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-m of state -m-^ J ^

bulletMU

ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volunne 84 / Number 2090

nrr \ t '984

September 1984

««»,,,

The Secretary / 3
U.S.S.R. /41
Human Rights / 48

^^Ih 0fw

^ /

Cover: Secretary Shultz

Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams

Departmpni of Siatp

bulletin

Volume 84 / Number 2090 / September 1984

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and
graphs) are published frequently to
provide additional information on current
issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

SHARON R. LOTZ

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. U.se of funds for printing this
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Office of Management and Budget through March 31,
1987.

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CONTENTS

The President

1 A Force for Freedom in the

Caribbean

2 News Conference of July 24

(Excerpts)

The Secretary

3 Asia-Pacific and the Future

7 Secretary Visits Asia; Attends

ASEA'N and ANZUS Meetings
(Warren Cooper, William
Hayden, Secretary Shultz, Text of
ANZUS Communique)

Human Rights

48 Extending Voluntary Departure

for El Salvadorans (Elliott
A bra ma)

49 Persecution and Restrictions of

Religion in Nicaragua (Elliott

Abrams)
51 Captive Nations Weei<, 1984

(Proclam.ation)
53 Human Rights in Cuba (Elliott

Abramn)
55 Human Rights Situation in Zaire

and South Africa (Elliott

Abrams)

Arms Control

Status of Conference on Disarm-
ament in Europe (President
Reagan)
Proposed Outer Space Negotia-
tions (White House Statements)

East Asia

25 The U.S.-China Trade Relation-
ship (Paul D. Wolfowitz)

28 Taking Stock of U.S. -Japan

Relations (Paul D. Wolfowitz)

34 U.S. -Asia Security: Economic and
Political Dimensions
(William A. Browyi)

Economics

World Economic Prospects
(Allen W. Wallis)

The Bretton Wood Legacy: Its
Continuing Relevance
(Richard T. McCormack)

Europe

41 U.S. -Soviet Bilateral Relations

(President Reagan, White House
Fact Sheet)

42 U.S. -Soviet Consular Agreement

(Department Statement)

45 U.S. -Soviet Union Expand "Hot

Line" Agreement (President
Reagan, White House Fact
Sheet)

46 19th Report on Cyprus (Message

to the Congress)

Food

46 Food for Peace Day,
(President Reagan,
Proclamation)

1984

Pacific

60 The ANZUS Relationship:

Alliance Management (Paul D.
Wolfowitz)

Refugees

64 African Refugees Relief Day, 1984

(Proclamation)

South Asia

65 Visit of Sri Lankan President
(J. R. Jayewardetie, President
Reagan)

Western Hemisphere

69 Review of Nicaragua's Commit-
ments to the OAS (J. William
Middendorf H)

71 Elections in Guatemala (White

House Statement)

72 President Meets With El

Salvador's President (White
House Statement)

73 Cuba as a Model and a Challenge

(Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr.)

Treaties

78 Current Actions

Chronology

80 July 1984

Press Releases

82 Department of State

Publications

82 Department of State

Index

HE PRESIDENT

A Force for Freedom
in the Carribbean

President Reagan's remarks to a Caribbean leaders
iference at Russell House Student Center at the University of
South Carolina in Columbia, on July 19, 1984^

a special honor and a pleasure for
to participate in this gathering of
lers from the Caribbean. You're
)ng our nearest neighbors and our
est friends. Our societies, economies,
histories have been intertwined
Ti the earliest days of the Americas.
As we face the future together, I
ik we have good reason to be confi-
t. Four years ago economic prospects
•e bleak and the forces of tyranny
e on the move, emboldened by what
med to be a paralysis among the
locratic peoples of the hemisphere.
But by joining together with courage
determination, we've turned that
ation around. Now the tide of the
ire is a freedom tide. The free people
his hemisphere are united and share
)mmon sense of purpose. Nowhere is
t more apparent than with the
ted States and the Caribbean
locracies as has been so evident in
meeting today.

Over these past 4 years, we've
ved to encourage democracy,
ance the economic vitality of the
ion, and cooperate in the defense of
jdom. Now, these are not separate
,1s. They are mutually reinforcing,
'sident Jorge Blanco pointed that out
lier this year when he observed,
ead, health, education, liberty,
nocracy, and peace are indivisible and
!placeable values."
I firmly believe that democratic
'ernment is the birthright of every
lerican. And when I say American,
talking about all of us in this
■stern Hemisphere, which together is
ed the Americas. All of us from the
■th slope of Alaska to the tip of Tierra
Fuego. And much progress has been
de. Today, 26 of 33 independent
intries in the hemisphere — countries

with 90% of the hemisphere's popula-
tion — are democratic or in transition to
democracy.

You realize when I refer to
"democratic," I do so with a small "d."
[Laughter.]

Your own democracies are an exam-
ple to developing countries everywhere.
That's not to say that you don't face
great challenges. The worldwide reces-
sion has profoundly affected the Carib-
bean with market prices for key com-
modities you produce dropping even as
the costs of your imports were rising.
The United States has been hardpressed
economically. But we've done our best to
help and provide hope and we'll continue
to do so. The United States has a deep
and abiding interest in the well-being of
its neighbors.

In these last 3 years, we've begun to
put our own economic house in order by
cutting down the growth of government
spending and regulations. We're enjoy-
ing high growth, declining unemploy-
ment and low inflation. And we've
become, once again, an engine for
worldwide economic progress. We
believe the secret of that success is
lower tax rates. And that's a secret
everyone can share and benefit from.

At the same time, we've increased
our aid to the region and helped
strengthen the International Monetary
Fund's [IMF] ability to assist countries
with debt problems. But let's be
realistic, stop-gap measures with the
IMF are merely that, temporary solu-
tions. The ultimate solution is strong
and steady growth in every Caribbean
country.

Our Caribbean Basin Initiative now
getting underway gives your people new
access to the world's largest and most
dynamic government— market, I meant
to say. Too much television. [Laughter.]
It encourages job-creating business in-
vestment for growth and prosperity and
is being put into place at a time when a
strong dollar and an expanding
American economy can translate into
greater demand for your products. The
Caribbean Basin Initiative is part of our
broader, overall economic strategy to
improve economic vitality and raise liv-
ing standards throughout the Caribbean.

We can and must work together to
improve the well-being of our people and
to ensure our safety as well. I'd like to
take this opportunity to congratulate
many of you for your courage and
leadership in turning back the com-
munist power grab in Grenada last fall.
We can be proud that thanks to the
unity and determination of our democ-
racies, we saved the peoples of that
troubled island, we restored their
freedom, we revived their hope in the
future, and we prevented danger and
turmoil from spreading beyond
Grenada's shores. Let us always
remember the crucial distinction be-
tween the legitimate use of force for
liberation versus totalitarian aggression
for conquest.

But, what was happening in
Grenada was not an isolated incident.
The Soviet bloc and Cuba have been
committing enormous resources to
undermining our liberty and in-
dependence. Nowhere is this threat
more pressing than in Nicaragua, a
country which today marks the fifth
year of Sandinista dictatorship. The San-
dinista revolution, like Castro's revolu-
tion, is a revolution betrayed. And now
faced with mounting internal pressures
and disallusionment abroad, the San-
dinistas have announced an election for
November of this year. We would
wholeheartedly welcome a genuine
democratic election in Nicaragua. But no
person committed to democracy will be
taken in by a Soviet-style sham election.

The situation in Nicaragua is not
promising; but if the Sandinistas would
keep their original commitment, permit
free elections, respect human rights, and
establish an independent nation, conflict
in the region would subside.

In the meantime, we have a moral
responsibility to support anyone who
aspires to live in a true democracy, free
from communist interference. If the

ptember 1984

THE PRESIDENT

democratic peoples do not stand
together, we certainly will be unable to
stand alone.

Just a few years ago, totalitarianism
was on the rise. But there's a new spirit
among democratic peoples. Prime
Minister Adams described it. when he
said, "There is a community of interest
among democratic countries which can

transcend ethnicity and differences in
economic development." This spirit is a
powerful new force for freedom in the
world today.

What we do together, as a family of
""fi^irien and women will determine
what the future will be like for our
children. If we're strong enough to live
up to our shared values, the promise of

News Conference of July 24 (Excerpts)

Excerpts from President Reagan's
news conference of July 2h. 198Jt.'^

Q. Mr. Mondale said in his acceptance
speech that 100 days into his presiden-
cy he would stop the secret war
against Nicaragua. I assume that
you're going to continue your policy
down there in that respect, and he
also implied, of course, once again,
that you, as President, will be trigger
happy and will get us into war. How
will you answer both of those?

A. I'm not trigger happy, and hav-
ing known four wars in my lifetime, I'm
going to do everything I can. I think the
greatest requirement is to strive for
peace, and I'm going to do that.

And, again, I think there was some
demagoguery in this. But, it's my
understanding that all of you have been
given a report— has a kind of a green
cover — on the Nicaraguan situation, and
it has also been delivered to every
member of the Congress.

And believe me, I wouldn't "round
file" those. I'd look at them. Because the
information is in there, it reveals that
everything we've said about the San-
dinista government is a proven fact.
They are trying to destroy El Salvador
by providing the rebels there with the
wherewithal to do it. They are a
totiilitarian government, but you'll also
find in there a statement by Ogarkov of
the Soviet military. This was prior to
our rescue mission in Grenada.

But he openly stated that after all
the years of only having a base in the
Western hemisphere in Cuba, that now
they had bases here in Nicaragua and in

Grenada. Well, they don't have one in
Grenada anymore. And I think that it is
the responsibility of this government to
assist the people of Nicaragua in seeing
that they don't have one in Nicaragua.

Q. Vice President Bush has
asserted that Mondale and the
Democrats don't understand the com-
munist threat in Central America. Do
you agree?

A. That they don't understand the
communist threat? Well, either that, or
they're ignoring it.

Q. Do you think they're ignoring
it?

A. They seem to be opposing
everything that we've tried to do, in-
cluding the aid to El Salvador. As a
matter of fact, I've been very worried
that their niggardly treatment of El
Salvador is such that we might see — it's
comparable to letting El Salvador slowly
bleed to death. And then they would be
able to point a finger and say, "Well,
see, your program didn't work."

Q. The Polish Government is
releasing hundreds of political
prisoners in a move that appears to
meet one of your conditions for nor-
malizing relations. You have removed
some of the sanctions you imposed a
couple of years ago. Will you remove
others, and if so, when do you think
youll be acting?

A. We're studying what they've
done in their legislation on amnesty very
carefully right now. Our purpose from
the beginning has been, with regard to
the sanctions, that we know that in
some instances those sanctions are
penalizing not only the Government of
Poland with which we're not in very

freedom and opportunity for the new
world will at long last be realized.

By working together, the free peo)
of this hemisphere can make certain tt
the next century will indeed be our cei
tury, a democratic century.

'Text from White House press release;
opening and closing paragrapns are omitte
here. ■

much sympathy, but the people
themselves. We don't want to impose
hardships on the people.

And if their legislation on amnest;
and things of that kind have met the
conditions that we laid down — yes, wi
will meet with regard to lifting the sa
tions.

Q. Could the United States con-
tinue its defense commitments to N
Zealand if it's denied court access f
nuclear ships? And, if this happens,
would it effect American trade wit]
New Zealand?

A. I don't think that would effect
trade. But I do know, and I would
rather not get in too deeply to
anything — because that is something
that will be worked out and negotiate
with the new Government of New
Zealand. And I have every reason to
optimistic that there won't be any de
to our ships.

Q. If the port access is denied,
the Labor Party says it will do, wo
the United States conclude a separ
peace treaty with Australia.

A. I don't want to get into thing
anything that might sound as if I'm
pressuring or threatening or anythir
the kind. So, let me just say that we
going to do our best to persuade the
that it is in their best interests as wi
as ours for us to continue with our
alliance, with ANZUS, those countri
as we have been.

iio
III
itoi
!lol
m
4,1

■mi

'Text from White House pres.s releas

1(1

Department of State Bui III

?phe

iE SECRETARY

^sia-Pacific and the Future

Secretary Skidtz's address before the
mcil 071 Foreign Relations in
lolulu on July 18, 1984.^

'* understand the future, you must
lerstand the Pacific. I came to this
elusion in the course of many trips to
a and the Pacific as a private citizen,
five trips to the region as Secretary
5tate have strengthened my convic-
1. In economic development, in the
wth of free institutions, and in grow-
global influence, the Pacific is in-
' asingly where the action is. As impor-
t as it was a few years ago, it is
re important today. And it will be
n more so tomorrow.
Americans welcome this. We see in
growth of this region a vitality that
mises a better future for all. When
isident Reagan addressed the
anese Diet last November he said:

For my part. I welcome this new Pacific
. Let it roll peacefully on, carrying a two-
flow of people and ideas that can break
n barriers of suspicion and mistrust and
d up bonds of cooperation and shared
mism.

Hawaii, our gateway to the region,
jrs vivid and dynamic evidence of
lerica's role as a great Pacific nation.
-e the historical westward movement
)ur population has been enriched by

growing diversity of talented im-
jants, including so many of

anese, Chinese, Filipino, Korean,
:ific island, and other Asian origins,
security, as symbolized by the silent

imony of the Pearl Harbor memorial,
aextricably bound to these islands

to events throughout this portion of

globe.

And Hawaii, like our nation as a
ole, enjoys a rich flow of two-way in-
tment and trade with Asia and the
;Lfic. While our trade with the rest of

world last year grew by only one-
f percent, trade with this region grew
, reaching $135 billion. That means
,t over one-third of our total world
de is done with Asia and the
3ific — and it exceeds by nearly a
irter our overseas trade with any
ler area.

)nly a few years ago people said that
lerica's interest and America's
!sence were receding in Asia; they
d we were pulling back. Well, in the
t few years we have turned that
)und, and all kinds of people recognize

that fact. As the authoritative Chinese
journal, International Studies Research,
put it, "1983 was a year symbolizing the
return of the United States to Asia."
As we look around the region, we
see good news in many places, good
news for American interests and good
news for the people of the Asia-Pacific
region. A fresh and confident American
foreign policy approach is in tune with
the dynamism of the region and has
helped foster a string of success stories.
Let me run through a partial list.

Japan

The U.S. -Japan relationship has
emerged as one of the most important in
the world. Today our excellent relations
with Japan are particularly reinforced
by the warm personal relationship be-
tween President Reagan and Prime
Minister Nakasone, who have met
together four times in just the last year
and a half. It is a far cry today from
1960, when the first American Presiden-
tial visit to Japan was canceled because
of anti-American rioting.

During the President's visit to Tokyo
last fall, and in intensive efforts since
then, we have worked cooperatively with

Japan's new and more active
diplomacy has brought a stronger com-
mon interest in arms control. At the
Williamsburg summit hosted by Presi-
dent Reagan, Japan participated for the
first time in a joint statement on arms
control and security— and did so again at
the London summit last June.

Although there is more that Japan
needs to do, America has benefited from
Japan's increased defense capabilities
and deepened cooperation with us.
Japanese support for U.S. bases in
Japan, for example, now exceeds
$1 billion— or more than $22,000 for
every U.S. serviceman stationed there.

China

Relations with China are more solid and
stable than ever. We have freed
ourselves of exaggerated fears and
unreal expectations, and we are focusing
on the significant interests our countries
have in common.

• Last year, President Reagan
decided on a major liberalization of high
technology trade with China. This move
offers significant trade prospects for
American exporters and acknowledges
our interest in participating in China's
economic modernization.

• We have smoothed the way for
economic interaction between our two
very different systems by negotiating

We have expanded our cooperation with Japan
as it has become one of the principal donors of
economic assistance to the Third World. . . .

the Japanese to achieve more equitable
access for U.S. products to Japan's
markets, with solid results in the areas
of computers, telecommunications equip-
ment, semiconductors, agricultural prod-
ucts, and many others, as well as access
to Japan's important financial markets.
Much remains to be done, but there is a
record of solid accomplishment.

We have expanded our cooperation
with Japan as it has become one of the
principal donors of economic assistance
to the Third World, not limited to the
Asia-Pacific region but including such
key countries as Egypt, Turkey, and
Pakistan. And Japan is now taking a
new and helpful role in the Caribbean.

agreements on important issues like tax-
ation of foreign businesses, textiles, civil
aviation, and industrial and technological
cooperation.

• China's Minister of Defense and
ours have had an important exchange of
visits. Careful discussions have begun on
ways in which American technology and
equipment might better enable China to
counter Soviet military intimidation.
This is an important development, but it
is also an area where we give careful
consideration to the concerns of our
allies and other friends in the region.
During those frigid years when we had
no contact with China, we were much
criticized. Today we are able to play a
constructive role in China's moderniza-
tion and changing relationship with
Asia.

THE SECRETARY

• And, for the first time since nor-
malization, an American President iias
visited China. President Reagan's trip
made an important contribution, not
only because of the warmth of the recep-
tion and the substance of the discussions
but also by the candor and directness
with which the President addressed our
concerns as well as our hopes.

Throughout our recent development
of the U.S. -China relationship. President
Reagan has insisted that we not harm
our old friends in the course of mai<ing
new ones. Our relations with the people
of Taiwan, although unofficial, are warm
and steadily expanding. Last year our
two-way trade with Taiwan passed the
$1.') billion level.

Korea

Korean confidence in our commitment to
their defense was shaken by President
Carter's planned withdrawal of U.S.
troops. The effects throughout Asia
were profound. Today, their confi-
dence has been substantially restored,
bolstered most recently by the
President's visit. Our policies in support
of South Korean statesmanship helped
the region to survive the shock of the
Rangoon bombing without escalation to
far wider violence. In the past, such an
event might have led to war. Today,
however, we have helped build a safety

To emphasize the importance we at-
tach to Korea, President Reagan within
weeks of his inauguration met with
President Chun Doo-hwan. Since the
release of a prominent opposition figure
in early 1981, we have seen important
relaxations of authoritarian controls in
South Korea, including the release of
many more political prisoners, the
reduction of restrictions on political ac-
tivity, and the removal of police control
from campuses. Much remains to be
done, but even gradual steps toward
liberalization are not easy for a country
in a virtual state of war, one whose sur-
vival depends on maintaining political
stability. We regard as particularly
significant President Chun's declared in-
tention to turn over power peacefully
when his term ends in 1988, for only
where peaceful change is routine can
genuine political stability prevail.

Southeast Asia

I have just returned from the annual
meeting of ASEAN — the Association of
South East Asian Nations— whose work
is of the greatest importance to our
overall Pacific policy. Each of the na-
tions of this remarkable regional
group — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, Thailand, and, most
recently, Brunei — has a unique impor-
tance. They are diverse in almost every
respect, except in their common commit-

Our exports to Korea for just a single year now ex-
ceed the entire total of economic aid we gave Korea
from 1946 until the program ended in 1981.

net of supportive ties and mutual con-
fidence that is a major factor for keep-
ing the peace.

Bolstered by confidence in its securi-
ty, the Korean economy has been boom-
ing, growing 9.3% last year with infla-
tion of only 0.2%. Our exports to Korea
for just a single year now exceed the en-
tire total of economic aid we gave Korea
from 1946 until the program ended in
1981. Korea's annual purchases of
military equipment from the United
States are more than half again as large
as the military sales credits we provide
each year. Korea, in short, is bearing
the lion's share of its own defense and is
paying its own way.

ment to the peace and economic develop-
ment of the region. Collectively, they
represent almost 300 million people with
a combined gross national product of
over $200 billion, a figure that has been
growing by more than 7% annually dur-
ing the whole decade of the 1970s.

Having just met the foreign
ministers of these six nations, I can con-
firm that this is one important part of
the world where the United States is
respected and where our attention to
their problems is appreciated. These
countries are understandably nervous
that their interests may be affected by
our dealings with their giant neighbors
to the north — China and Japan. But a
look at our record cannot but be
reassuring; our cooperative involvement

with ASEAN and similar nations of th
Pacific demonstrates our shared conce
about their problems and our moral co
mitment to their integrity. Certainly v.
have a big stake in their continued sue
cess. Our trade reached $23 billion las
year, making ASEAN America's fifth
largest trading partner.

We also are gratified by ASEAN's
success so far in forcing the world to
dress the problem of Vietnam's occup,
tion of Kampuchea. ASEAN has
developed and won support for a cred
ble political strategy for a peaceful se
tlement. They have steadily built up t
strength of the resistance, though we
share their concern that the noncom-
munist resistance has not grown as iif
as the Khmer Rouge, an organization
that we all abhor.

We have benefited from the role i
the ASEAN countries in providing fit
asylum for 1.37 million refugees from
Indochina since 1975, and we are pro
of our own role in providing permane
resettlement for 6.50, OCX)— almost hal
the entire total. It is one of the great
humamt£!,rian achievements of our tin
and one by which our own society ha;
been enriched as well.

This is a success story, but it is a '■>
tragedy too. And beyond that, it is a •'
lesson to be learned. Let us not forg(
that many of our friends in Southeas
Asia supported our effort in the Viet t"
nam war. They told us then— as Prir
Minister Lee Kwan Yew did, for ex-
ample—that if we faltered in our pui
pose, the peoples of Indochina would
suffer and their neighbors would feel
threat come closer. They told us thet
would be oppression and suffering. 1
told us there would be boat people. /
they were right.

Finally, the ASEAN countries h;
played a substantial part in furtherir
subject of the highest national priori
full accounting of our prisoners of w
(POWs) and missing in action (MIA)
Indochina. Some progress has been
made. The recent return of the rem;
of eight Americans from Vietnam is
significant and welcome event, but t
is much more to be done. Just last
February, we received a promise frc
Vietnamese authorities of accelerate
cooperation in accounting for missinij
Americans, along with agreement tc
resume the technical meetings which
provide valuable opportunities for ex
changing POW/MIA information. W
are pleased that the Vietnamese hav.
recently agreed to have a technical
meeting in Hanoi in mid-August, am
look forward to accelerated progress
this most important issue.

THE SECRETARY

i'/A'S

itlif South Pacific, the focus of our
1 u\ is our ANZUS [Australia, New
;ilaiul, United States security treaty]
es, Australia and New Zealand. These
' countries that share with us proud
ditions of democratic freedom and a
lingness to bear the cost of preserv-

those values. It is significant that
■se two allies have fought by our side
ill four major wars of this century. If

have the courage and the vision to
!p this and our other alliances strong,

will have done much to ensure the
ice we now enjoy.

We recognize that managing a
nocratic alliance requires mutual
insel as well as mutual obligations. It
or this reason that we have taken
[ZUS country views seriously into ac-
mt in formulating our arms control
ivisions. Arms control, in fact, was
important agenda item in our
etings which concluded on Tuesday in

lington.

We have been rewarded with a cor-
ponding sense of cooperation and
ponsibility. For example, when the
3or Party took office in Australia a
ir and a half ago, they began a
rching and serious debate on the
<s and benefits of ANZUS. The result

heir thorough review was a firm
ffirmation of the value of the alliance
i a renewed commitment to it.

With the recent election in New
iland, we are ready and willing, as

ays, to work with the new govern-
nt and review with our New Zealand
es the profound basis and mutual
lefits of our alliance. Indeed, my re-
it trip enabled me to meet with the
iv Prime Minister, Mr. Lange, even
I 'ore he took office. We are confident
;.it an openminded and thorough look
our alliance will result in a reaffirma-
n of the importance of an effective
JZUS for the peace of the region and
■ world. ANZUS is, after all, not
iply an isolated alliance for the
'ense of one portion of the globe, but
I rt of a broader network of relations
it together help to hold in check a
ibal threat. In today's world, a threat
any one region can become a threat
us all.

le Pacific Islands

le United States is working, along
th our ANZUS allies, to support
iedom and development for the many
oples of the South Pacific. Some will
ek fulfillment in independence and

others in association with larger states.
Last year, the United States Senate
ratified four treaties resolving old claims
disputes between the United States and
four small island states. This year, the
President has submitted the Compacts
of Free Association with the Federated
States of Micronesia and the Republic of
the Marshall Islands for congressional
approval. We are working with the
island states on agreements to regulate
tuna fishing and to control the dumping
of nuclear waste in their areas.

On a personal note, I stopped at
American Samoa on my way here. I was
there briefly, in Pago-Pago, during
World War II. I have never forgotten

peace, dialogue replaces diatribe, and
the good will of their peoples will carry
the day.

Freedom alone can work miracles.
But in a region filled with historic
animosities, threatened by heavily armed
totalitarian powers, slowed by the need
to gather skills and resources, and — in
many cases — only gradually adopting
democratic processes, sound policy is a
vital ingredient.

The U.S. Role in the Pacific

The Pacific region has benefited from
the mature leadership of many of the
countries I have mentioned. But it has

. . . the ASEAN countries have played a
substantial part in furthering ... a full accounting
of our prisoners of war and missing in action in In-
dochina.

those people, their pride in their tradi-
tions and their aspirations for the
future. It was great to go back. They
are proud today to be Americans, and
we are proud that they are one of us.

I have given you a catalogue of suc-
cesses. There are, of course, plenty of
problems. The Rangoon tragedy reminds
us of the depth of North Korean
viciousness and the ease with which that
peninsula could again become an arena
of violence. In the Philippines, despite
progress made in recent elections
toward restoring democratic processes,
major economic and political problems
continue. Throughout the region, the
threat of growing protectionism
threatens all our trade, and the tragedy
in Indochina goes on.

Other problems lie just below the
surface. In many places, economic prog-
ress is fragile. Tensions among ethnic
groups within countries and territorial
disputes between countries are a con-
stant worry. The region still has one of
the highest concentrations of military
forces anywhere in the world. Thus,
even the most heartening success stories
cannot be taken for granted.

But the forces for success are pro-
found, and I am optimistic that success
will keep the upper hand. When room is
left for individual initiative, peoples and
nations will prosper. When democratic
progress can be made peacefully, stabili-
ty will follow. When nations turn to

also benefited from the sound diplo-
matic, economic, and defense policies of
our own country. I am optimistic
because I am confident that a strong
U.S. role will continue. Most of the suc-
cess we have seen is the result of the
growing strength of the countries of the
region themselves. But crucial as this
may be, America's role has been
singularly important and must be car-
ried forward.

Diplomatically, we are often the
country with which others can work
best Our recovery is in many ways the
engine of economic growth for the entire
region. And our military strength pro-
vides the indispensable deterrent essen-
tial to maintaining stability and con-
fidence among our friends. America's in-
terests in the region and the interests of
our friends require a strong and perma-
nent U.S. presence in every area of the
Pacific.

The three keys to sound U.S. policy
in the region, therefore, are a free and
open world economy, a solid deterrent
posture, and an effective diplomacy. We
are working hard to obtain all three. To
put it another way, the watchwords of
our policy, since President Reagan took
office, have been: realism, strength, and
negotiation. Let me briefly review these
with you.

THE SECRETARY

Realism. Realism requires us to
acknowledge that economic growth lies
at the heart of progress around the
Pacific. It requires as well a recognition
that the single greatest contribution to
the current prosperity of the Pacific
region is the recovery of our own
economy; indeed, the recovery of our
economy has been the engine of our
economic recovery spreading ever more
widely throughout the world.

It is essential that we point out this
reality to others. As I told our ASEAN
partners, strong growth in the U.S.
economy has been the major factor in
their own growth. Increased exports to
the United States from ASEAN ac-
counted for over 60% of those nations'
total export increase in 1983. The
achievement of sustained noninfiationary
growth in the United States and
maintenance of our open markets are of
prime importance to the developing
world.

Similarly, we must point out the
truth about "protectionism." We in the
United States do face protectionist
pressure, and sometimes we are forced
to limit the growth of imports of some
products. But our economy is a genuine-
ly open one. We are, for example, the
world's biggest market for the manufac-
tured exports of developing countries,
taking over 50% of such exports to all
industrial countries.

It is time for all to realize that Presi-
dent Reagan has turned the American
economy toward productivity and expan-

mous concentrations of military power
in the hands of regimes that have shown
little hesitation to use force, either
directly or as a means of intimidation,
when provided with an opening. Viet-
nam has 1 million men under arms, a
staggering number for a country of that
size. North Korea is one of the most
heavily militarized nations in the world,
and it has shown no scruples about put-
ting force to use. Beyond the strategic
missiles on land and sea that threaten
the United States itself, the Soviet
Union has dramatically increased its
forces in the Pacific region to include
over 50 divisions, 3,000 modern combat
aircraft, its largest fleet, and 135
intermediate-range nuclear missiles,
poised against the nations of the Pacific
area, including ourselves. It has acquired
forward facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and
has now stationed bombers in Vietnam
as well.

Fortunately, nations of the region
are facing these dangers realistically and
building up their own strength. As a
result, we have an increasingly strong
ally in Korea that now bears the lion's
share of the cost of its own defense. We
are hopeful that Japan will steadily
move to achieve its own defense goals,
which would contribute to greater
stability in Northeast Asia and permit
greater U.S. flexibility throughout the
region. And China, with which we now
have a widening and maturing relation-
ship, plays its own special role in lending
stability to the region.

ANZUS is . . . part of a broader network of rela-
tions that together help to hold in check a global
threat.

sion once again. We are the benefi-
ciaries, and the world's nations are the
beneficiaries. This is a policy I assure
you we will continue.

The U.S. economy has performed
magnificently. It is a major source of
our own and our allies' strength.
Economic growth, in turn, is a key to
both political and military strength.

Strength. No course of economic
development and no effort at diplomacy
can succeed in an environment of fear
borne by a sense of weakness. The
Asian and Pacific region is one of enor-

Only a few years ago, our own posi-
tion of strength in the Pacific region
was in question. No more. President
Reagan has made it clear where we
stand. And our forces in the Pacific have
new muscle.

Our presence in Korea is critical to
preventing another war in that penin-
sula. In the vast reaches of the North,
Western, and South Pacific our Navy is
an essential element of stability. Two of
our most important military facilities—
Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base-
are in the Philippines. Guam has large

and vital air and naval bases. On
Okinawa, our Marines are forward-
positioned and we have there, as well,
an air division equipped with the most
sophisticated F-15s and the AW ACS
[airborne warning and control system]
Our alliance with Australia and New
Zealand has been a steady force for
peace throughout its 33 years.

Make no mistake; the United Stat
is committed permanently to the Pacij
and President Reagan's program to
restore America's defense capabilities
giving us the wherewithal to carry oui
the commitments and perform the tas
essential to peace. We shall not shirk
from that role as others take their pla
beside us. We seek the increased
strength of our allies not as a substitu
but as a complement to our own effor

Negotiation. But a sound econom
and a strong military commitment are
not enough. Nor can they provide stal
ty and confidence by themselves. The;
must be accompanied by an active an(
creative diplomacy and a willingness t
negotiate.

It is through diplomacy that we h
forged security ties with our democra
ANZUS partners, Australia and New
Zealand. It is diplomacy that last wee
brought together in Jakarta the
disparate group of ASEAN nations ir
their remarkable annual session of gi'
and-take and enhanced economic
cooperation. That cooperation has goi
beyond the economic realm to devise
strategy to deal with Vietnam's occuf
tion of Kampuchea and support for tl
noncommunist resistance. And it is
through diplomacy that we build for i
future.

On this trip, which I conclude toe |^
we began small but potentially far-
reaching steps. In Jakarta, I signed ;
memorandum of understanding on in
vestment issues with Indonesia. This
only a first such agreement in this fii
but it means we may contemplate an
eventual investment treaty and even
the far future, build toward a genern
agreement on investment to parallel
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.

In a similar vein, during this trij
general subject of the Pacific Basin \ i
addressed formally by a group of
governments for the first time. Initi;
discussions will have a specific focus i
human resources development. This
only a start, but its implications for ■
years ahead could be great.

THE SECRETARY

Finally, it is diplomacy that enables
|o deal with the world as it is. Our
lomy flourishes best in conjunction
. others who understand the benefits
he free market and put it into prac-
. Our military's mission is to defend
rom those who do not wish us well,
it is through diplomacy and negotia-
that we are able to foster our in-
■sts with adversaries as well as
nds. Here in the Pacific we value our
e association with our fellow
locracies and with others who share
goals. We also engage and work
3tructively— and often to mutual ad-
tage— with those whose view of the
' to organize political and economic
is quite different from ours. Thus, it
irough this third pillar of our policy
; we have the best hope of forestall-
eonflict and solving problems before
/ threaten to overwhelm us.

(elusion

ive portrayed a scene of success
ly. It is undeniable. The Pacific and
future are inseparable. I believe that
-e is no more remarkable story of
^ress and no greater source of op-
Tsm than here in this region. But I
e also called attention to the continu-
challenge ahead and to the ways we
moving to meet it. There are prob-
s. But we have a lot going for
-not created by luck or chance but
)ur own endeavor and our own vi-
,. My message today is simply this:
)ur performance, by our strength, by

diplomacy, let us encourage this
■nendous momentum toward peace

development in the Pacific.

Secretary Visits Asia;

Attends ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings

Secretary Shultz visited Hong Kong
{July 7-8. 1981,}. Malaysia (July 9-10),
Singapore (July 10-11). Indonesia (July
ll-l!t) to participate in the Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
dialogue. Australia (July U-15). and
New Zealand (July 15-17) to attend the
33d meeting of the ANZUS Council
[Australia, New Zealand, JJyiited States
security treaty].

Following are his remarks and news
conferences made on various occasions
during the trip, the text of the ANZUS
communique, and a joint news con-
ference held by Secret ar-y Shultz and
Foreign Ministers William Hayden of
Australia and Warren Cooper of New
Zealand.

'Press release 170 of July 19, 1984.

NEWS CONFERENCE,
KUALA LUMPUR,
JULY 10, 19841

I would like to express my appreciation
to the Prime Minister of Malaysia and
his colleagues, the Deputy Prime
Minister, the Acting Foreign Secretary,
and all the people who have been so^
gracious to us and engaged with us in
discussions of matters of concern to both
countries and also have made our stay a
very interesting and pleasant one.

This is not my first time to
Malaysia, so it is interesting especially
for me to see the progress which is right
in front of your eyes. My first visit was
about 10 years ago when I was
Secretary of the Treasury, and I have
been here since as a private citizen. I
have had a chance to watch the growth
of Kuala Lumpur, not only in the city
itself but the wonderful highway from
the airport here. It is a pleasure to see
this tangible evidence of economic
development. Again, I am very grateful
for the great hospitality that we have
had.

Q. Is the United States willing to
give more aid of any kind to the non-
communist elements of the Kampuchea
coalition?

A. The question of Kampuchea has
come up in our discussions here, and I
am sure it will be a centerpiece in the
ASEAN discussions. The United States
has basically taken the view that we will
support the efforts that the ASEAN
countries are making, and we support
them diplomatically, and we support
them in other ways, some in terms of

direct support to individual countries,
especially Thailand as a front-line state.
We have had massive support for the ef-
forts over the flood of refugees fleeing
the Vietnamese aggression, and in other
ways we have been and will continue to
be supportive, and I don't want to com-
ment on incremental moves one way or
another.

Q. Are there any new views you
could share with us on the proposed
U.S. talks with the Soviets in Vienna?

A. There are diplomatic contacts
practically daily on the subject. I've
been, of course, following it very closely,
but the situation remains about where it
has been for the last few days, namely
the Soviet Union seems to be having
great difficulty taking "yes" for an
answer.

Q. The issue of U.S.-China rela-
tions has been brought up with Malay-
sian leaders and will be brought up
again in Jakarta. In yesterday's brief-
ing by Malaysian officials, there seems
to be an indication that Malaysia has
expressed concern, not just over
military collaboration but also
technological collaboration which
could lead to a defense or military
capability and a Chinese threat to
Southeast Asia. Has the United States
given an assurance to Malaysia, and
later to ASEAN, that it will continue
to brief them on any major develop-
ment in U.S.-China relations, and is
this consultative procedure now going
to be a part of U.S.-ASEAN relations?
A. The meeting that you referred to
must be one I wasn't in, because perhaps
somebody else talked about those things,
but I know that the question of China,
and its relationship to the ASEAN ef-
forts in Kampuchea and its posture m
Asia generally, is of great interest, ob-
viously, to Malaysia and others in the
region. The evolution of U.S. relations
with China is also of central interest.
We do, as a matter of course, keep our
friends advised of what we are doing,
and we will certainly continue to do
that. It's our view, and I believe widely
shared in this part of the world, that the
emergence of a good and stable relation-
ship between the United States and
China, on the whole, advances the idea
of stability in this part of the world, and
it is a net plus. The relationship of the

THE SECRETARY

military sort that you mentioned in your
question is, of course, in its early stages
and focused on defensive matters, and I
don't think is, in any sense, a threat to
other parts of Asia. Insofar as Southeast
Asia is concerned, of course, the center
of gravity of the U.S. approach is with
ASEAN and the countries, Malaysia ob-
viously included, that make up the
ASEAN countries. We have worked
very closely with them and will continue
to do so.

Q. The Prime Minister has ex-
pressed regrets that trade relations
between United States and Malaysia
have not progressed satisfactorily.
What's your view on this?

A. i don't know what the right
definition of satisfactory is. If you just
take the exports of Malaysia to the
United States, if you compare 1983 with
1982, they rose 13%. If you take the
most recent figures, which are the first
quarter of 1984, and to deal with
seasonal factors you should compare it
with the first quarter of 1983, it's up by
about 50% now. The percentage in-
creases are very large and pretty much
across the board as to products, in-
cluding the often-cited example of tex-
tiles, which 1 think the increase is
something on the order of 69%, very
large, but that is on a small base. So
there had been large increases.

To my mind, what these increases il-
lustrate is the impact of the expansion
to the U.S. economy on the economies of
countries throughout the world, and, in
citing these figures, 1 would say
Malaysia is not an exception, not that
numbers like 50% can be typical of
anything, that's such a gigantic increase.
But 1 do think that, in a sense, the hero
of world economic recovery is the
recovery of the U.S. economy, and it has
been a very good thing for everybody,
including the people of this region.

Q. Several U.S. officials have
talked about increasing humanitarian
aid to noncommunist factions in Kam-
puchea. Can you give us an idea of
what kind of annual aid in terms of
dollars you have been giving and what
kind of proposals you have offered?

A. I suppose the most important
way in which aid is given— of the sort
you have in mind— is very human and
personal, and that is the longstanding
and heavy involvement of the United
States in coping with the large flow of
refugees from Vietnamese aggression. I
think the total number of refugees over
the last 7 years— or what is the time

period of these numbers about since
1975? So say almost 10 years, is like
1,350,000, something on that order, and
roughly half of those have wound up in
the United States— some 650,000.

We have reached out to this area
and I suppose in the tradition of the
United States, of being a country made
up, in a sense, of refugees. The flow
from this part of the world has been
taken in, and the most humanitarian
thing you can do is to help people when
they are really in need, and we will con-
tinue to do that.

Insofar as more direct assistance of
one kind or another right here, I don't
have the numbers right on the top of my
head, but if you add up the development
assistance of the ASEAN countries, the
security assistance, and the more
humanitarian — directly humanitarian —
aid, it comes to a very large annual
number, and we have been having some
discussions out here as to what that
number is. It depends a little bit on just
the things that you include in it, but it's
on the order of half a billion dollars or
perhaps larger.

Q. There was a report in the local
paper to the effect that there was a
rapid increase in the Soviet buildup in
Cam Ranh Bay. I wonder if you can
comment on the implications of this.

A. There is a continuing Soviet
buildup of naval forces — in other words,
a capacity to project power in this part
of the world. And I think it's a matter
that should be of concern to everyone; it
is of concern to us. And it only em-
phasizes the importance of strong
friendships here, and not only in the
case of the ASEAN countries but
Australia and New Zealand as well. So
it's part of the general Soviet develop-
ment of their military capability, and I
think that shows the importance of hav-
ing a strong deterrent capability, not
only of the United States but in coopera-
tion with our allies.

Q. I understand that the govern-
ment has reaffirmed its desire to pur-
chase F-16-As, the relatively ad-
vanced aircraft. What is the U.S. feel-
ing about this?

A. I don't believe the Thai have
finally made up their minds. They have
been given, as have other countries in
this region, a thorough briefing on the
various so-called FX aircraft so that
they can see the characteristics of them,
the costs of them, the maintenance prob-
lems that they all pose, and so forth.
And they will have to look at all of these
factors and decide what is in their best

interest in a matter of discussion with
us. But as a general proposition, we
want to support the efforts of the coui
tries in this region to look to their
security. And as to decisions about paj
ticular pieces of military equipment,
they are made case by case, but as a
general proposition, we look with favc
on sales to the ASEAN countries

Q. We understand that the Mala
sian position is that an economicalh
strong China will sooner or later les
to a militarily strong China which b
the potential of being a hegemonist
power in Southeast Asia. That is th
concern. What is your response to t
line of thinking about China if it
becomes economically, and later on
militarily, strong as well?

A. I think you have to start with
the proposition that China is there, it
an important country, it has been for
long time, it will continue to be, and,
don't have any doubt in my mind at a
that as an economic proposition Chin
will develop. And it seems to be ex-
pected that's going to take place. The
question is whether that developmeni
from the standpoint of stability in thi
region, is best done with other count
cooperating and being a part of it. A
we believe that it is important for ou
own interest, as a potential trading j:
ner and in the interest of security m;
ters and strategic considerations tha'
are very clear, to have a good workii
relationship with China. So we start
build that up in a way that we think
lend stability to this part of the worl

Q. In recent years the Asian
region, particularly ASEAN countir
has become quite an attractive are;-
investment for American businessi
compared with other regions of th
world. What, in your opinion, coul
ASEAN governments do to hasten
flow of American investment in thi
region, particularly with regards t
Malaysian participation here?

A. Basically the ASEAN countr
are doing very well in expanding tht
economies and in expanding their tr
particularly with the United States,
in attracting investment.

Of course, the basic conditions t
attract investments are: number ont
the prospect of realizing a good rate
return on the investment, and numb
two, being able to sustain it because
confidence that the rules of the gam
that prevailed when you made the ii
vestment are going to stay the samt
that you know the conditions that ai
going to affect you. 1 think that

:«

THE SECRETARY

thing that can be done that affects
se propositions is all to the good.
It seems to me that it's taken for
nted these days, and is a proper
g, that a country that is the host to
!Stment expects to get something out
;— not simply just the investment as
1. But one of the reasons that
lign investment is welcomed is that
pie of the host country learn
lething: they get trained, they
3me better able to carry on
Tiselves. There is a transfer in that
se — the deeper sense of the transfer
echnology and managerial and other
led capabilities.

But I think from the standpoint of
r question what is there to do, it is
ng as much of a sense of continuity
)ossible and allowing investment to
le into areas that are potentially
fi table.

There is one aspect of this that I like
mphasize, particularly in the light of
debt problems that we run into in
ous parts of the world, not so much
his part of the world as others. Part
he debt problem results from an at-
de toward foreign equity investment
;, it seems to me, needs to be
iged. It results from an attitude that
i when you want to attract resources
a another country to come to your
itry and help in the development of
ou should borrow the money rather
1 attract it as equity. And countries
that and did it to excess. When they
into rough weather, as always hap-
3 with world economy — it has its up
it has its down — they found
nselves debt-heavy, and the debt was
' difficult to carry, whereas, if the
oortion of the resources drawn in
a outside were heavier in equity,
1 the equity, so to speak, carries
f. There is no obligation to pay in-
st or to pay it back. It's there to par-
I )ate, and, of course, it's there as risk
I tal and hopes to profit well from
i , posture. So, I think that, just as
i panies have historically had to look
I heir debt equity ratio, one of the
ons that we should learn from our
erience of the last few years is that
itries, too, need to look at their debt
ity ratio. And this to my mind is an
itional reason why it's healthy to
ig in equity foreign investment. It
;s you greater protection in the sense
ing periods that are inevitably going
ome when everything isn't booming.

Q. In your opinion, there should be
some kind of continuity of foreign in-
vestment. In your meeting with
American businessmen this morning,
did anyone bring up any fears, or are
they generally satisfied?

A. They are generally satisfied. No
one is perfectly satisfied, so there are
always things that they would like to see
done.

There are two things in particular
that are being discussed with varying
degrees of urgency, both following the
Prime Minister's visit to Washington.
One is an investment treaty, and the
other is some discussions that are
restarting on a tax treaty. Both of these
two things would help in just the way
that I cited. An investment treaty would
tend to set out the rules of the game as
understood between the two countries.
And a tax treaty would set up a regime
that basically avoids double taxation and
makes clear, as between the two coun-
tries, which country is going to tax what
kind of earning and the individual enter-
prise. Then those are the rules of the
game. As we all know, the tax element
in any investment is a very important
one. So those are the two particular sug-
gestions that are being discussed, and
we hope that those discussions would
progress well.

Q. The Olympic Council of
Malaysia and the Olympic Council of
South Korea and a number of coun-
tries have been receiving letters
allegedly from the Ku Klux Klan
threatening athletes who are going to
the Los Angeles Olympics. Has the
U.S. Government investigation shown
whether it is from any particular
country or source, and could you com-
ment on this?

A. I have just heard about these let-
ters from the Ku Klux Klan— or alleged-
ly from the Ku Klux Klan— and they are
of such a nature that it is hard to believe
they were actually sent by any such
organization. And the sentiments they
expressed are totally unacceptable. It
almost makes you wonder if it isn't a
disinformation campaign of some sort.
And they will be looked into.

But the main point is that athletes
from all over the world are most
welcome at the Olympics in Los
Angeles. There are a record number of
countries that are attending. There will
be great care taken to see that the
security of all is well provided for, and
there is a tremendous effort being made
along those lines, as well as in all other
aspects of the conduct of the Olympics.
Just before leaving on my trip, I met

with the Olympic officials, both the U.S.
and international Olympic officials, and
we went over all these things. And I
think that, on the whole, matters are in
very satisfactory shape, and we look for-
ward to a wonderful amateur Olympic
games coming up.

Q. Did you mean Soviet disinfor-
mation?

A. No, I just — we will leave it at
that.

Q. There has been a lot of talk of a
Pacific Basin concept, something like
a Pacific version of the EEC [Euro-
pean Economic Community]. Do you
have any thoughts on it, if it's worth-
while to have some sort of common
market here?

A. The idea of a Pacific Basin is
sort of intuitively attractive. But I don't
know of anyone who really believes that
some organization like the European
Community is the right sort of parallel,
something that attempts to be opera-
tional in nature.

On the other hand, there are many
who feel that an improved way of shar-
ing information, of identifying common
problems, of developing a consensus
about how they might be dealt with, and
of having that kind of touch between the
countries of the region might be useful.
We've been exploring that. Ambassador
Fairbanks has been out around the
Pacific talking with people, trying to
gather a sense of their ideas, and it was
interesting to us, and quite welcome to
us, that the ASEAN countries decided
to put this general idea on the agenda of
the meetings that will be taking place in
Jakarta, and I will be very interested to
hear what their views are. But I don't
think that any operating sort of formal
organization, like the European Com-
munity, is the odds at all. And what may
emerge, if anything, is something that is
much looser and more in the nature of
an analytical, information-sharing,
consensus-building, problem-identifying
kind of organization.

But the area itself is going like
gangbusters. It's expanding. It's very
dynamic, and maybe that's a good argu-
ment for having the government stay
away from anything like this. It's doing
so well without the benefit of an
organization. But at the same time, it
may be that there are some things that
could be added by a loose form of
information-sharing. But this is an idea
that will be discussed a lot not only in
Jakarta but subsequently. From the U.S.
standpoint, we are very interested in
taking part in those discussions.

THE SECRETARY

NEWS CONFERENCE.
SINGAPORE,
JULY 10, 19842

It is always a special privilege to come
to Singapore because of what Singapore
represents in terms of its vibrancy and
growth, and, of course, also because it
gives me a chance to visit with Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, such an ex-
traordinary person. I have had that
privilege again this afternoon. I would
take this occasion to express my admira-
tion for him, my pleasure at having a
chance to talk with him again, and my
gratitude for being received so
hospitably here in Singapore.

Q. Yesterday in Amman, French
President Francois Mitterrand said
that the Soviet Union should be in-
volved in the peace process in the Mid-
dle East. How do you feel about that,
and if the current climate is such, is
Soviet involvement either likely or
desirable?

A. The Soviet Union has been in-
volved in the turmoil in the Middle East.
What we seek is solving the problems
there, and we have not seen any
evidence of a constructive instinct on
their part toward solving the Palestinian
problems, toward solving the problems
of Lebanon, or other aspects of the Mid-
dle East picture. We are always looking
for constructive contributions, but we
just have not seen any from that
quarter.

Q. In view of the Soviet Union
pouring arms to the Vietnamese, what
is the rationale behind your govern-
ment's decision not to give military
aid to the Kampuchean coalition to
fight Vietnamese repression?

A. Our program here is to support
the efforts of the ASEAN countries. We
believe that they have come about this
very intelligently and .strongly, not only
in terms of their efforts to support the
democratic forces in Kampuchea but
also in their diplomatic efforts to
demonstrate to the world and have the
world support the condemnation of Viet-
namese aggression and the development
of a better life in Kampuchea. So we
have felt that the best role for the
United States is supporting this good ef-
fort, and we will continue to do so.

Q. The State Department has
placed a ban on nonessential travel to
Bulgaria. Is it because of allegations
of Bulgaria's notorious involvement in
drug trafficking or because of recent
reports coming out on Bulgaria's in-
volvement in the assassination attempt
on the Pope?

A. No, the advisory on travel to
Bulgaria is simply a precaution to
Americans that they are well advised to
stay away at a time when there are
some tensions. This has nothing to do
with the Italian case. It has to do more
with the drug case and some of the
other repercussions of it.

Q. Most ASEAN members are
quite concerned about recent
U.S. -China relations and U.S. expecta-
tions of China's role in this region.
How would you allay such fears?

A. People in the past have been con-
cerned that we are concerned about
what we do, but I think that the basic
point is that China is an important coun-
try in Asia and in the world generally,
obviously. The center of gravity of our
efforts in this part of the world is on
what ASEAN is doing. Nevertheless we
think that a constructive relationship
between the United States and China
lends stability to the region, not the
other way around, and to the extent
that statements like that assuage
people's fears, then so be it.

Q. You said this morning and
today that we are not supplying more
aid to the Kampuchean coalition
because we support ASEAN. Are you
saying that we consult with ASEAN,
and they do not want us to supply
more aid to the Kampuchean coalition?

A. We consult with the ASEAN
countries. We discussed this whole ques-
tion at length today. I did with Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew yesterday in
Kuala Lumpur, and I expect to have fur-
ther discussions of it in Jakarta. What I
can say is that we believe we are playing
a genuinely helpful and constructive part
in this effort, and beyond that I am not
prepared to go.

Q. The ban on travel to Bulgaria,
is that to all Americans or just to
government officials?

A. We are concentrating on govern-
ment officials, but I think all Americans
might take note.

Q. There are certain reservations
stated by the Indonesians concerning
the U.S. agn"eement in principle to sell
arms to China. How sympathetic to
the fears expressed by Indonesia will
the United States be on this issue?

A. Of course, we will listen to com-
ments that our friends have to make
about things we are doing on all sorts of
matters. People register their views
with us about arms control, about our
economy, about all manner of things, in-
cluding subjects such as that.

We listen to our friends, and at the
same time we believe that it is impor-
tant that the United States develop a
stable and mature relationship with
China. The new fledgling military rela-
tionship is something that is just start-
ing, and the concept of it has entirely bjii
do with defensive arms. I think it is
worth calling people's attention to the
fact that there is a very large number \
Soviet forces ranged on China's north-
ern border, and there are many SS-20
missiles aimed in China's direction. So
there are threats that China must be
concerned about, naturally, that are di]
ferent from things that Indonesia may
be concerned about.

Q. Do you have any indication ths !j
the Soviet Union has been trying to
dissuade other countries not in the
Soviet area from coming to the Olym
pics? You suggested that perhaps
there was some disinformation in-
volved in this, a letter that went out
allegedly from the Ku Klux Klan.
Have there been any other indication
from other types of channels?

A. I didn't connect that letter witlJK
the Soviet Union in any explicit way, 1 f"
me just note. We have seen some acti"
ty designed to try to discourage peopl
and, of course, we know very well the
countries of Eastern Europe were dis;
pointed and are disappointed not to bi
going to the Olympics. The fact of the
matter is that a record number of cou
tries is coming to the Olympics. Let n
assure everybody again that strong
precautions are being taken to ensure
that the situation is a secure one and
that the games can go on in a strong
and lively competitive spirit and in th
spirit of amateur athletics. We all loo
forward to the Olympics.

Q. Apart from the talks with L«
Kuan Yew on the Kampuchean queii
tion. what are the other topics that
came up for discussion?

A. I don't want to go into detail
a discussion with a head of state, but
general topics that we talked about a
certainly things that you would expe(
The Kampuchean question was perha
foremost. We discussed world econor
issues, particularly as they bear on tl
part of the world. The Prime Ministe
sees very well the connection betwee
what goes on here and what goes on
elsewhere, so we spent a good bit of
time on that. I called attention to oui
concerns about the problem of intelle fci
tual property. We had a little discuss if
ai)out that, that was the general ran m
of our discussion. »i

THE SECRETARY

Q. Again from this morning, you
s;d that the Soviets are having trou-
l» taking "yes" for an answer regard-
ii; our going to the Vienna talks. Is
th U.S. position that we've accepted
^vthout preconditions and that the
Uited States will still go to the
V>nna talks even if we can't talk
vmi the reduction of missiles?
A. We have had a proposal to
cuss questions involving militarization
spare, and the Soviets put forth a
ir< of topics that they thought were
f,|aivalent of that concept. We have
1 v\ e will participate in a discussion of
t (i>pic, and we have some ideas
-I Ives about how the topic should be
iihmI, In our view, things that go
"iiL;h space that are military, like
li>iic missiles, ought to be on the
■IK la, and we intend to discuss them.
-, tliat is saying "yes" and at the same
iif suggesting that the way they
ine the topic is all right, but there are
ne additional definitions that we think
t important.

Q. The Soviets have at various
les also suggested that a precondi-
n to those talks would be an agree-
Int to a moratorium on all testing of
Cisatellite systems. Would the
i ited States be prepared to accept
lit, or are we not accepting that as
; of the conditions?

A. I don't think it is clear that it is
recondition, although sometimes
tements are made that make it a
>stion. This is just the kind of thing
need to get straightened out, and are
ing to get straightened out, in our
vate diplomatic discussions with the
net Union.

We think a moratorium on testing
•ht now, with them having testing and
jloyed an antisatellite system and we
; having done so, is assymetrical with
,pect to its impact. A moratorium on
Dloyment is the sort of thing that is
•y difficult to verify, and verification
;he heart of the problem here. If you
I't verify a moratorium, it's hard to
ow quite what it means. Or, to put it
Dther way, what is important is to get
o some discussion of this issue and
? what can be made of the issue of
rification. Until you do that, it doesn't
3m wise to agree to something that
u haven't really worked out.

Q. The fact that you drew atten-
>n to the question of American in-
llectual property in your talks with
e Prime Minister today reflects a
rtain amount of concern on your
,rt over the question of computer
ftware piracy in Singapore. Were
u interested in hearing the views of

our Prime Minister on this issue, or
were you actually advocating that the
Singapore Government do something
about this?

A. We think that it is a problem,
and something should be done about it. I
am always interested in hearing the
Prime Minister's views, and I did. And I
would say that the problem exists in
places other than Singapore. It is not
just something here. It is a concern that
we have with respect to many countries,
and I think it is a very legitimate prob-
lem that needs to be addressed. It is in
the interests of a country like Singapore
to address the problem because how that
property is to be handled affects the
flow of that property around the world,
not only here but elsewhere.

Q. At last year's ASEAN meeting,
as I recall, you were extremely critical
of the Vietnamese, especially on the
issue of the return of remains of
American servicemen and the general
prisoner-of-war issues. Since then, a
high-level U.S. delegation has gone to
Vietnam. The Vietnamese are, after
some fits and starts, releasing some
further remains of Americans. How do
you now feel about what Vietnam has
done or is doing in this area, and
could you say a word about what you
expect more broadly about U.S. rela-
tions with Vietnam in the year or two
ahead?

A. Some progress has been made.
We welcome it, and there is the prospect
of some further progress. We very much
want to see that happen. There is a
large problem ahead of us. There are
many people unaccounted for, possibly
even still alive, and so the issue is a very
important one.

Insofar as long-term relations with
Vietnam are concerned, it represents a
major stumbling block that must be got-
ten out of the way. Even if there were a
Kampuchean settlement of some kind
that was satisfactory, we would still find
this a matter of great concern and
would want to see it dealt with properly.

Q. You say that possibly there are
some still alive. Has anything been
learned in the past year that would
give any further indication whether
any are alive, or does our information
stand precisely where it did a year
ago?

A. My statement does not reflect
any new information. It is just that
there are a large number — some
2,500 — that we don't know about, and
so there is always the possibility that
there may be someone still alive. That is
all I meant.

Q. Returning to the intellectual
property question, might there be any
chance of GSP [generalized system of
preferences] quotas being used as a
possible lever to gain satisfaction
from Singapore and other countries
where there is a problem?

A. That proposal has been made as
I've heard, and I think that the right
way to go about this is to have the kind
of discussions that I've had. I hope it
will be possible to get it straightened out
without going in for that kind of condi-
tionality. It is the sort of thing that
tends to arise when a problem nags and
nags, and people start feeling strongly
about it.

I might say on the GSP legislation,
it is something the Reagan Admin-
istration strongly supports, and we have
been working at that for over a year
now, so that the GSP would be ex-
tended. It is not progressing well in the
House of Representatives, it is not pro-
gressing at all. But we want very much
to see some action by the Congress so
that it doesn't lapse at the end of this
year. We will be working on that.

Q. Last September, a joint appeal
on Kampuchea was signed by the
ASEAN countries. This move was
backed by the United States, and the
third step in the resolution on the
Kampuchean problem was the pro-
posed normalization of relations be-
tween Vietnam and the United States.
If such a thing should go through,
what sort of normalization, what sort
of relationship, would the United
States establish with Vietnam? Would
it include just developmental aid?

A. I'm afraid the prospect of nor-
malization is so far away that it is really
fruitless to speculate about it. There is
the MIA-POW issue we've spoken of,
and right now what we see in Kam-
puchea is a continued Vietnamese ag-
gression. So far as I can see, efforts to
bring about any kind of reasonable
negotiation on the subject have run into
a stone wall from Vietnam. I think that
any thought of normalization with the
United States is just miles away.

Q. There were reports a couple of
years ago, at least, that there were
probably several Americans still alive
who chose to stay. Are you referring
to that kind of thing or to Americans
still alive but in prison?

A. I was making a general observa-
tion, in effect, that when you are
without knowledge of as many in-
dividuals as is the case here that it is
always possible that someone may still
be alive. That's all, there's nothing, no
new information nor any special implica-
tion connected with the statement.

THE SECRETARY

STATEMENT,
ASEAN DIALOGUE,
JULY 13, 19843

This new opportunity to carry forward
my country's constructive and fruitful
dialogue with ASEAN is most welcome;
in fact, it is genuinely refreshing to
return to Southeast Asia and meet again
with my ASEAN friends.

I am delighted to note the addition
of Brunei to this association. The United
States has a tradition of diplomatic con-
tact with Brunei extending well back
into the 19th century.

The accomplishments of all the
ASEAN countries, individually and as a
group, have captured worldwide atten-
tion and admiration. In 1967, at a time
when few outside the region rated your
prospects very high, you founded this
unique organization to promote eco-
nomic development, in recognition of the
importance of regional cooperation and
self-help. Through disciplined and
creative economic management, your
real growth rate has averaged over 7%
a year for the last decade. Through
realism and courage you have forced the
world to address the threat to regional
and world peace posed by Vietnamese
aggression in Kampuchea. You in-
stituted this remarkable annual meeting
in early recognition of the importance of
serious dialogue between developed and
developing countries.

In all these respects the ASEAN
countries have distinguished themselves
by realism, imagination, and sense of
purpose. You face formidable economic
problems and the dangers of Vietnamese
aggression. You bear a significant
burden of refugees for whom you have
generously provided first asylum. But
your success so far enables you to con-
front these problems with confidence
and makes other nations— my own most
definitely included— want to work with
you.

Thus, in contrast to so many parts
of today's world, ASEAN represents the
stability and progress that are the goals
of people everywhere. ASEAN, like the
United States, faces both opportunities
and problems. These meetings give us
the chance to consult on both, and that
is why we are here. We can take
satisfaction from our common record to
date. But we cannot rest on our laurels.
Today, I would like to discuss three
of the most serious challenges we face
together and the principles upon which
President Reagan has determined that
the United States will address them.

They are principles that provide, I
believe, a solid basis for cooperation be-
tween my nation and ASEAN.

• The first is realism: we must see
the world as it is, not as we would wish
it to be, facing up to problems as well as
opportunities.

• Next is strength: no policy can
succeed from a position of weakness.
Economic vigor, military power, and a
strong sense of national purpose are
prerequisites to the achievement of our
objectives.

• And third, negotiation: fortified
by realism and strength, we must help
to resolve international problems
through principled, effective diplomacy.

On these pillars of realism, strength,
and negotiation, the United States is at
work today in the interest of peace and
freedom. On this basis we are prepared
to work with ASEAN on the great
challenges we face in common.

Preserving Peace and the
Challenge of Arms Control

No issue is more important today than
preserving peace, and none has higher
priority for the United States. Responsi-
ble policies to reduce the risk of war and
strengthen international stability are a
goal shared by all our peoples. The first
challenge of arms control is an impor-
tant part of this effort to preserve
peace.

Preserving peace in the nuclear age
is a duty we owe all inhabitants of this
planet. Ensuring a lasting peace is
foremost in President Reagan's mind,
for as he has said: "A nuclear war can-
not be won and must never be fought."
He said it in China. He said it in Ger-
many. He said it in Japan. He said it in
England. He said it in Congress. He said
it in the Oval Office. He has said it
throughout America. It is the essence of
a principle that has the full support of
responsible people everywhere.

Much of the debate on nuclear issues
focuses on the enormous destructive
potential of existing arsenals. President
Reagan has led the way in the responsi-
ble effort to reduce nuclear arsenals to
equal levels, with effective verification.
He has proposed the complete elimina-
tion of an entire class of nuclear
weapons— American Pershing lis and
ground-launched cruise missiles and
Soviet SS-20S, SS-4s, and SS-5s. He
has rejected Soviet proposals that would
simply transfer such weapons from
where they threaten Europe to where

they threaten Asia. In the strategic
arms reduction talks (START), he has
proposed deep reductions in intercon-
tinental nuclear arsenals, focusing on
the most powerful categories of
weapons— ballistic missile warheads— a
goal no previous strategic arms treaty
has even approached. Last November,
the Soviets walked out of the INF
[intermediate-range nuclear forces]
negotiations and in December suspended
indefinitely their participation in
START. The United States is ready to
resume both negotiations at any time
and in any place, without preconditions.
We hope the Soviet Union also will com
to recognize that its interests are best
served by returning to the negotiating
table as soon as possible.

But the United States has not sim-
ply waited for Soviet responses. In add
tion to our efforts, extending over man
years, to negotiate balanced and
verifiable arms control agreements, we
have made substantial reductions in ouj
own nuclear stockpile, as well as im-
provements to its safety and security.
Both the number and megatonnage of
our nuclear arsenal have been substan-
tially reduced. Our stockpile was one-
third higher in 1967 than it is now, anc
its total destructive power has declined
by 7.5% since 1968. In addition, we and
our allies have begun a process of redu
ing the stockpile of NATO nuclear
weapons in Europe, bringing it to the
lowest level in 20 years. Even in the
absence of an INF agreement, at least
five nuclear warheads will be taken ou
of Europe for every new Pershing II
and cruise missile introduced. The resi
will be a net reduction of 2,400 nucleai
weapons over the next few years.

America has begun to modernize ii
nuclear forces, even as we have sough
to reduce nuclear arsenals. We have
done so after a decade of restraint-
restraint unmatched, indeed exploited,
by our adversaries. We are modernizir
in a way which, in conjunction with ou
arms control proposals, will enhance
stability and reduce the risk of war.
modernization program provides impo
tant incentives for the Soviets to agre
to our proposals for equitable and
verifiable reductions in arsenals.

In addition to our far-reaching pre
posals for reducing the level of nuclea
armaments, the United States has pre
posed a number of other important ar
control initiatives to reduce the risk oi
war and halt or reverse the growth in
weapons.

iSfl

THE SECRETARY

In Geneva, Vice President Bush
?seiited to the Conference on Dis-
nament a draft treaty for a com-
^hensive ban on the development, pro-
ction, stockpiling, transfer, and use of
smical weapons.

In Stockholm, together with our
LTO allies, we have put forward a
:kage of confidence-building measures
signed to reduce the risk of a Euro-
in war occurring by accident, surprise
ack, or miscalculation.

In Vienna, at the mutual and
lanced force reduction talks, we
jsented, again with our European
ies, a new initiative that seeks a com-
)n ground between Eastern and
3stern positions and progress on
iucing the conventional forces of
^TO and the Warsaw Pact. We will
rsist in our efforts to reduce the risk
war and achieve substantial reduc-
ns in nuclear arsenals. And we will
rsevere in our efforts with the Soviets
build a relationship based on realism,
itraint, and reciprocity.

Unfortunately, until very recently,
! only response of the Soviet Union
5 been silence or walkout. We hope
it their recently expressed interest in
jotiations at Vienna represents a
inge of heart. We have accepted the
viet offer to begin talks on weapons in
ice, and we intend to go to Vienna,
ere are no preconditions attached to
- willingness to discuss arms control
.tters. The Soviets have proposed
ne issues and we, too, will have issues
want to discuss. We are now trying
work out arrangements through
iilomatic channels.

We want to improve our relations
i ;h the Soviet Union across a wide
tictrum. We have close and continuous
ilomatic contact with them at all
I els. President Reagan has called this
iir a year of opportunities for peace.
5 are making every effort to ensure
it these opportunities multiply and
it we make the most of every one of
j;m.

i At the same time, we will continue
j r efforts to strengthen our deterrent
•ces. This is as important to keeping
; peace as the effort to control arms,
is one of the ironies of the nuclear age
it weapons must be built in order that
;y not be used. The effectiveness of
r military forces in peacetime is of
al importance to the avoidance of
3ir employment in war. Our approach
s served us well; in the years since
orld War II, we have succeeded in
iintaining the nuclear balance and
terring nuclear war.

Your countries and my country
threaten no one. Our military forces are
designed to keep the peace, and we are
proud of the job they have done. This
has called for a considerable effort to fill
some of the gaps that had developed in
the last decade, particularly in this
critical part of the world. President
Reagan is determined that those efforts
will continue.

The Challenge of Regional Stability

A second great challenge which faces us
all is achieving regional stability. This
task is every bit as critical as the effort
to control nuclear weapons, for the
greatest danger of nuclear war arises
from smaller wars that could get out of
control. The promotion of regional
stability thus serves global as well as
regional interests. The nations of every
region achieving stability meet not only
the deepest aspirations of their own peo-
ple; they also contribute importantly to
the avoidance of global conflict, nuclear
or conventional. We must never forget,
however, that so-called small wars, even
if contained within a region, have caused
devastating losses in recent decades.
Hundred of thousands of lives have been
lost, damaged, or dislocated in virtually
every quarter of the globe. We must ex-
pend every effort to turn energies that
are absorbed in conflict toward peace,
justice, and lasting stability.

The United States is proud of its
part in the system of regional alliances.
These alliances— backed by credible
military presence— have helped to main-
tain a remarkable degree of regional
stability, even in the face of shocks like
the Rangoon bombing which, in an
earlier age, might easily have led to war.
Our alliances with two of your members,
the Philippines and Thailand, contribute
to a stability which benefits the entire
region, and we are grateful for their
contribution. We recognize as well the
responsible self-defense efforts of the
nonaligned members of ASEAN.

The principles of realism, strength,
and diplomacy are the keys to progress
in regional disputes. These are the prin-
ciples the United States has been using
in its Central America policy. We seek
and we support a regional solution
there— one that the nations most
threatened by the conflict agreed upon
in their meeting at San Jose, Costa
Rica. That objective is now embodied in
the 21 principles developed in the Con-
tadora process. Behind a strengthened
security shield, this approach can pro-
vide development, democracy, and an
end to attempts to achieve hegemony in

that region via Cuban and Soviet in-
tervention.

The policy ASEAN has adopted in
dealing with the problem of Vietnam's
occupation of Kampuchea reflects these
same principles. Realism leads you to
recognize that Vietnam's occupation of
Kampuchea threatens the entire region
and that no one is safe if such acts of
blatant aggression succeed. You recog-
nize the need for strength— political and
economic as well as military— to con-
front Vietnam with the clear choice be-
tween bearing the burdens of aggression
or enjoying the benefits of cooperation
with ASEAN and with countries, like
my own, that firmly support you. You
have offered Vietnam a realistic pro-
posal for a negotiated political solution,
one based on the restoration of Kam-
puchea's sovereignty and the rights of
its people to choose their own govern-
ment. Such a solution safeguards the in-
terests of the Khmer people and of all
Kampuchea's neighbors.

Your appeal to Vietnam is based not
only on what is right, but also on what
would serve Vietnam's own best in-
terest—if Vietnam would only see its
long-term interests more clearly. The
regional tensions which Hanoi causes
work to its own disadvantage. Vietnam
is disastrously diverting its resources
from its own development and the
welfare of its energetic and talented
people. Compared with the relationship
Hanoi could have with the rest of the
world— with access to markets, new
technologies, and foreign assistance, as
well as greatly increased diplomatic op-
tions—Vietnam's present isolation,
resulting from its occupation of Kam-
puchea, imposes a cruel burden on its
own people.

No Vietnamese proposal to date has
addressed the underlying issues-
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and
creation of a government in Phnom
Penh chosen by the Khmer people
themselves. It is a given, I think we all
agree, that free choice by the Khmer
people would not result in a return to
power of the Khmer Rouge. None of us
wish such an outcome. A Kampuchean
government responsive to the Khmer
people and to the urgent need for na-
tional reconstruction would be a threat
to no one and would contribute to the
kind of stability so important to
Southeast Asia.

I want to convey America's admira-
tion for what has been achieved by
ASEAN in obtaining international sup-
port for a just settlement in Kampuchea.

THE SECRETARY

We will continue to do our part, in-
cluding moral, political, and humani-
tarian support for the organizations led
by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann. We
will give no support to the Khmer
Rouge, whose atrocities outraged the
world.

While we are discussing Vietnam, let
me reemphasize that an accounting of
Americans missing in action from the
conflict in Indochina is a matter of the
highest priority for the Unites States.
The United States has both a legal and
moral responsibility to obtain the fullest
possible accounting of almost 2,500 of
our men still missing. The American
people rightfully expect no less. We
deeply appreciate the support you have
given us with Vietnam on this problem.
It is a problem which demands mean-
ingful cooperation and progress before
the American people will permit discus-
sion of normalization with the Viet-
namese, even in the context of a Kam-
puchea settlement.

It is, therefore, in the interest of all
of us to persuade Hanoi to come for-
ward rapidly. It is the humane thing to
do. The longer this issue lingers, the
deeper will be the resentment of the
American people. That serves no one's
interests and thwarts the goal we all
share of moving beyond the tragic
history of Indochina to a more hopeful
and constructive future. We appreciate
the recently announced repatriation of
remains. We call on Vietnam in a
humanitiirian spirit to meet the com-
mitments it made to us recently and ac-
celerate its efforts to resolve the issue.
Resolution of this sensitive problem
would be greeted as a significant and
positive step by the American people
and would establish a precedent for
future cooperation.

Still another tragedy is the large and
continuing flow of people fleeing Viet-
namese repression and aggression. Our
joint efforts on the refugee issue provide
a remarkable example of international
cooperation, involving ASEAN, the
United States, and other countries
whose humanitarian principles have led
them to assist in coping with this cruel
tragedy. Thailand, which has borne the
biggest burden of first asylum, has
responded magnificently in providing a
haven for close to two-thirds of a million
refugees. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines also have made major con-
tributions to the alleviation of human
suffering by providing temporary
asylum and processing facilities. The en-
tire international community applauds

you for your unceasing efforts in dealing
with this problem, which was caused by
Vietnam and imposed upon you.

The United States is proud of the
part it has played in resettling Indo-
chinese refugees. Of the 1.37 million
refugees who have been resettled
around the world since 197.5, 650,000—
almost one-half of the entire total— have
been resettled in the United States. Ab-
sorbing such numbers can never be easy,
but we are proud to have these refugees
come to our shores. Ours is a nation
built by people seeking freedom from
tyranny. Our country is enriched by the
energies and talents of the Vietnamese
and other Southeast Asian refugees.

Other nations represented at this
conference have also played their part.
In fact, the entire refugee resettlement
process, from first asylum to final reset-
tlement, represents international
cooperation at its finest. If we are to
maintain the cooperative nature of this
endeavor, all of us must continue to
shoulder our share of the burden. We in
the United States will do so, and we
urge others to do so as well.

One of the tragic effects of the
movement of people seeking refuge has
been an increase in piracy. Although the
number of vicious attacks on helpless
refugees— including women and
children— has declined, it is still a terri-
ble risk to run for those seeking
freedom. I know that all ASEAN
governments condemn these acts of
piracy and are anxious to find ways to
combat this problem. We stand ready to
help in any way possible.

The Challenge of Economic
Development

We face a third great challenge in con-
cert with all members of the interna-
tional community— economic develop-
ment. All the leaders of ASEAN have
made economic development a major
goal, and it has become a central part of
the U.S. -ASEAN relationship. But we
are all part of a world economy so our
efforts must extend beyond the confines
of the U.S.-ASEAN relationship.

Prior to the recent London economic
summit, [Indonesian] Foreign Minister
Mochtar wrote me and others in his
capacity as chairman of the ASEAN
Standing Committee, asking me to bear
in mind the concerns of the ASEAN
countries as the summit leaders ad-
dressed global economic issues. It should
be clear from the outcome of that sum-
mit that ASEAN's concerns were very
much on our minds.

Trade Issues. The first topic
Foreign Minister Mochtar addressed
was trade. We share the view that trad
is a major engine of the development
process. Trade liberalization is an in-
dispensable element in ensuring that thi
global recovery will endure and spread.
We worked hard to see that the summit
declaration urged formal movement on
new GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] trade round. In our
judgment, a new round will stimulate
confidence in the recovery and can offe
the prospect of significant benefits to
the developing world.

A key objective of a new trade
round will be to confront the protec-
tionist pressures that afflict all of us,
developed and developing countries
alike. On this point, I am sure we are i
full agreement. We may disagree,
however, on the extent of protectionisi
now being provided our respective in-
dustries.

The United States is frequently ac-
cused of bowing to protectionist pres-
sures to the detriment of the developir
world. Examples often cited are textilt
shoes, and steel. We do face pro-
tectionist pressure, and occasionally w
are forced to limit the growth of impo
of some products. I note with pride,
however, that the U.S. economy is a
genuinely open one, and this openness
of great benefit to developing countrif
The United States is the world's biggt
market for the manufactured exports
developing countries, taking over 50'R
such exports to all industrial countries
Even in sensitive industries where pri
tectionist pressure is high, imports ha
continued to grow, often exceeding tli ,
growth in total output in that industr |

The complaint heard most concerJ
textiles. But during the first 4 month^
1984, textile imports to the United
States are 50% above the same perio'
1983; in the case of the ASEAN coun- •'
tries, the figure is 107%. A rate of in
crease like that in a sensitive Americ;
industry causes us real problems and
brings an understandable reaction in
United States. But the increases are
there, nonetheless. The United State;
has an open market. Imports are a p'
manent part of our economic life and
welcome the benefits they bring.

Protectionism is a danger we all
must combat. IMF [International
Monetary Fund] studies have made c
the damage that high levels of protec
tionism have caused to certain devek
ing countries. I agree with those whc
have raised objections to proposals ir|^
the United States for local content

THE SECRETARY

slation. President Reagan's Ad-
istration is vigorously opposed to
1 laws but the principle of realism is
iired here as well, for this is a prac-
widespread in the developing as well
leveloped worlds. Nor can we ignore
reality that the average tariff level
he developing countries is 30% corn-
ed to 4.7% in developed countries.
A trade issue of particular concern
he United States is infringement of
■Uectual property rights. American _
inesses lose hundreds of millions of
ars annually due to the counter-
ing and piracy of records, tapes, and
er intellectual" property. But the even
ger losers are those nations who fail
jffer protection to intellectual prop-
y. America's high-technology com-
)ies— for example, in computers and
nputer software— are not going to
nt to invest in countries where their
ellectual property can be stolen with
Dunity. This will result in a loss to
)se countries of the types of skills
3ded to develop a modern industrial
:tor with well-educated, high paid,
lied workers. This is an issue that
-icerns us all and which must be ad-
3ssed quickly.

Growth in the industrial democracies
:rucial to the trade and thus to the
)nomies of the developing world
d— I wish to emphasize— vice versa.
al output in non-oil-producing develop-
<■ countries is expected to rise 3.5%
s year, compared to 1.6% last year. A
ijor part of this recovery is due to the
rease in world trade. Achievement of
rtained noninflationary growth in the
lited States and maintenance of our
en markets are of prime importance

the developing world. Conversely,
, ;EAN's prosperity has created new
I irkets and enhanced investment op-
I rtunities for American business.

The strong growth of U.S. import
[ mand has been the major factor in the
1 ;overy of world trade, with U.S. im-
1 rts up 13% in 1983 and an estimated
: % for 1984. In the case of ASEAN,
i Teased exports to the United States
a counted for over 60% of ASEAN's
1 ;al export increase in 1983. These
!] rcentages are pretty big in anybody's
I] -ms, but in terms of ASEAN's
Ijonomies they are huge, for the

nerican economy is truly enormous.

Commodity Agreements. The sec-
d issue mentioned by Foreign Minister
ochtar on behalf of the ASEAN coun-
les was commodities. In practice, com-
odity agreements often interfere with
arket forces to the detriment of ra-
)nal long-term allocation of capital.

land, and labor. Bearing these dif-
ferences in mind, however, we may be
able to turn to negotiation along
avenues that can lead to practical and
economically productive areas of agree-
ment.

The International Rubber Agree-
ment is one commodity arrangement
that we both are able to support. We an-
ticipate that negotiations to renew this
agreement will proceed in a good-faith
manner. Another example is the
U.S- ASEAN memorandum of under-
standing on tin that we concluded late
last year, directly as a result of the
ASEAN dialogue meeting. We intend to
follow the same precepts of realism and
diplomacy in examining other commodi-
ty issues.

Debt and Finance. The third and
fourth topics in Foreign Minister
Mochtar's letter were debt and finance.
Here the London summit participants
agreed that their strategy for dealing
with the international debt crisis is
working as intended. One of the lessons
we have learned in recent years is that
over-reliance on foreign borrowing to
finance development can lead to suc-
cessively complex problems, especially
during an economic downturn. I want to
underscore the Williamsburg and Lon-
don declarations' recognition of the im-
portance of private capital flows to the
developing world. Private equity funds
can provide an important complement to
domestic savings, while avoiding the pit-
falls that come with large amounts of
foreign debt. Furthermore, as the Lon-
don summit recognized, foreign direct
investment "carries the advantage of be-
ing tied to productive capital formation,
as well as forming part of the package
that includes the transfer of technology
and skills." Countries, just as companies,
must pay attention to their debt-to-
equity ratio. The ASEAN countries you
represent have been wise in pursuing,
for the most part, sensible strategies of
foreign borrowing. The United States
stands ready to work with you to im-
prove the climate for increased foreign
equity flows. For example, we are
prepared to enter into discussions about
treaties for encouraging and protecting
investment.

Another aspect of the financial side
of cooperation is development assist-
ance. While it can never match trade or
private foreign investment— let alone in-
vestment based on domestic savings— in
terms of its impact on the recipient

country, it can play a crucial catalytic
role, particularly for the poorest coun-
tries. U.S. assistance to the developing
world exceeds that of any OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development] country. In fiscal year
(FY) 1983, the United States provided
$249 million in bilateral economic
assistance to ASEAN countries.
Together with security assistance, our
total bilateral aid was $424 million.
When one adds in our share of
World Bank and Asian Development
Bank loans to the ASEAN countries,
total U.S. assistance in FY 1983 ex-
ceeded $1 billion. We are the largest
participant in the major international
financial institutions. We will maintain
these flows to the extent that our
budgetary conditions permit and we will
continue to support the programs
directed toward ASEAN of the IMF, the
World Bank, and the ASEAN Develop-
ment Bank.

North/South Dialogue. Mr.

Mochtar's fifth point addressed the
North/ South dialogue. We believe in
dialogue; that is why we are here. That
is why we support substantive work in
the GATT, IMF, the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, the African
Development Bank, the Inter- American
Development Bank, and other similar in-
stitutions. The forums for the dialogue
exist. The institutions for carrying out
programs exist. What we must find are
practical solutions, working in those
forums where constructive action can be
taken.

U.S. -ASEAN Relations

Each time I return to this region I am
impressed anew with the sense of
dynamism I encounter. ASEAN's record
of progress over the past decade has
been phenomenal. Your average real an-
nual growth is the envy of the rest of
the world— developed and developing.
Your growth in trade with the rest of
the world in the last decade was more
than twice that of overall world trade.
Your exports have grown from $14
billion to over $70 billion in the same
period— a most impressive record. Com-
plementing the dynamism of the region
is its stability. Much of the developing
world must grapple with rapid and un-
controlled change that threatens political
and economic institutions. But the coun-
tries of this region have become models
for balancing stability with controlled
and beneficial change.

On this visit, I have been reminded
again how our host government, under
President Soeharto's leadership, has

THE SECRETARY

drawn on the traditional Indonesian
values of consultation and consensus to
construct a stability that stands in stark
contrast to the turmoil that followed the
1945 revolution. In Malaysia, I saw a
vibrant parliamentary democracy at
work a political system that demon-
TtStes that people from different ethnic
roups can work together in harmony to
.rge a nation. In Singapore, 1 saw how
imaginative leadership combined with
the principles of free enterprise can
overcome the shortage of na ural
resources. The Philippines although still
beset by serious financial difficulties
recently held imporUmt legislative elec-
tions, which showed the Filipinos deep
commitment to the democratic process. I
have been heartened by Thailand s im-
pressive political stability and deepened
cooperation with my country. And
Deputy Secretary Dam felt the promise
of Brunei as it celebrated its in-
dependence this year.

Today, there is a growing awareness
of Asia's "importance to the United
States. East Asia's rapid economic
kirowth has had a profound impact <:.n
our own economy. U.S. investment in
ASEAN, currently almost $8 billion, ac-
cording to recent Department of Com-
merce figures, continues to increase, as
American business sees new oppor-
tunities in ASEAN's expanding free^
market economies. The U.S.-ASEAN
Center for Technology Exchange pro-
vides an opportunity to promote the
transfer of technology from the United
States to ASEAN firms. Americas an-
nual trade with East Asia and the
Pacific exceeds that with any other part
of the world-and has for 5 years.
ASEAN is now the fifth largest trading
partner of the United States-with total
trade exceeding $23 billion.

There is a deep human and cultural
dimension to our relations as well. This
year there are more than 40,000
students from ASEAN nations studying
in the United States and the number of
my countrymen who visit Southeast Asia
and become involved here continues to
rise. I, myself, visited this region often
as a private citizen and spread the word
of the new Southeast Asia to my friends
back home. Your societies, your his-
tories, your intellectual and artistic
achievements every year become more
familiar to Americans and contribute to
a lasting bond between us. Behind each
statistic there are complex person-to-
person contacts that will link our lands
and peoples ever more closely in the
future.

Southeast Asia is an area that com-
mands U.S. attention within the
Asia/Pacific region. In recent years
questions have been raised about the
firmness of American purpose in
Southeast Asia. Some feared that our
withdrawal from Vietnam would lead us
to abandon our interests in the region,
particulary in ASEAN. The prospect-
some years ago-of a withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Korea fed these fears.
Let me assure you that nothing
could be further from reality. U.S.
security interests are increasingly
engaged in Asia and the Pacific. We are
committed to an active, constructive
and long-term presence in Southeast

A SIR

Our relations with the ASEAN coun-
tries are the cornerstone of our policy in
Southeast Asia. As the United States
develops and expands its relations with
other countries, both large and small, m
Asia and around the worid, we will very
much keep in mind our strong ties with
the ASEAN region. We do not intend to
subordinate our interests m ASEAN to
the pursuit of better relations elsewhere.

U S relations with the ASEAN
region are based upon the perception
that we each have a constructive and
complementary role to play in dealing
with the challenges that confront us.
Your combined voices carry authority in
the international arena and contribute to
the quest for peace and economic justice.
Together we can make an impressive
contribution to the kind of world all our
peoples seek for the future.

levei

(|,ff

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me say once again
what a pleasure it is to participate m
this dialogue with you. The discussions
we have had here symbolize the
dynamism and vibrancy of your coun-
tries The inclusion in our agenda this
year of the theme of Pacific cooperation
reflects your vision of the opportunity
that the future offers to the Pacific
region. We share this vision and are
prepared to work with you to give it
substance. The success of ASEAN, both
as a regional organization and as in-
dividual countries, stands out as an
example for others everywhere. The
United States is proud to be associated
with our allies and friends in these joint
endeavors.

NEWS CONFERENCE,

CANBERRA,

JULY 15, 1984^

First I want to express my appreciatii

for the great hospitality shown me her«

by the Prime Minister, and the Foreig*

Minister, and others in Australia. We

had a very fine working dinner and a

lengthy discussion last night, and agai;

this morning a brief private meeting i (jcek

with the Foreign Minister. The meetii^ «rPa

this morning will continue on, so we j jZlSI

want to, all of us, express our apprecd ill

tion for this mark of cordiality. Of jster.

course I'll be meeting with the Foreigi ^sek

Minister further in New Zealand wher| strafc

we get there tomorrow. V

Q. The New Zealand Labor Party
abides by its policy in banning nucle>
ships from New Zealand waters. Doe
this mean the end of the ANZUS tre»

ty"'

A I had the chance to talk Ijnefly
on the" telephone with the newly electee
Prime Minister [David Lange], and 1 e>
pect that we will have a chance to mee
He said that he was going out of his w.
to come to Wellington, and we will hav
a chance to discuss the situation. Ihen
a very warm feeling between the peopl
of the United States and, I think, the
people of New Zealand, and we will
work at the situation. 1 don't want to
prejudge it.

Q. This morning David Lange saJ.
on TV that his government would iin ,j
plement his party's policy on banning ;„
U S. warships carrying nuclear ,

weapons from New Zealand ports, b^ „
he said he did not believe that that j.
would jeopardize ANZUS. Would yo- „

. . . • .__0 ,1

iWt;

lecl
slra!
A.

accept that view?

A As I said, 1 will have discussm
with him. We'll have a meeting of the
ANZUS group, and we'll make our
statements as we go along in that set
ting. I don't want to prejudge the situ
tion.

Q But do vou express concern
over that New Zealand Labor Party
policy, whether or not it's put into e
feet? Do you express concern of the

policv itself? .

A ANZUS is an alliance. It is an
alliance in the light of the fact that th
basic values of freedom, liberty, and t
rule of law are shared by Australia, ^
Zealand, and the United States, amor
other countries in the worid. And soj
recognize that there are threats to th.
valuis and that we have to deter thes
threats. That is essentially the basis t

neoartment of State Bulli

THE SECRETARY

\ alliance. Now for an alliance to
I ill anything, it has to be possible for
i military forces of the respective
iiitries to be able to interact together;
: r\\ ise it's not much of an alliance.
these are matters that we'll discuss
, nevertheless, I think that's just a
;ement of fact.

Q. Would you be asking for Mr.
fden to perhaps use whatever in-
mce he has on the New Zealand
tor Party to see the reality of the
ZUS treaty?

A. Mr. Hayden and the Prime
lister, of course, will express
mselves from the standpoint of the
5tralian view of matters, and we'll ex-
ss the U.S. view of matters. I think
t there's a great deal of good will on
sides of this issue, and we'll have to
ceed and see what we can work out.

Q. If the New Zealand Govern-
nt does ban the warships, can we
I'Cct to see more of them here in
l^tralia?

' A. I don't want to bite on the con-

iied speculation. I want to talk with
new leader in New Zealand, and we
work our way along on these issues.

)n't want to engage in excessive

culation.

Q. Do you expect to be able to
lolve the issue during the period of
I ANZUS talks?

A. I think, first of all, the ANZUS
:s take place among the governments
t are in place in the United States,
jtralia, and New Zealand. We will
I e a chance to meet with members of
1 new government, but it hasn't
-ned itself yet. So this ANZUS
jting, I think, comes at a good time
he sense that it affords us an oppor-
ity to meet with a new government,
it is the old government that will be
government in place for this
sting.

Q. As you've been aware, the
)or Party's national conference in
5 country has taken the decision to
p homeporting of American war-
ps in the Australian ports. Is that a
tter of concern?
A. We think that the way in which
ship visits and other aspects of our
itionship with Australia are basically
'ery good shape and we have no
blems.

Q. Would the United States be
itemplating changing the arrange-
nts whereby it makes regular use of
stralian ports, particularly the Port

of Fremantle in western Australia, as
a result of the decision that was taken
last week by the Labor Party con-
ference?

A. As far as I can see from the dis-
cussions that I've had here, and we'll
continue them, of course, the
U.S. -Australia leg of the ANZUS rela-
tionship is in very good shape. We have
a strong sharing of common values and
a sense of the importance of succeeding
in maintaining stability in the world and
a place where these values can flourish.
We share a common view that we must
maintain a deterrent capability.

Q. Do you think that this year's
ANZUS talks are slightly irrelevant,
given that they are taking place with
Mr. Muldoon and Mr. Cooper?
Shouldn't we really be discussing it
with the new Labor government?

A. I think it has fortuitously turned
out to be a good time to have this
conference because it gives us an oppor-
tunity to talk with a new government
and to hear their views and to express
our views so that these matters can be
considered before the new government
takes office and starts to take positions
as a government. So I think that it's
really a good time to be present in New
Zealand, and it gives us a chance to be
part of this transition that's under way.

Q. Is the United States worried
about Australia's depleted defense
capabilities and does the United
States believe that the balance of
power in the ASEAN region could be
destabilized because of a lack of
defense direction from Australia?

A. We think it's important for all
the countries in the various alliances
that we have to be looking to their
defense capabilities and seeing that they
are properly attended to. And, of
course, we struggle with that within the
United States.

President Reagan has wanted to re-
store the military balance and that has
meant spending a lot of money and on
the whole that has gone along suc-
cessfully. We have had some disappoint-
ments in the appropriations process, but
there has certainly been a major change
in the U.S. defense posture. We work on
this same problem with our NATO allies.
We talk about it, the responsibilities of
the Japanese and so on. So I think it's a
general proposition that we have to be
looking to our defense capabilities and
the same is true from the standpoint of
Australia.

I might say that we all recognize, on
the one hand, that the nuclear side of
strength is a key element in the deter-

rent, and at the same time we recognize
the importance of strength in conven-
tional forces and the importance of con-
ventional forces to the nuclear deter-
rent. It is the case, at the same time,
that conventional forces are expensive
and so that fact means that you
recognize the sig^nificance of improve-
ment in conventional capability; you also
have to be recognizing that it's going to
cost you some money.

Q. Does that mean you are con-
cerned about Australia's [inaudible]
defense capability?

A. We are concerned about
anything less than adequate all around
the world, including with ourselves, and
so we are trying to bring about — others
are working with us — attention to what
the capabilities are. And I don't single
out any one country. I just say that we
all need to be looking to our capabilities
and strengthening them; recognizing,
ironically, that it is through strengthen-
ing them that we lessen the chance that
they would ever be used.

Q. Does the United States regard
Australia's defense capabilities as ade-
quate or not?

A. We have an alliance with
Australia, as I have said, we feel that
there is work to be done on the part of
the United States, on the part of
Australia, on the part of NATO, on the
part of Japan, on the part of people who
are standing for freedom and democracy
all over the world. We have to be ready
to defend these values, and having
strength is the best insurance that we
can have that the strength will not need
to be used. So it isn't simply a problem
for Australia. It's a problem for all of
us, and all of us working together in our
respective alliances.

Q. Congresswoman Ferraro has
charged that President Reagan cannot
claim one single foreign policy suc-
cess. I am wondering if you would
like to respond to that.

A. Oh, I'm not going to get into a
debate with Congresswoman Ferraro,
but I think that, as a general proposi-
tion, the standing of the United States
in the world has been immeasurably
strengthened during the Reagan Ad-
ministration. Here we are in the
Australia-New Zealand area, and having
just come from a meeting with the
ASEAN countries, and earlier this year
the President has visited Japan and
Korea and China, so if you look at this
part of the world, we have very strong
relationships here. And the same can be

THE SECRETARY

said as you look around the world more
generally. So there are many problems
fhey are being addressed in a strong and
creative way, and I thmk the Umted

States is in very good shape.

Q This is what they call in
American journalism a "so-what" ques-
tion. If the ANZUS alliance is not
functioning effectively, what dif-
ference does it make beyond the
shared values and so forth.

A Shared values and so forth are
not a "so-what" question. The impor-
tance of freedom tends to be taken tor
granted in the United States, m
Australia, in New Zealand, m many
parts of Europe, and in places that have
had it and consider it normal, like
iireathing the air.

But it's very dramatic to talk to peo-
ple who are in a country that hasn t had
it For example, this past year, I ve had
a chance to visit with the leaders o
Spain and Portugal, and particularly 1
remember visiting with Prime Minister
Suarez just as he returned from the in-
auguration of President Alfonsin in
Argentina. And he was commenting
upon how wonderful it is to have free-
dom So, 1 think that freedom can t be
nut down as a "so-what" proposition. It
needs to be attended to everywhere, and
people need to address themselves to the
importance of this value and the fact
that it is under attack. If we're going to
keep it, we have to be ready to deter ag-
gression against it.

Q. Are you suggesting that if the
ANZUS pact is not effectively work-
ing, Australia and New Zealand would
lose their freedom?

A. It is part of an overall proposi-
tion, and the all-or-nothing approach
suggested bv your question, I don't think
is appropriate. But at the same time, it
we lose some deterrent capability, that
increases the margin for error, and we
shouldn't do it.

Q. There are reports from
Washington, somewhat ambiguous,
that the United States has told the
Soviet Union in regard to these
discussions on space weapons that it
would be prepared to delay these talks
until after the elections if that suited
the Soviet Union. Can you amplify this
in any way?

A. The Soviet Union suggested that
these talks take place in Vienna in the
middle of September, and we have said
yes, we'll be there. There have also been
lots' of questions raised by them, and
they keep talking about our election. We
don't talk about our election; we talk

about the importance of arms control at
any season of the year So we dont
want to delay these talks, but if for
some reason they can't conveniently be
arranged at the time set, and there s a
desire to somehow have them take p ace
after the election, then they'll take place
after the election. But our desire is to
have them take place in September, as
was originally set, but we're not going to
sort of hang on that. On the contrary,
our interest is in getting them gomg and
getting them going in a constructive
way as soon as possible.

Q. Our Foreign Minister just re-
turned from Moscow a month ago. Did
vou discuss that with him and. if so.
"did you gain any useful perceptions or
information?

A The Foreign Minister had a very
interesting trip to the Soviet Union, not
iust in Moscow, and he provided us a
good read-out from the trip after it was
completed. I've had a chance to talk with
him further about it on this visit, and 1
hope that I'll have chances for some fur-
ther exchanges as we're together over
the next few days. I think it's a very
valuable thing that he went and got his
own impressions and was able to provide
those to us. It's part of the continuing
dialogue, you might say, of the West
with the Soviet Union. And each piece
of it is of importance. His visit was quite
a worthwhile one, and we're very grate-
ful to him for being willing to share with
us his own thoughts and his experiences
there.

oi
1

Q. While in Jakarta, did you raise
the question of human rights in princi-
ple?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you present a letter to the
Indonesian Government from your
U S Congressmen expressing concern
about human rights? If not, why not?

A. I'm from the Administration, and
1 expressed our concern and there are
also things that we are trying to do that
we think are helpful on East Timor. We
believe that the best way to be helpful
and to try to make a constructive con-
tribution 'is to do it quietly in diplomatic
channels and at the same time be ready
to do things that may help people in
East Timor and provide access to the
situation. Those are the lines along
which we have been working.

REMARKS,
WELLINGTON.
JULY 16. 1984^

It is a great pleasure for me to welcomi
Foreign Ministers Cooper and Hayden
and the members of their delegations t
our Embassy. I believe our first sessio!
this morning went very well, and I loo_
forward to continuing in the same spim
during the remainder of the council

meeting.

We, of course, have had a very cloi
partnership with the existing and all
previous New Zealand Governments
and in the spirit which has character-
ized our dealings with New Zealand ov(
many years, we hope to continue m
partnership with the new government,

My visits to Australia and New
Zealand come at a time when the con
tinued strength of the alliance has nev(
been more critical to stability m the
Pacific. Soviet naval activity in the
Pacific, supported by the growing So
air and naval presence on the Pacific
rim continues to increase, probing for
weak or vulnerable areas into which it
can expand. Our ANZUS solidarity, I
believe, has been critical to the failure c
the Soviets to project their influence in-
to the Southwest Pacific, particularly
among the new island states of the
region.

But should the ANZUS resolve evei
weaken, should we ever allow our atter
tion to be diverted from potentially
destabilizing activities by indecision or ;
belief that opting out of the alliance wil
decrease the dangers we might face,
then I believe we will have handed our
adversaries a windfall by default. Our
unity is the best deterrence we have, tl
least expensive, and most effective wa:
we have of convincing any potential
adversary that we will always stand
together. That is why we stand
together, just as the United States
stands with our European allies in
NATO Both alliances are communitiet

ekao

fZl'St
Ll'll

mi
lOefen

km
lemn'J
hell

of nations, bounded by shared
democratic traditions, which have volu,,
tarily linked their peoples and institu-
tions into a strong chain of deterrence
against anyone who would dominate uf
But as with any chain, we must ensure
that all the links are sturdy and in goo
repair. ,

And 1 think that is why we are her
in Wellington these 2 days, reviewing,
as we have every year for 33 years, ou
Pacific end of the chain, to ensure that
we understand each other and our viev
on mutual defense and other importan j
global and regional matters. But equal |

npnartment of State Bullet

THE SECRETARY

ortant, we meet to deepen that sense
lutual trust which has always
racterized our relations and without
ch any community of nations united
eek a common goal cannot survive. I
optimistic that we will succeed.
In that spirit, I would like to pro-
3 a toast to Her Majesty Queen
iabeth II, Queen of New Zealand and
Australia.

ZUS COMMUNIQUE,
.Y 17. 1984

33rd meeting of the ANZUS Council
; place in Wellington on 16 and 17 July

1. The United States Secretary of State.
rge Shultz. the Australian Minister for
sign Affairs, Bill Hayden, and Minister
Defence, Gordon Scholes, and New
and's Minister of Foreign Affairs, War-
Cooper, and Minister of Defence. David
nison, represented their respective
jrnments. During their visit the leaders
le United States and Australian delega-
s called on the Prime Minister. Rt. Hon.
Robert Muldoon, and Mr. David Lange,
., Prime Minister elect.

2. Council members reaffirmed their
mitment to the maintenance of peace,
ility and democratic freedoms. They ex-
sed their belief that the ANZUS partner-
, based as it is on common traditions and
ed interests, contributes to this. They
•omed the increased exchanges that had
n place on political, economic, security
defense issues and agreed that defense
peration, including combined exercises,

s and logistic support arrangements,
ed an essential part in promoting mutual
1 rity. Access by allied aircraft and ships
! le airfields and ports of the ANZUS
I ibers was reaffirmed as essential to the
! inuing effectiveness of the Alliance.

3. Council members reviewed a broad
1 ;e of global issues and regional
lilopments of concern to the Alliance.

! ie included the persistent Soviet arms
1 1-up in the Pacific region as well as in
I ope; the need for early resumption of
I s control negotiations; the continuing
I ession and occupation by Soviet forces in
: nanistan; and Vietnam's occupation of
ipuchea.

4. The Coimcil members gave special at-
I ion to arms control and disarmament

1 es. They recognised that arms control
; 'ements which produced balanced, effec-
' and verifiable reductions in armaments
1 1d assist in reducing international ten-

Is and in strengthening international
irity. They agreed that the early conclu-
of such agreements was of the highest
ortance. Among arms control measures, a
5tantial reduction of nuclear weaponry to
.need, more stable levels was of the
itest urgency. Council members expressed
;ern at the Soviet Union's refusal to
ime the START [strategic arms reduction
s] and INF [intermediate-range nuclear

force] talks and called for the resumption of
those negotiations without delay. They en-
dorsed efforts by several countries, including
the United States and Australia, to establish
a political dialogue with the Soviet Union and
to make progress on arms control. The New
Zealand and Australian Council members
welcomed the readiness of the United States
to resume negotiations at any time and
without preconditions on reducmg nuclear
weapons and its agreement to discuss effec-
tive and verifiable limits on anti-satellite
weapons with the Soviet Union.

5. The Council members reaffirmed their
strong commitment to preventing the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons and agreed to
intensify their efforts to strengthen the inter-
national non-proliferation regime through
multilateral and bilateral measures. They
noted that the third Review Conference of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons is to take place in 1985.
Progress in fulfilling all the Treaty com-
mitments, including Article VI which com-
mits parties to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessa-
tion of the nuclear arms race at an early
date, is important to the international non-
proliferation regime and the Review Con-
ference.

6. In this context they reaffirmed the
commitment of their governments to work
towards the goal of a comprehensive and
fully verifiable nuclear test ban treaty. They
expressed satisfaction that the Western
group of countries in the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva had agreed on a
draft mandate for the Nuclear Test Ban Ad
Hoc Committee. They urged the conference
to move promptly to re-establish the Ad Hoc
Committee under this mandate.

