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)ff/cial Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy /Volume 86/ Number 2115
October 1986
Refugees/49
The President/1
Arms Control/7
Pacific/43
Western Hemisphere/65
Department of State
bulletin
Volume 86 / Number 2115/ October 1986
Cover: President Reagan
(White House photo by Pete Souza)
One of the priorities of the assistance pro-
vided by the international community is to
supply the refugees with clean drinking
water.
(Courtesy of UNHCR: J. Jessen-Petersen)
The Department of State Bulletin.
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
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The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
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senior State Department officials; se-
lected press releases issued by the
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U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and
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tional information on current issues but
should not necessarily be interpreted as
official U.S. policy statements.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State
BERNARD KALB
Assistant Secretary for Public Affair
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
SHARON R. LOTZ
Assistant Editor
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CONTENTS
i President
SDI: Progress and Promise
News Conference of August 1 2
(Excerpts)
International Trade
ns Control
Arms Control: Turning the
Corner? (Kenneth L. Adelman)
CDE Opens Final Session
(White House Statement)
Interim Restraint: U.S. and Soviet
Force Projections (President
Reagan, Letter to the Congress,
Unclassified Report)
Presidential Response to Soviet
Arms Control Proposals (White
House Statement)
U.S. Policy Regarding Limita-
tions on Nuclear Testing
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Discussions on
Nuclear Testing (White House
Statement)
SCC Meets in Geneva (White
House and U.S. Statements)
sartment
The Foreign Affairs Budget
(John C. Whitehead)
it Asia
U.S. -Japan Relations: A Global
Partnership for the Future
(Michael H. Armacost)
U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade
Agreement (President Reagan)
Perspective and Proportion for
U.S. -Japanese Relations
(Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.)
momics
Economic Sanctions to Combat
International Terrorism
Trade Policy: Where Will
America Lead? (Douglas W.
McMinri)
Energy
34 Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(White House Statement)
Europe
35 25th Anniversary of Berlin Wall
(President Reagan)
35 27th Report on Cyprus
(Message to the Congress)
Human Rights
36 11th Anniversary of the Helsinki
Final Act (President Reagan)
36 Captive Nations Week, 1986
(Proclamation)
Military Affairs
37 Binary Chemical Munitions
Program (White House
Statement)
Narcotics
37 U.S. International Narcotic
Control Programs and Policies
(John C. Whitehead)
Oceans
41 Who Will Protect Freedom of the
Seas? (John D. Negroponte)
Pacific
43 U.S. and Australia Hold
Ministerial Talks (Kim Beazley,
Bill Hay den, Secretary Shultz,
Caspar W. Weinberger)
Refugees
49 U.S. Refugee Policies and
Programs at Midyear 1986
(James N. Purcell, Jr. )
South Asia
54 Visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister
(Joint Statement)
Terrorism
55 Terrorism and Tourism
(Robert B. Oakley)
58 Antiterrorism Act Signed into
Law (President Reagan)
United Nations
58 Nicaragua's Role in
Revolutionary Internationalism
(Vernon A. Walters)
61 Report on UN Human Rights
Commission Meeting (Richard
Schifter)
63 UN Financial Crisis
(Vernon A. Walters)
Western Hemisphere
65 Visit of Mexican President
(Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado,
President Reagan)
66 Update on Chile
(Elliott Abrams)
70 Obstacles to Investment
and Economic Growth in Latin
America (Richard T.
McCormack)
73 Visit of President of Uruguay
(President Reagan,
Julio Maria Sanguinetti)
Treaties
75 Current Actions
Press Releases
77 Department of State
Publications
77 Department of State
78 Background Notes
78 Foreign Relations
Volume Released
Index
E PRESIDENT
31: Progress and Promise
'risuliiil Ixi'iifiini's n-mnrks ul u
1 House briefing on August 6, 1986. 1
grateful to have this opportunity to
k with you and to thank you for all
re doing to keep America in the
front of scientific and technological
ge. Our country's security today
s as much on the genius and
tivity of scientists as it does on the
age and dedication of those in the
ary services. It also relies on those
the wisdom to recognize innovation
n they see it and to shepherd change
the obstacles and through the maze,
kes a special person, endowed with
n and tenacity, to overcome po'itical
bureaucratic inertia; and many of
here today are just this kind of
ial people, and I want you to know
your President and your country
grateful. And, if I'm not being too
umptuous, I think history will
>mber you, too.
Chere are three stages of reaction to
lew idea, as Arthur C. Clarke, a
ant writer with a fine scientific
I, once noted. First, "It's crazy;
; waste my time." Second, "It's
■ble, but it's not worth doing." And,
:y, "I always said it was a good
Vhen I notice how much support tax
lification seems to have attracted as
fee, I can't help but think of Clarke's
irvation. Well, one sometimes has to
ivith opposition to proposals such as
ging the tax code, but when the
■ kind of skepticism stands in the
of the national security of our coun-
t can be perilous.
piearly, intelligent and well-meaning
riduals can be trapped by a mindset,
y of thinking that prevents them
! seeing beyond what has already
i done and makes them uncomfort-
Iwith what is unfamiliar. And this
(set is perhaps our greatest obstacle
gard to SDI.
we're at a critical point now on
>nal security issues, and we need
i help. Many of our citizens are still
rare that today we are absolutely
Useless against the fastest, most
hictive weapons man has ever
ked— ballistic missiles. Yet, there are
;those who want to cut off, or
!rely cut back, our ability to inves-
'e the feasibility of such defenses,
tressional action on the defense
iorization bill is coinciding with
psing diplomatic activity with the
Soviet Union. Yet, at the same time,
we're in the midst of a budget fight
which could take away the very leverage
we need to deal with the Soviets
successfully.
Back in 1983, I challenged America's
scientific community to develop an alter-
native to our total reliance on the threat
of nuclear retaliation, an alternative
based on protecting innocent people
rather than avenging them; an alter-
native that would be judged effective by
how many lives it could save, rather than
how many lives it could destroy.
All of you know that during the past
three decades deterrence has been based
on our ability to use offensive weapons
to retaliate against any attack. Once an
American President even had to make
the excruciating decision to use such
weapons in our defense. Isn't it time
that we took steps that will permit us to
do something about nuclear weapons,
rather than simply continue to live with
them in fear? And this is what our SDI
research is all about, and there can be no
better time than today, the 41st anniver-
sary of Hiroshima, to rededicate
ourselves to finding a safer way to keep
the peace.
Many people believe the answer lies
not in SDI but only in reaching arms
control agreements. Trust and
understanding alone, it is said, will lead
to arms control. But let's not kid
ourselves; it's realism, not just trust,
that is going to make it possible for
adversaries, like the Soviet Union and
the United States, to reach effective
arms reduction agreements. Our SDI
program has provided a historic oppor-
tunity; one that enhances the prospects
for reducing the number of nuclear
weapons. Technology can make it possi-
ble for both sides, realistically, without
compromising their own security, to
reduce their arsenals. And the fear that
one side might cheat— might have a
number of missiles above the agreed
upon limit— could be offset by effective
defenses. Clearly, by making offensive
nuclear missiles less reliable, we make
agreements to reduce their number more
attainable. Particularly is that true
where one side now is an economic
basket case because of the massive arms
buildup that it's been conducting over
the last few decades— the Soviet Union.
There has been progress. There's a
serious prospect today for arms reduc-
tions, not just arms control; and that by
itself is a great change, and it can be
traced to our Strategic Defense Initia-
tive. SDI can take the profit out of the
Soviet buildup of offensive weapons and,
in time, open new opportunities by
building on today's and tomorrow's
technologies.
I say this fully aware of the Soviet
campaign to convince the world that ter-
minating our SDI program is a pre-
requisite to any arms agreement. This
clamoring is nothing new. It also has
preceded steps we've taken to modernize
our strategic forces. It was especially
loud, for example, as we moved to offset
the unprovoked and unacceptable Soviet
buildup of intermediate-range missiles
aimed at our allies by deploying our
Pershing lis and cruise missiles.
When I made it clear that we would
no longer base our strategic force deci-
sions on the flawed SALT [strategic
arms limitation talks] Treaties— and, let
me add, that action was taken when
there was ample evidence that the Soviet
Union was already in clear violation of
key SALT provisions— the cry went up
that it was the death knell of arms con-
trol and the beginning of a new, even
more destructive nuclear arms race.
Well, let me just point out, in case no
one noticed, the naysayers' predictions
have been about as accurate as the time
my old boss, Harry Warner of Warner
Brothers' film company, said when
sound films first came in: "Who the hell
wants to hear an actor talk?"
Today, we continue to negotiate with
the Soviets, and they are negotiating
with us. In fact, their recent proposals—
in stark contrast to those gloomy
predictions— are somewhat more forth-
coming than those of the past. We are
giving serious consideration to what the
Soviets have recently laid upon the table
in response to our own concrete reduc-
tion proposals. Also, we are looking
toward the next summit between
General Secretary Gorbachev and me, as
we agreed upon last November, where
nuclear arms reduction will be one of
several significant issues to be discussed.
Forecasting is not useful, but, let me
just say again, I am optimistic. It is
demonstrably in the interest of both our
countries to reduce the resources that
we commit to weapons. If the Soviet
Union wants arms reduction— strategic,
chemical, or conventional— the United
States stands ready to commit itself to a
fair and verifiable agreement.
As for SDI, let me again affirm, we
are willing to explore how to share its
benefits with the Soviet Union, which
itself has long been involved in strategic
defense programs. This will help to
THE PRESIDENT
dein I have been emphasiz-
ing all along— that we seek no unilateral
advantage through the SDL
There's been some speculation that
in my recent letter to General Secretary
Gorbachev, I decided to seek some sort
of "grand compromise" to trade away
SDI in exchange for getting the Soviets
1 1 1 join with us in the offensive reduc-
tions. Now, to those who have been
publicizing what is supposed to be in that
letter, I hope they aren't offended to
find out that they don't know what's in
that letter because no one's really told
them. I know. Let me reassure you right
here and now that our response to
demands that we cut off or delay
research and testing and close shop is:
no way. SDI is no bargaining chip; it is
the path to a safer and more secure
future. And the research is not, and
never has been, negotiable. As I've said
before, it's the number of offensive
missiles that needs to be reduced, not
efforts to find a way to defend mankind
against these deadly weapons.
Many of the vocal opponents of SDI,
some of them with impressive scientific
credentials, claim our goal is impossible;
it can't be done, they say. Well, I think
it's becoming increasingly apparent to
everyone that those claiming it can't be
done have clouded vision. Sometimes
smoke gets in your eyes. And sometimes
politics gets in your eyes. If this project
is as big a waste of time and money as
some have claimed, why have the Soviets
been involved in strategic defense
themselves for so long, and why are they
so anxious that we stop?
I understand that General Abrahamson
[Director of the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization] has already
briefed you on the progress we've made.
I want to take this opportunity to con-
gratulate the General and his team.
They're all first string and doing a ter-
rific job.
I'm more than happy with the
strides made in our ability to track and
intercept missiles before they reach their
targets. The goal we seek is a system
that can intercept deadly ballistic
missiles in all phases of their flight,
including and, in particular, the boost
phase— right where they're coming out
of the silos. Our research is aimed at
finding a way of protecting people, not
missiles. And that's my highest priority
and will remain so.
And to accomplish this, we're pro-
ceeding as fast as we can toward
developing a full range of promising
technologies. 1 know there are those who
are getting a bit antsy, but to deploy-
systems of limited effectiveness now
would divert limited funds and delay out-
main research. It could well erode sup-
port for the program before it's per-
mitted to reach its potential.
Jack Swigert, an astronaut, an
American hero of the first order, once
said: "I was privileged to be one of the
few who viewed our earth from the
moon, and that vision taught me that
technology and commitment can over-
come any challenge." Well, Jack
tragically died of cancer and was cut
short from the great contributions he
would have made to his country and to
mankind. He was the kind of individual
who made this the great land of freedom
and enterprise that it is. His can-do
spirit is alive and well in America today.
We and the other free people of the
world are on the edge of a giant leap
into the next century. That turning point
in 13V2 years will not only mark the end
of a century but the beginning of a new
millennium. And the free people of the
world are ready for it. Our research on
effective defenses helps to point the way
to a safer future. The best minds from
some allied countries are already work-
ing with us in this noble endeavor, and
we believe others will join this effort
before too long. In SDI, as elsewhere,
we've put technology that almost bog-
gles the mind to work— increasing our
productivity and expanding the limits of
human potential. The relationship
between freedom and human progress
has never been more apparent.
But our freedom and security, as we
are sorely aware, depend on more than
technology. Both diplomacy and our
internal debate are at a critical juncture,
and your active support is imperative.
Together, we must make it plain th
this is the worst time to undermine
defense programs and take away
America's needed negotiating lever
If we cut back on our own force
unilaterally, we will leave our advet
saries no incentive to reduce their 1
weapons. And we will leave the nex
generations not a safer, more stabli
world but a far more dangerous one-
future is literally in our hands. And
SDI that is helping us to regain con
over our own destiny.
Just one last little incident, if y>
aren't aware of it already, that mig
helpful to you and some people that
might be discussing this subject wit!
Back when Fulton was inventing tr
steamboat and it came into reality,
was an effort made to sell it to Nap
in France. And that great general,
all his wisdom, said: "Are you tryin
tell me that you can have a boat th;
sail against the tide and the currem
the winds without any sails?" He se
"Don't bother me with such foolish
ness." Well, we know where the foi
ness lay, and let's not make the sar
mistakes.
I want to thank you all again fc
you are doing to keep our country c
front, to keep her secure and free,
let up. God bless you.
I'll just leave you with this thoi
once again. When the time has com'
the research is complete, yes, we'ra
going to deploy.
■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 11, 1981
News Conference of August 12
Excerpts from President Reagan 's
news conference held in Chicago on
August 12, 19S6.1
Tomorrow the Senate will cast a crucial
vote. The question is that of assistance
to the freedomfighters who are trying to
bring democracy to Nicaragua, where a
communist regime, a client state of the
Soviet Union, has taken over. The ques-
tion before the Senate is: Will it vote for
democracy in Central America and the
security of our own borders, or will it
vote to passively sit by while the Soviets
make permanent their military beach-
head on the mainland of North America?
Q. Soviet and American
negotiators just completed 2 days of
top-level talks in Moscow. Did they
narrow any differences on arms c«
trol, perhaps paving the way for a
summit later this year? And how <
the Soviets react to your offer to <
the deployment of a Strategic Def
Initiative in return for an agreem«
to deploy it later?
A. That isn't exactly what we''
proposed to the Soviet Union about
delaying our Strategic Defense Initi
ative. And I'm not going to discuss
was in my letter, and no one who ht
been guessing at it has guessed righ
yet. But the General Secretary did i
reveal his letter to me, and I'm not
going to reveal mine to him. But we
don't have an answer or a reply yet
our negotiators over there, and I'm F
waiting for their report to see wheriB
stand. But we have no word as yet.
Department of State Bit
THE PRESIDENT
dent Reagan at news conference of August 12.
J. Are you more or less optimistic
it the prospects for a summit in
ember?
L Yes, I am optimistic. And I'm
nistic that we're going to make
! progress than probably has been
2 in a number of years because of
| of the problems that are concern-
he General Secretary at this time.
J. Your recent speech on South
ca met with what one account
■d "a bipartisan chorus of boos on
tol Hill." It neither silenced your
cs nor satisfied members of your
party who are pressing for a more
eful U.S. approach to that prob-
At this point, are you willing to
re those calls for firmer U.S.
m and possibly see Congress seize
nitiative in setting policy toward
h Africa?
A. I don't think that it's a case of
whether it's firm action or not. I think
the simple case is that punitive sanctions
that would affect the economy there
would not only be disruptive to
surrounding states that are virtually
linked to South Africa's economy but
would also be very punitive to the people
that we want to help. And whether the
Members of the Congress were ready to
accept what I said in that speech— I can
tell you that in communication with
some of the most prominent of the black
leaders, individuals who are leaders of
groups of several million, 4V2 million in
one religious group, and are all solidly
opposed to the sanctions. And the one
group that is in support of them in South
Africa is a group that very definitely has
been the most radical and wants the
disruption that would come from
massive unemployment and hunger and
desperation of the people; because it is
their belief that they could then rise out
of all of that disruption and seize control.
And this has been transmitted to me
personally by some of these other
leaders, like Buthelezi of the largest
tribal group in all of South Africa, the
Zulus. And there are others. There are
religious leaders. Another one, another
Bishop— you never hear of him— I don't
know whether I pronounce his name
right, but it's, I think, Moreno or
Marnarama. I'm going to have to find
out what sounds they attach to some of
their combination of letters. But he's the
leader of 4Vl> million Christians there.
And all of them are deathly opposed to
sanctions. So, I just think that up on the
Hill there, well-intentioned though they
may be, they're asking for something
that would not be helpful.
On the other hand, I think there are
evidences that maybe ourselves and
some of our allies could be invited to
meet with their government represent-
atives and see if we couldn't bring about
some coming together of these respon-
sible leaders of the black community.
Q. If you're unwilling at this point
to define what a reasonable timetable
is for the abolition of apartheid, does
the situation, in fact, reach a point at
some stage where the United States is
pushed to go beyond friendly persua-
sion to prod the South Africans for
change?
A. I think that's something that you
face if and when that time comes. Yes,
we're impatient. And, yes, we feel as
strongly about apartheid as anyone does,
and it should be done away with. On the
other hand, President Botha himself has
said the same thing and that his goal is
to eliminate apartheid.
Q. After you announced your deci-
sion to subsidize grain sales to the
Soviet Union, Secretary of State
Shultz was extremely critical. And I'd
like you to reply to his criticism. He
said the Soviet Union must be chor-
tling at having sales to them subsi-
dized and scratching their heads about
a system that says we're going to fix it
up so that American taxpayers make it
possible for Soviet housewives to buy
American-produced food at a price
lower than an American housewife.
Now, that's Secretary Shultz; what do
you have to say about that?
A. You fellows all caught Secretary
Shultz— he'd been away, and you caught
him before he'd had a chance to talk to
us and find out what it was we really had
done.
ber 1986
THE PRESIDENT
Now, we're not out, as a matter of
policy, to continue subsidizing the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union has a long-term
grain agreement with us, and it calls for
a purchase of 4 million metric tons of
grain this year. They have not yet
boughl that.
This measure that I employed was in
the bill that the Congress passed. And
what we did was say for this one crop,
and for this one season, that we would
offer this subsidy to the farmers. We
didn't do it for the Soviet Union. We did
it for our farmers, who are, as you
know— and we hope temporarily— but in
a real bind, a very severe one. This
amounted to a subsidy for them, but
allowed the Soviet Union to buy that
4 million. If they came in and wanted to
buy 5, the other million would be back at
the regular price. And I think George
has mellowed considerably since he
found out what it is that we did.
Q. A lot of people just simply
think you were trying to buy votes in
the fall elections, because the
American taxpayer is going to pay
about 20C a bushel for this subsidy.
A. No, we're trying to help in a
situation that I believe was originally
created by the Federal Government,
when the Federal Government, back in
the days of the Depression, started
invading the farm community. And with
all its various programs, it has brought
on most of the problems that bother the
farmers today.
Q. Yesterday you offered strong
words of encouragement to those who
would like to see the Berlin Wall torn
down. I am wondering if at some point
in the future you might be willing to
go beyond rhetoric and perhaps put it
on a future agenda for negotiation
with the Soviet Union?
A. I would have no hesitation, what-
soever, in a summit meeting to discuss
this with the General Secretary. I think
it's a wall that never should have been
built. And I happen to believe that at the
time that they started to put it up— and
they started with wire, barbed wire,
instead of a wall— that if the United
States had taken the action it should
have— because that was a total violation
of the Four Powers agreement for
Berlin— that if we'd gone in there and
knocked down that wire then, I don't
think there'll he a wall today. Because I
don't think they wanted to start a war
over that.
Q. How realistic is it, though?
Some critics have suggested that it
raises false hopes for those beyond the
wall.
A. I don't think anyone is intending
to do anything of that kind. But we
know that they've done a kind of
lucrative business in letting people come
through that wall, if the price was right,
and rejoin their families and friends in
West Germany. And isn't it strange that
all of these situations where other people
build walls to keep an enemy out, and
there's only one part of the world and
one philosophy where they have to build
walls to keep their people in? Maybe
they're going to recognize that there is
something wrong with that soon.
Q. I'd like to go back to your first
answer on South Africa. You said that
the only blacks who want sanctions
are the radical blacks, the ones who
want upheaval. One of the blacks who
very much is in favor of sanctions and
is very critical of your policy is Des-
mond Tutu, who is a bishop of the
church and the Nobel Peace Prize win-
ner. Are you saying that he's one of
those radical blacks who wants
upheaval?
A. No, but I don't think he's right in
what he's advocating now. But, I guess
that was careless of me. I was talking in
terms of the various groupings, political
alliances and so forth, of the people in
the black community there. Of course
there are individuals that may be all
over, individuals that think that's the
thing to do, that there's no other answer
now except just punish, never mind try-
ing to find a solution to the problem.
And so, I agree that was careless of me.
No, I was not linking him in with the
particular group that I had in mind.
Q. You also, in your first answer,
talked about a possible meeting —
Western governments invited to talk
to the South African Government and
to blacks. Could you tell us a little bit
more about where that stands now, the
question of your appointing an ambas-
sador to South Africa and also the
possibility of a special envoy?
A. We have made no decision yet on
the ambassador, nor have we made up
our minds whether we want to send an
envoy or not. But at the risk of violating
something that I said, or I thought that I
wouldn't do, I am going to say one thing
about Mr. Botha's speech today. Now,
I'm not going to comment generally or
take questions on that because I haven't
heard it, and I'm not going to comment
until I hear the whole thing. But I did,
thanks to the media, hear at least one
line of his. And this line— he spoke of the
idea of having the leaders of West
Germany, France, United Kingdom, and
the United States to some meetings.
This is what we ourselves have k
talking about, and among ourselves |
these same leaders— is if we could bl
help. This is a sovereign nation. Yoil
can't go in and dictate to them and I
them how they must run their coun I,
But if we could be of help in bringirr
together various groupings there to I
discuss with the government as to f I
something could be planned to brin;|
along an end to apartheid earlier, til
we would be pleased to do.
As I say, I can't comment becail
haven't heard or read, and I will gen
transcript and read his speech. But f
did— and that was quoted on the aii 1
did say that he was thinking of suclB
meeting.
Q. Would you go to that kind fi
summit meeting?
A. I don't know whether it woil
require us or whether it could be del;
with foreign ministers or not. We'dfc
to see the details.
Q. When you spoke earlier of la
one group that you said wants dis rd
and is radical — just to clear up th i
point — you seemed to be referring ]o
the African National Congress, tr
very group that Secretary of Stat' (
Shultz says should be negotiated it
that the Commonwealths feel sho fi
be part of the solution. Are you s; jn
that they should not be among thi|
groups that ought to be included i
some sort of dialogue, even thougi
they seem to be very representative)
a large number of people in South
Africa?
A. The African National Congrfe
started out some years ago, and thtl
was no question about it being a soil
organization. But in 1921, in South I
Africa, the Communist Party was
formed. And some years later the Cn
munist Party of South Africa joinecl
with, and just moved into, the Africl.
National Congress. And it is that ell
ment; I don't say the entire ANC, rl
And George Shultz has talked with I
them. We know that there are still m
people. We've had enough experienli
our own country with so-called coml
munist fronts to know that you canftv
an organization with some well-meap
and fine people, but you have an ekiei
in there that has its own agenda. A I
this is what's happened with the All
And right now, the ANC in exile, til
ones we're hearing from, that are n*
ing the statements, are the membeikrf
that African Communist Party. So, I
you could do business with and sepsfc
out and get the solid citizens in the :N<
Department of State Biel
THE PRESIDENT
>me forward on their own, that's just
[J. Let me understand, also, the
l of what you said tonight about
tions. The front-line states, the
hboring states, have said that
, even though hurt by sanctions.
Id welcome it if it came from
tern countries. Yet President
1a has imposed sanctions upon
1. You've not criticized him for
, you personally, and at the same
this country has imposed sanc-
3 on Nicaragua and Poland. Are
saying that what those regimes do
leir people is worse than what the
;h African regime has done to the
lents of that country?
\.. No, with regard to Poland, if you
d check the sanctions that we finally
lad to be applied there, we applied
tions that we were sure— and we
ht Polish advice on this— that would
larm the citizens of Poland, that
I would be restrictions on the
rnment that was at that time deny-
jech Walesa and the union and so
I the Solidarity movement, its
;s. With regard to Nicaragua, there
comparison between South Africa
Nicaragua. In South Africa you're
rig about a country— yes, we
free and find repugnant some of the
'ices of their government, but
're not seeking to impose their
rnment on other surrounding coun-
. Nicaragua is a totalitarian, com-
ist state. It is a sort of a vassal of
Soviet Union. And it has made plain
terance after utterance, even since
Somoza revolution, that their revolu-
is not going to be confined to their
ers, that they intend to spread that
lution throughout Latin America.
So, what we're talking about is help-
he people of Nicaragua. Just
ltly, the last newspaper, La Prensa,
silenced; two religious leaders were
ed from the country for criticizing
: facets of the government. And we
ly feel that the revolution against
Dza, which declared in writing to the
inization of American States what
goals were: a pluralistic society, a
)cracy, free speech, freedom of
>, free labor unions, and all of this —
pledged what they were trying to
;ve. Then one element in the revolu-
threw out the others that had
ht beside them, and who largely
3 up the contras, took over, seized
!r at the point of a gun. And we
ly believe that the people of
ragua have got a right to try for
! original goals.
Q. After Reverend Lawrence Mar-
tin Jenco was released by his captors
in Beirut a few weeks ago, he met
with you and said he delivered a
message from his captors. What was
in that message, specifically, and how
have you been using that to obtain the
release of the other Americans held in
Lebanon?
A. Contrary to what the tone of
some people is, we've been trying relent-
lessly to get those hostages back from
the first day of their captivity. First, we
had to try and find out where they were.
We still don't really know that. They're
moved frequently. And we're going to
keep on trying. We have had some
broken hearts. Many times that we
thought we were on the track and that
we were almost going to be able to set a
day when they would be free, and then it
would disappear into the sand and we'd
have to start on another path. We're
going to continue until we get them
back.
But he did bring some oral mes-
sages—well, I say messages because I
didn't hear the one that was for the
Pope— but he did to us. And I feel that it
was told to me in confidence, and I have
a feeling that if I should go public with
some of the things in that, I might do
harm to our efforts to try and get them
back. So, I'm not going to comment on
that.
Q. Can you say tonight that we are
any closer to seeing the other Ameri-
cans held there being freed as Father
Jenco was?
A. My hesitance about that— it's just
what I've said before: that there have
been times when, if you'd asked me that
question, I would have been tempted to
say, yes, it's imminent. And then, as I
say, it disappeared, and we had to find
another track and start over. And we've
known encouragement and discourage-
ment. And I can't comment. We must
get them back, and we're going to keep
on doing everything we can and trying
to get them back. But I don't want to
say anything that will endanger them.
Q. The comparison you discussed
before between Nicaragua and South
Africa seems to agitate many of your
critics who note the eloquence with
which you address the issue of
freedom fighting in Nicaragua but
seem to lose that eloquence in South
Africa. Do you honestly believe that
the South African Government treats
its black majority worse than the
Sandinista regime, Marxist though it
may be, treats Nicaraguan citizens
inside Nicaragua, keeping in mind the
number of black South Africans who
have died over the past year alone, the
amount of the cross-border incursions
the South African Government has
conducted against the neighboring
states, et cetera, et all
A. I think that I have condemned
publicly all of those things that you're
talking about. On the other hand, I also
realize the complexity of the South
Africa problem, because much of that
death that you spoke of is being inflicted
by blacks on blacks because of their own
tribal separations. And all of this must
be taken into account in finding a system
of government.
But also I am quoting now one of
those black leaders who wrote a most
statesmanlike and eloquent letter to me
just recently, and he pointed out that
while, yes, they were impatient, and,
yes, we hope that we can make progress
faster, he pointed out he did not disap-
prove of Botha. He pointed out what he
has accomplished and the things that he
has done. And he also made a point
about what would happen if those in our
country who want us to have the
American companies that are over there
doing business withdraw. And he
pointed out that those companies— some
200 of them— following the Sullivan prin-
ciples, in which there is the kind of treat-
ment that we would recognize as being
decent in this country with regard to
their employees and outside the actual
employment, the things they've tried to
do to improve life for the families on the
outside, that this would all be lost if
some people had their way with sanc-
tions and so forth and with forcing us to
withdraw.
But then he also pointed out that
because of the Sullivan principles that
were used by these American companies,
a great many South African companies
had taken the cue from that and adopted
on their own principles that were similar
to that— having to do with promotion,
having to do with hiring, having to do
with ignoring racial difference with
regard to promotion to supervisory posi-
tions and all.
Now, this is all going on. Nothing
like that is going on in Nicaragua, not
when a priest stands up and speaks to
his congregation and because he says
some things that— well, for example,
protesting the fact that the government
has shut down on the church's news-
paper and shut down on the church's
radio station, seized their printing
presses so that they can't even have
church bulletins anymore— and then he's
thrown out of the country for having
said that.
)ber 1986
THE PRESIDENT
That's a little different than what
was going on in South Africa.
Q. Twice now, black candidates to
become your new Ambassador to
South Africa seemed, for one reason or
another, to have fallen by the wayside.
Are you having difficulty in finding a
black Ambassador to South Africa
because you can find no qualified black
who agrees with your policy now?
A. No, [it] has nothing to do with
that. And the one that fell by the
wayside— let me tell you that I regret
that more than anything. I have the
greatest respect and admiration for that
man. And what happened was some
possible connection with a legal action
involving some institutions— he's in a
public relations field at this moment
and that he, for one thing, he very j
ably would not be able to leave and
the time to go there as this comes fr
head.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 18, 198'
International Trade
President. Reagan 's radio address to
the nation of August 2, 1986. l
It's sometimes said that if you put three
economists together in a room and ask
them a question, you're liable to get
more than three answers. It's true,
economists don't often agree; but there
is one issue on which almost all responsi-
ble economists, whatever their political
persuasion, are unanimous. They agree
that free and fair trade brings growth
and opportunity and creates jobs. And
they all warn that high trade barriers,
what is often called protectionism,
undermines economic growth and
destroys jobs. I don't call it protec-
tionism; I call it destructionism.
That's why our motto is: free and
fair trade with free and fair traders.
Now, we've seen that governments
sometimes don't play by the rules. They
keep exports out of subsidy— or sub-
sidize, I should say, industries, giving
them an unfair advantage. Well, our
patience with unfair trade isn't endless,
and we're taking action to bring other
nations back in line to ensure that free
trade remains fair trade. We're aggres-
sively using existing trade laws to pry
open foreign markets and force others to
play by the rules.
This week, for instance, we signed a
breakthrough trade agreement that'll
open up Japanese markets to U.S.
semiconductors and prevent the
Japanese from dumping semiconductors
in our markets. And last month, after
intensive negotiations in response to a
deadline I set, the European Community
agreed to keep its market open to U.S.
farm exports.
These agreements are examples of
positive, result-oriented trade action.
Instead of closing markets at home,
we've opened markets to U.S. products
abroad, thus helping to create more
American jobs. Instead of erecting
destructionist import barriers, we're
tearing down foreign barriers to make
trade freer and fairer for all. Because,
believe me, when Americans are com-
peting on a level playing field, they can
outproduce and outsell anyone, any-
where in the world.
We've been tough with those nations
who've been unfair in their trading prac-
tices, and that toughness has produced
results. And with hard-pressed indus-
tries like textiles and apparel that have
gone through difficult times, we've
taken strong action to help. We renego-
tiated agreements with Taiwan and
Hong Kong over a year early to expand
product coverage and tighten controls of
imports from those countries. We are
pursuing negotiations with Korea to
tighten restraints on their exports to us
and improve opportunities for our pro-
ducers in their market. And just this
week we completed a tough, new multi-
fiber arrangement with our trading part-
ners that will include products not
previously covered and which gives us
tools to prevent damaging import
surges. This is result-oriented action.
What doesn't bring results is the
sort of destructionist legislation now
before the House of Representatives.
Next week the House will vote on
whether to override my veto of a textile
trade bill, and I'm hopeful this won't
happen.
My council of economic advisers
estimates this bill would cost you, the
consumer, $44 billion over the next 5
years: $70,000 for every job saved, jobs
that pay about $13,000 on average. Even
worse, these temporarily protected jobs
would be more than offset by the loss of
thousands of other jobs— jobs in retail.
marketing, and finance, and jobs di
related to importing, such as dock-
workers and transportation worker
And then there are all those who w
be thrown out of work as we began
feel the effects of foreign retaliatio
and you can bet there would be ret;
tion. I'm thinking, especially, of out
struggling agricultural sector and i'
many connected industries. At a tir
when we're trying to increase agric
tural exports, let's remember that !
of the first victims of retaliation wc
be our farmers— kicking them wher
they're already down.
So, our trade policy remains a
positive one that will not play off ot
region against another or one Ame
worker against another, doing grie'
damage to the industries involved,
trying to help workers in ailing indi
tries, we must be careful that the ci
not worse than the disease, like the
infamous Smoot-Hawley tariffs tha
deepened and prolonged the Great
Depression. The best way to help is
the pro-growth policies of free and
trade that have created more than
million new jobs in the last 3lk year
the last 7 months 1,650,000 people
found jobs in the United States. Th;
more than Europe and Japan combi
in the last 10 years. And by the wai
recently released figures show the
leading economic indicators are up
unemployment has dropped to 6.89E
You know, the Europeans talk i
the "American miracle" of economih
growth and job creation. Well, I'm ;i
to do everything I can to keep that
miracle of hope alive, creating jobs K
opportunities for all Americans.
■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 11. 1981
Department of State Bi3l
MS CONTROL
ms Control:
jrning the Corner?
'enneth L. Adelman
iddress before the American Bar
ciation 's annual meeting in New
: City on August. 12, 1986. Mr.
man is Director of the U.S. Arms
rot and 1 disarmament Agency.
summer has been an intensely busy
id for arms control. It began with
'resident's decision on interim
aint and SALT [strategic arms
ation talks]. Then there was the new
;t proposal, General Secretary Gor-
ev's subsequent letter to the Presi-
, a series of meetings with the Presi-
and his response to Gorbachev— as
as a special session of the Standing
mltative Commission and new talks
jclear testing issues. In roughly a
;h, the sixth round of the Geneva
will resume.
^s the President said at Glassboro,
lay be at a turning point in arms
•ol. There are signs of hope in
achev's letter and in Soviet moves
•neva. The President's response
i to bridge the remaining differ-
5 in our positions,
'o get this far has taken an enor-
; amount of perseverance on his
Having worked with him for 5-plus
5 now, I am most struck by his deep
nitment to building a safer world, to
-sing the nuclear arms buildup, and
oviding an alternative strategy that
not hinge so dreadfully on the
it of mutual annihilation,
rhat said, I suspect the question in
minds and many others is: "Will
\ be an arms agreement during this
inist ration?"
ro answer that question, we must
address two others.
Question One: What have we
led in the arms control process?
Question Two: What exactly is the
ed States trying to accomplish in
i control today?
t We Have Learned
, what have we learned? Several
:s:
''or one, we've learned the lesson
arms control negotiations with
soviet Union are not necessarily a
Tessive or cumulative enterprise.
The assumption in 1972. remember, was
that SALT I would be a "first step" to
more ambitious agreements— agree-
ments which actually reduced and
restricted the arms competition. You
would move step by step to more com-
prehensive and ambitious treaties. That
was the theory. The reality turned out
otherwise. By 1979 when SALT II failed
to get Senate approval, it was clear that
our hope had not materialized.
What happened, and who was to
blame? In 1979 I think there was a
widespread feeling in this country that
we had kept our side of the bargain.
Americans from the President on down
plainly saw the SALT agreements and
negotiations as an opportunity to limit
and stabilize the arms competition. In
the wake of SALT I, our defense effort
genuinely slackened, at least in part
because of our faith in the arms control
process. In the 1970s U.S. defense
spending actually dropped in real
terms— the most significant decline
since the Korean war— with procurement
of new strategic systems declining the
most.
I am not saying that we stood still.
We continued to modernize our forces.
But we did so at a far slower rate than
we had pursued during the previous
decade. We converted our missiles to
multiple warheads and thus increased
our total warheads, as did the Soviet
Union.
But we did not field a new set of
strategic weapons systems— and many of
the new systems that were scheduled to
come on in the late 1970s were stretched
out or postponed. There was no new
U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) after we began deploying
Minuteman III in 1970 until the MX. We
built no new ballistic missile submarines
between 1966 and 1981.
Believing, as many people did in the
1970s, that both sides were now pre-
pared to accept "mutual vulnerability"
and "mutual assured destruction," Con-
gress also slashed funds for strategic
defense research in the mid-1970s and
voted to dismantle our one permitted
ABM [antiballistic missile] site.
Meanwhile, on the Soviet side, we
saw basically the opposite pattern.
Instead of slowing down, the Soviets
accelerated their building effort, using
the breathing spell provided by SALT as
an opportunity to move ahead.
Working largely— but not entirely—
within the treaty limits, the Soviets
essentially quadrupled their arsenal of
ballistic missile warheads. They amassed
a large force of first-strike-capable
weapons— the SS-18 missiles, weapons
apparently designed to reduce our ability
to retaliate and to undermine mutual
deterrence. In a period of roughly 15
years— during which both sides were
supposedly restrained by SALT— the
Soviets deployed four new types of
ICBMs, five new classes of ballistic
missile submarines, and five new types
of submarine-launched ballistic missiles,
to name only the most conspicuous
things.
They never accepted the theory of
"mutual vulnerability." They poured
roughly an equal amount of money and
energy into defensive systems as they
did into offensive ones. They upgraded
their Moscow ABM system and vigor-
ously pursued their own strategic
defense program. (And, let me tell you,
the Soviets were vigorously engaged in
"star wars" long before anybody had
heard of Luke Skywalker.)
We see similar problems in the
negotiating process itself. With the
Soviets, discussions do not normally pro-
ceed step by step to bigger and better
things. More often than not, we found
ourselves in the position of Sisyphus hav-
ing to push the rock up the hill only to
have it roll right back down again.
To take one example: when the
SALT I negotiations began, the Soviets
insisted on a completely lopsided defini-
tion of strategic systems. They proposed
to include systems with which we defend
our European and Asian allies, while
excluding the' comparable Soviet systems
that threaten our allies. Eventually, the
Soviets dropped this requirement, so
that we could conclude SALT I. When
negotiations resumed on SALT II, it
reemerged. Eventually, they dropped it
again so that we could conclude SALT
II. When negotiations resumed on the
strategic arms reduction talks (START),
it reemerged. The rock kept rolling
down the hill.
Negotiating with the Soviets is really
an extraordinary experience, quite
unlike anything even the most experi-
enced negotiator— as many of you are-
is likely to come across in the West.
Throughout the past 15 years, we
have witnessed a process in which the
United States has frequently carried the
ball for both sides. In the SALT negoti-
ations, the United States supplied not
only the figures on U.S. forces but, rely-
ing on our intelligence, the figures on
Soviet forces as well. The Soviets did not
ARMS CONTROL
volunteer facts and figures on their
forces, but merely said they did not
dispute our estimates. They wouldn't tell
e number, the types, or even the
names of the systems on which we were
negotiating.
On one occasion, when we gave them
our figures on their weapons, the Soviet
military representative asked us to
refrain. He was agitated that such highly
secret information would be revealed to
the civilian members on his delegation.
The United States and the Soviet
Union viewed negotiations very differ-
ently. We crafted proposals designed to
be balanced and fair to both sides. The
Soviets crafted proposals to give
themselves advantages. The game was
being played, so to speak, on our half of
the field. To put it another way: while
we played to tie, they played to win.
In the second place, we've learned
that the Soviets use arms control
negotiations to advance their broader
aims of splitting the United States
from its allies and having the United
States unilaterally stop major
strategic programs.
This approach was clear even in
1917. When Trotsky went to negotiate
the peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Ger-
mans, Lenin told him to remember that
what happens outside the negotiating
room may be more important than what
happens within.
So, there has always been a large
political purpose to Soviet negotiating
strategy. Frequently, in arms control it
is the driving factor. During the negotia-
tions on intermediate-range nuclear
forces in 1981-83, for example, it was
extremely unlikely that the West could
have achieved an agreement. It's clear
now that the Soviets were not seriously
interested in any arms control agree-
ment. Their main effort was outside the
negotiating room to divide the NATO
alliance. Similarly, for the past 3 years,
their main effort was outside the
negotiating room— to stop the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI).
The problems in arms control
negotiations are, of course, not all on the
Soviet side. There is, to put it gingerly, a
great deal of "pluralism" on our side.
President Reagan wants to hear all
points of view on an issue before
deciding a course. Believe me, he is
never disappointed in this regard when
it comes to arms control. While this
diversity ran be constructive in the deci-
sionmaking process, it can get carried
away at times.
Imagine that you were representing
a corporation negotiating with another
corporation— as I am sure many of you
do— and that the other corporation
simply refused to reveal any financial
information relevant to the deal and
repeatedly reraised issues you thought
were settled. And then imagine that
your opposites maintained an absolutely
solid front— while your senior manage-
ment, your board of directors, and your
employees all staked out separate posi-
tions publicly that weakened your
negotiating hand.
But these are precisely the condi-
tions under which the United States
tends to go into an arms negotiation,
when you consider activities in the
media. Congress, and among our allies
and others.
The Congress has been particularly
prone over the years to conduct its own,
independent arms control policy based
largely on the discredited idea that
unilateral concessions by us will inspire
matching concessions on the Soviet side.
There is not a single instance when this
has occurred. On the contrary, the
Soviets read these gestures not as a sign
of good will but as a sign we lack will.
Unilateral concessions on our part just
mean unilateral advantages on theirs.
All too often a weapons system that
gets the Soviets' attention, that actually
prompts the Soviet Union to bargain
seriously, becomes fair game for Con-
gress to gut or kill in the name of arms
control.
The $5.3 billion proposed for SDI,
which got the Soviets back to the table
for talks, is trimmed to less than $4
billion by a Senate committee. A
$300-million program for an antisatellite
(ASAT) weapon is gutted. The fact that
the Soviets already have an ASAT
weapon and an extensive strategic
defense program in progress somehow
does not weigh heavily in the arcane
calculus by which Congress arrives at
such decisions.
Two hundred years ago Congress
was debating the creation of the Federal
army. One member introduced a resolu-
tion that would limit the army to 3,000
soldiers. General Washington responded
by suggesting his own resolution— to
provide that any enemy invading the
country would be limited to 2,000
soldiers. The first resolution was
drowned in laughter. I wish George
Washington were around to make the
same point today.
The third major lesson is that the
Soviets violate agreements. This says
something about the Soviets and about
the need for effective verification.
Look, for example, at the 1972 con-
vention banning biological and toxin
weapons. According to Arkady
Shevchenko, the former senior Sovil
official at the United Nations who I
defected to the United States, the
Politburo decided to continue activi
which violated the convention in tht
same time period that the Soviet U
signed it.
The Soviet violation of the 197£
ABM Treaty is a similar story. The
decided to build the Krasnoyarsk n
in the early to mid-1970s. They kne
would eventually detect it, since it
over three football fields large. Th<
must have known it could not be
explained except as a violation of tl
treaty.
Hours upon hours of the ABM
Treaty negotiations were spent
negotiating the provisions governi
such large radars. Why? Because tl
radars are a key to complying with E
treaty: they are the large, long-leac ir
item in any effort to deploy a natio ■
ABM system. This is an issue we h; i
come to terms with. Soviet violatio \
undermining the basis for future
agreements.
Finally, we've also learned tl
lesson that arms control negotiat lit
and agreements by themselves ar> M
guarantee of overall peace or stal |t
This lesson, too, went against the el
ventional wisdom.
After SALT I, the expectation B
for a steady improvement of relatk p
between the United States and the
Soviet Union. But the period betweM
SALT I and SALT II was, in fact, :|
period of deteriorating global stabi.li
Regional conflicts were multiplying I'
around the globe. Between 1975 an
1980-the height of the SALT proc
virtually a nation a year fell to com
munist forces: South Vietnam in 19
Angola in 1975-76, Ethiopia in 197
Cambodia in 1978, and Afghanistar
1979.
The Soviet invasion of Afghani
occurred in the same year as the sij
of the major arms control agreemei
SALT II— and just 6 months after
mit meeting between the American
President and the Soviet leader. At
control agreements can play a useft
role, but it takes much more than a
treaty to keep the peace.
What We Are Trying
to Accomplish
Now to my second question: what aw
trying to accomplish in arms contrc '
today?
Department of State Bjel
ARMS CONTROL
he answer is simple: we want an
agreement that will accomplish
thing of substance; one that will
jrably decrease the risk of war and
ice stability; one that will reverse
Dward nuclear spiral. President
in wants real reductions,
rms agreements need to
iplish something in the real world,
have to be worth more than the
1 they're printed on. They must
ss our hope, but they must be more
mere expressions of hope. That has
and continues to be, the principle
foverns the arms control policy of
Ldministration.
o, how far have we succeeded?
more than our critics concede.
irst, we have succeeded in getting
jviets back to the table. They
i politics and walked out. Now we
f discern what the President has
nay be a turning point toward real
etailed bargaining on the substan-
ssues that divide us. If this is true,
ood news. Staying the course on
overall goals is the watchword of
■ity on arms control. Shifting from
o goal is to treat arms control
rily as a public relations enter-
an activity more appropriate for
.on Avenue than Pennsylvania
le.
econd, we have succeeded in get-
he Soviets to talk about reductions
■lear weapons. This was no small
!n 1977, you may remember, Presi-
]arter sent Secretary of State
' to Moscow with a plan for deep
tions in nuclear weapons. Brezhnev
i the proposal down flat.
Tien President Reagan first pro-
deep cuts in nuclear arsenals in
he was criticized for seeking too
A major criticism of this
nistration's arms control policy
j the first term was that our pro-
> were too ambitious and thus, as
.ying goes, insufficiently
•tiable" with the Soviets. Over the
> years, we have redefined what is
iable by insisting on negotiating
what is most important.
hird. we have succeeded in getting
ilks to focus on the more critical
iires of strategic power. While the
i and obsolete SALT structure
almost entirely with strategic
ir delivery vehicles, our proposals
alk about warheads and destructive
ilities directly. The Soviets have
to move in this direction as well.
V accepted this approach with deep
tions, we would finally get an
ment that would mitigate Soviet
trike capabilities, really reduce the
risk of war, and thus realize the primary
goal of strategic arms control.
Finally, we have succeeded in
launching an effort to see whether we
can devise a means to effectively counter
such nuclear missiles. Such defenses, if
they prove feasible, could improve our
security by strengthening deterrence
and reducing the likelihood of any
nuclear attack. President Reagan has
simply asked whether we can find a
better way to maintain the peace than
the threat of mutual annihilation and
total vulnerability. It may not be possible
to find one. But we must continue to try.
Even with these successes we have a
long way to go. Major bargains are not
struck easily, especially with an adver-
sary like the Soviet Union.
Proposing good arms control is one
thing; attaining good arms control is
another. As Glendower boasts in Henry
IV, "I can call spirits from the vasty
deep," to which Hotspur replies, "Why,
so can I, or so can any man. But will
they come when you do call for them?"
That brings us back to the question
we began with: will there be an arms
control agreement in this Adminis-
tration?
Yes, there will be an agreement if
the Soviets decide they want an agree-
ment. Yes, there will be an agreement if
the Soviets move off some unacceptable
positions and, yes, if the Soviets are as
ready to bargain as seriously as we are.
I personally am hopeful about the
prospects for an agreement. We are
ready to move. But we don't know
whether the Soviets are ready to move
seriously with us.
But even if we do not achieve an
agreement, that does not mean we will
be less secure. In the past 5 years, we
have had no new agreements. But the
goals that arms control is meant to
advance— security, peace, a world safe
for free nations— have been advanced.
The 1980s have not witnessed those
kinds of crises that brought the world to
the brink— the Korean war in the 1950s,
the Berlin and Cuban missile crises in
the 1960s, and the Yom Kippur war in
the 1970s (when we went on strategic
alert to prevent Soviet forces from mov-
ing into the Middle East).
From 1975-80, when arms control
negotiations were occupying center
stage, freedom was on the run around
the world— from our embassy in Tehran,
to the valleys of Afghanistan, to the
CDE Opens Final Session
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 18, 19861
After 2lk years of negotiations, the
Stockholm Conference on Confidence-
and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe (CDE) begins its
12th and final session on August 19. It
will adjourn on September 19, and its
work must be complete by then.
The United States places great
importance on reaching a militarily
significant result in Stockholm. Success
in CDE would contribute directly to a
clearer and more predictable military
situation in Europe. More broadly it
would give an important impulse to the
Helsinki process, of which CDE is an
integral part, and thus contribute to pro-
motion of all the aims of the Helsinki
Final Act.
The United States was pleased with
the progress that was made in the final
days of the last round of negotiations. If
the East adopts a constructive posture,
we believe we can fulfill the conference's
mandate to negotiate concrete, verifiable
measures that increase the openness of
all military activities in Europe. To meet
this objective, we believe the Stockholm
conference must adopt measures to
create a comprehensive, verifiable
confidence-building regime requiring the
exchange of military information and the
forecasting, notification, and observation
of military activities. We believe that
effective verification of these measures
by all participating states can only come
from inspection of activities which cast
doubt on compliance.
Because so little time remains in
which to reach agreement, the President
has instructed the U.S. delegation to
return to Stockholm early to take part in
informal consultation aimed at resolving
some outstanding issues. Ambassador
Robert L. Barry, head of the U.S.
delegation to CDE, has the full support
of the President in seeking a concluding
document which meets the objectives we
have pursued since negotiations began
and which will contribute to the security
of all participating states.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 25, 1986.
er 1986
ARMS CONTROL
charnel houses of Cambodia. The com-
munist insurgencies of the 1970s— those
ieds of tyranny— have given way to
a new generation of popular movements
against Marxist regimes— in Afghani-
stan, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and
Cambodia.
In the 1980s we have restored
stability by rebuilding our military
strength and restoring our national
pride. We have intensified our dialogue
with the Soviet Union on human rights
and regional issues— as well as arms con-
trol. We have drawn the line against
tyranny and terrorism, and the faith and
free economies of the world are prosper-
ing. Democracy is burgeoning around
the globe. Freedom is no longer on the
run. Freedom is now on the march. ■
Interim Restraint:
U.S. and Soviet Force Projections
LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
AUG. 5, 19861
Enclosed in an unclassified version of a
classified report which I provided on June 19
in response to related Congressional requests,
including a request for projections and com-
parisions of U.S. and Soviet strategic force
dismantlements, inventories, etc., in terms of
adherence to existing arms control
agreements.
As I noted in my letter of June 19
transmitting the classified report, it is clear
that SALT II and I codified a very major
arms buildup including a quadrupling of
Soviet strategic weapons (warheads and
bombs) since SALT I was signed in 1972 and
near doubling of Soviet ballistic missile
warheads from about 5,000 to more than
9,000 since SALT II was signed in 1979.
The report further found that the SALT I
and II agreements, even if fully complied
with, would not prevent a very substantia]
further expansion of Soviet capabilities. We
believe that, absent SALT II, the Soviets
would not necessarily expand their forces
significantly beyond the increases already
projected with SALT II since the Soviet
forces are very large and would appear, in
our judgment, more than enough to meet
reasonable military requirements.
In my letter of June 19, I noted that in
view of the adverse implications of Soviet
noncompliance for our security and for the
arms control process, I had determined on
May 27 that, in the future, the United States
must base decisions regarding its strategic
force structure on the nature and magnitude
of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces,
and not on standards contained in the SALT
structure which has been undermined by
Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a
flawed SALT II treaty which was never
ratified, would have expired if it had been
ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet
Union.
I have also noted that the full implemen-
tation of the Strategic Modernization Pro-
gram is critical both to meeting our future
national security needs and to appropriately
responding to Soviet noncompliance. How-
ever, we will exercise utmost restraint. As we
modernize, we will continue to retire older
forces as national security requirements per-
mit. We do not anticipate any appreciable
growth in the size of U.S. strategic forces.
Assuming no significant change in the threat,
we will not deploy more strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic
missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.
I want again to emphasize that no policy
of interim restraint is a substitute for an
agreement on deep and equitable reductions
in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we
can be confident of Soviet compliance with
it. Achieving such reductions continues to
receive my highest priority. This is the most
direct path to achieving greater stablity and a
safer world.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
Report to the Congress on U.S.
Interim Restraint Policy and
Representative Soviet and U.S.
Dismantlement and Strategic Force
Projections With and Without
SALT I and II
I. Introduction: U.S. Interim
Restraint Policy and U.S. Responses
to Soviet Noncompliance
This report is an unclassified version of a
report forwarded to the Congress on
June 19, 1986, in response to the
requirements of the fiscal year 1986
Department of Defense Authorization
Act (Title X, Section 1001 (b)) for a
report on certain data and assessments
related to U.S. and Soviet strategic
offensive forces and on possible Soviet
political, military, and negotiating
responses to changes in the U.S. policy
of interim restraint. As requested U
legislation, the report covers a 5-yl
period. It is provided in conjunction
material including the President's I
ment of May 27 and a White Housi
sheet of the same date on "U.S. Irn
Restraint Policy: Responding to S<l
Arms Control Violations."
The U.S. policy of interim restl
as first announced by the Presidei n
1982 has been that, in spite of the ■
inherent in the SALT [strategic ara
limitation talks] agreements and ii r.
effort to foster an atmosphere of 1 1
restraint conducive to serious neg> ■
tions on arms reductions, the Unit 1
States would not undercut the expl
SALT I Interim Offensive Agreen U
1972 or the unratified SALT II Trl
1979 so long as the Soviet Union e |
cised equal restraint.
In three detailed Administrati* I
reports to the Congress on Soviet I
compliance, and through diplomat H
channels including the U. S. -Soviet I '
Standing Consultative Commissioi t]
President has consistently made cl a
that this U.S. policy required Sovi II
reciprocity and that it must not
adversely affect our national secui fl
interests in the face of the continu J
Soviet military buildup and uncorr tl
Soviet noncompliance.
In accordance with U.S. interi I
restraint policy and our efforts to H
framework of truly mutual restrai l|
United States has not taken any a< fl
that would undercut existing agre( I
ments. We have continued scrupul ^
to live within all arms control agre I
ments, including the SALT I and III
strategic arms agreements. Unforl|f
ately, while the United States has B
attempting to hold to the structure i
SALT through our policy of interirl
restraint, the Soviet Union has until
the very foundation of that structui
through its continued violations.
In June of 1985, the President I
the extra mile. He decided to dismili
U.S. Poseidon submarine, in order I
give the Soviet Union adequate tin
correct its noncompliance, reverse >
unwarranted military buildup, and |l
seriously pursue equitable and veri|l
arms reduction agreements in the '
Geneva negotiations. Regrettably, B.
Soviet LInion has so far failed to mj(
constructively in these three areas. i
In spite of our expressed concel
and our diplomatic efforts for corn!
Soviet actions, the Soviet Union hatt
corrected its noncompliance. Conctw
SALT II, the President's most reccjj
report, of December 23, 1985, to tr'
Congress cited as Soviet violations:
10
Department of State BJ
ARMS CONTROL
e development of the SS-25
e, a prohibited second new type of
continental ballistic missile (ICBM);
tensive encryption of telemetry on
1 missile flight tests, which impedes
cation; (3) concealment of the
iation between the SS-25 missile
I launcher during testing; and
ceeding the SALT II numerical cap
04 strategic nuclear delivery
es (SNDVs). In addition, the Presi-
; report cited three areas of
fuous Soviet behavior as involving
)le violations or other problems
■egard to SALT II: (1) SS-16 ICBM
ty, (2) the Backfire bomber's inter-
lental operating capability, and
a Backfire bomber's production
Concerning SALT I, the Presi-
I report cited a violation in the
; use of former SS-7 ICBM
ies in support of the deployment
jeration of the SS-25 mobile
s. These SALT II and SALT I
ons and other ambiguous situa-
nvolving these treaties remain
's of serious concern, as does
violation of the Anti-Ballistic
(ABM) Treaty of 1972 and of
najor arms control agreements.
e Administration has now con-
a comprehensive review, and
ive consultations with our allies
ends abroad and with Members of
ngress on the continuing Soviet
l of noncompliance, the Soviet
nc arms buildup, and the lack of
ss by the Soviets at the Geneva
itions. The President announced
/ 27 that in the future the United
would base decisions regarding its
nc force structure on the nature
ignitude of the threat posed by
e strategic forces, not on standards
aied in the flawed SALT structure,
ihas been seriously undermined by
Bnoncompliance.
this May 27 announcement on U.S.
rji restraint policy and on the U.S.
Ise to continued Soviet non-
knee, the President pointed out
appropriateness of continuing with
JLT II agreement. SALT II
Si continuing major arms buildups,
^considered by a broad range of
C| including the Senate Armed
lis Committee, to be unequal and
liable in important provisions. It
d/er ratified by the U.S. Senate
I s clearly headed for defeat before
Bsident's predecessor asked the
■ not to act on it. With SALT II
wiets have nearly doubled their
Hie ballistic missile warheads from
1,000 to 9,000, and with SALT II
1 hey could legally undertake a further
significant increase. Even if SALT II
had been ratified, it would have expired
on December 31, 1985.
Finally, continued Soviet violations
have seriously undercut the agreement
for several years in spite of repeated
U.S. requests for corrective Soviet
action. (Concerning SALT I, this agree-
ment expired in 1977, and since it was
signed in 1972, the Soviet Union has
quadrupled the number of its strategic
nuclear warheads. As for the United
States, even if we did not retire older
systems, the United States would, under
current plans, remain in technical
observance of the SALT I numerical
limits until mid-1989.)
The President made clear in his
May 27 announcement that the United
States would continue to exercise utmost
restraint in the future, seeking to meet
U.S. strategic needs, given the Soviet
buildup, by means that minimize incen-
tives for continuing Soviet offensive
force growth. The President stated that,
as we modernize, we will continue to
retire older forces as our national secur-
ity requirements permit and that we do
not anticipate any appreciable numerical
growth in U.S. strategic forces. He also
indicated that, assuming no significant
change in the threat we face as we
implement the strategic modernization
program, the United States will not
deploy more strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles or more strategic ballistic
missile warheads than does the Soviet
Union.
