- 
pulsory settlement  of  disputes.  Done  at  Vien- 
na Apr.  18,  1961.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  24. 
1964;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13,  1972.  TIAS  7502. 
Accessions  deposited:  Netherlands,  Sept.  7, 

1984. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental 
modification  techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5,  1978;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  17.  1980. 
TIAS  9614. 
Accession  deposited:  New  Zealand,  Sept.  7. 

1984. 

Ratification  deposited:  Australia,  Sept.  7, 

1984. 

Jute 

International  agreement  on  jute  and  jute 
products,  1982,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Geneva  Oct.  1,  1982.  Entered  into  force  pro- 
visionally Jan.  9,  1984. 


Accession  deposited:  Indonesia,  Aug.  31, 

1984. 

Ratification  deposited:  Nepal,  June  18.  1984. 

Marine  Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  and  develop- 
ment of  the  marine  environment  of  the  wider 
Caribbean  region,  with  annex.  Done  at  Car- 
tagena Mar.  24,  1983.' 
Ratified  by  the  President:  Sept.  6,  1984. 

Publications 

Convention  concerning  the  international  ex- 
change of  publications.  Adopted  at  Paris 
Dec.  3,  1958.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  23. 
1961;  for  the  U.S.  June  9.  1968.  TIAS  6438. 

Convention  concerning  the  exchange  of  of- 
ficial publications  and  government  documents 
between  States.  Adopted  at  Paris  Dec.  3, 
1958.  Entered  into  force  May  30,  1961;  for 
the  U.S.  June  9,  1968.  TIAS  6439. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Australia,  June  15. 

1984;  Japan,  May  29,  1984. 

Red  Cross 

Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the 
condition  of  the  wounded  and  sick  in  armed 
forces  in  the  field.  Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12, 
1949.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for 
the  U.S.  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  3362. 

Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the 
condition  of  the  wounded,  sick,  and  ship- 
wrecked members  of  armed  forces  at  sea. 
Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  2, 
1956.  TIAS  3363. 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  the  treatment 
of  prisoners  of  war.  Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12, 
1949.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for 
the  U.S.  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  3364. 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  the  protection 
of  civilian  persons  in  time  of  war.  Done  at 
Geneva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  2,  1956. 
TIAS  3365. 
Accessions  deposited;  Vanuatu,  Oct.  27,  1982. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  .3362,  3363,  3364, 
3365),  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vic- 
tims of  international  armed  conflicts  (Pro- 
tocol I),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  June 
8,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.' 
Accessions  deposited;  Cuba,  Nov.  25,  1982; 

St.  Lucia,  Oct.  27,  1982. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364, 
3365),  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vic- 
tims of  non-international  armed  conflicts 
(Protocol  II).  Done  at  Geneva  June  8,  1977. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978. ^ 
Accession  deposited;  St.  Lucia,  Oct.  7,  1982. 

Seabed — Operations 

Provisional  understanding  regarding  deep 
seabed  matters,  with  memorandum  of  im.- 
plementation,  joint  record,  exchanges  of 
notes,  and  declarations.  Signed  at  Geneva 
Aug.  3,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  3, 
1984. 


K 


Signatures;  Belgium,^  France,  Federal 

Republic  of  Germany,''  Italy,'  Japan, 
Netheriands,^'^  U.K.,  U.S. 

United  Nations 

Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  Statutt 
the  International  Court  of  Justice.  Signed 
San  Francisco  June  26.  1945.  Entered  inti 
force  Oct.  24,  1945.  59  Stat.  1031,  TS  993 
Admitted  to  membership;  Brunei,  Sept.  21 

1984. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms 
discrimination  against  women.  Adopted  al 
New  York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  for 
Sept.  3,  1981.2 
Ratification  deposited;  Indonesia,  Sept.  13 

1984. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  ti 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Donei' 
Paris  Nov.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 
Ratification  deposited:  U.K.,  May  29,  1984 


BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  8,  1982,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  a; 
modifies  (TIAS  10483).  Effected  by  exchar.. 
of  letters  at  Dhaka  Aug.  23,  1984.  Enterec 
into  force  Aug.  23,  1984. 

Barbados 

International  express  mail  agreement,  wit! 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Hamburg 
June  27,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1, 
1984. 

Botswana 

Agreement  relating  to  the  employment  of 
dependents  of  official  government  employ* 
Signed  at  Gaborone  June  15,  1984.  Enter* 
into  force  June  15,  1984. 

Brazil 

Agreements  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  31,  1982  (TIAS  10369).  relating  to  tn 
in  cotton  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  anH  '■ 
tile  products.  Effected  by  exchanges  nl 
ters  at  Washington  Aug.  3  and  9.  198-1.  ... 
Aug.  20  and  Sept.  10,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  9  and  Sept.  10,  1984. 

Canada 

Agreement  concerning  the  airworthiness  ai 
environmental  certification  of  imported  civi 
aeronautical  products.  Effected  by  exchanj 
of  letters  at  Ottawa  Aug.  31,  1984.  Entcro. 
into  force  Aug.  31,  1984. 
Supersedes  arrangement  of  July  28,  1!'"S. 

amended  (EAS  131,  TIAS  7091). 

Convention  with  respect  to  taxes  on  incoro 
and  capital,  with  related  exchange  of  notes 
Signed  at  Washington  Sept.  26,  1980;  and 
protocol  with  related  notes.  Signed  at  Otta 
June  14.  1983;  and  second  protocol.  Signed 
Washington  Mar.  28,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  16,  1984.  I 

L     _jrr>._._    r-i..iiJ 


TREATIES 


a<Mis  exchanged:  Aug.  16,  1984. 
s«»'s  arrangement  of  Aug.  2  and 
L'  1928,  relating  to  relief  from  double 
'  IX  on  shipping  profits  (EAS  4);  con- 
'1  tid  protocol  of  Mar.  4,  1942,  as 
and  supplemented,  for  avoidance  of 
\  at  ion  and  prevention  of  fiscal  eva- 
;  ne  case  of  income  taxes  (TS  983, 
^7,  3916.  6415);  convention  of 
1961,  for  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
Iprevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 

taxes  on  estates  of  deceased  per- 
.S  4995). 

iDca 

nt  concerning  the  establishment  and 
of  a  Voice  of  America  radio  broad- 
ion  in  Costa  Rica.  Effected  by  ex- 
|f  notes  at  San  Jose  July  17  and 

984.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  7, 


an  Republic 

mt  amending  the  agreement  of 
1984,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
ties.  Signed  at  Santo  Domingo 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  30, 


rreement  for  commodity  imports, 
lex.  Signed  at  Cairo  July  31,  1984. 
into  force  July  31,  1984. 

riendment  to  the  program  grant 
mt  of  Aug.  29,  1982,  as  amended 
0472,  10728),  for  decentralization  sec- 
ort.  Signed  at  Cairo  Aug.  8,  1984. 
into  force  Aug.  8,  1984. 


ent  concerning  emergency  use  of  the 

3d  Forces  Base  at  Hao,  French 

ia,  by  the  U.S.  space  shuttle.  Signed 

Sept.  6,  1984.  Entered  into  force 

1984. 


lent  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts 
J.S.,  with  annex  and  agreed  minute. 
at  Washington  Sept.  21,  1984.  Fnters 
ee  upon  exchange  of  notes  following 
ion  of  the  internal  procedures  of  both 
nents. 


loan  and  grant  agreement  for 
shtra  minor  irrigation.  Signed  at  New 
uly  31,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
1984. 

loan  and  grant  agreement  for  hill 
md  and  water  development.  Signed  at 
elhi  July  31,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
1984. 


nent  amending  the  agreement  of 
and  Nov.  9,  1982  (TIAS  10580),  as 
id,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 

made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ffected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
igton  Aug.  29  and  30,  1984.  Entered 
•ce  Aug.  30,  1984. 


Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  9,  1983,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Jakarta  Aug.  31,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  31,  1984. 

Italy 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Rome  Oct.  13, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  24,  1984. 
Ratifications  exchanged:  Sept.  24,  1984. 
Supersedes  extradition  treaty  of  Jan.  18, 
1973.  TIAS  8052. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  a 
cooperative  program  in  regional  digital 
seismic  studies.  Signed  at  Reston  and  Rome 
June  7,  1984.  Entered  into  force  June  7, 
1984. 

Kenya 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  31,  1980,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities  (TIAS  9969).  Signed  at  Nairobi 
Aug.  24,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  24, 
1984. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  26,  1979,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  9419,  10324,  10446).  relating  to  trade 
in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Mexico  and  Tlatelolco  June  25  and 
Aug.  16,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  16, 
1984. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  procure- 
ment of  aircraft  and  provision  of  operational 
and  maintenance  support  for  campaign 
against  narcotics  cultivation  and  trafficking. 
Signed  at  Mexico  Aug.  30,  1984.  Entered 
into  force  Aug.  30,  1984. 

Morocco 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  technical 
cooperation  in  the  earth  sciences.  Signed  at 
Reston  and  Rabat  June  7  and  July  16,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  July  16,  1984. 

Mozambique 

Investment  incentive  agreement.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Maputo  July  28,  1984. 
Entered  into  force:  Aug.  29,  1984. 

Panama 

Agreement  concerning  general  security  of 
military  information.  Signed  at  Panama 
Aug.  17,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  17, 
1984. 

Portugal 

Technical  agreement  in  implementation  of  the 
defense  agreement  of  Sept.  6,  1951,  as 
amended  (TIAS  3087,  10050),  with  annexes 
and  related  notes.  Signed  at  Lisbon  May  18, 
1984.  Enters  into  force  when  parties  have 
notified  each  other  in  writing  that  they  have 
satisfied  their  respective  constitutional  re- 
quirements. 

St.  Christopher-Nevis 

Agreement  relating  to  radio  communications 
between  amateur  stations  on  behalf  of  third 
parties.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  St. 


John's  and  St.  Kitts  July  6  and  9,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  8,  1984. 

Senegal 

Air  transport  services  agreement,  with 
memorandum  of  understanding.  Signed  at 
Dakar  Mar.  28,  1979. 
Entered  into  force:  Aug.  17,  1984, 

definitively 

Spain 

Agreement  on  space  cooperation.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  memoranda  at  Madrid 
Aug.  31,  and  Sept.  4,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  4,  1984. 

Sudan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  22,  1979,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Khartoum  Aug.  9,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  9,  1984. 

Sweden 

Supplementary  convention  on  extradition. 
Signed  at  Stockholm  Mar.  14,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  Sept.  24,  1984. 
Ratifications  exchanged:  Sept.  24,  1984. 

Thailand 

Treaty  on  cooperation  in  the  execution  of 

penal  sentences.  Signed  at  Bangkok  Oct.  29, 

1982.1 

Ratified  by  the  President:  Sept.  6,  1984. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  concerning  diplomatic  and  other 
visas,  with  agreed  minute  and  oral  under- 
standing. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Moscow  July  30,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
July  30,  1984. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  concerning  the  Cayman  Islands 
and  narcotics  activities.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  London  July  26,  1984.  Entered 
into  force  Sept.  6,  1984. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Oct.  26  and  27,  1978,  concerning  trade  in 
men's  and  boys'  wool  and  manmade  fiber 
suits.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Belgrade  May  22  and  July  3,  1984.  Entered 
into  force  July  3,  1984. 


'Not  in  force. 

^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

'With  declaration(s). 

'Applicable  to  Land  Berlin. 

^Not  a  signatory  to  the  memorandum  of 
implementation. 

•^Applicable  to  Isle  of  Man,  Anguilla,  Ber- 
muda, British  Virgin  Islands,  Cayman 
Islands,  Falkland  Islands  and  dependencies, 
Gibraltar,  Hong  Kong,  Montserrat,  Pitcaim, 
Henderson,  Ducie  and  Oeno  Islands,  St. 
Helena  and  dependencies,  Turks  and  Caicos 
Islands,  U.K.  Sovereign  Base  Areas  of 
Akrotiri  and  Dhekelai  on  the  Island  of 
Cyprus.  ■ 


H7 


CHRONOLOGY 


September  1984 


Note:  The  editors  solicit  readers'  comments 
on  the  value  of  the  Bulletin's  monthly 
chronologies.  Unless  a  positive  response  is 
received,  the  chronologies  will  be  discon- 
tinued. 

September  1 

Prai'da  reports  that  Soviet  President 
Cheriienko  says  an  outer  space  weapons  ban 
agreement  with  the  U.S.  will  ease  the  way 
for  discussions  on  other  disarmament  issues. 

Greek  and  Turkish  Cypriots  approve  a 
UN  peace  initiative  to  unite  Cyprus. 

Libyan  leader  Qadhafi  says  he  has  sent 
troops  and  arms  to  Nicaragua  to  help  the 
Sandinista  government  fight  the  U.S.  "on  its 
own  ground." 

September  2 

The  Reagan  Administration  welcomes  the 
statement  regarding  the  Soviet  Union's 
readiness  for  arms  negotiations  contained  in 
President  Chernenko's  Sept.  1  comments,  but 
dismisses  criticism  that  U.S.  interest  is  not 
genuine. 

Assistant  Secretary  Crocker  meets  with 
President  Nyerere  of  Tanzania  in  Dar  es 
Salaam  and  President  Kaunda  of  Zambia  in 
Lusaka. 

September  3-4 

Assistant  Secretary  Crocker  visits  Uganda  to 
meet  with  government  officials  in  an  effort  to 
improve  diplomatic  communications.  He  also 
expresses  U.S.  concern  over  the  human 
rights  situation. 

September  4 

( 'anada  holds  elections  for  new  representa- 
tives of  the  282-seat  Parliament. 

Palau  voters  approve  (66%  in  favor)  a 
compact  of  free  association  with  the  U.S.  The 
compact  must  now  be  accepted  by  a  majority 
of  the  people  and  by  both  houses  of  the 
Palauan  Congress. 

September  ,5-6 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Reda  Guedira,  a 
Royal  Counselor  to  Morocco's  King  Hassan, 
to  discuss  the  recent  treaty  between  Morocco 
and  Libya.  Guedira  subsequently  meets  with 
Vice  President  Bush  and  National  Security 
Advisor  McFarlane  on  Sept.  6. 

Ambassador  Shlaudeman  meets  with 
Nicaraguan  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Tinoco  in  Manzanillo,  Mexico.  It  is  their  fifth 
round  of  discussions  in  support  of  the  Con- 
tadora  process. 

September  5 

Canada's  Progressive  Conservative  Party 
wins  a  majority  in  the  parliamentary  election. 
Us  party  leader.  Brian  Mulroney,  replaces 
•Icihn  Turner  as  Prime  Mini.ster. 

Indian  Prime  Mini.ster  Gandhi  thanks  the 
U.S.  for  refusing  to  give  asylum  to  seven 
Sikhs  who  hijacked  a  plane  to  Dubai  in 
August.  She  adds  that  the  U.S.  decision  will 
strengthen  U.S.  Indian  relations. 

Assistant  Secretary  Crocker  meets  with 
President  Moi  of  Kenya  in  Nairobi. 


September  6-7 

Assistant  Secretary  Crocker  visits  Lusaka  to 
meet  with  a  representative  of  the  Angolan 
Interior  Ministry. 

The  nine  foreign  ministers  of  the  Con- 
tadora  process  meet  in  Panama  to  receive  a 
new  draft  of  the  Contadora  regional  agree- 
ment. 

September  6 

U.S.  vetoes  a  UN  Security  Council  draft 
resolution  calling  on  Israel  to  immediately  lift 
restrictions  on  normal  civilians  in  Israeli- 
occupied  southern  Lebanon. 

In  a  letter  to  Congress,  President  Reagan 
rejects  granting  import  relief  to  the  copper 
industry. 

September  7 

Department  of  State  spokesman  Hughes  con- 
firms a  U.S.  protest  to  Iran  regarding  the 
Sept.  3  attack  on  a  Swedish  member  of  the 
Iran-U.S.  Claims  Tribunal  by  two  Iranian 
members  at  The  Hague. 

September  8   15 

Under  Secretary  Armacost  visits  London 
(Sept.  10),  Paris  (Sept.  11),  Rome  (Sept.  12), 
Bonn  (Sept.  13),  and  Brussels  (Sept.  14). 
While  in  Brussels,  he  meets  with  the  North 
Atlantic  Council  and  the  EC  Commission. 

September  8 

Botswana  holds  general  elections.  President 
Masire's  ruling  Botswana  Democratic  Party 
receives  29  of  the  34  seats  for  Parliament. 

September  9 

Secretary  Shultz  reaffirms  that  the  U.S.  is 
ready  to  discuss  mutual  measures  of  restraint 
with  respect  to  testing  of  new  space  weapons 
but  would  not  accept  the  Soviet  Union's  pro- 
posal for  a  testing  freeze  prior  to  negotia- 
tions. 

On  NBC's  "Meet  the  Press,"  Secretary 
Shultz  says  the  Soviet  Union  is  constructing 
a  radar  that  is  believed  to  be  in  violation  of 
the  antiballistic  missile  treaty. 

September  10-21 

The  first  review  conference  of  the  En- 
vironmental Modification  Convention  is  held 
in  Geneva.  ACDA  Assistant  Director  Etzold 
heads  the  U.S.  delegation. 

September  10 

UN-sponsored  talks  to  resolve  disputes  be- 
tween Turkish  and  Greek  Cypriots  begin  in 
New  York.  Secretary  General  Perez  de 
Cuellar  serves  as  mediator. 

Ethiopia  establishes  the  communist 
Worker's  Party  as  its  only  legal  party. 

September  11 

President  Reagan  says  the  Soviet  Union  can 
increase  their  purchase  of  wheat  and/or  corn 
by  10  million  metric  tons  for  the  second  year 
of  a  long-term  grain  agreement  beginning 
Oct.  1.  This  increases  the  maximum  level  of 
grain  to  22  million  metric  tons. 

President  Reagan  meets  with  NATO 
Secretary  General  Lord  Carrington. 


Secretary  Shultz  notifies  Congress  ol 
U.S.  initiatives  on  the  release  of  Asian- 
Americans  and  "re-education  camp"  prise  1 
from  Vietnam.  ! 

The  third  round  of  the  Conference  or  i 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building  Measu 
and  Disarmament  in  Europe  (CDE)  opin 
Stockholm.  Ambassador  Goodby  heads  tl 
U.S.  delegation. 

The  VOA  receives  a  contract  from  a 
private  group  in  Costa  Rica  for  use  of  th  I 
transmitters  to  broadcast  programs  to  C  ' 
and  Nicaragua. 

September  12 

Soviet  authorities  detain  five  LI.S.  sailors  I 
their  supply  ship,  the  Frieda  K.  while  en 
route  to  Nome,  Alaska,  for  violation  of  S 
territorial  waters. 

LI.S.  Senate  unanimously  condemns  r 
cent  arrests  and  detentions  of  political  of 
ponents  of  the  South  African  Governmen 
and  calls  for  the  release  of  such  prisoners 

September  13 

Israel's  Parliament  approves  (89  to  18,  w 
abstention)  a  government  of  national  unit, 
that  includes  the  Labor  Party  and  the  Lil  i 
bloc.  Labor  Party  leader  Shimon  Peres 
becomes  Israel's  eighth  Prime  Minister  ai 
Likud  leader  Yitzhak  Shamir  will  serve  a 
Vice  Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Ministe 
the  first  half  of  a  50-month  term.  Their  p 
tions  will  be  reversed  for  the  second  25 
months. 

September  14 

Secretary  Shultz  certifies  that  the  El 
Salvador  Government  is  eligible  for  conti  i 
U.S.  military  aid  because  of  its  progress  i 
land  reform,  human  rights  abuses,  free  el 
tions.  and  other  areas. 

September  15 

Ambassador  Kampelman  presents  a  Staff  i 
Department  report  on  human  rights  viola  i 
tions  in  the  Soviet  Union  to  the  Stockholi  i 
Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation 
Europe. 

Panama  announces  its  decision  to  con 
the  U.S.  military  training  school  into  a  sc  i 
tific  military  school  when  it  is  turned  ove 
Panama  on  Oct.  1  as  called  for  in  the  197 
Panama  Canal  treaties. 

September  17  , 

U.S.  files  an  official  protest  over  the  Sovii 
Union's  handling  of  the  seizure  of  five  U.n 
seamen  off  the  Alaskan  coast  for  violatinj  i 
Soviet  territorial  waters.  State  Departme  < 
spokesman  Hughes  says  the  protest  note 
stated  that  the  U.S.  was  not  given  proper 
cess  to  the  men  and  they  were  asked  to  si  ■ 
a  statement  declaring  they  had  intentiona 
sailed  into  Soviet  waters. 

Brian  Mulroney  is  sworn  in  as  Canads 
18th  Prime  Minister. 


CHRONOLOGY 


(mber  18 

N  General  Assembly  opens  its  39th  ses- 

1  New  York.  Zambian  Ambassador 
;a  is  elected  President. 

■eshlent  Reagan  rejects  restrictions  on 
.tet'l  imports  requested  by  the  steel  in- 
t'  and  announces  a  policy  for  negotiating 
;ol  trade  with  foreign  supplier  countries. 

■puty  Assistant  Secretary  Kauzlarich 

he  i;.S.  is  calling  for  reform  of 
.TAD  to  return  to  its  original  goal  and  to 
if'more  efficiently  and  effectively  in  the 
|st  of  all  of  its  members." 

(P  celebrates  the  20th  anniversary  of 

eation  of  the  Office  of  Foreign  Disaster 

aiu-e.  Between  1964-1984,  the  U.S. 

nment  has  assisted  victims  of  729 
tors  in  121  countries.  These  disasters 
»(2.2  million  people  and  affected  another 
'  million.  The  U.S.  has  provided  about 

iillmn  in  disaster  relief. 

irniber  19 

■  oviet  Union  releases  the  five  Alaskan 
r'H  to  U.S.  Coast  Guard  authorities  in  in- 
1  i.mal  waters  of  the  Bering  Sea. 

If  U.S.  signs  an  agreement  with 
•ha  to  contribute  $38.6  million  to 

lie  the  port  of  Kismayu.  Somalia  will 

hute  $3.4  million  toward  the  $42  million 

■I 

le  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
lives  ratification  of  the  Convention  on 
:  revention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime 
Gnocide. 

1  testimony  before  the  Senate,  AID  Ad- 
jitrator  McPherson  says  the  Ethiopian 
wrnment  has  inhibited  the  distribution  of 
e^ency  food  supplies  contributed  by  the 
eiational  donor  community. 

■he  European  Community  welcomes 
••-lent  Reagan's  decision  to  reject  extra 

-  and  quotas  on  imported  steel.  Japan 

iiices  his  request  for  more  voluntary 
iiv  exporters. 

he  U.S.  asks  the  U.S.-Iran  Claims 
inal  to  dismiss  two  Iranian  members  for 
a<ing  a  Swedish  member  on  Sept.  3. 

p;mber  20-21 

SJapan  economic  consultations  are  held  at 
tate  Department.  Under  Secretary 
s  heads  the  U.S.  delegation;  Deputy 

n-ter  for  Foreign  Affairs  Motono  heads 

eapanese  delegation. 

'pjmber  20 

VI  loaded  with  explosives  runs  through  a 
laied  barricade  at  the  U.S.  Embassy  an- 
xn  a  northeastern  suburb  of  Beirut  and 
pdes  20  feet  in  front  of  the  annex.  Am- 
Klor  Bartholomew  is  injured.  Two 
■nans  and  13  Lebanese  (all  but  one  of 
;i  were  U.S.  Embassy  employees)  are 
I   A  group  calling  itself  "Islamic  Jihad" 
.i:s  responsibility  for  the  bombing. 
'he  international  tribunal  on  U.S.-Iran 
uis  suspends  its  work  after  receiving  a 
S  request  for  the  removal  of  two  Iranian 
«bers  who  attacked  a  Swedish  member. 


September  21 

Assistant  Secretary  Murphy  leads  a  team  to 
Beirut  to  investigate  the  annex  bombing. 

Brunei  Darussalam  becomes  the  159th 
member  of  the  United  Nations. 

The  School  of  the  Americas,  a  U.S. 
military  training  base  in  Panama,  closes  after 
38  years  of  operation. 

Nicaragua  announces  its  acceptance  of 
the  Contadora  revised  act  without  modifica- 
tion and  calls  on  the  U.S.  to  sign  the  addi- 
tional protocol  to  that  act. 

September  23-24 

President  Reagan  holds  bilateral  meetings 
with  Argentine  President  Alfonsin,  Zaire 
President  Mobutu,  and  Norwegian  Prime 
Minister  Willoch  before  attending  a  U.S. 
reception  for  heads  of  the  UN  delegations  in 
New  York  on  Sept.  23. 

On  Sept.  24,  President  Reagan  addresses 
the  39th  session  of  the  UN  General 
Assembly.  He  also  meets  with  Kampuchean 
Prince  Sihanouk  at  the  United  Nations. 

September  23  October  5 

Secretary  Shultz  attends  the  UN  General 
Assembly  where  he  holds  bilateral  meetings 
with  numerous  foreign  ministers. 

September  24 

The  State  Department  issues  a  worldwide 
alert  to  U.S.  Embassies  after  a  threat  of  fur- 
ther action  against  the  U.S.  by  Islamic  Jihad 
appears  in  the  Lebanon  newspaper.  As  Safir. 
The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
opens  its  28th  annual  conference  in  Vienna. 
Ambassador  Kennedy  heads  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion. 

September  25-26 

Ambassador  Shlaudeman  meets  with 
Nicaraguan  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Tinoco  in  Manzanillo,  Mexico.  It  is  their  sixth 
round  of  discussions  in  support  of  the  Con- 
tadora process. 

September  25 

President  Reagan  addresses  the  annual 
meeting  of  the  IMF  and  IBRD. 

Canadian  Prime  Minister  Mulroney  meets 
with  President  Reagan  at  the  White  House. 

TASS  says  President  Reagan's  speech  at 
the  United  Nations  on  Sept.  24  shows  no  sign 
of  change  in  U.S.  policy  and  denounces  it  as 
election  campaign  rhetoric. 

Jordan  restores  full  diplomatic  relations 
with  Egypt. 

September  26 

Secretary  Shultz  and  Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  meet  in  New  York  to  discuss 
Soviet-American  relations  and  other  issues  of 
mutual  concern. 

China  and  the  United  Kingdom  initial  an 
agreement  to  restore  Hong  Kong  to  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  China  effective  July  1,  1997. 

Druze  militia  leader  Jumblatt  says  the 
U.S.  and  France  face  further  terrorist  at- 
tacks unless  they  change  their  policies  on 
Lebanon. 


September  27 

President  Reagan  meets  with  President 
Belaunde  of  Peru. 

September  28-29 

Foreign  Ministers  of  the  European  Economic 
Community,  Spain,  Portugal,  the  Contadora 
group,  and  the  five  Central  American  states 
meet  in  San  Jose,  Costa  Rica,  to  discuss  in- 
creased European  assistance  to  the  Central 
American  region. 

September  28 

President  Reagan  meets  with  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  at  the  White  House. 

The  U.S.  imposes  additional  controls  on 
exports  to  Iran. 

The  U.S.  Embassy  in  Lima,  Peru,  is  hit 
by  automatic  weapons  fire.  Windows  are 
shattered,  but  no  injuries  are  reported. 

September  29 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  at  the  State 
Department.  ■ 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


USUN 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


•196 
197 


9/12 


9/12 


•194      [Not  issued.] 

195      9/10       Shultz:  interview  on  "Meet 
the  Press,"  Sept.  9. 

Shultz:  interview  on  "The 
Today  Show." 

Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States.  1952-54, 
Vol.  XII,  Part  1:  East  Asia 
and  the  Pacific,  Multi- 
lateral Relations,  released, 
Sept.  14. 
198      9/12       Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Immigra- 
tion and  Refugee  Policy, 
Senate  Judiciary  Commit- 
tee, and  Subcommittee  on 
Immigration,  Refugees, 
and  International  Law, 
House  Judiciary  Commit- 
tee, Sept.  11. 

Shultz:  address  before  the 
Chamber  of  Commerce, 
Miami. 

Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session  following  address 
before  Miami  Chamber  of 
Commerce. 

Shultz:  remarks  to  the  Con- 
ference on  Faith  in 
Humankind:  Rescuers  of 
Jews  During  the  Holo- 
caust. 

Shultz:  interview  on  "Good 
Morning,  America." 

Shultz:  remarks  at  the  senior 
Foreign  Service  presiden- 
tial awards  ceremony. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  the 
"Salute  to  USIA" 
ceremony. 

Shultz:  interview  on  NBC 
Nightly  News. 

Shultz:  interview  on  ABC 
World  News  Tonight. 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  of  Canadian 
Prime  Minister  Brian 
Mulroney,  Sept.  24-25. 

Shultz:  news  conference  at 
the  Waldorf  Astoria,  New 
York,  Sept.  23. 


199      9/14 


199A      9/14 


•200      9/17 


•201 
•202 


9/18 


9/20 


•203      9/20 


•204 
•205 
•206 


9/20 


9/20 


9/21 


•207      9/24 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  Public 
Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Na- 
tions, 799  United  Nations  Plaza,  New  York, 
N.Y.  10017. 

No.  Date  Subject 

•1       1/6         Lichenstein:  explanation  of 
vote  on  the  complaint  of 
Angola  against  South 
Africa,  Security  Council. 
*2      1/11        Smith:  transnational  corpora- 
tions, UN  Commission  on 
Transnational  Corpora- 
tions, Jan.  9. 
*3       1/19        Barabba:  population.  Popula- 
tion Commission. 
'4       1/23        Barabba:  population.  Popula- 
tion Commission. 
*5      2/3  Lichenstein:  Nicaragua,  Se- 

curity Council. 
*6      2/8  Keyes:  public  administration, 

ECOSOC. 
*7      2/15        Sorzano:  outer  space,  Scien- 
tific and  Technical  Sub- 
Committee,  Committee  on 
the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer 
Space. 
•8      2/16        Kirkpatrick:  Lebanon,  Secu- 
rity Council. 
*9      2/21        Keyes:  southern  Africa, 
racism,  and  apartheid, 
Human  Rights  Commis- 
sion, Geneva,  ¥eh.  15. 

•10      2/24        Lichenstein:  membership  for 
Brunei,  Security  Council. 

*11      3/1  Dewey:  donor's  meeting  or 

humanitarian  assistance  for 
Kampuchea. 

*12      2/29        Kirkpatrick:  Lebanon,  Secu- 
rity Council. 

*13      2/29        Kirkpatrick:  Lebanon,  Secu- 
rity Council, 

*14      3/8  Reynolds:  women.  Commis- 

sion on  the  Status  of 
Women,  Vienna,  Feb.  16. 

*15      3/8         Gerard:  women,  preparatory 
meeting  of  the  1985  World 
Conference  on  Women. 
Vienna,  Feb.  29  and 
Mar.  2. 

*16      3/8         Gerard:  women,  preparatory 
meeting  of  the  1985  World 
Conference  on  Women, 
Vienna,  Mar.  6. 

*17  3/12  Benedick:  population,  pre- 
paratory meeting  of  the 
1984  International  Con- 
ference on  Population. 

*18      3/12       Sorzano:  Indian  Ocean  zone 
of  peace,  ad  hoc  commit- 
tee. 

•19      3/27        Kirkpatrick:  Sudan's  letter  to 
the  President  of  the  Securi- 
ty Council,  Security  Coun- 
cil. 

•20      3/28       Clark:  Libya,  Security 
Council,  Mar,  20. 

•21       3/30        Kirkpatrick:  Nicaragua, 
Security  Council. 

•22      4/4         Clark:  Libya,  Security 
Council. 


•23      4/4  Sorzano:  Central  AmericE 

Security  Council. 
•24      4/19       Clark:  extension  of  UNIF 

resolution.  Security  Coi 

cil. 
*25      4/26       Goodman:  energy,  Commi 

tee  on  the  Development 

and  LItilization  of  New  : 

Renewable  Sources  of    11  ' 

Energy.  1 

•26      5/1  Feldman:  East  Asia  and  tl 

Pacific,  Economic  and     I 

Social  Commission  for  / 

and  the  Pacific,  Tokyo. 

Apr,  18. 
*27      5/2  Dewey:  donors' meeting  I > 

humanitarian  assistance 

Kampuchea. 
'28      .5/2  Handley:  narcotics, 

ECOSOC. 
*29      .5/2         Jones:  nongovernmental     „, 

organizations,  ECOSOC.  f 
*30      .5/8  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick's 

itinerary  for  visit  to  Asi; 

May  11-31. 
*31      5/8  Bergaust:  UN  Decade  for 

Women,  ECOSOC. 
*32      .5/11        Micronesia  exhibition  at 

the  UN. 
*33      .5/9  Keyes:  development, 

ECOSOC  Committee  of 

International  Developme 

Strategy,  May  8. 
*34      .5/9  Keyes:  nongovernmental 

organizations,  ECOSOC. 
*35      .5/11        Clark:  Cyprus,  Security 

Council. 
•36      .5/14        Sherman:  TTPI,  Trustees? 

Council. 
*37      5/14        Fleming:  population, 

ECOSOC. 
*38      5/16        Keyes:  human  rights, 

ECOSOC. 
*39      5/17        Keyes:  human  rights. 

Committee  II. 
*40      .5/18        Sherman:  Compact  of  Fi. 

Association,  Trusteeship  „ 

Council,  May  17.  ( 

*41      .5/18        Sherman:  Micronesia,  i 

Trusteeship  Council.         \ 
•42      .5/22       Jones:  women,  ECOSOC. 
•43      5/23        Sherman:  Marshall  Islands 

Trusteeship  Council. 
•44      .5/24       Jones:  women,  ECOSOC. 
•45      5/30        Herzberg:  Decade  to  Com!  j 

Racism  and  Racial 

Discrimination,  ECOSOC  | 

May  24. 
*46      .5/30       Wake:  human  rights, 

ECOSOC,  May  24.  j 

*47      .5/30       Jones:  social  development,   I 

ECOSOC,  May  25. 
•48      .5/29       Sherman:  TTPI,  Truster 

ship  Council. 
49      .5/30       Sorzano:  complaint  of  the    ! 

Gulf  Cooperation  Council 

(GCC).  Security  Council. 
*50      6/1  Sorzano:  complaint  of  the 

GCC,  Security  Council. 


JJLICATIONS 


1    ti/l  Sorzano:  disarmament,  Dis- 

armament Commission. 
i>  18       Kirkpatrick:  work  of  the 

UNDP,  UNDP  Governing 
Council,  Geneva,  June  13. 

1|  6/20        Blocker:  information,  Com- 

I'  mittee  on  Information. 

r  i>/l26        Eskin:  outer  space.  Com- 
mittee on  the  Peaceful 
Uses  of  Outer  Space,  June 
13. 
1.  12.5        Blocker:  information.  Com- 
mittee on  Information. 

>it  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


artment  of  State 


ngle  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
f  State  publications  are  available  from 
■respondence  Management  Division, 

of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 
!e  multiple  copies  may  be  obtained  by 
'  to  the  Office  of  Opinion  Analysis  and 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department 

I,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

!nt  Reagan 

ig  World  Tensions,  UN  General 
mbly,  Sept.  24,  1984  (Current  Policy 


uy  Shultz 

ning  Remarks  to  Holocaust  Con- 

ice,  Conference  on  Faith  in 

ankind:  Rescuers  of  Jews  During  the 

,ust,  sponsored  by  the  U.S.  Holocaust 
orial  Council,  Sept.  17,  1984  (Current 
y#614). 

.mpaign  Against  Drugs:  The  Inter- 
naj  Dimension,  Chamber  of  Com- 
e,  Miami,  Sept.  14,  1984  (Current 
y#611). 

:d  Refugee  Admissions  for  FY  1984, 
ommittee  on  Immigration  and  Refugee 
y,  Senate  Judiciary  Committee,  Sept. 
984  (Current  Policy  #610). 


dia:  The  Search  for  Peace,  Assistant 

itary  Wolfowitz,  Conference  on  the 

oodian  Crisis,  Sept.  11.  1984  (Current 

y  #613). 

tllAs  in  Southeast  Asia  (GIST, 

.  1984). 


itional  Energy  Security:  The  Con- 
ng  Challenge,  Deputy  Assistant 
itary  Wendt,  Oxford  Energy  Seminar, 
rd,  England,  Sept.  14,  1984  (Current 
y  #612). 


Atlantic  Council  Meets  in  Washington, 
29-31,  1984  (Bulletin  Reprint). 


General 

Index  of  the  GIST  series  (Sept.  1984). 

Human  Rights 

Sixteenth  Semiannual  Report:  Implementa- 
tion of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act,  Dec.  1, 
1983-Mar.  31,  1984  (Special  Report  #117). 

Human  Rights  (GIST,  Sept.  1984). 

Terrorism 

International  Terrorism  (GIST,  Sept.  1984). 

Western  Hemisphere 

The  Private  Sector's  Role  in  Latin  American 
Development,  Ambassador  Middendorf, 
American  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Santiago, 
Aug.  30,  1984  (Current  Policy  #609). 

Democracy  in  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean, Assistant  Secretary  Motley,  Subcom- 
mittee on  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs, 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  July  31, 
1984  (Current  Policy  #605).  ■ 


Background  Notes 


This  series  provides  brief,  factual  summaries 
of  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  about  170  countries 
(excluding  the  United  States)  and  of  selected 
international  organizations.  Recent  revisions 
are: 

Albania  (Aug.  1984) 
Andorra  (Aug.  1984) 
Australia  (May  1984) 
Bangladesh  (July  1984) 
Cape  Verde  (June  1984) 
Ecuador  (June  1984) 
Equatorial  Guinea  (June  1984) 
Haiti  (June  1984) 
Iceland  (July  1984) 
Kampuchea  (May  1984) 
Lesotho  (Aug.  1984) 
Liberia  (June  1984) 
Maldives  (June  1984) 
Papua  New  Guinea  (June  1984) 
St.  Lucia  (Aug.  1984) 
Senegal  (June  1984) 
United  Nations  (Aug.  1984) 

A  free  single  copy  of  one  of  the  above 
(and  an  index  of  the  entire  series)  may  be  ob- 
tained from  the  Correspondence  Management 
Division,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

For  about  60  Background  Notes  a  year,  a 
subscription  is  available  from  the  Superinten- 
dent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
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PUBLICATIONS 


jgn  Relations  Volume  Released 


The  Department  of  State  on  Septem- 
ber 14,  1984,  released  Foreign  Relations 
of  the  United  States.  1952-1954,  Volume 
XII,  Part  1,  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific; 
Multilateral  Relations.  The  volume 
presents  over  1,000  pages  of  previously 
highly  classified  documents  on  policy 
deliberations  and  diplomatic  negotiations 
between  the  United  States  and  its  major 
allies  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  during 
a  time  of  conflict  and  tension. 

In  1952  the  United  States  was  faced 
with  the  twin  challenges  of  formulating 
policy  with  regard  to  the  contingency  of 
Chinese  aggression  in  Southeast  Asia 
and  arriving  at  workable  arrangements 
for  both  political  and  military  consulta- 
tions with  major  allies.  The  first  400 
pages  of  the  volume  document  the  ef- 
forts of  both  the  Truman  and 
Eisenhower  Administrations  to  meet 
these  challenges,  including  U.S.  Govern- 
ment meetings  at  the  highest  level,  the 
initial  consultative  meetings  under  the 
Australia-New  Zealand-United  States 
(ANZUS)  treaty,  and  military  consulta- 
tions with  the  United  Kingdom,  France, 
Australia,  and  New  Zealand. 

The  main  theme  of  the  volume  from 
the  spring  of  1954  onward,  comprising 
almost  two-thirds  of  its  length,  is  the 
Eisenhower  Administration's  intensified 
concern  with  regional  defense  and 


security  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific, 
which  was  caused  by  the  collapse  of  the 
French  effort  in  Indochina.  Perhaps  the 
most  important  of  the  developments 
delineated  here  is  the  negotiation  and 
conclusion  of  the  Southeast  Asia  Collec- 
tive Defense  Treaty,  signed  at  Manila  on 
September  8,  1954.  Also  presented  is 
evidence  of  the  Eisenhower  Administra- 
tion's continuing  interest  in  the  consulta- 
tions under  the  ANZUS  treaty  and  a 
policy  debate  over  the  nature  and  extent 
of  U.S.  economic  aid  to  Asia. 

Foreign  Relations.  1952-1954, 
Volume  XII,  Part  1,  was  prepared  in  the 
Office  of  the  Historian,  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Copies  of 
Volume  XII,  Part  1  (Department  of 
State  Publication  No.  9390;  GPO  Stock 
No.  044-000-02019-0)  may  be  pur- 
chased for  $20.00  (domestic  postpaid) 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington  D.C.,  20402.  Checks  or 
money  orders  should  be  made  payable  to 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  The 
Foreign  Relations  series  has  been 
published  continuously  since  1861  as  the 
official  record  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 
The  volume  released  September  14  is 
the  ninth  of  16  to  be  published  covering 
the  years  1952-1954. 


Press  release  197  of  Sept.  12,  1984. 


92 


las  of  United  States 
oreign  Relations 

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••ng  100  pages  with  nnore  than  90  maps 
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.  ng  with: 

•  U.S.  national  security; 

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]EX 


iiember  1984 
lime  84,  No.  2092 

U.S.    Response    to    Africa's    Food 

ds    44 

ontrol 

lontrol:   Where   Do  We   Stand  Now? 

!lman)   45 

mpaign    Against   Drugs:    Tlie    Inter- 

Dnal  Dimension  (Shultz) 29 

Talks     Resume     in     Stockholm 

igan)    48 

Conventional    Defense    Capabilities 

er  to  the  Congress) 69 

Conference  Held  on  Environmental 
ification    Convention    (final    decla- 

m>n)  49 

ys  Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press"  .  39 
7's   Interview   on  "This   Week   With 

id  Brinkley" 42 

f  Arms  Control  Talks  (Reagan) 49 

Nuclear  Posture  of  NATO  (letter  to 
Congress) 70 

.  Anniversary  of  the  KAL  #007 
lent  (Burt,  Department  statement)  .  60 

dia:     The     Search     for     Peace 

Ifowitz)   51 

id  China  Reach  Agreement  on  Hong 
g  (Shultz) 56 

iS 

Rights  Practices  in  Sudan,  Ethiopia, 

alia,  and  Uganda  (Abrams) 62 

Conventional    Defense    Capabilities 

er  to  the  Congress) 69 

d  Refugee  Admissions  for  FY   1985 

iltz)    34 

Developments    in    the    Philippines 

Ifowitz)   54 

io    Nuclear   Posture   of   NATO   (letter 

Die  Congress) 70 

\  ges  Ratification  of  Genocide  Conven- 
ic  (Abrams,  Department  statement)  .  66 
unent  and  Foreign  Service.  U.S. 
ii  lassy  Bombed  in  Beirut  (Department 

tjement) 67 

elping  Countries.  The  Campaign 
Vjinst  Drugs:  The  International  Dimen- 

i<  (Shultz) 29 

jia.  Cambodia:  The  Search  for  Peace 

W  Ifowitz)   51 

i<  dcs 
( mpaign    Against   Drugs:    The    Inter- 

\3  -inal  I)imension  (Shultz) 29 

•n:ing    Global     Economic     Growth 

Rigan)    26 

K  onal  Affairs.  The  Campaign  Against 
)igs:     The     International    Dimension 

Siltz)    29 

oa.  Human  Rights  Practices  in  Sudan, 
i  iopia,     Somalia,     and     Uganda 

A-ams) 62 

>|.  Anniversary  of  the  KAL  #007  Inci- 
ie  (Burt,  Department  statement)  ....  60 


Food.     U.S.     Response    to    Africa's    Food 

Needs    44 

Foreign    Assistance.     U.S.    Response    to 

Africa's  Food  Needs 44 

Hong  Kong.   U.K.  and  China  Reach  Agree- 
ment cm  Hong  Kong  (Shultz) 56 

Human  Rights 

Cambodia:      The     Search     for     Peace 

(Wolfowitz)   51 

Human  Rights  Practices  in  Sudan,  Ethiopia, 

Somalia,  and  LIganda  (Abrams) 62 

U.S.  Urges  Ratification  of  Genocide  Conven- 
tion (Abrams,  Department  statement)  .66 
Iran.  U.S.  Imposes  Additional  Export  Controls 

on  Iran  (Department  statement) 68 

Israel.   The  Campaign  Against  Drugs:   The 

International  Dimension  (Shultz) 29 

Kampuchea.  Cambodia:  The  Search  for  Peace 

(Wolfowitz)   51 

Korea.  Anniversary  of  the  KAL  #007  Incident 

(Burt,  Department  statement) 60 

Lebanon 

Secretary's   Interview   on   "This   Week   with 

David  Brinkley"  42 

U.S.  Embassy  Bombed  in  Beirut  (Department 

statement) 67 

Military  Affairs 

NATO    Conventional    Defense    Capabilities 

(letter  to  the  Congress) 69 

Tactical    Nuclear    Posture   of   NATO   (letter 

to  the  Congress) 70 

Narcotics.  The  Campaign  Against  Drugs:  The 

International  Dimension  (Shultz) 29 

Nicaragua.  The  Campaign  Against  Drugs:  The 

International  Dimension  (Shultz) 29 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

NATO    Conventional    Defense    Capabilities 

(letter  to  the  Congress) 69 

Tactical    Nuclear    Posture   of   NATO   (letter 

to  the  Congress) 70 

Panama.  The  Campaign  Against  Drugs:  The 

International  Dnnension  (Shultz) 29 

Philippines.    Recent    Developments    in    the 

Philippines  (Wolfowitz) 54 

Presidential  Documents 

CDE  Talks  Resume  in  Stockholm 48 

NATO    Conventional    Defense    Capabilities 

(letter  to  the  Congress) 69 

President    Meets    With    Foreign    Minister 

Gromyko  (Reagan,  Shultz) 57 

Promoting  Global  Economic  Growth 26 

Reducing  World  Tensions 1 

Status  of  Arms  Control  Talks 49 

Tactical    Nuclear   Posture   of   NATO   (letter 

to  the  Congress) 70 

Publications 

Background  Notes 91 

Department  of  State 91 

Foreign  Relations  Volume  Released 92 

GPO  subscriptions 91 

Refugees.  Proposed  Refugee  Admissions  for 

FY  1985  (Shultz) 34 


Somalia.  Human  Rights  Practices  in  Sudan, 
Ethiopia,  Somalia,  and  Uganda 
(Abrams) 62 

Sudan.  Human  Rights  Practices  in  Sudan, 
Ethiopia,  Somalia,  and  Uganda 
(Abrams) 62 

Terrorism 

The  Campaign  Against  Drugs:  The  Inter- 
national Dimension  (Shultz) 29 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley"  42 

LI.S.  Embassy  bombed  in  Beirut  (Department 
statement) 67 

Trade 

Promoting  Global  Economic  Growth 
(Reagan)    26 

U.S.  Imposes  Additional  Export  Controls 
on  Iran  (Department  statement) 68 

Treaties 

Current  Actions 86 

Review  Conference  Held  on  Environmental 
Modification  Convention  (final  decla- 
ration)    49 

U.S.  Urges  Ratification  of  Genocide  Conven- 
tion (Abrams.  Department  statement)  .  66 

Uganda.  Human  Rights  Practices  in  Sudan, 
Ethiopia,  Somalia,  and  Uganda 
(Abrams) 62 

U.S.S.R. 

Anniversary  of  the  KAL  #007  Incident  (Burt, 
Department  statement) 60 

Arms  Control:  Where  Do  We  Stand  Now? 
(Adelman)   45 

The  Campaign  Against  Drugs:  The  Inter- 
national Dimension  (Shultz) 29 

CDE  Talks  Resume  in  Stockholm  (Reagan)  .  48 

President  Meets  With  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  (Reagan,  Shultz) 57 

Reducing  World  Tensions  (Reagan) 1 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press"  .39 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley" 42 

Status  of  Arms  Control  Talks  (Reagan)  ....  49 

United  Kingdom.  LI.K.  and  China  Reach 
Agreement  on  Hong  Kong  (Shultz)  ....  56 

United  Nations 

Promoting  Global  Economic  Growth 
(Reagan)    26 

Reducing  World  Tensions  (Reagan) 1 

The  United  Nations 7 

Vietnam.  Cambodia:  The  Search  for  Peace 
(Wolfowitz)   51 

Western  Hemisphere.  Atlas  of  the  Caribbean 
Basin  (Young) 71 


Name  Index 

Abrams,  Elliott 62,  66 

Adelman,  Kenneth  L 45 

Burt,  Richard  R 60 

Reagan,  President 1,  26,  48,  49,  57,  69,  70 

Shultz,  Secretary 29,  34,  39,  42,  56,  57 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D 51,  54 

Young,  Harry  F 71 


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3  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  84  /  Number  2093 


December  1984 


f^       ;,^jj^y 


The  Secretary/1 


i  Arms  Control/21 


Canada/54 


Departmvnt  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  84  /  Number  2093  /  December  1984 


aver:  Secretary  Shultz 


aple  leaf  of  Canada 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Pubhc 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affa 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief.  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


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CONTENTS 


The  Secretary 

1        Managing  the  U.S. -Soviet 

Relationship  Over  the  Long 
Term 

5       A  Foward  Lool<  at  Foreign  Policy 

11  Soviet  Jewry  and  U.S. -Soviet 

Relations 

12  Terrorism  and  the  Modern  World 
1 7       Preventing  the  Proliferation  of 

Nuclear  Weapons 

Arms  Control 

21        Security  and  Arms  Control: 

The  Search  for  a  More  Stable 
Peace 

Canada 

54  Visit  of  Canadian  Prime  Minister 

(Brian  Mulroney,  President 
Reagan) 

55  Secretary  Visits  Canada  (Joe 

Clark.  Secretary  Shultz) 

58       ICJ  Rules  on  Gulf  of  Maine  Case 

(Department  Statement) 

Energy 

60       International  Energy  Security: 
The  Continuing  Challenge 
(E.  Allan  Wendt) 

Europe 

63       NATO  and  the  Challenges  Ahead 
(Michael  H.  Armacost) 

66  20th  Report  on  Cyprus 

(Message  to  the  Congress) 

67  U.S. -Soviet  Relations  (White 

Hoiise  Statement) 

68  U.S.  Relations  With  Poland 

(Kenneth  W.  Dam) 


Middle  East 

73  Terrorism  in  the  Middle  East 

(Kenneth  W.  Darn) 

74  Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister 

(Shimon  Peres,  President 
Reagan) 

Oceans 

76       Freedom  and  Opportunity:  Foun- 
dation for  a  Dynamic  Oceana 
Policy  (James  L.  Malone) 

Population 

80       Population  Conference  Held  in 

Mexico  City  (James  L.  Buckley, 
President  Reagan,  Declaration) 

Refugees 

83       The  Challenge  of  Refugee  Pro- 
tection (James  N.  Purcell,  Jr.) 

Terrorism 

86  1984  Act  to  Combat  International 

Terrorism  (President  Reagan) 

Western  Hemisphere 

87  Secretary  Shultz  Visits  Central 

America  and  Mexico  (Jose 
Napoleon  Duarte,  Secretary 

Shultz) 

Treaties 

90       Current  Actions 

Chronology 

92       October  1984 


Food 

69  World  Food  Day,  1984 

(Proclamation) 

General 

70  Change  and  Continuity:  American 

Foreign  Policy  in  the  1980s 
(Kenneth  W.  Dam) 


Press  Releases 

93  Department  of  State 

Publications 

94  Department  of  State 
94       Background  Notes 

Index 


In  conducting  negotiations  and  discussions  in 
the  major  areas  of  U.S.-Soviet  relations  .  .  .  we 
have  been  guided  by  four  basic  principles. 

.  .  .  we  must  have  a  strong  defense. 

.  .  .  we  must  be  united  both  at  home  and  with 
our  friends  and  allies. 

.  .  .  we  must  be  patient. 

.  .  .  we  must  be  purposeful,  flexible,  and 
credible. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Managing  the  U.S.-Soviet 
Relationship  Over  the  Long  Term 


by  Secretary  Shultz 


Address  before  the 
Rand/UCLA  Center  for  the  Study  of 

Soviet  International  Behavior 
in  Los  Angeles  on  October  18,  1984 A 


distinguished  audience  knows  well 
the  Soviet  Union  presents  us  with  a 
eptual  as  well  as  a  strategic 
enge.  Let  me  take  advantage  of  this 
sion,  therefore,  to  raise  what  I  see 
me  of  these  larger  conceptual 
s  that  face  us  in  managing 
Soviet  relations  over  the  long  term. 

ferences  Between 
Systems 

iifferences  between  our  two  coun- 
lare  profound.  You  and  I  know  that, 
e  need  to  reiterate  it,  remind 
Ives  of  it,  and  reflect  upon  it.  The 
d  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
ent  histories,  cultures,  economies, 
•nmental  systems,  force  structures, 
•aphical  circumstances,  and  visions 
;  future.  We  cannot  analyze  the 
t  Union  as  if  it  were  a  mirror  of 
Ives. 

^e  Americans  stand  by  our  values 
lefend  our  interests,  but  we  also 
reat  store  by  pragmatism,  com- 
ise,  and  flexibility  in  international 
ttarxist-Leninist  ideology  subor- 
ns all  of  these  qualities  to  the  so- 
objective,  scientific,  and  inevitable 
)f  history.  We  can  debate  how  fully 
t  leaders  follow  this  ideology.  No 
,  however,  it  helps  shape  a  political 
'e  that  does  not  accommodate  well 
npromise  or  truly  positive  relations 
)pponents.  Their  doctrine  of 
y  teaches  them  that  their  op- 
ts are  doomed  to  crisis  and 
e — and  that  the  struggle  between 
/o  systems  is  a  mortal  struggle, 
ost  notable,  perhaps,  is  the  very 
ent  relationship  between  the 
nment  and  the  people  in  the  Soviet 
and  in  the  United  States.  Our  na- 


tional policies  are  the  product  of  open 
debate,  deliberation,  and  political  com- 
petition guided  by  constitutional  proc- 
esses. In  the  Soviet  Union,  policy  is  the 
exclusive  domain  of  a  self-perpetuating 
ruling  elite.  Soviet  leaders  do  not  ignore 
public  opinion;  on  the  contrary,  they 
vigorously  seek  to  control  it.  Theirs  is  a 
system  marked  by  repression  and  hostili- 
ty to  free  political,  intellectual,  or 
religious  expression.  A  nation  whose 
system  is  the  legacy  of  Marx,  Lenin,  and 
Stalin  obviously  bears  scant  resemblance 
to  one  that  draws  its  inspiration  from 
Washington,  Jefferson,  and  Lincoln. 

When  we  in  America  conduct  for- 
eign policy,  we  must  meet  certain  re- 
quirements that  Soviet  rulers  can  dis- 
regard. An  American  president  must 
win  and  sustain  support  from  the  Con- 
gress and  the  American  people  if  he  is 
to  lead  the  nation  on  any  path,  if  our 
policy  is  to  follow  a  steady  course  and  a 
coherent  strategy.  Through  this  process, 
we  gain  the  sustenance  and  commitment 
that  come  from  democratic  participation. 
And  in  the  complex  world  of  the  1980s 
and  1990s,  the  effectiveness  of  our  deal- 
ings with  the  Soviets  will  benefit  from  a 
level  of  national  understanding  of  the 
Soviet  Union  beyond  what  we  have  re- 
quired, or  had,  in  the  past.  That  is  why 
what  the  Rand/UCLA  Center  seeks  to 
accomplish  is  so  important,  and  why  I 
look  forward  to  the  contribution  that 
you  can  make. 


Complexity  of  Managing 
the  Relationship 

Today,  despite  these  profound  dif- 
ferences, it  is  obviously  in  our  interest 
to  maintain  as  constructive  a  relation- 
ship as  possible  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  Soviet  Union  is  powerful;  it  occupies 
a  very  large  part  of  a  shrinking  world; 
and  its  military  strength,  including  its 
vast  nuclear  arsenal,  is  a  reality  that  we 
cannot  ignore.  Its  people  are  a  great  and 
talented  people,  and  we  can  benefit  from 
interchange  with  them.  And  we  owe  it 
to  our  own  people,  and  to  the  future  of 
the  planet,  to  strive  for  a  more  construc- 
tive pattern  of  relations  between  our 
countries. 

A  brief  review  of  the  postwar  period 
reminds  us  of  how  complex  a  task  this 
is.  For  the  past  two  decades,  Soviet 
defense  spending  has  grown  at  a  rate  of 
3%-5%  a  year,  even  when  the  United 
States  was  cutting  back  its  own  defense 
expenditures.  And  the  Soviets  kept  up 
this  military  expansion  even  in  the  face 
of  mounting  economic  difficulties. 

In  the  postwar  period,  the  United 
States  never  sought  to  expand  its  ter- 
ritory nor  used  force  to  impose  its  will 
upon  weaker  nations,  even  when  we 
were  the  world's  preeminent  power.  The 
Soviets,  however,  have  used  force  fre- 
quently— in  East  Berlin,  Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia,  and  Afghanistan.  And  it 
was  their  threat  of  force  that  imposed 
martial  law  on  Poland. 

It  has  been  argued  that  Soviet 
behavior  is  partly  motivated  by  a 
historical  insecurity,  that  they  suffer 
from  an  endemic  paranoia  stemming 
from  centuries  of  war  and  foreign  inva- 


THE  SECRETARY 


sions.  But  this  analysis  is  clearly  inade- 
quate. The  problem  is  that  the  Soviets 
seek  absolute  security  in  a  way  that 
guarantees  insecurity  for  everyone  else. 
Their  policies  have  created  antagonism 
when  opportunites  existed  for  better 
relations;  their  vast  military  power— and 
their  demonstrated  willingness  to  use 
it—go  far  beyond  legitimate  self-defense 
and  pose  objective  problems  for  the 
world  community.  The  Soviets'  interven- 
tionist policies  in  the  Third  World,  for 
example,  seem  the  result  of  ideology 
combined  with  new  capability,  not  the 
product  of  "insecurity."  In  the  past  two 
decades  they  have  expanded  their  in- 
fluence in  Asia,  Africa,  the  Middle  East, 
and  Central  America  by  purveying  arms 
and  backing  those  who  subvert 
neighbors  or  block  peace. 

The  record  shows  that  when  the 
Soviets  have  perceived  weakness,  when 
they  have  seen  a  vacuum,  they  have 
seized  the  opportunity  to  gain  an  advan- 
tage. Their  code  of  behavior  has  not  in- 
cluded categories  for  voluntary  restraint 
or  self-denial. 

And  they  have  not  hesitated  to  per- 
secute those  of  their  own  people — 
whether  intellectuals,  religious  figures, 
or  average  citizens — who  dared  to  speak 
or  write  freely,  or  who  sought  to 
emigrate.  After  signing  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act,  which  confirmed  that  human 
rights  were  a  vital  part  of  the  diplomatic 
dialogue  on  peace  and  security  in 
Europe,  the  Soviets  and  their  East 
European  allies  even  suppressed  the 
very  citizens'  groups  that  were  formed 
to  monitor  compliance  with  the  Helsinki 
accord. 

We  are  left  with  two  inescapable 
truths:  in  the  nuclear  age  we  need  to 
maintain  a  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  Yet  we  know  that  they  have 
acted  in  ways  that  violate  our  standards 
of  human  conduct  and  rule  by  law  and 
that  are  repugnant  to  us — and  they  will 
likely  continue  to  do  so  in  the  future. 
What  kind  of  relationship  can  we  rea- 
sonably expect  to  have  in  these  cir- 
cumstances? How  can  we  manage 
U.S. -Soviet  relations  in  a  way  that  can 
endure  over  a  long  period? 

Question  of  Linkage 

The  U.S. -Soviet  relationship,  of  course, 
is  a  global  one.  We  impinge  on  each 
other's  interests  in  many  regions  of  the 
world  and  in  many  fields  of  endeavor.  A 
sustained  and  sound  relationship,  there- 
fore, will  confront  the  fact  that  the 


Soviets  can  be  expected  periodically  to 
do  something  abhorrent  to  us  or 
threaten  our  interests. 

This  raises  the  question  of  linkage. 
Should  we  refuse  to  conclude  agree- 
ments with  the  Soviets  in  one  area  when 
they  do  something  outrageous  in  some 
other  area?  Would  such  an  approach 
give  us  greater  leverage  over  Moscow's 
conduct?  Or  would  it  place  us  on  the 
defensive?  Would  it  confirm  our  dedica- 
tion to  fundamental  principles  of  inter- 
national relations?  Or  would  it  make  our 
diplomacy  seem  inconsistent?  Clearly, 
linkage  is  not  merely  "a  fact  of  life"  but 
a  complex  question  of  policy. 

There  will  be  times  when  we  must 
make  progress  in  one  dimension  of  the 
relationship  contingent  on  progress  in 
others.  We  can  never  let  ourselves 
become  so  wedded  to  improving  our 
relations  with  the  Soviets  that  we  turn  a 
blind  eye  to  actions  that  undermine  the 
very  foundation  of  stable  relations.  At 
the  same  time,  linkage  as  an  instrument 
of  policy  has  limitations;  if  applied  rigid- 
ly, it  could  yield  the  initiative  to  the 
Soviets,  letting  them  set  the  pace  and 
the  character  of  the  relationship. 

We  do  not  seek  negotiations  for 
their  own  sake;  we  negotiate  when  it  is 
in  our  interest  to  do  so.  Therefore,  when 
the  Soviet  Union  acts  in  a  way  we  find 
objectionable,  it  may  not  always  make 
sense  for  us  to  break  off  negotiations  or 
suspend  agreements.  If  those  negotia- 
tions or  agreements  were  undertaken 
with  a  realistic  view  of  their  benefits  for 
us,  then  they  should  be  worth  maintain- 
ing under  all  but  exceptional  circum- 
stances. We  should  not  sacrifice  long- 
term  interests  in  order  to  express  im- 
mediate outrage.  We  must  not  ignore 
Soviet  actions  that  trouble  us.  On  the 
contrary,  we  need  to  respond  forcefully. 
But  in  doing  so,  we  are  more  likely  to  be 
successful  by  direct  measures  that 
counter  the  specific  challenge. 

When  the  Soviets  invaded  Afghan- 
istan, President  Carter  said  his  opinion 
of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  goals  had 
changed  more  in  1  week  than  through- 
out his  entire  term  of  office.  He  can- 
celed the  grain  agreement,  withdrew  his 
own  arms  limitation  treaty  from  Senate 
consideration,  refused  participation  in 
the  Olympics,  and  stopped  the  annual 
meetings  with  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko.  But  did  his  actions  serve  our 
economic  interests?  Did  they  further 
progress  toward  a  better  arms  agree- 
ment? Did  they  get  Soviet  troops  out  of 
Afghanistan? 


When  the  Soviets  shot  down  tht 
Korean  airliner,  in  contrast,  Presidt 
Reagan  was  not  derailed  from  his 
steady,  firm,  and  realistic  course.  H 
never  had  illusions  about  the  Soviet 
Union.  After  the  KAL  [Korean  Air 
Lines]  shootdown,  he  focused  attent 
on  the  menace  to  civil  aviation  pose 
such  conduct.  He  made  sure  the  wo 
knew  the  truth  about  the  incident.  I 
he  also  sent  our  arms  control  negot 
ators  back  to  Geneva,  because  he  bt 
lieved  that  reducing  nuclear  weapoi 
was  a  critical  priority. 

In  the  final  analysis,  linkage  is  ; 
tical  question;  the  strategic  reality  < 
leverage  comes  from  creating  facts 
support  of  our  overall  design.  Over 
longer  term,  we  must  structure  the 
bargaining  environment  to  our  adv; 
tage  by  modernizing  our  defenses,  ; 
sisting  our  friends,  and  showing  we 
willing  to  defend  our  interests.  In  t 
way  we  give  the  Soviets  more  of  a 
stake,  in  their  own  interest,  in  betti 
relations  with  us  across  the  board. 

Need  for  a  Long-Term 
Strategy 

Sudden  shifts  in  policy,  stemming  f 
emotional  and  perfectly  understand 
reactions  to  Soviet  behavior,  are  nc 
way  to  pursue  our  interests.  It  seei 
me  that  the  West,  if  it  is  to  compet 
fectively  and  advance  its  goals,  mu; 
develop  the  capacity  for  consistenc; 
discipline  and  must  fashion — and  s' 
to— a  long-term  strategy. 

But  consistency  is  difficult  for  ; 
democracy.  Historically,  American 
has  swung  from  one  extreme  to  th- 
other.  We  have  gone  through  peric 
implacable  opposition— forgoing  ne 
tions,  building  up  our  defenses,  am 
fronting  Soviet  aggression.  Then,  c 
cerned  about  confrontation,  we  ha\ 
entered  periods  of  seeming  detente 
ing  which  some  were  tempted  to  m 
our  defenses  and  ignore  Soviet  thri 
to  our  interests  around  the  world— 
once  again  to  be  disillusioned  by  so 
Soviet  action  that  sent  us  swinging 
to  a  more  implacable  posture. 

We  have  tended  all  too  often  t( 
focus  either  on  increasing  our  stre! 
or  on  pursuing  a  course  of  negotiat 
We  have  found  it  difficult  to  pursui 
simultaneously.  In  the  long  run,  thi 
absence  of  a  consistent,  coherent 
American  strategy  can  only  play  tc 
advantage  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Therefore,  we  must  come  to  gr 
with  the  more  complex  reality  of  oi 


THE  SECRETARY 


tion.  A  sustainable  strategy  must 
de  all  the  elements  essential  to  a 
advantageous  U.S. -Soviet  relation- 
We  need  to  be  strong,  we  must  be 
y  to  confront  Soviet  challenges,  and 
hould  negotiate  when  there  are 
tic  prospects  for  success. 

poses  of  Negotiation 

ton  Churchill  understood  both  the 
and  the  necessity  of  negotiating 
the  Soviet  Union.'  In  May  19.53,  he 
"It  would,  I  think,  be  a  mistake  to 
ne  that  nothing  can  be  settled  with 
oviet  Union  unless  or  until  every- 
is  settled."  In  the  1980s,  as  then, 
rocess  of  U.S. -Soviet  negotiation 
s  its  purposes  both  to  avert 
rous  confrontations  and  to  reach 
ments  that  are  in  our  mutual  in- 

:'  we  are  to  be  effective  in  negotia- 
we  need  a  clear  sense  of  what  we 
to  achieve. 

he  United  States  seeks  an  interna- 
environment  that  enhances  the 
im,  security,  and  prosperity  of  our 
)eople,  our  allies  and  friends,  and 
mankind.  We  know  that  such  a 
sing  future  depends,  above  all,  on 
ity  and  global  security.  It  cannot  be 
ed  in  a  world  where  aggression 
inchecked  and  where  adventurous 
n  policies  succeed.  Nor  can  it  be 
'ed  in  a  world  where  the  two 
t  powers  refuse  to  engage  in  con- 
ive  relations. 

)  pursue  our  goals  successfully  we 
persuade  the  Soviets  of  two  things: 

rst,  that  there  will  be  no  rewards 
gi-ession.  We  are  strong  enough 
?termined  enough  to  resist  at- 
s  by  the  Soviet  Union  to  expand 
itrol  by  force;  and 
icond,  that  we  have  no  aggressive 
ions.  We  mean  no  threat  to  the 
ty  of  the  Soviet  Union.  We  are 
and  willing,  at  all  times,  to  discuss 
jgotiate  our  differences. 

le  conditions  for  successful 
ation  exist  when  both  sides  stand 
1  from  an  agreement  or  stand  to 
om  the  absence  of  an  agreement, 
ve  to  accept  the  fact  that  on  many 

our  respective  goals  may  be  in- 
tible,  making  agreements  impossi- 
reach.  When  this  occurs,  we 

not  despair  or  panic  about  the 
I  )f  our  relations.  Certainly,  we 

never  accept  disadvantageous 
nents  for  the  sake  of  making 
ations  seem  successful.  Occasional 


disappointments  are  part  of  the  long- 
term  process,  and  we  should  move  on  to 
seek  negotiations  when  and  where  the 
conditions  are  ripe  for  progress. 

Some  argue  that  if  you  cannot  trust 
the  Soviets,  you  should  not  negotiate 
with  them.  But  the  truth  is,  successful 
negotiations  are  not  based  on  trust.  We 
do  not  need  to  trust  the  Soviets;  we 
need  to  make  agreements  that  are  trust- 
worthy because  both  sides  have  incen- 
tives to  keep  them.  Such  incentives 
operate  best  when  there  are  clear  and 
working  means  to  verify  that  obligations 
undertaken  are,  in  fact,  carried  out. 

Each  side  will  watch  the  other 
carefully  to  ensure  that  neither  can  gain 
a  one-sided  advantage  by  violating  an 
agr-eement.  If  we  spot  Soviet  violations, 
we  must  do  what  is  necessary  to  protect 
ourselves  and  to  raise  the  cost  to  the 
Soviets  of  further  violations.  We  cannot 
allow  them  to  use  negotiations  or 
agreements  as  a  cover  for  actions  that 
threaten  our  interests. 

Sometimes  it  is  said  that  plain 
statements  by  us  about  Soviet  violations 
of  agreements,  whether  on  arms  or 
human  rights,  harm  our  relationship.  In 
our  system,  it  is  our  obligation  to  speak 
out  and  tell  the  truth— to  the  Soviets,  to 
the  world,  and  to  the  American  people. 
Our  own  values  have  claims  on  us,  both 
to  speak  out  honestly  and  to  use  our 
leverage  when  we  can,  and  often  quietly, 
for  humanitarian  goals.  Those  goals  are 
not  a  burden  on  the  U.S. -Soviet  relation- 
ship; they  are,  for  us,  a  key  part  of  that 
relationship.  If  we  can  help  a  Shcharan- 
sky  or  Sakharov,  or  prevent  the  jailing 
of  a  priest  in  Lithuania,  or  ease  the 
plight  of  Soviet  Jewry,  we  have  gained 
something  worth  negotiating  for  and 
worth  using  our  influence  to  obtain — not 
to  score  points  against  the  Soviets  but 
because  we  are  a  moral  people. 

The  experience  of  negotiations 
shows  that  the  Soviets  recognize  reality 
and  that  tough,  sober  bargaining,  when 
backed  by  American  strength,  can  lead 
to  mutually  advantageous  results. 
Negotiation  without  strength  cannot 
bring  benefits.  Strength  alone  will  never 
achieve  a  durable  peace. 

A  Policy  of  Strength 
and  Negotiation 

Throughout  this  Administration,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  has  adhered  to  this  ap- 
proach. He  has  based  his  policies  toward 
the  Soviet  Union  on  a  solid  foundation 
of  realism,  strength,  and  negotiation. 


This  approach  has  created  the  objective 
conditions  for  a  safer,  more  constructive 
relationship  in  the  years  ahead. 

In  light  of  Moscow's  history  of  tak- 
ing advantage  of  any  weakness,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  we  suffered  setbacks  in 
the  1970s.  In  light  of  the  recent  clear 
improvement  in  our  relative  position,  it 
is  not  surprising  that  Moscow  is  com- 
plaining about  our  policy.  The  1970s 
were  a  time  when  our  economy  was 
deeply  troubled,  when  our  military 
capabilities  were  eroding,  and  when  our 
self-confidence  and  sense  of  purpose 
both  at  home  and  overseas  were  at  a 
low  ebb.  The  Soviets  had  grounds  for 
believing  that  what  they  call  "the  global 
correlation  of  forces"  had  shifted  in  their 
favor.  And  we,  in  turn,  had  grounds  for 
fearing  that  they  might  overreach 
themselves  and  present  us  with  a 
challenge  that  we  could  neither  ignore 
nor  effectively  counter. 

Since  then,  the  United  States,  in 
particular,  and  the  West,  in  general, 
have  made  an  impressive  turnaround. 
We  have  begim  to  recover  lost  ground 
and  to  move  ahead. 

•  Our  own  economic  recovery  is  well 
underway.  Sustained  growth  without  in- 
flation is  within  reach.  The  American 
economy  has  bounced  back  and  is  giving 
welcome  impetus  to  global  recovery. 

•  The  much-needed  modernization 
of  Western  defense  capabilities  is  on 
track.  The  gaps  in  the  East-West 
military  balance  that  were  expanding  in 
the  1970s  are  being  narrowed  and 
closed.  The  Soviets'  temptation  to 
preempt  or  intimidate  at  any  point  on 
the  spectrum  of  deterrence  must  be 
diminishing. 

•  We  have  restored  the  relations  of 
confidence  and  harmony  with  our  key 
allies  in  Europe  and  Asia,  which  have 
been  the  bedrock  of  American  security 
throughout  the  postwar  era.  We  have 
provided  leadership  in  the  community  of 
nations  joined  to  us  by  common  values 
and  common  interest.  Disagreements 
have,  at  times,  been  sharp,  and  debate 
vigorous,  just  as  they  are  in  our  country. 
The  result,  however,  just  as  here,  has 
been  increasing  consensus  on  the 
challenges  to  the  common  security  and 
widening  agreement  on  what  is  required 
to  meet  those  challenges. 

•  Most  important,  we  have  restored 
our  own  confidence  in  ourselves.  We 
know  that  we  are  capable  of  dealing 
with  our  problems  and  promoting  our  in- 
terests and  ideals  in  a  complex  and 
dangerous  world.  We  have  renewed  our 
commitment  to  democratic  values  and 
human  rights,  a  commitment  that  joins 


THE  SECRETARY 


us  not  only  to  our  allies  but  to  other 
millions  across  the  globe. 

These  achievements  put  our  relation- 
ship with  Moscow  on  a  substantially 
safer,  sounder,  and  more  durable  basis. 
Our  credibility  as  a  strong  and  resolute 
nation  has  been  enhanced.  In  contrast  to 
the  1970s,  Moscow  has  not  only  failed  to 
add  any  new  territory  to  its  extended 
empire  in  the  1980s  but  it  has  been 
unable  to  prevent  adverse  trends  in  Cen- 
tral America,  the  Caribbean,  Asia,  and 
southern  Africa.  Some  in  Moscow  must 
wonder  if  the  "correlation  of  forces"  is 
not  shifting  against  them. 

We  hold  to  the  principle  that 
America  should  not  negotiate  from  a 
position  of  weakness,  and  this  Ad- 
ministration has  ensured  that  we  need 
not  face  such  a  prospect. 

But  we  reject  the  view  that  we 
should  become  strong  so  that  we  need 
not  negotiate.  Our  premise  is  that  we 
should  become  strong  so  that  we  are 
able  to  negotiate.  Nor  do  we  agree  with 
the  view  that  negotiated  outcomes  can 
only  sap  our  strength  or  lead  to  an  out- 
come in  which  we  will  be  the  loser.  We 
will  stay  strong  to  enforce  the  peace;  we 
will  bargain  hard  to  ensure  that  any 
agreement  we  sign  is  reliable  and 
verifiable;  and  we  will  negotiate  serious- 
ly to  find  solutions  that  endure. 

In  bargaining  with  the  Soviets,  we 
are  prepared  for  modest  advances  as 
well  as  major  breakthroughs.  We  have 
made  limited  proposals  designed  to 
stabilize  the  current  state  of  relations. 
And  we  have  made  ambitious  proposals 
that,  if  accepted,  could  put  the  Soviet- 
American  relationship  on  a  fundamental- 
ly new  and  .safer  footing. 

In  conducting  negotiations  and 
discussions  in  the  major  areas  of 
U.S. -Soviet  relations— arms  control, 
regional  issues,  human  rights,  and 
bilateral  cooperation— we  have  been 
guided  by  four  basic  principles. 

First,  we  must  have  a  strong 
defense.  The  United  States  does  not 
seek  military  superiority  over  the  Soviet 
Union.  But  the  Soviets  must  know  that 
in  the  absence  of  equitable  and  verifiable 
agreements,  we  will  proceed  with 
defense  programs  that  will  deny  them 
superiority.  The  test  of  arms  control  is 
whether  it  reduces  the  danger  of  war. 
An  arms  control  agreement  that  con- 
trols the  United  States  but  does  not  con- 
trol the  Soviet  Union  would  only  in- 
crease the  danger  of  war.  We  know  we 
will  adhere  to  agreements;  based  on 
their  conduct,  we  cannot  be  sure  they 
will.  Therefore,  agreements  must  be 
reliable  and  verifiable. 


Second,  we  must  be  united  both  at 
home  and  with  our  friends  and  allies. 
We  must  continue  to  strengthen  our  alli- 
ances and  friendships  and,  above  all, 
reaffirm  and  reinvigorate  our  own  bipar- 
tisan consensus  about  the  need  for  a 
foreign  policy  based  on  realism, 
strength,  and  negotiation. 

Third,  we  must  be  patient.  We  can- 
not abandon  negotiations  or  change  our 
whole  strategy  each  time  the  Soviets 
misbehave.  We  must  not  allow  ourselves 
to  panic  or  overreact  to  every  fresh 
demonstration  of  incivility  or  intran- 
sigence. Nor  can  we  abandon  our  de- 
fenses or  forget  the  importance  of  our 
friends  and  allies  each  time  there  is  a 
period  of  negotiating  success. 

Fourth,  we  must  be  purposeful,  flex- 
ible, and  credible.  We  must  negotiate 
with  the  Soviet  Union  on  the  basis  of 
equality  and  reciprocity,  in  ways  that 
demonstrate  to  the  Soviets  and  to  our 
friends  our  commitment  to  reaching 
agreements  that  are  in  the  interests  of 
both  sides.  We  stand  ready  to  join  the 
Soviets  in  equal  and  verifiable  arms 
reduction  agi'eements,  and  we  are 
prepared  to  move  rapidly  to  discuss  both 
offensive  and  defensive  systems,  in- 
cluding those  that  operate  in  or  through 
space. 

Future  Prospects 

This  was  the  spirit  in  which  President 
Reagan  and  I  conducted  our  recent 
discussions  with  Deputy  Prime  Minister 
Gromyko.  We  set  out  for  him  our  agen- 
da for  the  years  ahead.  Wcj  presented 
some  new  ideas  for  getting  nuclear  arms 
control  negotiations  on  track  and  for 
achieving  some  worthwhile  results.  We 
offered  a  dialogue  on  regional  issues,  to 
avoid  crises  and  aid  the  search  for 
peaceful  solutions.  We  urged  the  Soviets 
to  take  steps  in  the  human  rights  area. 
And  we  outlined  constructive  measures 
to  improve  bilateral  cooperation  in  a 
variety  of  fields. 

Our  discussions  with  Mr.  Gromyko 
lead  me  to  conclude  that  the  Soviets  are 
interested  in  continuing  our  dialogue 
and  in  exploring  ways  to  enrich  that 
dialogue  and  turn  it  into  concrete 
results. 

What  can  we  expect?  The  Soviets 
may  now  realize  that  it  is  in  their  in- 
terest to  engage  with  us  on  the  larger 
issues  in  a  constructive  way.  Their  in- 
transigence in  walking  away  from 
negotiations  has  brought  them  nothing. 


A  patriotic  Russian  looking  back 
over  the  history  of  our  relations  wou 
find  it  difficult  to  construe  how  the 
policy  of  rejection  that  Moscow  has  1: 
following  has  served  his  country  well 
And  he  would  surely  realize  that  sue 
policy  will  prove  even  more  costly  in 
future.  In  weighing  his  present  choic 
he  would  have  to  ask  some  very  poir 
questions. 

•  If  the  Soviet  Union  will  not  ac 
equitable  arms  agreements,  then  the 
United  States  and  its  allies  will  conti 
their  modernization  programs.  Is  the 
any  Soviet  gain  in  this  result? 

•  If  the  Soviet  Union  pursues  ag 
gressive  policies  in  the  Third  World, 
not  least  in  our  own  hemisphere,  tha 
threaten  us  and  our  friends,  then  we 
respond  equally  strongly.  Isn't  the  le 
of  armed  conflict  in  the  Third  World 
high  already? 

•  If  improvement  in  Soviet  hum 
rights  performance  continues,  as  in  ■ 
past,  to  be  nothing  more  than  the 
cynical  manipulation  of  human  lives 
political  purposes,  then  the  Soviets  c 
not  expect  that  international — and  i: 
nal — pressures  for  better  performan 
will  stop  growing.  Doesn't  the  Sovie 
Union  pay  a  price  for  this  censure  a: 
for  the  isolation  that  goes  with  it?  T 
price  is  large  and  steadily  increasing 

We  pose  these  questions  knowin 
full  well  that  a  state  founded  on  the 
theory  that  the  global  correlation  of 
forces  must  move  in  its  direction  dO' 
not  easily  alter  its  course  to  suit  ne\ 
and  changed  circumstances.  The  ter 
tion,  if  not  the  compulsion,  is  alway; 
present  to  create  new  facts  to  confii 
an  old  theory.  Therefore,  we  should 
count  on,  or  even  expect,  immediate 
exciting  breakthroughs. 

But  the  way  is  wide  open  to  mo 
sustained  progress  in  U.S. -Soviet  re 
tions  than  we  have  known  in  the  pa 
In  recent  months,  there  have  been  i 
least  a  few  signs  of  Soviet  willingne 
meet  us  halfway  on  some  secondary 
contentious  issues.  We  have  been  at 
agree  to  upgrade  the  Hot  Line,  to  e 
tend  our  10-year  economic  cooperati 
agreement,  and  to  open  negotiationi 
expand  cultural  exchanges.  And,  of 
course,  Moscow  has  made  it  possible 
us  to  resume  high-level  contacts.  Th 
are  welcome  steps:  they  just  may  he 
more  substantial  and  productive  mo 
to  come.  And  I  can  tell  you,  certain! 
that  President  Reagan  welcomes  yej 
day's  statement  by  Chairman  Chern 
that  the  Soviets  are  ready  to  pursue 
constructive  dialogue  with  us. 


1 


THE  SECRETARY 


iVe  cannot  confidently  fathom,  much 
predict,  the  direction  of  Soviet 
y.  We  recognize  that  much  of  Soviet 
vior  stems  from  problems  and 
5ures  within  their  own  system.  Our 
ments  and  our  actions  are  often  far 
relevant  to  their  decisions  than 
'  ;  might  think.  During  this  Ad- 
tration,  President  Reagan  has  had 
■al  not  with  one  Soviet  leader  but 

which  has  not  made  the 
tiating  process  any  easier. 
Vhat  we  have  begun  to  do  over  the 
4  years,  and  can  continue  to  do  in 
uture,  is  to  persuade  Soviet  leaders 
continued  adventurism  and  intran- 
ce  offer  no  rewards.  We  have  pro- 
1  persuasive  reasons  for  the  Soviets 
oose,  instead,  a  policy  of  greater 
aint  and  reciprocity.  We  must  be 
ortable  with  the  requirements  of 
a  strategy,  including  its  price,  its 
.  and  its  predictable  periodic  set- 
;.  We  must  be  able  to  deter  Soviet 
isionism  at  the  same  time  as  we 
to  negotiate  areas  of  cooperation 
Dwer  levels  of  armaments, 
'hese  are  the  essential  elements  of 
mg-term  policy.  If  we  pursue  such 
itegy  with  wisdom  and  dedication, 
ive  a  much  better  prospect  for 
nng  our  goals:  countering  the 
it  challenge,  directing  the  compe- 
nto  less  dangerous  channels,  and 
ually  forging  a  more  constructive 
onship. 


Tess  release  229. 


A  Forward  Look 
at  Foreign  Policy 


by  Secretary  Shultz 


Address  before  the 
Los  Angeles  World  Affairs  Council 
in  Los  Angeles  on  October  19,  1984..'^ 


My  message  today  is  simple  and 
straightforward:  the  next  4  years  have 
the  potential  to  be  an  era  of  unparalleled 
opportunity,  creativity,  and  achievement 
in  American  foreign  policy.  There  are 
two  fundamental  reasons  why:  first,  I 
see  a  new  national  consensus  emerging 
here  at  home;  and  second,  the  agenda 
before  us  holds  great  promise  for 
positive  accomplishments  abroad. 

A  New  National  Consensus 

For  much  of  the  last  15  years,  American 
society  has  been  deeply  divided  over 
foreign  policy.  This  period  of  bitter  divi- 
sion, I  believe,  is  coming  to  an  end. 

We  all  know  that  Vietnam  took  its 
toll  on  what  used  to  be  called  the  post- 
war consensus  on  foreign  policy.  Our 
two  political  parties  still  express  very 
divergent  views  on  international  issues. 
But  the  American  people  no  longer  are 
as  divided  as  that  suggests — or  as  they 
once  were. 

Just  as  President  Reagan  has  re- 
shaped the  national  discussion  of 
government's  role  in  our  economic  life, 
so,  too,  in  foreign  policy  there  is  a  grow- 
ing majority  behind  some  basic  truths: 
realism  about  the  Soviet  Union,  ap- 
preciation of  the  need  for  a  strong 
defense,  solidarity  with  allies  and 
friends,  and  willingness  to  engage  our 
adversaries  in  serious  efforts  to  solve 
political  problems,  reduce  arms,  and 
lessen  the  risk  of  war.  Most  important, 
there  is  a  new  patriotism,  a  new  pride  in 
our  country,  a  new  faith  in  its  capacity 
to  do  good. 

Restoring  the  people's  confidence  in 
American  leadership  has  been  perhaps 
the  President's  most  important  goal  in 
foreign  policy.  Yes,  we  have  rebuilt  our 
military  strength;  yes,  we  have  put  our 
economy  back  on  the  path  of  sustained 


growth  without  inflation;  yes,  we  have 
conducted  a  vigorous  diplomacy  to  help 
solve  international  problems.  But  these 
achievements  reflect  and  reinforce  some- 
thing even  more  fundamental:  our  peo- 
ple's renewed  self-confidence  about  their 
country's  role  and  future  in  the  world. 
The  United  States  is  a  very  different 
country  than  it  was  5  or  10  years  ago— 
and  our  allies  and  our  adversaries  both 
know  it. 

And  we  are  engaged  for  the  long 
term.  Foreign  policy  is  not  just  a  day-to- 
day enterprise.  The  headlines  provide  a 
daily  drama,  but  effective  policy  requires 
a  vision  of  the  future,  a  sense  of 
strategy,  consistency,  and  perseverance, 
and  the  results  can  only  be  judged  over 
time.  Our  well-being  as  a  country 
depends  not  on  this  or  that  episode  or 
meeting  or  agreement.  It  depends  rather 
on  the  structural  conditions  of  the  inter- 
national system  that  help  determine 
whether  we  are  fundamentally  secure, 
whether  the  world  economy  is  sound, 
and  whether  the  forces  of  freedom  and 
democracy  are  gaining  ground. 

In  the  last  4  years,  this  country  has 
been  rebuilding  and  restoring  its  strate- 
gic position  in  the  world  for  the  long 
term.  And  we  have  launched  a  patient 
and  realistic  diplomacy  that  promises 
long-term  results.  That  is  why  I  believe 
the  foreign  policy  agenda  for  the  coming 
years  is  filled  with  opportunities.  It  is  an 
agenda  on  which  the  American  people 
can  unite,  because  it  accords  with  our 
highest  ideals.  It  is  an  agenda  that  can 
reinforce  the  national  unity  that  is  itself 
my  most  important  reason  for  optimism 
about  the  future. 

It  is  an  agenda  that  starts  in  our 
own  neighborhood.  Some  say  good 
fences  make  good  neighbors.  I  say:  to 
have  good  friends,  one  must  be  a  good 
friend.  That  accounts  for  the  unprece- 
dented attention  we  have  devoted  to  our 
relations  with  Canada  and  Mexico.  I 


THE  SECRETARY 


spent  the  first  2  days  of  this  week  in 
Toronto  meeting  with  Canadian  Exter- 
nal Affairs  Minister  Joe  Clark,  in  accord 
with  our  agi'eement  with  Canada  to  hold 
at  least  four  such  meetings  each  year. 
With  Mexican  Foreign  Minister 
Sepulveda,  I  have  met  12  times  in  the 
past  18  months,  most  recently  in  Mexico 
just  last  week.  Mexico  and  Canada  were 
the  first  countries  on  our  agenda  when 
we  came  into  office,  and  we  will  con- 
tinue these  regular  encounters  with  firm 
friends.  They  have  strengthened  our 
relations. 

Let  me  now  review  our  global  agen- 
da for  the  coming  years:  the  great  issues 
of  global  security;  the  need  to  resolve 
regional  conflicts;  the  task  of  reinvigo- 
rating  the  international  economy;  and  a 
new  range  of  critical  challenges  that  the 
headlines  rarely  mention. 

East-West  Relations 
and  Arms  Control 

I  will  start  with  East-West  relations  be- 
cause of  their  obvious  importance.  There 
can  be  little  satisfaction  or  comfort  in 
foreign  policy  progress  on  other  issues 
unless  the  U.S. -Soviet  relationship  is 
soundly  managed.  The  meetings  with 
First  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Gromyko 
last  month  indicated  a  Soviet  willingness 
to  consider  a  renewed  dialogue  aimed  at 
easing  tensions. 

For  our  part,  the  United  States  is 
ready  for  a  major  effort  in  the  coming 


will  thank  their  lucky  stars  that  Ronald 
Reagan  has  given  them  the  tools  to  de- 
fend American  interests. 

Clearly  the  Soviet  leaders  were 
more  comfortable  with  the  earlier  trend, 
confident  that  the  "correlation  of  forces" 
was  shifting  in  their  favor.  A  more 
vigorous  and  self-confident  American 
posture  in  the  world  poses  problems  for 
them.  The  democracies  are  politically 
united  and  recovering  economically,  and 
the  Soviets  have  suffered  a  number  of 
setbacks:  their  political  warfare  against 
NATO  deployment  of  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces  in  Europe  was  a 
failure.  Their  attack  on  the  Korean 
airliner  brought  universal  condemnation. 
Their  Afghanistan  invasion  has  met  with 
tough,  unyielding  resistance.  Poland  has 
raised  ominous  questions  about  the 
viability  of  their  East  European  empire. 
Their  attempt  to  repair  relations  with 
China  has  gone  flat.  In  southern  Africa 
and  in  the  Caribbean  Basin,  their  clients 
are  on  the  defensive.  At  home,  they  face 
deep  economic  difficulties  and  leadership 
uncertainties. 

The  Soviets'  recent  reluctance  to 
engage  with  us  is  perhaps  a  symptom  of 
these  frustrations.  But  inevitably  there 
will  be  an  adjustment  to  the  new  reality. 
President  Reagan  made  clear  to  Mr. 
Gromyko  that  we  are  ready  and  willing 
to  work  seriously  toward  a  more  con- 
structive relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  are  patient,  and  we  are  pre- 
pared. 

Arms  reduction  is  a  top  priority  on 
our  agenda.  As  the  President  put  it,  we 


When  the  Soviets  last  June  invitrd 
us  to  begin  talks  on  limiting  what  tiny 
call  the  "militarization  of  space,"  we 
quickly  accepted.  We  were  ready, 
without  preconditions,  to  talk  about 
what  they  wanted  to  talk  about.  Uiilnr 
tunately,  they  then  sought  to  extract 
concessions  from  us  before  the  talks 
began.  These  issues  are  important,  ana 
they  deserve  a  U.S. -Soviet  dialogue. 
Both  offensive  and  defensive  weapon? 
can  go  through  space,  and  our  prioniy 
has  been  to  get  the  competition  in  nlfe 
sive  strategic  weapons  under  control. 
There  is  no  shortage  of  important  new 
issues  to  address.  We  stand  ready  td  g 
to  Vienna  or  elsewhere  anytime  the 
Soviets  are  ready  and  to  do  so  without 
any  preconditions  about  the  substame 
the  agenda.  i 

Beyond  the  issue  of  space,  our  age 
da  includes  a  range  of  other  vital  arrm 
control  initiatives:  a  ban  on  chemical 
weapons;  negotiations  on  mutual  and 
balanced  reduction  of  conventional 
forces  in  Europe;  nuclear  nonprolifera 
tion;  and  the  measures  of  confidence- 
building  and  non-use  of  force  being  dii 
cussed  at  the  Stockholm  Conference  o 
Disarmament  in  Europe. 

We  prefer  the  path  of  negotiation 
and  we  are  capable  of  defending  our  i 
terests.  All  across  the  agenda,  the 
Soviets  will  find  us  a  serious  inter- 
locutor. If  the  Soviets  are  ready  to  re 
ciprocate,  the  coming  years  could  be  i 
most  productive  period  in  U.S. -Soviet 
relations  and  see  a  positive  contributi 
to  security  and  stability  for  everyone. 


.  .  .  there  is  a  new  patriotism,  a  new  pride  in  our 
country,  a  new  faith  in  its  capacity  to  do  good. 


months  and  years.  And  the  last  4  years 
have  put  the  building  blocks  in  place  for 
a  promising  and  productive  second 
Reagan  term.  The  Reagan  Administra- 
tion, with  congressional  support,  has 
launched  a  major  effort  to  rebuild  our 
military  del'en.ses.  For  too  long,  there 
had  been  the  perception — and  the 
reality — of  a  global  military  balance 
shifting  in  favor  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
This  trend  weakened  our  foreign  policy. 
Our  modernization  programs  still  have  a 
long  way  to  go,  but  today  we  face  the 
future  stronger  and  more  secure.  We 
are  better  able  to  deter  challenges  or  to 
meet  them.  Future  presidents,  facing  a 
potential  crisis  anywhere  in  the  world. 


are  "determined  to  achieve  real  arms 
control — reliable  agreements  that  will 
stand  the  test  of  time,  not  cosmetic 
agreements  that  raise  expectations  only 
to  have  hopes  cruelly  dashed."  There- 
fore, we  do  not  seek  merely  to  freeze 
the  present  level  of  military  competition 
with  all  its  imbalances  and  instabilities. 
We  are  determined  to  achieve  real, 
substantial,  verifiable  reductions  in  the 
most  destabilizing  strategic  systems  as 
well  as  in  intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces.  Because  the  strategic  forces  of 
the  two  sides  are  differently  structured, 
we  are  pre[)ared  to  lie  flexible  and  to 
negotiate  tradeoffs  between  areas  of  dif- 
fering interest  and  advantage. 


Strengthening  Our  Allianc 
and  Friendships 

We  are  well  positioned  for  a  new  pha 
of  East-West  diplomacy  because  our 
strength  is  buttressed  by  a  new  sensf 
vitality  and  common  purpose  among 
industrial  democracies.  The  failure  of 
the  Soviet  campaign  against  NATO 
missile  deployments  was  a  tribute  to 
alliance  solidarity.  So,  too,  was  the  ui 
precedented  joint  statement  on  secur 
issued  last  year  at  the  Williamsburg  ( 
nomic  summit,  which  saw  Japan,  for 
first  time,  join  as  a  partner  in  the  se( 
ty  deliberations  of  the  democratic  wo 
This  past  June,  the  harmony  of  view! 
among  the  London  summit  partners  t 
tended  beyond  economic  and  financia 
issues  to  East-West  relations,  terrori 
and  other  global  security  concerns. 

The  agenda  for  the  future  is  to  ai 
dress,  in  the  same  spirit,  the  probleiT 


THE  SECRETARY 


;  remain  in  alliance  relations.  We  can 
:  forward  to  a  new  and  creative 
od  in  NATO  under  the  guidance  of 
i  Carrington,  the  new  Secretary 
eral.  It  is  time  for  our  alliance  to 
again  at  the  task  of  modernizing 
^entional  defenses,  for  this  can  raise 
nuclear  threshold  and  reduce 
.nee  on  nuclear  weapons.  As 
reign  nations,  we  allies  have  our  dif- 
nces  on  economic  issues,  East-West 
e,  levels  of  defense  spending,  and 
B  problems  outside  the  NATO  area, 
we  are  bound  together  by  our  over- 
ig  common  interest  in  resolving 
e  differences  and  strengthening  our 
leration. 

There  is  one  striking  success  of  the 
couple  of  years  that  gets  little 
icity  and,  therefore,  may  be  virtually 
lown  to  the  American  people.  We 
begun  to  build  a  network  of  new 
with  our  friends  in  Asia— relation- 
5  that  could  well  prove  to  be  one  of 
Host  important  building  blocks  of 
al  prosperity  and  progress  in  the 
century.  Only  a  decade  after  Viet- 
,  the  United  States  has  more  than 
)red  its  position  in  Asia.  Our 
ices  in  East  Asia  are  strong,  and 
'riendships  there  are  remarkably 
lising.  This  is  a  major,  lasting  ac- 
i)lishment. 

in  the  past  4  years,  our  total  trade 
Asia  and  the  Pacific  region  has 
greater  than  with  any  other  region 
«  expanding  at  an  accelerating  rate. 
Japan,  we  have  made  progress  in 
iving  tough  economic  issues,  largely 
ase  both  countries  recognize  the 
•iding  political  importance  of  our 
lership.  ASEAN — the  Association 
uth  East  Asian  Nations— has  be- 
one  of  the  world's  most  impressive 
pies  of  economic  development  and 
•nal  cooperation.  Chinese  Premier 
s  visit  to  Washington  and  the 
dent's  trip  to  Beijing  have  put  our 
lonship  with  China  on  a  smoother, 
pragmatic  track.  Our  China  policy 
s  that  the  United  States  can  main- 
Tiutually  beneficial  relations  with  a 
,y  that  is  ideologically  very  differ- 
■om  ours.  It  is  an  attitude  we  would 
ippy  to  apply  to  the  Soviet  Union  if 
't  attitudes  and  policy  permit  it. 
'ur  ties  to  Asia  are  not  at  the  ex- 
'  of  our  ties  to  Europe  or  the 
•icas,  but  they  do  offer,  in  my  view, 
^ue  and  attractive  vision  of  the 
e.  The  free  economies  of  East  and 
least  Asia  are  a  model  of  economic 
ess  from  which  other  developing 
IS  can  learn. 

oday,  a  sense  of  Pacific  community 
erging  with  the  potential  for 


greater  collaboration  among  many  na- 
tions with  an  extraordinary  diversity  of 
cultures,  race,  and  political  systems. 
Certainly  this  is  not  as  institutionalized 
as  our  ties  with  Europe,  but  there  is  an 
expanding  practice  of  consultation,  a 
developing  sense  of  common  interest, 
and  an  exciting  vision  of  the  future.  We 
may  well  be  at  the  threshold  of  a  new 
era  in  international  relations  in  the 
Pacific  Basin. 

Promoting  Peaceful 
Settlement  of  Regional 
Conflicts 

If  the  past  is  any  guide,  world  peace  in 
future  years  is  likely  to  be  challenged  by 
local  and  regional  conflicts  in  the  Third 
World— conflicts  that  take  innocent 
lives,  sap  economic  development,  and 
retard  human  progress.  The  democracies 
have  a  strategic  interest  in  not  allowing 
such  conflicts  to  be  exploited  by  our 
adversaries.  We  have  the  same  interest 
in  helping  to  resolve  or  contain  these 
conflicts  and  in  helping  to  build  a 
durable  foundation  for  regional  peace 
and  economic  advance. 

The  nuclear  equilibrium  has  success- 
fully deterred  world  war  III,  but  it  also 
tends  to  free  our  adversaries  to  take 
risks  in  local  challenges  to  our  interests 
around  the  globe.  In  the  wake  of  Viet- 
nam, as  America  looked  mostly  inward, 
the  Soviet  Union  and  its  surrogates  ex- 
ploited many  local  conflicts  to  expand 
their  influence.  Today,  Soviet  adven- 
turism no  longer  goes  unchallenged. 
There  have  been  no  new  Afghanistans, 
Angolas,  or  Nicaraguas  on  this  Ad- 
ministration's watch.  It  is  up  to  us  to  be 
vigilant  and  strong  to  ensure  that  this 
remains  the  case. 

Freedom  is  still  in  the  balance  in 
much  of  the  world.  But  today  the  pros- 
pects for  long-term  political  independ- 
ence and  regional  stability  in  the  devel- 
oping world  may  be  better  than  at  any 
time  since  the  end  of  the  colonial  era. 

Central  America  is  a  critical  testing 
ground.  Following  generations  of  oligar- 
chic rule,  the  future  will  belong  either  to 
the  advocates  of  peaceful  democratic 
change  or  to  the  forces  of  revolutionary 
violence.  The  outcome  will  directly  affect 
our  own  national  security  and  the  peace 
and  progress  of  the  hemisphere. 

Those  people  today  who  claim  that 
the  United  States  is  relying  on  a  policy 
of  military  pressure  while  refusing  to 
negotiate  do  not  know — or  do  not  want 
to  know — what  is  really  going  on  in 
Central  America.  Our  policy  has  been  to 


promote  democracy,  reform,  and  free- 
dom; to  support  economic  development; 
to  help  provide  a  security  shield  against 
those  who  seek  to  spread  tyranny  by 
force;  and  to  support  dialogue  and 
negotiation  both  within  and  among  the 
countries  of  the  region. 

The  United  States  has  played  and  is 
playing  a  key  role  in  all  these  most  sig- 
nificant efforts.  We  have  provided 
critical  military  and  economic  help  to  the 
forces  of  democracy  in  EI  Salvador.  We 
admire  the  democratic  elements  in 
Nicaragua  who  cannot  accept  the  San- 
dinistas' betrayal  of  their  revolution  and 
export  of  violence.  By  giving  heart  to 
those  who  want  freedom  and  justice,  we 
have  helped  to  build  the  stable  founda- 
tion from  which  negotiations  have 
become  possible. 

Our  policy  is  beginning  to  work.  It 
will  succeed  if  we  stick  with  it.  I  have 
just  returned  from  Central  America,  and 
I  can  tell  you  that  some  far-reaching 
developments  are  underway.  President 
Duarte  of  El  Salvador  took  a  bold  step 
toward  national  reconciliation  with  his 
dramatic  journey,  unarmed,  to  talk  with 
guerrilla  leaders  about  peace.  The  joint 
communique  agreed  to  at  La  Palma  on 
Monday  inaugurated  a  process  that 
gives  the  Salvadoran  people  their  first 
hope  in  years  that  peace  could  prove 
possible  in  a  democratic  framework. 
President  Duarte's  drive  for  peace  and 
his  election  last  spring  set  standards 
that  Nicaragua's  Sandinistas,  who  are 
refusing  to  allow  open  and  competitive 
elections,  would  do  well  to  follow. 

Some  progress  is  also  being  made  in 
the  wider  regional  negotiations.  The 
latest  Contadora  draft  treaty  represents 
a  step  forward;  the  Central  American 
countries  most  directly  affected  are 
working  intensively  to  perfect  it,  to  en- 
sure that  it  fulfills  its  promise  as  a 
framework  for  regional  peace.  My  trip 
to  Nicaragua  last  June  was  followed  by 
Ambassador  Harry  Shlaudeman's  con- 
tinuing negotiations  with  the  Nicara- 
guans  to  advance  the  Contadora  proc- 
ess. And  most  recently  we  have  intensi- 
fied our  diplomacy  with  our  friends  in 
Mexico,  Central  America,  and  Europe. 

We  have  no  illusions  about  com- 
munist aims  or  methods,  and  we  must 
show  staying  power  if  these  diplomatic 
efforts  are  to  succeed.  If  we  succeed — 
and  today  there  is  fresh  hope— Central 
America  will  enjoy  a  future  of  peace, 
security,  economic  advance,  reconcilia- 
tion, and  spreading  democracy.  Today, 
Central  America  presents  one  of  the 
most  promising  areas  for  significant 
progress  in  the  period  ahead. 


THE  SECRETARY 


In  southern  Africa,  justice  and 
stability  require  that  apartheid— which, 
as  President  Reagan  said,  is  "repugnant" 
to  us  and  our  values— must  be  replaced 
by  an  equitable  political  and  economic 
system  that  truly  represents  all  the  peo- 
ple of  South  Africa.  The  key  to  peace  in 
southern  Africa  more  generally  is  a  set- 
tlement that  will  bring  independence  to 
Africa's  last  colony,  Namibia,  and 
remove  Cuban  troops  from  Angola. 
Working  with  our  key  allies,  with  the 
key  neighboring  states  in  the  region, 


resolutions,  "litmus  tests,"  military  solu- 
tions—these will  never  substitute  for 
direct  negotiation  between  the  parties, 
which  is  the  only  way  that  lasting  prog- 
ress will  ever  be  achieved.  Nor  is  the 
status  quo  consistent  with  peace.  The 
positions  President  Reagan  set  forth  in 
his  initiative  of  September  1,  1982,  re- 
main the  most  practical  and  workable 
approach.  It  is  a  lasting  contribution  to 
the  settlement  of  this  tragic  conflict  and 
to  the  effort  to  gain  true  peace  and 
security  for  Israel. 


Our  modernization  programs  still  have  a  long  way 
to  go,  but  today  we  face  the  future  stronger  and 
more  secure. 


and  with  South  Africa,  our  patient 
diplomacy  has  helped  to  resolve  most  of 
the  contentious  issues  that  stand  in  the 
way  of  a  Namibia  solution  under  UN 
auspices.  Such  an  achievement  will  end 
an  ugly  colonial  war,  reduce  oppor- 
tunities for  Soviet  penetration,  and 
enhance  African  and  international 
security.  Here  again,  a  long-festering 
conflict  now  shows  a  glimmer  of  hope, 
thanks  in  considerable  part  to  our 
diplomatic  efforts. 

In  Southeast  Asia,  we  have  sup- 
ported the  proposal  put  forward  by 
ASEAN  for  a  negotiated  solution  to  the 
Cambodian  problem.  That  proposal  is 
based  on  the  restoration  of  Cambodia's 
sovereignty  and  the  right  of  its  people  to 
choose  their  own  government,  free  of 
Vietnamese  occupation.  It  is  the  only 
sound  and  realistic  framework  for  a 
solution,  and  we  will  continue  to 
support  it. 

On  the  Korean  Peninsula,  we 
strongly  back  the  confidence-building 
measures  proposed  by  the  Republic  of 
Korea  and  the  UN  Command.  We  also 
endorse  and  encourage  the  active  diplo- 
macy led  by  the  UN  Secretary  General 
to  find  a  diplomatic  solution  in  Afghani- 
stan and  Cyprus. 

The  area  of  regional  tension  to 
which  the  United  States  has  devoted  the 
most  attention  over  the  years  is  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict.  Our  commitment 
to  Israel's  security  and  well-being  is 
ironclad.  So  is  our  commitment  to  the 
pursuit  of  peace.  The  history  of  the  past 
decade  shows  that  negotiations  work. 
The  parties  in  the  area  must  realize 
there  are  no  shortcuts:  ill-prepared  in- 
ternational conferences,  empty  UN 


The  Iran-Iraq  war  shows  that  the 
Arab-Israeli  problem  is  not  the  only 
source  of  tension  in  the  Middle  East — 
far  from  it.  While  avoiding  direct 
American  involvement  in  the  gulf  war, 
we  have  worked  successfully  with  other 
countries  to  prevent  that  war  from  esca- 
lating to  threaten  the  overall  stability  of 
the  region  and  to  harm  the  free  world's 
oil  lifeline. 

In  Lebanon,  we  negotiated  the 
removal  of  11,000  Palestinian  terrorists 
from  Beirut  in  1982,  and  in  1983  we 
negotiated  an  agreement  that  would 
have  ensured  the  security  of  Israel's 
northern  border,  Israeli  withdrawal 
from  Lebanon,  and  a  restoration  of 
Lebanon's  sovereignty.  We  are  proud  of 
that  achievement,  and  whatever  set- 
backs may  come,  we  will  not  let  up  our 
efforts. 

And  we  will  not  be  driven  out  of  the 
vital  region  of  the  Middle  East  by  acts 
of  terrorism.  The  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  prove  itself  a  reliable  security 
partner  to  all  our  friends  in  the  area — 
including  our  many  friends  in  the  Arab 
world — against  the  forces  of  extremism 
and  state-supported  terrorism. 

Today,  many  cry  that  terrorist  at- 
tacks against  us  are  our  fault;  that 
America  must  change  its  ways  and 
change  its  policies.  I  can  tell  you  that  we 
will  never  waiver  in  our  support  for 
Israel.  We  will  never  cease  to  defend 
our  values.  And  we  will  never  abandon 
the  cause  that  terrorists  seek  to  destroy: 
America's  commitment  to  peace,  free- 
dom, and  security  around  the  world. 

As  President  Reagan  told  the  UN 
General  Assembly:  "In  every  part  of  the 
world,  the  United  States  is  similarly 
engaged  in  peace  diplomacy  as  an  active 
player  or  a  strong  supporter." 


Reinvigorating  the 
International  Economic 
System 

The  issues  of  war  and  peace,  of  global 
security,  and  of  regional  conflict,  repr 
sent  the  traditional  agenda  of  foreign 
policy.  But  there  are  important  addi- 
tional tasks — none  more  important  th. 
seeing  to  the  health  of  the  world 
economy. 

There  is  no  force  in  the  world  tod; 
doing  more  to  invigorate  the  global  ec 
nomic  system  than  the  powerful 
economic  recovery  we  see  now  in  the 
United  States.  The  impact  of  our  expj 
sion  is  both  direct  and  indirect. 

Directly,  we  are  importing  large 
amounts  from  other  countries,  both  tl" 
developed  and  the  developing  countrie 
Those  purchases  are  spreading  our  ex 
pansion  throughout  the  world  by  pum 
ing  tremendous  new  resources  into  th 
international  economy.  U.S.  merchan- 
dise imports  will  grow  by  about  30%  1 
year. 

Indirectly,  we  may  be  contributinj 
even  more  to  the  world  economy  by  t 
example  we  have  set  in  shaping  up  oi 
own  economic  policies.  We  have  revis 
our  tax  system  to  create  real  incentiv 
to  work,  to  save,  to  invest,  to  take  rii 
to  be  efficient.  We  have  reduced  gove 
ment  regulation,  intervention,  and  co 
trol.  We  have  opened  opportunities  f( 
freer  competition  in  transportation, 
finance,  communication,  manufacturii 
and  distribution.  Most  important,  we 
have  spread  the  benefits  of  our  recov 
to  the  working  population  by  creating 
new  and  better  job  opportunities,  red 
ing  inflation  to  one-third  of  its  level  4 
years  ago,  and  reducing  unemployme 
by  one-third  in  less  than  2  years. 

This  is  a  dramatic  change  from  tl 
state  of  the  American  economy  4  yea 
ago.  It  has  captured  the  attention  of    " 
world,  and  the  policies  that  have 
brought  it  about  are  becoming  under- 
stood. It  is  widely  noted  that  similar 
policies  are  pursued  in  those  parts  of 
world  that  have  been  enjoying  the  be 
economic  growth— most  strikingly  in 
Pacific  Basin  but  in  other  countries  a-f' 
well. 

Success  inspires  emulation.  We  n 
find,  almost  everywhere  in  the  world 
movements  to  decentralize,  to  deregt 
late,  to  denationalize,  to  reduce  rigidi 
and  to  enlarge  the  scope  for  individui 
producers  and  consumers  to  cooperat 
through  markets  rather  than  only 
through  government  dictates.  The  in- 
direct benefits  that  may  come  to  the 


THE  SECRETARY 


d's  economies  by  following  this  ex- 
e  are  likely  in  the  long  run  to  sur- 
by  far  the  direct  benefits  they  gain 
e  short  run  from  our  own  expan- 

^wo  central  issues  which  have  been 
ocus  of  our  attention,  and  which 
prominently  among  the  opportuni- 
br  further  progress,  are:  managing 
iternational  debt  problem  and  rein- 
ating  the  global  economy  through  a 
open  trading  system. 
[uch  progress  has  been  made  in 
ging  the  debt  problem.  A  lasting 
on  lies  in  three  areas:  restoring 
th  in  the  world  economy,  main- 
ig  open  trade  and  investment 
ets  in  both  developed  and  develop- 
juntries,  and  pursuing  sound  eco- 
policies  in  the  developing  coun- 
30  they  are  in  a  competitive  posi- 
0  benefit  from  the  global  recovery. 
he  United  States  is  doing  its  part. 
nport  about  one-third  of  all  the 
factured  exports  of  the  developing 
ries  and  about  half  of  all  their 
factured  exports  to  the  indus- 
ed  world.  In  1982,  we  provided 
Ithan  35%  of  the  nearly  $84  billion 
incial  resources,  public  and 
16,  that  flowed  to  developing  coun- 
With  new  resources  available  to 
Iternational  Monetary  Fund,  its 
6  a  catalyst  for  change  and  new 
B  debt  financing  has  been 
•thened.  The  current  account 
s  of  non-OPEC  developing  coun- 
1  1984  should  be  about  $28  billion, 
,an  half  the  1982  high-largely 
ling  the  $26  billion  improvement  in 
irade  balance  with  the  United 

it  there  are  no  shortcuts.  Stable 
;rm  expansion  in  the  developing 
will  require  sound  economic 
s,  freeing  up  the  market  and  en- 
ing  private  investment.  If  a  coun- 
•js  not  pursue  sound  economic 
6,  no  amount  of  outside  assistance 
reform  of  the  international 
%  and  financial  systems  can  assure 
eperity.  But  if  a  country  manages 
1  policies  wisely,  the  benefits  of 
policies  can  be  increased  by  well- 
ed outside  assistance  and  by  effec- 
stems  of  international  trade  and 

will  be  absolutely  essential,  at  the 
ime,  that  we  maintain  and 
e  the  openness  of  the  world 
;  system.  Trade  is  the  transmis- 
It  of  prosperity,  and  attempts  to 
)ff  trade  by  protectionism  can 
tard  the  general  recovery  and  ex- 
;e  the  debt  problem. 


The  United  States  has  the  most 
open  market  in  the  world,  and  we  have 
a  President  who  is  philosophically  com- 
mitted to  an  open  trading  system.  His 
recent  decision  on  copper  imports  was 
an  important  step  in  this  regard;  in  the 
steel  case  he  chose  a  course  designed  to 
focus  on  the  removal  of  unfair  trade 
practices  rather  than  protectionism.  He 
worked  hard  at  the  London  summit  to 
ensure  that  the  summit  declaration 
urged  formal  movement  toward  a  new 
round  of  multilateral  negotiations  to 
liberalize  trade.  The  only  effective  way 
to  prevent  protectionism  from  destroy- 
ing a  healthy  world  recovery  is  to  move 
rapidly  to  negotiate  a  fairer  and  more 
open  trading  system  for  all  countries. 

As  global  recovery  spreads,  the 
benefits  for  our  foreign  policy  will  be 
enormous.  A  restoration  of  noninfla- 
tionary  economic  expansion  will  advance 
all  our  political  objectives.  It  will 
strengthen  our  allies  and  friends;  it  will 
facilitate  the  strengthening  of  our  collec- 
tive defenses;  it  will  help  fend  off  pro- 
tectionism and  ease  economic  disputes; 
it  will  reinforce  our  bargaining  position 
in  East- West  negotiations;  it  will  stimu- 
late progress  in  the  Third  World,  deny- 
ing our  adversaries  new  problem  areas 
to  exploit.  It  will  improve  the  climate  for 
international  cooperation  and  spread 
new  confidence  in  the  future  of 
democracy. 

New  Dimensions  of 
International  Cooperation 

The  agenda  for  the  future  also  includes 
new  dimensions  of  international  concern. 
A  few  moments  ago,  I  mentioned  ter- 
rorism. Terrorism  is  a  threat  to  which 
democratic  societies,  open  and  free,  are 
particularly  vulnerable.  The  growing 
phenomenon  of  state  support  of  ter- 
rorism is  a  political  weapon  deliberately 
wielded  by  despotic  and  fanatical 
regimes  and  their  henchman  against  the 
basic  values  of  the  Western  democracies. 
The  bombing  of  our  Embassy  in  Beirut 
last  month  and  the  many  attacks  on 
other  Western  and  pro-Western  targets 
in  Beirut  show  that  the  threat  is  ever 
present.  And  last  week's  cowardly  bomb 
attack  in  Brighton,  England,  against 
Prime  Minister  Thatcher  and  members 
of  her  Cabinet  shows  again  that  the 
danger  is  not  confined  to  the  Middle 
East.  Those  who  wage  terrorist  warfare 
against  us  are  seeking  to  shake  our  com- 
mitment to  our  principles  and  to  alter 
our  policies  of  promoting  peace,  pros- 
perity, and  democracy.  We  will  not  yield 
to  blackmail. 


It  is  time  for  this  country  to  make  a 
broad  national  commitment  to  meet  this 
threat.  Congress  must  give  us  the 
resources  and  the  legislative  tools  to  do 
the  job.  We  need,  and  we  are  getting, 
the  resources  to  protect  our  facilities 
and  personnel  abroad.  We  need  new 
tools  of  law  enforcement.  Sanctions, 
when  exercised  in  concert  with  other  na- 
tions, can  help  to  isolate,  weaken,  or 
punish  states  that  sponsor  terrorism 
against  us. 

Our  law  enforcement  agencies  must 
continue  to  perfect  their  counter- 
terrorism  techniques  and  to  work  with 
the  agencies  of  friendly  countries,  for 
terrorism  is  truly  an  international  prob- 
lem. Our  military  and  intelligence  agen- 
cies must  be  given  the  capability,  the 
mandate,  the  support,  and  the  flexibility 
to  develop  the  techniques  of  detection, 
deterrence — and  response. 

All  too  often,  we  find  terrorism 
linked  to  another  problem  of  great  con- 
cern: narcotics.  We  all  know  the 
domestic  dimension  of  the  drug  problem, 
but  there  is  a  growing  awareness  in 
other  countries  that  it  is  truly  an  inter- 
national problem  to  which  few  are  im- 
mune. Not  only  is  drug  abuse  increasing 
in  other  countries,  but  the  corrupting  ef- 
fect of  drug  trafficking  on  political  and 
economic  institutions  is  more  and  more 
widely  recognized.  Beyond  the  disturb- 
ing links  between  drug  traffickers  and 
international  terrorism,  we  see  certain 
communist  governments,  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua  in  our  own  hemisphere,  using 
the  narcotics  trade  as  a  source  of  funds 
to  support  insurgencies  and  subversion. 

The  drug  problem  is  a  major  concern 
of  our  foreign  policy.  Our  strategy  ad- 
dresses the  problem  in  its  international 
dimension,  including  controls  on  the 
cultivation,  production,  and  distribution 
of  drugs;  curbs  on  the  flow  of  profits 
and  the  laundering  of  money;  and  relief 
against  the  impact  on  other  countries  as 
well  as  our  own.  We  have  reached  im- 
portant agreements  with  other  countries 
on  crop  control,  eradication,  and  inter- 
diction. We  have  provided  assistance  to 
implement  these  control  agreements,  as 
well  as  aid  for  development  and  training 
in  law  enforcement. 

But  it  is  clear  that  more  needs  to  be 
done,  on  an  international  as  well  as  na- 
tional basis.  Worldwide  crop  production 
still  provides  a  surplus  of  narcotics  that 
greatly  exceeds  not  only  American  but 
worldwide  demand.  Some  countries  have 
not  done  enough  to  reduce  crop  levels. 
We  must  promote  cooperation  to  reduce 
cultivation  further  in  all  producer  na- 


THE  SECRETARY 


tions.  But  we  must  also  wage  a  deter- 
mined campaign  against  drug  use  here 
at  home,  thereby  sending  the  message  to 
people  in  other  countries,  as  well  as  to 
their  governments,  that  we  intend  to 
control  our  own  drag  abuse  problem. 

Nuclear  nonprojiferation  is  another 
challenge  on  our  agenda.  Like  the  story 
of  our  prospering  relations  with  Asia 
and  the  Pacific,  the  steady  progress  we 
have  been  making  does  not  make  the 
headlines. 

Today,  the  number  of  states  that 
have  acquired  the  means  to  produce 
nuclear  explosives  is  far  lower  than 
doomsayers  predicted  20  years  ago, 
though  the  potential  dangers  to  world 
stability  remain  exactly  as  predicted. 
The  United  States  is  vigorously  leading 
the  international  effort  to  establish  a 
regime  of  institutional  arrangements, 
legal  commitments,  and  technological 
safeguards  to  control  the  spread  of 
nuclear  weapons  capabilities. 

The  Reagan  Administration  has  ap- 
proached the  problem  with  a  sophisti- 
cated understanding  of  its  complexities. 
We  see  the  growing  reliance  on  peaceful 
nuclear  energy,  the  security  concerns 
that  give  rise  to  the  incentive  to  seek 
weapons,  and  the  need  for  broad  multi- 
lateral collaboration  among  nuclear  sup- 
pliers. We  have  made  progress  in  restor- 
ing a  relationship  of  confidence  and  a 
reputation  for  reliability  with  our 
nuclear  trading  partners;  we  have  had 
fruitful  talks  with  the  Soviet  Union  on 
our  mutual  interest  in  cooperation  in 
this  field;  we  have  encouraged  interna- 
tional measures  to  promote  comprehen- 
sive safeguards  and  stricter  export  con- 
trols. In  the  last  4  years,  10  additional 
countries  have  joined  the  Nonprolifera- 
tion  Treaty,  making  it  the  most  widely 
adhered-to  arms  control  agreement  in 
history. 

Consolidating  and  reinforcing  the 
nonproliferation  accomplishments  of  re- 
cent years  is  one  of  this  Administration's 
top  priorities.  It  is  no  easy  task.  There 
may  have  been  a  time  when  the  United 
States  could  virtually  dictate  guidelines 
for  international  nuclear  trade,  but  that 
is  most  assuredly  not  the  case  today.  We 
will  need  the  continued  support  and  full 
cooperation  of  the  other  nuclear  sup- 
pliers and  the  major  nuclear  consumers 
if  our  nonproliferation  efforts  are  to  con- 
tinue on  their  present,  successful  course. 


Promoting  Human  Rights 
and  Democracy 

Finally,  and  most  importantly,  among 
the  broader  objectives  of  American 
foreign  policy  in  the  coming  years  are 
goals  that  are  not  technical  or  material 
but  moral.  The  United  States  has  always 
stood  for  the  rule  of  law  as  a  civilizing 
force  in  international  relations;  our 
foreign  policy  has  always  embodied  a 
commitment  to  foster  democracy,  free- 
dom, and  human  rights. 

A  few  years  back,  pessimists  main- 
tained that  the  democracies  were 
doomed  to  permanent  minority  status  in 
the  world  community.  Today,  there  is  in- 
creasing evidence  that  democracy  is 
alive  and  well  around  the  world,  and  the 
most  encouraging  signs  are  in  our  own 
hemisphere.  One  week  ago  I  represented 
the  United  States  at  the  inauguration  of 
President  Barletta  of  Panama,  a  signifi- 
cant step  in  the  proud  progress  of  a  true 
friend  of  ours  toward  an  even  fuller 
democratic  society.  The  remarkable  fact 
is  that  more  than  90%  of  the  population 
of  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  to- 
day lives  under  governments  that  are 
either  democratic  or  on  the  road  to 
democracy,  compared  with  only  one- 
third  in  1979.  In  noncommunist  Asia, 
rapidly  growing  prosperity  is  increasing 
the  opportunities  and  pressures  for 
political  pluralism.  Obstacles  remain. 
But  on  every  continent,  we  see  vivid 
demonstrations  that  the  democratic  idea 
is  far  from  a  culture-bound  aspiration  or 
possession  of  the  industrialized  West. 

Certainly,  the  world  still  has  far  to 
go  before  it  is  "safe  for  democracy."  The 
yearning  for  freedom  in  Poland  and 
Afghanistan  and  human  rights  activity 
in  the  Soviet  Union  continue  to  be  re- 
lentlessly suppressed.  But  we  must  not 
lose  sight  of  the  real  advances  that  are 
now  underway. 

For  the  American  people,  these 
developments  are  an  inspiring  reminder 
of  the  vitality  of  the  idea  of  freedom 
that  we  have  championed  for  200  years. 
These  are  the  ideals  that  give  meaning 
to  our  efforts  abroad.  When  we  con- 
tribute to  the  freedom  of  others,  we  vin- 
dicate our  own  freedom  and  enrich  our 
own  heritage  of  democracy.  This,  in  the 
final  analysis,  is  why  we  are  engaged  in 
the  world. 