7. The Australian and United States
members affirmed the important contribution
of the joint Australian/United States defence
facilities to arms control verification, effec-
tive deterrence, mutual security and main-
tenance of the stability of the strategic
balance.

8. The Australian and New Zealand Coun-
cil members indicated that they shared fully
the concerns of other countries of the South
Pacific region on nuclear issues, including
French nuclear testing. They gave an account
of the progress made in the discussions
among members of the South Pacific Forum
on a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The
ANZUS partners also noted that the pro-
posed South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone would
be discussed further at the 1984 meeting of
the South Pacific Forum in Tuvalu.

9. The Council members agreed that a
convention to prohibit the development, pro-
duction, stockpiling, transfer and use of
chemical weapons, with adequate provisions
for compliance and verification, would be an
important disarmament measure. The use of
chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq war and
evidence of their use elsewhere reinforced
the need for urgent conclusion of a conven-
tion to ban chemical weapons. The Australian
and New Zealand Council members welcomed
the recent initiative taken by the United
States Government in the Conference on Dis-
armament.

10. They noted the contribution to world
peace and security made by the Antarctic
Treaty which is the basis of international
cooperation in Antarctica and bans all
military activities and nuclear weapons there.
They expressed their continued commitment
to the Antarctic Treaty system.

11. The Council members agreed that the
political and strategic outlook would be great-
ly influenced by the economic environment
and that it was crucial to sustain the
economic recovery and to spread its benefits
more widely. Equally the debt problem which
many countries were facing needed to be
managed effectively. The threat to the world
trading system posed by the spread of protec-
tionist measures also needed to be resisted.
This was particularly so in the field of
agricultural trade which suffered from long-
standing protectionist measures and the
emergence of export subsidization on a scale
which threatened markets for many com-
modities.

12. Council members welcomed the em-
phasis placed by the major industrialised
countries at their recent Summit meeting in
London on the importance of global economic
interdependence and expressed the hope that
the recognition of this interdependence could
form the basis for future action. The impor-
tance of interdependence was nowhere more
evident than in relation to the debt problem
which required a careful and balanced ap-
proach. Economic adjustment in the debtor
countries was seen as an essential condition
for solving debt problems. At the same time
a cooperative approach was required from
the industrialised countries. Assistance to the
debtor countries had to be provided under
conditions that recognised the political and
social difficulties faced by these countries.
The increasingly important and central role
in the management of debt problems played
by the International Monetary Fund was
welcomed. Now that some of the most heavi-
ly indebted countries were undertaking the
first, necessary domestic adjustments, inter-
national attention was focusing increasingly
on longer-term changes that may be required
to strengthen the open trade and payments
system, with special attention being paid to
the closely linked problems of debt and trade.
The work being conducted on these issues by
a variety of groups reflected an encouraging
convergence of views. Council members con-
sidered that this had opened the way for
discussion and early agreement on practical
approaches to these issues.

13. The Council members reviewed devel-
opments in the South Pacific. They welcomed
the fact that the area remained one of peace
and cooperation and that it was firmly at-
tached to democratic systems and traditional
values. Change was being accommodated and
new opportunities were being taken up. The
independent and self-governing countries of
the region were strengthening relationships
with one another and with organisations and
countries outside the region that had con-
structive contributions to make.

14. Council members welcomed progress
towards self-government in the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands. They wanted to
see ratification on the Compact of Free

THE SECRETARY

Association and termination of the
Trusteeship concluded without delay and
looked forward to the Micronesian states ex-
panding their links with countries and
organisations in the Pacific region.

15. Council members agreed that signifi-
cant progress has been made in constitutional
evolution in New Caledonia, but noted there
was a need for continued participation of all
parties in the constitutional process. Peaceful
resolution of the situation in that territory
was of great concern to all countries in the
area and Council members noted that it was
important for France to maintain and expand
its dialogue with South Pacific Forum
members on this issue.

16. The Council members agreed on the
importance of effective regional institutions
in the area. They noted the major political
role of the South Pacific Forum in which
Heads of Government of Island nations and
Australia and New Zealand were able to
work towards shared approaclies on current
issues. Maritime matters, such as fisheries
cooperation and development, and possible
nuclear waste dumping were of major con-
cern to countries of the region. Council
members commended the valuable work be-
ing undertaken in these fields by the Forum
Fisheries Agency and the South Pacific
Regional Environmental Programme.
Members agreed they would continue sup-
porting and encouraging these regional
cooperative endeavors through financial con-
tributions or other means.

17. The Australian and New Zealand
Council members underlined the significance
of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea for the countries of the Pacific region
and stressed the importance of wide
adherence to it.

18. Recognising that political stability and
cooperation are underpinned by economic
security. Council members expressed admira-
tion for the resilience and good management
of Island nations which had, overall, enabled
Island nations to cope with the effects of
global economic recession and natural
disasters. They recognised nevertheless that
continued bilateral and regional aid, and en-
couragement of trade and investment were
essential to ensure the well-being of the peo-
ple of the area, and that such help would be
mutually beneficial.

19. Council members reaffirmed their
desire to work with the (Governments of the
Pacific Island countries in the interests of the
stability and security of the region. Australia
and New Zealand intend to maintain and
develop their bilateral defence cooperation
programmes with, and assistance to. Island
governments in fields such as maritime
surveillance, civil action, emergency and
disaster relief and training. The United
States, for its part, will continue to provide
assistance in these areas.

20. The Australian and New Zealand
members provided details of recent national
initiatives designed to reinforce the main-
tenance of regional security and stabiUty. The
New Zealand member explained that the New
Zealand Defence Review completed in 1983

placed greater emphasis on the role of the
New Zealand Armed Services to provide
assistance if requested to South Pacific coun-
tries. The Australian member informed the
Council that the Australian Government's of-
fer to develop a Pacific patrol boat to meet
the Island countries' expressed maritime
surveillance needs had been accepted by
several South Pacific countries.

21. Council members emphasised their
continuing support for the Association of
South East Asian Nations and welcomed the
contribution ASEAN makes towards the
stability and economic progress of the region.
The Council members also noted the increas-
ing significance of their own economic and
political links with the ASEAN countries.

22. Council members expressed full sup-
port for the principles adopted by ASEAN in
the search for a lasting settlement in Kam-
puchea. They reaffirmed their conviction that
the conflict in Kampuchea should be settled
by peaceful means. They agreed that a
negotiated settlement should be based on
respect for the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Kampuchea,
should take into account the desirability of
national reconciliation and should recognise
the legitimate security interest of all parties
concerned. To this end, they again urged the
early withdrawal of Vietnamese troops under
conditions that would allow for a peaceful
transition and a comprehensive settlement
which would enable the Khmer people freely
to decide their own future. Members wel-
comed the continuing humanitarian assistance
offered by the international community to the
Khmer people.

23. Council members' trade within the
Asian/Pacific region is now larger than with
any other group of countries. This reflected
not only the continuing strong growth in
their trade with Northeast Asia, but also an
increasingly dynamic element in economic
relations with the ASEAN countries. They
agreed that the growing strength of trade
and investment ties with ASEAN reinforced
the importance of political relationships.

24. Recent visits by President Reagan
and Prime Minister Hawke to China were
discussed. The Council members agreed that
China's continued commitment to modernisa-
tion and to constructive relations with others
in the region was a positive development
which should be encouraged.

25. The Council members welcomed the
steps taken by Japan to move towards
liberalising access to its market and ex-
pressed the hope that this process would be
maintained and accelerated to the benefit of
international trade as a whole. The Council
members noted the strengthening of Japan's
ties with the nations of Southeast Asia and
the South Pacific, including its contribution in
the field of development assistance. They also
noted Japan's commitment to an enhanced
capability for self-defense purposes.

26. Council members reaffirmed their
commitment to the sovereignty and in-
dependence of the Republic of Korea. They
called upon the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea to renounce its policies of hostility

towards the Republic of Korea, as evidenced
by last year's bombing in Rangoon, and to ai
cept proposals aimed at reducing tensions on
the Peninsula through the implementation ot
practical confidence-building measures. The
Council members reaffirmed their view that
direct negotiations between the two Koreas
provides the only realistic basis for a durablt
reconciliation. Noting that a reduction of ten
sions would considerably enhance regional
security, they called upon the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea to enter into
negotiations with the Republic of Korea as ji
genuinely equal participant.

27. Council members reaffirmed their oj
position to the continued Soviet occupation (
Afghanistan and condemned the recent
Soviet offensive which had caused con-
siderable suffering and loss of life among th
Afghan people. Council members called on '
the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces in a
cordance with successive United Nations
resolutions.

28. Council members exchanged views c
developments in the Indian Ocean region an
noted the strategic significance of the regio
The Australian Council member informed tl
meeting that the Australian Government ha
adopted guidelines for a comprehensive and
integrated approach to Indian Ocean issues
which included support for an Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace.

29. The Council members expressed the
concern at the serious loss of life and the ri
to peace and security in the Gulf resulting
from continuation of the war between Iran
and Iraq. They deplored all attacks on ship-
ping in the area and called on both countrif
to respect the right of free navigation for a
non-belligerent shipping. They expressed
their support for the security and territorij
integrity of all states in the area, in accord
ance with the Charter of the United Natior
The Council members also urged Iran and
Iraq to act with restraint and expressed th
hope that the two countries would seek wa
of bringing the conflict to an end and resti
ing peace to this area.

30. It was agreed that the next Counci
meeting would take place in Canberra in
1985 at a date to be decided.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE,

WELLINGTON,

JULY 17, 1984'^

Foreign Minister Cooper. Before I
open the news conference, 1 should s£
just that as chairman, we have had a
very good discussion in regard to
ANZUS. Obviously, in the circumstan
one would have believed going into th
conference, it was difficult to approac
the issues. We did approach the issue
that were before us, and I believe tha»
has been very beneficial. There are sc
issues that, as the outgoing Minister >
Foreign Affairs, I did not promote or
provoke. The questions that I believe
you are going to ask should be substa

tit

lit
A;

THE SECRETARY

i and directed to all elements of
ZUS; not just the particular issue
t you may think is the only thing in
ZUS. However, knowing the news
dia, you will ask what you wish to. I
V hand the news conference over to

I people. Welcome. It's nice to see a
group of people trying to give to the

iple of the Western alliance — and
ibably the Eastern bloc— but par-
ilarly Australia, New Zealand, and
lerica more news of what we have
m talking about here in Wellington in
rather inclement weather.

Q. The communique seems to give
airly clear indication to the incom-
; labor government of the ANZUS
•tners' attitude to ship visits. What

II Mr. Hawke be telling Mr. Lange,
i what will you be telling Mr.

nge of the Australian Labor Party's
w on it?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I don't
:)w what Mr. Hawke will be telling

Lange. You will have to ask him,
1 if I discuss anything with Mr.
nge, it will be a private discussion. I
uldn't propose to discuss that public-

Q. Would you say that you are ir-
lated at the current labor policy?

■ Foreign Minister Hayden. I leave

■ Labor Party of New Zealand to
re\op its own policy just as we develop

i-s. While we are fraternally asso-
ted to the Socialist International and
re many sentiments commonly shared
•ause we are both Labor Parties and
I ■ countries which are close to one
)ther — and not just geographic-
/ — we nonetheless are quite separate
i independent entities.

Q. What would you think would be
! effect on your antinuclear lobby in
stralia on a nuclear-free New
aland?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I'm not a
■mber of the antinuclear lobby in
stralia. On the contrary. So it's not
ich good asking me what they might
nk.

Q. Will they take strength from a
clear-free New Zealand?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I've just
plained to you, it's not much good ask-
f me. I'm rather prejudiced in views

that particular subject. You'd better
"K them.

Q. If the Labor Party does carry
t its policy of banning the visits of
[Clear ships here, would it be the
d of ANZUS?

Secretary Shultz. We'll have to see
what happens. And I think it's better to
stay away from iffy questions, to state
our positions clearly, and to work with
the new government and see if we can't
resolve the problem satisfactorily.

Q. In Washington last year, the
treaty partners noted the importance
of the visits of ships and aircraft to
the treaty partners. This year all of
the sudden, it is "essential." I was
wondering what has happened in the
last 12 months to bring about such a
change of emphasis.

Secretary Shultz. I think it's just a
question of people looking for different
words. It's obviously essential to any
alliance that military forces of the coun-
tries involved be able to have contact
with each other, and that's as true today
as it has been for 33 years.

Foreign Minister Hayden. If you
look at that, I think that it is referring
to a nuclear-free South Pacific, and in a
different context. I think if you look at
what I said in 1982 when the issue of
ship visits arose in Australia, when I
was leader of the opposition, we made a
rather unsteady start, but we estab-
lished beyond any doubt what our posi-
tion was within a few weeks. And that
was that we recognized that, as far as
Australia was concerned, ships visits
were essential.

In respect of aircraft, we allow air-
craft visits. There are special arrange-
ments in respect of B-.52s. That is quite
implicit in the last sentence of the sec-
ond paragraph of page one. At the na-
tional conference of the Labor Party last
week, the principles I've just outlined to
you were principles I staunchly pre-
sented and successfully defended. So the
attitudes of the Labor Party in these
respects has been on the table for some
time and adhered to.

Q. Between 1964 and 1976. suc-
cessive governments in New Zea-
land — Conservative and Labor —
banned visits of nuclear ships. In that
same period, for a considerable time,
successive Australian Governments
did the same thing. Why is it now, in
the words of the communique, essen-
tial to the continuing effectiveness of
ANZUS?

Secretary Shultz. I don't think that
your initial proposition is precisely right.
At the same time, nuclear-powered ships
are becoming more and more common,
because it is the efficient way in which
to power many kinds of ships and sub-
marines. So they are much more impor-
tant in the total fleet structure than
they were at one time. If you say you
ban nuclear-powered ships, you are

referring to a high proportion of the
total ships. Beyond that, you shy away
from the weapon that has provided the
main deterrent and has kept the peace
against the Soviet Union's very large
nuclear arsenal. So this is part and
parcel of what it takes to keep the
peace. These are peacekeeping forces,
and they represent a substantial fraction
of the total.

Q. Is it or is it not essential that
your ships be allowed into member na-
tion ports for the continuation of the
ANZUS treaty?

Secretary Shultz. Of course. What
kind of an alliance is it that military
forces of the countries involved are not
able to be in contact with each other?
Let me ask you to turn the proposition
around. In my many visits to this part of
the world, I'm thinking back 5, 6, and 7
years ago, people often tackled me, say-
ing, "Is the United States ready to pay
the attention to this part of the world
that it should? Why don't we see more
evidence of U.S. interest? Why don't we
see more people here? Why don't we see
more of your military presence here to
show us that you are really involved?"
You have to ask yourself what kind of
an alliance would it be if the United
States said we wouldn't send our
military forces to this area. The whole
point of the alliance is that it is a secu-
rity alliance. The whole part of it is that
if one of our countries gets in serious
trouble, as reflected in the alliance, we
will help each other. That help takes
many forms but the essence of it is
security; that is what it's about.

Q. There have been suggestions
from visiting Congressmen that,
should New Zealand ban nuclear ship
visits, this could well invoke trade
sanctions in the United States against
New Zealand export. Is that the policy
of the government that you represent?

Secretary Shultz. No. it isn't. The
ANZUS alliance is a security and
military alliance. That's what we are
discussing here. The relationship be-
tween the people of New Zealand and
the people of the United States is over a
century and a half old. It's been a warm
and deep relationship for a long time,
and it will continue that way. We look
forward to working in a cooperative
manner with the new Government of
New Zealand and any Government of
New Zealand that comes along.

Q. Are you able to broaden the
scope of ANZUS to make it much
more of an economic agreement?

THE SECRETARY

Secretary Shultz. No. ANZUS is
not an economic agreement in any
sense. It is a security agreement. That is
the extent of it— that is the sum and
substance of it— and economic arrange-
ments and cultural arrangements and all
sorts of other ways in which our coun-
tries are in contact with each other are
separate matters.

Q. You referred yesterday to a
resolute commitment, such as that em-
bodied in the ANZUS treaty, to come
to the defense of a valued ally. If the
New Zealand Government carried out
its policy of banning nuclear weapons,
does that mean that the United States
would no longer come to the defense
of New Zealand in a controversy.

Secretary Shultz. I have just said at
least once that I'm not going to get in-
volved in iffy questions. We have some
problems here, and we will work at
them, and I think some discussion is
called for. There are a lot of aspects to
this matter that need to be studied by
any new government, I know. I found
myself when I entered government that
there were a lot of things I found out
about that I didn't know when I was not
in the government that represent impor-
tant aspects of this relationship. So at
any rate, I think what is called for here
is some patience, and we'll try to work
our way through these problems.

I might take notice of the fact that a
year ago there was a new Australian
Government, we took the same approach
with the new Australian Government.
We had a thorough review of the
ANZUS alliance. We had a long and
searching meeting in Washington with
Foreign Minister Hayden. We had
discussions with Prime Minister Hawke
in Washington, and I've met with him
here. The problems have been worked
out in a very satisfactory way. The
Labor Government in Australia has
adapted it to its needs, and I think it is
stronger than ever insofar as Australia
is concerned. We'll work at it in connec-
tion with New Zealand in the same way.

Q. You talked about review with
Australia. Would you consider
renegotiations as the New Zealand
Labor Party's policy suggests'?

Secretary Shultz. I don't think
there is anything really to renegotiate
about it. But certainly we wanted to
stress the alliance and what it means,
what it implies, and what the various
countries get out of it. And I think that
such a thorough examination will lead
people to the same conclusion that was
reached last year; namely, that it is of

tremendous benefit to all of the coun-
tries involved. After all, we are talking
about the defenses of a country that is
very precious. It is a very precious thing
to have freedom, to have the freedom to
change government by a vote, to live
under the rule of law. There are a lot of
people in this world who don't have the
rule of law. There are a lot of people in
this world who don't have those
privileges, and all you have to do is talk
to some people who don't have them or
talk to some people who have recently
acquired them and you find out their
significance and importance. What we
are talking about here is a treaty that
has helped to preserve those values and
extend them in this part of the world
and which has played its part— just as
the NATO alliance has played its part in
Europe — in keeping the peace for a long
period of time. This is an alliance for
peace, and it has worked.

Q. With the need for access by
allied aircraft to airfields and ports of
ANZUS members, are you looking for
restricted access to Australian air-
fields by B-52 bombers?

Secretary Shultz. No, we are talk-
ing about the fact that, for example,
there are resupply flights — cargo flights,
military cargo flights — that come into
Christchurch, say to resupply Antarctic
stations. The same thing is true with
respect to some facilities in Australia.
There are B-52 training tlights and
through flights of various kinds. It's that
sort of thing that is being referred to.

Foreign Minister Hayden. Can I
add one note, so there's no misunder-
standing. There are special ar-
rangements in respect to B-.52s, but
Secretary of State Shultz should also
have mentioned that we have regular
joint military operations of exercise with
New Zealand and the United States.
They involve air units as much as
ground forces and naval units. So in that
sense, we've got to have this sort of pro-
vision. Otherwise, if there were any pro-
hibition against aircraft movements,
there would be no exercises. No exer-
cise, no military association. Therefore,
there would not be in any meaningful
sense for us in Australia — and I speak
only for us in Australia — a military
alliance.

Q. In the context of regional
security, was the question of a Pacific
ready-reaction force discussed? And if
so, how wide was the discussion?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I don't
know anything about a Pacific ready-
reaction force, I'm afraid.

Q. Could you clarify that point? Is
it that you believe the agreement is
not negotiable?

Secretary Shultz. It is an agree-
ment. And it stands on its feet. And I
believe that careful examination, in a
realistic and thoughtful way, of what it
has accomplished — how it works, what
it means to the various countries in
volved — will lead to the conclusion that
it is a very good thing. But, of course,
that is up to each country to determine
and review for itself. It has stood the
test of 33 years. It has stood the test oi
a lot of change around the world. It hai
stood the test of changes of governmen
in all three of the countries involved, sc
it must have something good about it
And I think when you look at it careful
ly, the good will shines through very,
very strongly.

Q. But as far as you're concerned
a nuclear-free New Zealand means nt
treaty as far as we're concerned?

Secretary Shultz. I have tried to
state my position on that, and I won't
try to restate it.

Q. Aren't you waving a big stick
over a fairly small matter?

Secretary Shultz. No, I don't thinl
liberty and freedom and the rule of lav
are small matters. And the defense of
them is the most important thing that
we have to do. These matters are the
essence of our society in the United
States, and I believe — from what I km
of the societies of Australia and New
Zealand — these values are highly prize
And if you say that you won't defend
them, pretty soon you're not going to
have them.

Q. So a handful of visits of nucla
vessels to New Zealand ports is vita(
to the freedom of —

Secretary Shultz. If you're going
have a military alliance, then the
military forces of the countries involve
have to interact. They have to talk to
each other. They have to know the
equipment that's involved. They have
plan. They have to exercise. They hav
to train themselves. All these things a
just commonplace. There's nothing ag-
gressive about the forces of the ANZI
alliance. It is a defensive alliance. In
order to deter aggression, it has to be
credible deterrent. And a credible deti
rent is one that people know is kept u
to scratch and is worked on constantly
And that's the essence of what our
armed forces do all over the world.

Q. Mr. Shultz has told us that
things change once you get to gover
ment. That was your experience, pai
ticularly with the ANZUS agreemen

ARMS CONTROL

ihat do you think Mr. Lange might
1 told that might change his mind?
Foreign Minister Hayden. Nothing

• mued since we got into government,
i-fspect to ANZUS, we declared

)(nro we got into government that we
Auilil .'^eek a review. When we got into
;\ (Tiiment, we pursued that. It was, as

Shultz pointed out, a quite thorough
sessment of the ANZUS agreement
it was conducted in Washington last
ir. So there was a change in that
5pect. What happened was that with

experience that we had in govern-
mt, there was a consolidation of our
tnmitment to ANZUS. There has
ver been any disagreement between
y of the major political parties in
istralia in regard to ANZUS.
lything that might be discussed with
•. Lange is something for discussion
th Mr. Lange, not on the public plat-

Q. Recognizing the importance of
E alliance, is it imperative that New
laland change its stand?

Foreign Minister Hayden. That's

• New Zealand to decide, and Mr.
ultz said much earlier that time was

ieded to sort this problem out. I don't
(ve his exact words. As far as I'm con-
!"ned — I quote the situation as
! istralia sees it, I am not talking for
I'w Zealand— there are other people to
! that.

Q. If New Zealand was to stand
m, would that put increasing
iBssure —

Foreign Minister Hayden. You're in
3 area of hypotheses now and as Mr.
ultz said, he's not in the iffy business,
d I'm not in the hj^pothesis business.

Q. It's no hypothesis. It's Labor —

Foreign Minister Hayden. Excuse

; a minute, gentlemen. Let me tell you

mething. You're out of luck. I've been

this game a long time and I'm not go-

g to be drawn in.

Q. Labor has said here that they
3n't negotiate their position —

Foreign Minister Cooper. Excuse
i9 a minute, ladies and gentlemen. We
I'.ve been in an ANZUS conference a
,y and a half. We had a very wide
:enda— East-West relationships, com-
ehensive nuclear test bans, disarma-
ent, arms control, the problems of con-
ct in various parts of the globe, the in-
rnational economic situation and I
ink we are starting to regurgitate ex-
■tly the same questions.

I do believe that if the relationships
nong the three countries are as we
ive discussed them — last year in
'ashington, this year, and on many

other previous occasions — there must be
other subjects rather than picking away
at this particular one. Because I believe
that the U.S. Secretary of State has
answered the same question four or five
times, and I think that Mr. Hayden is in
exactly the same situation. Is there
anyone here that is slightly interested in
arms control and disarmament, for in-
stance?

Q. Are there any plans for nuclear-
powered ships to visit New Zealand in
the ne.\t 6 months?

Secretary Shultz. We don't confirm
or deny anything about any particular
ship. And so I'll just have to stick with
that policy.

Q. Nuclear-powered ship?

Secretary Shultz. No, not that I
know of. Admiral Crowe is here. Is that
the right answer?

Admiral Crowe. There are no ships
in the next few months.

Q. On this issue of Australian sup-
port for the Indian Ocean zone of
peace, does that mean that this will
involve our projection or nonprojec-
tion of power in keeping warships out
of the area?

Foreign Minister Hayden. If you've
got a zone of peace, it is highly likely
that there will be no combatant ships in
the area, certainly no outside ones. But
we're a long way from that. We're a
long way from formulating the prin-
ciples that people might address
themselves to all that we're working
toward at the moment, which is as much
as we can hope to achieve as the first
step, is a consensus for the littoral na-
tions and the superpowers that some
sort of conference should go ahead. And
when we do that, then we can sit down
and start sorting out what the agenda is
and what the principles will be. So it's
going to be a long task. Now you might
be impatient with that. So am I. But I

Status of Conference on
Disarmament in Europe

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JULY 17, 19841

Today, I met with Ambassardor James
E. Goodby, the chief of the U.S. delega-
tion to the Conference on Confidence-
and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe. This con-
ference, commonly known as the CDE
or the Stockholm conference, involves
the United States, Canada, and 33 Euro-
pean nations and is part of the East-
West dialogue which originated in the
Helsinki accords of 1975.

Ambassador Goodby briefed me on
the second round of the conference,
which has just concluded, and on the
prospects for progress when the talks
resume in September. He noted the con-
tinuing efforts of the United States and
our NATO allies to achieve an outcome
which will genuinely increase mutual
confidence and reduce the risk of war in
Europe. Earlier, in the first round of the
conference, the West put forward a
package of concrete proposals designed
to achieve these goals.

In an effort to achieve progress in
Stockholm, I announced in June in my
address to the Irish Parliament that the
United States is prepared to consider

the Soviet proposal for a declaration on
the non-use of force if the Soviet Union
is willing to discuss concrete measures
to put that principle into action. We are
disappointed, however, that the Soviet
Union has so far failed to join the great
majority of the 35 participating nations
at Stockholm which have demonstrated
a desire to begin such concrete negotia-
tions.

I assured Ambassador Goodby that
he has my continuing strong support in
our efforts to get on with the practical
negotiations for which this conference
was intended. We will continue to do our
best to achieve progress at Stockholm,
just as we and our allies are working
hard together in other multilateral areas
of arms control — such as the East-West
conventional force talks in Vienna and
the 40-Nation Conference on Disarma-
ment in Geneva.

We are equally ready to seek resolu-
tions to bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms con-
trol issues on a flexible basis, but there
must, of course, be a willingness on both
sides to engage in practical discussions.
We, for our part, will not be found
wanting.

'Text from White House press release.

ARMS CONTROL

can't help it. That's the experience that
we're running into.

Q. Was there any discussion at the
council meeting on your proposal put
to ASEAN last week for a conference
on Kampuchea to be held in Australia?

Foreign Minister Hayden. No, it
went on the back burner. In fact, I think
it may have gone over the back of the
stove.

Q. Are you happy that this ANZUS
council meeting went ahead, consider-
ing that the administration that you've
been talking with will be out of office
next week?

Secretary Shultz. I think we should
carry on with our plans. We had a very
good exchange of views among us, and I
think it's been quite a worthwhile
meeting. It's also, I think, a good oppor-
tunity to meet the incoming government,
and I was struck by the extraordinary
courtesy which Mr. Lange extended to
me and to Mr. Hayden in coming to the
airport and greeting us. It was a very
generous gesture on his part, and I'm
sure both of us look forward to having a
chance to talk with him before we leave.
So I think in some ways, it's worked out
quite fortuitously.

Q. I'd like to ask a question of
Foreign Minister Hayden and
Secretary Shultz. Should the ANZUS
treaty become ineffective, would you
seek to create some bilateral security
arrangements between Australia and
the United States?

Foreign Minister Hayden. We see
it as effective right at this point, and as
I said earlier, I'm not in the area of
hypothesis. If anything happens later on,
I guess we would look at it. At this
point, it hasn't happened.

Secretary Shultz. Ditto.

Q. Could you tell me what hap-
pened at the conference on the issue
of French nuclear testing?

Foreign Minister Cooper. We've
really left that to a great degree to the
forum in Tuvalu. We're aware of the
situation in regard to possible moves
toward a South Pacific nuclear-free
zone, but I think that it might be a good
idea if you directed that question to Mr.
Hayden, in regard to the initiative the
Australians have taken in this area.

Foreign Minister Hayden. We have
protested regularly, in fact on every oc-
casion there has been a nuclear test, to
the French and publicly. They continue
to test. They make it clear that the pro-
gram is in place, and they will pursue it.
I would hope that one day they will be
able to carry out laboratory tests. I'm

not sure how you do that — it will be
very interesting — but until then, they
will continue to test in the South Pacific.
I guess that's a long time.

At our recent national conference,
one of the decisions taken was the deci-
sion that there would be no further ex-
ports of uranium to France while it con-
tinues to carry out these nuclear tests.
That decision was effective forthwith. It
involves the cancellation of contracted
uranium sales in excess of $1.30 million.
In turn, I expect that will involve a fair-
ly substantial compensation payment
from Australia. And although this is not
enforceable as law, I think there's a
general feeling there will be an obliga-
tion to meet it.

Q. Last year our Prime
Minister — our out-going Prime
Minister — said that he'd been given a
date as to when the French testing
would end. Do you know the date?

Foreign Minister Hayden. No. I
spoke to the French afterwards, and I
got the impression that they didn't. They
said quite explicitly they didn't have any
date in mind.

Q. You called for a report on the
prospect of mainland France nuclear
testing being carried out there. Have
you had that report back yet?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I read
that in the National Times and the guy
who wrote it is over there [pointing]. He
keeps telling me I told him, and I keep
saying I didn't so I've decided I'd better
fix it up by putting in a request for such
a report, and I did that 2 weeks ago.

Q. Returning to the French
nuclear testing question. There are
some documents that fell out of the
back of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs here in Wellington some weeks
ago that suggest New Zealand doesn't
take a very strong line in opposition t
that testing. Indeed, it featured, in
part of the recent trade, talks as a
trade-off if those documents are to be
believed. Do you find that a matter tc
regret?

Foreign Minister Hayden. These
are New Zealand foreign affairs
documents? I don't know anything abon
them.

Foreign Minister Cooper. I find it
matter of regret that journalists would
believe anything that fell out of The Ne
Zealand Times. They are not authentic.
They were taken by one official, in my
belief. They were given to the media.
They had a slant on them, and to sug-
gest that I, as the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Overseas Trade, had an
under-the-counter deal with the French
Foreign Minister or the French Trade
Minister or Agricultural Minister, is
abolutely nonsensical, and you should t
aware of that.

'Held at the U.S. Embassy (press relea
166 of July 18, 1984).

^Press release 162 of July 12.

^Press release 164.

''Press release 171 of July 20.

^Made at the luncheon for the ANZUS
council (press release 196 of July 19),

^Press release 174 of July 23. ■

Proposed Outer Space Negotiations

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JUNE 29, 1984'

The U.S. Government has taken note of
the statement by the Soviet Government
proposing a meeting of delegations in
September to begin negotiations on "pre-
venting the militarization of outer
space." The militarization of space began
when the first ballistic missiles were
tested and when such missiles and other
weapons systems using outer space
began to be deployed. The U.S. Govern-
ment, therefore, draws attention to the
pressing need for the resumption of
negotiations aimed at a radical reduction
of nuclear weapons, on a balanced and
verifiable basis.

Therefore, the U.S. (Government 1
informed the Government of the Sovii
Union that it is prepared to meet will
the Soviet Union in September, at an,\
location agreeable to the Soviet Unioi
and the government of the country
where the meeting is held, for the
following purposes: (1) to discuss and ji'
define mutually agreeable arrangemer« *^
under which negotiations on the re-
duction of strategic and intermediate-
range nuclear weapons can be resume
and (2) to discuss and seek agreement
on feasible negotiating approaches wh *?'
could lead to verifiable and effective ''•'
limitations on antisatellite weapons. W*
will also be prepared to discuss any
other arms control concerns or other
matters of interest to both sides.

««

ftt

EAST ASIA

We will continue contacts with the
viet Union through diplomatic chan-
Is on arrangements for these
ptember talks.

HUE HOUSE STATEMENT,
ILY 27, 19842

lis morning's TABS statement
srepresents our position, which is that
; have accepted the Soviet proposal
r discussions in Vienna in September
thout preconditions. Our preparations
e continuing vigorously, and we expect
be in Vienna. We do not believe that
ch discussions are impossible, and we
e continuing to deal with this subject
private diplomatic channels.

The U.S. finds it very disturbing
at the Soviets portray the United
ates as responsible for the breakdown
the nuclear negotiations in Geneva
len the world knows the Soviets
liked out of those discussions. Already
isting nuclear systems deserve our
ost urgent attention. If the Soviets do
it choose to listen to our views on this
bject, they need not, but, for us, and
r mankind, this subject is too impor-
nt to ignore. This U.S. approach does
it represent a precondition. We will
ike whatever the Soviets say on anti-
I tellite weapons seriously and respond
I nstructively. We simply point out that
' ? wish to restore exchanges on the
I bject of offensive nuclear arms. The
irld has a right to expect the U.S.S.R.
id the United States to maintain such
scussions.

HITE HOUSE STATEMENT,

UG. 1. 19843

le United States had made clear to the
)viet Government in a series of high-
vel messages that it accepts the Soviet
nion's June 29 proposal and is
•epared for serious talks in Vienna on
iter space, including antisatellite
eapons. We have expressed our view
lat the problem of weapons in space
mnot be considered in isolation from
le overall strategic relationship but
lat we have no preconditions for the
ienna agenda.

Despite this clearly stated, positive
and on our part, the Soviet Union has
leged that the United States has re-
efed the Soviet proposal. The latest
(oscow press briefing repeated these
larges, despite the clear statement of
le U.S. position in a series of high-level
lessages conveyed to the Soviet
■overnment in diplomatic channels.

In our communications with the
Soviets, we have stated our view that
their proposal for a conference on the
"militarization of outer space" is an "ex-
cellent idea" and that we are prepared
to have a U.S. delegation in Vienna on
September 18 to engage in such negotia-
tions.

We recently presented a proposal
for a possible joint Soviet-American an-
nouncement on the content and objective
of the Vienna talks. This proposal states
explicitly that the aim of the talks
should be to work out and conclude
agreements concerning the militarization
of outer space, including antisatellite
systems and other aspects of this issue.

In response to the Soviet proposal of
a mutual moratorium on antisatellite
tests from the outset of the talks, the
United States expressed a readiness to
have our negotiators consider what
mutual restraints would be appropriate
during the course of negotiations. The
latest Soviet statements have converted
this proposal into a precondition, a

transformation which suggests a dis-
ingenuous Soviet approach. We continue
to believe that possible mutual restraints
are an appropriate subject for the
negotiations. The joint statement,
however, should not prejudge the out-
come of these negotiations.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly
misrepresented the U.S. position regard-
ing the opening of arms control talks
between our two countries in Vienna.
From this latest Soviet statement, it ap-
pears that the Soviets were not serious
about their proposal. We regret this. As
noted above, we have consistently ac-
cepted their proposal to meet in Vienna.
We prefer that this matter be dealt with
in diplomatic channels.

'Made by Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of July 2, 1984).

^Text from White House press release.

^Made by Ambassador McFarlane (text
from White House press release). ■

The U.S.-China Trade
Relationship

by Paul D. Wolfowitz

Address before the National Council
for United States-China, Trade on
May 31, 1984. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assist-
ant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.

I don't need to tell you who are gathered
here today that doing business in China
is seldom doing "business as usual." You
who have been engaged in doing
business in China have, indeed, been do-
ing business as extraordinary: under
special and ever-changing circumstances
and in a still uncertain investment
climate. But most extraordinary is the
contribution that your endeavors make
to U.S. foreign policy; and it is that con-
tribution which I would like to acknowl-
edge at the outset here today.

Building a Comprehensive
Relationship

When President Nixon traveled to China
in 1972, our economic and cultural rela-
tions were almost nonexistent. The focus
of the relationship was almost entirely
our shared strategic concerns over
Soviet power and expansion. By con-
trast, during his recent trip, President
Reagan devoted perhaps 50% of his

discussions with the Chinese Premier to
economic and trade concerns. Our coun-
tries have developed a vital and growing
economic relationship. This organization
and some of the people in this room had
a good deal to do with that growth.

Some would go so far as to say that
the remarkable growth in our economic
ties has brought us to a point where
economic interests have replaced
strategic interests as the focus of our
relationship. That, however, would be
wrong. Our economic relations are, in-
deed, extremely important. But our
strategic interests also remain as
important today as they were when
President Nixon opened the way to
China.

We do not expect an alliance with
China, nor are we playing cards. Indeed,
we don't think that a successful long-
term relationship— and that is what we
seek— can be built on a basis that makes
our relations with one country depend-
ent on tactical shifts in our relations
with another.

Rather, our strategic relationship
rests on common concerns about the
growth of Soviet military power and the
tendency to use that power— whether by

EAST ASIA

the Soviets themselves, as in Afghani-
stan, or by their allies and proxies, as in
Kampuchea. We have some important
differences with China on international
questions, differences that the Chinese
are at pains to highlight, lest we— or
others— forget that China has an inde-
pendent foreign policy. But our common
concerns create important common in-
terests in resisting Soviet pressures and
in seeking changes in Soviet policies that
would genuinely reduce tensions in the
region and in the world. This remains a
central element in our relations.

We also have increasingly important
cultural ties with China. The Chinese
have sent some 12,000 of their brightest
students to study in this country, and
we have extensive exchanges of our own
in China. These exchanges may be our
most important legacy to the future ties
between our countries. These students
will one day form a core of understand-
ing that will speed our efforts, just as
our relations in the early 1970s were
spurred by a long history of ties before
1949.

In short, we have today neither a
predominantly economic nor a predomi-
nantly strategic relationship but rather a
comprehensive one, in which each ele-
ment reinforces the others. Indeed, the
economic progress that your group has
helped to build, important in itself, is
also an important element in the
strategic equation.

Over the last 12 years, our bilateral
relationship with China has grown richer
and deeper, the range of our cooperative
endeavors broader, and the opportuni-
ties for future cooperation more
numerous than before. Both sides have
put aside the myths, unrealistic expecta-
tions, and, frankly, the impossible
demands of the past. As Secretary
Shultz has said, we seek a relationship
that is no longer subject to the alternat-
ing cycles of euphoria and depression
that have characterized the past, but one
which rests on a stronger, more stable
foundation. Of equal significance, we
seek such a relationship without sacri-
ficing the principles and friendships our
nations value.

The distance we have traveled and
the benefits we have gained from im-
proving relations with China are perhaps
most clearly seen not in what is but in
what was. We need only think back to
the open hostilities of the 1950s or to
the antagonism of the 1960s to realize
the costs that a return to confrontation
in our relations would impose.

The Trade Dimension

Today, I would like to discuss the dimen-
sion of our relationship with China that
is of particular interest to this group-
trade. In trade, as elsewhere, we have
too often been the victims of our own
euphoria. Often, in the past, people have
been mesmerized by the thought of a
market with four times as many con-
sumers as our own. We have an obliga-
tion equally to avoid wishful thinking
and jaundiced pessimism and to judge
prospects realistically.

The unembellished record to date is
itself impressive. Since normalization of
relations, our two-way trade has grown
fourfold, from $1.1 billion in 1978 to
$4.4 billion last year. Our trade has, to
be sure, not grown steadily. U.S. ex-
ports, particularly of agricultural prod-
ucts, have been volatile.

While our total trade with China
does not involve large sums in terms of
our overall trade worldwide, trade with
China can be, and is, very important to
particular enterprises and sectors of our
economy— some of which are well repre-
sented in this room.

Today, I would like to discuss three
principles that seem to me particularly
important as guides for the govern-
ment's approach to this important area
of our relationship.

First, that an economically moder-
nizing China is in both our countries' in-
terests.

Second, that it should be the role of
the government to facilitate and further
trade, though not at the expense of our
security.

Third, that in the trade area, as in
other areas, it is important that both
sides live up to the agreements that they
make.

I need hardly elaborate for those in
this room the economic benefits a
modernizing China could bring to U.S.
business. But, as I suggested earlier,
economic benefits are only part of what
we might hope for from a modernizing
China. We believe that an increasingly
prosperous China will be more stable,
more secure, and more able to resist
outside pressure and intimidation. That
serves American interests as well, both
globally and regionally. A modernizing
China that is more integrated with the
world economy will develop important
trading ties to other Asian and Pacific
nations. Such ties help to reinforce the
constructive trends in China's interna-
tional role, trends from which the
United States and our friends and allies
in Asia benefit.

The Chinese see our willingness to
cooperate in their modernization efforts
as an important element in their pros-
pects for success and in our relations.
We have declared ourselves— and shown
ourselves— willing to help.

The President made the most tangi-
ble expression of his desire to see China
modernize last spring, when he directed
that China should be treated as a \

"friendly, nonallied" country with '

respect to exports of high technology.
Guidelines published last November
raised the levels of technology that
would generally be made available to
China in seven important product
categories. The level of permitted
exports of computers, scientific in-
struments, and microelectronic manufac-
turing equipment, to name three impor-
tant examples, were raised significantly.
Roughly 75% of all applications we are
now receiving for high-technology ex-
ports to China are processed under the
new, expeditious guidelines. And we are
working now on liberalized guidelines
for 10 additional product categories
which should cover a further 10%-15%
of license applications.

As expected, the new policy has
helped to encourage a healthy increase
in U.S. high-technology exports to
China. In 1982, approximately 2,000 eX'
port licenses were approved, with a tots*
value of just over $450 million. In 1983,
there were 3,300 approvals, valued at
approximately $1.1 billion. In the first
quarter of 1984 alone, 1,170 licenses
were approved, and the value of licensee "
high-technology exports to China for all' "'
of 1984 could surpass $1.5 billion.

The sheer volume of license referra.
has placed a considerable strain on the
COCOM [Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Security Export Controls]
mechanism. Since the new guidelines
were published last November, U.S. re- P
ferrals to COCOM have more than
doubled. Despite this, however, we and'
our COCOM partners have succeeded ii
increasing the rate of COCOM aprovals
so that the backlog of U.S. -China sub-
missions has remained steady at about
300. We believe that processing
times— now generally 60-90 days— can
be reduced.

This council has played an importar
supporting role in the liberalization of
export controls for China, and I
welcome your continued input into this
process. Chinese leaders have made it
plain that they regard our adoption of t i
more liberal policy as a turning point in "^'
the relationship, with considerably

EAST ASIA

jader implications than its purely eco-
mic effects.

A second principle concerns the
Dper role of government in trade. It's
gely up to individual businesses and
3ups like this one to make trade a
ility— a function you are performing
th remarkable results. But govern-
nt certainly has a role to play in
noving unnecessary obstacles and,
lere possible, in promoting trade. We
3 doing that, and we will continue to
so with due awareness that in certain
3as security considerations are an
portant factor.

The tax treaty, which we signed in
ijing last month, is one important ef-
•t to help provide a more predictable
vironment for businessmen and in-
stors. During Premier Zhao's visit in
nuary, he and the President signed
3 industrial and technological coopera-
n accord, and shortly after the Presi-
nt's visit we followed up with the con-
ision of two work programs under the
:ord— in the fields of metallurgy and
telecommunications and electronics,
ese and other work programs will
^e our firms an opportunity to partici-
te at an early stage in the planning
ocess of Chinese ministries. And, as
)st of you know, we will be mounting
iiresidential trade mission in a few
: mths to give a boost to trade oppor-
;iities, particularly for our firms en-
ged in aerospace industries.

We will continue to work hard to
liieve an investment agreement,
nericans have invested about $85
. Uion in joint equity ventures and
i^eral times that much in other forms
investment. U.S. oil companies will be
zesting hundreds of millions more in
'shore exploration and major in-
stments in coal are also likely. China
!lcomes foreign investment, not only
a source of capital but also as a very
'icient vehicle for technology transfer.
ir fifth round of negotiations will take
ace in September. Meanwhile, our
'erseas Private Investment Corpora-
in plans to organize an investment
ssion to China later this year.

We should also note that China has
ken steps of its own to improve the
nditions for investment. Some of
ese— such as its patent protection
jislation, organization of economic
nes, joint venture laws, and tax provi-
3ns— are remarkable, considering the
lormous differences in our juridical
lilosophies and legal systems. Nonethe-
3S, more needs to be done if China is
continue to attract American in-
istors.

In these and other ways, we seek to
increase trade, but our efforts must not
and will not come at the expense of our
security. That is why, even though our
technology sales are liberalized, restric-
tions remain, not just for China but for
other friendly countries as well. That is
why we will continue to work coopera-
tively with our COCOM partners, so that
we do not weaken the unique institution
which is vital for controlling exports to
the Soviet Union.

Perhaps nowhere have we had to go
to such pains to take security concerns
into account as we did in the long
negotiations to reach an agreement on
peaceful nuclear cooperation. This agree-
ment, which was initialed last month in
Beijing, took over 3 years to negotiate.
It will soon be submitted to the Presi-
dent. When approved by him and signed
by both countries, it will then be for-
warded to Congress, where it must lie
for 60 days of "continuous session"
before it can enter into force. We an-
ticipate full examination and discussion
of the text of the agreement on the Hill.

The implementation of the agree-
ment will further advance our coopera-
tion with China's modernization efforts,
and at the same time it will permit U.S.
companies to compete for a share of
China's ambitious nuclear power pro-
gram.

But the arduous negotiating process
that lies behind this agreement and the
mandatory approval process ahead are
necessary because the possibility of
trade, while enticing, cannot come ahead
of our interest in halting nuclear pro-
liferation. The proposed agreement ad-
vances that interest in important re-
spects. During the course of our negotia-
tions, China took several significant
steps to clarify its nonproliferation and
nuclear export policies. It joined the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in January and has stated that,
thereafter, it will require IAEA safe-
guards in its nuclear exports. Premier
Zhao has stated authoritatively that
China will not assist other countries to
develop nuclear weapons. In addition to
its other features, the agreement itself
will provide a framework for continua-
tion of discussions with China on non-
proliferation matters. We believe the
agreement is a real advance and
deserves and will receive full bipartisan
support.

A third principle of our economic
relationship has to do with the import-
ance of abiding by agreements. What
needs to be said can be said briefly, but
it is nonetheless important. This is not,
generally speaking, a problem in our
dealings with China. But it has, frankly.

been a disturbing aspect of our grain
trade. Although China was our best
customer for wheat in the period
1980-82, China reduced its grain ship-
ments to 3.8 million tons in 1983, 2.2
million tons short of its obligation under
our long-term grain ag^reement. The
Chinese have implied at various times
that reduced purchases were a response
to U.S. import restrictions on Chinese
textile imports or other factors having
nothing to do with the agreement. We
find unacceptable this unilateral attempt
to condition performance on matters un-
related to the agreement, and we have
made our position clear. We are pleased
that the Chinese have assured us that
they will make up the 1983 shortfall and
meet their 1984 obligation.

If we continue to follow these three
guidelines— cooperating on China's
modernization; facilitating trade while
protecting our security; and abiding by
agreements— we can build a sound foun-
dation for growing economic ties be-
tween our two countries. Such growth is
both good business and good foreign
policy.

Conclusion

In the short term, there is reason to
believe that trade will recover this year
as our high-technology exports continue
their momentum and as the Chinese
meet their grain purchase obligations.
Premier Zhao recently told us that we
can expect our traditional bilateral
surplus, which evaporated last year, to
return.

In the longer term, the most import-
ant factor in the growth of U.S. -China
trade remains the rate of China's own
economic progress. As China prospers,
we can expect our bilateral trade to
grow, as it has with the many dynamic
economies of Asia.

While China grows, there is a
natural complementarity in some areas
of our economies which holds promise
for the future. China will continue to
want imports of some agricultural prod-
ucts, notably grains. The United States
has grain surpluses. China has its own
industrial base and badly wants to im-
prove the efficiency of its industry. The
United States has technology and man-
agement to offer. China is determined to
develop its energy resources and to use
them efficiently. The United States has
capital and the technologies of energy
extraction and utilization.

What are the prospects for China's
growth? Surely, more growth is on the
way, though its pace is by no means

EAST ASIA

clear. China's most noteworthy progress
has come as a result of the introduction
of the "responsibility system" in agri-
culture. But progress is also being made,
more slowly, in the industrial sector.
The Chinese themselves acknowledge
that they still have enormous problems,
both structural and systemic. But they
have turned in an impressive perform-
ance so far— 6.5% average annual
growth since 1979. And they seem de-
termined to continue to deal with their
problems pragmatically.

China's economic modernization was
one of the primary subjects of the Presi-
dent's speeches during his recent trip to
China. Understandably, the American
press paid the most attention to portions
of the speeches that noted the differ-
ences between us or that the Chinese
media regrettably did not cover. The
President's most important speech, the

one at the Great Hall of the People, was
about America's involvement in China's
modernization. That speech was warmly
received. Indeed, it was interrupted re-
peatedly with loud applause. Extensive
portions were televised for audiences
throughout China.

In one of the most important
passages of this speech, the President
said:

Today, I bring you a message from my
countrymen. As China moves forward in this
new path [of economic modernization],
America welcomes the opportunity to walk by
your side.

That is perhaps the overriding
message of the President's trip. It is the
message that won him so warm a recep-
tion and that promises so much in future
cooperation between our peoples. The
President was the messenger— it is you
who will deliver the goods. ■

Taking Stock of
U.S.-Japan Relations

by Paul D. Wolfowitz

Statement before the Subcommittees
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and Inter-
national Economic Policy and Trade of
the House Foreign Affairs Com,mittee
on June 12. 1981,. Mr. Wolfowitz is
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs. '

It is a great pleasure for me to have the
opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss one of our nation's most im-
portant bilateral relationships— that
with Japan. The hearings on U.S.-Japan
relations that you held in 1982 made a
major contribution to illuminating the
importance of this relationship and the
problems and opportunities within it. I
would like to commend your subcommit-
tees for holding these new hearings to
bring not only the Congress but also the
American people up to date on where
we stand in our relationship with Japan
and where we are going.

I have studied carefully the ques-
tions that you have posed for these hear-
ings and believe that they can be
grouped into three general categories. It
is around these three categories that I
would like to present my testimony to-
day.

First, how does the Administration
view the nature of our relationship with
Japan?

Second, what have been the major
developments in our relationship over
the past 2 years?

Third, what are the challenges and
opportunities of the future and how do
we intend to deal with them?

THE NATURE OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN

The President's historic trip to Japan
last November successfully conveyed the
preeminent importance that we attach
to our relationship with Japan. Given its
economic power and its growing interna-
tional role, Japan clearly has become one
of the most important countries in the
world to us. While bilateral trade prob-
lems garner significant attention— legiti-
mately so— and often generate inor-
dinate controversy, our overall policy
toward Japan transcends these issues
and is based on three developments.

First, we have worked to achieve a
close bilateral relationship, with Japan
as an equal partner. The past decade has
brought a significant expansion of
Japan's economic and technological
prowess; an increase in its defense
awareness and capability; and a greater
interest and involvement in international
political and economic affairs. Of course,
there still are differences in our relative
political, economic, and military posi-

tions in the world. But we approach and
conduct our relationship as equals.

Second, because of our combined
economic and technological impact on
the world, our relationship has grown
beyond the bounds of the bilateral and
become global in scope. This was the
theme of Secretary Shultz's landmark
Shimoda speech last September, when
he referred to our new relationship with
Japan as an "international partnership."
While our combined impact on the world
is measured primarily in economic and
technological terms, in the future it will
have a greater political dimension as
Japan assumes a greater international
role and associates itself more actively
and closely with the political and securi'
ty goals oif the West.

Third, Japan is becoming increasing
ly assertive in global matters and is
forging a new international role for
itself. During most of the postwar
period, Japan pursued an international
role that was quite similar to our own
throughout most of American history-
pursuing economic interests and eschew
ing political involvement. But, par-
ticularly since the events in Iran and thi
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,
the Japanese have come to realize that
their own well-being is affected directly
by political and security developments
elsewhere in the world. The implication:
are clear— the days of "economic giant,
political pygmy" are over. The United
States wishes to encourage this trend
toward a greater international political
and economic role by Japan, within the
framework of a continued close bilatera
relationship.

When many people look at
U.S.-Japan relations, the focus is on th(
problems in our relationship and not on
its successes. But I believe that if we
step back and take a look at our overal,
relationship, we would determine that il li
is the best that it has ever been and th;
the problems that we have are the ex-
ceptions and not the rule. li

First of all, it is the general consen •■:
sus of Administration officials and long
time observers of U.S.-Japan relations
that our defense relationship with Japa >:
has never been better. We forget too
easily the scenes of years past, when oi
mutual security relationship and the
presence of U.S. bases caused tremen-
dous political upheavals in Japan. Todai
both the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security and the presence of U.S.
military bases are accepted by the largn p|

EAST ASIA

jority of the Japanese people. Beyond
Ijit. more Japanese are coming to ac-
• it and appreciate that our bases in
(i lan contribute not only to the defense
jJapan but also to our mutual interest
itnaintaining peace and stability
,-(Uii;hout the Asian region and
Jilially.

Second, we have with Japan one of
' liroadest and most diverse scientific
:iti(inships that we have with any
mtry in the world— both in the
\ ate sector and between our govern-
11 Is. Our science and technology rela-
iiship with Japan is not a one-way
ret either. As one example, U.S. com-
nifs that have signed cross-licensing
■ iTfiiients with Japanese companies
w receive more patents back from
pan than they send there.

Our educational and cultural rela-
nship with Japan is another aspect of
r relationship that we hear little
out— again, because everything is go-
? so smoothly. There is a renewed in-
est in Japan and Japanese studies in
! United States. We have one of our
')st active youth exchange programs
th Japan. We have over 1 million
Ipanese tourists a year visiting our
:jntry. Now we even have a 24-hour-a-
:y television satellite relay between our
o countries. Japanese viewers wake
every morning to a live 5-minute
ws report from New York describing
i ents in America.

The one area in our relationship
lere we continue to have well-publi-
ed problems is bilateral trade. Yet
en here I would argue that, even
5ugh difficulties in access and market
netration remain, the Japanese
irket is more open now to most
nerican products than it was even 2
ars ago. Although the common
rception is of a closed market, Japan
tually is our largest overseas market,
ist year, it bought $23-billion worth of
nerican products, equal to our exports
France, West Germany, and Italy
mbined. Japan is our best overseas
irket for agricultural products, yet
ly one-fourth of our exports to Japan
e in that category. Japan is a major
irket for U.S. manufactures; in fact, it
ys more manufactures from us than
est Germany does. Japan is our first
second largest market for a wide
nge of manufactured goods, such as
emicals, commercial aircraft, photo-
aphic supplies, medical and scientific
luipment, and pharmaceuticals. In ad-
tion, Japan buys $10-billion worth of
merican services from us, and we run
surplus with Japan in services trade.

Beyond that, Japan has increasingly
invested in the United States. This
direct and portfolio investment creates
employment, helps finance our govern-
ment's deficit, and makes money avail-
able for our banks to lend to American
companies and consumers. In 1982,
Japan transferred $20 billion in capital
back to the United States, an amount
almost equal to our merchandise trade
deficit.

I do not deny that we still have
trade difficulties with Japan. We do, and
we must deal with them. My point is to
indicate that we have made progress in
resolving these problems within the con-
text of our overall healthy economic
relationship. The Administration will
continue to address trade problems dili-
gently as they arise. The size and com-
plexity of our trade— $63 billion in two-
way merchandise trade in 1983— guaran-
tee that we will continue to have trade
problems in the future, especially as
both countries develop their potential in
the high technology area.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS DURING
THE PAST 2 YEARS

The past 2 years have been one of the
most active and productive periods in
U.S. -Japan relations. The President's
meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone
last week in London marked their fourth
meeting in 18 months. Secretary Shultz
and Foreign Minister Abe have met 10
times in that same period. The Presi-
dent, the Vice President, and nearly
every member of the President's Cabinet
have visited Japan. In one very busy
week in early May of this year, we ac-
tually had the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense, all making separate visits to
Tokyo.

But as much as our life at the State
Department is centered around prepara-
tions for meetings, we recognize that
frequent meetings do not represent
progress in themselves. There has been
significant movement in all aspects of
our relationship with Japan. Let me look
first at our economic relationship.

U.S.-Japan Trade

Historically, the U.S. Government has
taken a product-by-product approach to
U.S.-Japan trade, dealing with the con-
tentious issues of the moment. In the
1950s, we were concerned about clinical
thermometers, one dollar blouses, and
cotton typewriter ribbons. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the products shifted to tex-

tiles, color TVs. and specialty steel. To-
day, we worry about computer software,
telecommunications equipment and serv-
ices, and fiber optics. Historically, as we
resolved each problem, another industry,
another product, and another problem
would come along.

While continuing to work to achieve
greater market access for specific prod-
ucts and services, the Reagan Ad-
ministration has taken a broader, longer
term view that seeks to deal with the
underlying issues in the Japanese
economy and industrial structure that
limit our access to Japan's market.
There are a number of examples of our
success in this regard.

Standards Laws Reform. In terms
of its direct and long-term impact on a
wide range of U.S. exports, Japan's
reform of its standards and product-
approval laws is one of the most signifi-
cant actions that it has taken. In
response to U.S. concern, Japan passed
major revisions of its standards and
product-approval laws in May 1983,
making it possible for U.S. firms to
apply directly for approval without go-
ing through Japanese agents. We are
now working actively to allow product
testing to be conducted in the United
States by American firms and are seek-
ing the ability for U.S. companies to
help participate in designing Japanese
standards. As the door opens wider, we
hope more American companies will
take advantage of those fundamental
changes and become reliable suppliers to
Japan. At the same time, should prob-
lems arise, we want to be alerted so that
both sides can work to deliver the full
potential of this opening.

Transparency. The gradual move-
ment toward transparency in Japanese
procedures and decisionmaking also will
have a long-term impact. Basically, in a
number of ways Japan is moving toward
a "sunshine law" approach, allowing U.S.
firms to participate in actions that affect
their access to and ability to compete in
the Japanese market on an equal
footing. The Japanese Government has
agreed to transparency in a number of
ways over the past 2 years. For exam-
ple, U.S. firms can now make their
views known in developing Japanese
standards; Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone (N'TT) has agreed to pro-
cedures which should allow U.S. firms to
participate in its research and develop-
ment work; and the president of the
American Chamber of Commerce in
Japan has been invited to testify before
a Japanese Diet committee, as have

EAST ASIA

representatives of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Department of Com-
merce, and the U.S. Embassy. The
Japanese have even expressed a will-
ingness to allow us to make our views
known to their industrial deliberation
councils, which will provide them the
U.S. perspective on potential changes
before they can be implemented.
Further, the Japanese Government's
April 27 package of trade measures and
its joint report on capital markets/yen-
dollar publicly stated that efforts toward
greater transparency in some areas will
continue.

Capital Market Liberalization and
Internationalization of the Yen. In
terms of its far-reaching international
impact, this is the most significant ac-
tion that Japan has taken during the
past 2 years. In the Regan-Takeshita
statement of last November, Japan
agreed to further liberalize its capital
markets and to promote a greater inter-
national role for the yen. The U.S.
Treasury-Japanese Finance Ministry
report on yen/dollar exchange rate
issues, approved by Treasury Secretary
Regan and Minister Takeshita and
released on May 29, commits Japan to a
number of important measures with far-
reaching foreign exchange and other im-
plications. It is a landmark agreement,
and some financial experts have already
labeled it the most important develop-
ment in Japanese finance in 100 years.
Once the measures are implemented
fully, Japan's capital markets will be
more open than those of any other coun-
try in the world except the United
States. The yen will then be able to play
a role in international finance commen-
surate with Japan's status as the second
largest industrialized democracy and
should reflect more closely its true value
as determined by international markets.

Voluntary Restraint Agreement on
Automobiles. Japan's voluntary
restraints on auto exports over the past
4 years have given U.S. companies a
needed breathing space to retool and in-
vest, and this is having a long-term im-
pact on the competitiveness of the U.S.
automobile industry. Today, Detroit is
offering a better built car than it ever
has, and to meet the Japanese challenge
it will continue to have to do so. At the
same time, Japan's auto makers are
coming to the United States to invest in
production facilities, providing jobs to
our workers and further stimulating
U.S. competitiveness. Honda has an-
nounced it will double its production;
Toyota has established a joint venture
with GM; Nissan plans to add cars to its

truck production line in Tennessee; and
Mazda and Mitsubishi also are consider-
ing manufacturing in the United States.

High Technology Working Group.
In order to deal with issues on the cut-
ting edge of technology, we have
established a high-technology working
group. It serves as an "early warning
system," seeking to head off trade and
investment problems before they arise.
Far from being solely a forum for
discussion, it already has a number of
concrete successes to point to, such as
Japanese agreement on an import pro-
motion program for semiconductors and
agreement on the mutual elimination of
tariffs on semiconductors. The excellent
working relations established between
U.S. and Japanese participants in this
group have enabled us to make good
progress on the software protection
issue and value-added networks— again,
heading off problems before final action
is taken. A unique feature of this group
is that American and Japanese in-
dustries, such as the semiconductor sec-
tor, participate in the meeting with
government officials. Industry-to-
industry contact thereby is facilitated.

Reinstitution of Regular Economic
Consultations at the Subcabinet Level.
In order to engage in a continuous and
high-level dialogue with the Japanese on
economic issues, we have reinvigorated
the Economic Subcabinet Consultations,
led on the U.S. side by Under Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs Allen
Wallis. We have been holding meetings
every 6 months and have turned out the
highest level attendance ever. The con-
sultations have served as an excellent
forum to let the Japanese know, at a
high level and in a comprehensive man-
ner, our concerns and priorities; to head
off issues before they become real prob-
lems; or to approach outstanding issues
in a nonconfrontational manner better
designed to attain mutually agreeable
resolutions. Under the subcabinet con-
sultation mechanism are the trade com-
mittee and a new investment committee
which was established at the time of the
President's trip in November to promote
and facilitate two-way investment. These
two committees also serve as an ex-
cellent means to make our positions
known to the Japanese in a comprehen-
sive fashion.

Industrial Policy Dialogue. We
have instituted discussions with Japan
on industrial policy, trying to determine
how Japan's industrial policies work and
how they may distort trade or en-
courage trade. We believe that these
discussions already have provided us

with a better understanding of Japan's )
industrial policies and at the same time}
have impressed clearly upon the
Japanese the concern we have with any
industrial policies that inhibit trade. I
hope that out of this dialogue will come
mutual understanding of the role of
government in promoting industrial
development and of a joint commitment
that industrial policies should not have
conscious trade-distorting effects.

Energy Cooperation. Another step
which will have a long-term impact on
our economic relationship with Japan is
the joint statement on energy coopera-
tion issued during the President's trip.
In this, Japan commits itself to consider
seriously trade and investment in U.S.
energy resources— particularly coal and
liquified natural gas. Both governments
committed themselves to facilitate
private sector contact so that coopera-
tion and trade can be expanded. We
recognize that, in the end, market force
will he the determining factor in Japan's
decisions to invest in and buy U.S.
energy resources, but we believe that
the provisions of the joint statement,
when fulfilled, will have a positive im-
pact on our balance of trade over the
longer term.

Exchange Rates. Of all these
measures that deal with Japan's under-
lying economic structure and approach
toward imports, we believe that the
most significant action over the past
2 years— and the action that will have
the greatest long-term impact— is
Japan's movement toward greater
liberalization of its domestic capital
markets and a broader international rO'
for the yen. The prevailing exchange
rate also has the effect of making
Japanese goods more price competitive
compared to U.S. products, not only in
the U.S. and Japanese markets but als
in third-country markets, thereby affec
ting our global trade balance. Experts
do not expect the yen to appreciate im
mediately against the dollar, given othi-
factors. However, we believe that over
the longer term the yen should ap-
preciate because of Japan's perceived
economic strength and political stabilit;
Furthermore, U.S. investment in Japai
will he encouraged because a wider
range of instruments will be available 1
finance such investment.

Trade Packages

As I stated earlier, this Administration
also has continued to deal with the que
tion of access by specific U.S. products
and services to the Japanese market.
During the past 2 years, the Japanese
Government has issued three trade

EAST ASIA

[ 2kages that seek to reduce trade fric-
n and increase our ability to compete
the Japanese market on a fair and
litable footing. By far the most
•nificant of these packages from an
nerican point of view was that an-
unced on April 27 of this year, at the
iclusion of the followup process led by
; Vice President. During the Vice
Resident's followup, we sought to ad-
(hss a number of trade issues of impor-
ce to the United States. Specifically,
ise included beef and citrus quotas,
'iffs, high-technology issues (renewal
the NTT agreement, unimpeded ac-
s to telecommunications value-added
tworks, protection of computer soft-
re, and satellite procurement), energy
operation, general investment ques-
ns, and capital market liberaliza-
n/internationalization of the yen. The
panese Government package ad-
3ssed each of our concerns. Overall,
s package was responsive to our in-
ests, although we were disappointed
it certain items, such as tariff cuts on
estry products, were not included.
The main elements of the April 27
ckage are:

On the general question of market

cess— reducing trade barriers and
: ening Japan's market further— Japan
: imises to take additional steps to
: iplify and improve standards and cer-
: cation systems, to promote imports,
; J to accept foreign test data. Prime
Inister Nakasone's statement accom-
I nying the package said that the
ioanese Government considers it im-
i rtant to conduct "even more vigorous-
such policy measures as market
ening, import promotion, encourage-
■nt of investment to and from Japan,
d so forth.

On tariff reductions, it indicates
it tariffs for a number of products of
.erest to the United States will be
olished or reduced in Japan's fiscal
ar 1985. Cuts on color photographic
per and reduction to zero in farm
ichinery (hay balers) are among the
ijor items on the U.S. request list,
its on two other major items— wine
d paper products— have since been
lalized for implementation over the
xt 3 years. As I indicated, there were
cuts on forest products, a major
onomic and political disappointment,
vo items from the U.S. "long
t"— raw furskins of mink and un-
•ought magnesium— are included, as
iW as auto emission catalysts.

On tobacco, there is legislation
pending before the Diet that privatizes
the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public
Monopoly Corporation, which will give
U.S. companies the right to import and
distribute tobacco products on their own
account and to set prices with Ministry
of Finance approval. The tobacco item is
a bright spot in the package which could
significantly expand opportunities for
U.S. products.

On agricultural quotas, a satisfac-
tory new 4-year beef and citrus agree-
ment was reached April 7, which will
lead to an approximate doubling of U.S.
exports to what already is far and away
our best overall market for these prod-
ucts. An agreement on quotas and
tariffs on other agricultural categories,
such as fruit juices, was reached
April 24.

On high technology issues:

• Computer softwm-e— the Govern-
ment of Japan agreed not to seek new
legislation during this session of the
Diet, thereby effectively continuing
copyright protection. The package notes
the need for "international harmony"
and indicates that Japan will not take
any further action on this issue without
coordinating the viewpoints of the other
developed countries. We will continue to
consult on this key issue so that
copyright protection will be continued.

• Telecommunications— the package
refers to legislation which liberalizes the
telecommunications market in Japan.
Restrictions on foreign investment in
Japan's value-added network were
eliminated, and licensing requirements
were changed to notification re-
quirements. The package commits the
Japanese Government to ensure simplici-
ty and transparency in its notification
procedures and fair competition between
the new, privatized NTT and other
telecommunications firms. These
changes are a major step forward for an
open Japanese telecommunications
market. Implementation will be impor-
tant.

• SateWites— Japan revised its
satellite procurement policy, stating that
private firms now will be able to pur-
chase communications satellites from
any source after the passage of the
telecommunications legislation. Further-
more, when NTT is privatized the
government will open the way for it to
purchase satellites in a nondiscrimina-
tory way, while ensuring consistency
with its national space development
policy. Japanese Government agencies
will be able to procure foreign satellites

not necessary for autonomous develop-
ment of space technology. We intend to
continue to press for full open procure-
ment.

On energy cooperation, the package
repeats the Japanese Government's
agreement to send a Japanese coal mis-
sion to the U.S. in May and to facilitate
private sector interest in Alaskan gas
feasibility studies. A Japanese coal mis-
sion came May 14-15 and, while there
were no immediate results, the two
private sectors established an ongoing
committee to continue their dialogue.

On investment, the package accom-
modates our objectives. It establishes an
"expediter" mechanism to relay invest-
ment information and assist foreign
companies wishing to invest in Japan. It
also establishes an investment "om-
budsman" to settle investment
grievances. The Prime Minister's state-
ment included a clear indication that
Japan welcomes direct foreign invest-
ment, and the government is sending a
mission to the United States to promote
investment in Japan. I might point out,
in this connection, that the Japan
Development Bank is now making low
interest loans available to foreign com-
panies investing in Japan, even for sales
offices for U.S. -made products.

On other issues, the package states
that the Japanese Government will work
with the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations to reach an early resolution
of the lawyers' issue. It is noteworthy
that reference to the lawyers' issue was
included, as we believe it commits the
government to show concern and re-
sponsibility for a matter that legally is
under private jurisdiction.

Defense and
Security Cooperation

Another area in which we have made
significant progress over the past 2
years is Japanese defense and security
cooperation. I stated earlier that experts
believe that our security relationship has
never been better than it is today. I
agree. I spoke earlier of the tendency in
U.S. -Japan relations to focus not on
what is going right but on the areas
where we have problems. This is equally
true in defense. A number of years ago,
the focus in the security relationship was
on mutual security cooperation— prob-
lems relating to our mutual security
treaty and our bases in Japan. Today,
one seldom hears about this because

EAST ASIA

almost everything is going very
smoothly. The Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security and the
presence of U.S. military forces in Japan
are accepted by a broad majority of the
Japanese people. The environmental and
social problems connected with the
American military presence in Japan
have largely abated.

The issues that do arise in our
security relationship pale in comparison
to the issues of years past. Japan pro-
vides these bases to us rent free and, in
addition, contributes over $1.2 billion an-
nually to their support. This amounts to
over $23,000 for every American soldier
and sailor in Japan, which is more than
three times the NATO contribution. It is
a tangible manifestation of Japan's
cooperation and its ongoing commitment
to promote security in the Pacific
region.

The focus in our security dialogue
today, therefore, is not on our bases in
Japan but on Japan's own direct defense
efforts. We need to remember that
Japan's defense policies throughout the
postwar era— concentrating on economic
recovery and growth, abjuring the exer-
cise of political power, and renouncing
military power— accorded with U.S.
policy desires and represented the
foreign policy most likely to be accepted,
not only by the Japanese people but also
by Japan's Asian neighbors.

Today, however, we believe that the
situation has changed, and that Japan's
defense policies are changing with it.
Over the past 2 years, there has been a
significant change in Japanese attitudes
toward its own self-defense. First of all,
there is a greater awareness of the
Soviet threat to the region, and recent
public opinion polls in Japan confirm
this. The existence of the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces (JSDF) is now accepted
by an overwhelming majority of the
Japanese people. Most of the opposition
parties have changed their attitudes on
the JSDF; while still claiming that the
JSDF is unconstitutional, even the
Socialist Party now says that it is legal.

But the most important change over
the past 2 years is what I perceive as a
new understanding in Japan of the real
reasons why an enhanced defense effort
is necessary. For many years in our
security relationship, Japanese govern-
ments very often took the steps that
they did in the defense arena and
justified them to their own people by
saying that they were necessary for the
sake of the U.S. -Japan relationship. In-
creasingly in Japan, government leaders,
politicians, and opinionmakers have

come to realize that this is something
that must be done, not simply to "pacify
the Americans" but because it is in
Japan's own national interest. There,
therefore, has been a qualitative dif-
ference in the way the Japanese Govern-
ment and people look at defense issues.

There has been a quantitative dif-
ference as well. This Administration, as
you know well, does not focus on
defense spending per se. Our concern is
not with input but with output — Japan's
ability to fulfill the defense roles and
missions that it has set for itself, and
with which we agree. In the face of
severe fiscal constraints, Japan has
made a major effort to provide the
resources necessary to implement its
defense goals. Increases in Japan's
defense budgets have averaged about
5% in real terms during the years of the
Reagan Administration. (By comparison,
our own defense spending increased by
8% annually in the same period and that
of our NATO allies by only 2%.) During
the last Diet session, the government
passed what basically is a no-growth
budget, with an overall increase of only
0.5'Ki. Yet in the middle of this austere
budget, defense spending rose by 6.55%.
Both we and the Japanese Government
recognize that this level of spending will
not be sufficient to allow it to implement
the Mid-Term Defense Plan or, within
this decade, the defense roles and mis-
sions that it has set out for itself. But
we recognize that the Japanese Govern-
ment is making a consistent effort to
enhance its self-defense capabilities in
the face of political and fiscal con-
straints.

Another major achievement during
the past 2 years is the Memorandum of
Understanding on Defense Technology
Transfer, which was signed just before
the President's visit last November. This
agreement will permit the export of
Japanese technology to the United
States to be used for military purposes,
and I should note that the United States
is the only country to which Japan will
permit the export of militarily applicable
technology.

International Political
and Economic Cooperation

The third area in which we have made
significant progress in our relationship
with Japan during the past 2 years,
and the area that forms the centerpiece
of our vision of the future of U.S. -Japan
relations, is international political and
economic cooperation. I mentioned
earlier the Secretary's landmark speech

last September before the Shimoda con-
ference, in which he indicated that the
time had come to stop thinking of our
relationship with Japan as a simple
bilateral relationship. Given our com-
bined impact on the world, the Secretar;
said that we should now look upon our
relationship with each other as an "inter-
national partnership." In his historic
speech to the Japanese Diet, the Presi-
dent amplified this theme on behalf of
our nation when he told the Members of
Japan's Parliament that we should come
together to become a "powerful partner-
ship for good."

The basis for this thinking is clear.
Together the United States and Japan
account for one-third of world gross na-
tional product (GNP) and one-half of
free world GNP. Our combined share of
world trade is 22%. American and
Japanese banks together make over one
half of all internationally syndicated
commercial loans. The United States
and Japan already rank as the first and
second largest sources of resource flows
(official assistance and private lending)
to the Third World and the first and
third largest donors of official develop-
ment assistance. We soon shall be the
first and second largest shareholders in
the World Bank, and we are the first
and second largest contributors of
refugee assistance. We are universally
recognized as leading sources of
technology. Japan and the United State
are in the forefront of those calling for
new international trade round.

But it is not simply Japan's econom
and technological strength that leads u;
to call for an "international" partnership ,(
As I indicated earlier, Japan is moving
toward a greater international political f,,
role. Neither the United States nor an\ '■
other country is pushing Japan in this
direction; Japan is moving on its own
and in accordance with its own nation;i ,
interests. However, it is in our interest l

to recognize that our relationship with
Japan is now entering a new phase, an<
that we should work to establish new
patterns of association with Japan,
based both in theory and in practice or
close cooperation and respect. This we
have done successfully during the past
2 years, and there are a number of ex-
amples of how the United States and
Japan have worked together on an int«-
national level.

• The close working relationship
established between the President and
Prime Minister Nakasone helped lead I
the success of the Williamsburg summ

• Coordination of our approach to
East- West relations across the board
has led to enhanced Western solidarity

fit

ipp

EAST ASIA

1 general Soviet policy and arms con-
ol negotiations and helped stem the
3W of high technology goods to the
jviets.

• Increased Japanese foreign aid to
itions of strategic importance— such as
urkey. Pakistan, and Egypt— has pro-
oted economic development in those
)untries and enhanced political stahili-

• Japan's impressive cooperation
ith us at the time of the Soviet shoot-
)wn of the Korean Air Lines tlight
)07 proved Soviet responsibility, aided

combined search and recovery opera-
ons, and condemned the Soviet action.

• Japan worked with us to provide
plomatic support to South Korea in
le face of the Rangoon bombing and
le north's proposal for tripartite talks.

• Japan has worked actively to pre-
?nt escalation of the Iran-Iraq war.

• Japan has been cooperative on
bird World debt issues and has ex-
uded support to the Philippines to aid
in the financial crisis it faces.

• Japan has indicated a willingness
I join the President's African aid ini-
ative and help promote development in
16 Caribbean Basin area.

Finally, I should add that we and the
ipanese work actively on a daily basis
I consult on a wide range of interna-
onal political and economic issues. The
ipanese Embassy is among the most
;tive in Washington in its diplomatic
)ntacts with the State Department and
;her executive branch departments, and
am sure that the reverse is equally
ue about our Embassy's contacts with
le Japanese Foreign Ministry. In addi-
on, senior specialists in the State
epartment and the Japanese Foreign
Ministry, usually led at the Assistant
ecretary level, meet on a regular basis
>) exchange views and discuss our
jspective policies toward major regions
: the world. So far this year, we have
i\d extensive consultations on the
[iddle East and Africa, and later this
2ar we will meet to discuss
evelopments in Latin America and
urope.

HE CHALLENGES AND
PPORTUNITIES OF THE FUTURE

.s we look toward the future, the
'nited States has a number of specific
olicy goals to:

• Strengthen U.S. -Japan coopera-
on and consultation on a wide range of
iternational political and economic

issues in order to promote peace and in-
ternational security, not just in Asia but
throughout the world:

• Continue to strengthen our
mutual security relationship, while
stressing the importance of Japan's
making a larger and accelerated con-
tribution to our common defense burden;

• Continue our major efforts to
achieve greater and more equitable
market access to Japan and work
together to maintain the free trade
system and counter protectionist senti-
ment in the United States and Japan;

• Consult and cooperate closely with
Japan in our mutual efforts to foster an
open world trade and investment system
and to promote economic development
and financial stability in the developing
nations: and

• Continue to expand our educa-
tional, cultural, and scientific relations.

As we seek to accomplish these
goals, I see three major challenges
before us:

• Gaining a strengthened commit-
ment by both countries to the free trade
system;

• Ensuring that we treat Japan as
we would any other ally and friend; and

• Using the fundamentals and
overall importance of our relationship to
solve the more transitory problems of
the moment.

I mentioned earlier that, in the case
of defense, we are convinced that Japan
is now genuinely and sincerely moving in
the direction of an enhanced defense ef-
fort. Japan's intentions or motives are
not in doubt. Unfortunately, I cannot yet
say the same about our trade problems.
There still is a widespread perception
that Japan is not committed to allowing
our companies and products fair and
equitable access to its market and that
Japan makes concessions only begrudg-
ingly and under pressure. Two editiorial
comments from opposite ends of the
Pacific reflect this notion well. In
describing the capital market discus-
sions, Japan's Nikon Keiza i Shimbun
described on March 27 of this year what
it called Japan's

. . . conventional negotiating style in deal-
ing with the United States, namely, the style
of "delaying, haggling and seeking to
minimize changes in the status quo." If this
style continues, the U.S. dissatisfaction will
increase rather than diminish, resulting in a
further aggravation in U.S. frustration, and
this cycle will never stop.

Two weeks later, the Washington Post
commented on the beef and citrus
discussions, saying

By resisting desperately on minor mat-
ters such as beef imports, and pushing them
to the brink of crisis before compromising,
Japanese negotiators create an impression of
obduracy. It does not serve Japanese in-
terests to encourage Americans to think of
trade with Japan as a one-way street in
which even the most modest concessions are
made grudgingly and only after inordinate
delay. . . . That impression is damaging to
Japan. ... In the beef case, the Japanese
allowed the dispute to drag on much too long
at too great a political cost.

Another challenge in the future is to
learn how to treat Japan as we would
any other ally or friend. The quotations
I just used illustrate how perceptions in
both countries focus on pressure and on
response tactics. This is not the only
way to conduct business. Calm, con-
sistent attention to issues before they
are politicized should work to eliminate
the cyclical and emotional swings in our
relationship. We have, with few excep-
tions, attempted to do just that during
the past 3 years. In my view, we must
build upon this approach so that future
generations of leaders will not be so em-
bittered by the battles that a mature
dialogue and the accomplishment of
other important objectives in our rela-
tionship become impossible.

Particularly in trade matters, I
welcome the fledgling indications that
some circles in Japan see it as in their
own national interest to open completely
to foreign products and services. The
leaders of Japan have to foster this
growing recognition.

In terms of international political
cooperation, however, the obligation is
more on our side. If we want Japan to
work together with us as a close and
equal partner on the international stage,
we must act accordingly. We must treat
Japan as an equal, consult closely, and
be willing to listen — and in some cases
modify — our policies and actions when
Japan disagrees. In the global economic
arena, Japan already is speaking its
mind openly to us. However, Japan has
been less willing to do the same in inter-
national political affairs. When the day
comes when it does so, it may come as a
shock to many Washington policymakers
who are accustomed to a quieter Japan.
That day will come, and I hope that we
will be flexible and mature enough to
receive it as a sign of a successful policy.

The final challenge that we face is to
make sure that, when we deal with

EAST ASIA

Japan on transitory individual issues, we
keep our overall interests in mind and
utilize the importance of our relationship
to help achieve progress on those
outstanding issues. Our trade interests
are important to us, but they are not the
only part of our relationship. Conver.'-.e-
ly, our security interests in Japan are
extremely important to us, but this does
not mean that we should ignore our in-
terest in securing equitable access to
Japan's market. We should not be forced
to choose, Solomon like, one aspect of

our relationship over another. Our rela-
tionship with Japan is without question
one of our most important and vital rela-
tionships, and it will be increasingly so
in the future. If we keep the overall im-
portance of that relationship in mind, we
can make even greater progress in
resolving outstanding issues.

'The completed transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington. D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Asia Security: Economic
and Political Dimensions

by William A. Brown

Address before the U.S.-Asia In-
stitute on June 18, 198J,. Mr. Brown is
Acting Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Although formed only a few short years
ago, the U.S.-Asia Institute has already
made a large contribution to a deepen-
ing of understanding between the
peoples of the United States and Asia.
Your leadership, headed by your
distinguished chairman, Mr. Kay
Sugahara, and ably assisted by co-
founders Esther Kee, Joji Konoshima,
and others, is outstanding. Your
organization, through its research, sym-
posia, and publications, serves as a wise
adviser in meeting the challenge of
achieving ijetter relations between the
United States and the countries in the
Kast Asia and Pacific region.

Overview

The subject for my address today is the
political and economic dimensions of
U.S. -Asia security. That ancient and
very wise Chine.se sage, Lao Tzu, said:
"He who knows does not speak. He who
speaks does not know." I, therefore, ask
your kind indulgence.

Ever since immigrants from Europe
and Asia settled the West Coast, the
United States has necessarily looked to
both East and West. World War II ac-
celerated the trend away from paying so
much more attention to Europe toward
one of greater balance and concern. Our
future is as tied to events in East Asia
as it is to our more traditional relations
in Western Europe.

These last four decades since the
end of World War II have witnessed
great changes that have drawn the
United States ever closer to East Asia.
Peaceful trade and commerce have ex-
panded to such a degree that U.S. trade
with the East Asia and Pacific region
has outstripped our trade with Europe.
The dynamic growth of the Pacific na-
tions has transformed them into major
markets for U.S. products, services, and
capital.

There have been two major wars.
And we have learned our lessons. We
are resolved to maintain our military
posture and presence as a Pacific power
so as to deter armed aggression against
our allies and friends in the region. Im-
migration patterns have shifted; in re-
cent years, along with Latin America,
the largest number of immigrants have
come from Korea, Taiwan, the Philip-
pines, and the former Indochina coun-
tries. These hardworking people greatly
enrich our culture and economic life.

Economic Dimensions

Let me now comment on the economic
dimensions of U.S.-Asia security. No
society can be truly secure without a
strong economy. A flourishing economy
provides the necessary resources for a
strong defense. Breakthroughs in the
private sector often have application in
defense-related industries, but more
generally, a growing, vibrant economy
has certain intrinsic advantages: it
motivates people to become involved, to
increase production, and to be concerned
about the quality of the product. It also

stimulates education, and a better
educated workforce results in a better
educated fighting force.

The Republic of Korea is a good ex-
ample of the correlation between
economy and security. While North
Korea has maintained over the years a
20% of GNP spending rate for so-called
defense. South Korea, because of its ex-
panding economic strength, now is at
rough equivalence in military expendi-
tures. If the trend continues, there is no
doubt the South will right the current
imbalance in military forces. Although
the U.S. guarantee for the Republic of
Korea's security is an important factor
in this equation, the commitment of the
South Korean people to hardworking
economic growth is the key ingredient to
an increasingly strong defense posture.

On a broader plane, our growing
economic ties with our friends and allies
in the East Asia and Pacific region pro-
vide additional benefits from a security
standpoint. Commerce is a very strong
tie that binds. It helps cement relation-
ships and makes it that much harder for
adversaries to drive a wedge between
us. Across the sealanes of the Pacific to-
day are shipped a great deal of each
market country's wealth. They have
become, in fact, the sinews and arteries
of a larger system, and — needless to
say — crucial to the security of this
sytem and its parts.

Such close and very extensive
economic ties inevitably produce some
friction, and I suppose oui- trade with
Japan — one of our closest and most im-
portant friends in the world — is the besi
case to illustrate this. There are some
important trade problems, and issues
such as Japan's quotas and high tariffs
on agricultural and forestry products ar
illustrative of the difficulties that we
have in achieving the same kind of ac-
cess to Japan's market that Japanese
companies have to ours. We will con-
tinue to emphasize strongly to the
Japanese the importance of removing it I,
remaining barriers to the export of U.S J-
goods and services. And yet, such prob-
lems must be kept in perspective. ,
Because our economic ties are part of a
much wider, deeper relationship, with a
security dimension, we must never let
disputes eat away at the trust so
necessary for cooperation to meet com-
mon threats.

I beg your indulgence to cite a few
statistics to show just how phenomenal
the growth in our economic ties has
been over the last few years.

• U.S. investments in the region
rose an estimated $4 billion in 1981 to
.$26. <; billion.

EAST ASIA

I Also in 1981, before the recession,
; $128 billion trade with East Asia
d the Pacific signified a 12.2% in-
lase over the previous year. This com-
res with a 10.9% growth in our
rldwide trade.

• In 1982, in the recession, trade

th the region declined 1% compared to
'.8% decline worldwide.

• In 1983, the first year of recovery,
$136.5 billion trade with East Asia

d the Pacific was up 8% compared to
;t 0.5% worldwide. It is now 24%
ger than our trade with Western
irope and comprises 30% of our total
ide. ASEAN [Association of South
ist Asian Nations] by itself is our fifth
gest trading partner behind Canada,
pan, Mexico, and the European Com-
mity.

ilitical Dimensions

t me now turn to the political dimen-
ns of U.S. -Asia security. No society
n be secure if it is torn by internal
ife. No society can successfully cope
ith threats from the outside if it is
I'ak within. And political strength
irives from governments being respon-
e to the needs of their people. Over
years ago, Dr. Sun Yat-sen asked:

Is there any just reason why we should
Dose autocracy and insist on democracy?
s, because with the rapid advance of
1 ilization people are growing in intelligence
li developing a new consciousness of
if.... Which is more appropriate,
I ;ocracy or democracy? If we base our judg-
I nt on the people's intelligence and ability,
; come to the conclusion that the sovereign-
of the people is far more suitable to us.

Just as our society today is influ-
ced by Asian religious and cultural
!as, so too have Asian societies,
oecially after shaking off the yoke of
ionialism, been influenced by Western
litical ideas.

We are justifiably proud of our
mocratic system and feel most com-
-table in dealing with others who
are similar values. Happily, many
untries in the region have attained or
e moNang toward stable democracies,
le institutional growth and broad ac-
ptance of Japanese democracy, for ex-
nple, is something in which the
panese people can take pride, and we
11 continue to applaud — and encourage
appropriate ways — movement toward
ger societies in the Republic of Korea,
e Philippines and elsewhere. Our
lique relationship with Australia and

New Zealand is based upon shared
history, values, and generally compatible
interests and objectives. Anchored by
the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand,
United States pact] treaty, our contacts
with these two old friends continue to be
close and harmonious. We are encour-
aged by the political growth in the
Western tradition of the emerging na-
tions of the South Pacific. We look for-
ward to full self-government in the not
too distant future for the Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, and Palau.

Southeast Asia provides an in-
teresting example of the dynamic in-
teraction between political, economic,
and security factors. Two decades ago,
our Southeast Asian friends' foremost
threat was communist subversion foster-
ing internal disorder. The economic and
political progress of these countries has
reduced this threat in most countries to
manageable proportions. Finding their
ability to penetrate and influence inter-
nal developments sharply curtailed, both
the Soviet Union and Vietnam have
turned to conventional military forces
and intimidation as their principal policy
tools. The resulting threat is real and
must be met. But the wave of the future
clearly does not lie in the regimented
societies where experience starkly
reveals the central weakness of their
governing systems. Such one-
dimensional systems provide neither
economic nor political incentives or
development.

The U.S. Role

There is a psychological dimension of
the U.S. security role that I would also
like to touch on briefly. For a time after
the Vietnam war, there were many who
feared that isolationism would again
move America to withdraw from her
commitments as a Pacific power. Many
were concerned that U.S. foreign policy
in the Pacific would resemble that so
well-described by Winston Churchill,
speaking about his own country in the
mid-1930s: "Decided only to be unde-

cided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant
for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful
to be impotent."

Events fortunately proved that
America was not returning to isola-
tionism. While the lessons of the Viet-
nam war will provide debate material
for years to come, the negative conse-
quences of that war are plain for all to
see — namely a Vietnam under
repressive rule which invaded, occupies,
and now even colonizes parts of its
neighbor Kampuchea; provides the
Soviets with air and naval facilities in
the region; and is responsible for the
flight of more than a million and half
refugees from Indochina since 1975.

Such consequences challenged the
United States to respond, and I believe
we have. Our alliances with Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand
are stronger than ever. Our political ties
to new friends, such as China, and old
friends such as the ASEAN states, are
crucial in dealing with both security and
economic challenges. As Secretary
Shultz stated before the World Affairs
Council of San Francisco last year, the •
U.S. role in the East Asia and Pacific
region is unique. "We are the one nation
of the region with both a worldwide
view and the capacity to implement a
worldwide policy. As a great power, we
have great responsibilities. We have
borne them well, and we must continue
to do so. . . . The United States will re-
main a Pacific power. Although specific
tasks may change, our overall respon-
sibilities will not be diminished in impor-
tance nor shifted on others."

It is not just happenstance that over
the past year, the President of the
United States has made two major trips
to Asia — to Japan and the Republic of
Korea, and to China, and hopes to be
traveling to Southeast Asia as well. The
President has a deep and abiding com-
mitment toward strengthening U.S. ties
to the Pacific. As he commented recent-
ly in Beijing: "I see America and our
Pacific neighbors going forward in a
mighty enterprise to build strong
economies and a safer world." ■

ECONOMICS

World Economic Prospects

by W. Allen Wallis

Address i 1 merican

Chamber ofC <•■ .1 m Santiago on

July 27, 198A- Mr. Wallis is Under
Secretary for Economic Affairs.

I am happy to be in Santiago. This is my
first visit, and I am impressed already
by the beauty of the city and the
hospitality of its people. In addition, it is
an honor "and a pleasure to have this op-
portunity to address you.

I will first discuss prospects for the
world economy and U.S. policies to sus-
tain, strengthen, and spread the eco-
nomic recovery on a global basis.

Second, I will discuss the effects of
recovery on developing countries, a sub-
ject that this audience may find of par-
ticular interest.

Finally, I will comment on problems
related to international debts.

U.S. Recovery and
Global Outlook

Largely as a result of the strong U.S.
recovery, the world economy is in much
better shape than it was a year and a
half ago. The recovery is increasingly
picking up strength in the other in-
dustrialized economies, international
trade is again growing, and we have
passed the worst of the current debt
problems of some developing countries.
With strong growth in U.S. incomes
and production, the U.S. market for
foreign goods expanded rapidly during
1983. The value of imports in the fourth
quarter was 19% above a year earlier
and grew a further 13% in the first
quarter of this year. This growth in-
duced a recovery in global international
trade. The strong dollar has substantial-
ly improved the competitive position of
our trading partners, allowing them to
take advantage of the growth in our
market and to compete effectively in
third-country markets. The widening of
the U.S. trade deficit, estimated at a
$30-billion increase, is a measure of the
stimulus provided to other countries.
Perhaps as important as this trade
stimulus has been the psychological im-
pact of the U.S. recovery. Even though
recession and financial crisis continue in
too many countries, the United States
has achieved a strong upturn. Our
growth has strengthened confidence and
has eased concern about the world finan-
cial system.

The U.S. recovery seems likely to
continue to be robust throughout 1984.
Consumer confidence is high and, ac-
cording to recent surveys, businesses
plan the largest real increase in invest-
ment spending since 1977— over 9%.
Real output grew 9.7% in the first
quarter. The preliminary estimate of
real GNP [gross national product] in-
dicates growth in the second quarter at
the more sustainable rate of .5.7%. We
expect that growth will continue at a
moderate and sustainable pace for the
rest of the year.

Except for Canada, whose recovery
has paralleled that in the United States,
the upturn in the rest of the industrial-
ized economies has been less vigorous
than in the United States. Nevertheless,
there is increasing evidence that the rest
of the industrialized world is recovering.

The strength of this recovery varies,
of course, from country to country.
Growth is greatest in those economies
which have taken prompt and effective
action against inflation. In Japan, where
inflation in consumer prices has been
only about 2%, growth is estimated to
have been about 4. .5% from the fourth
quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of
1983. Both Japan and Canada benefit
from rapid growth of their exports to
the United States and should sustain
strong growth in 1984. In Europe,
growth improved in 1983, notably in
Germany and the United Kingdom, but
was still disappointing. Germany, which
has brought down its inflation rate to
about 3%, had a rather sluggish
recovery in 1983 of 3%i, but probably
will grow more than 3% this year.
Europe's relative slowness to recover
reflects, in large measure, the continu-
ing problems of France. The French
economy should start to grow this year,
so the growth of Europe as a whole
should strengthen in 1984. The OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development] now expects Euro-
pean growth to reach 2.25% this year,
up more than one percentage point from
last year.

Just as the recovery in the in-
du.strialized economies has been based
on success in reducing inflation, so our
ability to sustain it will depend on suc-
cess in keeping inflation from ac-
celerating again. The signs so far are
good. U.S. consumer prices have risen
by only about 4.5% in the last 12
months, only one percentage point above
the previous 12 months and far below
the double-digit rates of increase in 1979

and 1980. The low rate of inflation dur-
ing the past year has been reinforced by
falling energy prices and agricultural
prices. The inflation rate for other good
and services is about 5%, a level we ex-
pect to see during the remainder of
1984. With a stable monetary policy
keeping expansion under control, con-
tinued moderation in the growth of
wage rates and further good perfor- <
mance in productivity should help keep
inflation down.

The outlook for inflation in the rest
of the OECD is similarly good. Even the
high-inflation countries, notably Italy
and France, are showing significant im^
provements. Consumer prices for the
OECD as a whole are expected to con-
tinue to advance at about a 5% pace i
1984.

Another factor affecting the •"'

economic outlook will be the exchange
rate of the dollar. Recent movements iff
this rate have been dominated by inter-
national capital movements. With net in
ternational capital flows swinging sharp
ly toward the United States in 1983, th(
dollar appreciated further despite a
widening deficit in both trade and cur-
rent account. The trade-weighted
average value of the dollar rose during
the year to a fourth quarter level 6.5%
above a year earlier and 26.5% above
1981. (Adjusted for differences among
countries in rates of inflation, the corref'
sponding increases were 4.5% and
20.3%.) There is, however, a good deal
of doubt that the present level of the
dollar will persist, in view of the pros- ^
pects for a further widening of the U.S
deficit on current account.

If the value of the dollar should
fall — and far be it from me to predict
whether it will or will not — the effect 1
the world economic outlook would be
mixed. For the United States, our inte
national competitiveness would be im-
proved, stimulating our exports and ]>
products which compete with imports. ¥■
Our prices, however, would rise faster P!
for a while. In the other industrialized •'
countries, efforts against inflation wou
be assisted by a fall in the dollar, but
they would need to rely more on
domestic demand and less on their ex- im-
ports for their growth. On balance, an
orderly decline of the dollar would prol ^
ably not affect the size of the recovery* ^
in the industrialized countries much, bHfPl
it would affect its composition.

The.se facts that I have cited show
the U.S. recovery is strong and sustair
able, that recovery is spreading throug
the world, and that trends in interna-
tional trade are encouraging.

ffli

ECONOMICS

'ects on Developing Countries

lat will be the effects of recovery on
'eloping countries? Obviously, the
overy in the industrialized world
jhtens prospects considerably for the
feloping countries. A number of these
mtries have had severe debt problems
1 have had to make major ad-
tments in imports to deal with their
incial crises. Non-oil developing coun-
is are estimated to have cut their cur-

t account deficits by about $20 billion
t year. A major contributor to the im-
ivement was the gain in these coun-
!s' trade balance with the United
ites— about $13 billion. About $9
ion of this was due to increased ex-
"ts to the United States. The trade
ance between the United States and
ile, for example, moved from $837
lion in favor of the United States in
^0 to $241 million in favor of Chile in
^3.

The IMF [International Monetary
nd], assuming only a moderate 4.25%
« of growth for the industrialized
)nomies in 1984, projects growth in

dollar value of their imports to be
)ut 7.5%, in sharp contrast to declines
I the previous 4 years. Exports of non-
( developing countries are expected to
jrease about 10.3% in 1984. The
length in the U.S. economy, which is
Ich greater than was anticipated, may
ike this figure even higher. Although
mansion in a number of developing
I mtries will be limited by financial con-
laints and the need for further ad-
[ tments of their policies, on the whole
I )wth should improve this year. The
3st estimates by the World Bank are
it growth in the developing countries
a whole will rise to about 3.75% in
■84, compared to less than 1% last
iiir. As you know, growth in Chile—
lich was a negative 0.8% last year— is
ejected by the Chilean Government to
in the 4%-5% range in real terms
s year. Thus, prospects are bright for
v^eloping countries overall— at least for
)se with sound economic policies.

If the global recovery is to be sus-
ned and strengthened, steady, non-
lationary growth within individual
entries is required. The United States
s made substantial strides, but we still
ve more to be accomplished. For ex-
iple, the United States needs to cut its
cal deficits, as do many other coun-
es. European countries, in particular,
n improve their prospects by increas-
j the flexibility of their labor markets.
1 countries need to establish credible,
ninflationary monetary policies. Many
veloping countries need to free up

their economic structures, adopt realistic
exchange rates, and encourage redeploy-
ment of resources to the foreign trade
sector.

Effects on International
Indebtedness

In conclusion, some remarks about inter-
national indebtedness. In the latter part
of 1982, major international debt prob-
lems came to a head. There was wide-
spread fear of defaults which would lead
to grave damage to the world financial
system. But these difficult problems
have been managed through interna-
tional cooperation involving debtor and
creditor governments, private lending
institutions, and the International
Monetary Fund.

Countries with heavy burdens of
debt service may have prolonged periods
of adjustment ahead. We believe, how-
ever, that the worst of the world debt
problems may be behind us. We have
proven that the major industrialized na-
tions, working in cooperation with the
IMF and major international banks, are
able to coordinate their policies to assist
those nations unable to service their
debts.

For their part, many debtor coun-
tries have shown the ability and will to
act responsibly and to take appropriate
action to redress their balance-of-
payments positions. Chile, of course, is
among the countries in this category.
We are seeing significant reductions in
the current account deficits of many na-
tions, with the total current account
deficits of non-oil developing countries
having been cut very substantially from
1982 and 1983. In the case of Chile, the
current account deficit was slashed from
almost $5 billion in 1981 to about $1
billion in 1983. With the IMF quota in-
crease now in place, establishment of en-
larged general arrangements to borrow,
and the provision of new loans to the
IMF by members of the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements and Saudi Arabia,
we are pleased to see that the IMF has
been adequately financed to conduct its
important task.

We are now entering what I hope
will be the final phase of the debt prob-
lem. It is in this phase that the debtor
countries will have to work out their
debt problems and resume reasonable
rates of economic growth.

This phase will require action by
both debtors and creditors in a number
of areas, including:

First, the continued application of
now-established procedures to assist
those countries whose debt problems are
just emerging;

Second, continued adjustment by
the debtor countries;

Third, provision of adequate capital
inflows to those countries making ade-
quate adjustments, including the import-
ant provision of financing for trade;

Fourth, continued economic
recovery in the industrialized nations,
control of protectionism, and new ef-
forts to liberalize the world trading
system.

The problem of excessive depend-
ence on borrowed capital can only be
resolved effectively by the developing
countries themselves. However, interna-
tional direct investment can help. To
reduce the likelihood of future debt
crises, foreign direct investment must
become a more important source of
capital for the developing countries.

I remain confident that we will be
able to respond to emerging debt prob-
lems. Procedures for dealing with these
problems are in place and the members
of the international financial system,
both governments and commercial
banks, have shown the necessary resolve
and flexibility. Economic readjustment is
difficult and expensive but the economic
future of most major developing coun-
tries is bright if they follow appropriate
policies. Both they and we have a stake
in the preservation and strengthening of
the international financial system, which
can serve as an efficient global allocator
of investment funds.

Conclusion

In summary, worldwide economic
recovery is under way, led by the strong
recovery in the United States. World
trade is expanding. The benefits are
spreading to the developing countries.
Those with market-oriented development
policies are receiving the greatest
benefits from the expansion and will
continue to do so. The problems of pro-
tectionism and indebtedness pose
challenging tests to both the developed
and developing countries. These tests
can best be met by cooperation and
negotiation. The challenges of sustaining
growth in the world economy do not re-
quire us to devise radical new economic
instruments or strategies. What is
needed is an application of sound
economic principles, good sense, and a
great deal of patience. ■

ECONOMICS

The Bretton Woods Legacy:
Its Continuing Relevance

by Richard T. McCormack

Address at a conference com-
Tnemorating the J,Oth anniversary of the
signing of the Bretton Woodx agreements
in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, on
July 13, 198i. Mr. McCormack is Assist-
ant Secretary for Economic and
BusiTiess Affairs.

