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Departmvn t 






bulletin 



he Official Monthly Record of United St ates F orei gn Policy /Volume 85/ Number 210 3 






October 1985 



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ZN8ASWE 



88TSW*** 



Pretoria 
* 
SWA2ILAN 



SOUTH IH&tho/ 
AFRICA 



South Africa/1 , 54 
Helsinki Final Act/30 
Refugees/51 






Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 85/Number 2103/October 1985 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

BERNARD KALB 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31 , 
1987. 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-^ 
is published monthly (plus annual index) by thi 
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postagi 
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department of State Bulletin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, ' 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

LVMII'J 



CONTENTS 



Africa 

1 South Africa: Presidential Actions 

(President Reagan, Executive 

Order) 
4 The U.S. and South Africa: A 

Framework for Progress 

(Chester A. Crocker) 

7 Mr. McFarlane's Interview on 

"This Week With David 
Brinkley" 

8 Background on South Africa 

Arms Control 

17 Gorbachev's Next 100 Days 
(Edward L. Rowny) 



Nuclear Policy 

47 Reprocessing and Plutonium Use 
in Civil Nuclear Programs 
(Richard T. Kennedy) 

Refugees 

51 U.S. Refugee Program in 
Southeast Asia (James N. 
Purcell, Jr.) 



Terrorism 

54 U.S. Offers Reward for Informa- 
tion on Terrorist Attack (White 
House Announcement) 



East Asia 



19 



23 



U.S. China Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement (Kenneth L. Adel- 
man, Richard T. Kennedy, 
Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

Recent Security Developments in 
Korea (Paul D. Wolfowitz) 



Economics 



27 



28 



Improved Market Access to Japan 

(Clayton Yeutter) 
Trade With Japan (White House 

Statement) 



Europe 

30 10 Years After the Helsinki Final 

Act (President Reagan, Secretary 

Shultz) 
34 U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Late 

20th Century (Robert C. 

McFarlane) 
37 Soviet Use of Chemical Tracking 

Agents (Department Statement) 



International Law 

38 Fighting Terrorism Through Law 
(Abraham D. Sofaer) 



Military Affairs 



42 



46 



SDI: Setting the Record Straight 

(Kenneth L. Adelman) 
U.S. to Test ASAT Device (White 

House Statement) 



United Nations 

54 Security Council Meets on Situa- 
tion in South Africa (Warren 
Clark, Jr., Vernon A. Walters, 
Security Council Members, Text 
of Resolution) 

Western Hemisphere 

56 U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Commission 
Meets (Secretary Shultz) 

58 Current Challenges Facing the 
OAS (Richard T. McCormack) 

End Notes 

60 August 1985 

Treaties 

61 Current Actions 



Press Releases 

63 Department of State 
63 USUN 



Publications 

65 Department of State 
65 GPO Subscriptions 
65 Films and Videotapes 



Index 



AFRICA 



Sullivan Code 



i 1977 Rev. Leon Sullivan— a Baptist 
inister in Philadelphia and General 
otors Corp. director— formulated a set 
' principles for fair employment prac- 
ces in South Africa. He encouraged 
.S. companies with investments in 
}uth Africa to implement these prin- 
ples in their South African facilities 
id thus break down the apartheid 
sgulations which allow discrimination 
gainst nonwhite employees, 
hese principles are: 

• Nonsegregation of the races in all 
iting, comfort, and work facilities; 

• Equal and fair employment prac- 
ices for all employees; 

• Equal pay for all employees doing 
pal or comparable work for the same 
;riod of time; 

• Initiation and development of 
•aining programs that will prepare 
lacks, coloreds, and Asians in substan- 
al numbers for supervisory, ad- 
unistrative, clerical, and technical jobs; 

• Increasing the number of blacks, 
)loreds, and Asians in management and 
upervisory positions; and 

• Improving the quality of 
mployees' lives outside the work en- 
ironment in such areas as housing, 
ransportation, schooling, recreation, and 
ealth facilities. ■ 



South Africa: 
Presidential Actions 



Following are the texts of President 
Reagan's remarks made in the White 
House and the Executive order signed 
at the conclusion of the remarks on 
September 9, 1985. 1 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS 

I want to speak this morning about 
South Africa— about what America can 
do to help promote peace and justice in 
that country so troubled and tormented 
by racial conflict. 

The system of apartheid means 
deliberate, systematic, institutionalized 
racial discrimination denying the black 
majority their God-given rights. 
America's view of apartheid is simple 
and straightforward: we believe it's 
wrong. We condemn it. And we're 
united in hoping for the day when 
apartheid will be no more. 

Our influence over South African 
society is limited. But we do have some 
influence, and the question is how to use 
it. Many people of good will in this 
country have differing views. In my 
view, we must work for peaceful evolu- 
tion and reform. Our aim cannot be to 
punish South Africa with economic sanc- 
tions that would injure the very people 
we're trying to help. 

I believe we must help all those who 
peacefully oppose apartheid; and we 
must recognize that the opponents of 
apartheid using terorism and violence 
will bring not freedom and salvation, 
but greater suffering and more oppor- 
tunities for expanded Soviet influence 
within South Africa and in the entire 
region. 

What we see in South Africa is a 
beginning of a process of change. The 
changes in policy so far are inadequate— 
but, ironically, they've been enough to 
raise expectations and stimulate de- 
mands for more far-reaching, immediate 
change. It's the growing economic 
power of the black majority that has put 
them in a position to insist on political 
change. 



South Africa is not a totalitarian 
society. There is a vigorous opposition 
press. And every day we see examples 
of outspoken protest and access to the 
international media that would never be 
possible in many parts of Africa, or in 
the Soviet Union, for that matter. But 
is is our active engagement— our willing- 
ness to try— that gives us influence. 

Yes, we in America— because of 
what we are and what we stand for— 
have influence to do good. We also have 
immense potential to make things 
worse. Before taking fateful steps, we 
must ponder the key question: Are we 
helping to change the system? Or are 
we punishing the blacks whom we seek 
to help? 

American policy through several ad- 
ministrations has been to use our influ- 
ence and our leverage against apartheid, 
not against innocent people who are the 
victims of apartheid. 

Being true to our heritage does not 
mean quitting but reaching out; expand- 
ing our help for black education and 
community development; calling for 
political dialogue; urging South Africans 
of all races to seize the opportunity for 
peaceful accommodation before it's too 
late. 

I respect and share the goals that 
have motivated many in Congress to 
send a message of U.S. concern about 
apartheid. But in doing so, we must not 
damage the economic well-being of 
millions of people in South and southern 
Africa. If we genuinely wish— as I do- 
to develop a bipartisan basis of consen- 
sus in support of U.S. policies, this is 
the basis on which to proceed. 

Therefore, I am signing today an 
Executive order that will put in place a 
set of measures designed and aimed 
against the machinery of apartheid 
without indiscriminately punishing the 
people who are victims of that system- 
measures that will disassociate the 
United States from apartheid but associ- 
ate us positively with peaceful change. 



)ctober 1985 



AFRICA 



These steps include: 

• A ban on all computer exports to 
agencies involved in the enforcement of 
apartheid and to the security forces; 

• A prohibition on exports of 
nuclear goods or technology to South 
Africa, except as is required to imple- 
ment nuclear proliferation safeguards of 
the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) or those necessary for 
humanitarian reasons to protect health 
and safety; 

• A ban on loans to the South Afri- 
can Government, except certain loans 
which improve economic opportunities 
or educational, housing, and health 
facilities that are open and accessible to 
South Africans of all races; and 

• I'm directing the Secretary of 
State and the United States Trade 
Representative to consult with our 
major trading partners regarding ban- 
ning the importation of Krugerrands. 
I'm also instructing the Secretary of 
Treasury to report to me with 60 days 
on the feasibility of minting an 
American gold coin which could provide 
an alternative to the Krugerrand for our 
coin collectors. 

I want to encourage ongoing actions 
by our government and by private 
Americans to improve the living stand- 
ards of South Africa's black majority. 
The Sullivan code— devised by a dis- 
tinguished black minister from Phila- 
delphia, the Reverend Leon Sullivan- 
has set the highest standards of labor 
practices for progressive employers 
throughout South Africa. I urge all 
American companies to participate in it, 
and I'm instructing the American Am- 
bassador to South Africa to make every 
effort to get companies which have not 
adopted them to do so. 

In addition, my Executive order will 
ban U.S. Government export assistance 
to any American firm in South Africa 
employing more than 25 persons which 
does not adhere to the comprehensive 
fair employment principles stated in the 
order by the end of this year. 

I'm also directing the Secretary of 
State to increase substantially the 
money we provide for scholarships to 
South Africans disadvantaged by apart- 
heid and the money our Embassy uses 
to promote human rights programs in 
South Africa. 

Finally, I have directed Secretary 
Shultz to establish an advisory commit- 
tee of distinguished Americans to pro- 
vide recommendations on measures to 



encourage peaceful change, in South 
Africa. The advisory committee shall 
provide its first report within 12 
months. 

I believe the measures I am an- 
nouncing here today will best advance 
our goals. If the Congress sends me the 
present bill as reported by the Confer- 
ence Committee, I would have to veto 
it. That need not happen. I want to 
work with the Congress to advance 
bipartisan support for America's policy 
toward South Africa. That's why I have 
put forward this Executive order today. 

Three months ago, I recalled our 
Ambassador in South Africa for consul- 
tations so that he could participate in 
the intensive review of the southern 
African situation that we've been en- 
gaged in. I've just said good-bye to him. 
I'm now sending him back with a mes- 
sage to State President Botha under- 
lining our grave view of the current 
crisis and our assessment of what is 
needed to restore confidence abroad and 
move from confrontation to negotiation 
at home. The problems of South Africa 
were not created overnight and will not 
be solved overnight, but there is no 
time to waste. To withdraw from this 
drama— or to fan its flames— will serve 
neither our interests nor those of the 
South African people. 

If all Americans join together behind 
a common program, we can have so 
much more influence for good. So let us 
go forward with a clear vision and an 
open heart, working for justice and 
brotherhood and peace. And now I'm 
going to sign the Executive order. 

EXECUTIVE ORDER 

Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other 
Transactions Involving South Africa 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States of America, including the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), the United 
Nations Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287), the 
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et 
seq.), the Export Administration Act (50 
U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), the Atomic Energy 
Act (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Foreign 
Service Act (22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.), the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. 
App. I), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United 
States Code, and considering the measures 
which the United Nations Security Council 
has decided on or recommended in Security 
Council Resolutions No. 418 of November 4, 



1977, No. 558 of December 13, 1984, and N. 
569 of July 26, 1985, and considering that tl 
policy and practice of apartheid are repug- 
nant to the moral and political values of 
democratic and free societies and run count 
to United States policies to promote demo- 
cratic governments throughout the world a: 
respect for human rights, and the policy of 
the United States to influence peaceful 
change in South Africa, as well as the thre 
posed to United States interests by recent 
events in that country, 

I, Ronald Reagan, President of the 
United States of America, find that the 
policies and actions of the Government of 
South Africa constitute an unusual and ex- 
traordinary threat to the foreign policy anc 
economy of the United States and hereby 
declare a national emergency to deal with 
that threat: 

Section 1. Except as otherwise providt 
in this section, the following transactions a 
prohibited effective October 11, 1985: 

(a) The making or approval of any loan, 
by financial institutions in the United Stat' 
to the Government of South Africa or to e 
tities owned or controlled by that Govern- 
ment. This prohibition shall enter into fore 
on November 11, 1985. It shall not apply t 
(i) any loan or extension of credit for any 
educational, housing, or health facility whii 
is available to all persons on a nondiscrimi 
tory basis and which is located in a geogrc 
ic area accessible to all population groups 
without any legal or administrative restric 
tion; or (ii) any loan or extension of credit 
which an agreement is entered into before 
the date of this Order. 

The Secretary of the Treasury is herel 
authorized to promulgate such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary to carry 
this subsection. The initial rules and regul 
tions shall be issued within sixty days. Th 
Secretary of the Treasury may, in consult 
tion with the Secretary of State, permit e 
ceptions to this prohibition only if the 
Secretary of the Treasury determines tha 
the loan or extension of credit will improv 
the welfare or expand the economic oppor 
tunities of persons in South Africa disadv; 
taged by the apartheid system, provided t 
no exception may be made for any aparth 
enforcing entity. 

(b) All exports of computers, compute) 
software, or goods or technology intended 
service computers to or for use by any of 
following entities of the Government of S( 
Africa: 

(1) The military; 

(2) The police; 

(3) The prison system; 

(4) The national security agen 

(5) ARMSCOR [Arms Corporation 
South Africa] and its subsidiaries or the 
weapons research activities of the Council 
Scientific and Industrial Research; 

(6) The administering authorities 6 
the black passbook and similar controls; 

(7) Any apartheid enforcing agenc) 






AFRICA 



(8) Any local or regional government 
'homeland" entity which performs any 
ction of any entity described in 
agraphs (1) through (7). 

The Secretary of Commerce is hereby 
horized to promulgate such rules and 
ulations as may be necessary to carry out 
; subsection and to implement a system of 
use verification to ensure that any com- 
ers exported directly or indirectly to 
th Africa will not be used by any entity 
forth in this subsection, 
(c) (1) Issuance of any license for the ex- 
t to South Africa of goods or technology 
ch are to be used in a nuclear production 
itilization facility, or which, in the judg- 
lt of the Secretary of State, are likely to 
diverted for use in such a facility; any 
lorization to engage, directly or indirect- 
n the production of any special nuclear 
erial in South Africa; any license for the 
ort to South Africa of component parts or 
;r items or substances especially relevant 
i the standpoint of export control because 
leir significance for nuclear explosive pur- 
;s; and any approval of retransfers to 
:h Africa of any goods, technology, special 
ear material, components, items or 
stances described in this section. The 
•etaries of State, Energy, Commerce, and 
isury are hereby authorized to take such 
>ns as may be necessary to carry out this 
section. 

2) Nothing in this section shall preclude 
stance for International Atomic Energy 
ncy safeguards or IAEA programs 
Tally available to its member states, or 
echnical programs for the purpose of 
•icing proliferation risks, such as for 
icing the use of highly enriched uranium 
activities envisaged by Section 223 of the 
lear Waste Policy Act' (42 U.S.C. 10203) 
>r exports which the Secretary of State 
rmines are necessary for humanitarian 
ons to protect the public health and 

d) The import into the United States of 
•arms, ammunition, or military vehicles 
luced in South Africa or of any manufac- 
lg data for such articles. The Secretaries 
tate, Treasury, and Defense are hereby 
orized to take such actions as may be 
■ssary to carry out this subsection. 

>ec. 2. (a) The majority of United States 
s in South Africa have voluntarily 
sred to fair labor principles which have 
;fited those in South Africa who have 
i disadvantaged by the apartheid system, 
the policy of the United States to en- 
rage strongly all United States firms in 
.h Africa to follow this commendable 
nple. 

b) Accordingly, no department or agency 
le United States may intercede after 
amber 31, 1985, with any foreign govern- 
t regarding the export marketing activity 
ay country of any national of the United 
es employing more than 25 individuals in 
:h Africa who does not adhere to the 
ciples stated in subsection (c) with 



respect to that national's operations in South 
Africa. The Secretary of State shall pro- 
mulgate regulations to further define the 
employers that will be subject to the re- 
quirements of this subsection and procedures 
to ensure that such nationals may register 
that they have adhered to the principles. 

(c) The principles referred to in subsec- 
tion (b) are as follows: 

(1) Desegregating the races in each 
employment facilitiy; 

(2) Providing equal employment oppor- 
tunity for all employees without regard to 
race or ethnic origin; 

(3) Assiu-ing that the pay system is 
applied to all employees without regard to 
race or ethnic origin; 

(4) Establishing a minimum wage and 
salary structure based on the appropriate 
local minimum economic level which takes 
into account the needs of employees and their 
families; 

(5) Increasing by appropriate means, 
the number of persons in managerial, super- 
visory, administrative, clerical, and technical 
jobs who are disadvantaged by the apartheid 
system for the purpose of significantly in- 
creasing their representation in such jobs; 

(6) Taking reasonable steps to im- 
prove the quality of employees' lives outside 
the work environment with respect to hous- 
ing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and 
health; 

(7) Implementing fair labor practices 
by recognizing the right of all employees, 
regardless of racial or other distinctions, to 
self-organization and to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, freely and without penal- 
ty or reprisal, and recognizing the right to 
refrain from any such activity. 

(d) United States nationals referred to in 
subsection (b) are encouraged to take 
reasonable measures to extend the scope of 
their influence on activities outside the 
workplace, by measures such as supporting 
the right of all businesses, regardless of the 
racial character of their owners or employees, 
to locate in urban areas, by influencing other 
companies in South Africa to follow the 
standards specified in subsection (c) and by 
supporting the freedom of mobility of all 
workers, regardless of race, to seek employ- 
ment opportunities wherever they exist, and 
by making provision for adequate housing for 
families of employees within the proximity of 
the employee's place of work. 

Sec. 3. The Secretary of State and the 
head of any other department or agency of 
the United States carrying out activities in 
South Africa shall promptly take, to the ex- 
tent permitted by law, the necessary steps to 
ensure that the labor practices described in 
section (2) (c) are applied to their South 
African employees. 



Sec. 4. The Secretary of State and the 
head of any other department or agency of 
the United States carrying out activities in 
South Africa shall, to the maximum extent 
practicable and to the extent permitted by 
law, in procuring goods or services in South 
Africa, make affirmative efforts to assist 
business enterprises having more than 50 
percent beneficial ownership by persons in 
South Africa disadvantaged by the apartheid 
system. 

Sec. 5. (a) The Secretary of State and the 
United States Trade Representative are 
directed to consult with other parties to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
with a view toward adopting a prohibition on 
the import of Krugerrands. 

(b) The Secretary of Treasury is directed 
to conduct a study to be completed within 
sixty days regarding the feasibility of minting 
and issuing gold coins with a view toward ex- 
peditiously seeking legislative authority to 
accomplish the goal of issuing such coins. 

Sec. 6. In carrying out their respective 
functions and responsibilities under this 
Order, the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Secretary of Commerce shall consult with the 
Secretary of State. Each such Secretary shall 
consult, as appropriate, with other govern- 
ment agencies and private persons. 

Sec. 7. The Secretary of State shall 
establish, pursuant to appropriate legal 
authority, an Advisory Committee on South 
Africa to provide recommendations on meas- 
ures to encourage peaceful change in South 
Africa. The Advisory Committee shall pro- 
vide its initial report within twelve months. 

Sec. 8. The Secretary of State is directed 
to take the steps necessary pursuant to the 
Foreign Assistance Act and related legisla- 
tion to (a) increase the amount of internal 
scholarships provided to South Africans 
disadvantaged by the apartheid system up to 
$8 million from funds made available for 
Fiscal Year 1986, and (b) increase the amount 
allocated for South Africa from funds made 
available for Fiscal Year 1986 in the Human 
Rights Fund up to $1.5 million. At least one- 
third of the latter amount shall be used for 
legal assistance for South Africans. Ap- 
propriate increases in the amounts made 
available for these purposes will be con- 
sidered in future fiscal years. 

Sec. 9. This order is intended to express 
and implement the foreign policy of the 
United States. It is not intended to create 
any right or benefit, substantive or pro- 
cedural, enforceable at law by a party against 
the United States, its agencies, its officers, 
or any person. 



J Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 16, 1985. 



AFRICA 



The U.S. and South Africa: 
A Framework for Progress 

by Chester A. Crocker 

Address before the 

Commonwealth Club in San Francisco 

on August 16, 1985. 

Mr. Crocker is 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. 



It is a great honor and pleasure to ap- 
pear before this distinguished audience 
today. We have timing which I can only 
describe as propitious. The images of 
Africa— as they have flashed across our 
television screens night after night- 
have embedded themselves in the hearts 
and the minds of our people as never 
before. The scenes of suffering of the in- 
nocent victims of drought and famine 
have produced an outpouring of active 
help and sympathy that has always been 
one of the finest features of our national 
character. Our response to the wound- 
ing drama of South Africa confronts us 
with far more vexing difficulties; but 
here, too, our country has an important 
role to play. 

The wave of unrest and repression 
that has now swept across South Africa 
for almost a year has touched some of 
the most sensitive nerves in our body 
politic. The practice of racism, through 
apartheid, the denial of the inalienable 
rights of citizenship, and the disregard 
for due process of law are affronts to 
our national conscience. 

Events of the past 12 months have 
produced a quantum leap in our own 
public awareness of events and debate 
about what can and should be done. The 
very intense and emotional content of 
this debate reflects the frustration and 
impatience of many Americans in get- 
ting a grip on the problem. Our rela- 
tions with South Africa have inevitably 
reflected this strain. In South Africa 
itself, the government has cracked down 
hard by proclaiming a state of emer- 
gency in 36 magisterial districts and by 
resorting to mass arrests. Yet, at the 
same time, we have seen some tentative 
signs of a reappraisal of policy. Only 



yesterday, State President P.W. Botha 
delivered a policy speech in the stated 
hope of drawing black political leaders 
into negotiation about the sharing of 
political power. I will have some com- 
ments about that pronouncement a little 
later. But in the time we are together, I 
would first like to state some fundamen- 
tal propositions which I believe are 
widely shared and enable us to shape a 
common American approach to the 
South African problem. I will then 
discuss certain realities in South and 
southern Africa that all of us must keep 
in mind as we discuss U.S. policy. And 
finally, I will comment on yesterday's 
speech and the implications for U.S. 
policy. 

Central Propositions 

First and foremost, let us remember 
that there is no debate about the evils 
of apartheid across the spectrum of 
American politics. For this Administra- 
tion, apartheid is abhorrent. A primary 
goal of our policy is to get rid of apar- 
theid. Any status quo that excludes 73% 
of the population from the central pro- 
cesses of government on the basis of 
race and imposes on them a legal 
framework of dehumanizing restrictions 
on where they can live and work not 
only affronts our fundamental values but 
it also endangers our very real interest 
in the stability of this strategic part of 
the world. In our national debate, we 
must proceed from this common assump- 
tion and common conviction. I would 
like today to salute those leaders and 
people across our land and our political 
system who are speaking, writing, and 
acting to express American convictions 



against racism and for the search for 
alternatives to violence in South Africj 
As I do so, I would ask also that we a 
recognize what our public debate is 
about: it is about how to help end apai 
heid; what works and what doesn't 
work. 

The second proposition— with whic! 
few in the mainstream of American 
politics would disagree— is our opposi- 
tion to a scenario of violence (including 
of course, the violence of repression). 
The curse of violence, however it may 
be rationalized, is that it unleashes 
forces that quickly threaten to destroy 
the very values in whose name it is 
used. We know what has happened in 
the name of armed struggle or violent 
"liberation" in Indochina and Iran. In 
the South African context, where blac 
brown, and white South Africans will 
have to continue to live side by side, 
human, economic, and political costs o 
such scenarios would simply be horre' 
dous. South Africa and its neighbors 
have a long way to go before they 
achieve stability and justice. They als 
have a lot to lose if peaceful change 
fails. For us carelessly to throw mate 
into an already explosive and volatile 
situation would be a betrayal of such 
men of peace as Bishop Desmond Tut 
and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who are 
working for negotiated solutions. To 
turn our backs on such efforts would 
a counsel of despair. 

Third, we cannot insulate our ap- 
proach to South Africa from our con- 
cerns for the stability and security ir 
the countries in the region. We have 
portant regional goals in South Afric. 
independence for Namibia, a reductic 
in cross-border violence in the region 
the removal of foreign forces from 
Angola, and expanded economic deve 
ment there. Peaceful change in Soutl 
Africa away from apartheid is crucial 
improved relations between South 
Africa and its neighbors. By the sam 
token, an escalation of cross-border 
violence reduces the odds for peacefi 
change in South Africa itself. In ordt 
to have positive influence in regional 
diplomacy, we must be able to speak 
all the parties in the region. As in th 
Middle East, we would rapidly becor 
irrelevant if we maneuvered ourselv< 
into a position where we could talk c 
to one side. 






AFRICA 



Fourth, there simply is no way of in- 
ating our approach to southern Africa 
any other important region from the 
lities of our competitive relationship 
h our global adversary. The Soviet 
Brest is advanced by regional in- 
urity and instability. Our interest is 
Deacemaking, pushing change in 
ith Africa, and in using our resources 
help create the economic underpin- 
gs of regional prosperity. 
This brings me to my fifth and final 
■position, which relates directly to the 
rent sanctions debate. We Americans 
builders and not destroyers. Clearly, 
• goal must be a more hopeful, just, 
I prosperous South Africa, with ex- 
ided opportunities for all its people, 
s is unlikely to happen if the 
nomic pie is shrinking. Irrespective 
low South Africa will be run— and by 
Dm— damaging its economy now will 
only stunt economic growth but will 
) ultimately stunt the lives of this 
i coming generations of young South 
icans. 

Disinvestment would be doubly sad 
ause U.S. industrialists and 
inessmen bring to South Africa a 
que experience and state-of-the-art 
cies in race relations and equal op- 
tunity programs. I am pleased to 
s that our closest allies share with us 
rm belief that a growing economy 
help the reform process there. Our 
■erience in the United States but- 
5ses the point. As builders, we must 
f engaged; that is what we in 
lernment are doing— helping young 
3k South Africans with their educa- 
i, assisting black trade unionists, 
ning black entrepreneurs. Our self- 
3 grants have assisted hundreds of 
lmunities to help themselves and our 
nan rights fund is assisting the vic- 
s of the apartheid system. Our 
ernment programs— initiated in re- 
t years— are paralleled by the in- 
vement of many nongovernment in- 
utions: churches, businessmen, 
ons, foundations, and universities. 
3 principle at stake, that I am draw- 
, is a simple but powerful one of be- 
involved through our presence and 
• programs. This means having tools 
nfluence, rolling up our sleeves, and 
jhing our goals. It does not mean 
ng seduced by a status quo that is 
;rwhelmingly repellent to Americans. 



Current Realities in South and 
Southern Africa 

Turning from these fundamental prop- 
ositions, let me now address briefly 
some realities that we see in the current 
situation that none of us can afford to 
ignore. 

First, the process of change away 
from apartheid has begun. That odious 
system— rooted in racism and fear— was 
built in the 1940s and 1950s; it flour- 
ished in the 1960s and 1970s. Today It is 
eroding, it is being challenged, and it is 
being dismantled. We do not endorse 
the limited changes that have been 
made. They are not enough; they have 
not yet touched the core political issues; 
they do not have black support and 
have in some respects fueled black 
anger. But knowledgeable observers are 
widely agreed that significant change 
has started— in the economic and urban 
rights of blacks, in the grant of certain 
political rights to coloreds and Asians, 
and in the official recognition that power 
must be more broadly shared and that 
such fundamental change must be 
negotiated with blacks. 

Second, the vicious downward spiral 
of unrest and repression of the past 12 
months in South Africa has added to the 
urgency of such negotiation and basic 
change. It has also added to the dif- 
ficulties of bringing them about. The 
violence flows from the anger of blacks, 
especially those with no stake in the 
current setup. The explicit exclusion of 
blacks from recent constitutional moves 
and a severe economic downturn have 
had explosive consequences. With 
almost no legitimate outlets, discredited 
systems of rural and urban self- 
government, and a 50% unemployment 
rate among urban black youth, a volatile 
situation developed. Ironically, but 
perhaps not surprisingly, if we recall De 
Tocqueville's words, the explosion came 
at the very time when government was 
talking about change and white at- 
titudes were clearly shifting. 

Third, the main impetus for change 
is internal. It is the demands of a 
modernizing economy for a stable, 
skilled workforce and the demands of 
apartheid's victims for full political and 
economic opportunity that constitute the 
major pressures on the system. Black 
Africans have no formal political rights 
at the national level in South Africa, 
and the physical power of the state re- 



mains awesome. But as we are witness- 
ing daily, the black communities of 
South Africa have growing influence 
through their numbers, their role as 
workers and as consumers, and their 
ability to discredit and disrupt an out- 
dated and unacceptable system. South 
Africa's economy and its social fabric 
cannot be maintained at gunpoint. These 
facts speak for themselves about the 
urgent necessity of further change. 

Fourth, the current climate in South 
Africa inhibits as well as demands such 
change. There is tinder in the town- 
ships. Emotions are easily polarized at a 
time of violence that has taken over 600 
lives— mainly black— in the past 12 
months. Black unrest and government 
repression have created a larger than 
usual gulf of suspicion and distrust. 
Brutal killings, arrests, trials, and 
detentions make it hard for political 
leaders to reach each other, to make 
gestures, and to take risks. A time of 
tense polarization is also a time of 
posturing for the record. Keeping the 
faith with your own constituency can 
overwhelm the imperative of dialogue. 
For outsiders looking in on all this, it 
becomes difficult to discern the real 
positions of various parties and even 
harder to recognize the competition for 
power and position that is taking place 
within all South African communities. 

Let me conclude this brief rundown 
of relevant facts by stating something 
that may sound unduly optimistic: com- 
promise and reconciliation in this strife- 
torn area remain within reach. The 
states and peoples of southern Africa 
need each other. No single state can im- 
pose its will unilaterally, however un- 
equal the power relations seem to be. 
Similarly, inside South Africa there is 
growing interdependence among ethnic 
and racial communities. No responsible 
South African wishes to turn his coun- 
try into an economic basket case. No 
responsible leader who has looked 
deeply into the current abyss of violence 
can take comfort from it. 

In practice, a form of preliminary 
bargaining is going on, but both the 
government and the governed continue 
to indulge in the search for position. 
Whatever may be said, we are still at 
the stage of argument over ground 
rules— the shape of the table, who will 
sit there, and what is on the agenda. To 
get to the next stage will mean that 
South Africa's leaders and the leaders of 
the opposition will have to take respon- 
sibility for concrete stands and com- 



AFRICA 



promises. There is a long list of black 
grievances to be addressed. Power must 
be fully shared on some mutually accep- 
table basis. That is what ending apar- 
theid means. Equally, agreement on 
these central issues is unlikely unless 
the rights of South Africa's minorities— 
however defined— are also addressed. 
The task before South Africans is to end 
injustice and racial domination. That 
means building a genuinely democratic 
system. The fact that such values are 
not widely and genuinely practiced in 
Africa or elsewhere in the world does 
not make the process any easier in 
South Africa. But there is no African 
country more influenced by or any more 
committed, at least in theory, to 
Western norms. We should not write 
it off. 



Recent Developments and the 
Botha Speech 

Let me now turn to recent develop- 
ments in South Africa that have been 
costly in human lives and destructive to 
its political climate, economic confidence, 
and its relationships with the outside 
world. For our part, we have repeatedly 
made clear that official repression, in- 
cluding the recently imposed state of 
emergency, cannot address the root 
causes of unrest. We have deplored all 
violence; constructive change has 
nothing to do with random destructive 
acts in which angry people take the law 
into their own hands nor with police 
shootings of unarmed mourners or 
demonstrators. Many, perhaps most, 
South Africans as well as Americans 
share these views. We have also made 
clear that the Government of South 
Africa bears a special responsibility for 
restoring a climate of trust and reducing 
polarization by taking the steps 
necessary to address grievances and get 
negotiations going. 

Despite the grotesque distortions we 
sometimes see, no serious observer can 
claim that we have pulled our punches 
or accommodated ourselves to day-by- 
day apartheid injustice and mounting of- 
ficial repression. No major Western 
government has been more actively 
engaged on the whole range of human 
rights and reform issues than ours or 
brought its influence more fully to bear 
on the issue of regional diplomacy. 



Recent events have triggered a 
period of review inside the South 
African leadership. One week ago, at its 
request, the President's national secu- 
rity adviser, Bud McFarlane, several 
colleagues, and I met in Vienna for talks 
with South African Foreign Minister Pik 
Botha. The South Africans appeared to 
recognize that the underlying issues of 
political change had to be addressed and 
a process of negotiation launched. We 
were informed in general terms of the 
intention of President Botha to speak on 
these matters this week. We, in turn, 
made plain that bold steps were needed, 
and mounting official and public concern 
in the United States and elsewhere over 
continued violence and racism was 
severely jeopardizing South Africa's ex- 
ternal relations. 

The Botha speech has now been 
given, and it has received widespread 
comment. Let me offer a few comments 
of my own. 

The State President called it— and 
other recent, declarations— his manifesto; 
he made clear that, in the context of 
Afrikaner and National Party politics, it 
represents— and I quote— the "crossing 
of the Rubicon" from which "there can 
be no turning back." In practical terms, 
the content of the speech includes: 

• Recognition that key features of 
apartheid, such as influx control, are on 
the agenda for change; 

• A renewed commitment to reform, 
including certain ideas on citizenship for 
black South Africans; 

• Acceptance of the principle of par- 
ticipation and joint responsibility by all 
South Africans in an undefined constitu- 
tion; and 

• An explicit call for negotiation on 
these issues. 

We consider yesterday's speech to 
be an important statement in that it 
discussed some issues that are at the 
core of the problem of apartheid. At the 
same time, the speech— written in the 
code language of a foreign culture 
within a polarized society— is not easily 
interpreted and raises many questions. 
We have repeatedly called for negotia- 
tions among South Africans and can 
only reaffirm our appeal that every 
avenue to possible reconciliation and 
dialogue be explored. 

What must be emphasized is that a 
speech such as this is but an element of 
an ongoing process. It does not, in itself, 
constitute change. That can only come 



from concrete implementing actions thili 
follow up in tangible ways on the prin- 
ciples that have been outlined. We will: 
look for clarifications and implementa- !' 
tion of those principles through negotul 
tion between that government and 
leaders of South Africa's other 
communities. 

Clearly, it is too soon to predict 
whether this statement or others that 
we expect will follow will get dialogue 
started and break the destructive pat- 
tern of recent months. President 
Botha's invitation to negotiate on the 
basis of broad abstract principles can 1 
reinforced by practical steps such as tl 
abolition of influx control, perhaps the It 
most degrading aspect of apartheid in 
the daily lives of blacks. It is clear tht 
blacks, who are otherwise prepared to 
talk, will raise the release of Nelson 
Mandela and other detained leaders. 
The U.S. Government is also on recon 
in support of these goals. I do not me; 
to suggest an agenda here but rather 
suggest that the government bears a 
special responsibility for creating con- 
fidence. In present-day South Africa, 
the crossing of Rubicons in white 
politics simply cannot be stated; it mu 
be demonstrated. What we define as {. 
Rubicon is when negotiation is no lonj 
about whether apartheid is to be dis- 
mantled but is about how and when. 1 
must also recognize that fear and suS] 
cion are a two-way street. Just as the 
are some in white politics who do not 
want to see negotiated power-sharing 
with blacks, there are, no doubt, blacl 
who oppose a negotiated compromise. 
Statesmanship is needed on both side; 

At this time of turmoil, we 
Americans can only hope that South 
Africans will get on with it and not g 
hung up on questions of face and pro- 
cedure. Official government statemenl 
increasingly emphasize that reforms a 
rejected as inadequate or cosmetic' wl 
they are initiated by government; ac 
cordingly, specific reform commitment 
are delayed until they flow, or are se< 
to flow, from negotiation. On the opp< 
tion side, negotiation has often been 
turned down until specific pledges of 
change are made. Yet official reforms 
are frequently dismissed on the grow 
that no credit should be given to 
political decisions from which blacks 
have been excluded. While perhaps 
understandable, this escalation of pro- 
cedural and substantive preconditions 
has become destructive. Imagination ; 
leadership are needed. 



rionartmont rtf Qtato RnlUQ 



AFRICA 



'inclusion: How Do We Proceed? 

nave shared with you our basic prin- 
)les and deep concerns and hopes, and 
vant to think that you share them, 
le question of how we can best be 
lpful in this drama is one on which 
ople of integrity and conviction can 
fer. But let us remember our common 
al and discuss our role with the 
riousness it deserves. 

I will conclude with my sense of the 
plications for policy. 

• The United States should continue 
avoid prescribing blueprints for South 
rica's future. That is for South 
ricans. 

• We should remain builders and 

t destroyers in that land and in that 
*ion, using the influence that derives 
>m being present, having programs 



and people there, and from having con- 
tact and communication with all parties. 

• We should voice clearly, in private 
and in public, our strong convictions 
about racism and violence with the 
strength derived from our own diverse 
and complex society. 

• We should develop, rather than 
withdraw, our influence and be prepared 
to use it, while taking into account the 
strength and self-sufficiency of a state 
halfway round the world that cannot be 
coerced by outsiders on whom it is only 
marginally dependent. 

• Finally, we should recall that our 
strongest tools in this situation are 
moral and political. That being the case, 
it won't be effective to walk away and 
sever our contact. We don't intend 

to do so. ■ 



lr. McFarlane's Interview on 
This Week With David Brinkley 



j j 



n Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to 
I President for National Security 
I r a>rs, was interviewed on ABC-TV's 
Y'his Week With David Brinkley" on 
I oust 18, 1985, by David Brinkley and 
i m Donaldson, ABC News, and 
I orge F. Will, ABC News analyst. 

( Two weeks ago, about, you met 
i th South African officials in 
1 enna. Were you led to believe that 
1 •. Botha would be more forthcoming 
1 in it turned out he was? 
I A. 1 think the spectrum of 
i ^sibilities that were discussed in 
' ?nna included surely more than was 
Inounced this past Thursday. To be 
r, they did say that decisions have 
t been reached, but yes, quite a lot 
ire was discussed 2 weeks ago. 

Q. Are we going to maintain, can 
i maintain our constructive engage- 
mt policy as in the past? 

A. I think it's useful for people to 
derstand what constructive engage- 
?nt is. There seems to be this concept 
at it represents a "cozying up to" and 
relieved support for the Government 
South Africa by the United States, 
►at's not so. 

Constructive engagement has meant, 
eans today, trying to use our influ- 
ce, and in the past 4 years that has 
)rked to get change away from apart - 
dd. It doesn't at all mean simply a 



slavish following and support for 
whatever South Africa does. It means 
firm application of all of our influence 
behind the scenes, and it has been quite 
firm and effective, to move the country 
away from apartheid, and yes, that 
policy has gotten results and the Presi- 
dent's committed to carrying it on. I 
mean, what, what are we to do? Do you 
intend that we should throw up our 
hands and walk away, to have no influ- 
ence, to take a kind of a Pontius Pilate 
view of this issue and forget it? The 
United States has been the only country 
in the past 4 years which has worked 
for change and has been able to get it. 

Q. Are all, or some, or none of 
the proposals now moving through 
Congress involving sanctions toward 
South Africa so unacceptable that 
they would be vetoed? All, some, or 
none? 

A. I think that all of the bills are 
kind of a natural expression of American 
values and of American impulse toward 
doing something even if it may be 
wrong, specifically. The attempt is, 
whenever we have seen violence, to 
sever all ties that we have in a kind of a 
protest, but, is that sensible? To answer 
your question: Some of the things in the 
bills are measures the President could 
surely support. Stopping computer sales 
to agencies of government that adminis- 
ter apartheid. That's a very sensible 



thing to do, to stop it. Refusing loans to 
people who don't practice equal oppor- 
tunity, that's very sensible, and the 
President would agree with that. On the 
other hand, to prohibit investment by 
U.S. companies and loans for that pur- 
pose which clearly have helped blacks, 
which provide equal opportunity, educa- 
tion, and so forth, hurt the very people 
you're trying to help. 

Now most bills— virtually all— have a 
mixture of good and bad features in 
them, and so while we would prefer that 
we adopt the good ones and reject the 
bad ones, no bill in Congress right now 
does that. 

Q. Are you saying that any of the 
bills coming forward would be vetoed? 

A. No. The President has said that 
he will look at each one as it comes and 
make decisions on how best we can 
apply our influence to get change away 
from apartheid. 

Q. Is there a minimal program? 
Can you tell us, and have you told 
any of the ministers of South Africa, 
certain things that they could do, that 
you believe would or should relieve 
the pressure for immediate sanctions? 

A. No, we haven't because the 
President believes that it is not up to 
the United States to prescribe what is 
right for other people. We have said 
firmly we want an end to apartheid. The 
government this week has labored and 
produced a kind of a cloud. I think the 
black leadership has said that they 
expect violence to worsen and it's, I 
suppose, a little shocking to see what 
we've just seen on this show— the off- 
handedness with which people talk 
about the inevitability of violence. It 
seems to me, it seems to the President, 
that it is a reasonably low risk for peo- 
ple to challenge the government now. It 
has said certain things. Influx control is 
obsolete; citizenship is a possibility. And 
just this morning in what I think was a 
useful service on your own part, we've 
heard South African officials say that 
equality is envisioned at the end of this 
process. 

All right. Let's challenge the 
government, sit down, find out, what 
does all of this rhetoric mean? Is it a 
good faith commitment to a negotiated 
peaceful evolution from apartheid? Who 
knows? You can't tell from the speech. 



fctober 1985 



AFRICA 



Q. How long should we wait to 
find out? This challenge should be 
taken over a course of how many 
days, weeks, months, or years? 

A. For people to sit down in a 
negotiation, it need not take a long 
time. Basically, the problem is to find 
people to come, a place to meet, an 
agenda to discuss. 

Q. Yes, but you have changed the 
ground rules as far as I can see, from 
the standpoint of the U.S. Govern- 
ment's reaction. On Thursday, after 
President Botha's speech, you said it 
wouldn't be up to us to decide 
whether the speech had made it or 
not; it would be up to black South 
Africans and you would wait for their 
reaction. Their reaction appears to 
already be in and uniformly it is that 
the speech wasn't good enough. Why 
not accept that judgment? 

A. You seem to imply that it is 
within the U.S. power to require a cer- 
tain outcome, a negotiation, a set of 
milestones, and that's obviously not the 
case. I do think it's possible— only 
possible— that a second level reflection, 
after a couple of more days, may lead 
these leaders, on both sides, who are 
looking into the abyss of massive 
violence to simply say, does it cost us 
that much to sit down, challenge this 
government, ask them to put their 
money where their mouth is, turn the 
rhetoric into reality? You can still walk 
away next week if it doesn't turn out, 
but the alternative leads nowhere. 

Q. Had you expected that the 
government would release Nelson 
Mandela [imprisoned leader of the 
banned African National Congress]? 

A. No. 

Q. Do you want it to release 
Nelson Mandela? 
A. Yes. 

Q. Why do you think it did not? 

A. There's a pessimist's and opti- 
mist's answer to that. The pessimist can 
say that it was because of pressure from 
the conservative side of the community 
there. The optimist can say that perhaps 
as part of the negotiation, which is what 
we were told, this would be an item on 
the agenda and not out of the question. 



Q. Is it fair to say, in sum, that 
you were disappointed by the Botha 
speech from the standpoint of the 
specificity which was lacking? 

A. As long as there's apartheid 
we're going to be disappointed, yes. 

Q. This is to ask for a little 
political analysis on your part. Why 
did Botha make that speech? Couldn't 
he have been a little more forth- 
coming and calm some of the violence 
which continues today, by the way, in 
South Africa? Why do you think he 
did that? 



A. You'll have to ask him about 
that. We are dealing with very stubbor 
people on both sides of this issue in tha 
country. The limits of what the State 
President believed could be sustained 
apparently is what he said, and yet I 
think the frustrations it produced on th 
other side need not lead to violence. Tb 
black leadership doesn't risk a lot by si 
ting down now and saying, what do yoi 
mean by your citizenship rhetoric? Whs 
do you mean by what you said about 
influx control? Do you intend a nego- 
tiated process or not? And that will 
become quickly evident, but it will still 
I think, put them on the high road. I 



Background on South Africa 



GEOGRAPHY 

The Republic of South Africa lies at the 
southern tip of the African Continent. 
The independent Kingdom of Lesotho is 
an enclave located within the east- 
central part of South Africa. 

The country has a narrow coastal 
zone and an extensive interior plateau 
with altitudes ranging from 1,000 to 
2,000 meters (3,000-6,000 ft.) above sea 
level. South Africa lacks important 
arterial rivers or lakes, so extensive 
water conservation and control are 
necessary. The coastline is about 4,300 
kilometers (2,700 mi.) long. 




South Africa's climate is generally 
moderate, with sunny days and cool 
nights. The seasons are reversed 
because the country is in the Southern 
Hemisphere. The average mean 
temperature is remarkably uniform, the 



most southerly point having a mean 
yearly temperature of 16.5°C (61.8°F), 
while Johannesburg, about 1,600 
kilometers (1,000 mi.) to the northeast 
and 1,700 meters (5,700 ft.) higher, ha; 
an annual mean temperature of 16°C 
(60.8 °F). Mean annual precipitation 
ranges from less than 12.7 centimeters 
(5 in.) along the west coast to 102 cen 
timeters (40 in.) or more in the east. 



PEOPLE 

Smith African law divides the populate 
into four major categories: Africans. 
whites, coloreds, and Asians. In South 
Africa, the term "black" embraces 
Africans, coloreds, and Asians. The 
Africans (72% of the population) are 
mainly descendants of Sotho and Ngui 
peoples who migrated southward cen- 
turies ago. They are subdivided into l 1 
groups corresponding to the 1<> ethnic 
Iv based "homelands", called national 
states by South Africa. Four are con- 
sidered independent only by South 
Africa: Transkei, Venda, Ciskei, and 
Bophuthatswana. The largest African 
ethnic groups, according to 1980 esti- 
mates, are Zulu (6.0 million) and Xhos 
(5.8 million). 

Whites are primarily descendenta 
Dutch, French, English, and German 
settlers, with smaller admixtures of 
other European people, and constitute 
about 16% of the population. 

Coloreds are mostly descendants i 
indigenous peoples and the earliest 
European and Malay settlers in the 



South Africa— A Profile 



AFRICA 



sople 

.tionality: Noun and adjective — South 
rican(s). Population (1983 est.): 31.1 
llion. Annual growth rate: 2.5% — whites, 
1%; blacks*: "coloreds" 1.8%; Asians 1.8%. 
ricans 2.8%. Ethnic groups: White — 
glish, Afrikaner; black — colored, Asian, 
rican. Languages: English and Afrikaans 
ficial), Zulu, Xhosa, North and South 
tho, Tswana, others. Religions: 
^dominantly Christian; also traditional 
rican, Hindu, Muslim, and Jewish. Educa- 

: Years compulsory — white and coloreds, 
is 7-16; Asians ages 7-15; Africans, being 
roduced. Health: Infant mortality rate — 

1,000 live births (1978): Whites 14.9; 
cks, coloreds 80.6, Asians 25.3, Africans, 
tnown. Life expectancy — Whites 70 yrs.; 
cks: coloreds 59 yrs., Asians 66 yrs., 
■icans 55 yrs. Work force (11.0 million): 
riculture — 30%. Industry and com- 
rce— 29%. Services— 34%. Mining— 7%. 

ography 

:a: 1,233,404 sq. km. (472,359 sq. mi.), in- 
ling the enclave of Walvis Bay; about 
■ze the size of Texas. Capital: Ad- 
tistrative — Pretoria (pop. 1.0 million). 
rislative — Cape Town (1.7 million). 
'irml — Bloemfontein (0.2 million). Other 
es — Johannesburg (1.9 million), Durban 
1 million). Terrain: plateau, mountains, 
stal plains. Climate: moderate. 

•vernment 

•e: Executive — president, tricameral 
•liament with one chamber each for 
tes, coloreds, and Indians, under a new 
stitution effective September 3, 1984. In- 
tendence: May 31, 1910, Union of South 
ica was created; became sovereign state 
hin British Empire in 1934; May 31, 1961, 
ame republic; October 1961, left the 



British Commonwealth. Constitution (effec- 
tive September 3, 1984). 

Branches: Executive— state president 
(chief of state) elected to a 5-year term sub- 
ject to removal by majority vote of each of 
the three Houses. Legislative— tricameral 
Parliament consisting of 308 members in 
three chambers: House of Assembly (white) 
166 members elected directly for maximum 
5-year term, 4 members nominated by the 
president, 8 indirectly elected by the 
chamber; House of Representatives (colored) 
80 directly elected members, 2 members 
nominated by the president, and 3 indirectly 
elected by the chamber; House of Delegates 
(Indian) 40 members directly elected, 2 
nominated by the president, and 3 indirectly 
elected by the chamber. President's Coun- 
cil— 60 members, 25 appointed by the presi- 
dent, 20 elected by the House of Assembly, 
10 elected by the House of Representatives, 
and 5 elected by the House of Delegates. 
Members serve during term of Parliament. 
Judicial — Supreme Court consisting of the 
Appellate Division in Bloemfontein and four 
provincial divisions. 

Administrative subdivisions: Provincial 
governments of the Transvaal, Orange Free 
State, Cape of Good Hope, and Natal; ten 
separate "homelands" administered in areas 
set aside for black Africans. 

Political parties: White — National Party, 
Progressive Federal Party, New Republic 
Party, Conservative Party, Reconstituted Na- 
tional Party. Colored — Labor Party, Freedom 
Party, People's Congress Party, Reformed 
Freedom Party, New Convention People's 
Party. Indian — National People's Party, 
Solidarity. Suffrage: Adult whites, coloreds, 
and Indians 18 and older. 

Central government budget (FY 
1984-85): Rand 25 billion. 

Defense (FY 1984-85): 14.9% of govern- 
ment budget. 

Flag: Three horizontal bands — orange, 
white, and blue, from top to bottom — with 



the Union Jack and the flags of the two 
former Boer Republics (the Orange Free 
State and the Transvaal Republic) reproduced 
in miniature and centered on a white band. 

Economy 

GNP (1983): $75.5 billion. GDP (1983): $73.2 
billion. Annual growth rate (GDP): 12.6% 
nominal -3.1% real. Per capita GNP: $5,239. 
Avg. inflation rate: 12.3%. 

Natural resources: Nearly all essential 
minerals except oil. 

Agriculture (1983): 4.7% of GNP. Prod- 
ucts — corn, wool, dairy products, wheat, 
sugarcane, tobacco, citrus fruits. Cultivated 
land— 12%. 

Mining: 15.1% of GNP. 

Manufacturing: 23% of GNP. 

Industry: Types— minerals, automobiles, 
fabricated material, machinery, textiles, 
chemicals, fertilizer. 

Trade: Exports— $18.2 billion: gold, 
diamonds, corn, wool, sugar, fruit, fish prod- 
ucts, metals, metallic ores, metal products, 
coal. Major markets — US, Switzerland, 
Japan, UK. Imports — $14.4 billion: 
machinery, electrical equipment, transporta- 
tion equipment, office machinery and data 
processing equipment, metal products. Major 
suppliers — US, FRG, Japan, UK. 

Official exchange rate: The South 
African rand is under a managed float: 1.11 
rand=US$l (1983 avg). 

Fiscal year: April 1-March 31. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and many of its specialized agencies, 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), INTELSAT. 



*In South Africa, the term "black" em- 
braces the South African racial categories of 
"colored" (mixed race), Asian, and African. 



a. Living primarily in the Cape Pro- 
ces, coloreds constitute about 9% of 

population. 

Asians are mainly descendants of 

Indian workers brought to South 
■ica in the mid-19th century to work 
indentured laborers on sugar estates 
Natal. They constitute about 3% of 

population. 



Of South Africa's 15 residential 
universities, 10 are designated for 
whites, 3 for Africans, and 1 each for 
coloreds and Asians. There is also a 
medical university for Africans. Blacks 
can be admitted to white universities, 
but the government has legal powers to 
impose quotas. The University of South 
Africa conducts correspondence courses 
for some 55,000 students of all races. 



Another university, Vista, planned to ac- 
commodate Africans living in urban 
areas, opened in 1983. The literacy rate 
15 years and older) for the various 
groups has been estimated at 98% for 
whites; African, 50%; coloreds, 75%; 
and Asians, 85%. 

Christianity is the predominant 
religion, and diverse Christian sects 
exist. 



itn^ nr inoc 



AFRICA 



HISTORY 

Human life has existed in southern 
Africa for thousands of years, but of the 
present inhabitants, the earliest are the 
peoples whom the European settlers 
called Bushmen and Hottentots- 
members of the Khoisan language 
group, of which only a few survive. 

Members of the Bantu language 
group, to which most of the present-day 
Africans of South Africa belong, 
migrated slowly southward from central 
Africa and began to enter the Transvaal 
sometime before A.D. 100. The Nguni, 
ancestors of the Zulus and Xhosas, had 
occupied most of the east coast by 1500. 

The Portuguese were the first Euro- 
peans to reach the Cape of Good 
Hope— in 1486. Permanent white settle- 
ment began to take place when the 
Dutch East India Company established a 
provision station there in 1652. In subse- 
quent decades, additional French 
Huguenot refugees, Dutch, and Germans 
settled in the Cape area to form the 
Afrikaner segment of the modern 
population. By the end of the 18th cen- 
tury, European settlement had extended 
through the southern part of the Cape 
westward to the vicinity of the Great 
Fish River, where the whites first came 
into serious conflict with the Xhosa 
branch of the Nguni. 

Britain seized the Cape of Good 
Hope at the end of the 18th century, 
and subsequent British settlement and 
rule marked the beginning of a long con- 
flict between the Afrikaner and English. 
Partly to escape British political rule 
and cultural hegemony, many Afrikaner 
farmers (Boers) undertook a northern 
migration (the (jreai irek) beginning in 
1836. This movement brought them into 
contact with several African groups, the 
most formidable of which were the 
Zulus. Under their powerful leader, 
Shaka (1787-1828), the Zulu conquered 
most of the territory between the 
Drakensburg Mountains and the sea 
(now Natal). At the Battle of Blood 
River in 1838, the Zulus were defeated 
decisively by the whites, and their power 
was weakened. However, they remained 
a powerful force in northern Natal until 
1879, when, following an initial Zulu vic- 
tory, British troops destroyed the Zulu 
military force and occupied Zululand. 

The independent Boer republics of 
the Transvaal (the South African 
Republic) and the Orange Free State 
were created in 1852 and 1854. Rela- 
tions between these republics and the 
British Government continued to be 
strained. The famous diamond strike at 



Kimberley in 1870 and, 16 years later, 
the discovery of extensive gold deposits 
in the Witwatersrand region of the 
Transvaal resulted in an influx of Euro- 
pean (mainly British) investment and im- 
migrants. The Boer reaction to this 
flood and to British political intrigues 
against the two republics led to the 
Anglo-Boer wars, 1880-81 and 
1899-1902. After a bitter struggle, the 
British forces conquered the Boer 
republics and incorporated them into the 
British Empire. The two former 
republics and the two British colonies of 
the Cape and Natal were joined on May 
31, 1910, to form the Union of South 
Africa, a dominion of the British Em- 
pire, with its white population control- 
ling most domestic matters. In 1934, 
under the Statute of Westminster, the 
union achieved status as a sovereign 
state within the British Empire. 

Conflict between Afrikaners and 
English-speaking groups continued to in- 
fluence political developments. A strong 
resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism in 
the 1940s and 1950s led to a decision, 
through a 1960 referendum in the white 
community, to give up dominion status 
and establish a republic. This decision 
took effect on May 31, 1961. In October 
1961, South Africa withdrew its applica- 
tion for continued membership in the 
Commonwealth. 

In 1983, whites approved, by 66% of 
the vote, a new constitution which in- 
augurates limited powersharing with col- 
oreds and Asians. Elections for the col- 
ored and Asian Chambers of Parliament 
took place in August 1984. The new con- 
stitution was promulgated on Septem- 
ber 3, 1984. 



GOVERNMENT 

When the Union of South Africa was 
formed in 1910, the former Boer 
Republics and the principal British col- 
ony all wanted their capitals — Pretoria, 
Bloemfontein, and Cape Town — to be 
selected as the capital of the new Union. 
They compromised by making Pretoria 
the administrative capital. Cape Town 
the legislative capital, and Bloemfontein 
the judicial capital. 

The Republic of South Africa has 
opted for a unique combination of a 
strong presidential system somewhat 
modeled on the fifth French Republic 
and a tricameral Parliament in which 
each Chamber will respectively repre- 
sent whites, coloreds, and Indians. 
Parliament will operate in a form essen- 
tially similar to that of the United 



Kingdom, but emphasis will be placed 0; 
reaching consensus in joint committees. 
A distinction is made between "own" af- 
fairs (subjects limited to one racial 
group) and "general" affairs (common t( 
all). In cases of disagreement between 
the Houses, the President's Council can 
advise the president to which class par- 
ticular legislation belongs. Suffrage and 
membership in Parliament has been ex- 
tended from exclusive control of whites 
to include coloreds and Indians. Key 
government positions are monopolized 
by whites although there are colored ar 
Indian Cabinet members. 

The South African Parliament and 
president are sovereign, and the 
judiciary has no power to review 
parliamentary acts except to ascertain 
that they conform to proper procedure 
Although the new system has only 
begun to operate, it appears that real 
legislative initiative and authority ap- 
pears to rest primarily with the 
presidentially-appointed Cabinet. 
Presidentially-selected ministers' counc 
administer "own affairs" for each of th 
three population groups represented ir 
parliament. The president himself is 
elected by an electoral college consistii 
of 50 members elected from the white 
House of Assembly, 25 members electi 
by the colored House of Representa- 
tives, and 13 members elected from th 
Indian House of Delegates. The presi- 
dent's term is concurrent with the life 
Parliament or no more than 5 ye, -s a 
lapses at the dissolution of Parliament 
Elections for Parliament can be called 
by the president at any time but must 
held every 5 years. The last white 
general election was held in April 198 
and the colored and Indian elections 
were in August 1984. The term of off 
for members of the previous whites-oi 
parliament was rolled over for an add 
tional 5 years when the new tricamer 
parliament was created in September 
1984. The next general election is 
therefore not mandated until 1989. 

The head of state is the state prl 
dent, who is also commander in chief 
the defense forces, can dissolve Parli; 
ment or any House, can address or Ci 
joint setting of any or all Houses, ca) 
declare martial law, and can declare 
and make peace, 

The South African Parliament co 
sists of three chambers. A 178-memb 
House of Assembly representing whit 
an S5 member House of Kepresentati 
representing coloreds, and a 45-meml 
House of Delegates representing In- 
dians. The President's Council is com 



AFRICA 



>ed of 50 members, half directly ap- 
nted by the president, the rest 
cted by the majority of each chamber 
a fixed 4:2:1 ratio of whites, coloreds, 
1 Indians. The principal role of the 
?sident's Council is to render advise to 

president with particular reference 
determining if a legislative issue is an 
/n" or "general" affair. It can also 
ipose advice on any other issue it may 
.h to take up. Its advice is not bind- 
. The authors of the new constitution 
'e expressed the hope that consensus 
key issues between the three Houses 
i be reached through the operation of 
it standing committees. 

Judicial authority is vested in the 
)reme Court of South Africa, which 
sists of an Appellate Division in 
emfontein (the High Court) and pro- 
:ial and regional divisions. South 
•ica's four provinces have govern- 
its consisting of an Administrator 
'ointed by the state president and a 
;ameral legislature elected on the 
le franchise as the House of 
;embly (that is, white only). 

'eminent Institutions for 
icans, Coloreds, and Asians 

:ial discrimination in South Africa 
become increasingly institutionalized 
:e the ruling National Party first 
*e to power in 1948. The policy of 
rtheid calls for developing separate 
tical institutions for the racial groups 
louth Africa. 

Africans are not considered perma- 
o t citizens of South Africa but rather 
| he "homelands" to which each tribal 
up is assigned. Four of these home- 
is — Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ven- 
and Ciskei — have been made "in- 
endent." When a homeland becomes 
•pendent, all the members of the 
)ciated ethnic group lose their South 
ican citizenship and become citizens 
he homeland. The United Nations 
adopted resolutions condemning the 
th African homeland policy, and no 
ntry has recognized the independence 
tny of the homelands. 
During 1984, the permanence of an 
an black population outside the 
lelands was recognized in several of- 
il government statements. Early in 
5, the State President announced 
t the possibility of a common South 
ican citizenship to include all blacks 
aid be investigated. The practical 
aning and extent of these pro- 
uncements remains to be clarified. 



These and other fundamental tenets of 
the apartheid system are the subject of 
intense scrutiny and controversial 
debate as the government has entered 
into a process of political and racial 
reform. 

Coloreds and Asians are considered 
permanent citizens and are afforded 
some political expression. When colored 
representation (by whites) in the na- 
tional Parliament was eliminated in 
1969, the Coloured Persons' Representa- 
tive Council (CPRC) was established. 
The South African Government abolish- 
ed the CPRC in 1980 after its elected 
Coloured Labor Party membership 
boycotted the body. The South African 
Indian Congress (SAIC), with an elected 
membership, was the corresponding 
body for Asians. The SAIC also had no 
direct powers, but, like the CPRC, was 
designed to advise the appropriate 
ministers concerning colored and Asian 
affairs. 

Legal colored and Indian political ex- 
pression is now being channeled into 
their respective chambers of Parliament, 
and the SAIC will be abolished. How- 
ever, there is considerable dissent in 
both communities on the advisability of 
participating in the new system because 
it excludes Africans. Adherents of this 
view successfully called for a boycott of 
elections for the new chambers or non- 
participation in them on the grounds 
that the new system entrenches racial 
discrimination and would make coloreds 
and Indians partners of the whites in 
repression of blacks. Voter turnout 
averaged between 20% and 30%. 

Principal Government Officials 

State President— Pieter Willem Botha 
Ministers 

Cooperation and Development and 

Education— Dr. Gerrit Viljoen 
Transport— Hendrik Schoeman 
Constitutional Development and 

Planning— J. C. Heunis 
Home Affairs and National Education— 

F. W. de Klerk 
Communications and Public Works — 

Dr. L.A.P.A. Munnik 
Foreign Affairs and Information— 

Roelof F. Botha 
Mineral and Energy Affairs— 

D. W. Steyn 
Law and Order— Louis le Grange 
Health and Welfare— C. V. van der 

Merwe 
Environment and Tourism— 

J.W.E. Wiley 
Defense— Gen. Magnus Malan 



Manpower— P. T.C. du Plessis 
Trade and Industries— Dr. David J. 

de Villiers 
Justice — H. J. Coetsee 
Agricultural Economics and Water 

Affairs — J.J.G. Wentzel 
Finance — Barend du Plessis 

Ambassador to the United States— 

J.H.A. Beukes (appointed 9/23/85) 
Ambassador to the United Nations — 

Kurt von Schirnding 
Chairman of the Ministers' Council of 

the House of Representatives — 

Rev. Alan Hendrickse 
Chairman of the Minister's Council of 

the House of Delegates— Armichard 

Rajbansi 

The Republic of South Africa main- 
tains an embassy in the United States at 
3051 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., 
Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202- 
232-4400). 



POLITICAL CONDITIONS 

Political intercourse across racial lines 
has been illegal in South Africa. Official 
political activity, therefore, was largely 
confined within the various racial 
groups. The new system envisions broad 
consensus between whites, coloreds, and 
Indians, and a parliamentary committee 
is considering possible abolition of laws 
against multiracial political activity. 

The White Community 

Four white parties have been repre- 
sented in the South African Parliaments. 
In tne April 1981 general election, the 
National Party won 131 out of 165 
seats. Ten of the 12 appointed members 
of Parliament are also Nationalists. The 
National Party's control of 141 of Parlia- 
ment's 177 seats was cut to 127 with the 
defection in March 1982 of 17 members 
who left to form the Conservative Party 
(now 18 members). The National Party 
draws most of its support from the 
Afrikaners, who represent 60% of the 
white population. 

The central element of National Par- 
ty policy is the practice of apartheid, or 
separate development. Since 1948, Na- 
tional Party governments have passed a 
series of measuies to enforce the sep- 
aration of the races and have developed 
the homelands policy in an effort to en- 
sure continued white South African 
control. 



11 



AFRICA 



Although the National Tarty as a 
whole stands for white domination, 
elements of the party recognize that 
some accommodation must be made with 
the black majority if whites are to con- 
tinue to live peacefully in South Africa. 
Current party ideology denies that 
whites are racially superior to blacks. 
Under State President Botha, the party 
has been moving toward a refinement oi 
apartheid, which it hopes will prove 
more acceptable to the black majority 
and the international community. 

The Progressive Federal Party 
(PFP), led by Fredrik Van Zyl Slabbert, 
is the official opposition, with 27 seats in 
Parliament (26 elected, 1 appointed). 
The PFP draws its principal support 
from urban English-speaking constituen- 
cies. The party stands for universal suf- 
frage in a federal system, with strong 
guarantees for minority rights. The par- 
ty has little prospect of gaining suffi- 
cient seats to threaten the National Par- 
ty's control of the assembly. 

The New Republic Party (NRP), led 
by Bill Sutton, is the remnant of the 
United Party, which ruled South Africa 
until 1948. The NRP commands 5 
Parliamentary seats from Natal and the 
Eastern Cape, both concentrations of 
English-speaking voters. The NRP 
stands for continued white rule without 
the harsher aspects of apartheid. The 
reconstituted National Party (HNP) was 
formed in 1969 when dissidents left the 
National Party over a disagreement on 
interracial sports. The party leader is 
Jaap Marais. Although the HNP holds 
seats on town and city councils, it has nt 
members in either parliament or provin- 
cial assemblies. 

In March 1982, former Minister of 
State Administration and Statistics 
Andries P. Treurnicht led a walkout of 
17 National Party members, who then 
formed the Conservative Party. The 
Party supports what it interprets as 
original National Party principles and 
opposes any form of powersharing with 
"nonwhites," which, it claims, would 
jeopardize ultimate white control. 
Although it opposed the constitutional 
referendum, it participates in its 
assembly. 



The Colored and Asian Communities 

The principal concern of the colored and 
Asian communities is to what extent 
they will participate within the institu- 
tions created by the government. The 
older and more conservative segments 
of both communities have enjoyed their 
relatively privileged positions in society 
and have argued for opposition to apart- 
heid within the framework established 
by the government. The younger and 
more radical members of the colored 
and Asian communities, however, 
believe that their long-term interests lie 
with the African majority and that they 
should refuse any participation in the 
government system. 

The African Community 

Organized African opposition to South 
Africa's system of racial discrimination 
began with the founding of the African 
National Congress (ANC) in 1912. After 
World War II, with the rise of African 
nationalism throughout the continent, 
African political activity in South Africa 
intensified. Both the ANC and the Pan 
African Congress (PAC) turned to 
passive resistance as a means of advanc- 
ing their demands for a more equitable 
system. During a passive resistance 
campaign in March 1960 against the un- 
popular "pass laws," through which the 
movement of Africans outside the 
homelands is tightly controlled, white 
police opened fire on an African crowd 
in Sharpeville, killing 69 people. The 
Sharpeville massacre led to an interna- 
tional outcry against apartheid, led by 
the newly independent black African 
states. Within the country, the govern- 
ment moved quickly to restore order by 
banning the ANC and PAC and passing 
a series of tight security laws. 

Sixteen years of relative quiet 
followed, until rioting erupted in the 
Johannesburg township of Soweto in 
June 1976. The rioting began over stu- 
dent refusal to study Afrikaans in the 
school system. The rioting spread to 
other towns, and, before ending, police 
had killed several hundred Africans. 
After the rioting, students became a ma 
jor force in African politics, and new 
groups, known collectively as the Black 
Consciousness Movement, sprang up to 
replace the exiled ANC and PAC. The 
generally recognized leader of the move 
ment was Steve Biko, head of the Black 
People's Convention. 



iri 



:'.' 



Biko died from injuries received 
under mysterious circumstances while : 
police custody; his death led to renewei 
outcries against South Africa's racial 
policies and the often brutal security 
measures used to enforce them. In 
response to domestic criticism over the 
Biko incident, the government detained 
50 moderate black leaders, banned 
several leading white critics, and closed 
down the largest black newspaper and 
other institutions, such as the Christiai 
Institute, working to help black South 
Africans. The international response to 
these actions was a mandatory arms ei 
bargo on South Africa, voted by the U 
Security Council, the first mandatory 
embargo imposed on a UN member 
state. Domestically, however, the secu: 
ty crackdown succeeded in stifling ove 
criticism of South Africa's racial pohci. 

A period of political quiescence 
followed in urban areas. The major 
political organizations were the black 
consciousness oriented Azanian People. 
Organization (AZAPO) and the Zulu le 
Inkatha. Many urban blacks, in partici 
lar young people, turned to undergrou 
and exiled nationalist groups. Others 
channeled their political aspirations to 
trade unions where some activities ha 
been legalized for blacks. The govern- 
ment has had a mixed response to thi 
challenge; it has permitted black unioi 
to register for collective bargaining pi 
poses but has detained many trade ur 
activists. 

The constitutional referendum lee 
the formation of two new groups, the 
black consciousness oriented national 
forum and the multi-racial united 
democratic front which espoused the 
principles of the 1956 freedom charte 
These organizations supported the lai 
ly successful call for a boycott of colo 
and Indian parliamentary elections. 

African frustration at exclusion f 
the new constitution combined with a 
downturn in the economy to produce 
renewed unrest in 1984-85. Oppositu 
to the government-sponsored town cc 
cils in black townships, responsible fc 
increased rents, and continuing 
dissatisfaction with African educatioi 
were two key issues. Unrest began ir 
the transvaal and reached a climax n 
the vaal triangle in September 1984. 
the 21st anniversary of Sharpeville, 
people were killed as a funeral proce 
sion approached policemen near 
Uitenhage in the eastern cape. Since 
August 1984, the government has de 
tained many opposition figures includ 
most of the leadership of the UDF wl 
is to be charged with treason. 



■ .... -t Qtnta Ru, 



AFRICA 



Political activity in the homelands 
,s followed a course different from 
at in the urban areas. The government 
,s fostered development of political 
irties that will accept independence 
jm South Africa. Five homeland 
iders have rejected independence. In 
A-aZulu, homeland for South Africa's 
ilus. the nation's largest ethnic group, 
e Chief Minister, Gatsha Buthelezi, 
.s stated repeatedly that he will not ac- 
pt independence. He insists on political 
;hts for Africans within South Africa, 
le Government, however, maintains its 
termination to see all of South 
Tica's homelands independent in the 
ar future, as members of a future 
erarching confederation of southern 
'rican states. 



:onomy 

itil well into the 19th century, most 
.uth Africans— black and white— lived 
imarily by herding or farming. The 
icovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold 
1886 ushered in South Africa's in- 
strial age. Rapidly growing mineral 
iustries promoted the development of 
lies, an important part of which includ- 
concentrations of African workers by 
= hundreds of thousands. Johan- 
sburg grew rapidly out of grasslands 
;o the country's largest urban and in- 
strial center. 

South Africa's industrial activity was 
rther stimulated by the import short- 
es caused by both World Wars. Since 
orld War II, the South African 
>vernment has endorsed the concept of 
tional economic self-sufficiency, 
irgely for this reason, manufacturing 
akes the greatest sectoral contribution 
the economy. However, mining and 
riculture remain important to the 
>uth African economy. Exports of gold 
i the form of bullion and coins) account 
r more than half of the total value of 
mth African exports. A persistent 
ought has drastically reduced harvests 
the past 2Vz years and has had the 
|me effect on agricultural exports, 
ough in normal climatic conditions 
)uth Africa is a considerable food ex- 
>rter. 

During the 1960s and early 1970s, 
, Kuth Africa enjoyed impressive rates of 
■al economic ^owth (an average of 
|6%, 1960-74.) The downswing that 
:gan in late 1974 and continued 



through 1977 was caused by the impact 
of higher oil prices, a fall in demand for 
South African exports caused by reces- 
sion in its major trading partners' 
economies, declining gold prices, and a 
sharp drop in the incoming foreign 
capital because of regional political 
events. 

The economy began to recover in 
1978, when real GNP growth reached 
2.3%, after a year of no growth. In 
1980, a near record of 8% was reached. 
The economy improved through 
mid-1981, until a cyclical downswing 
developed once more; real growth for 
the year was 4.6%. In 1982, real growth 
declined by more than 1% and fell by an 
additional 3.7% the following year. The 
economy grew about 3% in 1984; the 
previous 2 years of negative growth had 
been unprecedented in South Africa's 
post-World War II experience. The next 
upswing in the country's business cycle 
is expected to be export led. Assuming 
recovery and expansion continues in 
South Africa's major (industrial) trading 
partners, increased demand for the 
country's (primarily) mineral exports will 
generate local income and jobs. En- 
dangering the domestic recovery is the 
continuing drought and a record low ex- 
change value of the rand (in early 1985) 
caused by a buoyant American dollar 
and a falling gold price. 

In 1981, the monetary and fiscal 
authorities declared a policy of con- 
solidation and adjustment to prepare the 
economy for its next cyclical upswing. 
Short-term interest rates soared in 1982, 
but government spending went well over 
budgeted targets. In what looked like 
favorable circumstances for recovery in 
early 1983, monetary policy was relaxed, 
and with government spending remain- 
ing expansionary, an unsustainable mini- 
boom developed in mid-year. This re- 
versed the balance-of-payments correc- 
tion that had began in mid- 1982, plung- 
ing the current account into deep deficit 
in the first quarter of 1983. Demand 



restraint measures, including increased 
taxation and a return to record high in- 
terest rates, cut into domestic demand, 
especially for credit, in the second half 
of 1984. 

South Africa suffered double-digit 
inflation for the 10th consecutive year in 
1983, though the average rate of con- 
sumer price index increase that year tell 
to 12.3%. For cyclical reasons the infla- 
tion rate may moderate somewhat in 
1984 but is certain to remain substan- 
tially over 10%. 

The rand was put under a managed 
float in 1979, and exchange controls on 
nonresidents were lifted in early 1983. 
The authorities are also committed to 
relax foreign exchange controls on 
South African residents as well, but will 
not do so until the balance of payments 
regains a healthy position. 

The revised economic development 
programs for 1978-87 predicts an 
average real growth rate of 5.1% for 
that period, roughly the level needed to 
absorb the expected new entrants into 
the labor market. Growth from 1978-84 
has averaged 3.3%. Achieving an 
average growth rate of 5.1% for 
1978-87 with so much of the period 
elapsed will be virtually impossible. 

Investment 

Foreign private investment is important 
to South Africa's economic development. 
More than 70% of the total direct 
foreign private investment is from 
Europe; the U.S. share is about 18%. 
Book value of U.S. investment at the 
end of 1982 was $2.5 billion. About 350 
U.S. companies are represented in South 
Africa. 

The U.S. Government neither en- 
courages nor discourages private U.S. 
investment in South Africa. The pro- 
spective investor is informed about in- 
vestment conditions in South Africa, in- 
cluding the economic and political con- 
siderations resulting from that country's 



South African Foreign Trade 

($ billions)* 



1980 



1981 



1982 



1983 



25.7 


20.6 


17.3 


18.2 


3.3 


2.4 


2.0 


2.0 


18.3 


20.8 


16.6 


14.4 


2.5 


2.9 


2.4 


2.1 



Total Exports 
Exports to the US 
Total imports 
Imports from the US 

•These figures include the customs areas comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia (South 
West Africa), and Swaziland, but South Africa alone accounts for at least 90% of the total. 



13 



AFRICA 



apartheid policies. The U.S. Government 
strongly encourages those firms with in 
vestments in South Africa to adopt 
enlightened employment practices for all 
employees, regardless of race. In this 
regard, it supports the equal employ- 
ment principles launched by Rev. Leon 
Sullivan 1 and urges all American firms 
to adhere to them. 

The United States has maintained 
the same posture, neither encouraging 
nor discouraging, toward investment in 
the black homelands. Americans con- 
sidering investment there should be 
aware, however, that the United States 
can offer no diplomatic or consular 
facilities in those areas that the South 
African Government has declared "in- 
dependent." 

In recent years, South African of- 
ficials estimate that about 10% of new 
investment capital has been obtained 
from foreign countries. Foreign invest- 
ment is concentrated in mining, manu- 
facturing, and petroleum processing and 
distribution. 

Trade 

Despite the development of a diversified 
manufacturing sector, South Africa re- 
tains its historic foreign trade pattern of 
importing mainly manufactured capital 
goods and exporting raw and semi- 
processed mineral and agricultural pro- 
ducts. 

Major suppliers in 1983 were the 
United States (15%), West Germany 
(14%), and Japan and the United 
Kingdom (each with 12%). The primary 
markets for South African exports in 
the same year were the United States 
and Switzerland (each taking 8%), Japan 
(7%), and the United Kingdom (6%). 

Minerals 

South Africa is the world's leading pro- 
ducer of gold, gem diamonds, vanadium, 
and ferrochromium, and one of the top 
producers of platinum-group metals, 
titanium, antimony, asbestos, and 
manganese. It is likely to remain a ma- 
jor mineral producer for the foreseeable 
future. South African reserves of 
manganese, platinum group metals, and 
chrome ore are each greater than half of 
the world's known supplies; reserves of 
gold are just under a half of total world 
reserves, and the country also has ex 

i live deposits of vanadium, vermicu- 
lite, phosphate, cobalt, iron. coal, cop 
per. fluorspar, lead, nickel, titanium 



sands, and zinc. Minerals listed here in- 
clude cobalt and nickel which are 
biproducts, and some such as copper 
which South Africa is only a small sup- 
plier compared with the largest, nickel. 

The lack of any known petroleum 
deposits is a cause of concern to this 
otherwise mineral-rich country. Despite 
extensive exploration efforts, no com- 
mercially promising petroleum deposits 
have been found in South Africa or in 
the adjacent off-shore areas, but a prom- 
ising off-shore gas field has been iden- 
tified. South African officials have long 
been aware of the potential vulnerability 
of their country to a petroleum boycott 
and consequently have stressed the 
necessity of using coal for energy. 
Domestic coal provides about 75% of the 
country's energy needs and may provide 
more in the future. In 1950, South 
Africa established the South African 
Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL), 
which uses a coal gasification/liquefica- 
tion process to produce petroleum prod- 
ucts. The following year, the construc- 
tion of the first production unit was 
started. By 1983, construction of a third 
production unit was complete. Together, 
all three SASOL units are capable of 
providing an estimated 50% of South 
Africa's petroleum requirements. One of 
two 941 -megawatt nuclear power 
generators in the Cape Province reached 
100% generating capacity in mid-1984; 
the second is to begin producing elec- 
tricity in 1985. 

Manufacturing 

South Africa has the most extensive and 
diversified manufacturing sector in 
Africa. Manufacturing accounts for 25% 
of the country's GDP. Most goods pro- 
duced in South Africa are destined for 
the domestic market. However, modest 
but growing quantities of South African 
manufactured products are entering in- 
ternational trade. 

Manufacturing industries provide 
jobs for almost 1.4 million persons, of 
whom over half are Africans. 



DEFENSE 

The South African Defense Force 
(SADF) comprises four services — army, 
navy, air force, and medical — each 
headed by a lieutenant general. Most 
SADF personnel are white; however, 
because of growing needs for staff in 
the military and civilian sectors, recruit- 
ment of volunteers among other races is 



increasing. Only white males are subjec 
to the draft. The armed forces are 
capable of conducting counterinsurgeneli 
and conventional operations within 
South Africa and in neighboring states. 
Improving the quality of training and ir 
creasing the quality and quantity of 
military equipment are emphasized. 
South Africa has no acknowledged 
alliances. The military budget for FY 
1984-85 represented 14.9% of the cen- 
tral government's budget or about rand 
3.8 billion. 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 

South African forces fought in World 
War I on the Allied side, and its 
diplomats participated in the 1919 Ver- 
sailles Peace Conference. South Africa 
was a founding member of the League 
of Nations and was given a mandate tc 
govern South-West Africa, now 
Namibia, which had been a German col 
ony before the war. South Africa 
created a Department of External Af- 
fairs in 1927 and later that year 
established diplomatic missions in the 
main West European countries and in 
the United States. 

South African volunteer forces, in- 
cluding blacks, also fought on the side 
the Allies in World War II, took part i 
the Berlin Airlift, and participated in t 
postwar UN force in Korea. A desire I 
cooperate with the West in combating 
communism remains an important par 
of South African foreign policy. 

The foreign relations of South 
Africa have been affected significantly 
by South Africa's racially discriminato 
domestic policies, particularly in the 
postwar period. International concern 
over South Africa's administration of I 
mandated territory of Namibia also ha 
caused friction with most of the world 

South Africa ignored an advisory 
judgment of the International Court o 
Justice (ICJ) in 1950 that any change 
the status of the Namibian territory 
must receive the assent of the United 
Nations as the successor to the Leagu ! 
of Nations. A proceeding later brough 
in the ICJ by Ethiopia and Liberia, 
charging South Africa with violating i 
mandate, was dismissed on technical 
grounds in 1966, but later that year tl 
United Nations declared, with U.S. su 
port, that the mandate was terminate 
and that responsibility for the territor 
had passed to the United Nations. Thi 
position was upheld in an advisory opi 
ion of the KM in 1971. (See Backgrotti 
Notes for Namibia.) 



AFRICA 



In 1974, the 29th General Assembly 
)ted to deprive South Africa of its 
isembly seat (although South Africa 
as not expelled from the organization 
I such) in reaction to its refusal to com- 
y with UN and ICJ rulings on 
amibia. In January 1976, the Security 
ouncil voted unanimously to demand 
lat elections leading to independence be 
eld in Namibia under UN supervision, 
iid in 1978, the South African Govern- 
lent agreed in principle. A process of 
Bgotiation, led principally by the United 
;:ates in cooperation with its major 
lies, continues over the precise manner 

which Namibian independence will be 
•hieved. South Africa views the 
resence of Cuban troops in Angola as a 
ajor obstacle preventing implementa- 
pn of an unsponsored independence 
hocess in Namibia. 

In the 1960s, South Africa at- 
impted to improve relations with the 

st of Africa, emphasizing the role that 

> economic and technological resources 
| ight play in the future of African 

•velopment efforts. Exchanges of visits 

tween South African leaders and 
■ose of other African states began in 

e late 1960s, and relationships were 
i tablished with a number of countries, 

:hough diplomatic relations were 
| tablished only with Malawi. 

The end of Portuguese rule in the 

■ighboring territories of Angola and 
1 ozambique and the internationally 
i cognized independence of Zimbabwe in 
: pril 1980 deprived South Africa of the 
I operation of their white-ruled colonial 
I ivernments. South Africa took a flexi- 

3 approach in responding to these 
i velopments; its leaders stressed their 

sh to maintain friendly relations with 
le new, militant African nationalist 

■vernment in Mozambique. Moreover, 

e urgings of the South African 
( rvernment were a major factor in the 
Icision of Prime Minister Ian D. Smith 
I the British Colony of Southern 

lodesia to negotiate with African na- 
I malist leaders for a peaceful transition 
majority rule. 
South Africa's efforts to win accept- 
I ice by a significant number of African 
lates have been set back by its in- 
I rvention in the Angolan civil war in 
He 1975 and by the riots that erupted 

I South Africa's urban areas beginning 
fc June 1976. South Africa has con- 

nded that it entered Angola only to 
winter Soviet and Cuban influence and 

I I protect hydroelectric and irrigation 
Irojects inside the Angolan border. 



Many African countries agreed with the 
need to oppose communist involvement, 
but few could accept that as a justifica- 
tion for South Africa's armed interven- 
tion. 

The riots in South Africa, with their 
heavy death toll and many arrests, led 
to increased pressure on South Africa 
from other African states and the inter- 
national community generally to effect 
fundamental changes in its racial 
policies. Moreover, the international op- 
position to South Africa's homelands 
policy was demonstrated when no nation 
recognized the independent status 
granted to Transkei in October 1976, 
Bophuthatswana in December 1977, 
Venda in September 1979, and Ciskei in 
December 1981. 

South Africa has responded to the 
international pressure by redoubling ef- 
forts to render South Africa immune to 
sanctions especially in energy, arms, and 
manufacturing, by orchestrating a well- 
financed public relations effort aimed at 
segments of Western society and by pro- 
ducing certain, limited changes in objec- 
tionable internal policies. Disclosure that 
some high-ranking officials involved in 
the public relations effort were involved 
in illegal activity became the biggest 
political scandal in South African 
history. Known as "Infogate," after the 
former Department of Information, the 
scandal ended the career of Prime 
Miniter Vorster, his heir apparent 
Connie Mulder, and many other high- 
ranking officials. 

South Africa also promotes the idea 
of a "confederation of southern African 
states," which would include South 
Africa, the "independent" homelands, 
and neighboring black African states 
willing to trade political recognition for 
increased economic assistance from 
South Africa. Despite earlier failures to 
win black African support for such a 
scheme, the South African Government 
continues to offer the confederation as 
its preferred solution to regional conflict 
and ethnic diversity. 

In the most ambitious foreign policy 
initiative in many year, the South 
African Government concluded a mutual 
noninterference pact with Mozambique. 
In March 1984, Prime Minister Botha 
and Mozambique's President Machel 
signed the "Nkomati Accord," in which 
each country pledged not to permit 
hostile operations against the other from 
its territory. In February 1984, the 



South African and Angolan Govern- 
ments reached an interim agreement in 
Lusaka which allowed the South 
Africans to begin withdrawing their 
troops from southern Angola, while the 
Angolans promised not to permit 
SWAPO (South West African People's 
Organization) insurgents or Cuban 
troops to reenter the vacated area. To 
date, the South African disengagement 
has reached to within 40 kilometers of 
the Namibian border. South Africa com- 
pleted the withdrawal of its troops from 
Angola into Namibia in April 1985. 

In May-June 1984, Prime Minister 
Botha undertook an eight-nation tour of 
Western Europe in which he sought to 
explain South Africa's constitutional in- 
itiatives and its regional foreign policy 
goals. 



U.S.-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS 

The United States has maintained an of- 
ficial presence in South Africa since an 
American consulate was opened in Cape 
Town in 1799 (the fifth on the African 
Continent). U.S. Consulates General are 
in Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape 
Town; a U.S. Embassy in Pretoria 
moves to Cape Town during parliamen- 
tary sessions. In addition to official rela- 
tionships, Americans and South Africans 
have many nongovernmental ties. For 
example, black and white American mis- 
sionaries have a long history of activity 
there, and the United States is South 
Africa's most important trading partner. 

During the past 20 years, however, 
U.S. -South African relations have been 
affected increasingly by South Africa's 
racial policies, which are antithetical to 
the U.S. commitment to racial justice 
and human rights. The United States 
believes that the denial of all political 
rights and equal economic opportunity to 
the black majority of South Africa is a 
major factor of instability in contem- 
porary Africa. The United States at- 
taches great importance to good rela- 
tions with other African countries, a 
large majority of which oppose South 
Africa's racial policies. If South Africa's 
policies are unaltered, the United States 
foresees progressively more violent 
racial confrontation and the introduction 
of great-power rivalry into the region to 
the detriment of all of its inhabitants. 



15 



AFRICA 



To demonstrate U.S. opposition to 
apartheid and to support peaceful 
change toward racial justice, the United 
States has imposed restraints on rela- 
tions with South Africa. Arms sales to 
South Africa have been embargoed since 
1963, and in 1977, the United States 
joined the United Nations in imposing a 
mandatory arms embargo on South 
Africa. In February 1978, the U.S. 
Government issued regulations (in com- 
pliance with, but going beyond, a UN 
Security Council resolution) to prohibit 
exports destined for the South African 
military, police, or apartheid-enforcing 
agencies. These were revised in early 
1982 to streamline enforceability and to 
limit the categories of goods under pro- 
hibition. The United States continues to 
observe the arms embargo in compliance 
with UN Security Council resolutions. 

Elements of the policy also include a 
1967 determination not to subject U.S. 
sailors to apartheid policy through U.S. 
use of South Africa's port facilities and, 
in commerce, a prohibition on direct Ex- 
imbank loans to finance U.S. sales to 
South Africa. Eximbank activity in 
South Africa was restricted further in 
1978 by a law allowing the extension of 
guarantees and credit insurance only to 
those private firms in South Africa that 
can demonstrate progress in eliminating 
racial discrimination in their companies. 
The United States has continued to 
demonstrate its opposition to apartheid 
by refusing to recognize the independ- 
ence of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ven- 
da, and Ciskei and by publicly stating 
that it will not recognize the independ- 
ence of any of the South African home- 
lands. The United States opposes the 
homeland policy because it forcibly ex- 



patriates many South African-born 
blacks, and because it is a logical exten- 
sion of separate development, a policy 
with which the United States strongly 
disagrees. 

In addition to these restraints, the 
U.S. Government has sought to use its 
influence to encourage a peaceful evolu- 
tion in South Africa toward government 
with the consent by all of the governed, 
regardless of race. The United States 
has sought to maintain contact with 
leaders of all South African racial 
groups. In recognition of efforts by 
South Africans of all races to move 
away from apartheid and effect peaceful 
reform, the Reagan Administration has 
implemented a policy that seeks to pro- 
mote peaceful change in South Africa 
through dialogue and encouragement of 
positive measures to alleviate discrimina- 
tion. Progress toward achievement of an 
internationally recognized settlement in 
Namibia has been made, and the United 
States regards the new constitution as 
recognition by white South Africans of 
the need to open participation in govern- 
ment to other races. However, U.S. 
policy refrains from dictating any for- 
mula, simply advising that whatever for- 
mula is ultimately devised must rest on 
the consent of all the governed. 

The United States also recognizes 
the important strategic role played by 
South Africa, both geographically and as 
a principal noncommunist supplier of 
defense-related minerals. In the 
framework of this policy, the United 
States has moved to restore earlier 
levels of military attache exchanges and 
to provide assistance to legally dis- 
advantaged South Africans in the fields 
of education, business, and labor. 



U.S. Ambassador to South Africa 



Herman W. Nickel 
was born October 23, 
1928, in Berlin, Ger- 
many. He graduated 
from Union College 
(1951) and from 
Syracuse University 
College of Law (1956). 
He became a naturaliz- 
ed U.S. citizen in 
1958. 

Mr. Nickel was a political reporter with 
the U.S. High Commission in Berlin (1951-53) 
and in 195(i was an escort-interpreter with 
the Department of State. In 1956-58, he was 
head of the research unit of the Foreign 
Policy Association in New York City. 




head of the research unit of the Foreign 
Policy Association in New York City. 

He joined Time, Inc. in 1958, serving as 
correspondent, Washington Bureau (1958), 
correspondent, London Bureau (1958-61), 
Africa correspondent, based in Johannesburg, 
South Africa (1961-62), correspondent, Bonn 
Bureau (1962-66), Bonn Bureau Chief 
(1966-69), senior diplomatic correspondent, 
Washington Bureau (1969-71), Tokyo Bureau 
Chief (1971-74), London Bureau Chief 
(1974-77), and member of the Board of 
Editors of Fortune magazine (1977-81). 

He was sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to 
the Republic of South Africa on April 6, 
1982. ■ 



Principal U.S. Officials 

Ambassador— Herman W. Nickel 
Deputy Chief of Mission and Minister- 
Counselor— Walter E. Stadtler 
Economic Counselor — Roderick M. 

Wright 

Political Counselor— Timothy M. Carne\ 
Public Affairs Officer— Robert R. 

Gosende 

Defense Attache — Col. Jerry W. Osgooc 
Administrative Counselor— Gerald S. 

Rose 

Agricultural Attache— Guy L. Haviland 
Consul General, Cape Town — 

Richard E. Scissors 
Consul General, Durban— Harold W. 

Geisel 
Consul General, Johannesburg — 

Kenneth L. Brown 

The U.S. Embassy in Pretoria is 
located at 225 Pretorius Street (tel. 
28-4266); the Consulate General in Cap 
Town, 4th floor, Broadway Industrial 
Centre, Heerengracht (tel. 21-4280); in 
Durban, 29th floor, Durban Bay House, 
333 Smith Street (tel. 304-4737), and ir 
Johannesburg, 11th floor, Kine Center, 
Corner of Commissioner and Kruis 
Streets (331-1681). 



'In 1977, the American civil rights ac- 
tivist and corporation executive introduced 
the Sullivan code, which encourages 
American companies in South Africa and 
South African firms to reduce apartheid in 
the work place. 

Taken from the Background Notes of May 
1985, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Juani' 
Adams. ■ 



k RMS CONTROL 



Gorbachev's Next 100 Days 



/ Edward L. Rowny 

, Address before the Comstock Club's 
itiotial security affairs symposium in 
Bcramento on July 19, 1985. Ambassa- 
hr Rowny is special adviser to the 
{resident and the Secretary of State on 
pns control matters. 

; ikhail Gorbachev faces a golden oppor- 
linity over the next 100 days. Gor- 
ichev himself has recently said the 
pviet Union is now at a turning point. 
jliereas he used the first 100 days of 
Is position as General Secretary to 
|;gin solidifying his power base, he 
liuld put the time between now and his 
eeting with President Reagan in 
eneva on November 19-21 to good use. 
is actions could profoundly effect the 
ability of U.S.-Soviet relations and fur- 
er the cause of world peace. 

But, even now, it appears that his 
>wer base is sufficiently consolidated 
that he could, if he chooses to do so, 
Lke a more serious approach to the 
Met position on arms control. We can 
> certain that he will continue to 
I lidify his power base, a process which 
| uld take— even at the swift speed with 
j hich he is moving— until the 27th 
Larty Congress in February to 
implete. 

While Gorbachev may want to 
?come serious about arms control, 
inging about changes in the Soviet 
i nion's past and current positions may 
■)t be as easy as many Westerners 
I ?lieve. Even when a Soviet leader has 
t consolidated power base, changes are 
)t easily or quickly accomplished under 
le Soviet system. At the present time, 
may be even more difficult for 
langes to occur since the Politburo con- 
dns a still significant minority of 
rezhnevites who have vested interest 
. continuing past Soviet policies. Even 
! ie younger members Gorbachev has 
rought into the Politburo are creatures 
I the Soviet system and know that the 
oviet Union needs to demonstrate a 
jntinuity in foreign policy and arms 
mtrol. Major policy changes, whether 
ley be related to external or internal 
natters, must be made slowly under the 
1 oviet system of government. Even if 
hanges are recognized to be in the best 
, iterests of the Soviet Union— for exam- 
le, reshaping their industry and 
conomy— they can be expected to take 
ears to bring about. 



What we in the West sometimes 
forget is that showing continuity fits the 
mold of the Soviet way of doing things, 
a mold which they inherited from Rus- 
sian leaders of earlier times. Those who 
brought Gorbachev into power may 
have recognized that internal reform 
and change were absolute necessities if 
the Soviet Union is to keep pace in the 
modern age. They may also have real- 
ized that such changes can be best 
brought about in a climate of relative 
international calm and relaxation of ten- 
sions. A period of relaxed tensions 
would not only permit the Soviets to 
turn their major energies inward but 
could also allow them to gain economic 
and technological assistance to facilitate 
bringing these internal changes to 
fruition. 

Security and Arms Control 

The West in general and the United 
States in particular are not only willing 
but anxious for a relaxation of tensions. 
Gorbachev is in a unique position to 
bring this about. As General Secretary, 
he is in a position to effect changes, 
both short- and long-term, in Soviet 
foreign policy to make this relaxation of 
tensions a reality. Only in this environ- 
ment can the arms control process 
flourish. However, Gorbachev will have 
to decide to make changes in their basic 
thrust, their outlook and goals 
throughout the world in order to cement 
these arms control agreements to make 
them a longlasting foundation for mutual 
security. 

It would be shortsighted, however, 
for us to believe that arms control 
agreements could, in the longer run, 
serve our interests— or for that matter 
even survive— unless our overall rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union im- 
proved. In fact, it would be detrimental 
to our longer run objectives if arms con- 
trol agreements were to lull us into a 
false sense of security that such funda- 
mental changes were not necessary. 

If there can be movement toward 
arms control agreements that serve our 
own security interests, we should, of 
course, try to bring such agreements 
about, all the while trying to improve 
our overall relationship with the Soviet 
Union. Indeed, the United States has 
designed its arms control positions so 
that not only the security interests of 



the United States are served but also 
those of the Soviet Union. 

In the United States, arms control is 
perceived as the most important ele- 
ment of our policy with respect to the 
Soviet Union and is closely scrutinized 
by the public. In contrast, Soviet arms 
control policy is not an area that must 
be justified to its citizens or subject to 
public pressure. The Soviet leadership 
could, if it chooses to, allow movement 
to occur toward an arms control 
agreement. 

Bilateral Issues 

Though arms control is, indeed, central 
to the relationship, there exists a whole 
host of issues that constitute our 
bilateral relations with the Soviet 
Union. 

First, there are many important 
regional issues such as Soviet direct 
intervention into Afghanistan and Soviet 
support of governments in Africa, Cam- 
bodia, and Central America. 

Second, there are important differ- 
ences between us over human rights, an 
area in which we have great interest as 
a champion of freedom and dignity 
everywhere. 

Finally, there are issues of invest- 
ment, trade, and technology transfer. 
However, as alluded to earlier, this last 
area is of particular importance to the 
Soviets in this age of rapid technological 
advancements. They recognize that 
there is an alternative to pursuing the 
less-assured route of stealing or buying 
technological secrets from the West. In 
the longer run, their technology could 
benefit from a climate of cooperation 
and improved relations with us. 

General Secretary Gorbachev cur- 
rently has an opportunity to take steps 
to improve U.S.-Soviet bilateral rela- 
tions. President Reagan has provided 
this opportunity— and further 
incentive— by saying he will "go the 
extra mile" and will show patience and 
restraint toward the disappointing 
Soviet arms control policies. This was 
reflected in his June 10th decision to 
continue not to undercut the SALT 
agreements. In doing so, President 
Reagan has sent Gorbachev a message. 
The message is that the Soviets must 
stop cheating on existing agreements 



■t^K^r -moc 



17 



ARMS CONTROL 



and must actively pursue arms reduc- 
tion agreements at the negotiating table 
in Geneva. In essence, this message to 
Gorbachev says: "Here is an opportu- 
nity; you can come back into compliance 
with existing agreements and join us in 
reducing strategic offensive arms and 
reducing the risk of nuclear war." 

At the same time, President Reagan 
instructed Secretary [of Defense] 
Weinberger to study the impact of 
Soviet conduct on our deterrent and to 
recommend, by November 15th, those 
steps needed to augment our strategic 
modernization program in response to 
and as a hedge against the military con- 
sequences of those Soviet violations of 
existing arms agreements which the 
Soviets fail to correct. What we are say- 
ing in effect is: "Like you, we will con- 
tinue to insure our national security. 
But we would prefer to do so at lower 
levels of offensive arms." This would 
make for a more stable world. 

Gorbachev can bring about these 
changes— within the bounds of the 
Soviets' claim that they are still main- 
taining continuity in their approach to 
arms control. He holds the key to 
resuming a dialogue which, if allowed to 
develop, could result in sensible, 
workable, and verifiable agreements, 
whereby both we and the Soviets can 
further our mutual security interests at 
lower levels of strategic offensive arms 
on both sides. 

However, we must guard against an 
overconfidence that such changes, even 
though they are sensible, will necessar- 
ily come about. We should, above all, 
not delude ourselves into thinking that 
unilateral concessions on our part will 
induce the Soviets to change. The 
Soviets have a long history of trying to 
influence Western publics with solutions 
which sound good to the uninitiated or 
to those who do not look beyond the 
simple psychological appeal of such 
proposals. 

Examples of this are the recent 
Soviet calls for reductions of 20% or 
25% in strategic offensive arms. By such 
proposals, the Soviets hope to create the 
illusion of reductions without actually 
expecting reductions. In recent news 
reports, we hear that the Soviet pro- 
posals have been changed to also call for 
reductions in warheads. Until very 
recently the Soviets focused on 
launchers. This SALT II standard— one 
of the major reasons why the SALT II 
treaty was fatally flawed— attempted to 
perpetuate the myth that it is somehow 



launchers which matter. It is the 
missiles in those launchers— and even 
more specifically the warheads on these 
missiles— which can kill. For this reason, 
the proposals introduced by the United 
States from the first days in 1982 at the 
strategic arms reduction talks (START) 
specified that we reduce warheads. We 
have proposed that we and the Soviets 
make significant reductions so that we 
reduce the number of warheads by one- 
third, to a level of 5,000 on each side. 
Our proposals call for more serious cuts 
than ever proposed before by either the 
United States or the Soviet Union. 

By way of contrast, whether the 
Soviet proposal to reduce launchers is 
by 25% or by 20%, depending on the 
baseline, the Soviets have said they 
want to end up at approximately 1,800 
launchers. The "Catch-22" until now in 
their proposal is that the Soviets insist 
that they be permitted 10 warheads on 
each of their remaining missiles. Thus 
the Soviets could reduce their launchers 
by 20% or 25% and still be permitted 
upwards of 18,000 warheads on their 
remaining missiles. This is more than 
twice the 7,900 warheads the Soviets 
now possess. 

Late in the round, the Soviets sur- 
faced some concepts which could involve 
possible reductions in existing offensive 
nuclear arsenals. However, the method 
of aggregation proposed in these con- 
cepts seems one-sidedly to favor preser- 
vation of the Soviet Union's primary 
area of advantage, its near monopoly in 
prompt, hard target kill capability. 
Efforts by the U.S. delegation to elicit 
some precision about these concepts 
with regard to numbers, ceilings, rates 
of possible reduction, and the like also 
went essentially unanswered. In this 
regard, we are disappointed that the 
Soviet Union has been unable to deal in 
concrete terms and with hard numbers, 
even framed as overall negotiating 
goals. 

The Soviets will, by virtue of their 
highly competitive nature and past suc- 
cess with their propaganda campaigns, 
be tempted to continue to tie their 
offers to demands that the United 
States give up research on defensive 
systems. Our research is taking place on 
defensive systems which we include 
under the term Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative (SDI). Moreover, the Soviets also 
have previously agreed that limiting 
research is unverifiable. Hence it cannot 
be subject to an effective agreement. 



(1 
1 



While the Soviets have been trying 
to limit such defensive research in the 
West, at the same time, comparable 
research in the Soviet Union is pro- 
ceeding at full speed. What is little 
understood in the West is that the 
Soviets have been conducting research 
on advanced defensive systems for over 
15 years. In fact, the Soviets have spent 
fully 50% of their strategic defense 
budget on defensive systems. They havd; 
the only operational antiballistic missile r 
system— 100 missiles— fully deployed. In L 
addition, they have a huge air defense L 
establishment amounting to about 10,00<j,- 
surface-to-air missiles and about 4,000 L 
interceptor aircraft, in contrast to a 
handful of surface-to-air missiles and 
about 250 interceptor aircraft in the 
United States. The Soviets, w T hile at- ft 
tempting to thwart our antisatellite prot 
gram, have the only deployed an- 
tisatellite system in existence today. n \ 

In the end, we can expect Gor- 
bachev to do what he believes to be in 
the best interests of the Soviet Union. 
While the Soviets do not have a public 
constituency which calls for arms control 
agreements or a legislative branch 
which controls funds for defense pro- 
grams, we, nevertheless, expect the 
Soviets will find it in their own self- 
interest to reduce the number and 
destructive power of their nuclear 
weapons. The more sophisticated 
elements of the Soviet leadership, and 
particular their military leaders, realize j :f 
that the Soviets' security interests, eve 
as they define it, can be served at low 
levels of strategic offensive weapons. !A* 
the more reason, therefore, for pointing 
out that now is the time for the Soviet 
to exhibit some genuine movement in 
Geneva. 

Opportunities for the 
Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting 

There will be increasing speculation, of 
course, about the meeting between 
President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva this 
November. I will not add to that 
speculation. However, I think it would 
be a mistake to expect the meeting to 
produce a major arms control agree- 
ment. Our positions are still too far 
apart to make this a realistic possibility 
But the meeting can give new impetus 
to negotiations over the entire range ol 
U.S.-Soviet issues. It will provide the 
opportunity for our two leaders to 
discuss the key substantive issues 



i 



EAST ASIA 



fore us and to agree on an agenda for 
ibsequent negotiation. If Mr. Gor- 
ichev approaches the issues as serious- 
{ and constructively as the President 
ill, then we can hope that the meeting 
ill be an important step in moving us 
ward agreements which enhance both 
liuntries' security by reducing the high 
|vels of offensive nuclear weapons. 

Let me repeat for emphasis that the 
United States has provided the Soviets 
■iith an opportunity. President Reagan 
i going the extra mile by displaying 
;straint in connection with our "no 
lidercut" policy. The Soviets are also 
•ell aware that our patience cannot be 
tipected to last forever. In this connec- 
|)n, the Soviets know of President 
pagan's direction to Secretary 
' einberger to present him recommen- 
jitions by November 15th as to those 
;-ograms needed to augment our 
;rategic modernization program. 

It must be abundantly clear that the 
I ill is in the Soviet court. President 
eagan, in a truly statesmanlike way, 
inounced on June 10th that the United 
ates will continue for the time being 

be patient, show restraint, and not to 
idercut existing SALT agreements, 
-esident Reagan has given General 
'cretary Gorbachev time to bring the 
rviets back into compliance with the 
\LT agreements and. the ABM Treaty 
ad to begin bargaining seriously in 
eneva. Let us earnestly hope that 
sneral Secretary Gorbachev will take 
Ivantage of this opportunity. ■ 



U.S. -China Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement 



Statements by Kenneth L. Adelman, 
Director of the Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency (AC DA), Ambassa- 
dor Richard T. Kennedy, U.S. perma- 
nent representative to the IAEA and 
special adviser to the Secretary of State 
on nonproliferation policy and nuclear 
energy affairs, and Paul D. Wolfowitz, 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on July 31, 
1985. 1 



MR. ADELMAN 

I am pleased to appear before this 
distinguished committee today to discuss 
the peaceful nuclear cooperation agree- 
ment between the United States and 
China— the first agreement with a 
nuclear-weapon state since the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Act. 

Before addressing how this agree- 
ment advances important nonprolifera- 
tion interests, I should place it into the 
broad picture of enhanced U.S. -Chinese 
consultations on arms control. This type 
of consultation followed on the heels of 
the President's April 1984 visit to 
China. Soon thereafter, in the summer 
of 1984, I led a delegation of American 
officials to Beijing to concentrate on 
arms control. The Chinese reciprocated 
by having their arms control experts 
come here just last month. 

Nonproliferation has been a key 
topic in these discussions with the 
Chinese. I explained to the Chinese that 
nonproliferation is one of the highest 
U.S. priorities as well as the one area of 
arms control which has been perhaps 
the most successful. This agreement 
continues that record. 

This committee has, of course, 
already received ACDA's Nuclear Pro- 
liferation Assessment Statement on the 
agreement, which we provided to the 
President prior to his approval of the 
agreement. The prime question before 
you now— as before the President on 
July 23— is: "Does this new agreement 
contribute to U.S. nonproliferation ef- 
forts?" I believe the answer is a 
resounding "yes." Why? Because our 
agreement with China helps ensure that 
they are part of the nonproliferation 
solution rather than part of the problem. 



China's Nonproliferation Policy 

During the 1960s and 1970s, China re- 
jected nonproliferation norms. They ac- 
tually portrayed proliferation in a 
favorable light by openly declaring that 
the spread of nuclear weapons around 
the globe would diminish the power of 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
and enhance the opportunities for 
revolution. China denied that a world of 
more nuclear-weapon states would 
enhance the risk of nuclear war. 

China also undertook no interna- 
tional legal obligations and had no policy 
to require safeguards and other controls 
on its nuclear exports. This naturally 
quickened our concerns about Chinese 
actions that could help other countries 
acquire nuclear explosives. Clearly, 
herein lay the potential for great harm 
to global nonproliferation efforts in both 
word and deed. And, needless to tell 
this committee, words are exceedingly 
important in this realm. They affect the 
strength of the international norms and 
standards upon which nonproliferation 
ultimately rests. 

Against this background, the United 
States opened talks on peaceful nuclear 
cooperation with China— first in 1981 
and then more intensively in 1983— with 
ACDA participating in all stages of the 
negotiations. 

After 2 years of negotiations, an 
agreement was initialed during Presi- 
dent Reagan's visit to China. It then 
became necessary to engage in further 
discussions with China to clarify matters 
related to implementation of its nuclear 
policies. We did not want to proceed un- 
til we were completely satisfied. We 
were willing to wait as long as need be. 
These discussions concluded successfully 
at the end of June. 

Over these past 2 years, the Chinese 
Government has taken a number of im- 
portant nonproliferation steps. 