As  we  look  to  the  years  ahead,  I 
want  to  make  sure  that  this  Administra- 
tion's approach  is  understood.  Human 
rights  policy,  to  us,  is  a  commitment  to 
active  engagement  in  the  world,  not  a 


set  of  excuses  for  abandoning  friends 
shirking  obligations.  When  other  nati( 
fail  to  meet  the  standards  we  feel  are 
right,  when  others  are  heedless  of  val 
we  cherish,  we  do  not  intend  to 
withdraw  in  righteous  indignation.  W 
do  not  intend  to  break  our  association' 
with  other  nations  on  the  grounds  th£ 
we  are  pure  and  they  are  wanting.  Tl| 
human  rights  policy  of  the  second 
Reagan  Administration,  as  in  the  firs 
will  be  to  stay  engaged,  to  be  active, 
never  give  up,  to  continue  to  fight  foi 
adherence  to  the  rights  and  values  th 
we  stand  for  and  which  are  humanity 
best  hope  for  justice,  freedom,  and  \n 
ress. 

Looking  Ahead 

Therefore,  as  we  look  around  and  loo 
ahead,  there  are  many  reasons  for  op 
timism  about  the  state  of  the  world  a 
the  future  of  our  foreign  policy.  The 
structure  of  the  global  systemns  sour 
stable,  and  secure.  The  trends  are 
positive  in  many  ways.  Our  adversari 
are  burdened;  the  democracies  are 
united  and  recovering  their  vitality.  ''. 
United  States  is  strong  and  once  aga 
comfortable  with  its  role  of  leadershi 
Today,  time  is  on  freedom's  side. 

Next  year,  we  will  celebrate  the  ■ 
anniversary  of  the  end  of  World  Wai 
In  the  immediate  postwar  period,  th( 
United  States  faced  a  series  of  un- 
precedented new  challenges  and 
responded  with  an  extraordinary  but 
of  bipartisan  creativity  and  energy' ;  t 
Marshall  Plan,  the  Greek-Turkish  aic 
program,  the  North  Atlantic  alliance 
the  Food  for  Peace  program,  and  otl 
initiatives.  We  changed  the  world,  fc 
the  better.  In  the  1960s  and  1970s,  t 
bipartisan  spirit  deteriorated,  and  wi 
paid  a  price  for  it. 

The  challenges  we  face  today  ar( 
very  different  from  the  postwar  yeai 
but  just  as  great.  I  can  assure  you  tl 
major  goal  of  President  Reagan  in  a 
ond  term  will  be  to  summon  again  th 
spirit  of  bipartisan  cooperation.  It  vvi 
be  time  for  a  reaffirmation  of  unity, 
two  parties  must  come  together  as 
Americans,  and  the  Executive  and  C 
gress  must  work  together  as  partner 

Let  us  reforge  a  national  consen: 
on  foreign  policy  that  will  sustain 
America's  leadership  in  the  world  ov 
the  long-term  future.  In  unity,  we  al 
know,  there  is  strength.  And  there  i,' 
limit  to  what  a  free  and  united  peopi 
can  accomplish  if  it  sets  its  sights  hij 
and  faces  the  future  with  confidence 


'Press  release  2.31  of  Oct.  18,  1984. 


Ii 


THE  SECRETARY 


Soviet  Jewry 
and  U.S.-Soviet  Relations 


by  Secretary  Shultz 


Remarks  before  the 

National  Assembly  of 

the  National  Conference  on  Soviet  Jewry 

on  October  22,  1984-'^ 


k  you  very  much,  Ken  [Kenneth 
in,  National  Chairman  of  the  Anti- 
nation  League  of  B'nai  B'rith  and 
'  Conference  of  Presidents  of  Major 
ican  Jewish  Organizations],  I'm 
V  honored  to  have  this  award,  and 
privileged  to  work  with  you.  Ken, 
lliott  Abrams  [Assistant  Secretary 
uman  Rights  and  Humanitarian  Af- 
— people  like  Max  Kampelman 
iltant  to  the  Department  of  State 
mbassador  and  chairman  of  the 
delegation  to  the  1980-83  followup 
ig  of  the  Madrid  Conference  on 
ity  and  Cooperation  in  Europe] 
any,  many  others — who  have  the 
/lew  and  who  are  trying  to  do 
il  test  in  this  great  effort.  I  hoped 
t  imetime  we  might  have  a  meeting 

IS  in  which  we  would  have  some- 
'.  I'ally  to  celebrate.  Unfortunately, 
1  i — other  than  to  pledge  our  con- 
1  and  very  strong  efforts.  I've  al- 
't'lieved  that  the  foreign  policy  of 
I  Lited  States  must  reflect  not  only 
1  iterial  and  security  interests  but 

1  iral  values  as  well.  These  strands 
C  npletely  intertwined,  for  as  long 
It  lan  rights  are  denied  the  citizens 
I T  countries,  the  freedoms  we  en- 
i  ;his  country  are  ultimately  in  jeop- 
/.  ^hat  is  why  freedom  for  Soviet 

r  and  other  human  rights  issues 
'    cupied  such  a  prominent  place  in 
■  ifrns  as  Secretary  of  State. 

.!  time  of  prosperity  and  peace, 
'  \  ('  may  be  liable  to  take  our  own 

I' If  granted,  it  is  good  to 
T  lier  Thomas  Jefferson's  observa- 
.  Those  who  expect  to  reap  the 
gs  of  freedom,"  he  said,  "must  .  . 
o  the  fatigues  of  supporting  it." 
'ish  I  could  use  this  occasion  to 
'ou  encouraging  news  about  the 
on  of  Soviet  Jewry,  but  you 
at  least  as  well  as  I  do,  that  their 

2  )n  remains  very  grim.  Soviet 
ation  of  Jews  and  other  minorities 


'I 


has  not  only  not  diminished,  it  seems  to 
be  getting  worse. 

•  Within  the  past  2  months,  four 
well-known  Hebrew  teachers  have  been 
arrested  in  what  appears  to  be  an  inten- 
sifying campaign  of  repression  aimed 
specifically  at  Jewish  cultural  activities. 
In  the  Soviet  view,  apparently,  pro- 
moting identification  with  one's  religious 
and  cultural  heritage  constitutes  "anti- 
Soviet  agitation  and  propaganda." 

•  We  cannot  forget  Anatoly 
Shcharansky,  courageously  clinging  to 
his  principles  as  his  health  is  deterio- 
rating in  Chistopol  Prison.  He  was  im- 
prisoned on  the  blatantly  false  charge  of 
spying  for  the  United  States,  but  his 
real  "crime"  was  to  try  to  escape  from 
Soviet  tyranny  so  that  he  could  lead  a 
full  Jewish  life  with  his  family  in  Israel. 

•  To  discourage  others  from  trying 
to  leave,  Soviet  authorities  are  continu- 
ing to  threaten  many  "refuseniks"  with 
confinement  in  psychiatric  hospitals,  ex- 
pulsion from  their  jobs,  and  internal 
exile. 

While  all  this  has  been  going  on, 
there  has  been  an  alarming  upsurge  in 
officially  sanctioned  anti-Semitic  prop- 
aganda. Scurrilous  cartoons,  broadcasts, 
and  articles  equate  the  study  of  Jewish 
culture  with  fanaticism  and  racism  and 
compare  the  State  of  Israel  to  Nazi 
Germany. 

Jews,  of  course,  are  not  the  only  vic- 
tims of  Soviet  persecution.  Efforts  to 
stamp  out  all  independent  thought  have 
led  to  the  victimization  of  Nobel  Prize 
laureate  Andrei  Sakharov  and  his  wife, 
Yelena  Bonner.  Within  the  past  6 
months,  three  prominent  Ukrainian 
human  rights  activists  died  in  Soviet 
labor  camps.  All  three  deaths  can  be  at- 
tributed to  the  brutal  conditions  in 
Soviet  labor  camps  and  prisons.  The 
small  group  of  Soviet  idealists  who  tried 
to  monitor  their  government's  com- 
pliance with  its  human  rights  obligations 


under  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  has  been 
decimated  by  imprisonment  and  exile. 
Even  foreign  tourists  and  diplomats 
have  been  subjected  to  Soviet  harass- 
ment. 

Emigration,  meanwhile,  has  come  to 
a  virtual  standstill.  Just  over  1,,300  Jews 
left  the  Soviet  Union  in  1983,  approx- 
imately 2%  of  the  peak  year  total  of 
51,000  in  1979,  This  year  it  looks  like 
fewer  than  1,000  Jews  will  leave  the 
Soviet  Union.  Soviet  authorities  would 
have  the  world  believe  that  almost  all 
Soviet  Jews  who  want  to  emigrate  have 
already  done  so.  But,  clearly,  this  is  not 
true.  Thousands  of  Soviet  Jews  have  ap- 
plied for  exit  visas,  only  to  have  them 
denied.  They  are  ready  to  leave  on  a 
moment's  notice. 

We  debate  the  question  of  what  to 
do  among  ourselves,  as  I  am  sure  you 
do.  We  are  all  frustrated  by  the  lack  of 
progress  and  by  the  absence  of  any  easy 
or  ready  solutions.  But  rather  than 
argue  inconclusively  among  ourselves,  I 
am  convinced  that  what  we  can  and 
should  do  is  to  make  clear  to  the  Soviets 
what  our  own  approach  is  and  how  it  is 
related  in  our  eyes  to  the  U.S.-Soviet 
relationship  as  a  whole. 

That  is  what  we  have  tried  to  do 
under  this  Administration.  The  Soviets 
know  that  we  seek  to  put  relations  on  a 
stable  and  constructive  basis  for  the 
long  term.  But  I  think  they  also  know 
that  we  will  not  stop  our  practice  of  call- 
ing them  to  account  for  their  abuses  of 
human  rights.  And  among  human  rights 
issues,  none  has  more  urgency  than  the 
treatment  of  Soviet  Jewry. 

As  a  government,  we  would  prefer 
to  deal  with  these  issues  on  a  confiden- 
tial basis,  simply  because  it's  more  effec- 
tive that  way.  But  we  understand  and 
support  the  efforts  of  public  interest 
groups  to  express  their  concerns,  and 
we  will  not  be  silent  when  the  Soviets 
act  in  a  way  we  consider  dangerous  or 
irresponsible,  as  they  so  often  do  in  the 
human  rights  area. 

The  United  States,  therefore,  con- 
tinues to  speak  out  at  every  opportunity 
against  Soviet  human  rights  violations. 
We  have  vigorously  denounced  Soviet 
anti-Semitic  propaganda  and  practices. 
We  have  consistently  condemned  denial 
of  the  basic  right  of  Soviet  citizens  to 
emigrate.  In  the  face  of  blatant  intimida- 
tion, our  Embassy  in  Moscow  and  our 
consulate  in  Leningrad  have  maintained 
contact  with  individual  "refuseniks,"  and 
we  have  made  numerous  representations 
on  behalf  of  Soviet  citizens  who  have 
been  denied  permission  to  emigrate.  We 
continue  to  consult  with  other  Western 
nations  on  ways  to  improve  human 


THE  SECRETARY 


rights  performance.  And  in  all  our 
diplomatic  discussions  with  the 
Soviets— including  President  Reagan's 
recent  meeting  with  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko— we  have  stressed  human 
rights  issues. 

Soviet  leaders  may  well  be  perplexed 
by  our  preoccupation  with  human  rights. 
After  all,  they  and  many  other  govern- 
ments throughout  the  world  take  the 
view  that  human  rights  are  strictly  an 
"internal  affair."  In  this  view,  how  a 
government  treats  its  own  citizens  is  not 
a  matter  of  legitimate  international  con- 
cern or  even  discourse.  Compassion,  it 
seems,  should  stop  at  a  country's 
borders. 

In  the  aftermath  and  in  the 
everlasting  memory  of  the  Nazi 
Holocaust,  this  attitude  must  be 
relentlessly  exposed  as  a  gross  moral 
evasion.  Numerous  international 
covenants,  conventions,  and  declara- 
tions—including the  Universal  Declara- 
tion of  Human  Rights,  the  Genocide 
Convention,  and  the  Helsinki  ac- 
cords— today  attest  to  the  fact  that 
human  rights  are  no  longer  regarded  as 
an  "internal  matter."  On  the  contrary, 
they  are  intimately  linked  to  the  issues 
of  war  and  peace.  We  recognize  that 
governments  not  at  peace  with  their 
own  people  are  unlikely  to  be  at  peace 
with  their  neighbors. 

The  people  and  Government  of  the 
United  States  are  deeply  and  irrevocably 
committed  to  the  rule  of  law  in  both 
domestic  and  foreign  affairs.  For  this 
reason,  we  have  insisted,  and  shall  con- 
tinue to  insist,  that  the  Soviet  Union 
adhere  to  all  its  international  obliga- 
tions, including  its  human  rights  obliga- 
tions. As  I  said  last  Thursday  in  an  ad- 
dress on  the  management  of  U.S. -Soviet 
relations: 

We  can  never  let  ourselves  become  so 
wedded  to  improving  our  relations  with  the 
Soviets  that  we  turn  a  blind  eye  to  actions 
that  undermine  the  very  foundation  of  stable 
relations. 

A  moment  ago,  I  referred  to  the 
President's  meeting  with  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  at  the  White  House. 
Every  American  hopes  that  this  meeting 
marks  the  beginning  of  a  new,  more 
constructive  period  in  Soviet-American 
relations.  We  look  forward  to  the  oppor- 
tunity to  build  on  our  common  interests 
and  to  help  narrow  the  scope  of  some  of 
our  differences. 

But  I  hope  that  no  one,  either  in  the 
Soviet  Union  or  in  this  country,  serious- 
ly entertains  the  idea  that  once  negotia- 
tions are  underway,  the  United  States 
will  refrain  from  raising  our  human 
rights  concerns.  If  improvement  in 


Soviet  human  rights  performance  con- 
tinues as  in  the  past  to  be  nothing  more 
than  the  cynical  manipulation  of  human 
lives  for  political  purposes,  then  the 
Soviets  cannot  expect  that  interna- 
tional— and  internal — pressures  for  bet- 
ter performance  will  stop  growing. 
Doesn't  the  Soviet  Union  pay  a  price  for 
this  censure  and  for  the  isolation  that 
goes  with  it?  The  price  is  large  and 
steadily  increasing.  And  let  me  add, 
ladies  and  gentlemen,  that  we  shall  con- 
tinue to  do  all  in  our  power  to  see  that 
the  price  continues  to  increase. 

From  the  experience  of  World 
War  II  and  its  aftermath,  we  have 


learned  that  the  issues  of  peace  and  oi 
human  rights  are  joined  and  that  at- 
tempts to  separate  them  can  bring  on 
disaster.  We  have  learned  that  it  is  nc 
the  advocacy  of  human  rights  but  rat/ 
their  denial  that  is  a  source  of  tension 
world  affairs.  The  issue  of  human  rigl 
is  at  the  top  of  our  agenda  because  wc 
have  learned  the  great  lesson  of  the 
Scriptures:  we  truly  are  our  brother's 
keeper. 

Thank  you.  We'll  keep  struggling, 
and  somehow,  some  way,  we're  going 
succeed. 


'Press  release  -lie. 


Terrorism  and 
the  Modern  World 


by  Secretary  Shultz 


Address  before  the 

Park  Avenue  Synagogue 

in  New  York  City  on  October  25,  1984.^ 


Someday  terrorism  will  no  longer  be  a 
timely  subject  for  a  speech,  but  that  day 
has  not  arrived.  Less  than  2  weeks  ago, 
one  of  the  oldest  and  greatest  nations  of 
the  Western  world  almost  lost  its  Prime 
Minister,  Margaret  Thatcher,  to  the 
modern  barbarism  that  we  call  ter- 
rorism. A  month  ago  the  American  Em- 
bassy Annex  in  East  Beirut  was  nearly 
destroyed  by  a  terrorist  truck  bomt),  the 
third  major  attack  on  Americans  in 
Lebanon  within  the  past  2  years.  To  list 
all  the  other  acts  of  brutality  that  ter- 
rorists have  visited  upon  civilized  society 
in  recent  years  would  be  impossible  here 
because  that  list  is  too  long.  It  is  too 
long  to  name  and  too  long  to  tolerate. 

But  I  am  here  to  talk  about  ter- 
rorism as  a  phenomenon  in  our  modern 
world — about  what  terrorism  is  and 
what  it  is  not.  We  have  learned  a  great 
deal  about  terrorism  in  recent  years.  We 
have  learned  much  about  the  terrorists 
themselves,  their  supporters,  their 
diverse  methods,  their  underlying 
motives,  and  their  eventual  goals.  What 
once  may  have  seemed  the  random, 
senseless,  violent  acts  of  a  few  crazed  in- 
dividuals has  come  into  clearer  focus.  A 
pattern  of  terrorist  violence  has 
emerged.  It  is  an  alarming  pattern,  but 


it  is  something  that  we  can  identify  i 
therefore,  a  threat  that  we  can  devis 
concrete  measures  to  combat.  The 
knowledge  we  have  accumulated  abc 
terrorism  over  the  years  can  provide 
basis  for  a  coherent  strategy  to  deal 
with  the  phenomenon,  if  we  have  thi 
will  to  turn  our  understanding  into  £ 
tion. 

Meaning  of  Terrorism 

We  have  learned  that  terrorism  is, 
above  all,  a  form  of  political  violence 
is  neither  random  nor  without  purpo 
Today,  we  are  confronted  with  a  wic 
assortment  of  terrorist  groups  whici'  ■ 
alone  or  in  concert,  orchestrate  acts 
violence  to  achieve  distinctly  politica 
ends.  Their  stated  objectives  may  ra 
from  separatist  causes  to  revenge  fo 
ethnic  grievances  to  social  and  politii 
revolution.  Their  methods  may  be  ju 
diverse:  from  planting  homemade  ex 
plosives  in  public  places  to  suicide  ca 
bombings  to  kidnapings  and  political 
assassinations.  But  the  overarching  i 
of  all  terrorists  is  the  same:  thev  ar« 


THE  SECRETARY 


g  to  impose  their  will  by  force — a 
al  kind  of  force  designed  to  create 
mosphere  of  fear.  The  horrors  they 
t  are  not  simply  a  new  manifesta- 
if  traditional  social  conflict;  they 
epraved  opponents  of  civilization 
aided  by  the  technology'  of  modern 
onry.  The  terrorists  want  people  to 
elpiess  and  defenseless;  they  want 
e  to  lose  faith  in  their  government's 
ity  to  protect  them  and  thereby  to 
■mine  the  legitmacy  of  the  govern- 
itself,  or  its  policies,  or  both, 
le  terrorists  profit  from  the  anar- 
lused  by  their  violence.  They  suc- 
hen  governments  change  their 
s  out  of  intimidation.  But  the  ter- 
can  even  be  satisfied  if  a  govern- 
responds  to  terror  by  clamping 
on  individual  rights  and  freedoms, 
nments  that  overreact,  even  in 
fense,  may  only  undermine  their 
gitimacy,  as  they  unwittingly 
the  terrorists'  goals.  The  terrorist 
ds  if  a  government  responds  to 
e  with  repressive,  polarizing 
or  that  alienates  the  government 
he  people. 

lat  to  Democracy 

list  understand,  however,  that  ter- 
,  wherever  it  takes  place,  is 
d  in  an  important  sense  against 
democracies — against  our  most 
ialues  and  often  our  fundamental 
:jc  interests.  Because  terrorism 
m  brutal  violence  as  its  only  tool, 
Jways  be  the  enemy  of 
acy.  For  democracy  rejects  the 
iminate  or  improper  use  of  force 
ties  instead  on  the  peaceful  settle- 
If  disputes  through  legitimate 
1  processes. 

■9  moral  bases  of  democracy — the 
les  of  individual  rights,  freedom 
ight  and  expression,  freedom  of 
L — are  powerful  barriers  against 
'ho  seek  to  impose  their  will, 
leologies,  or  their  religious  beliefs 
B.  Whether  in  Israel  or  Lebanon 
tey  or  Italy  or  West  Germany  or 
irn  Ireland,  a  terrorist  has  no  pa- 
'or  the  orderly  processes  of 
atic  society,  and,  therefore,  he 
D  destroy  it.  Indeed,  terrorism 
)  destroy  what  all  of  us  here  are 
to  build. 

United  States  and  the  other 
acies  are  morally  committed  to 
ideals  and  to  a  humane  vision  of 
ire.  Nor  is  our  vision  limited  to 
)ur  borders.  In  our  foreign 


policies,  as  well,  we  try  to  foster  the 
kind  of  world  that  promotes  peaceful 
settlement  of  disputes,  one  that 
welcomes  beneficial  change.  We  do  not 
practice  terrorism,  and  we  seek  to  build 
a  world  which  holds  no  place  for  ter- 
rorist violence,  a  world  in  which  human 
rights  are  respected  by  all  governments, 
a  world  based  on  the  rule  of  law. 

And  there  is  yet  another  reason  why 
we  are  attacked.  If  freedom  and 
democracy  are  the  targets  of  terrorism, 
it  is  clear  that  totalitarianism  is  its  ally. 
The  number  of  terrorist  incidents  in 
totalitarian  states  is  minimal,  and  those 
against  their  personnel  abroad  are 
markedly  fewer  than  against  the  West. 
And  this  is  not  only  because  police 
states  offer  less  room  for  terrorists  to 
carry  out  acts  of  violence.  States  that 
support  and  sponsor  terrorist  actions 
have  managed  in  recent  years  to  co-opt 
and  manipulate  the  terrorist 
phenomenon  in  pursuit  of  their  own 
strategic  goals. 

It  is  not  a  coincidence  that  most  acts 
of  terrorism  occur  in  areas  of  impor- 
tance to  the  West.  More  than  80%  of 
the  world's  terrorist  attacks  in  1983  oc- 
curred in  Western  Europe,  Latin 
America,  and  the  Middle  East.  Ter- 
rorism in  this  context  is  not  just 
criminal  activity  but  an  unbridled  form 
of  warfare. 

Today,  international  links  among 
terrorist  groups  are  more  clearly 
understood.  And  Soviet  and  Soviet-bloc 
support  is  also  more  clearly  understood. 
We  face  a  diverse  family  of  dangers. 
Iran  and  the  Soviet  Union  are  hardly 
allies,  but  they  both  share  a  fundamental 
hostility  to  the  West.  When  Libya  and 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
tion] provide  arms  and  training  to  the 
communists  in  Central  America,  they 
are  aiding  Soviet-supported  Cuban  ef- 
forts to  undermine  our  security  in  that 
vital  region.  When  the  Red  Brigades  in 
Italy  and  the  Red  Army  Faction  in  Ger- 
many assault  free  countries  in  the  name 
of  communist  ideology,  they  hope  to 
shake  the  West's  self-confidence,  unity, 
and  will  to  resist  intimidation.  The  ter- 
rorists who  assault  Israel — and,  indeed, 
the  Marxist  Provisional  IRA  [Irish 
Republican  Army]  in  Northern 
Ireland — are  ideological  enemies  of  the 
United  States.  We  cannot  and  we  will 
not  succumb  to  the  likes  of  Khomeini 
and  Qadhafi. 

We  also  now  see  a  close  connection 
between  terrorism  and  international  nar- 
cotics trafficking.  Cuba  and  Nicaragua, 
in  particular,  have  used  narcotics  smug- 
glers to  funnel  guns  and  money  to  ter- 
rorists and  insurgents  in  Colombia. 


Other  communist  countries,  like 
Bulgaria,  have  also  been  part  of  the 
growing  link  between  drugs  and  ter- 
rorism. 

We  should  understand  the  Soviet 
role  in  international  terrorism  without 
exaggeration  or  distortion.  One  does  not 
have  to  believe  that  the  Soviets  are  pup- 
peteers and  the  terrorists  marionettes; 
violent  or  fanatic  individuals  and  groups 
can  exist  in  almost  any  society. 

But  in  many  countries,  terrorism 
would  long  since  have  withered  away 
had  it  not  been  for  significant  support 
from  outside.  When  Israel  went  into 
Lebanon  in  1982,  Israeli  forces  un- 
covered irrefutable  evidence  that  the 
Soviet  Union  had  been  arming  and  train- 
ing the  PLO  and  other  groups.  Today, 
there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  Soviet 
support  for  terrorist  groups  around  the 
world  has  diminished.  Here  as 
elsewhere,  there  is  a  wide  gap  between 
Soviet  words  and  Soviet  deeds,  a  gap 
that  is  very  clear,  for  instance,  when 
you  put  Soviet  support  for  terrorist 
groups  up  against  the  empty  rhetoric  of 
the  resolution  against  so-called  "state 
terrorism"  which  the  U.S.S.R.  has  sub- 
mitted to  this  year's  UN  General 
Assembly.  The  Soviets  condemn  ter- 
rorism, but  in  practice  they  connive  with 
terrorist  groups  when  they  think  it 
serves  their  own  purposes,  and  their 
goal  is  always  the  same:  to  weaken 
liberal  democracy  and  undermine  world 
stability. 

Moral  and  Strategic 
Stakes 

The  stakes  in  our  war  against  terrorism, 
therefore,  are  high.  We  have  already 
seen  the  horrible  cost  in  innocent  lives 
that  terrorist  violence  has  incurred.  But 
perhaps  even  more  horrible  is  the 
damage  that  terrorism  threatens  to 
wreak  on  our  modern  civilization.  For 
centuries  mankind  has  strived  to  build  a 
world  in  which  the  highest  human 
aspirations  can  be  fulfilled. 

We  have  pulled  ourselves  out  of  a 
state  of  barbarism  and  removed  the  af- 
fronts to  human  freedom  and  dignity 
that  are  inherent  to  that  condition.  We 
have  sought  to  free  ourselves  from  that 
primitive  existence  described  by  Hobbes 
where  life  is  lived  in  "continual  fear  and 
danger  of  violent  death  .  .  .  nasty, 
brutish,  and  short."  We  have  sought  to 
create,  instead,  a  world  where  universal 
respect  for  human  rights  and  democratic 
values  makes  a  better  life  possible.  We 
in  the  democracies  can  attest  to  all  that 


THE  SECRETARY 


man  is  capable  of  achieving  if  he  re- 
nounces violence  and  brute  force,  if  he  is 
free  to  think,  write,  vote,  and  worship 
as  he  pleases.  Yet  all  of  these  hard-won 
gains  are  threatened  by  terrorism. 

Terrorism  is  a  step  backward;  it  is  a 
step  toward  anarchy  and  decay.  In  the 
broadest  sense,  terrorism  represents  a 
return  to  barbarism  in  the  modern  age. 
If  the  modern  world  cannot  face  up  to 
the  challenge,  then  terrorism,  and  the 
lawlessness  and  inhumanity  that  come 
with  it,  will  gradually  undermine  all  that 
the  modern  world  has  achieved  and 
make  further  progress  impossible. 

Obstacles  to  Meeting  the 
Challenge 

The  magnitude  of  the  threat  posed  by 
terrorism  is  so  great  that  we  cannot  af- 
ford to  confront  it  with  half-hearted  and 
poorly  organized  measures.  Terrorism  is 
a  contagious  disease  that  will  inevitably 
spread  if  it  goes  untreated.  We  need  a 
strategy'  to  cope  with  terrorism  in  all  of 
its  varied  manifestations.  We  need  to 
summon  the  necessary  resources  and 
determination  to  fight  it  and,  with  inter- 
national cooperation,  eventually  stamp  it 
out.  And  we  have  to  recognize  that  the 
burden  falls  on  us,  the  democracies — no 
one  else  will  cure  the  disease  for  us. 

Yet  clearly  we  face  obstacles,  some 
of  which  arise  precisely  because  we  are 
democracies.  The  nature  of  the  terrorist 
assault  is,  in  many  ways,  alien  to  us. 
Democracies  like  to  act  on  the  basis  of 
known  facts  and  shared  knowledge.  Ter- 
rorism is  clandestine  and  mysterious  by 
nature.  Terrorists  rely  on  secrecy,  and, 
therefore,  it  is  hard  to  know  for  certain 
who  has  committed  an  atrocity. 

Democracies  also  rely  on  reason  and 
persuasive  logic  to  make  decisions.  It  is 
hard  for  us  to  understand  the  fanaticism 
and  apparent  irrationality  of  many  ter- 
rorists, especially  those  who  kill  and 
commit  suicide  in  the  belief  that  they 
will  be  rewarded  in  the  afterlife.  The 
psychopathic  ruthlessness  and  brutality 
of  terrorism  is  an  aberration  in  our 
culture  and  alien  to  our  heritage. 

And  it  is  an  unfortunate  irony  that 
the  very  qualities  that  make  democracies 
so  hateful  to  the  terrorists — ou>-  respect 
for  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  the  in- 
dividual— also  make  us  particularly 
vulnerable.  Precisely  because  we  main- 
tain the  most  open  societies,  terrorists 
have  unparalleled  opportunity  to  strike 
at  us.  Terrorists  seek  to  make 
democracies  embattled  and  afraid,  to 


break  down  democratic  accountability, 
due  process,  and  order;  they  hope  we 
will  turn  toward  repression  or  succumb 
to  chaos. 

These  are  the  challenges  we  must 
live  with.  We  will  certainly  not  alter  the 
democratic  values  that  we  so  cherish  in 
order  to  fight  terrorism.  We  will  have  to 
find  ways  to  fight  back  without  under- 
mining everything  we  stand  for. 

Combatting  Moral  Confusion 

There  is  another  obstacle  that  we  have 
created  for  ourselves  that  we  should 
overcome— that  we  must  overcome— if 
we  are  to  fight  terrorism  effectively. 
The  obstacle  I  am  referring  to  is  confu- 
sion. 

We  cannot  begin  to  address  this 
monumental  challenge  to  decent,  civil- 
ized society  until  we  clear  our  heads  of 
the  confusion  about  terrorism,  in  many 
ways  the  moral  confusion,  that  still 
seems  to  plague  us.  Confusion  can  lead 
to  paralysis,  and  it  is  a  luxury  that  we 
simply  cannot  afford. 

The  confusion  about  terrorism  has 
taken  many  forms.  In  recent  years,  we 
have  heard  some  ridiculous  distortions, 
even  about  what  the  word  "terrorism" 
means.  The  idea,  for  instance,  that  deny- 
ing food  stamps  to  some  is  a  form  of 
terrorism  cannot  be  entertained  by 
serious  people.  And  those  who  would 
argue,  as  recently  some  in  Great  Britain 
have,  that  physical  violence  by  strikers 
can  be  equated  with  "the  violence  of 
unemployment"  are,  in  the  words  of  The 
Economist,  "a  menace  to  democracy 
everywhere."  In  a  real  democracy, 
violence  is  unequivocally  bad.  Such 
distortions  are  dangerous,  because 
words  are  important.  When  we  distort 
our  language,  we  may  distort  our  think- 
ing, and  we  hamper  our  efforts  to  find 
solutions  to  the  grave  problems  we  face. 

There  has  been,  however,  a  more 
serious  kind  of  confusion  surrounding 
the  issue  of  terrorism:  the  confusion  be- 
tween the  terrorist  act  itself  and  the 
political  goals  that  the  terrorists  claim  to 
seek. 

The  grievances  that  terrorists  sup- 
posedly seek  to  redress  through  acts  of 
violence  may  or  may  not  be  legitimate. 
The  terrorist  acts  themselves,  however, 
can  never  be  legitimate.  And  legitimate 
causes  can  never  justify  or  excuse  ter- 
rorism. Terrorist  means  discredit  their 
ends. 

We  have  all  heard  the  insidious 
claim  that  "one  man's  terrorist  is 


another  man's  freedom  fighter."  Whei 
spoke  on  the  subject  of  terrorism  thiS' 
past  June,  I  quoted  the  powerful  rebu 
tal  to  this  kind  of  moral  relativism  m; 
by  the  late  Senator  Henry  Jackson.  P 
statement  bears  repeating  today:  "Th 
idea  that  one  person's  'terrorist'  is 
another's  'freedom  fighter,' "  he  said, 
"cannot  be  sanctioned.  Freedom  fight 
or  revolutionaries  don't  blow  up  buses 
containing  non-combatants;  terrorist 
murderers  do.  Freedom  fighters  don'' 
set  out  to  capture  and  slaughter  scho 
children;  terrorist  murderers  do. 
Freedom  fighters  don't  assassinate  in 
cent  businessmen,  or  hijack  and  hold 
hostage  innocent  men,  women,  and 
children;  terrorist  murderers  do.  It  is 
disgrace  that  democracies  would  allo^ 
the  treasured  word  'freedom'  to  be 
associated  with  acts  of  terrorists."  Sc 
spoke  Scoop  Jackson. 

We  cannot  afford  to  let  an  Orwel 
corruption  of  language  obscure  our 
understanding  of  terrorism.  We  knoV' 
the  difference  between  terrorists  and 
freedom  fighters,  and  as  we  look  arc 
the  world,  we  have  no  trouble  telling 
one  from  the  other. 

How  tragic  it  would  be  if  democr 
societies  so  lost  confidence  in  their  o' 
moral  legitimacy  that  they  lost  sight 
the  obvious:  that  violence  directed 
against  democracy  or  the  hopes  for 
democracy  lacks  fundamental  justific 
tion.  Democracy  offers  the  oppornm 
for  peaceful  change,  legitimate  politi 
competition,  and  redress  of  grievanc 
We  must  opppose  terrorists  no  matt 
what  banner  they  may  fly.  For  terrc 
in  any  cause  is  the  enemy  of  freedor 

And  we  must  not  fall  into  the  d( 
trap  of  giving  justification  to  the  uii; 
ceptable  acts  of  terrorists  by 
acknowledging  the  worthy-sounding 
motives  they  may  claim.  Organizatic 
such  as  the  Provisional  IRA,  for  in- 
stance, play  on  popular  grievances,  i 
political  and  religious  emotions,  to 
disguise  their  deadly  purpose.  They 
ways  to  work  through  local  political 
religious  leaders  to  enlist  support  fo 
their  brutal  actions.  As  a  result,  we 
find  Americans  contributing,  we  hop 
unwittingly,  to  an  organization  whic 
has  killed— in  cold  blood  and  withoui 
slightest  remorse— hundreds  of  inno 
men,  women,  and  children  in  Great 
tain  and  Ireland;  an  organization  wt 
has  assassinated  senior  officials  and 
tried  to  assassinate  the  British  Prim 
Minister  and  her  entire  cabinet;  a  pi 
fessed  Marxist  organization  which  a 
gets  support  from  Libya's  Qadhafi  a 
has  close  links  with  other  internatic 
terrorists.  The  Government  of  the 


M 


THE  SECRETARY 


ed  States  stands  firmly  with  the 
jrnment  of  the  United  Kingdom  and 

overnment  of  Ireland  in  opposing 
iction  that  lends  aid  or  support  to 

rovisional  IRA. 
iloral  confusion  about  terrorism  can 

many  forms.  When  2  Americans 
12  Lebanese  were  killed  at  our  Em- 
!  Annex  in  East  Beirut  last  month, 
istance.  we  were  told  by  some  that 
Tiass  murder  was  an  expression, 

It  an  extreme  expression,  of  Arab 
lity  to  American  policy  in  the  Mid- 
Jast.  We  were  told  that  this  bomb- 
appened  because  of  a  vote  we  cast 
e  United  Nations,  or  because  of  our 
les  in  Lebanon,  or  because  of  the 
ill  state  of  our  relations  with  the 

nations,  or  because  of  our  support 

rael. 
Ve  were  advised  by  some  that  if  we 

to  stop  terrorism— if  we  want  to 
n  end  to  these  vicious  murders— 
what  we  need  to  do  is  change  our 
es.  In  effect,  we  have  been  told 
;errorism  is  in  some  measure  our 
fault,  and  we  deserved  to  be 
■ed.  I  can  tell  you  here  and  now 
;he  United  States  will  not  be  driven 

stayed  from  our  course  or  change 
iolicy  by  terrorist  brutality. 
lie  cannot  permit  ourselves  any 

tainty  as  to  the  real  meaning  of 

ist  violence  in  the  Middle  East  or 
Ihere  else.  Those  who  truly  seek 

in  the  Middle  East  know  that  war 
tiolence  are  no  answer.  Those  who 
16  radicalism  and  support  negotia- 

re  themselves  the  target  of  ter- 
(n,  whether  they  are  Arabs  or 

is.  One  of  the  great  tragedies  of 
P'iddle  East,  in  fact,  is  that  the 

moderates  on  the  Arab  side— who 

iady  to  live  in  peace  with 

are  threatened  by  the  radicals 
(leir  terrorist  henchmen  and  are 

tymied  in  their  own  efforts  for 

ne  terrorists'  principal  goal  in  the 
3  East  is  to  destroy  any  progress 
d  a  negotiated  peace.  And  the 
our  policies  succeed,  the  closer  we 
itoward  achieving  our  goals  in  the 
e  East,  the  harder  terrorists  will 
stop  us.  The  simple  fact  is,  the 
ists  are  more  upset  about  progress 
Middle  East  than  they  are  about 
leged  failures  to  achieve  progress. 
;  not  forget  that  President  Sadat 
lurdered  because  he  made  peace, 
lat  threats  continue  to  be  issued 
n  that  region  because  of  the 
■yes,  fear— that  others  might  favor 
)tiated  path  toward  peace, 
horn  would  we  serve  by  changing 
)licies  in  the  Middle  East  in  the 


face  of  the  terrorist  threat?  Not  Israel, 
not  the  moderate  Arabs,  not  the  Pales- 
tinian people,  and  certainly  not  the 
cause  for  peace.  Indeed,  the  worst  thing 
we  could  do  is  change  our  principled 
policies  under  the  threat  of  violence. 
What  we  must  do  is  support  our  friends 
and  remain  firm  in  our  goals. 

We  have  to  rid  ourselves  of  this 
moral  confusion  which  lays  the  blame 
for  terrorist  actions  on  us  or  on  our 
policies.  We  are  attacked  not  because  of 
what  we  are  doing  wrong  but  because  of 
what  we  are  doing  right.  We  are  right 
to  support  the  security  of  Israel,  and 
there  is  no  terrorist  act  or  threat  that 
will  change  that  firm  determination.  We 
are  attacked  not  because  of  some 
mistake  we  are  making  but  because  of 
who  we  are  and  what  we  believe  in.  We 
must  not  abandon  our  principles,  or  our 
role  in  the  world,  or  our  responsibilities 
as  the  champion  of  freedom  and  peace. 

Response  to  Terrorism 

While  terrorism  threatens  many  coun- 
tries, the  United  States  has  a  special 
responsibility.  It  is  time  for  this  country 
to  make  a  broad  national  commitment  to 
treat  the  challenge  of  terrorism  with  the 
sense  of  urgency  and  priority  it 
deserves. 

The  essence  of  our  response  is  sim- 
ple to  state:  violence  and  aggression 
must  be  met  by  firm  resistance.  This 
principle  holds  true  whether  we  are 
responding  to  full-scale  military  attacks 
or  to  the  kinds  of  low-level  conflicts  that 
are  more  common  in  the  modern  world. 

We  are  on  the  way  to  being  well 
prepared  to  deter  an  all-out  war  or  a 
Soviet  attack  on  our  principal  allies;  that 
is  why  these  are  the  least  likely  con- 
tingencies. It  is  not  self-evident  that  we 
are  as  well  prepared  and  organized  to 
deter  and  counter  the  "gray  area"  of  in- 
termediate challenges  that  we  are  more 
likely  to  face — the  low-intensity  conflict 
of  which  terrorism  is  a  part. 

We  have  worked  hard  to  deter  large- 
scale  aggression  by  strengthening  our 
strategic  and  conventional  defenses,  by 
restoring  the  pride  and  confidence  of  the 
men  and  women  in  our  military  and  by 
displaying  the  kind  of  national  resolve  to 
confront  aggression  that  can  deter 
potential  adversaries.  We  have  been 
more  successful  than  in  the  past  in  deal- 
ing with  many  forms  of  low-level  aggres- 
sion. We  have  checked  communist  ag- 
gression and  subversion  in  Central 
America  and  the  Caribbean  and  opened 


the  way  for  peaceful,  democratic  proc- 
esses in  that  region.  And  we  successfully 
liberated  Grenada  from  Marxist  control 
and  returned  that  tiny  island  to  freedom 
and  self-determination. 

But  terrorism,  which  is  also  a  form 
of  low-level  aggression,  has  so  far  posed 
an  even  more  difficult  challenge,  for  the 
technology  of  security  has  been  out- 
stripped by  the  technology  of  murder. 
And,  of  course,  the  United  States  is  not 
the  only  nation  that  faces  difficulties  in 
responding  to  terrorism.  To  update 
President  Reagan's  report  in  the  debate 
last  Sunday,  since  September  1,  41  acts 
of  terrorism  have  been  perpetrated  by 
no  less  than  14  terrorist  groups  against 
the  people  and  property  of  21  countries. 
Even  Israel  has  not  rid  itself  of  the  ter- 
rorist threat,  despite  its  brave  and  pro- 
digious efforts. 

But  no  nation  had  more  experience 
with  terrorism  than  Israel,  and  no  na- 
tion has  made  a  greater  contribution  to 
our  understanding  of  the  problem  and 
the  best  ways  to  confront  it.  By  support- 
ing organizations  like  the  Jonathan  In- 
stitute, named  after  the  brave  Israeli 
soldier  who  led  and  died  at  Entebbe,  the 
Israeli  people  have  helped  raise  interna- 
tional awareness  of  the  global  scope  of 
the  terrorist  threat. 

And  Israel's  contribution  goes 
beyond  the  theoretical.  Israel  has  won 
major  battles  in  the  war  against  ter- 
rorism in  actions  across  its  borders,  in 
other  continents,  and  in  the  land  of 
Israel  itself.  To  its  great  credit,  the 
Israeli  Government  has  moved  within 
Israel  to  apprehend  and  bring  to  trial  its 
own  citizens  accused  of  terrorism. 

Much  of  Israel's  success  in  fighting 
terrorism  has  been  due  to  broad  public 
support  for  Israel's  antiterrorist  policies. 
Israel's  people  have  shown  the  will,  and 
they  have  provided  their  government  the 
resources,  to  fight  terrorism.  They 
entertain  no  illusions  about  the  meaning 
or  the  danger  of  terrorism.  Perhaps 
because  they  confront  the  threat  every- 
day, they  recognize  that  they  are  at  war 
with  terrorism.  The  rest  of  us  would  do 
well  to  follow  Israel's  example. 

But  part  of  our  problem  here  in  the 
United  States  has  been  our  seeming  in- 
ability to  understand  terrorism  clearly. 
Each  successive  terrorist  incident  has 
brought  too  much  self-condemnation  and 
dismay,  accompanied  by  calls  for  a 
change  in  our  policies  or  our  principles 
or  calls  for  withdrawal  and  retreat.  We 
should  be  alarmed.  We  should  be  out- 
raged. We  should  investigate  and  strive 
to  improve.  But  widespread  public 
anguish  and  self-condemnation  only  con- 
vince the  terrorists  that  they  are  on  the 


THE  SECRETARY 


right  track.  It  only  encourages  them  to 
commit  more  acts  of  barbarism  in  the 
hope  that  American  resolve  will  weaken. 

This  is  a  particular  danger  in  the 
period  before  our  election.  If  our  reac- 
tion to  terrorist  acts  is  to  turn  on 
ourselves  instead  of  against  the 
perpetrators,  we  give  them  redoubled  in- 
centive to  do  it  again  and  to  try  to  in- 
fluence our  political  processes. 

We  have  to  be  stronger,  steadier, 
determined,  and  united  in  the  face  of  the 
terrorist  threat.  We  must  not  reward 
the  terrorists  by  changing  our  policies  or 
questioning  our  own  principles  or 
wallowing  in  self-flagellation  or  self- 
doubt.  Instead,  we  should  understand 
that  terrorism  is  aggression  and,  like  all 
aggression,  must  be  forcefully  resisted. 

Requirements  for 
an  Active  Strategy 

We  must  reach  a  consensus  in  this  coun- 
try that  our  responses  should  go  beyond 
passive  defense  to  consider  means  of  ac- 
tive prevention,  preemption,  and  retalia- 
tion. Our  goal  must  be  to  prevent  and 
deter  future  terrorist  acts,  and  ex- 
perience has  taught  us  over  the  years 
that  one  of  the  best  deterrents  to  ter- 
rorism is  the  certainty  that  swift  and 
sure  measures  will  be  taken  against 
those  who  engage  in  it.  We  should  take 
steps  toward  carrying  out  such 
measures.  There  should  be  no  moral  con- 
fusion on  this  issue.  Our  aim  is  not  to 
seek  revenge  but  to  put  an  end  to 
violent  attacks  against  innocent  people, 
to  make  the  world  a  safer  place  to  live 
for  all  of  us.  Clearly,  the  democracies 
have  a  moral  right,  indeed  a  duty,  to  de- 
fend themselves. 

A  successful  strategy  for  combating 
terrorism  will  require  us  to  face  up  to 
some  hard  questions  and  to  come  up 
with  some  clear-cut  answers.  The  ques- 
tions involve  our  intelligence  capability, 
the  doctrine  under  which  we  would 
employ  force,  and,  most  important  of 
all,  our  public's  attitude  toward  this 
challenge.  Our  nation  cannot  summon 
the  will  to  act  without  firm  public 
understanding  and  support. 

First,  our  intelligence  capabilities, 
particularly  our  human  intelligence,  are 
being  strengthened.  Determination  and 
capacity  to  act  are  of  little  value  unless 
we  can  come  close  to  answering  the 
questions:  who,  where,  and  when.  We 
have  to  do  a  better  job  of  finding  out 


who  the  terrorists  are;  where  they  are; 
and  the  nature,  composition,  and  pat- 
terns of  behavior  of  terrorist  organiza- 
tions. Our  intelligence  services  are 
organizing  themselves  to  do  the  job,  and 
they  must  be  given  the  mandate  and  the 
flexibihty  to  develop  techniques  of  detec- 
tion and  contribute  to  deterrence  and 
response. 

Second,  there  is  no  question  about 
our  ability  to  use  force  where  and  when 
it  is  needed  to  counter  terrorism.  Our 
nation  has  forces  prepared  for  ac- 
tion—from small  teams  able  to  operate 
virtually  undetected,  to  the  full  weight 
of  our  conventional  military  might.  But 
serious  issues  are  involved — questions 
that  need  to  be  debated,  understood, 
and  agreed  if  we  are  to  be  able  to  utilize 
our  forces  wisely  and  effectively. 

If  terrorists  strike  here  at  home,  it 
is  a  matter  for  police  action  and 
domestic  law  enforcement.  In  most 
cases  overseas,  acts  of  terrorism  against 
our  people  and  installations  can  be  dealt 
with  best  by  the  host  government  and 
its  forces.  It  is  worth  remembering  that 
just  as  it  is  the  responsibility  of  the  U.S. 
Government  to  provide  security  for 
foreign  embassies  in  Washington,  so  the 
internationally  agreed  doctrine  is  that 
the  security  of  our  Embassies  abroad  in 
the  first  instance  is  the  duty  of  the  host 
government,  and  we  work  with  those 
governments  cooperatively  and  with  con- 
siderable success.  The  ultimate  respon- 
sibility of  course  is  ours,  and  we  will 
carry  it  out  with  total  determination  and 
all  the  resources  available  to  us.  Con- 
gress, in  a  bipartisan  effort,  is  giving  us 
the  legislative  tools  and  the  resources  to 
strengthen  the  protection  of  our 
facilities  and  our  people  overseas — and 
they  must  continue  to  do  so.  But  while 
we  strengthen  our  defenses,  defense 
alone  is  not  enough. 

The  heart  of  the  challenge  lies  in 
those  cases  where  international  rules 
and  traditional  practices  do  not  apply. 
Terrorists  will  strike  from  areas  where 
no  governmental  authority  exists,  or 
they  will  base  themselves  behind  what 
they  expect  will  be  the  sanctuary  of  an 
international  border.  And  they  will 
design  their  attacks  to  take  place  in 
precisely  those  "gray  areas"  where  the 
full  facts  cannot  be  known,  where  the 
challenge  will  not  bring  with  it  an  ob- 
vious or  clear-cut  choice  of  response. 

In  such  cases  we  must  use  our  in- 
telligence resources  carefully  and  com- 
pletely. We  will  have  to  examine  the  full 
range  of  measures  available  to  us  to 
take.  The  outcome  may  be  that  we  will 
face  a  choice  between  doing  nothing  or 
employing  military  force.  We  now 


16 


recognize  that  terrorism  is  being  used 
our  adversaries  as  a  modern  tool  of  w 
fare.  It  is  no  aberration.  We  can  expe 
more  terrorism  directed  at  our  strate| 
interests  around  the  world  in  the  yeai 
ahead.  To  combat  it,  we  must  be  will 
to  use  military  force. 

What  will  be  required,  however,  L 
public  understanding  before  the  fact  of 
the  risks  involved  in  combating  ter- 
rorism with  overt  power. 

•  The  public  must  understand  hej 
the  fact  that  there  is  potential  for  loss 
life  of  some  of  our  fighting  men  and  t 
loss  of  life  of  some  innocent  people. 

•  The  public  must  understand  be} 
the  fact  that  some  will  seek  to  cast  an 
preemptive  or  retaliatory  action  by  us 
the  worst  light  and  will  attempt  to  m 
our  military  and  our  policymakers— 
rather  than  the  terrorists — appear  to 
the  culprits. 

•  The  public  must  understand  be) 
the  fact  that  occasions  will  come  wher 
their  government  must  act  before  eat 
and  every  fact  is  known — and  the  da 
sions  cannot  be  tied  to  the  opinion  po 

Public  support  for  U.S.  military  a 
tions  to  stop  terrorists  before  they  co 
mit  some  hideous  act  or  in  retaliation 
for  an  attack  on  our  people  is  crucial 
we  are  to  deal  with  this  challenge. 

Our  military  has  the  capability  ar 
the  techniques  to  use  power  to  fight  i 
war  against  terrorism.  This  capabilit; 
will  be  used  judiciously.  To  be  succesi 
over  the  long  term,  it  will  require  sol 
support  from  the  American  people. 

I  can  assure  you  that  in  this  Ad- 
ministration our  actions  will  be  govei 
by  the  rule  of  law;  and  the  rule  of  lai 
congenial  to  action  against  terrorists 
We  will  need  the  flexibility  to  respon 
ten  orist  attacks  in  a  variety  of  ways 
times  and  places  of  our  own  choosinj 
Clearly,  we  will  not  respond  in  the  si 
manner  to  every  terrorist  act.  Indeei 
we  will  want  to  avoid  engaging  in  a 
policy  of  automatic  retaliation  which 
might  create  a  cycle  of  escalating 
violence  beyond  our  control. 

If  we  are  going  to  respond  or 
preempt  effectively,  our  policies  will 
have  to  have  an  element  of  unpredic- 
tability and  surprise.  And  the  prere- 
quisite for  such  a  policy  must  be  a  br 
public  consensus  on  the  moral  and 
strategic  necessity  of  action.  We  will 
need  the  capability  to  act  on  a  moine 
notice.  There  will  not  be  time  for  a 
renewed  national  debate  after  every 
rorist  attack.  We  may  never  have  tht 
kind  of  evidence  that  can  stand  up  in 
American  court  of  law.  But  we  cann 
allow  ourselves  to  become  the  Hamle 


Dfinartmfint  of  State  Bull 


THE  SECRETARY 


»ns,  worrying  endlessly  over 
;her  and  how  to  respond.  A  great 
>n  with  global  responsibilities  cannot 
'd  to  be  hamstrung  by  confusion  and 
;isiveness.  Fighting  terrorism  will 
)e  a  clean  or  pleasant  contest,  but 
ave  no  choice  but  to  play  it. 
Ve  will  also  need  a  broader  interna- 
J  effort.  If  terrorism  is  truly  a 
it  to  Western  moral  values,  our 
lity  must  not  paralyze  us;  it  must 
us  the  courage  to  face  up  to  the 
it.  And  if  the  enemies  of  these 
!S  are  united,  so,  too,  must  the 
)cratic  countries  be  united  in  de- 
ng  them.  The  leaders  of  the  in- 
•ial  democracies,  meeting  at  the 
on  summit  in  June,  agreed  in  a 
declaration  that  they  must  redouble 
cooperation  against  terrorism, 
e  has  been  foUowup  to  that  initial 
ing,  and  the  United  States  is  com- 
id  to  advance  the  process  in  every 
possible.  Since  we,  the  democracies, 
he  most  vulnerable,  and  our 
igic  interests  are  the  most  at  stake, 
ust  act  together  in  the  face  of  corn- 
dangers.  For  our  part,  we  will 
whenever  possible  in  close 
iration  with  our  friends  in  the 
cracies. 

anctions,  when  exercised  in  concert 
other  nations,  can  help  to  isolate, 
en,  or  punish  states  that  sponsor 
nsm  against  us.  Too  often,  coun- 
are  inhibited  by  fear  of  losing  com- 
lal  opportunities  or  fear  of  provok- 
buUy.  Economic  sanctions  and 
forms  of  countervailing  pressure 
e  costs  and  risks  on  the  nations 
ipply  them,  but  some  sacrifices  will 
cessary  if  we  are  not  to  suffer  even 
er  costs  down  the  road.  Some  coun- 
ire  clearly  more  vulnerable  to  ex- 
t  n  than  others,  surely  this  is  an 
51  lent  for  banding  together  in 
rt  il  support,  not  an  argument  for  ap- 
'■  ment. 

■i\e  truly  believe  in  the  values  of 
•  vilization,  we  have  a  duty  to  de- 
c  hem.  The  democracies  must  have 
If-confidence  to  tackle  this  menac- 
iililem  or  else  they  will  not  be  in 
;■  111'  a  position  to  tackle  other  kinds 
lilfms.  If  we  are  not  willing  to  set 
ill  what  kinds  of  behavior  are 
'ililf,  then  our  adversaries  will  con- 
1  that  there  are  no  limits.  As 

IS  .lefferson  once  said,  when  we 
.vjunf rented  with  the  problem  of 
,  "an  insult  unpunished  is  the 
t  of  others."  In  a  basic  way,  the 
■racies  must  show  whether  they 
e  in  themselves. 


We  must  confront  the  terrorist 
threat  with  the  same  resolve  and  deter- 
mination that  this  nation  has  shown  time 
and  again  throughout  our  history.  There 
is  no  room  for  guilt  or  self-doubt  about 
our  right  to  defend  a  way  of  life  that  of- 
fers all  nations  hope  for  peace,  pro- 
gress, and  human  dignity.  The  sage 
Hillel  expressed  it  well:  "If  I  am  not  for 
myself,  who  will  be?  If  I  am  for  myself 
alone,  who  am  I?" 

As  we  fight  this  battle  against  ter- 
rorism, we  must  always  keep  in  mind 
the  values  and  way  of  life  we  are  trying 
to  protect.  Clearly,  we  will  not  allow 
ourselves  to  descend  to  the  level  of  bar- 


barism that  terrorism  represents.  We 
will  not  abandon  our  democratic  tradi- 
tions, our  respect  for  individual  rights, 
and  freedom,  for  these  are  precisely 
what  we  are  struggling  to  preserve  and 
promote.  Our  values  and  our  principles 
will  give  us  the  strength  and  the  con- 
fidence to  meet  the  great  challenge 
posed  by  terrorism.  If  we  show  the 
courage  and  the  will  to  protect  our 
freedom  and  our  way  of  life,  we  will 
prove  ourselves  again  worthy  of  these 
blessings. 


•Press  release  242. 


Preventing  the  Proliferation 
of  Nuclear  Weapons 


by  Secretary  Shultz 


Address  before  the 
United  Nations  Association  of  the  U.S.A 
in  New  York  City  on  November  1,  198Jf.'^ 


In  the  early  1960s,  during  the  presiden- 
cy of  John  F.  Kennedy,  it  was  the  con- 
sensus of  defense  policy  experts  that  by 
the  mid-1980s— today— between  15  and 
25  countries  would  have  nuclear  weap- 
ons. Serious  commentators  then  ac- 
cepted, almost  without  question,  the  idea 
that  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  was 
inexorable,  advancing  like  a  Greek 
tragedy  to  some  disastrous  preordained 
conclusion. 

Well,  I'm  happy  to  say  they  were 
wrong.  It's  1984,  and  despite  the  steady 
and  rapid  development  of  nuclear  energy 
around  the  world,  the  number  of  ac- 
knowledged nuclear-weapons  states  has 
held  at  five  since  China  tested  its  first 
atomic  bomb  20  years  ago.  Only  one  ad- 
ditional country,  India,  has  carried  out 
any  kind  of  nuclear  explosion— and  that 
was  10  years  ago. 

Clearly,  the  potential  danger  is  still 
with  us.  Regional  rivalries  and  grandiose 
ambitions  continue  to  tempt  some  coun- 
tries to  flirt  with  the  dangerous  and 
misguided  notion  that  their  security 
could  be  enhanced  by  obtaining  nuclear 
weapons  or  at  least  by  creating  the 
perception  that  they  can  do  so. 


But  these  temptations  can  and  are 
being  held  in  check.  The  prophets  of 
gloom  were  wrong  in  their  prediction 
that  nuclear  proliferation  was  inevitable, 
because  they  did  not  foresee  the  deter- 
mined efforts  that  would  be  undertaken 
by  the  international  community  to  deter 
the  spread  of  these  deadly  weapons. 
Without  this  undertaking,  the  nightmare 
of  rampant  nuclear  proliferation  might 
well  have  become  reality. 

While  superpower  negotiations  to 
limit  the  growth  of  nuclear  arsenals 
have  garnered  the  headlines,  the  effort 
to  prevent  the  spread  of  nuclear  ex- 
plosives has  gone  on  largely  out  of  the 
glare  of  publicity.  Through  seven  admin- 
istrations, the  United  States  has  led  a 
concerted  international  campaign  to  con- 
trol this  threat  to  world  peace.  The 
endeavor  has  fostered  a  web  of  institu- 
tional arrangements,  legal  commitments, 
technological  safeguards,  and  alternative 
means  for  addressing  security  concerns. 

The  ongoing  antiproliferation  cam- 
paign is  an  example  of  constructive 
diplomacy  and  international  cooperation 
at  its  finest.  In  this  enterprise  we  have 
found  common  ground  not  only  between 


THE  SECRETARY 


industrialized  and  developing  countries, 
and  between  nuclear  suppliers  and 
nuclear  consumers,  but  between 
ourselves  and  the  Soviet  Union.  What 
we  all  share  is  the  recognition  that 
nuclear  proliferation  would  aggravate 
political  tensions  among  nations, 
heighten  regional  insecurities,  and  con- 
tribute to  vastly  greater  instability  in 
the  world. 

Since  the  day  he  took  office.  Presi- 
dent Reagan  has  sought,  as  a  fundamen- 
tal objective,  to  reduce  the  dangers  to 
world  peace  and  global  stability  posed  by 
nuclear  weapons.  The  President's  well- 
known  efforts  to  achieve  reductions  in 
strategic  and  intermediate-range  nuclear 
weapons  have  been  one  part  of  this 
enterprise.  Prevention  of  nuclear  pro- 
liferation has  been  another  essential  ele- 
ment. 

In  our  efforts  to  control  nuclear  pro- 
liferation, like  those  directed  toward 
reducing  nuclear  weapons,  we  must  be 
guided  by  realism.  We  cannot  wish  the 
atom  away,  nor  should  we  ti7  to.  Its 
secrets  have  been  unlocked,  and  they 
have  brought  great  benefit  to  mankind. 
Peaceful  use  of  the  atom  has  yielded  not 
only  an  economical  and  reliable  energy 
source  but  a  wealth  of  applications  in 
the  fields  of  medicine  and  agriculture. 
We  are  only  just  beginning  to  realize  the 
potential  of  peaceful  nuclear  technology 
for  raising  the  living  standards  and  im- 
proving the  lives  of  millions  of  the 
world's  people. 

But  we  cannot  be  blind  to  the  poten- 
tial harm  that  misuse  of  this  powerful 
force  could  bring.  Diversion  of  nuclear 
technologj'  to  explosive  purposes  could 
pose  a  threat  to  peace  and  could  at  the 
very  least  undermine  global  stability. 

Many  of  you  undoubtedly  saw  press 
accounts  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment 
study  on  the  nuclear  proliferation  prob- 
lem that  was  released  a  couple  of  days 
ago.  The  study  publicized  a  fact  that 
those  of  us  who  deal  with  this  issue  have 
long  been  acutely  aware  of:  that  as  long 
as  international  tension  and  conflict 
exist,  there  will  be  insecure  or  irrespon- 
sible leaders  who  seek  to  shift  the 
balance  of  regional  power  dramatically 
by  acquiring  a  "secret  weapon." 

We  and  other  responsible  members 
of  the  international  community  are 
ceaselessly  at  work  to  deter  those  who 
might  he  tempted  to  transform  the 
promise  of  nuclear  energy  into  the  peril 
of  nuclear  weapons.  Although  we  cannot 
be  sure  that  further  proliferation  of 
nuclear  explosives  can  be  prevented  for 
all  time,  there  is  a  great  deal  we  can  do 
to  retard  its  pace  and  make  it  much 
more  difficult. 


18 


Nor  can  the  United  States  realis- 
tically expect  to  deter  proliferation  all  by 
itself.  America  no  longer  dominates  the 
nuclear  field— scientifically  or  commer- 
cially—as it  once  did.  As  mastery  of  the 
technology  has  spread,  it  has  been 
harder  to  persuade  others  simply  to 
follow  our  lead,  let  alone  to  dictate  their 
actions  and  choices.  Now  more  than 
ever,  a  successful  nonproliferation  effort 
requires  cooperative  undertakings  in- 
volving both  suppliers  and  users  of 
nuclear  technology,  taking  into  account 
their  energy  needs,  commercial  in- 
terests, and  concerns  about  their 
sovereignty. 

Equally  important,  we  must  address 
the  underlying  causes  of  nuclear  pro- 
liferation, not  just  its  symptoms. 
Although  the  search  for  nuclear 
weapons  might  arise  out  of  the  simple 
megalomania  of  a  national  leader,  a 
country  is  far  more  likely  to  "go  nuclear" 
out  of  feelings  of  insecurity,  usually  aris- 
ing from  regional  rivalries.  The  truth  is 
that  any  "security"  that  might  be  gained 
by  developing  a  nuclear-weapons 
capability  is  likely  to  be  illusory.  Pro- 
liferation begets  proliferation;  it  is 
synonymous  with  instability  and  is 
destructive  of  everyone's  security. 

Nevertheless,  as  long  as  that  sense 
of  insecurity  exists,  the  threat  of  sanc- 
tions, although  an  important  deterrent, 
may  not  always  suffice  to  discourage 
countries  with  the  potential  to  build 
weapons  from  trying  to  do  so.  If  the 
drive  to  acquire  nuclear  weapons  is  to  be 
curbed,  the  sources  of  tension  and  in- 
security also  must  be  addressed.  We  can 
do  this  by  providing  political,  economic, 
and  security  assistance  to  friendly  coun- 
tries anxious  about  their  security.  And 
we  can  continue  to  lend  our  efforts,  as 
we  have  in  the  Middle  East  and 
southern  Africa,  for  example,  to  resolu- 
tion of  the  conflicts  that  are  at  the  root 
of  the  problem. 

In  my  experience  as  Secretary  of 
State,  I  have  found  the  problem  of  pre- 
venting nuclear  proliferation  to  be  as 
complicated  and  as  challenging— intel- 
lectually, politically,  and  diplomatically— 
as  any  I've  had  to  deal  with.  Just  as  we 
have  discovered  in  dealing  with  other  in- 
tricate, morally  challenging  foreign 
policy  problems,  like  arms  reduction  and 
human  rights,  effective  solutions  often 
require  us  to  make  very  tough  choices. 

Keeping  our  hands  clean  by  trying 
to  disengage  from  the  problem,  or  by 
shunning  all  relations  with  potential  of- 
fenders, is  not  the  answer.  We  must 
deal  with  the  causes  of  the  problem  and 
offer  alternatives  for  its  solution  if  we 
are  to  maintain  our  influence  with 


potential  proliferators  and  not  jeopar- 
dize the  other,  often  critical,  interests^ 
we  may  have  in  common.  Balancing 
these  diverse  and  sometimes  contradic 
tory  policy  considerations  can  involve 
difficult  tradeoffs. 

By  the  same  token,  if  we  are  to 
maintain  the  cooperation  of  other  na- 
tions whose  participation  is  absolutely 
essential  to  any  nonproliferation  regin 
we  must  respect  their  needs,  their  in- 
terests, and  their  sovereignty. 

These  are  some  of  the  consideratii 
that  have  gone  into  shaping  the  nonpi 
liferation  policy  of  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration. 

Evolution  of 
Nonproliferation  Policy 

Over  the  last  three  decades,  America' 
nonproliferation  policy  has  benefited 
from  a  remarkable  continuity  and  stei 
fastness  of  purpose.  In  1953,  soon  aft 
he  was  elected.  President  Eisenhowei 
took  a  historic  step  in  inaugurating  tl 
Atoms  for  Peace  program.  By  this  ac 
the  United  States  volunteered  to  shai 
its  peaceful  nuclear  technologies  for  t 
good  of  all  mankind. 

The  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  (IAEA),  which  was  also  pro- 
posed by  President  Eisenhower,  was 
established  in  1957  as  an  internatiora 
institution  through  which  to  pursue 
those  same  goals.  The  IAEA  was  giv 
a  dual  mission:  to  promote  the  peacei 
use  of  nuclear  energy  and  to  effectua 
a  system  of  international  safeguards 
against  diversion  of  nuclear  materials 
for  nonpeaceful  purposes.  Through  tl 
intervening  years,  the  IAEA  has  as- 
sumed even  greater  importance  as  a 
instrument  in  the  nonproliferation 
regime.  It  is  an  agency  that  the  Unit 
States  ranks  among  the  most  import 
of  the  international  institutions. 

The  nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Tr 
ty  (NPT),  signed  in  1968,  provided  a 
juriiiical  framework  for  the  same  effi 
In  adhering  to  the  NPT,  non-nuclear- 
weapon  states  undertook  not  to  deve 
or  acquire  nuclear  explosives  and  to  i 
cept  safeguards  on  all  their  nuclear  a 
tivities.  At  the  same  time,  these  stati 
were  assured  access  to  peaceful  nucli 
technology',  while  nuclear  suppliers  o 
mitted  themselves  to  ensuring  that  tl 
nuclear  exports  were  covered  by  lAi 
safeguards.  The  parties  to  the  treaty 
also  agreed  to  make  good-faith  effort 
slow  the  nuclear  arms  race. 

The  early  197()s— particularly  aft 
the  1973  energ>'  crisis — were  perhap 
the  halcyon  days  for  nuclear  power. 


Ronort  nn^int  rsf  Cltntn   P  i  i  Mi 


THE  SECRETARY 


ear  generation  of  electricity  was  in- 
3ing  rapidly,  and  the  nonprolifera- 
reginie  was  expanding  and  ap- 
ed sound.  But  the  explosion  of  a 
lar  device  by  India  in  1974,  not- 
standing  its  "peaceful  use"  com- 
lents  under  bilateral  nuclear 
eration  agreements,  shocked  the 
?ar  suppliers  and  caused  them  to 
sess  their  nonproliferation  policies. 
Even  before  the  Indian  blast,  there 
a  growing  realization  that  variations 
e  export  policies  of  the  different 
ar  suppliers  made  it  difficult  to 
uniform  measures  to  deter  pro- 
ition.  To  close  these  gaps,  the  major 
ar  suppliers  convened  in  London  in 
to  discuss  common  multilateral  ex- 
policies.  Under  the  guidelines  first 
ted  in  1976,  members  of  the  Lon- 
5uppliers'  Group  agreed  to  transfer 
in  technology,  equipment,  and 
rial  only  if  the  customer  nation 
d  to  apply  IAEA  safeguards  to  the 
supplied  and  to  ensure  its  peaceful 

'or  nearly  three  decades,  the  United 
s  and  other  nations  that  share  our 
;  have  relied  on  this  combination  of 
cal  incentives,  international  safe- 
ds,  bilateral  export  controls,  and 
■ological  constraints  to  hold  nuclear 
I'eration  in  check.  But  nonprolifera- 
;trategies  have  had  to  be  con- 
asly  adapted  to  deal  with  evolving 
ologies  and  changing  political  cir- 
ances. 

/hen  the  Carter  Administration 
Dffice,  its  policy  was  fundamentally 
■d  by  the  view  that  nuclear  energy 
Dpment  worldwide  created  signifi- 
Droliferation  risks.  Decisions  were 
to  defer  reprocessing  and 
lium  use  in  this  country.  These 
Stic  policies  v/ere  paralleled  by 
leral  attempts  to  curtail  the  supply 
2lear  technology  abroad  and  par- 
rly  to  discourage  the  use  of 
lium-based  technologies  by  other 
•  industrial  nations. 
(ather  than  "setting  a  good  exam- 
is  it  was  intended  to  do,  this 
five  attitude  toward  nuclear  power 
leen  by  some  of  our  friends  as  a 
)nge  to  their  desire  for  energy  in- 
dence.  Thereby  it  reduced  our  in- 
■e  in  the  international  nuclear 
and  eroded  trust  in  the  United 
3  as  a  reliable  nuclear  supplier, 
he  enactment  of  the  Nuclear  Non- 
eration  Act  during  the  Carter  Ad- 
tration  represented  a  serious  effort 
imote  a  more  stringent  and 
•m  set  of  international  standards 
iclear  exports.  At  the  same  time, 
v'er,  it  precluded  us  from  carrying 


out  certain  supply  contracts  and 
agreements  to  cooperate  in  the  nuclear 
area,  thus  impairing  our  ability  to  pro- 
vide incentives  for  countries  to  act  in 
ways  consistent  with  nonproliferation 
goals.  As  a  result,  we  were  less  able  to 
win  the  support  of  those  nations  on 
critical  supply,  safeguards,  and  other 
nonproliferation  issues. 

Reagan  Administration 
Policies  and  Achievements 

President  Reagan,  therefore,  shaped  an 
approach  that  was  designed  to  facilitate 
cooperation  with  our  allies  and  friends 
and  to  ensure  us  an  effective  leadership 
role  in  international  nuclear  affairs. 

Supporting  Nuclear  Power.  As  I 

said  at  the  outset,  we  are  realistic.  In 
coming  decades,  nuclear  energy  will 
necessarily  play  a  major  role  in  pro- 
viding environmentally  safe  and 
economically  efficient  electric  power  in 
the  United  States.  Likewise,  it  is  clear 
that  nuclear-generated  energy  will  be  in- 
creasingly important  for  the  economic 
development  and  energy  security  of 
many  nations  around  the  world.  For 
these  countries — Japan,  for  example, 
and  much  of  Western  Europe — 
nuclear  power  is  critical  to  national  well- 
being  and  energy  security. 

Making  Rational  Distinctions.  We 

must  make  rational  distinctions  between 
close  friends  and  allies  who  pose  no 
great  proliferation  risk  and  those  areas 
of  the  world  where  we  have  real  con- 
cerns about  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons.  A  policy  of  denial  toward 
countries  with  excellent  nonproliferation 
credentials  would  be  arbitrary  as  well  as 
counterproductive.  On  the  other  hand, 
we  are  determined  to  maintain  stringent 
controls  to  ensure  that  our  nuclear 
cooperation  is  not  misused.  We 
recognize,  in  particular,  a  clear  need  to 
restrict  sensitive  nuclear  activities  in 
regions  of  instability  and  proliferation 
concern,  like  the  Middle  East  and  South 
Asia. 

At  the  same  time,  we  are  striving  to 
reduce  the  motivation  of  some  states  to 
acquire  nuclear  explosives  by  working 
with  them  to  improve  regional  and 
global  stability.  Our  $3.2-billion  package 
of  economic  and  security  assistance  to 
Pakistan  is  a  case  in  point. 

Closer  Consultation  and  Coopera- 
tion. In  light  of  the  earlier  criticism  by 
our  nuclear  partners,  and  the  recogni- 


tion that  America  is  no  longer  dominant 
in  the  field,  we  have  sought  to  restore 
an  emphasis  on  cooperation.  It  is  not 
always  possible,  of  course,  to  obtain  full 
agreement  on  controversial  issues.  But 
we  have  tried,  at  least,  to  implement  our 
nonproliferation  policy  with  a  maximum 
of  consultation  and  agreement  with 
other  nations.  Our  approach  is  designed 
to  give  our  closest  nuclear-trading  part- 
ners a  firmer  and  more  predictable  basis 
on  which  to  plan  their  vital  energy  pro- 
grams, while  at  the  same  time  further- 
ing our  nonproliferation  objectives. 

President  Reagan  has  stated  that 
the  United  States  will  not  inhibit  civil 
reprocessing  and  breeder-reactor 
development  in  countries  with  advanced 
nuclear  progi'ams  that  do  not  constitute 
a  proliferation  risk.  In  keeping  with  this 
policy,  the  United  States  has  been 
discussing  with  Japan  and  the  European 
Atomic  Energy  Community  long-term 
arrangements  on  reprocessing  and 
plutonium  use.  We  all  believe  that  such 
long-term  arrangements  will  be  mutually 
beneficial  and  will  enhance  the  global 
nonproliferation  regime. 

Our  negotiations  with  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  regarding  an  agree- 
ment for  cooperation  in  the  peaceful 
uses  of  nuclear  energy  also  have  impor- 
tant implications  for  the  strengthening 
of  the  worldwide  nonproliferation 
regime.  China's  decision  during  the  proc- 
ess of  those  negotiations  to  join  the  In- 
ternational Atomic  Energy  Agency  was 
a  significant  step  in  this  regard.  Its 
determination  to  require  IAEA  safe- 
guards on  its  future  export  com- 
mitments, and  its  strong  statement  that 
it  would  refrain  from  assisting  any  other 
nations  to  acquire  nuclear  explosives, 
are  evidence  of  China's  broadening  com- 
mitment to  the  world's  nonproliferation 
effort. 

We  are  convinced  that  nuclear  coop- 
eration with  China,  grounded  on  an 
agreement  that  satisfies  all  the  re- 
quirements of  our  law  and  policy,  will 
advance  our  worldwide  nonproliferation 
objectives,  enhance  our  overall  political 
relations  with  China,  and  benefit  U.S. 
economic  interests. 

Although  we  have  major  differences 
with  the  Soviet  Union  on  a  wide  range 
of  arms  control  issues,  we  have  broad 
common  interests  in  the  nonproliferation 
area.  In  the  fall  of  1982,  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  and  I  agreed  to  ini- 
tiate bilateral  consultations  on  non- 
proliferation.  Since  then,  three  rounds  of 
useful  discussions  have  taken  place,  with 


THE  SECRETARY 


both  sides  finding  more  areas  of  agree- 
ment than  disagreement.  We  expect  to 
confer  again  on  this  subject  later  this 
month.  It  is  clear  that  both  countries 
consider  the  horizontal  spread  of  nuclear 
explosives  to  be  in  no  one's  interest. 
Moreover,  we  agree  that  we  both  have 
major  responsibilities  in  strengthening 
the  nonproliferation  regime. 

Broadening  the  Dialogue.  Some 
rapidly  industrializing  nations— such  as 
Brazil,  Argentina,  and  South  Africa— 
also  have  active  peaceful  nuclear  energy 
programs.  Moreover,  they  are  emerging 
as  nuclear  materials  suppliers  in  their 
own  right.  We  have  restored  a  dialogue 
on  the  benefits  of  a  strong  nonprolifera- 
tion regime  with  these  countries,  where 
our  ties  in  the  area  of  peaceful  nuclear 
energy  had  been  all  but  broken.  We 
have  sought  their  cooperation  and  sup- 
port for  our  efforts  to  assure  that 
nuclear  exports  are  not  misused  for 
nonpeaceful  purposes.  At  the  same  time, 
we  have  stressed  that  regional  stability 
would  be  enhanced  if  they  would 
broaden  the  application  of  international 
safeguards  in  their  own  nuclear  pro- 
grams. 

We  are  pleased  to  note  that  the 
Government  of  South  Africa  has  publicly 
undertaken  to  require  IAEA  safeguards 
on  all  of  its  future  nuclear  exports. 
South  Africa  has  also  reopened  discus- 
sions with  the  IAEA  on  safeguarding  a 
significant  new  semicommercial  enrich- 
ment plant. 

Our  discussions  with  Brazil  and 
Argentina,  we  believe,  have  led  to  an  in- 
creased sensitivity  on  their  part  to  our 
nonproliferation  concerns.  We  attach 
great  importance  to  the  assurances  of 
Brazil  and  Argentina  that  their  nuclear 
programs  are  devoted  solely  to  peaceful 
uses,  and  we  look  forward  to  continuing 
our  dialogue  both  in  multilateral  fora 
and  in  bilateral  discussions. 

We  continue  to  urge  all  of  these 
countries  to  adhere  to  the  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty  and,  in  the  case  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  the  Treaty  of 
TIateloleo,  and  to  place  all  of  their 
nuclear  facilities  under  international 
safeguards. 

Improving  U.S.  Export  Controls.  I 

have  talked  mainly  about  this  Adminis- 
tration's diplomatic  and  policy  initiatives, 
but  we  have  not  neglected  the  technical 
side  of  the  problem.  In  his  1981  state- 
ment on  nonproliferation  policy,  the 
President  affirmed  that  the  United 
States  would  continue  to  inhibit  the 
transfer  of  sensitive  nuclear  material, 
equipment,  and  technology,  particularly 


90 


where  the  danger  of  proliferation  re- 
quired restraint. 

We  fully  recognize  the  risks 
associated  with  reprocessing  and  other 
sensitive  nuclear  technologies  because  of 
their  potential  direct  applicability  to 
weapons  production.  We  appreciate  the 
need  for  great  caution  and  restraint  in 
dealing  with  these  risks  and  the  impor- 
tance of  limiting  sensitive  facilities  and 
activities  to  as  few  locations  as  possible. 
Even  then,  reprocessing  should  only  be 
done  in  places  where  no  significant  risk 
of  proliferation  exists. 

A  small  but  significant  number  of 
the  world's  states  pose  a  real  prolifera- 
tion risk.  In  seeking  to  block  these 
states— Libya,  for  example— from  ob- 
taining nuclear  explosives,  we  have 
employed  a  range  of  political,  economic, 
and  security  measures.  And,  of  course, 
we  have  sought  to  persuade  other  sup- 
pliers to  impose  similar  conditions  and 
controls.  This  effort  has  been  successful 
thus  far  in  preventing  acquisition  of 
nuclear  weapons  by  unstable  and  ir- 
responsible regimes,  in  whose  hands 
they  could  create  a  catastrophe.  But 
unrelenting  vigilance  is  necessary. 

Strengthening  International 
Safeguards.  Our  commitment  to 
strengthened  international  safeguards 
remains  constant  and  firm,  for  we 
recognize  that  this  is  one  area  in  which 
we  cannot  allow  inspection  capabilities 
to  be  outpaced  by  advancing  technology. 
Obviously,  as  advanced  nuclear 
technologies  come  on  line  around  the 
world,  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  must  have  at  its  disposal  the 
trained  personnel  and  equipment  re- 
quired to  apply  adequate  safeguards. 
Under  our  Program  of  Technical 
Assistance  to  IAEA  Safeguards,  we  con- 
tinue to  contribute  importantly  to  this 
effort. 

In  a  major  arms  control  speech  last 
year.  President  Reagan  called  upon  all 
nuclear  suppliers  to  require  recipient 
states  to  accept  comprehensive 
safeguards  on  all  their  nuclear  activities 
as  a  condition  for  any  significant  new 
nuclear  supply  commitments.  Over  the 
past  3  years  we  have  worked  through 
diplomatic  channels  to  develop  a 
favorable  supplier  consensus  on  this 
issue. 

It  was,  for  example,  one  of  the 
topics  discussed  at  the  meeting  of 
nuclear  suppliers  held  earlier  this  year  in 
Luxembourg.  The  nations  represented 
there  agreed  that  adoption  of  com- 
prehensive safeguards  remains  a  highly 
desirable  nonproliferation  goal.  We  are 
seeking  to  build  on  the  Luxembourg 
results  by  examining  concrete  ways  of 


persuading  additional  consumer  states 
accept  comprehensive  safeguards.  As  ii 
pursue  our  dialogue  with  emerging  sup 
pliers,  we  will  work  to  assure  that  thej 
too,  come  to  understand  and  adopt  thtl 
nonproliferation  ethic  that  traditional 
suppliers  have  developed  over  the  past 
quarter  century. 

Sharing  Benefits  With  the 
Developing  World.  In  our  efforts  to 
deyelop  the  atom  for  peaceful  pur- 
poses— from  medicine  to  nuclear 
power — we  have  not  ignored  the 
legitimate  needs  of  those  technological 
less  advanced  nations  that  wish  to  sha 
in  the  peaceful  benefits  of  the  atom.  W 
will  continue  to  ensure,  bilaterally  and 
through  the  IAEA,  that  those  benefits 
are  made  available  on  a  reliable  basis  t 
nations  that  have  good  nonproliferatio: 
credentials. 

In  East  Asia  and  Latin  America,  t 
IAEA  has  recently  sponsored  initialivt 
to  promote  enhanced  cooperation  in 
nuclear  research,  development,  and 
training.  We  support  such  regional  ini- 
tiatives and  are  examining  the  feasibil 
of  broadening  the  Latin  American  eff( 
to  involve  other  nations  of  the  Wester 
Hemisphere,  including  the  United 
States. 

NPT  Review  Conference.  Over  tt 

past  several  years,  we  have  worked  to 
strengthen  the  treaty  that  is  at  the 
heart  of  the  international  nonprolifera 
tion  regime.  Ten  new  countries  have 
been  persuaded  to  join  in  the  last  4 
years,  making  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty,  with  125  parties,  the  most  wi( 
ly  adhered-to  arms  control  agreement 
history. 

Preparations  are  now  well  underv 
for  the  1985  conference  to  review  the 
implementation  of  the  NPT.  For  our 
part,  we  will  work  with  all  countries  i 
a  successful  review  conference  in  198) 
Indeed,  we  welcome  a  full  debate, 
which,  I  am  sure,  will  not  overlook  th 
treaty's  critical  contribution  to  interm 
tional  security  and  global  peace. 

The  Continuing  Priority  of 
Preventing  Proliferation 

It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  con- 
trolling the  spread  of  nuclear  weaponi 
critical  to  world  peace  and,  indeed,  to 
human  survival.  It  is  a  cause  that 
deserves  and  receives  a  top  priority  n 
our  foreign  policy. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


But  as  fateful  as  the  stakes  are,  our 
rts  have  not  been  widely  noted.  For 
struggle  we  are  waging  is  not  on  the 
;lefield.  It  goes  on  in  the  quiet  of 
omatic  chanceries,  at  meetings  of 
nical  experts,  and  in  safeguards 
ratories.  Success  is  measured  not  in 
as  of  territory  liberated  or  new  allies 
led  but  rather  in  terms  of  confidence 
blished,  restraints  voluntarily  ac- 
ed,  and  destabilizing  military  options 
one. 

By  those  measures,  our  nonprolifera- 
policy  has  been  a  success.  We  have 
tablished  a  spirit  of  confidence,  both 
other  nuclear  suppliers  and  with 
e  customers  of  nuclear  technology 
share  our  nonproliferation  goals;  we 
;  deepened  our  dialogues  on  practical 
)eration;  we  have  successfully  en- 
aged  some  important  countries  to 
)t  new  antiproliferation  measures; 
we  have  made  significant  progress 
ird  the  conclusion  of  new  bilateral 
ements  that  will  further  strengthen 
nternational  nonproliferation 
Tie. 

But  these  accomplishments,  impor- 
as  they  are,  must  not  lull  us  into 
Dlacency.  Thus  far,  we  have  proven 
ig  the  prophets  of  unchecked 
lar  proliferation.  But  only  with 
rmination,  realism,  and  unflagging 
t  can  we  continue  to  belie  their 
Tiy  prophecy  and  to  ensure  that  the 
atial  of  the  atom  will  be  exploited 
1.0  threaten  civilization  but  to  serve 


Security  &  Arms  Control: 

The  Search  for  a  More  Stable  Peace 


IPress  release  243  of  Nov.  1,  1984. 


September  1984 

A  little  over  a  year  has  passed  since  the 
first  edition  of  this  publication  on  securi- 
ty and  arms  control  appeared.  In  that 
time,  the  United  States  and  its  allies 
have  taken  a  number  of  important 
positive  steps  to  advance  the  arms  con- 
trol process.  For  its  part,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  chosen  to  interrupt  the 
crucial  Geneva  negotiations  on  strategic 
and  intermediate-range  nuclear 
weapons.  We  and  our  allies  have  made 
clear  that  we  want  talks  on  these  issues 
to  resume  at  once  without  preconditions, 
and  that  we  are  prepared  to  engage  in 
productive  negotiations  once  they  do. 

During  the  year,  a  new  East-West 
forum  began  in  Stockholm,  the  product 
of  Western  initiative:  the  Conference  on 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  in  Europe. 
Its  objective  is  to  negotiate  measures  to 
enhance  mutual  confidence  and  reduce 
the  risk  of  surprise  attack  in  Europe. 
The  West  has  put  forward  a  set  of  imag- 
inative and  constructive  measures  that 
would  concretely  advance  this  end.  In 
the  Vienna  negotiations  on  conventional 
forces  in  Europe,  the  West  has  also  ad- 
vanced a  concrete  new  proposal.  In 
April,  Vice  President  Bush  traveled  to 
the  Conference  on  Disarmament  in 
Geneva  to  present  a  new  draft  treaty  to 
ban  chemical  weapons  worldwide. 

In  June,  the  United  States  accepted, 
without  preconditions,  a  Soviet  invita- 
tion for  talks  on  space  arms  control,  in- 
cluding antisatellite  weapons.  The 
Soviets,  however,  have  portrayed  this 
acceptance  as  a  rejection,  while  in  effect 
insisting  that  we  agree  on  the  outcome 
before  the  talks  could  even  begin.  We 
remain  ready  to  meet  with  them,  both 
on  outer  space  questions  and  on  offen- 
sive nuclear  weapons. 


These  and  other  U.S.  arms  control 
efforts  are  part  of  a  long-term  Western 
effort  to  enhance  global  security  through 
balanced  and  verifiable  agreements.  This 
is  a  complement  to  maintaining  a  strong 
defense — not  an  alternative  to  it.  Since 
World  War  II,  the  United  States  and  its 
European  allies  have  preserved  the 
peace  through  a  commitment  to  collec- 
tive defense  within  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization  (NATO).  Conflict 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  has  been  avoided;  there 
has  been  no  resort  to  nuclear  weapons; 
and  the  industrialized  democracies  of 
Europe  have  enjoyed  the  longest  period 
of  peace  and  prosperity  in  their  modern 
history. 

For  almost  four  decades,  this  peace 
has  been  based  upon  the  twin  pillars  of 
defense  and  dialogue — the  maintenance 
of  Western  strength,  coupled  with  ef- 
forts to  resolve  differences  peacefully 
and  remove  sources  of  conflict.  The 
West  has  sought  to  use  arms  control  to 
strengthen  both  pillars,  to  stabilize  the 
military  balance  at  the  lowest  possible 
level,  and  in  so  doing  to  enhance  mutual 
confidence  and  expand  areas  of  under- 
standing. 

Over  the  past  year  Western  govern- 
ments have  recommitted  themselves  to 
this  broad  approach.  At  the  Williams- 
burg summit  the  leaders  of  the  world's 
seven  largest  industrial  democracies  af- 
firmed the  common  nature  of  our  securi- 
ty interests  and  called  upon  the  Soviet 
Union  to  join  us  in  reducing  nuclear  ar- 
mament. This  May,  in  Washington,  the 
16  NATO  Foreign  Ministers  reviewed 
the  course  of  East-West  relations  over 
the  past  two  decades,  and  reconfirmed 
the  validity  of  the  alliance's  dual  ap- 
proach of  defense  and  dialogue. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


The  United  States  and  its  allies  have       Summary 
oil  the  table  comprehensive  proposals  to 
reverse  the  arms  buildup,  establish  a 
more  stable  military  equilibrium  at  lower 
levels,  strengthen  deterrence,  and  rein- 
force world  peace.  These  are  goals 
which  people  of  all  nations  support. 
They  look  to  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  as  the  world's  two  most 
powerful  nations,  to  take  the  lead,  tor 
our  part,  as  the  efforts  outlined  in  this 
publication  illustrate,  we  are  doing  so. 

George  P.  Smi.TZ 


For  nearly  four  decades,  America  and 
its  friends  and  allies  have  preserved 
both  peace  and  the  fundamental  values 
of  personal  freedom,  human  dignity, 
democracy,  and  respect  for  national  m- 
dependence  and  diversity.  The  pursmt  of 
peace  and  freedom  has  never  been  easy, 
yet  the  West  has  succeeded  because  it 
has  remained  clear  on  its  goals  and 
united  in  the  means  for  achieving  them. 

The  responsibility  to  pursue  peace 
and  freedom  often  has  forced  the 
peoples  of  the  West  to  make  difficult 
decisions  on  security  issues.  They  have 
had  to  bear  the  burden  of  maintaining 
large,  modern  military  forces  adequate 
to  meet  the  threat  from  potential  adver- 
saries who  seek  political  and  military 
domination.  The  responsibility  to  main- 
tain an  effective  defense  imposes  sacri- 
fices and  requires  the  West  to  use  re- 
sources it  would  prefer  to  use  otherwise. 

In  the  nuclear  age,  any  East-West 
conflict  could  have  catastrophic  conse- 
quences  for  participants  and  nonpartici- 
pants  alike.  Thus,  while  the  United 
States  and  its  allies  have  maintained  a 
defense  adequate  to  deter  war,  they  also 
have  sought  to  lower  the  level  of  these 
forces,  to  reduce  the  risk  that  a  conflict 
might'occur,  and  to  establish  a  founda- 
tion of  mutual  restraint  and  responsibili- 
ty that  will  strengthen  peace. 

The  United  States  and  NATO  are 
committed  to  maintaining  the  minimum 
nuclear  forces  necessary  for  deterrence 
and  therefore,  over  time  have  made 
substantial  unilateral  reductions  in  those 
forces.  In  the  1960s,  the  United  States 
had  one-third  more  nuclear  weapons— 
with  four  times  the  explosive  power— 
than  it  has  today.  Similarly,  as  a  result 
of  several  NATO  alliance  decisions  taken 
over  the  past  4  years,  the  U.S.  nuclear 
stockpile  in  Europe  will  be  one-third 
smaller  than  in  1979.  ,  ., » ,„^ 

Thus  the  United  States  and  NAIO 
have  been  more  than  willing  to  under- 
take unilateral  nuclear  arms  reductions 
when  that  could  be  done  safely.  Re- 
grettably, this  cannot  be  said  for  the 
Soviet  Union.  Far  from  taking  com- 
parable steps  to  lower  its  nuclear  arma- 
ments, the  Soviet  Union  has  steadily  ex- 
panded its  stocks  of  strategic,  inter- 
mediate-range, and  short-range  nuclear 
weapons.  At  the  same  time,  it  has  con- 
tinued to  build  up  its  numerically 
superior  conventional  forces  and  quali- 
tatively improved  many  of  its  systems  to 
reduce  NATO's  technological  edge. 

The  United  States  and  its  allies, 
therefore,  are  seeking  arms  control 


agreements  that  would  genuinely 
enhance  stability  and  security,  reduce 
military  capabilities,  and  ease  the 
defense  burden.  Precisely  because  of  t 
importance  of  arms  control,  it  is  the  s 
ject  of  intense  public  debate  in  the  W« 
This  study  seeks  to  contribute  to  the 
discussion  by  reviewing  the  record  of 
U.S.  arms  control  efforts  since  the  en 
of  World  War  II  and  by  providing  a 
status  report  on  the  U.S.  arms  contro 
agenda  within  the  context  of  broader 
tional  security  objectives.  The  study  d 
scribes  the  factors  that  have  shaped 
U.S.  security  policy  and  recounts  past 
arms  control  efforts— those  that  have 
worked  and  those  that  did  not.  It  sets 
forth  the  principles  underlying  U.S. 
arms  control  initiatives.  It  reports  on 
eight  critical  arms  control  challenges 
and  how  the  United  States  and  its  alii 
are  addressing  them.  And  finally,  it 
summarizes  the  prospects  for  arms 
control. 


(Ft. 


A 


Collective  Security 

There  is  an  inescapable  relationship 
among  all  elements  of  security,  incluc 
defense  capabilities,  political  com- 
mitments, and  arms  control  agreemei 
It  is  often  argued  that  defense  and  ai 
control  are  separate  and  competing  C' 
cepts.  It  is  more  accurate,  however,  t 
say  that  arms  control  and  defense  an 
mutually  reinforcing;  each  bolsters  th 
effectiveness  of  the  other,  in  the  mte: 
of  greater  stability  and  security. 

Western  defense  and  arms  contn 
efforts  support  the  same  goal:  to  red 
the  risk  of  war.  One  also  can  see  the 
linkage  between  them  in  the  apparen 
paradox— borne  out  by  the  history  ol 
arms  control— that  the  West's  defensi 
modernization  programs  encourage  ! 
rather  than  discourage  progress  tow 
arms  reductions.  As  the  Scowcroft  o 
mission  noted  in  its  April  1983  repo 

Arms  control  negotiations— in  particU 
the  Soviets'  willingness  to  enter  agreemeij 
that  enhance  stability— are  heavily  influe:' 
by  ongoing  programs.  The  ABM  Treaty  o 
1972,  for  example,  came  about  only  becat 
the  United  States  maintained  an  ongoing 
ABM  program  and  indeed  made  a  decisioi 
make  a  limited  deployment.  It  is  illusory  t 
believe  that  we  could  obtain  a  satisfacton 
agreement  with  the  Soviets  limiting  K'B5 
deployments  if  we  unilaterally  termmated 
only  new  U.S.  ICBM  program  that  could 
to  deployments  in  this  decade. 

The  lesson  to  be  learned  is  that  t 
Soviet  Union  will  accept  equitable  re 
tions  that  create  a  stable  balance- 
essential  for  deterrence— at  lower  f( 


Deoartment  of  State  Bui 


ARMS  CONTROL 


\1:-  'inly  if  convinced  of  the  West's 
"I'liiiiiation  to  maintain  such  a 
t  IK  r  by  its  own  efforts. 
Sc  .'urity  in  the  nuclear  age  means 
\e  security.  History  demonstrates 
r  only  way  to  preserve  peace  and 
the  freedom  of  the  Western 
ocracies  is  through  their  unity  and 
mon  purpose.  This  principle  is  clear- 
cemplified  by  NATO — committing  16 
reign  nations  to  common  defense 
nst  aggression — and  by  similar  com- 
lents  in  which  the  United  States  has 
;d  in  the  Pacific  region. 
oUective  security  depends  on  the 
ical  will  and  military  capabilities  of 
)articipating  states.  Arms  control 
can  make  a  fundamental  contribu- 
te security,  if  equitable,  verifiable 
ements  can  be  achieved  that 
ificantly  reduce  the  level  of  forces 
helping  to  stabilize  the  military 
ice  and  strengthen  confidence  on  all 

\.rms  control  negotiations  are  com- 
But  beneath  the  technicalities, 
i  are  recurring  political  and 
egic  realities  that  must  be  recog- 
1  if  arms  control  is  to  contribute  to 
-ity.  The  most  important  of  these 
he  common  interests  of  the  in- 
•ialized  democracies,  including  the 
3d  States,  Canada,  Western 
pe,  Japan,  Australia,  and  New 
ind,  and  the  global  challenge  to 
interests  posed  by  the  Soviet 
n. 

oviet  power  and  aggressive 
/ior  have  led  the  United  States,  in 
nction  with  its  allies,  to  organize 
jliective  security — to  deter  and,  if 
sary,  to  repel  aggression.  This  ar- 
sment  has  succeeded  remarkably 
n  protecting  the  freedom  and 
ity  of  the  West  for  almost  40 

■ollective  security  has  been  based 
a  policy  of  deterrence,  which 
s  clear  to  any  adversary  that  the 
of  aggression  would  far  outweigh 
"ossible  benefits.  This  policy,  of 
1  NATO  is  a  central  element,  has 
mted  any  direct  U.S. -Soviet  conflict 
naintained  stability  in  the  North 
itic  area  since  1945,  a  period  that 
dtnessed  more  than  100  armed  con- 
globally. 

■ollective  security  also  provides  the 
upon  which  the  United  States  has 
led  a  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
1  aimed  at  reducing  tensions  and 
'ing  responsible  international  con- 
The  pursuit  of  effective  arms  con- 
as  been  an  important  part  of  that 


The  Arms  Control  Record 

Since  the  end  of  World  War  II,  the 
United  States,  working  closely  with  its 
allies,  has  been  the  leader  in  serious 
arms  control  proposals,  beginning  with 
the  1946  Baruch  Plan  to  eliminate 
nuclear  weapons  and  place  nuclear 
energy  under  an  international  authority. 
This  proposal  to  share  the  benefits  of 
nuclear  technology,  put  forward  when 
the  United  States  held  a  nuclear 
monopoly,  was  rejected  by  the  Soviet 
Union. 

In  1955,  President  Eisenhower  ad- 
vanced his  "open  skies"  proposal,  under 
which  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  would  have  exchanged  blueprints 
of  military  establishments  and  permitted 
aerial  reconnaissance  to  monitor  military 
maneuvers.  The  initiative  was  one  of  the 
first  suggested  "confidence-building 
measures"  aimed  at  increasing  mutual 
understanding  and  helping  to  reduce  the 
chances  of  surprise  attack.  It,  too,  was 
rejected  by  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  1963,  the  United  States  proposed, 
and  the  U.S.S.R.  agreed,  to  establish  a 
"hot  line"  to  facilitate  high-level  com- 
munication during  international  crises 
and  reduce  the  possibility  of  misunder- 
standings that  could  lead  to  conflict. 
That  same  year  the  Limited  Test  Ban 
Treaty — a  U.S.  initiative  prohibiting 
participating  states  from  testing  nuclear 
weapons  in  the  atmosphere,  outer  space, 
or  under  water — came  into  force. 

In  1968,  years  of  Western  effort  to 
prevent  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons 
and  to  provide  for  international  safe- 
guards on  civilian  nuclear  activities  re- 
sulted in  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  on 
the  Non-Proliferation  of  Nuclear 
Weapons.  Since  then,  the  United  States 
has  continued  efforts  to  eliminate  the 
threat  of  nuclear  proliferation  while 
sharing  the  benefits  of  nuclear  tech- 
nology through  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency. 

Other  arms  control  agreements 
which  the  United  States  has  had  a 
primary  role  in  negotiating  over  the  past 
25  years  include  the:  Antarctic  Treaty 
(1959),  which  demilitarized  the  Antarctic 
Continent;  Agreement  on  Peaceful  Uses 
of  Outer  Space  (1967),  which  prohibited 
stationing  weapons  of  mass  destruction 
in  space;  Seabed  Arms  Control  Treaty 
(1971),  which  prohibited  the  emplace- 
ment of  nuclear  weapons  on  the  seabeds 
and  ocean  floor  beyond  a  12-mile  coastal 
zone;  "Accidents  Measures"  Agreement 
(1971),  which  provides  for  U.S. -Soviet 
measures  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  ac- 
cidental nuclear  war;  Biological 
Weapons  Convention  (1972),  which  pro- 


hibits the  development,  production,  and 
stockpiling  of  bacteriological  and  toxin 
weapons;  ABM  Treaty  (1972),  which  im- 
posed limitations  on  defenses  against 
ballistic  missile  weapons;  and  the  In- 
terim Agreement  on  strategic  offensive 
arms  (1972),  usually  known  as  SALT  I, 
which  froze  the  number  of  U.S.  and 
Soviet  strategic  ballistic  missile 
launchers. 

The  U.S.  commitment  to  arms  con- 
trol has  never  wavered,  even  though  the 
global  security  environment  is  rapidly 
changing,  and  Soviet  behavior  regarding 
arms  control  has  been  far  from  satisfac- 
tory. It  is  axiomatic  that,  if  arms  control 
agreements  are  to  contribute  to  stabili- 
ty, all  parties  must  comply  with  them. 
Yet,  as  the  President  reported  to  Con- 
gress on  January  23,  1984,  the  United 
States  has  determined — after  a  careful 
review  of  many  months  and  numerous 
diplomatic  exchanges  with  the  Soviet 
Union— that  the  U.S.S.R.  has  violated 
or  probably  violated  several  legal  obliga- 
tions and  political  commitments  in  the 
arms  control  field.  Future  agreements, 
therefore,  must  include  effective  verifi- 
cation provisions,  and  the  Soviet  Union 
must  take  a  scrupulous  and  constructive 
attitude  toward  compliance. 

In  addition,  the  Soviet  Government 
suspended  both  the  negotiations  on 
strategic  and  on  intermediate-range 
nuclear  arms  in  late  1983,  following  the 
arrival  of  U.S.  longer  range  INF 
missiles  in  Europe  in  accordance  with 
NATO's  1979  "dual-track"  decision.  The 
Soviet  action  was  completely  unjustified. 
The  United  States  negotiated  for  2 
years  and  did  not  deploy  a  single  LRINF 
missile,  while  the  U.S.S.R.  added  over 
100  missiles,  with  more  than  300  war- 
heads, to  its  already  large  SS-20  force. 
As  of  September  1984,  that  force 
numbered  378  SS-20  missiles  with  1,134 
warheads  and  is  still  growing.  Moreover, 
the  United  States  repeatedly  made  clear 
that— while  NATO  LRINF  missile 
deployments  would  begin  at  the  end  of 
1983  in  the  absence  of  an  arms  control 
agreement  making  them  unnecessary — 
it  wants  to  continue  negotiations  and  is 
prepared  to  halt,  modify,  or  reverse 
those  deployments  in  accord  with  an 
eventual  agi-eement. 

The  United  States  deeply  regrets 
the  Soviet  suspension  of  START  and  the 
INF  talks.  It  is  convinced  that  equitable, 
verifiable  nuclear  arms  reductions  would 
be  in  the  interest  of  both  sides  and  is 
ready  to  resume  both  negotiations  at 
any  time  without  preconditions.  At  the 
same  time,  the  United  States  is  pressing 
ahead  for  progress  in  those  areas  where 
the  Soviets  are  willing  to  negotiate. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Today,  the  challenge  faced  by  those 
designing  Western  arms  control  policies 
is  great.  But  the  United  States,  together 
with  its  friends  and  allies,  remains  com- 
mitted to  genuine  arms  control  that  will 
enhance  stability  and  sustain  the  frame- 
work of  collective  security  that  has 
guaranteed  the  peace  throughout  the 
post-World  War  II  era. 


U.S.  ARMS  Control 
Principles  and  Initiatives 

In  underscoring  his  commitment  to  the 
pursuit  of  arms  control  agreements  that 
will  strengthen  peace.  President  Reagan 
has  stressed  the  essential  principles 
guiding  the  U.S.  approach. 

•  The  United  States  seeks  agree- 
ments that  will  enhance  security  while 
reducing  the  risks  of  war.  Thus  arms 
control  is  not  an  end  in  itself  but  a  vital 
means  to  ensure  a  secure  peace  and  in- 
ternational stability. 

•  The  United  States  seeks  to  reduce 
weapons  and  forces  substantially,  not 
just  freeze  them  at  high  levels  or 
legitimize  additional  buildups,  as  has 
been  the  effect  of  some  earlier  agree- 
ments. 

•  The  U.S.  goal  is  mutual  reductions 
to  equal  levels  in  both  sides'  forces.  An 
agreement  that  establishes  or  codifies  an 
unequal  balance  of  forces  creates  in- 
stability and  enhances  the  prospect  for 
conflict. 

•  Arms  control  agreements  must  in- 
clude provisions  to  ensure  effective  veri- 
fication and  encourage  compliance. 

Based  on  these  principles,  the 
United  States  is  pursuing  an  arms  con- 
trol agenda  of  unprecedented  scope.  To- 
day's efforts  build  upon  more  than  three 
decades'  experience,  upon  agreements 
already  achieved,  and  upon  lessons 
learned  from  past  successes  and  failures. 

In  all  areas,  the  United  States  has 
maintained  close  and  fruitful  consulta- 
tions with  its  allies  regarding  arms  con- 
trol positions  and  the  conduct  of  negotia- 
tions. This  consultation  grows  out  of  the 
common  recognition  that  arms  control  is 
an  important  instrument  of  Western 
policy  and  an  essential  element  of  world 
security. 

The  primary  challenges  for  U.S. 
arms  control  efforts  include: 

Strategic  Arms.  The  strategic  arms 
reduction  talks  (START),  dealing  with 
the  principal  elements  of  the  U.S. -Soviet 
intercontinental  nuclear  relationship.  In 
these  talks,  the  United  States  has  been 
trying  to  achieve  significant  reductions 
in  both  sides'  strategic  nuclear  systems 


Acronyms 


ABM— antiballistic  missile 
ALCM— air-launched  cruise  missile 
ASAT— antisatellite  weapons 
CD— Conference  on  Disarmament 
CDE— Conference  on  Confidence-  and 
Security-Building  Measures  and 
Disarmament  in  Europe 
CSCE— Conference  on  Security  and 

Cooperation  in  Europe 
IAEA— International  Atomic  Energy 

Agency 
ICBM  — intercontinental  ballistic 

missile 
INF— intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 
GLCM— ground-launched  cruise  missile 
LRINF— longer  range  INF 
MBFR— mutual  and  balanced  force 

reductions 
MIRV— multiple  independently- 

targetable  reentry  vehicle 
MV— miniature  vehicle 
NPT— Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty 
SALT— strategic  arms  limitation  talks 
SCG— Special  Consultative  Group 

(NATO) 
SDI— Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
SLBM— submarine-launched  ballistic 

missile 
START— strategic  arms  reduction  talks 


and  to  encourage  movement  toward  a 
more  stabilizing  force  structure.  For  ex- 
ample, the  United  States  has  proposed  a 
one-third  cut  by  both  sides  in  the 
number  of  strategic  ballistic  missile 
warheads.  Reductions  would  be  ac- 
complished through  a  "build-down"  of 
ballistic  missile  warheads  designed  to 
channel  modernization  of  strategic 
forces  toward  more  stabilizing  systems 
and  guaranteed  annual  reductions  even 
in  the  absence  of  modernization. 

Intermediate-Range  Nuclear 
Forces.  The  talks  on  intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces  (INF),  focusing  on  a 
crucial  part  of  the  Soviet  threat  to  coun- 
tries on  its  periphery.  In  these  talks,  the 
United  States  has  proposed  eliminating 
the  entire  category  of  U.S.  and  So\iet 
land-based,  longer  range  INF  missiles. 
The  United  States  also  has  proposed 
that,  as  an  interim  agreement,  the  two 
sides  agree  to  reductions  to  equal 
numbers  of  warheads  on  longer  range 
INF  missiles  and  has  significantly 
modified  its  position  to  meet  stated 
Soviet  concerns. 

Conventional  Forces  in  Europe. 
The  mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction 
(MBFR)  talks  in  Vienna,  dealing  with 
conventional  military  power  in  central 
Europe,  where  there  is  a  great  im- 
balance in  favor  of  the  Warsaw  Pact. 
The  agreed  goal  of  these  talks  is  to 


achieve  reductions  in  both  NATO  ami  i 
Warsaw  Pact  forces  in  central  Europe 
to  parity  at  levels  of  700,000  ground 
forces  and  900,000  ground  and  air  fon 
combined.  The  talks  have  long  been 
deadlocked  over  disagreement  on  the 
current  size  of  Eastern  forces  and 
Eastern  unwillingness  to  accept  effect 
verification  provisions.  In  April  1984, 
the  West  submitted  a  proposal  aimed  ; 
breaking  this  deadlock  by  focusing  the 
talks  initially  upon  only  combat  and  cc 
bat  support  forces  and  leaving  agree- 
ment on  rear  area  forces  until  later. 

Confidence-Building  Measures. 

Designed  to  promote  mutual  knowledf 
of  military  forces  and  activities  and  to 
prevent  misunderstanding  or  miscalcu 
tion  in  a  crisis,  these  measures  can  be 
applied  to  virtually  all  areas  of  arms 
control.  The  United  States  has  advanc 
proposals  for  confidence-building 
measures  relating  to  nuclear  forces  at 
the  START  and  INF  negotiations.  Thi 
United  States  also  has  proposed  furth 
measures  to  improve  communication 
with  the  Soviet  Union  on  which  the  tv 
sides  began  negotiating  in  August  198 
In  July  1984,  the  United  States  and 
U.S.S'R.  reached  agreement  on  imprc 
ing  the  "hot  line,"  one  of  the  measures 
proposed  by  the  United  States.  This  p 
vides  for  the  addition  of  high-speed  fa 
simile  facilities  to  the  existing  system 
The  United  States  and  its  allies  also 
have  advanced  measures  for  notificati 
and  clarification  of  the  activities  of  co 
ventional  forces  in  the  MBFR  talks  ai 
at  the  Conference  on  Disarmament  in 
Europe,  which  opened  in  Stockholm  i 
January  1984. 

Chemical  Weapons.  An  immediat 
challenge  is  to  ensure  compliance  witK 
existing  international  agreements 
outlawing  the  use  of  chemical  weapcr 
and  agreeing  to  new  accords  for  a  ve, 
fiable  ban  on  the  development,  produi ; 
tion,  stockpiling,  and  transfer  of 
chemical  weapons.  International  attert 
tion  has  been  drawn  to  violations  of  e  < 
isting  accords  by  the  Soviet  Union  an< 
its  allies,  who  have  employed  chemica 
and  toxin  weapons  in  Afghanistan,  _K: 
puchea,  and  Laos,  and  to  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons  by  Iraq  in  its  war 
with  Iran.  In  April  1984,  the  United 
States  introduced  a  draft  treaty  at  th 
Conference  on  Disarmament  in  Genev 
for  a  comprehensive  global  ban  on 
chemical  weapons. 

Nuclear  Testing.  Since  conclusio 
of  the  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty,  whic 
bans  atmospheric  testing,  attention  h; 
focused  on  efforts  to  limit  and  ultimai 
ban  underground  nuclear  testing.  An 
obstacle  has  l)een  the  inadequacy  of 


9A 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


ARMS  CONTROL 


ism-es  to  verify  compliance.  The 
:rl  States  repeatedly  has  proposed 

iiions  with  the  Soviet  Union  to 
,  ,~  strengthening  the  verification 
\  I -ions  of  the  unratified  Threshold 
,t  Ban  Treaty  and  the  Peaceful 
lear  Explosions  Treaty,  which  limit 
size  of  underground  nuclear  explo- 
s.  Achieving  a  comprehensive  ban  on 
ear  testing — in  the  context  of  broad, 
D,  and  verifiable  arms  reductions,  im- 
'ed  verification  capabilities,  expand- 
onfidence-building  measures,  and  the 
itenance  of  a  credible  deterrent — re- 
18  a  long-term  U.S.  objective. 

Nonproliferation.  The  United 
es  is  committed  to  effective  impu- 
tation of  the  1968  treaty  on  prevent- 
;he  spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  The 
,ed  States  is  working  to  strengthen 
•national  safeguards  on  nuclear 
jrial  and  to  more  tightly  control  ac- 


cess to  technology  relating  to  nuclear 
weapons  production. 

Outer  Space  Arms  Control.  The 

United  States  has  been  studying  and 
reviewing  the  whole  area  of  space  arms 
control,  to  identify  what  would  be 
equitable,  verifiable,  and  truly  effective 
in  limiting  threats  to  satellites.  The 
United  States  accepted,  without  precon- 
ditions, the  Soviets'  June  1984  proposal 
to  meet  in  Vienna  in  mid-September  to 
discuss  this  subject.  Regrettably,  the 
Soviet  Union  subsequently  backed  away 
from  its  own  proposal. 

The  scope  of  the  U.S.  arms  control 
agenda,  the  complexity  of  the  issues, 
and  the  range  of  interests  of  the  many 
countries  involved,  testify  to  the  impor- 
tance the  United  States  attaches  to 
arms  control  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
effort  to  strengthen  peace  and  security. 


Foundations  of  Western  Security 


United  States  borders  upon  two 
t  oceans  and  has  important  eco- 
ic,  political,  and  humanitarian  in- 
its  throughout  the  globe.  The  prin- 
threat  to  American  security,  and  to 
of  our  friends  and  allies  around  the 
i,  comes  from  another  continent- 
ning  nation,  the  Soviet  Union, 
h,  like  the  United  States,  faces  east 
vest  and  has  access  to  the  Atlantic 
^acific  Oceans. 

'he  keystone  of  U.S.  security  policy 
C  se,  cooperative  ties  with  the  world's 
li;trialized  democracies  in  Western 
upe,  Canada,  Japan,  New  Zealand, 
diustralia.  We  share  more  than  a 
tnon  threat  with  these  nations;  we 
,4'  values  and  political  principles  that 
u  be  protected,  fostered,  and  propa- 
til.  The  maintenance  of  a  stable 
'1 1  equilibrium  and  our  ability  to  con- 
b;e  to  peace  in  other  areas  of  the 
ijI  depend  upon  the  cooperation 
i{  g  this  group  of  like-minded  nations. 


RiTYiN  Asia 

iiormous  size  and  diversity  of  the 
I   region,  its  importance  to 
uan  security,  and  the  proximity 
rtivities  of  the  Soviet  Union  re- 
American  efforts  to  maintain  an 
;  ive  structure  of  security.  The 
nee  of  U.S.  land  and  air  forces  in 
1  and  Japan  and  of  the  Seventh 
in  the  western  Pacific  give 
ance  to  the  commitments  the 
d  States  has  undertaken  in 


bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements 
with  Japan,  South  Korea,  Australia, 
New  Zealand,  the  Philippines,  and 
Thailand. 

The  foremost  American  objective  in 
the  region  is  to  preserve  peace  and 
stability.  In  that  context,  the  United 
States  maintains  military  forces  to  meet 
the  growing  Soviet  military  threat  and 
supports  its  friends  and  allies  against 
potential  threats  from  North  Korea  and 
Vietnam.  The  United  States  also  pro- 
tects sealanes  that  are  strategically  im- 
portant to  the  regional  states  and  also 
crucial  to  the  defense  of  the  Indian 
Ocean,  East  Africa,  and  the  Middle 
East,  and  to  the  maintenance  of 
Western  access  to  these  regions.  The 
United  States  also  is  working  to  build  a 
long-term  and  constructive  relationship 
with  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 


Security  in  the  Near  East 
AND  Southwest  Asia 

The  United  States  also  has  vital  in- 
terests and  important  relationships  with 
friendly  nations  in  the  Near  East  and 
Southwest  Asia.  The  significance  of  this 
region  for  world  stability  and  the  health 
of  the  global  economy  cannot  be  over- 
stated. Our  objectives  are  to  deter  fur- 
ther Soviet  aggression  in  the  region,  to 
promote  progress  toward  Middle  East 
peace  that  will  assure  the  security  and 
recognize  the  legitimate  rights  of  all  par- 
ties, to  preserve  the  independence  of  the 
states  of  the  region,  to  maintain  free- 


dom for  navigation  in  the  contiguous 
waters,  and  to  ensure  Western  access  to 
the  region's  energy  resources. 

In  view  of  the  proximity  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  number  of  Soviet 
military  units  stationed  along  the  Soviet 
border  just  north  of  this  region  and  in 
the  surrounding  waters,  the  task  of  de- 
terring aggression  is  especially  challeng- 
ing. The  occupation  of  Afghanistan  in 
1979  brought  Soviet  forces  deeper  into 
the  region.  In  addition,  Soviet  access  to 
South  Yemen  and  Ethiopia  and  signifi- 
cant numbers  of  Soviet  military  person- 
nel and  equipment  in  Syria  and  Libya, 
compound  the  problem. 

U.S.  efforts  to  promote  peace  and 
stability  have  involved  a  number  of 
political,  economic,  and  security  coopera- 
tion programs  with  regional  states,  in- 
cluding efforts  to  resolve  the  Palestinian 
question  and  the  destabilizing  presence 
of  foreign  forces  in  Lebanon.  The  United 
States  has  provided  significant  amounts 
of  economic  and  security  assistance  to 
many  states  in  the  region  and  has 
cooperated  in  other  ways  to  strengthen 
regional  governments.  It  has  par- 
ticipated in  multinational  peacekeeping 
activities  in  the  Sinai  and  Lebanon. 

The  United  States  has  developed  the 
capabilities  for  the  rapid  projection  of 
power  into  the  region  in  order  to  deter 
aggression.  This  has  involved  improving 
mobility  and  service  support  forces  and 
designating  a  pool  of  forces  that  can  be 
quickly  deployed  if  required.  In  conjunc- 
tion with  several  governments,  we  are 
developing  a  number  of  facilities,  both 
en  route  and  in  the  region,  that  would 
be  available  for  such  rapid  deployments, 
subject  to  host  government  concurrence. 


Security  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere 

America  also  has  important  security  con- 
cerns in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  as  do 
the  other  industrialized  democracies  that 
rely  upon  American  strength.  In  the 
event  of  a  European  crisis,  for  example, 
about  half  of  the  U.S.  resupply  of  its 
NATO  allies  would  travel  from 
American  gulf  ports  through  sealanes  in 
the  Caribbean  Basin.  The  Rio  treaty  con- 
firms the  longstanding  U.S.  commitment 
to  the  security  of  the  nations  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere, 

U.S.  objectives  in  the  hemisphere 
are  to  maintain  the  security  of  the  North 
American  Continent,  the  Caribbean 
Basin,  and  the  Panama  Canal;  to  pro- 
mote economic  development  and  the 
strengthening  of  democratic  institutions; 
to  support  the  independence  and  stabili- 


ARMS  CONTROL 


ly  of  friendly  governments;  to  counter 
the  projection  of  Soviet  and  Cuban  mili- 
tary power  and  influence  in  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  and  South  America;  and  to 
strengthen  U.S.  political  and  defense 
relationships  with  friendly  countries. 

Historically,  the  Western 
Hemisphere  has  been  secure  enough  to 
allow  the  United  States  to  concentrate 
on  its  European,  Asian,  and  other 
security  commitments.  However,  the 
steady  growth  of  Cuban  military  power 
and  the  recent  involvement  of 
communist-bloc  countries,  other  radical 
states,  and  extrahemispheric  movements 
in  Central  American  instability  have 
created  serious  problems.  We  are  seek- 
ing to  address  these  problems  by  pro- 
moting equitable  social  and  economic 
development,  by  strengthening 
democratic  processes,  by  supporting 
regional  diplomatic  efforts  to  reduce  ten- 
sions, and  by  directly  bolstering  the 
ability  of  Caribbean  Basin  nations  to  de- 
fend themselves. 


Security  in  Africa 

Developments  in  Africa  are  important  to 
the  United  States  for  many  reasons. 
African— and  Western— interests  are 
best  served  in  an  atmosphere  of  political 
stability,  economic  growth,  and  physical 
security.  The  United  States  is  thus  con- 
cerned with  Africa's  political  moderniza- 
tion, social  progress,  and  economic 
development.  In  particular,  the  United 
States  is  concerned  about  those  coun- 
tries friendly  to  the  West  that  are 
threatened  by  subversion  and 
destabilization  from  various  quarters. 
They  need  the  help  and  support  of  the 
United  States  and  other  industrialized 
democracies.  The  Soviets  and  their 
surrogates  have  continued  to  supply 
arms  and  personnel  to  Africa  and  have 
attempted  to  exploit  conflicts  through- 
out the  continent.  American  policy  en- 
courages negotiated  solutions  to  these 
conflicts.  What  the  United  States  and  its 
allies  are  attempting  to  accomplish  in 
southern  Africa  exemplifies  this  ap- 
proach. At  the  same  time,  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  provide 
assistance  to  friends  whose  security  is 
threatened. 


Security  in  Europe 

Membership  in  the  North  Atlantic  Trea- 
ty Organization,  a  coalition  of  sovereign 
Western  countries  formed  and  sustained 
to  defend  the  interests  and  values  of  the 
Atlantic  democracies,  is  the  centerpiece 


of  U.S.  security  efforts.  NATO  is  based 
on  the  principle  that  Western  security  is 
indivisible  and  that  the  defense  of  the 
political  independence  and  democratic 
systems  of  the  European  allies  against 
the  Soviet  threat  is  vital  to  the  United 
States. 

Throughout  the  postwar  period, 
NATO  has  had  to  cope  with  two  fun- 
damental geographic  realities. 

•  The  nations  and  defense  resources 
of  the  West  are  divided  by  the  Atlantic 
Ocean. 

•  The  Soviet  Union  emerged  from 
World  War  H  in  control  of  a  contiguous 
landmass  extending  from  Asia  into  the 
heart  of  Europe. 

The  United  States  is  separated  from 
Europe  by  more  than  3,000  miles  of 
open  water.  Even  within  Europe,  the 
Western  nations  do  not  form  a  single 
contiguous  landmass.  Although  the 
United  States  and  its  NATO  allies 
together  have  more  population,  larger 
economies,  and  are  more  highly 
developed  than  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
East  European  states,  the  geographic 
division  has  always  posed  special 
challenges  to  collective  efforts  to 
guarantee  Western  security.  NATO  has 
always  had  to  contend  with  the  risk  that 
the  Soviet  Union,  for  military  or  political 
purposes,  could  bring  superior  forces  to 
bear  on  a  vulnerable  point. 

Not  only  does  the  Soviet  Union 
maintain  the  largest  single  army  in 
Europe,  but  its  direct  land  lines  of  com- 
munication permit  swift  reinforcement 
of  those  forces  from  elsewhere  on  its 
own  territory.  Moreover,  its  internal 
lines  of  communication  allow  it  to  choose 
the  point  of  potential  attack  or  pressure. 

For  the  United  States  and  other 
Western  nations,  it  was  clear  in  the  late 
1940s  that  these  geographic  realities 
could  be  overcome  only  through  a  close 
alliance  between  Europe  and  North 
America.  Memories  of  the  1930s— when 
the  absence  of  effective  solidarity  pre- 
vented the  democracies  from  checking 
the  rise  of  aggressive  dictatorships 
without  war— were  still  fresh.  The 
Soviets'  seizure  of  Eastern  Europe,  their 
rejection  of  free  elections  in  countries 
under  their  control,  and  their  attempt  to 
starve  out  the  free  city  of  Berlin  were 
immediate  reminders  of  the  dangers 
faced  by  a  prostrate  Europe  and  a  de- 
mobilized United  States.  It  was  evident 
that  only  a  policy  of  collective  security 
could  preserve  peace  and  protect  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Western  peoples. 
Only  the  commitment  by  the  Western 
democracies  to  a  common  defense  could 
deter  military  aggression  or  political 
pressure  against  any  one  of  them. 


Twice  in  this  century  the  United 
States  has  joined  with  its  allies  to  de- 
fend democracy  in  Europe  and  restore 
stable  equilibrium  of  power.  Since  Woi 
War  II,  the  Western  goal  in  Europe  h-.t 
been  to  prevent  a  new  conflict  from  e\ 
occurring.  1 

To  this  end,  NATO  was  established 
in  1949  as  the  formal  embodiment  of  a| 
security  partnership  of  equals.  From  t 
beginning,  NATO  has  been  a  defensivt 
alliance,  committed  never  to  use  force 
except  in  response  to  aggression. 
NATO's  basic  goal  has  been  to 
demonstrate  the  political  will  and 
military  strength  needed  to  deter  afj 
gression  and  prevent  intimidation. 


NATO's  Str.\tegy  of  Deterrence 
AND  Flexible  Response 

Deterrence  is  the  basis  of  U.S.  and 
NATO  security  policy.  It  requires  thai 
potential  aggressor  be  convinced  that 
the  costs  of  aggression  outweigh  any 
possible  gains.  Maintaining  deterrence 
for  almost  four  decades  has  been  a  di 
cult  and  dynamic  process.  The  United 
States  and  the  other  NATO  members 
have  had  to  adapt  to  technological  pn 
ress,  to  the  gi-owth  and  modernizatioi 
Soviet  military  power,  and  to  politica 
and  economic  change  at  home  and 
abroad.  In  particular,  they  have  had  1 
offset  repeated  efforts  by  the  Soviet 
Union  to  exploit  its  geographic  advar' 
tages  and  divide  NATO  in  order  to 
dominate  Western  Europe. 