The President also noted that, as a
result of his decision to dismantle two
older Poseidon submarines, the United
States will remain technically in observ-
ance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty
for some months. He continues to hope
that the Soviet Union will use this addi-
tional time to take the constructive steps
necessary to alter the current situation.
Should they do so, the President has
stated that this would be taken into
account.
Needless to say, the most essential
near-term response to Soviet non-
compliance remains the implementation
of our full strategic modernization pro-
gram, to underwrite deterrence today,
and the continued pursuit of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
research program, to see if it is possible
to provide a safer and more stable basis
for our future security and that of our
allies. The strategic modernization pro-
gram, including the deployment of the
second 50 Peacekeeper missiles, is the
foundation for all future U.S. offensive
force options. It provides a solid basis
that can and will be adjusted over time
to respond most efficiently to continued
Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program
represents our best hope for a future in
which our security can rest on the
increasing contribution of defensive
systems that threaten no one.
In his May 27 statement, the Presi-
dent emphasized that no policy of
interim restraint is a substitute for an
agreement on deep and equitable reduc-
tions in offensive nuclear arms, provided
that we can be confident of Soviet com-
pliance with it. Achieving such reduc-
tions has received, and will continue to
receive, his highest priority. We hope
the Soviet Union will act to give
substance to the agreement reached by
the President and General Secretary
Gorbachev at the summit meeting last
November to achieve early progress in
the Geneva negotiations. It was agreed
to focus, in particular, on areas where
there is common ground, including the
principle of 50% reductions, appropri-
ately applied, in the strategic nuclear
arms of both countries, as well as an
interim agreement on intermediate-
range nuclear forces. If the Soviet Union
carries out this agreement, we can move
now to achieve greater stability and a
safer world.
The classified report transmitted to
the Congress on June 19 provided a com-
parison of representative U.S. and
Soviet strategic weapons dismantlement
that would be required over the next 5
years if both countries were actually to
observe all of the quantitative limits of
the SALT I and SALT II agreements. It
then presented representative projec-
tions of the strategic offensive forces of
the two sides, assuming that the SALT I
and SALT II limits no longer apply.
Finally, it provided an assessment of
possible Soviet political and negotiating
responses, insofar as these are under-
stood and anticipated at present. For
security reasons, the present, unclassi-
fied version provides the information
concerning U.S. and Soviet forces in
substantially abbreviated form.
At the outset, it must be noted that
there are important uncertainties in the
assessments presented herein. With
respect to the data on Soviet forces, the
projections represent broad trends-
based on both evidence and assumptions
—and are not intended to be precise
forecasts. On the basis of U.S. exper-
ience, it is unlikely that Soviet strategic
forces 5 years from now will be identical
(or necessarily even extremely close) to
these force projections. Nevertheless, we
believe that Soviet strategic forces in the
S% 1986
11
ARMS CONTROL
next 3 5 years can be reasonably charac-
terized, based on evidence of ongoing
programs that would be difficult to alter
cally in this timeframe.
By contrast, the size and complexion
of future U.S. strategic forces are
relatively easier for the Soviets to deter-
mine. We must contend with potential
lncn ases in Soviet strategic programs
and capabilities. However, the principal
source of uncertainty for Soviet planners
about the scope and size of future U.S.
strategic programs is, in all likelihood,
the extent to which future U.S. pro-
grams may be reduced by congressional
or executive branch action.
The data presented here assume full
implementation of the Administration's
strategic modernization program. It is
absolutely essential that we maintain full
support for these programs. To fail to do
so would be the worst response to Soviet
noncompliance. It would immediately
and seriously undercut our negotiators
in Geneva by removing the leverage that
they must have to negotiate equitable
reductions in both U.S. and Soviet
forces. It would send precisely the
wrong signal to the leadership of the
Soviet Union about the seriousness of
our resolve concerning their non-
compliance. And, it would significantly
increase the risk to our security for
years to come. Therefore, our highest
priority must remain the full implemen-
tation of these programs.
II. Projected Soviet and U.S.
Dismantlements
This section of the report provides
representative projections on dismantl-
ing that would result if SALT limitations
were extended. They should be con-
sidered to be approximations and would
be subject to alteration by policy deci-
sions or programmatic adjustments by
either side. It should be pointed out that,
as documented in the President's
December 23, 1985, report to the Con-
gress on "Soviet Noncompliance With
Arms Control Agreements," the Soviet
Union's SALT-accountable strategic
nuclear delivery vehicle level is above
the SALT II cap of 2,504, in violation of
the Soviets' political commitment not to
undercut the treaty.
Representative Soviet Dismantle-
ments. The Soviet Union has several
programs underway to introduce new
strategic delivery systems that would
necessitate dismantling of older systems
if the Soviets were to restrict their
overall force to SALT levels. Under a
representative projection of such pro-
grams, consistent with SALT limits over
the next 5 years the Soviets would
deploy significant numbers of new
delivery vehicles, including SS-25 and
SS-X-24 ICBMs, Typhoon- and Delta-
type SSBNs, and Backfire bombers and
ALCM [air-launched cruise missile]
carriers.
Presidential Response
to Soviet Arms Control Proposals
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JULY 25, 19861
President Reagan on July 25, 1986,
responded to recent Soviet arms control
proposals in a private letter to General
Secretary Gorbachev. The President is
hopeful that the ideas he has put for-
ward in this letter will continue the proc-
ess of building a firm basis for progress
in a number of critical areas.
The President finds his exchange of
correspondence with General Secretary
Gorbachev to be of great value in the
search for understanding between our
ountries. We hope that our efforts
will produce agreement not only in arms
control but in the other important
regional and bilateral issues that too
oft''1 es of tensions between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
12
It is our policy to eliminate, where possi-
ble, these sources of tension.
The United States remains committed
to the objective of significant reductions
on offensive nuclear weapons, long-
range strategic missiles, and inter-
mediate nuclear forces. We look upon
the energetic research effort of our
government toward finding a defense
against these weapons of mass destruc-
tion to be an essential part of the task of
reducing the effectiveness and the very
need for these offensive weapons.
The prospects for progress on the
array of U.S. Soviet issues are enhanced
by conducting a confidential dialogue;
therefore, we will not comment on the
content of the President's letter.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 28, 1986.
If SALT I and II limits were tc
complied with, these actions would
necessitate dismantling some older
systems in the Soviet inventory, as
as some more modern systems. Th>
older systems include SS-11 and S1
ICBMs, SS-N-6 SLBMs [submarir
launched ballistic missiles] on Y-cla
SSBNs, and Bison and Bear aircra
Because the Soviets already are ve
close to the SALT II sublimit of 82i
MIRVed [multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle] ICBM 1
ers, deployment of the MIRVed
SS-X-24 would require dismantlin
existing MIRVed ICBMs-most lito
SS-17s and possibly some SS-19s-
stay within the ceiling. Similarly, \
the continued deployment of SS-N
and SS-N-23 SLBMs, their total c
MIRVed missile launchers would e
the ceiling of 1,200 in a year or tw
then they would need to dismantle
MIRVed ICBMs or some SS-N-18
launchers on relatively new D-III-
SSBNs to continue observing the
cumulative sublimit of 1,200 MIR\
ICBM and SLBM launchers. They
for some time, been at the limit of
modern SSBNs established by SAI
thus deployment of new SSBNs w< I
require continued dismantling of ol
submarines.
The dismantlements that woul-l
derive from these actions probably I
total over the next 5 years slightly I
than 600 strategic nuclear delivery I
vehicles, with some 1,000-1,200
associated ballistic missile warheaci
(The SNDV figure also includes he I
bombers judged to have a capacity I
some 300 nuclear weapons.) Some I
mantling of older systems would oil
eventually in any case, with or witll
SALT limits. These projected disml
ing actions do not take into accounl
Soviet potential for additional che;I
while nominally observing SALT
numerical limits. This might be intiM
to avoid compensatory dismantleml
other ICBMs, including MIRVed 1(1
Representative U.S. Dismant
ments. With respect to U.S. progr:
and dismantlements, full implemen
of the strategic modernization prof
would require continued dismantle!
under SALT of U.S. older strategi
gram systems, most of which are n
ing the end of their useful life base
both military and economic
considerations.
-»♦ i-,f Ot'.to
ARMS CONTROL
Projected Soviet and U.S.
:egic Forces
-cted Soviet Forces. In projecting
•t strategic offensive force deploy-
s, assuming SALT limits no
•r apply, the caveats discussed
i regarding assumptions and uncer-
es underlying such projections are
ant.
o place these figures in historical
«ctive, since 1972 when SALT I
igned, there has been a fourfold
ise in the number of Soviet
gic nuclear weapons (missile
?ads and bombs) and nearly a
ing of Soviet ballistic missile throw-
t. Indeed, since the signing of
1 II in 1979, the number of Soviet
gic ballistic missile warheads has
doubled from about 5,000 to more
>,000. This great expansion of
; strategic forces has been possible
e most part with SALT. (The
nents limited launchers and only
:tly affected deployed weapons.)
ted, however, the Soviet Union has
olated the arms control limitations
3d by these agreements,
e Soviet Union now has about
strategic nuclear weapons
3 warheads and bombs). The
I and II Treaties, even if fully
ed with, would not prevent a very
ntial further expansion of Soviet
ities. Even assuming future
compliance with SALT II— other
le continuation of current Soviet
ms— deployed Soviet weapons are
ed to increase to over 12,000 in
:t 5 years. Moreover, by further
lg the agreements, the Soviets
lausibly add in the same time
a relatively modest increase of
ore weapons to their forces.
s difficult to predict precisely
le Soviets might do absent SALT
ints. They would not necessarily
their forces significantly beyond
■eases discussed above, which are
ge and would appear, in our
nt, more than enough to meet
>jible military requirements. Thus
wight well be little appreciable dif-
M, in terms of total weapons,
|i the forces that the Soviets
leploy with and without SALT
lints. It is reasonable to expect
i he absence of SALT, the Soviets
lot dismantle all their older
'i i as rapidly as under SALT,
lasses of weapons (e.g., SSBNs)
lot be dismantled at all during the
tyears without SALT constraints.
Given the great extent of the Soviet
strategic modernization program,
however, many of these older systems
would have relatively little impact on the
overall threat to U.S. security.
The Soviets have the potential to
expand their forces somewhat further,
should they decide to do so for either
military or political reasons. If a
deliberate effort were made by the
Soviet Union to expand its strategic
forces beyond SALT II levels, they
might increase their forces somewhat
further, to about 15,000 weapons by
1991.
However, the costs associated with
such an expansion of capability, on top
of an already very aggressive and expen-
sive modernization program, would be a
disincentive against any such Soviet
effort.
With or without SALT, the Soviets
are, in any case, likely to modernize
their intercontinental nuclear attack
forces further by replacing most of their
currently deployed land- and sea-based
ballistic missiles and heavy bombers by
the mid-1990s. This impressive Soviet
modernization program, which will
result in significantly improved sur-
vivability, flexibility, and hard-target
capability, has been in train for a long
time.
Projected U.S. Forces. The United
States could achieve roughly 14,000
weapons by fiscal year 1991 in a
no-SALT environment by introducing
the full strategic modernization program
without undertaking the dismantlements
that would otherwise be required by
SALT.
IV. Soviet Political and
Negotiating Reponses
It is difficult to predict specific moves
the Soviets might decide to take
politically or in the negotiations to try to
increase criticism of, and build pressure
against, the President's May 27 decision.
They have already leveled a propaganda
campaign against the decision. Iron-
ically, in light of ongoing Soviet viola-
tions of SALT II, including violation of
the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
numerical limit, they have warned that
they will go beyond the SALT limits if
the United States does. While they have
stated that they would take the
"necessary practical" steps, e.g.,
increasing missiles and warheads, it is
not at all clear that they would further
expand their forces beyond the increases
already planned, as discussed above.
However, they are likely to portray any
expansion, including that already
planned, as a response to U.S. actions.
The Soviets may decide to make
political or negotiating moves as a mat-
ter of tactics that seek to discredit the
U.S. decision. However, the May 27 deci-
sion is not likely permanently to alter
their basic, overall objectives for
negotiations or for a summit. These
objectives include increasing opposition
to the U.S. modernization program, par-
ticularly the Strategic Defense Initiative,
and weakening the Western alliance.
We hope that the Soviet Union will
join us in a framework of truly mutual
restraint. For its part, the United States
will continue to exercise utmost restraint
in the future, seeking to meet U.S.
strategic needs, given the Soviet contin-
uing buildup, by means that minimize
incentives for continuing Soviet offen-
sive force growth. As we modernize, we
will continue to retire older forces as our
national security requirements permit.
Assuming no significant change in the
threat we face as we implement the
strategic modernization program, the
United States will not deploy more
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or
more strategic ballistic missile warheads
than does the Soviet Union.
No policy of interim restraint is a
substitute for an agreement on deep and
equitable reductions in offensive nuclear
arms, provided that we can be confident
of Soviet compliance with it. We hope
the Soviet Union will act to give
substance to the agreement reached by
the President and General Secretary
Gorbachev at the summit meeting last
November to achieve early progress in
the Geneva negotiations.
Our objectives in Geneva remain the
same as stated at the summit: to seek
common ground in negotiating deep,
equitable, and verifiable reductions in
strategic and intermediate-range offen-
sive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with
the Soviet Union how we could enhance
deterrence and stability by moving
toward a world in which we would no
longer rely exclusively on the threat of
nuclear retaliation to preserve the peace.
We hope the Soviets will negotiate
seriously with us toward these important
goals.
'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives; George Bush, President of
the Senate; Barry Goldwater, chairman of
the Senate Armed Services Committee; and
Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee (text from Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents of
Aug. 11, 1986.) ■
fa 1986
13
ARMS CONTROL
U.S. Policy Regarding Limitations
on Nuclear Testing
The United Stairs is rum mined to a
national security policy which includes
both a strong deterrent to aggression
and an active pursuit of deep, eipiitahle,
and verifiable reductions in Soviet and
American nuclear arms as well as
, tleetiee verification arrangements for
existing limitations on nuclear testing.
Under existing conditions, neither a
comprehensive ban nor a moratorium
tm unclear testing would enhance the
cause of security, stability, or peace.
This special report sets forth the
principles underlying U.S. policy
toward 1 1 nn tat inns on nuclear testing.
Recent Developments
Shortly before this special report went
to press, the White House announced
that the United States and the Soviet
Union agreed to have experts meet,
without preconditions, to discuss issues
related to nuclear testing. An initial
meeting of experts was held in late
July 1986 at Geneva.
As this report details, the United
States has long sought a meeting with
the Soviets to present our concerns
about the verification provisions of the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET). This meeting of experts allows
the United States to present its ideas
and concerns to the Soviets— and to hear
Soviet concerns. The United States is
ready to present and discuss our views
on verification improvements in existing
agreements which we believe are
needed and achievable at this time. If
we are successful in addressing these
verification concerns, we could move
forward on ratification of these two
treaties.
A Collective Security Issue
The maintenance of a strong nuclear
deterrent has for four decades ensured
the security of the United States and
the freedom of our allies and friends.
Therefore, while a comprehensive test
ban remains a long-term objective of the
United States and while we are actively
investigating technologies that could one
day reduce and ultimately eliminate our
dependence on offensive nuclear arms
for our security, nuclear weapons will
remain the key element of deterrence
for the foreseeable future. During such
14
a period, where both the United States
and our friends and allies must rely
upon nuclear weapons to deter aggres-
sion, nuclear testing will continue to be
required.
A carefully structured nuclear testing-
program is necessary to ensure that our
weapons are safe, effective, reliable, and
survivable. The directors of both the
Los Alamos and Livermore national
weapon laboratories have stated that,
while non-nuclear tests sometimes
detect problems with the nuclear compo-
nent of warheads, the most serious
problems with the nuclear weapons
stockpile are only revealed and solved
by actual nuclear testing. Even a seem-
ingly minor modification in a weapon
design could seriously undermine confi-
dence in the weapon's effectiveness
unless the modified design can be tested
with a nuclear yield. Testing also allows
us to take necessary steps to modernize
our forces to counter the continuing
Soviet military buildup, particularly in
offensive nuclear capabilities.
The United States has long sought
to achieve agreement with the Soviet
Union on nuclear testing limitations that
could strengthen security for all nations.
In 1963, both sides ratified the Limited
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which prohibits
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere,
outer space, and under water. The
LTBT also prohibits the release of
radioactive debris outside the bound-
aries of the state conducting a nuclear
explosion. In 1974 and 1976, respec-
tively, the United States and Soviet
Union signed the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty. These treaties prohibit under-
ground nuclear explosions having a yield
that exceeds 150 kilotons. Neither side
has ratified the TTBT or PNET, but
each has stated that it would respect
the 150 kiloton limit.
Verification Problems
and Soviet Violations
The United States is not currently
seeking ratification of the TTBT and
PNET because we cannot effectively
verify Soviet compliance with the
150-kiloton threshold on underground
nuclear explosions. The remote seismic-
techniques we must rely on today to
monitor Soviet nuclear tests do not
provide yield estimates with the accu-
racy required for effective verification of
compliance. Nor will the treaties'
verification provisions solve this
problem. The TTBT itself provides I
for an exchange of data. This data I
would be of limited value in verifial
and, in any event, cannot be indepel
ently validated by the U.S. Govermi
This means, for example, that we vl
have no way of knowing whether til
Soviets were providing data for all I
geophysically distinct testing areas. I
if the Soviets withheld such knowlel
from us, they could conduct high-yi I
tests in excess of 150 kilotons that, I
the perspective of a seismic observ'l
outside Soviet boundaries, could apl
to fall within the 150 kiloton limit. I
The verification provisions of trl
PNET Protocol would not resolve 1 1
problem of TTBT verification becail
they are not applicable to weapons I
tests. They would permit mandator I
site inspection only of peaceful nuc'.l
explosions— and then only in very rl
strictive circumstances. Specifically I
site inspection is mandatory only f( I
group of explosions whose aggrega I
yield exceeds 150 kilotons. In fact, I
1976 the Soviets have not conducte I
group nuclear explosions of the sizt I
which would have required them t< I
mit such inspection. Thus, even if \ I
were to ratify the treaties and imp I
ment their verification provisions 1 1
our concerns regarding Soviet com] I
ance with the TTBT would not be I
resolved.
These verification deficiencies hi
become a matter of great concern il
light of the pattern of Soviet noncol
ance with existing arms control agil
ments including existing limitations!
nuclear testing. As stated in the Pi I
dent's December 1985 "Report to (I
gress on Soviet Noncompliance Witl
Arms Control Agreements," the Scl
Union's testing practices have resul
in the release of radioactive debris I
caused radioactive matter to be pre!
outside the Soviet Union's territorii
limits in violation of its legal obligal
under the LTBT. The report notes I
Soviet venting has occurred on num
ous occasions. In his 1984 report, til
President concluded that "while the!
available evidence is ambiguous, in I
of ambiguities in the pattern of So\|
testing and in view of verification il
tainties, and [while] we have been ij
ble to reach a definitive conclusion,!
evidence indicates that Soviet nuclei
activities for a number of tests con:|
tute a likelv violation of legal obligJ
under the TTBT." In his 1985 repoj
the President reiterated this conceal
finding "that Soviet nuclear testing!
Department of State
Bi
ARMS CONTROL
.ities for a number of tests eonsti-
a likely violation of legal obligations
;r the TTBT of 1974...."
, Presidential Initiatives
lident Reagan has long advocated a
>gue with the Soviet Union to arrive
le required improvements in moni-
\g procedures for effective verifica-
of the TTBT and PNET, which are
necessary first steps if there is to
rogress in the area of nuclear test-
imitations. The United States has
n the following initiatives:
On several occasions in 1983, the
ed States unsuccessfully sought to
ge the Soviet Union in discussions
Brification improvements to these
ies.
In September 1984, the President
ased, in an address to the UN
ral Assembly, that the United
s and the Soviet Union find a way
oviet experts to come to the U.S.
ar test site and for our experts to
the Soviet test site to measure
tly the yields of nuclear weapons
In July 1985, the President invited
t experts to come to the U.S. test
o measure the yield of a U.S. test
any instrumentation devices they
ed necessary for measuring yield.
> were no conditions or require-
i for a reciprocal visit. The Presi-
; purpose was to begin a process to
confidence and cooperation
?en our nations regarding limita-
on nuclear weapons testing.
In December 1985, the President
sed to General Secretary
chev that U.S. and Soviet experts
clear testing limitations meet in
lary to discuss our respective
:ation approaches and to address
tangible steps to resolve this
'resident's Proposal
rch 1986
most recent initiative, on March
36, the President urged the Soviet
to begin bilateral discussions to
ays to reach agreement on essen-
rification improvements of the
and PNET. The President pro-
General Secretary Gorbachev with
nical description of a specific
d known as CORRTEX, which is
urate method for measuring the
if a nuclear explosion (see Appen-
The President also proposed, on
.teral basis, that Soviet experts
ur Nevada test site in April to
discuss verification methods, examine
the CORRTEX system more closely,
and monitor a planned U.S. nuclear
weapon test. The President stated that
if the United States and the Soviet
Union could reach agreement on the use
of an effective verification system incor-
porating CORRTEX, the United States
would be prepared to move forward
with the ratification of the TTBT and
PNET.
The President's proposal offers an
opportunity for the Soviets to demon-
strate that they take testing limitations
seriously and recognize that compliance
with such agreements is necessary. The
United States must stand by its stand-
ard of effective verification with respect
to the TTBT. Anything less would harm
U.S. security interests, undermine our
ability to demand effective verification
in other arms control areas, and under-
cut the objectives of the TTBT.
Comprehensive Test Ban
A Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)
remains a long-term objective of the
United States. As long as the United
States and our friends and allies must
rely upon nuclear weapons to deter ag-
gression, however, some level of nuclear
testing will continue to be required. We
believe such a ban must be viewed in
the context of a time when we do not
need to depend on nuclear deterrence to
ensure international security and stabil-
ity and when we have achieved broad,
deep, and verifiable arms reductions,
substantially improved verification capa-
bilities, expanded confidence-building
measures, and greater balance in con-
ventional forces. For our part, the
United States is energetically pursuing
negotiations and discussions with the
Soviet Union on concrete steps in all of
these areas. We have made clear our
strong and continuing view: that Soviet
calls for an immediate and unverifiable
nuclear testing moratorium are not a ba-
sis for meaningful progress to this end.
At the same time, the United States
has supported international discussion of
verification and compliance problems
related to nuclear testing limitations.
Discussions have taken place in past
years at the multilateral Conference on
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, in both a
technical-level ad hoc group of scientific
experts and in the Nuclear Test Ban
Working Group. We continue to support
consideration of scope, verification, and
compliance issues related to a CTB in
these two groups at the CD.
Appendix 1
CORRTEX System of
Direct Yield Measurement
CORRTEX (Continuous Reflectometry
for Radius versus Time Experiment) is
a hydrodynamic yield measurement
technique that measures the propagation
of the underground shock wave from an
explosion. This technique uses a coaxial
cable which can be emplaced in a hole
parallel to the device emplacement hole.
Precise measurements are made of the
length of the cable by timing the return
of low energy electrical pulses sent
down to, and reflected from, the cable
end. When the nuclear device is deto-
nated, a shock wave emanates through
the ground, crushing and shortening the
cable. The rate by which the cable
length changes is recorded via measure-
ments of the changing pulse transit
times. This rate is a measure of the
propagation rate of the explosive shock
wave through the ground which is, in
turn, a measure of the yield of the
nuclear explosion.
CORRTEX has been shown to be
accurate to within 15% of the more
accurate, radio-chemical yield measure-
ments for tests of yield greater than 50
kilotons and in the geologic media of the
U.S. test site in Nevada. Use of
CORRTEX-measured yields at the
Soviet Shagan River test site should
provide accuracies to within 30%. The
U.S. estimate is based on its use in over
100 tests with the sensing cable in the
device emplacement hole and four tests
with cables in a satellite hole. The accu-
racy of the technique is believed to be
relatively, but not wholly, independent
of the geologic medium, provided the
satellite hole measurements are made in
the "strong shock" region near the
nuclear device explosion. At greater
separation distances, the properties of
the medium become much more impor-
tant factors. A satellite hole separation
distance of 14 meters (46 feet) is appro-
priate for a test near 105 kilotons.
The electronic device that provides
the timing signals is a battery-powered,
suitcase-sized unit that may be remotely
controlled. All equipment for power,
recording, and data reduction can be
contained in a small trailer.
Appendix 2
Lessons of the 1958-61 Moratorium
The United States does not believe that
a testing moratorium is a prudent, effec-
tive, or constructive step along the path
,
3r 1986
15
ARMS CONTROL
CORRTEX YIELD MEASUREMENT CONCEPT
CORRTEX
recorder
*$?$&
Jin
Sensing
cable
Working'
point ^^
CORRTEX
recorder
Surface
"5^^:
^^5^"
Surface
Diagnostic
rack
Working
point
Typical cable emplacement
in satellite hole
\ vw / ;
N Shock front •
^v^ progression
Moving shock wave from
nuclear detonation
crushes and shortens cable
toward our goal of a safer world. A look
back at the 1958-61 testing moratorium
demonstrates why the United States
believes that moratoria are never
acceptable substitutes for negotiated,
equitable, and effectively verifiable arms
control agreements.
There were three unilateral, volun-
tary pledges to suspend testing in the
late 1950s: the United States and the
United Kingdom acted in 1958, followed
by the Soviet Union in 1959 (although
the Soviets suspended testing in
November 1958). These suspensions
amounted to a de facto moratorium.
There was, however, no joint formal
agreement. Thus, given a de facto
moratorium by the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union
beginning in late 1958, the question is:
who was the first to resume testing
The verdict of history is clear: it wa
the Soviet Union.
The following is a chronology of
statements and actions related to th
1958-61 moratorium:
1958
March 31. The Soviet Union
unilaterally suspends testing after a
16
Department of State Bu >
ARMS CONTROL
ar test series but just prior to an
junced U.S. test series. The United
,es and the United Kingdom reject
Soviet call to suspend testing, but
sident Eisenhower proposes a meet-
of technical experts to study the
;tical problems regarding interna-
al control of an agreed disarmament
rram.
July 1. An exchange of letters
veen Eisenhower and Soviet leader
ushchev results in the convening of
inference of Experts in Geneva to
ly the problems of verifying a test
August 21. The Conference of
>erts reports that it is technically
ible to establish a workable and
:tive system, using available capabil-
to monitor compliance with a
Idwide suspension of nuclear testing.
\ugust 22. Based on the experts'
irt, Eisenhower proposes trilateral
itiations on a verifiable test ban. He
expresses willingness to suspend
.ng for 1 year (on a renewable basis)
nning October 31, 1958, the date of
opening of the Geneva Conference
^continuance of Nuclear Weapons
Is. The United Kingdom follows suit.
ieptember 23. The United Kingdom
testing series begun in May 1958.
ieptember 30. The Soviet Union
i nes testing.
)ctober 30. As promised in August,
I'Jnited States ends testing. The
I'va Conference on Discontinuance of
I ear Testing convenes the following
November 3. The Soviet Union ends
fcg-
November 7. Eisenhower states
a in light of Soviet tests after the
i^ing of the Geneva conference, the
led States considers itself free from
I ledge. He adds that the United
les, nevertheless, would continue the
Ing suspension and hopes the Soviet
Bn will do the same.
Ill
anuary 5. The United States
pns the verification issue based on
Binding by U.S. seismic experts that
|br assessments by the Geneva
fflrts regarding verification of under-
Mid tests were too optimistic. The
fcts refuse to consider the new U.S.
i,
.ugust 26. Eisenhower extends U.S.
atorium until the end of the year.
Idays later, the Soviets pledge "not
i fsume nuclear tests. . .if the
reern Powers do not resume the test-
g|f atomic and hydrogen weapons,
nl in the case of resumption by them
of nuclear weapons tests will the Soviet
Union be free from this pledge." It
should be noted that given the Soviet
emphasis on "resumption," the term
"Western Powers" can only refer to
the United States and the United
Kingdom— the only Western Powers
to have tested at that time.
December 29. Eisenhower
denounces the intransigence of Soviet
technical experts in Geneva, who refuse
to address deficiencies in seismic
monitoring of underground nuclear
explosions. He announces that "the
voluntary moratorium on testing will
expire on December 31. Although we
consider ourselves free to resume
nuclear testing, we shall not resume
nuclear weapons tests without announc-
ing our intention in advance of any
resumption. During the period of volun-
tary suspension of nuclear weapons
tests the United States will continue its
active program of weapon research, de-
velopment and laboratory-type ex-
perimentation."
December 30. Khrushchev states
that the Soviet Union would not resume
testing until the "Western Powers"
resume.
1960
February 13. France, which had
indicated its intention to become a
nuclear power as early as March 1957,
conducts its first test.
April 1. France conducts a second
test.
December 27. France conducts a
third test.
1961
April 25. France conducts a fourth
test.
May 15. The Soviet Union states
that "if France continues" testing, the
Soviet Union would be compelled to
test.
August 30. Although the French
have not conducted another test, the
Soviet Union announces it would resume
testing— contrary to its statements of
August 28, 1959, and May 15, 1961.
August 31. Khrushchev tells visiting
British parliamentarians that he decided
to resume testing with a bomb of
unprecedented proportions to shock the
Western Powers into negotiations on
Germany on his terms, and into accept-
ing his demand that Geneva test-ban
negotiations be merged with those on
general and complete disarmament,
September 1. The Soviet Union
resumes atmospheric testing.
September 5. President Kennedy
authorizes underground testing, which
resumes on September 15.
November 4. The Soviet Union con-
cludes its test series, of over 40 tests,
including the largest single explosion in
history.
November 7. Seven months after
the Soviet warning against continued
testing, France conducts a fifth nuclear
test.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Discussions on Nuclear Testing
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JULY 16, 1986'
The United States and the Soviet Union
have agreed to have experts meet
shortly to discuss issues related to
nuclear testing. We have further agreed
to begin these discussions without
preconditions.
The United States has long sought a
meeting with the Soviets to present our
concerns about the verification provi-
sions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty. These treaties were signed in
the 1970s, but they have not been
ratified. The United States determined
in the early 1980s that U.S. ratification
could not be considered until verification
improvements were made and U.S. com-
pliance concerns were answered. We
have made repeated offers to the Soviet
Government to present our ideas for
improvements that would allow us to
move forward on ratification of these
treaties.
This upcoming meeting of experts
will allow the United States to present
its ideas and concerns to the Soviets and
to hear Soviet concerns. The United
States will be ready to present and
discuss our views on verification
improvements in existing agreements,
which we believe are needed and
achievable at this time. We hope the
Soviets will be prepared to join in a con-
structive dialogue.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 21, 1986.
'doer 1986
17
ARMS CONTROL
The preceding chronology clearly
demonstrates that the Soviets broke
own pledges as well as the morato-
rium then still being observed by the
United States and the United Kingdom.
In addition, Khrushchev's candid admis-
sion of August 1961, and the size of the
ensuing test series, undercuts argu-
ments that French testing or Eisen-
hower's December 1959 statement in
any way "justified" the Soviets' break-
ing of the moratorium. Indeed, Soviet
evidence of bad faith was so clear that,
in an address to the American people in
March 1962, Kennedy summed up the
experience as follows:
[0]n September 1st of last year, while
the United States and the United Kingdom
were negotiating in good faith at Geneva, the
Soviet Union callously broke its moratorium
SCC Meets in Geneva
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT.
JULY 16, 1986'
The United States has informed the
Soviet Union through diplomatic chan-
nels that it is prepared to convene a
special session of the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Standing Consultative Commission
(SCC) beginning on or about July 22 in
Geneva.
The United States will be prepared
to respond to questions or concerns the
Soviet Union has with respect to the
President's May 27th decision on interim
restraint. We would expect that in the
context of such a discussion the Soviet
Union will also be prepared to address
U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompli-
ance with arms control agreements.
Since the President came into office,
he has done everything he could to try to
persuade the Soviet Union to meet its
arms control obligations and to achieve
igreement on significant reductions in
U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In
1982 he said the United States would
continue not to undercut the SALT I
[strategic arms limitation talks] interim
agreement, which had already expired,
and the SALT II Treaty, which was
stillborn, so long as the Soviets exercised
equal restraint. Regrettably, the Soviets
did not. In June 1985 the President once
again called attention to the record of
Sovii npliance and called upon
1 fnion to join us in building an
interim framework of truly mutual
restraint until a new strategic arms
reduction treaty (START) replaced the
SALT structure. The SALT II Treaty.
with a 2-month series of more than 40
nuclear tests. Preparations for these tests
had been secretly underway for many
months. Accompanied by new threats and
new tactics of terror, these tests— conducted
mostly in the atmosphere— represented a
major Soviet effort to put nuclear weapons
back into the arms race ....
Some may urge us to try it [a morato-
rium] again, keeping our preparations to test
in a constant state of readiness. But in actual
practice, particularly in a society of free
choice, we cannot keep topflight scientists
concentrating on the preparation of an
experiment which may or may not take place
on an uncertain date in the future. Nor can
large technical laboratories be kept fully alert
on a standby basis waiting for some other na-
tion to break an agreement. This is not mere-
ly difficult or inconvenient— we have explored
this alternative thoroughly, and found it
impossible of execution. ■
even in its own terms, expired on
December 31, 1985.
In the absence of an adequate Soviet
response, the President announced on
May 27 of this year that henceforth the
United States would base decisions
regarding its strategic forces on the
nature and magnitude of the threat
posed by the Soviet Union rather than
on standards contained in SALT agree-
ments that had expired, were unratified,
and were being violated by the Soviet
Union.
On May 27th the President also
decided to retire two older Poseidon sub-
marines as the eighth Trident submarine
began sea trials. This means the United
States will remain in technical observ-
ance of the terms of the SALT agree-
ments for some months. Time remains
for the Soviet Union to alter the
situation which led the President to his
May 27 decision. If the Soviet Union
does, the President will take this into
account.
As the President said when he
announced his decision on May 27, we
must now look to the future, not to the
past. The primary task now facing both
the United States and the Soviet Union
is to build a new structure of arms con-
trol, one based on significant, equitable,
and verifiable reductions in the size of
existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear
arsenals. This is what we are proposing
in the Geneva negotiations.
Until this is achieved, the United
States will continue to exercise the
utmost restraint. Assuming no signifi-
cant change in the threat we face, as we
implement the strategic modernization
program, the United States will not
deploy more strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles or strategic ballistic missile
warheads than the Soviet Union.
This special session of the Stanc
Consultative Commission offers us t
opportunity to renew the President'
request that the Soviet Union join u
establishing an interim framework (
truly mutual restraint.
U.S. STATEMENT,
JULY 22, 1986
The 31st session of the U.S.-U.S.S.l
Standing Consultative Commission-
second session of 1986— began toda
with two meetings between the two
sides. The commission was establisl
by the Treaty on the Limitation of
Ballistic Missile Systems concluded
the United States and the U.S.S.R.
May 26, 1972.
This session was requested by t
Soviet side. Agreement by the Unit
States to convene this special sessic
stands in contrast to the position ta
by the Soviet Union in 1983, when t
United States asked for a special se
to discuss compliance matters relati
the SALT II Treaty. The Soviet Um
denied that request. However, the
United States has agreed to this ses
as a sign of our desire that the Sovi
Union join us in establishing an inte
framework of truly mutual restrain'
U.S. STATEMENT,
JULY 30, 1986
The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Con-
sultative Commission met in Genev?
today, completing a special session c
commission, the second session of 11
and the 31st since its establishment.
U.S. and Soviet commissioners reaf-
firmed that the next session of the c
mission would begin in the fall of th:
year in Geneva. The commission wa;
established by the Treaty on the Lin
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile System
concluded by the United States and
U.S.S.R. on May 26, 1972.
At this session, the Soviet Unioi!
rejected President Reagan's May 27!
1986, call for the Soviet Union to joi
the United States in establishing an
interim framework of truly mutual
restraint pending conclusion of a
verifiable agreement on deep and
equitable reductions in offensive nuc
arms. The Soviet Union was informs
that the call remains open.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 21, 1986.
18
Department of State Bu fr
EPARTMENT
he Foreign Affairs Budget
John C. miitehead
Statement at a press briefing on
mt 11, 1986. Mr. Whitehead is
uty Secretary of State. 1
face a national security crisis. Pro-
jd congressional cuts in the interna-
al affairs budget will seriously
tardize our national security interests
global foreign policy objectives. The
ity of the United States to maintain
eadership role in the world; to pro-
for its national security; and to sup-
; the cause of freedom, democracy,
economic development is at stake.
In January the Administration sub-
;ed to the Congress a bare bones
rnational affairs budget for fiscal
1987 of $22.6 billion-only 2% of
total Federal budget. This budget
ides funds for all of our foreign
irs functions: for the State Depart-
t and USIA [United States Informa-
Agency] operating budgets, which
ide the operations of our 260 embas-
|and consulates around the world;
s for economic development,
lary security, and humanitarian
!;tance programs; funds for our con-
itions to multilateral development
:s and international organizations;
I funds for combatting the inflow of
lotics, the battle against terrorism,
jo refugees, the Peace Corps, and
[security of American personnel
a ad. I came to government a year
jafter four decades in the private sec-
lis a banker and a businessman. I
|v how important it is to reduce
k to keep budgets lean, and to max-
lb efficiency. I participated actively in
Review of this budget. It is a
Imum, bare bones budget. With the
i of the Office of Management and
Ijet. and with my own input as a
1-nosed businessman and taxpayer,
lie fat has been squeezed out. In the
jfew months, I have been actively
Jived with my colleagues in the
tlgn affairs community in a review
^reduction of almost 1,500 foreign
firs positions overseas. That review
(designed to trim overseas costs
lout jeopardizing our ability to pro-
band implement our foreign policy
paves.
ifet the current congressional budget
lution reduces this minimal and
f ully considered request by 27%.
ant congressional actions would
flee and restrict the remaining
nint even further. Such cuts will cost
Americans more in national security and
foreign policy terms than we can afford
to pay.
Take, for example, foreign assist-
ance. Of the Administration's foreign
economic and military assistance
request, 34% is for Israel and Egypt to
sustain and nurture the search for peace
in the Middle East; 26% is for our allies
where we have important military bases,
such as the Philippines, Greece, and
Turkey, and for Pakistan which faces
cross-border threats from the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan; 11% is for pro-
grams to assist our neighbors in Central
America and the Caribbean; 17% is for
those who share our democratic ideals,
such as Colombia and India, or those
where democracy has only recently
emerged and is still fragile, such as
Bolivia and Uruguay, and those where
fundamental economic reform programs
are underway, such as Senegal and
Ecuador. Which of these would the Con-
gress have us eliminate? Which of these
are unimportant to our national
interests?
Congressional reductions of over $3
billion in these accounts, and the ear-
marking of aid levels in several key
countries, will mean a cut of 50%-60%
for our foreign assistance programs in
the remaining countries. I cannot
emphasize enough how seriously these
actions inhibit our ability to achieve our
foreign policy objectives worldwide.
Over the last several weeks, I have been
working on how we would implement
these congressional mandates. Let me
tell you what these cuts will mean in the
real world.
• It will mean a severe cut, maybe
even a complete elimination in some
cases, in our humanitarian programs in
sub-Saharan Africa.
• It will mean a two-thirds reduction
in our assistance programs for the key
Caribbean countries of Jamaica, Haiti,
and the Dominican Republic.
• It will mean severe limitations on
programs for Central America and the
Philippines and other countries where
we have military facilities. In some
cases, negotiations in upcoming base
talks would be undermined.
• It will mean a reduction in full-
time employment of up to 1,000 State
Department employees and the closing
of perhaps more than a dozen overseas
embassies and consulates in addition to
the seven posts already being closed.
• It will mean a one-third cut in
funding for the multilateral development
banks, which are crucial to development
efforts in the Third World and the imple-
mentation of the Baker initiative on
international debt.
• It will mean the reduction of
embassy security programs in posts
where the danger and threat to the lives
of our people is higher than ever.
• It will mean that our efforts to
halt the production and illegal export of
narcotics from the Andean region will be
seriously stymied just as they are gain-
ing momentum.
• It will mean a reduction of broad-
casts by the Voice of America, Radio
Liberty, and Radio Free Europe and the
closing of American libraries and
cultural centers overseas.
These are but illustrations of the
price Congress is asking Americans to
pay.
The cumulative impact of these cuts
will be devastating to our foreign rela-
tions. America's responsibilities and
commitments around the world are
many. They are important to Americans,
to our neighbors, and to those who seek
freedom and economic well-being. These
programs represent our first line of
defense in protecting American free-
doms. A penny-wise but pound-foolish
budgetary approach to foreign affairs
and security will only confuse our friends
and encourage our adversaries.
Even during times of financial con-
straint, the devotion of two cents out of
each budget dollar is a small price to pay
for the liberties and ideals we as
Americans and other freedom-loving
peoples hold dear. The values for which
our country stands— democracy, free
enterprise, freedom of thought, and the
right of self-determination— are on the
move around the world. Can we afford
to retreat at the very moment when
global interdependency and the momen-
tum of success demand our continuing
and active involvement?
The answer must be a resounding
no. And so I call on the Congress to take
another look, to review the decisions
they have made to date. I know Con-
gress' decisions have been based on the
well-intentioned objective of reducing
Federal expenditures and moving
toward a balanced budget. But I strong-
ly urge them to reconsider the effects of
these cuts on the ability of our national
government to meet its primary respon-
sibility of protecting U.S. interests
around the globe. The defense of
freedom and the pursuit of peace are not
cost free.
'Press release 159. The question-and-
answer session following the statement is not
printed here. ■
Qber 1986
19
EAST ASIA
U.S. -Japan Relations:
A Global Partnership for the Future
by Michael H. Armacost
Address before the Japan Society of
Northern California in San Francisco
on July 21, 1986. Ambassador Armacost
is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.
I am pleased and honored to join you on
this commemoration of the 80th anniver-
sary of the Japan Society of Northern
California. This organization has consist-
ently fostered closer relations between
the United States and Japan. It is an
important task, and it has never been
more consequential for our two coun-
tries than at the present time. So I
congratulate you on what you have
accomplished, even as I urge you to
redouble your efforts.
I am always happy to have an ex-
cuse to return to San Francisco. In a
sense, this city is the birthplace of the
modern U.S. -Japan relationship. At the
Presidio in 1951, the peace treaty be-
tween the allies and Japan and the secu-
rity treaty between the United States
and Japan were signed. These agree-
ments formally initiated 35 years of
peace and prosperity in U.S. -Japan rela-
tions. They set the framework for the
U.S.-Japan partnership about which I
wish to comment this evening.
It is a remarkable partnership.
Within the lifetimes of most of us in this
room, our countries struggled on oppo-
site sides of a bitter global war. Today,
we stand united in our efforts to
preserve peace and to promote economic
growth and development throughout the
world. The U.S.-Japan alliance is critical
to the security of both our nations, and
it is a pillar of that balance of power
which supports the independence of free
countries around the globe. Japan is our
largest overseas trading partner— a fact
of special significance to Californians,
since 40% of all U.S. trade with Japan
flows through this state. Politically,
Japan stands firmly within the Western
camp as a nation which practices market
economics and democratic politics. In
short, we both have a huge stake in this
relationship about which I should like to
make a few observations in order to
put past accomplishments, current
challenges, and future possibilities in
perspective.
Changing Contours of
U.S.-Japan Relations
Change has been a constant in this rela-
tionship. I have seen this firsthand. My
involvement with Japan goes back
nearly 20 years to 1968 when I took
sabbatical leave from Pomona College to
serve as a visiting professor at the In-
ternational Christian University (ICU). I
went not as a specialist but as a student
eager to learn about a country which I
vaguely apprehended would be an in-
creasingly important force in the world.
To my surprise, the Japanese I en-
countered at that time seemed less con-
cerned with the future than with the
past. They were preoccupied with issues
left over from history. They appeared
surprised by their considerable postwar
accomplishments and a little uncertain
whether they could be sustained.
Although Japan had created a
remarkably stable political structure,
Japanese politics remained polarized
over relations with the United States,
the terms of and necessity for the
mutual security treaty, and the constitu-
tionality and role of Japanese defense
forces. More than 100 universities-
including ICU— experienced crippling
student strikes during the year I was
supposedly teaching. I recall witnessing
Japanese riot police in full battle gear
evicting student leaders from Yasuda
Hall at Tokyo University. Though
scarcely anyone was injured, it had all
the appearances of a major military
operation. One source of contention was
the mutual security treaty, and the
struggle symbolized the unsettled state
of important issues between us.
In 1968 Japan was a relatively
prosperous country. But despite nearly
two decades of unbroken economic
growth, many Japanese exhibited doubts
about their economic future. They
thought of themselves as a "poor, island
nation without natural resources." They
acknowledged their achievements, yet
worried abut their "feet of clay." They
feared Japan's prosperity would not
last. Such anxieties fostered tight
government controls on commerce and
finance and encouraged an export-led
growth strategy sustained by extensive
neomercantilist import barriers.
Nor had U.S.-Japan bilateral rela-
tions attained the "equal partnership"
of which the period's diplomatic commu-
niques routinely spoke. Indeed, the
Japanese seemed uncertain of their I ■.
place in the world. Despite a natunl
preoccupation with its own neighbor
hood, Japan's role even in Northea? a
Asia was modest, Japan had little vl
at the United Nations, no place yetl
Western summits, and was just bedj
ning to make its presence felt in eel
nomic groups such as the Organizatl
for Economic Cooperation and Devil
ment (OECD).
Cultural interchange, in those dl
remained largely a one-way street. I
Japanese knowledge of the United I
States was spurred by friendship, tl
ness, and the experience of occupatl
Americans generally knew little of ||
Japan. We had only the sketchiest |
preciation of its potential and futur I j
promise. As a sign of the times, in I
days, Washington had only one susJ
bar, and you could still drive for bl I
without seeing a Japanese-made ca:|
I need not tell you that times h e
changed.
The Present
Earlier this month, concurrent elec I
were held in both Houses of the Jap I
nese Diet for only the second time i
history. The stunning, almost un-
precedented, landslide victory by tl
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) sy
ized perhaps the end of a political <
The young radicals of the 1960s, wl
fought the police on campus and vo
for socialists and communists, are r
white-collar workers, most of whoir
dently voted for the LDP.
The conservative party made in
pressive gains in the cities, where,
cording to conventional wisdom, it
weakest. Within the party, a group
energetic "new leaders" emerged t
ry their nation's banner into the fir!
And, of course, Prime Minister Nail
sone scored an extraordinary persol
triumph and secured a strong popu I
mandate for his policies. These inchl
expanding Japan's international rolil
continuing administrative and fiscal!
forms, and restructuring the econorl
lessen reliance on export-led growtll
With the support of a remarkably al
ive party, Prime Minister Nakasond]
demonstrated world-class leadership!
Last week, the most prominent I
of Japan's new leaders— Mr. Abe,
Mr. Miyazawa, and Mr. Takeshita-I
announced their support for extendi
the Prime Minister's tenure in officl
that he can finish pending business.!
20
Department of State Bi'l
EAST ASIA
come the prospect of continuing to
•k with a prime minister who is held
ligh esteem in the West and has so
vincingly earned the trust of the
anese electorate.
Mr. Nakasone, to be sure, faces
(he formidable challenges. The LDP
! achieved a general mandate for
Inge. Some of the presumed direc-
ts of change have been outlined in
Maekawa report— a future-oriented
leprint that has been widely praised
aoth sides of the Pacific. In a democ-
y like Japan's the Diet will obviously
/ a major role in translating a broad
idate into specific policies and laws.
: The ruling LDP now appears com-
(ted to opening the Japanese market
restructuring the economy. Some of
piet members, however, will con-
le to resist measures that appear
jatening to constituency interests.
5 should not be surprising to Ameri-
The President, after all, has
ired a broad, bipartisan consensus
nd tax reform. Yet some of the
lils are still to be negotiated in con-
nce. Just as I am sure an acceptable
bill will emerge from the House-
ite conference, so I am confident
a new consensus in Japan will sup-
a timely restructuring of the
nese economy. The die is cast, I
ve, in favor of a more and more in-
ationally oriented Japan.
J.S. -Japan relations were not a
>r issue in the recent election. In
the issues that dominated U.S.-
,n relations in the late 1960s have
ily disappeared. The Indochina con-
no longer stirs partisan emotions;
lawa transferred to Japanese admin-
tion in 1972; and both Tokyo and
hington have established solid work-
■elations with China.
Today, Japan perceives its interests
its role in global terms. Perhaps
. significant for U.S.-Japan relations,
3 is a striking convergence of U.S.
Japanese perceptions of the global
.tion. Two factors have contributed
ds substantial coincidence of world
s.
?irst, Japanese perceptions of its
rity requirements have been shaped
oviet intransigence on the Northern
itories issue, by the relentless
it military buildup in the Pacific,
oy Moscow's aggression in
lanistan and its support for Viet-
s occupation of Cambodia.
Second, developments beyond East
-such as the "oil shocks" of the
1970s and the persistent turbulence
e Middle East and Persian Gulf
areas since then— have reinforced our
common interest in global stability.
Over time, a consensus has emerged in
Japan which supports steady improve-
ments in Japan's self-defense capabilities
and expanded bilateral defense coopera-
tion with the United States.
In recent years the level and fre-
quency of the U.S.-Japan bilateral dia-
logue has also changed dramatically.
The Emperor's visit to the United *
States in 1975 symbolized the end of the
postwar period. Starting with Gerald
Ford, all our Presidents have visited
Japan while in office. President Reagan
and Prime Minister Nakasone have
already met twice this year— first at
Camp David and less than a month later
in Tokyo. Secretary of State Shultz and
Foreign Minister Abe have had 26 bi-
lateral meetings— four of them this year.
And senior officials responsible for areas
as diverse as arms control and African
affairs consult with even greater fre-
quency.
The substance of our exchanges has
changed as well. Twenty years ago, our
talks with Japan focused primarily on
bilateral rather than global or even
regional issues. Now, our political dia-
logue is unsurpassed in its breadth and
depth and extends literally to every
corner of the globe. Many of these con-
sultations go beyond simple exchanges
of views to include increasingly close co-
ordination of operational concerns. For
example, my Japanese counterpart and I
meet annually to promote the com-
plementarity of our respective aid
programs.
Foreign aid, in fact, is a good exam-
ple of the expanding scope of Japan's
international interests and involvement.
In the 1960s, Japan's modest aid effort
involved reparations to war victims and
subsidies for Japan's expanding commer-
cial interests. Today, under the concept
of comprehensive security, Japan is
seeking to make a significant contribu-
tion to Western security through other
than military means. In 1984 the United
States and Japan ranked first and sec-
ond in the world as donors of foreign
assistance. Between us, we furnished
over $11 billion to developing countries.
If Japan meets its declared objective of
doubling its foreign aid by 1992, it will
provide roughly $40 billion of additional
assistance to less developed countries
(LDCs) over the coming 6 years.
We particularly welcome the role
Japan has assumed in providing aid to
friendly countries such as Thailand,
Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and the
nations of Central America and the
Caribbean. The Philippines and Haiti
are now at crucial stages in their politi-
cal evolution. The South Pacific is
undergoing important political and eco-
nomic changes. Africa faces natural
calamities as well as daunting economic
problems. We are working cooperatively
with the Government of Japan to ex-
pand our respective efforts in promoting
growth and encouraging stability in
these and other areas.
The measures Japan has taken to ex-
pand its foreign aid constitute an ap-
propriate effort to recycle its prosperity
back into the global economic system.
Clearly, there is more to be done. Japan
gives twice as much aid to the nearby
nations of Asia as it gives to African,
Latin American, and Middle Eastern na-
tions combined. As Japan's foreign pol-
icy activities expand to take account of
its global economic power and "reach,"
we would anticipate not only increases
in the levels of its aid but a further
improvement in the concessional terms
of assistance and the provision of a
larger percentage of its aid to countries
outside East Asia.
Foreign assistance efforts pay for-
eign policy dividends. Over the past few
years, many developing countries have
discarded statist policies for market-
oriented approaches to economic growth
and are increasingly receptive to demo-
cratic ideas. Regrettably, at just this
moment of opportunity, the U.S. Con-
gress is drastically cutting back on our
own foreign aid budget. This is penny
wise and pound foolish, since aid to
friendly countries is one of the most
cost-effective investments we can make
in our own security. Aside from the fact
that about 70% of every U.S. bilateral
aid dollar is spent on American goods
and services, assistance to friendly
governments supports freer markets,
alleviates poverty or disaster, and
underpins newly democratic regimes.
The cuts Congress threatens are
potentially devastating. For fiscal year
1987 the President is requesting $22.6
billion for international affairs funding.
This covers all our economic, military,
and food aid programs as well as the
State Department and United States
Information Agency (USIA) budgets,
our security programs overseas, and the
costs of Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty.
Congress has cut that amount to
$17.4 billion— a 27% reduction. What will
happen if we are forced to take a cut of
this magnitude?
Some programs have been ear-
marked by Congress; they will be sus-
tained. Thev include aid to Israel and
ber 1986
21
EAST ASIA
Egypt, security assistance for base
rights countries, and important pro-
grams in Central America and Pakistan.
After taking care of these priorities, all
other programs would have to be cut by
nver 509; . What might this mean?
• Haiti and other fledgling democra-
cies in the Caribbean could see cuts in
U.S. economic aid by more than two-
thirds.
• Aid for the Andean countries-
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru-
could be eliminated, with unfortunate
consequences for our efforts to halt the
production and illegal export of narcot-
ics from that region.
• Economic support for Africa could
be virtually eliminated— undermining
policy reform plans and famine relief
efforts.
• The Peace Corps could be forced
to cut as many as 1,000 volunteers in
Africa alone.
• Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty could be forced into bankruptcy.
These are not idle threats or scare
tactics. They reflect the plans we would
be forced to put into action if Congress
does not reconsider its drastic reduc-
tions. It is inconceivable that any seri-
ous person could presume that cuts of
this magnitude will not significantly and
adversely affect our national interests.
We are a superpower. Superpowers
have far-flung interests. Supporting
those interests carries with it certain
costs. One cannot cut the means by
which we protect our interests without
placing our interests in jeopardy. This is
a simple verity I hope Congress will not
ignore.
Please excuse this brief commercial,
but it is relevant to my theme. We are
not encouraging Japan to do more in the
field of aid so that we can do less but in
order that jointly we can meet the
requirements of stability and develop-
ment in areas of vital interest to us
both. Japan is expanding its aid efforts.
It is not a time for us to be cutting our
own program.
U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JULY 31, 1986'
I am announcing today that the LInited
States and Japan have reached an agree-
ment on semiconductor trade. This
agreement represents an important step
toward freer and more equitable world
trade and will enhance the ability of our
semiconductor manufacturers to com-
pete fairly in the Japanese market. It
will also help prevent Japanese manufac-
turers from dumping semiconductors in
the United States and in third countries.
This agreement successfully
addresses a series of trade complaints
raised by the U.S. semiconductor indus-
try and this Administration charging
Japanese chip manufacturers with
impeding U.S. access to their market,
while dumping semiconductors on world
markets and violating U.S. dumping
laws.
With the agreement of the govern-
ment of Japan to this landmark pact, the
United States suspends the pending 301
market access case and EPROM
ible, programmable read only
memories] semiconductor dumping case.
The 256K semiconductor dumping case
will he suspended August 1.
By holding to our free market prin-
ciples, but at the same time insisting on
fair trade, we have created a climate in
which the U.S. semiconductor industry
should substantially increase its sales
position in Japan. We have also set an
important precedent to help prevent
future unfair trade practices in other
high technology industries.
As I have said time and again, we
will not stand idly by as American
workers are threatened by unfair
trading practices. We have and we will
take the tough actions that are necessary
to ensure that all nations play by the
same rules. Today's agreement shows
that vigorous enforcement of existing
laws can open markets. To succumb to
the temptation of protectionism will
benefit no one.
This is an historic agreement. U.S.
Trade Representative Yeutter, Secre-
tary of Commerce Baldrige, and the U.S.
negotiating team are to be commended
for their tenacity, skill, and resoluteness
during the months of intense
negotiations.
■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 4, 1986.
Current Challenges
The most difficult current bilateral I
problems continue to confront us in I
field of trade. When I first lived in I
Tokyo, the United States and Japan I
experienced some acute trade
problems— principally involving textik
But they were of a different order cl
magnitude and character than todayl
In the late 1960s, Japan maintained |
numerous quotas, high tariffs, and al
host of other formal trade barriers I
which it was just beginning to dism:|
tie. In 1968, Japan had a global tradl
deficit of $15 million. Its trade surpll
with the United States was $604 mi n
Over the last 20 years, the Japa s
Government has eliminated most of I
quotas and formal trade barriers. It I
reduced its tariffs to a point where I
Japan now has the lowest average 1 1
of any industrialized country. Howe' I
a host of nettlesome problems— inclt I
some quotas, high tariffs, nontariff 1 1
riers, and restrictive business practil
in certain areas— remain.
At the same time, the competitr I.
challenge posed by high-quality
Japanese products to important U.S|
manufacturing industries has increa; I
pressures for protection in this coun |
A 1985 U.S. global trade deficit of $1
billion— including a $50-billion trade I
deficit with Japan— coupled with a
Japanese global trade surplus of $46 1
lion that year, heightens these
pressures.
The U.S. trade problem is not, ol
course, limited to Japan. Our trade I
problem is global, but the bilateral
deficit with Japan remains so large 1 1
it will be difficult to make headway I
our global problem without redresshl
the bilateral imbalance. Progress mul
be made to reduce it.
We are determined to bring our I
bilateral trade with Japan into a moil
balanced equilibrium. Failure to do si
exposes our political relations and sel
rity cooperation to heavy strains. Arl
we believe our policv efforts will pajl
off.
• As Congress and the AdministH
tion reduce the U.S. Government's I
budget deficit, our savings/investmerl
imbalance should decline and, along 'I
it, our global trade deficit, including I
bilateral deficit with Japan.
• In accordance with agreements!
reached by the major financial poweil
(G-5) last 'fall and by the Summit Sel
in Tokyo last May, we are coordinatil
on international economic policies mcl
closely with Japan and the other majl
22
Department of State Bui ifl
EAST ASIA
dustrialized countries. Adjustment of
change rates is the most visible and
amatic result. A roughly 40% depreci-
lon in the dollar against the yen dur-
% the past year should have a sizable
ipact, over time, on our trade position.