I am here today to acknowledge the
debt of people of my generation to the
work done here 40 years ago. My
generation has never known soup kitch-
ens or bread lines or depression of the
type experienced in the 1930s. This is
due in no small part to the outstanding
work that was done here in setting up
an international monetary system
toward the end of the Second World
War.

Forty years ago, a group of
distinguished and farsighted men
erected what has become a living
historical landmark of international
economic cooperation. The structure
they erected enabled the world economy
to achieve an unprecedented four
decades of reconstruction, growth, and
change. Today, the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions, having proven both resilient
and flexible, are in the forefront of our
efforts to resolve current international
economic problems.

Some of those who helped to build
this structure 40 years ago are here
tonight. We pay tribute to them and
their fellow architects and salute the
men and women who, over the subse-
quent 40 years, worked within and built
upon the foundation laid down here.

The wisdom and farsightedness of
the architects of Bretton Woods are the
more remarkable when we consider the
background against which they labored.
It is sometimes noted that their con-
ference took place soon after the landing
of the Allied forces in Normandy. But,
as you know, the gestation period of the
Bretton Woods structure began earlier,
when the alliance was struggling for its
very survival. Remarkably, despite
preoccupation with the course of the
war, these men were able to look to the
future and to see that a totally new
cooperative international monetary and

financial structure was needed to rebuild
the world economy and secure a lasting
peace.

Developing a Stable
Monetary Order

What did the Bretton Woods founders
believe they had accomplished? How suc-
cessful were they? What elements of
their design are most relevant to our
concerns today? Let me begin with the
quote from U.S. Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau reproduced in our program:
"What we have done here in Bretton
Woods," Morgenthau said, "is to devise
machinery by which men and women
everywhere can freely exchange, on a
fair and stable basis, the goods which
they produce with their labor." A com-
monplace observation? Perhaps it seems
so today. But compare the ideal to the
then-existing reality.

The interwar period had left interna-
tional economic intercourse in virtual
anarchy, with countries attempting to
defend themselves against external
shocks (and, indeed, to export their
unemployment to others) through all
kinds of devices— exchange rate
manipulation, multiple rates and ex-
change controls of various kinds, import
barriers, and restrictive bilateral
agreements. In this context, Morgen-
thau's simple claim must have seemed
visionary indeed.

The first order of business, then,
was to bring countries together in a
structure that would substitute stability,
cooperation, and open markets for the
existing chaos. At the same time the
founders wanted to leave individual
countries scope to pursue their
legitimate individual economic objec-
tives. Balancing these two goals-
discipline and cooperation versus
freedom of action— was one of the most
fundamental and difficult problems fac-
ing the negotiators 40 years ago.

The Bretton Woods founders be-
lieved that these goals could best be
reconciled within a system of fixed but
adjustable exchange rates. They had
very much in mind the experience of the
interwar period with its turbulent spells
of flexible exchange rates and "beggar-
thy-neighbor" devaluations. Therefore, in
their system, countries were committed
to the maintenance of exchange rates
within narrow margins around agreed

lei

parities, and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) was to exercise discipline
over changes in these parities.

Did Bretton Woods Fail? '

Although this exchange rate structure
provided the foundation for the world's
monetary system for almost 30 years, it
is now generally believed to have had
fatal defects which caused it to be aban^
doned by the major countries a little
more than a decade ago— in practice, in
1973; in law, with the second amend-
ment to the IMF articles in 1976.

Many learned writers have written
countless pages on the reasons why this
happened. The consensus, as I under-
stand it, is that the system proved in
practice to be too rigid in the face of
changing conditions. Currency conver-
tibility, fixed exchange rates, and in-
dependent national macroeconomic
policies become increasingly inconsistent
with growing economic interdependence
The Bretton Woods escape hatch— ad-
justment through major exchange rate
realignments only after fundamental
disequilibrium had clearly emerged—
proved unworkable in a world economy
where vast amounts of capital can move
relatively freely across the exchange
markets to hedge or speculate on an an-
ticipated realignment.

Of course, the Bretton Woods
founders did not foresee— they could no
reasonably have foreseen— the vast in-
crease in funds free to cross and recrosi
national borders over the postwar
decades. And it is clear at least some of
them gave far less weight to the benefit
of free capital movement than to those
of free trade. To their credit, the
founders viewed their arrangements as
experimental, not immutable. If
anything, those who followed ought
probably to have modified the system a>
an earlier stage, before it collapsed.

Did the collapse of the Bretton
Woods exchange rate system signify
that the founders failed in their efforts
to construct an international monetary
system? In terms of their most funda-
mental objectives, the answer is no, the ^
did not fail.

After all, the original exchange rat«j«r
system provided sufficient stability and'
confidence over a quarter century so
that nations could move from the
chaotic, restrictive, prewar system to
successively greater currency conver-
tibility, vastly reduced barriers to the
flow of goods and services, and freer
capital movements. Largely under the
aegis of the IMF, the major trading

ECONOMICS

mntries of the world have adopted a
igime of free financial flows among na-
ons. These developments together pro-
ded the foundation for a rapid expan-
on of trade and interdependence, in
irn helping to produce an astonishing
jcovery from war and a sustained in-

ease in production and material well-
sing. The removal of exchange controls

accord with the Fund's articles has
;en instrumental in achieving the six-
)ld increase in world trade (in real

rms) that has occurred since the end
: European reconstruction in 1953.
conomists, of course, complain about
le misallocatlon of resources which oc-
irred with the growing exchange rate
lisalignments of the latter part of the
eriod; these misalignments reflected
iir failure to introduce more flexibility
ito the operation of the system as con-
itions changed.

Even more important, gains from
lat earlier period — convertibility and
pen markets — were not lost as the
/stem was transformed by the force
ajeure of the marketplace to a more
exible exchange rate system. Compare
lis evolution with the monetary
isintegration of the interwar period,
ad you will see clearly the lasting
snefits of Bretton Woods. The fun-
amental principles of international
lonetary cooperation survived and are
;ill operating as we work to improve
ir economic performance with the
resent exchange rate arrangements,
he principles that exchange rates and
ther international monetary issues are
matter for mutual concern, not
nilateral decisions; stable domestic
olicies are fundamental to international
lonetary stability; and that the reper-
jssions of one country's policies on
nother country's well-being cannot be
piored are still the core of our present
ystem. This is one lasting legacy — more
nportant than the details of any ex-
hange rate system — that the Bretton
W^oods founders left us.

'he IMF and the Debt Crisis

"hey also left us with an institu-
ion — the IMF — that is at the center of
ur efforts to deal with current interna-
ional financial problems.

In recent years nations all over the
/orld have found their efforts to
fianage their economic affairs swamped
>y a unique combination of adverse cir-
umstances — dramatically increased oil
)rices followed by worldwide inflation, a
:ollapse in commodity prices, the worst

world recession since the 1930s, and
historically very high interest rates.
Wien oil prices shot up, the first reac-
tion of oil-importing developing coun-
tries was to borrow to stave off im-
mediate economic dislocation. And with
liquidity abundant and real interest rates
low or negative in the late 1970s, they
continued to borrow. Tlius, by the end of
1982, when the crisis peaked, their in-
debtedness had reached $600 billion,
having quadrupled in a decade. At that
point, we were confronted with a
widespread debt crisis, as nation after
nation sought IMF assistance and debt
relief.

Some observers argue that the Fund
began to take on a new role in this
crisis, that of financial organizer for
troubled debtor nations. Indeed, for a
troubled world, I know for certain that
it has become the linchpin of our
strategy for dealing with this crisis, a
strategy endorsed last year by the
Williamsburg summit. "The IMF is

crucial to four of the basic elements of
that strategy and closely related to the
fifth.

First, the Fund obviously provides
its financial support to troubled nations.

Second, it is the one institution with
the expertise, experience, and interna-
tional acceptance to encourage and
guide debtor governments toward sound
adjustment of their domestic economies
to the new world realities. Such an ad-
justment program is unquestionably the
most vital step in addressing a country's
financial crisis, because it sets the
economy on a sustainable economic path
for the future.

Third, emergency official lending to
debtor nations is almost invariably
bridged to an approved IMF program.

Fourth, adequate continuing flows
of commercial bank financing, especially
following a crisis, require the im-
primatur and, increasingly, the en-
couragement of the IMF; later such
flows depend crucially on the success of

Assistant Secretary for Economic
and Business Affairs

Richard T. McCormack was born in Bradford,
Penn.. on March 6, 1941. He received his
B.A. degree from Georgetown University in
1963 and Ph.D. magna cum laude from the
University of Fribourg in Switzerland (1966).

Mr. McCormack began his career as a
staff member of the Peace Corps and has
been a consultant to a number of other U.S.
Government agencies and private corpora-
tions.

From 1969 to 1971, he served at the Ex-
ecutive Office of the President in a number of
capacities. As a senior staff member of the
President's Advisory Council on Executive
Organization, he was responsible for drawing
up the plans for the subsequently established
White House Council on International
Economic Policy. Mr. McCormack also served
as special assistant to former Governor
William Scranton at the INTELSAT negotia-
tions at the State Department in early 1969.
He was at the American Enterprise Institute
from 1975 to 1977.

In 1977 Mr. McCormack was deputy to
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
International Economic Affairs. Following his
tenure at the Treasury, he was a consultant
to the White House office of the Special
Trade Representative, where he analyzed
potential international commodity
agreements.

From 1979 to 1981, Mr. McCormack
served as a legislative assistant to Senator
Jesse Helms. And from December 1981 until
his confirmation by the Senate, he was a con-
sultant to the Department of State on inter-
national economic matters.

-^miltt^^\

(Department of State photo)

He was sworn in as Assistant Secretary
for Economic and Business Affairs in
February 1983.

Mr. McCormack is the author of Asians
in Kenya and a number of other articles and
monographs on foreign affairs. ■

ECONOMICS

the IMF-supported adjustment program.
(I might add that debt reschedulings,
both official and private, also necessitate
the assurance of eventual repayment
provided by a sound IMF program.)

The fifth element of the debt
strategy— strong industrialized-country
economic recovery with open markets—
obviously is not the direct responsibility
of the IMF. Nevertheless, it is of great
significance to the success of the Fund's
objectives, and I can assure you that the
Fund's managing director, for one, has
not been timid about making his views
known to the industrialized nations
whose policies govern the course and
strength of the recovery.

Thus, it is clear that the Fund has
become "a" and perhaps "the" key actor
in managing the debt crisis. Certainly in
handling this grave problem it provides
an invaluable tool which we would in all
probability have to create ourselves if
the Bretton Woods participants had not
had the foresight to do it for us.

Finally, if the performance under
the current e.xchange rate system is to
be improved, then we must have greater
convergence in economic performance
among major countries toward more
stable and noninflationary economic
growth in the interests not only of the
domestic economy but the international
economy. The Fund must have a central
role in this effort. In particular, we are
trying to strengthen the process of Fund
surveillance over all countries'
policies— not just those in debt to the
Fund. The Fund will certainly be cen-
trally involved in any future evolution of
the system.

The IBRD and Changing
Development Needs

Let me return now to Secretary
Morgenthau's statement. He went on to
say that: "We have taken the initial
steps through which the nations of the
world will be able to help one another in
economic development to their mutual
advantage and further enrichment of
all." He was talking, of course, about the
second Bretton Woods institution, the
International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD or World
Bank), whose primary objective would
be to provide or support long-term loans
for the reconstruction of Europe and the
development of low-income countries.
The IBRD, of course, was never in-
tended to supersede private investment
but to stimulate or supplement the
financing of specific projects that could
not be privately funded.

In the event, the magnitude of
postwar reconstruction turned out to be
beyond the resources of the IBRD. With
this job largely taken over by the Mar-
shall Plan, the Bank turned its attention
to the problems of the developing world.

Over the years the Bank has
responded to the changing needs of both
its borrowing and lending members. For
example, once focusing on capital in-
frastructure projects such as roads,
railways, and telecommunications, the
Bank now pays greater attention to
social infrastructure needs and to those
investments which directly affect the
population and serve to make them
more productive. Institutionally, too, the
IBRD has evolved to meet the man-
power training needs of borrowers. In

1955 the World Bank created the
Economic Development Institute to pro-
mote education and training. Then in

1956 the International Finance Corpora-
tion (IFC) was established to promote
growth in the private sector and to
mobilize domestic and foreign capital for
this purpose.

In 1960, specifically to meet the
development needs of the poorer bor-
rowers and to lend to them on terms
that would bear less heavily on their
balances of payments, the International
Development Association (IDA) was
established; the following year the IFC
articles were amended to allow that
agency to make equity investments.

To address the dynamic complexities
of an interdependent world economy,
the Boards of Governors of the World
Bank and the IMF established in 1974 a
Joint Ministerial Committee on the
Transfer of Real Resources to Develop-
ing Countries, better known as the
Development Committee. Today this
committee through task forces is pro-
viding a forum to examine both conces-
sional and nonconcessional flows to
developing nations and to look at the ef-
fective use of those resources. The com-
mittee is also the focus of informed
debate over the importance of trade to
growth in developing countries.

Confronted in the 1970s with an in-
ternational debt crisis, the World Bank
has already accomplished much to
alleviate development problems and to
assist its borrowing members to manage
their economies.

For example, since 1980, a
remarkably short time for a multilateral
institution, the World Bank has, among
other activities:

• Initiated the structural adjustment
loan to support programs in developing
countries for specific policy changes and
institutional reforms designed to achieve
a more efficient use of resources;

• Increased soft project lending;

• Developed and implemented a
special action program to provide finan-
cial measures and policy advice for coun
tries already pursuing appropriate
policies;

• Emphasized the needs of sub-
Saharan Africa — lending to sub-Saharan \}\
Africa was more than 30% of fiscal year
1981-83 lending; and

• Developed and implemented the
"B" Loan, designed to increase commer-
cial bank participation in less credit-
worthy nations.

Even with these and other recent
changes, however, the Bank recognizes
more may need to be done. Despite the
fact that the current international situa-
tion is improving, recovery is only slowly
coming to the Bank's less developed
members. The Bank is concerned that
the need for internal borrower reforms
together with unpredictable external
conditions beyond the control of bor-
rowers may make debt management and
continued development of borrowers
highly tentative.

Beyond considering additional
mechanisms to assist borrowers, the
Bank is reexamining its coordination
with the IMF. Bank use of structural ad
justment loans, increased nonproject
lending, and the longer term IMF in-
volvement with countries has blurred
the distinctions between its activities
and those of the IMF. Although there
always has been good coordination be-
tween the two institutions, their chang-
ing roles underline a need for
strengthening Bank-Fund coordination.

The Bank is working to meet these
challenges. Specifically, it is now con-
ducting a review of its current activities
their effectiveness, and possible future
actions. Management plans, I under-
stand, to present a coherent plan of ac-
tion on the future role of the Bank in
the spring of 1985. With the Bank's
history, I believe we can confidently e.\-
pect the Bank will continue to meet the
challenges presented by a dynamic worl
economy.

Conclusion

We are here celebrating the achievemei
of the drafters of the pathbreaking Bre
ton Woods agreements, which have con
stituted an essential foundation for
postwar economic cooperation. I have
reviewed some of the major ac-
complishments of these institutions,
which have been indispensable for the
enormous economic gains we have
achieved in the past four decades. I ha\
also mentioned some of the ways in

}

UROPE

liich these institutions are moving to
eet the critical challenges of today. We
list ensure that these institutions re-
nin as vital and effective in dealing
ith future problems as they have been
: tlie past. We must also rededicate
ill-selves to the task of building public
;i|i|H)rt for these institutions and their
iijrctives. For if they have been vital to

managing the expansion of the world
economy over the past 40 years, we can
be sure that they will be even more im-
perative in our increasingly interdepen-
dent world economy of the future. This,
more than anything else, is the tribute
we owe to the founders of Bretton
Woods. ■

J.S.-Soviet Bilateral Relations

RESIDENTS REMARKS,

JNE 27, 1984'

rs. Billington, Hamburg, Ellison, and
ihnson thank you for bringing your
stinguished group to the White House,
"hen I heard that you would be
eeting at the Smithsonian to discuss
.8. -Soviet exchanges, I was eager to
are my thoughts with you on this
Tiely and important topic.

First, I want to congratulate the
oodrow Wilson Center and the
irnegie Corporation of New York; cer-
inly nothing is more worthy of our at-
ntion than finding ways to reach out
id establish better communication with
e people and the Government of the
)viet tfnion.

For many months, I have encour-
■;ed the Soviet Union to join with us in
major effort to see if we could make
ogress in these broad problem areas:
ducing the threat and use of force in
Iving international disputes, reducing
jmamants in the world, and estab-
. hing a better working relationship
th each other.

At the United Nations, at the
,.panese Diet, at Georgetown Universi-
I , and at the Irish Parliament, I have
I plained our efforts to reduce arms,
; .rticularly nuclear arms, and to
I tablish a useful dialogue on regional
iiues. Let me describe to you some of
I e many efforts that we're making to
tablish a better working relationship
ith the Soviet Union.

We've informed the Soviet Govern-
ent that we're prepared to initiate
'gotiations on a new exchanges agree-
ent, and we've completed our prepara-
)ns for these negotiations. We've
oposed to resume preparations to
)en consulates in New York and Kiev.
e've taken steps to revive our
freements for cooperation in en-
ronmental protection, housing, health.

and agriculture. Activities under these
agreements have waned in recent years,
because there've been no meetings of
their joint committees to plan projects.
We've proposed that preparations begin
for such meetings in order to increase
the number of active projects.

We're in the process of renewing
several bilateral agreements that other-
wise would have expired this year. And
we've agreed to extend our fishing
agreement for 18 months, and we're
looking at possibilities to increase
cooperation under the terms of the
agreement.

We've proposed that our Agreement
to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and
Technical Cooperation be renewed for
another 10 years and that preparations
begin for a meeting of our Joint Com-
mercial Commission.

The U.S. Navy delegation held talks
last month with their Soviet counter-
parts in accord with our agreement on
avoiding incidents at sea. And we've
agreed to extend this useful agreement
for another 3 years.

We're reviewing the World Oceans
Agreement, which has been useful in
promoting joint oceanographic research,
and we'll give careful thought to renew-
ing the agreement prior to its expira-
tion. And we've made proposals in
several other areas to improve dialogue,
foster cooperation, and solve problems.

We've proposed a fair and equitable
resolution of our differences on the
maritime boundary off Alaska. We've
proposed a joint simulated space rescue
mission in which astronauts and
cosmonauts would carry out a combined
exercise in space to develop techniques
to rescue people from malfunctions in
space vehicles. And we're currently con-
ducting another round of talks on con-
sular matters, trying to improve visa
procedures and facilitate travel between
our two countries.

We've suggested discussions be-
tween the U.S. Coast Guard and the
Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on

search and rescue procedures to assist
citizens of all countries lost at sea. And
we've made progress in our talks on
upgrading the Hot Line, proposing dis-
cussions on potential nuclear terrorist
incidents, on establishing a joint military
communications line, and on upgrading
embassy communications in both coun-
tries. We've also suggested regular high-
level contacts between military person-
nel of our two countries.

So, as you can see, we've offered
comprehensive and sensible proposals to
improve the U.S. -Soviet dialogue and
our working relationship. And if the
Soviets decide to join us, new avenues
would open, I think, for your efforts.

It's still too early to judge the
results. A few proposals are near agree-
ment. Many others are still under
discussion, and some have been re-
jected — at least for now.

Meaningful contact with a closed
society will never be easy. And I'm as
disturbed as you are by recent reports of
new measures taken by Soviet
authorities to restrict contacts between
Soviet citizens and foreigners. These
restrictions come on top of intensified
repression of those brave Soviet citizens
who've dared to express views contrary
to those of the Soviet political elite.

The people of the Soviet Union pay
a heavy price for the actions of their
government. In fact, we all pay a price.
When the Soviet Government takes
repressive actions against its people and
attempts to seal them off from the out-
side world, their own intellectual and
cultural life suffers. At the same time,
the rest of the world is deprived of the
cultural riches of the Soviet people.
What would classical music be without a
Tchaikovsky or literature without a
Tolstoi or chemistry without a
Mendeleev.

Civilized people everywhere have a
stake in keeping contacts, communica-
tion, and creativity as broad, deep, and
free as possible. The Soviet insistence on
sealing their people off and on filtering
and controlling contacts and the flow of
information remains the central prob-
lem.

When Soviet actions threaten the
peace or violate a solemn agreement or
trample on standards fundamental to a
civilized world, we cannot and will not
be silent. To do so would betray our
deepest values. It would violate our con-
science and ultimately undermine world
stability and our ability to keep the
peace. We must have ways short of
military threats that make it absolutely
clear that Soviet actions do matter and

EUROPE

that some actions inevitably affect the
quality of the relationship.

These reactions do lead to a
decrease in contacts with the people of
the Soviet Union, and this is a dilemma.
However, our quarrel is not with the
Russian people, with the Ukrainian peo-
ple, or any of the other proud na-
tionalities in that multinational state. So,
we must be careful in reacting to actions
by the Soviet Government not to take
out our indignations on those not
responsible. And that's why I feel that
we should broaden opportunities for
Americans and Soviet citizens to get to
know each other better.

But our proposals to do that are not
a signal that we have forgotten
Afghanistan. We'll continue to
demonstrate our sympathy and strong
support for the Afghan people. The
United States will support their struggle
to end the Soviet occupation and to
reestablish an independent and neutral
Afghanistan.

Nor do our proposals mean that we
will ignore violations of the Helsinki
Final Act or plight of Andrei Sakharov,
Yelena Bonner, Anatoli Shcharanskiy,
Yuriy Orlov, and so many others. The
persecution of these courageous, noble
people weighs very heavily on our
hearts. It would be wrong to believe that
their treatment and their fate will not
affect our ability to increase cooperation
It will, because our conscience and that
of the American people and freedom-

loving people everywhere will have it no
other way.

I know these thoughts do not
resolve the dilemma we face. But it is a
dilemma for all of us. And I'll value your
advice.

I don't think there's anything we're
encouraging the Soviet leaders to do
that is not as much in their interest as it
is in ours. If they're as committed to
peace as they say, they should join us
and work with us. If they sincerely want
to reduce arms, there's no excuse for
refusing to talk, and if they sincerely
want to deal with us as equals, they
shouldn't try to avoid a frank discussion
of real problems.

Some say for the Soviet leaders
peace is not the real issue; rather, the
issue is the attempt to spread their
dominance by using military power as a
means of intimidation, and there is much
evidence to support this view. But it
should be clear by now that such a
strategy will not work. And once they
realize this, maybe they'll understand
they have much to gain by improving
dialogue, reducing arms, and solving
problems.

The way governments can best pro-
mote contacts among people is by not
standing in the way. Our Administration
will do all we can to stay out of the way
and to persuade the Soviet Government
to do likewise. We know this won't hap-
pen overnight, but if we're to succeed.

U.S.-Soviet Consular Agreement

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
AUG. 1, 1984'

On August 1, 1984, representatives of
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the
Consular Division of the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs exchanged diplomatic
notes concluding the latest round of the
U.S.-Soviet consular review talks. The
agreement brings to fruition a series of
discussions on consular matters con-
ducted in 1976, 1979, 1983, and 1984
and resolves a number of issues to visas
and the functioning of the diplomatic
missions of the two countries.

The issues involved were essentially
technical ones, to be resolved on the
basis of mutual benefit. The agreement
will facilitate the travel of participants
in educational exchange programs, ex-
pedite the issuance of certain categories
of visas, and improve conditions for the
travel of diplomats in the two countries

by allowing them to enter and leave
through two additional cities beyond the
three currently provided for.

The talks were proposed by us as
part of the President's effort to expand
contacts and to move forward on
bilateral issues that can be resolved to
our mutual benefit, as he mentioned in
his June 27 remarks on U.S.-Soviet ex-
changes, and it seemed to us that the
Soviet side approached them in the same
spirit.

The U.S. delegation was led by
Raymond F. Smith, officer-in-charge of
the Bilateral Relations Section of the
Department of State's Office of Soviet
Union Affairs. The Soviet delegation
was headed by Ivan Gorokhov, Deputy
Chief of the Consular Administration of
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affait-s.

you must stay involved and get more
Americans into wider and more mean-
ingful contact with many more Soviet
citizens.

It may seem an impossible dream to
think there could be a time when
Americans and Soviet citizens of all
walks of life travel freely back and
forth, visit each other's homes, look up
friends and professional colleagues,
work together in all sorts of problems,
and, if they feel like it, sit up all night
talking about the meaning of life and the
different ways to look at the world.

In most countries of the world, peo-
ple take those contacts for granted. We
should never accept the idea that
American and Soviet citizens cannot en-
joy the same contacts and communica-
tion. I don't believe it's an impossible
dream, and I don't think you believe
that, either.

Let me just conclude by saying
thank you, and God bless you for what
you're doing.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET,
JUNE 27, 19842

In his speech today to participants in th
Smithsonian's Conference on U.S. -Soviet
Exchanges, the President refers to
several proposals we have made to
establish a better working relationship
with the Soviet Union.

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

New Exchanges Agreement

We have been discussing a new Genera
Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges an
Cooperation and will present a draft to
the Soviets for formal negotiations in
the very near future. The previous
agreement, often referred to as the
"Cultural Agreement," lapsed in 1979.
was one of a series of 2-year agreemer
going back to 1958. Our new draft
would provide for resumption of officii
support for inter alia exchanges of m£i
jor exhibits, academic, cultural, and
sports individuals and groups and reac
tivation of film presentations. The
American team in the formal negotia-
tions will be headed by Ambassador
Arthur Hartman in Moscow.

New Consulates General

In 1974 the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed to establish new
Consulates General in Kiev and New
York City. We already have a Consult
General in Leningrad and the Soviets
have one in San Francisco. Following

[.r;

1(1

t3|

EUROPE

he Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979, the U.S. Government suspended
;he agreement for new Consulates
jeneral. At the time of the suspension,
ve had an advance team in Kiev for
learly 2 years and were approximately 6
nonths away from officially opening the
onsulate. The Soviets had a similar
«am in New York. Both advance teams
vere withdrawn. Since that time, we
lave discussed the Consulates issue on
lumerous occasions, focusing over the
)ast year on concrete steps that could be
aken to pave the way for opening these
consulates. We have recently proposed
io move forward and suggested we send
L team to Kiev to inspect available prop-
irty.

Environmental Protection Agreement

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on
ooperation in Environmental Protec-
;ion was signed at Moscow on May 23,
L972, by President Nixon and Chairman
■'odgorny. The agreement has been
enewed three times for 5-year periods
ind is due to expire May 23, 1987. Ac-
ivities under the agreement have in-
cluded seminars, joint publications, ex-
■hange visits, and joint projects in
'leveral topics including protecting en-
iangered species, modeling of long-
•ange air pollution, and earthquake
)rediction. EPA Administrator William
). Ruckelshaus has assumed the U.S.
o-chairmanship of the Joint En-
vironmental Committee and will seek to
ise this forum as a means to rein-
igorate the agreement. Mr.
luckelshaus is currently representing
he United States at the multilateral
Conference on the Environment in
/lunich, where he has discussed the
tgreement with Soviet officials.

Housing

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on
Cooperation in Housing and Other Con-
;truction was signed by President Nixon
md Chairman Kosygin on June 28,
.974, in Moscow. We decided in
December 1983 to renew the agreement
or a third 5-year period effective June
18, 1984. Besides exchange visits and
seminars, the agreement has supported
oint projects in construction techniques
n extreme climates and unusual
ideological conditions, sewage treatment
n a permafrost environment, and fire
3revention in the design of construction
jnaterials. The President's decision to
jxpand the activities under the agree-
Tient will lead to the convening of the
Krst Joint Housing Committee meeting

since 1978 and to an increase in the
already extensive private sector involve-
ment in joint projects. Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development
Samuel Pierce, Jr., will lead our efforts
under this agreement.

Health

The United States and the Soviet Union
entered into cooperation in the health
area through two agreements signed in
the early 1970s: the Agreement on
Cooperation in the Medical Sciences and
Public Health (signed May 23, 1972, at
Moscow by Secretary of State Rogers
and Minister of Health Petrovsky) and
the Agreement on Cooperation in Ar-
tificial Heart Research and Development
(signed at Moscow June 28, 1974, by
Secretary of State Kissinger and
Foreign Minister Gromyko). The Health
Agreement has been extended until May
23, 1987, while the Artificial Heart
Agreement will run until June 28, 1987.
The President has directed that steps be
taken in the near future to strengthen
cooperation under these agreements
through a renewal of high-level visits,
joint committee meetings, and the initia-
tion of new projects and possibly new
agreements. The timing for such steps
has not yet been set. The agreements
have provided for joint research inter
alia on laser treatment of glaucoma,
congenital heart disease, mechanically
assisted circulation in artificial hearts,
and cancer treatment and prevention.

Agriculture

Signed at Washington June 19, 1973, by
Secretary of Agriculture Butz and
Foreign Minister Gromyko, the
Agriculture Agreement has been extend-
ed three times and will not expire until
June 19, 1988. The Department of
Agriculture will now reactivate the
agreement (which has been dormant the
past several years) through a joint com-
mittee meeting, high-level visits, and ini-
tiation of new projects. Earlier the
agreement has supported plant, animal,
and soil science research (germ plasm
studies) and exchange of grain-related
economic information. Exchange visits,
especially those involving the private
sector, had been particularly active. All
of these programs will be rein vigor ated.

Fishing Agreement

In April, the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed to extend the ex-
isting fisheries agreement for 18 months
(as opposed to the two previous
12-month extensions). Final approval is
currently pending before Congress. The

Fisheries Agreement was initially signed
in November 1976. The Soviet Union
does not, however, have a directed
fishing allocation. After the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, the United States
terminated allocations to the U.S.S.R. to
fish within our 200-mile zone. (The
Soviet Union had been receiving a direct
allocation of between 400,000 and
500,000 MT a year). Soviet processing at
sea of fish caught by U.S. fisherman as
part of an existing joint venture was
allowed to continue since it benefited
U.S. fishermen. The United States is
currently reviewing the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
fishing relationship to determine
whether mutually beneficial steps can be
taken to increase cooperation.

Long-Term Cooperation Agreement

The United States has proposed to ex-
tend for 10 years the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Agreement to Facilitate Economic, In-
dustrial and Technical Cooperation. The
agreement was signed by Presidents
Nixon and Brezhnev during the 1974
Moscow summit. It is scheduled to ex-
pire June 28, 1984. The principal provi-
sions of the agreement call upon the
parties to use their good offices to
facilitate cooperation in economic, in-
dustrial, and technical areas. In practice,
the agreement has been exclusively
economic and has facilitated certain
business dealings between the two coun-
tries. If the agreement is extended, our
exception is that there will be a meeting
of the Working Group of Experts under
Article III to examine prospects for
trade. If that meeting is successful, then
a Joint Commercial Commission meeting
will be held when practical.

U.S. -Soviet Incidents at Sea
Agreement (INCSEA)

The 1972 U.S. -Soviet Agreement on the
Prevention of Incidents at Sea estab-
lished certain "rules of the road" to
govern special situations involving naval
surface vessels and aircraft of the two
nations. It also set up agreed-upon,
navy-to-navy channels for the prompt
resolution of any problems arising under
this agreement. Senior officers of the
U.S. and Soviet Navies meet on an an-
nual basis for a general review of the
implementation of the agreement and
discussion of ways in which it might be
strengthened. The most recent review
took place in Moscow in late May. At
that time, the U.S. and Soviet sides
agreed to a renewal of the INCSEA
agreement for another 3 years.

EUROPE

World Oceans Agreement

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. World Oceans Agree-
ment was signed in 1973 and renewed
for 3 years in 1981. It has been useful in
promoting joint oceanographic research
and has involved seminars, exchange
visits, and joint ocean research cruises.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration has taken the U.S. lead on
this agreement. The agreement comes
up for renewal in December.

Maritime Boundary

The United States and the Soviet Union
have a difference relating to the precise
cartographic depiction and location of
the boundary line established by the
1867 convention ceding Alaska. The dif-
ference relates to the fact that the
United States depicts the 1867 conven-
tion line as the maritime boundary by
arcs of great circles, while the Soviet
Union depicts the convention line by
rhumb lines. We have proposed a fair
and equitable resolution to the issue.
Three rounds of technical level discus-
sions have been held and a fourth round
is expected soon.

Space Rescue Mission

The U.S. proposal envisages cooperation
between NASA and Soviet space of-
ficials on a joint simulated space rescue
mission. A space shuttle would rendez-
vous with the Soviet space station to
practice procedures that might be
necessary to rescue each other's person-
nel. Details of the proposal would have
to be worked out.

Consular Review Talks

The session of U.S. -Soviet consular
review talks currently underway in
Moscow is the latest round of a series of
discussions which began in 1976, when
representatives of the United States and
the Soviet Union met to attempt to
resolve a number of consular issues
outstanding between the two countries.
Those issues primarily involved visa
questions and administrative matters
relating to the functioning of our
diplomatic missions. The discussions
have taken place in Moscow in 1976 and
in Washington in 1979 and 1983.

Search and Rescue Talks

In October 1981, the U.S. Coast Guard
was authorized to take the initiative to
open direct lines of emergency com-
munications with the Soviet maritime

rescue authorities in the Pacific. As a
result of subsequent exchanges in June
1983, agreement was reached to hold a
working-level meeting on a broad range
of search and rescue topics. This
meeting was scheduled for early
December 1983, but was postponed at
the request of the Soviet side. We have
proposed rescheduling this meeting.

U.S. -Soviet Communications
Improvements Talks

On the basis of the President's proposals
of May 1983, a U.S. team has met with
Soviet counterparts three times to
discuss possible means by which
U.S. -Soviet communications — for use in
both times of crisis and calm — might be
strengthened. The most recent meeting
was in Moscow in late April. On the
basis of those talks, significant progress
has been made in working out agree-
ment with the Soviets on the desirability
of upgrading the existing direct com-
munications link (the Hot Line) with
secure facsimile transmission
capabilities, which would increase the
speed, reliability, and versatility of that
system. We expect another meeting
shortly. Additionally, the United States
has put forward proposals to upgrade
the communications capabilities of the
U.S. and Soviet Embassies in each
other's countries, to establish a joint
military communications link to handle
the exchange of time-sensitive technical
data, and to facilitate consultations in
the event of a nuclear terrorist threat or
incident.

U.S. -Soviet Military Contact

With the exception of the special navy-
to-navy talks under the 1972 INCSEA
agreement, there has been no channel
for high-level military exchange between
the United States and Soviet Union out-
side of specifically arms control-related
talks since the one-time meeting of the
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff with their
Soviet counterparts during the 1979
Vienna summit. Earlier this year, the
President suggested to the Soviet
leadership the desirability of exploring
the possibility of regularizing some form
of contact and discussion between those
responsible for defense matters on both
sides for the purpose of increasing
mutual understanding and minimizing
the potential for misinterpretation and
miscalculation.

Human Rights Cases

Andrei Sakharov. Dr. Andrei Sakharov,
a physicist and Academy of Sciences
member who played a major role in the
development of the Soviet hydrogen
bomb, has spoken, out at length in
defense of human rights in the Soviet
Union. In 197.5 he was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize for those efforts.
Since 1980 he has been required to live
in internal exile in the closed city of
Gorky. In early May he began a hunger
strike to obtain permission for his wife,
Yelena Bonner, to travel abroad for
necessary medical treatment; there has
been no confirmed information of any
sort on his health or his status since that
time.

Yelena Bonner. A doctor by train-
ing, Yelena Bonner is the wife of Dr.
Sakharov and was a founding member
of the Moscow Helsinki Group. She has
served as his main channel of com-
munications to the outside world during
his exile in Gorky. She is also believed to
have begun a hunger strike in early May
to obtain permission to travel abroad for
vital medical treatment; she suffers
from both a heart condition and serious
eye problems.

Yuriy Orlov. A founder and leader
of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Yuriy
Orlov was long active on behalf of
human rights in the Soviet Union. He
was a founding member of the Moscow
chapter of Amnesty International and a
participant is unofficial scientific
seminars organized for refusenik scien-
tists. He was arrested in February 1977
and convicted in May 1978 of "anti-
Soviet agitation and propaganda."
Earlier this year he completed 7 years ir
a strict-regime labor camp and began 5
years of internal exile.

Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Anatoliy
Shcharanskiy is a long-time activist on
behalf of human rights and Jewish
culture in the Soviet Union. A founding
member of the Moscow Helsinki Group,
Shcharanskiy was also a leader of the
Jewish emigration movement and a
liaison between Western newsmen and
Soviet dissidents. In March 1977 he was
arrested and in July 1978 was convicteo
of "anti-Soviet agitation and
propaganda" and "treason." He is cur-
rently in Chistopol Prison; his wife,
Avital, lives in Israel.

'Made in the East Room at the White
House to participants in the Smithsonian In-
stitution's Conference on U.S. -Soviet Ex-
changes (te.xt from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 2, 1984).

^Text from White House press release. I

m
•m

usi-

EUROPE

J.S.-Soviet Union Expand
'Hot Line" Agreement

•RESIDENTS STATEMENT,
ULY 17, 19841

am happy to be able to announce today
hat we and the Soviet Union have
cached agreement to expand and im-
irove the operation of the direct com-
lunications link, or the "Hot Line."

This agreement is a modest but
iositive step toward enhancing interna-
ional stability and reducing the risk
hat accident, miscalculation, or
lisinterpretation could lead to confron-
ation or conflict between the United
■tates and the Soviet Union.

With the addition of a facsimile
apability, we will not only be able to ex-
hange messages faster, but for the first
me we will be able to send graphic
laterial such as maps or pictures which
'ould play a crucial role in helping to
esolve certain types of crises or
.lisunderstandings.

The negotiations which led to this
greement began about 1 year ago
August 1983), based upon a series of
roposals that we first made in May
983.

In developing this and other ini-
atives designed to reduce the risk of
ar due to accident, misunderstandings,
r miscalculation, v/e had the benefit of
:<cellent advice from a number of key
! jngressional leaders, including
enators Warner and Nunn and the late
enator Jackson.

I see this agreement as both an ap-
ropriate technical improvement to the
iot Line," which has served both our
overnments well for over 20 years, and
1 3 a good example of how we can, work-
ig together, find approaches which can
lOve us toward a reduction in the risks
f war.

?HITE HOUSE FACT SHEET,

ULY 17, 1984'

he United States and the Soviet Union
)day formally agreed to add a facsimile
•ansmission capability to the direct
jmmunications link (DCL), commonly
nown as the "Hot Line." This step— the
jcond major technical improvement to
le "Hot Line" since it was established
1 1963— will enhance the capability of
le system and thus its potential to help
esolve crises and avert misunderstand-

The agreement was initiated at the
State Department this morning by Act-
ing Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam
and Soviet Charge Victor F. Isakov.
Chairman of the U.S. delegation in the
talks on communications improvements
was Mr. Warren Zimmerman of the
State Department, who was until recent-
ly Deputy Chief of Mission of our Em-
bassy in Moscow. The Deputy Chairman
for the United States was Mr. Stuart
Branch who has been Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Communications.
The U.S. delegation included other of-
ficials of the State Department, the
Defense Department, and the National
Security Council staff. The Soviet
delegation was headed by Mr. A. M.
Varbanskiy, a Chief of Administration in
the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Communica-
tions. Other members of the delegation
included officials of the Communications
Ministry and the Foreign Ministry.

The addition of facsimile transmis-
sion capability to the "Hot Line" will
enable the U.S. and Soviet heads of
government to exchange messages far
more rapidly than they can with the ex-
isting teletype system. In addition, they
will be able for the first time to send
graphic material over the DCL. The
precise, detailed, and often easily inter-
preted information offered by such
graphic material as maps, charts, and
drawings could be essential to help
resolve a crisis or misunderstanding.

Prior Negotiating History

In June 1963, the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed in a memorandum
of understanding to establish a direct
communications link for use in time of
emergency. Each agreed to ensure
prompt delivery to its head of govern-
ment of any communications received
over the DCL from the other head of
government. The memorandum of
understanding was negotiated and sign-
ed by the heads of the U.S. and Soviet
delegations to the 18-nation Disarma-
ment Conference in Geneva. The DCL
was activated in August 1963.

Eight years later, the DCL was up-
dated by a September 30, 1971, agree-
ment negotiated by a special working
group of the two SALT [strategic arms
limitation talks] delegations and signed
by the U.S. Secretary of State and the
Soviet Foreign Minister. This agreement
provided for the addition of two satellite

circuits to the DCL, one using the Soviet
Molniya II satellite system and the other
the U.S. INTELSAT system. Those two
circuits became operational in January
1978.

A second special working group of
the two SALT delegations simultaneous-
ly negotiated a related Agreement on
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Out-
break of Nuclear War between the
United States and the U.S.S.R., which
was signed on the same day, September
30, 1971. This agreement provided for
each party to notify the other in advance
of any planned missile launch extending
beyond its national territory in the direc-
tion of the other and for each to notify
the other immediately in the event of
certain situations which could create a
risk of nuclear war. The parties agreed
that they would use the DCL to transmit
urgent information in situations requir-
ing prompt clarification.

The Reagan Proposals

In May 1983, President Reagan pro-
posed to the Soviet Union three
measures to improve the bilateral com-
munications network between the two
countries: the addition of a high-speed
facsimile capability to the "Hot Line;"
the establishment of a joint military
communications link (JMCL); and the
establishment of high-speed data links
between each government and its Em-
bassy in the other's capital.

The Secretary of Defense had
recommended those proposals to the
President following a full and complete
study of possible initiatives for enhanc-
ing international stability and reducing
the risk of nuclear war. That examina-
tion, which involved all concerned U.S.
Government agencies, was mandated by
the Congress in the Department of
Defense Authorization Act of 1983. The
Secretary of Defense transmitted its
results and recommendations in his
April 1983 Report to the Congress on
Direct Communications Links and Other
Measures to Enhance Stability.

U.S. -Soviet negotiations on improv-
ing bilateral communications links
opened in Moscow in August 1983. Sub-
sequent rounds have been held in
Washington in January 1984, in Moscow
in April 1984, and the one just com-
pleted in Washington in July 1984.
Those discussions have now resulted in a
U.S. -Soviet accord to add a facsimile
transmission capability to the direct
communications link.

FOOD

DCL System

The direct communications link will now
consist of:

• Three circuits (two satellite cir-
cuits plus one wire telegraph circuit);

• One Earth station in each country
for each satellite circuit; and

• Terminals in each country linked
to the three circuits and equipped with
teletype and facsimile equipment.

In keeping with the principle of con-
fidentiality concerning communications
between heads of government, the
precise number of times that the heads
of state have used the system has not
been discovered. We do know that it has
proved invaluable in major crises. U.S.
Presidents have cited its use during the
1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.

'Text from White House press release.

19th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
JULY 9, 1984'

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am
submitting herewith a bimonthly report on
progress toward a negotiated settlement of
the Cyprus question.

Since my last report to you there have
been several developments in the Cyprus
question worthy of note. On April 17 the self-
declared Turkish Cypriot "state" announced
the formal exchange of ambassadors with the
Government of Turkey. We strongly opposed
this development and declared publicly our
concern that it could set back the U.N.
Secretary General's efforts in the search for
progress. We also repeated our opposition to
any diplomatic recognition of the self-
declared entity.

On May 8 I informed the Congress that
the Administration intended to request
authorization for a "Cyprus Peace and
Reconstruction Fund" of up to $250 million to
be utilized on Cyprus at such time as a fair
and equitable solution acceptable to both
Cypriot communities is reached, or when
substantial progress is made toward that
goal. I intend this commitment to be a sym-
bol of the shared concern of the Administra-
tion and the Congress for promoting genuine
progress on Cyprus. I was pleased that a
committee of the House of Representatives
has Included this fund in an authorization bill
it is considering.

On May 11 the United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution 550 which con-
demned the Turkish Cypriot community for
several actions it had taken. We found it
necessary to abstain on the resolution, believ-
ing its language unlikely to contribute to the
goal of a negotiated settlement. We
reiterated to the Council our continuing op-
position to the Turkish Cypriot community's
declaration of statehood and our determina-
tion to see progress made under the aegis of
the Secretary General. Following passage of
that resolution Secretary Shultz's Special

Cyprus Coordinator, Richard Haass, and
other Administration officials undertook in-
tensive consultations with both Cypriot par-
ties, with U.N. officials and others on the
potential for progress on the question.

On June 15 the Security Council met
again on Cyprus, this time to renew,
unanimously, its mandate for U.N.
peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
The resolution approved on that date is iden-
tical in text to the previous renewal in
December, 198:3. Following the vote the
Turkish Cypriot representative told the Coun-
cil his community could not accept the resolu-
tion but would continue its cooperation with
the U.N. forces on the same basis as that an-
nounced by the Turkish Cypriots in
December, 1983. We view this continuation
of the vital U.N. peacekeeping mandate as a
positive sign that the parties to the Cyprus
question do intend to continue the search for
a solution. I am enclosing a copy of the
Secretary General's report to the Council on
UNFICYP activities.

At the time of the June Security Council
vote the Turkish Cypriot side pledged to
maintain the unoccupied status of the city of
Varosha and presented to the Secretary
General its latest ideas on possible next steps
toward a solution. We welcomed the Varosha
announcement and hope the ideas presented,
as well as the comprehensive framework
presented previously by the Government of
Cyprus, can assist the Secretary General as
he resumes efforts under his good offices
mandate.
Sincerely,

Ronald Rkagan

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Coni-
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 16. 1984). ■

Food for Peace
Day, 1984

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS,
JULY 10. 1984'

Thirty years ago today— and you've
probably been told this several
times— President Dwight D. Eisenhower
signed into law Public Law 480, the
Food for Peace program. And 10 years
before the signing ceremony which took
place here at the White House, Presi-
dent Eisenhower launched the Norman-
dy invasion. And only the year before
the signing ceremony, he was first
sworn in as President. It's possible that
on July 10, 1954, Ike thought most of
his great moments were behind him. But
that was not so, as this program proves,
for in time it grew to become one of the
greatest humanitarian acts ever per-
formed by one nation for the needy of
other nations.

I'm delighted to welcome here today
Ike's Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra
Taft Benson, who was present when the
Food for Peace bill was signed.
Welcome. Glad to have you here.

Food for Peace is still the largest
food aid program in the world. Over the
last 30 years, it's delivered almost 653
billion pounds of food to people in over
100 countries. It's helped bring hope and
new economic opportunity to more than
1.8 billion people. Statistics are, by their
nature, dry, but bear with me for a mo-
ment as I give you just a few more —
with the hope that they haven't been
given to you already.

Food for peace has delivered 27,000
tons of food a day to recipient countries
for three decades now. And the value of
those U.S. farm products exceeds $33
billion— more than $3 million a day over
the history of the program.

All of those numbers give us a sense
of the scope and the magnitude of this
program. But its great contribution is
that it's an instrument of American com
passion. And it also reflects America's
practicality. We recognized 30 years age
that people who are hungry are weak
allies for freedom. And we recognized,
too, that except in emergencies, hand-
outs don't help. From the beginning,
recipient countries paid for a significant
part of the food they received.

The businesslike approach is one of
the strengths of this program. We've
never attempted to make countries

iir
B

FOOD

hich receive our food become depend-
it on our aid. In fact, we've used our
d to foster economic development
ound the world. And that is an impor-
nt reason why, over the years, many
the nations that have received our aid
ive eventually become major commer-
il partners.

«In the early days of Food for Peace,
e major recipient nations were the
ar-devastated economies of Europe:
aly and Spain, West Germany and
ipan. And with time and with the help

Food for Peace, those economies
igained their strength. They began to
ly cash for American farm com-
odities. Many of these countries have
jcome our top commercial partners,
ight of our top 10 agricultural markets
■e former recipients of Food for Peace
d. And Japan is now our number one
jricultural market on a cash basis. And
lat has not only been good for the
merican farmer and the American
;onomy; it's been good for our interna-
Dnal relations.

Food for Peace has been very impor-
,nt in spreading good will and generosi-

throughout the world. When droughts
id flooding from the El Nimo weather
isturbances destroyed food crops in
eru, Bolivia, and other Latin American
mntries last year, Food for Peace took
16 lead in providing emergency relief,
uring the 1966 famine in India,
ughly 60 million people are estimated

have been sustained for 2 years by
ood for Peace shipments.

Today we face a severe and wide-
)read famine in Africa, which is
ireatening the lives of millions. And,
ice again. Food for Peace is saving
/es. We've already agreed to provide
fer $400 million for food assistance for
frica in this year alone. And I want to
inounce today a major initiative to help
i le starving people of Africa and the
, orld. It's a new program to help us
! jliver food more quickly and smoothly
) those who suffer the most from the
wages of famine.

I will shortly propose legislation to
■eate a $50 million Presidential fund
lowing us to set aside existing foreign
d resources to meet emergency food
d needs. By prepositioning food stocks
v-erseas where the requirements are the
reatest, we can respond to emergency
tuations more rapidly and effectively. I
■ill also propose authority to allow the
ood for Peace program to reduce the
urden of transportation costs on the

most needy countries. And all this is
aimed at reducing the loss of life to
acute hunger in the Third World.

Food for Peace has come to embody
the spirit of American voluntarism. The
Federal Government has developed a
strong partnership with the private sec-
tor to help feed malnourished infants
and children, to help mothers and the
aged and the disabled. This cooperative
effort with private and voluntary
organizations includes such agencies as
CARE and Catholic Relief Services, and
many qther groups are helping also.

In short, the Food for Peace pro-
gram has become a wonderful means by
which a nation of abundance has helped
those in need. It's helped us expand
agricultural markets, get needy allies
back on their feet, and help potential
allies become strong allies for freedom.
Food for Peace has helped to coordinate
the charitable impulses of the private
sector. It's helped feed the weakest peo-
ple in the world.

And this record of progress is the
result of what happened 30 years ago to-
day, when Dwight Eisenhower picked up
a pen and signed a piece of paper that
quietly— and, with no great attention
from the wise, he changed the world. I
think Dwight D. Eisenhower would be
very proud of what the Food for Peace
program has accomplished. I certainly
am, and I'm proud to be able to mark
with you its anniversary today.

May Food for Peace continue its
great work; may it continue to be ad-
ministered wisely; and may we continue
to combat hunger and malnutrition
throughout the world.

I thank you all again for being here,
and God bless you.

And, now, I'll sign this proclamation
which designates today, July 10, 1984,
as Food for Peace Day.

PROCLAMATION 5220,
JULY 10, 19842

July 10, 1984, is the thirtieth anniversary of
the signing of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954
(Public Law 480). This legislation, signed by
President Eisenhower, began the largest food
assistance program ever undertaken by one
country on behalf of needy people throughout
the world, the Food for Peace program.

The productivity and abundance of U.S.
agriculture have made this generosity possi-
ble. During the thirty years of this program,
more than 300 million tons of agricultural
commodities and products valued at approx-
imately $34 billion have been distributed to
over 150 countries. This food has helped
reduce world hunger and improve nutritional
standards.

The Food for Peace program has served
as an example for other countries which have
joined the United States in the effort to pro-
vide food aid to needy people. It has served
as a model for others to follow and continue
to meet changing needs and situations.

The Food for Peace program has ac-
complished multiple objectives to combat
hunger and malnutrition abroad, to expand
export markets for U.S. agriculture to en-
courage economic advancement in developing
countries, and to promote in other ways the
foreign policy of the United States.

In recognition of the accomplishments of
this program, the Congress, by Senate Joint
Resolution 306, has designated July 10, 1984
as "Food for Peace Day" and has authorized
and requested the President to issue a proc-
lamation in observance of that day.

Now. Therefore, I, Ronalii Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim July 10, 1984, as Food
for Peace Day, and I call upon the people of
the United States to commemorate this occa-
sion with appropriate ceremonies and ac-
tivities.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set
my hand this 10th day of July, in the year of
our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four,
and of the Independence of the United States
of America the two hundred and ninth.

Ronald Reagan

'Made at the signing ceremony in the
East Room of the White House (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of July 16, 1984).

^Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 16. ■

HUMAN RIGHTS

Extending Voluntary Departure
for El Salvadorans

by Elliott Ahrams

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Rules of the House Committee on
Rules on June 20. 19Si. Mr. Ahrams is
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs. '

I am grateful for this opportunity to ap-
pear before you today. As every member
of the subcommittee knows, and indeed
as every American must by now be well
aware, El Salvador is a country troubled
by poverty, violence, overpopulation,
and a history of oppression. For a
number of years, Salvadorans have
looked for economic opportunity
elsewhere. Prior to the war between El
Salvador and Honduras in 1969, a large
number were living in Honduras.
Through the 197()s and early 1980s, hun-
dreds of thousands of Salvadorans have
come to the United States. The in-
creased violence in El Salvador
prevalent since 1980 no doubt increased
the incentives to leave the country, as
have the economic difficulties which the
war has only worsened.

The United States is thus confronted
with a number of significant immigra-
tion issues regarding El Salvador. It is
difficult for Salvadorans to get visitors'
visas to the United States and difficult
for them to get immigrant visas as well.
We face a very significant amount of il-
legal immigration from El Salvador, and
a large quantity of asylum applications.
How do we deal with the asylum applica-
tions? To those not entitled to asylum,
how do we respond to their desire to live
in the United States?

Asylum Policies

The asylum issue is in a sense an easy
one. U.S. law, in incorporating the
definition of a refugee contained in the
Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, set forth the stand-
ards by which an asylum application
must be judged. We apply these stand-
ards and a limited number of aliens, ir-
respective of their nationality, can meet
them. This is true of asylum applicants
from El Salvador. This has occasioned
much criticism of the Administration's
asylum policy toward El Salvador, but in
fact we have no "asylum policy" toward
El Salvador or any other country; we
apply the same standards to each. In the
last few months recommendations for

the approval of applications from
Salvadorans and Nicaraguans have been
running at roughly the same rate; and
though, of course, there are variations
for both countries, about 10% of applica-
tions can meet legal standards. This
reflects no policy decision, nor does it
reflect the state of our bilateral relations
with either government; it simply re-
flects the fact that asylum applicants
must meet the legal standards in order
to be granted asylum. We are well
aware that much criticism could be end-
ed were the number of Salvadoran
asylum applications that are approved
higher. But, to approve asylum applica-
tions for partisan political reasons would
ignore the law. We recommend in favor
of applications that meet the standards
and against those that do not.

Deportation Considerations

The argument is then made that all
Salvadorans, even those who do not
qualify for asylum, should not be
deported to El Salvador but rather
allowed to remain here. As you know,
the Administration does not concur with
this view. All suspension of deportation
decisions require a balancing of
judgments about their foreign policy,
humanitarian, and immigration policy
implications.

In the case of El Salvador, the im-
migration policy implications of suspen-
sion of deportation are enormous. Here
we have a country with a history of
large-scale illegal immigration to the
United States. Can anyone doubt that a
suspension of deportation would increase
the amount of illegal immigration from
El Salvador to the United States? An in-
telligent and industrious Salvadoran
weighing a decision to try illegal im-
migration to the United States knows
that one of the risks is deportation,
which might occur before he has had a
chance to earn back the costs of the
journey. If we remove that possibility of
deportation, it is simple logic to suggest
that illegal entry becomes a more attrac-
tive investment.

Of course, not all Salvadoran
migrants to the United States are solely
or primarily economic migrants; some
are refugees who may be and have been
granted asylum, and they do not need
suspension of deportation to be pro-

tected. So, by definition, when we
discuss suspension of deportation for the
group which is not eligible for asylum,
what we are discussing is whether peo-
ple who emigrate from El Salvador to
the United States illegally should be per-
mitted to reside here. If one says yes to i
this question then we do not have an im-
migration policy with regard to El
Salvador. We have abdicated the respon-
sibility to have one.

It was the failure of our government
to have a coherent approach to refugee
flows that prompted the Congress to
pass the Refugee Act of 1980. It was tht
specific intent of the Congress to end
nationality-specific measures that pro-
vided benefits for persons from one
country and left other persons with
similar claims in limbo. It was also the
Refugee Act that made part of our law
the UN High Commissioner's definition
of refugee that requires each asylum ap
plication to be examined on an individuE
basis.

We believe our government should
avoid single nationality legislation. We
also believe passage of immigration
reform legislation provides long-term
solutions to some of our immigration
problems. Many Salvadorans, as well a
persons of other nationalities, will be
permitted to achieve legal resident
status through provisions of the
amnesty.

Some groups argue that illegal
aliens who are sent back to El Salvado
meet persecution and often death. Ob-
viously, we do not believe these claims
or we would not deport these people.
Twice, in recent years, the U.S. Em-
bassy in San Salvador has tracked
deportees to determine if they were be
ing persecuted; we concluded that the\
were not. Last year we asked some of
ficials of Tutela Legal, which is the
human rights office of the Archdiocest
of El Salvador, whether they believed
there was a pattern of persecution of
deportees. They replied that they did
not. It is noteworthy that these accus;
tions, which are lodged by some
American activist groups critical of U
policy in El Salvador, find no echo noi
did they find their source in complaint
from Salvadoran human rights groups
which have never made this claim. An
that stands to reason. El Salvador is ;
country, as noted above, in which
emigration abroad is a common and
respected means of self-improvement,
and it is engaged in by hundreds and
thousands of Salvadorans, by perhaps
quarter of the population. I submit th
the notion that the people being m^^

deported are easily identifiable when

In
lit

k
In
\k
111
»

HUMAN RIGHTS

ley return to El Salvador is false, and
le notion that they are automatically
ispect is equally false.
The subcommittee will be interested

learn that, in part, in response to the
•eat interest expressed by Chairman
iomano L.] Mazzoli, Senator [Alan K.]
mpson, and others, we have continued

study the treatment of deportees. The
mbassy in San Salvador was sent the
imes of nearly 500 deportees, selected
, random. Efforts were made to con-
,ct every one of them in order to see
hat happened to them after their
turn. We have been able to locate or
id out about roughly 50% of them, us-
g Salvadoran employees so as to draw

little attention as possible to this
hole survey.

We have now completed the study
id we will be happy to share the
)ecific information gathered as soon as
le final report is ready for release. I
in tell you, though, that we found no
'idence of mistreatment of those
ilvadorans interviewed, or among
lose whose welfare was verified
rough contact with family members or
lends. One interesting note is that 21%

those who were located are, according

family or friends, already back in the
nited States.

We have confirmed that one
turnee was killed. His wife reports
at the guerrillas killed him for his
irlier involvement with government
curity forces. A letter sent to the ad-
•ess furnished by a second person was
turned marked "deceased." The Em-
issy was unable to obtain any further
formation.

I would not suggest to this subcom-
ittee that we have completed here the
'finitive scientific study and that no
rther efforts are needed. But surely
ere must come a time when any
)server concludes that this alleged pat-
rn of wide-scale abuse of deportees is
•isupported by evidence.

umanitarian Assistance

am sometimes asked why the United
tates does not do anything to solve the
jmanitarian problem of poverty and
splaced persons and violence in El
alvador. This is a startling question,
hen you consider the enormous amount
" American diplomatic and political ef-
)rt aimed at bringing democracy and
sace to El Salvador, and the extraor-
inary amounts of economic aid which
e give and increased amounts which
le Administration has urged upon
ongress.

Our proposal of $341 million in
economic assistance for FY 1985 to El
Salvador is certainly a valuable response
to the humanitarian problem there. I do
not believe that the appropriate
response to the problems of poverty or
violence in El Salvador is to allow any
Salvadoran who wishes to simply live in
America instead— any more than I think
this is true for Guatemala, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan,
Iran, Uganda, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Viet-
nam, or Zimbabwe. My point, of course,
is that in a very large number of cpun-
tries millions of people, and indeed, tens
of millions, face lives which any
American can only view as desperate.
How do we respond? We respond with
our willingness to allow hundreds of
thousands to legally immigrate to the
United States. We respond with our
asylum and refugee programs, which are
the most generous in the world. We re-
spond with our foreign aid program,
now totaling $8.89 billion including the

pending supplemental request. And we
respond with various political and
diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes
and reduce violence. It does not seem to
me that a sensible response can be to
say that all these people, if they can
make it to the United States, can stay.
We can and we must do very many
things to address the urgent and
desperate humanitarian needs of tens of
millions of people throughout the world,
but one thing we really cannot do for
them all is tell them to move to
America.

I therefore respectfully suggest that
the current policy is an appropriate one,
combining large amounts of economic
assistance, energetic diplomatic efforts,
and the grant of asylum to those with a
well-founded fear of persecution.

'The completed transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Persecution and Restrictions
of Religion in Nicaragua

by Elliott Abrams

Address before the United Jewish Ap-
peal on June 28, 198U. Mr. Abrams is
Assistant Secretary for Humayi Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs.

As I am sure everyone here knows, on
July 20, 1983, President Reagan drew
attention to the plight of the tiny Jewish
community of Nicaragua at a White
House conference. "Virtually the entire
Jewish community of Nicaragua has
been frightened into exile," the Presi-
dent declared. "Their synagogue, which
had its doors torched by Sandinista sup-
porters in 1978, has since been con-
fiscated and turned into offices of a San-
dinista organization."

Needless to say, the President's
remarks provoked a firestorm of con-
troversy. The Nicaraguan Government
and its apologists in this country, and
some Americans who should know bet-
ter, indignantly denied that the San-
dinistas were anti-Semitic. Some of the
President's critics even accused him of
fabricating anti-Semitic allegations in
order to win support for U.S. policy in
Central America. For this reason, I am

very pleased to have been asked to
speak to you this afternoon on the
Jewish community in Nicaragua.

Overall Religious Conditions

Before turning to the fate of Nicaraguan
Jewry, however, I want to spend just a
few moments discussing freedom of
religion in general in Nicaragua. My
reason for doing so should be obvious. If
it were the case, for example, that the
Government of Nicaragua scrupulously
respects the rights of Catholics, of Prot-
estants, and of Indians, then even if
there were well-documented incidents of
anti-Semitism in Nicaragua, I think
many of us would be inclined to give the
Sandinistas the benefit of the doubt and
to attribute such incidents to vicious and
misguided individuals, rather than to the
government. On the other hand, if it
turned out that virtually all non-Jewish
religious groups in Nicaragua were be-
ing persecuted, then it would stand to
reason that the Jewish community would
also be subjected to persecution. To
believe otherwise would be to argue, in
effect, that the Sandinistas are philo-
Semitic, and no one, not even the San-
dinistas, have made that particular argu-
ment.

HUMAN RIGHTS

What, then, is the overall situation
with regard to freedom of religion in
Nicaragua? As I am sure all of you
know, about 85% of the Nicaraguan
population is Catholic. If you have been
following the situation in Nicaragua you
also know that the Sandinista regime
and the Catholic Church are locked in a
bitter struggle. You are probably aware
that the Sandinista government has
openly challenged the influence of the
Catholic Bishops of Nicaragua, especially
that of Archbishop Obando y Bravo. You
know that the regime has denied the
Archbishop of the Roman Catholic
Church the traditional opportunity to
broadcast the Mass on television during
Holy Week and has openly insulted the
Pope. You know that government-
organized mobs have interrupted
Masses, harassed churchgoers, threat-
ened priests, and physically attacked
members of the clergy. You know that
100,000 Nicaraguan Catholics attended a
rally on Good Friday this year to
demonstrate their support for the
church and their hostility to the regime.
And you know that in a homily to some
4,000 Nicaraguans several weeks ago,
the head of the Nicaraguan Bishops'
Conference, Bishop Pablo Antonia Vega,
said, "The tragedy of the Nicaraguan
people is that we are living with a
totalitarian ideology that no one wants
in this country."

Because of the great strength of the
Catholic Church in Nicaragua, the San-
dinista strategy has been to infiltrate,
censor, and control it, rather than to
eradicate it outright. The Sandinistas
have actually launched a two-pronged at-
tack on the Catholic Church as an in-
stitution. On the one hand, they have
taken a series of steps aimed at silenc-
ing and undermining the episcopal
hierachy of the church in Nicaragua.
Simultaneously, they have supported the
formation of a rival "popular" or
"people's" church subservient to the
regime.

In response, Nicaragua's Archbishop
Obando has condemned "those who are
trying to divide the church" and spread
the idea that there is "one bourgeois
church and another church for the poor."
The Vatican has become so alarmed at
the attempt of the Sandinistas to divide
the church in Nicaragua that the Pope
issued a Pastoral letter on June 29,
1982, which criticized advocates of the
"popular church." Despite that fact, the
Sandinistas and their supporters in the
church continue to portray the official
church hierachy as "bourgeois" and "op-
pressors," attempting to polarize the

faithful and create, in effect, a new
church controlled by the regime.

If the Sandinistas have been forced
to adopt a somewhat indirect approach
in their efforts to undermine the power-
ful Catholic Church in Nicaragua, they
have been under no similar inhibitions in
dealing with the far less powerful
Nicaraguan Protestant churches. Among
the Protestant groups harassed by the
Sandinistas are the Seventh-day Adven-
tists, the Mennonites, Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, and the Moravian
Church. By August 1982 more than 20
Managua Protestant churches had been
seized by Sandinista-led mobs. Some,
but not all, of the confiscated properties
were returned, but only on condition
that the ministers refrain from criticiz-
ing the government. In addition, the
Salvation Army was forced out of
Nicaragua in August 1980, after
ominous verbal threats from authorities,
and, finally, instructions to close up the
program and leave the country.

Perhaps the most tragic case of
government persecution in Nicaragua,
however, is that inflicted on the Miskito,
Sumo, and Rama Indians of Nicaragua's
isolated Atlantic coast. Most of the
members of these tribes are members of
minority Protestant churches, especially
the Moravian Church. Living in isolation
from most of Nicaragua, they have had
little to do with any government. The
Moravian missionaries filled the gap by
providing most of the schools, hospitals,
and support organizations that main-
tained the area.

The campaign of persecution against
the Indians has thus far been directed
largely at their religious leaders and in-
stitutions. In attacking the Indians'
religious leaders, the Sandinistas are at-
tacking their source of unity and
strength.

Upon coming to power the San-
dinistas sealed off the entire Atlantic
coast. Travel to the region was allowed
only by special permit. Indians were
drafted into the militia. Those who
refused were shot or forcibly relocated.
Villages were forcibly evacuated and
then burned. By midsummer 1982, the
Sandinistas had destroyed 55 Moravian
Churches.

In November of 1982, the
Misurasata Council of Ancients (elders),
the leg^itimate representatives of the
people of the three tribes, officially de-
nounced the Sandinista government
before the Organization of American
States.

In summary, then, when we examine
the state of religious freedom in

Nicaragua for Christians, the following
pattern emerges: harrassment and
subversion directed against the powerful
Catholic Church, brutal and undisguised
repression against the far weaker Prot-
estant churches. All of which is to say
that in relation to the churches, the San^
dinistas have behaved the way Marxist-
Leninists always behave: they have
sought to destroy the weaker churches,
and to subvert the more powerful
churches.

Jewish Persecution

With this background in mind, let me
turn now to the situation of the Jewish
community in Nicaragua. A principal
source of information about Nicaraguan
Jews is Rabbi Morton Rosenthal of the
ADL's Latin American Affairs Depart-
ment. When Nicaraguan Jews came to
the ADL and informed it that being
Jewish was a major factor in their
forced exile and loss of properties, the
ADL made representations on their
behalf, in 1981, to the Foreign Minister
of Nicaragua. The ADL hoped that
through "quiet diplomacy" it could obta
some clarification from the Nicaraguan
Government about the reasons for the
confiscations and the forced exiling of
the Jewish community. After 19 month
having concluded that the Government
of Nicaragua was not going to respond
to any of its questions, the ADL publi-
cized the plight of Nicaragua's Jews w
an article by Rabbi Rosenthal entitled
"Nicaragua Without Jews."

Rabbi Rosenthal points out that th
Jewish community in Nicaragua has
always been small, numbering about 5
families at its peak. Jews began comir
to Nicaragua in the late 1920s from
Eastern Europe. They dedicated
themselves to farming, manufacturing
and retail sales and made significant
contributions to Nicaragua's economic
development.

Nicaraguan Jews never encounter ^
anti-Semitism until the Sandinistas
started their revolution. Even before Ijgi
Sandinistas came to power they begai
threatening Jews. A favorite tactic w;
to anonymously phone Jewish homes
with warnings that "We are going to
you Jews," claiming that Nicaraguan
Jews were responsible for Israeli arm
sales to the Somoza regime. Graffiti I
Sandinistas was widespread, with at-
tacks on Jews and their religion. One
was "Death to the Jewish Pigs." The
Sandinista initials — FSLN [Sandinist;
National Liberation Front] — in red ai
black left no doubt as to who was
responsible. Another slogan painted (

lit
u

HUMAN RIGHTS

ynagogue walls, and elsewhere, by San-
inista supporters was "Israel, Jews and
omoza— The Same Thing."

In 1978, the synagogue in Managua
/as attacked by five Sandinistas wear-
ig face handkerchiefs. They set the
uilding on fire by throwing gasoline in
he main entrance doors, shouting PLO
Palestine Liberation Organization] vic-
pry slogans and anti-Jewish defamatory
inguage. As the doors caught fire, two
lembers of the community, at prayer
uring Sabbath services, ran through a
ide door. The Sandinistas met them
'ith a show of automatic weapons and
rdered them inside. The two members
f the congregation, incidentally, were
oth survivors of the Nazi concentration
amps.

When the Sandinistas came to
ower in July 1979, the storm broke,
ome members of the Jewish community
'ere advised to leave "for their own
afety." Others, who had gone abroad
uring the last months of the revolu-
lonary stuggle, found that they were
nable to return. The Nicaraguan Jews
ent into "exile" mainly in the United
tates, Israel, and other countries of
Central America.

Isaac Stavisky, a textile engineer
ho was born in Nicaragua, said, "I was
illing to return to my native country
nd engage in my usual activities, but I
■as stopped cold." It was suggested that
e refrain from returning for his own
ifety because he and his brother-in-law
ere considered enemies of the revolu-
on.

The president of the Jewish com-
lunity, Abraham Gorn, was jailed after
le Sandinista victory. Gorn, who was
len 70 years old, was falsely accused of
;ealing some land and forced to sweep
treets during the 2 weeks of his con-
nement.

Nicaraguan Jews claim that Jewish-
wned property was among the first to
e confiscated by the Sandinista gov-
rnment, while Nicaraguans of Arab
escent, because of the close PLO-
andinista relationship, were able to re-
lain in Nicaragua and continue their
usiness activities, often similar to those
ngaged in by Jews.

The Sandinistas also commandeered
lanagua's synagogue and covered the
Mr Stars of David at the front en-
rance with propaganda posters, and the
iterior with anti-Zionist posters. And
ven after the tiny Nicaragua Jewish
ommunity had fled, the Sandinistas
ontinued to engage in blatant
manifestations of anti-Semitism. In July

of 1982, for example, Nuevo Diario, a
Managua newspaper which closely ad-
heres to the government line, published
an article under the headline, "About
Zionism and the Palestinian Cause." It
spoke of "synagogues of Satan" and de-
nounced Jews "who crucified Jesus
Christ and . . . used the myth of God's
chosen people to massacre the Palestin-
ian people without mercy."

Two days later, July 17, 1982, the
same paper charged that "the world's

money, banking and finance are in the
hands of descendants of Jews, the eter-
nal protectors of Zionism. Consequently,
controlling economic power, they control
political power as now happens in the
United States." The paper even went so
far as to claim that President Reagan's
support for Israel stems from the fact
that he "must have Jewish ancestry."

Admittedly, we know of no laws in
Nicaragua that are aimed specifically at
Jews. There may well be no "official"

Captive Nations Week, 1984

PROCLAMATION 5223,
JULY 16, 19841

Once each year, all Americans are asked
to pause and to remember that their
liberties and freedoms, often taken for
granted, are forbidden to many nations
around the world. America continues to
be dedicated to the proposition that all
men are created equal. If we are to sus-
tain our commitment to this principle,
we must recognize that the peoples of
the Captive Nations are endowed by the
Creator with the same rights to give
their consent as to who shall govern
them as those of us who are privileged
to live in freedom. For those captive and
oppressed peoples, the United States of
America stands as a symbol of hope and
inspiration. This leadership requires
faithfulness towards our own democratic
principles as well as a commitment to
speak out in defense of mankind's
natural right.

Though twenty-five years have passed
since the original designation of Captive Na-
tions Week, its significance has not dimin-
ished. Rather, it has undeniably in-
creased — especially as other nations have
fallen under Communist domination. During
Captive Nations Week we must take time to
remember both the countless victims and the
lonely heroes; both the targets of carpet
bombing in Afghanistan, and individuals such
as imprisoned Ukrainian patriot Yuriy
Shukhevych. We must draw strength from
the actions of the millions of freedom fighters
in Communist-occupied countries, such as the
signers of petitions for religious rights in
Lithuania, or the members of Solidarity,
whose public protests require personal risk
and sacrifice that is almost incomprehensible
to the average citizen in the Free World. It is
in their struggle for freedom that we can find
the true path to genuine and lasting peace.

For those denied the benefits of liberty
we shall continue to speak out for their
freedom. On behalf of the unjustly persecuted
and falsely imprisoned, we shall continue to
call for their speedy release and offer our

prayers during their suffering. On behalf of
the brave men and women who suffer
persecution because of national origin,
religious beliefs, and their desire for liberty,
it is the duty and the privilege of the United
States of America to demand that the
signatories of the United Nations Charter
and the Helsinki Accords live up to their
pledges and obligations and respect the prin-
ciples and spirit of those international
agreements and understandings.

During Captive Nations Week, we renew
our efforts to encourage freedom, in-
dependence, and national self-determination
for those countries struggling to free
themselves from Communist ideology and
totalitarian oppression, and to support those
countries which today are standing face-to-
face against Soviet expansionism. One cannot
call for freedom and human rights for the
people of Asia and Eastern Europe while ig-
noring the struggles of our own neighbors in
this hemisphere. There is no difference be-
tween the weapons used to oppress the peo-
ple of Laos and Czechoslovakia, and those
sent to Nicaragua to terrorize its own people
and threaten the peace and prosperity of its
neighbors.

The Congress, by joint resolution ap-
proved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), has
authorized and requested the President to
designate the third week in July as "Captive
Nations Week."

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim the week beginning July
1.5, 1984, as Captive Nations Week. 1 invite
the people of the United States to observe
this week with appropriate ceremonies and
activities to reaffirm their dedication to the
international principles of justice and
freedom, which unite us and inspire others.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this sixteenth day of July, in the
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
eighty-four, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hudred and
ninth.

Ronald Reagan

'Text from White House press release.

HUMAN RIGHTS

policy of anti-Semitism. But as Rabbi
Rosenthal has stated, the Nicaraguan
situation demonstrates that one does not
need official policy in order to persecute
a small community. It can be effected
far more subtly by threat, intimidation,
and confiscation, thus avoiding the con-
demnation that Nuremburg-type laws
would invite.

In light of these facts, and also in
view of the government's behavior
toward Christians and Indians in
Nicaragua, I do not think any sensible
person can fail to conclude that the San-
dinistas are indeed anti-Semitic. What
remains to be answered, however, is
why they are anti-Semitic? What have
they got against us?

Nicaragua's Anti-Semitic Rationale

I think there are two explanations for
Sandinista anti-Semitism — a general ex-
planation and a specific explanation. The
general explanation is that the San-
dinistas—as they themselves have fre-
quently proclaimed — are communists,
and, as such, share the general com-
munist antipathy toward Jews. The
specific explanation is that the San-
dinistas have long enjoyed a close rela-
tionship with the PLO, from whom they
have undoubtedly picked up anti-Jewish
beliefs and attitudes. Let me elaborate
briefly on both these explanations.

The simple fact is that one of the
wellsprings of our belief in human rights
and the dignity of man is the Jewish
tradition. This tradition asserts that all
humans are created b'Tzelem Elohim — in
God's image. From this it follows that
men are not to be used simply as means
to an end: rather, each is an end in him-
self. Every person has an equal right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
by virtue of his humanity alone.
Everyone has his place in the sun, and
neither the place nor the sun was
created by the state.

For communists and their allies,
however, the notation that a man or a
woman can have a greater loyalty to
God than to the state is completely unac-
ceptable. Atheism is not an incidental or
peripheral element of their ideology, but
its very core: Communist and radical
parties claim for themselves the at-
tributes of omnipotence and omniscience
which Jews and others believe reserve to
God alone. Such parties also seek to con-
trol all political, economic, social,
cultural, and other developments in their
societies, and that whii'h they cannot
control, they seek to destroy. For this
reason, communism can perhaps best be

understood as a modern form of
idolatry — an attempt to establish the
party as the final arbiter of truth,
justice, and morality.

Because Jews are unwilling to aban-
don their own way of life and submit to
totalitarian governmental controls, they
invariably arouse the enmity and hatred
of communists everywhere. Because
they recognize an authority higher than
the state, they are persecuted. And
because the State of Israel is a model of
a vigorous, successful, and thriving poli-
ty organized along democratic principles,
it, too, naturally arouses the enmity of
communists everywhere. Hostility to
Jews and hostility to human rights are
two sides of a single coin and are
characteristic of communist regimes in
general.

As to the long-standing PLO-
Sandinista collaboration, this has been
documented at great length by the ADL,
by the U.S. Government, by Israel, and
in an excellent pamphlet entitled
"Castro, Israel and the PLO" published
by the Cuban-American National Foun-
dation. Suffice it to say that Jorge
Mandi, a Sandinista spokesman, told a
reporter for the Kuwaiti newspaper Al
Watan (August 7, 1979), "There is a
long-standing blood unity between us
and the Palestinian revolution. . . . Many
of the units belonging to the Sandinista
movement were at Palestinian revolu-
tionary bases in Jordan. In the early
1970s, Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood
was spilled together in Amman and in
other places during the 'Black
September' battles."

The brutal fact of the matter is that
we face a world in which many countries
are ruled by systems of despotism and
repression. In this world, Jews have
enemies. America has enemies, liberty
has enemies, democracy has enemies.
And they are one largely coherent
group. This group views world politics in
terms of what it calls the struggle
against "Imperialism, Zionism, and Co-
lonialism." Imperialism, of course, refers
to the United States. Colonialism refers
to our allies in the Third World, and in-
cludes countries such as South Vietnam,
which has already been destroyed, and
Turkey and El Salvador, which have at

various times been targeted for destruG
tion. And Zionism refers to the State of
Israel, and — let us be quite clear about

this — to the Jewish people as well. To
them, the enemy of humanity is the
same enemy whether he salutes the
Stars and Stripes or the Star of David.
It is, therefore, no accident, to bor-
row an old Marxist phrase, that the San
dinista hymn declares, "We will fight
against the Yankee, the enemy of
humanity." It is not an accident that
U.S. troops unearthed on Grenada an
agreement between the New JEWEL
Movement and Castro's Communist Par
ty of Cuba, stating the two are united b
"active solidarity . . . against im-
perialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism,
Zionism, and racism." It is not an acci-
dent that the honored guest at the San-
dinista's first anniversary celebration
was Yasir Arafat, to whom Interior
Minister Tomas Borge declared "We sa;
to our brother Arafat that Nicaragua is
his land and that the PLO cause is the
cause of the Sandinistas." It is not an a
cident, in short, that whenever com-
munists are in power, Jews are
persecuted. Israel is attacked, and the
United States is vilified.

Conclusion

I began my remarks this afternoon by
quoting President Reagan's remarks or
Nicaraguan Jewry. He concluded by sa
ing "Please share the truth that com-
munism in Central America means not
only the loss of political freedom but ot
religious freedom as well." I would like
to take this opportunity to endorse the
President's words. The small Jewish
communities throughout Central
America understand that communism
poses a real threat to their very surviv
as Jews. They understand that the
Nicaraguans and the Cubans must be
stopped from exporting revolution. Th
recognize that the bitter fate which
befell their brethren in Nicaragua mig
easily be theirs, as well. And like the
embattled Jewish communities in Israi
and the Soviet Union, they look to us,
the American Jewish community, for
support and understanding. We canno "'
let them down

!»i

aplf
m
to
U
kn

HUMAN RIGHTS

luman Rights in Cuba

r Elliott Abrams

Statement before the Subcommittees
r Human Rights and International
'ganizations and Western Hemisphere
fairs of the House Foreign Affairs
rmmittee on June 27, 198Jt. Mr.
'rrams is Assistant Secretary for
uman Rights and Humanitarian
fairs.^

le history of Cuba over the last 25
ars is one of the great tragedies of
odern times. It is the history of a
fted and industrious people, whose
pes for freedom and democracy have
en cruelly and systematically denied,
is the history of a liberal and
mocratic revolution which overthrew
e Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista,
ily to be betrayed by an even more
thless dictator. It is the history of one
the greatest tyrants of our time, Fidel
istro, who promised the Cuban people
at he would restore democracy and
spect for law and human rights, but
stead established a dictatorship which
IS brought ruin and misery to his
ople.

Cuba has been ruled for 25 years by
e one man, Fidel Castro, and a group
!iich seized power in 1959. The Com-
unist Party dominates all aspects of
ily life, controlling the means of pro-
iction and distribution of all goods,
rvices, and information; public com-
unication, public welfare, and educa-
)n; as well as national defense, foreign
lations, and public security. Under
ese circumstances, the human rights
Cubans are systematically denied,
bordinated to the aims of the Cuban
jmmunist Party, as defined by its
lilaximum Leader," Fidel Castro.

legal System Abuses

xecutions to discourage political dis-
■nt, for example, which began when
astro seized power in 1959, continued
roughout 1983. There are credible
■ports of summary executions following
■cret trials of civilians for alleged
)litical offenses by military tribunals. A
ember of Jehovah's Witnesses, for ex-
nple, was reported to have been ex-
:uted in August 1983 for allegedly
jreading "propaganda to incite armed
?bellion." A 23-year-old student, Carlos
Iberto Gutierez, was shot for belonging
) a group caught painting anti-
overnment slogans on walls.

Cuban police commonly round up
persons in nighttime arrests. Friends,
neighbors, and family members have no
knowledge of their fate and frequently
are too intimidated to ask. Usually these
persons are tried and sentenced in
secret, but sometimes they are inter-
rogated and released. In 1983, several
Cuban-Americans "disappeared" while in
Cuba visiting relatives. No information
regarding their detention or where-
abouts was provided to the U.S. Govern-
ment nor to their relatives who inquired
about them. In one case, an individual
was arrested and held incommunicado
for 3 months. Upon being released, he
reported that he had been interrogated
about alleged espionage and counter-
revolutionary activity.

Conditions in Cuban political prisons
are barbaric and include the use of tor-
ture. Political prisoners who refuse "re-
education" are subject to particularly
harsh penalties, including the denial of
clothing, medical attention, and com-
munication with friends and relatives
outside prison. One former political
prisoner, Jose Rodriguez Terrero, who
was released in August 1983, spent 22
years in Cuban prisons, including
months at a time confined naked in a
tiny cell called a "drawer" which forced
the prisoner to curl up in an embryo-like
position. Also included among the forms
of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment in Cuban prisons is the placing of
a prisoner in a small, sealed, unven-
tilated room, and totally isolating a
prisoner from other prisoners and from
the outside world. The use of psychiatry
for repressive purposes has been
reported by Dr. Abdo Canasi. He re-
ceived a 10-year jail sentence for his ex-
pose, and since his release from confine-
ment he is denied permission to leave
the country.

The Cuban legal system does not
provide internationally recognized stand-
ards of due process for defendants, and
is used to impose criminal sentences on
individuals who have been imprisoned
for political reasons, including lawyers
attempting to defend political prisoners
and those trying to establish free trade
unions. For example, in January 1983, a
Cuban court sentenced five persons to
death for having tried to organize a
"Solidarity-style" trade union movement
in Cuba. Subsequently, Cuban author-
ities arrested the attorneys who sought

to defend the five labor organizers.
Groups such as Americas Watch and
Amnesty International have estimated
that there are over 200 political
prisoners in Cuba; other estimates put
the figure at about 1,000. Americas
Watch also estimates that there are be-
tween 1,500 and 2,000 former political
prisoners to whom the Cuban Govern-
ment continues to deny employment. In
its 1983 report. Amnesty International
has drawn attention to the fact that
other political prisoners are refused per-
mission to leave Cuba, even when other
countries have been willing to give them

Restrictive Liberties

Freedom of speech and the press do not
exist in Cuba. All media outlets are
owned by the government or party-
controlled organizations and operate
strictly according to Communist Party
guidelines. No criticism of the policies of
the government, the party, or the
leadership is permitted. Artistic expres-
sion is also covered by these restrictions,
which require that artistic works serve
to reinforce the goals of the govern-
ment. Foreign publications, except those
from other communist countries, are not
available. Even private expression of dif-
ferences with government policies is
repressed by an informer network
operated by the politicized block commit-
tees, known as the Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution [CDR]. Those
who violate the prohibitions against
criticizing the government are im-
prisoned, and even those suspected of
potential opposition can be incarcerated
or detained in prison after the expiration
of their sentences under the so-called ley
de peligrosidad.

Freedom of assembly does not exist
in Cuba either. No free trade unions are
allowed to function. The Communist
Party operates a so-called "trade union"
federation called the Confederation of
Cuban Workers, which acts to enforce
labor discipline, encourage higher pro-
ductivity, and reduce labor costs, rather
than to defend workers' interests. The
rights to bargain collectively and to
strike are not recognized. In the last
year, over 200 workers have been prose-
cuted for trying to organize strikes in
the sugar and construction industries.
Five trade unionists were condemned to
death. But, according to reports, their
sentences were reduced to 30 years
after their cases became public
knowledge. The Cuban Government,

HUMAN RIGHTS

after at first denying the facts, has said
the "terrorists" received severe
sentences. At the recent conference of
the World Federation of Trade Unions
in Prague, the Cubans defended the
sentences, explaining they were
necessary to block any possible attempts
to set up a Solidarity-style organization.

Antireligious Activities

The Cuban Government also enforces an
active antireligious policy. In the early
years of the revolution, the extensive
Catholic educational system was
destroyed by the government and hun-
dreds of priests were expelled from the
country.

Today, a network of formal and in-
formal restrictions has the effect of
limiting religious activity. The official
state ideology of atheism is taught on all
levels of the educational system. Specific
constitutional and statutory provisions
are designed to restrict religious observ-
ance and education.

Among other restrictions on
religious practice enforced by the Cuban
Government are discrimination against
religious believers in educational and
employment opportunities, prohibition
on religious media, and restriction on
the construction of new churches.
Political meetings and work obligations
are regularly scheduled to conflict with
religious observances. Cuban law pro-
hibits the observance of religious events
when they conflict with work obligations
or patriotic celebrations. The July 26 na-
tional holiday, commemorating the at-
tack on Batista's Moncada barracks in
1953, has been promoted as a replace-
ment for Christmas, and the availability
of toys for children has been limited to
the 26th of July period to the exclusion
of Christmas. Similarly, Holy Week
observances are preempted by the week-
long celebration of the battle of the Bay
of Pigs.

Emigration Restrictions

Freedom of emigration also does not ex-
ist in today's Cuba. Although Castro
claims that Cubans are free to emigrate,
and though some left Cuba, as in the
Mariel exodus of 1980, the Cuban
government routinely refuses to allow
citizens to leave the country; there is
thus a backlog of some 200,000 Cubans
who have applied to emigrate. Those
who opt to leave Cuba lose their jobs,
ration cards, housing, and personal
possessions. Then the emigrants are sub-
jected to government-orchestrated mob

attacks call "assemblies of repulsion"
and are required to work in agriculture
until they leave the island, a period that
can extend indefinitely. As an example
of the extent to which people will go to
leave Cuba, in early 1983 three young
Cubans seized a small group of
American tourists in Villa Clara prov-
ince and held them hostage to force the
Cuban Government to permit the
Cubans to depart the country. The
Americans were subsequently freed, and
the young Cubans reportedly sentenced
to death (later reportedly commuted to
30 years in prison).

The Cuban Government still refuses
to permit the departure of some Cubans
who sought asylum in the Venezuelan
and Peruvian Embassies in Havana
more than 3 years ago. Persons who
have attempted to flee Cuba by seeking
refuge in diplomatic missions have been
arrested and sentenced to terms of up to
30 years. According to an Agence
France press report, for example, the
noted Cuban dissident, Ricardo Bofill
Pages, was arrested on September 27,
1983. In April, Bofill had sought refuge
in the French Embassy, but was in-
structed to leave the embassy after the
French Ambassador received assurances
from the Cuban Vice President, Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, that he would be
allowed to leave the country. Subse-
quently, two Agence France press per-
sonnel who tried to interview Bofill were
put under house arrest and expelled
from Cuba after 9 days.

The case of Cuban Ambassador
Gustavo Arcos Bergnes is also instruc-
tive. Arcos fought and was wounded at
Castro's side during the attack on
Batista's Moncada barracks. When
Castro took power, Arcos was named
Cuban Ambassador to Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. But, in
the mid-1960s he was recalled and im-
prisoned for 4 years for his democratic
beliefs. In 1979 his son was gravely in-
jured in a motorcycle accident in
Florida. The U.S. Congress appealed to
the Cuban Government to allow Arcos
to visit his son. The appeal was refused.
Months later, Arcos was charged with
attempting to leave the island without
the necessary papers and was given a
7-year prison sentence.

The reverse policy, forced emigra-
tion, can be just as cruel. Suddenly, in
1980 the emigration gates were opened.
During the rush that followed out of the
port of Mariel, when 125,000 Cuban
"boat people" fled to our shores, the
Castro government shipped along com-
mon criminals and many of Cuba's

psychiatric patients. The American
Psychiatric Association denounced this
action on September 28, 1980, saying it
was:

. . . Deeply concerned about the plight of
numerous recent refugees who have been
identified as mentally ill. There is growing
evidence that many of these Cuban citizens
were bused from Cuban mental hospitals to
the Freedom Flotilla to the United States. 1 f
this is the case, the transplantation of thesi-
patients constitutes a grossly inhumane act
since it deprives the patients of their right to
psychiatric treatement within the context of
their culture and primary language.

To date the Cuban Government is
still refusing to take back any
Marielitos— including those who seek
voluntarily to return.

Standard of Living

The Cuban Constitution states that "the
home is inviolable." Nevertheless, no
aspect of an ordinary Cuban's private
life is free from government
surveillance. Telephones are monitored,
mail is opened, and one's comings and
goings are monitored 24-hours-a-day by
block wardens in the neighborhood Com
mittee for the Defense of the Revolu-
tion. Meetings, parties, and other ac-
tivities are subject to particularly in-
tense scrutiny. Listening to foreign
radio and television broadcasts is
dangerous because of the surveillance b
CDR members. A jamming signal to in-
terfere with Voice of America broad-
casts has been noted in the Havana are:
and presumably is used in other urban
areas.

The Cuban Government has never
allowed international groups to visit
Cuba to investigate human rights condi
tions. Organizations such as Amnesty
International and Americas Watch,
which have sought access to Cuban
political prisons, have been rebuffed. N
domestic human rights organizations a
permitted to exist. Human rights ac-
tivists in Cui)a who are not in jail are
forced to carry out their activities
clandestinely and must rely upon inter-
national nongovernmental agencies for
support and publicity. If apprehended 1
the authorities, they are subject to pro fiy
ecution under Article 61 of the Cuban
Constitution, which states "None of thi
freedoms which are recognized for
citizens can be exercised contrary to
what is established in the constitution
and the law, or contrary to the exister
and objectives of the socialist state, or
contrary to the decision of the Cuban
people to build socialism and com-
munism. Violations of this principle ca isi
be punished by law."

1(1

tai
a

set
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HUMAN RIGHTS

Although apologists for Castro
iietimes claim that some human rights
lations were necessary in order to
Qg about the rapid modernization of
Cuban economy, in fact, Castro's dic-
orship has deprived the Cuban people
their opportunity for a better
nomic future. In 1958, Cuban income
capita was the fourth or fifth
hest in the hemisphere. Independent
dies have repeatedly shown that per
lita economic growth in Cuba is
ong the lowest in the hemisphere. If
sent trends continue, by the end of
century Cuba will be one of the
ser developed countries of the
lericas.

Castro's betrayal has also cost the
ban people their independence. In
9, Cuba paid its own way. Now even
stagnant standard of living can only
maintained with huge Soviet hand-
s — $4.7 billion in economic aid alone
1982, $25 billion over the last 7 years.
t this aid is no bargain for Cubans.
• in return, Cuba sends combat and
kup troops to countries where the
nets seek to establish a sphere of in-
ence. In Angola and Ethiopia they
1 their blood and that of Africans to
tect leftwing dictatorships from the
;er of their own people. All told,
re are some 70,000 Cubans, the so-
ed "internationalists," who serve the
det Union's interests in foreign lands.
It comes as no surprise, then, to
"n that as a result of 25 years of com-
nist control, more than 1 million
jans — over 10% of the island's in-
dtants — have fled their homeland,
irived of their civil and political liber-
., their national independence, and
ir hopes for a better future, Cubans
e demonstrated their dissatisfaction
h the regime through the only means
liable to them — by "voting with their
t."

nclusion

s, in broad outline, is the state of
nan rights in Cuba. It is not a very
tty picture. Neither, for that matter,
t a new picture. The facts about
3an repression have been available for
ny years now. Yet for just as many
,rs, not a few intellectuals and jour-
ists have been systematically denying
se facts. Although I will not attempt
describe this rather disgraceful
sode in any detail, I cannot resist giv-
one example of the kind of wild
information about Cuba which has
ped to shield the regime from inter-
;ional censure. I quote from a book
Dlished in 1975 by two prominent

Americans, Frank Mankiewicz and
Kirby Jones, titled "With Fidel: A Por-
trait of Castro and Cuba."

. . . Castro's Cuba is prosperous and its
people are enthusiastic, reasonably content,
and optimistic about the future. Perhaps the
overriding impression of three trips to Cuba
is the enthusiasm and unity of the Cuban peo-
ple. They are proud of their accomplishments
and sing songs about themselves and their
country that reflect this self-pride. . . . The
people work together and work hard — for
what they believe to be good for their
neighbors and therefore their country.

One of the reasons why I welcome
the hearings your committee is holding
on the human rights situation in Cuba is
that I hope they will serve to correct

misinformation of this sort. For too
many years, Fidel Castro has posed as a
champion of progress, and has suc-
ceeded in concealing the oppressive,
totalitarian nature of his regime. Simply
by telling the truth about Cuba, we can
help to expose Castro as the tyrant that
he is. At the same time, by telling the
truth we demonstrate our solidarity with
the principal victims of Castro's
regime — the long-suffering and much-
abused Cuban people.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Human Rights Situation
in Zaire and South Africa

by Elliott Abrams

Statement before the Subcommittees
on African Affairs and Human Rights
and International Organizations of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
June 21. 1984. Mr. Abrams is Assistant
Secretary for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs. ^

Africa presents a difficult challenge to
U.S. human rights policy. Single-party
states, lack of a free press, and freedom
of speech; weak judicial institutions,
poor prison conditions, and the use of
force to control dissent are all too often
the rule.

ZAIRE

You have available the 1983 human
rights report [Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1983] which
sets out Zaire's record in detail; you can
see that it is a troubled one. In my
remarks this morning I would like to de-
scribe the political, historical, and
cultural context for understanding the
human rights situation in Zaire. I would
also like to discuss why we believe it is
important to maintain a strong relation-
ship with this strategically important
country.

Strategic Importance

As you are well aware, Zaire has long
been a friend and key regional partner
of the United States and the West. It
has consistently worked with us, the

most recent examples being the respon-
sible role it played while on the UN
Security Council and its strong support
for the Government of Chad in its strug-
gle against the Libyan-backed invasion.
Zairian minerals, notably copper and
cobalt, are important to the West.
Zaire's strategic relevance, which is due
to its large size and population as well
as its common borders with nine African
countries, has never been more apparent
than now, as we work toward political
solutions in southern Africa. Stability in
Zaire is crucial if the delicate process
now underway is to be maintained.
Stability in Zaire is also the key to
stability in central Africa.

Zaire lived its first years of in-
dependence under extremely difficult
conditions. During the colonial period no
Zairians occupied positions of respon-
sibility and very few received a universi-
ty education. Belgian policy had been to
control life tightly and suppress dissent
in the Congo. Zaire's people were poorly
prepared to take over the responsibility
of governing themselves. Judicial institu-
tions, disciplined police forces, and
bodies of law and regulation based on
normally acceptable standards of human
rights did not survive the shocks of the
post-independence period. Rather, in-
dependence unleashed powerful forces
that Zaire's fragile political structure
was unable to accommodate. Hundreds
of ethnic groups, competing geographic
regions, and different ideologies clashed
against the backdrop of East- West

HUMAN RIGHTS

rivalry. Violence and anarchy were the
order of the day from 1960 until 1965.
Echos from this period were heard as
recently as 1977 and 1978, with the two
invasions of Shaba province by exiled ex-
Katangan gendarmes backed by Angola
and the Soviets. Zairians still suffer the
emotional and social consequences of
these traumatic events. A desire not to
relive the tribulations of that time goes
a long way toward explaining the inter-
nal stability that Zaire has enjoyed in
the years that President Mobutu [Sese
Seko] has been in power. As the United
States could well have to become in-
volved again if instability recurred,
stable government in Zaire is very im-
portant to us.

Current Conditions

I have briefly mentioned Zairian history
in order to give some context to my
comments on the current human rights
situation there, which has serious short-
comings. Arbitrary justice and problems
caused by low-paid and ill-disciplined
security forces plague the country.
Prison conditions are poor with inade-
quate food and medical care. People re-
main in preventive detention for long
periods of time during investigation,
because of shortages of lawyers and
magistrates and insufficient funds for
such services as transportation between
prisons and courtrooms. As in most
Third World countries, the press is con-
trolled and the flow of ideas is
restricted. In addition, the country has a
single-party political system which does
not espouse Western democratic prin-
ciples. President Mobutu's response to
continued political activity by ex-
parliamentarian activists who champion
a second political party— a violation of
Zaire's constitution — was internal exile
for the leaders and the arrest of key
supporters, some of whom are still in
jail. Thus in Zaire, as in most African
countries, it is not possible to call public-
ly for a change in government and re-
tain one's civil liberties.

Blemished as Zaire's human rights
record is, I would like to point out that
progress has been made. For example, a
positive area that is little noticed is
Zaire's acceptance of 250,000 refugees
from neighboring countries. There was a
general amnesty last year which
resulted in the release of political
prisoners and in the return of several
prominent exiles. The ICRC [Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross] has
been able to visit some Zairian prisons.
There have been few if any summan,' ex-

ecutions or disappearances in recent
years. Human rights conditions in Zaire
have improved over the past 20 years,
albeit fitfully rather than steadily.
Political opponents may be exiled to
small villages or periodically arrested,
but they are not killed or imprisoned for
life, as is unfortunately true in much of
the Third World. Zaire is very sensitive
to the views of the Administration and
the Congress on human rights, and our
concern has had a positive effect.
Although Zaire has a long way to go,
the government has shown it has the
capacity to listen to others and change.
It is important to keep in mind that
the United States has broad interests in
Zaire and is dealing with its government
on a number of key issues. We consult
on Chad where Zaire has given in-
valuable military and political assistance
to the Habre government. When Zaire
was on the UN Security Council in
1982-83, it was very supportive of U.S.
objectives. We also consult in the
economic area, where the government
has undertaken major reform steps. In
1983 Zaire successfully implemented
several reforms suggested by the IMF
[International Monetary Fund], including
an 80% devaluation of the zaire and the
institution of a floating exchange rate.
Controls on wage increases and the
liberalization of price controls have also
been adopted. The budget deficit has
been brought under control in spite of
low tax revenues because of severely
depressed copper and cobalt prices. The
successful implementation of these
reforms led the IMF to approve $350
million in new drawings for Zaire and
official creditors to reschedule Zaire's
debt in December. In reviewing the
situation in Zaire we see that they have
taken the steps we have recommended
to all countries on the continent — adop-
tion of a realistic exchange rate,
removal of price controls on foodstuffs
to encourage production, control of the
budget, and encouragement of the
private sector.

U.S. Assistance Projects

Respect for human rights forms a part,
albeit an integral part, of our bilateral
agenda with Zaire. In our dialogue with
President Mobutu and his government,
our Ambassador and other high-level of-
ficials—including Assistant Secretary
|for African Affairs Chester A.]
Crocker— consistently point out the im-
portance which we attach to observance
of human rights. In addition to our
representations from the highest levels

down, we are taking specific steps to
promote observance of human rights in
Zaire. Part of our assistance effort is
directly targeted on projects designed t(
promote human rights. One example is
program financing the printing and
distribution of the penal code to incrtM.-
knowledge of individual rights and
privileges under Zairian law. We have
also approved funding operations of the
Center for Continuing Legal Educatinn
in Kinshasa. We have provided
resources for a series of magistrate
training seminars to strengthen the
quality and scope of judicial services.

There are, of course, limits to what
we can do concerning full observance oi
human rights in Zaire. We can and dn
press the Zairian Government privately
and we can and do target our assistanc
on creating conditions under which
human rights can prosper. We cannot f
as far as some would have us and sup-
port the opposition group which has
sought to form a second political party
in Zaire. This would constitute a direct
intervention in Zaire's politics, in viola-
tion of its constitution, and would, we
are convinced, result in worsened rela-
tions and diminished U.S. influence in
the human rights field.

Human rights concerns are central
to our policy toward Zaire, and are on'
aspect of a complex and critical bilater
relationship. We have other policy goa
which must also be taken into account
including political and strategic stabili'
in Zaire and the region and the develo
ment of Zaire. To protect our interest
and achieve our goals we must mainta
our influence and deal with Zaire
cooperatively and on the basis of
respect. This approach will, we believi
be the best human rights policy as we
and will maximize U.S. influence in
Zaire.