At  the  outset,  deterrence  depend 
heavily  on  America's  superior  strate^ 
nuclear  power.  The  U.S.  lead  over  th 
Soviet  Union  in  nuclear  capabilities 
allowed  the  West  to  offset  substantij 
Soviet  advantages  in  conventional 
strength,  deter  aggression,  and  insul 
Europe  from  Soviet  intimidation. 

As  the  Soviet  Union  developed  it 
own  nuclear  forces,  however,  it  beca 
apparent  that  the  threat  of  nuclear 
retaliation  alone  was  not  sufficient  t( 
provide  credible  deterrence  under  all 
cumstances.  Increasingly,  on  both  si( 
of  the  Atlantic,  it  was  recognized  thf 
stability  could  be  assured  only  if  the 
nuclear  deterrent  was  supplemented 
more  robust  conventional  forces.  Thi 
in  the  1960s,  the  alliance  developed  t 
strateg>'  of  "flexible  response"  which 
continues  to  this  day. 

The  basic  premise  of  this  strateg 
that  NATO  must  deter  and,  if  neces! 
counter  military  aggression  of  varyii 
magnitudes  in  any  of  its  regions.  To 
this,  the  alliance  must  maintain  a  wi 
array  of  forces.  This  balance  of  forci 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Tiits  a  flexible  range  of  responses 
•ble  of  meeting  any  aggression  at  an 
ropriate  level  to  defeat  the  attack. 
5  strategy  relies  on  having  strong 
rentional  and  nuclear  forces  to  con- 
ic the  Soviet  Union  that  NATO  could 
would  counter  any  aggression  and 
;  the  risks  to  the  Soviet  Union  would 
outweigh  any  gains  from  an  attack 
ny  level. 


DO  Triad  of  Forces 

mplement  this  strategy,  NATO  fields 
iterlocking  combination  of  forces: 

Conventional  forces,  including 
ored  and  mechanized  divisions,  tac- 

aircraft,  and  naval  forces; 
[ntermediate-range  and  short- 

e  nuclear  weapons,  based  in 

ype,  with  delivery  systems  operated 

le  United  States  and  its  allies;  and 

trategic  forces,  including  inter- 
inental  ballistic  missiles,  submarine- 
ched  ballistic  missiles,  and  heavy 
bers,  based  in  the  United  States. 

\.ll  three  elements  of  the  triad  of 
5S  play  an  essential  role  in  the 
itenance  of  an  effective  deterrent, 
provide  NATO  with  the  capability 
lunter  aggression  at  a  variety  of 
B  and  confront  a  potential  aggressor 
great  uncertainty  about  the  level 
nature  of  a  Western  response.  An 
essor  must  perceive  that  any  attack 
ATO  could  incur  incalculable  risks, 
ding  the  risk  of  nuclear  retaliation 
Cessary  to  restore  the  peace  and 
the  aggressor  to  withdraw.  The 
!t  of  the  three  elements  working 
^  her  is  more  than  the  sum  of  the  in- 
"ual  parts.  Conventional  defense 
r)  would  not  provide  political  confi- 
r '  I  ir  military  deterrence  against  the 
\  t  Union.  Similarly,  a  nuclear  force 
■r\l'  would  not  be  a  credible  de- 
iiit  in  every  situation  and  might,  in 
;1  invite  political  pressure  and  limited 
liiry  adventure.  Moreover,  the  avail- 
>  I  if  nuclear  weapons  for  the 
'  sc  of  Western  Europe  complicates 
isk  of  the  Soviet  military  planner. 
liiT,  NATO's  combination  of  con- 
nal  and  nuclear  forces  has  proved 
extremely  effective  in  preserving 

111.'  key  is  the  firm  linkage  among 
cments.  An  aggressor  must  never 
-  '11  the  impression  that  risks  could 
t'ely  limited  and  that  an  attack 
st  NATO  might  be  an  attractive 
isition. 

Itimately,  the  most  important  link 
t  between  forces  in  Europe — both 


conventional  and  nuclear— and  the  U.S. 
strategic  deterrent.  It  is  this  crucial 
"coupling"  that  gives  concrete  form  to 
the  indivisibility  of  American  and  Euro- 
pean security  and  that  ensures  that  the 
Soviets  could  not  attack  Europe  without 
risking  retaliation  against  their  own  ter- 
ritory. Thus,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
over  the  years  the  way  to  maintain  the 
linkage  between  Europe  and  North 
America  has  been  the  single  most  dis- 
cussed element  of  NATO  strategy  and 
that  weakening  the  link  has  been  a  con- 
sistent Soviet  objective. 


The  Current  Debate 

In  recent  years,  the  U.S.  and  NATO 
strategy  of  deterrence  has  been  criti- 
cized from  a  variety  of  perspectives.  For 
some,  the  cost  of  maintaining  conven- 
tional forces  has  seemed  too  great,  par- 
ticularly in  a  time  of  economic  difficulty. 
To  these  critics,  it  has  appeared  far 
easier  to  move  back  to  the  simple 
strategy  of  an  earlier  era,  relying  on  the 
threat  of  massive  nuclear  retaliation  as 
an  inexpensive  deterrent. 

For  others,  the  risks  of  nuclear 
weapons  have  appeared  too  great.  They 
believe  that  the  deterrent  effect  of 
nuclear  weapons  is  less  important  than 
their  unquestioned  destructiveness  were 
they  ever  employed.  Such  critics  argue 
that  the  answer  lies  in  reducing  the  role 
of  nuclear  weapons  and  perhaps  even  in 
renouncing  their  first  use.  Some  say 
they  would  be  prepared  to  increase 
sharply  the  expenditures  for  conven- 
tional defense  to  offset  this  change. 

The  United  States  and  its  allies  can- 
not return  to  a  doctrine  based  solely  on 
massive  nuclear  retaliation,  such  as  ex- 
isted more  than  two  decades  ago.  In  an 
era  of  reciprocal  nuclear  vulnerability, 
the  threat  of  massive  nuclear  retaliation 
alone  is  not  suited  to  all  or  even  most 
contingencies.  Relying  on  nuclear 
weapons  alone  would  leave  the  West 
able  to  respond  only  to  one  contingen- 
cy— the  worst  one — with  no  credible 
means  of  dealing  with  all  the  other 
possibilities,  from  political  and  economic 
pressure  to  various  forms  of  limited  ag- 
gression. 

Conversely,  to  remove  nuclear 
weapons  from  the  deterrent,  or  to 
declare  a  policy  of  no-first-use,  would 
allow  an  aggressor  to  act  with  the  cer- 
tainty that  risks  could  be  limited.  It 
would,  in  practice,  make  Europe  safe  for 
conventional  war  by  appearing  to 
guarantee  to  the  Soviet  Union  that  the 
West  would  not  escalate  to  the  nuclear 
level  if  faced  with  defeat  by  conventional 


forces.  Renouncing  the  nuclear  compo- 
nent of  the  NATO  triad  would  gravely 
undermine  the  West's  ability  to  deter 
conflict  or  intimidation. 

Such  a  renunciation  also  would  pro- 
foundly damage  the  unity  of  the  alliance. 
It  would  mean  that  the  commitment  to 
defend  all  areas  of  the  alliance,  including 
those  most  exposed  to  Soviet  threats,     ' 
could  not  be  effectively  implemented. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
made  the  question  of  nuclear  no-first-use 
a  major  propaganda  theme  over  the 
years.  And  it  is  equally  unsurprising 
that  NATO  has  consistently  rejected  it 
while  maintaining  a  broad,  substantive 
arms  control  agenda. 

Some  in  the  West  maintain  that  the 
defense  of  Europe  is  unnecessary  or  im- 
possible. Those  who  hold  the  former 
view  no  longer  consider  the  Soviet 
Union  even  a  potential  threat  and  do  not 
believe  that  Soviet  military  advantage  in 
Europe  could  be  translated  into  political 
gains.  Those  who  accept  the  latter  view 
believe  opposition  to  the  Soviets  to  be 
futile  and  support,  instead,  a  process  of 
one-sided  accommodation. 

Neither  view  is  justified.  Recent 
history  shows  that  the  Soviet  Union  will 
not  hesitate  to  translate  military  power 
into  political  pressure:  witness,  for  in- 
stance, its  behavior  toward  Poland  since 
1981.  Nor  are  the  Soviets  averse  to  us- 
ing force  to  achieve  political  objectives, 
as  demonstrated  in  East  Germany  in 
1953,  in  Hungary  in  1956,  in  Czechoslo- 
vakia in  1968,  and  with  the  invasion  of 
Afghanistan  in  1979.  On  the  other  hand, 
nearly  four  decades  of  peace  in  Western 
Europe  demonstrate  that  through  collec- 
tive efforts,  the  Western  democracies 
can  secure  both  peace  and  freedom. 


The  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative 

On  March  23,  1983,  President  Reagan 
announced  the  beginning  of  a  research 
effort  now  known  as  the  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative  (SDI) — a  program  to 
explore  the  possibility  of  strengthening 
deterrence  through  recent  advances  in 
technologies  that  could,  in  the  long 
term,  provide  an  effective  defense 
against  ballistic  missiles.  The  SDI  will 
focus  and,  as  appropriate,  expand  ex- 
isting research  efforts  in  order  to 
develop  sound  technical  options  that 
could  allow  future  Presidents  and  Con- 
gresses— perhaps  in  the  early  1990s — to 
decide  whether  to  proceed  with  the 
development  of  such  a  defense. 

The  SDI  research  program  is  fully 
consistent  with  U.S.  treaty  obligations. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Relevant  treaties  include  the  ABM  Trea- 
ty, the  Outer  Space  Treaty,  and  the 
Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty.  The  Soviets, 
who  maintain  and  are  upgrading  the 
world's  only  existing  antiballistic  missile 
(ABM)  system,  installed  around  Moscow, 
have  for  several  years  been  actively 
conducting  research  on  conventional  and 
advanced  technologies  for  defense 
against  ballistic  missiles. 

The  United  States  has  expressed  to 
the  Soviets  the  view  that  a  discussion 
about  the  defensive  technologies  that 
both  countries  are  exploring  would  be 
mutually  beneficial.  For  these  discus- 
sions to  be  useful,  they  should  be  in  a 


government-to-government  forum.  The 
United  States  has  provided  the  Soviets 
with  a  specific  proposal  for  such  talks, 
but  as  of  September  1984,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  not  agreed. 

Since  the  Strategic  Defense  Initia- 
tive is  an  exploratory  research  program, 
it  does  not  signal  a  shift  in  priority  from 
the  much  needed  modernization  of  U.S. 
nuclear  and  conventional  forces  which  is 
essential  to  maintaining  deterrence  over 
the  next  decade  or  two.  The  United 
States  intends  to  work  closely  with  its 
friends  and  allies  to  ensure  that  the 
common  deterrent  remains  strong. 


The  Role  of  Arms  Control  in  U.S.  Security 


A  fundamental  tenet  of  U.S.  security 
policy  is  that  peace  and  security  are  best 
assured  by  following  the  dual  paths  of 
maintaining  effective  defense  and  deter- 
rent capabilities  and  seeking,  wherever 
possible,  to  increase  cooperation  with 
other  nations  and  negotiate  stabilizing 
and  verifiable  arms  control  agreements. 

Given  the  rapid  growth  of  Soviet 
military  power,  the  United  States  and 
its  allies  have  had  a  direct  security  in- 
terest in  redressing,  by  their  own 
defense  efforts  and  through  arms  con- 
trol if  possible,  current  and  emerging 
imbalances  in  conventional  and  nuclear 
forces.  As  democratic  societies,  they  also 
have  a  basic  responsibility  to  their  peo- 
ple to  maintain  defense  expenditures  at 
the  lowest  level  consistent  with  national 
and  alliance  security. 

Western  governments  have  devel- 
oped and  analyzed  potential  arms  con- 
trol agreements  in  terms  of  concrete 
security  implications.  They  have  en- 
gaged in  extensive  preparatory  work, 
public  discussion,  and  intra-alliance  coor- 
dination to  ensure  that  eventual  agree- 
ments would  strengthen  security  and 
stability  and  would  enjoy  public  support. 
The  results  of  this  work  are  evident  in 
today's  negotiating  agenda. 


Western  Arms  Control 
Objectives  and  Criteria 

Over  the  years,  Western  peoples  and 
governments  have  looked  to  arms  con- 
trol to  achieve  a  number  of  objectives, 
including: 

•  Reducing  the  risk  of  war; 

•  Lessening  political  tensions; 


•  Decreasing  the  economic  burden 
of  armaments;  and 

•  Ensuring  a  stable  military 
balance. 

Given  the  devastation  that  would 
result  from  a  nuclear  war,  the  priority 
for  arms  control  clearly  is  to  help  ensure 
that  such  a  conflict  will  never  occur. 
Thus,  the  primary  aim  of  American 
arms  control  policy  has  been  to  secure 
an  equitable,  stable  military  balance  at 
significantly  reduced  levels  of  ar- 
maments. 

To  meet  these  objectives,  arms  con- 
trol agreements  must  be  based  on  the 
following  criteria. 

Security.  Arms  control  agreements 
are  not  ends  in  themselves,  Their 
primary  objective  is  to  enhance  the 
security  of  the  nations  concluding  the 
agreements.  Although  agreements  may 
contribute  to  reduced  tension  and 
greater  international  understanding, 
those  effects,  desirable  as  they  may  be, 
cannot  replace  enhanced  security  as  the 
benchmark  for  judging  arms  control. 

Militarily  Significant  Reductions. 

To  enhance  security,  arms  control  agree- 
ments should  constrain  the  parties'  mili- 
tary capability  or  potential.  The  benefits 
of  agreements  which  provide  only  prom- 
ises or  statements  of  intent,  without 
significantly  limiting  the  parties'  ability 
to  undertake  military  action,  are  illusory 
and  they  are  potentially  destabilizing. 

The  United  States  and  its  allies  seek 
agreements  which  actually  constrain  or 
reduce  forces  and  make  a  concrete  con- 
tribution to  stability,  rather  than  merely 
reiterating  existing  international  law 
without  adding  any  meaningful  obliga- 
tions, i.e.,  nonaggression  pacts.  If  agree- 
ments are  to  strengthen  stability  and 
lower  the  level  of  military  confrontation. 


they  must  provide  for  more  than  tokei 
reductions  or  a  freeze  of  forces  at  levf 
that  perpetuate  existing  imbalances. 
Arms  control  should  achieve  a  signifi- 
cant reduction  in  current  force  levels. 

Equality.  Arms  control  agreemen 

should  bring  about  mutual  reductions 
equal  levels  in  the  comparable  measur 
of  military  capability.  Equality  is  esse' 
tial  if  arms  control  agreements  are  to 
.  strengthen  stability  and  preserve  effei 
tive  deterrence  at  reduced  levels. 

Verifiability  and  Compliance.  Sii 

arms  control  agreements  are  directly 
related  to  the  security  of  participants, 
is  vital  that  they  incorporate  measure; 
to  permit  effective  verification  and  th. 
all  parties  comply  with  the  obligations 
the  agreements.  Experience  has  show 
that  accords  lacking  such  provisions  b 
come  a  source  of  suspicion,  tension,  a 
distrust,  rather  than  reinforcing  pros- 
pects for  peace.  The  evidence  of  Sovii 
noncompliance  with  some  provisions  ( 
existing  arms  control  agreements  am] 
demonstrates  how  essential  effective 
verification  and  compliance  are  for  al 
future  accords. 


The  Soviet  Approach  to 
Arms  Control 

Despite  strong  rhetorical  support  for 
arms  control,  the  Soviet  Union  and  tl 
other  Warsaw  Pact  countries  have  ra 
ly  advanced  concrete  verifiable  propo 
to  limit  the  forces  of  both  sides.  Inst( 
they  usually  have  preferred  to  react  1 
tically  to  specific  Western  proposals  i 
to  Western  efforts  to  establish  a  mea 
ingful  arms  control  framework.  East" 
initiatives  characteristically  feature 
sweeping  and  unverifiable  proposals  ■ 
unenforceable  promises  of  good  will. 

The  Soviet  Union  seems  to  appro 
arms  control  less  as  a  tool  for  achiev 
stability  and  more  as  a  political  instrt 
ment  to  secure  advantages  either 
through  actual  agreements  or  throug 
the  negotiating  process  itself.  This  h< 
been  evident  in  Soviet  conduct  with 
respect  to  intermediate-range  nucleai 
forces:  Soviet  proposals  seem  to  havt 
been  designed  not  to  narrow  differen 
between  East  and  West  but  to  gener 
tensions  among  NATO  members,  to 
stimulate  public  concern,  and  to  achi( 
limits  on  Western  forces  without  re- 
ciprocal limits  on  Soviet  forces. 

The  Soviet  suspension  of  the  INF 
talks  and  failure  to  set  a  date  for  res 
ing  START  clearly  demonstrate  the  i 
dominance  of  political  objectives  over 
genuine  security  concerns  in  the  Sovi 
approach.  Through  2  years  of  INF 


28 


DeDartment  of  State  Bull 


ARMS  CONTROL 


atiations,  the  Soviet  proposals  had 
overriding  goal:  to  maintain  a  large 
growing  arsenal  of  forces  to 
laten  Europe  and  Asia,  while 
;luding  any  balancing  NATO 
oyments.  Thus,  while  the  United 
es — with  allied  support — 
erely  tried  to  negotiate  an  equitable 
lement,  the  Soviet  Union  spurned  all 
arms  control  proposals.  The  Soviet 
>n  was  detei-mined  to  preserve  a 
opoly  in  this  important  category  of 
iles  in  order  to  weaken  the  credi- 
:  of  the  link  between  U.S.  strategic 
s  and  the  defense  of  Europe,  there- 
ndermining  the  basic  foundation  of 
'0  deterrent  strategy. 
MATO  agreed  in  1979  that  it  would 
ay  its  own  LRINF  missiles  begin- 
in  late  1983,  if  the  United  States 
U.S.S.R.  had  not  yet  reached  an 
;  control  agreement  obviating  the 
for  those  deployments.  That  was 
;  years  after  the  U.S.S.R.  began  to 
3y  its  new  SS-20  missiles  at  an 
age  rate  of  about  one  missile  (with 
J  warheads  each)  a  week.  In  late 
,  in  response  to  the  deployment  of 
irst  NATO  LRINF  missiles,  the 
3t  Union  walked  out  of  the  INF 
and  then  refused  to  agree  to  a  date 
esuming  the  next  round  of  START, 
feet,  the  Soviets  appeared  to  be 
g  that  they  would  not  negotiate 
s  they  possessed  a  veto  power  over 
O's  security  decisions, 
'he  United  States  and  its  allies  con- 
to  believe  that  significant, 
ced,  and  verifiable  reductions  in 
ar  arsenals  would  be  in  the  best  in- 
tt  of  all  parties.  The  United  States 
spared  to  return  to  the  negotiations 
ly  time,  without  preconditions,  and 
0  informed  the  Soviet  Union  many 


LIANCE 

ns  control  agreements  are  to  con- 
:e  to  security,  all  parties  must  com- 
ith  them.  Traditionally,  the  Soviets 
resisted  including  effective  verifica- 
md  enforcement  provisions  in  such 
ments.  For  years,  the  Soviets  have 
ed  serious  discussion  in  the  MBFR 
of  the  size  and  composition  of  their 
3  in  central  Europe.  They  have  also 
«d  introducing  effective  verification 
ares  into  an  agreement  banning 
ical  weapons  and  have  worked  to 
le  international  investigation  of 
ical  and  toxin  weapons  use  in 
mistan,  Kampuchea,  and  Laos. 


In  1982,  increasing  concern  in  the 
U.S.  Congress  and  within  the  Ad- 
ministration about  Soviet  noncompliance 
with  existing  arms  control  agreements 
led  the  U.S.  Government  to  undertake 
an  in-depth  examination  of  verification 
and  compliance  issues.  After  a  careful 
review  by  a  senior  group  of  officials  and 
numerous  diplomatic  exchanges  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  United  States  deter- 
mined that  in  seven  areas  initially 
studied  the  Soviets  had  committed  viola- 
tions and  probable  violations  of  legal 
obligations  and  political  commitments. 

At  the  request  of  Congress,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  on  January  23,  1984,  re- 
ported on  Soviet  noncompliance  with 
arms  control  agreements.  The  report 
concluded  that  the  U.S.S.R.  has: 

•  Violated  the  1972  Biological 
Weapons  Convention  and  the  1925 
Geneva  protocol,  by  maintaining  an  of- 
fensive biological  warfare  program  and 
by  their  involvement  in  toxin  and 
chemical  warfare  use  in  Afghanistan  and 
Southeast  Asia; 

•  Violated  the  1975  Helsinki  Final 
Act  provision  requiring  full  prior  notifi- 
cation of  certain  military  exercises,  by 
their  failure  to  provide  full  and  timely 
notification  of  the  ZAP  AD  81  exercise  in 
and  around  Poland; 

•  Violated  the  SALT  II  ban  on 
telemetry  encryption  of  ICBM  tests  that 
impedes  verification,  through  heavy  en- 
cryption, of  SS-X-25  tests; 

•  Almost  certainly  violated  the  1972 
ABM  Treaty  through  deployment  of  a 
large  phased-array  radar  in  central 
Siberia; 

•  Probably  violated  the  SALT  II 
provision  limiting  each  party  to  one  new 
type  of  ICBM,  through  testing  of  the 
SS-X-25  (or,  if  the  SS-X-25  is  not  a 
new  type  as  defined  by  SALT  II,  it 
violates  permitted  modernization  criteria 
for  a  single-warhead  ICBM); 

•  Probably  violated  the  SALT  II 
ban  on  deployment  of  SS-16  missiles; 
and 

•  Likely  violated  the  unratified  1974 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  limit  of  150 
kilotons  on  underground  nuclear  tests. 

After  the  U.S.  findings  were  made 
public,  the  Soviet  Union  released  a  list 
of  unsubstantiated  countercharges  of 
alleged  U.S.  noncompliance  with  arms 
control  agreements.  The  Soviet  publica- 
tion of  these  countercharges  appears  to 
have  been  designed  to  deflect  attention 
from  the  findings  contained  in  the  Presi- 
dent's report,  rather  than  an  indication 
of  real  Soviet  concern  over  U.S.  arms 
control  compliance.  The  United  States 
continues  to  comply  with  all  of  its  arms 
control  obligations. 


Soviet  noncompliance  undermines 
and  can  negate  the  security  benefits  de- 
riving from  arms  control  agreements 
and  could  create  new  security  risks.  It 
threatens  the  confidence  essential  to  an 
effective  arms  control  process  and 
strengthens  doubts  about  Soviet  reliabili- 
ty as  a  negotiating  partner. 

The  United  States  is  proceeding 
with  serious  study  of  compliance  prob- 
lems, while  continuing  to  press  its  con- 
cerns with  the  Soviets  through  diplo- 
matic channels  and  to  insist  on  explana- 
tions, clarifications,  and  corrective  ac- 
tions. Meanwhile,  the  United  States  is 
continuing  to  fulfill  its  own  arms  control 
commitments  and  seeking  to  negotiate 
effectively  verifiable  agreements  to 
reduce  armaments  and  diminish  the  risk 
of  war. 


Conclusion 

The  firm  commitment  to  equitable,  veri- 
fiable, and  stabilizing  arms  control 
agreements  by  the  United  States  and  its 
allies  requires  a  clear  idea  of  common 
security  needs,  of  the  contribution  that 
arms  control  can  make  to  those  needs, 
and  of  the  kinds  of  agreement  that  can 
contribute  to  peace  and  security.  When 
these  elements  have  been  present,  the 
West  was  able  to  frame  a  constructive 
arms  control  agenda. 

Obviously,  equitable  and  effective 
arms  control  agreements  are  possible 
only  if  the  Soviet  Union  is  willing  to  ac- 
cept such  arrangements.  The  United 
States  and  its  allies  cannot  deliver 
agreements  alone.  What  they  can  do  is 
to  develop  well-designed  and  equitable 
proposals,  explain  their  rationale,  and 
negotiate  seriously. 

The  process  may  be  long.  But  the 
West  cannot  fall  victim  either  to  ex- 
cessive optimism  or  unwarranted 
pessimism.  It  must  show  resolve  in 
upholding  the  requirements  for  effective 
arms  control  and  convincing  the  Soviets 
that  they  will  not  be  allowed  to  maintain 
or  achieve  unilateral  advantage.  The 
West  must  evaluate  realistically  the 
prospects  for  agreement,  examining  the 
issues  at  stake,  the  objectives  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  its  own  goals.  Only  on 
this  basis  can  the  West  craft  an  ap- 
proach to  arms  control  that  will  truly 
enhance  the  common  security  and  pro- 
mote international  peace. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Eight  Challenges  for  Arms  Control 


Strategic  Arms  Reduction  Talks 

The  unique  element  in  the  U.S. -Soviet 
relationship  is  the  capability  of  both 
countries  to  destroy  each  other  and 
much  of  civilization  in  the  process. 
Strategic  arms  negotiations  address  this 
central  fact  of  the  nuclear  age.  Between 
1969  and  1979,  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  engaged  in  the 
strategic  arms  limitation  talks  (SALT). 
Although  that  process  yielded  some 
benefits,  it  failed  to  meet  the  hopes 
generated  in  the  early  1970s.  Indeed,  in 
spite  of  an  ongoing  arms  control  process 
and  the  exercise  of  unilateral  U.S. 
restraint,  the  Soviets  have  engaged  in 
an  unprecedented  military  buildup  over 
the  last  15  years. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  opened  the  strategic  arms  reduc- 
tion talks  (START)  in  June  1982.  The 
United  States  proposed  deep  reductions 
in  ballistic  missile  warheads  and  throw- 
weight  that  would  create  a  more  stable 
nuclear  balance  at  much  lower  strategic 
levels.  The  Soviet  side  has  proposed 
reductions  in  strategic  nuclear  delivery 
vehicles  (missile  launchers  and  bombers) 
but  has  not  agreed  to  the  substantial 
cuts  in  actual  warheads  that  the  United 
States  is  proposing. 

START  has  been  in  hiatus  since 
December  1983,  when  the  Soviet  Union 
declined  to  agree  to  a  resumption  date 
for  a  sixth  round  of  negotiations.  The 
United  States  has  made  clear  that  it  is 
ready  to  resume  the  negotiations  at  any 
time  without  preconditions. 

Background 

The  basic  role  of  U.S.  strategic  forces  is 
to  maintain  the  peace  by  deterring  at- 
tack or  preventing  intimidation  against 
the  United  States  or  its  allies.  The 
strategic  balance  is  critical  to  any 
calculation  by  a  potential  enemy  of  the 
costs  of  aggression  against  the  West. 
The  strategic  balance  reflects  an 
assessment  of  comparative  capabilities 
as  well  as  weapons  numbers,  command 
and  control  facilities,  and  overall  force 
structure.  In  considering  this  balance,  it 
is  particularly  important  to  weigh  quali- 
tative factors  such  as  a  system's  surviva- 
bility and  its  ability  to  reach  defended 
targets.  A  stable  deterrent  requires 
diversified  strategic  forces  to  guarantee 
that  sufficient  numbers  of  weapons 
could  survive  a  first  strike  and  retaliate 
successfully  against  well-defended 
targets. 


Strategic  stability  minimizes 
pressures  to  use  strategic  weapons  in  a 
crisis  and  is,  therefore,  an  area  of 
special  emphasis  by  the  United  States. 
With  their  differing  capabilities  and 
characteristics,  various  weapons  systems 
and  force  structures  can  either 
strengthen  or  undermine  stability. 
Systems  which,  when  deployed  in  large 
numbers,  threaten  the  other  side's 
strategic  forces  with  preemptive 
destruction  and  undermine  the  other 
side's  confidence  in  its  deterrent,  are 
considered  destabilizing. 

Ballistic  missiles — particularly  large 
land-based,  multiple-warhead  intercon- 
tinental ballistic  missiles,  given  their 
short  flight  times,  high  accuracies,  and 
large  yields — can  undermine  strategic 
stability  if  deployed  in  sufficiently  large 
numbers  to  create  the  possibility  of  a 
disarming  first  strike.  Bombers,  in  con- 
trast, have  long  flight  times,  which 
make  them  inappropriate  for  a  surprise, 
first-strike  attack.  Moreover,  U.S. 
bombers  face  extensive  Soviet  defenses 
that  are  unconstrained  by  any  treaty. 

Thus  the  strategic  balance  is  neither 
one  dimensional  nor  static.  Over  the 
past  1.5  years,  the  cumulative  effect  of 
various  political,  military,  and  tech- 
nological developments  on  the  overall 
balance  has  favored  the  U.S.S.R.  In  par- 
ticular, the  increasing  capability  of 
Soviet  forces  to  attack  and  destroy 
hardened  targets  (such  as  missile  silos) 
provides  the  Soviet  Union  with  a  troubl- 
ing margin  of  advantage  in  a  critical 
area  of  the  strategic  equation. 

Changes  in  the  U.S. -Soviet 
Strategic  Balance 

In  the  mid-1960s,  the  United  States  held 
unquestioned  superiority  in  strategic 
nuclear  forces. 

•  Although  the  U.S.S.R.  deployed  a 
sizable  ICBM  force,  it  was  far  smaller 
than  the  American  force  of  slightly  more 
than  1,000  ICBMs. 

•  The  United  States  had  656 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missiles 
(SLBMs)  in  41  nuclear  submarines,  while 
the  Soviets  were  only  beginning  to 
deploy  modern  ballistic  missile  sub- 
marines. 

•  The  U.S.  strategic  bomber  force, 
numbering  over  800,  was  numerically 
and  technok)gically  superior  to  the 
Soviet  Bison/Bear  bomber  force. 

By  1972— when  the  SALT  I  agree- 
ments were  signed— the  Soviet  Union 


had  caught  up  to  the  United  States  in 
several  measures  of  strategic  capabilit; 
and  had  taken  the  lead  in  the  number  i 
strategic  ballistic  missiles  (2,000  to 
1,700).  At  the  time,  however,  the  U.S. 
advantage  in  strategic  bombers  still  pr 
vided  for  rough  equality  between  the 
two  sides  in  total  numbers  of  strategic 
nuclear  delivery  vehicles.  Furthermore 
because  of  its  more  advanced  multiple 
independently-targetable  reentry  vehic 
(MIRV)  program,  the  United  States  st; 
held  a  substantial  lead  in  the  number  ( 
ballistic  missile  warheads  as  well  as  ce 
tain  qualitative  advantages. 

The  Soviet  Union  continued  its  mi; 
tary  buildup,  however,  and,  instead  of 
accepting  strategic  parity,  today  e(|ual 
or  surpasses  the  United  States  in  mos 
c[uantitative  measures  of  strategic 
capability. 

•  The  Soviet  Union  has  about  2,3' 
ballistic  missiles,  while  the  United  Sta^ 
has  about  1,650. 

•  The  Soviets  have  not  only  close 
the  gap  in  ballistic  missile  warheads, 
they  now  actually  lead  the  United 
States,  with  about  8,000  strategic 
ballistic  missile  warheads  to  7,600. 
Moreover,  the  Soviets  far  exceed  the 
United  States  in  the  destructive  powe 
of  their  ballistic  missiles. 

•  The  U.S.  B-52  bomber  force  he 
continued  to  age  and  to  decline  in 
number.  The  United  States,  as  of 
September  1984,  had  about  245  deplo 
B-52s,  which  in  a  conflict  would  face 
massive  Soviet  air  defenses  uncon- 
strained by  any  treaty.  The  Soviets  h 
deployed  more  than  235  Backfire 
bombers,  which  have  inherent  inter- 
continental capability,  and  more  than 
160  long-range  Bear  and  Bison  bomb 

In  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970? 
the  United  States  decided  not  to  re- 
spond to  Soviet  efforts  to  attain  equE 
in  strategic  forces.  American  strateg 
thinking  had  concluded  that  superior 
would  be  difficult  and  costly  to  main! 
and,  in  any  case,  was  not  necessary  t 
support  a  U.S.  defense  posture  basec 
deterring  war.  It  was  believed  that 
strategic  parity  could  provide  the  bas 
for  a  more  stable  and  mutually  benef 
East-West  relationship. 

During  the  1970s,  therefore,  the 
United  States  exercised  unilateral  re- 
straint. Once  the  MIRV  programs  foi 
the  Poseidon  SLBM  and  Minuteman 
ICBM  were  completed  in  the  first  ha 
the  1970s,  the  United  States  slowed  ■ 
canceled  a  number  of  new  strategic  { 
grams.  Construction  of  the  Ohio-clas! 
ballistic  missile  submarine  was  delay( 
Development  of  the  MX  ICBM  was 


30 


rionartmont  nf  Qtato  Riilll 


ARMS  CONTROL 


ved,  and  the  B-1  bomber  program 
;  first  slowed  and  then  canceled. 
Unfortunately,  U.S.  restraint  was 
reciprocated  by  the  U.S.S.R.  Since 
2,  the  Soviet  Union  has  deployed  800 
'  ICBMs  involving  at  least  three  new 
iM  types  (the  SS-17,  SS-18,  and 
19,  "all  with  MIRV  capabilities);  four 
'  SLBMs  (the  SS-N-8,  SS-N-17, 
N-18,  and  SS-N-20);  three  Delta- 
s  ballistic  missile  submarine  types; 
new  large  Typhoon  ballistic  missile 
marine;  and  over  235  new  Backfire 
ibers.  The  Soviets  also  have  begun 
jucing  a  new  variant  of  the  Bear 
iber  designed  to  carry  cruise 
>iles. 

By  any  objective  measure,  the  Soviet 
on  achieved  rough  equality  with  the 
ted  States  in  strategic  nuclear  forces 
le  early  to  mid-1970s.  The  Soviet 
dup,  however,  continued  unabated, 
ay  their  testing  and  development 
p-ams  for  new  classes  of  strategic 
ear  delivery  vehicles  (missiles  and 
bers)  are  moving  forward  with  no 
ence  of  diminished  momentum.  Thus 
U.S.S.R.  now  has  in  various  stages 

sting  and  development  two  new 
Ms  (SS-X-24  and  SS-X-25),  a  new 
:M  (SS-NX-23),  long-range  ground-, 

and  air-launched  cruise  missiles, 
the  Blackjack  strategic  bomber.  This 
sive,  unrelenting  buildup  goes 
md  any  reasonable  defense  needs 
raises  serious  questions  about  Soviet 
itions. 

ft  Failed  Promise  of  SALT 

rif.ljer  1969,  in  an  effort  to  bring 
-  rategic  arms  competition  under 
iieasure  of  control,  the  United 
and  the  Soviet  Union  began  the 
i  ir  series  of  strategic  arms  limita- 
I  ilks  known  as  SALT  L 
\tter  initial  attempts  to  achieve  a 
hensive  agreement  led  to  stale- 
ihe  two  sides  agreed  to  concen- 
3'  I  in  a  treaty  of  indefinite  duration 
T  iiig  defensive  antiballistic  missile 
;  nis  and  a  5-year  interim  agreement 
•  ilishing  certaining  limits  on  strate- 
! Trnsive  weapons. 

\  1  their  sum.mit  meeting  in  Moscow 
lay  26,  1972,  President  Nixon  and 
Soviet  General  Secretary  Brezhnev 
_,'il  two  agi-eements.  The  U.S. -Soviet 
I  Treaty  set  precise  limits  on  the 
)yment  of  ABM  systems,  allowing 
side  two  sites  with  100  ABM 
ile  launchers  each  (subsequently 
iied  in  1974  to  allow  each  side  only 
A.BM  site).  The  Interim  Agreement 
ed  each  side  essentially  to  the 
ber  of  strategic  ballistic  missile 


launchers  it  then  possessed  or  had 
"under  construction,"  while  permitting 
an  increase  in  SLBM  launchers  if  a  cor- 
responding numlier  of  older  ICBM 
launchers  were  dismantled. 

SALT  I,  however,  was  intended  only 
as  a  stopgap,  providing  for  some  re- 
straints until  a  more  comprehensive 
agreement  could  be  reached  and  defer- 
ring many  difficult  questions  to  later 
negotiation.  SALT  II,  an  effort  to  attain 
a  longer  term  comprehensive  treaty, 
began  in  late  1972.  In  November  1974, 
at  the  Vladivostok  meeting  between 
President  Ford  and  General  Secretary 
Brezhnev,  both  sides  agreed  to  a  basic 
framework  for  a  future  agreement.  This 
accord  established  equal  aggregate  limits 
on  the  overall  numbers  of  strategic 
nuclear  delivery  vehicles  (missile  launch- 
ers and  bombers)  allowed  each  side. 
After  Vladivostok,  however,  important 
issues  remained  to  be  settled,  including 
how  to  handle  emerging  systems  such  as 
the  cruise  missile  and  the  Backfire 
bomber. 

In  May  1977,  shortly  after  the 
Carter  Administration  assumed  office, 
the  United  States  offered  a  new  pro- 
posal calling  for  deep  reductions  in  the 
numbers  agreed  at  Vladivostok.  The 
Soviets  quickly  rejected  this  proposal. 
Subsequent  negotiations  returned  to  the 
Vladivostok  formula  and  eventually  led 
to  agreement  on  a  general  framework 
for  SALT  II,  including: 

•  A  treaty  entailing  equal  aggregate 
ceilings  on  various  categories  of 
strategic  nuclear  delivery  vehicles  as 
well  as  some  constraints  on  development 
and  construction; 

•  A  3-year  protocol  with  some  tem- 
porary constraints  on  mobile  ICBMs  and 
cruise  missiles;  and 

•  A  joint  statement  of  principles  for 
further  negotiations. 

This  agreement  was  signed  by  Presi- 
dent Carter  and  General  Secretary 
Brezhnev  in  Vienna  in  June  1979.  It  in- 
cluded a  number  of  specific  limits  but  lit- 
tle in  the  way  of  genuine  reductions. 
Although  the  agreement  did  call  for 
some  reductions  in  the  number  of  strate- 
gic nuclear  delivery  vehicles,  ballistic 
missile  warhead  and  throw-weight  levels 
were  allowed  to  rise. 

•  Each  side  would  be  allowed  a  com- 
bined total  of  2,400  (2,250  after  1981) 
ICBM  launchers,  SLBM  launchers,  and 
heavy  bombers. 

•  Each  side  accepted  equal  sublimits 
on  launchers  equipped  with  MIRVed 
ICBMs;  on  launchers  equipped  with 
MIRVed  ballistic  missiles;  and  on  launch- 


ers ecjuipped  with  MIRVed  ballistic 
missiles  plus  bombers  armed  with  cruise 
missiles. 

•  Each  side  agreed  to  various  con- 
straints on  modernization. 

Senate  consideration  of  SALT  II 
was  deferred  indefinitely  following  the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  in 
December  1979.  In  the  national  debate 
preceding  that  event,  considerable 
doubts  were  raised  within  the  Senate 
and  elsewhere  about  the  degree  to  which 
the  agreement  could  serve  as  an  effec- 
tive arms  control  measure,  whether  it 
could  be  effectively  verified  and  whether 
it  adequately  addressed  U.S.  and 
Western  security  needs. 

Although  the  SALT  process  brought 
certain  benefits  in  the  SALT  I  agree- 
ments, its  final  result  as  embodied  in 
SALT  II  was  a  clear  disappointment  to 
the  hopes  generated  in  the  early  1970s. 
The  basic  faults  of  SALT  II  were  that  it 
would  have  permitted  substantial 
growth  in  the  strategic  forces  of  both 
sides,  was  unbalanced  in  its  impact,  and 
was  inadequately  verifiable  in  several 
provisions. 

Evidence  of  the  inadequacy  of  the 
SALT  process  lay  in  the  fact  that  during 
the  period  of  U.S. -Soviet  negotiations, 
and  in  spite  of  the  unilateral  restraint 
demonstrated  by  the  United  States,  the 
U.S.S.R.  continued  its  massive  strategic 
buildup.  As  a  result,  the  adverse 
changes  in  the  strategic  balance  acceler- 
ated. Far  from  inhibiting  these  develop- 
ments, SALT  II  tended  to  codify  the 
asymmetries.  Thus: 

•  Limitations  were  applied  to 
launchers  but  not  to  the  growing 
number  of  warheads,  a  more  meaningful 
unit  of  account; 

•  The  Soviet  Union  was  granted  a 
unilateral  right  to  deploy  more  than  300 
heavy  ICBMs;  and 

•  The  Soviet  Backfire  was  not 
counted  under  the  strategic  delivery 
vehicle  aggregate  despite  its  intercon- 
tinental capabilities. 

A  New  Beginning: 

The  U.S.  START  Approach 

When  the  Reagan  Administration  took 
office  in  January  1981,  it  undertook  an 
in-depth  review  of  U.S.  security  and 
arms  control  policies.  President  Reagan 
concluded  that  because  of  SALT  II's  in- 
adequacies, it  would  be  inappropriate  to 
seek  ratification.  Renegotiation  of 
SALT  II  was  considered,  but  the  Presi- 
dent decided  that  it  would  be  better  to 
seek  significant  reductions  in  the  ex- 
isting numbers  of  strategic  forces  rather 


ARMS  CONTROL 


than  simply  to  make  another  attempt  to 
limit  further  growth. 

To  this  end,  the  United  States  pro- 
posed the  strategic  arms  reduction  talks 
or  START.  At  the  same  time,  in  order 
to  create  a  positive  atmosphere  for 
START  and  to  build  upon  the  SALT 
process,  the  United  States  affirmed  that 
it  would  take  no  action  to  undercut  ex- 
isting agreements,  including  the  SALT  I 
Interim  Agreement  and  the  SALT  II 
agreement,  provided  the  Soviets  exer- 
cised comparable  restraint.  The  Soviets 
have  made  statements  reflecting  a 
similar  policy. 

The  START  negotiations  began  in 
Geneva  in  the  summer  of  1982.  The 
basic  U.S.  objective  has  been  an  agree- 
ment that  would  enhance  stability  and 
achieve  major  reductions  in  the  level  of 
strategic  nuclear  weaponry  on  both 
sides.  This  would  be  the  first  agreement 
of  its  kind  in  the  postwar  era. 

In  emphasizing  significant  reduc- 
tions, the  United  States  seeks  an  agree- 
ment that  not  only  reduces  the  burden 
of  armaments  but,  more  importantly, 
reduces  the  risk  of  war.  Given  differing 
characteristics,  certain  types  of  strategic 
weapons  can  be  more  destabilizing  than 
others.  For  this  reason,  the  President 
decided  initially  to  emphasize  reducing 
ballistic  missiles,  particularly  large 
ICBMs.  In  announcing  the  U.S.  position 
in  May  1982,  the  President  made  clear 
that  nothing  was  excluded  from  the 
negotiations  and  that  the  United  States 
would  consider  any  serious  Soviet  pro- 
posal. 

The  U.S.  approach  to  START 
reflects  the  judgment  that  the  approach 
taken  in  SALT— limits  focused  primarily 
on  the  number  of  strategic  delivery 
vehicles — failed  to  ensure  real  reduc- 
tions in  strategic  forces  or  to  redress 
dangerous  asymmetries  in  the 
U.S. -Soviet  strategic  relationship.  Thus 
the  U.S.  START  approach  has  adopted  a 
broader  set  of  units  of  limitation,  in- 
cluding direct  constraints  on  the  number 
of  ballistic  missile  warheads,  along  with 
efforts  to  reduce  the  destructive  poten- 
tial of  U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  forces. 
Central  features  of  the  U.S.  proposals 
introduced  in  June  1982  include: 

•  Reductions  in  the  number  of 
ballistic  missile  warheads  by  about  one- 
third,  to  a  level  of  5,000  for  each  side; 

•  Additional  restrictions  to  ensure 
substantial  cuts  in  the  most  destabilizing 
categories  of  ballistic  missile  systems; 

•  Substantial  reductions  in  ballistic 
missile  destructive  capability  and  poten- 
tial (throw-weight); 

•  An  equal  ceiling  on  heavy  bombers 
below  the  U.S.  level  in  SALT  II;  and 


•  Equitable  limits  and  constraints 
on  other  strategic  systems,  including 
limits  on  the  number  of  cruise  missiles 
that  could  be  carried  by  bombers. 

The  Scowcroft  Commission  Report: 
Forging  a  New  Consensus 

In  January  1983,  President  Reagan 
established  the  Special  Commission  on 
Strategic  Forces  to  review  the  U.S. 
strategic  modernization  program,  par- 
ticularly the  future  of  the  land-based 
ICBM  deterrent,  and  to  provide  specific 
recommendations  for  greater  strategic 
stability.  The  commission,  popularly 
known  as  the  Scowcroft  commission 
after  its  chairman,  retired  General  Brent 
Scowcroft,  delivered  its  report  on 
April  6,  1983;  President  Reagan  en- 
dorsed the  commission's  recommenda- 
tions and  sent  the  report  to  Congress  on 
April  12,  1983.  The  commission  submit- 
ted a  final  report  to  the  President  on 
March  21,  1984,  in  which  it  reiterated  its 
previous  recommendations. 

The  April  1983  report,  which  provid- 
ed the  basis  for  a  revitalized  bipartisan 
consensus  on  American  strategic  securi- 
ty policy,  made  three  basic  recommenda- 
tions. 

First,  it  urged  continued  im- 
provements in  U.S.  command,  control, 
and  communications,  and  continuation  of 
the  U.S.  bomber,  submarine,  and  cruise 
missile  programs. 

Second,  it  urged  modernization  of 
U.S.  ICBM  forces,  including  deployment 
of  100  new  MX/Peacekeeper  missiles, 
and  initiation  of  developmental  work  on 
a  small,  single-warhead  ICBM  that  could 
be  ready  for  deployment  in  the  early 
1990s.  ' 

Third,  the  commission  recommend- 
ed major  research  efforts  in  strategic 
defense  and  on  ways  to  increase  the  sur- 
vivability of  U.S.  land-based  forces. 

Equally  important,  the  report  under- 
scored the  need  for  negotiations  leading 
to  balanced  arms  control  agreements 
that  would  promote  stability  in  times  of 
crisis  and  result  in  meaningful,  verifiable 
reductions.  The  commission  noted  that, 
in  time,  the  United  States  should  try  to 
promote  an  evolution  toward  forces  in 
which  each  side  would  be  "encouraged  to 
see  to  the  survivability  of  its  own  forces 
in  a  way  that  does  not  threaten  the 
other."  The  commission  said  that  its  ap- 
proach toward  arms  control  was  com- 
patible with  the  basic  objectives  and 
direction  of  the  Reagan  Administration's 
policies. 

President  Reagan,  in  endorsing  the 
commission's  report,  said  that  the 


modernization  effort  recommended  by 
the  report  "would  provide  clear  evider 
to  the  Soviet  Union  that  it  is  in  their 
best  interest  to  negotiate  with  us  in 
good  faith  and  with  seriousness  of  put 
pose."  The  President  called  on  Congre 
to  join  him  in  supporting  the  bipartisa 
program  set  forth  by  the  commission 
pursue  arms  control  agreements  that 
promote  stability,  to  meet  the  needs  o 
our  ICBM  force  today,  and  to  move  t( 
more  stable  ICBM  structure  in  the 
future." 

New  U.S.  START  Initiatives 

In  line  with  the  Scowcroft  commissior 
recommendations,  the  United  States 
began  research  and  development  on  a 
new  small,  single-warhead  ICBM  and 
June  1983  relaxed  its  original  propos; 
in  START  for  limits  of  850  on  the 
numbers  of  deployed  ballistic  missiles 
Wliile  the  central  elements  of  the  U.S 
START  proposal  remained  unchangec 
the  United  States  made  additional  im 
portant  revisions  to  its  position  which 
took  into  consideration  several  Soviet 
concerns  about  the  original  U.S.  pro- 
posal. The  United  States  presented  a 
draft  treaty  in  the  START  negotiatio 
on  July  7,  1983,  which  incorporated  t 
U.S.  START  position. 

In  a  further  important  initiative, 
taken  after  close  consultation  with  th 
Congress,  President  Reagan  in  Octob 
1983  added  to  the  U.S.  START  posit 
the  principle  of  mutual,  guaranteed, 
build-down  of  strategic  forces.  The  bi 
down  proposal  is  designed  to  channel 
modernization  of  strategic  forces  tow 
more  stabilizing  systems  and  to  ensu 
regular  annual  reductions  of  strategi' 
ballistic  missile  warheads  and  heavy 
bombers.  At  the  same  time,  Presiden 
Reagan  expressed  U.S.  willingness  ti 
explore  with  the  Soviets  possible  tra( 
offs  between  areas  of  U.S.  and  Sovie 
advantage  and  interest. 

The  Soviet  START  Proposal 

In  many  respects  the  Soviet  response 
was  disappointing,  but  progress  had 
been  made  before  the  Soviet  suspens 
of  the  talks  in  December  1983.  The 
Soviet  START  proposal  has  some 
positive  elements,  for  example,  propc 
reductions  in  the  number  of  strategic 
nuclear  delivery  vehicles  below  SALT 
levels.  However,  the  Soviet  proposal 
does  not  provide  an  adequate  basis  f< 
the  kind  of  far-reaching,  stabilizing,  ; 
equitable  agreement  the  United  StaU 
seeks. 


32 


Dpnartmpnt  nf  Statp  Riillil 


ARMS  CONTROL 


The  Soviet  proposal  retains  most 
;he  basic  faults  of  SALT  II.  Under 
Soviet  proposal,  the  United  States 
I  the  U.S.S.R.  each  would  be  allowed 
aggregate  of  1,800  strategic  nuclear 
very  vehicles  (ICBMs,  SLBMs,  and 
itegic  bombers).  The  Soviets  also 
e  proposed  a  combined  limit  on 
lear  charges  (by  which  they  mean 
,sile  warheads  and  bomber  weapons), 
iddition,  they  propose  to  ban  all 
und-  and  sea-launched  cruise  missiles, 
limit  air-launched  cruise  missiles, 
h  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 
•  The  Soviet  START  proposal  does 
provide  for  genuine  reductions  in  the 
countries'  forces.  It  would  reduce 
itegic  delivery  vehicles  by  25%  from 
high  level  of  2,400  that  would  have 
n  established  by  SALT  II,  but  it 
lid  permit  substantial  growth  in  the 
iber  of  hallistic  missile  warheads 
ve  current  levels. 

In  addition,  the  Soviet  proposal 
s  not  link  reductions  to  increased 
tegic  stability.  It  does  not 
inguish  between  fast,  accurate, 
tVed  ballistic  missiles  and  slow-flying 
ems  such  as  bombers  that  face  un- 
strained Soviet  defenses. 


START  Proposals: 

•  Mutual,  guaranteed  build- 

n  of  ballistic  missile  warheads 
bomber  platforms. 

•  5,000  ballistic  missile 
Tiead  limit. 

Significant  reductions  in 
iloyed  ballistic  missiles. 

Reduction  in  current  dlspari- 
i\  ballistic  missile  destructive 
Bcity  and  potential. 

Bomber  and  ALCM  limits 
i.w  SALT  II. 


intages: 

•  Reduce  strategic  ballistic 
Bile  warheads  by  one-third  for 
1  side. 

•  Encourage  a  more  stable 
ear  balance  at  lower  force 
Is. 

•  Permit  necessary  and 
)illzing  modernization. 

•  Establish  the  basis  for  fur- 
reductions. 


During  negotiations  in  the  fall  of 
1983,  the  Soviet  Union  did  not  discuss 
seriously  the  U.S.  build-down  proposal 
nor  did  it  respond  to  the  U.S.  offer  to 
explore  tradeoffs  between  areas  of  U.S. 
and  Soviet  advantage  and  interest.  The 
Soviets  have  publicly  leveled  several 
criticisms  at  the  U.S.  approach  to 
START. 

The  Soviets  charge  that  the  U.S. 
proposal's  focus  on  MIRVed  ICBMs  "dis- 
criminates" against  the  Soviet  Union, 
which  has  a  higher  proportion  of  its 
nuclear  warheads  on  MIRVed  ICBMs.  In 
fact,  however,  since  rough  equality  now 
exists  in  the  number  of  ballistic  missile 
warheads,  the  U.S.  proposal  would  force 
both  countries  to  make  approximately 
equal  reductions  in  this  area.  Although 
the  Soviet  Union  would  have  to  make 
proportionally  greater  reductions  in  its 
land-based  ICBM  systems,  because  a 
larger  proportion  of  their  warheads  are 
on  them,  the  United  States  would  have 
to  make  relatively  greater  reductions  in 
warheads  on  SLBMs. 

The  Soviets  also  charge  that  the 
U.S.  proposal  would  force  them  to 
restructure  their  strategic  forces. 
Although  the  U.S.  proposal  does  favor  a 
shift  away  from  land-based  MIRVed 
ICBMs,  such  a  shift  would  be  in  the  in- 
terest of  both  countries  because  it  would 
diminish  the  incentive  and  the  ability  to 
launch  a  crippling  first  strike. 

START  and  NATO 

The  LInited  States  has  kept  its  allies 
fully  informed  of  its  arms  control  ap- 
proach and  of  the  U.S.  and  Soviet 
START  positions.  The  U.S.  proposal 
was  endorsed  by  the  leaders  of  NATO 
governments  at  the  June  1982  NATO 
summit  in  Bonn  and  since  then  has  been 
repeatedly  endorsed  by  NATO  ministers. 
The  process  of  alliance  consultations 
is  traditional  and  vital.  The  START 
reductions  the  United  States  seeks 
would  enhance  the  security  of  other 
Western  nations  as  well  as  that  of  the 
United  States.  Since  the  opening  of  the 
talks  in  June  1982,  the  President's 
START  negotiator  has  met  periodically 
with  the  NATO  ambassadors  and  briefed 
them  on  the  course  of  the  talks,  a  prac- 
tice that  will  continue. 


Conclusion 

At  the  end  of  round  V  of  START  in 
December  1983,  the  Soviet  Union- 
claiming  "a  change  in  the  strategic  situa- 
tion" due  to  the  initiation  of  limited 
NATO  missile  deployments  in  Europe 
under  the  alliance's  1979  decision — re- 
fused to  set  a  resumption  date  for  the 
talks. 

START  touches  upon  issues  central 
to  both  U.S.  and  Soviet  national  security 
interests.  The  United  States  is  commit- 
ted to  fair  and  balanced  arms  control 
and  has  made  a  good  faith  proposal, 
demonstrating  considerable  flexibility 
while  remaining  open  to  serious  Soviet 
proposals.  The  United  States  is  con- 
vinced that  implementation  of  its 
START  proposals  would  enhance  not  on- 
ly U.S.  and  allied  security  but  that  of 
the  Soviet  Union  as  well  and  is  prepared 
to  resume  the  negotiations  any  time  and 
any  place. 


Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear  Forces 

The  INF  negotiations  began  in  Geneva 
in  November  1981;  the  Soviet  Union  uni- 
laterally broke  off  the  talks  in  November 
1983.  The  talks  centered  on  the 
intermediate-range  nuclear  systems  of 
greatest  concern  to  the  two  sides — 
land-based,  longer  range  INF  missiles. 
The  United  States  proposed  the  elimina- 
tion of  this  entire  class  of  U.S.  and 
Soviet  missiles  or,  as  an  interim  agree- 
ment, substantial  reductions  to  equal 
global  levels  for  both  sides  of  warheads 
on  such  missiles.  In  contrast,  the  Soviets 
have  insisted  on  keeping  their  monopoly 
in  LRINF  missiles  vis-a-vis  the  United 
States.  Their  approach  suggests  that 
they  place  much  greater  importance  on 
the  political  goal  of  trying  to  split  NATO 
than  on  addressing  real  security  con- 


Background 

U.S.  short-  and  intermediate-range 
nuclear  systems  in  Europe  are  essential 
to  deterrence.  These  systems  link 
NATO's  conventional  forces  and  the 
U.S.  strategic  nuclear  deterrent.  They 
"couple"  the  United  States  to  Western 
Europe  and  ensure  that  the  entire  spec- 
trum of  U.S.  power  is  available  to  deter 
any  potential  aggressor. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


The  Soviet  Union  has  long  deployed 
missiles  on  its  territory  with  sufficient 
range  to  strike  targets  in  Europe  but 
not  the  United  States.  In  the  late  1950s 
and  early  1960s,  the  U.S.S.R.  deployed 
SS-4  and  SS-5  missiles  targeted  against 
Europe.  Some  575  were  in  place  by 
mid-1977.  In  contrast,  the  United 
States,  in  the  early  1960s,  deployed 
fewer  numbers  of  roughly  equivalent 
missiles— the  Thor  and  Jupiter— in  the 
United  Kingdom,  Italy,  and  Turkey.  The 
United  States  unilaterally  withdrew  and 
retired  these  systems  in  the  1960s. 

Thus,  from  the  mid-1960s,  the 
Soviet  Union  held  a  monopoly  over  the 
United  States  in  this  type  of  missile.  The 
Soviet  lead  was  tolerable  in  an  era  when 
the  imbalance  in  these  intermediate- 
range  systems  was  offset  by  superior 
U.S.  strategic  forces,  which  provided  an 
adequate  deterrent  to  Soviet  aggression 
or  Intimidation. 

Two  critical  developments— Soviet 
achievement  of  strategic  parity  with  the 
United  States  and  deployment  of  the 
SS-20— came  together  in  the  1970s  to 
alter  the  situation. 

The  SS-20  Buildup.  As  part  of  an 
unprecedented  peacetime  military 
buildup,  the  Soviet  Union  began 
strengthening  its  intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces — an  area  in  which  it 
already  was  clearly  superior  to  NATO — 
with  the  deployment  in  1977  of  the 
highly  capable  SS-20. 

•  The  SS-20  is  more  accurate  and 
has  a  greater  range  than  the  SS-4  and 
SS-5.  From  its  bases  on  Soviet  ter- 
ritory, it  can  strike  targets  throughout 
Europe,  the  Middle  East,  North  Africa, 
and  much  of  Asia  and  the  Pacific. 

•  The  SS-20's  mobility  and  trans- 
portability allow  it  to  be  redeployed 
quickly  to  any  part  of  the  U.S.S.R. 

•  The  SS-20  carries  three  independ- 
ently targetable  warheads,  as  opposed  to 
the  single  warhead  of  the  earlier 
missiles,  and  its  launchers  are  capable  of 
firing  two,  three,  or  more  rounds  of 
missiles. 

The  SS-20  has  substantially  im- 
proved the  Soviet  LRINF  missile  force 
both  qualitatively  and  quantitatively. 
Soviet  deployment  of  these  missiles  (at 
the  rate  of  about  one  per  week)  con- 
tinued throughout  the  INF  talks,  even 
after  the  Soviet  declaration  in  1982  of  a 
"unilateral  moratorium"  on  new  missiles 


in  or  within  range  of  Europe,  and  it 
shows  no  sign  of  stopping.  As  of 
September  1984,  the  Soviets  had  de- 
ployed 378  SS-20  missiles  with  1,134 
warheads  (not  counting  refires),  as  well 
as  about  200  SS-4  missiles.  Even 
though  the  obsolete  SS-5s  had  been 
phased  out,  the  Soviets  still  have  in- 
creased the  total  number  of  warheads 
deployed  on  LRINF  missile  launchers  to 
some  1,300. 

By  the  late  1970s,  the  Soviet  Union 
had  attained  parity  with  the  United 
States  in  strategic  nuclear  forces, 
dramatically  increased  its  lead  in  INF, 
and  retained  its  conventional  force  ad- 
vantages. Strategists  and  political 
leaders  in  Europe  and  America  were 
concerned  that  these  trends,  if  un- 
checked, might  lead  Soviet  leaders  to 
conclude,  however  mistakenly,  that  the 
evolving  military  balance  made  aggres- 
sion feasible  or  intimidation  worthwhile. 
The  U.S.  commitment  to  the  defense  of 
its  allies  had  not  changed,  but  it  was 
feared  the  Soviet  Union  might  perceive 
the  linkage  between  European  and 
North  American  security  as  less  credi- 
ble. Such  a  perception  would  undermine 
deterrence  and  threaten  the  peace. 

European  concerns  were  e.xacer- 
bated  by  the  SALT  II  process,  which 
many  believed  did  not  take  adequate  ac- 
count of  European  security  interests. 
Specifically,  the  SS-20  was  not  limited 
by  the  SALT  II  agreement,  yet  cruise 
missiles,  which  offered  a  potential  for 
countering  Soviet  SS-20  deployments 
against  Europe,  would  have  been  con- 
strained, at  least  temporarily. 

The  December  1979 
"Dual-Track"  Decision 

These  concerns — first  expressed  by 
European  members  of  NATO— led  to  in- 
tensive alliance-wide  consultations, 
culminating  in  the  "dual-track"  decision 
of  1979.  On  the  modernization  track,  the 
alliance  decided  to  redress  the  INF  im- 
balance through  deployment  in  Western 
Europe,  starting  in  1983,  of  572  single- 
warhead  U.S.  LRINF  missiles— 108 
Pershing  II  ballistic  missiles,  as  a  re- 
placement for  the  shorter  range 
Pershing  I,  and  464  ground-launched 


cruise  missiles  (GLCMs).  Deployment  ( 
Pershing  lis  and  GLCMs  began  in 
December  1983  in  accordance  with  the 
schedule  agreed  to  by  NATO. 

The  second  element  of  the  1979  dc 
sion  was  the  arms  control  track,  callin 
for  U.S. -Soviet  negotiations  on  INF.  7 
alliance  agreed  that  such  talks  should 
proceed  step-by-step  toward  compre- 
hensive limitations.  It  was,  therefore, 
decided  that  the  talks  should  focus  ini- 
tially on  LRINF  missiles,  the  systems 
greatest  concern  to  both  sides — the 
Soviet  SS-20,  SS-4,  and  SS-^  and  th< 
U.S.  Pershing  II  and  GLCM. 

The  dual-track  decision  also  estab- 
lished criteria  for  INF  arms  control  th 
were  further  developed  by  NATO's 
Special  Consultative  Group  (SCG),  the 
alliance  forum  for  consultations  on  IN 
arms  control.  While  in  some  cases  the 
criteria  are  unique  to  the  INF  negotia 
tions,  they  derive  from  and  are  fully 
consistent  with  the  basic  principles  th. 
the  United  States  believes  essential  fc 
sound  arms  control. 

There  must  be  equality  of  rights 
and  limits.  The  principle  of  equality, 
ruling  out  unilateral  advantage,  is  fur 
mental  to  sound  arms  control,  stabilit 
and  a  U.S. -Soviet  relationship  based  c 
reciprocity  and  mutual  restraint. 

The  negotiations  should  encom- 
pass U.S.  and  Soviet  systems  only. 
bilateral  negotiations,  it  would  be  ina 
propriate  to  negotiate  limits  on,  or 
discuss  compensation  for,  the  indepei 
ent  nuclear  forces  of  any  other  count 

Limitations  must  be  applied 
globally,  with  no  transfer  of  the 
threat  from  Europe  to  Asia.  Becaus 
the  range,  mobility,  and  transportabi 
of  modern  Soviet  LRINF  missile 
systems,  regional  limits  alone  would 
insufficient.  Soviet  SS-20s  based  in  ( 
tral  Asia  can  strike  most  targets  in  t 
European  NATO  countries.  Those 
missiles  based  farther  east  also  could 
moved  readily  to  locations  from  whic 
they  could  strike  Europe  as  well.  An 
agreement  covering  only  missiles  in 
Europe,  therefore,  could  easily  be  un 
mined  and  would  not  be  militarily  m( 
ingful,  either  to  America's  European 
allies  or  to  those  in  Asia. 


34 


■si   Ct^tn   CM 


ARMS  CONTROL 


There  must  be  no  adverse  effect  on 
TO's  conventional  defense  and  de- 
rent  capability.  NATO  could  not  ac- 
t  Soviet  demands  to  eliminate  from 


/antages  of  NATO 
If  Proposals: 

•  Eliminate  entire  class  of 
i.  and  Soviet  longer  range  INF 
•"ssiles  or  reduce  them  to  equal 
:ze  levels. 

•  Constrain  shorter  range  INF 
Ksiles  capable  of  substituting 
3the  class  of  missiles  to  be 
ininated  or  reduced. 

•  Establish  the  basis  for  fur- 
ir  reductions. 

•  Strengthen  deterrence 
ivar. 


Prospects  for  talks  thus  remained 
stalemated  through  the  first  half  of 
1980.  Only  after  Moscow  recognized,  in 
the  summer  of  that  year,  that  NATO 
was  determined  to  proceed  with  deploy- 
ments, did  the  Soviets  agree  to  negotia- 
tions. A  month  of  preliminary  exchanges 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  took  place  in  Geneva  in  the 
fall  of  1980. 

When  President  Reagan  assumed  of- 
fice in  January  1981,  he  ordered  a  com- 
prehensive review  of  U.S.  security  and 
arms  control  policies.  In  March  of  that 
year,  the  Administration  reaffirmed  the 
U.S.  commitment  to  pursue  both  tracks 
of  the  1979  decision — arms  control  as 
well  as  modernization. 

At  the  May  1981  meeting  of  NATO 
foreign  ministers  in  Rome,  it  was  an- 
nounced that  the  United  States  would 
open  INF  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 


Union  in  the  fall.  That  summer,  contacts 
between  U.S.  and  Soviet  officials  took 
place  regarding  the  arrangements. 

At  the  same  time,  NATO's  Special 
Consultative  Group  began  intensive 
deliberations  on  the  specifics  of  the  U.S. 
negotiating  position.  The  SCG  continued 
to  meet  while  the  talks  were  going  on 
and  has  done  so  regularly  since  the 
Soviet  walkout.  A  second  NATO  body, 
the  High  Level  Group  of  NATO's 
Nuclear  Planning  Group,  also  met  to  ad- 
dress questions  raised  by  the  prospective 
deployment  of  U.S.  LRINF  missiles. 

Taken  as  a  whole,  these  activities 
represent  the  most  intensive  intra- 
alliance  consultations  in  NATO's  history. 
They  have  ensured  that  the  U.S. 
negotiating  position  fully  reflects  allied 
views  and  that  the  implementation  of 
both  tracks  of  the  1979  decision  pro- 
ceeds on  the  basis  of  full  coordination 


ope  virtually  all  U.S.  aircraft  with 
ortant  conventional  missions. 
Any  agreement  must  be  effectively 
fiable. 

m  Decision  to 
foliations  (1980-81) 

ccordance  with  the  dual-track  deci- 

the  United  States  immediately  of- 
d  to  begin  negotiations  with  the 

S.R.  The  Soviets  initially  refused, 
ng  the  condition  that  NATO  must 

renounce  the  modernization  track. 

Soviets  countered  with  a  proposal 
a  bilateral  "moratorium"  on  deploy- 
t  of  intermediate-range  nuclear 
es  in  Europe.  NATO  rejected  this  of- 
'or  three  reasons. 

•  A  moratorium  would  have  codified 
■Soviet  advantage  in  INF,  particular- 
3  monopoly  of  LRINF  missiles,  and 
preserved  the  imbalance  the  1979 
sion  had  set  out  to  redress. 
»  It  would  not  have  halted  the 
20  buildup  in  the  eastern  U.S. S.R. 
»  By  preventing  NATO's  deploy- 
it,  a  moratorium  would  have  re- 
ed the  very  incentive  the  Soviets 
to  negotiate  genuine  reductions. 


Target  Coverage  of  Soviet  SS-20  and 

NATO  Pershing  II  and  Ground-Launched  Cruise  Missiles 


A  SS-20  location 
•  ICBM  location 


ARMS  CONTROL 


among  llie  allies.  A  comprehensive  ac- 
count of  the  INF  talks  is  available  in  the 
SCO's  "Progress  Report  to  Ministers"  of 
December  8,  1983. 

First  Year  of  Negotiations 

Ambassador  Paul  Nitze,  the  U.S.  INF 
negotiator,  first  met  with  his  Soviet 
counterpart,  Ambassador  Yuli 
Kvitsinskiy,  in  Geneva  on  November  30, 
1981. 

Zero  Option.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  talks,  President  Reagan  set  forth  the 
"zero-zero"  option — an  offer  to  forgo 
deployment  of  the  Pershing  II  and 
GLCM  if  the  Soviet  Union  would  elimi- 
nate its  SS-20,  SS-4,  and  SS-5  missiles. 
The  "zero  option"  would  eliminate  an  en- 
tire class  of  U.S.  and  Soviet  nuclear 
weapons — longer  range  INF  missiles. 
That  remains  the  long-term  U.S.  objec- 
tive. At  the  same  time,  the  United 
States  emphasized  that  it  would  nego- 
tiate in  good  faith  and  consider  any  seri- 
ous Soviet  proposal. 

Soviet  Position.  The  Soviet  Union 
proposed  that  "NATO" — by  which  the 
Soviets  meant  the  United  States,  United 
Kingdom,  and  France — and  the 
U.S.S.R.  each  reduce  to  300  "medium- 
range"  missiles  and  aircraft  in  or  "in- 
tended for  use"  in  Europe.  The  Soviet 
proposal,  while  permitting  the  U.S.S.R. 
to  retain  a  substantial  number  of  SS-20s 
in  Europe  and  to  continue  its  buildup  of 
SS-20s  in  Asia,  would  have  prohibited 
deployment  of  any  U.S.  LRINF  missiles 
in  Europe.  It  also  would  have  removed 
from  Europe  hundreds  of  U.S.  aircraft 
capable  of  carrying  both  nuclear  and 
conventional  weapons,  essential  to 
NATO's  conventional  deterrent. 

Central  Issues.  As  the  negotiations 
progressed  during  1982,  several  areas  of 
disagreement  between  the  two  sides 
emerged. 

LRINF  Missiles.  While  the  United 
States  propo.sed  the  reciprocal  elimina- 
tion of  all  U.S.  and  Soviet  LRINF 
missiles,  the  Soviet  proposal  would  have 
legitimized  a  Soviet  monopoly  in  these 
systems. 

The  Balance.  The  Soviets  based 
their  position  on  the  assertion  that  a 
"balance"  in  "medium-range"  forces  in 
Europe  already  existed,  a  claim  resting 
on  a  selective  use  of  data.  In  fact,  the 
Soviet  Union  holds  an  advantage  in 
every  category  of  INF  systems.  The 
Soviets  include  in  their  "balance"  in- 


dependent British  and  French  systems 
and  U.S.  aircraft  not  located  in  Europe. 
They  ignore  missiles  in  the  eastern 
U.S.S.R.  that  can  strike  NATO  targets 
and  exclude  thousands  of  their  own 
nuclear-capable  aircraft  with 
characteristics  similar  to  those  of  the 
U.S.  aircraft  they  do  include. 

The  Soviets  first  claimed  that  there 
was  a  balance  in  October  1979,  when 
there  were  100  SS-20s.  They  repeated 
this  claim  while  they  continued  to  deploy 
such  missiles  and  NATO  deployed 
nothing:  in  1981,  when  there  were  250 
SS-20S,  and  early  1983,  when  351  were 
in  place,  while  NATO  still  had  not 
deployed  a  single  missile. 

Geographic  Scope.  The  United 
States  wants  global  limits  on  LRINF 
missiles  because  of  their  range,  mobility, 
and  transportability.  The  Soviets  have 
proposed  binding  limits  only  on  those 
systems  in  or  "intended  for  use  in" 
Europe,  leaving  the  ever-increasing 
systems  in  the  eastern  U.S.S.R.  outside 


U.S.  Arms  Control  Proposals 
on  Intermediate-Range  Nuclear 
Forces: 

•  First  U.S.  proposal  was  to 
eliminate  all  U.S.  and  Soviet  longer 
range  INF  missiles  worldwide. 

•  Although  zero-zero  remains 
the  ultimate  goal,  the  United 
States  also  has  proposed  interim 
accord  to  limit  each  side  to  low, 
equal  numbers  of  LRINF  missile 
warheads  worldwide. 

•  Subsequent  U.S.  initiative 
taken  to  meet  several  stated  Soviet 
concerns: 

—  Not  offset  entire  Soviet 
LRINF  missile  force  of  SS-20s, 
SS-4S,  and  SS-5s  with  U.S. 
deployments  In  Europe. 

—  Discuss  limits  on  LRINF 
aircraft. 

—Apportion  mix  of  GLCM  and 
Pershing  II. 


the  terms  of  an  agreement.  Soviet 
missiles  in  the  eastern  U.S.S.R.  pose  a 
growing  threat  to  U.S.  friends  and  allies 
in  Asia.  Many  such  missile  systems  are 
still  within  range  of  NATO  Europe, 
while  all  could  be  redeployed  quickly  to 
be  within  such  range. 


Aircraft.  The  original  one-sided 
Soviet  proposal  to  limit  certain  Wester 
aircraft  while  excluding  similar  Soviet/ 
Warsaw  Pact  aircraft  was  designed  to 
undermine  the  alliance's  conventional 
defense  and  deterrent  capabilities,  whi: 
leaving  untouched  a  large  number  of 
Soviet  nuclear-capable  aircraft.  The 
United  States  was  concerned  that  intrc 
ducing  aircraft  into  the  talks  could  deli 
agreement  on  LRINF  missiles.  Never- 
theless, there  was  some  progress  in  th( 
aircraft  issue  in  late  1983. 

Third-Country  Forces.  The  Soviet 
have  sought  to  "take  into  account"  the 
independent  forces  of  the  United  King- 
dom and  France.  NATO  made  clear 
from  the  outset  that  the  INF  negotia- 
tions should  encompass  limits  only  on 
U.S.  and  Soviet  systems.  If  Soviet 
SS-20s  are  to  be  retained,  only  U.S. 
LRINF  missiles  can  offset  them  and  ei 
sure  the  necessary  link  between 
American  strategic  power  and  Europe 
security.  Moreover: 

•  Britain  and  France  are  sovereig 
countries,  each  with  its  own  strategic 
security  interests.  The  United  States 
does  not  determine  the  composition  or 
control  the  use  of  these  independent 
forces; 

•  British  and  French  forces  repre- 
sent minimum  national  deterrents, 
designed  to  deter  attack  against  Brita 
and  France,  not  against  the  other  13 
non-nuclear  members  of  NATO; 

•  British  and  French  forces  are  di 
ferent  in  role  and  characteristics  from 
the  U.S.  and  Soviet  LRINF  missiles; 

•  British  and  French  forces  are 
small  compared  to  the  size  of  the  So\n 
nuclear  arsenal.  Even  if  all  Soviet 
LRINF  missiles  were  removed  from  c 
sideration,  the  Soviet  Union  would  sti 
have  thousands  of  INF  aircraft  and 
other  nuclear  systems  (including 
substantial  strategic  nuclear  forces) 
arrayed  against  Britain,  France,  and  t 
other  West  European  NATO  allies; 

•  In  essence,  the  Soviets  demand 
that  the  U.S.S.R.  be  granted  a  legally 
sanctioned  "right"  to  have  nuclear  fori 
equal  to  those  of  all  other  powers  com 
bined.  This  is  tantamount  to  a  demanc 
to  legitimize  global  Soviet  military 
superiority  and  political  domination;  a 

•  The  Soviets  sought  compensatic 
for  U.K.  and  French  forces  in  SALT  1 
and  SALT  II.  Like  those  talks,  the  IN 
negotiations  are  bilateral,  and  neither 
Britain  nor  France  would  permit  its 
forces  to  be  included.  In  SALT,  it  sho 
be  noted,  the  Soviets  accepted  agree- 
ments applying  limits  only  to  U.S.  anc 
Soviet  systems. 


3R 


ARMS  CONTROL 


The  "Walk-in-the- Woods."  In  sum 

r  1982,  Ambassadors  Nitze  and 
tsinskiy  developed  an  informal 
;kage  of  proposals  for  consideration 
their  respective  capitals.  That 
;kage  provided  for  equal  levels  of 
INF  missile  launchers  in  Europe  (the 
ited  States  to  be  allowed  75  GLCM 
nchers  and  300  warheads,  the  Soviets 
SS-20  launchers  with  225  warheads), 
Pershing  II  deployment,  and  a  freeze 
SS-20S  in  the  eastern  U.S.S.R.  The 
;kage  did  not  compensate  the  Soviets 
U.K.  and  French  forces.  Although 
.shington  had  some  problems  with  the 
;kage,  Ambassador  Nitze  was 
ihorized  to  pursue  informal  discus- 
is.  But  Moscow  rejected  the  entire 
;kage  as  well  as  further  informal  ex- 
rations. 

;ond  Year  of  Negotiations 

erim  Agreement  Proposal.  Follow- 
extensive  discussions  within  the 
ance  and  between  the  United  States 
1  Japan,  on  March  30,  1983,  Presi- 
it  Reagan  announced  a  new  proposal: 
ling  back  NATO's  planned 
iloyments  to  as  low  a  level  as  the 
det  Union  would  accept,  provided 
t  the  U.S.S.R.  reduced  its  own 
INF  deployments  to  an  equal  global 
el  of  warheads.  In  advancing  this  pro- 
lal  for  an  interim  agreement,  Presi- 
t  Reagan  reaffirmed  that  the  zero- 
D  outcome  remained  NATO's  long- 
m  objective. 

The  Soviets  rejected  the  interim 
ijeement  proposal  even  before  they 
i;  a  chance  to  study  it.  They  also  failed 
c  (insider  a  U.S.  offer  to  discuss  col- 
i  ral  constraints  following  a  U.S.  pro- 
■il  that  summer  to  make  reciprocal 
1  constraints  on  shorter  range  INF 
(ins.  However,  in  August  1983,  then 
i',  I  General  Secretary  Yuriy  An- 
;![i(;v  for  the  first  time  indicated 
'i  it>t  willingness  to  destroy  SS-20s 
!■  ived  from  Europe  as  part  of  an 
f ii.'ment,  rather  than  reserving  the 
i:it  to  redeploy  them,  as  had  been 
h  f  position  theretofore. 

U.S.  September  Initiatives.  On 

•it,>mber  22,  1983,  the  United  States 
liiluced  three  new  proposals  respond- 

i  directly  to  what  the  Soviet  Union 
described  as  important  concerns. 

•  Within  the  context  of  an  agree- 
it  providing  the  right  to  equal  global 
■Is  of  U.S.  and  Soviet  LRINF  missile 

heads,  the  United  States  was  pre- 
ed  to  consider  a  commitment  not  to 


U.S.  and  Soviet  Longer  Range  INF  Missiles 

How  the  LRINF  Imbalance  Developed 
and  Soviet  Claims  That  a  Balance  Exists 

No  of 

Nuclear 

Warheads' 

1,400  r 


1,300 


1,200 


1,100 


1,000 


900 


800 


April  1983 

TASS 
"Currently 
existing  parity" 


August  1982 

Defense  Minister 
Ustinov   "Approxi- 
mate parity  of 
forces         continues  , 
to  exist  today 


February  1981 

President  Brezfinev: 
"Tfiere  is  approxi- 
mate equality  now 


700  |-       December  1977 

SS-20  deploy 
ments  begin 


600 


October  1980 

Soviet  negotia- 
tors: "A  balance 
now  exists  ■ 


October  1979 

President  Brezfinev: 
A  balance  of 
forces  .  -  -  has  taken 
sfiape  in  Europe  "  — . 


,t 


U.S.S.R. 


December  1979 

NA  TO  INF  dual- 
track  decision 


November  1981 

INF  negotiations 
begin 


November  1983 

Soviet  walkout 


U.S. 


.1^ 


1977 


1978 


1979 


1980 


1981 


1982 


1983 


1984 


'Includes  warheads  on  Soviet  SS-20S  and  older  SS-4s  and  SS-5s.  but  does  not  include 
warheads  on  retire  missiles. 


offset  the  entire  worldwide  Soviet 
LRINF  missile  deployments  by  deploy- 
ments in  Europe,  while  retaining  the 
right  to  such  deployments  elsewhere. 

•  The  United  States  was  prepared 
to  apportion  reductions  under  an  agree- 
ment between  Pershing  lis  and  GLCMs 
in  an  appropriate  manner. 


•  The  United  States  was  prepared 
to  consider  equal  limits  on  specific  types 
of  U.S.  and  Soviet  land-based  LRINF 
aircraft. 

As  President  Reagan  stated  at  the 
UN  General  Assembly  in  September 
1983,  with  these  initiatives  "the  door  to 
an  agreement  is  open."  Nonetheless,  the 
Soviets  refused  to  explore  the  U.S.  sug- 


ARMS  CONTROL 


gestion.  They  said  they  could  not  discuss 
the  geographic  allocation  or  Pershing  II 
reduction  proposals,  since  these  presup- 
posed there  would  be  some  U.S. 
deployments.  (Throughout  the  negotia- 
tions, in  fact,  the  Soviets  insisted  that 
not  a  single  U.S.  cruise  or  Pershing  II 
missile  could  be  deployed.)  They  also 
declined  serious  discussion  of  the  U.S. 
aircraft  proposal. 

Soviet  Walkout.  On  October  26, 
1983,  Andropov  announced  a  somewhat 
modified  Soviet  position,  while  threaten- 
ing to  end  the  talks  when  NATO  deploy- 
ments began.  He  said  that  the  Soviets 
would  reduce  their  SS-20s  in  or  within 
range  of  Europe  to  about  140,  with  420 
warheads,  to  match  British  and  French 
missiles.  SS-20  deployments  in  the 
eastern  U.S.S.R.  would  be  frozen  follow- 
ing entry  into  force  of  an  agreement 
concerning  missiles  in  the  European 
area,  as  long  as  there  was  no  change  in 
the  "strategic  situation"  in  Asia.  An- 
dropov also  suggested  some  flexibility  on 
the  aircraft  issue.  In  November,  the 
United  States  proposed  agreeing  to  an 
equal  global  ceiling  of  420  LRINF 
missile  warheads,  corresponding  to  An- 
dropov's October  number  for  Soviet 
warheads  in  Europe. 

On  November  23,  1983,  the  Soviets 
walked  out  of  the  talks,  citing  recent 
parliamentary  votes  in  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  and  Germany  reaffirming  NATO's 
dual-track  decision  and  the  arrival  of 
U.S.  LRINF  missiles  in  Europe.  The 
Soviets,  whose  LRINF  deployments  had 
continued  throughout  2  years  of  negotia- 
tions, argued  that  NATO's  long-planned 
deployments  created  an  "obstacle"  to 
talks.  NATO  expressed  its  regret  at  the 
Soviet  decision  and  called  on  the  Soviets 
to  return  to  the  table.  The  United  States 
remains  ready  to  resume  INF  negotia- 
tions at  once,  without  preconditions. 

Reductions  in  NATO's 
Nuclear  Stockpile 

The  1979  decision  explicitly  stated  that 
INF  modernization  would  not  increase 
NATO's  reliance  on  nuclear  weapons. 
One  element  of  the  decision  was  to  with- 
draw 1 ,000  nuclear  warheads  from  the 
NATO  stockpile  in  Europe.  This  with- 
drawal was  completed  in  1980.  More- 
over, the  decision  stipulated  that  one  ad- 
ditional nuclear  warhead  would  be  with- 
drawn for  each  new  LRINF"  missile 
deployed. 

The  High  Level  Group  then  under- 
took an  extensive  study  of  NATO's 
security  needs,  the  results  of  which  were 
presented  to  NATO  defense  ministers  at 
the  October  1983  meeting  of  the  Nuclear 
Planning  Group.  At  the  meeting,  the 


ministers  announced  that,  on  the  basis 
of  the  study,  NATO  would  withdraw  an 
additional  1,400  nuclear  warheads  from 
Europe. 

When  these  actions  are  completed, 
NATO  will  have  withdrawn  at  least  five 
nuclear  warheads  for  each  LRINF 
missile  deployed,  and  the  total  NATO 
nuclear  stockpile  will  be  at  its  lowest 
level  in  over  20  years. 


Mutual  and  Balanced 
Force  Reductions 

The  negotiations  on  mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions  (MBFR)  began  in  Vien- 
na in  1973.  These  talks  result  from  a 
NATO  initiative  to  reduce  the  unequal 
levels  of  Eastern  and  Western  military 
manpower  in  central  Europe  to  equal 
but  significantly  lower  levels.  The 
negotiations  are  part  of  broader  efforts 
by  the  United  States  and  its  allies  to 
reduce  the  likelihood  of  conflict  in  cen- 
tral Europe  and  to  strengthen  East- 
West  stability.  Although  the  Warsaw 
Pact  nominally  accepts  this  goal, 
Eastern  unwillingness  thus  far  to  ad- 
dress its  present  manpower  superiority, 
or  to  accept  adequate  measures  to.  en- 
sure compliance  with  an  MBFR  agree- 
ment, remains  the  main  obstacle  to 
progress.  The  West  continues  to  seek 
ways  to  advance  the  negotiations. 

The  Origins  of  MBFR 

Central  Europe  is  the  scene  of  the  most 
massive  concentration  of  conventional 
military  power  in  the  world:  the  ground 
forces  of  East  and  West  in  this  area 
total  some  1.7.5  million  men.  These 
forces  constitute  a  burden  on  both  sides 
that  is  in  their  mutual  interest  to 
reduce.  Eastern  superiority  of  some 
170,000  ground  force  personnel  in  this 
region  is  an  element  of  instability  in  the 
East- West  balance.  Reductions  to  equal 
levels  of  conventional  forces  would  do 
much  to  strengthen  political  and  eco- 
nomic stability  and  to  decrease  the 
burden  of  maintaining  such  large 
numbers  of  troops. 

NATO's  attempt  through  negotia- 
tions to  reduce  these  troop  levels  began 
in  1967,  with  the  adoption  of  the  Harmel 
report  on  "The  Future  Tasks  of  the 
Alliance."  This  report  declared  that  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  should  be 
based  on  a  strong  defense  and  deterrent 
capability  as  well  as  a  readiness  for 
dialogue  and  detente.  The  report  ex- 
amined the  prospects  for  force  reduc- 
tions in  central  Europe  and  concluded 
that  as  long  as  balanced  reductions  in 


Warsaw  Pact  forces  in  central  Europe 
could  be  obtained,  NATO  could  safely 
make  limited  cuts  in  its  own  conven- 
tional strength  there. 

At  their  June  1968  ministerial 
meeting  at  Reykjavik,  Iceland,  the 
NATO  allies  expressed  interest  in  "a 
process  leading  to  mutual  force  reduc- 
tions" in  Europe.  "Balanced  and  mutu; 
force  reductions,"  the  declaration  statt 
"can  contribute  significantly  to  the 
lessening  of  tension  and  to  further 
reducing  the  danger  of  war."  (France, 
which  is  not  a  member  of  NATO's  in- 
tegrated military  structure,  did  not  pa 
ticipate  in  this  initiative  or  in  the  subs 
quent  MBFR  negotiations.) 

Negotiations  were  delayed,  howev 
by  the  Soviet-led  Warsaw  Pact  invasic 
of  Czechoslovakia.  In  August  1968,  ju 
2  months  after  the  Reykjavik  meeting 
32  Warsaw  Pact  divisions  invaded 
Czechoslovakia.  Five  Soviet  divisions 
mained  permanently  when  the  other 
forces  departed.  By  increasing  the 
number  of  Soviet  divisions  in  central 
Europe  from  22  to  27 — an  addition  ol 
some  70,000  Soviet  soldiers — the  inva 
sion  made  an  agreement  establishing 
force  parity  harder  to  achieve. 

At  their  Rome  ministerial  on 
May  27,  1970,  the  NATO  allies  renew 
their  offer  to  the  Warsaw  Pact.  For  2 
years,  however,  the  Soviet  Union  in- 
sisted that  the  "reduction  of  foreign 
troops"  could  be  considered  only  in  th 
context  of  its  own  proposal  for  a  Euri 
pean  security  conference.  In  May  197 
Soviet  leader  Brezhnev  finally  droppe 
this  condition  and  agreed  to  begin  ex- 
ploratory negotiations.  (The  Soviet  pr 
posal  for  a  security  conference  eventi 
ly  evolved  into  the  Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe, 
which  convened  at  Helsinki  in  1973.) 
That  month,  at  the  signing  of  the  In- 
terim Agreement  on  strategic  arms  li 
tation  (SALT  I),  Brezhnev  and  Presid 
Nixon  endorsed  "the  goal  of  ensuring 
stability  and  security  in  Europe  throu 
reciprocal  reduction  of  forces." 

Representatives  of  12  members 
NATO  and  the  7  Warsaw  Pact  memb 
met  on  January  31,  1973,  to  determir 
the  terms  of  reference  for  the  negotit 
tions.  The  first  MBFR  negotiating  roi 
began  on  October  30  of  that  year. 

The  Nature  of  the  MBFR  Talks 

The  MBF^R  negotiations  are  the  longt 
continuous  multilateral  arms  control 
talks  in  history.  They  were  5  years  in 
gestation  and  have  been  going  on  for 
more.  The  goal  is  to  reduce  each  side' 
military  manpower  in  the  central  Eur 


38 


■sf  Ct '^t,^   Di  ,11^ 


ARMS  CONTROL 


in  "zone  of  reductions"  to  parity  at  a 
el  of  700,000  ground  force  personnel 
i  a  maximum  of  900.000  air  and 
lund  force  personnel  combined.  The 
e  of  reductions  consists  of  the 
leral  Republic  of  Germany  and  the 
lelux  countries  on  the  Western  side, 

East  Germany.  Poland,  and  Czecho- 
/akia  on  the  Eastern.  In  addition  to 
se  reductions,  the  West  seeks  certain 
sociated  measures"  that  would 
iance  stability  and  facilitate  verifica- 
1.  These  measures  would  g:ive  each 

confidence  that  the  other  is  observ- 
the  agreed  manpower  limits  and  is 

assuming  a  threatening  posture  with 
idual  forces. 

Beyond  the  highly  technical  issues 
t  have  characterized  the  MBFR 
otiations  from  the  beginning  is  the 
'e  fundamental  question  of  whether 
Soviet  Union  is  prepared  to  accept  a 
ifiable  agreement  guaranteeing  East- 
st  manpower  equality  in  the  zone  of 
actions.  Despite  stated  Soviet  accept- 
e  of  the  principle  of  parity,  the 
iet  Union  has  steadfastly  resisted 
eement  on  the  data  relating  to  its 
■e  levels.  This  has  raised  serious 
stions  about  Soviet  willingness  to  ac- 
;  genuine  and  verifiable  reductions  to 
al  levels. 


graphical  Asymmetry 
Force  Disparity 


damental  to  the  question  of  the  con- 
ional  force  balance  in  central 
ope  is  the  geographical  asymmetry 
veen  the  United  States  and  the 
.S.R.,  which  works  to  the  advantage 
le  Warsaw  Pact. 

The  Soviet  Union's  western  border  is 
360-420  miles  from  the  eastern 
ler  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
y.  In  the  West,  however,  the  Atlan- 
)cean  lies  between  the  United  States 
the  European  allies.  In  the  event  of 
■re  tension  or  actual  conflict,  the 
et  Union,  drawing  on  its  vast  man- 
er  reserves,  could  quickly  move 
es  forward  over  an  excellent  railway 
paved  road  network.  To  reinforce 
rO,  the  United  States  would  have  to 
sport  troops  by  sea  and  air  from 
■s  over  3,500  miles  away  and  would 
!  to  overcome  serious  logistical 
)lems. 

Western  Europe's  geographical  com- 
ness  makes  defense  in  depth  diffi- 
and  undesirable;  one-quarter  of 
t  Germany's  industrial  production 
30%  of  its  population  are  less  than 
liles  from  the  NATO-Warsaw  Pact 


The  geographical  realities  of 
Western  Europe  and  NATO's  commit- 
ment to  preserve  the  territorial  integrity 
of  its  members  make  imperative  a  policy 
of  "forward  defense,"  but  the  distance 
separating  Europe  from  the  United 
States  complicates  the  implementation 
of  such  a  policy.  The  Soviet  Union  and 
its  allies  have  used  these  geographic 
disparities  to  gain  substantial  military 
advantage. 

Western  Objectives  in  MBFR 

NATO  draws  its  strength  from  the  fact 
that  it  is  a  coalition  of  free  nations, 
joined  together  to  ensure  their  common 
security.  The  Western  position  is  based 
on  consensus,  arrived  at  in  NATO  head- 
quarters in  Brussels  and  transmitted  to 
the  allied  negotiators  in  Vienna. 

NATO  is  a  defensive  alliance  not 
merely  in  declared  policy  but  in  its 
military  posture  and,  most  importantly, 
in  the  minds  of  its  people  and  their 
leaders.  What  NATO  seeks  at  Vienna  is 
greater  security  from  aggression  and,  by 
extension,  a  lessening  of  the  risk  of  war 
for  all  of  Europe.  The  keystone  of  this 
effort  is  the  search  for  parity:  the  West 
has  never  sought  in  MBFR  to  alter  the 
European  conventional  balance  to 
achieve  superiority  over  the  Warsaw 
Pact. 

The  geographic,  military,  and  politi- 
cal disparities  between  the  two  alliances 
have  led  NATO  to  set  certain  standards 
for  an  MBFR  agreement. 

Parity.  The  current  force  disparity 
threatens  stability,  poses  a  significant 


threat  to  NATO  security,  and  potentially 
lowers  the  nuclear  threshold.  The  MBFR 
negotiations  are  intended  to  eliminate 
this  disparity  at  least  in  the  central 
European  reductions  area. 

Reductions.  In  view  of  present  ine- 
quality, parity  can  be  achieved  only 
through  asymmetrical  reductions,  i.e., 
with  the  East  reducing  more  than  the 
West.  But  the  West  also  seeks  parity  at 
a  lower  level  and  would  thus  make 
sizable  reductions  of  its  own. 

Associated  Measures.  To  be  effec- 
tive, arms  reductions  agreements  must 
contain  provisions  to  ensure  and  verify 
compliance  and  to  inhibit  assumption  of 
a  threatening  posture  by  the  forces  still 
left  in  the  area.  The  Western  package  of 
associated  measures  would  serve  these 
objectives. 

The  Course  of  the  Negotiations: 
Eastern  and  Western  Positions 

In  MBFR's  11-year  existence,  both  East 
and  West  have  made  a  variety  of  pro- 
posals. On  both  sides,  however,  there 
has  been  a  strong  continuity  in  objec- 
tives. 

The  West  has  consistently  sought 
parity  of  forces  at  a  reduced  level.  The 
East,  with  equal  consistency,  has  re- 
sisted effective  acceptance  of  parity.  In- 
itially, it  rejected  equality  explicitly; 
later,  it  did  so  implicitly,  accepting  pari- 
ty as  a  goal  but  refusing  to  admit  to  the 
size  of  its  current  forces  and,  conse- 
quently, to  the  size  of  reductions  that 
would  be  needed  to  achieve  parity. 

On  November  8,  1973,  the  East  sub- 
mitted a  draft  agreement  calling  for 


MBFR:  Area  of  Reductions 


■'<^ 


Greenland 

(Den.) 


77?i  Area  of  reductions 

□  NATO  member 

I    I  Warsaw  Pact  member 


1% 


-fe.^ 


Iceland 


■"^ 


Canada 


#■ 


Portuo^JSpain 


Turkey 


The  United  Stales  Govornmenl  tias  nol  recognized 
(he  incDrporalion  dI  Estonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania 
inio  the  Soviet  Union.  Othst  boundary  reprosontalion 
is  nol  neceBsarily  sulhonlBlive. 


\     ^ 


ARMS  CONTROL 


overall  reductions  of  about  17%  for 
ground  and  air  forces  on  both  sides.  The 
reductions  were  to  take  place  in  three 
consecutive  phases;  each  side  was  to 
withdraw  20,000  forces,  and  those  not 
indigenous  to  the  area  of  reductions 
would  be  withdrawn  to  their  national 
territories.  The  equal  reductions  called 
for  by  the  East  would  have  perpetuated 
the  force  disparity  already  existing  in 
the  East's  favor. 

On  November  22,  1973,  the  West 
presented  its  proposal,  calling  for  reduc- 
tions in  two  phases  to  an  equal  level  on 
both  sides.  The  first  phase  would  be 
limited  to  U.S.  and  Soviet  personnel,  in- 
volving 29,000  U.S.  and  68,000  Soviet 
troops  and  withdrawal  of  1,700  Soviet 
tanks.  The  Soviet  reduction  was  to  en- 
tail withdrawal  of  a  complete  Soviet 
tiink  army,  representing  the  most 
threatening  offensive  force  in  the  area. 
In  the  second  phase,  reductions  would 
continue  on  both  sides  until  a  common 
ceiling  of  700,000  ground  forces  and 
900,000  ground  and  air  forces  combined 
was  reached. 

By  1975  it  was  clear  that  the  East 
was  not  prepared  to  accept  the  Western 
proposal.  Following  the  December  1975 
NATO  ministerial,  the  West  sought  to 
give  new  impetus  to  the  talks.  In  ex- 
change for  Eastern  agreement  to  the 
basic  principle  of  the  Western  proposal 
(two-phase  asymmetrical  reductions  to 
parity,  including  withdrawal  of  a  five- 
division  Soviet  tank  army  in  the  first 
phase),  NATO  offered  to  withdraw  54 
nuclear-capable  F-4  aircraft  and  36  Per- 
shing I  missiles,  together  with  1,000 
nuclear  warheads. 

The  East  again  failed  to  agree.'  It 
followed  this  Western  move  by  introduc- 
ing a  new  MBFR  proposal  in  February 
1976.  Withdrawals  were  expressed  sole- 
ly in  percentage  terms;  forces  would  be 
withdrawn  in  regiments  and  brigades; 
and — picking  up  the  idea  of  including 
nuclear  forces — each  side  would  with- 
draw 54  nuclear-capable  aircraft  and 
ballistic  missile  systems.  The  latter  offer 
ignored  the  Western  call  for  reductions 
in  Soviet  tanks. 

In  June  1976,  the  East  changed  its 
tactics  but  yielded  nothing  of  substance. 
Hitherto,  it  had  tabled  no  figures  for  the 
size  of  its  forces.  Now,  it  declared  that  it 
had  987,300  ground  and  air  force  per- 
sonnel, 805,000  of  them  ground  troops. 
These  figures  were  designed  to  suggest 
that  the  East  had  a  numerical  superiori- 
ty over  the  West  of  no  more  than  about 
14,000  troops  in  the  zone  of  reductions. 

From  this  point  on,  the  Soviet  Union 
shifted  its  position  to  accept,  for  the 
first  time,  the  principle  of  parity,  but  it 


contended  that,  given  the  alleged  rough 
equality  of  forces,  almost  equal  reduc- 
tions of  the  two  sides  would  suffice  to 
reach  parity.  The  East  followed  up  its 
data  figures  with  a  new  proposal  in  1978 
calling  for  equal  ceilings  of  700,000  for 
ground  forces  arrived  at  through 
substantially  equal  reductions:  105,000 
from  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  91,000  from 
NATO. 

The  West's  quarrel  with  the  Eastern 
position  was  not  with  the  proposed  com- 
mon ceiling  of  700,000,  which  had  been 
the  centerpiece  of  its  own  proposal  of 
1973;  rather,  it  objected  to  the  Eastern 
contention  that  the  current  level  of 
forces  on  the  two  sides  was  roughly 
equal  and  that  the  common  ceilings 
could  thus  be  reached  by  roughly  equal 
reductions  of  the  kind  the  Soviets  had 
proposed.  In  fact,  the  West  has  consist- 
ently estimated  that  Eastern  ground 
forces  were  larger  by  some  170,000  men 
than  the  Eastern  figures. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  refused  ever 
since  to  cooperate  with  Western  efforts 
to  identify  the  source  of  the  manpower 
discrepancy.  Eastern  negotiators  allege 
that  Western  probing  is  designed  to  ex- 
tract secret  information  about  Eastern 
forces  that  the  Soviet  General  Staff  con- 
siders essential  to  national  security  and 
to  gain  a  unilateral  military  advantage 
for  NATO  by  demanding  large,  asym- 
metrical Eastern  force  reductions.  Com- 
parable information  on  Western  forces  is 
publicly  available. 

The  actual  level  of  Soviet  and  other 
Eastern  forces  in  the  area  has  been  one 
of  the  most  important  unresolved  issues 
in  MBFR;  since  1976  the  data  dispute 
has  been  the  central  stumbling  block  in 
the  negotiations. 

Despite  Soviet  unwillingness  to 
resolve  the  data  question  and  accept  ge- 
nuine parity,  the  West  was  committed  to 
making  progress  toward  an  agreement. 
In  1978,  the  West  offered  to  guarantee 
that  European  NATO  forces  would  be 
reduced  following  initial  U.S.  and  Soviet 
reductions.  In  December  1979,  the  West 
scaled  back  demands  for  initial  reduc- 
tions in  the  hope  that  this  would 
facilitate  early  progress.  Under  this  new 
Western  proposal,  the  first  phase  would 
entail  reductions  of  13,000  U.S.  and 
30,000  Soviet  soldiers  (three  divisions) — 
a  considerable  modification  of  the 
original  Western  demand  for  the  first- 
phase  removal  of  a  complete  Soviet  tank 
army.  The  West  also  proposed  a  compre- 
hensive package  of  associated  measures 
designed  to  ensure  that  a  treaty  would 
be  effective  and  verifiable. 

Speaking  to  the  West  German 
Parliament  in  June  1982,  President 


Reagan  reaffirmed  that  an  MBFR 
agreement  was  an  important  objective  i 
his  Administration.  A  month  later,  the 
West  presented  a  new  draft  treaty  that 
represented  another  major  effort  to  ad 
dress  Eastern  concerns  while  preservin 
the  Western  requirement  for  parity  an< 
adequate  associated  measures. 

In  some  respects  the  1982  draft 
treaty  was  a  significant  departure  fronr 
previous  Western  approaches,  although 
the  fundamental  principle — reductions 
to  equal  ceilings  of  700,000  ground  fon 
personnel  and  900,000  ground  and  air 
force  personnel  combined — remained  u 
changed. 

The  major  innovation  of  the  Weste 
draft  was  that  it  would  bind  all  direct 
participants  in  one  agreement  to  under 
take  the  reductions  required  to  reach  t 
ceiling.  This  provision  sought  to  addres 
the  frequently  expressed  Soviet  concer 
that  initial  Soviet  reductions  might  not 
be  followed  by  reductions  in  the  forces 
of  the  United  States'  NATO  allies. 

Consistent  with  previous  Western 
approaches,  the  draft  treaty  called  for 
associated  measures  intended  to  give 
each  side  confidence  in  the  other's  con 
pliance.  These  measures  provided  for: 

•  Prenotification  of  activity  by  oni 
or  more  division  formations  outside  th 
division's  garrison  area; 

•  Provisions  to  permit  observers  ; 
such  activities; 

•  Prenotification  of  major 
movements  of  ground  forces  into  the 
area  of  reductions; 

•  An  annual  quota  of  on-call  inspe 
tions; 

•  Designation  of  permanent  entr> 
and  exit  points  into  and  from  the  ares 
reductions,  with  observers  stationed  a 
these  points; 

•  Exchange  of  information  on  for 
to  be  withdrawn  and  continuing  perioi 
exchanges  of  information  on  residual 
forces;  and 

•  Noninterference  with  national 
technical  means  of  verification. 

In  February  and  June  1983,  the 
East  made  new  proposals,  the  princip 
elements  of  which  were: 

•  U.S. -Soviet  reductions  by  "muti 
example,"  that  is,  outside  the  context 
an  agreement; 

•  An  agreed  freeze  on  all  forces  i 
armaments  in  the  MBFR  area  subse- 
quent to  the  U.S. -Soviet  reductions;  a 

•  Subsequent  negotiation  of  a  tre 
binding  all  direct  participants  to  redu(  f 
tions  in  a  single  phase.  The  East  sug- 
gested that  such  a  treaty  be  based  on 
1982  draft. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


In  this  proposal  and  others,  the  East 
agreed  in  principle  with  some  key 
stern  verification  measures  such  as 
)ection,  but  the  agreement  has  been 
ged  with  restrictive  conditions,  and 
East  has  been  reluctant  to  discuss 
dls. 

Although  there  are  some  positive 
nents  in  the  East's  approach,  it  is 
clearly  inadequate  because  it  fails  to 
ress  the  crucial  question  of  data  and 
esolve  the  problem  of  verification. 
In  April  1984,  the  West  presented  a 
MBFR  initiative  aimed  at  breaking 
impasse  over  data  and  verification 
es.  The  heart  of  that  initiative  is  a 
oosal  of  Western  flexibility  on  data 
xchange  for  Eastern  flexibility  in 
ting  Western  verification  re- 
ements. 

The  new  proposal  modifies  previous 
item  data  requirements  in  two  ways. 

Data  are  required  before  treaty 
lature  only  for  ground  combat  and 
bat  support  forces  (roughly  60%  of 
total  forces  and  75%  of  the  ground 
es  in  the  reductions  area). 

Precise  agreement  on  these  data 
i)t  required,  only  that  they  fall  within 
cceptable  range  of  Western  esti- 
es. 

I[n  return,  the  East  is  asked  to  ac- 
the  Western  package  of  verification 
sures  (outlined  in  the  1982  Western 
t  treaty)  with  the  following  modifica- 

>}^ 

•  Increased  numbers,  duration,  area 
iisite  inspections  and  increased  size 
ispection  teams; 

•  Observation  of  the  process  of 
ctions,  vacating  garrison,  and 
rture  of  the  area;  and 

•  Exchange  of  a  more  detailed 
Ikdown  of  information  on  individual 
!  components. 

limiting  the  initial  data  exchange  to 
i)at/combat  support  forces  focuses 
legotiations  on  forces  most  responsi- 
Dr  the  combat  potential  of  the  sides 
Dn  those  having  more  apparent 
:ture  and  more  predictable  man- 
;r.  Therefore,  the  prospect  for 
ement  on  the  current  levels  of 
nd  combat/combat  support  forces 
Id  be  better  than  for  total  forces, 
rmining  the  numbers  of  other  forces 
e  reductions  area  would  be  deferred 
years,  pending  onsite  verification 
igh  reciprocal,  cooperative 
iures. 

''he  full  schedule  of  reductions  to 
y  would  not  be  established  until 
on  all  forces  is  agreed.  But  the  pro- 
requires  the  United  States  and  the 


Soviet  Union  to  commit  to  a  schedule  of 
major  reductions  in  their  ground  com- 
bat/combat support  forces  on  the  basis 
of  the  pre-treaty  data  exchange. 

Requirement  for  Progress 

The  new  Western  treaty  proposal  con- 
tains the  necessary  elements  to  break 
the  impasse.  The  initial  Soviet  reaction, 
however,  has  not  been  positive,  and  until 
the  East  demonstrates  a  willingness 
through  concrete  actions  to  accept  the 
necessary  asymmetrical  reductions  to 
reach  parity,  progress  almost  certainly 
will  continue  to  be  curtailed. 

Although  the  lack  of  concrete  results 
thus  far  has  been  disappointing,  the 
West  has  made  some  progress.  The  prin- 
ciples of  collectivity  and  parity  seem 
finally  to  be  established;  associated 
measures  have  been  proposed  that 
would  contribute  substantially  to  stabili- 
ty and  confidence  in  Europe;  and  a  bet- 
ter understanding  of  the  two  sides' 
security  concerns  has  evolved. 

The  MFBR  talks  began  because  the 
United  States  and  its  NATO  allies  be- 
lieved that  a  satisfactory  solution  to  the 
problem  of  Eastern  conventional  force 
superiority  is  a  negotiated  agreement 
leading  to  force  parity  at  lower  overall 
levels.  The  West  remains  committed  to 
that  goal  and  convinced  that  such  an 
agreement  would  ultimately  increase  the 
security  of  all  the  peoples  of  Europe. 


Confidence-Building  Measures 

Nature  and  Purpose 

Confidence-building  measures — unlike 
arms  reductions  provisions,  which  seek 
to  constrain  the  size,  weaponry,  or 
structure  of  military  forces — are  de- 
signed to  enhance  mutual  knowledge 
and  understanding  about  military  forces 
and  activities.  Their  overall  purpose  is  to 
reduce  the  possibility  of  an  accidental 
confrontation  through  miscalculation  or 
failure  of  communicaton,  to  inhibit  op- 
portunities for  surprise  attack,  and  to 
enhance  stability  in  times  of  calm  or 
crisis. 

Confidence-building  measures  are  an 
important  part  of  U.S.  efforts  to  achieve 
greater  security  and  stability.  Although 
they  do  not  themselves  reduce  forces  or 
armaments,  by  providing  for  more  effec- 
tive and  timely  exchange  of  information 
and  greater  reciprocal  understanding  of 
intentions  and  actions,  they  can  help 
reduce  the  possibility  of  an  East- West 
confrontation  arising  by  accident  or  mis- 
calculation. 


U.S. -Soviet  confidence-building 
measures  include  the  "Hot  Line"  Agree- 
ment and  the  "Accidents  Measures"  and 
Incidents  at  Sea  Agreements.  Multi- 
lateral measures  in  force  are  contained 
in  the  CSCE  Final  Act,  signed  in 
Helsinki  in  1975.  The  principal  confi- 
dence-building feature  of  the  Final  Act 
is  the  agreement  of  both  East  and  West 
to  prior  notification  of  large  military 
maneuvers.  This  concept  has  been  incor- 
porated into  the  Western  proposal  at  the 
MBFR  negotiations.  The  allies  have  also 
presented  a  package  of  confidence-  and 
security-building  measures  at  the  Con- 
ference on  Confidence-  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  and  Disarmament  in 
Europe  (CDE)  talks  in  Stockholm. 

In  1982,  President  Reagan  proposed 
a  new  set  of  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  bilateral 
confidence-building  measures,  including 
prior  notification  of  ballistic  missile 
launches,  prior  notification  of  major 
military  exercises,  and  expanded  ex- 
change of  forces  data.  These  proposals 
were  submitted  at  the  START  and  INF 
negotiations.  In  addition.  President 
Reagan  in  1983  proposed  an  important 
set  of  measures  to  improve  the  ability  of 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
to  communicate  rapidly  and  urgently. 
Those  proposals,  on  which  the  United 
States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  began  negotiat- 
ing in  August  1983,  include  improving 
the  hot  Hne,  establishing  a  U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Joint  Military  Communications  Link, 
and  improving  Embassy-capital  com- 
munications. In  July  1984,  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  agreed  to 
improve  the  hot  line  by  adding  a  high- 
speed facsimile  capability  to  the  existing 
teletype  equipment.  This  will  enable  both 
countries  to  send  charts,  photos,  and 
other  graphic  materials  almost  instan- 
taneously. 

Bilateral  Agreements:  Nuclear 
Forces  and  Crisis  Stability 

Over  the  last  two  decades,  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
reached  agreement  on  several  measures 
designed  to  reduce  the  risk  of  accidental 
nuclear  war. 

•  The  "Hot  Line"  Agreement, 
signed  in  1963,  established  a  direct 
teletype  communications  link  between 
Washington  and  Moscow.  A  second 
agreement,  signed  in  1971,  provided  for 
upgrading  the  hot  line  by  adding  satel- 
lite circuits  which  began  operation  in 
1978.  Further  agreement  to  add  high- 
speed facsimile  capability  was  reached  in 
July  1984. 

•  The  "Accidents  Measures"  Agree- 
ment, signed  in  1971,  requires  each  side 
to  maintain  safeguards  against  the  ac- 


ARMS  CONTROL 


cidental  or  unauthorized  use  of  nuclear 
weapons;  to  notify  the  other  side  before 
planned  missile  launches  beyond  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  launching  party  in  the 
direction  of  the  other  party;  and  to 
notify  each  other  immediately  in  the 
event  of  an  accidental,  unauthorized,  or 
any  other  unexplained  incident  involving 
a  possible  detonation  of  a  nuclear 
weapon. 

•  The  Incidents  at  Sea  Agreement, 
sig^ned  in  1972,  enjoins  the  two  sides  to 
observe  strictly  the  letter  and  spirit  of 
the  International  Regiilations  for 
Preventing  Collisions  at  Sea;  to  refrain 
from  provocative  acts  at  sea  that  could 
increase  the  risk  of  war;  and  to  notify 
mariners  of  actions  on  the  high  seas 
representing  a  danger  to  navigation  or 
to  aircraft. 

•  Article  XVI  of  the  SALT  II  agree- 
ment contained  a  provision  requiring  ad- 
vance notification  of  all  multiple  ICBM 
launches  (more  than  one  ICBM  in  flight 
at  the  same  time)  or  single  ICBM 
launches  planned  to  extend  beyond  the 
national  territory  of  the  notifying  side, 
regardless  of  direction. 

Confidence-Building  Measures 
in  the  START  and  INF  Talks 

In  his  Berlin  speech  of  June  11,  1982;  at 
the  UN  Special  Session  on  Disarmament 
on  June  17,  1982;  and  in  his  speech  of 
November  22,  1982,  the  President 
pledged  to  leave  no  stone  unturned  in 
the  effort  to  reinforce  peace  and  lessen 
the  risk  of  war.  Recognizing  the  need  to 
improve  mutual  communication  and  con- 
fidence, he  suggested  various  ways  in 
which  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  could  deal  with  this  problem. 
These  included  reciprocal  exchanges  in 
such  areas  as  advance  notification  of 
major  exercises,  an  expansion  of  agreed 
advance  notification  of  ICBM  launches, 
and  an  expanded  exchange  of  strategic 
forces  data.  As  the  President  stated  in 
Berlin: 

Taken  together,  these  steps  would  repre- 
sent a  qualitative  improvement  in  the  nuclear 
environment.  They  would  help  reduce  the 
chances  of  misinterpretation  in  the  case  of 
exercises  and  test  launches.  And  they  would 
reduce  the  secrecy  and  ambiguity  which  sur- 
round military  activity. 

After  thorough  study  of  ways  to  im- 
plement and  expand  the  President's  pro- 
posals, the  United  States  proposed  to 
the  Soviet  Union  at  the  START  and  INF 
talks  in  Geneva  those  measures  men- 
tioned by  the  President  in  Berlin  as  well 
as  two  additional  ones:  advance  notifica- 
tion of  launches  of  submarine-launched 
ballistic  missiles  and  of  land-based. 


longer  range  INF  ballistic  missiles.  At 
U.S.  initiative,  a  Working  Group  on 
Confidence-Building  Measures  was 
established  within  the  START  negotia- 
tions in  the  fall  of  198.3. 

Notification  of  ICBM  Launches. 

Several  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  agreements  pro- 
vide for  advance  notification  of  certain 
ICBM  launches.  None,  however,  covers 
all  ICBM  launches,  since  none  covers 
single  launches  that  impact  within  the 
territory  of  the  launching  nation.  Be- 
cause any  launch  could  in  some  circum- 
stances create  uncertainty,  the  United 
States  proposed  in  START  that  the 
sides  provide  notice  of  all  ICBM 
launches,  whether  they  occur  singly  or 
in  multiples,  whether  their  flights  re- 
main within  national  boundaries  or  ex- 
tend beyond  them. 

Notification  of  SLBM  Launches. 

At  present,  the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  do  not  notify  each  other  of  sea- 
launched  ballistic  missile  launches;  they 
do  issue  standard  notices  to  airmen  and 
mariners,  announcing  "closure  areas,"  if 
an  SLBM  is  expected  to  impact  in  inter- 
national waters.  To  reduce  any  possi- 
bility of  misinterpretation,  the  United 
States  has  proposed  that  both  sides  pro- 
vide advance  notification  of  all  their 
SLBM  launches,  including  those  impact- 
ing within  national  territory.  Along  with 
the  ICBM  notification  measure,  this 
would  mean  that  for  the  first  time  ad- 
vance notification  would  be  required  for 
all  launches  of  strategic  ballistic  missiles 
in  the  arsenals  of  both  sides. 

Notification  of  Longer  Range  INF 
Ballistic  Missile  Launches.  The  United 
States  also  proposed  in  the  INF  negotia- 
tions that  advance  notification  be  provid- 
ed for  all  launches  of  LRINF  ballistic 
missiles.  These  include  the  Soviet 
Union's  SS-20  and  SS-4  missiles,  and 
the  U.S.  Pershing  II. 

Prior  Notification  of  Major 
Nuclear  Force  Exercises.  Each  year 
U.S.  and  Soviet  nuclear  forces  conduct 
large-scale  military  exercises  intended  to 
develop,  perfect,  or  refine  plans,  pro- 
cedures, or  operations,  and  to  provide 
training.  The  United  States  has  pro- 
posed that  each  side  provide  notification 
in  advance  of  those  major  exercises  to 
avoid  raising  the  concerns  of  the  other 
side.  This  would  complement  the 
reciprocal  notifications  on  conventional 
maneuvers  covered  by  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act  and  those  which  are  ctu-rently  being 
negotiated  in  the  CDE. 


Expanded  Exchange  of  Forces 
Data.  The  United  States  also  proposed 
in  the  START  and  INF  talks  that  both 
parties  agree  to  an  expanded  exchange 
of  information  on  their  strategic  and 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces.  This 
detailed  exchange  of  information  would 
help  reduce  the  risk  of  misinterpreting 
actions  involving  such  forces  and 
enhance  understanding  of  each  other's 
capabilities.  Moreover,  such  exchanges 
are  important  to  the  successful  negotia 
tion  of  any  START  or  INF  agreement, 
since  those  agreements  would  entail 
substantial  reductions  and  restrictions 
on  many  systems.  The  expanded  data 
exchange  would  be  an  important  step  ii 
the  verification  of  those  agreements. 

U.S. -Soviet  Communications 
Improvements 

In  May  1983,  the  President  strongly  er 
dorsed  a  Department  of  Defense  repor 
to  Congress  recommending  additional 
proposals  to  strengthen  stability  and 
reduce  the  risk  of  accident  or  miscalcu! 
tion.  The  proposals  resulted  from  more 
than  a  year's  study,  in  close  consultatic 
with  Congress.  The  specific  proposals 


•  Addition  of  a  high-speed  facsimil 
capabiHty  to  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  hot  line 
(on  which  agreement  was  reached  in 
July  1984),  which  will  permit  trans- 
mission of  more  complex  data,  includin 
full  pages  of  text,  maps,  and  graphs. 
This  capability  will  increase  the  speed 
and  reliability  of  communications,  ther 
by  improving  both  sides'  ability  to  clari 
ambiguous  situations; 

•  Establishment  of  a  Joint  Militar 
Communications  Link,  a  high-speed  fa 
simile  link  that  would  supplement  the 
hotline  and  existing  diplomatic  channe. 
Its  primary  purpose  would  be  to  facili- 
tate rapid  communication  regarding  th 
military  aspects  of  nuclear  or  other 
military  crises;  and 

•  Establishment  by  the  U.S.  and 
Soviet  Governments  of  improved  com- 
munications with  their  embassies  in  ea 
other's  capitals.  These  improved  com- 
munications could  supplement  both  the 
hotline  and  the  Joint  Military  Com- 
munications Link.  Each  government 
would  install  and  control  its  own  systei 

Each  of  those  measures  would  in- 
crease our  ability  to  resolve  crisis  situa 
tions  and  prevent  military  escalation. 
Taken  together,  they  would  mark  a  j 
substantial  advance  toward  further  j 
reducing  the  risk  that  accident  or  mis- 
interpretation could  ever  lead  to  war. 


P 


IF 


42 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Although  the  United  States  and  the 
viet  Union  reached  agreement  to  im- 
3ve  the  hotline  in  July  1984,  the 
viet  Union  has  not  expressed  any  in- 
■est  in  the  two  other  U.S.  proposed 
Timunications  improvements. 

iltilateral  Negotiations: 
nfidence-Building  Measures 
Conventional  Forces 

iCE.  Certain  confidence-building 
lasures  are  now  in  effect  throughout 
rope  as  a  result  of  the  1975  Helsinki 
lal  Act.  Negotiated  between  1973  and 
75  at  the  35-nation  CSCE,  they  pro- 
e  for  notification  of  major  maneuvers 
Giving  more  than  25,000  troops; 
untary  notification  of  smaller  scale 
.neuvers;  and  invitation  of  observers 
these  activities.  The  Final  Act  also 
;es  the  value  of  notification  of  other 
ge-scale  troop  movements,  below  the 
000  level,  but  does  not  require  such  a 
p. 

As  arms  control  devices,  the  confi- 
ice-building  measures  in  the  Final  Act 
re  made  only  a  modest  contribution. 
By  are  limited  in  the  activities 
ered,  in  the  specificity  of  their  provi- 
ns,  and  in  their  geographic  appli- 
lility.  Furthermore,  the  Soviets 
lated  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  by  failing 
yjve  adequate  notification  of  one  ma- 
exercise  in  1981. 


information  on  the  size  and  structure  of 
military  forces,  and  notification  of 
movements  of  major  military  formations 
into  and  within  Europe.  Since  then, 
there  has  been  some  progress  on  clarify- 
ing the  issues  involved,  but  the  Eastern 
participants  have  resisted  key  elements 
of  the  Western  package. 

Conference  on  Confidence-  and 
Security-Building  Measures  and  Dis- 
armament in  Europe.  The  next  stage  in 
the  evolution  of  Western  efforts  to 
develop  confidence-building  measures 
resulted  from  the  French  proposal  in 
May  1978  for  a  conference  on  disarma- 
ment in  Europe. 

The  Madrid  CSCE  review  con- 
ference, which  concluded  in  September 
1983,  agreed  to  a  CDE  within  the 
overall  CSCE  process  and  directed  it  to 
take  the  first  steps  to  negotiate  a  set  of 
mutually  complementary  confidence-  and 
security-building  measures  designed  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  military  confrontation 
in  Europe.  The  CDE,  at  least  initially,  is 
concerned  not  with  force  or  arms  limita- 
tions but  rather  with  how  such  forces 
are  used.  The  measures  to  be  negotiated 
must  be  militarily  significant,  politically 
binding,  verifiable,  and  applicable  to  the 
whole  of  Europe — including  Soviet  terri- 
tory as  far  east  as  the  Ural  Mountains. 
"  Implicit  in  the  Helsinki  CSCE  Final 
Act,  and  reaffirmed  in  the  November 
1983  Helsinki  CDE  preparatory  confer- 
ence decision  document,  is  that  CDE  will 
not  interfere  with  other,  ongoing 
negotiations — such  as  MBFR  and  the 
Geneva-based  UN  Conference  on  Dis- 
armament— and  that  its  future  schedule 
and  agenda  will  depend  on  the  CSCE 
review  conference  in  Vienna  in  1986. 
The  CDE  began  on  January  17,  1984,  in 
Stockholm  and  will  continue  with  brief 
recesses  until  the  next  CSCE  review 
conference  in  Vienna  in  1986. 

The  Western  Position 

From  the  Western  perspective,  the  CDE 
is  primarily  a  conference  about  surprise 
attack  in  Europe.  Its  purpose  is  to  pro- 
mote greater  openness  and  predictability 
in  military  activities.  Measures  proposed 
by  the  West  are  intended  to: 

•  Reduce  the  risk  of  conflict  by  sur- 
prise attack  or  miscalculation; 

•  Inhibit  displays  of  force  for  pur- 
poses of  intimidation;  and 

•  Enhance  communications  among 
participating  states. 

With  these  objectives  in  mind,  the 
United  States  and  its  allies  have  devel- 
oped a  coherent  package  of  confidence- 


and  security-building  measures.  These 
measures,  frequently  referred  to  as 
"openness  measures"  and  introduced  by 
the  West  on  January  24,  1984,  call  for: 

•  Information  exchange  on  ground 
and  air  forces  in  the  CDE  zone; 

•  Forecasts  and  notifications  of  mili- 
tary activities  in  the  zone,  including  am- 
phibious operations,  mobilizations,  and 
alert  activities,  as  well  as  regular  out-of- 
garrison  activities; 

•  Mandatory  invitations  to 
observers  at  these  activities; 

•  The  right  of  onsite  and  aerial  in- 
spection by  challenge;  and 

•  Facilities  for  improved  communi- 
cation between  participants. 