• Representatives of the U.S. and
panese Governments are initiating a
lateral dialogue concerning structural
onomic issues of mutual concern. In-
•ed, a preparatory meeting on this sub-
i was held in San Francisco today.
lis dialogue will examine the im-
iances in the Japanese economy and
,S. economy and consider ways to cor-
ct them.
• The MOSS (market-oriented,
ctor-selective) talks are improving
irket access to entire industrial sec-
rs within Japan. We have made sub-
mtial progress in electronics,
ecommunications, medical equipment
d pharmaceuticals, and forest
oduets. We will soon open discussions
a fifth sector— transportation
tchinery.
• And finally, we are seeking to
-ninate remaining trade barriers on
jer products— e.g., tobacco, leather,
—as we encounter them.
These are substantial efforts. We be-
e they are producing results. They
aimed at expanding trade while as-
ing equitable access to each other's
rket. They reflect faith in competition
1 a determination to see that the
ying field for competition is level.
iy constitute an alternative to protec-
lism, which we are determined to
ist.
Protectionism has a false and dan-
ous allure. Industries affected by
lorts usually ask for temporary and
ited protection. Yet, while giving
uporary relief to one industry, protee-
list actions penalize the consumer
I divert investment and labor from
•e efficient and productive industries,
tectionist bills like the House Omni-
Trade Bill (H.R. 4800) will not solve
trade problem. Protectionist meas-
s will damage the U.S. economy,
eaten American jobs, and embroil us
rade conflicts with virtually all our
■ or trading partners. We cannot af-
11 such an outcome, particularly with
'■'an.
I Current Japanese- American chal-
ices are not limited to trade. Signifi-
S: accomplishments have been regis-
I'd in bilateral security cooperation.
Bquently criticized as a "free rider"
■relying on American muscle to pro-
■ its economic and political health,
Japan has steadily augmented its
defense capabilities. A growing domestic
consensus has supported qualitative and
quantitative improvements in Japan's
Self-Defense Force and contributed to
steady annual increases in Japan's
defense spending.
We have also witnessed a growing
Japanese commitment to the U.S. -Japan
security structure. Antidefense shib-
boleths have disappeared from the plat-
forms of several opposition parties. The
Government of Japan has welcomed
U.S.-homeported ships; it has authorized
new U.S. Air Force deployments; it has
participated in additional joint exercises.
Japanese support for the American
presence in Japan is now valued at over
$1 billion annually.
While Japan's defense budget
remains small as a percentage of gross
national product, it is now the sixth
largest in the world and is growing
rapidly. This expanding defense budget
supports a modern, well-trained military
establishment with appropriate defense
roles and missions: the conventional
defense of Japanese territory, the sur-
rounding seas and sky, and the sealanes
within 1,000 miles. These roles are con-
sistent with Japanese and American
expectations— and with those of Japan's
neighbors.
Japan's new 5-year defense spending
plan represents a good start toward
achieving the capabilities necessary to
carry out these missions. We certainly
would like to see Japan achieve its goals
more quickly. Nonetheless, the Japanese
Self-Defense Force is already an increas-
ingly potent deterrent against aggres-
sion aimed at Japan and makes the role
of our own forces in the region that
much more effective.
Agenda for the Future
Time does not permit me to elaborate
on the variety of other ways in which
the U.S. and Japan cooperate diploma-
tically in many areas of the world.
Suffice it to say, compared with 20 years
ago, U.S. -Japan relations are now on
a firm and solid basis. Our give-and-
take on substantive issues has increased
significantly. Recognition in both our
countries of the scope of our interde-
pendence has grown. Our knowledge of
each other has appreciably increased.
We welcome these developments,
yet we know there is no room for com-
placency on either side of the Pacific. As
our relationship with Japan enters a
new and more mature stage, the issues
our two countries face become ever
more complex and far-reaching. Con-
structively managing the U.S. -Japan
relationship through the 1980s and be-
yond will be even more challenging.
We now need to look at the
U.S. -Japanese relationship as an active
partnership for global progress. In par-
ticular, we need to work closely with
Japan to:
• Make equitable and sustained eco-
nomic growth a reality for both the de-
veloped and developing world by
preserving and improving the interna-
tional trading system and assisting the
LDCs to cope with their myriad
problems, including the problem of ex-
ternal debt;
• See that people everywhere un-
derstand that a nuclear war cannot be
won and must not be fought, by
preserving deterrence while pursuing
substantial and verifiable arms
reduction;
• Expand international cooperation
to rid the world of the scourge of ter-
rorism;
• Defuse regional conflicts, such as
in Indochina and Afghanistan; and
• Find ways to apply the technologi-
cal developments of our information so-
cieties to the benefit of mankind.
Persistent and purposeful effort will
be required as our governments and
peoples create the conditions and con-
sensus necessary for cooperation on this
broad agenda.
Conclusion
Let me return to my opening theme.
Times change. As they do, we must
sometimes overcome what we thought
we knew in the past. We have long
since learned that we cannot go it alone,
and we have begun to see Japan with
new eyes. Japan is a strong country; it
is becoming an outward-looking country.
Japan is more than a trading partner; it
is a valued ally and good friend. Even
so, Japan is only on the brink of fulfill-
ing its potential as a major contributor
to world economic growth and comity.
We share many things with Japan:
above all the conviction that we are not
mere temporary allies but permanent
friends. Our task is to use that friend-
ship to bring to the benefit of all
mankind our shared devotion to peace,
our ability to foster change, our eco-
nomic prowess, and our dedication to
democracy. ■
3ober 1986
23
EAST ASIA
Perspective and Proportion
for U.S. -Japanese Relations
by Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.
Address before the "U.S. -Japan
Economic Agenda" sponsored by the
Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of
George Washington University, the
Carnegie Council, on Ethics, and Interna-
tionaX Affairs, Inc., on June 2, 1986. Mr.
Sigur is Assistant Scrrrta ry for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs.
It is a great pleasure to be here among
friends to offer some observations on
our kaleidoscopic relations with Japan. I
was reflecting on this subject not long
ago as I rode from Narita Airport to my
hotel in Tokyo.
Driving from Narita to central
Tokyo, one passes through rice fields
and groves of cryptomeria before enter-
ing the suburban sprawl of houses,
garish hotels of dubious purpose, and
small factories. At one point, Disney-
land's castle towers loom up beyond the
highway's embankment. As one crosses
the Ara Kawa, one sees ahead the
jumble of Tokyo's buildings and the
flashing signs advertising Ricoh, Seiko,
and a hundred other companies. Inching
along the overhead expressway, the
traveler can look into the companies'
windows and see the employees phoning,
writing, and, he imagines, making deals.
The car passes through the bright neon
of the Ginza and into the open area
around the Imperial Palace. The space is
relaxing and welcome after the traffic
and congestion; yet the moat and tur-
reted gate are incongruous. By the time
one reaches the hotel in Akasaka, one's
mind is nearly numb with jet lag and the
conglomeration of images. It is time for
a shower, a drink, and welcome rest.
In a way, U.S. -Japan relations are
like the ride in from Narita. Those of us
involved in them are bombarded with
reports, articles, meetings, conversa-
tions, and developments of a hundred
sorts. At least occasionally, we have to
stand back, reflect, sort out the images,
and put them into perspective. I would
like to use this relaxed occasion among
friends to consider events over the last
year or so and to comment on our
policies.
First, we should remember that
U.S. -Japan relations rest on a "triad"
that is the product of the early postwar
period— a shared commitment to demo-
cratic values, a fervent belief in the
dynamism of free markets, and a secu-
rity framework. This "triad" has
endured now for three decades.
Security Relationship
In the early years, the future of defense
cooperation was anything but certain:
the security treaty and United States
bases were the targets of violent protest
from the extreme left, and even the exist-
ence of the Japanese self-defense forces
was challenged by those who sought to
prevent a replay of the militarism of the
1930s by a strict and unrealistically
literal application of the constitutional
proscription against the use of military
force. But with the reversion of Okinawa
to Japanese sovereignty, the end of the
Vietnam war, the normalization of rela-
tions with China, and the steady buildup
of Soviet military power in the Far East
in general and in the Northern Terri-
tories in particular, a broad consensus
has emerged in support of our security
relationship and of Japanese self-defense
at about present levels. The Japanese
now recognize the threat posed by the
Soviet Union, the importance of a cred-
ible, conventional self-defense capability,
and the need for our military presence.
Under the Mutual Security Treaty,
the interest of both the United States
and Japan are well served. We are able
to maintain our personnel and facilities
in Japan, where they are essential for
the peace and security of the United
States and of the entire Far East; Japan
is provided a strategic deterrent— the
so-called nuclear umbrella. With the
threat of nuclear blackmail neutralized,
the Government of Japan has set for
itself the missions of defending, with
conventional weapons, its territorial
land, seas, and skies and also of protect-
ing the vital sealanes out to 1,000
nautical miles from Japan. It has main-
tained a slow, steady program of acquir-
ing the capabilities needed to carry out
those missions. In the process, it has
kept intact the essential domestic con-
sensus on the correctness of this policy
and has satisfied its neighbors, who have
historical cause for worry, that it does
not pose a threat to them.
Perhaps more important, Japanese
efforts to develop realistic defense mis-
sions and to relate defense spending to
their achievement have made increas-
ingly irrelevant the old concerns about
the Japanese defense budget— the dell
in both countries over the 1% of GNI
cap on defense spending and the ailed
"free ride."
To tell the truth, I never saw mu<|
point to those arguments. Despite thtl
GNP cap, Japanese defense spending!
kept growing. Moreover Japan now il
contributing over $1 billion per year
the direct support and maintenance i
U.S. forces in Japan. Not much is ev«
said about this, but it is a tribute to qi
cooperation and to the progress Japa
has been making.
Political Relationship
Cooperation with Japan is not limitec
the defense relationship. Every year
two governments hold consultations i
Africa, the Middle East, the United
Nations, the Soviet Union, and foreig
assistance. We discuss specific probk
as they occur. For example, during tl
past year, the United States and Jap;
consulted closely on developments in
Philippines, and we found that Japan
policy and actions were complements
to ours. In late May of this year, Jap;
was the host to an international cons
ative meeting to establish an enhanci
aid program for the Philippines. Inde
Japan has recently been the largest
donor of economic aid to the Philippi
Japan's parallel policies and help:
actions with regard to the Philippine:
are typical. Japan has also given
substantial development assistance t(
countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Turki
and Jamaica, which are of special imj
tance to us; it is almost uniquely able
use economic assistance to encourage
Chinese development with a Western
orientation; and Japan's global aid pr
gram is now the world's second large
To cite another example, Japan
joined its summit partners at the Tok
economic summit to put countries sp<
soring international terrorism on noti
I can say straightforwardly that on
issues ranging from arms control to t
Middle East, we have found Japan's
views to be valuable and geared to
Western goals, and we have seen our
cooperation become increasingly inti-
mate and fruitful.
Much of the consultation to whicb
have referred has occurred for many
years between senior bureaucrats of 1
two governments. What is noteworthr
about the last several years is that thu
consultations at the political level ha\-
become more frequent, more detailed I
and more useful. Since January 1985,'
Prime Minister Nakasone and the Pref
dent have met five times. In that sam:
24
Department of State Bull"
EAST ASIA
•iod Secretary Shultz and Foreign
lister Abe have had seven sets of con-
tations. In fact, since assuming their
sent positions, Foreign Minister Abe
1 the Secretary have met 23 times,
piously a good part of the eonversa-
is between the political officials of the
) countries concerns bilateral rela-
is, and particularly economic rela-
is. But the leaders have taken up a
iety of international topics as well,
! the discussions have taken on the
racter of coordination and collabora-
1. 1 hope that this very welcome pat-
t will continue.
imomic Relationship
precisely because our defense rela-
ship with Japan is crucial and
luse our cooperation with Japan on
rnational matters is so important
cordial that the economic friction
veen the two countries is so vexing,
resolution of the trade problems
veen our two countries is necessary
central to the maintenance of a
id overall relationship.
We quite correctly make the argu-
t that only protectionists place
irtance on bilateral trade balances,
'ever, the size of Japan's trade
luses with the United States and
the world has become a disruptive
ical issue, and we have to deal with
^e must not let economic friction
ist, for if it does, it has the potential
sturb our cooperation with Japan on
nse and international matters and,
hat matter, to impede the growth of
lie partnerships between U.S. and
I nese enterprises.
_*et me summarize my analysis of
challenge we face in our economic
lions with Japan. With determina-
ted with goals shared by business,
I rnment, and citizens, Japan has
i an economic structure capable of
iloping and producing attractive,
2-quality products at very competitive
|s. In the past, Japan often used
iknt industry" protection. That sort
jrotection, questionable in any event,
I' longer needed. The large Japanese
a|xfacturers have the engineers, the
Jnding research and development,
(Rmple finance to compete vigorously
^successfully at home and abroad in
(jbsence of government protection,
lie' is no more visible evidence of this
^ the amount of Japan's exports to
■Jnited States and to the world,
dicient industries in Japan, which
n.inly exist, should restructure or
Hnch in an environment of open
sj:ets. I believe Japan is already on
apath, and I wish to encourage it.
If we wish to solve problems, we
must confront reality. We must and will
seek the removal of Japan's remaining
trade impediments vigorously. But at the
same time, we must recognize that the
elimination of those barriers will not
result in a dramatic reduction of our
bilateral trade imbalance. Therefore, we
must address economic structural issues
in Japan and the United States. We
should not deceive ourselves that protec-
tionist bills like the House Omnibus
Trade Bill (H.R. 4800) will solve the
trade problem. If enacted, that bill would
severely damage the U.S. economy,
destroy American jobs, reduce our inter-
national trade competitiveness, and
embroil us in trade conflicts with vir-
tually all our major trading partners.
market access in entire industrial
sectors.
• The telecommunications talks
resulted in a major opening of the
Japanese market. The successful MOSS
talks with Japan are being used as a pat-
tern for discussions on telecommunica-
tions with the Europeans and the
Canadians.
• The talks on medical equipment
and pharmaceuticals were an overall
success.
• From the electronics MOSS came
tariff cuts, improvements in the patent
system, and legal protection for semicon-
ductor chips and computer software.
• We also obtained reductions of the
duties on some wood products and
. . . Japan now is contributing over $1 billion per
year for the direct support and maintenance of
U.S. forces in Japan.
One hears the allegation in
Washington that the Administration has
no trade policy. That is not so. With
regard to Japan, we have a policy which
addresses both individual trade problems
and the structural issues that lie behind
our deficit, and it is working. There are
five elements in that policy, and I would
like to describe them to you.
First, in accordance with the Presi-
dent's statement last September 7, we
are seeking the elimination of remaining
Japanese trade barriers. To cite an
example, last fall, [U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative] Ambassador Yeutter success-
fully negotiated the reduction of some of
Japan's barriers to the import of leather
and leather products and obtained com-
pensation for the barriers Japan would
not remove. Under a Section 301 case
begun by the Administration, we have
entered discussions with Japan to reduce
tariffs on tobacco products and to cor-
rect distribution problems. At present
we are also negotiating with Japan the
elimination of its import quotas on 12
agricultural product categories. We
stand ready to investigate and to
negotiate with Japan the removal of any
Japanese trade practices that are incon-
sistent with international rules.
Second, in the MOSS [market-
oriented, sector selective] process we are
achieving significant improvements in
paper products. The MOSS talks on
forest products will continue, and the
United States will monitor developments
in the other sectors. We have agreed
with Japan to begin discussions on a new
sector, transportation machinery, this
summer.
The third element of the
Administration's economic policy toward
Japan has been dealing with the financial
issues that affect exchange rates and,
therefore, the trade balance. Following
the G-5 agreement last September, the
value of the yen strengthened nearly
30% against the dollar. At [Treasury]
Secretary Baker's suggestion, the sum-
mit countries agreed in Tokyo in early
May that, "additional measure should be
taken to ensure that procedures for
effective coordination of international
economic policy are strengthened fur-
ther."
The summit statement correctly
emphasizes economic fundamentals as
determinants of exchange rates. That
brings me to the fourth element of our
policy toward Japan, a dialogue on
economic structural adjustment which
we expect to begin this July. One of the
observations that economists make is
that there are domestic savings/invest-
ment imbalances in both the United
States and Japan which foreordain a
Japanese global trade surplus and a U.S.
global trade deficit. In the structural
~oer 1986
25
EAST ASIA
dialogue, we will discuss with the Japa-
a ays of encouraging greater
domestic led growth in Japan. We also
will discuss imbalances in our own
economy, such as the dearth of savings.
The final element of our economic
policy toward Japan is really our own
domestic policy. As Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings bites and the Federal deficit
ilmps, the excess of consumption over
production, and the trade deficit, should
decline.
Japan is keenly aware that it is not
in its interest to continue to run large
trade surpluses. Announcing the
Maekawa commission's report in April,
Prime Minister Nakasone said: "It is im-
possible for Japan alone to continue to
be an island of solitary prosperity, with a
large current account imbalance,
depending on exports. It is no exaggera-
tion to say that our success in achieving
the transformation will be essential to
Japan's future." He went on: "Japan is
now at an historic turning point in its
relations with the international com-
munity. Our continuing large current
account imbalance is a matter of serious
concern not only for the management of
our own economy but also for the har-
monious development of the world econ-
omy. Therefore, it should be our
national goal to steadily reduce the cur-
rent account imbalance to one consistent
with international harmony."
I agree that Japan is at a historic
turning point. Japan's postwar economic
policies had their roots in the Meiji
period when the Japanese Government
regulation, that continuously produces
more than it consumes, and that tends
toward large current account surpluses.
These are among the sources of the cur-
rent economic friction between Japan
and its trading partners.
It is, in a way, ironic that in building
the strong, independent economy the
Meiji leaders sought, Japan became
dependent on foreign markets. It is also
ironic that Japan, whose culture pro-
motes harmony, should be provoking
such disharmony in its trading relation-
ships. Of course, Japan is not different
from the United States, Western
Europe, or its neighbors in Asia in being
enmeshed in an economically inter-
dependent world. Still Prime Minister
Nakasone's announcement that policies
and attitudes that have prevailed for a
hundred years must change is one of the
most significant statements in postwar
Japanese history.
The skeptical among us may ques-
tion whether Japan will carry through
with the changes necessary to reduce the
imbalance in its trade account. I think it
will, because it has to. If one reviews the
past year, one finds a tremendous
momentum in the direction of positive
change.
• In the MOSS talks, particularly
the telecommunications talks, Japan
removed many governmental controls.
Despite domestic political difficulties,
Japan made many of the concessions we
requested.
We must and will seek the removal of Japan's
remaining trade impediments. . . at the same time,
we must recognize that the elimination of those
barriers will not result in a dramatic reduction of
our bilateral trade imbalance.
sought to build a strong economy and to
maintain autonomy. Now the quotas,
high tariffs, and investment restrictions
thai Japan employed to achieve its goals
by and large have been discarded as
unnecessary.
Yet Japan's history over the last
100 years has left the present generation
a mixed inheritance. One legacy is solid
prosperity. But others are a certain
austerity of attitude and an economy
that tolerates excessive government
• In his unprecedented April 9,
1985, address to the nation, Prime
Minister Nakasone embraced the notion
that Japan's market should be "open in
principle, with restrictions by excep-
tion."
• Japan reduced tariffs on 1,850
items during 1985.
• Japan has played a positive role in
the G-5 decisions and will be involved in
the economic coordination mechanism
devised at the Tokyo summit.
• Japan is proceeding on course I
with the full liberalization of its finan (
markets.
• Japanese investment in overse;]
manufacturing is increasing rapidly. I
Japan's annual direct investment in
foreign countries more than doubled I
from $4.7 billion in 1980 to $10.2 billil
in 1984. By that year Japan's total
foreign investment totaled $71 billion!
which $19 billion was in the United
States.
• A November 1985 Nomura
Research Institute report predicts th;l
as a result of a strong yen, investmer I
overseas, and stronger foreign compt
tion, Japan's imports will increase fail
than its exports, so that by 1995 J apt I
trade surplus will decline to $1.5 billiil
I am confident that Japan will, in
Prime Minister Nakasone's words,
"steadily reduce the current account
imbalance to one consistent with inte
tional harmony." Apart from anythin
else, doing so will result in the higher
standard of living that the Japanese ]
pie have earned.
I would like to make some observ
tions on the conduct of our economic
relations with Japan. In the course ol
the series of intense trade negotiatioi
during the past several years, the U.i
and Japanese Governments have wor
together to solve problems. Some oft
negotiations have been strained at tir
but they have been successful. And
through the talks, Japanese agencies
U.S. agencies have established relatic
ships. The negotiations have been edi
tional for both sides, and the cooperai
they have engendered will continue tc
essential given the growing integratk
of the U.S. and Japanese economies.
In our attempt to deal with the
effects of trade on our own industries
and with political pressures in the
United States, we often forget that
other democratic governments must c
with much the same political realities
and problems as we. This is by no me;
an argument for inaction. Rather it is
caution that patience and subtlety ma
bring better results than importunate
demands.
We should keep a sense of propor-
tion in our relations with Japan and oi
other trading partners. Through inter
tional trade and investment, we seek
increased prosperity in the United
States. In order for the international
free economic system to work, there
obviously must be generally equal opp
tunities for all countries. However, it '
26
Department of State Build
ECONOMICS
■dly realistic to demand perfect justice
■n by item and sector by sector. If we
so in our negotiations, we have to
ose between total victory— which is
always realistic given politics in
er countries— or retaliation, which
ms everyone. We should not limit our
ions. I might add that perfect justice
ubjective and rarely takes account of
own import restraints.
Finally, there is no substitute for
d domestic economic policy. In the
sent international economy, goods
funds flow easily across borders,
inessmen have many options. If
rest rates are high in one country,
ipanies can borrow in another. If the
appreciates, Japanese businesses are
ly to invest in the United States or
■e this market from third countries.
e bar imports from one country, we
likely to see shipments from others,
survive in this kind of world, we must
to the fundamentals. We must save
invest, research and innovate. The
;rnment must create an environment
lucive to these things. But only
ate individuals and companies can
mplish them.
A.s I said earlier, I think that both
n and the United States are headed
e right directions. As a result of the
? appreciation, in volume terms
nese exports to the United States
leclining and Japanese imports from
Jnited States are growing. The
ed States is taking steps to correct
:onomic policies. At the same time,
apanese Government has resolved
ter its economic structure. The
ed States and Japan will undertake
uctural dialogue, and we both will
cipate in the new international
omic monitoring system. Market
3S negotiations on specific products
Continue. I am confident that
(hgh perseverance and cooperation,
SjJnited States and Japan will solve
a economic problems in a way that
Contribute to increased prosperity in
a country and to an ever more solid
(productive relationship across the
Economic Sanctions
to Combat International Terrorism
The following article is adapted from a
report prepared by the Department of
State hi response to a requestfrom
Senators Richard G. Lugar and Frank
H. Murkowski for an analysis of the
advisability of economic sane/ions as a
diplomatic tool to combat international
terrorism.
Advisability of Imposing
Antiterrorism Sanctions
This Administration is taking actions to
combat international terrorism by every
legitimate means. Economic sanctions
are an integral part of peaceful meas-
ures that we can take to deter states
from supporting terrorism. The advisa-
bility of imposing sanctions depends on
their likely effectiveness and the eco-
nomic and diplomatic consequences for
the United States. In addition to their
potential economic effect, sanctions may
serve useful political and diplomatic
ends.
Economic sanctions may be used to
pressure targeted states to change their
policies and to strengthen the resolve of
others, such as neighboring countries or
U.S. allies, in dealing with governments
that support terrorism. Although sanc-
tions such as trade controls may ad-
versely affect our global trade position
and may have a particularly negative
impact on some U.S. firms, they demon-
strate our resolve and show that we are
prepared to accept economic losses, if
necessary, in our battle against ter-
rorism. Openly acknowledging that the
United States also will suffer from sanc-
tions helps us to encourage others to fol-
low our example and make the required
trade and financial sacrifices. At the
Tokyo economic summit, the seven par-
ticipating heads of government agreed
in their Declaration on International
Terrorism that:
Terrorism has no justification. . . .[It]
must be fought effectively through deter-
mined, tenacious, discreet and patient action
combining national measures with interna-
tional cooperation.
However, antiterrorism considera-
tions, as important as they are, are only
one facet of our policy toward any coun-
try. Other relevant factors— strategic,
political, economic, humanitarian— must
play a part in deciding whether to un-
dertake an action such as imposing
trade controls. Thus, in the abstract it is
difficult to evaluate the advisability of
sanctions. A particular course may be
advisable in one case but inappropriate
in another. The Administration banned
virtually all trade and financial transac-
tions with Libya after it became clear
that previous actions, including partial
sanctions, had not gone far enough.
Similar action may not be useful in the
case of other countries that support
international terrorism.
Economic Consequences of
Trade Sanctions
Impact on Target Countries. The effec-
tiveness of U.S. economic sanctions in
exerting economic pressure on a foreign
government depends on many factors,
including the U.S. trade relationship
with the target country, the availability
of similar products from other countries,
and alternative markets for the target
country's products. The diversity of sup-
ply that characterizes most widely
traded goods today limits the impact of
unilateral trade sanctions on the target
country's behavior: when one country or
group of countries decides to withhold
goods or services from a terrorist-
supporting state, other suppliers may
move in to fill the gap. Similarly, a
unilateral boycott of the products of a
terrorist-supporting state may simply
shift market patterns. In the absence of
international cooperation, the terrorist
state often obtains what it wants to buy
and finds alternative customers for what
it has to sell, and our intended influence
on it is correspondingly reduced. Sanc-
tions, however, can have a significant
effect in sectors where the United
States is the key supplier. Export con-
trols tend to have the greatest economic
impact over the short term, as current
sources of supply are interrupted and
the target economy struggles to adjust.
The precise impact is often difficult
to judge because reliable, up-to-date eco-
nomic data may be lacking. In the case
of Libya, we believe that the measures
taken in January 1986 to ban virtually
all economic activity with that country,
magnified by the steep decline in oil
prices, are contributing to the deteriora-
tion of the Libyan economy. Other coun-
tries' willingness to join us increases the
economic effectiveness of the sanctions.
:toer 1986
27
ECONOMICS
From 1978 to L980, the United
States provided »i'i of I. Una's imports,
irding to International Monetary
Fund (IMF) figures. On the other hand,
the European Community (EC) ac-
counted for more than 60$ of Libya's
total imports, while other Western
industrialized countries supplied an addi-
tional 10%-15%. However, U.S. export
controls probably have assumed an en-
hanced significance because they focus
on items, such as aircraft and sophisti-
cated oil field equipment, that may not
be readily available from other
countries.
As a result of increasingly more
stringent export controls in 1981 and
1982, the U.S. market share in 1983
decreased to 2.5% of Libyan imports.
IMP' statistics indicate that, as a result
of the downturn in the Libyan economy,
European Community exports to Libya
also declined in absolute terms during
this period. It appears that our Euro-
pean trading partners were restrained
in assuming lost U.S. business. Newly
industrialized countries, however, includ-
ing South Korea and Brazil, substantial-
ly increased their share of exports to
Libya.
Following our 1982 ban on crude oil
imports, U.S. imports from Libya
declined dramatically, from $7.4 billion
in 1980 to only $865,000 in 1983, accord-
ing to Commerce Department statistics.
The President's Executive Order of
January 7, 1986, prohibited virtually all
direct trade to or from Libya.
Libya traditionally has sought out
U.S. contractors because of their reputa-
tion and reliability. Although the impact
on services is not easily quantified, the
departure of U.S. firms providing con-
sulting, management, construction, and
contracting services to Libya's oil indus-
i rv and major development projects
could be costly to the Libyan economy
in terms of temporary disruptions and
recontracting time. We have obtained
promises from the other Summit Seven
countries to try to discourage their
firms from replacing departing Ameri-
can companies. How this will work out
in practice remains to be seen, but the
Italian presence, for example, has fallen
from 15,000-17,000 to under 3,000.
Impact on the U.S. Economy.
When the Administration has restricted
trade with countries supporting ter-
rorism, it has acted in full awareness
that such measures also have costs for
the U.S. economy. These can be divided
into:
• Direct costs in terms of lost trade;
• Indirect costs in our trade with
other trading partners.
Direct Costs. The sheer size of the
U.S. economy has helped absorb the
direct costs of our trade controls. For
example, U.S. exports to Libya in the
late 1970s, before imposition of antiter-
rorism export controls, accounted for
less than 1% of all U.S. exports. As a
result of our export controls, U.S. ex-
ports to Libva declined by $500 million
from 1981 to 1982 and by another $191
million in 1983. These direct costs often
fall unevenly on different sectors of the
U.S. economy. In the Libyan case, the
most severe impact was on the U.S. air-
craft and petroleum industries, which
previously had dominated the Libyan
market. In 1983 alone, the Administra-
tion denied licenses to sell $597.5-million
worth of large civil transport aircraft to
Libya. The Commerce Department esti-
mates that in the petroleum sector, our
controls prevented U.S. firms from pur-
suing contracts worth at least $150
million in 1984 and 1985 for the develop-
ment of the Ras Lanuf refinery and
petrochemical plant in Libya.
U.S. trade with other terrorist-
supporting countries also has decreased
in recent years. For example, exports to
Iran declined from $954 million in 1979
to just under $74 million in 1985, and
imports from $2.7 billion to $762 million.
Trade with Syria and South Yemen is
mininal. In 1985, we exported
$106-million worth of goods to Syria,
while importing less than $3 million.
For South Yemen, the figures were
$9 million of exports and $1 million of
imports.
Indirect Costs. The use of economic
sanctions also may entail significant in-
direct costs— generally incurred over a
longer period. Frequent use of unilateral
trade controls for foreign policy pur-
poses can damage the reputation of
American firms as reliable suppliers.
Customers forced to buy elsewhere may
never return to their U.S. suppliers.
Other U.S. trading partners may change
suppliers or deliberately "design out"
U.S. components in their manufactured
goods to avoid restrictions on where
they can sell. For instance, the Com-
merce Department has reported that
some foreign aircraft manufacturers are
increasingly avoiding U.S. high-
technology navigational devices for fear
that new U.S. export controls might be
imposed, thereby preventing sales or
curtailing supplies of parts. U.S. firms
also report that they are being pre-
cluded from major aircraft projects in
some countries that do business with I
Libya and other targeted countries.
On the other hand, economic consl
quences flow from the continuation ol]
terrorism. Some countries have been I
reluctant to join in sanctions because I
concerns about losing the economic
benefits of trade with Libya. Howevel
the terrorist threat and growing publj
concern about terrorism are costing I
airlines and other businesses, inciudii I
American firms, millions of dollars in i
lost tourism and increased security
costs. Although difficult to quantify,
there is a growing economic cost frorj
the lack of sufficient international
cooperation to make economic and po
cal sanctions more effective.
Diplomatic Consequences
of Trade Sanctions
Leaving aside their economic impact,
sanctions can be used for their politic
or diplomatic effect to demonstrate I
determination to oppose another nati
support of terrorism. Sanctions send
powerful nonmilitary signal that we '
not countenance business as usual wi
those who support terrorists. They
demonstrate that we support our pol
cies with actions as well as words an
are prepared to incur costs in our ba
against international terrorism. This
serves to refute criticisms that we as
our allies to make sacrifices while we
continue to profit from commercial rs
tions with countries supporting terrot
or that we are unwilling to try "peact
ful measures" before taking other st(
Sanctions can have political costs
well. U.S. policy attempts to considei
political as well as economic conse-
quences of sanctions in adjusting our
responses. To the extent that we hav
other interests and prospects for cooj
ation with a targeted country, the
United States must weigh the probat
loss of influence against the expected
benefits from economic sanctions. Me
ures that appear unnecessarily harsh
inappropriate can undermine our crec
bility with the targeted country as w>
as with friendly countries whose supj
we seek.
Economic sanctions can also creat
difficulties in our political relations w
friendly countries that are unwilling t
take measures similar to ours. These
tensions may increase when our conti
are applied extraterritorially to perso
or things within the territories of frk
ly countries in a manner they conside1
infringes on their sovereignty. Our e>*
perience with the gas pipeline sanctio
against the Soviet Union demonstrate
28
Department of State Bull**
ECONOMICS
problems of extending unilateral
.. sanctions effectively to overseas
Maries of U.S. companies. Several
■opean countries, including the
ted Kingdom, have enacted blocking
slation that can be invoked to pro-
t persons in their territories from
iplying with U.S. controls. For these
sons, the Administration has at-
pted to moderate, where appropri-
the extraterritorial reach of our
Rons. For instance, our most recent
:tions against Libya were not ex-
led to foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
is or to reexports of U.S. -origin
is, except transshipments.
All of these considerations influenced
decision to impose economic sanc-
3 against Libya. Unilateral U.S. re-
lions underscored our opposition to
hafi's policies, but they did not
luce sufficient economic and political
sures to cause significant policy
ige. The decision to end all direct
nercial relations with Libya showed
allies that we are willing to accept
y costs and may have contributed
ir recent success in obtaining mul-
•iral cooperation, albeit limited, on
:ions and other measures,
jibya is an exceptional case. There
lajor qualitiative differences be-
n our relationship with Libya and
countries on the terrorism list. We
normal diplomatic relations with
i and maintain a limited dialogue
some of the other countries. In
contrast to Libya, we have been
on occasion to use our relationships
those countries to the benefit of
interests.
Ititial for Gaining International
unilateral Cooperation
Idifficult to evaluate abstractly the
■utial for gaining international or
lateral cooperation for sanctions
1st countries that support or harbor
Irists.
ince the United States, Japan, and
tern Europe together account for
h three-quarters of the world's
I [gross national product] and trade,
psition of our allies is worth noting.
lilies are reluctant to adopt eco-
I sanctions for several reasons.
irst, most maintain that sanctions
•effective, often pointing to past ef-
iwhere they believe sanctions
I such as Rhodesia.
?cond, many allies have substantial
lercial interests as well as citizens
Inight be placed in jeopardy by im-
fo sanctions.
Our major European allies belong to
the European Community. Community
decisions on sanctions historically have
been made on the basis of consensus.
Given the strong opposition of some EC
members to economic sanctions, for
reasons outlined above, consensus is
difficult to achieve in most cases.
The allies are prepared, on a case-
by-case basis, to take specific actions
short of broad economic sanctions. In
the Libyan case, the EC agreed at an
early date that members would not sell
weapons or military equipment to Libya
and that, to the extent possible, EC
governments would prevent their com-
panies from undermining U.S. actions
and replacing U.S. companies. Other
measures, reaffirmed at the Tokyo sum-
mit, such as reducing the staffs of the
Libyan Peoples' Bureaus, also are being
implemented in a number of countries.
We welcome the cooperation achieved
and the strong signal it sends. We are
consulting closely with our allies and
have been urging additional measures.
Adequacy of Existing Authority
to Impose Economic Sanctions
Existing legislation gives the President
extensive authority to take economic
measures against countries supporting
terrorism. This authority has proven
sufficient to impose broad controls on
trade and other economic activity with
such countries. The Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979, as amended, authorizes
restrictions on exports to countries that
support terrorism, and the recently
enacted International Security and De-
velopment Cooperation Act of 1985
authorizes a ban on imports from such
countries. U.S. law also permits a wide
range of other antiterrorism sanctions,
including a cutoff of foreign assistance
and arms sales and termination of air
services. In addition, the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act au-
thorizes the President, upon declaration
of a national emergency, to regulate or
prohibit a wide range of trade and finan-
cial transactions. An appendix to this
report describes the most important of
these authorities.
Under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act, the Secretary of
State has designated Libya, Syria, Iran,
Cuba, and the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) as
countries that have repeatedly provided
support for international terrorism.
These designations are periodically
reviewed, and changes are made when-
ever a country's conduct so warrants.
Cuba and Iran were added to the list in
1982 and 1984, respectively; Iraq was
removed in 1982.
As our sanctions against these coun-
tries and, more recently, our ban on vir-
tually all trade and financial transactions
with Libya illustrate, the Administration
is prepared to use these authorities
vigorously. We must continue, however,
to take specific circumstances into ac-
count, including the probable effective-
ness and diplomatic and economic
consequences of our actions. Other key
factors include the entire range of rela-
tions we have with a specific nation and
the direction of its policies. Legislation
that would tie our hands by mandating
blanket prohibitions on trade and/or
financial transactions could harm U.S.
business and relations with our allies
without imposing any significant costs
on the target country.
Flexibility is essential to respond to
the unique and often rapidly changing
circumstances of each case. For in-
stance, during the Iranian hostage
crisis, we imposed extensive prohibitions
on trade and financial transactions with
Iran. These sanctions provided a power-
ful negotiating tool in working for the
release of the hostages. Had the sanc-
tions been statutorily required, this
leverage would have been lost. Armed
with the flexibility to lift U.S. trade
sanctions, we were able to conclude the
1981 Algiers accord and secure the
release of the hostages.
APPENDIX A
Statutory Authorities for Sanctions
U.S. law permits a wide range of sanc-
tions by the executive branch against
countries involved in international ter-
rorism. These include terminating as-
sistance and arms sales, imposing
import and export controls, suspending
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) credits,
and, upon declaration of a national emer-
gency, prohibiting financial transactions.
The most important authorities are
discussed below.
Emergency Powers. The Interna
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act
authorizes the President to regulate or
prohibit a wide range of trade and finan-
cial transactions involving property in
which any foreign country or national
has an interest. This authority may be
used to deal with "an unusual and ex-
traordinary threat, which has its source
in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security.
cer 1986
29
ECONOMICS
foreign policy, or economy of" the United
States, if the President declares a na
tional emergency with respect to that
threat."
Commercial Exports. Section 3(8) of
Ixport Administration Act states
that it is "the policy of the United
States to use export controls to en-
courage other countries to take immedi-
ate stops to prevent the use of their
territories or resources to aid, en-
courage, or give sanctuary to those per-
sons involved in directing, supporting,
or participating in acts of international
terrorism." Section 6(a) authorizes the
President to adopt foreign policy con-
trols on exports of goods or technology
subject to U.S. jurisdiction (or by any
person subject to U.S. jurisdiction) to
carry out this policy. This authority is
exercised by the Secretary of Commerce
in consultation with the Secretary of
State, the U.S. Trade Representative,
and certain others.
Imposition of foreign policy controls
under the act is subject to procedural
and substantive limitations. For exam-
ple, section 3(8) provides that the Presi-
dent "shall make reasonable and prompt
efforts to secure the removal or reduc-
tion of such assistance to international
terrorists through international coopera-
tion and agreement before imposing ex-
port controls." There are requirements
for consultation, reports, and findings as
well as special limits on prior contracts
and foreign availability.
Antiterrorism export controls im-
posed under the Export Administration
Act are aimed at restricting the export
of goods or technology that would con-
tribute significantly to the military
potential or enhance the terrorist-
support capabilities of such countries.
These controls cover large aircraft;
militarized vehicles; specially designed
equipment with which to produce mili-
tary items; crime control and detection
equipment; and all goods and technology
subject to national security controls if
destined for military use and valued at
$7 million or more. These controls were
recently expanded to restrict the export
of light helicopters (helicopters over
10,001) pounds were already controlled).
For Iran, all aircraft, parts and avionics,
and large marine outboard engines are
embargoed; national security-controlled
goods and technologies with military ap-
plications also are controlled. Libya and
Cuba are subjeel to comprehensive
trade and financial embargoes1.
Imports. Section 505 of the Interna-
tional Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985 authorizes the
President to "ban the importation into
the United States of any good or service
from any country which supports ter-
rorism or terrorist organizations or
harbors terrorists or terrorist organi-
zations." Prior consultation with Con-
gress is required "in every possible
instance," and a report must be sent to
Congress when the authority is exer-
cised. Until this new authority was
enacted, imports could be controlled
only under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act pursuant to a
declaration of national emergency or un-
der the UN Participation Act pursuant
to mandatory Security Council
sanctions.
Libya. Section 505 was invoked
most recently to cut off trade with
Libya. In addition to the more general
authorities to control imports and ex-
ports discussed above, Section 504 of
the International Security and Develop-
ment Cooperation Act of 1985 authorizes
the President to prohibit imports of any
article grown, produced, extracted, or
manufactured in Libya. It also author-
izes the President to prohibit exports to
Libya of any goods or technology sub-
ject to U.S. jurisdiction or exported by
any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
Foreign Assistance. The executive
branch may terminate or decline to pro-
vide assistance for any foreign policy
reason to any recipient of U.S. as-
sistance under the Foreign Assistance
Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the
Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act, and the Peace Corps
Act.
Arms Sales. The executive branch
may decline to make military sales to
any country for any appropriate foreign
policy reason (including antiterrorism
considerations), and Section 2(b) of the
Arms Export Control Act gives the
Secretary of State responsibility for
authorizing sales to any particular coun-
try and in what amounts. The Depart-
ment of State also has the authority,
pursuant to section 38 of the act and the
Department's International Traffic in
Arms Regulations, to deny or cancel
licenses for private arms exports for any
foreign policy reason (including the
recipient's support of terrorism). Under
this authority, the Administration pro-
hibits the export of items on the U.S.
Munitions List to countries supporting
terrorism.
Eximbank Programs. Section
2(b)(1)(B) of the Export-Import Bank
Act explicitly mentions U.S. policy with
respect to international terrorism as c
of a limited category of nonfinancial c<
siderations that can justify Eximbank
denial of applications for credit, if the
President determines that such action
"would be in the national interest" ar
would "clearly and importantly ad-
vance" U.S. antiterrorism policy.
Aviation Sanctions. The Federal
Aviation Act grants sweeping authori
to the executive branch to impose avi
tion sanctions in response to terrorisn
as well as inadequate aviation securit;
• Section 1114(a) authorizes the
President to suspend air transportatu
between the United States and any
country that he determines is violatin;
The Hague convention or is aiding an;
terrorist organization that supports tl
seizure of aircraft as an instrument oi
policy.
• Section 1114(a) further authorize
the President to suspend air transpor
tion between the United States and a
foreign state that maintains air servic
with a third country guilty of violatinj
The Hague convention or aiding a ter-
rorist organization.
• Section 1115 authorizes the Sec
tary of Transportation, with the ap-
proval of the Secretary of State and
after 90 days' notice to the foreign cc
try, to withhold, revoke, or impose «
ditions on the operating authority of
U.S. or foreign air carrier to operate
tween the United States and a foreig
airport characterized by inadequate
security. Immediate suspension is ma
dated when "a condition exists that
threatens the safety or security of pa
sengers, aircraft, or crew' [and] the pi
lie interest [so] requires." In addition
the President is authorized to prohibi
U.S. and foreign air carriers from
providing service between the United
States and any foreign airport that is
directly or indirectly served by aircra
flying to or from an inadequately se-
cured airport.
• The Federal Aviation Act also
contains sufficient authority for the
Department of Transportation to pro-
hibit the sale in the United States of
airline tickets to countries against whl
aviation sanctions have been imposed.*
APPENDIX B
Sanctions Required by U.S. Law
In addition to the statutory authoritie
described above, a number of other pi J
visions of U.S. law require the imposi
30
Department of State Bulle
ECONOMICS
n of sanctions on countries that
ilitate international terrorism.
Commercial Exports. Section 6(j) of
• Export Administration Act requires
t certain congressional committees be
ified at least 30 days before any
!iise is approved for exports valued at
re than $7 million concerning which
• Secretary of State has made the fol-
ding determinations:
• The target country has repeatedly
ivided support for acts of interna-
lal terrorism; and
• Such exports would contribute sig-
cantly to the military potential of the
ntry, including its military logistics
ability, or would enhance its ability
support acts of international ter-
ism.
Technically, there is no requirement
t licenses for the exports actually be
ied if the necessary advance notice is
m. As amended this year, this sec-
requires that once a determination
lade regarding a particular country,
lay not be rescinded unless the
sident certifies and reports to Con-
ss that:
• The country concerned has not
rided support for international ter-
■sm, including support or sanctuary
any major terrorist or terrorist
ip in its territory, during the preced-
6-month period; and
The country concerned has pro-
d assurances that it will not support
of international terrorism in the
re.
Foreign Assistance. Section 620A of
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as
nded this year, prohibits assistance
3r the FAA, the Agricultural Trade
elopment and Assistance Act, the
:e Corps Act, the Export-Import
k Act of 1945, or the Arms Export
trol Act to any country that the
ident determines:
• Grants sanctuary from prosecution
ny individual or group that has corn-
ed an act of international terrorism;
Otherwise supports international
)rism.
The President may waive this prohi-
n if he determines and notifies
jress "that national security or
anitarian reasons justify such
er." If sanctions are imposed, the
on states that the President should
in other countries to take similar
n. Moreover, Section 512 of the
Foreign Assistance and Related Ap-
propriations Act of 1986 prohibits use of
any appropriated funds for assistance to,
inter alia, Libya. Syria, South Yemen,
and Cuba.
Foreign Military Sales. Section 3(f)
of the Arms Export Control Act re-
quires the President to terminate all
sales under the act to any government
"which aids or abets, by granting sanc-
tuary from prosecution to, any individu-
al or group which has committed an act
of international terrorism." Once this
provision is invoked, sales may not be
made for a 1-year period (to be ex-
tended for an additional year for any
subsequent grant of sanctuary). The
President may refrain from invoking the
provision if he finds and reports to Con-
gress "that the national security re-
quires otherwise."
Trade Preferences. Section 502(b)(7)
of the Trade Act of 1974 requires that
the President not designate a country as
a "beneficiary developing country" for
purposes of the generalized system of
preferences if such country "aids or
abets, by granting sanctuary from
prosecution to, any individual or group
which has committed an act of interna-
tional terrorism." The President may,
nonetheless, make such a designation if
he determines and reports to Congress
"that such designation will be in the na-
tional economic interest of the United
States."
Aviation Sanctions. Section 1115 of
the Federal Aviation Act, as amended
by the International Security and De-
velopment Cooperation Act of 1985, re-
quires the Secretary of Transportation
to assess security conditions at interna-
tional airports abroad. If deficiencies are
found and not corrected within 90 days,
the U.S. public will be notified through
public postings at airports, a notice in
the Federal Register, ticket supple-
ments, and a travel advisory.
Section 552 of the International
Security and Development Cooperation
Act of 1985 provides for the President
to suspend foreign assistance to a coun-
try that has an aii-port against which
sanctions have been imposed "if the
Secretary of State determines that such
country is a high terrorist threat coun-
try." Suspension may be waived if na-
tional security interests or a humani-
tarian emergency require.
■Our embargo on Cuba predates the an-
titerrorism export controls and was imposed
in 1963 under the Trading With the Enemy
Act. ■
Trade Policy:
Where Will America Lead?
by Douglas W. McMinn
Address before the Council on
Foreign Affairs in Baltimore, Maryland,
on July 2, 1986. Mr. McMinn is Assist-
ant Secretary for Economic and Business
Affairs.
The question I want to put before you
tonight is: where will America lead?
Will America lead to more open trade
among nations? Will America lead to
greater economic and political freedom
around the world? When put to the test,
what course will we steer for ourselves
and the world?
Economic and Political Freedom
As we approach the Fourth of July, it is
appropriate to remind ourselves of the
fundamental principles on which our
nation is built. The Founding Fathers
understood that political and economic
freedom were inseparable and believed
that human freedom and private initia-
tive would bring America progress and
prosperity. We have grown from a weak
colony to a prosperous nation by
remaining true to the vision of the
Founding Fathers.
Two hundred and ten years have
passed since the signing of the
Declaration of Independence. In their
wildest dreams the Founding Fathers
could never have imagined how success-
ful America's experiment with freedom
would be.
Our political and economic freedom
serves as an inspiring example to the
rest of the world. Countries in Asia,
Africa, Latin America, and even Europe
are embracing democracy. In a quieter
but equally important revolution,
nations all over the world are rejecting
state-controlled, interventionist economic
!Q'ber 1986
31
ECONOMICS
n s and adopting market-oriented
omic regimes.
One of the fundamental principles of
economic freedom is free and open
History has taught us that the
freer the flow of trade, the greater
world economic progress and the
greater the incentive for peaceful
relations among nations.
Trade
At the moment, one of the top issues in
Washington is track- policy. Recently,
the House of Representatives passed an
omnibus trade bill. The Senate has now
taken up trade legislation.
It is within the context of economic
and political freedom that we need to
examine today's trade policy debate.
When the trade bills are debated on
Capitol Hill, the vision of the upcoming
November elections is clear and present.
Douglas W. McMinn
was born in Salt Lake
City. Utah, on July 18.
1947, He received his
B.A. from Gustavus
Adolphus College, St.
Peter. Minnesota, in
1969 andhisM.L.A.
from Johns Hopkins
University in 1972. In
1975, Mr. McMinn
received his M.A. in
international affairs
from the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
specializing in international economics. While
al SAIS, he was named a Mellon Fellow.
In 1975, Mr. McMinn joined the Depart-
ment of the Treasury as an economist respon-
sible lor East-West economic policy in the
( (ffice of the Assistant Secretary for Interna-
tional Affairs. From 1977 to 1979 he was
Special Assistant to the Deputy Special Trade
Representative, Office of the President's
Special 'trade Representative. From 1979 to
1 '.'S l . M r McMinn was Deputy Chief of Mis-
sion, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
m Geneva, and Deputy U.S. Representative
to the General Agreement mi Tariffs and
Trade From 1981 to 1982, he was Acting
Director. Office of International Trade Policy
al Hie Department of Commerce. In 1982.
lie became principal adviser to the President's
national security affairs adviser for trade
policy and North-South economic relations.
He was a member of the U.S. Sherpa team
during policj preparations for the 1984
I. end. -n economic summit and the 1985 Bonn
economic summit.
Mr. McMinn was sworn in as Assistant
Secretary lor Economic and Business Affairs
on July L9, ins.",.
The voices of the special interests are
persistent and pervasive. The national
interest is less clearly heard.
H.R. 4800, the House trade bill
which passed overwhelmingly on May 22,
is a blueprint for closing markets.
Frankly, it is a bill based on election-
year politics. It would halt and reverse
the progress in international trade built
up over the past 40 years. It is sure to
increase political and economic tensions
around the world. H.R. 4cS00 offers
trade restriction as the solution without
understanding the true nature of the
trade problem.
What Is the Trade Problem?
I won't stand here and tell you that
there is no trade problem. There is a
problem. We are experiencing the
largest trade deficits in our history.
During the past 2 years, the deficit set
a record virtually every month. That
pattern may not yet be broken. These
massive trade deficits, and the even
larger Federal budget deficits, are
serious and must not be ignored. Among
other factors, these deficits have eroded
the important coalition we have had in
this country for freer, more open trade.
Deficits of this magnitude are almost
certainly not sustainable.
We must take action to deal with
our deficits and the concerns they
generate. We must rebuild that coalition
of farmers, consumers, businessmen,
politicians, academics, and— yes— even
Washington bureaucrats that has shaped
our open trading policies. And, at the
same time, we must guard against false
solutions that will make matters worse.
The American economy has per-
formed well over the last 4 years.
Certain industries and certain areas of
the country are in difficulty, but their
problems are set in a powerful pattern
of progress. Overall, we are better off
than we were 6 years ago. Prospects
are that we will be still better off this
year and the next. Deregulation, market
freedom, private sector incentives, and
less intrusive government have
produced this progress. We have rising
incomes, new jobs, low inflation,
productive investment, affordable
housing, lower taxes, dynamic capital
markets, and an efficient farm sector.
Why, I wonder, are some now
tempted to take trade policy in the
opposite direction? Why intervene in
international markets when our
domestic successes spring from less
intervention? Why close markets when
our postwar heritage of opening them
has stimulated the greatest expansio
economic well-being in the history of
world? Why add friction and increase
the risk of conflict between nations?
Is market closing the best way t<
deal with our trade imbalance? Are t
proponents of H.R. 4800 correct? Mo
to the point, would it even work?
Let's look at the five issues most
often raised in today's trade debate.
• Why do we have a trade defici
• How can trade policy reduce tl
deficit?
• Do imports cost jobs?
• What is fair trade?
• Do we have a trade policy?
Cause of the Trade Deficit
First, why do we have a trade defici
The fundamental cause is that
during the last 3 years domestic
investment has substantially exceed*
domestic saving. The difference— t ha
portion of our total investment finan
by foreign savings— is equal to the
deficit in our trade in goods and
services. Only when we bring domes
investment and domestic saving bad
into balance will we bring our trade
account back into balance.
To understand how the present
situation arose, we have to look agai
our record of economic performance.
The U.S. economy has created 1(1 mi
new jobs since 1981; investment was
necessary to create those jobs. In th>
recovery of the 1980s, investment co>
tributed more to growth than in any
previous postwar recovery. Real bus:
ness investment as a share of real G!
[gross national product] reached a
postwar high. The American people,
collectively, with renewed confidence
the economic future, invested their
savings at home rather than lending i
abroad. American consumers also fue
economic growth through their
spending.
For its part, the Federal Govern-
ment embarked on a monumental efft
to rebuild our nation's defenses— a
public investment in our future secur,
However, while private savings have
exceeded total private investment, th
Federal Government has been spend*
much more than its income. This draif
off savings from the private sector.
How is it possible for the econom
as a whole to spend more than it eanP
It's simple: others somewhere in the tl
world spend less than they earn and I
invest the difference the America. W#
are able to support our ambitious
investment program, public and priva
32
Department of State Bull1
ECONOMICS
h an inflow of savings from abroad,
it inflow of saving's must be
ompanied bv a parallel influx of
Ids.
To reduce the trade deficit, we must
tore a better balance between the
nand for capital— our public and
k'ate investment— and the domestic
ply of capital— the savings generated
households, businesses, and govern-
nt. We can invest less or save more.
i choice is ours.
Trade Policy Remedy?
at role can trade policy play in all
his?
Trade policy does not significantly
■ct the trade balance. Let me repeat
t: trade policy does not significantly
ct the trade balance.
To be sure, some trade policy
ons may cause minor shifts in
vious saving and investment
terns. But trade restrictions do not
ct the fundamental cause of the
le deficit: the inability of domestic
ngs to finance domestic investment,
de restrictions can only divert
>urces to protected sectors of the
iomy and away from dynamic
ors that are typically left unpro-
ed. When we restrict imports, we
not so much against foreign
iucers as against our own domestic
•sumers, our industries that rely on
orted materials, and our farmers and
istries who need foreign markets.
de and Jobs
1, what about jobs? Don't imports
Americans their jobs? Don't
orts create jobs? These are tough
stions, not because the answers are
Iplex or remote but because wrong
Ivers are so prevalent, appealing, and
renient.
IThere is no doubt that fewer Ameri-
fc are engaged in producing VCRs, or
p televisions, or cameras, or even
^mobiles and steel because we
Jort these items. There is also no
bt that more Americans are engaged
Deducing aircraft, computers,
fenced electronics, and agricultural
Suets because we export them. But
a fundamental truth that trade
i:y affects only the composition of
lloyment, not its total level. You can
»ly dismiss any analysis that states
■ a particular trade restriction will
■e" a certain number of American
I. Such restrictions do not save jobs
in the overall but shift employment from
our most dynamic industries to less
productive sectors.
Fairness and Market Access
But what about fairness? What about
the "level playing field" our exporters
have a right to expect? Americans value
fairness— it is one of our finest national
attributes. If we are not being treated
fairly, we will react, wmether our trade
is in surplus or in deficit.
Without doubt, there are unfair
trade practices in the world. Although
we do not necessarily agree, even some
of our own practices are perceived as
unfair by others. Developing countries
complain that we have cut our sugar
import quotas from 2.2 million tons in
1985 to 1.7 million tons this year; our
textile imports are subject to tight
controls; the new farm bill expands
subsidies for agricultural exports; we
recently restricted imports of certain
wood products; and we restrict steel
imports from 17 countries and Europe.
The list goes on. As someone said,
purity and virtue are hard to find in the
world of trade.
There is another aspect of fairness
that deserves attention. Too often, the
unspoken definition of fairness is "our
industry always wins." Loss of market
share abroad translates into an unfair
practice by a competitor. The trade
deficit is seen as proof that American
business is facing unfair competition.
Fairness does not mean that every U.S.
industry always prospers. Fairness
means we all play by the same rules.
Americans don't want guaranteed
success; but they do insist on the
opportunity to succeed.
But where unfairness exists, how
should we deal with it? Retaliation-
restricting access to the U.S. market-
comes quickly to mind. There are two
problems with retaliation.
First, it hurts our own economy.
Second, it invites an escalating and
dangerous spiral of counterrestrictions.
Nevertheless, despite the risks,
retaliation may be necessary in some
cases. When it is, we will act and have
done so.
What we shouldn't do. though, is
base our policy on the concept of retalia-
tion. The most effective approach to
foreign unfair trade practices is to
confront them directly: to demonstrate
the unfairness and secure change
through negotiation. This course serves
our broader economic interests and
those of the world trading community
by creating new possibilities for growth
and enhanced competition. Unlike
retaliation, it is true to the principles of
economic freedom that have served us
so well in the past. Success has not
been and will not be instantaneous,
since the political forces of protectionism
are at least as strong abroad as they
are in this country. But we have made
progress, real progress.
American exporters deserve the full
effort of their government to assure
them of as open and efficient a market
as possible when they set out to
compete. The President has pledged
that effort. But we must not bind
ourselves with a web of trade restric-
tions. As in the domestic economy, our
efforts must be devoted to greater
freedom, not greater government.
The Administration's Trade
Policy: Aims and Actions
What is our trade policy? In the
tradition of every American President
since F.D.R., President Reagan stands
for free trade and open markets. That is
our policy framework. Our objectives
are clear: to pry open foreign markets,
to tear down trade barriers, and to
eliminate unfair trade practices.
• The United States has taken the
lead in pushing for a new round of
international negotiations that will be
launched this fall. Our objective is to
strengthen existing trade rules and
extend them to areas such as agricul-
ture, services, intellectual property, and
investment which have, until now,
escaped meaningful— or any— interna-
tional discipline. Multilateral negotia-
tions in the GATT [General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade] are our best hope
for establishing a broader, level playing-
field free of the holes we have all dug
for ourselves in the past.
• Responding to a Canadian initia-
tive, we have just embarked on an
important and historic initiative with
Canada, our largest trading partner. We
are engaging in comprehensive talks to
establish free trade between our two
countries. The objective of these talks is
to reduce or eliminate barriers in a
broad array of trade and investment
areas. An agreement of this type will be
an engine of growth for the economies
of both countries.