Ill

SOUTH AFRICA

irtfi

Turning to South Africa, I intend to [
sent to this committee as factual a pi(
tiire as possible of recent developmen |iBit
on the human rights front in South
Africa — both positive and negative
developments. A portion of the inforr
tion I am providing here is drawn fro
the 1983 human rights report on Sou
Africa prepared by the State Depart-
ment, which, I might note, has been
praised by the Lawyers' Committee f
International Human Rights, Americ;
Watch, and Helsinki Watch as "one o
the State Department's more success
efforts to portray the human rights
situation in another country." I will a
attempt to update that report by

iler

aire
Haw

ttoi

Ktfl

HUMAN RIGHTS

i cribing developments which have
en place since it was prepared in
ember. Finally, I will attempt to give
some idea of how these factors af-
■( t U.S. policy toward South Africa.
As we observed in the 1983 human
Its report. South Africa is a
Itiracial country whose present con-
■ution codifies the system of apartheid
I ler which the white minority holds a
ri nopoly of power in the country's na-
) lal political institutions. The result
I been a parliamentary democratic

item run by the 16.2% of the popula-
1 which is white. Persons of "colored"
xed blood) and Asian descent have
1 no legal right to political participa-
1 at the national level; and the over-
elming black majority has also been
lied national political participation,
ept through the device of tribally
ed "homelands" or "national states"
ated by the South African Govern-
nt without regard to whether blacks
in or wish to be associated with
se areas.

nstitutional Reforms

ith Africa has introduced a new coii-
lution which will include a limited na-
lal franchise for South Africans of
)red and Asian descent. This constitu-
1, approved by a 2-1 margin by white
ers in a referendum held last
/ember, is scheduled to go into effect
September 3 of this year. Although it
s not allow for participation by
:ks in the central government, the
ith African Government has stated
t the constitutional reform process
■s not rule out further developments
iich could include extending participa-
1 in national political processes to
ith Africa's black majority. Con-
srable debate is underway in South
•ica over the meaning and direction of
se constitutional reforms.
Regardless of whether or not the
V constitution represents reform of
irtheid or only its rationale and
dernization, the practice of apartheid
lains the basis for the organization of
ith African society. Apartheid institu-
lalizes political and economic control
the white minority. Discriminatory
's and practices — such as legislation
iting South Africa's black citizens to
ource-poor homelands, the influx con-
1 laws, the Group Areas Act, the
xed Marriages and Immorality Acts,
i so forth — are woven throughout the
iric of South African society. The
uth African Government has also
icted legislation that, in the name of

security, curtails the civil liberties of
those persons of all races whose
statements, actions, or associations are
viewed as a serious challenge to the
established order.

In 1983 some improvements in the
human rights climate took place. On
July 1, for example, 54 persons were un-
banned, reducing the number of banned
individuals to 12, the lowest number in
recent years. The South African Govern-
ment took tentative steps to recognize
the right of blacks to live permanently in
urban -areas under certain conditions.
Black labor unions continued to grow
under the government's labor law
reforms.

• The efforts at limited power shar-
ing under the terms of the new constitu-
tion are moving forward. The new
tricameral parliament will sit in an ab-
breviated session during the month of
September. Although blacks remain ex-
cluded from the system, for the first
time legislation concerning blacks will no
longer be the prerogative of the white
parliament, but will require the concur-
rence of the Asian and so-called colored
chambers. In addition, the Minister of
Constitutional Development and Plan-
ning recently told parliament that the
South African Government does not
view the new constitution as final, and it

... a socioeconomic process is underway
which is contributing dramatically to the bargain-
ing power of South Africa's black population as
well as to the perception of white South Africans
that the status quo is untenable.

On the other hand detention without
charge or trial and "bannings" of in-
dividuals, organizations, publications,
and gathering continued. Despite orders
given by the South African Government
in 1982 for more humane treatment and
care of detainees held under security
laws, several died due to mistreatment
by police officials, or allegedly commit-
ted suicide in 1983. For the first time,
however, action was taken against police
and prison personnel who abused their
power.

We concluded in December 1983,
that while one can point to some positive
developments in recent years. South
Africa's fundamental human rights situa-
tion has changed little. There remains
no effective judicial remedy against the
denationalization of blacks into "inde-
pendent" tribal homelands or against
forced resettlements. Indefinite deten-
tion without charge or access to at-
torney and other judicial acts without
due process, such as banning, continue.
The 83.3% of South Africa's population
which is not white suffers from per-
vasive discrimination which severely
limits political, economic, and social life.

Recent Policy Developments

What has been the picture thus far in
1984? Let me outline some important re-
cent developments, both positive and
negative, which have taken place. On the
positive side:

is widely recognized that the issue of
black political rights must be addressed.

• A Parliamentary Select Commit-
tee is reviewing the Immorality and
Mixed Marriages Acts, seemingly with
an eye toward the modification or repeal
of both.

• In late April 1984, the Minister of
Cooperation and Development an-
nounced the withdrawal of the new
legislation governing the movement of
blacks in South Africa, the highly con-
tentious Orderly Movement and Settle-
ment of Black Persons Act. Its demise is
partially attributed to the fact that the
bill could have put in question the per-
manent residence rights of urban blacks
qualifying under Section 10 of the cur-
rent law, the Urban Consolidation Act,
including beneficiaries of the Rikhoto
decision.

• In February, the South African
Government announced its intention to
open central business districts in urban
areas to business people of all races. At
the same time, a recommendation was
made that segregation of public facilities
would be discretionary rather than man-
datory.

• No new banning orders have been
issued since August 1983. The number
of banned persons remains at 12.

• In early May 1984, the South
African Government announced its will-
ingness to relax the provisions of the

HUMAN RIGHTS

Prisons Act governing press coverage of
prison conditions, shortly before an in-
vestigative committee released findings
which shocked the public.

• On February 22, 1984, Sergeant
J. Van As of the security police was
sentenced to 10 years in prison for
shooting Paris Malatji while in detention
for interrogation. Van As was the first
security policeman prosecuted for an in-
cident carried out in the line of duty.

• In April 1984, three policemen at
the Dirkiesdorp Police Station were
fined for their role in the death of
Thomas Manana, who died while in
custody in early 1983.

• On January 1, 1984, the amend-
ment of the Defense Act which provides
for alternative service for religious ob-
jectors went into effect. The amendment
also created the Board for Religious Ob-
jection which determines the status of
religious objectors to military service.
Alternative service for conscientious ob-
jectors still does not exist. As of
February 14, 1984, 51 people had been
classified religious objectors. They were
ail Jehovah's Witnesses.

• The situation in the "independent"
homeland of the Ciskei has quieted,
although conditions there are still unset-
tled and more than 30 people may still
be in detention.

• A new Matrimonial Property Act,
designed to raise the status of white,
colored, and Indian women before the
law, is under consideration by parlia-
ment and may be passed during the
present session.

• Venda security police continue to
intimidate individuals they regard as
threats to state security. They use sur-
prise visits, unexpected searches, and
long questioning sessions in their own
offices to frighten people.

• In February 1984, Samuel
Tshikhudo died of illness while in deten-
tion in Venda after being held since
November 1983 incommunicado.

• Resettlement remains a mixed pic-
ture. A decision not to remove the peo-
ple from St. Wendolin's in Natal is offset
by the earlier removal of the residents
of Mogopa. The residents of Badplaas,
Leandra, Driefontein, Huhudi, and
Crossroads, among other places, still live
under the threat of removal. The South
African Government has not abandoned
the idea of the cession of Ingwavuma
and Kangwane to Swaziland, which
would result in the "removal" of large
black populations. Minister of Coopera-
tion and Development Piet Koornhof ad-
mitted in early May that about 2 million
black persons have been resettled by the
South African Government since 1960.
On April 27 the Prime Minister stated
that "forced removals" would no longer
take place in the future. This would ap-
pear to mean that henceforth the
government will attempt to induce peo-
ple to move by offering better housing,
facilities, and job opportunities
elsewhere. But this would seem to
signify a change in methods rather than
a departure from the policy of com-
pleting the process of "consolidation."

Regardless of whether or not the new constitu-
tion represents reform of apartheid or only its ra-
tionalization and modernization, the practice of
apartheid remains the basis for the organization of
South African society.

However, there have been negative
developments as well.

• Detentions continue; as of May 31,
1984, a total of 286 persons had been
detained in South Africa on political or
security grounds including 137 in Trans-
kei due to recent student unrest, 30 in
Ciskei, and 1 in Bophuthatswana, so-
called "independent" homelands. Overall,
the number of persons remaining in
detention as of May 31 is 38, the lowest
figure for some time.

• Prison sentences for treason and
security convictions vary considerably.
Carl Niehaus, a white university stu-
dent, was convicted of high treason and
sentenced to 15 years in prison for his
activities on behalf of the African Na-
tional Congress [ANC] and the South
African Communist Party. His fiancee,
Johanna Lourens, was sentenced to 4
years for her complicity. Two professed
ANC members were convicted of high
treason and attempted murder in early
April. They received 10-year prison
sentences. In December 1983, Mathews

Thabang Ntshiwa received a sentence ot
3 years, of which 18 months were
suspended for 5 years, for advising, ad-
vocating, and encouraging the aims of a
banned organization. Ntshiwa owned a
mug which carried ANC slogans. Also ii
December 1983, Sister Mary Ncube
received a 12-month prison sentence for
possession of banned literature. Eight
months of the sentence were suspended
for 5 years. On the other hand, however
on April 2, 1984, Constable Nienaber
was acquitted of murder in the April
1983 shooting death of Dreifontein com
munity leader Saul Mkhize. The court
found that Neinaber acted in self-
defense, and that Mkhize was "arrogant
and impolite." Also, members of the
white far rightwing Afrikaner
Weerstandsbeweging received suspend-
ed sentences in October 1983 for
charges of treason and possession of il-
legal weapons, despite having been
caught with a large weapon cache in-
cluding AK-47 assault rifles, explosives
and ammunition.

• The South African Government
has refused permission for banned
Pastor Beyers Naude to travel to
Europe to receive an award.

• The initial findings of extensive
private research reveal that black Sout!
Africans suffer from vastly inferior
standards of health, nutrition, housing,
income, and education as compared to
whites.

In short, we must conclude, as we
did in December, that we are dealing
with a mixed balance sheet; that despit
certain improvements, the established
system of comprehensive control over
the lives of most South Africans remai
substantially in effect. Nevertheless,
there is a process of change underway ,■
with major implications for the future
that system. This is a fact which objec
tive observers cannot deny. Those who
say that the situation is totally un-
changed, or has gotten worse, fail to
take this into account. Nothing could
make this more evident than the fer-
ment surrounding the new constitutioi
which reflects a clear consensus amon;
white South Africans that genuine
change must occur if they are to sur-
vive. With the expansion of parliameni
to include the Indian and so-called col-
ored South Africans, a door has been
opened and cannot be closed.

One of the major factors underlyin
this process of change has been the
dynamic of economic growth combined:
with demographics. Whites increasing!'
realize they cannot run their economy

pe
ail

HUMAN RIGHTS

hout more skilled labor, which blacks
being trained to supply in ever
ater numbers. Black awareness of
ir growing bargaining power in the
rkforce is reflected in the spread of
:k trade unions. Simultaneously.
ck purchasing power is also on the
!, and a distinct black middle class is
act being formed with the ability to
rcise important leverage in the South
ican marketplace. Those who believe
■t the formation of a black middle
s will result in political stagnation,
! to some perceived vested interest in
petuation of the status quo, fun-
nentally misread what has always
tivated human beings, namely, a
ire not just to obtain a higher stand-
I of living but also to exercise the
edom which that higher standard
— but does not always — make possi-
In short, a socioeconomic process is
ierway which is contributing
.matically to the bargaining power of
ith Africa's black population as well
to the perception of white South
■icans that the status quo is
;enable.

S. Policy Toward South Africa

ould now like to turn to the question
TOW this situation affects U.S. policy
l/ard South Africa. U.S. policy with
fard to apartheid is clear. Morally, the
i ith African system is completely con-
iry to our values. Morally "repugnant"
; 5 the word President Reagan used to

cribe it. Politically, apartheid nur-
; es instability which is contrary to
1 lerican interests in southern Africa.
- national interest compels us to pro-
te peaceful but genuine evolution
ay from apartheid and toward a
tern of government based on the con-
iit of all South Africans, regardless of
'e.

As we engage in this effort,
vever, we must not lose sight of the
t that just as a lasting basis for
ional stability requires evolutionary
inge toward government by consent
South Africa, so, by the same token,

are not likely to see internal change
iceeding at an adequate pace and by
nocratic means if escalating violence
and across frontiers polarizes the
itics and deepens domestic divisions
;hin South Africa itself. Thus, the
•efully negotiated agreements involv-
; South Africa, Angola, and Mozam-
[ue which have been reached in recent
>nths hold immense potential for the
;ure of peaceful, genuine, evolutionary
inge within South Africa itself. This is

precisely one of the principal reasons
why U.S. diplomacy has been so deeply
involved in trying to establish a climate
in which such agreements could be
reached.

Remarkably, there are elements at
all levels of South African society which
are themselves engaged in the effort to
promote peaceful change, to find a solu-
tion to South Africa's problems which
somehow steers between the extremes
of continued repression and the anarchy
of racial conflagration. One of the fun-
damental but least well known facets of
U.S. policy toward South Africa is the
degree to which we are involved in sup-
porting organizations and individuals
who have committed themselves to
peaceful change in South Africa. Such
support, in a tangible form, com-
plements our moral and political opposi-
tion to apartheid.

This year alone, with the support of
Congress, we have devoted over $10
million in U.S. funds to programs de-
signed to uplift those disadvantaged by
apartheid: programs to provide black
South Africans with scholarships for
university study in the U.S., programs
to assist blacks in qualifying for a
university education, programs to assist
the emerging black entrepreneur with
acquiring management skills, and pro-
grams to train black trade unionists in
effective union organization and bargain-
ing skills. As these efforts gain momen-
tum, we hope that they will increase the
overall bargaining power of South
Africa's blacks in the context of the
growing demand within South Africa's
economy for skilled workers.

Congress has helped lead the way in
providing the resources and imagination
for these sorts of programs. Most
recently. Congress passed a $1.5 million
Human Rights Fund for South Africa,
which provided funds for small grants to
be made by the U.S. Embassy in South
Africa to organizations which promote
human rights. To date our Embassy has
allocated $197,650 on 23 projects, which
have supported activities such as
research on the legal status of black
women, farm schools, education, and
pensions; the purchase of resource
materials for centers which study legal
questions; training for labor unions; and
establishment of facilities where people
can meet to discuss human rights topics.

Support for peaceful change within
South Africa is not limited, I would add.

exclusively to the public sector. The ac-
tivities of those U.S. firms which have
joined the Sullivan code, employing
enlightened management practices and
providing substantial benefits to their
employees outside the workplace, are
setting the pace for progress in the way
blacks are treated by employers in South
Africa. To date, U.S. firms have spent
over $78 million on improvements for
black employees and their families.

As I indicated, these efforts are in-
tended to complement the political
facets of U.S. policy: our strict
adherence to the arms embargo on
South Africa, our refusal to recognize
the so-called "independence homelands,"
and our firm rejection of apartheid. But
in addition, fundamental to our ability to
influence events in South Africa is our
capacity to communicate with the
government's leaders. With them lies the
responsibility for shaping South Africa's
future. They have the power to deter-
mine the speed and the context of
reform.

Let me be plain: we do communicate
with these leaders, and frankly. If we
choose to speak in confidential channels,
we also do so firmly. No South African
leader has the slightest doubt about the
strength of American feelings when
essential human rights are abused.

But we must recognize that we are
dealing with another sovereign nation,
and by no means the only country in the
world to abuse human rights. We cannot
dictate to that nation's leaders how to
conduct their internal affairs, though we
certainly can, and do, offer our own
reactions to what we see. We have
chosen the path of constructive involve-
ment in efforts to promote peaceful
change in South Africa. Even if the pace
is too slow to suit those of us who would
prefer to see white South Africans join
tomorrow before a stunned world in
sharing gladly the wealth and control of
their nation with all their fellow citizens,
one must nevertheless concede that our
course is perhaps the only realistic one.
We intend to fulfill our commitment to
promoting peaceful change toward
government based on the consent of all
South Africans in the months and years
ahead.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tlie Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

PACIFIC

The ANZUS Relationship:
Alliance Management

by Paul D. Wolfowitz

Address before the Conference on the
American Effect on Australian Defense
at the Aiistralian Studies Center of
Pennsylvania State University, Univer-
sity Park, Pennsylvania, on June 24,
1981t. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs.

ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, and
United States security treaty] is an
alliance of democratic nations committed
to peace. These two facts about the
alliance— our commitment to democratic
freedom and our commitment to
peace — are so fundamental to ANZUS
that they would be worth noting at the
outset even were they nothing more
than very broad statements of purpose.
But so far from being mere shopworn
generalities, these two facts have great
practical significance from the basic role
and function of our alliance — and even
for its day-to-day management —
significance which is often not suffi-
ciently appreciated.

It is because our nations are
democracies that the commitments we
make to one another are of great prac-
tical consequence and also why they are
so reliable. For our three nations,
vulnerable as we are to the infirmities
that are alleged to afflict democracies in
the conduct of their affairs, our alliance
commitments are imporUint in bringing
a fundamental continuity into our rela-
tions. But it is also because these com-
mitments represent the commitments of
whole nations to one another— not the
mere whim of arbitrary rulers— that it is
possible to rely on them. There is no
task more fundamental to alliance
management than the constant nurtur-
ing of public support.

Our collective commitment to
preserving peace is no less profound in
its practical implications for our alliance.
It is perhaps to be expected that so
much of the discussion of ANZUS con-
cerns questions about what would hap-
pen and how the various parties would
respond in the event of war. The treaty
itself, of course, contains important com-
mitments of mutual assisUince in the
event of armed attack. Yet it is no
depreciation of the importance of those
commitments to say that the foremost
goal of the alliance is to prevent those

commitments from ever having to be
called upon. The operation of the
alliance in peacetime is every bit as vital
as its operation in time of war— indeed,
even more so. Particularly in a nuclear
age, the task of preserving peace is fun-
damental to alliance management.

The Determination of National
Interest in a Democracy

The old aphorism that nations have no
permanent friends, only permanent in-
terests, is still a popular one, but it con-
tains as much concealed falsehood as ap-
parent truth. Viewing the flux and per-
fidy of 19th-century alliances, it was cer-
tainly plausible— and perhaps even
somewhat comforting— to believe that
geography, historic rivalries, and
economic interests provide the constants
in a nation's decisions, while policies and
alliances form and founder around these
fixed goals. A nation, so this view goes,
may be obsessed by a particular threat,
must have particular ports or trading
opportimities— or, conversely, may have
no interest in a distant land— and should
form its alliances in whatsoever way will
promote these ends.

The notion of permanent interests,
impermanent friends, left a great deal to
be desired as a model for the conduct of
international relations, even in the 19th
century. And in a nuclear age it is a
very dangerous basis for democratic na-
tions to conduct their affairs.

Among its other weaknesses, the no-
tion of permanent interests leads to the
dangerous fallacies of permanent
disinterest and predictability. These can
all too often be used to excuse neglect, a
seductive choice for peace-loving
democracies that sometimes fail to
recognize the aggressive designs of
others.

Why, so the argument goes, must a
nation spend valuable resources to de-
fend against distant challenges? Why
maintain forces without a visible threat?
If grand political and military goals are
constant, there is no need to reassess
defenses and alliances will naturally tend
themselves. If decisions are always
logical, the need to prepare for unex-
pected contingencies is quite small.

But we know from long, historical
experience that alliances are hard to put
together and to keep, that illogical and
unpredictable decisions are all too com-
mon, and that circumstances can change
radically, often without a shot being
fired. The fall of the Shah of Iran, the
Sino-Soviet split, the attempt to place
Soviet missiles in Cuba, even a coup in
the small island of Grenada, created new
strategic interests and shifted political
and military thinking abruptly. Uncer-
tain or ambiguous political commit-
ments, even where interests seemed
otherwise clear, led to bloodshed in
1914, in 1939, in 1950, and even in 1982

I believe that countries, and in par-
ticular democracies like the United
States and Australia and New Zealand,
do have permanent interests. But they
are not only or principally the geo-
strategic interests on which past debate
has centered. Our nations' permanent ii
terests are as much or more in justice
and the rule of law, in democracy and
freedom, and in peace.

In pursuit of these goals, we have
permanent "friends" as well: continuity
reliability, and strong alliances with
other nations that share the same
values. Surely nations that defend
freedom and the rule of law have a
sound foundation for the elements of
such permanent friendship. But these
foundations will only be maintained
through consistency, responsible policif
and a commitment to cooperation. The
burden of maintaining such cooperatio'
and policies in the first half of this cen |^,
tury was too heavy to avoid world con
flagration. We must avoid such misste
in the nuclear era.

I would like to discuss today the n
ANZUS plays in protecting all of our ■
terests in peace and freedom — both in
regional context and as an important
factor in the calculation of world peac
For these issues are intricately linked

itf

Preserving Nuclear Peace

Effective alliances require a fundamei
tal faith in the responsibility of our
allies. As no issue is more important
today than preserving nuclear peace,
responsible policies to this end are a
crucial element in preserving confider
among our countries. For this reason,
would like to begin a discussion of
managing ANZUS with a brief word > |'i«
managing this great issue of our time
the threat of nuclear war.

Surely, it is a topic on which muc
has been said. The dangers of nuclear

lyt

ork;
*

».:

PACIFIC

r have become common political
jics worldwide. In my own country, no
ue takes greater precedence. Preserv-
r nuclear peace is a duty we owe not
t to our friends and fellow coun-
rmei\ but to all the inhabitants of this
met.

"A nuclear war," President Reagan
s said, "cannot be won and must never
fought." He has said it in China. He
s said it in Germany. He has said it in
pan. He has said it in England. He
s said it in Congress. He has said it
the Oval Office. He has said it
oughout America. The essence of
esident Reagan's policy on preventing
clear war can be crystallized in this
rase. It is a principle that has the
1 support of responsible people
erywhere.

Much of the public debate on nuclear
ues focuses on the enormous destruc-
e potential of existing arsenals. Presi-
nt Reagan has led the way in the
sponsible effort to reduce nuclear
enals.

• He has proposed the complete
mination of an entire class of nuclear
iapons— intermediate-range missiles—
d in negotiations with the Soviets, he
s rejected any solution that would
nply transfer such weapons from
aere they threaten Europe to where

:y could threaten Asia.

• In the strategic arms reduction
ks (START), he has proposed deep

iductions in intercontinental ballistic
I ssiles, a goal no previous strategic
1 ms treaty has even approached.

Unfortunately, the Soviets tied prog-
1 3S in START to preventing INF
I termediate-range nuclear forces]
I ployments in Europe, deployments
at our NATO allies requested in 1979

offset massive Soviet deployments of
new missile, the triple-warhead SS-20.
ist November the Soviets walked out

the INF negotiations and in
jcember suspended indefinitely their
.rticipation in START, apparently due

their frustration over their failure to
event NATO's own counterdeployment

intermediate-range forces. We are
ady to resume both negotiations at
ly time and any place, without precon-
tions. Our proposals are fair and
orkable. All the elements for an agree-
ent are on the table. We hope the
5viet Union will also come to recognize
lat its interests can best be served by
■turning to the negotiating table as
)on as possible.

But the United States has not sim-
ply waited on Soviet responses to con-
trol nuclear weapons and to reduce their
destructive potential. We have acted on
our own to this end. Improvements in
our nuclear forces over the years have
made them safer— less vulnerable to sur-
prise attack, less prone to accident or to
unauthorized use, less susceptible to
seizure by terrorists. These improve-
ments in our nuclear forces are well
known, though insufficiently acknowl-
edged by those who propose to freeze all
changes to those forces. What is
perhaps less well known is the fact that
these improvements have made it possi-
ble to reduce the destructive potential of
our nuclear forces over the last 20
years.

Both the number and megatonnage
of our nuclear arsenal has been substan-
tially reduced. Our stockpile was one-
third higher in 1967 than it is now, and
the total yield has declined by 75% since
1960. The stockpile of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe has also been
dramatically reduced. The United States
and NATO allies withdrew 1,000 nuclear
weapons from Europe in 1980, and we
agreed in 1983 to withdraw an addi-
tional 1,400 weapons over the next
several years. These reductions will be
realized even if we have to carry
through with the deployment of ground-
launched and cruise missiles, as NATO
decided in 1979 that it would do if no
agreement with the Soviet Union to ban
or limit those weapons can be reached.
For each new weapon that would be
deployed in that event, we have
withdrawn an old one. Thus, when all
NATO withdrawals are taken into ac-
count, we will have withdrawn a total of
five weapons for each new one that we
may introduce under the 1979 decision.

Yes, America has begun to rebuild
its nuclear forces, even as we have
sought to reduce them. But we have
done so only after a decade of
restraint— restraint unmatched, indeed
exploited, by our adversaries. And we
have done so only to avoid the more
destabilizing situation when an adver-
sary might be tempted by forces suscep-
tible to a successful first strike.

The United States has consistently
taken responsible positions on reducing
the level of nuclear armaments— posi-
tions worthy of our allies' support. The
United States also has undertaken a
number of other important arms control
initiatives to reduce the risk of war and
halt or reverse the growth in weapons.

In Geneva, Vice President Bush
presented to the Conference on Dis-
armament in April a draft treaty for a

comprehensive ban on the development,
production, stockpiling, transfer, and
use of chemical weapons.

In Stockholm, together with our
NATO allies, we have put forward a
package of confidence-building measures
designed to reduce the risk of a Euro-
pean war occurring by accident, surprise
attack, or miscalculation.

In Moscow, we have proposed a
strenghthening of U.S. -Soviet com-
munications through a technical
upgrading of the hotline to help contain
possible crises.

In Vienna, at the mutual and
balanced force reduction talks we have,
again with our European allies, pre-
sented a new initiative this April that
seeks to find a common ground between
Eastern and Western positions, and to
make progress on reducing conventional
forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

These, too, are worthy of our allies'
respect and support.

A Commitment to Peace and Freedom

The public debate on the levels of
nuclear weapons is an important one.
But whether our forces freeze at current
levels, or gain or diminish slightly, the
potential destruction remains unaccept-
able.

The public debate on how we pre-
vent nuclear war is, therefore, of even
greater relevance to our fate, but unfor-
tunately, attracts less attention. The
prospects of preventing nuclear war de-
pend on far more than just nuclear
weapons themselves. Peace will depend
on a stable nuclear deterrent, but it will
also depend on preventing the regional
conflicts that can, unexpectedly, lead to
wider confrontations.

Herein lies the second great
challenge for preserving our freedom
and world peace. Our alliance com-
mitments play a crucial role in meeting
that challenge.

The initial and most basic step in the
effort to preserve peace and freedom is
the national decision to make the at-
tempt—and the national will to per-
severe. My country, like Australia and
New Zealand, considered itself for most
of its history secure behind vast ocean
frontiers. Even after World War I, we
maintained this illusion. Only after the
painful lessons of World War II did we
learn, as smaller nations like Norway
also learned so painfully, that neutrality
does not ensure safety. Since that time,
each of our three countries has faced up
to the high costs of isolationism in an in-
terconnected world; each has committed

PACIFIC

itself to the search for peace beyond our
borders, not merely in home waters but
in the Pacific and in areas as distant as
Africa and the Middle East.

In the aftermath of our difficult ex-
perience in Vietnam, America had a
renewed flirtation with a reduced inter-
national role, even with isolationism.
There were strong feelings in America
to draw back into ourselves. We con-
sidered withdrawing our troops from
Korea and other lands where they are
vitally needed. We considered reducing
our fleet in the hope that we could
"swing" ships as needed from one
theater to another, ignoring the very
real possibility that this could increase
the chances of a two-ocean challenge
and, even more immediately, would have
significantly reduced the U.S. presence
in the Pacific.

But with the steady growth of
Soviet military forces and the increasing
and alarming tendency of the Soviets to
use that force, either directly them-
selves—as in Afghanistan— or in-
directly—as in Kampuchea, Ethiopia,
Chad, and elsewhere— we emerged from
our Vietnam experience with renewed
determination, restored confidence, and
a heightened sense of realism.

Our determination and confidence
led us to begin to rebuild our forces and
to speak more forthrightly for freedom.
Our heightened sense of realism gave us
a clearer view of the dangers posed by
our adversaries and a desire to further
the increasing self-reliance among our
friends, including those in Asia. If most
of Asia is largely peaceful despite the
increase in Soviet activities and
capabilities, .surely it is due in part to
our renewed role and the growing
strength of friends.

America's return to a more vigorous
role in the world is testimony to the
staying power of democracies in foreign
affairs, a quality that has often been
questioned by [wlitical theorists, in-
cluding that most brilliant analyst of
democratic politics, Alexis de Tocque-
ville. Our alliances were one of the key
factors that kept America from straying
from its course. Without these alliances,
we might well have accepted a lessened
role— to the detriment of all our coun-
tries. Through the alliances, we main-
tained a clearer view of where our true
interests and responsibilities lie.

Indeed, not just America but the
democracies in general have succeeded
to an extraordinary degree since World
War II in maintaining a constancy of
policy. During this same period, the

world on the whole has also enjoyed an
extraordinary period of peace among the
major powers, a peace of critical impor-
tance in the nuclear age. Both of these
achievements are, in large part, a
tribute to the strength and vigor of the
West's interlocking set of alliances. In
the circumstances, I believe, a heavy
burden of proof falls on those who would
weaken a system of alliance that has
contributed so much to the maintenance
of nuclear peace.

This is not to say that our systems
of alliances cannot be improved upon.
Constant efforts are still required, and
complacency can be as dangerous as ex-
cessive anxiety. But our alliances on the
whole make an invaluable contribution,
and no one has as yet put forward a
surer way of preserving the peace. Cer-
tainly the isolation of each nation for
itself is not such an alternative.

ANZUS reflects our countries' joint
determination to avoid the dangers and
painful lessons of isolationism or
neutralism. Each of our nation's com-
mitments eases the burden of com-
mitments, real and psychological, of the
others. Our joint pledges give each of
our pledges added meaning.

The question is not so much whether
any one ANZUS country could prosper
as a neutral under the umbrella of
others' active roles but whether the
other countries would choose to continue
active roles once one chose to withdraw.
There are Americans who continue to
question our role in NATO, despite
strong European commitments, because
of what they see as inadequate defense
spending. I have little doubt that such
questions would increase dramatically if
the European commitments themselves
came into serious question.

Today, our three countries' com-
mitments remain firm. Only last year,
the ANZUS review confirmed that the
treaty "remains relevant and vitally im-
portant to the shared security concerns
and strategic interests of the three part-
ner governments." Let there be no doubt
in the mind of any potential adversary
that an armed attack on an ally would
require, and would receive from the
allies, full and prompt fulfillment of the
ANZUS security commitment including,
when necessary, military support.

The national security of each of us is
a fundamental interest of the others and
requires adequate and appropriate
response to threats or attacks on allies
from any source. In the case of an at-
tack on Australia, for example, our com-
mitment remains firm whether the at-

tack should come from the Pacific or
Indian Ocean approaches. Our commit-
ment to the defense of our allies is not
limited to any particular threat; it ap-
plies to any potential aggressor.

In the Falklands crisis when our
NATO ally. Great Britain, was wrong-
fully attacked by a Latin American
friend, America did everything it could
to negotiate an end to the crisis. But
when negotiations failed, we took a
strong stand on behalf of our wronged ,
ally, despite the predicted high costs of i
such a stand. We were strongly com-
mitted to doing what was right in sup-
port of our ally — even though we were
under no treaty obligation to do so.
(NATO does not extend to the South
Atlantic.)

The U.S. presence in the Pacific
over the past 40 years has been a
stabilizing one that has served the in-
terests of our friends and allies in the
region. ANZUS has been one of the
critical factors supporting this stability.
In the last 40 years, as well, countries ol
the region have made great progress
toward democracy and the rule of law.
These, too, are stabilizing factors. While
these conditions prevail, it is difficult to
see a situation in which ANZUS
members would be called upon to fulfill
their commitments in a dispute involvinj
another friendly power. Indeed, a
weakening of ANZUS or the consequent
weakening of the U.S. role in the Pacifi
is one of the few events that could con-
ceivably make such hypothetical imagin-
ings a reality. ANZUS is not weaker
because its members have other com-
mitments. These commitments do not
conflict, they interlock; and in so doing,
they help to prevent conflict.

By our alliances, we add ever
greater echoes of support to alliances "
throughout the free world. There are, ^'
for example, no direct political or legal
linkages between ANZUS and the Five
Power Defense Arrangement. Howevei
any potential aggressor in Southeast
Asia must take into account that
ANZUS alliance interests would be
threatened by an attack engaging
Australian and New Zealand forces
there.

A strong NATO strengthens deter-
rence globally to the advantage of
ANZUS. But equally, the health of
ANZUS is vital to the global Western
alliance— especially given the increasini
ly important locations of both Australi;
and New Zealand. It would be a mistal
to underestimate the moral and politic;
influence of this alliance of three of the
world's oldest democracies.

ilif

Tl!li

'orr
lai
tn
m

i\:
16

PACIFIC

Some argue that alliances are
igerous in the nuclear era. But an
limited nuclear war will leave no cor-
!• of our world safe and secure. No na-
n can hide its head in the sand and
int on being spared— a point made on
ae 6 in Parliament by [Australian]
ime Minister Hawke.

The enjoyment of freedom cannot be
jarated from the responsibilities of
edom— responsibilities the three
4ZUS countries have shouldered
larely. Clearly, there are risks
;ociated with engaging directly in
:errence through active cooperation in
najor alliance. The United States has
lingly assumed such risks on behalf of
allies. We have done so because we
ieve, as Prime Minister Hawke and
reign Minister Hayden have recently
1 eloquently argued, that such risks
• significantly less than those
lociated with the weakening and
lure of deterrence.

maging ANZUS

ce there is the will to take alliances
iously, the problems of managing an
ance come into full play. ANZUS, like
iTO, provides the elements for peace,
iance management is the art that
;s meaning into the framework that

■ treaty provides.

Successful alliance management
)ends on our success in meeting five
ideal challenges.

First, as an alliance of democracies,
IZUS inherits the challenges democra-
1 3 face in running a coherent foreign
I icy. Policies that do not sustain public
Dport will fail. Needed policies that
! k public support can go unrealized. In
} irt, alliance management requires an
i m and informed public debate led by
! zens mindful of the great, not just

■ immediately visible, threats the
I ure holds.

Second, an effective alliance among
'ee vital democracies requires exten-
e, ongoing contacts at all levels of
! /ernment and society. The need for
: )rdinated political and military ac-
; ities requires close official ties and
I ong institutionalized consultative
j )cesses. But they also require lively,
I ormal public commentary and per-
i lal interchanges (including con-
ences like this one). Together these
sure a constant flow of information
j views on potential problems, as well
a full awareness of each other's con-
•ns, interests, capabilities, and objec-

tives. Only through such exchanges can
alliance managers reach decisions that
serve a common purpose.

Such exchanges cannot be turned on
and off as crises arise and recede. To be
effective, they must continue at all levels
over time and reflect the high degree of
mutual confidence derived from ex-
perience and personal contact.

Fortunately, the management of the
ANZUS alliance in all three capitals pro-
vides precisely that kind of consultative
relationship. At the so-called working
levels, there are literally daily contacts
between both civilian and military of-
ficials, including a throughly institu-
tionalized sharing of intelligence and
related assessments. At a higher level,
there are frequent major meetings of
senior officials to exchange views on
issues of immediate concern to the
alliance.

Most importantly, there is the on-
going dialogue— through meetings, cor-
respondence, and communications— be-
tween ministers in the three capitals.
The annual ANZUS Council meeting
provides a vital element that links
political leaders and symbolizes the
significance of the relationship.

On the military side, even without a
pattern of integrated commands and
military forces as in NATO Europe,
ANZUS alliance managers over the
years have built up a pattern of close
defense cooperation which assures that
ANZUS forces can operate together
quickly and effectively, if that is ever
necessary. Key elements of this coopera-
tion are joint exercises between our
forces, especially our navies.

The third challenge of alliance
management is to meet the need for
continuity and long-term consistency of
policy. President Reagan came into of-
fice committed to demonstrating that
the United States is a reliable ally and
partner. Accordingly, while he has
brought strong views of his own to the
definition of new policy areas, he has
shown great respect for commitments
made by previous administrations. That
element of continuity between ad-
ministrations is essential to effective
management of alliances between
democracies.

I could cite examples as far afield as
the Middle East, Central America, and
southern Africa to make my point, but
let me stick for now to some of more
direct concern to ANZUS. In the area of
arms control, President Reagan main-
tained the U.S. commitment to both

tracks of the 1979 NATO decision, while
offering his new and imaginative pro-
posal on the "zero option" for the arms
control track. He announced that the
United States would observe the limits
of the unratified SALT II [strategic
arms limitation talks] Treaty while seek-
ing to negotiate a better substitute for
it. With respect to China policy, the
President has made very clear his deter-
mination to maintain the framework
provided by previous U.S. commitments
in this area, at the same time that he
has worked to put that critically impor-
tant relationship on a more realistic and
stable basis. The views and concerns of
our NATO and ANZUS allies were, and
are, important in shaping U.S. arms
control policy. And I can say from direct
personal involvement that ANZUS views
were of great importance at critical
junctures in the development of this Ad-
ministration's China policy.

Fourth, there is a need to accept the
mutual burdens as well as the mutual
benefits of alliance. It is in the nature of
alliances that the precise levels of the
burdens and benefits will shift over
time. Concerns that another partner is
getting a "free ride" plague every
alliance in some form. Indeed, alliances
can be endangered as much as
strengthened by too fervent an effort to
make all burdens precisely equal at any
given moment to the benefits received.
What is important to a healthy alliance
is that the burdens be shouldered by all
parties as needed and when needed, and
that the benefits be shared as well.

Article II of the ANZUS treaty
binds the partners "separately and joint-
ly by means of continuous and effective
self-help and mutual aid" to "maintain
and develop their individual and collec-
tive capacity to resist armed attack."
Because the ANZUS democracies, as the
NATO allies, are dedicated to preserving
the peace, not fighting a war, there is a
tendency in all our countries to resent
spending resources for defense that
seems unnecessary at the time. Yet,
when the danger becomes evident, it
may be too late or seem too provocative
to begin to rearm. There, once again, a
well-informed public is essential.

Domestic political pressures and
miscalculations in Argentina led to a
wholly unexpected war in the
Falklands— a war for which Britain was
just barely prepared. British naval plan-
ners, prior to the Falklands, assumed
that their forces would be used relative-
ly close to home, that they would never
have to engage without allies, that land-
based air support would always be
available, and that landings against
hostile forces would not be needed.

REFUGEES

These comfortable assumptions lowered
Britain defense spending. But an un-
predictable world made them predictably
dangerous.

The United States, for its part, is in
the midst of a substantial effort to in-
crease its conventional forces. We have
done so not to provoke, but to defend;
not to escalate, but to provide the means
by which problems can be contained. By
strengthening our conventional deter-
rent we help to increase our options and
reduce the risks of nuclear war. In this
defense effort, too, we have kept our
allies closely informed.

The United States attaches critical
importance to the opportunity to use
Australian and New Zealand ports that
provide ready access to the South
Pacific and Indian Oceans. We view
Australia's and New Zealand's will-
ingness to allow us use of their ports as
part of their contribution to ANZUS.
We also value efforts to assure stand-
ardization or interoperability of equip-
ment and weapons systems, share in-
telligence, exchange personnel, and con-
sult on problems. The maintenance of

U.S. presence in the region, and the
demonstration of our ability to operate
effectively with our treaty partners, are
tangible physical evidence of our treaty
commitments. All of the ANZUS nations
share in this effort and all benefit
from it.

Another and critical element of
defense cooperation is that involving the
joint facilities in Australia. Although the
subject of bilateral agreements between
Canberra and Washington, they clearly
are within the spirit of the provisions of
the ANZUS treaty. Indeed, such is
noted in the agreements.

There is, of course, considerable
public speculation about the use of these
facilities, including gross distortions or
misunderstandings of related U.S.
defense strategy. The simple truth, as
clearly and forcefully enunciated by
Prime Minister Hawke on June 6 in
Parliament in Canberra, is that these
facilities contribute to arms control, ef-
fective deterrence, mutual security, and
to stability in global strategic relation-
ships. Verification, early warning, and
the ability to control our nuclear forces
and communicate with them are critical

African Refugees
Relief Day, 1984

PROCLAMATION 5216,
JULY 9. 1984'

The United States and the American
people have a long and proud tradition
of helping those who are in need. In
Africa, the needs of refugees cry out for
continued attention. So, too, do the
needs of the host countries who, despite
their own limited resources, have ac-
cepted the refugees in the best tradition
of humanitarian concern. Their generosi-
ty has led them to make great sacrifices.

We in the United States are mindful of
the hurden.s that are borne by the refugees
and their host countries. We are dedicated to
the cause of meeting their needs now and in
the future. We fervently hope that the Sec-
ond International Conference on Assistance
to Refugees in Africa, which begins .July 9.
1984, will lead to a sustained effort by the in-
ternational community to help African coun-
tries effectively cope with the refugee
burden. Our own efforts have been and will
continue to be in support of the African
refugees and their host countries.

In order to heighten awareness in the
United States of the needs of Africa's

refugees and the needs of their host coun-
tries, the Congress, by H.J. Res. 604, has
designated July 9, 1984, as "African
Refugees Relief Day" and has requested the
President to issue a proclamation in observ-
ance of that day.

As we reflect on the situation of refugees
and their host countries, I hope Americans
will be generous in their support of voluntary
agencies that provide relief and development
assistance to Africa. Further, I wish special
consideration be given to the extraordinary
hardships borne by women refugees, their
children, and other vulnerable groups. The in-
nocent victims of civil strife and war deserve
our special concern.

Now, Therefore, I, Ro.nald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim July 9, 1984, as African
Refugees Relief Day.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this 9th day of July, in the year
of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four
and of the Independence of the United States
of America the two hundred and ninth.

Ronald Reagan

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 16, 1984.

to both stable deterrence and to arms
control. In addition, this capability could
be critical in preventing some bizarre ac
cident from turning into an unintended
catastrophe. For all of these reasons,
the facilities are an important, even
essential, part of the West's critical and
deeply felt commitment to maintain
world peace— perhaps the greatest
single challenge of this or any century. '

Fifth, as alliance managers in all
three capitals have recognized from the
outset of ANZUS, our treaty relation-
ship is only part of the many-faceted i
relations between our countries— com-
mercial, historic, cultural, and personal.
They are all important. They all affect
the course of the relationship and each
other. As we approach problems in any
one area, we must he careful to see
them in the perspective of the entire
relationship. If we do so, we will con-
tinue to have a strong reservoir of good
will and self-interest from which prob-
lems can be solved. At the same time,
we will recognize that each element of i
the relationship is a part of the whole
and that each is important and worthy
of our best effort for consultation, com-
promise, and deference to the interests
of all.

For alliance managers the essential
task, whether in Washington, Canbern
or Wellington, is to maximize coopera-
tion to mutual advantage when we are
on common ground and to contain dif-
ferences — legitimate though they may
be — through the kinds of compromises
necessary in an effective working part-
nership. By so doing, we can assure th
competition in commerce and differenc
in other areas do not threaten coopera
tion linked to our most fundamental
shared interest — mutual national sur-
vival.

■

Conclusion

Relations between America, Australia,
and New Zealand are truly broad and
vital. Our personal, commercial, and
cultural ties, and a common political
heritage dedicated to preserving and
enhancing individual liberty, have forg
uniquely close relations — relations
Americans value deeply. As President
Reagan said almost exactly a year age
"Our ties are a precious tradition, re-
flecting our many concerns and sharec
values."

The ANZUS commitment is not
limited to paper. It resides in the hear
of Australians, New Zealanders, and

«i

iia

SOUTH ASIA

lericans alike — in our affection for
another and in our profound belief
rihe rule of law. Our treaty commit-
>int naturally requires that our actions
'(in accordance with our constitutional
■icosses, but our deep ties ensure that
sr processes will be swift and sup-
. ti\ c and embody the full spirit of our
'.pit's — the type of commitment
ii'H'racies require and from which
, literacies profit. Speaking for the
itrd States. I can say that Aus-
iiaiis and New Zealanders should rest
iircil that if any emergency confronts
,m. the American system is capable of
tisive action — and willing to render it.
The ties between our peoples will
ays remain a powerful force. But
it the future holds for ANZUS may
foundly affect life within each of our
ions. Will freedom remain a vibrant
ce, uplifting peoples throughout the
rid? Or will freedom itself be a
itive, cowering in remote lands in the
)e that it is too small to note? In the
1, even that would prove a futile
)e.

Our freedom and world peace de-
id primarily on our own commitment
lur mutual defense and the rule of
. The choice before us is not between
,ce and freedom. By promoting
adom we build what is ultimately the
st secure foundation for peace as
1. Nor can we choose peace at the ex-
[Se of freedom. Life in a world of
ilitarian powers would not be peace,
would peace betv/een them long

, I believe our countries have the will
|ireserve freedom. There is an old
I ing: "If I am not for myself, who will
I But if I am for myself alone, what
I?"

I believe our countries know what
are — we are trustees of freedom. In
end, we can do more to protect that
edom and to build a safe and just
rid:

• If we are strong, than if we are
lak;

• If we proceed with reason and
irage, than if we hang back until
derate responses no longer suffice;

• If we are united, than if we stand
ne.

The path we must follow is an ar-
ms one — one not without risk. But
;n few routes are quicker, and none is
ler. There are no shortcuts. ■

Visit of Sri Lankan
President Jayewardene

President J.R. Jayewardene of Sri
Lanka made a state visit to the United
States June 16-23, 198Jt. While in
Washington, D.C., June 17-20, he met
with President Reagan and other govern-
ment officials.

Following are remarks made at the
arrival ceremony and dinner toasts
made by Presidents Reagan and
Jayewardene on June 18.''

ARRIVAL CEREM0NY2

President Reagan

President Jayewardene, Nancy and I are
very pleased to have this opportunity to
welcome you and Mrs. Jayewardene to
the White House.

Although our two countries are on
opposite sides of the globe, we share a
common bond in the great institution of
democracy. Sri Lanka has a remarkable
record among nations which won their
independence in the aftermath of World
War II. You've held elections at regular
intervals, and with amost equal regulari-
ty, your own hard-fought reelection in
1982, as a notable exception, your peo-
ple, through their votes, have removed
from power the governing party. And in

(White House photo by Michael Evans)

what distinguishes Sri Lanka as a truly
democratic country, losers as well as
winners accept the verdict of the people.
The true winners are, of course, the peo-
ple of Sri Lanka.

I'm told that in your embassy here in
Washington, pictures of every Sri Lanka
head of government since independ-
ence — those from your own party, as
well as the opposition — are respectfully
displayed. This is the kind of democratic
spirit essential to the success of human
liberty, the hallmark of democratic
societies.

Understanding and appreciating
your personal commitment to
democratic ideals, it is a pleasure for us
to have you as our guest. You under-
scored this heartfelt commitment during
your first visit here in September of
1951, during a gathering of the repre-
sentatives of nations who had fought in
the Pacific war. Some at that San Fran-
cisco conference insisted that Japan
should not be given its full freedom.
They argued that Japan should remain
shackled as a punishment for its role in
World War 11. As the representative of
Sri Lanka, you spoke out for the princi-
ple of freedom for all people, including
the Japanese. You quoted Buddha, the

SOUTH ASIA

great teacher, and said that "hatred
ceases not by hatred, but by love."

We share your dedication to
freedom and good will. This is more
than political theory; it's a way of life.
This spirit makes its natural that our
two nations should be friends.

Unfortunately, not everyone shares
these values. Recently, we were re-
minded of the menace of those who seek
to impose their will by force and terror.
Two American citizens were kidnapped
in Sri Lanka and threatened with death.
I want to take this opportunity to thank
you personally for your diligence and for
your resolute handling of this difficult
situation. The skill and courage that you
demonstrated helped free our coun-
trymen and, at the same time, prevented
the terrorists from achieving their goal.

During that time of tension, you
wrote to me, and I want you to know
how much I appreciated your sharing
your thoughts. You wrote, "I hope that
the international community will be able
to eradicate terrorism, which has
become a major challenge to those of us
who believe in the democratic process."
Well, I speak for all my coun-
trymen — and after the economic summit
I recently attended in London, I know
this sentiment is shared by the people of
all the democracies — when I say the free
men and women of this planet will never
cower before terrorists. Human liberty
will prevail and civilization will triumph
over this cowardly form of barbarism.

We applaud your determination not
to yield to terrorism in your own coun-
try, as well as your efforts to find
through the democratic process a
peaceful resolution of communal strife.
There is no legitimate excuse for any
political group to resort to violence in
Sri Lanka, a country with a strong
democratic tradition and peaceful means
to resolve conflict.

As a nation of many races, religions,
and ethnic groups, we Americans know
from experience that there is room for
all in a democracy. Dividing your coun-
try into separate nations, as some would
have you do, is not the solution. Instead
of separating people, now is the time to
bring them together. In the same spirit
you spoke about in San Francisco three
decades ago — of love, not hatred, a
united, progressive Sri Lanka can flour-
ish and live in peace with itself and the
rest of the world.

We wish you every success in your
search for reconciliation and a better life
for all your people. And their lives are
improving. Your leadership has in-
creased productivity and brought down

unemployment, has created exciting,
new opportunities for your citizens. Sri
Lanka is among those enlightened na-
tions that understand incentives hold the
key for greater economic growth and
personal opportunity. I believe your peo-
ple and their children will reap rewards
for many years to come, thanks to the
bold economic steps that you've taken.

We're pleased that Americans are
playing a part in this effort. Your
endeavors to improve your people's
economic well-being continues to have
our solid support. Your country has vast
potential.

Sri Lanka is an example of inde-
pendent people determining their own
destiny and a country which the United
States is proud to count among its
friends. Mr. President and Mrs.
Jayewardene, welcome to America.

President Jayewardene

President Reagan, Madam Reagan,
ladies and gentlemen, I'm glad that Mrs.
Jayewardene and I were able to accept
the invitation extended by Mrs. Reagan
and you to visit your great country.

We have come a very long way from
home. Yet, already we feel we are
among friends who believe and try to
follow common ideals for the welfare of
humanity.

This is not our first visit. We came
in September 1951 to your west coast to
attend the Japanese peace treaty con-
ference held at San Francisco. I came as
my country's representative. I received
then a full measure of praise and
gratitude from members of the L'.S.
Government of the day — Dean Acheson,
John Foster Dulles, and others who at-
tended the conference — for helping to
secure the acceptance by the conference
of the peace treaty with Japan. The
Japanese leaders. Prime Minister
Yoshida and others, were equally
grateful. Those alive are still so.

I mention that because the thinking
of the people of my country, which was
expressed by me on that occasion, was
that we should not ask for reparations
from a fallen foe who had harmed our
land and people also; that we should
forgive those who were our enemies,
quoting the words of the Buddha that
"hatred ceases not by hatred, but by
love," which you, also, Mr. President,
just quoted. I pleaded that we should
restore to Japan the freedoms of
democracy. Those were the ideals which
inspired us then and inspire us now.

Our history and civilization have sur-
vived in an unbroken sequence from the

fifth century B.C. for 2,500 years. There
were glimpses of modern democracy
even then, as in the appointment of
mayors to our ancient cities. The ruins
of state buildings still contain carvings
in stone where the cabinet of the kings
and their ministers sat. We were the
first in Asia in 1865 to select members
to the municipalities that governed our
major cities and, in 1931, under univer-
sal franchise, to exercise our right to
elect the government of our choice.

We also have, in our country, an un
broken, historical record, extending ove
the same long period, of a line of heads
of state, monarchies of different
dynasties from Sri Lanka and abroad,
including India and the United Kingdon
of two Presidents, one selected and one
myself, elected by the whole country. I
happen to be the 193d in the line of
heads of state from 483 B.C. to date.

In our modern history, we cannot
forget the contribution made by an
American, Col. Olcott, when he helped
the Buddhist leaders of Sri Lanka a hu
dred years ago to establish a movemen
for the revival of education, through
schools owned and managed by the Bu(
dhists themselves, and thus laid the
foundation for the revival of Buddhism
and the movement for freedom.

The United States of America, sine
it was born out of a revolution which
freed it from foreign rule, has not beei
known to be hankering after territory
supporting imperialism. Sri Lanka has
been for 53 years a practicing
democracy, where the freedoms of
speech and writing, of electing govern-
ments by universal franchise at regula
intervals, and the independence of the
judiciary and of the opposition are
safeguarded.

Fundamental rights which are
justifiable are guaranteed under the c(
stitution. Though there are occasions
when emergency powers have had to I
exercised, fundamental freedoms rem;
intact. Democracy cannot, however, li
and survive on a diet of words alone.
The people require food for their
stomachs, clothing for their bodies, ar
roofs over their heads.

In the nonaligned world of develo]
ing nations, which covers the whole oi
Central and South America, the wholt
of Africa, the whole of Asia from the
Mediterranean Sea to the seas of Chii
and Japan, there are very few countri
which could be called a democracy, su
as is your country. Ours is one. That i
why the assistance that developing na
tions of the world receive from the
World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund is appreciated, thougl
there are many matters on which we

SOUTH ASIA

I there should be change to help them
jxist as free countries.

We in the developing world have
tblems similar to those who live in the
'eloped world. We have deficit
igets, high interest rates, old valued
rencies, and unstable exchange rates.
3se are the classical examples of the
nptoms that affect both the developed
1 developing nations.

Those who speak so eloquently on
lalf of the developing nations have
in pressing for the opening of com-
dity markets of the developed world

their manufacturers without protec-
|e laws, stable prices for all products,
1 rescheduling of debts borrowed for
^elopment. Consider these requests
h sympathy and generosity.

In our own case, with the aid re-
ved, we have been able to commence
i have almost completed the largest
/elopment program — which in our
g history has ever been attempted by
g or president — a program possibly
equalled in magnitude by any develop-
nt program in any country in the con-
nporary world or earlier. This was
ssible due to the effects of my govern-
nt, which was elected to office in
n in an election conducted by our op-
lents, the previous government. We
ained 51% of the votes and won five-
ths of the seats in the legislature,
d subsequently since then, we have
I n five elections, including the
Jjsidential election, byelections, district
jmcil elections, local elections, and a
erendum.

We have, however, our problems,
me of them are unique to our coun-
— excessive rains, sometimes floods,
dslides, cyclones — some common to
countries, but still difficult for us to
ir.

Another and a modern problem, and
9 of universal occurrence today, is ter-
•ism. This happened in the extreme
rth of our country, where a group of
sguided people of Tamil birth, who
■re favored by the American people in
i latter half of the 19th century by the
action of schools and hospitals, seek
Daration from a united Sri Lanka,
ere are more Tamils living in the east
d among the Sinhalese, the major
mmunity, than in the regions that
3k separation who do not support
jem. My party holds 10 out of 12 seats
the eastern province, which
paratists seek to join to the north.

The terrorists are a small group who
ek by force, including murder, rob-
ries, and other misdeeds, to support
e cause of separation, including the

creation of a Marxist state in the whole
of Sri Lanka and in India, beginning
with Tamil Nadu in the south. Since we
assumed office in 1977, members of the
armed services and police, politicians
who leave the ranks of the separatists
and join us, and others, and innocent
citizens numbering 147 have been
murdered in cold blood.

I'm glad that your country is taking
a lead in creating an international move-
ment to oppose terrorism. If I may sug-
gest, it may be called a United Nations
antiterrorism organization. It is vital — it
is essential that the developed world
helps us with finances, that we help each
other in this sphere, and that all nations
cooperate to eliminate the menace of
terrorism from the civilized world.

I was very happy when I read your
address to the Irish Parliament on
June 4th. You made an appeal to nations
to reform the principle not to use force
in their dealings with each other. You
said the democracies could inaugurate a
program to promote the growth of
democratic institutions throughout the
world. You spoke on behalf of hundreds
of millions who live on the borderline of
starvation, while nations will spend next
year a trillion dollars on the manufactur-
ing of armaments for destruction of
human beings and their products.

At meetings of members of the
Commonwealth in Sydney, in New Delhi,
at meetings of nonaligned nations in
Havana and in Goa, New India, I have
never failed to express similar ideas.
Nonviolence is "Maithri" compassion,
and the great teacher whom I follow,
Gautama Buddha, and the great teacher
you follow, Jesus Christ, and India's
great son, Mahatma Gandhi, preached
and practiced the doctrine of non-
violence successfully.

Let your great and powerful nation
take the lead in implementing these
ideals, and the world will remember that
the President of the United States of
America, Ronald Reagan, preached the
laying down of arms not through fear,
but by the strength of the conviction
that to follow right for right is right,
without fear of consequence, is a way
for civilized man to adopt. The voice of
America will then become the voice of
righteousness.

I thank you, Mr. President and
Madam Reagan, for inviting us and giv-
ing me this opportunity of speaking to
you, and for entertaining us so
hospitably.

DINNER TOASTS

President Reagan

Mr. President, Mrs. Jayewardene,
distinguished guests, and ladies and
gentlemen, it's a special pleasure to have
you with us. Sri Lankan leaders, in-
cluding yourself, have been to our coun-
try before. Tonight, however, is the first
time that a Sri Lankan chief of state has
been an official guest at the White
House. It's our honor to have you with
us, and Nancy and I hope your visit will
be followed by many more.

Our talks this morning reflected the
cordial and cooperative relationship
which exists between our two democ-
racies. When your government was first
elected in 1977, Americans were excited
by your bold program for economic
development. And you've led your coun-
try in a new direction, and by doing so,
you've created new opportunities for
your people and expanded the potential
of every Sri Lankan.

The accelerated Mahaweli River
project is part of your effort, as is free-
ing the Sri Lankan economy from the
controls and redtape that stifled prog-
ress and economic expansion. One in-
novation of particular interest to me is
the creation of a free trade zone. This
practical approach to development with
its open market is attracting investment
and unleashing the energy of the private
sector. And I hope those over on Capitol
Hill who claim enterprise zones won't
work here in our country will take notice
of the progress that you've made.

We in the United States are happy
that we've been able to contribute to
your progress. Our Agency for Interna-
tional Development is working with you
in the river program and encouraging
Sri Lanka's private enterprise sector.
With the incentives that you now offer
to investors, your country is attracting
business and capturing the attention of
American entrepreneurs and investors. I
think we can look forward to growing
cooperation between our governments
and our people on many levels.

U.S. -Sri Lankan cooperation comes
in many forms. Last year the Peace
Corps began a program to assist in the
upgrading of Sri Lanka's English-
language teaching skills. And today we
signed a science and technology agree-
ment which provides an umbrella for in-
creased collaboration. We look forward
to the early completion of negotiating on
a tax treal^ and on a bilateral invest-
ment treaty. All this reflects the ex-
traordinary relationship that we're
building, a relationship of trust and
trade that will benefit both our peoples.

SOUTH ASIA

We understand Sri Lanka's choice,
as a small developing country, to remain
nonaligned in matters of foreign policy.
We respect genuine nonalignment. Your
country consistently has been a forceful
voice for reason and moderation in
nonaligned councils. Your strong opposi-
tion to unprovoked aggression in
Afghanistan and Kampuchea has swelled
the international chorus calling for
restoration of independence for these
two brutalized countries. We hope that
Sri Lanka will remain a strong moral
force in world politics.

And today, we came to know one
another better and to understand more
fully our objectives and concerns. Your
visit has undoubtedly strengthened the
bond between our two countries, and it's
laid a basis for even closer, more
cooperative relations between Sri Lanka
and the United States in the future.

Finally, I'd like to thank you again
for the elephant — [laughter] — a magnifi-
cent present that you gave us today.
The elephant happens to be the symbol
of the President's political party, and by
coincidence — [laughter] — we happen to
be also that smart. [Laughter]

Ladies and gentlemen, may I ask
you to join me in a toast to President
and Mrs. Jayewardene, and the pros-
perity of our relationship with Sri
Lanka.

President Jayewardene

Mr. President, Madam Reagan, ladies
and gentlemen, I don't mind President
Reagan telling the public that the gift of
the elephant was accidental. [Laughter]
But privately I know it's something else.
[Laughter] The elephant led my party to
victory in 1977. I received 51% of the
votes. Any party that gets 51% of the
votes must win an election. And I hope
you will have the same luck in the
months to come.

I came here as a stranger, but I
find— already I feel I am among friends.
I've heard that the American people are
very friendly people, hospitable people.
Both qualities have been proved during
the last few days. I'm surrounded, I
understand, by film sUirs. Those whom I
saw in my youth were rather different.
They were Charlie Chaplin, Laurel and
Hardy, Fatty Arbuckle— [laughter[—
and Mary Pickford.

I remember a story about Laurel
and Hardy. They joined the French
Legion. They were waiting in the in-
specting line.The sergeant came and
said, "What are you doing here? Why do
you join the French Legion?" They said,
"We joined the French Legion to
forget." "To forget what?" "We've
forgotten." [Laughter]

I haven't forgotten about the help
your country has given us during the
last few years. But I didn't come here to
ask for help. That's not my way. I'm
waiting to hear Mr. Frank Sinatra sing
"My Way." [Laughter] That's one of my
favorite songs, but I understand he
didn't like it. [Laughter] I used it in part
of my election campaign and asked the
people to vote for my way, which they
did.

Your country is, as far as the
Americans go, young. Our country is
old, very old. We go back to the fifth
century before Christ. We had Am-
bassadors at the court of Claudius
Caesar. You'll find it recorded in Pliny's
letters. He even mentions the name of
the Ambassadors. We had sent delega-
tions to China in A.D. 47, and I under-
stand the gift sent by our king to the
Emperor of China were water buffaloes
and hump cattle. The great Chinese

pilgrims Hsiian-tsang and Fa-Hsien
came to our country in the fourth cen-
tury A.D. and the sixth century A.D. Si
did Sinbad the Sailor, Marco Polo, and
Ibn Batuta.

For the first time. Westerners cam
in the 16th century and the Portuguese
came as tourists but stayed for 150
years. After that came the Dutch and
then came the English. And we are no
once again, a free country. We wish to
be friendly with all and the enemies of
none. That is my policy and the policy
our people.

We would like the people of Ameri
to understand us. In the long history c
Sri Lanka, there have been difficult
periods. There have been murders; the
have been assassinations; there have
been riots; there have been good deed
and bad deeds. Last July we had one i
those bad periods. But in time to comi
it will be forgotten.

Sri Lanka— A Profile

People

Noun and adjective: Sri Lankan(s). Popu-
lation (1983): 1.5.3 million. Annual growth
rate: 1.8%. Ethnic groups: Sinhalese 74%,
Tamils 18%, Moors 7%, Burghers. Malays,
Veddahs 1%. Religions: Buddhism, Hindu-
ism, Islam, Christianity. Languages: Sinhala
(official), Tamil (national), English.

Geography

Area: 65,610 sq. km. (25,322 sq. mi.); about
the size of West Virginia. Cities: Capital-
Colombo {pop. 1,262,000). Other citws—
Jaffna (270,600), Kandy (147,400), Galle
(168,100). Terrain: Low plain in the north;
hills and mountains in the .south. Climate:
Tropical.

Government

Type: Republic. Independence: February 4,
1948. Constitution: August 31, 1978.

Branches: Executive — president (chief of
state and head of government), elected for a
6-year term. Legislative — unicameral
168-member Parliament. Judicial — Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, High Court, subor-
dinate courts.

Political parties: Cnited National Party
(IINP), Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP),
Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Com-
munist Party/Moscow Wing (CP/M). Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF). .lanatha
Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). Suffrage: Hniver-
sal over age 18.

Flag: On a yellow background, a red and
groon stripe on the staff side; cm the remain-

ing two-thirds is a yellow lion holding up a
sword, centered on a red square.

Economy

GNP (1981): $4 billion. Annual growth ra

1982 est., 4.8%; 1981, 4.2%; 1980, 5.8%;
1979, 6.3%. Per capita income: $266. Av|
inflation rate (1982): 10%-15%.

Natural resources: Limestone, graph:
mineral sands, gems, phosphate.

Agriculture (24% of GNP): Products-
tea, rubber, coconuts, rice, spices. Arable
land—M%, of which 38% is cultivated.

Industry (18% of GNP): Consumer g(
textiles, chemicals and chemical products,
milling, light engineering, paper and pap(
products.

Trade (1981): fi'j-poW.s— $1,069 billioi
tea ($335 million), petroleum products ($'
million), textiles and garments ($156 mill
Major markets— VS ($146 million), UK (i
million), FRG ($63 million), Pakistan ($56
million), communist countries ($85 milliot
/mpor/s— $1,831 billion: petroleum ($448
million), machinery and equipment ($201
million), sugar ($147 million). Major sup-
pliers — Saudi Arabia ($273 million). Jap;
($2.58 million), US ($129 million), Iran ($:
million), UK ($111 million), communist cc
tries ($.52 million).

Official exchange rate (March 1983
rupees = US$1.

ill

Taken from the Background Notes of Jui
1983, published by the Bureau of Public
fairs. Department of State. Editor: J. D; I
Adams. ■

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

I see in one of your newspapers
Ire is an advertisement in which some
(iple are trying to make us remember
^t day. It was a fatal day; several peo-
were killed. It was not done by the
'ernment; it was done by a gang of
iligans, about which we are very,
y sorry. I'm trying to forget it. I'm
ing to make our people not com-
— some of them — such incidents
lin. I hope we will succeed.

I remember when one of your
resentatives came to see me and had
ch with me. I told her— she is your
resentative in the United Nations
;anization — "A leader must know only
3 words." She said, "What's that?" 1
i, "Yes and no." And I think Presi-
it Reagan knows those two words
y well. Once you say yes or once you

no, stick by it. Whatever happens,
'er change. That has been my policy,
1 it has succeeded.

Therefore, we're surrounded by
inds. We've been very happy the last
/ days. I have a few more days to
md. I hope to spend some time in the
lian settlements at Sante Fe, not for

other reason but because those were

stories I read in my youth, about
ffalo Bill and the various tribes. I'm
cinated by the fact they were the
est human settlements, as far as I
DW, in the continent of America, and
reat people. And we must give them
elping hand as we must give every
;e, every tribe, every human being,
atever his caste, religion, or race, a
ping hand.

We're all human beings. We extend
' affection, not only to human beings

even to animals; to the little
phant that we have gifted to you.
at is the philosophy which we have
.rned in our country; that is the
ilosophy which, if I can, I'll spread
•Qughout the world. And I find in you,
■. President and Madam Reagan, two
ry good disciples.

Thank you very much for entertain-
r us. May your country prosper. May,
the morning and in the evening, at
^htfall. may the name of President
■agan and Madam Reagan, never be
-gotten.

May I drink to the health of Presi-
nt Reagan, Madam Reagan, the
ivernment and people of the United
ates of America.

Review of Nicaragua's
Commitments to the OAS

^Text from Weekly Compilation of
esidentiai Documents of June 26, 1984.

2Held on the South Lawn of the White
)use where President Jayewardene was ac-
rded a formal welcome with full military

by J. William Middendorf II

Statement made in the Permanent

Council of the Organization of American
States (OAS) on July 18. 1984. Am-
bassador Middendorf is U.S. Permanent
Representative to the OAS.

The U.S. delegation wishes to raise the
matter of the solemn commitments
made to the Secretary General of this
body by the Sandinista junta 5 years ago
on July 12, 1979. This is not interven-
tion—this is reviewing our own role
after commitments made to it by a
member state. As a result of these com-
mitments and our own OAS resolutions,
we brought down a sitting government.
Tomorrow will be the fifth anniversary
of the date that the junta took effective
control of Managua; but, regrettably,
very little progress has been made in
putting into effect these commitments.

You will recall that these com-
mitments were made as a response to
the resolution of the 17th Meeting of
Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of member countries of the OAS.
According to Document 25 of this body,
published June 30, 1981, this resolution
"for the first time in the history of the
OAS, deprived an incumbent member
government of legitimacy" when it asked
that the Nicaraguan Government be "im-
mediately and definitively" replaced.

The resolution in question said that
a solution to Nicaragua's problems was
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Nicaraguan people but then proceeded
to dictate how the problems should be
settled. In addition to demanding a sit-
ting president's ouster, the resolution:

• Said that a "democratic" govern-
ment was to replace the existing govern-
ment. Its composition was to include
"the principal representative groups
which oppose the existing regime and
which reflect the free will of the people
of Nicaragua";

• Said that the human rights of all
Nicaraguans, without exception, should
be respected; and

• Called for the holding of free elec-
tions as soon as possible, leading to the
establishment of a "truly democratic
government that guarantees peace,
freedom, and justice."

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs
went on to urge the member states to
take steps that were within their reach
to facilitate an enduring and peaceful
solution of the Nicaraguan problem
based on these points "scrupulously re-
specting the principle of non-interven-
tion."

They also asked that member states
promote humanitarian assistance to
Nicaragua and contribute to the social
and economic recovery of the country.
Many countries responded with an open
heart, including my own, with the
United States donating $118 million in
the first 2 years.

I would note that this 17th Meeting
of Consultation has never formally ad-
journed but only recessed. Given the un-
precedented involvement of all of us in
the process that brought the Sandinista
regime to power, the member nations
have a continuing interest— indeed, a
responsibility — in monitoring the situa-
tion in Nicaragua to see whether or not
the Sandinista government has, indeed,
carried out the commitments it so
solemnly made to us in 1979.

It is in this context that I propose to
examine the record here today, in order
to see exactly what has been happening
in Nicaragua since the Sandinista junta
assumed power there.

Here are the commitments which
the junta made to the Secretary General
in its letter of June 12, 1979:

• "... our firm intention to
establish full respect for human
rights. . . . ";

• "... our decision to enforce civil
justice in our country ... to let justice
prevail for the first time in half a cen-
tury. . . . "; and

• "... call Nicaraguans to the first
free elections that our country will have
in this century. ..."

To do justice to the full historical
record, there were two other promises
contained in the same letter, one which
spoke of a peaceful and orderly transi-
tion from the Somoza government to the
Sandinista junta and another permitting
so-called collaborators of the Somoza
regime, except those responsible for so-
called genocide, to leave the country.
But I will concentrate here on the mat-
ters of human rights, civil justice, and
elections.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

It should be noted that those who
signed for the Sandinista junta were
Commandante Daniel Ortega, Violeta de
Chamorro, Commandante Sergio
Ramirez, Alfonso Robelo, and Moises
Hassan. Violetta de Chamorro is no
longer a member of the junta, and
Alfonso Robelo is in exile in Costa Rica,
where he is an outspoken critic of the
junta of which he was once a member.

Commitment Number One-
Human Rights

"... (0]ur firm intention to establish
full respect for human rights. ..."

Nothing has demonstrated the
callous disregard of human rights by the
Sandinista regime so much as their
treatment of the Miskito Indians. Ap-
proximately 20,000 Miskitos— one-third
of the entire Miskito population— have
crossed the border into neighboring
Honduras thus far, where they live in
refugee camps. They have been victims
of the Sandinistas' constant campaigns
against them.

It all began with efforts by the San-
dinista government to try to force the
Miskitos into adapting their way of life
to a preconceived Sandinista model.
Many of these human rights offenses are
detailed in a report just released by the
OAS General Assembly on June 4
transmitting a report by the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission
dated November 29, 1983.

Miskitos have been forcibly relocated
from their traditional villages. In a few
cases where they resisted, they were
killed. Many were force marched to the
new area and not allowed to take their
belongings with them. In other in-
stances, the government appropriated
their farm animals for itself. On
February 18, 1982, the Episcopal Con-
ference of Nicaragua, headed by
Managua's archbishop, directed a
message to the people and Government
of Nicaragua denouncing the human
rights violations against the Miskitos.

The Miskito Indians long ago
adopted the Moravian Church as their
primary religious institution. The San-
dinistas have harassed the Moravian
Church, calling some of its ministers
"counterrevolutionaries." They have been
asked to change their sermons into
vehicles of support for the Sandinista
revolution. Church services have been
interrupted by Sandinista troops looking
for so-called counterrevolutionaries. A
Moravian hospital, the only one serving
a wide area of eastern Nicaragua, was
confiscated by the government and

turned into a military headquarters, ac-
cording to the Miskitos. Many Moravian
pastors— out of fear, frustration, or
both— have taken refuge in Honduras.
Amnesty International, an organization
which was highly critical of the previous
regime, denounced the Sandinistas in
September 1983 for this sort of
behavior.

Miskito organizations say their
villages have occasionally been bombed
by Sandinista planes. Efforts have been
made to force them to join the San-
dinista militia.

Presumably for security reasons,
some Miskitos who were ocean
fishermen have been prohibited from
fishing, cutting off their livelihood and
their principal source of food.

The Miskitos had always maintained
their land as communal property of the
tribe. The Sandinistas have broken up
some of these communal holdings, mak-
ing them property of the state.

Smaller tribes, such as the Sumo
and the Rama, have also suffered similar
violations of their human rights at the
hands of this so-called peoples' govern-
ment.

But by no means have human rights
violations been limited to indigenous
peoples. As you will recall, the Pope, on
his visit to Managua, was treated with
unheard-of rudeness. Sandinista
militants set up a parallel loudspeaker
system over which they heckled the
Pope and attempted to drown out his
sermon. Most of the areas close to the
Pope were assigned to these militants,
and ordinary Catholics who turned out
to receive the Pope's blessings were kept
at a distance.

This is a fitting illustration of how
the Sandinista government has treated
the Catholic Church.

Another example has occurred in re-
cent days with the expulsion of 10
foreign priests from Nicaragua. The
ostensible excuse for their expulsion was
that they somehow had something to do
with a protest demonstration against the
house arrest of yet another priest.
Father Luis Amado Pena. But a majori-
ty of them were not even at the
demonstration in question, which, at any
rate, was a peaceful demonstration led
by the country's archbishop, the sort of
a demonstration which would be routine-
ly permitted in any truly democratic
country.

The Pope, in commenting on this ac-
tion, said: "I ask the Lord to illuminate
the minds of those responsible so that
they may reverse this decision, openly

harmful to the church and the needs of
the Catholic population of Nicaragua."

In recent years, the Archbishop of
Managua, Monsignor Obando y Bravo,
has not been able to have the traditiona
holy week services broadcast on radio
and television because the government
wanted to subject the process to prior
censorship, a demand to which the Arcl
bishop understandably refused to ac-
cede. In a crude ploy, a priest, who is
the spokesman for the archbishop and
director of the Catholic radio station,
was accused of having sexual relations
with the wife of another man, stripped
naked, and paraded in public where Sa
dinista mobs jeered at him while gover
ment press photographers and televisic
crews, which "just happened" to be on
the scene, took pictures. The program-
ming of the Catholic Church's radio stt
tion has been severely restricted. All
Marxist-Leninist governments eventua
reveal themselves as atheistic — even
though in the case of Nicaragua, a few
misguided priests hold high governmei
positions — and these governments use
their institutions to promote atheism.

The Sandinistas have attempted tc
infiltrate Catholic youth groups, and
when this largely failed, they set up
their own so-called "peoples' church." I
November of 1983, all Nicaraguan
churches closed for a day in protest
against attacks by Sandinista youth
mobs on numerous churches.

The Nicaraguan Permanent Comn
tee on Human Rights has itself been t
victim of Sandinista government ex-
cesses. The former president of the ct
mission, Jose Esteban Gonzalez, madt
trip to Italy in 1981 where he denoum
the existence of political prisoners in
Nicaragua. On his return to Managua
number of supporters and colleagues
came to the airport to receive him. Tl
were never allowed to get near him b
instead were roughed up and spat up.
by Sandinista mobs. Only the presenc
of the Venezuelan Ambassador
prevented Gonzalez himself from gett
roughed up, but he was arrested a w(
later anyway.

The current president of the
Nicarag:uan human rights group. Mar
Patricia Baltodano, told the Inter-
American Human Rights Commissior
May of this year that Sandinista laws
have institutionalized the violation of
human rights. The setting up of so-ca
Neighborhood Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution are really :
tempts to limit the freedom of the in-
dividual Nicaraguan by instituting a ( i
trol system over the population at th
neighborhood level.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Freedom of the press also suffers in
aragua. The only independent
vspaper, La Prensa, has had its
)lication suspended by the govern-
nt on numerous occasions and is sub-
t to prior censorship. On countless
rs, the paper has been so heavily cen-
ed that its editors decided not to
)lish.

A recent example of this happened
y 10 when La Prensa attempted to
)ort on the expulsion of the 10 priests,
incident which I have already dis-
ised. Three items— one reporting on
I government's cancellation of their
iidency permits, another on Catholics
idemning the expulsion, and a third
the fact that they were allowed to
ve carrying only the clothes they
re— were censored. Therefore, the
tors decided they could not print the
tion for that day.

The lack of the right for families to
termine how their children will be
iicated, which we in the United States
isider a fundamental human right,
3 been denounced by the Nicaraguan
rents' Association, The Sandinista
vernment tries to use education to
linwash the young against the ideals
their parents and even to get them to
nounce their parents' lack of revolu-
nary zeal to the authorities in some
ses. Intellectual freedom and the
;edom to belong to independent labor
ions are also restricted in today's
caragua.

The human rights of farmers have
ffered from Sandinista agricultural
licies. The so-called Economic and
cial Emergency Law decreed in late
81 has made the state the only pur-
aser of farm products. Thus, the
rmer can only sell his produce to the
vernment and only at the govern-
gnt's price. Many small farmers have
en ruined by this policy, and
icaragua must now import some foods
which it was previously self-sufficient.
t the same time, a large bureaucracy
is been established in order to control
1 activities of the populace, soaking up
oney which would normally be
'ailable for investment in agriculture,
ven the newspaper Nuevo Diario has
implained about the amount of money
ied to support the bloated Sandinista
ireaucracy. All of the foregoing
amonstrates that the commitment to
. . . our firm intention to establish full
;spect for human rights. ..." has thus
ir been grossly violated.

Commitment Number Two-
Civil Justice

Let us turn our attention to the second
Sandinista commitment to " . . . let
justice prevail for the first time in half a
century. ..."

Presumably, the Nicaraguan
Supreme Court, under the original San-
dinista plans, was supposed to have com-
plete autonomy in the judicial area, and
lower courts would be dependencies of
it. The Inter- American Human Rights
Commission in 1981, as well as an inter-
national commission of jurists, said that
the judicial branch in Nicaragua should
be independent from the legislative and
executive branches of the government,
not to mention the Sandinista party.

But, in reality, other courts have
been established which have nothing to
do with the concept of judicial independ-
ence as we know it. The Supreme Court
has no authority over them. One of them
is the so-called Peoples' Court at the
neighborhood level. These courts spend
their time ferreting out so-called
counterrevolutionaries in the neighbor-
hood. For example, a neighbor who does
not show up for a meeting to promote
the Sandinista cause may find himself
labeled a counterrevoluticjnary by one of
these courts.

The right of haheus corpus in
Nicaragua must be questioned. As in
Cuba, people who have been jailed for
so-called political crimes are often not
released when their sentences have been
served. New judges owe their jobs to the
Sandinistas and are not about to show
any independence on the bench.

There exists no constitution, as such.
There was the Economic and Social
Emergency Law of 1981 which in 1982
became the State of Emergency. This
State of Emergency has been routinely
extended every time it was about to ex-
pire. Under this system, all laws are
issued by government decree. The State
of Emergency does not provide for the
right of the individual to a defense in a
court of law in some cases and in others
suspends the civil rights of the in-
dividual. This has been denounced by
Amnesty International.

Commitment Number
Three— Elections

So much for Sandinista justice. Let's
turn now to commitment number three,
dealing with elections.

We see that elections have been
scheduled by the Sandinista government
for November 4 of this year, 2 days
before our own. As we once had high

hopes for the new Nicaraguan Govern-
ment 5 years ago, can we now have high
hopes that at least this commitment will
be fulfilled? This is, in itself, a welcome
development, but there are some dis-
turbing statements on the record which
lead one to question just how open this
election process will be. In the letter of
July 12, 1979, the Sandinista leaders
committed to the OAS to "call
Nicaragua to the first free elections our
country will have in this century." This
was in reply to the resolution of the 17th
Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs which had said free
elections should be held as soon as possi-
ble, leading to the establishment of "a
truly democratic government that
guarantees peace, freedom and justice."

Yet on August 25, 1981, Com-
mander Humberto Ortega said that elec-
tions would not be to contest power but
to strengthen the revolution. On July 7
of this year, less than 2 weeks ago,
Commander Carlos Nunez Tellez said on
Radio Sandino:

The electoral process is the result of a
political decision made by the FSLN [San-
dinista National Liberation Front], its revolu-
tionary leaders, and the government to rein-
force the historical popular plan. There is
nothing more alien to the electoral process
than sectarianism, dogmatism, and other
vices that are characteristic of certain so-
called democracies.

Elections in Guatemala

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JULY 4, 19841

We have noted with pleasure the record
turnout of Guatemalan voters in the
July 1 Constituent Assembly elections.
The bipartisan U.S. observer team and
our Embassy in Guatemala report from
visits throughout the country that the
process was fair and open, well orga-
nized, and orderly. We applaud the
Government of Guatemala for taking
this important step in carrying out its
commitment for a return to constitu-
tional practices and the unprecedented
response of the citizenry to the oppor-
tunity to participate in their political
process. We wish the Guatemalans well
as they prepare a constitution and pro-
ceed with elections for a new govern-
ment next year.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 9, 1984. I

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Government spokesmen have said in
the past: "There are only two types of
Nicaraguans, Sandinistas and counter-
revolutionaries." Does that mean that
candidates and voters for other parties
will automatically be labeled counter-
revolutionaries? And what kind of treat-
ment will that cause them to receive on
the part of the government?

The neighborhood control commit-
tees are called Sandinista Defense Com-
mittees. They have set up an informer
society, modeled on the East German
plan and with East German agents con-
trolling their internal security. They
have the power to deprive a citizen of
his food ration card, for example— a
card, by the way, which was never
needed in Nicaragua until this govern-
ment came along. These Sandinista De-
fense Committees also control access to
schools, medicine, and health care.

It is also worrisome that the army is
called the Sandinista Army, and other
branches of the armed forces are simi-
larly named. Thus, the security forces
are intimately linked with one of the
political parties which will be running in
the elections — the Sandinista party.

The electoral council which has been
set up is made up exclusively of promi-
nent members of the Sandinista party.
Will they be fair to the opposition par-
ties?

And will the state of emergency be
lifted for the elections?

Will the opposition parties be able to
campaign without interference by
authorities or by Sandinista-sponsored
youth mobs?

Will opposition parties have equal
access to radio and television as com-
pared with the Sandinista party? Will
they be able to have party rejiresen-
tatives at the poll.s?

Will the Sandinistas allow interna-
tional observers to move freely about
the country during the election process?
How will the ballots be counted and how
will results be relayed to election head-
quarters?

We also note that, as time has gone
on, the government has arbitrarily con-
centrated more and more power in the
hands of the Sandinista party. What was
once the Government of National
Reconstruction is now the Sandinista
Peoples' Revolutionary Government.
Will the Sandinistas allow this process
to be reversed, or are we in for a sham
election in November just before our
own general assembly?

We have seen how the Sandinistas
of Nicaragua have thus far failed to live
up to their commitments to tlie OAS of
5 years ago. It is a shame that the peo-
ple of Nicaragua, so hopeful in 1979 that
their situation would improve, have seen
their revolution betrayed by a group of
leaders who have aligned themselves
with international communism and
whose principal concern has been to
maintain themselves in power and, in-
deed, to export communism to their
neighbors virtually from the day they
took over. We in the OAS, which was
deeply involved in the process by which

the Sandinistas took power, have a
grave responsibility to monitor the
fulfillment of these commitments.

In June 1979 a respected scholar or
Latin America, Dr. Constantine Mengei
wrote: "The defeat of the Somoza Armj
by the Sandinistas will be followed by a
Cuban-type process from which the pro
Castro guerrilla leaders will emerge as |
the only group with real power." Five
years after he wrote this, and 5 years
after the Sandinistas' commitments to
the OAS, it developed that he was pro-
jihetic. ■

President Meets With
El Salvador's President

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JULY 23. 1984'

During his brief visit to Washington to-
day. El Salvador's President Jose
Napoleon Duarte met with President
Reagan this morning at 11:00 for half an
hour, with the Vice President present.
From the State Department, the
meeting included Secretary Shultz and
U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador
Thomas Pickering.

Following his meeting with Presi-
dent Reagan, President Duarte went to
the Hill to meet with House Majority
Leader James Wright. We believe he
was also seeing Jamie Whitten, chair-
man of the Appropriations Committee;
and Clarence Long, chairman of the
Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the
Appropriations Committee; and possibly
others.

Following his meeting on the Hill,
President Duarte was to return to New
York City. He's there for meetings with
UN officials, the Americas Society, and
others.

President Duarte gave a full readout
of the meeting, discussing his assess-
ment of developments in El Salvador,
his very successful trip to Europe, and
the Administration's efforts during the
current 3-week congressional session to
secure pending FY 1984 supplemental
funds and complete congressional action
on the Central American Democracy,
Peace, and Development Initiative. We
have nothing to add to what he said.

As you know, we still hope to secure
that portion of the FY 1984 supplemen-
tal request which has not been acted on
(for El Salvador this includes $134

million in economic assistance and $11'
million in military assistance) and the
Central America Democracy, Peace, ai
Development Initiative plan request fo
all of Central America which includes
for FY 198.5 $1,376 billion ($1.12 billio
in economic and $256 million in militai
assistance for the region). Of the $1.3'
billion requested, $473.6 million would
be for El Salvador— $341.1 million
would be for economic assistance and
$132.5 million would be for military
assistance.

The Administration in February n
quested a supplemental appropriation
$659 million to begin meeting the mos
urgent needs identified by the Nation:
Bipartisan Commission on Central
America; $312.7 million in the FY 19i
Supplemental ($134 million in econom
and $178.7 million in military assistar
is for El Salvador.

As you know, some $61.7 million
urgently needed military assistance f(
El Salvador was passed by the Con-
gress. The remaining $117 million in
military assistance and $134 million i
economic assistance have not been ac
upon and, at this point, are both urgt
ly needed by the Government of El
Salvador, as are the $266 million in
economic assistance and $142 million
military assistance requested in
February for other countries in Centi
America.

We will be striving for House act
on our requests for the Henry Jacksc
plan and the supplemental funds for
Salvador.

ill

'Text from "White House press
release. ■

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

;uba as a Model and a Challenge

Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr.

Address to the Americas Society
New York City on July 25. 1984.
: Skoug is Director of the Office of
ban Affairs, Bureau oflnter-
lerican Affairs.

Paradoxical Neighbor

r neighbor Cuba is a country of
•adoxes.

• It is a small island, but it has the
eign policy and the military establish-
nt of a major power, committed by

' deepest instincts of its leadership to
)jecting its system and its point of
w abroad.

Although it strives unceasingly for
dership of the Nonaligned Movement,
ba is more closely aligned with the
^et Union than many members of the
irsaw Pact, providing unique military
vices in kind in return for economic
1 military assistance.

• It has, especially in recent years,
ome an avowed advocate of Latin
lerican unity, but it has a history of
ervention in the region and maintains
se ties to subversive forces in every
tin American country.

Its economy literally lives off
.ssive infusion of foreign aid, but it
)resents itself as a development model
others.

• Its leaders sometimes assert that
y welcome democratic trends per-
ved in the hemisphere, but there is

unfortunately not the remotest
lection of such a trend in Cuba itself.

Out of these ingredients there has
erged a, so far, durable mixture of
' traditional Latin American caudillo
i the 20th century European concept
the party-state. The pyramidal Cuban
dership remains dedicated to its own
ongly held concept of world revolu-
n, asserting its independence of, but
reasingly dependent on and con-
ained by its bonds to, the U.S.S.R. It
a leadership disquieted by the apathy
d sometimes active dissent of its own
izens but unwilling or unable to
inge its fundamental approach. It re-
lins committed to projecting itself as a
e model for others. It sends its sons
fight and die thousands of miles from
me in the name of proletarian interna-
nalism. It funds, arms, trains, and
unsels revolution but craves recogni-
n as a proponent of a stable interna-
nal order.

Cuba wields influence far beyond its
size though perhaps still beneath the
aspirations of its leaders. Its human
resources are impressive. We need to
look carefully at the model it projects
and the challenge which it poses for us
in Latin America and the Caribbean.
For the leadership of revolutionary
Cuba, "Nuestra America" starts at the
Rio Grande and ends on Tierra del
Fuego. Its target is this immense
region, from which Cuba would like
to dispel U.S. influence or at least
diminish it.

Cuba's leadership, which has
changed surprisingly little in composi-
tion over the past quarter century, came
to power with two quintessential objec-
tives. It wanted to maintain power in
Cuba itself while effecting a thorough-
going social transformation, whatever
the cost. And it wanted to carry the
revolutionary struggle abroad to the
Caribbean, to Central America, to South
America, and even to Africa. Whatever
the price in human suffering, no one can
question the determination with which
each of these two basic objectives has
been pursued by Cuba's leaders down to
the present day.

There has been from the outset a
third motivation, an apparently visceral
animosity for the United States. To the
extent that this was calculated, it was
perhaps because it was thought that the
achievement of the two primary objec-
tives would inevitably bring the Cuban
revolutionaries into conflict on both
counts with American power. To the ex-
tent that it was irrational, it has been
even harder to address. In June 1958
the Cuban "Maximum Leader" wrote
from the Sierra Maestra to a confidante
that after the revolution had come to
power, he would begin a longer, larger
war against the Americans. He told her
he had come to understand that this was
his true destiny. It would be a serious
mistake to regard this as rhetorical. It is
among the most prized memorabilia of
the Cuban revolution. After a quarter
century it still seems to be valid.

The Cuban-Soviet relationship,
which is now so fundamental, is derived
from these motivations and logical only
in light of revolutionary Cuba's own ob-
jectives. The intent of the revolutionary
leadership in Havana to confront the
United States in Cuba and abroad in
pursuit of its twin objectives led natural-

ly and even inevitably to the decision to
invite the Soviet Union to the Western
Herhisphere. From the standpoint of the
Cuban leadership, the U.S.S.R. was and
is a necessary evil. Moscow had its own
reasons for accepting Cuba's invitation.
The course of this relationship has not
always been smooth, especially at the
outset, but it has evolved into a sym-
biotic one, where each is essential to and
derives unique benefits from the other.
As the mutual costs have risen, so have
the perceived benefits. Like the two
basic objectives and the anti- American
bias, the Soviet connection has been cen-
tral to the evolution of Cuba's domestic
and foreign policies alike. It is as much
of the fabric of today's Cuba as the
Sierra Maestra. And it is instructive
that Cuba's relationship with the Soviet
Union — once it began — has been largely
unaffected by any changes or trends in
U.S. -Cuban relations, including tem-
porary thaws in the relationship between
Washington and Havana.

The basic conflict in LI. S. -Cuban
relations that began in 1959 stems
primarily from Havana's foreign policy
and only indirectly from events in Cuba.
It is true that at the outset our attention
and expectations were directed mainly
to certain domestic actions by the
Castro government, such as expropria-
tion of U.S. property, execution of
prisoners, and the unforeseen introduc-
tion of the communist system, stimu-
lating massive flows of refugees to our
shores. It would at present be quite con-
ceivable, in theory at least, for Cuba to
have a repressive domestic system and
yet not promote turmoil in the region or
align itself militarily with the rival global
superpower. If Cuban foreign policy
were really noninterventionist and non-
aligned, Cuban-American relations
would still be less than harmonious, but
such a Cuba would not clash with U.S.
foreign policy interests throughout the
region.

In historical practice, the foreign
and the domestic policies of the Cuban
Government, however, spring from the
same imperative. Cuba still sees a mis-
sion and arrogates to itself the right and
even the duty to support revolution and
"national liberation" in other states.
When conditions are deemed appropri-
ate, the Cuban revolution is a model for
others. It is not passive. Cuba craves
emulation. The model need not, of
course, be accepted in every detail. The
Cubans have grown aware through trial
and error that conditions differ from
country to country. Doubtlessly with an
eye both to their own experience and to
their privileged access to the Soviet

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

treasury, they caution radical regimes in
third countries to keep their lines open
to Western trade and assistance and not
to expropriate too quickly all private
enterprise or to alienate or eliminate all
other institutions. But these have been
essentially prudent tactical considera-
tions, designed to ensure the survival
and firm implementation of a one-party
state system in third countries, such as
Nicaragua and Grenada, based on well-
known Leninist principles. The Cuban
leadership envisions the rise of societies
imitative of Cuban practice, alienated
from the United States, friendly to the
U.S.S.R., and looking to Cuba for
ideological leadership. In the short run,
however, where societies are not yet
ripe for revolution, Cuba is content to
use its power to encourage other states,
particularly in Latin America, to rally
together against the United States.

The Cuban Model in
Appearance and Reality

Since Cuba proselytizes, we need to
know what it is, and, perhaps more im-
portant, what it seems to be. Cuba of-
fers would-be leaders in other countries
the example of a hierarchical one-party
system, supported by ubiquitous organs
of control and punishment and by a near
total monopoly over the dissemination of
knowledge and ideas. It offers to would-
be emulators a command economy which
assigns nearly everyone some form of
employment, at least if it wishes them to
be employed. The fact that the economy
does not respond well to the needs of
the population, that it is a perpetuation
of monoculture and closely integrated in-
to and totally dependent on subsidies
from the Soviet orbit is not always
readily apparent to others. For domestic
support the model relies heavily and suc-
cessfully on national consciousness-
building enterprises like nationalized
sport and culture. It appeals to visceral
nationalism by calculated distortion of
past history and contemporary events.
Revolutionary Cuba has long assigned
the United States the same universal
malevolence which Hitler arrogated to
the Jews. It pretends to, and to a cer-
tain degree practices, a more egalitarian
distribution of the social product than is
customary in Latin America. It lays
great stress on so-called socialist
achievements, particularly in health and
education. In this respect — as with
many others, too — Cuba distorts and
belittles the achievements of the past so
as to improve the appearance of the pre-
sent. In short, Cuba offers to pro-
ponents of radical change a model for

seizing and holding power without need
for periodic popular ratification and for
altering society unrestrained by legal or
ethical limitations.

There is one essential element of the
Cuban model which could not be widely
replicated. Cuba's economy could not ex-
ist but for Soviet subsidies. These are on
the order of $12-$13 million dollars
daily for economic aid alone. Thus those
who might wish to emulate the Cuban
experience cannot truly do so unless
they can persuade the Soviet Union to
provide a similar degree of massive sup-
port.

Moreover, the Cuban reality is some-
what different from the point of view of
those who must live it. The costs are
very high. The benefits are less evident.
The Cuban system since 1959 has been
one-man rule. The same individual is
now President of the Council of State,
President of the Council of Ministers,
First Secretary of the Cuban Communist
Party, and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. The "Maximum Leader"
projects his views across all aspects of
Cuban society. From bovine genetics to
college textbooks, from sugar cultivation
to nurses' uniforms his views are norma-
tive. To challenge them, even to provide
well-intended advice, is not recom-
mended. Unsurprisingly, in these cir-
cumstances innovation does not flourish
in Cuba and practices are slow to
change.

Second, Cuba is a militarized society
with one-quarter million men under
arms and another million men and
women in the militia. In addition, as
Havana International Radio recently
stated, every able-bodied Cuban must
know his mission in a war situation. The
economy, it stated, ". . . is being pre-
pared so it can accomplish its objectives
in times of war and adapt its develop-
ment to defense interests." Militant
Cuba devotes its Sundays neither to the
spirit nor to rest nor to recreation but
rather to military drill. Cuba possesses
the most experienced and most highly
mechanized fighting force in Latin
America. Its leaders speak often of the
need to defend Cuba, but Cuba's
substantial combat experience has been
acquired almost exclusively on far away
foreign battlefields such as Bolivia,
Angola, Grenada, and the Horn of
Africa. As Cuban Politburo member
Jorge Risquet described it recently
(Havana International Service, June 15,
1984) when he decorated Cuba's "inter-
nationalists": "You have traveled
thousands of miles from your fatherland,
your homes, and your families to raise
the Cuban and internationalist flags in
the heart of Africa."

The essence of Cuba's political
organization is reflected in Article 61 o
the Constitution of Cuba of 1976,
according to which;

None of the freedoms which are recog-
nized for citizens may be exercised contrarj
to what is established in the Constitution aipi
the law, or contrary to the existence and ot
jectives of the socialist state, or contrary tc
the decision of the Cuban people to build
socialism and communism. Violation of this
principle is punishable by law.

This last is understatement. No or
ganizations or movements are permitt
in Cuba to oppose the political will of 1
leadership. "There is no organized dis-
sent, no effective institutional or
historical limitations on the exercise o:
power. No parties other than the Com
munist Party are tolerated. There is n
freedom of the press or speech, no rei
possibility through culture or the in-
tellectual arts to satirize the leadershi
The Catholic Church and Protestant
churches exist but cannot provide a ri
orientation or challenge the dictum of
Article 61. It is not surprising that th
"Seventh Report of the Organization (
American States on the Situation of
Human Rights in Cuba," published las
October, concluded that the structure
the Cuban state is totalitarian.

Over 1 million refugees since 195!
have found the way out of Cuba to ot
shores, especially to the United State
Less fortunate has been the fate of
those who stayed behind but who sou
to resist the party-state. The Cuban
leadership has singled them out for e
emplary punishment. Vengeance is ui
lenting on those who dare to resist th
system. Nowhere else in Latin Amer'
have so many been punished so long.
There are still in Cuba, at present, hi
dreds of prisoners who have spent m
than 15 or even 20 years in prison
because they opposed the regime anc
refuse to acknowledge their "crime" .
accept the new order. Like the recen
released poets Jorge Vails and Arma
Valladares, they have passed the bes
years of their lives free in spirit but
to the world.

Despite these punishments and
despite the evident will and capacity
the regime to deal harshly with disse
it continues to manifest itself. In
January of 1983, for example, we
learned of the trials and sentencing-
some originally to death— of a grou{
some 50 Cubans who apparently wis
to form a trade union on the model (
the Polish Solidarity. Arrests and tri j
of their lawyers and judges followed
After that, the former President of

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

a and, at the time, Minister of
ice, Oswaldo Dorticos, committed
ide. The veil of secrecy that sur-
ids Cuba makes it difficult to obtain
ible information about dissent and
enters, but we know enough to con-
e that the spirit of freedom still ex-
in Cuba.

It is clear that whatever Cuba has
iuced since 1959 has been wrought
le price of inordinate human suffer-
But what has, in fact, been pro-
jd which could justify this regime?
The Cuban revolutionaries took
er talking about an end to mono-
ure and to foreign domination of the
an economy. They spoke of economic
vth and egalitarian living standards.
984 Cuba is more dependent on
ir than before. In 1983 more than

of Cuban trade was with the Soviet
on and other communist countries
only some 10% with the West. Were
Dt for subsidized Soviet purchases of
lan sugar and subsidized Soviet oil
s, along with deliveries of Soviet and
t European equipment, the Cuban
lomy could not function. Even so,
capita economic growth in Cuba has
n among the lowest in the
lisphere. It is often forgotten that
)a on the eve of Fidel Castro was a
ily advanced society. In 1952 Cuba
the third highest per capita gross
ional product of the 20 Latin
erican republics. In 1981 it ranked
h. Only in the equalization of living
idards have the aspirations of the
)an revolutionaries been reached to
le degree, albeit at a modest level,
m so the elite has perquisites denied
he great majority. For example,
;r Cuba — which rations clothing to its
1 citizens — recently staged an inter-
ional fashion fair, the Cuban authori-
explained that the "fashions" would
for export or sale in "specialized"
res open to diplomats and tourists.
;y did not explain that the Cuban
e buys in such stores, too, and that
clothing is not always made in Cuba
the "socialist camp."
While leading the Cuban delegation
he June 1984 CEMA [Council for
tual Economic Assistance] summit
eting in Moscow, Cuban Vice Presi-
it Carlos Rafael Rodriguez cited
oa, Mongolia, and Vietnam as the
1st developed countries within
MA." For Cuba, which in 1959 had a
ndard of living that rivaled Spain, it
s a bizarre sign of progress to be
ssified with Mongolia and Vietnam
i to see accentuated those programs
;ich promise to perpetuate Cuba's
Lgnation.

Cuba— A Profile

PROFILE

People

Noun and adjective: Cuban(s). Population
(1981 census, preliminary data): 9.7 million;
67% urban, 30% rural. Avg. annual growth
rate: 1.2%. Density: 86/sq. km. (224/sq. mi.).
Ethnic group: Spanish-African mixture.
Language: Spanish. Literacy rate: 96% of
physically fit between ages 10 and 49.
Health: Infant mortality rate — slightly less
than 25/1,000. Life expectancy — 70 yrs.
Work force: Agriculture — 30%. Industry
and commerce — 45%. Services — 20%.
Government — 5%.

Geography

Area: 114,471 sq. km. (44,200 sq. mi.); about
the size of Pennsylvania. Cities: Capital —
Havana (pop. 1.9 million). Other cities — San-
tiago de Cuba, Camaguey. Terrain: Flat or
gently rolling plains, mountains up to
1,800 m. (6,000 ft,), and hills. Climate:
Tropical; avg. annual temperature 24 °C
(76°F).

Government

Type: Communist state. Independence:
May 20, 1902. Latest constitution: 1976.

Branches: Executive — president. Council
of Ministers. Legislative — National Assembly
of People's Government, headed by Council of
State. Judicial — subordinate to Council of
State.

Political party: Communist Party (PCC).
Suffrage: All citizens aged 16 and older, ex-
cept those who have applied for permanent
emigration. National elections were held in
1976 for the National Assembly of the Peo-
ple's Government, and municipal elections for
local assemblies were held in 1981.

Administrative subdivisions: 14 prov-
inces, 169 municipalities.

National holidays: Jan. 1, Revolution
Day; May 1, International Workers Day;
July 26, Moncada Barracks Attack anniver-
sary.

Flag: White star centered on red
equilateral triangle at staff side, 3 blue and 2
white horizontal stripes in the background.