Consistent  with  the  CDE  mandate, 
the  Western  proposals  call  for  concrete 
actions  that  can  contribute  meaningfully 
to  peace  and  stability.  They  represent  a 
significant  advance  over  the  confidence- 
building  measures  contained  in  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  because  they  will  all 
be  mandatory,  verifiable,  applicable  to 
the  whole  of  Europe,  and  cover  more 
military  activities.  The  Western  ap- 
proach to  the  CDE  also  complements  ef- 
forts in  other  arms  control  forums 
(START,  INF,  MBFR,  and  the  Confer- 
ence on  Disarmament),  and  other  securi- 
ty negotiations  such  as  upgrading  the 
U.S.-U.S.S.R.  hotline. 

The  Eastern  Position 

The  East,  led  by  the  Soviet  Union,  has 
promoted  six  proposals  at  Stockholm 
featuring  a  proposed  agreement  or 
treaty  on  the  non-use  of  force,  linked  to 
a  proposed  agreement  on  non-first-use 
of  nuclear  weapons.  The  other  four  pro- 
posals call  for  establishing  nuclear- 
weapons-free  zones,  reductions  of  mili- 
tary budgets,  a  ban  on  chemical 
weapons  in  Europe,  and  an  expansion  of 
the  Helsinki  confidence-building 
measures. 

These  proposals  were  presented  in 
Stockholm  at  the  beginning  of  the  sec- 
ond round  on  May  8,  1984.  Many  have 
been  featured  in  the  Eastern  agenda  for 
some  time.  All  appeared  in  the  Prague 
declaration  issued  at  the  Warsaw  Pact 
summit  in  January  1983.  Except  for  the 
last  measure,  they  are  generally  incon- 
sistent with  the  conference  mandate. 
The  Soviets  contend  that  the  Western 
package  of  "openness  measures"  is  a 
cover  for  spying  and  that  in  any  event 
the  Western  package  of  confidence-  and 
security-building  measures  is  too  tech- 
nical. The  West,  by  contrast,  will  con- 
tinue to  insist  on  measures  that  con- 
tribute specifically  to  European  security 


ARMS  CONTROL 


rather  than  merely  repeat  existing 
promises  of  good  behavior. 

In  his  speech  before  the  Irish  Parlia- 
ment on  June  4,  1984,  President  Reagan 
affirmed  U.S.  willingness  to  consider  the 
Soviet  proposal  for  a  declaration  on  the 
non-use  of  force  "if  discussions  on  re- 
affirming the  principle  not  to  use  force, 
a  principle  in  which  we  believe  so  deep- 
ly, will  bring  the  Soviet  Union  to 
negotiate  agreements  which  will  give 
concrete  new  meaning  to  that 
principle.  .  .  ."  The  Soviet  Union  had  not 
taken  up  that  offer  by  the  time  the 
negotiating  session  adjourned  in  July 
1984. 

The  Soviet  Approach  to 
Confidence-Building  Measures 

The  Soviet  Union  has  expressed  support 
in  principle  for  progress  in  confidence- 
building  measures  both  in  the  CSCE 
context  and  in  START.  However,  ex- 
perience suggests  that  the  Soviets  have 
a  different  view  of  these  measures  than 
the  West.  The  Soviet  concept  in  many 
cases  emphasizes  voluntary  expressions 
of  good  will  rather  than  concrete  con- 
tributions to  stability.  Thus,  the  West 
often  has  encountered  difficulty  in  turn- 
ing expressed  Soviet  interest  into 
specific  measures.  Frequently,  Soviet 
proposals  have  involved  declaratory 
devices,  such  as  non-use  of  force 
pledges,  which  would  add  nothing  to 
European  security  or  to  commitments 
already  undertaken  in  the  UN  Charter 
and  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  In  other  in- 
stances in  which  the  Soviets  have  ad- 
vanced proposals  that  would  restrict 
specific  military  activities,  the  measures 
have  been  vague  or  designed  to  inhibit 
U.S.  and  allied  military  flexibility  critical 
to  maintaining  an  effective  deterrent, 
while  leaving  Soviet  forces  and  activities 
relatively  unaffected. 

Conclusion 

The  United  States  has  taken  the  initia- 
tive in  proposing  in  START,  INF,  and 
other  forums  a  broad  range  of  bilateral 
measures  aimed  at  strengthening  mutual 
confidence  and  reducing  the  risk  of 
nuclear  conflict  as  the  result  of  accident 
or  miscalculation.  The  United  States  has 
continued  to  work  closely  with  its  allies 
in  the  MBFR  talks  and  the  CDE  to  iden- 
tify and  negotiate  agreements  on  con- 
crete measures  to  decrease  the  dangers 
of  conventional  conflict. 

The  success  of  these  efforts  will  de- 
pend largely  on  the  readiness  of  the 
Soviet  Union  to  move  beyond  simple 
declaratory  gestures  to  the  negotiation 
of  meaningful  and  effective  confidence- 
building  measures. 


44 


Chemical  Weapons 

The  use  of  chemical  weapons  in  warfare 
is  prohibited  by  the  Geneva  protocol  of 
1925  and  by  customary  international 
law,  but  there  are  no  restrictions  on  the 
production  and  stockpiling  of  such 
weapons.  Moreover,  the  Geneva  protocol 
lacks  provisions  for  verifying  or  enforc- 
ing compliance— a  deficiency  highlighted 
by  use  of  chemical  and  toxin  weapons  by 
the  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies  since  the 
mid-1970s  in  Southeast  Asia;  in 
Afghanistan  since  the  Soviet  invasion  in 
1979;  and  more  recently  by  Iraq  in  its 
conflict  with  Iran.  The  United  States  is 
seeking  to  improve  compliance  with  ex- 
isting agreements  and  to  negotiate  a 
more  effective  prohibition.  On  April  18, 
1984,  in  the  Geneva  Conference  on 
Disarmament,  the  United  States  in- 
troduced a  draft  treaty  calling  for  a 
comprehensive  and  verifiable  global  ban 
on  chemical  weapons.  Progress  depends 
largely  on  whether  the  Soviet  Union  is 
willing  to  accept  effective  provisions  for 
verification  and  compliance. 

Background 

Chemical  weapons  were  first  used  in 
World  War  I.  By  the  time  the  war  end- 
ed, chemical  warfare  had  claimed  more 
than  1  million  casualties.  To  prevent  a 
recurrence  of  this  tragedy,  the  1925 
Geneva  protocol,  one  of  the  oldest  arms 
control  agreements  still  in  force,  was 
negotiated.  This  treaty  prohibits  the  use 
in  war  of  "asphyxiating,  poisonous  or 
other  gases,  and  of  all  analegous 
materials,  liquids  or  devices,"  as  well  as 
"bacteriological  methods  of  warfare." 

Although  outlawing  the  use  of  both 
chemical  and  biological  weapons,  the 
Geneva  protocol  places  no  limits  on  pro- 
duction and  stockpiling.  Moreover,  it  has 
no  provisions  to  ensure  verification  and 
deal  with  issues  of  compliance.  It  has 
proven  tragically  inadequate  to  prevent 
use  of  chemical  weapons  against 
defenseless  people. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to  a 
complete  and  verifiable  prohibition  of 
chemical  weapons  production  and  stock- 
piling and  to  ensuring  the  destruction  of 
existing  chemical  weapons  stocks  and 
production  facilities.  This  goal  is  being 
pursued  in  the  40-nation  Conference  on 
Disarmament  in  Geneva,  where  the 
United  States  has  presented  a  draft 
treaty  banning  chemical  weapons.  Cen- 
tral to  the  U.S.  proposal  are  strong  veri- 
fication and  compliance  provisions,  in- 
cluding automatic  and  unimpeded  onsite 
challenge  inspections  of  military  and 


government-owned  or  -controlled 
facilities  in  the  event  of  a  suspected 
treaty  violation. 

The  Soviet  Union,  though  stating 
that  it,  too,  seeks  a  complete  ban  on 
chemical  weapons,  has  not  shown  itself 
willing  to  accept  such  measures.  It  main 
tains  a  large  chemical  weapons  produc- 
tion and  military  training  program,  and 
more  than  80,000  chemical  weapons 
specialists  are  in  the  Soviet  ground 
forces  alone.  This  far  exceeds  the  chemi 
cal  weapons  posture  of  all  other  states 
together  and,  combined  with  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons  by  the  Soviets  and 
their  allies  in  Afghanistan  and  Southeas 
Asia,  raises  serious  questions  regarding 
Soviet  intent  to  comply  with  a  chemical 
weapons  ban. 

Chemical  Weapons  Use 

Reports  of  the  use  of  lethal  chemical 
weapons  began  to  emerge  from  Laos 
nearly  9  years  ago.  Five  years  ago 
similar  reports  started  coming  from 
Afghanistan.  Early  reports  were  infre- 
quent and  fragmentary,  reflecting  the 
remoteness  of  the  conflict  and  the  isola- 
tion of  the  victims.  In  the  summer  of 

1979,  the  U.S.  Department  of  State 
prepared  a  detailed  compilation  of  inter 
views  with  refugees  from  Laos  on  this 
subject.  That  fall,  a  U.S.  Army  medical 
team  visited  Laos  to  conduct  further  in 
terviews.  By  the  winter  of  1979,  the 
United  States  felt  it  had  sufficient 
evidence  to  raise  the  matter  with  the 
Governments  of  Laos,  Vietnam,  and  thi 
Soviet  Union. 

Dissatisfied  with  their  responses,  tl 
United  States  began  raising  the  issue 
publicly  in  the  United  Nations,  before 
the  Congress,  and  in  other  forums.  In 

1980,  U.S.  experts  initiated  a  review  oi 
all  reporting  back  to  1975.  In  mid-1981 
these  experts  began  testing  physical 
samples  from  Southeast  Asia  for  the 
presence  of  toxins — biologically  pro- 
duced chemical  poisons  whose  produc- 
tion, stockpiling,  and  use  are  prohibitec 
by  the  1972  Biological  Weapons  Convei 
tion. 

On  March  22,  1982.  the  Secretary  c 
State  submitted  a  report  to  Congress 
(Special  Report  No.  98)  setting  forth  th 
results  of  the  U.S.  investigation.  This 
report  was  updated  by  Special  Report 
No.  104,  issued  in  November  1982. 
Subsequent  reports  were  issued  in 
August  1983  and  February  1984.  These 
reports  drew  upon  the  following 
evidence: 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Testimony  of  those  who  saw  or 
)erienced  chemical  weapons  attacks; 

Testimony  of  physicians,  refugee 
rkers,  journalists,  and  others  who  had 
opportunity  to  question  witnesses  or 
;ims; 

•  Testimony  of  those  who  had  en- 
ed  in  chemical  warfare  or  were  in  a 
ition  to  observe  those  who  did; 

Scientific  analysis  of  physical 
iples  taken  from  sites  where  attacks 
k  place; 

Documentary  evidence  from  open 
rces;  and 

Intelligence  derived  from  national 
mical  and  other  means. 

In  the  words  of  Special  Report 
98: 

taken  together,  this  evidence  has  led 
U.S.  Government  to  conclude  that  Lao 
Vietnamese  forces,  operating  under 
et  supervision,  have  since  1975  employed 
il  chemical  and  toxin  weapons  in  Laos; 
Vietnamese  forces  have,  since  1978, 
lethal  chemical  and  toxin  agents  in  Kam- 
lea;  and  that  Soviet  forces  have  used  a 
!ty  of  lethal  chemical  warfare  agents,  in- 
ng  nerve  gases,  in  Afghanistan  since  the 
et  invasion  of  that  country  in  1979. 

In  December  1980,  the  UN  General 

mbly  initiated  an  international  in- 
igation  into  the  use  of  chemical 
pons.  In  December  1982,  the  Ex- 
is  Group,  directed  by  the  General 

mby  to  conduct  the  investigation, 
ed  its  report.  The  report  supported 

claims  in  more  than  a  dozen 
lific  technical  areas  and  faulted  in 
tng  language  the  Soviet  "scientific  ex- 
ation"  for  the  presence  of  toxins  in 
deal  samples  from  Southeast  Asia. 

Experts  Group  concluded  that  it 
lid  not  disregard  the  circumstantial 
ence  suggestive  of  the  possible  use 
»me  sort  of  toxic  chemical  substance 
■ime  instances."  The  General 

mbly  was  sufficiently  concerned 

it  established  permanent  UN 
linery  to  permit  further  investiga- 

of  allegations  of  chemical  weapons 


n  March  1984,  the  United  Nations 
5tigated  charges  of  Iraqi  chemical 
oons  use  in  the  Iran-Iraq  war.  The 
Btigation  concluded  that  both 
:ard  gas  and  the  nerve  agent  tabun 

been  used  against  Iranian  forces. 
United  States  has  confirmed  these 
rts  independently  and  has  con- 
ned such  chemical  weapons  use.  In 
don,  the  United  States  and  several 
r  Western  countries  have  placed 

al  export  controls  on  selected 
licals  that  have  been  used  by  Iraq  to 
3  chemical  weapons. 


Arms  Control  Implications  of 
Chemical  Weapons  Use 

Soviet  involvement  in  the  use  of  chemi- 
cal and  toxin  weapons  violates  the  1925 
Geneva  protocol  and  the  1972  Biological 
Weapons  Convention.  It  highlights  the 
limitations  of  treaties  lacking  effective 
provisions  for  verification  and  com- 
pliance. Use  of  chemical  weapons  by 
Iraq — a  party  to  the  Geneva  proto- 
col— heightens  these  concerns. 

This  illegal  use  of  chemical  weapons 
underlines  the  importance  of  effective 
verification  and  compliance  mechanisms 
in  any  chemical  weapons  ban.  The  Soviet 
Union  has  consistently  described  U.S.  in- 
sistence on  such  mechanisms  as  an  at- 
tempt to  block  progress  toward  prohibit- 
ing chemical  weapons  use.  In  fact,  this 
U.S.  insistence  reflects  a  desire  to  en- 
sure that  a  treaty  prohibiting  chemical 
weapons  production  and  stockpiling 
could  be  effective. 

Soviet  use  of  toxin  weapons  also 
demonstrates  the  need  to  strengthen  the 
inadequate  compliance  mechanisms  con- 
tained in  the  Biological  Weapons  Con- 
vention. In  late  1982,  the  UN  General 
Assembly,  by  a  vote  of  124-15  (with  1 
abstention),  supported  convening  a  con- 
ference of  the  states'  parties  to  the  con- 
vention to  discuss  ways  to  make  the  con- 
vention more  effective.  The  initiative 
came  from  a  number  of  neutral  and 
nonaligned  nations,  led  by  Sweden;  vir- 
tually its  sole  opponents  were  the  Soviet 
Union  and  its  allies.  The  United  States 
strongly  supports  the  proposal  for  a  con- 
ference. 

The  United  States  and  Control 
of  Chemical  Weapons 

U.S.  opposition  to  chemical  warfare  is  as 
old  as  such  warfare  itself:  in  May  1915, 
a  month  after  the  first  use  of  poison  gas 
in  World  War  I,  President  Wilson  pro- 
posed the  discontinuance  of  its  use.  The 
belligerents  rejected  the  proposal.  In 
1922,  chemical  warfare  was  on  the  agen- 
da of  the  U.S. -sponsored  Washington 
Disarmament  Conference.  At  American 
initiative,  a  prohibition  on  "the  use  in 
war  of  asphyxiating,  poisonous  or  other 
gases  and  all  analogous  liquids, 
materials  or  devices"  was  included  in  the 
text  of  a  treaty  negotiated  at  the  con- 
ference but  which  never  entered  into 
force  due  to  the  failure  of  other  states  to 
ratify. 

This  prohibition  was  repeated  in  the 
1925  Geneva  protocol,  with  the  inclusion 
of  language  prohibiting  bacteriological 
warfare  as  well.  The  protocol  grew  out 
of  a  U.S.  suggestion  that  the  1925 
Geneva  Conference  for  the  Supervision 


of  the  International  Traffic  in  Arms  ad- 
dress the  task  of  banning  chemical 
weapons.  Unfortunately  the  protocol, 
lacking  any  provisions  for  ensuring  com- 
pliance, did  not  offer  adequate 
guarantees  against  the  threat  of  illicit 
chemical  weapons  use. 

During  World  War  II,  it  was  not  the 
Geneva  protocol  which  prevented  use  of 
chemical  weapons,  but  deterrence.  The 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  made 
clear  they  would  not  use  chemical 
weapons  first  but  would  retaliate  against 
military  objectives  if  the  Axis  Powers 
employed  them.  In  1943,  President 
Roosevelt  stated  that  the  United  States 
would  regard  a  chemical  attack  upon 
any  of  its  allies  as  an  attack  upon  itself. 
As  a  result,  poison  gas  was  not  used. 

In  1969,  the  United  States  reaf- 
firmed that  it  would  not  be  the  first  to 
use  chemical  weapons  and  that  it  would 
not  use,  under  any  circumstances,  bio- 
logical and  toxin  weapons.  Subsequently, 
the  United  States  played  a  leading  role 
in  the  Conference  of  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament  (a  forerunner  of  the  Con- 
ference on  Disarmament)  in  negotiating 
the  Biological  Weapons  Convention  of 
1972. 

From  1977  to  1980,  the  United 
States  engaged  in  bilateral  negotiations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  in  an  effort  to 
further  progress  toward  a  chemical 
weapons  treaty.  That  effort  proved 
fruitless  due  to  Soviet  unwillingness  to 
accept  effective  verification  and  com- 
pliance measures. 

U.S.  policy  on  chemical  warfare 
seeks  an  effectively  verifiable  chemical 
weapons  ban  and,  as  both  a  negotiating 
incentive  and  a  hedge  against  negotiat- 
ing failure,  to  maintain  a  limited  de- 
terrent capability.  Deterrence  is,  of 
course,  fundamental  to  NATO's  defense 
strategy.  Under  present  conditions, 
faced  with  a  significant  Soviet  offensive 
chemical  warfare  capability,  the  United 
States  must  maintain  a  limited  chemical 
weapons  retaliatory  capability. 

U.S.  efforts  to  ban  chemical 
weapons  are  concentrated  in  the  Con- 
ference on  Disarmament  in  Geneva.  For 
the  past  4  years,  the  United  States  has 
been  active  in  the  conference's  chemical 
weapons  working  group,  helping  focus 
attention  on  the  necessary  elements  for 
an  effective  chemical  weapons  prohibi- 
tion. 

The  draft  treaty  presented  by  Vice 
President  Bush  on  April  18,  1984,  con- 
tains detailed  provisions  to  ensure  com- 
pliance with  a  ban,  including: 


ARMS  CONTROL 


•  Declaration  and  systematic  inter- 
national onsite  inspection  of  chemical 
weapons  stocks  and  production  facilities 
and  declaration  of  plans  for  destruction 
of  the  stocks; 

•  Systematic  international  onsite  in- 
spection of  the  destruction  of  both 
chemical  weapons  stocks  and  production 
facilities; 

•  Declaration  and  onsite  inspection 
of  the  operation  of  other  facilities  for 
legal  production  of  chemicals  posing  a 
high  risk  of  diversion  to  chemical 
weapons  production;  and 

•  An  "open  invitation"  challenge  in- 
spection provision  whereby  suspected 
treaty  violations  in  military  or  govern- 
ment-owned or  -controlled  facilities 
would  be  investigated  within  24  hours  of 
a  complaint. 

Prospects 

As  Vice  President  Bush  made  clear  in 
his  April  1984  address,  the  United 
States  is  fully  committed  to  working 
toward  a  verifiable  prohibition  on 
chemical  weapons  development,  produc- 
tion, stockpiling,  transfer,  and  use.  Such 
a  prohibition  must  include  effective 
means  of  verifying  compliance  and  in- 
vestigating suspected  cases  of  noncom- 
pliance. Provision  for  onsite  inspection 
of  facilities,  stocks,  and  the  destruction 
process  must  be  among  them.  "National 
means"  suggested  by  the  Soviets  are 
equivalent  to  self-inspection,  and  "na- 
tional technical  means,"  such  as  recon- 
naissance satellites,  cannot  alone 
guarantee  that  we  could  detect  cheating. 

This  is  because  clandestine  produc- 
tion of  chemical  weapons  could  take 
place  in  a  factory  with  no  special  out- 
ward characteristics,  while  clandestine 
chemical  weapons  stocks  could  be  stored 
almost  anywhere.  The  U.S.  "open  invita- 
tion" inspection  proposal  is,  therefore, 
designed  to  provide  confidence  that  an 
eventual  ban  will  not  be  violated. 

The  United  States,  together  with 
other  Western  and  developing  countries, 
will  continue  to  press  in  the  Conference 
on  Disarmament  for  an  effective 
chemical  weapons  ban.  The  draft  treaty 
presented  in  Geneva  will  help  keep  ef- 
forts concentrated  on  the  issues  of 
verification  and  compliance.  The  United 
States  is  working  to  ensure  that  this  ef- 
fort will  result  in  a  treaty  that  will  per- 
manently abolish  the  practice  and  the 
threat  of  chemical  weapons  use. 


Si'.'\CE  Arms  Control 

The  United  States  has  played  a  lead  role 
in  negotiating  international  agreements 
governing  space  activities,  including  the 
Outer  Space  Treaty,  Limited  Test  Ban 
Treaty,  and  ABM  Treaty.  These  and 
other  agreements  constitute  an  exten- 
sive body  of  international  law  pertaining 
to  military  activity  in  space.  At  U.S.  ini- 
tiative, bilateral  talks  with  the  Soviet 
Union  on  antisatellite  arms  control  were 
held  during  1978-79.  The  United  States 
supports  formation  of  a  committee  to 
address  a  broad  range  of  space  arms 
control  issues  in  the  40-nation  Con- 
ference on  Disarmament  in  Geneva.  In 
June  1984,  the  Soviets  proposed  talks  on 
outer  space  arms  control,  including  anti- 
satellite  weapons  (ASATs),  to  take  place 
in  September  in  Vienna.  The  United 
States  accepted  at  once,  without  precon- 
ditions. The  Soviets  have  subsequently 
hardened  their  position,  set  forth 
preconditions,  and  rejected  coming  to 
the  Vienna  talks  which  they  themselves 
had  proposed.  The  United  States  re- 
mains ready  for  serious  talks  at  any 
time. 


Outer  Space  Treaty 

Background.  The  Soviets  launched 
Sputnik  I,  the  first  artificial  satellite  of 
the  Earth,  October  4,  1957.  Earlier  that 
year,  developments  in  rocketry  had 
already  led  the  United  States  to  propose 
international  verification  of  the  testing 
of  space  objects.  The  development  of  an 
inspection  system  for  outer  space  was 
part  of  a  Western  proposal  for  partial 
disarmament  put  forward  in  August 
1957.  The  U.S.S.R.,  in  the  midst  of 
testing  its  first  ICBM,  did  not  accept 
these  proposals. 

Between  1959  and  1962  the  Western 
powers  made  a  series  of  proposals  to  bar 
the  use  of  outer  space  for  military  pur- 
poses. Their  successive  proposals  for 
general  and  complete  disarmament  in- 
cluded provisions  to  ban  the  orbiting  and 
stationing  in  outer  space  of  weapons  of 
mass  destruction.  Addressing  the  UN 
General  Assembly  on  September  22, 
1960,  President  Eisenhower  proposed 
that  the  principles  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty — which  internationalized  and 
demilitarized  that  continent  and  pro- 
vided for  its  cooperative  exploration  and 
future  use — be  applied  to  outer  space 
and  celestial  bodies. 

Soviet  proposals  for  general  and 
complete  disarmament  between  1960 
and  1962  included  provisions  for  ensur- 
ing the  peaceful  use  of  outer  space.  The 
Soviet  Union,  however,  would  not 


separate  outer  space  from  other  disar- 
mament issues.  The  Western  powers  ol: 
jected  to  the  Soviet  approach,  which  wi 
tied  to  unacceptable  demands  in  other    i 
areas  and  designed  to  upset  the  militar 
balance. 


f 


UN  Resolution.  After  the  signing 
the  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty  in  1963, 
the  Soviet  Union's  position  changed.  0? 
September  19,  1963,  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  told  the  UN  General  Assembl 
that  the  U.S.S.R.  wished  to  conclude  ai 
agreement  to  ban  placing  nuclear 
weapons  in  orbit.  U.S.  Ambassador 
Stevenson  stated  that  the  United  State 
had  no  intention  of  orbiting  weapons  ol 
mass  destruction,  installing  them  on 
celestial  bodies,  or  otherwise  stationing 
them  in  outer  space.  The  General 
Assembly  unanimously  adopted  a  resoli 
tion  on  October  17,  1963,  welcoming  th 
Soviet  and  American  statements  and 
calling  upon  all  states  to  refrain  from  i 
troducing  weapons  of  mass  destruction 
into  outer  space. 

The  United  States  supported  the 
resolution.  Seeking  to  sustain  the 
momentum  for  arms  control  agree- 
ments, the  United  States  pressed  for  a 
treaty  to  give  further  substance  to  the 
UN  resolution. 

Treaty  Negotiated.  On  June  16. 
1966,  botli  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  submitted  draft  treaties. 
The  American  draft  dealt  with  celestia 
bodies;  the  Soviet  draft  covered  the 
whole  outer  space  environment.  The 
United  States  accepted  the  Soviet  posi 
tion  on  the  scope  of  the  treaty,  and  by 
September,  agreement  had  been  reach 
in  discussions  at  Geneva  on  most  treat 
provisions.  By  December,  differences  ( 
the  few  remaining  issues— chiefly  invc 
ing  access  to  facilities  on  celestial 
bodies,  reporting  on  space  activities,  a 
the  use  of  military  equipment  and  per- 
sonnel in  space  exploration — had  been 
satisfactorily  resolved  in  private  con- 
sultations. 

On  December  19,  the  General 
Assembly  approved  by  acclamation  a 
resolution  commending  the  treaty.  It 
was  opened  for  signature  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  on 
January  27,  1967.  On  April  25,  the 
Senate  gave  unanimous  consent  to  its 
ratification,  and  the  treaty  entered  int 
force  on  October  10,  1967. 

The  substance  of  the  treaty's  arms 
control  provisions  is  in  Article  IV,  whi 
restricts  military  activities  in  two  way 

•  First,  it  contains  an  undertaking 
not  to  place  in  orbit  around  the  Earth 
install  on  the  moon  or  any  other  celesi 
body,  or  otherwise  station  in  outer 


46 


ARMS  CONTROL 


ace,  nuclear  or  any  other  weapons  of 
iss  destruction. 

•  Second,  it  limits  the  use  of  the 
)on  and  other  celestial  bodies  ex- 
isively  to  peaceful  purposes  and  ex- 
essly  prohibits  their  use  for  establish- 

military  bases,  installations,  or  for- 
ications;  testing  weapons  of  any  kind; 
conducting  military  maneuvers. 

In  addition,  the  treaty  explicity  en- 
ns  states  to  observe  existing  interna- 
mal  law,  including  the  UN  Charter,  in 
eir  activities  in  the  exploration  and 
e  of  outer  space. 


S.  Space  Policy 

S.  national  space  policy  was  stated  by 
esident  Reagan  on  July  4,  1982,  and 
affirmed  in  his  March  31,  1984  Report 
Congress  Concerning  U.S.  Policy  on 
SAT  Arms  Control.  Its  basic  goals  are 
strengthen  the  security  of  the  United 
ates;  maintain  U.S.  leadership  in  the 
ploration  of  space;  obtain  economic 
d  scientific  benefits  through  the  ex- 
)itation  of  space;  expand  U.S.  private- 
3tor  investment  and  involvement  in 
il  space  and  space-related  activities; 
omote  international  cooperative  ac- 
ities  that  are  in  the  national  interest; 
d  cooperate  with  other  nations  in 
iintaining  the  freedom  of  space  for  all 
tivities  that  enhance  the  security  and 
•Ifare  of  mankind. 

The  United  States  will  conduct  its 
ace  program  in  accordance  with  im- 
irtant  principles,  among  which  are:  a 
mmitment  to  the  exploration  and  use 
space  by  all  nations  for  peaceful  pur- 
ses and  the  benefit  of  mankind;  rejec- 
n  of  any  claim  to  sovereignty  by  any 
tion  over  outer  space  or  celestial 
dies;  recognition  that  space  systems  of 
y  nation  are  national  property  with 
3  right  of  passage  through  and  opera- 
ns  in  space  without  interference;  im- 
f 'mentation  of  two  types  of  U.S.  space 
pgrams — national  security  and  civil; 
J  rsuit  of  activities  in  space  in  support 
r  the  U.S.  right  of  self-defense;  and  a 
,  It  liming  study  of  further  space  arms 
Ciitrol  options. 

In  that  regard,  the  President  made 
car  that: 

jl    ...  the  United  States  will  consider 
rifiable  and  equitable  arms  control 
■asures  that  would  ban  or  otherwise  limit 
;ting  and  deployment  of  specific  weapons 
5tems,  should  those  measures  be  compati- 
■  with  United  States  national  security. 


ASAT  Arms  Control 

Current  Soviet  Capabilities  and 
Threat.  Current  Soviet  ASAT  capa- 
bilities include  an  operational  co-orbital 
interceptor  system,  ground-based  test 
lasers  with  probable  ASAT  capabilities, 
nuclear-armed  Galosh  ABM  interceptors 
with  residual  ASAT  capabilities,  and  the 
technological  capability  to  mount  elec- 
tronic countermeasures  against  space 
systems.  The  co-orbital  interceptor 
system — deployed  for  over  a  decade  and 
the  world's  only  operational  ASAT — 
represents  a  threat  to  low-altitude  U.S. 
satellites. 

The  United  States  currently  has 
under  development  its  only  ASAT 
system,  a  miniature  vehicle  (MV)  system 
which  will  be  launched  from  an  F-15  air- 
craft. The  MV  is  designed  to  operate 
only  at  low  altitudes,  thereby  offsetting 
the  existing  Soviet  system. 

The  MV  would  be  able  to  deter 
threats  to  U.S.  and  allied  space  systems 
by  providing  the  capability  to  respond  in 
kind  to  a  Soviet  ASAT  attack.  It  would 
also  help  deter  war  by  being  able,  within 
the  limits  of  international  law,  to  deny 
any  adversary  the  use  of  some  space- 
based  systems  that  provide  support  to 
hostile  military  forces.  These  include 
satellites  which  would  provide  targeting 
intelligence  to  Soviet  weapon  platforms 
for  attacking  U.S.  and  allied  naval  and 
land  forces.  The  MV  cannot  and  need 
not  attack  Soviet  early  warning 
satellites  at  high  altitudes. 

Previous  Negotiations.  At  the  ini- 
tiative of  the  United  States,  bilateral 
negotiations  between  the  United  States 
and  U.S.S.R.  on  the  control  of  ASATs 
were  held  in  1978-79.  These  talks  in- 
volved an  extensive  discussion  of  some 
of  the  problems  of  space  arms  control 
and  revealed  major  differences  between 
the  two  sides.  Further  U.S.  study  since 
then  has  brought  the  whole  topic  of 
space  arms  control  into  sharper  focus. 

Soviet  Activities.  Although  the 
Soviets  have  periodically  tested  their 
operational  ASAT  interceptor,  they 
regularly  advance  space  arms  control 
measures  such  as  moratorium  proposals 
in  international  fora,  without  acknowl- 
edging their  own  ASAT  capabilities.  In 
August  1983,  they  submitted  a  draft 
treaty  to  the  UN  General  Assembly  call- 
ing for  the  elimination  of  existing  ASAT 
systems,  for  a  ban  on  the  development 
of  new  ASATs,  and  for  a  ban  on  attacks 
on  satellites.  At  the  same  time,  they  also 
announced  a  "unilateral  moratorium"  on 
launching  of  ASAT  weapons  so  long  as 
other  countries  refrained  from  putting 
ASAT  weapons  into  space. 


The  wording  of  these  proposals  had 
major  ambiguities  and  loopholes.  The 
Soviet  initiatives  pose  profound  verifica- 
tion problems,  as  in  the  case  of  their 
draft  treaty,  and,  in  the  case  of  both  the 
treaty  and  the  moratorium  offer,  would 
leave  the  U.S.S.R.  with  a  deployed 
system  and  thus  a  destabilizing 
advantage. 

Considerations  Affecting  U.S. 
Policy.  The  United  States  has  been 
studying  a  range  of  options  for  further 
space  arms  control  measures  with  a 
view  to  possible  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  other  nations,  if  such 
negotiations  could  lead  to  equitable  and 
verifiable  agreements  compatible  with 
U.S.  national  security  interests.  Atten- 
tion has  particularly  focused  on  possible 
ASAT  arms  control  measures. 

The  potential  benefits  of  any  ASAT 
control  regime  would  depend  on  both  its 
framework  and  its  details.  The  spectrum 
of  possible  space  arms  control  measures 
includes  bans  on  specialized  ASAT 
weapons  and  much  less  ambitious  under- 
takings. To  be  acceptable,  any  measure 
must  be  equitable,  effectively  verifiable, 
and  compatible  with  our  national  securi- 
ty. Any  space  arms  control  measures 
that  met  these  criteria,  and  were  com- 
plied with,  would  have  a  number  of 
potential  benefits.  For  example,  depend- 
ing on  the  scope  and  effectiveness  of 
any  agreement,  it  might: 

•  Limit  specialized  threats  to 
satellites  and  constrain  future  threats  to 
such  key  satellites  as  those  for  early 
warning.  Such  limitations  on  specialized 
threats  to  satellites,  together  with 
satellite  survivability  measures,  could 
help  preserve  and  enhance  stability; 

•  Raise  the  political  threshold  for 
attacks  against  satellites.  Restricting 
threatening  activity  and/or  prohibiting 
attacks  on  satellites  would  add  to  ex- 
isting international  law  aimed  at  lower- 
ing the  likelihood  of  conflict  in  space; 
and 

•  Meet  some  international  concerns 
regarding  the  use  of  space  for  military 
purposes. 

The  U.S.  review  of  space  arms  con- 
trol possibilities  thus  far  suggests  a 
number  of  difficulties  which  must  be 
overcome  if  effective  arms  control 
measures  on  ASATs  are  to  be  achieved. 
Those  difficulties  include: 

Verification.  A  ban  on  all  ASAT 
systems  would  require  elimination  of  the 
current  Soviet  ASAT  interceptor 
system,  but  no  satisfactory  means  has 
been  found  to  verify  Soviet  compliance 
effectively.  Cheating  on  ASAT  limita- 
tions, even  on  a  small  scale,  could  pose  a 
disproportionate  risk  to  the  United 

47 


ARMS  CONTROL 


States,  so  verification  would  be  par- 
ticularly important. 

Breakout.  This  is  the  risk  that  a  na- 
tion could  gain  a  unilateral  advantage  if 
the  agreement  ceased  to  remain  in  force 
for  any  reason — for  example,  through 
sudden  abrogation— and  obtain  a  head 
start  in  building  or  deploying  a  type  of 
weapon  which  has  been  banned  or 
severely  limited. 

Definition.  Defining  what  con- 
stitutes an  ASAT  weapon  for  arms  con- 
trol purposes  is  very  difficult.  This  prob- 
lem is  compounded  because  even  non- 
weapon  space  systems,  including  civil 
systems,  may  have  characteristics  dif- 
ficult to  distinguish  from  those  of 
weapons.  Furthermore,  many  systems 
not  primarily  designed  to  be  ASAT 
weapons  have  inherent  (or  residual) 
ASAT  capabilities. 

Vulnerability  of  Satellite  Support 
Systems.  An  ASAT  ban  would  not  en- 
sure survivability  of  other  elements  in  a 
space  system.  Ground  stations,  launch 
facilities,  and  communications  links  may 
be  more  vulnerable  than  the  satellites 
themselves. 

Soviet  Nonweapon  Military  Space 
Threat.  As  noted,  examination  of  space 
arms  control  needs  to  include  considera- 
tion of  the  growing  threat  posed  by  cur- 
rent and  projected  Soviet  space  systems 
which,  while  not  weapons  themselves, 
are  designed  to  support  directly  the 
U.S.S.R.'s  terrestrial  forces  in  the  event 
of  a  conflict. 

U.S.  Accepts  Soviet  Offer 
of  Vienna  Talks 

The  President's  March  1984  report  to 
Congress  on  ASAT  arms  control  policy 
made  clear  that  the  door  was  not  closed 
to  ASAT  arms  control  and  that  the 
United  States  was  seeking  to  develop  ef- 
fective measures  to  limit  specific 
systems.  On  June  29,  1984,  the  Soviets 
proposed  talks  on  "preventing  the 
militarization  of  outer  space"  to  begin  in 
Vienna  in  September.  They  specifically 
put  ASATs  on  the  agenda.  The  United 
States  accepted  without  preconditions, 
explicitly  stating  that  it  intended  to 
discuss  and  seek  agreement  on  feasible 
negotiating  approaches  which  could  lead 
to  verifiable  and  effective  limitations  on 
ASATs,  as  well  as  any  other  arms  con- 
trol concerns  of  interest  to  both  sides. 

At  the  same  time,  the  United  States 
noted  that  the  "militarization  of  space" 
began  when  the  first  ballistic  missiles 
were  tested  and  when  such  missiles  and 
other  weapons  systems  using  outer 
space  began  to  be  developed.  Thus,  the 
problem  of  weapons  in  space  cannot  be 


considered  in  isolation  from  the  overall 
strategic  relationship.  Accordingly,  the 
United  States  made  clear  it  would  seek 
to  discuss  and  define  mutually  agreeable 
arrangements  under  which  negotiations 
on  the  reduction  of  strategic  and 
intermediate-range  nuclear  weapons 
could  be  resumed. 

In  the  weeks  following  the  initial 
Soviet  offer,  the  United  States  sought  to 
make  necessary  arrangements  for  the 
Vienna  talks  throught  confidential 
diplomatic  channels.  However,  the 
Soviets  insisted  on  making  the 
diplomatic  exchanges  public  and,  in  do- 
ing so,  repeatedly  misrepresented  the 
U.S.  position,  obliging  the  United  States 
to  respond  in  public.  They  inaccurately 
portrayed  the  U.S.  view  on  the  need  to 
reduce  offensive  nuclear  forces  as  a 
precondition  for  the  talks,  while  making 
acceptance  of  their  own  suggestion  of  a 
mutual  moratorium  on  ASAT  tests  itself 
tantamount  to  a  precondition.  The 
United  States  made  clear  that  possible 
mutual  restraints  would  be  an  ap- 
propriate subjects  for  the  negotiations; 
however,  neither  this  outcome  nor  any 
other  should  be  prejudged  before  talks 
begin.  The  United  States  remains  ready 
to  begin  talks  without  preconditions,  at 
whatever  time  is  agreeable  to  the 
Soviets. 


Nuclear  Testing 

Restraint  in  nuclear  testing  has  long 
been  considered  an  important  step 
toward  controlling  nuclear^arms  com- 
petition. Since  the  1950s,  successive 
U.S.  Administrations  have  sought  veri- 
fiable limitations  on  nuclear  testing  that 
would  contribute  to  arms  control  while 
providing  the  ability  to  maintain  an  ade- 
quate deterrent.  These  efforts  have  been 
pursued  in  a  variety  of  channels,  in- 
cluding UN  bodies  and  tripartite 
negotiations  among  the  United  States, 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 

In  1963,  the  United  States,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  the  Soviet  Union 
agreed  to  halt  nuclear  tests  in  the  at- 
mosphere, under  water,  and  in  outer 
space.  In  1974  and  1976,  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  also  signed 
the  Threshold  Test  Ban  and  Peaceful 
Nuclear  Explosions  Treaties  limiting  the 
size  of  underground  nuclear  explosions. 
Agreement  on  a  more  comprehensive 
test  ban,  however,  has  been  inhibited  by 
concerns  about  the  proper  relationship 
of  such  a  ban  to  other  arms  control 
issues  as  well  as  to  the  overall  East- 
West  military  balance  and  the  need  to 


maintain  a  credible  nuclear  deterrent. 
East  and  West  also  disagree  over  how 
best  to  ensure  compliance  with  specific 
testing  limitations  and  prohibitions.  The 
United  States  is,  therefore,  seeking  to 
strengthen  two  of  the  existing  treaties. 

Introduction 

Except  for  negotiations  on  limiting 
nuclear  forces,  no  arms  control  endeavor 
since  World  War  II  has  generated  such 
sustained  international  interest  as  the 
issue  of  nuclear  testing.  Concern  about 
radioactive  fallout  in  the  1950s  spurred 
efforts  to  halt  testing,  as  the  nature  and 
effects  of  fallout  became  better 
understood  and  as  it  became  apparent 
that  no  region  was  untouched  by  radio- 
active debris. 

Efforts  to  negotiate  an  international 
agreement  ending  nuclear  tests  began  in 
the  UN  Disarmament  Commission  in 
May  1955.  Since  then,  a  comprehensive 
test  ban,  or  related  issues,  have  been 
pursued  in  various  forums  and  in  tri- 
lateral negotiations  involving  the  United 
States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  In  all  of  these  efforts,  how- 
ever, a  central  and  persistent  barrier  to 
a  treaty  limiting  tests  has  been  the  issue 
of  verifying  compliance  to  ensure 
against  testing  in  secret.  Another  impor- 
tant factor  has  been  the  role  of  testing 
in  maintaining  an  effective  nuclear  de- 
terrent. 

The  Soviet  Union  historically  has 
taken  the  position  that  national  technical 
means,  combined  with  mutual  pledges 
that  limits  would  be  observed,  are  suffi- 
cient to  verify  compliance.  The  United 
States  consistently  has  sought 
negotiated  means  of  assuring  that  any 
nuclear  testing  agreement  would  not  be 
vulnerable  to  clandestine  violation.  Given 
the  difficulties  of  detecting  underground 
tests  and  distinguishing  such  tests  from 
other  seismic  events,  these  means  have 
included  the  use  of  seismic  instruments 
and  onsite  inspections. 

Testing  Moratorium 

The  danger — both  to  Western  security 
and  to  progress  toward  genuine  arms 
control — of  failing  to  provide  for  effec- 
tive means  of  verification  in  arms  con- 
trol agreements  was  underscored  by  the 
fate  of  an  international  testing  mora- 
torium. Implemented  unilaterally  by  the 
United  States,  Soviet  Union,  and  the 
United  Kingdom  in  1958,  the  mora- 
torium held  until  1961.  During  that  time, 
however,  the  Soviet  Union  began 
preparing  secretly  for  the  largest  series 
of  nuclear  explosions  ever  conducted.  On 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


ig^ust  20,  1961,  the  Soviet  Union  an- 
lunced  that  it  would  resume  testing 
d,  on  the  following  day,  began  the 
•st  of  40  atmospheric  tests  conducted 
er  a  2-month  period.  The  United 
ates  and  the  United  Kingdom  pro- 
ised  on  September  3,  1961,  that  all  at- 
aspheric  tests  be  ended  without  any 
quirement  for  international  control. 
J  September  15,  with  Soviet  tests  con- 
iuing,  the  United  States  declared  that 
[would  resume  testing. 

These  Soviet  tests  ended  the  mora- 
'ium  and  represented  a  clear  breach  of 
th,  prompting  President  Kennedy  to 
te:  "We  know  enough  now  about 
oken  negotiations,  secret  preparations, 
d  long  test  series  never  again  to  offer 
uninspected  moratorium." 

mited  Test  Ban  Treaty 

vertheless,  efforts  to  achieve  a  test 
n  continued.  A  three-power  (United 
ates,  United  Kingdom,  U.S.S.R.)  con- 
•ence  met  in  almost  continuous  session 
•  over  3  years,  beginning  in  October 
58.  It  adjourned  in  January  1962, 
iable  to  complete  drafting  of  a  treaty 
hause  the  Soviets  insisted  that  na- 
Inal  means  of  detection  were  sufficient 
I  monitor  testing.  Further  efforts  in 

!  18-nation  Disarmament  Commit- 
!■ — a  forerunner  of  today's  Conference 
I  Disarmament — also  ended  in  frustra- 
in.  Nevertheless,  three-party  negotia- 
tns  resumed  in  the  summer  of  1963. 
i  e  Soviets  began  to  shift  toward  a 
hstern  proposal,  advanced  the  year 
I  'ore,  for  a  ban  on  testing  in  the  atmo- 
nere,  under  water,  and  in  outer 
lice — environments  in  which  both 
I  es  agreed  that  existing  verification 
1  hnology  was  adequate.  Because  long 
I  irs  of  discussion  had  clarified  the 
lues,  a  treaty  was  negotiated  within  10 
\/s  and  ratified  in  October  1963. 

The  parties  to  the  Limited  Test  Ban 
[jaty — originally  the  United  States, 
J  ited  Kingdom,  and  Soviet  Union — 
I  -eed  not  to  carry  out  any  nuclear 
I  apon  test  or  any  other  nuclear  explo- 
m  in  the  atmosphere,  under  water,  or 
1  outer  space,  or  in  any  other  environ- 
I  nt  if  the  explosion  would  send  radio- 
live  debris  beyond  the  border  of  the 

mtry  conducting  the  test.  The  treaty 

)f  unlimited  duration  and  has  been 

ned  by  nearly  125  nations. 

reshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  and 
aceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treaty 

important  follow-on  to  the  Limited 
st  Ban  Treaty  came  with  the  negotia- 
n  in  the  1970s  of  the  U.S.-Soviet 
reshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  signed  in 


1972.  In  this  treaty,  both  parties  agreed 
not  to  conduct  nuclear  weapons  tests  of 
any  type  with  planned  yields  exceeding 
150  kilotons.  The  150-kiloton  threshold 
was  designed  to  help  maintain  the 
strategic  balance  between  the  United 
States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  by  inhibiting  the 
development  of  new,  high-yield 
warheads  that  could  be  fitted  to  new, 
highly  accurate  missiles. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  also  agreed  to  apply  a  similar 
threshold  of  150  kilotons  to  their  under- 
ground nuclear  explosions  for  peaceful 
purposes.  This  agreement  was  formal- 
ized in  the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions 
Treaty  of  1974,  which  also  set  various 
aggregate  limits  on  multiple  under- 
ground nuclear  explosions  for  peaceful 
purposes.  It  is  a  necessary  complement 
to  the  threshold  test  ban,  because  there 
is  no  essential  distinction  between  the 
technology  used  to  produce  a  nuclear 
weapon  and  that  used  for  explosions  for 
peaceful  purposes. 

The  Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  and 
the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treaty 
were  submitted  to  the  U.S.  Senate  on 
July  29,  1976,  for  advice  and  consent  to 
ratification.  The  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  conducted  hearings  on 
them  during  the  summer  of  1977,  but 
the  treaties  have  never  been  acted  upon 
by  the  full  Senate.  However,  both  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
declared  their  intention  to  abide  by  the 
150-kiloton  testing  threshold  of  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  provided 
that  the  other  side  does  so  as  well. 

Monitoring  estimates  of  a  number  of 
Soviet  nuclear  tests  since  1976  have  in- 
dicated yields  in  excess  of  the  permitted 
150-kiloton  limits.  In  response  to  formal 
U.S.  queries,  the  Soviets  repeatedly 
have  claimed  that  they  are  observing  the 
150-kiloton  limit.  Although  a  definitive 
conclusion  cannot  be  reached — given  the 
ambiguities  in  the  available  evidence — 
Soviet  threshold  violations  are  likely  for 
a  number  of  tests.  President  Reagan 
communicated  that  finding  to  Congress 
in  his  January  1984  report  on  Soviet 
noncompliance  with  arms  control  agree- 
ments. 

The  United  States  is  seeking 
verification  improvements  that  would 
significantly  enhance  our  ability  to 
monitor  Soviet  compliance  with  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  and  Peaceful 
Nuclear  Explosions  Treaties.  On 
numerous  occasions,  the  United  States 
has  sought  unsuccessfully  to  engage  the 
Soviet  Union  in  talks  on  such  im- 
provements. The  Soviets  claim  that  if 
the  United  States  ratifies  both  treaties 
and  implements  their  verification  provi- 


sions, U.S.  verification  and  compliance 
concerns  would  be  resolved.  But  there  is 
clear  reason  to  doubt  such  claims.  For 
example,  no  provision  exists  in  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  for  indepen- 
dent validation  of  the  data  to  be  ex- 
changed upon  ratification.  The  United 
States,  therefore,  continues  to  believe 
that  verification  procedures  for  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  and  Peaceful 
Nuclear  Explosions  Treaties  need 
strengthening. 

Comprehensive  Test  Ban 

From  1977  through  1980,  the  United 
States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
Soviet  Union  met  periodically  to 
negotiate  a  comprehensive  test  ban.  The 
three  parties  failed  to  reach  agreement 
on  several  major  issues,  including  veri- 
fication. The  specific  verification  issues 
involved  the  conditions  for  carrying  out 
onsite  inspections  and  the  use  of  seismic 
equipment  on  the  territory  of  each 
monitored  party. 

The  United  States  has  decided  not 
to  resume  trilateral  negotiations  on  a 
comprehensive  test  ban  at  this  time.  In 
order  to  secure  progress  in  this  area, 
however,  the  United  States  agreed  in 
1982  to  the  formation  of  a  working 
group  in  the  Committee  on  Disarma- 
ment in  Geneva  with  a  mandate  to 
discuss  issues  related  to  verification  and 
compliance  with  any  future  compre- 
hensive test  ban. 

Conclusion 

Achieving  a  ban  on  all  nuclear  weapons 
tests  remains  a  long-term  U.S.  goal.  A 
test  ban  by  itself  cannot  end  the  nuclear 
threat.  It  is  important  that  such  a  ban 
be  verifiable  and  that  it  come  into  force 
in  circumstances  in  which  it  can  con- 
tribute to  peace  and  stability.  A  com- 
plete cessation  of  nuclear  tests  must  be 
viewed  in  the  context  of  broad,  deep, 
and  verifiable  arms  reductions;  improved 
verification  capabilities;  expanded  confi- 
dence-building measures;  and  the 
maintenance  of  an  effective  deterrent. 
The  United  States  has,  therefore,  given 
arms  control  priority  for  now  to  achieve- 
ment of  significant,  equitable,  and  veri- 
fiable arms  reductions,  and  to 
strengthening  verification  measures  for 
existing  agreements  on  the  limitation  of 
nuclear  testing. 

Limitations  on  underground  tests 
pose  a  difficult  verification  challenge. 
Efforts  to  improve  our  ability  to  verify  a 
ban  on  underground  nuclear  explosions 
have  continued  since  the  Limited  Test 
Ban  Treaty  entered  into  force,  and  the 


icember  1984 


49 


ARMS  CONTROL 


United  States  has  invested  more  than 
$300  million  in  research  and  develop- 
ment to  improve  seismic  and  other 
monitoring  techniques.  Even  so,  the 
need  for  effective  verification  measures 
beyond  national  means  was  underscored 
by  a  report  of  the  UN  Secretary  General 
on  a  comprehensive  test  ban  to  the  Com- 
mittee on  Disarmament  (March  24, 
1980).  The  report  noted  that: 

.  .  .  secret  underground  testing  may  pro- 
vide a  military  advantage  to  a  violator,  and  it 
may  not  be  possible  to  obtain,  through  the 
parties'  own  means  alone,  assurance  that  the 
prohibition  is  being  observed.  Provision  for 
verification  by  both  national  and  international 
means  must,  therefore,  be  made  in  a  treaty 
banning  all  underground  nuclear  tests. 


NUCLE.4R  NONPROLIFERATION 

The  international  community  long  has 
recognized  that  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  states  possessing  nuclear 
weapons  could  lead  to  greater  risks  of 
conflict.  For  this  reason,  just  as  the 
United  States  has  long  been  committed 
to  stemming  the  "vertical"  proliferation 
of  nuclear  weaponry  (that  is,  the  in- 
crease in  the  arsenals  of  states  already 
possessing  nuclear  weapons),  it  has  since 
1945  been  dedicated  to  preventing  the 
"horizontal"  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons  among  non-nuclear-weapon 
states. 


Origins  of  U.S. 
Nonproliferation  Policy 

No  arms  control  agenda  could  effectively 
limit  the  risk  of  conflict  and  the  danger 
of  nuclear  escalation  if  it  did  not  include 
a  well-thought-out  program  to  prevent 
the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 
Thus  the  United  States  and  many  other 
nations  have  worked  to  promote  peace- 
ful nuclear  programs  while  preventing, 
to  the  extent  possible,  the  spread  of 
nuclear  weapons.  Indeed,  halting  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons  and  guiding 
nuclear  development  toward  peaceful 
ends  have  been  central  policy  objectives 
of  every  U.S.  Administration  since  194.5. 
As  early  as  1946,  the  United  States, 
then  the  world's  only  nuclear  power, 
proposed  the  Baruch  Plan  for  the  inter- 
national control  of  nuclear  technology. 
Under  this  plan,  the  United  States 
would  have  given  up  all  its  nuclear 
weapons.  However,  the  Soviets  rejected 
this  initiative.  U.S.  efforts  today  center 
on  strengthening  the  international  non- 
proliferation  regime  in  several  ways: 
through  the  institutions  of  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency;  the  legal 
framework  of  the  Nuclear  Non- 


Proliferation  Treaty  (NET)  and  the 
treaty  of  Tlatelolco;  cooperation  among 
major  nuclear  supplier  countries;  and 
the  legislative  and  policy  structure  of 
the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Act  and 
Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act.  Presi- 
dent Reagan  underscored  his  Ad- 
ministration's commitment  to  preventing 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons— and  to 
working  with  all  other  nations  toward 
that  end— in  his  March  31,  1983,  arms 
control  speech  in  Los  Angeles,  as  well  as 
his  July  1,  1983,  statement  marking  the 
1.5th  anniversary  of  the  NPT. 

Evolution  of  U.S. 
Nonproliferation  Policy 

At  the  end  of  World  War  11,  the 
Truman  Administration  and  the 
American  scientific  community  under- 
stood that  the  Manhattan  Project  to 
develop  atomic  weapons  was  based  upon 
concepts  in  theoretical  physics  known  by 
scientists  for  some  time.  Thus  the  highly 
dangerous  prospect  of  nuclear  prolifera- 
tion became  a  priority  item  on  the  politi- 
cal agenda  of  the  United  States  and  all 
other  nations. 

As  a  result,  the  United  States  in 
1946  proposed  the  Baruch  Plan,  which 
offered  to  surrender  U.S.  nuclear  tech- 
nology to  an  international  authority  that 
would  develop  its  peaceful  applications 
and  prohibit  military  uses  through  a 
system  of  control  and  inspections.  The 
Soviet  Union  rejected  this  offer.  Faced 
with  the  need  to  address  the  dangers  of 
proliferation,  the  United  States  imposed 
strict  controls  on  nuclear  exports  with 
the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946. 

President  Eisenhower  made  a 
dramatic  innovation  in  this  policy  in 
December  1953,  when,  in  a  famous  UN 
speech,  he  inaugurated  his  "atoms  for 
peace"  program.  The  President  offered 
to  assist  other  countries  in  developing 
nuclear  energy  in  return  for  pledges  to 
use  nuclear  technology  solely  for  peace- 
ful purposes.  U.S.  assistance  took  the 
form  of  research  reactors,  hardware, 
technical  assistance,  and  training  for 
thousands  of  scientists  and  engineers. 
Subsequently,  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of 
1954  eliminated  the  U.S.  Government 
monopoly  on  nuclear  technology  and 
opened  the  way  for  the  domestic  use  of 
nuclear  energy  for  generating  electricity 
and  for  private  industrial  and  medical 
applications  under  a  formal  licensing 
process. 


'1 


Key  Elements  of  the 
Nonproliferation  Regime 

International  Atomic  Energy  Agency. 

The  "atoms  for  peace"  proposal  was  the 
precursor  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency,  which  the  United 
States  worked  hard  to  establish  and 
through  which  the  ideas  contained  in 
President  Eisenhower's  initiative  were 
developed.  The  IAEA,  formed  in  1957, 
has  two  complementary  purposes: 

•  To  promote  the  peaceful  applica- 
tion and  uses  of  atomic  energy;  and 

•  To  establish  and  administer  safe- 
guards designed  to  ensure  that  these 
technologies  are  not  used  for  military 
purposes. 

IAEA  safeguards  are  now  being 
applied  to  civil  nuclear  facilities  in  50 
non-nuclear-weapon  states.  These  state- 
agree  to  file  regular  reports  with  the 
agency  about  their  use  of  nuclear 
materials  and  equipment  and  to  allow 
the  use  of  containment  and  surveillance 
devices,  such  as  seals  and  cameras,  at 
the  safeguarded  facilities.  Periodic  on- 
site  inspections  are  conducted  by  inter- 
national officials  employed  by  the  lAEl 
to  confirm  that  nuclear  materials  are  n^ 
being  diverted  to  nonpeaceful  applica- 
tions. 

The  United  States  regularly  con- 
tributes about  one-third  of  the  IAEA's 
operating  budget  through  voluntary  am 
assessed  contributions.  In  September 

1982,  after  an  illegal  vote  denied  the 
credentials  of  the  Israeli  delegation  to 
the  IAEA  general  conference,  the 
United  States  withdrew  from  participa 
tion  and  reassessed  its  role  in  the  agen 
cy.  The  Reagan  Administration  decidec 
to  resume  participation  in  February 

1983,  while  making  clear  that  it  ex- 
pected the  IAEA  to  conduct  itself  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  provisions  of  its 
charter,  including  the  principle  of 
universality.  The  U.S.  goal  is  to 
strengthen  the  IAEA  and  make  its  safi 
guards  system  comprehensive  and  uni- 
versal. 

Non-Proliferation  Treaty.  In  1961 
the  Government  of  Ireland,  reflecting 
growing  concern  about  the  dangers  of 
proliferation,  proposed  at  the  United 
Nations  an  international  agreement  to 
halt  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons. 
With  U.S.  and  Soviet  support,  this 
initiative  evolved  into  the  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty,  which  was  com- 
pleted in  1968  and  went  into  force  in 
1970. 

To  date,  the  treaty  has  been  ratifiei 
by  124  countries,  including  the  United 
States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  Nuclear-weapon  states  that 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


ARMS  CONTROL 


tify  are  pledged  to  give  no  aid  to  non- 
clear-weapon  states  to  develop  nuclear 
plosives.  In  turn,  the  non-nuclear- 
;apon  states  renounce  manufacture  or 
quisition  of  nuclear  explosives  and 
ree  to  place  all  of  their  nuclear 
nlities  under  international  safeguards 
d  to  open  them  to  international  in- 
Bction.  The  United  States  continues  to 
courage  nonparties  to  adhere  to  the 
;aty.  Every  5  years  a  review  con- 
•ence  is  held  to  examine  the  operation 
the  treaty;  the  next  will  be  in  August- 
ptember  1985.  The  U.S.  objective  is  to 
sure  that  this  conference  reaffirms  the 
portance  of  the  NPT  to  international 
?urity. 

Nuclear  Supplier  Cooperation. 

though  the  combination  of  NPT  and 
EA  safeguards  worked  satisfactorily, 
the  mid-1970s  technological 
/elopments  led  to  heightened  concern 
Dut  the  adequacy  of  the  existing  safe- 
ards  regime.  Together  with  the  Indian 
clear  explosion  in  1974,  this  concern 

the  United  States  to  begin  discus- 
ns  with  other  nuclear  suppliers  (in- 
ding  the  Soviet  Union,  several  West 
ropean  countries,  Canada,  and  Japan) 
tighten  the  rules  and  procedures  for 

export  of  nuclear  supplies,  com- 
lents,  and  technology.  In  1978,  the  15 
dons  involved  in  what  became  known 
the  London  Suppliers'  Group  agreed 
permit  the  IAEA  to  publish  a  set  of 
leral  principles  governing  their  future 
:lear  exports.  These  norms,  although 
1  imperfect,  have  continued  to  be  re- 
gd  and  broadened,  and  much  progress 
i  been  made  in  their  coverage  and 
'cificity  in  recent  years.  The  United 
ites  is  determined  to  continue  con- 
itations  with  other  supplier  countries 
develop  rules  and  restraints  for  the 
lort  of  sensitive  nuclear  technologies, 
rterial,  and  equipment. 

Treaty  for  the  Prohibition  of 
*  clear  Weapons  in  Latin  America 
'eaty  of  Tlatelolco).  In  addition  to 
1  NPT,  the  treaty  of  Tlatelolco,  signed 
rVU'xico  City  in  1967,  is  a  mainstay  of 
1  international  nonproliferation  regime 
r Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean. 
^'  treaty,  the  only  one  to  provide  for  a 
1  loar-weapons-free  zone  in  a 
julated  region,  is  now  in  force  for  22 
tin  American  and  Caribbean  coun- 
;s.  In  addition  to  the  main  provision 
hibiting  development  or  use  of 
lear  weapons  by  regional  states,  two 
litional  protocols  call  on  states  out- 
e  the  region  to  respect  the 
luclearization  provisions  of  the  zone. 


•  Protocol  I  applies  to  nations  out- 
side the  treaty  zone  having  possessions 
within  it.  It  is  currently  in  force  for  the 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
the  Netherlands. 

•  Protocol  II  applies  to  nuclear- 
weapon  states.  They  undertake  to 
respect  the  denuclearized  status  of  the 
treaty  zone,  not  to  contribute  to  viola- 
tions by  other  parties  to  the  treaty,  and 
not  to  use  or  threaten  to  use  nuclear 
weapons  against  parties  to  the  treaty.  It 
is  the  only  nuclear  arms  control  agree- 
ment in  force  to  which  all  five  nuclear- 
weapon  states  are  parties. 

The  United  States  fully  supports  the 
goals  and  objectives  of  the  treaty  of 
Tlatelolco  and  hopes  that  those  few 
states  which  have  not  yet  adhered  to  it 
will  do  so. 

Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act. 

The  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  was 
signed  into  law  by  President  Carter  on 
March  10,  1978.  It  established  specific 
criteria  for  nuclear  exports  and  strict 
procedures  for  the  approval  of  exports. 
It  also  provides  a  stronger  congressional 
role  in  U.S.  export  policy.  Under  the 
act,  non-nuclear-weapon  countries  seek- 
ing U.S.  reactors  or  nuclear  fuel  must 
accept  IAEA  safeguards  on  all  of  their 
peaceful  nuclear  facilities — so-called  full- 
scope  or  comprehensive  safeguards. 

Current  U.S.  Nonproliferation  Policy 

On  July  16,  1981,  President  Reagan  out- 
lined the  U.S.  approach  to  international 
nuclear  cooperation  and  reaffirmed  the 
U.S.  commitment  to  nuclear  nonprolifer- 
ation. The  United  States  would: 

•  Seek  to  prevent  the  spread  of 
nuclear  explosives  to  additional  coun- 
tries as  a  basic  national  security  and 
foreign  policy  objective; 

•  Strive  to  reduce  the  motivation 
for  acquiring  nuclear  explosives  by  im- 
proving regional  and  global  stability  and 
promoting  understanding  of  the  legiti- 
mate security  concerns  of  other  states; 

•  Continue  to  support  adherence  to 
the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty 
and  the  treaty  of  Tlatelolco  by  countries 
that  have  not  accepted  them; 

•  View  a  violation  of  those  treaties 
or  of  an  international  safeguards  agree- 
ment as  having  profound  consequences 
for  international  order  and  U.S.  bilateral 
relations  and  view  any  nuclear  explosion 
by  a  non-nuclear-weapon  state  with 
grave  concern; 


•  Cooperate  with  other  nations  to 
strengthen  the  IAEA  and  its  safeguards 
system; 

•  Work  with  other  nations  to  com- 
bat the  risks  of  proliferation;  and 

•  Continue  to  inhibit  the  transfer  of 
sensitive  nuclear  material,  equipment, 
and  technology,  particularly  where  the 
danger  of  proliferation  exists,  and  seek, 
agreement  requiring  IAEA  safeguards 
on  all  nuclear  activities  in  non-nuclear- 
weapon  states  as  a  condition  for  any 
significant  new  nuclear  supply  commit- 
ment. 

At  the  same  time,  the  President  an- 
nounced that  the  United  States  would 
not  inhibit  civil  reprocessing  and  breeder 
reactor  development  in  countries  with 
advanced  nuclear  power  programs 
where  this  would  not  constitute  a  pro- 
liferation risk.  He  also  ordered  an  inten- 
sive interagency  review  of  policies  under 
which  the  United  States  exercises  its 
consent  rights  over  reprocessing  of 
U.S. -origin  fuel  and  plutonium  use  in 
other  countries.  As  a  result,  the  United 
States  is  attempting  to  work  out  pro- 
cedures with  Japan  and  the  European 
Atomic  Energy  Community  for  advance 
long-term  consent  to  retransfers,  re- 
processing, and  use  of  nuclear  material 
over  which  the  United  States  has  con- 
sent rights. 

The  President  underscored  the  link- 
age between  arms  control  and  nuclear 
nonproliferation  in  a  March  .31,  1983,  ad- 
dress in  Los  Angeles: 

For  arms  control  to  be  truly  complete 
and  world  security  strengthened  ...  we  must 
also  increase  our  efforts  to  halt  the  spread  of 
nuclear  weapons.  Every  country  that  values  a 
peaceful  world  must  play  its  part. 

He  then  renewed  his  call  for  compre- 
hensive safeguards  by  all  nuclear  sup- 
pliers as  a  condition  for  future  nuclear 
exports.  The  United  States  continues  to 
consult  closely  with  other  nuclear  sup- 
pliers on  this  key  question. 

Conclusion 

Preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  will  remain  one  of  the  U.S. 
Government's  most  urgent  national 
security  priorities.  Through  the 
maintenance  and  strengthening  of  the 
existing  international  nonproliferation 
regime,  the  United  States  is  working  to 
secure  this  objective.  The  United  States 
will  continue  to  seek  the  cooperation  and 
support  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  other 
countries  in  the  effort  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons. 


romhor  1  QRA 


51 


ARMS  CONTROL 


The  Road  Ahead:  Prospects  and  Problems 


The  history  of  arms  control  efforts  pro- 
vides ample  basis  for  hope  and  caution. 
Major  strides  have  been  achieved  over 
the  last  30  years  in  securing  interna- 
tional agreements  restricting  the 
development,  stockpiling,  and  use  of 
various  forms  of  armaments.  These  in- 
clude the  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty  of 
1963,  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty  of  1968,  the  Seabed  Arms  Con- 
trol Treaty  of  1970,  and  the  SALT  I 
agreements  of  1972. 

However,  the  growth  of  nuclear  and 
conventional  arms  continues,  and  some 
dangerous  quantitative  and  qualitative 
imbalances  have  arisen.  Arms  control 
negotiations  designed  specifically  to 
avert  or  correct  this  process  have  either 
been  disappointing,  as  in  SALT  II,  or, 
as  in  the  negotiations  on  conventional 
forces  in  central  Europe  and  on  chemical 
weapons,  failed  so  far  to  produce 
substantive  results.  In  November  1983, 
the  Soviet  Union  suspended  the  negotia- 
tions on  intermediate-range  nuclear 
force  reductions  and  in  December  1983 
refused  to  set  a  resumption  date  for 
START.  Furthermore,  the  U.S.S.R.  has 
violated  or  probably  violated  several  of 
its  existing  legal  obligations  and  political 
commitments  in  the  arms  control  field. 

Success  in  achieving  balanced  and 
verifiable  arms  control  agreements  that 
make  a  real  contribution  to  global 
stability  and  security  requires  Western 
patience,  persistence,  and  unity.  Failure 
or  disappointment  has  resulted  when 
Western  governments  succumbed  to 
confused  objectives,  divided  counsel,  and 
pressure  for  quick  results. 


The  Soviet  Union  is  a  closed  society 
depending  heavily  on  military  force  to 
sustain  its  international  position.  This 
makes  meaningful  arms  control  difficult. 
At  the  same  time,  the  enormous  destruc- 
tive capacity  of  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  makes  arms  control  all 
the  more  necessary.  We  cannot  assume, 
however,  that  the  Soviet  Union  shares 
our  perceptions  or  our  objectives. 

Careful,  patient  negotiations 
directed  toward  specific,  well-defined 
ends  can  lead  to  constructive  agree- 
ments that  enhance  the  security  of  the 
parties  to  these  accords  and  mankind  as 
a  whole.  The  United  States  and  its  allies 
have  led  in  these  endeavors  for  more 
than  30  years.  We  are  making  serious 
and  far-reaching  efforts  today  to  reduce 
nuclear  and  conventional  arms,  to 
achieve  a  comprehensive  global  ban  on 
chemical  weapons,  and  to  forge  new  bi- 
lateral and  multilateral  confidence- 
building  measures.  The  pursuit  of  a 
more  stable  peace  through  a  vigorous 
arms  reductions  program  is  an  essential 
part  of  collective  efforts  to  strengthen 
Western  security  and  will  remain  among 
the  highest  priorities  of  the  U.S. 
Government. 


'The  Western  proposal  eventually  was 
superseded  by  NATO's  1979  decision  to  offer 
separate  negotiations  on  intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces  while  unilaterally  withdrawing 
1,000  nuclear  warheads  from  Europe  before 
those  negotiations  began.  ■ 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Arms  Control  Glossary 


ABM  system — Antiballistic  missile, 
ystem  to  counter  strategic  ballistic 
3siles  or  their  elements  during  flight. 

Ballistic  missile — Any  missile  that 
5S  not  rely  upon  aerodynamic  surfaces 
produce  lift  and  consequently  follows 
lallistic  trajectory  when  thrust  is  ter- 
nated.  Ballistic  missiles  typically 
jrate  outside  the  atmosphere  for  a 
)stantial  portion  of  their  flight  path 
1  are  unpowered  during  most  of  their 
ht. 

Biological  warfare — Employment 
living  organisms  or  toxic  biological 
)ducts  to  produce  death  or  casualties. 

Confidence-Building  Measures 
JMs) — Measures  designed  to  enhance 
tual  knowledge  and  understanding  of 
itary  activities,  to  reduce  the  possi- 
ty  of  conflict  by  accident,  miscalcula- 
n,  or  the  failure  of  communication, 
1  to  increase  stability  in  times  of  both 
•mal  circumstances  and  crisis. 

Cooperative  measures — Measures 
:en  by  one  side  in  order  to  enhance 

other  side's  ability  to  monitor  and/or 
•ify  compliance  with  the  provisions  of 
agreement. 

Counterforce— The  employment  of 
ategic  nuclear  forces  in  an  effort  to 
stroy,  or  disable,  selected  military 
)abilities  of  an  enemy  force. 

Crisis  stability — A  strategic  rela- 
iship  in  which  neither  side  has  an  in- 
itive  to  initiate  the  use  of  force  in  a 
sis. 

Cruise  missile — A  guided  missile 
ng  aerodynamic  lift  that  sustains 
vered  flight  through  the  atmosphere 
its  target. 

Dual-capable  weapons — Those 
Items  capable  of  delivering  either  con- 
iitional  or  nuclear  weapons. 

Encryption— The  encoding  of  com- 
inications  or  other  data  (e.g.,  tele- 
trie  data)  for  the  purpose  of  conceal- 

information. 

Equivalent  megatonnage— A 
asure  used  to  compare  the  potential 

;ause  destruction  of  different  nuclear 
rhead  yields. 

Escalation — An  increase  in  scope  or 
lence  of  a  conflict  or  crisis. 


Flexible  response— A  strategy  to 
deter  and,  should  deterrence  fail,  to 
counter  aggression  at  varying  levels 
with  appropriate  forces. 

Hardened  site— A  site  constructed 
to  withstand  the  blast  and  associated  ef- 
fects of  a  nuclear  attack. 

Intercontinental  ballistic  missile 
(ICBM)— A  land-based  fixed  or  mobile 
rocket-propelled  vehicle  capable  of  de- 
livering a  warhead  to  intercontinental 
ranges  defined  in  SALT  I  and  II  as 
ranges  in  excess  of  5,500  kilometers. 

Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 
(INF) — Land-based  missiles  and  aircraft 
with  ranges/combat  radius  between 
short-range  nuclear  forces  and  5,500  km 
that  are  capable  of  striking  targets 
beyond  the  general  region  of  the  battle- 
field but  not  capable  of  intercontinental 
range. 

Kiloton— Nuclear  yield  equal  to  that 
of  1,000  tons  of  TNT. 

Megaton — Nuclear  yield  equal  to 
that  of  1  million  tons  of  TNT. 

Monitoring — Function  of  collecting, 
analyzing,  and  reporting  data  on  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  parties  to  an  arms  control 
agreement. 

Multiple  independently-targetable 
reentry  vehicle  (MIRV)— Multiple  reen- 
try vehicles  carried  by  a  ballistic  missile, 
each  of  which  can  be  directed  to  a 
separate  target. 

Multiple  reentry  vehicle  (MRV)— 
The  reentry  vehicle  of  a  ballistic  missile 
which  is  equipped  with  multiple 
warheads  but  which  does  not  have  the 
capability  of  independently  directing  the 
reentry  vehicles  to  separate  targets. 

National  technical  means  (NTM) — 
Assets  under  national  control  for 
monitoring  compliance  with  the  provi- 
sion of  an  agreement.  NTM  include 
photographic  reconnaissance  satellites, 
aircraft-based  systems  (such  as  radars 
and  optical  systems),  as  well  as  sea-  and 
ground-based  systems  such  as  radars 
and  antennas  for  collecting  telemetry. 

Payload — The  weapons  and  penetra- 
tion aids  carried  by  a  delivery  vehicle. 

Qualitative  limitations— Restric 
tions  on  capabilities  or  characteristics  of 
a  weapons  system  as  distinct  from  quan- 
titative limits  (e.g.,  on  numbers  of 
strategic  delivery  vehicles). 


Quantitative  limitations — Limits  on 
the  number  of  weapons  systems  in  cer- 
tain categories,  as  distinct  from  qualita- 
tive limits  on  weapons  capabilities. 

Reentry  vehicle  (RV) — That  portion 
(or  portions)  of  a  ballistic  missile,  con- 
taining a  nuclear  warhead,  which  re- 
enters the  earth's  atmosphere  in  the  ter- 
minal portion  of  the  missile's  trajectory. 

Short-range  Nuclear  Forces 
(SNF) — Land-based  missiles,  rockets, 
and  artillery  that  are  capable  of  striking 
only  targets  in  the  general  region  of  the 
battlefield. 

Special  Consultative  Group 
(SCG)— The  NATO  forum  for  review  of 
the  course  of  the  INF  negotiations  and 
for  consultation  on  any  U.S.  steps  in 
those  talks. 

Standing  Consultative  Commission 
(SCC) — A  permanent  U.S. -Soviet  com- 
mission established  in  accordance  with 
the  SALT  I  agreements.  Its  purpose  is 
to  promote  the  objectives  and  implemen- 
tation of  the  provisions  of  the  various 
treaties  and  agreements  achieved  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  to  which  it  is  assigned  respon- 
sibility. 

Submarine-launched  ballistic 
missile  (SLBM) — A  ballistic  missile  car- 
ried in  and  launched  from  a  submarine. 

Telemetry — Data  transmitted  by 
radio  during  a  weapons  test,  reporting 
functions  and  performance. 

Throw-weight — The  useful  weight 
placed  on  a  trajectory  toward  the  target 
by  the  boost  or  main  propulsion  stages 
of  the  missile. 

Verification — The  process  of  deter- 
mining whether  parties  to  an  agreement 
are  in  compliance  with  their  obligations. 

Warhead — The  part  of  a  missile, 
projectile,  torpedo,  rocket,  or  other 
munition  containing  either  the  nuclear 
or  the  thermonuclear  system,  high  ex- 
plosive system,  chemical  or  biological 
agents,  or  inert  materials  intended  to  in- 
flict damage. 

Yield — The  energy  released  in  an 
explosion.  The  energy  released  in  the 
detonation  of  a  nuclear  weapon  is 
generally  measured  in  terms  of  the  kilo- 
tons  or  megatons  of  TNT  required  to 
produce  the  same  energy  release.  ■ 


nnmKar  1QRil 


53 


CANADA 


Visit  of  Canadian 
Prime  Minister  Mulroney 


Prime  Minister  Brian  Mulroney  of 
Canada  made  an  official  working  visit  to 
Wa.Hhington,  D.C..  September  2J,-'25. 
1984,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and.  Prime  Minister 
Mulroney  after  their  meeting  on 
September  25. ' 

President  Reagan 

It  was  with  great  pleasure  that  we 
welcomed  Brian  Mulroney  back  to  the 
White  House.  He  was  here  this  past 
June  and  now  returns  as  Prime  Minister 
of  Canada — America's  neighbor,  ally, 
and  most  important  economic  partner, 
and  great  friend. 

I  congratulated  Prime  Minister 
Mulroney  on  winning  a  decisive  and 
historical  electoral  mandate  from  the 
people  of  Canada.  As  the  other  North 
American  Irishman,  I  also  wished  him 
well  in  his  new  responsibilities. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  I  exchanged 
views  on  a  broad  range  of  global  issues, 
reviewed  our  common  search  to  advance 
our  agenda  for  peace,  particularly  the 
search  for  real  and  equitable  reductions 
in  the  levels  of  nuclear  arms.  I  told  him 
that  in  our  efforts  to  build  a  lasting 
structure  of  peace  and  security,  we  shall 
continue  to  value  the  experience,  the 
counsel,  and  the  participation  of  our 
Canadian  allies. 

A  healthy  North  American  economic 
relationship  is  essential  to  the  prosperity 
of  our  two  countries.  We  discussed  some 
potential  ways  of  increasing  trade  and 
investment  between  us.  The  Prime 


Minister  impressed  upon  me  the  impor- 
tance his  government  attaches  to  en- 
vironmental concerns,  and  we  intend  to 
pursue  these  issues  together. 

Frequent  consultations  are  one  of 
the  hallmarks  of  the  relationship  be- 
tween Canada  and  the  United  States, 
and  I  look  forward  to  continuing  the 
fruitful  dialogue  that  we  had  today.  In 
addition,  I've  asked  Secretary  Shultz  to 
continue  the  series  of  very  productive 
regular  meetings  that  he  has  had  with 
his  Canadian  counterparts. 

Even  the  closest  of  partners  and 
allies  may  not  always  see  things  in  ex- 
actly the  same  way.  But  we  agree  to 
keep  each  other's  interests  in  mind,  to 
keep  one  another  informed,  and  to  hear 
one  another  out  on  the  issues  which  may 
arise  between  us.  We,  too,  intend  to  give 
our  neighbor  the  benefit  of  the  doubt. 

So,  I  thank  you,  Mr.  Prime  Minister, 
for  coming  here  today.  And,  once  again 
congratulations  on  your  decisive  victory 
and  (/  la  prochaine  [until  the  next  time]. 

Prime  Minister  Mulroney 

An  hour  ago  you  and  I  had  the  great 
pleasure  of  meeting  Canadian  and 
American  astronauts  soon  to  be 
launched  into  space.  No  endeavor  better 
underscores  our  friendship  or  so 
dramatically  indicates  the  potential  for 
cooperation  by  our  two  countries  in  the 
service  of  mankind  than  the  peaceful  use 
of  space.  Such  an  effort,  it  seems  to  me, 
demonstrates  to  us  all  the  tremendous 
potential  for  improved  cooperation  in 
joint  development  of  our  two  countries. 


Yesterday  in  the  United  Nations, 
you  reached  out  to  the  Soviet  Union 
with  a  message  of  peace,  and  you  in- 
vited the  leaders  of  the  world  to  join  ir 
what  we  can  accomplish  together.  We 
commend  you  for  this  appeal  and  for 
your  leadership  in  this  vital  area. 

For  our  part,  we  intend  to  continut 
to  seek  opportunities  for  constructive 
dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  wit 
Eastern  European  countries.  We  will 
continue  to  contribute,  as  we  have  in  tl 
past,  ideas  which  may  help  yield  result 
in  our  common  search  for  peace  and 
security. 

Our  two  countries  have  much  to  of 
fer  each  other  and,  I  believe,  together, 
to  the  world.  President  Kennedy  once 
said  that  "Geography  has  made  us 
neighbors,  history  has  made  us  friends 
economics  has  made  us  partners,  and 
necessity  has  made  us  allies." 

[At  this  point,  the  Prime  Minister  spok 
in  French.  He  then  resumed  his  remari 
in  English.] 

The  principal  task  of  our  new 
government  is  economic  renewal — to  e 
pand  trade,  to  attract  new  investment, 
and  to  seek  new  markets.  By 
establishing  a  climate  for  vigorous 
economic  growth,  we  wish  to  create  th 
new  jobs  that  our  people  need  and,  we 
believe,  deserve.  We  wish  to  mobilize 
our  very  best  talents  at  home  and  to 
seek  out  new  partners  abroad.  We  feel 
strong  external  voice  is  based  on  a 
vigorous  domestic  economy. 

Our  talks  today  have  focused  on 
strengthening  and,  indeed,  intensifying 
consultation  between  the  executive  arr 
of  our  two  governments  and  also  be- 
tween the  Congress  and  the  Parliamen 
of  Canada.  We  want  more  coherence  ii 
the  management  of  our  relationship  ar 
more  action  in  regard  to  our  shared 
priorities. 

And  so,  we  must  deepen  our  under 
standing  of  what  we  share  together  an 
of  the  distinctive  interests  we  have  in  i 
ternational  affairs.  And  I  thank  you,  M 
President,  for  your  generous  hospitalit 
and  for  a  most  satisfying  exchange  of 
views. 


'Made  to  reporters  assembled  at  the 
South  Portico  of  the  White  House  (text  fror 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Oct.  1,  1984).  ■ 


I 


54 


Deoartment  of  State  Bullet 


CANADA 


Secretary  Visits  Canada 


Secretary  Shidtz  visited  Toronto  on 
dober  15-16.  198i.  Following  are  his 
viral  statement  and  toast  given  at  a 
nner  hosted  by  Canadian  Secretary  of 
ate  for  External  Affairs  Joe  Clark  on 
tober  15.  and  a  joint  news  conference 
id  by  Secretary  Shultz  and  Secretary 
ark  on  October  16. 


RRIVAL  STATEMENT. 

CT.  15,  19841 

ippreeiate  very  much  our  warm 
Icome,  not  only  its  warmth,  but  the 
oughtful  comments  that  you  made 
•out  the  contents  of  the  talks  we  will 
having  and  their  objective.  You  notice 
at  this  is  the  150th  anniversary  of  the 
unding  of  Toronto,  and  I  think  it  does 
ike  a  particularly  appropriate  setting 
r  the  first  meeting  between  the 
reign  ministers  of  our  two  countries 
der  your  new  government. 

As  it  happens,  I  have  been  to  Toron- 
more  times  than  I  can  count,  so  I'm 
rtainly  glad  that  I  have  a  chance  to 
me  back  again  to  see  the  skyline  and 
of  the  excitement  of  Toronto.  I  do 
)k  forward  very  much  to  going 
"ough  with  you  the  bilateral  problems 
it  we  have,  the  stake  we  have  in 
my  international  issues — economic 
ues,  arms  control  issues — the  problem 
3ts  around  the  world  in  which  we 
are  joint  interests;  comparing  notes 
d  benefiting  from  that  kind  of  con- 
tation. 

I  am  very  interested  in  your  quota- 
n  from  President  Ford,  that  we  can 
agree  without  being  disagreeable,  and 
elieve  in  that  very  much.  At  the  same 
le,  it  seems  to  me  that  in  our  discus- 
ns  we  should  aspire  to  be  ready  to 
tognize  differences  when  we  have 
;m,  but  set  about  the  processes  that 
1  help  us  resolve  those  differences  and 
t  them  behind  us.  And  I  am  sure  that 

supply  of  differences  is  very  large 
i  we  will  have  lots  to  do.  I  also  think 
it  the  assignments  that  your  Prime 
nister  and  my  President  have  given  to 

to  try  and  help  manage  this  relation- 
p  between  our  two  countries,  is  of 
?at  importance.  And  it  has  always 
^n  the  view  of  President  Reagan,  and 
•tainly  mine  over  a  long  period  of 
le,  that  our  most  important  relation- 
ps  are  right  in  our  own  neighborhood 
■m  the  standpoint  of  the  United 
ites. 

It  is  quite  obvious  to  everybody  by 
s  time,  I  think,  that  our  most  impor- 


tant trading  partner  is  Canada,  not  just 
by  a  little  bit,  but  by  a  tremendous 
amount.  So  we  have  a  gigantic  stake  in 
the  United  States  in  having  a  construc- 
tive, thoughtful,  and  well-working  rela- 
tionship, and  President  Reagan  has  sent 
me  here  with  that  objective  very  much 
in  mind.  So  I  look  forward  to  these 
discussions  with  keen  anticipation  and 
the  prospect  of  real  success. 


DINNER  TOAST. 
OCT.  15.  19842 

This  has  been  a  wonderful  evening  for 
me.  This  gathering  has  a  great  feeling.  I 
don't  know  how,  in  your  experience,  you 
have  done,  but  you  can  go  to  dinners 
and  they  are  often  pretty  dead,  you 
know.  But  this  has  life,  and  I  remarked 
to  my  wife  we  are  never  going  to  get 
people  through  the  receiving  line;  they 
all  want  to  talk  to  each  other.  There's  a 
spirit,  and  I  was  asking  Mr.  Clark 
[Canadian  Secretary  for  External  Affair] 
a  little  bit  about  people  who  were  here, 
and  what  I  discovered  was  that  there  is 
a  tremendous  diversity  here.  There  is 
Alex  Colville  representing,  in  a  sense, 
painting;  there  are  people  here  from  the 
world  of  journalism;  there  are  people 
from  the  performing  arts;  there  are  peo- 
ple in  the  sports  world;  there  are  people 
in  the  professions;  there  are  business- 
men; and  of  course  politicians.  So  there 
is  a  great  sense  of  diversity.  And  I  sup- 
pose, in  a  way,  the  diversity  gives  a 
sense  of  the  Canadian  identity.  And  in 
that  sense,  your  identity  is  different 
from  ours,  and  of  course  in  that  respect 
nevertheless,  that  is  a  similarity.  We  are 
very  diverse  in  the  United  States,  and 
somehow,  out  of  this  diversity,  we  think 
we  have  a  more  interesting  identity  than 
many  countries  that  you  see  that  are 
very  homogeneous  and  where  everything 
is  pretty  much  the  same.  So  I  appreciate 
the  diversity  of  your  Canadian  identity. 

Now,  having  said  that  there  is  diver- 
sity and  difference,  there  are  obviously 
many  things  that  we  share.  And  it  is 
because  of  the  things  that  we  share  that, 
in  our  separate  ways,  we  find  so  much 
to  do  with  each  other.  It  isn't  simply 
that  we  have  the  world's  longest  bound- 
ary and  live  next  door  to  each  other. 
But  we  do  have  common  values,  we  do 
have  common  interests,  of  course  we 
have  this  gigantic  amount  of  trade  be- 
tween our  countries  that  out-distances 
the  trade  between  our  two  countries, 
and,  in  a  different  way  from  the  way 


you  put  it,  Joe,  our  largest  trading  part- 
ner for  the  United  States  is  Canada  and 
our  second  largest  trading  partner  is  the 
Province  of  Ontario.  [Laughter] 

So  you  ciin  see  how  close  to  you  we 
feel.  And  I  support  the  celebrated 
feature  of  our  relationship,  that  tremen- 
dous border,  could  be  remarked  upon, 
but  last  week  the  geographic 
significance  kind  of  seemed  to  fade  as 
Marc  Garneau  and  his  American  col- 
leagues voyaged  in  the  trackless  realms 
of  space  together.  That  was  really  quite 
a  dramatic  thing. 

I  had  the  privilege  of  meeting  Joe 
Clark  in  New  York  at  a  little  meeting 
there  as  part  of  the  UN  go-around.  All 
the  foreign  ministers  gather  and  we 
spend  our  time  meeting  with  each  other, 
and  everybody's  place  is  like  a  dentist's 
office.  But  we  managed  to  have  a  pleas- 
ant extra  dinner  together  and  I  met  him 
again  on  this  trip.  And  he's  tough.  I  got 
here  on  an  airplane  at  about  4:00  p.m.  in 
the  afternoon,  drove  into  the  hotel,  got 
unpacked.  Somebody  knocked  on  the 
door — "Mr.  Clark  says  it's  time  to  start 
the  meeting." — so  off  we  went  for  a  cou- 
ple of  hours  or  so  of  very  strong  ex- 
change. And  while  it  was  pleasant,  the 
pleasantries  were  quickly  done  away 
with,  and  we  got  right  into  the  content 
of  the  things  we  had  decided  in  advance 
we  should  exchange  views  upon.  And  we 
started  in  on  economic  issues;  U.S. 
situation;  Canadian  situation;  interna- 
tional problems  that  both  of  us  look  at 
and  worry  about.  And  we  will  go  on 
tomorrow  and  talk  about  our  common 
interests  in  reduction  in  armament,  and 
East- West  relations,  and  Central 
America,  the  Middle  East,  and  so  forth. 
And  then  I  suspect  we  will  spend  a  good 
part  of  our  time  tomorrow  morning 
reviewing  the  many  bilateral  issues  that 
we  have  that  just  are  nobody's  business 
but  ours. 

And  we  have  issues  of  the  environ- 
ment, we  have  trade  issues  of  one  kind 
or  another.  I  suspect  fish  will  come  up.  I 
found  that  you  spend  more  time  on  fish 
in  the  foreign  relations  business  than  on 
anything  else.  In  Japan  our  greatest 
problem  right  now  is  whales.  We  don't 
have  that  problem,  but  we  do  have  lots 
of  fish  to  fry. 

But  there  are  a  great  many  bilateral 
issues  and,  as  I  reflect  on  them,  having 
worked  at  this  to  some  extent  when  I 
was  in  the  government  before,  kept 
track  of  it,  and  then  coming  in  again  and 
working  at  it  some  more,  it's  almost  as 
though  there  is  a  constant  inventory  of 
problems,  but  they  keep  changing. 
That's  a  story,  but  I  hope  it's  more  and 
more  on  the  basis  of  first  in  first  out  (to 


npmhpr  1QR4 


55 


CANADA 


use  a  business  term).  As  we  cycle 
through  and  we  look  at  these  problems 
and  try  to  surround  the  problems  with  a 
process  that  leads  to  solutions;  as  you 
said,  disagreeing  without  being  disagree- 
able, but  nevertheless  adding  on  to  that 
a  process  that  seeks  to  solve  the  prob- 
lems that  we  have  and  then  go  on  to  the 
next  ones. 

We  know  that  we  are  always  going 
to  have  issues  between  us  because  there 
is  so  much  traffic,  there  is  so  much 
going  on.  The  job  of  the  foreign 
ministries,  I  think,  is  to  try  to  monitor 
that,  and  to  keep  track  of  what  the 
issues  are,  keep  them  under  control  and 
get  them  solved  and  keep  going  on  to 
the  next  thing  so  this  relationship  can 
continue  to  flourish  and  flourish  and 
flourish  to  the  mutual  benefit  of  both 
our  countries. 

I  look  forward  to  our  continuing 
relationship  there,  to  our  meetings,  but 
inore  than  that,  to  having  the  kind  of 
contact  not  only  ourselves  but  in  our 
governments,  but  more  than  that — the 
people  of  Canada  and  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  to  have  such  fabulous  in- 
timate relationships  that  we  can  do 
everything  we  can  to  see  that  it  con- 
tinues to  be  as  strong  and  warm  and 
worthwhile  as  it  has  been  for  so  many 
years. 

So  I,  in  turn,  would  like  to  ask  you 
to  join  me  in  a  toast  to  Joe  Clark  and 
Maureen  Clark,  and  as  he  did,  to  a 
warm,  productive,  and  constructive  rela- 
tionship between  Canada  and  the  United 
States. 


JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
OCT.  16,  1984^ 

Secretary  Clark.  We  had,  from  my 
perspective,  a  very  warm  and  positive 
discussion.  I  appreciated  Secretary 
Shultz's  coming  to  Toronto,  and  I  think 
that  we  were  able,  today  and  yesterday, 
in  the  extensive  discussions  we  carried 
forward,  to  maintain  the  spirit  that  was 
established  by  President  Reagan  and 
Prime  Minister  Mulroney  during  their 
meeting  at  the  White  House  in 
September.  In  my  judgment,  we  are  em- 
barked upon  the  opening  of  a  new 
chapter  in  Canadian-U.S.  relations.  The 
responsibility  of  Secretary  Shultz  and 
myself  is  to  deal  with  some  of  the  mat- 
ters of  detail,  of  important  detail,  that 
exist  between  our  two  countries,  and 
also  to  keep  in  close  contact  regarding 
international  questions  which  are  of  con- 
cern to  us  both. 

You  will  not  be  surprised  to  know 
that  I  gave  a  very  heavy  emphasis  to 


56 


some  of  the  economic  questions  that  are 
facing  Canada  and  the  world,  and  par- 
ticularly the  importance  to  us  of 
establishing  and  maintaining  Canadian 
access  to  markets,  which  is  going  to  be 
key  to  our  economic  strength  in  the 
future.  I  also,  of  course,  raised,  and  we 
discussed,  the  continuing  Canadian  con- 
cern about  the  problem  of  acid  rain, 
which  is  a  multi-partisan  concern  in  this 
country.  A  colleague  of  mine,  the 
Honorable  John  Fraser,  when  he  was 
Minister  of  the  Environment  in  my 
government  in  1979,  raised  that  ques- 
tion with  some  vigor  at  that  time,  and  it 
remains  a  very  major  concern  of  the 
new  Government  of  Canada.  I  think  that 
I  had  known  before  coming  to  the  first 
of  these  quarterly  meetings  that  the 
process  was  valuable  in  theory;  I  have 
certainly  found  it  to  be  valuable  in  fact, 
in  terms  of  establishing  ability  to  work 
together  as  very  close  neighbors. 

Secretary  Shultz.  First  I'd  like  to 
thank  Secretary  Clark  for  this  warm 
reception  and  for  the  high  quality  of  the 
meetings.  1  think  the  meetings  that  we 
have,  and  that  our  Prime  Minister  and 
President  have,  and  that  other  ministers 
have,  are  part  of  a  continuing  discus- 
sion. And  perhaps  these  meetings  for  us 
are  kind  of  a  high  point,  but  they  don't 
represent  the  whole  story  by  a  long 
shot.  They  represent  the  tip  of  the 
iceberg  of  this  relationship.  It  is  kind  of 
an  interesting  and  perhaps  symbolic  fact 
that  President  Reagan's  first  visit  to 
another  country  as  President  was  to 
Canada;  and  Prime  Minister  Mulroney's 
first  visit  to  another  country  as  Prime 
Minister  was  to  the  United  States;  and 
my  first  visit  to  another  country  as 
Secretary  of  State  was  to  Canada;  and 
your  first  visitor  from  another  country 
was  from  the  United  States;  so  there  is 
a  message  in  those  facts. 

When  I  arrived  at  the  airport,  you 
said  that  your  motto  was  that  it  would 
be  possible  to  disagree  without  being 
disagreeable,  and  I  would  have  to  say 
that  you  have  delivered  on  that  under- 
taking. On  the  other  hand,  he  gave  me  a 
hard  time,  frankly,  on  a  lot  of  subjects, 
particularly  acid  rain,  and  I  would  like 
to  point  out  to  you  that  acid  rain  is  a 
problem  in  the  United  States,  too.  At 
the  same  time,  as  I  said  in  our  meeting, 
we  feel  that  it's  important  to  really 
understand  this  phenomenon  better 
before  you  commit  gigantic  sums  of 
money  to  it,  but  this  is  only  replaying 
some  of  our  discussions.  And  I  do 
acknowledge  that  you  were  able  to 
disagree  without  being  disagreeable,  and 
I  appreciate  it. 


Q.  [In  French,  partially  trans- 
lated.] The  Ambassador  in  Washing- 
ton, Mr.  Allan  Gotlieb,  said  that  on 
June  18  in  Rhode  Island,  the  Governi 
had  said  that  acid  rain  was  the  most 
contentious  question  between  the  tw 
countries.  Do  you  think  that  there  w 
be  action  taken,  as  Mr.  Mulroney  hai 
said  after  his  visit  to  President 
Reagan? 

Secretary  Clark.  Today  we  had  ai 
extensive  conversation  about  acid  rain, 
and  Canada's  position  was  well  in- 
dicated, well  articulated,  and  I  under 
lined  that  for  our  part,  acid  rain  is  a 
bipartisan  question.  It  is  not  a  questio: 
of  one  government  or  one  party;  it  in- 
volves all  of  Canada  and  all  our  politic: 
parties.  It  was  accepted  by  the 
Secretary  of  State.  We  are  agreed  as  i 
the  importance  of  the  problem,  but  we 
have  discussed  various  means  of  dealir 
with  the  problem.  There  will  be  a 
meeting  involving  our  respective 
ministers  of  environment.  And  let  me 
say  it  is  important  for  us  to  maintain  t 
priority  of  this  question  that  will  be 
under  discussion  between  the  Secretar 
of  State  and  myself  and  between  the 
President  and  the  Prime  Minister  whe 
they  next  meet. 

Q.  [Inaudible]. 

Secretary  Clark.  American  policii 
will  always  influence  our  policies,  and 
Canadian  policies  can  have  an  influenc 
on  American  policies.  That  is  a  North 
American  reality.  It  hasn't  changed  ar 
will  not  change.  Insofar  as  specific  qui 
tions  that  we  discussed,  there  have  be 
two  types  of  questions,  the  first  being 
our  priority  as  a  government  to  attrac 
foreign  investment  to  Canada  to  help 
bring  about  further  Canadian  develop- 
ment. The  Americans,  for  various 
reasons,  have  often  been  in  disagree- 
ment with  our  past  policies,  the  past 
policies  of  the  former  government.  Wi 
disagree  also  with  certain  aspects  of  t 
national  energy  policy,  or  certain 
measures  of  implementation  of  FIR  A 
[Foreign  Investment  Review  Agency], 
So  this  question  of  investments  was  c( 
tainly  discussed.  There  was  another 
question  discussed,  that  of  internation 
trade  and  our  access  to  traditional  anc 
new  markets  and  the  necessity  for  us 
improve  and  to  keep  the  access  that 
already  exists. 

Q.  A  domestic  question  but  it's 
the  first  time  we've  had  a  chance  to 
meet  with  you.  Since  last  week  you 
rescinded  the  appointments  of  three 
Canadian  Ambassadors  appointed  bj 
the  Trudeau  government,  could  you 
tell  us  why?  Was  it  because  they  we 


■ 


CANADA 


beral  appointments,  or  were  they 
t  qualified? 

Secretary  Clark.  I  think,  since 
'Ve  only  got  half  an  hour  here,  rather 
in  detain  the  Secretary  of  State  with 
mestic  problems,  I'll  restrict  my  com- 
mts  to  matters  that  were  discussed  in 
?  bilateral  meeting. 

Secretary  Shultz.  I'd  be  fascinated 
know  how  you  deal  with  ambassa- 
rial  appointments.  [Laughter.] 

Q.  The  Canadian  Peace  Caravan, 
lich  is  bent  on  keeping  the  Canadian 
vernment  aware  of  the  disarmament 
ue,  is  in  Toronto  today  stirring  up 
^t  of  a — not  stirring  up,  but  foster- 
f  public  opinion  with  regards  to 
armament.  I  wonder  if  Mr.  Shultz 
>  any  words  of  encouragement  for 

Canadian  Peace  Caravan. 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  policy  of  the 
igan  Administration  is  to  seek  reduc- 
:s  in  armaments  on  an  equitable  and 
ifiable  basis,  and  there  are  proposals 
the  table  involving  the  complete 
ge  of  armaments  considerations, 
m  chemical  warfare  to  confidence- 
Iding  measures,  from  conventional 
:es  to  the  overriding  questions  of 
lear  armaments.  Our  emphasis  in  all 
hese  matters  is  reduction — not  con- 
,  not  freeze,  but  reduction.  And  we 

continue  to  work  for  those  objec- 
s.  And  we  wish  for  more  positive 
Donses  from  the  Soviet  Union  in 
Isr  that  progress  could  be  made. 

Q.  Over  the  last  2  days  we've  seen 
t  of  comments  about  the  special 
utionship,  the  strength  of  the  rela- 
iiship,  number  one  trading  partner, 
erica's  great  stake  in  maintaining  a 
<d  relationship  with  Canada.  I 
Ilk,  with  your  long  relationship 
h  this  country,  both  in  public  life 
1  private  life,  you  understand  that 
I  -e  are  some  Canadians  who  have 
lie  reservations  about  just  how 
•  e  we  get  to  the  United  States  or 
1  other  country — that  we  lose  our 
a  identity  in  the  process.  What  is 
I  quid  pro  quo  from  the  United 
l;es  in  terms  of  this  new  initiative 
he  new  Canadian  Government?  Is 
guarantee  for  access  to  those 
kets,  and  that  the  Administration 
resist  domestic  political  pressure 
||he  United  States  in  a  protectionist 
!,  that  the  Administration  will 
st  those  pressures  as  a  result  of, 
in  keeping  with,  this  new  special 
tion? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Well,  the  United 
,es  has  to  follow  policies  that  it  feels 
in  the  interests  of  the  United  States, 
as  Canada  follows  policies  that  you 
;ider  to  be  in  the  interests  of 


Canada.  We  think  it's  in  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  to  have  a  good  work- 
ing relationship  with  Canada,  and  we 
think  it's  in  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  to  have  open  trading,  not  only 
with  Canada,  but  on  a  world  basis, 
because  that  gives  our  consumers  a 
broad  access  to  what's  available  on  the 
world  market.  It  helps  to  control  infla- 
tion and  gives  us  many  other  advan- 
tages. So  I  think  that  if  the  focus  of 
your  questions  is  whether  or  not  you  can 
expect  the  Reagan  Administration  to 
continue  its  pursuit  of  an  open  trading 
regime  in  the  world,  the  answer  is  to  be 
found  in  what  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  are;  and  they  are  in  main- 
taining open  markets  and  in  having  a 
good  flow  of  trade  between  Canada  and 
United  States. 

Q.  I  understand  that  you  have 
agreed  that  Mr.  Ruckelshaus  [En- 
vironmental Protection  Agency  Ad- 
ministrator] and  our  Minister  of  the 
Environment  should  meet  on  a  regular 
basis.  Could  you  tell  us  how  often 
they'll  be  meeting,  when  the  first  one 
might  be,  and  where  it  would  be  held? 

Secretary  Clark.  We  haven't 
reached  that  level  of  detail.  And  I  want 
to  emphasize  that,  while  that  is  going  to 
be  an  important  meeting,  discussing  acid 
rain  and  other  questions,  and  there  will 
undoubtedly  be  some  regularities  to 
those  meetings,  on  the  question  of  acid 
rain  in  particular,  we  consider  it  suffi- 
ciently important,  as  well  as  being  dealt 
with  by  the  ministers  directly  concerned, 
certainly  from  Canada's  perspective  I  in- 
tend to  keep  raising  it  at  these  quarterly 
meetings,  and  I  would  imagine  that  the 
Prime  Minister  would  intend  to  keep 
raising  that  question  at  the  level  of  his 
meetings  with  the  President.  We  were 
very  encouraged  by  the  expressed  will- 
ingness of  the  President  at  the  White 
House  meeting  to  work  together  with 
Canada  to  resolve  environmental  ques- 
tions generally. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  we  were  told 
that  Mr.  Clark  gave  you  assurance 
that  Canada  would  no  longer  play  a 
role  as  a  mediator  in  the  East-West 
issues.  I  wonder  what  concerns  you 
have  about  that  role,  and  what  Mr. 
Clark  said  Canada  would  offer  in 
place  of  the  role  of  mediator? 

Secretary  Shultz.  As  far  as  the  role 
of  Canada  is  concerned,  I  look  on  it 
myself  much  like  our  role  or  the  role  of 
other  friends  and  allies.  Countries  have 
their  ideas;  we  see  that  in  this  broad 
struggle  for  our  values  we  have  a  very 
strong  common  stake  and  that  we  need 
to  pursue  a  kind  of  combined  policy  of 


being  strong  and  being  able  to  defend 
the  interests  and  values  that  we  share 
and  being  ready  to  negotiate  about 
them — not  about  the  values,  but  about 
the  problems  we  have  with  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Now,  as  people  from  each  country 
get  around  and  make  visits  or  receive 
people  in  their  own  country  or  meet 
them  in  other  places,  that's  a  valuable 
form  of  interaction;  and  I  know  in  my 
own  case,  when  I  have  meetings,  I  share 
the  content  and  the  impressions  I  get 
with  my  counterparts,  including  Mr. 
Clark.  I  sent  him  a  long  cable  following 
the  meetings  that  the  President  and  I 
had  with  Mr.  Gromyko,  and  I'm  sure  he 
will  do  the  same.  I  think  this  kind  of  col- 
laboration enables  all  of  us  to  have  a 
better  understanding  of  what  is  going  on 
and  be  more  effective  in  the  joint 
endeavor  that  we  have. 

Q.  Mr.  Clark,  you  said  that  we're 
seeing  a  new  chapter  in  U.S. -Canada 
relations.  Is  this  a  change  in  style  and 
in  tone  in  the  dealings  between  the 
two  governments,  or  is  there  a  change 
in  substance  as  well? 

Secretary  Clark.  My  view  is  that 
the  election  of  the  4th  of  September  in 
Canada  changed  more  than  a  govern- 
ment here;  that  it  allowed  to  be  ex- 
pressed a  greater  sense  of  Canadian 
self-confidence  that  meant  that  we  were 
freer  to  be  able  to  play  a  full  role  with 
the  United  States  in  the  pursuit  not 
simply  of  common  values  and  the 
defense  of  common  values,  but  also  in 
the  development  of  this  neighborhood. 
And  I  think  that  that  development,  that 
change,  that  maturing  has  been  occur- 
ring for  some  time.  I  think  it  has  been 
rather  hard  to  notice  it,  because  there 
has  been  so  much  discussion  about  inter- 
nal matters,  whether  they  were  the  con- 
stitutional debate  of  the  national  energy 
program  or  other  matters.  Some  of  you 
who  have  suffered  through  my  speeches 
before  will  know  that  I  have  spoken  on 
this  process  of  maturing  that  I  see  oc- 
curring in  this  country  on  previous  occa- 
sions. I  interpret  the  election  of  the  4th 
of  September  as  indicating  that  the 
country  has  moved  into  a  new  chapter  in 
its  life,  and  part  of  that  movement  has 
been  to  allow  us  to  develop  a  new 
chapter  in  relations  between  Canada  and 
the  United  States.  Obviously,  there  will 
be  some  changes  of  substance  as  time 
evolves.  Tomorrow,  I  guess,  will  be  my 
first  month  anniversary  of  being  sworn 
into  office,  so  I'm  not  able  to  speak  with 
much  precision  about  what  those 
changes  will  be,  but  I  was  very  en- 
couraged by  the  attitude  and  the  sen- 


omhor  1QH4 


57 


CANADA 


sibility,  the  sensitivity  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  to  the  Canadian  situation  as  we 
began  to  discuss  those  problems. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  me  if  you  have  set 
any  kind  of  a  timetable  for  coming  to 
a  management  agreement  on  Georges 
Bank,  beyond  the  fact  that  you  want 
to  set  the  process  in  motion? 

Secretary  Clark.  We  have  set  no 
firm  timetable  in  terms  of  days  that  wc 
can  give  you.  The  United  States  re- 
quested, and  we  agreed,  prior  to  the 
court  decision  to  an  extension  of  the 
grace  period  to  14  days  that  would  allow 
the  boats  now  in  place  to  stay  in  place. 


We've  both  got  to  study  the  decision 
more  minutely  than  we've  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  do,  but  we  are  agreed  that  we 
want  to  move  just  as  quickly  as  possible, 
after  we  understand  the  full  implications 
of  that  decision,  to  begin  to  put  in  place 
a  management  system  that  will  accept 
and  build  on  the  court  decision  and  serve 
the  best  interests  of  the  fisherman  and 
the  countries  involved.  Naturally,  there 
will  be  consultation,  at  least  on  our  part 
and  I'm  sure  on  the  American  part,  with 
affected  fishing  groups,  both  industry 
and  fishermen,  and  in  our  case,  provin- 
cial governments. 


Q.  The  Office  of  Science  and 
Technology  Policy  has  advised  the 
President  that  it's  time  to  move  on 
acid  rain  without  waiting  for  further 
research.  There's  been  similar  advice 
from  the  National  Academy  of 
Sciences.  Why  has  this  advice  not 
been  followed,  and  how  much  more 
research  is  it  going  to  take?  It  is  go- 
ing to  be  2  years.  5  years,  or  10  years 
And  why  has  this  advice  not  been 
followed  at  the  moment? 

Secretary  Shultz.  There  is  a  con- 
siderable difference  of  opinion  and  I 
think  a  genuine  broadness  of  view  that 
additional  research  will  be  necessary. 


i 


ICJ  Rules  on  Gulf  of  Maine  Case 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  12,  1984' 

On  October  12,  1984,  a  chamber  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  (ICJ)  in 
The  Hague,  the  Netherlands,  announced 
its  decision  in  the  Gulf  of  Maine  area 
boundary  dispute  between  the  United 
States  and  Canada.  The  case  was 
Ijrought  before  the  court  pursuant  to  a 
boundary  settlement  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada.  Under  the 
statute  of  court,  and  in  accordance  with 
the  treaty,  the  parties  are  bound  to  ac- 
cept the  boundary  line  established  by  the 
court.  The  court  has  considered  exten- 
sive written  and  oral  submissions 
presented  by  both  Canada  and  the 
United  States  during  the  past  2  years. 

The  court,  at  the  request  of  the  par- 
ties, established  a  special  chamber  of 
five  judges  to  hear  the  case.  The 
members  of  the  chamber  included:  Judge 
Roberto  Ago  of  Italy,  President  of  the 
chamber;  Judge  Andre  Gros  of  France; 
Judge  Herman  Mosler  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany;  Judge  Stephen 
Schwebel  of  the  United  States;  and 
Judge  ad  hoc  Maxwell  Cohen  of  Canada. 

At  stake  in  the  case  was  maritime 
jurisdiction  over  an  area  between  13,000 
to  18,000  square  nautical  miles  in  size. 
At  the  center  of  the  dispute  was 
jurisdiction  over  the  northeastern  half  of 
Georges  Bank,  one  of  the  world's  richest 
fishing  grounds.  The  area  may  also  con- 
tain oil  and  natural  gas.  During  the 
dispute,  the  United  States  maintained 
that  it  was  entitled  to  a  boundary  line 
that  would  retain  all  of  Georges  Bank 
under  U.S.  jurisdiction,  whereas  Canada 
sought  a  boundary  that  would  divide  the 
bank  in  half,  leaving  all  of  the  north- 


eastern portion  under  Canadian  jurisdic- 
tion. 

The  court  found  that  neither  side's 
boundary  position  was  justified.  It 
established  a  line  that  crosses  Georges 
Bank  essentially  midway  between  the 
claims  of  the  two  states.  The  line  the 
court  established  is  shown  on  the  map. 

The  two  governments  have  agreed 
to  a  14-day  grace  period  to  allow  the 
fishermen  of  both  countries  to  return  to 
their  respective  sides  of  the  new  bound- 
ary. 


The  implications  of  the  decisions  foi 
management  of  the  Atlantic  fisheries 
are  highly  complex  and  will  require 
detailed  study  in  consultation  with  New 
England  fishing  industry  and  congres- 
sional interests.  We  anticipate  that  im- 
plementation of  the  new  boundary  will 
take  place  in  the  atmosphere  of  coopera 
tion  that  generally  characterizes 
U.S. -Canadian  relations. 


'Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
by  Department  spokesman  Jolin  Hughes.  ■ 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletir. 


CANADA 


lere  are  huge  sums  of  money  involved, 
id  to  commit  such  sums  before  you  see 
3ariy  where  you're  going  can  wind  up 
ending  an  awful  lot  of  money  for  the 
•ong  thing,  and  we  don't  want  to  do 
at.  And  we  think  it  should  be — it  is 
sirable  to  take  a  little  bit  more  time 
d  be  a  little  more  sure  of  what  you're 
ing.  especially  in  light  of  the  large 
m  involved.  The  meetings  that  were 
scribed  between  Mr.  Ruckelshaus  and 
;  counterpart  will  not  only  be  between 
gm,  but  the  scientists  on  each  side  will 
brought  in  so  that  there  will  be  op- 
rtunities  for  scientific  exchange,  and 
■'11  certainly  be  ready  to  learn  as  much 
we  can  from  those  exchanges. 

Q.  Could  you  clarify  any  more 
lat  was  talked  about  yesterday:  this 
port  from  Israel  that  they  have 
reived  an  offer  and  accepted  with 
atitude  an  offer  for  a  moratorium  on 
ying  $500  million  in  debt.  The  in- 
ation  yesterday  was  that  there  was 
I  such  offer,  but  it  does  seem  rather 
lange.  Israel  is  accepting  an  offer 
|;  United  States  has  not  made. 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  can't  really 
rify  it  very  much.  It  does  seem 
ange. 

Q.  You  have  a  vocally  small  group 
I  New  England  fishermen  who  are 
i-y  unhappy  about  the  Georges  Bank 
reement.  It  seems  to  feel  that  the 
hte  Department  shares  their  point  of 
iw.  What  is  the  U.S.  position  on  this 
i'ision? 

Secretary  Shultz.  First,  on  this 
I'ision,  I  think  it's  important  to 
'lister  that  here  are  two  countries, 
'.  nada  and  the  United  States,  with  an 
!  jortant  issue  involving  a  boundary. 
!  d  you  set  a  boundary  and  it's  set. 
I  d  our  relationship  is  strong  enough 
;  i  our  confidence  that  we  can  work  out 
([Sequent  problems  is  high  enough,  so 
j  t  we  were  willing,  these  two  coun- 
ts, to  put  this  matter  before  an  inter- 
j  ional  court  and  agree  in  advance  that 
I  would  abide  by  whatever  the  decision 
J  5  that  they  set  down.  So  we  are  going 
do  that.  And  I'm  sure  the  Canadians 
])  see  some  problems  for  them  in  this 
ision.  So  each  side  sees  problems, 
( h  side  has  people  who  are  complain- 
]  and  no  doubt  feeling  quite  justified 
loing  so.  The  implications  of  the  deci- 
1  are  complicated,  and  we  need  to 
dy  them.  We  need  to  consult  with 
se  whose  interests  are  most  directly 
icted,  and  as  soon  as  we  have  done 
to  try — and  Mr.  Clark  and  I  agreed 
t  this  should  be  done — to  try  to  get 
top  of  this  issue  and  resolve  some  of 


these  managerial  problems,  you  might 
say  they  are,  in  a  satisfactory  way.  Of 
course,  a  lot  of  the  issue  arises  because, 
while  we  respect  the  international 
boundary,  the  fish  don't  and  so  we  have 
to  cope  with  that  fact  and  that  presents 
a  managerial  problem,  but  I'm  sure  that 
in  one  way  or  another  we'll  be  able  to 
resolve  it. 

Q.  Since  your  time  was  occupying 
economic  questions  and  questions  re- 
garding economic  matters,  in  par- 
ticular sectoral  free  trade  between 
your  two  great  countries.  I  am  a 
newcomer  to  the  Canadian  scene;  I 
was  based  in  your  country  for  a  while. 
I  have  read  a  lot.  What  is  the  situation 
now?  Are  the  two  governments 
pushed,  so  to  speak,  by  certain 
branches  of  industry,  for  instance,  on 
the  U.S.  side  where  many  industries 
regard  Canada— let's  not  kid  our- 
selves—as the  51st  state  of  the  union, 
so  to  speak,  in  economic  terms,  or  in 
Canada,  bombardier  or  whoever  might 
be  the  player;  or  is  it  rather  the  push 
by  the  two  governments  to  get  for- 
ward with  sectoral  free  trade? 

Secretary  Shultz.  In  responding  to 
your  question,  I  don't  want  any  implica- 
tion to  be  left  that  I  accept  any  of  your 
wording.  The  United  States  has  bene- 
fited a  great  deal  from  an  open  trading 
world  and  from  our  really  quite  open 
trading  border  with  Canada,  and  so  we 
like  to  see  that  extended  where  it  is  seen 
to  be  mutually  beneficial.  There  have 
been  some  discussions  about  additional 
free  trade  zones  that  might  be  modeled, 
say,  after  the  auto  agreement  or 
something  on  that  line.  Whether  there  is 
something  more  ambitious  that's  possi- 
ble, I  just  don't  know.  But  the  trade 
legislation  that  was  passed  just,  I  guess, 
a  week  ago  in  our  Congress  gives  us 
some  running  room  to  explore  this  with 
some  confidence.  And  we  discussed  it  in 
our  meeting,  and  I  think  a  fair  summary 
of  where  we  left  it  is  that  the  new 
government  in  Canada  will  be  studying 
this  carefully  itself.  It  has  the  same 
predispositions  that  we  do,  and  as  soon 
as  it's  ready,  we'll  start  to  have  a  more 
definitive  kind  of  discussion  about  what's 
the  right  agenda  and  where  to  go. 

Secretary  Clark.  Why  don't  I  just 
add  very  briefly,  the  reality  of  Canada  is 
that  our  future  depends  upon  an  open 
trading  system,  and  that  is  a  reality  that 
is  guiding  our  government.  There  have 
been,  as  Secretary  Shultz  indicated, 
discussions  between  his  country  and  the 
former  Government  of  Canada  regard- 
ing specific  approaches.  My  colleagues 


and  I  are  looking  at  those  and  looking  at 
other  avenues,  and  we  expect  that 
before  too  long  we  will  be  in  a  position 
to  become  involved  in  discussions  with 
the  United  States  regarding  the  applica- 
tion of  that  open  trading  .system  to  our 
two  countries  directly.  I  should  make 
the  point  that,  so  far  as  I  am  concerned, 
the  interest  in  that  kind  of  system  is  im- 
pelled neither  exclusively  by  govern- 
ments nor  by  businesses,  but  is 
understood  as  being  necessary  to  the 
future  of  this  country  and,  in  our  judg- 
ment, to  the  future  of  successful  world 
economic  development  by  all  parties  con- 
cerned. 

Q.  We're  told  that  you  and  Mr. 
Clark  discussed  the  situation  in  Cen- 
tral America.  Could  you  share  with  us 
your  assessment  of  yesterday's 
meetings  in  El  Salvador  with  Presi- 
dent Duarte? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  the  results 
of  the  meeting  justify  fully  President 
Duarte's  bold  initiatives.  He  took  a  risk 
for  peace,  and  I  think  he  has  gotten  at 
least  a  small  downpayment  on  that  ele- 
ment of  risktaking.  He  had  his  meeting. 
You  have  seen  the  announcement  of  the 
results.  There  will  be  a  commission  that 
will  look  into  how  to  bring  the  guerrilla 
war  to  a  halt  and  to  bring  peace  to  El 
Salvador  within  the  framework  of  the 
democratic  institutions  established  under 
their  constitution.  There  has  been  a 
statement  issued  in  my  name  from  the 
State  Department,  and  it's  available 
here.  That's  a  little  fuller  statement  of 
all  this,  and  it's  available  to  you. 


'Press  release  232  of  Oct.  17,  1984. 
^Press  release  240  of  Oct.  24,  1984. 
Opening  remarks  omitted  here. 

^Press  release  238  of  Oct.  19,  1984.  I 


member  1984 


59 


ENERGY 

International  Energy  Security: 
The  Continuing  Challenge 


by  E.  Allan  Wendt 

Statement  before  the  Oxford  Energy 
Seminar  in  Oxford,  United  Kingdom,  on 
September  12,  198i.  Mr.  Wendt  is  Depu- 
ty Assistant  Secretary  for  International 
Energy  and  Resources  Policy. 

Ten  years  ago,  the  Western  world  was 
thrown  into  a  dramatic  economic  crisis 
by  the  loss  to  the  world  market  of  less 
than  4  million  barrels  of  oil  per  day.  In 
the  decade  since  then,  world  oil  produc- 
tion has  declined  by  about  2  million  bar- 
rels per  day  (b/d).  OPEC  production  has 
declined  13  million  b/d.  As  much  as  12 
million  barrels  of  oil  production  capacity 
is  idle.  We  face  frequent  attacks  on  oil 
transportation  in  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
threats  to  tankers  and  pipelines 
elsewhere.  Who  would  have  believed  10 
years  ago  that  such  events  would  leave 
the  oil  market  undisturbed?  What  has 
happened  to  enable  the  oil  market  to 
respond  not  with  price  increases  but 
with  stability,  and  even  a  small  price 
decline?  And  what  lessons  does  our  pres- 
ent situation  hold  for  the  future? 

I  believe  the  answers  lie  in  two 
areas:  the  long-term  trend  toward 
energy  conservation  and  toward  diver- 
sification of  Western  energy  sources  and 
increased  preparedness  for  energy 
emergencies.  I  would  like  to  talk  first 
about  these  developments  and  then 
about  how  they  can  be  continued  in  the 
future. 


Past  Successes 

The  oil  embargo  of  1973  revolutionized 
the  way  the  West  thought  about  its 
energy  supply.  Before  1973,  cheap,  plen- 
tiful energy— much  of  it  from  Middle 
Eastern  oil— was  taken  for  granted. 
After  1973,  increased  prices  and  securi- 
ty concerns  led  us  to  reduce  dependence 
on  imported  oil  through  conservation 
and  use  of  alternative  fuels  and  to  in- 
crease our  preparations  for  an  energy 
emergency. 

The  reliance  of  TEA  [International 
Energy  Agency]  countries  on  imported 
energy  has  fallen  sharply.  In  1973, 
energy  imports  of  lEA  members  as  a 
group  totaled  23.5  million  b/d  of  oil 
equivalent  from  non-IEA  sources.  In 
1983,  TEA  energy  imports  had  fallen 
35%  to  the  equivalent  of  about  15 
million  b/d  of  oil. 


The  first  reason  for  our  reduced 
dependence  on  imported  oil  is  increased 
energy  production  by  lEA  members.  Be- 
tween 1973  and  1982  lEA  countries  in- 
creased their  output  of  oil  by  20%,  coal 
by  29%,  nuclear  energy  by  270%,  and 
hydroelectric  power  and  other  energy 
sources  by  21%.  Only  natural  gas  output 
decreased  (by  7%).  Oil  now  provides 
about  43.5%  of  total  energy  re- 
quirements of  lEA  member  countries, 
compared  to  51.4%  in  1973.  We  have 
thus  substantially  diversified  our  energy 
supplies. 

The  second  reason  for  our  reduced 
dependence  on  imported  oil  is  energy 
conservation.  While  producing  more 
energy,  we  are  also  producing  more 
goods  and  services  with  less  energy  in- 
put. In  1973,  the  lEA  countries  required 
about  nine-tenths  of  a  ton  of  oil 
equivalent  to  produce  $1,000  of  gross 
domestic  product  (GDP).  In  1983,  we  re- 
quired only  three-quarters  of  a  ton  of  oil 
equivalent  to  produce  the  same  GDP,  a 
reduction  of  about  17%.  Total  energy 
demand  was  about  the  same  in  1983  as 
it  was  in  1973.  The  lEA  countries  have 
not  only  diversified  their  energy  supplies 
but  have  realized  fundamental,  struc- 
tural changes  in  our  economic  systems 
to  make  them  less  energy  intensive. 

We  have  also  made  great  progress 
in  emergency  preparedness  since  that 
first  oil  shortage  in  1973.  The  existence 
of  the  IE  A  and  its  International  Energy 
Program  (lEP)  is  the  clearest  evidence 
of  our  desire  and  ability  to  prepare  for 
emergencies.  Emergency  stocks  and  a 
standby  oil-sharing  program  provide  a 
safety  net  for  the  world  oil  market.  The 
recent  lEA  decision  on  oil  stocks,  which 
I  shall  discuss  later  in  some  detail,  is 
clear  evidence  that  we  are  serious  about 
being  prepared  and  that  the  IE  A  re- 
mains a  vital,  forward-looking  organiza- 
tion—one that  is  essential  to  our  energy 
security. 