First, it made a pledge that it does 
"not engage in nuclear proliferation" 
nor does it "help other countries 
develop nuclear weapons." The sub- 
stance of this pledge has been reaf- 
firmed several times by Chinese officials 
both abroad and within China. In fact, 
China's sixth National People's Con- 
gress made this policy a directive to all 
agencies of that large and complex 



EAST ASIA 



government. As such, it constitutes a 
historic and positive change in China's 
policies. It helps bolster rather than 
break down those critical norms and 
standards that comprise the non- 
proliferation regime. 

Second, in January 1984, China 
joined the over 100 members of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which plays such a critical role 
in international nonproliferation efforts. 
This was a necessary step in China's 
evolution toward acceptance of the basic 
norms of nuclear supply. 

Third, China adopted a policy of re- 
quiring IAEA safeguards on its nuclear 
exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. 
This, too, was a big plus. Not only could 
a supplier that did not accept this basic 
norm directly contribute to spreading 
uncontrolled nuclear equipment and 
material to potential nuclear-weapon 
states, it could also undermine the con- 
sensus of supplier countries that has 
been painstakingly constructed over the 
past decade. 

Fourth, during our hours and hours 
of discussions, the Chinese have made it 
clear that they will implement their 
policies in a manner consistent with the 
basic nonproliferation practices we and 
others support so vigorously. 

In the short span of 2 years, China 
has embraced nonproliferation policies 
and practices, which it had eschewed so 
vociferously for a quarter of a century. 
This clearly is a turnabout of historic 
significance in our efforts to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons. The Chinese 
are to be applauded for such a change of 
course. 

We can take a measure of pride in 
this as well. For I believe that the 
lengthy discussions by the United 
States and other supplier nations with 
China, combined with the prospect of 
agreements for peaceful nuclear coopera- 
tion, contributed heavily to these 
Chinese actions. 

Protecting U.S. Interests 

We will, of course, watch Chinese prac- 
tices closely to satisfy ourselves that 
China's actions are consistent with its 
words, with our expectations, and with 
our policies and laws. The Chinese know 
that. They know that nuclear coopera- 
tion with us rests on their strict adher- 
ence to basic nonproliferation practices 
discussed and clarified at such great 
length. The agreement before you rests 
on that foundation. It could rest on no 
other. 



As presented in ACDA's Nuclear 
Proliferation Assessment Statement, all 
statutory requirements for such 
agreements have been fully met. Two 
issues that were subject to protracted 
negotiations are worth mentioning. 

• The agreement before you con- 
tains a provision for "mutually accept- 
able arrangements for exchanges of in- 
formation and visits" in connection with 
transfers under its terms. This was done 
to help ensure that all the agreement's 
provisions will be scrupulously honored. 
The specifics of visits and information 
exchanges will be worked out with the 
Chinese before any licenses are issued 
for nuclear exports. They will permit 
visits by U.S. personnel to sites in 
China wherever our material or equip- 
ment, subject to this agreement, is 
located. 

• The second issue concerns the 
right of prior approval over reprocess- 
ing of spent fuel subject to the agree- 
ment. The agreement notes that neither 
party contemplates reprocessing such 
material. In fact, activities of this kind 
are not likely to become an issue in 
China for at least 15 years. While the 
language dealing with this issue does 
differ from that in other agreements, it 
is clear that China cannot reprocess 
without U.S. approval. 

Other aspects of our assessment 
statement can be fully explained in 
response to your questions. Let me just 
add now that U.S. interests are fully 
protected. This agreement includes 
many written guarantees and controls to 
ensure that material, equipment, or 
technology supplied by the United 
States will not be misused. 

If they are misused, or if China's 
nonproliferation policies do not live up 
to their pledges and to our expectations, 
we have clear recourse. We hope and 
expect that this agreement will lead to 
significant peaceful nuclear commerce 
with China-otherwise the President 
would not have sent it to you— but the 
agreement is only an umbrella agree- 
ment. That is, it permits, but does not 
require, the export of any nuclear items. 
Thus, if Chinese behavior ever became 
inconsistent with our understandings, 
we would suspend the licensing of ex- 
ports. The Chinese know that. 

Conclusion 

China's recent nonproliferation steps are 
and will be critical to our mission of 
bolstering vital nonproliferation norms 
and standards. Our long talks with the 



Chinese, as well as the prospects of civi 
nuclear cooperation with the United 
States and other suppliers, contributed 
to these major improvements in China's 
nonproliferation policies. Further, as I 
said, the agreement will enhance our ef 
forts to cooperate to strengthen non- 
proliferation norms and actions. 

Thus, I believe this agreement is 
fully in U.S. national interests. I trust 
that, after a thorough consideration of 
all the issues, you and the whole Con- 
gress will agree. 



AMBASSADOR KENNEDY 



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I am pleased to have this opportunity 
speak to you today on the proposed 
agreement between the United States 
and the People's Republic of China 
(P.R.C.) concerning the peaceful uses o 
nuclear energy. This agreement was 
signed in Washington on July 23. We 
believe this agreement is important to 
the interests of both countries and sup 
portive of our shared nonproliferation 
objectives. 

The agreement establishes the basi 
for cooperation in a variety of the 
peaceful applications of nuclear energy 
It provides the basis for export of 
nuclear reactors, fuel, components, am 
the exchange of technology including 
cooperation in health, safety, and the < 
vironmental implications of the peacefi 
uses of nuclear energy. The agreemem 
is not, however, a commitment to sup- 
ply. Rather, it provides the legal fram 
work within which nuclear cooperation 
may take place. Once the agreement 
enters into force, nuclear reactors, coir 
ponents, and nuclear fuel may be ex- 
ported under licenses issued by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in ac 
cordance with existing law and 
regulations. 

The agreement permits nuclear 
cooperation between the United States 
and China exclusively in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy. It contains 
reciprocal commitments by the United 
States and China that nuclear facilities 
and materials subject to the agreemen 
will not be used for any nuclear ex- 
plosive or military purpose. This 
guarantee, as well as other assurances 
and controls in the agreement, will hel 
preserve the distinction between the 
civil and military use of nuclear energj 
It is also important to stress that 
cooperation under the agreement is 
limited to nonsensitive aspects of the 
nuclear fuel cycle. It expressly exclude 
the transfer of any sensitive nuclear 



1 



EAST ASIA 



ihnology such as enrichment or 
jrocessing. Nor does it in any way re- 
ire that technology of strategic or 
litary significance be transferred. 

ovisions of the Agreement 

ilvould now like to turn to a brief ex- 
lliination of the specific provisions of 
je agreement we have signed with the 
lople's Republic of China. The text of 
p agreement and supporting docu- 
Imts developed during its review 
Ithin the executive branch have been 
bmsmitted to the Congress by the 
resident. The text, in most respects, 
les not differ significantly from new 
Id renegotiated agreements for 
[aceful nuclear cooperation which we 
|ve concluded with other countries 
(ice enactment of the Nuclear Non- 
loliferation Act of 1978 and which have 
len before Congress for review. The 
Ireement with China fully meets all 
1 2 requirements specified in Section 
S3 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
\ amended, for nuclear cooperation 
reements with nuclear-weapon states. 
Specifically, section 123 requires that 
ch agreements contain several 
arantees by the cooperating partner. 

The first guarantee is that no 
i clear materials or equipment subject 
the agreement will be used for any 
I clear explosive device, for research on 
I development of any nuclear explosive 
i vice, or for any other military pur- 
hse. This requirement is met by article 
I paragraph 3, of the proposed agree- 
bnt with the P.R.C. 

The second guarantee required is 
tat no nuclear material or equipment 
I oject to the agreement will be trans- 
I red beyond the jurisdiction or control 
I the cooperating party without the 
reement of the United States. This 
quirement is met by article 5, para- 
aph 1, of the agreement. 

The third guarantee required is 
it adequate physical security will be 
lintained with respect to any nuclear 
iterial subject to the agreement. This 
quirement is met by article 6 of the 
reement. 

The fourth guarantee required is 
at no nuclear material subject to the 
reement will be enriched, reprocessed, 
.ered in form or content, or (in the 
se of weapons-usable materials) stored 
thout the prior agreement of the 
nited States. This requirement is met 
' article 5, paragraph 2, of the 
reement. 



The Chinese understood U.S. legal 
requirements, said they had no plans to 
undertake the activities in question, and 
were concerned that, in the event of 
possible future Chinese changes of 
plans, the United States would give a 
timely response. While the language 
that was negotiated is different from 
that appearing in other agreements, it 
provides that China may not engage in 
any of the specified activities without 
the agreement of the United States. If 
long-term arrangements are not agreed, 
it makes clear that each side will refrain 
from such activities if either side 
objects— i.e., until there is mutual agree- 
ment between the United States and 
the P.R.C. Both the United States and 
the P.R.C. understand this. 

All of these guarantees are recipro- 
cal in nature and wbuld apply to 
Chinese exports to the United States. 
They are, in substance, identical to 
those in all our other post- 1978 agree- 
ments. Unlike the other agreements 
concluded since 1978, however, this one 
is with a single nuclear-weapon state, as 
such states are defined in the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT). This agreement does 
not provide for International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards in the 
P.R.C. on nuclear material, equipment, 
or facilities subject to the agreement 
since they are not required for nuclear- 
weapon states by either the Atomic 
Energy Act or the NPT. But neither 
does the agreement foreclose such 
safeguards, were China to undertake a 
voluntary offer with the IAEA as the 
other nuclear-weapon states have done. 

The agreement contains provisions 
for consultations, exchanges of informa- 
tion, and visits to the sites of materials, 
facilities, and components subject to the 
agreement. The agreement also provides 
for exchanges of views and information 
on each country's national accounting 
and control systems and consultations 
on physical protection measures. The 
purpose of these exchanges of visits and 
information is to ensure that the provi- 
sions of the agreement are effectively 
and openly carried out, including the 
provision that cooperation will be for ex- 
clusively peaceful purposes. Those provi- 
sions have the duration envisaged in 
Section 123(aXl) of the Atomic Energy 
Act. 

Benefits of the Agreement 

There are very substantial benefits to 
be derived from this agreement. The 
agreement will lay the groundwork for 
strengthening economic ties between the 



United States and China and create new 
opportunities for U.S. companies to par- 
ticipate in China's expanding energy 
sector. China has begun the develop- 
ment of a major nuclear power program 
to meet its growing energy needs. The 
Chinese view nuclear energy as playing 
a key role in China's industrial develop- 
ment and modernization program. U.S. 
firms are already involved in other 
energy projects in China to develop 
coal, oil, and other energy resources, 
and we believe that participating in a 
diversified and well-balanced energy 
program in China is supportive of U.S. 
interests. 

A most important benefit of peaceful 
nuclear cooperation between the United 
States and China is the opportunity it 
provides for both countries to work 
together to prevent the spread of 
nuclear explosives. President Reagan 
has declared that the nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons is a fundamental 
national security and foreign policy 
objective of the United States. This con- 
sideration was at the top of our agenda 
during our talks with the Chinese and 
will remain the paramount concern of 
the United States. Clearly, cooperation 
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
must rest on a foundation of shared 
views and principles on the necessity 
of deterring the threat of nuclear 
proliferation. 

Since negotiations began on the pro- 
posed agreement, China made signifi- 
cant new statements of its nonprolifera- 
tion policy which show that China is 
opposed to the spread of nuclear explo- 
sives to additional countries. On Janu- 
ary 10, 1984, at the White House, 
Premier Zhao stated: 

China does not advocate nor encourage 
proliferation. We do not engage in prolifera- 
tion ourselves, nor do we help other coun- 
tries develop nuclear weapons. 

Premier Zhao reiterated this state- 
ment in February in Beijing and at the 
sixth National People's Congress in 
May. The Premier's speech to the 
National People's Congress is the 
closest equivalent in China to a presi- 
dential "State of the Union" address. 
The statement was endorsed by the 
National People's Congress and pub- 
lished as official policy. 

In January 1985, the official Chinese 
press published a statement by Vice 
Premier Li Peng that China has no 
present or future intention to help non- 
nuclear-weapon states develop nuclear 
weapons and that China's present or 
future cooperation with other countries 



EAST ASIA 



is confined to peaceful purposes. The 
Chinese have made clear to us that 
when they say that they will not assist 
other countries to develop nuclear 
weapons, this also applies to all nuclear 
explosives. This is a basic Chinese policy 
which we believe will guide China's 
nuclear cooperation in the future. 

China has also taken important steps 
to participate in international nonprolif- 
eration efforts. It joined the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency in Janu- 
ary 1984 and has stated that it requires 
the application of IAEA safeguards to 
nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon 
states. In adopting this policy, China is 
acting in accordance with existing inter- 
national norms for nuclear trade. 

As China undertakes nuclear 
cooperation with other countries and 
moves into international nuclear affairs, 
it is vital that we have a bilateral forum 
which allows us to work closely with 
China to maintain and strengthen the 
international nonproliferation regime. 
The agreement itself establishes a for- 
mal framework for consultations enab- 
ling regular exchanges of views and 
information on matters of mutual inter- 
est, including means to prevent the 
spread of nuclear explosives. 

Our contacts with the Chinese have 
already demonstrated that they appre- 
ciate the importance we attach to non- 
proliferation. We are satisfied that the 
policies they have adopted are consist- 
ent with our own basic views. Formaliz- 
ing our ties in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy through an agreement 
for cooperation will provide a means to 
advance our shared objectives. 

We believe the agreement serves 
the national security and nonprolifera- 
tion interests of the United States. We 
believe it deserves the full support of 
the Congress. 



MR. WOLFOWITZ 

It is a pleasure for me to join Secretary 
[of Energy John] Herrington, ACDA 
Director Adelman, and Ambassador 
Kennedy to discuss with you the U.S.- 
P.R.C. agreement on peaceful nuclear 
cooperation. In my prepared remarks, I 
would like to stress the importance of 
this agreement in our overall relation- 
ship with the P.R.C. 

But first, a word about the road we 
traveled before the agreement was 
signed last week. Mr. Adelman's and 
Ambassador Kennedy's statements ex- 
plain the importance of this agreement 
to our nonproliferation goals, and I do 
not want to >jo over the same ground. 



But I would like to underscore that U.S. 
nonproliferation concerns were para- 
mount in our negotiations with the Chi- 
nese on the agreement. The require- 
ments of U.S. nonproliferation policy 
and law— and not other foreign policy 
considerations— were absolute determi- 
nants of the shape and content of the 
agreement which we initialed and signed 
and of the discussions related to it. 
Despite the importance we attach to our 
overall relationship, great though it is, 
we repeatedly emphasized to the Chi- 
nese that the relationship could in no 
way obviate the need to meet our non- 
proliferation requirements and the re- 
quirements of U.S. law. 

Only when our nonproliferation con- 
cerns were met— concerns addressed in 
Mr. Adelman's and Ambassador Ken- 
nedy's testimony— were U.S. agencies 
able to move forward with a recommen- 
dation to the President that the agree- 
ment be signed. Over the past year and 
more, many people in our government 
worked hard on this issue. Discussions 
with the Chinese continued through 
diplomatic channels for many months 
prior to Ambassador Kennedy's June 
trip to Beijing. 

The groundwork was completed dur- 
ing that June visit. But further inter- 
agency consultations here, reporting to 
the President, and the President's own 
decision to approve were required 
before the agreement could be signed. 
We were pleased that these procedures 
were completed in time for the Li visit, 
which offered a propitious occasion for a 
signing ceremony, but we were fully 
prepared to take more time if that had 
been necessary. 

Now that U.S. Government concerns 
have been met and the agreement is 
signed and before Congress, let me turn 
to the question of what this agreement 
will mean for bilateral relations between 
the United States and China. 

Implications for 
U.S.-China Relations 

The first images that some in the 
United States might conjure up are 
those of pure economic gain for our side: 
billions of dollars in contracts; massive 
U.S. equipment exports; aid to the 
stricken American nuclear power indus- 
try; U.S. reactors for the city lights and 
factories of China. 

There is a kernel of truth behind 
these somewhat exaggerated expecta- 
tions, but I would submit that dreams of 
one-sided commercial gain do not con- 
stitute the most important positive 



.'' 



aspects of our cooperation with China ir 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

Yes, there will be opportunities for 
American companies to compete for 
nuclear power business in China. The 
market is there, and European and 
Japanese competitors are already active 
in it. China will look to the outside 
primarily for assistance in building up 
its indigenous nuclear power plant 
manufacturing industry. Over the long 
run, more than anything, China will 
want to import technology, modern mar 
agement methods, and old-fashioned 
engineering know-how. In these areas— 
which are vitally important for the 
safety and efficiency of reactor opera- 
tion— U.S. companies have a wealth of 
experience and flexibility, which puts 
them in a strong competitive position. 

Also, there is no doubt that in the 
first stages of China's nuclear power 
program— in which three or four nuclea^' 
plants will be built, including five to 
seven reactors— the Chinese industry 
will want to make major equipment 
imports. A nuclear cooperation agree- 
ment will have to be in force before 
U.S. companies can apply to the Nuclei { 
Regulatory Commission to ship major 
reactor components to China. 

But beyond its implications for the 
sale of discrete pieces of equipment for 
nuclear power reactors in China, the 
agreement can fill a gap in our relation 
ship with the P.R.C. Once in force, it 
will become an important support of a 
general framework of cooperation with 
China. If we fail to bring it into force, 
the framework will be that much less 
coherent and that gap— which you coulc 
label "nonproliferation objectives and 
peaceful cooperation in nuclear 
energy"— will remain open. 

For the past several years, under bot 
Democratic and Republican administra- 
tions, the United States has worked to 
strengthen and broaden political and 
economic ties with the P.R.C. Seeing a 
modernizing China as a potential force 
for peace and stability in East Asia, th< 
United States is committed to assisting 
China's ongoing modernization effort. 
The President and other Administratio: 
leaders have recognized that, while we 
and China have our differences, we con 
sider China a friendly country. While 
not a U.S. ally, neither is China allied 
with any other power, and it shares 
some important concerns with us. Hold 
ing this basic view of China's position i 
the world, the United States has sough 
to regularize our relations. 

In areas such as trade, investment, 
finance, civil aviation, and scientific 






IS 



•:. 



Hi 



EAST ASIA 



technological, and industrial coopera- 
pn— to name a few— we have sought to 
itablish a framework of agreements 
id arrangements consistent with the 
enerally good relations we and China 
Hijoy. In setting up this framework, we 
id the Chinese have learned a great 
>al about each other's political and 
■•onomic systems. Our bilateral agree- 
ments offer mutual benefits and mutual 
iiligations. They have been a measure 
| China's interest in strengthening its 
ks with us and a test of our commit- 
lent to China's modernization. 

We think the framework we have 
lilt up has not only benefited our 
lateral relations but also encouraged 
hina to be a more constructive player 
I the international arena. From another 
liewpoint, China's own push to open its 
•onomy and society to the outside 
orld after years of isolationism has 
i?en an impetus for U.S.-P.R.C. bilat- 
■al cooperation. Whatever one's point 
] view, I think it's fair to say that our 
amework of cooperation with China 
I id China's opening to the outside are 
utually reinforcing and mutually 
meficial. 

Within the context I've described, 
I e nuclear cooperation agreement will 
inforce the Sino-U.S. relationship by 
rthering both our nonproliferation 
i >als and our cooperation in peaceful 
, les of nuclear energy. We in the 
' dministration think it is an important 
i jreement— one that deserves the sup- 
port of the Congress. 

To sum up, bringing the present 
jreement into force will: 

• Allow us to maintain constructive 
msultations with the P.R.C. on non- 
■oliferation issues; 

• Give U.S. firms the opportunity to 
ake a significant contribution to the 
jvelopment of China's civil nuclear 
ower industry; and 

• Reinforce the overall framework 
' our relationship with the P.R.C. 



Recent Security Developments 
in Korea 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
ill be published by the committee and will 
5 available from the Superintendent of 
ocuments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Address before the Council on U.S.- 
Korean Military and Security Studies 
in Arlington, Va., on August 
12, 1985. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. 

I am delighted to be able to talk about 
the subject of Korean security, because, 
in fact, the U.S. commitment to the 
security of the Republic of Korea 
(R.O.K.) lies at the very heart of our 
bilateral relationship. For 32 years our 
commitment and the great efforts of our 
South Korean allies have deterred war. 
President Reagan recognizes the funda- 
mental nature of the security commit- 
ment and reaffirmed it immediately 
upon his assumption of office. He has 
emphasized it repeatedly and, most 
dramatically, when in November 1983, 
he visited the northernmost outposts of 
UN forces along the DMZ [demilitarized 
zone] to offer encouragement to the U.S. 
and Korean troops there. 

Security developments on the 
Korean Peninsula are of global import 
since the security interests of the Soviet 
Union, China, and the United States, as 
well as Japan, are all affected. An out- 
break of conflict there has the potential 
to ignite a confrontation between the 
major regional powers. The division of 
the peninsula and the level of tension 
between North and South have been 
among the more intractable problems of 
this century and, certainly, of the 
postwar era. 

Continuing Concerns About Security 

There are two very good reasons for a 
continuing preoccupation with security- 
one, I suppose, one could derive from 
the past and the second that derives 
from the present. 

Let me speak about the past for a 
moment and the first reason. It was just 
over 35 years ago that North Korea 
invaded the South, starting a terrible 
war that killed tens of thousands of my 
countrymen and even larger numbers of 
Koreans. We do not want to fight such 
a war again, but we know that preven- 
tion is the only remedy. The flirtation of 
the mid-1970s with withdrawal as a way 



of avoiding problems is something that 
we have put behind us. We all realize— 
and certainly history ought to teach 
those who do not understand it— that a 
war in Korea is not something the 
United States can stand away from or 
stand apart from. Therefore, it is all the 
more important that we make it clear 
what our commitment is and that we do 
everything that we possibly can to deter 
such a war. 

To turn, then, also to the present 
and the other reason for such a continu- 
ing concern about security in the 
Korean Peninsula, there is the fact that 
we face in Korea one of the most poten- 
tially severe imbalances in military 
power anywhere in the world. People 
who talk with concern about it are not 
being unduly alarmist. It is an extreme- 
ly serious and potentially unsettling 
situation. 

I think you all are pretty familiar 
with basic facts, but let me rehearse 
them for a moment anyway. 

The North has about 700,000 men 
under arms, compared with about 
540,000 in the South. But those numbers 
of men under arms really do not state 
the balance adequately. It is a good deal 
more seriously to the disadvantage of 
ourselves and our South Korean allies. 
North Korean forces are well-equipped 
and have a substantial advantage (at 
least 2 to 1) in several key categories of 
offensive weaponry, including such 
critical ones to an offensive as tanks, 
long-range artillery, and armored per- 
sonnel carriers. Perhaps even more dis- 
turbing, the North has perhaps the 
world's largest commando force, de- 
signed for insertion behind the lines in 
time of war. 

North Korea has more than twice as 
many combat aircraft than the South, 
though, of course, that is one of the 
important categories the South looks to 
us to make up in time of war. In fact, 
on that point, I can say that even with 
the recent introduction of MiG-23s into 
North Korea by the Soviet Union, com- 
bined U.S. -Korean forces will maintain a 
qualitative edge, particularly as South 
Korea begins receiving F-16s from the 
United States next year. 



VtnhAr 10QC 



23 



EAST ASIA 



In addition to the size and capabili- 
ties of the North Korean Armed Forces, 
the challenge they pose is compounded 
by factors of time and distance. The 
bulk of North Korean forces are 
deployed well forward, along the DMZ, 
and recently North Korea has begun to 
move even more of its rear echelon 
troops to hardened bunkers much closer 
to the DMZ. This makes prediction and 
warning of an impending attack more 
difficult, and with Seoul about as close 
to the DMZ as Washington is to Dulles 
Airport, an attack from the North could 
come with very little warning indeed. 

We have seen from what North 
Korea has done in Rangoon what North 
Korea is capable of. We have continuing 
evidence, including North Korea's con- 
tinued refusal to adhere to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, of intentions 
that, at the very least, are deeply 
disturbing. 

South Korean Progress and 
the U.S. Security Commitment 

If I say that we should be preoccupied 
with the issue of security, and I am 
frank to admit it, I do not believe that 
means we are indifferent to other con- 
cerns or that we are putting security 
ahead of the basic interests of the peo- 
ple of Korea, interests that they have in 
common with us, and really with all peo- 
ple, for a better life and a freer life. 

But, in fact, in addition to helping to 
deter war, American forces in Korea act 
as a shield, a shield behind which South 
Koreans have made tremendous eco- 
nomic progress. From a per capita GNP 
of less than $90 in 1960 to more than 
$2,000 today, the Korean economy has 
been able to provide an increasingly 
high standard of living for all Koreans, 
despite the necessity of devoting 
roughly 6% of national GNP to defense 
expenditures. 

Today, in 1 year— and this is a suc- 
cess story that I like to tell the Con- 
gress about— our exports to Korea 
exceed the total of U.S. economic assist- 
ance to that country during the entire 
36-year period that we were giving aid. 
That is quite a staggering record. It has 
made Korea now our seventh largest 
trading partner and a major producer of 
steel, ships, and electronic goods. 

And I suppose on this day, when 
some of my colleagues are looking at the 
recommendations of the International 
Trade Commission, I should add shoes 
and several other things as well- 



subjects that, of course, are the sources 
of problems and frictions between us as 
well. But those problems— and when 
they come up, let us remember this 
fact— those problems are the products of 
success. It is far, far better to be deal- 
ing with difficult issues about shoes and 
steel than not to be trading at all. 

In an area that, to me personally, is 
even more important, our security com- 
mitment to Korea is also a shield behind 
which Koreans can achieve a more con- 
sensual, a freer, and a more democratic 
political life. Democracy is itself a vital 
aspect of security. Indeed, I believe that 
evolution toward true democracy is not 
only compatible with security but is 
essential to its realization. During Presi- 
dent Reagan's visit to Korea in 1983, he 
told the National Assembly and a live 
Korean television audience: "The devel- 
opment of democratic political institu- 
tions is the surest means to build the 
national consensus that is the foundation 
of true security." 

An essential aspect of democracy is 
the peaceful transition of power. As 
President Reagan also stated during 
that visit to Seoul and again during 
President Chun's visit to Washington in 
April, we strongly support President 
Chun's pledge to achieve a peaceful 
transfer of power at the end of his term 
in 1988. 

We were also encouraged by politi- 
cal progress made in Korea in 1984 and 
the first part of this year. Most prison- 
ers in politically related cases were 
released. A new policy of "campus 
autonomy" was announced, allowing 
students greater freedom of expression 
on campus. The political ban was lifted, 
and a new, more outspoken political 
party was formed that contested the 
National Assembly election in February 
this year— elections that, without any 
question, were the freest, most strongly 
contested in postwar Korean history and 
that, in many places in Asia, would be a 
model to be emulated. In that election, 
this new opposition party, in fact, suc- 
ceeded in becoming Korea's largest op- 
position party. 

Partly as a consequence of this 
greater freedom, a strident criticism of 
existing policies developed. Our efforts, 
as the U.S. Government, have been to 
encourage both government and opposi- 
tion in Korea to engage in dialogue and 
to act with moderation toward one 
another, in order to help ensure the 
internal stability upon which the South's 
security depends— and, in fact, upon 



which progress toward democracy 
depends as well. We are averse to all 
acts that tend to cut off dialogue or to 
polarize views. Despite some recent 
government steps that we feel are some 
what at variance with the real progress 
that has been made, we remain confi- 
dent that Koreans and the Korean 
Government will continue upon the pat! 
they have embarked, to the benefit not 
only of democracy in Korea but, in fact, 
to the benefit of security on the penin- 
sula and the interests of the United 
States in the process. 

In fact, the concern of this confer- 
ence, the concern with security, is one 
that is enormously aided by the eco- 
nomic and political progress that Korea 
has made, and it is something that will 
be enormously aided by the continuatio 
of that progress. The fact is that, toda\ 
spending only 6% of its GNP on 
defense, South Korea is very close to 
having available the budgetary 
resources that North Korea— with its 
extraordinary percentage of GNP 
devoted to defense— is able to muster. 
South Korea's GNP has now reached 
roughly four times that of the North. 

That does not mean the millenium 
has arrived. It does not mean, as I hav 
had to explain, unfortunately, to some 
congressmen on the Hill, that we can 
now withdraw troops from Korea 
because we have reached "budgetary 
balance" and that is all that matters. II' 
is going to be many years, at best, 
before the military balance on the peni 
sula is redressed. And even then, the 
United States will have a continuing 
interest not simply in maintaining 
balance but in maintaining deterrence. 

Nevertheless, this economic progre 
is something that is very heartening ai 
encouraging. It means that— at least in 
this case and as, I think, is increasingl; 
emerging in quite a few others— histor 
is on our side, not on the side of the 
Marxist- Leninist regimes that have 
proven to be such failures. But in orde 
to make history work with us, we have 
to stay the course. And in my view, fo 
U.S. policy, that means not presuming 
too much too quickly. 

I am confident that the R.O.K. will 
continue gradually to redress the mili- 
tary imbalance with the North. In the 
meantime, our commitment to the 
R.O.K. will continue to help guarantee 
deterrence. What we would like to see 
however, is that this arms competition 
between North and South might even- 
tually be replaced by peaceful competi- 
tion, by the the exchange of goods and 



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EAST ASIA 



ideas. That day is a long way off still, 
3ut it is a day from which the people of 
both North and South Korea would 
benefit, and the world itself would be a 
safer place. 

Thus, in recent years we have made, 
through the UN Command, a number of 
proposals for confidence-building 
measures at the Military Armistice 
Commission at Panmunjom. These 
nclude proposals for mutual notification 
jf military exercises, proposals to 
exchange observers during exercises, 
md proposals for an increased role for 
;he Neutral Nations Supervisory Com- 
■nittee. We even have a proposal, and I 
suppose it is only in a context as 
strained as the one you are all familiar 
With at the DMZ that you could make 
such a proposal— we even have proposed 
lemilitarizing the demilitarized zone. 

Unfortunately, North Korea has not 
•esponded to these proposals. I would 
lote, however, that just last month 
Morth Korea did put forward at the 
Military Armistice Commission certain 
>roposals concerning new security 
irrangements for the Joint Security 
\rea. Those proposals are being given 
•areful and serious study by the authori- 
ses both here and in South Korea. 
Meanwhile, our proposals remain on the 
able, and we continue to await a 
lerious North Korean response. 

The U.S. Government has long 
encouraged direct dialogue between the 
wo parties most concerned here— North 
ind South Korea. We have welcomed 
.he resumption of direct dialogue that 
>egan last fall. I believe that even most 
ixperts were somewhat surprised at the 

Eesumption of the talks, and certainly 
he multiplicity of talks— on economic 
natters, family reunification, possible 
•ultural and parliamentary exchanges— is 
mprecedented. Some people, I think, 
ire unduly tempted to optimism because 
>f this and because of recent domestic 
md geopolitical developments that have 
:reated a situation that is, in many 
■espects, quite different from that of a 
decade ago. 

But all who have followed Korean 
affairs know that caution in dealing with 
Morth Korea is essential. North Korea 
las used dialogue in the past to create 
;he illusion of reasonableness while plot- 
:ing acts of the most profound perfidi- 
susness. Our intelligence about that 
most closed society and its intentions 
remains limited in the extreme. The 
±allenge, given this history but also 
|ejven the vital importance of deterring 



war and reducing tensions in Korea, is 
to deal cautiously but creatively with 
the North rather than instinctively. And 
I might say that I believe South Korea 
has handled its diplomacy in this very 
delicate area with a great deal of states- 
manship and agility in the last 2 years, 
all the more so in view of the atrocity in 
Rangoon that immediately preceded this 
period. 

Recent Changes Affecting Security 

It might be useful here to discuss some 
of the changes both in and outside the 
Korean Peninsula in the last decade or 
so that have affected the security situa- 
tion and that have some bearing on 
the North-South talks that are now 
underway. 

In recent years the Republic of 
Korea has truly emerged as a middle 
power in the region, and its growing 
confidence is reflected in its increasing 
international role and stature. At the 
same time, I believe that President 
Reagan's reaffirmation of the U.S. 
security commitment to Korea and, in- 
deed, of the U.S. role in Asia more 
broadly, as well as improved Korean 
ties with Japan, have added to South 
Korea's confidence in dealing with the 
North. 

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and 
China in very different ways have 
indicated a willingness to deal with 
South Korea in international contexts. 
China has allowed South Koreans to 
participate in international conferences 
and sports events in China and has 
itself sent representatives to such 
events in South Korea. Some limited 
contact at international events between 
the Soviet Union and South Korea has 
begun, after a hiatus following the 
shoot-down of KAL [Korean Air Lines] 
007 in 1983. 

We believe that neither China nor 
the Soviet Union wants to see another 
outbreak of war in Korea, which could 
serve as a flashpoint igniting a larger 
conflict. In the past few years, China, 
particularly, has shown a new willing- 
ness to engage in a serious dialogue 
with us about the Korean Peninsula and 
about the need to reduce tensions there. 
While China still endorses North 
Korean proposals and positions, we 
believe that it also encourages 
Pyongyang to carry on in the dialogue 
with Seoul and to concentrate on im- 
proving its economic performance. 



Nevertheless, we have to put a qualifi- 
cation on all of this, if no more than to 
say— and this is quite a qualifica- 
tion—that the competition and rivalry 
between China and the Soviet Union for 
influence in the North more often than 
not seems to be a prevailing if not con- 
trolling factor in their conduct and in 
their policy. 

Regional geopolitical factors may 
play a role in the overall security situa- 
tion, but North and South Korea 
themselves are the key to this story, a 
point that we have made repeatedly. 
Some significant changes have occurred 
in both countries that affect security 
and that may also have played a role in 
the opening of the current dialogue, par- 
ticularly changes in the South. 

In the South, the Republic of Korea 
has every reason to want dialogue with 
the North and to feel confident in pursu- 
ing it. The R.O.K.'s economic growth, 
export oriented and based on free mar- 
ket mechanisms, has been phenomenal. 
Militarily, South Korea maintains 
extremely capable armed forces and has 
a firm security commitment from my 
country. It has diplomatic relations with 
over 120 countries and is a member of 
almost all specialized agencies of the 
United Nations. A most dramatic 
illustration of the South's growing inter- 
national stature was the selection of 
Seoul as the site of the 1988 Olympics. 
All in all, it is a picture of great success 
of which the R.O.K., its government, 
and its people can be proud. 

While economic success is one of the 
factors contributing to South Korean 
confidence in approaching North-South 
talks, ironically it may be— and I 
underline that word "may" several 
times— it may be that it is economic 
crisis that is forcing the North to seek 
new approaches. As I said already, our 
knowledge concerning internal develop- 
ments in North Korea is extremely 
limited. However, there is no question 
that country is suffering severe eco- 
nomic stagnation; there are indications 
that its GNP actually may have declined 
in the last 5 years. North Korea 
remains unable to repay its rather 
limited foreign debts, after defaulting on 
them a decade ago. Bottlenecks and 
chronic shortages stemming from the 
inefficiences of a centralized command 
economy bedevil all attempts at solving 
the North's economic problems. 

The gap between the standard of liv- 
ing in Pyongyang and in the countryside 
appears to be severe. The North's 



25 



EAST ASIA 



expenditure of more than 20% of its 
GNP on the military makes most of the 
consumer goods widely enjoyed by 
South Koreans an impossible luxury for 
all but the most privileged-and we 
know who the most privileged are-m 
the North. 

There are indications that North 
Korea has shown an interest in China's 
new economic policies. North Korean 
officials have paid numerous visits, for 
example, to China's free trade zones, 
and North Korea's new joint ventures 
law is apparently patterned after that ol 
China. It may be that the North's 
interest in economic talks with the 
South, which is unprecedented, reflects 
in some measure this groping for new 
economic solutions. The North may 
believe that by improving relations with 
the South, at least to some degree, it 
may be able to persuade Western 
nations to provide the technology, trade, 
and investment that it hopes for and 

needs. 

Another reason possibly motivating 
North Korea is a new interest in 
improving its international image. Never 
good, it was virtually discredited by the 
1983 Rangoon bombing, an atrocity of 
incredible scale and audacity perpetra- 
ted by North Korean commandos— one 
that killed 17 Korean Government offi- 
cials (including a man that I would have 
been proud to claim as a good friend, 
former Foreign Minister Lee Bum-suk) 
and missed President Chun himself only 
by chance. That has undoubtedly led to 
even greater diplomatic isolation for the 
North. And it may, indeed, be that one 



of its motives is to try to break out of 
that isolation. 

However, I think we have to recog- 
nize-given the extremely closed nature 
of North Korea-we have to accept that 
we cannot judge it by its intentions. 
Only its actions really provide legitimate 
clues. Little that has come of the talks 
so far is inconsistent with the most 
skeptical and fundamental interpretation 
of North Korean motivations. That is 
that they are, perhaps, engaged in an 
effort— perhaps reinforced by their 
failure to achieve a withdrawal of 
American troops through American 
weakness-perhaps an effort to 
encourage a premature and unwarranted 
relaxation of vigilance and to encourage 
divisions between the United States and 
our allies in South Korea. 

We will not allow that to happen. On 
the other hand, we will pursue these 
talks in a serious vein. The slow prog- 
ress we have seen may simply reflect a 
very prudent approach by both sides to 
a very difficult negotiation. The distrust 
of 35 years will not be overcome by a 
few handshakes and a few smiles. A 
habit of talking out differences, essentia 
differences, must still be formed. Mutual 
confidence must be nurtured, not just 
by words but by deeds. But fundamen- 
tally, we are encouraged that direct 
dialogue between North and South is 
taking place, and we will continue to 
welcome and to support our South 
Korean ally in that process. 



Conclusion 

Let me just conclude by saying that I 
believe that the net effect of the various 
developments I have described this 
evening represents a considerable 
increase in South Korea's security. Com- 
pared to a decade ago, the R.O.K. has 
stronger armed forces, a firmer U.S. 
security commitment, an enhanced diplo- 
matic presence, and greater stature 
throughout the world. 

Internally, the Republic of Korea 
has made great economic progress and 
is commited to democratic development, 
including a peaceful transfer of power in 
1988. Moreover, North and South Korea 
are now engaged in direct talks. Though 
that dialogue has yet to produce con- 
crete results, the very fact of its 
existence and its continuation is signifi- 
cant. Security is necessarily linked to 
the level of tension and real threat, and 
we believe that the key to reducing ten- 
sions lies in a step-by-step building of 
confidence through direct dialogue and 
concrete actions by North and South 
Korea. 

Until that process reaches some Uto- 
pian conclusion, and that is a long way 
away, the Korean Peninsula will remain 
a hotspot, and continued vigilance-and 
continued efforts in all these fields-is a 
vital necessity. As I noted at the begin- 
ning, I am very optimistic about the 
future of South Korea and about the 
future of U.S.-Korean relations. As the 
Republic of Korea continues its efforts 
in all these fields, it can count on the 
close friendship and support of the 
United States. ■ 



nonartment of State Bulletii 



ECONOMICS 



Improved Market Access to Japan 



by Clayton Yeutter 

Address before the Foreign Cor- 
respondents Club in Tokyo on, August 
IS, 1985. Ambassador Yeutter is U.S. 
tTrade Representative. 

■It's a pleasure to be here in Japan for 
Imy first major overseas trip since 
{becoming U.S. Trade Representative on 
jjuly 1. I have been hoping that my first 
Imajor speech outside the United States 
j would be in Japan. Thanks to the kind 
limitation of the Foreign Correspond- 
ents Club, that hope is now being 
Irealized. I have visited Japan many 
[times in the past. Each visit has pro- 
vided the opportunity to make more 
(new friends. I have great respect and 
t affection for this country, which has 
I accomplished so much with so few 
I physical resources. That is a great 
1 tribute, of course, to its human 
i resources. 

Today I would like to address my 
I remarks to the people of Japan as a 
! friend of Japan at a pivotal time in our 
I relationship. Trade between our two 
j nations does not concern just our gov- 
j eminent and yours, our businesses and 
I your businesses. It concerns all of us— 
1 all Americans and all Japanese. It is in 
all of our interests to foster a fair, open, 
and efficient world trading system. For 
the United States, growth in world 
trade is indispensable to a continued 
rise in our living standards through in- 
creased efficiency and expanded con- 
sumer choice. 

For Japan, exporting has been the 
■key to an economic revival such as the 
modern world has never seen. An open 
world trading system is essential for 
you to have access to raw materials and 
to earn foreign exchange. Increasing 
world trade also provides the best 
chance for progress by developing 
nations, and an integrated world 
economy can be a powerful force for 
peace. 

Yet, the world trading system is 
beset by serious problems. Increasingly, 
countries are resorting to unfair export 
subsidies and nontariff import barriers 
in an attempt to get the upper hand on 
their trading partners. If we allow such 
impulses to continue to grow globally, 
all of us will end up suffering, because 
world trade ultimately will decrease. 



Need for New 
Trade Negotations 

That's why Japan and the United States 
have taken a strong leadership role in 
calling for a new round of multilateral 
negotiations under the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 

The GATT system has permitted a 
major expansion of world trade through 
the mutual reduction of trade barriers, 
to the benefit of all trading countries, 
over the past 37 years. Its success is 
based on a framework of rules and com- 
mitments that up to now have been 
widely accepted as being fair. 

Six years have now elapsed since 
the end of the last round of trade 
negotiations. In the intervening period, 
world trade has been buffeted by severe 
economic problems— a deep worldwide 
recession, crushing debt burdens, 
volatile exchange rate movements, and a 
growth in trade restrictions to deal with 
payments problems. 

Many GATT rules have fallen into 
disuse or abuse, and trade barriers have 
been rising as one country after another 
has taken actions outside of the existing 
rules in an attempt to solve its grave 
economic problems. What is remarkable 
under the circumstances is that the 
world has not resorted to much greater 
protectionism than has been the case. 
But what is also clear is that the core of 
the multilateral trading system— the 
GATT— is in urgent need of repair. 



There is both old business, required to 
improve and strengthen existing provi- 
sions, and new business, to extend the 
GATT to new areas and to deal with 
new problems affecting world trade. 

If we do not take firm action soon to 
strengthen GATT rules and to expand 
the GATT to new areas, we risk a 
deterioration in the world trading 
system of phenomenal proportions. If 
the GATT is allowed to become ineffec- 
tive and irrelevant, protectionism will 
rise in waves and our world trading 
system will be obliterated. 

I'm confident that, by working 
together, we can prevent this from 
happening. Japan's leadership in advo- 
cating a new round of multilateral nego- 
tiations is a crucial and welcome factor 
in preserving that system for all of us. 

Exposure to Foreign Competition 

By its impressive economic develop- 
ment, which has earned the world's 
admiration, Japan has achieved the 
strength and the credibility to play a 
major leadership role in the global 
trading community. With a determined 
national effort, you have become the 
second most important economic power 
in the Western world. 

As Japan developed its modern econ- 
omy, you saved with fervor, and that 
helped provide the capital to fuel your 
growth. You innovated, and your man- 
agement techniques and people skills 



U.S. Trade Representative 




Clayton Yeutter was 
bom Dec. 10, 1930, in 
Eustis, Neb. He re- 
ceived a B.S. (1952), a 
J.D. degree (1963), and 
a Ph.D. in agricultural 
economics (1966), all 
from the University of 
Nebraska. He served 
in the U.S. Air Force 
on active duty in 
1952-57 and in the active reserve until 1977. 
He is presently a Lt. Col. in the inactive 
reserve. 

From 1957 to 1975, Ambassador Yeutter 
operated a 2,500-acre farming-ranching-cattle 
feeding enterprise in central Nebraska, and 
during 1963-68, as other obligations per- 
mitted, he practiced law in Lincoln. 

He was on the faculty at the University 
of Nebraska (1960-66), served as executive 



assistant to the Governor of Nebraska 
(1966-68), director of the University of 
Nebraska's agricultural technical assistance 
program in Colombia (1968-70), Administra- 
tor of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 
Consumer and Marketing Service (1970-71), 
regional director for the Committee for the 
Reelection of the President (1972), Assistant 
Secretary of Agriculture for Marketing and 
Consumer Services (1973-74), Assistant 
Secretary of Agriculture for International 
Affairs and Commodity Programs (1974-75), 
Deputy Special Trade Representative 
(1975-77), senior partner of the law firm of 
Nelson, Harding, Yeutter and Leonard in 
Lincoln (1977-78), and President and Chief 
Executive Officer of the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (1978-85). 

Ambassador Yeutter was sworn in as 
U.S. Trade Representative on July 1, 1985. I 



Ol-tnhor 1QRt; 



ECONOMICS 



are now admired and emulated through- 
out the world. And you learned the 
importance of quality products, probably 
better than anyone. 

You also protected your fledgling 
industries from foreign competition, giv- 
ing them a chance to flourish into world- 
class export competitors. You actively 
constrained imports while vigorously 
expanding exports. 

Now it's time for Japan to take the 
next step toward full economic partner- 
ship in the family of nations. You must 
fully expose your economy to foreign 
competition, just as you have asked 
other nations to expose their industries 
to competition from Japanese firms. As 
the U.S. recovery of the past 2V2 years 
has strengthened the economies of our 
trading partners and helped pull them 
out of economic lethargy, Japan too has 
the capacity to lift other economies and 



help sustain global trade growth. In 
these difficult times, we may even have 
a moral obligation to do so. 

That means many of the trade bar- 
riers erected to protect your infant 
economy as it developed must come 
down. Your economy now is mature, 
and your "infant" industries are no 
longer in need of protection. 

You have recognized this need to 
begin to erase your trade barriers. That 
is evidenced by your series of market 
opening measures, announced over the 
past 2 or 3 years. But announcements 
are not enough. Implementation is the 
key, and that calls for followup, not only 
by your government but also by your 
importers and foreign exporters. Results 
are the ultimate measure of success, and 
thus far the results are modest at best. 



Trade With Japan 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 30, 1985 1 

The Government of Japan today 
announced its action program for 
imports. This program is to be the 
framework for Japan's market-opening 
activities over the next 3 years. It 
fulfills a commitment by Prime Minister 
Nakasone to provide such a program by 
the end of July; however, it is difficult 
to determine from the announcement 
whether the program will remove the 
bulk of these barriers in a timely 
fashion. So we must reserve judgment 
until the effect of the program on our 
exports is realized. 

The program focuses on long-term 
access to the Japanese market. Effective 
implementation of its initiatives would 
remove numerous nontariff barriers to 
trade with Japan. While a long-term 
effort is welcome, earlier implementa- 
tion would help resolve the crucial trade 
problems confronting us today. 

The action plan focuses primarily on 
specific trade barriers, but the removal 
of such barriers will not result in more 
imports without an accompanying in- 
crease in the willingness of Japanese 
businessmen and consumers to purchase 
imported poods. We hope the Prime 
Minister's countrymen will heed his call 
to reevaluate and alter their attitudes 
toward imports. 



An encouraging note is the recog- 
nition of the need for domestic demand 
expansion, which would result in higher 
levels of imports. Also announced are 
steps on the path to capital market 
liberalization, which we have long 
encouraged. We are especially aware of 
the need to improve investment oppor- 
tunities in Japan. 

This program comes at a crucial 
time in Japan's trading relations with us 
and with its other trading partners. 
While U.S. relations with Japan are 
amicable and cooperative in nearly all 
respects, trade issues have been a 
source of deep and growing concern. 
U.S. firms believe strongly that they 
have less access and opportunity to com- 
pete in the Japanese market than 
Japanese firms enjoy here. The Ad- 
ministration has made righting this im- 
balance of market opportunities a 
number one priority with Japan. We will 
continue discussions with Japan in an 
ongoing effort to resolve these trouble- 
some trade frictions. This afternoon the 
Economic Policy Council will begin a 
thorough examination and analysis of 
the plan. We will have more to say upon 
completion of this review. 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 5, 1985. 



Addressing U.S.-Japanese 
Trade Problems 

Access to Japanese markets is certainly 
a matter of great importance to the 
United States. In 1984, two-way trade 
between the United States and Japan 
reached $81 billion. That makes Japan 
our second-largest trading partner, after 
Canada— our neighbor with which we 
share a 4,000-mile border. 

Unfortunately, our trading relation- 
ship is very one-sided. In 1984 Japan's 
trade surplus with the United States 
reached $37 billion. This year it may 
-reach $50 billion or even higher. These 
numbers cannot be sustained for long; 
the trend must be reversed. But it 
should not be reversed via Japanese 
export restraint measures. Export 
restraint is no substitute for market 
access. I do not want to see fewer 
Japanese exports to the United States. I 
want to see more U.S. exports to Japan. 

An "emergency" import program 
could ease the situation in the short run 
but would be no substitute for long-term 
efforts to expand market opportunities 
for U.S. and foreign suppliers. 

Our goal must be to address our 
serious trade problems in a way that is 
mutually beneficial. That means expand- 
ing trading opportunities, not limiting 
them. As Japanese markets are opened 
to foreign imports, you will find that 
your economy is strengthened and your 
standard of living is enhanced. To 
achieve these benefits will require a con 
certed effort to remove trade barriers 
that constrain imports from coming into 
the Japanese marketplace. 

You believe that you have already 
been responsive to that need, and to a 
certain extent you have. But the recent 
history of our trade relationship with 
Japan has shown that, as formal trade 
restraints— tariffs and quotas— are 
stripped away, import levels do not rise 
appreciably. Some of that can be blamec 
on our own policies, or on shortcomings 
in our own export efforts, but not all of 
it. Other institutionalized barriers, visi- 
ble and invisible, are so pervasive that 
many foreign firms simply can't crack 
the Japanese market. 

Under such circumstances your trad 
ing partners begin to perceive that 
there is something unfair about the 
Japanese importing environment. These 
concerns were acknowledged recently b; 
your prominent business organization, 
the Keidanren, which published a study 
concluding that "major obstructions to 
trade exist in the systems of authori- 
zation, inspection, and paperwork proc- 



tit 
id 

Hi 



ECONOMICS 



ssing." The organization called for a 
:omprehensive overhaul of Japan's trade 
•egulatory system. 

I would like to cite just two exam- 
ples, though I have brought many 
others with me. 

In the United States, rules are 
ipplied equally to all products, regard- 
ess of source. In Japan, it is easy to 
obtain the requisite authorization and 
other paperwork necessary to have 
lapanese-made, high-cube containers 
;ransported to Japanese ports for 
ixport. What has been impossible has 
oeen for those same high-cube con- 
:ainers to be transported within Japan 
when they came back full of imported 
oroducts. A solution may be near at 
land but the differing regulations set by 
orefectural groups and other involved 
ntities as to hours of travel have so far 
frustrated both governments' efforts to 
settle what should be a simple issue. 

If you wanted to build a manufactur- 
ng plant in the United States, local gov- 
ernments would compete with each 
other to have you select their location, 
n order to provide jobs for their people. 
But U.S. cigarette companies are pro- 
oibited from building plants here. And 
despite recent reforms, imported ciga- 
rettes still face a high tariff and price 
ipproval by the Ministry of Finance, 
'actors which have kept the U.S. share 
of the market around 2%, compared to 
125% in Europe and 70% in Hong Kong. 

Prime Minister Nakasone under- 
stands well how a more open system 
would benefit Japan. Last January he 
and President Reagan agreed to initiate 
l 'MOSS" talks designed to open Japa- 
aese markets in four industry sectors, 
i In April he pledged a major new effort 
} to increase Japanese imports. In June 
j your government announced tariff 
reductions on more than 1,800 products, 
and in recent days, Mr. Nakasone 
announced an extensive "action pro- 
gram" designed to reduce nontariff bar- 
riers, open further your capital markets, 
and expand domestic demand. I com- 
mend all these endeavors. 



Your Prime Minister deserves a 
great deal of credit for his willingness to 
open up Japan to the international 
trading world. I admire his political 
courage in doing so, and his perspicacity 
in recognizing the importance of this 
action to Japan. 

So far, however, progress in the 
MOSS effort has been mixed. Talks in 
the four selected industries have laid 
the groundwork for positive change in 
some areas; in others progress has been 
nominal and disappointing. The indus- 
tries involved in the talks are tele- 
communications, electronics, forest prod- 
ucts, and medical equipment and phar- 
maceuticals. In each of these sectors, 
there is a large potential growth market 
here in Japan, and the United States 
has highly competitive products. Yet we 
have not been able to overcome your 
import barriers. We must do so in the 
MOSS talks; our exports to you must 
accordingly increase, and our export 
community must emerge from the proc- 
ess with a feeling that, in the future, it 
will have the opportunity to compete 
fully, fairly, and openly in the Japanese 
market. 

The new action program is encour- 
aging in that it deals with many of the 
problems of greatest concern to us. It is 
a bold stroke, with great potential 
benefits both for Japan and its trading 
partners. But we have deep reserva- 
tions about the pace of implementation 
and concern with respect to what is 
actually intended in some areas. 

In summary, the prevailing attitude 
in the United States is that there is still 
a long way to go in achieving satis- 
factory access to the Japanese market. 
We feel that our markets are much 
more open to you than yours are to us. 
That perception may not always be 
accurate. It assuredly is not accurate in 
some product categories, but it is accu- 
rate in many, and that leads to 
frustrations. 

At the moment, we're all frustrated. 
You wonder whether you can ever 
satisfy the demands of those impatient 
Americans. And you feel that we should 



look in a mirror and solve our own 
macroeconomic problems, some of which 
clearly affect our international 
competitiveness. 

We are frustrated too, in cases like 
those I just mentioned, and others like 
them. And neither the U.S. Congress 
nor the Administration can long tolerate 
a global trade imbalance of $150 billion 
per year. No other nation on the face of 
the Earth would have tolerated it this 
long. There are now 200 trade bills 
pending in the U.S. Congress, many of 
them directed at Japanese trade prac- 
tices. A number of those bills will come 
to a vote within the next 90 days. 

So we must all respond. Your inter- 
ests, our interests, and those of the 
entire world are at stake. Our bilateral 
political and economic relationships 
alone are too important for either of us 
to permit this situation to explode. The 
Administration is determined to counter 
unfair trade practices. But this is not 
the time for Japan or the United States 
to do something foolish. We need to 
calm everyone down and approach our 
trade disputes in a systematic, rational, 
and sensible way. 

Our trading relationship is not a 
zero-sum game. For us to win, it is not 
necessary for you to lose. And for Japan 
to win, it is not necessary that the 
United States lose. If we handle these 
issues and disputes properly, we can 
both win. 

There is considerably more that both 
of us can do in confronting these mutual 
problems. We can assist you by articu- 
lating what we deem to be our respec- 
tive priorities, and you can do likewise. 
Together we should be able to meet the 
challenge. After all, we're friends, not 
adversaries. 

My basic request is that you truly 
open your markets and that you apply 
the same level of commitment to your 
importing endeavors as you do to 
exporting. We Americans need to 
become more aggressive salesmen, but 
we'll be much more enthusiastic if there 
are vigorous buyers on the Japanese 
side. Your consumers just might decide 
that those "Made in U.S.A." products 
are all right. ■ 



EUROPE 



10 Years After the Helsinki Final Act 



Secretary Shultz was in Helsinki 
July 29-August 1, 1985, to participate in 
the commemoration of the 10th anni- 
versary of the signing of the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Follow- 
ing is his address at that ceremony on 
July SO. 1 

Let me first join my colleague from the 
Soviet Union and the others who have 
spoken here this afternoon in thanking 
the Government and people of Finland 
for their fine hospitality and good 
preparations for this meeting. We all 
enjoy breathing the friendly air of 
Helsinki. 

The modern political values that 
underlie our civilization were born in 
Europe. The belief in human progress, 
in intellectual freedom, in religious 
tolerance, in the rights of the individual 
against the state, and in a peaceful 
international order— these are the lega- 
cies that have been passed on to us by 
European thought and culture since the 
Enlightenment. At times, oppression, in- 
tolerance, and war have banked the 
flames of this humane spirit. But always 
these values have stayed alive, offering 
hope and inspiration to mankind— that 
we might explore the outer reaches of 
knowledge, that we might ascend to a 
higher plane of human existence, that 
we might live in peace with our neigh- 
bors, that we might have faith in 
progress and in freedom for ourselves 
and our world. 

Today, tragically, Europe is a di- 
vided continent. Yet the ideals of Euro- 
pean civilization have not been extin- 
guished. They live still in every nation, 
in every city and village, on every 
street, in every home, West and East. 
They bind Europe together. The bar- 
riers, the walls, the barbed wire, and 
the weapons cannot truly divide Euro- 
peans from each other or from their 
heritage. The spiritual strength of Euro- 
pean civilization cannot be broken by 
government-made artifice. 

Europe, lei us not forget, has been 
divided before, though never so starkly. 
Vastly different political systems have 
lived side-by-side on this continent for 
hundreds of years. Empires, constitu- 
tional monarchies, and dictatorships 
have stood beside republics and democ- 
racies. Religious wars, over the cen- 
turies, have caused the deaths of count- 



less innocents. And in this century 
alone, the people of Europe have en- 
dured two world wars that ravaged 
their continent. Only the heroic efforts 
of the Western democracies and the 
Soviet Union saved Europe from 
Hitler's tyranny. Yet Europe has out- 
lived even these times of trouble. 

And the modern idea of liberty, 
since the 18th century, has continued to 
grow and flourish. It has survived all 
the historic conflicts and divisions of 
Europe because, even in the dark 
moments, the aspiration of individuals to 
speak, think, and travel freely— through- 
out the continent— was never extin- 
guished. Belief in the rights of man has 
deep roots in European philosophy and 
history. 

For now, we all live uneasily with 
the brutal and artificial division of this 
continent, even as we search for ways 
to end it. But nothing in human history 
has proven irreversible. Perhaps no one 
here of my generation can confidently 
expect that the walls and the barbed 
wire will magically disappear in our 
lifetime, but surely the division must be 
altered within the lifetimes of many who 
are alive today. 

And yet, there are some things for 
which we can hope now: that the idea of 
liberty in Europe may continue to grow, 
even in those areas of darkness behind 
the walls, and that peace may reign 
over this continent, despite persistent 
confrontation between East and West. 
Today, competing powers and political 
values are arrayed against each other in 
Europe. Their differences may be ulti- 
mately irreconcilable. We hope not. But 
tensions will exist so long as some per- 
sist in violating the most fundamental 
human rights. Yet, can we not reduce 
the threat of armed conflict? Can we not 
achieve some greater measure of free- 
dom for all Europeans, for all indi- 
viduals? We, the inheritors of the Euro- 
pean spirit, must keep it alive for future 
generations all across the continent. 

Goals of the 
Helsinki Final Act 

These are the hopes that inspired the 
Helsinki conference a decade ago. The 
statesmen at Helsinki understood that 
the twin goals of peace and greater 
freedom are intimately connected in 
Europe. They understood that we owed 
it to ourselves and to our children to 



keep the great European tradition alive, 
even in these difficult times. 

Today, we mark the 10th anniver- 
sary of the Helsinki Final Act. If any 
single lesson emerges from the history 
of the Final Act's first 10 years, it is 
precisely that the interests of individual 
human beings are a fundamental part of 
security and stability in Europe. 
Greater security and a more stable 
peace among our nations depend on 
greater freedom for the people of 
Europe. 

The Final Act was an expression of 
the humane European tradition. It 
affirmed the most basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. It called for 
a freer flow of information, ideas, and 
people. It offered the possibility for 
greater cooperation among states and 
peoples. It reaffirmed the basic prin- 
ciples of relations among states. And it 
recognized, in its structure and in its 
purpose, that security, economic ties, 
human rights, and contacts among peo- 
ple are all equally important— and 
related to each other. Peace encom- 
passes the totality of our relations. 

In signing the Final Act 10 years 
ago, we recognized as governments that 
if we were to make progress toward 
greater security and more stable peace, 
we would have to go beyond the tradi- 
tional agenda of governments. We 
recognized that our security require- 
ments must extend beyond walls and 
weapons; that they had to include find- 
ing ways to lessen suspicion, reduce 
obstacles, instill greater confidence, and 
increase contacts among the peoples of 
Europe. And we recognized that these 
could only be achieved if commitments 
extended beyond our governments to 
engage the hopes, good will, and efforts 
of our peoples, too. 

And, in fact, the Helsinki Final Act 
did engage the attention and enthusiasm 
of our peoples because it appealed to all 
that has bound European civilization 
together oxer the centuries and because 
it opened the door to a better future. 
The Final Act described ways to span 
the gulfs, to break down at least some 
of the walls that had been put in place 
since 1945. It offered a definition of our 
common security that was both compre- 
hensive and precise. It gave the citizens 
of all participating states the hope that 
they could develop their full potential 



In 
Btl 



EUROPE 



knd contribute to a better, safer world. 
iBut, above all, it sought to preserve the 
rights of individuals. 

The message of the Final Act was 
phat we can reduce the divisions in 
Europe, that we can ease the sufferings 
they have caused, and that we can 
■someday hope to see an undivided 
ipeaceful continent if we are wise 
enough, practical enough, dedicated 
enough. 

We all knew that it would not be 
easy to turn our hopes into reality. We 
knew that our expectations about what 
could be would have to be tempered by 
realism, that progress might come slow- 
ly. And we knew that, as President 
iFord said: 

History will judge this conference not by 
what we say here today, but by what we do 
tomorrow— not by the promises we make, but 
oy the promises we keep. 

But we also knew that the goals and 
principles we set down here were worth 
striving for. 

The genius of the Final Act was that 
it was not merely an expression of goals 
and principles; it was also a program of 
practical steps for turning our hopes 
into reality. It provided a standard 
coward which to strive and against 
which to measure our behavior. Perhaps 
we shall not soon see the day when all 
nations meet that standard, but the 
?ffort, in and of itself, could lead to a 
more secure peace, greater individual 
freedom, and, thus, a greater fulfillment 
of Europe's vast potential. 

Progress During the 
Past 10 Years 

Can we look back over the past 10 
I years and see some limited progress? I 
believe the answer is yes, though the 
reality of Europe's division remains. Let 
us review these past 10 years, and, in 
keeping with the wisdom of the Final 
Act, let us judge the progress in the 
most practical, concrete terms. Pious 
declarations are cheap. Real progress 
can only be seen in its effect on human 
beings. 

The Final Act has had some prac- 
tical effect. Today, journalists travel 
more easily between our countiies. 
Large numbers of citizens in some East 
European countries have been reunited 
with their families in the West. By 
recalling what had been hoped for and' 
what had seemed possible when the 
Final Act was signed, our review con- 
ferences at Belgrade and Madrid helped 
keep those hopes and possibilities alive. 



CSCE Final Act Anniversary 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
JULY 30, 1985 2 

Ten years have passed since the United 
States, Canada, and 33 European gov- 
ernments joined in Helsinki to sign the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
Today Secretary Shultz and the Foreign 
Ministers of those nations, East and 
West as well as neutral and nonaligned, 
are meeting again in the capital of 
Finland to commemorate this important 
event. 

In 1975 President Ford affirmed the 
support of the United States for the 
universal standards of international con- 
duct and the fundamental human free- 
doms contained in the Helsinki Final 
Act. Today I reaffirm our commitment 
to those principles and our equally firm 
dedication to give them meaning in the 
daily lives of all citizens whose govern- 
ments have undertaken the obligations 
contained in the Helsinki Final Act. 

The CSCE process has long been a 
source of hope that the division of 
Europe can be overcome and that the 
human freedoms enjoyed in the West 
will be honored and respected through- 
out the continent. The Helsinki process 
offers the peoples of East and West the 
way that, by patient and serious dia- 
logue, we can improve the lives of our 
individual citizens and increase security 
and cooperation among our states. 

As Secretary Shultz said in his 
statement in Helsinki, we had no illu- 
sions in 1975, and have none today, that 
words alone can strengthen security and 
nurture freedom. When heads of state 
and government gathered in Helsinki 10 
years ago, President Ford stated: 
"History will judge this conference not 
by what we say here today, but by 
what we do tomorrow— not by the prom- 
ises we make, but by the promises we 
keep." 



Sadly, despite some gains, the 
Soviet Union and several other signa- 
tories of the Helsinki act have failed to 
keep their promises. Despite the solemn 
pledge that citizens have the right "to 
know and act upon" their rights, brave 
men and women have suffered for tak- 
ing this commitment by their govern- 
ments seriously. Those who have tried 
to exercise freedoms of religion, 
thought, conscience, and belief have 
often paid a tragic price. The Helsinki 
accords called for freer movement of 
people and ideas across the European 
divide, but that flow remains impeded, 
and in the case of the Soviet Union it is 
but a trickle. 

The Helsinki accords and the Madrid 
concluding document of 1983 provided 
standards by which to judge the conduct 
of the 35 participating states and set 
down a process which can be used to 
ensure accountability. The Unites States 
will continue to uphold these standards 
and press for compliance with them. We 
consider this a commitment on the part 
of all those who voluntarily subscribed 
to the Final Act of the Helsinki accords. 

As we mark this 10th anniversary 
and reflect on the hopes initially raised 
by the CSCE process, it is time to 
renew our efforts to ensure that those 
hopes were not totally without founda- 
tion. We rededicate ourselves to the 
code of conduct embodied in the Hel- 
sinki Final Act. We call upon all of 
those who participate with us in CSCE 
to fulfill their pledges. With commit- 
ment and determination, we can make 
the promise of the Helsinki accords' 
first 10 years the reality of this second 
decade of CSCE. 



2 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 5, 1985. 



H/M^k^r 1QQC 



31 



EUROPE 



So, too, our recent meetings in Ottawa 
and our current negotiations in Stock- 
holm keep our aspirations alive. 

These achievements are not negligi- 
ble. They have pointed the way we 
must take if we are to put our relations 
on a better and more stable basis in the 
future and if we are to open up the 
possibility of freedom for all Europeans. 

And yet, 10 years after the signing 
of the Final Act, no one can deny the 
gap between hope and performance. 
Despite the real value of the Final Act 
as a standard of conduct, the most im- 
portant promises of a decade ago have 
not been kept. 

Let's look at the specifics. 

Soviet-Bloc Performance on 
Helsinki Principles 

In the Final Act, we all committed 
ourselves to treat, in a positive and 
humanitarian way, the applications of 
persons who wish to be reunited with 
members of their family. Yet, over the 
past 5 years, the number of Soviet citi- 
zens of Jewish nationality permitted to 
emigrate, mainly for family reunifica- 
tion, fell from more than 51,000 to 896. 
The regrettable trend is the same for 
Soviet citizens of German and Armenian 
nationality. 

There are over 20 cases of Ameri- 
can/Soviet marriages in which the 
Soviet spouse has been denied exit per- 
mission two or more times, in spite of 
specific provisions of the Helsinki Final 
Act. Yuriy Balovlenkov, who married an 
American citizen in 1978, was on a 
hunger strike from March 25 to July 4 
protesting 6 years of continued denial. 
He has seen only one of his two daugh- 
ters and is in terribly weakened health. 

The Final Act confirms the right of 
the individual to know and act upon the 
provisions of the agreement. Yet the 
citizens' group set up in Moscow to 
monitor implementation of the Final Act 
in the Soviet Union disbanded in Sep- 
tember 1982 for fear of further persecu- 
tion. Here is a group of enthusiastic 
Soviet citizens who were pleased and 
proud of the decision of their govern- 
ment to sign the Helsinki Final Act. Yet 
today, Yuriy Orlov, the group's founder, 
languishes in remote Siberian exile after 
7 years in a labor camp. Founding mem- 
ber Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, imprisoned 
on a false charge in 1977, has completed 
his term in the notorious Chistopol 
prison and is now serving out the rest 
of his 13-year sentence in one of the 
most brutal of Soviet labor camps. Im- 



prisoned group member Anatoliy Mar- 
chenko, currently serving a 12-year 
sentence, has been permitted no cor- 
respondence with his family for more 
than a year. Group member Ivan 
Kovalyov's health has reportedly 
deteriorated badly since his transfer to 
labor camp. His wife and fellow group 
member, Tatyana Osipova, recently had 
her own 5-year labor camp sentence ex- 
tended by 2 years. 

The founder of a peace group in 
Moscow, Sergei Batovrin, was first 
harassed, then put in a psychiatric 
ward, and then, when he persisted in 
advocating peace the way so many 
thousands of young people do in other 
countries, he was thrown out of his 
native land altogether. Other peace 
activists have met similar fates, as have 
those struggling for womens' rights and 
free trade unions. The founders of a 
Social Democratic Party in Moscow 
were jailed in January of this year. 

On June 14, Bogdan Lis, Adam 
Michnik, and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk were 
sentenced in Gdansk to terms ranging 
from 2V2 to 3V2 years on charges of hav- 
ing nothing ostensibly to do with their 
real "crime" of leading the fight for free 
trade unionism— a right recognized in 
the concluding document of the Madrid 
review meeting. In the Soviet Union, 
Vladimir Klebanov's efforts to found a 
free trade union put him in a psychiatric 
hospital for 4 years. 

Nor has abuse of psychiatric treat- 
ment been limited to trade unionists 
and peace activists. In the Ukraine, 
Vladimir Khailo, an Evangelical Baptist, 
has been interned in psychiatric 
hospitals since 1980 for his faith and his 
efforts to emigrate with his wife and 15 
children. He has refused an offer of 
freedom in exchange for renunciation of 
his faith. 

All who would live an active reli- 
gious life according to their faith— 
whether Christian, Jewish, or Muslim- 
risk harassment, imprisonment, or con- 
finement in psychiatric institutions. 
Baptists, Ukrainian and Lithuanian 
Catholics, Russian Orthodox, Seventh- 
day Adventists, and Pentecostals have 
all been increasingly subject to repres- 
sion. Dina Shvedsova, Vasyl Kobrin, 
Father Alfonsas Svarinskas, Father 
Gleb Yakunin, Pastor Nikolai Goretoi, 
and Pastor Viktor Valter are only a few 
of the Christians currently serving 
sentences of up to 12 years in prison or 
exile in the Soviet Union because of 
their faith. A small community of 
Pentecostals from the village of 



Chuguevka in the Soviet Far East has 
suffered grievously in the past several 
months. Ten community elders have 
been sentenced to up to 5 years in labor 
camp and the rest fired from their jobs. 
Six families have been threatened with 
losing custody of their children. 

At least 16 Jewish cultural activists, 
including 9 teachers of the Hebrew 
language, have been arrested in the 
Soviet Union since last July, and many 
have been convicted on obviously 
trumped-up criminal charges to 3-4 
years of imprisonment and labor camp. 
Iosif Berenshtein, currently serving a 
4-year term, was savagely beaten and 
stabbed while in prison and lost most of 
his vision. Yuliy Edelshtein, who is 
serving a 3-year term, is reportedly 
undergoing repeated beatings in his 
labor camp in Siberia as part of an 
effort "to exorcise his religious fanati- 
cism," according to camp authorities. 

Abuzakar Rahimov, a Muslim from 
Tashkent in Soviet Central Asia, was 
sentenced to 7 years in a strict-regime 
labor camp in 1982 for distributing 
material about the Islamic faith, 
including translations from the Koran. 

Last year in Czechoslovakia, seven 
priests and nuns were arrested for 
"obstructing state supervision over 
churches and religious orders." 

Finally, the man who more than any 
other represents the ideals enshrined in 
the Final Act— Andrei Sakharov— 
remains totally isolated from the outside 
world— in exile, probably still in Gorkiy. 
Even as I speak, he may be in a 
hospital following his most recent 
hunger strike on behalf of decent 
medical treatment for his beloved wife. 
We have reason to believe he was force- 
fed to break his hunger strike. 

We cannot talk about the Helsinki 
process without talking about human 
beings, for they are supposed to be the 
true beneficiaries of the Helsinki Final 
Act. The fate of these individuals, 
moreover, affects the actions of 
thousands, maybe millions, by showing 
what happens to those who dare exer- 
cise their lights and freedoms. 

Commitment for the Future 

My country and most other countries 
represented here remain committed to 
the goal of putting the program of the 
Final Act into practice in all of its provi- 
sions. We know that hard work and 
patience are needed. We believe that 
the truest tests of political intentions 
are actual steps to improve cooperation 



; !' r 
'* 

« 
Si 

! 



EUROPE 



mong states, to enhance contacts 
mong people, and to strengthen respect 
Dr individual rights. The provisions of 
he Final Act are indivisible. We must 
ee progress in all areas. At next year's 
Vienna review conference, we will have 
chance to measure that progress 
gain. 

We are convinced that the future 
eed not be as bleak as the recent past. 
k.s we look ahead toward the next 
lecade of the CSCE process, we should 
lso look back to the kinds of beneficial 
ractical actions we enlisted then and 
leasure ourselves against the standards 
/e set. 

We have an opportunity at the 
Stockholm conference to find concrete 
/ays to increase confidence and security 
i the military field. The package of 
pecific measures proposed by the 
Vestern participants in Stockholn ad- 
resses some of the causes of war— 
liscalculation and misinterpretation, 
'hese measures can help ensure that 
xisting forces are never used. They 
ncourage greater openness about 
lilitary forces and exchanges of infor- 
lation that would increase mutual 
nderstanding and reduce the risk of 
urprise attack. 

As President Reagan stated in 
)ublin over a year ago and more recent- 
f in Strasbourg, we are .prepared to 
iscuss the principle of non-use of 
orce— a principle to which the United 
itates is committed— if this will bring 
he Soviet Union to negotiate agree- 
lents that give concrete meaning to 
hat principle. A solution should be 
■ossible that adds to our security and 
ontributes to peace in Europe, and 
hereby, ultimately, to a better life for 
ur peoples. We are prepared to move 
head in all areas in Stockholm. And I 
vas pleased to note in [Soviet Foreign 
Minister] Mr. Shevarnadze's address 
hat he expressed a positive attitude 
oward these negotiations. 

We can contribute to our common 
.ecurity, to a more stable peace, and to 
he future vitality of European civiliza- 
ion by steps directly affecting people's 
ives. The freedom of individuals to 
ietermine their own destinies is not 
wily a good ultimate objective, it is also 
i good place to start. Sustained 
mprovements are vital, but concrete 
steps— to improve emigration, to allow 
spouses and dual nationals to unite with 
oved ones, to release human rights 
ictivists and religious teachers— these 
concrete steps are also important. 



Each of us has the obligation to 
press forward wherever we can. One 
particularly urgent task is to stop the 
spread of chemical weapons. Too many 
times in recent years, these weapons 
have been brutally employed, not only 
against military forces but against inno- 
cent civilians. The proliferation and use 
of these weapons represent an ominous 
warning that long-accepted constraints 
are breaking down. We must all look to 
the steps we can take to halt the use of 
these weapons now, to prevent further 
proliferation, and to invigorate the 
effort in Geneva to move toward a 
verifiable treaty that would genuinely 
ban these weapons forever. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union have an opportunity to help build 
a more secure world in the arms control 
negotiations currently underway in 
Geneva— where, I might say, we 
advocate radical reductions in offensive 
nuclear armaments. And in November 
our leaders will meet to examine the 
whole spectrum of issues before us. We 
are ready and willing to seize the oppor- 



tunity. Let our two countries begin the 
patient, serious work of resolving prob- 
lems and reaching agreements of benefit 
to us both and to other countries as 
well. 

Steps to reduce weapons and 
enhance security, steps to enhance 
economic and other exchanges, and 
steps to relieve the suffering and enrich 
the lives of individuals— all these rein- 
force each other. They are part of the 
same broad program of security and 
cooperation enshrined in the Helsinki 
Final Act. Taken together, they could 
lead us toward a new era in relations in 
Europe— one that could bring alive once 
again the promise of Helsinki and the 
larger promise of European history. 

They are not massive or difficult 
steps to take. But they are important; 
they have a larger meaning. They 
require only courage and political will on 
the part of all of us. 



1 Press release 196 of Aug. 1, 1985. 



Secretary Meets With 
Soviet Foreign Minister 




While in Helsinki for the 10th anniversary commemorating the signing of the Final Act, 
Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze held bilateral 
discussions. 



VtAk» nnoc 



33 



EUROPE 

U.S. -Soviet Relations in 
the Late 20th Century 



by Robert C. McFarlane 

Address before the Channel City 
Club and the Women's Forum luncheon 
in Santa Barbara on August 19, 1985. 
Mr. McFarlane is Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs. 

Before long President Reagan will meet 
in Geneva with the General Secretary of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, Mr. Gorbachev. The meeting 
comes at a historic moment if measured 
by the enormity of change that has 
taken place in the West and the appar- 
ent potential for change in the East. In 
the past 4 years here in the United 
States, and more broadly in the West, 
we have experienced a political, eco- 
nomic, and social renewal of historic pro- 
portion. Four years ago we seemed 
paralyzed by the moral and institutional 
aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate; 
our economic problems seemed beyond 
our comprehension with solutions 
nowhere in sight; the military balance 
had shifted dramatically against us, and 
its effects were reflected in growing 
Soviet influence from Angola to Ethi- 
opia to Indochina, Afghanistan, and 
Nicaragua. Our alliances were severely 
shaken and leaders from London to 
Paris to Moscow were asking whether 
the United States had lost its way and 
whether we could regain our ability to 
play a positive role of leadership in 
international affairs. 

Today, the picture is dramatically 
different. President Reagan has set our 
economy solidly on the road to recovery; 
our foundation of strength is being 
restored; Soviet expansion has been 
checked and even rolled back on a tiny 
island in the Caribbean. In sum, 
America has regained its moorings, it is 
leading, and peace is more secure. 

On the Soviet side of the ledger, the 
picture is less clear, but surely the 
possibility for a more promising future 
exists. A new Soviet leader is in place— 
a man unencumbered by the vicissitudes 
of primary elections and campaigns and, 
therefore, a man who may endure 
through the turn of the century. 

Here in the United States— a nation 
of optimists led by the greatest optimist 
in our history— we hope for the best. 



We are sobered by the knowledge that 
seldom has our optimism been vindi- 
cated. And yet it endures. But as we 
set out on what we hope will be a more 
promising period, we should proceed 
forthrightly, honestly stating both our 
purposes and our misgivings, hiding 
neither our hopes nor our fears. 

This is a time of considerable flux 
and introspection in the Kremlin. They 
deserve to know from whence we are 
coming if they are to reach coherent 
decisions. Perhaps by stating some of 
our frustrations we can shape their 
thinking. That is my purpose today. 

Soviet-American Rivalry 

It's often said that the rivalry between 
the United States and Soviet Union is 
close to immutable and that our job is 
not to end it but merely to keep it 
under control. Some say that since 1945 
there's been only one way to end it and 
that it's too terrible to contemplate. But 
for many others the inevitability of com- 
petition is not caused simply by the 
gruesome facts of the nuclear age. It 
has much deeper, older, and— as some 
see it— even more ineradicable causes. 
For some, De Tocqueville's famous 
predictions of 150 years ago have taken 
on a folkloric, if not intellectual 
legitimacy. 

Anyone who works on the concrete 
issues dividing these countries knows 
that practical policy decisions are never 
made on the assumption that a funda- 
mental change in Soviet- American rela- 
tions is anywhere in sight. To the con- 
trary, we have to take competition as a 
given and do the best that we can. But 
this should not become an excuse for 
not thinking about what is at the heart 
of our disagreements. I have studied, 
reflected, and worked on international 
affairs for many years, and no one has 
ever convinced me that there is some 
law of nature requiring two populous 
and powerful nations halfway around 
the world from each other to be locked 
in permanent hostility. If they are 
hostile, it's probably for reasons other 
than their "two-ness," their "populous- 
ness," their "powerful-ness," or their 
distance from each other. 



, 



.;. 



I think the real sources of conflict 
are things that can— and do— change. If 
there is a military rivalry between two 
great countries, it's caused less by the 
arms themselves than by the way the 
two sides think about military security. 
If there is a geopolitical rivalry, it's not 
caused by the facts of geography but by 
the way the two sides define their 
political security and their other in- 
terests. If there is a clash of ideas— wellj 
not even ideologies are permanent. 
Some political ideologies are a source of 
near boundless energy and creativity, 
but others are true prisons, confining 
not only those who believe in them but 
many who don't. Nothing can hinder 
human energy and creativity like a bad 
idea. But, as I have said, it is our good 
fortune that ideas are not immortal. 
They are subject to what is sometimes 
called "reality therapy"— the test of 
time and experience. Sometimes, with 
any luck, they can be cast off. Mental 
prison walls do come down. As rare as 
it seems in this century of institu- 
tionalized fanaticisms, people do change fe 
their minds. 

We know from the statements of 
Soviet leaders that these days many 
existing policies are getting especially 
close scrutiny. Certainly the test of tirm 
and experience has been a very harsh 
one. General Secretary Gorbachev him- 
self recently called for "a fresh look at 
all the shortcomings, negative phe- 
nomena, all sorts of blunders." He mad< fli[ 
clear that reevaluation has been long 
deferred. In the future, in his words: 



m 

ii 
n 

Vi 

in 



» 
[e 
eai 

i'i 
1 



1 



. . . more order will be required, more 
scientific inquiry, more major, important dec 
sions, and so forth. Overall it will require 
immense mobilization of creative forces, and 
the ability to restructure and conduct mat- 
ters in the country in a new way, not only ir 
the economy but also in the social sphere, in 
that of culture, ideology, in all spheres. 

These seem like hopeful words, but 
perhaps you will agree that those of us 
in the West, on the outside, have a hare 
time knowing how to interpret them. 
We cannot know whether a process of 
comprehensive change is underway or 
not. In the past, the appearance of 
change has been no more than a mask 
behind which systemic rigidities endure 



at 
I] 



to 

Up 



EUROPE 



ach new leader— however strongly he 
ight favor change— has found that hav- 
g risen by following the rules of the 
rstem, he becomes captive to it. If 
ich a process is beginning, it will be 
ifficult to discern, we may or may not 
i able to make a contribution to it, and 
e cannot predict its outcome. But inas- 
luch as it does greatly affect us, it is 
»rtainly appropriate for us to suggest 
le kinds of questions that we will be 
sking about it— the questions whose 
lswers will make a large difference in 
ir own policy. I assume that Soviet 
ficials would also like to know our 
linking as to what kinds of change 
ould do the most to make Soviet- 
merican relations more stable. We 
imetimes hear the Soviet complaint 
lat they don't know what we're after, 
) let us be clear. 

[ilitary Issues 

et me begin with military issues. I 
ive said that the wheels of military 
valry are not set in motion by arms 
lemselves but by the thinking that 
jverns the arms, by the political doc- 
rines, decisions, and interests that are 
•fleeted in the organization, shape, and 
ae of a military machine. In recent 
;ars many Soviet decisions have been 
aite troubling to us, suggesting an 
itlook on security issues that is very 
fferent from our own. By this I don't 
>iean simply that Soviet military spend- 
,g is so high— although it is. But that 
toi't what concerns me here. I want to 
ill your attention to something differ- 
ent— to decisions that resume or initiate 
impetition in an area where there 
idn't been any at all. 

Take the case of chemical weapons. 
1 this century, these weapons have 
■eated a revulsion and horror in West- 
•n publics second only to nuclear 
eapons. It was a horror, moreover, 
lat our governments were able to act 
n quite successfully. The Geneva pro- 
>col of 1925 was for many years one of 
ae most widely supported and observed 
rms control agreements on record. As 
result, our own capabilities, stocks, 
nd training experienced a long decline. 
fe haven't produced chemical weapons 
1 15 years. Unfortunately, this was not 
aralleled on the Soviet side, whose 
lajor effort became impossible to 
more. For this reason we have now 
roposed to modernize our own chemical 
weapons program. We'd rather not do 



this, and Congress also would rather 
not, and we've tried to head it off. In 
April 1984 President Reagan sent Vice 
President Bush to Geneva with pro- 
posals to negotiate a complete ban on 
chemical weapons, but since then the 
talks have not made progress. 

This record suggests a specific ques- 
tion: what has the Soviet side gained 
from reviving this competition? Par- 
ticularly now, as chemical weapons are 
being made (cheaply) and used (lethally) 
by small countries, isn't it imperative 
that we find effective, verifiable 
controls? 

I wish this were an isolated case. 
But we see the same pattern in the 
issue that dominated Soviet-American 
arms control talks, as well as public con- 
troversy, during the President's first 
term— medium-range nuclear missiles. 
Again, a bit of history may be useful. 
You may know that over many years 
the United States scaled back its 
medium-range missile capabilities in 
Europe; the Soviets did not. During the 
1950s and 1960s many plans were devel- 
oped within the Western alliance to 
counter the Soviet edge, but they were 
abandoned one after another for a series 
of different reasons. A sense of urgency 
about the problem began to subside 
with the emergence of detente in the 
late 1960s. And the specific military 
worry created by a large Soviet missile 
advantage was softened over time: the 
Soviet Union seemed to be letting its 
large medium-range missiles grow old. 
But then an odd thing happened. The 
Soviets began instead to add to their 
force, introducing the SS-20, one of the 
most formidable weapons ever fielded 
by the East. To make a long story 
short, the result was a NATO decision 
that, after all, these new Soviet deploy- 
ments had to be answered. In 1983, 
after 2 fruitless years of trying to nego- 
tiate a solution to the INF problem— 
that stands for intermediate-range 
nuclear forces— the West began to put 
its own missiles in place. 

INF isn't in the headlines much 
these days, and there may be an analyti- 
cal advantage in this. We now have a 
little distance on this sequence of events 
and a responsibility to judge them 
critically. What happened? An East- 
West dispute took shape on an issue 
that some thought had gone away. Two 
questions come to mind that I still find 
hard to answer: what can the Soviet 
Union imagine that it got out of 
reigniting this competition? What did it 



get out of several years of one-sided 
negotiating positions, premised on an 
expectation of Western disunity? 

Finally, let me take up the military 
question that is in the headlines— the 
relation between offensive and defensive 
strategic systems. As you may know, in 
1972 the United States and Soviet 
Union agreed that neither side should 
build a defense against ballistic missiles. 
The Soviet Union has since built and 
maintained the defensive system around 
its capital allowed by the agreement; 
the United States has not. Both sides 
have pursued research, as the treaty 
permits; the Soviet research effort has 
been extremely large. 

Now, while keeping strictly within 
the limits of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic 
Missile] Treaty, President Reagan has 
proposed the Strategic Defense Initia- 
tive to reinvestigate the feasibility of 
defenses. Two reasons above all others 
produced this decision: 

First, the past decade's enormous 
Soviet offensive buildup, which has put 
the survivability of our forces in ques- 
tion, and 

Second, the President's desire to 
see whether the fragility of the nuclear 
balance can be reduced by moving us 
away from a morally unsatisfactory doc- 
trine on nuclear retaliation. 

As the President has said many 
times, this is one of the most hopeful 
possibilities of our time. We believe it 
could contribute to both sides' security, 
especially if we make progress in the 
Geneva arms talks. We have hoped in 
these talks to explore each side's think- 
ing on how to strengthen strategic 
stability. But what has been the Soviet 
response? Soviet public statements, with 
which many of you will be familiar, 
simply propose something we believe is 
non-negotiable and nonverifiable— a ban 
on research even as they pursue the 
largest research program on earth. And 
in a masterpiece of chutzpah, they insist 
repeatedly that ours is a program 
designed to acquire a first-strike 
capability. 

In short, we're having a lot of trou- 
ble establishing a real dialogue. And 
bearing in mind the other examples I've 
cited, we have to face some disturbing 
questions. Will the Soviet Union start to 
approach this matter as a potentially 
cooperative one or approach everything 
on a zero-sum basis? The other instances 
—chemical and INF— suggest that these 
all-or-nothing tactics don't serve the 
Soviet Union well. 



» -• r»nr- 



35 



EUROPE 



Obviously, a great deal hangs on the 
answers to these questions. The Presi- 
dent has committed himself to meet the 
Soviet Union halfway in developing 
responsible solutions to outstanding 
problems. I can restate that commit- 
ment today. But without some change in 
the Soviet approach to security issues— 
in fact, in the thinking that underlies 
it— I fear that even incremental im- 
provements will be extremely hard to 
reach. And they will be much less likely 
to gather momentum, to build on each 
other. 

International Political Issues 

The issues of Soviet-American rivalry, 
of course, go beyond military matters. 
There is the critical question of how 
each side defines its interests in the 
world. Many in the West are looking for 
signs of change in the Soviet Union's 
thinking on international political issues. 
Some students of the problem argue 
that it is now what they call a "mature" 
power; that it is not guided by Lenin's 
old dictum "the worse, the better"; that 
it is not so deeply driven by an ideologi- 
cal animus against the West; and that it 
need not leap at every opportunity to 
hamstring American policy for its own 
sake. 

These would obviously be important 
changes. How should we decide whether 
they are true? Obviously, by practical 
measures. As these matters come to be 
discussed in Moscow, the Soviet leader- 
ship should know that we have practical 
measures like Afghanistan, Cuba, and 
Libya in mind. 

Take Afghanistan. Today, 120,000 
Soviet soldiers there are waging the 
most brutal war now underway on the 
face of the Earth. For what? It's not so 
easy to say. Some in the West believe 
that the Soviet Union instigated the 

1978 communist coup that preceded the 

1979 invasion. As you may know, Soviet 
officials and commentators always dis- 
sociate themselves from this and explain 
that they had nothing to do with it. We 
can't know, but we can ask questions 
about Soviet policy to clarify its objec- 
tives. If the Soviets truly propose to 
dissociate themselves from it, to indicate 
that they have no interest in fomenting 
such events, then why are 120,000 

t n " ips in Afghanistan protecting the 
small number of people who made that 
coup from the opposition of the Afghan 
people? Soviet officials say that they 
I a friendly Afghanistan on their 
border. We can perhaps understand this 
desire, but how is friendship to be built? 



Our proposition to the Soviet leadership 
is that their present policy is only 
increasing the Afghan people's hatred. 
Does the Soviet side have a nonmilitary 
strategy for dealing with that problem? 
If so, they will find us ready to help put 
it in place. 

Or take Libya. There are few if any 
governments today whose policy as a 
whole could be better described as "the 
worse, the better." Col. Qadhafi is an 
heir to that tradition of seeking to pro- 
voke or benefit from trouble and insta- 
bility. That being the case, Americans 
have to ask some serious questions 
about Soviet support for him. A small 
example will suffice: with all the prob- 
lems of terrorism in that part of the 
world, what good is served by providing 
Soviet submarines to Qadhafi? Or, given 
the war in the Persian Gulf, which 
seems to drag on endlessly, what good 
is served by giving missiles to Col. 
Qadhafi, which then find their way to 
Iran and finally land in downtown 
Baghdad, the capital of a country that 
has a friendship treaty with the Soviet 
Union? Is this what friendship treaties 
mean? Americans are entitled to ask 
with utmost seriousness: if Soviet policy 
is not "the worse, the better," then 
shouldn't the Soviet Union's relationship 
with Col. Qadhafi be very different? 

Finally, take Cuba. The price tag of 
Soviet support for Cuba is calculated by 
our experts at something like $5 billion 
a year. As a benchmark of sorts, that's 
about as much as we provide to Egypt 
and Israel combined— and together their 
population is five times that of Cuba. 
This must be, in other words, a mas- 
sively important commitment of Soviet 
policy. But what is it a commitment to? 
To us, frankly, it seems that the prin- 
cipal benefit is in the offensive purposes 
to which Cuba— Cuban troops, Cuban 
advisers, Cuban bases— can be put. 

The record of Cuban policy in the 
past 10 years is an extraordinary one, 
and it is all the more extradordinary 
because it did not have to be this way. 
For the first 10 years or so after the 
missile crisis of 1962, Cuba was not a 
major irritant in Soviet-American rela- 
tions. Now it is. Its military personnel 
are in the thick of wars on two conti- 
nents and, despite international pres- 
sures from many directions, show no 
signs of returning home. The pattern is 
something like what I sketched in talk- 
ing about chemical weapons or missiles 
in Europe. The Soviet Union has 
reignited a source of conflict. Has it 
benefited by doing so? We hope this 
question is being asked in Moscow. 



la 



There should be no doubt about the 
ability of the United States to deal with 
these difficulties when they are placed 
in our way. That's not the issue. Natu- 
rally, we have to pay more attention to 
the security of Pakistan than we did 
some years ago, but we can do it. 
Similarly, we now have to pay more 
attention to the security of El Salvador 
than we used to, but we can manage 
that too. And we don't look the other 
way at the problems that Libya creates 
for neighboring countries, among them 
some good friends of the United States. 

The question that remains, however, 
concerns the broader impact of all this 
on Soviet-American relations and 
whether this is the impact that the 
Soviet side wants. It certainly sends us 
loud messages that can't be ignored 
about the motivations of Soviet policy. 
It makes improvements in other areas 
more difficult. It all but guarantees that'll"! 
any small steps forward that we may be *' 
able to take will be isolated, hard to 
preserve, and perhaps devalued in 
advance by both sides. 

None of this, I might add, is much 
changed by hearing from the Soviet sidafrc 
of their responsibility to help other 
"socialist" countries. For us, of course, 
that comes down to helping other 
governments oppress their people. We 
believe that Soviet-style socialism has 
brought hardship to and restricted the 
potential of many great nations. That is 
our deeply held view. No doubt the 
Soviet leadership disagrees, but let's no 
leave the matter there. I hope they will 
at least ponder a different question: thatja 
is, whether such Soviet involvements 
can be justified even in your own terms 
Here in the West, for example, we 
remember General Secretary Andro- 
pov's comments about the difference 
between building socialism and merely 
proclaiming it. We hope that such skep- 
ticism can be a source of doubt about 
whether the Soviet policies I've been 
describing have really served your 
interests. 



kI 



:: 



e. 



Human Rights and Democracy 

So far, I have dealt with the political- 
military issues that trouble our rela- 
tions. They almost always dominate the 
agenda of problems between us. They 
are what our negotiators focus on. 
There are many more issues I could 
touch on— from Poland to nuclear pro- 
liferation. But, as important as all these i 
are, they are not the area in w : hich the 
most momentous changes could take 



K 



EUROPE 



lace. Frankly, the most durable and 
ir-reaching kind of improvement in 
oviet-American relations— and probably 
1 the Soviet Union's relations with 
Imost every country of the world— 
'ould be created by events inside the 
oviet Union. 

When Americans raise the issue of 
uman rights with Soviet officials, they 
now what to expect. It is the Soviet 
osition that we are treading on "inter- 
al matters." The Soviet side by now is 
Iso quite accustomed to what we usu- 
lly say in return— that many of these 
latters involve commitments made in 
ae Helsinki Final Act. We're talking 
bout obligations that the Soviet Union 
•eely assumed. 

This is an important point: treaties 
igned have to be taken seriously. But 
's not the main reason Americans take 
n interest in human rights and democ- 
acy. And the reason isn't just that we 
elieve in morality in politics or that our 
earts go out to Soviet Jews who wish 
) emigrate and can't. No, it's that real 
-jrogress in that direction would have a 
indamental effect on the international 
i /stem, on the way we do business with 
lach other. 

When President Reagan was in 
hina in April 1984, he gave a speech 
i lat must surely rank as one of the 
i tost candid ever made by a leader 
isiting a country with a different 
olitical system. He put his message 
:mply: "Trust the people." For us, the 
leaning of a phrase like that is obvious, 
ut many of the ideologies of the 20th 
sntury rest on suspicion of the people, 
n the conviction that they cannot han- 
le their own affairs. Since that's the 
1 ase, let me say briefly what trusting 
he people means in practical terms, 
jet's leave aside sentiment and turn to 
i ome specifics. What can the people do 
: they are trusted? 

First, only the people can revolu- 
ionize agricultural productivity. All 
■ther approaches are hopelessly irrele- 
vant. Over 20 years ago, the Communist 
; 'arty of the Soviet Union accused the 
Chinese party of believing that "if a 
>>eople walks in rope sandals and eats 
i vatery soup out of a common bowl— that 
s communism." No such sarcastic accu- 
sation could be made today. In the past 
' years, agricultural productivity in 
Dhina has actually doubled. And Prime 
Minister Gandhi, during his recent visit 
here, spoke to us of the gains made in 
Indian agriculture through increased in- 
centives. Today, India is a net exporter 
)f grain. How? The people have done it. 



Soviet Use of 
Chemical Tracking Agents 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 21, 1985 1 

The U.S. Government has recently 
determined that Soviet authorities, for a 
number of years, have used chemical 
substances to monitor the activities of 
employees at the U.S. Embassy in 
Moscow. The substances in question, 
which have been applied indirectly to 
Embassy personnel, leave deposits on 
the person or possessions of people with 
whom they have had contact. 

The most exensively used of such 
tracking agents— nitro phenyl pentadien 
(NPPD)— has been determined, through 
biological screening tests, to be a 
mutagen. Mutagens can be, but are not 
always, carcinogens in human beings. 
Extensive testing will be necessary to 
determine whether NPPD and other 
compounds used by the Soviets pose a 
threat to health, as well as to determine 
the extent of the Embassy community's 
exposure to these chemicals. 

Preliminary indications suggest that 
the levels of NPPD and other 
substances to which individuals may 
have been exposed is very low. There is 
no evidence to date that any Embassy 
personnel have suffered ill effects due to 
exposure to tracking agents. 



Embassy Moscow's staff was briefed 
earlier this morning on what is cur- 
rently known of the health implications 
of the Soviet Union's use of tracking 
agents. 

Unofficial Americans resident in the 
U.S.S.R., as well as other embassies 
which may have been targeted, are also 
being informed. A special task force 
under the leadership of the National 
Institutes of Health and the Environ- 
mental Protection Agency have been 
established to conduct a thorough 
investigation into the long-term implica- 
tions of exposure to NPPD and other 
tracking agents. 

The United States deplores the 
Soviet Union's use of chemical sub- 
stances against its diplomatic repre- 
sentatives in the U.S.S.R. We have pro- 
tested the practice in the strongest 
terms and demanded that it be termi- 
nated immediately. 

The United States will take every 
possible measure to ensure the safety 
and well-being of all American citizens 
in the Soviet Union and to determine 
the full implications of the risks to 
which they have been exposed. 



1 Read to news correspondents by 
Department deputy spokesman Charles 
Redman. ■ 



Second, only the people can lead the 
scientific-technological revolution. They 
are leading it in those countries enjoy- 
ing the most rapid economic growth 
today. No Ministry of Central Planning 
can lead it. In the United States the 
watchword of change in the structure of 
our economy is decentralization— the 
spectacular growth of new companies of- 
fering new products in a field like infor- 
mation technology. In the speech in 
China that I just quoted, President 
Reagan said, "Make no mistake: those 
who ignore this vital truth will condemn 
their countries to fall farther and far- 
ther behind . . . ." 

Finally, only the people can invigo- 
rate national culture. I mean culture in 
both the low- and the high-brow sense. I 
mean, as it happens, both entertainment 
and enlightenment. I mean arts and let- 
ters, music and films. Only the people 



can build national self-esteem and self- 
expression out of malaise. No Ministry 
of Culture can do it. 

Now every people will perform 
these tasks in its own way. Cultures 
come out differently. For all the changes 
underway, China remains distinctly 
Chinese and recognizably socialist. But, 
in every case, to succeed at the tasks 
I've mentioned, the people have the 
same basic needs. They need to make 
more of their own decisions; they need 
to act on their own brainstorms; they 
need to be able to learn from each 
other; they need to know the basic facts 
of their own economic and social life. 
They need to shake off an institutional- 
ized secrecy that the rest of the world 
finds absurd and self-defeating. They 
need to know simple things, like the size 
of last year's wheat harvest, and big 
things, like what's going on in the world 



"\/s*^i^^ 



37 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



at large. They need to be able to leave, 
if they want. If they are denied all 
these, they cannot do very much at all. 

To the Soviet leadership, I would 
say that these things are not our roman- 
tic ideals. Rather, they are the practical 
requirements of some of your own 
goals— and of our goals as well, for they 
are the key to transforming East- West 
relations. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, let me return to the prac- 
tical perspective with which I began: we 
don't plan policy in the expectation of 
transforming East-West relations. We 
seek incremental improvements, and we 
don't dismiss their value. The Soviet 
leadership should know that President 
Reagan is ready— patiently, methodi- 
cally—to take small steps forward, and 
that we will respond in proportion to 
what we see from them. 

But at this time of questioning in 
the Soviet Union, it seems to me that 
we should ask more of ourselves and of 
the Soviet side as well. We should 
recognize that those who seek only 
small improvements often end up with 
none. We know cosmetic improvements 
when we see them and know the mean- 
ing and the value of major change. We 
should ask those questions and insist on 
the answers that point the way. ■ 



Fighting Terrorism Through Law 



by Abraham D. Sofaer 

Address before the American Bar 
Association convention in London on 
July 15, 1985. Mr. Sofaer is the Legal 
Adviser of the Department of State. 

The timeliness of today's session is pain- 
fully obvious. We have just emerged 
from another harrowing encounter with 
terrorism in Lebanon. The hijacking of 
TWA #847 is one in a rash of recent ter- 
rorist atrocities. Seven Americans and 
other innocent civilians remain in the 
hands of kidnappers in Lebanon. 

Less than 1 month ago, nine civilians 
and four off-duty U.S. Embassy guards 
were gunned down at a sidewalk cafe in 
San Salvador. Over 300 men, women, 
and children were killed when an Air 
India flight disappeared mysteriously 
not far from here. A bomb put on 
another flight in the same Canadian city 
almost simultaneously exploded in 
Japan, killing two baggage handlers and 
injuring many others. A bomb in the 
Frankfurt airport during the same week 
killed two and injured several more. 
And a delicate, brilliantly executed 
investigation by Judge Webster's Fed- 
eral Bureau of Investigation saved 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi from what 
might well have been the same fate his 
mother met some months ago. 

Even more sobering is the realiza- 
tion that the timeliness of today's topic 
was predictable. Ask yourselves when, 
during the last 10 years, this topic 
would have lacked tragic immediacy. 
Just 9 months ago, Prime Minister 
Thatcher narrowly escaped injury when 
a bomb planted by the Provisional IRA 
[Irish Republican Army] exploded at her 
hotel in Brighton, killing 4 and injuring 
34. In July 1983 after repeated PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] 
attacks, a group of Jewish extremists 
fired randomly at Arab students at the 
Islamic College in Hebron, killing 3 and 
wounding 33 others. 

The State Department has estimated 
that, from 1979 to 1983, 2,093 people 
have been killed as a result of inter- 
national terrorist incidents and 4,349 
injured. We can be grimly certain that, 
if this subject is set again for next year, 
we will have new tragedies to talk 
about. 



Of course, nothing we say today, or 
do tomorrow, could put an end to the 
evil that is modern terrorism. As long 
as people find it in themselves to tor- 
ture and murder indiscriminately, to 
advance their political ends, we must 
live with terrorism in its many manifes- 
tations. And we are not about to 
witness any fundamental change in 
human nature or the sudden enlighten- 
ment of mankind through a divine will. 

Indeed, a common thread among 
most terrorists is the deep belief each 
holds in the justice of his cause. Each 
hears, or pretends to hear, his own par- 
ticular god cheering on the sidelines as 
he kills and maims the innocent— be tha. 
god Jehovah, Allah, Marx, a Utopian 
vision of society, or some insane dream 
of racist supremacy. 

Controlling domestic criminality is 
itself an endless challenge, even though 
every civilized nation has criminal laws 
prohibiting antisocial conduct, national 
police forces universally empowered to 
use reasonable and necessary force, and 
courts with authority to punish viola- 
tors. In the international arena, while 
we have conventions, agreements, and 
customs that make many terrorist acts 
universal crimes, international practice 
and doctrines greatly limit the enforce- t< 
ability of these norms. Furthermore, W' (■*■ 
lack anything like an international polic 
force to apply rules of conduct or court: 
routinely to enforce them through pun 
ishments. Even when we can lawfully 
apply force against terrorists, its utility 
is often limited by the value we attach 
to human life. 

The problem also has a political 
dimension. While a consensus can 
usually be found among the citizens of 
particular nations against terrorist acts 
on the international scene, as President 
Reagan noted last week, a number of 
states either provide safe havens for 
terrorists or actively encourage ter- 
rorism and use terror as a weapon in 
their war against free governments. 



in 

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The TWA Incident 

You can best appreciate the special diff I 
culty of dealing with international ter- 
rorism if we review some of the issues 
the U.S. Government has faced during 
the latest crisis. The underlying facts 
are no doubt familiar to you all. 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



Three Lebanese hijackers flew from 
;irut to Athens where two of them 
arded TWA #847 bound for Rome, 
le third man was unable to get a seat 
the plane and was subsequently 
rested in Athens. Shortly after 
keoff, the hijackers produced pistols 
d grenades, commandeered the plane 
Beirut for refueling, and then took it 
Algiers. They demanded that their 
conspirator in Athens be reunited 
th them in exchange for the release of 
e Greek nationals on the plane, and 
e Greeks agreed. The plane was then 
>wn back and forth between Beirut 
d Algiers. In the process, all but 
passengers and crew were released, 
i the ground in Beirut, the hijackers 
ercilessly beat and then shot to death 
sbert Stethem, a young U.S. Navy 
ver. They were then joined by mem- 
ts of both Hizbollah and Amal forces, 
10 took a dozen passengers off the 
ane for "safekeeping." The hijackers 
ught publicity and got it. The world 
as treated to a media extravaganza 
at gave tastelessness new meaning. 
The immediate problem posed by 
e hijacking was to get back the 
'Stages safely and in a manner consist- 
t with our overall security interests. 
•esident Reagan and Secretary Shultz 
t the rules for our conduct: no deals, 
iximum diplomatic pressure, and the 
■e of reasonable, discriminate force, if 
pessary. Their efforts succeeded with- 
t further loss of life. We continue to 

• ek the return of all other hostages in 
jbanon. 

In addition to obtaining the safe 
lease of the passengers and crew, we 
'e working to achieve four additional 
ijectives: to bring the hijackers to 

; stice, to get back the plane, to end the 
utine use by terrorists of the Beirut 
iternational Airport, and to improve 
■curity at the Athens airport. We are 
so seeking to rally like-minded govern- 

I ents to join us in improving worldwide 

i ieguards for civil aviation security. 

he Hijackers 

I ou will recall that one of the hijackers 
as arrested at the Athens airport. As 
j party to the Tokyo, The Hague, and 
Montreal conventions against terrorism, 
reece had the responsibility to hold the 
ould-be hijacker until he was extra- 
cted or prosecuted. Instead, Greek offi- 
jals swapped the terrorist for the 
reek nationals on the plane. 



Releasing the hijacker in exchange 
for some of the hostages was a grave 
mistake. The reason no exception is 
written into the obligation to extradite 
or prosecute aircraft hijackers is simply 
that, once one begins to make exchanges 
with terrorists, there is no end to the 
types of deals they would demand. 
Kuwait, to its credit, has repeatedly 
resisted terrorist demands that it 
release convicted terrorists. We have 
insisted that Greece abide by its obli- 
gation to hold alleged hijackers until 
extradition or prosecution. As you will 
see, however, we can do little more on 
this issue until the conventions are 
made enforceable. 

By signing The Hague and Montreal 
conventions, Lebanon agreed to extra- 
dite or prosecute terrorist hijackers. In 
addition, customary principles of inter- 
national law support the principle that 
pirates must be punished either in the 
requesting or requested nation. Under 
legislation passed last fall, the TWA 
hijacking is a crime under U.S. law. We 
have filed a formal demand that 
Lebanon fulfill its international obliga- 
tions to take law enforcement measures 
against those responsible for the TWA 
hijacking and the crimes they com- 
mitted; Attorney General Meese will 
determine when to file a formal demand 
for extradition and what other law 
enforcement options to pursue. 

The press greeted with skepticism 
our intention to pursue the hijackers 



through legal means. They questioned 
the point of such an effort, and if the 
Government of Lebanon cannot control 
its airport, how can we reasonably 
expect it to investigate, identify, arrest, 
and prosecute the individuals respon- 
sible for the hijacking? 

The short answer to this is that we 
cannot know in advance that an effort to 
arrest the hijackers is bound to fail. 
Lebanon is a complex place, and if the 
news stories are accurate— that an effort 
to arrest them is being made— a good 
result could come about through circum- 
stances we cannot now entirely 
anticipate. 

In any event, Lebanon's inability to 
arrest the offenders cannot relieve it of 
its obligation to try and to keep trying 
until it succeeds. Our effort to bring 
these hijackers to justice has signifi- 
cance far beyond the individual case. We 
must persist in asserting that the rule 
of law be obeyed, if we want to retain 
the hope that some day it will be 
obeyed. 