Economy

GNP (1979 est.): $9-11 billion. Annual
growth rate (1980 est): - 1%/ -i- 1%. Per
capita income (1981 est.): $900-$l,100.

Natural resources: Metals, primarily
nickel.

Agriculture: Sugar, tobacco, coffee,
citrus and tropical fruits, rice, beans, meat,
vegetables.

Major industries (17% of labor force):
Refined sugar, metals. Other industries: Oil
refining, cement, electric power, food proc-
essing, light consumer and industrial prod-
ucts.

Trade: Exports— $4.7 billion (f o.b. 1981):
sugar and its byproducts (83%), nickel oxide
and sulfide (10%), tobacco and its products,
fish, rum, fruits. Major markets — USSR,
Eastern Europe, China. Imports — $5.4 billion
(c.i.f. 1980 approx. figures): capital equip-
ment (33%), raw materials (33%), petroleum
(10%), foodstuffs and consumer products
(20%-25%). Major sources— USSR, Eastern
Europe.

Offlcial exchange rate: 1 Cuban
peso = US$1.28.

Membership in International
Organizations

iJN and various specialized agencies, in-
cluding General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade; Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CEMA); observer. Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA); In-
ternational Sugar Council; Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO); nonpartici-
pating member, Organization of American
States (OAS) and Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (IDB); Latin American Economic
System (SELA); Group of 77; Nonaligned
Movement.

Taken from the Background Notes of April
1983, published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: J. Darnell
Adams. ■

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Cubans are still rationed to three-
quarters of a pound of meat per person
each 9-11 days. There recently have ap-
peared billboards in Havana admonish-
ing the population to think not of con-
sumption but of development. In other
words, perhaps, to think less of the fact
that a Cuban is entitled to a ration of
one pair of shoes a year and more of the
future development of the shoe industry.
But even the notion of industrial devel-
opment is belied by the facts. According
to the World Bank, manufactures ac-
counted for 5% of Cuba's exports in
1960 and the same percentage in 1980.
By way of contrast, Jamaica's went
from 5% to 53% in the same period,
Brazil's from 3% to 39%, Costa Rica's
from 5% to 34%, and Paraguay's from
0% to 12%.

The Cuban elite boasts of achieve-
ments in the fields of health and educa-
tion, speaking in terms of being a
"medical power" in the world. It is
beyond dispute that Cuba has health
facilities superior to those in many other
countries. But Cuba was a leader among
Latin American nations before 1959, in
part due to its close association with the
United States. The first great health
revolution in Cuba was introduced by
the United States in 1900. Havana and
yellow fever were synonymous in the
19th century. In 1900 there were 1,400
known cases of yellow fever in Havana.
In February 1901 William Gorgas com-
menced his campaign to eliminate the
disease. In 1901 there were 37 cases,
and in 1902 there was no yellow fever in
Havana. Deaths from malaria in 1900
were 325. In 1902 they were 77.

Cuba was a healthy country long
before it aspired to be a "medical
power." In 1960 it already had 1 physi-
cian for each 1,060 inhabitants— only
Argentina and Uruguay had more. In
1980 when Cuba had 700 inhabitants per
physician, Argentina and Uruguay had
530 and 540 respectively.

In 1960 life expectancy in Cuba was
already 63 years. It gained 10 years to
73 by 1980. But in the same period
greater gains were made by nine Latin
American countries and similar ones by
three others. Infant mortality, according
to the 1977 StatiMical Abstract of Latin
Amenca, was 32 per 1 ,000 live births in
Cuba in I960, the best in the region and
better than Spain and Italy. In 1980 it
was 19. In the same period Jamaica had
gone down to 16. Percentage decreases
better than Cuba's 41% were achieved in
11 other states. As Professor Norman
Luxenburg of the University of Iowa has
written, Cuba in 1958 had twice as many
physicians for its 6.6 million inhabitants

(6,421) as the rest of the Caribbean
Basin had for 19 million. Even if Cuba
today does have the 15,000 doctors
which it claims, the rate of growth since
1958 is less than that between 1948
(3,100) and 1958 (6,421) when the
number doubled in 10 years.

In sum, the Cuban system may ap-
peal to certain would-be strongmen, but
it is not a successful development model.
It is a model, perhaps, for retention of
political and military power but not for
economic growth and human well-being.

However, the Cuban revolution has
another side, its foreign policy ac-
complishments. Here the record is more
complex. Cuba in the past decade has
finally gained some of the revolutionary
success which long eluded it after 1959.
Lacking freedom and economic progress
itself, Cuba has, nonetheless, grown into
a force which challenges the potential
development of the open society in Latin
America.

The Cuban Challenge

The revolutionary process that was suc-
cessful in Cuba was applied repeatedly
by Cuba to other states in the region
after 1959. In the beginning, expecta-
tions were simplistic, costs modest, and
results slim. Cuba viewed its neighbors
with hostility and as proper targets for
revolutionary bands. This interven-
tionary policy, which earned Cuba few
friends in the region and even strained
ties to Moscow, was put in abeyance
after the death of Che Guevara in
Bolivia in 1967. But the revolutionary
zeal of Cuba has continued as an in-
tegral part of the Cuban system. It is
anchored as Article 12(c) in the Cuban
Constitution. It has — in connection with
Cuba's more mature relationship with
the Soviet Union and its pretensions to
leadership in the Third World — become
a more sophisticated challenge to the
rival concept of the open society in the
Western Hemisphere.

Especially since the early 1970s,
Cuba has moved ever more definitively
into the Soviet sphere. In view of the
drastic change in the terms of trade be-
tween sugar and oil, the barter relation-
ship between Cuba and the Soviet Union
has become marked by increasing Soviet
subsidies and mounting Cuban economic
dependency. Cuba owes the Soviet
Union vast soft currency debts it cannot
repay. Indeed, the Soviet Union and its
East European allies must supply
greater subsidies, expressed in un-
balanced trade accounts, to sustain
Cuba's economy.

But if Cuba, on the one hand, has '
creased in cost for the Soviet Union, i1
also has increased in strategic value
The decade of the 1970s witnessed the
appearance of Cuban combat troops
engaged on African battlefields. Partii
larly in the case of Ethiopia, this Cubs
presence served Soviet interests in a
way which no European ally of the
U.S.S.R. could or would have done.
Cuba's military success in Africa, at
least in the short run, was in stark co
trast to what had, until then, been a {
tern of failure in Latin America. Mon
over, after its lonely endorsement of 1
Soviet crushing of the Prague spring
1968, Cuba has been unfailingly sup-
portive of Soviet foreign policy, even
when this allegiance has cost Cuba
respect among countries which truly i
nonaligned.

At the end of the 1970s, when Cu
perceived new opportunities closer to j
home, two vital elements had changec ,
from the situation prevailing in the
1960s. For one, the Soviet Union was
now supportive of Cuba's renewed
revolutionary activism and was also
prepared to underwrite the massive
buildup of the Cuban Armed Forces
which has been taking place since the
end of 1980. This, together with Sovi
activities in and around Cuba, has in-
creased tensions and would be an ele
ment in any major East- West conflic
The second factor is that Cuba has
learned to differentiate its own Latir
American policy objectives. In the loi
run, probably, Cuba envisions transf(
mation along Marxist-Leninist lines f
every state in the region, but the Cu
leadership has learned to order its si
range priorities. Cuba now has the o
tion of cultivating better diplomatic i
tions with the states of the region, ti
ing thereby to stimulate a Latin
American consciousness against the
United States and to cultivate its ow
general acceptance as a normal men- . ,u
of the international order.

Yet, anchored by its bonds to thi
Soviet Union, Cuba maintains close i
tions with virtually every radical or
revolutionary group in the region, si
plying training, money, weapons, an^
counsel and providing the nexus be-
tween the revolutionaries and the Sc
Union. At the same time, it assesses
relative value of its associations with
various Latin American government
and particularly the degree to which
these governments can be made usel
to Cuba. Cuba thus seeks to be both
mecca for subversives and a focal pc
for rallying their governments again
the United States.

.to

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

'he examples of this situation in the
!.! 5 are many.

In the case of Argentina, Cuba
^ haste to show its firm support of
ntil-then despised Galtieri regime
the battle for the Falklands began,
deology of the Argentine military
>red the Cubans less than the
36 to be seen in the forefront of
1 culture against the Anglo-Saxon.
dditional reward for Cuba has been
:enerous trade credits which both
Argentine military regime and its
an successor have supplied to the

Cuban economy.

Once the momentum of the Falk-
j issue was lost, Cuba — which was

obliged in August 1982 to ask
tern creditors to reschedule part of
3-billion Cuban hard currency
— seized upon the general financial
1 in the region to promote Cuban
arity with other Latin American
ors. This, incidentally, shows again
adept Cuba is at exploiting even its
problems for political gain.
• In the case of Colombia, the
m Government admitted having
led the M-19 revolutionaries who
ulted the Turbay Ayala government,
which Havana was maintaining
tly normal diplomatic relations,
e recently Cuba showed its influence
new way. The head of the Cuban
rnment requested that Colombian
orists release the kidnapped brother
le President of Colombia. The ter-
sts heeded this request from an in-
Sual whom they apparently respect
esteem. The obvious lesson is that
voice which can stay the terrorist's
i can also permit it to strike.

The focus of Cuba's foreign policy,
ever, is presently on Central
erica. Cuba primarily wishes to see
Sandinista government in Managua
iOlidated as a permanent force on
American mainland with its funda-
ital approach in close harmony with
Cuban system. Communist Cuba
its a communist Nicaragua. It also
lid like to see the revolutionary
■es in El Salvador come to power
'•e through the process of a
otiated settlement, sharing power on
■ansitional basis until Leninist-style
trol can be established. Cuba's im-
iiate attitude toward the other states
he region seems to be dictated
narily by how they react to the
jggle in Nicaragua and in El
vador. For example, it is largely ir-
avant to the Cubans that elections

take place in Guatemala. What is essen-
tial is that Guatemala stay out of the
conflict at its very door or else bear the
brunt of Cuban displeasure. The same
policy was followed in the case of Hon-
duras, where Cuban actions were keyed
to the stand taken by Honduras toward
the two conflicts on its borders. Cuba —
which has trained revolutionaries from
almost all countries in the hemisphere —
was able to send such forces into Hon-
duras. The invaders were defeated, but
they demonstrated the same principle as
applied in Colombia and elsewhere. The
government which displeases Cuba,
whether or not it has normal diplomatic
relations with Havana, can expect
armed retaliation.

Cuban officials occasionally say they
favor the democratic trend in Latin
America. But this putative endorsement
of something which Cuba has never per-
mitted its own people is suspect. Free
elections are clearly not seen by Cuba as
the answer to questions in Central
America or even as a useful step for-
ward. They are not likely to be seen as
relevant in other countries once there
exist concrete prospects for revolution
on the Cuban pattern. Rather, it appears
that Cuba, if it welcomes democratic
trends at all, does so only where it can
envision prospects of winning from
within or where the elected government
supports foreign policy objectives which,
at least in the short run, are consistent
with Cuba's own. In either case, how-
ever, there is no reason to believe that
Cuba will suspend its close ties to
revolutionary forces in any country,
forces which Cuba can help to bring to
power when conditions are appropriate
or which can be used as a threat to com-
pel or to persuade.

The United States and Cuba

The underlying issues between the
United States and Cuba have their
genesis in Cuba's revolutionary posture
and its close alignment with the Soviet
Union. Cuba has indicated on many oc-
casions that neither of these pillars of
Cuban policy is open to discussion. Its
behavior consistently underscores this
reality. It is Cuba's unique role as a
linchpin between Soviet power and a
Latin America in transition which intro-
duces strategic and ideological con-
siderations into conflicts which could
otherwise be resolved or at least
ameliorated on their own terms. Cuba
facilitates Soviet military power on our

doorstep. That is why foreign policy is
at the root of our differences with
Havana and why so much of our policy
toward Cuba is directed toward its
restraint.

In the 1970s there were good faith
efforts by the United States to improve
this relationship. Interests sections were
established to facilitate direct communi-
cations between the two parties. The
U.S. trade and financial embargo was
relaxed. Cuba released some political
prisoners and permitted the return of
Cuban-Americans who had left Cuba as
"worms" and came back as "butterflies,"
pouring dollars into Cuban coffers. But
this movement did not and could not
touch the main thrust of Cuban policy.
Having gone into Ethiopia in 1977 at
Soviet behest, Cuba in succeeding years
engaged itself in Nicaragua and El
Salvador and exploited the seizure of
power by the New JEWEL Movement
in Grenada. In so doing, Cuba demon-
strated the depth of its determination to
reconstruct the Western Hemisphere
along the lines of its own model.

The attitude of the U.S. Government
toward Cuba remains one of serious con-
cern about the militarization of Cuba
and about Cuba's stimulation of revolu-
tionary violence in this hemisphere and
elsewhere. After Grenada it is likely that
Cuba has some better appreciation of
the risks of uncontrolled violence and of
the limitations of its own power and that
of its allies, but there is no convincing
indication that the overall thrust of
Cuban foreign policy has been or will be
altered. Cuba remains militant and
prone to stimulate violent change.

There remains, however, a willing-
ness on our part to resolve those prob-
lems with Cuba which Cuba may wish to
resolve and for which there is a
reasonable basis for mutually satis-
factory solutions. One example is the
problem of the Mariel excludables who
came with the boatlift of 1980 and who
are ineligible to remain in the United
States for substantive reasons. We have
also tried to engage Cuba in talks about
problems of radio interference. In both
cases we were and are prepared to deal
with Cuba on the basis of equality and
mutual respect and to make concessions
in order to resolve problems. There are
perhaps other issues of this nature
where progress could be made if Cuba is
so interested.

It is occasionally asked if there can
be an improvement in overall U.S.-
Cuban relations. Such an improvement
can hardly be a goal in itself. There are
some bilateral issues, relatively free of

TREATIES

ideological content, which can be re-
solved. But the differences of principle
between the United States and Cuba are
profound. There is unfortunately no sign
yet that the Cuban leadership is recon-
sidering its own world view or is begin-
ning seriously to address those issues
which set it apart from a region which is
striving for greater freedom and eco-
nomic well-being.

Assuming that these circumstances
continue, we shall continue to work with
friendly nations to meet the Cuban
challenge and to overcome it until that
day when the constructive genius of
Cuba can be turned to the commonweal
of all who inhabit this hemisphere. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation, Civil

Tnternational air services transit agreement.
Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into
force Jan. 20, 194.5; for the U.S. Feb. 8,
1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Italy, June 27, 1984.

Bill of Lading

International convention for the unification of

certain rules relating to bills of lading and

protocol of signature. Done at Brussels

Aug. 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2,

1931; for the U.S. Dec. 29. 1937. 51 Stat.

233.

Denounced: U.K. for Bermuda. British Virgin

Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands
and dependencies, Hong Kong, Montserrat,
and Turks and Caicos Islands, effective
Oct. 20, 1984.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1983, with an-
nexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982.
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983.
Ratification deposited: Togo, June 4, 1984.

Accession deposited: Nigeria, May 3i, 1984.

Commodities — Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980'
Ratification deposited: Brazil, June 29, 1984.

Human Rights

International covenant on economic, social,
and cultural rights. Adopted at New York
Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force .Ian. 3,
1976.2

International covenant on civil and political
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.^
Accessions deposited : Cameroon, June 27,
1984.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the civil aspects of interna-
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1,
1983.2
Extended: Canada to Province of New-

foundland, July 5, 1984.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the International Maritime

Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948.

Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS

4044.

Accession deposited: Vietnam, June 12, 1984

Prisoner Transfer

Convention on the transfer of sentenced per-
sons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983.
Signature : Italy Mar. 20, 1984.

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President : July 17, 1984.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to INTELSAT, with an-
nexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971.
Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Malawi, July 17, 1984.

Operating agreeement relating to
INTELSAT, with annex. Done at
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into
force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Department of Posts and Tele-
communications, Malawi. July 17, 1984.

Shipping

United Nations convention on the carriage of
goods by sea. 1978. Done at Hamburg Mar.
31, 1978.'
Ratification deposited: Hungary, July 5,

1984.

Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention
signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926 (TS 778),
with annex. Done at New York Dec. 7, 1953.
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953, for the Pro-
tocol, July 7, 1955, for annex to Protocol; for
the U.S. Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of
slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva
Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30,
1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, June 27,

1984.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977, as ex-
tended. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977.
Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978;
definitively Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664, 10467.
Withdrawal: Bangladesh, effective June 23,
1984.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punish-
ment of crimes against internationally pro-

tected persons, including diplomatic agents.
Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973.
Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 853
Accession deposited: Greece, July 3, 1984

International covention against the taking o
hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979
Entered into force June 3, 1983.2
Ratification deposited: Portugal, July 6, 19J

Trade

Agreement on implementation of art. VI of
GATT (antidumping). Done at Geneva Apr.
12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
TIAS 9650.

Agreement on import licensing procedures.
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered int
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9788.
Acceptances deposited: Singapore, June 20

1984.

UNIDO

Constitution of the UN Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.'
Signature: Guyana, July 17, 1984.

Ratifications deposited: Guyana, Ireland,

July 17, 1984.

Wheat

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the Int(
national Wheat Agreement. 1971, as exter
ed (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Mar.
11. 1980. Entered into force June 30, 198(
TIAS 10015.
Approval deposited: European Economic

Community, July 23, 1984.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into for
Sept. 3, 1981.2
Accessions deposited: Liberia, July 17, 19:

Mauritius, July 9, 1984.

BILATERAL

Antigua and Barbuda

Agreement for the furnishing of commodi
and services in connection with the
peacekeeping force for Grenada. Effected
exchange of notes at Bridgetown and St.
John's Nov. 30, 1983 and Jan. 27, 1984.
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1984.

Australia

Agreement extending the agreement of C
16. 1968 (TIAS 6589), relating to scientifi
and technical cooperation. Effected by ex
change of notes at Canberra Apr. 16 and
May 11, 1984. Entered into force May U
1984; effective Apr. 16, 1984.

Canada

Convention with respect to taxes on incoi |
and capital, with related exchange of noti
Signed at Washington Sept. 26, 1980.

TREATIES

;ocol with related notes. Signed at Ottawa
; 14, 1983. Second protocol. Signed at
ihington Mar. 28, 1984.
ite advice and consent to ratification :

3 28, 1984.

fied by the President : July 16, 1984.

,ty relating to the Skagit River, Ross
e, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the
d d'Oreille River, with annex. Signed at
ihington Apr. 2, 1984.
ate advice and consent to ratification:

i 28, 1984.

eement regarding mutual assistance and
leration between customs administrations,
led at Quebec June 20, 1984. Enters into
e upon exchange of diplomatic notes in
ch the parties notify each other of the
ipletion of any procedures required by
r national law for giving effect to this
?ement.

•eement relating to the operation of radio
phone stations. Signed at Ottawa Nov.
1969. Entered into force July 24, 1970.
IS 6931.
ification of termination: May 8, 1984;

ctive Nov. 7, 1984.

ombia

noranduni of understanding for scientific
technical cooperation in the Earth
nces. Signed at Bogota June 22, 1984.
ered into force June 22, 1984.

ninica

eement relating to radio communications
ween amateur stations on behalf of third
ties. Effected by exchange of telexes at
dgetown and Roseau Dec. 8, 1983 and
9, 1984. Entered into force Mar. 10,
4.

Ypt

■eement amending the agreement of Dec.
nd 28, 1977 (TIAS 8973), relating to trade
extiles and textile products. Effected by
hange of notes at Cairo June 21 and 25,
;4. Entered into force June 25, 1984.

aatorial Guinea

reement concerning the provision of train-
related to defense articles under the U.S.
ET program. Effected by exchange of
es at Malabo Mar. 9 and 30, 1983.
tered into force Mar. 30, 1983.

mce

itocol to the convention with respect to
es on income and property of July 28,

7 (TIAS 6518), as amended by the Pro-
ols of Oct. 12, 1970 (TIAS 7270), and Nov.

1978 (TIAS 9500). Signed at Paris Jan.

1984.
gate advice and consent to ratification :

le 28, 1984.

tified by the President: July 16, 1984.

invention on the transfer of sentenced per-
is. Signed at Washington Jan. 25, 1983.
nate advice and consent to ratification:

ne 28 1984.

.tified by the President: July 17, 1984.

Memorandum of understanding on the par-
ticipation of France in the ocean drilling pro-
gram. Signed at Washington and Paris May
17 and June 13, 1984. Entered into force
June 13, 1984.

Memorandum of understanding on en-
vironmental cooperation. Signed at Paris
June 21, 1984. Entered into force June 21,
1984.

Gabon

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
IMET program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Libreville Mar. 21, 1983 and July 5,
1984. Entered into force July 5, 1984.

Grenada

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
IMET program. Effected by exchange of
notes at St. George's May 18 and 24, 1984.
Entered into force May 24, 1984.

Guinea

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com-
modities, related to the agreement of Apr.
21, 1976 (TIAS 8378). Signed at Conakry
June 11, 1984. Entered into force June 11,
1984.

Honduras

Agreement amending agreement of Dec. 16,

1983, as amended, for the sale of agricultural
commodities. Signed at Tegucigalpa June 19,

1984. Entered into force June 19, 1984.

India

Agreement extending and amending the
memorandum of understanding of July 18,
1978 (TIAS 9285) concerning furnishing of
launching and associated services for Indian
national satellite system (INSAT)-l
spacecraft. Signed at Washington and
Bangalore Apr. 10 and 25, 1984. Enters into
force upon exchange of diplomatic notes.

Indonesia

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of Dec. 11, 1978 (TIAS 9609), for
cooperation in scientific research and
technological development. Signed at
Washington July 9, 1984. Entered into force
July 9, 1984.

Italy

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat-
ters, with memorandum of understanding.
Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Jamaica

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com-
modities relating to the agreement of
Apr. 30, 1982 (TIAS 10495). Signed at
Kingston May 30, 1984. Entered into force
May 30, 1984.

Madagascar

Agreement concerning the provisions of
training related to defense articles under the
U.S. IMET program. Effected by exchange

of notes at Antananarivo Feb. 25, 1983 and
May 3, 1984, Entered into force May 3, 1984.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to addi-
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Mexico May 29, 1984.
Entered into force May 29, 1984.

Morocco

Convention on mutual assistance in criminal
matters. Signed at Rabat Oct. 17, 1983.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President : July 13, 1984.

Norway

Revised agreement for cooperation concern-
ing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with an-
nexes and agreed minute. Signed at Oslo
Jan. 12, 1984,
Entered into force: July 2, 1984.

Supersedes agreement of May 4, 1967, as

amended (TIAS 6260, 6849).

Poland

Agreement extending the agreement of
Aug. 2, 1976, concerning fisheries off the
coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8524, 10533, 10697).
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
and Warsaw Mar. 7 and 30, 1984.
Entered into force : July 27, 1984.

Romania

Agreement amending the agreement of
Sept. 3 and Nov. 3, 1980, as amended (TIAS
9911, 10639), relating to trade in wool, man-
made fiber textiles, and textile products. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Washington
and New York June 12 and 22. 1984.
Entered into force June 22, 1984.

Sri Lanka

Agreement on cooperation in science and
technology. Signed at Washington June 18,
1984. Entered into force June 18, 1984.

Sweden

Supplementary convention to the extradition
convention of Oct. 24, 1961 (TIAS 5496).
Signed at Stockholm Mar. 14, 1983.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President : July 13, 1984.

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and
gifts. Signed at Stockholm June 13, 1983.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President : July 13, 1984.

Thailand

Treaty relating to extradition. Signed at

Washington Dec. 14, 1983.

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: July 18, 1984.

CHRONOLOGY

U.S.S.R.

Agreement relating to the memorandum of
understanding of June 20, 1963 (TIAS 5362),
and the agreement of Sept. 30, 1971 as
amended (TIAS 7187, 8059), concerning the
direct communications link. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington July 17, 1984.
Entered into force July 17, 1984.

Yemen (Sanaa)

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com-
modities, with related letter. Signed at Sanaa
June 19, 1984. Entered into force June 19,
1984.

Zaire

Agreement concerning provision of training
related to defense articles under the U.S.
IMET program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Kinshasa Dec. 22, 1983, and
June 18, 1984. Entered into force June 18,
1984.

'Not in force.

^Not in force for the U.S.

July 1984

Note: The editors .solicit readers' comments
on the value of the Bulletin's monthly
chronologies. Unless a positive response is
received, the chronologies will be discon-
tinued.

July 1-12

ACDA Director Adelman, visits Japan,
China, and Thailand to discuss arms control
and disarmanent issues, as well as chemical
weapons use in Southeast Asia.

July 1

TASS reports that the Soviet Union's offer
for talks on banning weapons in outer space
remains open, but the Soviets reject an U.S.
attempt to discuss other arms issues.

(Juatemalans hold elections for an
88-member ("onstituent Assembly to write a
new constitution. An U-member U.S. delega-
tion observes the election process.

Senator Charles Mathias heads the U.S.
delegation at the inauguration of Richard von
Weizsaecker as Federal President of the
Federal Republic of Germany.

July 2

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko says the
U.S. is avoiding talks on banning weapons in
space and imposing unacceptable conditions
on talks proposed for the fall.

White House spokesman Speakes says
the U.S. agrees to outer space weapons talks
in September, but also plans to discuss ar-
rangements for nuclear arms talks.

U.S. Postmaster General Bolger, attend-
ing the UPU conference in Hamburg, says
the Soviet Union's unethical postal practices
threaten the integrity of the international
system. He also affirms U.S. support to in-
vestigate Soviet violations.

The World Bank lowers interest rates to
9.89% on conventional loans to developing
countries for the next 6 months.

July 3

During a meeting with Soviet Ambassador
Dobrynin, Secretary Shultz reaffirms U.S.
commitment to hold space weapons talks in
September and repeats that the U.S. also in-
tends to discuss "offensive missiles that go
through space."

British Foreign Secretary Howe, meeting
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and
President Chernenko, assures the Soviets
that the U.S. has set no preconditions for
proposed outer space arms talks.

Soviet authorities refuse to allow U.S.
Ambassador Hartman to deliver a Fourth of
July television address, claiming it is part of
President Reagan's reelection campaign.

July 4-7

CARICOM's 13 members meet in Nassau to
discuss the future of the organization. They
agree to eliminate trade barriers and to grant
observer status to Haiti, Dominican Republic,
and Suriname.

July 4

Soviet authorities detain for 2 hours two U.S.
diplomats, accusing them of activities incom-
patible with their diplomatic status. They
were meeting in public with a Soviet citizen
when they were picked up.

The Lebanese Government begins im-
plementation of its security plan for the
Beirut area. The Lebanese Army redeploys
throughout Beirut and armed militias leave
the streets.

July 5-17

Secretary Shultz visits Hong Kong (July 7-8).
Malaysia (July 9-10), Singapore (July 10-11),
Indonesia (July 11-14), Australia (July
14-15), and New Zealand (.July 15-17).

On July 12-13 Secretary Shultz attends
the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in
Jakarta.

The ANZUS council holds its 33d meeting
(July 16-17) in Wellington. The Foreign
Ministers of ANZUS issue a joint communi-
que (July 17) reaffirming their commitment
to the Pacific pact.

July 6

State Department acting spokesman
Romberg reiterates U.S. protests on the
detention of two U.S. diplomats by the Soviet
Union.

In response to a TASS report that the
Soviet Union's offer for September outer
space weapons talks in Vienna remains open.
State Department acting spokesman
Romberg repeats the U.S. acceptance saying
there are no preconditions on having such
talks.

Senators East (North Carolina) and
Symms (Idaho) urge President Reagan to
repudiate the SALT II treaty, terming it as
"dangerous to American security" and
"unconstitutional."

The Lebane.se Army assumes authority of
Beirut from militia forces.

July 7

Secretary Shultz says U.S. is willing to
negotiate some aspects of space weaponry
with the Soviet Union if a plan for talks in
September can be worked out.

July 9-11

Second International Conference on
Assistance to Refugees in Africa is held in
Geneva. Attorney General Smith heads the
U.S. delegation.

July 9

Greece tells the U.S. it will reassess the tre
ty permitting American military bases then
for 5 years and the Voice of America
facilities unless the U.S. stops interfering ir
its domestic affairs.

The U.S. Consulate in Belfast denies an
entry visa to Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn
Fein, the Irish Republican Army's political
wing.

President Reagan signs a proclamation
designating today as African Refugees Reli
Day.

Beirut airport opens for the first time i
5 months.

July 10-14

Assistant Secretary Abrams visits Turkey
assess human rights conditions.

July 10

While in Malaysia, Secretary Shultz says tl
death threat letters received in Malaysia,
South Korea, Zimbabwe, and other Third
World countries may be a "disinformation
campaign" used to embarrass the U.S. The
letters are allegedly from the Ku Klux Kla
and have postmarks from the Virginia and
Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C.

In Singapore, Secretary Shultz says V
nam is blocking efforts to improve relatior
with the U.S. by not providing informatioi
on 2.500 missing Americans from the Viet
nam war and by its continued aggression i
Kampuchea.

President Reagan signs a proclamatioi
designating July 10 as "Food for Peace D:
marking the 30th anniversary of the Food
Peace program. He also announces a pro-
posed five-point food aid initiative.

Bolivia reverses an earlier decision an
says it will send six athletes to compete ii
the Summer Olympic Games.

World Bank's World Development Re
predicts the Earth's population will reach
billion by the year 2050; the biggest incre
will be in poor countries where economic
growth will be stunted by a large populat

'■

July 11-15

West German Defense Minister Worner v
Washington. D.C. On July 12 he meets w
Secretary Weinberger to sign an agreemt
for deploying air defense missiles in Ger-
many. He meets with President Reagan,
President Bush, and Acting Secretary of
State Dam on July 13.

July 11

State Department acting spokesman
Romiierg says the theme of recent threat
ters .sent to Third World countries in the

CHRONOLOGY

■pirs is "dovetailed" with the Soviet
tualKin for its boycott and "bears all the
larks of a disinformation campaign."
.i-i'tk Prime Minister Papandreou and
iAmliassador Stearns meet to discuss re-
il'S. -Greece disagreements.

hr International Trade Commission
:<iiiiK'nds that President Reagan impose
Ir quotas and tariffs on 70% of steel im-
for the next 5 years in order to protect
-ican steel producers and workers,
roverning Board of the International
gy Agency meeting in Paris reaches
jment on a coordinated policy for draw-
own contingency oil stoclvs of member
ns in the event of a major supply disrup-

ptate Department report on the situa-
n El Salvador, Acting Secretary Dam
El Salvador's armed forces have im-
;d in professionalism as well as in per-
ance. Other areas of progress in El
idor include land reform, free elections,
lishment of an effective judicial system,
,he elimination of death squad activity,
he U.S. announces it will no longer pro-
bilateral family planning assistance to
tries that use any method of force to
ve population reduction objectives.

letter to Soviet President Chernenko,
dent Reagan says he is willing to delay
iroposed Vienna talks on space weapons
November to eliminate any Soviet con-
about the presidential elections.
4ew Zealand holds its general elections.
Labor Party, led by David Lange, wins
55 seats in Parliament. The National
I takes 38 seats and the Social Credit
y takes 2 seats.

; Department acting spokesman
Iberg confirms reports that 13 Western
bers of the London Suppliers Club met
■ixembourg (July 11-13) to discuss
lods of strengthening controls on nuclear
I rts. Ambassador Kennedy headed the
I delegation. Other participating countries
!■ Austraha, Belgium, Canada, Federal
iiblie of Germany, France, Italy, Japan,
i?mbourg, the Netherlands, Sweden,
I zerland, and the U.K.
; Embassador Shlaudeman meets with
raguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
CO in Atlanta.

President Reagan signs a proclamation
iring the third week of July (July 15-21)
Captive Nations Week."

and Soviet Union initial an agreement to
-ade the 21-year-old "Hot Line" for crisis
munications. The new system will in-
se word transmission threefold from its
ent 64 words a minute and can also
ismit graphics.

President Reagan expresses disappoint-
it over the Soviet Union's failure to join
majority of the 35 nations that wish to
in "concrete" negotiations at the Con-
•nce on Disarmament in Europe.

Vietnam returns the remains believed to
be eight U.S. servicemen.

Department of State acting spokesman
Romberg says the U.S. and 14 other COCOM
members reached agreement on a new com-
puter definition. This is part of a review to
define products and technologies to be con-
trolled to the East bloc.

The Guatemalan Supreme Electoral
Tribunal reports that the coalition of the Na-
tional Liberation Movement and the Na-
tionalist Authentic Central received the most
seats (23) in the new 88-member Constituent
Assembly, despite finishing third in the
July 1 voting. The Union of the National
Center and the Christian Democratic Party
each took 21 seats.

July 18

In a speech to the Honolulu Council on
Foreign Relations, Secretary Shultz says
Vietnam has agreed to meet next month to
discuss the Americans missing-in-action from
the Vietnam war.

The Drug Enforcement Administration
reports that two Nicaraguan Government of-
ficials are directly involved with cocaine
trafficking between South America and the
U.S.

Departments of State and Defense
release a report titled Nicaragua's Military
Buildup and Support for Central American
Subversion.

The Lebanese Government announces its
decision to restore diplomatic relations with
Iran.

Lebanese Defense Minister Osseiran
orders Israel to close its liaison office in
Dubayyah.

July 19

President Reagan attends a conference of
Caribbean heads of government in Columbia,
South Carolina.

Communist Party members leave the
French Government over economic policy
disputes.

State Department acting spokesman
Romberg says the U.S. regrets any move by
Lebanon to close Israel's liaison office.

July 20

At a White House ceremony marking today
as National POW/MIA Recognition Day,
President Reagan announces that Laos will
allow the U.S. to search for the remains of 13
U.S. servicemen at the site where an Air
Force gunship exploded in midair on
December 21. 1972.

On the 10th anniversary of the coup on
Cyprus, Department of State acting
spokesman Romberg reaffirms U.S. hope for
a reunited Cyprus.

July 21

Poland approves an amnesty bill to release
652 political prisoners within 30 days. The
Administration indicates that President
Reagan may ease some sanctions as a result
of the amnesty.

July 23

The Soviets suggest that the U.S. and Soviet
Union issue a joint statement to show a will-

ingness for serious talks on banning space
weapons.

El Salvador's President Duarte meets
with President Reagan, Vice President Bush,
Secretary Shultz, and congressional leaders
to appeal for increased U.S. economic and
security assistance.

July 24

Senate votes 93 to to urge the Soviet Union
to deliver information on the Sakharovs to all
signatory nations of the Helsinki Final Act.

The Department of State presents the
Soviet Union with a counterproposal for an
agenda statement for the Vienna space
weapons talks projected to begin on
September 18. The latest proposal would
allow the U.S. and Soviets to discuss a broad
range of weapons issues, including strategic
and medium-range nuclear arms.

Speaking at a televised news conference,
President Reagan charges Nicaragua's San-
dinista regime with trying to destroy El
Salvador.

A U.S. Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion report says that Bulgaria uses illegal
narcotics trafficking to support terrorism and
as a "political weapon to destabilize Western
societies."

July 25-26

South Africa's Administrator General to
Namibia Willie von Niekerk and SWAPO
President Sam Nujoma meet to discuss end-
ing armed activities in Namibia.

July 25

President Reagan ends a ban on Soviet com-
mercial fishing in U.S. Pacific waters. The
Soviet allocation will be about 50,000 metric
tons.

U.S. F-14 fighters fly exercises over the
Gulf of Sidra which Libya considers to be its
territorial waters. No incidents are reported.

West Germany approves a $333 million
private bank loan to East Germany which has
promised to ease restrictions on contacts be-
tween East and West German citizens.

Israel closes its liaison office in
Dubayyah, Lebanon, after weeks of pressure
from the Lebanese Government.

Poland agrees to allow the Primate of
Poland and Catholic Church appointed of-
ficials to supervise a fund to assist private
farmers in an effort to relax U.S. imposed
economic sanctions and improve relations.

July 26

State Department acting spokesman
Romberg says three Libyan journalists were
denied visas, for security reasons, to cover
the Olympic Games.

State Department acting spokesman
Romberg says the election of Rabbi Kahane
to the Israeli Parliament could result in
Kahane losing his U.S. citizenship.

July 27

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov
says the latest U.S. response to a proposal to
begin talks in Vienna on outer space weapons
makes it impossible to conduct the kind of
negotiations the Soviets are interested in.

PRESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

White House spokesman Speakes says the
U.S. accepted the proposed talks without
preconditions and that such talks are not im-
possible.

In response to a speech made on July 26
by Fidel Castro, State Department acting
spokesman Romberg says Cuba will have to
demonstrate some fundamental changes in its
foreign policy before the U.S. will agree to
comprehensive talks with Cuba.

Panama President-elect Nicolas Ardito
Barletta meets with President Reagan, Vice
President Bush, and Secretary Shultz at the
White House.

July 28

In a letter to UN Secretary General Perez de
Cuellar, Libya protests the presence of the
U.S. F-14 fighters over the Gulf of Sidra on
July 25. citing it is a violation of Libyan ter-
ritorial waters.

Burundi President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
is reelected as president of the Uprona Party
for a second 5-year term.

In Honduras, six U.S. citizens affiliated
with the AFL-CIO are arrested and deported
to Nicaragua for participating in a political
rally in Tegucigalpa on July 27.

July 29

Competition in the Summer Games of the
XXIIl Olympiad begins in Los Angeles. A
record 140 countries send athletes.

A Venezuelan DC-9 jet, carrying 87 peo-
ple, is hijacked to Curacao. Four U.S. citizens
are among the passengers.

July 30

Six hostages from the hijacked Venezuelan
jet are freed.

The last of the Marine combat troops at
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut return to Navy
ships.

July 31

Venezuelan commandos storm the hijacked
DC-9 jet killing the two hijackers and rescu-
ing all remaining passengers. State Depart-
ment acting spokesman Romberg says U.S.
antiterrorism experts flew to the scene to of-
fer advice to local authorities.

U.S. and Cuba resume talks on migration,
including the Mariel issue. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

*157 7/5 Appointment of Dean Burch
as chairman of the U.S.
delegation to the Space
Services World Ad-
ministrative Radio Con-
ference (biographic data).

*158 7/10 Owen W. Roberts sworn in
as Ambassador to the
Republic of Togo, July 9
(biographic data).

*159 7/10 John W. Shirley sworn in as
Ambassador to the United
Republic of Tanzania,
July 9 (biographic data).

*160 7/10 Weston Adams sworn in as
Ambassador to the
Republic of Malawi, July 9
(biographic data).

•161 7/11 U.S. and Indonesia renew

Agreement for Cooperation
in Scientific Research and
Technological Develop-
ment, July 9.
162 7/12 Shultz: news conference,
Singapore, July 10.

*163 7/13 Shultz: remarks at banquet
hosted by Acting Foreign
Minister Datuk Abdullah
HJ. Ahmad Badawi, Kuala
Lumpur. July 9.
164 7/13 Shultz: remarks to the

ASEAN Foreign Ministers,
Jakarta.

*165 7/17 Shultz: statement at the

New Zealand Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Well-
ington, July 16.
166 7/18 Shultz: news conference at
the American Embassy,
Kuala Lumpur, July 10.

*167 7/18 Shultz: remarks at closing
of the bilateral meeting
with Indonesian President
Soeharto, Jakarta, July 13.

*168 7/19 Shultz: remarks at ANZ'US
Council dinner, Wellington,
.July 16.

169 7/19 Shultz: remarks at luncheon

for ANZUS Council, Well-
ington, July 16.

170 7/19 Shultz: address before the

Honolulu Council on
Foreign Relations,
Honolulu, July 18.

171 7/20 Shultz: news conference at

the Parliament House,
Canberra, July 15.

•172 7/23 Shultz: interview on "The
Today Show" by Bernard
Kalb.

•173 7/23 Shultz: arrival statement,
Jakarta, July 11.
174 7/23 Shultz, Hayden, Cooper:

news conference at closing
of ANZUS Council Meet-
ing, Wellington, July 17.

•Not printed in the Bulletin. ■

Department of State

Free single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available fro
the Correspondence Management Division, '
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Free multiple copies may be obtained
writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis a
Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Departme
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Secretary Shultz

Asia-Pacific and the Future, Honolulu Cou
on Foreign Relations, Honolulu, Hawai
July 18, 1984 (Current Policy #598).

Challenges Facing the U.S. and ASEAN.
Foreign Ministers of the Association o
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),
Jakarta. Indonesia, July 13, 1984 (Cur
rent Policy #597).

Arms Control

Nuclear Arms Control and the NATO Alii
ance, Ambassador Rowny, Royal Unit
Services Institute, London, U.K.,
June 21, 1984 (Current Policy #591).

Preserving Freedom and Security, Deput;
Secetary Dam. Senate Foreign Relatii
Committee, June 13, 1984 (Current
Policy #590).

East Asia

Taking Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations, As
ant Secretary Wolfowitz, Subcommitt
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and Inte
tional Economic Policy and Trade, Ht
Foreign Affairs Committee, June 12,
1984 (Current Policy #593).

The U.S. -China Trade Relationship, Assis
Secretary Wolfowitz, National Counc
U.S. -China Trade. May 31, 1984 (Cur
Policy #594).

U.S. -China Relations (GIST, July 1984).

Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) (GIST, July 1984).

Economics

The Bretton Woods Legacy: Its Continu
Relevance, Assistant Secretary McC'
mack, 40th anniversary of the signin
the Bretton Woods agreements, Bre
Woods, New Hampshire, July 13, 19
(Current policy #596).

Europe

Soviet Active Measures, Deputy Assista
Secretary Knepper, Chicago Council
Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois,
May 30, 1984 (Current Policy #595).

Narcotics

International Narcotics Control (GIST,
July 1984).

Western Hemisphere

Atlas of the Caribbean Basin, Harry F.
Young, Bureau of Public Affairs, De
ment of State, July 1984. ■

ilDEX

September 1984
^}lume 84, No. 2090

ica

ican Refugees Relief Day, 1984 (proclama-
tion) 64

nan Rights Situation in Zaire and South

Africa (Abrams) 55

ns Control
ANZUS Relationship: Alliance Manage-
ment (Wolfowitz) 60

?osed Outer Space Negotiations (White
louse statements) 24

tus of Conference on Disarmament in

Europe (Reagan) 23

ia. Asia-Pacific and the Future

(Shultz) 3

itralia

1 ANZUS Relationship; Alliance Manage-
ment (Wolfowitz) 60

retary Visits Asia; Attends ASEAN and
ANZUS Meetings (Cooper, Hayden,
Shultz, text of ANZUS communique) .... 7
ina. The U.S. -China Relationship

(Wolfowitz) 25

igress

nan Rights Situation in Zaire and South

Africa (Abrams) 55

1 Report on Cyprus (message to the

Congress) 46

ing Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations
(Wolfowitz) 28

nsular Affairs. U.S. -Soviet Consular
Agreement (Department statement) ... 42

)a as a Model and a Challenge (Skoug) . . 73

man Rights in Cuba (Abrams) 53

jrus. 19th Report on Cyprus (message to
the Congress) 46

veloping Countries. World Economic

Prospects (Wallis) 36

t Asia

•cing Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations

(Wolfowitz) 28

-Asia Security; Economic and Political
Dimensions (Brown) 34

onomics

a-Pacific and the Future (Shultz) 3

; Bretton Woods Legacy; Its Continuing
Relevance (McCormack) 38

King Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations
(Wolfowitz) 28

5. -Asia Security; Econoniic and Political
Dimensions (Brown) 34

)rld Economic Prospects (Wallis) 36

Salvador

tending Voluntary Departure for El
Salvadorans (Abrams) 48

;sident Meets With El Salvador's President
(White House statement) 72

od. Food for Peace Day, 1984 (Reagan,
proclamation) 46

reign Assistance. President Meets With
EI Salvador's President (White House
statement) 72

enada. A Force for Freedom in the
Caribbean (Reagan) 1

latemala. Elections in Guatemala (White
House statement) 71

iman Rights

.ptive Nations Week, 1984 (proclamation) 51

'.tending Voluntary Departure for El
Salvadorans (Abrams) 48

iman Rights in Cuba (Abrams) 53

iman Rights Situation in Zaire and South

Africa (Abrams) 55

■rsecution and Restrictions of Religion in
Nicaragua (Abrams) 49

Immigration. Extending Voluntary Departure
for El Salvadorans (Abrams) ." 48

Indonesia. Secretary Visits Asia; Attends
ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings (Cooper,
Havden, Shultz, text of ANZUS communi-
que) 7

Industrialized Democracies. World Economic
Prospects (Wallis) 36

Japan. 'Taking Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations
(Wolfowitz) 28

Malaysia. Secretary Visits Asia; Attends
ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings (Cooper,
Havden, Shultz, text of ANZUS communi-
que) 7

Monetary Affairs

The Bretton Woods Legacy; Its Continuing
Relevance (McCormack) 38

World Economic Prospects (Wallis) 36

New Zealand

The ANZUS Relationship; Alliance Manage-
ment (Wolfowitz) 60

President Reagan's News Conference of
July 24 (excerpts) 2

Secretary Visits Asia; Attends ASEAN and
ANZUS Meetings (Cooper, Hayden,
Shultz, text of ANZUS communique) .... 7

Nicaragua

A Force for Freedom in the Caribbean
(Reagan) i

Persecution and Restrictions of Religion in
Nicaragua (Abrams) 49

Review of Nicaragua's Commitments to the
OAS (Middendorf) 69

Nuclear Policy

The ANZUS Relationship; Alliance Manage-
ment (Wolfowitz) 60

The U.S. -China Trade Relationship
(Wolfowitz) 25

Organization of American States. Review of
Nicaragua's Commitments to the OAS
(Middendorf) 69

Pacific

The ANZUS Relationship; Alliance Manage-
ment (Wolfowitz) 60

Asia-Pacific and the Future (Shultz) 3

Poland. President Reagan's News Conference
of July 24 (excerpts) 2

Presidential Documents

African Refugees Relief Day, 1984 (proclama-
tion) 64

Captive Nations Week, 1984 (proclamation) 51

Food for Peace Day, 1984 (proclamation) . .46

A Force for Freedom in the Caribbean 1

19th Report on Cyprus (message to the
Congress) 46

President Reagan's News Conference of
July 24 (excerpts) 2

Status of Conference on Disarmament in
Europe 23

U.S. -Soviet Bilateral Relations (White House
fact sheet) 41

U.S. -Soviet Union Expand "Hot Line"
Agreement (White House fact sheet) ... 45

Visit of Sri Lankan President (Jayewardene,
Reagan) 65

Publications. Department of State 82

Refugees. African Refugees Relief Day,
1984 (proclamation) 64

Science and Technology. The U.S. -China

Trade Relationship (Wolfowitz) 25

Security Assistance

President Meets With El Salvador's President
(White House statement) 72

U.S. -Asia Security; Econoniic and Political
Dimensions (Brown) 34

Singapore. Secretary Visits Asia; Attends
ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings (Cooper,
Hayden, Shultz, text of ANZUS communi-
que) 7

Soutn Africa. Human Rights Situation in
Zaire and South Africa (Abrams) 55

Sri Lanka. Visit of Sri Lankan President
(Jayewardene, Reagan) 65

Congress

Taking Stock of U.S. -Japan Relations
(Wolfowitz) 28

U.S. -Asia Security; Economic and Political
Dimensions (Brown) 34

The U.S. -China Trade Relationship
(Wolfowitz) 25

Treaties

Current Actions 78

U.S. -Soviet Consular Agreement (Department
statement) 42

U.S. -Soviet Union Expand "Hot Line" Agree-
ment (Reagan, White House fact sheet) . 45

U.S.S.R.

Proposed Outer Space Negotiations (White
House statements) 24

Status of Conference on Disarmament in
Europe (Reagan) 23

U.S. -Soviet Bilateral Relations (Reagan,
White House fact sheet) 41

U.S. -Soviet Consular Agreement (Department
statement) 42

U.S. -Soviet Union Expand "Hot Line" Agree-
ment (Reagan, White House fact sheet) . 45

Western Hemisphere

Extending Voluntary Departure for El
Salvadorans (Abrams) 48

A Force for Freedom in the Caribbean
(Reagan) 1

Human Rights in Cuba (Abrams) 53

Persecution and Restrictions of Religion
in Nicaragua (Abrams) 49

President Reagan's News Conference of
July 24 (excerpts) 2

Zaire. Human Rights Situation in Zaire
and South Africa (Abrams) 55

Name Index

Abrams, Elliott 48, 49, 53, 55

Brown, William A 34

Cooper, Warren 7

Hayden, William 7

Jayewardene, J. R 65

McCormack, Richard T 38

Middendorf, J. William II 69

Reagan, President 1, 2, 23, 41, 45, 46, 48

51, 64, 65

Shultz, Secretary 3,7

Skoug, Kenneth N. Jr 73

Wallis W. Allen 36

Wolfowitz, Paul D 25, 28, 60

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U.S. Government Printing Office
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Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2091

October 1984

*'^

■^^•^

^TS

DiPOSITORY

Western Hemisphere/1

Arms Control/21

Europe v. Asia/33

Cover Photos:

Assistant Secretary Motley
Ambassador Goodby
Deputy Secretary Dam

M^epnrttnvni of Siaie

huUetin

Volume 84 / Number 2091 / October 1984

The Department oe State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ I

Secretary of State |

JOHN HUGHES

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

SHARON R. LOTZ

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March 31,
1987.

Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-
is published monthly (plus annual index) by th
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW,
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation
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will be appreciated. The Bli.letin is indexed in the
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
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20402

CONTENTS

FEATURE

Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean
(Langhome A. Motley)

The President

40th Anniversary of the Warsaw
Uprising

The Secretary

18 Diplomacy and Strength

Arms Control

21 Security for Europe
(James E. Goodby)

East Asia

25 U.S. Activities on POW-MIA
Issue (Paul D. Wolfowitz)

27 Continuation of MFN Status for

China (William A. Brown)

Europe

28 U.S. -Bulgaria Relations

(Richard R. Burt)

30 Polish Government's Release of

Political Prisoners
(White House Statement)

Foreign Assistance

31 Food and Population Planning

Assistance (M. Peter McPherson)

General

33 Europe v. Asia; Is Diplomacy a
Zero-Sum Game?
(Kenneth D. Darn)

Human Rights

36 Ninth Anniversary of the

Helsinki Final Act

Middle East

37 Current Developments in the

Middle East
(Richard W. Murphy)

Narcotics

39 International Narcotics Control

Nuclear Policy

40 Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply

and Mutual Obligations
(Richard T. Kennedy)

Science & Technology

43 Competitive Challenges of

Global Telecommunications
(William Schneider, Jr.)

South Asia

47 Afghanistan

47 Afghan Attacks on Pakistan

(Department Statement)

Terrorism

48 International Terrorism: A Long

Twilight Struggle
(Robert M. Sayre)

Treaties

50 Current Actions

Chronology

52 August 1984

Press Releases

54 Department of State

Publications

54 Department of State

Index

Latin America and the Caribbean

Boundary represent al> on is
nol necessarily authoritative

Betmuda
(O.KJ

.Nassau
. » The Bahamas

Jamaica Haiti
Kingston au-Prlnca

Dominrcan
Republic
Santo
' Ingo

North

Atlantic

Ocean

Honduras

P««tll R'cii - '.Anliiju. »nd B
Saint Chris^*^^ DDominica

Guaterrttla

Gi,„,„

North
Pacific
Ocean

T«gucignpa
SarSaW9°" ^ j Nicaragua

Managua^

,.ao<

,.nd Nevis _. „ „,„_,

Caribbean Sea ='.„«".

St lucre
Barbados

^•h_ Trinidad and Tobago
,i^Vort-of- Spain

(Ecuador)

South
Pacific
Ocean

F/<f.UV IrJur-J
(Chill)

1000 Kilometers

1000 Mites

Azimuthal Equal-Area Projection

South

Atlantic

Ocean

Falklsnd ts/Brnfs

"^S^IMainiilsnd b| UH.
ctllmftf bf A(Q«nttni)

South Coorgia
(FilUinil li{inili)

FEATURE

ised on oral and written testimony
the Subcommittee on Western
rphere Affairs of the Hoitse Foreign
■s Committee on July 31, 198^. Am-
ior Motley is Assistant Secretary
ter-American Affairs. '

Democracy in

Latin America and

the Caribbean

by Langhorne A. Motley

Support for democracy is one of the
cardinal points of U.S. foreign policy in
the Caribbean and in Latin America as
a whole. Ambassador Motley's testimony
discusses the status of democratic politics
in the region. It concludes that democ-
racy is proving to be a practical path to
staMlity as well as to freedom. This con-
clusion, with the data that support it,
parallels the finding of the National

Bipartisan Commission on Central
America that recent events have "de-
stroyed the argument of the old dictators
that a strong hand is essential to avoid
anarchy and communism, and that
order and progress can only be achieved
through authoritarianism. "

Selected Latin American Elections
in a 20- Year Perspective

Country

Year

Type-

Total Vote

(thousands)

Adult
Population
Voting"

(%)

Argentina

1983

P, L

15,180

1963

P, L

9,326

Brazil

1982

48,440

1962

14,747

Colombia

1982

6,816

1962

2,634

Costa Rica

1982

P, L

992

1962

P, L

391

Ecuador

1984

2,024

1962

709

El Salvador

1984

1,524

1962

P, L

400

Guatemala

1984

1,856

1964

337

Honduras

1981

P, L

1,171

1965

551

Mexico

1982

P, L

22,523

1964

P.L

9,422

Peru

1980

4,030

1962

1,693

Venezuela

1983

P. L

6,741

1963

P, L

3,126

•P= Presidential, L= Legislative, CA= Constituent Assembly.
"Estimates based on votes cast as a percentage of total population age 20 or over as
reported in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook for the year in question.

FEATURE

THE BEST MEASURE
OF FREEDOM

Since November 1980, when the United
States last went to the polls to elect a
president, our southern neighbors have
cast some 150 million votes in 33 elec-
tions in 24 countries. That is more votes
in more elections in more countries than
in any previous 4 years in the history of
Latin America and the Caribbean.

In Latin America, voter participa-
tion has increased, sometimes
dramatically. In fact, recent turnouts, in
some cases, have doubled those of 20
years ago in relative as well as absolute
terms.

• More than 15 million Argentine
voters went to the polls last fall. In the
hotly contested election that ended near-
ly a decade of military rule, 9 out of
every 10 adults voted. Raul Alfonsin
became president with the largest vote
in Argentine history, exceeding even
Juan Peron's highest tally.

• In Brazil's 1982 congressional and
municipal elections, 48.4 million
Brazilians voted. This was more than
three times the 14.8 million who voted in
the 1962 legislative elections; the
percentage of adults voting rose from
45% in 1962 to 81% in 1982.

• In May of this year, an absolute
majority of all adult Salvadorans, some
1.5 million men and women, defied guer-
rilla violence to choose between
Napoleon Duarte and Roberto
D'Aubuisson. In the 1962 presidential
elections, only 400,000 voters, roughly
one-third of adult Salvadorans, had par-
ticipated in an election dominated by an
official military candidate.

• Two Constituent Assembly elec-
tions in Guatemala 20 years apart reveal
a similar evolution: in May 1964,
337,000 votes were cast, 40% of those
registered; in July 1984, the voters
numbered 1,856,000, or 73% of those
registered.

What lies behind this region-wide
upsurge in democratic politics? Long-
term development— including the revolu-
tions in communications and expecta-
tions—is clearly, if slowly, making itself
felt. A more immediate factor— one that
has impressed many observers at recent
elections— is voter desire to repudiate
both dicUitors and guerrillas. To most
Latin Americans, the uncertainties of
democracy are preferable to the violence
and abuse of leftist and rightist ex-
tremes.

Growth of Voter Participation
in Selected Countries

(Estimate ol Percent of Total Adult Population Voting)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Argentina

Brazil

Colombia

Costa Rica

Ecuador

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Mexico

Pen

Venezuela

FEATURE

'he force of tlie democratic tide ami
ejection of extremism can also be
in what has not happened. Not a
B country that was democractic 4

ago has lost its freedom. The
iry coups predicted for El Salvador
Honduras did not take place. Boliv-
emocracy has not fallen. Not one
ilia movement has taken power

1979, when the Sandinistas re-
el Somoza and abandoned their
ises to hold free elections. And to
o's frustration and surprise,
ida's Marxist-Leninist dictators did
rove immune to their own abuses
wer and were replaced by constitu-

authorities committed to holding
>lections by the end of 1984.
lections by themselves cannot
<.e society or solve every problem,
ompetitive elections are, as
tary Shultz has noted, "a practical
tick of democracy. They are an in-
able test of public accountability."
therefore, U.S. policy to support

lections without reservation, see-

them assurances that human
; will be protected, that reconcilia-
>!\\\ reflect the work of people and

guns, and that U.S. aid and
ration will have firm local founda-

he English-speaking Caribbean,
Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela
)lidly based democracies of long
ing. Over the last 5 years, elected
n presidents have replaced military
, in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El
dor, Honduras, Panama, and Peru,
ional countries as different as
and Uruguay, Guatemala and
da are now also moving toward
;r democracy.

fie result is that more than 90% of
feople of Latin America and the
bean are now living in countries
governments that are either
:ractic or heading there. For a part
world often identified with dicta-
ip, this is something to cheer about,
s recently as 1979, two-thirds of
jighbors lived under military or
iry-dominated governments of both
hd right. Any shift so striking in-
skepticism. But measured in voter
ipation and in competition at the
g booth, today's democractic
jence is astonishingly deep,
ur neighbors deserve the credit for
■ogress they are making. We can,
n, be proud that we are cooper-
with them. Freedom is not a zero-
^ame. Everyone wins when democ-
s strengthened.

The Military and Democracy

Essential to the survival of democ-
racy is an apolitical military establish-
ment — one which seeks not to defend
one partisan interest or another but
rather one committed to institutional
democratic government. Significantly,
the recent history of hemispheric
democratic advance has been that of
a transformation in which the
military itself has taken an active
part.

An example of this difficult proc-
ess is today's El Salvador, which
owes its agrarian reform to military
support. After decades as defenders
of the status quo, since 1979 El
Salvador's security forces have made
considerable progress toward im-
proved field performance, greater
respect for human rights, and an
apolitical role in society.

THREATS TO DEMOCRACY

Despite this extraordinary pattern of
progress, democracy in Latin America
still faces many problems.

Competitive elections can help
measure success or failure in dealing
with particular problems; the problems
themselves do not automatically disap-
pear at the ballot box, regardless of who
wins. Democracy requires elections; but
elections alone are not enough.

Democracies must establish a track
record as problem-solving mechanisms.
If democratic institutions cannot solve
problems, they cannot survive. If we are
interested in the survival of democracy,
we must help democratic governments
deal with their problems— even though it
is they, not we, who must solve them.

Internal problems include unequal
access to education, justice, and employ-
ment; the clash of indigenous and im-
migrant cultures; great disparities in
wealth; government inefficiency and cor-
ruption; civilian caudUlismo and military
intervention. These problems do not, of
course, all exist in every country. But
they do persist in varying degrees in the
region as a whole.

External problems include increased
costs for imported oil; the decline in the
global economy accompanied by reduc-
tions in export earnings and forced
reliance on increasingly expensive bor-
rowed capital; and active efforts by

Training and organizational
changes are largely responsible. Merit
promotion has been implemented.
President Duarte has appointed a
Vice Minister of Defense responsible
for the three police forces, as well as
new, able commanders to head each.
Officers associated with human rights
abuses have been removed and a unit
suspected of human rights abuse
disbanded.

This increased professionalism
was reflected in the performance of
the armed forces during this year's
presidential elections and inaugura-
tion. The Salvadoran military, once
considered an impediment to the es-
tablishment of political democracy, is
today defending the future rather
than the past.

hostile powers outside the hemisphere to
exploit local grievances and economic
hardship. Again, the mix can vary great-
ly from country to country, but these ex-
ternal pressures are felt throughout the
hemisphere.

These problems combine to create
two immediate threats to democracy in
Latin America today: political ex-
tremism and economic recession. To
them must be added the growing inter-
national trade in illicit drugs, which
degrades the rule of law as well as
human dignity.

Political Extremism. The enemies
of democracy often point to under-
development and economic hardship to
justify violence and dictatorship. The
problem with their argument is that
neither left nor right extremes are
stable or productive.

Marxist-Leninist regimes have
tended to perpetuate both the political
and the economic backwardness out of
which they grew. When feuding Marxist-
Leninists plunged Grenada into
murderous disorder, the United States,
Barbados, Jamaica, and Grenada's
eastern Caribbean neighbors came to the
rescue. The result was restoration of
legal order. This was a major defeat for
the extremists and their Cuban and
Soviet supporters, who nonetheless still
support totalitarianism in Nicaragua and
oppose the consolidation of democracy in
El Salvador.

FEATURE

Like leftwing extremism, extremism
of the right is weai<ened by economic
development. Unlike leftwing ex-
tremism, it has few reliable external
sources of support. But the consolidation
of democratic politics and reform has,
nonetheless, been hindered by such
phenomena as death squads and denials
of elemental equity.

A Precedent for 1984?

In 1972-74, Anastasio Somoza
stepped aside from the presidency of
Nicaragua, continuing as commander
of the National Guard, and, after the
1972 earthquake, as President of the
National Emergency Committee.

In 1974, disregarding the advice
of friends who thought the time had
come for the family to withdraw from
active politics, Somoza decided to
become president again. To do so, he
had the Constitution amended and
barred 9 out of 10 opposition parties
from the presidential election.
Nicaragua's Roman Catholic bishops
warned in a pastoral letter that these
electoral manipulations amounted to
"legal war."

Under those conditions, Somoza
received a smashing 95% of the vote:
216,158 votes to 11,997 for Edmundo
Paguaga Irias of the Conservative
Party. But the victory was Pyrrhic.
Many Nicaraguans, including former
close associates of Somoza, became
convinced a democratic end to the
Somoza dynasty had become
impossible.

Economic Recession. During the
last 8-10 years, economic mismanage-
ment and pressures for reform con-
tributed to the decline of several unrep-
resentative regimes. Yet if democratic
governments cannot produce economic
recovery, then they, too, can lose their
mandate. Today, many democracies
need to restructure their economies at a
time when living standards have already
declined.

The countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean constitute the developing
world's most indebted region. External
debt exceeded $330 billion at the end
of 1983. In 1982 and 1983, interest
payments alone added up to more than
$40 billion per year. These payments
were equivalent to more than 35% of the
value of the region's exports of goods

and services— the world's highest debt
service ratio. In some individual coun-
tries the ratio exceeded 100% before
debt rescheduling.

The region's real per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) has dropped by
over 10% from its 1980 level (by far
more in some countries), and there is lit-
tle doubt that per capita real economic
growth will again be negative in 1984.
In nearly all countries, unemployment
and underemployment are at levels not
seen since the Great Depression.

It hardly needs to be pointed out
how dangerous such conditions are to
any government that has to face elec-
tions.

The Drug Trade. Illicit narcotics
trafficking and consumption also
threaten democratic development by
fostering disregard for the law and cor-
rupting institutions as well as in-
dividuals. In some remote valleys, the
lure of extraordinary profits and the
absence of productive alternatives have
broken down social and political order;
lawlessness prevails and drug kings hold
sway, sometimes in symbiosis with guer-
rillas.

In the past, many Latin Americans
considered illicit drugs a "U.S. problem."
Some even welcomed the increased
employment and foreign exchange earn-
ings brought by the drug trade. Today,
they are increasingly aware of the enor-
mous threat narcotics pose to the moral
fiber of their own societies and to the
legitimacy of their own political institu-
tions. Democracy requires a collective
victory over the traffickers and their
allies.

U.S. POLICY IS TO
SUPPORT DEMOCRACY

It is U.S. Government policy to support
democracy and democratic institutions.
This approach is neither interventionist
nor a mindless export of ideology. It is
legitimate, it is in our enlightened self-
interest, and it works— not overnight or
in 6-month increments but over time.

• Democracy is the h^est guarantor
of human rights. A government respon-
sible to its people cannot abuse them
with impunity.

• Democracy is also the best long-
term guarantor of stability. Democratic
governments do not drive their people
into armed opposition nor do they
threaten or attack their neighbors.

American officials from the Presi
dent on down have made clear our ui
equivocal support for democratic pro
esses. During his trip to Latin Ameri
in 1982, President Reagan insisted tl

The future challenges our imaginatioi
but the roots of law and democracy and <
inter-American system provide the
answers. . . . Together, we will work tow
the economic growth and opportunity th;
can only be achieved by free men and
women. We will promote the democracy
is the foundation of our freedom and stai
together to assure the security of our
|ieoples, their governments, and our way
life. "

Support for democracy can mea
everything from a public embrace fo
new president of Argentina to sendi
qualified election observers requeste
a government in Central America. I
mean encouragement of political
dialogue and communication, technii
exchange programs, specialized con-
ferences, and even analytical public;
tions. It can mean support for a
strengthened administration of justi

Rule of Law is Key

A judicial system that is independei
and fair, accessible and effective is
essential to democracy.

Working with the UN-affiliated
Latin American Institute for the
Prevention of Crime and the Treat
ment of Offenders, the U.S. Goven
ment is developing a program to
assist efforts by governments and
private groups in Latin America ar
the Caribbean to strengthen legal i
stitutions and improve the adrninis
tration of justice.

During the last 4 years, it has
all of these things— and more. We
couraged the open and competitive
tions that took place in Honduras,
Salvador, and Guatemala. We urgi
Sandinistas to honor the democrat
promises they have abandoned an(
betrayed. We welcomed the returr
democratic rule in Argentina. We
clear that we would favor a restor
of democracy in Chile and Urugua
showed our support for democratic
legitimacy when President Siles w
naped in Bolivia. We let the Gover
of Paraguay know we were unhap
with the closing of the independen
newspaper ABC Color. We let the
Government of Haiti know of our

iti(

k
k

FEATURE

n at the arrest and mistreatment of
losition leaders.

In country after country in Latin
lerica and the Caribbean, U.S. Em-
gies are today correctly perceived as
porting democracy. Local officials
citizens recognize in growing
ibers that our representatives are
ently fostering democratic dialogue,
stitutional procedures, and respect
political diversity.
We also have recognized that
ernment officials are not alone in
ing a role to play in promoting
locratic values and traditions,
/ate citizens are ultimately the back-
e of democracy, and we have at-
pted to catalyze broader private
aeration. The West German political
idations, the political internationals,
own American Institute for Free
lor Development, and many in-
dual leaders have long proven that
tical cooperation among like-minded
pie and groups gets results.
The democratic tide has made it
er to build on these experiences. We
e strengthened the ability of the U.S.
)rmation Agency (USIA) to sponsor
ate exchanges. The National Endow-
it for Democracy and its constituent
itutes are strengthening our national
acity to develop mutual support net-
ks among democratic leaders and
ties throughout the world.

Citizens: the Backbone
of Democracy

. ( lovernment contributions to the
ional Endowment for Democracy
port private sector initiatives to
Durage free and democratic in-
jtions throughout the world,
■se initiatives involve U.S. busi-
s and labor as well as political par-
. They include cooperation and
anizational activities that promote
pluralism, individual freedoms,
! internationally recognized human
its essential to the functioning of
locratic institutions.

Costa Rica's Constitution

The new Center for Electoral Advice
I Promotion in San Jose, Costa Rica,
,n example of how a regional institu-
1 can help nations translate demo-
tic theory into the nuts, bolts, and
lot boxes of an open political system.

Democratic countries have a par-
ilar obligation to reach out and assist

After the short 1948 civil war, a
coalition of Costa Ricans looked at
their own and their neighbors'
political experiences and set out to
create a legal framework to prevent
abuses and assure a democratic
future for the country. The document
they wrote has been religiously
followed since. Among other things,
the Constitution of 1949:

• Permanently eliminated the
army {not as an expression of "neu-
tralism" — the civil war resulted part-
ly in the explicit choice of democracy
over communism — but to end any in-
stitutionalized military threat to
elected civilian government);

each other and those on the path to
democracy. If they do not, they leave
the field to those who are opposed to
democracy. As President Eisenhower
said on return from his 1960 South
American trip:

... all nations— large or small, powerful
or weak— should assume some responsibility
for the advancement of humankind. . . .
Cooperation among free nations is the key to
common progress.

Economic Growth and Adjustment

With economic recession challenging
social and political stability in several
hemisphere countries, economic adjust-
ment is not a matter of choice but of
necessity. If economies are to grow,
they must do so in accordance with
market forces, not in opposition to them.
Stable and equitable growth in the
future requires economic adjustment
now.

We in the United States have
learned that lesson ourselves. The deci-
sions we took to foster the resurgence of
the American economy were not easy.
Costs were incurred. At the height of
the adjustment process, unemployment
reached painfully high levels and in-
dustrial production declined markedly.
But we are now reaping the benefits of
the hard decisions we made earlier. In-
dustrial production is expanding. Infla-
tion is down and personal income is up.
And in the past two quarters, our gross
national product (GNP) grew much
faster than anticipated.

• Created an independent
"Supreme Electoral Tribunal," a
fourth branch of government co-equal
with the traditional three and with
remarkably independent powers
designed to assure scrupulously clean
elections;

• Elaborated a complex system
of checks, balances, and independent
financing aimed at preventing undue
concentration of power anywhere in
the government; and

• Prohibited presidential reelec-
tion (not only of the incumbent, but
of anyone in his/her cabinet or im-
mediate family).

Direct parallels cannot be drawn be-
tween the situation in the heavily in-
debted developing countries of Latin
America and in the United States. But
there is a lesson to be learned from our
experience. It is clear that to achieve
sustained noninflationary growth coun-
tries need policies that reflect economic
realities and release the productive
forces of their people.

Governments often face agonizing
choices in the political management of
adjustment. They must distribute the
burdens of that adjustment. And they
often must decide between taking hard
measures at once or trying to postpone
economic shocks— with the risk that
those shocks will be more severe and
violent later on. These are real dilemmas
for which there is no simple or universal
answer.

Democratic governments, with broad
popular participation and support, are
especially well positioned to deal with
these tough decisions. As Costa Rican
President Luis Alberto Monge told the
International Labor Organization in
Geneva on June 12, 1984:

We have drawn back from the gulf [by
adopting] some very bitter and harsh deci-
sions in order to improve a sick economy. . . .
Democracy works as a means of settling the
problems of production and to win battles in
the struggle against under-development and
poverty.

We are acutely aware of the scope
and seriousness of the economic prob-
lems confronting the hemisphere. We
are concerned, and we are helping.

FEATURE

The United States and the other in-
dustrialized countries will continue to
respond constructively to external debt
and other economic problems. It would
be a disservice to all nations to weaken
the very international instruments that
can help troubled economies adapt to
new economic realities. But it would be
an equal disservice not to recognize the
need for flexibility and understanding.

The June economic summit in Lon-
don carefully considered debt-related
issues. The summit leaders confirmed a
basic strategy centered on adjustment,
growth, and support and agreed to
develop it flexibly, case by case. They
also agreed on measures to strengthen
and broaden that strategy over time.

The summit leaders also pledged to
maintain and, where possible, increase
bilateral and multilateral assistance, par-
ticularly to the poorest countries. They
encouraged the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to continue its key role of
helping debtor countries make necessary
policy changes. And they asked the
World Bank to strengthen its role in
fostering economic development, urging
closer cooperation between the IMF and
the Bank.

This approach has been successful in
avoiding systematic crisis. Indeed, we
have come a long way since August
1982, when Mexico's acute lack of
liquidity raised fears that the interna-
tional financial system might sudddenly
topple.

We and other creditor governments
quickly provided temporary bridge fi-
nancing to deal with immediate liquidity
problems and began developing continu-
ing measures to support Mexico's
economic adjustment program. We have
since collaborated on the official credits
involved in financial support packages
for a variety of debtor countries.

The responses of the United States,
other creditor governments, commercial
banks, the IMF, and other institutions
reflect a more activist and creative ap-
proach to the hemisphere's economic
problems.

Some countries, notably Mexico and
Brazil, have made significant progress in
adjusting their economies. Almost no
country— from Jamaica to Peru, from
the Dominican Republic to Costa Rica-
has escaped the crisis or has failed to
act to meet it. It is important that they
be able to service their debt and bring
about a resumption of sustainable, non-
inflationary growth.

Opinion Polling
in Latin America

Thomas Jefferson wrote that "it is
rare that the public sentiment decides
immorally or unwisely, and the in-
dividual who differs from it ought to
distrust and examine well his own
opinion." Scientific polling is a mod-
ern reflection of that sentiment —
a common practice in democratic
states, including in Latin America
and the Caribbean.

Several dozen respected public
opinion firms, from Mexico to Argen-
tina, engage in a wide range of
political polling, from in-depth in-
quiries into citizen concerns to can-
didate popularity polls. Some are
associated with well-known compa-
nies like Gallup, and internationally
accepted survey methods are the rule.

Individual companies have dem-
onstrated the validity and usefulness
of polling even in disturbed areas. In
Central America, for example, poll-
sters have elicited public attitudes on
such diverse themes as regional peace
talks, the impact of U.S. policies, and
the effects of economic adjustment.

To help make that possible, and to
support democratic processes
throughout the hemisphere, LT.S. policy
has sought to provide assistance to help
governments implement adjustment
measures conducive to long-term
political and economic stability.

• The United States has made un-
precedented use of Commodity Credit
Corporation guarantees and special
Export-Import Bank guarantee and in-
surance programs as specific debt
management tools. We and our Paris
Club colleagues have been flexible in
rescheduling debt on a case-by-case
basis. The debts of more countries are
being rescheduled, including principal
and interest, with longer repayment
terms and grace periods.

• Our approach inclu(^es encourag-
ing commercial bankers to maintain pru-
dent involvement in lending and re-
scheduling. Commercial bank reschedul-
ing and lending terms have improved
over the past 18 months for countries
which have successful adjustment pro-
grams—lower rescheduling and other
fees, a drop in "spreads," lengthening
repayment periods, and the rescheduling
of maturities over multiyear periods.

[

• Adequate funding for the inter
tional financial institutions is an intej
part of the solution. We have encour-
aged the evolution of the role of the
IMF and other international financia
stitutions over the past 18 months.
Working with the Congress last year
we secured a major increase in IMF
re.sources. The IMF is increasingly s(
sitive to political and social strains a<
companying painful economic adjust-
ment programs. The Fund, for exam
has been innovative in defining the
public sector deficit targets for Peru
Brazil and has negotiated more liber
targets for Mexico and Chile.

• We have worked for the favor
evolution of World Bank operations,
couraging such innovations as struct
adjustment loans, which offer financ
support over the medium term to co
tries undertaking economic reforms.
And we are examining development
bottlenecks resulting from inadequai
counterpart or local currency funds
under World Bank lending.

• An important part of our stra
egy, and one that depends heavily o
Congress for support, is to prevent
tectionist measures from inhibiting "
American access to the U.S. market
The hemisphere's share of U.S. imp'
has grown from 13% ($23 billion) in
1978 to 16% in 1983 (.$41.7 billion)-
withstanding recessions, debt crises
competition from other regions. Tht
outlook for hemisphere exports to t
United States is positive. U.S. impo
from Latin America and the Caribb
in 1983 were up by 11% over 1982.
preliminary data for 1984— first qu£
figures— show an increase of 31% o
the first quarter of 1983.

• The Caribbean Basin Initiativ
(CBI) is a milestone. The CBI open:
new opportunities for trade, investi
employment, and broad-based grow
the reg^ion. Its 12-year life represer
long-term LI.S. political commitmen
with incentives beyond its immedia
trade objectives. Countries with thf
policy framework to promote invest
and innovation will best be able to :
trade opportunities, increasing verj
significantly the payoff for appropr
economic policies.

• Another significant step is th
trade credit guarantee program rec
mended for Central America by th(
tional Bipartisan Commission on C(
America, included in the foreign ai(
authorization bill, which passed the
House in May.

FEATURE

n all these efforts, we are keenly
e that our programs and policies,
ver supportive, cannot be decisive.
Tiain responsibility for economic
opment lies with the developing
tries themselves. The flow of new
ng from the industrialized countries
ely to remain below recent levels
n e.xtended period of time. Yet
oping countries continue to need
capital for development than they
enerate internally,
'oreign direct investment is, there-
likely to grow in importance as an
le of development in Latin America,
■t investment, particularly new equi-
pital, offers the recipient country
' advantages over external debt.

Equity investment is cheaper to
ce, especially in hard times. Al-
ih interest must be paid regardless,
ts are remitted only when they are
^d.

Equity brings with it technology,
and management skills that are
to acquire in other ways.

Direct investment encourages
ration into the world system,
ring a more open trading system
e protectionist pressures can be
ted more readily.

'he United States is the source of
y 60% of all foreign direct invest-
in Latin America and the Carib-
. Investment flows respond to
)mic conditions and to fiscal, trade,
■xchange-rate policies in the recipi-
ountries. Nations that choose to
e an attractive climate for foreign
tors can expect to attract an in-
;ed portion of the available funds,
will thus reduce their dependence
;bt for growth. We encourage this.
!ut we recognize that the debtor
;ries alone, even with wise policies,
Dt surmount the current crisis. Our
;ance is necessary— and we will con-
to provide it. The cooperation of
' lending countries is vital— and it
'een forthcoming. The international
cial institutions have an essential
;o play— and they are playing it.
this support, we believe the
)nsible and democratic governments
e hemisphere can meet the
imic challenges that confront them.

Security

The export of violence by Cuba and
Nicaragua with Soviet backing is the
principal external security threat to
democracy in the hemisphere. U.S.
security assistance and training are
essential to help our neighbors defend
themselves against this threat. As a
demonstration of our resolve and to im-
prove the capability of our own and
regional forces, we continue to conduct
joint exercises and maneuvers in the
area.

At the same time, our diplomats are
working actively to contain the threat
posed by Nicaragua's military ties to
Cuba and the Soviet bloc, its subversive
activities, militarization, and internal
repression. We believe the Contadora
process provides the means to negotiate
a comprehensive, verifiable, and durable
regional solution.

The leaders of the Caribbean under-
stand well the vital importance of collec-
tive effort. Pioneers of economic and
political cooperation in CARICOM, they
helped inspire the Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative to broaden that cooperation to in-
clude both Central America and the in-
dustrialized world. Similarly, faced with
what one Caribbean leader called "an

Democracy in
the Caribbean

The constitutions of the English-
speaking nations of the Caribbean
build on the British or "Westminster"
model which has been followed in the
region for over 300 years. Generally
speaking, each nation elects a lower
house or assembly roughly equivalent
to the House of Commons, based on
single member constituencies for a
term of no more than 5 years. The
leader of the majority party or coali-
tion becomes Prime Minister, names
a cabinet, and is responsible for
governing during the term. An ap-
pointed Senate with minority repre-
sentation sits for the duration of the
term of the lower house. In those
states whose constitution provides for
it, a Governor-General represents the
Queen. But this connection is only
with the monarch, not at all with the
Government or Prime Minister of
Great Britain. The tradition of
career, nonpartisan public service
also runs deep in the Caribbean.

ideology of violence whose aim is to
undo democracy," the democracies of the
eastern Caribbean, in particular, and the
Caribbean as a whole did not vacillate in
cooperating to restore order in Grenada
in 1983.

Defense against the illicit narcotics
trade entails cooperation of a similar
kind among those in the region who
recognize the threat and seek our active
help— primarily in helping to fund what
is, after all, a war against a well-armed
and ruthless enemy.

AN END TO INDIFFERENCE?

Although its mandate was confined to
Central America, the National Bipar-
tisan Commission on Central America
could not avoid a broader conclusion in
its report to the President:

Powerful forces are on the march in near-
ly every country of the hemisphere, testing
how nations shall be organized and by what
process authority shall be established and
legitimized. Who shall govern and under what
forms are the central issues in the process of
change now under way in country after coun-
try throughout Latin America and the Carib-
bean.

The United States is powerful
enough to make a difference in favor of
democracy. But successive LJ.S. Admini-
strations and Congresses, Republicans
and Democrats, have learned that our
own democratic example and national
power are not enough to make a decisive
difference in the face of indifference
abroad.

The important thing— the key to
understanding how the United States
should be conducting itself in this hemi-
sphere—is that today indifference
toward democracy is disappearing in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Re-
cent experience demonstrates this
remarkable truth— in Central America,
in the Andean countries, in Brazil, in the
Caribbean, and in the Southern Cone.
The voting statistics, the personal
testimony of election observers, the
palpable solidarity felt by anyone who
has attended a Latin or Caribbean in-
auguration over the last 5 years— all
evidence the growing sense of participa-
tion in national political life.

In international political cooperation
today, the Contadora process is a critical
experiment. It says a great deal about
the invigorated power of the democratic
idea that this group of countries has
reached the "revolutionary" conclusion

FEATURE

Contadora

on Democracy

in Central America

On September 9, 1983, all nine par-
ticipants in the Contadora peace proc-
ess* agreed on a 21-point "Document
of Objectives" — a framework for ad-
dressing obstacles to peace in the
region. Two of those objectives dealt
specifically with internal democracy:

To adopt measures conducive to the
establishment and, where appropriate, im-
provement of democratic, representative
and pluralistic systems that will guarantee
effective popular participation in the
decision-making process and ensure that
the various currents of opinion have free
access to fair and regular elections based
on the full observance of citizens' rights;

To promote national reconciliation ef-
forts wherever deep divisions have taken
place within society, with a view to foster-
ing participation in democratic processes
in accordance with the law. . . .

*Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Mexico,
Panama, and Venezuela.

that democracy is absolutely essential
for peace and development in Central
America (see above).

Are these— and the more specific
benchmarks elaborated within the proc-
ess since then— not standards which we
can all support? Don't they reveal both
an understanding of democracy and a
rejection of indifference?

Can there be any question of the
results of any comparative application of
these same benchmarks to the two Cen-
tral American countries most often in
the news: El Salvador and Nicaragua?
Whose election experience or plans meet
the standard? In which country is there
"free access"? In which country are
there "fair and regular elections"? Which
country is promoting "national recon-
ciliation efforts" on the basis of "foster-
ing participation in democratic proc-
esses"? The answer in each case is El
Salvador.

Those inclined to answer differently
might ponder what Peruvian novelist
Mario Vargas Llosa wrote in 1983:

When an American or European intellec-
tual—or liberal newspaper or institution— ad-
vocates for Latin American countries political
options and methods he would never
countenance in his own society, he is betray-
ing a fundamental doubt about the capacity
of the Latin American countries to achieve
the liberty and the respect for the rights of
others that prevail in the Western democ-
racies. In most cases, the problem is an un-
conscious prejudice, an inchoate sentiment, a
sort of visceral racism, which these per-
sons—who generally have unimpeachable
liberal and democratic credentials— would
sharply disavow if they were suddenly made
aware of it.

Vargas Llosa is right. Too many of
us have not looked at what is happening
in Latin America closely enough to get
beyond the stereotypes.

It is time to bury the canard that
Latin Americans are "incapable of

democracy." The United States cannc
afford ignorance, indifference, or in-
action.

Our policy must be a program of
understanding, of action, and of
democractic solidarity. Recent histor
proclaims the strength of Latin
America's drive for democracy. By e
couraging it and supporting it, we at
not "exporting" our own ideology or
posing" something "made only in US
We are helping our neighbors fulfill
their own aspirations. And in doing
we are confirming our own deepest ;
most hopeful convictions.

'The complete transcript of the hear
will be published by the committee and v
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing C
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The "Coordinadora" Nine Points

Following, in translation, is a sum-
mary of the nine points first made in
December 1983 by the opposition
Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating
Board (made up of three political
parties, two labor unions, and the
umbrella private sector organization)
as a basis for free elections in
Nicaragua.

1. Separation of State and Par-
ty. The army, the militia, the police,
the Sandinista Television Service, and
others must be part of the state and
not of the FSLN [Sandinista National
Liberation Front].

2. Repeal of Laws That Violate
Human Rights. The code that
restricts freedom of expression in the
press, radio, and television must be
abrogated. The laws that violate
private ownership and others must be
abolished.

3. Suspension of the State of
Emergency. Suspension of the state
of emergency and full exercise of
freedom of expression and informa-
tion.

4. Amnesty Law. A general
amnesty law that will permit the par-

ticipation of all Nicaraguan citizens
the electoral process.

5. Respect for Freedom of Wo
ship. Freedom for priests, pastors,
and the faithful to perform their
religious ceremonies.

6. Union Freedom. The full ex<
cise of workers' rights, including th
right to strike, to organize, and to
bargain collectively.

7. Autonomy of the Judicial
Branch. The judicial branch to hav'
true independence from the govern
ment party and from the legislative
and executive branches.

8. Protective Law With
Recourse to Unconstitutionality.
Recognition of the Fundamental
Statute and the Statute of Rights ;
Guarantees as the Supreme Law u
a new constitution is enacted, so tl
these will not be changed at the w'
of the government.

9. National Dialogue To Hold
Elections in the Presence of the
Contadora Group or the GAS. Al
political parties and movements, ir
eluding those in arms, should
negotiate on the elections.

-,t ,^f CtotQ Ol

FEATURE

untry Summaries

]ua and Barbuda

: jua and Barbuda gained its in-
ndence from the United Kingdom in
?mber 1981. Prime Minister Vere C.
Sr., leads the Antigua Labour
y (ALP). The Progressive Labour
ment (PLM) is the major opposition
f but lost its representation in
ament when the ALP swept open
ions in 1984. A third party, the
gua Caribbean Liberation Move-
has little support.

ntina

igress

Oct.
1983

196S

isident

Oct.
1983

1989

)ctober 30, 1983, Radical Civic
)n Party leader Raul Alfonsin was
ed president after a hotly contested
free campaign against the candidate
le Justicialist (Peronist) Party. A
rd-breaking turnout of more than 15
on gave Alfonsin an absolute majori-
the presidential vote. The Radicals
won control of the Chamber of
aties, but no party obtained a ma-
y in the Senate. One-third of the
ite and one-half of the House will be
wed in both 1985 and 1987.
Argentina's return to democracy
r almost a decade of internal conflict
military rule was one of the most
ificant political events in 1983. The
guration of President Alfonsin in
ember was a powerful and emotional
bration. Vice President Bush headed
U.S. delegation. Representatives of
itries that have become democratic
le past decade — including Spain,
tugal, Peru, and Ecuador — were
Tiinent. The United States shares
1 other democracies a vocation to
nd and promote the democratic

The Bahamas

Type of I I Date of Most
Election(s) | | Recent Election(s)

Bolivia

Date of
ext Election(s)

Parliament

June
1982

By
1987

The 1982 elections gave Prime Minister
Lynden 0. Pindling's Progressive
Liberal Party (PLP) its fifth straight vic-
tory. Four other parties contested the
elections, but only the Free National
Movement received sufficient support to
be represented in the Parliament. All
parties had free and equal access to the
media.

Barbados

Parliament

June
1981

By
1986

One of the most stable and prosperous
countries in the Caribbean, Barbados is
an open parliamentary democracy in the
British tradition. J.M.G. "Tom" Adams,
leader of the Barbados Labour Party
(BLP), is Prime Minister. The main op-
position is provided by the Democratic
Labour Party (DLP).

Belize

National Assembly

Nov.
1979

1985

Belize, which achieved independence in
1981 after an extended period of inter-
nal self-government, has a democratic
and parliamentary form of government.
By law, general elections must be held
by February 1985. In the 1979 election,
the People's United Party, led by George
C. Price, won .52% of the vote and the
United Democratic Party 47%. The up-
coming election also will be contested by
the Christian Democratic Party.

Municipal

1949

Dec.
1984

President,
Congress

June
1980

1986

After 18 years of military rule, Bolivian
democracy was restored on October 10,
1982, when former President Hernan
Siles Zuazo was elected president in a
second-round vote by Congress and in-
stalled as constitutional president. Siles
had obtained a plurality of the 1.4
million votes cast in June 1980 but had
been prevented from assuming office by
a July 1980 coup that led to three
military regimes. Congress is responsi-
ble for setting election dates and seems
likely to return to the traditional
timetable by which a new president
would be inaugurated on August 6,
1986.

U.S. support for the constitutional
order has been a significant factor in
buttressing Bolivian democracy, which
faces difficult political, narcotics, and
economic problems. President Siles
publicly thanked the United States for
its role in helping to frustrate the
June 30, 1984, coup attempt in which he
was kidnaped.

Brazil

President (indirect)

Oct.
1978

1985

Congress, State,
Municipal

Nov.
1982

1986

Brazil has taken significant strides
toward a fully representative govern-
ment. Its opening to democracy, or aher-
fura, was amply demonstrated in the
November 1982 congressional, state, and
municipal elections in which over 48
million voters chose some 40,000 of-
ficials. The opposition parties won 10 of
the 22 contested governships, including
all but one of the important industrial
states in populous southern Brazil. In
the 69-member Senate, the governing
Democratic Social Party (PDS) won 15
of the contested seats for a total of 46,

FEATURE

or a two-thirds majority. The major op-
position party, the Brazilian Democratic
Movement (PMDB), won 9 seats for a
total of 21. Of the 479 seats in the
Chamber of Deputies, all of which were
at stake, the PDS won 235 and the
PMDB 200, so that neither of the major
parties commands a majority.

The 1982 elections also determined
the composition of the electoral college
which will select the successor to Presi-
dent Joao Figueiredo on January 15,
1985. The 686-member college will
consist of all Federal Senators and
Deputies and six members of the majori-
ty party of each state legislative
assembly. Only the two major parties
are presenting candidates. The PDS has
nominated Sao Paulo Federal Deputy
Paulo Maluf; the PMDB has chosen
Minas Gerais Governor Tancredo Neves.
The election, which is expected to be
hotly contested, will produce Brazil's
first civilian president in over 20 years.
Both candidates are campaigning on
platforms calling for direct presidential
elections in 1988. As elsewhere, U.S.
policy is wholeheartedly in support of
the democratic process, but neutral
about who wins.

Chile

Plebiscite

Sept.

1980

19B9

Chile came under military rule in
September 1973. A constitution ratified
by plebiscite in September 1980 took ef-
fect in March 1981. Though its provi-
sions and the conditions under which it
was ratified were criticized by opposition
groups, this constitution confirmed
Augusto Pinochet as president until
1989, at which time another plebiscite is
scheduled to vote on the junta's nominee
to succeed him. If the nominee wins, he
would be inaugurated on September 18,
1989. If the nominee is rejected in the
vote, Pinochet would remain in office,
and open presidential elections would be
held on March 18, 1990, concurrent with
elections for Congress. Opposition
groups have proposed several changes to
this election timetable process.

Some political liberalization occurred
during 1983. The government is now
considering a law which would legalize

I [Type of

Election(s)

some political parties. There is no formal
dialogue between the government and
and the opposition but informal contacts
have taken place. The U.S. strongly sup-
ports the return to elected, democratic,
civilian government in Chile. We hope
the process of communication between
the government and the opposition will
produce a consensus on a return to
democracy.

Colombia

Parliament,
State, Local

Mar.
1982

Mar.
1986

President

May
1982

May
1986

State, Municipal,
Territorial

Mar.
1984

Mar.
1988

Colombia has been an active democracy
for more than 25 years. Power has alter-
nated between the Liberal and Conser-
vative parties. Belisario Betancur of the
Conservative Party was elected presi-
dent in May 1982, winning decisively
over Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, a former
president and Liberal Party candidate.
Colombian democracy confronts a
low-level but persistent Cuban-backed
insurgency, as well as the narcotics
scourge. Colombia has begun to take ex-
traordinary steps to stamp out narcotics
trafficking and President Betancur has
negotiated a cease-fire with the largest
guerrilla group, offering them the oppor-
tunity to lay down their arms and join
the country's free political life.

Costa Rica

President,
Legislative Assembly

Feb.
1982

Feb.
1986

The elections of 1899 began a trend of
free and honest elections that have
enabled Costa Rica to evolve into a
democratic republic with a strong
system of checks and balances.

The electoral process is supervised
by the powerful Supreme Electoral
Tribunal, selected by Costa Rica's

Date of Most
Recent Election(s)

Date of
Next Electic

Supreme Court of Justice. The purpos
of this unique fourth branch of goverr
ment is to guarantee free and fair ele(
tions.

President Luis Alberto Monge is ;:
member of the leading political party,
the National Liberation Party (PLN).
The PLN is social-democratic in
philosophy. With but one exception, tl
PLN and various non-PLN coalitions
have alternated in the presidency in
every election since 1953.

Cuba

Cuba is a communist one-party state,
and the key exception to the prevailin
democratic environment in the Carib-
bean. Although a self-professed cham
pion of "national liberation" where otl
countries are concerned, Cuba itself is
one of the least democratic, least in-
dependent countries in the world.

Candidates for "election" are dete
mined by the Communist Party. Ther
no concept of legal organized oppositi
Suffrage, limited to voting for local
assemblies, is universal for citizens a^
16 and over except for those who hav
applied for permanent emigration. Oi
sitting members of the local assembli<
may vote to choose members of regio
assemblies and of the National Peopk
Assembly. Membership in a local
assembly is not, however, a requirem
for candidacy to the National Assemt
This assures seats to all Politburo
members and other high-ranking govi
ment and party officials. The Nations
People's Assembly selects a council o;
ministers, again under the direction t
the Com.munist Party.

Twenty-five years after coming t(
power, Fidel Castro rules through
classic Marxist-Leninist methods, in-
cluding direct repression. Behind the
ideological smokescreen he has estab-
lished, Castro's government is the
despotism of the traditional caudillo ;
gravated by unprecedented subservie
to foreign interests. Cuba adheres clc
ly to Soviet political and military
guidance. Only a massive Soviet subs
of $12-$13 million per day keeps the
Cuban people from even greater priv;
tion.

FEATURE

Type of
Election(s)

Date of Most
Recent Election(s)

Date of

Next Election(s)

iinica

jse of Assembly

July
1980

June
1985

le Minister Mary Eugenia Charles
the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP)
ed control of the House of Assembly
fair and open election. The DFP
?ntly holds 17 of 21 seats. Opposing
es are the Dominica Labour Party,
Democratic Labour Party of
inica, and a leftist grouping called
inica Liberation Movement Alliance.

inican Republic

sident,
igress

May
1932

May
1986

Dominican Republic turned to
Dcratic institutions after a long
)d of dictatorship and social and
ical upheaval. In spite of destabil-
: economic problems, democracy con-
s to gain strength there, as
snced by strongly contested elec-
; in 1978 and 1982. Suffrage is
ersal and compulsory for those over

married.
Three major parties contested the

presidential elections in which 1.7
DH citizens elected Salvador Jorge
CO of the Dominican Revolutionary
y as president. The opposition par-
the Reformist Party and the
inican Liberation Party, have
esentation at all levels of the
rnment — federal, state, and local.

idor

islative,
licipal

Jan.
1984

July
1986

sident

May

1984

{2d

round)

Jan.
1989

'.ident Leon Febres-Cordero was in-
irated on August 10, 1984, marking
first transition in 24 years from one
;ed democratic government to
her. President Febres-Cordero, a
nessman, is a member of the Social

Christian Party (PSC), which allied itself
with several other parties in a coalition
called the National Reconstruction Front
to oppose Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, the
candidate of the Democratic Left (ID),
also supported by a coalition of political
parties, some of which supported the
outgoing government of President
Osvaldo Hurtado.

El Salvador

Legislative Assembly,
Municipal

Mar.
1982

1985

President

May

1984

(2d

round)

1989

El Salvador's political structure is
established by a constitution that
entered into force in December 1983.
The Constitution was written by a con-
stituent assembly elected in a direct
popular vote in 1982. The 1982 elections
for the assembly were part of a program
of democratization agreed to among the
military officers responsible for the coup
in 1979 and the Christian Democratic
Party. Automatic registration for the
elections was offered to the political par-
ties allied with the guerrilla umbrella
organization, the Farabundo Marti Na-
tional Liberation Front (FMLN), but re-
jected by them.

Jose Napoleon Duarte was elected
president on May 6, 1984. International
observers attested to the fairness of the
1984 presidential elections. Eight can-
didates representing a broad political
spectrum competed in the first round.
Jose Napoleon Duarte, a founder of the
Christian Democratic Party, won 54% of
the votes in a run-off against ARENA
[National Republican Alliance] candidate
Roberto D'Aubuisson. Over 80% of the
electorate went to the polls.

Despite communist subversion,
rightwing terrorism, crushing economic
difficulties, and a history of repression,
the people of El Salvador have
persevered in constructing democratic
institutions. The legislative and
municipal elections to be held in the
spring of 1985 will provide a further op-

portunity for political parties associated
with the guerrillas to compete demo-
cratically for power. The United States
strongly supports President Duarte's ef-
forts to bring about such a national
reconciliation through democratic pro-
cedures.

Grenada

Parliament

Dec.
1976

By the

end of

1984

The erratic rule of Sir Eric Gairy was
forcibly ended on March 13, 1979, by
Maurice Bishop and the New JEWEL
[Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education,
and Liberation] Movement. The Con-
stitution was suspended, elections
postponed indefinitely, and an extraor-
dinary military buildup begun under
Cuban and Soviet advisers.

In October 1983, Grenada's eastern
Caribbean neighbors proved their
democratic mettle when they acted —
without hesitation and with the support
of other democratic nations, including
the United States — to restore order in
Grenada after the country had fallen
prey to a bloody power struggle among
its Marxist-Leninist leaders. Their collec-
tive action made it possible for Grena-
dians to resume their democratic
heritage. An interim government was
appointed by Governor-General Paul
Scoon in November 1983. Parliamentary
elections are expected to take place
before the end of 1984.

Guatemala

President

Mar.
1982

1985

Constituent Assembly

July
1984

Not
appli-
cable

On March 23, 1982, Efrain Rios Montt
was named president after Gen. Lucas
Garcia was ousted in a bloodless coup.
On August 8, 1983, Gen. Oscar
Humberto Mejia Victores seized power
from Rios Montt and pledged a prompt
return to democracy. International
observers invited to witness the Con-
stitutent Assembly elections, held July 1,
1984, were favorably impressed by their

FEATURE

fairness; 73% of registered voters par-
ticipated. The assembly, inaugurated on
August 1, 1984, will write a new con-
stitution and electoral law. The expecta-
tion is widespread that presidential elec-
tions will facilitate a return to civilian
control in 1985.

Guatemala faces formidable social,
cultural, human rights, and economic
problems, but the 1984 election, which
was conducted openly and fairly, has en-
couraged democrats everywhere. We
support continued progress toward
democratization.

Guyana

National Assembly

Dec.
1980

None
sched-
uled

While Guyana maintains the structure of
a multiparty parliamentary republic
within the Commonwealth, its 1980
Constitution defines the country as a
"democratic sovereign state in the
course of transition from capitalism to
socialism." The ruling party and its
leader, Forbes Burnham, have imposed
a minority government on the nation,
resulting in an erosion of democratic
practices.

Haiti

National Assembly

Feb.
1984

1990

Municipal

Apr.

1983

None
sched-
uled

Impoverished and lacking democratic
traditions, Haiti follows a constitution
which, as amended in 1983, provides for
lifetime President Jean-Claude Duvalier
to designate his successor and legislative
elections to be held every 6 years.

Although violence has been reduced,
major human rights problems exist, in-
cluding abuse of due process and a lack
of freedom of speech, press, and associa-
tion. For the first time, however, the
government has announced plans for

Type of
Election(s)

legislation governing political party ac-
tivities; recognized a labor federation;
and called for judicial reform, strict
observance of legality, and an end to in-
terference in the judicial process. Press
controls have been theoretically relaxed,
but the recent temporary detention of
several journalists raises serious ques-
tions about this process.

Honduras

President,
Congress

Nov.
1981

Nov.
1985

The April 1980 Constituent Assembly
elections began a process that ended
nearly 18 years of military rule. In
January 1982 full democratic civilian
government was restored to Honduras.

Roberto Suazo Cordova, of the
Liberal Party, was elected president
with about 54% of the votes. The
Liberal Party won 44 of 82 congres-
sional seats. The major opposition party,
the National Party, won 34 seats.

Despite severe economic problems,
the upheavals of the region, and the
need to safeguard itself against
Nicaragua, Honduras continues along
the democratic path under able civilian
leadership.

Jamaica

Parliament

Dec.
1983

By
1988

Jamaica has been a stable functioning
democracy since obtaining independence
in 1962. Elections are held at the discre-
tion of the Governor-General upon ad-
vice of the Prime Minister, but not less
than every 5 years.

Prime Minister Edward Seaga's
Labour Party (JPL) won the December
1983 elections. The chief opposition
party, the People's Niitional Party (PNP)
led by Michael Manley, boycotted the
elections and did not post any can-
didates. JPL candidates won all but 6
(contested by small minority parties) of
60 Parliament seats. Thus, although the
JPL and the PNP have regularly alter-
nated in power, the JPL now heads a
single-party government. Many

Date of Most
Recent Election(s)

' ' N

Date of
ext Electic

observers anticipate that with the
clarification of the voter registration
issue that resulted in the PNP boycot
PNP participation in the electoral pre
ess will resume.

IVIexico

Deputies, Certain
State Governors,
Municipal

1984

19M

President, Senators,
Deputies

July
1982

19<

Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado was
elected president on July 4, 1982. Pn
dent and senators are elected for coii
ciding 6-year terms; governors at sta
gered intervals for 6-year terms;
deputies and municipal officials for
3-year terms.

Mexico has had an evolving demc
cratic system for more than 50 years
Recent constitutional amendments le
expanded representation of oppositio
parties, including the National Actioi
Party (PAN) and the Mexican Unifie
Socialist Party (PSUM), which in
1982-83 carried some important
municipal elections traditionally won
the ruling Institutional Revolutionar;
Party (PRI). President de la Madrid
key advisers are deeply engaged in e
forts to resolve Mexico's most seriou
economic and financial problems sine
the Great Depression; his
administration's programs include
broadening popular participation in
government.

Nicaragua

President,
Council of State

Sept.

1974

Ni.