Our  commitment  to  the  lEA  and  the 
lEP  remains  firm.  The  United  States 
and  other  lEA  members  regularly  test 
their  procedures  for  an  emergency 
through  the  lEA's  allocation  systems 
tests.  Four  such  tests  have  been  held, 
and  a  fifth  is  scheduled  to  be  held  in  Oc- 
tober and  November  of  1985.  Each  test 
has  provided  valuable  training  to 
government  and  industry  participants  in 
the  procedures  that  would  be  followed  if 
the  sharing  system  were  to  be  activated 
in  a  major  supply  disruption. 


1^ 


<1 


In  addition  to  the  existence  of  a 
scheme  for  sharing  oil  during  crises,  t 
lEA  considers  the  use  of  oil  stocks  to 
an  essential  element  of  preparedness 
under  the  International  Energy  Pro- 
gram. At  present,  lEA  members  hold 
available  stocks  equivalent  to  about  47 
days  of  consumption  or  1,400  million 
barrels.  More  than  half  of  these  avail- 
able stocks  are  private — they  are  neithifs! 
government  owned  nor  controlled 

lEA  members  have  been  building  |er 
stocks  that  are  government  owned  or 
controlled.  These  are  strategic  stocks, 
reserves  that  can  be  made  available  in 
an  emergency.  The  U.S.  Strategic  Pet 
leum  Reserve,  which  was  insignificant 
the  1970s,  now  holds  more  than  430 
million  barrels  of  oil  and  is  growing 
daily.  We  expect  to  reach  our  goal  of 
750  million  barrels  by  1990.  Other  maj 
oil  users,  especially  the  Federal  Repub 
of  Germany  and  Japan,  also  hold  sizab 
strategic  stocks.  Oil  stocks  controlled  b 
lEA  governments  other  than  the  Unit< 
States  now  amount  to  over  300  million 
barrels.  We  estimate  that,  were  a  crisi 
to  occur  today,  lEA  member  govern- 
ments could  supply  from  stocks  they 
control  as  much  as  3.0-3.7  million  b/d 
for  the  first  2  months,  declining  to 
perhaps  2.5-3.0  million  b/d  for  up  to  6 
months.  While  not  adequate  for  every 
conceivable  eventuality,  we  are  clearly 
a  position  to  cushion  the  economic  im- 
pact of  a  major  crisis  and  to  provide 
time  for  the  necessary  adjustments. 

Where  Do  We  Go  From  Here? 

Conservation,  diversification,  and 
greater  preparedness  for  an  energy 
emergency  have  been  the  themes  of  thi 
past  decade.  We  have  come  to  a  cross- 
roads now  where  we  need  to  examine 
our  accomplishments  and  adapt  them  ti 
the  future. 

The  reduction  in  lEA  reliance  on  in 
ported  oil  is  the  central  fact  of  today's 
oil  market.  There  is  growing  evidence, 
however,  that  this  trend  is  coming  to  ai 
end.  Oil  imports  by  OECD  [Organizatioi 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment] countries  increased  13%  in  the 
first  quarter  of  1984  compared  to  the 
same  period  in  1983.  This  is  the  first 
year-to-year  increase  in  the  first  quarte: 
since  1979.  Preliminary  evidence  in- 
dicates that  the  upward  trend  in  oil  im- 


60 


DepartnTient  of  State  Bulletii 


ENERGY 


3rts  has  continued  in  recent  months.  In 
le  United  States,  average  daily  imports 
:  oil  through  mid- August  are  up  11% 
/er  1983.  Nothing  is  certain  in  the  oil 
arket,  however,  and  we  may  see  some 
actuations  in  oil  imports  over  the  next 
w  years.  But  at  current  oil  prices  it 
!ems  reasonable  to  say  that  the  decline 
lEA  oil  imports  is  at  an  end.  If 
jthing  happens  to  upset  the  market,  it 
oks  as  if  the  long-term  trend  now  is 
iward  greater  reliance  on  imports. 
It  may  be  a  long  time  before  in- 
eased  lEA  oil  imports  have  a  signifi- 
.nt  impact  on  oil  prices.  If  there  is  no 
ss  of  production  capacity,  we  can  look 
rward  to  at  least  another  5  and 
;rhaps  as  many  as  10  years  before 
rong  upward  pressure  on  oil  prices 
sumes.  It  is  even  possible  that  in  the 
terim  we  wall  see  temporary  price 
creases.  But  it  is  likely  that  by  the 
190s  we  will  be  faced  with  the  need  to 
:pand  oil  production  and  that  real  up- 
ard  pressure  on  prices  will  return.  By 
en,  lEA  oil  production,  especially  from 
e  United  States  and  from  the  North 
!a,  is  expected  to  be  declining,  and  in- 
genous  alternatives  will  be  more  ex- 
insive  (if  they  are  available  at  all).  Our 
oblem  today  is  to  lay  the  basis  for  con- 
jnting  the  new  era  of  scarce  oil  that 
U  seem  likely  to  enter  in  the  1990s. 
I    Let  me  put  the  matter  another  way: 
Biay  we  rightly  feel  a  sense  of  security 
tilt  comes  from  our  past  efforts.  But  if 
t  it  sense  of  security  lulls  us  into  inac- 
l:  n  it  can  lead  to  insecurity  within  the 
rxt  decade.  I  submit  that  the  basic  ap- 
E  caches  of  the  past  10  years— conserva- 
t  n,  diversification,  and  preparedness— 
B?  needed  also  in  the  next  10  years. 
3  e  lEA,  which  has  helped  to  free  the 
130s  of  oil  crises,  must  continue  its 
aod  work. 

i  nservation  and  Diversification 

[  energy  conservation,  lEA  members 
s  luld  expect  much  slower  gains  in  the 
;  -aile  ahead  than  in  the  one  just  ended. 
]  e  simplest  and  cheapest  improve- 
r'lits  in  energy  efficiency  have  already 
C.'ii  made.  The  rate  of  gain  in  energy 
e  iciency  is  expected  to  fall  by  almost 
5  ^n.  With  moderate  economic  growth, 
t  al  lEA  energy  demand  by  the  end  of 
;  century  will  be  about  30%  higher 
m  it  is  today. 

In  addition  to  conservation,  we  will 

ed  to  continue  to  diversify  away  from 

,  Oil  demand  will  continue  to  grow  in 

solute  terms,  but  lEA  forecasts  call 

oil's  share  to  fall  to  about  one-third 


of  total  lEA  energy  demand  by  the  end 
of  the  century.  Coal  and  nuclear  energy 
will  be  the  primary  substitutes. 

But  this  will  not  happen  automatical- 
ly. We  face  major  environmental  ob- 
stacles to  expanded  use  of  both  coal  and 
nuclear  energy.  These  will  have  to  be 
faced  in  a  pragmatic  way,  with  due  at- 
tention paid  to  economic  feasibility.  No 
one  can  predict  how  the  competition  be- 
tween nuclear  energy  and  coal  will  turn 
out.  The  essential  point  is  that  both  op- 
tions must  be  kept  viable.  We  must  not 
revert,  because  of  soft  prices  and  en- 
vironmental concerns,  to  oil-fired  boilers 
in  industry  or  in  electrical  generation. 

I  am  convinced  that  the  environ- 
mental obstacles  can  be  overcome.  Great 
gains  have  already  been  made  in  clean 
burning  of  coal,  and  new  technologies 
can  make  coal  even  cleaner.  But  we 
must  move  cautiously.  It  would  be  a 
great  mistake  to  impose  an  expensive 
pollution  control  technology  only  to 
discover  later  that  it  did  little  to  control 
the  emissions  that  are  causing  en- 
vironmental problems.  For  nuclear 
energy  the  problems  are  more  fully 
understood,  but  we  still  lack  proven 
solutions  for  disposal  of  high-level  radio- 
active waste,  for  responding  to  the  small 
risks  of  major  accidents,  and  for  satisfy- 
ing public  concerns.  I  expect  no  single, 
magical  solution  to  these  problems. 
What  counts  is  steady  progress  and  the 
will  to  keep  the  nuclear  option  alive. 

Natural  Gas 

In  addition  to  coal  and  nuclear  energy, 
natural  gas  will  play  an  important  role 
in  the  future  as  an  alternative  to  im- 
ported oil.  Gas  is  a  clean  and  efficient 
fuel  that  is  attractive  for  many  uses.  It 
has  helped  reduce  the  use  of  oil — not- 
ably in  home  heating  and,  to  a  lesser  ex- 
tent, in  industrial  applications.  Gas  is 
especially  attractive  in  residential  and 
commercial  uses,  an  area  in  which  its 
share  is  likely  to  increase. 

Gas,  however,  raises  its  own  securi- 
ty concerns,  particularly  as  its  impor- 
tance in  the  sensitive  residential  and 
commercial  sector  grows.  Industrial 
users  can,  and  do,  switch  between  fuels 
much  more  easily  than  homeowners  and 
other  small  users  can.  In  the  immediate 
aftermath  of  the  1973-74  crisis,  lEA 
members  tended  to  equate  improved 
energy  security  exclusively  with  reduced 
imports  of  oil.  In  the  early  1980s,  there 
came  a  new  realization  that  non-oil 
sources  of  imports  could  no  longer  be 


necessarily  considered  as  "better"  or 
more  secure  than  oil  and  that  excessive 
dependence  on  any  single  external 
source  of  gas  could  create  serious 
problems. 

lEA  and  OECD  ministers  have 
agreed  on  the  importance  of  working  ac- 
tively and  cooperatively  to  enhance 
Western  natural  gas  security  in  the 
policy  conclusions  reached  at  the  May 
1983  ministerial  meetings.  Energy 
security  requires  that  we  limit  undue 
dependence  on  any  single  external  sup- 
plier of  energy.  We  need  in  gas,  as  in 
oil,  to  develop  indigenous  energy  re- 
sources to  the  maximum  economically 
feasible  extent. 

The  time  is  approaching  for  major 
decisions  on  natural  gas  supply  for  the 
1990s  and  beyond.  In  order  to  build  the 
necessary  infrastructure,  we  must  make 
decisions  within  the  next  couple  of  years 
that  will  determine  the  availability  dur- 
ing the  next  century  of  natural  gas  from 
secure  sources.  We  must  not  let  our 
long-term  need  for  secure  sources  of 
energy  be  obscured  by  temporary  sur- 
pluses at  the  moment  of  decision.  We 
are  living  with  the  consequences  of  over- 
reaction  to  market  conditions  by  gas 
buyers  and  sellers  a  few  years  ago.  At 
that  time,  the  gas  business  was  driven 
by  the  need  to  ensure  adequate  supplies, 
and  a  number  of  large,  expensive  con- 
tracts were  signed  that  seem  uneco- 
nomic now.  This  turn  of  events  has 
naturally  encouraged  caution  on  the  part 
of  those  who  must  invest  in  the  re- 
sources on  which  our  future  security  de- 
pends. But  if  we  now  overreact  by  refus- 
ing to  take  the  steps  necessary  to  ensure 
supplies,  we  will  not  have  the  gas  when 
we  need  it. 

Increased  Preparedness 

No  matter  how  successful  we  may  be  in 
conserving  energy  and  diversifying  away 
from  oil,  we  will  need  to  continue  to 
prepare  for  a  possible  disruption  of  oil 
imports,  which  remain  essential  to  our 
economic  well-being.  Despite  the  prog- 
ress we  have  made,  our  reliance  on  im- 
ported energy— especially  oil— remains 
high.  More  than  half  the  oil  used  in  lEA 
countries— or  almost  a  quarter  of  our 
total  energy  supply— still  comes  from 
outside  the  lEA,  primarily  from  the 
member  countries  of  OPEC.  We  value 
our  good  trading  relations  with  our  oil 
suppliers,  but  at  the  same  time  we  must 
recognize  that,  for  many  reasons,  nor- 
mal trade  flows  can  be  and  have  been 


!cember  1984 


61 


ENERGY 


disi-upted.  Such  disruptions,  whatever 
lie  cause,  can  be  enormously  costly  to 
our  economies. 

We  believe  that  the  enhancement  of 
energj'  supplies  in  an  emergency  could 
discourage  panic-induced  reactions  and 
mitigate  these  economic  consequences. 
In  the  United  States  we  have,  therefore, 
set  forth  a  general  policy  of  drawing 
down  the  Strategic  Petroleum  Reserve 
in  large  volumes  early  in  a  crisis.  We 
believe  that,  if  we  do,  it  will  have  the  ef- 
fect of  supplementing  and  enhancing  the 
collective  capacity  of  the  member  states 
of  the  International  Energy  Agency  to 
respond  effectively  to  serious  oil  supply 
disruptions  and  will  benefit  all  oil  con- 
suming countries. 

Last  July  11,  the  IE  A  Governing 
Board  reached  a  decision  on  the  use  of 
stocks  in  supply  disruptions.  This  deci- 
sion, in  our  view,  is  a  key  element  in 
preparedness  for  possible  future  oil 
shocks.  The  member  states  have  agreed 
that  the  early  drawdown  of  emergency 
stocks  in  the  case  of  an  oil  supply 
dismption  and  other  mutually  supportive 
actions  to  restore  the  supply  and  de- 
mand balance  are  vital  elements  in 
minimizing  economic  damage.  In  time  of 
crisis,  the  decision  envisages  that  a  con- 
sultative group  of  those  nations  in  a 
position  to  contribute  meaningfully  will 
meet  to  work  toward  "timely,  coor- 
dinated stock  draw."  This  group,  which 
is  open  to  all  OECD  members,  provides 
an  opportunity  for  key  energy  con- 
sumers to  meet  quickly  and  informally. 
Although  the  lEA  Governing  Board 
fully  retains  all  of  its  institutional 
responsibilities,  the  smaller  group  would 
be  free  to  decide  on  and  implement  a 
coordinated  stock  draw  by  its  par- 
ticipants, starting  before  activation  of 
the  lEA's  emergency  allocation  system. 
President  Reagan  has  long  stressed 
the  need  for  international  cooperation  on 
energy  security  and  was  very  pleased 
with  the  results  of  the  July  1 1  meeting. 
Secretary  of  Energy  Hodel  character- 
ized the  decision  as  "exceptionally 
significant."  The  Chairman  of  the  lEA 
Governing  Board,  Mr.  Alan  Woods  of 
Australia,  described  it  as  "one  of  the 
most  significant  achievements  in  the 
lEA's  ten-year  history."  lEA  Executive 
Director  Mrs.  Helga  Steeg  emphasized 
the  flexibility  of  the  new  arrangement 
and  the  potential  of  timely,  coordinated 
action  for  calming  psychologically  in- 
duced fears  and  the  prevention  of  panic 
buying  in  an  emergency. 


Economic  predictions  are  notoriously 
unreliable.  They  are  said  by  some  to 
have  only  one  purpose:  making  astrology 
respectable.  Predictions  of  the  economic 
impact  of  a  hypothetical  future  oil  crisis 
have  to  be  regarded  as  doubly  uncer- 
tain—both the  disruption  of  oil  supply 
and  its  economic  impact  are  likely  to 
follow  unpredictable  courses.  But  we 
can,  from  economic  modeling,  get  some 
idea  of  the  order  of  magnitude  of  possi- 
ble economic  damage  and  of  the  benefits 
of  drawing  on  oil  stocks  during  a  crisis. 
To  illustrate  why  we  think  this  July 
lEA  decision  is  so  important,  let  me 
assume  that  a  major  net  loss  of  oil  to 
the  world  market  occurred  in  the  first 
quarter  of  this  year.  The  early  draw- 
down of  the  U.S.  Strategic  Petroleum 
Reserve  at  a  rate  of  2.1  million  b/d  could 
have  limited  the  resulting  rise  in  prices. 
This  might  have  mitigated  something 
like  one-third  of  the  resulting  economic 
damage.  What  further  difference  would 
a  coordinated  stockdraw  have  made? 
Assuming  that  stocks  controlled  by 
Western  Europe  and  Japan  could  be 
drawn  down  at  2  million  b/d,  it  has  been 
estimated  that  the  economic  impacts 
would  have  been  less  than  half  of  what 
was  estimated  without  any  drawdown  of 
strategic  stocks.  The  impact  of  such  a 
disruption  would  be  dramatically  less 
severe  than  that  of  the  disruption  of 
1973-74,  even  though  the  initial  net  loss 
of  oil  to  the  world  market  might  be  sub- 
stantially larger.  And,  I  might  add,  the 
proceeds  from  the  sale  of  oil  stocks 
would  have  largely— perhaps  com- 
pletely—defrayed the  costs  of  buying 
and  holding  them.  Oil  stocks,  in  our 
view,  are  insurance,  and  the  premiums 
we  pay  today  are  reasonable. 

We  might  still  face  the  need,  even 
with  this  coordinated  stock  drawdown, 
to  activate  the  lEA's  existing  emergency 
allocation  system.  Let  there  be  no  doubt 
about  it:  The  United  States  is  prepared 
to  fulfill  its  obligations  under  this 
sy.stem.  The  coordinated  stock  draw- 
down would  make  the  need  for  activa- 
tion of  the  IE  A  allocation  system  less 
likely,  but  it  would  also— and  here  is  the 
key  point— make  the  allocation  system 
more  likely  to  succeed  once  activated. 
No  one  imagines  that  activation  of  the 
lEA  allocation  system  in  a  shortfall  of  5 
million  b/d  would  be  without  problems. 
If  that  shortfall  were,  in  effect,  reduced 
to  1  million  b/d  by  a  coordinated 
stockdraw,  our  odds  of  success  would  be 
much  better. 


Future  lEA  Work  on  Preparedness 

The  July  11  decision  of  the  IE  A  Govern 
ing  Board  signals  not  the  successful  con 
elusion  of  our  efforts  in  this  area  but 
only  the  beginning.  It  constitutes  a  ver; 
important  policy  commitment,  but  muci 
remains  to  be  done.  The  foUowup  phase 
to  the  decision  is  of  fundamental  impor 
tance.  Numerous  questions  must  be 
answered  if  the  new  agreement  is  to 
have  clear,  practical  consequences.  This 
was  recognized  explicitly  in  annex  2  to 
the  July  decision,  which  outlines  work 
that  we  plan  to  pursue  within  the  lEA 
to  give  practical  embodiment  to  the 
general  idea  of  an  early  coordinated 
reaction  to  an  oil  supply  disruption. 

There  are  two  fundamental  re- 
quirements at  present:  building  stocks  ■ 
adequate  levels  and  ensuring  that  they 
can  be  drawn  down  quickly  and  effec- 
tively. Stocks  may  look  sufficient  on 
paper,  but  the  situation  can  be  very  difl 
ferent  in  practice.  In  the  United  States 
we  have  found  that  about  half  of  our 
commercially  held  stocks  cannot,  in  fac 
be  used  because  they  constitute  what  v 
term  "minimum  operating  require- 
ments," i.e.,  they  are  needed  for  the 
proper  operation  of  our  oil  supply 
system  or  are  otherwise  unavailable  (oi 
in  heavy  tank  bottoms,  for  example).  I 
Western  Europe  and  Japan,  there  is 
uncertainty  about  how  much  of  the 
stocks  would,  in  fact,  be  available  for 
use  in  an  emergency. 

There  are  also  doubts  that  arise 
from  institutional  and  legal  problems.  I 
some  countries,  emergency  stocks  are 
held  by  oil  companies.  Would  these 
stocks  be  made  available  early  in  an 
emergency,  or  would  commercial  in- 
terests, which  may  favor  holding  stock 
prevail?  Do  national  laws  permit  gover 
ments  to  order  companies  to  use 
emergency  stocks  early  in  a  disruption 
perhaps  before  an  official  emergency  h 
been  declared?  In  the  United  States  w< 
believe  that  government-owned  stocks 
are  the  best  approach,  though  we 
respect  the  desire  of  other  IE  A 
members  to  rely  on  privately  held 
stocks.  We  want  to  be  sure,  however, 
that  stocks— whoever  owns  them— can 
in  fact,  be  readily  used  early  in  a  disru 
tion. 

I  could  go  on  about  other  aspects  c 
emergency  preparedness  that  require  i 
tention  in  the  months  and  years  ahead 
Some  of  our  friends  and  allies  believe 


62 


EUROPE 


ht  tlu'v  can  cope  effectively  with  a 
i-u|'ti(in  by  reducing  demand  for  oil 
sIht  than  by  lirawing  on  stocks.  These 
mand  restraint"  measures  need  to  he 
ted  at  carefully  and  their  contribu- 
is  quantified.  In  a  disruption,  we 
fer  demand  restraint  that  comes 
n  price  increases.  We  have  doubts 
?ther  government  regulation  can  do 
job.  whether  government  action 
]ld  not  cause  additional  economic 
;es,  and  whether  governments  will  be 
ing  to  suffer  the  resulting  political 
m.  We  also  need  to  look  more  closely 
he  potential  contribution  of  switching 
Is  quickly  in  an  oil  disruption.  How 
:h  oil  can  be  backed  out  and  how 
?kly?  But  I  hope  already  to  have 
ie  my  point:  we  have  more  to  do  to 
pare,  and  we  would  be  wise  to  use 
time  we  have  to  prepare  well. 
While  there  are  many  problems  to 
overcome,  solutions  are  available  if 
are  willing  to  make  the  necessary  ef- 
:  and  commit  the  needed  resources, 
;  as  one  would  pay  an  insurance 
mium.  There  are  grounds  for  neither 
ic  nor  complacency.  We  have  learned 
le  real  lessons  over  the  past  decade, 
we  now  have  an  opportunity  to  take 
antage  of  this  experience.  All  coun- 
s,  consumers  and  producers  alike, 
e  an  interest  in  preventing  the  highly 
■uptive,  unpredictable  turbulence  in 
market  we  saw  on  occasion  in  the 
Os.  It  is  especially  important  for  the 
or  consuming  countries  to  provide 
the  secure  energy  supplies  our 
nomies  require.  In  our  view,  this 
ms  investing  in  stocks  in  the  short 
m  and  conserving  and  diversifying 
rgy  supplies  in  the  longer  term, 
urity  is  cheap  when  compared  to  the 
,e  costs  we  have  paid  in  the  past.  ■ 


NATO  and 

the  Challenges  Ahead 


by  Michael  H.  Armacost 

Address  before  the  30th  meeting  of 
the  Atlantic  Treaty  Association  in 
Toronto  on  October  10.  198J,.  Ajnbas- 
sador  Armacost  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs. 

May  I  begin  by  thanking  the  Atlantic 
Treaty  Association  and  the  Atlantic 
Council  of  Canada  for  the  opportunity  to 
be  with  you  as  we  celebrate  the 
achievements  of  the  North  Atlantic 
alliance.  Viev/ed  from  Washington,  the 
alliance  is  stronger  than  ever,  and  we 
now  have  the  momentum  to  seize  new 
opportunities— the  altogether  ap- 
propriate theme  of  this  conference. 

The  NATO  alliance  remains  the  cor- 
nerstone of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  It  not 
only  embodies  a  fundamental  security  in- 
terest; it  represents  a  community  of 
moral  and  political  values.  It  is  no  acci- 
dent that  one  of  America's  most  durable 
peacetime  alliances  is  with  our  fellow 
democracies  of  the  Atlantic  world. 

This  afternoon  I  would  like  to  speak 
to  you  on  three  issues  of  continuing  con- 
cern to  all  of  us:  first,  the  security  of 
Europe  following  the  successful  com- 
mencement of  intermediate-range 
nuclear  missile  deployments;  second,  the 
outlook  for  East- West  and  U.S. -Soviet 
relations  following  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko's  meetings  with  President 
Reagan  and  Secretary  of  State  Shultz; 
and  third,  the  importance  to  NATO 
security  of  maintenance  of  a  favorable 
balance  of  forces  in  other  geographic 
regions.  I  have  been  asked,  in  particular, 
to  comment  on  the  security  situation  in 
the  Asia/Pacific  region.  This  is  especially 
appropriate  in  Canada— a  country  with 
the  closest  of  ties  to  Europe  and  which 
also  looks  increasingly  toward  the 
Pacific  Basin. 

European  Security  After 
the  INF  Deployments 

Let  me  begin  with  some  thoughts  about 
European  security.  In  recent  years  allied 
governments  and  their  publics  have 
focused  special  concern  on  how  best  to 
control  nuclear  weapons  and  further 
diminish  the  risk  of  nuclear  conflict.  Our 
success  in  implementing  NATO's  1979 
two-track  decision  on  INF  [intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces]  has  bolstered  the 


deterrent  posture  on  which  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  depends,  increased 
Soviet  incentives  to  negotiate  real 
restraints  on  these  weapons,  denied  the 
Soviet  Union  a  significant  political  and 
psychological  victory,  and  strengthened 
NATO's  cohesion.  The  alliance  can  be 
justifiably  proud  of  this  accomplishment. 

Our  conventional  military  capability, 
however,  continues  to  lag  behind  that  of 
the  Warsaw  Pact,  and  Moscow  continues 
to  build  up  its  conventional  forces.  This 
leaves  NATO  reliant  to  an  uncomfort- 
able degree  on  the  threat  of  nuclear 
escalation.  Today,  therefore,  our  top 
priority  within  the  alliance  should  be  to 
reduce  this  reliance  by  strengthening 
our  combined  conventional  defense 
capabilities. 

Some  argue  that  Warsaw  Pact  ad- 
vantages in  conventional  forces  are  so 
overwhelming  that  NATO  has  no  hope 
of  implementing  an  effective  conven- 
tional defense:  NATO  would  have  to  re- 
spond to  a  conventional  attack  by  the 
early  use  of  nuclear  weapons,  so  the 
argument  goes,  thus  making  im- 
provements in  conventional  defense 
capabilities  an  expensive  exercise  in 
futility.  Others  argue  that  even  if  NATO 
were  to  mount  a  successful  conventional 
defense,  any  conflict  would  spell  disaster 
for  Europe. 

Rather  than  accepting  these 
pessimistic  prognoses,  we  should  focus 
on  the  main  point:  stronger,  modernized 
conventional  forces  will  reduce  the  risk 
of  aggression,  and  preventing  conflict 
has  always  been  the  fundamental  pur- 
pose of  the  alliance.  Effective  deterrence 
in  a  period  of  nuclear  parity  requires 
those  conventional  capabilities  necessary 
to  implement  the  flexible  response 
strategy.  This  objective,  moreover,  is 
within  our  reach.  NATO  has  a 
technological  lead  over  the  Warsaw 
Pact,  as  well  as  superior  industrial, 
economic,  and  manpower  resources. 

Thus,  there  are  several  reasons  for 
undertaking  a  serious  effort  at  this  time 
to  modernize  NATO's  conventional 
defense. 

First,  to  maintain  the  credibility  of 
NATO's  deterrence,  we  must  respond  to 
the  sustained  Warsaw  Pact  conventional 
military  buildup,  which  far  exceeds  the 
pact's  legitimate  defense  needs. 


63 


EUROPE 


Second,  public  debate  in  Europe  and 
North  America  over  the  dangers  of 
nuclear  weapons  provides  a  powerful 
argument  for  raising  the  nuclear 
threshold;  that  is,  strengthening  our 
defenses  in  ways  that  reduce 
dependence  on  nuclear  weapons. 

Third,  technologies  are  emerging 
that  offer  us  new  possibilities  of  more 
effective  conventional  defense,  as  well  as 
better  battlefield  tactics. 

Fourth,  there  is  deep  concern 
among  knowledgeable  American  sup- 
porters of  NATO  about  the  ability  of  the 
alliance  to  withstand  a  conventional  at- 
tack and  about  the  adequacy  of  allied 
contributions  to  the  common  defense. 
Senator  Nunn's  recent  amendment 
regarding  U.S.  troop  withdrawals  from 
Europe— an  amendment  which  the 
Reagan  Administration  vigorously  and 
successfully  opposed— is  only  the  tip  of 
that  iceberg. 

These  considerations  have  prompted 
a  great  deal  of  reflection,  inside  and  out- 
side governments,  on  ways  to  improve 


NATO's  conventional  defenses.  It  will 
take  strong  political  leadership  within 
each  country— and  concrete,  effective, 
coherent  programs— to  develop  and  nur- 
ture the  necessary  public  support.  At 
NATO  headquarters,  we  are  confident 
that  Lord  Carrington,  like  his 
distinguished  predecessor  Dr.  Luns,  will 
provide  the  vigorous  moral  and  intellec- 
tual leadership  that  is  required. 

Our  expanded  efforts  cannot  be  the 
product  of  any  one  nation.  Collective 
security  requires  collaborative  endeavor. 
Improvements  in  NATO's  conventional 
forces  will  require  increased  defense 
resources,  which  raises  again  the  ques- 
tion of  the  equitable  sharing  of  these 
burdens  within  the  alliance.  It  is  no 
secret  that  some  members  of  the 
alliance,  and  not  always  the  richest,  in- 
vest far  more  heavily  in  defense  than 
some  others,  not  always  the  poorest.  I 
recognize  that  the  picture  changes  over 
time.  The  allied  share  of  the  overall 
defense  effort  increased  relative  to  that 
of  the  United  States  during  the  1970s 
because  of  a  steady  increase  in  allied 


\i 


Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs 


Michael  H.  Armacost  wa.s  born  April  \h. 
1937,  in  Cleveland,  Ohio.  He  is  a  graduate  of 
Carleton  College  (B.A.,  1958)  and  Columbia 
University  (M.A.,  1961;  Ph.D.,  1965). 


He  was  an  instructor  of  government 
(1962-65)  and  assistant  professor  of  govern- 
ment (1965-68)  at  Pomona  College  in  Clare- 
mont,  Calif.  In  1968-69  he  was  visiting  pro- 
fessor of  international  relations  at  the  Inter- 
national Christian  University  in  Tokyo.  He 
was  then  lecturer  at  Johns  Hopkins  Universi- 
ty (1970-71)  and  at  Georgetown  University 
(1971-72). 

Ambassador  Armacost  was  a  member  of 
the  Policy  Planning  Staff  at  the  Department 
in  1969-72  and  1974-77.  During  1972-74  he 
was  special  assistant  to  the  U.S.  Ambassador 
to  Japan.  In  1977-78  he  was  senior  staff 
member  for  East  Asia  at  the  National  Securi- 
ty Council  and  in  1978-80  served  as  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense.  In  1980-82 
he  was  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs.  He  was 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  Philippines  from 
1982  until  his  present  appointment.  He  was 
sworn  in  as  Under  Secretary  of  State  for 
Political  Affairs  on  May  18,"  1984. 

Ambassador  Armacost  includes  among 
his  awards  the  State  Department's  Superior 
Honor  Award  and  the  Department  of 
Defen.se's  Distinguished  Civilian  Service 
Award.  He  is  a  career  member  of  the  Senior 
Foreign  Service,  Class  of  Minister 
Counselor.  ■ 


(k 


t 


defense  budgets  during  a  period  of 
decline  in  real  terms  in  U.S.  defense 
budgets. 

In  the  last  4  years,  however,  the 
United  States  has  increased  its  defense 
spending  much  more  rapidly  than  most 
of  its  allies.  And  while  some  allies  have 
maintained  very  substantial  defense  pro 
grams  in  the  face  of  economic  dif- 
ficulties, others'  efforts  appear  inade- 
quate to  the  threat  and  less  than  what  i 
affordable.  Without  a  more  substantial 
and  balanced  effort,  the  alliance  will  be 
able  neither  to  maintain  an  adequate 
deterrent  nor  sustain  the  crucial  politics 
consensus  on  which  our  partnership  is 
based. 

We  must  clearly  focus  on  specific  ob 
jectives  and  requirements— not  just 
money  spent  but  the  specific  results 
which  are  needed.  To  show  that  results 
can  be  achieved  promptly,  we  need  to 
look  for  some  short-term  remedies  for 
the  most  urgent  deficiencies.  One  such 
requirement  is  for  additional  facilities  tc 
receive  and  sustain  reinforcements  that 
the  United  States  and  Canada  might 
transport  across  the  Atlantic.  Another 
high  priority  is  expanding  the  reserve 
forces  that  could  be  mobilized  by  our 
European  allies  in  an  emergency.  In  ad- 
dition, the  augmentation  of  ammunition 
stocks— a  crucial  component  of  readi- 
ness—merits high  priority  attention. 

There  are  other  critical  deficiencies 
that  can  be  addressed  effectively  only 
through  sustained  effort  over  an  ex- 
tended period.  But  we  must  not  yield  to 
the  temptation  to  substitute  still  more 
studies  for  a  program  of  concrete  ac- 
tions. Given  the  economic  constraints 
under  which  all  the  allies  labor,  real  im- 
provement in  alliance  conventional 
defense  will  almost  certainly  require 
major  efforts  to  make  more  efficient  us( 
of  defense  resources. 

There  will  have  to  be  better  trans- 
atlantic cooperation  and  a  more  open  ex 
change  among  national  defense  in- 
dustries, while  at  the  same  time  protec- 
tion against  diversion  of  militarily 
significant  technology  must  be  sus- 
tained. The  United  States  recognizes 
that  many  allies  are  concerned  about 
achieving  access  to  our  own  defense 
market.  We  want  to  help,  and  we  have 
moved  against  restrictive  provisions  in 
our  legislation.  By  the  same  token,  we 
believe  other  members  of  the  alliance 
must  ease  their  own  restrictive  laws  and 
practices  and  increase  their  investment 
in  defense  technology.  Overall,  we  can 
stimulate  greater  cooperation  among 
defense  industries  on  a  more  competitive 
basis  if  we  show  the  political  will  to 
create  a  larger  and  more  open  market  in 


64 


EUROPE 


defense  products  and  in  high 
;hnology  in  particular. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  one  of 
?  arguments  for  looking  now  at  the 
provement  of  NATO  conventional 
fense  is  the  emergence  of  new 
;hnologies,  which  provide  additional 
vantages  to  the  defense  and  enhanced 
portunities  for  industrial  collaboration, 
th  would  increase  the  efficiency  and 
'ectiveness  of  NATO's  conventional 
fense  efforts. 

The  rapid  buildup  of  the  Warsaw 
,ct's  conventional  forces  is  NATO's 
eatest  current  challenge.  We  must 
)ve  quickly  to  reinforce  our  conven- 
nal  defense  capabilities  and  thereby 
lintain  our  deterrent,  which  is  a 
econdition  for  progress  on  East- West 
ations. 

ospects  for  Improved 
ist-West  Relations 

e  ultimate  goal  of  our  defense  efforts 
to  enhance  security  and  lay  the  foun- 
tion  for  a  reduction  of  East- West  ten- 
ns.  Deterrence  is  necessary  but  not 
[ficient.  Peace,  as  E.B.  White  once 
t  it,  is  not  merely  "nothing  bad 
ppening"  but  "something  good  happen- 
',."  While  continuing  to  strengthen  our 
fenses,  we  must  also  redouble  our  ef- 
•ts  to  improve  our  relations  with  the 
.St.  And  that  is  precisely  what  the 
lagan  Administration  has  been 
tempting  to  do. 

U.S.  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union 
ve  persistently  reflected  elements  of 
nflict  and  cooperation.  We  are,  after 

natural  geopolitical  rivals,  and  we 
i  engaged  in  a  long-term  competition 
ipolitical  values— a  struggle  the 
viets  themselves  say  is  inevitable.  Yet 
B  are  also  necessary  partners  in  the 
t;ks  of  limiting  the  arms  race,  averting 
ai  managing  crises,  and  preventing 
r  i^ional  conflicts  from  becoming  great 
pver  confrontations. 

We  Americans  take  some  satisfac- 
t  n  from  our  relative  position  in  the 
g  jpolitical  competition.  Our  defenses 
3'  improving.  Our  economy  is  robust. 
C  r  alliances  are  in  sound  condition.  A 
a  id  domestic  consensus  on  foreign 
f  licy  is  reemerging  in  the  United 
i;  itfs.  The  West  has  the  diplomatic  ini- 
ttive  in  dealing  with  regional  conflicts 
rsiiuthern  Africa,  Central  America, 
i  lochina,  and  the  Middle  East.  We  can 
'  ■  I  ake  satisfaction  from  the  growing 
.,  pt  al  of  democratic  values  and  the 
owing  respect  for  human  rights  in 
iny  areas  of  the  world.  Meanwhile,  the 
viet  Union  faces  economic  difficulties, 
;reasing  restlessness  among  its  East 


)cember  1984 


European  allies,  and  a  steady  decline  in 
the  appeal  of  its  ideology. 

Even  as  we  respond  to  the  com- 
petitive challenge,  we  are  prepared  to 
expand  areas  of  cooperation  with 
Moscow.  We  have  no  illusions  that 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko's  meetings 
with  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State  herald  an  imminent  breakthrough 
in  U.S. -Soviet  relations.  But  while  Mr. 
Gromyko  did  not  reveal  changes  in  well- 
known  Soviet  positions,  his  visit  was 
significant  because  it  marked  a  Soviet 
willingness  to  renew  a  higher  level  of 
dialogue. 

We  welcome  the  prospect.  We  have 
much  to  discuss.  It  is  important,  and  in 
the  interests  of  both  countries,  and,  in- 
deed, of  the  world: 

•  To  resume  the  nuclear  arms  con- 
trol process  and  make  significant  prog- 
ress in  ongoing  arms  control  negotia- 
tions; 

•  To  discuss  regional  problems  to 
reduce  the  risks  of  confrontation  or 
miscalculation; 

•  To  resolve  bilateral  issues  in  a 
businesslike  and  productive  manner;  and 

•  To  make  progress  on  human 
rights  questions. 

We  have  placed  many  arms  control 
proposals  on  the  table  over  the  past 
several  years.  Regarding  strategic  arms, 
our  goal  is  to  enhance  stability  and 
reduce  the  risk  of  war  through  signifi- 
cant reduction  in  U.S.  and  Soviet 
ballistic  missile  forces,  particularly  the 
most  destabilizing  systems.  We  are 
prepared  for  an  agreement  reducing 
INF  missiles  to  lower,  equal  levels  or 
eliminating  them  altogether.  We  have 
proposed  a  complete  ban  on  chemical 
weapons.  The  West  has  made  concrete 
proposals  to  limit  conventional  forces  in 
Europe  and  to  create  a  system  of 
confidence-building  measures  to  reduce 
the  risks  of  a  European  war.  We  have 
urged  improvements  in  verification 
techniques  to  ensure  compliance  with 
the  unratified  Threshold  'Test  Ban  and 
Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treaties. 
We  remain  prepared  to  negotiate  on 
what  the  Soviets  call  the  militarization 
of  space  and  had,  indeed,  accepted 
without  preconditions  the  Soviet  pro- 
posal for  talks  in  Vienna  last  month. 

When  he  met  with  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko,  President  Reagan  made  a 
number  of  suggestions  for  further  con- 
tact, including  a  regular  pattern  of 
U.S. -Soviet  consultations.  We  hope 
Moscow  will  respond  positively,  and  I 
believe  the  prospects  are  reasonably 
good  that  a  serious  and  substantive 
U.S. -Soviet  dialogue  will  resume  after 
our  elections.  For  our  part,  we  are 


prepared  to  address  the  outstanding 
problems  between  us  and  to  seek  to  sur- 
mount them.  We  shall  approach  this 
task  with  realism,  with  patience,  and 
with  an  awareness  that  negotiated 
agreements  must  embrace  the  interests 
of  both  parties. 

The  Asia/Pacific  Region 

Regional  issues  are  among  the  subjects 
we  have  proposed  to  include  in  an  ex- 
panded dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
While  we  will  have  no  part  of  any  at- 
tempt to  promote  a  superpower  con- 
dominium, we  are  also  aware  that 
regional  hostilities  can  lead  to  wider  con- 
flict. The  purpose  of  such  exchanges 
would  be  to  increase  understanding  of 
our  respective  interests  and  policies  and 
to  diminish  risks  of  miscalculation. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  become  a 
global  power  with  a  global  strategy.  The 
security  of  Europe  and  of  the  NATO 
treaty  area  is  now,  more  than  ever, 
directly  affected  by  events  and 
challenges  in  other  areas:  for  example, 
the  Persian  Gulf,  which  is  the  West's  oil 
lifeline;  Central  America,  which  directly 
affects  the  security  and  overall  role  of 
the  United  States;  and  East  Asia,  the 
Soviet  Union's  eastern  front. 

Thus  far,  I  have  been  speaking  of 
NATO  as  a  formal  alliance  with  an  iden- 
tifiable structure  and  specific  geographic 
limits.  In  considering  challenges  to  our 
respective  security  interests  outside  the 
treaty  area,  we  may,  however,  identify 
opportunities  to  cooperate  as  allies  even 
though  the  alliance  per  se  may  not  be 
the  appropriate  instrument  for  manag- 
ing that  cooperation. 

In  this  regard,  important  oppor- 
tunities in  East  Asia  deserve  great  at- 
tention from  NATO  allies.  Why? 
Because  the  dynamism  of  East  Asia 
makes  the  area  increasingly  important 
to  the  security  and  prosperity  of  the 
West. 

This  proposition  is  readily 
understandable  to  Americans.  Twice  in 
the  postwar  period,  American  military 
forces  have  been  directly  engaged  in 
Asian  conflicts.  Our  security  continues 
to  require  an  equilibrium  in  Asia,  and  no 
such  equilibrium  is  foreseeable  without 
American  participation. 

Secondly,  Asian  economic  dynamism 
has  made  the  region  an  increasingly  im- 
portant source  of  Western  prosperity. 
As  former  Prime  Minister  Trudeau  said 
during  his  visit  last  year  to  Japan: 

I  can  see  the  Asian  Pacific  region  in  the 
21st  century  being  the  engine  of  global 
economic  and  cultural  development  that 
Europe  was  in  the  19th  century.  The  poten- 
tial is  in  their  resources,  a  vast  population, 
the  dramatic  chemistry  of  Eastern  culture 
and  Western  technique.  .  .  . 

65 


EUROPE 


Today,  following  their  own  economic 
"miracle,"  the  nations  of  the  Asia/Pacific 
region  account  for  one-sixth  of  total 
world  trade.  Over  one-third  of  total  U.S. 
trade  is  now  conducted  with  the  region. 
European  trade  with  Asia  has  also  ex- 
panded rapidly. 

For  all  these  reasons,  too,  the  West 
has  an  interest  in  preserving  the  in- 
dependence of  our  partners  in  Asia.  We 
have  a  stake  in  the  region's  continued 
economic  development,  in  the 
strengthening  of  Asian  political  institu- 
tions, and  in  the  protection  of  those  sea 
routes  over  which  vast  trade  flows  now 
move  between  East  Asia  and  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  and  Europe  and  the  United 
States. 

Japan  and  China,  in  particular, 
figure  as  increasingly  weighty  elements 
in  the  global  configuration  of  forces. 
Any  joining  of  the  military  power  of  the 
Soviet  Union  with  either  the  vast  man- 
power of  China  or  the  industrial  prowess 
of  Japan  would  have  the  most  profound 
consequences  for  the  global  balance. 
Happily,  there  is  little  prospect  of  such 
developments. 

A  spirit  of  cooperation  and  common 
identity  with  the  West  has  developed 
rapidly  over  the  past  decade  in  Japan. 
Tokyo's  foreign  policy  has  developed 
from  a  nearly  exclusive  emphasis  on  the 
protection  of  its  economic  interests  to  a 
more  diversified  focus— which  includes 
strategic  considerations— appropriate 
to  Japan's  emerging  global  role.  This 
evolution  reflects  a  Japanese  decision 
to  define  itself,  in  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone's  words,  as  "a  full  member  of 
the  West." 

The  Williamsburg  summit  declara- 
tion manifested  recognition  of  the  in- 
creasing closeness  among  Japan, 
Europe,  and  North  America.  Japan  has 
supported  the  allies  on  sanctions  toward 
Poland;  it  has  devoted  increased 
economic  assistance  to  countries  of 
strategic  importance  to  the  West;  it  has 
financed  a  large  proportion  of  the  UN 
costs  for  Indochinese  refugees;  and  it 
has  endorsed  joint  allied  statements  on 
arms  control  and  security. 

China  also  has  a  pivotal  role.  Sur- 
rounded by  Soviet  and  Soviet-backed 
forces  on  three  sides,  China  has  long 
demonstrated  its  resolve  to  oppose  ex- 
ternal pressures.  Beijing's  diplomatic 
emphasis  on  Cambodia,  Afghanistan, 
SS-20s,  and  Soviet  border  forces 
derives  directly  from  this  strategic  con- 
cern and  the  prospect  of  long-term  Sino- 
Soviet  competition  in  Asia. 

This  reality  of  Sino-Soviet  rivalry 
has  important  consequences. 


66 


20th  Report  on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
OCT.  17,  1984' 

In  accordance  with  Public  Law  95-384,  I  am 
submitting  herewith  a  bimonthly  report  on 
progress  toward  a  negotiated  settlement  of 
the  Cyprus  question. 

Since  my  previous  report  to  you.  United 
Nations  Secretary  General  Perez  de  Cuellar 
met  August  6  and  7  in  Vienna  with  repre- 
sentatives of  the  two  Cypriot  communities  to 
launch  a  new  initiative  in  the  search  for  a  set- 
tlement to  the  Cyprus  question.  Those 
meetings  resulted  in  the  sides  agreeing  to 
enter  into  proximity  talks  in  New  York  under 
the  Secretary  General's  auspices.  President 
Kyprianou  and  Mr.  Denktash  were  in  New 
York  from  September  10  through  20  for 
those  meetings. 

Upon  the  completion  of  that  first  round 
of  proximity  talks  the  parties  agreed  to 
return  to  New  York  for  a  second  round 
beginning  in  mid-October.  We  understand  the 
talks  produced  a  clearer  understanding  of  the 
respective  positions  of  the  parties  and  that  in 
the  second  round  the  Secretary  General  will 
attempt  to  secure  agreement  to  an  outline  of 
general  points  for  eventual  direct  discussion 
between  the  parties. 

High-ranking  Administration  officials 
have  kept  in  close  contact  with  lioth  Cypriot 
sides,  with  United  Nations  officials,  and  with 
other  interested  parties  throughout  this 
period.  Amljassador  Jeane  Kirkpatrick  met 
with  United  Nations  Secretary  General  Perez 
de  Cuellar  on  September  19,  and  Secretary 
Shultz  saw  President  Kyprianou,  as  well  as 
the  Foreign  Ministers  of  Greece  and  Turkey, 
on  September  27.  In  addition.  Special  Cyprus 


Coordinator  Richard  Haass  met  Septem- 
ber 2.5  with  Mr.  Rauf  Denktash.  leader  of  tl 
Turkish  Cypriot  community,  following  the 
end  of  the  first  round  of  proximity  talks  in 
New  York. 

At  these  bilateral  meetings  we  urged  th 
Cypriot  parties  to  use  this  important  series 
proximity  talks  to  establish  the  basis  for  a 
fair  and  final  settlement,  and  we  reiterated 
our  support  for  the  Secretary  General  in  his 
good  offices  role.  I  made  this  clear  to  the 
Secretary  General  when  I  met  him  on  Sep- 
tember 23  as  well  as  in  my  address  to  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  on 
September  24  when  I  stated:  "the  United 
States  supports  the  Secretary  General's  ef- 
forts to  assist  the  Cypriot  parties  in  achiev- 
ing a  peaceful  and  reunited  Cyprus." 

We  have  been  pleased  to  see  that  both 
Cypriot  parties  have  taken  a  serious  approa- 
to  the  Secretary  General's  initiative  and  ha\ 
foregone  actions  that  might  damage  the  pro 
ess.  We  will  continue  to  strive  for  an  enviro 
ment  conducive  to  serious  discussions  be- 
tween the  Cypriot  parties  and  the  Secretary 
General,  away  from  the  glare  of  publicity.  V 
remain  convinced  that  quiet  diplomacy  and  ! 
mutual  spirit  of  compromise  represent  the 
best  means  of  eventually  achieving  a  reunite. 
Cyprus  in  which  all  Cypriots  can  live  in  peac 
and  security. 

RON.\LI>  Re.-\g; 


1 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  H 
O'Neill.  Jr..  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  Charles  H.  Percy,  chaiJ 
man  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  torn 
mittee  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  "of  Oct.  22,  1984). 


•  It  has  complicated  Soviet  strategic 
calculations. 

•  The  West  no  longer  has  to  plan 
for  the  contingency  of  a  conflict  with 
both  major  communist  powers 
simultaneously. 

•  It  has  established  a  climate  in 
which  we  are  able  to  maintain  close  rela- 
tions with  both  China  and  Japan  at  the 
same  time— a  fact  of  no  little  conse- 
quence to  the  global  balance  of  power. 

China  is  conscious  that  it  has  some 
parallel  security  interests  with  the  West. 
We  have  a  corresponding  interest  in  a 
strong,  secure,  outward-looking  China 
that  can  protect  its  independence.  We 
should  continue  to  respond  positively  to 
Chinese  interest  in  closer  relations  with 
the  West.  A  dialogue  with  Beijing  pro- 
vides the  opportunity  to  resolve  bilateral 
problems  and  to  develop  closer  economic 
and  cultural  ties  from  which  both  China 
and  the  West  will  benefit. 


There  are  other  encouraging  trends" 

•  On  the  Korean  Peninsula  the 
Republic  of  Korea  enjoys  increasing  ad- 
vantages in  the  North-South  competitic 
and  is  a  growing  force  in  world  trade. 

•  The  ASEAN  [Association  of  Soul 
East  Asian  Nations]  nations— Indonesia 
Singapore,  Thailand,  Malaysia,  Brunei, 
and  the  Philippines— display  that  com- 
bination of  internal  resilience,  economic 
development,  regional  cohesion,  and  em 
pathy  toward  the  West  which  makes 
them  increasingly  valuable  partners  in  i 
variety  of  cooperative  endeavors.  Their 
strategic  location  astride  the  sealanes 
between  the  Persian  Gulf,  Japan,  and 
the  U.S.  west  coast  lends  added  impor- 
tance to  such  cooperation. 

•  Traditionally  close  ties  with 
ANZUS  [Security  Treaty  Between 
Australia,  New  Zealand  and  the  United 
States]  allies  continue,  and  these  are  of 


ecial  importance  in  assisting  the 
velopment  of  newer  island  states  of 
;  South  Pacific. 
Alongside  these  favorable  trends,  we 

0  see  a  steady  Soviet  military  buildup 
Asia  and  the  Pacific.  The  Soviets  have 
divisions  facing  China  and  Japan — 
•ces  which,  if  diverted  westward, 

ild  transform  the  military  balance  in 
rope.  The  Soviet  occupation  of 
ghanistan  poses  a  potential  threat  to 
kistan  and  the  oil  fields  of  the  Persian 
If — and  thereby  to  the  economic  well- 
ng  of  the  West.  Soviet-supported 
?tnamese  forces  in  Cambodia  bring 
ect  pressure  on  the  ASEAN  states 
i  the  sealanes.  The  over  400  SS-20 
rheads  targeted  on  Asia  can  be  used 
pressure  governments  in  the  region,  a 
'tic  with  which  we  in  the  alliance  are 
ly  familiar  and  a  point  of  common 
urity  interest  between  the  West  and 
•  friends  and  allies  in  Asia. 

The  objectives  in  Asia  of  the  Soviet 
litary  buildup  appear  to  include  bring- 

pressure  to  bear  on  Beijing,  Tokyo, 
i  other  Pacific  capitals,  countering 
3.  air  and  naval  deployments  in  the 
cific,  achieving  the  ability  to  threaten 

1  and  air  lines  of  communication  link- 
;  East  Asia  and  the  Persian  Gulf  to 
rope  and  North  America,  and  facil- 
ting  in  general  the  expansion  of 
viet  influence  in  South  Asia  and  the 
ciflc. 

The  remarkable  fact  is  that  the 
viets  have  pursued  these  objectives 
Ither  at  the  expense  of  Soviet 
^abilities  in  Europe,  nor  of  Soviet  cen- 
1  reserves,  nor,  since  1979,  of  Soviet 
Dloyments  in  Afghanistan.  The  Soviet 
Idup  in  Asia  has  taken  place  as  part 
(the  steady  enlargement  of  all  Soviet 
ices.  It  is  this  process  upon  which 
lends  the  U.S.S.R.'s  status  as  a  global 
itary  power.  And  we  have  no  choice 
:  to  view  our  strategic  interests  from 
;lobal  perspective. 

At  times  these  interests  may  be 
i)merged  by  economic  considerations, 
iarly,  there  is  nervousness  in  some 
arters  about  the  vigor  of  Japan  and 

emergence  of  the  newly  industrial- 
ig  countries  of  Asia  as  formidable 
.ding  competitors.  China,  too,  may 
play  comparable  competitive  prowess 
its  modernization  unfolds.  But  the 
e  nations  have  always  understood 
it  the  expansion  of  global  trade  is  the 
derpinning  of  our  common  prosperity, 
at  premise  underlay  the  U.S.  re- 
jnse  to  the  establishment  and  growth 
the  European  Community.  The  West 
a  whole  benefited  from  the  spur  of 
npetition,  and  we  have  all  undertaken 


to  manage  our  economic  disputes  with 
an  eye  to  the  common  political  and 
security  interests  we  share. 

Given  the  increasing  significance  of 
East  Asia  from  the  global  strategic 
perspective,  this  same  spirit  should 
mark  the  approach  of  the  Atlantic  allies 
to  developments  in  the  Asia/Pacific 
region.  The  resilience  of  our  friends  in 
Asia  clearly  contributes  to  a  favorable 
global  balance  of  power.  North  America, 
Western  Europe,  and  our  friends  in  Asia 
have  sufficient  common  interests  to  war- 
rant a  wider  framework  of  cooperation 
in  many  spheres. 

I  am  not  proposing  a  new  institu- 
tional structure  for  U.S./Europe/Pacific 
coordination.  Nor  am  I  suggesting  an 
enlarged  military  role  in  the  Pacific  for 
our  NATO  partners.  With  their  remark- 
able economic  development,  the  Asian 
states  can  assume  more  responsibility 
for  their  own  defense. 

Rather,  we  in  North  America  and  in 
Western  Europe  should  strengthen  our 
economic  and  political  ties  with  the 
region  to  develop  habits  of  cooperation 
and  to  nurture  among  Asian  countries 
and  the  Pacific  island  nations  a  greater 
sense  of  common  identity  with  the  West. 
Such  close  ties  can  contribute  to  the 
maintenance  of  a  balance  of  power  from 
which  we  all  stand  to  benefit. 

For  example,  we  are  continuing  to 
seek  to  strengthen  Tokyo's  identification 
with  the  West;  dialogue  with  Beijing  on 
global  issues  helps  inform  the  Chinese 
about  Western  thinking— and  us  about 
their  perspective.  At  the  same  time,  the 
West  should  encourage  Asia's  awareness 
of  the  broader  community  of  interests 
that  link  it  with  both  North  America  and 
Western  Europe.  With  a  shared  under- 
standing of  our  broad  interests,  the  peo- 
ple of  the  three  regions  will  be  in  a  bet- 
ter position  to  master  the  economic, 
political,  and  security  problems  that  we 
will  confront  in  the  years  ahead. 

Let  me  reiterate:  I  am  not  proposing 
that  we  extend  the  geographic  limits  of 
the  NATO  area,  nor  suggesting  that  we 
seek  to  develop  formal  cooperative  ar- 
rangements for  dealing  with  security 
problems  outside  the  NATO  area 
through  the  alliance.  But  it  is  equally 
illusory  to  imagine  that  NATO's  security 
can  be  ensured  without  cooperation 
among  key  allies  in  other  particular 
cases. 

I  call  on  our  European  friends  to 
recognize  the  importance  and  dynamism 
of  Asia  and  the  importance  of  stability 
and  prosperity  of  that  region  to  Euro- 
pean security. 


EUROPE 


Looking  Ahead 

Let  me  conclude  by  ob.serving  that 
overall  trends  in  world  politics  today  ap- 
pear favorable  to  Western  interests  if 
we  conduct  ourselves  wisely.  The  new 
mood  of  self-confidence  and  the 
spreading  economic  recovery  afford  an 
opportunity  for  a  deepening  of  coopera- 
tion among  the  democracies.  A  consen- 
sus within  NATO  for  modernizing  con- 
ventional forces  would  strengthen  our 
common  security  and  enhance  the  pros- 
pects for  arms  control  and  other  talks 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  With  wisdom, 
creativity,  and  political  will,  I  am  con- 
vinced that  the  Western  democracies 
can  find  opportunities  to  deepen  their 
relationships  with  Asia,  as  well  as  with 
other  regions.  Thereby  we  will  better 
promote  our  economic  well-being  and 
strengthen  our  security  over  the  long 
term.  ■ 


U.S.-Soviet 
Relations 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  17,  1984' 

We  agree  with  President  Chernenko 
that  there  is  no  sound  alternative  to  con- 
structive development  in  relations  be- 
tween our  two  countries.  We  are  pleased 
to  see  the  emphasis  he  puts  on  positive 
possibilities  for  LI. S. -Soviet  relations. 
We  will  be  studying  his  remarks  careful- 
ly, and,  as  was  agreed  during  Deputy 
Prime  Minister  Gromyko's  recent 
meeting  with  President  Reagan,  we  will 
be  pursuing  our  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  exploring  the  possibilities  for 
progress  through  diplomatic  channels. 
President  Reagan  has  repeatedly 
demonstrated  that  we  are  ready  for  co- 
operation with  the  Soviet  Union.  In 
April  1981,  he  sent  a  handwritten  letter 
to  President  Brezhnev  describing  his 
feelings  about  the  issue  of  war  and 
peace  and  to  ask  President  Brezhnev  to 
join  him  in  removing  the  obstacles  to 
peace.  Since  then,  the  United  States  has 
made  practical  proposals  for  forward 
movement  in  all  areas  of  the  relation- 
ship, including  arms  control. 


67 


EUROPE 


Over  the  past  year,  for  instance,  the 
United  States  and  its  allies  have  put  for- 
ward new  proposals  for  limits  on 
strategic  weapons,  on  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  weapons,  on  chemical 
weapons,  and  on  conventional  forces.  On 
June  4  in  Dublin,  President  Reagan 
stated  our  willingness  to  discuss  the 
Soviet  proposal  for  a  mutual  non-use-of- 
force  commitment,  if  this  would  lead  to 
serious  negotiation  on  the  Western  pro- 
posals for  practical  steps  to  enhance 
confidence  and  reduce  the  risk  of  sur- 
prise attack  in  Europe.  This  summer  we 
accepted  a  Soviet  proposal  to  begin 
space  arms  control  negotiations  in 
Vienna  without  preconditions.  At  the 
United  Nations  last  month  President 
Reagan  reiterated  his  desire  to  move 
forward  in  these  fields  and  put  forward 
a  number  of  concrete  new  proposals  for 
U.S.-Soviet  cooperation.  In  his  subse- 
quent meeting  with  Deputy  Prime 
Minister  Gromyko,  the  President  em- 
phasized our  strong  desire  to  move  to  a 
more  productive  dialogue  across  the 
board  and  put  forward  specific  sugges- 
tions as  to  how  we  might  do  so. 

We  cannot  agree  with  President 
Chernenko's  version  of  recent  history.  It 
is  the  Soviet  Union  which  has  broken  off 
negotiations  on  nuclear  arms  and  backed 
away  from  its  own  proposal  to  begin 
space  arms  control  talks.  The  United 
States  stands  ready  to  negotiate  on 
these  and  other  issues,  but  we  cannot 
concur  in  the  apparent  Soviet  view  that 
it  is  incumbent  upon  the  United  States 
to  pay  a  price  so  that  the  Soviet  Union 
will  come  back  to  the  nuclear  nego- 
tiating table. 

President  Chernenko  has  stated  that 
improvements  in  the  U.S.-Soviet  rela- 
tionship depend  on  deeds,  not  words. 
We  agree.  When  the  Soviet  Union  is 
prepared  to  move  from  public  exchanges 
to  private  negotiations  and  concrete 
agreements,  they  will  find  us  ready. 


U.S.  Relations  With  Poland 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  the 
principal  deputy  press  secretary  to  the  Presi- 
dent, Larry  SpeaKes  (text  from  Weekly  Com- 
pilation of  Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  22, 
1984.)  ■ 


by  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Remarks  at  the  opening  of  the 
foreign  policy  briefing  for  Polish- 
American  leaders  on  October  11,  198 Jt. 
Mr.  Dam  is  Deputy  Secretary  of  State. 

I  should  like  to  welcome  you  to  the 
State  Department  for  an  afternoon  of 
briefings  on  our  foreign  policy.  It  is  a 
pleasure  for  me  to  have  an  opportunity 
to  meet  with  you  again.  I  remember 
with  great  fondness  the  dinner  and  the 
parade  in  honor  of  the  40th  anniversary 
of  the  Polish  American  Congress.  On 
behalf  of  the  President,  I  should  like  to 
thank  you  for  your  support  for  our 
Polish  policy.  I  should  also  like  to  com- 
pliment you  for  your  generosity  in  pro- 
viding over  $50  million  in  humanitarian 
aid  to  the  people  of  Poland  since  the  end 
of  1981. 

It  is,  of  course,  entirely  appropriate 
that  we  meet  on  General  Casimir 
Pulaski  Day.  As  the  President  noted  in 
his  proclamation  declaring  October  1 1  as 
General  Pulaski  Day,  Casimir  Pulaski 
".  .  .  was  a  patriot  for  two  countries.  The 
United  States  and  Poland  share  the  no- 
ble legacy  of  a  hero  who  gave  his  life  so 
that  the  torch  of  freedom  would  remain 
lit." 

I  would  now  like  to  tell  you  where 
we  stand  in  our  relations  with  Poland. 
The  step-by-step  approach  to  relations 
with  the  Polish  Government  set  out  by 
President  Reagan  remains  otir  policy. 
You  will  recall  that  the  President 
pointed  out  that  the  restrictions  adopted 
in  protest  against  the  imposition  of  mar- 
tial law  are  reversible.  On  Human 
Rights  Day,  December  10,  1982,  the 
President  reiterated:  "...  if  the  Polish 
Government  introduces  meaningful, 
liberalizing  measures,  we  will  take  equal- 
ly significant  and  concrete  actions  of  our 
own." 

Pursuant  to  the  President's  policy, 
we  have  responded  to  certain  im- 
provements within  Poland.  For  example, 
in  January  1984,  in  reaction  to  the 
release  of  many  political  prisoners,  the 
successful  visit  of  Pope  John  Paul  II, 
and  an  appeal  by  Lech  Walesa  for  the 
relaxation  of  certain  sanctions,  we 
undertook  two  steps.  We  lifted  the 
suspension  of  fishing  rights  in  U.S. 


i 


waters  for  the  Polish  commercial  fishii 
operations.  The  Polish  fleet  is  now 
catching  its  quota  of  fish,  just  like  the 
other  nations  that  cooperate  in  fishing 
with  us.  Also  in  January  we  permitted  [jj 
the  Polish  authorities,  on  a  reciprocal 
basis,  to  operate  88  charters  through  t  ^ 
Christmas  season  this  year.  Charter 
planes  are  now  flying  in  both  direction 
The  amnesty  declared  last  July  wa 
a  positive  move.  After  careful  delibera 
tion,  the  President  decided  to  lift  the 
suspension  of  landing  rights  for  regula 
ly  scheduled  flights  by  the  Polish  na- 
tional airlines  LOT.  Of  course,  a 
bilateral  civil  aviation  agreement  is 
necessary  before  regularly  scheduled 
flights  can  resume.  This  is  normal  inte 
national  practice.  We  have  proposed 
dates  for  negotiations  through 
diplomatic  channels,  and  we  hope  to 
begin  formal  discussions  of  a  new  agre 
ment  soon. 

In  addition,  the  President  authoriz 
the  resumption  of  full-scale  scientific  e 
changes.  In  the  past,  the  scientific  ex- 
change program  with  Poland  was  the 
most  active  of  its  kind  in  Eastern 
Europe.  Despite  martial  law  and  the 
baseless  expulsion  of  our  science  attacl 
from  Warsaw,  scientific  cooperation  h; 
continued,  although  at  a  relatively  low 
level.  Since  the  President's  decision,  w 
have  undertaken  a  number  of  measure 
to  restore  the  program.  A  distinguishe 
scientist,  Joseph  Loferski,  will  go  to 
Warsaw  within  the  next  few  months  a 
our  new  science  attache.  Mr.  Loferski 
speaks  excellent  Polish  and  has  past  e: 
perience  in  Poland  as  an  exchange  scie 
tist  himself. 

We  are  moving  with  deliberate 
speed  on  a  new  science  and  technology 
agreement  with  the  Government  of 
Poland.  We  hope  to  have  a  draft  agree 
ment  to  submit  to  the  Polish  Govern- 
ment for  its  consideration  shortly. 

In  addition  to  LOT  flights  and  scie 
tific  exchanges,  the  White  House  an- 
nouncement of  August  3  stated  that: 

.  .  .  the  President  has  indicated  that  cor 
plete  and  reasonable  implementation  of  the 
amnesty  decision  will  create  a  positive  at- 
mosphere that  would  allow  the  reactivation 
Poland's  application  for  membership  in  the 
International  Monetary  Fund. 


68 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


FOOD 


We  have  not  yet  made  a  determina- 
1  on  the  implementation  of  the 
nesty  decisions,  but  the  question  is 
ier  active  consideration. 
The  President  hopes  that  his  August 
ision  will  encourage  the  Polish 
horities  to  take  further  steps  toward 
mine  national  reconciliation.  Both  the 
iscopate  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
arch  and  prominent  Solidarity 
lers,  such  as  Lech  Walesa,  have  ex- 
ssed  the  hope  that  the  amnesty  will 
the  prelude  to  more  positive 
elopments. 

Although  most  segments  of  Polish 
iety  regard  the  amnesty  favorably, 
gap  separating  government  and 
iety  remains.  As  official  Polish 
/spapers  have  noted,  youth  in  par- 
lar  remain  disaffected.  In  addition, 
le  Solidarity  members  have  reported- 
ncountered  difficulty  in  reclaiming 
jobs  or  finding  suitable  new  jobs. 
Polish  economy  has  improved 
lewhat  in  the  past  year,  but  produc- 
and  the  standard  of  living  are  still 
)W  1979  levels.  Shortages  continue  to 
jue  both  production  and  consumption 
'oland. 

President  Reagan  said  in  his 
istmas  speech  of  December  23,  1981, 
,  ".  .  .  we  in  America  would  gladly  do 
share  to  help  the  shattered  Polish 
lomy"  if  commitments  to  human 
its  were  honored.  The  President's 
r  still  stands. 

In  the  meantime,  the  U.S.  Govern- 
it  has  supplemented  the  generous 
lanitarian  assistance  that  you  have 
/ided  the  Polish  people.  Since  the  im- 
tion  of  martial  law,  the  United 
;es  has  distributed  more  than  $130 
ion  in  surplus  food  to  the  Polish  peo- 
through  voluntary  agencies 
Derating  with  the  Catholic  Church  in 
ind.  An  additional  $30  million  in 
1  )lus  food  will  be  distributed  in  fiscal 
i-  1985.  This  aid  will  continue  as  long 
^  he  need  is  great. 

The  President  believes  that  the  con- 
'.sional  initiative  to  fund  an  outpa- 
t  clinic  attached  to  the  American 
dren's  Hospital  in  Krakow  is  an  ex- 
ionally  worthwhile  project.  The 
c  will  be  a  fitting  memorial  to  the 
Congressman  Clement  Zablocki, 
meant  so  much  to  the  American 
Polish  peoples. 

On  August  17  at  the  White  House, 
President  announced  his  support  for 
plan  of  the  Episcopate  of  the  Roman 
lolic  Church  to  funnel  private  and 
lie  contributions  from  the  West 


World  Food  Day,  1984 


PROCLAMATION  5260, 
OCT.  16,  19841 

The  United  States  has  a  long-  tradition  of 
sharing  its  rich  agricultural  abundance  and 
technical  expertise  with  those  in  need,  and  of 
leading-  the  worldwide  effort  to  eliminate 
hunger.  All  nations  are  not  equally  endowed 
with  food  potential,  and  the  struggle  against 
hunger  continually  presents  us  with  chal- 
lenges which  sometimes  appear  overwhelm- 
ing. However,  we  will  not  be  diverted  from 
our  intention  to  achieve  victory  over  world 
hunger. 

The  United  States  is  dedicated  to  the 
proposition  that  real  progress  in  eliminating 
hunger  will  be  realized  when  more  nations 
are  able  to  produce  or  purchase  enough  food 
for  their  own  people.  It  is  heartening  that  the 
resurging  economy  of  the  United  States  is 
helping  other  nations  toward  new  economic 
expansion,  with  lower  rates  of  inflation  and 
rising  output  in  many  countries. 

This  Nation — indeed,  all  nations — should 
move  forward  with  domestic  policies  that  en- 
courage growth.  At  the  same  time  we  must 
vigorously  resist  policies  which  inhibit  growth 
or  discourage  free  and  equitable  international 
trade  in  food  products. 

Since  the  enactment  of  the  Eisenhower 
Food  for  Peace  Program  in  1954,  the 
American  people  have  provided  more  than 
$33  billion  in  food  aid  to  164  nations. 
Thousands  of  technical  experts  have  been 
sent  to  Africa,  Asia,  Latin  America,  and  the 
Middle  East  to  assist  in  the  development  of 
agricultural  projects.  We  have  trained  tens  of 
thousands  of  agriculturalists  from  developing 
nations  to  help  them  in  building  a  sound 
economic  foundation  in  their  countries. 

These  efforts  by  other  industrial  coun- 
tries and  the  United  States  have  yielded 
promising  results.  Food  production  per  per- 
son has  increased  21  percent  in  the  develop- 


ing countries  since  19,'J4.  Consumption  of 
calories  per  capita  has  increased  7.h  percent 
since  19()3.  Unfortunately,  Africa's  progress 
in  food  production  or  the  consumption  of 
calories  per  capita  have  not  shown  equally  en- 
couraging results. 

This  year,  the  United  States  supports  ef- 
forts by  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organiza- 
tion of  the  United  Nations  to  recognize  the 
role  of  women  in  agricultural  development  in 
the  Third  World.  In  some  less  developed 
countries,  women  and  children  constitute  80 
percent  or  more  of  the  agricultural  work 
force — yet,  rarely  aided  by  modern  agri- 
cultural technology,  research  or  adequate 
training.  We  strongly  support  efforts  to  im- 
prove the  efficiency  of  their  agricultural 
techniques. 

In  recognition  of  the  need  to  increase 
public  awareness  of  world  hunger,  the  Con- 
gress, by  Senate  Joint  Resolution  332,  has 
proclaimed  October  16.  1984,  as  "World  Food 
Day"  and  has  authorized  and  requested  the 
President  to  issue  a  proclamation  in  obser- 
vance of  that  day. 

Now  Therefore,  I,  Ronald  Reagan, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
do  hereby  call  upon  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  observe  October  16,  1984,  as  World 
Food  Day  with  appropriate  activities  to  ex- 
plore ways  in  which  our  Nation  can  further 
contribute  to  the  elimination  of  hunger  in  the 
world. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  sixteenth  day  of  October,  in 
the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 
eighty-four,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America  the  two  hundred 
and  ninth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  22,  1984.  I 


through  an  autonomous  foundation 
closely  associated  with  the  church  to 
private  family  farms  in  Poland.  The  pro- 
gram is  designed  to  give  private  farmers 
access  to  machinery,  fertilizer,  and  other 
agricultural  materials  that  are  hard  to 
obtain  within  Poland.  The  President  said 
that  he  would  seek  $10  million  from  the 
Congress  to  contribute  to  the  pilot  phase 
of  the  project.  This  has  been  done.  We 
hope  that  other  private  and  public  in- 
stitutions will  make  similarly  generous 
donations.  If  the  pilot  phase  is  a  success, 
we  will  consider  continuing  our  support 
because  we  think  that  private  agri- 
culture is  the  key  to  abundance. 


Before  closing,  I  should  like  to  ad- 
dress one  problem  that  I  know  greatly 
interests  you.  That  is  the  question  of  the 
status  of  Polish  citizens  in  the  United 
States  who  want  to  stay  but  do  not  have 
legal  status.  As  you  know,  the  President 
formed  a  task  force  several  months  ago 
to  look  into  the  problem.  I  cannot  an- 
nounce a  final  position  today,  but  I  can 
assure  you  that  we  understand  your  con- 
cerns, we  have  by  no  means  forgotten 
them,  and  we  will  do  our  utmost  to  re- 
spond to  them  in  a  humanitarian, 
equitable  fashion. 

I  should  like  to  wish  you  a  successful 
board  meeting  here  in  Washington.  ■ 


;emhfir  1984 


69 


GENERAL 


Change  and  Continuity: 

American  Foreign  Policy  in  the  1980s 


by  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Address  before  the  Commonwealth 

Club  of  California  in  San  Francisco  on 
October  15,  1984-  Mr.  Dam  is  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State. 

The  last  4  years  have  been  marked  by  a 
change  in  the  climate  of  international  af- 
fairs. The  Reagan  Administration  has 
restored  our  national  self-confidence  and 
America's  leadership  of  the  free  world. 
New  threats  to  peace  and  new  chal- 
lenges to  freedom,  however,  are  con- 
stantly arising.  Military  technology 
evolves,  and  economic  forces  act  in  un- 
predictable ways.  Our  policies  for 
meeting  these  challenges  must  keep  up 
with  this  dynamic  process. 

The  foreign  policy  agenda  for  the 
next  4  years  will  not  look  like  that  of  the 
past  four.  In  the  security  sphere,  nuclear 
arms  control  will  continue  to  be  a  priori- 
ty. Joining  it,  however,  will  be  the 
urgent  issue  of  conventional  defense.  In 
the  economic  sphere,  the  focus  of  our  at- 
tention will  shift  from  providing  a  few 
key  debtor  countries  with  sufficient 
liquidity  to  promoting  self-sustaining 
growth  throughout  the  Third  World. 
And  in  the  political  sphere,  we  will  see  a 
redoubling  of  our  efforts  to  achieve 
negotiated  settlements  of  conflicts  in 
Africa,  the  Middle  East,  and  Central 
America. 

In  the  next  4  years  we  will  thus 
have  to  strike  out  in  new  directions  in 
some  areas,  while  consolidating  our 
gains  in  others.  I  should  like  today  simp- 
ly to  highlight  for  you  a  few  of  those 
areas  of  change  and  continuity  in  our 
foreign  affairs. 

Security  Sphere 

In  the  security  sphere,  attention  in  re- 
cent years  has  been  focused  on  inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  forces  or  INF.  In 
the  late  1970s  the  Soviets  began  deploy- 
ing SS-20  intermediate-range  nuclear 
missiles,  threatening  our  allies  in 
F^urope  and  Asia.  In  response  to  West 
pjuropean  concerns,  the  NATO  countries 
in  December  1979  decided  to  seek  to 
negotiate  limits  on  INF  missiles  and  to 
deploy  counterbalancing  NATO  forces  if 
negotiations  failed  to  remove  the  Soviet 
threat. 


Following  this  "dual-track"  decision, 
the  United  States,  through  2  years  of  in- 
tense negotiations,  sought  reductions  in 
INF  missiles  to  an  equal  level — pre- 
ferably zero — on  each  side.  All  Soviet 
proposals,  however,  would  keep  a  Soviet 
monopoly  of  such  forces.  They  used 
political  pressure  and  military  threats  in 
an  attempt  to  undermine  the  dual-track 
decision  and  to  divide  the  United  States 
from  Europe;  but  the  alliance  held  firm. 
After  the  Soviets  walked  out  of  the  talks 
last  November,  NATO  began  counter- 
deployments. 

Although  the  "year  of  the  missile"  is 
behind  us,  INF  is  not  a  closed  issue.  The 
Soviets  now  have  more  than  375  SS-20 
missiles  in  place,  with  three  warheads 
apiece,  and  deployments  continue.  For 
our  part,  we  are  still  ready  to  negotiate 
reductions — with  no  preconditions.  But 
in  the  absence  of  an  agreement,  NATO 
deployments  will  also  continue. 

In  the  coming  years,  nuclear  arms 
reductions  will  continue  to  be  our  first 
priority.  As  you  know,  the  Administra- 
tion has  proposed  deep  cuts — up  to  one- 
third — in  strategic  missile  warheads. 
The  President's  recent  meeting  with 
Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
demonstrates  our  determination  to  find 
a  way  to  begin  negotiations  on  the 
reduction  of  offensive  nuclear  weapons. 
At  the  same  time,  we  will  be  emphasiz- 
ing—and you  will  be  hearing  more 
about — conventional  defense,  an  issue 
that  is  closely  linked  to  nuclear  arms. 
Conventional  defense  in  Europe  serves 
the  critical  function  of  reducing  the  risk 
of  nuclear  war.  The  greater  NATO's 
ability  to  repel  aggression  through  the 
use  of  conventional  forces,  the  higher 
the  nuclear  threshold  will  be. 

Improving  NATO's  conventional 
defense  has  thus  always  been  on  our 
security  agenda.  For  several  reasons, 
however,  the  time  is  now  right  for  an  in- 
creased effort  on  conventional  defense. 

First,  the  Warsaw  Pact  continues  to 
build  up  conventional  forces  on  a  scale 
that  far  exceeds  its  own  defense  needs. 

Second,  concern  exists  in  the  Con- 
gress and  the  public  about  the  fairness 
of  allied  contributions  to  the  common 
defense. 

Third,  with  the  INF  debate  largely 
behind  us,  our  European  allies  are  in  a 
better  position  to  address  conventional 
defense  issues. 


» 


Fourth,  new  technologies  and  tac- 
tics now  offer  creative  solutions  to  con- 
ventional defense  problems. 

Let  me  cite  a  few  figures  to  il- 
lustrate the  threat  we  face  from  the 
Soviet  conventional  force  buildup  oppo- 
site Western  Europe. 

In  manpower,  the  Warsaw  Pact 
now  has  some  4  million  men  facing 
Western  Europe,  almost  twice  the 
number  of  NATO  standing  forces. 

In  main  battle  tanks,  the  Warsaw 
Pact  has  almost  27.000,  twice  the  NAT 
figure. 

In  combat  aircraft,  the  Warsaw 
Pact  has  about  300  more  fighter- 
bombers  and  ground  attack  aircraft  tha 
NATO,  and  leads  NATO  by  5  to  1  in  in 
terceptor  aircraft  (4,000  to  800).  We 
believe  we  have  a  qualitative  edge  in  ai 
craft,  but  the  Soviets  are  narrowing  thi 
gap. 

Some  critics  argue  that  these  War- 
saw Pact  advantages  are  so  great  that 
NATO  should  abandon  its  conventional 
defense  efforts  and  rely  solely  on  the 
threat  of  nuclear  retaliation  for  the 
defense  of  the  alliance.  Others,  con- 
cerned about  the  real  horrors  of  nuclea 
retaliation,  argue,  on  the  contrary,  thai 
NATO  should  rely  solely  on  convention 
defense.  Both  arguments  are  flawed. 
NATO's  strategy  remains  valid — a 
strong  conventional  defense  capability 
backed  up  by  the  threat  of  nuclear 
retaliation. 

What  NATO  needs  today  is  not  a 
new  strategy  but  more  and  better  re- 
sources. NATO  needs  the  equipment  ai 
the  manpower  to  provide  conventional 
defenses  strong  enough  to  frustrate  an 
attack  in  Europe.  Such  defenses  w<iuld 
enhance  deterrence  and  reduce  the  risl 
that  the  alliance  would  have  to  resort  t 
nuclear  weapons  in  a  crisis. 

Strengthening  conventional  defens< 
as  I  noted  earlier,  is  a  global  challenge 
The  Soviet  military  buildup  in  Asia  anc 
the  Pacific  is  every  bit  as  great  and 
menacing  as  their  buildup  in  Europe. 
For  this  reason,  we  continue  to  en- 
courage a  steady  improvement  in 
Japan's  self-defense  capability.  In  recer 
years  the  Japanese  have  expanded  thei 
defense  budget  by  almost  7%  a  year 
(though  from  a  very  low  base).  They 
have  also  undertaken  to  defend  the  sea 
and  airlanes  leading  to  their  country  oi 
to  1,000  miles.  As  the  Japanese  them- 
selves recognize,  much  more  needs  lob 
done,  but  a  promising  start  has  been 
made. 

NATO  and  Japan  unquestionably 
have  the  economic  strength,  the  popula 
tion,  and  the  technological  base  to  field 


70 


GENERAL 


equate  conventional  forces.  The  prob- 
n  has  always  been  how  to  generate 
litical  support  for  strengthened  con- 
ntional  defense  in  peacetime.  More- 
er,  controversy  exists  over  the  re- 
Bctive  contributions  that  we  and  our 
ies  make  to  the  common  defense.  This 
a  comple.x  issue.  How  we  assess 
lether  one  country  has  contributed  its 
.ir  share"  depends  on  what  we  are 
anting.  The  United  States,  for  exam- 
I,  ranks  high  in  terms  of  the  percent- 
e  of  GNP  [gross  national  product] 
mted  to  defense.  The  European  coun- 
ts, most  of  which  have  military 
ifts,  rank  high  in  terms  of  active  duty 
i  reserve  troops.  One  thing  is  clear: 
all  have  to  do  more. 

onomic  Sphere 

it  as  a  new  issue — conventional  de- 
se — will  receive  increasing  attention 
;he  security  sphere,  so,  too,  will  a 
V  issue — self-sustaining  growth — re- 
i/e  increasing  attention  in  the  eco- 
nic  sphere. 

In  the  last  several  years,  our  inter- 
ional  economic  agenda  has  been 
ninated  by  the  $700  billion  Third 
rid  debt.  The  debt  crisis  that  erupted 
982  threatened  the  viability  of  the  in- 
lational  economic  system.  To  manage 
t  crisis,  we  and  the  other  major  in- 
trial  democracies  undertook  extra- 
inary  financing  programs  in  several 
he  largest  debtor  countries.  Our 
itegy  focused  on  ensuring  liquidity 
supporting  economic  reform  and 
rt-term  stabilization. 
Those  actions  have  produced  some 
r-term  successes.  The  total  current 
3unt  deficits  of  the  seven  major  Latin 
erican  debtors  (Argentina,  Brazil, 
cico,  Colombia,  Chile,  Peru,  and 
lezuela)  were  reduced  from  $34 
on  in  1981  to  just  $3  billion  in  1983. 
he  same  period,  the  combined  trade 
mnts  of  these  countries  jumped  from 
nail  surplus  of  less  than  $1  billion  to 
irplus  of  $31  billion.  Mexico  and 
zil  should  record  positive  growth  this 
!•  after  several  years  of  stagnant  or 
ng  output.  Mexico's  impressive  per- 
nance  enabled  it  to  sign  an  agree- 
it  last  month  with  its  commercial 
k  advisory  committee  to  reschedule 
iebt  payments  over  a  multiyear 
od. 

The  United  States  contributed  to  the 
jress  achieved  by  Mexico  and  the 
tr  Latin  debtors  by  keeping  its 
kets  open  to  their  exports — even 
■n  those  countries  were  forced  to 
h  their  imports.  Overall,  Latin 
erican  exports  grew  16%  in  the  first 


quarter  of  1984— and  the  United  States 
took  four-fifths  of  that  increase.  These 
Latin  goods  certainly  contribute  to  our 
projected  $100-billion-plus  trade  deficit. 
But  access  to  our  markets  provides 
those  countries  with  the  hard  currency 
needed  to  service  their  debts  and  buy 
our  exports.  In  turn,  imports  from 
abroad  help  keep  inflation  down  in  the 
United  States  and  improve  the  standard 
of  living  of  U.S.  consumers. 

The  major  liquidity  problems  are 
now  increasingly  under  control.  Conse- 
quently, the  focus  of  our  efforts  is  shift- 
ing from  ensuring  adequate  financing 
for  some  key  debtors  to  promoting  self- 
sustaining  growth  throughout  the  Third 
World.  Without  growth,  debtor  nations 
may  reel  from  short-term  crisis  to  short- 
term  crisis. 

Achieving  sustained  economic 
growth  presents  challenges  that  are 
more  complex  than  those  of  imposing 
the  belt-tightening  measures  needed  to 
deal  with  balance-of-payments  problems. 
Belt-tightening  can  be  sold  politically  as 
a  short-term  necessity.  Sustainable 
growth,  on  the  other  hand,  requires 
structural  adjustment.  Such  adjustment 
demands  permanent  shifts  in  income 
distribution,  resources,  and  political 
power — often  between  city  and  country- 
side, labor  and  management,  consumers 
and  exporters.  Shifts  of  this  sort  can 
strain  the  social  and  political  fabric  of  a 
nation.  Two  important  factors,  however, 
can  help  ease  the  adjustment  process — 
first,  greater  cooperation  between  the 
IMF  [International  Monetary  Fund]  and 
the  World  Bank  and,  second,  increased 
foreign  direct  investment. 

IMF  programs  aim  primarily  at  im- 
proving a  country's  balance-of-payments 
position  in  the  short  to  medium  term. 
World  Bank  programs,  however,  focus 
more  on  long-term  economic  changes. 
The  bank's  structural  adjustment  loan 
program,  for  example,  has  committed 
over  $4  billion  to  some  16  countries 
since  it  began  in  1980.  These  loans, 
together  with  the  World  Bank's  sectoral 
and  project  lending,  can  help  developing 
countries  carry  out  reforms  at  a  time 
when  slow  growth  and  tight  credit  make 
such  reforms  as  difficult  as  they  are 
necessary.  We  believe  that  there  is 
scope  for  strengthening  cooperation  be- 
tween the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank. 
Such  cooperation  can  help  foster  the 
long-term  economic  reforms  needed  to 
promote  sustained  growth  in  the  debtor 
countries. 

Restructuring  an  economy  also  re- 
quires direct  investment  from  abroad. 
Like  corporations,  countries  cannot 
grow  by  borrowing  alone.  Rather,  local 
savings  must  be  encouraged  and  private 


foreign  investment  attracted.  Ample 
room  exists  for  increasing  the  equity 
share  of  total  LDC  [less  developed  coun- 
try] financing:  in  1970,  foreign  direct  in- 
vestment accounted  for  almost  20%  of 
net  long-term  capital  flows  to  developing 
countries;  by  1982,  however,  that  figure 
had  fallen  to  just  over  10%. 

To  reverse  this  trend,  developing 
countries  will  have  to  adopt  policies  that 
attract  foreign  direct  investment.  Such 
policies  should  entail  a  realistic  exchange 
rate  that  permits  free  currency  converti- 
bility and  a  legal  environment  that 
allows  owners  of  capital  to  earn  an  at- 
tractive, risk-adjusted  rate  of  return. 
These  steps  will,  in  turn,  curb  capital 
flight  and  stimulate  local  savings. 

The  issues  of  structural  adjustment, 
IMF- World  Bank  cooperation,  and  direct 
investment  will  receive  increasing  atten- 
tion in  the  years  ahead.  Indeed,  at  last 
month's  IMFAVorld  Bank  meetings  in 
Washington,  those  institutions  endorsed 
Treasury  Secretary  Regan's  proposal 
that  they  tackle  these  and  other  subjects 
in  an  effort  to  find  ways  in  which  the  in- 
dustrialized and  developing  countries 
can  better  pursue  the  goal  of  worldwide 
noninflationary  growth. 

As  we  seek  to  promote  such  growth, 
two  sets  of  countries  will  receive  in- 
creasing attention:  the  resource-poor 
countries  of  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  a 
strategically  important  set  of  smaller 
debtors,  especially  in  Latin  America. 

Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  countries 
of  sub-Saharan  Africa  are  among  the 
poorest  in  the  world  and  have  benefited 
less  than  others  from  the  global 
recovery.  That  region's  gross  domestic 
product  has  fallen  every  year  since  1980. 
With  population  increasing  at  over  3% 
annually,  per  capita  income  in  1983  is 
projected  to  be  about  4%  below  the  1970 
level.  And  the  long-term  decline  in 
agricultural  output  has  been  exacerbated 
by  the  recent  drought.  The  number  of 
hungry  and  sometimes  starving  people  is 
in  the  millions. 

The  figures  are  staggering.  But  as 
the  World  Bank  recently  noted  in  a  new 
report  on  Africa  ("Toward  Sustained 
Development:  A  Joint  Action  Program 
for  Sub-Saharan  Africa"),  the  potential 
for  economic  growth  does  exist: 
domestic  reform  coupled  with  donor  sup- 
port can  revitalize  sub-Saharan  Africa. 
The  United  States  strongly  supports  the 
report's  emphasis  on  policy  reform  and 
donor  coordination.  Moreover,  we  are 
committed  to  doing  our  part.  The  United 
States  now  provides  over  half  of  all  food 
aid  to  Africa.  In  addition,  in  response  to 
the  President's  request  for  a  special  pro- 
gram to  encourage  economic  policy  re- 


■omhor  1QH/1 


71 


GENERAL 


forms  in  Africa,  Congress  has  provided 
$75  million  for  this  purpose  in  the 
budget  resolution  passed  last  week. 

Smaller  Debtors.  The  second 
category  of  countries  that  you  are  sure 
to  be  hearing  more  about  in  the  near 
future  are  the  smaller  debtors— coun- 
tries such  as  the  Dominican  Republic, 
Jamaica,  and  Peru.  These  countries  are 
small  debtors  in  comparative  terms.  The 
Dominican  Republic,  for  example,  has 
slightly  more  than  $3  billion  in  external 
obligations,  whereas  Mexico  has  almost 
$100  billion.  The  small  debtors,  however, 
are  beginning  to  receive— and  will  con- 
tinue to  receive— much  of  our  attention. 

The  social  fabric  of  many  of  these 
countries  has  been  dangerously  strained 
by  necessary  but  politically  unpalatable 
adjustment  measures.  Such  strains 
threaten  the  prospects  for  economic 
reform  in  these  countries  and,  in  some 
cases,  U.S.  strategic  interests  as  well. 

The  Peruvian  Government,  for  ex- 
ample, has  made  successive  com- 
mitments to  the  IMF  to  impose  painful 
austerity  measures  to  reduce  its  $13 
billion  debt.  But  intense  opposition— 
from  political  parties,  labor,  business 
and  interest  groups— has  undermined  ef- 
forts to  implement  these  reforms.  A 
year  ago  a  Marxist  was  elected  mayor  of 
Lima;  a  nationwide  general  strike  was 
widely  effective  in  March;  and  guerrilla 
agitation  and  violence  persist.  These 
developments  now  represent  a  serious 
challenge  to  Peru's  Government,  which 
was  restored  to  civilian  democratic  con- 
trol only  in  1980. 

Clearly,  the  strains  produced  by  ad- 
justment must  be  carefully  monitored. 
In  the  pursuit  of  growth,  we  must  re- 
main sensitive  to  the  tradeoffs  Peru  and 
other  Third  World  governments  are  be- 
ing forced  to  make  between  long-term 
economic  recovery  and  short-term  politi- 
cal stability. 

Political  Sphere 

The  evolving  conditions  of  the  late 
1980s,  then,  will  see  the  emergence  of 
conventional  defense  as  a  security  issue 
and  self-sustaining  growth  as  an  eco- 
nomic issue.  In  the  sphere  that  can  be 
loosely  called  "political,"  no  intrinsically 
new  issues  will  be  added  to  our  agenda. 
Rather,  we  will  see  a  redoubling  of  the 
efforts  that  we  have  already  begun. 

Promoting  Negotiations  in 
Regional  Conflicts.  In  Latin  America, 
Africa,  and  the  Middle  East,  regional 
conflicts  continue.  We  have  used  our 
resources  to  promote  resolution  of  these 
conflicts  at  the  bargaining  table  rather 
than  on  the  battlefield.  In  so  doing,  we 


79 


have  reduced  the  potential  for  confron- 
tation between  the  major  powers. 

The  area  where  our  diplomatic  ef- 
forts have  been  most  productive  is 
southern  Africa.  In  that  region,  the 
United  States  has  stimulated  a  dialogue 
between  South  Africa  and  its  neighbors. 
This  dialogue  has  lowered  the  level  of 
cross-border  violence  and  has  fostered  a 
welcome  improvement  in  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Mozam- 
bique which,  since  independence,  had 
associated  itself  with  the  Soviet  bloc. 

For  more  than  20  years,  the  inter- 
national community  has  been  searching 
for  a  formula  under  which  South  Africa 
would  relinquish  its  administration  of 
Namibia,  or  South-West  Africa.  Since 
1977,  the  United  States  and  some  of  its 
closest  allies  have  worked  with  all  the 
African  states  in  the  region  to  find  a 
solution  to  this  problem.  A  multifaceted 
agreement  that  will  bring  independence 
to  this  last  African  colony  is  now  within 
reach.  But  before  it  can  be  achieved, 
both  Pretoria  and  Angola  will  have  to 
make  difficult  decisions.  The  most  im- 
portant of  these  is  the  removal  from 
Angola  of  30,000  Cuban  troops  that  con- 
stitute a  major  intrusion  of  Soviet  power 
in  the  region. 

We  continue  to  believe  that  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  can  yield  to  patient, 
persistent  diplomacy  just  as  southern 
Africa  is  yielding.  The  parties  to  the 
dispute  must  soon  realize  that  there  is 
no  substitute  for  direct  negotiations. 
President  Reagan's  initiative  of  Septem- 
ber 1,  1982,  remains  the  best  and  most 
workable  basis  for  such  negotiations. 
When  the  parties  are  ready  to  resume 
the  active  pursuit  of  peace,  the  United 
States  will  be  there.  No  threat,  no  in- 
timidation, no  amount  of  random  terror 
will  prevent  us  from  participating  as  a 
full  partner. 

The  regional  conflict  of  greatest 
direct  concern  to  the  United  States  is,  of 
course,  Central  America.  The  popular 
and  democratically  elected  Governments 
of  El  Salvador  and  Honduras  continue 
to  be  threatened  by  communist  guer- 
rillas supported  and  trained  by 
Nicaragua  and  Cuba.  The  aim  of  these 
guerrillas  is  to  replace  constitutionally 
elected  democratic  governments  with 
Marxist-Leninist  regimes.  Our  economic, 
military,  and  diplomatic  support  has 
helped  democratic  forces  throughout  the 
region  to  gradually  turn  the  tide  in  their 
favor. 

This  conflict,  however,  will  not  be 
solved  by  military  means  alone:  diplo- 
matic initiatives  are  necessary.  The  ef- 
forts of  the  Contadora  group  (composed 
of  Mexico,  Panama,  Colomliia,  and 
Venezuela)  to  negotiate  a  comprehen- 
sive, verifiable  regional  peace  are  central 


to  our  policy.  The  United  States  fully 
supports  the  objectives  of  the  Contadoi 
process  and  believes  that  they  offer  the 
best  chance  for  a  stable  peace  in  the 
region.  At  the  request  of  the  Contador 
Group,  Secretary  Shultz  initiated  bi- 
lateral talks  with  Nicaragua  last  June. 
Since  then,  our  special  envoy  for  Centi 
America,  Ambassador  Harry 
Shlaudeman,  has  met  six  times  with 
high-level  Nicaraguan  officials.  These 
talks  are  designed  to  enhance  the  Cont 
dora  process.  Any  agreement  reached 
will  be  incorporated  into  the  Contador; 
framework:  there  will  be  no  separate 
agreement. 

Promoting  Democracy  and  Huma 
Rights.  Resolving  regional  conflicts 
helps  minimize  opportunities  for  Soviei 
intervention  around  the  world.  So,  too 
does  our  commitment  to  democracy  an 
human  rights,  for  autocracy  and  oppre 
sion  breed  the  instability  that  our  adve 
saries  seek  to  exploit. 

Our  policy  has  been  not  merely  to 
shun  human  rights  violators  but  to  wo 
actively  with  friendly  governments  to 
seek  improvements  in  human  rights 
practices:  release  of  political  prisoners 
more  freedom  of  emigration,  reductioi 
of  official  brutality. 

In  the  final  analysis,  however,  we 
know  that  democracy  and  the  rule  of 
law  provide  the  only  enduring  guarant 
of  human  rights.  And,  wherever  we 
look,  democracy  is  on  the  move.  In 
Southeast  Asia,  rapidly  growing  pros- 
perity is  paralleled  by  increasingly  opt 
political  systems.  Last  May's  elections 
the  Philippines,  and  growing  popular 
patience  with  autocratic  rule,  represei 
progress  toward  a  return  to  that 
nation's  democratic  traditions. 

Democracy  has  made  its  most  stri 
ing  gains  right  here  in  our  own  hemi- 
sphere. The  figures  are  impressive. 

•  Over  the  last  5  years,  elected 
civilian  presidents  have  replaced  milit 
rulers  in  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Ecuador, 
Salvador,  Honduras,  Panama,  and  Pe 
Next  January,  Brazil  will  elect  its  firs 
civilian  president  in  20  years.  Urugua 
is  on  a  firm  timetable  for  return  to 
democracy,  and  Guatemala  is  in  the 
early  stages  of  transition.  We  are  esp 
cially  pleased  that  elections  in  Grenad 
now  scheduled  for  December,  will  ret 
that  country  to  democracy.  The  resuli 
that  90%  of  the  people  of  Latin  Amei 
and  the  Caribbean  now  live  under 
governments  that  are  either  democra 
or  heading  there. 

•  Not  a  single  country  that  was 
democratic  4  years  ago  has  lost  its  fn 
dom.  Not  one  guerrilla  movement  haS; 
taken  power  since  1979,  when  the  Sa; 


1 


:l 


MIDDLE  EAST 


3tas  replaced  Somoza— and  then 
neged  on  their  promises  to  hold  free 
'ctions,  to  seek  a  nonaligned  foreign 
licy,  and  to  develop  an  open  market 
Dnomy. 

•  Since  November  1980,  when  the 
lited  States  last  went  to  the  polls  to 
!Ct  a  president,  our  southern  neighbors 
ve  cast  some  150  million  votes  in  33 
ictions  in  24  countries.  That's  more 
tes  in  more  elections  in  more  coun- 
es  than  in  any  previous  4  years  in  the 
tory  of  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
in. 

We  should  not  allow  these  encourag- 
:  statistics  to  go  to  our  heads.  The  dic- 
orships  have  been  swept  aside 
;ause  they  could  not  solve  their  na- 
is'  severe  economic  and  social  prob- 
is.  Democratic  governments,  if  they 

to  survive,  must  prove  they  can 
ve  these  problems. 

I  spoke  earlier  of  the  measures  we 

taking  to  assist  the  major  debtor  na- 
is  of  Latin  America  to  restore  eco- 
nic  growth.  In  my  opinion,  dealing 
h  this  problem  in  a  manner  that 
es  sensitive  political  ramifications  in- 
iccount  is  probably  the  most  impor- 
t  contribution  we  can  make  to  the 
mg^hening  of  the  new  democracies  of 
in  America. 

iclusion 

se,  then,  are  the  issues  that  you  will 
.eeing  when  you  open  your  news- 
er  next  week,  next  month,  and  next 
-:  conventional  defense  and  the  need 
raising  the  nuclear  threshold,  eco- 
lic  growth  and  the  need  to  imple- 
it  reforms,  negotiated  settlement  of 
onal  conflicts  and  the  need  to  sup- 
.  the  march  of  democracy  around  the 
•e. 

All  of  these  issues  will  demand  U.S. 
urces  and  U.S.  commitment.  But 
■r  nations  must  do  their  part.  The 
;ed  States  already  accounts  for  the 
jrity  of  the  NATO  defense  budget; 
mpply  one-half  of  all  food  aid  to 
ca;  we  absorb  one-half  of  all  the 
d  World's  manufactured  exports  to 
industrialized  world;  we  alone  are 
ing  to  resolve  conflicts  on  three  con- 
its  simultaneously. 
Improved  defenses,  economic 
vth,  and  the  resolution  of  regional 
licts  will  benefit  the  United  States 
our  allies  alike.  We  are  prepared  to 
these  new  challenges— and,  in  turn, 
hallenge  our  allies  to  face  them  with 


Terrorism  in  thie  IVIiddle  East 


by  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Remarks  to  leaders  of  the  National 
United  Jewish  Appeal  at  the  White 
House  on  October  1.  I98i.  Mr.  Dam  is 
Acting  Secretary  of  State. 

Eleven  days  ago  the  number  of  innocent 
lives  lost  in  the  search  for  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  increased  again.  The  suicide 
terrorist  attack  on  the  American  Em- 
bassy annex  in  east  Beirut  cost  two 
American  lives  and  an  unknown  number 
of  Lebanese.  That  attack  was  another 
grim  reminder  of  the  obstacles  we  face 
to  a  diplomatic  solution  in  the  Middle 
East. 

As  the  east  Beirut  bombing  shows, 
terrorism  is  on  the  increase.  It  is  a  fact 
that  more  people  were  killed  or  injured 
by  international  terrorists  last  year  than 
in  any  year  since  governments  began 
keeping  records. 

It  is  a  fact  that  there  is  a  trend 
toward  increasing  involvement  of 
foreign  states  in  terrorist  acts.  Attacks 
supported  by  what  Qadhafi  calls  the 
"holy  alliance"  of  Libya  and  Iran  and  at- 
tacks sponsored  by  North  Korea  and 
others  have  taken  a  heavy  toll  of  inno- 
cent lives.  Seventy  or  more  incidents  in 
1983  probably  involved  significant  state 
support  or  participation. 

And  it  is  a  fact  that  the  United 
States  is  the  favorite  target  of  terror. 
Although  the  French,  Saudis,  Kuwaitis, 
and  others  have  also  been  targeted,  200 
of  the  500  terrorist  attacks  in  1983  were 
against  the  United  States. 

Some  people  here  and  in  the  Middle 
East  have  concluded  from  these 
statistics  that  the  United  States  has 
been  singled  out  because  we  have  failed 
to  follow  an  evenhanded  policy  in  the 
Middle  East.  We  are  told  that  our  Em- 
bassy annex  was  bombed  because  of  a 
vote  we  cast  in  the  United  Nations,  or 
because  of  our  policies  in  Lebanon,  or 
because  of  our  support  for  Israel.  In 
short,  we  are  told  that  we  deserve  these 
attacks  because  of  our  refusal  to 
capitulate  to  extremism  and  to  forsake 
our  obligations  to  Israel.  These  critics 
advocate  a  simple  solution:  if  you  want 
to  stop  terrorism,  abandon  your  prin- 
ciples and  change  your  policies. 

But  it's  not  that  simple.  Those  who 
advocate  such  a  solution  misunderstand 
both  the  nature  of  terrorism  and  the 
thrust  of  U.S.  policy. 

We  have  watched  terrorism  grow 
over  the  decades.  We  are  learning,  pain- 


fully, about  terrorists,  their  methods  and 
their  motives.  We  are  learning  who  sup- 
ports them;  who  gives  them  sanctuary, 
guns,  and  money;  and  who  benefits  from 
their  violent  deeds. 

Above  all,  we  are  learning  their 
goal.  Simply  put,  it  is  to  impose  their 
will  by  force.  Terrorism  is  a  form  of 
political  violence.  It  is  directed  against 
any  and  all  who  believe  in  the  rights  of 
the  individual  and  who  seek  peace 
through  the  nonviolent  give-and-take  of 
diplomacy. 

The  blast  in  east  Beirut  destroyed 
many  innocent  lives.  And  in  destroying 
those  lives,  the  terrorists  sought  not  to 
change  a  policy  but  to  destroy  diplomacy 
itself.  For  it  is  not  the  content  of 
our — or  any — particular  diplomacy  that 
is  their  target  but  the  process — a  proc- 
ess that  seeks  through  negotiation  to  ad- 
dress the  legitimate  grievances  of  all 
parties;  a  process  that,  above  all,  seeks 
to  prevent  one  party  from  imposing  its 
will  on  another. 

If  we  examine  the  statistics  again, 
we  see  that  the  instruments  of 
diplomacy  are  the  prime  targets  of  ter- 
ror. And  while  the  United  States  has 
been  singled  out,  all  those  within  the 
region  and  without  who  share  our  goal 
of  a  peaceful  settlement  have  been 
targets  as  well. 

•  The  French  have  seen  their 
troops,  who  helped  bring  a  measure  of 
stability  to  Beirut,  attacked  in  their  bar- 
racks (November  4,  1983)  and  have  seen 
their  Embassy  bombed  (May  24,  1982). 

•  The  United  Arab  Emirates  have 
seen  their  Ambassador  to  France 
assassinated  (February  8,  1984). 

•  The  Israelis  have  seen  their 
soldiers  bombed  at  Tyre  (November  4, 
1983). 

•  And  the  Saudis  have  seen  their 
Embassy  bombed  in  Beirut  (June  7, 
1984)  and  their  consul  kidnaped 
(January  27,  1984);  the  Saudis  have  now 
withdrawn  all  their  diplomatic  personnel 
from  Lebanon. 

These  are  just  some  of  the  23  recent 
attacks  for  which  the  self-styled  Islamic 
Jihad  has  claimed  credit  or  been  respon- 
sible. Anyone  who  thinks  that  we  can 
stop  these  suicide  bombings  by  cozying 
up  to  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization],  or  by  walking  away  from 
Israel,  is  dead  wrong.  Terrorists  feed  on 
instability;  they  are  the  scavengers  of 
strife  and  conflict.  No  moderate  state  or 
individual  is  safe  from  them.  No  change 


lember  1984 


73 


MIDDLE  EAST 


in  policy  will  appease  them.  Only  an  im- 
placable desire  for  peace  can  stop  them. 

We  believe  that  the  best  hope  for 
peace  is  embodied  in  the  President's 
September  1  initiative.  That  initiative, 
which  the  President  reaffirmed  in  his  re- 
cent speech  to  the  UN  General 
Assembly,  is  balanced  and  fair.  It  rejects 
the  extreme  positions  of  all  parties.  It  is 
designed  to  bring  about  a  just  and 
lasting  peace  that  will  both  recognize  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  peo- 
ple and,  at  the  same  time,  assure  the 
security  of  Israel  (our  commitment  to 
which  remains  "ironclad").  Those  goals 
are  not  incompatible.  Indeed,  neither 
can  be  truly  achieved  without  the  other. 

Let  me  underscore  something  about 
this  initiative.  Because  our  positions  are 
balanced,  because  they  are  fair,  because 
they  can  point  the  way  to  a  just  solution, 
the  President  is  committed  to  them  as 
they  are.  They  will  not  be  changed. 
Those  who  seek  a  different  solution 
must  seek  it  not  through  terror  but  at 
the  negotiating  table. 

The  United  States  will  continue  to 
be  a  terrorist  target  so  long  as  we 
adhere  to  this  commitment  to  negotia- 
tions. Whenever  we  have  taken  the  ini- 
tiative to  bring  peace  to  the  Middle 
East,  terrorism  has  increased.  That  is 
no  coincidence.  The  terrorists  know  that 
the  United  States  alone  has  the  power, 
the  will,  and  the  confidence  of  the  par- 
ties to  give  peace  a  chance  in  the  Middle 
East.  It  is  for  that  reason  that  the 
avowed  goal  of  the  terrorists  is  to  drive 
us  from  the  region.  And  it  is  for  that 
reason  that  we  will  not  surrender  and 
we  will  not  leave. 

In  taking  this  position,  some  have 
accused  the  United  States  of  not  follow- 
ing an  evenhanded  policy  in  the  Middle 
East.  And  they  are  right — they  are  right 
if  what  they  mean  is  that  we  stand 
against  violence  and  for  diplomacy;  that 
we  stand  against  extremism  and  for 
moderation;  that  we  stand  against  the 
Islamic  Jihad  and  their  radical  backers 
on  the  one  hand,  and  for  Israel  and  the 
moderate  Arabs  on  the  other.  In  short, 
they  are  right  insofar  as  the  United 
States  stands — and  will  continue  to 
stand — against  fear  and  for  freedom  in 
the  Middle  East.  ■ 


Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister 


Prime  Minister  Shimon  Peres  of  the 
State  of  Israel  made  a  working  visit  to 
Washington.  D.C..  October  8-10.  1984.  to 
meet  with  President  Reagan  and  other 
(jovemmen t  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Peres  after  their  meeting  on  October  9.^ 

President  Reagan 

We've  just  completed  an  intensive  round 
of  discussions  with  Prime  Minister  Peres 
and  Foreign  Minister  Shamir.  And  may 
I  say  that  our  discussions  reconfirm  the 
close  friendship,  the  mutual  respect,  and 
the  shared  values  that  bind  our  coun- 
tries. Our  ties  remain  unbreakable,  con- 
tinue to  grow  stronger. 

It's  been  a  particular  pleasure  for 
me  to  welcome  Mr.  Peres  to  the  White 
House  in  his  new  capacity  as  Prime 
Minister.  Mr.  Shamir,  of  course,  has 
been  a  frequent  visitor  to  Washington, 
and  I'm  very  pleased  that  we  were  able 
to  meet  with  him  again. 

I  want  to  pay  special  tribute  to  the 
leadership  qualities  of  Prime  Minister 
Peres  and  Foreign  Minister  Shamir. 
Both  have  shown  courage  and  deter- 
mination to  put  aside  partisan  politics 
and  join  together  in  a  government  of  na- 
tional unity  in  order  to  deal  with  Israel's 
most  pressing  problems.  This  demon- 
stration of  unity  reminds  us  of 


democracy's  great  strength  and  the  ho 
it  offers  for  all  the  people  of  the  world 

In  our  talks,  we  focused  on  severa 
issues.  We  discussed  in  some  detail  the 
plans  of  Prime  Minister  Peres  and  his 
partners  in  the  new  unity  government 
for  revitalizing  the  Israeli  economy  aU' 
putting  it  on  the  road  to  sustained 
recovery.  And  I'm  impressed  by  the  b( 
and  wide-ranging  steps  the  Prime 
Minister  and  his  Cabinet  colleagues  ar 
planning. 

I  know  from  our  own  experience 
how  difficult  the  problem  of  economic 
readjustment  is,  yet  how  vitally  impor 
tant  a  strong  economy  is  to  national 
security.  We've  made  clear  our  will- 
ingness to  continue  our  dialog-ue  and  t 
cooperate  with  Israel  in  the  best  way 
can  as  Israel  proceeds  with  its  plans. 

The  new  Government  of  Israel  ha; 
already  taken  some  steps  to  reduce  in 
flation  and  increase  economic  growth 
and  is  working  to  develop  additional 
steps.  The  economic  support  funds  anx 
other  funds  that  the  Congress  has  ap- 
propriated for  Israel  come  at  an  oppoii 
tune  time,  for  they  will  enable  Israel  t 
develop  its  programs  without  having  t 
divert  undue  attention  to  balance-of-p< 
ments  problems.  Should  such  problem 
arise,  the  U.S.  Government  will  work 
closely  with  the  Israeli  Government  to 
avert  them. 


7A 


nor\Qrtmcint  r\f  Qtot^i  Qiilli 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Looking  aliead,  Prime  Minister 
3res  has  described  a  bright  vision  of 
rael's  economic  future  as  a  dynamic 
impetitor  in  world  markets.  We  have 
jreed  to  explore  with  Israel  ways  to 
ihance  its  growth  and  development 
■ospects  through  structural  adjust- 
ent,  increased  trade  and  investment, 

I  well  as  American  aid. 

And  Prime  Minister  Peres  and  I 
ive  decided  to  establish  a  joint 
onomic  development  group  of 
onomic  officials  from  our  two  govern- 
ents  and  private  economists  to  discuss 
rael's  economic  recovery  and  develop- 
ent  program.  And  this  group  will  be 
f  important  forum  for  exchanging 
;ws  on  the  full  range  of  economic 
lues  and  examining  ways  to  help  sup- 
rt  Israel's  efforts. 

The  establishment  of  a  free  trade 
ea  between  our  two  countries  also  of- 
s  great  promise  to  Israel's  economic 
ture  and  to  the  United  States.  This 

II  be  the  first  such  agreement  that 
"'ve  entered  into  with  another  nation, 
ime  Minister  Peres  and  I  have  in- 
•ucted  our  delegations  to  conclude 
gotiations  within  30  days.  I'm  confi- 
nt  that  this  unprecedented  agreement, 

expanding  Israel's  exports  markets  to 
i  United  States,  will  be  important  in 
iping  Israel  on  the  way  to  economic 
■.overy,  and  it  will  also  boost  U.S.  ex- 
rts  to  Israel. 

We  also  discussed  the  situation  in 
banon.  The  Prime  Minister  made 
ar  the  firm  Israeli  determination  to 
j;hdraw  fully  from  Lebanon  as  soon  as 
jurity  arrangements  can  be  put  in 
I  ce  to  ensure  the  safety  of  Israel's 
i*thern  border.  I  reassured  him  that 
!■  L^nited  States  stands  ready  to  help, 
hvided  the  parties  concerned  want  us 
iplay  this  role  and  are  committed  to 
iding  answers  to  the  difficult  issues  in- 
!ved.  We  agreed  to  stay  in  close  touch 
( this  subject  in  the  days  ahead. 
And,  finally,  I  reaffirmed  our  fun- 
nental  commitment  to  Israel's  na- 
lal  security.  I'm  pleased  that  we've 
eed  to  consult  in  a  systematic  way  on 
LI. S. -Israel  security  assistance  pro- 
m,  a  way  that  contributes  most  effec- 
i\y  to  Israel's  overall  national  security 
\  the  maintenance  of  its  qualitative 
e.  Secretary  Weinberger  will  be 
:ussing  this  process  and  other  securi- 
matters  when  he  visits  Israel  next 


I  made  clear  to  the  Prime  Minister 
and  his  colleagues  our  firm  commitment 
to  the  goal  of  a  just  and  lasting  peace 
between  Israel  and  all  its  Arab 
neighbors.  Outstanding  steps  in  that 
direction  are  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  242,  the  Camp  David  ac- 
cords, and  the  historic  Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace  Treaty. 

I  reaffirmed  today  my  initiative  of 
September  1,  1982.  At  that  time  I  set 
forth  U.S.  positions  designed  to  bring 
the  parties  to  the  negotiating  table, 
presumably  with  their  own  positions. 
The  Prime  Minister  stressed  that  his 
government  is  also  determined  to  move 
the  peace  process  forward,  and  I  join 
him  in  this  great  and  common  objective. 
In  partnership,  Israel  and  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  work  toward  a 
common  vision  of  peace,  security,  and 
economic  well-being. 

Prime  Minister  Peres 

I  want  to  thank  the  President  of  the 
United  States  for  his  understanding,  his 
friendship,  his  hospitality,  and  may  I 
say,  Mr.  President,  that  in  our  meetings 
the  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Israel  have  reached  a  new  level  of 
harmony  and  understanding,  which  I  am 
very  grateful  for. 

I  would  like,  from  the  outset,  on 
behalf  of  all  of  the  people  of  Israel,  to 
thank  the  President,  the  Congress,  and, 
first  and  foremost,  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  for  the  lasting  friendship 
existing  between  our  two  peoples  and 
countries. 

Vice  Premier  Shamir  and  myself 
have  had  a  series  of  most  rewarding 
discussions  with  the  President,  Vice 
President,  the  Secretary  of  State,  the 
Secretary  of  Defense,  and  their  col- 
leagues. I  found  in  the  White  House  a 
true  friend  of  Israel  and  I  understand — 
who  understands  our  problems  and 
dilemmas,  is  aware  of  our  difficulties, 
and  closely  follows  our  efforts  to  face 
them. 

I'm  grateful  to  the  President  for  his 
warm  and  detailed  statement  and  con- 
sider it  an  important  contribution  to  the 
process  of  rebuilding  the  Israeli 
economy.  Equally  significant  is  my  hope 
that  the  United  States  will  continue  to 
play  an  important  role  in  reducing  ten- 
sion in  our  region  and  revitalizing  the 
peace  process. 


I  detailed  to  the  President  the  posi- 
tion of  our  government  of  national  unity 
on  a  wide  range  of  issues  in  the  political, 
security,  and  economic  areas.  The  gov- 
ernment of  national  unity  was  formed  in 
the  united  city  of  .Jerusalem  in  the  spirit 
and  the  words  of  Prophet  Ezekiel,  who 
said,  "And  I  shall  give  them  an  undi- 
vided heart  and  a  new  spirit." 

Despite  the  differences  between  the 
policies  of  this  government,  we  are  all 
united  in  our  thankfulness  and  con- 
fidence in  the  United  States  of  America. 
We  are  all  united  in  our  desire  for 
peace.  We  are  all  united  in  the  desire  to 
bring  our  boys  back  from  Lebanon,  pro- 
vided that  the  security  of  the  northern 
part  of  Israel  will  be  guaranteed.  We 
are  determined  to  tackle  our  economic 
difficulties  head  on. 

Our  land  is  not  a  land  for  skeptics, 
but  a  cradle  for  believers,  and  this  is 
more  important  than  any  passing 
economic  difficulty.  While  we  certainly 
build  a  primary  responsibility  for  dealing 
with  these  problems  and  we  have 
demonstrated  our  resolve  with  regard  to 
each,  nevertheless,  the  support  of  the 
President,  the  U.S.  Government,  and 
the  American  people  is  a  source  of 
strength  and  inspiration  to  all  of  us. 

Again,  I  thank  you  from  the  depths 
of  my  heart  for  your  understanding, 
friendship,  and  support  in  the  long  and 
short  range  of  the  destinies  of  Israel. 


'Made  from  the  Rose  Garden  at  the 
White  House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  15, 
1984).  ■ 


member  19fi4 


75 


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Freedom  and  Opportunity: 

Foundation  for  a  Dynamic  Oceans  Policy 


by  James  L.  Malone 

Address  before  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Institute  in  San  Francisco  on  Septem- 
ber 24,  1984.  Ambassador  Malone  is  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Oceans  and  Inter- 
national Environmental  and  Scientific 
Affairs. 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  with  you  today  to 
discuss  the  position  of  the  United  States 
on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (LOS)  as  well  as 
our  view  of  the  future  of  oceans  law  and 
policy.  Our  position  with  regard  to  the 
UN  convention,  as  you  know,  is  well  set- 
tled. I  believe  it  is  a  very  sound  one, 
based  on  long-recognized  principles  of 
international  law  and  upon  a  deep  con- 
viction of  our  responsibility  to  promote 
and  protect  America's  vital  interests. 
And,  I  must  say,  our  vision  of  the  future 
is  a  very  positive  one.  In  essence,  it  is  a 
vision  of  freedom  and  of  all  that  free- 
dom both  demands  and  offers.  It  is  a  vi- 
sion of  order,  of  stability,  of  opportuni- 
ty, and  of  prosperity— not  only  for 
Americans  but  for  all  people  who  share 
these  goals  and  who  would  commit 
themselves  enthusiastically  to  their  pur- 
suit. For  that  vision— and  the  policy  in 
which  it  is  embodied— reflects  the  very 
ideals  and  principles  that  are  fundamen- 
tal to  economic  growth  for  all  countries, 
developing  and  developed  alike. 

U.S.  Position  on  the 

Law  of  the  Sea  Convention 

Perhaps,  however,  before  discussing 
both  the  conception  and  implementation 
of  our  national  oceans  policy  it  would  be 
helpful— without  dwelling  on  affairs 
long-since  settled  and  explained— to 
glance  briefly  at  the  past. 

As  you  know  only  too  well,  over  the 
past  decade  we,  as  a  nation,  have  gone 
through  a  period  of  intense  soul- 
searching  and  agonizing  debate  over  the 
role  America  should  play  in  multilateral 
efforts  to  build  consensus  and  reach 
universal  agreement  on  a  comprehensive 
Law  of  the  Sea  Treaty:  what  national  in- 
terests were  to  be  recognized  and  given 
priority,  what  were  the  means  by  which 
we  would  best  be  able  to  protect  those 
interests  either  within  the  framework  of 
such  a  convention  or  in  its  wake. 

It  was  not  an  easy  period  for  us  by 
any  means,  but  we  have  now  emerged 
from  it  with  what  I  strongly  believe  is  a 


highly  disciplined  and  widely  respected 
position.  We  have  a  firm  sense  of  where 
we  are  headed.  We  have  identified  and 
enunciated  clearly  for  all  the  world  our 
own  national  priorities  and  have  made 
equally  clear  our  responsibility  to  stand 
by  them.  At  the  same  time  we  have  ex- 
pressed our  willingness  to  cooperate 
with  other  nations  in  all  ocean-related 
activities  of  mutual  benefit.  I  believe 
that  our  sincerity  in  this  is  recognized, 
our  determination  is  admired,  and  our 
leadership  appreciated. 

This  was  not  the  case  prior  to  1981. 
When  Ronald  Reagan  assumed  the 
presidency  in  January  of  that  year,  the 
United  States  was  on  the  verge  of  ac- 
cepting a  treaty  which  presented  a 
serious  threat  to  its  own  security, 
economic,  and  political  interests.  The 
treaty's  provisions  establishing  a  deep 
seabed  mining  regime  were  intentionally 
designed  to  promote  a  new  world 
order— a  form  of  global  collectivism 
known  as  the  new  international 
economic  order— which  ultimately  seeks 
the  redistribution  of  the  world's  wealth 
through  coercive  organizational  means. 
Those  provisions  were  predicated  on  a 
distorted  interpretation  of  the  noble  con- 
cept of  the  Earth's  vast  oceans  as  the 
"common  heritage  of  mankind."  Rather 
than  recognizing  the  seas  as  belonging 
to  no  nation  or  individual  but  iapen  to 
those  willing  to  take  the  risk  and  invest 
the  labor  necessary  to  derive  benefit 
from  the  abundant  resources  they  con- 
tain, many  countries  sought,  instead,  to 
build  a  regime  upon  the  assumption  that 
every  nation  shares  ownership  of  the 
oceans  as  an  undivided  property  in- 
terest. Claiming  for  themselves  the  right 
to  be  the  primary  beneficiaries  of  the 
seabed  regime  so  constructed,  they 
asserted  that  each  is  entitled  auto- 
matically to  a  proportionate  share  of  the 
profit  gained  by  those  whose  efforts  pro- 
duce wealth  from  what  would  otherwise 
be  economically  valueless.  And  to  en- 
force that  claimed  right,  they  built  into 
the  treaty  a  regulatory  vehicle  which 
permits  them  to  exert  virtually  unre- 
strained control  over  all  future  deep 
seabed  mining  operations. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the 
United  States  agreed  to  the  basic  com- 
mon heritage  "principle"  during  the  early 
stages  of  the  conference  and  that  the 
Reagan  Administration  reneged  on  that 
agreement.  In  fact,  the  actual  position  of 
all  U.S.  Administrations  involved  in 


UNCLOS  III  [Third  UN  Conference  on 
the  Law  of  the  Sea]  remained  consister 
on  this  issue.  While  the  United  States 
agreed  in  general  on  the  merit  of  the 
concept  of  a  common  heritage,  it  stead 
fastly  maintained  that  such  a  concept 
had  not  become  a  legal  principle  and 
could  not  become  one  until  developed 
and  clearly  defined  as  part  of  a  genera 
ly  accepted  Law  of  the  Sea  Convention 
'That  convention,  having  received  to  da 
only  12  of  the  60  ratifications  needed  t 
enter  into  force,  has  not  been  so  ac- 
cepted. Indeed,  the  United  States  and 
other  key  industrial  states  have  not 
signed  and  do  not  accept  the  treaty,  nc 
does  the  United  States  accept  the  intei 
pretation  of  the  common  heritage  that 
reflects. 

President  Reagan  correctly  viewed 
the  deep  seabed  mining  provisions  in  t 
LOS  Convention  as  inimical  to  our  na- 
tional interests  and  was  unwilling  to 
compromise  those  interests  for  the  saki 
of  world  or  domestic  public  opinion.  H' 
could  not  consent  to  American  particip 
tion  in  a  regime  structured  with  an  in- 
herent bias  against  the  interests  of  tht 
United  States  and  its  allies;  a  regime 
which  denied  fundamental  principles  o 
political  liberty,  private  property,  and 
free  enterprise. 