Don't let this discussion mislead you. 
If Lebanon or Greece refused to carry 
out their obligations under the anti- 
terrorism conventions, our prospects for 
enforcement would be slight. Thus far, 
neither the conventions nor customary 
law have been held to create enforceable 
duties. Parties to the conventions have 
repeatedly refused to extradite or prose- 
cute hijackers and, indeed, have sup- 
ported their activities. Kevin Chamber- 



The Legal Adviser 




\m 



Abraham D. Sofaer 
was born May 6, 1938, 
in Bombay, India. He 
served in the U.S. Air 
Force 1956-59 and 
became a naturalized 
citizen in 1959. He 
received a B.A. 
magna cum laude in 
American history from 
Yeshiva College in 
New York City (1962) and an LL.B. cum 
laude from New York University (1965) 
where he was editor-in-chief of the law 
review. He was a Root-Tilden scholar. Mr. 
Sofaer was awarded an honorary doctorate 
from Yeshiva in 1980. 

From 1965 to 1966, Mr. Sofaer served as 
law clerk to Judge J. Skelly Wright of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 
and to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., of the 



M 



U.S. Supreme Court from 1966 to 1967. He 
was Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern 
District of New York (1967-69), professor of 
law at Columbia University (1969-79), and 
healing officer for New York State (1975-76). 
In 1979 he was appointed a Federal District 
Court judge in the Southern District of New 
York. Among the cases he handled as a 
Federal judge was the libel action by Gen. 
Ariel Sharon against Time, Inc. 

He was sworn in as the Legal Adviser of 
the Department of State on June 10, 1985. 

Judge Sofaer is a member of the New 
York Bar, the American Bar Association, and 
the American Law Institute; he is adjunct 
professor of law at Columbia. He has written 
and lectured on constitutional law, executive 
privilege, and the President's foreign affairs 
powers. He is the author of a book entitled 
War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional 
Power. ■ 



39 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



lain, a legal counsellor of Britain's 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
wrote of the conventions in a recent 
article that "there is no effective means 
of ensuring compliance with their provi- 
sions." 

Frustration over the refusal of 
several nations to comply with the anti- 
hijacking conventions led the economic 
summit seven to issue a "declaration" at 
Bonn in 1978. In it, the seven codeclar- 
ants, whose airlines account for about 
70% of all civil aviation, "jointly re- 
solved that their governments should 
take immediate action to cease all 
flights" connected with any country that 
"refuses extradition or prosecution of 
those who have hijacked an aircraft 
and/or do not return such aircraft. . . ." 
Thus far, the declaration has been 
invoked only once— against Afghanistan 
in 1981. On that occasion, moreover, the 
sanction was imposed only after the 
declarants had given Afghanistan the 
1-year notice, argued by some to be 
required by bilateral aviation 
agreements. 

If the hijackers are not brought to 
justice, we will be faced with the option 
of seeking action under the Bonn 
declaration. However persistently we 
pursue this course, it is a difficult one, 
depending on the will and courage of 
seven nations, each with independent 
interests and views. 

Let me depress you further with the 
fact that, even when a hijacker is 
arrested, that is no assurance he will be 
brought to justice. Many states will not 
extradite their own citizens, or will 
extradite them only for the most 
heinous crimes. A state that does not 
provide for the death penalty under its 
laws may refuse to extradite a person 
for an offense that could be punished by 
death in the requesting state, or it 
might condition extradition on assur- 
ances that the death penalty will not be 
imposed. 

An especially important obstacle to 
extradition is the so-called political- 
offense exception found in the extra- 
dition law of many states. As inter- 
preted by the U.S. courts, this excep- 
tion prohibits the extradition of any per- 
son whose crime, however serious, was 
committed in the course or in further- 
ance of civil war, insurrection, or 
political commotion. Invoking this doc- 
trine, American courts have refused the 
last four extraditions sought by the 
executive branch of IRA members 
guilty of murdering police and military 



officials. France has refused to extradite 
Americans to the United States on this 
basis, where they claimed to have com- 
mitted their criminal acts for political 
reasons, including alleged racial oppres- 
sion. Of course, a refusal to extradite 
loses its sting if the requested nation 
prosecutes the offender but no enforce- 
ment mechanism exists to insure that a 
prosecution will occur, that a meaningful 
sentence will be imposed and served. 
And these obstacles, I hasten to add, 
describe only a few of the difficulties in 
bringing hijackers to justice. 

The Plane 

TWA's aircraft remains on the ground 
at Beirut International Airport, 
although Article 11 of the Tokyo conven- 
tion states that the "contracting state in 
which the aircraft lands . . . shall return 
the aircraft and its cargo to the persons 
lawfully entitled to possession." Arti- 
cle 9 of The Hague convention imposes a 
similar obligation, and the Bonn declara- 
tion applies to a nation's refusal to 
return a hijacked plane. 

We are assisting TWA in getting 
back its plane. The risks associated with 
using an American crew have compli- 
cated the situation. Here, too, the 
Government of Lebanon claims it is will- 
ing to comply with its obligation, but 
the absence of effective control over the 
airport has posed substantial obstacles. 

Athens and Beirut Airports 

Immediately after the hijacking, we 
took steps to insure that our concerns 
about security at both the Athens and 
Beirut airports were made known to the 
traveling public. Athens airport has 
been the object of special scrutiny on 
security grounds for many years, not 
only by the United States but also by 
other governments. Deficiencies there 
had been associated with other terrorist 
acts, including the hijacking of TWA 
#847. Given the history of repeated inci- 
dents, the issuance of a travel advisory 
became imperative. The Greek Govern- 
ment has objected to this measure, 
claiming it to be unfair and discrimi- 
natory. We acted reluctantly, however, 
and only because prior efforts to 
improve security at Athens had been 
unsuccessful. 

International law obliges all states 
engaged in international civil aviation to 
insure adequate security at their air- 
ports. In 1974, ICAO [International 



ecti 

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Civil Aviation Organization] adopted 
annex 17 to the Chicago convention on 
international civil aviation, establishing 
standards and recommended practices 
on security. That document has been 
amended and updated several times as 
experience warranted, and it is a useful 
benchmark against which to measure 
the sufficiency of security standards at 
airports. We believe, moreover, that 
when experience demonstrates that 
special circumstances at a particular air- 
port require more stringent measures 
than those recommended by ICAO to 
provide necessary security, those 
measures must be adopted. Our travel 
advisory was also a lesser remedy than 
is expressly authorized by the U.S.- 
Greece bilateral aviation agreement, 
which provides for the suspension of all 
air service for unsafe conditions. 

Material improvements have been 
made at Athens airport, and we are 
working with the Greek Government to 
bring about the necessary improve- 
ments. The Secretary of State looks for- 
ward to being able to lift the advisory 
at Athens, consistent with his obligation 
to protect American citizens abroad 
from unwarranted danger. 

Long before the hijacking, the 
Department of State had advised U.S. 
citizens that the unstable conditions 
prevailing in Lebanon made travel 
through Beirut airport unsafe. In fact, 
the Beirut airport has been involved in 
36 separate terrorist hijackings in 
recent years. After the latest incident, 
President Reagan determined (pursuant 
to Section 1114(A) of the Federal Avia- 
tion Act) that Lebanon was acting incor 
sistently with The Hague Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 
of Aircraft and suspended the rights of 
all U.S. air carriers to engage in air 
transportation, direct or indirect, to anc 
from Lebanon, as well as the rights of 
Lebanese carriers to engage in air 
transportation to and from the United 
States. 

In addition, Transportation Secre- 
tary Dole took actions modifying the 
authority of Middle East Airlines (MEA 
to fly to the United States and pro- 
hibiting the sales of air transportation 
to, from, or through Lebanon (pursuant 
to the Federal Aviation Act, Sections 
402 and 403). We are encouraging like- 
minded countries to join in these effort' 
which we intend to continue until that 
aii-port is effectively secured against iffij 
by terrorist groups. 



7. 



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(, 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



The government of Lebanon has ob- 
icted to these measures, claiming it 
iould not be punished for what it could 
ot control. But it is precisely 
.ebanon's lack of control that justifies 
le measures we have adopted. Until 
,ebanon assumes control, it is our 
bligation to discontinue air commerce 
lvolving that airport. We are ready to 
Doperate with Lebanon in accomplish- 
lg this objective as quickly as possible, 
leanwhile we have demonstrated our 
allingness to allow flights to the United 
tates by Lebanese aircraft, so long as 
ley do not use the Beirut airport. For 
xample, flights of an MEA-leased air- 
aft between Cairo and New York have 
ot been terminated. 

Lebanon also claims that our actions 
iolate the U.S. -Lebanon bilateral avia- 
on agreement. That agreement, like 
lost other aviation bilaterals, requires 
lat disputes be settled through con- 
ization and arbitration and provides 
nat it can be terminated only after 
year's notice. 

We are confident that the measures 
iiken with respect to the Beirut airport 
'•e consistent with our bilateral aviation 
^reement with Lebanon and with our 
jligations under international law. Air 
■affic is conducted either without 
iforceable traffic rights, on the basis of 
imity and reciprocity, or under bilat- 
al agreements often containing safety 
(ad security provisions. Both types of 
i [lateral arrangements complement the 
asic multilateral framework for inter- 
ational civil aviation, the core of which 
the Chicago convention. This multi- 
iteral framework places a high priority 
pn the safety of international civil avia- 
i'On and incorporates, as requirements, 
ie ICAO standards for aviation securi- 
/ and other air terrorism conventions. 
. specific reference to these ICAO 
;andards is included in Article 6 of the 
ilateral agreement with Lebanon, 
ound commercial practice suggests that 
cceptable standards of safety and 
ecurity for aeronautical facilities are an 
ssential precondition to the operation 
f this network of aviation rights. They 
re, therefore, an essential element of 
•he consent of a state to be bound to a 
ilateral accord. 

Furthermore, under established prin- 
iples of international law, an interna- 
ional agreement, such as a bilateral 
viation accord, may be terminated or 
uspended when a provision essential to 
ts object has been violated or when fun- 
lamental conditions underlying it have 



been changed. The concepts of material 
breach and fundamental change of cir- 
cumstance, rebus sic stantibus (incor- 
porated in Articles 60 and 62 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties), can be invoked by parties to 
bilateral aviation agreements when air 
safety and security violations wan-ant. 
In cases of urgency, these actions can 
be taken promptly, without notice 
periods (as Article 65(2) of the Vienna 
convention reflects). 

International law also allows propor- 
tionate actions in connection with agree- 
ments, in response to breaches of 
related legal duties. Whatever the provi- 
sions of a country's particular bilateral 
aviation agreement, almost all partici- 
pants in international civil aviation are 
party to the Chicago convention, with 
its airport security standards, and to the 
air terrorism conventions. The duties of 
countries under these accords are owed 
to all states and to the traveling public. 
Lebanon's conceded inability to insure 
the minimum degree of safety necessary 
to permit air transportation services 
with other countries deprives it of the 
capacity to insist upon the exercise of 
reciprocal commercial air rights. 

Our bilateral agreements should ex- 
plicitly provide that air services may be 
suspended in response to violations of 
fundamental international obligations. A 
number of our agreements, including the 
one with Greece, specifically authorize 
us to enforce the ICAO standards bi- 
laterally by suspending operating rights. 
But not all agreements contain such a 
provision, and most fail to incorporate 
violations of the Tokyo and The Hague 
conventions as express grounds for 
suspending operating rights. We need to 
re-examine all of our agreements, to 
urge other nations to do the same, and 
to take steps to insure that future ones 
provide for more effective enforcement 
of international air safety and security 
obligations. A tight web of such agree- 
ments would be a powerful incentive to 
countries to abide by their solemn com- 
mitments to fight terrorism and to in- 
sure aviation security. 

Conclusion 

I am sure that some of you are thinking 
at this point: Forget about law; let's 
just go in there and get the killers. And 
if we can't find them, let's punish the 
crazed groups to which they belong until 
they stop harming innocent persons. 



The President has warned terrorists 
and the states which support them that 
our patience has run out. They had best 
heed his warning. International law 
recognizes the right to use force in self- 
defense against armed attacks. The 
groups that are responsible for attack- 
ing us in Lebanon, El Salvador, and 
elsewhere have openly announced their 
intentions to keep on trying to kill 
Americans. To the extent that they are 
state supported, or beyond the capacity 
of their governments to control, we are 
entitled now to use necessary and pro- 
portionate force to end such attacks. 
This Administration's willingness to use 
appropriate force in itself has a deter- 
rent and moderating effect on our 
enemies. 

But the possible use of force should 
not distract us from the role that law 
can play in this struggle. The President 
flatly rejected any improper use of 
force. We cannot become terrorists, he 
said, in the fight against terrorism. 

While force will play its part, the 
President challenged us last week to 
develop "a better domestic and interna- 
tional legal framework for dealing with 
terrorism"— to "deal legally with law- 
lessness." And we stressed the need to 
move our focus from the tactical to the 
strategic and to recognize the interna- 
tional pattern of terrorist activity. 

The President has called us to the 
highest duty lawyers can have. He has 
asked us to fight, within the constraints 
of our moral values and legal traditions, 
an enemy that scorns and exploits our 
respect for those limiting rules. The in- 
adequacies and obstacles to meaningful 
legal action against hijacking which I 
have reviewed today should have 
demonstrated that we have a great deal 
of difficult and frustrating work ahead 
of us. 

• We have to create meaningful en- 
forcement mechanisms, through both 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements, 
for the obligations stated in antihijack- 
ing conventions and in the ICAO 
standards. 

• We need to amend the Bonn decla- 
ration to provide for a range of sanc- 
tions and for their swift imposition 
whenever any important aspect of the 
aviation conventions is violated. 

• We must strive to overcome the 
reluctance even of civilized nations to 
extradite terrorists. In this connection, 
we have made important, recent prog- 
ress. We just signed with the United 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



Kingdom an amendment to our extradi- 
tion treaty which will eliminate the 
political-offense exception for major 
crimes, such as hijacking and murder. 
The ABA must join us in seeking 
Senate confirmation of this important 
step against terrorism; the gun is not a 
proper substitute for the ballot box in 
free societies which offer fair systems of 
justice. 

• We must continue to encourage all 
like-minded nations to join us in our ef- 
forts. One of the most heartening devel- 
opments of the latest crisis is the 
cooperation and support we received 
from virtually all nations, including the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel, 
but particularly from concerned Arab 
staies. Almost all the Arab nations con- 

i demned the hijacking and murder; Jor- 
dan's King Hussein called it the work of 
mad dogs. Syria and Algeria played con- 
structive roles in helping to get our 
hostages back, and President Assad may 
continue to demonstrate good will by 
helping us retrieve those who remain 
captives in Lebanon. 

• We must organize ourselves more 
effectively to deal with terrorism by 
treating international law enforcement 
as a routine aspect of foreign relations. 
We will use, in this effort, our new 
authority to issue rewards for help in 
bringing those who attack Americans to 
justice. 

• We must get ahead of the terror- 
ists in technology. Just as we have 
adopted a Strategic Defense Initiative, 
we need a terrorist defense initiative 
that enables us to detect and defuse ter- 
rorist threats before they can do 
damage. 

The fight against terrorism through 
law will take ingenuity, endurance, and 
money. We must harness the outrage 
we feel over these acts to give us the 
strength to carry on the struggle. When 
you start to tire, I suggest you think 
about the innocent victims of terror, in- 
cluding young Robert Stethem. A 
passenger on the plane described 
Stethem's screams as the kind that 
went on until the very breath went out 
of his lungs. The thought of those 
screams will keep me in this fight for as 
long as it takes to prevail. ■ 



SDI: Setting the Record Straight 



by Kenneth L. Adelman 

Address before the Council on 
Foreign Affairs in Baltimore on August 
7, 1985. Ambassador Adelman is Direc- 
tor of the Arms Control and Disarma- 
ment Agency (AC DA). 

It is a great pleasure to be here this 
evening before the Baltimore Council on 
Foreign Affairs. I know firsthand the 
valuable role such councils play all 
across the country— particularly in en- 
suring public awareness of critical 
issues. Separating fact from fiction in 
arms control and national security is 
essential to understand those issues. 

The year 1984 is behind us. It was 
many things, but it was not at all the 
year George Orwell had depicted. Wars 
in sundry regions troubled us, but the 
perpetual wars of Orwell's imagination 
were nowhere upon us. 

Rather, 1984 was most significant 
for what did not happen. On the 15th of 
May 1984, the world broke the modern- 
day record for length of time without 
major war in Europe— no mean ac- 
complishment. The old record, just short 
of 39 years, was set between the battle 
of Waterloo (1815) and the outbreak of 
the Crimean War (1854). 

The year 1984 marked another sig- 
nificant unfolding: the increasing 
discourse surrounding— and, at times, 
even enveloping— President Reagan's 
Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI. 
This research program is designed to 
see if effective defense against nuclear 
weapons is possible. Over the coming 
years, the subject will surely come to 
dominate our discussions on arms con- 
trol, deterrence, and military strategy— 
if, indeed, it has not already. 

The starting point for any rational 
discourse on SDI— and many discourses 
on SDI have not been rational but have 
been wrapped in and warped by emo- 
tion—is a large dosage of modesty at 
predicting what science and technology 
can offer in the future. How many times 
in our history has human ingenuity 
overcome human expectations and even 
expert predictions? 

To take just a few examples: 

• Thomas Edison forecast: 

Fooling around with alternating currents 
is just a waste of time. Nobody will use it, 
ever. It's too dangerous .... Direct current 
is safe. 



• Simon Newcomb noted in 1903: 

Aerial flight is one of that class of prob- 
lems with which man will never be able to 
cope. 

• Lee DeForrest argued in 1926 
that: 

While theoretically and technically televi- 
sion may be feasible, commercially and finan- 
cially I consider it an impossibility, a develop- 
ment of which we need waste little time 
dreaming. 

• Admiral William Leahy, Chief of 
Staff to President Truman, warned in 
1945 that: 

The [atomic] bomb will never go off, and I 
speak as an expert in explosives. 

• One scientist argued in 1932 that: 

There is not the slightest indication that 
[nuclear] energy will ever be obtainable. It 
would mean that the atom would have to be 
shattered at will. 

That scientist was Albert Einstein. 



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With these and many more ex- 
amples, one cannot blithely accept the 
word of some self-anointed "experts" 
who tell us how a strategic defense can 
never work, can never be cost effective, 
can never be stabilizing. 

SDI is a fetching subject which in- 
evitably provokes eruptions. Any 
meeting that drags can be instantly 
brought to high drama just by mention- 
ing SDI. Too often, however, the public 
debate is marked by flamboyant rhetori* 
and stark, unsupported conclusions. To 
make an impact in our open society, ex 
aggeration seems unavoidable. 

Soviet Propaganda Against SDI 

Internationally, the issue has been 
joined as well. Here, too, there is a 
good deal of emotion and rhetoric on the 
subject. And, not to be forgotten, the 
Soviet Union has launched a major prop 
aganda campaign and strategy to stop 
or at least slow down SDI. The assault 
involves disinformation and misinforma- 
tion—a form of "newspeak," to borrow 
again from 198U- It conforms to Lenin's 
dictum that what happens outside the 
negotiating room is far more important 
than what happens within it. 

The lines of Soviet propaganda 
against SDI often have curious incon- 
sistencies. For example, they cast SDI 
as a dangerous and destabilizing move 
that will be met by Soviet counter- 



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MILITARY AFFAIRS 



leasures, while at the same time saying 
, is useless and won't work. It can 
ardly be both— or, as you might ask, 
If it won't work, why are the Russians 
o worried about it?" 

But make no mistake about it: one 
f the Soviets' prime purposes is to try 
o abort U.S. research on SDI while 
maintaining their own programs. Not 
urprisingly, they are jumping into our 
ational debate on SDI. 

No such public debates, of course, 
re allowed in their closed system. This, 
oo, leads to curious positions. They can 
rgue, for example, that the "intent" of 
heir own research program is for pur- 
'Oses other than strategic defense. At 
ne point the Soviets claimed that their 
iser research was for medical purposes, 
'he problem with that claim is that one 
f their major laser facilities at Sary 
lhagan is the size of a couple of football 
elds— not exactly the size or power for 
se in cataract or other surgery. 

iey Questions Concerning SDI 

low should we respond to the 
umerous questions, concerns, mis- 
nderstandings, and even to this Soviet 
newspeak"? The truth, I believe, is 
lways the best answer. I wish tonight 
a address three key questions on SDI. 
us these issues are likely to gain more 
pan less attention, we should focus on 
hem now. 

First, does SDI constitute a breach 
r anticipatory breach of the ABM 
Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty? 

Second, is SDI wrong in terms of 
trategic stability, the U.S. strategic 
nosition, or U.S. arms control 
bjectives? 

Third, is SDI ethically wrong? 

SDI and the ABM Treaty. As to 

whether we are breaking or committing 
'anticipatory breach" of the ABM 
Yeaty, the answer is flatly "no." 

That treaty limits deployment of 
ixed, land-based ABM systems and pro- 
libits development, testing, or deploy- 
nent of space-based, sea-based, air- 
>ased, or mobile land-based ABM 
systems and their components. The 
.reaty unmistakably leaves the research 
ioors wide open. That was wise when 
-he treaty was negotiated, and it is wise 
low in light of potentially promising 
lew technologies. Research increases 
•cnowledge and, as Prime Minister Craxi 
if Italy put it recently, "You cannot put 
i brake on the human mind." 



SDI is a research program only. It 
does not include development, testing, 
or deployment inconsistent with the 
ABM Treaty. President Reagan has 
made clear that the research efforts will 
be fully consistent with our international 
legal obligations, including the ABM 
Treaty. That requirement definitely 
affects the configuration of the SDI 
research program. It will be under con- 
stant review to ensure that consistency. 

The research on defensive systems, 
as embodied in the President's initia- 
tive, is not only permitted under the 
ABM Treaty but was actively advocated 
by the Nixon Administration as a neces- 
sary safeguard against Soviet programs. 
When that treaty stood before the 
Senate, then Defense Secretary Laird 
noted that we would "vigorously pursue 
a comprehensive ABM technology pro- 
gram." While not necessarily as vigor- 
ous as this statement suggests, active 
research programs on ABM technology 
have been supported by every Adminis- 
tration since 1972. 

Critics of SDI argue that the re- 
search is "purposeful" and will lead to 



[The Soviets] cast SDI as 
a dangerous and destabi- 
lizing move that will be 
met by Soviet counter- 
measures, while at the 
same time saying it is 
useless and won't work. 
It can hardly be 
both. . . . 



abrogation of the ABM Treaty. This is 
basically an argument of anticipatory 
breach. 

Ironically, this argument assumes 
that we know exactly where technology 
developments will lead us and how they 
will affect us. That assumption, whether 
by critics or by proponents of SDI, is 
premature at best. No one has a crystal 
ball or crib sheet in this business. No 
decisions on development or deployment 
have been made. Indeed, they could not 
be made responsibly until the research 
efforts yield their results over the next 
several years. 



We are doing a lot of research to 
look at technological developments and 
their potential for defense against 
ballistic missiles. Can they work? Can 
they be cost-effective? Can they be 
made survivable? How will they impact 
on deterrence and strategic stability? 
We do not know answers to these ques- 
tions today. That is what the major 
research program is all about. 

At any rate, intent behind any 
research is simply not relevant to the 
ABM Treaty limitations. The framers 
made no distinction between permitted 
and prohibited research or between pur- 
poseful and nonpurposeful research. The 
treaty simply does not prohibit or con- 
strain research in any way, shape, or 
form. 

The Soviets know this and, before 
SDI came on the scene, they willingly 
acknowledged it. In a major statement 
before the Soviet Presidium in 1972, 
shortly after the treaty was signed, then 
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko stated 
that the ABM Treaty ". . . places no 
limitations whatsoever on the conduc- 
ting of research and experimental work 
directed toward solving the problem of 
defending the country from nuclear 
missile strike." 

Despite all the focus on SDI's effect 
on the ABM Treaty, the threats to the 
treaty lie elsewhere. They lie, first and 
foremost, in the Soviets' clear violation 
of the treaty by the location and orien- 
tation of a new, large radar at Krasnoy- 
arsk in Siberia. This Soviet action is 
most disturbing, as the Soviets must 
have known we would detect such a 
massive structure, several football fields 
large. They had to have planned it in 
the 1970s, not long after signing the 
ABM Treaty. 

The limitation on the construction of 
such radars was and still is considered a 
critical constraint of the ABM Treaty, 
since such radars are a long lead-time 
item for any nationwide defense, and 
that is a key prohibition in the treaty. 
One of our main objectives in the 
Geneva arms control talks is to reverse 
this erosion of the ABM Treaty. 

And talk about "newspeak": both in 
public and in the negotiating rooms of 
Geneva, the Soviets attempt to deny us 
the right to do what the ABM Treaty 
clearly allows— that is, conduct research- 
while asserting a right for themselves to 
do what the treaty clearly prohibits— 
that is, construct the Krasnoyarsk 
radar. 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



SDI and U.S. Arms Control Objec- 
tives. Given that the SDI research pro- 
gram is consistent with the ABM 
Treaty, the most central question is: will 
SDI improve deterrence, strengthen 
stability, and reduce the risk of war? 

Surely we all agree that such 
defenses should be developed or 
deployed only if they enhance strategic 
stability. The arguments on strategic 
stability and the offense-defense rela- 
tionship were central to the debate in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s before 
signing on to the ABM Treaty. What we 
do not know, and what we need to look 
at in relation to SDI, is whether newly 
emerging technologies can change some 
of those considerations. 

Let's look at a relatively simple ex- 
ample. For years it has been assumed— 
and correctly so— that defenses against 
ballistic missiles were not cost-effective. 
No matter how many defenses one side 
deployed, it would be cheaper for the 
other side to overwhelm those defenses 
with decoys or even with more offensive 
systems. We do not know if that 
generalization will hold true for future 
technologies. 

We do know, however, that we must 
scrupulously guard against a vicious 
cycle of defensive efforts spurring the 
other side to yet more offensive 
weapons in order to saturate prospec- 
tive defenses, and so on and so on. That 
snowball effect would undercut stability 
and hinder deterrence. 

One way to help this is by engaging 
the Soviets in frank and factual discus- 
sions on strategic stability and the 
offense-defense relationship. How might 
strategic defenses, if they prove feasi- 
ble, enhance the security of both sides? 
How could the two sides cooperate 
toward such an end? What kind of tran- 
sition would be necessary? Detailed 
talks on these subjects should minimize 
the possibility of misunderstanding. This 
is another major area we are pursuing 
in the Geneva talks. 

The survivability of defensive sys- 
tems is also a central criterion. Vulner- 
able systems or easy targets can pro- 
vide incentives for preemptive or first 
strikes. They are the worst systems in a 
crisis. If defensive systems can be 
knocked out or overwhelmed easily, 
they provide no defense at all. Sur- 
vivability is, thus, essential to SDI, and 
it alone will involve considerable 
research into both passive and active 
defense measures. 



If new technologies do prove out and 
systems could prove cost-effective and 
be made survivable, they could be 
stabilizing, not destabilizing. We can 
surmise now that even a less than 
perfect defense could markedly reduce a 
potential attacker's expectation of suc- 
cess by reducing the likelihood that he 
might realize the objectives of his at- 
tack. And this, after all, constitutes the 
quintessence of deterrence. 

We need not go far for examples. 
Less vulnerability of our command, con- 



[SDIJ does not include 
development, testing, or 
deployment inconsistent 
with the ABM Treaty. 
. . . The treaty simply 
does not prohibit or con- 
strain research in any 
way, shape, or form. The 
Soviets know this and, 
before SDI came on the 
scene, they willingly 
acknowledged it. 



trol, communications, and intelligence 
capabilities is a critical component of a 
stronger deterrence; less vulnerability of 
our fixed land-based ICBMs [interconti- 
nental ballistic missiles] also helps keep 
the peace. If cost-effective, survivable 
defenses could better protect these com- 
ponents, would we not be better off? 

And what about a capability against 
accidental launch? How many of us 
recall the novel Fail-Safe! As Martin 
Anderson once described it: 

If you live in New York City or 
Washington and the sirens start wailing, it 
will be of little consolation to . . . learn that 
the Soviet Union has apologized profusely for 
the nuclear bomb that is going to explode. 

Would we not all be better off if the 
President had the option of pushing a 
second button— one that could destroy 
incoming missiles— rather than only the 
button that would destroy people? An 
effective defense system could provide 
such a button. 



So, is SDI worth the investment of 
scarce resources? I strongly believe so. 
If the research pans out, then a result- 
ing program could strengthen deter- 
rence based more upon defense against 
missiles than solely upon the threat of 
mutual annihilation. While we do not 
know what the future holds, we do 
know that the research effort is a 
reasonable bet. For some, SDI research 
stands at the very frontier of today's 
scientific and technological advance- 
ments—in computers, in sensors, in 
radars, in high-energy particle beams, 
and in lasers. 

On the other hand— even if the 
technology does not pan out or systems 
do not prove cost-effective or cannot be 
made survivable— our SDI research is 
valuable for other reasons. 

Greater understanding of the tech- 
nologies, their potential, and their 
drawbacks can give us greater under- 
standing of the threat to the United 
States— the threat emanating from the 
Soviets' active defensive programs and 
research. This is particularly vital in 
view of the Soviets' breakout potential 
in ABM systems. Not only have they 
constructed the permitted ABM system 
around Moscow, but they may be mov- 
ing toward a nationwide ABM capabili- 
ty, contrary to the heart and soul of the 
ABM Treaty. They also have an exten- 
sive air defense program. They are 
engaged in vigorous research on lasers 
and neutral particle beams for strategic 
defenses. 

They spend some 10 times more 
than do we on defensive programs 
overall. Surely the worst outcome wouk 
be to tie our own hands on research on 
defensive systems while the Soviets 
gained substantial advantage in this 
realm. 



IS 



The Ethics of SDI. Finally, is SDI 
wrong from an ethical standpoint? 

The ethics or morality of relying on 
nuclear deterrence is, as you know, one 
of the most critical issues of our times. 
As one who was a religion and philoso- 
phy major in college— and as one now 
deeply involved with nuclear arms con- 
trol policies— I find the ethical considera 
tions compelling. 

The debate on the morality of 
nuclear deterrence— prompted and rein! 
forced by the U.S. Catholic bishops' 
pastoral letter in 1983— and the debate 
on strategic defenses are remarkably 
similar. We deploy nuclear weapons, not 
to use them but to make war against 
the United States and our allies far, far 



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MILITARY AFFAIRS 



;ss likely. In this same vein, if we find 
ut that some defensive systems can 
educe the risk of war, they, too, would 
hereby be morally justified. We cannot 
imply sit back and forever assume that 
he only deterrent is the threat of 
■Ritual annihilation. 

It is not coincidental that over 1,000 
lergymen have publicly endorsed SDI 
esearch. The declaration claimed "that 
' a non-nuclear, genuinely defensive 
ystem is feasible, then its deployment 
. . is not only morally justifiable, but 
erhaps even obligatory for the Ameri- 
an people and their government." To 
he extent that defensive systems can 
ctually reduce the risks of war— 
trough accident, miscalculation, or 
eliberate design— it would surely be 
ie right thing to do. 

f.S. Nonproliferation Efforts 

lo task is more important to President 
;eagan than dealing with the threat of 
uclear weapons and nuclear war. As 
lis month marks the 40 years since the 
se of such weapons over Hiroshima and 
fagasaki, we need to rededicate our- 
jives to the goals that they never be 
sed and that the threat eventually be 
iminated. 

That task requires a broad and 
igorous strategy. Not least in this 
-rategy is our effort to prevent the fur- 
ier spread of nuclear weapons. It 
ould be ironic were we to succeed in 
educing substantially U.S. and Soviet 
uclear arsenals only to confront a 
orld of many small nuclear powers. 

Just over 20 years ago, many smart 
eople feared that the spread of nuclear 
eapons to dozens of countries was 
mply unavoidable. President Kennedy, 
>r example, warned of a world of 20-25 
uclear-weapon states by 1975. In 1958 
ie National Planning Association 
redicted that every state with a signifi- 
ant military capability would also 
ossess "the bomb." 

These predictions have not come 
me. Instead, working together, the 
Tnited States and other countries have 
uilt up a set of norms, practices, and 
istitutions to prevent the further 
pread of nuclear weapons. Political 
lliances and security guarantees have 
een nurtured and strengthened, reduc- 
lg incentives for seeking security 
hrough nuclear weapons. The safe- 
uards of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency provide essential confi- 
ence that peaceful nuclear activities 



are not being misused for military pur- 
poses. Export controls and guidelines 
have been put in place to make it 
harder for countries seeking nuclear ex- 
plosives to acquire the needed material 
and equipment. 

A critical cornerstone in this whole 
foundation is the Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT). It is the most widely ac- 
cepted arms control treaty to date, with 
more than 125 states party to it. 

Two events— one recent and one 
upcoming— are important in this never- 
ending battle against the spread of 
nuclear weapons. President Reagan's 
decision last month to authorize signa- 
ture of a nuclear cooperation agreement 
between the United States and the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China signifies a major 
event in our nonproliferation effort. It 
helps ensure that China is part of the 
nonproliferation solution, not part of the 
problem. 

During the 1960s and 1970s, China 
rejected nonproliferation norms. It ac- 
tually portrayed proliferation in a 
favorable light by openly declaring that 
the spread of nuclear weapons around 
the globe would diminish the power of 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
and would enhance the opportunities for 
revolution. China denied that a world of 
more nuclear-weapon states would be 
riskier. 

China also undertook no interna- 
tional legal obligations, and had no 
policy, to require safeguards and other 
controls on its nuclear exports. This 
naturally quickened our concerns about 
Chinese actions that could help other 
countries acquire nuclear explosives. 
Clearly, herein lay the potential for 
great harm to global nonproliferation 
efforts, in both word and deed. Against 
this background, the United States 
entered into talks— first in 1981 and 
then more intensively in 1983— on 
nuclear cooperation. 

With the change in Chinese leader- 
ship, with its momentous impact on 
world politics, we have also seen 
changes in China's thinking on arms 
control. Over the past 2 years, the 
Chinese Government has taken a num- 
ber of important nonproliferation steps. 
It has pledged neither to engage in 
nuclear proliferation nor to help other 
countries develop nuclear weapons. 
China joined the over 100 members of 
the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and made clear that it would 
require agency safeguards on its nuclear 
exports. The Chinese also made it clear 
that they will implement their policies in 



a manner consistent with the basic non- 
proliferation practices that we and 
others support so vigorously. 

In the short span of 2 years, China 
has embraced nonproliferation policies 
and practices, which it had eschewed so 
vociferously for a quarter of a century. 
This positive turnabout is of historic 
significance in efforts to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 

We, too, can take a measure of pride 
in this. I believe the lengthy discussions 
by us and other suppliers with China, 
combined with the prospect of agree- 
ments for peaceful nuclear cooperation, 
contributed heavily to these Chinese 
actions. 

The second event in the never- 
ending battle against the spread of 
nuclear weapons is the Nonproliferation 
Treaty review conference later this 
month. More than 125 parties to this 
treaty will convene in Geneva for 4 
weeks to take stock, to ask how well 
have the treaty's goals been met. 

There is little doubt that the treaty 
has been successful in helping avoid 
what President Kennedy feared— namely, 
a world of many nuclear-weapon states. 
Indeed, since the treaty came into force 
in 1970, only one additional country has 
detonated a nuclear explosive. This con- 
trasts with the more than 125 countries 
that have joined the NPT. The NPT can 
and will stand on its merits; it is an 
arms control success. 

Considerable progress has been 
made as well in fulfilling the treaty's 
goal of making available the benefits of 
the peaceful atom, especially to develop- 
ing countries. Many NPT parties now 
make use of the atom in agriculture, in 
industry, in medicine, in science, in 
research, and as a source of energy. We 
believe that NPT parties should receive 
special treatment; we have sought to 
give them preference in funding techni- 
cal assistance, in providing training, in 
facilitating exports, in funding power 
projects, and in other ways. 

Less progress than hoped for or 
desired has been made toward the 
treaty's goal of an "end to the nuclear 
arms race." But let there be no doubt 
about the Reagan Administration's com- 
mitment to that goal. We are redoubling 
efforts to reduce radically both U.S. and 
Soviet nuclear arsenals. If the Soviets 
would ever cooperate as well on reduc- 
ing our respective nuclear weapons as 
they do on nonproliferation, such reduc- 
tions could be realized. This would be 
the best first step in the treaty's vision— 
and President Reagan's vision— of a 
world without nuclear weapons. ■ 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



U.S. to Test ASAT Device 



P 

C 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 20, 1985' 

The President today submitted to the 
Congress, in accordance with the 1985 
Department of Defense Authorization 
Act, the certification required by the 
Congress prior to a test against an ob- 
ject in space of the non-nuclear 
miniature vehicle antisatellite (ASAT) 
system which is now in development. 
The miniature vehicle is launched from 
an F-15 aircraft. In the certification, the 
President attests to the Congress that: 

• The United States is endeavoring 
in good faith to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable 
agreement with the strictest possible 
limitations on antisatellite weapons con- 
sistent with the national security in- 
terests of the United States; 

• Pending agreement on such strict 
limitations, testing against objects in 
space of the F-15 launched miniature 
homing vehicle ASAT warhead is neces- 
sary to avert clear and irrevocable harm 
to the national security; 

• Such testing would not constitute 
an irreversible step that would gravely 
impair prospects for negotiations on an- 
tisatellite weapons; and 



• Such testing is fully consistent 
with the rights and obligations of the 
United States under the 1972 Anti- 
ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as those 
rights and obligations exist at the time 
of testing. 

The Soviet Union has for many 
years had the world's only operational 
antisatellite system. There is also a 
growing threat from present and pros- 
pective Soviet satellites which are 
designed to support directly the 
U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces. The United 
States must develop its own ASAT 
capability in order to deter Soviet 
threats to U.S. and allied space systems 
and, within such limits imposed by inter- 
national law, to deny any adversary ad- 
vantages arising from the offensive use 
of space-based systems which could 
undermine deterrence. Systematic con- 
tinued testing is necessary for us to be 
able to proceed with ASAT development 
and finally to validate operational 
capability in order to restore the 
necessary military balance in this area. 

A number of serious problems, in- 
cluding definitional and monitoring dif- 
ficulties plus the need to counter ex- 
isting Soviet targeting satellites, con- 



tribute to the conclusion that a com- 
prehensive ban on development, testing, 
deployment, and use of all means of 
countering satellites is not verifiable or 
in our national security interest. 
Moreover, no arrangements or agree- 
ments beyond those already governing 
military activities in outer space have 
been found to date that are judged to 
be in the overall interest of the United 
States and its allies and that meet con- 
gressionally mandated requirements of 
verifiability and consistency with the 
national security. We will continue to 
study possible ASAT limitations in good 
faith to see whether such limitations are 
consistent with the national security in- 
terests of the United States. 

The United States is presently 
engaged in negotiations with the Soviet 
Union at Geneva on nuclear arms reduc- 
tions, defense, and space issues. We 
believe that ASAT testing can con- 
stitute an incentive to the Soviet Union 
to reach agreements on a wide range of 
issues. 



■i 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 26, 1985. 



JUCLEAR POLICY 



Reprocessing and Plutonium Use in 
?ivil Nuclear Programs 



y Richard T. Kennedy 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
\i Arms Control, International Securi- 
i, and Science and on International 
conomic Policy and Trade of the 
'ouse Foreign Affairs Committee on 
•dy 2k, 1985. Ambassador Kennedy is 
'.S. permanent representative to the 
\EA and special adviser to the 
?cretary on nonproliferation policy 
id nuclear energy affairs. 1 

would like to thank you for this oppor- 
tnity to appear before the committee 
i discuss U.S. policy on cooperation 
! ith other nations in the areas of 
jclear spent fuel reprocessing and use 
' the derived plutonium in civil nuclear 
)wer programs. 
I would like to begin by saying that 
this area, as in other areas of the 
vil nuclear fuel cycle, the overriding 
ijective of this Administration is to in- 
ire that the policies we follow are fully 
insistent with achieving our non- 
•oliferation goals. In a policy statement 
ade soon after he took office, Presi- 
Snt Reagan declared that preventing 
ie spread of nuclear explosives is one 
' the most critical challenges facing our 
ition in international affairs. Further 
-oliferation, he said, would pose a 
were threat to international peace, 
^gional and global stability, and the 
purity interests of the United States 
id other countries. He pledged that 
ie United States would seek to prevent 
ie spread of nuclear explosives as a 
indamental national security and 
reign policy objective. 

In a major address before the UN 
i ssociation of the USA on November 1, 
1 484, Secretary of State Shultz strongly 
-'affirmed this basic commitment to 
! iducing the dangers to world peace and 
lobal stability posed by the potential 
bread of nuclear weapons. "It is no ex- 
l^geration," he declared, "to say that 
i mtrolling the spread of nuclear 
■'eapons is critical to world peace and, 
ideed, to human survival. It is a cause 
nat deserves and receives a top priority 
ii our foreign policy." 



To underscore the depth of our con- 
viction on this point, I can only reaffirm 
in the strongest terms this Administra- 
tion's commitment never to sacrifice its 
nonproliferation principles for commer- 
cial gain or political adavantage and its 
belief that this standard should be a 
universal norm for all countries. 

It is not enough, however, simply to 
proclaim a nonproliferation policy. That 
policy must bring results. And to bring 
results, it must first find support with 
the world's other nuclear suppliers. The 
day is long past when the United States 
could unilaterally dictate the terms and 
conditions of international nuclear com- 
merce. We no longer enjoy a monopoly 
over nuclear technology and the ability 
to supply or deny it as suits our in- 
terest. We are not even close to enjoy- 
ing this privileged position anymore. 

We must, therefore, face reality. If 
our nonproliferation policy is to succeed, 
we must persuade other countries of the 
benefits and desirability of supporting 
U.S. views on critical supply, safe- 
guards, and other nonproliferation 
issues. We are making good progress in 
this direction, and I am convinced that 
it offers by far the best road to insuring 
that the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
does not lead to further nuclear ex- 
plosives proliferation. 

And so, as a necessary complement 
to our strong nonproliferation policy, we 
are also committed to cooperation with 
other nations in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy under adequate 
safeguards and controls. 

Motivating Factors 

for Nuclear Development 

Many of the world's industrial and in- 
dustrializing nations have not been 
blessed with abundant domestic sources 
of fossil or other organic fuels. They 
regard the development of nuclear 
energy as vital to their national well- 
being and energy security needs. In 
order to exploit the potential of nuclear 
energy to the fullest, a very few of 
them— certain West European countries 
and Japan— have developed plans to 
reprocess spent fuel from existing 
nuclear power reactors and to use the 



separated plutonium as fuel to generate 
additional electric power. Their plans in- 
clude the development of breeder and 
other types of advanced reactors and 
the use of mixed plutonium oxide and 
uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in light water 
power reactors (so-called thermal 
recycle). 

The economic justification for these 
programs may be debatable. But 
economics is not the principal 
motivating factor. Much more important 
is a determination on the part of these 
countries to achieve the highest possible 
degree of self-sufficiency in energy pro- 
duction capability. The oil shocks of the 
1970s, along with other developments 
such as the sweeping changes that oc- 
curred in U.S. laws and policies in the 
late 1970s concerning U.S. nuclear ex- 
ports, have caused considerable uncer- 
tainties in the energy plans of other na- 
tions. These nations believe it essential 
to develop an energy infrastructure less 
vulnerable to the changing demands of 
outside energy suppliers. 

There are, of course, other moti- 
vating factors as well. Some countries 
with advanced nuclear programs regard 
reprocessing as a potentially important 
tool for managing nuclear waste, not 
just technologically but politically as 
well. In some countries, it is only the 
promise that nuclear waste will be 
reprocessed rather than stored in- 
definitely that permits governments to 
overcome opposition to their nuclear 
power programs on environmental 
grounds. In these countries U.S. opposi- 
tion to or interference with reprocessing 
would be regarded as jeopardizing not 
just some marginal adjunct to their 
nuclear programs but the programs 
themselves. 

These are serious concerns, just as 
Plutonium's potential for use in nuclear 
explosives is a serious concern. We have 
been faced with the need to develop a 
realistic policy that takes both sets of 
concerns into account. And I think we 
have managed to do this. 

Stated very succinctly, it is the 
policy of the United States not to seek 
to inhibit or set back such civil 
reprocessing and civil plutonium use in 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



countries with advanced nuclear power 
programs where it does not constitute a 
proliferation risk, provided that certain 
strict conditions and controls are 
maintained. 

The Reagan Administration 
recognizes full well that plutonium is a 
dangerous material, the use of which 
must be carefully controlled and 
safeguarded. The President has 
categorically reaffirmed our commitment 
to inhibiting the transfer of sensitive 
nuclear material where the danger of 
proliferation requires restraint. We 
believe that sensitive nuclear facilities 
and activities should be limited to those 
countries where their presence results 
in no significant risk of proliferation. We 
have urged that this view be accepted 
as an international norm. We have 
initiated and participated in a number of 
multilateral efforts to improve 
safeguards on plutonium and to reduce 
the risk of its use for nonpeaceful pur- 
poses. These have included efforts to 
revise and upgrade the Zangger commit- 
tee trigger list on exports of reprocess- 
ing equipment and close cooperation 
with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and other nations on 
developing more efficient and effective 
measures for safeguarding reprocessing 
plants and facilities where plutonium is 
present. 

We are thus alert to the potential 
risks and are at the forefront of efforts 
to minimize them. But at the same time 
we are simply not in a position to dic- 
tate or prescribe a policy on reprocess- 
ing and plutonium use to developed 
countries with advanced nuclear pro- 
grams that value the capability to use 
plutonium in meeting their future 
energy needs. 

Misconception About 
U.S. Consent Rights 

There is a misconception that the 
United States controls the world's 
plutonium and that all we have to do is 
say no and reprocessing and plutonium 
use will quickly come to an end. I would 
like to correct this misconception. In the 
case of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EUR ATOM), where much 
of the planning for breeder reactor 
development and thermal recycle is tak- 
ing place, the United States does not 
presently have consent rights over 
EURATOM's reprocessing of U.S.-origin 
spent fuel. According to a recent study 
by Mr. Myron Kratzer of International 



Energy Associates, Ltd., by the year 
2000, the EURATOM countries will 
have accumulated in spent fuel and in 
separated form more than 330 metric 
tons of fissile plutonium, none of it sub- 
ject to U.S. reprocessing controls. Even 
assuming a new or revised agreement 
for cooperation granting the U.S. con- 
sent rights over all U.S.-origin material, 
including material we have previously 
supplied as well as material we might 
supply in the future, nearly 290 of the 
330 metric tons will still not be subject 
to U.S. consent rights, because it will be 
derived from non-U. S. sources. I might 
note that these estimates are based on 
conservative assumptions regarding the 
rate of plutonium production in 
EURATOM from now until the end of 
the century. 

In the case of other advanced 
nuclear countries where the United 
States currently does enjoy consent 
rights, these rights apply only to a por- 
tion of the material now present or ex- 
pected to be present. According to Mr. 
Kratzer's study, by the year 2000, Japan 
will have accumulated 11.3 metric tons 
of fissile plutonium not subject to U.S. 
control, Spain 18.9 metric tons, Sweden 
2.4 metric tons, and Switzerland 4.2 
metric tons. 

The implication is clear: The United 
States has no legal basis, nor can it 
hope to acquire a legal basis, for pre- 
venting the advanced nuclear nations of 
Western Europe and Japan from using 
large quantities of plutonium in their 
thermal recycle or fast breeder-reactor 
programs. 

It has been argued, of course, that 
even in the absence of enforceable con- 
sent rights, the United States should 
seek to persuade these countries against 
plutonium use, if necessary, by exercis- 
ing other forms of leverage. But here 
too some hard facts must be reckoned 
with. 

Use of Plutonium for Energy 

The nations of EURATOM and Japan 
have repeatedly made clear that they 
regard plutonium use as essential, even 
crucial, to their civil energy plans. In- 
deed, they already have large invest- 
ments in reprocessing technology of 
their own; active programs of research, 
development, and demonstration for ad- 
vanced nuclear fuel cycles using 
plutonium; and sizable quantities of 
separated plutonium already available 
for use. They are intimately familiar 



with the arguments against civil 
plutonium use and they do not find 
them compelling. If, in the face of this 
clearly expressed determination on the 
part of EURATOM and Japan to pro- 
ceed on their present course, the United 
States was to attempt to dissuade them 
by resorting to pressure in this or other 
areas of our relationship, it would risk a 
serious unravelling of cooperation not 
only in nonproliferation matters but also 
in other areas equally vital to U.S. in- 
terest. The price could be heavy, indeed. 

It is sometimes argued that re- 
processing and use of plutonium in civil 
nuclear power programs by the in- 
dustrialized countries will set a "bad ex- 
ample" for countries with developing 
nuclear programs, which will inevitably 
seek to imitate the former in this 
regard. But it is by no means clear that 
a simple desire to emulate the in- 
dustrialized world has ever been the 
primary motivation for any Third World 
nuclear program. To the extent that 
emulation is a factor at all, it is much 
more likely to manifest itself as a desire 
to match a neighboring country's pro- 
gam step-for-step. And, more important- 
ly, there is no evidence that self-denial 
on the part of the industrialized world is 
likely to lead to similar forbearance on 
the part of Third World nations. It was 
analogously argued in the late 1970s 
that U.S. forbearance in reprocessing 
and civil plutonium use would prompt 
other countries with advanced nuclear 
programs to follow a similar path. 

Another argument of those who op- 
pose the present U.S. policy on 
reprocessing and plutonium use is that 
by encouraging such activities or at 
least permitting them to go forward it 
hastens the day when plutonium will be 
a commodity in routine commercial use 
and thus more susceptible to diversion 
or access by nuclear terrorists. It is 
sometimes added, as a corollary, that 
the present Administration is not doing 
enough to defend against nuclear 
terrorism. 

Protections for Plutonium 



' 



It 

i 



mil 
III 



It is true that increasing use of 
plutonium in civil nuclear power pro- 
grams poses new challenges for pro- 
viding adequate safeguards and physical m 
protection. But we believe these 
challenges can be met. The United 
States has taken the lead in developing 
improved physical protection techniques 
requisite to insure that plutonium will 



■:., 
It 

'<■'■' 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



; fall into terrorist hands. Plutonium 
'lot just another commodity, and it is 
, and will not be treated as such. 
As to the Administration's position 
nuclear terrorism, we regard it as a 
ientially very grave threat to the na- 
n's security. We have taken and will 
itinue to take the necessary and ap- 
)priate steps to prevent nuclear ter- 
ism. It was at the initiative of the 
Bcutive branch that Congress enacted 
igh criminal legislation in 1982 to 
;er potential terrorist acts involving 
clear material. Internationally, the 
Iministration has worked vigorously to 
Dmote agreement among the major 
clear suppliers to require adequate 
ysical security measures as a condi- 
n for their nuclear exports. And it is 
■ongly urging all countries that have 
t yet signed and/or ratified the Con- 
ntion on the Physical Protection of 
iclear Material to do so at the earliest 
ssible date. 

I iplementing U.S. Policy 

f t me turn now to the ways in which 
( ■ are implementing our policy on re- 
[ jcessing and plutonium use. We are 
| Dceeding with caution and prudence. 

We have continued the practice of 
| jvious Administrations of approving, 
i a case-by-case basis, requests by ad- 
i need nuclear countries, such as Japan 
i d Switzerland, to reprocess U.S.- 
ntrolled nuclear material for peaceful 
e in their civil nuclear programs. 

In addition, in the context of seeking 
w or amended agreements for co- 
eration that incorporate the more 
ingent nonproliferation conditions 
lied for by the Nuclear Nonprolifera- 
m Act, and in order to help restore 
nfidence in the United States as a 
Liable supplier, we have discussed 
th Japan and the countries of 
(J R ATOM certain long-term arrange- 
ents for reprocessing of material sub- 
ct to U.S. control and use of the 
tfived plutonium. 

More specifically, we have discussed 
ith Japan an advance-consent arrange- 
ent for reprocessing, retransfers for 
•processing, and use of plutonium from 
.S.-controlled material in a Japanaese 
•ogram for which we have sufficient in- 
rmation to make the necessary 
atutory determinations. Section 123 of 
le Atomic Energy Act provides that 
le President must make a determina- 
an that a proposed agreement will pro- 
ote, and will not constitute an 



unreasonable risk to, the common 
defense and security. In addition, we 
would not approve reprocessing and 
retransfers of plutonium for further use 
unless we determined that these ac- 
tivities would meet the requirements of 
Section 131 of the act, namely that they 
not be inimical to the common defense 
and security and not result in a signifi- 
cant increase in the risk of proliferation. 

We envisage that this advance- 
consent arrangement could include: 

• The retransfer of U.S.-origin spent 
fuel from Japan to facilities in France 
and the U.K. for reprocessing; 

• The reprocessing of U.S.-origin 
spent fuel at Japan's Tokai-Mura 
reprocessing plant as well as future 
reprocessing plants; 

• The use of U.S.-origin plutonium 
in Japan's breeder, advanced reactor, 
and thermal recycle programs; and 

• The return of U.S.-origin separ- 
ated plutonium from France and the 
U.K. to Japan for use in the Japanese 
program. 

With respect to EUR ATOM, the 
United States does not currently have a 
right of consent over the reprocessing of 
U.S.-origin material. In accordance with 
Section 404 of the Nuclear Nonprolifera- 
tion Act, we are seeking a new or 
amended agreement for cooperation 
with EURATOM containing, inter alia, 
such a right of consent. In the context 
of seeking this new or amended agree- 
ment, we have discussed with EURA- 
TOM arrangements for advance, long- 
term approvals for reprocessing and 
plutonium use that are essentially the 
same as those we have discussed with 
Japan. 

In the case of other countries with 
which we have cooperation agreements, 
we are prepared to offer advance con- 
sent for the transfer of U.S.-origin 
material to France and the United 
Kingdom for reprocessing in facilities 
for which we are able to make the 
necessary statutory determinations. By 
way of example, our new agreements 
for cooperation with Norway and 
Sweden, which entered into force last 
year, and our new agreement with 
Finland, which is now before the Con- 
gress, provide U.S. consent in advance 
to these countries to transfer material 
subject to the agreements to specified 
reprocessing facilities in the United 
Kingdom or France without rechecking 
with the United States prior to each 
transfer. In turn, Norway, Sweden, and 



Finland are required to keep records of 
any such transfers and to notify the 
United States of each one. They are also 
required to obtain prior confirmation 
from EURATOM that the material will 
be held within EURATOM subject to 
the U.S.-EURATOM agreement for 
cooperation, to retain legal control over 
any plutonium separated as a result of 
the transfer, and to obtain prior agree- 
ment for any subsequent transfers to 
another country or for any use of the 
plutonium. 

It should be noted that these U.S. 
offers of advance, long-term consent 
have only been made subject to the 
stringent conditions in new or amended 
agreements for cooperation continuing 
to be met, including adequate safe- 
guards and physical security. Moreover, 
before entering into such an arrange- 
ment, we carefully review whether 
authorizing these activities will result in 
a significant increase in the risk of pro- 
liferation beyond that existing at the 
time the approval is requested, giving 
foremost consideration to whether the 
reprocessing or transfer will take place 
under conditions that would insure 
timely warning to the United States of 
any diversion. We also retain the ability 
to terminate the arrangement if we ever 
judge these conditions no longer to be 
met. 

It is our policy, finally, to permit the 
export of sensitive U.S. reprocessing 
technology and equipment to Japan and 
EURATOM provided that the necessary 
statutory requirements and Nuclear 
Supplier Group guidelines are satisfied 
and provided that the recipient has a 
continuing commitment to nonprolifera- 
tion and to strengthening IAEA safe- 
guards and physical protection measures 
at facilities using or deemed to be 
derived from the U.S. -supplied sensitive 
technology or equipment. This policy, 
too, does no more than recognize reality. 
Japan and several EURATOM countries 
are building and will continue to build 
these facilities with or without U.S. 
technology and equipment. Our maxi- 
mum attainable objective thus becomes 
to insure the strongest possible safe- 
guards and physical protection. Our 
direct involvement in helping design and 
equip the facilities will help us to 
achieve our objective in two ways: It 
gives us some standing to express our 
views, and it makes U.S. expertise 
available to help accomplish the 
objective. 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



® 



Let me make a few general observa- 
tions regarding our overall policy: 

First, it is not one that endorses or 
encourages the spread of reprocessing 
and civil plutonium use. Rather, it is 
one that recognizes that certain major 
civil nuclear programs involving 
reprocessing and plutonium use already 
exist in countries with advanced nuclear 
programs posing no proliferation risk, 
that these programs will go forward 
regardless of any U.S. attempt at 
dissuasion, and that a more realistic 
course is, therefore, to work with these 
select countries to help improve 
safeguards and controls over the sen- 
sitive technology and materials that 
they are using. 

Second, it is not a radical departure 
from past practice. The previous two 
Administrations, as well as the present 
one, have acted favorably on requests 
by certain West European countries and 
Japan for U.S. consent to reprocessing. 
These requests have pertained to the 
reprocessing of U.S.-origin fuels by 
Japan at Tokai-Mura and the shipment 
of spent fuel from Japan and a few 
other advanced countries to France or 
the United Kingdom for reprocessing. 
Some of the U.S. approvals, although 
not contained in agreements for coopera- 
tion, have run for a number of years 
and have not been limited to specific 
quantities of nuclear material. For ex- 
ample, the U.S. approvals for Japanese 
reprocessing of U.S.-origin material at 
Tokai-Mura have permitted reprocessing 
of U.S.-origin fuel for the Japanese 
research and development program over 
a several-year period. 



Third, it is a policy that makes 
rational distinctions between close allies 
and friends that have advanced nuclear 
programs, share our nonproliferation ob- 
jectives, and pose no proliferation risk, 
on the one hand, and countries that 
could or do pose such a risk, on the 
other. We continue to seek to inhibit the 
spread of sensitive materials and tech- 
nology to countries and regions where 
there is a risk of proliferation. 

In sum, ours is a carefully cir- 
cumscribed, measured, and restrained 
policy that we believe will substantially 
increase the ability of the United States 
to influence foreign nuclear programs in 
ways that will help us to achieve our 
nonproliferation goals. It is a policy con- 
sistent with the approaches adopted by 
Canada and Australia, counties that 
have strong nonproliferation policies 
and, like the United States, insist on 
consent rights as part of their nuclear 
export policies. 

I would like to close with a few 
additional thoughts on the theme of con- 
stancy in U.S. policy. It is quite ap- 
parent that the sharp turns in U.S. 
nuclear policy in recent years have led 
to serious friction with our nuclear 
trading partners and a consequent 
decline in our ability to win their sup- 
port for important nonproliferation ob- 
jectives. Only now, after several years 
of determined effort and relative sta- 
bility in our policies, are we beginning 
to reestablish the United States as a 
predictable and reliable partner for 
peaceful nuclear cooperation under a 



regime of adequate safeguards and con- II 
trols. It would damage the national 
interest to jeopardize these hard-won 
gains by taking actions that would 
prompt our close nuclear trading part- 
ners once again to question the con- 
stancy and reliability of the United 
States as a partner in peaceful nuclear 
cooperation. 

I cannot emphasize too strongly tha| ' 
a successful nuclear policy must procee< 
from a basis of mutual respect and 
trust. The confidence of our allies and 
friends in the nuclear area is vital. We 
must be able to work with them if we 
are to strengthen the nonproliferation 
regime. 

Some may argue that our ability to 
work with others counts for little if it 
does not induce them to forego pluto- 
nium use. But such an "all-or-nothing" 
attitude is shortsighted and lacks appre^ 
ciation of the possibilities open to us. 
Our leverage, though certainly limited, 
can pay substantial dividends if realist! 
ally applied. Only if we indicate a will- 
ingness to understand the needs and ob 
jectives of our friends and allies, we cai B < 
expect them to work with us to assure 
needed stringent safeguards and secu- 
rity for plutonium use. We are con- 
vinced that this is the course most like 
to result in the ever stronger nonpro- 
liferation regime we seek. 



SI 



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a 

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lt( 



•The complete transcript of the hearing? 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offic 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



tEFUGEES 



J.S. Refugee Program in Southeast Asia 



■ James N. Purcell, Jr. 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
ti Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
louse Foreign Affairs Committee on 
lily 31, 1985. Mr. Purcell is Director of 
ie Bureau for Refugee Programs. 1 

Ihank you for this opportunity to testify 
lifore you today on the most recent 
|;velopments in the U.S. refugee pro- 
ram in Southeast Asia. The humani- 
lirian response of the American Govern- 
[ent and the American people to the 
[agic plight of the Indochinese refugees 
being communist oppression over the 
list 10 years has been exemplary. On 
pril 25, 1985, Secretary of State Shultz 
I ated in his address to State Depart- 
ent employees marking the 10th an- 
versary of the fall of South Vietnam: 

The work of people in this Department 
Lis saved countless lives. Your dedication to 
■e refugees of Indochina marks one of the 
lining moments of the Foreign Service. 

Over the last 10 years persons asso- 
ated with the U.S. refugee program 
kve compiled a distinguished list of ac- 
implishments on behalf of the Indo- 
linese refugees. 

• Since April 1975, we have brought 
> the United States more than 700,000 
idochinese refugees— who for the most 
art have successfully integrated them- 
;lves into American society. 

• Since 1980, we have accepted for 
^settlement over 35,000 people from 
ietnam under the UNHCR's [United 
ations High Commissioner for Refu- 
ees] orderly departure program— many 
f whom might have otherwise been 
impted to undertake the dangerous 
»andestine escape from Vietnam by 
oat. 

• Last September, the Secretary an- 
ounced on behalf of President Reagan 

major initiative to bring out of Viet- 
am all of the Amerasian children and 
he "reeducation camp" political prison- 
irs. Unhappily, the President's humani- 
arian gesture on behalf of the political 
trisoners has not yet been accepted by 
he Vietnamese. But I assure you we 
vill continue to press for the release of 
hese persons who are of such profound 
lumanitarian concern. 

• With regard to the Amerasian 
:hildren, the results have been particu- 
arly noteworthy. In fiscal year 1983, 



■ 




(UNHCR photo by G. Mann/Lensman) 



1,350 Amerasians and their close 
families were released from Vietnam 
whereas— due to our continued efforts— 
this year about 4,000 will be accepted 
for admission to the United States. 

• Meanwhile, we have succeeded in 
getting the Vietnamese to allow 38 
former political prisoners plus 127 
family members to leave Vietnam so far 
this year. And we will continue to press 
the Vietnamese to allow an increasing 
number of these persons to leave Viet- 
nam for resettlement and reunion with 
their families in the United States. 

• By contributing about $250 million 
in relief assistance, the United States 
has played the leading role in averting a 
serious famine in Cambodia and in pro- 
viding life-sustaining assistance to the 
Khmer people forced to live a precarious 
existence along the Thai border by the 
Vietnamese Army. 

• Our refugee assistance and reset- 
tlement programs have been an essen- 
tial element in maintaining regional 
stability and strengthening the security 
of our friends and allies in the Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). 

• With the particular support of this 
committee, we have been at the fore- 
front working with the UN High Com- 
missioner for Refugees and the Thai 
Government in the development and 
continued improvement of programs to 
combat the complex problem of pirate 
attacks on helpless refugees in the Gulf 
of Thailand— programs that are showing 
progress. 

• In addition, over the last 5 years 
we have put into place at relatively low 
cost the largest and possibly finest 
English-as-a-second-language and cul- 
tural orientation program in the world. 
As a direct result, Indochinese refugees 
admitted to the United States are enter- 
ing better prepared to become fully pro- 
ductive and self sufficient members of 
the cities and communities in which they 
now reside. 

Much of the credit for these accom- 
plishments must go to the various inter- 
national organizations, private voluntary 
agencies, and concerned individuals who 
have made innumerable sacrifices on 
behalf of refugees. Unfortunately, while 
the efforts have been great, serious 
problems remain to be resolved. There 
are important refugee issues in South- 
east Asia— involving the lives and well- 
being of thousands of persons— which we 



REFUGEES 



must continue to address. I know that 
these are as much of a concern to you 
and your committee as they are to me 
and my bureau. 

First of all, there is the issue of the 
processing of the Khmer refugees. Al- 
though the U.S. refugee program has 
completed formal processing of Khmer 
refugees, resettling 120,000 of the 
original 165,000 under the UNHCR's 
mandate in Thailand, the revised system 
that was formalized in February of this 
year for the review of cases that have 
been denied resettlement remains in 
effect and reviews are continuing. This 
review system is just and equitable and 
in accordance with U.S. immigration and 
refugee law. Persons not accepted by 
the U.S. program, or by other resettle- 
ment countries, remain at the Khao-I- 
Dang refugee holding center. Also in 
this camp are 4,400 so-called "family 
cardholders" who were registered by 
Thai officials in August 1984 but have 
not yet been permitted by the Thai 
authorities to apply for resettlement. 

In September, 1984 we requested of 
the Thai that these persons be made 
available for interviewing by the United 
States and other resettlement countries. 
These cardholders receive food and 
medical services. In addition, another 
5,000 unregistered Khmer who entered 
Khao-I-Dang after August 1984 remain 
in the camp. They are considered illegal 
entrants by the Thai and are subject to 
return to the evacuation sites estab- 
lished for Cambodians driven into Thai- 
land by Vietnamese attacks. 

Second, we must all be concerned 
about the future of the border Khmer. 
This year marks the sixth time these 
unfortunate people have had to be evac- 
uated into Thailand for safety. Unlike 
previous years, however, the current 
Vietnamese occupation of the border has 
rendered their safe return uncertain for 
the time being. The Royal Thai Govern- 
ment has generously permitted them 
temporary evacuation in Thailand until 
they can return with safety. We will 
follow future events carefully to see that 
their welfare is properly considered. 

We are continuing to support pro- 
grams for the 225,000 Cambodian dis- 
placed persons driven into Thailand 
from the Thai-Cambodian border. As 
you know, assistance for these people is 
coordinated by the UN Border Relief 
Operation (UNBRO), no doubt the most 
effective UN humanitarian operation in 
the world today. The visit of Secretary 
Shultz to one of the evacuation sites on 
July 9 underlined the longstanding com- 
mittment of the United States to assist 




(UNHCR photo) 



these displaced Khmer. There are a 
series of on-going concerns stemming 
from dislocation due to Vietnam's 
savage attacks— especially health, nutri 
tion, and sanitation. UNBRO, in coordi 
nation with the ICRC [International 
Committee of the Red Cross], is playing 
a de facto protection role in acting as a 
focal point for grievances and complaints 
concerning camp security and physical 
protection. We have consulted with the 
ICRC concerning increasing its legal 
protection role in this new situation for 
the Khmer. These steps, plus consulta- 
tions with the UN Secretary General's 
special representative— Dr. [Tatsuro] 
Kunugi— on facilitating voluntary repa- 
triation when appropriate, remove the 
need for UNHCR to become involved 
with this Khmer population. 

Third, we note the resolution 
offered by Congressman [Frank] Wolf 
and included in the House passed ver- 
sion of the foreign assistance authoriza- 
tion bill requires that the Secretary of 
State consider establishing a family 
reunification program for the border 
Khmer. As you know, the United 
States, other resettlement countries, 
and the Government of Thailand have 
been concerned that were resettlement 
offered to even a portion of this large 
population— under whatever name we 
choose to call it— many more Khmer 
would be drawn into Thailand in the 
hope of being resettled. Aside from the 
dangers they would face from Viet- 
namese military forces on the border, a 
major new influx might well lead the 
Thai Government to consider reversing 
its present policy of providing- tempo- 
rary asylum to the Khmer. However, 
because of our concern for reuniting 
families, we will continue to review 
family reunion possibilities and report 
the results of our review to the Con- 
gress at the upcoming refugee consulta- 
tion hearings in September. 

Fourth, after months of work with 
Thai and UNHCR officials, we are able 
to report that on July 1 the Thai Gov- 
ernment began to screen persons cross- 
ing the border from Laos in order to 
determine which of them should be 
recognized as refugees. The UNHCR 
participates in the screening interviews 
as an observer. Those Lao who are 
found not to be refugees are to be 
returned to Laos under the terms of a 
1979 border agreement between Thai- 
land and Laos. We hope that the screen 
ing process will provide an impartial 
review of those actually seeking asylum 
in Thailand and permit continuation of 
first asylum for those facing persecutior 
in Laos. 



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1 Finally, let me mention our inten- 
e work to strengthen international 
orts to combat pirate attacks on 
iigee boats— an effort to which you, 

Chairman, have devoted so much at- 
ltion. At our suggestion, the UNHCR 
3 established a four-person team 
ed in Bangkok devoted exclusively to 
tipiracy activities, and we have four 
rsons working full-time at the State 
partment and at the American Em- 
ssy in Bangkok to assist in this effort. 
e are beginning to see an upturn in 
ests and convictions of pirates. Im- 
oved counseling and medical services 

now available to the victims of 
rate attacks, and we would like to be 
ale to provide additional services to 
j?et their special needs after they have 
t rived in the United States. The fight 
; ainst piracy is far, far from over, but 
I ogress is being made. 

I As you can see, we have made great 
s -ides in relieving the tremendous suf- 
1 "ing of the Indochinese refugees and 
e are committed to work intensely on 

■ e remaining problems. We are proud 

■ this record of accomplishment and we 
e proud of our partners in this impor- 

■ nt enterprise— that is, the interna- 
mal organizations, the private volun- 
ry agencies, first asylum governments, 
nor nations and, of course, the Con- 
fess. That is why it is with great 

stress and grave worry that I must 
port to you today that recent congres- 
ma\ budget actions are threatening to 
idermine this important humanitarian 
ideavor. The House Appropriations 
oreign Operations Subcommittee has 
it $45 million from an already austere 
dministration budget request of $338 
illion for fiscal year 1986. In addition, 
le conference committee on the State 
athorization bill has levied a total of $9 
illion in earmarks to this budget re- 
aest. Therefore a total of $54 million 
ill have to be cut from vitally impor- 
int programs. 

But it gets worse. These programs 
re protected by the earmarks— total 
75.5 million of our budget request— and 
annot legally absorb any of these pro- 
posed reductions. This means that pro- 
rams not protected by any earmark 
vould have to absorb the $54 million 
tut. It is those refugee programs which 
ire of paramount interest to this sub- 
:ommittee: Indochinese refugee care and 
naintenance (including Khmer border 
■elief) and the U.S. refugee admissions 
which are over 70% Indochinese) are 
imong those programs which would suf- 
'er the most from these cuts. 




REFUGEES 



There is no way that the United 
States can operate a viable, Worldwide 
refugee program within the fiscal con- 
straints imposed by these congressional 
actions. Something has to gv/e. And, 
tragically what will have to give is the 
number of refugees we can admit— and 
the number of refugees we can help 
feed and clothe. 

• Refugee admissions to the United 
States would have to be reduced by 
about 15,000 persons, or about 22% of 
those proposed in the 1986 budget. If 
these cuts were evenly distributed 
among all the various geographic 
regions, the admissions from Indochina, 
including those from the orderly depar- 
ture program, would only amount to no 
more than 38,000 persons. Such a pre- 
cipitously large and sudden drop, I 
believe, would bring into serious ques- 
tion the U.S. role in first asylum preser- 
vation and the U.S. commitment to the 
orderly departure program. 

• In addition, refugee funds for 
relief and assistance abroad would be 
reduced to levels below subsistence and 
survival. We would be forced to reduce 
by approximately 30% below this year's 
level the U.S. contribution toward 
assistance (for food, shelter, and medi- 
cine) to refugees in Southeast Asia, in- 
cluding the Cambodians at the border; 
and relief and assistance to refugees in 
such sensitive areas as the Middle East, 
Pakistan, and Latin America would have 
to be similarly dropped by 15-20% to 
dangerously low levels. 

I understand the need of the execu- 
tive branch and the Congress to curb 
government spending and reduce the 
deficit. And, I do not want to sound like 
an alarmist. But I believe I have a 
responsibility to point out to this com- 
mittee that we must all acknowledge the 
special life-and-death nature of our 
refugee activities abroad and the 
responsibility to provide the minimal 
funds necessary to avert disaster. 

Because of the longstanding support 
which you and your colleagues on this 
committee have so steadfastly extended 
to the refugee program, I respectfully 
ask your assistance in assuring that the 
State Department receive appropriations 
sufficient to carry out the programs re- 
quested in the President's 1986 budget 
for refugee assistance. 



■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be publisned by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402.B 



TERRORISM 



UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Offers Reward 
for Information 
on Terrorist Attack 



WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, 
JULY 19, 1985' 

Today the U.S. Government announced 
a reward of up to $100,000 for informa- 
tion leading to the effective prosecution 
and punishment of those responsible for 
the murders of six U.S. citizens on June 
19, 1985, in San Salvador, El Salvador. 
Those with information in El Salvador 
should notify the investigating authori- 
ties of the Salvadoran Government. 
Those with information in the United 
States should notify the Office of Secu- 
rity, Department of State. Those with 
information in any other country should 
notify the nearest U.S. Embassy. Infor- 
mation received will be handled on a 
confidential basis, and the identities of 
informants will be protected. Officers or 
employees of any governmental organi- 
zation who furnish information while in 
performance of official duties are not 
eligible for the reward. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 22, 1985. 



Security Council Meets on 
Situation in South Africa 



Following are statements by Ambas- 
sador Vernon A. Walters, U.S. Perma- 
nent Representative to the United Na- 
tions, Warren Clark, Jr., U.S. alternate 
representative to the Security Council, 
members of the Security Council, and 
the text of Resolution 569. 



AMBASSADOR WALTERS, 
JULY 25, 1985' 

This is the fourth time in as many 
weeks that the Security Council has met 
to discuss issues relating to South 
Africa. Such a measure of the insecurity 
and violence that beleaguers the area, 
bringing anguish to so many. 

Today, however, we are not discuss- 
ing a military strike or the treatment of 
a government toward its own popula- 
tion. Such a discussion must focus on 
one overriding goal: What can the world 
community do to help abolish the sys- 
tem of apartheid, whereby a person— 
because he or she is not white— is deem- 
ed socially and politically inferior? 

My country underwent a terrible 
civil war to rid itself of institutionalized 
servitude and prejudice. Brother fought 
against brother until an abhorrent racial 
system was eliminated. We wish no 
country to undergo the same hemor- 
rhage of lives and talents that inevitably 
results when one man seeks to oppress 
another. 

Since the formal instigation of apart- 
heid, the United States has sought— in a 
variety of ways— to encourage the 
leaders in Pretoria toward a truly 
humane government. There are those in 
this room, who, while sharing our objec- 
tives, criticize our means. They say we 
have not done enough to pressure the 
South African Government on its inter- 
nal policies and that no significant 
change can be effected without totally 
isolating Pretoria economically and 
politically. 

The United States firmly believes, 
however, that such isolation will lead to 
more bloodshed, to increased autarky of 
the South African economy, a curtail- 
ment of external influence to effect 
change, and, in the end, to greater suf- 
fering for the very people we are all 
trying to help. 

The United States condemns un- 
equivocally the system of apartheid. The 
Administration of President Reagan 



holds apartheid directly responsible for 
the tragic events occurring at this time 
in South Africa. Particularly under the 
present state of emergency, we look to 
the South African Government to exer- 
cise its responsibilities in a manner 
which respects the fundamental rights 
of all South Africans. The violence and 
deaths must end now, so that South 
Africans can proceed to a meaningful 
dialogue leading to urgent, fundamental 
reforms and an end to the system of 
apartheid. 

My government has, on numerous 
occasions over the years, conveyed to 
the South African Government— in 
public and private— our firm convictions 
that apartheid will sooner or later lead 
the country into chaos. To underscore 
the seriousness of our conviction, we 
have undertaken various measures. For 
example, in an effort to eliminate apart- 
heid, U.S. arms sales to South Africa 
have been embargoed since 1963, and ir 
1977 the United States joined the 
United Nations in imposing a further 
mandatory arms embargo on South 
Africa. Our regulations are, in fact, 
more severe than the UN embargo and 
restrict U.S. exports to the South 
African military and police, for items 
not covered in the UN embargo. In 
December of last year, the United 
States joined with other UN Security 
Council members in voting for an em- 
bargo on imports of arms and ammuni- 
tion produced in South Africa. We have 
recalled our Ambassador to Pretoria foi 
consultations. 

Our commercial relationship is now 
also restricted. We extend no official 
credits to South Africa. The Export- 
Import Bank is essentially prohibited 
from financing U.S. sales to South 
Africa except under very restrictive cir 
cumstances. The Overseas Private In- 
vestment Corporation does not provide 
investment guarantees for South Africa 
Our representative at the International 
Monetary Fund must "actively oppose 
any facility involving use of fund credit 
by any country which practices apart- 
heid" unless the Secretary of the 
Treasury makes certain certification to 
Congress. U.S. trade fairs do not travel 
to South Africa. We carefully review e: 
port license applications for the export 
of, among other things, U.S. crime con- 
trol equipment to prevent the use of 
such items in the enforcement of 
apartheid. 



»■ 



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■:. 






UNITED NATIONS 



My government has, on numerous 
casions over the years, conveyed to 
e South African Government— in 
iblic and private— our firm conviction 
at apartheid will sooner or later lead 
e country into chaos. To underscore 
e seriousness of our conviction, we 
ive undertaken various measures. For 
ample, in an effort to eliminate apart- 
id, U.S. arms sales to South Africa 
ive been embargoed since 1963, and in 
'77 the United States joined the 
nited Nations in imposing a further 
andatory arms embargo on South 
frica. Our regulations are, in fact, 
ore severe than the UN embargo and 
^strict U.S. exports to the South 
frican military and police, for items 
)t covered in the UN embargo. In 
ecember of last year, the United 
tates joined with other UN Security 
ouncil members in voting for an em- 
irgo on imports of arms and ammuni- 
on produced in South Africa. We have 
;called our Ambassador to Pretoria for 
msultations. 

Our commercial relationship is now 
so restricted. We extend no official 
•edits to South Africa. The Export- 
nport Bank is essentially prohibited 
om financing U.S. sales to South 
frica except under very restrictive cir- 
amstances. The Overseas Private In- 
estment Corporation does not provide 
lvestment guarantees for South Africa, 
'ur representative at the International 
Ionetary Fund must "actively oppose 
ny facility involving use of fund credit 
y any country which practices apart- 
eid" unless the Secretary of the 
Veasury makes certain certifications to 
I Jongress. U.S. trade fairs do not travel 
o South Africa. We carefully review ex- 
'Ort license applications for the export 
f, among other things, U.S. crime con- 
rol equipment to prevent the use of 
uch items in the enforcement of 
ipartheid. 

My government seeks to eradicate 
ipartheid by employing the full power 
)f its diplomacy, by working with 
dements in South Africa that share a 
/ision of peace and harmony, by en- 
:ouraging fair employment practices for 
U.S. companies there, and by involving 
ourselves in financing programs ($30 
million in 3 years) to give South African 
blacks better training and opportunities. 
We are joined by Americans from many 
walks of life— our companies, which are 
spending millions of dollars to aid the 
black working man in South Africa, our 
press, civic organizations, and other 
bodies. In short, U.S. policy has teeth. 

Furthermore, we believe our actions 
have had an effect but that extreme 



measures will not produce the desired 
results. We are not convinced, however, 
that certain elements of the resolution 
under consideration are suitable means 
of discouraging apartheid; it can only 
disrupt the functioning of an economy 
that has in recent years been increas- 
ingly open to blacks and has given them 
growing power to eliminate apartheid. 
Between now and the end of the cen- 
tury, the black population of South 
Africa will double, and thousands of 
Africans from neighboring states will 
seek employment as they do now. 

The United States will continue to 
speak out and act against oppression in 
South Africa. The dignity of mankind is 
at stake. The situation in South Africa 
is dangerous. Lives are at stake. It is 
time for the international community to 
act responsibly and to use its influence 
constructively, not to take actions that 
will have the opposite effect from those 
intended. We call on all states to join 
with us in responsible and constructive 
actions. 

SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 569, 
JULY 26, 1985 2 

The Security Council, 

Deeply concerned at the worsening of the 
situation in South Africa and at the continu- 
ance of the human suffering that the apart- 
heid system, which it strongly condemns, is 
causing in that country, 

Outraged at the repression, and condemn- 
ing the arbitrary arrests of hundreds of 
persons, 

Considering that the imposition of the 
state of emergency in 36 districts of the 
Republic of South Africa constitutes a grave 
deterioration in the situation in that country, 

Considering as totally unacceptable the 
use by the South African Government of 
detention without trial and forcible removal, 
as well as the discriminatory legislation in 
force, 

Acknowledging the legitimacy of the 
aspirations of the South African population as 
a whole to benefit from all civil and political 
rights and to establish a united, non-racial 
and democratic society, 

Acknowledging further that the very 
cause of the situation in South Africa lies in 
the policy of apartheid and the practices of 
the South African Government, 

1. Strongly condemns the apartheid 
system and all the policies and practices 
deriving therefrom; 

2. Strongly condemns the mass arrests 
and detentions recently carried out by the 
Pretoria Government and the murders which 
have been committed; 

3. Strongly condemns the establishment 
of the state of emergency in the 36 districts 
in which it has been imposed and demands 
that it be lifted immediately; 



4. Calls -upon the South African Govern- 
ment to set free immediately and uncondi- 
tionally all political prisoners and detainees, 
first of all Mr. Nelson Mandela; 

5. Reaffirms that only the total elimina- 
tion of apartheid and the establishment in 
South Africa of a free, united and democratic 
society on the basis of universal suffrage can 
lead to a solution; 

6. Urges States Members of the Organi- 
zation to adopt measures against South 
Africa, such as the following: 

(a) Suspension of all new investment in 
South Africa; 

(b) Prohibition of the sale of krugerrands 
and all other coins minted in South Africa; 

(c) Restrictions in the field of sports and 
cultural relations; 

(d) Suspension of guaranteed export 
loans; 

(e) Prohibition of all new contracts in the 
nuclear field; 

(f) Prohibition of all sales of computer 
equipment that may be used by the South 
African army and police; 

7. Commends those States which have 
already adopted voluntary measures against 
the Pretoria Government and urges them to 
adopt new provisions, and invites those which 
have not yet done so to follow their example; 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to 
report to it on the implementation of the 
present resolution; 

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter 
and to reconvene as soon as the Secretary- 
General has issued his report, with a view to 
considering the progress made in the im- 
plementation of the present resolution. 

MR. CLARK, 
JULY 26, 1985 s 

The United States supports most of the 
elements in the resolution this Council 
has just enacted. The United States 
wants an end to the state of emergency 
in South Africa. Clearly, the underlying 
problem in South Africa is apartheid, 
and the impatience to see that system 
change underlies the current turmoil. 
The Government of South Africa must 
understand that the question is not 
whether, but how, apartheid is going to 
end. We reiterate our call for serious 
talks between the Government of South 
Africa and black leaders, aimed at estab- 
lishing a just society in South Africa. 

We will maintain our policy of con- 
structive engagement with South Afri- 
cans. If there is no voice of reason talk- 
ing with South Africa, it could lead to 
results that none of us would wish. 
However, as we said in our statement 
before this Council yesterday, we 
believe that actions to restrict new in- 
vestment in South Africa both under- 
mine the economy of that country and 
create additional hardships for blacks in 
South Africa. Isolating the South Afri- 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



can economy further with economic 
sanctions would only do more harm for 
the black majority in South Africa. 

SECURITY COUNCIL 
STATEMENT, 
AUG. 21, 1985 4 

The members of the Security Council, 
deeply alarmed by the worsening and 
deteriorating situation of the oppressed 
black majority population in South 
Africa since the imposition of the state 
of emergency on 21 July 1985, express 
once again their profound concern at 
this deplorable situation. 

The members of the Council con- 
demn the Pretoria regime for its con- 
tinued failure to heed the repeated ap- 
peals made by the international com- 
munity, including Security Council 
Resolution 569 of 26 July 1985, and in 
particular the demand made in that 
resolution for the immediate lifting of 
the state of emergency. 

The members of the Council 
strongly condemn the continuation of 
killings and the arbitrary mass arrests 
and detentions carried out by the 
Pretoria government. They call, once 
again, upon the South African Govern- 
ment to set free immediately and uncon- 
ditionally all political prisoners and de- 
tainees, first of all Mr. Nelson Mandela, 
whose home has lately been subjected to 
an act of arson. 

The members of the Council believe 
that a just and lasting solution in South 
Africa must be based on the total eradi- 
cation of the system of apartheid and 
the establishment of a free, united, and 
democratic society in South Africa. 
Without concrete action toward such a 
just and lasting solution in South Africa, 
any pronouncements of the Pretoria 
regime can represent nothing more than 
a reaffirmation of its attachment to 
apartheid and underline its continuing 
intransigence in the face of mounting 
domestic and international opposition to 
the continuation of this thoroughly un- 
justified political and social system. In 
this context, they express their grave 
concern at the latest pronouncements of 
the President of the Pretoria regime. 



'USUN press release 85. 

'Adopted by a vote of 13-0, with 2 ab- 
stentions (U.K. and U.S.). 

3 USUN press release 86. 

'Read on behalf of all 15 members of the 
ity Council by the Council's President 
for August, Soviet Ambassador Oleg 
Troyanovsky. ■ 



U.S. -Mexico Bilateral 
Commission Meets 



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tie 



Secretary Shultz headed the U.S. 
delegation to the fifth U.S. -Mexico 
Bilateral Commission meeting in Mex- 
ico City July 25-26, 1985. 

Following are his remarks at the 
opening session of the meeting and his 
statement before departing Mexico City. 



OPENING SESSION 
REMARKS, 
JULY 25, 1985 • 

All of us are pleased to be in Mexico 
again for a meeting of the U.S. -Mexico 
Binational Commission. This is my 
fourth visit in a little more than 7 years. 
Each visit has increased my admiration 
and respect for your culture, your hospi- 
tality, and for the graciousness and 
national pride of the Mexican people. 
Each visit has also confirmed my belief 
that constructive, cooperative, and 
friendly relations are of the utmost 
importance to both our governments 
and our people. 

U.S. Trade Representative Clayton 
Yeutter, Under Secretary of Commerce 
Bruce Smart, Assistant Secretary of 
State Elliott Abrams, Ambassador 
Harry Shlaudeman, Assistant Secretary 
of the Treasury David Mulford, Assist- 
ant Secretary Bernard Kalb, our new 
representatives, Ambassador to the 
OAS Richard McCormack, along with 
our Ambassador, of course, are here 
along with a supporting cast that sug- 
gests the importance that we attach to 
this meeting and this opportunity for an 
interchange with you. 

The meetings of the Binational Com- 
mission, the meetings of our two Presi- 
dents, and the extensive communica- 
tions, trade, and personal relationships 
between our countries show how two 
major nations can relate to one another 
in peace, friendship, and mutual respect. 
They show that we can successfully face 
and deal with issues that affect both 
countries. They are testament to the 
fact that Mexico is one of the most 
important nations in the world in the 
eyes of the United States. 

We find in our meetings that despite 
the asymmetry in our relationship, we 
do have much in common. On occasion 
we also have different perspectives on 
matters of common concern. What is 



important is that we maintain respect 
for the opinions of each other and that 
we seek to expand areas of cooperation, 
for the mutual benefit of our citizens. I 
That is the spirit in which we welcome 
today's meeting. 

There is no more important task for 
both our governments than to work 
together for peace and development in i 
this hemisphere. The nations of Central 
America are developing and have high 
prospects for the future. Unfortunately, 
outside forces are seeking to introduce 
totalitarianism and faulty economic doc- 
trines into the region, preventing 
change and hampering economic growth. 
The United States strongly supports 
democratic reform and equitable social 
and economic development. Conse- 
quently, our economic assistance to Cen-i 
tral America this year will be almost 
$1 billion, an indicator of our belief that 
economic progress is essential to peace 
and stability. 

But the problems of Central 
America are being exacerbated by 
Soviet and Cuban attempts, working 
through Nicaragua, to undermine 
elected governments. We are deter- 
mined to help the peaceful nations of 
the region defend themselves from such 
intervention. We do not seek a military 
solution. Rather the United States 
strongly supports the efforts of the Con^ 
tadora nations to bring about a peaceful 
settlement. 

In our view, a durable peace in Cen- 
tral America requires a comprehensive, 
verifiable, regional agreement encom- 
passing all the 21 points of the Con- 
tadora document of objectives, which all 
the countries have accepted, including 
particularly that of national reconcilia- 
tion in a democratic framework. Mexico 
and the United States can work 
together to promote such an outcome. 

Since the last Binational Commission 
meeting in April 1984, we have achieved 
major progress in strengthening trade 
and investment relations to our mutual 
benefit. This April the U.S.-Mexican 
subsidies agreement was signed, a land- 
mark accomplishment which will facili- 
tate Mexico's trade with the United 
States. 

We also agreed to begin negotiation 
of a bilateral framework agreement on 
trade and investment. This is an oppor- 



101 

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«ty to expand our trade and invest- 
ojit relationship and to improve the 
ftiency of our economies in a com- 
■tive world. It will require under- 
lding and flexibility on both sides to 
:h an agreement. We will approach 
se discussions with a positive spirit. 
The United States will continue to 
k with Mexico and other nations to 
er the economic growth necessary to 
e standards of living and to reduce 
burden of debt. Experience demon- 
tes that development and growth 
come only to countries with sound 
lestic policies that stimulate savings, 
mote trade, and attract external 
jurces. Mexico has become an exam- 
to other countries for its intelligent, 
■iplined effort to restore its economy, 
we look forward to further conver- 
ons about your most recent policies. 
We have made significant progress 
r the past year in cooperating on dif- 
lt border environmental problems. 
I are particularly encouraged by the 
B iroach agreed upon under our border 
\ ironment agreement, which is a first 
| p toward resolving the problem of 
I ;er pollution in the Tijuana-San Diego 
I a. It will be important to move 
j mptly and effectively with the imple- 
I ntation of this agreement to benefit 
: zens on both sides of the border. 
', cussions are well underway to 
t tress this and other environmental 
i 'blems along the border. 
Both Mexico and the United States 
'e taken casualties in the battle 
«iinst vicious and destructive narcotics 
ffickers. Money, greed, and power 

■ their driving principles, and they 

■ a corrosive influence on individuals, 
lilies, and governments. They 
eaten the very foundations of civil- 

d nations. There is no higher priority 
my government than to rid society 
these criminals. We will not be intimi- 
;ed, nor will we rest until we have 
.•omplished this objective. We intend 
discuss during my meeting today 
iys to increase the effectiveness of our 
jperation against drug trafficking and 
aduction. 

There are many other matters of 
itual concern which we will discuss 
iay. They include fisheries, maritime 
undaries, bridges and border cross- 
es, law enforcement cooperation, and 
e safety of U.S. and Mexican citizens 
len they visit each other's country. As 
our previous meetings, I am confident 
at we will achieve progress on these 
itters. 



As we discuss the issues and prob- 
lems, it is important that we not forget 
that there is a vast amount of daily 
ongoing cooperation between the United 
States and Mexico that proceeds 
smoothly and efficiently. The U.S.- 
Mexico Boundary and Water Commis- 
sion is a model for all nations of suc- 
cessful international cooperation. 

Every day hundreds of thousands of 
our citizens cross our borders on 
legitimate pursuits. The U.S.-Mexican 
prisoner exchange agreement is an 
effective and humane arrangement. We 
cooperate in planning for how to deal 
with natural disasters, should they occur 
in our border areas. Steady progress is 
occurring on bridges and border cross- 
ings such as the recently opened Otay 
Mesa crossing and the nearly completed 
bridge at Presidio. These are only a few 
of many examples. 

Both our nations and our people can 
be proud of what we have achieved 
through discussion, cooperation, and 
friendship. I am confident that this 
meeting of the U.S.-Mexican Binational 
Commission will continue in that spirit 
and further contribute to our good 
relations. 



DEPARTURE STATEMENT, 
JULY 26, 1985 2 

My thanks to President De la Madrid 
and Foreign Secretary Sepulveda for 
their gracious hospitality and for the 
opportunity to discuss thoroughly our 
mutual concerns and interests. The 
meeting of the U.S. -Mexico Binational 
Commission demonstrates that our rela- 
tions are mature, respectful, and friend- 
ly. We discussed the full range of issues 
and made significant progress on many 
of them. 

We devoted considerable attention 
to trade and investment issues, an area 
in which much progress had been made 
recently. The presence of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, Clayton Yeutter, 
and Under Secretary of Commerce 
Bruce Smart demonstrates the impor- 
tance which we attach to this subject. 
We agreed that we should move for- 
ward promptly to build on the subsidies 
agreement signed last April by nego- 
tiating a framework agreement on trade 
and investment. A working group will 
meet in September, and there will be 
two other meetings on specific trade 
issues in August. We believe that such 
an agreement will bring major trading 
benefits for both countries. 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



We are especially pleased by the 
progress made recently in dealing with 
a number of environmental problems 
along the U.S.-Mexican border. We 
reviewed the results of the very suc- 
cessful environmental meeting held 
recently in San Diego where steps were 
announced to resolve the problem of 
sewage flows which threaten the health 
of residents of Tijuana and San Diego. 
A cooperative approach was also agreed 
upon to deal with the serious problem of 
air pollution from copper smelters along 
the border of the States of Arizona and 
Sonora. This cooperation is further 
evidence of our ability to resolve dif- 
ficult problems in a spirit of friendship 
and respect. 

The problems of narcotics are of 
transcendant importance to us both. We 
reaffirmed our commitment to increas- 
ing cooperation and improved results in 
combatting illegal drug trafficking, and 
we look forward to Attorney General 
Meese's visit with Attorney General 
Garcia Ramirez in Mexico City in 
August. We will not rest until the 
abhorrent narcotics problem is done 
away with. We appeal to the rest of our 
friends in the hemisphere to join us in 
our efforts to end this scourge. 

In discussing Mexico's economy, we 
recognize that Mexico has made a sus- 
tained effort under strong leadership 
over a period of years to adjust its 
economy and reestablish growth. Signifi- 
cant progress has been accomplished 
under difficult international economic 
conditions, requiring significant sacri- 
fices by the Mexican people, and we are 
heartened to see Mexico's determination 
to continue. We welcome the significant 
economic and financial measures 
announced on July 22nd by President 
De la Madrid and believe these repre- 
sent a solid step forward as Mexico 
adjusts its program to changing inter- 
national and domestic conditions. We 
also look forward to efforts by Mexico 
to broaden its economy for future 
growth through more open policies 
encouraging savings and investment. 

We discussed cooperation in the up- 
coming space shuttle flight, in which a 
Mexican scientist will participate. 

We also exchanged views on the sit- 
uation in Central America. We agreed 
that it is important to us to cooperate in 
support of a peaceful political solution to 
the Central American crisis. I would 
like to elaborate on this point, to make 
our position clear. 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



-V 



The United States fully supports 
efforts to achieve a political solution to 
the Central American crisis. We have 
given strong support to the efforts of 
the Central Americans themselves, 
assisted by the Contadora group, to 
achieve a negotiated settlement. In our 
view there exists in the Contadora docu- 
ment of objectives a fair, comprehen- 
sive, and balanced framework for such 
an outcome. We expressed our support 
for a comprehensive and verifiable 
implementation of the document of 
objectives when it was agreed in 
September 1983. We reaffirm that sup- 
port today. 

The Contadora process is the most 
appropriate vehicle for achieving a 
political solution because it aims not 
only to reduce tensions among states 
but to promote democratic national 
reconciliation within states. This is abso- 
lutely vital. In the absence of national 
reconciliation in a democratic 
framework, no treaty will produce a 
lasting peace. 

Last year the United States held 
nine rounds of bilateral conversations 
with the Government of Nicaragua. Our 
purpose was to reach understandings 
that could be channeled into the Con- 
tadora process and thereby facilitate a 
successful outcome. 



Nicaragua's purpose then, as now, 
was to negotiate bilateral accords deal- 
ing on a priority basis only with its 
security concerns. The Nicaraguan com- 
munists refused then, as they refuse 
now, even to consider dialogue with the 
Nicaraguan democratic resistance. These 
conflicting purposes were never recon- 
ciled and hindered progress from the 
start. 

The United States ultimately con- 
cluded that the talks were detracting 
from instead of contributing to a com- 
prehensive Contadora agreement. In 
deciding in January of this year not to 
schedule further meetings, we made it 
clear that we were not closing the door 
to their possible resumption under 
appropriate conditions. On June 11, the 
President made public his readiness to 
have U.S. representatives meet with 
representatives of Nicaragua when such 
a meeting would promote a church- 
mediated dialogue between the contend- 
ing factions in Nicaragua and a 
workable Contadora agreement. 

Earlier this week, the Foreign 
Ministers of Mexico, Panama, Vene- 
zuela, and Colombia called for resump- 
tion of the Manzanillo talks. We have 
given this appeal full and serious con- 
sideration because we share the Con- 
tadora group's concern to achieve peace 



Current Challenges Facing the OAS 



by Richard T. McCormack 

Address before the Organization, of 
American States Permanent Council on 
August 21, 1985. Ambassador McCor- 
mack is U.S. Permanent Representative 
to the OAS. 

I am honored to be here today to join 
this distinguished company, to work 
with you on the serious issues which 
confront this hemisphere. I want to talk 
to you about the well-being and security 
of this hemisphere and the role that I 
think the Organization of American 
States ran play to advance the collective 
interests of the 600 million people we 
represent. 

During the past 5 years, I have 
visited more than 20 countries, some of 
them several times. I have been in hun- 
dreds of cities and towns and talked 
with thousands of the citizens of the 



Americas about their hopes and fears, 
their problems and accomplishments, 
and the challenges we all face. I want to 
discuss with you some of those 
challenges as I see them. 

Democracy 

First, the peoples of the Americas— both 
north and south— have spoken strongly 
for democracy. In almost every country 
in this hemisphere, there are freely 
elected governments. 

This is a time of triumph for the 
peoples of the Americas and the prin- 
ciples for which this organization has 
been the chief draftsman and exponent. 
Democracy has not always been the 
norm as all of us well know. It is our 
first and most important challenge that 
democracy succeed in every country in 
this hemisphere. We must, for example, 
assure that the commitment which the 



in Central America. We do not believe.) 
however, that the appropriate cir- 
cumstances exist at this time. 

We will continue to consult closely 
with all parties with a view to judging * 
the appropriateness of resumption of 
bilateral talks. We strongly urge 
Nicaragua to begin a church-mediated 
dialogue as proposed by the unified 
Nicaraguan opposition and to return to 
multilateral negotiations within the Corlt 
tadora process to continue work on a 
comprehensive and verifiable regional I: 
accord. 

In conclusion, I want to emphasize t 
that U.S. -Mexican discussions within thi 
Binational Commission are important t<|> 
the maintenance of open, positive, and |j 
friendly relations. Neighboring countrnir 
will always face important issues. Our 
desire is to deal with them construc- 
tively and to resolve them. Our 
meetings yesterday and today had that 
objective. Our fruitful discussions here 
are an indication of our healthy relatioi 
ship and ability to deal with common 
problems in our societies. 

I believe we made useful strides to 
strengthen our relationship and we loo 
forward to a meeting between our 
Presidents later this year. 



1 Press release 191 of July 26, 1985. 

2 Press release 195A of Aug. 14. ■ 



present Nicaraguan Government made 
in this room to free and democratic 
governments is honored. We represent 
governments here and act on the in- 
structions of those governments. But 
we, who are the present custodians of 
this house of the Americas, must let tl 
people of this hemisphere know that w 
have heard their voice and that we tn 
believe in the self-determination of 
peoples. You can be confident that my 
government will do everything it can 
toward that end. 



Economic Growth 

Second, there is the challenge of 
economic growth. This hemisphere ha: 
remarkable record. This hemisphere S' 
a goal in the 1960s to grow at 2.5% pi 
capita gross domestic product through 
the 1960s and 1970s. We surpassed tha 
goal, going from 5.3% in the early 196( 



h 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



6% in the 1966-70 period and then to 
% from 1971 to 1974. In two decades, 
:ording to data of the Inter-American 
velopment Bank, the Latin American 
mtries tripled their gross domestic 
)duct from $200 billion in 1960 to over 
18 billion by 1981. In every economic 
itor, there was growth. 
This growth has translated into bet- 

!• living for our peoples. As the Inter- 
nerican Bank points out, in this 
■year period, potable water supplies 
reased from 40% to 75% in urban 
»as or from 41 to 168 million people 
nefiting. Life expectancy increased, 
Id infant mortality dropped from 9.2 
Ir thousand to 7.2 per thousand. While 
■pulation was increasing by 70 million, 
limary education advanced by 186%, 
p^ondary by 354% and university 
^ucation by 782%. From the very 
ljungest to the very oldest, the record 
| the Americas in the past two decades 
p s been one of hope and opportunity. 
I Today, the countries of Latin 
Jnerica are going through some diffi- 
i.t times, but no one should doubt the 
i jacity of this hemisphere to solve its 
jblems. Working together we can 
ercome any obstacle and provide our 
oples with freedom and opportunity. 
For the past 3 years, I have been 
eply involved with the international 
jnomic policies in my government, 
d I have lived with the issues on a 
ily basis. The fact is that the coun- 
ts of Latin America grew at the rate 
2%. in 1984 after severe downturns in 
•82 and 1983. The governments in this 
misphere have demonstrated that 
<ey can handle the economic ship of 
ite in difficult weather and get back 
course. We are pleased that we could 
ay a constructive role. 

Let me be clear. We are not in calm 
as. There is much more that needs to 
i done both by governments repre- 
nted in this room, by the private sec- 
r, and by the international community, 
ur friends in Europe and Japan must 
so do their part, and we must work 
gether toward that end. Our task is 
)t easy— in some cases adjustments 
ay continue to be difficult and, for 
ose who have postponed action, it 
ay, indeed, be very painful. Unfor- 
nately, too many of us, in both the 
iblic and private sectors, have not 
ways made the wisest use of our 
ailable economic resources. We have 
arned hard lesssons. We now know 
hat we must do. But let me be equally 
Jar that the economic health of this 
smisphere is as important to the 



United States as it is to each of you. 
Now that this hemisphere is back on 
course to economic growth, we intend to 
play a vigorous role in keeping it on 
track. 

Security 

Our third challenge is the security of 
this hemisphere. We know that there 
are countries which do not wish us well. 
They have sought to prevent people 
from voting in open and democratic elec- 
tions. They have sought to overthrow 
democratically elected governments. 
Because of the courage of the people, 
they have consistently failed, but we 
know that they will try again. They 
should know that we will do what is 
necessary to uphold the principle of 
nonintervention in the internal affairs of 
other governments. They should also 
know that we are all bound by solemn 
agreement that an attack by any state 
against an American state shall be con- 
sidered an attack against all the 
American states and that we will con- 
sult immediately on measures to be 
taken on any fact or situation that 
might endanger the peace of the 
Americas. As I said when I began, the 
peoples of the Americas have spoken on 
their preference for democratic govern- 
ment. We here, and the governments 
we represent, have an obligation to do 
everything we can to assure that the 
will of the people is respected, that the 
opponents of democratic government do 
not thwart the will of our people. 

Putting the OAS in the Forefront 

Our fourth challenge is to put this 
organization in the forefront in meeting 
the challenges ahead and in speaking for 
the people and governments of this 
hemisphere about our goals and aspira- 
tions. When Simon Bolivar first called 
for the establishment of an inter- 
American organization in 1822, he envi- 
sioned that it would: 

. . . serve as a council in great conflict, as 
a point of contact in common danger, as a 
faithful interpreter of public treaties when 
difficulties occur: as a conciliator, in short, of 
our differences. 

We have built on that concept, and 
this organization has achieved its 
greatest triumphs in peacekeeping ef- 
forts. It played a key role in resolving 
the conflict in 1969 between Honduras 
and El Salvador. But that is only one of 
a long list. We have gone much beyond 



that initial vision of Bolivar into other 
areas that we know provide the essen- 
tial foundations of a peaceful and 
vigorous international community. 

The OAS developed the concept and 
finally succeeded in creating an Inter- 
American Development Bank at Bogota 
in 1960. The policies urged by this 
organization played a major role in pro- 
moting the economic growth of the 
1960s and 1970s. 

The Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission, which is surely one of the 
organization's greatest achievements, 
has mobilized the conscience of the 
Americas and been a beacon of hope not 
only for people in the hemisphere but 
also for those outside. It has contributed 
in substantial measure to the reduction 
of arbitrary rule and the promotion of 
democracy. 

The OAS has made a significant con- 
tribution to cultural exchange and made 
it possible for many in this hemisphere 
to receive an education that would not 
have otherwise been possible. With such 
programs we have built true under- 
standing and cooperation in this 
hemisphere. 

One of the proudest achievements of 
this organization and its predecessors 
over the past 100 years has been to en- 
courage the preservation of our architec- 
tural and cultural heritage for future 
generations. We need to consider ways 
in which we can keep that tradition ac- 
tive and expanding. One possibility is a 
major fund-raising initiative from 
private sources as part of a much larger 
commemoration of the cinquecentennial 
of the European discovery of America. 

The OAS has accepted the challenge 
in confronting the insidious problem of 
drug trafficking. This trafficking under- 
mines the effectiveness and justice of 
public institutions through bribery and 
intimidation. It taxes the resources of 
public security forces. We are also 
aware of cases where the proceeds of 
drug trafficking have been used to sup- 
port terrorists and insurgent groups. 
Today, narcotics blight the promise of 
millions of young victims in every nation 
in our hemisphere. 

We need to comb the world to iden- 
tify the most successful local antidrug 
programs and make this information 
available to school districts throughout 
the hemisphere. It is imperative that 
the school children of this hemisphere 
see the most detailed and graphic infor- 
mation showing how narcotics diminish 
the mind, corrupt the personality, and 
poison the future of those unfortunates 



END NOTES 



who fall into its deadly embace. What- 
ever the OAS can do to raise the con- 
sciousness of the hemisphere and com- 
bat this terrible problem will have the 
cooperation of my government and the 
gratitude of millions of concerned 
parents in each of our countries. 

Despite our past remarkable 
achievements, and for reasons which are 
not entirely clear to my government, 
this organization has fallen into the 
severest financial crisis in its history. 
Governments are not meeting their 
obligations to the organization, and, at 
present, 90% of all the funds available 
so far in 1985 have come from the 
United States. 

This clearly is not a healthy situa- 
tion. It undermines all of the programs 
I have mentioned on which this 
organization has been so effective and 
the very basis of inter- American 
cooperation. I must frankly tell you that 
my government is concerned that many 
members of this organization are not 
meeting their financial obligations under 
the OAS Charter. 

The Secretary General has made 
very constructive proposals to resolve 
the financial difficulties of the OAS. 
These will be given the most serious 
consideration by the United States, and 
I hope that your governments will do 
the same. This matter should and can be 
resolved at the upcoming General 
Assembly in December. 

But I believe that the most impor- 
tant action that must be taken to over- 
come the present crisis in the OAS is 
for this council to agree on an action 
program to meet the challenges con- 
fronting the Americas in the rest of this 
decade. Such an action program should 
have many objectives. For example, it 
should underscore that this organization, 
which is the collective voice of the 
hemisphere, will do everything it can to 
consolidate and expand the writ of 
democracy in this hemisphere. It should 
make clear that this organization, which 
has made such positive contributions in 
the past to the concepts and ideas of 
growth and development, is still work- 
ing effectively to assure that the return 
to economic and social growth in the 
past 2 years continues and expands. It 
should build on the truth, that the most 
effective way to provide new jobs on a 
large scale is to remove existing direct 
and indirect obstacles to investment and 
to encourage the initiative of our people 
and enterprises. 

In revitalizing our work program, 
we also need to make clear that we are 
serious about our commitments under 



the charter of the organization and the 
Rio Treaty and that victims of overt 
aggression and external subversion will 
have our help. 

Our program should also demon- 
strate that we all care deeply about our 
architectural and cultural heritage and 
that we will do our part to pass that 
heritage intact to future generations. 