• In a series of talks with the
Japanese Government, we have agreed
on the removal of barriers to sales in
Japan of telecommunications gear, wood
>ober 1986
33
ENERGY
and paper products, pharmaceuticals and
medical equipment, and electronic
components. In the near future, we will
discuss ways ti> enhance market access
in a new sector which includes auto-
mobile parts.
• We arc pressing the European
Community to offer us adequate and fair
compensation for damage to our agricul-
tural exports caused by the recent
expansion of the Community to include
Spain and Portugal.
• We are negotiating with Korea to
improve opportunities for our insurance
companies to sell in Korea and to obtain
better patent and copyright protection
there. Similarly, we are pressing Brazil
to administer its laws regarding com-
puters and related equipment so as not
to disadvantage unfairly U.S. investors
and exporters.
This is only a partial list, but it
illustrates that positive, market-opening
actions have been taken and are under-
way to eliminate unfair trade practices
and expand market access for competi-
tive U.S. exports of both goods and
services. The record shows that negotia-
tion can open markets.
We have also made important
strides on domestic and multilateral
measures that will help attack the
fundamental cause of the trade deficit.
• On the domestic front, Congress
has tackled its responsibility to
discipline spending by the Federal
Government by passing the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings amendment. By 1990,
the Federal Government's voracious
appetite for American savings will be
curbed.
• Also, the Senate has passed a tax
reform bill that will enhance the incen-
tives to work, to save, and to invest in
productive activities.
These two measures alone will
significantly enhance the competitive
position of the United States and
release resources to the private sector.
They will also contribute to a better
balance in our external accounts— a
lower trade deficit— by reducing the
internal imbalance between saving and
investment. They represent major
achievements in the making.
Abroad, we are working with our
trading partners on monetary matters.
Exchange rates have shifted to reflect
better fundamental economic conditions.
The dollar has moved to a level that
reflects our commitment to put our
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 6, 1986'
Yesterday the President reaffirmed
strong administration support of a 750
million barrel strategic petroleum
reserve. The strategic petroleum reserve
was created to maintain adequate
strategic and economic protection
against oil supply disruptions. It
moderates the economic impacts of oil
price increases and supply shortages,
reduces the pressures for allocation and
price controls in the event of a supply
disruption, reduces the likelihood of
panic buying, and provides more time for
diplomacy to work in special situations.
Since 1981 we have increased the
reserve over fivefold, and it now con-
tains 503 million barrels. The President
committed the Administration to con-
tinue filling the reserve throughout fiscal
year 1987. He gave Secretary of Ener
John Herrington the discretion to exc<
the current congressionally approved
rate, should oil prices make this an
economically attractive choice.
Reaffirmation of our goal of a 750
million barrel strategic petroleum
reserve demonstrates the President's
continued leardership and commitmen
to our allies that holding strategic stoe
is the best defense against the effects
rapid price escalation or supply intern
tions. The President, in reaching his
decision, also called upon other oil con
suming nations to take similar actions
stressing that strategic stockpiles are
the best defense against world oil supj
disruption.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 11, 1986.
economic house in order and restores
the competitiveness of American
industry and agriculture. Agreements
reached last September at the Plaza
Hotel and in May at the Tokyo summit
promote greater stability in exchange
rates.
American Leadership
The trade policy debate in Washington
is serious and disturbing. The trend in
the Congress— at least in the House of
Representatives— runs counter to the
policy direction that has revived the
American economy in the 1980s and to
the course of American trade policy
over nine administrations, Democratic
and Republican. It contradicts the prin-
ciples of economic and political freedom
that have been the basis of the strength
and prosperity of this country.
The United States has been in the
forefront of the battle for economic
freedom, just as we have been at the
front lines in the struggle for political
freedom. Will the United States main-
tain its leadership role in the global
economy and continue to lead in the
pursuit of freer trade and more open
markets?
The importance of American leade'
ship to the progress of freedom was
emphasized by the Prime Minister of
Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, before
joint session of our Congress last fall.
Let me conclude by quoting from his
speech:
If, because of domestic problems, the
United States loses the will to maintain op
and fair trade, protectionism and retaliatioi
will shrink trade and so reduce jobs. Is
America willing to write off the peaceful at
constructive developments of the last 40
years that she has made possible? A replaj
of the depression of the 1930s, which led U
World War II, would be ruinous for all. All
major powers in the West share the respor
bility for not repeating this mistake. But
America has the primary responsibility, for
she is the anchor economy of the free mark
economies of the world. In your hands,
therefore, lies the future of the world.
Our friends are calling on us to
lead— to remain true to the economic
and political values that form the
bedrock of our way of life. We need th
vision, statesmanship, and— yes— couraj
that inspired the Founding Fathers 2V
years ago. If we are true to our prin-
ciples, we can lead the world to a futu
of progress and prosperity. ■
34
UROPE
5th Anniversary of Berlin Wall
RESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
UG. 13, 19861
venty-five years ago. one of the
yrld's great cities was torn in two, its
ople divided and a unity that had
ited for more than 700 years brutally
stroyed. Overnight a wall was thrown
i around the Western sectors of Berlin
East Germany in collusion with the
iviet Union. As thousands of persons
sperately sought to flee, fences of
rbed wire and armed men blocked the
its and turned them back. Often the
Idiers themselves threw down their
;apons and vaulted over the first crude
rriers, choosing freedom in the West
the risk of their lives.
After 25 years, the Berlin Wall
mains as terrible as ever— watched
jht and day by armed guards in
wers, the ground between barriers
odlit and patrolled by dogs. Those
iking freedom still attempt to cross
! death strip in a burst for liberty.
The Berlin Wall is tragic testimony
to the failure of totalitarian governments.
It is the most visible sign of the
unnatural division of Germany and of
Europe— a division which cruelly
separates East and West, family from
family, and friend from friend.
The horror of the wall can easily
overwhelm us. But this anniversary
reminds us too of the Berliners who, in
resisting tyranny, proved and still prove
their courage and their passion for
freedom. They have made Berlin a thriv-
ing metropolis, a showcase of liberty
which will invite the world to join in its
750th anniversary next year. The United
States is proud to fulfill, with its British
and French allies, its solemn commit-
ment to the Berliners and to their great
city. Western strength and cohesion pro-
tected Berlin in the past; they are the
only basis on which future improvements
are possible.
Those who built and maintain the
Berlin Wall pretend it is permanent. It
cannot lie. One day it— and all those like
it— will come down. As long as the wall
stands, it can never be porous enough
for free men and women in the West-
ami freedom-loving men and women in
the East— to tolerate it.
Freedom, not repression, is the way
of the future. Dividing Europe, defying
the will of its people, has brought ten-
sion, not tranquility. True security for all
requires that Europeans be able to
choose their own destiny freely and to
share their common heritage.
Berlin's division, like Europe's, can-
not be permanent. But our conviction
must be more than a distant hope. It
must be a goal toward which we actively
work. Let us rededicate ourselves to new
efforts to lower the barriers dividing
Berlin. Before another anniversary has
passed, I hope that this problem can be
the subject of renewed thought and
serious discussion between East and
West.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 18, 1986.
7th Report on Cyprus
HSSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
(LY 1, 19861
irdance with Public Law 95-384. I am
ting to you a bimonthly report on prog-
ward a negotiated settlement of the
is question,
my last report, I noted that on
i 29 the United Nations Secretary
al gave Greek and Turkish Cypriot
ientatives a draft framework agree-
That draft agreement contained an
e for an overall settlement and a
ied process with summit meetings and
ng groups for reaching that desirable
\cceptance of the agreement would
ed to immediate negotiations on all the
nding issues, including such key ques-
is troop withdrawal, guarantees, and
hree freedoms" (freedom of settlement,
im of movement, and the right to
rty).
jring the period since my last report,
ican officials have continued their active
efforts in support of the Secretary General's
approach. It remains our view that his initi-
ative presents the leaders of the two Cypriot
communities with an historic opportunity to
begin a process toward peace and reconcilia-
tion. We have continued to express our hope
that they would embark on this path. We also
stated our view that the Secretary General's
"integrated-whole" concept, under which
"nothing is final until everything is final,"
would protect the interests of the parties
throughout the negotiating process envi-
sioned in the recent framework agreement.
The Turkish Cypriots have accepted the
March 29 draft framework agreement. The
Greek Cypriots have not accepted the docu-
ment and instead have proposed the conven-
ing of an international conference or a high-
level meeting between the leaders of the two
Cypriot communities. The Secretary General
summarized his view of the current situation
in a June 11 report to the Security Council,
which I have attached. He stated that since
one side is not yet in a position to accept the
March 29 draft framework agreement, the
way is not yet open to proceed with the
negotiations he has proposed for an overall
solution. He added that, under the cir-
cumstances, the way forward will require
careful reflection by all concerned.
We continue to believe that the Secretary
General's effort offers the best prospect for
achieving progress toward a just and lasting
Cyprus settlement. The Secretary General
will have our full confidence and support as
he proceeds with his good offices mission. We
urge the parties to work constructively with
him in order to move forward toward a
negotiated solution.
Sincerely,
Ronald Rkagan
■Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 7. 1986). ■
3ober 1986
35
HUMAN RIGHTS
11th Anniversary
of the Helsinki Final Act
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
AUG. 1. 1986'
Eleven years ago today the I United
States, Canada, and 33 European coun-
tries signed in Helsinki the Final Act of
the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (CSCE). The signatories
undertook to observe important stand-
ards of international conduct and to pur-
sue practical steps to reduce the barriers
dividing Europe between East and West.
( )t' special importance to the West, the
Final Act affirmed basic human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
The Final Act is an eloquent state-
ment of hopes and goals to which the
United States fully subscribed, because
its principles were rooted in our own
philosophy and traditions. The United
States remains firmly committed to the
full implementation of the Final Act in
all its provisions and to the indivisibility
of its human, security, and economic
dimensions.
Unfortunately the Soviet Union and
its East European allies have repeatedly
failed to carry out many of their Helsinki
pledges. There has been limited progress
since the signing of the Final Act. But
the reality of Europe's division remains,
and the most important promises of a
decade ago have not been kept. That was
our assessment on the 10th anniversary
last year. It remains our assessment
today. Eastern governments continue to
impede the free flow of people, informa-
tion, and ideas. They continue to repress
those who seek to exercise freedoms of
religion, thought, conscience, and belief.
They continue to disregard Final Act
provisions as they choose.
As we commemorate this 11th anni-
versary, we should recall the hopes for
greater peace and freedom in Europe
expressed a decade ago. The Final Act
recognized the interrelationship between
these goals, that the interests of indi-
vidual human beings are a fundamental
pari of progress toward peace in
Europe, that a more stable peace among
nations depends on greater freedom for
the people of Europe. The ambitious
goals of the Helsinki process can be
achieved only through balanced progress
on all fronts.
The next followup meeting of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe will open in Vienna this
November. An important task of that
meeting will be to take stock of the
promises made and the promises kept,
and to weigh the balance among the var-
ious dimensions of the Helsinki process.
Governments must be made to account
at Vienna for their commitments. The
meeting must also address the challenge
of achieving balanced progress if the
Final Act is to have meaning in the daily
lives of all citizens whose governments
have undertaken its obligations.
The United States takes its com-
mitments under the Final Act seriousl
and will continue to strive for the full
realization of its goals for all the peop
of Europe. We call upon others to do
likewise. We will work to ensure that
upcoming meeting in Vienna will marl
step toward making the promises of
Helsinki's first decade a reality in its
second.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 4, 1986.
Captive Nations Week, 1986
PROCLAMATION 5512,
JULY 21, 1986'
America, built on a firm belief in the dignity
and rights of all the members of the human
race, continues to hold up that message to the
world. Included in that message is unwaver-
ing opposition to all forms of oppression and
despotism. Freedom is not divisible. To main-
tain it for ourselves, we must pursue it for
others. As President Roosevelt declared in
1941, "we look forward to a world founded
upon four essential freedoms. The first is
freedom of speech and expression—
everywhere in the world. The second is the
freedom of every person to worship in his
own way— everywhere in the world. The third
is freedom from want . . . everywhere in the
world. The fourth is freedom from fear. . .
anywhere in the world."
This vision of the future has been a
beacon of hope and guidance both for those
individuals who seek refuge here and for
those nations whose aspirations for self-
determination have been crushed by the
Soviet empire. Deprived of basic human
rights, their peoples are the victims of
ruthless regimes run according to totalitarian
ideologies. These are the nations held captive
by forces hostile to freedom, independence,
and national self-determination. These captive
nations include those of Eastern Europe that
have known foreign occupation and com-
munist tyranny for decades; those struggling
to throw off communist domination in Latin
America; and the people of Afghanistan.
Southeast Asia, and Africa struggling against
foreign invasion, military occupation, and
communist oppression.
Each year we renew our resolve to sup-
port the struggle for freedom throughout the
world by observing Captive Nations Week. It
is a week in which all Americans are asked
remember that the liberties and freedoms
that they enjoy are denied to many people;
With this observance, we hope to inspire
those who struggle against military occups
tion, political oppression, communist expai
sion, and totalitarian brutality. We hope tc
inspire, but we also seek inspiration. Becai
the history of liberty is a history of
resistance, we learn from those who live
where the struggle is most urgent. Purifiei
by resistance, they show us the path to a
renewed commitment to preserve our own
liberties and to give our support and
encouragement to those who struggle for
freedom.
To pursue that struggle, and to honor
those who are with us in that battle, the C(
gress, by joint resolution approved July 17
1959 (73 Stat. 212), has authorized and
requested the President to issue a proclam.
tion designating the third week in July of
each year as "Captive Nations Week."
Now. Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
hereby proclaim the week beginning July 2
1986. as Captive Nations Week. I invite th<
people of the United States to observe this
week with appropriate ceremonies and acti
ities to reaffirm their dedication to the inte
national principles of justice, freedom, and
national self-determination.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
my hand this twenty-first day of July, in th
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
eighty-six, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred
and eleventh.
Ronald Reac
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 28, 1986.
36
ILITARY AFFAIRS
NARCOTICS
nary Chemical
unitions Program
[ITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
,Y 29, 1986'
President today certified to Con-
ss that certain conditions required by
igress for the release of fiscal year
6 funds for the binary chemical
pons modernization program have
n met.
This certification to Congress will
w the United States to proceed with
modernization of the chemical
pons deterrent stockpile so critical to
nation's security. U.S. policy on
-nieal warfare remains unchanged.
United States renounces the first
of lethal and incapacitating chemical
pons. A comprehensive, effectively
fiable global ban on all chemical
pons remains our foremost priority.
/ever, until such a ban is attained,
will pursue deterrence through a
ng defensive posture and a credible
liatory capability. The chemical
ons threat to U.S. forces is a
dwide threat, not limited to NATO,
small, readily deployable stockpile of
ry munitions which we seek will pro-
the flexibility to meet and deter this
at.
Specifically, the legislation requires
the President certify to Congress
1 The North Atlantic Treaty
inization (NATO) has adopted a
ry chemical munitions force goal
essed to the United States;
• The United States has developed,
>ordination with the Supreme Allied
imander, Europe (SACEUR), a plan
he deployment of binary chemical
itions under appropriate contingen-
and
» The United States has consulted
NATO member nations on that
3n May 15 NATO's Defense Planning
mittee in permanent session, com-
d of the permanent representatives
ATO of the 15 nations participating
e alliance's military structure,
>ted the NATO force goals for
-92, including the binary chemical
itions force goal addressed to the
ed States. Defense Ministers,
;ing as the Defense Planning Corn-
fee in ministerial session on May 22,
4rding to normal NATO procedures
«ed" the permanent representatives'
tn. The Defense Ministers' action
completes the established NATO pro-
cedure for adopting force goals for
alliance.
The United States had developed, in
coordination with SACEUR, a plan for
the deployment of binary chemical muni-
tions under appropriate contingency
plans.
The United States has conducted
extensive consultations with allied
governments on chemical weapons
issues, including consultations on the
plan for deployment of chemical
weapons under appropriate contingen-
cies. On June 19, consultations with
allies on this military contingency plan
were completed in the appropriate
NATO forum: NATO's Military Commit-
tee, which is composed of senior military
representatives from nations to NATO.
The U.S. Military Representative to the
Military Committee briefed the Military
Committee on the U.S. plan for con-
tingency deployment of chemical
weapons. Recognizing the conclusions
reached in the Defense Planning Com-
mittee, and within the context of those
conclusions and of national statements
and reservations expressed in the
Defense Planning Committee, the Mili-
tary Committee took note of the briefing
of the U.S. plan for the contingency
deployment of chemical weapons.
■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 4, 1986.
U.S. International Narcotic
Control Programs and Policies
by John C. Whitehead
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the Senate
Appropriations Committee on August l.'f,
1986, and a, report on the status of efforts
to control narcotics prndnction prepared
by the Bun mi of International Narcotic
Matters. Mr. Whitehead is Deputy
Secretary of State.1
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the
Administration's international narcotic
control programs and policies. I am
accompanied today by Mr. Peter
McPherson, the AID [Agency for Inter-
national Development] Administrator;
Miss Ann Wrohleski, Assistant Secre-
tary Designate for International Nar-
cotic Matters (INM); and Mr. Frank
McNeil, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. We
have a fairly detailed report which, with
your permission, I would like to include
for the record. It was prepared in
response to the interest of the commit-
tee expressed during the course of a
number of recent hearings.
I would, however, like to offer some
brief introductory remarks.
As the President's recent statements
make clear, let there be no mistake that
this Administration is fully committed to
stopping the flow of illicit narcotics into
our country. The danger of narcotics to
our youth and to the very fabric of our
society cannot be a subject of partisan
debate. We are grateful to the support
this committee has provided for the
Administration's efforts in the past, and
I am confident we can count on your
continued support in the future.
International narcotics control is
central to the pursuit of our foreign
policy objectives. We have and will con-
tinue to use every opportunity to convey
the message to our friends in the inter-
national community on the need for
greater effort in controlling narcotics
traffic. The President made this an
agenda item at the Tokyo economic sum-
mit. We have raised it at the United
Nations. It is a priority issue in the
bilateral talks with President De la
Madrid of Mexico this week as it was
with Prime Minister Junejo of Pakistan
last month.
The most effective tool we have in
this effort is the growing realization
among foreign governments that nar-
cotics trafficking is not just an American
problem, but a universal threat. The
efforts of the First Lady and our high-
level attention to this problem are
already paying dividends. Countries in
which narcotics are produced or which
are part of the international trafficking
pattern now recognize the unacceptable
high risk that narcotics pose to their own
societies. These risks range from
increases in violent crime to national
security threats by narcoterrorist
groups. The international community is
finally recognizing the challenge we all
face. That is the first and most impor-
tant step in winning the battle.
liber 1986
37
NARCOTICS
Nevertheless, there remains a large
and unacceptable gap between percep-
tion and effective action We expect
measures from our
friends and are prepared to encourage
and supporl them. The situation remains
'HIS.
From the foreign policy perspective,
our highest priority is to reduce produc-
tion. We are moving closer to our objec-
tive of having effective eradication pro-
grams in all key producing countries. In
1981 only two governments were
engaged in eradication programs. By
1985 the list had grown to 14. As a
result, marijuana production is today
declining in Colombia, Jamaica, and
other countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean. We expect that trend to
continue.
Current Colombian experiments to
identify environmentally safe herbicides,
which can be reproduced on a large scale,
could provide a new tool for eradicating
coca plants. The recent dramatic
demonstration of the renewed commit-
ment of the Bolivian Government to nar-
cotics control has resulted in the price of
the coca leaf falling to an all-time low. I
met with President Paz Estenssoro and
his senior officials in La Paz this spring
and know directly of their concerns and
their need for support.
In the meetings this week involving
Presidents Reagan and De la Madrid,
Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign
Secretary Sepulveda, and Attorneys
General Meese and Garcia, the United
States and Mexico have reiterated their
unrestricted cooperation and assistance
in rejuvenating a control program. We
have emphasized the high priority we
attach to reducing the flow of heroin and
marijuana from Mexico, and the high
priority we attach to effective action
against those traffickers responsible for
the death of DEA [Drug Enforcement
Administration] Agent Camarena.
In September, the United States and
Mexico will collaborate in an intensive
spraying program of opium poppy in the
infamous tri-State area. Mexico lias
agreed t<> let us bring in six turbo
Thrush aircraft, and combine them with
three of their high-spraying capacity Bell
212 helicopters, in an effort to eliminate
70% or mere of the fall poppy crop
before it is harvested. We have assisted
the Mexicans in improving this program
in 1986, including refinements in the
spraying process. Together with the
verification program, in which DEA
agents ride with Mexican officials to con-
firm fields destroyed, these improve-
ments bode well for restoring the effec-
tiveness of this once heralded program.
However, we have other problems: the
level of effectiveness in seizures, arrests,
and prosecutions has never been as good
as in the eradication program. We seek a
strong across-the-board effort at improv-
ing enforcement.
U.S. Encouragement and Support
The tools and resources provided by
Congress are critical assets supporting
our diplomatic efforts. The Administra-
tion's FY 1987 budget request for $65.4
million for international narcotics con-
trol programs includes a substantial
increase in funds for eradication. We
also have requested more funds for
enforcement efforts, supporting crop
reduction activities. Seventy-three per-
cent of available funding is dedicated to
these very efforts. We urge the commit-
tee to appropriate the full amount.
We have also used economic assist-
ance funds administered by AID in
direct and indirect support of our nar-
cotic control objectives. In Peru, Bolivia,
and Pakistan, for example, the disburse-
ment of development assistance funds
are tied to achieving specific narcotic
control objectives in target areas. In
Thailand, AID and INM are funding a
project in which entire villages must
agree to keep farming areas free of
poppy. This program is going well with
the support of the Thai Army's aggres-
sive new eradication program.
We still have a long way to go. I
would not minimize the obstacles, but I
am heartened by what I believe are
clearly positive trends. I believe that our
friends recognize the need to eliminate
this scourge. They know that we mean
business. Continued and increased
pressure has to be applied at all points of
the chain— through crop control; through
increased seizures of both drug products
and financial assets; through intensified
investigation and prosecution of traf-
fickers; and through effective treatment
and prevention of drug abuse.
The Administration is committed to
work with you and other Members of the
Congress in support of this effort.
Report on Status of Efforts
to Control Narcotics Production
The Link Between Assistance
and Narcotics Control
Of the 18 countries that are the primary
sources of illicit narcotics entering the
United States, 15 receive some form of
U.S. economic, military, or narcotics
control assistance. Fourteen of the
fifteen conducted eradication progran
in 1985; the other, Morocco, relies on
interdiction to control hashish pro-
duction. The remaining three— Iran,
Afghanistan, and Laos— are politically
inaccessible to us.
Security assistance levels are sign
cant in 11 of the 14 cases. However, r
cotics assistance constituted all of the
assistance ($700,000) to Brazil and 98
of the $10.3 million given to Mexico,
while Venezuela's total assistance was
$100,000 in military training funds.
Beyond these source countries, th
are other nations which are important
transit points for illicit narcotics
shipments to the United States, such i
India, Malaysia, the Bahamas, Lebanc
and Turkey. Of these, all but the
Bahamas receive some economic or
military assistance.
There are both direct and indirect
links between U.S. assistance and nar
cotics control.
The countries in which narcotics c
trol and development assistance objec
tives have been most closely linked ar<
Peru, Bolivia, and Pakistan. In each
country, AID and INM have agreed oi
target areas, and development assist-
ance is conditioned on achieving sped
narcotics control objectives. For exam
pie, much of the development assistan
intended for the Chapare region of
Bolivia, the primary growing region fc
coca destined to become cocaine, has r
been spent since 1983 because its rele;
is contingent upon Bolivia complying
with conditions of its 1983 agreement
with the United States.
There are various types of indirect
links between control and developmeni
assistance, such as the poppy clauses
used in Pakistan and Thailand. These
clauses commit a government to keepii
specific development areas free of nar-
cotics, especially areas which have not
been traditional narcotics growing are;
In the one instance when new opium
poppy was discovered in an area of
Pakistan which was under such an
agreement, the government destroyed
the crop
AID and INM emphasize develop-
ment assistance, rather than crop
substitution, to control narcotics. That
change in policy reflects the discovery
that, under substitution programs,
farmers grew new crops but didn't
abandon opium poppy.
Despite the disappointment in the
spring 1986 opium crop, which expands
largely in response to greatly increased
demand and higher prices within the
region, it still appears that the model
38
Department of State Bullet
NARCOTICS
iveloped by INM in Pakistan works
ere and will work elsewhere. Specific
nds of development assistance in
iected areas are conditioned on
surances— backed up by demonstrable
iforcement— that the areas will be rid
illicit narcotics crops. For example,
lailand has a program in which
•velopment assistance is conditioned
ion entire villages agreeing to keep
eir farming areas free of poppy. Since
84, that program has steadily
ogressed— boosted in 1985 and 1986
the Thai Army's aggressive new
adication program.
So far, assistance that is directly or
iirectly linked to narcotics control
'ough one or more types of
reements have been discussed. Other
jes of assistance are not tied to con-
>1, such as most military assistance,
d economic assistance to nongrowing
as. However, the government of
Bry source and transit nation is fully
are of the conditions imposed in
blic Law 98-164. Without exception,
>se governments know they could lose
U.S. assistance if they fail to take
'quate steps to cooperate with the
3. Government on narcotics control,
s message was solidly reinforced by
?sident Reagan last week.
e Narcotics Problem:
view of Progress
3 highest U.S. Government priority is
Jucing production. In 1981, only two
Intries were eradicating illicit narcotic
ips. In 1985, there were eradication
Igrams in 14 countries. We are mov-
il closer to our objective of having
fcctive eradication campaigns
ijrating simultaneously in all key
Iwing sectors. The 1987 INM budget
ludes a substantial increase in funds
c eradication. Increased funding for
Horcement is also projected where such
Kvities support crop reduction or
euce the supply of illicit narcotics or
Bcursor chemicals.
Many 1985 objectives were not only
it, but exceeded. Even more will be
We this year and next. The gains are
fl, and the prospects for continued
icancement in 1986 and 1987 are quite
\AA- But the situation remains severe.
)jig abuse has spread to many drug
•Sducing and trafficking countries,
wping production at high levels, and
ii:otics trafficking organizations in
»ie countries are so powerful that they
Kfe a security threat to the legitimate
Mernment. Narcotics-related violence
sh the increase. However, significant
hige has occurred, and many of our
hopes ride on that change. Other nations
now realize that narcotics trafficking is a
clear and present universal danger, and
that they too stand in harm's way. With
that realization, we are finally beginning
to work together as an international
community progressing toward common
goals.
The 1986-87 Agenda
The Administration has requested $65.4
million for the international narcotics
program for FY 1987, a level that is
essential to support the needed expan-
sion of eradication and enforcement pro-
grams. The Department urges the com-
mittee to provide the full amount
requested.
The precedent-setting Colombian
program has capped efforts in Latin
America and the Caribbean to destroy
marijuana crops, and it is estimated that
marijuana production totals for 1986 will
continue the decline of recent years.
Aerial surveys confirm that the 1985
crop in the traditional northern growing
areas of Colombia was 85% smaller than
the 1983 crop. In 1986, the eradication
effort is being expanded into other areas
of Colombia to counter traffickers'
efforts to develop new sources of supply.
Several countries are working hard
to contain the problem. Ecuador, which
collaborated with Colombia on a joint
coca eradication effort along their com-
mon border, is intensifying both its
eradication and interdiction efforts for
1986. Brazil, with U.S. assistance, initi-
ated operations to destroy both coca and
marijuana, as well as important seizure
campaigns, while also expanding its
efforts to interdict shipments of pre-
cursor chemicals used in cocaine
refining.
Like Colombia, Panama and Belize
conducted aerial eradication programs,
using herbicides, in 1985 and 1986.
Following the spraying this spring,
Panamanian production of marijuana
dropped sharply enough that authorities
think aerial spraying is no longer
needed. Jamaica initiated a long-needed
manual eradication campaign to destroy
both spring and fall marijuana crops in
1985, resulting in gains that have been
confirmed by aerial surveys. Brazil,
Costa Rica, Guatemala, and other
governments have also destroyed mari-
juana plantations.
The marginal gains of the manual
eradication campaigns against the coca
bush could be a thing of the past. In
1985, Colombia succeeded in identifying
chemicals which appear to meet the
criteria of being environmentally safe
while effectively destroying the hardy
coca bush. Expanded testing is pro-
ceeding with both backpack and aerial
applications. It should lead to a method
that affords large-scale elimination of
illicit coca cultivation. If it succeeds in
Colombia, it could work in other coca
cultivation areas, too.
Colombia remains the major refining
source for cocaine, while Bolivia and
Peru remain the major sources of coca
leaf. Cocaine refining sites are shifting
somewhat because of Colombia's cam-
paign against cocaine labs and improved
ways of controlling the flow of refining
chemicals.
The bottom line on cocaine is that
the supply of coca leaf must be
reduced. New leaders in Bolivia and
Peru began their administrations in 1985
by declaring their intentions of attacking
the drug production problem. Perhaps
the most dramatic demonstration of the
new Bolivian intent is the ongoing cam-
paign to suppress cocaine refining and
trafficking. As Ambassador Rowell told
Congress last week, these have come to
a halt in the Beni area. Moreover, thanks
to this campaign, called "Operation
Blast Furnace," the price of leaf has
fallen to an all-time low, and the
Embassy reports that more farmers are
requesting assistance in cultivating alter-
native crops. This may be the first
trickle in what could be a flood-like
movement away from the economic
dependence of farmers and others on the
coca trade— a change that is essential if
eradication is to succeed. Traffickers
have learned they can no longer count on
Bolivia as a safehaven. Moreover, the
raids are achieving the primary goal of
stopping the spread of cocaine refining.
Bolivia must complete the planning
for both the voluntary and involuntary
phases of its eradication campaign, and
bring a substantial portion of its illicit
coca acreage under control, enforced by
eradication where necessary, enhanced
by alternative development opportunities
where appropriate. The government
recognizes that continued assistance is
dependent in part on achieving the
eradication targets in the new agree-
ment now being negotiated with the
United States.
The killings and lawlessness in
Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley continue,
proving again that narcotics control and
the battle against terrorism must both
share a high priority with the Govern-
ment of Peru. Economic and military
assistance to Peru in 1987 are dependent
in part on the development and imple-
mentation of a comprehensive strategy
Dober 1986
39
NARCOTICS
ategictaskin
L986 and 1987 is to extend the coca
era.] ampaign into additional
growing areas of the I fpper Huallaga
Valley. Coca eradication in the valley
doubled in 1985, hut the new areas are
quite inaccessible and the pace of manual
eradication may be difficult to sustain.
Increased production of heroin and
marijuana in Mexico, which were on a
downward trend for several years
thanks to effective aerial eradication,
were key disappointments in 1985 when
other countries, despite great burdens,
met or even exceeded our expectations.
In meetings this week involving
Presidents Reagan and De la Madrid,
Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign
Secretary Sepulveda, and Attorneys
General Meese and Garcia, the United
States and Mexico have reiterated their
unrestricted cooperation and assistance
in rejuvenating a control program. The
United States is emphasizing the high
priority it attaches to reducing the flow
of heroin and marijuana from Mexico,
and the high priority it attaches to effec-
tive action against those traffickers
responsible for the death of DEA Agent
Gamarena.
In September, the United States and
Mexico will collaborate in an intensive
spraying program of opium poppy in the
infamous tri-State area. Mexico has
agreed to let the U.S. Government bring
in six turbo Thrush aircraft, and combine
them with three of their high-spraying
capacity Bell 212 helicopters, in an effort
to eliminate 70% or more of the fall
poppy crop before it is harvested. The
U.S. Government has assisted the Mex-
icans in improving this program in 1986,
including refinements in the spraying
process. Together with the verification
program, in which DEA agents ride with
Mexican officials to confirm fields
destroyed, these improvements bode
well for restoring the effectiveness of
this once heralded program. However,
there are other problems: the level of
effectiveness in seizures, arrests, and
prosecutions has never been as good as
in the eradication program. The U.S.
Government seeks a strong across-the-
board effort at improving enforcement.
In 1986 INM has purchased addi-
tional aircraft and is launching the
special Latin American regional enforce-
ment program for which the Appropria-
tions Committee provided $5 million.
The regional air wing, based in Colom-
bia, will upgrade strike force capability
throughout the Andean coca growing
region. Future Blast Furnace-type
operations may he conducted through
use of this regional air wing, funded by
INM, or with the assistance of DEA air-
craft, or further use of U.S. military air-
craft, or a combination thereof. The U.S.
Government is not limited to the military
option.
This air wing is but one aspect of the
trend toward regional approaches to nar-
cotics control. The cross-border opera-
tions involving Colombia with Peru,
Ecuador, and now Bolivia find their
counterpart at the policy level in the
expressions of solidarity at the OAS
[Organization of American States] con-
ference this year.
The U.S. Government is also helping
to curb the overseas demand, which
keeps production at high levels. AID,
USIA [U.S. Information Agency], and
INM have worked successfully on public
awareness and prevention campaigns.
In Southeast Asia, Burma now has
the opportunity, with production down in
1985 and a major eradication program
having been successfully undertaken in
the first quarter of 1986, to reduce the
world's largest production of illicit
opium. In Thailand the new eradication
program is being expanded. These
governments must enhance their efforts
to seize control of the border from traf-
fickers, to destroy heroin laboratories,
and to interdict shipments of both
precursor chemicals and finished opium
products.
It is estimated that opium production
in Pakistan this spring rose to a new
range of 100-150 metric tons— more
than double what it was 1 year ago. This
expansion was driven largely by higher
prices, resulting from increased regional
opium and heroin demand, and by a
reduction in the Pakistani Government's
enforcement program in the key Gadoon
area coupled with an expansion of opium
cultivation into remote tribal areas such
as Bajaur and Mohmand.
The United States and Pakistan
agreed at a special meeting of the
bilateral narcotics working group in
June that the ban on opium cultivation
would be effectively enforced in the
Gadoon, where AID has a major develop-
ment project, and in the Dir, where the
Special Development and Enforcement
Project managed by the United Nation
is being developed. The Pakistanis also
agreed to enforce the ban in those por-
tions of the Bajaur and Mohmand triba
areas where development assistance hi
been scheduled.
India is increasingly important as i
conduit for opium products from both
Southwest and Southeast Asia, as well
as for the shipment of precursor
chemicals into the Golden Triangle.
Turkey continues to sustain one of
the most successful efforts at preventi;
production of illicit opium poppy. Long
natural attraction for smugglers of eve
stripe because it serves as the landbrid
between Asia and Europe, Turkey con-
tinues to be a principal trafficking rout
for heroin from Southwest Asia, some
it refined in Turkish labs.
Pakistan and neighboring nations
must also find ways of curbing the flov
of opium products out of Afghanistan
and suppressing the numerous heroin
labs which operate along the Afghan-
Pakistan border. Viable approaches ha
not been found to Iran or to Laos, and
reports of increased opium production
the latter are of renewed concern, par-
ticularly given success elsewhere in th<
Golden Triangle.
Conclusion
The general task remains the same as :
earlier years: the grower-to-user nar-
cotics chain which stretches across five
continents must be broken through a
comprehensive program of internation;
control. Pressure must be applied at al.
points in the chain— through crop
control; through increased seizures of
both drug products and financial assets
through intensified investigation and
prosecution of traffickers; and through ,
effective treatment and prevention of
drug abuse.
'The complete transcript of the hearingsl
will be published by the committee and will b
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
40
Department of State Bullet
CEANS
/ho Will Protect
reedom of the Seas?
i John D. Negroponte
Address before the Law of the Sea
Ititute in Miami on July 21, 1986.
hbassador Negroponte is Assistant
tretaryfor Oceans and International
pironmental and Scientific Affairs.
lay, I would like to consider the
stion: "Who will protect the freedom
.he seas?" I intend to put aside the
' points and phrases of the law of the
and, instead, speak as a layman to
question.
The world's oceans are vital to
ikind in diverse ways. We are just
I inning to understand their environ-
|ital significance. We have always
d their fishery resources. We have
\xm to learn how to exploit some of
r other resources. And through the
Juries the world's oceans have been
ntial as waterways, and now air-
I'S, necessary to preserve the peace
to move world trade and commerce.
IThe freedom of use of the world's
line waters is what we mean by the
Idom of the seas. It is perhaps our
l| st customary international law
Q rine.
The freedom of the seas was not
tin to mankind. It was won— won
\ ujrh scholarly and legal debate and
■aval engagements. Over the years,
■freedom of the seas has undergone
ie changes and refinements. Its exer-
ie has become geographically com-
Bised; its composition has been
P;en into fragments, and some of
l<e have been lost. So, today, when
'upeak of the freedom of the seas, we
>en, primarily, the freedom of move-
It on the world's seas and oceans by
aies and maritime commerce: the free-
i to navigate and to fly from one
Hinent to another over broad
ftnses; the freedom to navigate and
Hy from one sea to another through
n the narrowest of straits.
Without the freedom of the seas, the
|qd would be a different place. Mari-
B commerce as we know it would not
U:. The global balance of power would
Unalterably shifted.
W;ats to Freedom of the Seas
Hfreedom of the seas has come under
ftk, traditionally, because of two con-
vations: coastal security and
resource requirements of coastal commu-
nities. Security considerations have
played a role in promoting new coastal
state jurisdictions. Both the legal
regimes of the territorial sea and the
continental shelf were justified on secu-
rity grounds. And coastal state resource
considerations have justified virtually all
forms of maritime jurisdiction.
Thus, in spite of its traditions and
benefits, the freedom of the seas is con-
fronted by something called the coastal
state. The coastal state regards the sea
as a resource— its resource. Some
coastal states go beyond that, seeing in
the sea a means of providing a security
buffer for their territory. The upshot is
that the coastal state seeks to bring
within its grasp as much of the offshore
area and resources as it can justify.
The coastal state is assisted in its
efforts by some of our finer professions:
scientists, engineers, lawyers, and politi-
cians. Marine science's search for knowl-
edge is resulting in many new discov-
eries of the ocean's potential. Engineers
find in the ocean the opportunity to
invent and to apply new technologies to
capitalize on that potential. Lawyers
find ample opportunities to create
"new" law, quietly whispering how to
justify exploiting that potential without,
as they say, "adversely affecting" the
freedom of the seas. And, then comes
the politician, weighing the issue, and,
as he or she does so, we must ask:
"Does he hear an advocate for the free-
dom of the seas?"
The technique which coastal states
have used for many years to assert con-
trol over area and resources, while
ostensibly not "adversely affecting" the
freedom of the seas, is to draw a dis-
tinction between the interest of the
coastal state and that of the interna-
tional community. The normal pattern is
that the coastal state acknowledges that
the international community has a cer-
tain right to navigate off its coast, if the
resource- or security-related jurisdic-
tional claim by the coastal state is
accepted by the international
community.
In concept the distinction between
resources use and navigation is a
reasonable approach which provides a
basis for balancing the interests of all
states. And the balance which exists
between coastal state security concerns
and the rights of the international com-
munity also has justification. In fact,
however, over the years the interna-
tional community has had a hard time
protecting its navigation rights. The fine
points of the law, the subtle distinctions
which are often the key to concluding
negotiations, often are lost sij^ht of in
practice. The result is ironic. Instead of
coastal state jurisdiction beinj; an
exception— a limited encroachment on
the freedom of the seas— we find the
opposite to be true, at least in terms of
political emotions: the freedom of the
seas becomes an exception or encroach-
ment upon the rules of coastal state
jurisdiction.
This trend, which has been going on
for some time, further endangers the
freedom of the seas. It does so by creat-
ing a new way of thinking about the
oceans in the minds of scientists, engi-
neers, lawyers, politicians, and others.
We begin to think in proprietary terms
about the sea off our coast, and, in
doing so, the freedom of the seas takes
second place to coastal state jurisdiction.
Examples of this process are evident
in the law of the sea. Once the freedom
of the sea applied to all marine waters.
Then the concept of the narrow ter-
ritorial sea developed— in which there is
the right, or some would call it an
exception, of innocent passage. Later
the concept of straight baselines found
its way into state practice and a right
(or exception) of innocent passage was
recognized where it had previously
existed. Later came the resource
claims— first the continental shelf, then
the narrow and later the broader fishing
zones, all ostensibly not "adversely
affecting" the freedom of the seas. More
recently, we have seen the development
of broader 12-mile territorial sea claims
together with a straits navigation
regime called transit passage that is not
supposed to "adversely affect" the free-
dom of the seas. The list goes on to
include the archipelagic states princi-
ples, together with the regime of archi-
pelagic sealanes passage. And, finally,
there is the exclusive economic zone,
and if you find the appropriate cross-
referenced passage in the 1982 conven-
tion, you will find that the exercise of
jurisdiction in that zone, also, is not sup-
posed to "adversely affect" the freedom
of the seas.
The freedom of the seas seems to be
lost in a welter of coastal state jurisdic-
tions. I remember a cartoon from the
New Yorker magazine about the time
the Third UN Law of the Sea Confer-
ence was beginning. It showed a group
of diplomats around a conference table.
Standing in the doorway at the back of
the room was Neptune. One diplomat
leber 1986
41
OCEANS
was speaking, and the caption said
something like: "Befon we begin our
conference on dividing up the sea. there
is a gentleman here who wishes to be
heard."
Well, would you say that from Nep-
tune's perspective the third conference
was a success or failure? A lot of ocean
and resources got divided up by the
coastal states at that conference. The
conference's attempt to deal with the
resources beyond coastal state jurisdic-
tion failed to achieve the agreement of
all states. And the promotion and pro-
tection of the freedom of the seas, under
the convention the conference devel-
oped, may only be found by proper legal
interpretation of subtle points and
phrases.
Why is this so? Why could not the
maintenance and preservation of the
freedom of the seas be expressed in
categorical terms throughout the con-
vention text? Why were so many points
disguised?
Perhaps the reason is that there is
no one group of states for which the
freedom of the seas is that group's
exclusive interest in the law of the sea.
There are no exclusively maritime
states. All the maritime states are
coastal states, as well. They must
balance their interests. One aspect of
their national interest must be balanced
against the other. Yet, it is this group
of states that is the principal user of the
sea— for coastal resource exploitation
and for international navigation. From
the practice of this group of states, the
customary law of the sea emerges.
Thus, the freedom of the seas— the free-
dom that presumably Neptune would
have us preserve— has no advocate that
does not have other interests and
responsibilities.
Avoiding Further Setbacks
The Third Law of the Sea Conference
was called, in part, because of the inter-
est of the United States and the Soviet
Union in stopping further erosion in the
meaning of the freedom of the seas. The
conference didn't halt it— look at what
happened during the conference— but it
may be said to have stabilized matters
for a period. Rut for how long? If the
freedom of the seas is not to suffer fur-
ther setbacks in the wake of the third
conference, the maritime states must do
tWO things and do them well.
The first of these is not to be afraid
to assert the freedom of the seas in
their activities around the globe. The
rights and freedoms of the sea will be
lost over time if they are not used.
There may, from time to time, be politi-
cal costs in exercising such rights; but
these costs cannot be avoided if the
right is to be preserved. Deference to
coastal states in the exercise of rights
will only make it more difficult to exer-
cise the right in the future, since the
political cost of using the right will
increase in the absence of usage.
In this regard, it is particularly
important that the maritime states uti-
lize the rights set forth and identified in
the 1982 convention. Many of the rights
making up the freedom of the seas are
somewhat obscured by the coastal
states' orientation of the convention
text. If the maritime states do not
remind others from time to time of the
existence or meaning of the significant
commas, phrases, and words found in
the text, the freedoms they represent
will be lost to sight.
The second thing that must be done
by the maritime states is that they must
keep their own houses in order. If they
let their coastal state personality get
the better of them, the freedom of the
seas will founder. The danger I see is
that there is a tendency for each state
to see the waters and circumstances off
its coast as in some way unique. In this
way the coastal state justifies assertions
of new or broader forms of jurisdiction
to satisfy its coastal appetite.
This tendency, which has been
dubbed "creeping uniqueness," is the
latest threat to the freedom of the seas.
A maritime state will not do good serv-
ice to the freedom of the seas if it gives
in to calls to consider its coastal waters
as unique, justifying a new and creative
legal approach. And it is worse still if
that creative legal approach goes be-
yond or severely strains the principles
laid out in the 1982 convention, thus
destabilizing the balance between the
freedom of the seas and the interests of
the coastal state that are reflected
therein.
The U.S. Role
How does the United States stack up in
all of this? The United States does,
after all, have a split personality when
it comes to the law of the sea.
On the first point, the United States
has been at the forefront in exercising
the freedom of the seas in spite of occa-
sional political costs. In particular, the
Navy's routine assertion-of-rights pro-
gram has received quite a lot of noto-
riety in recent weeks, given the events
in the Gulf of Sidra. It is important to
note that the program was developed in
the late 1970s, during the Carter
Administration. Thus, it has a bipartisan
character. Also, it is important to poa
out that the program was developed il
anticipation of the successful conclusuY
of the Third Law of the Sea Conferer i
It was believed that, even with a widl
ratified Law of the Sea Treaty to whil
the United States was party, it still
would be necessary to exercise the
rights set forth in the convention in
order not to lose them.
It goes without saying that it is
even more important that we exercist
our rights today. The 1983 presidenti;
ocean policy statement commits the
United States to this course. The exe
cise of rights— the freedom to navigat
on the world's oceans— is not meant t
be a provocative act. Rather, in the
framework of customary international
law, it is a legitimate, peaceful assert
of a legal position and nothing more,
the United States and other maritime
states do not assert international rigr
in the face of claims by others that d(
not conform with the present status c
the law, they will be said to acquiesc<|
those claims to their disadvantage.
What is particularly difficult in this si
ation is to understand that the more
aggressive and unreasonable and piw
ative and threatening a claim may be
the more important it is to exercise
one's rights in the face of the claim. T
world community can't allow itself to
coerced— coerced into lethargy in the
protection of the freedom of the seas.
On the second point, as well, the
United States gets good marks— but
perhaps not straight As. In general, t
United States has taken a conservath
approach to its coastal state claims. Ii
making its claims, it has made clear tl
there is no intention to "adversely
affect" the navigation rights of other
states in the waters off the coast of tl
United States. Both the 1945 Proelam
tion on the Continental Shelf and the
1983 Proclamation of the Exclusive E(
nomic Zone make clear in specific lan-
guage in the proclamations themselves
that the resource claim is not intende<
to affect the international rights and
freedoms of other states.
The United States has maintained
its narrow territorial sea at 3-miles
breadth. It has chosen not to draw-
straight baselines. It conservatively
exercises its right under Article 7 of t
1958 Convention on the Territorial Se;
and Contiguous Zone to claim juridical
bays less than 24-miles wide at the
mouth. It has only very few small
spots of historic waters, which are of I
consequence to the international comrr
nity and which could have been incorp
rated in a straight baseline system ha<
42
ACIFIC
chosen to do so. Contrary to what
ne foreign press reports have said,
> United States has not drawn
elines between the islands of the
mtians or of Hawaii. Foreign vessels
all states— commercial or military—
»'igate off the U.S. coast routinely,
isistent with their rights under inter-
ional law.
The United States has taken a con-
■vative approach to its maritime
ims for several reasons, one of which
.he desire to lead by example. By its
ion it hopes to encourage similar con-
vative approaches by others.
But the United States has been
>wn to put its coastal state hat on
m time to time. For the most part,
ugh, it has resisted the creation of
3S to meet its unique concerns. As
United States moves into the imple-
ntation of its exclusive economic
e, it must bear this in mind. We
st recognize that one cannot slice the
pie too thin. We must stand for prin-
ciples—recognizable principles that are
not riddled with self-serving exceptions.
The present challenge before the
freedom of the seas is that its tradi-
tional defenders have begun to think of
the oceans as a resource rather than as
the world's highway. Science and tech-
nology have opened to us the ocean's
resources. We must not expect that
mankind will be denied the opportunity
to exploit them. As mankind does so,
satisfying its needs and using its capa-
bilities, the freedom of the seas will con-
tinue to come up against coastal state
demands. If the freedom of the seas is
to survive— not to be subject to further
inroads— we must be energetic in its
promotion and protection. As we face
the challenges that science and technol-
ogy bring us, we must meet them bear-
ing in mind the question: "Who is
protecting freedom of the seas?" ■
.S. and Australia
old Ministerial Talks
Secretary Skultz and Secretary of
mse Caspar W. Weinberger and
tralian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Hayden and Minister for Defense
i Beazley met in ministerial session
'an Francisco August 10-11, 1986.
Following are the texts of Secretary
Uz's statement at the first plenary
Son, the joint news conference, and
joint statement issued at the conclu-
; of their meeting.
i:retary shultzs
tatement,
C. 11, 1986'
nehalf of Secretary Weinberger and
delf and the American delegation and
fericans everywhere, I want to
lome you formally to the opening of
IU.S. -Australian bilateral min-
tial talks. Our location on the Pacific
»t reflects the importance which the
led States attaches to this most
flimic region of the world and par-
larly to Australia— a fellow
alocracy, a strong ally, and a major
i|ributor tc global and regional
Bility.
The United States and Australia,
«g with New Zealand, came together
Litis same location 35 years ago to
m the ANZUS [Australia, New
Zealand, United States security pact]
alliance. Our countries had witnessed the
destruction of the peace by distant
aggressors and had learned that broad
oceans and geographic isolation did not
guarantee security. We had come to
understand that the survival of indi-
vidual freedom depends on strong
defense, both alone and in concert with
allies.
When he signed the ANZUS treaty
at the Presidio in 1951, a distinguished
New Zealand diplomat, Ambassador Sir
Carl Berendsen, said, "By creating an
area of stability in the Pacific, this
ANZUS treaty may be expected to
reduce world tensions and thus to prove
a reinforcement of, and a contribution
to, the general system of international
security. ... By providing directly a
strong measure of defense against
attack in the Pacific, it does at the same
time . . . make it possible for its parties to
play their part elsewhere because the
problem that the free world is facing to-
day is a global problem. ..."
Ever since, Australia and the United
States have worked together in ways
that benefit not only our own countries,
but the security of others whose fate is
linked to our own. We cooperate, for
example, in joint facilities that enhance
deterrence of nuclear war through pro-
viding for strategic early warning. These
same facilities allow us to verify arms
control agreements, thus making arms
control itself possible.
We also work together in military
exercises, improving the capability of
our forces to operate separately or
jointly in the event of a threat to peace.
Americans particularly value our ship
and air access in Australia. Our four to
five dozen ship visits per year allow us to
play a stabilizing role in the Western
Pacific and the Indian Ocean, areas of
vital importance to both countries
though nearer to Australian shores than
to our own.
Our fruitful cooperation conveys a
strong message to potential adversaries;
it shows Americans and Australians the
value of alliance. Our cooperation pro-
vides a bulwark against any temptation
to disengage from world problems and
look after only parochial interests, and it
deepens the bonds and special relation-
ship between our countries.
The United States and Australia
have strong economic ties. Our bilateral
trade exceeds $8 billion annually. We are
Australia's second largest market and
supplier. Australia is one of our major
trading partners and is also the location
of the largest U.S. investments stake in
East Asia, totaling more than $9 billion
by 1984. And our economic ties are
reciprocal; in 1985 Australian invest-
ment in the United States grew by more
than $450 million.
I would note also Australia's leading
role in regional growth and stability.
Official Australian development
assistance should exceed $365 million in
1986, primarily to Papua New Guinea
and other developing countries of the
South Pacific and Southeast Asia.
Australia continues to be a welcome and
major contributor to multilateral aid
organizations active in the region.
We also confront common difficult
problems as in the field of agriculture.
As was stated in the Tokyo summit
economic declaration, "a situation of
global structural surplus now exists for
some important agricultural products,
arising partly from technological
improvements, partly from changes in
the world market situation, and partly
from long-standing policies of domestic
subsidy and protection of agriculture in
all our countries," said these seven coun-
tries. "This harms the economies of cer-
tain developing countries and is likely to
aggravate the risk of wider protectionist
pressures. This is a problem which we all
share and can be dealt with only in
cooperation with each other. . . action is
needed to redirect policies and adjust
structures of agricultural production in
»«)ber 1986
43
PACIFIC
the light of world demand." I guess from
what I've heard, Bill, you might say,
"Amen, and let's get going on that proj-
ect."
We come together today without
New Zealand. We regret this absence
deeply. New Zealand has been a major
contributor to regional and global stabil-
ity, fighting bravely with its allies in four
wars during this century. This
distinguished record is testimony to New
Zealand's place in the community of free
nations.
Access for allied ships and aircraft,
however, is essential to the effectiveness
of the ANZUS alliance. If New Zealand
continues to say "no" to ships operating
under our universal policy of neither con-
firming nor denying the presence or
absence of nuclear weapons, then we
cannot send navy vessels to New
Zealand's ports. The New Zealand
Government's current policies of block-
ing traditional ship and air access thus
vitiate the principal contribution that
New Zealand makes to ANZUS.
Because of New Zealand's decision
to renege on an essential element of its
ANZUS participation, it has become
impossible for the United States to sus-
tain its security obligations to New
Zealand. We sincerely hope that New
Zealand will soon undertake adequate
corrective measures which will restore
port and air access and permit a return
to alliance cooperation.
New Zealand's actions can only
encourage those who hope to tear at the
fabric of Western cooperation. The
United States and Australia choose to
provide a different vision— a reaffirma-
tion of the willingness of democratic
peoples to make common cause in
defense of our principles and way of life.
I am deeply pleased to open this
bilateral ministerial— the symbol of our
continued alliance relationship. Our talks
today will range over issues of bilateral
security, economics, Asia and the
Pacific, and global security. In addition,
we hope to reach conclusions on the
nature of our relationship in the absence
of New Zealand, as well as to establish a
st ructure to preserve our ties until the
trilateral activities of the alliance can be
resumed.
JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE,
AUG. 11, 19862
Secretary Shultz. This meeting has
borne out once again the value— from
the standpoint of the United States, and
I hope from that of Australia— of the
ANZUS alliance and the discussions that
44
take place under it. We've had a broad
review of the security situation in the
South Pacific, the Australian area, and
for that matter, all through the world.
We've also had a good and, at times,
a vigorous discussion of economic prob-
lems, including those involved in
agriculture. While we have some dif-
ferences of view, it's good to state them
and talk them through, and see where
we may go from here.
So from our standpoint, the joint
statement expresses very well our sen-
timents, and we have welcomed very
much this opportunity to meet once
again with Foreign Minister Hayden and
Defense Minister Beazley and their col-
leagues. It's been a very good and pro-
ductive day.
Foreign Minister Hayden. The
Australian delegation. Defense Minister
Beazley and myself, have appreciated
the opportunity once again to explore a
wide range of mutual concerns of the
bilateral relationship which exists
between Australia and the United
States; and furthermore, to reinforce
that bilateral security association
between our two countries.
It is, as I mentioned this morning, a
matter of marked regret for us that New
Zealand is unable to participate on a
trilateral basis with Australia and the
United States under the ANZUS treaty.
As we've said before, the reasons which
have caused this are reasons with which
we disagree. We have an entirely dif-
ferent approach to policy on such mat-
ters to that adopted by New Zealand.
I also repeat, as Mr. George Shultz
said, there was a wide canvas explored,
including not only regional issues and
bilateral ones but broader global ones. In
particular, as I mentioned this morning,
we discussed the issue of increasing pro-
tectionism and the damage that it's
doing to countries in the world, allies of
other countries which are practicing
protectionism.
And in our case, it is clearly evident
to us that protectionism is impairing and
will continue to impair our ability to
fulfill a number of security roles which
we would wish to fulfill in the region.
We wish to see steps taken to roll back
that protectionism, and I have here, but
more particularly elsewhere, explored
with counterparts that need, and action
which might be taken.
Defense Minister Beazley and I
appreciate the warmth with which we've
been greeted on this occasion and helpful
dialogue which has taken place.
Q. One of the things that was
discussed on the issue of protectionism
is, where do we go from here? The
communique that you've issued is
bland in the extreme on the subject.
What is the answer? Where do we gi
from here?
Secretary Shultz. I think the
answer is, first of all, to recognize tha
the pattern of subsidies and the settin:
of higher than market prices that
encourages production, an attribute ol
policies throughout major countries
without exception, has brought us to a
position where there is a huge amount
supply of major commodities in excess
the demand. And so this subsidy struc
ture needs to be examined and
something done about it.
That is precisely what was called 1
at the Tokyo economic summit. I migr
say that before the President went
there, he heard very vigorously from
Prime Minister Bob Hawke about it in
visit to Washington, and that was ver;
much the message that he got.
So I think this is a principal conce
and we hope that it can be done in the
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] round which we hope will j
started in Punta del Este in the meeti
that takes place there in the middle of
September. I think that's the principa
thing that has to be done.
And in the meantime, all countries
need to examine their own policies am
do everything possible to roll back anc
contain the protectionist pressures th;
we see everywhere.
Q. There's been a lot of referent
today to air problems, or to air acces
I wonder if this is a new element
that's been interjected, and do you
foresee a time when the Antarctic b<
facility at Christchurch might be
shifted to Australia because of potei
tial air problems?
Secretary Shultz. We don't forest
any such shift. That facility has operat
successfully there for a long time. It's
research facility and is not connected
with this set of problems.
However, access to airfields and
ports from the standpoint of our milita
relationship operate under a similar ki:
of policy. And basically what's happeni
here is that the ANZUS treaty remain,
in effect— Australia and the U.S. rela-
tionship under it remains unchanged,
strong and vigorous. And New Zealani
has, in effect, withdrawn from that
security relationship by withdrawing
from one of its most important contrib
tions to the relationship.
Foreign Minister Hayden: The m;
ter hasn't been put to the Australian
Government. Should it be put, it would
be considered then and a determination
Department of State Bull
H
PACIFIC
ide. At this point, however, there's
such proposal before us.
Secretary Weinberger. Tasmania is
entirely separate activity, but as
cretary Shultz says, New Zealand has
cen action which, in effect, frustrated
; execution of the treaty, taken
;mselves out of it, and left themselves
?n without the security and the protec-
n of the treaty. The treaty remains in
ect between Australia and the United
ites, and if New Zealand ever changes
policy, we hope they can come back in
sin.
Q. If the United States is prepared
treat Australia with indifference as
trade, what faith should we place in
Is treaty negotiated today?