Particularly  offensive  among  the  a,  „ 
tides  in  part  XI  of  the  convention  wen  j 
provisions  that: 

•  Would  enable  a  future  "review 
conference"  to  adopt  key  changes  to  t 
treaty  over  the  objection  of  member 
states,  thus  denying  to  the  U.S.  Senat.J« 
its  constitutionally  mandated  role  in  tl"  ^ 
treaty  process; 

•  Would  intentionally  deter  rathe:  iff 
than  promote  economic  development 
with  the  establishment  of  an  ostensibl  i ' 
"parallel  system"  that  would,  if  im^ 
plemented,  discriminate  against  prival|| 
operations,  thereby  restricting  U.S.  a( 
cess  to  minerals  of  strategic  importan 

•  Would  create  a  bias  against  the 
production  of  mineral  resources  as  set 
forth  in  article  150  of  the  convention; 

•  Would  impose  unconscionable 
financial  and  regulatory  burdens  on 
American  industry  and  government,  r 
quiring,  by  the  best  estimates  of  U.S. 
Government  officials,  a  potential  liabill  "■ 
for  the  United  States  of  $1  billion  in 
direct  costs  and  loan  guarantees  for 
both  initial  expenses  and  continuing 


It 


OCEANS 


aerations  of  the  Enterprise  and  the  In- 
trnational  Seabed  Resource  Authority 

i.elf; 

•  Would  effectively  enjoin  the  man- 
loiy  transfer  of  private  and  possibly 
ii>itive  technology  to  an  international 
ili('(i  authority  dominated  by  countries 
til  unsympathetic  to  U.S.  interests  as 
■  price  of  its  use  in  private  mining 

, oiations;  and 

•  Would  establish  a  potential  source 
funding  for  the  terrorist  activities  of 
tional  liberation  organizations. 

Nevertheless,  the  President  re- 
ined committed  to  efforts  to  correct 
!h  flaws  through  the  multilateral 

ptiating  process  and,  in  complete 
Dd  faith,  pursued  such  efforts  with 
;or  and  imagination  throughout  the 
al  sessions  of  UNCLOS  III  in  1981 
1  1982.  Unfortunately,  the  conference 
)ved  incapable  of  accommodation  in 
/  of  the  six  basic  areas  just  identified 
critical  to  the  United  States.  Serious 
npromise  proved  impossible.  Intran- 
ence,  prompted  to  a  significant 
jree  by  a  pervasive  view  of  the  con- 
ition  as  a  means  to  promote  the  new 
ernational  economic  order,  was  adept- 
ixploited  by  some  in  an  effort  to  con- 
date  their  influence  with  the  "non- 
^ed  nations"  and  to  isolate  further 

United  States  and  its  allies  within 

"world  community."  This  rendered 

conference  essentially  incapable  of 
iching  consensus.  This,  of  course,  has 

been  peculiar  to  UNCLOS  III. 
lilar  ideological  confrontations  have 
■upted  many  other  multilateral 
otiations  and  rendered  various 
inical  agencies  of  the  United  Nations 

otent. 

Ultimately,  the  United  States  was 

with  no  acceptable  alternative  but  to 
3  against  adoption  of  the  treaty, 
■sequently,  on  July  9,  1982,  after  a 
;her  searching  review.  President 
igan  announced  his  decision  to  refuse 
ign  the  treaty,  expressing  his  inten- 

to  put  behind  us  a  decade  of  well- 
ntioned  but  often  less  than  fruitful 
otiations  and  turn  America's  vision 
in  to  the  future. 

tans  Law  and  Policy  in  the 
ke  of  UNCLOS  III " 

ognizing  that  the  peaceful  uses  of 
world's  oceans  and  the  management 
conservation  of  marine  resources  re- 
n  a  matter  of  fundamental  con- 
1— as  well  as  a  potential  source  of 
ndless  opportunity— to  all  maritime 
es.  President  Reagan  set  forth  on 
•ch  10,  1983,  the  principles  upon 
ch  the  United  States  would  base  its 


future  oceans  policy  and,  consistent  with 
those  principles  and  the  rule  of  law,  pro- 
claimed the  establishment  of  a 
200-nautical-mile  exclusive  economic 
zone  (EEZ). 

In  order  to  fully  grasp  and  ap- 
preciate that  policy,  however,  a  key 
principle  underlying  it— namely,  that  the 
nonseabed  sections  of  the  treaty  reflect 
customary  law  in  distinction  to  those 
prescribing  the  mining  regime— must  be 
understood. 

Of  paramount  importance  in  assign- 
ing the  proper  meaning  to  the  various 
sections  of  the  LOS  Convention  is  the 
need  to  recognize  that  unlike  all  former 
oceans-related  conventions,  UNCLOS  III 
does  two  things:  it  codifies  existing  law 
and  prescribes  new  law.  The  attempt 
was  made  to  both  set  out  present  and 
developing  law  in  familiar  areas  in  light 
of  circumstances  since  1958  as  well  as  to 
provide  new  regimes  for  unregulated  ac- 
tivities. Navigation  rights,  as  seen  in  the 
very  wording  of  the  LOS  Convention  ar- 
ticles on  navigation,  were  frequently 
drawn  from  the  1958  Geneva  Conven- 
tions on  the  Territorial  Sea  and  Con- 
tiguous Zone  and  that  on  the  High  Seas, 
which  embodied  customary  law  as  it  had 
developed  to  that  time.  As  such,  it  is 
void  of  merit  to  argue  that  only  parties 
to  the  LOS  Convention  enjoy  customary 
international  legal  rights  of  longstanding 
status. 

Similarly,  it  is  without  legal  founda- 
tion to  maintain,  on  the  basis  of  the  so- 
called  contractual  theory,  that  the  con- 
vention is  a  package  and  that  for  a  non- 
party all  rights  are  lost  if  a  state  does 
not  become  a  party  to  it.  Absent  a 
peremptory  norm  to  the  contrary, 
customary  rights  of  sovereign  states  re- 
main inviolate  and  cannot  otherwise  be 
denied.  I  do  not  subscribe  to  the  views 
of  critics  of  the  U.S.  position  who  accuse 
nonsignatories  of  "picking  and  choosing" 
among  sections  of  the  convention.  The 
"package  deal"  concept  was,  it  must  be 
remembered,  nothing  more  than  a  pro- 
cedural device,  based  on  a  December 
1973  "gentleman's  agreement"  and 
designed  to  further  the  achievement  of 
consensus.  As  such,  the  concept  died 
upon  the  conclusion  of  the  LOS  negotia- 
tions. It  has  no  continuing  merit 
whatever. 

States  certainly  are  free  to  continue 
to  apply  customary  international  law 
and  ignore  de  novo  prescriptive  provi- 
sions which  have  neither  been  tried  nor 
admitted  by  wide  practice  to  be  a  source 
of  recognized  international  law. 

It  is  the  position  of  the  United 
States  then  that,  despite  its  short- 
comings, the  Law  of  the  Sea  Convention 


does  reflect  a  successful  effort  to  ar- 
ticulate and  codify  existing  rules  of 
maritime  law  and  actual  state  practice 
with  respect  to  the  traditional  uses  of 
the  oceans,  such  as  navigation  and 
overflight.  Indeed,  the  United  States 
believes  that  most  of  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty,  apart  from  the  seabed  mining 
text  in  part  XI,  fairly  balance  the  in- 
terests of  all  states  and  are  fully  con- 
sistent with  norms  of  customary  interna- 
tional law.  Hence,  it  is  prepared  to  ac- 
cept and  act  in  accordance  with  these 
provisions  on  a  reciprocal  basis. 

But,  since  the  seabed  mining  por- 
tions of  the  convention  establish  wholly 
new  law  and  new  obligations,  which  are 
contractual  in  nature  and  not  part  of 
customary  international  law,  the  provi- 
sions will  be  binding  only  on  parties  to 
the  convention  and,  then,  only  when  and 
if  it  enters  into  force.  The  provisions  in 
part  XI  of  the  convention  are  predicated 
on  the  establishment  of  a  new  interna- 
tional organization,  the  International 
Seabed  Resource  Authority,  and  on  the 
acceptance  by  parties  of  that  organiza- 
tion's jurisdiction  and  of  their  own 
obligation  to  act  in  accordance  with  its 
mandates.  Such  obligations  must  be  will- 
ingly assumed  by  states  and  cannot  be 
thrust  upon  them.  The  United  States 
does  not  and  will  not  accept  them  and  is 
not  bound  by  them. 

In  nonseabed  areas,  however,  as  I 
have  said,  the  United  States  does 
recognize  the  existence  of  an  interna- 
tional law  of  the  sea  entirely  indepen- 
dent of— though  reflected  in— the  Law 
of  the  Sea  Convention  and  based  upon 
accepted  principles  of  customary  inter- 
national law.  The  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  honor  those  principles  and  will 
assert  its  rights  consistent  with  those 
principles  on  a  global  basis. 

In  essence,  all  this  is  the  legal  foun- 
dation for  the  national  oceans  policy  an- 
nounced by  President  Reagan  on  March 
10,  1983.  The  United  States  will 
recognize  the  legitimate  rights  of  all 
coastal  and  maritime  states  and  will  ex- 
pect that  its  own  rights  and  those  of 
other  states  are  recognized  in  return.  In 
his  statement,  the  President  stressed  the 
importance  of  the  traditional  rights  of 
navigation  and  overflight  to  the  United 
States.  Unimpeded  commercial  and 
military  navigation  and  aviation  are 
crucial  to  our  national  security  and 
economic  interests.  The  right  of  transit 
through  straits  and  archipelagic 
sealanes,  freedom  of  the  "high  seas" 
within  and  beyond  coastal  state  ex- 
clusive economic  zone  jurisdiction,  and 
the  right  of  innocent  passage  within  ter- 
ritorial seas  must  be  protected  and  will 


bember1984 


77 


OCEANS 


be  respected  by  the  United  States  within 
its  own  jurisdiction. 

The  importance  of  the  rule  of  law  to 
the  regTilation  of  peaceful  uses  of  the 
oceans  is  critical,  and  the  United  States 
will  further  those  acceptable  provisions 
of  the  convention  which  are  based  on 
customary  law  as  consistently  as  possi- 
ble in  order  to  assure  other  states  of 
U.S.  intentions  and  in  order  to  promote 
certainty  and  stability.  As  a  major 
maritime  power  and  large  coastal  state, 
the  United  States  is  in  a  preeminent 
position  to  do  so. 

At  the  same  time  we  have  sought  to 
address  the  difficulties  and  dangers  that 
the  unsettled  future  of  the  LOS  Conven- 
tion imposes.  After  almost  2  years  since 
the  convention  was  opened  for  signa- 
ture, only  20%  of  the  ratifications  re- 
quisite to  the  entry  into  force  have  oc- 
curred. Consequently,  global  reliance  on 
the  convention  as  a  conventional  source 
of  law  within  the  meaning  of  Article 
38(l)(a)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  [Inter- 
national Court  of  Justice]  is  uncertain  at 
best.  The  convention  may  not  enter  into 
force  for  many  years — perhaps  a 
decade — or,  just  as  likely,  not  at  all. 
Given  the  rapid  rate  of  change  in  ocean 
law,  much  will  happen  in  the  coming  10 
years  which  could  render  many  sections 
of  the  convention  obsolete.  Responsible 
states  must,  therefore,  in  the  interim 
comply  with  and  promote  the  customary 
law  it  embodies.  Fortunately,  this  has 
already  proven  to  be  the  case. 

A  perfect  example  of  such  practice 
is  the  almost  universal  acceptance  of  the 
EEZ  as  customary  law.  With  enactment 
of  EEZ  legislation  by  60  coastal  states 
and  the  acceptance  of  these  zones  by 
user  states  as  evidenced  by  bilateral 
agreements — such  as  governing  interna- 
tional fisheries  agreements — it  is  clear 
that  the  EEZ,  a  concept  which  had  not 
existed  prior  to  the  LOS  Conference 
negotiations,  derives  its  contemporary 
validity  from  state  practice  and  not  the 
convention,  as  the  latter  is  not  in  force. 

Similarly,  state  practice  applies  to 
navigational  freedoms.  The  tortuous 
negotiating  history  associated  with  the 
convention's  EEZ  provisions  reflected  in 
no  small  measure  a  balancing  of  coastal 
state  and  navigational  interests.  I  find  it 
telling  that  state  P]EZ  practice  has 
resulted  in  very  few  encroachments  on 
traditional  navigational  freedoms,  not- 
withstanding earlier  approaches,  such  as 
200-mile  territorial  and  patrimonial  seas 
in  which  freedom  of  navigation  was 
denied.  In  the  most  vital  navigational 
areas,  straits  used  for  international 
navigation,  there  has,  to  my  knowledge, 


been  no  incident  in  which  a  straits 
riparian  state  has  denied  or  restricted 
passage  of  U.S.  vessels  in  any  way  in- 
consistent with  the  straits  transit 
passage  regime. 

In  furtherance  of  the  President's 
March  10  statement,  the  U.S.  Navy  has 
and  shall  continue  to  exercise  these 
navigational  rights  and  freedoms  global- 
ly. In  those  instances  in  which  coastal 
state  claims  are  inconsistent  with 
customary  law,  exercises  are  openly  car- 
ried out.  If  a  coastal  state  protests,  the 
United  States  by  reply  note  stipulates 
the  navigational  right  or  freedom  in- 
volved, the  manner  in  which  it  has  been 
circumscribed,  and  the  U.S.  resolve  to 
continue  to  exercise  such  rights  and 
freedoms.  Two  recurring  areas  subject 
to  challenge  have  been: 

First,  requirements  of  advance 
notification  to  or  receipt  of  advance  per- 
mission from  a  coastal  state  as  a  pre- 
requisite to  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
innocent  passage  by  warships  through 
the  territorial  sea;  and 

Second,  claims  to  historic  bays. 

It  is  imperative  that  this  program  be 
executed  regularly  in  order  to  prevent 
arguments  of  acquiescence  or  prescrip- 
tion. 

Such  challenges  are,  however,  by  far 
the  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  Our 
negotiations  with  select  archipelagic 
states  which  are  in  the  process  of  draft- 
ing archipelagic  state  legislation  are 
gratifying— in  no  instance  has  there 
been  any  indication  of  inconsistencies 
with  the  archipelagic  states'  transit 
passage  articles  of  the  convention.  As  in 
the  case  of  EEZ  navigational  practice, 
here  also  there  is  abundant  evidence  of 
good-faith  application  of  applicable  LOS 
Convention  provisions  pending  its  uncer- 
tain entry  into  force. 

U.S.  policy  in  the  area  of  interna- 
tional law  and  the  orderly  regulation  of 
the  traditional  uses  of  the  oceans  is 
firmly  established.  But  our  policy  is 
built,  as  well,  upon  a  recognition  of  the 
opportunities  to  wisely  utilize  the 
resources  of  the  oceans  both  within  and 
beyond  the  EEZ  and  a  commitment  to 
pursue  those  opportunities  energetically 
in  a  manner  which  realistically  promotes 
economic  development. 

Recognizing  this,  the  United  States 
is  conducting  a  deep  seabed  mining 
policy  pursuant  to  statutory  authority 
and  presidential  directive.  In  accordance 
with  Section  118  of  the  Deep  Seabed 
Hard  Mineral  Resources  Act  of  1980, 
the  President  is  authorized  to  negotiate 
agreements  with  foreign  nations 
necessary  to  achieve  reciprocal  recogni- 
tion of  deep  seabed  mining  licenses  and 


permits,  priorities  of  rights  for  applica- 
tions for  commercial  recovery  licenses, 
and  prohibition  of  activities  which  con- 
flict with  licenses  or  permits  already 
issued.  The  President's  March  1983 
oceans  policy  statement  directed  effort 
to  work  with  "like-minded"  countries  tc 
develop  a  framework,  free  of  un- 
necessary political  and  economic 
restraints,  for  exploration  and  exploita 
tion  of  the  deep  seabeds  when  conditio 
warrant. 

Accordingly,  the  United  States  has 
concluded  two  significant  agreements. 
The  first  agreement,  an  "Agreement 
Concerning  Interim  Arrangements 
Relating  to  Polymetallic  Nodules  of  thi 
Deep  Seabed,"  signed  on  September  2, 
1982,  by  France,  the  Federal  Republic 
Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  th 
United  States,  had  three  primary  pur- 
poses: 

•  To  avoid  overlaps  and  conflictin 
claims  and  to  ensure  that  activities  an 
carried  out  in  an  orderly  and  peaceful 
manner; 

•  To  ensure  that  the  agreement 
would  not  prejudice  the  decisions  of  tl 
parties  with  respect  to  the  LOS  Convt 
tion;  and 

•  To  ensure  that  adequate  deep 
seabed  areas  containing  nodules  rema 
available  for  operations  by  other  state 
in  accordance  with  international  law. 

The  1982  agreement  has  served  tl 
parties  well.  Numerous  negotiations 
were  held  among  the  parties  and  in 
coordination  with  private  consortia 
leading  to  a  successful  resolution  of 
overlapping  claims  and  avoidance  of  ( 
flicts.  These  negotiations  fostered  a 
positive  climate,  establishing  the  pro[_ 
osition  that  those  states  possessing  tl 
requisite  technology  and  having  over 
years  expended  the  greatest  sums  in 
developing  the  possibility  of  deep  seal 
mining  exploration  and  exploitation 
could  resolve  their  sovereign  differen 

Negotiations  since  September  19h 
have  led  to  the  successful  conclusion 
second  agreement,  the  "Provisional 
Understanding  Regarding  Deep  Seab< 
Matters"  signed  on  August  3,  1984,  a 
which  entered  into  force  on  the  secori 
of  this  month.  This  agreement— con- 
sistent with  the  primary  objectives  of 
the  September  2,  1982,  agreement— i 
exactly  the  type  of  agreement  en- 
visioned in  Section  118  of  the  1980  D< 
Seabed  Hard  Mineral  Resources  Act. 
The  provisional  understanding  con- 
stitutes an  agreement  among  the  maj 
industrialized  nations  with  interests  i 
deep  seabed  mining,  aimed  at  avoidira 
conflict  over  deep  seabed  mine  sites  & 


78 


npnartmpnt  nf  ^tptp  Riilli 


OCEANS 


viding  for  regular  consultations  with 
Dect  to  deep  seabed  mining. 
The  provisional  understanding— 
led  by  Belgium,  France,  West  Ger- 
\v.  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands,  the 
ted  Kingdom,  and  the  United 
tes— includes  two  appendixes  which 
stitute  an  integral  part  of  the  agree- 
it.  There  are  a  number  of  salient 
:ures,  including  provisions  to  avoid 
flicts  of  registration  or  operations 
,  to  require  notification  and  consulta- 
1  prior  to  the  application  for  registra- 
(,  the  issuance  of  authorizations,  or 
conduct  of  operations.  The  parties  to 
provisional  understanding  have 
eed  that  no  exploitation  shall  occur 
>r  to  January  1,  1988,  and  to  settle 
)utes  by  appropriate  means.  In  addi- 
1,  provision  is  made  for  additional 
,es  to  accede  to  the  agreement. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  the  agree- 
it  is  without  prejudice  to,  nor  does  it 
ict,  the  positions  of  the  parties,  or 
obligations  assumed  by  any  of  the 
ties,  in  respect  to  the  LOS  Conven- 
1.  A  memorandum  attached  to  the 
eement  also  ensures  that  operations 
;he  parties  shall  be  conducted  with 
?onable  regard  to  the  interests  of 
3r  states  in  the  exercise  of  the 
'dom  of  the  high  seas,  will  protect 
quality  of  the  marine  environment, 
v'ent  waste,  and  preserve  future  op- 
nmities  for  the  commercial  recovery 
he  unrecovered  balance  of  the  hard 
leral  resources  in  the  authorization 

IS. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the 
jement  is  illegal  and  contrary  to  in- 
lational  law.  Such  a  suggestion  is 
jnable.  I  find  irreproachable  and  en- 
iy  consistent  with  international  law 
proposition  that  sovereign  states 
'  conclude  an  agreement  the  purpose 
/hich  is  to  avoid  conflict  and  waste, 
-note  rational  and  orderly  develop- 
it  of  the  seabeds,  further  the  rule  of 
,  and  be  controlling  among  them  in 
absence  of  any  other  binding  inter- 
onal  instrument  in  force  to  which 
/  are  parties  and  which  treats  the 
le  issue.  I  believe  the  conclusion  of 
provisional  understanding  is  a 
lificant  and  responsible  step  forward 
he  field  of  international  affairs  and 
conduct  of  foreign  relations.  I  also 
eve  the  understanding  to  be  the  only 
>istic  and  workable  approach  to  deep 
oed  mining  beyond  the  limits  of  na- 
tal jurisdiction  which  has,  to  date, 
n  achieved  or  which  is  likely  to  be 
ieved  within  the  coming  decade. 


A  Look  at  the  Future 

I  believe  that  the  oceans  policy  of  the 
United  States,  given  real  world  condi- 
tions, is  the  only  viable  means  of  dealing 
with  circumstances  in  which  consensus  is 
not  possible.  That  policy  admirably  pro- 
tects U.S.  interests  and  will  undoubtedly 
shape  the  course  of  oceans  affairs  for 
many  years  to  come. 

Let  me  state  very  emphatically  that 
the  United  States  cannot— and  will 
not— -sign  the  UN  Convention  on  the 
Law  of  the  Sea.  The  convention  is  fatal- 
ly flawed  and  cannot  be  cured.  It  took  a 
decade  of  continuous  negotiations  to  ar- 
rive at  the  text  and  the  last  such 
substantive  session  showed  how  difficult 
it  was  to  achieve  amendments,  no  mat- 
ter how  small,  in  that,  under  the  con- 
ference procedure,  achievement  of  con- 
sensus was  so  friable  a  creature. 

Furthermore,  and  a  fact  often 
overlooked,  the  convention  is  open  for 
signature  only  until  December  10,  1984, 
after  which  it  is  open  for  adherence  or 
accession  only.  This  Administration, 
whether  reelected  or  not,  will  be  in  of- 
fice through  January  and  has  no  inten- 
tion of  altering  its  stance  on  signature. 
After  December  10,  a  two-thirds  majori- 
ty of  the  Senate  will  be  required  to 
achieve  U.S.  advice  and  consent.  Given 
the  fact  that  more  than  one-third  of  the 
current  Senate  membership  disapproves 
of  the  convention,  and  that  U.S.  in- 
dustry is  officially  on  record  as  being  ir- 
revocably opposed  to  its  mining  regime, 
adherence  or  accession  to  the  convention 
in  its  present  form  is  not  possible. 

Let  me  speculate.  In  my  experience, 
as  a  general  rule,  it  is  legally  virtually 
impossible  to  amend  a  convention  prior 
to  its  entry  into  force.  It  is  also  tremen- 
dously difficult  to  amend  after  its  entry 
into  force  as  between  parties  and  those 
who  have  signed  but  not  ratified  it. 

Further,  in  the  case  of  the  LOS  Con- 
vention, given  the  present  political 
climate  among  the  convention's  pro- 
ponents, even  if  these  legal  facts  of  life 
were  somehow  miraculously  overcome,  I 
do  not  believe  the  political  will  exists  at 
present  for  serious  amendment  of  the 
convention.  However,  since  the  conven- 
tion was  opened  for  signature  in 
December  1982,  the  political  climate  has 
become,  if  not  less  hostile,  certainly 
more  realistic. 


Given  this  country's  resolute  and 
clear  stand  on  the  convention  and  our 
provisional  approach  to  deep  seabed 
mining  matters,  I  believe  that  percep- 
tions will  become  increasingly  realistic. 
This  process  will  be  gradual— it  will  not 
come  about  within  the  next  year,  or  two, 
or  even  four,  but  I  expect  it  will  in  the 
next  six  or  eight,  during  which  time  the 
United  States  and  its  like-minded  allies 
are  resolved  to  stand  firm.  At  such  a 
stage,  I  feel  the  political  will  may  well 
develop  to  reopen  the  conference  and  to 
give  serious  consideration  to  the  minimal 
needs  of  the  United  States  and  the  in- 
dustrialized world.  I  believe  that  ensuing 
years  will  demonstrate  to  those  who 
espouse  the  common  heritage  concept 
that  too  much  of  lasting  benefit  and  pro- 
mise will  be  lost  if  they  do  not  come  to 
grips  with  such  realistic  expectations. 
When  that  realization  and  the  will  to  ex- 
ecute it  are  rekindled,  the  Law  of  the 
Sea  will  again  become  an  effective 
negotiating  forum.  I  look  forward  to 
that  day. 

In  the  interim.  President  Reagan 
has  set  us  on  a  dynamic  course  into  the 
future.  The  truly  historic  significance  of 
his  national  oceans  policy  may  not  be 
fully  comprehended  for  generations  to 
come.  Referring  to  the  sheer  size  of  the 
area  included  within  the  President's 
EEZ  proclamation.  Secretary  of  the  In- 
terior William  Clark  has  recently 
pointed  correctly  to  the  acquisition  of 
the  Louisiana  Purchase  as  the  only  com- 
parable event  in  our  national  experience. 
The  exclusive  economic  zone,  he  noted, 
"increased  by  one  and  two-thirds  the  size 
of  the  territory  controlled  by  the  people 
of  the  United  States,"  and  to  date  we 
know  remarkably  little  of  the  abundant 
wealth  of  resources  this  territory  might 
hold.  As  the  Secretary  pointed  out,  it  is 
an  incredible  challenge— and  oppor- 
tunity—that this  "newest  frontier"  holds 
out  for  America  and  for  the  world.  To 
meet  that  challenge  will  require  a  policy 
which  taps  the  energy,  the  imagination, 
and  the  initiative  of  the  American 
people— a  policy  which  offers  them  the 
freedom,  the  incentive,  and  the  stability 
to  put  those  attributes  to  work  and  set 
out  to  develop  the  resources  of  the 
oceans  for  the  benefit  of  all  mankind.  ■ 


-Rmhpr  1984 


79 


POPULATION 


Population  Conference 
Held  in  IVIexico  City 


The  International  Conference  on 
Population  was  held  in  Mexico  City 
August  6-U.  198J,.  Following  is  the 
plenary  statement  made  by  Ambassador 
James  L.  Bw.kley,  head  of  the  U.S. 
delegation,  on  August  8  and  the  text  of 
the  declaration  adopted  by  the  conference 
on  August  lU,  as  well  as  President 
Reagan's  message  of  May  30. 


AMBASSADOR  BUCKLEY, 
AUG.  8,  1984 

We  thank  the  Government  of  Mexico, 
under  its  distinguished  President,  Miguel 
de  la  Madrid,  for  its  hospitality  in 
hosting  this  important  gathering  of  the 
international  community. 

This  conference  has  been  called  to 
review  the  World  Population  Plan  of  Ac- 
tion adopted  in  Bucharest  10  years  ago. 
As  we  do  so,  it  is  important  to  keep  in 
mind  that  the  subject  of  population  is 
part  of  a  larger  objective.  In  its  own 
words,  the  Plan  of  Action  is  "an  instru- 
ment of  the  international  community  for 
the  promotion  of  economic  development, 
quality  of  life,  human  rights  and  fun- 
damental freedom." 

In  short,  population  goals  and 
policies  must  be  considered  not  as  ends 
in  themselves  but  in  the  context  of  social 
and  economic  strategies  designed  to 
enhance  the  human  condition  in  a  man- 
ner consistent  with  basic  values. 

Over  the  past  20  years,  the  United 
States  has  played  a  leading  role  in  focus- 
ing attention  on  population  issues,  in 
urging  international  cooperation,  and  in 
the  design  and  implementation  of  pop- 
ulation strategies  based  on  voluntary 
family  planning.  In  the  current  year,  we 
will  be  contributing  $240,000,000  for 
these  purposes,  or  44%  of  the  total 
population  assistance  provided  by 
developed  nations;  and  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration has  requested  an  increase 
for  1985.  U.S.  support  for  these  pro- 
grams has  increased  by  more  than  30% 
since  1980. 

The  Need  for  a  Sharper  Focus 

At  the  same  time,  the  experience  of  the 
last  two  decades  not  only  makes  possible 
but  requires  a  sharper  focus  for  our 
population  policy. 


Given  the  dramatic  success  achieved 
by  developing  nations  over  the  past  30 
years  in  reducing  mortality  rates,  there 
is  no  question  that  many  of  them  find  it 
difficult  to  cope  with  the  resulting  surge 
in  their  populations.  Moreover,  major  in- 
creases are  destined  to  continue  well 
into  the  next  century  even  with  signifi- 
cant reductions  in  birth  rates. 

Small  wonder  that  so  many  have 
reacted  to  this  dramatic  phenomenon  by 
concentrating  more  on  how  to  control 
the  surge  in  human  numbers  than  on 
how  expanding  populations  might  be  ac- 
commodated. 

We  believe,  however,  that  in  the 
superb  address  welcoming  us  to  Mexico 
on  Monday,  President  De  la  Madrid 
placed  the  problem  in  context  when  he 
said: 

Our  planet,  inhabited  today  by  4.8  billion 
human  beings,  has  the  natural  resources,  pro- 
duction capacity  and  different  administrative 
and  political  skills  it  needs  to  fully  meet  the 
basic  needs  of  its  future  population.  To  that 
end,  let  us  make  reason  our  guide  in  our  ef- 
forts to  prepare  for  the  future. 

Let  us  follow  the  advice  of  President 
De  la  Madrid  and  place  the  population 
problem  in  proper  perspective. 

First,  and  foremost,  population 
growth  is,  of  itself,  neither  good  nor 
bad.  It  becomes  an  asset  or  a  problem  in 
conjunction  with  other  factors,  such  as 
economic  policy,  social  constraints,  and 
the  ability  to  put  additional  men  and 
women  to  useful  work.  People,  after  all, 
are  producers  as  well  as  consumers. 
Hong  Kong  and  South  Korea  are 
cases  in  point.  They  have  few  natural 
resources.  Over  the  past  20  years,  they 
have  experienced  major  increases  in 
population,  yet  few  nations  have  ex- 
perienced such  rapid  economic  growth. 
We  believe  it  no  coincidence  that  each  of 
these  societies  placed  its  reliance  on  the 
creativity  of  private  individuals  working 
within  a  free  economy- 
Some  developing  nations  chose  a  dif- 
ferent path,  that  of  a  controlled,  central- 
ly planned  economy.  In  such  cases,  the 
concentration  of  economic  decisionmak- 
ing in  the  hands  of  planners  and  public 
officials  tended  to  inhibit  individual  ini- 
tiative and  sometimes  crippled  the  abili- 
ty of  average  men  and  women  to  work 
toward  a  better  future.  In  many  cases, 
agriculture  was  devastated  by  govern- 
ment price  controls  that  wiped  out  the 
rewards  for  labor.  Job  creation  in  infant 


industries  was  hampered  by  confiscatoi 
taxes.  Personal  industry  and  thrift  wei 
penalized.  Under  such  circumstances, 
population  growth  became  a  threat. 

One  of  the  consequences  of 
"economic  statism,"  and  the  lagging 
development  such  an  approach  implies 
was  the  disruption  of  the  natural 
mechanism  for  slowing  population 
growth.  The  world's  developed  nations 
have  reached  a  population  equilibrium 
without  compulsion.  The  controlling  fa 
tor  has  been  the  adjustment,  by  in- 
dividual families,  of  reproductive 
behavior  to  economic  opportunity  and 
aspiration.  Historically,  as  opportunity 
and  the  standard  of  living  rise,  the  bir 
rate  falls.  Fortunately,  a  broad  interna 
tional  consensus  has  emerged  since 
Bucharest  that  economic  development 
and  population  policies  are  mutually 
reinforcing. 

This  conference  offers  a  unique  op 
portunity  for  all  of  us  to  reflect  on  the 
interaction  between  economic  develop- 
ment and  population  in  the  light  of  ex- 
perience so  that  we  may  develop  more 
effective  strategies  for  the  years  ahea( 
Our  thinking,  however,  must  not  be 
limited  to  a  consideration  of  economic 
and  population  factors  alone.  Any  polii 
adopted  must  be  consistent  with  a 
respect  for  human  dignity  and  fun- 
damental freedom. 

U.S.  Policy 

As  President  Ronald  Reagan  stated  in 
his  message  to  this  conference: 

We  believe  population  programs  can  ar 
must  be  truly  voluntary,  cognizant  of  the 
rights  and  responsibilities  of  individuals  an 
families,  and  respectful  of  religious  and 
cultural  values.  When  they  are,  such  pro- 
gi-ams  can  make  an  important  contribution 
economic  and  social  development,  to  the 
health  of  mothers  and  children,  and  to  the 
stability  of  the  family  and  of  society. 

In  preparing  for  this  conference,  t 
United  States  has  issued  a  carefully 
developed  statement  of  policy,  a  copy  ■ 
which  has  been  distributed  to  each 
delegation.  It  does  not  represent  a 
radical  shift  in  its  past  position.  Rathe 
it  reflects  a  sharpening  of  focus  to  mal 
its  foreign  assistance  programs  more 
responsive  to  true  needs  and  more 
reflective  of  fundamental  values. 

The  United  States  will  continue  its 
longstanding  commitment  to  develop- 
ment and  family  planning  assistance  tc 
other  countries.  By  exercising  greater 
care  in  determining  how  those  contribi 
tions  are  used,  the  United  States  ex- 
pects to  increase  the  effectiveness  of  it 
economic  assistance  while  ensuring  tha 


80 


POPULATION 


'aniily  planning  funds  are  used  in 
s  consistent  with  human  dignity  and 
ily  values. 

The  UN  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of 
Child  (1959)  recognizes  the  right  of 
iren  to  protection  before  birth  as 
as  after.  In  keeping  with  this  af- 
ation,  the  United  States  does  not 
ider  abortion  an  acceptable  element 
imily  planning  programs. 
Over  the  past  decade,  the  United 
es  has  not  allowed  its  population 
stance  contribution  to  be  used  to 
nee  or  promote  abortion.  The  pres- 
policy  tightens  this  existing  restraint 
iree  ways. 

First,  where  U.S.  funds  are  con- 
ited  to  nations  which  support  abor- 
with  other  funds,  the  United  States 
contribute  to  such  nations  through 
egated  accounts  which  cannot  be 
for  abortion. 
Second,  the  United  States  will  no 
er  contribute  to  separate  nongovern- 
tal  organizations  which  perform  or 
ely  promote  abortion  as  a  method 
.mily  planning  in  other  nations. 
Third,  before  the  United  States  will 
;-ibute  funds  to  the  UN  Fund  for 
jlation  Activities,  (UNFPA),  it  will 
t  that  no  part  of  its  contribution  be 
for  abortion  and  will  also  first  re- 
;  concrete  assurances  that  the 
PA  is  not  engaged  in,  and  does  not 
ide  funding  for,  abortion  or  coercive 
ly  planning  programs.  Should  such 
ranees  not  be  possible,  and  in  order 
aintain  the  level  of  its  overall  con- 
tion  to  the  international  effort,  the 
ed  States  will  redirect  the  amount 
5  intended  contribution  to  other, 
UNFPA  family  planning  programs. 
A^hen  efforts  to  lower  population 
th  are  deemed  advisable,  U.S. 
y  considers  it  imperative  that  such 
ts  respect  the  right  of  couples  to 
•mine  the  size  of  their  own  families, 
•rdingly,  the  United  States  will  not 
ide  family  planning  funds  to  any  na- 
which  engages  in  forcible  coercion 
hieve  population  goals. 
)ur  support  of  family  planning  pro- 
is  serves  two  basic  purposes,  both 
hich  require  ready  access  to  the 
/ledge  and  services  that  will  enable 
les  to  exercise  their  right  to  deter- 
when  they  will  conceive  a  child. 
The  first  concerns  health.  The  avail- 
:y  of  effective  family  planning  serv- 
will  enable  couples  to  better  protect 
lealth  of  mother  and  child  by  enabl- 
hem  to  control  the  spacing  of 
ren  and  avoid  pregnancies  among 
en  who  are  too  young  or  too  old  to 
one  with  safety. 


The  second  end  of  family  planning  is 
to  facilitate  parental  control  over  the 
size  of  families.  An  effective  voluntary 
family  planning  program  will  result  in 
substantial  decreases  in  family  size  only 
to  the  degree  that  couples  desire  fewer 
children  and  that  safe,  acceptable,  effec- 
tive, and  affordable  methods  are 
available. 

Here  again  we  can  benefit  from  re- 
cent as  well  as  historical  experience.  So 
long  as  the  great  majority  of  couples 
sees  an  economic  advantage  in  having  a 
large  number  of  children,  they  will  tend 
to  have  them.  This  desire  is  prevalent  in 
the  least  developed  countries  where 
children  begin  to  contribute  to  family  in- 
come at  an  early  age  and  are  the  main 
source  of  support  for  parents  too  old  to 
work.  Once  a  society  achieves  a  certain 
level  of  real  economic  development, 
however,  the  incentives  to  childbearing 
will  change— especially  where  women 
have  achieved  higher  education  and 
broader  economic  opportunities  and  are 
able  to  attain  their  rightful  place  in 
society. 

South  Korea  and  the  ASEAN 
[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions] countries  are  cases  in  point.  Be- 
tween 1970  and  1982,  they  experienced 
an  average  annual  rate  of  economic 
growth  of  over  7%,  well  above  that  of 
any  other  part  of  the  world.  At  the  same 
time,  through  a  combination  of  signifi- 


cant family  planning  efforts  and  the 
decline  in  the  desire  for  children 
historically  associated  with  economic 
growth,  they  reduced  their  average 
crude  birth  rate  by  more  than  30%. 
While  some  of  these  nations  are  richly 
endowed  with  natural  resources,  others 
have  none.  What  they  do  share  in  com- 
mon are  marketplace  economies  and 
policies  which  encourage  [irivate  invest- 
ment and  initiatives. 

Unfortunately,  the  current  situation 
in  many  developing  countries  is  such 
that  relief  from  population  pressures 
cannot  be  achieved  overnight  even  under 
optimal  economic  policies.  In  the  mean- 
time, rapid  population  growth  com- 
pounds already  serious  problems  and  in- 
creases the  costs  and  difficulties  of 
economic  development.  Slowing  popula- 
tion growth,  however,  is  not  a  panacea. 
Without  sound  and  comprehensive 
development  policies,  it  cannot  in  itself 
solve  problems  of  hunger,  unemploy- 
ment, crowding,  or  potential  social 
disorder. 

By  helping  developing  countries 
through  support  for  effective  voluntary 
family  planning  programs  in  conjunction 
with  sound  economic  policies,  U.S. 
population  assistance  contributes  to 
stronger  saving  and  investment  rates, 
speeds  the  development  of  effective 
markets  and  related  employment  oppor- 
tunities, reduces  the  potential  resource 


President  Reagan's 
Message,  May  30,  1984 


1  am  grateful  to  Mexico,  under  the  leadership 
of  President  Miguel  de  la  Madrid  Hurtado, 
for  its  gracious  hospitality  in  hosting  the  In- 
ternational Conference  on  Population. 

World  leaders  have  come  to  recognize 
that  the  historically  unprecedented  growth  of 
population  now  occurring  in  many  countries 
affects  economic  and  social  development  and 
presents  a  unique  set  of  challenges  and  op- 
portunities. It  is  for  these  reasons  that  the 
United  States  provides  bilateral  and 
multilateral  assistance  in  population  pro- 
grams. 

Recognizing  the  seriousness  of  en- 
vironmental and  economic  problems  and  their 
relationship  to  social  realities,  the  United 
States  places  a  priority  upon  technological  ad- 
vancement and  economic  expansion  which 
hold  out  the  hope  of  prosperity  and  stability 
for  a  rapidly  changing  world.  That  hope  can 
be  realized  to  the  extent  nations  respond  to 
problems,  whether  economic  or  ecological,  in 
ways  that  respect  and  enhance  the  freedom 
and  dignity  of  the  individual. 

We  believe  population  programs  can  and 
must  be  truly  voluntary,  cognizant  of  the 


rights  and  responsibilities  of  individuals  and 
families,  and  respectful  of  religious  and 
cultural  values.  When  they  are,  such  pro- 
grams can  make  an  important  contribution  to 
economic  and  social  development,  to  the 
health  of  mothers  and  children,  and  to  the 
stability  of  the  family  and  of  society. 

Our  concern  over  the  dimensions  of 
demographic  change  is  inseparable  from  a 
concern  for  the  welfare  of  children — who  are 
the  ultimate  resource  of  any  society. 
Together  we  must  strive  for  a  world  in  which 
children  are  happy  and  healthy.  They  must 
have  the  opportunity  to  develop  to  their  full 
mental  and  physical  potential  and,  as  young 
adults,  be  able  to  find  productive  work  and  to 
enjoy  a  decent  and  dignified  existence. 

I  wish  the  participants  in  this  Conference 
good  counsel  and  inspiration  in  addressing 
these  issues.  I  am  confident  they  will  fulfill 
their  responsibility  to  produce  recommenda- 
tions for  action  by  the  international  communi- 
ty which  will  improve  the  well-being  of 
generations  to  come. 

Ronald  Reagan 


R1 


POPULATION 


requirements  of  programs  to  improve 
tiie  health  and  education  of  the  people, 
and  hastens  the  achievement  of  each 
country's  graduation  from  the  need  for 
external  assistance. 

These  are  our  goals  and  expecta- 
tions as  we  take  advantage  of  the  ex- 
perience of  the  last  two  decades  to  pro- 
vide our  population  assistance  policy 
with  a  sharper  focus. 

We  urge  this  conference  to  do  the 
same  as  it  reviews  the  World  Population 
Plan  of  Action.  We  hope  in  examining 
alternative  models,  it  will  seek  out  those 
that  have  proven  the  most  successful. 

Much  remains  to  be  done,  but  we 
can  take  heart  from  the  extraordinary 
progi-ess  already  achieved.  Over  the  past 
30  years,  for  example,  fertility  rates  and 
birth  rates  in  the  developing  world  have 
fallen  more  than  halfway  toward  a  goal 
of  population  stability;  human  life  expec- 
tancy has  increased  dramatically,  caloric 
intake  per  capita  has  improved,  literacy 
rates  have  increased  significantly, 
disease  is  on  the  decline,  and  per  capita 
income  in  most  countries  has  risen 
substantially. 

This  record  of  accomplishment 
should  be  encouragement  enough  as  we 
proceed  with  the  work  of  this  con- 
ference. At  the  same  time,  we  should  be 
neither  surprised  nor  disturbed  by  the 
inevitable  differences  we  will  encounter. 

We  here  today  represent  a  rich 
diversity  of  cultures  and  historical  ex- 
perience. Our  ethical  and  moral  perspec- 
tives have  been  shaped  by  a  variety  of 
religious  and  secular  traditions.  We 
govern  ourselves  in  different  ways  in  ac- 
cordance with  fundamentally  different 
assumptions  about  the  nature  of  man 
and  the  purpose  of  nations. 

When  all  this  diversity  is  brought  to 
bear  on  two  of  the  most  profoundly  sen- 
sitive of  all  human  subjects— namely, 
human  reproduction  and  the  rights  of 
the  family— it  should  surprise  no  one 
that  there  will  be  differences  among  us 
on  a  number  of  important  issues. 

We  can  all  benefit  from  the  sharing 
of  experience,  insights,  and  perspectives 
on  family  planning,  population  policy, 
and  economic  development.  Rut  we  can- 
not expect  agreement  on  every  item  that 
has  a  necessary  place  on  our  agenda. 

This  said,  we  do  look  forward  to 
working  with  all  other  nations  repre- 
sented here  in  identifying  areas  in  which 
the  international  community  can  work  in 
concert  and  in  determining  how  common 
goals  can  best  be  achieved. 


DECLARATION  ON  POPULATION 
AND  DEVELOPMENT, 
AUG.  14,  1984 

1.  The  International  Conference  on  Popula- 
tion met  in  Mexico  City  from  6  to  14  August 
1984,  to  appraise  the  implementation  of  the 
World  Population  Plan  of  Action,  adopted  by 
consensus  at  Bucharest,  ten  years  ago.  The 
Conference  reaffirmed  the  full  validity  of  the 
principles  and  objectives  of  the  World  Popula- 
tion Plan  of  Action  and  adopted  a  -set  of 
recommendations  for  the  further  implementa- 
tion of  the  Plan  in  the  years  ahead. 

2.  The  world  has  undergone  far-reaching 
changes  in  the  past  decade.  Significant  prog- 
ress in  many  fields  important  for  human 
welfare  has  been  made  through  national  and 
international  efforts.  However,  for  a  large 
number  of  countries  it  has  been  a  period  of 
instability,  increased  unemployment,  mount- 
ing external  indebtedness,  stagnation  and 
even  decline  in  economic  growth.  The  number 
of  people  living  in  absolute  poverty  has  in- 
creased. 

.3.  Economic  difficulties  and  problems  of 
resource  mobilization  have  been  particularly 
serious  in  the  developing  countries.  Growing 
international  disparities  have  further  exacer- 
bated already  serious  problems  in  social  and 
economic  terms.  Firm  and  widespread  hope 
was  expressed  that  increasing  international 
co-operation  will  lead  to  a  growth  in  welfare 
and  wealth,  their  just  and  equitable  distribu- 
tion and  minimal  waste  in  use  of  resources, 
thereby  promoting  development  and  peace 
for  the  benefit  of  the  world's  population. 

4.  Population  growth,  high  mortality  and 
morbidity,  and  migration  problems  continue 
to  be  causes  of  great  concern  requiring  im- 
mediate action. 

.5.  The  Conference  confirms  that  the  prin- 
cipal aim  of  social,  economic  and  human 
development,  of  which  population  goals  and 
policies  are  integral  parts,  is  to  improve  the 
standards  of  living  and  quality  of  life  of  the 
people.  This  Declaration  constitutes  a  solemn 
undertaking  by  the  nations  and  international 
organizations  gathered  in  Mexico  City  to 
respect  national  sovereignty  to  combat  all 
forms  of  racial  discrimination  including  apart- 
heid, and  to  promote  social  and  economic 
development,  human  rights  and  individual 
freedom. 

6.  Since  Bucharest  the  global  population 
growth  rate  has  declined  from  2.03  to  1.67 
per  cent  per  year.  In  the  next  decade  the 
growth  rate  will  decline  more  slowly. 
Moreover,  the  annual  increase  in  numbers  is 
expected  to  continue  and  may  reach  90 
million  by  the  year  2000.  Ninety  per  cent  of 
that  increase  will  occur  in  developing  coun- 
tries and  at  that  time  6.1  billion  people  are 
expected  to  inhabit  the  Earth. 

7.  Demographic  differences  between 
developed  and  developing  countries  remain 
striking.  The  average  life  expectancy  at  birth, 
which  has  increased  almost  everywhere,  is  73 
years  in  developed  countries,  while  in 
developing  countries  it  is  only  .57  years  and 
families  in  developing  countries  tend  to  be 
much  larger  than  elsewhere.  This  gives  cause 
for  concern  since  social  and  population 


pressures  may  contribute  to  the  continuatioi 
of  the  wide  disparity  in  welfare  and  the  qua 
ty  of  life  between  developing  and  developed 
countries. 

8.  In  the  past  decade,  population  issues 
have  been  increasingly  recognized  as  a  fun- 
damental element  in  development  planning. 
To  be  realistic,  development  policies,  plans 
and  programmes  must  reflect  the  inextrical 
links  between  population,  resources,  enviroi 
ment  and  development.  Priority  should  be 
given  to  action  programmes  integrating  all 
essential  population  and  development  factor 
taking  fully  into  account  the  need  for  ration 
utilization  of  natural  resources  and  protectii 
of  the  physical  environment  and  preventing 
its  further  deterioration. 

9.  The  experience  with  population  polici 
in  recent  years  is  encouraging.  Mortality  an 
morbidity  rates  have  been  lowered,  althoug 
not  to  the  desired  extent.  Family  planning 
programmes  have  been  successful  in  reducii 
fertility  at  relatively  low  cost.  Countries 
which  consider  that  their  population  growth 
rate  hinders  their  national  development  pla 
should  adopt  appropriate  population  policies 
and  programmes.  Timely  action  could  avoid 
the  accentuation  of  problems  such  as  over- 
population, unemployment,  food  shortages 
and  environmental  degradation. 

10.  Population  and  development  policies 
reinforce  each  other  when  they  are  respon- 
sive to  individual,  family  and  community 
needs.  Experience  from  the  past  decade 
demonstrates  the  necessity  of  the  full  par- 
ticipation by  the  entire  community  and  gra; 
roots  organizations  in  the  design  and  im- 
plementation of  policies  and  programmes. 
This  will  ensure  that  programmes  are  rele- 
vant to  local  needs  and  in  keeping  with  per 
sonal  and  social  values.  It  will  also  promote 
social  awareness  of  demographic  problems. 

11.  Improving  the  status  of  women  and 
enhancing  their  role  is  an  important  goal  ir 
itself  and  will  also  influence  family  life  and 
size  in  a  positive  way.  Community  support 
essential  to  bring  about  the  full  integration 
and  participation  of  women  into  all  phases 
and  functions  of  the  development  process, 
stitutional,  economic  and  cultural  barriers 
must  be  removed  and  broad  and  swift  actic 
taken  to  assist  women  in  attaining  full  equ; 
ty  with  men  in  the  social,  political  and 
economic  life  of  their  communities.  To 
achieve  this  goal,  it  is  necessary  for  men  ai 
women  to  share  jointly  responsibilities  in 
areas  such  as  family  life,  child-caring  and 
family  planning.  Governments  should  for- 
mulate and  implement  concrete  policies  \vh 
would  enhance  the  status  and  role  of  wonie 

12.  Unwanted  high  fertility  adversely  a 
fects  the  health  and  welfare  of  individuals 
and  families,  especially  among  the  poor,  an' 
seriously  impedes  social  and  economic  prog 
ress  in  many  countries.  Women  and  childre 
are  the  main  victims  of  unregulated  fertilit; 
Too  many,  too  close,  too  early  and  too  late 
pregnancies  are  a  major  cause  of  maternal, 
infant  and  childhood  mortality  and  morbidit 

13.  Although  considerable  progress  has 
been  made  since  Bucharest,  millions  of  peo] 
still  lack  access  to  safe  and  effective  family 
planning  methods.  By  the  year  2000  some  ] 
liillion  women  will  be  of  childbearing  age,  1 


82 


Dpnartmpnt  of  State  Bullel 


REFUGEES 


in  of  them  in  developing  countries.  Major 
•ts  must  be  made  now  to  ensure  that  all 
les  or  individuals  can  exercise  their  basic 
an  rights  to  decide  freely,  responsibly 
without  coercion,  the  number  and  spac- 
)f  their  children  and  to  have  the  informa- 
education  and  means  to  do  so.  In  exer- 
g  this  right,  the  best  interests  of  their 
g  and  future  children  as  well  as  the 
onsibility  towards  the  community  should 
iken  into  accoimt. 

14.  Although  modern  contraceptive  tech- 
jy  has  brought  considerable  progress  into 
ly  planning  programmes,  increased  fund- 
^  required  in  order  to  develop  new 
ods  and  to  improve  the  safety,  efficacy 
icceptability  of  existing  methods.  Ex- 
ed  research  should  also  be  undertaken  in 
in  reproduction  to  solve  problems  of  in- 
ity  and  sub  fecundity. 

As  part  of  the  overall  goal  to  improve 
ealth  standards  for  all  people,  special  at- 
on  should  be  given  to  maternal  and  child 
h  services  within  a  primary  health  care 
m.  Through  breast-feeding,  adequate 
tion.  clean  water,  immunization  pro- 
mies.  oral  rehydration  therapy  and  birth 
ng,  a  virtual  revolution  in  child  survival 
be  achieved.  The  impact  would  be 
atic  in  humanitarian  and  fertility  terms. 

6.  The  coming  decades  will  see  rapid 
ges  in  population  structures  with  marked 
nal  variations.  The  absolute  numbers  of 
ren  and  youth  in  developing  countries 
ontinue  to  rise  so  rapidly  that  special 
ammes  will  be  necessary  to  respond  to 
needs  and  aspirations,  including  produc- 
mployment.  Aging  of  populations  is  a 

3menon  which  many  countries  will  ex- 
nce.  This  issue  requires  attention  par- 
rly  in  developed  countries  in  view  of  its 
I  implications  and  the  active  contribution 
ged  can  make  to  the  social,  cultural  and 
imic  life  in  their  countries. 

7.  Rapid  urbanization  will  continue  to  be 
ent  feature.  By  the  end  of  the  century, 
ion  people,  48  per  cent  of  the  world's 
lation,  might  live  in  cities,  frequently 
large  cities.  Integrated  urban  and  rural 
opment  strategies  should  therefore  be 
sential  part  of  population  policies.  They 
d  be  based  on  a  full  evaluation  of  the 
and  benefits  to  individuals,  groups  and 

ns  involved,  should  respect  basic  human 
3  and  use  incentives  rather  than  restric- 
neasures. 

The  volumes  and  nature  of  interna- 
1  migratory  movements  continue  to 
rgo  rapid  changes.  Illegal  or  undocu- 
ed  migration  and  refugee  movements 
gained  particular  importance;  labour 
Uion  of  considerable  magnitude  occurs 
regions.  The  outflow  of  skills  remains  a 
us  human  resource  problem  in  many 
oping  countries.  It  is  indispensable  to 
Hard  the  individual  and  social  rights  of 
ersons  involved  and  to  protect  them 
exploitation  and  treatment  not  in  con- 
ty  with  basic  human  rights;  it  is  also 
isary  to  guide  these  different  migration 
ms.  To  achieve  this,  the  co-operation  of 
;ries  of  origin  and  destination  and  the 
tance  of  international  organizations  are 
red. 


19.  As  the  years  since  1974  liave  shown, 
the  political  commitment  of  Heads  of  State 
and  other  leaders  and  the  willingness  of 
Governments  to  take  the  lead  in  formulating 
population  programmes  and  allocating  the 
necessary  resources  are  crucial  for  the  fur- 
ther implementation  of  the  World  Population 
Plan  of  Action.  Governments  should  attach 
high  priority  to  the  attainment  of  self- 
reliance  in  the  management  of  such  pro- 
grammes, strengthen  their  administrative 
and  managerial  capabilities  and  ensure  co- 
ordination of  international  assistance  at  the 
national  level. 

20.  The  years  since  Bucharest  have  also 
shown  that  international  co-operation  in  the 
field  of  population  is  essential  for  the  im- 
plementation of  recommendations  agreed 
upon  by  the  international  community  and  can 
be  notably  successful.  The  need  for  increased 
resources  for  population  activities  is  em- 
phasized. Adequate  and  substantial  interna- 
tional support  and  assistance  will  greatly 
facilitate  the  efforts  of  Governments.  It 
should  be  provided  wholeheartedly  and  in  a 
spirit  of  universal  solidarity  and  enlightened 
self-interest.  The  United  Nations  family 


should  continue  to  [lerl'orni  its  vital  respon- 
sibilities. 

21.  Non-governmental  organizations  have 
a  continuing  important  role  in  the  implemen- 
tation of  the  World  Population  Plan  of  Action 
and  deserve  encouragement  and  support  from 
Governments  and  international  organizations. 
Memliers  of  Parliament,  community  leaders, 
scientists,  the  media  and  others  in  influential 
positions  are  called  upon  to  assist  in  all 
aspects  of  population  and  development  work.. 

22.  At  Bucharest,  the  world  was  made 
aware  of  the  gravity  and  magnitude  of  the 
population  problems  and  their  close  interrela- 
tionship with  economic  and  social  develop- 
ment. The  message  of  Mexico  City  is  to  forge 
ahead  with  effective  implementation  of  the 
World  Population  Plan  of  Action  aimed  at  im- 
proving standards  of  living  and  quality  of  life 
for  all  peoples  of  this  planet  in  promotion  of 
their  common  destiny  in  peace  and  security. 

23.  In  issuing  this  Declaration,  all  par- 
ticipants at  tlie  International  Conference  on 
Population  reiterate  their  commitment  and 
rededicate  themselves  to  the  further  im- 
plementation of  the  Plan.  ■ 


The  Challenge 

of  Refugee  Protection 


by  James  N.  Piircell,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  the  UN  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees  (UNHCR)  in  Geneva  on  October 
9.  198i.  Mr.  Purcell  is  Director  of  the 
Bureau  for  Refugee  Programs. 

May  I  begin  by  joining  in  the  expres- 
sions of  support  and  commendation  we 
have  heard  for  the  High  Commissioner 
[Poul  Hartling],  Under  his  direction,  the 
office  of  the  High  Commissioner  has 
continued  its  excellent  record  of  helping 
refugees  throughout  the  world.  The 
responsibilities  of  the  High  Commis- 
sioner are  among  the  most  important  of 
those  entrusted  to  the  UN  system.  He 
deserves  our  recognition  and  apprecia- 
tion. 

Usually,  our  statement  is  a  broad 
review  of  the  High  Commissioner's  ac- 
tivities. The  Report  on  UNHCR  Assist- 
ance Activities  with  the  proposed  budget 
for  1985  deserves  our  full  attention,  as 
does  the  work  of  the  Subcommittee  on 
Protection  and  that  of  the  Subcommittee 
on  Administration  and  Finance.  We  will 
be  following  and  participating  fully  in 
the  discussion  of  these  subjects. 


The  Importance  of  Protection 

In  the  time  available  to  me  today, 
however,  I  wish  to  stress  the  paramount 
importance  of  refugee  protection.  While 
most  of  UNHCR's  resources  are  applied 
in  one  form  or  another  to  vital  assist- 
ance activities,  and  while  governments 
continue  to  shoulder  substantial  burdens 
in  support  of  refugee  assistance  and 
resettlement,  protection  is  the  essential 
underpinning  of  the  international  com- 
munity's concern  for  refugees. 

Without  protection,  no  amount  of 
material  aid  will  be  effective.  It  is  the 
sine  qua  wow  of  all  other  refugee  pro- 
grams: voluntary  repatriation,  where 
possible;  assistance,  including  durable 
solutions;  and  third-country  resettle- 
ment, where  that  is  the  only  available 
alternative. 

In  today's  troubled  world,  protection 
must  encompass  both  the  traditional 
norms  of  legal  protection  and  the  equal- 
ly urgent  need  for  physical  protection  of 
refugees. 

For  generations,  legal  protection  has 
been  the  cornerstone  of  refugee  status. 
UNHCR  and  its  predecessor  bodies  have 
played  a  lead  role  in  establishing  the 
legal  framework  for  refugee  protection. 
The  convention  and  the  protocol  set 
forth  a  basic  structure  of  rules  by  which 


83 


REFUGEES 


refugees  can  establish  their  rights  and, 
in  the  name  of  law,  seek  the  protection 
of  law.  It  is  a  noble  structure,  one  which 
has  served  refugees  and  governments 
well. 

In  recent  years,  it  has  become  in- 
creasingly—often tragically— evident 
that  physical  protection  is  an  equally 
vital  part  of  the  High  Commissioner's 
responsibilities.  It  does  little  good  to  in- 
form a  refugee  of  his  rights  and  status  if 
he  is  physically  assaulted,  mistreated,  or 
is  a  victim  of  pirate  attacks. 

In  short,  protection  undergirds  all 
help  for  refugees.  Without  protection 
the  refugees  will  not  survive,  assistance 
will  not  be  viable,  resettlement  cannot 
begin.  Protection  is  a  responsibility  that 
challenges  all  of  us. 

•  It  is  a  challenge  to  the  UNHCR. 
Protection  must  draw  on  the  full  range 
of  UNHCR's  capabilities.  We  applaud 
the  protection  process  for  which 
UNHCR's  leadership  has  major  respon- 
sibility—especially in  specific  voluntary 
repatriation  achievements  and  in  other 
instances  of  patient,  persistent 
maintenance  of  first  asylum  under  dif- 
ficult conditions. 

•  Protection  is  especially  a  challenge 
to  the  governments  of  countries  in 
regions  where  refugees  are  concen- 
trated. These  countries  must  reconcile 
the  urgent,  often  life-or-death  needs  of 
refugees  with  the  traditional  and  fully 
justified  requirements  of  their  own 
populations.  We  must  support  par- 
ticularly the  many  developing  countries 
that  have  accepted  this  difficult  respon- 
sibility in  the  humane  spirit  of  the  con- 
vention and  protocol. 

•  The  list  of  countries  carrying 
substantial  refugee  responsibilities  is  a 
long  one.  It  includes  Pakistan,  with 
millions  of  refugees  from  Afghanistan; 
Somalia,  Sudan,  Tanzania,  Zaire,  and 
the  many  other  countries  sheltering 
refugees  in  Africa;  Thailand,  Malaysia, 
Singapore,  Indonesia,  the  Philippines, 
and  Hong  Kong,  which  for  many  years 
have  given  asylum  to  refugees  from  In- 
dochina; and  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  where  over  250,000  refugees 
have  been  resettled. 

•  Some  countries,  like  my  own,  are 
in  a  position  to  contribute  the  vital 
material  resources  that  care  for  refugees 
and  support  the  development  of  durable 
solutions.  The  same  countries  have  ac- 
cepted large  numbers  of  refugees  for 
third-country  resettlement.  We  have 
long  been  engaged  in  the  efforts  to 
establish  the  framework  for  legal  protec- 
tion, and  we  recognize  our  obligation  to 
act  in  defense  of  the  legal  and  physical 
protection  of  refugees. 


We  also  recognize  the  vital  role  of 
voluntary  agency  workers  who  are  in 
closest  contact  with  refugees  and  whose 
presence  in  troubled  areas  can  often 
help  ensure  that  refugees  are  safe. 

At  this  time,  I  would  like  to  pay  per- 
sonal tribute  to  the  three  men— my 
countrymen— who  were  awarded  the 
Nansen  Medal  yesterday,  in  recognition 
of  their  exceptional  heroism  and  courage 
in  rescuing  refugees  in  distress  at  sea. 
We  honor  the  selfless  actions  of  Captain 
Hiller  and  his  crewmen,  Mr.  Kass  and 
Mr.  Turay,  who  shared  in  the  award  of 
the  medal,  and  the  rest  of  the  crew 
members  of  the  Rose  City  who  came  to 
the  aid  of  85  refugees  lost  in  a  storm  at 
sea.  We  share  in  the  hope,  expressed  by 
Captain  Hiller  and  his  men,  and  by  those 
responsible  for  the  award  of  the  medal, 
that  this  public  recognition  will  en- 
courage others  to  come  to  the  aid  of 
refugees  wherever  and  whenever  they 
are  in  distress.  The  award  of  the  Nansen 
Medal  for  1984  symbolizes  the  vital  need 
for  physical  protection  for  refugees. 

The  Need  for  Viable  Solutions 

Heroic  acts  are  one  way  in  which  people 
who  care  can  help.  There  is  also  a  need 
for  systems  to  assure  the  necessary 
followup  and  to  seek  viable,  durable 
solutions  for  the  refugees  once  their 
physical  safety  is  assured. 

Particularly  relevant  is  the  Rescue 
at  Sea/Resettlement  Offers  or  RASRO 
program,  to  provide  assurances  in  ad- 
vance that  refugees  rescued  at  sea  will 
have  onward  resettlement  opportunities 
and  will  not  add  to  the  refugee  popula- 
tion of  the  first-asylum  countries.  The 
United  States  has  announced  its 
readiness  to  participate  fully  in  RASRO. 
We  are  concerned  that  the  initiation  of 
RASRO  has  not  yet  occurred,  and  we 
urge  other  governments  to  join  in  mak- 
ing RASRO  a  viable  refugee  protection 
program. 

The  Disembarkation/Resettlement 
Offers  or  DISERO  program  provides 
resettlement  offers  for  refugees  rescued 
by  ships  of  countries  that  are  not 
themselves  able  to  resettle  refugees. 
Both  these  programs  represent  direct, 
creative  responses  to  a  specific 
protection-related  need.  They  deserve 
the  continued  support  and  engagement 
of  the  international  community. 

A  program  in  which  my  government 
has  played  an  active  role  is  the  orderly 
departure  program  from  Vietnam.  Since 
its  initiation  following  the  boat  refugee 
conference  in  Geneva  in  1979,  it  has 
become  established  as  a  safe,  legal  alter- 
native to  the  hazards  of  flight  by  sea. 


We  appreciate  especially  the  importan 
efforts  of  the  High  Commissioner  and 
his  office  in  facilitating  the  operation  < 
this  humanitarian  program.  We  also  a 
predate  the  role  UNHCR  has  played  i 
arranging  for  resettlement  countries  t 
meet  here  in  Geneva  with  representa- 
tives of  the  Vietnamese  Government  i 
order  to  resolve  problems  relating  to  1 
orderly  departure  program.  The  resul 
of  such  meetings  over  the  past  3  year; 
have  led  to  significant  improvements  i 
the  operation  of  the  program. 

Secretary  of  State  Shultz  announc 
on  September  11  of  this  year  two  ini- 
tiatives that  we  regard  as  significant 
steps  toward  the  expansion  of  the  ord 
ly  departure  program  as  a  means  to  a 
persons  of  special  humanitarian  conce 

•  The  Secretary  declared  that  the 
United  States  will  accept  all  Amerasi; 
children  and  their  close  family  membe 
from  Vietnam.  This  group  is  of  par- 
ticular concern  to  us,  and  we  hope  th( 
will  be  permitted  to  come  to  the  Unit* 
States,  if  they  so  wish,  over  the  next 
years. 

•  The  Secretary  also  announced  c 
intention  to  receive  for  admission  to  t 
United  States  the  prisoners  who  have 
been  confined  in  so-called  re-educatioi 
camps  because  of  their  past  associatic 
with  the  former  Republic  of  Vietnam 
and  with  U.S.  programs  in  support  of 
that  government.  This  initiative  has  a 
its  goal  the  departure  from  Vietnam  i 
10,000  of  these  persons,  including  the 
close  family  members,  over  the  next  i 
years.  This  group  also  is  of  special 
humanitarian  concern  to  us,  and  we 
have  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
authorities  of  Vietnam  will  respond 
positively  to  these  appeals. 

In  our  judgment,  the  orderly  dep; 
ture  program  continues  to  serve  a  usi 
purpose  in  offering  a  safe,  legal  alter- 
native to  the  risks  of  flight  by  land  oi 
sea.  A  program  such  as  this  does  not 
come  to  grips  with  the  root  causes  of 
refugee  flows,  but  it  does  serve  the 
humanitarian  function  of  easing  their 
consequences.  It  is  our  hope  and  expe 
tation  that  the  orderly  departure  pro- 
gram will  contribute,  at  least  to  some 
extent,  to  reducing  the  continued  mo\ 
ment  of  refugees  into  the  first-asylun' 
countries  of  the  region.  That  problem 
by  no  means  resolved  and  will  require 
continued  international  burdensharinj 
for  the  resettlement  of  these  refugees 
third  countries. 


REFUGEES 


We  call  on  UNHCR  and  concerned 
[tries  to  make  a  special  effort  at  this 
regardinjj:  both  protection  for  the 
gees  in  Southeast  Asia  and  lasting 
ions  for  the  refugee  problems  in 
region.  While  support  for  third- 
try  resettlement  must  continue, 

must  also  be  renewed  efforts  to 
;ve  other  appropriate  solu- 
; — including  voluntary  repatriation, 
suggest  that  the  High  Commissioner 
consideration  to  appointing  a  per- 
1  representative  for  the  region:  a 
jcted  senior  person  who  will  work 
ime  to  build  confidence  and  achieve 
ress  toward  effective  long-term 
ions. 

Ay  government  is  gratified  to  note 
there  have  been  some  limited  ac- 
to  come  to  grips  with  what  has 
sted  as  a  tragic  and  desperate 
ical  protection  problem — pirate  at- 
5  against  boat  people  in  the  South 
a  Sea.  We  condemn  in  the  strongest 
ble  terms  the  actions  of  govern- 
;s  which  cause  the  refugees  to  flee, 
ak  for  all,  I  am  sure,  in  condemning 
.ttacks  on  refugees — including  many 
ess  women  and  children.  We  com- 
1  the  governments  of  the  region 
1  are  cooperating  with  UNHCR  in 
enforcement  efforts  which  have 
ted  in  the  arrest  and  conviction  of 
es.  We  hope  these  actions  will  con- 
and  that  they  will  have  a  deterrent 
t.  Donor  countries,  on  the  whole, 
recognized  the  value  of  this  vital 
t  and  have  kept  up  the  level  of  their 
:es.  For  those  who  have  not  re- 
d  their  contributions,  I  hope  they 
econsider  and  participate  in  this 
itial  protection  program, 
i  have  mentioned  that  refugee  pro- 
hn  is  a  key  component  for  any  suc- 
iul  program  of  lasting  solutions.  The 
iid  International  Conference  for 
\  tance  to  Refugees  in  Africa 
IRA  U)  defined  an  approach  to 
)le  solutions  in  Africa  which  the 
id  States  supports  fully.  The  suc- 
3f  the  ICARA  H  process  is  highly 
ident  on  the  protection  of  refugees 
rica.  The  High  Commissioner  and 
.aff,  together  with  the  other  inter- 
nal agencies  and  governmental  par- 
,nts  in  ICARA  II,  are  to  be  com- 
led  for  having  taken  this  large  step 
ird  in  achieving  durable  solutions 
jfugees  in  Africa.  We  are  encour- 
that  the  momentum  of  the  con- 
ce  is  being  sustained  through 
fie  followup  procedures, 
t  is,  indeed,  time  for  solutions  in 
a.  But  we  can  take  heart  that  the 
is  also  ripe  for  solutions  elsewhere. 
e  look  to  the  future,  we  may  en- 


visage a  growing  role  for  UNHCR  in 
that  most  satisfactory  of  solutions — safe 
and  voluntary'  repatriation.  For  volun- 
tary repatriation  to  succeed,  this  may 
call  for  a  more  assertive  role  by  the 
UNHCR,  such  as  it  undertook  with 
respect  to  repatriation  from  Djibouti  to 
Ethiopia.  In  Central  America,  it  will 
mean  establishing  a  presence  in  receiv- 
ing countries  and  helping  to  build  the 
confidence  necessary  for  a  viable 
returnee  program— for  example,  from 
Mexico  and  from  Honduras.  We  en- 
courage the  High  Commissioner  to  re- 
spond positively  to  the  signs  of  promise 
which  we  continue  to  see  in  Africa, 
which  we  begin  to  see  in  Central 
America,  and  which  I  hope  we  may  see 
elsewhere — including  Southeast  Asia — 
and  to  seize  the  opportunities  to  which 
these  signs  may  point. 

Although  the  solution  of  preference 
for  refugee  problems  is  voluntary 
repatriation,  the  solution  de  facto  in 
many  instances  is  local  settlement.  The 
convention  and  protocol  provide  con- 
siderable codification  of  the  practical 
measures  which  are  essential  for  refugee 
settlement  to  succeed,  such  as  access  to 
land,  social  services,  and  professional 
and  business  licenses.  Since  international 
resources  are  increasingly  being  shifted 
from  care  and  maintenance  of  refugees 
to  durable  solutions,  we  hope  that,  at 
the  same  time,  full  regard  will  be  given 
to  these  kinds  of  refugee  rights  which 
are  so  important  to  successful  settle- 
ment. 

Although  all  refugees  are  needy  peo- 
ple, not  all  needy  people  are  refugees. 
Receiving  countries  should  avoid,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  extreme  of  denying 
refugee  status  to  those  who  have  a  well- 
founded  fear  of  persecution  or  of  lightly 
providing  the  mantle  of  refugee  status, 
on  the  other  hand,  to  those  who  are  flee- 
ing economic  or  climatic  situations, 
criminal  prosecution,  and  other  condi- 
tions which  may  warrant  material 
assistance  but  which  do  not  warrant 
refugee  status. 

Indiscriminate  extension  of  refugee 
status,  often  on  a  group  basis,  to  such 
people  weakens  both  the  international 
community's  support  and  the  role  of  the 
High  Commissioner.  Such  actions  also 
jeopardize  the  safety  and  well-being  of 
true  refugees  who  are  fleeing  persecu- 
tion. 

Turning  briefly  to  some  other 
aspects  of  the  High  Commissioner's  pro- 
grams, we  must  face  the  reality  that,  for 
large  numbers  of  refugees,  care  and 
maintenance  will  continue  to  be  required 
for  long  periods.  In  these  situations 
there  may  be  oppportunities  for  more 


thorough  evaluations  of  cost  effec- 
tiveness, sharing  of  lessons  learned,  and 
improved  coordination  of  the  activities 
of  implementing  partners.  We  have  seen 
examples  where  such  evaluations  have 
led  promptly  to  good  results.  Perform- 
ance standards  for  implementing  agen- 
cies as  detailed  in  UNHCR  handbooks 
should  be  the  criteria  for  continued  in- 
volvement of  agencies.  It  should  also 
provide  the  basis  for  UNHCR  quality 
control  and  direction  with  respect  to 
these  private  agencies.  We  look  to  the 
UNHCR  as  the  responsible  agency  to  en- 
sure that  camp  management  and  camp 
operations,  as  well  as  the  related 
assistance  and  protection  operations,  go 
well. 

My  delegation  notes  with  approval 
the  continued  devolution  of  responsibili- 
ty from  UNHCR  headquarters  to  the 
field,  with  improved  support  to  field 
operations.  Enhanced  incentives  should 
encourage  UNHCR's  most  able  person- 
nel to  seek  field  postings  where  much  of 
the  most  important  refugee  work  is 
done.  It  is  hoped  that  the  new  Director 
for  Field  Affairs  will  help  to  establish 
the  primacy  of  field  operations,  as 
recommended  by  the  Administrative 
Management  Study.  It  is  essential  that 
strong  performers  of  all  ranks  be  at- 
tracted by  the  opportunities  and 
challenges  of  field  service. 

Another  area  of  progress  over  the 
last  year  for  which  the  High  Commis- 
sioner should  receive  special  recognition 
is  the  improvement  in  his  emergency 
response  capability.  A  promising  system 
has  been  put  in  place.  We  are  not  yet 
convinced  that  UNCHR  is  using  its  new 
emergency  response  capability  to  the 
best  advantage.  We  still  see  the  need  for 
a  clear  definition  of  how  the  emergency 
unit  fits  into  UNHCR's  regular  structure 
during  a  crisis.  Questions  remain  about 
standard  procedures  to  determine  in 
emergencies  how  many  refugees  need 
help  and  what  their  needs  are.  We  call 
on  the  High  Commissioner  to  resolve 
these  issues  and  to  ensure  the  fullest  use 
of  his  emergency  response  capability. 

Conclusion 

I  have  dwelt  at  length  on  assistance,  but 
I  am  drawn  back  to  my  underlying 
theme— the  core  of  effective  assistance 
and  viable  solutions  is  protection.  If 
refugees  are  not  safe  from  danger  of 
whatever  kind,  material  assistance  will 
be  little  consolation  and  durable  solu- 
tions are  made  more  difficult. 


85 


TERRORISM 


Perhaps  too  often  in  those  meetings, 
we  are  unable  to  make  the  real  connec- 
tion between  frightened,  desperate  peo- 
ple whom  we  seek  to  help  and  the 
means  which  we  have  to  help  them.  This 
year's  Nansen  award  reminds  us  of  the 
reality  of  refugees'  need  for  protection. 
Permit  me  to  close  with  the  words  of  a 
crew  member  of  the  Roue  City  who 
made  that  connection.  Here  is  what  was 
written. 

On  the  night  of  September  23rd  the 
refugees  were  disembarked  into  the  hands  of 
the  United  Nations  in  Singapore.  We  watched 
the  refugees  walk  down  our  gangway  to  the 
waiting  launches  and  the  first  day  of  their 
new  lives,  knowing  they  had  given  us  as 
much  as  we  them.  They  owed  us  nothing;  the 
ledger  of  human  gratitude  was  balanced.  For 
it  is  rare  in  this  profession  that  one  is 
touched  by  something  warm,  fundamentally 
human;  memories  are  seldom  cherished  as  the 
various  ships,  ports,  shipmates,  and  voyages 
collectively  blur  in  the  passing  years.  But  for 
us  the  memory  of  the  night  of  September  21, 
1983  will  remain  with  crystal  clarity.  For 
what  we  all  saw  and  felt  and  did  transcends 
the  "best  tradition  of  the  sea."  It  made  us 
proud  of  our  fellow  man,  and  bathed  us  in  the 
love  of  one  human  for  another.  Even  the  ship 
herself,  the  Rose  City,  displayed  her  compas- 
sion for  these  courageous  refugees  as  she 
nudged  her  enormous  bulk  alongside  a  swim- 
ming child  so  that  one  of  her  crew  could 
pluck  him  from  the  sea  to  begin  a  new  life. 

One  of  the  final  entries  in  the  deck 
logbook  of  the  Eose  City  for  September 
23,  1983,  reads,  "23.50— All  refugees 
disembarked,  God  bless  them."  ■ 


1984  Act  to  Combat 
International  Terrorism 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  19,  1984' 

I  have  today  signed  into  law  H.R.  6311, 
the  1984  Act  to  Combat  International 
Terrorism.  This  act  will  provide 
resources  and  authorities  essential  in 
countering  the  insidious  threat  terrorism 
poses  to  those  who  cherish  freedom  and 
democracy.  International  terrorism  is  a 
growing  problem  for  all  of  us  in  the 
Western  world — not  just  the  United 
States.  While  we  in  the  Western 
democracies  are  most  often  the  targets, 
terrorist  attacks  are  becoming  increas- 
ingly violent  and  indiscriminate.  Since 
the  first  of  September,  there  have  been 
41  separate  terrorist  attacks  by  no 
fewer  than  14  terrorist  groups  against 
the  citizens  and  property  of  21  nations. 
Sixteen  of  these  were  attacks  against  in- 
dividual citizens,  and  18  of  these  were 
bombings  or  attempted  bombings  in 
which  innocent  third  parties  were  vic- 
timized. 

This  nation  bears  global  re.spon- 
sibilities  that  demand  that  we  maintain  a 
worldwide  presence  and  not  succumb  in 
these  cowardly  attempts  at  intimidation. 
In  several  important  ways,  this  act  will 
enable  us  to  improve  our  ability  to  pro- 


tect those  who  serve  our  country 
overseas. 

•  It  authorizes  payment  of  rewai 
for  information  concerning  terrorist 
acts. 

•  It  provides  for  the  authorizatir 
of  $356  million  of  urgently  needed 
security  enhancements  for  U.S.  miss 
abroad. 

I  am  grateful  that  the  Congress  I 
responded  swiftly  to  my  request  for 
these  authorities  and  resources.  This 
is  an  important  step  in  our  multiyear 
fort  to  counter  the  pervasive  threat 
ternational  terrorism  poses  to  our 
diplomatic  personnel  and  facilities 
overseas.  The  act  complements  othei 
tions  now  under  review  and  separate 
measures  taken  with  our  allies  aimec 
significantly  improving  our  ability  to 
thwart  this  menace  to  mankind.  Whi 
none  of  these  steps  guarantee  that  t< 
rorism  acts  will  not  occur  again,  we 
be  certain  that  the  measures  made  p 
ble  by  this  act  will  make  such  attack 
more  difficult  in  the  future. 


'Made  on  signing  H.R.  6311  into  law 
which,  as  enacted,  is  Public  Law  98-533 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Oct.  22,  1984).  ■ 


s 
n 


RR 


!  . 


iSTERN  HEMISPHERE 


cretary  Shultz  Visits  Central  America  and  Mexico 


'ecretary  Shultz  departed  Washing- 
D.C..  October  10.  19Si.  to  visit  El 
idor  (October  10).  Panama  (October 
0  where  he  headed  the  U.S.  delega- 
it  the  inauguration  of  President 
:>las  Ardito  Barletta.  and  Mexico 
ber  11-12).  On  his  return  to 
lington  on  October  12.  he  stopped  in 
Juan.  Puerto  Rico,  to  meet  with 
John  Paul  II. 

^allowing  are  the  Secretary's  re- 
's made  on  various  occasions  during 
•ip. 


IVAL  REMARKS, 
SALVADOR, 

10,  1984' 

/linister,  thank  you  so  much  for 
greeting.  It  is  very  generous  of  you 
Tie  out  here  to  the  airport  to  greet 
id  my  wife,  along  with  your  wife, 
in  act  of  friendship  that  I  deeply 
ciate.  You  referred  to  momentous 
s,  and  I  want  to  read  to  you  a 
nent  that  President  Reagan  has 
nade  within  the  hour. 

'ongratulate  President  Duarte  for  his 
courage  and  foresight.  His  offer  Mon- 
sit  down  next  week  with  the  guer- 
without  preconditions  and  without 
to  discuss  their  participation  in  the 
ratic  system  in  El  Salvador  is  an  act  of 
nanship.  I  applaud  his  leadership  and 
t  his  decision.  It  appears  as  though  the 
lias  have  accepted  President  Duarte 's 
If  only  the  comandantes  in  Nicaragua 
make  the  same  offer  to  the  resistance 
there,  we  would  all  be  much  closer  to 
in  Central  America. 

3  we  are  here  at  the  time  of 
■ntous  events  in  the  history  of  this 
lie.  President  Duarte  has  offered 
vel  to  La  Palma  to  meet,  without 
nditions  and  without  arms,  the 
iUas  who  have  plagued  this  coun- 
his  is  an  act  of  great  courage 

in  pursuit  of  peace  and  national 
filiation.  His  initiative  has  our  un- 
ied  support.  President  Duarte  has 
istrated  that  his  purpose  is 
;s;  his  cause  is  the  future  of  his 
ry,  and  in  the  service  of  that  cause 
3  shown  that  he  is  prepared  to  take 

risks. 

'e  have  every  reason  to  rejoice  in 
lurse  of  events  in  this  nation.  The 
it  situation  contrasts  dramatically 
he  situation  which  prevailed  in 
and  I  think  back  to  the  time  when 

became  Secretary  of  State.  Two 


years  ago  many  still  doubted  that 
democracy  had  a  future  in  Central 
America,  and  some  even  thought  com- 
munism was  the  wave  of  the  future.  To- 
day thinking  citizens  in  my  own  country 
and  around  the  world  have  seen  in  El 
Salvador  what  hard  work  and  a  dedica- 
tion to  democratic  ideals  can  accomplish. 

President  Duarte  has  been  elected 
the  constitutional  President  of  all 
Salvadorans  in  the  most  open  and 
honest  elections  in  Salvadoran  history,  I 
might  say,  with  a  turnout  that  would  be 
startling  if  it  occurred  in  the  United 
States.  General  Vides  Casanova  has 
brought  new  standards  of  probity  and 
professionalism  to  the  armed  forces  and 
security  organizations. 

Today  no  one  disputes  the  progress 
that  has  been  achieved  and,  although 
many  hurdles  remain,  this  is  a  moment 
of  great  promise  and  you  have  shown 
the  initiative,  the  will,  and  the  courage 
to  prevail.  Through  democracy,  justice, 
and  the  tenacity  of  courageous  patriots, 
you  have  achieved  what  few  thought 
possible  and  you  have  our  admiration 
and  support  as  you  move  forward 
toward  the  most  difficult  but  attainable 
goal — a  lasting  peace  for  El  Salvador. 


JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
SAN  SALVADOR, 
OCT.  10.  19842 

Q.  What  are  the  terms  or  objec- 
tives of  the  La  Palma  meeting  next 
week? 

President  Duarte.  First  of  all,  it  is 
to  present  the  guerrillas  with  an  oppor- 
tunity to  incorporate  themselves  into  the 
democratic  process,  according  to  the 
Constitution.  This — and  I  want  to  make 
sure  that  everybody  understands — has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  participation  of 
power,  because  power  belongs  to  the 
people  and  only  through  a  democratic 
electoral  process  is  there  a  method  to 
obtain  power,  not  through  guns  and 
violence.  This  has  to  be  very  clearly 
understood. 

Second,  I  guarantee  personally — and 
I  have  ordered  the  commander  of  the 
region  to  keep  all  the  soldiers  of  the 
area  in  the  fort— that  I  will  go  without 
any  protection;  whether  the  guerrillas 
have  arms  or  not,  I  will  go  to  La  Palma. 

Third,  I  declared  many  months  ago 
that  I  was  ready  to  propose  a  solution 
on  a  national  basis  to  discuss  the  prob- 
lem in  the  country  among  and  between 


Salvadorans  with  no  one  else  involved. 
Therefore,  on  this  basis,  I  have  asked 
the  church,  the  Archbishop— Monsignor 
Rivera  y  Damas— and  Monsignor  Rosas 
to  be  the  intermediaries  for  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  details  of  this  first  meeting. 
For  this  fir.st  meeting,  the  guerrillas 
have  asked  that  I  should  go  with  the 
whole  high  command  of  the  army.  Let 
me  say  that  I  am  the  Commander 
General  of  the  army.  Therefore,  accord- 
ing to  the  Constitution,  I  represent  the 
army.  I  will  select  the  people  who  will 
accompany  me  in  this  discussion.  They 
have  also  established  certain  other  con- 
ditions— for  example,  that  they  will 
select  their  own  guerrillas  and  people 
representing  the  FDR  [Revolutionary 
Democratic  Front],  thinking  that  I  will 
be  against  that.  I  am  not  against 
anybody  who  wants  to  participate,  if 
they  select  them  themselves,  because 
that  is  also  part  of  the  democratic  proc- 
ess. 

Next  is  the  participation  of  the  press 
and  the  people.  I  have  said  that  I  will  go 
by  myself  without  any  protection  what- 
soever. If  you  want  to  come  along  with 
me,  I  welcome  you  to  come  along.  Also 
if  the  people  want  to  go  to  the  town,  the 
town  is  part  of  our  territory  and  is  open 
to  everybody.  I  think  I  have  given  you 
the  overall  picture.  Specifically,  I  will 
ask  the  guerrilla  people  to  make  a  total 
declaration  whether  they  stand  for 
violence  or  whether  they  stand  for 
democracy.  This  is  the  main  thing. 

Q.  Who  will  be  accompanying  you 
from  the  high  military  command. 

President  Duarte.  I  will  select  the 
people  who  will  go  along  with  me.  I  will 
make  the  decision  later  on. 

Q.  Have  you  spoken  with  any  of 
the  guerrilla  representatives,  either 
here  or  in  Mexico,  before  or  after  your 
decision  to  meet  with  them? 

President  Duarte.  No.  I  have  not 
spoken  with  anybody.  I  have  already 
asked  the  Bishop  to  do  whatever  is 
necessary  to  establish  the  contact. 

Q.  Have  there  been  contacts  with 
the  Bishop? 

President  Duarte.  I  don't  know. 

Q.  Did  the  U.S.  Government 
recommend  this  meeting  with  the 
guerrillas  in  La  Palma,  Mr.  Shultz? 
And  for  Mr.  Duarte,  did  the  armed 
forces  and  the  high  military  command 
know  about  your  plans  to  meet  with 
the  guerrillas,  and  will  there  be 
military  representatives? 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Secretary  Shultz.  This  decision,  as 
far  as  the  United  States  was  concerned, 
was  a  decision  of  President  Duarte's.  We 
are  delighted  to  support  him  in  what  he 
has  decided  to  do  because  we  think  it  is 
a  move  toward  peace — and  peace  and 
stability  and  justice  are  what  we  seek, 
just  as  he  seeks  it. 

President  Duarte.  In  reply  to  the 
second  part  of  your  question,  I  want  you 
to  know  that  2  days  before  I  notified  the 
Chief  of  Staff  and  the  Minister  of 
Defense  that  from  that  moment  on  they 
should  begin  informing  the  military  com- 
manders. The  day  of  my  speech,  at  3:00 
a.m.,  I  called  the  Minister  of  Defense  so 
that  by  7  o'clock  that  morning  he  would 
be  at  my  house  to  read  it  half  an  hour 
before  he  was  scheduled  to  leave  the 
country.  In  this  way,  my  statement  was 
passed  on,  and  I  assumed  the  full 
responsibility  of  this  decision. 

In  addition,  I  should  tell  you  that 
besides  the  military,  I  also  informed  the 
political  parties  and  the  Cabinet  so  that 
they  too  would  know  about  this  matter. 
The  other  part  of  the  question,  about 
whether  the  high  command  will  be  ac- 
companying me  to  La  Palma — just  as 
the  guerrillas  have  asked  in  their  pro- 
posal— the  answer  is  no. 

I  will  choose  my  own  personal 
representatives;  it  may  be  that  among 
them  military  personnel  will  be  present, 
but  they  will  not  go  as  members  of  the 
armed  forces,  only  as  my  own  advisers 
in  these  proposals,  which  are  political 
proposals,  and  for  which  I  assume  the 
entire  responsibility. 

Q.  Do  any  preconditions  exist  in 
your  talks  with  the  guerrillas? 

President  Duarte.  As  I  have 
already  explained,  as  President  of  the 
Republic,  I  cannot  accept  any  conditions 
concerning  the  sovereignty  of  the  coun- 
try. Within  this  context,  what  I  have 
done  is  given  the  appropriate  orders  to 
the  Chief  of  Staff,  General  of  the  Joint 
Armed  Forces,  and  to  the  Minister  of 
Defense,  to  instruct  Commander  Colonel 
Ochoa  so  that  his  troops  will  remain  in 
their  barracks  on  that  day  and  thus 
leave  the  area  in  total  liberty  so  that  I 
can  go  there  without  any  protection. 

Q.  The  United  States  has  con- 
tributed enormously  in  El  Salvador's 
fight  to  eradicate  the  guerrillas.  The 
United  States  has  also  affirmed  that 
there  are  problems  of  injustice. 
Therefore,  will  the  United  States  put 
pressure  on  El  Salvador  to  sanction 
the  death  [sic]  squads  which  are  still 
at  large? 


Secretary  Shultz.  President  Duarte 
has  spoken  very  clearly  many  times  on 
the  importance  of  a  strong  system  of 
justice  and  law  and  against  death 
squads,  and  we  will  support  President 
Duarte  fully  in  his  effort  to  improve  and 
perfect  the  system  of  justice  and  to 
eliminate  death  squads. 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 
PANAMA  CITY, 
OCT.  10,  19843 

On  behalf  of  President  Reagan  and  of 
the  people  of  the  United  States,  I  am 
happy  to  be  here  in  Panama  to  witness 
the  inauguration  of  Dr.  Barletta  as 
Panama's  President.  My  pleasure  is  all 
the  greater  because  President-elect 
Barletta  is  a  long-time  and  respected 
friend.  His  inauguration  offers  to 
Panamanians  of  all  political  persuasions 
a  new  opportunity  for  progress  and  na- 
tional development. 

We  intend  to  work  closely  with  Dr. 
Barletta  as  he  strives  to  strengthen  the 
democratic  process  at  home,  to  address 
Panama's  economic  needs,  and  to  con- 
tinue Panama's  contributions  to  the 
search  for  peace  throughout  Central 
America. 

The  destinies  of  our  two  countries 
have  long  been  bound  together.  Having 
just  successfully  passed  the  5-year  mark 
laid  down  in  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty 
of  1977,  we  can  take  pride  in  the  endur- 
ing relationship  that  has  developed  over 
the  years  between  our  peoples.  We  are 
partners  in  operating  a  canal  that  is  a 
vital  link  in  our  international  transporta- 
tion network.  We  are  two  neighbors  who 
have  shown  the  world  that  we  can  suc- 
cessfully resolve  the  most  complicated 
and  important  of  issues  by  means  of 
skillful  negotiation  and  full  implementa- 
tion of  agreements. 

For  a  region  troubled  by  conflict  and 
violence,  this  message — negotiations 
work — is  an  important  message.  Only 
serious  and  thorough  negotiations  pro- 
tecting the  fundamental  interests  of  all 
the  parties  involved  will  bring  genuine 
and  abiding  peace  to  Central  America. 
As  the  founding  host  of  what  is  now 
known  as  the  Contadora  process, 
Panama  has  played  a  central  role  in  ef- 
forts to  achieve  a  strong  and  abiding 
settlement.  We  support  the  efforts  of 
Panama  and  its  colleagues.  We  are  con- 
fident that,  over  time,  regional  peace 
and  development  can  be  achieved  by 
democratic  means  and  by  cooperation  in 
the  defense  of  democracy. 


Again  it  is  with  a  sense  of  person, 
warmth  and  friendship  that  I  look  for 
ward  to  witness  the  inauguration  of  E 
Barletta. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
PANAMA  CITY. 
OCT.  11.  1984^ 

I  want  to  say  what  a  great  pleasure  i 
has  been  for  me  personally  to  be  a 
witness  at  the  inauguration  of  Presid' 
Bartletta,  and  I  might  say  that  I  was 
stirred  by  his  address  this  morning.  I 
seems  to  me  that  he  has  set  out  a  pre 
gram  and  a  standard  for  this  country 
As  far  as  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned, we  look  forward  to  working 
closely  with  the  Government  of  Panai 
and,  of  course,  we  encourage  very 
strongly  the  movement  in  the  directic 
of  democracy  and  the  establishment  ( 
democracy  here  as  in  other  parts  of  c 
hemisphere. 

I  also  had  the  occasion  while  hen 
of  course,  have  a  private  meeting  wit 
Dr.  Barletta  and  with  General  Mejia 
this  morning  with  President  Betancu 
[of  Colombia]  and  President  Monge  [( 
Costa  Rica].  And  you  know  in  these 
meetings,  in  addition  to  discussions 
about  matters  of  interest  between  th 
respective  countries  and  the  United 
States,  we  talked  about  the  importar 
of  the  Contadora  process  and  our 
mutual  concern  to  see  that  it  move  fi 
ward  to  a  successful  conclusion  and  j 
us  a  result  that  will  truly  work.  And 
think  it  has  been  quite  worthwhile,  a 
least  from  my  standpoint,  to  have  ha 
those  discussions  with  those  gentlem 
and  I  look  forward  to  continued  wor 
with  them. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  the  draf 
treaty  as  written  is  imbalanced  in 
Nicaragua's  favor?  And  if  so  why? 

A.  I  think  from  my  conversations 
with  the  other  Central  American  coui 
tries  involved,  it's  clear  that  they  thiii 
that  improvements  are  desirable  and 
possible.  I  think  we  all  share  the  vie\ 
that  a  tremendous  amount  has  been  i 
complished  and  so,  with  all  of  that  act 
complishment  behind  us,  it  is  only  s^ 
ble  to  try  to  bring  about  those  im-  ' 
provements  that  will  make  the  docun 
into  something  truly  workable.  And 
I'm  expressing  what  seems  to  us  to 
sensible  but  really  also  reflecting  w! 
people  from  the  other  countries  invi 
have  said. 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


5.  How  would  you  describe  the 
tion  of  some  of  the  regional 
ers  you've  talked  to  concerning 
recommendations  the  United 
es  has  to  change  the  current  draft 
ty? 

\.  We've  made  some  general  com- 
bs, but  basically  the  countries  in- 
jd  in  the  Contadora  process  are  the 

that  are  shaping  this,  so  it  isn't  so 
1  a  question  of  us  putting  out 
?thing  and  people  reacting  to  it  but 
3r  of  people  discussing  together 
>  of  their  views,  and  then  each  coun- 
las  to  decide  for  itself  what  it  wants 
.y  about  this  proposal.  After  all,  it's 
)posal  that  was  put  forward  and 
nents  were  asked  for  and  so,  at 

as  I  understand  it,  each  of  the 
tries  is  probably  making  some. 

J.  Could  you  tell  us  whether 
ident  Betancur  was  able  to  give 
any  indication  of  a  change  in  posi- 
by  the  guerrillas  in  El  Salvador 
would  indicate  that  next  week's 
ing  would  produce  some  concrete 
Its? 

We  discussed  the  meeting  and  he 
Tie  about  some  of  his  perceptions 
;ome  of  the  ideas  that  he  has  about 
it  should  be  conducted.  And  I 
'd  with  him  what  President  Duarte 
oublicly  yesterday  about  the 
ing,  and  I  am  sure  that  both  of  us 
gly  support  the  initiative  that 
dent  Duarte  has  taken.  We  hope 
t  will  be  successful  and,  to  the  ex- 
;hat  anything  either  country  can  do 
iividuals  can  do  to  help  bring  that 
;,  we'll  do.  But,  of  course,  as  Presi- 
Duarte  has  emphasized,  this  is 
tially  something  that  he  is  doing 
n  the  framework  of  El  Salvador, 
le  is  determined  to  do  his  best  to 
this  out  and  he  will  have  our  full 
ort. 

\.  Do  President  Betancur  and  the 
imanian  President  agree  that  the 
ladora  agreement  can  be  nego- 
\i  over  a  long  period  of  time,  or 
;  ey  believe  that  it  should  be  quick- 
ened, with  just  a  little  adjust- 

..  I  don't  want  to  try  to  speak  for 
e  as  individuals,  and  they'll  say 
they  believe.  But  I  think  that 
one  that  I've  talked  to  shares  the 
i  to  see  a  workable  acta  produced 
Dn  as  possible,  because  peace  and 
ity  are  needed  and  wanted,  and  the 
■r  we  can  get  there  the  better.  At 
ime  time,  I  think  there  is  a  recogni- 
hat  it's  important,  particularly  hav- 
)me  this  far,  that  anything  that  is 
y  agreed  upon  be  genuinely  work- 


able so  that  it  produces  the  results  that 
everyone  seeks  and  doesn't  turn  out  to 
be  just  a  piece  of  paper.  We  want 
something  that  works,  and  we  share 
that  point  of  view  very  strongly.  The 
sooner  peace  and  stability  can  come  to 
Central  America,  the  better  we're  all  go- 
ing to  like  it. 

Q.  Would  you  describe  the  controls 
and  the  proposed  mechanisms  that 
would  satisfy  your  government,  and 
would  you  propose  the  involvement  of 
the  Organization  of  American  States 
(OAS)-? 

A.  There  are  various  proposals  to 
strengthen  the  general  idea  that  seems 
to  be  agreed  on  that  there  must  be  a 
verification  process.  Now  there  are  lots 
of  different  ways  to  do  that,  and  people 
are  trying  to  find  and  describe  the  kind 
of  detail  that  would  do  the  job.  I  don't 
want  to  particularly  try  to  put  forward 
any  approach  to  that,  except  that  you 
have  to  go  beyond  the  general  principle 
of  agreeing  on  verification— into  the 
sort  of  detailing  of  precisely  how  it 
would  work,  how  it  would  get  set  up, 
agreeing  to  do  it  that  way — so  that  you 
can  see  that  the  general  principle  will 
really  become  a  reality.  That's  the  real 
point. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
MEXICO  CITY, 
OCT.  11,  19845 

It's  always  a  privilege  to  meet  with 
President  De  la  Madrid,  and  this  even- 
ing we've  had  a  couple  of  hours  of  very 
constructive  and  worthwhile  discussions. 
I  would  say  a  good  portion  of  the  total 
amount  of  time  was  spent  in  discussing 
the  Contadora  process  and  the  balance 
in  discussing  various  aspects  of  the 
bilateral  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico. 

I  think  I  can  say  very  clearly  at  the 
end  of  a  searching  discussion  and  shar- 
ing of  views  about  developments  in  Cen- 
tral America  that  we  both  agree  that  a 
great  deal  has  been  accomplished  in  the 
Contadora  process,  that  there  are  some 
additional  things  that  need  to  be  done, 
and  that  we  both  believe  that  it's  impor- 
tant to  work  on  these  things  with  a  real 
sense  of  thrust  and  with  an  effort  which 
we  both  feel  is  important  to  try  to  bring 
things  to  a  conclusion,  because  we  both 
want  to  see,  and  we  all  want  to  see,  of 
course,  peace  and  stability  in  this  region. 
So  that  is  what  we  are  pledged  to  do. 
And  Ambassador  Shlaudeman  was  pres- 
ent and  took  part  in  the  discussion — 
and,  of  course,  he  is  the  key  individual 


as  far  as  actually  getting  out  and  around 
the  working  on  this  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  United  States. 

On  the  bilateral  side,  we  discussed 
certain  trade  and  investment  issues.  We 
took  not^vof  the  fact  that  there  is  a 
meeting  of  experts  to  take  place— I 
think  it's  October  19  in  Mexico— and  we 
both  will  try  to  give  a  little  push  to 
tho.se  processes  and  try  to  see  if  some  of 
the  issues  in  that  field  can  be  resolved. 
We  took  notice  of  the  very  good  col- 
laboration that's  taken  place  in  the  field 
of  finance  between  our  respective 
finance  ministries  and  central  banks.  I 
think  it's  been  a  very  fruitful  association. 
We  sort  of  cruised  over  some  of  the 
border  issues,  and  we'll  discuss  them 
tomorrow  at  breakfast  with  Secretary 
Sepulveda  and  other  colleagues. 

And  so  we  examined  quite  a  wide 
variety  of  such  issues  and  I  think  both 
feel  that,  recognizing  that  there  are 
always  outstanding  problems,  never- 
theless, that  we  have  developed  a  good 
capacity  to  work  on  them  and  resolve 
them  and  take  up  new  ones.  The  rela- 
tionship between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  is  receiving  a  lot  of  priority  in 
both  countries.  I  must  say  the  respect  of 
President  Reagan  for  President  De  la 
Madrid — and  it  seems  vice  versa — is 
very  strong.  On  this  basis  of  mutual 
respect  of  two  great  and  large  countries 
that  live  right  next  to  each  other,  it's  a 
very  good  thing  to  be  able  to  say  that 
these  relationships  are  in  fine  shape. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  why  the 
United  States  has  objected  to  the 
^acta"  of  Contadora. 

A.  The  U.S.  view  is  not  to  object 
but,  quite  to  the  contrary,  to  observe 
that  the  present  acta  represents  a 
tremendous  achievement:  to  have  gone 
through  a  set  of  principles — 21  prin- 
ciples— and  start  to  get  them  turned 
into  something  operational.  We  do  think, 
and  from  the  discussions  that  I've  had 
with  practically  all  the  countries  in- 
volved here  in  the  last  week  and  a  half, 
that  there  are  some  further  things  to  be 
done.  But  there's  a  tremendous  amount 
already  achieved,  and  so  that  gives  hope 
that  perhaps  a  conclusion  can  finally  be 
reached.  We'd  like  to  see  that. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  know  what  the 
United  States  is  really  prepared  to  do 
to  support  the  pacification  process  of 
Contadora? 

A.  First  we're  giving  the  whole  proc- 
ess and  the  area  a  tremendous  amount 
of  attention;  and  one  of  the  most  out- 
standing diplomats,  U.S.  Ambassador 
Harry  Shlaudeman,  has  been  given  the 
assignment  of  working  on  this — spend- 
ing all  of  his  time  on  it. 


TREATIES 


Second,  we  have  devoted  a  great 
deal  of  attention,  President  Reagan  has, 
to  this  set  of  issues — it  is  the  only  set  of 
issues  outside  his  times  of  addressing 
our  Congress  at  the  annual  State  of  the 
Union  time,  that  he's  addressed  a  joint 
session  of  Congress  on  this  issue.  He  has 
appointed  a  bipartisan  commission  to 
look  into  it,  headed  by  Henry  Kissinger, 
and  their  report,  which  was  a  unanimous 
report,  has  been  put  forward  by  the 
President  in  the  form  of  legislation.  And 
not  in  all  the  detail,  but  to  a  very  broad 
extent,  the  Congress  has  now  voted 
general  support  for  the  ideas  involved. 
And  among  the  things  that  are  involved 
are:  number  one,  what  has  been  called 
the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative,  which 
provides  unusual  access  to  the  U.S. 
market  for  countries  in  the  region  and, 
in  terms  of  economic  support  through 
the  appropriations  process,  very  large 
sums  of  money  that  are  available  to  help 
in  the  process  of  economic  development. 
We  think  that  social  reform  and 
economic  development  are  the  heart  of 
solving  the  problems  of  Central 
America.  And  we've  been  seeking  to  do 
everything  we  can  to  bring  about 
democratic  participation  in  government, 
the  operation  of  the  rule  of  law,  and  op- 
portunities for  economic  development  in 
the  region. 

Q.  You  said  that  there  was  an 
agreement  on  both  sides  that  there 
was  a  need  for  additional  changes  in 
the  draft  of  the  Contadora  proposal. 
Can  you  tell  us  on  what  specific  issues 
you  agreed  that  there  should  be 
changes?  In  other  words,  what  did 
you  and  Mr.  De  la  Madrid  agree 
should  be  changed? 

A.  We  observed  that  the  countries 
of  Central  America  are  in  the  process  of 
making  comments  and  some  of  them 
have  sent  in  comments,  so  those  are 
matters  that  need  to  be  dealt  with.  And 
we  talked  about  the  general  nature  of 
the  comments  and,  broadly  speak- 
ing—and I  don't  want  to  try  to  speak 
for  President  De  la  Madrid  on  this— we 
think  they  fall  under  the  general 
categories  of  verification  and  simul- 
taneity. 


'Press  release  222  of  Oct.  1,5,  1984. 

'Press  release  225  of  Oct.  16.  Some  ques- 
tions have  been  paraphrased,  as  noted  in 
original. 

•'I'ress  release  223  of  Oct.  15. 

"Press  release  2.33  of  Oct.  17. 

^Press  release  234  of  Oct.  12.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendatinns  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic Treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Buenos 
Aires  July  7,  1981.' 

Notification  of  acceptance:  Chile,  Oct.  17, 
1984. 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  the  recognition  and  enforce- 
ment of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at 
New  York  June  10,  1958.  Entered  into  force 
June  7,  19,59;  for  the  U.S.,  Dec.  29,  1970. 
TIAS  6997. 
Accession  deposited:  Panama,  Oct.  10,  1984. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1983.  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Oct.  1,  1983. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Venezuela,  Oct.  2, 
1984. 

Commodities 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  27,  1980.' 
Signature:  Djibouti,  Oct.  9,  1984. 
Ratification  deposited:  Bhutan,  Sept.  18, 
1984. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international 
transport  of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR 
carnets,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov. 
14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20.  1978; 
for  the  U.S.,  Mar.  18,  1982. 
Accession  deposited:  Iran,  Aug.  16,  1984. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental 
modification  techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Geneva  May  18.  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5,  1978;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  17.  1980. 
TIAS  9614. 
Ratification  deposited:  Brazil,  Oct.  12,  1984. 

Financial  Institutions 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund,  formulated  at  Bretton 
Woods  Conference  July  1-22,  1944.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  27,  1945.  TIAS  1501. 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International 
Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 
formulated  at  Bretton  Woods  Conference 
July  1-22,  1944.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  27. 
1945.  TIAS  1.502. 

Signature  and  acceptances  deposited: 
Mozambique,  Sept.  24,  1984. 


Human  Rights 

American  convention  on  human  rights.  D( 

at  San  Jose  Nov.  22.  1969.  Entered  into  f 

July  18,  1978.2 

Signature:  Argentina,  Feb.  2,  1984. 

Ratification  deposited:  Argentina,  Sept.  5 

1984.3 

International  Labor  Organization 

Instrument  for  the  amendment  of  the  con 
stitution  of  the  International  Labor  Orgai 
tion.  Adopted  by  the  International  Labor 
Conference  at  Montreal,  Oct.  9.  1946. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  20,  1948.  TIAS  1 
Acceptance  deposited:  Solomon  Islands, 
May  28.  1984. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Inter-American  convention  on  letters 
rogatory.  Done  at  Panama  City  Jan.  30, 
1975.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  16,  1976.2 
Ratification  deposited:  Venezuela,  Oct.  4, 
1984.3 

Law,  Private  International 

Statute  of  The  Hague  conference  on  priv 
international  law.  Done  at  The  Hague 
Oct.  9-31,  1951.  Entered  into  force  July 
1955;  for  the  U.S.  Oct.  15,  1964.  TIAS  5' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Cj-prus,  Oct.  8,  19 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  : 
Moscow  Julv  1,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  5.  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
Notification  of  succession  deposited: 
Dominica,  Aug.  10,  1984. 
Accession  deposited:  Equatorial  Guinea, 
Nov.  1,  1984. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the  protection  o' 
dustrial  property  of  Mar.  20,  1883,  as  re 
vised.  Done  at  Stockholm  July  14,  1967 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  26.  1970;  for  th' 
U.S..  Sept.  5,  1970.  except  for  Arts.  1-1 
entered  into  force  May  19,  1970;  for  the 
Aug.  25,  1973.  TIAS  6923,  7727. 
Ratification  deposited:  Iceland,  Sept.  28. 
1984. 

Property— Industrial-Classification 

Nice  agreement  concerning  the  internati 
classification  of  goods  and  services  for  tl 
purposes  of  the  registration  of  marks  of 
June  15,  1957,  as  revised.  Done  at  Gene 
May  13,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  6 
1979;  for  the  U.S.,  Feb.  29,  1984. 
Ratification  deposited:  Belgium,  Aug.  9, 
1984. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intel 

tual  Property  Organization.  Done  at 

Stockholm  July  14,  1967.  Entered  into  f 

Apr.  26,  1970;"  for  the  U.S.,  Aug.  25,  19 

TIAS  6932. 

Accession  deposited:  Venezuela.  Aug.  2i 

1984. 


TREATIES 


d  Cross 

leva  Convention  for  the  amelioration  of 
condition  of  the  wounded  and  sick  in 
led  forces  in  the  field.  Done  at  Geneva 
T.  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  21, 
0;  for  the  U.S.,  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  3362. 

leva  Convention  for  the  amelioration  of 
condition  of  the  wounded,  sick,  and  ship- 
:cked  members  of  armed  forces  at  sea. 
le  at  Geneva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into 
;e  Oct.  21.  1950;  for  the  U.S.,  Feb.  2, 
6.  TIAS  3363. 

leva  convention  relative  to  the  treatment 
irisoners  of  war.  Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12, 
9.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for 
U.S.,  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  3364. 

leva  convention  relative  to  the  protection 
ivilian  persons  in  time  of  war.  Done  at 
eva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force 
21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.,  Feb.  2,  1956. 
S  3365. 

essions  deposited:  Angola,  Sept.  20, 
4;3  Belize,  June  29,  1984;  Guinea,  July  11, 
4. 

ification  of  succession:  Western  Somoa, 
;.  1,  1984. 

tocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
LUg.  12.  1949,  and  relating  to  the  protec- 
of  victims  of  international  armed  con- 
s  (Protocol  I)  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
eva  June  8.  1977.  Entered  into  force 

7,  1978.2 

:ocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
ug.  12,  1949,  and  relating  to  the  protec- 
of  victims  of  noninternational  armed  con- 

s  (Protocol  II).  Adopted  at  Geneva 

8,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7, 

fications  deposited:  Togo,  June  21,  1984. 
;ssions  deposited:  Angola,  Sept.  20, 
l;"  Belize,  June  29,  1984;  Central  African 
.,  July  17,  1984;  Guinea,  July  11,  1984; 
item  Samoa,  Aug.  23,  1984. 

ig^ees 

,ocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees, 
e  at  New  York  Jan.  31,  1967.  Entered  in- 
)rce  Oct.  4,  1967;  for  the  U.S.,  Nov.  1, 
i.  TIAS  6577. 
-'ssion  deposited:  Haiti,  Sept.  25,  1984. 

llites — Program-Carrying  Signals 

vention  relating  to  the  distribution  of 
jramme-carrying  signals  transmitted  by 
"  ite.  Done  at  Brussels  May  21,  1974. 
ered  into  force  Aug.  25,  1979.^ 
ate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
12,  1984. 

bed  Disarmament 

ity  on  the  prohibition  of  the  emplacement 
uclear  weapons  and  other  weapons  of 
s  destruction  on  the  seabed  and  the  ocean 
r  and  in  the  subsoil  thereof.  Done  at 
hington,  London,  and  Moscow  Feb.  11. 
1.  Entered  into  force  May  18.  1972.  TIAS 
1. 
;ssion  deposited:  Mexico,  Mar.  23,  1984.^ 


Seals— North  Pacific 

1984  protocol  amending  the  interim  conven- 
tion of  Feb.  9,  1957,  as  amended  and  ex- 
tended, on  conservation  of  North  Pacific  fur 
seals  (TIAS  3948,  5558,  8368,  10020),  with 
statement.  Signed  at  Washington  Oct.  12, 
1984.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  on  which 
instrument.'?  of  ratification  or  acceptance  have 
been  deposited  by  all  the  signatory  govern- 
ments. 
Signatories:  Canada,  Japan,  U.S.S.R..  U.S. 


BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  8,  1982,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities (TIAS  10483).  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  Dhaka  Oct.  3,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  3,  1984. 

Brazil 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Mar.  31. 
1982  (TIAS  10369),  as  amended,  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Washington  Oct.  19  and  24,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  24,  1984. 

Canada 

Agreement  concerning  an  experimental 
transborder  air  service  program.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa,  Aug.  21,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  21,  1984. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  22,  1983,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  San  Jose  July  3  and  27,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  July  27,  1984. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  30,  1983,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Sept.  24  and  Oct.  3,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  3,  1984. 

Egypt 

Grant  agreement  to  promote  economic  and 
political  stability.  Signed  at  Cairo  Sept.  26, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  26,  1984. 

Project  grant  agreement  concerning 
wastewater  collection  and  treatment  system 
(Cairo  Sewerage  II).  Signed  at  Cairo 
Sept.  26,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  26, 
1984. 

European  Economic  Community 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts 
of  the  United  States,  with  annex  and  agreed 
minute.  Signed  at  Washington  Oct.  1.  1984. 
Enters  into  force  upon  an  exchange  of  notes 
following  completion  of  the  internal  pro- 
cedures of  both  parties. 


Guatemala 

Agreement  for  the  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing. Signed  at  Guatemala  Aug.  1,  1984. 
Entered  into  force:  Sept.  28,  1984. 

Italy 

Agreement  concerning  taxation  of  income  by 
some  U.S.  Navy  employees  in  Italy.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Rome  July  24,  1982. 
Entered  into  force:  Sept.  28,  1984;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1982. 

Japan 

Agreement  amending  the  arrangement  of 
Aug.  17,  1979,  concerning  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles,  as  extend- 
ed and  amended  with  record  of  discussion 
(TIAS  9564,  10484).  Signed  at  Washington 
Sept.  28,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  28, 
1984. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  26,  1979,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  9419.  10324,  10446),  relating  to  trade 
in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Washington  Sept.  26  and  28,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  28,  1984. 

New  Zealand 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
international  express  mail  service,  with 
detailed  reg^ulations.  Signed  at  Wellington 
and  Washington  Aug.  1  and  20,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  28,  1984. 

Norway 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Oslo  and 
Washington  July  5  and  Aug.  10,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  15,  1984. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  26,  1970  (TIAS  6836),  relating  to  safe- 
guarding of  classified  information.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Oslo  Sept.  27,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  27,  1984. 

Peru 

Project  agreement  for  disaster  relief, 
rehabilitation,  and  reconstruction  projects. 
Signed  at  Lima  July  20.  1983,  as  amended 
Sept.  30  and  Oct.  17,  1983,  and  Mar.  30, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  July  20,  Sept.  30, 
Oct.  17,  1983,  and  Mar.  30,  1984,  respec- 
tively. 

Loan  agreement  to  provide  foreign  exchange 
to  relieve  balance-of-payments  pressure. 
Signed  at  Lima  May  11,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  May  11,  1984. 

Romania 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
June  4,  1976,  as  amended,  on  maritime  trans- 
port (TIAS  8254,  9531).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Bucharest  Aug.  30  and 
Sept.  20,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  20, 
1984;  effective  Aug.  30,  1984. 


CHRONOLOGY 


Saudi  Arabia 

Agreement  extending  the  technical  coopera- 
tion agreement  of  Feb.  13,  1975  (TIAS  8072), 
as  amended  and  extended.  Signed  at 
Washington  Sept.  25,  1984.  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  25,  1984;  effective  Feb.  13,  1985. 

Sweden 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  estates,  inheritances,  and 
gifts.  Signed  at  Stockholm  June  13,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  5,  1984. 
Ratifications  exchanged:  Sept.  5,  1984. 

Thailand 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  technical 
cooperation  in  agricultural  development. 
Signed  at  Washington  Sept.  19,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  19,  1984. 

Uruguay 

Administrative  arrangement  for  a  visa 
system  relating  to  trade  in  certain  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Montevideo  Aug.  24  and  Sept.  13,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  13,  1984. 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Dec.  30, 
1983,  and  Jan.  23,  1984,  concerning  exports 
of  certain  textile  products  manufactured  in 
Uruguay  to  the  United  States.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Montevideo  Aug.  24  and 
Sept.  13,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  13, 
1984. 

Zambia 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Lusaka  July  17,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  July  17,  1984. 


October  1984 


'Not  in  force. 
^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 
^With  reservation(s). 
■■Angola  acceded,  with  reservations,  to 
Protocol  I  only. 

*With  statement.  ■ 


Correction:  The  entry  under  United 
Kingdom  in  the  November  1984  issue  of  the 
Bulletin  should  read  as  follows: 
Agreement  concerning  the  Cayman  Islands 
and  narcotics  activities.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  London  July  26,  1984.  Entered 
into  force  Aug.  29,  1984. 


This  monthly  chronology  is  being  discon- 
tinued. Beginning  with  the  January  1985 
issue,  it  will  be  replaced  by  a  listing  of 
some  of  the  significant  official  U.S.  foreign 
policy  actions  and  statements  during  the 
month  not  reported  elsewhere  in  the 
Bulletin,  under  the  heading  "End  Notes." 

October  1 

The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  upholds  a  ruling 
allowing  the  U.S.  Government  to  bar  U.S. 
business  companies  from  complying  with  an 
Arab  boycott  of  Israel. 

October  2 

Lebanese  Prime  Minister  Karami  asks 
Secretary  Shultz  for  U.S.  assistance  in 
removing  Israeli  forces  from  southern 
Lebanon. 

October  3-4 

At  Geneva  consultations  on  the  UN's  orderly 
departure  program,  U.S.  officials  present 
Vietnam  with  President  Reagan's  proposals 
for  accepting  Asian- American  children  and 
"re-education  camp"  prisoners  into  the  U.S. 

October  3 

Ambassador  Shlaudeman  and  Assistant 
Secretary  Motley  meet  with  Nicaraguan 
leader,  Daniel  Ortega,  in  New  York. 

October  8-10 

Israeli  Prime  Minister  Peres  makes  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.,  to  meet 
with  President  Reagan,  Vice  President  Bush, 
and  Secretary  Shultz. 

October  9 

President  Reagan  pledges  U.S.  cooperation 
for  Israeli's  economic  revitalization  plan. 

Congress  approves  an  international  trade 
bill  that  renews  tariff  benefits  for  140 
developing  countries  and  authorizes  President 
Reagan  to  negotiate  a  U.S. -Israel  free-trade 
agreement. 

AID  Administrator  McPherson  announces 
the  establishment  of  a  special  task  force  to 
coordinate  the  U.S.  response  to  a  continuing 
food  "disaster"  situation  in  Africa. 

The  U.S.  calls  on  the  UN  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees  to  conduct  a  special  in- 
ternational effort  to  help  refugees  in 
Southeast  Asia. 

October  10-12 

Secretary  Shultz  travels  to  El  Salvador 
(Oct.  10)  to  meet  with  President  Duarte, 
Panama  (Oct.  10-11)  where  he  headed  the 
U.S.  delegation  at  the  inauguration  of  Presi- 
dent Barletta,  and  Mexico  (Oct.  11-12)  for 
discussions  with  President  De  la  Madrid.  On 
his  return  to  Washington  on  Oct.  12,  he 
stopped  in  Puerto  Rico  to  meet  with  Pope 
John  Paul  II. 

October  12 

The  International  Court  of  Justice  rules  on 
the  maritime  boundary  dispute  between  the 


U.S.  and  Canada  over  the  Gulf  of  Maine  ar 
Georges  Bank.  The  Court  awards  each  side 
about  half  of  the  disputed  area. 

UN  Security  Council  votes  to  extend  U 
forces  in  southern  Lebanon  for  6  months. 
The  vote  was  13  to  0  with  the  U.S.S.R.  an. 
Ukraine  abstaining. 

October  14 

Libya  makes  an  official  protest  to  the  U.S. 
concerning  the  arrest  of  two  Libyan  stude; 
The  U.K.  also  receives  a  protest  from  Libj 
regarding  one  Libyan  student  under  arrest 

October  15-16 

Secretary  Shultz  visits  Toronto  to  meet  wi 
Canadian  Secretary  of  State  for  External 
fairs  Clark. 

October  16 

President  Reagan  issues  a  proclamation 
observing  Oct.  16,  1984,  as  World  Food  D; 
South  African  Bishop  Desmond  Tutu  i: 
awarded  the  1984  Nobel  Peace  Prize 

October  17 

The  U.S.,  Canada,  France,  and  Soviet  Uni 
sign  an  agreement  to  continue  until  1990  ; 
satellite  system  used  in  air  and  sea  rescue 
UN  General  Assembly  votes  80  to  41 
with  22  abstentions  and  15  members  not  f 
ticipating  in  the  vote,  to  reject  Iran's  thirc 
tempt  in  3  years  to  challenge  the  credenti; 
of  Israel's  delegation  in  the  Assembly. 

October  19 

President  Reagan  signs  the  1984  Act  to  C 
bat  International  Terrorism.  The  act 
authorizes  payment  of  rewards  for  inform 
tion  on  terrorism  and  provides  $356  millio 
to  enhance  security  at  U.S.  missions  abroi 

State  Department  acting  spokesman 
Romberg  confirms  that  all  U.S.  dependen 
have  temporarily  departed  from  Beirut. 

U.S.  gives  32,000  tons  of  additional 
disaster  relief  food  aid  to  drought-stricken 
Ethiopia. 

VOA  celebrates  its  25th  anniversary  e 
its  special  English  programs  broadcast 
worldwide  seven  times  a  day,  7  days  a  we* 
News  and  features  are  the  most  popular  c 
these  programs  which  are  designed  for 
listeners  learning  English  or  for  whom 
English  is  a  second  language.  China  has 
largest  audience  for  the  special  English  pi' 
grams. 


October  20 

U.S.  reduces  the  size  of  its  U.S.  Embassy] 
staff  in  Beirut  as  a  result  of  continuing 
security  threats.  These  temporary  measui 
are  pending  security  enhancement  and  en 
bassy  reorganization. 

October  22 

U.S.  gives  $1  million  to  UNICEF  for 
assistance  to  drought  victims  in  Ethiopial 


October  23 

President  Reagan  designates  Oct.  23,  191 
as  "A  Time  of  Remembrance"  for  victimi 
terrorism  worldwide. 


. 


PRESS  RELEASES 


JN  Security  Council  adopts  a  resolution 
inding  the  immediate  end  to  apartheid 
jnconditional  release  of  all  political 
ners  in  South  Africa.  The  vote  was  14  to 
,h  the  U.S.  abstaining. 

ber  24 

dent  Reagan  designates  Oct.  24  as 
■d  Nations  Day. 

ber  26-27 

ign  and  defense  ministers  from  Belgium, 
ce,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
I.K.,  and  West  Germany  meet  in  Rome, 
ct.  27  the  European  members  of  the 
itic  alliance  announce  plans  to  reorganize 
I'estern  European  Union  in  hopes  of 
ig  European  influence  with  NATO  on 
3  of  disarmament  and  weapons  procure- 


ber  26 

tary  Shultz  meets  with  Soviet  Am- 
dor  Dobrynin  at  the  State  Department 
cuss  matters  of  mutual  interest, 
he  UN  General  Assembly  adopts,  by 
nsus,  a  resolution  calling  on  the  five 
al  American  governments  to  speed  up 
Jtations  with  the  Contadora  group  and 
!e  a  treaty. 

)er  29-30 

issador  Shlaudeman  meets  with 
aguan  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
0  in  Manzanillo,  Mexico,  for  the  seventh 
of  bilateral  talks  in  support  of  the  Con- 
a  process. 

•er  29 

tary  Shultz  meets  with  Dr.  Arturo  Cruz 
ther  members  of  the  Nicaraguan 
icratic  Coordinator  Group. 

er  30 

lent  Reagan  signs  the  Trade  and  Tariff 
?  1984. 
a  vote  of  110  to  22,  with  18  absten- 
the  UN  General  Assembly  calls  on 
am  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  Kam- 


ier31 

[  Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi  is 
inated  by  two  Sikh  members  of  her 
laJ  bodyguard.  Her  son  Rajiv  Gandhi  is 

in  as  India's  sixth  Prime  Minister. 
Department  spokesman  Hughes  an- 
es  a  travel  advisory  to  U.S.  citizens 
ing  within  and  to  India  due  to  reports 
ence  following  the  assassination. 

the  UN  General  Assembly's  First  Com- 
■,  the  U.S.  restates  its  call  on  the  Soviet 

to  begin  talks  for  a  totally  verifiable 
1  chemical  and  bacteriological  weapons. 
I  Deputy  Director  Emery,  U.S. 
;entative  to  the  committee,  says  the 
3  "willing  to  do  whatever  is  necessary 
cessfully  conclude  an  effective  and 
ible  chemical  weapons  ban,  a  ban  which 

advance  the  cause  of  peace,  of  human 
y,  and  the  security  of  all  nations."  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
"Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.         Date  Subject 

208     10/1         Shultz:  interview  on  "This 
Week  With  David 
Brinkley,"  Sept.  30. 