Finally, the people of the Americas, 
and those who have served before us in 
this organization for the almost 100 
years of its illustrious existence, should 
see through our actions that we as the 
present stewards will not allow the OAS 
to crumble through neglect and indiffer- 
ence but, rather, that we have the 
energy and absolute determination to 
solve our financial crisis in the im- 
mediate months ahead so that we can 
carry out a vital and strengthened work 
program. 

This hemisphere is on the march. 
We have witnessed a resurgence of 
democracy unlike anything we have 
seen in many years, and we have made 
remarkable economic progress in the 
hemisphere in 1984, progress that con- 
tinues this year. This organization now 
has an obligation to build on these 
accomplishments to provide new ideas, 
to develop a new consensus to meet the 
challenges ahead. 

I'd like to close on a personal note. 
More than a year ago, I was in a South 
American country with my colleagues 
from our Treasury to work on a debt- 
related problem. One morning we had a 
long meeting with bankers and officials 
in an elegant room in a beautiful 
building in the capital. There we spent 
hours talking about debt, adjustment, 
and other technical matters associated 
with our problem. 

Eventually, the meeting broke up, 
and we went outside to get into our 
limousines. And then I noticed a young 
mother sitting on the sidewalk holding a 
baby in her arms. She was begging. 
Standing beside her was a small emaci- 
ated boy about 6 years old. He was cry- 
ing his eyes out. And as I got into my 
limousine, his little swollen red eyes met 
mine. And I realized in that instant the 
sheer human cost of the economic stag- 
nation then existing throughout the 
region. 

The truth is that this small boy can 
do nothing to help himself. Only those of 
us in government can provide the frame- 
work in which economic growth and 
development can take place. At this 
moment in history, this little boy and 
millions like him like him look to us for 
answers. ■ 



August 1985 



The following are some of the signifi- 
cant official U.S. foreign policy actions 
and statements during the month that are 
not reported elsewhere in this periodical. 



J 
y 

!E 
111 



August 1 

AID awards a $7.5 million grant to UNICEF 
to reduce death and disease among children 
in developing countries. 

August 3-12 

Deputy Secretary Whitehead visits Jordan, 
Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco to 
become directly acquainted with key Middle 
East leaders. 

August 8-9 

Ambassador McFarlane, Assistant Secretary 
Crocker, and Ambassador Nickel meet with 
South African Foreign Minister Botha in 
Vienna to discuss the serious situation in 
South Africa. On August 9, Ambassador 
McFarlane returns to the U.S. to report to 
the President. 

August 8 

A car bombing at the Rhein-Main Air Force 
Base in West Germany leaves two Americar 
dead and several other people injured. 

August 13-18 

Assistant Secretary Murphy travels to Jor 
dan (Aug. 13-15 arid Aug. 17-18), Israel 
(Aug. 15-16) and Egypt (Aug. 16-17) to mee 
with Middle East leaders and discuss furthe 
ing the peace process. 

August 14 

U.S. and Poland sign an agreement relating 
to Poland's fishing activities off the coasts o 
the U.S. The agreement will come into fora 
after the completion of internal procedures 
by both governments. 

August 15 

In West Germany, two bombs explode 
damaging a tower used by the U.S. Armed 
Forces Radio Network. No injuries are 
reported. 

AID announces emergency actions to 
transport food supplies to the Sudan for 2 
million Sudanese and Chadian refugees in in 
mediate danger of starvation. 

August 25-31 

U.S. and Soviet Union officials meet in 
Moscow to discuss expanding agricultural 
trade. Agriculture Secretary Block heads th 
U.S. delegation. 



a- 
I1.S 

:.c 



; . 

i 
■ 

i 



TREATIES 



:ust 27-30 

) Administrator MePherson visits 
iopia (Aug. 27-28) and Sudan (Aug. 29-30) 
neet with officials and aid workers and to 
luate the famine relief effort. 

rust 27-September 4 

J.S. delegation of eight Senators will visit 
ngary (Aug. 28-29) and the Soviet Union 
pt. 2-3) for meetings with Secretary 
leral Gorbachev and other Soviet officials, 
ate Minority leader Robert Byrd heads 
U.S. delegation. 

gust 27 

;peeial U.S. task force of experts from the 
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) and the 
vironmental Protection Agency travels to 
scow to collect data and analyse the health 
ilieations for U.S. personnel exposed to 
chemical tracking agent NPPD. The four- 
mber task force is headed by NIH Dr. 
nest McConnell. 

„gust 28-29 

I. and Vietnamese delegations meet in 
j noi to discuss the issue of American 
Isoners-of-war and missing-in-action. Na- 
! lal Security Council staff member Richard 
iildress heads the U.S. delegation. ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International plant protection convention. 
Done at Rome Dec. 6, 1951. Entered into 
force Apr. 3, 1952; for the U.S. Aug. 18, 
1972. TIAS 7465. 
Adherence deposited: Niger, June 4, 1985. 

Amended constitution of the International 

Rice Commission. Done at Rome Nov. 23, 

1961. Entered into force Nov. 23, 1961. TIAS 

5204. 

Acceptance deposited: Suriname, June 10, 

1985. 

Aviation, Civil 

Memorandum of understanding regarding 
technical measures to improve the safety of 
civil aviation in the North Pacific. Done at 
Tokyo July 29, 1985. Enters into force upon a 
trilateral exchange of diplomatic notes. 
Signatures: Japan, U.S.S.R., U.S., July 29, 
1985. 

Fisheries 

Protocol to amend the international conven- 
tion of May 14, 1966, for the conservation of 
Atlantic tunas (TIAS 6767). Done at Paris 
July 10, 1984 1 . 

Acceptances deposited: Japan, June 13, 1985, 
Senegal, June 14, 1985. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention abolishing the requirement of 
legalization for foreign public documents, 
with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. 
Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the U.S. 
Oct 15, 1981. TIAS 10072. 
Ratification deposited: Turkey, July 31. 1985 2 

Jute . 

International agreement on jute and jute 
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at 
Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force pro- 
visionally Jan. 9, 1984. 
Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, July £>, 
1985. 

Marine Pollution 

Convention on the prevention of marine 
pollution by dumping of wastes and other 
matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mex- 
ico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29 
1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 

Accession deposited: St. Lucia, Aug. 23, 1985. 
Ratifications deposited: Australia, Aug. 21, 
1985; Belgium, June 12, 1985. 3 
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the prevention of pollution 
from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 
1978. Entered into force Oct 2, 1983. 
Accession deposited: Iceland, June 25, 1985." 



Convention for the protection and develop- 
ment of the marine environment of the wider 
Caribbean region, with annex. Done at Carta- 
gena Mar. 24, 1983. 1 
Signatures: Barbados, Mar. 5, 1984; 
Guatemala, July 5, 1985. 
Ratifications deposited: Barbados, May 28, 
1985; Grenada, May 30, 1985; Mexico, Apr. 9, 
1985; St. Lucia, Nov. 30, 1984. 
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Apr. 16, 
1984. 

Protocol concerning cooperation in combat- 
ting oil spills in the wider Caribbean region, 
with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 24, 
1983. > 

Signatures: Barbados, Mar. 5, 1984; 
Guatemala, Aug. 5, 1983. 
Ratifications deposited: Barbados, May 28, 
1985; Mexico, Apr. 9, 1985. 
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Apr. lb, 
J 984. 

Protocol of 1984 to amend the international 
convention on civil liability for oil pollution 
damage, 1969. Done at London May 24, 1984. 
Open for signature at London from Dec. 1, 
1984, to Nov. 30, 1985. Enters into force 
12 months following the date on which 
10 states including 6 states each with not less 
than 2 million units of gross tanker tonnage 
have deposited instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval, or accession. 
Signatures: France, June 14, 1985; Federal 
Republic of Germany, May 21, 1985; Morocco, 
June 4, 1985; Portugal, Apr. 24, 1985; U.S., 
Feb. 12, 1985. 

Protocol of 1984 to amend the international 
convention on the establishment of an inter- 
national fund for compensation for oil pollu- 
tion damage, 1971. Done at London May 25, 
1984 Open for signature at London from 
Dec. 1, 1984 to Nov. 30, 1985. Enters into 
force 12 months following the date on which 
at least 8 states have deposited instruments 
of ratification, acceptance, approval, or acces- 
sion, and certain other requirements have 
been met. 

Signatures: France, June 14, 1985; Federal 
Republic of Germany, May 21, 1985; Morocco, 
June 4, 1985; Portugal, Apr. 24, 1985; U.S., 
Feb. 12, 1985. 



Maritime Matters 

International convention on maritime search 
and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Ham- 
burg Apr. 27, 1979. Entered into force 
June 22, 1985. 
Approval deposited: China, June 24, 1985. 

Amendments to the international convention 
on load lines, 1966. Adopted at London 
Nov. 17, 1983. 1 
Acceptance deposited: U.K., June 24, 1985. 5 

Patents— Microorganisms 

Budapest treaty on the international recogni- 
tion of the deposit of microorganisms for the 
purposes of patent procedure, with regula- 
tions. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977. 
Entered into force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS 9768. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, June 1, 1985. 



TREATIES 



Pollution 

Convention on long-range transboundary air 

pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979. 

Entered into force Mar. 16, 1983. TIAS 

10541. 

Ratification deposited: Poland, July 19, 1985. 

Protocol to the convention on long-range 
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 1979 
(TIAS 10541) concerning monitoring and 
evaluation of the long-range transmission of 
air pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with annex. 
Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984. 1 
Ratifications deposited: Sweden, Aug. 12, 
1985; Switzerland, July 26, 1985. 

Postal 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union. Done at Tokyo 
Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 
1971, except for Art. V which entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 

Second additional protocol to the constitution 
of the Universal Postal Union. Done at 
Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 
Ratification deposited: Benin, July 1, 1985. 

General regulations of the Universal Postal 
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulatons. Done at Rio de 
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 
July 1, 1981; except for Art. 124 of the 
general regulations which became effective 
Jan 1, 1981. TIAS 9972. 
Approval deposited: Indonesia, Mar. 25, 1985; 
Romania, May 22, 1985. 
Ratifications deposited: Benin, July 1, 1985; 
Iceland, July 9, 1985. 

Money orders and postal travelers checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations with 
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 26, 
1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981. TIAS 
9973. 

Approvals deposited: Indonesia, Mar. 25, 
1985; Romania, May 22, 1985. 
Ratifications deposited: Benin, July 1, 1985; 
Iceland, July 9, 1985. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1984, with 
annexes. Done at Geneva July 5, 1984. 
Entered into force Apr. 4, 1985; provisionally 
for the U.S. Jan. 1, 1985. 
Accession deposited: Iraq, July 30, 1985. 

Timber 

International tropical timber agreement, 
1983, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 18, 
1983. Entered into force provisionally Apr. 1, 
1985; for the U.S., Apr. 26, 1985. 
Acceptance deposited: France, Aug. 6, 1985. 

UNIDO 

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, with annexes. 
Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. 
Entered into force: June 21, 1985. 
Ratifications deposited: Angola, Iran, Aug. 9, 
1985; Morocco, Julv 30, 1985; New Zealand, 
Julv 19, 1985. 



Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms of 

discrimination against women. Adopted at 

New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 

Sept. 3, 1981. 6 

Accessions deposited: Cyprus, July 23, 1985; 

Thailand, Aug. 9, 1985. 

Ratification deposited: Uganda, July 22, 1985. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement concerning the furnishing of 
launching and associated services for long- 
duration balloon flights beyond Australia. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra 
Jan. 24 and July 24, 1985. Entered into force 
July 24, 1985. 

Canada 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 6 and 12, 1942, as amended, (56 Stat. 
1451; TIAS 2452), relating to unemployment 
insurance benefits. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Ottawa Oct. 29, 1984 and June 21, 
1985. Entered into force June 21, 1985. 

Chile 

Agreement concerning the use of Mataveri 
Airport, Isla de Pascua, as a space shuttle 
emergency landing and rescue site. Signed at 
Santiago Aug. 2, 1985. Enters into force on 
date on which both govenments advise each 
other, through diplomatic channels, of conclu- 
sion of their required internal procedures. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreements amending the agreement for the 
sales of agricultural commodities of May 15, 
1985. Signed at Santo Domingo Aug. 1 and 
19, 1985. Entered into force Aug. 1 and 19, 
1985. 

Ecuador 

Agreement concerning the general security of 
military information. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Quito July 12, 1985. Entered into 
force July 12, 1985. 

Finland 

Agreement relating to scientific and technical 
cooperation, with patent annex. Signed at 
Washington Mar. 22, 1985. 
Entered into force: Sept. 15, 1985. 

France 

Protocol to convention with respect to taxes 
on income and property of July 28, 1967 
(TIAS 6518), as amended by protocols of 
Oct. 12, 1970 (TIAS 7270) and Nov. 24, 1978 
(TIAS 9500). Signed at Paris Jan. 17, 1984. 
Ratifications exchanged: Aug. 23, 1985. 
Enters into force: Oct. 1, 1985. 

Ghana 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Accra July 31, 1985. 
Entered into force July 31, 1985. 






Greece 

International express mail agreement, witi 
detailed regulations. Signed at Athens and 
Washington June 5 and 21, 1985. Entered 
into force July 1, 1985. 

Jamaica 

Agreements amending the agreement for : 
of agricultural commodities of Dec. 17, 198 
Effected by exchanges of notes at Kingston 
Mar. 19 and 28, 1985, and July 25 and 30, 
1985. Entered into force Mar. 28 and Julv 30,1 
1985. 

Japan 

Memorandum of understanding on the par- 
ticipation of Japan in the ocean drilling pro- 
gram, with annex. Signed at Washington 
June 5, 1985. Entered into force June 5, 1989" 

Agreement extending the agreement of pta 
Aug. 5, 1975, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 8172, 9853), on cooperation in the fielop 
of environmental protection. Effected by p 
exchange of notes at Tokyo July 31, 1985. Iff 
Entered ito force July 31, 1985; effective 
Aug. 5, 1985. 

Kenya 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Nairobi July 16, 1985. up 
Entered into force July 16, 1985. 

Korea 

Agreements amending agreement of Dec. 1, 
1982 (TIAS 10611), as amended, relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber te>\^ 
tiles and textile products. Effected by- 
exchanges of letters at Washington July 2 
and Aug. 18, and Aug. 1 and 13, 1985. 
Entered into force Aug. 13 and 18, 1985. 



B 

i 

I 



Liberia 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- |i 
modifies. Signed at Monrovia July 22, 1985, 
Entered into force Julv 22, 1985. ' 



Maldives 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Colombo July 13, 1985. 
Entered into force July 13, 1985." 

Mauritania 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annex. 
Signed at Washington Aug. 14, 1985. Enters 
into force on receipt by Mauritania of writte 
notice from the U.S. Government that all 
necessary domestic legal requirements have 
been fulfilled. 

Norway 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the operation of the INTELPOST field trial, 
with details of implementation. Signed at 
Oslo and Washington July 9 and 25, 1985. 
Entered into force Julv 25, 1985. 



ite 
11 



■a 
b 



e 
IS 



PRESS RELEASES 



Wlippines 

■jangement for the exchange of technical 
ftmation and cooperation in nuclear safety 
liters, with addenda. Signed at Bethesda 
£ Manila May 24 and June 18, 1985. 
lered into force June 18, 1985. 

••eement for sales of agricultural eom- 
jlities. Signed at Manila July 8, 1985. 
lered into force July 8, 1985. 

■•eement regarding the consolidation and 
J.'heduling of certain debts owed to, 
Iranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
i eminent and its agencies, with annexes, 
■ned at Manila July 29, 1985. Enters into 
Ire on receipt by the Philippines of written 
lice from the U.S. Government that all 
tessary domestic legal requirements have 
»n fulfilled. 

Band 

J -eement concerning fisheries off the coasts 
I he U.S. with annexes and agreed minutes. 
5 ned at Washington Aug. 1, 1985. Enters 
}> force on a date to be agreed upon by 
- hange of notes, following the completion 
8 nternal procedures of both governments. 

I -tugal 

\ morandum of understanding concerning 
i operation of the INTELPOST field trial, 
i h details of implementation. Signed at 
[ bon and Washington Apr. 15 and July 3, 
i-5. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1985. 

i jth Africa 

i reement relating to the reciprocal granting 
; authorizations to permit licensed amateur 
t lio operators of either country to operate 
•ir stations in the other country. Effected 
exchange of notes at Pretoria Mar. 28 and 
,,y 1, 1985. Entered into force May 1, 1985. 

ailand 

reement amending agreement of July 27 
i Aug. 8, 1983, as amended, relating to 
ide in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber tex- 
; and textile products. Effected by 
change of notes at Bangkok May 29 and 
ly 23, 1985. Entered into force July 23, 
-if). 



inisia 

ireement amending the agreement for sale 
agricultural commodities of June 7, 1976 
IAS 8506). Signed at Tunis July 3, 1985. 
ntered into force July 3, 1985. 

.S.S.R. 

greement extending the agreement of 
me 19, 1973, as amended and extended 
'IAS 7651, 9349), on cooperation in studies 
' the world ocean. Effected by exchange of 
Jtes at Moscow Mar. 25 and July 30, 1985. 
ntered into force July 30, 1985; effective 
ec. 15, 1985. 

nited Kingdom 

greement relating to cooperation in map- 
ing, charting, and geodesy. Signed at 
eltham and Washington July 4 and 18, 1985. 
intered into force July 18, 1985. 



Yugoslavia 

Agreement amending and extending the 
memorandum of understandings effected by 
the agreement of Mar. 17 and 19, 1982, as 
amended and extended (TIAS 10450), relating 
to air transport and nonscheduled air service. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade 
Mar. 20 and Apr. 9, 1985. Entered into force 
provisionally Apr. 9, 1985; definitively July 2, 
1985; effective Apr. 1, 1985. 

Zambia 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Lusaka July 9, 1985. 
Entered into force July 9, 1985. 

Zaire 

Agreement amending the agreement for the 
sale of agricultural commodities of Dec. 22, 
1984. Effected by exchange of notes at Kin- 
shasa July 1 and 3, 1985. Entered into force 
July 3, 1985. 



1 Not in force. 

2 With designation. 

3 With statement. 

4 Not a party to (optional) Annexes III, 
IV, and V of the convention. 

5 Extended to Bermuda, Hong Kong, and 
Isle of Man. 

6 Not in force for the United States. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

196 8/1 Shultz; address at the 10th an- 
niversary commemoration of 
the signing of the CSCE 
Final Act, Helsinki, July 30. 

*197 8/1 L. Craig Johnstone sworn in 
as Ambassador to Algeria, 
July 29 (biographic data). 

*198 8/1 Thomas R. Pickering sworn in 
as Ambassador to Israel, 
July 22 (biographic data). 

*199 8/1 Thomas A. Nassif sworn in as 
Ambassador to Morocco, 
July 25 (biographic data). 

*200 8/1 Nicholas Ruwe sworn in as 
Ambassador to Iceland, 
July 19 (biographic data). 

*201 8/1 J. William Middendorf II 

sworn in as Ambassador to 
the European Communities, 
July 19 (biographic data). 

*202 8/5 John D. Scanlan sworn in as 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 
July 17 (biographic data). 

*203 8/1 Shultz: interview on Finnish 
TV, Channel One, Helsinki, 
July 31. 



*204 8/5 Richard Burt sworn in as Am- 
bassador to the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
(biographic data). 

*205 8/5 Shultz: news briefing following 
meeting with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Shervadnadze, 
Helsinki, Julv 31. 

*206 8/14 U.S., Poland sign fisheries 
agreement, Aug. 1. 

*207 8/14 Thomas M.T. Niles sworn in 
as Ambassador to Canada, 
Aug. 13 (biographic data). 

*208 8/19 Elliott Abrams sworn in as 
Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs, 
July 17 (biographic data). 

*209 8/19 John Arthur Ferch sworn in 

as Ambassador to Honduras, 
July 19 (biographic data). 

*210 8/28 Regional foreign policy con- 
ference, Kansas City, 
Sept. 11. 



* Not printed in the Bulletin. 



USUN 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, 
New York, N.Y. 10017. 



No. 



Date 



Subject 



*1 1/30 Kirkpatrick: resignation 
announced. 

*2 2/5 Rosenstock: Special Committee 
on Enhancing the Effective- 
ness of the Principle of Non- 
Use of Force in International 
Relations, Feb. 4. 

*3 2/11 Keyes: planning and public 
administration, ECOSOC, 
Feb. 5 

*4 2/19 Schifter: human rights viola- 
tions in occupied territories, 
Human Rights Commission, 
Feb. 7. 

*5 2/12 Sorzano: U.S. participation, 
Scientific and Technical 
Affairs Subcommittee, Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space. 

*6 2/19 Viglienzone: committee activi- 
ties, Scientific and Technical 
Affairs Subcommittee, Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space, Feb. 14. 

*7 2/19 Kirkpatrick: dedication of 

native American sculpture, 
Feb. 27. 



PRESS RELEASES 



UE 



*8 2/19 



*9 2/19 
*10 2/20 

*11 2/21 



*12 2/21 

*13 2/22 

*14 2/28 

*15 2/28 

*16 3/1 

*17 3/8 

*18 3/12 

*19 3/12 

*20 3/21 

*21 4/3 



*22 


4/9 


*23 


4/11 


*24 


4/12 


*25 


4/15 


*26 


4/15 


*27 


4/17 


*28 


4/18 


*29 


4/19 


*30 


4/19 


*31 


4/24 


*32 


5/1 


*33 


5/1 


*34 


5/2 



Morrison: space life, Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee, 
Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space. 

Barabba: population, ECOSOC. 

Kirkpatrick: Cambodian 
refugees. 

Morrison: transportation 
systems, Scientific and Tech- 
nical Subcommittee, Commit- 
tee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space. 

Morrison: Unispace 82 and 
space studies, Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee, 
Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space, Feb. 20. 

Gayoso: development, UNDP 
Governing Council, Feb. 21. 

Clark: Lebanon, Security 
Council. 

Statement on the death of 
Ambassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge. 

Schifter: totalitarianism, Human 
Rights Commission, Geneva, 
Feb. 21. 

Kirkpatrick: Lebanon, Security 
Council, Mar. 7. 

Kirkpatrick: Lebanon, Security 
Council. 

Clark: South Africa, Security 
Council. 

Borek: remarks, Legal Subcom- 
mittee, Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 

Borek: outer space definition 
and geostationary orbit, Legal 
Subcommittee, Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. 

Keyes: consumer protection, 
General Assembly. 

Scott: natural resources, 
ECOSOC, Apr. 10. 

Keyes: assessment process, 
General Assembly. 

Keyes: global negotiations, 
General Assembly, Apr. 12. 

Di Martino: UNICEF, Execu- 
tive Board. 

Schifter: UNIFIL renewal, 
Security Council. 

Cox: women, UNICEF Execu- 
tive Board. 

Di Martino: Americas region, 
UNICEF Executive Board. 

Fleming: Africa programs, 
UNICEF Executive Board. 

Frost: budget and plans, Com- 
mittee on Administration and 
Finance, UNICEF. 

Reagan: refugee women, High 
Commission for Refugees, 
Geneva, Apr. 26. 

Kirkpatrick: refugee women, 
High Commission for 
Refugees, Geneva, Apr. 26. 

Dewey: Cambodian refugees. 



*35 5/3 Feldman: Guam, Subcommittee 
on Small Territories. 

*36 5/8 Goodman: Solemn commemora- 
tive ceremony, ECOSOC. 

*37 5/8 Lowitz: disarmament, General 
Assembly. 

*38 5/9 Scott: nongovernmental 

organizations, ECOSOC, 
May 8. 

*39 5/9 Sorzano: Nicaragua, Security 
Council. 

*40 5/9 Sorzano: Nicaraguan trade 
embargo, Security Council. 

*41 5/10 Lowitz: disarmament, General 
Assembly, May 9. 

*42 5/13 Sorzano: Nicaragua, Security 
Council, May 10. 

*43 5/13 Feldman: Micronesia, Trustee- 
ship Council. 

*44 5/14 Keyes: narcotic drugs, 
ECOSOC, May 13. 

*45 5/14 Herzberg: narcotic drugs, Com- 
mittee II. 

*46 5/15 Sorzano: diplomatic note 

delivered to Soviet Mission 
protesting exile of Andrei 
Sakharov. 

*47 5/16 Paul: social development, Com- 
mittee II. 

*48 5/22 Sorzano: U.S.S.R. rejects diplo- 
matic note on Sakharovs. 

*49 5/21 Feldman: Micronesia, Trustee- 
ship Council. 

*50 5/23 Reagan: women, ECOSOC. 

*51 5/24 Sorzano: human rights, Commit- 
tee II. 

*52 5/24 Feldman: Micronesia, Trustee- 
ship Council. 

*53 5/28 Goodman: human rights, 
ECOSOC, May 24. 

*54 5/30 Guth: disarmament, General 
Assembly. 

*55 5/31 Bader: American Samoa, Sub- 
committee on Small Terri- 
tories, Decolonization Com- 
mittee, May 30. 

*56 5/31 Sorzano: Lebanon, Security 
Council. 

*57 6/11 McPherson: UN Development 
Program, Governing Council, 
ECOSOC. 

*58 6/12 Sorzano: Namibia, Security 
Council. 

*59 6/13 Brookner: Virgin Islands, Sub- 
committee on Small Terri- 
tories, Decolonization 
Committee. 

*60 6/13 Walters: Namibia, Security 
Council. 

*61 6/17 Clark: Namibia, Security Coun- 
cil, June 14. 

*62 6/17 Clark: hostages, Security 
Council. 

*63 6/18 Eskin: outer space, Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. 



ill 



* 



*64 6/18 Grooms: world information ar ' 
communication, Committee 
Information. 

*65 6/19 Grooms: Radio Marti, Commi \"' 
tee on Information. 

*66 6/19 Eskin: U.S. activities in spaet 
Committee on the Peaceful f ' 
Uses of Outer Space. 

*67 6/19 Clark: Namibia, Security 
Council. 

*68 6/20 Grigg: UN Conference on 
Women, ECOSOC. 

*69 6/20 Grooms: point of order, Com- 
mittee on Information. 

*70 6/20 Clark: Angola, Security Coun 

*71 6/21 Viglienzone: maintaining peat 
in space, Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Spa 
June 20. 

*72 6/21 Clark: South African raid on 
Botswana, Security Council 

*73 6/24 Brady: population, UNDP 
Governing Council. 

*74 6/24 Eskin: space shuttle, Scientif 
and Technical Subcommitte 
Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space. 

*75 6/24 Walters: 40th anniversary of 
the UN Charter, San 
Francisco. 

*76 6/25 Lowell: UNISPACE eonferei 
recommendations, Committ 
on the Peaceful Uses of Ou 
Space. 

*77 6/26 Borek: nuclear power source: 
Legal Subcommittee, Comi 
tee on the Peaceful Uses o 
Outer Space. 
78 6/27 Shultz: 40th anniversary of t 
UN Charter, San Francis© 
June 26. 

* Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 



••; 



A 



BLICATIONS 



partment of State 



single copies of the following Depart- 
nt of State publications are available 
m the Correspondence Management 
rision, Bureau of Public Affairs, Depart- 
nt of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

etary Shultz 

Years After the Helsinki Final Act, com- 
•moration of the 10th anniversary of the 
,CE Final Act, Helsinki, July 30, 1985 
irrent Policy #728). 

:a 

U.S. and South Africa: A Framework for 
ogress, Assistant Secretary Crocker, 
mmonwealth Club, San Francisco, 
lg. 16, 1985 (Current Policy #732). 

s Control 

Setting the Record Straight, ACDA 
•ector Adelman, Council on Foreign 
lations, Baltimore, Aug. 7, 1985 (Current 
licy #730). 



U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 
ACDA Director Adelman, Ambassador 
Kennedy, and Assistant Secretary 
Wolfowitz, House Foreign Affairs Commit- 
tee, July 31, 1985 (Current Policy #729). 

Economics 

International Aviation (GIST, Aug. 1985). 
International Commodity Agreements (GIST, 
Aug. 1985). 

Europe 

U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Late 20th Cen- 
tury, National Security Adviser McFarlane, 
Channel City Club and Women's Forum, 
Santa Barbara, Aug. 19, 1985 (Current 
Policy #733). 

Terrorism 

International Terrorism (GIST, Aug. 1985). 

Western Hemisphere 

Current Challenges Facing the OAS, 
Ambassador McCormack, OAS Permanent 
Council, Aug. 21, 1985 (Current Policy 
#734). ■ 



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from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. Checks or money orders, made 
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Diplomatic List 

This is a quarterly list of foreign diplomatic 
representatives in Washington, D.C, and 
their addresses. Annual subscription — $14.00 
domestic; $17.50 foreign. Single copy— $3.75 
domestic; $4.70 foreign. 

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Single copy— $4.50 domestic; $5.65 foreign. ■ 



Asia 

nt Security Developments in Korea, 
■sistant Secretary Wolfowitz, Council on 
3.-Korean Military and Security Studies, 
lington, Va., Aug". 12, 1985 (Current 
iicv #731). 



lilms and Videotapes 

<e State Department distributes a four-part 
-n series. "The History of U.S. Foreign 
Nations. " and '■From Where I Sit. " an ex 
nination of how public opinion affects 
reign policy decisions 

The History of U.S. Foreign Rela- 
ons: Using actual locations, paintings, 
•ilitical cartoons, and documentary 
otage, this series of four 30-minute color 
•ns recreates the history of U.S. foreign 
lations from the American Revolution to 
id-1975. "An Age of Revolutions" 
jcuments American diplomacy from the 
•nerican Revolution through the Monroe 
octrme. "Youth to Maturity" traces the ex- 
ansion of American interests and the 
/olution of the United States into a major 
orld power prior to the events of World 
'ar I. "The Reluctant World Power" il- 
strates the increasing involvement of the 
nited States in world affairs engendered 
i the events of the period between the 
/ars "The Road to Interdependence" 
utlines the development of US foreign 
olicy from the end of World War II through 
le onset of the 1970s. 

From Where I Sit: This 30-minute film 
xplores the many conflicting interests anc 
pinions which converge on foreign policy 
ssues and shape our national goals. Using 
ie issues of trade, energy, and arms con- 



trol, the film provides a basis for discussion 
of the kinds of decisions and choices con- 
fronting policymakers. 

Videotapes 

The Department also has available the 
following videotapes: 

The Strategic Defense Initiative 

(25 minutes): Senior Administration officials 
explain the rationale for the Strategic 
Defense Initiative research program, in- 
cluding the basic technologies being in- 
vestigated, how such a defensive system 
might protect us from a nuclear attack, and 
the relative deterrent value of offensive and 
defensive systems. Also included are 
discussions of Soviet space defense 
research, compliance with the ABM Treaty, 
the reaction of our NATO allies, and the 
Soviet attitude toward SDI at the Geneva 
arms control negotiations This videotape 
may be supplemented with the Depart- 
ment's Special Report No. 129, The 
Strategic Defense Initiative. June 1985 

(8 pp.) 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion (17 minutes): A minidocumentary show- 
ing how the members of NATO have coped 
with the Soviet Union's military and political 
challenges since World War II. It also 
describes the overall organization of NATO 
and its military and political mechanisms. 



An excellent Department publication to ac- 
company this tape is the Atlas of NATO. 
February 1985(24 pp.). 

Nuclear Arms and Arms Control (25 

minutes): A discussion of nuclear issues by 
a panel of Administration specialists ques- 
tioned by a group of college students. The 
questions include U.S. objectives in arms 
control, the nuclear freeze proposal, and 
why the United States will not renounce the 
first use of nuclear weapons in the event of 
war in Europe. You may use this videotape 
in conjunction with the State Department 
publication A Short Guide to U.S. Arms Con- 
trol. October 1984(32 pp.) 

Central America— The Search for 
Peace (27 minutes): A tape based on a day- 
long conference on Central America held at 
the Department of State. The economic, 
political, and military situation is discussed 
as well as U.S. policy and its results. You 
may supplement this tape with the Depart- 
ment's Atlas of the Caribbean Basin. July 
1984 (20 pp.). 

For information on borrowing or pur- 
chasing these films and/or videotapes con- 
tact the: 

Bureau of Public Affairs 
Special Projects Staff 
Room 4827A 
U.S. Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 

Tel: 202-632-2353 



65 



Atlas of NATO 

The Atlas of NATO, February 1985, pro- 
vides basic information about the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 
19 displays it illustrates NATO's 
membership and structure, military 
strength, members' role in world af- 
fairs, and relations with the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact. 



Atlas of the Caribbean Basin 

The Atlas of the Caribbean Basin, July 
1984 (2d edition), consists of 16 pages 
of maps and charts showing the 
basin's economic and political features, 
such as political and economic align- 
ments, the military balance, import 
sources and exports, immigration, and 
development assistance. 







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N3EX 



^tober 1985 
Wume 85, No. 2103 



s Control 

lachev's Next 100 Days (Rowny) 17 

Setting the Record' Straight' (Adel- 

nan) 42 

-Soviet Relations in the Late 20th Cen- 

urv (McFarlane) 34 

to Test ASAT Device (White House 

tatement) 46 

ibodia. U.S. Refugee Program in 

Southeast Asia (Purcell) 51 

la. U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation 
Vgreement (Adelman, Kennedy, 

Volfowitz) 19 

gress 

recessing and Plutonium Use in Civil 

Nuclear Programs (Kennedy) 47 

-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 

Adelman, Kennedy, Wolfowitz) 19 

Refugee Program in Southeast Asia 

Purcell) 51 

artment and Foreign Service. Soviet 
Jse of Chemical Tracking Agents 

Department statement) 37 

nomics. Current Challenges Facing the 

)AS (McCormack) 58 

ope. 10 Years After the Helsinki Final 

\ct (Reagan, Shultz) 30 

Ith. Soviet Use of Chemical Tracking 

Agents (Department statement) 37 

lan Rights. 10 Years After the Helsinki 

Sinai Act (Reagan, Shultz) 30 

lligence Operations. Soviet Use of 
^hemical Tracking Agents (Department 

;tatement) 37 

rnational Law. Fighting Terrorism 

Through Law (Sofaer) 38 

in 

'roved Market Access to Japan (Yeut- 
ter) 27 

le With Japan (White House state- 
ment) 28 

»ea. Recent Security Developments in 

Korea (Wolfowitz) 23 

cico. U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Commission 

Meets (Shultz) 56 

tary Affairs 

: Setting the Record Straight (Adel- 
man) 42 

.-Soviet Relations in the Late 20th Cen- 

:urv (McFarlane) 34 

. to Test ASAT Device (White House 
statement) 46 



Narcotics. Current Challenges Facing the 
OAS (McCormack) .... 5g 

Nuclear Policy 

Reprocessing and Plutonium Use in Civil 
Nuclear Programs (Kennedy) 47 

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation' Agreement 
(Adelman, Kennedy, Wolfowitz) 19 

Presidential Documents 

South Africa: Presidential Actions (Reagan, 
Executive order) i 

10 Years After the Helsinki Final Act 
(Reagan, Shultz) 30 

Publications 

Department of State 65 

GPO Sales ..'.'.'.'..'. 65 

Refugees. U.S. Refugee Program in 
Southeast Asia (Purcell) 51 

South Africa 

Background on South Africa 8 

Mr. McFarlane's Interview on "This Week 
With David Brinkley" 7 

Security Council Meets on Situation in South 
Africa (Clark, Walters, Security Council 
statement, text of resolution) 54 

South Africa: Presidential Actions (Reagan, 
Executive order) 1 

The U.S. and South Africa: A Framework for 
Progress (Crocker) 4 

Terrorism 

Fighting Terrorism Through Law (So- 
faer) 38 

U.S. Offers Reward for Information on Ter- 
rorist Attack (White House announce- 
ment) 54 

Thailand. U.S. Refugee Program In 
Southeast Asia (Purcell) 51 

Trade 

Improved Market Access to Japan 

(Yeutter) 27 

South Africa: Presidential Actions (Reagan, 

Executive order) 1 

Trade With Japan (White House statement) 28 



Treaties 

Current Actions 61 

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
(Adelman, Kennedy, Wolfowitz) 19 

U.S.S.R. 

Gorbachev's Next 100 Days (Rowny) 17 

SDI: Setting the Record Straight (Adel- 
man) 42 

Soviet Use of Chemical Tracking Agents 
(Department statement) 37 

10 Years After the Helsinki Final Act (Rea- 
gan, Shultz) 30 

U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Late 20th Cen- 
tury (McFarlane) 34 

United Nations. Security Council Meets on 
Situation m South Africa (Clark, Walters, 
Security Council statement, text of reso- 
lution) 54 

Vietnam. U.S. Refugee Program in South- 
east Asia (Purcell) 51 

Western Hemisphere 

Current Challenges Facing the OAS (McCor- 
mack) 5 g 

U.S. Offers Reward for Information on Ter- 
rorist Attack (White House announce- 
ment) 54 

Name Index 

Adelman, Kenneth L 19, 42 

Clark, Warren Jr '54 

Crocker, Chester A \ 4 

Kennedy, Richard T .'..'. 19^ 47 

McCormack, Richard T [58 

McFarlane, Robert C 7, 34 

Purcell, James N., Jr '51 

Reagan, President i, 30 

Rowny, Edward L 17 

Shultz, Secretary 30, 56 

Sofaer, Abraham D .38 

Walters, Vernon A 54 

Wolfowitz, Paul D 19, 23 

Yeutter, Clayton \ 27 



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Depart men t 



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IV " /s "'"' JFJf j A\\ 

, u bulletin 

[lie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 85 / Number 2104 



November 1985 






Trade 



1 



I 



^^0f9H^.- 




Arms 
Control 



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Volume 85 / Number 2104 / November 1985 



Cover: President Reagan. 

(Whiu-> House phot" by Michael Evans) 



Secretary Shultz at UN General 
Assembly. 

(Department of State photo by Walter Booze) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

BERNARD KALB 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affair: 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



Hi 



11 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



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CONTENTS 



le President 

Trade Policy Action Plan 
News Conference of Septem- 
ber 17 (Excerpts) 
40th Anniversary of the End 
of World War II in the Pacific 



lie Secretary 

The Charter's Goals and Today's 

Realities 
Security Council Holds 

Commemorative Session 
U.S. Role in the ILO 
Interview on "Meet the Press" 
Proposed Refugee Admissions 

for FY 1986 

frica 

I Visit of Mozambique's President 
(Samora Moises Machel, 
President Reagan) 



cms Control 

Antisatellite Arms Control 

(Kenneth L. Adelman) 
Arms Control Talks Resume 

in Geneva (President Reagan) 
U.S. Activities in the Conference 

on Disarmament 

(Donald S. Lowitz) 
Conference on Disarmament in 

Europe Reconvenes 

(President Reagan) 
Status of MBFR Negotiations 

(Robert. D. Black-will) 
MBFR Talks Resume in Vienna 

(President Reagan) 
Mr. McFarlane's Interview on 

"This Week With 

David Brinkley" 
Third Review Conference Held 
for Nonproliferation Treaty 

(Kenneth L. Adelman, Final 

Document) 



East Asia 

45 U.S. Releases Affidavits for 

Aquino Assassination Trial 
(Department Statement) 

Economics 

46 Finance Ministers, Central Rank 

Governors Discuss Economic 
Policies (Final Announcement) 

48 Nonrubber Footwear Industry 

(President Reagan) 

Energy 

49 Energy Trade: Problems and 

Prospects (E. Allan Wendt) 



Terrorism 



Europe 



53 President Meets With Soviet 
Foreign Minister 
(Secretary Shultz) 

56 Visit of Danish Prime Minister 

(President Reagan, 
Poul Schluter) 

57 23d Report on Cyprus 

(President. Reagan, Message 
to the Congress) 

Human Rights 

58 Human Rights and U.S. -Soviet 

Relations 

(Michael H. Armacost) 

59 U.S. Repeats Call for Sakharovs 

Release (Department Statement) 

60 Fifth Anniversary of Solidarity 

(President Reagan) 



61 



65 



Terrorism: Overview and 
Developments 
(Robert B. Oakley) 

Terrorists Arrested in 
El Salvador (President's Letter 
to President Duarte) 



United Nations 

66 The U.S. and the United Nations 
(Vernon A. Walters) 



Western Hemisphere 

68 Department Releases Report on 
Sandinista Intervention in 
Central America (Summary) 

70 Nicaragua!! Humanitarian 

Assistance Office Established 
(President Reagan) 



End Notes 

71 September 1985 

Treaties 

72 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

74 Department of State 

Publications 

74 Department of State 

«™w 'FSwuKents] 

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. . . the freer the flow of world trade, the stronger 
the tides for human progress and peace among 
nations. 



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THE PRESIDENT 



The President's 
Trade Policy Action Plan 

President Reagan's address before business leaders 

and members of the President's Export Council 

and Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations 

in the East Room of the White House 

on September 23, 1985} 



i pleased to have this opportunity to 
with you to address the pressing 
;stion of America's trade challenge 

the 1980s and beyond. And let me 
t at the outset that our trade policy 
its firmly on the foundation of free 
i open markets— free trade. 

I, like you, recognize the inescapable 
lclusion that all of history has taught: 
! freer the flow of world trade, the 
onger the tides for human progress 
1 peace among nations. 

I certainly don't have to explain the 
lefits of free and open markets to 
i. They produce more jobs, a more 
>ductive use of our nation's resources, 
re rapid innovation, and a higher 
ndard of living. They strengthen our 
ional security because our economy, 
i bedrock of our defense, is stronger. 

itical Roles of U.S. 
■vernment and Business 

i pleased that the United States has 
yed the critical role of ensuring and 
)moting an open trading system since 
)rld War II. And I know that if we 
=r faltered in the defense and promo- 
•n of the worldwide free trading 
stem, that system will collapse, to the 
triment of all. 

But our role does not absolve our 
iding partners from their major 
sponsibility— to support us in seeking 
nore open trading system. No nation, 
■en one as large and as powerful as 
e United States, can, by itself, ensure 
ree trading system. All that we and 
hers have done to provide for the free 
iw of goods and services and capital is 
sed on cooperation. And our trading 
rtners must join us in working to im- 
ove the system of trade that has con- 



tributed so much to economic growth 
and the security of our allies and of 
ourselves. 

And may I say right here to the 
leaders of industry that my admiration 
for business in the United States is 
stronger than ever. You know, 
sometimes in Washington, there are 
some who seem to forget what the 
economy is all about. They give me 
reports saying the economy does this 
and the economy will do that. But they 
never talk about business. And 
somewhere along the way, these folks in 
Washington have forgotten that the 
economy is business. Business creates 
new products and new services. 
Business creates jobs. Business creates 
prosperity for our communities and our 
nation as a whole. And business is the 
people that make it work— from the 
CEO [chief executive officer] to the 
workers in the factories. 

I know, too, that American business 
has never been afraid to compete. I 
know that when a trading system 
follows the rules of free trade, when 
there is equal opportunity to compete, 
American business is as innovative, effi- 
cient, and competitive as any in the 
world. I also know that the American 
worker is as good and productive as any 
in the world. 

Promoting Free and Fair Trade 

And that's why to make the interna- 
tional trading system work, all must 
abide by the rules. All must work to 
guarantee open markets. Above all else, 
free trade is, by definition, fair trade. 
When domestic markets are closed to 
the exports of others, it is no longer 
free trade. When governments subsidize 
their manufacturers and farmers so that 
they can dump goods in other markets, 



it is no longer free trade. When govern- 
ments permit counterfeiting or copying 
of American products, it is stealing our 
future, and it is no longer free trade. 
When governments assist their ex- 
porters in ways that violate interna- 
tional laws, then the playing field is no 
longer level, and there is no longer free 
trade. When governments subsidize in- 
dustries for commercial advantage and 
underwrite costs, placing an unfair 
burden on competitors, that is not free 
trade. 

I have worked for 4 years at 
Versailles and Williamsburg and London 
and last at Bonn to get our trading 
partners to dismantle their trade bar- 
riers, eliminate their subsidies and other 
unfair trade practices, enter into 
negotiations to open markets even fur- 
ther and strengthen GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the 
international accord that governs 
worldwide trade. I will continue to do 
these things. 

But I also want the American people 
and our trading partners to know that 
we will take all the action that is 
necessary to pursue our rights and in- 
terests in international commerce, under 
our laws and the GATT, to see that 
other nations live up to their obligations 
and their trade agreements with us. 

I believe that if trade is not fair for 
all, then trade is "free" in name only. I 
will not stand by and watch American 
businesses fail because of unfair trading 
practices abroad. I will not stand by and 
watch American workers lose their jobs 
because other nations do not play by the 
rules. 

We have put incentives into our own 
economy to make it grow and create 
jobs. And, as you know, business has 
prospered. We have created over 8 
million new jobs in the last 33 months. 
Just since 1980, manufacturing produc- 
tion has increased 17%. But I'm not un- 
mindful that within this prosperity some 
industries and workers face difficulties. 
To the workers who have been displaced 
by industrial shifts within our society, 
we are committed to help. To those in- 
dustries that are victims of unfair trade, 
we will work unceasingly to have those 
practices eliminated. 

Just a few weeks ago, I asked the 
U.S. Trade Representative [Clayton 
Yeutter] to initiate unfair trade practice 
investigations. It's the first time a presi- 
dent has done this. And, as you know, 
we have self-initiated three such cases 
that will investigate a Korean law that 
prohibits fair competition for U.S. in- 
surance firms, a Brazilian law restrict- 
ing the sale of U.S. high-technology 



THE PRESIDENT 



products, and Japanese restrictions on 
the sale of U.S tobacco products. I have 
also ordered the U.S. Trade Representa- 
tive to accelerate the ongoing cases of 
Common Market restrictions of canned 
fruit and Japanese prohibitions on 
imports of our leather and leather 
fi ii it wear. 

But I believe more must be done. I 
am, therefore, today announcing that: I 
have instructed Ambassador Yeutter to 
maintain a constant watch and to take 
action in those instances of unfair trade 
that will disadvantage American busi- 
nesses and workers; I have directed the 
Secretary of the Treasury to work with 
the Congress to establish a $300 million 
fund that will support up to $1 billion in 
mixed credit loans. These funds will 
counter our loss of business to trading 
partners who use what, in effect, are 
subsidies to deprive U.S. companies of 
fair access to world markets. And I've 
asked that these initiatives be continued 
until unfair credit subsidies by our 
trading partners are eliminated through' 
negotiations with them. 

I have further instructed Treasury 
Secretary Jim Baker to inform the par- 
ticipants at the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank conferences in 
Seoul that we will take into considera- 
tion the trading practices of other na- 
tions in our deliberations and 
decisionmaking. 

A major factor in the growth of our 
trade deficit has been the combination of 
our very strong economic performance 
and the weak economic performance of 
our major trading partners over the last 
4 years. This has limited our exports 
and contributed to the weakening of 
other currencies relative to the dollar, 
thereby encouraging additional imports 
by the United States and discouraging 
our exports. Yesterday, I authorized 
Treasury Secretary Baker to join his 
counterparts from other major industrial 
countries to announce measures to pro- 
mote stronger and more balanced 
growth in our economies and, thereby, 
the strengthening of foreign currencies. 
This will provide better markets for 
U.S. products and improve the com- 
petitive position of our industry, 
agriculture, and labor. 

1 have ordered the Secretary of 
State to seek time limits on negotiations 
underway to open up markets in specific 
product areas in Japan. 

I have instructed the U.S. Trade 
Representative to accelerate negotia- 
tions with any and all countries where 



the counterfeiting and piracy of U.S. 
goods has occurred to bring these prac- 
tices to a quick end. And I look forward 
to working with the Congress to in- 
crease efforts to protect patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, and other in- 
tellectual property rights. 

And, finally, I am today directing 
that a strike force be established among 
the relevant agencies in our government 
whose task it will be to uncover unfair 
trading practices used against us and 
develop and execute strategies and pro- 
grams to promptly counter and 
eliminate them. 



Working With Congress 

I'm also looking forward to working 
with the Congress to put into place any 
necessary legislation that would help us 
promote free and fair trade and secure 
jobs for American workers. Among the 
topics that we should jointly consider 
are: 

• Authority to support our new 
trade-negotiating initiatives that would, 
among other things, reduce tariffs and 
attempt to dismantle all other trade 
barriers; 

• To protect intellectual property 
rights, including trade in articles that in- 
fringe U.S. process patents, longer 
terms for agricultural chemicals, and 
eliminating Freedom of Information Act 
abuses that will help our businesses pro- 
tect their proprietary property; 

• To improve our antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws so that a 
predictable pricing test covers non- 
market economies, enabling our com- 
panies to have protection against unfair 
dumping from those countries; we 
should also improve these laws so that 
business can have full and rapid protec- 
tion in receiving help against unfair im- 
ports; and 

• To amend our trade laws to put a 
deadline on dispute settlement and to 
conduct a fast-track procedure for 
perishable items; we should no longer 
tolerate 16-year cases and settlements 
so costly and time consuming that any 
assistance is ineffective. 

I am also directing the Secretary of 
Labor to explore ways of assisting 
workers who lose jobs to find gainful 
employment in other industries, and I 
look forward to working with Congress 
in this vital task. 

Additionally, I welcome the sugges- 
tions of the members of Congress on 
other potential legislation that has as its 
object the promotion of free and fair 



trade. I will work with them to see tha 
good legislation is passed. Conversely, 
will strongly oppose and will veto 
measures that I believe will harm 
economic growlh, cause loss of jobs, an< 
diminish international trade. 

But I do not want to let this discus 
sion pass without reminding all of our 
ultimate purpose— the expansion of free 
and open markets everywhere. There 
are some, well-meaning in motive, who 
have proposed bills and programs that 
are purely protectionist in nature. Thes 
proposals would raise the costs of the 
goods and services that American con- 
sumers across the land would have to 
pay. They would invite retaliation by 
our trading partners abroad; would, in 
turn, lose jobs for those American 
workers in industries that would be th 
victims of such retaliation; would re- 
kindle inflation; would strain interna- 
tional relations; and would impair the 
stability of the international financial 
and trading systems. 

The net result of these counter- 
productive proposals would not be to 
protect consumers or workers or 
farmers or businesses. In fact, just the 
reverse would happen. We would lose 
markets, we would lose jobs, and we 
would lose our prosperity. 

Reducing Impediments 
to Free Markets 

To reduce the impediments to free 
markets, we will accelerate our efforts 
to launch a new GATT negotiating 
round with our trading partners. And 
we hope that the GATT members will 
see fit to reduce barriers for trade in 
agricultural products, services, 
technologies, investments, and in mati 
industries. We will seek effective 
dispute-settlement techniques in these 
areas. But if these negotiations are no 
initiated or if insignificant progress is 
made, I'm instructing our trade 
negotiators to explore regional and 
bilateral agreements with other nation 

Here at home we will continue our 
efforts to reduce excessive governmeB 
spending and to promote our tax refor 
proposal that is essential to strengther 
ing our own economy and making U.S. 
business more competitive in interna- 
tional markets. 

Further, we will encourage our 
trading partners, as agreed upon at th 
Bonn summit, to accelerate their own 
economic growth by removing rigiditie 
and imbalances in their economies. An 
we will encourage them to provide 






:« 



B 






THE PRESIDENT 





ind fiscal and monetary policies to 
re them fully participate in the 
>wth potential that is there for all. 
We will seek to strengthen and im- 
ive the operation of the international 
netary system, and we will encourage 
: debt-burdened, less developed coun- 
ts of the world to reduce and 
ninate impediments to investments 
i eliminate internal restrictions that 
courage their own economic growth. 

e U.S. Commitment 

t me summarize. Our commitment to 
le trade is undiminished. We will 
rorously pursue our policy of pro- 
ving free and open markets in this 
Entry and around the world. We will 
list that all nations face up to their 
(;ponsibilities of preserving and 
iiancing free trade everywhere. 



But let no one mistake our resolve 
to oppose any and all unfair trading 
practices. It is wrong for the American 
worker and American businessman to 
continue to bear the burden imposed by 
those who abuse the world trading 
system. 

We do not want a trade war with 
other nations; we want other nations to 
join us in enlarging and enhancing the 
world trading system for the benefit of 
all. 

We do not want to stop other na- 
tions from selling goods in the United 
States; we v/ant to sell more of our 
goods to other nations. 

We do not dream of protecting 
America from others' success; we seek 
to include everyone in the success of the 
American dream. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 30, 1985. 



ews Conference of September 17 
Excerpts) 



Excerpts from President Reagan 's 
rws conference of September 17, 19S5. X 



3 need stronger growth not just at 
me but throughout the world. And we 
nst have free and fair trade for all. 
lis is the path of cooperation and 
ccess that will make our people more 
oductive and that can lead to a decade 
growth and 10 million new jobs in the 
ixt 4 years. 

But there's another path that can 
lly lead away from opportunity and 
ogress: A mindless stampede toward 
otectionism will be a one-way trip to 
onomic disaster. That's the lesson of 
e Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930, which 
ijed to trigger a worldwide trade war 
at spread, deepened, and prolonged 
i.e worst depression in history. And I 
low; I lived through that period. I've 
•en and felt the agony this nation 
ldured because of that dreadful 
gislation. 

If we repeat that same mistake, 
e'll pay a price again. Americans 
hose jobs depend upon exports of 
lachinery, commercial aircraft, high- 
pen electronics, and chemical products 
buld well be the first targets of retalia- 
on. Agriculture and industry, already 
) great difficulty, would be even more 
ulnerable. Protectionist tariffs would 



invite retaliation that could deliver an 
economic death blow to literally tens of 
thousands of American family farms. 

We've begun doing many good 
things for America these last 4V2 years. 
Much remains to be done and can be 
done. So, let us not place all that prog- 
ress, all our hopes for the future at risk 
by starting down on a slippery slope of 
impulsive acts and imprudent judgment. 
And this is a time for cool heads and 
clear vision. 

Q. As you head toward the 
summit, one of the big questions is 
whether you would be willing to 
explore the possibility of a tradeoff on 
the space weapons or big cuts in the 
Soviet arsenal. 

A. No, we're talking about the 
Strategic Defense Initiative now. I'm 
sorry that anyone ever used the appella- 
tion "Star Wars" for it because it isn't 
that. It is purely to see if we can find a 
defensive weapon so that we can get rid 
of the idea that our deterrence should 
be the threat of retaliation, whether 
from the Russians toward us or us 
toward them, of the slaughter of 
millions of people by way of nuclear 
weapons. And rather than that kind of 
negotiation, I think at this summit 
meeting what we should take up is the 
matter of turning toward defensive 



weapons as an alternative to this just 
plain naked nuclear threat of each side 
saying we can blow up the other. And I 
would hope that if such a weapon 
proves practical, that then we can 
realistically eliminate these horrible 
offensive weapons— nuclear 
weapons— entirely. 

And I also have to point out that 
with regard to whether that would be a 
bargaining chip— which I don't see it as 
that at all— is the fact that the Soviet 
Union is already ahead of us in this 
same kind of research. They have been 
doing it much longer than us, seeking a 
defensive weapon also. 

Q. And you're really saying, then, 
that you are not going to negotiate 
and that you really want to test just 
to see if it's practical. But aren't you 
really paving the way toward a 
militarization of the heavens, because 
the Soviets are bound to build up a 
weapon— offensive to counter the 
"Star Wars"? 

A. No, the strategic defense that 
we're seeking is something that, just as 
an antiaircraft gun once could protect 
you against bombers, could be used 
against these offensive weapons— the 
missiles. And it doesn't mean no 
negotiation at all. As a matter of fact, 
the side that has not been negotiating— 
with all of our months and months of 
meetings in Geneva and the arms 
talks— is the Soviet Union. 

We have offered at least six versions 
of a possible reduction and six different 
ways to enlist their interest in 
negotiating with us in a reduction of 
warheads. They have come back with 
nothing. They simply won't discuss it or 
negotiate. 

But the original idea of weapons in 
space dealt with the thought that, in ad- 
dition to the present missiles that we 
have, that somebody would place 
weapons of that kind in orbit in space 
with the ability to call them down on 
any target wherever they wanted to in 
the world, and we agreed. 

This isn't anything of what we're 
talking about. We're talking about a 
weapon that won't kill people; it'll kill 
weapons. And, as I say, they have been 
exploring this, but there's a great deal 
of room for negotiation. The room would 
be if and when such a weapon does 
prove feasible, then prior to any deploy- 
ment, to sit down with the other nations 
of the world and say, "Here. Now, isn't 
this an answer?" 

I don't see it as being something 
that we would add to our arsenal to 
increase our ability over them. I see it 



Jrui^mk^r 1QQQ 



THE PRESIDENT 



as the time then that you could say, 
"Isn't this the answer to any of us 
having nuclear weapons?" 

Q. Why has the United States con- 
sistently played down expectations of 
what will happen at the summit 
meeting when you meet with Mr. Gor- 
bachev in November, even as the 
Soviet Union has insisted that summit 
meetings are for grand and important 
decisions and sought to raise our 
expectations? 

A. It worries me a little bit that 
they go out of their way to try and 
raise expectations, in view of summits in 
the past and what has come of them. 

Maybe we were overly concerned, 
but we were worried that there might 
build up a euphoria and that people 
would be expecting something of a neat- 
miracle to come out of that summit. But 
I don't mind saying right now, we take 
this summit very seriously. And we're 
going to try to get into real discussions 
that we would hope could lead to a 
change in the relationship between the 
two countries— not that we'll learn to 
love each other; we won't— but a change 
in which we can remove this threat of 
possible war or nuclear attack from be- 
tween us and that we can recognize 
that, while we don't like their system 
and they don't like ours, we have to live 
in the world together and that we can 
live there together in peace. And we're 
going to be very serious about that. 

Q. That implies that you think 
that you will be able to reach some 
sort of agreement. Can you reach 
agreement? Or do you think that this 
will be used mainly to get acquainted? 

A. No. This has got to be more than 
get acquainted, although, that's impor- 
tant, too. As you know, I've said before, 
I believe that you start solving prob- 
lems when you stop talking about each 
other and start talking to each other. 
And I think it's high time that we talk 
to each other. 

Q. The United States has just had 
its first successful test of an antisatel- 
lite weapons system. We showed the 
Soviet Union that we could do it. 
Would this not be an ideal time to 
stop further ASAT tests and negotiate 
a ban on such weapons? 

A. Here again, this is going to take 
a lot of verification if you're going to 
try to do that, because, here again, we 
were playing catch-up. They already 
have deployed an antisatellite missile. 
They can knock down and have knocked 
down satellites that have been sent up 



in their testing, and they've completed 
all of that testing. And this was our 
test, and I don't know whether others 
are necessary to complete the thing, but 
we couldn't stand by and allow them to 
have a monopoly on the ability to shoot 
down satellites when we are so depend- 
ent on them for communication, even 
weather and so forth. 

Q. You sent the arms negotiators 
back to Geneva for the start of the 
third round of talks that begin in 2 
days. Did you send them with any new 
proposals? 

A. No, because they have a great 
flexibility, and I sent them back with 
the same thing that we sent them in in 
the first place, and that is that we are 
to be flexible. We know that there is a 
difference in the Soviet Union's— the 
emphasis they place on various weapons 
systems. They have all the same ones 
we do— airborne, submarine launched, 
and so forth. Theirs is a little different 
strategy than ours. So we said that we 
proposed a number of warheads as an 
opener for discussion, that we would 
reduce to a certain number. As I said 
earlier, we have presented at least six 
different ways in which that could be 
done, and we have made it plain that 
we're willing to meet whatever are their 
specific problems with regard to their 
mix of weapons, that we would find 
ways to accommodate the differences 
between us in our strategies. 

And so far they have not made a 
single comment or proposed a different 
number. They have just been there. 
And I don't know how much more flex- 
ible we can be, but we're there waiting 
for them to say, well, that number's 
wrong; let's try another number, or 
make a proposal of their own. And in 
spite of the language that's been used in 
some of the international broadcasts 
recently by leaders in the Kremlin, none 
of those proposals, nothing of that kind 
has ever come to the table for 
negotiations. 

Q. We did conduct an antisatellite 
weapons test the other day, and the 
Soviets said that that showed you 
were not serious about curbing the 
space race and that it complicated the 
summit. Why was it necessary to 
make that test now? Couldn't it have 
waited until after the summit? 

A. No, I don't think so, because, as 
I said, we're playing catch-up. We're 
behind, and this was on the schedule 
that we hoped that we could keep with 
regard to the development of this 
weapon. And it wasn't done either 



because of or with the summit in mind 
at all. It was simply time for the test. 
They've been doing it, and we didn't 
call them any names. 



Q. British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher met Mr. Gorbachevs 
and said, "I like Mr. Gorbachev. We 
can do business together." Is it 
necessary, do you think, that you antfiD 
Gorbachev like each other at the 
summit in order to do business? 

A. I wasn't going to give him a 
friendship ring or anything. [Laughter] 
No, seriously, I believe this. I think shies 
made an observation out of this, and 01 
own people who've been over there— on 
recent group of Senators who met with 
him found him a personable individual. 
I'm sure I will, too. It isn't necessary 
that we love or even like each other. 
It's only necessary that we are willing 
to recognize that for the good of the 
people we represent, on this side of thf 
ocean and over there, that everyone w: 
be better off if we come to some deci 
sions about the threat of war. We're tH 
only two nations in the world, I believe 
that can start a world war. And we're 
the only two that can prevent it. And 
think that's a great responsibility to al 
of mankind, and we'd better take it 
seriously. 

Q. Some people believe that the 
Soviets are winning the propaganda 
war leading up to the summit, that 
Mr. Gorbachev, in recent days, has 
made a number of proposals for test 
moratoria, for a chemical-free zone i 
Europe, while the United States is 
testing an antisatellite weapon and, 
we learned today, a test of a compo- 
nent of SDI. With them talking peac 
while we're testing weapons of war, 
Mr. Gorbachev beating you at your 
own game? 

A. I've not engaged in a propagam 
game. I'm getting ready to go to the 
meeting and take up some things I 
think should be discussed. 

I do think that this is a continuatio 
of a long-time campaign aimed mainly ; 
our allies in Europe and in an effort to 
build an impression that we may be th 
villains in the peace and that they're tl 
good guys. I don't think it has 
registered with our allies, and I'm not 
going to take it seriously at all. He car 
practice whatever tactics he wants to. 
We're going to meet, and we're seriou: 
ly going to discuss the matters that I'\ 
just mentioned here. 



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THE PRESIDENT 



Q. Y'ou're known as a pretty good 
legotiator, and some people think 
hat even if you were willing to 
legotiate on SDI, you wouldn't tell us 
low; you'd wait for Geneva. Are you 
elling the American people tonight 
hat you are ruling out any deal with 
he Soviets at this point on testing, 
leplovment, research, development of 
SDI?" 

A. I'm saying that the research to 
ee if such a weapon is feasible is not in 
iolation of any treaty. It's going to con- 
inue. That will, one day, involve, if it 
eaches that point, testing. On the other 
and, I stop short of deployment 
ecause, as I said then, I'm willing to 
alk to our allies, talk to them, and talk 
o the Soviets— to anyone about the 
leaning of it, if it could be used in such 
way as to rid the world of the nuclear 
hreat. 

Q. But development and testing— 
ou're ruling out any deal on that? 
'ou're ruling out a deal on testing or 
■evelopment? 

A. I think that's a legitimate part of 
esearch, and, yes, I would rule that 
ut. I don't mind saying here— and nor- 
lally I don't talk about— as you said, 
'hat's going to be your strategy in 
■egotiations. But in this, this is too im- 
ortant to the world to have us be 
filling to trade that off for a different 
umber of nuclear missiles when there 
re already more than enough to blow 
oth countries out of the world. 

Q. Your sanctions against South 
frica seem to have drawn criticism 
om many sides. Bishop Tutu called 
du a racist; President Botha says 
ley w ill impede U.S. efforts to help 
!i the region, and many in Congress 
ire still pressing for stronger 
teasures. What is your answer to 
<iese charges, and do you plan to 
ppoint a special envoy to the region 
s you have in Central America? 

A. I think that when you're stand- 
ig up against a cellophane wall and 
ou're getting shot at from both sides, 
ou must be doing something right. And 
it had all come from one direction, I 
ould have looked again and said, 
Well, did I miss something here?" But 
rie very fact that both factions are 
nhappy— one says it goes too far, and 
he other one says it doesn't go far 
nough— I must be pretty near the 
riddle. 

And what I tried to do was to avoid 
he kind of sanctions— economic 
anctions— that would have militated 
gainst the people we're trying to help. 



And there have been other leaders over 
there and Leaders against apartheid who 
have been gratified by what we did. So, 
we'll see what happens. 

Q. For the first time in 70 years, 
we have become a deficit nation— since 
1914. Does this disturb you? 
Throughout your political life, you 
have decried deficit spending and our 
secondary posture in the world of 
trade. Do you have a solution for this? 

A. You used the word deficit; you 
mean our trade imbalance? 

Q. Yes, the fact that we have 
become a debtor nation for the first 
time since 1914. 

A. Are we? I think this false im- 
pression that's being given that a trade 
imbalance means debtor nation. This 
isn't our government that is expending 
more than it is for imports than it is 
getting back in exports. These are the 
people of our country and the businesses 
and the corporations and the individual 
entrepreneurs. 

On one hand, the American people 
are buying more than the American 
people are selling. Incidentally, those 
figures of export and import have some 
failings in them, some weak spots. They 
don't include on exports anything that 
we're getting back for services. There's 
a lot of technical things I won't get into, 
because they get too complicated here, 
about the difference in the two figures. 

But let me point something out 
about this. The deficit that I'm con- 
cerned about, that is the most impor- 
tant, and that can be the biggest prob- 
lem for us and that must be solved, is 
the deficit in Federal spending— here, 
our domestic spending. This is the 
threat to everything that we hold dear. 

But the trade imbalance— from 
1890-or 1790 to 1875, this country, all 
that 85 years, ran a trade imbalance. 
And in those years, we were becoming 
the great economic power that we are in 
the world today. 

Now we come up to the present. 
And in the last 33 months, we have 
seen more than 8 million new jobs 
created. Yes, we've lost since 1979 1.6 
million jobs in manufacturing, but we've 
added 9 million new jobs in travel and 
service industries. 

We've had this great recovery; 
we've brought inflation down; the 
interest rate is coming down— all of 
these things that we want. This 
recovery, the greatest one we've known 
in decades, has been done with this 
same trade imbalance. 



In the 1930's, in that depression that 

I mentioned earlier in my remarks, in 
that depression, 25% unemployment— 
the worst depression the world has ever 
known— we had a trade surplus every 
line (if those 10 years until World War 

II ended the depression. 

I think this has been exaggerated, 
and it isn't a case of us being a debtor 
nation. Another thing we don't count is 
that from abroad, that is not counted in 
our export figures are the billions of 
dollars of foreign capital that has been 
invested in the United States, invested 
in our private industries, invested in our 
government bonds, if you wall, things of 
this kind because we are the best and 
safest investment in the world today. 

Q. Why couldn't all the weapons 
and all the technology that are cur- 
rently under rubric of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative be used offensively 
as well as defensively and thereby 
defeat your rationale for a strategic 
defense? Why couldn't lasers and elec- 
tronic beam weapons be used offen- 
sively and defeat the purpose of the 
program? 

A. I'm sure there must have been 
some research in things of that kind, 
but we're definitely seeking a defensive 
weapon. And one of the things that I 
believe should be taken up at the sum- 
mit is to make it plain that we're both 
willing to look at certainly a mix and 
see if we can't place more dependence 
on defensive weapons rather than on 
destructive weapons that could wipe out 
populations. 

Q. But isn't it fair to assume that 
the Russians, out of their own sense 
of military security, are bound to con- 
sider the possibility that weapons 
developed under SDI could be used 
offensively as well as defensively? 

A. I'm not a scientist enough to 
know about what that would take to 
make them that way. That isn't what 
we are researching on or what we're 
trying to accomplish. And at the mo- 
ment I have to say the United States— 
in spite of some of the misinformation 
that has been spread around— is still 
well behind the Soviet Union in literally 
every kind of offensive weapon, both 
conventional and in the strategic 
weapons. And we think that we have 
enough of a deterrent, however, that 
the retaliation would be more than 
anyone would want to accept. For 40 
years we've maintained the peace, but 
we've got more years to go, and this 
threat hangs over all of us worldwide, 



THE PRESIDENT 



and some day there may come along a 
madman in the world someplace- 
everybody knows how to make them 
anymore-that could make use of these. 
It's like when we met in 1925, after 
the horror of World War I, in Geneva 
and decided against poison gas any more 
as a weapon in war. And we went 
through World War II and clown to the 
defeat of our enemies without anyone 
using it, because they knew that 
everyone had it. But they also knew 
something else. We outlawed poison gas 
in 1925, but everybody kept their gas 
masks. I think of this weapon as kind of 
the gas mask. 

Q. This week you'll be meeting 
with President Machel of Mozam- 
bique, who is a Marxist, but he has 
turned his back on his Soviet allies to 
cut off the lines of infiltration from 
the African National Congress to 
South Africa. What is the quid pro 
quo in this meeting? In other words, 
what will you do to make President 
Machel's action worth what it has 
probably cost him? 

A. All I know is that for some time 
now there has been an indication that 
he, who had gone so far over to the 
other camp, was having second 
thoughts. We just think it's worthwhile 
to show him another side of the coin, 
and we think it's worth a try to let him 
see what our system is and see that he 
might be welcome in the Western world. 
And that's why I'm meeting with him. 

Q. Mr. President, I'd like to turn, 
if I might, to the subject of the recent 
spy scandals and ask you a two-part 
question. Do the string of West Ger- 
man defections mean that the United 
States must cut back the amount of 
sensitive information it shares with 
NATO? And, secondly, does the 
Walker spy scandal in the United 
States suggest to you that perhaps we 
should reduce the Soviet presence in 
this country? 

A. We've always been aware of the 
fact that the Soviets had, undoubtedly, 
more agents in this country than any 
personnel that we had in theirs; this has 
been very much on our minds. I don't 
know just how you can evaluate what 
might have been compromised. The 
Walker case somehow doesn't seem to 
look as big as it did a short time ago 
now with what we've seen happening in 
the other countries. 

1 think that if there has been 
damage, it's been done already with 
what they could have conveyed both 



ways in this. You know, England, at the 
same time, has got the defectioners 
from the KGB that have now come to 
them with information that certainly 
must make a lot of agents throughout 
the world wonder when they're going to 
feel a tap on their shoulder. And we 
just have to play with this the best we 
can and hope that, together and be- 
tween us all, we can establish some 
means of identifying better those who 
are loyal. 

Q. Can I follow up on that and 
ask again the first part of the ques- 
tion, and that is whether you feel that 
now, given these defections in West 
Germany, that perhaps it's time for us 
to reevaluate just how much informa- 
tion we share with some of our allies 
in Europe? 

A. I think there's reevaluating 
that's going on all over the world on 
that, and I'm sure here, too. 

Q. Just returning to trade 
specifically for a minute. Members of 
Congress who support the so-called 
Textile and Apparel Protection Act 
claim that the U.S. adherence to free 
trade and our allies' adherence to un- 
fair trade practices has not only cost 
the jobs of 300,000 workers since 1980 
but forced companies here to close 
down even the newest, most efficient 
plants in the world. If the shoe were 
on the other foot, and you represented 
a textile apparel producing State, how 
would you explain the President's 
reluctance to support a bill that seems 
to be the last, best hope for those in- 
dustries and also for the 2 million re- 
maining workers in those industries? 

A. Again, protectionism is a two- 
way street. And there is no way that 
you can try to protect and shield one in- 
dustry that seems to be having these 
competitive problems without exposing 
others. No one ever looks over their 
shoulder to see who lost their job 
because of protectionism. We do know 
the history of the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
and what 'it did. There were over a 
thousand economists that sought the 
President out at the time and begged 
him to veto that bill. But in this one 
with a single industry, if there is an 
unfairness-and we've already made 
that plain and made it evident-we are 
going to, if they're taking advantage in 
some way in another country— 
competing unfairly with us— to take ac- 
tion on those items. 



For almost 2 years now, I have been 
begging our allies and trading partners 
in the GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade], the general tariff 
program, to join with us in another 
round of trade talks to again eliminate 
whatever holdovers there are of 
discrimination against someone else's 
products getting into their country or 
subsidizing sale at less than production 
cost in other countries. These things 
we'll do and we'll do vigorously. 

But just plain protectionism— let me 
point out another problem that no one 
has considered. You take one product- 
that kind— and you look at the list of 
countries, and then you find out we're 
the biggest exporter in the world. Then 
you find out that in some of these coun- 
tries, if we punish them for that one 
product, we happen to have a trade 
surplus in that country. How can they 
stand by on that one thing they're ex- 
porting successfully and then say, "But 
■ we're buying more from you than we're 
selling to you in your country." 

So, there just is no excuse for pro- 
tectionism that is simply based on 
legitimate competition and curbing that 
competition. 

Q. If the current bills which are 
on the Hill now seeking sweeping 
trade protectionism were enacted, do 
you foresee somewhat of a, might say, 
reenactment of Smoot-Hawley which 
led to the Depression or certainly 
deepened it? Do you feel there is a 
cause and effect there? 

A. I don't know. I think there are 
probably some individuals that haven't 
learned' the lesson or haven't lived long 
enough to have been around when the 
Great Depression was on. That's one of 
the advantages of being a kid my age. 



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•Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 23, 1985. 



Dfinartment of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



Oth Anniversary of the End 
if World War II in the Pacific 



President Reagan's radio address to 
le nation on August 10, 1985. 1 

i a few days, we'll be commemorating 

J Day, the 40th anniversary of the 
id of the war in the Pacific, which 
rought to a close the most destructive 
id widespread conflagration in the 
istory of mankind. 

Over 3 million American airmen, 
>ldiers, sailors, and marines served in 
le Pacific and Asian theaters between 
Ml -45. They endured some of the most 
ivage combat of the war, from the 
ozen Aleutian Islands in the north to 
le jungles of Guadalcanal and the 
)lcanic sands of Iwo Jima. 

Our fighting forces came back from 
ie defeat at Pearl Harbor and slugged 
teir way across the Pacific, island by 
land. Gen. Douglas MacArthur wrote 
the American fighting man in the 
•icific: "He plods and groans, sweats 
id toils. He growls and curses. And at 
■e end, he dies, unknown, uncom- 
-aining, with faith in his heart, and on 
■s lips, a prayer for victory." 

Well, the victory was won, and our 
eedom and way of life were preserved 
(cause of the courage and honor of 
nose who put their lives on the line 
tur decades ago. The Americans who 
nt through this ordeal of storm and 
>crifice, just as their counterparts who 
ittled our enemies in Europe, deserve 
special place in the hearts of all those 
tio love liberty. 

Vice President Bush might be a 
itle embarrassed if he knew I was 
>ing to say this, but he's one of those 
nericans I'm talking about. As a 
iung fighter pilot in the Pacific, his 
ane was shot down on a military mis- 
hi. He came perilously close to losing 
s life. 



If you know any veterans of the 
Second World War, you might take the 
time on August 14th to thank them. 
There are so many heroes among us, 
and I'm sure they'd like to know how 
much we appreciate them. 

The veterans of the Pacific war 
should take special pride that today the 
Pacific rim is blessed with stability and 
bustling with enterprise and commerce. 
The hard-fought battles of the Pacific 
laid the foundation for what is becoming 
one of the most vibrant regions of the 
world. The devastation and rubble of 
the war have given way to great 
centers of human progress, futuristic 
metropolises with vast industrial com- 
plexes, modernistic transportation 
systems, and impressive institutions of 
culture and learning. 

Nowhere is this more evident than 
in Japan, now a close and reliable friend 
and one of our most important allies. In 
these last 40 years, the Japanese have 
transformed bombed-out ruins into a 
great industrial nation. With few natural 
resources of their own, they now pro- 
duce over 10% of all the world's goods 
and services. They've accomplished this 
economic miracle with hard work, free 
enterprise, and low tax rates. 

The Japanese are today in so many 
ways our partners in peace and enter- 
prise. Our economic ties are a great 
boon to both our peoples. Our good will 
and cooperation will be maintained by a 
mutually beneficial trading relationship 
based on free trade and open markets 
on both sides of the Pacific. 

The great strides forward being 
made in the Pacific rim bode well for 
the United States. We are, after all, a 
Pacific rim country. Already our trade 
with Pacific and East Asian countries is 
greater than with any other region of 
the world. We can look forward to the 



future with anticipation of a better 
tomorrow. The people of our country 
will be in the forefront of the economic 
renaissance of the Pacific. 

Liberty not only spawns progress, 
but it is the genesis of true peace as 
well. As free peoples, it is unthinkable 
that the Japanese and Americans will 
ever again go to war. Where there are 
differences, as there are in the relations 
of any two great nations, they can be 
settled in the spirit of good will. 

Those brave Americans who fought 
in the Pacific four decades ago were 
fighting for a better world. They 
believed in America and often they gave 
the last full measure of devotion. One 
such man was Marine Lt. David Tucker 
Brown from Alexandria, Virginia. While 
in the Pacific, he wrote home: "I am 
more than ever convinced that this is 
Thomas Jefferson's war, the war of the 
common man against tyranny and pride. 
It is really a war for democracy and not 
for power or materialism." Well, Lieu- 
tenant Brown was later killed in action 
in Okinawa, one of so many brave and 
courageous young Americans who made 
the supreme sacrifice. 

I think if those brave men were 
with us today they'd be proud of what 
has been accomplished. At war's end, 
with victory in hand, we looked forward, 
not back. We lived up to our ideals, the 
ideals of heroes like Lt. David Tucker 
Brown. And we worked with our former 
enemies to build a new and better 
world, a world of freedom and oppor- 
tunity. That's the America we're all so 
proud of. 



broadcast from the Oval Office at the 
White House (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Aug. 19, 
1985). ■ 



THE SECRETARY 



The Charter's Goals 
and Today's Realities 

Secretary Shultz's address before 

the UN General Assembly in New York City 

on September 23, 1985. 1 



Three years ago, when I addressed this 
body for the first time, I stressed the 
need for realism. There is probably no 
other quality so appropriate and neces- 
sary for this organization. 

But realism does not mean cynicism 
or even pessimism. It means a clear- 
sighted appreciation of the opportunities 
we face, as well as of the obvious prob- 
lems. It means remembering the many 
challenges that the world community 
has overcome and drawing lessons from 
that. It means understanding that ideal- 
ism and the yearning for human better- 
ment are themselves part of reality and 
thus have enormous practical signifi- 
cance. 

The founding fathers of the United 
Nations are sometimes accused of naive 
utopianism. Supposedly, they ignored 
the harsh realities of power politics in 
attempting to create a global system of 
collective security. I doubt it. The men 
and women who set up this organization 
40 years ago were among the great 
statesmen of the century. They drafted 
the Charter as a set of standards for 
international conduct— knowing full well 
that the world's nations probably would 
fall short of those standards but know- 
ing also that the setting of high goals is 
a necessary precondition to their pursuit 
and attainment. 

The lofty goals of the Charter have 
a concrete, practical meaning today. 
They not only point the way to a better 
world; they reflect some of the most 
powerful currents al work in the con- 
temporary world. The striving for 
justice, freedom, progress, and peace is 
an ever-present and powerful reality 
that is today, more than ever, impress- 
ing itself on international politics. 

Our political thinking must catch up 
to this reality. The policies of nations 
must adapt to this basic human striving. 
This organization, too, must adapt to 
reality; it cannot afford to consume itself 



in political warfare and unrealistic pos- 
turing. There is work to be done. Let's 
do it. 

The world community faces enor- 
mous challenges in three areas: 

• In satisfying mankind's yearning 
for democracy, freedom, and justice; 

• In preserving and perfecting 
global peace and stability; and 

• In spreading economic prosperity 
and progress. 

The Democratic Revolution 

First, the quest for democracy and free- 
dom: since the end of the Second World 
War, modern communication has opened 
the eyes of most of the world's peoples 
to the realization that they do not have 
to live their lives in poverty and 
despair— that, on the contrary, the bless- 
ings of prosperity and liberty known in 
the past only by a relative few can be 
theirs as well. The ideals for which the 
war was fought, and the spread of 
democracy and of prosperity in the 
industrialized world since, created an 
explosion of expectations. 

The result has been, in recent years, 
a revolution of democratic aspirations 
sweeping the world. At the time of the 
San Francisco conference in 1945, most 
of the nations represented in this hall 
today were not independent states but 
possessions— colonies of European em- 
pires. The vast number of languages, 
cultures, and traditions I can now see 
before me testifies to the revolution in 
the world order. The old empires even- 
tually had to accept the postwar reality 
of self-determination and national 
independence. 

Much of the conflict in the world 
today stems from the refusal of some 
governments to accept the reality that 
the aspirations of people for democracy 
and freedom simply cannot be sup- 
pressed forever by force. 



In South Africa, these aspirations on 
the part of the black majority have— as 
never before— drawn global attention 
and support. Change is inevitable. The 
issue is not whether apartheid is to be 
dismantled but how and when. And 
then, what replaces it: race war, blood- 
bath, and new forms of injustice or 
political accommodation and racial co- 
existence in a just society? The outcome 
depends on whether and how quickly 
the South African Government can 
accept the new reality and on whether 
men and women of peace on both sides 
can seize the opportunity before it is toe 
late. 

This much is clear: there must be 
negotiation among South Africans of all 
races on constitutional reform. True 
peace will come only when the govern- 
ment negotiates with— rather than locks 
up— representative black leaders. The 
violence will end only when all parties 
begin a mutual search for a just system 
of governance. 

One area where the future has 
brightened in the past 5 years, as the 
aspirations of the people for democracy 
have been met in country after country 
is Latin America. In contrast to only 
30% in 1979, today more than 90% of 
the people of Latin America live under 
governments that are either democratic 
or clearly on the road to democracy. 

In Central America, El Salvador— 
under the courageous leadership of 
President Duarte— has shown that 
democracy can take root and thrive 
even in the most difficult terrain. Its 
citizens braved extremist violence to 
participate overwhelmingly in four free 
elections since 1982. Their president's 
current personal ordeal only serves to 
underscore the sacrifices thousands of 
Salvadorans continue to make as they 
fight to realize the ideals of the UN 
Charter. For this commitment they 
should be applauded by all members. 
Ironically, El Salvador is today the onl; 
democracy subject to the scrutiny of a 
special rapporteur for human rights. 

Among El Salvador's neighbors, 
Costa Rica has long been the region's 
beacon of representative government: 
Honduras is about to replace one freely 
elected government with another; and 
Guatemala is about to join them as a 
democratic nation with election of a 
president in November. These develop 
ments should enhance regional coopera- 
tion for economic development, which 
the United States supports through out 
Caribbean Basin Initiative and Presi- 
dent Reagan's initiative for peace, 
development, and democracy. 



THE SECRETARY 




Secretary Shultz addressing the UN General Assembly. 



But regional peace in Central Amer- 
ica is threatened by the rulers of Nicar- 
agua and their Soviet and Cuban allies. 
Behind a cloak of democratic rhetoric, 
the Nicaraguan communists have 
betrayed the 1979 revolution and em- 
barked on a course of tyranny at home 
and subversion against their neighbors. 
(Brave Nicaraguans are fighting to 
restore the hope for freedom in their 
country, and the other nations of the 
region are working together in collective 
self-defense against Nicaraguan 
aggresssion. 

How can this crisis be resolved? The 
Central American nations, together with 
their nearest neighbors— the Contadora 
Group— have subscribed to a document 
of 21 objectives. These include noninter- 
ference in the affairs of one's neighbors, 
serious dialogue with domestic opposi- 
tion groups, free elections and democ- 
racy in each country, removal of foreign 
military personnel, and a reduction of 
armaments. My government supports a 
verifiable treaty based on full and simul- 
taneous implementation of the 21 objec- 
tives. We welcome the resumption of 
talks next month in Panama and hope 



they lead to a final agreement. Conta- 
dora is the best forum for pursuing a 
settlement. 

In El Salvador, President Duarte, 
true to his pledge to the assembly last 
year, has pursued a dialogue with the 
guerrilla opposition. Would that the 
rulers of Nicaragua make— and honor— 
the same pledge to the assembly this 
year. In San Jose on March 1 of this 
year, the Nicaraguan democratic resist- 
ance called for internal dialogue, mod- 
erated by the Roman Catholic Church, 
to end the killing. 

The people of the region are waiting 
for a positive answer from the rulers of 
Nicaragua. Can it be that, never having 
been chosen by their people in a truly 
free election, they lack the confidence to 
face opponents they cannot silence or 
lock up, as they have so many others? 
The United Nicaraguan Opposition 
deserves to participate in Nicaraguan 
political life and has an important role 
to play in the diplomatic process. Re- 
gional peace will not come without it. 

The reality of the democratic revolu- 
tion is also demonstrated by the rise of 
national liberation movements against 
communist colonialism: in Afghanistan, 



Cambodia, Angola, and other lands 
where, as in Nicaragua, people have 
organized in resistance to tyranny. 
Unlike the old European empires that 
came to accept the postwar reality of 
self-determination and national inde- 
pendence, the new colonialists are swim- 
ming against the tide of history. They 
are doomed to fail. 

In Afghanistan, the almost 6-year-old 
Soviet invasion has inflicted untold suf- 
fering on a people whose will to resist 
and to free themselves from a pitiless 
tyranny cannot be broken. Hundreds of 
thousands of Afghans are dead and 
maimed; millions more make up the 
largest refugee population in the world; 
and countless villages, schools, and 
farms lie in ruins. Nowhere in the world 
has the carnage wrought by Soviet im- 
perialism been greater than in Afghani- 
stan, and nowhere has the resistance 
been more determined and courageous. 

The withdrawal of Soviet forces, as 
the General Assembly has noted on six 
occasions, would lead to a solution of the 
Afghanistan problem. A solution must 
also encompass restoration of the coun- 
try's independent and nonaligned status, 



November 1985 



THE SECRETARY 



self-determination for the Afghan peo- 
ple, and the return in safety and honor 
of the more than 3 million refugees. 
Unless and until the Soviet Union per- 
mits such a solution, the national libera- 
tion struggle in Afghanistan will con- 
tinue, the worldwide effort to provide 
r to a beleaguered people will go 
forward, and Soviet protestations of 
peace on this and other issues will not 
ring true. My government, together 
with others concerned, stands ready to 
implement a just solution to this 
problem. 



body to honor their solemn commit- 
ments. As Thomas Jefferson once said, 
the opinions of men and women are not 
the rightful object of any government, 
anywhere. 



The Quest for Peace 

The quest for peace continues on many 
fronts. And for all the obstacles con- 
fronting it, there are examples of 
success— such as the Antarctic Treaty, 
which recently marked a quarter cen- 
tury of effective international coopera- 



i 



Much of the conflict in the world 
^ today stems from the refusal of some 
w aovernments to accept the reality 



w governments to accept the reality 
sk | p, V that the aspirations of people for 

democracy and freedom simply can- 
not be suppressed forever by force. 



Cambodia, as we all know, stands as 
one of the worst examples in history of 
a totalitarian ideology carried to its 
bloodiest extreme. Today, courageous 
freedom fighters under the leadership of 
Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann straggle 
to reclaim their country. We continue to 
support the ASEAN [Association of 
South East Asian Nations] program for 
a peaceful solution: Vietnamese forces 
must withdraw completely; and Cam- 
bodia's independence, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity must be restored 
under a government chosen in free 
elections. 

In other countries, where the appa- 
ratus of repression is well developed, 
countless thousands of men and women 
wage private struggles for freedom, 
armed only with their consciences and 
their courage. Some suffer for their 
political convictions; others for their 
religious beliefs: Solidarity trade 
unionists in Poland; Jews, Baptists, 
Roman Catholics, Pentecostalists, and 
others in the Soviet Union; Baha'is in 
Iran. With all the men and arms at 
their disposal, what are these govern- 
ments afraid of? 

These brave and often nameless 
prisoners of conscience straggle to 
achieve for men and women in every 
corner of the world the promises of this 
organization. We are with them, and we 
call on all states as members of this 



tion. We can learn from problems over- 
come, as we tackle the formidable prob- 
lems ahead. 

In the Middle East, 10 or 15 years 
ago, peace between Israel and any Arab 
state seemed a remote if not impossible 
dream. Finally, after untold suffering 
and four wars, a courageous leader, An- 
war Sadat, abandoned the old ways of 
thinking and took the step no other 
Arab leader had been prepared even to 
contemplate: he recognized that the 
State of Israel was here to stay and, 
with Prime Minister Begin, vowed there 
would be no more wars. Peace and nor- 
mal relations were established, and the 
Sinai was returned. 

The past year has seen major efforts 
toward new negotiations between Israel 
and its Arab neighbors. The United 
States is committed and engaged in sup- 
port of those efforts, in accordance with 
President Reagan's initiative of 3 years 
ago. Yet the lesson of the past is clear: 
progress can only be achieved through 
direct negotiations, based on Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. There 
is no other way, and evasion of this 
reality only prolongs suffering and 
heightens dangers. Nothing positive will 
ever be achieved by chasing illusions of 
"armed struggle"; but much can be ac- 
complished by parties who are commit- 
ted to peace and engaged in serious 



dialogue. The moment is at hand— this 
year— to make major progress and to 
begin direct negotiations. 

To the east, we have the continuing 
failure of reason to prevail and end the 
devastating war between Iran and Iraq. 
Prolonged by Iran's refusal to come to 
terms with its inability to achieve vic- 
tory, this war has now entered its sixth 
year, with no end in sight. We again call 
on both parties to negotiate an end to 
the fighting. 

On the Korean Peninsula we see the 
first tentative steps being taken to get 
away from the mode of thinking that 
has characterized the past 40 years. A 
decade ago, there seemed little hope for 
a significant reduction of tension. Yet 
last year both Koreas began a multi- 
faceted direct dialogue, which the 
United States supports as the key to a 
solution. While the animosities of a life- 
time are not resolved quickly, a start 
has been made. We also believe that 
UN membership for both the Republic 
of Korea and North Korea, in accord- 
ance with the principle of universality, 
would help reduce tensions. 

Perhaps the most dramatic problem 
that requires new ways of thinking is in- 
ternational state-sponsored terrorism. 
Terrorism is every bit as much a form 
of war against a nation's interests and 
values as a full-scale armed attack. And 
it is a weapon wielded particularly 
against innocent civilians, against free 
nations, against democracy, against 
moderation and peaceful solutions. It is 
an affront to everything the United Na- 
tions stands for. 

Progress has been made against the 
terrorist threat through cooperation in 
the UN system. Many nations subscribe 
to the Hague, Tokyo, and Montreal con- 
ventions to make air travel safer and to 
suppress hijacking and sabotage. Prog- 
ress has also been made in providing 
protection for diplomats, and some 
nations have agreed on how to handle 
hostage situations. Just this month, par- 
ticipants at a UN congress in Milan 
adopted a strong, broad-ranging resolu- 
tion urging all states to adhere to these 
agreements and to strengthen interna- 
tional actions against terrorism. 

Much more remains to be done. The 
United States and other nations, for ex- 
ample, are working with the Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization to im- 
prove standards of security. Over the 
past year, some 90 potential terrorist 
actions against U.S. facilities or citizens 
have been deterred or prevented. But 
the fight has only begun, and it cannot 
be won by one government alone. The 



nnMHmant nf Qtoto Rllllptin 



THE SECRETARY 



ivilized world must put the terrorists 
nd their supporters on notice: we will 
efend ourselves in any and every way 
re can. 

J. S. -Soviet Relations 

"he reality of the nuclear age has im- 
'elled the United States and the Soviet 
Jnion to engage in a dialogue, of vary- 
<\g intensity, for the past 40 years. This 
lialogue has been an unprecedented 
ttempt by two rivals to manage their 
ompetition and avert war. We know 
hat we share a responsibility for main- 
aining peace, not just for our peoples 
put for all the Earth's people. 

Despite all the difficulties, let us 
emember what has been accomplished. 
Lfter the two most destructive wars in 
istory, the superpowers have averted 
rorld war for four decades. We have 
ad some success in limiting nuclear 
esting. Working together with other 
ations since the Non-Proliferation 
Yeaty (NPT) in 1968, we have suc- 
eeded in restricting the proliferation of 
uclear weapons. Twenty years ago it 
/as conventional wisdom that there 
/ould be 15-25 nuclear-weapons states 
>y today; yet the number of states 
cknowiedged to possess nuclear 
weapons has held at five for the past 20 
ears. The United States remains com- 
mitted to all the goals of the NPT, 
whose third review conference just suc- 
■essfully concluded in Geneva. And the 
Jnited States and the Soviet Union 
aave taken practical steps to avoid con- 
lict. Our navies have long agreed to 
rork together to prevent incidents at 
•ea. And we have set up and improved 
he "Hot Line" for crisis communications. 

In the nuclear and space arms talks 
n Geneva, the United States has ad- 
fanced far-reaching proposals: a reduc- 
tion by almost one-half in the most 
destabilizing weapons, strategic ballistic 
•nissile warheads, and elimination of the 
vhole class of U.S. and Soviet longer 
•ange INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
brces] missiles worldwide— all leading 
iltimately to the complete elimination of 
luclear arms. We repeatedly have 
stressed our readiness for give-and-take 
ind to consider alternative proposals. 
Each of our proposals has been followed 
Up by further attempts to find common 
ground with the Soviet Union. We have 
offered tradeoffs and made clear our 
readiness to take account of legitimate 
Soviet concerns to obtain an agreement 
that would enhance strategic stability 
and strengthen deterrence. 



Progress at Geneva has been slow. 
Thus far the Soviet Union has not nego- 
tiated with the responsiveness that the 
talks require. Nonetheless, our determi- 
nation to reach an equitable agreement 
has not wavered. 

In this spirit. President Reagan last 
June decided to continue our policy of 
taking no action that would undercut 
the limits of previous agreements, to the 
extent the Soviet Union shows compara- 
ble restraint. Despite serious reserva- 
tions about those agreements, and seri- 
ous concerns about the Soviet record of 
noncompliance, the President made this 
decision to foster a climate of truly 
mutual restraint to facilitate progress in 
arms control. 

While the most direct path to a 
safer world is through equitable, verifi- 
able reductions, we also see value in 
verifiable limitations on nuclear testing. 
For that reason, President Reagan, in 
his speech to this body last year, pro- 
posed that the United States and the 
Soviet Union exchange visits of experts 
at test sites to measure directly the 
yields of nuclear weapons tests. This 
would significantly improve confidence 
in the verifiability of proposed treaty 
limits on underground testing. The 
Soviet Union rejected this offer. Never- 
theless, last July, the President issued 
an unconditional invitation for a Soviet 
team to observe and measure a nuclear 
test at the Nevada test site. We again 
call on the Soviet Union to take up this 
offer, which is a concrete, positive step 
toward verifiable restrictions on nuclear 
testing. 



first-strike capability— which is eroding 
the basis on which deterrence has 
rested for decades. The strategy of reli- 
ance on offensive retaliation to preserve 

deterrence and prevent war thus is be- 
ing called into question by Soviet 
actions. 

The answer is, first, for us both to 
agree on strategically significant, verifi- 
able reductions in the numbers and 
destructive potential of offensive 
weapons. But there are additional ways 
to redress the problem. President Rea- 
gan has directed our scientists and 
engineers to examine— in light of new 
technologies and fully in accord with the 
ABM Treaty— the feasibility of defense 
against ballistic missile attack. Strategic 
defense could give our children and 
grandchildren a safer world. We would 
continue to rely on deterrence to pre- 
vent war, but deterrence would be bas- 
ed more on denying success to a poten- 
tial attacker and less on threatening 
massive mutual destruction. Such a 
means of deterrence should be safer and 
more stable. Our goal is not to achieve 
superiority but to add to the security of 
both sides. As former Soviet Premier 
Kosygin said, an antimissile system "is 
intended not for killing people but for 
saving human lives." 

We want to cooperate with the 
Soviet Union in making progress on 
these most important of all issues. Prog- 
ress requires— it demands— good will, 
realism, and honesty. Behind the curtain 
that encloses Soviet society, free from 
the open debate we see in the West, a 
major strategic defense program has 



Terrorism is every bit as much a 
form of war against a nation's inter- 
ests and values as a full-scale armed 
attack . ... It is an affront to 
everything the United Nations stands 
for. 




When the An ti- Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty was signed in 1972, it 
was assumed that tight limits on defen- 
sive systems would make possible real 
reductions in strategic offensive arms. 
But the Soviet Union has never agreed 
to any meaningful reductions in offen- 
sive nuclear arms. Instead, it has con- 
tinued an unprecedented military 
buildup— particularly in heavy ICBMs 
[intercontinental ballistic missiles] with a 



proceeded for decades. The current 
Soviet leaders know that. In the past 20 
years, the Soviet Union has spent about 
as much on strategic defense as on their 
offensive nuclear forces. They know 
that. The Soviets have the world's most 
active military space program, last year 
conducting about 100 space launches- 
some 80% of which were purely military 
in nature— compared to a total of about 
20 U.S. space launches. The Soviets 



November 1985 



11 



THE SECRETARY 



know that, too. They deploy the world's 
only ABM system, whose nuclear-armed 
interceptors and other components are 
undergoing extensive modernization. 
They are researching many of the same 
new technologies as we and are ahead in 
some. And the Soviet Union has the 
world's only extensively tested and fully 
operational antisatellite system. The 
Soviet leaders know full well their own 
efforts in these fields. Their propaganda 
about American programs is blatantly 
one-sided and not to be taken seriously. 

So let's get down to real business, 
with the seriousness the subject de- 
serves. And let us do so in the quiet of 
the negotiating room, where we can 
really make progress on narrowing our 
differences. 

Progress needs to be made in other 
arms control areas as well. Restraints 
against chemical and biological weapons 
have eroded in recent years as inter- 
national agreements have been violated 
by the Soviet Union and others. In 
April 1984 the United States proposed a 
comprehensive treaty for a global ban 
on chemical weapons. We will again 
introduce a resolution on chemical 
weapons in the First Committee. We 
must have talks on serious, verifiable 
proposals. 

To reduce the risk of conflict through 
miscalculation, we and our Atlantic 
allies have proposed significant confi- 
dence- and security-building measures at 
the Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe. To enhance security in Central 
Europe, we have repeatedly sought 
ways to move the mutual and balanced 
force reduction talks in Vienna forward. 

In sum, the United States and the 
Soviet Union now have a historic oppor- 
tunity to reduce the risk of war. Presi- 
dent Reagan looks forward to his meet- 
ing with Genera] Secretary Gorbachev 
in November. We have a long agenda. 
The United States is working hard to 
make it a productive meeting. And we 
want the meeting itself to give further 
impetus to the wide-ranging dialogue on 
which we both are already embarked. 

Soviet ads of g 1 faith and willingness 

in reach fair agreements will be more 
than matched on the American side. 

Economic Freedom 
and Material Progress 

Just as there is a democratic revolution 
in the world today, there is also a revo- 
lution in economic thinking. Mankind is 
moving toward an ever greater recogni 
lion nf the inescapable tie between free- 
dom and ec imic progress. < Command 



19 



economies, in spite of all their preten- 
sions, have not done very well in liber- 
ating people from poverty. In reality, 
they have served as instruments of 
power for the few, rather than of hope 
for the many. Expectations of material 
progress and prosperity have been ful- 
filled in countries whose governments 
applied reason and fresh thinking to 
their problems, learning from experience 
rather than slavishly following outworn 
dogma. The new way of thinking- 
economic freedom— actually is a return 
to old truths that many had forgotten or 
never understood. 

Those developing countries in Asia 
relying on free market policies, for ex- 
ample, have enjoyed one of the most 
remarkable economic booms in history, 
despite a relative lack of natural 
resources. The ASEAN nations and the 
Republic of Korea have grown at 7% a 
year over the past decade, the fastest 



rate in the world, and ASEAN has 
become a model of regional development 
and political cooperation. In recognition 
of the success of economic freedom, the 
nations of the South Pacific have con- 
tinued to encourage the private sector 
as well. We are joining with them in a 
dedicated effort to negotiate quickly a 
regional fisheries agreement that will 
benefit all. 

These and other countries' success 
demonstrates that the laws of economics 
do not discriminate between developed 
and developing. For all nations, equally, 
the true source of wealth is the energy 
and creativity of the individual, not the 
state. After decades of fashionable 
socialist doctrine we see today— on 
every continent— efforts to decentralize, 
deregulate, denationalize, and enlarge 
the scope for producers and consumers 
to interact in the free market. In India, 
China, and elsewhere, new policies are 




Secretarj Shultz and Bernard Kalb, Assistant Secretary for Public 
Affairs and Department of Slate spokesman, in the UN General 

Assembl) hall mi September 2:!. His."). 



THE SECRETARY 



being adopted to unleash the creative 
abilities of talented peoples. At the 
Bonn economic summit last May, the 
leaders of the largest industrial democ- 
racies acknowledged the same truth. 
The road to prosperity begins at the 
same starting point for all nations: free- 
dom and incentives for the individual. 

This truth should be our guide as we 
address today's economic challenges. 

In sub-Saharan Africa, drought has 
placed perhaps 30 million men, women, 
and children at risk. We do not know 
how many have already died. Along 
with other Western countries, the 
United States has undertaken one of the 
largest disaster relief programs in 
history. This year alone, the United 
States has provided $1.2 billion for 
drought and famine relief and $800 mil- 
ion in other economic assistance. The 
lations that have been helping should 
:ontinue to do so; those that have not 
Dome their share should start doing so. 

But we owe it to the suffering to 
isk this question: "Why is food so 
?carce?" Drought, without question, is 
)art of the reason. But in some coun- 
tries, there are other, more important 
'easons. One is government policies that 
nave severely harmed agricultural pro- 
luctivity. These policies must be re- 
versed. Those countries that have 
indertaken liberalizing reforms are 
eaping the benefits and can show the 
way for others. Another problem is lack 
>f appropriate technologies. The United 
[States is carrying out a long-term pro- 
l^ram to strengthen African agricultural 
•esearch, which we hope will help to 
produce a green revolution on the 
•ontinent. 

Elsewhere in the developing world, 
s in Africa, countries face the continu- 
ng problem of debt. Many have under- 
aken necessary, though painful, adjust- 
ment— taking courageous steps to cut 
government spending, eliminate subsi- 
dies and price controls, permit curren- 
cies to adjust to the market, free inter- 
est rates to encourage saving and dis- 
courage capital flight, and create condi- 
,ions to attract new capital. Austerity, 
ciowever, is certainly not an end in 
tself. The purpose of short-term adjust- 
ment is to get back on the track of long- 
',erm growth. 

In all these efforts we must be care- 
ul that the heavy burden of servicing 
the historic debt levels of the developing 
lations of Latin America and Africa 
does not inhibit their future growth. 
Creative cooperation between borrowers 
uid lenders, with continued constructive 



assistance from the World Bank and the 
IMF, will be essential in achieving this 
goal. 

Other nations, too, have a major part 
to play in helping these countries over- 
come their debt problems and resume 
sustainable growth. External financing 
to support effective adjustment has 
been, and will continue to be, important. 
Access to export markets is also 
necessary. 



Sound economic policies in every 
country are the key to strengthening 
the world economy. In the United 
States, policies that have unleashed indi- 
vidual talent, reduced government's 
role, and stabilized prices have helped to 
produce more than 8 million new jobs 
since 1982 and lead the world out of 
recession. But many imbalances in the 
world economy remain— notably in trade 
accounts, exchange rates, and capital 



Despite all the difficulties, let us 
remember what has been accomp- 
lished. After the two most destructive 
wars in history, the superpowers 
have averted world war for four 
decades. 




Indeed, an open trading system is 
crucial to the hopes of all of us. Trade 
expansion has been an engine of post- 
war prosperity. It would therefore be 
suicidal to return to the protectionism of 
the 1920s and 1930s, which helped bring 
on the Great Depression. Protectionism 
is not a cure; it is a disease— a disease 
that could cripple all of us. Trade must 
be free, open, and fair— the United 
States will work to see that it is. But 
there must be a level playing field. We 
want to open trading, but that means 
mutuality. Barriers erected against 
American products are just not accept- 
able to us. 

As President Reagan is saying today 
in a major speech, "the freer the flow of 
world trade, the stronger the tides for 
human progress and peace among na- 
tions." To preserve and strengthen the 
trading system may well be the central 
economic issue facing the world com- 
munity today. For that reason, it is 
essential that all nations join now in 
preparations for a new GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] round 
next year. No nation, even one as large 
and as powerful as the United States, 
can, by itself, ensure a free trading 
system. All that we and others have 
done to provide for the free flow of 
goods and services and capital is based 
on cooperation. Indeed, it was that very 
spirit of cooperation that prompted the 
United States and five of the leading 
industrial nations yesterday to pledge 
firm resolve to work together in ad- 
dressing the pressing economic issues of 
this decade. 



flows. These must be corrected, by the 
world community acting in concert, if re- 
cent economic gains are to be preserved 
and hopes for progress sustained. For 
its part, the United States must restrain 
public spending, reduce its budget 
deficit, and encourage saving. Others 
must do more to reduce rigidities and 
promote the private investment needed 
to facilitate adjustment and spur 
expansion. 

I believe we can surmount our prob- 
lems, just as we succeeded in solving 
the energy crisis and bringing inflation 
under control. There was a time when 
those problems, too, seemed insurmount- 
able. We can succeed again today if we 
have the honesty and courage to face 
our problems squarely, and if our ways 
of thinking conform to reality. 

Conclusion 

Forty years ago the founders of the 
United Nations recognized that new 
ways had to be found to regulate con- 
duct between nations. That remains true 
today. The Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights speak to 
us not as different races, creeds, and 
nationalities, but as human beings, men 
and women. Our task as we look to the 
next century is to learn that the things 
which unite us— the desire for peace, 
human lights, and material well-being— 
as set down in those documents, are far 
more important than the things which 
divide us. 



November 1985 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



The main obstacle to greater realiza- 
tion of the goals of the Charter is the 
lust of the few for power over the 
many, just as it has been the obstacle to 
human happiness since the dawn of 

history. , 

But change is inevitable. And toaaj 
change, technological change, holds out 
hope, perhaps as never before. The 
revolution in communications and infor- 
mation may be the most far-reaching 
development of our time. Those political 
systems that try to stand in the way of 
the free flow of knowledge and informa- 
tion will relegate their citizens to 
second-class status in the next century. 
The future belongs to societies that can 
spread knowledge, adapt, innovate, tap 
the unfettered talents of well-informed 
citizens, and thus fully exploit the new 
technologies; free societies clearly are 
best equipped for this challenge. The 
communications revolution will be a 
truly liberating revolution— for it 
threatens the monopoly of information 
and thought upon which tyrants rely for 
absolute control. 

On every continent— from Nicaragua 
to Poland, from South Africa to Afghan- 
istan and Cambodia-we see that the 
yearning for freedom is the most power- 
ful political force all across the planet. 
The noble ideals of democracy and free- 
dom are in the ascendant. Today, we 
can look with renewed hope to the day 
when the goals of the United Nations 
truly will be met. 



department of State press release 225; 
USUN press release 98. ■ 



Security Council Holds 
Commemorative Session 



^t 



Secretary Shultz's statement at the 
both anniversary commemorative 

meeting of the UN Security Council on 
September 26, 1985. x 

Forty years ago, the United Nations 
and its Charter embodied mankind's 
most cherished hopes for a better 
world— a world where international 
disputes would be settled peacefully, 
where self-determination would be 
advanced, where economic cooperation 
would promote prosperity, and where 
human rights would be honored. For 
four decades, this grand vision has 
inspired millions across the globe. Today 
each of us, and especially members of 
the Security Council, have a duty to our 
own people and to posterity to keep 
that vision alive. 



#er 



The UN's Value 

None of us here harbors any illusions 
about our world or about the United 
Nations. International conflicts, aggres- 
sion, and violence still mar the global 
landscape, still bring suffering to 
millions, still threaten world peace. 
Hunger and disease still claim victims 
among the poor and needy. Freedom, 
and the most basic human rights, still 
lie trampled beneath the tyrant's boot in 
many parts of the world. The United 
Nations today is a troubled organization. 
But that is, in part, because it mirrors a 
troubled world. 

For some, the evils prevalent in our 
world are evidence that the United 
Nations has failed, that its founders 
were little more than Utopian dreamers, 
and that this idealistic venture of ours 
has broken apart in the rocky waters of 

reality. 