: Secretary Shultz. The United States
?sn't treat Australia with indifference
>ut anything, including in the field of
momics.
i In the field of economics and trade.
struggle as others do with these huge
plusses that have been generated. The
bsident's decision was simply one to
tag about the fulfillment of an obliga-
1 undertaken by the Soviet Union in
King a long-term grain agreement
h us, which was, that their minimum
chase would be 9 million metric tons,
east 4 million of which would be
hat. That's something that's been on
books for a long time.
In terms of thinking about
(stralia's interests, as we think about
|s, it's very much in our minds, and
jfeel that there was a great contribu-
li to our thinking when Prime Minister
[vke was in the United States before
i| Tokyo summit. We work together on
lie matters regularly, and I might say
It Foreign Minister Hayden has
Iged on me a little bit. So we under-
bid the importance of these matters to
Itralia. And we appreciate that.
Q. I'd like to ask Mr. Hayden what
neant by the statement in paragraph
<)f the communique, where it's
tted that Australia notes that pro-
. ionisl policies, particularly toward
^culture, would impair Australia's
■ity to work effectively in coopera-
i'l with its allies and friends. What
<s this mean?
Foreign Minister Hayden. Prime
Bister Hawke of Australia has stated
le categorically that there will be no
lage between security matters, such
■he joint facilities in Australia, and
fcmercial matters. He stated that
|e categorically, on a number of ocea-
ns recently, and publicly. So there's
Reference, no illusion to such matters
Tlied in that comment.
That comment refers to one simple
fact, and that is, as a result of the loss of
markets or the loss of income, I should
say, that will arise because of certain
pricing subsidization policies, Australia's
national income will be affected; export
income will be affected; our ability to
make purchases of a certain level of
defense equipment will be impaired;
perhaps our role to provide aid with a
political consideration behind it could be
impaired. And accordingly, our role to
fulfill as much as we would have wished
to have fulfilled will be less than it would
otherwise have been.
Q. It was recently reported to the
Australian Minister of Defense — the
Dibb report on the future of
Australian defenses finds that
Australia does enough as an ally by
hosting the joint facilities and pro-
viding access to naval ships.
And suggesting there's no need for
Australian defense forces to continue
to be equipped and trained for joint
operations with U.S. forces, it pro-
poses an independent draw of
Australian forces and an end to the
traditional participation of Australia
in joint allied forces in wartime. I
wonder if you have any thoughts on
the implications of these proposals for
the U.S. -Australia alliance.
Secretary Weinberger. We don't
read the Dibb report as reaching those
conclusions. We think that it is very
desirable for Australia to strengthen its
military forces to act in the various
regions set out in the Dibb report to
widening circles that encompass a great
deal of territory.
We think that if the Australian
forces are strengthened, as he suggests,
that that will benefit all of us, and it will
also enable Australia to play a role
anywhere that its government— present
or later government— may decide is
appropriate. And we think that that's an
encouraging and a useful suggestion of
the Dibb report.
We don't get any suggestion that
Australia would be withdrawing from or
giving up any of the basic obligations
that all of us who are interested in
freedom have to undertake.
Secretary Shultz. I might say that
the description of the Dibb report given
up by Defense Minister Beazley this
morning didn't bear much resemblance
to the description that you just gave.
Defense Minister Beazley. That's
absolutely correct, and I endorse the
views put forth by Secretary Weinberger
on his conclusions as to what it means.
I think the point that is important to
establish in regard to the Dibb report is
that it is a force-structure document. It
clearly relates the types of armed forces
that Australia needs to the most likely
categories of conflict into which we
would enter. It contains, nevertheless,
within it a capacity to operate effectively
unilaterally across something like 10% of
the Earth's surface and, with allies and
friends, across something like 25% of it.
Obviously forces so structured, with
that sort of capability, are capable of
deployments over substantial distances.
And any change in the force structure
that is related to that still leaves options
available to governments, if they wish to
exorcise them at different points of time
to go further afield.
I've been making that point immi-
nently clear, both in the tabling state-
ment that I made to the Dibb report and
in subsequent public debate on it.
And, of course, the talks today have
provided an opportunity to make that
point further. There's nothing essentially
new in it.
Q. You say in the statement that
New Zealand's current policies detract
from individual and collective capacity
to resist armed attack. My question to
you is whether or not there was any
discussion about measures to bring
New Zealand into line? Was it
discussed and discarded, not
discussed? And if not, why just the
rhetoric and no positive action to bring
New Zealand back into the alliance?
Secretary Shultz. First, there has
been a tremendous amount of effort to
find a way to maintain New Zealand's
posture in the alliance.
I can remember a very windy, rainy,
cold day in Wellington a couple of years
ago, when Prime Minister-elect Lange
came, and we had a meeting and started
a process of trying to work this out. But
it proved to be impossible, in that, at
least for the present. New Zealand has
consistently taken the position that it
won't receive vessels of our navy, under
our policy of no confirm or deny the
presence of nuclear weapons. It also has
its reservations about nuclear powered
ships, which represent, I think,
something like 40% of the navy.
So what you're saying is that you
won't allow into your port ships from
our navy. And if the navy can't call
there and use those bases, then how can
we operate effectively as an alliance?
We tried very hard to see if there
isn't some way that this could be worked
through, but there are certain hard
realities you have to face. I think in the
end, New Zealand chose, as it has a right
to do, basically to withdraw itself from
the alliance by denying port access.
3ober 1986
45
PACIFIC
\\ e're sorry about that. I miss New
Zealand, and as I said after my meeting
with Prime Minister Lange in Manila
only a few weeks ago, we part as
friends, but we part on security matters.
Q. Is ANZUS dead? Are we enter-
ing a new alliance era here?
Secretary Shultz. No. The ANZUS
treaty remains in effect, and the rela-
tionship between the United States and
Australia is as strong and vigorous as
ever, if not more so. It's very much a
strong and working system.
It's unfortunate that it doesn't
include New Zealand anymore, but as
has been pointed out here, it is left there
exactly as it has been, and if there can at
some point be some shift that makes it
possible for New Zealand to rejoin us,
we will be delighted. But there will have
to be some shift.
Q. In regard to the question of
New Zealand being left out, or having
left itself out of the ANZUS alliance,
there are, as you know, discussions
going on in Scandinavia still about the
nuclear-weapons-free zone — in an
upcoming meeting of the arm of the
Socialist Democratic Parties concern-
ing that question. Should, for
instance, the Labor Party government
of Norway now decide to go in for a
nuclear-weapons-free zone, which
would, in effect, mean that American
missiles can no longer come into
Norwegian ports without such
guarantees, as the New Zealanders
asked for, would that mean that
Norway, too, will be considered left
out of NATO?
Secretary Shultz. I would call your
attention to the fact, without the United
States having made any decision about
the South Pacific nuclear-free zone, that
the way in which that treaty is postured
in no way forecloses— in fact it explicitly
is consistent with the movement of
nuclear powered ships through that zone
and the calling on ports of countries in
that zone under the no confirm or deny
policj
So it's not a question of some
generalization; it's a question of exactly
whal operating policies are followed, and
SO far. our capacity to operate with all
our NATO allies has gone along very
well.
Q. In the talks today, and the talks
leading up to it, did the United States
ask Australia to in any way restrict its
ties or its relationship with New
Zealand?
Foreign Minister Hayden. No.
[Laughter]
Q. You discussed regional arms
control in the Pacific, and you men-
tioned that you had concerns in that
region. What are those concerns as
they relate to small Pacific island
nations, and what effect do you think
New Zealand's action will have on the
policies of those nations?
Secretary Weinberger. The basic
concern that we would have, first of all,
is that New Zealand has made itself far
less defensible by its action thus far. If
there is any suggestion that other
nations should follow that course, we
would obviously be worried that they
themselves are following a course which
would make it very difficult to defend
them. And if it's difficult to defend
them, then their vulnerability to Soviet
aggression increases. And that, of
course, we feel, would be bad for all of
us.
Q. While the Australian Govern-
ment has not raised the joint facilities
as leverage in the present negotia-
tions, the issue has been raised by sit-
ting members of the ruling Labor
Party and members of other political
parties in Australia. Has the United
States told Australia that recent
developments in communications
technology will make those facilities
redundant, and not necessary for
American —
Secretary Weinberger. No. We
most certainly have not.
Q. If the United States continues
to sell subsidized wheat to some of
your current customers, do you think
there's a risk that sentiment will grow
for Australia not to renew the leases
on the bases at Nurrangar, Pine Gap,
and Cape North West?
Foreign Minister Hayden. The
Prime Minister of Australia, as I men-
tioned to you earlier, said as recently as
this last week— and it was the severalth
time he had said it— there would be no
linkage between security matters and
commercial matters, and that specifically
that ruled out any linkage between the
joint facilities and our commercial
problems.
Q. Since Australia is maintaining
its bilateral defense relationships with
New Zealand, and the United States
with Australia, in effect, don't we
have a kind of domino problem here, in
the event that New Zealand was
attacked?
Foreign Minister Hayden. We sup-
port the American attitude that the
policy of the New Zealand Government
violates its longstanding principle and
practice of neither confirming nor deny-
ing in respect of the armament capabil-
ity of its naval vessels. It's not a policy
we accept; we've had the opportunity c
adopting that policy, and we rejected it
overwhelmingly as a party.
The relationship between Australia
and the United States— the security rel
tionship is an important one; it's impor
tant for that to be confirmed by the
exchange of letters which has taken
place today.
We have important strategic inter-
ests which we share with New Zealand
for instance, in the South Pacific, and
accordingly, we exchange information
[inaudible] is Australian-sourced, and
we're engaged in military exercises wil
them as a part of that common, shared
[inaudible] concern for that region. The
relationship will continue.
Q. Following the withdrawal of
U.S. security commitment to New
Zealand, does this in any way affect
New Zealand's access to purchasing
U.S. military equipment?
Secretary Weinberger. We have n
had any indications of any interest in
that, but I think all of these factors
would go into any equation, on any que
tion with respect to sales or anything o
that kind.
We would want to examine very
carefully what the request was that
came in and see if the request was in ai
way consistent with the change, the
unfortunately changed relationship tha
we now have with New Zealand.
Q. You pointed out a moment age
that America does not treat Australia
with indifference on trade issues. Yoi
also noted that the only sale of sub-
sidized wheat so far has been an
outstanding amount under a trade
agreement with Russia —
Secretary Shultz. No. That may
have been the implication of what I saic
but that's not correct.
There is an effort, particularly with:
respect to the subsidized sales by Euro-
peans, which we feel have disrupted
international markets, to give them the
message, through competition from the
United States, that this pattern of sub-
sidization is leading to very undesirable
results.
So there have been some sales, but
they have been directed at markets
which we have felt, through subsidies,
the Europeans took from the United
States.
And we've tried very hard to adminl
ister the program in a way that is sen- |
sitive to the interests of Australia, whici
in the field of wheat is a comparative,
advantaged, nonsubsidizing producer.
46
Department of State Bulleti
PACIFIC
Q. My question was going to be,
e you been able today to tell the
tralians that that will be the only
of subsidized wheat, and their
ket might be further affected?
And to Mr. Hayden, have you been
to extract anything from
retary Shultz today that this will
he only subsidized sale?
Secretary Shultz. The President's
sion is a specific, concrete decision,
there is that decision, and there isn't
:hing further.
I wish I could tell you exactly what
Congress will do, but I'm not able to
lict that. I do know that the Presi-
;'s view is that protectionism in any
i is bad. Subsidies are a form of pro-
ionism, and he has been waging a
strong battle against it. And not
a strong battle, but a winning
le. And so we see that in his veto of
textile bill; his veto was sustained
week in a very hard-fought vote.
We also see that part of the battle on
ection, from our standpoint, is to go
:her countries that have closed their
kets to our goods and to tell them
our case for maintaining our
rcets open is heavily dependent on
i opening their markets, so that
3 is, in the parlance of this field, a
playing field for everybody. That's
: we see. And I think that's what
;ralia sees.
foreign Minister Hayden. I raised
uiestion with Mr. Shultz today, and
inswer you've just received is pretty
i the answer that I received.
[inaudible] strongly our concern
t this advantage that we're
riencing, and will experience at a
ter level, as a result of this decision;
II affect price, and, therefore, it will
:t income for Australian wheat sales,
that will have a deleterious effect on
;conomy.
[inaudible] strongly that we would
"eatly concerned if there were to be
expansion of this, particularly into
markets or in greater volume into
soviet market.
Ve are pleased that, to this point,
n in the Congress, in particular
.tor Dole's proposal, has not been
Sed. I think it's going to be a
enge for Australia to be even more
•ous in representing its view, not
to the Administration, which we
been doing quite directly— and we
been doing it to the Congress— but
; so to the U.S. Congress in the hope
we can head off any further
llopments in this direction.
Q. Are you more confident than
the delegation was in Washington a
couple of weeks or so ago?
Foreign Minister Hayden. I don't
know how confident they were, but I
sincerely hope that with repeated
representation and lobbying, we'll be
successful. But if we're not, then as a
good friend and ally, we'll be taking a lot
of punishment. And we think that
inappropriate for a good friend and ally.
The estimate of our Wheat Board is
that the cost of these measures collec-
tively could go as high as $1,000 million,
and that's a lot for a country like
Australia to be affected by.
We're the second biggest— Australia
has the second biggest trade deficit with
the United States, just behind Saudi
Arabia, and that's in excess of $3,000
million, according to the last count I
saw.
The United States has a problem
with its balance of trade and current
account; therefore our contribution, as
one of the few countries which is con-
tributing a substantial trade, bilateral
trade surplus, is a very important one.
We don't wish to be disadvantaged in
other markets.
Australia's also a fairly important
market for the United States. We're its
eighth largest market in the world,
which, given our size, is a significant
level of market opportunities.
So we're looking for some considera-
tion of all of these factors, but in par-
ticular the fact that, as a friend and ally,
our capacity to function as effectively as
we would wish as a friend and ally is
impaired. To the degree to which we are
disadvantaged by these measures, they
have the capability of substantially dis-
advantaging us; therefore, the degree to
which we can fulfill our functions as a
friend and ally will be substantially
impaired.
Q. The U.S. Commander of the
Pacific fleet said at an interview with
the Los Angeles Times yesterday that
the absence of New Zealand causes or
creates a gap, a security gap.
Is it then wise to lose a friend, at
times when Mr. Gorbachev publicly is
raising more attention to the Pacific
and obviously wants to obtain Soviet
influence in this area? Specifically, is
Australia trying to fill that gap? Does
it not cause damage to your relation-
ship with New Zealand, your fragmented
relationship, if you only share limited
intelligence with New Zealand?
Secretary Weinberger. The gap
that's been opened was a gap that was
opened by New Zealand, in making
themselves far more vulnerable to
attack, far less easy for themselves to
defend or for anyone else to defend
them.
And they have, in effect, prevented
us from filling the gap by carrying out
our treaty obligations. They frustrated
the object and the purpose of the treaty.
We hope that they will change their
policy, and that we will be able to
resume normal relationships with them.
Defense Minister Beazley. There is
a substantial increase in Australian
activity in the Southwest Pacific
altogether going on at the moment. We
have a variety of defense cooperation
programs in place. Part of that program
is an increase in surveillance activities
which the Southwest Pacific countries
regard as very important to an impor-
tant area of their national sovereignty,
and that is their capacity to protect their
fishing zones.
We have a patrol boat program under-
way, by which we give to the Pacific
states a patrol boat, and something like
14 of those have now been ordered by
the South Pacific states. We anticipate a
substantially greater activity by
Australia in that area in the future.
In the question of Australia coopera-
tion with new Zealand, it remains in
place. We have a substantial historical
defense relationship with New Zealand;
that continues. It continues in the form
of joint exercises, joint training, and the
like.
It is Australia's view that the con-
temporary situation is not ideal, that it
would be obviously better to have a fully
functional trilateral relationship. In the
absence of it, we believe that we have an
obligation to maintain strong and
improving relationships with the United
States in a bilateral sense and also to
maintain those links with New Zealand.
Q. Will the United States help out
Australia in its purchase of the F-18,
and is the United States going to
accept Nomads in exchange for a
reduction on the F-18s?
Defense Minister Beazley. You'll
have to buy a lot of Nomads to get the
offset— [laughter]
Secretary Weinberger. We are
working with Australia very closely in
the Nomad program and in the acquisi-
tion of Nomads by various units of the
U.S. Government.
And we are also doing the best we
can to help out with respect to the pur-
chase of the F-18s. The F-18 is a very
capable plane and one whose capability
is demonstrated daily. Australia has
recognized this, and we're trying to do
the best we can to assist in that pur-
ser 1986
47
PACIFIC
e because it will strengthen both
countries very much.
Defense Minister Beazley.
Secretary Weinberger did point oul to
mi in mj private discussions with him
yesterday that they were picking up on
the Nomad. And that, from Australia's
point of view, is a very welcome deci-
sion. 1 might say, to offset the F-18s
would require the purchase of something
like 1,500 Nomads— [laughter]— and I'm
not about to impose that obligation on
Secretary Weinberger.
1 think, though, it was an opportu-
nity today to make a point which is being
well-accepted by our American col-
leagues, that we are a substantial arms
purchaser from the United States.
We have a situation, as a result of
the Dibb report and decisions of this
government, where we're purchasing
over the next decade something like
$20-30 billion worth of new arms.
Currently we spend about $2 billion
a year on arms overseas— sorry, alto-
gether. About $1.5 billion overseas, of
which something like 75% of that is
spent in the United States. And our
capacity to sustain that type of program,
which we see as critical not only to our
security but the security of our region, is
very much dependent upon the economic
growth of Australia. And I think that
point has been well accepted by our col-
leagues in discussions today.
Secretary Shultz. Thank you very
much. We have had a good discussion
here today. We look forward to periodic
discussions in the course of the year.
And the Australians have invited us to
come to Australia for the next install-
ment sometime next year, and we look
forward to that. We'll see you in
Australia.
JOINT STATEMENT,
AUG. 11, 1986
1. The U.S. Secretary of State,
Mr. George Shultz, and Secretary of
Defense, Mr. Caspar Weinberger, and
the Australian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Bill Hayden, and Minister
for Defense, Mr. Kim Beazley, met
August 10-11, 1986, in San Francisco to
discuss regional and global issues and
the further development of bilateral
relations.
Security Issues
2. I '.nth sides welcomed the continuation
of the pattern of close contact between
their governments at the ministerial
level. As a reflection of their shared
interests and continuing obligations as
allies, the two sides agreed to maintain
the practice of annual bilateral
ministerial meetings. In addition, the
two governments confirmed that they
would continue to hold their regular
defense meetings, annual political-
military discussions, and annual arms
control talks in order to maintain tradi-
tionally close consultations between
Australia and the United States. Addi-
tional contacts to maintain and enhance
military-to-military links, including com-
bined exercises, will ensure a continued
strong and dynamic security
relationship.
3. Both sides stressed the impor-
tance of the ANZUS treaty and of con-
tinued cooperation on defense and other
matters under the alliance.
4. Both governments regretted that
the continuation of New Zealand's port
and air access policies has caused the
disruption of the alliance relationship
between the United States and New
Zealand. They agreed that access for
allied ships and aircraft is essential to
the effectiveness of the ANZUS alliance
and that New Zealand's current policies
detract from individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack.
5. The United States said that it
could not be expected under these cir-
cumstances to carry out its security
obligations to New Zealand. Accord-
ingly, the U.S. side stated that it is
suspending its security obligations to
New Zealand unde the ANZUS treaty
pending adequate corrective measures.
6. The Australian Government
regretted that no resolution had proved
possible of the situation which had
developed. The Australian Government
repeated the view it had expressed con-
sistently over the last 2 years that it
disagreed completely with New Zealand
policy on port and air access and
expressed its understanding of the
action which the United States had
taken.
7. Both sides noted that, in the pres-
ent circumstances, although the ANZUS
treaty remains in place, virtually all
trilateral activities under it have been
suspended for nearly 2 years. Both sides
agreed that the relationship between
Australia and the United States under
the ANZUS treaty and the rights and
obligations assumed by Australia and the
United States toward each other under
the treaty would remain constant and
undiminished.
8. Both the Australian and U.S.
Governments appealed to New Zealand
to restore normal port and air access in
order to permit a return to trilateral
alliance cooperation under ANZUS. In
this context, Australia retains its tradi-
tional bilateral security relationship w
New Zealand.
Regional/Arms Control
9. Among other matters discussed w<
recent developments in U.S.-Soviet n
tions and issues of common concern ii
Asia, the Pacific, southern Africa, am
Central America.
10. The two sides also exchanged
detailed views on arms control and di
armament. They confirmed their com
mitment to negotiation of substantial
balanced, and verifiable reductions in
nuclear and conventional weapons as
means of reducing tension and streng
ening international security. Both sid>
while recognizing that there were son
positive elements in recent Soviet pre
posals, expressed the hope that the
Soviet Union would give substance to
the agreement reached between Pres
dent Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev in Geneva, which would op
the way to early progress on a new
agreement on offensive nuclear arms
reductions, in particular in areas whe
there is common ground, including th
principle of 50% reductions in the
strategic nuclear arms of both countr
appropriately applied, as well as an
interim global INF [intermediate-ran^
nuclear forces] agreement. Both sides
reaffirmed that strict compliance with
arms control agreements was essentk
to real arms control. Both sides dis-
cussed in detail their positions on the
SALT II Treaty. Other issues discusse
were nuclear testing and the need for
global ban on chemical weapons. The
two sides noted recent developments
with respect to the South Pacific
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, protocols t
which would be open to the nuclear
weapons states and states with ter-
ritories within the region.
11. The two sides exchanged view
on, and expressed their determination
see an end to, international terrorism.
Both condemned unequivocally states
involved in directing, exporting, and si
porting such activities. Both sides
expressed understanding of the need f
concerned nations to combat interna-
tional terrorism.
12. The two sides reviewed once
again issues affecting states and ter-
ritories in the Pacific Ocean. They noti
Australia's special interest in the islam
members of the South Pacific Forum, :
well as the U.S. proposals for termina-
tion of the Micronesian trusteeship, its
cooperation with successor entities, an
its efforts to reach a regional fisheries
agreement. Both emphasized the desir-'
ability of continued encouragement of
48
Department of State Bullet
REFUGEES
social and economic development of
island nations. They also reaffirmed
r intention to continue to work with
id countries in promoting security
stability in the area. Both sides
sd the increasing support being given
Australia to the development of
onal security capabilities of island
ltries and its commitment of defense
urces to support the security of this
on.
13. Both sides also reviewed devel-
ents in Southeast Asia. They noted
r common commitment to regional
ility was supported by Australia's
;e military cooperation and bilateral
■rising with the nations of the region.
nomic and Trade Issues
Both countries reaffirmed their com-
nent to holding and reversing protec-
sm and to reducing and dismantling
e restrictions. Australia noted,
ever, that protectionist policies,
cially toward agriculture, are
msly damaging its vital interests.
' would also impair Australia's abili-
• work effectively in cooperation
its allies and friends. The
ralian Government's concerns ex-
ed to the economies of other friends
allies in Australia's region, with
|itial substantial effects on regional
lity. This stability is important not
to the vital interests of Australia
dso to those of the United States.
5. Both countries agreed that the
1 practices of allies and friends, and
ability to achieve economic growth,
ital for their stability in pursuit of
ihion interests. The Australian
n-rnment expressed its deep convic-
lof the need for major agricultural
During countries that are subsidizing
Irts to pull back from pursuing
llies which could cause fundamental
jage to the international political and
nomic system.
j.6. Both sides agreed that recent
^national economic developments
fld importance to the need to obtain
ttantive commitments to address
Cultural trade problems in the
thing of the new round of multi-
:tal trade negotiations.
J 7. The Australian Government
led out, however, that while the
)>' [multilateral trade negotiations]
less on trade issues was important,
Jesuits that might be in prospect as
»jult were several years in the future.
Htwo sides noted that they have held
spent ministerial and technical con-
Itions on various aspects of U.S.
cj programs, including the export
enhancement program, and agreed that
these consultations would continue with
the aim of finding solutions to the prob-
lems created.
18. Mr. Shultz and Mr. Hayden
exchanged letters affirming continuation
of the commitments between Australia
and the United States under the ANZUS
treaty.
19. The Australian-U.S. ministerial
discussions underlined the wide range of
interests shared by the partners and
their continuing and steady determina-
tion to work together for peace and
security.
'Press release 160 of Aug. 15, 198(1.
2Press release 1(12 of Aug. 15. ■
U.S. Refugee Policies
and Programs at Midyear 1986
by James N. Purcell, Jr.
Statement before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on June 20, 1986.
Mr. Pur cell is Director of the Bureau for
Refugee Programs. '
This midyear consultation provides a
welcome opportunity to review develop-
ments in U.S. refugee policies and pro-
grams that have occurred since the
annual consultation at which the Secre-
tary of State testified last September.
By their nature, refugee programs
reflect and respond to rapidly changing
situations in many regions throughout
the world. The established structures of
an annual refugee consultation and an
unpredictable budget process often come
into conflict with the changing require-
ments of the real world. Periodic consul-
tations such as this enable us to report
on steps needed to adjust our programs
to the changing realities.
Your letter inviting us to this con-
sultation expresses particular interest in
the current situation of the "border
Khmer," the "Khmer review process"
at Khao I Dang, and other subjects
addressed in your comprehensive report
on the "U.S. Refugee Program in
Southeast Asia: 1985." In addressing
these and related subjects, I also want
to draw on the report of the independ-
ent Indochinese Refugee Panel, headed
by the former Governor of Iowa, Robert
D. Ray, which was submitted to the
Secretary of State on April 18. With the
assistance of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), we are
now conducting our own analysis of the
report.
I will also discuss the implications
for our programs of the funding cuts
mandated by the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings legislation and other budgetary
restrictions for this fiscal year (FY 1986)
and the related shifts in program and
funding priorities we will follow as a
result of these budget reductions. I will
also express the Administration's con-
cerns about the sizable reductions which
will occur in refugee and many other
international affairs programs as a
result of House and Senate action to
reduce funding for these programs in
their deliberations on the 1987 budget
resolution. Finally, as you have sug-
gested, I will provide an update on the
African refugee situation, with particu-
lar reference to Ethiopia and Sudan and
in light of the report recently completed
by the subcommittee's staff.
Reports on Southeast Asian
Refugee Programs
Before discussing these issues, however,
I would like to discuss briefly the con-
text in which we are addressing several
recent studies which have suggested
new policy directions in our Southeast
Asia program. We have had available
your review, as well as that of the Ray
panel and a number of other policy or
operational critiques. All point to a
crossroads, a need to move from almost
exclusive reliance on refugee resettle-
ment in the program to a more balanced
use of refugee and normal immigration
mechanisms. The Administration agrees
with this redirection.
For example, the Ray report pro-
vides, we believe, an excellent analysis
of the problem and offers viable sugges-
tions for addressing it. Implementation,
however, if it is to be enduring and
problem solving, must be done in an
international context with renewed
leadership and direction from the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and his staff. Only in this
way can we achieve broad-based burden-
sharing through the active participation
of other resettlement countries.
Furthermore, we must have a
mechanism capable of actively pursuing
sber 1986
49
REFUGEES
comprehensive, durable solution plan-
ning if we arc to avoid almost exclusive
reliance on third country resettlement,
issioner [of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service Alan C.] Nelson
and 1 had the opportunity to continue
the dialogue on such a process in
Geneva last week (June 12) with a num-
ber of our partners: Australia, Canada,
and Japan. We found the UN High
Commissioner and leaders of several
other major resettlement governments
receptive to the need to review our
joint approaches to the Southeast Asian
refugee program and willing to discuss
such approaches further. Coordinated
action at the international level is essen-
tial for future planning and operations,
and we are optimistic that our other
partners share this view and are eager
to pursue it further over the coming
months.
Also, we must realistically acknowl-
edge that reductions in the U.S. budget
for international affairs programs—
which, at this point, seem very likely to
occur— argue strongly for pursuing refu-
gee assistance programs with a renewed
emphasis on viable burdensharing. The
United States must never back away
from its humanitarian traditions and
obligations, but we must realistically
determine the proper U.S. role in such
undertakings. We are confident that the
good will and capacity still exist in the
international community for aggressively
pursuing solutions to the Indochinese
refugee problem, as well as those of
other regions, but care and patience
must be taken to develop the framework
which will permit an equitable burden-
sharing response to such problems.
Thai-Cambodian Border
Your report and that of the Ray panel
deal with many of the same issues,
including those highlighted in your let-
ter calling this consultation. Of those is-
sues, none is more significant and
sensitive for the future of the Southeast
Asian region, and for the future direc-
tion of our programs, than the situation
of the 250,000 Khmer and other popula-
tions along the Thai-Cambodian border.
The recent dry season in that region
came and went without significant
attacks on civilian encampments by
Vietnamese military forces, unlike ear-
lier years when Vietnamese ground
forces and artillery fire forced repeated
evacuations of the border populations.
This may well lie due, in part, to the
Thai Government's decision to move the
border encampments a short distance
into Thailand, thus removing the oppor-
tunity to attack camps immediately on
the border. To further lessen the
pretext for attacks, combatants were
separated from civilians.
In its discussion with senior Viet-
namese officials in Hanoi, the Ray panel
urged the Vietnamese not to attack the
civilian camps as had happened in
earlier years. The subsequent January
visit to Hanoi by Assistant Secretary of
Defense Armitage and then Assistant
Secretary of State [for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs Paul] Wolfowitz was
made conditional on the absence of such
attacks. The United States and its allies
used the diplomatic tools at then-
disposal to assure that the Vietnamese
knew that attacks on innocent civil-
ians would be met by worldwide
condemnation.
Now that the 1985-86 dry season is
over, we have seen that Vietnamese
military efforts this year concentrated
on further sealing the border region and
on measures to extend Vietnamese con-
trol of the Cambodian countryside. The
Khmer now residing in the camps in the
vicinity of the border will continue to
require special attention from the inter-
national community to assure their secu-
rity and welfare. With the International
Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] act-
ing as the focal point for protection and
the UN Border Relief Operation for
welfare and maintenance, we believe the
international mechanisms now in place
can adequately attend to these vulnera-
ble populations as the search for politi-
cal solutions to their situation continues.
Need for Improved
Education Programs
To the extent that the situation has
stabilized, it becomes all the more
desirable to provide improved education,
health, and feeding programs for the
displaced Khmer who remain in the
vicinity of the border. I was pleased to
see that the Ray panel emphasized the
need for such programs in terms similar
to those set forth in your report a year
earlier.
We in the Administration have also
urged that such programs be established
and expanded, and from information we
have received recently, I believe that
the responsible authorities in Thailand
are giving serious consideration to
allowing such programs to go forward if
the necessary international funding can
be assured. For a population of this size,
expansion of educational programs now
in place will require substantial addi-
tional resources.
Our government recognizes a
responsibility to assist financially, but
is also important that other govern-
ments, as well as private organization:
in a position to contribute, help to un-
derwrite these programs. The Khmer
the border have been forced to flee
their homelands in what the Thai and
we continue to regard as a temporary
displacement caused by the presence <
Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.
Although eventual return to their hon
regions clearly seems the right solutic
for the great majority of these people
is a tragic waste of human potential tl
so many of them have been growing i
for years without access to even mini-
mum schooling.
Border Processing
Such programs are even more import;
in view of the Ray panel's finding-
similar to yours— that refugee admis-
sions processing for resettlement in
third countries is not the appropriate
solution for the Khmer on the border.
The Ray panel endorsed our current
policy of immigrant visa processing fo
family reunification cases in this grou]
recommending generous use of human
tarian parole for hardship cases. I
believe this is also consistent with the
recommendations in this subcommittee
report.
Another group on the border— the i
4,500 so-called land Vietnamese refuge
who survived the hazardous trip acros
Cambodia from Vietnam— have been o:
particular concern to many Members c
Congress. Because of their special vul-
nerability, surrounded by hostile Viet-
namese communist military forces and
unfriendly Cambodian groups, we and
other countries are processing the lane
Vietnamese for resettlement on an
urgent basis. The Thai authorities
requested assurances that this entire
group would be processed, and we
understand that they are seriously conn
sidering moving the group away from ii
the border to a nearby inland site for I
greater safety and more efficient inter- ■■
viewing. We hope they will make a
favorable decision shortly. For this
group, the United States is considering
cases in all our processing priorities. V(>
believe this policy is justified by the
special vulnerability of the land Viet- i
namese and the absence of any prosper
for them to return to their homeland, j
You will also be interested to know]
that the United States has completed i
processing of a small group of Monta- I
guard refugees which was also located
at Site 2. We received many expressioi,
50
Department of State Bullet,
REFUGEES
ncern about this vulnerable popula-
from Members of Congress and the
ic. We processed the entire group,
i.ting all 213 considered. They are
undergoing' ESL/CO [English as a
id Language/Cultural Orientation]
ing prior to resettlement in the
;d States.
» I Dang
•efugee camp at Khao I Dang has
d as the main site for Cambodian
■ees within Thailand since their
al in the wake of the Vietnamese
ion in 1978-79. Of the approxi-
ly 1 (55,000 pre- 1980 arrivals, over
have been resettled abroad, in the
d States and other receiving coun-
The United States has approved
90% of the cases in this population
were presented to the INS. The re-
ng 14,500 of this group have been
;ed for admission to the United
s and, in some cases, other coun-
and have been the subject of con-
lg case reviews carried out by the
gration and Naturalization Service
he State Department, with the
ance of experts from private volun-
igencies.
le initial review of the Khmer
»ad at Khao I Dang was completed
le 1985. Between February and
i of 1985, there was a further
v of 154 previously denied cases in
aid, for whom the earlier denials
upheld in 84 cases and reversed in
ith some cases held for further
v. A subsequent formal review of
ditional 631 previously denied
was instituted in November 1985,
f this number, slightly under 10%
:t of 631 cases) were reversed,
each case averages several people
imily, we estimate that about 20%
population of 14,500 has benefited
such reviews.
le Ray panel stated that it was im-
d by the major efforts undertaken
lew the cases of the "denied
r" and recognized the difficulty of
ng out this process but concluded
.dditional cases should also be
ved. The panel noted that among
:nied Khmer are some with family
i the United States for whom it
be especially desirable to assure
here has been a full review,
has been the INS's judgment, in
we have concurred, that the
v of the 631 cases effectively com-
I the special review process. The
were selected with an eye to those
ppeared most likely to benefit
review, including those with family
i the United States.
Family Card Holders
Another group at Khao I Dang— the
4,300 so-called family card holders who
entered the camp between 1980 and
1984— has just become available for
resettlement processing, and the United
States will soon commence processing in
priorities one through five. We are not
planning to process those who entered
the camp illegally after August
1984— the so-called ration card holders
who are regarded by the Thai and the
international community as essentially in
the same status as the Khmer on the
border.
At a June 13 meeting in Bangkok,
the Thai authorities stated their ulti-
mate intention to close Khao I Dang and
to move those remaining there to a loca-
tion of their choice along the border. We
have reminded the Thai of our interest
in the family card holders, as well as
those who will benefit from immigrant
visa processing. The planned relocation
of these groups is, of course, the re-
sponsibility of the Thai, but we have
requested that they keep the camp open
until all governments have had an
opportunity to complete their processing
and the UNHCR has had an opportu-
nity to determine whether other forms
of durable solutions should be consid-
ered. The UN High Commissioner will
visit Southeast Asia in September, and
this is one of the subjects he will ad-
dress. Thai officials agreed at the
June 13 meeting to meet again later in
the year to review the status of Khao I
Dang with UNHCR and the major
resettlement governments.
Lao in Thailand
Both this committee's report and that of
the Ray panel deal extensively with the
situation of Lao refugees in Thailand,
particularly the screening program that
has been instituted by the Thai authori-
ties with the participation of the
UNHCR to determine which of the
newly arriving Lao qualify for refugee
status and which should be returned to
Laos as illegal immigrants.
Essential to this program has been
the Lao Government's agreement to
accept back those screened out. Despite
an earlier agreement in principle be-
tween the Lao and Thai Governments,
thus far, none of the approximately
1,000 persons have been permitted by-
Laos to return home. We are supporting
the UNHCR's efforts to work with the
Lao authorities to assure their safe and
orderly return.
On the positive side, the screening
program has acted to reduce the num-
ber of new Lao arrivals in Thailand.
Since it started in July 1985, 3,900 Lao
have arrived in Thailand, as opposed to
16,000 during the comparable period in
the preceding year. Almost half of the
arrivals since July 1985 have been
granted temporary asylum by Thailand
and are currently in UNHCR camps.
U.S. Admissions Policy
On the general subject of Indochinese
refugee admissions to the United States,
the Ray panel's recommendations point
in the same direction as your report a
year earlier. The panel concludes that
the Indochinese program should have
two components:
• A continuing refugee program for
those who meet the legal definition of
refugees; and
• An effective immigration program
for those seeking admission to the
United States on the basis of family
ties.
Such a shift toward immigration
processing was endorsed in Secretary
Shultz's statement to this committee
last September, and it is now under
careful review by the interagency study
group to which I referred earlier. The
Ray panel suggested a number of steps
to be considered in a transition period.
There appears to be wide recognition
that the time is at hand for such a shift
of emphasis in our admissions programs.
Essential to this recommendation is
the recognition that many of the 800,000
Indochinese now in the United States
are or will soon be eligible, if they pro-
ceed with adjusting their status, to peti-
tion on behalf of relatives for admission
as immigrants. The panel endorsed the
suggestion, which also finds favor in
your report, that the private voluntary
agencies should continue to play a key
role in aiding these groups, regardless
of their method of admission to the
United States.
Budget Situation and
FY 1986 Admissions
In recent months, all parts of the execu-
tive branch have been undertaking pro-
gram reductions necessary to conform to
the requirements of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings legislation. In our
case, in addition to applying the across-
the-board reductions, we have had to
consider additional shifts in our limited
funds to meet critical refugee assistance
needs overseas.
!er 1986
51
REFUGEES
Life-sustaining care and maintenance
requirements are expanding n>r refugees
in Africa, the Aghans in Pakistan, the
Cambodians on the Thai-Cambodian
border, and for other groups in South-
east Asia and elsewhere. These acceler-
ating needs cannot be met out of the
funds originally budgeted for this pur-
pose, even before the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings reductions. In order to meet
t hese highest priority needs, therefore,
we have no alternative but to apply
even greater cuts in proposed funding
for FY 1986 admissions— and, thus, in
the numbers to be admitted— beyond
those mandated by the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985.
Revised FY 1986 Admissions
For FY 1986, we can foresee that we
will be unable to utilize fully the 67,000
admissions ceilings announced by the
President. Instead, we expect refugee
admissions at about the 61,000 level.
The following chart shows the
regional ceilings established for this
year and the projected number of admis-
sions that we expect to be able to fund
out of our budget after the shifts and
reductions described above.
Department's 1986 refugee program has,
as we expected, proven inadequate to
meet the serious refugee needs the in-
ternational community is addressing
throughout the world. The impact of
these reductions is magnified when one
considers that up to a quarter of our
budget is protected from reductions
through statutory earmarking imposed
by authorizations and appropriations
actions.
Therefore, because of the unavoida-
ble and critical need to meet serious
care and maintenance requirements of
refugees in Africa and Southeast Asia,
which exceed current budget availabili-
ties, we have proposed to reprogram
$9.2 million from the U.S. admissions
program. This will result in the ability
to fund only 61,000 new admissions. We
regret this action but believe we have
no alternative, given the urgent needs
overseas and our reduced ability to
meet them. Highest priority will have to
be given to life-preserving programs.
Funding for FY 1987 programs
could become even more limited, espe-
cially if the major reductions proposed
in either the House or Senate overall
budget resolutions are enacted into law.
As you will recall, the Administration's
FY 1986 Regional Admissions Ceilings
East Asia— First Asylum
East Asia-ODP
Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R.
Near East and South Asia
Latin America
Africa
Total
FY 1986
Ceiling
37,000
8,500
9,500
6,000
3,000
3,000
67,000
Revised
Admission
Levels
35,000
8,500
9,500
6,000
250
1,750
61,000
We have substantially reduced the
projected Latin American numbers be-
cause the Government of Cuba has not
resumed implementation of the Migra-
tion Agreement with the United States
signed in December 1984. The lower
African admissions result from a
moratorium on refugee movements insti-
tuted by the Government of Sudan. We
have been forced to reduce expected ad-
missions from East Asia/First Asylum
by 2,000 in order to free additional
resources for basic refugee assistance
requirements, particularly in Africa.
The post-Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
budget of $324 million for the State
1987 budget request of $22.6 billion for
the international affairs budget function
has been reduced to $17.9 billion and
$17 billion by the Senate and House
respectively. What these actions will
mean specifically for the refugee pro-
gram request of $347 million is, at this
time, uncertain, but it is likely to be
substantial. Given that these funds aid
almost 10 million refugees throughout
the world, cutbacks of the magnitude
now being discussed would have serious
implications for the well-being of these
vulnerable people. We urge the support
of this committee in assuring that ade-
quate funds are provided for these
vitally important humanitarian
programs.
First Half FY 1986 Admissions
For the committee's information, I ar
also providing the status of actual
admissions to the United States as of
April 30, 1986:
East Asia— First Asylum 21
East Asia-ODP 4.
Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. 5.
Near East and South Asia
Latin America
Africa
Total
:!.->
Drawing on refugees already in t\
refugee processing centers, projected
Indochinese admissions for the re-
mainder of the fiscal year are expeeti
to be close to the proposed reduced
level of 35,000. Admissions under the
Orderly Departure Program (ODP) ai
likely to reach the 8,500 ceiling.
Although admissions of refugees
from the Soviet Union (primarily Sov
Jews) continue to run disturbingly lc
(511 as of the end of April), admissioi
of other categories of refugees from
Eastern Europe should bring us closi
the 9,500 ceiling.
In the Near East region, refugee.'
are drawn primarily from Afghans
(1,629 as of April 30) and Iranians (1,!
for the same period), and total admis-
sions for the year are expected to coi
close to the 6,000 ceiling.
From Latin America, as noted
above, we have been disappointed in
hope that the Cubans would terminat
the suspension of the December 1984 ;
Migration Agreement. Admissions noi(
total 21 Cubans from other parts of
Central America, and admissions for t|
year may well stay below 100 persons.
The shortfall from Africa, as I ha\|
mentioned, is caused largely by sus- I
pension of processing in Sudan. The |
suspension resulted initially from the j
government's moratorium on refugee |
movements but has continued becausej
the current security situation and the
withdrawal of American personnel. If
we are able to move the 950 already £
proved by INS in Sudan, we could stiij
come close to the projected admission,
of 1,750.
Actual Admissions in FY 1985
For comparison, actual refugee admis-
sions in FY 1985 totaled 68,045 out of,
ceiling of 70,000 [see chart].
52
Department of State Bulle
REFUGEES
19S5 Refugee Admissions
It Asia— First Asylum
tAsia-ODP
tern Europe and U.S.S.R.
r East and South Asia
n America
ca
AL
Actual
Admissions
41,972
7,998
9,990
5,994
138
1,953
68,045
Regional
Ceilings
42,000
8,000
10,000
0,000
1,000
3,000
70,000
lgees in Africa
budget shifts I have described have
i driven, to a large extent, by the
jased requirements for refugee as-
mce in Africa. The African refugee
ition is complex and dynamic. Many
itries are concurrently generators of
receivers of refugees; refugees may
eturing home to some countries at
same time as their compatriots are
ng into refuge.
fou will remember that, during late
and 1985, the number of refugees
frica in need of international as-
nce grew from some 2 million to
; 2.8 million. The dramatic increase
principally caused by the coinci-
e of drought and civil strife. The
ively abundant rains this year may
d an end to the natural disaster of
ght but do not necessarily lead to a
ion to Africa's refugee problems,
example, Chadians who fled into
in may have been seeking food
!f aid as much as they were fleeing
•avages of assorted bandits and
'.1 enemies. Although rains have
rned, renewed fighting in Chad's in-
al war and the geopolitical interests
ibya, Sudan, and Chad— among
rs— conspire to keep many of those
lians in Sudan and of concern to
iCR. Elsewhere in Africa, the num-
of refugees able to return to their
2s have been offset by new refugee
3. Therefore, the overall number of
jees in Africa remains fairly con-
t, though the composition of the to-
* changing.
i of Africa
respect to the Horn of Africa, we
nue to monitor closely the condi-
which generate refugees. Two poli-
of the Government of Ethiopia-
rial resettlement and villagization—
ar to have caused significant flows
fugees into Sudan and Somalia.
Resettlement is currently suspended,
although the Ethiopian Government has
announced that it will resume later in
1986. We hope that any resumption will
not be accompanied by the gross viola-
tions of human rights previously asso-
ciated with the program.
Villagization, which is purported to
improve services by organizing commu-
nities into more easily assisted units, is
an ongoing effort to relocate up to
33 million rural peasants. As many as
70,000 people have arrived in northwest
Somalia during the past 6 months, claim-
ing that they are fleeing the effects of
villagization.
There have been a number of
problems with the assistance effort in
northwest Somalia since the Govern-
ment of Somalia has decided not to
move these new refugees away from the
border to a more suitable site. However,
the office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees is organizing relief opera-
tions, and conditions seem to be
stabilizing.
Of course, civil strife in northern
Ethiopia is an ongoing cause of major
refugee flows into Sudan. And the
Oromo Liberation Front is engaged in
activities in western and southern
Ethiopia that contribute to flows to
Somalia.
Uganda
Another refugee emergency "hot spot"
which we are watching closely is south-
ern Sudan and northern Uganda. War in
southern Sudan has led to the collapse
of traditional civil authorities. As a
result, in early May, armed attacks
were made on Ugandan refugee settle-
ments. To date, some 60,000 Ugandan
refugees have fled home to Uganda.
Uganda is currently enjoying a period of
relative stability and, so far, has been
able to reintegrate these returning refu-
gees with remarkable ease, despite
rather widespread destruction in north-
ern Uganda. Additional precipitous
returns, however, could result in more
serious problems for Uganda, since
there are as many as 200,000 Ugandan
refugees still in southern Sudan.
Southern Africa
There have not been the outflows from
the Republic of South Africa that one
might have expected, given the current
violence there. Rather, South African
Government pressures on countries of
first asylum— including the recent raids
in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe-
have caused UNHCR to relocate refu-
gees to safer places of asylum. Our
government has strongly condemned
those raids, and the Refugee Bureau has
earmarked funds to help repair the refu-
gee reception center in Zambia that was
attacked.
We are, of course, quite concerned
about the potential for new refugees, in-
cluding some who may simply be fleeing
the widening violence rather than being
associated with any of the banned
organizations. We are continuing to
work with our refugee officers in the
neighboring countries to ensure that
contingency planning is done by the
relevant international organization
whose mandates require it.
If the number of South African refu-
gees has not been growing dramatically,
the number of Mozambican and Angolan
refugees has. As many as 180,000
Mozambican refugees have fled to South
Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and
Swaziland since 1984. Over 100,000 new
Angolan refugees have entered Zaire
and Zambia last year and this year.
Refugee Aid and Development
African host nations are developing
countries with limited resources to pro-
vide for their own citizens. We try to do
our fair share of providing for the care
and maintenance of African refugees
through international organizations such
as the UNHCR, ICRC, and WFP
[World Food Program]. However, there
is also a need to pursue more lasting
solutions through integration of refugee
and development aid. These medium-
and long-term needs must not be forgot-
ten in the process of responding to
urgent lifesaving demands.
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
53
SOUTH ASIA
Visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister
Prime Minister Mohammad Khan
Junejo of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan made mi official visit to the
United States July 986. While in
Washington, B.C., July 15-18, he met
with 1'resident Reagan and other govern-
ment officials.
Following is the text of the joint
statement issued on July 18.
At the invitation of the President
of the United States of America,
Ronald Reagan, the Prime Minister of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
Mohammad Khan Junejo, paid an official
visit to the United States from
July 15-22, 1986.
The Prime Minister held intensive
and wide-ranging discussions with the
President, with senior representatives of
his Administration, and with Members of
Congress on matters of mutual concern
relating to the promotion of inter-
national peace and security, political
cooperation, and economic development.
The President and the Prime
Minister reviewed bilateral relations and
found them warm, friendly, and
mutually beneficial. They expressed
satisfaction with existing cooperation
and the hope that further progress
would be made through the U.S.-
Pakistan Joint Commission and the U.S.-
Pakistan Consultative Group. Both sides
welcomed the conclusion of the
memorandum of understanding to
facilitate transfer of technology to
Pakistan and to ensure its protection.
They noted with approval the discussions
underway to revise the Convention on
the Avoidance of Double Taxation. They
agreed that private-sector investment
missions should be encouraged, and in
the field of education, they agreed on the
despatch of an American team later this
year to discuss cooperation aimed at
improving the teaching of English in
Pakistan.
The President lauded the return of
representative democracy to Pakistan,
praising Prime Minister Junejo and
President Zia-ul-Haq for the steps taken
during the last year to end martial law
and to restore to the Pakistan people the
full liberties guaranteed by the 1973
Constitution. The President and the
Prime Minister agreed that democratic
institutions will make an important con-
tribution to Pakistan's continued stabil-
ity and progress.
Secretary Shultz greets Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo at Andrews Air Force I
on July i5. 1986.
The President underscored his
strong personal commitment to arms
control and to the prevention of the
spread of nuclear weapons. The Prime
Minister expressed his understanding
and support of U.S. efforts to promote
arms control and the nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister
reitereated the peaceful nature of
Pakistan's nuclear program. The two
leaders agreed, moreover, that it is
incumbent on each state in the region to
ensure that its use of nuclear energy is
strictly peaceful and to take concrete
steps to demonstrate a shared commit-
ment to nonproliferation.
The Prime Minister and the PresL
dent considered in depth the situatiori
South and Southwest Asia. They note!
with serious concern the grave consal
quences for regional and international,
peace and stability which flow from tip
continuing Soviet occupation of and aw
gression against Afghanistan. They a.,
demned the repeated attacks on
Pakistan's territory from Afghanistan
The President reaffirmed the U.S. coy
mitment to nonaligned Pakistan's ind,
pendence, security, and territorial
integrity.
54
Department of State Bulk
TERRORISM
IBoth leaders agreed on the urgent
id for a political settlement of the
nanistan problem consistent with the
:iples enunciated in the seven resolu-
: adopted by overwhelming major-
in the UN General Assembly. The
ident expressed his strong support
'akistan's sustained efforts to pro-
] such a peaceful settlement of the
al conflict imposed upon the Afghan
»le. They expressed the hope that at
xtrthcoming round of the Geneva
'mity talks under the auspices of the
onal representative of the UN
etary General, the Kabul side will
brward a short timetable for the
drawal of Soviet troops from
mnistan.
The President expressed his admira-
for Pakistan's courage in standing
Soviet pressures through Afghani-
and for its selfless provision of
anitarian relief to the nearly 3
3n Afghans who have fled to
stan in the last 7 years. The two
ts agreed on the importance of
asing the availability of
initarian assistance for the
tless numbers of Afghans affected
le war. The President recalled his
it meeting with the courageous
rs of the Afghan alliance. The two
rs expressed the hope that the
ce will play an increasing role in
ering international support for the
■ of Afghan freedom,
he Prime Minister and the Presi-
expressed satisfaction with the suc-
il conclusion of negotiations earlier
ear of a follow-on assistance
tge for Pakistan in the sum of $4.02
l over a 6-year period beginning
year. The President stressed that
nique multiyear program provides
ble evidence of the durability and
luity of the U.S. commitment to
sfthen Pakistan's defensive
'ilities in the face of Soviet
ures from Afghanistan. U.S.
mic assistance is intended also to
ement Pakistan's own efforts to
irthen its economy,
he Prime Minister briefed the
ient on discussions between the
nments of Pakistan and India on
ving relations between their two
ries, a process strongly supported
; United States. The President wel-
1 the pledge made by the Govern-
i of Pakistan and India not to
: each other's nuclear installations
{pressed the hope that these
isions would continue to yield suc-
The Prime Minister also pointed to
initiatives supported by his
government to expand regional coopera-
tion among the nations of South Asia,
highlighting the promising beginning
last December of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC). The President referred to his
message to the South Asian leaders
welcoming their establishment of
SAARC and expressed his government's
support for regional efforts, both under
SAARC as well as bilaterally, to pro-
mote peace and cooperation.
The Prime Minister and the Presi-
dent expressed deep concern at the
growing threat posed by international
narcotics trafficking to the very fabric of
society in every part of the world. They
discussed measures to halt the produc-'
tion of opium and other dangerous drugs
at their source, to suppress processing
facilities wherever they may be found,
and to escalate the war against domestic
and international traffickers. To this
end, the two leaders agreed to
strengthen their antinarcotics coopera-
tion and to explore aerial spraying as a
poppy eradication measure.
The Prime Minister expressed his
sincere gratitude to the President and
the people of the United States for the
generous assistance provided his country
over the past 35 years and for the warm
welcome accorded to him and his delega-
tion. He extended a cordial invitation to
the President to visit Pakistan. The
President expressed his appreciation for
the invitation and reiterated his desire to
visit Pakistan at a convenient date. ■
Terrorism and Tourism
by Robert B. Oakley
Address before the Conference on the
Future of Transatlantic Travel at the
Plaza Hotel in New York City on
July 23, 1986. Ambassador Oakley is
Acting Ambassador at Large for
Counter-Terrorism.
It is a pleasure to be here today to
discuss a very important issue to us
both— terrorism and tourism. The two
words unfortunately could be used for a
tongue twister— they sound too much
alike and get mixed up not only when
one is talking too fast but sometimes in
the popular perceptions.
We're all probably sick of hearing of
the "horror stories" about how the fear
of terrorism has sharply hurt tourism in
many parts of the world. I'm sure these
stories cause a sinking feeling in the
stomachs of those who are in the tourism
business, especially dealing with travel
to Europe. I won't try going into detail
on how bad that picture is— you have the
figures. We do not. But it might be
useful to first sketch out the broad pic-
ture of the actual terrorism situation-
including the figures we do have— and
then discuss what the use is trying to do
about it and how we can work together.
Facts and Figures on Terrorism
It seems that almost every day there is
some new reminder of terrorism on our
televisions or on the front pages of our
newspapers. Some of it is good news and
bad news. An Italian court recently con-
victed the hijackers of the Achille Lauro
but there is a strong feeling that the
sentence was not long enough for some
of them. There have been several recent
major terrorist acts in Europe, but
because Americans were not involved
they got only fleeting attention from the
American media.
Over the past 2 years there has been
a major surge in terrorism abroad, both
internal (for example: within Lebanon,
India, Sri Lanka, Peru, Colombia, and
Chile) and international incidents. The
latter rose from the 500 per year
average for 1979-83 to 600 in 1984 and
about 800 in 1985. This upward trend
continued during the first several
months this year. Preliminary tallies
indicate there were about 417 interna-
tional terrorist incidents for January-
June 1986, compared with 352 for the
same period of 1985.
The increase since mid-1984 has
come from the Middle East and Latin
America. For 1984 there were only 81
incidents recorded in Latin America,
with 132 for 1985 and 65 for the first
half of 1986. There were 109 incidents
during 1983 in the Middle East, 206 dur-
ing 1984, 378 during 1985 (plus about 75
conducted by Middle East terrorists in
Europe), and 165 during the first half of
this year in the Middle East (plus about
26 conducted in Europe). Since April,
Qadhafi-directed terrorism has been
quiescent in the aftermath of U.S.
military raids and the ensuing Libyan
disarray and the European crackdown in
which more than 100 Libyan so-called
tier 1986
55
TERRORISM
diplomats and businessmen have been
expelled; Syria and Iran appear to be in
ious mode. However, several
Palestinian splinter groups have been
active and could get even more active in
Europe. And during the past 2 weeks,
leftwing European groups have once
again resumed their operations. Thus it
seems probable that terrorist activity in
Europe will not diminish during the last
half of the year, although it may not be
directed so much against Americans.
In Latin America, the most intensive
area of recent activity has been Peru,
followed by Colombia and Central
America. Two American tourists
recently were killed during a terrorist
attack in Peru, although it received little
public attention. Cooperation between
narcotics traffickers and terrorists is a
growing problem. The United States and
the U.S.S.R. rank just behind the
Government of Peru as targets there,
and resident Americans are choice
targets elsewhere in Latin America.
Although for the past decade U.S.
citizens and installations abroad have
been the number one terrorist target
(aside, of course, from Israel), it is a
mistake to believe that we are the prin-
cipal target of foreign terrorists. Despite
the impression received from sensa-
tionalist, ethnocentric media coverage,
the percentage of attacks against
Americans has actually decreased over
the past 3 years from 40% to 25%. The
2,200 terrorist casualties last year— up
from 1,300 in 1984-and the nearly 800
incidents were spread among citizens
and facilities of some 90 countries. Of
the 877 men, women, and children who
were killed last year, 28 were Americans
and 28 were Israelis. The impression
that the terrorists— especially Middle
East terrorists— are waiting in Europe
to pounce primarily upon Americans is
just not true. Among the various targets
of Middle East terrorists operating in
Europe— the region in which you are most
concerned— Americans have been the
targets of fewer incidents than anyone
else. The biggest target has been
Palestinians and other Arabs. In the past
year and a half, from January 1985
through June 1986, there were about
100 terrorist attacks in Europe attri-
buted to Middle Eastern groups. Arabs
and Palestinians were the victims of 49%
of the attacks, down from 65% for the
preceding 5 years. The percentage of
attacks against Israeli and Jewish
citizens remained virtually the same at
15%. The percentage of attacks against
Western Europeans and Americans
doubled— 26% for the Western
Europeans; 10% of the Americans. But
for Americans, that worked out to only
10 incidents over the past 18 months.
Any death from terrorism is one too
many, and terrorism is designed for the
maximum shock effect upon public and
political opinion— we do not and should
not accept them as a part of the modern
world the way we do car accidents.
However, we should keep the number of
incidents in perspective as well as the
perpetrators, intent to shock. We must
take the proper precautions but not
allow ourselves to fall into their trap and
react thoughtlessly. The chances of
being unexpectedly killed in a car or
plane crash or in a criminal attack are
much higher than being in the wrong
place at the wrong time when a terrorist
group manages to make an attack.
Resolving the Decline in Tourism
While it's easy to hit on the fear of ter-
rorism as the culprit in the decline in
European tourism, and it is an important
factor, we believe a combination of fac-
tors are involved: terrorism, the weaken-
ing of the U.S. dollar in many countries,
attractive travel packages plus falling
gasoline prices for those who stay at
home, and the competition of other coun-
tries and regions of the world. But the
perception among Americans and the
Europeans that it was terrorism did
have major and unprecedented
economic, political, and security conse-
quences in Western Europe and the
Mediterranean where hundreds of
millions of dollars have been lost by the
LInited Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Israel,
Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries.