Sandinista Nicaragua contrasts shar
with progress toward more open an(
tolerant societies elsewhere in Centr
America. Despite promises of free el
tions and nonalignment, the Sandinii
in the 5 years since taking power in

Denartmfint of Statft Bu

FEATURE

□Type of I I
Election(s) I 1

Date of [VIost
Recent Election(s)

Date of

Next Election(s)

developed a militarized Marxist-
nist state with close ties to Cuba
the Soviet Union.
Videspread internal pressures and
usionment abroad led the San-
tas to announce elections for
'mber 4, 1984. A genuine political
ing in Nicaragua would be wel-
d by the Ihiited States and others
itin America and Western Europe,
'ervasive FSLN [Sandinista Na-
Liberation Front] presence and
•ol throughout Nicaragnan society
ts close identification with the
rnment and armed forces provide it
enormous leverage in an electoral
tion. The coordinating body of the
)cratic opposition has called on the
rnment of Nicaragua several times,
ining in December 1983, to take
fie steps to create an environment
ucive to genuine electoral competi-
;see p. 9). To date, the government
efused to significantly alter the
of the game which greatly favor
:overning FSLN party. Thus the
r opposition parties have declined
gister for the elections in November,
^s of August 1984, it appeared that
984 Nicaraguan elections could
nble the 1974 Nicaraguan elections,
lich the government candidate ob-
d an overwhelming percentage of
ote after ensuring the disqualifica-
Df all potentially serious opposition.

ima

Paraguay

las Ardito Barletta was elected
dent in May 1984 in Panama's first
■t presidential election in 16 years.
; than three-quarters of Panama's
;s, 717,000 voters, participated in
|, proved a very tight race. The op-
ion Democratic Opposition Alliance
3), its candidate Arnulfo Arias, and
government party challenged votes
any districts.

i President,
Congress

Feb.
1983

Feb.
1988

President and Congress serve concur-
rent 5-year terms. President Alfredo
Stroessner was reelected in 1983 to a
seventh term that ends in February
1988. The elections resulted in his
Colorado Party receiving over 90% of
the votes cast in a process flawed by
campaign and media restrictions. Only
two of the legally recognized opposition
parties participated, the Liberal and the
Radical Liberal parties.

There has been little change in
Paraguay's political system in recent
years. A state of siege is continuously
renewed, and human rights problems
persist. At the same time, the govern-
ment has taken some positive steps,
such as releasing almost all political
prisoners, allowing some political ac-
tivitists to return to Paraguay after
many years of exile, and arresting some
police officials for abuse of authority.

Peru

sident,

ional Assembly

May
1984

May
1989

nicipal

June
1984

June
1989

President,
Congress

May
1980

1985

Municipal

Nov.
1983

1986

Fernando Belaunde Terry, founder of
the Popular Action (AP) party, was
elected president for the second time in
1980. Reelected 12 years after he was
deposed by a military coup, President
Belaunde heads a democratic govern-
ment that faces severe economic strains
and terrorism from the indigenous
Maoist guerrilla group, Sendero
Luminoso. Nevertheless, Peru remains
firmly on its democratic course. National
elections planned for April 1985 will
pave the way for the first constitutional
turnover of power in 40 years.

Belaunde's coalition partner, the
Popular Christian Party (PPC),
withdrew from the government in May
1984 in anticipation of the 1985 elec-

tions. Candidates from the American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA)
and from the United Left (lU) did well
in the 1983 municipal elections.

St. Christopher-Nevis

House of Assembly

June
1984

By
June

1989

St. Christopher-Nevis, which achieved
independence from the United Kingdom
on September 19, 1983, is a parliamen-
tary democracy with a strong tradition
of peaceful electoral change of
government.

Prime Minister Kennedy A. Sim-
monds, leader of the People's Action
Movement rules in coalition with the
Nevis Reformation Party led by Simeon
Daniel. This coalition government was
recently returned to power in peaceful
democratic elections. The leader of the
opposing St. Christopher-Nevis Labour
Party, Lee Moore, lost his seat, thus
limiting his ability to challenge the pres-
ent government.

St. Lucia

Parliment

May
1982

By
Aug.
1987

The St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) won
the first postindependence elections in
1979, winning 12 of the 17 House of
Assembly seats. By 1982 the political
tide had turned, and Prime Minister
John Compton's United Worker's Party
defeated both the SLP and the Pro-
gressive Labour Party (PLP), winning
14 of the 17 seats. The PLP has been
largely discredited since trying to send
14 students to Libya for military
training.

FEATURE

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Milton Cato's St. Vincetit and the
Grenadines Labour Party won the elec-
tions held in 1979 and until 1984 held 12
of 13 seats in the House of Assembly.
The 1984 elections produced a peaceful
upset, as James "Son" Mitchell and his
New Democratic Party won 9 of the 13
seats and took control of Parliament.

Suriname

Until a violent military coup in February
1980, Suriname was a functioning
democracy with a history largely free of
violence. The military government
headed by Lt. Col. Desire Bouterse has
suspended the constitution and has not
announced any plans for elections. In
December 1982, 15 national leaders
were killed while in government custody.
There has been some dialogue among
various political and social groups, but
power remains in the hands of the army.

Trinidad and Tobago

Parliament

Nov
1981

By
Mar.
1987

Trinidad and Tobago has been a func-
tioning and stable democracy since it
achieved independence in 1962.

Prime Minister George Chamber's
People's National Movement (PNM) won
the 1981 elections. Of the eight political

□ Type of I I
Election(s) 1 I

parties contesting the elections, the
PNM, the United Labour Front (ULF),
the Democratic Action Congress (DAC),
and the Tapia House Movement (THM)
won seats in the assembly. The elections
were hotly contested with all parties ac-
tively campaigning for popular support.

Uruguay

President,
Congress

Plebiscite

1971

1980

Nov.
1984

Not
applj.
cable

Uruguay has been under military rule
since 1973. In 1980 a constitution
drafted by the military and widely
criticized as undemocratic was rejected
in a plebiscite. In September 1981, the
military selected a retired general,
Gregorio Alvarez, as president.

Since 1981, Uruguay has pr-oceeded
on an accelerated course toward a
democratic transition. The military
recently deproscribed the Blanco and
Colorado parties and most of the consti-
tuent member parties of the Broad
Front. An agreement has been con-
cluded between the Colorados, the
Broad Front, and the military governing
the modalities of the transition to
civilian rule. Elections are scheduled for
November 1984. Although the Blanco
Party did not participate in the agree-
ment because of the detention of its
leader, Wilson Ferreira, it does plan to
take part in the election. The United
States firmly supports the return of
democracy to Uruguay.

Date of Most
Recent Election(s)

Venezuela

Date of
Next Elect

len

President,
Congress

Municipal

Dec.
1983

D«
19

May
1984

Venezuela has had a democratic gov
ment for over 25 years. Although
smaller parties represent a full spec'
of political tendencies, Venezuelan
politics have evolved into a two-part
system made up of COPE I and
Democratic Action (AD), typifying
respectively the classic international
competition between Christian
Democratic and Social Democratic c
rents. Continuing a tradition of altei
tion of power with COPEI, the AD's
Jaime Lusinchi was elected presider
December 1983— the first president
be elected by an absolute majority s
the restoration of democracy in 195!
After the ouster of dictator Mar
Perez Jimenez in 1958, the country
cessfully fought both Cuban-backed
surgents and rightwing extremists i
early 1960s— but without sacrificing
respect for human rights and the ru
law. Few Venezuelans have forgott(
how close their country came to losi
its liberty, and 90% of Venezuela's i
population typically turns out for
presidential elections.

rati

leii

ids

Department of State Bl

lendent Territories

lilla

rated from St, Christt)pher-Nevis
'Cember 1980, Anguilla remains
tish ciependent territory.

>h Virgin Islands

FEATURE

slative Assembly

British Virgin Islands is a British
■n Colony with a parliamentary
m of government. The most re-
elections brought the United
/, under the leadership of Cyril
3niney, to power. The Virgin
ds Party forms the opposition.

nan Islands

islative Assembly

layman Islands is a British
ndency with a parliamentary

of government. The legislature
nprised of 12 elected members
i members appointed by the

□ Type of
Election(s)

Governor. Although there are no
highly structured political parties,
there are loosely structured political
organizations or "teams." The Unity
Team and the Progress with Dignity
Team are represented in the
Legislative Assembly.

Montserrat

National Parliament,
Chief Minister

Mar,
1983

Mar.
1988

Montserrat is a British Crown Col-
ony. Elections are held every 5 years.
InMarch 1983, Chief Minister John
Osborne was reelected, but his Peo-
ple's Liberation Movement lost two of
its seven seats in Parliament to the
opposition People's Democratic Party.

Netherlands Antilles

The Netherlands Antilles has been a
stable parliamentary democracy since
the beginning of autonomy in 1954 as
a part of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands. Federal Parliamentary elec-

nch Overseas Departments

Date of Most
Recent Election(s)

Date of

Next Election(s)

tions are mandatorily held every 4
years but may be called sooner should
the party or coalition in power lose
its majority. None of the 12 parties
participating in the Federal Parlia-
ment election in 1982 received a ma-
jority of the vote, and a coalition
government was formed.

Each of the islands has its own
representative body, the Island Coun-
cil, which enacts laws regarding local
island affairs.

Turks and Caicos Islands

Legislative Council

May
1984

1990

Federal Parliament

June
1982

1986

The Turks and Caicos Islands is a
British Crown colony. The most re-
cent Legislative Council elections
returned the People's National Party
(PNP), headed by Norman Saunders,
to power. The PNP won 8 of the 11
Legislative Council seats with the op-
position People's Democratic Move-
ment winning three.

ch Guiana

Guadeloupe

Martinique

General Council,
Municipal

Mar,
1983

Mar.
1988

General Council

Mar.
1983

Mar.
1988

ich Guiana normally holds elec-
5 every 5 years. It elects one
itor and one Deputy to the
ich Senate and National
?mbly.

General Council elections normally
are held every .5 years. Guadeloupe
elects two Senators and three
Deputies to the French Senate and
National Assembly.

General Council elections are usually
held every 5 years. Martinique elects
two Senators to the French Senate
and three Deputies to the National
Assembly.

THE PRESIDENT

40th Anniversary of
the Warsaw Uprising

President Reagan's remarks to guests
at a White House luncheon marking the
anniversary on August 17. 1984 J

It's always an honor for me to be with
individuals like yourselves who under-
stand the value of freedom. I'm remind-
ed of a story about a conversation be-
tween one of our citizens and a Soviet
citizen. The American described the
freedom of speech that we have here in
the United States, and the citizen of the
Soviet Union said, "Well, we're free to
speak in the Soviet Union just like you
are in the United States." He said, "The
only difference is you're free after you
speak." [Laughter]

But today we pay tribute to a nation
which for two centuries has struggled
for freedom and independence. From
the uprisings in 1794, the November
uprising in 1830, and then again in 1863,
the people of Poland demonstrated
courage and a commitment to human
liberty that inspired free men and
women everywhere.

And this 200-year record of
perseverance and bravery coincided with
the development of our own precious
liberty here in the United States, and
that is no mere coincidence. Our two
peoples drank from the same well of
freedom, held dear the same Judeo-
Christian values, respected the simple
virtues of honesty and hard work. And
even today, it's often noted that unlike
many others, our two peoples take their
religious convictions seriously. These
heartfelt convictions have kept the spirit
of freedom burning in our hearts,
especially during times of great adversi-
ty.

Pope John Paul II has said,
"Freedom is given to man by God as a
measure of his dignity. ..." And "as
children of God," he said, "we cannot be
slaves." I know that you feel as I do,
we're truly blessed in this time of great
need to have a spiritual leader like Pope
John Paul II.

The continuing suppression of the
Polish national identity brought wave
after wave of Polish immigrants to the
United States. And for that, we can be
grateful. We all know the list of con-
tributions and the names of those who
rose to great prominence. But just as

important are the millions who came
here and, with their hard work and with
their moral strength, helped shape the
American character.

During this century, Americans and
Poles have stood side by side in those
two conflagrations that swept the world.
The First World War, unfortunately, did
not end all wars, but it did result in the
reestablishment of the Polish state.

This month, we commemorate a
desperate battle of the Second World
War, an heroic attempt by free Poles to
liberate their country from the heel of
Nazi occupation and to protect it from
postwar, foreign domination. For years,
they covertly resisted the occupation
forces. And then in 1944, for 63 brutal
and agonizing days, ill-equipped and
overwhelmingly outnumbered they — and
I could say, many of you— held off the
Nazi war machine. And it's fitting that
we and all free people take special care
to remember this occasion.

Of those who fought for freedom,
and those who put their lives on the line
for human liberty, I can think of none
who should be prouder than those who
can say, "I fought in the Polish Home
Army."

And today, we honor three in-
dividuals, heroes of the Polish Home
Army, never given their due after the
Allied victory. And it's my great honor
to now present the Legion of Merit to
the families or representatives of these
men.

Let us salute Stefan Rowecki, who
led the Resistance until he was captured
and executed by the Gestapo.

[The President presented the award to
Jan Morelewski, president of the Polish
Home Army Veterans Association.]

Next, his son will arise, the son of
Bor-Komorowski, leader of the Warsaw
uprising, who later died in near poverty
in exile in London.

[The President presented the award to
Adam Komorowski.]

And finally. General Leopold
Okulicki, who was lured into a trap and
died under suspicious circumstances in
Moscow.

[The President presented the award
Zdzislaw Dziekonski, chairman of th(
Warsaw Uprising Commemorative E
ecutive Committee and director of th
Polish American Congress.]

These brave men and the
courageous individuals who fought u
their command represent the best of
human spirit. They risked all for the
ideals, for their God and country, at
time when the odds were so much
against them. They're now part of tl
inspiring legacy of the Polish people

If there's a lesson to be learned
from the history books, it is that Pol
may be beaten down, but it is never
defeated. It may be forced into subn
sion, but it will never give up. It ma
pressured to acquiesce, but it will ne
accept foreign domination and the si
pression of God-given freedom. Afte
two decades of brutal foreign domin
tion, we witnessed, just a short time
ago, a resurrection of the indomitab
spirit of the Polish people. And I as;
you we have not forgotten and will
never forget Solidarity and the freei
of the Polish people.

There are some, of course, who
seem all too willing to turn a blind (
to Soviet transgressions, ostensibly
improve the dialogue between East
West. But those who condemn firm
port for freedom and democracy — v
in order to prove their sincerity, wc
project weakness — are no friends o
peace, human liberty, or meaningfu
dialogue.

Our policies toward Poland and
other captive nations are based upo
set of well-established principles.

First, let me state emphatically
we reject any interpretation of the
agreement that suggests American
sent for the division of Europe into
spheres of influence. On the contrai
we see that agreement as a pledge
the three great powers to restore fi
dependence and to allow free and
democratic elections in all countries
liberated from the Nazis after Worl
War II, and there is no reason to al
solve the Soviet Union or ourselves
this commitment. We shall continue
press for full compliance with it, an
with the Charter of the United Nat I
the Helsinki Final Act, and other ir :
national agreements guaranteeing i j)
damental human rights.

THE PRESIDENT

Passively accepting the permanent
ugation of the people of Eastern
ope is not an acceptable alternative.
981, when it appeared that Poland
Id siiffer a similar fate to that of
gary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in
i, we raised our voices in support of
ij Polish people. And we did not re-
: passive when, under intense Soviet
sure, martial law was imposed on

Many credit, trade, and fishing
ileges extended to Poland, due to its
ewhat broader degree of freedom
1 other Eastern European countries,

' ? suspended. At the same time, we

assisted voluntary organizations to
bide humanitarian aid through the

l" sh church to avoid hurting the very
3le we want to help.
I would especially like to commend
work of Al Mazewski and the Polish
rican Congress. In cooperation with
church, they've provided over $40
ion worth of food, clothing, and
ical supplies to the people of Poland.
I know that I speak for Nancy — my
is thrilled to have been selected
Drary chairman for the Polish
;rican Congress' Infant Charity
'e. We both wish you the best on this
thwhile project.

I've pledged that our sanctions can
ifted, one by one, in response to
.ningful improvement of the human
ts situation in Poland. For example,
mplete and reasonable implementa-
of the Polish Government's amnesty
•ee would create a positive at-
phere that would allow reactivation
'oland's application for membership
le International Monetary Fund.

In the meantime, we've agreed,
along with our allies and private
organizations, to help fund a Polish
church program to assist individual
farmers. I am pleased to announce today
that I am seeking support for a $10
million American contribution to the
pilot phase of the church's program. And
we will follow the progress of this pro-
gram carefully to determine whether ad-
ditional support should be forthcoming.

Perhaps the most significant thing
that we can do is let the Polish people
and all the people of Eastern Europe
know that they're not forgotten. And
that's why we're modernizing Radio
Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the
Voice of America. Our radio program-
ming is becoming the mighty force for
good that it was intended to be. As the
Scriptures say, "Know the truth and the
truth will make you free." Our broadcast
will carry the truth to captive people
throughout the world.

The free peoples of the world are in
ideological competition with the
followers of a doctrine that rejects the
basic tenets of freedom and declares the
worship of God to be a social evil. As
important as this competition is, until
recently, the democracies, including the
United States, seemed paralyzed by
uncertainty and lacking the will to com-
pete.

In the last 3V2 years, we've quit
apologizing, and at long last, we're
standing up and being counted. As our
UN Ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick,
said, we've taken off our "Kick me" sign.

We're proud of our way of life, we're
confident that freedom will prevail,
because it works and because it is right.
We believe the free peoples of the world
should support all those who share our
democratic values.

The National Endowment for
Democracy, which I first proposed in a
speech before the Parliament in London
2 years ago, has been established to en-
courage the democratic forces and the
development of free institutions
throughout the world. Its concerns in-
clude nonviolent, democratic movements
like that of Solidarity in Poland.

And the rise of Solidarity is a mat-
ter of historic significance. It continues
to be an inspiration of all free people
that the Marxist-Leninist myth of in-
evitability is crumbling. Communism has
brought with it only deprivation and
tyranny. What happened in Poland is
one sign that the tide is turning. The
Polish people, with their courage and
perseverance, will lead the way to
freedom and independence, not only for
themselves but for all those who yearn
to breathe free.

The battle cry of the Polish Home
Army still rings true: "Poland is
fighting. Poland will live. Poland will
overcome."

'President's introductory remarks
omitted here, as is the response by Stefan
Korbonski, honorary chairman of the Warsaw
Uprising Commemorative Executive Commit-
tee and president of the Polish Council of
Unity in the United States (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents of
Aug. 20, 1984). ■

THE SECRETARY

Diplomacy and Strength

Secretary Shultz's address before the
Veterans of Foreign Wars in Chicago on
August 20, 198V

Patriotism in our country has been re-
awakened during these last few years.
Pride in America is greater than at any
time in recent generations. So it is a
particular honor and privilege to be here
today among this distinguished group.
For you are patriots who have never
waivered in your devotion to our nation.
The service you have given the United
States in times of peril and your unflag-
ging dedication— in good times and in
bad— to the principles for which America
stands have earned the admiration and
appreciation of your fellow citizens.

And we are grateful not just for
your service in war but for your con-
tribution in times of peace as well. For
you have been steadfast and vigorous
supporters of a strong defense for
America. You know, better than anyone,
that a strong defense is essential for en-
suring security and freedom. Your Presi-
dent is profoundly grateful for the sup-
port you have given to his efforts to
restore America's strength these past 4
years.

And 1 am here to tell you that I am
grateful, too. For if history has taught

come a better world in which peace and
prosperity would reign and war would
be a thing of the past. But we learned
soon after the war that there are no
final victories: the struggle between
freedom and tyranny goes on; the
United States, as the leader of the
democracies, cannot evade its continuing
responsibility to promote freedom and
prosperity and to defend what we hold
dear.

The Purpose of Negotiation

Dwight Eisenhower, as a great
military leader and a great president,
knew that America's strength was moral
as well as military and economic. Our
power was the servant of our positive
goals, our values, and ideals. We
Americans have always deeply ijelieved
in a world in which disputes were settled
peacefully— a world of law, international
harmony, and human rights. But we
have learned through hard experience,
in World War II and after, that such a
world cannot be created by good will
and idealism alone. Since 1945, every
president, Democratic or Republican,
has understood that to maintain the
peace we had to be strong, and, more
than that, we had to be willing to use

No negotiation can succeed when one side believes
that it pays no price for intransigence and the
other side believes that it has to make dangerous
concessions to reach agreement.

us anything, it is that effective
diplomacy depends on strength. Dwight
Eisenhower— in whose name you are
honoring me tonight- understood it
well. "Military power," he once told the
Congress, ". . . serves the cause of peace
by holding up a shield behind which the
patient, constructive work of peace can
go on."

It has been almost 40 years since the
end of the Second World War, a war in
which many of you fought. You fought—
and many Americans died— not only to
defend our nation but to free the world
from a bruUil tyranny. The American
people hoped that with victory would

our strength. We would not seek con-
frontaticm, but we would never appease
or shrink from the challenge posed by
threats of aggression. And this deter-
mination was always accompanied by an
active and creative diplomacy and a will-
ingness to solve problems peacefully.

President Kennedy defined the two
goals of this solidly bipartisan approach
in his inaugural address: "Let us never
negotiate out of fear," he said, "but let
us never fear to negotiate."

In the years that followed, however,
the consensus behind this balanced ap-
proach began to show signs of strain.
P''or whatever reason, Vietnam created

doubts in the minds of some that pea'
and military strength were compatibi
The lessons so clearly understood by
President Eisenhower, it seemed, we
being forgotten. And today, even tho
we have overcome the trauma of Vie
nam, one gets the sense that some st
believe that power and diplomacy are
alternatives. From one side, we hear
that negotiations alone are the answt
If we will only talk (the argument rui
we can have peace. If we will only ta
our differences will easily be resolvec
is as if negotiations were an end in
themselves, as if the goal of America
foreign policy were not primarily to \
tect the peace, or defend our values,
our people, or our allies, but to negot
for its own sake. From another side,
though the chorus is considerably
smaller, we hear that we should nevt
negotiate, never compromise with ou
adversaries, because the risks are to(
great and the differences irreeoncilat

Both views are as wrong today e
they would have been four decades s
Negotiations are not the goal of
American foreign policy, they are a
means of attaining that goal. In fact
they are an essential means. But we
know, as surely as we know anythin
that negotiations and diplomacy not
backed by strength are ineffectual a
best, dangerous at worst.

As your Secretary of State I car
you from experience that no diploma
can succeed in an environment of fe:
from a position of weakness. No nejj
tion can succeed when one side belie
that it pays no price for intransigen(
and the other side believes that it h;
make dangerous concessions to reac
agreement. This is true whether we
talking about Vietnam or Lebanon,
Central America; it is true in arms i
trol and in our relations with the So
Union. Americans have only to remc
ber what we understood so well foui
decades ago: neither strength nor
negotiations are ends in themselves.
They must go hand in hand.

And I can also tell you that any
strategy, to be effective, must be su
tainable over the long haul. It canno
sustained if our policies vacillate wil
in response to events beyond our coi
trol. Americans are by nature a peo|
of actii)n, and we are sometimes im;
tient with a world that progresses si
ly. When Americans act, we want U

THE SECRETARY

• and quick results. And the pattern
e recent past has been one of ex-
ve expectations that, when unful-
I, have led to equally excessive
rsals in policy. This inconsistency
lindered the achievement of
■rican goals.

iVe do not negotiate with our adver-
ts because we think they are perfec-
;. Nor do we negotiate just to please
or that domestic constituency. We
itiate because it is in our country's
•est to do so, and we reach agree-
ts when we perceive that both we
our adversaries can gain from a
)tiated solution. To negotiate on
e terms is to deal with the world as
without illusions.

We know that negotiations with the
et Union, for instance, are not a
icea. Yet we know that equitable
verifiable agreements can make a
ificant contribution to stability in the
ear age or to the resolution of con-
5 that might otherwise escalate and
aten to overwhelm us. To negotiate
lese ends is the only prudent and
onsible course. It serves American
-ests.

If our proposals are rejected and
■ciprocated— as they have been of
-we must show staying power,
etimes, it seems as if the Soviets
t take yes for an answer. At the
2 time, we should not seek agree-
t for the sake of agreement or allow
sional successes to give rise to un-
-anted euphoria. Our interests re-
5 that we stay on course despite the
jdic disappointments and setbacks
we are bound to encounter in deal-
A^ith such a ruthless competitor. Un-
inately, outrageous incidents, such
le Korean airliner attack or the
ecution of Andrei Sakharov, are
t we must expect. However shock-
they do not come as surjifises that
;ire us to reassess and change our
: strategy, including our strategy of
ngness to negotiate.
Patience is a virtue in foreign affairs
mch as in our personal lives. If we
) our eye on our strategic objectives,
e negotiate without illusions, if we
our strength effectively, we will see
jress. The truth is, we advance our
rests less by the big, obvious suc-
es, by summits, by decisive battles,
;-lamorous international agreements,
1 we do by our permanent engage-
it and by the steady application of
id policies.

The Tide of Freedom

Let's look at Central America. It is
no coincidence that when America has
shown consistency and commitment in
Central America, progress in that region
has been equally consistent. We all know
what the problem is in Central America:
Nicaragua's push toward militarism and
totalitarianism. We have seen increased

solution is to be found that ends the fear
and agony in Central America and opens
a promising future of peace, freedom,
and prosperity.

Our policies are working. Gradually,
but inevitably, communist aggression is
losing the contest. Hope is being created
for the people of Central America. Suc-
cess will not come overnight; and we
cannot let our policies vacillate in

Despite grave economic problems and communist
efforts to exploit them, almost every nation [in
Latin America] is either democratic or on the path
toward democracy . . . This gradual movement
does not receive the attention of the media as much
as the sporadic guerrilla offensive. . . .

repressions, persecution of the church, a
massive influx of Soviet arms, and con-
tinued aggression against Nicaragua's
neighbors. Today we hear of Nicaraguan
elections promised for November. The
notion of democracy is so powerful that
even dedicated Marxist-Leninists feel
they have to show that they are holding
elections. Feeling the pull of the tide of
true democracy that is running now in
Central and South America, they seek to
represent their elections as meaningful.
But they are not succeeding. The
failures of the Nicaraguan regime have
generated a determined internal opposi-
tion—the true Sandinistas. Because of
the regime's efforts to suppress that in-
ternal opposition, the elections promised
for November now look more and more
like sham elections on the Soviet model.

America has responded with pa-
tience and consistent policies based on
strength and diplomacy. We have sought
a dialogue with the Nicaraguan leader-
ship. We have given our full support to
the Contadora peace efforts. But we
have also maintained an American mili-
tary presence in the region to serve as
the" shield, in President Eisenhower's
words, behind which effective diplomacy
can go forward. We have provided eco-
nomic, political, and military support for
the free elected Government of El
Salvador.

And we admire the dedication of the
Nicaraguan freedom fighters, who want
only to bring democracy to their people.
All these forces help provide the
strength and the purpose essential if a

response to emotions or political pas-
sions at home. Only a steady, purposeful
application of our diplomatic and
military strength offers real hope for
peace in Central America and security
for the hemisphere.

We can see similar signs of progress
throughout the world. While there are
always obstacles and occasional set-
backs, the broader picture is a hopeful
one. The day-to-day events of foreign
policy are like waves rolling up against
the shore. Some break in one direction;
some break in the other. But what is
more important than the path of a single
wave is the flow of the tide beneath it.
Is the tide rising or is it falling? Is the
course of history on the side of peace,
freedom, and democracy? Or is America
standing on weak ground against in-
evitable and ineluctable forces?

The tide of history is with us. The
values that Americans cherish— demo-
cratic freedom, peace, and the hope of
prosperity— are taking root all around
the world. Look again at Latin America.
Despite grave economic problems and
communist efforts to exploit them,
almost every nation in that region is
either democratic or on the path toward
democracy. Never before have more peo-
ple in our hemisphere had such hope of
tasting the fruits of true freedom. This
gradual movement does not receive the
attention of the media as much as the
sporadic guerrilla offensive, but it is
there. It is undeniable. The tide in Latin
America is the tide of freedom.

THE SECRETARY

Restoration of Confidence

A month ago, 1 visited our friends
and allies in Southeast Asia. Our rela-
tions with those nations have never been
stronger, in large part because the
values we Americans cherish are
flourishing in those faraway lands, as
well. Japan, Korea, Australia, and New
Zealand are valued allies and vibrant
societies; the free Southeast Asian na-
tions, ASEAN [Association of South
East Asian Nations], are embarked on
the same journey toward freedom and
democracy; their economic success sym-
bolizes how far they have come. The
U.S. -China relationship is maturing and
broadening as we identify and develop
common interests. Our deepening friend-
ship with these nations gets few head-
lines, but it marks the fact that in the
decade since Vietnam, the United States
has restored its position and its relations
in Asia. And, increasingly, the real
lesson of Vietnam is clear. The world

The yearning for
democracy and freedom
in the countries of
Eastern Europe is a
powerful and growing
force. . . . someday it
will happen.

now condemns Vietnam's aggression in
Kampuchea. The steady outflow of
refugees from areas dominated by Hanoi
are showing the Vietnamese communists
for what some of us always knew they
were.

In Europe, we have faced periodic
crises, moments of apparent disunity,
and times when Soviet intimidation has
jostled relations with our oldest and
closest friends. The Soviets once thought
they could split the NATO alliance by
pointing SS-20 nuclear missiles at the
free peoples of Western Europe. But
these tests of the alliance's strength
have served only to prove one thing:
that the solidarity of democratic nations
endures, that the transatlantic bonds are
strong and secure. Our shared moral
values and political principles have made

NATO the keeper of the peace for 35
years and wilt continue to do so into the
next century and beyond.

Indeed, if there is weakness in
Europe, it is within the Soviet empire.
The yearning for democracy and free-
dom in the countries of Eastern Europe
is a powerful and growing force. We
have seen it in recent years among the
brave people of Poland, as we saw it in
Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Hungary in
1956, and East Germany in 1953. We
will never accept the idea of a divided
Europe. Time is not on the side of im-
perial domination. We may not see free-
dom in Eastern Europe in our lifetime.
Our children may not see it in theirs.
But someday it will happen. The world's
future is a future of freedom.

Make no mistake. History will do us
no special favors. A better future
depends on our will, our leadership, our
willingness to act decisively in moments
of crisis, and on our ability to be con-
stant and steadfast in moments of calm.
We must be ready to engage ourselves
where necessary throughout the world.
We must be ready to use our di|:iloniatic
skills and our military strength in
defense of our values and our interests.

There was a time, a decade or so
ago, when some Americans may have
doubted that their great nation could
continue to be a force for good in the
world. But today Americans no longer
doubt America's ability to play its proper
role. In the past 4 years, this nation has
taken the essential steps to restore its
leadership of the free world. We have
restored the strategic balance. We have
restored the strength and thrust of our
dynamic economy. We have restored our
will and self-confidence. We have re-
stored national pride and respect for the
men and women who serve in our
Armed Forces. And we have restored
the confidence of our friends and allies
around the world that America can be
trusted to confront challenges, not wish
them away.

I don't mean to suggest that the
path ahead of us is easy. But in the face
of the forces of tyranny, we draw in-
spiration from the basic goodness of
America, and our pride in our country
gives us strength to lead abroad.

No one understands or feels that
pride more deeply than you, who have
defended this great nation in times of
national peril. You knew what you were
fighting against and what you were
fighting for. And you knew what kind of

people you were defending— a peopk
devoted to freedom and justice, a br;
people willing to sacrifice for what tl
believe. And it was your sacrifices tl
have made peace possible. You laid t
foundation for the kind of world we
seek. Let us never forget that as we
look toward the future.

Americans must never be timid,
ashamed, or guilt-ridden, or weak. V
are proud and strong— and confideni
We will use our power and our
diplomacy in the service of peace ani
our ideals. We have our work cut ou
us. But we feel truly that the future
bright.

'Press release 191.

9(1

DeDartment of State Bui

IMS CONTROL

3curity for Europe

'antes E. Goodby

The following is an article repr'inted
i the June 1981, issue of NATO
ew. Ambassador Goodby is head of
11 J.S. delegation to the Conference on
It Idence- and Security-Building
sures and Disarmament in Europe

the past 10 years, the United States
its NATO alHes have sought to ease
division of Europe through the proc-
)f dialogue, cooperation, and critique
ted by the Helsinki accords of 1975.
Ti the Helsinki process has now
rged a new negotiating forum which
the potential to create a system of
rity based on carefully defined
teration in military affairs "from the
ntic to the Urals." This is the Con-
nce on Confidence- and Security-
ding Measures and Disarmament in
ope, which opened in Stockholm last
lary.

The Stockholm conference is dif-
nt from "classical" arms control
jtiations in that it addresses not the
ibilities for war — the number of
pons and troops — but rather the
t likely causes of war: flawed
^ents or miscalculations stemming
n fears of sudden attack and uncer-
ty about the military intentions of an
jrsary. It is highly unlikely that any
at all will commence in Europe. But
ar should ever come, it probably
Jd not be in the form of a "bolt-from-
blue" attack by one side against
j:her. The most probable cause of the
)reak of war would be some small in-
nt, perhaps connected with a
tary maneuver, which would not be
rly understood, leading to confronta-
and armed conflict. This nightmare
n improbable scenario but the stakes
so high that some reassurance
inst such a contingency would be in
•yone's interest. If it is successful,
Stockholm conference will negotiate
put into place certain procedures
ch could stop a fatal progression
ard catastrophe.
Procedures which would make
tary activities in Europe more
dictable would reassure governments
t those activities were normal,
tine, and nonthreatening. Procedures
questioning and verifying the essen-
character of specific military ac-
ties would provide more certain

knowledge of the intentions of the par-
ties to this agreement. Such reassurance
would lead to increased confidence and
security among all participating states.
It could also, in time, lead to a habit of
cooperation among participants on ac-
tivities affecting their most vital national
security interests, thus acting to dissolve
distrust. From this, a new system of in-
ternational security might emerge in
Europe, which could soften some of the
rougher edges of the adversarial rela-
tionship and provide a mechanism for
preventing escalation toward crisis and
war.

Proposals have been advanced by
the 16 members of the Atlantic alliance
which represent initial steps toward this
ambitious goal. These proposals do not
call for large changes in the military
postures of the countries involved in the
Stockholm conference. That objective is
for other negotiations. But if a first,
substantial agreement can be achieved in
Stockholm, the consequences can be of
historic importance.

The Stockholm conference will re-
main an integral part of the Helsinki
process, and its achievements will be
evaluated in a CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe]
followup meeting scheduled for Vienna
in 1986, which will also review progress
in the other dimensions of the process,
including human rights. As U.S.
Secretary of State George Shultz said
when he addressed the opening of the
Stockholm conference last January:

. . . true peace and security in Europe depend
on a foundation of basic freedoms — not the
least of which is the right of peoples to deter-
mine their own future. . . . Confidence-
building in the larger sense means pursuing
the work of Helsinki — through practical steps
to break down barriers, expand human con-
tact and intellectual interchange, increase
openness, and stretch the boundaries of the
human spirit.

Origins of the Stockholm Conference

Although the Stockholm conference is
the child of the Helsinki process, it has
even more remote ancestors. When
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in 1954
called for an all-European security trea-
ty, he was giving expression to a key ob-
jective of Soviet policy, then and now: a
security arrangement for Europe which
would ratify postwar borders and, if
possible, isolate the United States from
European security affairs. With Western

Europe thus isolated, the Soviet Union
would be left in the position of supreme
arbiter on the continent.

What the diplomacy of the Soviet
Union and its allies eventually settled
for was the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. But the con-
ference was far from what the East had
originally envisaged. In fact, it was
much closer to Western concepts.

Before the negotiations which led to
the Helsinki Final Act could even begin,
some longstanding issues dividing
Europe had to be resolved or accom-
modated. An example was the signing of
the 1972 Quadripartite Agreement on
Berlin. And although Soviet accommoda-
tions to Western interests were probably
regarded as tactical concessions
necessary for a longer range strategy,
the agreements which preceded or came
from the Helsinki meeting created
political dynamics which significantly
altered the role of the CSCE as conceiv-
ed by Moscow.

The Helsinki conference and the
process that flowed from it, in fact,
came to support a grand strategy pur-
sued by the United States and its allies
which, in the broadest terms, sought to
ameliorate the harsher results of the
division of Europe; far more than a
European security conference in the
Eastern sense, it also encompassed
human rights, human contacts, economic
issues, and cultural and educational ex-
changes. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975
accepted the Western concept that
security embodies political, social, and
economic concerns as well as strictly
military concerns. The CSCE gave a
particular impetus to the promotion of
human rights, and it remains today a
major forum for pursuing enhancement
of fundamental principles of Western
democracies.

Furthermore by including both the
United States and Canada as full part-
ners in the process, the Helsinki Final
Act reaffirmed the necessity for perma-
nent American involvement in European
security matters.

Shortfalls and Shared Interests

Far from fulfilling a Soviet conception,
the Stockholm conference, mandated in
the Madrid CSCE review meeting in
September 1983, emerged from a
French idea for a multistage "Con-
ference on Disarmament in Europe,"
which looked to a high-level forum on

ARMS CONTROL

security and disarmanent issues, linked
to the CSCE process. The French called
for a first stage devoted to making
significant improvements in those provi-
sions of the Helsinki Final Act which
called for notification and observation of
military maneuvers. A second stage
would discuss broad disarmament issues.
The Helsinki process has shown that
the West can pursue and achieve some
limited objectives in negotiations with
the East. Thus there already has been
experience with the kinds of cooperative
security arrangements (which are re-
ferred to as confidence- and security-
building measures) which the West seeks
to enact in Stockholm. Those measures

agreed in the Helsinki Final Act are
modest in scope; they need to be ex-
panded in Stockholm. Implementation of
them has been imperfect; implementa-
tion needs to be strengthened in
Stockholm. Nevertheless, experience
with them and their implementation up
to now has been instructive. It is possi-
ble even now to see how cooperation in
security affairs can work, as well as how
this cooperation needs to be improved.
The central features of the Helsinki
security provisions were a measure call-
ing for prenotification 21 days in ad-
vance of certain military maneuvers in-
volving more than 2.5,000 troops and a
measure calling for invitation of

Head of U.S. CDE Delegation

James E. Goodby was born December 29,
1929, in Providence, Rhode Island. He
graduated from Harvard in 1951 and at-
tended graduate school at the University of
Michigan. He served in the U.S. Air Force
(1952-53) and then continued graduate
studies at Harvard.

Ambassador Goodby entered the Foreign
Service in 1952 and transferred to the
Atomic Energy Commission in 1954. While
there he took part in several international
negotiations relating to nuclear arms control
and cooperation in the civil uses of nuclear
energy.

In 1960 he moved to the office of the
special assistant to the Secretary of State for
atomic energy, specializing in nuclear arms
control matters. With the creation of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), he became officer in charge of the
nuclear test ban negotiations. Those negotia-
tions resulted in the first major arms control
treaty since World War II.

Following service as a member of the
State Department's Policy Planning Staff, he
was assigned in 1967 to the U.S. Mission to
the European Communities in Brussels,
where his major concern was the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty, under negotiation at that
time, and U.S. relations with EURATOM, the
atomic energy component of the European
Communities.

From 1969 to 1971, Ambassador Goodby
was officer in charge of defense policy affairs
at the State Department's office for NATO
affairs. He then served for 3 years as
Coun.selor of Political Affairs at the U.S. Mis-
sion to NATO in Brussels. In that role he
negotiated common positions with the allies,
including those involving the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
mutual and balanced force reduction.s
(MBFR). and the 1974 Ottawa declaration of
Atlantic relations. From 1974 to 1977, he
was Deputy Director of the Bureau of
Politico-Militaiy Affairs, with responsibilities
for the strategic arms limitation talks
(SALT), other arms control negotiations, and
various defense policy issues.

He was appointed Deputy Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs in 1977,
handling U.S. relations with the countries of
northern and central Europe and European
regional political and security affairs, in
which capacity he was responsible for the
followup to the Helsinki accords (the CSCE).
In 1980-81 he served as U.S. Ambassador to
Finland.

In 1982-83 he was deputy chairman of
the U.S. delegation to the strategic arms
reduction talks (START) in Geneva. Am-
bassador Goodby has been head of the U.S.
delegation to the Conference on Confidence-
and Security-Building Measures and Disarma-
ment in Europe (CDE) since September
1983. ■

observers to those maneuvers. There
was also a measure calling for notific
tion of some smaller-scale exercises ii
volving fewer than 25,000 troops. Th'
zone of application extended only 250
kilometers into the Western part of t ,
Soviet Union.

In the 8V2 years since adoption ol
the Final Act, there have been nearly
100 notifications of military activities
Europe involving well over 2 million
men. Although the system has workt
well on the whole, notable exceptions
ist, and precisely in the case of the
largest military maneuver conducted
a CSCE state since 1975 — the
U.S.S.R.'s Zapad 81, which took plac
1981 in the Soviet Union near the Pc
border and which was not properly
notified.

In accordance with the Helsinki
agreements, observers have been inv
to approximately 50 exercises. The V
has extended more than 30 invitatioi
the United States alone has invited \
saw Pact observers to 10 exercises. '
Eastern record is less impressive. Tl
Warsaw Pact has announced more tl
20 maneuvers but has invited Weste'
observers to less than half of these,
among the Western observers, Amei
observers have been invited to Wars
Pact maneuvers only twice and not i
since 1979.

In the area of smaller-scale exer
cises, the West has notified 29
maneuvers. The Warsaw Pact has
notified four.

On the basis of this record, clear
the .35 CSCE participants have not i
met the aspirations of the Final Act
particular, they have not succeeded
dealing with the problem of
misunderstanding or miscalculation
cerning military activities where, in
words of the Final Act, "... par-
ticipating States lack clear and time
formation about the nature of such ;
tivities." In spite of partial implemei
tion of the Helsinki agreement,
therefore, significant uncertainties s
exist among the participating states
about the military activities taking \
in Europe and about the intentions
which lie behind them. Such uncerta
ties can be destabilizing, and this cir
cumstance points the way to an inte
which East, West, and neutrals shot
hold in common.

m,
us

: ^>i _ i ^

.. :tAi

ARMS CONTROL

Co Western Proposals

January 24, 1984, the 16 members of
' Atlantic alliance tabled a formal six-
nt proposal, the first of the
ickholm conference, the thrust of
ich was to make the military environ-
nt in Europe more understandable,
'dictable, and stable. That the 16
re able to table a comprehensive
ument at the outset of the con-
ence is indicative of the unity and
iousness of purpose with which the
ance has approached this negotiation.

In brief the six Western measures

Measure 1, the exchange of
litary information, which provides

t, on a yearly basis, participants will
orm each other about the structure of
'ir ground and air forces in all of
rope, giving unit designation, normal
idquarters location, and composition
the forces.

Measure 2, exchange of forecasts
activities notifiable in advance, calls

an exchange of forecasts, again on a
irly basis, of military activities. The
ecasts would furnish the name of the

rcises, the countries participating,

size and type offerees involved, and

place and time it would occur. The
ecasts would also list the purpose of

exercise.

Measure 3, notification of military
;ivities, calls for notification, 45 days
advance, of activities involving field
ining of units at division level or
Dve and notification of certain
bilization and amphibious exercises.

Measure 4, observation of certain
litary activities, requires states to in-
e observers from all other states to all
;notified activities and to certain alert
ivities.

Measure 5, compliance and
rification, has two parts. States
ree not to interfere with the "national
hnical means"' of other states;
•ondly, participating states may send
servers, on a limited basis, to observe
;ivities which seem not to be in com-
ance with negotiated agreements.

Measure 6, development of means
communication, asks that the par-
ipating states develop better means
d procedures for urgent communica-
ns.

These measures are mutually rein-
cing. Their objective is to reduce ten-
ms, to promote common understand-

among all participants, and to
ninish the danger of armed conflict
ising from misunderstanding or
scalculation. They focus on preventing
lequence of events which has all too

often led to war on the Continent of
Europe: the incident, military move-
ment, or political event which is
misunderstood, with misunderstanding
leading to suspicion, reaction, escalation,
and perhaps confrontation and conflict.

. . . And How They Work

The six points of the Western proposal
can be implemented easily with a
minimum of intrusion into or alteration
of normal, nonthreatening military ac-
tivity. The process would work some-
thing like this.

A context of basic information is
established through measure 1, near the
end of each year. Much of the informa-
tion which would be exchanged is
already available to the CSCE states
through other means. At the same time,
under measure 2, a state would advise
the other participants of its planned
military activities during the next calen-
dar year. Incidentally, because modern
training and rotational activities are
complex and are planned a year or more
in advance, military forces routinely
develop this kind of information.

Measure 3, on prenotification, then
provides more detail and also a cross-
check on the forecast. If a state should
notify under measure 3 an activity not
previously forecast, other countries
could demand an explanation of the ap-
parent anomaly. A nation with ag-
gressive intent would be raising an
alarm against itself if it announced an
exercise which it had not forecast, and,
of course, this alarm would sound even
louder if a country failed either to
forecast or to notify 45 days in advance
of the event. The measures are thus self-
enforcing.

The observers called for in measure
4 serve to verify that activities are as
they have been advertised. But there
may be occasions where one state sees,
or thinks it sees, an activity that has not
been notified but should have been. In
such a case, under measure 5, suspicions
can be alleviated or confirmed by asking
for verification, either by direct observa-
tion, if necessary, or by some other ap-
propriate means. The communications
network of measure 6 could be utilized
to seek further information on a poten-
tially destabilizing event.

These measures would not, in
themselves, prevent war. They could not
absolutely prevent one state from using
force for political intimidation. But they
could make unwanted confrontation less
likely, and they could raise the political
cost of using force to intimidate. By
establishing a pattern of routine ac-

tivities, anomalies would stand out clear-
ly. Governments would know with
reasonable certainty what was supposed
to happen. If a departure from the
routine pattern occurred, they would
have some time to clarify the situation
before political tensions escalated or in
time to take counteraction against a real
threat. The result, over time, should be
an increase in confidence and stability
among the participating countries.
The six points of the Western
package are, as required by the mandate
for the Stockholm conference, militarily
significant, politically binding, verifiable,
and applicable to the whole of Europe.
The Helsinki measures were less mean-
ingful in military terms. They applied
only to part of Europe, most of the
European Soviet Union being excluded.
Exercises to be notified were larger.
The notification period was only 21
days, as opposed to 45. There was no
exchange of information to establish a
base of knowledge. There was no annual
forecast. And the Helsinki measures
were largely voluntary. The measures
proposed by the West in Stockholm are
meant to be mandatory.

Hoary Ideas

All 35 states, to one degree or another,
have supported an expansion of the
measures of the Helsinki Final Act. But,
of course, differences exist. The Soviet
Union chose for Stockholm a collection
of rather hoary ideas, which are hardly
the grist for a serious security negotia-
tion. This incongi'uous approach, draw-
ing on a stock of old proposals, would be
compatible with the thesis that Moscow
has still not fully assessed the potential
of the Stockholm conference.

At the outset, however, Soviet
behavior in Stockholm has been consist-
ent with at least one of the goals they
have pursued throughout the Helsinki
process: the Soviet Union has tried to
use the conference for image-building,
attempting to portray Moscow as the
defender of peace and the United States
and some of its allies as aggressive,
militaristic adventurers. The Soviet
Union has also sought to find and ex-
ploit differences between the United
States and Europe. This self-serving ap-
proach has not caught on either among
other delegations or with the European
or American publics, but it has
prevented the conference from getting
quickly down to business.

The Soviet Union has raised two ob-
jectives to the Western proposals. It
claims that they amount to "legalized es-
pionage" and that they are technical and

ARMS CONTROL

too trivial to affect the security situa-
tions that exists today in Europe.

While it is true that the Soviet
Union is a closed society in which
routine information is much harder to
obtain than in the West, it is not true
that the Western measures seek to ex-
pose important secrets of the Soviet
military establishment. The information
exchange and forecast measures ask for
facts which frequently are already
available in the public domain. The
notification measure involves only field
exercises, not other sensitive areas. Nor
would observers prowl at will all over
Soviet or any other territory. They
would visit the area where field training
exercises were taking place. Even the
most superficial examination of the
Western measures deflates the conten-
tion that they aim at any kind of es-
pionage.

The second Soviet charge is that the
Western proposals involve trivial
technical matters which would do little
or nothing to enhance security in
Europe. For its part, the Warsaw Pact
has offered six alternative proposals:
agreements on the non-use of force, the
non-first-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear
weapons-free zones, reduction of
military budgets, a chemical weapons
ban in Europe, and expansion of the
confidence-building measures of the
Helsinki accords.

Many of these ideas have been
around for a long time, some for a
quarter of a century or more, and they
have failed in all that time to gain con-
sensus among the states now par-
ticipating in the Stockholm conference.
Furthermore, the chemical weapons ban
is currently being negotiated in Geneva.
The United Nations annually tries to
carry on a study of military budgets,
where the Soviets and their allies have
been entirely uncooperative.

The non-use of force proposal, usual-
ly combined with a proposal not to be
the first to use nuclear weapons, has
emerged as the flagship of the Warsaw
Pact's entries. The Western countries
have never questioned the principle of
non-use of force; we all subscribe to it in
the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act,
and, most recently, in the concluding
document of the Madrid CSCE review
meeting last year. The point that we
have made in Stockholm is that the prin-
ciple must now be given effect and ex-
pression through an agreement on prac-
tical measures which will affect the
everyday behavior of the 35 par-
ticipating countries and their military
establishments. In order to make clear
the American view on this issue, Presi-

dent Reagan, in a major policy state-
ment on June 4, announced explicitly
that "if discussions on reaffirming the
principle not to use force, a principle in
which we believe so deeply, will bring
the Soviet Union to negotiate
agreements which will give concrete,
new meaning to that principle, we will
gladly enter into such discussions."

In expressing Western willingness to
meet the Soviet concerns and to explore
every reasonable avenue for progress to
serious negotiations, the President clear-
ly and specifically identified the context
in which the non-use of force principle
must be approached. "Mere restatement
of a principle all nations have agreed to
in the UN charter and elsewhere," he
said, "would be an inadequate conclusion
to a conference whose mandate calls for
much more. We must translate the idea
into actions which build effective bar-
riers against the use of force in
Europe." The United States is prepared
to discuss reaffirmation of the principle
of non-use of force; the discussion must
be in the context of negotiations on
measures that will have a real impact on
military activities in Europe.

Proposals made in the Stockholm
conference by the Soviet Union, in fact,
recognize such a context. The Soviet
Union, supported by other Warsaw
treaty organization countries, has pro-
posed an expansion of the Helsinki
confidence-building measures in ways
that could prove to be similar in kind to
proposals offered by NATO countries
and by the neutral and nonaligned coun-
tries in the conference. These proposals
remain on the periphery of the Eastern
presentations; the West hopes they will
move closer to the center of understand-
ing shared by nearly all the other par-
ticipants in the conference. In keeping
with President Reagan's June 4 initia-
tive, the West is seeking to encourage
the East to recognize the possibilities for
progress and move to join the devel-
oping consensus.

A Time for Choice

Some observers, especially in the East,
like to characterize the current interna-
tional situation as a time of deep crisis
between East and West, a time of ten-
sion so great that normal discourse be-
tween East and West is all but impossi-
ble. The necessity for choice remains,
however, no matter how one
characterizes the current European
scene, reacts to it, or allocates the credit
for it. The 35 nations of the Stockholm
conference are beginning the process of

deciding, incrementally, what to makt
this new forum. This includes the Sov
Union, of course, and the evidence suj
gests that Moscow, even though its
grand strategy and ultimate objective
remain unchanged, is now far from a
tain how it should proceed with its
original idea of a European security
conference under present-day cir-
cumstances.

For the Atlantic alliance, the proc
of inventing and agreeing on the six
confidence- and security-building
measures tabled by the alliance on
January 24 required an effort which
testifies to the alliance's intentions in
Stockholm. The neutral or nonalignec
group of nations also accepts the proj
osition that the Stockholm conference
can be a path to genuine improvemen
in security. Thus the majority of par-
ticipants already agree that the potei
of Stockholm should be seriously ex-
plored.

The Soviet Union now faces a chi
of whether to exaggerate differences
its relations with the West or to try,
Stockholm, the path of greater coope
tion, looking not for unilateral gain b
for mutual advantage. Relations be-
tween the United States and the Sov
Union are not destined to be trouble-
free. There will always be competitiv
elements in relations between system
with such different social, political, a
economic values. But limited coopera ')
is possible in security affairs as in oti *
areas.

If the Soviet Union decides that i
interests lie in following a cooperativ
rather than an adversarial course, th
Stockholm conference can make a st;
toward improving the stability of the
current system of international secui
In so doing, it can lay the foundation
confidence and experience essential 1
more ambitious and complex negotia
tions in the future.

In itself, the Stockholm conferen
can be a forum of cooperative action
fering an opportunity to restart the
ternational dialogue and improve the
climate of relations among states. W
is needed now is a commitment from
35 participating states, including the
Soviet Union, to seize that opportuni

'National technical means (NTM) reft
assets which are under national control fi
monitoring compliance with the provision
an agreement. NTM includes photograph
reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based
systems (such as radar and optical systen
as well as sea- and ground-based systems
(such as radars and antenna for collectinf
telemetry). ■

fit:

r\an^rtmar,t nf Qt=itQ Pull ll«k.

\ST ASIA

.S. Activities on POW-MIA Issue

Paul D. Wolfowitz

Statement before the Subcommittee
\.sian and Pacific Affairs of the
'^e Foreicpi Affairs Committee on
'ust 8. 198Jf. Mr. Wolfowitz is As-
mt Secretary for East Asian and
if ic Affairs.^

ank you for the opportunity to ap-
' before this committee and the
V-MIA Task Force to discuss U.S.
ernment efforts to obtain the fullest
ible accounting for Americans still
ing in Southeast Asia as a result of
Indochina war.

ninistration Commitment

e I last spoke before this committee,
;ident Reagan has reemphasized his
ional concern about this issue on
lerous occasions and reaffirmed his
ninistration's commitment to make
jress in resolving the POW-MIA
;tion.

In his May 28 remarks at the
norial Day ceremony honoring the
:nown Soldier of the Vietnam war,
President said, "We write no last
Dters. We close no books. We put
,y no final memories. An end to
erica's involvement in Vietnam can-
come before we've achieved the
;st possible accounting of those miss-
in action." And in his remarks at the
te House on the occasion of National
V-MIA Recognition Day [July 20,
4], the President told the families of
;e still missing in Indochina. "I'm
dful that you gave your sons and
Dands and fathers into the care of
government when they left to fight
our nation. You knew they might die
attle. But you had, and will always
3, every right to expect that your
ernment will not abandon those who
!d to return."

Despite our many actions to resolve
issue, the ultimate key to resolution
his tragedy must necessarily be a
sion to cooperate by the Govern-
its of Vietnam and Laos. It is only
I their cooperation that real progress
be made. We are pressing those
ernments for full cooperation as a
,ter of highest national priority, and
will continue to do so as long as
ssary to achieve the fullest possible
Dunting for those missing from the
flict in Indochina.

Slow Progress From Vietnam

Progress with Vietnam on resolving this
issue has been disappointingly slow, but
developments in recent weeks offer
room for some hope.

Hanoi returned the remains of nine
persons following the last POW-MIA
technical meeting in Hanoi in June 1983.
Then, as you recall, despite their agree-
ment to treat the POW-MIA issue as a
humanitarian one, separate from other
issues, the Vietnamese suspended our
regular quarterly technical meetings.
They cited what they characterized as
"hostile" American statements as the
reason.

Shortly thereafter, discussions began
which resulted in Vietnam's agreement
to receive the highest level executive
branch delegation to visit Vietnam since
the end of the war. This delegation,
which was led by Assistant Secretary of
Defense Armitage, included a member
of the National Security Council staff,
the executive director of the National
League of Families, and two Depart-
ment of State officials.

As a result of these February 1984
discussions in Hanoi, both sides agreed
that cooperation in resolving the
POW-MIA problem would be pursued as
a separate humanitarian issue, not
linked to other matters which divide our
two countries. Our delegation impressed
on the Vietnamese the U.S. Govern-
ment's desire to move beyond the unac-
ceptably low level of past cooperation
and, instead, to work together seriously
to remove what is the primary bilateral
obstacle to improvement of the at-
mosphere between the two countries.
The Vietnamese stated their intention to
accelerate efforts to resolve the
POW-MIA issue and to concentrate ini-
tially on the cases involving the more ac-
cessible sites. The Vietnamese offered to
resume regularly scheduled technical
meetings in the near future. During the
same discussions, they agreed to turn
over five sets of remains and indicated a
willingness to turn over three others
that had been previously promised to a
private group of Americans.

The Vietnamese have fulfilled two of
their promises since the February
discussions. On July 17 they handed
over the remains of eight persons to an
American military team. We welcome
the return of these remains, but we
must recognize that the pace is painfully

slow. One thousand eight hundred twen-
ty-six Americans are still missing in
Vietnam alone; government-to-
government negotiations have thus far
resulted in only 95 remains repatriated
by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and
subsequently identified as Americans.
(The Chinese turned over two additional
remains and the Lao one which have
been identified as Americans and were
the result of negotiated efforts.)

On resumption of technical
meetings, Hanoi first agreed to, and
then abruptly cancelled, a mid-April ses-
sion. They expressed an unwillingness to
schedule another technical meeting until
just a few weeks ago. They again
claimed that a "hostile" American at-
titude was the reason for this delay. We
are pleased to report, however, that the
first in a resumed series of technical
meetings has now been set for next
week.

We hope the Vietnamese will fulfill
all of the commitments they made dur-
ing the visit of the Armitage delegation,
including their longstanding agreement
that resolution of the POW-MIA issue is
a humanitarian matter to be dealt with
separately from other issues dividing
Vietnam and the United States. We
have told the Vietnamese that we are
prepared to recognize publicly any
significant steps they take toward
resolution of this issue, as the President
did in his July 20 statement.

At the same time, we will continue
to speak out frankly about this issue and
to express fully justified concern about
the inadequate pace of cooperation.
Secretary of State Shultz underlined the
importance of the POW-MIA issue and
its relevance for our relations with Viet-
nam, when he said to the ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Na-
tions] meeting in Jakarta: "The United
States has both a legal and moral
responsibility to obtain the fullest possi-
ble accounting of almost 2,500 of our
men still missing. The American people
rightfully expect no less. We deeply ap-
preciate the support you have given us
with Vietnam on this problem. It is a
problem which demands meaningful
cooperation and progress before the
American people will permit discussion
of normalization with the Vietnamese,
even in the context of a Kampuchea set-
tlement."

We believe that we have the support
of the Congress and American people in
urging Vietnam to honor its pledge to
resolve this issue. As the President
stated on Memorial Day, "Today, a
united people call upon Hanoi with one

9>;

EAST ASIA

voice: Heal the sorest wound of this con-
flict. Return our sons to America. End
the grief of those who are innocent and
undeserving of any retribution."

Signs of Progress With Laos

Following the President's statement to
the League of Families in January 1983
that we are prepared to improve rela-
tions between Laos and the United
States, with progress on the POW-MIA
issue as the principal measure of Lao
sincerity, we have closely pursued the
POW-MIA issue with the Lao Govern-
ment and can report modest progress.

In October 1983, I met with the Lao
Foreign Minister during the UN General
Assembly to stress our interest in the
POW-MIA issue. I reaffirmed that the
United States would cooperate in our
mutual effort to improve bilateral rela-
tions and informed him that we would
henceforth vote in favor of loans for
Laos by multilateral lending institutions
which otherwise meet our criteria.
Shortly thereafter Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State John Monjo and Na-
tional Security Council staff member
Richard Childress met with a Lao Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs and other
officials in Vientiane to propose joint
Lao-American searches of crash sites of
American aircraft downed during the
war.

In December 1983, at the invitation
of the Lao Government, a team of U.S.
POW-MIA experts conducted a
preliminary survey of the crash site of
an American aircraft downed during the
war near Pakse, Laos. In January we
proposed to the Lao a joint excavation
of that site to search for remains. Ex-
cavation of the crash site will not be
possible until the dry season at the end
of this year, but we and the Lao have
been discussing details of this joint
operation. Last month, as the President
announced in his July 20 address to the
League of Families, the Lao Govern-
ment agreed in principle to the excava-
tion.

I am encouraged by this sign of
progress and cooperation from the Lao
and hope that we can soon reach agree-
ment on the specific details of the ex-
cavation. We look forward to the pros-
pect of excavating other crash sites in
Laos.

As I noted earlier, we and the Lao
Government have agreed that each of us
will try to take concrete steps to im-
prove relations. Although there is no
direct link between what we do and
what they do, an honest effort by both

sides will further the POW-MIA ac-
counting process. I should mention in
this regard that we have recently taken
the opportunity to demonstrate our
desire for better relations with Laos by
responding to an emergency food short-
age caused by irregular monsoon rains.
The United States has joined other na-
tions—particularly Sweden, Japan, and
Australia — in providing Laos with
emergency food aid. Laos accepted our
offer of some 5,000 tons of California
glutinous rice under the PL 480 (Food
for Peace) Title II program. We are
working with the World Food Program
to arrange distribution of this rice to
those areas most severely affected.

The foreign assistance legislation
now, of course, prohibits development
assistance to Laos. We have told Lao of-
ficials that action to lift this congres-
sional ban would be possible only after a
pattern of sustained cooperation has
been established toward resolving the
fate of Americans missing in Laos from
the war in Indochina. If future progress
develops into a pattern of sustained
cooperation, we would consult with
Members of Congress on the question of
lifting the ban.

Kampuchea

Our policy of firm support for the ap-
proach of ASEAN to the Kampuchean
problem is well known and was recently
reaffirmed by Secretary of State Shultz
in his meeting with the Foreigji
Ministers of the six ASEAN countries in
Jakarta.

The Heng Samrin regime, which was
installed in Phnom Penh by the Viet-
namese, joined the Foreign Ministers of
Vietnam and Laos last January in a
communique which stated that the three
countries would share POW-MIA infor-
mation. They indicated a readiness to
cooperate with the United States on the
POW-MIA issue due to the increased in-
terest of the American people, if we
would "change our attitude." A senior
Heng Samrin regime official made a
similar offer to cooperate with the
United States in a meeting with a
delegation from a private American
relief organization.

The Heng Samrin regime does not
have control over the entire country,
and there is reason to question whether
it could carry out the kind of careful in-
vestigation required to account for miss-
ing Americans. Any available informa-
tion on Americans missing in Kam-
puchea would almost certainly be known
to the Vietnamese,, who exercise de facto
control there as they did in many areas

of Kampuchea during the Vietnam wa;
If Hanoi does have such information, c
finds it in the future, we will look to
them to cooperate with us in the same
way that they are pledged to do in the
case of Americans missing in Vietnam
At the same time, we have asked an ii
ternational humanitarian organization
(which has asked not to be identified) ■
contact the Phnom Penh authorities tc
transmit to us any information they n-
be willing to provide on Americans mi
ing in Kampuchea. So far no such infc
mation has been forthcoming.

Efforts With Other Governments

We actively seek the cooperation of
other governments in making known i
the Vietnamese and Lao Governments
our concern about the POW-MIA issi
In June of last year Secretary Shultz
raised the POW-MIA issue with the f
Foreign Ministers of ASEAN in
Bangkok. They said they would do wl
they could to help, and several useful
contacts were made as a result. Our
allies and a number of other countries
both Europe and Asia are sympatheti
and constructive concerning this
humanitarian issue. Such approaches
bring home to the two governments t
importance attached to this problem 1
international opinion and make clear
that the POW-MIA issue can have ar
effect on broader Vietnamese and La
foreign policy interests.

During the past year we made an
across-the-board effort to advise all
friendly countries with missions in H;
of our interest in the POW-MIA issu

I wish I could express publicly oi;
appreciation for the efforts of all the
countries that have helped, but their
preference — and the need to give qui
diplomacy a chance to work — require^ ik
that I not do so.

American allies have cooperated
with our efforts to contact Indochine
refugees resettled in their countries
information about POW-MIAs. Our ■
forts have also been directed toward
refugees resettled in other countries
who have been reported to have rele
information.

Southeast Asian governments ha
expressed understanding of and sym
pathy for our POW-MIA efforts and
have assisted our attempts to screen
refugees from Indochina for POW-^
information. The Royal Thai and Hoi
Kong Governments have been most
helpful in granting special access for
American POW-MIA specialists to e
camps housing refugees from Vietna
Laos, and Kampuchea which are nor

Deoartment of State Bull li

EAST ASIA

j *» losed to outsiders. The refugee
""■( lening program, however, requires

"( stant monitoring because of changing
'^'\ iitions, among them changing volun-

1 ' agencies and host-country officials.
I'^-' i year my Department and the
I*' I lartment of Defense again reviewed

I programs to ensure, as much as
ible, that refugees know of our in-
st.

^ragency Effort

Department of State chairs the in-
igency POW-MIA group and par-
lates fully in the planning of U.S. ac-
is aimed at making progress on the
MIA issue. We have taken the
iS in efforts to improve our overall
.tions with Laos, in developing a
.tegy to deal with the Vietnamese on
issue, and in approaches to other
ernments.

The POW-MIA policy is formulated
participating interagency members:
Department of State, the Depart-
it of Defense, including the Joint
efs of Staff and the Defense In-
gence Agency, the National Security
moil, and the Executive Director of
League of Families, whose long ex-
ience on this issue and depth of
■wledge of family concerns has been
iluable. Staff members of the House
Senate also participate in the in-
igency group.

We strongly encourage support from
'ate Americans for our POW-MIA
)rts. Public support is the backbone
Iiur policy. At the same time, we
rher support nor condone forays by
J 'ate Americans in search of remains
prisoners. Such actions jeopardize the
I ernment-to-government efforts which
I the only viable channel for resolution
I .he POW-MIA issue. In addition, it
I been our experience that they often
rate on fabricated or faulty informa-
1 and thus only add to the misunder-
ndings and misperceptions involved in
; issue.

Making progress on the POW-MIA
le clearly requires a long-term effort.
3 U.S. Government, supported by the
lerican people, can be successful in
•suading Hanoi to cooperate on the
W-MIA issue. We believe that we
'e such support and join with the
jsident in saying that, "Today, a
ted people call on Hanoi with one
ce."

Continuation of MFN Status for China

'The complete transcript of the hearings
be published by the committee and will
ivailable from the Superintendent of
uments, U.S. Government Printing Of-
, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

by William A. Brown

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Trade of the Senate
Finance Committee on August 8, 198J,.
Mr. Brown is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs. '

I welcome this opportunity to testify
before this subcommittee as part of an
Administrative panel concerning the ex-
tension of the President's general waiver
authority under Section 402(c) of the
Trade Act and the continuation of the
specific waivers permitting most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment for
China, Hungary, and Romania. My
testimony will address the waiver for
China.

Development of strong, stable, and
enduring relations with China has been a
foreign policy objective of four con-
secutive Administrations. President
Reagan has reiterated that "such a rela-
tionship is vital to our long-term na-
tional security interests and contributes
to stability in East Asia. Economic
development has become China's top
priority, and China has opened the door
to foreign trade and investment. Accord-
ingly, our bilateral economic relationship
has moved to the forefront of our
developing ties with China. As this rela-
tionship has grown, disagreements have
naturally arisen in some areas. We can
expect that other problems will come up
in a trading relationship which is
dynamic and which involves two very
different trade and legal systems.
Nevertheless, we believe the prospects
are good for further growth of our
economic ties.

Trade and Investment

Bilateral trade has increased dramatical-
ly in recent years. Overall, China ranks
22d among our world trading partners,
while we are China's third largest
trading partner, after Japan and Hong
Kong. Last year, two-way trade totaled
$4.4 billion, a four-fold increase over
1978 but 20% less than 1981's $5.5
billion. In most years, the United States
has maintained a trade surplus. Sales of
U.S. agricultural products declined last
year, and we are concerned about the
slow pace of Chinese grain purchases
under the U.S. -China grain agreement
so far this year. At the same time.

however, the volume of high-technology
manufactured products exported to
China has grown steadily, reflecting
China's development needs and our own
liberalized export guidelines. Last year,
the dollar value of export licenses ap-
proved for high-technology shipments to
China was about $1 billion and will prob-
ably exceed $L5 billion in 1984.

American business has not hesitated
to take advantage of the opportunities
for investment in China. The United
States stands as China's number one
source of foreign investment in equity
joint ventures and commitments to ex-
plore for offshore oil and gas. Twenty
U.S. firms account for 25% of China's
total direct foreign investment ($85
million out of $340 million). Twelve U.S.
oil companies have made commitments
to spend $500-600 million in exploring
for oil off China's coast. U.S. firms are
also expected to participate in a major
coal mining project in China's Shanxi
Province, which could involve U.S.
equipment exports amounting to over
$300 million. The prospects are excellent
that investment and trade opportunities
for U.S. firms will continue to expand as
China seeks foreign help in modernizing
existing industries and in developing
new ones, in fields such as telecom-
munications, electronics, instrumenta-
tion, and electrical power generation.

The opportunities for U.S. trade and
mvestment with China are enhanced by
the series of government-to-government
economic agreements that we have con-
cluded and will conclude with China. .
Agreements on trade, civil aviation,
grain, textiles, and claims and assets,
among others, now form the basis for
the expansion of economic relations.
Work programs under our science and
technology agreement and our industrial
and technological cooperation accord
contribute to China's development and
create opportunities for American
business. During President Reagan's
visit to China in April, a new tax agree-
ment was signed which will promote fur-
ther commercial relationships with
China. We will hold further discussions
on an investment agreement with the
Chinese.

As the economic relationship has
grown, so have official and unofficial ex-
changes which promote longer bilateral
relations. For example, there are 21
U.S. media organizations with offices in
Beijing, nearly 200 U.S. firms with of-
fices in China, more than 80 U.S.

ober 1984

EUROPE

universities that maintain affiliations
with about 120 Chinese schools, and
more than 20 American States and cities
that have sister relationships with their
Chinese counterparts. At the same time,
over 200 Chinese delegations visit the
United States each month, and
American tourists to China numbered
more than 168,000 last year.

Travel and Emigration

China's decision to speed up the pace of
developments by greater reliance on
foreign goods and technology has been
accompanied by some liberalization in
the area of emigration. Travel restric-
tions have been relaxed and simplified
for both immigrants and short-term
travelers. There are currently more than
10,000 Chinese students and scholars in
this country. In addition, last year some
11,000 business visas were issued to
Chinese citizens. At the same time, our
China posts issued nearly 10,000 im-
migrant visas. There are over 60,000
Chinese with approved visa petitions
waiting for their turn to immigrate to
the United States, most of whom have
close family members already living
here.

China's commitment to more liberal
emigration practices is reflected in the
bilateral U.S.-China consular convention,
which has been in effect for 2 years. In
diplomatic notes accompanying the con-
vention, both sides agreed to facilitate
travel for the purpose of family
reunification and also to facilitate travel
between the two countries of persons
with simultaneous claims to the na-
tionality of the United States and of
China.

This is not to say that Chinese
emigration is problem free. China, like
many developing countries, is concerned
about potential brain drain. Current
Chinese regulations restrict foreign
study by Chinese university students un-
til they complete their Chinese education
and work for 2 years. In addition, local
work units may be slow to approve
departure, and officials are sometimes
reluctant to issue passports and exit per-
mits to persons whose emigration might
create gaps in modernization efforts.
There is no evidence, however, of any
policy aimed at inhibiting the emigration
of those with legitimate family ties
abroad, although many encounter
bureaucratic delays in obtaining
passports and exit permits.

The principal obstacle to emigration
from China remains the limited ability or
willingness of other countries to receive
the large numbers of people able and
willing to immigrate. In the case of the
United States, our numerical limitation
on immigrants from each country cannot
keep up with the Chinese demand. For
example, applications for fifth pref-
erence immigration (siblings of U.S.
citizens) stretch back to 1979, implying
at least a 5-year wait for applicants in
this category.

Trade is a fundamental component
of China's modernization effort and an

avenue for China's further integration |
into the community of nations. China's
advancement toward greater modernia
tion and integration is clearly in the
American interest, and MFN treatment
contributes to this. The Administration
strongly believes that the continuation
MFN status for China is vital to our
foreign policy interests. |

'The complete transcript of the hearing
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Bulgaria Relations

by Richard R. Burt

State-ment before the Subcommittee
on European and Middle East Affa irs
and the Task Force on International
Narcotics Control of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on July 24, 1984.
Mr. Burt is Assistant Secretary for
European a,nd Canadian Affairs. ^

I thank you for the opportunity to ap-
pear before you to discuss our policy
toward Bulgaria.

As the most loyal member of the
Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria evidences the
least amount of differentiation from the
Soviet Union in its political, ideological,
and economic policies. For years the
Bulgarian leadership evoked an almost
symbiotic relationship with the Soviet
Union. They seemed to fall over
themselves to defer to the Soviets, to
echo their propaganda, and to support
them in every single issue of interna-
tional importance. Bulgarian devotion to
the Moscow line seemed to go far
beyond their obligation under existing
political realities, surpassing that of
their partners in the Warsaw Pact. One
looked hard for even small signs of
diversity. Under those conditions, there
were few grounds for dialogue. In fact,
during the decade of the 1950s, we did
not even maintain diplomatic relations.

Relations were reestablished in
1960, but little has happened. Our rela-
tions with Bulgaria remain at a low
level. Unlike some of the other countries
in Eastern Europe with which our rela-
tions began to expand in keeping with
our policy of differentiation, we have not
exchanged high-level political visits nor

do we have official bilateral commissioi
on economic and trade development. A
Bulgaria has not fulfilled the require-
ments of the Trade Act of 1974, we do
not extend most-favored-nation (MFN)
tariff treatment to Bulgaria. Nor is
Bulgaria eligible for U.S. Government
trade credits or guarantees.

By the end of the 1970s, Bulgaria
began paying greater attention to
developing its economic and commerci:
ties to Western Europe and the Unitec
States. In order to do so, its leaders a(
cepted a broadened political and cultm
dialogue with us on matters of impor-
tance to us. In this dialogue, we pressi
for improved Bulgarian adherence to t
CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] principles-
greater contacts, reunification of divid
families, and human rights generally.
We pressed the Bulgarians to stop jan
ming our Bulgarian-language Voice of
America broadcasts. We pressed then:
on persistent allegations and reports c
official Bulgarian involvement in the i
legal drug trade and in illegal arms sa
to terrorist groups in the Third World
and the Middle East.

The results of our efforts have bei
on balance, disappointing. In the area
the Helsinki principles and human
rights, they have resolved nearly all o
the longstanding family reunification
cases for which we had been seeking
solutions, in some cases, as much as 1
years. They have also taken steps to
facilitate the operation of our Embass
in Sofia and improve their access to
Bulgarian officials. Last fall, they re-
ceived at the very highest level —

i«

Department of State Bulle

EUROPE

■<;ident Zhivkov — an important
Ration from this House led by Con-
fsiiian Gibbons [Sam M. Gibbons,

•la.l.

:otics Trafficking and Arms Trade

on the very serious issues of
;arian involvement in the illegal nar-
:s and illicit arms trade, our
esentations have produced few
Its. Our drug enforcement coopera-
efforts with Bulgaria have been
ed into propaganda exercises to
onstrate apparent rather than real
eration in eliminating drug traffick-
Tom Bulgaria. Repeated requests by
cey for extradition of known Turkish
otics smugglers have been refused,
rmation passed by our Drug En-
jment Administration (DEA) people
it known narcotics smugglers in
:aria has been largely ignored, and,
!ad, we have been given statistics
it the number of seizures at the
,er. Little has been done to crack
n on those vnthin the country who
; moving drugs and illicit arms in in-
ational trade.

After several years of frustrating
leration that produced few real im-
'ements in drug enforcement, we
lended customs cooperation with
raria in 1981. We reluctantly came
16 conclusion that the relationship
largely fruitless and was being
ised for propaganda purposes.
Last February I visited Bulgaria,
g with two other countries in
tern Europe, to provide that close
of the Soviet Union our position on
s control and, in particular, INF
irmediate-range nuclear forces], in
context of Soviet counter-
oyments in Eastern Europe. I also
i that opportunity to make un-
akably clear our continuing interest
concern over Bulgaria's official deal-
in or toleration of the international
;otics trade, their involvement in the
t arms trade, and over allegations of
ifjort for terrorist groups. I stressed
i: there could be no marked improve-
mt in our relations until these con-
'is could be satisfied. In addition to
itri|), I note that representatives of
i\ also have been in Sofia recently to
ivs the Bulgarians and will be continu-
ijsuch contacts.
I understand that there are recent
Its of improved Bulgarian enforce-
Kit action along their borders, and
I ifieant drug seizures have been an-
iiiifd. I hope these reports are cor-
: . However, there has been insuffi-

Bulgaria— A Profile

People

Noun and adjective: Bulgarian(s). Popula-
tion (Dec. 1980): 8,876,652. Annual growth
rate: 3.6/1,000. Birth rate: 14.3/1,000. Den-
sity: 80/sq. km. (207/sq. nu.). Ethnic groups:
85.3% Bulgarian, 8.5% Turk, 6.2% others
(Gypsies, Greeks, Armenians, and Russians).
Lang^uage: Bulgarian. Religions: Bulgarian
Orthodox; Muslim minority. Education:
Fears compulsory — 8. Attendance —
1,457,848. Literacy— 9h% (est.). Health: In-
fant mortality rate— 20.2/1,000. Life expec-
tancy — men 69 yrs., women 74 yrs. Work
force (3,997,615): Agriculture— 2Z. 2%. In-
dustry and commerce — 42.6%. Government —
1.5%. Other— 32.7%.

Geography

Area: 110,912 sq. km. (44,365 sq. mi.); about
the size of Ohio. Cities: Capital— Sofia (pop.
1,056,945). Other cifes— Plovdiv (350,438),
Varna (291,224), Ruse (172,782), Burgas
(168,412). Terrain: Mountainous. Climate:
Similar to US Midwest (dry, hot summers
and damp, cold winters), but with strong
regional variations.

..-w/'-^

— \-..

MIMANiA [^

ymmAmk

-^4

BULGARIA J

* Sofia ^A

Black Sea

TURIffY

« ^

r~"^

l2_

'V.J \-^

Government

Type: Communist people's republic. Constitu-
tion: May 1971.

Branches: Executive — chief of state
(chairman of State Council), head of govern-
ment (chairman of Council of Ministers).

Legislative — unicameral National Assembly;
Council of State (chairman, 1 first deputy
chairman, 5 deputy chairmen, 1 secretary,
and 21 members). Judicial— Supreme Court,
28 provincial courts, 103 people's courts.

Political parties: Bulgarian Communist
Party, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union.
Suffrage: Universal over 18.

Administrative subdivisions: 27 prov-
inces, 1 city.

Defense: 5.9% of government budget
(est.).

National holiday: September 9.

Flag: White, green, and red horizontal
strif>es with a lion framed by wheat stalks on
white stripe.

Economy

National income (1981): $23.31 billion. An-
nual growth rate: 4%. Per capita income

(1980): $2,625.

Natural resources: Bauxite, copper, lead,
zinc, coal, lignite, lumber.

Agricultural products: Grain, tobacco,
fruits, vegetables, sheep, hogs, poultry,
cheese, sunflower seeds.

Industrial products: Processed agricul-
tural products, machinery, chemicals,
metallurgical products.

Trade (1982): Exports— $n.2 billion (US
share, $25.6 million), /mports— $11.32 billion
(US share, $106.45 million). Major trade
partners— USSR 54%, other CEMA coun-
tries 19%, developing countries 11.4%.

Official exchange rate (April 1982): 0.96
leva = US$1.

Membership in International
Organizations

UN and many of its specialized agencies.
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA), Warsaw Pact.

Taken from the Background Notes of April
1983. published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita
Adams. ■

EUROPE

cient movement on elimination of the
drug rings that operate out of Bulgaria,
moving drugs and guns between the
Middle East and Europe. Those are the
operators that we have to get at. Those
are the connections that must be broken.
We must and will continue to press the
Bulgarians on these concerns. We have
also discussed our concerns with key
West European governments, urging
them to approach the Bulgarians direct-
ly on the subject. We will continue to
work to enlist the support of other
governments.

Assassination Attempt
Against the Pope

With regard to the two resolutions con-
cerning Bulgaria that are currently
before this subcommittee, let me say
that there should be no mistake as to
the gravity with which we view the at-
tempt on the life of Pope John Paul II.
We regard the cowardly attack on the
Pope as one of the most terrible and
despicable of all possible crimes.

As you know, the crime occurred on
Vatican soil, and it is the Italian judicial
system which has the jurisdiction to in-
vestigate the charges. All along, we
have been extremely impressed with the
thorough and dispassionate manner in
which the Italian authorities have pur-
sued their investigation. Their
courageous, painstaking, exhaustive, and
impartial approach has been most
laudatory. We continue to have complete
faith in the integrity of the Italian in-
vestigation. And we have offered the
fullest possible assistance to the Italian
investigation, and we will continue to do
so.

Since the Italian judicial process has
not yet been completed, we must main-
tain both the appearance and the reality
of nonintervention in this case. This is
the position that the Secretary of State
stressed in his testimony on June 13
before the full Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee.

In considering these pieces of
legislation (H.R. 5980 and H. Con. Res.
337), let me assure you that we share
the concerns of members of this subcom-
mittee about the very grave charges of
Bulgarian complicity in the attempted
assassination of the Pope. We support
the conduct of a comprehensive review
of U.S. policy toward Bulgaria to ex-
amine all facets of our relationship. I
would strongly recommend, however,
that the study be delayed until such time
as the Italians have completed their in-

vestigation and the outcome of an even-
tual trial is known. By awaiting those
results, we will not have interfered in
the Italian judicial process. We will also
avoid playing into Soviet and Bulgarian
hands by introducing the appearance of
external pressure that could discredit
the impartiality of the investigation and
an eventual trial.

In conclusion, let me assure you
once again of the seriousness with which
the Department of State regards the

charges and evidence of Bulgarian in-
volvement and toleration of illicit nar
cotics and arms trafficking and suppc
to terrorist groups. We will continue
devote close attention to the concerns
raised by you and members of your c
mittees.

)

'The complete transcript of the hearit
will be publisned by the committee and w
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents. U.S. Government Printing
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Polish Government's
of Political Prisoners

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 3, 1984'

The President has taken note of the
release of political prisoners announced
by the Polish Government on July 21.
He believes that it represents a signifi-
cant move in the direction of national
reconciliation in Poland. Therefore, in
accordance with his step-by-step ap-
proach for dealing with the Polish situa-
tion, he has decided to take two steps.

First, the President has authorized
the lifting of the ban on landing rights
for regularly scheduled flights by the
Polish state airline, LOT, subject to the
regularization of our civil aviation rela-
tionship and the full reestablishment of
scientific exchanges between the United
States and Poland.

Second, the President has indicated
that complete and reasonable implemen-
tation of the amnesty decision will
create a positive atmosphere that would
allow the reactivation of Poland's ap-
plication for membership in the Interna-

Release

tional Monetary Fund (IMF). The Un
States would, of course, consider anj
final application on its merits, includi
Poland's willingness to fulfill the obli
tions of IMF membership.

The purpose of our sanctions, frc
the very beginning, has been to en-
courage movement away from confr(
tation toward reconciliation in Polan
While the United States remains con
cerned with the situation in Poland,
view the Polish Government's amnes
declaration as a potentially positive
development.

The United States is prepared tc
take further positive steps in respon
to further significant movement tow
national reconciliation in Poland. In
meantime, we will be consulting witl
our NATO allies and others on the f
tion in Poland and a Western respoi
to it.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 6, 1984.

Department of State Bui

REIGN ASSISTANCE

►od and Population
anning Assistance

r. Peter McPherson

Uatement before the House Foreign

rs Committee on August 2, 198j.
McPherson is Administrator of the
cy for International Development

:hairman [Dante Fascell], it is a
ure to be here to discuss with your
nittee two areas of vital importance
e developing countries, food and
lation. I would like to express my
eciation to the committee for its
support for foreign assistance, and
k forward to continued cooperation
r your leadership. I would also like
ank Under Secretary Amstutz for a
)Ugh briefing on the 10th ministerial
on of the World Food Council. The
irtment of Agriculture and AID

long had a productive relationship
:ing together on food aid and the
d hunger problem.
_,ast week I returned from Africa
•e I saw the tragic effect of the
ght and social disruption on the

situation. As I have previously
id, the long-term solution rests
arily with the African governments
iselves which must reassess their
omic and agricultural policies. At

needed policy reforms are being in-

ted in many countries giving

lers a fair price for their production

encouraging the private sector to
1 nvolved in providing agricultural in-

, fiiod processing, storage, and

;tt\ng. If the necessary policy
irms are instituted, then, over the

i,>rm Africa will be less likely to be
(ght to its knees by drought. While
(United States bases its support on
:'s [less developed countries] under-
hg longer term solutions, we con-
le to undertake actions to relieve the

•t-term food needs of these popula-

The United States has learned some
Dns from the present African food
ation. We are using these lessons to
ride food assistance more efficiently
iture emergencies. These lessons are
jcted in the recent presidential food
initiative which I will discuss briefly.

Presidential Food Aid Initiative

President announced on July 10 a
or initiative to allow the United
tes to respond more quickly and ef-

fectively to the hungry and malnour-
ished of Africa and the rest of the
world. This initiative includes a five-
point plan to increase effectiveness:

1. Prepositioning of Grain in
Selected Areas. Prepositioning grains in
or near areas especially vulnerable to
acute food shortages will help save lives
by shortening U.S. response time from
the present 3-6 months to as little as 2
weeks. A number of possible sites in
Africa are being investigated.

2. Special $50-Million Presidential
Fund. The creation of this special fund
will provide the President the ability to
accelerate emergency food relief efforts,
saving lives by responding more quickly
to emergency requests for food aid. The
President will shortly propose legislation
to set aside foreign aid resources within
current and planned levels to meet
emergency food aid needs. Replenish-
ment of the fund will be through trans-
fers of unobligated foreign assistance
and PL 480 funds or appropriations.

3. Financing or Payment of
Transportation Costs of Food. Unfor-
tunately, many of the countries most
severely affected by hunger and
malnutrition are unable to or find it very
difficult to finance ocean transportation
costs under the concessional sales pro-
gram or inland transportation and
distribution costs under the grant pro-
gram. Assistance under the current
Food for Peace Title II legislation is
limited to providing only the ocean
freight transportation costs to a re-
cipient's port or border. The President,
therefore, proposes to amend PL 480
Title II to allow, in limited cases, pay-
ment of internal transportation costs as
a way of ensuring that U.S. food aid
reaches the people most in need of our
assistance. We will also consider a
change in policy to finance, on a limited
basis, the ocean freight costs associated
with the concessional sales program
(PL 480 Title I).

This action will increase the flexibili-
ty of the PL 480 Title I and II programs
in helping to meet emergency food situa-
tions.

4. Creation of a Government Task
Force to Better Forecast Food Short-
ages and Needs. The best response to
an emergency food crisis is an early and
smooth delivery of food aid. To meet
this goal, an interagency task force will
be created to bring together all available

information and resources to prepare an
early warning system to forecast possi-
ble famine situations.

5. Establishment of an Advisory
Group of Business Leaders. The
perspective and expertise of U.S.
business leaders represents an untapped
resource in dealing with Third World
food problems. U.S. agricultural exports
to the Third World represent over one-
third of total U.S. agricultural exports.
The Business Advisory Committee of the
Department of State will be expanded to
include a senior-level working group on
Third World food problems.

These five steps respond to the
President's request in December 1983
for a high-level interagency study of the
worldwide hunger situation. This study
group was chaired by Ambassador
Robert Keating, the President's envoy to
Madagascar and the Comoros. We be-
lieve these measures will significantly
improve our ability to respond rapidly
and effectively when emergency food
needs arise.

Population

Before the advent of government
population programs, several factors
combined to create an unprecedented
surge in population. In developing na-
tions, the tremendous expansion of
health services— from simple medication
to elimination of major diseases— saved
millions of lives every year. Emergency
relief, facilitated by modern transport,
helped millions to survive flood, famine,
and drought. The sharing of technology,
agricultural improvements, improve-
ments in educational standards generally
all helped to reduce mortality rates,
especially infant mortality and to
lengthen life spans. The parodox is that
these beneficial and desirable actions
have upset the preexisting equilibrium
and created challenges in some places of
excessive population pressures. Other
necessary actions have not occurred to
restore the equilibrium required between
population growth and economic growth.

Statist government policies have
disrupted economic incentives, awards,
and opportunities for advancement,
especially in agriculture. Natural
disasters have made the provision of
adequate supplies of food even more dif-
ficult.

It is clear that the current exponen-
tial growth of population cannot con-
tinue indefinitely and that there is a
need to reach an equilibrium between
population and economic growth. The
Administration's position is that both
economic and social conditions and

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

access to a broad range of voluntary
family planning services are important
components of fertility declines and sus-
tained economic growth.

The United States has prepared a
policy paper for the International Con-
ference on Population which will begin
In Mexico City on August 6. The policy
paper has two basic thrusts— first, a
strong statement of this Administra-
tion's continued support for voluntary
family planning; and, second, additional
policy guidance to ensure that no U.S.
Government funds support abortion-
related activities.

Rapid population growth compounds
the already serious problems faced by
both public and private sectors in LDCs
in meeting the needs and demands of
their citizens for food, shelter, educa-
tion, and health care. It diverts scarce
economic resources from investments
which will produce rapid economic
progress.

AID attempts, through its programs
and policy dialogues with host govern-
ments, to ensure that family planning
programs and economic development
policies and programs in other sectors
are mutually reinforcing. Under this Ad-
ministration, we have used these com-
plementary approaches to resolving the
problems of the imbalance between
population growth and economic growth.
I believe that this follows very well the
congressional mandate outlined in Sec-
tion 104(d) of the Foreign Assistance
Act, which is based on recognition of the
reciprocal links between fertility and
other aspects of development. We also
believe that the International Con-
ference on Population offers the United
States an opportunity to strengthen the
international consensus on the interrela-
tionships between economic development
and population growth which has
solidified since the World Population
Conference in 1974.

The population problem is not just
numbers and national statistics, and it
dehumanizes the problem to speak only
in broad statistical terms. We must
recognize that population pressures
result from individuals and families who
make life and death decisions. It is
essentially a family crisis. One of the
most poignant consequences of rapid
population growth is its effect on the
health of mothers and children. Especial-
ly in poor countries, the health and
nutrition status of women and children
is linked to family size. Maternal and in-
fant mortality and morbidity rise with
the number of births and with births too
closely spaced. Complications of
pregnancy are more frequent among

women who are very young or near the
end of their reproductive years. In
societies with widespread malnutrition
and inadequate health conditions, these
problems are reinforced; numerous and
closely spaced births lead to even
greater malnutrition of mothers and in-
fants. Unfortunately, in many countries
abortion is seen as an answer. But abor-
tion is not family planning; it is family
planning failed. Voluntary family plan-
ning programs provide a humane and
workable alternative to abortion.
Widespread resort to abortion is
evidence of the need for safe and accept-
able methods of family planning.

For all these reasons, the United
States will maintain its strong support
for voluntary family planning programs.
As President Reagan stated in his
message to the Mexico City conference,
where population programs are ". . . truly
voluntary, cognizant of the rights and
responsibilities of individuals and
families, and respectful of religious and
cultural values. . . . such programs can
make an important contribution to
economic and social development, to the
health of mothers and children and to
the stability of the family and of
society." This has been the consistent
thrust of aid's population assistance
while I have been administrator.

The new U.S. policy articulates the
Administration's concern about abortion.
Abortion is not an acceptable method of
family planning, and it must not be part
of our program in any way. The policy
tightens our controls and provides a
more effective means of assuring that
U.S. funds are not used for abortion. It
states that "when dealing with nations
which support abortion with funds not
provideii by the United States Govern-
ment, the United States will contribute
to such nations" only "through
segi'egated accounts which cannot be
used for abortion." Moreover, the United
States will no longer contribute to
separate nongovernmental organizations
which perform or actively promote abor-
tion as a method of family planning in
other nations.

This policy, which has now been
developed as the Administration position
for the conference in Mexico, represents
a tighter policy and is consistent with
the Administration's overall position con-
cerning abortion. I believe that it pro-
vides a more effective means of assuring
that U.S. funds are not used for abor-
tion. We will now ensure that any II. S.
Government funds to nations which sup-
port abortion with other monies will be
given through segregated accounts for
purposes which are allowed under

legislation. As a practical matter, th
has generally been the case; now it '
be universal. And. we will no longer
fund separate nongovernmental org;
nizations which perform or actively
mote abortions in other countries.

Draft recommendations for the
Mexico meeting include one which c
on countries "[t]o take appropriate s
to help women avoid abortions and,
whenever possible, to provide for th
humane treatment and counselling c
women who have had recourse to ill
abortion." We will support this reco
mendation as it is fully consistent w
our policy.

Our policy includes the need for
broader access to family planning ec
tion and services, especially in the c
text of maternal/child health progra
National maternal/child health pro-
grams, however, are only one chanr
for distributing family planning ser\
As the recent "World Development
Report" makes clear, one of the prii
cipal constraints on the practice of 1
ly planning is access to contraceptiv
knowledge and materials. Here the
private sector can plan a critical am
cost-effective role. Thus, we have e:
panded our support for the marketi
contraceptives which can provide fa
planning at low cost through existir
commercial channels. These channe
can reach out beyond cities and tow
remote rural villages not easily serv
by centralized government program
and can provide assistance to famili
who may not have access to service jan
from other sources. Provision of sei
which are acceptable within the cull
and religious context of each counti
critical, and we believe that we hav
enhanced our programs in accordar 'f'
with congressional mandates by in- i;
eluding natural family planning mel
where these are appropriate to the
beliefs of the individuals and nation
which we support.

In summary, we have a policy \
emphasizes the need for voluntary 1
ly planning services, while ensuring
these do not include abortion as a
method of family planning. Our poli
also makes clear the importance of
links between economic developmer
and effective family planning.

We will continue to carry out oi
population assistance programs wit
the cultural, economic, and political
text of the countries we are assistir
and in keeping with our own values

fit

5 1
ist
m
fit

ilFiJ
iSl
Wi

«'a
I;

In J
su
nail
k

'The complete transcript of the heai
will be published by the committee and
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing '
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

NERAL

iirope V. Asia: Is Diplomacy
Zero-Sum Game?

nneth W. Dam

ddress before the American Bar
iation in Chicago on August 6.
Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of

iften said that where you sit in-
■es how you think. For two cen-
, the east coast dominated U.S.
71 policy. Not surprisingly, Europe
t the core of our international rela-
But today some well-known and
ntial thinkers believe that is chang-
'hey say that America is reorient-
self from the Atlantic to the
c, from Europe to Asia. This
mtation, they claim, is exacerbated
growing policy divergence— indeed,
on— between the United States and
pe. In some cases it is not clear
ler these commentators favor such
rientation or simply believe that
tening it will have a salutary effect
iropean thinking.

.awyers bring special skills to world
•s, and the American Bar Associa-

* IS an institution has played an im-
ive role in the development of U.S.
rn policy. Perhaps today, with

u ;rs from Maine to California
!red here in America's heartland,
m cast a critical eye on the "Europe
ia" debate.

Ulleged Shift From
ipe to Asia

IS first consider this notion that
rica is "tilting" toward Asia. Cer-
/ the center of gravity of U.S. trade
s to be shifting westward. Since

more U.S. trade has crossed the
"ic than the Atlantic— and the gap is
ing. In 1983 our two-way trade
5S the Pacific totaled $137 billion.

was some $30 billion more than our
vvay trade across the Atlantic. The

East" is now America's "Near
t."

n addition, the Asian economies
, surged while those of Europe have
ill nated. Growth in Europe over the

decade has averaged about 2% an-
ly. In contrast, the newly in-
rialized countries of Asia have
/n at a 7% annual rate. And their
ufacturing exports have grown at an

annual clip.

These changes in the world have
been paralleled by changes in the United
States. Economic power and in-
fluence—as well as people— have
migrated south and west. U.S. exports
reflect that shift. The latest statistics
(1981) show that California and Texas
are the company's top two exporters of
manufactured goods.

Perceived Divergence
Between U.S. and Europe

This alleged shift from Europe to Asia
has been exacerbated, in the eyes of
some commentators, by a perceived
divergence in security and economic
policies between the United States and
Europe. Whether this divergence is a
cause or a consequence of the alleged
shift in interest from Europe to Asia is
unclear.

On the security front the most
serious problem, in the opinion of these
commentators, is that the United States
bears a disproportionate burden of the
cost of the common defense of Europe.
They note that we spend about 1.7 times
as much of our GNP [gross national
product] on defense as does Western

ministration and our allies strongly op-
posed this measure, but it still came
within 14 votes of passage. A strong
sentiment obviously exists in Congress
that Europe is not carrying its share of
the defense burden.

In the economic field, this decade
has witnessed a major divergence in
U.S. and European economic policies—
and performance. Over the past 10
years, the big difference between the
U.S. and European economies has not
been in growth or inflation but in job
creation. Between 1973 and 1983, 15
million new jobs were created in the
United States. The West Europeans
netted no new jobs in the same period.
The ratio of employment to working-age
population is higher in the United States
(66%) than all of Western Europe except
for Sweden. And the ratio is rising in
the United States and falling in Europe,
as more women participate in the U.S.
labor force.

But why the higher rate of job for-
mation in the United States, whether for
men or women? Part of the answer is
that in America we have dismantled
burdensome regulations and lowered
taxes so that market forces can work. In

... a major foreign policy accomplishment of this
Administration is its success in encouraging the in-
dustrialized democracies— in Europe, Asia, and
North America— to cooperate in developing global,
not parochial, solutions to our common economic
and security problems.

Europe. But this is a complex issue; no
single measure can stand as an adequate
indicator of relative burdensharing. The
point is that more must be done by the
Europeans, as well as ourselves and our
Asian friends, to offset the relentless
Soviet military buildup.

Yet, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia
recently proposed in Congress that
American forces in Europe be frozen
now and reduced in future years if the
European defense effort does not grow
to meet specific target levels. The Ad-

Europe, fragmented markets (particular-
ly in the service sector), a tradition of
government intervention, and immobile,
high-cost labor impede economic growth.
Instead of the tonic of the marketplace,
Europeans have too often chosen the
dulling narcotic of subsidies and pro-
tectionism. Thus, Europe is struggling
to match the vitality of Japan and of
our own silicon valley. As one Euro-
pean statesman recently lamented:
"The Japanese have a strategy. The
Americans have a dream. But where do
we fit in?"

GENERAL

The Questions Raised

The thesis that the United States is
turning away from Europe in favor of
Asia raises some fundamental questions.

First, is such a shift from Europe
to Asia in' fact taking place?

Second, if so, does it have either as
a cause or a consequence increasing
policy differences between the United
States and Europe?

this nation. When George Washington
was inaugurated, Yankee clippers
already were in the port of Canton.
Since 1945 we have fought two wars,
both in Asia. The 7th (or Far East)
Fleet has always been bigger than the
6th (or Mediterranean). Asian issues
have played a role in at least five of the
nine postwar presidential campaigns:
remember 1948 (who lost China?); 1952
(Ike- I will go to Korea); 1960 (Quemoy

the United States is a global power with global
interests. We do not have the luxury of choosing to
care about one region more than another.

Third, in the face of these
developments, how can the industrialized
democracies of Europe, North America,
and Asia continue to meet the common
challenges to their prosperity and peace?

Today, I should like to examine
these questions. My own view is that in-
ternational affairs is not a zero-sum
game. There are, indeed, changes under-
way in both Europe and Asia— and in
U.S. relations with both— but our policy
is balanced, not tilted in one direction or
the other. Yet, Asia is growing in impor-
tance in political, security, and especially
economic terms; but no, our strength-
ened relations with Asia need not
diminish our traditional ties to Europe.
And those ties remain close despite— or,
in some cases, because of— our dif-
ferences and debates. Indeed, a major
foreign policy accomplishment of this
Administration is its success in en-
couraging the industrialized
democracies— in Europe, Asia, and
North America— to cooperate in
developing global, not parochial, solu-
tions to our common economic and
security problems.

The Shift Toward Asia
Reconsidered

Let's look again at the so-called "tilt"
toward Asia. Increased U.S. interest in
the Pacific Basin over the next decade
seems likely to me. But this increased
interest does not mean that Americans
have just "discovered" Asia. Rather, it
merely represents a return to a
historical association.

Let us recall that America has been
involved in Asia from the first days of

and Matsu); 1968 (Romney: I was brain-
washed; Nixon: I have a plan); and 1972
(Kissinger: peace is at hand).

In short, a strong American interest
in Asia has been the norm. What has
been abnormal has been the low level of
public interest in the aftermath of Viet-
nam. This Administration, however, has
given a great deal of emphasis to our
relations with Asia, and we have
achieved results. U.S. -China relations, as
exemplified by the President's recent
visit, have been put on a sound,
businesslike footing. U.S.-Japanese
security relations are better than they
have ever been, and we have succeeded
in further opening up many Japanese
markets for American products and
capital. Finally, our relations with the
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) are so good that during
Secretary Shultz's trip last month to
that region, no television network
bothered to air a single report on his ac-
tivities. As they say, no news is good
news.

The Policy Divergence Reconsidered

Just as America's interest in Asia is not
new, neither is dissent, division, and
debate in the Atlantic alliance. How
could it be otherwise in an organization
composed of 16 vigorous democracies?
Debate within each country, and be-
tween countries, is expected. And it
beats the alternative.

So, before anyone proclaims the
demise of NATO, let us put today's
security and economic disagreements
with Europe in perspective. Do you
remember the 1949 debate over whethe
the United States should even commit

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itself to a permanent, peacetime
alliance? Or 1956 and our falling out^;
with Britain and France over Suez?
Remember the 1960s with the
multilateral force and DeGaulle's
withdrawal of France from NATO's
military structure? Remember the 1
and the debates with Europe over \
nam and the Middle East? And the '
1970s and the criticism of America'^
"zig-zag" foreign policy?