I disagree. The founders of the 
United Nations were not foolish ideal- 
ists. They were statesmen, perhaps the 
greatest statesmen of this century. For 
them, the United Nations was no pana- 
cea for the world's ills. They knew that 
pursuing the ideals of the Charter m a 
world of sovereign states would be an 
endless, often disappointing task, that it 
would require perseverance and hard 
work on the part of all nations. 

Yet the founders believed in the 
future. They believed that by setting 
standards toward which all nations could 
aspire and work, progress toward a 
better world could be made. They set 
themselves and their nations on a course 



without any certainty of ever reaching 
the final destination but with the deter- 
mination always to move forward-to 
greater prosperity, to greater freedom, 
to greater peace. 

That is the test by which we must 
judge the United Nations today. Our 
goal must be to continue to move for- 
ward, to work for progress despite the 
obstacles. And in doing so, we must 
combine idealism about the goals we 
seek with realism about how best to 
achieve them in this imperfect world. 
The United Nations can be a force for 
peace and human betterment, if we have 
the will and the wisdom to make it so. 



The UN's Record 

We have seen many successes over the 
past 40 vears. The UN's peacekeeping 
and peacemaking efforts have been 
valuable at critical times-in Korea, in 
the Congo, in Cyprus, and on the Golan 
Heights. Through its various specialized 
agencies, the United Nations has helped 
eradicate diseases like smallpox; it has 
provided relief to millions of refugees 
throughout the world; it has served 
mankind well in the areas of health, 
communications, and transportation. On 
all these issues, the United Nations has 
remained true to the principles of the 
Charter, and the world is a better and 
safer place for it. 

Unfortunately the United Nations 
has also failed in important ways. And I 
do not mean that it has failed to remake 
the world and put an end to the evils 
we see all around us; that would truly 
be a Utopian expectation. I mean that 
the United Nations has often failed to 
remain true to itself and its own prin- 
ciples; it has failed to provide the 
guiding vision we need to keep us on a 
straight path toward a better world. 
Too often the United Nations has 
been abused in the service of narrow, 
selfish national or bloc interests. Too 
often it has been used as a platform for 
voices of hatred and bigotry-as in the 
case of the resolution 10 years ago 
equating Zionism with racism. Too often 
disputes and disagreements among 
nations and peoples have been magnified 
and exacerbated instead of being re- 
solved through reasoned debate and 
discussion. Too often the purposes and 
principles set forth in the Charter have 
been twisted, distorted, and manipulated 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



in the service of goals antithetical to the 
rision of the founders. 

We can do better than this. We owe 
t to future generations to restore and 
naintain the integrity of this great in- 
ititution. My country recognizes that it 
pas an important role to play. We all do. 
fhe United States is committed to pro- 
iecting the United Nations against 
larmful and abusive practices. We are 
■ommitted to ensuring that the prin- 
iples of the Charter are honored and 
idhered to. And we will remain eom- 
nitted so long as there is hope that the 
Jnited Nations can continue to be a 
orce for good. President Harry Truman 
.aid it 40 years ago: "We have solemnly 
ledicated ourselves and all our will to 
foe success of the United Nations Orga- 
lization." Today, with our hopes tem- 
pered by realism. I can tell you on 
lehalf of all Americans: our will has not 
lagged, and our dedication has not 
vavered. 

Hole of the Security Council 

•Ve, the members of the Security Coun- 
il, are the focal point of the world's 
topes. The major powers represented 
iere have a vital role to play in building 
he safer, more peaceful world we all 
•eek. The Charter gave the Council for- 
midable powers to help resolve disputes, 
"'hose powers should be used wisely and 
ourageously in the service of peace. 

We have seen that creative Council 
..ctions can provide a basis for resolving 
<ome of the most difficult issues of our 
ime. Resolution 242, for instance, has 
irovided the essential political and legal 
ramework for Middle East peacemak- 
ng. The lesson is that Security Council 
'esolutions can have an impact when 
hey are realistic, balanced, and con- 
tractive. One-sided actions and resolu- 
tions, on the other hand, have accom- 
)lished nothing and never will. Selective 
■ondemnation has often exacerbated 
lituations. 

We have to make the Security Coun- 
cil work for peaceful solutions as effec- 
ively as possible. This may require 
greater and more systematic involve- 
nent of the Council at early stages of 
developing conflicts; wider capacities for 
'act-finding, observation, and good of- 
fices; more extensive and regular 
nformal consultations among Council 
nembers; and greater use by the Secre- 
tary General of his powers under Arti- 
cle 99 to bring threatening situations to 
the Council's attention. 

What we need, above all, is a 
greater commitment to fulfilling the role 
envisioned for the Council by the UN's 




Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardr 
outside the UN Security Council. 



founders. This Council chamber should 
not be treated as another arena for 
name-calling, for ideological and political 
confrontation. As the Secretary General 
has noted in his most recent report, 
Council members are the guardians of 
peace; no one else can perform this vital 
role. After 40 years, let us rededicate 
ourselves to the task. 

The Future 

We too must believe in the future. It is 
not for us to end the journey that began 
40 years ago or to deviate from the path 
set forth in the Charter simply because 
the going has been hard. It is not for us 
to despair to take refuge in cynicism but 
to labor constructively to make the 
United Nations better serve its original 
goals. 

The true lesson of experience is a 
lesson of continued aspiration. The 
United Nations has done important 
work; there is much it can do to help 
the world maintain peace and improve 



the human condition. Progress toward 
the goals of the Charter has been possi- 
ble where idealism and realism have 
been harnessed together. 

The failure of the United Nations to 
meet all its lofty aims is no cause for 
despair. We cannot make the world over 
with the stroke of a pen or a well- 
turned phrase, but we can work to 
ensure that the United Nations guides 
us on a straight course in our common 
journey. We must continue to set high 
goals that inspire us to work harder and 
to persevere. As President Reagan said 
in his address to the General Assembly 
2 years ago: 

You have the right to dream great dreams. 
You have the right to seek a better world for 
your people. And all of us have the respon- 
sibility to work for that better world. And as 
caring, peaceful peoples, think what a power- 
ful force for good we could be. Let us regain 
the dream the United Nations once dreamed. 



^ress release 231 of Oct. 1, 1985; USUN 
press release 101. ■ 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



U.S. Role in the ILO 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources on September 11, 
1985. • 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear 
before the Senate Labor and Human 
Resources Committee. It is many years 
since I have had an occasion to do so, 
and I am happy to have an opportunity 
this morning to discuss the U.S. role in 
the ILO [International Labor Organiza- 
tion] and some concrete steps we can 
take to strengthen our participation. 

I know you have felt for some time 
now that these hearings would be 
useful, and I should say at the outset 
that I regret it was impossible for me to 
attend earlier. As I understand it, the 
committee is interested in two issues: 

• The feasibility of U.S. ratification 
of certain ILO conventions without 
there being a detrimental effect on U.S. 
labor law; and 

• Whether there is any linkage be- 
tween the U.S. ratification of conven- 
tions and our influence in the organ- 
ization. 

The Labor Department is the agency 
most qualified to address the first ques- 
tion. I will be glad to give my views on 
the linkage question. 

ILO Developments Since 1980 

I first would like to state briefly how 
we assess developments in the ILO over 
the 5 years since the United States re- 
joined the organization in 1980. 

Members will recall that the United 
States withdrew from the ILO in 1977 
because we believed fundamental ILO 
principles were being undermined to a 
point that was inconsistent with our con- 
tinued participation. The ILO, in our 
opinion, had allowed itself to be 
subverted from its admirable, original 
goals. 

• We believed that the principle of 
tripartitism— that is the right of em- 
ployer and worker groups to participate 
autonomously in the organization and on 
national delegations— was being eroded. 

• We also believed that the organi- 
zation was exercising a double standard 
in citing countries found to be in viola- 
tion of ratified conventions. Up to the 
time of our withdrawal, the ILO Confer- 
ence on only one occasion had censured 



a communist country for violating one of 
the critical ILO human rights conven- 
tions dealing with freedom of associa- 
tion, forced labor, or discrimination. 
However, the Conference regularly 
criticized others, particularly Latin 
American countries. 

• Thirdly, we were dissatisfied with 
the organization's growing disregard of 
its own principles of due process— its 
disregard of the ILO's longstanding pro- 
cedures for impartially investigating 
complaints against members alleged to 
have violated their obligations under 
conventions. This was particularly true 
in the case of Israel. 

• Finally, we believed that too many 
members were using the ILO simply as 
a political forum to pursue issues irrele- 
vant to the ILO's mission and that prop- 
erly belonged in the Security Council or 
the UN General Assembly. These politi- 
cal activities were disrupting ILO pro- 
ceedings and detracting from legitimate 
technical work. 

The United States returned to the 
organization in 1980 because we be- 
lieved there had been substantial im- 
provement in these areas during our 
absence. We rejoined because the ILO 
showed greater determination to adhere 
to its original principles. We have seen 
continued improvements in the ILO 
over the past 5 years and are en- 
couraged by them. 

I might say this little experience 
with a unit in the UN system is instruc- 
tive, and I think we have to, throughout 
the UN system, be prepared to say 
what we believe and stand for it— and if 
a given organization gets way off the 
rail, be prepared to withdraw with the 
understanding that if things improve 
and come around to the original pur- 
poses, then we can consider reentry. 
And, as you know, we've done that on 
another occasion. 

• In 1980 the Conference censured 
Czechoslovakia for discriminating 
against workers on the basis of their 
political beliefs and, over Soviet objec- 
tions, strengthened mechanisms for 
supervising the implementation of 
conventions. 

• In 1981 the Soviet Union was 
cited for failure to bring its law and 
practice into conformity with the ILO's 
convention on freedom of association, 
and in December of that year, with the 



suppression of the trade union Soli- 
darity, the ILO began what was to be- 
come a long and entirely proper effort 
to ameliorate the tragic conditions in 
Poland. 

• In 1982 the ILO Conference did 
not act on a politically motivated anti- 
Israeli resolution. However, its prestig- 
ious Committee on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations cen- 
sured the Polish Government, as had 
the Governing Body's Committee on 
Freedom of Association in a series of 
overwhelming votes in the spring and 
fall. 

• In 1983 the organization turned a 
deaf ear to Soviet calls to "reform" and 
"democratize"— in reality, to politicize 
and, thus, to weaken— ILO supervisory 
machinery (the procedures by which the 
organization supervises the implementa- 
tion of conventions). It established a 
Commission of Inquiry on Poland. And, 
by secret votes, it adopted a well- 
balanced human rights report that, over 
strenuous Soviet opposition, included 
criticism of Czechoslovakia. 

• This encouraging trend continued 
in 1984. The Conference decisively re- 
jected a concerted Soviet effort to 
undermine the supervisory machinery. 
The Committee of Inquiry on Poland 
turned in a strong report justifiably 
critical of the Polish Government, and 
the report was approved by the Govern 
ing Body over strong Soviet resistance. 
The Conference adopted another bal- 
anced human rights report, and it af- 
firmed Israel's right to participate in 
ILO regional activities. 

• Finally, in 1985 the organization 
once more rejected Soviet so-called 
reforms. It turned back a Nicaraguan 
effort to manipulate the nonaligned 
group and to politicize the annual con- 
ference through the introduction of a 
resolution against the U.S. trade 
embargo. 

We could not have achieved these 
improvements without the close cooper; 
tion of U.S. employers and workers. 
Tripartism constitutes the very essence 
of the ILO, which sets it apart from all 
other organs of the UN system. It is 
the unique feature of tripartism, to- 
gether with the ILO's mission of pro- 
moting workers' human rights and 
working standards around the world, 
which underlies the basic interest of th< 
United States in the ILO. As we look 
at the full panoply of international 
organizations in the UN system, we noi 
find the ILO in the forefront of those 
advancing U.S. political interests 



if, 



THE SECRETARY 



because of these special features— and it 
is these special features of the ILO that 
we are committed to preserving. 

This list of truly positive develop- 
ments since our return to the ILO, 
however, has been accompanied by set- 
backs, and there are areas where we 
believe further improvement is neces- 
sary. Several come readily to mind. 

• Despite Director General Blanch- 
ard's laudable efforts in recent years to 
hold down costs, we have not been able 
to support the ILO's proposed budget 
two of the three times it has come up 
for a vote since 1980. Although this year 
we were able to join a consensus on the 
budget, intensified efforts will be re- 
quired in the future to identify savings 
and to reprogram resources from lower 
to higher priority activities. 

• Second, we believe the organiza- 
tion has not completely rid itself of an 
unfortunate double standard with regard 
to labor rights violations in the Soviet 
bloc. We still see it hesitant and reluc- 
tant to squarely address those human 
rights issues. Unfortunately, last June's 
conference provided an example of this 
practice when it abruptly decided to 
forego a discussion of freedom of associ- 
ation in the Soviet Union. 

• Finally, despite some recent suc- 
cesses, too many members want to in- 
troduce extraneous political issues into 
the ILO's debate. Others persist in mis- 
using the speaker's platform at annual 
conferences for attacks on the United 
States and other member states on mat- 
ters unrelated to the concerns of the 
ILO. Nevertheless, on balance the 
record over the past few years has been 
positive. 

Linkage Between 

U.S. Influence and Ratification 

With this as background I would like to 
address the question "Is there any 
linkage between U.S. influence in the 
ILO and our own record of ratification 
of ILO conventions?" I believe there is 
such linkage. 

It is my view that the primary fac- 
tor that led the ILO to turn around was 
that other members took seriously our 
withdrawal from the organization in 
1977. They understood the implications 
of our withdrawal. We clearly demon- 
strated our determination not to par- 
ticipate until there were clear signs that 
the organization was prepared to 
resume its proper functions. The ILO 
took those steps, and we returned, 
determined to use our influence to help 
the ILO continue to improve. 



But our leverage is somewhat ham- 
pered by the fact thai the United States 
has not improved its own record of rati 
fication of ILO conventions over the 
past 30 years. Thus far, this has not 
proven to be a crucial impediment to 
achieving our goals in the ILO in any 
concretely verifiable way, but we 
believe it has taken a subtle toll. It has 
provided our adversaries with ready- 
made propaganda ammunition. It fosters 
attitudes on the part of third countries 
to equate U.S. actions and policies with 
those of our adversaries, and, ulti- 
mately, it is used to excuse decisions in 
the Committee on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations to 
go easy on the Soviets in individual 
cases under review. It is my judgment 
that an improved ratification record 
would have served U.S. foreign policy 
interests better. More importantly, I 
believe a better record can help us in 
the future. Let me give some cases that 
point out the need for a stronger U.S. 
presence in the ILO. 

• The recent increasing effectiveness 
of the ILO in monitoring Soviet and 
East European behavior placed the So- 
viets on the defensive. In response, the 
Soviets and their allies have launched a 
major continuing campaign to subvert 
the ILO's human rights supervisory 
machinery and its unique tripartite 
system. If they don't get their way, 
they are threatening to reduce their 
budget contributions, pull out, or cause 
other problems. In response to these 
threats, we are already seeing some 
signs of backsliding in ILO subordinate 
bodies. 

• Thwarting the Soviet counter- 
attack will be a major U.S. goal in the 
ILO for the foreseeable future. Our 
traditional approach that ratification of 
ILO conventions is simply out of the 
question for us makes it harder for us 
to exert influence. 

• We are open to the frequent 
charge— and it comes not just from our 
adversaries— that our defense of the 
ILO machinery is hypocritical because 
we ratify no conventions and are, there- 
fore, not subject to the machinery's 
operations to the same extent as others. 
It is also charged that because the 
United States does not ratify conven- 
tions we have no moral standing when 
urging the organization to take up the 
alleged transgressions of others. As a 
practical matter, because we have not 
ratified most ILO conventions we are 
disbarred by the ILO constitution from 
bringing complaints against those who 
violate their obligations. 



In response to these charges, we say 
thai U.S. law and practice are in sub- 
stantial compliance with ILO conven- 
tions. It is more important, we say, for 
the aims of ILO conventions to be em- 
bodied in national legislation than 
merely ratified and never implemented, 
as is the case in too many countries 
with superficially good ratification 
records. We also note that the U.S. 
Constitution, Bill of Rights, and civil 
rights statutes ensure freedom of asso- 
ciation, freedom from forced labor, and 
equality of opportunity and treatment. 
These arguments are important, but 
they do not defuse the charges against 
us brought about by our refusal to con- 
sider ratification of all but a few ILO 
conventions. 

However, this approach conflicts 
with the obligations we assumed when 
we joined the ILO. The ILO's purpose 
is to raise labor standards around the 
globe through the process of adoption 
and ratification of conventions. Every 
member state has a moral obligation to 
make a good faith effort to determine 
whether it can ratify conventions. But 
our behavior sends a message that ILO 
procedures don't apply to us. The 
message we send is: do as we say, not 
as we do. 

There is also inconsistency between 
our failure to consider ratification of 
ILO conventions and the growing tend- 
ency in the Congress to refer to inter- 
nationally recognized worker rights 
standards regarding freedom of associa- 
tion and forced labor in U.S. trade and 
aid legislation. These standards are com- 
patible with the ILO conventions. 

Our allies in the ILO who have 
stood squarely with us in turning back 
the Soviet offensive against the super- 
visory machinery have warned us that 
the Soviets intend increasingly to ex- 
ploit our nonratification record as they 
continue to press their assault. Our 
allies see the U.S. nonratification record 
as a chink in our collective armor. 

Now we need to give this issue its 
proper measure of importance. I'm not 
saying that a reversal of U.S. ratifica- 
tion policy would provide a magic cure- 
all for the residue of defects we find in 
the ILO, but it would repair a signifi- 
cant weak spot in our defenses. 

Recommended Actions 

We feel we should correct our approach 
by reopening the ledger on possible rati- 
fication, making a good faith effort to 
review more systematically and vigor- 
ously those conventions which we can 



Mnuomhflr 1 QQR 



THE SECRETARY 



ratify without contravening U.S. labor 
laws. We should be more flexible and 
consider individual conventions on their 
own merits rather than to continue to 
make a priori judgments that only 
maritime conventions are suitable for 
the United States to ratify. 

This is not to say that after 30 years 
of inactivity on the conventions we can 
suddenly rush into the ratification proc- 
ess without due deliberation and careful 
consideration. There are serious impedi- 
ments to the ratification of conventions 
by the United States, and they will not 
go away simply by wishing them away. 
There are mechanisms in the govern- 
ment designed to assess conventions in 
terms of their impact on current U.S. 
domestic law. I applaud the decision of 
Secretary [of Labor] Brock to schedule a 
meeting of the President's Committee at 
an early opportunity and his intention to 
continue the important work of the Tri- 
partite Advisory Panel on International 
Labor Standards. 

These procedures should be followed 
to explore whether there are ways we 
can ratify conventions without compro- 
mising Federal and state labor laws. I 
also firmly believe that in order to move 
effectively ahead in this process, it is 
absolutely essential to have the consen- 
sus of the U.S. worker and employer 
representatives. I hope that business 
and labor leaders can explore ways 
together of providing us with their 
wisdom and helping us to get this 
process underway. 

The ILO's central mission is to im- 
prove people's lives through the devel- 
opment of effective international labor 
standards. We support this mission and 
participate actively in almost all aspects 
of the ILO's work. We have not, how- 
ever, made ratification of conventions as 
high a priority as we perhaps might 
have, given our leadership responsibili- 
ties in the organization. I would like to 
see us improve our record in this 
regard. It would be in the foreign policy 
interests of the United States to do 



Secretary's Interview 
on "Meet the Press 



» 5 



■Press release 219. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on 
September 29, 1985, by Marvin Kalb 
and Chns Wallace, NBC News, and 
Robert Novak, syndicated columnist. 1 

Q. Before we get into the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship, I want to ask you about 
reports this morning from the Middle 
East that the six American hostages 
being held in Lebanon may soon 
appear at a news conference and state 
their views in some form or another, 
or the Reverend Jenko may be re- 
leased. Do you have any information 
on this? 

A. Only what I've heard reported. 
Of course, we welcome seeing them, if 
they are to appear, alive. We welcome 
any release, but we want all of the 
hostages back. 

Q. You've got some indication, 
then, that there may, in fact, be some 
movement on getting one or the six 
back? 

A. Only these reports that have 
been telephoned in. 

Q. Nothing through diplomatic 
channels? 

A. No. 

Q. There was a clearly implied 
threat as well in that phone call, the 
threat being that after the news con- 
ference, and I quote: "The American 
Government will assume full respon- 
sibility for the lives of the hostages." 
What would the United States do if 
these people start killing hostages? 

A. The message that the Reverend 
Weir delivered essentially linked the 
fate of American hostages to the fate of 
prisoners being held by Kuwait. We 
don't agree with the approach of 
bargaining with people who are kidnap- 
ping or hijacking or whatever, and we 
will be following this very closely. 

Q. What will you do then if you're 
not willing to make the deal? What 
will you do if they make good on their 
threat and start killing hostages? 

A. I'm not going to discuss that 
question. 

Q. But you will not go to the 
Kuwait Government under any 
conditions? 



A. We don't think it is wise to 
pressure the release of people who are 
being held for, in effect, blowing up 
things in Kuwait and killing people 
there, in exchange for the hostages 
being held, wherever they're being held, 
probably in Lebanon. All that kind of 
thing does is invite people to take other 
hostages, and you endanger the lives of 
others in that process. 

Q. Turning to the U.S.-Soviet 
situation, there's a lot of excitement 
in this town about the new Soviet pro- 
posal, but is there any change 
whatever in the Soviet precondition 
that we— the United States— has to 
abandon testing of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative in order to get 
missile reduction. 

A. It's clear that they want us to 
abandon the President's Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). It's also clear 
that the President won't. What's new is 
that they have brought forward a 
proposal— or will in Geneva tomorrow— 
that deals with offensive matters, and to 
date, they haven't done that before. We 
have had proposals on the table- 
important proposals in the strategic 
missile talks, in the intermediate-range 
missile talks, and in the space and 
defense group. So this represents a time 
when they'll put some counterproposals 
on the table, and we welcome that. 

Q. You have just said, once again, 
that the President is not going to give 
up on his program for strategic 
defense. It's clear from what the Rus- 
sians have said publicly that they are 
going to continue to insist that the 
President gives it up. Don't you have 
built in there— you're smiling. Do you 
think that they're going to give up on 
their insistence? 

A. Go ahead; ask your question. 

Q. No, no. But isn't there then 
built into the negotiation a deadlock, 
and how can one approach the summit 
with anything but pessimism rather 
than the optimism that everyone's 
seeking to project? 

A. We're not trying to project op- 
timism or pessimism. We're trying to 
project realism about what the situation 
is in general, and also, insofar as the 
Geneva talks are concerned. As I said, 



THE SECRETARY 



ve have proposals on the table. Appar- 
ntly the Soviets will put some pro- 
posals on the table on Monday and 
\iesday. We welcome that, and we'll 
ee where we go from there. The Presi- 
lent said yesterday, we're prepared for 
tough day of bargaining. 

Q. He also said he doesn't want 
iny preconditions laid down in the 
egotiation, and it seems as if, from 
vhat, again, the Russians are saying 
hat there is the precondition that the 
Jnited States give up on, on strategic 
lefense. 

A. Up until now they have more or 
ess said that they're not really going to 
alk in the strategic arms group or the 
ntermediate arms group until we say in 
he space and defense talks that we're 
■eady to give up on strategic defense. 
)f course, we won't do that, so there's 
neen a kind of blockage, a precondition, 
f you will, which we don't think is in 
iccord with the agreement that [Foreign 
tlinister] Gromyko and I reached in 
fanuary. At any rate, at this point they 
ire going to table, I presume, with 
iome ideas in the strategic defense area 
iind some ideas in the intermediate 
•ange area, as well as whatever they 
•vill say on Monday and Tuesday in the 
mace defense field. So we'll listen to 
hose ideas, and perhaps that's a way of 
jetting around the preconditions. 

Q. You say it's clear that you're 
lot going to back down on the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, but we've 
ill covered this Administration for 
several years and there are a number 
if times when the President takes a 
ough stand, and then, as a bargaining 
;hip, he decides to back down later 
>n. He's forced by events. Is this a 
bargaining position, or do you really 
Tiean— and you're saying from now 
jntil the summit— that the President, 
;he Administration is going to rule out 
iny deal on research, testing, and 
developing of SDI? 

A. Any deal on research would be 
ridiculous because there would be ab- 
solutely no way to verify whether or not 
it's being observed. It's inherently im- 
possible, and that isn't even disputed. 

Remember what the President is 
trying to do. The President is trying to 
get the answer to the question, "Is it 
possible to defend against ballistic 
missiles?" The Soviets are also trying to 
get the answer to that question and 
they've had an extensive program going 
on, trying to find the answer. That's 
what the Strategic Defense Initiative is 



at this point, what is the answer to that 
question, and the President is not going 
to give it up. Personally, I would cer 
tainly not advise him to give that up. 
And there is no sentiment for such— 

Q. You talk explicitly about 
research. What about testing and 
development? Are you also ruling out 
any deal in those areas, in all testing? 

A. We believe that the answer to 
that question can be gotten within the 
framework of the ABM [Antiballistic 
Missile] Treaty, so what is being done is 
perfectly in accordance with that treaty, 
which does not prohibit certain kinds of 
testing. 

Q. The Soviets have been cleaning 
our clock in this propaganda war, and 
the latest is they come in with a 50% 
reduction in missiles. Is there 
anything inherent in a 50% reduction 
that makes us any safer from a Soviet 
first-strike? 

A. The point about percentage 
reductions is, what do they apply to? 
Remember what it is we're trying to 
reduce. We're trying to reduce the 
threat of nuclear war. That's what this 
is about. The President proposes that 
we eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. 
That would get rid of the threat of 
nuclear war. 

In the meantime, between there and 
where we are now, how do we get 
there? We get there by coming down 
and coming down in terms, first and 
foremost, of those weapons that con- 
stitute the greatest threat, and those 
weapons are the very powerful, highly 
accurate many-warhead land-based 
missiles. Those are the biggest threat 
and that's what we— 

Q. Is there any effort, though, to 
introduce now on the Soviet side 
sublimits on the SS-18 and -19 that 
you're now talking about? 

A. If you're going to talk some 
percentage, obviously you can't just talk 
a percentage; you have to be talking a 
percentage of what, and that is why it's 
so important that we see what is laid 
out in Geneva in detail and not jump to 
conclusions about it, and then respond, 
as our negotiators are prepared to do, in 
terms of the intricacies of this very com- 
plicated subject. 

Q. Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Richard Perle today, on television, 
said that it looked to him as though 
this proposal was a step backward into 
the 1970s. Do you agree with that? 

A. The point about this proposal— I 
don't know that it's a step backward or 
forward. The point about it is that for 



the first time, the Soviets arc talking 
about genuine reductions. Now we'll 
have to see. Reductions of what? As 
I've said, we need to take a look and 
see what comes forward in Geneva. 

Q. It's not clear to me whether 
you're saying that the Russians are 
now prepared to agree to sublimits on 
the SS-18 and -19. 

A. That's what we're going to find 
out in Geneva. If their proposal is to go 
back to the concept that all warheads 
are the same, which I think is what Mr. 
Perle was suggesting and which I agree 
with him on, then obviously that's not 
acceptable. 

Q. Cosmetically, however, you 
seem so reasonable and soft when Mr. 
Shevardnadze talks about the sinister 
"Star Wars" and comes up with a 
"Star Peace" proposal at the United 
Nations. Why was there no response 
from the State Department to the 
"Star Peace" proposal? Not a word. 

A. Did you read the speech that I 
gave at the United Nations? 

Q. Yes, I did. 

A. Did you think it was soft? 

Q. No, I meant from a propaganda 
standpoint why wasn't there a 
response to "Star Peace"? 

A. —I thought it was well phrased 
and factual and realistic. Why don't you 
report it like that instead of saying it's 
"soft" and all this kind of stuff? In 
other words, maybe our propaganda 
problem is with the way things are 
reported, rather than what is actually 
done. 

Q. I think that we did report what 
you said on this program itself. 

A. Good. I'm glad to hear it. 

Q. As you project and look toward 
the summit right now, is it your aim 
that both leaders will be able to 
achieve, at a minimum, a framework 
for an arms control agreement that 
could then be given to the negotiators 
in Geneva to work on within a 
timeframe, or not? 

A. If that could be done, it would be 
very desirable and, certainly, we will 
try. But we don't want to get in a posi- 
tion and won't, where, because there is 
a meeting coming up in November, we 
agree to something that may not be 
wise to agree on. But if there is an 
agreement that we feel is in our in- 
terest, recognizing that any agreement 
the Soviets will have to see is in their 
interest too, but if there is such an 
agreement there, we want to do 
everything we can to find it. 



19 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Does the United States have a 
propaganda problem, though, at this 
point? The Soviets continue to make 
peace proposals while the United 
States, over the last month, is mostly 
testing weapons of war— antisatellite 
test, standing by "Star Wars." Aren't 
they, in a public relations sense, 
"cleaning our clock"? 

A. People keep saying that, but I 
really don't think so, and it seems to me 
it's probably a good thing for the 
Soviets to try to appeal to American 
public opinion, and perhaps they'll find 
out how much common sense and savvy 
there is in the body politic. Our own 
politicians find it out all the time. 

Q. Something interesting happened 
on Friday. Just as the President and 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze were 
sitting down in the Oval Office, it 
turned out that at that very moment 
the United States was conducting an 
underground nuclear test in Nevada. 
First of all, did you know about it? 
And secondly, does that really send 
the signal that you want to the 
Soviets and to the world? 

A. We have to conduct our testing 
programs, including nuclear tests, and 
our tests on antisatellite weapons in 
terms of the programmatic necessities 
and that's what we'll continue to do. 

Q. Did you know about it? 

A. I didn't know about it. I don't 
keep track of exactly when the tests 
take place. 

Q. Do vou have anv problem with 
it? 

A. No. None. I think that our pro- 
grams should go forward in their own 
terms. We shouldn't accelerate them 
because of— or time them because of a 
meeting like that, or we shouldn't fail to 
conduct them. We should conduct them 
in t heir own terms. 

Q. One more try on this whole 
question of whether the Soviets are 
scoring propaganda wins. It is 
generally perceived that they're acting 
much better, but they have not, unless 
you can tell me otherwise. Have they 
changed anything that they are doing 
in Afghanistan? Have they changed 
their repressive policies in Poland? 
Have they changed, in any way, their 
program for world domination? 

A. The problems of what goes on in 
various trouble spots around the world 
are being discussed with the Soviet 
Union and will lie discussed by mutual 
agreement in the meeting that the 
President will have in Geneva. We'll 



discuss regional troublespots. In fact 
we're going to have a discussion later in 
October with them on Central America, 
where we intend to tell them what it is 
that we object to about their behavior 
there. So all of that will be discussed 
and was discussed in the Oval Office by 
the President. 

Q. The question was that under 
this new "sweetness and light," with 
Mr. Shevardnadze smiling and point- 
ing to the Sun, has there been any 
change that you know of, or can 
point, call out to our attention, in 
Soviet conduct around the world? 

A. There hasn't been, and we keep 
that before them. And that's a very im- 
portant problem, and important that we 
keep it before them. In addition, it's im- 
portant that the human rights perform- 
ance is kept up there in the spotlight. 

Q. A question regarding King 
Hussein on the Middle East. He said 
on Friday: "We are prepared to 
negotiate with Israel directly and 
promptly." 

A. I was interested to see that 
Prime Minister Peres welcomed that 
statement "from" the President. 



Q. In your view, is the "we" in 
that sentence, Jordan alone or Jordan 
plus the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization]? 

A. The King insists— and he is right, 
I believe— that there must be Palestin- 
ians in a Jordanian delegation that 
bargains with Israel about what will 
happen on the West Bank because it's 
populated mainly by Palestinians. Now 
what their status is, in regard to the 
PLO, is a big question mark, and that's 
one of the difficulties that we're trying 
to get through in getting those direct 
talks started. 

Q. So that in your view the "we" 
still relates to Jordan and the PLO, is 
that correct? 

A. To the extent that the PLO 
remains dedicated to the so-called armed 
struggle, which so far as I can see they 
still do, it doesn't seem to me that they 
belong at the bargaining table. If they 
change their posture, that's a different 
matter. 



'Press release 233 of Oct. 1. 



Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1986 



Secretary Skultz's statement before 
the Subcommittee on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on September 17, 1985. 1 

It is a pleasure to consult with you on 
the U.S. refugee admissions ceiling for 
fiscal year (FY) 1986. This annual con- 
sultation affords the Administration and 
the Congress an opportunity to discuss 
the refugee situation in the world and 
the humanitarian response to this situa- 
tion by the United States. 

Since the end of the Second World 
War, the United States has provided 
haven to literally millions of refugees. 
They have arrived in waves: first from 
Eastern Europe; then from Cuba; then, 
in the 1970s, from the Soviet Union; 
and, most recently, from the countries 
of Indochina. All of these countries and 
regions continue to produce refugees, 
and the United States accepts more of 
them than any other resettlement coun- 
try. We are a nation founded by 
refugees, and our national life has been 
reinvigorated throughout our history by 
recurring waves of refugees. I think it 



is well that we remember this as we 
consider the question of how many new 
refugees we should admit to the United 
States in the coming fiscal year. 

This is the second consecutive year 
in which I have been privileged to pre- 
sent the President's refugee admissions 
proposal to the Congress. In doing so, I 
would again like to thank the members 
of this committee for their continuing 
support of the U.S. refugee program— 
which includes both the admission of 
refugees to the United States and the 
important overseas assistance efforts to 
which the United States contributes. 

Proposed Regional 
Admissions Ceilings 

I turn now to the President's proposal 
for refugee admissions in FY 1986. The 
President proposes to establish a ceiling 
of 70,000 for refugee admissions to the 
United States in the coming fiscal year. 
This total will be broken down into 
3,000 for refugees from Africa; 40,000 
for Fast Asia first asylum; 8,500 for the 



THE SECRETARY 



orderly departure program (ODP) from 
Vietnam; 9,500 for refugees from 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; 
3,000 for refugees from Latin America 
and the Caribbean; and 6,000 for 
refugees from the Near East and South 
Asia. 

The President is proposing a ceiling 
of 3,000 for Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the hope that Cuba will 
end its suspension of the U.S. -Cuba 
Migration Agreement of December 1984. 
If, however, Cuba does not terminate its 
suspension of the migration agreement, 
a portion of the numbers will be trans- 
ferred on a quarterly basis to other 
regional ceilings to accommodate unfore- 
seen increased admissions needs. If 
these numbers are not needed 
elsewhere, they will be allowed to lapse. 

As was the case last year, the Presi- 
dent wishes to maintain a separate ceil- 
ing for admissions under the UNHCR's 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees] 
orderly departure program from Viet- 
nam. This separate ceiling serves two 
purposes. It reassures the ASEAN 
Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] countries that an expanding ODP 
will not mean a decrease in resettlement 
from the first-asylum camps; and it 
sends a clear signal to Hanoi that the 
United States is prepared to make good 
Dn its offer to accept a large number of 
Amerasians and "re-education camp" 
prisoners. 

Aside from the uncertainties con- 
nected with the Cuban and Vietnamese 
programs, the proposed regional admis- 
sions ceilings should be adequate to pro- 
vide for refugee resettlement needs dur- 
ing the coming fiscal year. 

The United States and 

the World Refugee Situation 

Once again in 1985, the United States 
has played a major role in responding to 
urgent refugee needs— both through life- 
saving assistance overseas and through 
resettlement in the United States where 
necessary. Although this consultation is 
primarily concerned with refugee admis- 
sions, I would like to mention briefly 
the U.S. role in assisting refugees 
abroad. 

The United States continues to pro- 
vide the largest share of financial sup- 
port for the Office of the United Na- 
tions High Commissioner for 
r Refugees— some 30% of its budget or 
I $107 million in FY 1985-as well as for 
other international relief organizations 



such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross— over $20 million in this 
fiscal year. The United States maintains 
its leading role in support of the UN 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in 
the Near East— initially providing $67 
million in contributions for this fiscal 
year and then an additional $8 million 
from the President's emergency fund to 
help UNRWA avoid a curtailment of 
services due to extraordinary budget 
problems. It is our hope that these in- 
ternational organizations will take an 
even more active role in providing 
assistance to refugees in the coming 
year. 

The United States has been deeply 
involved during the past year in pro- 
viding emergency assistance to refugees 
and others suffering from the effects of 
drought and civil conflict in Africa. The 
U.S. Government will have contributed 
almost $200 million for all aspects of 
refugee assistance in Africa this fiscal 
year alone. I would note, in particular, 
our rapid intervention in Sudan in 
response to requests for assistance from 
the UNHCR and the Government of 
Sudan which contributed to the saving 
of thousands of refugees' lives. 

Other notable developments in the 
U.S. refugee program during the past 
year have been: 

• The continued expansion of the 
UNHCR's orderly departure program 
from Vietnam. Some 14,000 refugees 
and immigrants will leave Vietnam 
under this program in FY 1985 for new 
lives in the United States. Continued 
expansion of the ODP is essential to our 
goal of ending— or at least diminishing— 
the dangerous phenomenon of 
clandestine flight by sea from Vietnam. 

• Through our contributions to the 
UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) 
and other international relief organiza- 
tions, we have played a principal role in 
ensuring that Cambodians forced to flee 
into Thailand in order to escape Viet- 
namese armed attacks have been able to 
maintain some semblance of a normal 
life. 

• Elsewhere in Asia, U.S. contribu- 
tions to refugee assistance in Pakistan 
have helped sustain the 2.5 million 
Afghan refugees there and allowed them 
to pursue their lives while awaiting the 
day when they can finally return to 
their embattled homeland. 

• In Central America, the growing 
vitality of the Duarte government is at- 
tested to by the continuing return of 
Salvadoran refugees to their country 



from Honduras. The United States ap- 
plauds this development and will con- 
tinue to provide assistance, both 
through international organizations and 
bilaterally, to help those who return. 

• A major achievement of the past 
year was aborted when Fidel Castro an- 
nounced the suspension of the U.S.- 
Cuban Migration Agreement just after 
the first Cuban ex-political prisoners 
had arrived in the United States on 
May 20. The United States is prepared 
to resume processing of refugees in 
Havana as soon as Cuba decides to reac- 
tivate the migration agreement. 

The Indochinese 
Refugee Situation Today 

Our large Indochinese resettlement pro- 
gram is at a transition point. The root 
cause of the refugee problem in 
Southeast Asia is clear. The outflow of 
refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Laos is a direct result of the imposition 
of communist oppression on the people 
of these countries. The United States 
has responded to this great human 
tragedy by offering new homes and the 
chance to live in freedom to hundreds of 
thousands of Indochinese refugees. The 
goal of the U.S. refugee program has 
been to treat these refugees from 
persecution in as humane a fashion as 
possible. I believe that history will pass 
a favorable judgment on our efforts. 

Over the last 10 years some 755,000 
refugees have arrived in the United 
States from Indochina. About 52,000 of 
the 71,000 total refugee admissions in 
FY 1984 came from Indochina. The 
same proportion is expected in FY 1985. 
Even though current resettlement pro- 
grams have declined dramatically from 
high levels of 1980-82, we believe they 
have been responsive to the true 
humanitarian needs for the region. 

As with any program, however, we 
must continue to be sensitive to the 
need to balance refugee resettlement 
from Southeast Asia with other U.S. in- 
terests and concerns. Indochinese 
refugee resettlement must be balanced 
against other, regional solutions; bal- 
anced as a fair share of an international 
resettlement effort; balanced in terms of 
its budgetary implications; balanced in 
terms of other immigration and 
domestic policy considerations; and 
balanced against the need to provide 
resettlement to deserving refugees from 
other parts of the world. 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



To achieve this balance, the United 
States— working with the UNHCR and 
other nations— is pursuing measures to 
address the remaining refugee problems 
in Southeast Asia. There are two 
general categories of measures that 
either have been implemented or are be- 
ing considered. 

• First, increasing emphasis is being 
placed on international and bilateral 
measures to reduce the number of per- 
sons arriving in first-asylum countries 
who do not meet refugee criteria. An 
example of this type of measure is the 
Lao screening program initiated on 
July 1, 1985, by the Thai Government. 
This program, which is being monitored 
closely by the UNHCR, is designed to 
identify the true refugees as defined in 
international law. Essential to the suc- 
cessful operation of this program is 
agreement by Laos to allow the safe 
return of those found ineligible for 
refugee status. We are following the 
results of this program with great 
interest. 

• The second category of measures 
is aimed specifically at assuring that the 
U.S. refugee program fits the current 
situation in the region. Available 
evidence suggests that people leave the 
Indochinese countries today for a vari- 
ety of reasons: to escape persecution, to 
seek a better standard of living, or to 
join family members who have previous- 
ly fled. Our objective is to ensure that 
the U.S. refugee resettlement program 
is available exclusively to those who 
have been persecuted or have a well- 
founded fear of persecution if returned 
to their homelands and who cannot 
reasonably expect to voluntarily 
repatriate or resettle to another coun- 
try. Those who have left their homes 
primarily for reasons of family reunifica- 
tion should, to the degree possible, use 
normal immigration programs which 
have been established for that purpose. 
In this connection, we will continue to 
work on improving the availability and 
use of safe and orderly migration pro- 
grams from the countries of origin. 

In furtherance of this second ap- 
proach, the relevant agencies have been 
studying the proper use of departure 
mechanisms for the future, including the 
increased use of normal immigration 
channels for the family reunification seg- 
ment of the Indochinese resettlement 
program. Our intention is to take a 
regional approach to the use of immigra- 
tion, as well as refugee admissions, and 
to include all ethnic groups within this 
approach. 



Also, I am commissioning a high- 
level, independent panel that will be 
going to Southeast Asia in the near 
future with a broad mandate to assess 
the refugee situation and to make 
recommendations on necessary changes 
in U.S. policy. 

I want to emphasize that, as we 
review the refugee situation as it exists 
in Southeast Asia today, we will con- 
tinue to be guided by our bedrock con- 
cern for humanitarian principles. Fur- 
thermore, our national refugee policy 
will continue to be based on thorough 
consultations with the Congress, with 
the first-asylum countries in the region, 
other primary resettlement countries, 
and the UNHCR. 

Nonresettlement Solutions in 
Southeast Asia 

While resettlement remains a necessary 
means for dealing with the refugee 
situation in Southeast Asia, other solu- 
tions within the region must be pursued 
more vigorously. Such measures— in par- 
ticular, the alternative of voluntary 
repatriation with appropriate safeguards 
and international monitoring— may re- 
quire negotiation of agreements by the 
UNHCR with the states concerned. 

UNHCR's Orderly Departure 
Program from Vietnam 

In our consultations with the Congress 
last September, I announced, on behalf 
of President Reagan, two special ini- 
tiatives for expanding the High Commis- 
sioner's orderly departure program from 
Vietnam. 

• One of these initiatives called for 
the admission to the United States of all 
Amerasian children and close family 
members from Vietnam over the three 
fiscal years 1985-87. 

• The second initiative called for the 
resettlement in the United States of 
political prisoners currently and 
previously confined in Vietnam's "re- 
education camp" prisons and their quali- 
fying family members, totaling 10,000 
persons over the 2-year period, 1984-86. 

The United States presented these 
two presidential initiatives to the Viet- 
namese in Geneva last October. 

We have had success in nearly 
doubling the number of Amerasians 
released by the Vietnamese— almost 
4,000 children and family members this 
year compared to 2,200 'in FY 1984- 



however, the Vietnamese failed to reach 
our goal of 5,000 for the first year. 

We are, however, greatly disap- 
pointed that the Vietnamese have not, 
as yet, responded positively to our pro- 
posal for the "re-education camp" 
prisoners. After the initial presentation, 
the United States has twice proposed to 
Vietnam that we meet to continue 
discussions on this proposal, but so far 
the Vietnamese have not agreed. In 
unofficial conversations, Hanoi has in- 
dicated that it is backing off from its 
earlier announced willingness and com- 
mitment to allow these people to be 
resettled in the United States. 

I would like to reaffirm again today 
that the United States is profoundly 
concerned about the continued imprison- 
ment of these people and that we re- 
main ready and willing to accept them— 
both former and present prisoners— and 
their families for resettlement in the 
United States as soon as the Viet- 
namese authorities will allow them to 
leave. This is a purely humanitarian 
matter and should not be made depend- 
ent on the settlement of the political 
differences that separate our two 
countries. 

Next month, we will be meeting 
with Vietnamese representatives in 
Geneva, under UNHCR aegis, to 
discuss the operation of the orderly 
departure program. Our goal remains 
the expansion of this vital international 
program. We will be seeking agreement 
by Vietnam to improvements in the 
operation of the ODP which will enable 
more Amerasian children and other per- 
sons of special humanitarian concern to 
the United States to leave Vietnam via 
this safe and humane route. We are 
prepared— as we were last year— to hold 
bilateral talks with the Vietnamese on 
our humanitarian initiative to resettle 
the former and present "re-education 
camp" prisoners. 

It is our intention to continue to 
maximize the use of immigrant visas for 
family reunification within the ODP, 
thereby reserving refugee numbers for 
those who have no alternative but to 
leave as refugees. 

Assistance to Cambodian 
Border Population in Thailand 

The large population of displaced Cam- 
bodians living in evacuation camps in 
Thailand is of intense concern to the 
United States. I had an opportunity dur- 
ing my visit to Thailand in July to meet 
and talk with some of these heroic peo- 
ple of Cambodia who have been driven 



THE SECRETARY 



'rom their homeland by Vietnamese 
irmed attacks on their border encamp- 
nents. The violence of the latest 
i^tacks— occurring over the period from 
November 1984 through April 1985— was 
uch that the entire border population of 
>ver 225,000 people— men, women and 
hildren— was driven into Thailand. The 
jovemment and people of Thailand and 
,he UN Border Relief Operation have 
esponded magnificently to the plight of 
hese victims of Vietnamese aggression. 
The United States will continue to pro- 
r ide support to this population and to 
he people of Thailand whose lives have 
>een disrupted by the impact of Viet- 
nam's attacks. 

We and the other resettlement coun- 
ries support the policy of the Royal 
Thai Government that the evacuees 
rom the border area should be provided 
ill necessary assistance but that reset- 
lement abroad should not be viewed as 
he solution to their plight. However, 
>ve have decided, subject to Thai Gov- 
•rnment approval, to initiate a limited 
>rogram to unite close family members 
vith relatives already in this country, 
)rimarily through immigration-type 
hannels. This program will include 
ihose eligible for immigrant visas, 
'visas 93" for spouses and unmarried 
ninor children, and selected use of 
I lumanitarian parole for close depend- 
ent s in the two preceding categories. 
We recognize this has to be handled 
'ery carefully so we don't trigger off an 
inwarranted set of expectations. 

Also of special concern to the United 
States is a group of Vietnamese who 
lave fled overland to the Thai- 
Cambodian border and were evacuated 
into Thailand along with the Cambodian 
>order population. Although the United 
i-States has previously accepted some of 

hem for resettlement, approximately 
i 1,500 remain under Red Cross protec- 
tion at one of the evacuation sites, 
vhich also houses much larger numbers 
>f Khmer border evacuees. Because of 
Uour concerns about the unique security 
loroblem of this small but especially 
li/ulnerable population, we are support- 
ing a Red Cross initiative to obtain 
^agreement to relocate the Vietnamese 
l.o a separate and more secure location. 
lA.s soon as necessary security provisions 
md international cooperation can be ob- 
tained, the United States is prepared to 
Initiate a limited program to resettle 
|:hose with close family ties to the 
ilUnited States and those of particular 
■lumanitarian concern, such as former 
[j're-education camp" inmates. 



The United States is greatly con- 
cerned about the quality of life in the 
evacuation camps. We will be working 
with UNBRO and the Royal Thai 
Government to upgrade camp conditions 
and to ensure security for camp inhabi- 
tants. In addition, the Administration— 
and the Congress— are looking at ways 
that this large Cambodian community 
can be provided an opportunity for 
educating its young people so that they 
can be better prepared for the day 
when they can return to their homes on 
the other side of the border. The Royal 
Thai Government has also expressed an 
interest in the education of these Cam- 
bodian children. In consultation with the 
Congress, we will be working with the 
Thai and with various international 
organizations, and with the Cambodians 
themselves, to devise a program to 
respond to this important need. And, 
certainly, it is something that makes an 
emotional impact on you, to visit there 
and sense the determination of those 
people to govern themselves— to educate 
their young, getting what help they 
can— and their determination in the end 
to return to Cambodia and to their 
homes; and, certainly, that is the spirit 
we want to see perpetuated. 

Completing Resettlement 
Processing for Cambodian Refugees 

The United States has been in the 
forefront of the effort to resettle quali- 
fied refugees from the population of 
Cambodians in UNHCR camps in Thai- 
land. The approval rate for Cambodian 
refugees seeking resettlement in the 
United States has been over 90%, one of 
the highest for any group of refugees. 
Since the beginning of Cambodian reset- 
tlement processing in 1975, the United 
States has taken over 130,000, and other 
countries have resettled over 60,000. 
This is a record of which we can all be 
proud. 

Recently, public and congressional 
interest has been focused on the pro- 
cessing of remaining Cambodian 
refugees in Thailand for resettlement in 
the United States. The Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
held a hearing on July 31 at which this 
subject received a thorough review. It 
should be clear to all concerned that the 
objective of the U.S. refugee program 
remains the fairest possible considera- 
tion of all applicants for refugee 
admission. 



However, where there are indica- 
tions that a refugee applicant has par- 
ticipated in the persecution of others, he 
cannot— under U.S. law— be granted 
refugee status, unless he can prove that 
he has not participated in such activi- 
ties. Determining whether or not some- 
one engaged in the persecution of others 
during the period of Khmer Rouge 
atrocities in Cambodia is a difficult and 
time-consuming task. I believe that the 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, working closely with the De- 
partment of State and the concerned 
voluntary agency representatives, has 
reviewed the denied cases in a just and 
reasonable manner. The established 
review mechanism, which was formal- 
ized last February, remains in place to 
reconsider denied cases. 

Refugee Admissions 
from Other Regions 

Although we extend a strong and help- 
ing hand toward the refugees of South- 
east Asia, we must not forget the needs 
of the millions of refugees in other 
regions of the world. In most cases 
these refugees do not require third- 
country resettlement. They are being 
given long-term asylum in Pakistan, 
throughout Africa, and in Central 
America. Our goal and the goal of the 
High Commissioner for Refugees is to 
assist these people to maintain them- 
selves until they can return safely to 
their home countries. A certain number 
of them will continue to require resettle- 
ment in the United States, and we have 
made provision for their admission to 
this country in our proposed admissions 
ceilings for FY 1986. 

I would like to note, in particular, 
the need to address refugee admissions 
backlogs of East Europeans, Iranians, 
and Afghans. Our goal in the Near East 
is to continue to provide resettlement 
opportunities in the United States for 
those refugees with close ties to this 
country and for those of special concern, 
such as members of the persecuted 
Iranian religious minorities. We plan to 
continue to provide resettlement for a 
fair share of East European refugees 
who flee to Western Europe. Hopefully, 
the proposed ceilings will reduce the 
waiting time for these applicants. 

Despite fluctuations in departure 
rates in recent months, there does not 
appear to have been any basic change in 
the Soviet policy of restricting emigra- 
tion. As in past years, I will reiterate to 
the Soviet Foreign Minister when I 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



meet with him later this month that the 
Soviet Union has an obligation, under- 
taken when it signed the Helsinki ac- 
cords, to permit those who wish to join 
their families abroad to do so. 

As already mentioned in the discus- 
sion of our contingency plan to transfer 
unused numbers from the Latin Ameri- 
can admissions ceiling to other regions 
in FY 1986, the United States remains 
ready to reactivate the U.S. -Cuban 
Migration Agreement on short notice. 
When Fidel Castro suspended the 
agreement in May, some 1,800 ex-politi- 
cal prisoners and accompanying family 
members had been tentatively approved 
for refugee status. Our goal is to bring 
these and other former prisoners to the 
United States, along with their families. 
We hope that Castro will soon decide to 
drop his unilateral suspension of the 
migration agreement, making possible a 
continuation of our program for ex- 
political prisoners in Cuba. 

Providing Adequate Funding 
for the Refugee Program 

Refugees are an international responsi- 
bility, but traditionally the United 
States has been the leader in rallying 
support for assistance to the burgeoning 
world refugee population. Working 
through the UNHCR, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, and other 
organizations, the United States has 
made protection of those fleeing oppres- 
sion a key component of its foreign 
policy. By assisting the persecuted we 
demonstrate our own attachment to the 
values of freedom and human dignity. It 
would be a severe blow to these values 
if, due to well-meant but misguided at- 
tempts to save money, the Congress 



sustained the large cuts in refugee pro- 
gram funding proposed by the House 
Appropriations Committee in July. 
These cuts— amounting to $45 million 
from an Administration request of $338 
million— when combined with $9 million 
in earmarks added by the Congress, 
would leave insufficient funds to operate 
a viable, worldwide refugee program. 

At the funding level currently being 
proposed by the House Appropriations 
Committee, we would have to drastical- 
ly reduce refugee admissions in FY 
1986. A sudden drop from the FY 1985 
level of 70,000 admissions would serious- 
ly threaten the preservation of first 
asylum for refugees in Southeast Asia 
and elsewhere in the world. 

Similarly, the funds available for 
relief and assistance would be inade- 
quate to maintain subsistence and sur- 
vival for thousands of refugees in 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, 
Pakistan, and Latin America. Our 
African relief efforts would also be af- 
fected adversely. 

All of us recognize the need to 
restrain expenditures in the coming 
years, but our foreign policy interests 
and humanitarian concern for refugees 
at home and abroad cannot be carried 
out if these budget cuts are sustained. 
The President's FY 1986 request for 
refugee programs already reflected the 
need for budget restraint. 

Conclusion 

In the 12 months since I last appeared 
before this committee we have accom- 
plished much on behalf of refugees. The 
President's initiatives in favor of Amer- 
asian children and political prisoners in 
Vietnam remain at the top of our agen- 
da of unfinished business. We will con- 
tinue to pursue a solution to the other 
persistent and difficult refugee problems 



in Southeast Asia. In close consultation 
with Congress and our allies, we will ex- 
amine new approaches to dealing with 
these problems. With the cooperation of 
the Congress, we will maintain our com- 
mitment to those refugees in need of 
life-sustaining assistance in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. We must not forget 
that the great majority of refugees to- 
day are found in the poorest countries 
of the world and can only be helped 
through international efforts. With the 
support of Congress and the American 
people, we will keep our doors open to 
refugees of special concern who suffer 
persecution at the hands of tyrannical 
governments and for whom there are 
not effective and humane alternatives. 

The cost of our refugee programs is 
small compared to the vast needs that 
they must address. To those of you on 
this committee and to your colleagues 
elsewhere in the Congress who have 
given your active support to the Presi- 
dent's refugee assistance budget re- 
quest, I express my appreciation. This is 
truly a nonpartisan program and one 
that deserves your strong support. 

'Press release 224. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington. 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



AFRICA 



Visit of Mozambique's President 




President Samora Moises Machel of 
the People's Republic of Mozambique 
made an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C., September 17-21, 
1985, to meet with President Reagan 
and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by the 
two Presidents after their meeting on 
September 19. 1 

President Reagan 

It has been a pleasure for me today to 
meet with President Machel of Mozam- 
bique. At a time when much attention is 
focused on southern Africa, my meeting 
with the President underscores the 
determination of the United States to 
continue playing an active and construc- 
tive role in this volatile portion of the 
globe. 

The United States prides itself as a 
force for freedom and progress and 
stability, and this is true in southern 
Africa, as in other parts of the world. 
We seek to encourage the development 
of democratic government in all the 
nations of southern Africa. Democracy 
and the respect for fundamental human 
liberties are not only consistent with our 
values as a free people but are also the 
surest pathway to economic progress, 
internal reconciliation, and international 
peace. 

President Machel, you have already 
taken a step toward peace. And because 
of your personal foresight and courage, 
cross-border violence in the region has 
been reduced and a more constructive 
relationship with South Africa has 
begun. 



These efforts already have proven to 
be a great boon to the well-being of 
your people. We know that economic 
recovery and development will require 
the restoration of peace, a process which 
will call upon all the statesmanship of 
Mozambique's leaders. 

Mozambique has suffered greatly in 
the last decade from drought, domestic 
violence, and economic dislocation. I was 
impressed today with President 
Machel's sincere desire to improve the 
lot of his people. The United States, as 
is true in other African countries, is do- 
ing what it can to alleviate the worst ef- 
fects of the drought. We are now also 
involving ourselves in a major effort to 
rebuild Mozambique's shattered 
economy. We welcome Mozambique's 
decision to cooperate with the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank to design a program of economic 
stabilization and development. Encour- 
aging Western investment and 
strengthening Mozambique's private sec- 
tor is a formula for economic advance- 
ment and improving the quality of life. 
We know you will find that the freer 
people are in the arena of economics, 
the more enterprising they become and 
the more benefits are enjoyed by the 
society as a whole. 

I was glad to have had this oppor- 
tunity today to express personally to 
President Machel America's good will 
toward the people of his country. We 
look forward to the success of his 
economic initiatives and movement 
toward national unity. 



President Machel 

We have come here on an official visit 
at the invitation of President Ronald 
Reagan. We say a sincere thank you for 
this friendly gesture. Our aim in this 
visit is to strengthen existing bilateral 
relations and define a basis for the long- 
term development of these relations. 

I have just had a very positive, 
fruitful, and constructive meeting with 
President Ronald Reagan. I had the op- 
portunity to express our appreciation 
for the food and development aid that 
the United States of America has 
granted us. 

Mozambique is an independent and 
nonaligned African country. We value 
our independence. We are proud of our 
independence. We are intransigent in 
the defense of our national interest. We 
firmly believe that, like ourselves, each 
people must determine the destiny of its 
own country. 

Our chief concern is to solve the 
basic problems of our people and to 
make the region where we live one of 
peace, stability, good-neighborliness, 
cooperation, and development. In this 
context, we signed with the Republic of 
South Africa the Nkomati agreement, 
an essential condition for peace and 
development. The People's Republic of 
Mozambique has strictly complied with 
the Nkomati agreement. 

The need for the urgent elimination 
of apartheid is a matter of common con- 
cern. Mozambique took a positive view 
of the efforts of the international com- 
munity, including the United States, in 
this regard. We hope that such efforts 
continue and that they lead to the in- 
dependence of Namibia, to peace and 
stability for the whole of southern 
Africa. 

Mozambique is still a backward and 
underdeveloped country, but one with 
vast potential and natural resources. We 
seek the participation of the United 
States and of its private sector in put- 
ting those resources at the service of 
our economic and social development. 

I am convinced that the meeting I 
have just had with President Ronald 
Reagan has established a solid basis for 
long-term cooperation in all fields be- 
tween Mozambique and the United 
States. With mutual respect and 
reciprocal advantages, we shall develop 
the friendship which we all seek. 



J Made at the South Portico of the White 
House. President Machel spoke in Portu- 
guese, and his remarks were translated by an 
interpreter (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 23, 1985). ■ 



November 1985 



25 



ARMS CONTROL 



Antisatellite Arms Control 



by Kenneth L. Adelman 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Arms Control, International 
Security, and Science of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on 
September 11, 1985. Ambassador 
Adelman is Director of the Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency. 1 

It is a pleasure to appear before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee to 
discuss antisatellite (ASAT) arms con- 
trol. I believe that the most significant 
recent event in this area was the Presi- 
dent's certification, as required by the 
Department of Defense 1985 authoriza- 
tion act. Thus I would like, in my 
testimony, to focus today both on the 
progress of the negotiations in Geneva 
and that certification and its implica- 
tions for arms control. First, however, I 
would like to review Administration 
thinking on space arms control. 

Background 

For 25 years, the United States has sta- 
tioned satellites in space for peaceful 
purposes, including support of national 
security and arms control. Launch 
detection satellites provide immediate 
warning of a ballistic missile attack. 
Communication and navigational 
satellites support the command and con- 
trol of U.S. and allied military forces. 
Other satellites provide U.S. national 
technical means (NTM) to assist in 
verification of compliance with existing 
arms control agreements. 

The United States has been a con- 
tributor and party to several major 
international agreements that govern 
space activities, including the UN 
Charter, Outer Space Treaty, Limited 
Test Ban Treaty, and Antiballistic 
Missile Treaty. At U.S. initiative, 
bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on 
ASAT arms control were held during 
1978-79. The United States supported 
the recent formation of an ad hoc com- 
mittee to discuss space arms control in 
the 40-nation Conference on Disarma- 
ment (CD) in Geneva. 

U.S. Policy 

U.S. national space policy was ar- 
ticulated by President Reagan on July 4, 
1982, and reaffirmed in his March 31, 
1984, report to Congress on U.S. policy 



and ASAT arms control: "The United 
States will consider verifiable and 
equitable arms control measures that 
would ban or otherwise limit testing and 
deployment of specific weapon systems, 
should those measures be compatible 
with United States national security." 

Guided by these criteria, the United 
States has studied a range of possible 
options for space arms control. Factors 
which complicate ASAT amis control in- 
clude significant difficulties of verifica- 
tion, diverse sources of threats to U.S. 
and allied satellites, and threats to U.S. 
and allied terrestrial forces posed by 
Soviet targeting and reconnaissance 
satellites. 

Depending on the scope and effec- 
tiveness of an agreement, a verifiable 
space arms control agreement, if com- 
plied with, might limit specialized 
threats to satellites and constrain future 
threats to such key satellites as those 
for early warning. Limitations on 
specialized threats to satellites, together 
with satellite survivability measures, 
could help preserve and enhance stabili- 
ty. Agreements could also raise the 
political threshold for attacks on space 
objects and meet some international con- 
cerns about unconstrained military ac- 
tivity in space. 

On November 22, 1984, the United 
States and U.S.S.R. agreed to enter 
new negotiations with the objective of 
reaching mutually acceptable 
agreements on the full range of issues 
concerning nuclear and space arms. The 
January 7-8 meeting between Foreign 
Minister Gromyko and Secretary Shultz 
began this process by reaching an 
understanding as to the subject and ob- 
jectives of the negotiations. 

It was agreed that the objective of 
the negotiations is to work out effective 
agreements aimed at preventing an 
arms race in space and terminating it on 
Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear 
arms, and at strengthening strategic 
stability. The negotiations are being con- 
ducted by a delegation from each side 
divided into three groups, one of which 
is addressing defense and space issues. 

Arms Control Issues 

The 1978-79 ASAT arms control talks 
revealed major U.S.-Soviet differences, 
and subsequent study has brought space 
arms control issues into sharper focus. 
Space arms control involves difficulties. 



Verification. Verification problems 
are aggravated for space systems 
because satellites that serve U.S. and 
allied security are few in number; 
cheating, even on a small scale, could 
pose a disproportionate risk. For 
example, a ban on all ASAT systems 
would require elimination of the current 
Soviet ASAT interceptor system, but no 
satisfactory means has been found to 
effectively verify Soviet compliance with 
such an undertaking. The Soviet inter- 
ceptor is relatively small and launched 
by a booster and launch pad used for 
other space missions. We do not know 
how many interceptors have been 
manufactured, and the U.S.S.R. could 
maintain a covert supply. 

Breakout. Among the criteria 
which must be used in evaluating the 
implications for national security of any 
potential arms control measure is that of 
"breakout." This is the risk that a 
nation could gain unilateral advantage if 
the agreement ceased to remain in force 
for any reason— for example, through 
sudden abrogation— and obtain a head 
start in building or deploying a type of 
weapon which had been banned or 
severely limited. The importance of 
certain critical U.S. satellites, which are 
limited in numbers, could create an in- 
centive for the Soviets to maintain a 
breakout capability. 

Definition. Defining a space 
weapon for arms control purposes is 
very difficult. Space weapons could 
include coorbital and direct ascent inter- 
ceptors (i.e. modified ballistic and ABM 
missiles), directed energy weapons, 
active electronic and countermeasures, 
and weapons which could be carried on 
manned space complexes. The problem 
is compounded because non-weapon 
space systems, including civil systems, 
may have characteristics difficult to 
distinguish from those of weapons. Fur- 
thermore, many systems not designed to 
be ASAT weapons have inherent (or 
residual) ASAT capabilities. 

Disclosure of Information. Infor- 
mation regarding certain U.S. space 
systems that are associated with 
national security is among the most sen- 
sitive information within the govern- 
ment. Measures with the objective of 
enhancing verification of an ASAT arms 
control agreement that required any 
form of access to U.S. space systems 
could create an unacceptable risk of 
compromising the protection of that 
information. 






ARMS CONTROL 



Vulnerability of Satellite Support 
Systems. ASAT arms control would 
not ensure survivability of other 
elements in a space system. Ground 
stations, launch facilities, and com- 
munications links may, in some cases, be 
more vulnerable than the satellites 
themselves. 

Soviet Non-Weapon Military Space 
Threat. Certain current and projected 
Soviet space systems, although not 
weapons, are designed to support Soviet 
terrestrial forces in the event of a crisis 
or conflict. These satellites are designed 
to provide radar and electronically 
derived targeting intelligence to Soviet 
weapon platforms for attacking U.S. and 
allied surface fleets and land forces. In 
response to this threat and as a counter 
to the Soviet ASAT, the United States 
has been developing the miniature vehi- 
cle (MV) system. The purposes of this 
system are to deter threats to U.S. and 
allied space systems by having the 
capability to respond in kind to a Soviet 
ASAT attack and to help deter conven- 
tional and nuclear conflict by placing at 
risk Soviet satellites which support 
hostile military forces. 

Soviet and U.S. ASAT Systems 

Current Soviet ASAT capabilities 
include an interceptor system which is 
the only operational ASAT system in 
the world; in addition, they include 
ground-based test lasers with probable 
ASAT capabilities, possibly the nuclear- 
armed GALOSH ABM interceptors, 
which might need only software changes 
to be used in an ASAT role, and the 
technological capability to conduct elec- 
tronic warfare against space systems. 
There have been more than a dozen 
' tests of the interceptor system, which 
we consider operational, including 
testing during a Soviet strategic forces 
exercise in 1982. 

A Soviet high-altitude orbital in- 
terceptor capability is a possible threat, 
but we have no direct evidence of such 
a program by the Soviets, and we may 
not obtain such evidence before testing. 
Other techniques for accomplishing this 
objective may appear preferable to the 
Soviets. For example, they could also 
use their developing electronic warfare 
capabilities against high-altitude 
satellites. We cannot now say which, if 
any, such high-altitude capabilities may 
be, or have been, developed by the 
U.S.S.R. 



Continuing, or possible future, 
Soviet efforts that could produce ASAT 
systems include developments in 
directed energy weapons. We have in- 
dications that the Soviets are continuing 
development of ground-based lasers for 
ASAT applications. In addition, we 
believe the Soviets are conducting 
research and development in the area of 
space-based laser ASAT systems. We 
have, as yet, no evidence of Soviet pro- 
grams to develop ASAT weapons based 
on particle beam technology. 

The U.S. ASAT system presently 
under development consists of an MV 
non-nuclear warhead mounted on a two- 
stage short-range attack missile 
(SRAM)/Altair booster. This is carried 
aloft and launched from a specially 
modified F-15 aircraft. The MV will be 
capable of attacking satellites in low 
altitude orbits. The system is currently 



undergoing testing. It is to be deployed 
at one air force base on each coast of 
the United States. 

The United States conducted the 
second test of the MV on November 13, 
1984. No target was involved; the object 
was to demonstrate sensor ability to ac- 
quire and track an infrared source. 
Following the President's recent cer- 
tification to Congress, the United States 
plans to conduct a test of the MV 
against a space object this month. The 
United States has no plans to extend 
the altitude capability of the MV ASAT 
system to place high altitude satellites 
at risk. We are, however, continuing to 
review ways in which U.S. ASAT 
capability could be improved. The U.S. 
ASAT program is being conducted in a 
manner fully consistent with all U.S. 
obligations, including the ABM and 
Outer Space Treaties. 



Arms Control Talks Resume In Geneva 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 13, 1985 1 

I met today with my senior negotiators 
to the nuclear and space arms talks in 
Geneva— Ambassadors Max Kampelman, 
John Tower, and Maynard Glitman. I 
gave them my instructions for the third 
round of the negotiations, which begins 
on September 19, and discussed with 
them the prospects for progress in this 
round. 

I reiterated to Ambassadors 
Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman my 
strong desire to move with renewed 
effort to reduce nuclear arms. Achieving 
real reductions in both strategic and 
intermediate nuclear forces is our over- 
riding objective in Geneva. We have 
placed a number of positive and far- 
reaching proposals on the table for 
significant and verifiable reductions. Our 
negotiators have unprecedented author- 
ity for give and take in trying to reach 
these objectives. There is no reason why 
a serious reduction process cannot begin 
promptly, as these nuclear arms exist 
today and are of considerable concern to 
both sides. At the same time, I have 
emphasized my desire to strengthen the 
dialogue with the Soviets in Geneva on 
the full range of issues involving defense 
and space arms. 

I am hopeful that we may, indeed, 
be able to move forward in this round. 



Soviet leaders have recently given 
public indications that they may be con- 
sidering significant nuclear reductions, 
and we have encouraged them to 
translate this expression into concrete 
proposals at the negotiating table in 
Geneva. Now is the time for them to 
spell out their intentions; now is the 
time for both sides to move forward. 
Concrete Soviet proposals would get the 
talks moving and would make a positive 
contribution to the intensified U.S.- 
Soviet dialogue which has been under- 
way in recent months. 

I am looking forward to my meeting 
with General Secretary Gorbachev in 
November. Arms control will, of course, 
be one of the important parts of our 
agenda at that meeting, and progress at 
the negotiating table in Geneva in this 
round would provide a positive, addi- 
tional stimulus to a productive discus- 
sion in November. 

As I have stressed before, my Ad- 
ministration is committed to bringing 
down dramatically the levels of nuclear 
arms through equitable and verifiable 
agreements. We have made serious pro- 
posals, we are patient, and we are ready 
for serious give and take. With a com- 
parable Soviet attitude, much can be ac- 
complished and soon. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 16, 1985. 



November 1985 



27 



ARMS CONTROL 



The Strategic Defense Initiative and 
ASAT 

President Reagan's speech of March 23, 
1983, established the direction for what 
we now call the Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative (SDI). New technologies are 
becoming available that justify a major 
research effort in ballistic missile 
defense. The SDI research program is 
also a prudent hedge against Soviet 
breakout from the ABM Treaty. (The 
Soviet Union currently is upgrading its 
operational ABM system at Moscow and 
is pursuing aggressive research and 
development programs in both tradi- 
tional ABM systems and in advanced 
ABM technologies such as high energy 
lasers.) 

The U.S. SDI is a program for 
research on a broad range of 
technologies which have potential for 
defense of both the United States and 
our allies. 

The purpose is to explore possible 
means by which deterrence could be 
enhanced. The United States has made" 
no decision to develop or deploy an 
ABM system. The SDI program is 
structured to support informed decisions 
by the early 1990s on whether to 
develop and deploy advanced defensive 
systems. 

Research under the SDI will be con- 
sistent with all current U.S. treaty 
obligations, including the ABM Treaty. 
The SDI complements U.S. policy call- 
ing for significant reductions in offensive 
nuclear armaments. This is because 
defenses whose effectiveness could be 
maintained at less cost than needed to 
proliferate offenses have potential for 
reducing the value of ballistic missile 
forces and thus increasing the likelihood 
of negotiated reductions. Both the SDI 
and our ASAT program aim at enhanc- 
ing deterrence and strengthening 
strategic stability, but in different ways. 
Many of the technologies involved in the 
SDI research and the ASAT program 
are related. However, the ASAT pro- 
gram is a near-term effort to develop an 
ASAT weapon intended to redress a 
specific military imbalance as discussed 
above, and it has no ABM capability. 
The SDI, on the other hand, is a long- 
term research program. The U.S. posi- 
tion on ASAT arms control should 
neither prejudge the results of SDI 
research nor preclude the research 
itself. 

Progress in the Negotiations 

In the defense and space negotiations, 
the U.S. approach has focused on the 
need to address I he instability thai 



exists in the current strategic situation; 
the United States has stressed the 
importance of reversing the erosion of 
the ABM Treaty regime and correcting 
other Soviet actions that violate existing 
arms control agreements. The United 
States has explained its view of the 
relationship between offensive and 
defensive forces, the potential contribu- 
tion of defensive forces to our mutual 
security, and how— if new defensive 
technologies prove feasible— the sides 
might manage to stable transition over 
time toward increased reliance on 
defenses. 

The Soviet Union, in an effort to 
stop the U.S. SDI research program, 
has proposed and continues to demand a 
comprehensive ban on research, develop- 
ment, testing, and deployment of what 
they call "space-strike arms." They 
have made U.S. acceptance of such a 
ban a precondition for progress— or even 
detailed discussion— on offensive nuclear 
arms reductions but have not addressed 
verification problems. The United States 
has responded that research is permit- 
ted under the ABM Treaty and that a 
ban on SDI research is unacceptable as 
it would be neither verifiable nor 
desirable and that such preconditions 
will only delay getting down to the kind 
of discussions that can lead to progress 
toward reductions in nuclear arsenals. 

The President's Certification 

On August 20 the President, as required 
by Congress, certified to Congress as 
follows: 

• The United States is endeavoring 
in good faith to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable 
agreement with the strictest possible 
limitations on ASAT weapons consistent 
with the national security interests of 
the United States. 

• Pending agreement on such strict 
limitations, testing against objects in 
space of the F-15 launched miniature 
homing vehicle ASAT warhead by the 
United States is necessary to avert 
clear and irrevocable harm to the 
national security. 

• Such testing would not constitute 
an irreversible step that would gravely 
impair prospects for negotiations on 
ASAT weapons. 

• Such testing is fully consistent 
with the rights and obligations of the 
United States under the Antiballistic 
Missile Treaty of 1972 as those rights 
and obligations exist at the time of such 
testing. 



I would like to review the reasoning 
behind this certification. 

Endeavoring to Negotiate the 
Strictest Possible Limitations. As you 

know, the United States is presently 
involved in negotiations at Geneva on a 
whole range of nuclear and space issues, 
including preventing an arms race in 
space. 

We have been unable, to date, to 
identify a specific ASAT proposal which 
meets the requirements identified by 
the Congress in 1984— that any agree- 
ment be verifiable and consistent with 
U.S. national security. We are seriously 
exploring with the U.S.S.R. arms con- 
trol arrangements intended to prevent 
an arms race in space. We will continue 
to study possible ASAT limitations in 
good faith to see whether such limita- 
tions are consistent with the national 
security interests of the United States, 
and we will continue to explore with the 
Soviets their proposals and the prob- 
lems associated with them. We are, 
therefore, acting in conformity with the 
first certification requirement. 

Necessity of MV Testing. The 

primary purposes of a U.S. ASAT 
capability are to deter threats to space 
systems of the United States and its 
allies and, within such limits imposed by 
international law, to deny any adversary 
advantages arising from the offensive 
use of space-based systems which could 
undermine deterrence. 

The U.S.S.R. has the world's only 
operational ASAT system with an effec- 
tive capability to seek and destroy 
critical U.S. space systems in near- 
Earth orbit. In addition, since space 
systems are vulnerable to a broad range 
of threats from direct attack to elec- 
tronic warfare to nuclear effects, the 
Soviet Union could have developed— 
without our knowledge— a variety of 
other means to attack our satellites. 

There is also a growing threat posed 
by present and prospective Soviet 
satellites which, while not weapons 
themselves, are designed to support 
directly the U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces 
in the event of conflict. These include 
ocean reconnaissance satellites which 
use radar and electronic intelligence in 
efforts to provide targeting data for use 
in attacking U.S. and allied surface 
fleets. They also include photographic 
and electronic intelligence satellites 
which provide targeting data and other 
information useful in supporting Soviet 
land forces. These Soviet space assets 
constitute a clear threat to our national 
security and that of our allies. 



n^nartment of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



The United States must take the 
steps necessary to avert a situation in 
which the Soviet Union has full freedom 
to conduct effective attacks on our space 
systems knowing that their space 
objects, including those that provide 
targeting data, are not vulnerable to 
U.S. attack. The resultant instability 
from this asymmetry creates a risk of 
irrevocable harm to the United States. 
U.S. development of a credible ASAT 
system is a necessary integral part of 
the steps needed to avert this situation. 
Therefore, testing of the MV against 
objects in space by the United States is 
necessary to avert clear and irrevocable 
harm to the national security of the 
United States and its allies. 

Impact on the Negotiations. The 

ASAT testing which we intend to under- 
take follows by more than a decade the 
initiation by the U.S.S.R. of its testing 
of a coorbital ASAT system which has 
for some time been the world's only 
operational ASAT system. The Soviets, 
moreover, as noted above, have tested 
and, in some cases deployed, other 
systems which have inherent ASAT 
capabilities. The existence of such 
Soviet capabilities and their testing 
effectively preclude the possibility that 
testing by the United States of its MV 
ASAT will constitute an irreversible 
step. 

In addition, we believe that testing 
can constitute an incentive to the Soviet 
Union to reach agreements on a wide 
range of issues and thus would not 
impair prospects for a successful conclu- 
sion to the negotiations now underway. 

Compatibility with the ABM 
Treatv. The testing against objects in 
space of the U.S. F-15 MV ASAT 
system will not give the system the 
capability to counter strategic ballistic 
missiles or their elements in flight tra- 
jectory and will not constitute a test in 
an ABM mode. Therefore, such testing 
is not prohibited by the ABM Treaty. 

Space arms control is a difficult 
area; I hope these remarks have helped 
clarify Administration thinking on it. 



U.S. Activities in the 
Conference on Disarmament 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Donald S. Lowitz 

Statement before the Arms Control 
Panel of the House Armed Services 
Committee on September 10, 1985. Am- 
bassador Lowitz is U.S. representative 
to the Conference on Disarmament. 1 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to 
appear before you today to discuss the 
activities of the United States in the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD). I was 
appointed U.S. representative last 
December and took up my duties in 
Geneva in January. 

As you may recall— or in the case of 
those of you who have been to Geneva, 
as you know first hand— the Conference 
on Disarmament is the principal 
multilateral body of the international 
community with the objective of carry- 
ing out substantive work in the area of 
arms control and disarmament and 
negotiating agreements affecting that 
community as a whole. 

Structure of the CD 

The CD is the successor body to 
organizations dating back to the 
18-Nation Disarmament Conference 
established in 1962. These bodies have 
been associated with negotiations 
leading to several important arms con- 
trol treaties, including the 1963 Limited 
Test Ban Treaty, the 1968 Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, the 1971 Seabeds 
Convention, the 1972 Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 
1976 Environmental Modification Con- 
vention. While the prior bodies operated 
under a U.S. and Soviet cochairmanship 
arrangement, in 1978, following the first 
special session of the UN General 
Assembly devoted to disarmament, it 
was agreed that the new body, with an 
expanded membership of 40 states, 
would operate with a chairmanship that 
rotated on a monthly basis. The CD, as 
did its predecessors, operates on the 
basis of consensus. This ensures that the 
United States and the other members 
can protect their essential interests. 

The CD is not a UN entity, although 
the UN Secretary General appoints a 
personal representative, who heads the 
CD's secretariat. The secretariat is also 
staffed by UN personnel and submits an 
annual report to the UN General 
Assembly. 



The conference includes most of the 
militarily important states in the world. 
For the first time, all five nuclear 
weapons states— the United States, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, 
France, and China— participate in a 
disarmament negotiating body. The 
United States is joined by many of its 
NATO allies-Canada, the United 
Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands— as well as Japan and 
Australia. The Soviet Union has the 
other members of the Warsaw Pact and 
Mongolia as its allies. Twenty-one 
neutral or nonaligned states participate, 
ranging from Sweden to India and 
Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina, Mexico 
and Egypt. 

Each year the conference meets 
from February to May and from June to 
September. It determines its agenda 
and program of work on an annual 
basis, but these have not varied much 
over the 7 years that the conference has 
met. Recently, two new items have been 
added to the agenda— the question of 
"The Prevention of Nuclear War, 
Including all Related Matters," and that 
of "The Prevention of an Arms Race in 
Outer Space." The other items include 
nuclear test ban, nuclear disarmament, 



U.S. Representative to the 
Conference on Disarmament 



Donald S. Lowitz was bom April 16, 1929, in 
Chicago. He received a bachelor of legal 
science from the Northwestern University 
School of Commerce (1950) and a J.D. from 
the Northwestern University School of Law 
(1952). 

He was engaged in private law practice 
in Chicago 1952-54, 1959-69, and 1971-84. In 
1954-59, Mr. Lowitz was Assistant U.S. 
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. 
In 1969-71, he was general counsel of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity in Washing- 
ton, D.C. In 1972-78, he was a member and 
then Chairman of the Board of Foreign 
Scholarships and served as a consultant in 
the Executive Office of the President in 
1974-75 and with the Department of Defense 
in 1975. 

Ambassador Lowitz assumed his duties as 
U.S. representative to the Conference on 
Disarmament on December 4. 1984. ■ 



Mni/omhor 1 Qftc; 



29 



ARMS CONTROL 



chemical weapons, radiological weapons, 
new types of weapons of mass destruc- 
tion, so-called negative security 
assurances, and a comprehensive pro- 
gram of disarmament. 

Issue of Chemical Weapons 

Of the broad spectrum of items on its 
agenda at the present time, the one of 
most importance, in my view, is that of 
chemical weapons. The clear objectives 
of the Administration in this area are to 
negotiate promptly a comprehensive ban 
on these weapons that have such ter- 
rible effects, as well as to seek to pre- 
vent their further proliferation, and, so 
long as a comprehensive ban is not in 
place, to maintain an adequate 
retaliatory capability to deter their use 
by the Soviet Union. 

The work of the CD on chemical 
weapons is carried out largely in a sub- 
sidiary body— the chemical weapons ad 



hoc committee— which has the task of 
developing a convention. As you know, 
the United States introduced a complete 
draft of such a convention when Vice 
President Bush appeared before the con- 
ference in April 1984. At the urging of 
our delegation, the chemical weapons 
committee has now produced, for the 
first time, a comprehensive text— albeit 
one containing many bracketed portions 
and incomplete sections— which the com- 
mittee has agreed will serve as the 
basis of its further work. 

In an effort to continue the chemical 
weapons negotiations on a timely basis, 
the CD has agreed that informal con- 
sultations within the framework of the 
chemical weapons committee will be 
held this fall for 3 weeks, as well as a 
formal committee session in January, 
before the CD begins its 1986 session in 
February. 

In reviewing the chemical weapons 
negotiations this past year, I see a 



Conference on Disarmament 
in Europe Reconvenes 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 9, 1985' 

On September 10th the Conference on 
Disarmament in Europe will reconvene 
in Stockholm for its seventh session. 
The Stockholm conference can con- 
tribute importantly to creating a more 
stable and secure Europe and to improv- 
ing the East-West relationship. The 
coming months will determine whether 
the conference will be successful in 
fulfilling its great potential as an instru- 
ment for enhancing peace in Europe. 

The issues before the Stockholm con- 
ference are important and complex. 
They directly affect the vital security in- 
terests of the participants— the United 

, Canada, plus 33 European 
nations. If these issues are to be 
resolved and a meaningful agreement 
achieved in time for the review meeting 
next year of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
serious and detailed negotiations on con- 
crete confidence-building measures must 

;n very soon. 

Toward this end, the members of 
the Atlantic alliance worked together in 
Stockholm to put forward six specific 
proposals which meet the mandate of 
the conference to enact practical, con- 



crete, militarily significant measures to 
reduce the risk of military confrontation 
and surprise attack in Europe. These 
Western proposals go well beyond the 
modest confidence-building measures 
enacted in Helsinki 10 years ago. They 
are aimed at increasing openness in rela- 
tions among all the participating states, 
reducing the suspicion and mistrust 
which divide East from West, and 
lowering the risk of conflict arising from 
miscalculation, misunderstanding, or 
misinterpretation. 

In preparing for this new round, the 
U.S. delegation has consulted closely 
with our allies to explore how best to 
advance the work of the conference. The 
alliance remains flexible and open to 
constructive ideas from others. We are 
in close contact with the other par- 
ticipating states and look forward to 
continuing this substantive dialogue in 
the upcoming round. 

The U.S. delegation to the 
Stockholm conference continues to have 
the full support of my Administration in 
its efforts to achieve an agreement 
which will promote the security of all. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. lfi, 1985. 



modest amount of progress, although 
largely of a procedural character. It is 
regrettable that the negotiations con- 
tinue to move much too slowly. It is 
regrettable that the continuing spread 
and use of chemical weapons has not yet 
imparted a greater sense of urgency to 
the CD's work. 

I mentioned the Administration's 
position concerning our need to maintain 
an adequate retaliatory chemical 
weapons capability to serve as a deter- 
rent to the use of these weapons by the 
Soviet Union. In addition, as I review 
this session's negotiations, it appears 
'that immediately following the House of 
Representatives vote to authorize the 
production of binary chemical weapons, 
the Soviet Union reacted in a polemical 
fashion and for a few weeks adopted a 
stance of silent withdrawal from active 
negotiations. Then I believe the Soviet 
Union assessed the situation and con- 
cluded that, since U.S. resumption of 
chemical weapons production might well 
become a reality, it was in their interest 
to participate in the negotiations rather 
than to remain silent. The Soviet delega- 
tion then resumed negotiating and the 
modest progress achieved in the com- 
mittee occurred largely in the closing 
weeks of this year's session with the 
active participation of the Soviet delega- 
tion. This seems to indicate that U.S. 
resumption of chemical weapons produc- 
tion may provide some incentive to the 
Soviet Union to become serious about a 
chemical weapons convention. 

I must caution against making too 
much of the largely procedural progress 
made by the chemical weapons commit- 
tee during 1985. The comprehensive ban 
that we seek, of necessity, will be a 
complex agreement, as it must ensure 
both the destruction of existing chemical 
weapons stockpiles and that new stocks 
are not illegally produced in the peaceful 
chemical industry. The negotiation of 
such a ban is perforce a complex and 
lengthy undertaking. At present, on the 
most important substantive issues- 
verification in particular— there con- 
tinues to be little agreement. While we 
search for mutually acceptable solutions, 
we continue to view as essential the 
need for mandatory, short-notice 
challenge inspection provisions— that 
would apply to any government-owned 
or -controlled facility— to complement 
the more routine types of verification of 
such matters as the destruction of 
stockpiles and the nonproduction of 
chemical weapons in the chemical in- 
dustry. On the other hand, we have 



ARMS CONTROL 



made clear in Geneva that it is the level 
of verification required to satisfy 
security concerns, not necessarily our 
specific language, that is important. 

Let me add that the delegation, of 
course, maintains close contacts with 
many other delegations in the CD on 
these negotiations as well as on other 
matters. We have had a bilateral 
dialogue on the chemical weapons issue 
with the delegation of the Soviet Union, 
and I should be pleased to expand on 
those discussions in closed session. 

Other Agenda Issues 

Let me discuss with you very briefly 
two other agenda items which have 
received a considerable degree of atten- 
tion in the conference. 

The first is that of the prevention of 
an arms race in outer space. Clearly, a 
primary focus on this important matter 
is the bilateral nuclear and space talks 
which are to resume shortly in Geneva. 
However, we recognize that many 
states have an interest in the outer 
space environment. This year the CD 
carried out an initial examination of 
outer space issues relevant in a 
multilateral arms control context. The 
United States fully participated in these 
activities, but thus far we do not see 
the possibility of identifying any par- 
ticular subject as appropriate for begin- 
ning a multilateral negotiation. I expect 
the question of outer space to continue 
as a major issue in the CD. 

The second item is that of a com- 
prehensive nuclear test ban. We have 
made it clear in Geneva that our posi- 
tion continues to be that a complete 
cessation of nuclear explosions is a long- 
term objective of the United States. We 
have stressed that the achievement of 
deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals 
of the Soviet Union and the United 
States is a more meaningful approach to 
nuclear arms control and should take 
precedence. At the CD, we have con- 
tinued to support the need for substan- 
tive work on a range of test ban issues, 
including the scope of an eventual ban, 
and verification and compliance. In par- 
ticular, we have endorsed, and sup- 
ported with significant financial and 
technical resources, the group of experts 
in seismology and data processing that 
has been developing ways of exchanging 
seismic data on a global basis for 
verification of a comprehensive test ban. 

On balance, I believe that the Con- 
ference on Disarmament had a year of 
modest success, particularly in the area 
of the chemical weapons negotiations. 



We attempted, and I believe succeeded, 
in making clear the U.S. positions on 
the issues dealt with in the CD and 
maintained unified positions with our 
allies. I am looking forward to the 
resumption of formal work in the Con 
ference in February. 

In the meantime, much of the focus 
of multilateral arms control efforts will 
shift to the UN General Assembly, 
where its First Committee will take up 



and debate a wide variety of arms con- 
trol issues. I will be representing the 
United Stah^ in this work, and I will 
be joined by a large number of my col- 
leagues from Geneva. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be publisned by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Status of MBFR Negotiations 



by Robert D. Blackwill 

Statement before the Arms Control 
Panel of the House Armed Services 
Committee on September 10, 1985. 
Ambassador Blackwill is U.S. 
representative to the mutual and 
balanced force reductions (MBFR) 
negotiations. 1 

I am pleased to be here this morning to 
discuss the Vienna mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) negotiations 
with you. I will keep my introductory 
remarks brief so that we can pursue 
issues of particular interest to you. 

General Observations 

As you are aware, the MBFR negotia- 
tions have been going on now for nearly 
a dozen years. While the 19 countries in- 
volved have reached accord in principle 
on some key points, the talks to date 
have not produced agreement on how to 
proceed to reductions of NATO and 
Warsaw Pact forces in a way that meets 
the interests of both sides— particularly, 
from our vantage, Western security in- 
terests. A variety of factors have con- 
tributed to the lack of substantive 
results. A basic issue, of course, is the 
matter of Soviet interest— or, converse- 
ly, the lack thereof— in actually reducing 
its military presence in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the German 
Democratic Republic, as well as in 
reducing the Warsaw Pact's conven- 
tional superiority vis-a-vis NATO in cen- 
tral Europe. 

Setting aside for the moment this 
central question of Soviet motivations, 
there are at least three other fundamen- 
tal factors which contribute to making 
these negotiations difficult. 



First, there is the matter of 
geography. A glance at the map quickly 
demonstrates how the East's geographic 
situation— with the Soviet Union directly 
adjacent to, but outside, the reductions 
area— confers on the Warsaw Pact 
significant advantages for introducing 
reinforcements quickly into central 
Europe. In contrast, U.S. troops are an 
ocean away. We must be sure that any 
MBFR agreement does not shift the 
military balance even more in the East's 
favor. Thus, NATO has to carefully 



U.S. Representative to 
the MBFR Negotiations 



Robert D. Blackwill was born August 8, 
1939, in Kellogg, Idaho. He obtained a B.A. 
from Wichita State University in 1962. 

He is a career member of the Senior 
Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor. 
He began his Foreign Service career as a 
Peace Corps volunteer in Malawi (1964-66) 
and was appointed a Foreign Service officer 
in 1967. His assignments have been training 
officer in the Bureau of Personnel (1968-69), 
associate watch officer in the Department's 
Operations Center (1969-70), political officer 
in Nairobi (1970-72), staff officer in the Ex- 
ecutive Secretariat (1972-73), special assistant 
to the Counselor of the Department (1974), 
political-military officer in London (1975-78), 
political counselor in Tel Aviv (1978-79), 
Director for West European Affairs on the 
National Security Council staff (1979-81), 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political- 
Military Affairs in the Department (1981-82); 
and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Euro- 
pean Affairs (1982-83). From 1983 to 1985, he 
was on sabbatical as associate dean at the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard. 

Ambassador Blackwill was sworn in as 
U.S. representative to the MBFR negotia- 
tions on April 26, 1985. ■ 



Wnupmhpr IQftfi 



31 



ARMS CONTROL 



weigh the impact of geography in 
assessing the specific terms of any 
MBFR proposal— and in so doing, to 
recognize that geography intrinsically 
favors the other side in the NATO- 
Warsaw Pact security equation. 

Second, there is the matter of the 
existing imbalance of conventional forces 
in central Europe itself. According to 
Western estimates, the Warsaw Pact 
has over 200,000 more ground and air 
force personnel in the MBFR reductions 
area than does NATO. Achieving the 
Western goal of parity at lower man- 
power levels— which, by definition, re- 
quires that the East take significantly 
greater reductions than the West— runs 
into obvious difficulties, particularly as 
the East claims that a balance of forces 
already exists in central Europe. 

Third, there is the matter of the 
secretive nature of the Soviet system. 
The Eastern penchant for excessive 
secrecy— particularly with regard to 
military matters— places a formidable 
obstacle in the way to the necessary 
degree of clarity required for an effec- 
tive agreement. These factors weigh 
heavily on the MBFR negotiations and 
are at the root of the two chief issues 
which have dominated the talks. 



Key Issues 

The first is the data issue. In brief, the 
sides disagree on the number of Warsaw 
Pact forces in the reductions area, with 
a discrepancy of approximately 20% be- 
tween Eastern and Western figures. 
Our estimates indicate, for example, 
some 970,000 Warsaw Pact ground 
forces in the reductions area. The 
Soviets and their allies, however, claim 
that the number is approximately 
800,000. The deadlock on the data issue 
is longstanding, going back a decade at 
least. The import of the data issue goes 
beyond its implication of asymmetrical 
Eastern reductions if time parity is to 
be achieved, as both sides have agreed. 
There are also serious political questions 
which go to the very heart of the arms 
control process and raise doubts about 
Eastern intentions, as do documented 
Soviet violations of existing arms con- 
trol agreements in other contexts. 

The second major issue is verifica- 
tion. By and large, the East insists— as 
it does in other arms control fora— that 
national technical means (NTM) are suf- 
ficient to verify an MBFR agreement 
and has resisted such measures of 
verification as on-site inspection. 



MBFR Talks Resume in Vienna 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 26, 1985 1 

Today in Vienna, members of NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact will resume their 
efforts to negotiate reductions and 
limitations on conventional forces in 
central Europe. 

The Vienna talks are an important 
part of the U.S. commitment to achieve 
concrete progress in arms reductions on 
a broad front— in the areas of conven- 
tional, chemical, and nuclear forces. In 
Geneva U.S. negotiators are striving to 
reduce the risk of nuclear war through 
significant reductions of nuclear 
weapons that will create a more stable 
deterrence. Also in Geneva, the 
American negotiators continue our effort 
to achieve a comprehensive, global, and 
verifiable ban on chemical weapons, as 
we proposed last year at the 40-nation 
Conference on Disarmament. And at the 
Stockholm Conference on Confidence- 
and Security Building Measures in 



Europe, the United States, in conjunc- 
tion with its NATO allies, will continue 
to press for agreement on confidence- 
building measures designed to reduce 
the risk of surprise attack in Europe. 

The United States and its NATO 
allies in Vienna will actively pursue 
every avenue of possible agreement in 
the upcoming negotiating round in order 
to achieve a verifiable agreement that 
reduces conventional forces in central 
Europe in an equitable manner. The 
U.S. delegation will give close scrutiny 
to proposals on the table as part of its 
ongoing search for mutually acceptable 
solutions to the difficult issues that 
underlie the talks. We hope for a similar 
approach from the Warsaw Pact. 

Ambassador Robert Blackwill, our 
representative to these negotiations, can 
count on my support and keen interest 
in reaching a meaningful agreement that 
will add to the security of both sides. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sep!. :'.(!, 1985. 



Current State of Play 

The current Western proposal in Vienna 
calls for a single, comprehensive treaty, 
to be preceded by prior agreement be- 
tween the two sides on the number of 
all ground combat and combat support 
forces in the area of reductions. The 
West is willing to set aside initially the 
issue of ground combat service support 
forces and air force personnel, where we 
believe much of the East- West data 
discrepancy may exist. The proposal, 
which was originally tabled in 1982 and 
modified in April of last year, also calls 
for staged reductions— i.e., beginning 
with U.S. and Soviet reductions, 
followed by those of the other MBFR 
participants— to eventual common ceil- 
ings of 700,000 ground forces and 
900,000 combined ground and air force 
personnel for each side in the reductions 
area. The Western proposal also con- 
tains a set of interrelated "associated 
measures," including provisions for on- 
site inspection, which are aimed at 
strengthening confidence and stability 
without unduly restricting normal 
peacetime activities. 

The current Eastern position is 
based on a proposal tabled by the War- 
saw Pact in February of this year. It 
calls for a limited, initial agreement 
focusing on U.S. and Soviet reductions 
only and a freeze on the forces of both 
alliances, deferring negotiations on fur- 
ther reductions. The proposal for Soviet 
reductions of 20,000 troops in return for 
U.S. reductions of 13,000 falls 10,000 
Soviet troops short of the NATO posi- 
tion on initial U.S. -Soviet reductions. 
Moreover, the provision for a general 
freeze would contractualize the existing 
conventional military imbalance and pro- 
vide a disincentive for the Warsaw Pact 
to negotiate seriously any further 
reductions. 

The latest Eastern position also 
demands reductions and a freeze on 
armaments, a move I believe clearly is 
aimed at derailing NATO conventional 
modernization efforts. The February 
Eastern proposal, however, makes no 
move to meet Western verification re- 
quirements and, indeed, arguably 
represents a hardening of the Eastern 
position. The East's proposed freeze, for 
example, would be without numbers and 
would be verified by a combination of 
NTM and "political goodwill." As for 
the data issue, the Fast proposes to 
"resolve" this problem simply by 
dismissing it entirely. 



ARMS CONTROL 



I should stress that our NATO allies 
attach great political and military impor- 
tance to MBFR. It is the one East-West 
arms control forum in which they are 
able to participate actively. As are our 
allies, the Reagan Administration is cur- 
rently concluding a review of the Vienna 
negotiations and how to conduct them in 
the months ahead. No conclusions have 
yet been reached, and we will be con- 
sulting and coordinating closely with our 
NATO friends. 

Conclusion 

In sum, the prospects for progress in 
the near term in the negotiations are 
not especially encouraging. Resolution of 
the two key issues— data and 
verification— does not seem to be on the 
immediate horizon. The factors of 
geography, conventional imbalance, and 
Soviet secrecy continue to complicate 
our efforts aimed at reaching an effec- 
tive and sound agreement. At the same 
time, however, alliance unity continues 
to hold strong, and the NATO countries 
remain committed to achieving an agree- 
ment which corresponds to Western 
security requirements and interests. As 
my friend Ambassador Kampelman [Max 
Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation 
on arms control negotiations] has in- 
dicated, the essence of arms control 
negotiations is that we must be 
prepared to sit at the table 1 day longer 
than the other side. 

Finally, I would like to say how 
delighted I am that members from this 
panel will be visiting the MBFR 
negotiations in Vienna later this month 
at the beginning of the next round. I 
look forward to continuing our discus- 
sion of the MBFR talks there. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Mr. McFarlane's Interview 

on "This Week With David Brinkley' 



Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to 

the President for National Security Af- 
fairs, teas interviewed on ABC-TV's 
-This Week With David Brinkley" on 
September 22, 1985, by David Brinkley 
and Sam Donaldson, ABC Neivs, and 
George F. Will, ABC News analyst. 

Q. Let us first deal with the question 
of the 'bargaining chip," if it exists, 
which apparently it does not. Mr. 
Reagan said he would make no 
concessions— and correct me if I'm 
misquoting— on the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), otherwise known as 
"Star Wars," even though the Rus- 
sians are insisting that that is the 
first step toward some kind of agree- 
ment. Where does that leave us? 

A. I think probably your show is 
unique in affording a chance to explain 
fundamentals, and you cast a question 
which is the central public policy issue 
of this generation, I think. 

For 25 years, we've relied on the 
notion that stability comes from offen- 
sive nuclear balance where each side can 
threaten the other. There is very clear 
evidence that that proposition will not 
be stable within this very decade 
because of the kind of offensive nuclear 
power the Soviets are going to deploy- 
weapons which we won't be able to find, 
or count, and, therefore, that we simply 
won't know what the balance, or im- 
balance, really is. In short, we're going 
to have a very unstable future if we 
rely on nuclear offensive weapons. 

So the President believes that we 
have to ask the question, "Isn't there 
an alternative?" and that might be non- 
nuclear defensive systems. And we 
really don't have any choice, for as long 
as the Russians go ahead with these 
kinds of systems, and we cannot, then 
we have to have some military means of 
compensating for their advantage. So 
you begin a research program, when 
you find something that looks promising 
you have to test it, and at that point the 
President has said he would stop, talk 
to the Soviet Union, and our allies, and 
try to find a way where this non-nuclear 
future could be established, and there is 
quite a lot to negotiate, quite a lot to 
talk about. But it would be irresponsible 
not to, at least, ask the question, which 
some future President will have to 



answer, of whether you can't get rid of 
these nuclear weapons. President 
Reagan thinks you can. 

Q. Then you're really saying to 
the Soviets in Geneva— and you know 
their position is that unless we take 
back our insistence on research, they 
won't move forward on an offensive 
weapons deal that they have to give. 
That's true, isn't it? 

A. Now I don't accept that. First of 
all, the notion that once they've stated a 
position, it will never change hasn't 
been really accurate. They've said they 
wouldn't negotiate if we deployed 
missiles to Europe but they're back at 
the table. They've said they wouldn't do 
a dozen things unless we did something 
else and that has changed. The point is 
that the Soviet Union has the most 
advanced SDI program on the face of 
the Earth, and for them to say what's 
theirs is theirs, what's ours is 
negotiable, is nonsense. 

Q. I didn't say they wouldn't give. 
I said your position is, to state it 
then, you have to give, and you've just 
pointed out in the past they have, and 
I take it you expect them to do so in 
the future. 

A. The President's position is that 
both of us can gain by the integration of 
non-nuclear defense into our forces and 
getting rid of nuclear weapons. That 
isn't giving; that's gaining. 

Q. Mr. Arbatov speaks for them, 
says flatly, they don't have any SDI 
program, that they fooled around with 
it for a while, decided it wouldn't 
work and dropped it. Is that simply a 
lie? 

A. Yes. 

Q. I take it though, if they don't 
give— and you've made it clear and the 
President made it clear we won't on 
this matter of SDI— that we have to 
look forward to months, if not years, 
of stalemate on the arms question, or 
what? 

A. No. I think that there is a very 
good prospect that there will be some 
kind of arms agreement in the next 
year's time. 



November 1985 



33 



ARMS CONTROL 



Q. What will it look like? 

A. You can't really define that yet, 
but I think there are certain fundamen- 
tals that both sides accept, that you can 
envision, and that is that the Soviets 
believe very strongly in strategic 
defense. They have an enormous invest- 
ment in it. So there's going to be some 
kind of strategic defense on both sides. 
The Soviet Union also, I think, has self- 
interests in defending against what we 
may see in the coming years third coun- 
tries, others, getting nuclear weapons 
and defending against those unpredic- 
table possibilities. And I think, too, that 
at least if you take their public 
statements at face value, they have said 
they want to reduce offensive systems. I 
think that what we're trying to define, 
and will define, is what mix of offense 
and defense serves the security in- 
terests of us all. 

Q. The Soviet Union has hinted at 
a willingness to cut offensive systems. 
Why doesn't the Administration steal 
the march on them and, instead of 
allowing them to make the running, 
saying we'll cut offensive if you'll cut 
defensive? Why don't you propose a 
30% cut in warheads or whatever cuts 
would achieve numerical equality of 
deliverable megatonnage, something of 
the sort? Why not get specific? 

A. We have, and that's perhaps 
been where we have failed publicly. But 
our position in Geneva for almost 2 
years has been, we want a one-third cut 
in offensive ballistic missile warheads. 
We want a cut as low as zero in 
intermediate-range systems. We want to 
ban completely chemical systems, and 
we want equality in conventional forces. 

Q. Now how is it the "great com- 
municator" isn't communicating this? 
I mean, clearly, the world believes 
that the Soviet Union is making the 
running in proposals. 

A. I think there is this impulse of 
Americans that if you try something and 
it isn't accepted by the other side, that 
we must be wrong, when in fact the 
other side just hasn't had anything to 
say at all. And you're right. We need to 
i In a better job in making clear that 
we're the ones who have been proposing 
reductions, getting rid of these things. 

Q. There's some belief in this 
town that as we draw near the sum- 
mit, there should be a sort of muting 
of our differences and a cooling of our 
complaints and rhetoric toward the 
Soviet Union. However, the President, 
in sort of extending compliance with 
SALT II about 4 months ago, said 



that by November 15th, he wanted a 
report from the Pentagon on Soviet 
noncompliance and appropriate and 
proportionate U.S. responses thereto. 
Can you tell us today that that report 
will be written and published on or by 
November 15th, before the summit? 

A. I think the report will be 
prepared. We haven't seen a draft yet, 
but I expect to within a couple of 
weeks. I would think that whether or 
not the President chooses to decide it, 
or to decide based upon what it says 
versus what the Soviet Union says to 
him in Geneva, is an open question. 

Q. Is there any particular reason 
why you would not release this report 
on Soviet noncompliance before the 
summit, other than to create some 
kind of false atmosphere of cordiality? 

A. I think doing something publicly 
to believe that you affect fundamentals 
is probably a misguided notion and that 
responsible government requires that 
you get your analysis, look at it, use it 
in making decisions, but whether or not 
it affects public opinion ought to be a 
secondary consideration. 

Q. So you're saying it's not clear 
that the report from the Pentagon will 
be published at all? 

A. That's an open question. There 
are many reports we never publish that 
are used to make decisions. 

Q. The other night at his press 
conference, President Reagan said 
that the United States was behind, 
that the Soviets had a three to one 
advantage in every weapons category. 
That does not appear to be right. Is 
it? 

A. The President's point was that in 
the central measures of strategic power 
and coercive potential, that is the hard 
target kill capability. There is, indeed, a 
Soviet three to one advantage of about 
6,000 warheads to our 2,000. 

Q. But that's not what he said. In 
this propaganda campaign, shouldn't 
we be right when we make a public 
statement before the world? 

A. In asserting that the Soviet 
Union has, where it counts, a substan- 
tial advantage, the President was abso- 
lutely right. That key measure of sta- 
bility during crises of the nuclear 
balance favors the Soviet Union without 
any question. 

Q. A senior White House official 
told a group of reporters the other day 
on background that if it came to 
having to violate the Antiballistic 



Missile (ABM) Treaty, in the national 
interest I suppose, to test an SDI 
system in space, that we'd have to do 
it, or words to that effect. Is that the 
policy of this Administration? 

A. The President has said that our 
program will be carried out in accord- 
ance with the ABM Treaty, and it will. 
The ABM Treaty was written in 1972 
and doesn't encompass what, indeed, 
can be done in the way of research or 
testing of many kinds of systems. An 
agreed statement "D," for example, 
says that systems based on other 
concepts— research, testing, even 
development of those— are not pro- 
scribed. But I don't assert that there 
isn't some margin in the distant future 
for both sides examining the ABM 
Treaty, if they both conclude that both 
of us can benefit from the— 

Q. Are you suggesting that the 
treaty be revised by mutual consent, 
or are you saying that at some point 
the United States may, in its national 
interest, have to violate the present 
provisions of that treaty? 

A. We don't foresee that, surely in 
the Reagan Administration, and the 
President has said SDI will be con- 
ducted in accordance with the treaty. 

Q. The President discussed, and 
you have discussed, the fact that the 
Russians have an enormous number of 
weapons, and you can balance one 
kind against another. But earlier— I 
think it was the other day— the 
Secretary of Defense and some of his 
people put on a press conference with 
all sorts of charts and graphs and so 
on, saying that most of the weapons 
the Russians have they stole from 
us— at least the technology, they stole 
from us. Presumably, this continues. 
Are we going on forever subsidizing 
their weapons programs and giving 
them the technology, saving them the 
work, which they can't do anyway, 
and saving them the money? 