Other governments, as well as some
in the travel and terrorist industry, have
blamed the Reagan Administration as
somehow being responsible for the
problems— as if the President created
terrorism, or dictated the type of media
coverage, or should not have spoken
publicly of a serious threat to this coun-
try and its citizens, or should not have
taken action to try and stop terrorism
and protect our citizens. This totally
unfair criticism misses the entire point
of the Administration's policies and pro-
grams for countering terrorism.
We have been working with other
governments for several years— and
more intensively as terrorism has
increased— to try and deal with what is
obviously a common problem. We urged
them to place tighter controls upon the
movements of suspected terrorists, to
improve security at their ports and air-
ports, and increase intelligence
exchanges on terrorist threats. We
offered them assistance for these pur
poses. Indeed, we have a very useful
antiterrorism training assistance pro-
gram which helps train security offici
from friendly countries. We also urge
them to join us in applying pressure t
states who support terrorism. Unfor-
tunately, our warnings, our advice, ai
our offers of help generally fell upon
deaf ears or were resented as an intn
sion, as improper pressure. This attiti
prevailed for most governments until
terrorists struck so close to home anc
the problem for the country or counti
concerned became too great to ignore
For example, over the years ther
had been lengthy discussions with tht
Greek authorities about the security
problem at Athens airport. ICAO [Inl
nation Civil Aviation Organization] ai
FAA [Federal Aviation Administratk
teams repeatedly had visited the airp
to discuss the need and ways to
strengthen security procedures. In
February 1985, the Greek and U.S.
experts agreed upon a number of
specific measures to be taken at Atht
airport. But nothing happened— until
after the TWA hijacking in June, the
U.S. Government issuance of a trave
advisory, and a sharp fall in tourism I
Greece. The Greek authorities then tt
the previously promised actions. Afte
inspecting the improved situation, we
then rescinded the travel advisory.
Athens airport today has good securi
The TWA #847 hijacking, and other t
rorist attacks also prompted various
governments to tighten up a bit, but
there were still lots of loopholes, as
dramatically illustrated in the attacks
Rome and Vienna airports in Decemb
and the hijacking of an Egyptian airli
These highly publicized incidents, plui
Qadhafi's public threats to attack
Americans, caused additional Americf
tourists to cancel plans for visiting
Europe, and it began to take on a
snowball effect.
Let me say a word here about tra
advisories. It should be pointed out th
the State Department has not issued I
travel advisories against traveling to I
Western Europe because of terrorismi
We have been questioned on this, pari
ticularly by Congress, and I think it '
might be worth sharing the same expir
ation we have provided to Congress, f
Travel advisories are issued from tim<>
time by the State Department's Offici'
Overseas Citizens Services which alsoi
handles hundreds of phone calls a dav'
about whether it is safe to visit countr
XorZ.
The majority of advisories refer td
temporary conditions unrelated to
56
Department of State Bull'1':
TERRORISM
sical safety, such as health-related
;ters, changes in customs, visa and
rency requirements, or warnings
at penalities for blackmarket or nar-
cs activities. Relatively few travel
isories are used for security reasons,
i as crime, civil unrest, or warfare.
Security-related advisories usually
ect a trend or pattern of violence not
/iously experienced in the area. Thus,
ited international terrorist attacks,
h can and do occur virtually any-
re, do not trigger travel advisories,
exception would be a country whose
rnment consistently failed to pro-
reasonable security. Travel advi-
s are not issued for political reasons,
are issued only after careful coor-
tion with our diplomatic mission in
iffected country and various U.S.
rnment agencies. While travel
sories have the primary purpose of
ing the public to adverse conditions,
may also have the effect of helping
e a government to change those
itions.
The advisories can be obtained from
>nal passport offices or the Citizens
rgency Center in the State Depart-
;. The Consular Affairs Bureau also
>s a number of pamphlets available
le public on tips to travelers and
ltly issued one on security tips.
Approach to Travel and Security
Department has consistently tried to
a nonalarmist approach to the ques-
: yf travel safety. We take oppor-
ies such as this one to emphasize
there are no security-related advi-
s for any of the European countries.
Ve believe in tourism— it is good for
idividuals and for the host coun-
We do not like to see the adverse
ct of tourism overreaction on our
ds overseas. We have been in con-
tfith the U.S. travel industry's
p which is trying to deal with the
em. We are pleased to see these
by the industry, and we are ready
ovide information and assistance.
Ve also have been providing
fance to other U.S. businessmen
gh the Overseas Security Advisory
cil which was established last year
p provide information, guidance,
riefings to American firms
ting abroad. And, of course, we
been working with the airline
try, and since the Ackille Lauro
;ing, the maritime industry, to help
>ve security. A major effort, in
ership with Congress, has been
to improve airline and cruiseline
security. Two major avenues are the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization
and the International Maritime
Organization which have been develop-
ing tightened international standards.
Many of the suggestions for
improved security standards predate the
rash of spectacular terrorism attacks
last year. However only after Qadhafi's
attempt to conduct a widespread mass-
casualty terrorist campaign against the
United States and our actions against
Libya in self-defense did many European
governments respond to the need for
firm, concerted action such as we had
been promoting.
International Cooperation
These measures and other collective
measures are important because fighting
terrorism has to be an international
effort. The responsibility for security
and protection of the airports used by
local citizens and visitors lies with the
host country. We cannot patrol every
airport and street used by American
tourists. We cannot unilaterally decide
to send in rescue teams into any airport
in the world regardless of the attitudes
of the local government. We cannot
literally be the policemen of the world.
Thus it is crucial that the nations of
the world cooperate in the international
terrorism effort. The past months have
seen important progress in this direc-
tion. For example, the foreign ministers
of the 12 European Community (EC)
countries on April 21 agreed to reduce
the size of the Libyan People's Bureaus
and increase cooperation among law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.
They also agreed to impose tight con-
trols upon the entry and movement of all
Libyans, including diplomats and other
government officials. On May 5 in
Tokyo, the leaders of the seven govern-
ments of the economic summit countries
agreed to a series of actions to be taken
against international terrorism and
states that support it, again identifying
Libya. In addition to reiterating and
strengthening the actions agreed to by
the EC, the Tokyo statement called for
improved extradition procedures,
strengthening the Bonn declaration on
civil aviation security, and greater inter-
national cooperation generally, including
use of the United Nations.
In fighting terrorism effectively, we
must keep the momentum going both
unilaterally and multilaterally. At the
same time, we must not exaggerate the
threat nor allow ourselves to be intimi-
dated by it. Nothing encourages ter-
rorists more than seeing that they have
succeeded in panicking public or political
opinion, which is a paramount objective.
Therefore, it is important for groups
such as the travel industry to work
together. The work and messages need
to be more than public relations and
advertising. Yes, it is important to try to
put the terrorist situation in perspective
and help people understand they should
not be frightened from important
cultural experiences by exaggerated
fears. Of course, I may be preaching to
the brave— you who have braved the
perils of New York, a city that many
Europeans are frightened to visit.
Your activities and message should
not only be aimed at Americans, telling
them it is OK to "come home" to
Europe. It is necessary to also make it
clear to European colleagues that adver-
tisements and cosmetics are not enough,
and that we shouldn't relax because of
what may be a temporary lull in Libyan
and particularly state-supported ter-
rorism. Governments and businessmen
in Europe need to understand that
whatever money they may save or make
from buying Libyan oil or selling spare
parts to that country is far outweighed
by the losses in tourist dollars, security
expenses, and hesitant investors.
A complete end to terrorism may be
impossible. There are too many different
groups and too many grievances to
satisfy all of their so-called root causes.
But a great deal of terrorism can be con-
tained and limited by strong action. And
many potential tourists would be
reassured if they were convinced that
other governments were taking all the
effective actions possible, not cutting
corners or trying to make deals with
terrorists.
Nor can we let the terrorists feel
that they are succeeding in creating ten-
sions within the Western alliance and to
believe that they can be successful over
time in creating an isolationist mentality
in this country which will erode our
important economic, strategic, and
political interests abroad. Such a feeling
would only encourage more attacks upon
Americans as well as damage our
broader interests.
In summation, we must take a cool,
calm, and cooperative as well as deter-
mined approach in fighting terrorism.
The terrorists must not be allowed to get
the best of us. Progress has been made
and more will be, but fighting terrorism
is a long-term effort for all of us, those
in business, those in the U.S. Govern-
ment, and those in other governments.
We have started working together
through a variety of informal contacts. I
hope we can continue. ■
57
UNITED NATIONS
Antiterrorism Act
Signed into Law
PRESIDENTS STATEMENT,
AUG. 27, 19861
I have signed into law H.R. 4151, the
"( imnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-
terrorism Act of 1986." This marks yet
another step forward in our bipartisan
effort to eradicate international ter-
rorism. I would like to recognize the
valuable contributions to this legislation
by the Vice President and his task force
on combatting terrorism; Secretary
Shultz and Admiral Inman and their
panel on diplomatic security; and the
work of Senator Richard Lugar and
Representatives Dante Fascell, Rill
Broomfield, Dan Mica, and Olympia
Snowe, as well as many other
distinguished Members of the Congress,
for bringing the various parts of this act
together. This is truly a bipartisan piece
of work.
This act once again puts those who
would instigate acts of terrorism against
U.S. citizens or property on notice that
we will not be deterred from carrying
out our obligations throughout the
world. I am committed to ensuring the
safety of our diplomats, servicemen, and
citizens wherever they may be. This
historic act provides the organization
and authorities necessary to implement
the recommendations of the Advisory
Panel on Overseas Security. It also
establishes within the Department of
State a new Bureau of Diplomatic
Security and a diplomatic security serv-
ice to increase the professionalism and
effectiveness of our security personnel.
Another important piece of this act
that I am particularly pleased to have
supported is the victims of terrorism
assistance program. This, for the first
time, will provide for the care and
welfare of the victims of terrorism and
their families.
At the same time, I continue to urge
cooperation with all nations, on both a
bilateral and multilateral basis, to seek
ways to work together to end the contin-
uing onslaught of international terrorism
against civilized society. Seeking inter-
national cooperation is vital in the strug-
gle against terrorism, and that effort
will remain a top foreign policy priority
for me. Within the government, coopera-
tion and coordination among all depart-
ments and agencies is also essential in
protecting our vital national security
interests from the terrorist threat.
We can never legislate an end to ter-
rorism. However, we must remain
resolute in our commitment to confront
this criminal behavior in every way—
diplomatically, economically, legally,
and, when necessary, militarily. First-
rate intelligence remains the key
element in each of these areas. We will
continue to improve our ability to
predict, prevent, and respond to threats
of terrorism with an expanded intelli-
gence-gathering capability. We will c<
tinue to work with the Congress to id
tify legislative gaps in our ability to c
bat terrorism. This act adds to our
capabilities and further demonstrates
our resolve. I congratulate those
responsible for this historic act.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 1, 1986. I
Nicaragua's Role
in Revolutionary Internationalism
by Vernon A. Walters
Statement before the UN Security
Council on July 1. 1986. Ambassador
Walters is U.S. Permanent Represent-
ative to the United Nations. '
Before addressing the specific reasons
for this present Security Council
meeting, I feel it imperative to point out
that this is the 11th time the Sandinista
regime has come to this Council to lay
out a, by now, standard litany of
complaints.
Nicaragua seeks yet again to divert
the Council's attention away from
Nicaragua's own behavior in the region.
It is about time we ceased being fooled
by Sandinista propaganda; it is about
time we recognized that it is Nicaragua's
aggression which is the source of the
conflict in Central America.
The members of this Council should,
by now, be familiar with the facts con-
cerning Nicaraguan aggression. The
United States has provided abundant-
overwhelming— evidence of Nicaragua's
misdeeds. It is, nonetheless, evident that
the Sandinistas remain consummately
skilled in obscuring their odious record
of subversion, aggression, and armed
attack.
Nicaragua has stated in the most
solemn terms that "it has never supplied
arms or other material assistance to
insurgents in El Salvador or sanctioned
the use of its territory for such purpose,
it has never permitted Salvadoran
insurgents to establish a headquarters or
operations base or command and control
facility in Nicaraguan territory and has
never permitted its territory to be used
for training of Salvadoran insurgents."
Nicaragua has made similar statements
not only at the International Court of
Justice but in innumerable other fora as
well. There can be no pretense that this
categorical assertion is a slip of the
tongue or an ill-considered, ill-inform
or unauthoritative statement. And ye
was— and is— entirely false.
An essential element of Nicaragu
foreign policy from the very beginnin
has been its continuing support of
subversion in Latin America. This su
port has been active, deliberate, subs
tial, and sustained. At a meeting for
party activists barely 2 months after
coming to power, the Sandinista lead
ship committed itself to support for
revolutionary struggle beyond its
borders. Later that year, as recounte
by former commanders of the
Salvadoran FMLN [Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front], the San-
dinistas established facilities and sites
within Nicaragua for use in training
guerrillas from other Central Americi
countries.
Sandinista Aggression
in El Salvador
The principal target of Sandinista
aggression has been El Salvador.
Nicaragua has since 1979 provided
massive support to the guerrillas seekl
to overthrow that country's governmt1-
That support has included training;
command-and-control headquarters ari
advice; and weapons, ammunition, ani'
other vital supplies. Nicaragua has
served as a rear-area sanctuary for tbf
guerrillas and headquarters for their F1
political arm. The interaction of the
Sandinista leadership with that of the'
FMLN and FDR [Revolutionary
Democratic Front] has been constant
and intimate. Nicaragua has publicly \
identified itself with the goals and
methods of the Salvadoran guerrillas. '
The evidence of this activity is rea'
varied, and massive. Documents cap- |
tured in El Salvador establish the key
58
Department of State Bulk
UNITED NATIONS
araguan role in unifying, supplying.
sustaining the FMLN. That role was
:ial in 1980-81, as shown in the
iments published by the United
tes in February 1981. Documents
tured from FMLN commander Nidia
2 in April 1985 made clear that the
ire of Nicaragua's support for the
Is had remained substantial. Aerial
tography, released by the United
,es, shows the very airfield from
;h many of those supplies were
n.
Guerrilla commanders captured or
cting from 1981 to the present day
one after another, described in
pelling detail the dependence of the
adoran guerrillas on Nicaraguan-
ilied weapons and supplies, on
haven in that country, on com-
ications and command services from
ragua, and on training conducted in
tcilitated by Nicaragua. The deaths
vo top guerrilla leaders in Managua
>83— and the attendance of top
finista leaders at their funerals—
rscored that the FMLN leadership
>perated out of Managua with the
ollaboration of the Sandinistas.
Veapons captured from, or remain-
i, guerrilla hands have been traced
igh official U.S. shipping and pro-
on records from Vietnam through
i-agua to the rebels. The elaborate
Tgling network developed by the
inistas is attested to by such irrefut-
physical evidence as the large
r truck crammed with weapons and
unition captured by Honduran
)rities en route from Nicaragua to
ilvador in 1981. This pattern contin-
Several months ago a Lada automo-
« the same Nicaragua-El Salvador
crashed and was found to contain
ons, ammunition, demolitions and
ographic equipment, and letters to
Halvadoran guerrilla leadership,
[finally, there are the confessions of
!|andinistas themselves. They have
Iveral occasions stated their capac-
\\ halt the aid being given to the
IN. At the International Court, one
I ruling comandantes has sworn that
kvernment "never" had a policy of
■ng arms to Salvadoran guerrillas—
I presenting an affidavit that it had
lone precisely that "in a good long
i
jnd yet, Nicaragua would have us,
rie world, believe that none of this
Ince exists. Nicaragua would like us,
Id, to pitch all this evidence out the
kw and take its flat, unsupported
jthat "in truth, [it] is not engaged,
and has not been engaged in, the provi-
sion of arms or other supplies" to the
guerrillas in El Salvador. Nicaragua
would have us disregard the tens of
thousands of dead, the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in economic damage, the
immense human misery it has imposed
on El Salvador, and take its word that it
has not attacked El Salvador.
Other Subversion Targets
But let us not stop our examination with
El Salvador. Others as well have suf-
fered from "revolutionary interna-
tionalism." Honduras has been the
target of attempted subversion. Twice,
in 1983 and 1984, the Sandinistas sought
to infiltrate groups into Honduras to
initiate a guerrilla war against the
government of that country. A large
number of these guerrillas were cap-
tured and attested to Nicaragua's role in
their training, direction, and infiltration
across the border. In 1985, members of
the Nicaraguan intelligence services
were captured inside Honduras and con-
fessed their involvement in conveying
arms to subversive groups in Honduras.
As documented in detail by a Costa
Rican legislative commission, the
Sandinistas— while conducting their cam-
paign against Somoza, and later when
they began to provide material support to
the Salvadoran rebels— also established
and maintained a clandestine arms sup-
ply network in Costa Rica. Sandinista-
supported terrorists conducted a series
of attacks in Costa Rica between 1981
and 1985, and agents of Nicaragua have
attempted or conducted a number of
assassinations in that country. Farther
afield, Nicaraguan support for the M-19
was revealed by tracing the serial
numbers of weapons captured after the
bloody attack on the Palace of Justice in
Bogota, Colombia.
While its preferred method is
through secret support for subversion,
since if caught it can hope to brazen its
way out by lying, Nicaragua has not
hesitated to apply direct, conventional
military force. It has conducted literally
hundreds of cross-border military incur-
sions into Honduras, beginning 3 days
after the July 19, 1979, takeover and
culminating in March of this year, when
some 1,500 Sandinista soldiers pene-
trated 25 kilometers into Honduras and
remained for a period of several days. In
familiar form, officials of the Nicaraguan
Government— including its permanent
representative— initially denied that San-
dinista troops had crossed the border at
all. Ambassador Astorga went before
the world's cameras and stated that the
so-called invasion was a total falsehood.
an invention of the Reagan Administra-
tion. Only after undeniable evidence had
surfaced did President Ortega
acknowledge the incursion and some 150
casualties, proving which country had
lied. The Sandinista military has
attacked into Costa Rica on many occa-
sions, including one occasion last year
when it killed two members of the Costa
Rican Civil Guard and compelled Costa
Rica to take the case to the OAS
[Organization of American States].
The Militarization
of Nicaragua's Society
Nicaragua has been able to flagrantly
violate its neighbors' borders because it
has amassed the largest and most power-
ful military force in the history of Cen-
tral America. Those who considered the
Somoza regime to present an image of
unmatched military repression should
take pause in realizing that the San-
dinista armed forces, like their secret
police, are some 10 times larger than
those of Somoza at their height. And
yet, Nicaragua has recently begun to
assert an intention to expand its forces
to 200,000 or 300,000 trained personnel.
Not only are the Sandinista forces
numerically the largest, but they have
arms unmatched elsewhere in the
region, including 340 tanks and armored
vehicles, dozens of combat helicopters,
and 70 long-range howitzers. These
forces are made all the more effective by
the presence of thousands of Cuban and
other foreign advisers operating from
the highest echelons of ministries to the
battalion and even company level,
including Cuban pilots flying combat
missions.
This massive military buildup has
had the most profound impact on
Nicaraguan society. And this impact has
not been accidental: the militarization of
Nicaraguan society has been a key goal
from the beginning of Sandinista rule
and has, as intended, contributed enor-
mously to the ability of the regime to
exercise comprehensive control over the
society as a whole. Thus, long before
even Nicaragua asserts there was any
threat from contra* or any other source,
the Sandinistas planned and executed an
accelerating and major expansion of the
Nicaraguan Armed Forces. The army, of
course, is designated as the "Sandinista
Popular Army" and great attention is
paid to political indoctrination. These
steps parallel those imposed over the
past 7 years throughout the society as a
whole.
ier 1986
59
UNITED NATIONS
This is not the occasion to rehearse
the sail and predictable story of San-
dinista repression, or to discuss at
length— as so easily could be done— the
betrayal of the high hopes of the
Nicaraguan people. Sandinista claims to
lit fend human rights have been shown to
be as hollow as their claims to be living
in peace with their neighbors.
Nicaragua, a small country, now has
more political prisoners than any coun-
try in the hemisphere except Cuba and
maintains a system of political tribunals
outside the law which ensure that no one
escapes "revolutionary justice." In 1982,
the Sandinistas imposed a "temporary"
state of emergency; 4 years later the
Nicaraguan people are still deprived of
the rights of free speech, assembly, and
movement— to name only a few of the
"basic human rights" promised in 1979
and stolen by the Sandinista regime. It
may be noted that by closing down La
Prensa, Nicaragua has now become the
single country in mainland Latin
America entirely precluding opposition
access to the media. Nicaragua today has
nothing to do with the Nicaragua its
people believed they were fighting for in
1979, nor with the Nicaragua the San-
dinistas promised both to the people of
that country and to the inter-American
community.
The internal situation in Nicaragua,
tragic in itself, is relevant to one other
crucial element in the Central American
picture. The repressive regime of the
Sandinistas is directly responsible for
the development and growth of the
armed democratic resistance in
Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan democratic
resistance is fighting to restore the
original objectives of the Nicaraguan
revolution. Its 20,000 participants seek
to establish a true democracy in which
the people of Nicaragua are free to
select their own leaders. They seek full
respect for human rights and an eco-
nomic system providing both for growth
and for equitable distribution of wealth.
The leaders of this resistance are the
same men and women who fought
against Somoza— and with the
Sandinistas— 7 years ago. Like
thousands of other Nicaraguans who
believed in the revolution and once were
allies of the Sandinistas, they did not
take lightly their decision to join the
resistance; they joined because they had
been left no choice. The Sandinistas
closed the avenues of meaningful
political participation within Nicaragua
and convinced them that change could
come only through armed force.
These, then, are the facts. Nicaragua
has deliberately, as a matter of state
policy and without provocation, con-
ducted armed attacks on its neighbors.
In the case of El Salvador, that attack,
conducted through proxies, has lasted
over 5 years at immense cost in lives and
economic damage. The Sandinistas have
sought to develop insurgencies in Hon-
duras, and have both covertly and openly
attacked both Honduras and Costa Rica.
They have sought, through a massive
military buildup, to intimidate both their
neighbors and their own people. They
have created a repressive state, the very
nature of which is ominously unprece-
dented in Central America. And in so
doing, they have given rise to a move-
ment involving tens of thousands of men
and women fighting to restore
Nicaragua to the ideals of the 1979
revolution.
U.S. Objectives and Assistance
Is it surprising, in these circumstances,
that the United States should have
become involved in the response to the
multifaceted threat to peace presented
by Sandinista Nicaragua? U.S. policy
toward Nicaragua has four broad
objectives:
• An end to Nicaraguan aggression,
whether through support for guerrilla
groups in neighboring countries or
through conventional military attack;
• Severance of Nicaraguan military
and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet
bloc;
• Reduction of Nicaragua's military
strength to levels that would restore
military equilibrium to the region; and
• Fulfillment of the original
promises of democratic pluralism and
respect for human and civil rights.
It is our conviction that achievement
of these goals would ensure the restora-
tion of peace and a climate conducive to
growth, democratic political develop-
ment, and security in the region. These
goals are entirely consistent with those
of the other countries of the region and
with multilateral diplomatic initiatives
strongly endorsed by this body. While
Nicaragua focuses on U.S. support,
which it considers unjustified, for the
democratic resistance, it is important to
recall that the United States has pursued
these benign and constructive goals
through any number of peaceful means.
Regrettably, those approaches have
proven very largely unsuccessful in
achieving changes in the Nicaraguan
behavior that so concerns its neighbors
and the United States.
The United States initially provided
substantial economic assistance to the
Sandinista-dominated regime. We wer
largely instrumental in the OAS actioi
delegitimizing the Somoza regime and
laying the groundwork for installation
for the new junta. Later, when the Sa
dinista role in the Salvadoran conflict
became clear, we sought through a co>
bination of private diplomatic contact'
and suspension of assistance to convir
Nicaragua to halt its subversion. Late
still, economic measures and further
diplomatic efforts were employed to t:
to effect changes in Sandinista behavi
Still, Nicaragua's posture was one of
complete and sustained intransigence.
It is perhaps worth underscoring
that this "intransigence" is not quite
what Nicaragua would like us to see il
as— the plucky refusal of a small but
proud nonaligned state to be bullied b
brutish and overweening superpower.
Rather, it was an adamant continuatii
of entirely unprovoked and unwarran'
policies of attempting to overthrow tr
Salvadoran Government, of a rapid
military buildup well beyond anything
justifiable in internal or regional term
of an embrace of the Cubans and
Soviets, and of internal political repre
sion raising the most profound doubts
about the Sandinistas' readiness to
observe their commitments of July 19
It was long hoped that Nicaragua
could be induced to modify one crucia
element of its behavior— its penchant
attacking its neighbors— by demon-
strating that it could not hope to achii
its goal of replacing their government
with one more like its own. My goven
ment provided substantial assistance 1
the countries suffering from Sandinisl
attentions.
Nicaragua's neighbors have asked
for assistance against Nicaraguan
aggression, and the United States has
responded. Those countries have
repeatedly and publicly made clear th;
they consider themselves to be the vie
tims of aggression from Nicaragua, ar
that they desire United States assistai
in meeting both subversive attacks an*
the conventional threat posed by the
relatively immense Nicaraguan Armec
Forces.
The United States has provided o\
$2 billion in assistance to Central
America since 1979. Three-quarters oi"
this sum has come in the form of
economic assistance; barely one-fourtl
has been military assistance despite th1
enormous costs entailed in meeting th'
covert attacks and conventional threal
posed by Nicaragua. Regrettably, too
great a proportion of this assistance •
must be used, not for the development
and human needs of those countries, b
60
Department of State Bulk-
UNITED NATIONS
jpair economic damage caused by the
:y of the Nicaraguan-sponsored
jN of deliberately destroying the
adoran infrastructure. U.S. military
economic assistance have con-
ited to limiting the scale and impact
le active warfare, especially in
ador, and to increasing Nicaragua's
hbors' security against the San-
tas. There was every evidence, how-
, as there is today, that the San-
tas could and intended to continue
aggressive policies indefinitely.
raced with the failure of all peaceful
is, and the unacceptability of allow-
*Iicaraguan subversion and aggres-
to continue unchecked, the United
;s began to provide limited support
he democratic resistance forces
,dy in the field. Supporting the
tance is the most effective means of
;ing pressure on the Sandinistas to
fy those policies presenting a threat
eir neighbors and to regional peace,
"he United States is hopeful that the
lination of failure in Nicaragua's
y of aggression, the increasing costs
iintaining its overblown military
ilishment, a collapsing economy,
ening popular discontent, and an
asingly effective democratic
ance will finally lead the San-
tas to realize they have no alter-
e but to engage in serious negotia-
aimed at achieving both regional
• and internal reconciliation,
et me make clear that U.S. policy
not seek the overthrow of the
aguan Government, nor do we
e that full achievement of our prin-
|policy objectives in Nicaragua
1 be incompatible with the Govern-
of Nicaragua's own stated posi-
Nicaragua has accepted the Con-
}a Document of Objectives as the
for negotiation and for a com-
nsive and effective peace in the
n. The United States, too, has made
pantly clear that full and verifiable
mentation of the Document of
[tives would meet all our policy
in Nicaragua and the region. Presi-
Reagan essentially confirmed this
on as recently as June 24. Indeed,
irtually impossible to imagine any
context in which peace could come
| region.
We believe that continued U.S. sup-
or the resistance is essential to
2 the Sandinista regime to enter
leaningful negotiations. We regret
his is so, but have too often been
with Sandinista promises which
rate when the immediate tactical
for their issuance has disappeared,
ot enough for Nicaragua to assert
a readiness to sign an incomplete
regional treaty; they must actually
achieve and implement one.
The history of Contadora is replete
with occasions on which Nicaragua for
tactical reasons took an apparently
forthcoming position, only to reverse
itself at a later moment. Indeed, their
June 21 response to the latest draft
agreement underscores their cynical
attitude toward Contadora. While claim-
ing to respond favorably to the draft,
they in fact simply recycled old proposals
which had been rejected by the other
parties to the negotiations. Since the
Central American democracies had
already noted major deficiencies in the
new draft, the Sandinistas' response can
only be seen as a cost-free gambit aimed
at influencing the vote on assistance for
the democratic resistance. Still, we
remain hopeful that Nicaragua will come
to realize that this course of action is
bankrupt and self-destructive, and that
there are other, constructive roles it
could be playing instead.
The U.S. House of Representatives'
approval of the request for further
assistance for the resistance should give
the Sandinistas good reason to negotiate
seriously. That vote made clear that the
United States is not going to weary of
the fight against their aggression— is not
going to let Nicaragua conduct its
aggressive and repressive policies unchal-
lenged. Nicaragua, as we have seen,
plays fast and loose with the facts. This
time, perhaps, it succeeded in deluding
even itself about just how well it had
deceived the Congress about its true
nature and policies.
Will Nicaragua Choose Peace?
The United States seeks peace, security,
democracy, and economic development
throughout Central America. We believe
that our actions are in compliance with
international law and the highest ideals
of the UN Charter. We are helping
friends defend themselves against armed
attack from Nicaragua and thus striking
a blow against aggression. Our support
for the Nicaraguan resistance is
designed only to encourage Nicaragua to
participate seriously and in good faith in
the regional negotiations now under
way. We remain prepared to resume a
high-level bilateral dialogue with
Nicaragua at the same time as it opens
talks with the opposition.
The question now is whether the
Sandinistas truly want peace. Are they
willing to negotiate seriously with their
neighbors and their own people? Are
they willing to halt their efforts to over-
throw or intimidate their neighbors? Are
they willing to fulfill their promises of
July 1979?
The fact remains that these choices,
so crucial for peace in Central America,
are for the Nicaraguans to make, not for
the United States. We have not launched
an unprovoked attack on El Salvador.
We have not sustained for 5 years a war,
bleeding El Salvador's people and
economy white. We have not sought to
destabilize or intimidate Nicaragua's
unoffending neighbors. We have not
inserted the East- West dimension by
inviting in thousands of Cuban and
Soviet-bloc "advisers." We have not con-
ducted since 1979 an unprecedented and
unnecessary military buildup. We have
not established in Nicaragua an increas-
ingly rigid and ideologically-controlled
society wholly at variance with the 1979
promises. And, finally, it is not our
policies which have caused tens of
thousands of Nicaraguans to fight to
restore the democratic values in the
name of which the 1979 revolution was
fought.
The crucial choices, then, are
Nicaragua's. And we will be watching
closely to see what choice they make.
'USUN press release 76 of July 1, 1986.
Report on UN Human Rights
Commission Meeting
by Richard Schifter
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Human Rights and International
Organizations of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on June 25, 1986.
Ambassador Schifter is Assistant
Secretary for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs.1
I am grateful to you for giving me this
opportunity to report to you on the pro-
ceedings at the 1986 session of the UN
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC).
This was the sixth successive session
that I attended and my fourth as head of
the U.S. delegation. As the commission
is, in its essence, a parliamentary body,
you will, in the light of your own political
61
UNITED NATIONS
experience, understand that the sixth
m was much easier than the first.
There are benefits derived from having
learned the unwritten rules and customs
and having developed personal friend-
ships with one's colleagues.
UNHKC Operations
Before addressing myself to the events
of the 1986 session of the UNHRC, let
me offer a few general comments on the
commission. There is, on one hand, the
risk of approaching the commission with
starry-eyed notions about what it can
accomplish. These starry-eyed notions
will be retained only if one is blind to
reality. On the other hand, the hypocrisy
so evident among a good number of com-
mission members can easily drive one to
give up all hope of doing anything useful
at the commission. My recommendation
is that we recognize the UN Human
Rights Commission for what it is,
another forum in which UN politics is
played; and that we then, understanding
all its limitations, use this forum as best
we can to advance the cause of human
rights.
These limitations, under which the
commission operates, become clear when
we review the role of its 43 members.
Though the membership changed over
the course of the six sessions that I
attended and though a number of
member countries shifted during this
period from dictatorial governments to
democracies, at no time during these
years was there a majority on the com-
mission that would be rated "free" in
the annual evaluation prepared by
Freedom House. The challenge to us is
to determine how, given the commission
composition, we can most effectively
function there to advance the very ideals
for which this UN body was created.
The delivery of thoughtful and per-
suasive speeches is undoubtedly the least
complicated way of advancing the human
rights cause at the commission. It is
striking that the hubbub that usually fills
the commission room suddenly comes to
an end when the United States is ready
to deliver a major address. It is a rather
heady experience for any one of us
whose task it is to speak on behalf of our
country. We n I to remind ourselves
that the silence around us is not a
tribute to our eloquence nor to any other
personal factor but to the nameplate
behind which we speak. The United
States i i. That is why it is
important that when we take the floor,
we make sure that we have something
worthwhile to say and t hat we say it
convincii
Next, there is the matter of how to
influence the parliamentary proceedings
on proposals advanced by others, both
friends and acquaintances, and ulti-
mately how we vote on them. Our per-
formance and our votes are noted. It is
important that they are well thought
through and ultimately well explained.
Finally, there is the matter of par-
ticipating in initiatives, either as a part-
ner advancing a proposal in which we
join a larger group or as a sole per-
former, advancing our own ideas. In the
latter situation, we must consider with
care whether we have a reasonable
chance of winning and then organize to
win or whether we want to advance our
proposal for the record, even though we
might lose.
It is against this background that I
shall now turn to a discussion of the pro-
ceedings of the commission at its 1986
session.
Proceedings of 1986 Session
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance.
The most satisfying event of the session,
from our point of view, was the adoption
of our resolution to establish the position
of a rapporteur on religious intolerance.
The mechanism of appointing rap-
porteurs is a relatively recent develop-
ment at the UNHRC. Rapporteurs were
initially appointed so as to examine the
situation in a particular country in which
human rights violations were understood
to occur. The task of the rapporteur was
to study the problem, write a report on
it, and then submit the report to the
commission. To these country rap-
porteurs, there have recently also been
added subject matter rapporteurs. These
report on occurrences worldwide of a
particular category of human rights
violations. The first such rapporteur was
entrusted with the task of reporting on
the problem of summary and arbitrary
executions. The second was called upon
to report on incidents of torture. To this
we added in 1986 a rapporteur whose
responsibility it will be to examine the
problem of infringements on religious
liberty and to act and report thereon.
We decided on this initiative, first,
because we thought it dealt with a
human rights problem that required
attention and, second, because we
thought we could get the votes for it. To
be sure, some of our friends thought the
proposal could not win and. in particular,
that it could not win if sponsored by the
United States. The final vote was 26 to
5, with 12 abstentions. Voting "no" were
the USSR. Byelorussia, East Germany.
Bulgaria, and Syria.
Chile. Another major initiative c
ours at the 1986 session was our resi
tion on Chile. I need to emphasize th
did not reflect a fundamental shift oi
our part in our attitude toward hum;
rights conditions in Chile. Since the :
of 1984, we have expressed in UN fo
our deep concern about human right
violations in Chile. The reason for ot
voting "no" on past UN resolutions'
the subject of Chile, we had explaine
was our disagreement with the speci
wording of these resolutions, rather
with the basic principle of adopting j
resolution on this subject. It was a
natural outgrowth of our position in
matter that we would ultimately put
ward the kind of text on the issue of
Chilean human rights that we could,
fact, support. As distinct from its
predecessors, it referred to the Gove
ment of Chile as a government rathe
than using the term "the Chilean
authorities." Our resolution, as distil
from its predecessors, did not denou
the Chilean Constitution of 1980, noi
it resort to name-calling. It sought, i
stead, to set forth our specific conceiJ
regarding human rights violations in i
Chile and appealed to the governmei I
correct the situation.
Negotiating the text of the resol
tion proved to be an extraordinarily I
time-consuming task. Until the very I
day of the commission session, it wa: I
certain as to whether our resolution 1
would pass or whether the eommissioi
would adopt the draft resolution spot ■
sored by Mexico, a text patterned afli
the resolutions of previous years. On I
last day of the session, however, Mem
withdrew its text and let our text be ■
adopted by consensus. Even at that '
point there was a last-minute hitch ail
the Soviet Union announced that it '
would object to consensus. Rather th.1
see the Soviet bloc isolated on this issf
the Soviets ultimately withdrew theii'
objection.
Ethiopia's Resettlement Prograp
Our third major initiative dealt with 1r
human rights violations which occunji
in the context of the resettlement pre*
gram conducted in 1984 and 1985 by 4
Government of Ethiopia. We drew thr
commission's attention to the brutaliti
with which this resettlement program
had been conducted, to the thousand?!'
lives that have been lost as a result oil'
such brutality. Our proposal to have th
UNHRC deal with the issue of Ethior.lt
was, however, sidetracked through a \-
motion "to take no decision," the Unir
Nations' equivalent of a motion to tat1 •
Voting "no" on this resolution weretn
62
Department of State Bull
UNITED NATIONS
jiemhers of the Western group, plus
In and Cost Rica.
.Dther Issues. Finally, let me men-
(that we delivered major statements
le Middle East, South Africa,
ious intolerance, self-determination
:h covered Afghanistan and
bodia), and the Subcommission on
ention of Discrimination and Protec-
of Minorities, as well as a com-
ensive statement on human rights
itions throughout the world in which
iscussed human rights conditions in
ilvador, Guatemala, Chile, Cuba,
ragua, Iran, Ethiopia, Poland,
aria, and the Soviet Union.
Vside from these two major
itives, we joined with our Western
igues and many others in voting for
utions on Afghanistan, Cambodia,
ran. Resolutions were also adopted
J Financial Crisis
\?rnon A. Walters
tatement before the UN General
nbly on April 30, 1986. Ambassador
?rs is U.S. Permanent Represen-
■ to the United Nations.1
ite of the obvious and profound dif-
ies which beset the United Nations,
resence here today signals our com-
ent to address these problems and
dtalize an institution to which we
;ain our dedication. There can be no
. that the United Nations is a
led organization. But there can also
doubt that the lofty goals and pur-
for which the United Nations was
ed are as relevant today as they
four decades ago. The U.S. Govern-
recognizes the vital importance of
lational cooperation and is corn-
el to its improvement,
he Secretary General has convened
esumed session of the 40th General
nbly because, in his words, "the
d Nations faces the most serious
lial crisis in its history." The
lative effects of late payments by a
ity of member states, withholdings
estions of principle by a substantial
er, and recent legislation in the
d States have combined to put the
ization in a position where it will
: able to carry out all planned
;ies in the current year. Resolving
•isis has both short-term and
■ term aspects, and while the
ic purpose of this session is to deal
which noted human rights progress in
El Salvador and Guatemala. Other reso-
lutions, such as the UN perennials on the
Middle East and southern Africa, passed
over our opposition, in which we were
usually joined by many of our Western
colleagues.
As I indicated at the beginning, each
session of the Human Rights Commis-
sion presents us with a renewed
challenge of extracting something useful
from this rather imperfect mechanism. I
believe that as we reflect on the results
of the 1986 session, we can say that we
met that challenge.
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents. U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington. D.C. 20402. ■
with the short-term problems of 1986,
my government believes we must keep
in mind the longer term aspects of the
crisis, as well as its underlying causes, as
we go about our work.
As important and pressing as the
financial issues facing us are, let us not
overlook the fact that what we face is, in
the words of the Secretary General,
"above all a political crisis." The
Secretary General is correct in describ-
ing this political crisis as arising from
lack of agreement among member states
on means and purposes for financing the
organization. The crisis, however, goes
much deeper than that. Why are mem-
ber states unable to agree on the means
and purposes for financing the organiza-
tion? The reason is that the United
Nations is facing a crisis of confidence.
Member states remain committed to
the ideals of the United Nations— we saw
this clearly in statement after statement
at the 40th anniversary session of the
General Assembly— but member states
no longer have confidence in the United
Nations as an institution for effectively
serving those ideals. The Secretary
General and member states share
responsibility for rebuilding a sense of
confidence in the organization.
The resumed session of the General
Assembly is an important test to see if
such confidence can be restored. A
serious effort among member states—
with active guidance and assistance from
the Secretary General— to deal with the
short-term financial problems now con-
fronting the organization, will be of
great importance in rebuilding con-
fidence in the United Nations. This, in
turn, will lay an encouraging foundation
for addressing the long-term fundamen-
tal reforms which must be agreed upon
at the 41st General Assembly. Our
failure at this resumed session to deal
constructively with the short-term finan-
cial issues now before us would seriously
jeopardize prospects for success over the
long term.
Background
The current cash shortfall has been
building up over a long period of time.
According to the Secretary General's
report, shortfalls in the payment of
assessed contributions began at the end
of 1956 and reached serious proportions
as early as 1960. The General Assembly
has taken a number of steps since then
to address the problem and has looked at
an agenda item called "the financial
emergency" every year since 1976. This
financial emergency has existed because
some member states have declined to
pay part of their assessments because of
disagreements with certain programs,
such as peacekeeping, and because other
member states have failed to stay cur-
rent with their assessments.
The Secretary General's report of
April 12 on the current financial crisis
indicates that, as of March 31, 1986, 80
countries, a majority of UN members,
had all or a portion of their 1985
assessments still unpaid. For 1986, only
14 member states had paid their current
assessments in full by the end of March.
This situation' reflects the pattern of
recent years. The organization has
managed to continue operations because
of its reserves, made up of the working
capital fund and the special account, and
because the United States, which is
assessed 25% of the organization's
expenses, has contributed virtually its
full assessment to the organization each
year.
This year, because of two recently
enacted laws, the United States finds
itself unable to pay its full assessment.
The fact that the arrearages of other
member states have totally depleted the
organization's reserves suggests that the
U.S. shortfall becomes the straw that
breaks the back of the camel. The $76
million shortfall described by the
Secretary General, in fact, is very close
to the projected U.S. arrearage for 1985
and 1986, which we estimate currently
at about $80 million. One could say
cynically that the United States is being
>er 1986
UNITED NATIONS
blamed now because it is late in joining
the member states •■ ho have no1 paid
assessments in the past. 1 might
add that such cynicism may not be
misplaced in this organization where
countries who have for many years
deliberately withheld substantial
amounts from the UN budget refer to
the U.S. withholdings as a policy of
"financial diktat and blackmail." More
to the point, however, the financial crisis
is not the responsibility of one member
state, but is the result of years of
withholdings and late payments by a
majority of countries.
Let me now turn to the two laws
which are causing the United States to
fall short on its assessed payments. The
first is the Kassebaum amendment,
which limits U.S. payments to the
United Nations and the specialized agen-
cies to 20% of their budgets unless the
organizations institute a decisionmaking
system for budgetary matters providing
voting strength proportional to the size
of contributions. The law reflects
dissatisfaction in the U.S. Congress over
the fact that countries which contribute
the great majority of the organizations'
money have little say in how it is spent.
The Secretary General has pointed out
that member states who contribute
70%-80% of the UN regular budget
have not been able to vote in favor of
any of the last three biennial budgets of
the United Nations.
The U.S. delegation made it clear in
the 40th General Assembly that a
Charter amendment to produce so-called
weighted voting was not the only way in
which the intent of the Kassebaum
amendment could be addressed. We
were pleased that the General Assembly
approved the establishment of the Group
of 18 to examine the administrative and
financial functioning of the United
Nations, and we note that one element
of the group's agenda is to look at the
procedures for reaching a broad agree-
ment on the organization's budget. We
are hopeful that the group's delibera-
tions will produce recommendations to
the 41st General Assembly which, when
acted upon, will strengthen the organiza-
tion and will provide a basis for seeking
mollification of the Kassebaum
amendment.
The other law is the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollin^s Deficit Reduction Act,
which requires that the total U.S.
federal budget deficit be progressively
reduced to zero over the next 5 years.
To the extent that targets are not met
by directed program cuts, the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings act requires a pro ruin
sequestering, or cutting, of virtually all
federal programs. This law has resulted
in a sequestering of a portion of the U.S.
1985 UN assessment and could poten-
tially require an additional sequestering
of part of the 1986 payment as well. The
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings act is not
specifically directed at the United
Nations or at international organiza-
tions, but its effects are being felt by
them. The future of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings is unclear, but the need to
reduce the federal budget deficit is sure
to remain a high priority for the U.S.
Government. We hope that the deficit
ceilings specified by this law will be met
through directed program reductions so
that across-the-board cuts will not be
needed in future years.
Current Situation
Given the existence of large cumulative
arrears and the inability of the United
States to make its full payment this
year, the United Nations is forced to cut
its expenses now. The Secretary General
has already undertaken administrative
measures which he believes will save $30
million, and he is asking this resumed
session to approve an additional $30
million of program deferrals and suspen-
sions. The delegation of the United
States has carefully reviewed these
measures. We regret the curtailment of
some of the activities proposed for defer-
ral, and, more important, we believe that
administrative savings and program
deferrals should be more directly aimed
at improvements in the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of Secretariat operations.
Nevertheless, we conclude that it is im-
portant to keep the Secretary General's
proposals together as a package. We
believe, therefore, that the Secretary
General's proposals represent a con-
structive first step to address the finan-
cial shortfall, and we support their ap-
proval as a package.
The United States is concerned that
the Secretary General's savings pro-
posals do not equal the projected short-
fall. A gap of some $46 million is to be
filled by voluntary contributions or other
measures to be decided upon by member
states, such as commercial borrowing or
further increasing the working capital
fund. The U.S. delegation opposes these
last two proposals, as we have in the
past years.
We are also concerned that the
Secretary General's projection of the
1986 shortfall may be somewhat
optimistic. For one thing, the projection
assumes that, except for the United
States, payments to the regular budg
will be almost equal to the amount
assessed for the current year. Such r
formance is possible, but would requ
substantial departure from past prac
We would hope, therefore, that the
Secretary General will monitor the I
financial situation closely throughout
year and be prepared, if necessary, t
propose additional savings measures
A related concern is that the
Secretary General's proposals only c
1986. We are aware that the Group (
is considering a number of proposals
cost reduction and increased efficien
whose effects would be felt in 1987. '
beginning of each year, however, ha;
been a time when few payments are
received. This situation is likely to be
more critical next year, because the
Secretary General has proposed that
member states advance a portion of'
1987 payments into 1986, and defer
programs into 1987.
Conclusion
The United States has always been
the largest financial supporter of the
United Nations and fully intends to <*
tinue its support. The current financi
crisis has resulted in part from subst
tial arrearages spread among many
member states and partly from trust-
tion on the part of the United States
and, we believe, other member state;
that their views on the level and cont
of the organization's budget are not!
taken seriously. As we indicated earl:
the United Nations faces a crisis of ci
fidence. This resumed session is not
intended to resolve the basic problem
that have brought the organization tc
this point. Those problems can be
addressed only by candid discussions
among member states over the comin
months, assisted by thoughtful and
serious recommendations from the
Group of 18. The U.S. delegation star,
ready to participate in any and all sue
discussions.
For now, our goal must be to assi
the continued functioning of the
organization until a broad consensus it
the future budget and program of the
United Nations is obtained. As I
indicated earlier, the U.S. delegation !
believes that the Secretary General's ,
savings proposals should be accepted, '
that he should be asked to monitor thi,
short-term financial situation careful);
The decisions we take at this sess'
can have a profound effect, positive oi
negative, on the future of the United
64
Department of State Bulk
ESTERN HEMISPHERE
mas. I urge that the member states
Ik together to ensure that the effect
fepsitive one, because the future of
lorganization is of great importance
3 all.
In closing let me renew the commit-
t that Secretary of State [George]
tz made when he spoke on the occa-
of the 40th anniversary of the sign-
)f the Charter of the United Nations
in Francisco on June 26, 1985. He
I want to leave you with one clear
message: The I Inited States is going to stick
with it. We will fight for peace and freedom
and for our interests— in the United Nations
as we do everywhere else. And we will do our
part to make the United Nations work as a
force for security, for human rights, and for
human betterment.
'USUN pressrelease 37
sit of Mexican President
resident Miguel de la Madrid
hdo of the United Mexican States
I an official working visit to
{ington, B.C., August 12-U. 1986, to
with President Reagan and other
wment officials.
following are remarks made by the
presidents after their meeting on
mis.1
dent Reagan
Sent De la Madrid and I have just
Beted one of our most constructive
I think, fruitful meetings. It was
|th in a series which began in 1982
pmonstrated again that U.S.-
Ian relations are based on respect,
fetanding, open and frank discus-
Bind mutually beneficial
ration.
The decline of oil prices and the
burden of a debt incurred in past years
have hit Mexico hard. President De la
Madrid's Administration and the people
of Mexico are making a courageous,
determined effort to face up to their
nation's fundamental economic problems
and turn a difficult situation around.
In our meeting today, I emphasized
to President De la Madrid that the
people and Government of the United
States are ready to lend a hand when
and where it can make a difference. The
United States, for example, strongly
endorses Mexico's recent agreements
with the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank. We hope arrange-
ments made with Mexico's private
creditors move quickly so that Mexico
can reignite economic growth, evolve
toward a more efficient market-oriented
system, continue to meet its debt obliga-
tions, and meet the economic needs of
the Mexican people.
As I expressed to President De la
Madrid today, the United States is
prepared to do its part with commercial
and agricultural credits; support for
international financial institution pro-
grams in Mexico; and by maintaining our
markets open to Mexican products-
products Mexico must export if it is to
prosper and meet its international finan-
cial obligations.
Mexico's entry into the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is also
viewed here as a major step forward.
This step comprises part of a strategy of
economic restructuring which highlights
productivity and the creation of a
favorable business climate. Toward this
end. President De la Madrid and I
agreed to give priority to negotiations of
a framework agreement on trade and
investment and to have it done within a
year.
Symbolic of our strengthening
bonds, I am pleased to announce that the
United States is lifting today our 6-year-
old embargo on the importation of tuna
from Mexico. Former Ambassador John
Gavin, I should point out, was instru-
mental in achieving this breakthrough.
And we're looking for further progress
in our discussions on fisheries issues.
One area of solid agreement was our
• recognition of the necessity of maintain-
ing our countries' strong campaign
against drugs. We pledged to bolster our
eradication programs and our efforts to
bring to justice vicious drug traffickers,
who have been such a corrupting
influence in both our countries. We also
pledged to do all possible to attack the
demand side of this evil by aggressively
discouraging the consumption of narcotic
drugs.
We can be proud of the broad range
of cooperation developing between our
countries, including border environmen-
tal policy, improved civil aviation
arrangements, new bridges and border
crossings, and our strong energy rela-
tions. We plan to strengthen our
binational consultations at the Cabinet
level to better meet the challenges and
take advantage of opportunities for our
two nations in the coming years.
What we have accomplished today
builds upon the successes of the past and
will benefit both our peoples. It was a
pleasure to see my friend, President De
la Madrid, again. As a good friend and
neighbor, we wish you a safe journey
home. Hasta luego and nos vemos.
tar 1 QOC
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
President De la Madrid2
I wish to express my appreciation to
dent of the United States, Ronald
Reagan, for his cordial invitation to hold
this meeting in Washington. It has been
a timely and fruitful meeting. It has
been a fruitful meeting because it has
been positive results in allowing us to
deal frankly and in depth with various
problems that both Presidents consider
to be of prime importance for the proper
development of relations between the
United States and Mexico.
President Reagan and I agreed to
give priority attention to the topics
included in the bilateral agenda. We are
pleased to acknowledge that this year
there have been positive developments
and agreements in dealing with various
economic matters and in border coopera-
tion. We agreed that it is necessary and
just to emphasize such progress.
We have agreed that the govern-
ments, beginning today, should make an
extraordinary effort to strengthen and
improve our relations. This is a
necessary element in order to broaden
and intensify the cooperation between
the two peoples. It is with satisfaction
that I have today confirmed the firm
determination of President Reagan to
give renewed impetus to the develop-
ment of positive relations between the
United States and Mexico.
In this spirit, we have exchanged
views on various issues of great interest
to the two governments and to both
countries in general. Allow me to point
out some of them briefly.
Firstly, we took up in detail different
aspects of our financial and trade rela-
tions. The recent negotiations on the
part of the Mexican Government with
the international financial institutions,
particularly the International Monetary
Fund, have successfully opened the way
to new and more realistic and flexible
formulas for dealing with the problem of
the foreign debt.
I recognize that the Government of
the United States, in playing a very con-
structive role, did a very fine thing, and
this we greatly appreciate. It is our pur-
pose that Mexico should attain a suffi-
cient and sustained growth as a basis in
order to restructure and renew its
economy; in order to maintain the social
progress that has been the basis for the
long stability of our country; and in
"rilcr to extend its capacity to comply
with its international commitments.
The problem of the foreign debt is
related with more finances in order to
improve the conditions that will make it
possible for us to comply with our
foreign debt. Mexico seeks P. create
greater exportations in areas in which it
has comparative advantages. Exports
that are not oil problems, commercial
links that will recognize the varying
degrees of developments of both
economies and that do not offer
decrimination or absolute reciprocity,
can be a good basis for the increase of
our trade.
Both Presidents have given instruc-
tions to their associates in order to
undertake a broadened agreement on
trade and on other subjects, and we have
given definite instructions to our
negotiators on both sides.
President Reagan and I also had the
opportunity to exchange points of view
on the problems of the undocumented
workers in the United States. This is a
problem that has to do with the struc-
tures of both economies. And there is no
doubt that as the Mexican economy
improves, the migrant flows will tend to
decline.
I would also like to refer to a subject
that President Reagan and I dealt with
as a very important part of our conver-
sations. And I am referring now to the
war against drug trafficking. The
Government of Mexico maintains that
international cooperation is absolutely
necessary in order to efficiently face
drug trafficking.
We agreed that it's necessary to
simultaneously attack all the links of the
Update on Chile
by Elliott Abrams
Prepared statement before the Sub-
committee on International Development
Institutions and Finance of the House
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
Committee on July 30, 1986. Mr. Abrams
is Assistajit Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs.1
In early December last year, I testified
before this subcommittee outlining the
Administration's policies and goals
toward Chile. At that time, I noted our
hopes and concerns for progress in
greater respect for human rights and a
democratic transition in a land once
known for its democratic traditions. I
concluded with an explanation of how,
on a case-by-case basis, we determine
our votes on loans for Chile in the inter-
national financial institutions (IFIs).
I welcome this opportunity to review
some of the main developments in Chile
chain; that is, production, distribution,
and consumption. I have said to Presi-
dent Reagan that we believe that the
campaign that, under his leadership, h.
been established in the United States i
very important to combat the consumf
tion and the distribution of drugs.
We shall continue to strengthen th
cooperation between both government
in order to combat this cancer of mode
society. I believe, as has been said by
President Reagan, this conversation h;
been particularly satisfactory. It is an
additional proof of the firm and loyal
friendship that unites our two peoples.
We have a great deal to benefit frc
a dignified, cordial relationship of
mutually good for both. I thank Presi
dent Reagan and the members of his
party for the very warm hospitality th:
they have extended to us. And, once
again, I would like to state the recogni '
tion of the Government and the people '
Mexico for the assistance that was giv I
to us by the United States during the I
earthquakes in the month of Septembe i
particularly the very warm friendship t
Nancy Reagan who went to be with us I
during those painful times.
>Made at the South Portico of the Whit
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 18, 1986).
2President De la Madrid spoke in Spanii
and his remarks were translated by an inte;
preter. ■
since December as well as the Admini-
stration's policy toward that troubled
country. In dealing with Chile we must
move with a clear vision, shaping our
actions to the reality of the situation ai
using our limited instruments of
influence, such as our IFI loan votes, ir
a prudent manner. We must not act in
haste and anger, but ask how each loanp
vote fits into our policy of support for i
democratic transition and human rights
improvements, as well as the economic
merits of each proposed loan. And, of !
course, we must observe the require- |
ments of applicable legislation.
Human Rights: Progress
and Continuing Problems
The tragic death of Rodrigo Rojas
earlier this month has again focused th(t
attention of Americans on the cycle of j
violence in Chile and the need to
66
Dffnartment of State Bullet,
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ourage greater respect for human
its. We have repeatedly made clear
t we have a strong commitment,
pite limited policy tools, to bring
ut increased respect for human rights
"Jhile. Our humanitarian concern over
death of this young man was evident
iur aid to his mother in entering
le, our statements calling for an
est investigation, and in our
bassador's attendance at Rojas'
eral with the Administration's full
currence.
I would like to briefly outline what
see as some of the pertinent events
ring on respect for human rights in
le since I last testified before this
committee.
As I testified before last December,
have welcomed the expressed will-
less of the Chilean Government to
Derate with the UN Special Rap-
;eur, Fernando Volio, as providing
opportunity to encourage concrete
lan rights improvements. Progress in
area, however, has been slow— much
'er than we would have liked. In
e areas there have been positive
;lopments; although, I should note,
e of these are so new that the ver-
is not yet in on their effectiveness.
3n the positive side, I would note
willingness of the government in
to authorize publication of a daily
spaper— La Epoca— associated with
e's democratic opposition and
duled to be on the stands early next
As far as the existing media are
erned, there has been much more
dom of expression allowed since the
lg of the state of siege over a year
although the government imposed
t censorship on several radio sta-
early in July. In addition, there is
government decision last month to
te a human rights advisory commis-
which is significant if only as
ial recognition that Chile has human
;s problems. We hope that this
ial human rights commission will
c with the respected private human
;s groups in Chile and have a
ive impact in bringing about rights
ovements. Similarly, the announce-
1 that the government intends to
;ablish separate labor courts could
to greater protection of worker
;s.
Another positive development, which
isponds to Mr. Volio's recommenda-
is an apparent decision by the
:an Government to refrain from
ing its opponents into forced inter-
xile. This practice was used against
reds of protestors in 1985, but so
lis year the government has not
invoked this repressive authority. The
authority to do so, however, still exists
on paper, deriving from transitory Arti-
cle 24 of the L980 constitution, which
gives the Chilean president sweeping
powers to restrict civil liberties during
announced states of exception in Chile,
such as are in effect now.
The government's decision to turn to
the judicial system to prosecute pro-
testors or other government opponents
represents an improvement over past
practice, when there was no opportunity
for those affected to contest actions
against them, but does not eliminate our
concerns about how the government
responds to peaceful dissent by Chilean
citizens. Those charged with violations of
state security laws frequently are
detained for prolonged periods,
sometimes incommunicado, whether or
not they have been charged with per-
sonal involvement in specific acts of
violence. We will watch carefully the
trial proceedings now going on for the
13 Civic Assembly leaders who are
charged with violations of state security
laws in connection with the July 2-3
general strike. Despite the explicit public
calls of these leaders for nonviolence
during the work stoppage, these Chilean
leaders face sentences of 60 days to 3
years in prison. Arrested on July 10,
they have not been released on bail, but
have received visitors, including a
human rights officer of the U.S.