History has its uses. One is to r
mind us that the present is less
unique— and in this case less dire—
we imagine. Our problems in the all
today are real but not nearly of the
magnitude of the ones I have just ci
It is true, for example, that in t
security sphere Western Europe is (
too parochial. But let's remember tl
Americans and Europeans have alw
had different perspectives on securi
The Europeans sit next door to the
Soviet Union. Former West Germai
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt often p.
out that his home in Hamburg is on
kilometers from the East German
border. For a Chicagoan, that is as
the Iron Curtain fell straight down
middle of Lake Michigan.

And yet, Western Europe still
demonstrates genuine concern for i
national security issues. U.S. and E
pean forces serve together not only
Berlin but also in the Sinai. France
example, has forces defending Wes
interests not only in the Mediterrar
but also in Africa; and the United
Kingdom has forces on station in tl
Central American country of Belize
well as on the Rhine.

It is also true that our NATO a
could do more with respect to the i
ventional defense of Europe. And j
1983_the Year of the Missile— tht
alliance rebuffed a determined Sov
tempt to divide it. Instead, we and
allies united in support of the 1979
NATO "dual-track" decision to seel-
negotiate limits on intermediate-ra
nuclear missiles and, if necessary,
deploy such missiles ourselves. Aft
arms control negotiations failed to
remove the threat posed by well ov
200 Soviet SS-20 missiles in Eurof
NATO began to deploy counterbala
forces.

The willingness of European g(
ments to deploy these missiles is a
ther demonstration of their politics
courage and their commitment to t
alliance. That courage and commiti
are not limited to governments alo
Recent elections in Europe demon?
that the people support the allianc*

rel

lie

Department of State Bl

GENERAL

. In elections last year, supporters
alliance and of the 1979 NATO
)n won clear mandates in all three
major countries that are deploy-
termediate- range missiles to
ir the Soviet monopoly.
3 for those economic differences I
jarlier, it is true that Europe
imes succumbs to protectionism,
sspite European protectionism, our
e on current account with the
)ean Community switched from a

ion deficit in 1980 to a $3-billion
IS in 1983. And the volume of our
ay trade with Europe is quite

over $100 billion annually. As
Uiry Shultz has said in discussing
European trade: "We must be
something right."

asks Ahead

! compared our relations with Asia
urope. It should be clear that
rthening our ties with Asia, while
:aneously encouraging debate and
Dy consensus within the Atlantic
se, are not only compatible but, in
nutually reinforcing activities,
reflect a simple geopolitical fact:
nited States is a global power with
I interests. We do not have the lux-
f choosing to care about one region
than another. We should not write
e Atlantic alliance or prescribe
(like the Nunn amendment's troop
tions) far worse than the ailment,
er should we ignore the burgeoning
Asian economies. Rather, the
oean-U.S. -Asian relationship should
;wed in complementary, not com-
ve, terms. Europe gains, not loses,
strengthened U.S. -Asian ties. And
gains, not loses, from strengthened
European ties.

1 short, we must close ranks and
ogether, not apart. This is par-
rly true if we are to meet the two
important tasks of the 1980s:
ng protectionism— which threatens
1 prosperity; and meeting the
t challenge — which threatens the

ighting Protectionism. The U.S.
ation has shifted to the south and
as the smokestack industries in
trth and east have declined. Some
we should protect those declining
, tries from import competition. You
low the arguments against protec-
.m. You know alwut the importance
mparative advantage and consumer
I shall not dwell on those notions
, . for we in the United States have
ally avoided protectionism. Instead,

we have used deregulation and tax
changes to create a climate in which
new technologies— and new jobs-
flourish. There have been exceptions and
qualifications to this policy, but on the
whole we have held to it.

The decline of our old industries has
led us to import more basic goods from
abroad. This contributes to our trade
deficit. Until last year the biggest cur-
rent account deficit ever experienced by
a country in a single year was $15
billion. Arthur Burns recently noted that
the current account shortfall we are
headed for this year, now estimated to
be $80-$100 billion, is "awesomely dif-
ferent from anything experienced in the
past." This deficit makes the need to
fight protectionism in common with
Europe and Asia both more imperative
and more difficult than ever before.

Europe's old industries, like ours,
are also in decline. The steel mills of
Lorraine and the Ruhr are in trouble.
The shipyards on the Clyde in Scotland
are laid low. But, unlike the United
States, Europe has failed over the past
decade to create new jobs and develop
new technologies. Efforts to protect
dying industries through subsidies and
trade barriers have stifled the tech-
nological innovation the European econ-
omies need. Lagging economic perform-
ance in turn complicates the effort to in-
crease the strength of Europe's
defenses. It is thus imperative that
Europe be encouraged to resist protec-
tionism.

satellites, and— something important to

me and all of you as well— legal services.
We must continue to build upon the
progress that has lieen made. The
United States, Europe, and Asia must
all remember that erecting trade bar-
riers invites retaliation. And retaliation
is a threat to the one out of every eight
American jobs dependent on exports.

Meeting the Soviet Challenge. The

second task that demands the combined
efforts of North America, Europe, and
Asia is meeting the Soviet challenge. To
be successful, countries on all three con-
tinents need to adopt a global, not a
regional, outlook. For example, Europe
initially viewed the negotiations on
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)
as a purely European problem.
However, more than one-third of all
Soviet SS-20s are in Asia. For that
reason, the United States saw INF as a
global problem and proposed global
limits. During the negotiations, the
Europeans and the Japanese also came
to appreciate that SS-20s pose a
worldwide problem. Faced with this
common front, the Soviets eventually ac-
cepted the need for a global solution to
INF. Unfortunately, no agreement has
been reached because the Soviets con-
tinue to demand a monopoly on such
weapons and have refused to negotiate
further.

Another aspect of meeting the
Soviet challenge is strengthening our
collective defenses. The United States is

. . . more than one-third of all Soviet SS-20s are in
Asia. For that reason the United States saw INF as
a global problem and proposed global limits.

Fortunately, the Europeans have
always understood that market access
must be reciprocal— at least in areas
other than agriculture. The Japanese,
however, have been slower to endorse
reciprocity. U.S. trade policy is aimed at
achieving the same access to Japan's
markets that Japanese goods have to
ours. The trade package announced in
April by Prime Minister Nakasone is the
latest of several encouraging steps in
that direction. Progress has been made
on beef, citrus, tobacco, telecommunica-
tions, semiconductors, and capital
market liberalization. But more needs to
be done on tariffs on forest products.

increasing its effort, as we believe it
must. But Europe must also do its full
share. Only in this way can we expect to
maintain a cohesive alliance and a credi-
ble deterrent.

The level of spending is not the only
issue. Last year the debate in NATO
was over nuclear missiles. In the coming
years, the focus will be on conventional
defense. In the past there has been a
difference of perspective on this issue,
with the United States favoring strong
conventional defenses to keep the
nuclear threshold high; and many Euro-

HUMAN RIGHTS

peans tending to favor reliance on
nuclear forces as the only guarantee
against conventional war fought on their
territory. Now there is a ferment of new
ideas on conventional defense: new
technologies, new tactics, and new
resources. If we approach this oppor-
tunity with skill and ingenuity, the
alliance can emerge militarily stronger
and politically more cohesive, just as
was the case with INF deployments.

In Asia, Japan, too, needs to do
more. We support Japan's commitment
to protect its air- and sealanes out to
1 .000 miles. In recent years, Japan's
defense spending has increased by
nearly 5% per year in real terms. But
we believe that the pace of Japan's ef-
forts must be stepped up even more in
the face of the Soviet threat to Asian
stability.

Finally, Japan and Europe must be
more concerned about threats to our
common security arising in distant
regions. Europeans often argue that
detente has been largely successful in
Europe. But Europe, like the United
States, has vital interests at stake in
areas, such as the Persian Gulf, far from
its own borders. That is why the United
States, Europe, Japan, and our other
Asian friends must work in concert to
oppose Soviet adventurism and to pro-
mote stability throughout the world.

Conclusion

We have made great progress toward
the development of concerted policies.
This Administration has sought not
merely to strengthen our bilateral ties
with Asia and Europe but to encourage
greater interaction among all members
of the community of advanced in-
dustrialized democracies. This new and
more cohesive allied consensus, spanning
three continents, was in evidence at last
year's economic summit meeting in
Williamsburg. With President Reagan as
host, the leaders of the seven largest in-
dustrialized democracies of North
America, Europe, and Asia took a
historic step. Up to that time the annual
summit meetings, which began in 1975.
had dealt only with economic matters.
But at Williamsburg, in addition to the
traditional economic business of the
summit, the seven leaders issued a state-
ment explicitly recognizing that the
security of each nation was indivisible
from that of the others; the statement
also supported the deployment of
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in
Europe to counter the Soviet threat.

This year's summit meeting in Lon-
don, under Prime Minister Thatcher's
leadership, built on the success of
Williamsburg. And again, the heads of
government of the seven summit coun-
tries demonstrated the growing political
consensus that binds us together as a
community of democratic states with
shared values and common interests.
The seven leaders discussed an un-
precedented range of political and
security problems. They issued a series
of declarations on democratic values.
East- West relations, and terrorism. The
range of their discussions demonstrated
that the economic and security concerns

of the industrialized democracies are
common and truly global.

In economics it is generally reco
nized that trade is not a zero-sum gi
Growth in our trade with Europe or
Asia creates greater opportunities—
and wealth — for all.

International relations, like trad
need not be a zero-sum game. Ever
benefits, if each takes a global rathe
than a parochial view of the problen
that face us all. In short, there will
no losers if we resist — as we must-
temptation to permit where we sit t
determine how we think. ■

Ninth Anniversary of
the Helsinki Final Act

Nine years ago, in Helsinki, Finland, the
United States and Canada joined 33
Eastern and Western European govern-
ments in signing the F'inal Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE). The Helsinki accords,
which committed the signing nations to
abide by a set of universal standards of
international conduct and fundamental
human rights, hold out a beacon of hope
for human dignity and freedom.

The United States remains firmly
committed to the full implementation of
the provisions of the Helsinki accords.
During the past year, there have been a
number of significant developments in
the CSCE. Last September, the 3-year-
long Madrid followup meeting was suc-
cessfully concluded, with the adoption of
important new provisions intended to
advance the cause of human rights, in-
cluding trade union and religious
freedom. The Stockholm conference on
European security was t)pened, where
we have propo.sed measures to lessen
the risk of surprise attack in Europe.
Just as the United States and its allies
played an essential role in achieving a
positive outcome at Madrid, we have ad-
vanced concrete proposals at Stockholm
to enhance East- West security.

Unfortunately, the promises of the
Helsinki Final Act have all too frequent-
ly gone unfulfilled. The Helsinki accords
pledge the signatory states "to respect
human rights and fundamental

freedoms, including the freedom of
thought, conscience, religion or belii
for all without distinction as to race
sex, language, or religion." There ai
also commitments to advance trade
union freedoms, to combat terrorist
reunify families, to encourage the fi
flow of information, and more.

Over the years, there have beer
some gradual, hard-won gains. But
often in Eastern Europe, and parti<
ly in the Soviet Union, we find a di!
ferent story — repression of dissent,
straints on religious freedoms, refu
to permit citizens to emigrate, jamr
of Western radio broadcasts, suppo
terrorism, and disbanding of free ti
unions. The plight of Dr. Andrei
Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonn*
one very important example among
many where the denial of basic hur
rights impedes the development of
more constructive East- West relati
ship we seek.

The challenge is a formidable o
give real meaning, through deeds, i
promise of the Helsinki process. W
have realistic expectations, a patiei
proach, and are prepared for serioi
dialogue. We call upon all CSCE st
to foster human rights and freedon
through the promise and commitmf
of the Helsinki Final Act.

Till

,eir
m

Press release IT.-J of Aug. 2, 1984.

'IS I

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[DLE EAST

irrent Developments in the Middle East

hard W. Murphy

dement before the Subcommittee
ope and the Middle East of the
Foreijpi Affairs Committee on
), 19 8J,. Ambassador Murphy is
int Secretary for Near EaMem
luth Asian Affairs. '

is is a time of steady, sustained
on our part to maintain stability
region and to deal with persistent
al conflicts. The gulf war seems to
ie on its own momentum in a pro-
twilight beyond any reason or
)r either Iran or Iraq. Lebanon is
^ginning the slow and painful
s of healing from 9 years of bitter
ar. Israel has just held its national
ns and will now proceed to form a
avernment. When that govern-
las been established, it can turn
ention to addressing the urgent
ms of Lebanon, the peace process,
e Israeli economy. We will be in-
3d in pursuing the long process of
g a durable peace between Israel
e Arab states.

ran Conflict

ar in the gulf has evolved into a
waiting game, with a quarter of a
1 Iranian troops massed in the
Jim sector for a major offensive
II lay come tomorrow — or never,
vhile, preparations for the attack
ue, as do efforts to strengthen
defensive positions. In the gulf, the
.r continues at an uneven but
Tous pace. The Iraqis are continu-
eir sporadic attacks against ship-
erving Iranian ports in an attempt
uce Iran to negotiate, and the Ira-
are retaliating against ships serv-
'Utral ports. For the moment, the
lion is not getting any better — nor
letting any worse — but this is a
us duel. The danger is real that it
t any moment ignite a wider con-
tie single bright spot is the cease-
^ainst attacks on civilian popula-
enters which was proposed by the
ecretary General and agreed to by
ran and Iraq June 12. That cease-
; still holding, despite some claims
lations by both sides. We would
rt any efforts to broaden the
ment, but we have no evidence

that Iran is yet willing to accept either a
wider cease-fire or one limited to gulf
shipping and ports.

The gulf states, meanwhile, are
strengthening their own defenses, while
continuing to emphasize that a
diplomatic solution to the war deserves
the highest priority. In the first in-
stance, they will rely on their own
resources to deter or prevent aggression
against their own territories and ship-
ping in their waters. Their capabilities to
defend themselves have grown steadily
over the last decade — to a large extent
due to the sustained assistance we and
Western Europe have provided through
our military supply and training relation-
ships. Our objective has been to
strengthen their security by developing
a credible defense capability. In the case
of Saudi Arabia our policy has been
especially effective. We believe our
prompt support for Saudi self-defense,
in combination with Saudi determination
to defend itself without being pro-
vocative, has played an important role in
checking escalation in the northern gulf.
We are now engaged in discussions with
several of the other states, including
Kuwait and Bahrain, to assess ways in
which we could further strengthen their
individual and collective defense
capabilities on a near-term basis.

Our one overriding objective in the
gulf war is to bring it to an end. We
have consistently supported the pursuit
of every avenue to a negotiated settle-
ment which would leave neither party
dominant and which would preserve the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of
both. Those efforts have thus far not
borne fruit, nor will they until both sides
agree that it is time to stop the bloodlet-
ting. But it is important that the efforts
continue.

It is also our objective to avoid
direct U.S. military involvement in the
fighting. Thus far we have been suc-
cessful. We trust that our success will
continue, but we must continue intensive
planning for contingencies which might
be beyond the capabilities of the Arab
states of the gulf to meet, even while we
help them develop the capability to pro-
vide for their own self-defense.

Retaining Access to Oil Supplies

It is in our vital interest that the world
retain access to the oil supplies of the
gulf. We are not seeking military in-

volvement in the war, but neither do our
interests permit us to ignore it or to
allow the gulf to be closed to our ships
or those of our allies and friends. Our
strategy, therefore, has been one of pur-
suing diplomacy while cooperating with
the gulf states and our allies to prevent
or to be prepared to deal with a military
crisis if regional capabilities prove inade-
quate.

Our consultations with our allies
have included energy preparedness. We
have worked with the International
Energy Agency (lEA) for some months
to lay out a broad approach to dealing
with a major supply disruption. We are
pleased with the July 1 1 decision of the
lEA's governing board that early
drawdown of emergency oil stocks, and
other mutually supportive actions to
restore supply-demand balance, are vital
elements in minimizing the economic ef-
fects of a disruption.

Despite the protracted nature of the
war and the continued shipping losses,
there has been no appreciable drop in oil
exports from the gulf, and prices on the
spot market have fallen. While the price
weakness is primarily due to the con-
tinued glut of oil on the market, it may
also in part reflect world confidence that
the United States and its allies will en-
sure that the energy supplies continue.

I would note in this context, and in a
larger context as well, that our military
supply relationship with many countries
in the Middle East not only allows them
to provide for their own security — a
burden we are not called upon to
bear — but it also provides a concrete
means of maintaining American in-
fluence in the region. The states of the
Middle East are going to seek arms to
defend themselves. The only question is,
who will supply those arms. To the ex-
tent that our longstanding military sup-
ply relationships are supplanted by arms
purchases from elsewhere — the Soviet
Union or even Western Europe — our
own influence is diminished. This has im-
plications for our ability to move the
peace process forward or to aid in
resolving crises within the region,
wherever they may develop.

MIDDLE EAST

Israel

Let me turn for a moment to Israel.
Although you are all aware of the
results thus far of the Israeli elections, I
thought it might be useful to go over
them with you. With over 98% of the
vote in, projections for the 120 seats in
Israel's 11th Knesset indicate no clear
victory for either the Labor Alignment
(45 seats) or the Likud (41). As the
smaller parties are doing well, it appears
that the coalition-forming process may
be prolonged.

The projections thus far are not
definitive. The final breakdown for party
representation in the 11th Kn£sset will
not be determined for a day or two. In
the face of this uncertainty, it would be
inappropriate to make any predictions
about what party will lead the next
government or what that government's
policies will be.

After the election results are
published early next week, President
Herzog will begin to consult with the
parties prior to giving one party the
first opportunity to form a government.
There is no time limit within which
President Herzog must make his choice,
although it usually takes only a few
days.

Whatever the outcome of the elec-
tion, we do expect and intend to con-
tinue our close cooperative relationship
with the next Israeli Government.

Lebanon

Concerning Lebanon, since my ap-
pearance before this subcommittee in
June, the national unity government of
Prime Minister Karami has begun to im-

plement a security plan for the greater
Beirut area. The "green line" has been
reopened between east and west Beirut,
and the airport and main seaport are
also open. 'These are welcome signs that
the Lebanese Government is having
some success in addressing the many
problems before it and that the various
political factions are beginning to come
together. The United States has strong-
ly backed efforts to form a more broadly
based government and to undertake the
internal reforms needed for reconcilia-
tion between Lebanon's warring fac-
tions. We hope the government will
make further progress toward restoring
stability and security.

We believe that Syria has been one
of the helpful players in these recent
developments. We also believe that
Lebanon needs peaceful, cooperative
relations with both Syria and Israel. No
lasting solution is possible which fails to
take into account the interests of both of
these important neighbors. We will con-
tinue to encourage Lebanon to deal
directly with Israel on the issue of
Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon
and security arrangements along their
border.

But there is a long and difficult road
ahead for the Lebanese people and for
their government. We will be supportive
of every effort which advances the goals
of restoring unity and national recon-
ciliation and the withdrawal of foreign
forces. In the final analysis, however,
both we and the Lebanese realize that
they themselves must take the prime
responsibility in dealing with their own
problems. We can help; other friends
can help; but the basic solution is in
their own hands.

Jordan

With Jordan, we continue to enjoy p
ductive relations on many levels. As
befits friends, we have maintained a
ongoing dialogue on many issues — J
danian security and economic develo
ment, the Iran-Iraq war and stabilit
the gulf, and prospects for broader
peace in the area. Jordan has main-
tained its continuing interest in seel-
a political solution to the conflict wi
Israel.

Finally, I would like to touch br
on the peace process. We are comm
to seeking progress toward a just ai
lasting peace wherever progress is ]
ble. We also remain committed to tl
positions in the President's initiativt
September 1, 1982. The United Sta'
has a consistent record, which has (
tended over succeeding Administrat
of seeking to promote progress tow
peace whenever the opportunities f(
progress have arisen. We will work
ensure that no opportunity is lost.

'The complete transcript of the hea
will be published by the committee and
be available from the Superintendent oJ
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

RCOTICS

lernational Narcotics Control

rround

ouse of heroin, cocaine, marijuana,

;her dangerous drugs causes

s health and social problems in the

i States, Canada, Western

le, and other countries, including

nations in which these drugs are

ced and /or transshipped.

le United States consumes annual-

le 4.1 metric tons of imported

1, 50-61 metric tons of imported

le, and 13,600-14,000 metric tons

rijuana, much of it imported. Pro-

m of these drugs far exceeds

ited demand. For example, if all

icit coca leaf currently produced

onverted to cocaine, it would yield
ich as 227 metric tons of cocaine;
wide demand is about 80 metric
I year. Worldwide illicit opium pro-
)n exceeds 1,700 metric tons, com-

to 41 metric tons needed to supply

to U.S. addicts.

Sources

n, for conversion to heroin and
n world markets, is grown primari-
three areas — Mexico; the "Golden
gle" of Burma, Thailand, and Laos;
he "Golden Crescent" of Iran,
inistan, and Pakistan. Most of the
1 and, recently, much of the heroin
iced in Southeast and Southwest
are consumed by increasingly
r addict populations in those
ns.

locaine is derived primarily from
leaves grown in Bolivia and Peru
rafficked through Colombia, which
las become a coca producer.
larijuana, too, comes from many
tes. Although Colombia still pro-
more than half of the U.S. mari-
supply, U.S. domestic production
mports from Mexico and Jamaica
;her supply about 41% of the
;et.

dethaqualone, a tranquilizer widely
ed in the United States and other
;, had been shipped in bulk from
pe and Asia to clandestine labs in
mbia and elsewhere for processing
rerouting to the United States. But
ability has dropped sharply thanks
fective control at the source.

Department of State Role

The Department of State's Bureau of In-
ternational Narcotics Matters (INM),
directed by an assistant secretary, is
charged with coordinating the U.S.
Government's international drug control
activities. INM aims to strengthen U.S.
diplomatic and program efforts to
reduce the supply of dangerous drugs
entering the United States. The bureau
receives about $41 million annually for
bilateral and multilateral narcotics con-
trol programs. These funds are used for:

• Crop eradication and control pro-
grams;

• Law enforcement assistance;

• Equipment and materials;

• Training of foreign law enforce-
ment personnel;

• Development assistance to provide
economic alternatives for illicit narcotics
crops; and

• Technical assistance for demand
reduction programs.

INM works with narcotics coor-
dinators in t!he Department's regional
bureaus and U.S. Embassies and col-
laborates with the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID) on new proj-
ects linking narcotics control with
development assistance in Bolivia, Peru,
and Pakistan. INM participates in
multilateral control efforts with UN
agencies and cooperates with the White
House, Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast
Guard, and other concerned U.S. agen-
cies on domestic and international ac-
tivities.

Narcotics control, a matter of
government responsibility under
treaties, should be dealt with as an in-
ternational obligation. Producer and
transit countries have the primary
responsibility under treaties for control-
ling the cultivation, reproduction, and
distribution of illicit narcotics. In
assisting these countries, INM places
highest priority on programs to control
production and prohibit trafficking at
the source.

Programs

The worldwide supply of marijuana, co-
caine, heroin, and other drugs is so
great, and trafficking channels to the
United States so diverse, that major in-
terdictions and even crop eradications
cause only temporary declines in

availability when achieved in just one or
two producing areas. INM's strategy is
based on the ultimate objective of
simultaneously controlling production in
all key geographic sectors so that signifi-
cant and lasting reductions are achieved.

INM has drug control projects in
key opium producing nations (Burma,
Thailand, Mexico, and Pakistan) and in
transit countries through which opium is
refined into heroin or transshipped. INM
supports coca control and cocaine inter-
diction projects in Bolivia, Peru, and
Colombia and projects to control mari-
juana production and trafficking in Mex-
ico and Colombia. It also supports inter-
diction and enforcement efforts in other
producer and transit nations in the three
target regions — Latin America and
Southeast and Southwest Asia — and
assists dozens of countries through INM-
funded law enforcement and customs
training programs.

Multilateral Efforts

Drug abuse is not just an American
problem; it affects all nations from the
poorest to the wealthiest, countries that
produce and traffic in drugs, and those
that are consumers.

Historically the U.S. Government
has borne much of the cost of interna-
tional control programs; now it is urging
other nations to assist through their own
bilateral programs, through direct
economic assistance to producer coun-
tries, and through multilateral activities.
The U.S. Government has urged interna-
tional financial institutions to target
development programs in narcotics-
producing areas whenever feasible.

The U.S. Government also pursues
international narcotics control objectives
in the UN General Assembly, the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
and other UN agencies that coordinate
multilateral efforts to control produc-
tion, trafficking, and abuse. These latter
efforts are directed by the UN Commis-
sion on Narcotics Drugs, its Division for
Narcotic Drugs, the International Nar-
cotics Control Board, and the UN Fund
for Drug Abuse Control, which supports
key drug control projects throughout the
world. The U.S. Government helped
create the fund and, to date, has con-
tributed the largest single amount of the
fund's resources.

Taken from the GIST series of July 1984,
published by the Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Editor; Harriet
Culley. ■

NUCLEAR POLICY

Nuclear Trade: Reliable
Supply and Mutual Obligations

by Richard T. Kennedy

Address before the Center for
Strategic atid International Studies at
Georgetown University in Washington.
D.C., on June 28. 198i. Ambassador
Kennedy is special adviser to the
Secretary on nonproliferation policy and
nuclear energy affairs.

It is a great pleasure and honor for me to
have the opportunity to speak to this
very distinguished audience. I particularly
enjoy an opportunity to step back from
the trees in order to take a look at the
forest— to take a look at the bigger pic-
ture. In dealing with nonproliferation
problems on a day-to-day basis, one must
not lose sight of the basic objectives and
policies which guide us, and it is helpful
to reexamine them periodically.

What I would like to discuss with
you is both the fundamental importance
and the implications of being a reliable
nuclear supplier. At the outset, let me
assert that the nonproliferation regime
in place today could not have been
achieved and cannot be maintained for
the future without widespread con-
fidence in the reliability of supply and
cooperative undertakings in the nuclear
arena. But it is equally true that
reliability of supply implies obligations
not only on the part of suppliers but on
the part of recipients as well.

Over 30 years ago, President
Eisenhower took a historic step which,
in a sense, created the worldwide
civilian nuclear industry: he inaugurated
the Atoms for Peace program in 1953.
The United States volunteered to share
the nuclear technologies it had
developed so that they could benefit all
mankind. In the intervening years,
American policy has sought to assure
that nations could benefit from the
peaceful application of nuclear
technology under a system which
prevented the misuse of that technology.
Atoms for peace, not war, has been our
objective. Our basic approach today is
one of continuity with the principles of
the past — to assure the benefits of
peaceful nuclear technology and to pre-
vent its misuse. All of our efforts have
been bent to the task of ensuring that
these principles are not only honored in
the abstract but are given concrete ex-
pression in practice.

There is now in place an interna-
tional nuclear regime which, while clear-
ly not perfect, is functioning effectively.
We want to make that regime and the
institutions, norms, and practices which
comprise it, stronger, more complete,
and more effective. This Administration,
like its predecessors, has fully embraced
nonproliferation as a high priority and
has taken numerous steps to further the
objective of strengthening the non-
proliferation regime. Let me cite a few
specifics.

• We have actively encouraged addi-
tional adherence to the NPT [Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty].

• We have provided strong financial
and technical support to IAEA [Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency]
safeguards.

• We have implemented the volun-
tary offer to accept IAEA safeguards.

• We ratified the physical security
convention and have strongly urged
others to do so.

• We ratified Protocol I of the
treaty of TIateloIco and have urged
others to ratify the treaty to bring it
fully into force.

• We have made considerable prog-
ress in addressing the problem of
safeguards on large reprocessing plants.

• We have pursued an initiative
aimed at the adoption by all major sup-
pliers of comprehensive safeguards as a
condition for future nuclear supply com-
mitments.

• We have buttressed U.S. alliances
and security ties that reduce incentives
to acquire nuclear explosives.

In addition, there has been a num-
ber of other developments which have
strengthened the nonproliferation
regime, for example:

• China has taken steps to par-
ticipate in international nonproliferation
efforts and has joined the IAEA.

• South Africa announced earlier
this year that it would require IAEA
safeguards on all its nuclear exports and
is also discussing with the IAEA the ap-
plication of safeguards to its new
semicommercial enrichment plant.

• The trigger lists have been further
clarified and refined.

its«i

We also can and should take conjconiii'
siderable satisfaction from the progi
we have made in strengthening tho&
ternationally agreed rules of nucleaniproj
trade without which peaceful nuclea
commerce would not be possible.

In the United States, we have Is
policies, and procedures aimed at
preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons. Every other major nucleaii
porting country has adopted its own
although obviously not wholly identi
restrictions. We can and should taktijep

ersi

!tkf

nil oil

EtlHf

ilne

considerable comfort from these fac

The Need To Strengthen
Rules of Nuclear Trade

But let us be completely candid: the
are strains on the existing norms, ai
there is need for still further efforts
broaden and strengthen these rules
nuclear trade.

In many countries, there are lar
nuclear industries created at a time
when projected energy demand was
much greater and when it seemed t!
the future for nuclear power was un
bounded. But times have changed, a
we are all faced with the problem oi
how to preserve those nuclear Indus ,»
for the future when demand for nuc
power will again grow— as I believe
will. In this situation, it is only natu
that competitive pressures are inten ve
And those pressures are focused inc
ingly on the effort to find new mark
abroad.

But it is in the interest of every
tion— supplier and purchaser alike-
competition for those markets be ca
out in terms of such factors, for exa
pie, as the quality and capacity of e(
ment, know-how, and expertise and
delivery schedules. These are the tr; is
tional and understood grounds for c
petition in the marketplace.

Competition must not be conduc
in a way that it will hinge on the
readiness of a supplier to shade
safeguards or other nonproliferation
conditions, to look for possible
technology sweeteners that will mak
purchasing from it seem more attrac
than from another country that hon(
existing sound norms. For, once the
process of shading our shared non-
proliferation standards begins, we w

Department of State Bull

NUCLEAR POLICY

L witli the lowest common
■niiator of what can be agreed to
r nations. Each will be motivated
1 Its or the world's long-term in-
dmt by short-term gain and fear of
Cts neighbors might do. Under
"'|ronditions, the nonproliferation
■t ' will gradually unravel, and we
''" id ourselves unable to realize the
*i promise for the health and well-
« Df all.

t me emphasize that, for our part,
^' lited States has never sacrificed,
11 never sacrifice, its nonprolifera-
inciples for commercial gain or

■ nic advantage. We have set this
^ndard for our own conduct. We

' ; it should be the universal norm.

■"' e prospective emergence of new

- ;rs on the scene adds even greater
:y to efforts to preserve and
then the agreed rules of nuclear
If there is disharmony and con-
sy among the major nuclear sup-

' on conditions for nuclear export,

■ lew suppliers inevitably will be
;d to use nonproliferation condi-
is a bargaining factor in their pur-
sales. If they see existing sup-
performing in this way, what else
5 reasonably expect? By contrast,
nent now among the existing sup-
on sound guidelines and a commit-
to honor those guidelines will

it easier to urge new suppliers to
those agreed and sensible export
ees in the future,
further word about such common
er policies and guidelines: it is
;hat no list of sensitive materials
'er be immutable. The items on
ich list must change over time as
elegies change and as our
standing of technologies becomes
er and deeper.

at there are other items whose
jn to sensitive activities is more
ex. What should we do, for exam-
a nation seeks to buy a computer
could be useful in the operation of
safeguarded reprocessing plant?
ere we get to the heart of the dual-
aestion: the same computer that
help in the operation of a reproc-
l plant could also be used quite
rly and harmlessly in a large
ical facility. How should the nations
i world decide which request to
and which to reject? The nuclear-
■ting states, after all, are those
likely to be in a position to export
jmputer in question. Should there
policy aimed at foreclosing the ex-
of any item which has a dual use?

Should any item be barred which could
conceivably find its way into a facility
which could be used in developing
nuclear explosives?

These are not simple questions, and
there are no simple answers. Clearly, for
example, a blanket export prohibition
might prevent the construction of a
perfectly respectable — indeed, vitally
necessary — chemical plant in a develop-
ing country. But by the same token, the
potential dangers cannot be ig^iored.

If we can have confidence that the
intended use of that mythical computer
is not related to the manufacture of
nuclear explosives, the question is clear-
ly much easier to answer. But how can
the requesting nation generate that
confidence? One clear answer would be
by adhering to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty or, in the case of
Latin American countries, by accepting
and agreeing to be bound by the treaty
of Tlatelolco. The voluntary acceptance
of IAEA safeguards on all of a country's
nuclear facilities and activities is yet
another way to generate that needed
confidence.

Let me elaborate. In order to
manufacture nuclear explosives, a nation
needs two things.

First is the know-how and technical
backup — the scientists and the
necessary materials and equipment. This
is the technical side of the equation and,
though the barriers are considerable and
must remain so, more and more nations
are coming to possess the technical
wherewithal to cross those barriers.

Second is the political decision to
"go nuclear." A nation must consciously
make this hard decision. Presumably, it
would make that decision because it sees
some benefit to itself in doing so. This is
the political ingredient. After all is said
and done, the political ingredient is by
far the more important. All the export
controls that suppliers can devise or
safeguards that the IAEA can imple-
ment cannot forever bar a country from
acquiring nuclear explosives. A nation,
however, can rule out "going nuclear" by
an act of political will. It can turn its
back on the development of nuclear
weapons by adhering to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepting
safeguards on all its nuclear activities.
Over 120 non-nuclear-weapons states so
far have done just that. Adherence to a
regional treaty such as the treaty of
Tlatelolco can serve the same purpose.

But there is more to it than a simple
signature on a treaty. The best way for
a nation to demonstrate its bona
fides — the most graphic way — is to ac-
cept safeguards in spirit as well as in
the letter. It is unseemly for nations
with facilities subject to safeguards to
haggle about the niceties of safe-
guards — whether a given action or a
particular technical change is within the
writ of a particular IAEA safeguards
agreement. Instead of a preoccupation
with preventing the agency from going
beyond the precise legal letter of safe-
guards — a preoccupation with form over
substance — such nations — indeed, all na-
tions — should work to strengthen the
IAEA safeguards system and help it to
perform its vital task.

Only such a cooperative attitude can
provide the proper basis for nuclear
commerce. Without it, that mutual trust
and confidence, which is essential to con-
tinued use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, will be lacking. For after we
strip away all the verbiage, it comes
down to this: trust must be the
predicate for all nuclear commerce. The
exporting nation must have confidence
that the materials it exports will not be
turned into devices of war and destruc-
tion; the recipient nation must have con-
fidence that, having demonstrated by
word and deed its own bona fides, it can
get the help it needs to realize the
atom's peaceful promise.

A Positive Approach
to Nuclear Power

While there has been a broad continuity
with past administrations on non-
proliferation policy goals, the Reagan
Administration has placed more em-
phasis on the need for mutual confidence
among exporting and recipient coun-
tries. There are several aspects of pres-
ent policy which impact on this.

The Administration, for instance,
has taken a very positive approach to
nuclear power. It considers nuclear
power to be a clean, efficient, and safe
way to generate electricity. It is not con-
sidered a choice of last resort. Instead,
it is seen to be a key element in our
domestic energy future. And nuclear-
generated energy is recognized as im-
portant for the economic development
and energy security of many nations.
The Administration stands by the idea
that where the necessary nonprolifera-
tion conditions are met, nations can and
should have access to the benefits of
nuclear energy.

NUCLEAR POLICY

Next, the Administration firmly
believes that the United States must
be— and must be seen to be— a predict-
able and reliable supplier of nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology.
For only in that event can the United
States reasonably expect to exert the in-
fluence which its technological ex-
perience and competence could rightly
be presumed to yield. In his key non-
proliferation policy statement of July
1981, President Reagan noted that many
friends of the United States had lost
confidence in our ability to recognize
their needs. Therefore, he called for the
reestablishment of this nation as a
"predictable and reliable partner under
adequate safeguards."

Another important aspect of this
Administration's policies involves its at-
titude toward reprocessing and the use
of plutonium. There is no question that
plutonium is an inherently dangerous
substance. How to control it has always
been a very real and substantial
challenge for the nonproliferation
regime. U.S. policy seeks to inhibit the
spread of sensitive technology, equip-
ment, and material which could lead to
production of weapons-useable material,
particularly where there is a risk of pro-
liferation. We want to restrict the
number of reprocessing plants around
the world and to limit other sensitive
fuel cycle activities. These are not and
should not be items of general com-
merce.

The approach to these concerns and
objectives, however, has not been to
seek the abandonment of reprocessing in
any of the industrialized countries or the
reversal of plans to enlarge existing
capabilities. Instead of a universal ap-
proach aimed at foreclosing reprocessing
and plutonium use everywhere, a
coherent, realistic, yet prudent
plutonium use policy is being pursued
which differentiates among countries on
the basis of their needs and their non-
proliferation credentials. Specifically,
President Reagan decided that the
United States should not attempt to in-
hibit or set back civil reprocessing and
breeder reactor development abroad in
nations with advanced nuclear power
programs and where it did not con-
stitute a proliferation risk. An important
aspect of this approach is a willingness
under the proper circumstances to grant
programmatic ap[)rovals for the
reprocessing of U.S. -origin fuel— ap-
provals which we believe are essential to
the maintenance and improvement of
close relationships with our industrial-
ized nuclear partners.

The effort to pursue a more positive
approach to nuclear cooperation— to be
perceived as a reliable nuclear partner
and to be a reliable supplier as con-
templated by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act— is a key element of
the Administration's policy. The United
States realizes that it cannot take a
unilateral approach to nuclear supplier
policy if it is to continue to play a mean-
ingful role with respect to nuclear com-
merce and the nonproliferation regime.
We no longer possess the degree of in-
fluence in the nuclear field— scientific or
commercial— that we once enjoyed. In-
deed, none of today's suppliers does. As
mastery of the technology has become
more widespread, the ability of any one
nation to influence others through a
nuclear supply relationship, let alone dic-
tate their nuclear energy choices, has
diminished. This trend can only continue
over the long term, particularly as new
suppliers enter the scene.

But what does being a reliable sup-
plier mean in terms of specifics? It is
essential that nuclear trading partners
have confidence that if they adopt and
apply the strong nonproliferation stance
of which I have spoken, the suppliers,
including the United States, will be
responsible to the needs of their nuclear
programs. Needlessly long delays in
responding to specific requests must be
avoided. And requests must be re-
sponded to in a consistent manner. If
such confidence is not maintained, these
partners will inevitably seek to
disengage themselves from dependence
on the otherwise responsible suppliers
and look elsewhere.

Nuclear trading partners also must
believe that they can conduct commer-
cial nuclear relations with each other
without running the risk that new legal
requirements of one side will change the
name of the game without the other's
consent. They must not be led to think
that, at any time, they may be forced to
choose between breaking off a relation-
ship which is crucial to their own
economy or accepting intrusions by
others into matters they believe are
within the scope of their sovereignty.
Such unpredictability and change does
not serve nonprolifepation interests.

As an example— and only that— con-
sider one side effect of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act. That act provided a
positive benefit by establishing a new
legislative underpinning for U.S. nuclear
exports. But, unfortunately, the percep-
tion of some of our closest allies was
that it called into question existing

agreements. At least in the initial st
of the implementation of the law, m
nations perceived it as an attempt ti
substitute unilaterally U.S. desires f
international consensus in the nude
field. It appeared to them that we \t
using domestic legislative and ad-
ministrative processes to adopt rule

the conduct of nuclear commerce
which affected their own nuclear p;-
grams— thereby imposing those rule
our trading partners by fiat. We wf
perceived to be ignoring the traditic
forms of agreement, accommodatioi
negotiation, and mutual adjustment
interests which characterize interna
tional diplomacy. Consequently, we
less able to win their support on pn
ing supply, safeguards, and other n
proliferation matters.

With time we believe we are rey
ing the confidence and trust of our
nuclear partner; but one lesson is
clear— in the future we should seek
avoid major sudden changes in nucl
export policy. As I noted, I cite this
experience only as an example— an
ample which could be repeated by s
supplier if it acts unilaterally and
without developing the climate of a
ment and support which a successf
nonproliferation regime requires. B
that is not to say that we would sh
from pursuing a course that we cor
the proper one— that we would sac
principle on the altar of harmony.

But what about recipient count
which for one reason or another ha
not demonstrated their own bona f
through adherence to the NPT or,
least, acceptance of full-scope
safeguards. Certainly, such countri
must not have the degree of access
nuclear goods that countries which
taken these actions enjoy. Howeve
self-defeating to preclude maintain
dialogue with countries which purs
nuclear policies different from our
We must allow ourselves some
maneuvering room to influence tht
nuclear policies of such countries t
move them to accept international
proliferation norms.

Let me return to the point I m
the beginning. I have tried to illust
that reliability of supply implies ob
tions not only on the part of suppli
but on the part of recipients as we
Suppliers can only be seen as capr
if they are or are perceived to be a
tempting to dictate unilaterally anc
an absolutist fashion the scope and
terms of international commerce. I
same token, only if they are seen t
reliable, reasonable, and predictabl

Dpnartmpnt nf .^tato Ri

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

■ 1 -s expect to have the long-run in-
Ki over the future course of nuclear
'I -ce that they should rightly ex-
i": n the other hand, suppliers can-
-I called upon to make nuclear
; ; technology available if the re-
's 1 are unwilling to undertake the
ental obligation to fully assure
the possible misuse of that

our part, we recognize that it is
that a common understanding

:ved with nations whose percep-
their self-interest differs perhaps
ly from our own perceptions of
ierest. Nations do not respond to
htly, and this is especially so

ey have alternatives. As a

proposition, we favor dialogue
nfrontation, persuasion over in-
ion, and common sense over iron

Nevertheless, in the pursuit of
n understandings, we must build
le norms which have evolved over
ades and not succumb to the
common denominator. ■

Competitive Challenges

of Global Telecommunications

by William Schneider, Jr.

Statement before the Subcommittee of
Telecommunications, Consumer Protec-
tion, and Finance of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee on July 25,
1984- Mr. Schneider is Under Secretary
for Security Assistance, Science, and
Technology. '

I would like to preface my remarks by
commenting that the global system of in-
ternational communications satellites is
a magnificent achievement of U.S. policy
based on the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962. While the telecommunica-
tions revolution founded on satellite
technology seems almost a routine
achievement these days, this was not the
case 20 years ago when the INTELSAT
[International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization] system was con-
ceived.

We know by experience that even
great successes give rise to new ques-
tions, to new issues, even to new prob-
lems. It is appropriate that we should
from time to time review our interna-
tional communications satellite policies
and their instruments to see if they best
meet the changing requirements and op-
portunities that the continuing
developments of telecommunications
technology provide. I am not here to
criticize INTELSAT, INMARSAT [In-
ternational Maritime Satellite Organiza-
tion], or COMSAT [Communications
Satellite Corporation]; they have per-
formed beyond the expectations of their
founders, including the Congress, and
deserve praise for their achievements. I
am here to comment on proposals to
amend the rules of COMSAT's participa-
tion in the international satellite
organizations in light of changing times
and to discuss the Department of State
perspectives and responsibilities in the
instructional process and related mat-
ters.

COMSAT Instruction Process

The Communications Satellite Act of
1962, as amended, provides the
framework for U.S. international
satellite policies. The act sets out the

basis for U.S. participation in the inter-
national satellite organizations,
INTELSAT and INMARSAT, and
created a private sector corporation,
COMSAT, to own and represent the
U.S. shares in those organizations.

The development of policies toward
the international satellite organizations
is complex since we are dealing with
continuously operating international
commercial organizations and with a
private sector public corporation,
COMSAT, as signatory to agreements
establishing INTELSAT and INMAR-
SAT. COMSAT sits on the executive
board of both organizations which hold
formal sessions quarterly. As in any
business, there are a host of internal
management functions which require
directions from a board representing
shareholders. There are also issues
which affect international telecom-
munications policies. As an example,
there are INTELSAT'S objectives as a
user of orbit locations and radio frequen-
cies which do not necessarily coincide
with those of the United States or other
members.

Congress foresaw the need for
governmental oversight and included
provisions for Presidential instructions
to COMSAT in the 1962 act. The Presi-
dent has delegated that responsibility to
the Secretary of State. The instruction
procedure was set out in a letter from
the Department of State to COMSAT on
August 18, 1966, resulting from an
agreement between the Department,
FCC [Federal Communications Commis-
sion], and the then Office of Telecom-
munications Management in the Ex-
ecutive Office of the President.

The procedures are that COMSAT
provides the agenda and documentation
for each meeting to the Department of
State, FCC, and NTIA [National
Telecommunications Information Agen-
cy]. COMSAT then meets with repre-
sentatives of these agencies in advance
of the meeting and submits in writing its
proposed position on the agenda items.
These positions are discussed and perti-
nent questions are raised. Following this
briefing, the Department of State con-
sults with the other agencies and after
considering their views, issues instruc-
tions to COMSAT on those agenda items
which are deemed to require such in-

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

structions. Following the meeting, COM-
SAT again meets with representatives
of the three agencies to report on what
transpired. Again, questions are asked
and explanations given for any actions
taken by the executive board.

Proposals before Congress would re-
quire that all instructions issued to
COMSAT be made public. While we
favor making as many INTELSAT and
INMARSAT documents as possible
available to the public, there may be in-
stances where the instructions affect
U.S. Government concerns as the party
to both INTELSAT and INMARSAT
and raise issues involving foreign rela-
tions. While foreign signatories would
have access to U.S. positions and
negotiating strategies, we would not
have access to theirs which would place
U.S. interests at a disadvantage. We
would prefer to have public dissemina-
tion of U.S. Government instructions
judged by the normal criteria for public
release of government documents found
in the Freedom of Information Act. We
are working closely with COMSAT to
provide substantial additional informa-
tion to the public and we applaud their
cooperation.

We do not agree with the proposal
that the Federal Communications Com-
mission issue separate instructions to
COMSAT with respect to regulatory
matters within its jurisdiction. Although
the International Maritime Satellite
Communications Act provides for
separate FCC instructions to COMSAT
for INMARSAT meetings, this has not
been used. The FCC has been an active
participant in the instruction process
and we are concerned that separate in-
structions might unnecessarily raise con-
flicts over the primacy of "public in-
terest" and "national interest." The Com-
munications Satellite Act clearly gives
the President primary authority in the
instruction process and we believe it
would be a mistake to infringe on this
authority by separate FCC instructions.

How Binding are Instructions
to COMSAT?

The Communications Satellite Act
directed executive branch supervision
over COMSAT to ensure its relations
with foreign governments or entities or
international bodies are consistent with
the U.S. national interest and foreign
policy. While instructions on these mat-
ters are binding, the act does not pro-
vide for direct enforcement procedures
or sanctions beyond judicial relief con-
tained in Section 403 should COMSAT
refuse to follow government instruc-

tions. Nevertheless we find it difficult to
perceive a situation where COMSAT
would reject instructions based on U.S.
Government considerations. Any
substantive departure from instructions
could lead to an Administrative request
for legislative remedy. COMSAT is also
subject to regulatory supervision of the
FCC.

The instruction process has worked
well over the years as evidenced by the
lack of serious disagreements between
COMSAT and the government. This, I
believe, is due to government apprecia-
tion of the commercial nature of the in-
ternational satellite systems and the
responsibility of COMSAT to its
shareholders as well as its customers
and the general public. At the same
time, COMSAT has accepted that the
government is required to exercise
supervision over COMSAT in matters of
national interest.

Determination of Policy

While the instruction process has
worked well, it is a vehicle for applying
existing policy rather than the deter-
mination of policy in response to new
challenges or a perceived need for
change. Such a challenge occurred with
the applications now before the FCC for
non-INTELSAT international com-
munications satellite systems. This has
posed an extremely difficult policy deci-
sion involving the importance of protect-
ing the integrity of INTELSAT and the
value to the consumer of competition in
the provision of new international com-
munication services. The Senior In-
teragency Group [SIG] on International
Communication and Information Policy,
consisting of representatives of 15
government agencies, undertook a
detailed examination of the applications
and forwarded its recommendations to
the Secretaries of Commerce and State
to assist them in their advice to the
President on what decisions he should
make on this matter. While much of the
internal debate on the most appropriate
position to take has been aired in the
trade press, I would not wish to com-
ment further until the decision has been
reached other than to say any controver-
sy is a reflection of the importance and
complexity of the issue.

The transborder use of domestic
satellites is another issue of importance
in international satellite policy. After a
lengthy interagency consideration,
Under Secretary of State James Buckley
set forth the foreign policy requirements
for approval of the use of U.S. domestic

satellites for transmissions to neighb
ing countries. This was by letter to i
FCC Commissioner on July 23, 1981
and the requirements included agree
ment of the other government and ci
dination with INTELSAT under Art
14(d) of its agreement, which include
submission on the economic effect of
service on the INTELSAT global
system.

In the past year, concerns of the
tion picture and program supplier in
dustry that copyrights may be inade-
quately protected in transborder sat
TV transmissions were studied by a
working group and a policy decision
taken that appropriate assurances o
copyright protection would lie requii
before TV transmissions would be fi
approved to the individual country.

The ITU [International Telecom-
munications Union] forum includes t
consideration of international com-
munication satellite issues and the
United States is in the midst of pre]
tions for a World Administration Ri
Conference [WARC] on the use of
geostationary satellite orbit and spa|«!
services to begin in July 1985 with ;
ond session in 1988. Preparations f(
this conference began several years
and include the FCC Notice of Inqu
Process and Public Advisory Comm
on Space WARC, and technical con |te
tions from an NTIA-chaired ad hoc
group under its Interdepartment R;
Advisory Committee. A SIG steerir
committee under the chairmanship
the Coordinator for International C
munications and Information Policy
vides a forum to incorporate the co
tributions of various working grouf
individual agencies. The office of th
coordinator also provides an execut
director and support staff for confe
preparations and works with the dt
tion and appropriate agencies.

I hope that I have presented th
case that international communicat
satellite policy is not determined in
arbitrary way but is a result of coo
tion within the government involvii
many technical experts and foreign
policy talents in close coordination
the private sector.

Private Sector Participation

While the private sector does not p
ticipate directly in the COMSAT in
tion process, in formulating the ins
tions government agencies have a j
deal of relevant information and
knowledge obtained through struct
and regular meetings with the priv
sector on international telecommur
tions issues.

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SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

e United States is unique in world
imunications in relying fully on
vate sector for providing the serv-
d in the extent to which competi-
encouraged in those services.
is no way the U.S. Government
equately understand and promote
ecommunications interest in inter-
il negotiations without the active
3ation of the carriers, service pro-
equipment suppliers, users, and
leral public.

addition to the direct participa-
the private sector in the ITU con-
re committees and study groups,
8 advisory committees organized
st in WARC preparations, there
ler groups that deal with specific
such as the Working Group on
)order Data Flows, and the
5 facilities planning committees of
:C in the Atlantic, Pacific, and
lean regions.

le facilities planning process is
the development of overseas
•nmunications facilities and serv-
fering an opportunity to carriers,
5 providers, users, and the general
to submit views on the design and
ation of the future telecommunica-
;tructure linking the United States
rest of the world. Through this
IS U.S. positions on international
tes, cables, and terrestrial systems
iveloped from among competing m-

itside these forma! structures,
lovernment officials welcome in-
[ meetings with interested firms
dividuals who have a specific in-
ional telecommunications problem
simply want to present their
on any issue of importance to
In addition, testimony taken by
essional committees such as this

di les important information and
and the opinions expressed in
journals are given close attention,
inlikely that any significant private
position or opinion is overlooked

., continuous intensive and exten-

-,i Tocess of private sector consulta-
n international telecommunications
js. If this occurs, it is because the
)r individual has failed to make use
many channels of communications
the government which are
ible.

INTELSAT and INMARSAT
Procurement

A primary interest of the U.S. space in-
dustry is selling products and services to
the international satellite organizations.

Article XIII of the INTELSAT
agreement provides that procurement of
goods or services shall be "effected by
the award of contracts, based on
responses to open international invita-
tions to tender, to bidders offering the
best combination of quality, price and
the most favorable delivery time." The
responsibility for carrying out this provi-
sion is borne by the INTELSAT
Secretariat, under the direction of the
Board of Governors. Equivalent provi-
sions are contained in the INMARSAT
convention.

U.S. industry has done well in com-
petition for INTELSAT procurement. In
October 1983, the director general-
designate of INTELSAT informed the
Subcommittee en Arms Control, Oceans,
International Operations, and Environ-
ment of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that since 1964 over 2,500
contracts had been awarded some 600
U.S. firms with a total value of $3,365
billion. This is not surprising given the
lead of U.S. space and launch
technologies. American spacecraft
manufacturers and launch service pro-
viders are actively participating in bids
for the second generation INMARSAT
system. The U.S. Government has been
assisting U.S. industry in this effort.

The FCC did examine whether
COMSAT would have advantages over
other U.S. firms in INTELSAT procure-
ment as part of its 1980 study. It found
several examples because of its activities
as technical adviser to INTELSAT and
its knowledge of specific development.
This was an element in the decision to
split COMSAT into monopoly and com-
petitive components.

It is a responsibility of the U.S.
Government to ensure that all American
firms are offered equal opportunities to
compete for INTELSAT and
INMARSAT procurement. We take this
responsibility seriously and will continue
to offer U.S. industry assistance to this
end.

COMSAT'S Representation of
U.S. Policy

Can there be conflicts between
COMSAT'S corporate interests and U.S.
national or public interest, and what
would happen if this occurs?

We are actually progressing through
such a potential situation. INTELSAT
has energetically campaigned against

U.S. approval of non-INTELSAT inter-
national satellite systems. COMSAT
shares with INTELSAT an interest in
maintaining a monopoly on transoceanic
international communication satellite
services. While expressing its own view
as a signatory, COMSAT has carried out
instructions to inform the INTELSAT
Board and Meeting of Signatories
that the U.S. Government viewed
INTELSAT'S intervention in the
domestic consideration of applications
before the FCC as premature and inap-
propriate and the publication of leaked
U.S. policy papers as improper.

COMSAT has a variety of obliga-
tions to its stockholders, its customers,
and to the public by virtue of its role as
signatory to the satellite organization
agreements. By providing for U.S.
Government oversight and instructions.
Congress was aware that these obliga-
tions could be in conflict. In the exercise
of oversight, we do not rely on COM-
SAT to define what is the U.S. national
interest and public interest; we make
that determination and instruct accord-
ingly. We believe this is the prudent
thing to do.

In regard to the proposal that the
President appoint a government
representative to participate in all of
COMSAT'S activities with respect to
INTELSAT and INMARSAT, we
believe "activities" is too broad a term
that seems to include every COMSAT
contact with the organizations. While
such an expansive provision in our view
is unnecessary, more narrowly drawn
provisions may be useful.

Competition With INTELSAT

Technological developments in the past
several years have opened the doors to
more competition in telecommunications
services in our domestic market. It was
inevitable that these same forces would
press upon the international provision of
these services.

The applicants to the FCC for non-
INTELSAT systems have made many
arguments why their projects would not
significantly damage the INTELSAT
global systems. Some assert that their
designs for innovative new services
would benefit INTELSAT by developing
new markets which INTELSAT can also
serve in the future without risking
capital needed for the expansion of
global basic telecommunications services.
These arguments merit consideration by
ourselves and the world community.

In our deliberations of proposals for
non-INTELSAT international com-
munication satellite systems, we should

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

be aware that a number of regional non-
INTELSAT satellite systems are being
implemented by INTELSAT members.
The policy question we face is not
whether regional systems are incompati-
ble with INTELSAT obligations but
whether U.S. participation in such
systems, particularly across the North
Atlantic, would undermine the viability
of the global system. It is this search for
a possible accommodation between com-
petition with all of its potential benefits
and the preservation of a viable global
system, with its known benefits, that
has preoccupied executive branch
policymakers. We hope and believe such
an accommodation can be achieved.

Transatlantic Fiber Optic Cable

Officials of INTELSAT for good reasons
regard fiber optic cables as a major com-
petitive threat. The decision to build a
U.S. -Europe fiber optic submarine cable
has acknowledged the potential of this
new cable technology. The international
impact of the eighth transatlantic
telephone cable (TAT-8) has become evi-
dent long before its planned entry into
service in 1988. For the first time since
the launch of "Early Bird" in 1965 — the
inauguration of commercial satellite
communications across the Atlantic — the
cable will become competitive with
satellites for certain transoceanic
services.

Contract awards in mid-November
1983 for TAT-8 reflected the U.S. lead
in fiber optic communications
technology. The 29-nation consortium of
telecommunications administrations (in-
cluding AT&T [American Telephone and
Telegraph Company] and other U.S.
companies for the United States) that
will own the cable awarded the major
portion of the contract — $250
million — to AT&T communications. The
remainder of the $335 million total in-
vestment will be split between the
United Kingdom's Standard Telephone
and Cables Limited and France's SUB-
MARCOM. The link will span some
6,500 kilometers (3,900 miles) between
Tuckerton, New Jersey, and Wide-
mouth, United Kingdom, and Penmarch,
France, with the cable branching at the
edge of Europe's continental shelf.

TAT-8 will represent state-of-the-art
technology, which is considerably more
advanced than the long distance fiber
optic networks AT&T installed along the
Northeast corridor of the United States
and in California last year. It will differ
from its predecessor cables in several
critical respects.

• TAT-8 will be the first transatlan-
tic digital— as opposed to

analog — undersea link. Voice sounds are
not sent as direct electrical signals
(analog), but instead are converted by
computers into bits (binary digits) repre-
senting zeros and ones, transformed into
pulses of laser light, transmitted
through the special glass optical fibers in
discrete bunches, and reconstructed by
computers into a conventional analog
signal at the other end.

• The cable, made up of only three
pairs of optical fibers, will be able to
handle up to 40,000 conversations
simultaneously — about four times the
volume of either TAT-6 or TAT-7,
which entered service in 1976 and 1983,
respectively. The large capacity will
make TAT-8 competitive with the most
advanced communications satellite,
INTELSAT VI, which is scheduled for
launch in 1986.

• Light beam repeater/regenerators
will be spaced at 20-mile intervals along
the cable, compared with 5 miles for the
older systems, and be able to process
the data flow more than 3 times faster.

• The cable will be able to stretch
by up to 2% without breaking (3 to 4
times more than terrestrial cable), in-
creasing its survivability in case of sub-
marine landslides like those that severed
three cables across the North Atlantic in
1929.

• The light-beam-generating laser-
diode transmitters are expected to be
trouble-free for 25 years. 15 years
longer than the projected life span of the
new communications satellites.

Transmission lines and switching
equipment in the United States, Japan,
and most of Europe are being changed
to accommodate digital transmission in a
sweeping transformation of the
developed world's telecommunications
system. TAT-8 could become, along
with satellites, a key link in the planned
global integrated services digital net-
work.

The fact that TAT-8 can make
multiple landing points raises the
economic stakes. Cable landings are an
important source of revenue for nations
involved, since they:

• Allow significant potential reduc-
tions in telecommunications operational
costs,

• Allow the sales of services to
other countries through routing of traf-
fic and cable maintenance, and

• Make economically feasible links
to route traffic to third countries, an op-
tion which might not have been viable
with local traffic alone.

Although the "bident" landing apt
proach has been taken, the addition c
third link to TAT-8 has been left ope
The extra cost of a southern landing
and the supporting revenue remain t
determining factors. The Department
continuing to monitor this considerat

Although opinions differ, many i
perts regard optical fibers as intrinsji
ly superior to satellite radio commuij
tions for point-to-point voice transmi
sions over busy routes, and for secuj
and privacy as well.

Satellites are likely to remain m« k
competitive in applications that reqij ;
wide-band communications channels,
such as business data transmissions,
distribution of television programs,
videoconferencing, and in the ability
satellites to provide direct services t
consumer premises. Satellites also hi
the edge for point-to-point transmiss
over thin routes, such as links to am
within developing countries. But for
present bread-and-butter business ol
ternational communications satellite
the introduction of fiber optic cables
poses a significant economic and
technological challenge.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I can assure you that
Department of State is very much a
of the challenges in the field of inte
tional telecommunications policy. W
the LI.S. Government and industry ■
be justly proud of their past contrib
tions, we must continuously seek in
national agreement to permit the ir
national system to benefit from rap
advancements in equipment and sei
ices. The participation of our privat
sector is essential to this process. \
cannot unilaterally change internat
policies, but our leadership in teiec(
munications technology is universal
recognized and the world is closely
watching our response to the chanj
technological environment. We hav
already witnessed in some countrie
moves to open the telecommunicati jfi
sector to more competition. As the
benefits of these policies spread, w
should experience a more ready ac( Jjf,;
ance of less regulation and more pi
competitive policies in Internationa femsi
telecommunications. We will contir nf
work toward this goal. y\

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'The complete transcript of the hea
will be publisned by the committee and
be available from the Superintendent o
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

'CTH ASIA

[ihanistan

found

mber 1979, the Soviet Union in-
fghanistan, executed Marxist
inister Hafizullah Amin, and in-
;he puppet regime of Babrak
to head the Democratic RepubHc
anistan (DRA). The DRA was
ihed following the "Great Saur
-evolution," the 1978 Marxist
at overthrew President Moham-
.oud and named Noor Mohammad
as President of the Revolutionary
and Prime Minister. Taraki was
ly Amin in a coup d'etat in
ber 1979.

osition to the Marxist govern-
[eveloped almost immediately
e April 1978 coup and subse-
spread throughout Afghanistan,
istance continues today in the
f a countrjTvide insurgency
; the Soviets and the DRA by the
ajority of Afghan people. The

with 110,000-115,000 troops,
ot succeeded in their attempts to
ss the Afghan resistance or to
an effective Afghan Army and
sh the authority of the Karmal
ment.

ti Resistance Groups

c Afghan resistance, or mujahidin
warriors"), groups maintain their
il headquarters in Peshawar,
an. United in their desire to rid
ountry of the Soviets, they are
1 by ideologies and personalities
ajor and minor factions, loosely
;d into two alliances — the
rates" and the "fundamentalists."
16 morale of the Afghan freedom
"S remains high, with their
th against the Soviets increasing,
"ontrol 75% of the countryside and
r better armed and trained than
. The resistance has become par-
ly effective against Soviet/DRA
' convoys, and Soviet helicopter
rcraft losses have risen significant-
less the Soviets substantially in-
' the size of their army in
nistan, the military stalemate will
aie, and the Soviets will be unable
eat this determined and resilient
f. Faced with growing opposition,
Dviets have turned to increasingly
tactics, including reprisals against
mbatants, as a means of wearing
civilian support for the resistance.

Afghan Refugees

The 2-3 million Afghan refugees in
Pakistan, located in some 348 camps in
the border areas of the Northwest Fron-
tier and Baluchistan Provinces, con-
stitute the world's largest refugee
population.

Since the international relief effort
began in 1980, the U.S. Government has
contributed more than $350 million for
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. These
funds are channeled primarily through
the world food program and the office of
the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), which has overall
responsibility for coordinating inter-
national contributions. Other contribu-
tions are made to the International
Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)
and U.S. voluntary agencies working
among the refugees.

With the roughly 1.5 million
Afghans in Iran, about half of them
refugees, the estimated number of
Afghans in exile is now well over 3.5
million, more than 20% of the entire
prewar Afghan population. Many
refugees continue to leave Afghanistan
and will do so as long as the Soviet oc-
cupation continues. The rate has slowed
somewhat due to the large numbers that
already have fled abroad, but each major
Soviet operation brings a new influx of
refugees into Pakistan.

UN Efforts

Since January 1980, the UN General
Assembly has approved overwhelmingly
five resolutions calling for a settlement
in Afghanistan based on the removal of
Soviet forces, the independent and
nonaligned status for Afghanistan, self-
determination for the Afghan people,
and the return of the refugees with safe-
ty and honor.

To achieve these goals, UN
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has
appointed Diego Cordovez, Under
Secretary for Special Political Affairs,
as his personal representative in an in-
direct negotiating process that seeks a
political settlement. This process of con-
sultations in the region and indirect
talks in Geneva includes the DRA
regime and the Pakistan Government
with the Soviets unofficially involved.
Although all parties want the UN proc-
ess to continue, their positions remain
far apart, and prospects for a political
settlement are not promising.

Soviet Position

The Soviets justify their continuing
presence in Afghanistan with the claim
that a limited contingent of Soviet
troops was invited into Afghanistan by a
friendly government. This assertion ig-
nores the fact that the head of this
government, Hafizullah Amin, was ex-
ecuted by the Soviets and Babrak Kar-

Afghan Attacks on Pakistan

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
AUG. 23, 1984'

On a number of occasions over the
course of the past week, aircraft, ar-
tillery, and rocket launchers based in
Afghanistan carried out a series of
brutal violations of Pakistan's territorial
sovereignty which cost the lives of near-
ly 50 innocent persons, injured a large
number, and destroyed property.

The United States deplores these at-
tacks on Pakistan, a nation whose in-
dependence and territorial integrity we
have long supported. We call upon the
Soviet Union and its Kabul clients to put
an end to these actions.

These attacks once again highlight
the tragedy and suffering caused by the
Soviet Union's effort to subjugate the
Afghan nation and people and to in-

timidate Afghanistan's neighbors. These
actions have brought death, misery, and
exile to millions of innocent Afghan
men, women, and children. We believe it
is vital that an orderly withdrawal of
Soviet forces be achieved, thereby end-
ing the repression in Afghanistan.

We call upon the Soviet Union to
permit genuine progress in the talks
about to resume in Geneva so that
Soviet forces are withdrawn from
Afghanistan and Afghans may be per-
mitted to establish their own govern-
ment. This would create the conditions
in Afghanistan for the citizens of that
country, including the millions who are
now refugees elsewhere, to return to
live in peace in their own land.

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

TERRORISM

mal installed in his place, and ignores
the right of the Afghan people to self-
determination.

The Soviets insist that the with-
drawal of their forces is a bilateral mat-
ter between them and the Kabul regime,
to take place only with Kabul's "agree-
ment"— an unlikely eventuality since the
regime could not survive without the
Soviet military presence. The central
element of the Soviet/ DRA conditions
for a political settlement is the cessation
of outside interference, for which the
Soviets name the United States as the
major source. The Soviets stress the
need for international guarantees to ac-
company the required pledges of non-
interference—but not withdrawal of
their forces— in effect asking the outside
world to secure the end of Afghan re-
sistance as a precondition to Soviet
withdrawal.

U.S. Position

President Reagan has said: "We seek the
removal of Soviet military forces so that
the Afghan people can live freely in
their own country and are able to choose
their own way of life and government."
The United States strongly opposes the
continuing Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, and the issue remains
significant in East- West relations.

Although in our view Soviet with-
drawal is the key, we believe that a
resettlement also must provide for the
other three requirements spelled out in
the UN General Assembly Afghanistan
resolutions. Such an agreement could
also include appropriate international
guarantees of the settlement's stability.
The United States supports the UN
negotiating effort of indirect talks to
achieve these goals.

Taken from the GIST series of August 1984,

gublished by the Bureau of Public Affairs,
lepartment of State. Editor: Harriet
Culley. ■

International Terrorism:
A Long Twilight Struggle

by Robert M. Sayre

Address before the Foreign Policy
Association in New York on August 15,
198U- Ambassador Sayre is Director of
the Office for Counterterrorisvi and
Emergency Planning.

Now the trumpet summons us again— not as
a call to bear arms, although arms we need;
not as a call to battle; though embattled we
are; but a call to bear the burden of a long
twilight struggle, year in and year out, "re-
joicing in hope, patient in tribulation," a
struggle against the common enemies of man:
tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.

These words expressed by an
American president more than two
decades ago are a very appropriate in-
troduction to a discussion of political
violence and terrorism because we are
asked "to bear the burden of a long
twilight struggle, year in and year out,
'rejoicing in hope, patient in
tribulation.' "

The problem is real enough, especial-
ly for those engaged in the diplomatic
profession. The problem has been grow-
ing since 1968. Although the total
number of incidents has been almost the
same for the past 5 years, 1983 stood
out from the rest because of sheer
violence. In 1983 there were more vic-
tims (some 1,925) and more U.S.
casualties (387) from international ter-
rorist acts than ever before. The Middle
East dominated the global terrorism
scene although the region ranked third
after Western Europe and Latin
America in the number of incidents. The
United States was the target in 40% of
the cases and diplomats in general in
52% of the cases. The figures so far in
1984 suggest a significant increase— in-
cidents in the first 6 months are running
25% ahead of 1983.

These incidents of international ter-
rorism are only the tip of the iceberg of
worldwide political violence and probably
represent no more than 1% of the total.

Beyond the statistics, there are
other reasons why recent events are
disturbing. The accent is on killing peo-
ple. Such imprecise weapons as vehicle
bombs have been used to produce mass
casualties. So were the bombs placed
aboard commercial aircraft. Terrorists
have become less discriminating and are

more willing to target low-level vict
when the high-level victims prove fj
well protected.

What has become particularly j
turbing to us and our allies in the »
year is the extent to which states
themselves have increasingly used i
intelligence services and other agei
of government to engage directly ii
rorist activity. This concern promp
the issuance of the London declara
on terrorism at the recent meeting
the summit seven. The weight of tl
evidence is that Syria and Iran wei
directly involved in the three majoi
bombing incidents in the Middle Ei
1983— the destruction of the Amer
Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait oi
April 18 and December 12 and the
bombing of the Marine barracks in
Beirut on October 23. Members of
North Korean military carried out
bombing in Rangoon that killed m;
members of the South Korean Cab
Members of the Libyan "Embassy'
in London opened fire on a peacef
demonstration and killed a British
policewoman.

As tragic as specific events ar
human terms, the end objective oi
events was to force governments
change their policies and to destal
governments. If states practicing
rorism are successful in that objec
we can expect more such efforts,
must demonstrate to them that tl f
not an effective way to conduct
diplomacy. Giving in to such activ f"'
also sends signals to others who n -"
tempted to be venturesome and a
gressive. So we must be mindful
only of the immediate effects of t
rorism but its longer range and b
consequences.

Any event in isolation may nc
threaten our security. But it mus
priority policy concern when stati
lively engage in terrorist acts ag;
us; when states like the Soviet U:
provide training, arms, and other
and indirect support to nations ai
groups that engage in terrorism;
when the pattern of terrorism ag
the United States and its allies is
centrated in Western Europe, th(
die East, and the Caribbean area
of course, are areas of strategic i
tance to the United States and es |«tii
to NATO defense. «!;

•Ill)

[10

B
ltd

TERRORISM

Ivould not want to suggest by
ithting the events of the past year
; I ISO of particular concern to the
111 Stales that these are the only
,(is for terrorism. Some engage in
t activity for irredentist reasons
s the Basques in Spain, the Arme-
.gainst the Turks, and others,
us differences are a key factor in
ife in northern Ireland, in the
,cy of Iran, and the civil war in
on. These events disturb our rela-
ith other countries and in total
eate an atmosphere of instability
security in the world.

lesponse

lad outlines, we have a significant
■m of political violence that is
ed primarily against the Western

racies and our interests. The prin-
.arget is the United States, and it
:en for some years. States have
le more actively involved in pro-
g and supporting this violence as a
3 of influencing our policy. What
)ne do about it?

ur first response is, of course, to
d ourselves. We are in the process
Droving security at our diplomatic
around the world, first at the
3t risk posts. We have made a

effort to improve emergency plan-
)y our Embassies, to work more
y with the American community in

ountry, and to train our personnel

on how to handle such problems,
ave made a good beginning, but we
a considerable distance to go.
^e have sought to expand coopera-
vith other countries both on a com-
ipproach to the problem as well as
actical measures to deal with it.
Jnited Nations has developed con-
Dns to deal with specific types of
rist activity. Thus there are conven-
on aircraft hijacking and sabotage,
rrorist acts against protected per-
and on the taking of hostages. The
dent is seeking legislation from the
ress to implement fully all of our
litments under these conventions
jll as fill other gaps in existing
ation. Efforts in the United Na-
to have a general convention on
uppression of terrorism have
iered on the definition of terrorism,
ummit seven countries have con-
ted considerably to developing a
y consensus on dealing with ter-
m through their declarations on the
king of commercial aircraft, the
jction of diplomats, and more
itly the London declaration on deal-
vith state-supported terrorism.

We have strengthened greatly the
collection of intelligence on terrorist ac-
tivities and the exchange of information
with our friends and allies.

The Congress approved last year
and we are now implementing a training
program for foreign law enforcement of-
ficers to deal with all types of terrorist
activity. This program will promote a
stronger international consensus on the
threat terrorism poses and how we and
our friends and allies can deal with it. It
will also improve communications and
strengthen ties among law enforcement
officials generally.

We believe that we have made
substantial progress within the U.S.
Government on an effective response to
terrorist attacks and have also
developed a good working relationship
with our allies. Much more can and
should be done on defensive measures.

Events of 1983, however, persuaded
us that a good defense posture was not
adequate. We need to improve our
capabilities, especially intelligence, to
prevent terrorist states and groups from
undertaking attacks. Within the United
States we have, with effective police
work, been rather successful in pre-
empting terrorist activity. Other coun-
tries, such as Italy and the Federal
Republic of Germany, have also had con-
siderable success in identifying terrorist
groups and preventing terrorist acts.
Without in anyway minimizing the dif-
ficulties, we believe with greater effort
and resources that it should be possible
to prevent many of the terrorist attacks
against us in other countries.

Conclusions

Having lived with the issues for almost 3
years, reading daily intelligence reports,
studying intelligence on the subject,
responding to dozens of incidents and
helping to resolve them, considering
various policy options, and working
within the U.S. Government and with
our allies on ways to deal with the prob-
lem, I have naturally come to a few con-
clusions.

• Terrorism is politically motivated
and is planned and organized. It is a
mixed picture as to the states and
groups that engage in it. Most of it is
carried out by states and groups of
Marxist-Leninist persuasion, and the
Soviet Union and its Eastern-bloc part-
ners lend support and comfort to them.
The Soviet Union continues to do this
because it considers it in its interest to
do so. If the Soviet Union would stop

providing military training, equipment,
and other support, there would be a
significant drop in terrorist activity.
There are other major actors such as
Islamic fundamentalist groups supported
by Iran. A considerable amount of the
terrorism even in Western Europe
stems from the turmoil in the Middle
East, and if there were a peaceful settle-
ment there, it would contribute to a
drop in terrorist activity.

• Given the nature and motivation
of most of the groups and states engag-
ing in terrorism, it is not surprising that
the Western democracies, and especially
the United States, are the primary
targets.

• Given these conclusions, it is not
likely that there will be any general
agreement within the United Nations on
the suppression of terrorist activity.

• Rather, the United States and its
friends and allies will be most effective
with good intelligence and the sharing of
that information, improved defense
measures, more effective police work,
and preemption of terrorist acts
whenever and wherever possible. Shar-
ing of technical knowledge on dealing
with terrorism through the training of
foreign law enforcement officers is an
essential element in any effective pro-
gram. Combatting terrorism is essen-
tially a police and not a military matter.

• Stronger international cooperation
both bilaterally and multilaterally is
essential. The international community
has to recognize the problem first before
we can deal with it effectively. The Lon-
don declaration that identifies state ac-
tions as a major cause of terrorist activi-
ty is a major step forward.

• We will have to learn to use effec-
tively both diplomacy and force and in
ways that reinforce each other. We will
not have the luxury of clear-cut situa-
tions. In dealing with terrorism on a
global basis, we will have to be very
discriminating and know when our in-
terests are being threatened and when
they are not. Our opponents in seeking
to achieve their objectives will delib-
erately confuse the issues and try to
keep the threshold below what they
believe we conceive to be our vital in-
terests.

• It is possible to deal with ter-
rorism on a legal basis. There is no need
to resort to extralegal measures. Italy,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and
we have all been very successful with
aggressive law enforcement. Any at-
tempt to deal with it outside the law

TREATIES

helps the terrorists achieve their objec-
tives and leads to very disastrous results
as we have seen in Argentina and
Uruguay.

• An effective program against ter-
rorism requires the employment of
substantial resources. We have to accept
that fact and provide the resources. The
Federal Government alone, for example,
spent some $65 million on security at
the Olympic Games in Los Angeles.
Local jurisdictions spent substantial ad-
ditional sums. The games were not only
a major success as an international
sports event but they were very peaceful
and demonstrated beyond any doubt
that the Soviet assertions about poor
security were phony.

• Most of the terrorism against the
United States occurs overseas. We need
to strengthen our efforts to deal with it
there, including the root causes, or we
run the substantial risk that it will grow
and spread into the United States.

• We have been reluctant to apply
sufficient resources to deal with ter-
rorism, possibly because we hoped that
the problem was temporary. WTiile we
have prepared for the larger challenges
of conventional or nuclear war, our op-
ponents have nibbled at us in Europe,
the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America with low-level warfare. The
events of 1983 brought home to us very
clearly that we will have to cope with
terrorism for some time to come and we
need to make certain that we are
organized and apply the resources
needed to do that. The facts suggest
that the problem will continue to grow.
We are, indeed, engaged in a long
twilight struggle. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington
Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23,
1961. TIAS 4780.
Accession deposited: Cuba, Aug. 16, 1984.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc-
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Canberra
Sept. 27, 1983 at the 12th Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting. Enters into force when
approved by all contracting parties whose
representatives were entitled to participate.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1983, with
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982.
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983.
Ratifications deposited: Angola, .June 20,
1984; Federal Republic of Germany, July 12,
1984'; Paraguay, June 15. 1984.

Commodities — Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980.2
Ratifications deposited: Cape Verde, July 30,
1984; Greece, Aug. 10, 1984.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International

Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Done at Bretton Woods Conference

July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27

1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance deposited : St.

Christopher & Nevis, Aug. 15, 1984.

Articles of agreement of the International
Monetary Fund. Done at Bretton Woods Con-
ference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force
Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1.501.
Signature and acceptance deposit ed: St.
Christopher & Nevis, Aug. 15, 1984".

Jute

International agreement on jute and jute
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at
Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force pro-
visionally Jan. 9, 1984.
Accession deposited: Switzerland, June 19,
1984.

Patents— Plant Varieties

International convention for the protection of
new varieties of plants.of Dec. 2, 1961, as re-
vised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. Entered
into force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS 10199.
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Aug. 2,
1984.3

Pollution

Convention for the protection and develop-
ment of the marine environment of the wider
Caribbean region, with annex. Done at Car-
tagena Mar. 24, 1983.2
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Aug. 9, 1984.

Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Un
Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered
force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS .5881.
Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14,

Additional protocol to the Constitution i
Universal Postal Union. Done at Tokyo
Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July
1971, except for Art. V which entered I
force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. ^

Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 11'

Second additional protocol to the Constii

of the Universal Postal Union. Done at

Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into for

Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14,

Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, July i

1984.

General regulations of the Universal Pq
Union, with final protocol and annex, ar
universal postal convention with final pi
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at 1
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into fore
July 1, 1981; except for Art. 124 of the
general regulations which became effec
Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 9972.
Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14,
Approval deposited: Thailand, July 3, T
Ratifications deposited: Bahamas, July
1984; Lebanon, July 18, 1984; Philippir
June 28, 1984; Sri Lanka July 20, 1984
Uruguay, June 21, 1984.

Money orders and postal traveler's che(
agreement, with detailed regulations w
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro
Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July
1981. TIAS 9973.

Approval deposited: Thailand, July 3, 1
Ratifications deposited: Lebanon, July
1984; Sri Lanka, July 20, 1984; Urugu;
June 21, 1984.

Property— Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intc
tual Property Organization. Done at Si
holm July 14, 1967. Entered into force
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25,
TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Cyprus, July 26,

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977,

annexes, as extended (TIAS 9664, 104

Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered

force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978; defini

Jan. 2, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Venezuela, Au}

1984.

lit;

tsi

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendices an
protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 197£
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982; defin
for the U.S. Oct. 27, 1983.
Approvals depo.sited: Jamaica, June 1,
Republic of Korea, May 11, 1984.

Trade

Arrangement regarding international
textiles. Done at Geneva Dec. 20, 197
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1974. TIAS ill

1»[
ill*
tl!i

lite

Kit

TREATIES

iMeiiding the arrangement regard-
national trade in textiles of Dec. 20,

extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done
'a Dee. 22, 1981. Entered into force
982. TIAS 10323.
ices deposited: Norway, July 1,

lents to the schedule to the interna-
nvention for the regulation of whal-

(TIAS 1849). Adopted at Buenos
ne 22, 1984. Enters into force Oct. 8,
less any contracting party lodges an

)tocol for the further extension of the
ade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered
e July 1, 1983.«

itocol for the further extension of the
convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015).
Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered
e July 1, 1983.«
Is deposited: France, Aug. 13, 1984.

[ealth Organization

tion of the World Health Organiza-
ie at New York July 22, 1946.

into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the U.S.

1948. TIAS 1808.
ice deposited: Kiribati, July 26, 1984.

5RAL

ment for the conduct of a balloon
1 in Australia for scientific purposes,
it Washington and Canberra June 27
9, 1984. Enters into force upon ex-
)f notes.

agreement on air transport services,
morandum of consultation [dated
rton, June 14, 1984]. Effected by ex-
jf notes at Brasilia July 11, 1984.
into force July 11, 1984.

•elating to the Skagit River and Ross
id the Seven Mile Reservoire on the
)reille River, with annex. Signed at
rton Apr. 2, 1984.^
by the President: Aug. 27, 1984.

'.ica

tion treaty, with exchange of notes,
it San Jose Dec. 4, 1982.2
idvice and consent to ratification:
, 1984.
by the President:

Aug. 17, 1984.

tion for the avoidance of double taxa-
I the prevention of fiscal evasion with
to taxes on estates, inheritances,
id certain other transfers. Signed at
gton Apr. 27, 1983.^
advice and consent to ratification:
1984.'

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement of
Jan. 23, 1984, as amended, for the sale of
agricultural commodities. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Washington Aug. 2,
1984. Entered into force Aug. 2, 1984.

European Economic Community

Agreement extending the agreement of
F'eb. 15, 1977, concerning fisheries off the
coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8598). Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington June 27,
1984. Entered into force July 30, 1984; effec-
tive July 1, 1984.

Gabon

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Libre-
ville July 25 and Aug. 2, 1984. Entered into
force Aug. 2, 1984.

Grenada

General agreement for economic, technical,
and related assistance. Signed at Grenada
May 7, 1984. Entered into force May 7, 1984.

Guatemala

Agreement for the sales of agricultural com-
modities, with memorandum of understand-
ing. Signed at Guatemala Aug. 1, 1984.
Enters into force upon exchange of notes
confirming that the internal procedures of
the importing country have been met.

Guinea

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
IMET program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Conakry Mar. 29, 1983, and Feb. 13,
1984. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1984.

Haiti

Agreement for the interdiction of narcotics
trafficking. Signed at Port-au-Prince Aug. 22,
1984. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1984; ef-
fective Oct. 1, 1983.

India

Agreement amending and extending memo-
randum of understanding of July 18, 1978
(TIAS 9285), concerning furnishing of launch-
ing and associated services for Indian na-
tional satellite system (INSAT)-l spacecraft.
Signed at Washington and Bangalore Apr. 10
and 25, 1984.

Entered into force: July 31, 1984; effective
Jan. 1, 1984.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the arrangement of
Oct. 1 and 15, 1979 (TIAS 9667), relating to
a visa system for exports of cotton, wool, and
manmade fiber apparel manufactured in Indo-
nesia. Effected by exchange of notes at
Jakarta June 1 and 14, 1984. Entered into
force June 14, 1984.

Ireland

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington

July 13, 1983.2

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: Aug. 10, 1984.

Italy

Extradition treaty. Signed at Rome Oct. 13,

1983.2

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: Aug. 10, 1984.

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat-
ters, with memorandum of understanding.
Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982.2
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
June 28, 1984.
Ratified by the President: Aug. 16, 1984.

Jamaica

Extradition treaty. Signed at Kingston

June 14, 1983.2

Se nate advice and consent to ratification:

Jilne 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: Aug. 17, 1984.

Agreement for the furnishing of commodities
and services in connection with the peace-
keeping force for Grenada. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Kingston Nov. 29 and
Dec. 6, 1983. Entered into force Dec. 6,
1983.

Agreement amending the air transport agree-
ment of Oct. 2, 1969, as amended (TIAS
6770, 9613). Effected by exchange of notes at
Kingston July 17 and 23, 1984. Entered into
force July 23, 1984.

Japan

Agreement concerning Japan's financial con-
tribution for U.S. administrative and related
expenses for 1984 (JFY) pursuant to the
mutual defense assistance agreement of
Mar. 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Tokyo July 20, 1984.
Entered into force July 20, 1984.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of
Dec. 1, 1982 (TIAS 10611), relating to trade
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles
and textile products. Effected by exchange of
letters at Washington July 26 and 27, 1984.
Entered into force July 27, 1984.

Liberia

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or
guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its
agencies, with annexes and implementing
agreement regarding payments due under
PL 480 agricultural commodity agreements,
with annexes. Signed at Monrovia June 22,
1984. Entered into force July 27, 1984.

Mauritius

Agreement amending the agreement of
Dec. 30, 1982, for the sale of agricultural
commodities (TIAS 10628). Effected by ex-
change of letters at Port Louis Mar. 29 and
July 4, 1984. Entered into force July 4, 1984.

Morocco

Agreement amending the agreement of
Feb. 2, 1984, for the sale of agricultural com-
modities. Effected by exchange of letters at
Rabat July 5, 1984. Entered into force
July 5, 1984.

CHRONOLOGY

Mozambique

Invesiment incentive agreement. Effected by
exchange of notes at Maputo July 28, 1984.
Enters into force on date Mozambique com-
municates by note to U.S. Government that
exchange of notes has been approved pur-
suant to its constitutional procedures.

Niger

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S.
Government and its agencies, with annexes.
Signed at Niamey June 11, 1984. Entered in-
to force July 24, 1984.

Panama

Agreement relating to wool textiles and tex-
tile products manufactured in Panama, with
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at
Panama Aug. 7 and 21, 1984. Entered into
force Aug. 21, 1984; effective Dec. 1, 1983.

Thailand

Treaty on cooperation in the execution of

penal sentences. Signed at Bangkok Oct. 29,

1982.^

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

Aug. 9, 1984.

Tunisia

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com-
modities relating to the agreement of June 7.
1976 (TIAS 8506). Signed at Tunis June 13,
1984. Entered into force June 13, 1984.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement extending the agreement of
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended, concerning
fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS
8528, 10531). Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington Feb. 28 and Apr. 11, 1984.
Entered into force: July 31, 1984.

Agreement extending the long-term agree-
ment of June 29, 1974 (TIAS 7910), to facili-
tate economic, industrial, and technical
cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington June 15 and 27, 1984. Entered
into force June 27, 1984.

Zaire

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guar-
anteed by, or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed
at Kinshasa May 3, 1984. Entered into force
June 11, 1984.

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage-
ment and protection of investment. Signed at
Washington Aug. 3, 1984. Enters into force
30 days after date of exchange of instru-
ments of ratification.

'Applicable to Berlin (West).

^Not in force.

^P'or the Kingdom in Europe.

■•With declaration.

■''With statement.

'■In force provisionally for the U.S.

'With reservation. ■

August 1984

Note: The editors solicit readers' comments
on the value of the Bulletin s monthly
chronologies. Unless a positive response is
received, the chronologies will be discon-
tinued.

August 1

Representatives of the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow and the Consular Division of the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs exchange
diplomatic notes concluding the latest round
of U.S-Soviet consular review talks.

National security adviser McFarlane, in a
public statement, reaffirms that the U.S. has
accepted the Soviet Union's June 29 proposal
to meet in Vienna and is prepared for serious
talks on outer space, including antisatellite
weapons. He also says the Soviet Union has
repeatedly misrepresented the U.S. position
on such talks suggesting that the Soviets
were not serious about the proposed talks.

At his ranch in Santa Barbara, President
Reagan meets with the Vatican's Archbishop
Pio Laghi to discuss the situation in Poland,
East-West issues, and Central America.

House rejects an Administration request
for $117 million in supplementary military aid
to El Salvador for this fiscal year.

U.S. sends a team of Navy mine-warfare
experts to investigate shipping explosions in
the Red Sea.

August 2-20

Delegates from 135 countries meet in Vienna
for the fourth general conference of the
United Nations Industrial Development
Organization. Ambassador Richard S.
Williamson leads the U.S. delegation.

August 2

A U.S. Marine guard at the Consulate
building in Leningrad is beaten by Soviet
police and jailed for 2 hours. The Marine was
off duty but investigating a suspicious vehicle
that had been circling the Consulate. State
Department acting spokesman Romberg says
the U.S. strongly protested this serious inci-
dent but that the Soviet Union has not given
a satisfactory response.

In New York City, U.S. and Cuban repre-
sentatives end a second round of talks on im-
migration issues, including the return of per-
sons from the 1980 Mariel boatlift. Michael
G. Kozak headed the U.S. delegation.

In Tehran, hijackers of an Air France
Boeing 737 released all passengers and crew,
set off an explosion in the cockpit, and then
surrendered to authorities ending a 2-day
siege. It is discovered that three passengers
aboard are Americans.

USIA Director Wick greets 47 Japanese
exchange students at welcoming ceremonies
at the Department of State.

August 3

U.S. signs a deep seabed mining agreement
with Belgium, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
and the U.K. The agreement is aimed at
avoiding conflicts over deep seabed mine sites
and providing for regular consultations.

In response to Poland's announcement
release 652 political prisoners, President
Reagan lifts the ban on the Polish state
airline LOT and reestablishes full scientifi
exchanges between the U.S. and Poland,

Upper Volta officially changes its nam
to Burkina Faso which means "land of hoi)
men" in the Mossi tribe language. Its new
flag is red and green with a gold star. Th(
people of this West African country will It '
called Burkinabes.

August 6-14

The second International Conference on
Population is held in Mexico City. Am- ■
bassador James L. Buckley heads the U.l
delegation. !

The conference adopts (August 10) a
recommendation that abortion should notft
promoted as a family planning method. ,

On August 11, Ambassador Buckley i
the U.S. will continue its support for the
United Nations Fund for Population Ac-
tivities having received the necessary "con
Crete assurances" that the organization do
not engage in or provide funding for abon
or coercive family planning programs.

The conference adopts (August 14) thi
text of the Mexico City Declaration on
Population and Development, as well as 8
recommendations to further implement th
World Population Plan of Action approve
Bucharest in 1974.

August 6

Department of State issues warning to
travelers to Leningrad that their rights a
foreign tourists and the protections affor
them under the U.S. -U.S.S.R. consular cci
vention are not being respected by Soviei™*
authorities.

August 7

At the request of Egyptian President
Mubarek, the U.S. Navy sends mine-swe
helicopters and about 200 servicemen to
search the Gulf of Suez area for explosiv i
that have damaged commercial shipping.

Uganda suspends its international
military education and training (IMET) f; "
gram with the U.S. and bars a U.S. milili 'Be
attache from visiting the country to help !''s
minister the program in response to reci '■'"
U.S. criticism of human rights abuses in [' ' •
Uganda.

At an African-Arab solidarity confer '
in Tunisia, PLO leader Arafat urges An '•
adopt "rigorous positions" against the U *'■

August 8

Iran accuses U.S. and Israel of placing r |frB»
in the Red Sea in a "conspiracy" to disct ilkt
Teheran's Islamic government.

In a letter to Congress, President Rliajs
reports that U.S. nonproliferation initial' lny;
in 1983 had a positive contribution to th
goal of preventing "the further spread o
nuclear explosives."

Seven Afghans, wounded in fighting fwm
caused by the Soviet Union's occupation
their country, arrive in the U.S. for trej
ment at Walter Reed Army Medical Cei fwJIi
The mission is sponsored by the private
Americas Foundation.

^ ('i)r

CHRONOLOGY

d the U.K. announce they will join
1 for explosives in the Red Sea and
,ez at the request of Egypt.
laS grees to help Belgium purchase a
Sir ade high technology lathe for the
in rmy to avoid its sale to the Soviet

approves an extra $70 million in
id to El Salvador for the remaining

oviet Union travel agency, In-
Jt. Jls the State Department's
travel advisory about Leningrad
ill intentioned."

Cuba agree to improve trade,
i ind technological relations despite
IS in international matters.

Angeles Summer Olympics conclude.
222 gold medals were awarded
is 16-day event. U.S. athletes win a
74 medals, of which 83 are gold.

Reagan and Secretary Shultz meet
t an Foreign Minister Andreotti while

igeles.
" holds swearing in ceremony of its

ament.

1 jartment acting spokesman

says the review process has begun
«jjiine whether Rabbi Kahane should

S. citizenship after being sworn in
i^iber of the Israeli Parliament.

15-16

Sdor Shlaudeman meets with Nicara-
ie Minister of Foreign Affairs Tinoco
inillo, Mexico, for the fourth round of

Jt Reagan says the U.S. will consider
; its participation in the United Na-
.3iference on Women at Nairobi,
I, ' the conference adopts a measure
r Zionism with racism,
ihd notifies the U.S. of its willingness
T talks on the lifting of some U.S. eco-
: notions.

8l7

■( 'niony commemorating August 1,
f the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw
n atjainst Nazi occupation. President
iKays the U.S. rejects "the interpreta-
ne Yalta agreement that suggests
n consent for the division of Europe
eres of influence." He expresses his
lation to "press for full compliance"
jreement, especially free elections.
ta agreement was signed in February
President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin,
ne Minister Churchill.

The UN Security Council approves, by a
vote of 13 in favor and 2 abstentions (U.S.
and the U.K.), a resolution that rejects and
declares "null and void" the constitutional
changes made by South Africa.

August 18

In response to President Reagan's statement
of August 17 regarding the Yalta agreement,
the Soviet Union accuses President Reagan
of distorting history and defaming the Soviet
Union and Poland.

August 19

Uganda says that about 15,000 people have
been killed in political and tribal violence
since 1981, disputing Assistant Secretary
Abrams testimony of August 9 that 100,000
people have been killed by the military.

August 20

Greece cancels a joint military exercise with
the U.S. in northern Greece saying it
perceives no threats from its Warsaw Pact
neighbors.

August 21-22

At the CDE session in Stockholm, U.S. and
Soviet Union conduct talks on ways to
enhance security, build confidence, and pre-
vent surprise attack in Europe. Ambassador
James E. Goodby heads the U.S. delegation.

August 21

State Department acting spokesman
Romberg expresses U.S. regret of Greece's
decision to cancel a joint military exercise in
the Aegean Sea. He adds that the U.S. does
not agree with the Greek reasons for justify-
ing the cancellation.

August 22

President Reagan signs a bill that includes
$503 million in economic and military aid to
Central America; $70 million of the aid will
go to El Salvador.

State Department acting spokesman
Romberg says the U.S. deplores recent at-
tacks on Pakistan made from Afghanistan
and calls upon the Soviet Union and the
Kabul regime to end these actions.

State Department acting spokesman
Romberg reaffirms U.S. relations with
Australia and support of ANZUS after
reports of concern regarding the Administra-
tion's current views on these issues.

For the first time in 28 years. South
Africa holds its first round of elections to
choose representatives for people of mixed
race. In South Africa's new, three-chamber
Parliament, whites will be represented in a
160-seat house, people of mixed race will
have an 80-seat house, and Indians will be
represented in a 40-seat house. The black ma-
jority will not be represented.

August 23

State Department receives a report that
Yelena Bonner was convicted of slandering
the Soviet Union and sentenced to 5 years of
internal exile on August 17.

Romania celebrates the 40th anniversary
of the overthrow of the Fascist government.

Auburn University announces the estab-
lishment of the International Aquacultural
Network that will link scientists in 70 nations
by satellite to each other for obtaining the
latest research information to help developing
nations and U.S. producers grow fish more
efficiently.

The Department of Defense makes public
its recommendation to provide coverage of
military operations by news organizations.

August 24

U.S. announces it will send additional grain
shipments to Ethiopia and Kenya to ease con-
ditions caused by drought.

August 25

TASS reports that the Soviet Union has suc-
cessfully tested a long-range ground-launched
cruise missile allegedly in response to the
U.S. deployment of such weapons.

August 24 30

A third round of indirect talks between
Pakistan and Afghanistan are held in Geneva
in an attempt to arrive at a political settle-
ment for Afghanistan. Issues discussed in-
clude a timetable for Soviet withdrawal,
pledges of noninterference and noninterven-
tion, international guarantees of an agree-
ment, and a mechanism for consulting the
refugees on the condition of their return. UN
envoy Diego Cordovez mediates the discus-
sions.

August 27

State Department spokesman Hughes says
the Soviet Union's testing of a long-range
ground-launched missile "comes as no sur-
prise." He adds that the Soviet's cruise
missile program had been active long before
U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise
missile deployments began.

U.S. and China sign an agreement under
which the Department of the Interior will
help China design the world's largest hydro-
electric dam.

The Department of State rejects as
"totally false" recent allegations by Radio
Moscow that Korean Air Lines Flight 007
was blown up by a U.S. bomb to prevent evi-
dence that it was a spy plane from falling in-
to Soviet hands. The plane was shot down by
a Soviet military aircraft on September 1,
1983.

The U.S. Immigration Service reports
that an estimated 7,000 Nicaraguans, be-
tween the ages of 15 and 22. are in Miami,
Florida, to escape their homeland's com-
pulsory military draft.

August 28

South Africa holds its second round of elec-
tions to choose representatives for the
40-seat Indian house of the new Parliament.

PRESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

August 29

A U.S. Court of Appeals overturned Presi-
dent Reagan's "pocket" veto of a military aid
bill that required him to certify improve-
ments in El Salvador's human rights situa-
tion. The bill was vetoed while Congress was
in its Thanksgiving holiday recess last year.
The following newly appointed ambassa-
dors present their credentials to President
Reagan: Falilou Kane (Republic of Senegal),
Guenther van Well (Federal Republic of Ger-
many), Joseph Edsel Edmunds (Saint Lucia),
Donald Aloysius McLeod (Republic of
Suriname), Ignatius Chukuemeka Olisemeka
(Federal Republic of Nigeria), and Maati
Jorio (Kingdom of Morocco).

August 30

President Reagan establishes a new Commis-
sion on Agricultural Trade and Export
Policy.

U.S. Trade Representative Brock says
the Soviet Union has contracted to purchase
7.9 million tons of grain— 1.3 million tons of
wheat and 6.6 million tons of corn— in the
1984-85 agreement year of the current
U.S.-U.S.S.R. long-term grain agreement.

Greece protests the U.S. military's re-
fusal to reinstate 16 striking workers at the
Hellenikon air base in Athens, despite an
understanding that no striking workers would
be dismissed.

August 31

U.S. restricts Libya's UN diplomats from
traveling outside New York City without
special permission.

South Africa lifts ban on The Windhoek
Observer, a weekly newspaper known for its
reports against the government's policies on
Namibia. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

175 8/2 Statement on the 9th anni-
versary of the Helsinki
Final Act.

•176 8/3 Diana Lady Dougan con-
firmed rank of Ambassador
(biographic data).

*177 8/7 Signature of seabed mining
agreement, Aug. 3.

•178 8/7 Committee of the U.S. Or-
ganization for the Interna-
tional Telegraph and Tele-
phone Consultative Com-
mittee meeting, Sept. 6.

*179 8/9 Leonardo Neher .sworn in as
Ambassador to Burkina
Faso, July 17 (biographic
data).

•180 8/14 Samuel F. Hart, Ambassa-
dor to the Republic of
Ecuador, Dec. 14, 1982
(biographic data).

'181 8/13 Everett E. Briggs, Ambassa-
dor to the Republic of
Panama, Oct. 6, 1982 (bio-
graphic data).

•182 8/13 Lewis A. Tambs, Ambassa-
dor to the Republic of
Colombia, Mar. 24, 1983
(biographic data).

♦183 8/14 Malcolm R. Barnebey, Am-
bassador to Belize, May 25,
1983 (biographic data)."

•184 8/14 Curtin Winsor, Jr., Ambassa-
dor to the Republic of
Costa Rica, June 9, 1983
(biographic data).

•185 8/17 Paul F. Gardner sworn in as
Ambassador to Papua New
Guinea and Solomon
Islands (biographic data).

•186 8/17 Alan W. Lukens sworn in as
Ambassador to the People's
Republic of the Congo,
Aug. 14 (biographic data).

*187 8/20 David C. Jordan, Ambassa-
dor to the Republic of
Peru, Mar. 8, 1984 (bio-
graphic data).

*188 8/20 Richard W. Boehm sworn in
as Ambassador to the Re-
public of Cyprus, Aug. 15
(biographic data).

*189 8/20 Diego C. Asencio, Ambassa-
dor to the Federative Re-
public of Brazil, Nov. 22,
1983 (biographic data).

•190 8/20 Frank V. Ortiz, Jr., Ambas-
sador to the Argentine Re-
public, Nov. 21, 1983 (bio-
graphic data).

•191 8/20 Shultz: address before the

Veterans of Foreign Wars,
Chicago.

•192 8/23 Shultz: interview by Daniel
Schorr of "Cable News
Network," Aug. 22.

•193 8/28 Clayton E. McManaway, Jr.,
Ambassador to the Repub-
lic of Haiti, Dec. 6, 1983
(biographic data).

•Not printed in the Bulletin, ■

Department of State

Free single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Correspondence Management Division,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Free multiple copies may be obtained by
writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and
Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Secretary Shultz

Power and Diplomacy, Veterans of Foreign
Wars, Chicago, Aug. 20, 1984 (Current
Policy #606).

Africa

U.S. Response to Africa's Food Needs (C
Aug. 1984).

East Asia

U.S.-China Agricultural Relations (GIST,
Aug. 1984). I

Economics

World Economic Prospects, Under SecJ
Wallis, American Chamber of Coma
Santiago, July 27, 1984 (Current P|
#.S99).

Europe

U.S. Policy: The Baltic Republics (GIS'^

Aug. 1984).
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges (GIST, Aug.