A. We don't want to. This Adminis- 
tration, the first in a long time, has 
tried, not only in our own business com- 
munity but with allies, to set some con- 
crete thresholds of technology that 
would give you a handle on what ought 
to be sold, and what shouldn't. But 
there is no doubt that a lot of U.S. 
technology openly available, some 
stolen, has wound up costing the 
American people more money to defend 
against it later. That's foolish, and we're 
not going to do that. 



nonartment nf Statp Rnllptin 



ARMS CONTROL 



Q. Assistant Secretary [of Defense] 
Richard Perle said we could send 
home 700 Russians and still have the 
same number of Russians here that we 
have Americans there. Why don't we 
do that? They're all spying, he says. 

A. I think at the heart of President 
Reagan's policy for dealing with the 
Soviet Union is realism, reciprocity, and 
that goes to the point of your question. 
Reciprocity implies that there ought to 
be a balance between their presence 
here and ours there. So yes, as a 
general proposition, the President 
supports that. Our own cabinet officers, 
in intelligence as well as defense, point 
out that there are some down sides to 
what happens on our side of the ledger 
if we get into that, but nobody opposes 
the principle of reciprocity. 

Q. What's the matter with the 
idea that the people, all of them, who 
work in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow 
ought to be Americans so there would 
be fewer Soviet spies indoors? 

A. I think we're examining that 
practice that has led us to employ a 
number of Soviet citizens as mechanics 
or as people in supporting services in 
our Embassy. The Department of State 
has looked at that for about a year and 
is going to make some changes there, I 
think. 

Q. What changes? What changes 
will they make? 

A. We haven't gotten to that yet, 
but there'll be some changes. 

Q. On the question of human 
rights, the pattern when Americans 
negotiate with the Soviet Union is the 
Americans raise the subject of human 
rights and the Soviet negotiator yawns 
elaborately and looks bored and 
doodles and says, "Can we not go on 
and get rid of this subject?" Can we 
go on allowing them, on the 10th 
anniversary of the Helsinki agree- 
ment, to violate every particular of 
that agreement, and will it be 
forcefully raised in the case of 
Shcharanskiy and Sakharov and the 
rest, raised by the President per- 
sonally with Gorbachev? If not, why 
not? 

A. It will be raised. It is a matter, 
as you say, of international legal com- 
mitment on the part of the Soviet Union 
which they have violated, and even if it 
weren't a legal matter, as a moral 
proposition it will remain high, in fact, 
the leading issue on our agenda, yes. ■ 



Third Review Conference Held 
for Nonproliferation Treaty 



The third review conference of the 
parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) was held in Geneva 
August 21 'September 21, 1985. 

Following are the statement by Ken- 
neth L. Adelman, head of the U.S. 
delegation and Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency 
(AC DA), of August 28 and the text of 
the final document. 



AMBASSADOR ADELMAN, 
AUG. 28, 1985 

Forty years ago, the world witnessed 
the birth of a new kind of weapon of un- 
precedented and until-then unimaginable 
destructiveness. Since then all nations 
and all peoples of the world have had to 
face the promise and the peril of the 
atom. 

Over the next 4 weeks, the 
distinguished delegates gathered here 
have the solemn responsibility to discuss 
the most important subject of our era— 
the nuclear challenge. Together we will 
evaluate the contribution to meeting 
that challenge made by the Treaty on 
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. President Reagan has set 
forth my country's thoughts on the 
tasks ahead, which I would like to share 
with you. 

It gives me great pleasure to address this 
message to the delegates to the third Non- 
proliferation Treaty review conference— an 
event that also commemorates the 15th an- 
niversary of that treaty. The Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty is a historic accomplishment. It is 
a critical cornerstone in our common effort to 
prevent the further spread of nuclear 
weapons, while providing an essential 
framework for parties to reap the benefits of 
the peaceful atom. By reducing the dangers 
of the spread of nuclear weapons and the 
risks of nuclear war, it contributes to the 
security and safety of all nations and all 
peoples. 

My central arms control objective has 
been to reduce substantially and ultimately to 
eliminate nuclear weapons and rid the world 
of the nuclear threat. Toward that end, the 
United States has proposed in Geneva radical 
reductions in the number of existing nuclear 
weapons. This, I believe, is the most direct 
and best course to pursue if we are to 
eliminate the danger of nuclear war. 

At the same time, I believe that 
verifiable limitations on nuclear testing can 
play a useful, although more modest, role. 



For this reason, on July 29, I reiterated my 
desire to get a process going which will 
enable the United States and the Soviet 
Union to establish the basis for effectively 
verifying limits on underground testing. We 
have invited the Soviet Union to send 
' observers, with any instrumentation devices 
they wish to bring, to measure a nuclear test 
at our site. This invitation has no conditions. 

Yet another critical objective of the 
United States is to build a stable, more 
cooperative relationship with the Soviet 
Union. Of the shared interests between our 
two countries, avoiding war and reducing the 
level of arms are among the greatest. As I 
have said before, cooperation begins with 
communication, and I look forward to 
meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev 
this November. 

All parties to the NPT now share the 
responsibility of taking stock, of looking in a 
fair and balanced way at how well the 
treaty's vital goals are being met, and of con- 
sidering how we might do even better. 

As the operation of this important treaty 
is reviewed, the conference should also 
celebrate the fact that it is a tremendous suc- 
cess. The United States remains firmly com- 
mitted to the objectives embodied in this 
treaty and to its vision of a more stable and 
secure world for all nations. 

As President Reagan says, it is in- 
cumbent upon us once again to take 
stock of the NPT. This task is especially 
useful now, as we are more than half- 
way between its entry-into-force and 
1995 when the subject of extending the 
treaty must be addressed. 

Surely there is a diversity of views 
on how to meet the nuclear challenge, 
which will be reflected in this hall over 
the coming month. Indeed, there should 
be. 

As free people, we Americans 
understand and accept the importance of 
a diversity of views. This conference's 
concrete outcome— whether there is a 
final declaration or what type it may 
be— is far less important than our 
holding an honest and balanced 
review— with, as I say, its panoply of 
opinion. There is no question in my 
mind that such a review will reveal that 
we all share a great stake in the Non- 
proliferation Treaty and that it serves 
the security interests of all countries. 

Why? Because it has made our 
world safer. No treaty can be asked to 
do more. As one of our Founding 
Fathers, John Jay, stated in the 
Federalist Papers, "Among the many 
objects to which a wise and free people 



Nnvemher 198S 



35 



ARMS CONTROL 



find it necessary to direct their atten- 
tion, that of providing for their safety 
seems to be the first." 

The treaty was designed to serve 
three purposes: 

• To stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons; 

• To help member nations acquire 
peaceful nuclear capabilities; and 

• Lead to further progress in com- 
prehensive arms control and disarma- 
ment measures. 

How has it done with these three 
goals? 

Stopping the Spread 
of Nuclear Weapons 

Best, surely, on the first goal, the cen- 
tral element of the treaty which benefits 
all nations. In the late 1950s and early 
1960s, it was feared that there could be 
no stopping the spread of nuclear 
weapons. A special committee of the 
U.S. National Planning Association, for 
example, predicted in 1958 that "by 
1970, most nations with appreciable 
military strength will have in their 
arsenals nuclear weapons— strategic, tac- 
tical, or both." Similar concerns partly 
led to a 1961 UN General Assembly 
resolution, sponsored by Ireland, which 
called attention to the dangers of pro- 
liferation and the need to stop it. Presi- 
dent John F. Kennedy, just 2 years 
later, warned of a world which, by 1975, 
would have 15-20 nations with nuclear 
weapons. 

Such a fearful expectation could 
have resulted in diplomatic fatalism and 
political stagnation. But it did not. 
World leaders were wise enough to take 
positive actions to head off the looming 
danger. The result was the Non- 
proliferation Treaty. And since its entry 
into force in 1970, the treaty has truly 
played a crucial role in stopping the 
bomb's spread. Who then would have 
believed that in the ensuing 15 years, 
only one additional country— India- 
would detonate a nuclear explosive 
device? Very few persons, but it turned 
out so. 

As a result, today all of us are more 
secure. In part, this is due to the 
treaty's wide adherence, the readiness 
of more than 125 countries to renounce 
the acquisition of nuclear explosives and 
to accept International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their 
peaceful nuclear activities. These moves 
have helped check both the domestic 
pressures and international concerns 
that can, and otherwise might have, 



triggered pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
The treaty's nonproliferation and 
safeguards provisions have likewise 
served as a foundation for sound nuclear 
supply policies. 

Even more important, with its con- 
tinually growing membership— 16 more 
countries have joined since the last 
review conference— the treaty reflects 
an increasingly universal norm of non- 
proliferation. A world of many nuclear 
powers is avoidable and must be 
avoided. For a state to embark on the 
path to these weapons would be met 
with international concern, not ac- 
quiescence. To acquire them would be 
met with international condemnation, 
not praise. These norms, valued at the 
time of the NPT's creation, have been 
reinforced every year since. 

All countries have an interest in 
preventing the further spread of nuclear 
weapons. We in the United States know 
that a world of many nuclear powers 
would threaten our security and that of 
our allies. But the spread of nuclear 
weapons would equally— if not even 
more so— threaten the neighbors of a 
new weapons state and would sooner or 
later undermine the security of the new 
owners themselves. Indeed, long- 
standing suspicions and tensions would 
be heightened; the risk of conflict 
increased. The result would be less 
security for each of us and consequently 
for all of us. 

This simple fact, as I have said, is 
widely recognized. It underlies the 
cooperation among us to maintain and 
strengthen the NPT and other defenses 
against the bomb's spread. It is 
reflected in the efforts of many of us— 
East and West, aligned and 
nonaligned— to convince more countries 
to join the treaty. Indeed, it is 
demonstrated by each of our country's 
adherence to this treaty, making it the 
most widely accepted arms control 
treaty ever. 

But pledges of commitment to the 
treaty are not enough. We need to 
match our words with actions. The 
United States has done so, as 
documented in the information we have 
provided to the preparatory committee. 

First, since the 1980 review, we have 
tightened further our export procedures 
to make it even less likely that any U.S. 
exports would contribute to the risk of 
further proliferation. We have also 
worked with other NPT suppliers to 
upgrade the so-called trigger lists, 
created to help parties meet their 
obligations under Article III. 



Second, we have urged all nuclear 
suppliers to agree to require comprehen- 
sive, or full-scope, safeguards on all of a 
non-nuclear-weapons state's peaceful 
nuclear activities as a condition for 
significant new supply commitments. 
Parties to the NPT already accept such 
comprehensive or full-scope safeguards 
on their peaceful activities; to require 
acceptance by nonparties as condition of 
supply would equalize the treatment of 
the two. Further, the job of the IAEA 
would be made easier and greater 
assurance provided of a country's 
peaceful intentions in the nuclear field. 
We continue to believe that all suppliers 
should adopt this approach. 

Third, also since the last review con- 
ference, the safeguards agreement that 
permits routine inspections of U.S. 
peaceful nuclear facilities has been im- 
plemented. The IAEA now has the right 
to apply safeguards at more than 230 of 
our private and government-owned 
nuclear facilities. We welcome inspec- 
tions at those facilities selected by the 
IAEA as a means to demonstrate U.S. 
support for effective safeguards, and 
will continue to do so. We urge others 
to do likewise. We are pleased by the 
recent conclusion of a Soviet voluntary 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, 
and we hope that the Soviets will make 
additional types and numbers of 
facilities eligible for safeguards. We 
hope that China, too, will accept IAEA 
safeguards on some of its nuclear 
facilities. 

Fourth, the United States in 1981 
ratified Protocol I of the treaty of 
Tlatelolco which creates a nuclear- 
weapons free zone in Latin America. By 
this act, we have pledged not to store 
or deploy nuclear weapons in U.S. ter- 
ritories in the zone. We had earlier 
ratified Protocol II of this treaty, 
thereby committing the United States 
not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against parties to the 
Tlatelolco treaty. A few weeks ago, 
another regional initiative was 
announced: a draft nuclear-free zone for 
the South Pacific. We are ready to 
study this new draft treaty with in- 
terest and an open mind. 

So the NPT has been a great 
success in meeting the first goal of 
halting the spread of nuclear weapons. 
And in the words of one of Parkinson's 
famous laws, the success of a policy can 
be measured by the catastrophes that 
do not happen. The proliferation so 
widely expected in past decades— that 
catastrophe— just has not happened. 



36 



r\Qi-»'irtn-»£ir»t r\f Ci^t^i Pi illi^tii 



ARMS CONTROL 



'eaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 

iVhat about the second goal of the 
xeaty— to foster the peaceful uses of 
mclear energy? Here the picture is 
;ery good. 

From the early days of the Atoms 
'or Peace program, the United States 
has helped other countries gain the 
peaceful benefits of nuclear energy— to 
meet their needs in power, in medicine 
and health care, in science, in industry, 
and in agriculture. We believed then, as 
we believe now, that all NPT countries, 
especially developing countries, have a 
legitimate right to pursue these peaceful 
uses, and that NPT parties should 
receive special benefits. 

During the lifetime of the treaty, 
peaceful nuclear cooperation among 
NPT parties has steadily expanded. The 
nonproliferation commitments of the 
parties to the treaty have provided con- 
fidence that peaceful nuclear assistance 
and exports would not be misused to 
produce nuclear explosives. This con- 
fidence has made it possible for nuclear 
supply to take place. 

The historical record bears out a 
growth in assistance to parties. During 
the past 15 years, tens of thousands of 
students from developing countries were 
trained in nuclear and related sciences, 
and that number continues steadily 
growing. Nearly 20 developing member 
states now have research reactors. And 
since 1980, the IAEA has provided near- 
ly $150 million in technical assistance, 
more than doubling the funding of the 
preceding decade, the great bulk going 
to NPT parties. 

Partly as a result, the Republic of 
Korea now generates a significant part 
of its electricity from nuclear energy. 
Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt are 
moving to build nuclear power plants. 
Still others may follow in the years 
ahead. 

Here too, the United States has 
greatly helped, as a few examples of our 
activities since 1980 clearly show: 

• Virtually all U.S. nuclear export 
financing— totaling more than $1 
billion— has been given to NPT parties. 

• Special training arrangements 
have been set up to foster technology 
transfer only with parties to the NPT or 
the treaty of Tlatelolco. 

• We have granted hundreds of 
fellowships for technical training under 
the IAEA nearly exclusively to NPT 
parties. 

• All U.S. extra budgetary funding 
of technical assistance projects not fund- 
ed by the IAEA has gone to NPT 
parties. 



• We have modified our regulations 
to make it easier to license exports to 
NPT parties. 

• We have pledged nearly $22 
million to the IAEA's technical 
assistance program. 

In essence, on this second goal of 
the NPT, we have taken many concrete 
measures and devoted considerable 
resources to promote peaceful nuclear 
programs of real utility to developing 
countries. As always, still more can be 
done. We will continue to work with 
others to help ensure that all of us 
together take full advantage of the 
atom's peaceful promise. 

Halting the Arms Race 

The third— but by no means last— goal of 
the Nonproliferation Treaty is expressed 
by Article VTs call for "negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating 
to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race. . . ." The United States has under- 
taken a vast panoply of arms control 
negotiations to this very end. We have 
met, and will continue to meet, our 
obligations under Article VI. 
Nonetheless we fully share the sen- 
timents felt throughout this room and 
sure to be voiced in this hall that the 
results of those negotiations have been 
disappointing. 

This goal of substantial arms control 
exists quite independently of the NPT, 
although it is clearly reinforced by it. 
No other nation, or even set of nations, 
has more motivation for real steps to 
stop and reverse nuclear competition 
than we do. No other nation or set of 
nations has a greater desire for progress 
under Article VI. 

I would go even further: No nation 
or set of nations desires progress in 
arms control more than the United 
States of America. Preventing nuclear 
war and moving toward the goal of 
eliminating nuclear weapons are Presi- 
dent Reagan's top priorities. As he has 
said so often, nuclear war can never be 
won and must never be fought. 

Many of you will point out over the 
coming month how slender has been 
progress toward the goal of eliminating 
nuclear weapons since the treaty 
entered into force. We can only agree 
with the thrust of that sentiment, 
though perhaps not with the 
explanations. 

Still we should not ignore the fact 
that some progress has been made. The 
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty set 
limits on the deployment of missile 



defenses; the SALT Treaties limited, 
but unfortunately did not reduce, the 
growth of strategic offensive forces. 

No one can deny that there simply 
are too many nuclear weapons in the 
world today. No one can deny that we 
need to get on with the most urgent 
task of reducing and eventually 
eliminating those weapons. No one can 
deny that what is needed now are 
options not words. 

The United States is totally commit- 
ted to the task. We are not only 
negotiating intensely and flexibly, but 
we have acted on our own and with our 
allies to reduce nuclear weapons. Since 
the NPT was negotiated in the 1960s, 
the United States has unilaterally 
reduced its total nuclear arsenal by one- 
fourth. Since the NPT was negotiated, 
we have, again on our own, reduced the 
total destructive power in our nuclear 
arsenal by well over one half. And since 
the last review conference, the United 
States, along with its NATO allies, 
withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from 
Europe and subsequently decided in 
1983 to pull out another* 1,400. 

Since the last review conference, 
and again here today, the United States 
has proposed that the Soviet Union send 
observers, with any instrumentation 
devices they wish to bring, to measure 
one of our nuclear tests. If the Soviets 
agree, which we hope, this can begin a 
process to help effectively verify limits 
on underground nuclear testing. 

For our part, we remain committed 
to a complete ban on nuclear testing as 
a long term goal. But we do not agree it 
should be the next step in our efforts to 
reduce the nuclear threat. A nuclear 
test ban would not reduce the number 
of nuclear weapons. And our most 
urgent task must be deep reductions of 
those existing nuclear arsenals. 

For that reason, since the last 
review conference, the United States 
has tabled first in the strategic arms 
reduction talks (START) and the 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
talks, and now in the Geneva nuclear 
and space talks, far-reaching proposals 
to reduce radically the number of 
strategic ballistic missiles, their 
warheads, and their destructive poten- 
tial. It is these systems that pose the 
gravest threat today. Other U.S. pro- 
posals would eliminate a whole category 
of nuclear weapons— so-called 
intermediate-range nuclear forces. Our 
goal is action on arms control: 
negotiating concrete agreements which 
are effective, verifiable, and equal in 
treatment of both sides. 



November 1985 



37 



ARMS CONTROL 



In just a few weeks, in this city, the 
next round of the nuclear and space 
talks will resume. We know that the 
stakes are high. We remain convinced 
that agreements can be reached which 
would strengthen stability and serve all 
countries' security. We stand ready to 
make the commitments necessary to 
produce such agreements. 

Conclusion 

So now, 15 years after the treaty's en- 
try into force, what is the record of 
achievement in pursuit of its three 
goals? A high score is warranted on the 
first goal of halting the spread of 
nuclear weapons; a clearly positive 
rating on advancing the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy; but despite on-going 
negotiations, less progress than wanted 
in reaching sound arms control accords. 
What is the overall assessment? On 



Background on the NPT 



The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was concluded 
on July 1, 1968, and entered into force 
on March 5, 1970. » With 130 states now 
party to the treaty (including the 
nuclear-weapons states of the U.S., 
U.K., and U.S.S.R.), it is the most 
widely subscribed arms control agree- 
ment in history. 

The NPT continues to be a corner- 
stone of international efforts to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons. This has 
been a fundamental national security 
and political objective of the United 
States for the past 40 years. At the 
same time, the treaty establishes a 
framework within which nations can 
cooperate to obtain the benefits of the 
peaceful atom under strict controls to 
prevent its misuse for nuclear explosive 
purposes. Finally, the NPT calls upon 
all states, particularly the nuclear 
weapons states, to pursue good faith 
negotiations to end the nuclear arms 

race. 

Three conferences have been held to 
review the implementation of the terms 
of the treaty: May 5-30, 1975; 
August 11-September 7, 1980, and 
August 27-September 21, 1985. 



1968. 



'For text, see Hi Mi -tin of July 1, 



balance, has the NPT successfully 
served the interests of its parties? 

Before reaching that final evaluation, 
let us look back again over the four 
decades since the dawn of the atomic 
age. Since then nuclear weapons, 
thankfully, have not been considered 
just megapowerful conventional arms. 
They have not been used in over four 
decades. 

At the same time, the four decades 
of nuclear peace have seen four decades 
of countless smaller wars, costing hun- 
dreds of thousands of lives. The list of 
countries— nuclear and non-nuclear- 
involved in such conflicts would run 
many pages. Just think for a moment of 
the consequences to all of our citizens 
and to the world if nuclear weapons had 
been used in any of these conflicts. 

Herein lies the ultimate overall 
evaluation of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty. It has served very well as a 
cornerstone of the success that we have 
enjoyed thus far in preventing that 
further spread of nuclear weapons. It 
equally has provided and continues to 
provide a moral and political imperative 
for the existing nuclear-weapons states 
to negotiate additional measures to 
reduce and eventually eliminate the 
threat of nuclear war. Both aspects 
serve the security of each and every 
country represented in this hall and are 
in the interest of those nonmembers as 
well. Nor should we forget the treaty's 
contribution to making available the 
benefits of the peaceful atom. 

Therefore, in the view of the United 
States, and taken as a whole, the NPT 
has been very successful. Without it, the 
world would quite simply be a much 
more dangerous place. This is an essen- 
tial point that we all must never lose 
sight of even if we are disappointed 
with progress in one particular area or 
another. 

Over the coming weeks here, let us 
recognize the successes of the treaty 
while we acknowledge where greater 
progress still is needed. The United 
States will present its views frankly and 
will listen to your views intently. 

Most importantly, let us rededicate 
ourselves to the treaty's principles and 
goals. They were sound when the treaty 
was born. They remain sound today. We 
will stand with you in this rededication. 
We will stand with you too in making 
our actions implement those principles 
in the future. And we will stand with 
you in building on the treaty's suc- 
cesses. This, the world expects of us. 
We can afford to do no less. 



FINAL DECLARATION, 
SEPT. 21, 1985 

The States Party to the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which met 
in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 
1985 to review the operation of the Treaty, 
solemnly declare: 

• Their conviction that the Treaty is 
essential to international peace and security, 

• Their continued support for the objec- 
tives of the Treaty which are: 

• the prevention of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices; 

• the cessation of the nuclear arms 
race, nuclear disarmament and a treaty or 
general and complete disarmament; 

• the promotion of co-operation be- 
tween States Parties in the field of the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy; 

• The reaffirmation of their firm commit- 
ment to the purposes of the preamble and 
the provisions of the Treaty, 

• Their determination to enhance the im- 
plementation of the Treaty and to further 
strengthen its authority. 



REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE 
TREATY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Articles I and II and Preambular 
Paragraphs 1-3 

1. The Conference noted the concerns and 
convictions expressed in preambular 
paragraphs 1 to 3 and agreed that they re 
main valid. The States Party to the Treaty 
remain resolved in their belief in the need to 
avoid the devastation that a nuclear war 
would bring. The Conference remains con- 
vinced that any proliferation of nuclear 
weapons would seriously increase the danger 
of a nuclear war. 

2. The Conference agreed that the strict 
observance of the terms of Articles I and II 
remains central to achieving the shared ob- 
jectives of preventing, under any cir- 
cumstances, the further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's 
vital contribution to peace and security, 
including to the peace and security of 
non-Parties. 

3. The Conference acknowledged the 
declarations by nuclear-weapons States Party 
to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their 
obligations under Article I. The Conference 
further acknowledged the declarations that 
non-nuclear-weapons States Party to the 
Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under 
Article II. The Conference was of the view, 
therefore, that one of the primary objectives 
of the Treaty had been achieved in the period 
under review. 

4. The Conference also expressed deep 
concern that the national nuclear pro- 
grammes of some States non-Party to the 
Treaty may lead them to obtain a nuclear 



38 



ARMS CONTROL 



weapon capability. States Party to the Treaty 
feted that any further detonation of a 
uclear explosive device by any non-nuclear- 

Kreapon State would constitute a most serious 
reach of the non-proliferation objective. 

5. The Conference noted the great and 
erious concerns expressed about the nuclear 
apability of South Africa and Israel. The 
inference further noted the calls on all 
itates for the total and complete prohibition 
f the transfer of all nuclear facilities, 
esources or devices to South Africa and 
srael and to stop all exploitation of Nami- 
ian uranium, natural or enriched, until the 
ttainment of Namibian independence. 



Article III and Preambular Paragraphs 4 
nd 5 

. The Conference affirms its determination 
o strengthen further the barriers against the 
iroliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
mclear explosive devices to additional States, 
'he spread of nuclear explosive capabilities 
vould add immeasurably to regional and in- 
ernational tensions and suspicions. It would 
ncrease the risks of nuclear war and lessen 
he security of all States. The Parties remain 
onvinced that universal adherence to the 
■<Ion-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to 
trengthen the barriers against proliferation 
ind they urge all States not Party to the 
reaty to acceed to it. The Treaty and the 
egime of non-proliferation it supports play a 
■entral role in promoting regional and inter- 
lational peace and security, inter alia, by 
lelping to prevent the spread of nuclear ex- 
olosives. The non-proliferation and safeguards 
commitments in the Treaty are essential also 
or peaceful nuclear commerce and 
.■o-operation. 

2. The Conference expresses the convic- 
tion that IAEA safeguards provide assurance 
;hat States are complying with their under- 
.akings and assist States in demonstrating 
;his compliance. They thereby promote 
iirther confidence among States and, being a 
nindamental element of the Treaty, help to 
strengthen their collective security. IAEA 
safeguards play a key role in preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
nuclear explosive devices. Unsafeguarded 
nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon 
States pose serious proliferation dangers. 

3. The Conference declares that the com- 
mitment to non-proliferation by nuclear- 
weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant 
to Article I, by non-nuclear- weapon States 
Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article II 
and by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards 
on all peaceful nuclear activities within non- 
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty 
pursuant to Article III is a major contribu- 
tion by those States to regional and interna- 
tional security. The Conference notes with 
satisfaction that the commitments in Articles 
I— III have been met and have greatly helped 
prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. 

4. The Conference, therefore, specifically 
urges all non-nuclear-weapon States not 
Party to the Treaty to make an international 
legally binding commitment not to acquire 



nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all 
their peaceful nuclear activities, both current 
and future, to verily that commitment. The 
Conference further urges all States in their 
international nuclear co-operation and in their 
nuclear export policies and, specifically as a 
necessary basis for the transfer of relevant 
nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon 
States, to take effective steps towards 
achieving such a commitment to non- 
proliferation and acceptance of such 
safeguards by those States. The Conference 
expresses its view that accession to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty is the best way to 
achieve that objective. 

5. The Conference expresses its satisfac- 
tion that four of the five nuclear-weapon 
States have voluntarily concluded safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA, covering all or 
part of their peaceful nuclear activities. The 
Conference regards those agreements as fur- 
ther strengthening the non-proliferation 
regime and increasing the authority of IAEA 
and the effectiveness of its safeguards 
system. The Conference calls on the nuclear- 
weapon States to continue to co-operate fully 
with the IAEA in the implementation of 
these agreements and calls on IAEA to take 
full advantage of this co-operation. The Con- 
ference urges the People's Republic of China 
similarly to conclude a safeguards agreement 
with IAEA. The Conference recommends the 
continued pursuit of the principle of universal 
application of IAEA safeguards to all 
peaceful nuclear activities in all States. To 
this end, the Conference recognizes the value 
of voluntary offers and recommends further 
evaluation of the economic and practical 
possibility of extending application of 
safeguards to additional civil facilities in the 
nuclear-weapon States as and when IAEA 
resources permit and consideration of separa- 
tion of the civil and military facilities in the 
nuclear-weapon States. Such an extending of 
safeguards will enable the further develop- 
ment and application of an effective regime in 
both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear- 
weapon States. 

6. The Conference also affirms the great 
value to the non-proliferation regime of com- 
mitments by the nuclear-weapon States that 
nuclear supplies provided for peaceful use 
will not be used for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive purposes. Safeguards in 
nuclear-weapon States pursuant to their 
safeguards agreements with IAEA can verify 
observance of those commitments. 

7. The Conference notes with satisfaction 
the adherence of further Parties to the 
Treaty and the conclusion of further 
safeguards agreements in compliance with 
the undertaking of the Treaty and recom- 
mends that: 

(a) The non-nuclear-weapon States Party 
to the Treaty that have not concluded the 
agreements required under Article 111(4) con- 
clude such agreements with IAEA as soon as 
possible; 



(b) The Director-General of IAEA 
intensify his initiative of submitting to States 
concerned draft agreements to facilitate the 
conclusion of corresponding safeguards 
agreements, and that Parties to the Treaty. 
in particular Depositary Parties, should ac- 
tively support these initiatives; 

(c) All States Party to the Treaty make 
strenuous individual and collective efforts to 
make the Treaty truly universal. 

8. The Conference notes with satisfaction 
that IAEA, in carrying out its safeguards ac- 
tivities, has not detected any diversion of a 
significant amount of safeguarded material to 
the production of nuclear weapons, other 
nuclear explosive devices or to purposes 
unknown. 

9. The Conference notes that IAEA 
safeguards activities have not hampered the 
economic, scientific or technological develop- 
ment of the Parties to the Treaty, or interna- 
tional co-operation in peaceful nuclear ac- 
tivities and it urges that this situation be 
maintained. 

10. The Conference commends IAEA on 
its implementation of safeguards pursuant to 
this Treaty and urges it to continue to ensure 
the maximum technical and cost effectiveness 
and efficiency of its operations, while main- 
taining consistency with the economic and 
safe conduct of nuclear activities. 

11. The Conference notes with satisfac- 
tion the improvement of IAEA safeguards 
which has enabled it to continue to apply 
safeguards effectively during a period of 
rapid growth in the number of safeguarded 
facilities. It also notes that IAEA safeguards 
approaches are capable of adequately dealing 
with facilities under safeguards. In this 
regard, the recent conclusion of the project 
to design a safeguards regime for centrifuse 
enrichment plants and its implementation is 
welcomed. This project allows the application 
of an effective regime to all plants of this 
type in the territories both of nuclear-weapon 
States and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties 
to the Treaty. 

12. The Conference emphasizes the im- 
portance of continued improvements in the 
effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA 
safeguards, for example, but not limited to: 

(a) Uniform and non-discriminatory im- 
plementation of safeguards; 

(b) The expeditious implementation of 
new instruments and techniques; 

(c) The further development of methods 
for evaluation of safeguards effectiveness in 
combination with safeguards information; 

(d) Continued increases in the efficiency 
of the use of human and financial resources 
and of equipment. 

13. The Conference believes that further 
improvement of the list of materials and 
equipment which, in accordance with Article 
111(2) of the Treaty, calls for the application 
of IAEA safeguards should take account of 
advances in technology. 

14. The Conference recommends that 
IAEA establish an internationally agreed ef- 
fective system of international plutonium 
storage in accordance with Article XII(A)5 of 
its statute. 



November 1985 



39 



ARMS CONTROL 



15. The Conference welcomes the signifi- 
cant contributions made by States Parties in 
facilitating the application of IAEA 
safeguards and in supporting research, 
development and other supports to further 
the application of effective and efficient 
safeguards. The Conference urges that such 
co-operation and support be continued and 
that other States Parties provide similar 
support. 

16. The Conference calls upon all States 
t.i take the IAEA safeguards requirements 
fully into account while planning, designing 
and constructing new nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities and while modifying existing nuclear 
fuel cycle facilities. 

17. The Conference also calls on States 
Parties to the Treaty to assist IAEA in ap- 
plying its safeguards, inter alia, through the 
efficient operation of States systems of ac- 
counting for and control of nuclear material, 
and including compliance with all notification 
requirements in accordance with safeguards 
agreements. 

18. The Conference welcomes the Agen- 
cy's endeavors to recruit and train staff of 
the highest professional standards for 
safeguards implementation with due regard 
to the widest possible geographical distribu- 
tion, in accordance with Article VII(D) of the 
IAEA statute. It calls upon States to exer- 
cise their right regarding proposals of 
designation of IAEA inspectors in such a 
way as to facilitate the most effective use of 
safeguards manpower. 

19. The Conference also commends to all 
States Parties the merits of establishment of 
international fuel cycle facilities, including 
multination participation, as a positive con- 
tribution to reassurance of the peaceful use 
and non-diversion of nuclear materials. While 
primarily a national responsibility, the Con- 
ference sees advantages in international co- 
operation concerning spent fuel storage and 
nuclear waste storage. 

20. The Conference calls upon States 
Parties to continue their political, technical 
and financial support of the IAEA safeguards 
system. 

21. The Conference underlines the need 
for IAEA to be provided with the necessary 
financial and human resources to ensure that 
the Agency is able to continue to meet effec- 
tively its safeguards responsibilities. 

22. Tin- Conference urges all States that 
have not done so to adhere to the Convention 
on the- Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material at the earliest possible date. 

Article IV and Preambular Paragraphs 6 

and 7 

1. The erence affirms that the NPT 

fosters the world wide peaceful use of nuclear 
energy and reaffirms that nothing in the 

Treaty shall i" interpreted as affecting the 

inalienable right of any Party to the Treaty 

o di elop n < arch, producl ion and use of 

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without 
discrimination and in conformity with Art i 

cles I and II. 



2. The Conference reaffirms the under- 
taking by all Parties to the Treaty, in accord- 
ance with Article IV and preambular para- 
graphs 6 and 7, to facilitate the fullest possi- 
ble exchange of equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information for 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the 
right of all Parties to the Treaty to partici- 
pate in such exchange. In this context, the 
Conference recognizes the importance of 
services. This can contribute to progress in 
general and to the elimination of techno- 
logical and economic gaps between the 
developed and developing countries. 

3. The Conference reaffirms the under- 
taking of the Parties to the Treaty in a posi- 
tion to do so to co-operate in contributing, 
alone or together with other States or inter- 
national organizations, to the further develop- 
ment of the applications of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, especially in the terri- 
tories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party 
to the Treaty, with due consideration for the 
needs of the developing areas of the world. 
In this context the Conference recognizes the 
particular needs of the least developed 
countries. 

4. The Conference requests that States 
Parties consider possible bilateral cooperation 
measures to further improve the implementa- 
tion of Article IV. To this end, States Parties 
are requested to give in written form their 
experiences in this area in the form of na- 
tional contributions to be presented in a 
report to the next Review Conference. 

5. The Conference recognizes the need 
for more predictable long-term supply 
assurances with effective assurance of 
non-proliferation. 

6. The Conference commends the recent 
progress which the IAEA's Committee on 
Assurances of Supply (CAS) has made 
towards agreeing to a set of principles 
related to this matter, and expresses the 
hope that the Committee will complete this 
work soon. The Conference further notes 
with satisfaction the measures which CAS 
has recommended to the IAEA Board of 
Governors for alleviating technical and ad- 
ministrative problems in international 
shipments of nuclear items, emergency and 
back-up mechanisms and mechanisms for the 
revision of international nuclear co-operation 
agreements and calls for the early completion 
of the work of CAS and the implementation 
of its recommendations. 

7. The Conference reaffirms that in 
accordance with international law and ap- 
plicable treaty obligations, States should 
fulfill their obligations under agreements in 
the nuclear field, and any modification of 
such agreements, if required, should be made 
only by mutual consent of the Parties 
concerned. 

8. The Conference confirms that each 
country's choices and decisions in the field of 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be 
respected without jeopardizing their respec- 
tive fuel cycle policies. International co- 
operation in this area, including international 
transfer and subsequent operations, should 
be governed by effective assurances of non- 
proliferat and predictable long term supply 



assurances. The issuance of related licenses 
and authorization involved should take place 
in a timely fashion. 

9. While recognizing that the operation 
and management of the back-end of the fuel 
cycle, including nuclear waste storage, are 
primarily a national responsibility, the Con- 
ference acknowledges the importance for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy of interna- 
tional and multilateral collaboration for 
arrangements in this area. 

10. The Conference expresses its pro- 
found concern about the Israeli attack on 
Iraq's safeguarded nuclear reactor on 7 June 
1981. The Conference recalls Security Council 
Resolution 487 of 1981, strongly condemning 
the military attack by Israel which was 
unanimously adopted by the Council and 
which considered that the said attack con- 
stituted a serious threat to the entire IAEA 
safeguards regime which is the foundation of 
the Non-proliferation Treaty. The Conference 
also takes note of the decisions and resolu- 
tions adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency on this attack, including 
Resolution 425 adopted by the General Con- 
ference of the IAEA. 

11. The Conference recognizes that an 
armed attack on a safeguarded nuclear facil- 
ity, or threat of attack, would create a situa- 
tion in which the Security Council would 
have to act immediately in accordance with 
provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
The Conference further emphasizes the 
responsibilities of the Depositaries of NPT in 
their capacity as Permanent Members of the 
Security Council to endeavour, in consulta- 
tion with the other Members of the Security 
Council, to give full consideration to all ap- 
propriate measures to be undertaken by the 
Security Council to deal with the situation, 
including measures under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations ( 'barter. 

12. The Conference encourages Parties to 
be ready to provide immediate peaceful 
assistance in accordance with international 
law to any Party to the NPT. if it so re- 
quests, whose safeguarded nuclear facilities 
have been subject to an armed attack, and 
calls upon all States to abide by any decision 
taken by the Security Council in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter in relation 
to the attacking State. 

13. The Conference considers that such 
attacks could involve grave dangers due to 
the release of radioactivity and that such at- 
tacks or threats of attack jeopardize the 
development of the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. The Conference also acknowledges 
that the matter is under consideration by the 
Conference on Disarmament and urges co- 
operation of all States for its speedy 
conclusion. 

11. The Conference acknowledges the im- 
portance of the work of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the prin- 
cipal agent for technology transfer amongst 
the international organizations referred to in 
' Article 1Y(2> and welcomes the successful 
operation of the Agency's technical assistance 



40 



ARMS CONTROL 



,nd co-operation programmes. The Con- 
ference records with appreciation that 
jrojects supported from these programmes 
©vered a wide spectrum of applications, 
elated both to power and non-power uses of 
iuclear energy notably in agriculture, 
nedicine, industry and hydrology. The Con- 
ference notes that the Agency's assistance to 
;he developing States Party to the Treaty 
las been chiefly in the non-power uses of 
iuclear energy. 

15. The Conference welcomes the 
?stablishment by the IAEA, following a 
■•ecommendation of the First Review Con- 
ference of the Parties to the Treaty, of a 
mechanism to permit the channelling of 
actra-budgetary funds to projects additional 
to those financed from the IAEA technical 
assistance and co-operation fund. The Con- 
ference notes that this channel has been used 
to make additional resources available for a 
wide variety of projects in developing States 
Party to the Treaty. 

16. In this context, the Conference pro- 
poses the following measures for considera- 
tion by the IAEA: 

(i) IAEA assistance to developing coun- 
tries in siting, construction, operation and 
safety of nuclear power projects and the 
associated trained manpower provision to be 
strengthened; 

(ii) To provide, upon request, assistance 
in securing financing from outside sources for 
nuclear power projects in developing coun- 
tries, and in particular the least developed 
countries; 

(iii) IAEA assistance in nuclear planning 
systems for developing countries to be 
strengthened in order to help such countries 
draw up their own nuclear development 
•plans; 

(iv) IAEA assistance on country-specific 
nuclear development strategies to be further 
developed, with a view to identifying the ap- 
plication of nuclear technology that can be 
expected to contribute most to the develop- 
ment both of individual sectors and develop- 
ing economies as well; 

(v) Greater support for regional coop- 
erative agreements, promoting regional proj- 
ects based on regionally agreed priorities and 
using inputs from regional countries; 

(vi) Exploration of the scope for multi- 
year, multi-donor projects financed from the 
extra-budgetary resources of the IAEA; 

(vii) The IAEA's technical co-operation 
evaluation activity to be further developed, 
so as to enhance the Agency's effectiveness 
in providing technical assistance. 

17. The Conference underlines the need 
for the provision to the IAEA of the 
necessary financial and human resources to 
ensure that the Agency is able to continue to 
meet effectively its responsibilities. 

18. The Conference notes the appreciable 
level of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, and urges that States 
in a position to do so should continue and 
where possible increase the level of their co- 
operation in these fields. 



19. The Conference urges that preferen- 
tial treatment should be given to the non- 
nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty in 
access to or transfer of equipment, materials, 
services and scientific and technological infor- 
mation for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, taking particularly into account needs 
of developing countries. 

20. Great and serious concerns were ex- 
pressed at the Conference about the nuclear 
capability of South Africa and Israel and that 
the development of such a capability by 
South Africa and Israel would undermine the 
credibility and stability of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty regime. The Conference 
noted the demands made on all States to sus- 
pend any co-operation which would contribute 
to the nuclear programme of South Africa 
and Israel. The Conference further noted the 
demands made on South Africa and Israel to 
accede to the NPT, to accept IAEA safe- 
guards on all their nuclear facilities and to 
pledge themselves not to manufacture or ac- 
quire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. 

21. The Conference recognizes the grow- 
ing nuclear energy needs of the developing 
countries as well as the difficulties which the 
developing countries face in this regard, par- 
ticularly with respect to financing their 
nuclear power programmes. The Conference 
calls upon States Party to the Treaty to pro- 
mote the establishment of favourable condi- 
tions in national, regional and international 
financial institutions for financing of nuclear 
energy projects including nuclear power pro- 
grammes in developing countries. Further- 
more, the Conference calls upon the IAEA to 
initiate and the Parties to the Treaty to sup- 
port the work of an expert group study on 
mechanisms to assist developing countries in 
the promotion of their nuclear power pro- 
grammes, including the establishment of a 
financial assistance fund. 

22. The Conference recognizes that fur- 
ther IAEA assistance in the preparation of 
feasibility studies and infrastructure develop- 
ment might enhance the prospects for 
developing countries for obtaining finance, 
and recommends such countries as are 
members of the Agency to apply for such 
help under the Agency's technical assistance 
and co-operation programmes. The Con- 
ference also acknowledges that further sup- 
port for the IAEA's small and medium power 
reactor (SMPR) study could help the develop- 
ment of nuclear reactors more suited to the 
needs of some of the developing countries. 

23. The Conference expresses its satisfac- 
tion at the progress in the preparations for 
the United Nations Conference for the Pro- 
motion of International Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPIC- 
PUNE) and its conviction that UNCPIC- 
PUNE will fully realize its goals in ac- 
cordance with the objectives of Resolution 
32/60 and relevant subsequent resolutions of 
the General Assembly for the development of 
national programmes of peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy for economic and social 
development, especially in the developing 
countries. 



24. The Conference considers that all pro- 
posals related to the promotion and 
Strengthening of international co-operation in 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which 
have been produced by the Third Review 
Conference of the NPT, be transmitted to 
the Preparatory Committee of 
UNCPICPUNE. 



Article V 

1. The Conference reaffirms the obligation of 
Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate 
measures to ensure that potential benefits 
from any peaceful applications of nuclear ex- 
plosions are made available to non-nuclear- 
weapon States Party to the Treaty in full ac- 
cordance with the provisions of Article V and 
other applicable international obligations, that 
such services should be provided to non- 
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on 
a non-discriminatory basis and that the 
charge to such Parties for the explosive 
devices used should be as low as possible and 
exclude any charge for research and 
development. 

2. The Conference confirms that the 
IAEA would be the appropriate international 
body through which any potential benefits of 
the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions 
could be made available to non-nuclear- 
weapon States under the terms of Article V 
of the Treaty. 

3. The Conference notes that the poten- 
tial benefits of the peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions have not been 
demonstrated and that no requests for serv- 
ices related to the peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions have been received by the 
IAEA since the Second NPT Review 
Conference. 



Article VI and Preambular Paragraphs 
8-12 (A) 

1. The Conference recalled that under the 
provisions of Article VI all Parties have 
undertaken to pursue negotiations in good 
faith: 

• On effective measures relating to cessa- 
tion of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date; 

• On effective measures relating to 
nuclear disarmament; 

• On a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective inter- 
national control. 

2. The Conference undertook an evalua- 
tion of the achievements in respect to each 
aspect of the Article in the period under 
review, and paragraphs 8 to 12 of the pream- 
ble, and in particular with regard to the goals 
set out in preambular paragraph 10 which 
recalls the determination expressed by the 
Parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to 
continue negotiations to achieve the discon- 
tinuance of all test explosions of nuclear 
weapons for all time. 



November 1985 



41 



ARMS CONTROL 



3. The Conference recalled the declared 
ion of the Parties to the Treaty to 

achieve at the earliest possible date the 
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to 
undertake effective measures in the direction 
of nuclear disarmament and their urging 
made to all Stales Parties to co-operate in 
the attainment of this objective. The Con- 
ce also recalled the determination ex- 
pressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the At- 
mosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 
in its preamble to seek to achieve the discon- 
tinuance of all test explosions on nuclear 
weapons for all time and the desire to further 
the easing of international tension and the 
st lengthening of trust between States in 
order to facilitate the cessation of the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquida- 
tion of all existing stockpiles and the elimina- 
tion from national arsenals of nuclear 
weapons and the means of their delivery. 

4. The Conference notes that the Tenth 
Special Session of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations concluded, in paragraph 
50 of its Final Document, that the achieve- 
ment of nuclear disarmament will require 
urgent negotiations of agreements at ap- 
propriate stages and with adequate measures 
of verification satisfactory to the States con- 
cerned for: 

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improve- 
ment and development of nuclear-weapon 
systems; 

(b) Cessation of the production of all 
types of nuclear weapons and their means of 
delivery, and of the production of fissionable 
material for weapons purposes; 

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme 
with agreed timetables whenever feasible, for 
progressive and balanced reduction of 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their 
means of delivery, leading to their ultimate 
and complete elimination at the earliest pos- 
sible time. 

5. The Conference also recalled that in 
the Final Declaration of the First Review 

( lonference, the Parties expressed the view 
that the conclusion of a treaty banning all 
nuclear-weapon tests was one of the most im- 
port ant measures to halt the nuclear arms 
race and expressed the hope that the nuclear- 
weapon States Party to the Treaty would 
take the lead in reaching an early solution of 
the technical and political difficulties of this 
issue. 

6. The Conference examined develop- 
ments relating to the cessation of the nuclear 
arms race, in the period under review, and 
noted in particular that the destructive 
potentials of the nuclear arsenals of nuclear- 
weapon States Parties were undergoing con- 
tinuing development, including a growing 
research and development component in 
military spending, continued nuclear testing, 
development of new delivery systems and 
their deployment. 



7. The Conference noted the concerns ex- 
pressed regarding developments with far 
reaching implications and the potential of a 
new environment, space, being drawn into 
the arms race. In that regard the Conference 
also noted the fact that the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics are pursuing bilateral negotiations 
on a broad complex of questions concerning 
space and nuclear arms, with a view to 
achieving effective agreements aimed at 
preventing an arms race in space and ter- 
minating it on Earth. 

8. The Conference noted with regret that 
the development and deployment of nuclear 
weapon systems had continued during the 
period of review. 

9. The Conference also took note of 
numerous proposals and actions, multilateral 
and unilateral, advanced during the period 
under review by many States with the aim of 
making progress towards the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. 

10. The Conference examined the existing 
situation in the light of the undertaking 
assumed by the Parties in Article VI to pur- 
sue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament. The Conference recalled that a 
stage of negotiations on the strategic arms 
limitation talks (SALT II) had been concluded 
in 1979, by the signing of the Treaty which 
had remained unratified. The Conference 
noted that both the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the United States of America 
had declared that they are abiding by the 
provisions of SALT II. 

11. The Conference recalled that the 
bilateral negotiations between the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United 
States of America which were held between 
1981 and 1983 were discontinued without any 
concrete results. 

12. The Conference noted that bilateral 
negotiations between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States of 
America had been held in 1985 to consider 
questions concerning space and nuclear arms, 
both strategic and intermediate-range, with 
all the questions considered and resolved in 
their interrelationship. No agreement has 
emerged so far. These negotiations are 
continuing. 

13. The Conference evaluated the prog- 
ress made in multilateral nuclear disarma- 
ment negotiations in the period of the 
review. 

14. The Conference recalled that the 
trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive 
test ban treaty, begun in 1977 between the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- 
ern Ireland and the United States of 
America, had not continued after 1980, that 
the Committee on Disarmament and later the 
Conference on Disarmament had been called 
upon by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in successive years to begin negotia- 
tions on such a treaty, and noted that such 
negotiations had not been initiated, despite 
the submission of draft treaties and different 
proposals to the Conference on Disarmament 
in this regard. 



15. The Conference noted the lack of 
progress on relevant items of the agenda of 
the Conference on Disarmament, in particular 
those relating to the cessation of the nuclear 
arms race and nuclear disarmament, the 
prevention of nuclear war including all 
related matters and effective international 
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon 
States against the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons. 

16. The Conference noted that two 
Review Conferences had taken place since 
1968, one on the Sea-Bed Treaty and one on 
the Environmental Modification Treaty and 
three general conferences of the Agency for 
the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin 
America. In 1982 a Special United Nations 
General Assembly Session on Disarmament 
took place without any results in matters 
directly linked to nuclear disarmament. 

17. The Conference also noted the last 
five years had thus not given any results con- 
cerning negotiations on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race 
and to nuclear disarmament. 

Article VI and Preambular Paragraphs 

8-12 (B) 

1. The Conference concluded that, since no 
agreements had been reached in the period 
under review on effective measures relating 
to the cessation of an arms race at an early 
date, on nuclear disarmament and on a treaty 
on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control, the 
aspirations contained in preambular para- 
graphs 8 to 12 had still not been met, and 
the objectives under Article VI had not yet 
been achieved. 

2. The Conference reiterated that tin- 
implementation of Article VI is essential to 
the maintenance and strengthening of the 
Treaty, reaffirmed the commitment of all 
States Parties to the implementation of this 
article and called upon the States Parties to 
intensify their efforts to achieve fully the ob- 
jectives of the article. The Conference ad- 
dressed a call to the nuclear-weapon States 
Parties in particular to demonstrate this 
commitment. 

3. The Conference welcomes the fact that 
the United States of America and the I'nion 
of Soviet Socialist Republics are conducting 
bilateral negotiations on a complex of ques 
tions concerning space and nuclear arms— 
both strategic and intermediate-range— with 
all these questions considered and resolved in 
their interrelationship. It hopes that these 
negotiations will lead to early and effective 
agreements aimed at preventing an arms 
race in space and terminating it on Earth, at 
limiting and reducing nuclear amis and at 
strengthening strategic stability. Such 
agreements will complement and ensure the 
positive outcome of multilateral negotiations 
on disarmament, and would lead to the reduc- 
tion of international tensions and the promo- 
tion of international peace and security. The 
Conference recalls that the two sides believe 
that ultimately the bilateral negotiations, just 
as efforts in general to limit and reduce 
arms, should lead to the complete elimination 
of nuclear arms everywhere. 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



4. The Conference urges the Conference 
in Disarmament, as appropriate, to proceed 
o early multilateral negotiations on nuclear 
lisarmament in pursuance of paragraph 50 of 

Hhe Final Document of the First Special Ses- 
,ion of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations Devoted to Disarmament. 

5. The Conference reaffirms the deter- 
nination expressed in the preamble of the 
963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, confirmed in 
\rticle KB) of the said Treaty and reiterated 
n preambular paragraph 10 of the Non- 
proliferation Treaty, to achieve a diseontin- 
lance of all test explosions of nuclear 
weapons for all time. 

6. The Conference also recalls that in the 
F'inal Document of the First Review Con- 
ference, the Parties expressed the view that 
he conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear 
weapons tests was one of the most important 
neasures to halt the nuclear arms race. The 

inference stresses the important contribu- 
;ion that such a treaty would make towards 
strengthening and extending the international 
Darriers against the proliferation of nuclear 
A-eapons; it further stresses that adherence 
,o such a treaty by all States would con- 
;ribute substantially to the full achievement 
of the non-proliferation objective. 

7. The Conference also took note of the 
appeals contained in five successive United 

{ Nations General Assembly resolutions since 

1 1981 for a moratorium on nuclear weapons 
testing pending the conclusion of a com- 
prehensive test ban treaty, and of similar 
:alls made at this Conference. It also took 
note of the measure announced by the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics for a unilateral 
moratorium on all nuclear explosions from 6 

l August 1985 until 1 January 1986, which 
would continue beyond that date if the 
United States of America, for its part, 
refrained from carrying out nuclear explo- 
sions. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
suggested that this would provide an exam- 
ple for other nuclear-weapon States and 

1 would create favourable conditions for the 
conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty 
and the promotion of the fuller implementa- 
tion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

8. The Conference took note of the 
unconditional invitation extended by the 
United States of America to the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics to send observers, 
who may bring any equipment they deem 
necessary, to measure a United States of 
America nuclear test in order to begin a 
process which in the view of the United 
States would help to ensure effective verifica- 
tion of limitations on under-ground nuclear 
testing. 

9. The Conference also took note of the 
appeals contained in five United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions since 1982 for a 
freeze on all nuclear weapons in quantitative 
and qualitative terms, which should be taken 
by all nuclear-weapon States or, in the first 
instance and simultaneously, by the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United 
States of America on the understanding that 
the other nuclear-weapon States would follow 
their example, and of similar calls made at 
this Conference. 



10. The Conference took note of pro- 
posals by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the United Slates of America 
for thi' reduction of nuclear weapons. 

11. The Conference took note of pro 
posals submitted by States Parties on a 
number of related issues relevant to achiev- 
ing the purposes of Article VI and set out in 
Annex I to this document and in the 
statements made in the General Debate of 
the Conference. 

12. The Conference reiterated its convic- 
tion that the objectives of Article VI remain- 
ed unfulfilled and concluded that the nuclear- 
weapon States should make greater efforts to 
ensure effective measures for the cessation of 
the nuclear arms rate at an early date, for 
nuclear disarmament and for a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control. 

13. The Conference expressed the hope 
for rapid progress in the US-USSR bilateral 
negotiations. 

14. The Conference, except for certain 
States whose views are reflected in the 
following sub-paragraph, deeply regretted 
that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear 
test ban treaty banning all nuclear tests by 
all States in all environments for all time had 
not been concluded so far and, therefore, call- 
ed on the nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 
1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapons 
States to participate in the urgent negotia- 
tion and conclusion of such a treaty as a mat- 
ter of the highest priority in the Conference 
on Disarmament, 

15. At the same time, the Conference 
noted that certain States Party to the Trea- 
ty, while committed to the goal of an effec- 
tively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test 
ban treaty, considered deep and verifiable 
reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear 
weapons as the highest priority in the proc- 
ess of pursuing the objective of Article VI. 

16. The Conference also noted the state- 
ment of the USSR as one of the nuclear- 
weapon States Party to the Treaty, recalling 
its repeatedly expressed readiness to proceed 
forthwith to negotiations, trilateral and 
multilateral, with the aim of concluding a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and 
the submission by it of a draft treaty pro- 
posal to this end. 

Article VII and the Security of 
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 

1. The Conference observes the growing in- 
terest in utilizing the provisions of Article 
VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which 
recognizes the right of any group of States to 
conclude regional treaties in order to assure 
the absence of nuclear weapons in their 
respective territories. 

2. The Conference considers that the 
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones 
on the basis of arrangements freely arrived 
at among the States of the region concerned 
constitutes an important disarmament 
measure and, therefore, the process of 
establishing such zones in different parts of 



the world should be encouraged with the 
ultimate nlijective of achieving a world 
entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the proc- 
ess of establishing such zones, the 
characteristics of each region should be taken 
into account. 

3. The Conference emphasizes the impor- 
tance of concluding nuclear-weapon-free zone 
arrangements in harmony with inter- 
nationally recognized principles, as stated in 
the Final Document of the First Special Ses- 
sion of the United Nations Devoted to 
Disarmament. 

4. The Conference holds the view that, 
under appropriate conditions, progress 
towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon- 
free zones will create conditions more con- 
ducive to the establishment of zones of peace 
in certain regions of the world. 

5. The Conference expresses its belief 
that concrete measures of nuclear disarma- 
ment would significantly contribute to 
creating favorable conditions for the 
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. 

6. The Conference expresses its satisfac- 
tion at the continued successful operation of 
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco). It reaffirms the repeated exhorta- 
tion of the General Assembly to France, 
which is already a signatory of additional 
Protocol I, to ratify it, and calls upon the 
Latin American States that are eligible to 
become Parties to the Treaty to do so. The 
Conference welcomes the signature and 
ratification of Additional Protocol II to this 
Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States. 

7. The Conference also notes the con- 
tinued existence of the Antarctic Treaty. 

8. The Conference notes the endorsement 
of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
Treaty by the South Pacific Forum on 6 
August 1985 at Rarotonga and welcomes this 
achievement as consistent with Article VII of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference 
also takes note of the draft protocols to the 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and 
further notes that agreement at the South 
Pacific Forum that consultations on the pro- 
tocols should be held between members of 
the Forum and the nuclear-weapon States 
eligible to sign them. 

9. The Conference takes note of the 
existing proposals and the ongoing regional 
efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones 
in different areas of the world. 

10. The Conference recognizes that for 
the maximum effectiveness of any treaty 
arrangements for establishing a nuclear- 
weapon-free zone the co-operation of the 
nuclear-weapon States is necessary. In this 
connection, the nuclear-weapon States are 
invited to assist the efforts of States to 
create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to 
enter into binding undertakings to respect 
strictly the status of such a zone and to 
refrain from the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons against the States of the 
zone. 



November 1985 



43 



ARMS CONTROL 



E' 



1 1 . The Conference welcomes the consen- 
iched by the United Nations General 

Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the 
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
in the region of the Middle East would 
greatly enhance international peace and 
security, and urges all Parties directly con- 
cerned to consider seriously taking the prac- 
tical and urgent steps required for the imple- 
mentation of the proposal to establish a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the 
Middle East. 

12. The Conference also invites the 
nuclear-weapon States and all other States to 
render their assistance in the establishment 
of the zone and at the same time to refrain 
from any action that runs counter to the 
letter and spirit of United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 39/54. 

13. The Conference considers that ac- 
ceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
acceptance of IAEA safeguards by all States 
in the region of the Middle East will greatly 
facilitate the creation of a nuclear- weapon- 
free zone in the region and will enhance the 
credibility of the Treaty. 

14. The Conference considers that the 
development of a nuclear weapon capability _ 
by South Africa at any time frustrated the 
implemenation of the Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of Africa and that collabora- 
tion with South Africa in this area would 
undermine the credibility and the stability of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. South 
Africa is called upon to submit all its nuclear 
installations and facilities to IAEA 
safeguards and to accede to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. All States Parties 
directly concerned are urged to consider 
seriously taking the practical and urgent 
steps required for the implementation of the 
proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in Africa. The nuclear-weapon states are 
invited to assist the efforts of States to 
create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, 
and to enter into binding undertakings to 
respect strictly the status of such a zone and 
to refrain from the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons against the States of the 

Zone. 

15. The Conference considers that the 
most effective guarantee against the possible 
use of nuclear weapons and the danger of 
nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and the 
complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 
Pending the achievement of this goal on a 
universal basis and recognizing the need for 
all States to ensure their independence, ter- 
ritorial integrity and sovereignty, the Con- 
ference reaffirms the particular importance of 
assuring and strengthening the security of 

lien nuclear-weapon Stales Parties which 
have renounced the acquisition of nuclear 

weapons. The Conference recognizes that dif- 
ferent approaches may lie required to 
strengthen the security of non-nuclear- 

on States Parties ti> the Treaty. 



16. The Conference underlines again the 
importance of adherence to the Treaty by 
non-nuclear-weapon States as the best means 
i if reassuring one another of their renuncia- 
tion of nuclear weapons and as one of the ef- 
fective means of strengthening their mutual 
security. 

17. The Conference takes note of the con- 
tinued determination of the Depositary 
States to honour their statements, which 
were welcomed by the United Nations 
Security Council in Resolution 255 (1968), 
that, to ensure the security of the non- 
nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, 
they will provide or support immediate 
assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to 
any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty which is a victim of an act or an 
object of a threat of aggression in which 
nuclear weapons are used. 

18. The Conference reiterates its convic- 
tion that, in the interest of promoting the 
objectives of the Treaty, including the 
strengthening of the security of non-nuclear- 
weapon States Parties, all States, both 
nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon 
States, should refrain, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, from the 
threat or the use of force in relations 
between States, involving either nuclear or 
non-nuclear weapons. 

19. The Conference recalls that the Tenth 
Special Session of the General Assembly, in 
paragraph 59 of the Final Document, took 
note of the declarations made by the nuclear- 
weapon States regarding the assurance of 
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons and urged 
them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appro- 
priate, effective arrangements to assure non- 
nuclear-weapon States against the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons. 

20. Being aware of the consultations and 
negotiations on effective international 
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon 
States against the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons, w : hieh have been under way 
in the Conference on Disarmament for 
several years, the Conference regrets that 
the search for a common approach, which 
could be included in an international legally 
binding instrument, has been unsuccessful. 
The Conference takes note of the repeatedly 
expressed intention of the Conference on 
Disarmament to continue to explore ways 
and means to overcome the difficulties 
encountered in its work and to carry out 
negotiations on the question of effective 
international arrangements to assure non- 
nuclear-weapon States against the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this con- 
nection, the Conference calls upon all States, 
particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to 
continue the negotiations in the Conference 
on Disarmament devoted to the search for a 
common approach acceptable to all, which 
could be included in an international instru- 
ment of a legally binding character. 



Article VIII 

The States Party to the Treaty participating 
in the Conference propose to the Depositary 
Governments that a Fourth Conference to 
review the operation of the Treaty be con- 
vened in 1990. 

The Conference accordingly invites States 
Party to the Treaty which are members of 
the United Nations to request the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations to include the 
following item in the provisional agenda of 
the forty-third session of the General 
Assembly: 

"Implementation of the conclusions of the 
Third Review Conference of the Parties to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a 
Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Con- 
ference." 



Article IX 

The Conference, having expressed great 
satisfaction that the overwhelming majority 
of States have acceded to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 
having recognized the urgent need for fur- 
ther ensuring the universality of the Treaty, 
appeals to all States, particularly the nuclear- 
weapon States and other States advanced in 
nuclear technology, which have not yet done 
so, to adhere to the Treaty at the earliest 
possible date. ■ 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



u 



.S. Releases Affidavits 
for Aquino Assassination Trial 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
KEPT. 16, 1985 1 

lit has been the consistent position of 
the United States since the 1983 murder 
nf Benigno Aquino that the investigation 
if that crime be thorough and impartial 
md that those responsible, no matter 
vvho they may be, be brought to justice 
md punished to the fullest extent of the 
Law. The United States, therefore, 
pelieves it important that the outcome 
'rf the current Aquino assassination trial 
in Manila be seen by the Filipino people 
as based on a thorough, complete consid- 
sration of all pertinent information. 

In mid-July, newspaper accounts 
reported that on August 21, 1983, the 
day of Senator Aquino's assassination in 
Manila, unusual levels of activity by the 
Philippine Air Force were witnessed at 
two airbases in the Philippines (Wallace 
Air Station and Villamor Air Force 
(Base) by U.S. Air Force personnel. So 
far as we have been able to ascertain, 
no one in the Department of State or 
the U.S. Embassy in Manila or the 
Defense Department other than U.S. 
Air Force personnel in the Philippines 
were aware of the reported activities 
until the July newspaper accounts. 

On August 7, the Philippine Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs requested, through 
the U.S. Embassy in Manila, that the 
United States provide to the Philippine 
Government any information in its 
possession relating to events on Au- 
gust 21, 1983, as reported in the July 
newspaper accounts. In a discussion 
between the U.S. Ambassador in Manila 
and Acting Foreign Minister Castro on 
August 8, it was agreed that the United 
States would prepare sworn affidavits 
from the U.S. Air Force personnel on 
duty on August 21, 1983, at the two air- 
bases in question. It was further agreed 
that these affidavits would be trans- 
mitted to the prosecutors, through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a sealed 
envelope. 



In mid-August, the U.S. Air Force 
prepared affidavits from six USAF per- 
sonnel who were on duty at Wallace Air 
Station or Villamor Air Force Base on 
August 21, 1983. The affidavits were 
sworn before a notary public. The affi- 
davits were then "authenticated" by the 
Department of State and the U.S. Em- 
bassy in Manila before being presented 
on August 30, as had been previously 
agreed, in a sealed envelope to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for trans- 
mittal to the prosecutors. 

On September 13, the Chief Prose- 
cutor (Tanodbayan), Bernardo Fer- 
nandez, announced that the prosecutors 
do not intend to use the USAF affi- 
davits and consider this matter closed. 
We indicated to the Philippine authori- 
ties from the outset that we expected 
the affidavits to become public at an 
appropriate moment. We also indicated 
that we were prepared to consider any 
further Philippine requests for assist- 
ance in this matter. Since the Tanod- 
bayan has stated that it will not exam- 
ine this matter further, it appears to us 
appropriate to release the affidavits 
now. 

Mr. Fernandez also suggested in his 
statement of September 13 that the affi- 
davits had not been properly authenti- 
cated and this alleged infirmity was 
somehow related to the Prosecutors' 
decision not to use them. We do not 
understand the basis for this assertion. 
Authentication is a technical legal proce- 
dure by which the authenticity of docu- 
ments is protected. There is no question 
of the authenticity of the affidavits. Nor 
is there any basis for challenging the 
procedures by which they were authen- 
ticated. Authentication is simply a series 
of attestations of the authenticity of the 
documents as they pass from hand-to- 
hand. There are several ways of doing 
this. In this case, the State Department 
verified under seal that the affidavits 
had been properly notarized; the U.S. 
Ambassador in Manila verified that the 
Department seal had been properly 
affixed. This was in accord with normal 
judicial procedures. 



An alternative procedure would have 
been to involve the Philippine Consulate 
in Washington in the chain of authen- 
tications. We considered and rejected 
this alternative when the Consulate 
refused to make the authentications 
without copying the documents— a condi- 
tion we considered inconsistent with the 
arrangements of August 8 with the 
Acting Foreign Minister to have the 
documents transmitted in a sealed enve- 
lope to the prosecutors. When it became 
clear that the United States would not 
agree to permit the Consulate to copy 
the affidavits, the Philippine Embassy in 
Washington specifically suggested 
precisely the procedure that we, in fact, 
followed. Under these circumstances, we 
cannot explain the Tanodbayan's 
criticism of the authentication process 
that was followed. The statements of 
Tanodbayan Fernandez on Septem- 
ber 13 that the affidavits were somehow 
defective is, in our view, wholly without 
foundation. 

The affidavits in question represent 
the best recollections of six different 
individuals as to events that occurred 
2 years earlier. As one would expect, 
there are minor discrepancies in their 
recollections. 

The one unambiguous conclusion to 
which the affidavits point is that there 
was, in fact, a highly unusual degree of 
activity by the Philippine Air Force on 
August 21, 1983 (a Sunday), and that 
two Philippine Air Force fighters were 
scrambled on that day. The affidavits 
include all we know about those events. 

We cannot, of course, substitute our 
judgment for that of the Philippine judi- 
cial processes concerning the weight or 
probity of the information in the affi- 
davits. We had hoped, however, that a 
rigorous examination of that information 
would have occurred within the judicial 
processes themselves. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by Department deputy spokesman Charles 
Redman. ■ 



November 1985 



45 



ECONOMICS 



Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors 
Discuss Economic Policies 



FINAL ANNOUNCEMENT, 
SEPT. 22, 1985' 

1. Ministers of Finance and Central 
Bank Governors of France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States met 
today, September 22, 1985, [in New 
York City] in the context of their agree- 
ment to conduct mutual surveillance and 
as part of their preparations for wider 
international discussions at the forth- 
coming meetings in Seoul, Korea. They 
reviewed economic developments and 
policies in each of their countries and 
assessed their implications for economic 
prospects, external balances, and ex- 
change rates. 

2. At the Bonn economic summit in 
May 1985 the heads of state or govern- 
ment of seven major industrial countries 
and the President of the Commission of 
the European Communities issued an 
Economic Declaration Toward Sustained 
Growth and Higher Employment. In 
that declaration the participants agreed 
that: 

The best contribution we can make to a 
lasting new prosperity in which all nations 
can share is unremittingly to pursue, individ- 
ually in our own countries and cooperatively 
together, policies conducive to sustained 
growth and higher employment. 

3. The Ministers and Governors 
were of the view that significant prog- 
ress has been made in their efforts to 
promote a convergence of favorable eco- 
nomic performance among their coun- 
tries on a path of steady noninflationary 
growth. Furthermore, they concluded 
that their countries are restoring the 
vitality and responsiveness of their 
economies. As a result of these develop- 
ments, they are confident that a firm 
basis has been established for a sus- 
tained, more balanced expansion among 
their countries. This sustained growth 
will benefit other industrial countries 
and will help ensure expanding export 
markets for developing countries, there- 
by contributing importantly to the 
resolution of problems of heavily 
indebted developing countries. 

4. They believe that this conver- 
gence of favorable economic perform- 
ance has been influenced increasingly by 
policy initiatives undertaken by their 
countries. Moreover, each of their coun- 
tries is committed to the implementation 



of further policy measures which will 
reinforce favorable convergence and 
strengthen the sustainability of the cur- 
rent expansion. 

5. Ministers and Governors were of 
the view that recent shifts in funda- 
mental economic conditions among their 
countries, together with policy commit- 
ments for the future, have not been 
reflected fully in exchange markets. 

Recent Economic Developments 
and Policy Changes 

6. Ministers and Governors expect that 
real growth in aggregate for their coun- 
tries will be about 3% this year, com- 
pared to negative growth of -0.7% in 
1982. Although this figure is down 
slightly from 1984, growth will be more 
balanced than at any time in the last 
4 years. After the particularly rapid 
U.S. growth of 1983-84, there is now 
increased evidence of internal growth in 
the other countries. In particular, 
private investment has picked up 
strength. The current expansion is 
occurring in a context of fiscal consolida- 
tion; it is not dependent on short-lived 
fiscal stimulus. As a result of the 
changes in the components of growth, 
real growth in their countries can be 
expected to remain strong as U.S. 
growth moderates. 

7. The current sustained expansion 
is occurring within a framework of 
declining inflation, a phenomenon that is 
unprecedented in the past three 
decades. Inflation rates are at their 
lowest in nearly 20 years, and they show 
no signs of reviving. 

8. There has been a significant fall 
in interest rates in recent years. Apart 
from welcome domestic effects, this has 
been particularly helpful in easing the 
burden of debt repayments for develop- 
ing countries. 

9. This successful performance is the 
direct result of the importance given to 
macroeconomic policies which have 
reduced inflation and inflationary expec- 
tations, to continue vigilance over 
government spending, to greater empha- 
sis on market forces and competition, 
and to prudent monetary policies. 

10. These positive economic develop- 
ments notwithstanding, there are large 
imbalances in external positions which 



pose potential problems, and which 
reflect a wide range of factors. Among 
these are: 

• the deterioration in its external 
position which the United States experi- 
enced from its period of very rapid rela- 
tive growth; 

• the particularly large impact on 
the U.S. current account of the eco- 
nomic difficulties and the adjustment 
efforts of some major developing 
countries; 

• the difficulty of trade access in 
some markets; and 

• the appreciation of the U.S. dollar. 

The interaction of these factors- 
relative growth rates, the debt problems 
of developing countries, and exchange 
rate developments— has contributed to 
large, potentially destabilizing external 
imbalances among major industrial coun- 
tries. In particular, the United States 
has a large and growing current account 
deficit, and Japan— and to a lesser 
extent Germany— large and growing cur- 
rent account surpluses. 

11. The U.S. current account deficit, 
together with other factors, is now con- 
tributing to protectionist pressures 
which, if not resisted, could lead to 
mutually destructive retaliation with 
serious damage to the world economy: 
world trade would shrink, real growth 
rates could even turn negative, 
unemployment would rise still higher, 
and debt-burdened developing countries 
would be unable to secure the export 
earnings they vitally need. 

Policy Intentions 

12. The Finance Ministers and Gover- 
nors affirmed that each of their coun- 
tries remains firmly committed to its 
international responsibilities and obliga- 
tions as leading industrial nations. They 
also share special responsibilities to 
ensure the mutual consistency of their 
individual policies. The Ministers agreed 
that establishing more widely strong, 
noninflationary domestic growth and 
open markets will be a key factor in 
ensuring that the current expansion con- 
tinues in a more balanced fashion, and 
they committed themselves to policies 
toward that end. In countries where the 
budget deficit is too high, further meas- 
ures to reduce the deficit substantially 
are urgently required. 



46 



Derjartment of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



13. Ministers and Governors agreed 
hat it was essential that protectionist 
>ressures be resisted. 

14. Ministers recognized the impor- 
ance of providing access to their 
narkets for LDC [less developed coun- 
ries] exports as those countries con- 
inue their essential adjustment efforts, 
and saw this as an important additional 
-eason to avoid protectionist policies. 
They welcomed the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] pre- 
paratory meeting scheduled for late 
September and expressed their hope 

hat it will reach a broad consensus on 
subject matter and modalities for a new 
jATT round. 

15. In this context, they recalled 
ind reaffirmed the statement in the 
Bonn economic declaration on the debt 
ituation. 

Sustained growth in world trade, lower 
nterest rates, open markets and continued 
inancing in amounts and on terms appro- 
bate to each individual case are essential to 
enable developing countries to achieve sound 
growth and overcome their economic and 
Inancial difficulties. 

16. The Ministers agreed that they 
would monitor progress in achieving a 
;ustained noninflationary expansion and 
ntensify their individual and coopera- 
;ive efforts to accomplish this objective. 
To that end, they affirmed the state- 
ments of policy intentions by each of 
their countries, which are attached. 

Conclusion 

17. The Ministers of Finance and Cen- 
tral Bank Governors agreed that recent 
economic developments and policy 
changes, when combined with the spe- 
cific policy intentions described in the 
attached statements, provide a sound 
basis for continued and a more balanced 
expansion with low inflation. They 
agreed on the importance of these 
improvements for redressing the large 
and growing external imbalances that 
have developed. In that connection, they 
noted that further market-opening meas- 
ures will be important to resisting 
protectionism. 

18. The Ministers and Governors 
agreed that exchange rates should play 
a role in adjusting external imbalances. 
In order to do this, exchange rates 
should better reflect fundamental eco- 
nomic conditions than has been the case. 
They believe that agreed policy actions 
must be implemented and reinforced to 
improve the fundamentals further, and 



that in view of the present and prospec- 
tive changes in fundamentals, some fur- 
ther orderly appreciation of the main 
nondollar currencies against the dollar is 
desirable. They stand ready to cooper- 
ate more closely to encourage this when 
to do so would be helpful. 

COUNTRY STATEMENTS 

The United States Government is 

firmly committed to policies designed to 
ensure steady noninflationary growth; 
maximize the role of market's and 
private sector participation in the 
economy; reduce the size and role of the 
government sector; and maintain open 
markets. 

In order to achieve these objectives, 
the United States Government will: 

1. Continue efforts to reduce gov- 
ernment expenditures as a share of 
GNP [gross national product] in order to 
reduce the fiscal deficit and to free up 
resources for the private sector. 

2. Implement fully the deficit reduc- 
tion package for fiscal year (FY) 1986. 
This package passed by Congress and 
approved by the President will not only 
reduce by over 1% of GNP the budget 
deficit for FY 1986, but lay the basis for 
further significant reductions in the 
deficit in subsequent years. 

3. Implement revenue-neutral tax 
reform which will encourage savings, 
create new work incentives, and in- 
crease the efficiency of the economy, 
thereby fostering noninflationary 
growth. 

4. Conduct monetary policy to pro- 
vide a financial environment conducive 
to sustainable growth and continued 
progress toward price stability. 

5. Resist protectionist measures. 

The United Kingdom Government, 

noting that the British economy has 
been experiencing steady growth of out- 
put and domestic demand over the past 
4 years, will continue to pursue policies 
designed to reduce inflation; to promote 
sustained growth of output and employ- 
ment; to reduce the size of the public 
sector; to encourage a more competitive, 
innovative, market-oriented private sec- 
tor; to reduce regulation and increase 
incentives throughout the economy; and 
to maintain open trading and capital 
markets free of foreign exchange 
controls. 

In particular, the United Kingdom 
Government intends: 

1. To operate monetary policy to 
achieve further progress toward price 



stability and to provide a financial envi- 
ronment for growing output and employ- 
ment, and to buttress monetary policy 
with a prudent fiscal policy. 

2. To continue to reduce public- 
expenditure as a share of GDP [gross 
domestic product] and to transfer fur- 
ther substantial parts of public sector 
industry to private ownership. 

3. To reduce the burden of taxation 
in order to improve incentives and to 
increase the efficient use of resources in 
the economy. 

4. To take additional measures to 
improve the effective working of the 
labor market, including the reform of 
wages councils and improvements in 
youth training, and implement proposals 
to liberalize and strengthen competition 
within financial markets. 

5. To resist protectionism. 

The Government of Japan, noting that 
the Japanese economy is in an autono- 
mous expansion phase mainly supported 
by domestic private demand increase, 
will continue to institute policies 
intended to ensure sustainable noninfla- 
tionary growth; provide full access to 
domestic markets for foreign goods; and 
internationalize the yen and liberalize 
domestic capital markets. 

In particular, the Government of 
Japan will implement policies with the 
following explicit intentions. 

1. Resistance of protectionism and 
steady implementation of the action pro- 
gram announced on July 30 for the fur- 
ther opening up of Japan's domestic 
market to foreign goods and services. 

2. Full utilization of private sector 
vitality through the implementation of 
vigorous deregulation measures. 

3. Flexible management of monetary 
policy with due attention to the yen 
rate. 

4. Intensified implementation of 
financial market liberalization and inter- 
nationalization of the yen, so that the 
yen fully reflects the underlying 
strength of the Japanese economy. 

5. Fiscal policy will continue to focus 
on the twin goals of reducing the central 
government deficit and providing a pro- 
growth environment for the private sec- 
tor. Within that framework, local 
governments may be favorably allowed 
to make additional investments in this 
FY 1985, taking into account the indi- 
vidual circumstances of the region. 

6. Efforts to stimulate domestic de- 
mand will focus on increasing private 
consumption and investment through 
measures to enlarge consumer and mort- 
gage credit markets. 



November 1985 



47 



ECONOMICS 



The Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, noting that the 
German economy is already embarked 
on a course of steady economic recovery 
based increasingly on internally gener- 
ated growth, will continue to implement 
policies tn sustain and extend the prog- 
ress achieved in strengthening the 
underlying conditions for continuing 
vigorous, job-creating growth in the con- 
text of stable prices and low interest 
rates. 

In particular, the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany will imple- 
ment policies with the following explicit 
intentions. 

1. The priority objective of fiscal 
policy is to encourage private initiative 
and productive investments and main- 
tain price stability. 

2. Toward this end, the Federal 
Government will continue to reduce pro- 
gressively the share of the public sector 
in the economy through maintaining 
firm expenditure control. The tax cuts . 
due to take effect in 1986 and 1988 form 
part of the ongoing process of tax 
reform and reduction which the Federal 
Government will continue in a medium- 
term framework. 

3. The Federal Government will con- 
tinue to remove rigidities inhibiting the 
efficient functioning of markets. It will 
keep under review policies, regulations, 
and practices affecting labor markets in 
order to enhance the positive impact of 
economic growth on employment. The 
Federal Government and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank will provide the framework 
for the continuing evolution of deep, effi- 
cient money and capital markets. 

4. The fiscal policy of the Federal 
Government and the monetary policy of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank will continue 



to ensure a stable environment con- 
ducive to the expansion of domest it- 
demand on a durable basis. 

5. The Federal Government will 
continue to resist protectionism. 

The French Government intends to 
pursue its policy aimed at reducing infla- 
tion, moderating income growth, and 
achieving continued improvements in 
external accounts. It will further inten- 
sify its efforts to speed up structural 
adjustment and modernization and thus 
lay the basis for job-creating growth. 
Therefore, it is determined: 

1. To pursue vigorously disinflation. 

2. To secure the attainment of 
monetary aggregates growth targets, 
consistent with decelerating inflation. 

3. To curb public expenditures pro- 
gressively so as to lower the tax burden 
while reducing the government borrow- 
ing requirement. 

4. To foster the investment recovery 
allowed for by the improved financial 
situation in the business sector. 

5. To take further steps toward 
liberalization and modernization of finan- 
cial markets, to increase competition in 
the financial sector so as to reduce 
financial intermediation costs and give a 
greater role to interest rates in 
monetary control. 

6. To foster job creation through the 
implementation of an innovative and ac- 
tive policy in the field of education and 
training and by promoting constructive 
discussions between social partners on 
work organization. 

7. To resist protectionism. 



^.S. participants included Secretary of 
the Treasury James A. Baker, III, and Paul 
A. Volcker. chairman of the Board of Gover- 
nors for the Federal Reserve System. ■ 



Nonrubber Footwear 
Industry 

PRESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
AUG. 28, 1985 1 

Today we increasingly find ourselves 
confronted with demands for protec- 
tionist measures against foreign com- 
petition, but protectionism is both inef- 
fective and extremely expensive. In 
fact, protectionism often does more 
harm than good to those it is designed 
to help. It is a crippling cure, far more 
dangerous than any economic illness. 

Thus, I am notifying the Congress 
today of my decision not to impose 
quotas on nonrubber footwear imports. 
As President, it is my responsibility to 
take into account not only the effect of 
quotas on the shoe industry but also 
their broader impact on the overall 
economy. After an extensive review, I 
have determined that placing quotas on 
shoe imports would be detrimental to 
the national economic interest. 

While we support the principle of 
free trade, we must continue to insist of 
our trading partners that free trade also 
be fair trade. In that regard, I have in- 
structed our Trade Representative to 
take action to initiate investigations 
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974, as amended, to root out any unfair 
trade practices that may be harming 
U.S. interests. 

With respect to the footwear in- 
dustry, the Council of Economic Ad- 
visers estimates that quotas on nonrub- 
ber shoe imports would cost the 
American consumer almost $3 billion. 
Low-income consumers would be par- 
ticularly hard hit as shoe prices rose 
and less expensive imports were kept 
off the market. Instead of spending 
billions of consumers' dollars to create 
temporary jobs, I am directing the 
Secretary of Labor, through the Job 
Training and Partnership Act, to 
develop a plan to retrain unemployed 
workers in the shoe industry for real 
and lasting employment in other areas 
of the economy. 

There is also no reason to believe 
that quotas would help the industry 
become more competitive. Between 1977 
and 1981, U.S. footwear manufacturers 



ENERGY 






received protection from foreign im- 
ports, but emerged from that period 
even more vulnerable to international 
competition than before. In fact, while 
unprotected by quotas, the shoe in- 
dustry has begun to show positive signs 
of adjustment. Producers have invested 
in state-of-the-art manufacturing equip- 
ment, modernizing their operations, and 
diversifying into profitable retail 
operations. 

While bringing no lasting benefit to 
the shoe industry, quotas or other pro- 
tectionist measures would do serious in- 
jury to the overall economy. The quotas 
proposed by the International Trade 
Commission could cost over $2 billion in 
compensatory claims under GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] and could invite retaliation from 
our trading partners. The result would 
be an immediate and significant loss of 
American jobs and a dangerous step 
down the road to a trade war, a war we 
fought in 1930 with the infamous Smoot- 
Hawley taiiffs and lost. 

Our economy is truly interwoven 
with those of our trading partners. If 
we cut the threads that hold us 
together, we injure ourselves as well. If 
our trading partners cannot sell shoes in 
the United States, many will not then 
be able to buy U.S. exports. That would 
mean more American jobs lost. 

Thus, we find that the true price of 
protectionism is very high indeed. In 
order to save a few temporary jobs, we 
will be throwing many other Americans 
out of work, costing consumers billions 
of dollars, further weakening the shoe 
industry, and seriously damaging rela- 
tions with our trading partners. 

The United States can set an exam- 
ple to other countries. We must live ac- 
cording to our principles and continue to 
promote our prosperity and the pros- 
perity of our trading partners by ensur- 
ing that the world trading system re- 
mains open, free, and, above all, fair. 



'Read to news correspondents assembled 
in the White House briefing room by U.S. 
Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter. Presi- 
dent Reagan's memorandum to Ambassador 
Yeutter and message to the Congress of 
Aug. 28, 1985, are omitted here (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Sept. 2). ■ 



Energy Trade: 
Problems and Prospects 



by E. Allan Wendi 

Address before the Oxford Energy 
Seminar in Oxford, England, on 
Septembers, 1985. Mr. Wendt is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Economic and 
Business Affairs. 

I want to talk today about a business in 
which we all have a stake, a more than 
$300-billion enterprise that has tripled in 
constant dollars since 1973. I am not 
referring to the energy sector as a 
whole, which is many times larger. I am 
referring to a small but key part of the 
energy business: energy trade. Trade in 
oil, natural gas, coal, electricity, and 
uranium amounts to over 20% of total 
world trade. Every country in the world 
today imports or exports energy in one 
form or another, and the continued 
healthy growth of the world economy 
depends on our ability to maintain and 
expand energy trade. 

Trade issues today are controversial. 
Increasingly, we are seeing efforts to 
protect national industries by one means 
or another. Such efforts are not new. I 
would like to recall Adam Smith's view, 
expressed more than 200 years ago. He 
said: 

Each nation has been made to look with 
an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all 
the nations with which it trades, and to con- 
sider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, 
which ought naturally to be, among nations, 
as among individuals, a bond of union and 
friendship, has become the most fertile 
source of discord and animosity. 

My aim is to demonstrate how we 
can contribute to establishing that bond 
of union and friendship and avoid the 
discord and animosity that have all too 
often characterized energy trade. 

I would like to begin by examining 
in some detail the growth and changing 
patterns of energy trade since 1973. I 
will then turn to future prospects and, 
in particular, how energy trade can 
grow and prosper if it is freed from the 
constraints currently imposed on it. 



Growth and Changing 
Patterns in Energy Trade 

The spectacular growth of energy trade 
is dominated, at first sight, by oil: oil 
trade increased from about $100 billion 
in 1973 to about $275 billion a decade 
later (in constant 1983 dollars). As a 



percentage of total world trade, crude 
oil and product trade has grown 
markedly— from about 10% to almost 
20%. But this growth in dollar terms 
hides a reduction in volume terms. As a 
consequence of the oil price increases of 
1973-74 and 1979-80, crude oil trade 
volume is down— from 30 million barrels 
per day (MMBD) in 1973 to 21 MMBD 
in 1983. 

The pattern of oil trade has also 
shifted sharply in response to the price 
increases. OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil ex- 
ports, which in 1973 represented 92% of 
total world crude oil exports, by 1983 
had declined to less than 70%, and the 
total volume was approximately halved. 
With the sharp rise in North Sea pro- 
duction, OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] oil 
exports have more than doubled in 
volume, increasing from 3.7% (1.1 
MMBD) of the total in 1973 to 12.5% 
(2.6 MMBD) in 1983. Non-OPEC, non- 
OECD oil exports (excluding Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union) have 
increased even more sharply, from 4% 
(1.2 MMBD) of global oil exports in 1973 
to 18.7% (3.9 MMBD) in 1983. 

Thus, the sources of oil exports have 
shifted dramatically from OPEC to non- 
OPEC oil producers. To put it more 
sharply, oil exports have shifted away 
from those who seek to control prices 
and production toward those willing to 
produce in response to market forces. 
OPEC's effort to maintain prices above 
long-term production costs has caused it 
to lose market share. 

As spectacular as is the more than 
threefold growth in the value of the oil 
trade, the growth of the natural gas 
trade is even more striking. Natural gas 
trade in 1973 was worth about $3.5 
billion (in 1983 dollars). By 1983, it had 
grown to around $30 billion. Volumes 
increased 75% between 1973 and 1983. 
The market share of natural gas as a 
fraction of energy trade has increased 
from about 3% in 1973 to about 10% in 
1983. The producers who benefited most 
from the growth in natural gas trade 
were those in a position to supply the 
growing West European and Japanese 
markets: Norway, the Soviet Union, 
Algeria, and Indonesia. 

Growth in two other energy sectors- 
coal and electricity— has been more 
moderate, and they comprise less than 



November 1985 



49 



ENERGY 



10% of total energy trade. While coal 
trade increased considerably in constant 
dollars from 1973 to 1983, it has stag- 
nated in recent years and has declined 
as a percentage of total energy trade. 
Electricity trade, which roughly doubled 
in constant dollar terms from 1973 to 
1983, still represents only about 1% of 
total energy trade. 

What are the constraints today on 
energy trade? Where is it being arti- 
ficially restricted by government poli- 
cies, and how might it develop if the 
constraints were removed? 

OPEC Limitations on Oil Production 

Certainly, the most significant of the 
constraints on energy trade today is the 
OPEC limitation on oil production. 
OPEC today is producing around 14 
MMBD. As'much as 10 MMBD of oil 
production capacity lies idle. No one can 
predict the price to which oil would fall 
if 10 MMBD were to be put on today's 
market, and I am not going to try. 
OPEC members will have to decide for 
themselves whether they would have 
been better off today with lower prices 
but closer to full production capacity. 
Clearly, the continued erosion of oil's 
market share poses a real threat to the 
medium-term interests of major pro- 
ducers. If oil prices had not jumped 
sharply in 1979-80 but had, instead, in- 
creased gradually at a rate of, let us 
say, 5% annually in real terms, a barrel 
today would still cost close to $25, and 
OPEC production would be, I think, 
much closer to full capacity than its pre- 
sent 14-15 MMBD. 

I am not going to assume success, 
however, in converting OPEC to free 
market principles. To the contrary, I 
think there is every reason to believe 
that OPEC, though currently strained, 
will manage to muddle through, even if 
oil prices drift marginally lower. If the 
oil market tightens in the early to 
mid-1990s, which I think it prudent to 
expect, OPEC may have another oppor- 
tunity to choose between a policy of ad- 
ministered price increases and a more 
patient and ultimately more stabilizing 
policy of allowing the market to deter- 
mine prices. 

Removing Trade Barriers 

In the meantime, it is in the interest of 
oil-consuming countries to concentrate 
mi removing barriers to energy trade 
among themselves and on achieving, 
thereby, a diversified and balanced 
energy mix. The principal forum for pur- 
suit of this objective is the International 



Energy Agency (IEA), which maintains 
a constant effort to monitor barriers to 
energy trade and to seek their removal. 
Whether IEA members will be as 
vulnerable to oil supply disruptions in 
the 1990s as they were in the 1970s 
depends in large measure on what they 
do in the next 10 years. If the IEA 
countries establish flexible, resilient, and 
transparent energy markets, based on 
an open trading system, they will 
greatly reduce the potential for eco- 
nomic harm arising from supply disrup- 
tions and associated sharp price 
increases. 

In discussing the removal of barriers 
to energy trade, I would like to take an 
American point of view and concentrate, 
first, on what is happening to make our 
own energy markets more flexible and 
resilient and, second, on what we regard 
as the principal barriers to increased 
energy trade with other OECD coun- 
tries. Three bilateral relationships are of 
particular importance to us: those with 
Canada, Japan, and Western Europe. I 
would like to discuss each of these and 
then turn to a specific issue that faces 
us all: the issue of refined product 
imports. 

Domestic Deregulation. Let me 

begin at home. The domestic energy 
market in the United States is a very 
large one. We use about 38 MMBD of 
oil equivalent— 16 MMBD of oil, more 
than 9 MMBD oil equivalent of natural 
gas, almost 9 MMBD oil equivalent of 
coal, and about 5 MMBD oil equivalent 
of nuclear and renewable energy 
sources. The U.S. Administration would 
like to see these markets freed of arti- 
ficial restrictions. President Reagan 
removed all controls on oil prices in 
1981. As a result of gradual decontrol 
over the last several years, more than 
one-half of the natural gas in the United 
States is now sold at market prices. We 
would like to remove the remaining 
natural gas price controls as soon as 
possible, but even if the required legis- 
lative action is not taken, natural gas 
prices will eventually be decontrolled in 
any case, as older gas reserves are 
depleted. From an economic point of 
view, coal and uranium are virtually 
unregulated in the United States, and 
electric utilities are being freed of many 
of the economic restrictions imposed on 
them in the past by the Federal 
Government. 

This movement toward deregulation 
has encouraged much more market- 
oriented behavior throughout the energy 
sector. Oil, natural gas, and coal are in- 
creasingly priced on a "spot" or, at 



least, market-sensitive basis. The mar- 
ket for oil futures has grown rapidly, 
and a natural gas futures market is 
about to open. The futures market 
allows participants to hedge their risks 
and, at the same time, contributes to 
market transparency by serving as an 
additional indicator of market conditions. 
Competition has heightened, and we are 
now confident that our energy system, 
on the whole, can respond freely to 
changes in supply and demand. Even in 
a supply disruption, we would avoid 
price controls and allocation and depend 
on market mechanisms to restrain de- 
mand and distribute oil. 

We would not, however, depend ex- 
clusively on market responses in an 
energy crisis. Assuring energy security, 
in our view, can justify government 
measures. The United States maintains 
a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) of 
almost 500 million barrels. We would 
use it early in a supply disruption to 
cushion our economy from the effects of 
a sharp increase in prices. Although use 
of the SPR would unquestionably repre- 
sent a government rather than market 
response, release of SPR oil would be 
by market mechanisms: the oil would be 
sold at auction to the highest bidder. 

Trade With Canada. With the free- 
ing of market forces inside the United 
States has come a change in our energy 
trade, especially with Canada. Canadian- 
U.S. energy trade, which today amounts 
to about $10 billion annually, provides a 
striking example of how market forces 
can bring mutual benefits. Canada today 
is by far our largest energy trading 
partner. It is our second largest foreign 
supplier of oil and oil products (900,000 
b/d [barrels per day]) and our number 
one foreign supplier of natural gas (26.9 
billion cubic meters per year) and elec- 
tricity (39 billion kilowatt-hours per 
year). We, in turn, are Canada's largest 
supplier of coal (20 million tons per 
year), and we export small amounts of 
crude and oil products to Canada. 

U.S.-Canadian trade is now prosper- 
ing, but this was not the case at the 
beginning of the 1980s. Government in- 
tervention on both sides of the border 
was then stifling our bilateral trade in 
natural gas and petroleum. Canadian 
gas exports to the United States were 
based on a Canadian Government- 
administered, uniform border price, 
which ceased to be competitive as a gas 
delivery surplus developed in the 
United States. As a result, Canadian 
gas sales had plummeted from 90% of 
licensed volumes in 1977 to only 43% of 



sn 



npnarlmpnl nf RtatP Rullptin 



ENERGY 



licensed levels in 1983. Following exten- 
sive bilateral discussions between the 
two governments over a 2-year period, 
the Canadian Government in the sum- 
mer of 1984 implemented a new gas ex- 
port pricing policy that allows U.S. 
buyers and their Canadian suppliers to 
negotiate directly the price at the 
border. The new market-oriented policy 
has led to a 25% drop in border prices 
(to an average of $3.26 per million Btu 
[British thermal units]), bringing great 
savings to American consumers. At the 
same time, Canadian gas exports to the 
United States this year are expected to 
increase by at least 30%, which means 
that the value of Canadian gas exports 
will increase, despite the price drop. 
Similarly, we are taking steps to 
remove barriers to U.S. -Canadian 
energy trade in general. At the Quebec 
summit last March 17-18, President 
Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister 
Mulroney agreed to give market forces 
a major boost: 

... by reducing restrictions, particularly 
those on petroleum imports and exports, and 
by maintaining open access to each other's 
energy markets, including oil, natural gas, 
electricity and coal. 

Prime Minister Mulroney fulfilled his 
commitment with respect to oil when he 
decontrolled exports to the United 
States on June 1. President Reagan 
reciprocated 2 weeks later by removing 
restrictions on the export of crude oil 
from the lower 48 states to Canada. 
Electricity trade, which is subject on 
both sides to extensive regulation, is ex- 
panding within limits imposed by the 
high costs of long-distance transmission. 
In the United States we hope to see 
Canada's uranium industry freed of cur- 
rent requirements to upgrade the ore to 
uranium hexafluoride before export. We 
also hope to see fulfilled the Canadian 
Government's pledge to remove restric- 
tions on energy investment, including 
the so-called retroactive back-in, so that 
U.S. investment is encouraged, with 
beneficial consequences for trade be- 
tween the two countries. 

Trade With Japan. Our bilateral 
energy trading relationship with Japan, 
unfortunately, is not so thriving as our 
relationship with Canada. There are 
problems on both sides. On the U.S. 
side, a major issue is the restriction, 
which amounts almost to a prohibition, 
on oil exports. There are six different 
laws in the United States that, in one 
way or another, restrict oil exports. 



Because of Canada's proximity to the 
United States and the historical rela- 
tionship between the two countries (in- 
cluding the longstanding export of oil 
from Canada to the United States), we 
have been able to allow exports of crude 
oil from the lower 48 states to Canada. 

Although the United States is a 
large net importer of oil, the Reagan 
Administration would, in principle, like 
to remove the ban on export of Alaskan 
oil because there are substantial eco- 
nomic advantages— in particular, lower 
transportation costs— in doing so. Under 
free market conditions, some Alaskan oil 
would be likely to go to Japan, Korea, 
and other Pacific rim destinations. We 
have not yet reached the point of allow- 
ing such exports, largely because of 
domestic interests that fear such a step 
would weaken U.S. energy security and 
harm our maritime fleet. The Adminis- 
tration would like to allow, under exist- 
ing legislation, export of small quantities 
of oil from the Cook Inlet area of 
Alaska. Although the limited amount of 
oil involved (less than 30,000 b/d) poses 
no significant risk to U.S. energy secu- 
rity or maritime interests, the proposal 
is controversial and has aroused some 
congressional opposition. It is still being 
discussed within the Administration. 
On the Japanese side, we see the 
major problem arising from price con- 
trols in the energy sector. Japan allows 
refiners to charge higher than market 
prices for gasoline in order to subsidize 
fuel oil and kerosene. This price control 
system would appear to make it more 
difficult for natural gas and coal, which 
are the principal competitors to fuel oil 
in the electrical sector, to penetrate the 
Japanese market. We wonder whether 
the Japanese claim that it is uneconomi- 
cal to convert more powerplants to coal 
and whether Japanese projections of 
limited growth in natural gas demand 
are due in part to artificially low fuel oil 
prices. Without price controls, the pros- 
pects for coal and natural gas demand in 
Japan might look brighter, and our 
bilateral energy trade, which already 
amounts to more than $1.5 billion per 
year, might expand significantly by the 
1990s. 

Trade With Western Europe. With 
Western Europe, our trade in oil and oil 
products faces minimal barriers on both 
sides and has grown substantially. Our 
exports of oil products to Western 
Europe have reached 205,000 b/d, and 
we import 620,000 b/d of crude and oil 
products from Western Europe. In 
sharp contrast, our coal trade with 



Western Europe has stagnated in recent 
years. There are several reasons: the 
strong dollar has made U.S. coal expen- 
sive relative to that of our Australian, 
South African, and Polish competitors; 
and the economic slowdown in Europe- 
combined with the growing availability 
of French nuclear power— has reduced 
demand for coal-generated electricity. 
European restrictions are also limiting 
the potential market. The United 
Kingdom and Germany subsidize locally 
produced coal so that it reaches the end 
user at prices equivalent to U.S. coal, 
despite significantly higher production 
costs in Europe. Although some steps 
have been taken in recent years to 
reduce these subsidies, the market for 
imports is still significantly smaller than 
it would be under free market condi- 
tions. We would like to see a real effort 
made in the next few years to put the 
West European coal market on a free 
market basis. 



An Open Market Strategy 
for Refined Product Imports 

So far, I have discussed our bilateral 
relationships with our major OECD 
energy trading partners. I would like 
now to discuss the matter of refined 
product imports. This issue concerns the 
OECD countries in general and will af- 
fect their relationship with oil-exporting 
countries for many years to come. It 
also challenges our capacity to act collec- 
tively to maintain open markets for the 
common good. 

The problem of oil product imports 
arises because of the vast overcapacity 
in the refining industry that has 
developed since 1980 and the shift of 
some refining activity from consuming 
to producing countries. Much has been 
written and said about how the global 
refining industry reached the point 
where it has 8-10 MMBD of idle refin- 
ing capacity and another 1 MMBD com- 
ing on-line in the next year or so. My 
own view is that it really does not mat- 
ter how this situation came about. The 
question is, how do we respond? Do we 
seek to protect our respective refining 
industries by erecting barriers to trade, 
or do we move toward a more open 
system and allow market forces to find 
an economic solution? 

I am pleased to say that the princi- 
pal industrialized countries, through the 
instrument of the International Energy 
Agency, have taken the first step 
toward a market-based solution— one 
that will avoid the "invidious eye" that, 



ikar -1QQK 



51 



ENERGY 



in Adam Smith's view, creates "discord 
and animosity." At a ministerial 
meeting on July 9 of this year, IEA 
member states agreed to a communique 
that calls for a "common approach 
whereby they would maintain or create 
conditions such that imported refined 
products could go to the markets of the 
different IEA countries and regions on 
the basis of supply and demand as 
determined by market forces without 
distortions." 

How are we to interpret this state- 
ment? It does not call explicitly for free 
trade or open markets, but it does, in 
our view, define open market conditions. 
This definition is contained in the phrase 
"on the basis of supply and demand as 
determined by market forces without 
distortions." We have no objection if 
Japan and Western Europe maintain 
licensing and stockholding require- 
ments—even though we do not— so long 
as those requirements are otherwise 
compatible with the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and do 
not affect the volumes and prices of oil 
product imports that would otherwise 
prevail; nor will we object to the cur- 
rent tariff levels, especially if the 
revenues are used for energy security 
purposes. 

We believe that implementation of 
the IEA "common approach" is the only 
reasonable basis for resolving the issue 
of refined product imports. If all IEA 
members— including Japan, Spain, and 
Greece— import oil products on the basis 
of supply and demand, the products 
coming from new refineries will be suffi- 
ciently dispersed to allow us all to make 
the necessary adjustments. Keeping 
those markets closed would only 
strengthen protectionist pressures else- 
where and lead to a wave of new 
restrictions that would leave all of us in 
the OECD worse off. 

Such a protectionist wave would also 
damage the interests of oil-producing 
countries, especially those that have in- 
vested in downstream operations. In our 
view, the interests of both producers 
and consumers lie in the direction of 
open markets. We in the OECD are do- 
ing our part, and the IEA plans to 
monitor carefully the implementation of 
the ministerial agreement. At the same 
time, we expect oil producers to avoid 
subsidies to their refineries and to en- 
sure that uneconomic operations are not 
artificially maintained. Some producing 
countries appear to be maintaining 
energy resource prices below market 
levels in order to benefit export-oriented 
refiners and petrochemical producers. 



This practice has given rise in the 
United States to calls for legislation to 
take account of so-called natural re- 
source subsidies in countervailing duty 
procedures. It would be preferable for 
producers to eliminate such subsidies, 
where they exist, before legal or legisla- 
tive actions are taken in the United 
States and, perhaps, elsewhere. 

The Developing World's Future 
Role in Energy Trade 

Finally, I would like to turn to the 
world outside OPEC and the OECD. 
What is its future role in energy trade? 
Here I am thinking primarily of the 
non-OPEC developing countries. Despite 
the strong growth in oil production in 
non-OPEC developing countries during 
the past decade, there is still potential 
for increased oil and natural gas produc- 
tion and exports. Egypt, Mexico, Oman, 
Angola, Malaysia, and other nonmem- 
bers of OPEC have expanded their oil 
production. In today's market, the ques- 
tion is whether they can capture the 
slow growth in demand— perhaps 1% per 
year— that can be expected between 
now and the year 2000 and, perhaps, 
also compete for OPEC's declining 
market share. A similar problem faces 
gas producers: are they willing to com- 
pete aggressively? Algeria has yet to 
develop into the major gas supplier its 
potential would indicate. A more 
market-oriented approach to gas sales 
might enable Algeria and other gas sup- 
pliers to slow Soviet penetration of the 
West European market. 

Of particular importance to future 
oil and gas production in developing 
countries is their attitude toward 
foreign investment, which can be viewed 
either as a threat or as an opportunity. 
I would suggest that the threat is 
minimal and the opportunity is great. 
Brazil, which has been expanding pro- 
duction very rapidly, has been doing so 
essentially without foreign equity par- 
ticipation. Despite Petrobas' [Brazilian 
State petroleum company] remarkable 



and highly laudable effort, it would take ) 
a long time, at the current rate of activ- 
ity, to explore all of Brazil thoroughly. 
Is it not wiser to speed up the process 
and to spread the risk? Brazil by 1990 
will be almost energy independent if 
current plans are fulfilled. Could it not 
become an oil exporter, as well, by en- 
couraging foreign investment in its 
hydrocarbon sector? 

If developing countries do take a 
more market-oriented point of view and 
if they accept foreign investment, the 
developed countries will have to re- 
double their efforts against protec- 
tionism. The "invidious eye" will be all 
too ready to see national interests 
threatened and to ask for protective 
quotas or tariffs. A coal mine in 
Colombia— one with a potential capacity 
in the year 2000 of less than 5% of U.S. 
coal production— has already led to 
serious coal tariff proposals in the 
United States. So far, we have been 
successful in fending off these proposals. 
In the past year, we have also seen pro- 
posals for an oil tariff, for oil product 
quotas, for restrictions on natural gas 
imports, and for relief for our domestic 
uranium industry. It is the Administra- 
tion's policy to resist proposals of this 
sort and to try to keep our energy 
markets open to fair competition. 

Our job will be much easier if we 
can point to a broad consensus in favor 
of open markets, free trade, and 
equitable treatment for foreign in- 
vestors. It is unrealistic to expect our 
markets to remain open if others are 
closed or if others subsidize their prod- 
ucts or restrict foreign investment. We 
would like to see the kind of commit- 
ment we have undertaken with 
Canada— to reduce restrictions and 
maintain open access to energy markets 
and energy investment— spread to other 
countries, both developed and develop- 
ing, and become a world standard for 
energy commerce. If we succeed, energy 
trade will become "a bond of union and 
friendship" that contributes to the 
prosperity and security of all our 
countries. ■ 



•,r*mor-,t nf QtatO RllllPtin 






[UROPE 



'President Meets With 
Soviet Foreign Minister 




Following is the news briefing by 
Secretary Shultz which he held at the 
inclusion of a meeting between Presi- 
ient Reagan and Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the 
Mite House on September 27, 1985. 1 

he President held a lengthy meeting- 
hours or so— with Foreign Minister 
ihevardnadze today and then had him 
or lunch in the White House. 

Q. Can you tell us if there was a 
new proposal or if Mr. Shevardnadze 
-said he would soon offer a new pro- 
posal on arms reduction? 

A. The sequence of the meeting was 
that, first, the President presented a 
comprehensive view of his thoughts 
labout the upcoming meeting in Geneva, 
and then Mr. Shevardnadze gave the 
President a lengthy letter from General 
Secretary Gorbachev. The letter was in 
Russian, and it was rather lengthy, so, 
obviously, it wasn't read. But Mr. 
Shevardnadze talked about it and 
described it as giving Mr. Gorbachev's 
views about the upcoming Geneva 
meeting, including some material in the 
field of arms control, which is, ob- 
viously, an important part of all of this. 

The counterproposal that they have 
to what we have on the table in Geneva 
will, we understand, be presented in 2 
days of plenary session in Geneva next 
week, although the general outlines 
were described to us. 



There were many other matters 
discussed and referred to in terms of 
our bilateral relations and in regional 
matters. So that was, in general, the 
nature of the meeting. 

Q. What was our reaction, and 
can you tell us what generally was in 
their proposal? 

A. I think the right thing to happen 
now is for their counterproposal to be 
placed on the table in Geneva and for it 
to be discussed there in the privacy of 
that negotiating forum. If we're going to 
really make progress in these negotia- 
tions, they ought to be conducted there 
and by the negotiators. I'm not going to 
characterize the general sense that was 
presented to us beyond simply saying 
that there were some materials 
presented. 

Q. Does that satisfy what we were 
told yesterday, that the President was 
hoping that there would be a new pro- 
posal? In other words, does it con- 
stitute a full proposal, in your judg- 
ment, or just a bit here and a piece 
there? 

A. The President welcomed what 
was put before him, as he did some of 
the other things that were said. The 
fullness of the proposal, of course, we'll 
have to judge when we see it in 
Geneva. Anything that is genuinely 
serious in this field is complicated, and 



they have asked for 2 days of plenary 
session to do it, so we'll have to see 
what's there— our negotiators will. 