Embassy in Santiago.
We hope that the Chilean Govern-
ment's willingness to continue its
exchange with Mr. Volio reflects the
intention to take more concrete actions
to improve human rights practices.
Should there be progress of this kind, we
would certainly welcome it, and would
urge due recognition by the General
Assembly when the Chilean human
rights situation is reviewed by the
United Nations this fall.
While it is important that we
recognize where there has been prog-
ress, it is also important that we
recognize where problems have con-
tinued or become more acute. A review
of the the problem areas highlighted in
the resolution on Chile drafted by the
United States and adopted by consensus
at the UN Human Rights Commission
meeting in March makes clear that there
are many areas in need of improvement.
For instance, there is no reasonable
explanation for the frequent failure in
Chile to identify, prosecute, and punish
those responsible for violent crimes. In
the case of Rodrigo Rojas, an instance of
such violent crime, we have made clear
that we look to Chilean authorities for a
thorough and impartial investigation.
We have seen the decision of the judge
to indict one military officer for
manslaughter, as well as the July 24
statement issued on this decision by the
Vicariate of Solidarity. There are serious
questions raised by the differing views of
how this incident actually occurred and
we are concerned over these discrepan-
cies. We will not consider this matter
closed until the discrepancies between
what the judge ruled to have occurred,
and what eyewitnesses claim, are
resolved, and all those responsible for
crimes related to Rojas' death and the
severe injury of Carmen Quintana are
tried and brought to justice.
Another problem I spoke of last
December remains unresolved. We have
continued to receive credible reports of
torture by security forces. After a
notable drop-off of reports of this nature
to the Vicariate in the period of March-
April, reports again have been received.
At least 14 cases of torture in Santiago
alone have been brought before Chilean
courts this year.
The final problem area I would
highlight today is the nature of the
government response to acts of civil
disobedience and to antigovernment
violence and terrorism. According to
provisional figures available from
Chilean human rights groups, there were
approximately 3,300 people detained by
security forces for participating in
politically motivated demonstrations dur-
ing the first 6 months of this year. By
comparison, during the last 6 months of
1985 (the best period of comparison,
since the state of siege was in effect for
the first half of 1985), a total of 3,920
were detained for similar reasons.
As these figures imply, the heavy-
handed government action at Rodrigo
Rojas' funeral was not the only instance
of overreaction apparent this year.
Another notable instance was the
deployment of thousands of government
troops to cordon off Santiago on May 21
in order to prevent small antigovern-
ment protests from taking place, which
was even criticized by some supporters
of the Chilean Government. Government
sweeps of poor neighborhoods in San-
tiago and temporary detentions of
thousands of people similarly seem
unwarranted and excessive, in view of
the small number of accused criminals or
terrorists actually arrested and the
limited quantity of illegal arms reported
discovered. Such actions can only con-
tribute to the climate of confrontation
and complicate efforts to bring about a
transition to democracy.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
As the Chilean ( !i e of
[j noted, the violence in
Chile today stems from complex causes.
Among those are concerted efforts of
the < Ihilean Communist Party and its far
left allies to pursue their undemocratic
ends by attempting to provoke ever
greater repression through terrorist
violence. These groups have pursued a
wave of bombing attacks which included
in recent months a bomb directed
against the residence of the U.S.
Ambassador; an attack against San-
tiago's subway system that left two
people dead; killing of policemen; straf-
ing of military housing for women and
children; and bombings of some Mormon
churches and U.S. businesses. The tombs
of President Pinochet's parents were
also vandalized. The most recent act of
terrorism occurred on July 25, when 39
persons were injured by a bomb explo-
sion at a bus stop in downtown Santiago.
No group has claimed responsibility for
this bombing, which we strongly
condemn.
Support for Democracy
and Human Rights
Our encouragement of greater respect
for human rights goes hand-in-hand with
our efforts to encourage a peaceful
democratic transition. History shows
that only in truly democratic states are
the rights of an individual secure.
In December. I related to you our
mow that the creation of the National
Accord represented an advance in the
process of dialogue and reconciliation
necessary if Chile is to achieve a
peaceful democratic transition. Though
the Chilean Government has shown
intransigence in dealing with the
democratic parties comprising the
accord, we continue to believe it pro-
vides a base from which peaceful prog-
ress on Chile's democratic transition can
ade. We hope that all Chileans con-
cerned about the future of democracy in
their country will build on the positive
elements they see in the accord.
During his July 12-18 visit to Chile.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert
1 lelbard also renewed our message on
democracy and human rights. He clearly
articulated that the United States sup-
eaceful transition to full
democratic rule in Chile by the most
pt and effective means. How Chile
achieves a democratic system must be
determined by the Chilean people. But
we are committed to using our limited
influence and encouragement to helping
them bring that about. With the strong,
talented, and experienced U.S.
Ambassador we have in Santiago, and
the public expressions of support for a
democratic transition coming from
Washington, this Administration has put
itself squarely on the side of democracy
and human rights in Chile.
President Reagan on a number of
occasions has signaled his personal sup-
port for democratic change in Chile. In
spring 1985 he spoke of "entrenched
military rule" in both Chile and
Paraguay, where we have another very
effective ambassador. During his Human
Rights Day speech in December, the
President noted that in Chile, as in the
Philippines, we had "shown our strong
concern when our friends deviate from
established democratic traditions." In
his public welcome for Uruguayan
President Sanguinetti just last month,
the President said bluntly, "in this hemi-
sphere, the days of dictatorship, left or
right, are numbered," noting that the
peaceful return to democracy in
Uruguay can serve as a model for
others, and concluding "authoritarian
regimes should take notice."
If any doubt remained over U.S.
policy following these statements, they
should have been dispelled by the
response of the White House to the
recent public attack on Ambassador
[Harry] Barnes. The White House issued
a statement the following day reaffirm-
ing President Reagan's full confidence in
Ambassador Barnes. Ambassador
Barnes, like our other ambassadors, car-
ries out Administration policy which is
made in Washington. This policy is, of
course, to encourage a democratic
transition.
The vast majority of Chileans sup-
port a peaceful transition to democracy
and understand the substance of our
policy toward their country. The Chilean
Communist Party, which is the largest in
the hemisphere next to that of Cuba or
Nicaragua's Sandinistas, also is aware of
our stance. It, however, has adopted the
tactic of "armed struggle" to remove
the military government since it has no
interest in peaceful solutions which
would leave the party lacking complete
power. By supporting terrorism and
violence, the communists hope to pro-
voke greater government repression and
produce general polarization. They have
tried hard to convince democratic
elements of Chilean society that the only
means of restoring democracy is through
violence.
We reject violence from any side as
an attack not only on human and civil
rights but against the future of a
democratic Chile. Groups such as the
Communist Party, who favor violent
means to political ends today, cannot 1
expected to abide by democratic rules
tomorrow. Those who accord legitimai
to the communists and other extremis
are not contributing to a stable,
democratic Chile.
The Challenge for the United States
and Chile
The current climate of violence and co
frontation in Chile poses a difficult
challenge for the United States. The
Chilean Government believes that it h
a workable plan for returning Chile to
democracy relying on the mechanism i
out in the 1980 constitution. The gove
ment announced this spring a scheduli
for drafting and approving certain bas
laws related to that constitution. The
constitution would be fully implement
in 1989, when a presidential candidate
chosen by the military junta is to be p
before the people in a plebiscite.
We look forward to enactment of
these laws as positive steps. But to be
truly meaningful, they should be enac'l
in a context of full civil liberties, such 1
freedom of assembly, speech, and pre; I
and access to the means of communic; (■
tion. Advances in these crucial areas I
mean progress in restoring democracy ,
as well as improvements in human rig
observance.
The 1980 constitution, however, ail
its timetable and program for a transi |
tion are matters of great controversy |
Chile. In the absence of any broad and
meaningful dialogue with the democra I
opposition, grounds for skepticism exitf
that the Chilean Government intends t|»
take steps toward developing the sort I
broad consensus that would enable a j
peaceful, orderly transition to demo- |
cratic government take place. Further |
delay in taking concrete steps to give t^
Chilean people confidence that their
nation is headed toward democracy an|
to restore full civil liberties can only
benefit enemies of democracy on the
extreme left and right. Failure to retui|-
to democracy will be accompanied by i
increasing polarization and violence. T»
strengthening of the far left in Chile
resulting from this could have a negatif
impact on some still fragile democracies
elsewhere in the region and jeopardize
U.S. interests.
Given the important stakes involveji
the United States needs to have a
forward-looking, prudent policy. We
have been careful not to endorse any |
program or timetable for a transition— k
issues only the Chilean people can
decide. We all need to recognize that )
68
Department of State Bulle^
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ugh pro- and antigovernment
ans put great store in what the
;d States does or does not do with
ct to Chile, we have in fact very
■d real influence. We have few car-
ind few sticks available. We have
curity assistance program; no
try training relationship; no
ral economic assistance program to
: of except for a small amount of
nitarian food aid. Because of
ative restrictions imposed on the
five [branch] by the Congress, we
very limited channels of corn-
nation to the Chilean Armed
is, who must play a key role in
ing a peaceful transition to
cracy.
) carrying out our policy of
raging democracy and human
i improvements in Chile, we hope
11 have active bipartisan support
the Congress. We need to work
ler. I am sure you share our desire
ire do not contribute— even
ertently— to accelerating the very
=s of polarization and violent con-
ation which we see developing, and
only benefits the extremes in
fates on Loans to Chile
ation related to the IFIs requires
ecutive [branch] to examine the
i|i rights situation, in addition to the
imc rationale, carefully in deter-
b our votes on loans in the
lateral institutions. Pursuant to this
ly-case review, we look at each loan
litely and consider the situation in a
nular country as it exists just before
liins are scheduled to be reviewed
I executive boards.
k the committee is aware, no loans
pie are scheduled for review until
ill. The earliest loan expected to
Lp is a $250 million World Bank
jural adjustment loan (SAL),
bs in early October. We also expect
Ing sector loan to come up at the
International Finance Corporation]
liber. Three loans at the IDB
sAmerican Development Bank] are
Ito be voted on prior to the end of
lar. These include a $240 million
Ir a hydroelectric power project, a
jnllion loan for urban services, and a
pillion loan for regional hospitals.
|e also anticipate that there will
feed for Chile to approach the com-
m banks for another debt
jlduling next year, which could also
fc a request to the banks for new
Our judgment on Chile's economic
policies is that, considered in isolation of
human rights concerns, they provide a
strong basis for voting in favor of most
IFI loans for Chile. The economic
management team of the Government of
Chile has a solid free market orientation
and is considered by international finan-
cial institutions to be highly skilled.
The country, however, still confronts
acute economic problems. World prices
for copper, Chile's principal source of
export revenues, remain at low levels.
Unemployment is historically high,
although it is gradually declining, and
the need to service the country's large
external debt of about $20 million— a
figure which already exceeds GDP [gross
domestic product]— represents a
restraint on growth. About one-third of
this debt is held by U.S. commercial
banks. Despite difficulties, the Chileans
have the remarkable record of having
met all the interest payments on their
foreign debt as well as having generally
complied with IMF [International
Monetary Fund] targets.
In order for Chile to maintain the
modest growth rates of 3%-4% forecast
for this year and the next, it will need an
injection of new foreign funds from the
IFIs and commercial banks. Some op-
position figures are aware of the
importance of such funds to the Chilean
economy and have counseled us to con-
sider carefully the impact of our actions
on the average Chilean.
Given the sound economic policies
being followed in Santiago, it is apparent
that our loan vote decisions will largely
be driven by how we see the human
rights situation in Chile. How we vote
will depend a great deal on what hap-
pens in Chile between now and then. As
the subcommittee is aware, we have
used our loan votes in the past to pro-
mote human rights improvements and
movement toward democracy, and we
may do so again. No decisions have yet
been made regarding our votes on these
upcoming loans. It would not be good
policy to remove our flexibility to use the
human rights improvements and prog-
ress on democratization. An announce-
ment of our position now would leave
the Chilean Government no incentive to
make positive changes. This would
defeat what I understand to be a key
purpose of the human rights legislation
related to IFI votes, which is to provide
the executive [branch] with a mechanism
for encouraging improvements. As I've
repeatedly stressed, we have only
limited policy tools available. Curbing
our flexibility by taking a position on
loan votes now would in my judgment
work against our shared policy goals in
Chile.
Prospects
Chile today is in flux. Along with the
danger of greater polarization,
the situation offers the possibility
for constructive change. A vigorous
public debate is going on within Chile,
covering a wide spectrum of issues,
ranging from President Pinochet's rejec-
tion of dialogue with the National
Accord to the tragic death of Rodrigo
Rojas. To a large degree, the govern-
ment has permitted this debate to be
reported in the print media— although,
there are still distressing instances of
censorship and indirect economic
pressure being applied to shape the
news. This public debate seems to be
matched to a certain extent by internal
debate within the government— still very
tentative— about Chile's return to
democracy. This was apparent in the
quick reaction by various junta members
to President Pinochet's announcement
earlier this month that he intended to
extend his government's rule for another
8-year term— virtually until the end of
the millenium.
There are certainly real possibilities
for a peaceful democratic outcome in
Chile. The Administration will continue
to provide every encouragement to those
Chileans truly committed to democracy
and help to strengthen, not weaken,
their position with respect to other
elements in the society. We will continue
to advocate dialogue between the
government and democratic opposition.
We will continue to support the efforts
by Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno and
the Chilean Episcopal Conference to
bring about national reconciliation and
an end to violence. We share their desire
to avoid any actions which could lead to
greater suffering by the Chilean people.
Efforts such as those of the Cardinal, we
hope, will eventually be well-received by
the Chilean Government, and lead to an
understanding among the various sec-
tors of Chilean society, which remain
deeply divided by a lack of communica-
tion and mutual distrust. The Pope's
visit next spring will provide an impor-
tant opportunity to strengthen and add
even greater moral force to these
efforts.
The Administration has a strong
human rights policy in place, which we
will continue to pursue vigorously. I am
sure you will agree it stands the best
Bar 1986
fiq
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
chance of succeeding if we have bipar-
support from the Congress. We
will, of course, continue to consult with
( longress in order to achieve such a con-
sensus. Our foreign policy goals in Chile,
shared by the vast majority of
Americans, are a peaceful transition to
democracy and increased respect for
human rights. We believe these also are
the goals of the majority of the people of
Chile, who ultimately are the only ones
who can and will determine their coun-
try's destiny.
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
Obstacles to Investment
and Economic Growth in Latin America
by Richard T. McCormack
Address before the second Conference
of the Great Cities of the Americas in
Si i a Juan, Puerto Rico, on June 20, 1986.
Ambassador McCormack is U.S. Perma-
nent Representative to the Organization
of American States.
The obstacles to investment and growth
in Latin America deserve the great
attention they are receiving. Investment
is particularly important because without
investment no new jobs will be created.
Without new jobs, there will be no
economic growth. Without economic
growth, political stability will gradually
erode, and the precious democracies that
all of us have worked so hard with Latin
America to bring about may lapse into
military dictatorships or the further
spread of communist tyranny.
During the past years that I've
worked as Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic and Business Affairs, and
more recently as Ambassador to the
Organization of American States, it has
been my great privilege to visit virtually
every country in the Western Hemi-
sphere. So what I'm going to share with
you today are my personal observations
on concrete obstacles to foreign and
domestic investment that I've seen
myself in the course of my travels. This
will include obstacles to investment in
food production. Finally, I will also offer
some thoughts about what might be done
to overcome these impediments to
economic growth.
Investment and Growth Prospects
First, a word about the quality and value
of many official statistics on economic
growth in Latin America. They can be
very misleading.
There is obviously a lot more
economic activity taking place in some
countries by way of investment and
growth than official statistics indicate.
Peru, which undeniably has economic
problems, is a case in point, where
estimates of the size of the underground
economy range from between one-quar-
ter to one-half of all economic activity in
the country. Even buses, I am told, are
assembled in factories without official
recognition that they exist.
There is, however, a lot less eco-
nomic activity than meets the eye in
parts of Central America and the
Caribbean. Growth statistics here are
misleading, due to very high levels of
official external economic assistance to
individual countries, which cover up the
low level of private investment and
economic activity. External economic
assistance, without a strong underlying
base, creates economic hothouse plants
kept alive by artificial conditions. But all
of us know what happens when the heat
in the greenhouse fails to work. So it is
very important to achieve self-sustaining
economic growth.
There is nothing mysterious about
the policies that successful governments
have used to encourage private invest-
ment and economic growth. They simply
provide a stable environment in which
investors have reasonable prospects for
a competitive return on their capital and
the assurance that they can get their
money back if and when they want to.
That's it. That's the basis of it all.
With these conditions, private invest-
ment occurs. Without them, money hides
or goes elsewhere, and local economies
languish.
There are subordinate complexities,
of course, which determine investment
and growth prospects. For example:
• Investment capital has to be gen-
erated in sufficient quantities, either
from internal savings or foreign savl
Without somebody's savings, you ha
no money to invest.
• Nondiscriminatory, easily und
standable regulation of business in t
economy is vitally necessary. Nothin
strangles business like red tape.
• A degree of physical security
necessary, so that investors and mai
agers and their children are reasona
safe from terror and lawlessness an<
the economy can operate in a norma
manner.
• Adequate technology must be
available.
• Local and foreign markets are
required.
• Rational progrowth tax policii
are vital.
• Production-oriented national :
policies must be established to repla
those based on 19th-century relics o
class warfare, such as excesses in th
name of land reform and shortsighti
arbitrarily imposed food prices.
Attracting Investment Capital
All of these investment-related mat!
must be addressed if optimum econc
growth is to take place. For exampl
is imperative that governments ado]
tax and economic policies to encoun
the creation of savings in individual
countries and, equally important, to
encourage those savings to remain e
home. Capital flight in Latin Amerk
estimates of which range from $100
$180 billion in the past 5 years— is r<
bing nations of their vital investmen
capital. If Latin American capital
invested abroad could be recovered,
could largely eliminate the foreign d
problems of Argentina, Mexico, and
Venezuela. When you add the econo
activity and growth that returning f
capital could generate, it would go f;
restoring Latin America's economic
health.
Beyond that, unless the capital f
problem is addressed, no amount of
foreign aid can rescue local economi"
Instead of priming a pump, foreign
assistance is merely pouring water ii
sieve.
Thus, it is crucial to attack
systematically the causes of capital
flight. But it must be clearly underst
that governments cannot successfull
wall in capital with laws prohibiting
export. All negative legislation
accomplishes, in the long run, is to
create a de facto capital export tax a
nervous saver uses various sublegal
techniques to get his imperiled savin
70
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
of the country. A better approach is
governments to adopt positive incen-
5 that will encourage people to keep
C money at home.
One of the most important positive
ntives involves exchange rates that
realistic and sustainable. Not only is
important to make exports com-
;ive, but local people quickly see
their country is attempting to
itain an artificially high exchange
vis-a-vis the dollar, as has happened
idically in Mexico and elsewhere.
know that their capital is endan-
d by a devaluation that is merely a
tion of time. So they get their
ey out of the local currency and into
,rs. And, because many have learned
painful experience that even their
■nal dollar holdings are not always
they often put their dollar savings
ad.
t is also important to keep inflation
r conti-ol. Citizens will be less
led to keep their money at home—
lere I'm talking about people's
ement savings— if they see their
try running the monetary printing
i at a rate which is bound to cause
savings to be inflated away. So
shift their money out of the cur-
r, out of the country, into mobile,
iion-proof assets such as gold or
onds, or move to other defensive
tments. These defensive invest-
s, however, are usually not very
ictive from the point of view of job
ion.
'eople have learned that as indi-
ts they are often powerless to per-
; their governments to adopt
lal economic policies. So their
ict is to grab the life preservers
they see the ship headed for the
; thus, the capital flight. That is
•ealistic exchange rates, sound
tary policies, and other measures
) critical.
he second source of savings is
nal capital, otherwise known as
yi investment, which should be
med everywhere from an economic
of view and given national treat-
Some governments, however,
foreign-owned companies and
;ors as some reputedly were in the
: corporate tigers who involved
lelves heavily in local politics of
dual countries. Years ago,
rer, governments positioned
dves to get the upper hand. Some
jacted with nationalizations and
extreme measures. In any case,
:uation profoundly changed. But
some governments do not seem to
realize is that yesterday's so-called cor-
porate tigers are today an extinct
species. The private foreign companies
now fear governments, not the other
way around. Thus, the challenge facing
governments is not how to deal with the
legendary tigers of yesteryear but,
rather, how to make today's corporate
rabbits feel secure and happy so that
they will reproduce and multiply,
creating badly needed jobs and economic
growth. This requires a totally different
attitude on the part of governments.
Efforts to provide more investment
security, including those of the new
World Bank multilateral investment
guarantee agency, should be supported.
Beyond that, some local manufac-
turers fear the competition from more
technologically advanced foreign com-
panies and strive to keep them out.
Sadly, to protect the existing jobs of
hundreds, the potential new jobs for
thousands thus are lost by default. Also,
countries thus become trapped with
obsolete technology and internationally
uncompetitive products.
The challenge facing government
policies is to nurture and attract both
local and foreign sources of investment
capital.
Factors Limiting Economical Growth
The second condition needed for
increased investment in Latin America is
sheer physical security. Today's ter-
rorism, lawlessness, and kidnapping is a
deathblow aimed at the weak link in the
economic chain of growth— private
investment. Let's take the example of El
Salvador. For a time in the 1960s, El
Salvador had one of the fastest growing
economies in the world. Then came the
terrorists and the kidnappers and the
saboteurs, targeting the owners and
managers of private local and foreign
companies and their children. This was a
deliberate, conscious strategy for the
economic and political destabilization of
the victim country. Criminal elements
added to the chaos. Uncertain of the
future and fearful for their lives and the
lives of their children, local investors
began to hedge their bets by increasingly
salting away their savings and sending
their children abroad. Foreign investors
also fled. The economy ground to a halt.
Unwise government policies then further
damaged the economy and gravely
weakened the financial and agricultural
sectors of the nation.
The body politic, thus weakened,
became more vulnerable to the second
phase of terrorist operations— large-scale
guerrilla warfare.
Recently, I visited Guatemala and
talked to businessmen. They told me
that violence and uncertainty due to
guerrilla activities and terrorism were
limiting their own willingness to put
their family fortunes into long-term local
investment. They told me that until the
predatory communist regime in neigh-
boring Nicaragua changed and security
prospects for the region improved, they
were going to continue to limit their
involvement in long-term, immobile
investments.
Thus, until our Latin American
friends and we successfully come to
grips with the mounting violence and
terrorism in parts of Latin America,
investment and economic growth will
continue to be disappointing and
democracies vulnerable.
The third factor is the availability of
modern technology, but a fundamental
misinterpretation exists. The limiting
factor on economic growth today is not
some secret process of IBM [Interna-
tional Business Machines Corporation] or
Silicon Valley but, rather, the decision
on where to locate the factories to
manufacture high-technology products.
If governments make it attractive for
capital, technology will follow. It's not
the other way around. This is a large
measure of the success story of North
and Southeast Asia.
Another key factor involves ade-
quate markets for goods. Without access
to markets, there will be no investment.
This means that all of us must work to
keep the trading system open, but there
must be a bargain here. American com-
puter workers need access to Brazilian
markets as much as Brazilian shoe
workers need American markets. And
unless both sides work to open these
markets, political pressures will work
gradually to close and restrict them, a
lasting detriment to us all.
All of us must, therefore, work
urgently to bring more open markets
about. But it takes two to tango, and our
trading partners abroad have been
quicker to point accusing fingers at
lingering remnants of American protec-
tionism than they have been to come to
the bargaining table with offers of quids
pro quo. A country with a $150-billion
trade deficit, such as ours, cannot con-
tinue to operate this way indefinitely.
The golden goose of open U.S. markets
may eventually die, either a political or
economic death.
So all of us interested in global
economic investment and growth would
do well to press urgently for action on a
new global trade round to eliminate
>er 1986
71
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
everyone's barriers to trade. Beyond
that, governments need to ensure that
their own internal markets are growing
on a sustainable basis, and that means
following economic policies which have
proven their value when they have been
successfully tried elsewhere.
Public v. Private Investment
At this point, perhaps a word about the
relative merits of public, as opposed to
private, investment would be in order.
Because of the failure of some
governments to establish and maintain
conditions needed to attract and nurture
private investment in sufficient quan-
tities, governments sometimes tax their
citizens or borrow funds to establish a
variety of state-owned manufacturing
enterprises to provide employment and
growth. The problem comes when these
enterprises run into difficulties, as they
frequently do, and start losing large
amounts of money. This can happen
because of bad luck, product obso-
lescence, mismanagement, or because
the enterprise was ill-conceived to begin
with. Such enterprises, launched with
much fanfare by government leaders,
cannot be easily terminated without
substantial political cost. To keep them
alive, governments are then compelled
to provide large subsidies by raising
taxes on their citizens and the healthy
parts of the economy. This, in turn, robs
healthier businesses of money that would
otherwise be used for new investment.
To make matters worse, governments
also frequently compel the managers of
state-owned enterprises to hire or retain
large numbers of unnecessary workers,
further adding to the requirements for
state subsidies and increasing the cost of
the products manufactured by the
inefficient.
A case in point concerns the example
of two oil refineries in Latin America of
similar age, size, and construction, one
still in private hands, the other now a
state-owned enterprise. I am told the
private refinery employs about 600
workers and the state-owned refinery
more than 5,000 employees to generate
a similar amount of output.
This pattern of events, in similar but
less dramatic cases, is depressingly
familiar throughout much of the world.
The question is what to do about it.
Some thoughts come to mind.
It is important to recognize that
public investment in state-owned
manufacturing enterprises is a poor
substitute for the more difficult but far
more important task of creating condi-
tions that will result in more private
investment. Governments do best when
they invest in basic infrastructure, such
as roads, schools, harbors, industrial
parks, and other similar undertakings
that will create opportunities for more
private investment. Experience shows
that governments, as a rule, are not
good at establishing or managing actual
manufacturing or producing operations.
This is because politics interferes with
rational day-to-day decisionmaking in
state-owned enterprises. Hardheaded,
practical, specialized businessmen per-
form this function far more efficiently.
Collectively, this results in a much more
dynamic national economy.
What I am saying here is not mere
theory. It is simply the empirical results
of vast past experience about state-
owned enterprises around the world.
Yes, there are exceptions due to
specialized circumstances or unusually
gifted individual managers. But vital
national growth policies should be based
upon the broader patterns, not the
exceptions.
Divesting inefficient state-owned
enterprises, while broadly recognized as
desirable, is a difficult task that can only
be done by political leaders who can
articulately explain to their peoples the
importance of creating a modern
national economy based on efficient self-
sustaining building blocks instead of on
state-owned industrial dinosaurs that
consume, through endless subsidies, the
investment capital that would otherwise
be used to create self-sustaining
economic growth and productive jobs
elsewhere in the nation.
Land Reform and Food Production
Finally, I want to offer a personal word
about a sensitive subject that has a bear-
ing on private investment in agriculture
in Latin America. That subject is "land
reform."
Several hundred years ago, textiles
in England were produced largely
through a cottage-type industry. Indi-
viduals wove tweeds and clothing of all
sorts in their homes for their families
and for limited sale to others.
Then came the arrival of the indus-
trial revolution, and suddenly cottage
workers were threatened with displace-
ment due to the revolutionary new
technology of power looms. The Luddite
movement developed and thousands of
workers swarmed into the factories in
England to destroy the power looms
and, they hoped, to save their cottage
jobs.
We know that this did not succe<l
and England continued for decades tj
lead the world in technology. Living I
standards rose dramatically, and
everyone benefited.
In my view, some exponents of 1; I
reform, in attempting to replace larg I
scale private agriculture with a new I
emphasis upon micro-sized subsisten |
peasant farming, are unwittingly pre b:
ing policies very similar in aim to th< j
Luddite movement. Nor have collect I
farms, by whatever name, proven ml
acceptable or successful in Latin
America than they have been elsewh |e
in the world in producing food for
nations.
We have seen in this century an I
explosion of population. However, tr I
Malthusian prediction of mass starvs I
has not occurred because modern
technology has developed agricultur: I
techniques, whereby a relatively few I
diminishing number of farmers can { V
duce more food on a fixed amount of I
land to feed the world's billions. We
have discovered that economies of sc I
work in many kinds of privately run I
food-growing facilities as well as the I
in industry.
The practice of land reform in L; I
America, by contrast, has usually be
accompanied by dramatic reductions I
long-term food production on the sai '
acreages, despite frequent state sub- 1
sidies of various kinds. Peru, for exa
pie, once was the world's most efficii .
producer of sugar. It now must impo
part of its sugar from Guatemala dm I
a well-intentioned but utterly disastr I
land reform. Peru's land reform also I
triggered a rush of former farm worl I
and their families to the cities as the I
rural economy weakened across the I
board.
Land reform efforts designed to I
solve social and economic problems o
the 19th century, and farm pricing
policies that deny farmers a fair retu:
have turned nation after nation in pa
of Latin America from being food
exporters to food importers. Unwise
food-pricing policies also rob countrie
needed investment in agriculture
because no one will voluntarily invest
a money-losing proposition. Moreover
the money now needed to purchase
foreign food is not available to invest
jobs at home. Finally, farmers are no
ferent from the rest of us. They wil
work hard or pay for expensive fertil-
izers and machines to produce food tr
must be sold without profit or reward
for their risks and labors.
We must, therefore, urgently
transform our thinking about food
72
Department of State Bull
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
icies. The growing needs of the 21st
tury for food and jobs, rather than
class warfare of the 19th century,
st be the driving force behind
[.cultural policies. And all of us, in
shington and in Latin America, must
©nest enough to face the empirical
ience of policy results. Where policies
, however well-intentioned, let us
Dgnize them for what they are. In this
.1 area, continuing to spend scarce
purees on proven mistakes is feeding
*ed cattle at the expense of hungry
ions.
An alternative to land reform is to
w the market to determine food
es and to levy fair, but not excessive,
2S upon successful large farms, keep-
the productive units intact, the
erienced owners and managers on
r farms, the workers gainfully
Joyed in the countryside, and the
on fed.
elusion
1 basic reality of what I have been
ing about today is very simple. As I
at the outset of my remarks,
lout investment there will be no new
. Without new jobs, there will be no
lomic growth. Without economic
vth, there will be no political stabili-
^.nd without political stability,
isk a return to violence and
itorships.
Kll of us have a role to play to create
;conomic, political, and security con-
ns necessary for investment and
rth. And all of us must do our part,
use the absence of just one element
e comprehensive package means
sustained economic growth and
stment will not take place.
Vithin countries, political party
;rs have a special role to play in
ating the electorate about the corn-
requirements of building a modern
mic economy. They need to be
e that investor confidence is a very
le commodity and that more jobs
ometimes lost through irresponsible
>ric during election campaigns than
rnments are later able to encourage
!ars of patient constructive action.
Ve in the United States have our
to play. It is important that we
vigorously to keep our own
:ets open. We must also work with
■ countries far more effectively than
D now to combat the mortal threat
■rorism and lawlessness now sap-
economic vitality in Central
America, Peru, and elsewhere. This will
be a major challenge facing our peoples
and our diplomacy in the decade ahead,
and solving it won't be cheap or easy.
Other governments, in varying
degrees, need to reform their macro-
economic, tax, investment, trade, and
food policies. Without these reforms,
they will not be able to produce the food
and jobs required by their peoples, and
without producing these two vital
necessities, democracy itself will surely
fail.
It must be our highest priority to
make sure that this does not happen. ■
Visit of President of Uruguay
President Julio Maria Sanguinetti of
the Oriental Republic of Uruguay made a
state visit to the United States June 16-20,
1986, to meet with President Reagan and
other government officials.
Following are remarks made by
President Reagan and President
Sanguinetti at the arrival ceremony on
June 1 7. 1
President Reagan
It gives me great pleasure to greet
President Sanguinetti. As the elected
leader of a free and democratic
Uruguay, you have our respect, our
admiration, and our heartfelt welcome.
Uruguay is a friend and a country
that shares with us the heritage, tradi-
tions, and values of the Americas. Our
countries, as is true of so many in this
hemisphere, were born of independence
movements seeking to break away from
colonial power. Yet those who founded
our two countries fought not only to be
rid of domination but also for freedom.
Our histories run parallel— both are the
stories of people struggling to be free;
people striving to live up to the ideals
expressed at the time of their nation's
birth.
Today the people of Uruguay are
reaffirming their faith in democracy.
And all those who love liberty applaud
this giant step forward. President
Sanguinetti, we appreciate that your
official delegation includes represen-
tatives from the judicial and legislative
branches, as well as your executive
branch of government. Separation of
'Ciber 1986
'C
73
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
powers, protection of the rights of all
citizens, and a healthy respecl tor the
opinions of others are hallmarks of a
truly tree society. And that is what you
and the current leaders of Uruguay are
building.
In recent years, we have witnessed
an unprecedented expansion of
democracy in the Americas. Just a
decade ago, only one-third of the people
in this hemisphere lived in democracy.
Today 90% of the people live in countries
that are democratic or in transition to
democracy. We should not be satisfied
until all Americans— and that means
every living soul from the North Slope of
Alaska to the tip of Tierra del Fuego—
live in freedom, as is their birthright.
In this hemisphere, the days of dic-
tatorship, left or right, are numbered.
The peaceful process used to reestablish
democracy in Uruguay can serve as a
model for others. Authoritarian regimes
should take notice.
Yet while we celebrate the progress
that has been made, no one should
overlook the decisive battle in the cause
of human freedom now taking place in
Central America. The outcome will
determine, ultimately, whether the
people of that region will enjoy a future
blessed with peace and development or,
instead, be engulfed in tyranny and con-
flict. We who enjoy the fruits of liberty
understand that just and lasting peace is
built on freedom.
Our search for peace in Central
America must, above all, be an effort to
continue the expansion of democratic
freedom that has reached four of the five
nations of this troubled region. We must
continue to press for a negotiated solu-
tion. And in this work, we must uphold
our democratic values and insist that
they be the basis for any agreement that
is worthy of our support.
The Western Hemisphere still holds
the promise of liberty and opportunity
that drew our forefathers and mothers
from the Old World. Uruguay, like the
United States, is a nation of immigrants.
They came to our shores in quest of
freedom and looking for the chance,
through hard work, to improve their
well-being and that of their families.
Uruguay's commitment to economic
growth and revitalization is well
appreciated here. You have set out to
attack not just the symptoms but the
underlying causes of your country's
economic problems. By protecting
Uruguay's good name and credit wor-
thiness, by avoiding simplistic solutions
and quick fixes, and by strengthening
your private sector, you are building the
confidence at home and abroad needed
to carry your country into better and
more prosperous times.
In a speech to your people on
April 7th, you said, "The state sets the
direction, but it does not move the boat.
The boat is moved by the private
sector. . . . " This appreciation of the
essential role of profit motive and enter-
prise bodes well for Uruguay. Already,
your country is enjoying its first real
economic growth in 4 years. And there's
every reason to be optimistic that this
upward trend will continue. Let me just
add that, as Uruguay's largest trading
partner, nothing makes us happier than
to see your country prosper.
ARGENTINA
URUGUAY^
Montevideo
Atlantic
Ocean
I'm looking forward to getting to
know you and discussing some of the
issues that are of importance to both of
our countries. These are exciting times,
and we're proud to have you here with
us and thrilled that Uruguay is again in
the family of free peoples.
President Sanguinetti2
It is a great honor for any Uruguayan
citizen to come to this house. There are
strong reasons for this. Our countries
were born during the same span of his-
tory and were part of the same liberal
revolution which inspired them with the
same ideals. Our century and a half of
independent life since then has demon-
strated our faithfulness to those princi-
ples. Because of this, we stood together
in the two great World Wars of this cen-
tury; milestones which have defined the
political philosophies of the people of the
world ever since. If this is true for any
Uruguayan citizen, how much more so is
it true for someone like me, arriving
here as the President of the Republic
and representing a people that has, by
its vote, entrusted me with the difficult
task of peacefully guiding our republic
back, after a de facto government,
full and stable institutional life.
You know that during these las
months, all of Uruguay has made a
effort and lived a wonderful experi
of peaceful change with the full an<
unrestricted interplay of its institui
and rights with violence toward no
Uruguay is heir to a long democrat
tradition and, therefore, suffered a
more from the collapse of its institi
tions. Today it feels it has returnee
old legacy and has done so in exem
fashion, one that enhances those
traditions.
For this reason, as you, yourse
have pointed out, you have before 3
today not only the chief of the exec
branch but also the President of th ■
Supreme Court of Justice, the Pres
of the House of Representatives, w^
represents the main opposition par
and my party's leader in the Senat
happens to be the son of the last
Uruguayan President to visit here,
31 years ago. This environment of
monious cordiality among the diffe
branches of government and demoi
parties is the best evidence we can
the world of what we have achieve
such a short time.
I would not be sincere, howeve
did not mention that our country is
experiencing serious problems that
from both domestic and internatior
causes. It is not easy to strive for t
consolidation of our hard-won deni(
and to put our domestic economy ii
order while external economic and
cial conditions subsist that in some
hamper, and in other cases actually
cancel out, the fruits of our own int
efforts.
We must respond to the legitirr
and urgent call of our people to rec
their past standard of living and, at
same time, confront the heavy debt
have inherited— all within the conte
an increasingly closed and protectic
world trading system. These are tn
which your government has commit
itself to fight, a position we whole-
heartedly endorse in order to prese
the mutual advantages of fair and c
world trade.
We have come to exchange viev
with you and your government on
of these problems. We shall speak
frankly, as we always do— the more
a country we have always considers
friend. We may at times disagree, I
precisely because of our friendship
feel that it is our duty to speak to e
other with loyalty, clearly and
constructively.
1 1
74
Department of State B> J
We know that public opinion is very
lortant in this democratic nation, and
, therefore, understand our positions,
are also confident that your govern-
it will take them into consideration
:n we look together at ways of
roving our relationship and overcom-
the consequences of these problems.
Either international trade is freed,
ve must all resign ourselves to being
:ed into a new feudalism. The more
■erful may survive longer, although
demned to live in an aggressive,
table, and violent world. The weaker,
us, will be sentenced to a life of
liocrity. But all of us, sooner or later,
be staring poverty in the face.
George Washington foresaw the
Drtance of this over 200 years ago
n he said, "Sound policy,
anitarianism, and our own self-
rest all suggest a harmonious and
al exchange with all nations."
fever, even in our trading policy, we
t keep a fair and unbiased position
out seeking or granting favors or
usive preferences, respecting the
ral course of events. For this
on, we seek neither charity nor pro-
rs of any kind. We need only
€rative partners, strong in capital
technology, with whom we may
c together to build a better world
ed by the same ideals of freedom
inspired our forefathers.
n a troubled world, our country is
y, as it has been in the past, a land
ace and democracy. We would wish
e this same peace and democracy all
the Americas, achieved by us Latin
ricans as the result of our own
'rical commitments and our sense of
msibility to the future. Uruguay will
nue to participate in all political
ts aimed at promoting peace in
?'s world, especially within our
rica.
'eace and democracy are insepa-
. We cannot have one without the
\ Uruguay today reaffirms once
1 its faith in both principles, which
;itute the backbone of its very
ence as a free and independent
n.
t is in this spirit that we greet you,
government, and our friends, your
le.
leld at the South Portico of the White
: where President Sanguinetti was
Jed a formal welcome with full military
5 (text from Weekly Compilation of
ential Documents of June 23, 1986).
President Sanguinetti spoke in Spanish,
is remarks were translated by an inter-
TREATIES
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency-Done at New York Oct. 26, 1956. *
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873
Acceptance deposited: Zimbabwe,
Aug. 1, 1986.
Conservation
( ''invention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an
arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,
1980. Entered into force Apr. 7. 1982. TIAS
10240.
Accession deposited: Korea, Rep. of.
Mar. 29, 1985.
Finance— Asian Development Bank
Articles of agreement establishing the Asian
Development Bank. Done at Manila Dec. 4.
1965. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1966. TIAS
6103.
Acceptances deposited: China. People's Rep.
of, Mar. 10, 1986; Spain, Feb. 14, 1986.
Finance — Inter-American Development
Bank
Agreement establishing the Inter-American
Development Bank, with annexes. Done at
Washington Apr. S. 1959. Entered into force
Dec. 30, L959. TIAS 4397.
Signature and acceptance deposited: Norway.
July 7, 1986.
Fisheries
Protocol to amend the international conven-
tion of May l-l. 1966, for the conservation of
Atlantic tunas (TIAS 6767). Done at Paris
July 10, 1984.1
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
July 24. 1986.
Human Rights
International convenant on civil and political
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 999 UNTS
171.-
International convenant on economic, social,
and cultural rights. Done at New York
Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan 3, 1976.
999 UNTS 3.2
Ratifications deposited: \rgentina, Aug 8, 1986
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of interna-
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1,
1983.2
Ratification deposited: U.K., May 20,
1986.3
Marine Pollution
International convention relating to
intervention on the high seas in cases of oil
pollution casualties, with annex. Done at
Bi i sels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force
May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.
\ceession deposited: South Africa. July 1, 1986.
Maritime Matters
International convention on maritime search
and rescue. 1979, with annex. Done at Ham-
burg Apr. 27. 1979. Entered into force
June 22, 1985.
Accession deposited: Venezuela, July 8, 1986.
Pollution
Protocol to the convention on long-range
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 1979
(TIAS 10541), concerning monitoring and
evaluation of the long-range transmission of
air pollutants in Europe (EMEP). with annex.
Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984.1
Approval deposited: EEC, July 17, 1986.
Convention for the protection of the ozone
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22,
1985.1
Senate advice and consent to ratification
July 24. 1986.
Ratified by President: Aug. 14, 1986.
Postal
Second additional protocol to the constitution
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964.
I "one at Lausanne July 5, 1974. TIAS 8231.
Ratification deposited: Turkey, June 25, 1986
Property— Intellectual
I 'invention establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organization. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25. 1970.
TIAS 6932.
Ratification deposited: Iceland, June 13, 1986.
Red Cross
( leneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded and sick in armed
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362.
< leneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked members of armed forces at sea.
Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2. 1956.
TIAS 3363.
Geneva convention relative to the treatment
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364.
Geneva convention relative to the protection
of civilian persons in time of war. Done at
Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS
3365
\ccessions deposited: Equatorial Guinea,
July 24, 1986
Der 1986
75
TREATIES
Protocol additional to the Geneva convenl
of Aug. 12, [949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364,
3365), and relating to the protection of vic-
tims of international armed conflicts (Protocol
I), with anne ces I tone at Geneva June 8,
L977. Entered into force Dec. 7. 19'
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
ig. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364,
3365). and relating to the protection of vic-
tims of noninternational armed conflicts (Pro-
tocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977.
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.
Accessions deposited: Benin, May 28, 1986;
Equatorial Guinea, July 24, 1986; Jamaica,
July 29, 1986.
Ratifications deposited: Belgium,
May 20, 1986."
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention,
with annexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi
Nov. 6, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984;
definitively for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986.
Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates,
May 22. L986.
Ratifications deposited: Barbados. May 22, 1986;
Bulgaria, May 21, 1986;3 Italy, May 13, 1986;3
Zambia, May 29, 1986.
Terrorism
International convention against the taking of
hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979.
Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the U.S.
Jan. 6, 1985.
Accession deposited: Antigua and Barbuda,
Aug. 6. 1986.
Ratification deposited: Togo, July 25, 1986.
UNIDO
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, with annexes.
Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into
force June 21, 1985.
Accession deposited: Tonga. Aug. 13, 1986.
Wheat
Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at Lon-
don Mar. 14, 1986. Entered into force July 1,
1986.5
Notifications i if provisional application deposited:
El Salvador. July 11, 1986; Panama, July 3,
1986
Ratification deposited: Barbados, July 2, 1986.
Women
Convention on the political rights of women.
Done ;it New York Mar. 31. 1953. Entered
into force July 7. 1954; for the U.S. July 7
1976. TIAS 8289
Accession deposited: Colombia. Aug. 5, 1986.
entior on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination againsl women. Done at New
York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force
Sept 3, 1981.2
deposited: Iraq, Aug. 13, 1986.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement concerning the furnishing of
launch and associated services for Australia's
national satellite system. Signed at
Washington Mar. 7, 1985. Entered into force
Mar. 7, 1985.
Canada
Agreement concerning the exchange of fuel
for naval ships and aircraft, with enclosure.
Signed at Ottawa and Washington May 5 and
June 27, 1986. Entered into force June 27,
1986.
Agreement modifying the agreement of
Oct. 19, 1983, relating to limitation of imports
of specialty steel from Canada. Effected by
exchange of letters at Washington July 15
and 17, 1986. Entered into force July 17,
1986; effective July 20, 1986.
Central African Republic
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or
guaranteed by the U.S. Government through
the Export-Import Bank of the United States.
Signed at Washington May 23, 1986. Entered
into force Aug. 1, 1986.
Dominican Republic
Memorandum of understanding governing
cooperation in mapping, charting, and
geodesy. Signed at Santo Domingo July 24,
1986. Entered into force July 24, 1986."
El Salvador
Agreement amending the agreement for the
sale of agricultural commodities of Dec. 20,
1985. Effected by exchange of notes at San
Salvador June 27, 1986. Enters into force
upon written notification by the parties that
the internal procedures of both countries have
been completed.
Ghana
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Accra July 14, 1986.
Entered into force July 14, 1986.
Guatemala
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities (and amending agreement of June 6,
1985). Signed at Guatemala July 2, 1986.
Enters into force following an exchange of
notes confirming that the internal procedures
of the importing country have been met.
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of June 6, 1985.
Signed at Guatemala Aug. 9. 1985. Entered
into force Aug. 9, 1985.
Haiti
Agreement on procedures for mutual
assistance in law enforcement matters.
Signed at Port-au-Prince Aug. 15, 1986.
Entered into force Aug. 15, 1986.
Honduras
Third amendment to the grant agreemei
Mar. 25, 1985, relating to financial stabi
tion and economic recovery in Honduras i
Signed at Tegucigalpa June 19, 1986.
Entered into force June 19. 1986.
Hong Kong
Agreement modifying and extending ag I
ment of June 23, 1982 (TIAS 10420), rel
to trade in certain textiles and textile pr
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at F
Kong Aug. 4, 1986. Entered into force
Aug. 4, 1986; effective Jan. 1, 1986.
Kenya
Agreement for sales of agricultural com
modities. Signed at Nairobi July 16, 198
Entered into force July 16, 1986.
Malaysia
Agreement amending agreement of Jul;
and 11, 1985, as amended, relating to tr
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textile
textile products. Effected by exchange i
notes at Kuala Lumpur July 24 and 25,
Entered into force July 25, 1986.
Mozambique
Agreement amending the agreement fo
sale of agricultural commodities of Apri
1986. Effected by exchange of letters an
Maputo July 9, 1986. Entered into force
July 9, 1986.
Pakistan
Agreement concerning the provisions o:
training related to defense articles unde-
U.S. international military education an
training (IMET) program. Effected by
exchange of notes at Islamabad Dec. 10
1985. and July 30, 1986. Entered into fd
July 30, 1986.
Panama
Agreement regarding the consolidation
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S.
Government and its agencies, with anne
Signed at Washington July 2. 1986. Ent
into force Aug. 18, 1986.
Senegal
International express mail agreement, v
detailed regulations. Signed at Dakar ar
Washington June 5 and Julv 3, 1986. Er
into force Sept. 1, 1986.
Sierra Leone
Agreement amending the agreement foi
of agricultural commodities of May 5, 1£
Effected by exchange of notes at Freeto
Aug. 1, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 1
1986.
76
Denartmfint nf State Bl
IESS RELEASES
PUBLICATIONS
Department of State
releases may be obtained from the
of Press Relations, Department of
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Dale
8/4
8/6
8/11
8/11
8/11
Subject
Air fares between Switzerland
and U.S. to be partially
deregulated; Swissair to
offer new service to U.S.
Foreign Relations of the
failed States, 1955-1957,
Volume II, China, released.
Program for the official work-
ing visit to Washington, D.C,
of President Miguel de la
Madrid Hurtado of the
United Mexican States,
Aug. 12-14.
Shultz: statement and
question-and-answer ses-
sion, Bogota, Aug. 7.
Whitehead: statement and
question-and-answer
session.
160 8/15 Shultz: opening statement at
first plenary session of
U.S. -Australian bilateral
ministerial. San Francisco.
Aug. 11.
*161 8/15 Shultz: dinner remarks aboard
The Citi/ of San Francisco,
Aug. 11.
162 8/15 Shultz, Weinberger, Hayden.
Beazley: joint news con-
ference, San Francisco,
Aug. 11.
*163 8/18 Shultz: remarks at Balaguer
House. Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic, Aug. 15.
*164 8/26 Reginald Bartholomew sworn
in as U.S. Ambassador to
Spain, Aug. 20 (biographic
data).
*165 8/26 Regional Foreign Policy Con-
ference. Baltimore, Sept. 19.
*166 8/29 CSCE forum, Miami, Sept. 7.
♦167 8/29 U.S.. Mexico AM broadcasting
agreement signed, Aug. 28.
*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■
ment amending the agreement for sales
cultural commodities of Jan. 26, 1986.
ed by exchange of notes at Khartoum
1986. Entered into force July 16,
nd
ment concerning the provision of train-
ated to defense articles under the U.S.
itional military education and training
') program. Effected by exchange of
it Bangkok Apr. 15 and July 28, 1986.
>d into force July 28. 1986.
Agreement amending agreement of July 27
and Aug. 8, 1983. as amended, relating to
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber tex-
tiles and textile products. Effected by
exchange of notes at Bangkok Apr. 4 and
June 5, 1986. Entered into force June 5,
1986.
'Not in force.
2Not in force for the U.S.
3With reservation(s) and declaration(s)
4With declaration.
5In force provisionally for the U.S. ■
Department of State
Free single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Correspondence Management Division,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
President Reagan
SDI: Progress and Promise, briefing on the
SDI, Aug. 6, 1986 (Current Policy #858).
Africa
Does South Africa Have a Future?. Assistant
Secretary Keyes, National Urban League's
annual conference. San Francisco, July 21,
1986 (Current Policy #857).
Africa: U.S. Policy (GIST. Aug. 1986).
Meaning of Sanctions and Countersanctions
for South Africa's Neighbors (GIST, Aug.
1986).
U.S. Pressures on South Africa (GIST. Aug.
1986).
Arms Control
Arms Control: Turning the Corner?, ACDA
Director Adelman, American Bar Assoc,
New York City, Aug. 12, 1986 (Current
Policy #861).
U.S. Policy Regarding Limitations on Nuclear
Testing,' Aug. 1986 (Special Report #150).
Interim Restraint Policy: U.S. and Soviet
Force Projections, Aug. 1986 (Special
Report #151).
Department & Foreign Service
The Foreign Affairs Budget, Deputy
Secretary Whitehead, press briefing,
Aug. 11, 1986 (Current Policy #860).
East Asia
U.S. -China Science and Technology
Exchanges (GIST. Aug. 1986).
Europe
Twentieth Semiannual Report on Implemen-
tation of Helsinki Final Act, Oct. 1,
1985-Apr. 1, 1986 (Special Report #146).
Soviet Active Measures: The WPC
Copenhagen Peace Congress, Oct. 15-19,
1986, July 1986 (Foreign Affairs Note).
General
Current Policy Digest No. 18, July 1986.
Selected State Department Publications, July
1986.
Narcotics
U.S. International Narcotic Control Pro-
grams and Policies, Deputy Secretary
Whitehead, Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee, Aug. 14, 1986 (Current Policy #863).
fier 1986
77
PUBLICATIONS
Oceans
Will Protect Freedom of the Seas?,
Assistant Secretary Negroponte, Law of
Sea Institute, Miami, July 21, 1986
(Current PoliCJ 0855).
Terrorism
Economic Sanctions to Combat International
Terrorism, July 1986 (Special Report #149).
Western Hemisphere
Obstacles to Investment and Economic
Growth in Latin America, Ambassador to
the OAS McCormack, Conference of the
Great Cities of the Americas, San Juan,
June 20, 1986 (Current Policy #862). ■
Background Notes
This series provides brief, factual summaries
of the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of about 170 countries
(excluding the United States) and of selected
international organizations. Recent revisions
are:
Afghanistan (July 1986)
Argentina (July 1986)
Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) (Apr. 1986)
Burma (May 1986)
Chile (Apr. 1986)
Korea, North (May 1986)
Laos (May 1986)
Mali (Apr. 1986)
Morocco (July 1986)
Sierra Leone (July 1986)
Somalia (Apr. 1986)
Syria (June 1986)
Tanzania (July 1986)
Index (June 1986)
A free copy of the index only may be
obtained from the Correspondence Manage-
ment Division, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
For about 60 Background Notes a year, a
subscription is available from the Superintend-
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for
$32.00 (domestic) and $40.00 (foreign). Check
or money order, made payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accom-
pany order. ■
Foreign Relations Volume Released
The Department of State on August 6,
1986, released Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-1957. Volume II,
China. This volume documents U.S.
policy in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1955.
In mid-January 1955, Chinese com-
munist attacks on the Dachen Islands,
northernmost of the nationalist-held
islands off the China coast, posed a
dilemma for the United States. The
Eisenhower Administration was commit-
ted to protect the nationalist regime on
Taiwan but hoped to avoid being drawn
into an armed conflict with China. The
Administration developed a threefold
strategy. The United States pressed the
nationalists to evacuate the Dachens and
assisted in the evacuation. Congress
passed the Formosa Resolution,
authorizing the President to use U.S.
Armed Forces to protect Taiwan, the
Pescadores, and related positions.
Simultaneously, the United States sup-
ported a New Zealand initiative to raise
the offshore islands problem before the
UN Security Council.
President Eisenhower was deeply
disturbed by the ongoing Taiwan Strait
crisis. He concluded that nationalist
withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu
offered the best solution, and he hoped
Chiang Kai-shek would decide on his
own initiative to treat them as dispen-
sable outposts. In April 1955, he sent
Assistant Secretary of State Walter S.
Robertson and Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Admiral Arthur Radford to
Taiwan in an unsuccessful attempt to
persuade Chiang to withdraw from
Quemoy and Matsu.
The crisis entered a new phase ■
Premier Zhou Enlai of the People's
Republic of China declared in April
the Bandung Conference of Asian a><
African nations that China was will
enter into negotiations with the Uni
States in order to discuss the relaxa
of tension. Great Britain, India, and'
other countries renewed diplomatic
efforts to bring about a peaceful res
tion of the crisis. In July, these effoi
culminated in a U.S. -Chinese agreer
to begin talks at the ambassadorial
The volume concludes with preparat
for the U.S.-People's Republic of Cr
ambassadorial talks. The talks, held
Geneva from August 1955 through
December 1957, will be documented
Volume III, scheduled for publicatio
later this year.
Foreign Relations, 1955-1957,
Volume II, which comprises 688 pag
previously classified foreign affairs
records, was prepared in the Office
the Historian, Bureau of Public AM
Department of State. This authoriffl
official record is based upon the file:
the White House, the Department 0'
State, and other government agenci
Copies of Volume II (Departmer
State Publication No. 9450 (GPO St.
No. 044-000-02118-8) may be pur-
chased for $23.00 (domestic postpak
from the Superintendent of Doeume-
U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C, 20402. Checks oil
money orders should be made payab
the Superintendent of Documents.
Press release 156 of August 6, 1986.
78
Department of State Bui1
EX
lober 1986
jme 86, No. 2115
il Control
i Control: Turning the Corner?
ulman) 7
[ Jpens Final Session (White House
lement) 9
s-n Restraint: U.S. and Soviet Force
I ections (letter to the Congress,
lassified report) 10
i ential Response to Soviet Arms Control
oosals (White House statement) 12
I ent's News Conference of August 12
l?rpts) 2
ileets in Geneva (White House and U.S.
pments) 18
progress and Promise (Reagan) 1
. olicy Regarding Limitations on Nuclear
sing.
.14
LS.S.R. Discussions on Nuclear Testing
e House statement) 17
&lia. U.S. and Australia Hold
isterial Talks (Beazley, Hayden, Shultz,
I iberger, joint statement) 43
li Update on Chile (Abrams) 66
jess
in Restraint: U.S. and Soviet Force
ections (letter to the Congress,
Wtssified report) 10
■ on UN Human Rights Commission
ding (Schifter) 61
I eport on Cyprus (message to the
Iress) 35
il ternational Narcotic Control
flrams and Policies (Whitehead) 37
; pfugee Policies and Programs at
idear 1986 (Purcell) 49
a on Chile (Abrams) 66
r\ . 27th Report on Cyprus (message to
e| ongress) 35
ament & Foreign Service. The Foreign
Srs Budget (Whitehead) 19
Inks
mnic Sanctions to Combat International
iflirism 27
aes to Investment and Economic
tith in Latin America (McCormack) . .70
itcic Petroleum Reserve (White House
llhient) 34
kf oliey: Where Will America Lead?