*209     10/4         South  Pacific  prospecting  to 
continue  under  agreement 
signed  Sept.  19  by 
Australia,  New  Zealand, 
and  U.S. 

*210  10/4  U.S.-China  meeting  on  fish- 
eries, Sept.  24-25. 

*2n     10/4         Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C,  of 
Israeli  Prime  Minister 
Shimon  Peres,  Oct.  8-10. 

-212     10/9         Shultz:  remarks  following 
Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko's  address  before 
UN  General  Assembly, 
Sept.  27. 
213     10/9         Shultz:  news  conference. 
New  York,  Sept.  28. 

*214     10/11       Shultz:  remarks  at  luncheon 
for  Latin  American  and 
Caribbean  officials.  New 
York,  Oct.  5. 

*215     10/11        Carl  E.  Dillery  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Fiji,  Tonga, 
Tuvalu,  and  Kiribati, 
Oct.  5.  (biographic  data)." 

*216  10/12  J.  Stapleton  Roy  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Singapore, 
Oct.  11  (biographic  data). 

*217     10/12       Shultz:  remarks  at  luncheon 
for  Gulf  Cooperation  Coun- 
cil officials.  New  York, 
Oct.  1. 

*218  10/12  Shultz:  remarks  at  luncheon 
for  ASEAN  officials.  New 
York,  Oct.  2. 

*219     10/12       Shultz:  remarks  at  luncheon 
for  OAU  officials.  New 
York,  Oct.  4. 

•220     10/12       Protocol  extending  the  Con- 
vention of  North  Pacific 
Fur  Seals  signed  by 
Canada,  Japan,  U.S.S.R., 
and  U.S. 

*221     10/15       Shultz:  news  conference, 
New  York,  Sept.  24. 

222  10/15        Shultz:  arrival  remarks,  San 

Salvador,  Oct.  10. 

223  10/15       Shultz:  arrival  remarks, 

Panama  City,  Oct.  10. 
•224     10/15       Shultz:  interview  on  "The 

Today  Show." 
225     10/16       Shultz,  Duarte:  joint  news 

conference,  San  Salvador, 

Oct.  10. 
*226     10/16       Charles  R.  Carlisle  named 

special  negotiator  with  the 

rank  of  Ambassador, 

Oct.  10  (biographic  data). 


*227     10/17       Dam:  remarks  on  behalf  of 
the  Secretary  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  Grenada  docu- 
ments collection  at  the  Na- 
tional Archives. 

'*228     10/18       Shultz:  remarks  (and  ques- 
tion-and-answer  session) 
before  the  Chamber  of 
Commerce  International 
Forum,  Oct.  17. 
229       10/18     Shultz:  address  before  the 

Rand/UCLA  Center  for  the 
Study  of  Soviet  Interna- 
tional Behavior,  Los 
Angeles. 

*229A    10/22     Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session  following  Rand/ 
UCLA  address,  Oct.  18. 

*230       10/18     Shultz:  interview  for  Biznet. 
Oct.  17. 

231  10/18      Shultz:  address  before  the 

World  Affairs  Council,  Los 
Angeles,  Oct.  19. 
*231A    10/22      Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session  following  World 
Affairs  Council  address, 
Oct.  19. 

232  10/17     Shultz:  arrival  statement, 

Toronto,  Oct.  15. 

233  10/17     Shultz:  news  conference, 

Panama  City,  Oct.  11 

234  10/12     Shultz:  news  conference, 

Mexico  City,  Oct.  11. 

*235       10/22     Shultz:  interview  on  "Meet 

the  Press,"  Oct.  21. 
236       10/22     Shultz:  remarks  before  the 
National  Assembly  of  the 
National  Conference  on 
Soviet  Jewry. 

*237       10/22     U.S.  officials  to  meet  with 
ITU  Secretary  General 
R.E.  Butler,  Oct.  24. 
238       10/19     Shultz,  Clark:  joint  news 
conference,  Toronto, 
Oct.  16. 

"239       10/16     U.S.  telecommunications 

delegation  to  visit  Mexico 
City,  Oct.  30-31. 
240       10/24     Shultz:  toast,  Toronto, 
Oct.  15. 

*241       10/26     Advisory  Committee  on  His- 
torical Diplomatic 
Documentation,  Nov.  9. 
242       10/25      Shultz:  address  before  the 
Park  Avenue  Synagogue, 
New  York. 

*242A    10/29      Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session  following  Park 
Avenue  Synagogue  ad- 
dress, Oct.  25. 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


PUBLICATIONS 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs.  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Free  multiple  copies  may  be  obtained  by 
writing  to  the  Office  of  Opinion  Analysis  and 
Plans,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department 
of  State.  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

President  Reagan 

Promoting  Global  Economic  Growth,  IMF 
and  World  Bank  joint  annual  meeting, 
Sept.  25,  1984  (Current  Policy  #616). 

Secretary  Shultz 

Terrorism  and  the  Modern  World,  Park 
Avenue  Synagogue,  New  York,  Oct.  25, 
1984  (Current  Policy  #629). 

Soviet  Jewry  and  U.S. -Soviet  Relations, 
leadership  assembly  of  the  National  Con- 
ference on  Soviet  Jewry,  Oct.  22,  1984 
(Current  Policy  #628). 

A  Forward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy,  World 
Affairs  Council,  Los  Angeles,  Oct.  19,  1984 
(Current  Policy  #625). 

Managing  the  U.S. -Soviet  Relationship  Over 
the  Long  Term,  Rand/UCLA  Center  for  the 
Study  of  Soviet  International  Behavior,  Los 
Angeles,  Oct.  18,  1984  (Current  Policy 
#624). 

Africa 

An  Update  of  Constructive  Engagement  in 
South  Africa,  Assistant  Secretary  Crocker, 
Subcommittee  on  African  Affairs,  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee.  Sept.  26, 
1984  (Current  Policy  #619). 

Ethiopian  Famine  (GIST,  Oct.  1984). 

Arms  Control 

A  Short  Guide  to  U.S.  Arms  Control  Policy 

(pamphlet),  Oct.  1984. 
Security  and  Arms  Control:  The  Search  for  a 

More  Stable  Peace  (pamphlet),  revised 

Sept.  1984. 


Middle  East 

Terrorism  in  the  Middle  East,  Acting  Secre- 
tary Dam,  National  United  Jewish  Appeal 
leaders,  Oct.  1,  1984  (Current  Policy  #618). 

Plight  of  the  Iranian  Baha'is  (GIST, 
Oct.  1984). 

Oceans 

Freedom  and  Opportunity;  Foundation  for  a 
Dynamic  National  Oceans  Policy,  Assistant 
Secretary  Malone,  Law  of  the  Sea  Insti- 
tute, San  Francisco,  Sept.  24,  1984  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #617).  ■ 


Background  Notes 


This  series  provides  brief,  factual  summaries 
of  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  about  170  countries 
(excluding  the  United  States)  and  of  selected 
international  organizations.  Recent  revisions 
are: 

Barbados  (Aug.  1984) 
Burma  (Aug.  1984) 
Italy  (Sept.  1984) 
Singapore  (Aug.  1984) 
Tunisia  (Sept.  1984) 
Zambia  (Aug.  1984) 

A  free  single  copy  of  one  of  the  above 
(and  an  index  of  the  entire  series)  may  be  ob- 
tained from  the  Correspondence  Management 
Division,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

For  abi.iut  60  Background  Notes  a  year,  a 
subscription  is  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402,  for 
$.S4.00  (domestic)  and  .$42.50  (foreign).  Check 
or  money  order,  made  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  accom- 
pany order.  ■ 


Economics 

Commercialization  of  Outer  Space,  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  Marshall,  International 
Astronautic;il  Federation  and  the  Interna- 
tional Institute  of  Space  Law,  Lausanne, 
Oct.  9,  1984  (Current  Policy  #622). 

Europe 

U.S.  Relations  With  Poland,  Deputy  Secre- 
tary Dam,  Polish-American  leaders, 
Oct.  11,  1984  (Current  Policy  #621). 

NATO  and  the  Challenges  Ahead,  Under 
Secretary  Armacost,  Atlantic  Treaty  Asso., 
Toronto." Oct.  10,  1984  (Current  Policy 
#620). 


General 

Change  and  Continuity:  American  Foreign 
Policy  in  the  1980s,  Deputy  Secretary  Dam, 
Commonwealth  Club,  San  Francisco, 
Oct.  15,  1984  (Current  Policy  #623). 


DEX 


(cember  1984 
ilume  84,  No.  2093 


a 

Challenge    of    Refugee    Protection 

'urcell) 83 

ge   and   Continuity:    American    Foreign 

olicy  in  the  1980s  (Dam) 70 

•ward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  .   5 
Control 
je   and   Continuity:    American   Foreign 

olicy  in  the  1980s  (Dam) 70 

'ward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  .   5 
ging  the  LIS. -Soviet  Relationship  Over 

le  Long  Term  (Shultz) 1 

0     and     the     Challenges     Ahead 

irmacost)    63 

nting    the    Proliferation    of    Nuclear 

'eapons  (Shultz) 17 

tary  Visits  Canada  (Clark,  Shultz)  ....  55 
ity  and  Arms  Control:  The  Search  for  a 

ore  Stable  Peace 21 

Soviet    Relations    (White    House    state- 

ent) 67 

la 

ules  on  Gulf  of  Maine  Case  (Department 

atement) 58 

tary  Visits  Canada  (Clark,  Shultz) 55 

of  Canadian  Prime  Minister  Mulroney 

lulroney,  Reagan) 54 

ess.  20th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to 

e  Congress) 66 

s.  20tn  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to 

e  Congress) 66 

oping   Countries.    Change   and   Conti- 
lity:    American   Foreign   Policy   in   the 

80s  (Dam) 70 

\sia 

Challenge    of    Refugee    Protection 

urcell) 83 

ward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  .   5 
3     and     the     Challenges     Ahead 

rmacost)    63 

rmics 
e   and   Continuity:    American   Foreign 

•licy  in  the  1980s  (Dam) 70 

Afard  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  .   5 
of    Israeli     Prime     Minister    (Peres, 

agan) 74 

vador 
:ary  Shultz  Visits  Central  America  and 

'xi'co  (Duarte,  Shultz) 87 

ary  Visits  Canada  (Clark,  Shultz)  ....  55 

"y  ■     , 

ational  Energy  Security:  The  Continu- 

;  Challenge  (Wendt)  .  .'. 60 

iting    the    Proliferation    of    Nuclear 

japons  (Shultz) 17 

Dnment.  Secretary  Visits  Canada  (Clark, 
ultz) ' 55 

ing  the  U.S. -Soviet  Relationship  Over 

!  Long  Term  (Shultz) 1 

)     and     the     Challenges     Ahead 
"•macost)    63 


Fisheries 

Secretary  Visits  Canada  (Clark,  Shultz) 55 

U.S.  Relations  With  Poland  (Dam) 68 

Food.  World  Food  Day,  1984  (procla- 
mation)     69 

Foreign  Assistance.  The  Challenge  of  Refu- 
gee Protection  (Purcell) 83 

Human  Rights 

Change  and  Continuity:  American  Foreign 
Policy  in  the  1980s  (Dam) 70 

A  Forward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  .    5 

Managing  the  U.S. -Soviet  Relationship  Over 
the  Long  Term  (Shultz) 1 

Soviet  Jewry  and  U.S.-Soviet  Relations 
(Shultz)    11 

U.S.  Relations  With  Poland  (Dam) 68 

International  Law.  ICJ  Rules  on  Gulf  of 
Maine  Case  (Department  statement)  ...  58 

International  Organizations  and  Confer- 
ences. Population  Conference  Held  in  Mex- 
ico City  (Buckley,  Reagan,  declaration)  .  80 

Israel 

Terrorism  and  the  Modern  World  (Shultz)  .  .  12 

Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister  (Peres, 
Reagan) 74 

Lebanon.  Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister 
(Peres,  Reagan) 74 

Mexico.  Secretary  Shultz  Visits  Central 
America  and  Mexico  (Duarte,  Shultz)  .  .87 

Middle  East 

Change  and  Continuity:  American  Foreign 
Policy  in  the  1980s  (Dam) 70 

A  Forward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  .   5 

Terrorism  in  the  Middle  East  (Dam) 73 

Terrorism  and  the  Modern  World  (Shultz)  .  .  12 

Visit    of    Israeli    Prime    Minister    (Peres, 

Reagan)   74 

Narcotics.  A  Forward  Look  at  Foreign 
Policy  (Shultz) 5 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

A  Forward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  .   5 

NATO  and  the  Challenges  Ahead 
(Armacost)    63 

Security  and  Arms  Control:  The  Search  for  a 
More  Stal)le  Peace 21 

Nuclear  Policy.  Preventing  the  Proliferation 
of  Nuclear  Weapons  (Shultz) 17 

Oceans 

Freedom  and  Opportunity:  Foundation  for  a 
Dynamic  Oceans  Policy  (Malone) 76 

ICJ  Rules  on  Gulf  of  Maine  Case  (Department 
statement) 58 

Pacific.  A  Forward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy 
(Shultz)    5 

Panama.  Secretary  Shultz  Visits  Central 
America  and  Mexico  (Duarte,  Shultz)  .  .87 

Poland.  U.S.  Relations  With  Poland  (Dam)  .  68 

Population.  Population  Conference  Held  in 
Mexico  City  (Buckley,  Reagan,  declara- 
tion)   80 

Presidential  Documents 

1984  Act  to  Combat  International  Terror- 
ism   86 

Population  Conference  Held  in  Mexico  City 
(Buckley,  Reagan,  declaration) 80 

20th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)   66 

Visit  of  Canadian  Prime  Minister  Mulroney 
(Mulroney,  Reagan) 54 

Visit  of  Israeli  Prime  Minister  (Peres, 
Reagan) 74 

World  Food  Day,  1984  (proclamation) 69 


Publications 

Background  Notes 94 

Department  of  State '94 

Refugees  The  Challenge  of  Refugee  Protec- 
tion (I'ui-coll) 83 

Science  and  Technology.  U.S.  Relations  With 
I'ciland  (Dam)   68 

South  Asia 

The  Challenge  of  Refugee  Protection 
(I'liri'cll) 83 

A  Forwaril  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  .    5 

Terrorism 

A  Forward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz)  .    5 

1984  Act  to  Combat  International  Terrorism 

(Reagan)    86 

Terrorism  in  the  Middle  East  (Dam) 73 

Terrorism  and  the  Modern  World  (Shultz)  .  .  12 

Trade.  Secretary  Visits  Canada  (Clark, 
^liultz) 55 

Treaties 

Current  Actions  90 

Freedom  and  Opportunity:  Foundation  for  a 
Dynamic  Oceans  Policy  (Malone) 76 

U.S.S.R. 

Change  and  Continuity:  American  Foreign 
Policy  in  the  1980s  (Dam) 70 

A  Forward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy  (Shultz) .   5 

Managing  the  U.S.-Soviet  Relationship  Over 
the  Long  Term  (Shultz) 1 

NATO  and  the  Challenges  Ahead 
(Armacost)    63 

Security  and  Arms  Control:  The  Search  for  a 
More  Stable  Peace 21 

Soviet  Jewry  and  U.S.-Soviet  Relations 
(Shultz)    11 

U.S.-Soviet  Relations  (White  House  state- 
ment)   67 

United  Nations.  Population  Conference  Held 
in  Mexico  City  (Buckley,  Reagan,  declara- 
tion)   " 80 

Western  Hemisphere 

Change  and  Continuity:  American  Foreign 
Policy  in  1980s  (Dam) 70 

A  Forward  Look  at  Foreign  Policy 
(Shultz) 5 


Name  Index 

Armacost,  Michael  H  63 

Buckley,  James  L 80 

Clark,  Joe   55 

Dam,  Kenneth  W 68,  70,  73 

Duarte,  Jose  Napoleon 87 

Malone,  James  L 76 

Mulroney,  Brian  54 

Peres,  Shimon 74 

Purcell,  James  N,  Jr 83 

Reagan,  President 54,  66,  69,  74,  80,  86 

Shultz,  Secretary 1,  5,  11, 12,  17,  55,  87 

Wendt,  E.  Allan 60 


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Il 


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"he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Vol.  84  /  Nos.  2082-2093 


^2^gZ- 20^5/1  KiP 


Index  1984 


Departinvni  of  SUtiP 

bulletin 


Vol.  84  /  Nos.  2082-2093  /  Index  1984 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
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statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  uf  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

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Director, 

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Editor 

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Assistant  Editors 


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INDEX:  Vol.  84,  Nos.  2082-2093 


Abbott,  S.L.,  swearing  in  as  Ambassador 

to  Lesotho,  PR  133,  5/15 
Abrams,  Elliott,  Jan.  55,  Feb.  24,  July  77 

Sept.  48,  49,  53,  55,  Nov.  62,  66 
Abshire,  David  M.,  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
NATO,  biographical  details,  July  16 
Adams,  Weston,  swearing  in  as  Ambassa- 
dor to  Malawi,  PR  160,  7/10 
Adelman,  Kenneth,  Jan.  45,  July  42,  46, 
Nov.  45 
Biography,  Jan.  46 
Afghanistan  {see  also  under  Refugees): 
Reagan,  Nov.  4;  Shultz,  PR  65,  3/6 
Chemical  warfare,  Soviet  use  of.  See 

Chemical  and  antipersonnel  weapons, 
reports  of  use 
Soviet  occupation  and  need  for  withdrawal: 
Dec.  25;  ANZUS,  Sept.  20;  Armacost, 
Dec.  67;  Bush,  Aug.  27,  28;  Depart- 
ment, Aug.  61;  Kirkpatrick,  Aug.  61; 
Murphy,  May  66;  NAC,  Feb.  13,  July 
10;  Reagan,  Jan.  25,  Feb.  37,  May  2, 
7,  June  64,  Sept.  42;  Schaffer,  May  81; 
Shultz,  Apr.  17,  Dec.  8,  PR  124,  5/7 
Overview,  Jan.  73 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  86, 
July  88 

Afghanistan  Day,  1984:  Reagan,  Shultz, 
May  82 

'Africa  (see  also  names  of  individual  coun- 
tries): 
Economic  problems:  Aug.  4;  Dam,  Dec.  71; 
Lyman,  May  43,  47,  48;  Mubarak, 
Apr.  64;  Shultz,  Apr.  9,  May  27,  PR 
219,  10/12 
Los  Angeles  conference  on  U.S.  trade  and 
investment  in,  announcement,  PR  1 12, 
4/13 
Sahara  dispute  (Shultz),  Feb.  17 
Southern  Africa,  peace  talks:  Apr.  36; 
Reagan,  May  3,  July  37,  Nov.  3; 
Shultz,  May  20,  38,  July  37,  PR  38, 
2/8,  PR  65,  3/6,  PR  219,  10/12 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance: 
Appropriations  request:  May  36;  Lyman, 

May  43 
Economic  Policy  Initiative,  proposed: 
Lyman,  May  43,  44;  McPherson, 
May  64,  66;  Reagan,  May  5,  Nov. 
28;  Shultz,  Mar.  7,  Apr.  "lO,  May  20, 
22,  27,  PR  219,  10/12 
U.S.  emergency  food  relief:  Nov.  44; 
Crocker,  Jan.  39;  Dam,  Dec.  71; 
Lyman,  May  44;  McPherson,  May  64, 
66,  Oct.  31;  Reagan,  May  5,  Sept.  47; 
Shultz,  Mar.  7,  Apr.  9,  May  20,  27 
U.S.  policy,  interests,  role:  Dec.  26; 
Crocker,  Jan.  38;  Shultz,  May  26 
African  Development  Bank:  Lyman,  May  43; 
Shultz,  Apr.  10.  May  31 
Agreement  establishing  (1963),  as 

amended:  Portugal,  Feb.  46,  Apr.  79; 
Saudi  Arabia,  Feb.  46,  June  86;  Spain, 
Apr.  79 
\frican  Refugees  Relief  Day,  1984,  proclama- 
tion (Reagan),  Sept.  64 


ndex 1984 


Agriculture  {see  also  Wheat): 

Agricultural  commodities,  sale  of,  bilateral 
agreements:  Bangladesh,  Jan.  90, 
Nov.  86,  Dec.  91;  Bolivia,  Mar.  74, 
July  89;  Costa  Rica,  Mar.  74,  Dec.  91; 
Dominican  Republic,  Apr.  80,  Aug.  87, 
Nov.  86;  Egypt,  May  88,  Aug.  87,  Oct. 
51;  El  Salvador,  Mar.  74,  June  87; 
Guatemala,  Oct.  51,  Dec.  91;  Guinea, 
Sept.  79;  Haiti,  Aug.  88;  Honduras, 
Apr.  80,  Sept.  79;  Indonesia,  Mar.  74, 
June  87,  Nov.  87;  Jamaica,  Sept.  79; 
Kenya,  Nov.  87;  Liberia,  Apr.  80; 
Madagascar,  May  88;  Mauritius,  Oct. 
51;  Morocco,  Apr.  81,  Oct.  51; 
Pakistan,  June  87;  Peru,  July  90; 
Senegal,  July  89;  Sierra  Leone,  July 
89;  Somalia,  May  88;  Sri  Lanka,  Mar. 
75;  Sudan,  Mar.  75,  Nov.  87;  Tunisia, 
Oct.  51;  Yemen  (Sanaa),  Sept.  80; 
Zaire,  Mar.  75;  Zambia,  Dec.  92 

Cooperation  and  trade,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Algeria,  Apr.  80 

International  Fund  for  Agricultural  Devel- 
opment: McPherson,  May  66;  Newell, 
May  85;  Shultz,  May  31 

Mediterranean  fruit  fly  eradication  pro- 
gram, bilateral  agreements: 
Guatemala,  Mexico,  Feb.  47 

Technical  cooperation  in  agricultural  devel- 
opment, bilateral  agreement  with 
Thailand,  Dec.  92 

U.S.  exports:  Dam,  Feb.  19,  Mar.  14; 
Wallis,  Mar.  28,  29 
Corn  gluten  feed:  Mar.  30;  Burt,  Mar.  45 
Albania,  accession  to  the  Universal  Postal 
Union  general  regulations,  and  the 
universal  postal  convention  (1979),  July 
89 
Algeria: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Feb. 
47,  Mar.  73,  Apr.  80,  May  87,  July  88 

U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  34 
American  ideals:  Reagan,  June  3,  10,  16; 

Shultz,  Apr.  15,  Oct.  18 
American  Samoa  (Shultz),  Sept.  5 
Angola  (Crocker),  Jan.  40 

Cuban  troop  issue:  Abrams,  Sept.  55; 
Crocker,  Jan.  42;  Dam,  Dec.  72; 
Shultz,  Apr.  11,  May  38,  Dec.  8 

Regional  peace  talks:  Apr.  36;  Reagan, 
May  3,  4;  Shultz,  July  37 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Oct.  50,  Dec.  91 

U.S.  food  aid,  proposed.  May  36 
Antarctic  Treaty  (1959):  ANZUS,  Sept.  19 

Accessions:  Cuba,  Oct.  50;  Finland,  July 
88;  Hungary,  Apr.  79;  Sweden,  June 
86 

Principles  and  objectives,  recommendations 
relating  to  furtherance  (1975),  accept- 
ance. Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Apr.  79 

Principles  and  objectives,  recommendations 
relating  to  furtherance  (1981):  Chile, 
Dec.  90;  Japan,  June  86;  South  Africa, 
May  87 

Principles  and  objectives,  recommendations 
relating  to  furtherance  (1983),  Oct.  50 


Antigua  and  Barbuda:  Oct.  9;  Reagan,  Mar. 
72 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Apr. 
80,  June  87,  Sept.  78 
ANZUS  (Australia,  New  Zealand,  U.S.): 

ANZUS  communique  and  joint  news  con- 
ference, Sept.  19;  Armacost,  Dec.  66; 
Muldoon,  June  64;  Reagan,  June  63, 
Sept.  2;  Shultz,  May  26,  Sept.  5,  16,  18, 
21,  PR  114,  4/19,  PR  165,  7/17,  PR  168, 
7/19;  Wolfowitz,  Sept.  60 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  {see  also  names  of  indi- 
vidual countries):  Eagleburger,  Mar.  50; 
Reagan,  May  7;  Shultz,  Mar.  31,  32,  34, 
Apr.  17,  PR  217,  10/12 
Jerusalem,  status:  Armacost,  Aug.  62; 
Eagleburger,  Apr.  65;  Shultz,  May  38, 
41 
Jordan,  role:  Hussein,  Apr.  62;  Mubarak, 
Apr.  64;  Murphy,  May  69;  Reagan, 
Apr.  63,  May  7;  Shultz,  Jan.  35,  Mar. 
31,  32,  July  42 
Palestinian  issues:  Dam,  Dec.  74;  Mubarak, 
Apr.  64;  Shultz,  Feb.  17,  Mar.  31,  Apr. 
14,  Dec.  13 
Peace  process:  Dam,  Dec.  72,  74;  Eagle- 
burger, Mar.  49;  Murphy,  Mar.  56, 
May  67,  68,  Oct.  38;  Nimeiri,  Jan.  45; 
Reagan,  Jan.  34  (quoted),  44,  Feb.  5, 
31,  Apr.  4,  62,  May  8,  10,  Nov.  4; 
Shamir,  Feb.  31;  Shultz,  Jan.  33,  Feb. 
18,  Mar.  48,  49,  May  20,  25,  37,  Dec. 
8,  PR  231A,  10/22,  PR  242A,  10/29 
U.S.  Sinai  Support  Mission,  appropriations 
request:  Schneider,  May  76;  Shultz, 
May  29 
West  Bank  settlements  (Shultz),  July  42, 
PR  242A,  10/29 
Arbitration,  arbitral  awards,  foreign,  recog- 
nition and  enforcement,  convention 
(1958):  Guatemala,  June  86;  Haiti,  Feb. 
46;  Panama,  Dec.  90 
Argentina:  Adelman,  July  44;  Reagan,  May  5; 
Shultz,  Dec.  20,  PR  207,  9/24 
Democratic  progress:  Oct.  9;  Abrams,  Jan. 
56;  Dam,  Dec.  72;  Michel,  Jan.  57; 
Motley,  Feb.  43,  44,  Oct.  1;  Shultz, 
Feb.  15,  Apr.  19,  26,  July  37 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Feb. 

47,  June  86,  Dec.  90 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Ortiz),  swearing  in,  PR 

190,  8/20 
U.S.  arms  sales,  question  of  (Shultz), 

Feb.  14,  15 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request, 

May  35 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush:  Feb.  9; 
Shultz,  Feb.  15 
Armacost,  Michael  H.,  July  80,  Aug.  62,  Dec. 
63 
Biography,  Dec.  64 

Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Political  Af- 
fairs, nomination  (Shultz),  PR  89,  3/23 
Arms  control  and  disarmament  {see  also  Eur- 
ope: Confidence-  and  Security-Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  Conference 
(CDE);  Europe:  Mutual  and  balanced 
force  reduction  talks;  Soviet  Union:  U.S. 
arms  control  negotiations):  Dec.  28; 
Adelman,  Jan.  45;  Eagleburger,  May  49; 
Rowny,  Aug.  42;  Shultz,  June  28,  Sept. 
12.  Dec.  23,  57 


Arms  control  and  disarmament  (Cont'd) 
Chemical  weapons  convention,  proposed: 
Adelman,  Jan.  49;  ANZUS,  Sept.  19; 
Burt,  Mar.  47,  Apr.  47,  50;  NAC,  Feb. 
12,  13;  Reagan,  July  44,  Aug.  17,  Nov. 

5,  49;  Shultz,  Mar.  36,  37,  38,  40,  Apr. 
28,  Dec.  21,  24,  PR  107,  4/6 

U.S  draft  treaty:  June  41,  Nov.  20,  Dec. 
44,  45;  Adelman,  Nov.  45;  Bush, 
June  40,  July  2;  Dam,  Aug.  46, 
NAC,  July  9,  13;  Palmer,  July  76; 
Reagan,  May  3,  8,  9,  July  8;  Shultz, 
May  38,  June  30,  Sept.  13; 
Wolfowitz,  Sept.  61 
Conventional  weapons  with  excessively  in- 
jurious or  indiscriminate  effects,  con- 
vention (1980):  Guatemala,  Feb.  47;  In- 
dia, May  88 
Glossary,  Dec.  53 

Stockholm  conference.  See  Europe:  Confi- 
dence- and  Security-Building  Measures 
and  Disarmament  Conference  (CDE) 
U.N.  role,  Nov.  19 
Asencio,  Diego  C,  swearing  in  as  Ambassa- 
dor to  Brazil,  PR  189,  8/20 
Asia  (see  also  names  of  individual  countries): 
ANZUS,  Sept.  20;  Reagan,  Aug.  16 
Foreign.  Relatione  of  the  United  States, 
1952-1954,  Volume  XII,  Part  1,  East 
Asia  and  the  Pacific,  Multilateral 
Relations,  released,  Nov.  92 
Soviet  deployment  of  missiles  in:  Reagan, 
Jan.  9;  Shultz,  Jan.  26;  Wolfowitz,  May 
53 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  35;  Shultz, 
May  21.  23,  25,  29;  Wolfowitz,  May  52 
U.S.  interests  and  objectives:  Dec.  25; 
Armacost,  Dec.  65;  Brown,  Sept.  34; 
Bush,  Aug.  27;  Dam,  Oct.  33;  Shultz, 
July  36,  Sept.  3,  Oct.  20,  Dec.  7; 
Wallis,  Aug.  50 
Asian  Development  Bank  (Shultz),  May  30 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN):  ANZUS,  Sept.  20;  Armacost, 
Dec.  66;  Dam,  Jan.  82,  Oct.  34;  Eagle- 
burger,  Apr.  40;  Reagan,  Nov.  4;  Shultz, 
May  21,  23,  Sept.  4,  6,  10,  Dec.  7,  8,  PR 
163,  7/13,  PR  218,  10/12;  Wallis,  Mar. 
30,  Aug.  50,  52;  Wolfowitz,  May  55,  56, 
Nov.  52 
Jakarta  meeting,  July  11-14  (Shultz),  Sept. 

6,  7,  12,  PR  167,  7/18 
Australia  (Wallis),  Aug.  51 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Feb. 

47,  Mar.  73,  May  87,  88,  July  89,  Aug. 

86,  Sept.  78,  Oct.  51,  Nov.  86 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Sept.  16 
Austria: 
Profile,  June  52 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  47,  Apr. 

79,  June  86,  87,  July  88,  Aug.  86 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request, 

May  34 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Kirchschlager: 

Kirchschlager,  June  50,  52;  Reagan, 

June  50,  51;  program,  PR  56,  2/27 
Aviation: 
Air  services,  bilateral  agreement  with 

U.K.,  Aug.  88 


Aviation  (Cont'd) 
Air  transport,  bilateral  agreements:  Can- 
ada, Aug.  87;  Costa  Rica,  Feb.  47; 
Czechoslovakia,  July  89;  Hungary,  May 
88;  Jamaica,  Oct.  51;  Mexico,  May  88; 
Papua  New  Guinea,  May  88  (termina- 
tion) 
Air  transport  services,  bilateral 
agreements: 

Argentina,  Jan.  91;  Brazil,  Oct.  51; 
Denmark,  Jan.  91;  Greece  (termina- 
tion). May  88;  Norway,  Jan.  91;  Philip- 
pines, Jan.  91,  Apr.  81;  Senegal,  Nov. 
87;  Switzerland,  Mar.  75,  Apr.  81,  May 
89;  Yugoslavia,  July  90 
Civil  aeronautical  products,  imported,  air- 
worthiness and  environmental  cer- 
tification, bilateral  agreement  with 
Canada,  Nov.  86 
Civil  aircraft,  trade  agreement  (1984), 

entry  into  force,  June  86 
Experimental  transborder  air  service  pro- 
gram, bilateral  agreement  with 
Canada,  Dec.  91 
International  air  services  transit  agree- 
ment (1944),  acceptance,  Italy,  Sept. 
78 
International  civil  aviation,  convention 
(1944): 
Protocol  (1968)  re  authentic  trilingual 
text,  adherence,  St.  Vincent  and  the 
Grenadines,  Jan.  90 
Protocol  (1977)  re  amendment:  Afghani- 
stan, Algeria,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Italy,  Seychelles,  Sri 
Lanka,  Vietnam,  Sept.  88 
Protocol  (1977)  re  authentic  multilin- 
gual text:  China,  June  86;  Turkey, 
Apr.  79 
Protocol  (1980)  re  amendment:  Belgium, 
Denmark,  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, Mali,  Philippines,  Seychelles, 
Spain,  July  88 
Protocol  (1984)  re  amendment  (art.  3 
his),  Aug.  86 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organization, 
Nov.  15,  23 
Airline  safety  discussions  (Shultz),  Mar. 
42 
Offenses  and  certain  other  acts  committed 
on  board  aircraft,  convention  (1963): 
Bahrain,  Czechoslovakia,  Jamaica,  St. 
Lucia,  Tanzania,  July  88 
Polish  sanctions,  lifting  of  (Dam),  Dec.  68 
Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  against  the 
safety  of  civil  aviation,  convention 
(1971):  Bahrain,  Aug.  86;  Guinea, 
Haiti,  July  88;  Monaco,  Aug.  86; 
Nauru,  July  88;  St.  Lucia,  Jan.  90 
Suppression  of  unlawful  seizure  of  aircraft, 
convention  (1970):  Aug.  86;  St.  Lucia, 
Jan.  90 
Transatlantic  passenger  air  fares,  memo- 
randum of  understanding  (1982):  Den- 
mark, Norway,  Sweden,  Jan.  90 
Protocol  (1983):"  Belgium,  Denmark,  Fin- 
land, France,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Nether- 
lands, Norway,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden,  U.K.,  U.S.,  Yugoslavia, 
Feb.  46 


Aviation  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  airlines,  conversion  and  remittance  of 
Jamaican  dollar  earnings,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Jamaica,  July  90 

U.S. -European  Civil  Aviation  Conference 
memorandum  of  understanding  (1982) 
inclusion  of  Denmark,  Norway,  and 
Sweden,  bilateral  agreements:  Den- 
mark, Norway,  Sweden,  Jan.  91 


B 


Bahamas,  Oct.  9 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  88,  June 

87,  Oct.  50 
U.S.  defense  facilities,  bilateral 

agreements,  June  87,  PR  99,  4/5 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistsmce,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  34 
Baihrain,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  88, 

Aug.  86 
Balance  of  payments,  U.S.:  Burns,  July  55; 

Lamb,  July  63 
Baltic  Freedom  Day,  proclamation  (Reagan), 

Aug.  54 
Baltic  States  (Abrams),  July  77 
Bangladesh: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Feb. 

47,  Sept.  78,  Nov.  86,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  35;  McPhei 
son.  May  66;  Schaffer,  May  77,  78 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Ershad:  Reagan, 
Ershad,  Feb.  36 
Barbados:  Oct.  9;  Reagan,  Jan.  84;  Shultz, 
PR  39,  2/8,  PR  50,  2/22 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Aug.  86,  87, 
Nov.  86 
Barnebey,  Malcolm  R.,  swearing  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Belize,  PR  183,  8/14 
Bartholomew,  Reginald:  Department,  Nov. 
67;  Shultz,  Jan.  36,  PR  202,  9/20,  PR 
203,  9/20 
Belgium,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90 
Feb.  46,  47,  Apr.  80,  May  88,  July  88, 
Aug.  86,  87,  Nov.  86,  Dec.  90 
Belize:  Oct.  9;  DiCarlo,  Jan.  70,  72;  Reagan 
Mar.  72 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  91, 

June  87,  Aug.  87,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Barnebey),  swearing  in 

PR  183,  8/14 
U.S.  economic  and  security  aissistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  34 
Benin: 
International  trade  in  endangered  species, 
convention  (1973),  accession.  May  87 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  36 
Berlin:  Goodby,  Oct.  21;  NAC,  Feb.  14,  Julj 
10;  Reagan,  July  28;  Shultz,  Mar.  36, 
July  19 
European  Parliament  elections,  status  in, 
tripartite  statement,  Aug.  55 
Bhutan: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Dec.  9' 
U.S.  food  aid,  proposed.  May  35 
Big-power  responsibility:  Aug.  1;  Luns,  July^ 
5;  Reagan,  Sept.  41;  Shultz,  May  12, 
Dec.  3,  10;  Zhao,  Mar.  22 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


Bills  of  lading,  international  convention 
(1924)  for  unification  of  certain  rules: 
Denunciation:  U.K.  (for  certain  islands), 

Sept.  78 
Terminations:  Denmark,  Finland,  Norway, 
Sweden,  June  86 
Biological  and  toxic  weapons  convention 
(1972):  Nov.  20,  Dec.  44;  Colombia,  Feb. 
46;  F'rance,  Nov.  86 
Birendra  Bir  Bikram  Shah  Dev,  King  of 

Nepal,  Feb.  39,  40 
Blanco,  Salvador  Jorge,  Aug.  84 
Boehm,  Richard  W.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Cyprus,  PR  188,  8/20 
Bolivia:  Oct.  9;  Dam,  Dec.  72;  Motley,  Feb. 
44,  Oct.  3;  Shultz,  Apr.  19;  Taylor,  May 
73 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  74,  May 

87,  July  89 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  35 
iosworth,  Steven  W.,  Ambassador  to  the 
Philippines: 
Nomination  (Shultz),  PR  89,  3/23 
Swearing  in,  PR  118,4/24 
Botswana:  Crocker,  Jan.  42;  Shultz,  Apr.  11 
Employment  of  dependents  of  official  gov- 
ernment employees,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  U.S.,  Nov.  86 
International  express  mail  agreement  with 

U.S.,  Nov.  86 
Profile,  June  39 

U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  36;  Lyman, 
May  48;  Shultz,  May  27,  28 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Masire:  Reagan, 

Masire,  June  38;  program,  PR  121,  5/4 
Brazil:  Oct.  9;  Dam,  Dec.  72;  DiCarlo,  Jan. 
70,  72;  Motley,  Feb.  44,  Oct.  1;  Shultz, 
Apr.  19,  July  37,  Dec.  20 
Debt  problems:  Motley,  Feb.  43,  Oct.  6; 

Shultz,  Apr.  23 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  91, 
Feb.  47,  Apr.  80,  Aug.  87,  Sept.  78, 
Oct.  51,  Nov.  86,  Dec.  90,  91 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Asencio),  swearing  in, 

PR  189,  8/20 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  35 
U.S.  relations:  Malone,  Aug.  71;  Shultz, 
Apr.  22,  PR  34,  2/6,  PR  35,  2/7,  PR 
36,  2/9,  PR  38,  2/8 
Jretton  Woods  agreements,  40th  anniversary 

(McCormack),  Sept.  38 
Jriggs,  Everett  Ellis,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Panama,  PR  181,  8/13 
Jritish  Virgin  Islands  (Reagan),  Mar.  72 
Brower,  Charles  N.,  appointment  to  Iran-U.S. 

Claims  Tribunal,  PR  83,  3/22 
Jrown,  William  A.,  Sept.  34,  Oct.  27 
$runei:  Shultz,  Sept.  12,  16;  Wallis,  Aug.  51 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  79,  Nov. 

86 
U.S.  Ambassador  (King),  swearing  in,  PR 

115,  4/19 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 

May  35;  Wolfowitz,  May  56 
Juckley,  James  L.,  Dec.  80 
Bulgaria: 
Drug  trafficking  and  terrorism:  Burt,  Oct. 

29;  Shultz,  Dec.  13 
Profile,  Oct.  29 


Bulgaria  (Cont'd) 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  73,  May 
87,  88,  June  86,  87,  July  89,  Aug.  86 
U.S.  relations  (Burt),  Oct.  28 
U.S.  travel  advisory  (Shultz),  Sept.  10 
Burch,  Dean,  appointment  as  Chairman  of 
U.S.  delegation  to  Space  WARC,  PR 
157,  7/5 
Burkina  Faso,  U.S.  Ambassador  (Neher), 

swearing  in,  PR  179,  8/9 
Burma:  Shultz,  Nov.  30;  Taylor,  May  74 
U.S.  economic  and  securi^  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  35;  Shultz, 
May  30;  Wolfowitz,  May  54,  56 
Burns,  Arthur  F.,  July  55 
Burt,  Richard  R.,  Mar.  44,  Apr.  44,  May  59, 

Oct.  28,  Nov.  60 
Burundi: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  87 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  36 
Bush,  George: 
Addresses  and  remarks: 

Chemical  weapons  ban,  proposed,  June 

40 
El  Salvador,  Feb.  9 
NAC  ministerial  meeting,  Washington, 
July  1 
Visits: 

East  and  South  Asia  and  Middle  East, 

Aug.  25 
Europe,  Apr.  5 
Latin  America:  Bush,  Feb.  9;  Reagan, 

Feb.  6;  Shultz,  Mar.  4 
Soviet  Union,  Apr.  5 


Cameroon: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  Aug. 

87,  Sept.  78 

U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  36;  Lyman, 
May  47;  Shultz,  May  27,  28 
Canada: 

Gulf  of  Maine  boundaries  and  ICJ  ruling: 
PR  72,  3/8;  Clark,  Dec.  58;  Depart- 
ment, Dec.  58;  Shultz,  Dec.  59 

St.  John  River  water  quality  committee,  bi- 
lateral agreement.  May  88 

Skagit  River  and  Ross  Lake,  Seven  Mile 
Reservoir  on  the  Pend  d'Oreille  River, 
treaty:  June  87,  Sept.  79,  Oct.  51; 
MacEachen,  Shultz,  PR  96,  4/3 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  91, 

Feb.  46,  47,  Mar.  74,  Apr.  80,  May  87, 

88,  June  87,  July  89,  Aug.  86,  87, 
Sept.  78,  Oct.  51,  Nov.  86,  Dec.  91 

U.S.  economic  relations:  Shultz,  June  33; 

Wallis,  Mar.  28 
U.S.  relations:  Clark,  Dec.  57;  Shultz, 

Feb.  16,  Dec.  5 
U.S.  surplus  property,  bilateral  agreement, 

June  87 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Mulroney: 

Reagan,  Mulroney,  Dec.  54;  program, 

PR  206,  9/21 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz  and  joint  news 

conference,  Dec.  55 
Cape  Verde: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Aug.  87,  Oct. 

50 


Cape  Verde  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  36 
Captive  Nations  Week,  1984,  proclamation 

(Reagan),  Sept.  51 
Carlisle,  Charles  R.,  nomination  as  Special 
Negotiator  for  Bureau  of  Economic  and 
Business  Affairs,  PR  226,  10/16 
Carrington,  Lord,  July  26 
Central  African  Republic: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  87,  Dec. 

91 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  36 
Central  Intelligence  Agency:  Reagan, 

July  30;  Shultz,  Nov.  39,  PR  235,  10/22 
Chad:  Nimeiri,  Jan.  45;  Reagan,  Jan.  44; 
Shultz,  PR  219,  10/12 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  74,  Aug. 

86 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  36;  Crocker, 
Jan.  39;  Lyman,  May  45,  46;  Shultz, 
Apr.  11,  May  20,  27 
Chemical  and  antipersonnel  weapons,  reports 
of  use:  Mar.  9,  June  62,  Dec.  29,  44; 
Adelman,  Jan.  47;  ANZUS,  Sept.  19; 
Bush,  June  40;  Department,  Apr.  64; 
NAC,  Feb.  13,  July  9;  Reagan,  May  8; 
Shultz,  May  42,  June  30,  Dec.  24 
Cheysson,  Claude,  July  3 
Child  abduction,  international,  civil  aspects 
of,  convention  (1980):  Canada,  extension 
to  certain  provinces,  May  87,  Sept.  78; 
Switzerland,  Jan.  90 
Chile:  Oct.  10;  Abrams,  Jan.  56;  Michel,  Jan. 
58;  Motley,  Feb.  44;  Pickering,  Apr.  77; 
Shultz,  Apr.  19 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  89,  Dec.  90 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request. 
May  35 
China: 
Cultural  exchange  agreement  with  U.S.: 

Reagan,  June  12;  text,  June  13 
Fisheries  off  coast  of  Alaska,  talks  with 

U.S.,  PR  210,  10/4 
Kampuchea,  position  on  (Wolfowitz),  Nov. 

52 
Leadership  change,  question  of  effect 

(Shultz),  PR  128,  5/11 
Managers  training,  bilateral  agreement 

(Reagan),  June  12,  15,  20 
Modernization:  ANZUS,  Sept.  20;  Arma- 
cost,  Dec.  67;  Eagleburger,  Apr.  40; 
Reagan,  June  3,  6,  11,  12;  Shultz, 
Sept.  8,  PR  124,  5/7,  PR  128,  5/11; 
Wolfowitz,  July  50 
Nuclear  energy,  peaceful  uses:  Kennedy, 
Oct.  40;  Shultz,  PR  243A,  11/5 
Bilateral  jigreement:  Adelman,  July  44; 
Reagan,  June  4,  12,  15,  20;  Shultz, 
Dec.  19,  PR  114,  4/19;  Wolfowitz, 
July  49 
Profile,  June  21 

Science  and  technology  agreements  with 
U.S.:  Malone,  Aug.  72;  Reagan,  June 
12,  15,  20;  Shultz,  July  17 
Fact  sheet.  Mar.  24 
Sino-Soviet  relations:  Armacost,  Dec.  66; 

Shultz,  PR  124,  5/7,  PR  128,  5/11 
Taiwan:  Reagan,  June  9;  Shultz,  Mar.  31, 
PR  114,  4/19,  PR  117,  4/23,  PR  124, 
5/7,  PR  128,  5/11,  PR  192,  8/23; 
Wallis,  Aug.  51,  52;  Wolfowitz,  July  50 


ndex 1984 


China  (Cont'd) 
Tax  agreement  with  U.S.:  Reagan,  June  4, 

12;  Shultz,  June  36 
Travel  and  emigration  (Brown),  Oct.  28 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Mar. 

73,  74,  Apr.  80,  May  87,  June  86 
U.S.  arms  sales,  question  of  (Shultz),  Sept. 

10 
U.S.  economic  relations:  Dam,  Feb.  19; 
Shultz,  Sept.  3;  Wallis,  July  67,  Aug. 
51;  Wolfowitz,  May  58,  July  49,  Sept. 
25 
Long-term  grain  agreement  (Dam),  Feb. 

22 
MFN  status,  extension  proposed 
(Brown),  Oct.  27 
U.S.  relations:  Dec.  25;  Adelman,  Nov.  45; 
Bush,  Aug.  26;  Reagan,  Jan.  14,  Mar. 
20,  23,  June  1,  6,  8,  9,  11,  12,  14,  18, 
20,  Aug.  6,  Nov.  3;  Shultz,  Mar.  22, 
July  36,  38,  Sept.  7,  10,  Oct.  20,  Dec. 
7,  PR  163,  7/13;  Wolfowitz,  July  49; 
Zhao,  Mar.  21,  23,  24 
U.S.  technology  transfer  policy:  Reagan, 
June  4;  Shultz,  Sept.  7,  10;  Wolfowitz, 
Sept.  26 
U.S.  visit  of  Premier  Zhao:  Reagan,  Mar. 

20;  Zhao,  Mar.  21;  program,  PR  7,  1/7 
Visit  of  President  Reagan:  Reagan,  May  4, 
June  1,  6,  8,  9,  11,  12,  14,  18,  20; 
Shultz,  June  37,  Sept.  4,  PR  114,  4/19, 
PR  117,  4/23,  PR  120,  4/30,  PR  124, 
5/7,  PR  128,  5/11;  Wolfowitz,  July  49 
Itinerary,  June  2 
Chronology  of  world  events  by  month,  Jan. 
92,  Feb.  48,  Mar.  75,  Apr.  81,  May  89, 
June  88,  July  90,  Aug.  88,  Sept.  80,  Oct. 
52,  Nov.  88,  Dec.  92 
Claims: 
Iran,  expropriation  of  property  of  U.S. 

nationals,  and  treaty  protection  (Robin- 
son), Jan.  60 
Iran-U.S.  Claims  Tribunal,  appointment  of 
arbitrators,  PR  83,  3/22,  PR  84,  3/22, 
PR  85,  3/22,  PR  86,  3/22 
Marshall  Islands,  U.S.  nuclear  weapons 
testing  program  (Wolfowitz),  May  58 
Clark,  Joe:  Dec.  56;  Shultz,  Dec.  55 
Classified  information,  safeguarding  of,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Norway,  Dec.  91 
Coffee  (Wallis),  July  66 
International  agreement  (1983):  Angola, 
Oct.  50;  Austria,  July  88;  Burundi, 
May  87;  Cameroon,  Canada,  Feb.  46; 
Colombia,  May  87;  Costa  Rica,  Feb. 
46;  Cyprus,  May  87;  Ecuador, 
Equatorial  Guinea,  Fiji,  Feb.  46; 
Finland,  July  88;  Gabon,  Ghana,  Feb. 
46;  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Oct. 
50;  Haiti,  July  88;  Honduras,  Apr.  79, 
May  87;  India,  Feb.  46;  Indonesia,  May 
87;  Ivory  Coast,  Apr.  79;  Madagascar, 
Malawi,  Feb.  46;  Mexico,  July  88; 
Netherlands,  Nov.  86;  Nicaragua,  May 
87;  Nigeria,  May  87,  Sept,  78; 
Paraguay,  Oct.  50;  Peru,  May  87; 
Philippines,  June  86;  Portugal,  July  88; 
Spain,  June  86;  Sri  Lanka,  Apr.  79; 
Togo,  Sept.  78;  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
May  87;  Uganda,  Feb.  46;  U.K.,  May 
87;  Venezuela,  Dec.  90;  Yugoslavia, 
June  86;  Zimbabwe,  July  88 


Colombia:  Oct.  10;  DiCarlo,  Jan.  70;  Motley, 
Oct.  1;  Shultz,  Nov.  30;  Taylor,  May  72 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  Mar. 

74,  May  87,  Aug.  87,  Sept.  79 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Tambs),  swearing  in,  PR 

182,  8/13 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 
May  35;  Shultz,  May  28 
Commodities  and  commodity  trade  {see  also 
names  of  commodities):  Wallis,  July  66 
Commodity  imports,  bilateral  agreement 

with  Egypt,  Nov.  87 
Common  Fund,  agreement  establishing 
(1980):  Afghanistan,  June  86;  Bhutan, 
Dec,  90;  Brazil,  Sept.  78;  Cape  Verde, 
Oct.  50;  Chad,  Aug.  86;  Comoros,  Apr. 
79;  Djibouti,  Dec.  90;  Greece,  Oct.  50; 
Lesotho,  Feb.  46;  Nepal,  June  86; 
Nicaragua,  May  87;  Sao  Tome,  Feb. 
46;  Singapore,  Mar.  73;  Somalia,  Nov. 
86;  Spain,  Mar.  73;  Togo,  June  86; 
Western  Samoa,  May  87;  Zaire,  Jan. 
90 
Comoros: 
Common  Fund  for  Commodities  agreement 

(1980),  ratification,  Apr.  79 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request. 
May  36 
Congo,  People's  Republic: 
Geneva  conventions  (1949),  protocols  I  and 

II,  accession,  Feb.  46 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Lukens),  swearing  in, 

PR  186,  8/17 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  36 
Congress,  U.S.: 
Executive-congressional  relations: 

Adelman,  July  45;  Motley,  June  78; 
Reagan,  May  5,  10,  11;  Shultz,  Apr. 
17,  May  15,  32,  40,  41,  42,  PR  107,  4/6 
Legislation: 

Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Act,  FY 

1984  (Reagan),  Mar.  8 
Caribbean  Basin  Economic  Recovery 
Act:  Dam,  Jan.  81,  85;  Michel,  Jan. 
87;  Reagan,  Jan.  84,  Mar.  72,  May  4 
Human  Rights  for  South  Africa 

(Abrams),  Sept.  59 
Intelligence  Authorization  Act  of  1984 

(Shultz),  Jan.  85,  June  67,  74 
International  Monetary  Fund,  quota  in- 
crease: Dam,  Feb.  19;  Motley,  Feb. 
43;  Reagan,  May  5 
Lebanon,  withdrawal  of  U.S.  Marines: 
Eagleburger,  Mar.  49;  Murphy, 
Mar.  55;  Reagan,  May  68 
National  Endowment  for  Democracy, 
funding:  Apr.  54;  Dam,  Jan.  86; 
Motley,  Feb.  45 
Terrorism,  control  of:  Reagan,  June  66, 
Dec.  86;  Sayre,  Oct.  49;  Shultz, 
Aug.  30,  33,  Dec.  9 
Legislation,  proposed: 

Africa,  Economic  Policy  Initiative: 
Lyman,  May  43,  44;  McPherson, 
May  64,  66;  Reagan,  May  5,  Nov. 
28;  Shultz,  Mar.  7,  Apr.  10,  May  20, 
22,27 
Central  America  Democracy,  Peace,  and 
Development  Act:  Motley,  Apr.  72, 
June  76;  Reagan,  Apr.  71,  75,  May 
3,  11,  June  25;  Shultz,  June  67,  74 


Ci 


Congress,  U.S.  (Cont'd) 

El  Salvador,  U.S.  assistance:  Reagan, 
Apr.  71;  Shultz,  Mar.  4,  Apr.  32, 
May  19;  White  House,  Jan.  88 
Emergency  foreign  food  aid  (Reagan), 

Sept.  47 
Export  Administration  Act,  amend- 
ments: Reagan,  Apr.  3;  Shultz,  Jun 
34 

Foreign  assistance:  Kirkpatrick,  Aug.  59 
Lyman,  May  43;  McPherson,  May 
62;  Murphy,  May  66;  Schaffer,  May 
77;  Shultz,  May  17,  22;  Taylor,  May 
72;  Wolfowitz,  May  52 
Foreign  Assistance  Act,  amendment  re 

China  (Wolfowitz),  May  58 
Generalized  system  of  preferences,  ex- 
tension: Motley,  Aug.  75;  Shultz, 
Sept.  11 
Nicaraguan  freedom  fighters  (Reagan), 

July  30 
Poland,  aid  to  private  family  farms 

(Dam),  Dec.  69 
Security  assistance  programs:  Burt,  May 
59;  Lyman,  May  45;  Schaffer,  May 
77;  Schneider,  May  75;  Shultz,  May 
20,  22,  37,  39,  40;  Wolfowitz,  May 
52 
State  Department  Authorization  Act  for 
FY  1984  and  1985  (Kirkpatrick), 
Apr.  68 
Strategic  defense  initiative:  Reagan, 
June  61,  July  33;  Shultz,  June  31 
Fact  sheet.  May  71 
U.S.  embassy  in  Israel,  question  of  mov- 
ing to  Jerusalem;  Eagleburger,  Apr 
65;  Shultz,  May  38,  41 
Senate  advice  and  consent: 

Compact  of  Free  Association  for  Micro- 
nesia and  Marshall  Islands,  approva. 
urged:  Reagan,  May  74,  Aug.  64; 
Wolfowitz,  May  58,  PR  95,  4/3 
(Senocide  convention,  ratification  urged: 
Abrams,  Nov.  66;  Department,  Nov 
66 
Conservation  (see  also  Fish  and  fisheries): 
Antarctic  marine  living  resources,  conven- 
tion (1980):  Norway,  Feb.  46;  Poland, 
July  89 
Endangered  species  of  wild  fauna  and 

flora,  international  trade  in,  conventio;^ 
(1973):  Newell,  May  87 
Current  actions:  Benin,  May  87;  Nether- 
lands, Aug.  86;  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  May  87 
1979  amendment:  Algeria,  Mar.  73; 

Austria,  Aug.  86;  Belgium,  Jan.  90; 
Luxembourg,  Mar.  73;  Panama, 
May  87 
North  Pacific  fur  seals,  1984  protocol 
amending  interim  convention  (1957), 
PR  220,  10/12 
Signatures:  Canada,  Japan,  Soviet  Union 
U.S.,  Dec.  91 
Consular  relations: 
Consular  agreement  with  Soviet  Union:  De- 
partment, Sept.  42;  Reagan,  Sept.  41; 
White  House,  Sept.  42,  44 
Vienna  convention  (1963):  Korea,  Liberia, 
Nov.  86 
Cook  Islands,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan. 
91,  July  89,  Aug.  87 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Cooper,  Warren,  Sept.  20 

Copyrights,  universal  copyright  convention 

(1971),  accession,  Sri  Lanka,  Mar.  73 
Costa  Rica:  Oct.  10;  Dam,  Jan.  80,  85; 

DiCarlo,  Jan.  70,  72;  Kirkpatrick,  Aug. 
60,  61;  Michel,  Jan.  87;  Motley,  Feb.  44, 
Aug.  77,  81,  Oct.  1,  5;  Shultz,  Mar.  41, 
Apr.  18 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  47, 
Mar.  74,  May  87,  88,  Aug.  87,  Oct.  51, 
Nov.  87,  Dec.  91 

U.S.  Ambassador  (Winsor),  swearing  in, 
PR  184,  8/14 

U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Motley, 
June  77;  Reagan,  Jan.  84;  Shultz,  May 
24 
Cotton,  International  Institute,  articles  of 
agreement  (1966),  Greece  (withdrawal), 
Feb.  46 

Amendments  (1983),  entry  into  force. 
Mar.  73 

rabtree,  Kenneth  (Shultz),  June  49 
Crocker,  Chester  A.,  Jan.  38 

uba:  Oct.  10;  Dam,  Jan.  84;  Motley,  Feb. 
44;  Shultz,  Apr.  19;  Skoug,  Sept.  73 

Drug  trafficking  (Shultz),  Nov.  31,  Dec. 
9,  13 

Profile,  Sept.  75 

Radio  Marti  (Reagan),  Mar.  3,  May  5 

Regional  activities:  Dam,  Jan.  86;  Reagan, 
Jan.  15,  June  22;  Shultz,  June  68,  Dec. 
13 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Mar. 
74,  June  86,  Aug.  86,  Oct.  50,  Nov.  86 

25th  anniversary  of  revolution  (Reagan), 
Mar.  3 

ultural  relations: 

Educational,  cultural,  scientific,  technolog- 
ical fields,  exchanges  and  cooperation, 
bilateral  agreements:  Bulgaria,  June 
87;  Hungary,  Apr.  80;  Romania,  Mar. 
74 

Educational,  scientific,  and  cultural  mate- 
rials, importation,  UNESCO  agree- 
ment (1950)  and  protocol  (1976),  acces- 
sion, Portugal,  Aug.  86 

International  Centre  for  the  Study  of  the 
Preservation  and  Restoration  of 
Cultural  Property,  Statutes  (1969), 
ratification,  Philippines,  July  89 

Recovery  and  return  of  stolen  archeolog- 
ical,  historical,  and  cultural  properties, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Ecuador, 
Feb.  47 

U.S. -China  cultural  exchange:  Reagan, 
June  12;  text  of  accord,  June  13 

World  cultural  and  natural  heritage,  pro- 
tection, convention  (1972):  Antigua  and 
Barbuda,  Apr.  80;  Bangladesh,  Feb. 
47;  U.K.,  Nov.  86;  Yemen  (Sanaa), 
June  87 
Customs: 

Containers,  customs  convention  (1972),  ac- 
cession, Cuba,  Aug.  86 

Customs  administrations,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Canada,  Sept.  79 

Safe  containers  (CSC),  international  con- 
vention (1972),  amendments  to  An- 
nexes I  and  II  (1983),  entry  into  force, 
Feb.  46 


Customs  (Cont'd) 
Simplification  and  harmonization  of  cus- 
toms procedures,  convention  (1973),  ac- 
cession and  entry  into  force  for  U.S., 
Jan.  90 
TIR  camets,  international  transport  of 
goods  under,  customs  convention 
(1975):  Iran,  Dec.  90;  Israel,  Apr.  79; 
Kuwait,  Feb.  46 
Cyprus:  Department,  Aug.  53;  Haass,  Jan. 
52;  Reagan,  July  75,  Nov.  5;  Shultz,  Dec. 
8 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  87,  Oct. 

50,  Dec.  90 
Turkish  Cypriot  declaration  of  statehood: 
Burt,  May  61;  Department,  Jan.  52; 
Shultz,  Mar.  39,  July  21 
UNFICYP,  appropriations  request: 

Schneider,  May  76;  Shultz,  May  29 
U.S  Ambassador  (Boehm),  swearing  in, 

PR  188.  8/20 
U.S.  economic  assistance,  appropriations 

request:  May  34;  Burt,  May  61 
U.S.  reports  to  Congress  (Reagan),  Mar. 
46,  July  73,  Sept.  46,  Dec.  66 
Czechoslovakia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.. 
Mar.  74,  June  86,  July  88,  89,  Aug.  87 


D 


D-Day,  40th  anniversary:  Aug.  7;  Reagan, 

Aug.  10,  21,  23 
Dam,  Kenneth  W.,  Jan.  80,  83,  Feb.  19,  27, 
Mar.  11,  Aug.  44,  Oct.  33,  Dec.  68,  70, 
73,  PR  227,  10/17 
Debts,  consolidation  and  rescheduling 
(Wallis),  July  62 
Bilateral  agreements:  Central  African  Re- 
public, June  87;  Costa  Rica,  Aug.  87; 

Ecuador,  July  90;  Liberia,  Oct.  51; 

Malawi,  Aug.  88;  Mexico,  July  90; 

Morocco,  Apr.  81;  Niger,  Oct.  52; 

Peru,  May  88;  Romania,  June  87; 

Sudan,  May  88;  Togo,  Feb.  48,  Apr. 

81;  Zaire,  Oct.  52;  Zambia,  Apr.  81 
Defense  and  national  security: 
Budget  (Shultz),  Mar.  38 
Collective  security  {see  also  North  Atlantic 

Treaty  Organization):  Sept.  25;  Shultz, 

Dec.  22 
Deterrent  strategy:  Dec.  30;  Adelman,  Jan. 

45;  Burt,  Apr.  48;  Eagleburger,  May 

49;  Reagan,  Jan.  15,  Feb.  2,  May  1,  6, 

June  22;  Rowny,  June  46;  Shultz,  Apr. 

28,  May  41,  June  28,  31,  Dec.  4,  PR 

65,  3/6 
Nuclear  weapons  freeze  proposals: 

Adelman,  Nov.  45;  Eagleburger,  May 

52;  Shultz,  Mar.  38 
Scowcroft  commission  recommendations, 

Dec.  32 
Strategic  defense  initiative:  Dec.  27; 

Adelman,  Nov.  48;  Fact  sheet.  May  71; 

Reagan,  June  61;  Shultz,  June  31,  July 

21,  Nov.  40 
Strategic  Forces  Commission,  report 

(Reagan),  June  61 
Strategic  modernization:  Dam,  Aug.  44; 

Reagan,  July  31,  33;  Rowny,  Aug.  38; 

Shultz,  July  40,  Sept.  12,  17,  Dec.  6, 

22 


De  la  Madrid  Hurtado,  Miguel,  July  86,  87, 

88 
Democracy  and  democratic  principles: 
Crocker,  Jan.  41;  Dam,  Dec.  72;  Guer- 
reiro  (quoted),  Apr.  27;  Motley,  Feb.  43; 
Reagan,  Mar.  1,  May  6,  Aug.  8,  18; 
Shultz,  Apr.  15,  26,  Dec.  10,  13,  PR  152, 
6/13 
Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Prac- 
tices for  198S,  released,  Apr.  53 
Declaration  on  Democratic  Values  (London 

Economic  Summit),  Aug.  1 
Human  rights  and  (Shultz),  Apr.  18 
National  Endowment  for  Democracy:  Apr. 
54;  Dam,  Jan.  86;  Motley,  Feb.  45; 
Reagan,  May  5;  Shultz,  Apr.  18,  27 
Denmark,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90, 
91,  Feb.  46,  May  87,  June  86,  July  88, 
Aug.  87,  Oct.  51 
Developing  countries  {see  also  Foreign  aid, 
U.S.;  Trade:  Free  trade  and  antiprotec- 
tionism;  and  names  of  individual  coun- 
tries): Nov.  22;  Eagleburger,  Apr.  42; 
Lamb,  July  65;  NAC,  July  11;  Reagan, 
May  4;  Shultz,  May  12,  22,  27,  Dec.  7; 
Wallis,  July  67 
Debt  problems:  Aug.  3;  ANZUS,  Sept.  19; 
Burns,  July  55,  56;  Dam,  Feb.  19,  Dec. 
71;  Lamb,  July  63;  Lyman,  May  43; 
McCormack,  Sept.  40;  McPherson, 
May  63;  Motley,  Feb.  43,  Aug.  76; 
Murphy,  May  67;  Reagan,  May  5; 
Schneider,  May  75;  Shultz,  Apr.  27, 
May  28,  July  41,  Sept.  9,  15,  Nov.  33, 
Dec.  9;  Wallis,  Mar.  28,  July  54,  67, 
Sept.  37 
Nuclear  energy  needs  (Shultz),  Dec.  20 
Radio  frequency  allocations,  question  of 

(Marks),  Feb.  34 
Steel  production  (Wallis),  Aug.  48 
Unitary  taxation  proposals:  Shultz,  June 
34;  Wallis,  July  68 
Developmental  assistance  {see  also  Foreign 
aid,  U.S.;  and  names  of  individual  coun- 
tries); appropriations  requests:  May  33, 
34;  Lyman,  May  44;  McPherson,  May  63, 
66;  Schaffer,  May  78;  Shultz,  May  29; 
Wolfowitz,  May  53 
DiCarlo,  Dominick  L.,  Jan.  70 
Dillery,  Carl  Edward,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Fiji,  Tonga,  Tuvalu,  and 
Kiribati,  PR  215,  10/11 
Diplomatic  relations,  Vienna  convention 
(1961)  and  optional  protocol  re  com- 
pulsory settlement  of  disputes,  accession, 
Netherlands,  Nov.  86 
Djibouti: 
Common  Fund  for  Commodities  agreement 

(1980),  signature,  Dec.  90 
Refugees,  repatriation:  Crocker,  Jan.  40; 

Purcell,  Feb.  33 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Lyman, 
May  44 
Dominica:  Oct.  11;  Reagan,  Jan.  84 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan,  90,  Aug. 
87,  Sept.  79,  Dec.  90 
Dominican  Republic:  Oct.  11;  Reagan,  Dec. 
72 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Apr. 
80,  May  88,  June  87,  Aug.  87,  Nov.  87, 
Dec.  91 


ndex1984 


Dominican  Republic  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Reagan, 
Jan.  84;  Shultz,  May  28 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Jorge  Blanco: 

Reagan,  Jorge  Blanco,  Aug.  84;  White 
House,  Aug.  85;  program,  PR  100,  4/6 
Double  taxation,  avoidance  of: 
Bilateral  agreements:  Australia,  Jan.  91, 
Feb.  47;  Bahamas,  May  88;  Canada, 
Nov.  86;  Denmark,  Oct.  51;  New 
Zealand,  Jan.  91,  Feb.  47;  Sweden, 
Sept.  79,  Dec.  92 
Malaysia  (Shultz),  Sept.  9 
Income  tax  reimbursement  procedures,  bi- 
lateral agreements:  Canada,  Sept.  78; 
France,  Sept.  79;  Haiti,  Aug.  88;  Italy, 
Jan.  91;  NATO,  Aug.  88;  OAS,  Mar. 
74 
U.S.  Navy  employees  in  Italy,  taxation  of 
income  by,  bilateral  agreement,  Dec. 
91 
Dougan,  Lady  Diana,  Coordinator  for  Inter- 
national Communication  and  Information 
Policy,  confirmation,  PR  176,  8/3 
Drugs,  narcotic: 
Bulgaria,  narcotics  trafficking  (Burt),  Oct. 

29 
Control  of  production  and  traffic,  bilateral 
agreements:  Belize,  Jan.  91,  June  87; 
Haiti,  Oct.  51;  Mexico,  Feb.  47,  Apr. 
80,  Sept.  79,  Nov.  87;  U.K.  (Cayman 
Islands),  Nov.  87,  Dec  92c 
International  control:  Oct.  39;  DiCarlo,  Jan. 
70;  Schaffer,  May  81;  Shultz,  Nov.  29, 
Dec.  9 
Program  for  control,  appropriations  re- 
quest: May  33;  Shultz,  May  29;  Taylor, 
May  72 
Psychotropic  substances,  convention  (1971), 

Ivory  Coast,  June  86 
Single  convention  (1961),  protocol  (1972), 
ratification,  Belgium,  Aug.  86 
Duarte,  Jqs6  Napoleon:  July  83,  84,  Dec.  87; 
Reagan,  July  29,  83 


E 


Eagleburger,  Lawrence,  S.,  Mar.  49,  Apr.  34, 
39,  65,  May  49 
Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Political  Af- 
fairs, resignation  (Shultz),  PR  89,  3/23 
Earth  sciences,  technical  cooperation  in,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  Morocco,  Nov.  87 
Earthquake  (seismic)  research,  bilateral 

agreements:  El  Salvador,  July  90;  Italy, 
Nov.  87 
East-West  relations:  Bush,  June  42,  July  2; 
Cheysson,  July  3;  NAC,  Feb.  13,  July  9, 
10;  Reagan,  June  48,  July  28;  Shultz, 
Apr.  57  (quoted).  May  13,  June  36,  July 
13,  Dec.  6,  21,  PR  155,  6/21;  Wallis, 
Mar.  29,  July  60 
Advanced  technology  transfers,  security 

aspects  (Schneider),  Aug.  68 
Canada,  role  (Shultz),  Dec.  57 
London  economic  summit,  declaration  on, 
Aug.  4 
Economic  and  Social  Council,  U.N. 
(ECOSOC),  Nov.  11,  21 


Economy,  domestic:  Burt,  Mar.  45,  47; 
Motley,  Feb.  43;  Reagan,  Jan.  10,  16, 
May  2,  June  3,  July  31,  33,  Nov.  26; 
Shultz,  Apr.  27,  Dec.  3,  8;  Wallis,  Mar. 
28,  July  68,  Aug.  52 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1952-1954,  Volume  I,  General:  Eco- 
nomic and  Political  Matters,  released, 
June  93 
Economy,  world  (see  also  Developing  coun- 
tries and  Trade):  Bums,  July  55;  Dam, 
Feb.  19;  Eagleburger,  Apr.  42;  McPher- 
son.  May  63;  Mitterrand,  June  57; 
Motley,  Aug.  75;  Nakasone,  Jan.  3,  4; 
Reagan,  Mar.  25,  May  4,  Nov.  26,  60; 
Shultz,  Apr.  27,  Dec.  8;  Wallis,  Mar.  27, 
Sept.  36;  Wolfowitz,  May  53 
Economic  summit  meeting,  London,  June 
7-9:  Aug.  1;  ANZUS,  Sept.  19;  Motley, 
Oct.  6;  Reagan,  May  4,  July  32,  Aug. 
5;  Shultz,  Dec.  6,  PR  152,  6/13,  PR 
155,  6/21;  Wallis,  Mar,  27,  July  52 
Declaration  on  Democratic  Values, 

Aug.  1 
Declaration  on  East- West  Relations  and 

Arms  Control,  Aug.  4 
Declaration  on  International  Terrorism: 

Aug.  4;  Shultz,  PR  152,  6/13 
Economic  Declaration,  Aug.  2 
Statement  on  Iran-Iraq  conflict,  Aug.  5 
Ecuador:  Oct.  11;  Dam,  Dec.  72;  Motley,  Feb. 
44,  Oct.  1;  Reagan,  July  27;  Shultz,  Apr. 
19,  July  37 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  47, 

Apr.  80,  July  90 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Hart),  swearing  in,  PR 

180,  8/14 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  35;  Shultz, 
May  28 
Education: 
Educational,  cultural,  scientific,  techno- 
logical fields,  exchanges  and  coopera- 
tion, bilateral  agreements:  Bulgaria, 
June  87;  Hungary,  Apr.  80;  Romania, 
Mar.  75 
Educational  exchange  programs:  Jan.  29; 
Crocker,  Jan.  43;  McPherson,  May  63; 
Reagan,  June  15;  Shultz,  Nov.  33 
Educational,  scientific,  and  cultural  mate- 
rials, importation,  UNESCO  agree- 
ment (1950)  and  protocol  (1976),  acces- 
sion, Portugal,  Aug.  86 
Bilateral  agreement  with  Yugoslavia, 
Aug.  88 
Recognition  of  studies,  diplomas,  and  de- 
grees concerning  higher  education  in 
European  states  (1979),  ratification, 
Sweden,  July  89 
Egypt:  Dam,  Mar.  12;  Shultz,  May  39 
Decentralization  sector  support,  bilateral 

agreement,  Aug.  87,  Dec.  87 
Economic  and  political  stability,  bilateral 

agreement,  Dec.  91 
Shoubra  El-Kheima  thermal  power  plant, 

bilateral  agreement,  Aug.  88 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Feb. 
47,  Mar.  73,  Apr.  80,  May  88,  Aug.  87, 
Sept.  79,  Oct.  51,  Nov.  87,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  McPher- 
son, May  66;  Murphy,  May  68; 
Schneider,  May  75;  Shultz,  May  20,  28, 
29.32 


Egypt  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Mubarak:  Reagan, 
Mubarak,  Apr.  63;  program,  PR  41, 
2/10 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  departure  state- 
ments (Shultz),  PR  244,  11/2 
Wastewater  collection  and  treatment  sys- 
tem (Cairo  Sewerage  II),  bilateral 
agreement,  Dec.  91 
Eisenhower,  Dwight  D.:  Reagan,  Sept.  46; 

Shultz,  Oct.  18 
El  Salvador:  Kirkpatriek,  Aug.  61;  Motley, 
Mar.  67;  Reagan,  Mar.  72,  June  22; 
Shultz,  Apr.  19,  PR  65,  3/6,  PR  152,  6/13 
Death  squads:  Bush,  Feb.  9;  Dam,  Jan.  85; 
Motley,  Aug.  79;  Reagan,  Feb.  6; 
Shultz,  Apr.  16,  17,  18,  32,  May  37 
Democratic  progress  and  land  reform:  Oct. 
11;  Bush,  Feb.  9;  Dam,  Jan.  81,  Dec. 
72;  Kirkpatriek,  Aug.  60;  Michel,  Jan. 
87;  Motley,  Feb.  44,  Mar.  58,  62,  June 
74,  Aug.  78,  82,  Oct.  1;  Pickering, 
Apr.  77;  Reagan,  June  24,  Aug.  18; 
Shultz,  Apr.  14,  19,  July  37,  Dec.  88 
Elections:  Reagan,  May  4,  11,  June  25, 
July  27,  29,  83,  Nov.  4;  Shultz,  Apr. 
18,  19,  20,  26,  May  37,  39,  40,  June 
70,  July  39,  84,  Dec.  87;  White 
House,  June  85 
Duarte  meetings  with  guerrilla  leaders: 
Duarte,  Dec.  87;  Reagan,  Dec.  87; 
Shultz,  Dec.  7,  59,  87,  88,  89,  PR  224, 
10/15,  PR  228,  10/18,  PR  230,  10/18 
Economy:  Dam,  Jan.  80,  85;  Motley,  Mar. 

60 
Refugees  in  U.S.,  issues  (Abrams),  Sept.  48 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  74,  June 

87,  July  90 
U.S.  advisers:  Reagan,  July  32;  Shultz,  PR 

235,  10/22 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance:  May 
34;  Abrams,  Sept.  49;  Dam,  Jan.  81; 
Motley,  Mar.  65,  Apr.  73,  June  74, 
Aug.  79;  Reagan,  Feb.  6,  Mar.  3,  Apr. 
71,  75,  May  10,  11,  June  26,  27,  July 
29,  Sept.  2;  Schneider,  May  75,  76; 
Shultz,  Feb.  12,  Apr.  20,  May  14,  19, 
24,  28,  37,  39,  40,  PR  98,  4/4,  PR  107, 
4/6;  White  House,  June  77,  Sept.  72 
Certification  for:  Reagan,  Apr.  71; 
Shultz,  Mar.  4,  Apr.  32,  May  19; 
White  House,  Jan.  88 
U.S.  visit  of  President-Elect  Duarte:  joint 
communique,  July  83;  Reagan,  July  29; 
White  House,  Sept.  72 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush:  Reagan,  Feb. 

6;  Shultz,  Mar.  4 
Visits  of  Secretary  Shultz  (Shultz),  July  84, 
Dec.  87 
Employment  of  dependents  of  official  govern- 
ment employees,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Philippines,  Feb.  48 
Energy  resources  and  problems  (see  also 
Nuclear  energy): 
Alaskan  energy  resources:  Jan.  12;  Dam, 

Mar.  14;  Reagan,  Apr.  3 
Cooperation;  Japan,  Jan.  12;  Korea,  Jan. 

29 
International  Energy  Agency:  Murphy, 
Oct.  37;  Shultz,  PR  148,  6/8;  Wallis, 
July  62;  Wendt,  Dec.  60 
Natural  gas:  Wallis,  Mar.  29;  Wendt,  Dec. 

61 
Oil  prices:  Shultz,  May  28;  Wendt,  Dec.  61 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  L 


nvironmental  problems  and  control:  Aug.  4; 

Shultz,  May  28 
Acid  rain:  Clark,  Dec.  56,  57;  Shultz,  Dec. 

56,58 
Cooperation,  bilateral  agreements:  France, 

Sept.  79;  Mexico,  Apr.  80 
Intervention  on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of 
pollution  by  substances  other  than  oil, 
protocol  (1973):  Australia,  Denmark, 
May  87 
Long-range  transboundary  air  pollution, 
convention  (1979):  Czechoslovakia, 
Liechtenstein,  Mar.  74 
Marine  environment  of  the  wider  Carib- 
bean region,  protection  and  develop- 
ment, convention  (1983),  U.S.,  Oct.  50, 
Nov.  86 
Prevention  of  marine  pollution  by  dumping 
of  wastes  and  other  matter,  convention 
(1972):  Italy,  July  89;  Oman,  June  86; 
Solomon  Islands,  Aug.  86 
Prevention  of  pollution  from  ships,  interna- 
tional convention  (1973):  China, 
Finland,  Israel,  Lebanon,  Netherlands, 
St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines,  Soviet 
Union,  May  87 
Prohibition  of  military  or  other  environ- 
mental modification  techniques,  con- 
vention (1977): 
Current  actions:  Australia,  Nov.  86; 
Brazil,  Dec.  90;  New  Zealand,  Nov. 
86;  Sweden,  July  89 
Review  conference,  final  declaration, 
Nov.  49 
Water  quality,  bilateral  agreements  with 

Canada,  Jan.  91,  May  88 
quatorial  Guinea: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  July 

89,  Sept.  79,  Dec.  90 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  36;  Crocker, 
Jan.  40 
rshad,  Hussain  M.,  Feb.  36 
thiopia:  Dec.  25;  Abrams,  Sept.  55,  Nov. 

62;  Crocker,  Jan.  39,  40 
U.S.  aid,  appropriations  request. 

May  36 
urope  {see  also  names  of  individual  coun- 
tries): Gonzalez  (quoted),  Apr.  42,  Oct. 
20;  Wallis,  Aug.  50 
Chemical-weapons-free  zone,  Soviet  pro- 
posal: Burt,  Apr.  49;  Shultz,  Mar.  33 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building  Meas- 
ures and  Disarmament  Conference 
(CDE):  Burt,  Mar.  47,  Apr.  47,  48,  49; 
Bush,  June  42,  43;  Dam,  Aug.  46; 
NAC,  Feb.  12,  13,  July  10,  13;  NATO, 
Feb.  23;  Reagan,  Feb.  1,  3,  Mar.  42, 
May  8,  June  47,  July  9,  44,  Aug.  17, 
Nov.  5,  48,  49;  Shultz,  Jan.  49 
(quoted),  Feb.  10,  14,  15,  17,  Mar.  32, 
39,  Apr.  28,  May  16,  38,  Sept.  13,  Dec. 
21,  PR  155,  6/21;  Wolfowitz,  Sept.  61 
Foreign  Affairs  Outline,  Mar.  43 
Status  report  (Reagan),  Sept.  23 
Western  proposals:  Adelman,  Jan.  49; 
Department,  Mar.  43;  Mally,  Jan. 
49;  Shultz,  Mar.  34 
Western-Soviet  proposals  compared:  Dec. 
43;  Goodby,  Oct.  21 


Europe  (Cont'd) 
CSCE  Final  Act  of  Helsinki  (see  also  Con- 
fidence- and  Security-Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  Con- 
ference above):  Dec.  41,  43;  Adelman, 
Nov.  45;  Goodby,  Oct.  21;  NAC,  July 
10,  12;  Shultz,  Mar.  35 
Madrid  review  meeting  (NAC),  Feb.  13 
Ninth  anniversary,  Oct.  36 
Vienna  review  meeting,  proposed,  Mar. 
43 
Eastern,  U.S.  relations  (Shultz),  Nov.  41 
Inter-German  states  relations:  Kirkpatrick, 
July  74;  NAC,  July  10,  12;  Reagan, 
Nov.  5;  Shultz,  Nov.  41 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction  talks: 
Mar.  43,  Dec.  43;  Adelman,  Jan.  49; 
Burt,  Mar.  44,  47,  Apr.  47;  Bush,  June 
42,  43;  Dam,  Aug.  46;  NAC,  Feb.  12, 

13,  July  10;  NATO,  Feb.  23;  Reagan, 
Feb.  3,  May  3,  8,  50,  July  9,  Aug.  17, 
Nov.  5;  Shultz,  Feb.  14,  Mar.  33,  36, 
38,  40,  41,  Apr.  28,  May  38,  June  30, 
Sept.  13,  Dec.  21,  24;  Wolfowitz,  Sept. 
61 

Western  proposals:  July  45,  Dec.  38; 
Reagan,  June  46,  48,  July  46,  Nov. 
49 
U.S.  commitment  to  security  of  (see  also 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization): 

Burt,  Apr.  48;  Dam,  Oct.  33; 

Eagleburger,  Apr.  39;  Goodby,  Oct. 

21;  Reagan,  June  58 
U.S.  economic  relations:  Burt,  Mar.  44, 

Apr.  49;  Dam,  Mar.  14;  Shultz,  Feb. 

12,  16,  Mar.  38,  June  58 
U.S.  missile  deployment:  Dec.  29,  33; 

Adelman,  Jan.  46,  Nov.  46;  Burt,  Mar. 

44,  46,  47,  Apr.  47;  Bush,  June  43; 

Cheysson,  July  3;  Dam,  Oct.  34,  Dec. 

70;  Eagleburger,  Apr.  40,  May  50; 

Genscher,  Feb.  11;  Luns,  July  6;  NAC, 

Feb.  12,  13;  NATO,  Feb.  22;  Nitze, 

Jan.  48;  Reagan,  Feb.  2,  May  2,  June 

53,  July  31,  32,  Aug.  17,  Nov.  70; 

Rowny,  June  44,  Aug.  38,  40,  44; 

Shultz,  Feb.  10,  11,  15,  Apr.  28,  July 

14,  17,  20,  36,  39,  Dec.  23,  PR  65,  3/6; 
Wolfowitz,  Sept.  61 

Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz  (Shultz),  Feb.  10, 

Mar.  31 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush,  Apr.  5 
Western  European  Union  Foreign  Minis- 
ters meeting  (Shultz),  July  20 
European  Community:  Armacost,  Dec.  67; 
Dam,  Oct.  35;  FitzGerald,  Aug.  14; 
Shultz,  Feb.  12;  Wallis,  Mar.  30 
Agricultural  policy:  Mar.  30;  Burns,  July 
56;  Burt,  Mar.  45;  Dam,  Feb.  19,  20; 
Wallis,  Mar.  28,  29,  July  66 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Sept.  78,  Oct. 
51,  Dec.  91 
Export  controls,  U.S.:  Adelman,  July  43;  De- 
partment, Nov.  68;  Malone,  Aug.  71; 
Reagan,  June  4;  Schneider,  Aug.  68; 
Shultz,  May  16,  June  34,  July  16;  Wallis, 
Mar.  28,  30,  July  61 
Expositions,  international,  convention  (1928), 
protocol  revising  (1972),  accession  of 
Uruguay,  Feb.  46 


Extradition,  bilateral  agreements:  Costa 
Rica,  Ireland,  Oct.  51;  Italy,  Oct.  51, 
Nov.  87;  Jamaica,  Oct.  51;  Sweden,  Sept. 
79,  Nov.  87;  Thailand,  Feb.  48,  Sept.  79; 
Uruguay,  June  88 

Extraterritoriality.  See  Judicial  matters:  Con- 
flicts of  jurisdiction 


Falklands/Malvinas  Islands:  Eagleburger, 
Apr.  41;  Shultz,  Apr.  20,  21,  22; 
Wolfowitz,  Sept.  62,  63 
Fiji: 
International  coffee  agreement,  1983,  ac- 
cession, Feb.  46 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Dillery),  swearing  in,  PR 

215,  10/11 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 

May  35;  Wolfowitz,  May  57 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Mara,  pro- 
gram, PR  253,  11/21 
Finland: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  47, 

Mar.  74,  May  87,  June  86,  July  88,  89 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request. 
May  34 
Fish  and  fisheries: 
Fisheries  off  coasts  of  U.S.:  Dam,  Dec.  68; 
Reagan,  Sept.  41;  White  House,  Sept. 
43 
Bilateral  agreements:  Bulgaria,  July  89; 
Colombia,  Mar.  74;  Denmark,  Aug. 
87;  European  Economic  Communi- 
ty, Oct.  51,  Dec.  91;  Iceland,  Nov. 
87;  Poland,  July  90,  Sept.  79;  Soviet 
Union,  July  90,  Oct.  52 
U.S.-China  meeting,  PR  210,  10/4 
Foreign  fishing  allocations,  1984,  PR  30, 

2/2 
High  seas  fisheries  of  the  North  Pacific 
Ocean,  international  convention  (1978); 
bilateral  amendment  with  Japan,  Aug. 
88 
North  Atlantic  salmon,  conservation,  con- 
vention (1982):  Canada,  Denmark,  Nor- 
way, Jan.  90;  U.S.,  Feb.  46 
West  Coast  Pacific  salmon  management, 

U.S.-Canada  negotiations,  PR  44,  2/14 
Whaling: 

International  convention  (1946),  with 
schedule  of  whaling  regulations: 
Amendments  (1983),  entry  into  force, 

Jan.  91 
Amendments  (1984),  Oct.  51 
International  observer  scheme,  agree- 
ment (1975),  extension  of  bilateral 
agreement  with  Japan,  May  88 
FitzGerald,  Garret,  Aug.  13 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization,  Nov.  15 
Food  for  Peace  Day,  1984,  proclamation 

(Reagan),  Sept.  46,  47 
Food  production  and  shortages  (see  also 
Agriculture): 
U.S.  food  aid:  Crocker,  Jan.  39;  Eagle- 
burger, May  53,  54,  55;  Lyman,  May 
44;  McPherson,  Oct.  31;  Murphy,  May 
67;  Shultz,  Mar.  7,  Apr.  9 


idex  1984 


Food  production  and  shortages  (Cont'd) 
Public  Law  480  (Food  for  Peace):  May 
33,  34;  Crocker,  Jan.  40;  Dam,  Feb. 
19;  Lyman,  May  44,  47;  McPherson, 
May  62.  64,  66;  Motley,  Mar.  65, 
June  77;  Murphy,  May  69,  70; 
Schaffer,  May  78;  Shultz,  May  20, 
24,  27,  29;  Wolfowitz,  May  53,  54, 
55 
World  Food  Day,  1984,  proclamation 

(Reagan),  Dec.  69 
World  Food  Program  (Wolfowitz),  Oct.  26 
Foreign  aid,  U.S.:  Kirkpatrick,  Aug.  58; 
McPherson,  Oct.  31;  Reagan,  Aug.  63, 
Sept.  46;  Shultz,  Sept.  15 
Appropriations  requests:  May  33,  34; 

Lyman,  May  43;  McPherson,  May  62; 
Murphy,  May  66;  Schaffer,  May  77; 
Shultz,  May  17,  22,  PR  68,  3/8,  PR  69, 
3/8,  PR  70,  3/8,  PR  71,  3/8;  Wolfowitz, 
May  52 
Commission  on  Security  and  Economic  As- 
sistance review:  McPherson,  May  62, 
63;  Schneider,  May  75;  Shultz,  May  17, 
18,31 
Human  rights  considerations:  Apr.  54; 
Kirkpatrick,  Apr.  69;  Shultz,  Apr.  18, 
May  19 
Foreign  policy,  U.S.:  Nov.  22;  Burt,  Apr.  46; 
Shultz,  May  39,  Nov.  40 
Conduct  of  (Shultz),  PR  152,  6/13,  PR  207, 

9/24 
National  consensus  (Shultz),  Dec.  5 
Principles,  objectives,  and  purposes:  Dam, 
Feb.  19,  Dec.  70;  Kirkpatrick,  Apr.  70, 
Aug.  59;  Motley,  Feb.  44;  Reagan, 
May  1,  Nov.  2;  Shultz,  May  12,  25,  32, 
July  35,  38,  Oct.  18,  Dec.  11; 
Wolfowitz,  Sept.  62 
Regional  conferences:  Alabama,  PR  64, 
2/28;  St.  Louis,  PR  136,  5/17;  Texas, 
PR  94,  4/2 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1952- 
195Jt,  Volume  I,  General:  Economic  and 
Political  Matters,  released,  June  93 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1952- 
195U,  Volume  IV,  The  American  Re- 
publics, released,  Feb.  52 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1952- 
1954,  Volume  XII,  Part  1,  East  Asia  and 
the  Pacific,  Multilateral  Relations, 
released,  Nov.  92 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1952- 
195i,  Volume  XV,  Korea,  released,  Aug. 
93 
Foreign  Service  (Malone),  Aug.  72 
Senior  Foreign  Service  Presidential  Award 
(Bartholomew),  ceremony  (Shultz),  PR 
202,  9/20 
Foreign  Service  Day,  1984  (Reagan,  Shultz), 

June  49 
France  (Reagan),  May  4 
Nuclear  testing  in  Pacific:  ANZUS,  Sept. 

19;  Cooper,  Sept.  24;  Hayden,  Sept.  24 
Overseas  departments,  current  status, 

Oct.  15 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Feb. 
46,  47,  May  87,  July  90,  Sept.  79,  Oct. 
51,  Nov.  86,  87 


France  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Mitterrand: 

Mitterrand,  June  57,  60;  Reagan,  June 
56,  59;  program,  PR  78,  3/20 
Visit  of  President  Reagan:  Aug.  7;  Reagan, 
Aug.  21,  23 
Friedman,  Milton  (Shultz),  PR  65,  3/6 


Gabon: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Feb. 

46,  Sept.  79,  Oct.  51 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request. 
May  36 
Gambia: 
Defense  articles  under  U.S.  IMET  pro- 
gram, bilateral  agreement.  Mar.  74 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Hennemeyer),  swearing 

in,  PR  137,  5/24 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request,  May  36 
Gardner,  Paul  F.,  swearing  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Papua  New  Guinea  and  Solomon 
Islands,  PR  185,  8/17 
(}emayel,  Amin,  Feb.  30 
General  Assembly,  U.N.:  Nov.  8,  PR  207, 
9/24;  Shultz,  PR  219,  10/12 
39th  session  (Reagan),  Nov.  1 
U.S.  delegation,  Nov.  4 
Geneva  conventions  (1949)  on  treatment  of 
armed  forces,  civilian  persons,  and 
prisoners  of  war:  Angola,  Belize,  Guinea, 
Dec.  90;  Vanatu,  Nov.  86;  Western 
Samoa,  Dec.  90 
Protocol  I  (1977)  re  protection  of  victims  of 
international  armed  conflicts:  Aug.  87; 
Angola,  Belize,  Dec.  91;  Bolivia,  May 
87;  Central  African  Republic,  Dec.  91; 
China,  Jan.  90;  Congo,  Feb.  46;  Costa 
Rica,  May  87;  Guinea,  Dec.  91; 
Namibia,  Feb.  46;  St.  Lucia,  Nov.  86; 
St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines,  Jan. 
90;  Syria,  Feb.  46;  Togo,  Western 
Samoa,  Dec.  91 
Protocol  II  (1977)  re  protection  of  victims 
of  noninternational  armed  conflicts: 
Angola,  Belize,  Dec.  91;  Bolivia,  May 
87;  Cameroon,  Aug.  87;  Central 
African  Republic,  Dec.  91;  China,  Jan. 
90;  Congo,  Feb.  46;  Costa  Rica, 
France,  May  87;  Guinea,  Dec.  91; 
Namibia,  Feb.  46;  Oman,  Aug.  87;  St. 
Lucia,  Nov.  86;  St.  Vincent  and  the 
Grenadines,  Jan.  90;  Togo,  Western 
Samoa,  Dec.  91 
Genocide  convention  (1948):  Maldives,  July 
89;  Tanzania,  June  86;  Togo,  Aug.  86 
U.S.  ratification  urged:  Abrams,  Nov.  66; 
Department,  Nov.  66 
Genscher,  Hans-Dietrich,  Feb.  10,  11,  12 
German  Democratic  Republic  (Shultz),  Nov. 

41,  Dec.  13 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of:  Burt,  Mar.  45; 
Reagan,  May  4;  Shultz,  July  22 
Profile,  June  54 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  Apr. 

79,  June  87,  July  88,  Oct.  50,  Nov.  86 
U.S.  relations:  Genscher,  Feb.  10;  Shultz, 
Feb.  10 


Germany,  Federal  Republic  of  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  visits  of  Chancellor  Kohl:  Kohl,  June 
54;  Reagan,  June  53;  programs,  PR  63, 
2/28,  PR  254,  11/28 
Ghana  (Dam),  Mar.  12 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Feb.  46 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance:  May 
36;  Crocker,  Jan.  40;  Lyman,  May  46 
Glenn,  John  H.,  Jr.,  Nov.  4 
Goodby,  James  E.:  Oct.  21;  Shultz,  Mar.  35 

Biography,  Oct.  22 
Goodman,  Robert:  Dam,  Feb.  28;  Reagan, 

Feb.  8;  Shultz,  PR  65,  3/6 
Greece  {see  also  Cyprus),  NATO,  Feb.  23 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  Mar. 
74,  May  88,  June  87,  Aug.  87,  Sept. 
78,  Oct.  50 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 
May  34;  Burt,  May  59,  60;  Shultz,  May 
21,  26,  28 
Grenada:  Mar.  71,  Oct.  11;  Dam,  Dec.  72,  PR 
227,  10/17;  Eagleburger,  Apr.  41; 
Kirkpatrick,  Aug.  61;  Motley,  Mar.  70, 
Oct.  3;  Reagan,  Mar.  3,  72,  Sept.  1,  2; 
Shultz,  Jan.  27,  Apr.  19,  May  19,  Dec. 
15,  PR  235,  10/22 
Caribbean  peace  forces,  appropriations  re- 
quest: Schneider,  May  76;  Shultz,  May 
29 
Economic,  technical,  and  related  assistance 

agreement  with  U.S.,  Oct.  51 
Status  of  U.S.  forces,  bilateral  agreement, 

June  87 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  74,  Aug. 

88,  Sept.  79,  Oct.  51 
U.S.  action,  human  rights  implications  for 

(Abrams),  Feb.  24 
U.S.  objectives,  role:  Dam,  Jan.  84,  85; 

Motley,  Feb.  45;  Reagan,  Jan.  25,  Feb. 

45,  Mar,  2,  May  2;  Shultz,  Apr.  23,  24, 
26,  27,  May  14,  16,  PR  50,  2/22 

U.S.  peacekeeping  force,  commodities  and 
services,  bilateral  agreements:  Antigua 
and  Barbuda,  Sept.  78;  Barbados, 
Dominica,  Aug.  87;  Jamaica,  Oct.  51; 
St.  Christopher-Nevis,  May  88;  St. 
Lucia,  St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines, 
Aug.  88 
Guam  (Reagan),  Aug.  64 
Guatemala:  Oct.  11;  Dam,  Jan.  85;  Michel, 
Jan.  87;  Motley,  Feb.  44,  Aug.  77,  82; 
Pickering,  Apr.  77;  Shultz,  Apr.  19 
Elections:  Dam,  Dec.  72;  Motley,  Oct.  1; 

White  House,  Sept.  71 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Feb. 

46,  47,  June  86,  Oct.  51,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Motley, 
June  77;  Reagan,  Mar.  72;  Shultz,  May 
28 

Guinea: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  88,  Sept. 

79,  Oct.  51,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request,  May  36 
Guinea-Bissau,  U.S.  economic  and  security  as 
sistance,  appropriations  request:  May  36; 
Lyman,  May  46 
Guyana,  Oct.  12 
UNIDO  Constitution  (1979),  signature, 

Sept.  78 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 


H 


iaass,  Richard  N.,  Jan.  52 
laiti,  Oct.  12 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  47, 

July  88,  90.  Aug.  88,  Oct.  51,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  Ambassador  (McManaway),  swearing 

in,  PR  193,  8/28 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request;  May  34;  Reagan, 
Mar.  72 
lart,  Samuel  Friedlander,  swearing  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Ecuador,  PR  180,  8/14 
iayden,  Bill,  Sept.  21 
lealth  and  medical  research: 
Naval  Medical  Research  Institute,  estab- 
lishment and  operation,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Peru,  Feb.  48 
Technology  transfer  (McPherson),  May  62, 

65 
World  Health  Organization,  Nov.  15 
Constitution  (1946);  Antigua  and  Bar- 
buda, June  87;  Kiribati,  Oct.  51 
Amendments  to  Articles  24  and  25; 
Algeria,  Feb.  47;  Canada,  Apr. 
80;  entry  into  force,  Apr.  80; 
Cook  Islands.  Aug.  87;  Malaysia, 
Apr.  80 
lelms,  Jesse  (Shultz),  PR  235,  10/22 
lenn,  Lisa  Zanatta  (Reagan),  Aug.  23 
lennemeyer,  Robert  T..  swearing  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Gambia.  PR  137,  5/24 
lillery,  Patrick  J.,  Aug.  20 
Mocaust  (Shultz),  PR  200,  9/17 
ionduras:  Oct.  12;  Dam,  Jan.  81,  85,  Mar. 
12,  Dec.  72;  Kirkpatrick.  Aug.  60,  61; 
Michel,  Jan.  87,  June  81;  Motley,  Feb. 
44,  Aug.  77,  80,  Oct.  1;  Reagan.  May  10; 
Shultz,  Apr.  19,  PR  107,  4/6 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  79,  80, 

May  87,  Sept.  79 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Michel, 
June  82;  Motley,  June  77;  Reagan, 
Mar.  72;  Schneider,  May  76;  Shultz, 
May  24,  28 
long  Kong;  Eagleburger,  Apr.  40;  Shultz, 

PR  114,  4/19;  Wallis,  Aug.  51 
Textile  agreement  with  U.S.,  June  87 
U.K. -China  agreement  (Shultz),  Nov.  56, 

PR  192,  8/23 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Sept.  7 
luman  rights: 
Africa  (Abrams),  Nov.  62 
American  convention  (1969).  current  ac- 
j  tions,  Argentina,  Dec.  90 

Baltic  States  (Abrams),  July  77 
Bill  of  Rights  Day.  Human  Rights  Day  and 
Week.  1983.  proclamation  (Reagan). 
Jan.  59 
Civil  and  political  rights,  international 
covenant  (1966):  Cameroon.  Sept.  78; 
Togo.  Aug.  86;  Zambia.  July  89 
Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Prac- 
tices for  1983,  released,  Apr.  53 
Cuba  (Abrams),  Sept.  53 
Economic,  social,  and  cultural  rights,  inter- 
national covenant  (1966):  Cameroon, 
Sept.  78;  Togo,  Aug.  86;  Zambia,  July 
89 


Human  rights  (Cont'd) 
Europe;  NAC.  July  10;  Reagan,  July  29; 

Shultz,  Mar.  35 
Fundamental  to  U.S.  foreign  policy:  Apr. 

53;  Abrams,  Feb.  26;  Dam,  Dec.  72; 

Reagan.  May  7,  Nov.  2;  Shultz.  Apr. 

15.  32.  Dec,  10.  12 
Grenada  (Abrams),  Feb.  24 
Latin  America;  Abrams,  Jan.  55;  Michel, 

Jan.  57;  Motley,  Oct.  4 
Nicaragua:  Abrams,  Sept.  49;  Middendorf, 

Sept.  69;  Shultz,  PR  242A,  10/29 
South  Africa:  Abrams,  Sept.  56;  Crocker, 

Jan.  42,  43;  Reagan,  Nov.  3;  Shultz, 

Apr.  17,  18,  July  37,  Dec.  8,  PR  219. 

10/12 
Soviet  Union:  Oct.  36;  Abrams,  July  78; 

Bush.  July  2;  Cheysson.  July  3; 

Reagan.  Feb.  4.  Aug.  8,  18,  Sept.  41, 

42;  Shultz,  July  36,  Dec.  2,  4,  11; 

White  House,  Sept.  44 
U.N.  conventions,  committees,  Nov.  20 
U.N.  declaration,  35th  anniversary 

(Reagan),  Feb.  5 
Zaire  (Abrams),  Sept.  55 
Hungary:  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  79, 

80,  May  88,  June  87,  July  89,  Sept.  78 
Hunt,  Leamon  R.  (Shultz),  June  49 
Hussein,  King  of  Jordan,  Apr.  62,  63 


Iceland  (Shultz),  July  20 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Nov. 

87,  Dec.  90 

U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request, 

May  34 
India  (Wallis),  Mar.  30 
Maharashtra  minor  irrigation  and  hill  areas 

land  and  water  development  projects 

agreements.  Nov.  87 
Prime  Minister  Gandhi,  funeral  (Shultz). 

PR  246.  11/5 
Scientific  cooperation  with  U.S.  (Malone), 

Aug.  72 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  May 

88,  Sept.  79,  Oct.  51,  Nov.  87 

U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  35; 
Schaffer,  May  77,  78 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush,  Aug.  26,  27 
Indian  Ocean-Persian  Gulf:  Aug.  4,  5; 
ANZUS,  Sept.  20;  Armacost,  July  80; 
Bush,  Aug.  29;  Crocker,  Jan.  39,  42; 
Hayden,  Sept.  23;  Murphy,  Mar.  56,  May 
66,  69,  70,  Oct.  37;  Reagan,  Apr.  4,  May 
4,  7,  July  30,  31;  Security  Council  resolu- 
tion, Aug.  74;  Shultz,  May  21,  25,  27,  39, 
July  14,  15,  22;  Sorzano,  Aug.  73 
Soviet  role  (Shultz),  July  16,  PR  147,  6/5, 
PR  148,  6/8,  PR  217,  10/12 
Indonesia  (Wallis),  Aug.  51 
East  Timor  (Shultz),  Sept.  18 
Science  and  technology  agreement,  renew- 
al, PR  161,  7/11 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  74,  Apr. 
80,  May  87,  June  87,  Sept.  79,  Oct.  51, 
Nov.  86,  87 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  35;  Shultz, 
May  26,  28;  Wolfowitz,  May  53,  54,  55 


Indonesia  (Cont'd) 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz  (Shultz),  PR  167, 

7/18,  PR  173,  7/23 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush,  Aug.  26 
Industrial  property; 
Nice  agreement  (1957.  as  revised),  Bel- 
gium, Dec.  90 
Protection  of  (convention  of  Paris,  1883,  as 
revised)  (1967);  Iceland,  Dec.  90;  New 
Zealand,  July  89;  Rwanda,  Apr.  79 
Inter-American  Development  Bank  (Shultz), 

May  30 
Inter-American  Foundation  (lAF)  (Shultz), 

May  30 
Inter- American  Investment  Corporation 

(Shultz),  May  30 
Interdependence  of  modern  world:  Shultz, 
Apr.  9,  May  32,  June  33;  Wallis,  Mar.  30 
Economic:  Aug.  3,  Nov.  23;  Burns,  July  55; 
Reagan,  Nov.  60;  Shultz,  Sept.  15 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency:  Nov. 
19,  23,  Dec.  50;  Adelman,  July  43; 
Newell,  May  86;  Shultz.  May  31,  Dec.  18, 
23 
International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development  (World  Bank):  Dam,  Dec. 
71;  Lyman,  May  43;  Motley,  Aug.  76, 
Oct.  6;  Reagan,  Nov.  26;  Shultz,  Mar.  7, 
Apr.  10;  Wallis,  Mar.  30,  July  54 
Articles  of  agreement  (1944);  Mozambique, 
Dec.  90;  St.  Christopher-Nevis.  Oct.  50 
Bretton  Woods  agreements,  40th  anni- 
versary (McCormack),  Sept.  38 
U.S.  contributions  (Shultz),  May  21,  30 
International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 

(Purcell),  Feb.  33 
International  Court  of  Justice,  Nov.  14 
Gulf  of  Maine  case,  Nov.  14 

Set  for  argument:  PR  72,  3/8;  Depart- 
ment, Dec.  58;  Shultz,  Dec.  59 
Nicaraguan  complaint  against  U.S.:  Depart- 
ment, June  78;  Reagan,  June  27 
Statute  (1945),  signature,  Brunei,  Nov.  86 
International  Development  Association: 

McCormack,  Sept.  40;  Shultz,  May  21.  30 
International  Labor  Organization  (ILO),  Nov. 
21 
Constitution  (1946),  instrument  for  amend- 
ment, acceptance.  Solomon  Islands, 
Dec.  90 
U.S.  income  tax  reimbursement  proce- 
dures, bilateral  agreement,  Aug.  88 
International  Law  Digest,  1979,  released, 

June  94 
International  Monetary  Fund:  Bums,  July  59; 
Dam,  Dec.  71;  Motley,  Aug.  76,  Oct.  6; 
Reagan,  Nov.  28;  Shultz,  Dec.  9;  WaUis, 
Mar.  30,  July  54 
Articles  of  agreement  (1944);  Mozambique, 
Dec.  90;  St.  Christopher-Nevis,  Oct.  50 
Bretton  Woods  agreements,  40th  anniver- 
sary (McCormack),  Sept.  38 
Special  drawing  rights,  Aug.  3 
U.S.  quota  increase:  Dam,  Feb.  19;  Motley, 
Feb.  43;  Reagan,  May  5 
Investment  incentive,  bilateral  agreements: 
Chile,  Cook  Islands,  July  89;  Mozam- 
bique, Oct.  52,  Nov.  87 
Investment  of  private  capital  abroad:  Jan.  12, 
Aug.  3;  Crocker,  Jan.  41;  Dam,  Dec.  71; 
McPherson,  May  62,  65;  Shultz,  Sept.  15 


ndex 1984 


Investment  of -private  capital  abroad  (Cont'd) 
Central  and  Latin  America;  Dam,  Jan.  81, 

85;  Motley,  Feb.  44,  Oct.  7 
China;  Brown,  Oct.  27;  Reagan,  June  4; 

Wolfowitz,  Sept.  27 
East  Asia  and  Pacific;  Brown,  Sept.  34; 
Shultz,  Sept.  8;  Wallis,  Aug.  52; 
Wolfowitz,  Sept.  31 
Ireland  (FitzGerald),  Aug.  13 
Korea,  Jan.  29 

Reciprocal  encouragement  and  protection, 
bilateral  agreements;  Haiti,  Feb.  47; 
Senegal,  Feb.  48;  Zaire,  Oct.  52 
Treaty  protection  (Robinson),  Jan.  60 
Iran;  Dam,  Dec.  73;  Eagleburger,  Mar.  51 
Customs  convention  on  international  trans- 
port of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR 
camets  (1975),  accession,  Dec.  90 
Nuclear  potential  (Adelman),  July  42 
U.S.  antiterrorism  export  controls  (Depart- 
ment), Nov.  68 
Iran-Iraq  war;  Adelman,  July  42;  ANZUS, 
Sept.  19;  Armacost,  July  80;  Depart- 
ment, Apr.  64;  Mubarak,  Apr.  64;  Mur- 
phy, Mar.  56,  May  69,  Oct.  37;  Reagan, 
Apr.  4,  May  7,  Nov.  4;  Shultz,  May  38, 
42  July  15,  37,  Dec.  8,  PR  147,  6/5,  PR 
148,  6/8,  PR  152,  6/13,  PR  155,  6/21; 
Sorzano,  Aug.  73 
Iraqi  use  of  chemical  weapons;  Dec.  45; 

Shultz,  Dec.  24 
London  economic  summit  statement,  Dec.  5 
Ireland; 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  May 

87,  June  87,  Sept.  78,  Oct.  51 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  FitzGerald, 

June  59 
Visit  of  President  Reagan,  July  31,  Aug. 
7,  8,  10,  12,  14,  15,  19 
Israel  (Shultz),  Apr.  17 
Antiterrorist  policies  (Shultz),  Dec.  15 
Economic  problems  (Shultz),  PR  242A, 

10/29 
Elections;  Murphy,  Oct.  38;  Shultz,  PR 

172,  7/23 
Energy  research  and  development,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  U.S.,  Aug.  88 
National  unity  government  (Shultz),  Nov. 

34,  PR  231A,  10/22 
Security  of,  importance;  Dam,  Dec.  74; 
Eagleburger,  Mar.  50;  Murphy,  Mar. 
56;  Reagan,  Dec.  75;  Shultz,  Jan.  34, 
37,  July  40,  Dec.  8,  15 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  Apr. 

79,  80,  May  87,  Aug.  88 
UPU  participation,  Arab  objectives  (De- 
partment), July  82 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request;  May  33; 
McPherson,  May  66;  Murphy,  May  67; 
Reagan,  Feb.  31;  Schneider,  May  75; 
Shamir,  Feb.  31;  Shultz,  May  20,  28, 
29,  32 
U.S.  embassy,  question  of  relocation; 

Eagleburger,  Apr.  65;  Shultz,  May  38, 
41,  PR  128,  5/11 
U.S.  relations;  Nov.  24;  Reagan,  May  6; 

Shultz,  Feb.  17 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Peres;  Peres, 
Dec.  75;  Reagan,  Dec.  74;  program, 
PR  211,  10/4 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Shamir; 
Reagan,  Feb.  30;  Shamir,  Feb.  31 


Italy: 
Red  Brigade  terrorists  (Shultz),  Dec.  13 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Mar. 

74  Apr.  80,  June  87,  July  88,  89,  90, 

Sept.  78,  79,  Oct.  51,  Nov.  86,  87,  Dec. 

91 
Ivory  Coast; 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  79,  June 

86 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request; 

May  36;  Shultz,  May  27 


Jackson,  Henry  (quoted),  Dec.  14 
Jackson,  Jesse  (Shultz),  PR  65,  3/6 
Jamaica;  Oct.  12;  Dam,  Jan.  85,  Mar.  12; 
DiCario,  Jan.  72 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May  87,  July 

88,  90,  Sept.  79,  Oct.  50,  51 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request;  May  34; 
Reagan,  Jan.  84 
Japan;  ANZUS,  Sept.  20;  Armacost,  Dec.  66, 
67;  Dam,  Oct.  36,  Dec.  70;  Shultz,  Dec. 
6;  Wolfowitz,  July  50 
Energy,  cooperation  with  U.S.;  Jan.  12; 

Wolfowitz,  Sept.  30 
Mutual  defense  assistance,  Japan's  financial 
contribution,  bilateral  agreement,  Oct. 
51 
Profile,  Jan.  3 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Feb. 
47,  May  88,  June  86,  Aug.  88,  Oct.  51, 
Nov.  86,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Mansfield),  biography, 

Jan.  5 
U.S.  economic  relations;  Brown,  Sept.  34; 
Dam,  Feb.  19,  20,  Mar.  11; 
Eagleburger,  Apr.  40;  Nakasone,  Jan. 
4;  Reagan,  Jan.  5,  6,  11,  18,  30,  Mar. 
15  (quoted),  May  4,  10,  Aug.  6;  Shultz, 
Sept.  3;  Wallis,  Mar.  28,  29,  30,  July 
66,  Aug.  50;  Wolfowitz,  Sept.  28 
U.S.  relations;  Reagan,  Jan.  7;  Shultz, 

July  36;  Wolfowitz,  Sept.  28 
U.S.  security  assistance;  Nakasone,  Jan. 

4;  Reagan,  Jan.  4,  10 
U.S.  visit  of  Foreign  Minister  Abe;  Dam, 

Feb.  20,  Mar.  14;  Shultz,  PR  20,  1/27 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Nakasone,  pro- 
gram, PR  268,  12/26 
Visit  of  President  Reagan;  Dam,  Mar.  14; 

Nakasone,  Jan,  1,  3;  Reagan,  Jan.  1 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush,  Aug.  25 
Yen  exchange  rate;  Regan,  July  59; 
Wolfowitz,  Sept.  30 
Jayewardene,  J.  R.,  Sept.  65,  66,  68 
Jordan,  David  Crichton,  swearing  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Peru,  PR  187,  8/20 
Jordan  (Murphy),  Oct.  38 
U.S  economic  and  military  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request;  May  33;  Murphy, 
May  67,  69;  Schneider,  May  76;  Shultz, 
May  20,  25,  28,  37,  38,  July  42 
U.S.  visit  of  King  Hussein;  Hussein, 

Reagan,  Apr.  62,  63;  program,  PR  42, 
2/10 
Judicial  matters; 
Conflicts  of  jurisdiction  (Shultz),  June  33 
Execution  of  penal  sentences,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Thailand,  Oct.  52, 
Nov.  87 


Judicial  matters  (Cont'd) 
Letters  rogatory,  inter- American  conven- 
tion (1979);  Mexico,  Feb.  46; 
Venezuela,  Dec.  90 
Mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters,  bi- 
lateral agreements;  Italy,  Sept.  79, 
Oct.  51;  Morocco,  Sept.  79 
Transfer  of  sentenced  persons,  convention 
(1983);  Cyprus,  May  87;  France,  Sept 
79;  U.K.,  Apr.  79;  U.S.,  Sept.  78 
Jute  and  jute  products,  international  agree- 
ment (1982);  Australia,  July  89;  Egypt, 
Mar.  73;  Finland,  July  89;  Indonesia, 
Nepal,  Nov.  86;  Pakistan,  July  89; 
Switzerland,  Oct.  50;  Thailand,  Turkey, 
U.K.,  Mar.  73 


K 


Kampuchea;  June  63;  Armacost,  Dec.  67; 
Shultz,  Sept.  7,  13,  Oct.  20,  PR  114, 
4/19,  PR  163,  7/13,  PR  167,  7/18,  PR 
221,  10/15;  Wolfowitz,  Oct.  26,  Nov.  51 
ASEAN  proposals  for  negotiated  settle- 
ment; ANZUS,  Sept.  20;  Reagan,  Nov 
4;  Shultz,  Sept.  4,  10,  Dec.  8;  Wallis, 
Aug.  50;  Wolfowitz,  Nov.  52 
Racial  discrimination,  elimination,  inter- 
national convention  (1965),  ratificatioi 
Feb.  46 
Kennedy,  Richard  T.,  Oct.  40 
Kenya  (Dam),  Mar.  12 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  88,  Nov. 

87 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Crockei 
Jan.  39;  Lyman,  May  45,  47,  48; 
Shultz,  May  27,  28 
Keogh,  Dennis  W.  (Shultz),  June  49 
King,  Barrington,  swearing  in  as  Ambassad( 

to  Brunei,  PR  115,  4/19 
Kirchschlager,  Rudolf,  June  50,  52 
Kiribati  (Reagan),  Aug.  63 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Feb. 

46,  Oct.  50,  51 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Dillery),  swearing  in, 
PR  215,  10/11 
Kirkpatrick,  Jeane  J.: 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Doctrine  of  moral  equivalence,  Aug.  57 
NATO  and  U.S.  national  interests,  July 

70 
U.S.  participation  in  United  Nations, 
report,  Apr.  68 
U.S.  Representative  to  U.N.  39th  General 
Assembly,  Nov.  4 
Knepper,  William  E.,  Aug.  53 
Kohl,  Helmut,  June  54 
Korea,  Democractic  People's  Republic, 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations 
accession,  Nov.  86 
Korea,  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1952-195J,,  Volume  XV,  Korea, 
released,  Aug.  93 
Korea,  Republic  of:  Armacost,  Dec.  66; 

Brown,  Sept.  34;  Eagleburger,  Apr.  40; 
Reagan,  Jan.  2;  Shultz,  Apr.  17,  19 
Democratic  progress:  Jan.  28;  Reagan, 

Jan.  22,  23;  Shultz,  Jan.  27;  Wolfowitit 
Mar.  18 
Profile,  Jan.  20 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletli 


Korea,  Republic  of  (Cont'd) 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  47  Aug 

86,  Oct.  50,  51 
U.N.  membership,  proposed,  Jan.  28 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Walker),  biography  Jan 

21 
U.S.  consulate  at  Pusan,  proposed,  Jan.  29 
U.S.  economic  relations:  Jan.  28;  Reagan, 

Jan.  21,  30;  Wallis,  Mar.  30 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance:  Jan. 
28,  May  35;  Reagan,  Jan.  18,  21,  23, 
24,  30;  Shultz,  Jan.  26,  27,  May  21,  23 
26,  28,  29;  Wolfowitz,  May  54,  57 
U.S.  relations:  Adelman,  July  43;  Shultz, 
June  37,  Sept.  4;  Wolfowitz,  Mar.  16 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Chun,  proposed, 

Jan.  29 
Visit  of  President  Reagan,  Jan.  17,  27 
Visit  of  Secretary  of  State  Shultz  (Shultz), 
June  37 
Corean  peninsula:  ANZUS,  Sept.  20; 

Nakasone,  Jan.  4;  Reagan,  Jan.  22,  Nov. 
4;  Shultz,  Mar.  6,  Dec.  8,  PR  114,  4/19, 
PR  117,  4/23,  PR  128,  5/11;  Wallis,  Aug. 
50;  Wolfowfitz,  Mar.  19,  July  50 
ioi|Cuwait,  TIR  camets,  customs  convention 
(1975),  accession,  Feb.  46 


jamb,  Denis,  July  63 
laos:  June  63;  Taylor,  May  74 
Emergency  food  aid  (Wolfowitz),  Oct.  26 
POW's  and  MIA's  issue  (Wolfowitz),  May 

57,  Oct.  25 
atin  America  (see  also  Organization  of 
American  States  and  names  of  in- 
dividual countries): 
Atlas  of  Caribbean  Basin,  Nov.  71 
Caribbean  and  Central  America: 

Central  American  Development  Orga- 
nization, proposed:  McPherson,  May 
65;  Motley,  Apr.  73,  June  79; 
Reagan,  Apr.  71,  75,  June  25; 
Shultz,  May  19 
Contadora  process:  Dam,  Dec.  72; 
Michel,  Jan.  88,  June  84;  Motley, 
Mar.  67,  June  77,  Aug.  83,  Oct.  7, 
8;  Reagan,  Apr.  75,  June  22,  27,  Ju- 
ly 29,  85;  Shultz,  Jan.  38,  85,  Feb. 
12,  Apr.  14,  19,  20,  21,  26,  May  19, 
June  67,  68,  July  39,  84,  Sept.  13, 
PR  214,  10/11 
Draft  treaty  (acta):  Shultz,  Dec.  7,  88, 
89.  90,  PR  207,  9/24,  PR  224, 
10/15,  PR  231A,  10/22 
Democratic  progress:  Dam,  Jan.  80,  84, 
Dec.  72;  Michel,  Jan.  87;  Motley, 
Aug.  77.  Oct.  1;  Reagan,  July  27, 
Sept.  1;  Shultz,  Apr.  15,  20,  May 
19,  Oct.  19,  Dec.  15 
National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Cen- 
tral America,  and  recommendations: 
McPherson,  May  62,  63,  64;  Michel, 
Jan.  88;  Motley,  Mar.  66,  Apr.  72, 
June  74,  Aug.  79,  Oct.  7;  Reagan, 
Mar.  1,  2,  Apr.  71,  May  3,  4,  11, 
June  22,  25,  July  28,  29;  Schneider, 
May  75;  Shultz,  Mar.  4,  41,  Apr.  14, 
21,  22,  27,  May  17,  18,  23,  25,  June 
72,  July  37,  Dec.  90 


idex  1984 


Latin  America  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  34; 
McPherson,  May  64,  66;  Motley, 
June  77;  Schneider,  May  76;  Shultz, 
May  18,  23,  25 
U.S.  policy,  objectives:  Dam,  Jan.  80,  83; 
Kirkpatrick,  Aug.  59;  Michel,  Jan. 
87,  June  81;  Motley,  Mar.  67,  June 
74,  Aug.  77;  Reagan,  Mar.  2,  June 
22,  27,  July  29,  Sept.  1,  Nov.  4; 
Shultz,  Feb.  11,  Mar.  41,  42,  Apr. 
25,  May  14,  18,  42,  June  67,  July 
37,  39,  Nov.  34,  40,  Dec.  7,  PR  98 
4/4,  PR  124,  5/7;  White  House,  June 
85 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative:  Dam,  Jan.  81, 
85;  Michel,  Jan.  87;  Motley,  Feb.  44, 
Aug.  75,  Oct.  6;  Reagan,  Jan.  84,  Mar. 
72,  May  4,  July  28,  Sept.  1;  Shultz, 
Mar.  41,  Apr.  27,  Dec.  90,  PR  228 
10/18 
Central  American  Democracy,  Peace,  and 
Development  Initiative,  proposed: 
Motley,  Apr.  72,  June  76;  Reagan, 
Apr.  71,  75,  May  3,  11,  June  25; 
Shultz,  June  67,  74 
Democratic  progress:  Apr.  58;  Motley,  Oct. 
1;  Reagan,  May  5,  June  25,  July  27, 
Aug.  18;  Shultz,  Apr.  19,  26,  July  36, 
PR  114,  4/19,  PR  125,  5/8,  PR  214, 
10/11 
Drug  control  programs:  Oct.  39;  Motley, 
Oct.  4;  Shultz,  Nov.  31 
Appropriations  requests:  Shultz,  May  30; 
Taylor,  May  72,  75 
Economic  problems:  Bums,  July  55; 

Motley,  Oct.  4;  Shultz,  PR  125,  5/8,  PR 
155,  6/21 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1952-195J,,  Volume  TV,  The  American 
Republics,  released,  Feb.  52 
Nuclear  weapons,  prohibition  (Treaty  of 
Tlatelolco  and  protocols):  Dec.  51; 
Adelman,  July  44 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request.  May  35 
U.S.  interests,  policy,  role:  Dec.  25;  Michel, 
Jan.  57;  Motley,  Feb.  43;  Reagan,  Jan. 
57  (quoted),  July  27,  29;  Shultz,  May 
25 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush:  Bush,  Feb. 
9;  Reagan,  Feb.  6 
Lebanon:  DiCarlo,  Jan.  73;  Mubarak,  Apr. 
64;  Shultz,  Feb.  11,  Apr.  24,  July  37,  PR 
38,  2/8,  PR  50,  2/22,  PR  65,  3/6,  PR  217, 
10/12,  PR  218,  10/12;  White  House,  Jan. 
69 
Beirut  embassy  bombing  incidents  and 
other  terrorist  activities;  Dam,  Dec. 
73;  Department,  Nov.  67;  Reagan, 
Feb.  6,  8;  Shultz,  Apr.  30,  32,  May  16, 
20,  41,  Nov.  43,  Dec.  9,  12,  15,  PR 
202,  9/20,  PR  203,  9/20,  PR  204,  9/20, 
PR  205,  9/20,  PR  221,  10/15,  PR  230, 
10/18 


Lebanon  (Cont'd) 
Israel-Lebanon  security  treaty  of  May  17: 
Dam,  Feb.  27;  Murphy,  Mar.  54; 
Reagan,  Mar.  53;  Shultz,  Jan.  32 
Abrogation:  Department,  Apr.  61;  Eagle- 
burger,  Apr.  37;  Reagan,  May  7; 
Shultz,  Apr.  31 
Reconciliation  process:  Dam,  Feb.  27; 
Gemayel,  Feb.  30;  Murphy,  Mar.  55, 
Oct.  38;  Nakasone,  Jan.  4;  Nimeiri, 
Jan.  45;  Reagan,  Jan.  10,  Feb.  5,  7,  29, 
31,  Mar.  47,  52;  Shamir,  Feb.  31; 
Shultz,  Jan.  32,  Feb.  15,  Mar.  31,  32 
Syrian  role:  Dam,  Feb.  28;  Eagleburger, 
Mar.  50,  Apr.  36;  Murphy,  Mar.  55; 
Shamir,  Feb.  31;  Shultz,  Jan.  27,  33, 
Mar.  5,  7,  34,  Apr.  13,  29; 
Weinburger,  Apr.  60 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  87,  Oct.  50 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  33;  Murphy, 
May  66,  69;  Reagan,  May  68;  Shultz, 
May  20,  25 
U.S.  Marines:  Jan.  28;  Dam,  Feb.  28; 
Eagleburger,  Mar.  49,  Apr.  35; 
Murphy,  Mar.  54,  55;  Reagan,  Jan.  19, 
Feb.  5,  6,  7,  28,  Mar.  1,  48,  52,  Apr.  2, 
4,  60,  May  9,  68;  Shultz,  Jan.  32,  33, 
36,  37,  Mar.  31,  49,  Apr.  13,  22,  29, 
30,  PR  235,  10/22;  Weinberger,  Apr. 
59 
U.S.  objectives,  role:  Dam,  Feb.  27; 
Eagleburger,  Mar.  51;  Kirkpatrick, 
Aug.  59;  Murphy,  Mar.  54;  Reagan, 
Mar.  47,  May  7,  Nov.  4;  Shultz,  Jan. 
35,  36,  Feb.  17,  Mar.  37,  48,  Apr.  29, 
May  13,  37,  41,  42,  July  40,  Dec.  8 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Gemayel:  Gemayel, 
Feb.  30;  Reagan,  Feb.  29 
Lesotho:  Crocker,  Jan.  43;  Shultz,  Apr.  11 
Common  Fund  for  Commodities  agreement 

(1980),  Feb.  46 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Abbott),  swearing  in,  PR 

133,  5/15 
U.S.  economic  assistance,  appropriations 
request.  May  36 
Levit,  William  H.,  Jr.,  Substitute  Arbitrator 
on  Iran-United  States  Claims  Tribunal, 
appointment,  PR  86,  3/22 
Liberia  (Shultz),  Apr.  18 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Apr. 