Q. Sometimes in the past when the 
Soviets have made proposals, they 
have been discounted very quickly by 
this country as propaganda, as not 
serious. Would it be fair to say, then, 
that you regard this proposal as 
serious? 

A. It is something that comes for- 
ward; it's different from what they have 
been saying, and we look for it to be 
put on the table in Geneva, and com- 
bined with what we have on the table, 
we hope that can lead to a process of 
genuine negotiation. So we welcome 
that. 

Q. You take it seriously? 

A. We welcome the fact that 
something has been brought forward, or 
will be in Geneva, to lay alongside what 
we have put there and which, with 
those two together, can be a basis of 
negotiation. 

Q. Have you discussed the 
possibility of follow-up talks after 
your talks this afternoon, either with 
Mr. Shevardnadze in Moscow or in 
Geneva or here? 

A. We haven't had any particular 
discussion of that. We have a schedule 
so far, but when I talked with Mr. 
Shevardnadze in New York, we had a 
fairly lengthy private conversation as 
well as the general one. I think both of 
us see a responsibility to help develop 
the preparatory work for this meeting 
in Geneva, and we're going to try to get 
organized to see that that's done prop- 
erly. It doesn't necessarily have to be 
done by the two Foreign Ministers; but, 
at any rate, we're certainly addressing 
that. 

Q. In the interest of just public 
understanding, since the Soviets have 
been leaking a lot of details all week 
and there's been a lot of reporting 
about 40% reduction and 60% in land- 
based, and for the first time really 
being specific about chargers- 
meaning warheads— were those reports 
misleading, or were those along the 
lines of Soviet thinking? Can you give 
us some help on that, since so much 
of it's been out in the public fora? 

A. The President is very serious 
about arms control and very serious 
about wanting to see the upcoming 
meeting in Geneva be a constructive and 
positive one. We believe that the 
chances of getting somewhere in arms 
control are maximized, if we don't have 
a lot of public things to say about it, 



November 1985 



53 



EUROPE 



and let the negotiators handle it in 
Geneva. So I'm not going to— 

Q. Except that the other side is 
being public. That's why I'm asking 
you if you can be. 

A. We are being serious. 

Q. Are they not being serious? 
A. We'll see. 

Q. Could you tell us if there is an 
agreement not to publicize this pro- 
posal until it's been discussed 
privately, or is it likely that the 
Soviets themselves will put it out as 
part of this public relations campaign 
leading up to the summit? 

A. I am not going to try to speak 
for them. Our approach to this is the 
approach that, in our estimate, is most 
likely to lead to results, that approach is 
to have serious, well-informed people, as 
they do, in Geneva and to focus the 
attention of them on our proposal and 
their counterproposal and see if we can 
get somewhere with it and that's the 
way I'm going to leave it. 

Q. Were you generally pleased 
with what you heard and saw from 
the Soviets today, or was this— what 
they put before us— in any way a sur- 
prise to you? 

A. It's part of an ongoing and 
perhaps more stepped-up process now of 
discussions between us. The President 
had an opportunity to say to Mr. Gor- 
bachev through his Foreign Minister 
how he views our relationship and the 
prospects for it and the prospects for 
that meeting. And so that's an impor- 
tant result as far as we're concerned. 
And he heard, so to speak, from Mr. 
Gorbachev through a very authoritative 
source. 

That is what happened today, and I 
met with Mr. Shevardnadze in New 
York, as you know, and in Helsinki, and 
I'll meet with him again this afternoon. 
We have an ongoing process here 
di'signed to make the meeting in 
November as productive as possible. 
How productive it will be remains to be 
seen. 

Q. He said that the President- 
there were statements by Mr. Shevard- 
nadze that the President welcomed 
other than those on arms control. Can 
you describe any of them? 

A. The general structure of the 
meeting I think we both agree on. We 
will have discussions of security issues, 
of which there are a number, other than 
the Geneva nuclear and space arms 
talks. We'll have discussions of regional 
problems. We'll have discussions of 



bilateral matters, and you can be certain 
that the President, as he did today, will 
always bring up the subject of human 
rights and express the importance which 
we attach to it. 

That is in general the outline of 
these discussions, and we will be trying 
to fill in there in our more detailed 
discussions. 

Q. You mentioned something 
about discussion of the new Soviet 
leadership which is new on style but 
not very new on policy. With this new 
counterproposal, do you get the feel- 
ing that there is new policy emerging 
from this leadership? 

A. The counterproposal is different 
from the position that they have been 
taking. And, so, we welcome that. 

Obviously the people who decided it 
are the new leadership. Whether the old 
leadership would have made the same 
decision or not, I don't know. There's no 
way to tell. I do think that the situa- 
tion, as a situation, should call forth ef- 
forts on both sides to try to get firmer 
control over nuclear arsenals and get 
them down to more manageable shape— 
and as the President has emphasized 
and as the Soviets have said— eventually 
to get them down to zero, eliminate 
them. 

Q. Would you call this counter- 
proposal a dramatic departure? 

A. I'm not going to characterize it, 
other than to say it's a change in their 
position. And we welcome that. And it 
will be put on the table in Geneva in 
much more full form than it's possible to 
do in a meeting such as we had. And 
we'll have to evaluate it when we see 
its full detail. 

Q. Could you at least clarify if the 
way the proposal is different concerns 
their attitudes about SDI [Strategic 
Defense Initiative]? 

A. I don't want to go into detail 
about it. I can say that the President is 
the same in private as he is in public. 
That is, he insists on the importance of 
finding out whether, through the needed 
research and testing, it is possible to de- 
fend against ballistic missiles. And we 
are doing so in a manner that is per- 
fectly consistent with the ABM [Anti- 
ballistic Missile] Treaty. The President 
has said that publicly, as you know. And 
I can tell you that he says that pri- 
vately as well. 

Q. Could you just explain if the 
Soviets have changed their position? 

A. I don't want to describe the 
Soviet position or get started conducting 



a negotiation, so to speak, in public. I 
think the place to do it is in Geneva. 

Q. You said that Mr. Gorbachev, 
through his Foreign Minister, had a 
chance to express the prospects and 
how he views the prospects. Are those 
prospects coincident with the views of 
this Administration, or do you see 
someplace where there is an obstacle 
or a hurdle? 

A. In terms of words, I think both 
say that we recognize the great dif- 
ference between the systems, as 
represented by the Soviet Union and 
the United States. We're very different 
economies, different societies, different 
political systems, and so on. 

But it is important, if we can do so, 
to work out a way in which we have a 
more stable relationship between us. 
The President says that and, through 
his Foreign Minister, Mr. Gorbachev 
said that here today. 

I can't really characterize the letter. 
I probably shouldn't anyway, because 
we haven't got it translated and read 
yet. 

Q. A senior Administration 
official, in this room yesterday, said 
that even if the Soviets were to bring 
a fresh proposal today, it was 
unrealistic to expect that it might be 
acted on and resolved before the 
meeting. Have you heard at least a 
general outline of this fresh proposal? 
And do you share that assessment? 

A. The subject is complicated, and 
the amount of time between now and 
the middle of November is not very 
large. Nevertheless, as far as the 
United States is concerned, we are 
there in Geneva, our negotiators are 
very well prepared, and we're ready to 
work at this and achieve as much as can 
possibly be achieved, although we don't 
believe in getting put in the position 
where, because of the deadline of a 
meeting, we are tempted to agree to 
something that we might think is 
unwise. We'll push the negotiations as 
hard as we can, get as far as we can, 
and we'll just have to wait and see. But 
certainly we want to see the November 
meeting be as productive a one as 
possible. 

Q. Along with this difference in 
the substance of their proposal, was 
there also a difference in mood, in at- 
mosphere, that they brought to this 
meeting? 

A. The discussions were very 
straightforward discussions, and I think 
that what problems we have are not 
problems of inability to communicate. 



nnnartmonl nf QtatP Rllllptin 



■. Shevardnadze is a very easy person 
talk to. In terms of atmosphere there 
s no special problems. 

Q. Is there an agreement now, 
etty much, on what the agenda at 
e meeting will be? 

A. I think broadly as I outlined it. 
id, of course, we'll have to work in 
jre details. I think also, as I think we 
ve said and as I think they also have 
id, in addition to discussing current 
ings and whatever may be 
complished to ratify there, we also 
int to focus on the future and try to 
t out an agenda for the future. That, 
a general way, is the overall shape of 

Q. Does the general agreement on 
e agenda extend to the Soviets 
peeing that human rights should be 
scussed, and could you characterize 

more detail today's discussion on 
iman rights? 

A. I think it's better not to get into 
■tail on the subject, but I would only 
y to you that it is a subject that the 
•esident and all of us feel very 
rongly about and so it will be dis- 
ssed by us. 

Q. Was there a substantive discus- 
on of bilateral and regional issues 
•dav and could you discuss that for 

n? 

A. It was impossible to get into any 
irticular detail on any of those mat- 
rs, except to take note of them, of 
leir importance, the role they play in 
ds meeting. Of course, in the bilateral 
•ea there are some readily identifiable 
.atters that you're familiar with, where 
>e are working, and I think there is— 
lould be— an ability to come to some 
mclusion. You never know until you've 
it it, but certainly the ingredients are 
iiere to do so. 

Q. Without going into detail on 
tie Soviet counterproposal, could you 
t least tell us whether it encompasses 
oth offensive and defensive weapons? 

A. I'm not going to characterize it 
K all. I'm just going to leave it in the 
►osture that I left it. 

Q. Could you tell us if the Presi- 
tent said anything about the United 
States continuing to abide by the 
erms of the ABM Treaty, and 
whether that was a subject raised by 
he Soviets? 

A. We discussed the ABM Treaty 
tnd various aspects of it. The President 
las said many times that the program 



that we're conducting is, in our view, 
consistent with the ABM Treaty. 

Q. Who raised the matter? 

A. I can't say for sure just who 
raised the matter, but it was discussed. 
Whether it came up in terms of the 
ABM Treaty or the Krasnyarsk radar, 
or just how— but anyway, we discussed 
it for a little bit. 

Q. Is it your understanding that as 
a result of this meeting, the arms con- 
trol discussions have moved out of the 
public realm and into a more serious 
realm at this point? Do you expect the 
public discussions of the various pro- 
posals in the propaganda battle that's 
been going on to be over now? 

A. I believe that the chances of suc- 
cess in negotiations are maximized by 
having them take place privately in 
Geneva. Whether that is what will 
happen remains to be seen. That's the 
way we're going about it. We have 
basically said publicly the broad nature 
of what we have on the table, but we 
are prepared for those discussions in 
Geneva, and we think that's the place to 
hold them. If we wind up with public 
discussion and negotiation through press 
statements and so forth, I think it's not 
as likely to be productive. I'm on in- 
structions from the President of not 
doing so. 

Q. Was there any exploration 
today of Mr. Shevardnadze's comment 
in his UN speech that under certain 
conditions they might accept interna- 
tional as well as national means of 
verification? 

A. We discussed the subject of 
verification and its importance and 
agreed on the importance of that subject 
and the need to address it. The Presi- 
dent welcomed that. 

Q. Do you see any shift in the 
Soviet position, in Mr. Shevardnadze's 
comments? 

A. You'd have to get into much 
more detail than we did today to see 
the extent to which particular kinds of 
verification might be possible, including 
more intrusive kinds. Those are the 
ones that are ticklish. 

Q. Did you discuss SALT II? 

A. What the President has said con- 
sistently is that the research program 
that we have underway is concistent 
with the terms of the ABM Treaty. 
We're not contemplating an amendment 
to it. 

Q. Did Mr. Shevardnadze indicate 
any new flexibility on their part on 
what they would accept as research? 



EUROPE 



A. I'm not going to discuss the 
possible negotiating elements in the 
nuclear and space arms talks. Whatever 
nuances there may lie, it's up to the 
negotiators to talk about. 

Q. But since you've said over and 
over again that we think it important 
not to publicly negotiate this issue 
and that whole idea's been expressed 
many times in statements from here 
in the last few weeks, did the Presi- 
dent raise this as an objection in the 
meeting or voice the same sort of ex- 
pressions of disappointment that have 
been voiced by spokesmen here about 
public Soviet proposals as opposed to 
presenting them in Geneva? 

A. I think he used the word TASS 
once or twice and there was discussion 
of that. 

Q. When you said there was a 
discussion about things, are you sug- 
gesting that things didn't follow along 
a very carefully scripted format? In 
other words, there just wasn't reading 
back and forth, but real deal dialogue. 

A. What we had was a presentation 
by the President; it was a comprehen- 
sive presentation— a presentation by Mr. 
Shevardnadze that followed his presen- 
tation of the letter and which was, in a 
sense I suppose, a description of the 
letter. I can't say that because I haven't 
read it yet, but that is the general idea. 
Then there followed a conversation for 
quite a while, I suppose about half of 
the time in the Oval Office, and the con- 
versation went from one subject to 
another as the two principles wished. 
Others in the meeting interjected now 
and then. What we had was a general 
sort of discussion of various topics and 
in a mode where people said something 
and you said something back. In other 
words, people weren't just making ran- 
dom declaratory sentences. In that 
sense it was an exchange and that's 
good. 

Q. Did they discuss SALT II and 
possible extension of SALT II? 
A. No. 

Q. Were those two presentations 
read and did the two men at the end 
of the session spend time alone 
without the rest of you with just the 
translators? 

A. Each person had some notes or 
cards and talked— in other words, had 
thought through beforehand what each 
was going to say, but talked in a con- 
versational way. They weren't just 
reading things. As far as the format is 
concerned, the President did spend 



55 



EUROPE 



some private time after the general 
meeting concluded with Mr. Shevard- 
nadze alone with the interpreters and 
then came over— 

Q. How much time? 

A. I think 10 or 15 minutes, 
something like that. 

Q. Can you give us any general 
characterization of what they dis- 
cussed during that time? 

A. No, I can't. 

Q. The same things the President 
discussed with Mr. Gromyko— the 
same general area of the personal 
view of world peace and what needed 
to be done? 

A. I don't have any characterization 
of it. 

Q. The United States seems to be 
preoccupied with the prospect of new 
mobile missiles in the Soviet Union 
almost as much as they are with the 
prospect of SDI. Did the President 
raise that concern, and what did you 
say about it? 

A. We are concerned, of course, 
about the implications for strategic 
stability of the increased accuracy with 
MIRVed [multiple independently - 
targetable reentry vehicles] missiles that 
are mobile and, in fact, that set of 
developments is one of the motive 
powers for seeking a defense against 
ballistic missiles. That is part of the 
presentation that we've made to the 
Soviet Union quite a number of times. 

Q. Was there a suggestion in those 
remarks that if they move or agree to 
move more slowly on that or to make 
changes in their program so that the 
United States would find a defensive 
program less urgent? 

A. I'm not going to discuss the 
question of proposals and counter- 
proposals and what might be said. I 
think that kind of thing is for the people 
in Geneva to talk about. But the Presi- 
dent has, as 1 said before, said in public 
and in private that he feels it is 
absolutely necessary to find out whether 
or not it is possible to defend against 
ballistic missiles and the program of 
research and testing that we con- 
template, we believe, is ((insistent with 
the ABM Treaty. 

Q. You have said, the President 
said, that the program that he has fits 
under the ABM Treaty. The Soviets 
have said it doesn't. Is there any nar- 
rowing of the gap in terms of our 
interpretations of what's legal under 
the treaty from your talks on Wednes- 
day and from the talks today? 



A. No, this is the sort of thing that, 
it seems to me, deserves intensive 
discussion in Geneva. 

Q. You said no, that there hasn't 
been any narrowing? 

A. The subject has been discussed, 
and there was no resolution to it, 
obviously. 



Q. Do you expect the defection of 
the KGB agent to have any impact on 
U.S.-Soviet relations? 

A. I have no comment on that 
subject. 



^ress release 232 of Oct. 1. 



Visit of Danish Prime Minister 



H/JI 






y *~ Ifl 


■£*""" 


i 


v^'/b 









Prime Minister Poul Schluter of the 
Kingdom of Denmark made an official 
visit to Washington, D.C., September 
9-11, 1985, to meet with ['rest/lent 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Schluter at the arrival ceremony on 
September 10. ' 

President Reagan 

Prime Minister Schluter, Mrs. Schluter, 
today it's a great pleasure to welcome 
you. 

Denmark is an old friend and an 
ally, in NATO and an active trading 
partner; ties between our two countries 
run long and deep. Denmark recognized 
the United States as a free and inde- 
pendent nation shortly after our Decla- 
ration of Independence. Ever since that 
act of friendship, relations between the 
Danish and American people have con- 
tinued to grow to our mutual benefit. 
Commerce between our two countries, 
for example, has been a boon on both 
sides of the Atlantic, underscoring the 
need for free and open international 
trade. 

I look forward to discussing with 
you the need to Strengthen and broaden 
the international trading system, 



perhaps through a new round of com- 
prehensive trade negotiations. At a time 
when our countries are enjoying improv 
ing economic conditions, protectionism 
looms as a threat. Working together, w< 
can see to it that our international 
markets stay open and that this avenue 
to progress and well-being is not 
blocked. 

In the past century, many Danes inr 
migrated here to look for the American 
dream. With their hard work and good 
citizenship, they not only made that 
dream real, they helped build a great 
nation as well. So many Danes came 
here around the turn of the century, in 
fact, it's said that every Dane in Den- 
mark has a relative in America. 
Whether that's true or not, clearly we 
are of the same family of free peoples. 
We're bound together by our common 
dedication to the principles of human 
liberty and our mutual commitment to 
the preservation of peace. Our countriei 
have both recognized that the blessings 
of peace can only be secured by free 
peoples who are strong and stand 
together. This fundamental truth is at 
the heart of the NATO alliance in whicl 
Denmark has played an active role for 
nearly four decades. The collective 
deterrence of NATO has given Denmar 
and all of Europe 40 years of peace. Wt 
in the United States are proud to have 
played a role in preserving European 
peace and are grateful that Denmark 
has committed its moral weight and 
made a military contribution to the suc- 
cess of the Western alliance. 

As we face new and complex 
challenges to our mutual security, it is 
ever more important that we reaffirm 
the trust and friendship which has 
served us so well. By strengthening otu 
common defense and standing united in 
our efforts to achieve effective and 
verifiable arms reductions, we can mak< 
ours a safer planet. We can, must, and 
will have not just four decades of peace 
but a century of peace— a more stable 
peace which is what we want most next 



nornrtmon) nf Qtato Rollptir 






) the preservation of our own freedom, 
nd independence will not be secured 
y wishful thinking or public relations 
impaigns; free people must be mature, 
igilant, and stand in solidarity. 

We have already reached out in the 
luse of a safer world on numerous 
ccasions, and we will continue to do so. 
fe have offered to reduce the number 
f intermediate-range missiles in Europe 
) zero. We have offered major reduc- 
ons in strategic and intermediate 
eapons as well as a lowering of the 
vel of conventional forces. We look for- 
ard to the coming meeting in Geneva, 
ot for an end of all that has been 
rong between East and West but a 
eginning point for better relations, a 
tailing point for progress. 

I'm certain you agree with me that 
emocratic governments are naturally 
iclined toward peace. Freedom brings 
eople of diverse backgrounds together 
s friends. I hope that during the time 
ou spend in the United States you'll 
eel, through our welcome to you, the 
armth and friendship that Americans 
hare for the Danish people. 

Perhaps something that best ex- 
mplifies this is the unique Fourth of 
uly celebration that takes place every 
ear in Denmark. In the hills of Rebild, 
housands of Danes and Americans 
elebrate together the birth of the 
United States and the values we share, 
he American and Danish flags fly 
ogether in honor of democracy and 
reedom. 

We had the wonderful pleasure— 
*Jancy and I— of sharing that day in 
Denmark in 1972 when we personally 
mrticipated in the Rebild Fourth of 
luly festivities. And the warmth and 
riendship we felt that day reflected 
something between our two peoples that 
is very special, and we shall never 
brget it. 

It's an honor for me at this time to 
return to you the good will and 
lospitality that was extended to us 
then. On behalf of all of our citizens, 
welcome to America. 

'Prime Minister Schluter 

H wish to thank you for your very kind 
words of welcome. 

Relations between Denmark and the 
United States of America have always 
Ibeen close and friendly. When Denmark, 
as early as in 1801, established 
diplomatic relations with the United 
States, we were among the very first 
countries to do so. Over the years, the 
dynamic creativity of the new nation 



tempted, as you mentioned, thousands 
of Danes looking for challenges and op- 
portunities. The contribution by Danish 
immigrants to the building of America 
has been one of the pillars of Danish- 
American relations. 

The American engagement in 
Europe in two World Wars and 
American support for European 
recovery after World War II have 
become basic elements in our relation- 
ship in the second half of the 20th cen- 
tury. The presence of American troops 
in Europe is visible proof of the U.S. 
commitment to the Atlantic alliance, 
which, for almost four decades now, has 
protected its members against war and 
secured their freedom. The solidarity of 
the Atlantic alliance has also provided 
the necessary background for our 
endeavors to seek a more secure and 
confident relationship between East and 
West. 

We wish that the upcoming meeting 
in November with General Secretary 
Gorbachev will lead to the beginning of 



23d Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
SEPT. 3, 1985 1 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am 
submitting herewith a bimonthly report on 
progress toward a negotiated settlement of 
the Cyprus question. 

Since my previous report, United Nations 
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has con- 
tinued his efforts, begun last fall, to obtain 
the two Cypriot communities' acceptance of 
an agreement containing the elements of a 
comprehensive Cyprus settlement. He 
endeavored to overcome the difficulties that 
had arisen during the January 1985 summit 
meeting by incorporating components of the 
documentation into the consolidated draft 
agreement. His expressed intention was to 
bring greater clarity to its various elements 
and to devise procedural arrangements for 
follow-up action, while preserving the 
substance of the documentation. The 
Secretary General reported to the Security 
Council in June, a copy of which is attached, 
that the Greek Cypriot side had replied 
affirmatively to his revised documentation 
and that he was awaiting the Turkish 
Cypriot response to his efforts. The 
Secretary General added that, "provided 
both sides manifest the necessary goodwill 
and co-operation, an agreement can be reach- 
ed without further delay." 

The Turkish Cypriots postponed replying 
to the Secretary General while they pro- 

c I. '.I with a constitutional referendum on 

May 5, a presidential election on June 9, and 



EUROPE 



a more constructive East-West relation- 
ship, benefiting the United States, the 
Soviet Union, the alliance, and the 
world. 

We all have, as you also expressed, 
one major goal in common— survival. As 
free societies, we have always been able 
to discuss openly; a free and open 
debate serves mutual understanding and 
unity in cooperation. 

You have not only been a strong 
supporter of NATO; I would also like to 
pay tribute to your support of our 
economy. Protectionism is indeed, as 
you have said, destructionism. 

I'm looking very much forward to 
our talks today and to meet members of 
the American Administration. 



'Held at the South Portico of the White 
House, where the Prime Minister was 
accorded a formal welcome with full military 
honors (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 16, 1985). ■ 



parliamentary elections on June 23. The 
Turkish Cypriots stated that the referendum 
and elections would not preclude their par- 
ticipation in a federal Cypriot state. We have 
repeatedly registered with both communities 
our conviction that actions which might 
impede the Secretary General's efforts to 
negotiate an agreement should be avoided 
and have reiterated our policy of not recog- 
nizing a separate Turkish Cypriot "state." 

Since my last report to you, American 
officials in Cyprus have met regularly with 
leaders of both Cypriot communities. Depart- 
ment of State Special Cyprus Coordinator 
Richard Haass visited Cyprus, Greece, and 
Turkey in July. He discussed the Cyprus 
issue with the two Cypriot parties and the 
Governments of Greece and Turkey and 
expressed our support for the Secretary 
General's initiative. We continue to urge flex- 
ibility by all parties and are encouraged that 
they continue to support a negotiated settle- 
ment under the Secretary General's good 
offices mandate. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



■Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugar, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 9, 1985). ■ 



November 1985 



57 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Human Rights and U.S.-Soviet Relations 



by Michael //. Armacost 

Address before the International 
Council oj the World Conference on 
Soviet Jewry on September 9, 1985. 
Ambassador Armacost is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. 

It is a great honor to be your speaker 
this evening. I bring you greetings from 
the Secretary of State who, along with 
all Americans, shares your deep concern 
about the plight of Soviet Jewry. I 
should like to address my remarks this 
evening to the human rights situation in 
the Soviet Union and the impact this 
has on U.S.-Soviet relations. 

The State of U.S.-Soviet Relations 

First, a comment about the state of 
U.S.-Soviet relations. The world is 
awash with commentary on the subject 
as preparations intensify for the 
November meeting between President 
Reagan and General Secretary Gorba- 
chev. The question leaders on both sides 
must address is whether the basis for a 
more durable U.S.-Soviet rapprochement 
can be established. A distinguished Har- 
vard historian, Adam Ulam, has re- 
cently commented that: "What con- 
cretely upsets . . . Americans about the 
U.S.S.R. is what the Kremlin does, and 
what must be a continuing source of ap- 
prehension to the latter springs from 
what America is." 

American hopes for detente in the 
1970s foundered on Soviet efforts to 
achieve geopolitical advantage in Indo- 
china, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghani- 
stan; to back an ti- American forces in 
Central America and the Caribbean; to 
quash attempts at liberalization in 
Poland; and to build military forces 
beyond any reasonable need for defense. 

If there is to be real improvement in 
the relationship, these underlying diffi- 
culties must be addressed. For our part, 
we are determined to make such an 
effort. The task is great. 

• A basis must be found for resolv- 
ing through political means such re- 
gional issues as Afghanistan. It is not, 
after all, weapons themselves that cause 
wars but political actions. 

• In coping with problems of arms 
competition, propagandistic offers of 
moratoria are not the answer. The test 
is whether we can achieve major, stabil- 
izing reductions in offensive nuclear 



arms now, while examining whether in 
the future deterrence can rely more 
heavily on defense than on threats of 
mutual annihilation. 

• In our bilateral relations the range 
of mutually beneficial contacts and ex- 
changes must be expanded. 

Moreover, there is the burden on 
our relations imposed by the way Soviet 
authorities treat their own people. We 
raise human rights questions with our 
Soviet counterparts not to score de- 
bating points, nor to achieve political ad- 
vantage, but because of the kind of peo- 
ple we are. Freedom is fundamental in 
our society. Americans have always at- 
tempted to hold the torch of freedom 
alive not merely for themselves but for 
others around the world. It is to this 
subject that I would like to turn. 

Deterioration of the 
Human Rights Situation 

In recent years the Soviet human rights 
situation has deteriorated sharply. In 
1980, Andrey Sakharov was exiled from 
Moscow and placed under house arrest, 
Jewish emigration was cut in half, and 
the KGB began moving even more 
freely against dissident activists. 

The KGB, under Chairman Yuri 
Andropov, refined existing techniques of 
repression and developed more sophisti- 
cated but no less harsh measures. 

• Many prominent dissidents were 
allowed or forced to emigrate. 

• Others were arrested on criminal 
charges or confined in psychiatric 
hospitals. 

• Induction of would-be Jewish emi- 
grants into the military enabled authori- 
ties cynically to claim reasons of "state 
security" to denv them permission to 
leave the U.S.S.R. 

• The criminal code was revised to 
make repression of dissidents less cum- 
bersome and more brazen. 

• Intimidation of Western journal- 
ists was stepped up to stop their report- 
ing about dissidents. 

Why was the repression intensified? 
Internal and external causes seem to 
have been at play. At home, Moscow 
faced serious problems— an inefficient 
economy, social malaise, troubles in the 
empire from Poland to Afghanistan, and, 
until recently, immobility in the leader- 
ship. Abroad, the Soviet regime faced 
more steadfast resistance by the West 



r 



and in the Third World following its in- 
vasion of Afghanistan and crackdown in 
Poland. 

One way Soviet authorities reacted 
to these problems was to intensify con- 
trol and repression at home and cut 
back contacts between their citizens andl 
the outside world. Arrests of dissidents 
increased. All forms of emigration were 
reduced dramatically. Jewish emigra- 
tion—which peaked in 1979 at over 
51,000— had fallen by last year to below 
900. A similar fate befell Germans and 
Armenians living in the U.S.S.R. 

Soviet leaders sanctioned renewed 
manifestations of anti-Semitism. In cut- 
ting off the safety valve of Jewish emi- !| 
gration, Soviet authorities may have 
brought upon themselves a new upsurge 
of religious and national consciousness in 
one of the U.S.S.R.'s most assimilated 
minority communities. 

They embarked on a campaign of ar- 
resting and convicting teachers of the 
Hebrew language and others in the fore- 
front of this new awareness and iden- 
tity. Since July 1984 at least 16 Jewish 
cultural activists, including 9 Hebrew 
teachers, have been arrested. Thirteen 
have been convicted, several on crudely 
trumped-up criminal charges. Soviet 
authorities have planted drugs in the 
apartments of two of them, a pistol and 
ammunition in the apartment of a third. 
Yet another was convicted for stealing 
books he had borrowed from a syna- 
gogue library. Three were beaten fol- 
lowing their arrests; one, Iosif Beren- 
shtein, was virtually blinded. 

Many Jews have also been fired 
from their jobs or had their apartments 
searched, phones disconnected, or mail 
seized. Soviet newspapers and television 
have branded Hebrew teachers and 
other Jewish cultural activists as 
"Zionist" subversives. Zionism has been 
equated with nazism. World War II 
Jewish leaders have been accused of 
helping the Nazis round up Jews for the 
death camps. 

A notorious episode in this campaign 
was the recent stage-managed television 
recantation of convicted Moscow He- 
brew teacher Dan Shapiro. Shapiro was 
given a suspended sentence after agree- 
ing to condemn publicly the movement 
with which he had become so closely 
associated. Reportedly, he did so after 
threats to charge him with treason and 
sentence him to death. The choice that 
Dan Shapiro faced was an extreme form 
of the dilemma facing Soviet Jews to- 
day. How does one survive in an envi- 
ronment in which the authorities are not 
constrained by the rule of law? 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Unofficial religious activity is cur- 
ntly the most vigorous form of dissent 
the U.S.S.R., but it has been hit hard 
ross the board. In addition to Jews, 
e Ukrainian Uniates, Lithuanian 
jman Catholics, and unregistered Bap- 
its and Pentecostalists have come in 
severe repression. 
Nor has there been progress on the 
ses of major human rights figures 
ch as Audrey Sakharov and his wife, 
jlena Bonner, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, 
d Yuriy Orlov. Dr. Sakharov, in 
reed and isolated exile in the closed 
ty of Gorkiy, was apparently abducted 
om his apartment last spring after 
^ginning another hunger strike, this 
ne to resurface in a cynical yet sadly 
lignant KGB film showing him eating 
a hospital bedroom. What his true 
ndition is today we cannot say. Just 
;t week Vasyl Stus, a leading member 
the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring 
roup, died tragically in a Soviet labor 
mp. 

We look for signs of progress on 
iman rights, but the evidence is not 
icouraging. Monthly emigration figures 
is year have been up slightly one 
onth and down the next— to be sure, 
1 at a very low level. Whether these 
ictuations represent anomalies or a 

^liberate tease is unclear. 

In a slightly more positive vein, one 

| our long-time dual national cases was 

j 'solved this spring, and three long- 
anding cases involving the spouses of 

■ merican citizens have also been re- 
lived. While we welcome these ges- 

I ires— however calculated or isolated— 
any more cases remain unresolved, 
eanwhile, the arrest of Hebrew 

I achers, religious believers, and human 

• ghts activists persists. 

Ttpact on Bilateral Relations 

i/Tiy do we attach such importance to 
■oviet human rights performance? First, 
uman rights abuses have major impact 
n American perceptions of the Soviet 
Inion. When Americans hear that So- 
iet authorities have abducted an An- 
rey Sakharov from his home, planted 
rugs on Hebrew teachers, or treated 
heir own citizens as captives in their 
wn country, they wonder about the 
'Ossibilities for constructive relations 
•etween our two governments. In this 
/ay, Soviet human rights abuses influ- 
nce U.S. public opinion and circum- 
cribe the flexibility of any U.S. admin- 
stration to deal with the Soviet Union 
in a pragmatic basis. 



Soviet leaders allege that expres- 
sions of our concern amount to inter- 
ference in their internal affairs. They 
claim that human rights issues are not 
legitimate topics for dialogue between 
governments. Yet, the Soviet Union 
assumed solemn international obliga- 
tions, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final 
Act, to respect specific human rights of 
their citizens. Violations of these obliga- 
tions cannot but affect perceptions of 
Soviet willingness to abide by other ac- 
cords and erode political confidence 
needed to make progress on a variety of 
issues. 

At meetings of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), such as the recent one in Ot- 
tawa of human rights experts, we have 
pressed vigorously for Soviet compliance 
with the human rights provisions of the 
Final Act. We hope progress can be 
made soon in the Stockholm conference. 
A unique aspect of the Final Act is its 
recognition that respect for human 
rights is essential to development of 
security and cooperation in Europe. In 
pursuit of this commitment to balanced 
progress in the CSCE process, we are 
sending a distinguished delegation, led 
by former Deputy Secretary of State 
Walter Stoessel, to the Budapest Cul- 



tural Forum this autumn. There, and at 
the Human Contacts Experts Meeting 
in Bern, we will continue to press our 
concerns. 

While we have not hesitated to 
speak out in international meetings, we 
have also consistently raised our con- 
cerns in confidential channels. We have 
made human rights a prominent part of 
our dialogue with Soviet leaders. We 
have detailed our specific concerns, in- 
cluding those about Soviet Jewry, and 
made clear their importance to the U.S.- 
Soviet relationship. We tell Soviet 
leaders that our relations cannot be put 
on a long-term, constructive basis 
without significant gains in this area. 

On some occasions, we have pre- 
sented the Soviets with representation 
lists of persons denied permission to 
leave the Soviet Union. One list names 
about 20 U.S. -Soviet dual nationals, 
another about 20 Soviet spouses of U.S. 
citizens, and still another over 100 So- 
viet families denied permission to join 
their loved ones in the United States. 
Many individuals on these lists are So- 
viet Jews. We also regularly present a 
list of over 3,400 Soviet Jewish families 
who have been refused permission to 
emigrate to Isarel. 



U.S. Repeats Call for Sakharovs Release 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 11, 1985 1 

We continue to be greatly disturbed 
about reports reaching the West con- 
cerning the health and whereabouts of 
the distinguished Soviet scientist and 
Nobel Peace Prize winner, Dr. Andrey 
Sakharov, and his wife, Yelenna Bonner. 
For well over a year, the Soviets have 
kept them in Gorkiy, isolated from 
direct contact with their family or in- 
dependent Western observers. Our 
Embassy in Moscow is making a high 
priority effort to try to locate the 
Sakharovs, but information about their 
current situation is difficult to verify. 
The Soviets have turned a deaf ear to 
the outpouring of international concern 
and outrage about their treatment. 

We remain profoundly concerned 
about their health and welfare, and we 
will continue to do everything we can to 
try to help these courageous people. We 
have raised the issue of the Sakharovs 
in our high level meetings with Soviets; 



we will continue to do so until there has 
been a satisfactory resolution of this 
case. In fact we have done so again in 
the past few days. We have specifically 
urged them to permit family members 
to visit them. 

The Soviets are fully aware of our 
views on this issue. We have told them 
repeatedly that human rights is in- 
separable from other areas of the 
relationship. 

We again call on the Soviet leader- 
ship to end the isolation of Dr. Sakharov 
and his wife and to permit family 
members and independent observers to 
meet with them. As President Reagan 
stated on May 15, "Let all who cherish 
Dr. Sakharov's noble values, both 
governments and individuals, continue 
to press the Soviets for information 
about the Sakharovs and for an end to 
Soviet persecution of two of its most 
distinguished citizens." 



'Made available to news correspondents 
bv State Department spokesman Bernard 
K.illi. ■ 



Movember 1985 



59 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



It is our hope that Soviet authorities 
are coming to recognize that human 
rights will remain central to the U.S.- 
Soviet agenda. We are not asking Soviet 
authorities to do the impossible but only 
to live up to their international obliga- 
tions and loosen the screws of repres- 



sion tightened so cruelly in recent years. 
We watch the patterns of Soviet Jewish 
emigration, as you do. We are prepared 
to respond as improvements occur. On 
this score, we appreciate your counsel 
and that of others interested in Soviet 
Jewry. 



Fifth Anniversary of Solidarity 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 31, 1985 ■ 

In the history of Eastern Europe since 
World War II, there have been few- 
events whose anniversaries can be 
celebrated with any sense of pride or 
satisfaction. The lot of these countries 
has been one of repression, of sacrifice, 
i if waiting for a better day that never 
comes. Five years ago, however, in a 
unique, spontaneous, and overwhelming 
expression of the public will, the work-, 
ing people of Poland exacted from their 

i irnment the right to form their own 
free trade unions. The myth of the 
"worker state," as communist govern- 
ments so misleadingly characterize 
themselves, was thereby shattered for 
all lime. 

During the ensuing 15 months, some 
10 million Polish citizens banded 
together under the banner of the 
Solidarity movement, to be joined by 
4 million farmers, who created their own 
union along similar lines. Their goals 
were no different from those of the 
working class throughout the world— 
decent working conditions, a fair wage, 
an economic system that works, and a 
genuine voice in shaping the society of 
which they form the foundation. They 
pursued those goals then, as they do 
today, not with force, for they had no 
weapons other than indomitable 
courage, steadfast will, and a readiness 
to accept high risks in pursuit of their 

cause, Not ■ drop of blood was shed 

when Polish workers gained their vic- 

and Solidarity has consistently 
eschewed violence in any form ever 
since. 

These brave aspirations were 
brought to a temporary standstill in 
i 1981, when, pressured by 
Moscow, Hen. Wojciech Jaruzelski used 
the Polish Armed Forces to impose mar- 
tial law on his own people, to arrest 

i of Solidarity's leaders and many of 
and file, to force others into 
hiding, and to withdraw from the union 



its legal right to exist. Since that day, 
the alienation of the Polish Government 
from the people it professes to repre- 
sent has become all too evident. 

But Solidarity has not died, nor have 
the principles for which it came into 
existence become any less urgent in the 
minds of the Polish people. Despite all 
oppressive measures, provocations, im- 
prisonment, police brutality, and even 
killings, this, the only free trade union 
in the entire communist world, has con- 
tinued its struggle by peaceful means to 
persuade its government to provide all 
elements of the society a role in shaping 
Poland's destiny. Although Solidarity's 
voice has been muted by being forced 
underground, its message, whether via 
underground radio, clandestine publica- 
tions, public demonstrations, or by 
simple word of mouth, continues to be 
heard clearly throughout Poland and 
throughout the world, wherever there 
are people who value freedom. 

We here in the United States have 
also heard Solidarity's message and re- 
spond to it with all our hearts. We call 
upon the Polish Government to do 
likewise. This is not a subversive 
organization. It asks only that basic 
human rights be observed and that 
Poland be governed by responsible and 
responsive leaders. It asks those leaders 
to seek participation of workers, 
managers, and technocrats, academicians 
and intelligentsia, and the cohesive 
strength of the church in grappling with 
the massive economic and societal prob- 
lems which must be solved if Poland is 
to assume its rightful place within the 
brotherhood of nations. Should such a 
reconciliation take place, the traditional 
hand of American friendship will be 
ready and unreservedly extended to 
Poland, just as it has been throughout 
the last 200 years. Meanwhile, we shall 
continue to support the legitimate hopes 
of our Polish brothers and sisters who 
are defending our common values. 






'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 9, 1985. 



We do not expect miracles over- 
night. But Soviet leaders must surely be 
confident enough to be able to lessen 
repression and increase emigration 
without endangering the so-called "lead 
ing role of the Communist Party." We ! 
repeatedly make the point to Soviet 
leaders that this could benefit our 
relations. 

Soviet officials hint that improve- 
ments in human rights, including Jewish 
emigration, can follow an upward swing! 
in overall relations. There are those wnj 
believe that at times in the past better 
relations meant more emigration. 
Whether or not this was true, we rejecfl 
the notion that improvements in human) 
rights can come last. The reality is that! 
Soviet abuses of human rights under- 
mine the political confidence needed to 
improve relations, negotiate arms con- 
trol agreements, and cooperatively 
lessen regional tensions. 

Soviet leaders seek to create the im- 
pression that they are more serious thai) 
American leaders in seeking to improve 
relations. They aver that better rela- 
tions depend on U.S. and Western polity 
cal "will," not on changes in Soviet 
behavior. They are mistaken. Let us 
look at what the United States has tried 
to accomplish and what it seeks for the 
future. 



Steps Toward Improved Relations 

We will start with bilateral issues. Last- 
year following the commencement of 
NATO missile deployments in Europe, 
the Soviets tried to freeze bilateral rela- 
tions. Nevertheless, we persevered and 
ultimately signed modest accords on 
consular affairs and hotline moderniza 
tion. This year there has been slightly 
more progress, mainly the conclusion of 
the North Pacific air safety agreement 
and visits of legislative delegations and 
Secretary [of Agriculture] Block. We 
look forward to better exchanges in 
these areas and to making progress in 
maritime boundary talks and peaceful 
space cooperation. 

Finding ways to reduce regional ten- 
sions could have enormous benefit. Over 
the past year, teams of U.S. and Soviet 
experts have had talks on the Middle 
East, southern Africa, and Afghanistan 
and will hold them this week on East 
Asia. These talks have not yet. how- 
ever, met our expectations. 

A continuing exchange of views can 
help avoid misunderstandings. But 
specific steps are needed, too. For ex- 
ample, the Middle East remains a tense 
area that affects directly the interests of 
the Soviet Union and the United States. 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



TERRORISM 



Soviet Union seeks a greater role 
he peace process, yet has offered 
ng but procedural suggestions. One 
lediate step it can take is to lessen 
unremittingly hostile propaganda 
>cted against Israel. It should also 
upon its friends in the PLO [Pales- 
Liberation Organization] to for- 
;ar violence. 

Afghanistan may be the most press- 
regional issue for the new Soviet 
iership. Moscow's brutal occupation 
continuing repression spur resist- 
e, not acquiescence, from the brave 
^han people. Informed Soviets ought 
realize by now that the hope of build- 
communism in Afghanistan, even in 
long term, is futile. In our view it 
uld be possible to find a solution 
ich protects the legitimate interests 
ill parties, the right of the Afghan 
pie to live in peace under a govern- 
nt of their own choosing, and the 
net interest in a secure southern 
der. Soviet commitment to early 
op withdrawals would be a good 
ginning and would promote progress 
;he UN negotiations on Afghanistan. 
The arms control dialogue was re- 
ed earlier this year when the two 
ps agreed to commence nuclear and 
ce arms talks in Geneva. The United 
.tes is prepared for concrete progress 

I arms control, based on an enduring 

I I realistic foundation. The President 
i ully committed to achieving major, 
rbilizing reductions in nuclear arse- 

s. He has given our negotiators great 
dbility to achieve this end. 

We welcome General Secretary Gor- 
:hev's expressed interest in achieving 
lical reductions, but we must also ex- 
re the potential of strategic defenses 
strengthen deterrence. Our research 
this field is vital to the long-term 
)spects for maintaining the peace. 
viet work on strategic defenses has 
ig been greater than our own. The 
viets would gain from engaging us on 
w strategic defenses— if they prove 
isible— might play a greater role in 
i future, to our mutual benefit. 

We would like to believe the Soviet 
lion wants improved relations with 
3 United States. For our part, we are 
dng steps that can lead to that end. 
the months ahead, and at the meet- 
$ of President Reagan and General 
cretary Gorbachev in Geneva this 
ivember, we hope political confidence 
i be developed that will lead to con- 
:te progress in all areas— arms con- 
il, regional and bilateral issues, and 
man rights. 



Human rights is an essential part of 
this process. We are willing to discuss 
our human rights concerns with the 
Soviets in an atmosphere free from ran- 
cor and recrimination. If the new leader- 
ship shows the foresight and the confi- 
dence to improve the human rights situ- 
ation, important political confidence can 



be generated. Certainly, our willingness 
to improve trade and other aspects of 
our relationship would be enhanced. Let 
us hope that Soviet leaders will take ad- 
vantage of this opportunity. Both our 
peoples and people everywhere will 
benefit if thev do. ■ 



Terrorism: 

Overview and Developments 



by Robert B. Oakley 

Address before the Issues Manage- 
ment Association in Chicago on 
September 13, 1985. Ambassador Oakley 
is Director of the Office for Counter- 
Terrorism and Emergency Planning. 

It was 15 years ago today that a major 
new chapter in international terrorist 
spectaculars literally exploded on the 
world scene. Palestinian terrorists from 
the radical PFLP [Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine] faction hijacked 
four airliners and forced the pilots to fly 
three of them to a former World War II 
RAF [Royal Air Force] base in Jordan— 
Dawson Field. On September 13, 1970, 
they blew the planes up before the 
cameras. A fourth plane already had 
been blown up in Cairo. Those blazing 
explosions marked a new dimension in 
the ability of terrorists to catch our 
attention and make terrorism an act of 
macabre theater as well as deadly 
crime. 

That mass hijacking attack brought 
the terrorist groups to the front 
pages— and, more important to them— to 
the prime-time evening television news 
around the world. 

That spectacular did not benefit the 
terrorists in the short term. It led to 
King Hussein's expulsion of the PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] from 
Jordan amid heavy fighting which cost 
hundreds, if not thousands, of Pales- 
tinian lives. However, the events of 
September 1970, which prompted one 
terrorist group to take on the name 
"Black September," set into motion a 
chain of events in Lebanon and else- 
where which are still unfolding. These 
range from the 1972 Olympic tragedy in 
Munich, the attack upon Lod Airport in 
Israel, all the way to current terrorist 
actions by Palestinians in the Middle 
East and Europe. Some of them are 
Palestinian vs. Palestinian, with 
mainline PLO and Jordanian officials 



targeted by dissident Palestinian 
groups, some of which receive help from 
Syria. 

During the 1970s, West European 
terrorists struck at their own targets— 
the IRA [Irish Republican Army] assas- 
sinated Lord Mountbatten and killed 
hundreds of innocent people in Northern 
Ireland and Britain. Italian terrorists, 
notably the Red Brigades, killed former 
Prime Minister Moro, and scores of 
Italians became innocent victims. West 
German terrorists— the Red Army 
Faction— robbed banks, planted their 
bombs, killed, and kidnapped. 

Today, new groups which were 
virtually unknown on the international 
terrorist scene a few years ago have 
suddenly emerged alongside the older 
groups to take their toll of lives. 

• Muslim fundamentalist Shi'a 
terrorists, inspired by the Ayatollah 
Khomeini's "Islamic revolution" and 
supported by the Iranian Government, 
have committed suicide bombings 
against the U.S. Marine barracks and 
Embassy buildings in Lebanon and car- 
ried out attacks in Kuwait, including the 
U.S. Embassy, the French Embassy, 
and Kuwaiti facilities. 

• Sikh terrorists have assassinated 
Prime Minister Indira Ghandi and sev- 
eral other Indian officials, apparently 
planted the bombs which blew up the 
Air India 747 in mid-air and exploded at 
Tokyo's Narita Airport, and tried to 
conduct assassinations in the United 
States. 

• In Latin America, leftist guerrilla 
groups and narcotics traffickers have 
used terrorists to attack and threaten 
U.S. ambassadors and other officials as 
well as local government leaders in 
several Latin American countries. 

Some forms of terrorism had 
appeared to be on the decline, such as 
aircraft hijacking. But Shi'a terrorists 
last year revived that technique, which 
had been used by the Palestinians. Two 



ivember 1985 



61 



TERRORISM 



American Government employees were 
killed when the terrorists hijacked a 
Kuwaiti airliner to Iran last December. 
A Jordanian airliner was hijacked and— 
in echoes of Dawson Field— blown up at 
Beirut airport this summer. And, of 
course, there was the hijacking of 
TWA 847 in June— the first time an 
American plane had been hijacked in the 
Middle East since a Pan Am plane was 
blown up during that September 1970 
attack. Kidnappings had also appeared 
to be on the decline, but in the past 
2 years seven Americans have been kid- 
napped in Beirut and remain as cap- 
tives. A U.S. businessman was kid- 
napped in Bogota, Colombia, last month. 
And President Duarte's daughter has 
just been taken this week in El 
Salvador. 

Nevertheless, the principal terrorist 
tactics in the past 2 years have been 
bombings and armed attacks with an 
increasing intent to kill, maim, and 
injure— not merely to frighten or inflict 
property damage. We have seen this in 
West Germany where a Red Army Fac- 
tion car bomb, 5 weeks ago, killed and 
injured Americans and Germans alike at 
a U.S. Air Force base near Frankfurt, 
and an American serviceman was bru- 
tally murdered for his identification 
card. In Madrid this week, an American 
businessman died of injuries received 
while jogging nearby as Basque terror- 
ists set off a bomb which wounded some 
16 Spanish policemen. 

I mention these points not with the 
intention of providing a comprehensive 
overview— it would take more time than 
you have and a better memory or files 
than I have. Nor do I want to scare you 
into abandoning travel or business oper- 
ations abroad for a retreat into fortress 
America. Rather, this brief introduction 
is meant to help illustrate one of the 
major problems in countering inter- 
national terrorism— its shifting patterns 
and cycles— as well as to accentuate the 
need for security preparedness. Terror- 
ism is a form of warfare in which unpre- 
dictability and surprise are major 
weapons. Those who indulge in this 
form of ripping at the thin veneer of 
civilization hide behind sneak attacks 
and faceless phone calls. Their favorite 
targets are usually not military or police 
installations but unarmed and unsuspect- 
ing civilians, particularly diplomats— and 
businessmen. 

Terrorism is not a new scourge. It is 
too easy to forget that even terrorism 
has a history and that some of the 
terrorists of today are following trends 
set hundreds of years ago and set in the 
same part of the world. In the Middle 
East, terrorism has been known at least 



since the 1st century A.D. during the 
Zealots' struggle against the Romans in 
ancient Palestine. In the 11th century 
A.D., the Assassins sect emerged in 
Persia and spread to Syria where they 
attacked the Christian crusaders as well 
as other local officials. 

The Barbary pirates conducted their 
own form of terrorism, operating from 
what is now Libya and leading to the 
landing by the U.S. Marines on the 
shores of Tripoli a century and a half 
ago. The forerunner of the car bomb, 
the cart bomb, was reported in 
Napoleonic times. 

The more modern versions of terror- 
ism and its ideological underpinnings 
emerged in the latter part of the 19th 
century, particularly in Russia and other 
European countries. The German 
radical, Karl Heinzen, of the mid- 19th 
century wrote: "If you have to blow up 
half a continent and pour out a sea of 
blood in order to destroy the Barbar- 
ians, have no scruples of conscience." 
The leftist terrorist groups in Europe, 
such as the German Red Army Faction, 
appear to have inherited this sort of 
pseudo-intellectual rationalization for 
their violent attacks upon society. 

Current Trends 

Terrorism has ebbed and flowed, but 
today the number of incidents is greater 
than before, and it is increasingly a 
worldwide phenomenon. In 1984, there 
were more than 600 international terror- 
ist incidents, a 20% increase over the 
average level of the previous 5 years. 
The number of incidents is up further 
this year— 480 for the first 8 months, 
compared with 382 for the same period 
last year. 

Here are some of the trends we are 
likely to see over the next few years: 

First, international terrorism is and 
will remain a prominent factor on the 
international political landscape, despite 
the intensified efforts we and other 
governments are making. Terrorism will 
not easily disappear for many reasons: a 
worldwide system of competitive arms 
sales makes modern weapons available 
more easily to terrorist groups; mass 
communications assure instantaneous 
publicity for terrorist acts; travel is 
easier between different countries, and 
border controls are diminishing, particu- 
larly in Western Europe; the copycat 
phenomenon causes more and more 
desperate or amoral individuals and 
groups to adopt terrorism; and, most 
important, in an age when weapons of 
mass destruction as well as increasingly 
lethal conventional armaments have 



made regular warfare too costly, terroBfc: 
ism is viewed by certain countries as w 
cheap way to strike a blow at their Ijtr 
enemies with little or no retaliatory Mm 
action. Hoi 

Second, for the United States the! io 
problem is likely to continue to be mu<| « 
more external than internal. Incidents! 
within the United States, especially 
externally connected terrorism, have I 
been decreasing, altogether represent™ 
less than \°Ic of the world total, wherea 
the United States abroad has been thel 
number one target for terrorists. This! 
due, in large part, to the exceedingly el 
fective work of the FBI [Federal 
Bureau of Investigation], generally 
tighter controls on visas and at U.S. I 
points of entry, and an aversion by the 
American people to foreign-inspired 
violence. 

Domestic terrorism is a serious 
problem, with the principal threats corn 
ing from Puerto Rican terrorists plus 
individuals and groups, often loosely 
linked, who reflect inchoate neo-Nazi, 
white supremacy attitudes. But the 
effective work of the FBI and local law- 
enforcement agencies has kept it from 
getting out of hand. 

There is a potential foreign terroris 
threat of major dimensions within the 
United States, particularly from seven 
Moslem and other ethnic groups (e.g. 
Libyan, Iranian, Palestinian, Sikh, 
Armenian, etc.). Excellent work by the 
FBI, other law enforcement agencies, I 
and our intelligence community, plus 
fear by the state sponsors of terrorism 
of the consequences were they to be 
caught supporting attacks within the 
United States, have kept this threat 
under control so far. However, we can 
never feePsafe, never slacken vigilance, 
as shown by the FBI prevention this 
spring of planned attacks in this count! 
by Sikh and Libyan terrorists and its 
arrest last month of Puerto Rican 
terrorists linked to Cuba. 

Third, open societies wall remain th 
principal targets of terrorists, although 
no societies are immune. Democratic 
societies are vulnerable to terrorism, on 
the one hand, because the terrorists 
might succeed more easily in bringing 
the democratic governments to their 
knees due to their very openness and 
concern for their citizens; or, on the 
other hand, overreaction by a demo- 
cratic state to the threat could destroy 
the very nature of the society. Terror- 
ists would welcome either outcome. 

The means of attack which are in- 
creasingly available to the opponents of 
democratic states are also available, to i 



62 



Department of State Bulleti 



TERRORISM 



er degree, to the opponents of 
atorships. They may have tighter 
trols at home where basic freedoms 
lot count, but they are vulnerable 
aad, and during 1984 the Soviet 
on ranked number seven on the 
rnational terrorist victim list. This is 
behind the United States and other 
countries, probably because most 
ups abroad are vaguely leftist or 
xist in ideology. We have little evi- 
ce of direct Soviet support to such 
■orist groups. However, their objec- 
s clearly parallel those of the 
.S.R., and they receive indirect sup- 
t and encouragement. 
Fourth, there has been an unmis- 
ible rise in state-supported terrorism 
r the past few years, with Iran, 
ya, Syria, Cuba, and Nicaragua as 
most active, determined, systematic 
porters of terrorist groups and activ- 
The combination of direct govern - 
it assistance in arms, explosives, 
jnunications, travel documents, and 
ning with fanatic individuals or 
jps goes a long way to explaining 
shift in tactics toward bombing and 
ted attack and the accompanying 
ease in the casualty rates from 
•orist attack. The fact that the states 
ive mentioned— except Iran— receive 
;e quantities of Soviet arms, which, 
urn, flow directly to the terrorists, is 
Idly coincidental. 
Fifth, there is a trend toward 
I ater lethality. To date, terrorists 
lie, by and large, used conventional 
i hods of attack (high explosives, 
i arms, hand grenades, car bombs, 
I ) with great effect. However, as our 
i mses against conventional weapons 
i rove, so does the likelihood that 
1 'orist groups will move to more 
histicated and esoteric methods of 
I ick. The potential impact to our 
ety and to our national security is 
astrophic in nature. (In recognition of 
enormity of the potential, we have 
•n developing interagency plans for 
response to and the countering of 
isible terrorist threat in either 
lear or chemical/biological attack. 

The Current International Terror- 
Scene. Looking behind these trends 
nore detail at the international 
rorist scene, we note that the Middle 
st has become the primary source of 
srnational terrorism, accounting for 
•>ut 35% of the incidents. But inter- 
ional travel has permitted the export 
Middle Eastern terrorism elsewhere, 
ere are two main categories of Middle 
stern terrorists: 



First, fanatical Palestinians who 
have split off from the mainline PLO led 
by Arafat and often have the direct sup- 
port of Libya and Syria; and 

Second, Shi'a zealots residing in 
many Arab countries, especially 
Lebanon, who are inspired, trained, and 
often armed, financed, and, to varying 
degrees, guided by Iran. They have 
bombed the U.S. Embassy and Marines 
and the French military in Beirut, 
hijacked U.S. and French aircraft, and 
taken U.S., French, British, and other 
nationals hostage. They are responsible 
for terrorist activities against various 
Arab states. 

In addition, Libya is becoming an 
increasing threat to its neighbors in 
North Africa, to many states in black 
Africa, and to peace and stability in the 
Middle East, using propaganda and sub- 
version or overt military attempts as 
well as terrorism. Moreover, Qadhafi's 
worldwide ambitions— which strongly 
resemble those of the U.S.S.R. and cer- 
tain of its close allies— have brought 
Libyan agents and money to terrorist 
operations in the Carribean, Central 
America, New Zealand, and even the 
South Pacific island of New Caledonia. 
At present, the greatest Libyan threat 
is to the moderate and black states of 
Africa— mostly Tunisia, Algiers, Egypt, 
Sudan, Chad, and others further south. 
The United States is working with these 
states to help them resist Libyan 
aggressive plans. 

The targets of Middle East terror- 
ism fall principally into four groups: 
Israel; Western governments and citi- 
zens, particularly France and the United 
States; moderate Arab governments and 
officials, including the mainline PLO as 
well as Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and 
Saudi Arabia; and critics of radical 
regimes, particularly Libyans, who are 
targeted by their own governments. 

While the Middle East might be the 
source of most terrorism, Europe is the 
location of the largest number of inci- 
dents, ranging from 36% to 53% of the 
total during each of the past 5 years. 
Nearly 25% of these incidents, however, 
are of Middle Eastern origin. Indigenous 
European terrorists consist of: 

• Elements of ethnic groups, such as 
Corsicans, Basques, Croatians, and 
Armenians, which have been fighting for 
autonomy or to redress reputed griev- 
ances; in particular, the Armenian 
groups which have waged a deadly and 
relentless campaign, both here in the 
United States and in Europe, against 
Turkish interests in an effort to estab- 
lish an Armenian state. 



• Leftist groups such as the Red 
Brigades in Italy, Direct Action in 
France, Red Army Faction in Germany, 
the CCC [French acronym for Fighting 
Communist Cells] in Belgium, Grapo in 
Spain, and November 17 in Greece. 

• Special note should be made of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army, the 
PIRA, which is both ethnic and leftist. 
It is the most deadly of all European 
groups, having killed some 50 people in 
1984! This group should be distinguished 
from the IRA of earlier days. 

For many years these groups pur- 
sued their separate targets independent 
of each other, but a new phenomenon 
developed during late 1984 among some 
of the European leftist groups. Aside 
from an apparent increase in mutual 
logistical and propaganda support, 
groups in Germany, Belgium, and 
France all attacked NATO-related 
targets over a period of several months. 
This resurgence accounted for most of 
the increase in the total number of inci- 
dents in Europe during the past year. 
There was a lull at the end of the 
hunger strike by jailed terrorists in Ger- 
many, followed by a rash of incidents 
preceding the annual summit meeting in 
Bonn. Experts expect that we will see 
similar outbreaks during future months. 

Latin America is the third great 
center of terrorist incidents, accounting 
for approximately 20% of the events 
worldwide. Social, economic, and politi- 
cal turmoil have served to prolong exist- 
ing patterns of insurgency, which have 
assumed terrorist dimensions in some 
countries— particularly Colombia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru. There 
has been some spillover into Latin 
America from terrorism in the Middle 
East and Europe, particularly Iran and 
Libya. Cuba and Nicaragua provide the 
strongest encouragement and direct sup- 
port for terrorist activities in other 
Latin American countries, particularly 
those with insurgency situations. They, 
of course, receive support from the 
Soviet bloc. In addition, Italian and pos- 
sibly other leftist terrorists have found 
refuge in Nicaragua. 

U.S. Actions 

What is the United States doing to 
defend itself and its citizens abroad, 
unilaterally and in cooperation with 
other governments? Has this been, will 
it be successful? Given the current 
preoccupation with the use of force to 
counter terrorism and the controversy 
over the lack of U.S. military retaliation 
to terrorist acts, it may surprise you to 
learn that there have been successes. 



MYiknr 1 OOC 



63 



TERRORISM 



We have identified over 90 planned 
attacks upon U.S. citizens or facilities 
abroad during the past year which we 
are satisfied have been preempted by 
improved intelligence, stronger security, 
and cooperation from other govern- 
ments. There are unconfirmed reports of 
additional incidents which may have 
been planned against the United States, 
but they are not counted because we 
are uncertain of their validity. There are 
undoubtedly other incidents of which we 
are completely unaware. But only ter- 
rorist successes receive public attention, 
leaving the impression that they are all 
powerful and always successful. Ob- 
viously we cannot divulge too much 
about our successes and about where 
and why the terrorists failed. This 
would give the enemy our game plan 
and the means to overcome our de- 
fenses. However, there are several illus- 
trative incidents from the 90 successful 
cases which can be cited: 

• Last fall, the Italian Government 
prevented a group of Shi'a terrorists 
from blowing up our Embassy in Rome 
and arrested the terrorists. 

• Our Ambassador and Embassy in 
Colombia avoided several specific ter- 
rorist attacks, including a bomb attack 
which was stopped short of the Em- 
bassy and several bombs destined for 
U.S. business concerns. 

• We have preempted several 
specific plans to bomb the Embassy 
residence in Beirut and assassinate or 
kidnap the Ambassador and other senior 
officials. 

• We detected and defused a large 
car bomb which would have caused 
dozens of casualties at a U.S. and 
NATO training facility in Oberammer- 
gau, West Germany. 

• The United Kingdom avoided a 
series of Brighton-type bombings and 
arrested 14 IRA terrorists in June. 

To improve security of diplomatic 
installations, a new approach was set in 
motion after the 1983 bombings in 
Beirul and funded by Congress last fall. 
Some $55 million has been spent to 
enhance physical and operational secur- 
ity of our diplomatic posts abroad in the 
past year. In fiscal years (FY) 1986 and 
1987, budget requests for overall secur- 
itj resources total $391 million and 
$331 million respectively. The number of 
professional State Department security 
officers abroad will double during the 

1985 Mi period and the Marine security 
guard complement has been augmented. 

Seventy major perimeter security 
enhancement projects are scheduled for 
FY S~> St;, anil a dozen new Fmbassies 



are being built to replace those in high- 
threat countries which are far below 
acceptable standards. New turnkey pro- 
cedures involving joint action by the 
Department of State and private busi- 
ness have been adopted in order to cut 
completion time to one-third of what it 
once was. 

The Inman panel, headed by Admi- 
ral Robert Inman, the former Deputy 
Director of the CIA, recently proposed 
a large expansion of the Embassy secur- 
ity program. For the 1986 fiscal year, 
six specific areas are highlighted for 
increased security enhancement. These 
are: 

• Construction, relocation, and 
renovation of scores of buildings that 
will meet new physical and technical 
security standards: 

• Residential security (to include 
guard services and field support); 

• Perimeter security program; 

• Technical countermeasures and 
counterintelligence programs; 

• Foreign Service security training 
(security training development, overseas 
guard and post security officer, general 
security, Federal law enforcement, cop- 
ing with violence abroad, and firearms 
and evasive driving); and 

• Protective security resources, 
additional personnel. 

Other Developments 

It is important to note that in counter- 
ing terrorism abroad the United States 
is limited in what it can do alone 
because we must rely very heavily upon 
the cooperation of foreign governments 
who control the countries from which 
the terrorists come and those in which 
they operate. We are working hard to 
increase this cooperation and have made 
progress. But much more remains to be 
done. 

• The recent series of hijackings, 
aircraft and airport bombings, as well as 
the attacks against targets in Western 
Europe associated with the NATO 
alliance, has spurred moves toward 
greater cooperation with our European 
allies. We are working with friendly 
countries in Europe and elsewhere to 
improve sharing of information and 
techniques in dealing with terrorists. 

• In Latin America, progress has 
also been made, although the travel 
threat remains very high. For example, 
during the past year, a coordinated 
interagency counterterrorist program in 
Colombia has helped that government 
regain the initiative from the terrorists 
and narcotics traffickers. 



We will soon be requesting funds i 
urgently for a similar but larger Admift 
istration counterterrorism program fori 
Central America. The threat there is I 
becoming more serious. For example, iirf ; 
El Salvador, the guerrillas and terror- 
ists have decided to move into the 
cities, reacting to successes of Un- 
supported counterinsurgency programs! 
in rural areas. As the assassinations oil 
the American marines and the kidnap- j 
ping of President Duarte's daughter 
have indicated, the same trend is likely 
to continue. This means that the police! 
who have been getting almost no assisl 
ance and are in poor shape, must bear 
the burden of defending their govern- 
ments—and U.S. personnel— from terrcl 
ist attack. It is essential that Congress 
act to approve the Administration re- I 
quest for carefully controlled counter- I 
terrorist assistance to Central America! 
police forces, administered by the Statl 
Department and coordinated with mili-' 
tary programs administered by the 
Defense Department. 

• In the Middle East, we will con- 1 
tinue our efforts to release the seven I 
Americans still held hostage by Iranian* 
supported Shi'a terrorists. We will also 
continue to work with Israel, Jordan, j 
Egypt, and the moderate states of the 
gulf in opposing terrorism as well as 
helping them face the threat of conven-< 
tional attack instigated by Libya, Iran, 
or Syria. We will not change our 
policies, give up on the peace process, 
or be driven out of the region, despite 
the threats to U.S. facilities and 
citizens. 

• In the civil aviation field, the 
Departments of State and Transporta- 
tion have taken several important steps 
unilaterally and with other govern- 
ments, to improve security. These in- 
clude air marshalls, better security 
screening at U.S. airports and for U.S. 
airlines abroad, and pressure on other 
governments to tighten their own 
security. We are also providing training 
and technical assistance to some 20 
governments in this field. We will not 
hesitate to act, as we did with Greece 
and Lebanon, where foreign govern- 
ments refuse to provide adequate 
security. 

Training Cooperation 

Since most terrorism takes place 
abroad, it is obvious that cooperation 
with other governments is extremely 
important in combating this menace. Wf 
work on this in many different ways, 
from publicized, top-level meetings be- 
tween chiefs of state to tmpublicized 



64 



nonarimont r*f Qtato Rollpti 



TERRORISM 



on contacts between the CIA [Cen- 
Intelligence Agency] and FBI and 
ices of other governments. The 
i-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Pro- 
has been in operation for only 16 
ths but is paying big dividends in 
roved cooperation and support from 
;ign governments. In the past year 
have held high-level, interagency 
cy consultations on how better to 
ibat terrorism and how to improve 
teral cooperation with a range of 
ernments such as the United 
gdom, Italy, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, 
ece, Colombia, Honduras, and 
unark. India, Pakistan, the Nether- 
ds, and France are among those plan- 
b; to participate. The ATA Program 
vides training for foreign, civilian 
enforcement agencies, focusing upon 
h fields as civil aviation and airport 
urity, bomb detection and disposal, 
I hostage negotiation and rescue, 
tropolitan police forces in such cities 
New York, Los Angeles, Boston, 
shington, D.C., Miami, and Chicago 
r e participated, as well as numerous 
enforcement organizations. By Janu- 
1, 1986, the program will have 
almost 2,000 participants from 
:ountries. 

We also are increasing cooperation 
h American businesses operating 
Tseas. The Threat Analysis Group of 
Office of Security in Washington and 
regional security officers at posts 
•:rseas encourage contact with the pri- 
pe sector on security issues. The Sec- 
ary announced in February the for- 
tion of the Overseas Security Advi- 
ly Council. It is now operating to 
ng public sector and private sector 
icials together to exchange infor- 
i tion on security issues and make 
•ommendations for closer operational 
operation. 
We continue to explore and develop 
lumber of other multilateral, bilateral, 
d unilateral options, including the 
tential use of military force. Secretary 
State Shultz has been foremost 
long those who have said that we 
ed to consider the use of military 
Dls when appropriate. Each terrorist 
ent presents a different situation, 
wever; and while our military forces 
ve been in a high state of readiness in 
cent crises, the situation has not been 
propriate to their actual employment, 
e must be and we are willing to use 
"ce, carefully, if the circumstances call 
-it. 

Although sometimes the media 
ems to assume that the use of U.S. 
litary force for retaliation is the only 
jans to fight terrorists, this is usually 



not the case. We and other governments 
have made preventive strikes through 
police action— arresting terrorists before 
they can attack, as was done in Rome. 
And as we recently saw in El Salvador, 
where effective action has been taken 
against some of those responsible for 
killing American servicemen and civil- 
ians in June, military action does not 
necessarily require the use of American 
forces. That is one reason why we place 
so much emphasis upon military and 
police training and assistance programs 
for other countries and on closer intelli- 
gence and law enforcement cooperation 
with them. 

Conclusion 

This overview is by no means the com- 
plete story of international terrorism. 
Books have been written on this sub- 
ject, and more will be. The same goes 
for TV. But, I hope it has been useful. 
On closing, it is important to keep a few 
things clearly in mind. 

The United States must not take a 
defeatist attitude toward international 
terrorism. We can make and are making 
progress. But it will be long and dif- 
ficult; it takes a great deal of effort and 
requires cooperation by other nations; 
and there will be-occasional incidents, 
because the United States is the 
number one target. 

It also is costly. There are the costs 
of improving the physical security of our 
Embassies and other installations 
overseas. Private business must also in- 
crease expenditures for security, at 
home and abroad. Using economic 
pressures or not shipping arms has an 
impact on governments such as Libya 
and Iran and others who support ter- 
rorism, although it may result in finan- 
cial pain to individual companies who 
hope to make lucrative sales. 

But we must not and will not 
retreat, close our military bases, aban- 
don our businesses, change our policies, 
let down our allies, because of terrorist 
threats and attacks. That would be 
much more costly, economically as well 
as in political and strategic coin. It 
would also lead to still more terrorism. 

Terrorism, as many experts have 
said, is a form of low-intensity warfare. 
It is not an easy one to fight. There are 
no magic weapons— there are no quick 
fixes. However, I assure you that we 
are in the struggle for the duration. 
With your support and that of other sec- 
tors of the American public, we will con- 
tinue to make progress, and the chances 
for still more success will continue to 
improve. ■ 



Terrorists Arrested 
in El Salvador 



Following is the text of President 

Reagan's letter to El Sal radar's /'resi- 
dent Jose Napoleon Duarte of August 
29, 1985. ' 

Dear Mr. President: 

I was gratified to hear from you of the 
important accomplishments of your govern- 
ment's ongoing investigation of the murder of 
thirteen persons, including American and 
Salvadoran citizens, in a brutal raid in San 
Salvador on June 19, 1985. I congratulate you 
on the speed and professionalism of the 
arrest of William Celio Rivas Bolanos, Juan 
Miguel Garcia Melendez, and Jose Abraham 
Dimas Aguilar. On behalf of the victims' 
families and the United States, I personally 
thank all involved. 

Terrorism is the antithesis of democracy. 
By brutal acts against innocent persons, ter- 
rorists seek to exaggerate their strength and 
undermine confidence in responsible govern- 
ment, publicize their cause, intimidate the 
populace, and pressure national leaders to 
accede to demands conceived in violence. 
Where democracy seeks to consult the 
common man on the governance of his nation, 
terrorism makes war on the common man, 
repudiating in .bloody terms the concept of 
government by the people. 

I am proud that the Special Investigative 
Unit, which we in the U.S. worked with you 
to develop, is playing an active role in the in- 
vestigation. I shortly will be consulting with 
Congress to find new ways to assist Central 
American nations in their laudable efforts to 
overcome the scourge of terrorism. I hope 
that, with the support of the Congress, we 
can help police and military units to respond 
consistently with the maturity, profes- 
sionalism, and respect for the law shown by 
your police in this case. We must not com- 
promise with criminals. Appeasement only 
invites renewed attack. Terrorists merit only 
swift, certain justice under the rule of law. 

The people of El Salvador and the people 
of the United States stand together against 
terrorism. Each defeat for the terrorist 
makes the world safer and more just for 
everyone. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 2, 1985. 



ivember 1985 



65 



UNITED NATIONS 



The U.S. and the United Nations 



by Vernon A. Walters 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on Human Rights and International 
Organizations and on International 
Operations of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on September 18, 1985. Am- 
bassador Walters is U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations. 1 

It gives me very great pleasure to be 
here with you this morning in what is 
my first appearance before a congres- 
sional committee as the U.S. Ambassa- 
dor to the United Nations. It seems to 
be particularly fitting that your two sub- 
committees hold this joint session now— 
the day after the formal opening of the 
40th General Assembly of the United 
Nations— in order to consider where the 
United Nations is going, where it should 
be going, and what the role of the 
United States in the United Nations 
ought to be. I expect to be engaging in 
many discussions of this nature during 
the forthcoming General Assembly ses- 
sion, so the advice I receive from 
members of these two subcommittees 
today will be of great help to me. I am 
particularly pleased that Chairman [of 
the Subcommittee on International 
Operations Daniel] Mica and Congress- 
man [Gerald B.] Solomon will be 
members of our delegation at the 
United Nations this fall. 

The UN's Role and 
Effectiveness 

In his 1985 report on the work of the 
United Nations issued just 2 weeks ago, 
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar had 
this to say: 

.... we must also consider the many 
precarious balances of the claims and ambi- 
tions of nations; the unresolved disputes we 
carry with us into the future; the many 
smouldering conflicts of ideas, beliefs and in- 
terests in the world; the dizzy pace of the 
technological revolution both in production 
and in weapons; the widening gulf between 
abundance and absolute poverty; the web of 
economic ties which locks all parts of the 
world together; and the steadily increasing 
dangers of deep harm to the biosphere on 
which life depends. Such a list-and it could 
easily be made longer— makes it clear that in- 
ternational cooperation, however complex and 
difficult to organize, is not a choice for tin- 
nations of the world, but a necessity. 



But in the very next sentence of his 
report, the Secretary General goes on to 
say: 

However, if the United Nations is fully to 
play the role I have indicated in the develop- 
ment of the international system, it has to 
become a more effective institution. 

I think that both halves of this state- 
ment by the UN Secretary General are 
true. The United Nations is essential to 
us. But if the United Nations is to func- 
tion as it should, if it is to play the role 
it should play, it must become a more 
effective institution. 



The General Assembly 

We should not forget just how impor- 
tant the United Nations is to us as a 
people and a nation. Even though we 
may be distracted from time to time by 
what goes on in the General Assembly— 
and what goes on there sometimes is far 
from pretty— we need to remember that 
the General Assembly is not all there is 
and that the totality of the organization 
is far larger and far more complex. The 
United Nations is also the Security 
Council with its peacekeeping mission. 
It is the World Health Organization, 
which essentially has eliminated small- 
pox from the planet. It is the work of 
the High Commissioner for Refugees in 
caring for more than 10 million refugees 
around the world— a figure which is 
twice the population of Israel and Jor- 
dan combined. It is the work of 
UNICEF [UN Children's Fund] saving 
the lives of children and the role of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency as 
a watchdog against nuclear weapons 
proliferation. 

Some have suggested that the 
General Assembly, in fact, may be the 
price we have to pay for the rest of the 
organization. I would not go that far. I 
think the United Nations has to remain 
a place where nations of a billion and 
nations of a hundred thousand can come 
together to express their opinions and 
their grief and maybe even their out- 
rage—even if we in this country may 
not always agree. But I also think that 
the General Assembly can be and should 
be a place of more responsible debate, 
more impartial and more informed 
debate, and I think it is our business to 
work to make it so. 



In recent years, thanks in large pafl 
to the outstanding efforts of my prede* 
cessor, Dr. Kirkpatrick, we have seen E 
some very encouraging demonstrations* 
of the General Assembly's willingness ■ 
deal with political reality in keeping 
with the spirit of the Charter. I refer to 
the approval by overwhelming majori- | 
ties of resolutions calling for the with- 1 
drawal of foreign troops from Cambodia 
and the end of foreign occupation of 
Afghanistan. I also refer to the rejecti<l 
by the General Assembly of the out- 
rageous Cuban effort to designate as afl 
colonial territory Puerto Rico, whose I 
citizens enjoy freedoms— including the I 
right to determine their own political I 
leadership— that Fidel Castro and his I 
Soviet masters have not permitted the | 
unfortunate people of Cuba. I refer parf 
ticularly to our success at the last ses-l 
sion of the General Assembly in repuls-j 
ing attempts to charge us with actions 
we have never committed. I will have I 
more to say about name-calling in a few 
minutes. 

I think the General Assembly can 
and should aim at economic ideas more i 
meaningful than the ritualistic assertion 
that if poverty exists anywhere in the 
world it is due to the evil machinations 
of the industrialized West. It should 
understand that slogans are not solu- 
tions and that difficult, protracted prob- 
lems probably will require complex and j 
sustained efforts at solution and, in any 
case, are not likely to be solved by ex- J 
eluding from the discussion all the par- 
ties to the problem. 

There is another aspect of General 
Assembly behavior I particularly want 
to point out, and that is the practice of 
scapegoating— what my colleague, the 
French Ambassador, refers to as "le 
name-calling." Over the years, there has 
grown up the nasty habit of singling out 
the United States for special condemna- 
tion in resolutions. It is a transparent 
ploy promoted by the Soviet Union and 
its henchmen, and they usually throw- 
Israel in with the United States in 
order to attract Arab votes. 

This vituperation is a departure 
from normal UN behavior— for example, 
the resolution which the General Assem- 
bly adopts each year on the situation in 
Afghanistan always calls for the removal 
of "foreign troops" without mentioning 
that they are Soviet troops, and the one 
it adopts on Cambodia similarly does not 
mention that the foreign troops there 
are Vietnamese. Moreover, this name- 
calling almost always lacks any basis in 



66 



Department of State Bulletin!' 



UNITED NATIONS 



One of these resolutions, for in- 
ce, accuses the United States of 
ing South Africa to develop nuclear 
pons. As you, the lawmakers of the 
ion, know better than anyone else, 
!er American law that would be a 
ny. 

Another example is the resolution 
ch accuses the United States of sell- 
arms to South Africa in defiance of 
UN embargo. In point of fact, our 
l U.S. embargo on weapons sales to 
ith Africa went into effect during the 
medy Administration, 7 years before 
UN's first embargo, and the terms 
>ur embargo were and remain more 
trictive. 

Last year, we were successful for 
first time in eliminating this kind of 
ch language from General Assembly 
olutions. It continues to be the 
nber one priority with me, and I can 
ure you that as the U.S. represen- 
ve in the United Nations, I will rep- 
and reply sharply, to attacks on the 
ited States. But I also want to say, 
one who has visited 108 countries in 
last 4 years and logged a million and 
alf miles in doing so— and, in fact, as 
ing just 2 weeks ago returned from 
-ip to a dozen countries precisely to 
suit on UN-related matters— that 
re is enormous good will for the 
ited States out there. We need to do 
it more to explain our case and our 
.itions in the nonaligned countries and 
I Third World generally and try to 
ike sure they understand. In the 
■ heral Assembly, as elsewhere in the 
i ited Nations, we need to do the hard, 
iorious, day-in and day-out work of 
lding the coalitions that bring suc- 
s, just as you gentlemen and ladies 
here on the Hill. 



•e Security Council 

it me say a few words about the 
Eurity Council— the organ of the 
lited Nations which, under the Char- 
•, has unique responsibility for the 
tintenance of international peace and 
surity and for the pacific settlement of 
iputes. A few moments ago I quoted 
>m Secretary General Perez de 
lellar's 1985 report. Here is what he 
d to say a year earlier about the work 
the Security Council. 

In recent years the collective capacity 
d influence of the Security Council have 
en insufficiently tested. There are impor- 
lt issues where the members of the Coun- 
i including the permanent members, hold 
bstantially similar views. And yet other 
tors not directly related to those problems 



inhibit the Council from exerting collective 
influence as envisaged iii the Charter. 

The same consideration applies to peace- 
keeping. We are often urged to strengthen 
the peacekeeping capacity of the United Na- 
tions, the implication being that this is a mat- 
ter that can be handled without regard to the 
political relations of Member States and par- 
ticularly of members of the Security Council. 
A number of lessons have been learned 
recently about the nature of peacekeeping, 
but it is essential to re-emphasize the funda- 
mental issue. Peacekeeping is an expression 
of international political consensus and will. If 
that consensus or will is weak, uncertain, 
divided or indecisive, peacekeeping opera- 
tions will be correspondingly weakened. 

I think we certainly can agree with 
this analysis. The Security Council is 
not something above and beyond its 
membership. It is and will be what its 
members make of it. In this connection, 
it seems to me that a major contributor 
to an ineffective Security Council is the 
tendency on the part of some, especially 
on the part of the Soviet bloc and some 
others as well, to try to turn the Secu- 
rity Council into a miniature version of 
the General Assembly. So that when a 
dispute is brought, instead of calm and 
reasoned discussion by the Council's 15 
members after having heard the views 
of the immediate parties to that dispute, 
for the past few years we instead have 



had a procession of speakers— perhaps 
30 or 40 in all— who vie with each other 
in excoriating, in terms of the most ex- ' 
travagant abuse, one of the parties. And 
all this in the name of conciliation and 
pacific settlement. 

In such a situation, subregional dis- 
putes easily become regional, and re- 
gional ones become global. As political 
scientists have pointed out: 

Use of the United Nations is a barometer 
of the hostility existing between nations. Na- 
tions interested in reaching agreement almost 
always ignore or avoid the UN. Bringing an 
issue to the UN is likely to be regarded as a 
hostile act. 

I think the analysis is correct and 
certainly worth pondering. How can the 
United Nations be, in the words of the 
Charter, "a center for harmonizing the 
actions of nations," when bringing an 
issue to the UN Security Council has 
been a procedure so misused over the 
years that it is widely perceived as a 
hostile act? How can the Security Coun- 
cil function as a body for peacemaking 
or conciliation under those circum- 
stances? 



Evolution of the UN 

Over the years, the United Nations has 
evolved in interesting ways. I'm 




Vernon A. Walters 

was born January 3, 
1917, in New York 
City. He attended St. 
Louis Gonzaga School 
in Paris, France, and 
Stonyhurst College in 
Great Britain and has 
received honorary 
degrees from several 
universities. 
Ambassador 
Walters served in the U.S. Army from 
1941-76, when he retired with the rank of 
Lieutenant General. In the course of his 
military career, he served as special aide and 
interpreter to U.S. general officers, senior 
diplomats, and to Presidents Truman, 
Eisenhower, and Nixon on their foreign 
travels. In 1972 Gen. Walters was named 
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency where he served for 4V2 years, in- 
cluding a 5-month period as Acting Director. 
Following his retirement, he was a consul- 
tant, lecturer, and author from 1976-81. His 
memoirs, Silent Missions, were published by 
Doubleday in 1978. His other writings include 
Sunset at Saigon, The Mighty and the Meek, 
and many articles and book reviews. 



Prior to his appointment to the U.S. Mis- 
sion to the United Nations, Ambassador 
Walters served as senior adviser to former 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig until his 
nomination by the President to serve as Am- 
bassador at Large, a position he held from 
1981-85. In this capacity he traveled to more 
than 108 countries as the Reagan Administra- 
tion's chief diplomatic troubleshooter. 

Ambassador Walters is fluent in seven 
foreign languages: French, Portuguese, 
Spanish, Italian, German, Dutch, and Rus- 
sian. He is also the recipient of many honors 
and distinguished service awards, including 
the U.S. National Security Medal; the 
Distinguished Service Medal (two oak leaf 
clusters); the Legion of Merit (oak leaf 
cluster); the Bronze Star; the Air Medal; the 
Distinguished Intelligence Medal; and many 
campaign medals. He has been decorated by 
the Governments of France (Legion of 
Honor), Italy, Brazil, South Vietnam, Spain, 
Portugal, Morocco, and Peru. 

Ambassador Walters was sworn in as 
U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations on May 22, 1985. As chief 
U.S. representative to the United Nations, 
he also serves as a member of the Presi- 
dent's Cabinet. ■ 



jvember 1985 



67 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



tempted to say strange ways. On the 
one hand, we have the world of the 
UN's technical bodies and specialized 
agencies— the world I spoke of before 
w hen I mentioned the World Health 
Organization and the elimination of 
smallpox. This constellation of activities 
and agencies has worked marvelously 
well, and we should acknowledge that it 
has. I think no one could have predicted 
in 1945 just how well it has worked. 
On the other hand, we have main 
organs of the United Nations like the 
Security Council, which works half- well, 
and the General Assembly, which is 
something of a disappointment. If I 
were asked what particular thing I hope 
to accomplish during my tenure as your 
man in the United Nations, I would say 
I hope to improve the functioning of the 
General Assembly and the U.S. role in 



it. Rut, above all things, what I would 
like to do, and what I think needs 
desperately to be done, is to return the 
Security Council to the functions given 
it in the Charter. It is not a court of 
law, and it certainly should cease to be 
a theater for psychodrama. It must 
become precisely the place where dis- 
putes among nations can be brought in 
the expectation of reasonable solutions. 
I will work with all my strength to 
achieve that result— to increase the 
number of my country's friends and to 
diminish the number of its enemies. 



•The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Department Releases Report 
on Sandinista Intervention 
in Central America 



Following is the summary of a 
report released by the Department of 
State on September 13, 1985. 

Introduction 

The issue in the debate over Central 
America is not whether outside support 
for irregular forces fighting their 
government is legal or not; both the 
United States and Nicaragua agree that 
it is a use of force legally identical to 
open use of regular armed forces. The 
key issue is whether that use of force is 
an unlawful act of aggression or a 
legitimate response in collective 
self-defense. 

Often overlooked in the debate over 
U.S. policy toward Nicaragua is the 
fundamentally important fact that the 
Sandinistas began to intervene in El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica 
within a year of entering the 
Nicaraguan Government in July 1979 
and that they have actively continued 
thai aggression to the present. In an 
efforl to sustain its carefully fostered 
image as an innocent and aggrieved 
victim of unprovoked aggression, 
Nicaragua denies that it has ever 

ened in neighboring countries by 
supporting antigovernment rebels. (In 
e now before the World Court, 
for example, Nicaragua submitted a 
sworn statement by Foreign Minister 



D'Escoto that "my country is not en- 
gaged, and has not been engaged, in the 
provision of arms or other supplies to 
either of the factions engaged in the 
civil war in El Salvador.") 

The facts, however, show- 
Nicaragua's solemn denials to be untrue. 
As the Congress has found, the 
Government of Nicaragua "has 
committed and refused to cease 
aggression in the form of armed 
subversion against its neighbors." (PL 
99-83) By the same token, the 
Sandinistas' claim that U.S. actions, 
including support for the democratic 
resistance, constitute aggression against 
Nicaragua stands the facts on their 
head. It is Nicaragua, and not the 
United States and its friends, that 
committed the aggression that led 
directly to the actions of which the 
Sandinistas now complain. And it is the 
United States and its friends, and not 
Nicaragua, which are acting in lawful 
self-defense in countering the 
Sandinistas' subversion and intimidation. 

The United States initially made 
strong efforts to forge a friendly rela- 
tionship with Nicaragua after Somoza's 
ouster, then undertook, by a series of 
diplomatic efforts directed at inducing 
the Sandinistas, to halt their policies of 
subversion and intimidation. Only as 
those initiatives proved ineffectual did 
the United States begin, as a means of 



countering Sandinista actions, to provuj 
limited support to groups engaged in I 
armed resistance to the Sandinista 
regime. The United States has made i 
clear that in its view, the Contadora 21 j 
objectives create a framework for the J 
resolution of the conflict in Central 
America that, if fully implemented, 
would satisfy all U.S. concerns. 

Nicaragua's Interventions 
Against Its Neighbors 

The 6-year record of Sandinista 
behavior, based on many sources 
(statements of Sandinista officials and 
defectors, Salvadoran guerrilla 
defectors, captured documents, physical, 
evidence, intelligence observations, and! 
other evidence), demonstrates several 
things. 

• In mid- 1980, the Sandinistas began 
major assistance to guerrillas aiming at 
the overthrow of the Government of El 
Salvador in a "final offensive." Support 
from Nicaragua and other states 
operating through Nicaragua trans- 
formed the guerrillas from terrorist 
bands into a major military force able ta 
mount a nationwide offensive. Since the 
failure of that offensive in 1981, con- 
tinued Nicaraguan provision of arms, 
command and control, and logistical 
assistance has enabled the guerrilla war 
to continue despite the rejection of the 
guerrillas by the people. Their policy of 
"prolonged war" has resulted in 
thousands of deaths and over $1 billion 
in direct economic damage to El 
Salvador. 

• The Sandinistas have directly and 
through local groups in Honduras and 
Costa Rica engaged in bombings. 
assassinations, and other attacks against 
those nations. In Honduras they have 
attempted to initiate a guerrilla war. 
They have used Costa Rica as a channel 
for unlawful assistance to the 
Salvadoran rebels and have supported 
terrorist actions in Costa Rica. 

• To shield themselves from 
reprisals for their aggressions, the San- 
dinistas initiated a massive military 
buildup beginning in 1979. By mid- 1981, 
a year before the Sandinistas allege any 
significant military threat came from the 
resistance, Nicaragua's regular armed 
forces were already two or three times 
larger than Somoza's National Guard. 

Nicaragua's actions reflect the com- 
mitment of the Sandinista front to 
"revolutionary internationalism." Soon 
after taking power, the Sandinistas 
began active contact with Central 
American "vanguard" groups. With 



68 



Department of State Bulletin! 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Dstantial Cuban assistance, they 
lped unify guerrilla groups in El 
lvador, Honduras, and Guatemala; 
ovision, train, direct, and advise guer- 
las in El Salvador; insert guerrilla 
aups into Honduras; and sustain 
:lical antidemocratic parties, and 
sociated armed elements, in Costa 
ca. 

In El Salvador, the FSLN's 
mdinista National Liberation Front] 
st strategy was to help the FMLN 
arabundo Marti National Liberation 
ont] repeat the pattern of their own 
al military offensive against Somoza. 
hen that failed, the FSLN-FMLN 
iance shifted to a destructive 
rolonged war" of attrition against El 
lvador' s economy, political system, 
d institutions. Once previously 
igmented Salvadoran guerrilla factions 
ned in a unified military structure, 
e Sandinistas redirected their original 
>sta Rican network to provide arms to 
e Salvadorans. This was followed by 

!3LN offers of a secure headquarters, 

Hterial contributions, and an 

i dertaking to assume "the cause of El 

l.lvador as its own." By late 1980, 
icaragua was at the hub of a flow of 
indreds of tons of weapons from the 

j >viet bloc to El Salvador, serving both 
warehouse and as staging point for 
pertion by air, land, and sea routes. 
y January 1981, the rebels were armed 

I ith modern weapons, including M-16s 

• -awn from stocks left behind by the 

j'nited States in Vietnam. 

The nationwide "final offensive" was 
>feated, but the war continued and 

. cpanded through 1983. With the 
stitution of political reforms, the 
>pularity of the elected Duarte 
wernment, and the increasing 

■ -ofessionalization and effectiveness of 

lie Salvadoran Armed Forces, the 
jpular appeal of the FMLN declined 

. larply. Continued Sandinista supply, 
Dwever, enabled the FMLN to 
jntinue a war of attrition designed to 
lake the country ungovernable. As of 
lid- 1985, Sandinista support for the 
'MLN's "prolonged war" continues to 
lclude military training in Nicaragua 

Lnd assistance to travel to Cuba for 

pore sophisticated training), 
eadquarters and command-and-control 
upport, and provision of arms, 
mmunition, and logistical support. 
Initially Honduras' role in the 
Sandinista scheme was to serve as a 

huiet transit route for arms and other 
;upplies from Nicaragua to El Salvador 

and Guatemala. By 1981, however, 
ictive support was being provided to 



"vanguard" groups. The FSLN- 
supported "Cinchonero" group 
conducted a number of terrorist actions, 
some directly connected with Nicaragua 
in 1981 and 1982. In 1983 and again in 
1984, the Sandinistas infiltrated 
Honduran guerrilla groups into the 
Provinces of Olancho and El Paraiso in 
an attempt to initiate armed activity 
against the government; both efforts 
were foiled. In 1985 members of the 
Nicaraguan Security Service were 
captured in the same area attempting to 
smuggle weapons. The Sandinista armed 
forces have conducted innumerable 
border crossings over 6 years, by 1985 
including mortar and artillery attacks as 
well as the mining of Honduran roads. 
Costa Rica provided crucial support 
for the Sandinista campaigns against 
Somoza. In the process of aiding the in- 
surrection, however, democratic Costa 
Rica unwittingly permitted development 
of a clandestine arms-trafficking net- 
work, later used to assist the FMLN. 
Participation by members of radical 
parties in the FSLN war against 
Somoza was followed by establishment 
of a "vanguard" brigade of Costa Ricans 
operating to this day with the San- 
dinista army on the Costa Rican- 
Nicaraguan border. From 1981 
Sandinista-sponsored terrorism became 
persistent, leading in 1981 and 1982 to 
expulsions from Costa Rica of 
Nicaraguan, Soviet, and Eastern bloc 
diplomats involved in those activities. 
The Sandinistas have carried out several 
attempted assassinations of Nicaraguan 
opposition leaders in Costa Rica and 
have conducted frequent cross-border 
raids and attacks, including shelling and 
bombing. One such raid this year led to 
the death of two members of the small 
police guard which is Costa Rica's only 
security force. 

The evidence speaks for itself. 
Despite Sandinista protestations, the 
record is clear that they had engaged in 
massive armed intervention in the 
neighboring states well before they 
allege that the United States or the 
other Central American states under- 
took action against them. 

The Collective Response 

The international community hoped for 
the best when in July 1979 the junta of 
the Government of National Reconstruc- 
tion assumed power on a program of 
pluralism, nonalignment, and a mixed 
economy and provided massive support 
to assist it. The United States was the 
largest single contributor. In El 



Salvador, a reformist junta began a pro- 
gram of social reform; Honduras too 
began a return to electoral democracy. 
By mid- 1980, however, fragmentary in- 
telligence reports indicated that 
Nicaragua had begun to supply the 
Salvadoran rebels. U.S. diplomatic 
efforts to halt that material support 
were met with denials of such involve- 
ment. Despite doubts, President Carter 
released aid provided in a special 
appropriation to assist Nicaraguan 
recovery. 

Clear Sandinista involvement in the 
"final offensive," which aimed at 
creating a fait accompli in El Salvador 
before the inauguration of President 
Reagan, led to a Carter Administration 
decision to provide military assistance to 
El Salvador and an informal suspension 
of U.S. aid to Nicaragua. While assisting 
Nicaragua's neighbors in their programs 
of social and political reform and defense 
modernization and professionalization, 
the United States also intensified 
diplomatic efforts to persuade the San- 
dinistas to cease their interference in 
neighboring countries. In early 1981, the 
United States presented Nicaragua with 
evidence that their previous denials of 
support for the FMLN had been false 
and made clear that failure to stop their 
aggression would result in a cut-off of 
assistance. Despite renewed denials, in- 
telligence confirmed that assistance con- 
tinued. Upon expiration of a 30-day 
period designed to give the Sandinistas 
a "way out" by ceasing such support, 
the United States finally cut off 
assistance as required by law. Subse- 
quent repeated U.S. bilateral efforts 
directed at halting Sandinista aggression 
were met with refusals to acknowledge, 
much less address, their attacks on their 
neighbors. 

With steady political and military 
progress in El Salvador, the focus of 
U.S. policy on Central America shifted 
more and more to Nicaragua. A consen- 
sus formed that Sandinista intervention 



Copies of the Report 



Free single copies of this 52-page 
report— titled "Revolution Beyond Our 
Borders: Sandinista Intervention in Cen- 
tral America" (Special Report #132)— are 
available from the Correspondence 
Management Division, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



69 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



in its neighbors' affairs was a funda- 
mentally destabilizing factor in Central 
American affairs and that this "interna- 
tionalist" intervention was intimately 
related to the Sandinista military 
buildup, ties with Cuba and the Soviet 
Union, and expanding repression of the 
domestic opposition. By 1982 the United 
States began to provide assistance to 
the armed opposition in an effort to 
counter Nicaraguan aggression more 
directly. 

A similar consensus began to 
emerge in other countries as well. 
Multilateral efforts directed at achieving 
a lasting Central American peace by 
comprehensively addressing the social, 
economic, political, and security 
problems of the region began in 1982 
with the San Jose declaration and con- 
tinued with the initiation in 1983 of the 
Contadora mediation effort of Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. 

The Contadora process achieved, by 
September 1983, formal agreement by 
all five Central American countries- 
including Nicaragua— on 21 social, 
political, economic, and security objec- 
tives to be negotiated and embodied in a 
comprehensive Central American treaty. 
The Contadora mediators presented a 
draft treaty in September 1984; negotia- 
tions since that date have focused on 
developing its provisions on verification 
and ensuring that the obligations which 
fall on Nicaragua come into effect no 
later than those which fall on its 
neighbors. The issue should no longer be 
the legitimacy of the agreed objectives 
but rather the development of concrete 
arrangements to implement them. 

Nicaragua's initial resistance to any 
participation in Contadora was followed 
by a more subtle policy of attempting to 
pursue issues of interest to the San- 
dinistas while thwarting progress on 
other issues. While paying lip service to 
Contadora, it has repeatedly offered 
"peace initiatives" inconsistent with the 
Contadora approach. Those plans have 
been bilateral rather than multilateral 
and uniformly address only those 
security issues in which the Sandinistas 
have an interest, while studiously 
avoiding the broader issues of 
democratization and Sandinista 
militarization. Nicaragua similarly has 
attempted in avoid responding seriously 
to the concern of its neighbors— in light 
of the Sandinistas' record of failure to 
comply with its promises to the 
I frganization of American States (OAS) 
ami its persistent denial of any involve- 
ment in subversion beyond its 
borders that adequate verification of 



any commitments entered into in a com- 
prehensive treaty be ensured. 

The United States has supported 
these multilateral negotiations, imple- 
mentation of the goals of which would 
fully achieve U.S. objectives in Central 
America. At Contadora request, the 
United States initiated a series of 
bilateral discussions with Nicaragua in 
Manzamilo, Mexico, with the agreed 
objective of promoting the Contadora 
process. The U.S. objective was to reach 
bilateral understandings that, channeled 
into that process, would facilitate conclu- 
sion of a comprehensive Contadora 
agreement. The talks were suspended 
when it became apparent that agree- 
ment would be possible only if the 
United States accepted the Nicaraguan 
position that the September 7, 1984, 
draft should be left unchanged, without 
addressing the concerns of Nicaragua's 
neighbors about verification and 
simultaneity, or if the United States 
was willing to jettison Contadora 
entirely and enter into bilateral 
agreements which addressed only cer- 
tain security issues. 



By September 1985, El Salvador had 
made significant progress in the 
political, social, and military spheres, 
and the FMLN was sustained increas- I 
ingly by Sandinista assistance alone. 
Honduras had weathered Sandinista 
attempts to foster terrorist and in- 
surgent activities. Costa Rica, too, had 
survived efforts at destabilization and 
intimidation but had emerged fearing 
Sandinista Nicaragua far more than it 
had ever feared its long-time enemy 
Somoza. 

The record shows the measured and 
gradual nature of the U.S. response, 
first in trying to develop a friendly rela- 
tionship with Nicaragua, then in 
attempting, through diplomatic and 
economic pressure and support, for 
multilateral negotiations to stop San- 
dinista aggression. Finally the United 
States became more and more convinced 
that support for the democratic 
resistance was a necessary element in 
placing effective pressure on the San- 
dinistas to halt their policies of aggres- 
sion, achieve internal reconciliation, and 
contribute to regional peace as 
envisaged in the Contadora 21-point 
Document of Objectives. ■ 



Nicaraguan Humanitarian 
Assistance Office Established 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 30, 1985 1 

I have signed an Executive order which 
establishes the Nicaraguan 
Humanitarian Assistance Office. This 
office will administer the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance to the 
Nicaraguan democratic resistance as 
provided for in the International 
Security and Development Cooperation 
Act of 1985 and the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1985. 

The democratic resistance in 
Nicaragua was born and has grown in 
response to the steady consolidation of a 
totalitarian and interventionist Marxist- 
Leninist regime in Nicaragua since 1979. 
Most of the members of the armed and 
unarmed opposition supported the over- 
throw of General Anastasio Somoza and 
expected that a democratic, pluralist 
government would follow. Very quickly, 
however, it became clear that the San- 
dinistas intended to make Nicaragua a 
one-party state. There would lie no 
room for those who opposed the San 
dinistas or who sought through 



democratic elections to challenge the 
Sandinistas' right to absolute rule. 
There would be collaboration with Cuba 
and the Soviet bloc in assisting revolu- 
tionary groups seeking to subvert and 
overthrow the democratic governments 
of neighboring countries. The good will 
that had existed between the Sandinista 
front and the Nicaraguan people who 
had welcomed the new government soon 
began to crumble. Prominent leaders 
who served in the government after the 
revolution and who had led the opposi- 
tion to Somoza fled the country and 
broke publicly with the Sandinista 
regime. By 1982 significant numbers of 
Nicaraguans were compelled to pursue 
the last resort for civil resistance of 
bearing arms against the government 
because there was no other choice. 
Their numbers have grown steadily. In 
recent months, with the resistance 
forces desperately short of weapons, am- 
munition, food, and supplies, volunteers 
kept coming. The resistance could not 
even provide boots, but people from all 
walks of life left their homes to join the 
cause. Tens of thousands of Nicaraguans 



70 



END NOTES 



e gone to refugee camps in Costa 
:a and Honduras rather than continue 
live under the Sandinistas. Many of 
se people are poor, simple 
sants— the very people the San- 
istas claim to be helping— yet under 
1 Sandinistas they lost too much. 
iey lost their individuality, they lost 
sir freedom, they lost the opportunity 
control their own destiny. 
The $27 million appropriated by the 
ingress for humanitarian assistance to 
e democratic resistance recognizes the 
rious nature of the conflict in 
caragua and the desperate conditions 
rich have forced people to choose 
med opposition and the hard life of 
irfare and refugee camps over the 
ntrolled life offered by the San- 
listas. As Americans who believe in 
jedom, we cannot turn our backs on 
ople who desire nothing more than 
e freedom we take for granted. By 
oviding this humanitarian assistance, 
are telling the people of Nicaragua 
at we will not abandon them in their 
ruggle for freedom. 

This Administration is determined to 
trsue political, not military solutions in 
■ntral America. Our policy is and has 
en to support the democratic center 
; ainst extremes of right and left and to 
. cure democracy and lasting peace 
rough internal reconciliation and 
gional negotiations. 

In El Salvador, the opening of the 
ilitical system has led to impressive 
conciliation and the beginning of a 
alogue between President Duarte and 
e Salvadoran guerrillas. 

In Nicaragua we support the united 
iearaguan opposition's call for a 
lurch-mediated dialogue accompanied 
/ a cease-fire, to achieve national 
■conciliation and representative govern- 
ment. We oppose the sharing of power 
irough military force, as the guerrillas 
El Salvador have demanded; the 
iearaguan democratic opposition shares 
ur view. They have not demanded the 
v'erthrow of the Sandinista govem- 
lent; they want only the right of free 
eople to compete for power in free 
lections. By providing this 
umanitarian assistance, we help keep 
lat hope for freedom alive. 

As with any foreign assistance pro- 
ram, the mandate of the Nicaraguan 
[umanitarian Assistance Office will be 
arried out under the policy guidance of 
he Secretary of State. Program funds 
/ill be provided through the State 
)epartment, which will also be respon- 
ible for providing administrative serv- 
es and facilities. Other agencies of the 



U.S. Government will be able to provide 
advice, information, and personnel; 
however, by the terms of this Executive 
order, no personnel from the Central In- 
telligence Agency or the Department of 
Defense will be assigned or detailed to 
this office. I have ordered that the 
director of the Nicaraguan 
Humanitarian Assistance Office shall be 
an officer of the United States 
designated by the President, and the 
staff of the office shall be limited to 12 
officials, plus support staff. The director 
will be responsible for assisting the 
President with reporting requirements, 
including the detailed accounting 
required by the law. Authority for this 
office will terminate on April 1, 1986, or 
when all the funds to be distributed are 
disbursed, whichever is later. 2 
I am proud to establish the 
Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance 
Office by this Executive order and to 
begin providing the humanitarian 
assistance needed to help those people 
who are fighting for democracy in 
Nicaragua. I value the support that 
Congress has shown for this important 
measure and will assure that the im- 
plementation of the program is fully in 
accord with the legislation the Congress 
has enacted. 



•Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 2, 1985. 

2 0n Sept. 6, 1985, the President 
designated Ambassador Robert W. Duemling 
to be the director. ■ 



September 1985 



The following are some of the signifi- 
cant official U.S. foreign policy actions 
and statements during the month that are 
not reported elsewhere in this periodical. 

September 9-13 

President Reagan meets with U.S. arms con- 
trol delegation before its return to the third 
round of negotiations due to begin Sept. 19 in 
Geneva. 

September 9 

President Reagan meets with major NATO 
commanders and the NATO military 
committee. 

September 12-13 

Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz meets with 
Soviet Foreign Ministry officials in Moscow 
to exchange views on East Asian and Pacific 
issues. The meeting is the latest in a seines 
of regional experts' discussions that U.S.- 
Soviet officials have held in recent months. 



September 12 

Assistant Secretary Abrams meets with six 
leaders of Chilean political groups at the 
State Department to review the development 
of the national accord for transition of a 
return to an elected government and full 
democracy in Chile. 

September 13 

U.S. successfully conducts its first air- 
launched miniature vehicle antisatellite 
(ASAT) test against a target satellite. 
Specific test results are classified. 

Secretary of Agriculture Block announces 
the sale of 175,000 metric tons of subsidized 
wheat flour to Egypt for delivery in 
November and December. 

September 14 

Reverend Weir is released after 16 months of 
captivity in Lebanon. He was taken hostage 
in March 1984. 

September 15 

U.S. restricts travel of UN employees from 
the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Iran, Cuba, 
Vietnam, and Libya. UN employees from 
these countries will be required to obtain 
U.S. approval for personal travel outside a 
25-mile (40 kilometer) radius of midtown New 
York City and must submit a detailed 
itinerary showing routes, times, and means of 
travel 2 days in advance. 

September 16-19 

Under Secretary Armacost visits India and 
Pakistan to discuss a number of regional and 
international issues of mutual concern with 
government officials. 

September 17 

The following newly appointed ambassadors 
present their credentials to President 
Reagan: Frederick Rawdon Dalrymple 
(Australia), Eulogio Jose Santaella Ulloa 
(Dominican Republic), Edward A. Laing 
(Belize), Federico Vargas Peralta (Costa 
Rica), Padraic N. MacKernan (Ireland), and 
Hector Luisi (Uruguay). 

September 19-20 

Under Secretary Wallis meets with Japanese 
Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Teshima to discuss all aspects of mutual 
economic interests. 

September 19 

Secretary Shultz meets with New Zealand 
Deputy Prime Minister Palmer to discuss the 
ship visit issue and other key issues. 

September 25-26 

U.S.-Vietnam delegations meet in Hanoi to 
discuss the recovery of remains of U.S. serv- 
icemen listed as missing in action. 

September 25 

Secretary Shultz meets with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze at the Soviet Mission 
to the United Nations in New York. 



71 



TREATIES 



September 26 

U.S., Japan, and Panama sign an agreement 
to establish an international commission to 
examine future inter-ocean transit uses of the 
Isthmus of Panama. 

September 27 

U.S. and Vietnamese officials meet in New- 
York to discuss POW/MIA matters. 