General

Europe v. Asia: Is Diplomacy a Zero-Si
Game?, Deputy Secretary Dam, Amj
Bar Association, Chicago, Aug. 6, ij
(Current Policy #603). I

Middle East

U.S. -Egyptian Relations (GIST, Aug. 19

Nuclear Policy

Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and Mut
Obligations, Ambassador Kennedy,
Center for Strategic and Internatioi
Studies, Georgetown University, Jui
1984 (Current Policy #607).

IDII

Population

U.S. Commitment to International Popi
Planning, Ambassador Buckley, Int isii
tional Conference on Population, Mi
City, Aug. 8, 1984 (Current Policy i

Food and Population Planning Assistan
AID Administrator McPherson, Ho
Foreign Affairs Committee, Aug. 2
(Current Policy #602).

South Asia

Afghanistan (GIST, Aug. 1984).
Indian Ocean Region (GIST, Aug. 1984

Terrorism

International Terrorism: A Long Twili;
Struggle, Ambassador Sayre. Fore
Policy Association, New York, Aug
1984 (Current Policy #608).

Western Hemisphere

Grenada Occasional Paper No. 1: Maui
Bishop's "Line of March" Speech, i
ber 13, 1982; Department of State
1984.

Cuba as a Model and a Challenge, Cub
Affairs Director Skoug, Americas
ty. New York, July 25, 1984 (Curr
Policy #600).

Review of Nicaragua's Commitments t
OAS, Ambassador Middendorf, OA
manent Council, July 18, 1984 (Cu
Policy #601). ■

CEX

;1)ber 1984

lime 84, No. 2091

iVstan

Attacks on Pakistan (Department

ment) 47

Stan 47

n Principles. Diplomacy and Strength

iltz) 18

antrol. Security for Europe (Goodby)21
iternational Terrorism: A Long Twi-

t Struggle (Sayre) 48

Energy. Nuclear Trade: Reliable
iply and Mutual Obligations

inedy) 40

a. U.S. -Bulgaria Relations (Burt) ... 28
is. Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply

Mutual Obligations (Kennedy) 40

Continuation of MFN Status for China

)wn) 27

nications. Competitive Challenges of

)al Telecommunications (Schneider). 43

itive Challenges of Global Telecom-

lications (Schneider) 43

ation of MFN Status for China

)wn) 27

, Developments in the Middle East

rphy) 37

ind Population Planning Assistance

Pherson) 31

ctivities on POW-MIA Issue (Wolfo-
.) 25

igaria Relations (Burt) 28

4 ilica. Democracy in Latin America and
Caribbean (Motley) 1

1 ment and Foreign Service. Interna-

i lal Narcotics Control 39

sia

acy and Strength (Shultz) 18

Asia; Is Diplomacy a Zero-Sum
^ .'(Dam) 33

uiics
■Miv in Latin America and the Carib-

' M (Motley) 1

\, Asia: Is Diplomacy a Zero-Sum

;iif:'(Dam) 33

a ador. Democracy in Latin America and
Caribbean (Motley) 1

Energy. Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and
Mutual Obligations (Kennedy) 40

Europe

Diplomacy and Strength (Shultz) 18

Europe v. Asia: Is Diplomacy a Zero-Sum
(;ame?(Dam) " 33

International Terrorism: A Long Twilight
Struggle (Sayre) 48

Ninth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final
Act 36

Security for Europe (Goodby) 21

Food. Food and Population Planning Assist-
ance (McPherson) 31

Foreign Assistance. Food and Population
Planning Assistance (McPherson) 31

Health. Food and Population Planning Assist-
ance (McPherson) 31

Human Rights

Democracy in Latin America and the Carib-
bean (Motley) 1

Ninth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final
Act ■ 36

Intelligence Operations. International Ter-
rorism: A Long Twilight Struggle
(Sayre) 48

International Law. International Terrorism:
A Long Twilight Struggle (Sayre) 48

Kampuchea. U.S. Activities on POW-MIA
Issue (Wolfowitz) 2.5

Laos. U.S. Activities on POW-MIA Issue
(Wolfowitz) 25

Middle East

Current Developments in the Middle East
(Murphy) 37

International Terrorism: A Long Twilight
Struggle (Sayre) 48

Narcotics

Democracy in Latin America and the Carib-
bean (Motley) 1

International Narcotics Control 39

Nicaragua. Democracy in Latin America and
the Caribbean (Motley) 1

Nuclear Policy. Nuclear Trade: Reliable
Supply and Mutual Obligations
(Kennedy) 40

Pakistan. Afghan Attacks on Pakistan (De-
partment statement) 47

Poland

40th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising
(Reagan) 16

Polish Government's Release of Political
Prisoners (White House statement) .... 30

Population. Food and Population Planning
Assistance (McPherson) 31

Presidential Documents. 4Uth Anniversary
of the Warsaw Uprising (Reagan) 16

Publications

Department of State 54

Science and Technology

Competitive Challenges of Global Telecom-
munications (Schneider) 43

Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and Mutual
Obligations (Kennedy) 40

Security Assistance. Democracy in Latin
America and the Caribbean (Motley) ... 1

Space. Competitive Challenges of Global
Telecommunications (Schneider) 43

Terrorism. International Terrorism: A Long
Twilight Struggle (Sayre) 48

Trade

Continuation of MFN Status for China
(Brown) 27

Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and Mutual
Obligations (Kennedy) 40

Treaties. Current Actions 50

U.S.S.R. Security for Europe (Goodby) 21

United Nations. International Terrorism: A
Long Twilight Struggle (Sayre) 48

Vietnam. U.S. Activities on P"OW-MIA Issue
(Wolfowitz) 25

Western Hemisphere

Democracy in Latin America and the Carib-
bean (Motley) 1

Diplomacy and Strength (Shultz) 18

International Terrorism: A Long Twilight
Struggle (Sayre) 48

Name Index

Brown, William A 27

Burt, Richard R 28

Dam, Kenneth W 33

Goodby, James E 21

Kennedy, Richard T 40

McPherson, M. Peter 31

Motley, Langhorne A 1

Murphy, Richard W 37

Reagan, President 16

Sayre, Robert M 48

Schneider, William Jr 43

Shultz, Secretary 18

Wolfowitz, Paul D 25

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Deparimt^ni

.3:

bulletin

' Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2092

November 1984

UN General Assembly/1
Caribbean Basin Atlas/71

Dppartmeni of St ait*

bulletin

Volume 84 / Number 2092 / November 1984

Cover:

The Inited Nations flag- a symbol of
peace, progress, and justice.

(United Nations photo by T. Chen)

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreig^n policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin'.s contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and
graphs) are published frequently to
provide additional information on current
issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

Assistant Secretary for Public Affair:

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD ^

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

SHARON R. LOTZ

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that the
publication of thi.s periodical is neces.sary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
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20402

CONTENTS

FEATURE

1
7

Reducing World Tensions (President Reagan)
The United Nations

The President

26 Promoting Global Economic

Growth

The Secretary

29 The Campaign Against Drugs:
The International Dimension

34 Proposed Refugee Admissions for
FY 1985

39 Interview on "Meet the Press"

42 Interview on "This Week With
David Brinkley"

Africa

44 U.S. Response to Africa's Food

Needs

Arms Control

45 Arms Control: Where Do We

Stand Now? (Kenneth L.
Adelman)

48 CDE Talks Resume in Stockholm

(President Reagan)

49 Status of Arms Control Talks

(President Reagan)
49 Review Conference Held on En-
vironmental Modification Con-
vention (Final Declaration)

East Asia

51 Cambodia: The Search for Peace

(Paul D. Wolfowitz)
54 Recent Developments in the

Philippines (Paul D. Wolfowitz)
56 U.K. and China Reach Agreement

on Hong Kong (Secretary

Shultz)

Human Rights

Europe

President Meets With Foreign
Minister Gromyko (President
Reagan, Secretary Shultz)

Anniversary of the KAL #007
Incident (Richard R. Burt,
Department Statement)

Human Rights Practices in Sudan,
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda
(Elliott Abrams)

U.S. Urges Ratification of Geno-
cide Convention (Elliott
Abrams. Department StateTnent)

Middle East

U.S. Embassy Bombed in Beirut
(Department Statement)

U.S. Imposes Additional Export
Controls on Iran (Departrnent
Statement)

Military Affairs

69 NATO Conventional Defense

Capabilities (Letter to the
Congress)

70 Tactical Nuclear Posture of NATO

(Letter to the Congress)

Western Hemisphere

71 Atlas of the Caribbean Basin

(Harry F. Young)

Treaties

86 Current Actions

Chronology

88 September 1984

Press Releases

90 Department of State

90 USUN

Publications

91 Department of State
91 Background Notes

91 GPO Subscriptions

92 Foreign Relations Volume

Released

Index

President Reagan addresses the 39th session of the UN General Assembly.

-A

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

Reducing
World Tensions

by President Reagan

Address before the 39th session

of the UN General Assembly

in New York on September 2U, 19Sh^

First of all, I wish to congratulate Presi-
dent Lusaka [Paul Lasaka of Zambia] on
his election as President of the General
Assembly. I wish you every success, Mr.
President, in carrying out the respon-
sibilities of this high international office.

It is an honor to be here, and I
thank you for your gracious invitation. I
would speak in support of the two great
goals that led to the formation of this
organization — the cause of peace and
the cause of human dignity.

The responsibility of this Assem-
bly — the peaceful resolution of disputes
between peoples and nations — can be
discharged successfully only if we
recognize the great common ground
upon which we all stand: our fellowship
as members of the human race, our
oneness as inhabitants of this planet, our
place as representatives of billions of our
countrymen whose fondest hope remains
the end to war and to the repression of
the human spirit. These are the impor-
tant, central realities that bind us, that
permit us to dream of a future without
the antagonisms of the past. And just as
shadows can be seen only where there is
light, so, too, can we overcome what is
wrong only if we remember how much is
right; and we will resolve what divides
us only if we remember how much more
unites us.

This chamber has heard enough
about the problems and dangers ahead;
today, let us dare to speak of a future
that is bright and hopeful and can be

ours only if we seek it. I believe that
future is far nearer than most of us
would dare to hope.

At the start of this decade, one
scholar at the Hudson Institute noted
that mankind also had undergone enor-
mous changes for the better in the past
two centuries, changes which aren't
always readily noticed or written about.

"Up until 200 years ago, there were
relatively few people in the world," he
wrote. "All human societies were poor.
Disease and early death dominated most
people's lives. People were ignorant and
largely at the mercy of the forces of
nature."

"Now," he said, "we are somewhere
near the middle of a process of economic
development ... at the end of that proc-
ess, almost no one will live in a country
as poor as the richest country of the
past. There will be many more people
living long healthy lives with immense
knowledge and more to learn than
anybody has time for. It will be able to
cope with the forces of nature and
almost indifferent to distance."

We do live today, as the scholar sug-
gested, in the middle of one of the most
important and dramatic periods in
human history — one in which all of us
can serve as catalysts for an era of
world peace and unimagined human
freedom and dignity.

And today, I would like to report to
you, as distinguished and influential

The starting point and cornerstone of our foreign
policy is our alliance and partnership with our
fellow democracies.

members of the world community, on
what the United States has been at-
tempting to do to help move the world
closer to this era. On many fronts enor-
mous progress has been made, and I
think our efforts are complemented by
the trend of history.

If we look closely enough, I believe
we can see all the world moving toward
a deeper appreciation of the value of
human freedom in both its political and
economic manifestations. This is partial-
ly motivated by a worldwide desire for
economic growth and higher standards
of living. And there's an increasing
realization that economic freedom is a
prelude to economic progress and
growth — and is intricately and in-
separably linked to political freedom.

Everywhere, people and govern-
ments are beginning to recognize that
the secret of a progressive new world is
to take advantage of the creativity of
the human spirit; to encourage innova-
tion and individual enterprise; to reward
hard work; and to reduce barriers to the
free flow of trade and information.

Our opposition to economic restric-
tions and trade barriers is consistent
with our view of economic freedom and
human progress. We believe such bar-
riers pose a particularly dangerous
threat to the developing nations and
their chance to share in world prosperity
through expanded export markets.
Tomorrow at the International Monetary
Fund, I will address this question more
fully, including America's desire for
more open trading markets throughout
the world.

This desire to cut down trade bar-
riers and our open advocacy of freedom
as the engine of human progress are
two of the most important ways the
United States and the American people
hope to assist in bringing about a world
where prosperity is commonplace, con-
flict an aberration, and human dignity
and freedom a way of life.

Let me place these steps more in
context by briefly outlining the major
goals of American foreign policy and
then exploring with you the practical
ways we're attempting to further
freedom and prevent war. By that I
mean, first, how we have moved to
strengthen ties with old allies and new
friends; second, what we are doing to
help avoid the regional conflicts that
could contain the seeds of world con-
flagration; and third, the status of our
efforts with the Soviet Union to reduce
the levels of arms.

U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

Let me begin with a word about the ob-
jectives of American foreign policy,
which have been consistent since the
postwar era and which fueled the forma-
tion of the United Nations and were in-
corporated into the UN Charter itself.

The UN Charter states two over-
riding goals: "to save succeeding gens
tions from the scourge of war, whichi
twice in our lifetime has brought untf
sorrow to mankind," and "to reaffirin
faith in fundamental human rights, ir
the dignity and worth of the human ]
son, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and smai

The founders of the United Natio
understood full well the relationship I
tween these two goals, and I want yo
to know that the Government of the
United States will continue to view tl
concern for human rights as the mon
center of our foreign policy. We can
never look at anyone's freedom as a
bargaining chip in world politics. Our
hope is for a time when all the peopl(
the world can enjoy the blessings of)
sonal liberty.

But I would like also to emphasiz
that our concern for protecting huma
rights is part of our concern for prot
ing the peace. The answer is for all r
tions to fulfill the obligations they frf
assumed under the Universal Declan
tion of Human Rights. It states: "Th(
will of the people shall be the basis o
the authority of government; this wil

President Reagan and Secretary General Perez de C'uellar.

. J

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

expressed in periodic and gen-
sctions." The declaration also in-
these rights: "to form and to join
inions"; "to own property alone as
in association with others"; "to
ny country, including his own,
return to his country"; and to en-
jedom of opinion and expression."
)S the most graphic example of
ationship between human rights
ace is the right of peace groups to
t nd to promote their views. In
. le treatment of peace groups may
mus test of government's true
for peace.

fthening Alliances
irtnerships

ition to emphasizing this tie be-
the advocacy of human rights and
jvention of war, the United States
ien important steps, as I men-
earlier, to prevent world conflict,
arting point and cornerstone of
■eign policy is our alliance and
irship with our fellow democracies,
years, the North Atlantic alliance
laranteed the peace in Europe. In
lurope and Asia, our alliances
leen the vehicle for a great recon-
tn among nations that had fought
■wars in decades and centuries
i^nd here in the Western
phere, north and south are being
jn the tide of freedom and are
in a common effort to foster
'ul economic development,
e're proud of our association with
se countries that share our com-
nt to freedom, human rights, the
f law — and international peace. In-
tthe bulwark of security that the
ratic alliance provides is essen-
and remains essential — to the
anance of world peace. Every
;e involves burdens and obliga-
but these are far less than the
and sacrifices that would result if
ace-loving nations were divided
eglectful of their common security,
eople of the United States will re-
faithful to their commitments,
ut the United States is also faithful
alliances and friendships with
of nations in the developed and

. . . the United States is also faithful to its
alliances and friendships with scores of nations in
the developed and developing worlds. . . .

developing worlds with differing political
systems, cultures, and traditions. The
development of ties between the United
States and China — a significant global
event of the last dozen years — shows
our willingness to improve relations with
countries ideologically very different
from ours.

We're ready to be the friend of any
country that is a friend to us and a
friend of peace. And we respect genuine
nonalignment. Our own nation was born
in revolution; we helped promote the
process of decolonization that brought
about the independence of so many
members of this body, and we're proud
of that history.

We're proud, too, of our role in the
formation of the United Nations and our
support of this body over the years. And
let me again emphasize our unwavering
commitment to a central principle of the
UN system, the principle of universality,
both here and in the UN technical agen-
cies around the world. If universality is
ignored, if nations are expelled illegally,
then the United Nations itself cannot be
expected to succeed.

The United States welcomes diversi-
ty and peaceful competition; we do not
fear the trends of history. We are not
ideologically rigid; we do have principles
and we will stand by them, but we will
also seek the friendship and good will of
all, both old friends and new.

We've always sought to lend a hand
to help others — from our relief efforts in
Europe after World War I to the Mar-
shall Plan and massive foreign
assistance programs after World War II.
Since 1946, the United States has pro-
vided over $115 billion in economic aid
to developing countries and today pro-
vides about one-third of the nearly $90
billion in financial resources, public and
private, that flow to the developing
world. And the United States imports
about one-third of the manufactured ex-
ports of the developing world.

Negotiations To Resolve
Regional Conflicts

But any economic progress, as well as
any movement in the direction of
greater understanding between the na-
tions of the world, are, of course, en-
dangered by the prospect of conflict at
both the global and regional levels. In a
few minutes, I will turn to the menace
of conflict on a worldwide scale and
discuss the status of negotiations be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union. But permit me first to address
the critical problem of regional con-
flicts — for history displays tragic
evidence that it is these conflicts which
can set off the sparks leading to
worldwide conflagration.

In a glass display case across the
hall from the Oval Office at the White
House, there is a gold medal — the
Nobel Peace Prize won by Theodore
Roosevelt for his contribution in
mediating the Russo-Japanese War in
1905. It was the first such prize won by
an American, and it is part of a tradition
of which the American people are very
proud — a tradition that is being con-
tinued today in many regions of the
globe.

We're engaged, for example, in
diplomacy to resolve conflicts in
southern Africa, working with the front-
line states and our partners in the con-
tact group. Mozambique and South
Africa have reached a historic accord on
nonaggression and cooperation; South
Africa and Angola have agreed on a
disengagement of forces from Angola,
and the groundwork has been laid for
the independence of Namibia, with vir-
tually all aspects of Security Council
Resolution 435 agreed upon.

Let me add that the United States
considers it a moral imperative that
South Africa's racial policies evolve
peacefully but decisively toward a
system compatible with basic norms of
justice, liberty, and human dignity. I'm

We recognize that there is no sane alternative
to negotiations on arms control. . . .

pleased that American companies in
South Africa, by providing equal
employment opportunities, are con-
tributing to the economic advancement
of the black population. But clearly,
much more must be done.

In Central America, the United
States has lent support to a diplomatic
process to restore regional peace and
security. We have committed substantial
resources to promote economic develop-
ment and social progress.

The growing success of democracy
in El Salvador is the best proof that the
key to peace lies in a political solution.
Free elections brought into office a
government dedicated to democracy,
reform, economic progress, and regional
peace. Regrettably, there are forces in
the region eager to thwart democratic
change, but these forces are now on the
defensive. The tide is turning in the
direction of freedom. We call upon
Nicaragua, in particular, to abandon its
policies of subversion and militarism and
to carry out the promises it made to the
Organization of American States to
establish democracy at home.

The Middle East has known more
than its share of tragedy and conflict for
decades, and the United States has been
actively involved in peace diplomacy for
just as long. We consider ourselves a full
partner in the quest for peace. The
record of the 1 1 years since the October
war shows that much can be achieved
through negotiations. It also shows that
the road is long and hard.

• Two years ago, I proposed a fresh
start toward a negotiated solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. My initiative of
September 1, 1982, contains a set of
positions that can serve as a basis for a
just and lasting peace. That initiative re-
mains a realistic and workable approach,
and I am commited to it as firmly as on
the day I announced it. And the founda-
tion stone of this effort remains Security
Council Resolution 242, which in turn
was incorporated in all its parts in the
Camp David accords.

• The tragedy of Lebanon has not
ended. Only last week, a despicable act
of barbarism by some who are unfit to
associate with humankind reminded us
once again that Lebanon continues to
suffer. In 1983, we helped Lebanon and
Israel reach an agreement that, if im-
plemented, could have led to the full
withdrawal of Israeli forces in the con-
text of the withdrawal of all foreign
forces. This agreement was blocked, and
the long agony of the Lebanese con-
tinues. Thousands of people are still
kept from their homes by continued
violence and are refugees in their own
country. The once flourishing economy
of Lebanon is near collapse. All of
Lebanon's friends should work together
to help end this nightmare.

• In the gulf, the United States has
supported a series of Security Council
resolutions that call for an end to the
war between Iran and Iraq that has
meant so much death and destruction
and put the world's economic well-being
at risk. Our hope is that hostilities will
soon end, leaving each side with its
political and territorial integrity intact,
so that both may devote their energies
to addressing the needs of their people
and a return to relationships with other
states.

• The lesson of experience is that
negotiation works. The peace treaty be-
tween Israel and Egypt brought about
the peaceful return of the Sinai, clearly
showing that the negotiating process
brings results when the parties commit
themselves to it. The time is bound to
come when the same wisdom and
courage will be applied, with success, to
reach peace between Israel and all of its
Arab neighbors in a manner that assures
security for all in the region, the
recognition of Israel, and a solution to
the Palestinian problem.

In every part of the world, the
United States is similarly engaged in
peace diplomacy as an active player or a
strong supporter.

• In Southeast Asia, we have
backed the efforts of ASEAN [Assoi
tion of South East Asian Nations] to
mobilize international support for a
peaceful resolution of the Cambodiai
problem, which must include the
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces am
the election of a representative gove
ment. ASEAN's success in promotin
economic and political development 1
made a major contribution to the pe;
and stability of the region.

• In Afghanistan, the dedicated
forts of the Secretary General and h
representatives to find a diplomatic
tlement have our strong support. I
assure you that the United States w
continue to do everything possible U
find a negotiated outcome which pre
vides the Afghan people with the rif
to determine their own destiny; alio'
the Afghan refugees to return to tb
own country in dignity; and protects
legitimate security interests of all
neighboring countries.

• On the divided and tense Kon
Peninsula, we have strongly backed
confidence-building measures propoi
by the Republic of Korea and by the
Command at Panmunjon. These are

U.S. Delegation

to the 39th

UN General Assembly

Representatives

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Jose S. Sorzano

Robert D. Ray

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., U.S. Senate)

the State of Maryland
John H. Glenn, Jr., U.S. Senator from
the State of Ohio

Alternate Representatives

Richard Schifter
Alan Lee Keyes
Harvey J. Feldman
Preston H. Long
Guadalupe Quintanilla

USUN press release 75 of Sept. 27, 198

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

mt first step toward peaceful

ation in the long term.

Ve take heart from progress by

in lessening tensions, notably the

by the Federal Republic to

barriers between the two Ger-

ites.

^d the United States strongly

bs the Secretary General's efforts

;t the Cypriot parties in achieving

iful and reunited Cyprus.

I United States has been, and
will be, a friend of peaceful
is.

.S.S.R. Relations

no less true with respect to my
^'s relations with the Soviet
When I appeared before you last
noted that we cannot count on
tinct for survival alone to protect
.nst war. Deterrence is necessary
; sufficient. America has repaired
ngth; we have invigorated our
3S and friendships. We're ready
structive negotiations with the
Union.

i recognize that there is no sane
.tive to negotiations on arms con-
d other issues between our two
;, which have the capacity to
! civilization as we know it. I
this is a view shared by \nrtually
country in the world, and by the

! Union itself.
d I want to speak to you today on
the United States and the Soviet
( can accomplish together in the
; \ I'ars and the concrete steps we
I ) lake.

\ u know, as I stand here and look

pim this podium— there in front of

- can see the seat of the represen-

froni the Soviet Union. And not

' m that seat, just over to the side,

seat of the representative from

lited States.

this historic assembly hall, it's
here is not a great distance be-
us. Outside this room, while there
ill be clear differences, there is
reason why we should do all that
;ible to shorten that distance. And
why we're here. Isn't that what
•ganization is all about?

. . . any agreement must logically depend upon our
ability to get the competition on offensive arms
under control and to achieve genuine stability at
substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.

Last January 16, I set out three ob-
jectives for U.S. -Soviet relations that
can provide an agenda for our work
over the months ahead. First, I said, we
need to find ways to reduce— and even-
tually to eliminate— the threat and use
of force in solving international disputes.
Our concern over the potential for
nuclear war cannot deflect us from the
terrible human tragedies occurring every
day in the regional conflicts I just
discussed. Together, we have a par-
ticular responsibility to contribute to
political solutions to these problems,
rather than to exacerbate them through
the provision of even more weapons.

I propose that our two countries
agree to embark on periodic consulta-
tions at policy level about regional prob-
lems. We will be prepared, if the Soviets
agree, to make senior experts available
at regular intervals for in-depth ex-
changes of views. I have asked
Secretary Shultz to explore this with
Foreign Minister Gromyko. Spheres of
influence are a thing of the past. Dif-
ferences between American and Soxdet
interests are not. The objectives of this
political dialogue will be to help avoid
miscalculation, reduce the potential risk
of U.S. -Soviet confrontation, and help
the people in areas of conflict to find
peaceful solutions.

The United States and the Soviet
Union have achieved agreements of
historic importance on some regional
issues. The Austrian State Treaty and
the Berlin accords are notable and
lasting examples. Let us resolve to
achieve similar agreements in the
future.

Our second task must be to find
ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of ar-
maments in the world. I am committed
to redoubling our negotiating efforts to
achieve real results: in Geneva, a com-
plete ban on chemical weapons; in Vien-
na, real reductions— to lower and equal

levels — in Soviet and American, Warsaw
Pact and NATO, conventional forces; in
Stockholm, concrete practical measures
to enhance mutual confidence, to reduce
the risk of war, and to reaffirm com-
mitments concerning non-use of force; in
the field of nuclear testing, im-
provements in verification essential to
ensure compliance with the Threshold
Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explo-
sions agreements; and in the field of
nonproliferation, close cooperation to
strengthen the international institutions
and practices aimed at halting the
spread of nuclear weapons, together
with redoubled efforts to meet the
legitimate expectations of all nations
that the Soviet Union and the United
States will substantially reduce their
own nuclear arsenals. We and the
Soviets have agreed to upgrade our "hot
line" communications facility, and our
discussions of nuclear nonproliferation in
recent years have been useful to both
sides. We think there are other
possibilities for improving communica-
tions in this area that deserve serious
exploration.

I believe the proposal of the Soviet
Union for opening U.S. -Soviet talks in
Vienna provided an important oppor-
tunity to advance these objectives.
We've been prepared to discuss a wide
range of issues and concerns of both
sides, such as the relationship between
defensive and offensive forces and what
has been called the militarization of
space. During the talks, we would con-
sider what measures of restraint both
sides might take while negotiations pro-
ceed. However, any agreement must
logically depend upon our ability to get
the competition in offensive arms under
control and to achieve genuine stability
at substantially lower levels of nuclear
arms.

Our approach in all these areas will
be designed to take into account con-
cerns the Soviet LInion has voiced. It

. . . / will suggest to the Soviet Union that we in-
stitutionalize regular ministerial or cabinet-level
meetings between our two countries on the whole
agenda of issues before us. ... I believe such talks
could work rapidly toward developing a new
climate of policy understanding. . . .

will attempt to provide a basis for a
historic breakthrough in arms control.
I'm disappointed that we were not able
to open our meeting in Vienna earlier
this month, on the date originally pro-
posed by the Soviet Union. I hope we
can begin these talks by the end of the
year or shortly thereafter.

The third task I set in January was
to establish a better working relation-
ship between the Soviet Union and the
United States, one marked by greater
cooperation and understanding.

We've made some modest progress.
We have reached agreements to improve
our "hot line," extend our 10-year
economic agreement, enhance consular
cooperation, and explore coordination of
search and rescue efforts at sea.

We've also offered to increase
significantly the amount of U.S. grain
for purchase by the Soviets and to pro-
vide the Soviets a direct fishing alloca-
tion off U.S. coasts. But there is much
more we could do together. I feel par-
ticularly strongly about breaking down
the barriers between the peoples of the
United States and the Soviet Union and
among our political, military, and other
leaders. All of these steps that I have
mentioned, and especially the arms con-
trol negotiations, are extremely impor-
tant to a step-by-step process toward
peace. But let me also say that we need
to extend the arms control process, to
build a bigger umbrella under which it
can operate — a roadmap, if you will,
showing where, during the next 20 years
or so, these individual efforts can lead.
This can greatly assist step-by-st«p
negotiations and enable us to avoid
having all our hopes or expectations ride
on any single set or series of negotia-
tions. If progress is temporarily halted

at one set of talks, this newly estab-
lished framework for arms control could
help us take up the slack at other
negotiations.

A New Beginning

Today, to the great end of lifting the
dread of nuclear war from the peoples
of the earth, I invite the leaders of the
world to join in a new beginning. We
need a fresh approach to reducing inter-
national tensions. History demonstrates
beyond controversy that, just as the
arms competition has its roots in
political suspicions and anxieties, so it
can be channeled in more stabilizing
directions and eventually be eliminated,
if those political suspicions and anxieties
are addressed as well.

Toward this end, I will suggest to
the Soviet Union that we institutionalize
regular ministerial or cabinet-level
meetings between our two countries on
the whole agenda of issues before us, in-
cluding the problem of needless ob-
stacles to understanding. To take but
one idea for discussion: in such talks we
could consider the exchange of outlines
of 5-year military plans for weapons
development and our schedules of in-
tended procurement. We would also
welcome the exchange of observers at
military exercises and locations. And I
propose that we find a way for Soviet
experts to come to the U.S. nuclear test
site, and for ours to go to theirs, to
measure directly the yields of tests of
nuclear weapons. We should work
toward having such arrangements in
place by next spring.

I hope that the Soviet Union will
cooperate in this undertaking and
reciprocate in a manner that will enable

the two countries to establish the b: '
for verification for effective limits i, '
underground nuclear testing.

I believe such talks could work
rapidly toward developing a new cli
of policy understanding, one that is
essential if crises are to be avoided
real arms control is to be negotiate
course, summit meetings have a usi
role to play, but they need to be cai
fully prepared, and the benefit here
that meetings at the ministerial lev
would provide the kind of progress
is the best preparation for higher k
talks between ourselves and the So
leaders.

How much progress we will ma
and at what pace, I cannot say. Bu
have a moral obligation to try and i
again.

Some may dismiss such proposa
my own optimism as simplistic Am^
idealism. And they will point to the
burdens of the modern world and t
history. Well, yes, if we sit down ai
catalogue, year by year, generation
generation, the famines, the plague
wars, the invasions mankind has er
dured, the list will grow so long, ai
assault on humanity so terrific, tha
seems too much for the human spit
bear.

But isn't this narrow and short
sighted and not at all how we thin!
history? Yes, the deeds of infamy c
justice are all recorded, but what s
out from the pages of history is thi
ing of the dreamers and the deeds
builders and the doers.

These things make up the stori
tell and pass on to our children. TY
comprise the most enduring and st
fact about human history: that thr(
the heartbreak and tragedy man h;
always dared to perceive the outlin
human progress, the steady growtl
not just the material well-being but
spiritual insight of mankind.

"There have been tyrants and
murderers, and for a time they car
invincible. But in the end, they alw
fall. Think on it . . . always. All thi
history, the way of truth and love
always won." That was the belief a

Deoartment of State Bi

I n of Mahatma Gandhi. He
that, and it remains today a
at is good and true,
is gift," is said to have been the
expression of another great
st, a Spanish soldier who gave
ays of war for that of love and
nd if we're to make realities of
Igreat goals of the UN

the dreams of peace and
ignity— we must take to heart
rds of Ignatius Loyola; we must
[ng enough to contemplate the
eived from him who made us:
of life, the gift of this world, the
ach other.

the gift of the present. It is this
this time, that now we must
eave you with a reflection from
a Gandhi, spoken with those in
10 said that the disputes and
of the modern world are too
overcome. It was spoken short-
Gandhi's quest for [Indian] in-
nce took him to Britain.
•n not conscious of a single ex-
throughout my three months'
England and Europe," he said,
ide me feel that after all east is

west is west. On the contrary, I
an convinced more than ever
nan nature is much the same no
ander what clime it flourishes,
I; if you approached people with
Id affection, you would have ten-
i3t and thousand-fold affection
ji to you."

I the sake of a peaceful world, a
here human dignity and freedom
)ected and enshrined, let us ap-
3ach other with tenfold trust and
dfold affection. A new future
as. The time is here, the moment

of the Founding Fathers of our
Thomas Paine, spoke words that
) all of us gathered here today,
jply directly to all sitting here in
m. He said: "We have it in our
.0 begin the world over again.

t from Weekly Compilation of
itial Documents of Oct. 1, 1984.

-—«•"'!*£,

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

The United Nations

Background

The immediate antecedent of the United
Nations was the League of Nations,
created under U.S. leadership (although
the United States never became a
member) following World War I. The
League existed from 1919 until its
reduced organization and functions were
replaced by the United Nations in 1945.

The roots of the United Nations
organization go back more than 100
years. Since the early 19th century, na-
tional governments have discussed and
acted on common issues and problems
through intergovernmental parliamen-
tary bodies. This process led to con-
ferences such as The Hague conferences
of 1899 and 1907, which pointed the way
to developing legal and arbitrative alter-
natives to war.

The idea for the United Nations
found expression in declarations signed
at conferences in Moscow and Tehran in
October and December 1943. In the
summer of 1944, informal conversations
were held by representatives of the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and
the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, a
mansion in Washington, D.C. Later,
discussions among the United Kingdom,
the United States, and China resulted in
proposals concerning the purposes and
principles of an international organiza-
tion, its membership and principal
organs, arrangements to maintain inter-
national peace and security, and ar-
rangements for international economic
and social cooperation. These proposals
were discussed and debated by govern-
ments and private citizens all over the
world.

On March 5, 1945, invitations to a
conference to be held in San Francisco
in April were issued by the United
States on behalf of itself, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China
to 42 other governments that had signed
the January 1, 1942 "Declaration by
United Nations" and that had declared
war on Germany or Japan no later than
March 1, 1945. The conference added

Argentina, Denmark, and the two Rus-
sian republics of Byelorussia and the
Ukraine, bringing the total to 50.

The 50 nations represented at San
Francisco signed the Charter of the
United Nations on June 26, 1945. ^
Poland, which was not represented at
the conference but for which a place
among the original signatories had been
reserved, added its name later, bringing
the original signatories to a total of 51.
The United Nations came into existence
4 months later, on October 24, 1945,
when the Charter had been ratified by
the five permanent members of the
Security Council— China, France, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and
the United States — and by a majority of
the other signatories.

Membership. UN membership is open to
all "peace-loving states" that accept the
obligations of the UN Charter and, in
the judgment of the organization, are
able and willing to fulfill these obliga-
tions. As of October 1984, there were
159 members. Admission to membership
is determined by the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Securi-
ty Council.

New York Headquarters. The head-
quarters site in New York is owned by
the United Nations and is international
territory. Under special agreement with
the United States, certain privileges and
immunities have been granted, but
generally the laws of New York City,
New York State, and the United States
apply.

The presence of the United Nations
in New York indirectly contributes an
estimated $692.2 million per year to the
economy of New York, as estimated in
1980 by the New York City Commission
for the United Nations. It greatly offsets
the estimated $15 million annual cost to
the city. More than 4,000 Americans are
employed in New York in UN-related
jobs. The commission concluded that the
United Nations is a "year-round conven-
tion, aiding hotels, restaurants, taxi

her 1Qft4

drivers and a myriad of other local
enterprises."

About 5,000 meetings are held in the
headquarters each year. UN radio pro-
grams are broadcast in some 24
languages and reach all continents. Sales
of UN postage stamps — usable only for
letters and articles mailed at the head-
quarters—total about $7.8 million an-
nually. About 300 correspondents and
110 photographers are permanently ac-
credited to the United Nations, and an
additional 750 hold temporary accredita-
tion at any given time. The United Na-

tions answers about 47,000 public re-
quests for information each year.
Estimates show that some 2.7 million
visitors have taken guided tours of the
headquarters since it opened.

The Security Council

Under the UN Charter, the Security
Council has "primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace
and security," and all UN members
"agree to accept and carry out the deci-

sions of the Security Council in ac
ance with the present Charter."

Other organs of the United N.
make recommendations to membe
governments. The Security Counc
however, has the power to make i
sions, which member government
obligated to carry out under the
Charter. A representative of each
Security Council member must ab
be present at UN headquarters sc
the Council can meet at any time.

Decisions in the Security Coui
all substantive matters — for exan

United Nations— A Profile

Established: By charter signed in San Fran-
cisco, Calif., on June 26, 1945: effective Oc-
tober 24, 1945.

Purposes: To maintain international
peace and security; to develop friendly rela-
tions among nations; to achieve international
cooperation in solving economic, social,
cultural, and humanitarian problems and in
promoting respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms; to be a center for har-
monizing the actions of nations in attaining
these common ends.

Members: 159.

Official languages: Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Russian, Spanish.

Principal organs: General Assembly,
Security Council, Economic and Social Coun-
cil, Trusteeship Council, International Court
of Justice, Secretariat.

Budget: UN assessment budget (calendar
year i9«5>— $685.3 million. US
sfcare— $171.3 million. The total UN system
budget (including the UN and specialized
agencies and prog^rams, but not the World

Bank) was about $4.5 billion in calendar year
1981. The US share was $1 billion.

Secretariat

Chief administrative officer: Secretary
General of the United Nations, appointed to a
5-year term by the General Assembly on the
recommendation of the Security Council.
Secretary General 1982-present: Javier Perez
de Cuellar (Peru).

Staff: A worldwide staff of 22,000 from
some 150 countries, including more than
2,900 US citizens. The staff is appointed by
the Secretary General according to UN
regulations.

General Assembly

Membership: All UN members. President:
Elected at the beginning of each General
Assembly session.

Main committees: First — Political and
Security; Special Political Committee.
Second — Economic and Financial. Third —
Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural. Fourth
— Trusteeship. Fifth — Administrative and
Budgetary. Sixth — Legal. Many other com-
mittees address specific issues, including
peacekeeping, crime prevention, status of
women, and UN Charter reform.

Security Council

Membership: 5 permanent members (China,
France, USSR, UK, US), each with the right
to veto, and 10 nonpermanent members

elected by the General Assembly for I
terms. Five nonpermanent members ;
elected from Africa and Asia; one fro
Eastern Europe; two from Latin Amc
and two from Western Europe and ol
areas. Nonpermanent members are n
ble for immediate reelection. The 198
nonpermanent members are Egypt, I
Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakis
Peru, Ukrainian SSR, Upper Volta (r
Burkina Faso), and Zimbabwe. Presic
Rotates monthly in English alphabet!
of members.

Economic and Social Council

Membership: 54; 18 elected each yea
General Assembly for 3-year terms. I
dent: Elected each year.

Trusteeship Council

Membership: US, China, France, US
President: Elected each year.

International Court of Justice

Membership: 15, elected for 9year t
the General Assembly and the Securi
cil from nominees of national groups
provisions of the International Court
Justice Statute.

Taken from the Background Notes of
1984, published by the Bureau of Pul
fairs, Department of State. Editor: J
Adams. ■

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

ailing for direct measures
the settlement of a dis-

uire the affirmative votes of

bers, including the support of
jrmanent members. A negative
to — by a permanent member
adoption of a proposal that has
the required number of affirm-

s. It was agreed early in UN
lat abstention is not regarded

A permanent member usually
when it does not wish to vote in
1 decision or to block it with a

ugh July 1984, a total of 194
.d been cast: 116 by the Soviet

by China, 15 by France, 22 by
;d Kingdom, and 38 by the
tates. Of the 3 vetoes by China,
ist by the People's Republic of
,er being seated in 1971. Of the

t vetoes, 87 (80%) were cast
•58. All 38 of the U.S. vetoes
n cast since 1969 — 32 since

, and 15 since January 1981.

on questions of procedure,
ption of the agenda, require the
ve votes of any nine members
iiot subject to a veto,
ite that is a member of the
ations but not of the Security
nay participate in Security
liscussions in which the Council
lat the country's interests are
rly affected. In recent years,
icil has interpreted this criterion
jnabling many countries to take
s discussions. Nonmembers are

invited to take part, under con-
lid down by the Council, when
parties to disputes being con-
)y the Council.

Dugh the UN Charter gives the
Council primary responsibility
national peace and security, it
nds that parties attempt to
eement before taking recourse
rocedures. The Charter enjoins
rst to make every effort to set-
disputes peacefully, either
ly or through regional organiza-

er Chapter VI of the Charter,
Settlement of Disputes," the
Council "may investigate any
or any situation which might

lead to international friction or give rise
to a dispute." The Council may "recom-
mend appropriate procedures or
methods of adjustment" if it determines
that the situation might endanger inter-
national peace and security.

Under Chapter VII, the Council has
broader power to decide upon measures
to be taken in situations involving
"threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, or acts of aggression." In such
situations, the Council is not limited to
recommendations but may take action,
including the use of armed force, "to
maintain or restore international peace
and security." The 1977 application of an
embargo on the sale of military equip-
ment to South Africa was the first use
of this power against a member nation.

Under Article 43, the signatories
undertook to make armed forces
available to the Council "on its call and
in accordance with a special agreement
or agreements" between the Council and
UN member states. Because of disagree-
ments among the permanent members
of the Council, however, efforts to im-
plement such arrangements were
dropped early in UN history. Never-

:^^VSitJ-

theless, military forces have been made
available to the United Nations by its
members on an ad hoc basis when
specifically authorized by the Security
Council, e.g., in Cyprus, the Sinai, and
Lebanon.

The General Assembly

The General Assembly is made up of all
159 UN members. Each member may
designate five representatives. Member
countries are seated in English
alphabetical order. Each year, seating
begins at a different point in the
alphabet, determined through a drawing.

The Assembly meets in regular ses-
sion once a year under a president
elected from among the representatives.
The regular session usually begins on
the third Tuesday in September and
ends in mid-December. Special sessions
can be convened at the request of the
Security Council, of a majority of UN
members, or, if the majority concurs, of
a single member.

There have been 12 special sessions
of the General Assembly. In 1978, the
Assembly held its eighth special session

t.'iaifirifiiiiii

UN Security Council

■XQr 1QB/1

(on financing of a new peacekeeping
force in Lebanon) and its ninth (on
Namibia). The 10th special session, in
May and June 1978, constituted the
largest intergovernmental conference on
disarmament in history. A followup ses-
sion on disarmament, the 12th special
session, took place in June and July
1982. A special session, the 11th, on
North-South economic issues, occurred 2
years earlier in August and September
1980.

Voting in the General Assembly on
important questions — recommendations
on peace and security; election of
members to organs; admission, suspen-
sion, and expulsion of members; trustee-
ship questions; budgetary matters — is by

a two-thirds majority of those present
and voting "yes" or "no." Abstentions
are not counted. Other questions are
decided by a simple majority vote. Each
member country has one vote.

Apart from approval of budgetary
matters, including adoption of a scale of
assessment. Assembly resolutions are
only recommendatory and are not bind-
ing on the members. The General
Assembly may make recommendations
on any questions or matters within the
scope of the United Nations except mat-
ters of peace and security under Securi-
ty Council consideration.

As the only organ of the United Na-
tions in which all members are repre-

sented, the Assembly has been tl
forum in which members have la
major initiatives on international
tions of peace, economic progres
human rights. It may initiate stu
make recommendations to prom(
ternational political cooperation;
and codify international law; real
human rights and fundamental fi
doms; and further international (
nomic, social, cultural, education:
health programs.

The Assembly may take acti(
Security Council is unable — usua
to disagreement among the five ;
nent members — to exercise its p
responsibility for the maintenanc
ternational peace in a case invoh

Ci^JTHE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

principal organs 0( me UmieO Nali<
^B Other United Nairons organs

S'andinq aiO
proceOural commiitees

Omer suDSidiary organs
ol Ihe General AssemOly

United Nations Reltef and WorKs Agency 'or
Palestine Refugees m me Near Easi UNRWA

Unilea Nations Con'e'ence
on Trade and Deveiopmpni UNCTAO

United Nations Children s Fund UNICEF

Ollice ol Ihe Uniled ^:2•'ons High Commissione'
lor neiuge«'s UNHCR

World Food Programme WFP

United Nalions Insliluie
lor Training and Research UNITAR

United Nations Development Programme UNDP

United Nations industrial
Development 0'ganijaiior> UNIOO

United Nations Enwironmenl P<oqramme UNEP

united Nations University UNU

United Nations Special Fund

World Food Council

United Nations C#nire for

Human Seiilsmenii iHabnat) UNCMS

United Nation! Fund (o« Population Activmei UNFPA

TRUSTEESHIP
COUNCIL

SECURITY
COUNCIL

UNDOF United Naiions Disengagement
Otse'ver Force

UNFICVP Untied Nanons Peacekeeping Force
■ n Cyprus

I UNIFIL United Natio

UNMOGIP United Nations Miliiafy

OBserver Group m India an3 Pakistan

UNTSO United Nations Truce Superv
Organtialion in Palestine

ihlary Stall Comm

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF
JUSTICE

ECONOMIC

AND

SOCIAL

COUNCIL

Regional comr
Functional cor

Sessionat •
ad hoc com

-iiSSiOns
imissions
d.nq and

SECRETARIAT

— o

-O

-O
-O

-O
K)

-O

-O
-O
-O
-O
-O

L-o

IAEA international Atomic Energy Agency

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

ILO Internal onal Lal>our Organisation

FAO Food and Agriculture Orga.-iiiation
ol Ihe Uniied Nations

UNESCO Uniied Nations Educational

Scieniiiic and Cultural Organiiaiion

WHO World Health Organisation

IDA iniemationai Development Assoc >ai'on

IBRD international Bank lo' Reconstruct>on
and Developmenl

IPC tnlernanonal Finance Corporation

IMF Internationa' Monetary Fund

ICAO InlernaliOiial Civil AvialiOn
Organiiation

UPU Universal Postal Union

ITU inietnational Telecommunication Union

WMO World Meteorological Organualion

IMO iniernationil Maritime Organiiaiion

1*IP0 World intellectual Properly O'ganiiaiion

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Oevelopment

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

'.ti

°' threat to the peace, breach of
' act of aggression. The
for Peace" resolution, adopted
■'^^ smpowers the Assembly, if not
session, to convene an
cy special session on 24-hour
d to recommend collective

including the use of armed
;he case of a breach of the
act of aggression. Two-thirds of
bers must approve any such
ndation. Emergency special ses-
ler this procedure have been
'' line occasions. The eighth

cy special session, in September
■Prisidered the situation in

The situation in the occupied
ritories, following Israel's
I extension of its laws, jurisdic-
administration to the Golan
was the subject of the ninth
cy session in January and
y 1982.

icent years, the Assembly has
a forum for the North-South
— the discussion of issues be-
dustrialized nations and
ng countries. In large part, this
the phenomenal growth and
l makeup of the UN membership
fact that the Assembly is the
body comprising all members,
countries that achieved inde-
e after the United Nations' crea-
e caused a massive shift in the
ly. In 1945, the United Nations
nembers, most of them Western
. Of its present 159 members,
an two-thirds of them are
ng countries.

re are many differences in
size, and outlook among the
ing countries. Nevertheless, this
oup (some 120 countries in the
Assembly), known as "the Third
the "nonaligned," and the
of 77," usually votes and acts in
Because of their numbers they,
t, determine the agenda of the
ly, the character of its debates,
nature of its decisions. For
eveloping countries, the United
is particularly important. It is
ective source of much of their
itic influence and the basic outlet
r foreign relations initiatives. In-

creasingly, they seek inclusion in the
councils of power, and the United Na-
tions provides such a policy forum.

The United Nations has devoted
significant attention to the problems of
the developing countries, in response to
their growing political importance in
multilateral arenas. The General
Assembly has guided, and in many cases
created, special programs to help
developing nations acquire the skills,
knowledge, and organization they need
for more productive economies. 'These
programs complement the work of the
various specialized agencies in the UN
system. 'Through its economic commit-
tee, the Assembly remains concerned
with the question of economic develop-
ment.

The Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) assists the General Assembly
in promoting international economic and
social cooperation. ECOSOC has 54
members, 18 of which are selected each
year by the General Assembly for a
3-year term. A retiring member is eligi-
ble for immediate reelection — the United
States, France, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union have been

members since the United Nations was
founded. ECOSOC holds two major ses-
sions each year: a spring meeting, usual-
ly in New York, and a summer meeting,
usually in Geneva. The president is
elected for a 1-year term. Voting is by
simple majority.

ECOSOC undertakes studies and
makes recommendations on develop-
ment, world trade, industrialization,
natural resources, human rights, the
status of women, population, narcotics,
social welfare, science and technology,
crime prevention, and other issues.

A number of standing committees
and functional commissions assist
ECOSOC. It also has regional economic
commissions that seek to strengthen
economic development of countries
within their regions. These are:

• The Economic Commission for
Africa (EGA), Addis Ababa;

• The Economic and Social Commis-
sion for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP),
Bangkok;

• The Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE), Geneva;

• The Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLA), Santiago; and

• The Economic Commission for
Western Asia (ECWA), Baghdad.

U.S. Representatives

to the United Nations*

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

March 1946-June 1946

Hershel V. Johnson (acting)

June 1946-January 1947

Warren R. Austin

January 1947-January 1953

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

January 1953-September 1960

James J. Wadsworth

September 1960-January 1961

Adlai E. Stevenson

January 1961-July 1965

Arthur J. Goldberg

July 1965-June 1968

George W. Ball

June 1968-September 1968

James Russell Wiggins

October 1968-January 1969

Charles W. Yost

January 1969-February 1971

George Bush

February 1971-January 1973

John A. Scali

February 1973-June 1975

Daniel P. Moynihan

June 1975-February 1976

William W. Scranton

March 1976-January 1977

Andrew Young

January 1977-April 1979

Donald McHenry

April 1979-January 1981

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

January 1981 -present
ations is the Chief of the U.S. Mission to

*The U.S. Representative to the United N
the UN in New York and holds the rank and s

^tatus of Ambassador Extraordinary and

Plenipotentiary. ■

ECOSOC also provides consultative
status to nongovernmental organizations
active within its fields of competence.
These organizations may send observers
to public meetings of the council and its
subsidiary bodies and submit statements
related to the council's work.

Trusteeship Council

The UN trusteeship system was
established to help ensure that ter-
ritories were administered in the best in-
terests both of the inhabitants and of in-
ternational peace and security. The
Trusteeship Council operates under the
authority of the General Assembly, or,
in the case of strategic trusts, the
Security Council. It assists those bodies
in carrying out their responsibilities
under the UN Charter.

A UN member administering a trust
territory is pledged to promote the
political, economic, and educational ad-
vancement of the territory's people. It is
also to promote "progressive develop-
ment towards self-government or in-
dependence as may be appropriate to
the particular circumstances of each ter-
ritory and its people and the freely ex-
pressed wishes of the peoples
concerned."

As recently as 1957, 11 terri-
tories — most of them former mandates
of the League of Nations or territories
taken from enemy states at the end of
World War II — were part of the UN

UN headquarters in New York covers an
18-acre area on Manhattan Island. The
buildings include the 39-story Secretariat,
the General Assembly, council chambers
and conference rooms, and the Dag
Hammarskjold Library.

trusteeship system. All but one have at-
tained self-government or independence,
either as separate nations or by joining
neighboring independent countries.

The only remaining is the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia),
designated as a strategic area and ad-
ministered by the United States under a
1947 agreement with the Security Coun-
cil. Following negotiations which began
in 1969, an agreement was reached in
197.5 with one part of the territory, the
Northern Mariana Islands, which will
become a commonwealth of the United
States upon termination of the trustee-
ship. In 1983, UN-observed plebiscites
were held in the remaining three
jurisdictions — the Federated States of
Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall
Islands. All resulted in voter approval of
an agreement providing for a "free
association" relationship with the United
States. While the governments of two of
these areas subsequently approved a
Compact of Free Association, Palau's
formal approval has been held up by
constitutional difficulties. The United
States is working with the Palau
Government to resolve this problem. The
United States continues to strive toward
termination of the trusteeship for all
four components of the trust territory as
soon as possible, under terms acceptable
to all parties.

Membership of the Trusteeship
Council consists of the United

iinililljini

(UN photo by Saw Lwin)

U^il'^^J-

^^Ji / jf IV

' -r^

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

The 159 Members of the United Nations^

an (1946)

The Gambia (1965)

1955)

German Democratic Republic (1973)

962)

Germany, Federal Republic of (1973)

976)

Ghana (1957)

ind Barbuda (1981)

Greece

Grenada (1974)

Guatemala

1955)

Guinea (1958)

(1973)

Guinea-Bissau (1974)

1971)

Guyana (1966)

sh (1974)

Haiti

(1966)

Honduras

Hungary (1955)

181)

Iceland (1946)

160)

India

1971)

Indonesia (1950)

Iran

I (1966)

Iraq

Ireland (1955)

arussalam (1984)

Israel (1949)

(1955)

Italy (1955)

-"aso— formerly Upper Volta (1960)

Ivory Coast (1960)

948)

Jamaica (1962)

;i962)

Japan (1956)

3ian SSR

Jordan (1955)

Kenya (1963)

■de (1975)

Kuwait (1963)

^rican Republic (1960)

Lao People's Democratic Republic (Vt

30)

Lebanon

Lesotho (1966)

Liberia

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1955)

(1975)

Luxembourg

960)

Madagascar (1960)

Malawi (1964)

Malaysia (1957)

L960)

Maldives (1965)

wakia

Mali (1960)

ctic Kampuchea—

Malta (1964)

ly Cambodia (1955)

Mauritania (1961)

tic Yemen (1967)

Mauritius (1968)

Mexico

1977)

Mongolia (1961)

L (1978)

Morocco (1956)

in Republic

Mozambique (1975)

Nepal (1955)

Netherlands

lor

New Zealand

al Guinea (1968)

Nicaragua

Niger (1960)

))

Nigeria (1960)

1955)

Norway

Oman (1971)

960)

Pakistan (1947)

Panama

Papua New Guinea (1975)

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal (1955)

Qatar (1971)

Romania (1955)

Rwanda (1962)

St. Christopher-Nevis (1983)

St. Lucia (1979)

St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1980)

Samoa (1976)

Sao Tome and Principe (1975)

Saudi Arabia

Senegal (1960)

Seychelles (1976)

Sierra Leone (1961)

Singapore (1965)

Solomon Islands (1978)

Somalia (1960)

South Africa

Spain (1955)

Sri Lanka (1955)

Sudan (1956)

Suriname (1975)

Swaziland (1968)

Sweden (1946)

Syria

Thailand (1946)

Togo (1960)

Trinidad and Tobago (1962)

Tunisia (1956)

Turkey

Uganda (1962)

Ukrainian SSR

USSR

United Arab Emirates (1971)

United Kingdom

United Republic of Cameroon (1960)

United Republic of Tanzania (1961)

United States of America

Uruguay

Vanuatu (1981)

Venezuela

Vietnam (1977)

Yemen (1947)

Yugoslavia

Zaire (1960)

Zambia (1964)

Zimbabwe (1980)

ntries are listed with names as registered by the United Nations. Year in parentheses indicates date of admission; countries with no
e original members in 1945.

Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of Oct. 25, 1971, the General Assembly decided "to restore all its rights to the People's Repubhc of China and
nize the representative of its Government as the only legitimate representative of China to tne United Nations." ■

States — the only country now ad-
ministering a trust territory — and the
other permanent members of the Securi-
ty Council: China (which does not par-
ticipate), France, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union.

International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice is the
principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. The Court was established
under the Charter in 1945 as the suc-
cessor to the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. The Court's main func-
tions are to decide contentious cases
submitted to it by states and to give ad-
visory opinions on legal questions sub-
mitted to it by the General Assembly or
Security Council, or by such specialized
agencies as may be authorized to do so
by the General Assembly in accordance
with the UN Charter.

The seat of the Court is at The Hague,
Netherlands. It is composed of 15 judges
elected by the General Assembly and the
Security Council from a list of persons
nominated by the national groups in the

International Court of
Justice Officials

Nine-year terms expire on February 5 of the
year shown in parentheses. The President is
elected by the Court for a 3-year term.

President of the Court— Taslim Olawale

Elias, Nigeria (1985)
Vice President— Jose Sette-Camara, Brazil

(1988)

Other Members of the Court

Manfred Lachs, Poland (198.5)

Pianton Dmitrievich Morozov, USSR (1988)

Nagendra Singh, India (1991)

Jose Maria Ruda, Argentina (1991)

Hermann Mosier, F.R.G. (1985)

Shigeru Oda, Japan (1985)

Roberto Ago, Italy (1988)

Abdallah Fikri El-Khani, Syria (1985)

Stephen M. Schwebel, US (1988)

Robert Y. .Jennings, UK (1991)

Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere, France (1991)

Keba Mbaye, Senegal (1991)

Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algeria (1988) ■

Permanent Court of Arbitration. Elec-
tors are mandated to bear in mind the
qualifications of the candidates and the
need for the Court as a whole to repre-
sent the main cultural groups and prin-
cipal legal systems. No two judges may
be nationals of the same country. Judges
serve for 9 years and may be reelected.
One-third of the Court (five judges) is
elected every 3 years.

Questions before the Court are
decided by a majority of judges present.
Nine judges constitute a quorum. In case
of a tie, the president of the Court casts
the deciding vote. In certain cir-
cumstances, parties may be entitled to
choose a judge for a specific case.

Only states may be parties in cases
before the International Court of
Justice. This does not preclude private
interests from being the subject of pro-
ceedings if one state brings the case
against another. Jurisdiction of the
Court is based on the consent of the par-
ties. Consent may be given in several
ways. States may specify, generally in a
treaty, that any dispute concerning the
meaning of the treaty may be referred
to the Court; or, after a specific dispute
arises, they may agree to take it before
the Court for resolution. In addition, a
state may, in relation to any other state
accepting the same obligation, accept
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in
certain categories of disputes, such as
those concerning the interpretation of a
treaty or a question of international law.
In the event of a dispute concerning the
Court's jurisdiction, the matter will be
settled by the Court. Judgments in con-
tentious cases are binding upon the par-
ties. The Security Council can be called
upon by a party to determine measures
to be taken to give effect to a judgment
if the other party fails to perform its
obligations under that judgment.

The United States is one of the 47
countries that had accepted the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court by
1983. In accepting that jurisdiction in
1946, the United States specifically
excluded disputes regarding matters
essentially within the U.S. domestic
jurisdiction, "as determined by the
United States of America." The last
phrase, known as the Connally reserva-
tion, permits the United States rather

than the Court to determine whet!
certain disputes should come befot
Court.

On a number of occasions sino
1950s, the Court has dealt with iss
regarding control by South Africa
Namibia (South-West Africa). In tl
most recent advisory opinion (197]
Court advised that since the contii
presence of South Africa in Namit
illegal. South Africa is obliged to \
draw its administration and end it
cupation of the territory.

Other recent cases include:

• A complaint by Pakistan in
that India was planning to turn o\
Bangledesh for trial 195 Pakistani
prisoners of war;

• Challenges by Australia and
Zealand in 1973 to further French
mospheric nuclear weapons tests i
South Pacific Ocean;

• Complaints by the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republi
Germany about the decision of Ice
to extend its exclusive fisheries zc
from 19 kilometers (12 mi.) to 80
kilometers (50 mi.) around its coai

• Questions raised by the Ger
Assembly about the status of the
Spanish Sahara (now Western Sal

• A dispute between Greece i
Turkey over the boundary of the ■
tinental shelf in the Aegean Sea;

• A complaint by the United
in 1980 that Iran was detaining
American diplomats in Tehran in
tion of international law; and

• A dispute between Tunisia
Libya over the delimitation of the
tinental shelf between them.

A chamber of the Court curre
has before it a question as to the
of the maritime boundary dividing
Continental Shelf and fisheries zo
the United States and Canada in
Gulf of Maine area.

scretariat

jcretariat is headed by the
ary General, assisted by a staff of
;han 16,000 international civil
its worldwide. It provides studies,
lation, and facilities needed by UN
for their meetings. It also carries
;ks as directed by the Security
A, the General Assembly, the
mic and Social Council, and other
■ized LTN bodies. The Charter pro-
;hat the staff be chosen by applica-
■ the "highest standards of efficien-
Tipetence, and integrity," with due
1 for the importance of recruiting
iff on as wide a geographical basis
sible.

le Charter also provides that the
^ry General and staff shall not
ir receive instructions from any
iment or authority other than the
1 Nations. Each UN member is en-
to respect the international
;ter of the Secretariat and not
influence its staff. The Secretary
al alone is responsible for the staff
ion.

le Secretary General's duties in-
using his good offices in resolving
ational disputes, administering
keeping operations, organizing in-
;ional conferences, gathering infor-
n on the implementation of Securi-
3jncil decisions, and consulting with
i.er governments regarding various
■1 alional relations initiatives. The
rtary General may bring to the at-
t n of the Security Council any mat-

ter that in his or her opinion may
threaten international peace and
security.

In 1977, the General Assembly
created a new position in the Secre-
tariat—a director general for develop-
ment and economic cooperation. The in-
cumbent, second only to the Secretary
General, works to obtain better efficien-
cy and coordination of the many
economic and developmental programs
operating in the UN system. Jean Ripert
of France currently occupies this post.

The UN Family

In addition to the six principal UN
organs, the UN family includes nearly
30 major programs or agencies. Some
were in existence before the creation of
the United Nations and are related to it
by agreement. Others were established
by the General Assembly. Each special-
ized agency provides expertise in a
specific area.

The World Health Organization
(WHO) has eradicated smallpox and is
working toward the goal of the "health
for all by the year 2000." It has
established a worldwide network to
warn against the outbreak of other con-
tagious diseases and is promoting a
global campaign to make available im-
munizations against the six major child-
hood diseases by 1990.

UN Secretaries General

e Lie

lammarskjold

int

litially appointed acting
tary General; formally
ited Secretary General
nber 30, 1962.)

Waldheim

Perez de Cuellar

Norway
Sweden
Burma

Austria
Peru

February 1, 1946- April 10, 1953
April 10, 1953-September 18, 1961
November 3, 1961-December 31, 1971

January 1, 1972-December 31, 1981
January 1, 1982-present ■

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

The Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization (FAO) gathers, analyzes, and
publishes information for the benefit of
the world's food producers and con-
sumers; provides technical assistance to
developing countries to improve agricul-
tural production and stimulate economic
development; provides systematic early
warnings on impending food and crop
shortages; and carries out programs to
control plant and animal diseases.

The World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) has established a
World Weather Watch to increase the
collection and dissemination of data
necessary for more accurate weather
prediction. It promotes standardization
of meteorological observations and pro-
vides information about long-term
climate changes that can affect
agriculture and other economic activity.

The International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) develops the prin-
ciples and techniques of international air
navigation and fosters the planning and
development of international air
transport to ensure the safe and orderly
growth of civil aviation. Practices and
recommended standards developed by
ICAO directly affect U.S. commercial air
travel and the sale of U.S. aircraft and
equipment abroad. ICAO also promotes
standards for the control of noise and
pollution from aircraft.

The International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) is a

specialized agency primarily devoted to
lending to low-income farmers in poor
food-deficit countries. It is a cooperative
effort of industrialized, oil-exporting,
and developing nations. Most of IFAD's
loans involve cofinancing with other in-
ternational financial institutions.

Other prominent specialized agencies
are the UN Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the
Universal Postal Union (UPU), the In-
ternational Telecommunication Union
(ITU), and the International Labor
Organization (ILO).

Programs created by the United Na-
tions also work to fill many important
economic and social needs.

The UN Development Program

(UNDP) is the largest multilateral
source of grant technical assistance in
the world. Voluntarily funded, it main-
tains 116 field offices to fulfill its role as
the central funding and coordinating
mechanism for technical assistance
within the UN system. Its country and
intercountry programs in some 150 na-
tions and territories focus on training,
institution building, and preinvestment
activity, with the greater proportion of
resources going to the least developed
countries. Total expenditures for 1982
exceeded $850 million.

The UN Children's Fund
(UNICEF), originally created to assist
homeless and destitute children in
Europe and China after World War II,
now provides humanitarian and
developmental assistance to children and
mothers in developing countries.
UNICEF concentrates on long-term pro-
grams that maximize local community
participation and stimulate self-reliance
in efforts to improve maternal and child
health, nutrition, and education as well
as to increase the availability of clean
water and sanitation. UNICEF was
awarded the 1965 Nobel Peace Prize. In
1982, UNICEF urged broad collabora-
tion among multilateral and bilateral aid

donors, private voluntary agencies,
developing country governments, and
local communities to take advantage of
the opportunity created by recent
developments in health science and
social organization to achieve "a health
revolution for children" in developing
countries.

The UN Environmental Program
(UNEP) is responsible for coordinating
UN environmental activities, calling in-
ternational attention to global and
regional environmental problems, while
stimulating programs to correct these
problems. It assists developing countries
in promoting environmentally sound
development policies and has developed
a worldwide environmental monitoring
system to standardize international en-
vironmental data.

The Office of the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) pro-
vides refugees — people outside of coun-
try of nationality because of well-
founded fear of persecution— with legal
protection and material assistance at the
request of a government or of the
United Nations. UNHCR was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1954 and 1982.

International Conferences

Some conferences held in the UN
system are regular annual meetings;
others are convened specifically to ad-
dress a single topic. Most of the
specialized agencies hold periodic
assemblies of the representatives of
member governments for the agencies'
regular business and attention to specific
problems. Subgroups of these agencies
often meet to discuss specific problems
and to make recommendations to the
larger representative body for action.

For example, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) focuses
specific attention on efficient navigation,
pollution control, and tanker safety. The
International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) recommends uniform regulations
and standard safety measures as well as
simpler procedures at international

borders. The International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU) allocates th
radio frequency spectrum, registers
radio frequency assignments, and wi
to reduce or eliminate interference t
tween radio stations.

The United Nations organizes s{
worldwide conferences to concentrai
particular issues. The 1981 UN Con-
ference on New and Renewable Sou
of Energy was held in Nairobi, Ken;
to encourage new and renewable so
of energy such as solar and geother
power and oil shale. The conference
dealt especially with the problem of
developing countries' access to new
sources of energy.

The World Assembly on Aging,
in Vienna in July and August 1981,
phasized the problems facing the ag
and addressed their rights; role in ;
ty; and social, economic, and persoi
security.

UNISPACE '82, also held in Vi
in August 1982, addressed internat
cooperation in the peaceful applicat
of space technology.

U.S. delegations often include i
only executive branch officials but
Members of Congress, technical ex
and representatives of relevant seg
ments of the U.S. private sector.

The United Nations also draws
tention to specific issues by design:
international "decades," "years," ai
"days." Some of these are:

• Decade for Women: Equality
Development and Peace (1976-85);

• Second Disarmament Decadi
(1980s);

• Third UN Development Dec;
(1981-90);

• International Youth Year (11

• International Year of Peace
(1986);

• World Health Day (April 7);

• World Environment Day (Ju

• United Nations Day (Octobe
date of entry into force of the UN
Charter in 1945); and

■^

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

luman Rights Day, annually
^ted on December 10, the date of
option of the Universal Declara-
' Human Rights by the General
Ibly in 1948.

ring the System

N system is financed in two ways:
; ed contributions from member
' in fulfillment of their treaty
;ions, and voluntary contributions
nember states.

16 regular budgets of the United
IS and its specialized agencies are
1 by assessments. In the case of
lited Nations, the General
r( ibly approves the regular budget

rtermines the assessment for each
J er. The assessment is broadly
J on the relative capacity of each
] -y to pay, as measured by national
A e statistics, although there are
li variations.

, j le Assembly has established the
I pie that no member should pay
„i than 25% of the regular budget.
I nited States is the only nation af-
■i by this limitation. If the standard
i on of "capacity to pay" were ap-
,ij n the same manner to the United
ti; as to other major industrial
/fs, the United States would be
S;ed at about 29%. The minimum
,j|;ment is 0.01%.
jnder the scale of assessments
jed for the 3-year period 1983-85,
_^ major contributors to the regular
judget are the Soviet Union
,]:%), Japan (10.32%), the Federal
alic of Germany (8.54%), France
7o), and the United Kingdom
%). The assessments against
)ers for the regular budget amount
Dut $762 million for each year of
984-85 period; the U.S. share is
million.

N peacekeeping operations have
financed by a combination of
sments, voluntary contributions,
he sale of UN bonds. The UN

in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been
ced solely by voluntary contribu-

Some member nations, in addition
oviding monetary support, have
ied troops, equipment, or services
)ut subsequent reimbursement. The

United States has airlifted personnel
from nations contributing troops to a
number of peacekeeping operations.

Special UN programs not included in
the regular budget— such as UNICEF
and the UNDP — are financed by volun-
tary contributions from member govern-
ments. Some private sector funds are
also provided. Some nations use the UN
system extensively to contribute to
developmental assistance programs in
other nations.

In calendar year 1982, expenditures
by the United Nations; the specialized
agencies; the IAEA; and the special pro-
grams such as UNDP, UNICEF, the
UNEP, WFP, and the UNHCR totaled
about $4.5 billion.

The United States contributes vary-
ing percentages of the costs of the dif-
ferent agencies and programs in the UN
system. In FY 1982, its combined
assessed and voluntary contributions
amounted to $702.6 million, or about
16% of the total.

Some nations have refused to pay all
or part of their assessments for certain
peacekeeping operations as a matter of
principle and thereby have caused fi-
nancing difficulties for the United Na-
tions. These refusals and other factors,
such as making some payments in non-
convertible currency, have produced a
deficit estimated at $326 million in
December 1983.

Maintaining the Peace

The UN Charter gives the Security
Council the power to:

• Investigate any situation threaten-
ing international peace;

• Recommend procedures for
peaceful solution of a dispute;

• Call upon other member nations
to completely or partially interrupt
economic relations as well as sea, air,
postal, and radio communications, or to
sever diplomatic relations; and

• Enforce its decisions militarily, if
necessary. The original assumption that
the United Nations would have its own
armed forces did not work out.
However, through contributions of
troops and equipment by various na-
tions, UN peacekeeping forces have been

able to limit or prevent conflict in a
number of situations. With steady ex-
perience in the operation of such forces
over a number of years, this UN activity
has become more readily acceptable, al-
though disagreement among the perma-
nent members has led to difficulties in
some efforts to institute new peacekeep-
ing forces.

The United Nations has also served
to reduce the danger of wider conflict
and to open the way to negotiated set-
tlements through its services as a center
of debate and negotiation, as well as
through factfinding missions, mediators,
and truce observers. On the other hand,
there have been many violent interna-
tional outbreaks since the United Na-
tions was created. Some have not been
discussed by the Security Council at all,
and others proved to be beyond the
capacity of the United Nations to affect.
Continuing efforts by the United States
and other nations have sought to
enhance the effectiveness of the Security
Council in dealing with international
conflicts.

The most extensive use of UN
troops was in Korea, where, in 1950, the
Security Council mobilized forces under
U.S. leadership for the defense of south
Korea against an attack from the north.
UN forces reached a peak strength of
500,000.

In the Congo (now Zaire), the UN
peacekeeping operation in 1960-64
helped the Congolese Government
restore order following its independence.
At its peak, the UN force totaled more
than 20,000 officers and troops.

In 1964, a UN Peacekeeping Force
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was created to
prevent the recurrence of fighting be-
tween Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
Since Turkish troops landed on Cyprus
in 1974, UNFICYP also has helped to
maintain the cease-fire between the
Cyprus National Guard and the armed
forces of Turkey. Other UN efforts have
sought a peaceful settlement of the
Cyprus dispute.

In the search for a peaceful solution
in the Middle East, the United Nations
has been involved in various ways over
the past 36 years. Its efforts have
ranged from employment of the "good

offices" of UN officials in helping to
resolve differences to the actual deploy-
ment of UN troops. The fighting that
broke out when the State of Israel was
established in 1948 was halted by a UN
cease-fire. UN mediators helped bring
about armistice agreements between
Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and
Syria. These agreements provided for
implementation by mixed armistice com-

missions and the UN Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO). The UN Relief
and Works Agency (UNWRA) was
established to assist refugees from the
conflict.

In 1956, the Suez crisis was resolved
by the withdrawal of Israeli, British, and
French forces from Egyptian territory
in compliance with a UN resolution and
by the establishment of the UN

The UN Charter gives the Security Council power to enforce decisions militarily. In a
number of situations, UN peacekeeping forces have been able to limit or prevent conflict.

Emergency Force (UNEF) to prese)
the peace. A LIN "presence" in Jord
and observer groups in Lebanon an(
Yemen also have helped to diminish
potential threats to international pe
and security in the area. UNEF pol
the Gaza and Sinai lines between Is
and the United Arab Republic from
to 1967, when it was withdrawn at
Egyptian request. In the June 1967
the Security Council achieved a ceas
fire and installed UN observers on t
cease-fire lines between Israel and '

Following the outbreak of hostil
in 1973, a new UN Emergency Fon
was created to impose itself betwee
forces of Israel and Egypt. In 1974.
meeting chaired by the UNEF com-
mander, the two countries signed a
agreement on disengagement, whicl
UNEF then supervised. Under the
agreement, as well as under a secoi
disengagement agreement in 1976,
UNEF manned the zones of diseng;
ment and inspected the zones of lin
arms and forces as agreed to by tht
ties. UNEF was dissolved in 1979 v
the Egyptian-Israeli peace renderec
mandate no longer necessary.

After Israel and Syria reached
agreement on disengaging their for
on the Golan Heights in 1974, the
Security Council established a UN
Disengagement Observer Force (Ul
DOF). The mandate of UNDOF als.
has been extended periodically by t
Council.

The UN Interim Force in Leba
(UNIFIL) was created in early 197:
following an Israeli reprisal attack
Palestine Liberation Organization (
bases in southern Lebanon. LTNIFI
first with 4,000 troops and then wi
more, was established to permit an
Israeli withdrawal and restore ordt
under the control of Lebanese
authorities. UNIFIL helped to pres
a fragile cease-fire along the Israel
Lebanese border until Israel's invaj
of June 1982 drastically transform*
conditions in southern Lebanon.
LINIFIL still performs its duties to
extent possible in its anomalous siti
tion behind Israeli lines. Its mandat
been extended periodically by the S
ty Council on an interim basis, wit!
humanitarian and other temporary

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

to its functions. At the end of
UNIFIL had a strength of some

NTSO. originally created to help
' nent the armistice agreements
I the first Arab-Israeli war, has
performed a variety of chores in

East conflict zones. Its unarmed
/ers assist UNDOF and UNIFIL.
Ti of UNTSO observers has been in
t since 1982, monitoring the situa-
fter the Israeli invasion. At the
f 1983, it had an authorized force
I observers throughout the Middle

^e United Nations also has been
in establishing terms for the
'ement of independence of Namibia
-West Africa) from South African
)1. Numerous meetings of the
al Assembly and the Security
;il — including a special session of
eneral Assembly on Namibia in
1978 — have focused on this issue.
ince early 1977, a small "contact
i" consisting of the then five
srn members of the Security Coun-
he United States, the United
lorn, France, Canada, and the
-a! Republic of Germany— has been
; in facilitating negotiations on the
bia dispute. In July 1978, initial
ment was reached, and the Securi-
uncil asked the Secretary General
aw up a plan to ensure the early in-
idence of Namibia through free
ons under UN auspices. Although
1 Africa objected to portions of the
itary General's plan, the Council, in
jmber 1978, endorsed the plan as
>ecurity Council Resolution 435 and
)rized creation of a UN Transition
itance Group (UNTAG), with
in and military components. This
remains the internationally ac-
d basis for Namibian independence.
Dugh implementation of the plan has
delayed, most differences among
larties have been overcome through
ided negotiations. The Security
icil remains seized of the issue.

Arms Control and Disarmament

Although the UN Charter adopted in
1945 gave no immediate priority to
disarmament, it envisaged a system of
regulation that would ensure "the least
diversion for armaments of the world's
human and economic resources."

The advent of nuclear weapons came
only weeks after the signing of the UN
Charter and provided immediate im-
petus to concepts of arms limitation and
disarmament. In fact, the first resolu-
tion of the first meeting of the General
Assembly (January 24, 1946) was en-
titled "The Establishment of a Commis-
sion to Deal with the Problems Raised
by the Discovery of Atomic Energy,"
and called upon the commission to make
specific proposals for "the elimination
from national armaments of atomic
weapons and of all other major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction."

Since the early years of the United
Nations, great-power disagreement has
severely hampered efforts to promote
arms control and disarmament within
the UN system. However, the United
Nations has undertaken continuing ef-
forts to develop organizational
machinery that can effectively address
disarmament issues. The early establish-
ment of an atomic energy commission
and a commission for conventional ar-
maments met with difficulties; in 1952,
these two commissions were merged by
the General Assembly into the Disarma-
ment Commission (UNDC). The UNDC
was largely ineffective and stopped
meeting in 1965, but was reestablished
by the General Assembly in 1978 as a
new committee composed of the entire
UN membership. The UNDC served as a
deliberative body, lacking authority to
conduct negotiations or establish
negotiating bodies. Today, these func-
tions are centered in the Conference on
Disarmament.

In 1957, the United Nations created
the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy (IAEA), which administers nuclear
materials safeguards and promotes
peaceful uses of atomic energy.

In 1959, the United States, France,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union decided to create a 10-nation

disarmament committee outside — but
linked to— the United Nations. This
committee ceased meeting in 1960, but
in 1962, the Eighteen-Nation Disarma-
ment Committee (ENDC) was estab-
lished. Later renamed the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament (CCD),
membership grew to 26 in 1969 and to
31 in 1974. The United States and the
Soviet Union served as cochairmen.

In 1978, agreement was reached to
create a new body, the Committee on
Disarmament (CD), to succeed the CCD.
The CD, which met first in 1979, re-
mains the principal multilateral
negotiating forum for arms control. It is
composed of the five nuclear-weapons
states and 35 other states representing
all areas of the world. The chairmanship
rotates on a monthly basis among all
members. Like its predecessors, the CD
is not formally a UN body. However, it
reports annually to the General
Assembly, takes relevant Assembly
resolutions into account as it conducts
its work, and has a secretary appointed
by the UN Secretary General.

The CD reconvened in February
1984 as the Conference on Disarmament
and plans to expand its membership by
four, which would raise total member-
ship to 44. Issues on its agenda are
discussed in plenary sessions and then
referred to ad hoc working groups when
the members consider them ripe for
negotiation or more detailed examina-
tion. Also in February 1984, the position
of the personal representative of the UN
Secretary General to the CD was
redesignated as Secretary (General of the
CD; the first incumbent was Rikhi Jaipal
of India.

Since its creation, the CD has con-
centrated on the issues of banning
chemical and radiological weapons, arms
control in outer space, and nuclear arms
control. Although some progress has
been made in the chemical and
radiological areas, the tense interna-
tional climate, the inherent complexity
of the issues, and the large membership
of the new body have prevented rapid
agreement on any of these issues. The
CD has also devoted considerable time
to attempting to elaborate a comprehen-
sive program on disarmament.

Despite considerable progress in
many areas of international concern,
worldwide arms expenditures continue
to grow, amounting in 1982 to more
than $800 billion per year in current
(1982) dollars.

The United Nations has held two
special sessions devoted entirely to
disarmament. The first Special Session
on Disarmament (SSOD I) in 1978 was
an initiative of the nonaligned nations to
spur progress in all aspects of disarma-
ment. The general atmosphere at the
session was constructive. The extensive
conference document — referred to as
the final document, which included a
declaration on disarmament and a pro-
gram of action — was adopted by consen-
sus. Among other things, the first
special session:

• Declared that "effective measures
of nuclear disarmament and the preven-
tion of nuclear war have the highest
priority;"

• Urged the United States and the
Soviet Union to conclude a new strategic
arms limitation agreement at the
earliest possible date and urged the ear-
ly conclusion of a comprehensive test
ban treaty;

• Noted the importance of interna-
tional action to prevent further pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons;

• Noted the value of nuclear-
weapon-free zones;

• Took note of the assurances given
by nuclear-weapons states that such
weapons would not be used against non-
nuclear-weapons states;

• Urged efforts to limit various non-
nuclear weapons that have the potential
for mass destruction;

• Recognized the importance of con-
ventional arms issues, particularly inter-
national transfers of these weapons;

• Urged the financial resources
released as a result of disarmament ef-
forts be devoted to the economic and
social development of all nations, and
called for an expert study on the rela-
tionship between disarmament and
development; and

• Endorsed changes in the machin-
ery for multilateral disarmament talks.

At the second Special Session on
Disarmament (SSOD II), held in 1982,
the assembled members reaffirmed their
commitment to the final document of
SSOD I. The member states could not
agree, however, on a substantive docu-
ment going beyond SSOD I. SSOD II
was highlighted by the participation of
18 heads of state or government, in-
cluding President Reagan, who ad-
dressed the session on June 17, 1982. In
the face of a strong Soviet campaign to
promote proposals on the nonfirst use of
nuclear weapons, Western leaders made
clear their commitment to prevention of
war of any sort — nuclear or conven-
tional — and the value of deterrence.

In mid-October of each year, the
First Committee of the General
Assembly convenes to consider arms
control and disarmament matters. The
committee holds general debates, adopts
resolutions regarding issues on its agen-
da, and forwards them to the General
Assembly for further action.

Items on the First Committee agen-
da include but are not limited to: reduc-
tion of military budgets, conclusion of a
nuclear test ban, establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones, efforts to
ban chemical weapons, nuclear disarma-
ment, and confidence-building measures.

At the September 26, 1983, meeting
of the General Assembly, President
Reagan, addressing the plenary session,
called for a recommitment to the basic
tenet of the United Nations Charter and
reaffirmed the U.S. goal of taking new
and bolder steps to calm an uneasy
world. The President specifically reaf-
firmed the U.S. commitment "to reduce
nuclear arms and to negotiate in good
faith toward that end."

In 1984, the United States remains
hopeful for progress in multilateral arms
control. On April 18, 1984, Vice Presi-
dent Bush presented to the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva a draft U.S.
convention banning the development,
production, use, transfer, and stockpil-
ing of chemical weapons on a global
basis. The U.S. Government also favors
the convening of a meeting of the states
parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention to discuss ways to
strengthen the compliance mechanism of

that convention. A General Assemh'.
resolution adopted in 1982 called for
such a meeting.

In 1985, the third review confeni
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferatii
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be hi
Since its entry into force in March li
the NPT has been a cornerstone of 1
nonproliferation policy. About 120 sii
are party to the treaty. This is the
largest number of states ever to adh
to an arms control agreement, india
the breadth of international support
the objectives of the treaty.

Under the NPT, nuclear-weapor
states are obligated not to assist an;
non-nuclear states to acquire nuclea
plosive devices (Article I). According
non-nuclear-weapons states party to
treaty are obligated not to manufac
or otherwise acquire such devices (/
cle II). In order to monitor compliar
with the treaty's provisions, the NP
provides for the application of inter
tional safeguards by the IAEA to al I
nuclear material in the peaceful pro
grams of nonnuclear weapons statei i
(Article III).

To balance the obligations assur
by non-nuclear-weapons states not t
quire nuclear weapons, the NPT pn
vides that all parties will facilitate t
fullest possible exchange of peacefu
nuclear cooperation (Article IV) anc
vides for access to any benefits fror
peaceful applications of nuclear exp
sions (Article V). It also enjoins all
ties to pursue in good faith negotia'
on arms control and disarmament
measures (Article VI).

Human Rights

The pursuit of human rights was oi
the central reasons for creation of t
United Nations. World War II atroi
including the execution of millions (
Jews, led to a ready consensus that
new organization must work to pre
any similar tragedies in the future.
An early objective was the crea
of a framework of legal obligations
the basis for consideration of and ai
on complaints about human rights \
tions. The UN Charter obliges all
member nations to promote "univer

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

''-it, for, and observance of, human
'■ and to take "joint and separate

to that end.
""fle Universal Declaration of Human
*ra , though not legally binding, was
1* d by the General Assembly in
''* s an early indicator of the goals
■ lould be assumed by the interna-
■' I community. Treaties and conven-
-'. oUowed, many of them drawing
'*i he Universal Declaration. These
m, 3d:

The Convention on the Prevention

jnishment of the Crime of
,, ide;
'' The International Covenant on

,nd Political Rights;

The International Covenant on
Social, and Cultural Rights;

mic.

The International Convention on
imination of All Forms of Racial
mination.

though each of these treaties has
It signed by the United States, con-
itjo their ratification has not been
by the Senate.

addition to the preparation of
)l|locuments, various organs of the
stem undertake consideration of
1 rights issues. The General
;fi ibly regularly takes up human
questions originating in the
nbly or referred to it by subor-
bodies.

16 UN Human Rights Commission,
ECOSOC, is charged specifically
promoting human rights. To carry
lis mandate, the commission can
international instruments, conduct
t studies, or investigate situations
mtries where human rights viola-
are believed to occur-. Investiga-
can be proposed by any member
nment and are decided upon by
)f the entire commission. The 43
lission members (including the
d States) are elected by ECOSOC
e basis of equitable geographic
bution.

he commission has a Subcommis-
3^)n Prevention of Discrimination and
!ction of Minorities, composed of
-ts serving as individuals rather
as government representatives.

Under procedures set up by ECOSOC,
the subcommission may make a con-
fidential review of private communica-
tions sent to the United Nations contain-
ing complaints about human rights.
Situations that appear to reveal a consis-
tent pattern of gross human rights viola-
tions may be referred to the commission
in closed session. That body may then
make a thorough study of the situation
or may undertake an investigation with
the consent of the accused government.

A Human Rights Committee was
formed in 1977 under the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which entered
into force in March 1976. Its 18
members, who serve in their personal
capacities, are nationals of the countries
that have ratified or acceded to the
covenant. The committee receives
reports on measures adopted and prog-
ress made in participating countries and
may comment on those reports directly
to those countries or to ECOSOC. The
committee may also consider complaints
from one country that another is not
fulfilling the obligations of the covenant,
provided that both nations have ac-
cepted the competence of the committee
to perform this role. Further, under the
optional protocol to this covenant, the
committee may consider complaints sub-
mitted by private individuals against
governments that are parties to the pro-
tocol.

The Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was
established in 1969, the year of entry
into force of the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. Like the Human
Rights Committee, its 18 members are
experts, serving in their personal
capacities, elected by countries that are
parties to the convention. The jurisdic-
tional mandate is also similar.

(#)

Other UN agencies also act on
human rights concerns. The Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) was one
of the first agencies to set high stand-
ards and reporting requirements on
human rights situations in the labor

field. A special UNESCO committee ex-
amines human rights complaints from
individuals; groups; and nongovernmen-
tal organizations within the fields of
education, science, culture, and com-
munication. This procedure permits ini-
tiation of a probe based on a single com-
plaint rather than on the establishment
of a "consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions," as required by the Human Rights
Commission. The Organization of
American States (OAS) has written an
American Convention on Human Rights
that gives jurisdiction to an Inter-
American Human Rights Commission
and creates a new court on human
rights. The convention entered into
force in July 1978. The United States
has signed but not ratified the conven-
tion.

The United Nations also has been
expanding its work on behalf of women,
not only to ensure their rights as in-
dividuals but also to stress the need for
them to use their talents and abilities for
progress on social issues. These efforts
are reflected in the agendas of the Com-
mission on the Status of Women,
ECOSOC, the General Assembly, the
Human Rights Commission, the UNDP
Governing Council, and in discussions of
the rights and problems of elderly
women at the World Assembly on Ag-
ing. UN efforts led to the celebration of
International Women's Year in 1975 and
to the declaration of a UN Decade for
Women, 1976-85.

Although the UN system has created
a legal framework for action on human
rights, efforts to implement the
established standards have been uneven.
Some observers have suggested that UN
forums have been characterized by
"selective morality" as criticism has been
focused primarily on the state of human
rights in Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala,
South Africa, and the Israeli-occupied
territories simply because such criticism
was acceptable to the majority of UN
members, while criticism of other na-
tions' abuses was not. The 1982 and
1983 sessions of the Human Rights
Commission marked a departure in this

regard, by taking public action on an
East European country, Poland, for the
first time in the commission's history.

Another reason for slow progress on
human rights has been a debate about
priorities-whether precedence should
be given to violations of the integrity ot
the person-genocide, torture, illegal
detention, or execution without trial; to
civil or political liberties-freedom of
speech, association, press, or movement
within or outside one's country; or to
economic problems— inadequate food,
shelter, and health care. The Reagan
Administration is on record as question-^
ing the notion that economic, social, and
cultural rights occupy a place in the con-
stellation of human rights comparable to
civil and political rights. The idea of
economic and social rights is easily
abused by repressive governments which
claim that they promote human rights
even though they deny their citizens the
basic rights of the integrity of person, as
well as civil and political rights. This
justification for repression has, m fact,
been extensively used. No category of
rights should be allowed to become an
excuse for the denial of other rights.
For these reasons, the Administration
does not use the term economic and
social rights.

There exists, however, a profound
and necessary connection between
human rights and economic develop-
ment. The engine of economic growth is
personal liberty. Societies that protect
civil and political rights are far more
likely to experience economic develop-
ment than societies that do not.

Despite this debate over categories
of rights and despite the great national
and regional sensitivities to human
rights criticism, there have been
strenuous efforts, led by Western coun-
tries, to broaden concern about human
rights in the UN context. Recent Human
Rights Commission sessions have, in
fact, included an increasingly broad
range of human rights issues, and it is
hoped that this trend will expand.

Participation in the United Nations:
Benefits

One of the chief benefits of the UN
system is the opportunity it provides for
government officials to meet, share
ideas and consult on international prob-
lems.' This helps them solve problems
while avoiding confrontations that might
otherwise result from misunderstandings
of national intentions and interests.

Each year in September, the
General Assembly's annual regular ses-
sion brings together not only the official
representatives of all member countries
but also, in many cases, the foreign
ministers and chiefs of state. The U.S.
Secretary of State traditionally spends 2
or 3 weeks at the General Assembly
each year consulting with other govern-
ments on both bilateral questions and on
issues coming before the United Na-
tions. In September 1983 and 1984,
President Reagan addressed the 38th
and 39th sessions of the General
Assembly and met with a number of
world leaders in New York.

Similariy, at other conferences and
meetings in the UN system, delegates of
many nations— including people from
the private sector— become more deeply
acquainted with each other and with the
perspectives of various countries on im-
portant issues. In this way stereotypes
are removed and misunderstandings
reduced. By bringing together
educators, scientists, cultural leaders,
development experts, economists, and
government leaders of many nations,
UN agencies build a growing global com-
munications network of people who have
learned to cooperate toward the achieve-
ment of shared objectives. Their respec-
tive governments may be unfriendly but,
on an individual basis, participants in
these meetings have the opportunity to
strengthen ties between nations that
over time can reduce the likelihood of
conflict.

General Foreign Policy Benefits.
Participation in the United Nations and
its affiliated programs and agencies
helps the United States in at least two
ways: it provides important mechanisms
for the advancement of U.S. foreign
policy objectives, and it gives concrete
benefits to private and public sectors of
this country.

In foreign policy, the United Na
clearly accomplishes tasks that neitb
the United States nor any nation co. k'
accomplish alone or in small coalitio
UN peacekeeping forces in the I
die East, for example, have been ess
tial to the maintenance of a cease-fij
thereby meeting U.S. objectives of
establishing an atmosphere in which
fruitful peace negotiations could tak.|i|
place. The United States and other
Western nations have pursued initia
for peaceful settlement in Namibia i
the UN framework, not because of i
doctrinaire belief in UN mechanisms
because the parties most directly co
cerned want the United Nations in-
volved. The Middle East, Namibia, ;
other security issues have the poten
for international conflict that could
to great power confrontation. The
United States hopes that involving i
United Nations will reduce the dang
inherent in such problems and pron
more stable international order.

Achievement of U.S. internatioi
goals in human rights depends larg(
on the support by other nations anc
ternational organizations. If only or
tion urges an end to genocide, torti
terrorism, illegal detention, or polit i
or economic deprivations, the offen.
nation can procrastinate without pe
ty. If international forums such as 1i
United Nations become involved,
pressures for reform are more effec
and the likelihood of corrective acti
correspondingly greater.

UN programs also serve U.S. o

tives for the developing world by p

moting development. Concerned ab

global poverty, the United States a

tempts through various means to h

developing nations meet basic hum;

needs— clean water, food, shelter, :

health care— and other developmer

goals. This objective is pursued in

various channels: on a bilateral bas

through regional approaches, and b

tively working in the UN system tc

suade other countries to share the

burden of global development. UN

technical assistance and financing s

needed experience, skills, equipmei

and resources. Several donor count

now use the UN system as a chanr

nonartmpnt of State Bl

FEATURE
I UN General Assembly

\llevelopment aid, thus making the
leijl Nations increasingly important
Idwide economic development,
programs also meet humani-
needs. They reflect the interna-
|community's collective concern for
elfare of groups — children in the
ing world; refugees in the Middle
frica, and Asia; and victims of
disaster anywhere — disadvan-
;r by circumstances beyond their
5 1. Education and training pro-
j meet the general needs of specific
.: > lacking normal educational op-
1 lities. Programs promoting scien-
)operation deal with major pro-
such as the weather, environment,
iclear safety. All of these efforts
tg portant to U.S. policy objectives,
icouraging and assisting dialogue
en the industrialized countries and
veloping nations is another impor-
ale played by the United Nations,
particularly appropriate because
developing nations regard the UN
jo n as their chief vehicle for foreign
)ns.

•owing world economic inter-
dence enhances the importance of
nited Nations in developing a con-
i between industrialized countries
North and lesser-developed coun-
f the South. Both regions want to
problems impeding economic
h. Developing countries constitute
than two-thirds of the UN mem-
p and purchase over one-third of
jxports. In the specialized UN
ies dealing with trade, commodi-
nd investment, the United States
\ to expand the world economy in a
ompatible with its own economic
n and values. In the Economic and
Council, the regional commissions,
le UN Conference on Trade and
opment, the United States has pro-
1 an open international trading and
ment system. The United States
; on maintaining a strong role for
rivate sector in meeting the
Dpment needs of all countries.

irect Benefits. Beyond benefits
d for U.S. foreign policy interests,
nited States also gains economic,
, and humanitarian benefits. Large
of U.S. financial assistance to the

United Nations and its related agencies
are returned to U.S. companies through
equipment and supply sales and con-
sulting services. The UNDP, in par-
ticular, spends a major part of its
resources in the United States for pro-
curement, fellowships, and other train-
ing.

As the world's most advanced na-
tion, the United States has extensive
needs for immediate and reliable
worldwide communication, and thus
relies on the International Telecomunica-
tion Union (ITU) to maintain and extend
international cooperation between
member states and to promote the
development of efficient technical
facilities with a view to improving inter-
national telecommunication services. The
United States is the largest producer
and supplier of telecommunications
equipment, and therefore, benefits from
the technical assistance extended to
developing countries from agencies such
as the ITU.

U.S. maritime interests benefit
directly from the International Maritime
Organization's work on standardization,
safety of life at sea measures, and ocean
antipollution programs. Other U.S. en-
vironmental interests are supported by
the UN Environmental Program, which
serves as a catalyst in bringing interna-
tional attention to global and regional
environmental problems and helping
developing countries conceive sound en-
vironmental programs.

The World Meteorological Organiza-
tion provides weather information to
persons from all spheres of U.S. life;
farmers, mariners, aviators, and
travelers. Its work has significant
economic and social impact on the
United States.

Practices and recommended stand-
ards developed by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) directly
affect U.S. commercial air travel and
favorably influence the U.S. economic
community, which supplies the greatest
share of aircraft and equipment to both
developed and developing countries.
ICAO develops the principles and techni-
ques of international air navigation and
fosters the planning and development of
international air transport to ensure the

safe and orderly growth of civil aviation.
It also promotes standards for the con-
trol of noise and pollution from aircraft.
The United States also benefits from
the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy, which facilitates the use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes while
utilizing important programs of non-
proliferation and safeguards to protect
against the use of atomic energy for
military purposes. The IAEA fosters the
exchange of scientific and technical in-
formation and assists in the training of
scientists and experts.

U.S. Policy Toward the United
Nations

Today .... I solemnly pledge my nation to
upholding the original ideals of the United
Nations. Our goals are those that guide this
very body. Our ends are the same as those of
the United Nations' founders, who sought to
replace a world at war with one where the
rule of law would prevail, where human
rights were honored, where development
would blossom, where conflict would give
way to freedom from violence.

President Reagan, in an
address to the UN
General Assembly,
September 26, 1983

Even before he took office, Presi-
dent Reagan expressed his determina-
tion to reassert U.S. authority in the
United Nations. Since January 1981, he
has sought to make increased use of the
diplomatic machinery available through
the UN system and to strengthen U.S.
support for a more effective and effi-
cient UN system. The U.S. Government,
in particular, has urged recognition of
UN value to the conduct of U.S. foreign
relations and in terms of direct benefits
to this country and its people.

The U.S. Government, an essential
force in the creation of the United Na-
tions in 1945, joined the organization
with great enthusiasm. The Senate, by a
vote of 89-2, gave its consent to the
ratification of the UN Charter on
July 28, 194,5. In December 1945, the
Senate and the House of Represen-
tatives, by unanimous votes, requested
that the United Nations make its head-
quarters in the United States. Since the
founding days, the United States has

been a major participant; however, with
the changing political makeup of the
world following World War II, this has
entailed changes in the United Nations
as well as U.S. approaches to UN issues.

Since the early 1980s, the United
States has sought to reassert its leader-
ship in multilateral affairs, strengthen
its influence in the United Nations and
its related agencies, promote fiscal
responsibility in the budgetary process,
increase the number of U.S. nationals on
staffs of international organizations, and
augment private sector involvement in
UN programs and activities. The United
States has achieved results in several of
these areas.

Efforts to reassert U.S. leadership
were assisted by forceful action in New
York and elsewhere in the UN system.
A prominent example was U.S. Perma-
ment Representative Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick's October 1981 letter con-
cerning the Nonaligned Movement com-
munique at the 36th session of the
General Assembly. That letter formally
put nonaligned nations on notice that
the United States was closely following
their activities in the United Nations and
expected them to act more responsibly.
Moreover, the United States has made it
a point, through speeches and frequent
rights of reply, to spotlight unacceptable
Soviet bloc behavior and to counter
harmful Soviet positions. Vigorous and
well-publicized U.S. efforts to prune
swelling UN budgets have won serious
attention and made some headway in
curbing costs, thus laying the ground-
work for future progress.

An active and systematic review of
all major multilateral agencies in terms
of their relationship to the above-cited
policy goals led to the decision in late
1983 to notify UNESCO that the United
States would withdraw at the end of
1984. The reasons for this decision were:

• Unacceptably high budget growth;

• Politicization of the UNESCO
work program; and,

• A drift toward statist solutions —
e.g., the call for a new world informa-
tion and communication order — to com-
plex social and political problems.

The United States said it would also re-
main watchful for any changes in
UNESCO during 1984, and left open the
possibility that, if these changes were
significant, the decision to withdraw
might be reconsidered. In a somewhat
related case, the 1977 U.S. decision to
withdraw from the International Labor
Organization contributed to the progress
in that body to reduce politicization,
eventually enabling the United States to
rejoin in 1980.

The United States has remained a
firm and unwavering advocate of the
universality principle with respect to UN
membership. Secretary of State Shultz
reiterated this position on October 16,
1982, stating that the United States
would cease participation in and support
for any UN body which excluded Israel
or denied Israel the full privileges of
membership.

The United States has continued to
seek UN support for its ongoing efforts
to help bring about peaceful settlements
in the Middle East and southern Africa.
In this regard, the United States sup-
ports UN peacekeeping operations in
Lebanon and the Golan Heights and
stands ready to assist the transitional
assistance group for Namibia envisioned
in Security Council Resolution 435.

Concern that the United States can
be outvoted in the General Assembly by
the "automatic nonaligned majority" has
led to various suggestions for reform.
Rather than have one vote for each na-
tion, it has been proposed that votes be
weighted according to the wealth, UN
contributions, population, or power of
each country. Several studies have
shown that in many cases results under
a weighted voting system would be less
favorable to U.S. interests than under
the current one-country, one-vote
system. Moreover, such changes could
not be implemented unless the perma-
nent members of the Security Council
were willing to accept curbs on their
veto power. For obvious reasons, the
permanent members have not accepted
such proposals.

Apart from approval of budgetary
matters. Assembly resolutions are
recommendatory and not binding on the
members. Binding decisions concerning
action with respect to threats to the

peace and acts of aggression can op
made by the Security Council. In th:
case, the UN Charter gives the Unit
States and the four other permanen
members the right of veto. The Lfni
States is thus the beneficiary of an
portant voting privilege.

The United States, over the yea
has offered several proposals for en
hancing UN effectiveness, which inc

• Strengthening the role of the
Security Council in the settlement o
disputes, particularly through more
automatic referral to the Council or
situations of international tension;

• Greater use of the Internatioi
Court of Justice;

• More effective peacekeeping
capability, including the designation
member nations of trained national
troop contingents for quick deployn
in international situations when
authorized, and the establishment o
reserve fund to ensure the covering
initial costs of peacekeeping operati ■

• Better means of addressing c
mament and arms control questions

• More effective machinery tn ;
dress human rights issues; ;

• Exploring ways to supplemer
financing of international programs
funds from international commerce ■
services, or resources;

• Better coordination of the
technical assistance programs in va i
UN agencies, including expanded e
for evaluation, monitoring, and qu^.
control;

• Improving the UN Secretarial
both in operations and quality of pw
nel; and

• Better coordination of the pa
ticipation in the UN system of vari' I
branches of the U.S. Government, i

U.S. Representation

The U.S. representative to the Uni
Nations heads this country's Perma
Mission to the United Nations in N' <
York. The mission serves as the chH
of communication for the U.S. Govi I
ment with the IIN organs, agencies
commissions at UN headquarters a
with the other permanent missions
credited to the United Nations and

FEATURE

UN General Assembly

ber observer missions. The mis-
s a pr