80,  July  89,  Sept.  78,  Oct.  51,  Nov.  86 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  36;  Lyman, 
May  44,  45,  46;  Shultz,  May  27 
Libya:  Dec.  25;  Crocker,  Jan.  39;  Dam,  Dec. 
73;  Eagleburger,  Mar.  51;  Lyman,  May 
46,  47;  Shultz,  May  20,  39,  Dec.  13,  14, 
20,  PR  114,  4/19,  PR  128,  5/11,  PR 
242A,  10/29 
U.S.  travel  restrictions,  PR  6,  1/6 
Liechtenstein,  ratification  of  long-range 
transboundary  air  pollution  convention 
(1979),  Mar.  74 
Load  lines,  international  convention  (1966): 
Accession,  United  Arab  Emirates,  Aug.  86 
Amendments  (1979):  Bulgaria,  Canada, 

Aug.  86 
Amendments  (1983),  Aug.  86 
Lukens,  Alan  W.,  swearing  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Congo,  PR  186,  8/17 


11 


Luns,  Joseph  M.A.H.,  July  5,  26;  NAC, 
July  11 
U.S.  Medal  of  Freedom  Award:  Luns,  July 
7;  Reagan,  July  6 
Luxembourg: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  73,  74, 

Aug.  87 
U.S.  visit  of  Grand  Duke  Jean,  program, 
PR  248,  11/7 
Lyman,  Princeton,  May  43 


M 


Macao,  textile  agreement  with  U.S.,  Apr.  80 
MacEachen,  Allan,  PR  96,  4/3 
Madagascar  (Shultz),  Mar.  8 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  May 

88,  Sept.  79 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Lyman, 
May  47 
Mahathir  bin  Mohamad,  Mar.  26 
Malawi  (Shultz),  Apr.  11 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  May 

87,  July  89,  Aug.  88,  Sept.  78 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Adams),  swearing  in,  PR 

160,  7/10 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request,  May  36 
Malaysia:  Shultz,  Sept.  8,  16;  Wallis,  Aug.  50 
Profile,  Mar.  26 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  80,  May 

87 
U.S.  assistance,  proposed:  May  35;  Shultz, 

May  26;  Wolfowitz,  May  56 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Mahathir,  Mar. 
26;  Reagan,  Mar.  25;  program,  PR  13, 
1/13 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz  (Shultz),  Sept.  7, 
PR  163,  7/13 
Maldives: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  July  89 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request. 
May  35 
Mali: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  87,  July 

88 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  36;  Lyman, 
May  46 
Mally,  Gerhard,  Jan.  49 
Malone,  James  L.,  Aug.  71,  Dec.  76 
Mansfield,  Michael  J.,  biography,  Jan.  5 
Marine  pollution.  See  Environmental  prob- 
lems and  control  ajid  Oil  pollution 
Maritime  boundaries: 
Bilateral  agreements:  Cook  Islands,  Jan. 
91;  Cuba,  Mar.  74;  New  Zealand,  Jan. 
91 
Gulf  of  Maine  dispute,  set  for  argument  be- 
fore ICJ,  PR  72,  3/8 
ICJ  ruling;  Clark,  Dec.  58;  Department, 
Dec.  58;  Shultz,  Dec.  59 
U.S. -Soviet  boundary  off  Alaska:  Reagan, 
Sept.  41;  White  House,  Sept.  44 
Maritime  matters; 
Carriage  of  goods  by  sea,  convention 

(1978),  ratification,  Hungary,  Sept.  78 


Maritime  Matters  (Cont'd) 
International  Maritime  Organization,  Nov. 
23 
Convention  (1948),  accession,  Vietnam, 
Sept.  78 
Amendments  (1977):  Dominican  Re- 
public, Mozambique,  Jan.  90 
Amendments  (1979):  Algeria,  Brazil, 
Cuba,  Dominica,  Dominican 
Republic,  Gabon,  Ghana,  Mozam- 
bique, Singapore,  Uruguay, 
Yemen  (Sanaa),  Jan.  90 
Jurisdiction  over  vessels  utilizing  Louisiana 
offshore  oil  port,  bilateral  agreements: 
Bahamas,  June  87;  Belgium,  Feb.  47; 
Gabon,  Oct.  51;  Poland,  June  87; 
Singapore,  Apr.  81;  Spain,  Feb,  48; 
Turkey,  June  88 
Maritime  search  and  rescue,  international 
convention  (1979):  Australia,  Barbados, 
Aug.  86 
Maritime  transport,  bilateral  agreements: 
Bulgaria,  May  88;  Romania,  Dec.  91 
Ocean  carriage  of  government-controlled 
cargoes,  access,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Brazil,  Jan.  91 
Marks,  Leonard  H.,  Feb.  34 
Marshall  Islands:  Reagan,  May  74;  Wolfowitz, 

May  58;  PR  95,  4/3 
Masire,  Quett  K.J.,  June  38 
Mathias,  Charles  McC,  Nov.  4 
Mauritania,  U.S.  assistance,  appropriations 
request:  May  36;  Crocker,  Jan.  39; 
Lyman,  May  46 
Mauritius  (Crocker),  Jan.  41 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Sept.  78,  Oct. 

51 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request,  May  34 
McCormack,  Richard  T.,  Sept.  38,  39 
McFarlane,  Robert  C.  (Shultz),  Jan.  27 
McManaway,  Clayton  E.,  Jr.,  swearing  in  as 

Ambassador  to  Haiti,  PR  193,  8/28 
McPherson,  M.  Peter,  May  62,  Oct.  31 
Meteorology: 
Cooperation,  bilateral  agreements: 

Bahamas,  June  87;  Mexico,  May  88 
World  Meteorological  Organization,  Nov. 
15,  23 
Voluntary  Cooperation  Program 
(Newell),  May  86 
Mexico:  Oct.  12;  Motley,  Oct.  1 
Drug  control  efforts:  Oct.  39;  DiCarlo, 

Jan.  71;  Taylor,  May  72,  73 
Economic  problems:  Dam,  Dec.  71; 

De  la  Madrid,  July  86;  Motley,  Feb.  43, 
Oct.  6 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  47, 
Apr.  80,  May  88,  July  88,  89,  90,  Aug. 
88,  Sept.  78,  Nov.  87,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 

May  35;  Shultz,  May  30 
U.S.  visit  of  President  De  la  Madrid 
Hurtado:  De  la  Madrid,  July  85,  86, 
87,  88;  Reagan,  July  85,  86,  87,  88; 
Shultz,  July  41,  Dec.  5;  program,  PR 
127,  5/11 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz:  Dec.  87; 
Shultz,  Dec.  89 


Michel,  James  H.,  Jan.  57,  87,  June  81 
Micronesia,  Federated  States  of:  Reagan, 

May  74,  Aug.  64;  Wolfowitz,  May  58,  PRl 
95,  4/3 
Middendorf,  J.  William  II,  Sept.  69 
Middle  East  (see  also  Arab-Israeli  conflict, 
Indian  Ocean-Persian  Gulf,  and  names  of 
individual  countries):  Dec.  25;  Armacost  i 
July  80;  Eagleburger,  Mar.  50;  Murphy, 
Oct.  37;  Reagan,  Jan.  15,  Feb.  3,  May  4, 
7,  Nov.  4;  Shultz,  July  37,  40,  42,  PR 
152,  6/13,  PR  221,  10/15 
Arab  position,  role  (Shultz),  PR  242A, 

10/29 
Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (Shultz),  PR  217, 

10/12 
Soviet  role,  question  of:  Dec.  25;  Reagan, 

Feb.  4;  Shultz,  Sept.  10,  PR  207,  9/24 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  33; 
Murphy,  May  66;  Shultz,  May  21 
Migration  assistance.  See  Refugees:  U.S. 

assistance 
Military  information,  general  security  of, 
bilateral  agreements:  Panama,  Nov.  87; 
Singapore,  Apr.  81;  Spain,  May  88 
Military  personnel,  exchange,  bilateral  agree- 
ments: Norway,  Mar.  74;  U.K.,  Feb.  48 
Miller,  David  C,  Jr.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Zimbabwe,  PR  116,  4/23 
Mitterrand,  Francois,  June  57,  60 
Monaco:  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Aug.  86 
Monjo,  John  C,  Apr.  37 
Montserrat  (Reagan),  Mar.  72 
Morocco  (DiCarlo):  Jan.  73 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  81,  Sept. 

79,  Oct.  51,  Nov.  87 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  34; 
Murphy,  May  67,  70;  Schneider,  May 
75,  76;  Shultz,  May  25,  28 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Karim- 

Lamrani:  June  60;  program,  PR  57, 
2/27 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Feb.  10,  17 
Mosk,  Richard  M.,  Substitute  Arbitrator, 
Iran-U.S.  Claims  Tribunal,  appointment, 
PR  84,  3/22 
Motley,  Langhome  A.,  Feb.  43;  Mar.  58, 
67,  70,  Apr.  72,  June  74,  Aug.  74,  77, 
Oct.  1 
Mozambique:  Crocker,  Jan.  40,  42,  43;  Dam, 
Dec.  72;  Lyman,  May  48;  Reagan,  May  4 
Shultz,  Apr.  11,  May  38,  July  37 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Feb. 
46,  Oct.  52,  Nov.  87,  Dec.  90 
Mubarak,  Mohamed  Hosni,  Apr.  63 
Muldoon,  Robert  C,  June  64 
Mulroney,  Brian,  Dec.  54 
Multilateral  development  banks,  U.S.  contri- 
butions: May  33;  McPherson,  May  66; 
Shultz,  May  21,  24,  30 
Murphy,  Richard  W.,  Mar.  54,  May  66,  Oct. 
37 
Biography,  Mar.  55 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin: 


N 


Nakasone,  Yasuhiro,  Jan.  1,  3 

Namibia:  Crocker,  Jan.  38,  42;  Dam,  Dec. 
72;  Kirkpatrick,  Aug.  59;  Lyman,  May 
43,  48;  Mubarak,  Apr.  64;  Reagan,  May 
4;  Shultz,  Apr.  11,  May  27,  38,  July  37. 
Dec.  8,  PR  219,  10/12 

Namibia,  U.N.  Council  for,  accession  to 

Geneva  conventions  (1949)  and  Protocols 
I  and  II  (1977),  Feb.  46 

Nationality,  double,  military  obligations  in 
certain  cases  of,  protocol  (1930),  succes- 
sion, Kiribati,  Feb.  46 

Nauru,  accession  to  convention  (1971)  for 
suppression  of  unlawful  acts  against  safe- 
ty of  civil  aviation,  July  88 

Neher,  Leonard,  swearing  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Burkina  Faso,  PR  179,  8/9 

Nepal: 
Profile,  Feb.  40 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  June 

86,  Nov.  86 

U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 

appropriations  request:  May  35; 

Schaffer,  May  77,  79 
U.S.  visit  of  King  Birendra:  Birendra,  Feb. 

39,  40;  Reagan,  Feb.  38,  39 
Netherlands: 
INF  deployments,  question  of:  Reagan, 

July  32;  Shultz,  July  14,  17,  20 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46;  May 

87,  Aug.  86,  Oct.  50,  Nov.  86 
Netherlands  Antilles  (Reagan),  Jan.  84 
New  Caledonia  (French):  ANZUS,  Sept.  20 
New  Zealand  (Wallis),  Mar.  30,  Aug.  51 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Feb. 

47,  May  88,  July  89,  Nov.  86,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  nuclear  ships,  question  of  access: 
Crowe,  Sept.  23;  Hayden,  Sept.  21; 
Reagan,  Sept.  2;  Shultz,  Sept.  16,  21 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Muldoon: 
Muldoon,  June  64;  Reagan,  Jime  63; 
program,  PR  48,  2/17 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz  (Shultz),  PR  165, 
7/17,  PR  168,  7/19 
Newell,  Gregory  J.,  May  83 
Nicaragua:  Dam,  Jan.  85;  Kirkpatrick,  Aug. 
59;  Michel,  Jan.  88;  Motley,  Feb.  44, 
Mar.  67;  Reagan,  Mar.  2,  June  22,  July 
30;  Shultz,  Feb.  12,  Mar.  5,  6,  7,  Apr. 
14,  19,  26,  July  39,  Nov.  31,  PR  107,  4/6; 
White  House,  June  85 
CIA  manual,  alleged  publication  (Shultz), 

PR  231A,  10/22 
Complaint  to  ICJ  against  U.S.:  Depart- 
ment, June  78;  Reagan,  June  27 
"Coordinadora"  Nine  Points,  Oct.  8 
Drug  trafficking  (Shultz),  Dec.  9,  13 
Economic  problems  (Dam),  Jan.  82 
Elections:  Oct.  12;  Middendorf,  Sept.  71; 
Motley,  Aug.  80,  Oct.  4;  Pickering, 
Apr.  77;  Reagan,  May  11,  June  27; 
Shultz,  Jan.  38,  Apr.  21,  32,  June  71, 
PR  228,  10/18,  PR  231A,  10/22 
Miskito,  Sumo,  and  Rama  Indians:  Midden- 
dorf, Sept.  70;  Shultz,  May  42 
Religious  persecutions  and  restrictions: 
Abrams,  Sept.  49;  Middendorf,  Sept. 
70;  Reagan,  Aug.  18 


Nicaragua  (Cont'd) 
Soviet-Cuban  militarization:  Dam,  Jan.  84, 
Dec.  72;  Kirkpatrick,  Aug.  61;  Motley, 
Aug.  78,  82;  Reagan,  Sept.  1,  2; 
Shultz,  Mar.  41,  July  41,  PR  147,  6/5, 
PR  152,  6/13 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  87, 

June  87 
U.S.  policy:  Michel,  June  83;  Motley,  Aug. 
79,  83;  Reagan,  May  10,  July  29,  Nov. 
4;  Shultz,  Jan.  85,  June  67,  Oct.  19, 
Nov.  34,  Dec.  7 
Visit  of  Secretary  (Shultz),  July  84,  PR 
47,  6/5 
Niger: 
Debt  consolidation  and  rescheduling  agree- 
ment with  U.S.,  Oct.  52 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  36; 
Lyman,  May  45,  46;  Shultz,  May  27 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Kountche,  program, 
PR  259,  12/10 
Nigeria:  Crocker,  Jan.  41;  Shultz,  May  27 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May  87,  July 

89,  Sept.  78 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Smith),  swearing  in, 
PR  53,  2/24 
Nimeiri,  Gaafar  Muhammed,  Jan.  44 
Nitze,  Paul  H.,  Jan.  48,  Aug.  34 
Non-use  of  force:  Goodby,  Oct.  24;  Reagan, 

Feb.  2,  Nov.  5;  Shultz,  July  14 
North  Atlantic  Council: 
Ministerial  meeting,  Brussels  (Dec.  7-9, 
1983),  declaration  and  final  com- 
munique: Shultz,  Feb.  15,  16;  text, 
Feb.  12 
Ministerial  meeting,  Washington  (May 

29-31):  July  1;  Bush,  July  1;  Cheysson, 
July  3;  Luns,  July  5,  7;  NAC,  Feb.  14; 
Reagan,  July  6,  8;  Shultz,  July  13,  Dec. 
21 
Final  comunique  and  annex,  July  9 
Press  credentials,  PR  111,  4/12 
Washington  Statement  on  East- West 
Relations:  July  11;  Shultz,  July  14 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO): 
Burt,  Mar.  44;  Eagleburger,  Apr.  39; 
Genscher,  Feb.  10;  Kirkpatrick,  Aug.  57; 
Mitterrand  (quoted),  May  2;  Reagan, 
Mar.  2,  Aug.  10,  Nov.  3;  Rowny,  Aug. 
40;  Shultz,  Feb.  10,  12,  June  31,  July  36, 
Sept.  18,  Oct.  20,  Dec.  6,  21,  23; 
Wolfowitz,  Sept.  62 
Advanced  technology:  Burt,  Apr.  50; 
Eagleburger,  Apr.  41,  42;  Rowny, 
Aug.  41;  Wallis,  July  62 
Conventional  defense  capabilities:  Dec.  27; 
Armacost,  Dec.  64;  Dam,  Dec.  70; 
Reagan,  Nov.  69 
Defense  Planning  Committee  meeting, 
Brussels  (Dec.  6-7,  1983),  final  com- 
munique, Feb.  22 
Defense  strategy:  Dec.  26;  Armacost,  Dec. 
63;  Burt,  Mar.  46,  Apr.  45,  50;  Dam, 
Oct.  35;  NATO,  Feb.  23,  July  9,  13; 
Reagan,  May  2,  Aug.  6;  Rowny,  Aug. 
38,  41;  Shultz,  July  16 
Dual-track  decision,  1979.  See  Europe: 
U.S.  missile  deployment 


North  Atlantic  Council  (Cont'd) 
Equitable  sharing  of  defense  expenses, 
question  of:  Armacost,  Dec.  64;  Dam, 
Dec.  71;  Eagleburger,  Apr.  41;  Shultz, 
July  22 
Security  interests  outside  treaty  area 

(Armacost),  Dec.  65 
Southern  flank,  U.S.  security  assistance: 
May  34;  Burt,  May  59;  Shultz,  May  21, 
23,  26,  28,  29 
Spain,  accession:  Genscher,  Feb.  12; 

NATO,  Feb.  23;  Shultz,  Feb.  12,  July 
20 
Status  of  forces  of  U.S.  ground-launched 
cruise  missile  unit,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Belgium,  Apr.  80,  May  88 
Tactical  nuclear  posture:  Reagan,  Nov.  70; 
Shultz,  Dec.  22 
35th  anniversary:  Luns,  July  5;  Reagan, 
July  5,  6,  8;  Shultz,  July  18 
Chronology,  July  22 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Abshire),  biography, 

July  15 
U.S.  income  tax  reimbursement,  interim 

agreement  (1984),  Aug.  88 
U.S.  national  interests:  Kirkpatrick,  July 
70;  Reagan,  July  33;  Wallis,  Aug.  50 
Northern  Mariana  Islands  (Reagan),  May  74, 

Aug.  64 
Norway  (Shultz),  July  20,  PR  207,  9/24 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  91, 
Feb.  46,  Mar.  74,  June  86,  July  90, 
Sept.  79,  Oct.  51,  Dec.  91 
Notices  of  meetings: 
Advisory  Committee  on  Historical  Diplo- 
matic Documentation,  PR  241,  10/26 
Advisory  Committee  on  International 

Intellectual  Property,  international  in- 
dustrial property  panel,  PR  73,  3/8 
Advisory  Committee  on  International 

Investment,  Technology,  and  Develop- 
ment: 
Working  group  on  accounting  standards, 

PR  90,  3/26 
Working  group  on  energy  and  develop- 
ment, PR  139,  5/24 
Working  group  on  international  data 

flows,  PR  142,  5/25 
Working  group  on  multilateral  invest- 
ment standards,  PR  102,  4/6 
Working  group  on  transborder  data 
flows,  PR  8,  1/10,  PR  60,  2/27 
Working  group  on  treatment  of  invest- 
ment and  special  investment  prob- 
lems, PR  5,  1/3 
Fine  Arts  Committee,  PR  61,  2/27 
International  Telecommunication  Union 
(ITU),  Secretary-General  Butler,  an- 
nouncement of  meeting  with  U.S.  of- 
ficials, PR  237,  10/22 
Oceans  and  International  Environmental 
and  Scientific  Affairs  Advisory  Com- 
mittee: 
Antarctic  section,  PR  79,  3/20 
Open  meeting,  PR  138,  5/25 
Presidential  Commission  on  the  Conduct  of 
United  States-Japan  Relations,  PR  16, 
1/25 


Index  1984 


13 


Notices  of  meetings  (Cont'd) 
Secretary  of  State's  Advisory  Committee 
on  Private  International  Law,  PR  101, 
4/6 
Study  group  on  trusts,  PR  141,  5/25 
Shipping  Coordinating  Committee,  PR  119, 
4/25 
Committee  on  Ocean  Dumping,  PR  3, 

1/3,  PR  135,  5/16 
National  Committee  for  the  Prevention 
of  Marine  Pollution,  PR  45,  2/15, 
PR  80,  3/20 
Subcommittee  on  SOLAS,  PR  62,  2/27 
Working  group  on  radio  communica- 
tions, PR  9,  1/10,  PR  29,  2/2,  PR 
81,  3/20 
Working  group  on  safety  of  naviga- 
tion, PR  105,  4/6 
Working  group  on  stability,  load  lines, 
and  safety  of  fishing  vessels,  PR 
74,  3/8 
Working  group  on  standards  of  train- 
ing and  watchkeeping,  PR  58, 
2/27 
Subcommittee  on  UNCTAD,  PR  134, 
5/16,  PR  266,  12/19 
U.S.  National  Committee  for  the  Interna- 
tional Radio  Consultative  Committee 
(CCIR),  PR  140,  5/25 
Study  group  1,  PR  55,  2/24 
Study  group  6,  PR  104,  4/6 
U.S.  National  Commitee  of  the  Interna- 
tional Telegraph  and  Telephone  Con- 
sultative Committee  (CCITT),  PR  15, 
1/25,  PR  151,  6/12,  PR  178,  8/7 
Integrated  services  digital  network  tech- 
nical working  group,  PR  75,  3/8 
Study  group  A,  PR  4,  1/3,  PR  59,  2/27, 

PR  103,  4/6,  PR  149,  6/12 
Study  group  B,  PR  28,  2/2,  PR  149,  6/12 
Study  group  C,  PR  26,  1/31,  PR  106,  4/6 
Study  groups  C  and  D  and  the  ISDN 
Joint  Working  Committee,  PR  150, 
6/12 
Study  group  D,  PR  25,  1/31 
Modem  working  party,  PR  54,  2/24 
U.S.  telecommunications  delegation  to 
Mexico  City  meeting,  announcement, 
PR  239,  10/16 
Nuclear  energy  (see  also  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  aiui  Nuclear  non- 
proliferation),  Adelman,  July  44 
Cooperation,  bilateral  agreements:  Greece, 
June  87;  Japan,  Jan.  91;  Norway,  Mar. 
74,  Sept.  79;  Sweden,  Mar.  75,  June 
88;  U.K.,  Aug.  88 
EURATOM,  U.S.  cooperation  (Reagan), 

Apr.  66 
Export  controls:  Dec.  51;  Kennedy,  Oct. 

40;  Shultz,  Dee.  19,  20 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  Stat- 
ute (1956),  acceptance,  China,  Mar.  73 
Physical  protection  of  nuclear  material, 
convention  (1979):  Australia,  May  87; 
Bulgaria,  Hungary,  July  89;  Poland, 
Jan.  90 
Plutonium  reprocessing,  U.S.  policy 

(Kennedy),  Oct.  42 
Radioactive  waste  management,  coopera- 
tion in  safety,  bilateral  agreement  with 
France,  July  90 
Safeguards:  Kennedy,  Oct.  40;  Reagan, 
Aug.  17;  Shultz,  Dec.  20 
South  Africa  (Department),  Mar.  57 


Nuclear  energy  (Cont'd) 
Severe  (nuclear)  accident  research,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Canada,  July  89 
Transfer  of  enriched  uranium  and  (for)  re- 
search reactors,  agreements:  Canada, 
IAEA,  Jamaica,  U.S.,  Apr.  79;  Moroc- 
co, Feb.  46 
Nuclear  nonprolife ration:  Dec.  50;  Adelman, 
Jan.  49,  July  42;  ANZUS,  Sept.  19; 
Department,  Mar.  57;  Kennedy,  Oct.  40; 
Reagan,  Jan.  5,  May  4,  June  4,  15,  Aug. 
17,  Nov.  5;  Schaffer,  May  82;  Shultz, 
Mar.  36,  May  12,  24,  27,  June  30,  32, 
Dec.  10,  17,  20,  23,  25,  PR  243A,  11/5 
Review  conference,  1985:  Nov.  20; 

Adelman,  July  44;  Shultz,  Dec.  20 
Treaty  (1968):  Dec.  50;  Shultz,  Dec.  18 
Current  actions:  Dominica,  Equatorial 
Guinea,  Dec.  90;  Sao  Tome  and 
Principe,  Apr.  79 
Nuclear  test  ban  treaty,  comprehensive,  pro- 
posed: Dec.  49;  ANZUS,  Sept.  19; 
Shultz,  Dec.  24 
Nuclear  testing.  Dee.  48 
Nuclear  war,  dangers  of:  Adelman,  Jan.  45; 
Eagleburger,  May  49;  Reagan,  Jan.  9, 
14,  45  (quoted),  Mar.  2,  May  2,  June  2, 
15;  Rowny,  June  45;  Shultz,  Apr.  29, 
Sept.  12,  Nov.  43,  Dec.  22;  Wolfowitz, 
Sept.  60 
Nuclear  weapons,  elimination,  proposed: 
Reagan,  Feb.  3,  July  32,  Aug.  17,  23; 
Shultz,  July  20,  Sept.  12,  Nov.  42 


0 


Oceans: 

Atlantic  Undersea  Test  and  Evaluation 
Centre,  U.K.  access,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  U.K.,  June  88 

Deep  seabed  matters,  provisional  under- 
standing (1984):  Belgium,  France, 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Italy, 
Japan,  Netheriands,  U.K.,  U.S.,  Nov. 
86 
U.S.  signature,  PR  177,  8/7 

Law  of  the  sea  convention  and  seabed 
mining  regime,  U.S.  nonacceptance: 
Malone,  Dec.  76;  Reagan,  Aug.  65 

Ocean  drilling  program,  bilateral  agree- 
ments: Canada,  Jan.  91;  France,  Sept. 
79;  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  June 
87;  Japan,  Aug.  88 

U.S.  oceans  policy  (Malone),  Dec.  76 

World  Oceans  Agreement  (1973):  Reagan, 
Sept.  41;  White  House,  Sept.  44 
Oil  pollution: 

Civil  liability  for  oil  pollution  damage, 
international  convention  (1969), 
ratification,  Australia,  Mar.  73 

Intervention  on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of, 
international  convention  (1969): 
Australia,  Bulgaria,  Mar.  73 

Loan  of  petroleum  spill  cleanup  equipment, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Iceland,  Jan. 
91 
Olympics,  Los  Angeles:  Reagan,  July  30; 
Shultz,  July  36,  39,  40 

Security,  question  of  (Shultz),  Sept.  9,  10 


Oman: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  86,  Aug. 

87 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  34;  Mur- 
phy, May  69;  Shultz,  May  28 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush,  Aug.  28 
O'Neill,  Thomas  (Tip):  Reagan,  Aug.  8 
Organization  of  African  Unity  (OAU): 
Crocker,  Jan.  39;  Lyman,  May  43; 
Shultz,  PR  219,  10/12 
Organization  of  American  States  (OAS): 
Middendorf,  Sept.  69;  Motley,  Mar.  67; 
Shultz,  May  31,  June  67,  Dec.  89 
Charter  (1948)  and  protocol  of  amendment 
(1967),  signature  and  ratification,  St. 
Christopher-Nevis,  May  87 
Development  Assistance  Program,  U.S. 

contribution  (Newell),  May  86 
U.S.  income  tax  reimbursement  procedure, 
agreement,  Mar.  74 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD):  Aug.  3;  McPher- 
son,  May  83;  Motley,  Feb.  43;  Wallis, 
Mar.  30,  July  54,  Sept.  36 
Export  Credit  Arrangement  (Wallis),  July 
62 
Ortiz,  Frank  V.,  Jr.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Argentina,  PR  190,  8/20 


Pacific  area: 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1952-1951,.  Volume  XII,  Part  1.  East 
Asia  and  the  Pacific,  Multilateral 
Relations,  released,  Nov.  92 
Nuclear  concerns:  ANZUS,  Sept.  19,  20; 
Cooper,  Sept.  24;  Hayden,  Sept.  21, 
24;  Reagan,  Aug.  65;  Shultz,  Sept.  21 
Pacific  Basin  economic  unit,  question  of 

(Shultz),  Sept.  9 
South  Pacific  Forum  (ANZUS),  Sept.  20 
South  Pacific  Nuclear  Free  Zone,  proposed: 

ANZUS,  Sept.  19;  Cooper,  Sept.  24 
South  Pacific  prospecting  for  energy  and 
mineral  resources,  agreement,  PR  209, 
10/4 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  35; 
Wolfowitz,  May  52,  57 
U.S.  interests,  policy:  Dec.  25;  Armacost, 
Dec.  67;  Dam,  Oct.  34;  Reagan,  Aug. 
63;  Shultz,  Sept.  3,  5,  8,  18;  Wallis, 
Aug.  50;  Wolfowitz,  Sept.  62 
Pakistan:  Adelman,  July  43;  Dam,  Mar.  12; 
DiCario,  Jan.  73;  Sh-oltz,  Nov.  30;  Taylor, 
May  73;  Wallis,  Mar.  30 
Afghan-based  attacks  (Department),  Oct. 

47 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  48,  Apr. 

81,  June  87,  July  89 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  34; 
McPherson,  May  66;  Schaffer,  May  77, 
80;  Shultz,  May  28,  30 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush,  Aug.  27 
Palmer,  Mark,  July  75 
Panama:  Oct.  13;  Dam,  Dec.  72;  DiCario, 
Jan.  70,  73;  Motley,  Feb.  44;  Reagan, 
July  27;  Shultz,  July  37 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Panama  (Cont'd) 
Election  of  Dr.  Barletta  (Shultz),  Nov.  33, 

Dec.  10,  88 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  87,  Oct. 

52,  Nov.  87,  Dec.  90 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Briggs),  swearing  in, 

PR  181,  8/13 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  34; 
Reagan,  Jan.  84;  Shultz,  May  24,  28 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz:  Dec.  87;  Shultz, 

Dec.  88 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush,  Feb.  9 
Papua  New  Guinea: 
Air  transport,  bilateral  agreement,  May  88 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Gardner),  swearing  in, 

PR  185,  8/17 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 
May  35;  Wolfowitz,  May  58 
Paraguay:  Oct.  13;  Abrams,  Jan.  55;  Michel, 
Jan.  59 
International  coffee  agreement,  1983, 

ratification,  Oct.  50 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request, 
May  35 
Patents: 
Microorganisms,  deposit  for  purpose  of 
patent  procedures,  international 
recognition,  Budapest  treaty  (1977), 
Austria,  Apr.  79 
Entry  into  force,  Aug.  86 
New  varieties  of  plants,  protection,  inter- 
national convention  (1961,  as  revised), 
acceptance  by  Netherlands,  Oct.  50 
Patent  cooperation  treaty  (1970):  Bulgaria, 
June  86;  Republic  of  Korea,  Aug.  86 
Peace  Corps: 
Appropriations  request:  May  33; 

McPherson,  May  66;  Shultz,  May  30 
Nepal  (Reagan),  Feb.  38 
Sri  Lanka,  Feb.  48 
Peres,  Shimon,  Dec.  75 
Persian  Gulf  region.  See  Indian  Ocean- 
Persian  Gulf 
Peru:  Oct.  13;  Dam,  Dec.  72;  Motley, 

Feb.  44,  Oct.  1;  Shultz,  Apr.  19,  Nov.  30; 
Taylor,  May  73 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  48,  May 

87,  88,  July  90,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Jordan),  swearing  in, 

PR  187,  8/20 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  35; 
Shultz,  May  28 
Philippines  (Shultz),  Sept.  5,  16 
Aquino  investigation:  Monjo,  Apr.  38; 
Shultz,  Apr.  16;  Wolfowitz,  May  54, 
Nov.  54 
Economic  problems  (Wolfowitz),  Nov.  55 
Elections:  Monjo,  Apr.  37;  Shultz,  Apr. 

19;  Wolfowitz,  May  54 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Feb. 
48,  Apr.  81,  June  86,  87,  July  88,  89, 
Oct.  50 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Bosworth),  swearing  in, 

PR  118,  4/24 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 
May  35;  McPherson,  May  66;  Schneid- 
er, May  75,  76;  Shultz,  May  21,  26,  28, 
29;  Wolfowitz,  May  53,  54 
U.S.  bases:  Shultz,  PR  114,  4/19;  Wallis, 
Aug.  51;  Wolfowitz,  Nov.  54,  57 
Pickering,  Thomas  R.,  Apr.  77 


Poland:  Nov.  22;  Abrams,  July  77;  NAC, 
Feb.  13,  July  10;  Shultz,  July  19,  Oct.  20 
Political  prisoners  released:  Dam,  Dec.  68; 

White  House,  Oct.  30 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Feb. 
48,  June  87,  July  89,  90,  Aug.  86, 
Sept.  79 
U.S.  relations  (Dam),  Dec.  68 
U.S.  sanctions:  Burt,  Apr.  49;  Dam,  Dec. 
68;  Genscher,  Feb.  11;  Reagan,  Sept. 
2,  Oct.  16;  Shultz,  Feb.  10,  15,  PR  228, 
10/18;  Wallis,  July  61;  White  House, 
Jan.  54,  Oct.  30 
Warsaw  uprising,  40th  anniversary 
(Reagan),  Oct.  16 
Pope  John  Paul  II  (quoted),  Oct.  16 

Meeting  with  President  Reagan,  June  26 
Population  growth  and  problems 
(McPherson),  May  62,  Oct.  31 
International  Conference  on  Population, 
Mexico  City:  Buckley,  Dec.  80; 
McPherson,  Oct.  32;  Reagan,  Dec.  81 
Declaration  on  Population  and  Develop- 
ment, Dec.  82 
Portugal  (NATO),  Feb.  23 
Azores,  military  facilities,  U.S.  use 
(Shultz),  Feb.  18,  May  21,  July  21 
Bilateral  agreement,  Apr.  81 
Defense,  implementation  of  bilateral 

technical  agreement,  Nov.  87 
NATO,  accession  to  (Genscher),  Feb.  12 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  Apr. 
79,  81,  May  87,  88,  July  88,  90,  Aug. 
86,  87,  Sept.  78,  Nov.  87 
U.S.  security  assistance:  May  34;  Burt, 
May  59;  Schneider,  May  75;  Shultz, 
May  21,  26,  28,  29 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Soares: 

Reagan,  Soares,  June  55;  program,  PR 
76,  3/9 
Postal  matters: 
International  express  mail,  bilateral  agree- 
ments: Bangladesh,  Nov.  86;  Egypt, 
Apr.  80;  Ireland,  June  87;  Italy,  Mar. 
74;  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Dec.  91; 
Thailand,  Mar.  75 
Money  orders  and  postal  travelers'  checks, 
agreement  (1979);  Argentina,  June  86; 
Chad,  Mar.  74;  Lebanon,  Oct.  50;  Mex- 
ico, July  89;  Sri  Lanka,  Thailand, 
Uruguay,  Oct.  50,  Yemen  (Sanaa), 
Mar.  74 
Universal  Postal  Union: 

Constitution  (1964):  Kiribati,  Oct.  50; 
Solomon  Islands,  July  89 
Additional  protocol  (1969):  Kiribati, 
Oct.  50;  Malawi,  Solomon  Islands, 
July  89 
Second  additional  protocol  (1974): 

Kiribati,  Oct.  50;  Malawi,  Solomon 
Islands,  July  89 
General  regulations  and  universal  postal 
convention  (1979):  Albania,  July  89; 
Argentina,  June  86;  Bahamas,  Oct. 
50;  Chad,  Cuba,  Mar.  74;  Kiribati, 
Lebanon,  Oct.  50;  Liberia,  Malawi, 
Mexico,  July  89;  Philippines,  Oct. 
50;  Solomon  Islands,  July  89;  Sri 
Lanka,  Oct.  50;  Tanzania,  July  89; 
Thailand,  Oct.  50;  Ukrainian  S.S.R., 
Mar.  74;  Uruguay,  Oct.  50;  Yemen 
(Sanaa),  Mar.  74 


Postal  matters  (Cont'd) 

Israeli  participation,  Arab  challenge 
(Department),  July  82 
Prem  Tinsulanonda,  July  51 
Private  international  law,  statute  of  The 
Hague  conference  (1951):  Cyprus,  Dec. 
90;  Poland,  Aug.  86 
Proclamations  by  the  President: 
Afghanistan  Day,  1984  (5/65),  May  82 
African  Refugees  Relief  Day,  1984  {5216), 

Sept.  64 
Baltic  Freedom  Day  (520,9),  Aug.  54 
Bill  of  Rights  Day;  Human  Rights  Day  and 

Week,  1983  (51S5),  Jan.  59 
Captive  Nations  Week,  1984  (522S),  Sept. 

51 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  35th 

anniversary  {5158),  July  5 
World  Food  Day,  1984  {5260),  Dec.  69 
Public  Law  480  (Food  for  Peace).  See  under 

Food  production  and  shortages 
Publications: 
Government  Printing  Office  subscriptions, 

list,  Apr.  85,  July  94,  Aug.  92,  Nov.  91 
International  exchange  of  publications, 
convention  (1958):  Australia,  Japan, 
Nov.  86 
Obscene  publications,  repression  of  cir- 
culation, agreement  (1910)  and  pro- 
tocol (1949),  acceptance,  Cuba,  June  86 
Official  publications  and  government 

documents,  exchange  between  states, 
convention  (1958):  Australia,  Japan, 
Nov.  86 
State  Department,  Feb.  51,  Mar.  78, 
Apr.  84,  May  93,  June  93,  July  94, 
Aug.  92,  Sept.  82,  Oct.  54,  Nov.  91, 
Dec.  94 
Background  Notes,  May  94,  Nov.  91, 

Dec.  94 
Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights 

Practices  for  1983,  released,  Apr.  53 
Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in 

International  Law.  1979,  released, 
June  94 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1952-195J,,  Volume  1.  General: 
Economic  and  Political  Matters, 
released,  June  93 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1952-195J,,  Volume  TV,  The 
American  Republics,  released,  Feb. 
52 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1952-1954,  Volume  XII,  Part  1,  East 
Asia  and  the  Pacific,  Multilateral 
Relations,  released,  Nov.  92 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1952-195i,  Volume  XV,  Korea,  re- 
leased, Aug.  93 
Press  releases,  list,  Jan.  94,  Feb.  51, 
Mar.  77,  Apr.  84,  May  93,  June  91, 
July  93,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  82,  Oct.  54, 
Nov.  90,  Dec.  93 
Traveler  Tips,  released,  PR  1,  1/3, 

PR  2,  1/3 
Visa  Requirements  of  Foreign  Govern- 
ments, released,  PR  1,  1/3 
USUN,  lists,  June  91,  Nov.  90 
Purcell,  James  N.,  Jr.,  Feb.  32,  Aug.  66, 
Dec.  83 


Index  1984 


15 


R 


Racial  discrimination,  international  conven- 
tion (1965)  on  elimination  of:  Kam- 
puchea, Feb.  46;  Maldives,  July  89; 
Suriname,  May  87 

Ray,  Robert  D.,  Nov.  4 

Reagan,  Ronald: 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Afghanistan,  Jan.  25,  Feb.  37,  May  2, 

7,  June  64,  Sept.  42,  Nov.  4 
Afghanistan  Day,  1984,  May  82 
Africa: 

U.S.  Economic  Policy  Initiative,  May 

5,  Nov.  28 
U.S.  food  aid,  May  5,  Sept.  47 
Alaskan  oil  resources,  Apr.  3 
American  and  Japanese  businessmen, 

Jan.  6 
American  ideals,  June  3,  10,  16 
Antisatellite  weapons,  question  of,  May 

8,  June  48,  July  34,  Nov.  49 
Arab-Israeli  conflict,  Jan.  34  (quoted), 

44,  Feb.  5,  31,  Apr.  4,  62,  63,  May 
7,  10,  Nov.  4 
Austria,  June  50,  51 
Beriin,  July  28 
Bill  of  Rights  Day;  Human  Rights  Day 

and  Week,  1983,  Jan.  59 
Botswana,  June  38 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative,  Jan.  84, 

Mar.  72,  May  4,  July  28,  Sept.  1 
Caribbean  leaders  conference.  University 

of  South  Carolina,  Sept.  1 
Central  America,  June  22,  27,  July  27, 
29,  Sept.  1,  Nov.  4 
National  Bipartisan  Commission,  Mar. 
1,  2,  Apr.  71,  May  3,  4,  11,  June 
22,  25,  July  28,  29 
Central  America  Democracy,  Peace,  and 
Development  Act,  proposed,  Apr. 
71,  75,  May  3,  11,  June  25 
Chemical  weapons  ban,  proposed.  May 
3,  8,  9,  July  8,  44,  Aug.  17,  Nov.  5, 
49 
China,  U.S.  relations,  Jan.  14,  Mar.  20, 
23,  June  1,  6,  8,  9,  11,  12,  14,  18, 
20,  Aug.  6,  Nov.  3 
Congressional-executive  relations,  May  5, 

10,  11 
Council  of  the  Americas,  July  27 
Cuba,  regional  activities,  Jan.  15, 

June  22 
Cuban  Revolution,  25th  anniversary, 

Mar.  3 
Cyprus,  July  75,  Nov.  5 
D-Day,  40th  anniversary,  Aug.  10,  21, 

23 
Deep  seabed  mining  regime,  Aug.  65 
Defense  and  national  security,  Jan.  15, 
Feb.  2,  May  1,  6,  June  22,  July  31, 
33 
Strategic  Forces  Commission,  report, 
June  61 
Democracy,  Mar.  1,  May  5,  6,  Aug.  8 

18 
Developing  countries.  May  4,  5 
Economy,  domestic,  Jan.  10,  16,  May  2, 

June  3,  July  31,  33,  Nov.  26 
Economy,  world.  Mar.  25,  May  4,  Aug. 
5,  Nov.  26,  60 
London  economic  summit,  July  32, 
Aug.  5 


Reagan,  Ronald  (Cont'd) 

El  Salvador,  Feb.  6,  Mar.  3,  Apr.  71, 
75,  May  4,  10,  11,  June  22,  24,  25, 

26,  27,  July  27,  29,  84,  Aug.  18, 
Nov.  4,  Dec.  87 

U.S.  troops,  question  of,  July  32 
Europe: 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions, 
Feb.  3,  May  3,  8,  50,  June  46, 
48,  July  9,  46,  Aug.  17,  Nov.  5, 
49 
Stockholm  Conference  (CDE),  Feb.  1, 
3,  Mar.  42,  May  8,  June  47, 
July  9,  44,  Aug.  17,  Sept.  23, 
Nov.  5,  48,  49 
U.S.  missile  deployment,  Feb.  2,  May 
2,  June  53,  July  31,  32,  Aug.  17, 
Nov.  70 
Foreign  policy.  May  1,  Nov.  2 
Foreign  Service  Day,  1984,  June  49 
France,  June  56,  59 
German  inter-state  relations,  Nov.  5 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of,  U.S. 

relations,  June  53 
Grenada,  Jan.  25,  Mar.  2,  3,  72,  May  2, 

Sept.  1,  2 
Honduras,  Mar.  72,  May  10 
Human  rights.  May  7,  July  29,  Nov.  2,  3 
International  Bank  for  Reconstruction 

and  Development,  Nov.  26 
Iran-Iraq  war,  Apr.  4,  May  7,  Nov.  4 
Irish  Parliament,  Aug.  15 
Israel,  Feb.  30,  May  6,  Dec.  75 
Japan,  Jan.  1,  4,  6,  7,  11,  12,  18,  30, 

Mar.  15  (quoted).  May  4,  10,  Aug.  6 
Japanese  Diet,  Jan.  7 
Korea,  Jan.  2,  17,  18,  21,  23,  24 
Korean  National  Assembly,  Jan.  18 
Korean  peninsula,  Jan.  22,  Nov.  4 
Latin  America,  U.S.  policy,  goals,  July 

27,  29 

Lebanon,  Jan.  10,  Feb.  29,  31,  Mar.  47, 
May  7,  Nov.  4 
Multinational  peacekeeping  force.  Mar. 

1,  48,  Apr.  60 
U.S.  Marines,  Jan.  19,  Feb.  5,  6,  7, 
28,  Mar.  1,  48,  52,  Apr.  2,  4, 
May  9 
Withdrawal,  May  68 
Malaysia,  Mar.  25 
Middle  East,  Jan.  15,  Feb.  3,  May  4, 

7,  Nov.  4 
NAC  ministerial  meeting,  Washington, 

July  6,  8 
Namibia,  May  4 
Nepal,  Feb.  38,  39 
New  Zealand,  June  63,  Sept.  2 
Nicaragua,  Mar.  2,  May  11,  June  22,  27, 
July  30,  Aug.  18.  Sept.  1,  2,  Nov.  4 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization, 

Mar.  2,  May  2,  July  33,  Aug.  6,  10, 
Nov.  3,  69,  70 
35th  anniversary,  July  5,  6,  8 
Nuclear  nonproliferation,  Jan.  5, 

May  4,  June  4,  15,  Aug.  17,  Nov.  5 
Nuclear  war,  danger  of,  Jan.  9,  14,  Mar. 

2,  May  2,  June  2,  15 
Olympic  Games,  Los  Angeles,  July  30 
Pacific  islands  region,  Aug.  63 
Panama,  Jan.  84,  July  27 
Persian  Gulf  oil  shipping,  Apr.  4,  May  4, 
7,  July  30,  31 


Reagan,  Ronald  (Cont'd) 
Poland,  Sept.  2 
Warsaw  uprising,  40th  anniversary, 
Oct.  16 
Portugal,  June  55 
Regional  security.  May  3,  Nov.  3 
Sakharov,  Andrei,  and  Yelena  Bonner, 

July  32,  Sept.  42 
Smithsonian  Institution's  Conference  on 

U.S. -Soviet  Exchanges,  Sept.  41 
South  Africa,  May  3,  Nov.  3 
Soviet  Union: 
Hot-line  agreement  expansion,  Sept. 

45,  Nov.  5 
INF  negotiations,  Jan.  4,  9,  48,  Feb. 

3,  May  3,  8 

Meeting  with  Foreign  Minister 

Gromyko,  Nov.  57,  60 
Military  buildup,  Jan.  15,  May  10, 

June  22,  July  6,  32,  Sept.  42 
START,  Jan.  9,  Feb.  3,  May  2,  8 
U.S.  arms  control  negotiations,  Jan. 

14,  Feb.  3,  June  2,  53,  July  33, 

44,  Aug.  6,  17,  Sept.  23,  Nov.  5, 

48,  49 
U.S.  relations,  Feb.  1,  Mar.  1,  Apr.  1, 

4,  May  2,  July  30,  32,  33,  Aug. 
23,  Sept.  41,  Nov.  5 

Space,  arms  control  for.  May  8,  June 

48,  July  34,  Nov.  49 
Development,  proposed,  June  5,  15 
Manned  space  station,  proposed,  Aug. 

6 
State  of  the  Union  (excerpts).  Mar.  1 
Technology  and  technology  transfers, 

Jan.  2,  June  4 
Terrorism,  Jan.  19,  Feb.  6,  Mar.  47,  48, 

52,  Apr.  2,  51,  62,  May  7,  8,  June 

49,  Aug.  14,  16,  Dec.  86 
Trade: 

Multilateral  trade  negotiations,  pro- 
posed new  round,  Jan.  5,  Mar.  2 
Protectionism,  Jan.  5,  6,  10,  16,  18, 
21,  23,  May  4,  Nov.  2,  27 
U.N.  General  Assembly,  39th  session, 

Nov.  1 
U.S.  leadership  in  U.N.,  Nov.  23 
Correspondence,  message.  Population 
Conference,  Mexico  City,  Dec.  81 
Leadership  (Shultz),  PR  192,  8/23,  PR  228, 

10/18,  PR  235,  10/22 
Meetings  with  Heads  of  State  and  officials 
of,  remarks  and  joint  communiques: 
Austria,  June  50;  Bangladesh,  Feb.  36; 
Botswana,  June  38;  Canada,  Dec.  54; 
China,  Mar.  20;  Dominican  Republic, 
Aug.  84;  Egypt,  Apr.  63;  El  Salvador, 
July  83,  Sept.  72;  France,  June  56; 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  June  53; 
Ireland,  June  59;  Israel,  Feb.  30,  Dec. 
74;  Jordan,  Apr.  62,  63;  Lebanon,  Feb. 
29;  Malaysia,  Mar.  25;  Mexico,  July  85; 
Morocco,  June  60;  Nepal,  Feb.  38; 
New  Zealand,  June  63;  Portugal,  June 
55;  Sri  Lanka,  Sept.  65;  Sudan,  Jan. 
44;  Thailand,  July  51;  Yugoslavia,  Apr. 
51 
Messages  and  reports  to  Congress: 
Antisatellite  weapons  systems,  arms 

control  for,  June  48 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  recipients 
designated,  Jan.  84,  Mar.  72 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Reagan,  Ronald  (Cont'd) 

Compact  of  Free  Association  (Micronesia 

and  Marshall  Islands),  May  74 
Cyprus,  progress  reports.  Mar.  46,  July 

73,  Sept.  46,  Dec.  66 
Grenada,  U.S.  objectives,  Feb.  45 
Lebanon,  multinational  forces  in,  Feb. 
28,  Apr.  60 
Termination  of  U.S.  participation, 
May  68 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization: 
Conventional  defense  capabilities,  Nov. 

69 
Tactical  nuclear  posture,  Nov.  70 
Nuclear  cooperation  with  EURATOM, 

Apr.  66 
Science  and  technology,  U.S.  inter- 
national activities,  1983,  Apr.  67 
Soviet  noncompliance  with  arms  control 

agreements.  Mar.  8 
Terrorism,  proposed  legislation  to 
combat,  June  65 
News  conferences,  interviews,  transcripts, 
Feb.  5,  Apr.  2,  May  8,  June  8,  July  29, 
32,  Sept.  2 
Question  and  answer  sessions,  Mar.  53, 

Aug.  63 
Radio  and  television  addresses  to  nation, 
Jan.  18,  Feb.  5,  Apr.  1,  May  11,  June 
11,  22,  27,  Aug.  5,  10,  Nov.  60 
Visits  to: 

China,  May  4,  June  1,  6,  8,  9,  11,  12, 
14,  18,  20 
Itinerary,  June  2 
France,  Aug.  7 
Ireland,  Aug.  7 
Japan,  Jan.  1 
Korea,  Jan.  17 
U.K.,  Aug.  7 
'  Refugees  (Purcell),  Feb.  32 

Afghan:  Jan.  73,  78;  Bush,  Aug.  27,  28; 
Purcell,  Feb.  33,  Aug.  66,  Dec.  84; 
Schaffer,  May  81;  Shultz,  Nov.  36,  37 
African:  Abrams,  Sept.  56,  Nov.  63; 
Crocker,  Jan.  40;  Lyman,  May  45; 
Purcell,  Feb.  33,  Aug.  66,  Dec.  84; 
Shultz,  Apr.  9,  Nov.  36,  37 
African  Refugees  Relief  Day,  1984, 

proclamation  (Reagan),  Sept.  64 
ICARA  II  conference:  Lyman,  May  45; 
Purcell,  Dec.  85;  Shultz,  Apr.  10 
Central  American:  Abrams,  Sept.  48; 

Motley,  Aug.  81,  82;  Purcell,  Aug.  67; 
Reagan,  June  22;  Shultz,  May  42,  Nov. 
36,38 
Indochinese:  Purcell,  Feb.  33,  34,  Aug. 
67,  Dec.  84;  Shultz,  May  26,  July  37, 
Sept.  4,  7,  8,  14,  Oct.  20,  Nov.  34,  PR 
221,  10/15;  Wallis,  Aug.  50;  Wolfowitz, 
May  55,  Nov.  53 
Piracy  attacks  on,  and  antipiracy  meas- 
ures: Purcell,  Dec.  85;  Shultz,  Nov. 
37;  Wolfowitz,  May  55 
J     Lebanese  (Dam),  Feb.  28 


Protection  of  (Purcell),  Dec.  83 
Status  of,  protocol  (1967),  accession  by 

Haiti,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  admissions  FY  1985,  proposed 

(Shultz),  Nov.  34 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 

May  33;  Lyman,  May  45;  Purcell,  Aug. 

66;  Shultz,  May  24,  29,  Nov.  35 


Regan,  Donald:  July  59;  (Reagan)  Aug.  12 
Regional  security  {see  o/so  Latin  America: 
Caribbean  and  Central  America):  Dam, 
Dec.  72;  Reagan,  May  3,  Nov.  3; 
Schneider,  May  76;  Shultz,  Apr.  17,  Dec. 
7 
Africa  (Shultz),  Apr.  10 
East  Asia,  U.S.  role  (Wolfowitz),  May  57 
Restatement  of  Foreign  Relations  Law  of  the 
United  States,  critique  (Robinson),  Jan. 
69 
Roberts,  Owen  W.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Togo,  PR  158,  7/10 
Robinson,  Davis  R.,  Jan.  60,  67 
Rodman,  Peter,  Chairman  of  Policy  Plan- 
ning Council,  nomination  (Shultz),  PR  89, 
3/23 
Romania  (Burt),  Apr.  48 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  74,  75, 
June  87,  Sept.  79,  Dec.  91 
Rowny,  Edward  L.,  June  44,  Aug.  38 

Biography,  June  45 
Roy,  J.,  Stapleton,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Singapore,  PR  216,  10/12 
Rubber,  international  natural  rubber  agree- 
ment (1979):  Shultz,  Sept.  15,  accession, 
Greece,  Aug.  87 
Rumsfeld,  Donald:  Dam,  Feb.  28;  Eagle- 
burger,  Mar.  50;  Reagan,  Feb.  5,  8,  30; 
Shultz,  Jan.  36,  37,  Feb.  11,  Mar.  5,  49 
Rwanda: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  79,  July 

89 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request,  May  36 


Safety  of  life  at  sea: 
International  convention  (1974):  Algeria, 
Australia,  Bulgaria,  Ireland,  Jamaica, 
Lebanon,  Malaysia,  Portugal,  St.  Vin- 
cent and  the  Grenadines,  Sri  Lanka, 
United  Arab  Emirates,  May  87 
Amendments  (1983),  entry  into  force. 
Mar.  74 
U.S. -Soviet  Incidents  at  Sea  agreement 
(INCSEA),  renewal:  Dec.  42;  Reagan, 
Sept.  41;  White  House,  Sept.  43 
St.  Christopher-Nevis:  Oct.  13;  Reagan, 
Jan.  84 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  May 
87,  88,  June  88,  Oct.  50,  Nov.  87 
St.  Lucia:  Oct.  13;  (Reagan),  Jan.  84 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  91, 
July  88,  Aug.  88,  Nov.  86 
St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines:  Oct.  14; 
(Reagan),  Jan.  84 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  91, 
Feb.  48,  May  87,  Aug.  88 
Sakharov,  Andrei  and  Yelena  Bonner:  Oct. 
36;  Bush,  July  2;  Cheysson,  July  3; 
Reagan,  July  32,  Sept.  42;  Shultz,  July 
36,  39,  Dec.  11,  PR  147,  6/6,  PR  148, 
6/8;  White  House,  Sept.  44 
Salans,  Carl  F.,  Substitute  Arbitrator,  Iran- 
U.S.  Claims  Tribunal,  appointment,  PR 
85,  3/22 
Sao  Tome  and  Principe: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  Apr. 

79 
U.S.  food  assistance,  appropriations 
request.  May  36 


Satellites: 
COMSAT  framework  (Schneider),  Oct.  43 
Indian  national  satellite  system  (INSAT)-l 
spacecraft,  bilateral  agreement  with 
India,  Sept.  79,  Oct.  51 
INTELSAT,  agreement  and  operating 

agreement  (1971),  Malawi,  Sept.  78 
INTELSAT  program,  launch  and  associ- 
ated services,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Italy,  Mar.  74,  June  87 
Landsat  system,  operation,  bilateral  agree- 
ments: Brazil,  Aug.  87;  Japan,  Feb.  47; 
South  Africa,  Feb.  48 
Laser  Geodynamics  Satellite-2  (Lagos) 

development,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Italy,  June  87 
Loran  transmitting  station,  bilateral  agree- 
ment, termination,  Nicaragua,  June  87 
Loran-C  chains,  establishment,  operations, 
and  maintenance,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Canada,  Aug.  87 
Programme-carrying  signals  transmitted 
by  satellite,  convention  (1974),  U.S. 
ratification,  Dec.  91 
Tethered  Satellite  System  development, 
bilateral  agreement  vnth  Italy,  June  87 
Saudi  Arabia: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  June 

86,  Dec.  92 
U.S.  military  assistance:  Armacost, 

July  80;  Department,  July  81;  Murphy, 
Oct.  37 
Sayre,  Robert  M.,  Oct.  48 
Schaffer,  Howard  B.,  May  77 
Schneider,  William,  Jr.,  May  75,  Aug.  68, 

Oct.  43 
Science  and  technology  (Wallis),  Aug.  51 
Advanced  technology:  Adelman,  July  43; 
Burt,  Mar.  45,  Apr.  50;  Dam,  Mar.  14; 
Eagleburger,  Apr.  40,  42;  Lamb,  July 
64;  Reagan,  Jan.  2;  Rowny,  Aug.  41; 
Wallis,  July  62 
U.S.  export  policy:  Malone,  Aug.  71; 

Reagan,  June  4;  Schneider,  Aug.  68; 
Shultz,  June  34,  July  17;  Wallis, 
Mar.  28,  30 
Balloon  launching  and  associated  services, 
bilateral  agreements:  Australia,  Oct. 
51;  France,  Feb.  47;  Italy,  Jan.  91 
Cold  region  engineering,  cooperation, 

bilateral  agreement  with  Finland,  Mar. 
74 
Cooperation: 

Japan  (Wolfowitz),  Sept.  30,  31 
Poland  (Dam),  Dec.  68 
Cooperation,  bilateral  agreements  (Malone), 
Aug.  71 
Current  actions:  Australia,  Jan.  91,  Sept. 
78;  Austria,  June  87;  Brazil,  Feb. 
47;  China,  Mar.  24  (fact  sheet),  74; 
Colombia,  Sept.  79;  France,  Feb. 
47;  Indonesia,  Sept.  79,  PR  161, 
7/11;  New  Zealand,  May  88;  Sri 
Lanka,  Sept.  79;  Thailand,  July  90 
Earth  sciences,  cooperation,  bilateral 

agreements:  Hungary,  Italy,  Apr.  80 
Educational,  scientific,  cultural,  techno- 
logical fields,  exchanges  and  coopera- 
tion, bilateral  agreements:  Bulgaria, 
June  87;  Hungary,  Apr.  80;  Romania, 
Mar.  75 
Geological  and  geophysical  research 

station,  Alice  Springs,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Australia,  May  88 


Index  1984 


17 


Science  and  technology  (Cont'd) 

Geological  and  geophysical  research 

station,  Alice  Springs,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Australia,  May  88 
Geological  sciences,  cooperation,  bilateral 
agreements:  Dominican  Republic,  Apr. 
80;  France,  Jan.  91 
Intellectual  property,  piracy  (Shultz), 

Sept.  11,  15 
Social  sciences,  cooperation,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Israel,  Apr.  80 
Strong-motion  data  acquisition  and 
analysis,  cooperative  program, 
memorandum  of  understanding  with 
Turkey,  June  88 
Technical  cooperation,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Saudi  Arabia,  Dec.  92 
U.S.  international  activities,  1983  report 
(Reagan),  Apr.  67 
Seabed  disarmament,  treaty  (1971),  acces- 
sion, Mexico,  Dec.  91 
Security  assistance,  U.S.: 
Appropriations  requests:  May  33,  34;  Burt, 
May  59;  Lyman,  May  45;  Schaffer, 
May  77;  Schneider,  May  75;  Shultz, 
May  20,  22,  37,  39,  40,  PR  68,  3/8,  PR 
69,  3/8,  PR  70,  3/8,  PR  71,  3/8; 
Wolfowitz,  May  52 
Defense  and  economic  cooperation,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Greece,  Mar.  74 
Grenada.  See  Grenada 
Mutual  logistics  support,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Luxembourg,  Mar.  74 
Training  related  to  defense  articles  under 
IMET  program,  bilateral  agreements: 
Equatorial  Guinea,  Gabon,  Sept.  79; 
The  Gambia,  Mar.  74;  Grenada,  Sept. 
79;  Guinea,  Oct.  51;  Liberia,  Jan.  91; 
Madagascar,  Sept.  79;  Mali,  June  87; 
St.  Christopher-Nevis,  June  88; 
Swaziland,  May  89;  Zaire,  Sept.  79 
Transfer  of  defense-related  technologies, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Japan,  Feb. 
47 
Security  Council,  U.N.,  Nov.  8 
Resolution,  freedom  of  navigation  in 
Persian  Gulf  (text),  Aug.  74 
Senegal:  Crocker,  Jan.  41;  Shultz,  Mar.  7 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  Feb. 

48,  June  88,  July  90,  Nov.  87 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  36; 
Lyman,  May  44,  45,  46;  Shultz,  May 
27 
Seychelles: 
International  civil  aviation  convention, 
protocols  (1977,  1980),  ratification, 
July  88 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request.  May  34 
Shamir,  Yitzhak,  Feb.  31 
Shcharansky,  Anatoly  (Shultz),  Dec.  10 
Shirley,  John  W.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Tanzania,  PR  159,  7/10 
Shlaudeman,  Harry:  Dam,  Dec.  72;  Shultz 

July  40,  84,  Dec.  7,  89 
Shultz,  George  P.: 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Afghanistan,  Apr.  17,  May  82,  Dec.  8, 

PR  65,  3/6,  PR  124,  5/7 
Africa,  Feb.  17,  Mar.  7,  Apr.  9,  May 
20,  26,  PR  219,  10/12 
Southern  Africa  peace  talks,  May  20, 
38,  July  37,  PR  38,  2/8,  PR  65, 
3/6,  PR  219,  10/12 


18 


Shultz,  George  P.  (Cont'd) 

Angola,  Apr.  11,  May  38,  July  37, 

Dec.  8 
ANZUS,  May  26,  Sept.  5,  16,  18,  21, 

PR  114,  4/19,  PR  165,  7/17,  PR  168, 
7/17 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  {for  details  see 

Arab-Israeli  conflict),  Jan.  33,  Feb. 
17,  Mar.  31,  32,  34,  48,  49,  Apr.  14, 
17,  May  37,  41,  July  42,  Dec.  8,  13, 
PR  217,  10/12,  PR  231A,  10/22,  PR 
242,  10/29 
Argentina,  Feb.  14,  15,  Apr.  19,  26, 
July  37,  Dec.  20,  PR  207,  9/24 
Arms  control  and  disarmament  {see  also 
Soviet  Union:  U.S.  arms  control 
negotiations),  June  28,  Sept.  12, 
Dec.  23,  57 
Chemical  weapons  convention,  pro- 
posed. Mar.  36,  37,  38,  40,  Apr. 
28,  May  38,  June  30,  Sept.  13, 
Dec.  21,  24,  PR  107,  4/6 
Asia,  Jan.  26,  July  36,  Sept.  3,  Oct.  20, 
Dec.  25 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations 
requests,  May  21,  23,  25,  29 
Association  of  South  East  Asian 

Nations,  May  21,  23,  Sept.  4,  6,  10, 
12,  Dec.  7,  8,  PR  163,  7/13,  PR  167, 
7/18,  PR  218,  10/12 
Aviation  safety,  ICAO  talks.  Mar.  42 
Barbados,  PR  39,  2/8,  PR  50,  2/22 
Beriin,  Mar.  36,  July  19 
Brazil,  Apr.  19,  22,  July  37,  Dec.  20, 
PR  34,  2/6,  PR  35,  2/7,  PR  36,  2/9, 
PR  38,  2/8 
Canada: 
Gulf  of  Maine  boundaries,  Dec.  59 
Ross  High  Dam  agreement,  PR  96, 

4/3 
U.S.  relations,  Feb.  16,  June  33, 
Dec.  5 
Chemical  weapons  use.  May  42,  June  30, 

Dec.  24 
China  {for  details  see  China),  Mar.  22, 
31,  June  36,  July  17,  36,  38,  Sept. 
3,  8,  10,  Oct.  20,  Dec.  7,  19,  PR 
114,  4/19,  PR  117,  4/23,  PR  120, 
4/30,  PR  124,  5/7,  PR  128,  5/11,  PR 
163,  7/13,  PR  192,  8/23,  PR  243, 
11/5,  PR243A,  11/5 
Cong^ressional-executive  relations,  Apr. 
17,  May  15,  32,  40,  41,  42,  PR  107, 
4/6 
Cyprus,  Mar.  39,  July  21,  Dec.  8 
Defense  and  national  security.  Mar.  38, 
Apr.  28,  May  41,  June  28,  31,  July 

21,  40,  Sept.  12,  17,  Nov.  40,  41, 
Dec.  4,  22,  PR  65,  3/6,  PR  114,  4/19 

Democracy  and  democratic  principles, 
Apr.  15,  26,  Dec.  10,  13,  PR  152, 
6/13 
National  Endowment  for  Democracy, 
Apr.  18,  27 
Developing  countries,  Apr.  27,  May  12, 

22,  27,  June  34,  July  41,  Sept.  9, 
15,  Nov.  33,  Dec.  7,  20 

Drugs,  international.  May  29,  Nov.  29, 
Dec.  9 


Shultz,  George  P.  (Cont'd) 

East-West  relations,  May  13,  June  36, 
July  13,  17,  Nov.  41,  Dec.  6,  21,  PR 
155,  6/21 
Economy,  domestic,  Apr.  27,  Dec.  3,  8 
Economy,  worid,  Apr.  27,  July  41,  Dec.  8 
London  Summit,  Dec.  6,  PR  152, 
6/13,  PR  155,  6/21 
Educational  exchange  programs,  Nov.  33 
El  Salvador  {for  details  see  El  Salvador), 
Feb.  12,  Mar.  4,  Apr.  14,  16,  17,  18, 
19,  26,  32,  Mar.  14,  19,  37,  39,  40, 
June  70,  July  37,  39,  84,  Dec.  87, 
PR  65,  3/6,  PR  98,  4/4,  PR  107,  4/6, 
PR  152,  6/13,  PR  235,  10/22 
Duarte  meeting  with  guerrilla  leaders, 
Dec.  7,  59,  87,  88,  89,  PR  224, 
10/15,  PR  228,  10/18,  PR  230, 
10/18 
Europe,  June  31,  July  20,  Oct.  20 
Chemical  weapons-free  zone,  proposed. 

Mar.  33 
Division  of.  Mar.  35,  36,  37,  38 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction 
talks,  Feb.  14,  Mar.  33,  36,  38, 
40,  41,  Apr.  28,  May  38,  June  30, 
Sept.  13,  Dec.  21,  24 
Stockholm  Conference  (CDE),  Feb.  10, 

14,  15,  17,  Mar.  32,  34,  39,  Apr. 
28,  May  16,  38,  Sept.  13,  Dec.  21,  1 
PR  155,  6/21 

U.S.  economic  relations,  Feb.  12,  16, 

Mar.  38,  June  58 
U.S.  missile  deployment,  Feb.  10,  11, 

15,  Apr.  28,  July  14,  17,  20,  36, 
39,  Dec.  23,  PR  65,  3/6 

Export  controls,  U.S.,  May  16,  June  34, 

July  16 
Extraterritoriality,  June  33 
Falklands/Malvinas  Islands,  Apr.  20  21 

22 
Foreign  aid,  Apr.  18,  Sept.  15 
Appropriations  requests.  May  17,  PR 
68,  3/8,  PR  69,  3/8,  PR  70,  3/8, 
PR  71,  3/8 
International  Security  and  Develop- 
ment Program,  FY  1984  and 
1985,  May  22 
Foreign  policy.  May  12,  25,  32,  39,  July 
35,  38,  39,  Oct.  18,  Nov.  40,  Dec.  5, 
11,  PR  152,  6/13,  PR  155,  9/24,  PR 
207,  9/24 
Foreign  Service  Day,  1984,  June  49 
Foreign  Service  Presidential  Award 
(Bartholomew),  ceremony,  PR  202, 
9/20 
Friedman,  Milton,  PR  65,  3/6 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of,  Feb.  10, 

July  22 
Grenada,  Jan.  27,  Apr.  19,  23,  24,  26,  27, 
May  14,  16,  19,  29,  Dec.  15,  PR  50, 
2/22,  PR  235,  10/22 
Holocaust,  PR  200,  9/17 
Honduras,  Apr.  19,  May  24,  28,  PR  107, 

4/6 
Hong  Kong,  Sept.  7,  Nov.  56,  PR  114, 

4/19,  PR  192,  8/23 
Human  rights.  Mar.  35,  Apr.  15,  32,  Dec, 
10,  12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  i  „( 


Shultz,  George  P.  (Cont'd) 

South  Africa,  Apr.  17,  18,  July  37, 

Dec.  8,  PR  219,  10/12 
Soviet  Union,  July  36,  Dec.  2,  4,  11, 
PR  147,  6/6,  PR  148,  6/8 
India,  funeral  of  Prime  Minister  Indira 

Gandhi,  PR  246,  11/5 
Indian  Ocean-Persian  Gulf  region.  May 
21,  25,  27,  39,  July  14,  15,  22,  PR 
147,  6/5,  PR  148,  6/8,  PR  217,  10/12 
Iran-Iraq  war.  May  38,  42,  July  15,  37, 
Dec.  8,  24,  25,  PR  147,  6/5,  PR  148, 
6/8,  PR  152,  6/13,  PR  155,  6/21 
Israel,  Jan.  34,  37,  Feb.  17,  Apr.  17,  May 
20,  28,  29,  32,  Dec.  8,  PR  172,  7/23, 
PR  231A,  10/22 
National  unity  government,  Nov.  34, 

PR  231A,  6/22 
U.S.  embassy,  question  of  relocation, 
May  38,  41,  PR  128,  5/11 
Japan,  July  36,  Sept.  3,  Dec.  6 
U.S.  visit  of  Foreign  Minister  Abe,  PR 
20,  1/27 
Jordan,  U.S.  assistance,  appropriations 
request.  May  20,  25,  28,  37,  38,  July 
42 
Kampuchea,  Sept.  4,  7,  10,  13,  Oct.  20, 
Dec.  8,  PR  114,  4/19,  PR  163,  7/13, 
PR  167,  7/18,  PR  221,  10/15 
Korea,  Republic  of,  Jan.  26,  27,  Apr.  17, 
19,  May  21,  23,  26,  28,  29,  June  37, 
Sept.  4 
Korean  Peninsula,  Mar.  6,  Dec.  8,  PR 
114,  4/19,  PR  117,  4/23,  PR  128, 
5/11 
Latin  America,  Central  America,  and 
Caribbean  {for  details  see  Latin 
America  aTid  names  of  individual 
countries): 
Contadora  process,  Jan.  38,  85,  Apr. 

14,  June  67,  68,  Sept.  13 
Draft  treaty  (acta),  Dec.  7,  88,  89,  90, 
PR  207,  9/24,  PR  224,  10/15,  PR 
231A,  10/22 
U.S.  position,  policy,  role,  Feb.  11, 
Mar.  4,  41,  Apr.  19,  21,  May  14, 
17,  23,  25,  June  67,  July  36,  39, 
41,  84,  Oct.  19,  Nov.  40,  Dec.  15, 
PR  98,  4/4,  PR  114,  4/19,  PR  124, 
5/7,  PR  125,  5/8,  PR  155,  6/21, 
PR  214,  10/11 
Lebanon,  Jan.  27,  35,  36,  Feb.  11,  15, 
17,  Mar.  5,  7,  32,  34,  37,  48,  Apr. 
24,  29,  31,  May  13,  37,  41,  42,  July 
37,  40,  Nov.  43,  Dec.  8,  PR  38,  2/8, 
PR  50,  2/22,  PR  65,  3/6 
Beirut  Embassy  bombings,  Nov.  43, 
Dec.  9,  12,  15,  PR  202,  9/20,  PR 
203,  9/20,  PR  204,  9/20,  PR  205, 
9/20,  PR  221,  10/15,  PR  230, 
10/18 
U.S.  Marines,  Jan.  32,  33,  36,  37,  Mar. 
31,  49,  Apr.  13,  22,  29,  30,  PR 
235,  10/22 
Libya,  May  20,  39,  Dec.  13,  14,  20,  PR 

128,  5/11,  PR  242,  10/29 
Madagascar,  Mar.  8 
Mexico,  May  30,  July  41,  Dec.  5,  89 


Shultz,  George  P.  (Cont'd) 

Middle  East,  July  37,  40,  42,  Sept.  10, 

PR  207,  9/24,  PR  242,  10/29 

Gulf  Cooperation  Council,  PR  217, 

10/12 

Namibia,  Apr.  11,  May  27,  38,  July  37, 

Dec.  8,  PR  219,  10/12 
Nicaragua  (for  details  see  Nicaragua), 
Jan.  38,  85,  Feb.  12,  Mar.  5,  6,  7, 
41,  Apr.  14,  19,  21,  26,  32,  May  42, 
June  67,  July  39,  Oct.  19,  Nov.  31, 
34,  Dec.  7,  9,  13,  PR  107,  4/6,  PR 
147,  6/5,  PR  152,  6/13,  PR  222, 
10/18,  PR  231A,  10/22,  PR  242A, 
10/29 
North  Atlantic  Council: 
Ministerial  meeting,  Brussels  (Dec.  7- 

9,  1983),  Feb.  15,  16 
Ministerial  meeting,  Washington  (May 
29-31),  July  13,  Dec.  21 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  Feb. 
10,  June  31,  July  14,  16,  22,  36,  39, 
Sept.  18,  Oct.  20,  Dec.  6,  21,  22,  23 
Spain,  accession,  Feb.  12,  July  20 
35th  anniversary,  July  18 
U.S.  security  assistance  to  southern 
flank,  May  21,  23,  26,  28,  29 
Norway,  July  20,  PR  207,  9/24 
Nuclear  energy,  Dec.  19,  20 
Nuclear  nonproliferation,  Mar.  36,  May 
12,  24,  27,  June  30,  32,  Dec.  10,  17, 
23,  25,  PR243A,  11/5 
Nuclear  war,  dangers  of,  Apr.  29,  Sept. 

12,  Nov.  43,  Dec.  22 
Olympic  Games,  Los  Angeles,  July  36, 

39,40 
Pacific  area,  Sept.  3,  5,  8,  9,  18,  21 
Panama  elections,  Nov.  33,  Dec.  10,  88 
Persian  Gulf.  See  Indian  Ocean-Persian 

Gulf 
Philippines,  Apr.  16,  19,  May  21,  26,  28 

29,  Sept.  5,  16,  PR  114,  4/19 
Poland,  Feb.  10,  15,  July  19,  Oct.  20,  PR 

228,  10/18 
Portugal,  defense  agreement  with  U.S., 
Feb.  18,  May  21,  July  21 
U.S.  security  assistance.  May  21,  26, 
28,29 
President  Reagan,  working  relations, 

July  42 
Refugee  admissions  for  FY  1985,  pro- 
posed, Nov.  34 
Sakharov,  Andrei,  and  Yelena  Bonner, 
July  36,  39,  Dec.  11,  PR  147,  6/5, 
PR  148,  6/8 
Security  assistance,  appropriations  re- 
quests, May  20,  22,  37,  39,  40,  PR 
68,  3/8,  PR  69,  3/8,  PR  70,  3/8,  PR 
71,  3/8 
Senegal,  Mar.  7,  May  27 
Somalia,  Mar.  8,  May  21,  27,  28 
South  Africa,  Apr.  11,  17,  18,  May  20, 
38,  July  37,  Dec.  8,  20,  PR  38,  2/8, 
PR  65,  3/6,  PR  93,  4/2,  PR  219, 
10/12,  PR  242,  10/29 
Soviet  Union  (for  details  see  Soviet 
Union): 
Andropov,  Yuriy,  Jan.  27,  Feb.  16, 
Apr.  43 


Shultz,  George  P.  (Cont'd) 

Human  rights,  Apr.  16,  July  36,  Dec. 
2,  4,  11,  PR  147,6/6,  PR  148,  6/8 

Meeting  of  President  Reagan  and  For- 
eign Minister  Gromyko,  Nov.  42, 
58,  Dec.  4,  12,  PR  210,  9/18 

Military  buildup,  deployments.  Mar.  6, 
38,  July  19,  21,  Sept.  6,  8,  18, 
Dec.  1,  PR  114,  4/19 

Soviet  noncompliance  with  arms  con- 
trol agreements.  Mar.  6,  Nov.  33, 

40,  41,  Dec.  23,  24,  PR  192,  8/23, 
PR  196,  9/12 

Submarine  in  Swedish  waters.  Mar.  37 
U.S.  arms  control  negotiations.  See 

under  Soviet  Union 
U.S.  grain  agreement,  PR  230,  10/18 
U.S.  relations,  Feb.  17,  Mar.  6,  7,  31, 

33,  35,  Apr.  12,  13,  33,  44,  May 

41,  July  38,  Nov.  39,  42,  44,  Dec. 
1,  PR  65,  3/6,  PR  66,  3/7,  PR  107, 
4/6,  PR  152,  6/13,  PR  201,  9/18, 
PR  207,  9/24,  PR  212,  10/9,  PR 
218,  10/12,  PR  228,  10/18,  PR 
229A,  10/22,  PR  230,  10/18,  PR 
243A,  11/5,  PR  252,  11/19 

U.S.  seamen,  detention,  PR  201,  9/18 
Space,  antisatellite  weapons,  June  31, 
Sept.  11,  18,  Nov.  39,  Dec.  21,  25, 
PR  152,  6/13,  PR  172,  7/23 
Spain,  Feb.  12,  May  21,  26,  28,  29 
State  Department: 
Appropriations  requests,  May  15,  PR 

92,  3/29 
Christmas  tree  lighting  ceremony,  PR 
267,  12/20 
Sudan,  Mar.  8,  May  21,  27,  28,  39 
Suriname,  Feb.  15,  PR  38,  2/8 
Syria,  Jan.  27,  33,  34,  35,  36,  37,  Mar. 
5,  7,  34,  Apr.  13,  29,  PR  231A, 
10/22 
Technology  transfers,  June  34,  July  17 
Terrorism,  international,  Jan.  28,  Apr. 

17,  30,  May  12,  June  37,  49,  Aug. 
29,  31,  PR  114,  4/19,  PR  117,  4/23, 
PR  242A,  10/29 

Central  America,  Feb.  4,  Apr.  16,  17, 

18,  19,  32,  May  25,  37,  42 
Lebanon,  Apr.  30,  32,  May  16,  20,  41, 
Nov.  43,  Dec.  8,  9,  15,  PR  107, 
4/6,  PR  202,  9/20,  PR  204,  9/20, 
PR  205,  9/20,  PR  221,  10/15,  PR 
230,  10/18 
Trade,  Feb.  12,  16,  Mar.  38,  Apr.  10, 
June  33,  Sept.  6,  11,  Dec.  9,  PR 
228,  10/18 
Conflicts  of  jurisdiction,  June  33 
Free  trade  and  antiprotectionism,  Apr. 
22,  27,  June  58,  Sept.  14,  Dec.  9, 
57,  59,  PR  228,  10/18,  PR  231A, 
10/22 
Tunisia,  Feb.  16,  May  28 
Turkey,  May  21,  26,  28,  29,  30,  July  15, 

18,  21 

UNESCO,  U.S.  notice  of  withdrawal, 

Feb.  41 
U.S.  Information  Agency,  Apr.  18,  PR 

203,  9/20 
U.S.  Marines,  tribute,  PR  131,  5/21 
Venezuela,  Apr.  20,  26 


nclex1984 


19 


Shultz,  George  P.  (Cont'd) 

War  Powers  Resolution,  May  15,  PR 

107,  4/6 
Zambia,  Mar.  8,  Apr.  11 
American  Legion  1984  Public  Spirit 

Award,  presentation  (Gear),  PR  66,  3/7 
Interviews,  PR  230,  10/18 
News  conferences,  transcripts,  Jan.  35, 
Feb.  10,  14,  17,  Mar.  4,  31,  36,  39, 
Apr.  19,  20,  23,  May  37,  July  13,  Sept. 
7,  10,  16,  21,  Dec.  56,  87,  88,  89,  PR 
38,  2/8,  PR  50,  2/22,  PR  117,  4/23,  PR 
155,  6/21,  PR  221,  10/15 
Press  briefings,  Nov.  58,  PR  128,  5/11, 

PR  207,  9/24 
Question  and  answer  sessions.  Mar.  7,  48, 
Apr.  12,  July  39,  Nov.  33,  PR  65,  3/6, 
PR  152,  6/13,  PR  228,  10/18,  PR 
229A,  10/22,  PR  242A,  10/29,  PR 
243A,  11/5 
Television  interviews,  Jan.  26,  Apr.  28,  30, 
May  40,  July  18,  Nov.  39,  42,  PR  107, 
4/6,  PR  114,  4/19,  PR  120,  4/30,  PR 
124,  5/7,  PR  147,  6/5,  PR  148,  6/8,  PR 
172,  7/23,  PR  192,  8/23,  PR  196,  7/12, 
PR  201,  9/18,  PR  204,  9/20,  PR  205, 
9/20,  PR  224,  10/15,  PR  235,  10/22, 
PR  252,  11/19 
Visits  to: 

Asia,  July  7,  PR  163,  7/13,  PR  173,  7/23 
Canada,  Dec.  55 

Egypt,  departure  remarks,  PR  244,  11/2 
El  Salvador,  Nicaragua,  July  84 
Europe,  Feb.  10,  Mar.  31 
Latin  America,  Apr.  15,  19 
North  Africa,  Feb.  10,  16 
Sierra  Leone: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  88,  90 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  36;  Lyman, 
May  46 
Singapore:  Shultz,  Sept.  16;  Wallis, 
Aug.  50 
Computer  software  diversion  problem 

(Shultz),  Sept.  11 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Mar. 

73,  Apr.  81,  July  90,  Sept.  78 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Roy),  swearing  in,  PR 

216,  10/12 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 

May  35;  Wolfowitz,  May  56 
Visit  of  Secretary  (Shultz),  Sept.  10 
Skoug,  Kenneth  N.,  Jr.,  Sept.  73 
Slavery,  abolition,  convention  (1926),  protocol 
(1953)  and  supplementary  convention 
(1956):  Cameroon,  Sept.  78;  Guatemala, 
Jan.  90 
Smith.  Raymond,  F.,  Sept.  42 
Smith,  Thomas  W.  M.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Nigeria,  PR  53,  2/24 
Soares,  Mario,  June  55 
Social  security,  bilateral  agreements:  Bel- 
gium, Canada,  Aug.  87;  Italy,  Norway, 
July  90;  U.K.,  May  89 
Solomon  Islands  (Reagan),  Aug.  63 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  89,  Aug. 

86,  Dec.  90 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Gardner),  swearing  in, 

PR  185,  8/17 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 
May  35;  Wolfowitz,  May  58 


20 


Somalia:  Abrams,  Nov.  62;  Dam,  Mar.  12; 
Shultz,  Mar.  8 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May  88,  Nov. 

86 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Crocker, 
Jan.  39,  40;  Lyman,  May  45,  47,  48; 
Shultz,  May  21,  27,  28 
Sorzano,  Jose  S.,  Aug.  73,  Nov.  4 
South  Africa:  Lyman,  May  43,  48;  Mubarak, 
Apr.  64;  Shultz,  Apr.  11,  PR  93,  4/2 
Human  rights:  Abrams,  Sept.  56;  Crocker, 
Jan.  42,  43;  Reagan,  Nov.  3;  Shultz, 
Apr.  17,  18,  July  37,  Dec.  8,  PR  219, 
10/12 
Nuclear  safeguards  and  exports  policy:  De- 
partment, Mar.  57;  Kennedy.  Oct.  40; 
Shultz,  Apr.  11,  Dec.  20 
Regional  peace  talks:  Apr.  36;  Dam,  Dec. 
72;  Reagan,  May  3;  Shultz,  May  20, 
38,  July  37,  PR  38,  2/8,  PR  65,  3/6,  PR 
242A,  10/29 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  48,  May  87 
U.S.  policy:  Abrams,  Sept.  59;  Crocker, 
Jan.  38,  42,  43,  44;  Shultz,  July  37 
Soviet  Union: 
Andropov,  Yuriy,  illness  and  death:  Bush, 
Apr.  7;  Reagan,  Apr.  1;  Shultz,  Jan. 
27,  Feb.  16,  Apr.  43;  White  House, 
Apr.  43 
Anti-Semitic  practices  (Shultz),  Dec.  1 1 
Economic,  industrial,  and  technical  co- 
operation, bilateral  agreement:  Oct.  52; 
Reagan,  Sept.  41 
Human  rights  (Shultz),  Apr.  16,  July  36, 

Dec.  2,  4,  11,  PR  147,  6/6,  PR  148,  6/8 
Intelligence  operations  and  propaganda 

(Knepper),  Aug.  53 
Jewish  emigration:  Reagan,  Feb.  4;  Shultz, 

Apr.  16,  Dec.  11 
Korean  airline  shootdown,  1983:  Jan.  28; 
Adelman,  Jan.  47;  Reagan,  Jan.  10,  18, 
19,  22,  23,  30;  Shultz,  Mar.  33,  42, 
June  37,  Nov.  41,  Dec.  2,  PR  203, 
9/20,  PR  229A,  10/22 
Anniversary  of:  Burt,  Nov.  60;  Depart- 
ment, Nov.  61 
Meeting  of  President  Reagan  and  For- 
eign Minister  Gromyko:  Armacost, 
Dec.  65;  Reagan,  Nov.  60;  Shultz,  Nov. 
42,  58,  Dec.  4,  12,  PR  210,  9/18;  White 
House,  Dec.  68 
Military  and  naval  buildup:  Dec.  26,  30; 
Adelman,  Jan.  45,  Nov.  46;  ANZUS, 
Sept.  19;  Armacost,  Dec.  67;  Burt, 
Apr.  50;  Cheysson,  July  3; 
Eagleburger,  May  49,  50;  NAC,  Feb. 
12,  July  12;  NATO,  Feb.  22;  Reagan, 
Jan.  15,  Feb.  1,  May  10,  June  22,  July 
6,  32,  Sept.  42;  Shultz,  Mar.  6,  38,  July 
19,  21,  Sept.  6,  8,  18,  Dec.  1.  6,  21,  PR 
114,  4/19;  Wolfowitz,  May  53,  Sept.  62 
Noncompliance  with  arms  control  agree- 
ments: Dec.  29;  Reagan,  Feb.  2,  Mar. 
8,  July  35;  Shultz,  Mar.  6,  Nov.  33,  40, 
41,  Dec.  23,  24,  PR  192,  8/23,  PR  196, 
9/12 
Fact  sheet.  Mar.  9 
Nuclear  nonproliferation  talks:  Adelman, 
July  45;  Shultz,  Dec.  19,  PR  243A, 
11/5 
Scientific  and  technological  exchanges  with 
U.S.  (Malone),  Aug.  72 


Soviet  Union  (Cont'd) 
Soviet  decisionmaking  process:  Eagle- 
burger,  May  51;  Nitze,  Aug.  34,  36; 
Palmer,  July  76;  Rowny,  Aug.  42; 
Shultz,  July  14 
Submarine  in  Swedish  waters  (Shultz), 

Mar.  37 
Submarines  off  U.S.  coast,  question  of: 
Adelman,  Nov.  47;  Reagan,  July  31 
Summit  meeting,  question  of:  Eagleburger, 
Apr,  34;  Reagan,  July  33,  Nov.  6; 
Shultz,  Apr.  13,  Nov.  39,  PR  152,  6/13, 
PR  252,  11/19 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May  87,  July 

90,  Sept.  80,  Oct.  52,  Nov.  87,  Dec.  91 
Underground  nuclear  testing,  verification 

agreement,  proposed  (Reagan),  Nov.  6 
U.S.  arms  control  negotiations:  Mar.  43, 
Aug.  4,  Dee.  28;  Adelman,  July  48,        • 
Nov.  45;  Armacost,  Dec.  65;  Burt, 
Apr.  48,  50;  Bush,  June  42,  Aug.  26; 
Cheysson,  July  4;  Dam,  Aug.  44; 
Eagleburger,  Apr.  34;  Kohl,  June  54; 
Luns,  July  5;  NAC,  Feb.  12,  13,  July 
9,  13;  Nitze,  Aug.  34;  Palmer,  July  75; 
Reagan,  Jan.  14,  Feb.  3,  May  3,  June 
2,  53,  July  8,  33,  Aug.  6,  17,  Nov.  5; 
Rowny,  Aug.  38;  Shultz,  Mar.  7,  35, 
36,  38,  39,  41,  May  41,  June  29,  July 
15,  21,  40,  Sept.  7,  11,  12,  Oct.  19, 
Nov.  39,  41,  42,  59,  Dec.  3,  6,  21,  22, 
PR  155,  6/21,  PR  221,  10/15;  White 
House,  Sept.  24;  Wolfowitz,  Sept.  61 
Acronyms,  Dec.  24 

Chernenko  statements:  Dec.  48;  Reagan, 
July  34;  Shultz,  Dec.  4,  PR  229A, 
10/22,  PR  235,  10/22,  PR  252,  11/19 
Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  (INF) 
negotiations:  Dec.  33,  36;  Adelman, 
Jan.  46,  48;  Burt,  Apr.  46,  48; 
Bush,  June  43;  Dam,  Aug.  45,  Oct. 
35,  Dec.  50;  Eagleburger,  May  51; 
Genscher,  Feb.  10;  NAC,  Feb.  12; 
Nakasone,  Jan.  4;  NATO,  Feb.  22; 
Nitze,  Aug.  35;  Reagan,  Jan.  4; 
Shultz,  Feb.  10,  11,  Mar.  5,  Apr.  33, 
44,  June  30,  July  21,  36,  39,  Dec.  24 
Soviet  suspensions  and  interruptions: 
Dec.  38;  ANZUS,  Sept.  19;  Burt, 
Mar.  44,  47,  Apr.  45,  48;  Bush,  June 
42,  43;  Dam,  Aug.  45;  Eagleburger, 
Apr.  34,  May  51;  Nitze,  Jan.  48, 
Aug.  35;  Palmer,  July  76;  Reagan, 
Jan.  48,  Feb.  3,  May  8,  July  31. 
Sept.  23,  Nov.  48,  49;  Rowny.  June 
44,  Aug.  38;  Shultz,  Feb.  14,  Mar. 
33,  38,  40,  Apr.  28,  29,  33,  44,  May 
38,  40,  July  36,  39 
Strategic  arms  reduction  talks  (START): 
Dec.  30;  Adelman,  Jan.  47;  Bush, 
June  43;  Dam,  Aug.  45;  Eagle- 
burger, May  50;  Reagan,  Jan.  9, 
May  2;  Rowny,  June  44,  Aug.  38; 
Shultz,  Feb.  14,  June  29,  Dec.  24 
U.S.  confidence-building  measures  (see  also 
Europe:  Confidence-  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  and  Disarmament 
Conference  (CDE)):  Dec.  41;  Reagan, 
Sept.  41;  Shultz,  Mar.  37,  June  31, 
Dec.  24;  White  House,  Sept.  43 


\ 


Department  cf  State  Bulletin 


wiet  Union  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  direct  communications  link  (hot  line): 
Sept.  80,  Dec.  41,  43;  Adelman.  Nov. 
45;  Reagan,  Sept.  41,  45,  Nov.  5; 
Shultz,  Dec.  24;  White  House,  Sept. 
44,  45;  Wolfowitz,  Sept.  61 
U.S.  economic  relations:  Dam,  Feb.  19; 
Palmer,  July  76;  Reagan,  Aug.  18; 
Wallis,  Mar.  29,  July  67 
Grain  agreement:  Dam,  Feb.  22;  Reagan, 
Nov.  6;  Shultz,  PR  230,  10/18 
U.S.  general  agreement  on  contacts,  ex- 
changes, and  cooperation:  Reagan, 
Sept.  41;  White  House,  Sept.  42 
U.S.  relations:  Armacost,  Dec.  65;  Burt, 
Apr.  44;  Bush,  Apr.  7;  Eagleburger, 
Apr.  41;  Reagan,  Feb.  1,  Mar.  1,  Apr. 
1,  4,  May  2,  July  30,  34,  Aug.  23, 
Sept.  41,  Nov.  5;  Shultz,  Feb.  17,  Mar. 
6,  7,  31,  33,  35,  Apr.  12,  13,  33,  May 
41,  July  38,  Nov.  39,  42,  44,  Dec.  1, 
PR  65,  3/6,  PR  66,  3/7,  PR  107,  4/6, 
PR  152,  6/13,  PR  201,  9/18,  PR  207, 
9/24,  PR  212,  10/9,  PR  218,  10/12,  PR 
228,  10/18,  PR  230.  10/18;  White 
House,  Apr.  43 
Chemenko  statements:  Shultz,  PR  229A, 
10/22,  PR  243A,  11/5,  PR  252, 
11/19;  White  House,  Dec.  67 
50th  anniversary,  exchange  of  letters, 

Jan.  53 
Soviet  leadership  changes,  question  of 
effect:  Eagleburger,  Apr.  34,  May 
51;  Reagan,  Apr.  1,  July  33,  34; 
Shultz,  Apr.  33,  44 
U.S.  sanctions  policy  (Wallis),  July  61 
U.S.  seamen,  detention  (Shultz),  PR  201, 

9/18 
U.S. -Soviet  moral  equivalence  (Kirk- 

patrick),  Aug.  57 
U.S.-Soviet  trade  and  economic  council 

meeting  (Palmer),  July  75 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Bush,  Apr.  5 
)ace: 

Antisatellite  weapons:  Dec.  47;  Adelman, 
July  46,  Nov.  45,  47;  Dam,  Aug.  46; 
j        NAC,  Feb.  14,  July  9;  Reagan,  May  8, 
June  48,  July  34,  Nov.  49;  Shultz,  June 
31,  Sept.  11,  18,  Nov.  39,  Dec.  21,  25, 
PR  152,  6/13,  PR  172,  7/23;  White 
House,  Sept.  24,  25 
Cooperation,  bilateral  agreement  with 

Spain,  Nov.  87 
Development  for  peaceful  uses  (Reagan), 

June  5,  15 
IGEODSS  (ground-based,  electro-optical 
deep  space  surveillance)  station, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Portugal, 
July  90 
Manned  space  stations,  future:  Aug.  4,  5; 

Malone,  Aug.  72;  Reagan,  Aug.  6 
IMoon  treaty  (1967):  Dec.  46;  China,  Mar. 

74 

U.S.-Soviet  simulated  space  rescue  mission, 
proposed:  Reagan,  Sept.  41;  White 
House,  Sept.  44 
U.S.  space  shuttle: 

Agreement  with  France  re  emergency 
use  of  Combined  Forces  Base  at 
Hao,  French  Polynesia,  Nov.  87 
Tracking  station  and  communication  fa- 
cility, bilateral  agreement  with 
Senegal,  June  88 


Spain: 
NATO,  accession  to:  Genscher,  Feb.  12; 

NATO,  Feb.  23;  Shultz,  Feb.  12 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  48, 

Mar.  73,  74,  Apr.  79,  80,  May  88,  June 
86,  July  88,  Aug.  88,  Nov.  87 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 
May  34;  Burt,  May  59,  60;  Shultz,  May 
21,  26,  28,  29 
Spiljak,  Mika,  Apr.  51 
Sri  Lanka: 
Profile,  Sept.  68 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  48,  Mar. 
73,  75,  Apr.  79,  May  87,  July  88,  Sept. 
79,  Oct.  50 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  35;  Schaffer, 
May  77,  80 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Jayewardene: 
Jayewardene,  Sept.  66,  68;  Reagan, 
Sept.  65,  67;  program,  PR  153,  6/13 
State  Department: 
Advisory  Committee  on  Investment,  Tech- 
nology, and  Development,  formation  of 
subcommittee  on  Food  and  Agricul- 
ture, PR  257,  12/4 
Appropriations  requests:  Kirkpatrick,  Apr. 

68;  Shultz,  May  15,  PR  92,  3/29 
Board  of  Appellate  Review  to  publish  de- 
cisions, Apr.  58 
Bureau  of  Economic  and  Business  Affairs, 
Special  Negotiator  (Carlisle),  nomina- 
tion, PR  226,  10/16 
Christmas  tree  lighting  ceremony  (Shultz), 

PR  267,  12/20 
Coordinator  for  International  Commimi- 
cation  and  Information  Policy 
(Dougan),  confirmation,  PR  176,  8/3 
Scientific  and  technological  cooperation 

role  (Malone),  Aug.  72 
Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Political 
Affairs  (Armacost),  nomination 
(Shultz),  PR  89,  3/23 
State  of  the  Union  (excerpts),  Reagan,  Mar.  1 
Stone,  Richard  (Shultz),  July  40 
Sudan:  Abrams,  Nov.  62;  Dam,  Mar.  12; 
Shultz,  Mar.  8,  May  39 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  75,  May 

88,  Nov.  87 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  34; 
Lyman,  May  44,  45,  47;  Schneider, 
May  75;  Shultz,  May  21,  27,  28 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Nimeiri:  Reagan, 
Nimeiri,  Jan.  44 
Sugar  (Wallis),  July  66 
International  agreement  (1977)  as  ex- 
tended: Bangladesh  (withdrawal),  Sept. 
78;  Venezuela,  Oct.  50 
Suriname:  Oct.  14;  Shultz,  Feb.  15,  PR  38, 
2/8 
Racial  discrimination,  elimination,  inter- 
national convention  (1965),  May  87 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request. 
May  34 
Swaziland  (Shultz),  Apr.  11 
IMET  program  training,  bilateral  agree- 
ment. May  89 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request,  May  36 
Sweden,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90, 
91,  Feb.  46,  Mar.  75,  May  89,  June  86, 
88,  July  89,  Sept.  79,  Nov.  87,  Dec.  92 


Switzerland,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan. 
90,  Mar.  75,  Apr.  81,  May  89,  July  89, 
Oct.  50 
Syria:  Dec.  25;  Burt,  Apr.  45;  Eagleburger, 
Mar.  51;  Reagan,  May  7;  Shultz,  Jan.  34, 
36,  37,  PR  231A,  10/22 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  Apr. 

80 
U.S.  airman  Goodman,  capture  and  subse- 
quent release:  Dam,  Feb.  28; 
Eagleburger,  Mar.  51;  Reagan,  Feb.  8, 
Mar.  53;  Shultz,  Jan.  35 


Tambs,  Lewis  Arthur,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Colombia,  PR  182,  8/13 
Tanzania:  Crocker,  Jan.  42;  Dam,  Mar.  12 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  86,  July 
88,89 

U.S.  Ambassador  (Shirley),  swearing  in, 
PR  159,  7/10 

U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request.  May  36 
Taylor,  Clyde  D.,  May  72 
Telecommunications  {see  also  Satellites): 

AM  broadcasting  service,  bilateral  agree- 
ment, Canada,  Apr.  80 

Frequency  modulation  broadcasting  in  the 
88  to  108  MHz  bands,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Mexico,  Aug.  88 

Government  procurement,  agreement 
(1980),  extension  of  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Japan,  May  88 

International  telecommunication  conven- 
tion (1973),  ratification,  Guatemala, 
Jan.  90 

International  Telecommunication  Union 
(ITU),  Nov.  23 
Secretary-(jeneral  Butler,  meeting 

with  U.S.  officials,  announcement, 
PR  237,  10/22 

Radio  Ceylon,  facilities,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Sri  Lanka,  Mar.  75 

Radio  communications  between  amateur 
stations  on  behalf  of  third  parties, 
bilateral  agreements:  Belize,  Aug.  87; 
Dominica,  Sept.  79;  Grenada,  Mar.  74; 
St.  Christopher-Nevis,  Nov.  87;  St. 
Vincent  and  the  Grenadines,  Feb.  48 

Radio  regulations,  Geneva  (1979):  Jamaica, 
Republic  of  Korea,  Oct.  50;  U.S.,  Jan. 
90 

Radio  telephone  stations,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Canada  (termination),  Sept. 
79 

U.S.-Netherlands  consultations,  PR  23, 
1/30 

U.S.  teleconrununication  delegation,  talks 
with  Japanese  officials,  announcement, 
PR  249,  11/8 

U.S.  telecommunication  delegation  to 
Mexico  City  meeting,  announcement, 
PR  239,  10/16 

Voice  of  America,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Costa  Rica,  Nov.  87 

World  Administrative  Radio  Conference 
(Marks),  Feb.  34 
Space  Services,  U.S.  delegation  chairman 
(Burch),  appointment,  PR  157,  7/5 


iidex  1984 


21 


Terrorism,  international:  NAC,  Feb.  14, 
July  11;  Reagan,  Apr.  51,  62,  Aug.  14, 
16;  Sayre,  Oct.  48;  Shultz,  Apr.  17,  May 
12,  June  49,  Aug.  29,  31,  Nov.  30,  Dec. 
12,  PR  114,  4/19,  PR  117,  4/23,  PR  155, 
6/21,  PR  243A,  11/5;  Spiljak,  Apr.  52; 
White  House,  June  65 
Central  America:  Bush,  Feb.  9;  Dam,  Jan. 
85;  Reagan,  Feb.  6,  June  23,  27; 
Shultz,  Feb.  4,  Apr.  16,  17,  18,  19,  32, 
May  25,  37,  42 
Freedom  fighters  distinguished  (Shultz), 
Aug.  32,  PR  156,  6/26,  PR  242A, 
10/29 
London  economic  summit,  declaration  on: 

Aug.  4;  Shultz,  Aug.  33 
Middle  East:  Dam,  Dec.  73;  Eagleburger, 
Mar.  49,  51;  Murphy,  Mar.  55,  56,  57; 
Reagan,  Jan.  19,  Feb.  6,  Mar.  47,  48, 
52,  Apr.  2,  May  7,  8,  June  49;  Shultz, 
Jan.  28,  Apr.  30,  32,  May  16,  20,  41, 
Nov.  43,  Dec.  8,  9,  15,  PR  107,  4/6,  PR 
230,  10/18;  White  House,  Jan.  69 
Prevention  and  punishment  of  crimes 

against  internationally  protected  per- 
sons, including  diplomatic  agents,  con- 
vention (1973),  Greece,  Sept.  78 
Provisional  IRA  (Shultz),  Dec.  13,  14 
Rangoon  (Burma)  bombing  incident:  Jan. 
28;  Nakasone,  Jan.  4;  Reagan,  Jan.  10, 
19,  22,  23,  30;  Shultz,  Jan.  26,  June 
37,  Sept.  5;  Wolfowitz,  May  53 
Soviet  role  (Shultz),  Aug.  32,  Dec.  13 
Sri  Lanka:  Jayewardene,  Sept.  67;  Reagan, 

Sept.  66 
U.N.  convention  against  taking  of  hostages 
(1979):  Portugal,  Sept.  78;  Spain,  June 
86 
U.S.  counterstrategy:  Department,  Nov. 
68;  Reagan,  June  65,  Dec.  86;  Sayre, 
Oct.  49;  Shultz,  Aug.  30,  32,  Dec.  9, 
15,  PR  156,  6/26 
U.S.  incidents:  Dam,  Dec.  73;  Reagan, 
Feb.  6 
Textiles  (Shultz),  Sept.  14 
Cotton,  wool,  and  man-made  textiles, 

bilateral  agreements:  Brazil,  Nov.  86, 
Dec.  91;  China,  Apr.  80;  Costa  Rica, 
May  88;  Dominican  Republic,  June  87, 
Dec.  91;  Haiti,  July  90,  Aug.  88;  Hong 
Kong,  June  87;  Hungary,  May  88,  June 
87;  Indonesia,  Apr.  80,  Oct.  51,  Nov. 
87;  Japan,  Aug.  88,  Dec.  91;  Korea, 
Feb.  47,  Oct.  51;  Macao,  Apr.  80;  Mex- 
ico, Nov.  87,  Dec.  91;  Pakistan,  Feb. 
48;  Philippines,  June  87;  Romania, 
Mar.  74,  Sept.  79;  Singapore,  July  90; 
Yugoslavia,  May  89,  June  88 
Exports  of  certain  textile  products  manu- 
factured in  Uruguay,  bilateral  agree- 
ment, July  90,  Dec.  92 
International  trade,  arrangement  (1973), 
accession,  China,  Apr.  80 
Protocol  extending  (1981):  China,  Apr. 
80;  Dominican  Republic,  May  88; 
Norway,  Oct.  51;  Yugoslavia,  Apr. 
80. 
Trade  in  textiles  and  textile  products, 

bilateral  agreement  with  Egypt,  Sept. 
79 
Visa  system  re  trade  in  certain  textile 

products,  administrative  arrangement 
with  Uruguay,  Dec.  92 


Textiles  (Cont'd) 
Wool  textile  and  textile  products,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Panama,  Oct.  52 
Thailand:  DiCarlo,  Jan.  70;  Shultz,  Sept.  16, 
Nov.  30;  Taylor,  May  74;  Wallis,  Aug.  50 
Refugees,  policy  of  first  asylum  for:  Shultz, 

Sept.  14;  Wolfowitz,  May  55 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  48, 
Mar.  73,  75,  July  90,  Sept.  79,  Oct.  50, 
52,  Nov.  87,  Dec.  92 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 

May  35;  Shultz,  May  21,  26,  28,  29,  30; 
Wolfowitz,  May  53,  54,  55 
U.S.  F-16-As,  proposed  purchase 

(Shultz),  Sept.  8 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Prem:  Reagan, 
Prem,  July  51;  program,  PR  109,  4/9 
Tillman,  Jackie  (Reagan),  July  27 
Togo: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  48,  Apr. 

81,  June  86,  Aug.  86,  Sept.  78,  Dec.  91 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Roberts),  swearing  in, 

PR  158,  7/10 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request.  May  36 
Tonga: 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Dillery),  swearing  in, 

PR  215,  10/11 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request: 
May  35;  Wolfowitz,  May  58 
Tourists  and  tourism,  bilateral  agreements: 

Mexico,  Apr.  80;  Yugoslavia,  Apr.  81 
Trade: 
Agricultural  trade:  Lamb,  July  65;  Motley, 

Aug.  76;  Wallis,  July  65 
Bovine  meat  arrangement  (1979): 

Colombia,  Aug.  87;  Egypt,  Jan.  90 
East  Asia  and  Pacific:  ANZUS,  Sept.  20; 
Armacost,  Dec.  66;  Shultz,  Sept.  14; 
Wallis,  Aug.  51 
Free  trade  and  antiprotectionism:  Jan.  29, 
Aug.  3;  ANZUS,  Sept.  19;  Burt,  Mar. 
45,  46,  Apr.  49;  Clark,  Dec.  59;  Dam, 
Feb.  20,  Mar.  13;  Eagleburger,  Apr. 
42;  Lamb,  July  63;  Motley,  Feb.  44, 
Aug.  74;  Nakasone,  Jan.  4;  Reagan, 
Jan.  5,  6,  10,  16,  18,  21,  23,  May  4, 
Nov.  2,  29;  Shultz,  Apr.  22,  27,  June 
58,  Sept.  14,  Dec.  9,  57,  59,  PR  228, 
10/18,  PR  231A,  10/22;  Wallis,  Mar. 
28,  July  52,  Aug.  48,  52 
General  agreement  on  tariffs  and  trade 
(GATT),  Wallis,  Mar.  29,  30,  July  54 
Article  VI  (antidumping),  implementation 
of,  agreement  (1979),  Singapore, 
Sept.  78 
Article  VII,  agreement  on  implemen- 
tation (1979,  1981):  Czechoslovakia, 
June  86,  Aug.  87;  Malawi,  May  87 
Article  XIX: 
Porcelain-on-steel  cookware,  memo- 
randum of  understanding  re  U.S. 
action:  Japan,  Spain,  Aug.  88 
Safeguards,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Canada,  May  88 
Articles  VI,  XVI,  and  XXIII,  interpre- 
tation and  application,  agreement 
(1979),  Egypt,  Jan.  90 
Multinational  trade  negotiations,  pro- 
posed: Aug.  4;  Lamb,  July  63; 
Motley,  Feb.  44;  Nakasone,  Jan.  4; 
Reagan,  Jan.  5,  Mar.  2;  Shultz,  Dec. 
9;  Wallis,  Mar.  29,  July  68,  Aug.  52 


Trade  (Cont'd) 

Provisional  application,  protocol  (1974): 
Antigua  and  Barbuda  (de  facto  ap- 
plication), Belize,  Jan.  90;  Brunei 
(de  facto  application),  Apr.  79; 
Maldives,  St.  Christopher-Nevis, 
Zambia,  Jan.  90 
Import  licensing  procedures,  agreement 

(1979),  Singapore,  Sept.  78 
Services:  Lamb,  July  64;  Motley,  Aug.  76 
Steel:  Burns,  July  57;  Reagan,  Nov.  27; 

Shultz,  Dec.  9;  Wallis.  Aug.  47 
Technical  barriers  to  trade,  agreement 

(1979),  Egypt,  Jan.  90 
U.S.  (see  also  Balance  of  payments), 
Shultz,  Sept.  6,  PR  228,  10/18 
Advanced  technology:  Adelman,  July  43; 
Burt,  Mar.  45;  Dam,  Mar.  14; 
Eagleburger,  Apr.  40;  Lamb,  July 
64;  Reagan,  Jan.  2 
Africa:  Crocker,  Jan.  41;  Shultz,  Apr.  10 
Conference  on  U.S.  Trade  and  Invest- 
ment in  Africa,  announcement, 
PR  112,  4/13 
Civil  aeronautical  products,  imported, 
airworthiness  and  environmental 
certification,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Canada,  Nov.  86 
Copper  (Shultz),  PR  228,  10/18 
Europe:  Burt,  Mar.  44;  Dam,  Mar.  14; 
NAC,  Feb.  13;  Shultz,  Feb.  12,  16, 
Mar.  38 
Generalized  system  of  preferences:  Jan. 
29;  Motley,  Feb.  44,  Aug.  75; 
Shultz,  Apr.  10,  Sept.  11 
Import  quotas  (Bums),  July  56 
Latin  America:  Nov.  71;  Bums,  July  55; 
Dam,  Jan.  80,  Mar.  14,  Dec.  71; 
Motley,  Feb.  44,  Aug.  74 
Men's  and  boys'  wool  and  manmade 

fiber  suits,  trade  in,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Yugoslavia,  Nov.  87 
Reciprocal  Trade  Act  of  1934,  50th  an- 
niversary (Department),  July  57 
Specialty  steel,  limitation  of  U.S.  im- 
ports, bilateral  agreements:  Argen- 
tina, Austria,  Canada,  Japan,  Feb. 
47;  Poland,  Spain,  Feb.  48;  Sweden, 
May  89 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Feb.  46, 
Mar.  73,  Apr.  79,  May  87,  June  86,  July 
88,  Aug.  86,  Sept.  78,  Oct.  51,  Nov.  86, 
Dec.  90 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Oct.  14 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  87 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Reagan, 
Jan.  84 
Trudeau,  Pierre  (Shultz),  July  22 
Trujillo,  Stephen  (Reagan),  Mar.  2 
Truman,  Harry  S.:  July  71  (quoted);  Luns, 

July  5 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands 

(Micronesia):  Nov.  12;  ANZUS,  Sept.  19; 
Reagan,  May  74;  Wolfowitz,  May  58,  PR 
95,  4/3 
Tsantes,  George  K.  (Shultz),  June  49 
Tunisia: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Aug.  87,  Oct. 
52 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Tunisia  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Murphy, 
May  67,  70;  Schneider,  May  75;  Shultz, 
Feb.  16,  May  28 
rurkey  {see  also  Cyprus):  Dam,  Mar.  12; 
NATO,  Feb.  23;  Shultz,  July  15,  18; 
Taylor,  May  73 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  91,  92, 

Mar.  73,  Apr.  79,  June  88 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  34;  Burt, 
May  59,  61;  Schneider,  May  75,  76; 
Shultz,  May  21,  26,  28,  29,  30,  July  21 
Duvalu: 
Treaty  of  friendship  with  U.S.,  Jan.  92 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Dillery),  swearing  in,  PR 
215,  10/11 


U 


Jganda: 
Human  rights  (Abrams).  Nov.  62 
International  coffee  agreement  (1983),  rati- 
fication deposited,  Feb.  46 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance,  ap- 
propriations request:  May  36;  Crocker, 
Jan.  40 
Jkrainian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic,  general 
regulations  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union 
(1979),  approval.  Mar.  74 
Jnited  Arab  Emirates,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc..  May  87,  Aug.  86 
Jnited  Kingdom  (Reagan),  May  4 
Brighton  bomb  attack  (Shultz),  Dec.  9,  12, 

14,  PR  230,  10/18 
Dependent  territories,  current  status,  Oct. 

15 
Northern  Ireland:  Fitz(}erald,  Aug.  13; 
Reagan,  Aug.  8,  14,  16;  Shultz,  Dec. 
13,  14 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  48, 

Mar.  73,  Apr.  79,  80,  May  87,  89,  Aug. 
88,  Sept.  78,  Nov.  86,  87,  Dec.  92 
Visit  of  President  Reagan,  Aug.  7 
United  Nations: 
Arms  control  committees,  conferences, 

agencies,  Nov.  19 
Membership: 
Brunei,  Nov.  86 
Kampuchea,  Vietnamese  challenge 

(Wolfowitz),  Nov.  53 
List,  Nov.  13 
Membership,  organization,  and  agencies, 

Nov.  7 
Privileges  and  immunities  of,  convention 
(1946),  accession,  Uruguay,  Apr.  80 
Profile,  Nov.  8 

Secretaries  General,  list,  Nov.  15 
U.S.  participation:  Nov.  22;  Kirkpatrick, 

Apr,  68;  Newell,  May  83 
U.S.  representatives,  list,  Nov.  11 
United  Nations  Capital  Development  Fund 

(Newell),  May  86 
United  Nations  Children's  Fund:  Nov.  16; 
McPherson,  May  66;  Newell,  May  85; 
Shultz,  May  31 
United  Nations  Commission  on  Human 

Rights  (Shultz),  Apr.  17 
United  Nations  Development  Program:  Nov. 
16;  McPherson,  May  66;  Newell,  May  85; 
Purcell,  Feb.  32;  Shultz,  May  31 


United  Nations  Education  and  Training  Pro- 
gram for  Southern  Africa  (Newell),  May 
86 
United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and 
Cultural  Organization,  U.S.  withdrawal: 
Newell,  May  83;  Reagan,  Apr.  67; 
Shultz,  Feb.  41,  Apr.  17 
United  Nations  Environment  Program:  Nov. 

16,  23;  Newell,  May  86 
United  Nations  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control 

(Taylor),  May  74 
United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refu- 
gees: Nov.  16;  Purcell,  Feb.  32,  Dec.  83; 
Shultz,  Nov.  35 
United  Nations  Industrial  Development 
Organization: 
Constitution  (1979),  with  annexes:  Bhutan, 
Jan.  91;  Costa  Rica,  Mar.  74; 
Equatorial  Guinea,  July  80;  Guyana, 
Ireland,  Sept.  78;  Israel,  Mozambique, 
Nepal,  Feb.  46;  Portugal,  Aug.  87;  Sao 
Tome  and  Principe,  Feb.  46;  Senegal, 
Yemen  (Sanaa),  Jan.  91 
Industrial  Investment  Promotion  Service 
(Newell),  May  87 
United  Nations  Trusteeship  Council,  Nov.  12 
United  Nations  Voluntary  Fund  for  the 

Decade  for  Women  (Newell),  May  86 
United  States  Information  Agency: 

McPherson,  May  66;  Shultz,  Apr.  18,  PR 
203,  9/20 
United  States  Marines,  tribute  (Shultz),  PR 

131,  5/21 
Upper  Volta,  U.S.  economic  and  security  as- 
sistance, appropriations  request:  May  36; 
Crocker,  Jan.  40 
Uruguay,  May  35 
Democratic  progress:  Oct.  14;  Abrams, 

Jan.  55;  Dam,  Dec.  72;  Michel,  Jan.  58; 
Motley,  Feb.  44;  Reagan  (quoted),  Jan. 
56;  Shultz,  Apr.  19 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Feb. 
46,  Apr.  80,  June  88,  July  90,  Oct.  50, 
Dec.  92 


Vanuatu  (Reagan),  Aug.  63 
Geneva  conventions  (1949),  accession,  Nov. 
86 
Venezuela: 
Democratic  progress:  Oct.  14;  Motley,  Oct. 

1;  Shultz,  Apr.  20,  26 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Oct.  50,  Dec.  90 
U.S.  assistance.  May  35 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Lucinchi,  program, 
PR  255,  10/29 
Veterans  of  Foreign  Wars  (Shultz),  Oct.  18 
Vietnam: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  88,  Sept. 

78 
U.S.  prisoners  of  war  and  missing-in-action 
issue:  Shultz,  Sept.  4,  11,  14; 
Wolfowitz,  Oct.  25 
U.S.  relations,  question  of  (Wolfowitz), 

Nov.  54 
Use  of  chemical  weapons.  See  Chemical  and 
antipersonnel  weapons,  reports  of  use 
Visas,  diplomatic  and  other  visas,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Soviet  Union,  Nov.  87 


Voice  of  America:  Reagan,  May  5;  Shultz,  PR 
203,  9/20 
Bilateral  agreement  with  Costa  Rica,  Nov. 
87 


w 


Walker,  Richard  Louis,  biography,  Jan.  21 
Wallenberg,  Raoul  (Shultz),  Mar.  34,  40 
Wallis,  W.  Allen,  Mar.  27,  July  52,  60,  65, 

68,  Aug.  47,  50,  Sept.  36 
Weinberger,  Caspar  W.,  Apr.  59 
Wendt,  E.  Allan,  Dec.  60 
Western  Samoa  (Reagan),  Aug.  63 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  87,  Dec.  91 
Wheat: 
Food  aid  convention  (1980),  European 
Economic  Community,  Sept.  78 
Protocol  for  extension  (1983):  Austria, 
June  86;  Belgium,  Finland,  Feb.  47; 
France.  Oct.  51;  Luxembourg,  Aug. 
87;  Spain,  U.K.,  Apr.  80 
Wheat  trade  convention  (1971),  protocol  for 
extension  (1983),  Oct.  51 
Current  actions:  Algeria,  Apr.  80; 

Austria,  June  86;  Belgium,  Feb.  47; 
Ecuador,  Apr.  80;  Finland,  Feb.  47; 
Luxembourg,  Aug.  87;  Portugal, 
May  88;  Spain,  Apr.  80; 
Switzerland,  July  89;  Syria,  Apr.  80; 
Tunisia,  Aug.  87;  Turkey,  Jan.  91; 
U.K.,  Apr.  80 
Wine,  international  office  (Paris),  agree- 
ment creating  (1924),  accession,  U.S., 
Apr.  80 
Winsor,  Curtin,  Jr.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Costa  Rica,  PR  184,  8/14 
Wolfowitz,  Paul  D.,  Mar.  16,  May  52,  July 
49,  Sept.  25,  28,  66,  Oct.  25,  Nov.  51,  54 
Biography,  Mar.  18 
Women,  discrimination,  convention  for  elim- 
ination of  (1979):  Brazil,  Apr.  80;  France, 
Feb.  47;  Indonesia,  Nov.  86;  Kenya,  May 
88;  Liberia,  Mauritius,  Sept.  78;  Nigeria, 
July  89;  Spain,  Mar.  74;  Yemen  (Aden), 
Aug.  87 
World  Intellectual  Property  Organization, 
convention  (1967):  Cyprus,  Oct.  50;  New 
Zealand,  Rwanda,  July  89;  Venezuela, 
Dec.  90 


Yemen  (Aden),  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

Aug.  87 
Yemen  Arab  Republic  (Sanaa): 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  91, 

Mar.  74,  June  87,  Sept.  80 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
appropriations  request:  May  34;  Mur- 
phy, May  70;  Shultz,  May  25,  28 
Yugoslavia: 
Profile,  Apr.  52 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  46,  Apr. 
80,  81,  May  88,  June  86,  88,  July  90, 
Aug.  88,  Nov.  87 
U.S.  assistance,  appropriations  request, 

May  34 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Spiljak:  Reagan, 
Spiljak,  Apr.  51;  program,  PR  21,  1/27 


Index  1984 


23 


Z  Zambia:  Crocker,  Jan.  42;  Shu]tz,  Mar.  8,  Zimbabwe:  Crocker,  Jan.  40,  42,  43;  Shultz, 

Apr.  11  Apr.  11,  18 

7airo-  Ahrpm<;  Spnt  -iS-  Shultz  Anr   18  Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  90,  Apr.  Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  88 

PR  207  9/24  81,  J^y  89,  Dec.  92  U.S.  Ambassador  (Miller),  swearing  in, 

Tr«atip«  MTPPments  etc    Jan  90  Mar.  U.S.  economic  assistance,  appropriations  PR  116,  4/23 

vr'inlv  90  Sect  8o"0ct  52  '  request:  May  36;  Lyman,  May  44.  48  U.S.  economic  and  secunty  assistance, 

U  S  economic  and  security  assistance,  Zanatta,  Peter  Robert  (Reagan),  Aug.  23  appropriations  request:  May  36; 

appropriations  request:  May  36;  Zhao  Ziyang,  Mar.  21,  23,  24  Lyman,  May  48 
Abrams,  Sept.  56;  Lyman,  May  45,  47; 
Shultz,  May  27 


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