September 30 

U.S. -Soviet delegations meet in Geneva for a 
special joint plenary meeting to allow the 
Soviet Union to present a counter-proposal to 
the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts 
committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo 
Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4, 
1969. TIAS 6768. 
Ac cession deposited: Malaysia, Mar. 5, 1985. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 
1977. ' 
Ratification depo sited: India, .Ian 31, 1985. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Oct. 6, 1980. ' 
R atifications deposited: Switzerland, Feb. 21, 
1985; Tunisia, Apr. 29, 1985. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement, 1983, with 
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. 
Definitive entry into force: Sept. 11, 1985. 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Sept. 11, 1985. 

Commodities— Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27, 1980. » 
Rati fication deposited: Germany, Fed. Rep., 
Aug. 15, L985. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in endan- 
gered species of wild fauna and flora, with 
appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 
1973. Entered into force Julv 1, 1975. TIAS 
8249. 
Accession de posited: Hungary, May 29, 1985. 



Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1973 
on international trade in endangered species 
of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). Adopted 
at Gaborone Apr. 30, 1983. » 
Accep tance de posited: Belgium, July 30, 1985. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, 
scientific, and cultural materials. Done at 
Lake Success Nov. 22, 1950. Entered into 
force May 21, 1952; for the U.S. Nov. 2, 1966. 
TIAS 6129. 

Protocol to the agreement on the importation 

of educational, scientific, and cultural 

materials of Nov. 22, 1950. (TIAS 6129). 

Adopted at Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976. Entered 

into force Jan. 2, 1982. 2 

Accessions deposited: San Marino, July 30, 

1985. 

Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Coopera- 
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels 
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: Nepal, July 22, 1985. 

Financial Institutions 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund, formulated at Bretton 
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered 
into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
formulated at Bretton Woods Conference 
July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 
1945. TIAS 1502. 

Signature and acceptances d eposited: Tonga, 
Sept. 13, 1985. 

Judicial Procedure 

Additional protocol to the inter-American 
convention on letters rogatory, with annex. 
Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered 
into force June 14, 1980. 2 
Ratifi c ation deposited : Paraguay, July 5, 1985. 

Jute 

International agreement on jute and jute 
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at 
Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force provi- 
sionally Jan. 9, 1984. 
Acceptance deposited: U.S., Sept. 9, 1985. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at 
New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered into force 
Dee. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967. 
TIAS 6298. 

Protocol amending the single convention on 
narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva 
Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 
1975. TIAS 8118. 
Accessions deposit ed: China, Aug. 23, 1985. 



Convention on psychotropic substances. Done 
at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force i 
Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. 
TIAS 9725. 
Accession depos ited: China, Aug. 23, 1985. 

Nuclear Weapons— Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force 
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Notification of succession deposited: Belize, 
Aug. 9, 1985. 

Pollution 

Convention for the protection of the ozone 
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 
1985. > 
Signal ure: Ausl ria, Sepl 16, 1985 

Protocol to the convention on long-range 
transboundary pollution of Nov. 13, 1979 
(TIAS 10541) concerning monitoring and 
evaluation of the long-range transmission of 
air pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with annex. 
Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984. 1 
Ratification deposited: U.K., Aug. 12, 1985. 
Acceptance deposited: Ukrainian SSR, 
Aug. 30, 1985. 



Rubber 

International natural rubber agreement, 1979. 
Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered into 
force Apr. 15, 1982. TIAS 10379. 
Extension of the agreement: Until Oct. 22, 
1987. 

Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of crimes against internationally pro- 
tected persons, including diplomatic agents. 
Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered 
into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532. 
Accession deposited : Spain, Aug. 8, 1985. 

Trade 

Convention on transit trade of land-locked 
states. Done at New York July 8, 1965. 
Entered into force June 9, 1967; for the U.S. 
Nov. 28, 1968. TIAS 6592. 
Accession deposited: Senegal, Aug. 5, 1985. 

Agreement on interpretation and application 
of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the general 
agreement on tariffs and trade (subsidies and 
countervailing duties code). Done at Geneva 
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. 
TIAS 9619. 

Acceptances deposited : Indonesia, Mar. 4, 
1985; 2 Israel, Aug. 15, 1985; 3 Philippines, 
Mar. 15, 1985; 3 Turkey, Feb. 1, 1985. 3 

Treaties 

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, 
with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. 
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980. 2 
Ratification deposited: Liberia, Aug. 29, 1985. 



TREATIES 



ivention on the elimination of all forms of 
simulation against women. Adopted at 
w York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 
it. 3, 1981. 2 

Jfieations deposited: Guinea-Bissau, 
g723, 1985; Mali, Sept. 10, 1985; Tanzania, 
g. 20, 1985. 

LATERAL 

ngladesh 

reement amending the agreement of 
r. 8, 1982, as amended, (TIAS 10483, 
i42) for sales of agricultural commodities, 
'ected by exchange of letters at Dhaka 
g. 31, 1985. Entered into force Aug. 31, 
!5. 

livia 

reement amending the agreement of 
b. 4, 1985, for the sale of agricultural com- 
dities. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Paz Aug. 20, 1985. Entered into force 
!g. 20, 1985. 

itswana 

reement concerning the construction, 
oration, and maintenance of a Voice of 
Jnerica radio relay facility in Botswana, 
\ M appendix. Signed at Gaborone Sept. 5, 
H5. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1985. 

1 azil 

. reement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
i 1 manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
i >, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 

es at Brasilia Aug. 7 and 29, 1985. 

itered into force Aug. 29, 1985; effective 
|r. 1, 1985. 



ilombia 

rreement amending the investment agree- 
■nt of Apr. 3, 1985. Effected by exchange 
notes at Washington July 18 and Aug. 19, 
■85. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1985. 

Salvador 

jreement amending the agreement of 
)v. 1, 1984, as amended, for the sale of 
ricultural commodities. Effected by 
change of notes at San Salvador Aug. 8, 
•85. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1985. 

ranee 

mendment modifying the agreement of 
<ly 27, 1961 (TIAS 4867), for cooperation in 
e operation of atomic weapons systems for 
utual defense purposes. Signed at Paris 
ily 22, 1985. Enters into force on the date 
l which each government receives from the 
,her written notification that it has complied 
ith all statutory and constitutional 
>quirements. 



Guatemala 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, with memorandum of understand- 
ing. Signed at Guatemala June 6, 1985. 
Entered into force: Aug. 7, 1985. 

Israel 

Agreement on the establishment of a free 
trade area, with annexes, exchange of letters, 
and related letter. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 22, 1985. 
Entered i n to force: Aug. 19, 1985 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the installation, operation, and maintenance 
of a seismic station. Signed at Tel Aviv 
May 1, 1985. Entered into force May 1, 1985. 

Japan 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
May 1, 1980 (TIAS 9760), on cooperation in 
research and development in science and 
technology. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Apr. 26, 1985. Entered into force 
Apr. 26, 1985. 

Agreement concerning the furnishing of 
launch and associated services for Spacelab 
mission, with memorandum of understanding. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
Mar. 29, 1985. Entered into force Mar. 29, 
1985. 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting 
of authorizations to permit licensed amateur 
radio operators of either country to operate 
their stations in the other country. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Tokyo Aug. 8, 1985. 
Entered into force Sept. 7, 1985. 

Agreement concerning Japanese participation 
in the commission for the study of alterna- 
tives to the Panama Canal, with attachments. 
Effected by exchange of notes at New York 
Sept. 26, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 26, 
1985. 

Malaysia 

Agreement amending agreement of July 1 
and 11, 1985, relating to trade in cotton, 
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile 
products. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Kuala Lumpur Aug. 21 and 23, 1985. Entered 
into force Aug. 23, 1985. 

Mauritania 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annex. 
Signed at Washington Aug. 14, 1985. 
Entered into force: Sept. 23, 1985. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
May 17, 1984, relating to additional 
cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal 
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Mexico July 24 and Aug. 20, 1985. 
Entered into force Aug. 20, 1985. 



Morocco 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 19, 1985, as amended. I'm' the sale of 
agricultural commodities. Signed at Rabat 
July 24, 1985. Entered into force July 24, 
1985. 

Panama 

Agreement concerning establishment of the 
commission for the study of alternatives to 
the Panama Canal, with annex and related 
notes. Effected by exchange of notes at New 
York Sept. 26, 1985. Entered into force 
Sept. 26, 1985. 

Philippines 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at Manila July 29, 1985. 
Entered into force: Aug. 30, 1985. 

Sudan 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 27, 1984, as amended, for the sales of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Khartoum Aug. 24, 
1985. Entered into force Aug. 24, 1985. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 8528, 10531, 10532, 10696), concerning 
fisheries off the coasts of the United States. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
July 29 and Sept. 2, 1985. Enters into force 
following written notification of the comple- 
tion of internal procedures of both 
governments. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
July 23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8641, 8965, 
9722, 10059), concerning air services. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington May 3 
and Aug. 9, 1985. Entered into force Aug. 9, 
1985. 

Agreement extending the memorandum of 
understanding of Sept. 24, 1975, as extended 
(TIAS 9033), relating to the principles gov- 
erning cooperation in research and develop- 
ment, production, and procurement of 
defense equipment. Signed at Washington 
June 28, 1985. Entered into force June 28, 
1985. 

Yemen 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Apr. 15, 1985, for the sale of agricultural 
commodities. Signed at Sanaa July 30, 1985. 
Entered into force July 30, 1985. 



'Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the U.S. 

3 With declaration. ■ 



J n ., Am u n .. -inoc 



73 



PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. 

*211 



Subject 



9 I 



*212 9/4 



*213 9/5 



*214 9/6 



*215 9/6 



*216 

*217 



Gary L. Matthews sworn in 
as Ambassador to Malta, 
Aug. 22 (biographic data). 

U.S.-Mexico agree on 
measures to resolve the 
Tijuana sanitation problem. 

Program for the official visit 
to Washington, D.C, of 
Prime Minister Poul 
Schlueter of Denmark, 
Sept. 9-11. 

U.S. Delegation to Budapest 
( 'ultural Forum (Oct. 15- 
Nov. 25) announced. 

Irvin Hicks sworn in as 
Ambassador to the 
Republic of Seychelles, 
Aug. 9 (biographic data). 
[Not issued.] 



9/6 U.S.-Mexico sign Annexes 

Nos. I and II to border 
environmental agreement, 
July 18. 

*218 9/11 Shultz: news conference on 

South Africa, Sept. 9. 
219 9/11 Shultz: statement before 
Senate Committee on 
Labor and Human 
Resources. 

*220 9/11 Shultz: welcoming remarks 
before International 
Communications 
Technology and Foreign 
Policy Symposium. 



*221 9/12 Shultz: remarks at swear- 
ing-in ceremony of the 
Christopher Columbus 
Quincentenary Jubilee 
Commission. 

*222 9/16 Program for the official 

working visit to Washing- 
ton, D.C. of President 
Samora Moises Maehel of 
the People's Republic of 
Mozambique, Sept. 17-21. 

*223 9/16 Blair House Restoration 
Fund. 

224 9/17 Shultz: statement before the 

Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 

225 9/23 Shultz: address before the 

40th session of the UN 
General Assembly, New 
York. 

*226 9/25 Harvey F. Nelson, Jr., sworn 
in as Ambassador to 
Swaziland, Aug. 19 
(biographic data). 

*227 9/25 Edwin G. Con- sworn in as 
Ambassador to El 
Salvador, Aug. 23 
(biographic data). 

*228 10/16 Richard W. Bogosian sworn 
in as Ambassador to Niger, 
Aug. 23 (biographic data). 

*229 9/30 Indochinese Refugee Panel 
announced. 

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following 
Department of State publications are 
available from the Correspondence 
Management Division, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, I 
D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

South Africa: Presidential Actions (with text* 
of Executive order), Sept. 9, 19S5 (Current 
Policy #735). 

The President's Trade Policy Action Plan, 
business leaders and members of the 
President's Export Council and the 
Advisory Committee for Trade 
Negotiations, Sept. 23, 1985 (Current 
Policy #745). 

Secretary Shultz 

The Charter's Goals and Today's Realities, 
UN General Assembly, Sept. 23, 1985 
(Current Policy #743). 

Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1986, 
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy, Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Sept." 17, 1985 (Current Policy #738). 

U.S. Role in the ILO, Senate Labor and 
Human Resources Committee, Sept. 11, 
1985 (Current Policy #737). 



Africa 

Southern Africa: 
Sept. 1985). 



U.S. Policy (GIST, 



Energy 

Energy Trade: Problems and Prospects, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Wendt, Oxfon 
Energy Seminar, Oxford, England, Sept. 5> 
1985 (Current Policy #741). 

Oil and Energy (GIST, Sept. 1985). 



Europe 

CSCE Process: An Overview (GIST, 
Sept. 1985). 

Human Rights 

Human Rights and U.S.-Soviet Relations. 
Under Secretary Armacost, International 
Council of the World Conference on Soviet 
Jewry, Sept. 9, 1985 (Current Policy #736). 

Middle East 

An Overview of Developments in the Middle 
Fast, Assistant Secretary Murphy, Subcotr 
mittee on Europe and the Middle East, 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sept. li 
1985 (Current Policy #740). 

Narcotics 

International Narcotics Control (GIST, 
Sept. 1985). 

South Asia 

Afghanistan (CIST, Sept. 1985). 



Western Hemisphere 

Revolution Beyond Our Borders: Sandinista 
Intervention in Central America, Sept. 198.' 
(Special Report #132). ■ 



OEX 



fevember 1985 
tf>lume 85, No. 2104 



ca. Terrorism: Overview and Developments 

(( (akley) 61 

is Control 

isatellite Arms Control (Adelman) 26 

is Control Talks Resume in Geneva 

(Reagan) 27 

Charter's Goals and Today's Realities 
(Shultz) 8 

ference on Disarmament in Europe 
Reconvenes (Reagan) 30 

McFarlane's Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 33 

FR Talks Resume in Vienna (Reagan) . 32 

rident Meets With Soviet Foreign Minister 
(Shultz) 53 

adent's News Conference of September 17 
(excerpts) • 3 

•etary's Interview on "Meet the Press" 18 

us of MBFR Negotiations (Blackvvill). . 31 

d Review Conference Held for Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty (Adelman, final document) 35 

. Activities "in the Conference on Disarma- 
ment (Lowitz) 29 

iness. The President's Trade Policy Action 
Plan (Reagan) 1 

nbodia. Proposed Refugee Admissions for 
FY 1986 (Shultz) 20 

lada. Energy Trade: Problems and Pros- 
pects (Wen'dt) 49 

igress 

isatellite Arms Control (Adelman) 26 

posed Refugee Admissions for FY 1986 
(Shultz) 20 

.us of MBFR Negotiations (Blackwill). . 31 
Report on Cyprus (Reagan, message to the 
Congress) 57 

■. Activities in the Conference on Disarma- 
ment (Lowitz) 29 

,. Role in the ILO (Shultz) 16 

■ U.S. and the United Nations (Walters) 66 

»rus. 23d Report on Cyprus (Reagan, 
message to the Congress) 57 

imark. Visit of Danish Prime Minister 
(Reagan, Schluter) 56 

momics 

i Charter's Goals and Today's Realities 
(Shultz) 8 

,ance Ministers, Central Bank Governors 
Discuss Economic Policies (final 
announcement) 46 

nrubber Footwear Industry (Reagan) . . 48 

3 President's Trade Policy Action Plan 
(Reagan) 1 

Salvador. Terrorists Arrested in El Salvador 
(President's letter to President Duarte) 65 

iergv. Energy Trade: Problems and Pros- 
pects (Wen'dt) 49 

irope 

nference on Disarmament in Europe 
Reconvenes (Reagan) 30 

lergy Trade: Problems and Prospects 
(Wendt) .-49 

man Rights and U.S.-Soviet Relations 
(Armacost) 58 

BFR Talks Resume in Vienna (Reagan) . 32 

atus of MBFR Negotiations (Blackwill). . 31 

srrorism: Overview and Developments 
(Oakley) . 61 

treign Assistance. Nicaraguan Humanitarian 
Assistance Office Established (Reagan) 70 



France. Finance Ministers, Central Bank Gover- 
nors Discuss Economic Policies (final 

announcement) 46 

Germany. Finance Ministers, Central Bank 
Governors Discuss Economic Policies (final 

announcement) 46 

Human Rights 

Fifth Anniversary of Solidarity (Reagan) . . 60 

Human Rights 'and U.S.-Soviet Relations 

(Armacost) 58 

U.S. Repeats Call for Sakharovs Release 

(Department statement) 59 

International Organizations and Con- 
ferences. Third Review Conference Held 
for Nonproliferation Treaty (Adelman, final 

document) 35 

Japan 

Energy Trade: Problems and Prospects 

(Wendt) 49 

Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors 
Discuss Economic Policies (final 

announcement) 46 

Labor 

Fifth Anniversary of Solidarity (Reagan) . . 60 

U.S. Role in the 'ILO (Shultz) 16 

Middle East 

Secretary's Interview on "Meet the Press" 18 

Terrorism: Overview and Developments 

(Oakley) 61 

Military Affairs 

President's News Conference of September 17 

(excerpts) • 3 

Secretary's Interview on "Meet the Press" 18 

Mozambique 

President's News Conference of September 17 

(excerpts) 3 

Visit of Mozambique's President (Machel, 

Reagan) 25 

Nicaragua 

Department Releases Report on Sandinista 
Intervention in Central America 

(summary) 68 

Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office 

Established (Reagan) 70 

Nuclear Policy. Third Review Conference Held 
for Nonproliferation Treaty (Adelman, final 

document) 35 

Pacific. 40th Anniversary of the End of World 

War II in the Pacific (Reagan) 7 

Philippines. U.S. Releases Affidavits for 
Aquino Assassination Trial (Department 

statement) 45 

Poland. Fifth Anniversary of Solidarity 

(Reagan) 60 

Presidential Documents 

Arms Control Talks Resume in Geneva ... 27 

Conference on Disarmament in Europe 

Reconvenes 30 

Fifth Anniversary of Solidarity 60 

40th Anniversary of the End of World War II 

in the Pacific 7 

MBFR Talks Resume in Vienna 32 

Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office 

Established 70 

Nonrubber Footwear Industry 48 

President's News Conference of September 17 

(excerpts) 3 

Terrorists Arrested in El Salvador (Presidents 

letter to President Duarte) 65 

23d Report on Cyprus (message to the 

Congress) 5 1 

Visit of Danish Prime Minister (Reagan, 

Schluter) 56 

Visit of Mozambique's President (Machel, 

Reagan) 25 

Publications. Department of State 74 

Refugees . 

The Charter's Goals and Today s Realities 

(Shultz) 8 

Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1986 
(Shultz) : 20 



South Africa. President's News Conference of 

September 17 (excerpts) 3 

Space. Antisatellite Arms Control (Adelman) 26 

Terrorism 

The Charter's Coals and Today's Realities 

(Shultz) 8 

Secretary's Interview on "Meet the Press" 18 
Terrorism: Overview and Developments 

(Oakley) 63 

Terrorists Arrested in El Salvador (President's 

Letter to President Duarte) 65 

Thailand. Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 

1986 (Shultz) 20 

Trade 

The Charter's Goals and Today's Realities 

(Shultz) 8 

Energv Trade: Problems and Prospects 

(Wendt) 49 

Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors 
Discuss Economic Policies (final 

announcement) 46 

Nonrubber Footwear Industry (Reagan) . . 48 
President's News Conference of September 17 

(excerpts) 3 

The President's Trade Policy Action Plan 

(Reagan) 1 

Treaties. Current Actions 72 

U.S.S.R. 

Arms Control Talks Resume in Geneva 

(Reagan) 27 

The Charter's Goals and Today's Realities 

(Shultz) 8 

Human Rights and U.S.-Soviet Relations 

(Armacost) 58 

Mr. McFarlane's Interview on "This Week With 

David Brinkley" 33 

President Meets W'ith Soviet Foreign Minister 

(Shultz) 53 

President's News Conference of September 17 

(excerpts) • 3 

Secretary's Interview on "Meet the Press" 18 
U.S. Repeats Call for Sakharovs Release 

(Department statement) 59 

United Kingdom. Finance Ministers, Central 
Bank Governors Discuss Economic Policies 

(final announcement) 46 

United Nations 

The Charter's Goals and Today's Realities 

(Shultz) 8 

Security Council Holds Commemorative Session 

(Shultz) 14 

U.S. Role in the ILO (Shultz) 16 

The U.S. and the United Nations (Walters) 66 
Vietnam. Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 

1986 (Shultz) 20 

Western Hemisphere 

Department Releases Report on Sandinista 
Intervention in Central America (sum- 
mary) -68 

Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office 

Established (Reagan) 70 

Terrorism: Overview and Developments 
(Oakley) 61 

Name Index 

Adelman, Kenneth L 26, 35 

Armacost, Michael H 58 

Blackwill. Robert D 31 

Lowitz, Donald S 29 

Machel, Samora Moises 25 

McFaiiane, Robert C 33 

Oakley. Robert B ■ ■ • • ■ • -61 

Reagan, President 1, 3, 7, 25, 27, 30, 

32, 48. 56, 57, 60, 
65, 70 

Schluter, Poul 56 

Shultz, Secretary .8, 14, 16. 18, 20, 53 

Walters, Vernon A 6b 

Wendt, E. Allan 49 



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pe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy/Volume 85/Number 2105 



December 1985 




Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 85 / Number 2105 / December 1985 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
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(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
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provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

BERNARD KALB 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief. Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



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CONTENTS 



FEATURE 




A Foundation for Enduring Peace (President Reagan) 

United Nations Day, 1985 (A Proclamation) 

Secretaries General of the United Nations 

U.S. Delegation to the 40th UN General Assembly 

United Nations Headquarters 

United Nations Activities 



The Vice President 

18 Visit to China 



The Secretary 

Arms Control, Strategic Stability, 

and Global Security 
Morality and Realism in 

American Foreign Policy 
News Conference of October 31 



>0 



>5 



!7 



nterview 

12 Mr. McFarlane's Interview on 

"Meet the Press" 



\rms Control 



15 



(? 



The Soviet Arms Control 

Counterproposal (Paul H. 

Nitze) 
The ABM Treaty and the SDI 

Program (Paul H. Nitze, 

Abraham D. Sofaer) 



Department 

10 Managing the Department of 
State (Ronald I. Spiers) 

East Asia 



14 



»7 



Japan and the U.S.: A Global 
Partnership (Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

Visit of Singapore's Prime 
Minister (Lee Kuan Yew, 
President Reagan) 



Economics 



49 



52 



The Relation of Japan's Economic 
Inefficiencies to Its Balance of 
Trade (W. Allen Wallis) 

Open Markets: Key to a 
Stronger, Richer, and Freer 
America (W. Allen Wallis) 



Europe 

54 Situation in Poland (President 

Reagan) 

Foreign Assistance 

55 Foreign Assistance and the U.S. 

National Interest (Michael H. 
Armacost) 

International Law 

58 The Political Offense Exception 
and Terrorism (Abraham D. 
Sofaer) 

Middle East 

62 The Peace Process and Arms 
Sales to Jordan (President 
Reagan, Secretary Shultz) 

64 Visit of Jordan's King Hussein 

(King Hussein I, President 
Reagan) 

65 Visit of Israel's Prime Minister 

(Shimon Peres, President 
Reagan) 

66 An Overview of Developments in 

the Middle East (Richard W. 
Murphy) 



Military Affairs 

69 SDI: Its Nature and Rationale 
(Paul H. Nitze) 

Refugees 

72 Refugees: The Need for 

Continuing Support (James N. 
Purcell, Jr.) 



Terrorism 

74 Terrorists Seize Cruise Ship in 
Mediterranean (John F. 
Lehman, Jr., Richard W. 
Murphy, President Reagan, 
Secretary Shultz, Abraham D. 
Sofaer, William H. Webster, 
Wiiite House and Department 
Statements) 

77 U.S. Offers Rewards for 
Terrorists (Department 
Announcement) 

End Notes 

81 October 1985 

Treaties 

82 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

84 Department of State 

Publications 

85 Department of State 
85 Background Notes 

Index 



Correction 



On page 32 of the September 1985 issue 
(Volume 85, Number 2102) remarks were 
mistakenly attributed to Fiji Ambassador 
Radrodro. Secretary Shultz was speaking 
to U.S. Ambassador to Fiji, C. Edward 
Dillery. The Bulletin regrets this er- 




nonarlmDnl nf Qtatp Rllllptit 



*"* 



a«» v *- 




FEATURE 
United Nations 



A Foundation 
for Enduring Peace 

by President Reagan 

Address before the kOth session 

of the UN General Assembly 

in New York on October 2k, 1985. y 



Forty years ago, the world awoke dar- 
ing to believe hatred's unyielding grip 
had finally been broken— daring to 
believe the torch of peace would be pro- 
tected in liberty's firm grasp. 

Forty years ago, the world yearned 
to dream again innocent dreams, to 
believe in ideals with innocent trust. 
Dreams of trust are worthy, but in 
these 40 years too many dreams have 
been shattered; too many promises have 
been broken; too many lives have been 
lost. The painful truth is that the use of 
violence to take, to exercise, and to 
preserve power remains a persistent 
reality in much of the world. 

The vision of the UN Charter— to 
spare succeeding generations this 
scourge of war— remains real. It still 
stirs our souls and warms our hearts. 
But it also demands of us a realism that 
is rockhard, clear eyed, steady, and 
sure— a realism that understands the 
nations of the United Nations are not 
united. 

I come before you this morning pre- 
occupied with peace, with ensuring that 
the differences between some of us not 
be permitted to degenerate into open 
conflict. And I come offering for my 
own country a new commitment, a fresh 
start. 

On this UN anniversary, we 
acknowledge its successes: the decisive 
action during the Korean war; negotia- 
tion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; 



strong support for decolonization; and 
the laudable achievements by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees. Nor 
must we close our eyes to this organiza- 
tion's disappointments: its failure to deal 
with real security issues, the total inver- 
sion of morality in the infamous 
Zionism-is-racism resolution, the 
politicization of too many agencies, the 
misuse of too many resources. 

The United Nations is a political in- 
stitution, and politics requires com- 
promise. We recognize that. But let us 
remember: from those first days one 
guiding star was supposed to light our 
path toward the UN vision of peace and 
progress— the star of freedom. 

What kind of people will we be 40 
years from today? May we answer— free 
people, worthy of freedom, and firm in 
the conviction that freedom is not the 
sole prerogative of a chosen few, but 
the universal right of all God's children. 
This is the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights set forth in 1948. And 
this is the affirming flame the United 
States has held high to a watching 
world. We champion freedom not only 
because it is practical and beneficial but 
because it is morally right and just. 

Free people, whose governments 
rest upon the consent of the governed, 
do not wage war on their neighbors. 
Free people, blessed by economic oppor- 
tunity and protected by laws that 



lecemhfir IQRfS 



respect the dignity of the individual, are 
not driven toward the domination of 
others. 

We readily acknowledge that the 
United States is far from perfect. Yet 
we have endeavored earnestly to carry 
out our responsibilities to the Charter 
these past 40 years, and we take na- 
tional pride in our contributions to 
peace. We take pride in 40 years of 
helping to avert a new world war and 
pride in our alliances that protect and 
preserve us and our friends from ag- 
gression. We take pride in the Camp 
David agreements and our efforts for 
peace in the Middle East rooted in 
Resolutions 242 and 338; in supporting 
Pakistan, target of outside intimidation; 
in assisting El Salvador's struggle to 
carry forward its democratic revolution; 
in answering the appeal of our Carib- 
bean friends in Grenada; in seeing 
Grenada's representative here today, 
voting the will of its own people. And 
we take pride in our proposals to reduce 
the weapons of war. 

We submit this history as evidence 
of our sincerity of purpose. But today it 
is more important to speak to you about 
what my country proposes to do, in 
these closing years of the 20th century, 
to bring about a safer, a more peaceful, 
a more civilized world. 




Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., chairman of the U.S. delegation 
to the San Francisco conference, signed the UN Charter on June 26, 1945, 
while President Truman (left) witnessed. Behind the Secretary and at the 
right of this photo are other members of the U.S. delegation who also signed 
the Charter— Commander Harold E. Stassen, U.S. Naval Reserve; Virginia C. 
Gildersleeve, Dean, Barnard College; (unidentified aide); Representative 
Charles A. Eaton (R-N.J.); Representative Sol Bloom (D-N.Y.); Senator 
Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-Mich.); and Senator Tom Connally (D-Tex.). 
Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, senior adviser and member of the 
U.S. delegation, was convalescing in Washington, D.C., and signed the 
Charter at a later date. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945 for 
his role in establishing the United Nations. 



U.S. -Soviet Differences 

Let us begin with candor— with words 
that rest on plain and simple facts. The 
differences between America and the 
Soviet Union are deep and abiding. The 
United States is a democratic nation. 
Here the people rule. We build no walls 
to keep them in, nor organize any 
system of police to keep them mute. We 
occupy no country. The only land abroad 
we occupy is beneath the graves where 
our heroes rest. What is called the West 
is a voluntary association of free na- 
tions, all of which fiercely value their in- 
dependence and their sovereignty. And 
as deeply as we cherish our beliefs, we 
do not seek to compel others to share 
them. 




U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
Vernon A. Walters presents the original 
copy of the UN Charter to Secretary 
General Javier Perez de Cuellar so that 
it can be displayed during the 40th ses- 
sion of the General Assembly. The 
Charter is in permanent custody of the 
U.S. Government in fulfillment of its 
depositary function. It is bound in a 
single document and contains all five 
original language texts (English, 
French. Spanish, Russian, and Chinese). 



,f Clots Qnllot 




United Nations 



United Nations Day, 1985 



ROCLAMATION 5372, 
:T. 1, 1985' 

e founders of the United Nations, meeting 
San Francisco 40 years ago, set forth in 
s U.N. Charter the fervent hope that 
manity might experience peace and inter- 
tional cooperation in the era after the 
eatest and most costly war ever experi- 
ced. The ideals expressed in the Charter 

e that all member states would work 
aether to maintain international peace and 
curity, encourage human rights, and 
operate in dealing with the economic, 
cial, humanitarian, and technical problems 
at afflict our planet. 

The United Nations and its family of in- 
rnational organizations have sought, con- 
ructively, to improve the human condition, 
any people today live under better condi- 
>ns because of work done in the name of 
ese organizations. That hope for interna- 
>nal cooperation, expressed 40 years ago, 
is been achieved most often in the U.N.'s 
rchnical, development, and humanitarian 
encies. The United Nations Children's 
and (UNICEF), the World Health Organiza- 
on (WHO), the International Civil Aviation 
•ganization (ICAO), the World 
leteorological Organization (WMO), the In- 
rnational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
id the World Food Program (WFP), for ex- 
nple, have made major contributions to the 
fety and welfare of people everywhere. 
On this the United Nation's 40th An- 
iversary, it is appropriate that all member 
lates reflect not only on the achievements of 
»e organization, but also its shortcomings, 
6 unfulfilled promise and yes, even its 
.ilures. We do so in a positive spirit, seeking 
Dnstructive solutions to those problems that 
-event the U.N. from realizing its full 
otential and fully embodying the ideals of 
le Charter. We believe that by facing those 
roblems realistically and working together, 
lany can be solved. The tasks before us are 
ot easy. It will require both patience and 
edication to the ideals of the U.N. Charter. 
fe owe it to ourselves, however, to our 
lildren, and to all future generations to 
lake this effort. 

To the American people and their elected 
jpresentatives, the United Nations plays an 
nportant role in the search for peace with 



justice. It provides a forum where member 
states can discuss and try to resolve their dif- 
ferences peacefully, in the spirit of the 
Charter. We will continue to do all we can to 
support that process within the U.N., within 
recognized regional fora, and in direct 
bilateral dialogue. As we encourage more 
responsible international behavior, we 
strengthen the United Nations and the pros- 
pect for achieving the goals of its Charter. 
But much more can and must be done. We 
look to all member states to support the 
sound principles upon which the U.N. was 
founded. These include respect for the rights 
and views of states that may find themselves 
in the minority, and support for recognized 
regional associations as provided for in the 
Charter, as well as the wise use of its own 
resources and established procedures. 

The people and the government of the 
United States take satisfaction in the very 
substantial moral, political, and financial sup- 
port we have given to the United Nations 
since its founding. We remain firmly commit- 
ted to the noble ideals set forth in the 
Charter; they are entirely consonant with the 
ideals embodied in our own political institu- 
tions. The United Nations continues to stand 
as the symbol of the hopes of all mankind for 
a more peaceful and productive world. We 
must not disappoint those hopes. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim Thursday, October 24, 
1985, as United Nations Day and urge all 
Americans to acquaint themselves with the 
activities of the United Nations, its ac- 
complishments, and the challenges it faces. I 
have appointed Peter H. Dailey to serve as 
1985 United States Chairman for United 
Nations Day and welcome the role of the 
United Nations Association of the United 
States of America in working with him to 
celebrate this special day. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this first day of October, in the 
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-five, and of the Independence of the 
1 States of America the two hundred 
and tenth. 

Ronald I: 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 7, 1985. 



When we enjoy these vast freedoms 
as we do, it is difficult for us to under- 
stand the restrictions of dictatorships 
which seek to control each institution 
and every facet of people's lives, the 
expression of their beliefs, their 
movements, and their contacts with the 
outside world. It is difficult for us to 
understand the ideological premise that 
force is an acceptable way to expand a 
political system. 

We Americans do not accept that 
any government has the right to com- 
mand and order the lives of its people, 
that any nation has a historic right to 
use force to export its ideology. This 
belief— regarding the nature of man and 
the limitations of government— is at the 
core of our deep and abiding differences 
with the Soviet Union, differences that 
put us into natural conflict— and 
competition— with one another. 

We would welcome enthusiastically a 
true competition of ideas, welcome a 
competition of economic strength and 
scientific and artistic creativity, and, 
yes, welcome a competition for the good 
will of the world's people. But we can- 
not accommodate ourselves to the use of 
force and subversion to consolidate and 
expand the reach of totalitarianism. 

When Mr. Gorbachev and I meet in 
Geneva next month, I look to a fresh 
start in the relationship of our two 
nations. We can and should meet in the 
spirit that we can deal with our dif- 
ferences peacefully. That is what we 
expect. 

The only way to resolve differences 
is to understand them. We must have 
candid and complete discussions of 
where dangers exist and where peace is 
being disrupted. Make no mistake: our 
policy of open and vigorous competition 
rests on a realistic view of the world. 
Therefore, at Geneva, we must review 
the reasons for the current level of 
mistrust. 

For example, in 1972 the interna- 
tional community negotiated in good 
faith a ban on biological and toxin 
weapons; in 1975 we negotiated the 
Helsinki accords on human rights and 
freedoms; and during the decade just 



•ecember 1985 



past, the United Slates and the Soviet 
Union negotiated several agreements on 
strategic weapons. And yet we feel it 
will be necessary at Geneva to discuss 
with the Soviet Union what we believe 
are violations of a number of the provi- 
sions in all of these agreements. Indeed, 
this is why it is important that we have 
this opportunity to air our differences 
through face-to-face meetings— to let 
frank talk substitute for anger and 
tension. 

The United States has never sought 
treaties merely to paper over dif- 
ferences. We continue to believe that a 



nuclear war is one that cannot be won 
and must never be fought. And that is 
why we have sought, for nearly 10 
years, still seek, and will discuss in 
Geneva radical, equitable, verifiable 
reductions in these vast arsenals of 
offensive nuclear weapons. 

At the beginning of the latest round 
of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, 
the Soviet Union presented a specific 
proposal involving numerical values. We 
are studying the Soviet counterproposal 
carefully. I believe that within their pro- 
posal there are seeds which we should 
nurture, and in the coming weeks we 



will seek to establish a genuine process] 
of give-and-take. 

The United States is also seeking to 
discuss with the Soviet Union in Geneva 
the vital relationship between offensive 
and defensive systems, including the 
possibility of moving toward a more 
stable and secure world in which 
defenses play a growing role. The 
ballistic missile is the most awesome, 
threatening, and destructive weapon in 
the history of man. Thus, I welcome the 
interest of the new Soviet leadership in 
the reduction of offensive strategic 



Secretaries General of the United Nations 




Trygve Lie (Norway) 
1946-1952 




Dag Hammarskjold (Sweden) 
1953-1961 





U Thant (Burma) 
1961-1971 




Javier Perez de Cuellar (Peru) 
1982-Present 




Kurt Waldheim (Austria) 
1972-1981 




FEATURE 
United Nations 



>rces. Ultimately, we must remove this 
lenace— once and for all— from the face 
f the Earth. 

Until that day, the United States 
eeks to escape the prison of mutual ter- 
or by research and testing that could, 
i time, enable us to neutralize the 
hreat of these ballistic missiles and, 
ltimately, render them obsolete. How 
i Moscow threatened if the capitals of 
ther nations are protected? We do not 
sk that the Soviet leaders— whose coun- 
ry has suffered so much from war- 
save their people defenseless against 
Dreign attack. Why then do they insist 
hat we remain undefended? Who is 
hreatened if Western research— and 
'Oviet research that is itself well- 
idvanced— should develop a non-nuclear 
ystem which would threaten not human 
eings but only ballistic missiles? 

Surely, the world will sleep more 
ecure when these missiles have been 
endered useless, militarily and political- 
f, when the sword of Damocles that 
.as hung over our planet for too many 
•ecades is lifted by Western and Rus- 
sian scientists working to shield their 
dties and their citizens and one day 
hut down space as an avenue of 
weapons of mass destruction. 

If we are destined by history to 
ompete, militarily, to keep the peace, 
'hen let us compete in systems that de- 
end our societies rather than weapons 
vhich can destroy us both and much of 
Jod's creation along with us. Some 18 
ears ago, then-Premier Aleksei 
£osygin was asked about a moratorium 
m the development of an antimissile 
lefense system. The official Soviet news 
igency, TASS, reported he replied with 
hese words: 

I believe that defensive systems, which 
prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms 
•ace, but constitute a factor preventing the 
death of people. . . . Maybe an antimissile 
system is more expensive than an offensive 
system, but it is designed not to kill people 
out to preserve human lives. 



The Search for Real Peace 

Preserving lives— no peace is more fun- 
damental than that. Great obstacles lie 
ahead, but they should not deter us. 
Peace is God's commandment. Peace is 
the holy shadow cast by men treading 
on the path of virtue. 

But just as we all know what peace 
is, we certainly know what peace is not. 

• Peace based on repression cannot 
be true peace and is secure only when 
individuals are free to direct their own 
governments. 

• Peace based on partition cannot be 
true peace. Put simply: nothing can 
justify the continuing and permanent 
division of the European Continent. 
Walls of partition and distrust must give 
way to greater communication for an 
open world. Before leaving for Geneva, 

I shall make new proposals to achieve 
this goal. 

• Peace based on mutual fear cannot 
be true peace because staking our 
future on a precarious balance of terror 
is not good enough. The world needs a 
balance of safety. 

• And, finally, a peace based on 
averting our eyes from trouble cannot 
be true peace. The consequences of con- 
flict are every bit as tragic when the 
destruction is contained within one 
country. 

Real peace is what we seek, and 
that is why today the United States is 
presenting an initiative that addresses 
what will be a central issue in Geneva— 
the issue of regional conflicts in Africa, 
Asia, and Central America. 

Our own position is clear: as the 
oldest nation of the New World, as the 
first anticolonial power, the United 
States rejoiced when decolonization gave 
birth to so many new nations after 
World War II. We have always sup- 
ported the right of the people of each 
nation to define their own destiny. We 
have given $300 billion since 1945 to 
help people of other countries. And 
we've tried to help friendly govern- 



ments defend against aggression, 
subversion, and terror. 

We have noted with great interest 
similar expressions of peaceful intent by 
leaders of the Soviet Union. I am not 
here to challenge the good faith of what 
they say. But isn't it important for us to 
weigh the record, as well? 

• In Afghanistan, there are 118,000 
Soviet troops prosecuting war against 
the Afghan people. 

• In Cambodia, 140,000 Soviet- 
backed Vietnamese soldiers wage a war 
of occupation. 

• In Ethiopia, 1,700 Soviet advisers 
are involved in military planning and 
support operations along with 2,500 
Cuban combat troops. 

• In Angola— 1,200 Soviet military 
advisers involved in planning and super- 
vising combat operations, along with 
35,000 Cuban troops. 



U.S. Delegation 

to the 40th 

UN General Assembly 

Representatives 

Vernon A. Walters 

Herbert S. Okun 

Gerald B. Solomon, U.S. Representative from 

the State of New York 
Daniel A. Mica. U.S. Representative from the 

State of Florida 
John Davis Lodge* 

Alternate Representatives 

Patricia M. Byrne 
Joseph Verner Reed 
Hugh Montgomery 
Robinson Risner 
Adele Langston Rogers 



*Mr. Lodge died Oct. 29, 1985. 
USUN press release 95 (rev.) of Oct. 17, 
1985. ■ 



• In Nicaragua— some 8,000 Soviet- 
bloc and Cuban personnel, including 
about 3,500 military and secret police 
personnel. 

All of these conflicts— some of them 
under way for a decade— originate in 
local disputes, but they share a common 
characteristic: they are the consequence 
of an ideology imposed from without, 
dividing nations and creating regimes 
that are, almost from the day they take 
power, at war with their own people. 
And in each case Marxism- Leninism's 
war with the people becomes war with 
their neighbors. 

These wars are exacting a stagger- 
ing human toll and threaten to spill 
across national boundaries and trigger- 
dangerous confrontations. Where is it 
more appropriate than right here at the 
United Nations to call attention to Arti- 
cle 2 of our Charter which instructs 
members to refrain "... from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of 
any state. . . ."? 

During the past decade these wars 
played a large role in building suspicions 
and tensions in my country over the 
purpose of Soviet policy. This gives us 
an extra reason to address them seri- 
ously today. 



U.S. Proposal for a 
Regional Peace Process 

Last year I proposed from this podium 
that the United States and Soviet Union 
hold discussions on some of these issues, 
and we have done so. But I believe 
these problems need more than talk. 
For that reason, we are proposing, and 
are fully committed to support, a 
regional peace process that seeks pro- 
gress on three levels. 

• First, we believe the starting 
point must be a process of negotiation 
among the warring parties in each coun- 
try I've mentioned— which, in the case 
of Afghanistan, includes the Soviet 
Union. The form of these talks may 



and should vary, but negotiations— 
and an improvement of internal politi- 
cal conditions— are essential to achiev- 
ing an end to violence, the withdrawal 
of foreign troops, and national 
reconciliation. 

• There is a second level: once 
negotiations take hold and the parties 
directly involved are making real pro- 
gress, representatives of the United 
States and the Soviet Union should sit 
down together. It is not for us to im- 
pose any solutions in this separate set of 
talks. Such solutions would not last. But 
the issue we should address is how best 
to support the ongoing talks among the 
warring parties. In some cases, it might 
well be appropriate to consider guar- 
antees for any agreements already 
reached. But in every case the primary 
task is to promote this goal: verified 
elimination of the foreign military 
presence and restraint on the flow of 
outside arms. 

• And, finally, if these first two 
steps are successful, we could move on 
to the third— welcoming each country 
back into the world economy so its 
citizens can share in the dynamic 
growth that other developing coun- 
tries—countries that are at peace- 
enjoy. Despite past differences with 
these regimes, the United States would 
respond generously to their democratic 
reconciliation with their own people, 
their respect for human rights, and their 
return to the family of free nations. Of 
course, until such time as these negotia- 
tions result in definitive progress, 
America's support for struggling 
democratic resistance forces must not 
and shall not cease. 

This plan is bold. It is realistic. It is 
not a substitute for existing peacemak- 
ing efforts; it complements them. We 
are not trying to solve every conflict in 
every region of the globe, and we 
recognize that each conflict has its own 
character. Naturally, other regional 
problems will require different ap- 
proaches. But we believe that the recur- 
rent pattern of conflict that we see in 
these five cases ought to be broken as 
soon as possible. 



We must begin somewhere, so let us 
begin where there is great need and 
great hope. This will be a clear step for- 
ward to help people choose their future 
more freely. Moreover, this is an ex- 
traordinary opportunity for the Soviet 
side to make a contribution to regional 
peace which, in turn, can promote future 
dialogue and negotiations on other 
critical issues. 



The Need for Individual 
Freedom and Human Rights 

With hard work and imagination, there 
is no limit to what, working together, 
our nations can achieve. Gaining a 
peaceful resolution of these conflicts will 
open whole new vistas of peace and 
progress— the discovery that the prom- 
ise of the future lies not in measures of 
military defense, or the control of 
weapons, but in the expansion of in- 
dividual freedom and human rights. 

Only when the human spirit can 
worship, create, and build, only when 
people are given a personal stake in 
determining their own destiny and 
benefiting from their own risks do 
societies become prosperous, pro- 
gressive, dynamic, and free. 

We need only open our eyes to 
the economic evidence all around us. 
Nations that deny their people 
opportunity— in Eastern Europe, In- 
dochina, southern Africa, and Latin 
America— without exception are drop- 
ping further behind in the race for the 
future. But where we see enlightened 
leaders who understand that economic 
freedom and personal incentive are key 
to development, we see economies 
striding forward— Singapore, Taiwan, 
and South Korea; India, Botswana, and 
China. These are among the current and 
emerging success stories because they 
have the courage to give economic in- 
centives a chance. 




FEATURE 



United Nations 



Let us all heed the simple eloquence 
1 Andrei Sakharov's Nobel Peace Prize 
lessage: 

Interaational trust, mutual understanding 
isarmament and international security are 
(conceivable without an open society with 
■eedom of information, freedom of con- 
.•ience, the right to publish and the light to 
avel and choose the country in which one 
ishes to live. 

At the core, this is an eternal truth, 
'reedom works. That is the promise of 
ne open world and awaits only our col- 
■ctive grasp. Forty years ago, hope 
ame alive again for a world that 
ungered for hope. I believe fervently 
lat hope is still alive. 



he American Commitment 
o the World 

he United States has spoken with ean- 
or and conviction today, but that does 
ot lessen these strong feelings held by 
very American: it's in the nature of 
Lmericans to hate war and its destruc- 
iveness. We would rather wage our 
truggle to rebuild and renew, not to 
ear down. We would rather fight 
.gainst hunger, disease, and catas- 
rophe. We would rather engage our 
dversaries in the battle of ideals and 
deas for the future. 

These principles emerge from the in- 
iate openness and good character of our 
people— and from our long struggle and 
>acrifice for our liberties and the liber- 
ies of others. Americans always yearn 
or peace. They have a passion for life. 
^hey carry in their hearts a deep 
:apacity for reconciliation. 

Last year at this General Assembly, 

indicated there was every reason for 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
,o shorten the distance between us. In 
Geneva— the first meeting between our 
leads of government in more than 6 
»fears— Mr. Gorbachev and I will have 
;hat opportunity. 

So, yes, let us go to Geneva with both 
sides committed to dialogue. Let both 



sides go committed to a world with 
fewer nuclear weapons— and some day 
with none. Let both sides go committed 
to walk together on a safer path into 
the 21st century and to lay the founda- 
tion for enduring peace. 

It is time, indeed, to do more than 
just talk of a better world. It is time to 
act. And we will act when nations cease 
to try to impose their ways upon others. 
And we will act when they realize that 
we, for whom the achievement of 
freedom has come dear, will do what we 
must to preserve it from assault. 

America is committed to the world, 
because so much of the world is inside 
America. After all, only a few miles 
from this very room is our Statue of 
Liberty, past which life began anew for 
millions— where the peoples from nearly 
every country in this hall joined to build 
these United States. 

The blood of each nation courses 
through the American vein and feeds 
the spirit that compels us to involve 
ourselves in the fate of this good earth. 
It is the same spirit that warms our 
heart in concern to help ease the 
desperate hunger that grips proud peo- 
ple on the African Continent. 

It is the internationalist spirit that 
came together last month when our 
neighbor, Mexico, was struck suddenly 
by an earthquake. Even as the Mexican 
nation moved vigorously into action, 
there were heartwarming offers by 
other nations offering to help and glimp- 
ses of people working together without 
concern for national self-interest or gain. 

And if there was any meaning to 
salvage out of that tragedy, it was 
found one day in a huge mound of rub- 
ble that was once the Juarez Hospital in 
Mexico City. A week after that terrible 
event and as another day of despair un- 
folded, a team of workers heard a faint 
sound coming somewhere from the heart 
of the crushed concrete and twisted 
steel. Hoping beyond hope, they quickly 
burrowed toward it. As the late after- 
noon light faded, and, racing against 
time, they found what they had heard, 
and the first of three baby girls- 



newborn infants— emerged to the safety 
of the rescue team. And let me tell you 
the scene through the eyes of one who 
was there. 

Everyone was so quiet when they 
lowered that little baby down in a basket 
covered with blankets. The baby didn't make 
a sound, either. But the minute they put her 
in the Red Cross ambulance, everybody just 
got up and cheered. 

Well, amidst all that hopelessness 
and debris came a timely— and time- 
less—lesson for us all. We witnessed the 
miracle of life. 

It is on this that I believe our na- 
tions can make a renewed commitment. 
The miracle of life is given by One 
greater than ourselves. But, once given, 
each life is ours to nurture and 
preserve— to foster not only for today's 
world but for a better one to come. 

There is no purpose more noble than 
for us to sustain and celebrate life in a 
turbulent world. And that is what we 
must do now. We have no higher duty, 
no greater cause as humans. Life— and 
the preservation of freedom to live it in 
dignity— is what we are on this earth 
to do. 

Everything we work to achieve must 
seek that end so that some day our 
prime ministers, our premiers, our 
presidents, and our general secretaries 
will talk not of war and peace but only 
of peace. 

We've had 40 years to begin. Let us 
not waste one more moment to give 
back to the world all that we can in 
return for this miracle of life. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 28, 1985, and 
USUN press release 125. ■ 



December 1985 



United Nations 
Headquarters 




One of the key decisions facing the first 
UN General Assembly was to select the 
location for the permanent head- 
quarters, Many sites were considered. 
However, in December 1946, the 
American philanthropist and financier, 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., offered a gift 
of $8.5 million to purchase land adjacent 
to the East River in New York City; 
the General Assembly quickly accepted. 

The four buildings which comprise 
the UN headquarters are the low, dom- 
ed General Assembly; the 39-story 
Secretariat; the rectangular Conference 
Building along the river; and the Dag 
Hammarskjold Library. Construction 
costs, exclusive of the library, amounted 
to about $67 million and were financed 
by an interest-free loan from the United 
States. The library was built at a cost of 
$6.7 million and was a gift of the Ford 
Foundation. Occupancy of the 
Secretariat began in 1950, but it was 
not until 1952 that meetings could be 
held in the General Assembly and Con- 
ference Buildings. The Dag Hammarsk- 
jold Library was dedicated in 1961. ■ 



The General Assembly hall is 
enormous— 165 feet long, 115 feet wide, 
with a ceiling 75 feet high. There are more 
than 2,000 seats in the General 
Assembly— 1,400 for delegates, alternates, 
and advisers and the remainder for the 
public and press. At the green marble 
podium are places for the President of the 
Assembly, the Secretary General, and the 
Under Secretary General for General 
Assembly Affairs. To the left and right of 
the podium are voting panels listing the 
name of each member state. A mechanized 
system allows delegates to vote by pressing 
a button at their desks, although voting is 
sometimes by secret ballot. Broadcast, 
photo, and interpreters' booths line both 
sides of the hall. 




Department of State Bulletir 




FEATURE 
United Nations 




The Security Council chamber is one of 
three chambers in the Conference 
Building. It was designed by the 
Norwegian architect Amstein Arneberg, 
and most of the furnishings are gifts from 
the Norwegian Government. The large 
mural by Per Krohg (of Norway) sym- 
bolizes the promise of future peace and in- 
dividual freedom. 



The Economic and Social Council chamber 
was designed by Sven Markelius of Sweden. 
Much of the decorative furnishings and the 
white marble flooring were gifts of the 
Government of Sweden. 



In the Trusteeship Council chamber, a 
light and harmonious effect is achieved 
through the use of fine woods and con- 
trasting colors. This chamber was designed 
by Finn Juhl of Denmark; the Government 
of Denmark provided most of the 
furnishings. 



December 1985 



United Nations Activities 



Health 



This baby, receiving an inoculation in a 
village in Bhutan, is the beneficiary of a 
worldwide campaign by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) to immunize by 1990 
every child in the world against the six ma- 
jor communicable diseases— diphtheria, 
measles, poliomyelitis, tetanus, tuber- 
culosis, and whooping cough. WHO helps 
countries expand and modernize their 
health facilities, and it promotes research 
relating to nutrition, maternal and child 
care, environmental safety, mental health, 
disease control, and medical care and 
rehabilitation. This UN specialized agency 
eradicated smallpox in 1979. 





(UN photo) 



10 



DeDartment of State Bulletir 




FEATURE 
United Nations 





Food 



Most of the world's 1 billion hungry people 
live in the developing countries, areas 
which do not produce enough to feed their 
populations. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) aims to raise levels of 
nutrition and standards of living; improve 
production and distribution of all 
agriculture products; promote rural 
development by encouraging investment 
and research; and, by these means, 
eliminate hunger. Through the efforts of 
FAO, new farming methods have increased 
food production where it is most needed. 
This farmer in Sri Lanka is sowing rice, a 
staple crop in many Third World countries. 



(UN photo) 




Women 



Many women worldwide are locked in a 
lifestyle of exploitation. The voluntary 
fund for the UN Decade for Women, 
established in 1975, is attempting to im- 
prove their circumstances through training 
and literacy projects implemented on a 
village level. This UN expert is training 
rural women in Tunisia in clothing 
manufacture. 



IN photo) 



11 



Environment 



The protection of these zebras in Tanzania 
is only one of the special interests of the 
UN Environment Program (UNEP). Its 
other programs to protect the Earth's flora 
and fauna include Earthwatch (a network 
to monitor environmental changes), land 
reclamation and management, and combat- 
ting marine pollution. 



\ 







(UN photo) 



Disabled 



The UN General Assembly proclaimed 1981 
as the International Year for Disabled Per- 
sons. Its focus was to encourage national 
and international efforts for the rehabilita- 
tion of the estimated 450 million people in 
the world who suffer from some form of 
physical or mental impairment. This young 
man in Burma works in the carpentry shop 
of a school despite his disability. 




(UN photo) 




FEATURE 
United Nations 




Human Rights 



(UN photo) 



Millions of Indians living in the isolated 
highlands of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are being 
helped toward better living and working 
conditions through joint programs under- 
taken by their governments and UN agen- 
cies. These Indians in Colombia vote in a 
district gubernatorial election. 





Refugees 



Due to severe drought in Africa, millions 
of people have become refugees, such as 
those in Ethiopia. The UN High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was 
established in 1950 to protect refugees and 
promote durable solutions to their prob- 
lems. It depends entirely on voluntary con- 
tributions from governments and private 
sources for its programs for the more than 
10 million refugees under its care around 
the world. UNHCR was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1954 and 1981. 



(UN photo) 



r"i~~~ m K~* inoc 



13 



Investment 



The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) finances major 
development projects in Third World coun- 
tries, such as this dam in Nigeria. 



.TIONAL B 




C? "'ON AND** 



Aging 



Rising life expectancy and declining birth 
rates throughout the world are creating an 
increasing proportion of old people to 
young. By the year 2000, there will be 600 
million people over 60 years of age, twice 
the 1970 figure. The 1982 World Assembly 
on Aging asked all countries to formulate 
plans to help the aging as individuals and 
to deal with the long-term social and 
economic effects of an aging population. 
This resident of Saint Fatima House for 
the aged in Cairo is having her blood 
pressure checked by one of the Roman 
Catholic nuns who operate the facility. 




(UN photo) 



14 




FEATURE 
United Nations 




Population 



A government worker briefs residents of a 
rural village in China on procedures to be 
followed in taking that country's first 
modern census (1982). It took the combined 
efforts of almost 13 million people (6 
million trained personnel and about 7 
million volunteers) to make it a success. 
Responses were processed by computers 
provided by the UN Fund for Population 
Activities (UNFPA). Preliminary results 
revealed that there are 1.08 billion people 
in China, nearly a quarter of the human 
race. The full results will take years to 
analyze. 



(UN photo) 



| j 

photo) 




Aviation 



The International Civil Aviation Organiza- 
tion (ICAO) was established in 1947 to en- 
sure the safe and orderly growth of inter- 
national civil aviation, such as adopting 
standards governing the performance of 
pilots, air traffic controllers, and ground 
maintenance crews and formulating rules 
of the air for pilots, aeronautical charts of 
navigation, and telecommunications 
systems. ICAO also provides training 
assistance, such as to these mechanics in 
Burkina Faso. 



(UN photo) 




15 



Disaster Relief 



Since it began operations in 1972, the UN 
Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) has 
coordinated the relief efforts of other UN 
agencies and private organizations for 
some 220 major natural disasters, such as 
this devastating earthquake which struck 
Guatemala in 1976, leaving about 1 million 
people homeless. 



Weather 



The World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) has implemented the World 
Weather Watch using surface-based obser- 
vations, meteorological satellites, and a 
system of world and regional meteorolog- 
ical centers operated by national weather 
services. One result is that major economic 
development projects are getting informa- 
tion about the distribution and quality of 
the water supply. This meteorologist in 
Ecuador replaces a recording chart on a 
sunshine gauge. Data from this station is 
transmitted to the national meteorological 
center in Costa Rica. 




(UN photo) 







(UN photo) 



16 



npnartmpnt nf Rlatp Rullptin 




United Nations 




(UN photo) 




Human Settlements 



These young children play in an overcrowd- 
ed slum area in a Central American coun- 
try. This is one of the many problems con- 
fronting the UN Center for Human Set- 
tlements (Habitat). With more than 4.5 
million people unevenly distributed over 
the world's habitable areas, the quality of 
their lives is, to a major extent, influenced 
by patterns of population growth and den- 
sity. Some countries are already facing 
serious overpopulation, manifested in the 
form of food shortages, inadequate hous- 
ing, and high unemployment rates. 



Development 



The UN Development Program (UNDP) and 
the UN Industrial Development Organiza- 
tion (UNIDO) contribute to the ever- 
growing industrial needs of the world. 
UNIDO field officers are in direct contact 
with the technical authorities of govern- 
ments receiving assistance from UNDP in 
order to establish training centers like this 
carpentry workshop in Togo. 



(UN photol 



noromhor 1 Qfi^ 



17 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Vice President Bush 
Visits China 



Vice President Bush visited 

Beijing (October 13-16, 1985), 

Chengdu (October 16), Guilin (October 16-17), 

Guangzhou (October 17-18), and 

Shenzhen (October 18). 





u% VI 


K 


j 






If j 


to A 11 


With Deng Xiaoping, Chairman, Central 
Advisory Commission and Central Military 
Commission 


-1L Jk 




n 



With Li Xiannian, President, People's 
Republic of China 



With Hu Yaobang, General Secretary. 
Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee 



With Peng Zhen, Chairman, National's 
People's Congress Standing Committee 



[Our economic] ties are central to the evolving Chinese- 
American relationship. Look how they have grown. 

In 1972 our two-way trade came to less than $100 
million. This year it will exceed $7 billion. In 1972 the 
United States had almost no investments in China. Today 
America is the largest foreign country investor. Americans 
have committed $150 million to more than 60 joint equity 
ventures and another $550 million in off-shore oil explora- 
tion Some of America's most extensive involvement is in 

areas that China has identified as those most in need of 
development— energy, transportation, telecommunications, 
and management. 

Sichuan University 
Chengdu, China 
October 16, 1985 




With Premier Zhao Ziyang, Premier, State 
Council 




With Wan Li Vice Premier, State Council 



-,ortrr»ont nf Qtato Rllllptin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



ice President Bush officiates at the 
eremony on October 16 in Chengdu open- 
lg the fourth U.S. Consulate in China. 



The Vice President visits the Beijing Jeep 
Dorp, (above) and the Shenzhen Pepsi-Cola 
bottling Co. Plant (below)— two of many 
oint equity U.S. -China ventures. 



(White House photos by Dave Valdez) 




December 1985 



19 



THE SECRETARY 



Arms Control, 

Strategic Stability, 

and Global Security 

Secretary Shultz's address before 

the North Atlantic Assembly 

in San Francisco 

on October U, 1985. 1 



My talk this morning is about our rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union, a central 
issue for the Western democracies. But 
before I start on that, I want to say- 
something about terrorism, because ter- 
rorism is the war we're fighting right 
now. 

Terrorists and the regimes that sup- 
port them aim to shatter our ideals and 
our principles, undermine our demo- 
cratic life, and pull down civilization 
itself. We've learned some lessons in the 
few days just past. The event isn't over, 
but still while it's fresh in our minds, let 
me tell you three points that stand out 
in my own mind. 

• First, it tells us something about 
terrorists— that they're animals, cow- 
ardly animals. These are not guerrillas. 
These are not fighters for some libera- 
tion movement. They select the helpless 
to torture and murder. They lack the 
guts to do battle, just as they lack the 
guts to seek justice and peace by negoti- 
ation. That's the first lesson. [Applause] 

• It tells us that we must take ac- 
tion. If free peoples do not move against 
the terrorists, no one will stop them. 
We must have the courage to act with- 
out violence, if possible, but recognizing 
that violence sometimes cannot be 
avoided. If our dedication to that princi- 
ple paralyzes us, all our principles will 
be in jeopardy. That's a little more 
sobering lesson, so I notice you didn't 
clap. But it's an important lesson. We 
have to be ready to act. 

• And, third, it tells us that the 
democracies must stand together in our 
own cause. Our nations are the founders 
and the defenders of the rule of law. 
The terrorists know and seek to turn 
that against us. They insist that we be 
rigorous in granting due process to the 



enemies of the rule of law, and, as they 
do, they seek to instill fear— the fear 
that anyone who captures and brings to 
justice a terrorist becomes a target of 
terrorism. 

We must stand for the rule of law, 
but we must not let fear turn it into a 
key to the jailhouse door. If we of the 
democracies stand together against this 
scourge, we will defeat it, and our ideals 
and values will thrive and be safe. I 
think we are now starting to do that. 

Arms Control 

I have a lengthy statement here that 
deals principally with the arms control 
matters being discussed in Geneva right 
now. I know it is too long, but it is an 
effort to pull together in one place 
where we are and they are, so we can 
see just what the issues are. So I ask 
you to bear with me and take it as a 
compliment, as you run out of patience, 
that we have thought, the President has 
thought, that this audience was the ap- 
propriate one to lay out in a rather 
painstaking way just what this is all 
about as we see it. 

For 40 years, the Western democra- 
cies have wrestled with the problem of 
relations with the Soviet Union. As 
legislators, you know firsthand that 
democracies love peace and really do not 
like spending money on defense. But 
you also know how precious freedom 
and democracy are and, therefore, how 
important it is that we defend the 
values that we hold dear. We democra- 
cies know that freedom has enemies in 
this world. But we also know that the 
purpose of our defensive strength is 
peace. Therefore, we all conduct foreign 
policies whose aim is a more positive 



and constructive relationship between 
East and West. 

Nearly 2 years ago, President Rea- 
gan offered the Soviet Union a challenge 
to begin building a more constructive 
relationship. He said: 

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring 
out the best in us. It also calls for the best 
from the Soviet Union .... If the Soviet 
Government wants peace, then there will be 
peace. 

Since that time, we have made a 
start. The Geneva and other arms con- 
trol negotiations are underway. We 
have initiated a process for discussing 
ways to defuse regional tensions and 
manage our competition peacefully. We 
have urged the Soviet Union to take 
practical steps to fulfill its international 
commitments on human rights. We have 
advanced ideas for expanding contact 
and interchange between our two socie- 
ties, to fashion the network of bilateral 
ties that is a necessary feature of any 
productive relationship between two 
countries. These are steps forward, but 
much more needs to be done. One of 
President Reagan's major goals when he 
meets next month with General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev is to discuss this entire 
agenda, giving new impetus to all of 
these efforts. 

Arms control, of course, is a key 
part of this agenda. It has been a focal 
point of our alliance deliberations for 
many years. Allied unity and support 
are a key to the success of our endeav- 
ors with the Soviet Union. And, indeed, 
Europe's security is one of the principal 
objectives at stake. 

In Geneva today, American and 
Soviet negotiators are in the middle of a 
new round of talks. An American pro- 
posal for radical reductions in offensive 
nuclear arms has been on the table for 
some time. The Soviet Union has re- 
cently come forward with— and exten- 
sively publicized— a new counterproposal. 

Let me review for you today where 
we stand, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, on the main issues in 
arms control. 

Our Objectives in Arms Control 

Let us start at the beginning. What is it 
we are trying to accomplish? 

The purpose of arms control negotia- 
tions is not agreement for its own sake. 
A bad agreement could do harm. Loop- 
holes could be a source of new mistrust; 
the structure of limitations could leave 
one side with special advantages that 
only leave the other less secure; loose 



~< o«~*~ o. .n~«; 



THE SECRETARY 



imits could only legitimize an intensify - 
ng arms race in areas left open by the 
igreement. Saving money on weapons 
;xpenditure is, of course, a worthwhile 
foal, but it is not sufficient or even the 
nain issue. 

What we really want, in short, are 
neasures that enhance security and 
•educe the risk of war. Arms control is 
lot just a technical exercise; it has to be 
:mbedded in a policy and in an environ- 
nent that reduce our real dangers and 
make the world safer. The rivalry be- 
tween East and West is not the result 
}f personalities or simple misunder- 
standings. It is grounded in fundamental 
moral differences about justice and free- 
dom; it is reflected in political differ- 
ences over a range of international prob- 
lems. Weapons are the symptom of this 
struggle, not its cause. Arms reduction 
;an help reduce tensions; yet expansion- 
ist Soviet behavior can so fuel insecurity 
and mistrust that, at the very least, the 
arms control process is undermined. Do 
Inot forget that it was Soviet geopolitical 
i challenges— like intervention in Angola, 
Ethiopia, and most particularly Afghan- 
istan—that derailed detente and the 
■jSALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks] Treaty in the 1970s. 

Preventing a war means addressing 
not only these political conflicts but also 
the military postures of the two sides. 
In the nuclear age, even more than in 
the past, force structure can shape not 
only how a conflict might be fought but, 
more importantly, whether or not a con- 
flict would break out at all. President 
Reagan's program to rebuild our mili- 
tary strength is addressed to this 
problem. 

The concept of strategic stability is a 
fundamental one. At various periods in 
history, war was prevented by a balance 
of power. The balance was not always 
stable, but much of the time it worked, 
deterring attack by denying the at- 
tacker his confidence in victory and pos- 
ing the risk of counterattack. In the age 
of the ICBM— the intercontinental ballis- 
tic missile with thermonuclear war- 
heads—security has had to rest largely 
on the threat of retaliation, since there 
has been no defense against these 
missiles. This form of deterrence— the 
mutual threat of mass destruction— is 
what Churchill called the balance of 
terror. 

Is this balance stable? Will it remain 
stable in the face of the steady Soviet 
buildup of weaponry with first-strike 
potential? Or is the balance in danger of 
breaking down in crisis conditions? This 
is one of the central issues— if not the 



central issue— in arms control today. We 
cannot afford— as we have been tempted 
in the past— to assume that the balance 
is automatically stable. We have come to 
recognize that the vulnerability of a 
country's retaliatory forces, in a crisis, 
could put a premium on striking first, or 
preemptively, and thus magnify the 
dangers. Or it could call into question 
America's commitment to effectively 
support its allies against Soviet conven- 
tional attack. 

This is why one of the key tests by 
which we judge arms control proposals 
is whether they will enhance strategic 
stability. The military balance that 
results from an agreement should be 
one that reduces the incentive for a first 
strike. It should enhance deterrence by 
ensuring that no first strike can suc- 
ceed, that no one can be tempted by 
illusions of "victory." A stable environ- 
ment reduces the incentive to build new 
weapons and enhances the incentive to 
reduce the level of arms. It defuses the 
tension and danger of any crisis that 
may occur. Thus an emphasis on stra- 
tegic stability goes to the heart of 
reducing the danger of the outbreak of 
war. 

We must also remember that the 
forces of history have cast the United 
States in the role of the most powerful 
member of an alliance of democracies. 
Any agreement we reach with the 
Soviet Union must enhance our allies' 
security as well as our own. Since 1945, 
Soviet military power has cast its 
shadow over both Europe and Asia; this 
is a reality, as is the relentless buildup 
of Warsaw Pact forces, both nuclear and 
conventional. The Western concept of 
security, which has kept the peace in 
Europe for 40 years, is that of a close 
and permanent link between Western 
Europe and the United States. The 
American pledge to underwrite the 
defense of Europe is given concrete ex- 
pression in the presence of American 
forces and American weapons in 
Europe, which make it a certainty that 
any Soviet attack on Europe engages 
us. Thus our strategic forces defend 
Europe as much as they defend the 
United States. This is what deters war, 
and it has worked. Arms control must 
enhance, not weaken, this dimension of 
deterrence. 

We have other criteria for judging 
arms control proposals: 

• An arms control agreement, to 
strengthen stability, should be based on 
equality, leaving both sides with equal 
or essentially equivalent levels of forces. 



• An agreement should emphasize 
strategically significant reductions. Past 
agreements only codified existing levels 
or rechanneled the competition. It is 
time, now, to reverse the pattern of con- 
stant buildup; it is time to begin radical 
reductions. 

• An arms control agreement must 
be verifiable. The Soviets' selective 
record of compliance with previous 
agreements unfortunately makes this in- 
dispensable. Radical reductions, in fact, 
can increase the incentive to cheat, since 
a balance at lower levels can more 
easily be tipped. 

The U.S. Proposal 

The United States has serious proposals 
now on the table at Geneva. We have 
been criticized for our restraint in the 
public relations field. But our proposals 
were not made for propaganda; they 
were made to make progress toward 
these central objectives. Our proposals 
cover reductions in strategic offensive 
forces; reduction or elimination of U.S. 
and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear 
forces; and a serious dialogue on defen- 
sive weapons and the relationship be- 
tween offense and defense. These issues 
are being discussed now in the Geneva 
negotiations in three separate but inter- 
related forums. 

Strategic Arms Reduction. First, in 
the talks on strategic arms reduction, 
the United States has proposed radical 
reductions down to 5,000 ballistic-missile 
warheads on each side. This represents 
a cut of nearly 50% from the current 
Soviet level. We have proposed substan- 
tial reductions in the number and 
destructive power of ballistic missiles, 
and limits on heavy bombers, on the 
cruise missiles they carry. 

The strategic forces of the United 
States and the Soviet Union are very 
different. The great majority of Soviet 
warheads and destructive power are 
concentrated on their large, land-based 
ICBMs. We have a more balanced ap- 
proach, with as much emphasis on 
submarine-based missiles and bombers 
as on ICBMs. The Soviet force is de- 
signed for preemption, ours for retalia- 
tion. These differences greatly compli- 
cate the achievement of an equitable 
agreement. We are prepared to explore 
tradeoffs between areas of relative 
advantage— such as our advantage in 
bombers versus their advantage in 
ICBMs— to establish an overall balance. 



December 1985 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



Our proposal is comprehensive, but 
its core is a recognition that reductions 
should focus on the most destabilizing 
systems. Weapons like large, fixed, land- 
based ICBMs with multiple warheads, 
capable of destroying missile silos— these 
are the most powerful strategic 
weapons, the most rapid, the most pro- 
vocative, the most capable of carrying 
out a preemptive strike, the most likely 
to tempt a hair-trigger response in a 
crisis. 

The Soviets have over 300 heavy 
ICBMs; we at present have none. (Our 
first deployments of MX, a smaller 
missile but roughly comparable because 
of its accuracy, will begin late next 
year.) With their accuracy, destructive 
power, and multiple warheads, the 
Soviet weapons are capable of destroy- 
ing virtually the entire land-based por- 
tion of our retaliatory force. For nearly 
a decade this category of weapons has 
been, for us, one of the central issues of 
arms control. One of the odd features of 
the current debate is that the Soviets 
would have us believe that this central 
issue has disappeared. It is as if the 
threat from these powerful weapons, 
which already exist in the hundreds, is 
somehow less important than research 
into new categories of systems which do 
not exist, will not exist for many years 
at best, and will not come into being at 
all unless research is successful in 
meeting stringent criteria we ourselves 
have set. 

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces. 

The second negotiation in Geneva is 
about intennediate-range nuclear forces 
or INF. This negotiation is taking place 
because in 1977 the Soviet Union began 
deploying SS-20 intermediate-range 
missiles in the western U.S.S.R., aimed 
at our European allies, and in the Soviet 
Far East, aimed at our friends and 
allies in East Asia. Today, there are 441 
operational launchers deployed; with 
three warheads on a missile, that makes 
over 1,300 modern nuclear warheads 
aimed at the cities and defense facilities 
of our friends and allies. 

In response— and, I repeat, in 
response— the Atlantic alliance decided 
in 1979 that it had no choice but to 
deploy weapons of its own in this cate- 
gory, as a deterrent, while seeking to 
negotiate with the Soviet Union on a 
formula for mutual restraint. The 
Soviets agreed to talk but have not 
negotiated on the basis of mutuality. 
They insisted on their right to a 
monopoly of longer range INF missiles; 
they waged an unprecedented campaign 



of political warfare to intimidate our 
allies into retreating from the NATO 
decision of 1979. Our allies- 
governments and legislatures— stood 
firm; NATO Pershing II ballistic- 
missiles and ground-launched cruise 
missiles began to be deployed in several 
allied countries in 1983—6 years after 
the SS-20 deployment began. 

The United States proposed at 
Geneva that we agree to eliminate both 
sides' longer range land-based INF 
missiles on a global basis— eliminate. 
The Soviets refused. Then we proposed 
that both sides reduce to the lowest 
possible equal number of warheads. The 
Soviets still refuse. Our position is 
based on the principle of equality be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union. And limits must be applied 
globally, since the SS-20 is a mobile 
missile and it is not our objective simply 
to shift the SS-20 threat from Europe 
to Asia. 

The threat of the SS-20 goes to the 
heart of our commitment to our allies. 
These are weapons aimed at Europe— 
although they could be aimed at 
America. Their purpose is to "decou- 
ple," that is, to separate you from us by 
intimidating you. The alliance's response 
is a united response, and a unifying 
response, in that it symbolizes once 
again that our destinies are tied to- 
gether. The principle of collective secu- 
rity is thus confirmed and reinforced. 
Europe is safer, because deterrence is 
strengthened. 

Defense and Space Arms. The third 
area of negotiation is that of defense 
and space arms. But the core issue is 
the same: the stability of deterrence. 

The SALT I accords of 1972 limited 
antiballistic missile systems and were 
also a partial first step toward limiting 
offensive weapons. We continue to com- 
ply with them, provided the Soviet 
Union corrects its noncompliance and 
negotiates seriously in Geneva. We must 
remember, however, that those accords 
of 13 years ago, and the hopes they 
engendered, were founded on certain 
assumptions. Developments since then 
have called those assumptions into 
question. 

First of all, when the ABM [Anti- 
Ballistic Missile] Treaty was signed, it 
was assumed that offensive weaponry 
would be reduced by further negotia- 
tions. In fact, offensive weapons pro- 
liferated. Each side now— and particu- 
larly the Soviet side— has vastly higher 
numbers than in 1972— vastly higher. 



We see the Soviet heavy ICBMs with a 
first-strike potential. On both sides we 
see offensive weapons of astonishing ac- 
curacy and with multiple warheads. The 
Soviets are developing two new varieties 
of ICBMs whose mobility makes them 
harder to identify and count. If we fail 
to respond to these trends, at some 
point in the future they could undermine 
the military balance on which deterrence 
is based. 

Second, in the ABM Treaty we also 
assumed that we had set up critical bar- 
riers that would prevent any breakout, 
that is, any sudden and significant ex- 
pansion of ABM systems in violation of 
the treaty. In fact, while the United 
States has dismantled even the one 
ABM complex that was permitted, the 
Soviets have taken full advantage of the 
deployments allowed by the treaty. And 
some Soviet activities are clear viola- 
tions, such as the large radar at Kras- 
noyarsk, which raises a question of 
whether the Soviets might be planning a 
nationwide ABM system, negating the 
treaty entirely. 

But technological advance, which 
helps create these new problems, also 
offers other possibilities. Methods of 
defense against ballistic missiles, which 
were relatively rudimentary in 1972, 
now offer new hope as a possible 
counter to the growing offensive threat. 
What if it were possible, even in this 
age of ballistic missiles, to block an at- 
tack, rather than simply suffer the at- 
tack and then retaliate? What if the 
balance of power could rest more on a 
mutual sense of security and less on a 
mutual threat of annihilation? Thus the 
President's Strategic Defense Initiative 
(or SDI), a research program to explore 
promising new technologies. Effective 
strategic defenses, able to intercept and 
destroy missiles before they reach their 
targets, would strengthen security. 
Even if far less than 100% perfect, such 
a defensive system would vastly compli- 
cate any aggressor's first-strike planning 
and frustrate any temptation to consider 
launching an attack. 

In an age of anxieties about nuclear 
weapons, this should provide enormous 
hope for the future. As former Soviet 
Premier Kosygin once eloquently stated, 
an antiballistic missile system "is in- 
tended not for killing people but for sav- 
ing human lives." 

The last few decades' emphasis on 
offensive strategies reflected the state 
of technology, not a law of nature. 
Mutual vulnerability was a fact of life, 
not a positive virtue. A new strategic 



99 



-,t s\{ Cl3*o QnllAtin 



THE SECRETARY 



equilibrium based on defensive technolo- 
gies and sharply reduced offensive 
deployments on both sides could be the 
most stable and secure arrangement of 
all. It cannot be fully achieved without 
negotiations, and, therefore, we have 
sought the fullest dialogue on this sub- 
ject with the Soviet Union— as well as 
with our allies. In fact. General 
Abrahamson, director of our SDI office 
[Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, Director 
of the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization], traveled to Geneva to 
take part in a briefing of the Soviet 
negotiators on our program, its potential 
and its prospects. 

Our research program is and will 
continue to be consistent with the ABM 
Treaty. The treaty can be variously in- 
terpreted as to what kinds of develop- 
ment and testing are permitted, particu- 
larly with respect to future systems and 
components based on new physical prin- 
ciples. The treaty's text, the agreed 
statements accompanying it, the negoti- 
ating record, and official statements 
made since that time are subject to dif- 
fering interpretations. 

Because of the great potential con- 
tribution that SDI could make to our 
security, and because of our interest in 
a rigorous implementation of the ABM 
Treaty by both sides, we have devoted 
much attention to the question of how 
to interpret the treaty. It is our view, 
based on a careful analysis of the treaty 
text and the negotiating record, that a 
broader interpretation of our authority 
is fully justified. This is, however, a 
moot point; our SDI research program 
has been structured and, as the Presi- 
dent has reaffirmed last Friday, will 
continue to be conducted in accordance 
with a restrictive interpretation of the 
treaty's obligations. Furthermore, any 
SDI deployment would be the subject of 
consultations with our allies and to 
discussion and negotiation, as appropri- 
ate, with the Soviets in accordance with 
the terms of the ABM Treaty. 

Our policy thus reflects: 

• The President's commitment to 
explore thoroughly the potential contri- 
bution of strategic defenses to peace and 
stability and his vision of a "balance of 
safety" replacing the "balance of 
terror." 

• Our commitment to pursue the 
program as currently structured, which 
is consistent with a restrictive interpre- 
tation of our obligations under the ABM 
Treaty. 



• Our judgment that the SDI pro- 
gram, provided that it is consistently 
funded at the levels required, will be 
adequate to answer the question of 
whether a cost-effective and survivable 
defense against ballistic missiles is 
feasible. 

In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior, 
our policy of restraint with respect to 
the conduct of the SDI program demon- 
strates by deeds U.S. seriousness and 
sincerity in seeking a more stable inter- 
national environment. 

The American proposals in Geneva 
are a comprehensive blueprint for reduc- 
ing nuclear weapons, for strengthening 
deterrence, and for making the world 
safer. They are paralleled by other pro- 
posals in other forums: 

• To strengthen safeguards and con- 
trols against the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons capabilities; 

• To ban chemical weapons and to 
prevent chemical weapons proliferation; 

• To stabilize the conventional mili- 
tary balance in Europe, by mutual and 
balanced reductions of forces, and by 
measures to reduce the risk of war by 
surprise attack, accident, or miscalcula- 
tion, which would give concrete form to 
a reaffirmation of the principle of non- 
use of force. 

This is President Reagan's amis con- 
trol agenda— the most comprehensive 
arms control agenda of any president in 
our history. 

The Soviet Counterproposal 

Now we have, at long last, a Soviet 
counterproposal in Geneva. It could be a 
step forward and thus, in and of itself, 
represents a success for our alliance 
policies. The very fact that the Soviets 
have offered a new proposal is directly 
due to the patience, strength, and unity 
of the Western democracies. We have 
maintained our principles and our stand- 
ards, and these, in turn, are carrying us 
farther than sceptics had believed 
possible. 

Remember that for over a year in 
1983 and 1984, the Soviets boycotted 
any negotiation of these issues. That ef- 
fort to intimidate the alliance failed, just 
as their earlier efforts to block INF 
deployments failed. Continued alliance 
firmness and unity eventually brought 
the Soviets back to the negotiating table 
earlier this year. In these new talks, the 
Soviets stated in the most general terms 
that they agreed with us on the impor- 
tance of offensive reductions. But they 



gave no specifics. Rather, they have 
devoted their greatest effort to propa- 
ganda against SDI and held everything 
hostage to getting their way on SDI. 

Two weeks ago, the Soviets did 
begin to offer specific and detailed ideas 
about deep cuts in offensive forces. We 
welcome this. While some of their ideas 
may indicate progress, altogether the 
new Soviet position, however, remains 
deeply flawed and self-serving. It would 
have a particularly dangerous impact on 
the security of our allies. Let me touch 
on the highlights. 

The Soviet proposal is a combination 
of various bans, freezes, limitations, and 
reductions of some, but not all, offensive 
forces. Overall, the Soviets propose a re- 
duction by 50% of each side's "delivery 
vehicles which can reach the territory of 
the other side." It's their definition. 

The hooker is their definition of 
what they consider "relevant" systems- 
systems which can strike the territory 
of the other side. Under their definition 
American systems in Europe pointed 
toward the U.S.S.R. are constrained, 
while Soviet missiles and aircraft aimed 
at Europe are not. It would imply no 
necessary reduction of the SS-20 threat 
(which, incidently, can reach Alaska) but 
calls for a unilateral withdrawal of the 
U.S. counter to that threat. I can think 
of nothing that would more smack of a 
U.S.-Soviet deal at Europe's expense, 
and we won't do that. 

This one-sided definition is a step 
backward. It is the Soviet position of 
1969, which the United States and its 
allies could not accept then or at any 
time since. It is not reflected in the 
SALT I accords or in SALT II or in the 
distinction between strategic and INF 
systems that was the basis of the 
Geneva negotiations from 1981 to 1983. 

The Soviets also propose to limit 
what they call "nuclear charges" (that 
is, warheads and bombs) on strategic 
forces to 6,000. Of these 6,000 weapons 
no more than 60% could be on any one 
component (that is, ICBMs, submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles, or aircraft). 
This would limit the number of Soviet 
ICBM warheads to 3,600-but there is 
no commitment to reduce their most 
destabilizing heavy ICBMs, the SS-18s. 
Thus the Soviet proposal does not 
directly address the main problem of 
strategic stability. With deep reductions 
in U.S. systems, it would add to 
NATO's vulnerability and increase the 
significance of the Soviet advantage in 
hard-target-killer ICBMs. 



9.1 



THE SECRETARY 



The Soviets also propose to ban or 
severely limit all "new" nuclear delivery 
systems, defining as "new" those sys- 
tems not tested as of an agreed date. 
Assuming the agreed date would not be 
in the past, such a ban would preclude 
our Midgetman missile— which was 
recommended, as you remember, by the 
Scowcroft commission and which would 
add to stability— D-5 Trident submarine 
missile, and Stealth bomber. Oddly 
enough, it would allow the two new 
ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and the SS-25), 
the new submarine-launched ballistic 
missile, and the new Blackjack bomber 
they are now testing or deploying. It's a 
hell of a deal. 

The Soviet position on INF is not 
totally clear. But to the extent that they 
now agree that an acceptable INF ac- 
cord could be concluded separately— no 
longer held hostage to SDI and other 
issues— we would regard it as construc- 
tive. And implicit in their new position 
may be a grudging acceptance of the 
presence of some U.S. INF missiles in 
Europe defending our allies. 

However, they propose a stop to all 
further deployments in Europe of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces. This 
would halt NATO's INF deployment at 
about 200 warheads— while they have 
about seven times as many SS-20 war- 
heads already deployed. And it would 
permit unlimited new SS-20 deploy- 
ments against our allies and friends in 
Asia. 

The Soviets also ask to be "compen- 
sated" in these negotiations for the 
British and French strategic nuclear 
deterrents. This is not only part of their 
effort to undercut NATO's decision of 
1979; it is also an effort to undercut sup- 
port for British and French nuclear 
forces. Yet those forces represent those 
countries' determination to maintain 
their independence and their control 
over their own destiny in the face of the 
nuclear danger. Those independent 
forces contribute to deterrence and to 
Europe's security. Of course, in the con- 
text of deep U.S. and Soviet reductions, 
British and French forces could become 
a relatively larger part of the picture. 
And both countries have made clear 
that in that context they would consider 
discussions of their forces. 

The Soviet proposal tabled in 
Geneva, finally, indicates that all limita- 
tions on offensive forces are contingent 
on banning SDI— banning not only its 
testing and deployment but also "scien- 
tific research." This is rather sweeping. 
Indeed, it flies in the face of the ABM 
Treaty, which puts no limits on 
research. 



The problem is that, just as with 
SS-20s, the Soviets have not yet given 
up their efforts to keep a unilateral ad- 
vantage. They want to stop our program 
while they continue their own program 
in the same field. Behind the curtain 
that encloses Soviet society, free from 
the scrutiny or open debate we have in 
the West, a major Soviet strategic 
defense program has proceeded for 
decades. In the past 20 years, the 
Soviets have spent about as much on 
strategic defense— missile defense, civil 
defense, and air defense— as they have 
spent on strategic offense. They deploy 
the world's only operational ABM 
system and are continuing to modernize 
it. Their propaganda about the so-called 
militarization of space rings rather 
hollow when one considers that they 
have the world's most active military 
space program; last year they conducted 
about 100 space launches and nearly 
80% of them were military in nature, 
while the United States had only about 
20 total space launches. The Soviets also 
have the world's only extensively tested 
and fully operational antisatellite system. 
And their own research efforts into SDI 
technologies— high-energy lasers, 
particle-beam weapons, radio frequency 
weapons, and kinetic energy weapons- 
long antedate our own. Indeed, some of 
the Soviet scientists most active in sign- 
ing declarations against our SDI pro- 
gram are themselves the men leading 
the Soviet military research in the same 
technologies. 

I said it at the United Nations, and 
I will say it again: the Soviet leaders 
know full well their own programs in 
these fields. Their propaganda against 
American programs is blatantly one- 
sided and not to be taken seriously. 

Aside from the central issues of the 
Geneva nuclear and space talks, the 
Soviets have taken constructive posi- 
tions in some fields and less constructive 
positions in others. 

In the struggle against nuclear pro- 
liferation, for example, they and we 
have worked together well. We welcome 
Mr. Gorbachev's expression of interest 
in working with us to check the spread 
of chemical weapons. 

Their proposed moratorium on 
nuclear testing, however, was aimed 
more at invidiously publicizing the 
Hiroshima anniversary than at serious 
arms control. Let us remember that in 
1962, after the Soviets had unilaterally 
broken an earlier joint moratorium on 
nuclear tests, President Kennedy said: 



"We know now enough about broken 
negotiations, secret preparations, and 
the advantages gained from a long test 
series never to offer again an un- 
inspected moratorium." We have 
stressed over and over again the crucial 
importance of improving verification, 
whether with respect to the threshold 
test ban or any other more ambitious ef- 
fort. We have on the table some precise 
and practical ways to move forward on 
verification. For example, we have pro- 
posed that they send experts to our 
nuclear test site to measure the yield of 
a nuclear test in order to provide better 
calibration of their instruments and thus 
more accurate verification. 

The Soviets are also practitioners of 
vague, superficially attractive proposals 
like non-use of force, no-first-use of 
nuclear weapons, or nuclear-free zones. 
The problem with such ideas is that 
they are a kind of escapism— evading 
the reality of the political problems that 
give rise to conflict. Peace will ulti- 
mately depend on solving the political 
problems, not on high-sounding declara- 
tions. We recall the basic principles of 
U.S. -Soviet relations in 1972 and the 
1973 agreement on the prevention of 
nuclear war. These accords stated the 
right principles— particularly the need to 
forswear the perpetual quest for uni- 
lateral advantage. The problem was not 
the principles but the performance. 
Soviet calls for the non-use or threat of 
force look rather unimpressive against 
the background of events in Afghanistan 
or Poland. 

Prospects 

In sum, the new Soviet positions on 
arms control could be a step forward 
but do not meet the basic criteria of 
strengthened stability, equality, stra- 
tegically significant reductions, and in- 
creased verifiability. But we approach 
this positively. We are now in a new 
phase of the negotiations in which, if the 
Soviets are serious, real progress can be 
made. The President has given our 
negotiators unprecedented authority to 
explore ways of bridging differences. 
Whether or not there is genuine prog- 
ress before the time of the President's 
meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, we at 
least are now both getting down to 
business. 

You hear from the Soviets a lot of 
talk about the "increasing danger of 
war." This is propaganda designed to in- 
timidate. Deterrence has kept the peace, 
certainly in the NATO area. With the 



THE SECRETARY 



restoration of Western strength in the 
last few years, the world is really more 
stable and secure than it has been in a 
long time. It is when the West is weak 
that the world is a more dangerous 
place. 

So we will pursue arms reductions, 
with seriousness and dedication, but also 
with realism. 

We have a complex task. As the 
President has put it: "We must both de- 
fend freedom and preserve the peace. 



We must stand true to our principles 
and our friends while preventing ;i 
holocaust." 

There is no escape from this dual 
responsibility. The world we seek is a 
world of both peace and freedom. Such 
a world is attainable if the democracies 
are true to themselves and steadfast of 
purpose. 



'Press release 246 of Oct. 17, 1985. 



Morality and Realism 

in American Foreign Policy 



Secretary Shultz's address before the 
National Committee on American 
Foreign Policy after receiving the Hans 
J. Morgenthau Memorial Award in New 
York City on October 2, 1985. x 

I deeply appreciate this marvelous 
award because of the greatness of the 
man in whose honor it was established. 
My appreciation is doubly reinforced 
because of the greatness of the man 
[Dr. Henry Kissinger] who has just 
made this presentation. 

Hans Morgenthau 's Legacy 

Hans Morgenthau was a pioneer in the 
study of international relations. He, 
perhaps more than anyone else, gave it 
intellectual respectability as an academic 
discipline. His work transformed our 
thinking about international relations 
and about America's role in the postwar 
world. In fundamental ways, he set the 
terms of the modern debate, and it is 
hard to imagine what our policies would 
be like today had we not had the benefit 
of his wisdom and the clarity of his 
thinking. 

As a professor at the University of 
Chicago— and I was once a professor at 
the University of Chicago and a col- 
league of his— in 1948 he published the 
first edition of his epoch-making text, 
Politics Among Nations. Its impact was 
immediate— and alarming to many. It 
focused on the reality of so-called power 
politics and the balance of power— the 
evils of the Old World conflicts that im- 
migrants had come to this country to 
escape and which Wilsonian idealism 
had sought to eradicate. 



Morgenthau's critics, however, 
tended to miss what he was really say- 
ing about international morality and 
ethics. The choice, he insisted, is not 
between moral principles and the na- 
tional interest, devoid of moral dignity, 
but between moral principles divorced 
from political reality and moral prin- 
ciples derived from political reality. And 
he called on Americans to relearn the 
principles of statecraft and political 
morality that had guided the Founding 
Fathers. 

Hans Morgenthau was right in this. 
Our Declaration of Independence set 
forth principles, after all, that we be- 
lieved to be universal. And throughout 
our history, Americans as individuals— 
and, sometimes, as a nation— have fre- 
quently expressed our hopes for a world 
based on those principles. The very 
nature of our society makes us a people 
with a moral vision, not only for 
ourselves but for the world. 

At the same time, however, we 
Americans have had to accept that our 
passionate commitment to moral prin- 
ciples could be no substitute for a sound 
foreign policy in a world of hard 
realities and complex choices. Our 
Founding Fathers, in fact, understood 
this very well. 

Hans Morgenthau wrote that "the 
intoxication with moral abstractions . . . 
is one of the great sources of weakness 
and failure in American foreign policy." 
He was assailing the tendency among 
Americans at many periods in our later 
history to hold ourselves above power 
politics and to believe that moral prin- 
ciples alone could guide us in our rela- 
tions with the rest of the world. He cor- 
rectly worried that our moral impulse, 



noble as it might be, could lead either to 
futile and perhaps dangerous global 
crusades, on the one hand, or to 
escapism and isolationism, equally 
dangerous, on the other. 

The challenge we have always faced 
has been to forge policies that could 
combine morality and realism that 
would be in keeping with our ideals 
without doing damage to our national in- 
terests. Hans Morgenthau's work 
shaped our national debate about this 
challenge with an unprecedented inten- 
sity and clarity. 

Ideals and Interests Today 

That debate still continues today. But 
today there is a new reality. 

The reality today is that our moral 
principles and our national interests 
may be converging, by necessity, more 
than ever before. The revolutions in 
communications and transportation have 
made the world a smaller place. Events 
in one part of the world have a more 
far-reaching impact than ever before on 
the international environment and on 
our national security. Even individual 
acts of violence by terrorists can affect 
us in ways never possible before the ad- 
vent of international electronic media. 

Yesterday, outside of Tunis, violence 
struck yet again in the Middle East. In 
the face of rising terrorist acts of 
violence against the citizens of Israel, 
yesterday saw Israel's response in its 
attack on the facilities of the PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] in 
Tunis. Terrorism is terrorism. It 
deserves no sanctuary, and it must be 
stopped. 

But where do we go from here? Do 
we go toward more and more violence, 
or do we go toward peace? I say, it is 
time to say, "Enough. Enough to 
violence in the Middle East." We have 
heard the exclamation point of violence. 
Let us now follow it with a period, a 
period that signifies an end to armed 
struggle and a commitment to find a 
negotiated way to peace and justice. 

Let us reject the radicals and the 
haters. Let us turn toward and support 
and encourage those who stand for 
reason and statesmanship, like President 
Bourguiba of Tunisia. President 
Bourguiba leads a country which has 
long been a close friend of the United 
States, and he shares our dedication to 
a more peaceful world. President 
Bourguiba is, indeed, one of those 
farseeing and wise statesmen, who was 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



among the very first to urge a 
negotiated settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. 

And let us rally in support of those 
who display the courage to move toward 
peace. We have had, in recent days, in- 
tensive talks with King Hussein of 
Jordan, aimed at our joint goal of ad- 
vancing the peace process and the day 
when negotiations can start. We support 
his efforts. We admire his wisdom and 
courage and pray that we may soon see 
the opening of a new chapter in the 
expansion of the peace process. 

And let us recognize a leader whose 
commitment to peace is unequivocal and 
beyond question: Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres. The truth is unavoidable. There 
will be no justice for the Middle East 
unless it is understood that there is no 
military option and that the only road to 
peace and justice lies through direct 
negotiations between Israel and each of 
its Arab neighbors. 

In our world, our ideals and our in- 
terests thus are intimately connected. In 
the long run, the survival of America 
and American democracy is essential if 
freedom itself is to survive. No one who 
cherishes freedom and democracy could 
argue that these ideals can be gained 
through policies that weaken this nation. 

We are the strongest free nation on 
earth. Our closest allies are democracies 
and depend on us for their security. 
And our security and well-being are 
enhanced in a world where democracy 
flourishes and where the global 
economic system is open and free. We 
could not hope to survive long if our 
fellow democracies succumbed to 
totalitarianism. Thus, we have a vital 
stake in the direction the world takes— 
whether it be toward greater freedom 
or toward dictatorship. 

All of this requires that we engage 
ourselves in the politics of the real 
world, for both moral and strategic 
reasons. And the more we engage 
ourselves in the world, the more we 
must grapple with the difficult moral 
choices that the real world presents 
to us. 

We have friends and allies who do 
not always live up to our standards of 
freedom and democratic government, 
yet we cannot abandon them. Our 
adversaries are the worst offenders of 
the principles we cherish, yet in the 
nuclear age, we have no choice but to 
seek solutions by political means. We 
are vulnerable to terrorism because we 
are a free and law-abiding society, yet 
we must find a way to respond that is 



consistent with our ideals as a free and 
law-abiding society. 

The challenge of pursuing policies 
that reflect our ideals and yet protect 
our national interests is, for all the dif- 
ficulties, one that we must meet. The 
political reality of our time is that 
America's strategic interests require 
that we support our ideals abroad. 

Consider the example of Nicaragua. 
We oppose the efforts of the communist 
leaders in Nicaragua to consolidate a 
totalitarian regime on the mainland of 
Central America— on both moral and 
strategic grounds. Few in the United 
States would deny today that the 
Managua regime is a moral disaster. 
The communists have brutally repressed 
the Nicaraguan people's yearning for 
freedom and self-government, the same 
yearning that had earlier made possible 
the overthrow of the Somoza tyranny. 
But there are some in this country who 
would deny that America has a strategic 
stake in the outcome of the ideological 
struggle underway in Nicaragua today. 
Can we not, they ask, accept the ex- 
istence of this regime in our hemisphere 
even if we find its ideology abhorrent? 
Must we oppose it simply because it is 
communist? 

The answer is we must oppose the 
Nicaraguan dictators not simply because 
they are communists but because they 
are communists who serve the interests 
of the Soviet Union and its Cuban client 
and who threaten peace in this 
hemisphere. The facts are indisputable. 
Had the communists adopted even a 
neutral international posture after their 
revolution; had they not threatened 
their neighbors, our friends and allies in 
the region, with subversion and aggres- 
sion; had they not lent logistical and 
material support to the Marxist-Leninist 
guerrillas in El Salvador— in short, had 
they not become instruments of Soviet 
global strategy, the United States would 
have had a less clear strategic interest 
in opposing them. 

Our relations with China and 
Yugoslavia show that we are prepared 
for constructive relations with com- 
munist countries regardless of 
ideological differences. Yet, as a general 
principle in the postwar world, the 
United States has and does oppose com- 
munist expansionism, most particularly 
as practiced by the Soviet Union and its 
surrogates. We do so not because we 
are crusaders in the grip of ideological 
or messianic fervor, but because our 
strategic interests, by any cool and ra- 
tional analysis, require us to do so. 



Our interests, however, also require 
something more. It is not enough to 
know only what we are against. We 
must also know what we are for. And in 
the modern world, our national interests 
require us to be on the side of freedom 
and democratic change everywhere— and 
no less in such areas of strategic impor- 
tance to us as Central America, South 
Africa, the Philippines, and South 
Korea. 

We understood this important lesson 
in Western Europe almost 40 years ago, 
with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall 
Plan, and NATO; and we learned the 
lesson again in just the last 4 years in 
El Salvador: the best defense against 
the threat of communist takeover is 
the strengthening of freedom and 
democracy. The most stable friends and 
allies of the United States are invariably 
the democratic nations. They are stable 
because they exist to serve the needs of 
the people and because they give every 
segment of society a chance to influence, 
peacefully and legally, the course their 
nation takes. They are stable because no 
one can question their fundamental 
legitimacy. No would-be revolutionary 
can claim to represent the people 
against some ruling oligarchy because 
the people can speak for themselves. 
And the people never "choose" 
communism. 

One of the most difficult challenges 
we face today is in South Africa. 
Americans naturally find apartheid to- 
tally reprehensible. It must go. But how 
shall it go? Our influence is limited. 
Shall we try to undermine the South 
African economy in an effort to topple 
the white regime, even if that would 
hurt the very people we are trying to 
help as well as neighboring black coun- 
tries whose economies are heavily 
dependent on South Africa? Do we want 
to see the country become so unstable 
that there is a violent revolution? 
History teaches that the black majority 
might likely wind up exchanging one set 
of oppressors for another and, yes, could 
be worse off. 

The premise of the President's 
policy is that we cannot wash our hands 
of the problem or strike moralistic 
poses. The only course consistent with 
American principles is to stay engaged 
as a force for peaceful change. Our in- 
terests and our values are parallel 
because the present system is doomed, 
and the only alternative to a radical, 
violent outcome is a political accom- 
modation now, before it is too late. 



THE SECRETARY 



The moral— and the practical— policy 
is to use our influence to encourage a 
peaceful transition to a just society. It is 
not our job to cheer on, from the 
sidelines, a race war in southern Africa 
or to accelerate trends that will inex- 
orably produce the same result. 

Therefore, the centerpiece of our 
policy is a call for political dialogue and 
negotiation between the government 
and representative black leaders. Such 
an effort requires that we keep in con- 
tact with all parties, black and white; it 
means encouraging the South African 
Government to go further and faster on 
a course on which it has already halt- 
ingly embarked. The President's Ex- 
ecutive order a month ago, therefore, 
was directed against the machinery of 
apartheid, but in a way that did not 
magnify the hardship of the victims of 
apartheid. This approach may suffer the 
obloquy of the moral absolutists— of 
those opposed to change and of those 
demanding violent change. But we will 
stick to this course because it is right. 

The Importance of Realism 

A foreign policy based on realism, 
therefore, cannot ignore the importance 
of either ideology or morality. But 
realism does require that we avoid 
foreign policies based exclusively on 
moral absolutes divorced from political 
reality. Hans Morgenthau was right to 
warn against the dangers of such moral 
crusades or escapism. 

We know that the spread of com- 
munism is inimical to our interests, but 
we also know that we are not omni- 
potent and that we must set priorities. 
We cannot send American troops to 
every region of the world threatened by 
Soviet-backed communist insurgents, 
though there may be times when that is 
the right choice and the only choice, as 
in Grenada. The wide range of 
challenges we face requires that we 
choose from an equally wide range of 
responses: from economic and security 
assistance to aid for freedom fighters to 
direct military action when necessary. 
We must discriminate; we must be pru- 
dent; we must use all the tools at our 
disposal and respond in ways ap- 
propriate to the challenge. Realism, as 
Hans Morgenthau understood it, is also 
a counsel of restraint and healthy com- 
mon sense. 

We also know that supporting 
democratic progress is a difficult task. 
Our influence in fostering democracy is 
often limited in those nations where it 



has never before taken root, where 
rulers are reluctant to give up their 
privileged status, where civil strife is 
rampant, where extreme proverty and 
inequality pose obstacles to social and 
political progress. 

Moral posturing is no substitute for 
effective policies. Nor can we afford to 
distance ourselves from all the difficult 
and ambiguous moral choices of the real 
world. We may often have to accept the 
reality that advances toward democracy 
and greater freedom in some important 
pro-Western nations may be slow and 
will require patience. 

If we use our power to push our 
nondemocratic allies too far and too fast, 
we may, in fact, destroy the hope for 
greater freedom; and we may also find 
that the regimes we inadvertently bring 
into power are the worst of both worlds: 
they may be both hostile to our in- 
terests and more repressive and dic- 
tatorial than those we sought to change. 
We need only remember what happened 
in Iran and Nicaragua. The fall of a 
strategically located, friendly country 
can strengthen Soviet power and, thus, 
set back the cause of freedom regionally 
and globally. 

But we must also remember what 
happened in El Salvador and throughout 
Latin America in the past 5 years— and, 
for that matter, what is happening to- 
day in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Afghani- 
stan, and Angola, where people are 
fighting and dying for independence and 
freedom. What we do in each case must 
vary according to the circumstances, but 
there should not be any doubt of whose 
side we are on. 

Our Ideals as a Source of Strength 

Over 20 years ago, President Kennedy 
pledged that the United States would 
"pay any price, bear any burden, meet 
any hardship, support any friend, op- 
pose any foe, in order to assure the sur- 
vival and the success of liberty." We 
know now that the scope of that com- 
mitment was too broad, even though it 
reflected a keen understanding of the 
relevance of our ideals to our foreign 
policy. More recently, another ad- 
ministration took the position that our 
fear of communism was inordinate and 
emphasized that there were severe 
limits to America's ability or right to in- 
fluence world events. I believe this was 
a council of despair, a sign that we had 
lost faith in ourselves and in our values. 



Somewhere between these two poles 
lies the natural and sensible scope of 
American foreign policy. Our ideals 
must be a source of strength— not 
paralysis— in our struggle against 
aggression, international lawlessness, 
and terrorism. We have learned that our 
moral convictions must be tempered and 
tested in daily grappling with the 
realities of the modern world. But we 
have also learned that our ideals have 
value and relevance, that the idea of 
freedom is a powerful force. Our ideals 
have a concrete, practical meaning to- 
day. They not only point the way to a 
better world, they reflect some of the 
most powerful currents at work in the 
contemporary world. The striving for 
justice, freedom, progress, and peace is 
an ever-present reality that is today, 
more than ever, impressing itself on 
international politics. 

As Hans Morgenthau understood, 
the conduct of a realistic and principled 
foreign policy is an honorable endeavor 
and an inescapable responsibility. We 
draw strength from our ideals and prin- 
ciples, and we and our friends among 
the free nations will not shrink from 
using our strength to defend and further 
the values and principles that have 
made us great. 



'Press release 238 of Oct. 7. 



News Conference of 
October 31 



Secretary Shultz held a news con- 
ference at the Department of State on 
October 31, 1985. 1 

My trip to Moscow is part of a continu- 
ing and intensive process to prepare the 
way for the President's meetings in 
Geneva with Mr. Gorbachev. Those 
meetings will provide an opportunity to 
address a variety of important issues in 
a businesslike and constructive manner. 
The goals of the United States are 
clear. 

• We want countries to stop trying 
to expand their influence through armed 
intervention and subversion. President 
Reagan, at the United Nations last 
week, put forth an initiative for 
negotiated settlements, withdrawal of 



December 1985 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



outside forces, and international efforts 
to build economies and meet human 
needs. 

• We want to reduce the risk of 
nuclear war through drastic cuts in 
nuclear arsenals. Just an hour ago, the 
President announced that the United 
States will table in Geneva a new and 
far-reaching proposal to the Soviet 
Union 

• We want to promote and defend 
human rights everywhere. We insist 
that the Helsinki accords and other in- 
ternational commitments be observed. 

• And we seek to establish better 
communication between our societies to 
reduce the danger of miscalculation and 
misunderstanding. That is why we are 
proposing dramatic increases in people- 
to-people exchanges, programs to share 
information, and enhanced cooperation 
in meeting human needs. 

These are ambitious goals, and our 
efforts to reach them will continue. We 
can have a more constructive relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union in which we 
are better able to resolve outstanding 
issues but only if the Soviet leaders also 
want it. The meetings in Geneva can, 
and we hope will, mark a new phase in 
this process. We recognize the impor- 
tance of this event; we are looking for- 
ward to it; and we are making serious 
preparations toward a useful and pro- 
ductive meeting. 

Active preparations began in 
Helsinki July 31 when I first met with 
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. 
We continued to delineate the key 
issues and sketch out possible progress 
when the Foreign Minister visited New- 
York and then Washington, where he 
met with President Reagan, in late 
September, and then last week when 
Mr. Shevardnadze was in New York for 
the UN ceremonies and again met with 
the President and with me. In addition, 
there have been, throughout this period, 
detailed discussions through diplomatic 
channels in Washington and Moscow. 
My meeting in Moscow will be the next 
step in this process. 

We have explored, with great 
thoroughness, all issues on the agenda- 
regional issues, arms control, human 
rights, and bilateral matters. The Presi- 
dent is prepared to discuss all these 
with Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva. The 
United States has advanced specific 
ideas in all these areas; the Soviets have 
offered proposals and ideas of their own. 



We will be discussing these ideas in 
Moscow, both to see if we can advance 
the work on some questions and to 
refine the issues for discussion in 
Geneva. 

After 5 years of strengthening our 
defenses and our economy and conduct- 
ing a vigorous and confident foreign 
policy, the United States proceeds on a 
solid foundation of public and congres- 
sional support.