Hinn) 31
-.pan Relations: A Global Partnership
rie Future (Armacost) 20
-..pan Semiconductor Trade Agreement
e£an) 22
ajon Chile (Abrams) 66
ri . Strategic Petroleum Reserve (White
Be statement) 34
p|
Jbens Final Session (White House
jfcient) 9
item and Tourism (Oakley) 55
b*i Assistance
•Jj-eign Affairs Budget (Whitehead) . . 19
. j'fugee Policies and Programs at
liar 1986 (Purcell) 49
ifriv
Hnt's News Conference of August 12
«*pts) 2
i Jiniversary of Berlin Wall (Reagan) . 35
Human Rights
Captive Nations Week, 1986 (proclamation) 36
1 lth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act
(Reagan) 36
Report on UN Human Rights Commission
Meeting (Schifter) til
I fpdate on Chile (Abrams) 66
Japan
Perspective and Proportion for U.S.-Japanese
Relations (Sigur) 24
U.S. -Japan Relations: A Global Partnership
for the Future (Armacost) 20
U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement
(Reagan) 22
Law Of The Sea. Who Will Protect Freedom
of the Seas? (Negroponte) 41
Maritime Affairs. Who Will Protect
Freedom of the Seas? (Negroponte) 41
Mexico. Visit of Mexican President (De la
Madrid. Reagan) 65
Military Affairs
Binary Chemical Munitions Program (White
House statement) 37
SDI: Progress and Promise (Reagan) 1
Narcotics. U.S. International Narcotic Con-
trol Programs and Policies (Whitehead) . . 37
New Zealand. U.S. and Australia Hold
Ministerial Talks (Beazley, Hayden, Shultz,
Weinberger, joint statement) 43
Nicaragua
Nicaragua's Role in Revolutionary Interna-
tionalism (Walters) 58
President's News Conference of August 12
(excerpts) 2
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Binary
Chemical Munitions Program (White House
statement) 37
Oceans. Who Will Protect Freedom of the
Seas? (Negroponte) 41
Pakistan. Visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister
(joint statement) 54
Presidential Documents
Antiterrorism Act Signed into Law 58
Captive Nations Week, 1986 (proclamation) 36
1 lth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act 36
Interim Restraint: U.S. and Soviet Force
Projections (letter to the Congress,
unclassified report) 10
International Trade 6
President's News Conference of August 12
(excerpts) 2
SDI: Progress and Promise 1
25th Anniversary of Berlin Wall 35
27th Report on Cyprus (message to the
Congress) 35
U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade Agree-
ment 22
Visit of Mexican President (De la Madrid,
Reagan) 65
Visit of President of Uruguay (Reagan,
Sanguinetti) 73
Publications
Background Notes 78
Department of State 77
Foreign Relations Volume Released 78
Refugees. U.S. Refugee Policies and Pro-
grams at Midyear 1986 (Purcell) 49
South Africa. President's News Conference
of August 12 (excerpts) 2
Terrorism
Antiterrorism Act Signed into Law
(Reagan) 58
Economic Sanctions to Combat International
Terrorism 27
President's News Conference of August 12
(excerpts) 2
Terrorism and Tourism (Oakley) 55
Trade
Economic Sanctions to Combat International
Terrorism 27
International Trade (Reagan) 6
Obstacles to Investment and Economic
Growth in Latin America (McCormack) . . 70
Trade Policy: Where Will America Lead?
(McMinn)' 31
U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement
(Reagan) 22
Travel. Terrorism and Tourism (Oakley). . .55
Treaties. Current Actions 75
U.S.S.R.
Arms Control: Turning the Corner?
(Adelman) 7
Interim Restraint: U.S. and Soviet Force Pro-
jections (letter to the Congress, unclassified
report) 10
Presidential Response to Soviet Arms Control
Proposals (White House statement) 12
President's News Conference of August 12
(excerpts) 2
SCC Meets in Geneva (White House and U.S.
statements) 18
U.S. Policy Regarding Limitations on Nuclear
Testing 14
U.S. -U.S.S.R. Discussions on Nuclear Testing
(White House statement) 17
United Nations
Nicaragua's Role in Revolutionary Inter-
nationalism (Walters) 58
Report on UN Human Rights Commission
Meeting (Schifter) 61
UN Financial Crisis (Walters) 63
Uruguay. Visit of President of Uruguay
(Reagan, Sanguinetti) 73
Western Hemisphere
Nicaragua's Role in Revolutionary Interna-
tionalism (Walters) 58
Obstacles to Investment and Economic
Growth in Latin America (McCormack) . . 70
Name Index
Abrams, Elliott 66
Adelman, Kenneth L 7
Armacost, Michael H 20
Beazley, Kim 43
De La Madrid Hurtado, Miguel 65
Hayden, Bill 43
McCormack, Richard T 70
McMinn, Douglas W 31
Negroponte, John D 41
Oakley, Robert B 55
Purcell, James N., Jr 49
Reagan, President . . 1, 2, 6, 10, 22, 35, 36, 58,
65, 73
Sanguinetti, Julio Maria 73
Schifter, Richard 61
Shultz, Secretary 43
Sigur, Gaston J., Jr 24
Walters, Vernon A 58, 63
Weinberger, Caspar W 43
Whitehead, John C 19, 37
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Department
3[
& flWIo
i« oi sum- i* im > «>
bulletin
Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy/Volume 86/Number 21 16
November 1986
%*
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*
^PWhrtJB^ffW^
I vii lit »-i ■ ■ k r*IJL™JIr^7J
CDE Accord/20
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Brazil/83
Department of State
bulletin
Volume 86/Number 21 16/November 1986
The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; se-
lected press releases issued by the
White House, the Department, and the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and
treaties and other agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party. Special features, articles, and
other supportive material (such as maps,
charts, photographs, and graphs) are
published frequently to provide addi-
tional information on current issues but
should not necessarily be interpreted as
official U.S. policy statements.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State
GEORGE B. HIGH
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
SHARON R. LOTZ
Assistant Editor
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Department of State Bulletin (ISSN
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CONTENTS
FEATURE
1 Prospects for World Peace (President Reagan)
i President
Keeping America Strong
• Vice President
Visit to the Middle East
(Secretary
; Progress, Freedom, and
Responsibility
I Proposed Refugee Admissions
for FY 1987
r:a
| Continuation of South Africa
Emergency (Message to the
Congress)
ns Control
CDE Delegations Reach Accord
on Military Activities in
Europe (Robert L. Barry,
President Reagan, Document)
Nuclear and Space Arms
Negotiations
( Wh ite House Stateme n t )
MBFR Talks End 39th Round
(Western Statement)
MBFR Negotiations Reconvene
(White House Statement)
U.S. and Soviet Approaches to
Arms Control
(Edward L. Rowny)
• Verifying Nuclear Testing
Limitations: Possible U.S.-
Soviet Cooperation
(Message to the Congress, Text
of Study)
East Asia
39
42
U.S. and East Asian-Pacific
Relations: The Challenge
Ahead (Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.)
U.S. -Japanese Relations
Economics
43
45
An Agenda for the New GATT
Round (Clayton Yeutter)
GATT Nations Agree to Launch
New Round of Trade
Negotiations (Clayton
Yeutter, Declaration)
Europe
49 Under Secretary Armacost's
Interview on "Meet the Press"
51 Secretary's News Briefing of
September 12
52 Deputy Secretary Whitehead's
Interview on "Face the
Nation"
54 Secretary's News Briefing of
September 20
57 Secretary's News Conference of
September 25
60 President's and Secretary's
News Conference of
September 30
64 Secretary's Interview on "The
Today Show"
66 Secretary's News Briefing of
October 2
70 Prospects for the Vienna
CSCE Follow-Up Meeting
( Warren Zimmerman)
72 CSCE Follow-Up Preparatory
Meeting
(Department Statement)
73 A Discussion on U.S. -Soviet
Relations (Paul H. Nitze,
Ma rk Palmer)
76 28th Report on Cyprus
(Message to the Congress)
Human Rights
77 Religious Persecution in
the Soviet Union
(Edward J. Derwinski,
Richard Schifter)
Science & Technology
83 ITU Issues Report on Soviet
Jamming
Western Hemisphere
Visit of Brazil's President
(President Reagan,
Jose Sarney)
U.S. -Brazil Relations
Cuba: New Migration and
Embargo Measures
(Department Statement)
Arrival of Cuban Political
Prisoners (Department
Statements)
84
86
86
87
Treaties
88 Current Actions
Press Releases
90 Department of State
Publications
90 Department of State
Index
f DEC 1 7 1986
attbi.
-j
1 HM.'
■
A i ^H
X
>*l
**»,
With Secretary General Perez de Cuellar.
(White House photo by Petef
Department of State Bu i1
FEATURE
United Nations
Prospects for
World Peace
by President Reagan
Address before the 41st session
of the UN General Assembly
in New York City on September 22, 1986. 1
A short walk from this chamber is the
delegates' Meditation Room, a refuge
from a world deafened by the noise of
strife and violence. "We want to bring
back the idea of worship," Dag
Hammarskjold once said about this
room, "devotion to something which is
greater and higher than we are
ourselves."
Well, it's just such devotion that
gave birth to the United Nations, devo-
tion to the dream of world peace and
freedom, of human rights and demo-
cratic self-determination, of a time
when, in those ancient words, " . . .and
they shall beat their swords into
plowshares . . . nation shall not lift up
sword against nation, neither shall they
learn war any more."
The United States remains com-
mitted to the United Nations. For over
40 years, this organization has provided
an international forum for harmonizing
conflicting national interests and has
made a significant contribution in such
fields as peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, and eradicating disease. And
yet, no one knows better than those in
this chamber how the noble ideals
embodied in the Charter have often
remained unfulfilled. This organization
itself faces a critical hour— that is usually
stated as a fiscal crisis. But we can turn
this "crisis" into an opportunity. The
important reforms proposed by a group
of experts can be a first step toward
restoring this organization's status and
effectiveness. The issue, ultimately, is
not one of cash but of credibility. If all
the members of this universal organiza-
tion decide to seize the moment and turn
the rhetoric of reform into reality, the
future of the United Nations will be
secure. And you have my word for it: my
country, which has always given the
United Nations generous support, will
continue to play a leading role in the
effort to achieve its noble purposes.
U.S. -Soviet Relations
When I came before you last year, an
important moment in the pursuit of
those purposes had not yet occurred.
The leaders of the Soviet Union and the
United States were to meet in Geneva.
These discussions have now been held.
For over 15 hours, Soviet and American
delegations met. For about 5 hours,
General Secretary Gorbachev and I
talked alone.
Our talks were frank. The talks were
also productive— in a larger sense than
even the documents that were agreed.
Mr. Gorbachev was blunt, and so was I.
We came to realize again the truth of the
statement: nations do not mistrust each
other because they are armed; they are
armed because they mistrust each other.
And I did not hesitate to tell Mr.
Gorbachev our view of the source of that
mistrust: the Soviet Union's record of
seeking to impose its ideology and rule
on others. So, we acknowledged the deep
and abiding differences between our
systems of government, our views of
history and the future of mankind. But,
despite these differences, we resolved to
work together for real reductions in
nuclear arms as well as progress in other
areas.
Delegates to the 41st General
Assembly of the United Nations, today I
want to report to you on what has
transpired since the summit: notably the
important letter I sent July 25th to Mr.
Gorbachev. In that letter, I dealt with
the important issues of reducing nuclear
arms, agreeing on strategic defenses,
and limiting nuclear testing. In addition
to those issues, which concern the mili-
tary aspects of Soviet-American rela-
tions, I would also like to address other
essential steps toward peace: the resolu-
tion of political conflicts, the strengthen-
ing of the international economy, and
the protection of human rights.
Before I do this, however, let me, in
the tradition of candor established at
Geneva, tell you that a pall has been cast
over our relations with the Soviet Union.
I refer here to a particularly disturbing
example of Soviet transgressions against
human rights.
Recently— after the arrest of a
Soviet national and UN employee
accused of espionage in the United
States— an American correspondent in
Moscow was made the subject of fabri-
cated accusations and trumped-up
charges. He was arrested and jailed in a
callous disregard of due process and
numerous human rights conventions. In
effect, he was taken as a hostage— even
threatened with the death penalty.
Both individuals have now been
remanded to their respective ambas-
sadors. But this is only an interim step,
agreed to by the United States for
humanitarian reasons. It does not
change the facts of the case: Gennadiy
Zakharov is an accused spy who should
stand trial; Nicholas Daniloff is an inno-
cent hostage who should be released.
The Soviet Union bears the responsibil-
ity for the consequences of its action.
Misusing the United Nations for pur-
poses of espionage does a grave disserv-
ice to this organization.
And the world expects better. It
expects contributions to the cause of
peace that only the leaders of the United
States and the Soviet Union can make.
With NATO Scretary General Lord Carrington.
With King Juan Carlos I of Spain.
Department of State Built,
ns Control
for this reason that I wrote last
mer to Mr. Gorbachev with new
s control proposals. Before discus-
the proposals, let us be clear about
h weapons are the most dangerous
threatening to peace. The threat
not come from defensive systems,
h are a shield against attack, but
1 offensive weapons— ballistic
iles that hurtle through space and
ivreak mass destruction on the sur-
of the earth, especially the Soviet
in's heavy, accurate intercontinental
stic missiles (ICBMs), with multiple
leads, which have no counterparts in
or number in any other country.
That is why the United States has
urged radical, equitable, verifiable
ctions in these offensive systems,
s that I said reduction; for this is the
purpose of arms control: not just to
'y the levels of today's arsenals, not
to channel their further expansion,
,o reduce them in ways that will
ce the danger of war. Indeed, the
ed States believes the prospect of a
•e without such weapons of mass
•uction must be the ultimate goal of
. control.
am pleased to say that the Soviet
n has now embraced our idea of
:al reductions in offensive systems.
le Geneva summit last November,
greed to intensify work in this area.
then, the Soviets have made
led proposals which, while not
3table to us, appear to represent a
us effort. So, we continue to seek a
reduction of American and Soviet
lals— with the central focus on the
:tion of ballistic missile warheads. If
oviet Union wants only a lesser
:tion, however, we are prepared to
der it but as an interim measure. In
• provisions, as well, we have sought
ke account of Soviet concerns. So,
has been movement.
Similarly, in the area of intermediate-
e nuclear forces, the United States
5 the total elimination of such mis-
on a global basis. Again, if the
;t Union insists on pursuing such a
in stages, we are prepared to con-
i an interim agreement without
Lll this gives me hope. I can tell you
xchanges between our two sides
summer could well have marked the
ming of a serious, productive
negotiation on arms reduction. The ice of
the negotiating stalemate could break— if
both sides intensify their effort in the
new round of Geneva talks and if we
keep the promises we made to each
other last November.
For too long a time, however, the
Soviet response has been to downplay
the need for offensive reductions. When
the United States began work on
technology to make offensive nuclear
weapons someday obsolete, the Soviets
tried to make that the main issue— as if
the main danger to strategic stability
was a defense against missiles that is
still on the drawing boards, rather
than the menacing ballistic missiles
themselves that already exist in exces-
sive numbers.
Still, the United States recognizes
that both the offensive and defensive
sides of the strategic equation must be
addressed. And we have gone far to
meet Soviet concerns expressed about
the potential offensive use of strategic
defensive systems. I have offered firm
and concrete assurances that our
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) could
never be used to deploy weapons in
U.S. Delegation
to the 41st
UN General Assembly
Representatives
Vernon A. Walters
Herbert S. Okun
Larry Pressler, U.S. Senator from the State
of South Dakota
Thomas F. Eagleton, U.S. Senator from
the State of Missouri
Helen Marie Taylor
Alternate Representatives
Patricia M. Byrne
Hugh Montgomery
Joseph Verner Reed
Paul S. Trible, Jr., U.S. Senator from the
State of Virginia
John Kerry, U.S. Senator from the State of
Massachusetts
USUN press release 101 of Oct. 9, 1986.
FEATURE
United Nations
space that can cause mass destruction on
Earth. I have pointed out that the
radical reduction we seek now in offen-
sive arsenals would be additional
insurance that SDI cannot be used to
support a first-strike strategy. And our
preference from the beginning has been
to move forward cooperatively with the
Soviets on strategic defenses, so that
neither side will feel threatened and both
can benefit from the strategic revolution
that SDI represents.
The United States continues to
respect the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty in spite of clear evidence the
Soviets are violating it. We have told the
Soviets that if we can both agree on
radical reductions in strategic offensive
weapons, we are prepared right now to
sign an agreement with them on
research, development, testing, and
deployment of strategic defenses based
on the following.
First, both sides would agree to con-
fine themselves through 1991 to
research, development, and testing,
which is permitted by the ABM Treaty,
to determine whether advanced systems
of strategic defense are technically
feasible.
Second, a new treaty, signed now,
would provide that if, after 1991, either
side should decide to deploy such a
system, that side would be obliged to
offer a plan for sharing the benefits of
strategic defense and for eliminating
offensive ballistic missiles. And this plan
would be negotiated over a 2-year
period.
Third, if the two sides can't agree
after 2 years of negotiation, either side
would be free to deploy an advanced
strategic defense system, after giving
6-months notice to the other.
As the United States has repeatedly
made clear, we are moving toward a
future of greater reliance upon strategic
defense. The United States remains
prepared to talk about how— under what
ground rules and process— we and the
Soviet Union can do this cooperatively.
Such strategic defenses, coupled with
radical reductions in offensive forces,
would represent a safer balance and
would give future statesmen the oppor-
tunity to move beyond it to the ultimate
elimination of nuclear weapons from the
face of the earth.
Secretary's Bilaterals
at the United Nations
China
Foreign Minister Wu
Congo
President Sassou-Nguesso
Honduras
Foreign Minister Lopez
In addition to our proposals on offen-
sive reductions and strategic defense, we
have suggested new steps in another
area— nuclear testing. Just as eliminat-
ing all nuclear weapons is our long-term
goal, so, too, is a total ban on nuclear
testing. But both must be approached
with practical steps. For the reality is
that, for now, we still must rely on these
weapons for the deterrence of war. Thus
the safety and reliability of our deterrent
are themselves critical to peace.
The United States is proud of its
record of nuclear safety and intends to
maintain it. Nevertheless, we are, as I
said, ready now to take two important
steps toward limiting nuclear testing.
First, we are ready to move forward on
ratification of the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions, once agreement is
reached on improved verification pro-
cedures. We have proposed new ideas to
make this possible.
Second, upon ratification of those
treaties, and in association with a pro-
gram to reduce and ultimately eliminate
all nuclear weapons, we are prepared to
discuss ways to implement a step-by-step
parallel program of limiting and
ultimately ending nuclear testing.
These are steps we could take in the
near future to show the world that we
are moving forward. And I, therefore,
call upon the Soviet Union to join us in
practical, attainable progress in limiting
nuclear testing.
Just a few days ago, I received a
reply from General Secretary Gorbachev
to my letter of July 25. And, for the
moment, let me say simply that we
are giving it serious and careful
consideration.
As we move toward our goal of
eliminating nuclear weapons, it is vital
that we also address important imbal-
ances of other kinds of weapons. And
this is why the United States has pro-
posed a comprehensive global ban on all
chemical weapons and why we and our
allies have tried hard to break the
stalemate in the conventional force
negotiations in Vienna. And in the
Stockholm conference, a major advance
has been achieved— a concrete new set of
military confidence-building measures
which includes inspections.
Regional Conflicts
But we must remember from the
experience of the 1970s that progres
arms control cannot be divorced fror
regional political developments. As I
at the beginning, political tensions c;
the military competition, not the oth
way around.
But while the United States and
Soviet Union disagree over the root
causes of political tension, we do agr
that regional conflicts could escalate
global confrontation. Last year from
rostrum, I presented a formula for p
which would apply to five critical
regional conflicts that are potential
flashpoints for wider conflict. I point
out how difficult it is for the United
States to accept Soviet assurances o
peaceful intent when 126,000 Soviet
troops prosecute a vicious war again
the Afghan people; when 140,000 So
backed Vietnamese soldiers wage we
the people of Cambodia; when 1,700
Soviet advisers and 2,500 Cuban con
troops are involved in military plann
and operations in Ethiopia; when 1,3
Soviet military advisers and 36,000
Cuban troops direct and participate i
combat operations to prop up an unp
ular, repressive regime in Angola; w
hundreds of millions of dollars in So\
arms and Soviet-bloc advisers help a
tatorial regime in Nicaragua try to
subvert and betray a popular revolut
The danger inherent in these con
flicts must be recognized. Marxist-
Leninist regimes tend to wage war a
readily against their neighbors as the
routinely do against their own people
fact, the internal and external wars
often become indistinguishable.
In Afghanistan, for example, the
puppet regime has announced its inte
tion to relocate tens of thousands of
people from border areas. Can anyon
doubt this will be done in classic conn
munist style— by force? Many will die fi
make it easier for the Soviets and the '
satellite troops to intimidate Pakistar
It is just such transgressions that
make the risk of confrontation with
democratic nations so acute. So, once
again, I propose a three-point peace
process for the resolution of regional
conflicts:
(Siatr Depl photos bj Walb
Department of State Bull'
FEATURE
United Nations
irst, talks between the warring
s themselves, without which an
violence and national reconcilia-
re impossible;
econd, discussions between the
|d States and Soviet Union— not to
fee solutions but to support peace
dand eventually eliminate the supply
jjns and the proxy troops from
id; and
ihird, if the talks are successful,
Jefforts to welcome each country
Into the world economy and the
iunity of nations that respect
nn rights.
rorism
pition to regional disputes, the
I threat of terrorism also jeopard-
he hopes for peace. No cause, no
ince can justify it. Terrorism is
Ins and intolerable. It is the crime of
Ids— cowards who prey on the inno-
tjthe defenseless, and the helpless,
fith its allies and other nations, the
Id States has taken steps to counter
rism directly— particularly state-
lored terrorism. Last April, the
id States demonstrated that it will
p its interests and act against ter-
1 aggression. And let me assure all
ji today, especially let me assure
ntential sponsors of terrorism, that
jmerican people are of one mind on
jsue. Like other civilized peoples of
brld, we have reached our limit.
its against our citizens or our inter-
rill not go unanswered. We will also
jin our power to help other law-
|g nations threatened by terrorist
is. To that end, the United States
aes that the understandings reached
I seven industrial democracies at
bkyo summit last May made a good
toward international accord in the
ti terrorism. We recommend to the
|al Assembly consideration of the
> resolutions.
International Economy
Moving to the economic realm, how
ironic it is that some continue to espouse
such ideas as a "new international
economic order" based on state control
when the world is learning, as never
before, that the freedom of the indi-
vidual, not the power of the state, is the
key to economic dynamism and growth.
Nations have turned away from central-
ized management and government con-
trols and toward the incentives and
rewards of the free market. They have
invited their citizens to develop their
talents and abilities to the fullest and, in
the process, to provide jobs, to create
wealth, to build social stability and foster
faith in the future for all.
The economic summits of the indus-
trial democracies have paid tribute to
these principles— as has the historic UN
Special Session on [the Critical
Economic Situation in] Africa in May.
We applaud the African nations' call for
reform leading to greater reliance on
their private sectors for economic
growth. We believe that overcoming
hunger and economic stagnation
requires policies that encourage
Africans' own productivity and initi-
atives; such a policy framework will
make it easier for the rest of the world,
including the United States, to help. The
laws of economic incentives do not
discriminate between developed and
developing countries. They apply to all
equally.
Much of the recent recovery in the
world economy can be directly attributed
to this growth of economic freedom. And
it is this trend that offers such hope for
the future. And yet this new hope faces
a grave threat: the menace of trade
barriers.
History shows the imposition of such
barriers invites retaliation, which in turn
sparks the very sort of trade wars that
plunged the world in the 1930s deeper
into depression and economic misery.
Truly, protectionism is destructionism.
That is why the United States seeks
the assistance of all countries repre-
sented here in the General Assembly in
protecting the practice of free and fair
Secretary's Bilaterals
at the United Nations
India
Foreign Minister Shankar
Iraq
Foreign Minister Aziz
South Korea
Foreign Minister Choi
((Tiber 1986
Secretary's Bilaterals
at the United Nations
Morocco
Foreign Minister Filali
Pakistan
Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan
Saudi Arabia
trade. We applaud the success of the
meeting of GATT [General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade] trade ministers
last week in Uruguay, where agreement
was reached to launch a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations covering
a wide range of topics important to
economic growth. With over 90 other
countries of the GATT, the United
States is working to maintain the free
flow of international trade.
In addition to resistance to protec-
tionism, the United States is also seek-
ing to stimulate world economic growth
in other ways. Our Treasury bill interest
rate is now just over 5%, the lowest it
has been in 9 years, which provides enor-
mous relief to debtor countries.
America's new tax structure will open
the way for greater prosperity at home,
which will contribute to greater prosper-
ity abroad. And, finally, the United
States is working with other countries to
minimize currency swings, to promote
stability in the monetary markets, to
establish predictability as a basis for
prosperity.
But the United States believes the
greatest contribution we can make to
world prosperity is the continued
advocacy of the magic of the market-
place—the truth, the simple and proven
truth, that economic development is an
outgrowth of economic freedom just as
economic freedom is the inseparable
twin of political freedom and democratic
government.
Human Rights
And it is here that we come to our final
category— human rights— the indispens-
able element for peace, freedom, and
prosperity. I note that Mr. Gorbachev
has used in recent speeches the same
categories I have used here today: the
military, the political, and the economic;
except that he titled his fourth category:
humanitarian.
Well, the difference is revealing |
United States believes that respect |
the individual, for the dignity of thei
human person— those rights outlinei(
the UN Universal Declaration of Hij
Rights— does not belong in the realr j
charity of "humanitarian" causes.
Respect for human rights is not soc |
work; it is not merely an act of com j
sion. It is the first obligation of gov j
ment and the source of its legitimac
It also is the foundation stone ir |
structure of world peace. All throug j
history, it has been the dictatorship. |
the tyrannies that have surrenderee j
to the cult of militarism and the pur j
of war. Countries based on the cons j
of the governed, countries that reco (
the unalienable rights of the individ i
do not make war on each other. Pea j
more than just the absence of war. '
peace is justice; true peace is freedc |
And true peace dictates the recogni |
of human rights.
Commitments were made more \
10 years ago in Helsinki concerning |
these rights and their recognition. ^ |
need only look to the East today to
how sadly unfulfilled those commitn
are. The persecution of scientists,
religious leaders, peace activists,
political dissenters, and other prisor
of conscience continues unabated be i
the Iron Curtain. You know, one sec
of the Helsinki accords even speaks
"improvement of working condition:
journalists."
So, it is clear that progress in th
human rights area must keep pace \»
progress in other areas. A failure on
score will hinder further movement
East- West relations.
Foreign Minister Sa'ud
Department of State Bui
FEATURE
United Nations
se: The Highest Reality
fc, then, are the areas of concern
f opportunity that the United
s sees in the quest for peace and
am— the twin objectives of the UN
;er.
last year, I pointed out in my
ss to the General Assembly that
fferences between the United
5 and the Soviet Union are deep
biding. But I also called for a fresh
in relations between our two
is, a fresh start that could benefit
vn people and the people of every
). Since that time, the United
5 has taken action and put forth
roposals that could lead to our two
ries and the entire world in a direc-
re all have long sought to go. Now
than ever, it is the responsibility of
>viet Union to take action and
istrate that they, too, are continu-
e dialogue for peace.
s I've said, I believe that we can be
ll about the world and the pros-
for freedom. We only need look
i us to see the new technologies
lay someday spare future genera-
he nightmare of nuclear terror, or
owing ranks of democratic activ-
nd freedom fighters, or the increas-
iivement toward free market
mies, or the extent of worldwide
Jti about the rights of the indi-
u in the face of brute, state power.
1 the past, when I have noted such
ii.— when I have called for a "for-
dstrategy for freedom" and
kted the ultimate triumph of
uratic rule over totalitarianism—
Slave accused me of telling people
they want to hear, of urging them
t engage the day but to escape it.
fet, to hope is to believe in human-
ti in its future. Hope remains the
let reality, the age-old power; hope
i.ie root of all the great ideas and
causes that have bettered the lot of
human mankind across the centuries.
History teaches us to hope— for it
teaches us about man and about the
irrepressible human spirit. A Nobel
laureate in literature, a great figure of
the American South, William Faulkner,
once said that the last sound heard on
earth would be that of the two remaining
humans arguing over where to go in the
spaceship they had built. In his speech to
the Nobel committee in 1950, Faulkner
spoke of the nuclear age, of the general
and universal physical fear it had
engendered, a fear of destruction that
had become almost unbearable. But, he
said, "I decline to accept the end of man.
I believe that man will not merely
endure, he will prevail. He is immor-
tal.. . because he has a soul, a spirit
capable of compassion and sacrifice and
endurance."
Faulkner spoke of "the old verities
and truths of the heart," of the courage,
honor, pride, compassion, pity, sacrifice,
and, yes, that hope which is the glory of
our past. And all of these things we find
today in our present; we must use them
to build our future. And it's why today
we can lift up our spirits and our hearts;
it is why we resolve that, with God's
help, the cause of humanity "will not
merely endure" but prevail; that some-
day all the world— every nation, every
people, every person— will know the
blessings of peace and see the light of
freedom.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1986.
Secretary's Bilaterals
at the United Nations
Spain
Foreign Minister Fernandez-Ordonez
Sweden
anp^-- t 'jh m m ;»
I 1*1 SS
Foreign Minister Andersson
Tunisia
Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi
'fiber 1986
THE PRESIDENT
Keeping America Strong
President Reagan 's address to sup-
ofth Administration 's defense
policies in the Roosevelt Room of the
Whitt House on September 23, 1986.}
Thank you all for coming here to the
Roosevelt Room this morning. This
room, of course, was named for two
great Presidents, one a Republican, the
other a Democrat. Both understood the
vital importance of keeping America
strong— something I know everyone in
this room understands. Let me say how
grateful all Americans are for the con-
tributions that you and your organiza-
tions have made to building a stronger
America.
Restoring America's strength has
been one of our Administration's highest
goals. When we took office, we found
that we had ships that couldn't leave
port, planes that couldn't fly— both for
lack of trained men and women and ade-
quate supplies of spare parts. We found
that for years the United States sat on
its hands while the Soviet Union
engaged in a military buildup, the likes
of which the world had never seen. The
American nuclear deterrent, upon which
world peace depends, had been allowed
to slide toward obsolescence. And across
the earth, Soviet-sponsored regimes had
been imposed in countries as diverse as
Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.
In the last 5Vz years, we've begun to
turn that desperate situation around.
We've restored the morale, the training,
and the equipment of our armed forces.
And let me just say that around the
world and here at home, I've met many
of our young men and women in uniform
over the last several years. It does
something to you when you're standing
up there on the demilitarized zone in
Korea and a young fellow standing there
in uniform says, "Sir, we're on the
frontier of freedom." Everyone who
works with them will confirm what I've
said about them, and those serving today
are the best darn bunch who've ever
served our country. I'm proud of all of
them.
In the last 5lk years, we've begun
the necessary modernization of our
nuclear deterrent. We've begun research
on strategic defense, the one great hope
that we might some day rid the world of
the prison of mutual nuclear terror. As I
told the I'N General Assembly yester-
day, we're prepared right now to enter
an agreement with the Soviet Union on
research, development, testing, and
deployment of strategic defense.
In pursuit of a safer world, we're
determined to move toward a future of
greater and greater reliance on strategic
defense. The only question for the
Soviets is, do we move toward strategic
defense together or alone?
In the last 5lk years, America has
also taken a stand with embattled
defenders of freedom around the world.
In Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and
Nicaragua, we've said that we stand
with those who would turn back the
night of totalitarian tyranny. And in this
I wish I could say that we had united
backing in the Congress. But, you know,
the truth is different, particularly
regarding our support of freedom
fighters in this hemisphere. Even though
both Houses of Congress have approved
critically needed military assistance for
the freedom fighters, this bill has been
deliberately stalled on Capitol Hill.
Freedom fighters will pay with their
lives for this politics of obstructionism.
We're determined to bring their bar-
ricades down, to let the light of hope
through to the Nicaraguan people— and
we will.
But, all in all, in the last 5V2 years,
we've come a long way. You saw this
when Mr. Gorbachev and I met in
Geneva last November. As I said yester-
day at the United Nations, despite dif-
ferences, we resolved at that meeting to
work together for real reductions in
nuclear arms as well as progress in other
areas. The Soviets are still relentless
adversaries, as their totally unwarranted
arrest of an innocent American reporter
3 weeks ago demonstrates— an action
which jeopardizes all areas of our rela-
tionship. But at the arms reduction
table, they now appear to treat meetings
as more than just another propaganda
forum. This, I believe, is because of the
new will the United States has shown for
the last 5V2 years. The Soviets have been
convinced that we're serious about
rebuilding our strength.
But all this progress has now been
placed in jeopardy by actions taken in
the House of Representatives, actions
just as serious as the attempt to block
aid to the freedom fighters. If permitted
to stand, these actions would pull the
rug out from under our arms negotiators
in Geneva and imperil our national
security. The House voted to ban tes
antisatellite systems, even though tl
Soviets have a system in operation ;
we don't. They voted to stop us fron
producing a deterrent to modern So
chemical weapons. They voted to sla
our request for the strategic defense
research— an initiative that helped b
the Soviets back to the bargaining ti
in Geneva. They voted to deny fund:
move beyond the limits of SALT II
[strategic arms limitation talks], a tr
that couldn't be ratified, and that
would've expired by now if it had be
ratified, and that the Soviets have
repeatedly violated. And finally, the
House would prohibit essentially all
testing of nuclear weapons. Well, all
this is bad for our national security ;
for arms reduction talks. And if the
defense budget arrives on my desk 1
ing anything like that, I'll veto it.
All of these issues [applause]— tl
you. You make vetoing even more p:
ant than I find it. [Laughter.] But al
these issues are important. Each He
action undermines our peace and sei
rity. But I'd like to use my time todi
what's left of it— to discuss one areai
I touched on yesterday that I believ<
needs more attention. With the Sovi
orchestrating a major propaganda c.
paign to get us to declare a morator
on nuclear testing, it's time to set tH
record straight on why we need that
test. There are four important reaso
First, nuclear testing is essentia
guarantee that our weapons— the ke
deterring nuclear aggression— actual
work. We insist on the most rigorou
field tests for non-nuclear weapons 1
airplanes, tanks, and guns, but nuck
weapons are far more complex, and
they, too, must be tested. Some time
ago, for example, we found that the
safety on the warhead for the Polari
missile wouldn't release. Without th<
testing that helped us fix that, most
our sea-based deterrent would have 1
ineffective.
Without testing, we couldn't red
the size and improve the effectivenes
our warheads and make them safer,
we have. So until we can negotiate tl
elimination of nuclear weapons with I
Soviets, we must have tests to make
sure that our deterrent works and th
it's safe.
Second, we use nuclear tests to
design non-nuclear weapons and equ:
ment— for example, satellites, ships,
tanks, and sensors— so that they can
ter withstand a Soviet nuclear attack
Department of State Bu I
THE VICE PRESIDENT
ncreases the chances that our
Iry can survive and still fight, which
es the Soviet incentive to attack us
ur allies in the first place.
hird, testing helps us keep ahead
net efforts, including non-nuclear
s, to neutralize our deterrent,
al years ago, improved Soviet air
ses threatened to make our B-52s
;te, so we began the production of
1 , which can get through those
ses. But some weapons designed
e old B-52s weren't reliable at the
des and speeds that the B-l flies,
sting was essential to developing
}ns with a proven reliability.
nd, fourth, testing ensures that
nviets won't surprise us with
throughs that might alter the
sgic balance. The Soviets have
for years to modernize and expand
weapons systems. We're still play-
ttchup, and this imbalance is a
t to world peace. It'd be an even
er threat if the Soviets scored
breakthroughs.
ven if we were to agree to a
;orium or a test ban, we cannot be
he Soviets would honor it or that it
be verified. In the early 1960s the
ts broke out of a 3-year morator-
nat they had agreed to with the
intensive series of nuclear tests in
y. They had been planning all
g the moratorium for the testing
were going to do, and when they
ready, they just violated the
:orium.
fe, on the other hand, had abated,
o it took us more than a year to
e our testing facilities to their con-
before the moratorium so we could
to try and catch up.
ny agreement to limit testing must
rifiable. We've made a number of
sals to improve verification of cur-
xeaties. The Soviets should accept
proposals or make one of their own
top playing propaganda games,
ur highest arms control priority is
; the Soviets to agree to deep arms
tions in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear
als. Soviet emphasis on the testing
is a diversion from this urgent
The House's ban on testing, on the
hand, is a back door to a nuclear
2, which would make arms reduc-
almost impossible. Some Congress-
>eem to believe that peace and
ican weakness mean the same
, Didn't it ever occur to anyone
the Soviets must be thinking?
re thinking: if we wait long
;h, they'll do our work for us.
So this is what we're up against and
why I'm so grateful to all of you for
what you are doing. Now I don't dare
look at the gentleman sitting right over
here, because I've been telling a story
the last couple of days in some speeches
that I like to tell that illustrates the
attitude of those in Congress that are
bringing this about.
It has to do with three fellows that
came out to get in their car and found
they'd locked themselves out. And one of
them said, "Get a wire coat hanger, and
we can straighten it out and manage to
get in." And the other one says, "We
can't do that. Somebody would think
we're stealing the car." And the third
one said, "Well, we'd better do some-
thing pretty quick. It's starting to rain
and the top's down."
■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1986. ■
Vice President Bush Visits
the Middle East
Vice President Bush departed the
United States July 25, 1986, to visit
Israel (July 27-30), Jordan (July 30-
Aug. 2), and Egypt (Aug. 2-5). He
returned to the United States August 5.
Following is n stul, incut he made in
Cairo on August 5.
Several common themes emerged from
my discussions in Israel, Jordan, and
Egypt. All the leaders I met with reaf-
firmed and pledged their total rejection
of the use of terror and violence. All the
leaders also expressed their concern
about the economic situation in the
region. While not a substitute for the
peace process, they believe that efforts
to deal with the economic situation will
make a major contribution to that
process.
With regard to the question of
peace, all the parties want to see move-
ment and are frustrated by what they
see as a stalemate. No one is satisfied
with the current impasse. All the parties
want the United States to play an active
role in reenergizing the peace process.
We have always been prepared to play
such a catalytic role.
During my meetings with the leaders
of the three countries, I was able to
discuss the common elements that unite
those committed to making peace in the
area. While much still divides those in
the region, I am convinced after my
talks that there is enough common
ground for progress to be made in the
peace process.
With Prime Minister Peres in Jerusalem.
(White House photos by Dave Valdez)
I was particularly struck by the
areas of commonality among Israel,
Jordan, Egypt, and many Palestinians. I
believe this commonality creates a basis
on which peace negotiations can move
forward.
To be specific, my impression of the
points of agreement on the negotiating
process and the goals of that process are
as follows:
• A just and lasting peace is essen-
tial, urgent, and can only be reached
through negotiations.
• Negotiations should produce peace
treaties between the parties based on
the recognition of the right of all states
and peoples in the region to a life of
peace and security.
• Negotiations must take into
account the security needs of Israel, the
security needs of all other states in the
Imber 1986
THE VICE PRESIDENT
region, and the aspirations of the Pales-
n people.
• Negotiations must resolve the
Palestine question in all its aspects
within the context of a relationship
between Jordan, the West Bank, and
Gaza. This relationship can be achieved
based on Security Council Resolutions
212 and 338. The U.S. view is that
Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338 embody the principle of secure and
recognized boundaries for all states in
the region and the exchange of territory
for peace.
• The United States believes in the
importance of face-to-face negotiations.
We recognize that direct negotiations
may involve the framework of an inter-
national conference or forum structured
in a way that permits progress and not
paralysis; agreement, not dictates.
• The form of the negotiations
should provide for talks between an
Israeli delegation and a Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation, as well as
between Syrian and Israeli delegations.
Delegations must consist of individuals
who seek peace and openly reject
violence and terrorism.
The United States believes these
areas of agreement are embodied in the
Reagan plan of September 1, 1982,
which itself was based on Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 242 and 338 and the
Camp David accords. I believe these
areas of agreement or common under-
standing provide a basis for moving the
peace process forward. I call on Palestin-
ian representatives not to miss yet
another opportunity to achieve their
aspirations as a people.
Palestinian rejectionism has con-
tributed only to a tragic history. It's
time for Palestinian representatives to
assume responsibility and step forward
to shape their own destiny.
I will return to Washington and
review what I have learned with the
President, the Secretary of State, and
others. Together we will determine what
should come next, how we can build on
the progress made in this visit and how
we can implement our common
objectives.
The road to peace is taken a step at
a time, and I am encouraged by my talks
with Prime Minister Peres, King Hus-
sein, and President Mubarak this week. I
do believe the atmosphere has improved
and that all nations should engage in the
search for a true and lasting peace in the
Middle East. ■
Vice President and Mrs. Bush with Their Majesties King Hussein and Queen Noor.
With President Mubarak in Cairo
10
Department of State Bull'
E SECRETARY
pgress, Freedom, and Responsibility
cretary Shultz's address before
rd University's 350th anniversary
ation in Cambridge on September 5,
you very much. President [of
'd University Derek] Bok. Thank
dies and gentlemen. Mr. President,
ior, Mayor, of course, Mr. Speaker,
uished ladies and gentlemen. Tip
essman O'Neill], we spend so
)f our lives paying tribute to you
ihington that it's a real pleasure to
iere and pay tribute to you in your
)wn.
d, Mr. Governor, I will deliver the
je you requested to Jim Baker,
like to make a request. If he
lown those World Series tickets,
you save them for me?
the introduction, President Bok
ned my diverse career, but you
mention the fact that my univer-
ave been Princeton, M.I.T.,
o, and now Stanford. So you can
v I feel right now— a chance to
;alk at Harvard. This magnificent
ion stands for a great tradition of
tual openness, free inquiry, and
of truth. And as the nurturer of
y Presidents, Governors,
rs, Secretaries of State, and other
;ervants, Harvard also embodies a
ment to country— a devotion to
1-being of the nation and to its
?ible role of leadership in the
I know that I have come to the
ace to voice a message of outrage
letention of Nick Daniloff,
d class of 1956. The cynical arrest
inocent American journalist
s us of what we already know:
litions of free inquiry and open-
5 spurned by the Soviets, showing
k side of a society prepared to
0 hostage-taking as an instru-
1 policy. Let there be no talk of a
' for Daniloff. We, and Nick
i have ruled that out. The Soviet
lip must find the wisdom to
lis case quickly in accordance
3 dictates of simple human
i and of civilized national
r.
1 know also I've come to the right
' deliver a message of concern, to
f some disturbing trends I see in
ntry, to tell of some important
America has leai ted in recent
id some lessons • /e apparently
have not yet learned. These disturbing
trends at home are all the more paradox-
ical because they occur against the
backdrop of powerful positive forces at
work today in the world at large, forces
that offer us an extraordinary opportun-
ity if we don't throw it away.
Change and Its Positive Implications
Ours is a time of many seemingly con-
tradictory forces at work: even as com-
munications shrink the planet and
economics increases our interdepend-
ence, nationalism is more potent than
ever; technology advances at dizzying
speed even as, once again, religious faith
becomes a powerful political force all
around the world.
But one significant trend is already
discernible. The advanced nations of the
world are already in the throes of a new
scientific and technological revolution-
one whose social, economic, political, and
strategic consequences are only begin-
ning to be felt.
The industrial age is ending; in some
parts of the world, it is already gone. A
century ago, our country moved from an
agricultural to an industrial phase of our
development. Today, we remain agricul-
turally and industrially productive. We
more than feed ourselves. Over the last
20 years, manufacturing as a share of
our gross national product has remained
constant at 22% even as the proportion
of the labor force needed to produce
those goods has declined from 24% to
18% during these same two decades. But
if we try to put a label on our era, we
would have to call it an information
revolution. And it promises to transform
the structure of our economies and the
political life of the planet as thoroughly
as did the industrial revolution of the
18th and 19th centuries.
I see this as a revolution of great
promise. It's a stimulus to a new era of
economic growth. It's a challenge that
the free nations of the world, above all,
are in the best position to meet. The
President captured the essence of the
essential relationship between freedom
and progress when he noted:
Everywhere, people and governments
are beginning to recognize that the secret of a
progressive new world is the creativity of the
human spirit .... Our open advocacy of
freedom as the engine of progress [is one of]
the most important ways to bring about a
world where prosperity is commonplace, con-
flict an aberration, and human dignity a way
of life.
So it is no coincidence that the free
nations have once again been the source
of technological innovation. An economic
system congenial to free scientific
inquiry, entrepreneurial risk-taking, and
consumer freedom has been the fount of
creativity and the mechanism for
spreading innovation far and wide. A
political system that welcomes, indeed,
thrives on a free flow of ideas and infor-
mation and people and goods across
national boundaries finds itself the
natural breeding ground of progress.
The developing countries, seeking their
own path to a better future, find the
West their natural partner for coopera-
tive endeavors. And even the countries
of the communist worjd turn to the West
as the source of advanced technology.
Our adversaries, indeed, face an
inescapable dilemma. They see the new
postindustrial era coming, and they see
the West well poised to take advantage
of it. And yet, opening themselves up to
the information revolution and its
benefits risks what is the essence of
their political power— the effort to con-
trol thought and behavior through the
tight monopoly they maintain over infor-
mation and free communication. They
fear losing control over what their
people read and see. How can a system
that keeps photocopiers and mimeograph
machines under strict control and sur-
veillance exploit the benefits of the video
cassette recorder and the personal com-
puter? With each innovation, the leaders
of the totalitarian world are reminded of
their agonizing choice: they can either
open their societies to the freedoms
necessary for the pursuit of technolog-
ical advance or they can risk falling even
further behind the West. In reality,
though, it may be already too late for
them to catch up with the future.
So we are learning that the informa-
tion revolution holds out profound pro-
mise for America. And yet, it's only one
of the positive forces at work in the
world. Let me give you some examples
of other things we have learned in recent
years.
First, we have learned once again
that freedom is a revolutionary force.
Dictatorships— left or right— are not per-
manent. In Afghanistan, Angola, Cam-
bodia, and Nicaragua, imperialism,
liber 1986
11
THE SECRETARY
oppression, and regimentation have
n rise to resistance movements that
struggle for the rights denied them by
communist rule. In South Africa, the
structure of apartheid is under seige as
never before. In Latin America, the
yearning for democracy has transformed
the political complexion of the entire
continent. Contrary to the expectations
of many only 5 or 6 years ago, El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala
have joined Costa Rica in the democratic
trend in Central America— leaving only
Nicaragua as the odd man out. In the
Philippines, the same yearning brought a
remarkable, peaceful transition to a new
democratic way. And Thailand has not
received the notice it deserves. Sharp
political differences there led to vividly
contested recent elections, and they have
re-formed their government on the basis
of that election result. Not so many
years ago, democratic nations were
thought to be a dwindling and embattled
minority; today, the vitality of the idea
of democracy is the most important
political reality of our time.
And we have learned again that
there is a connection between freedom
and economic progress. Few countries
around the world now dispute that entre-
preneurial initiative in a market environ-
ment is the engine of development and
growth. At the economic summits, all
the leading industrial nations have
acknowledged that structural rigidities
imposed by government are the main
obstacle to renewed growth. At the UN
Special Session [on the Critical
Economic Situation in Africa] in May,
the African nations— including those
hardest hit by experiments in collectivist
planning— issued an extraordinary docu-
ment calling for more open markets and
less intervention by the state. These
truths, too, are now being acknowledged
even in the communist world, as reforms
in China and Hungary demonstrate.
Closer to home, we have redis-
covered the truths that, as America's
weakness makes the world a more
dangerous place, America's strength
deters aggression and encourages
restraint and negotiation. We have seen
how the rebuilding of America's
defenses in the early 1980s gave the
Soviets an incentive to return to negotia-
tions on arms control. Our ability to pro-
ied power abroad has helped us protect
our vital interests and defend our friends
against subversion and aggression. Our
military strike against Libya— under-
taken as a last resort after years of
Qadhafi's terrorism— has sent a powerful
signal to friends and enemies alike. This
morning our prayers and our all-out
efforts go to the hostages on Pan Am
Flight 73. Clearly, the day has not yet
arrived when terrorism has taken its
place among other vanquished bar-
barisms of our time. But that day will
come— and when it does, history will
show that American resolve, backed up
by our power, tipped the balance in favor
of peace and security.
And the past few years have
reminded us of another truth: America is
a powerful and constructive force in the
world for progress and human freedom.
Throughout the three centuries and a
half we mark today, Americans have
believed this country had a moral
significance and responsibility that
transcended our military and economic
power. There is an irresistible current in
our national character that impels us to
serve as a human example and champion
of justice.
Part of America's positive role has
to do with our history. Our fight for
independence and for political freedom
began not far from here— with more
than a few Harvard men in the van-
guard. A century or so ago, we fought
the bloodiest war in our history to try to
eradicate the curse of oppression based
on race. Today, that epic struggle for
justice continues here at home. As our
nation emerged as a world leader,
especially in the past 50 years, we
always sought to apply to our interna-
tional endeavors the same high stand-
ards and high moral goals that we set
for ourselves. From the founding of the
United Nations, to the Marshall Plan, to
the formation of our democratic
alliances, to our support for decoloniza-
tion and for economic development, to
our stance as a champion of human
rights— this nation can be proud of what
it has accomplished in the world. And we
should find special satisfaction in seeing
the trends I described earlier— the
spread of democracy and economic
freedom, the new technological revolu-
tion—trends that once again mean
history is on our side.
Trends That Threaten Our Future
And yet now, when we can see for
ourselves that a better future is likely to
take shape if, and perhaps only if,
America is there to help shape it,
pressures are mounting within our coun-
try to turn our backs on the world.
Ominous developments are on the all-
too-near horizon, and most of us may not
even realize it.
And this is not the first time. Oi|
nation more than once has swung fr
involvement to isolation. And even i
decades since we supposedly put ou;
isolationist past behind us, we have
times been tempted again by the illv
that we can promote justice by aloo:i
righteousness, that we can promote1
peace by merely wishing for it. We :
an impatient people. We sometimes
seemed to feel that problems should
solved quickly or not at all, that we |
serve our principles by striking the I
pose or doing what makes us, for th |
moment, feel good.
It's time to wake up— before we I
endanger the world's future and out I
own. These dangers take many fonrl
but they all have in common a thoug j
less escapism, a retreat from resporl
sibility, an attempt to evade the real
of our dependence on the world and i
world's dependence on us. As such, ,
whether we admit it or not, they air I
to nothing less than an isolationist
throwback that could once again pn (
the world toward catastrophe.
One danger sign is the evil of pi t
tionism. Not since the days of Smoo |
Hawley have the forces of protectio i
been as powerful as they are today i I
U.S. Congress. We should have lear j
from the experience of 50 years ago |
protectionism only impoverishes us . I
with our trading partners, spurs ine |
able retaliation, and shuts down the t
engine of world trade and, therefore (
world growth.
In our earliest days as a nation, j
founders of the United States under
stood that free trade was the key to |
growth and prosperity. Within the i
borders of our nation, they created c j
open trading system, and the world' |
biggest— and, because of that, most |
prosperous— economy was the result
Similarly, the statesmen at work aft|
World War II knew well the lessons |
the 1930s. They put in place a more:}
more open world economy, and gene I
tions benefited from the growth and |
stability that followed. In today's gloj
economy, our prosperity and that of
other nations depend even more on a
open trading system.
Yet now we see a new spiral of p
tectionism, and the spread of other aj
competitive practices like subsidies, |
endangering some of our most import
political and security relationships wi|
other countries. The new democraciej
the Philippines and Latin America, i\
poorer countries burdened by debt, a|
many key friends around the world— -
all wish to earn their way back to
12
Department of State Bu,1
THE SECRETARY
•.purity— find the road ahead threat-
si by protectionism in this country.
e our economy is the biggest— and
i we have always been the pillar of
■ trade— if we succumb, we will do
lid damage to the world's hopes for
perity and peace. And our own
isns of the future will blame us for
shly failing to uphold our own
pn's interests.
Another form of escape is self-
jteous moralism. I have to say I see
j 3 of this in the fervor for punitive
i tions against South Africa. The
ity is that the United States has
osed increasing sanctions against
1 Africa from President Kennedy's
pn military sales in 1962 to the array
leasures in President Reagan's
tutive order of 1985. And now the
|market itself is slowing the pace of
feouth African economy. But sanc-
f are not solutions. Those on whom
lical sanctions are imposed grow
e defiant and can evade their own
aonsibilities by pointing to so-called
%de influences as a scapegoat.
'White South Africans must recog-
jthat apartheid is a disaster of their
j creation and that it must be done
J' with in an active and orderly
Ion if their own interests are to sur-
I The wide-ranging sanctions now
losed in the Congress would do
Irica a double disservice— by enabl-
iroponents of apartheid to blame
lh Africa's disastrous economy on us
fc, at the same time, drastically
icing our presence, our leverage, and
Example as a force for economic and
Ileal change. In a delusion of increas-
Jur influence over events, we could
liourselves quickly on the verge of
Aa\ powerlessness as a result of our
Bice from the South African scene,
f he transition from tyranny to
(bcracy is a delicate process.
a?times it goes badly wrong, as in
|or Nicaragua. Sometimes it goes
I as in Spain, Portugal, the
Hppines, or in Latin America. We
ad be clear about what we are for:
Ire for a rapid end to apartheid and
fl peaceful transition to a democratic
fern. It is not our job to egg on a race
fcr to accelerate a polarization that
Bead to such a result. Our morality
pur values must have a strong
fcnce in our foreign policy. But we
I guard against a self-righteous
llity which can be self-defeating and
fby run counter to our moral
Rive.
Other examples of our native inclina-
tion toward withdrawal can be found in
our impatience with diplomacy. The pur-
suit of practical political solutions in this
world calls for perseverance, under-
standing of ambiguity, and a recognition
of the need for compromise. Negotiation
is how we engage other nations for
positive purposes. But the very concept
of negotiations is assaulted today by an
array of misconceptions.
Some call urgently for negotiations
but deny that diplomacy requires
strength to back it up. Others argue-
correctly— that we should never
negotiate from weakness, but then
assert that when we are strong, we need
not negotiate. Some would deny us all
leverage or would legislate unilateral
concessions; others are fearful of
negotiations because they assume for
some reason that we are bound to be
taken advantage of. Many despair of the
United Nations and the disturbing
trends within it— but some would walk
away from its challenges and oppor-
tunities rather than make use of our
ability to improve its operation. We must
strengthen our role in the United Nations
for affirmative reasons and also lest
others whose interests are adverse to
ours step into our place.
Thus, whether the issue is regional
conflict, arms control, or trade, elements
far apart on the political spectrum com-
bine in counsels of escapism. They are
denials of reality. The reality is that
efforts to resolve problems among
nations are essential and, in the end,
inevitable. The reality is that demo-
cracies will not support policies of intran-
sigence. The reality is that many prac-
tical, realistic objectives can be attained
by hardheaded negotiations. Negotia-
tions can work.
There is, finally, another extraor-
dinary development: the congressional
attack on the foreign affairs budget. We
are about to witness the dismantling—
indeed, butchering— of the most impor-
tant instrument of our foreign policy:
our ability to represent and support
strongly our interests and ideals. We
face a self-inflicted crisis which, if not
reversed, will gravely damage the ability
of the United States to maintain its
leadership in the world, to bolster inter-
national security, and to support the
cause of freedom, democracy, and
human progress.
It pains me to speak of this at
Harvard, where George C. Marshall pro-
posed a plan that committed the United
States to the future of Europe. We all
heard him only a few minutes ago [by
recording]. He spoke for a generation of
statesmen, of both political parties, who
had learned the lessons of the 1930s and
who committed the United States to the
world, to an open economic system, to
the defense of freedom against tyranny.
They established the pillars of the
postwar system: the Bretton Woods
monetary system that tied the world
together; the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and its successive
rounds; the Marshall Plan and World
Bank— mechanisms for international
reconstruction and development— the
Marshall Plan then made up 11% of the
total Federal budget; and NATO.
The achievements of the postwar
statesmen were an assertion of thought
and learning and leadership, foreseen
and set out in the broadest scale. They
became the foundation stones for the
democracy, the prosperity, and the
security of the West that we know
today.
In January of this year. President
Reagan submitted to Congress an inter-
national affairs budget for fiscal year
1987 that we had stripped to the bone. It
amounted to only 2% of the total
Federal budget. Yet the current congres-
sional budget resolution cuts that
minimal and considered request by 27%.
And recent congressional actions would
reduce and restrict the remaining
amount even further.
These reductions, and the earmark-
ing of aid levels to a few countries, will
deprive us of over half of all our security
and economic assistance to many coun-
tries of the world. These are nations who
are key to our interests and security or
where we must help in the transition to
democracy and economic freedom. The
dollars we spend on such assistance are
the most cost-effective bargain among
all of our national security activities.
• It will mean the closing of
diplomatic posts and the reduction of our
personnel abroad— to an overall person-
nel level that will then be below that
when George C. Marshall was Secretary
of State.
• It will mean a one-third cut in
funding for the multilateral development
banks, which are crucial to Third World
economic progress.
• It means a severe setback to our
effort to halt the production and illegal
export of narcotics from abroad, just as
our programs are gaining momentum.
• And it means the closing of
American libraries and cultural centers
overseas and curtailing Voice of America
broadcasting.
imber 1986
13
THE SECRETARY
I have not come to Harvard to tell
you of just one more bureaucratic budget
battle. The impact of these cuts com-
bined with fierce reductions in our
defense budget, rampant protectionism,
and moralistic instincts toward with-
drawal from the world, will be
devastating to our foreign relations.
They mean undoing the last 50 years of
America's positive role of leadership in
the world; it is simply mindless to do so
when so many positive trends are at
work in the world and so many oppor-
tunities open before us.
History shows that in this century
American withdrawal only heightens
global dangers and the risk of conflict.
The strategic and economic conse-
quences of the Smoot-Hawley tariff-
along with the illusions of isolationism
and lowered defense preparedness-
helped ignite the international tensions
that exploded in World War II. Even in
the 1970s we saw that when America
retreats within itself, the advantage
goes to our adversaries, whose purposes
in the world are antithetical to our most
deeply held principles.
Why then look inward just as the
gains of remaining engaged are most
profound? We are a nation of unprece-
dented strengths— strategic, economic,
and political— and unprecedented bless-
ings. When our economy is strong, when
our position in the world is secure, it is
easy to forget that much of the world
around us is still ruled by a ruthless few,
who will not hesitate to fill the vacuum
created when we pull back.
assets. There is nothing like our system
of higher education anywhere else in the
world.
So today, the world turns to the
United States precisely because of our
openness. At Harvard, as at all our great
universities, students from every corner
of the globe come in search of new
dimensions of understanding and
analysis, new currents of thought and
innovation, new developments across the
range of human knowledge. Today, over
340,000 young men and women from
overseas are studying in the United
States— just to take a few numbers:
21,000 Malaysians; 18,000 from Nigeria;
6,000 from the United Kingdom. It is
especially gratifying that China— a coun-
try that for so long tried to cut itself off
from the world and to develop itself in
the totalitarian mold— now sends
upwards of 15,000 students here each
year.
America is inextricably engaged in
the world through its great private
institutions and through its people—
whose international interests, travels,
and ties continue. How paradoxical it is
that we may now be drifting— stumbling,
perhaps unconsciously— out of phase
with our outward-looking citizens and
their wide-ranging interests.
Proposed Refugee Admissions
for FY 1987
Today, our ideals and interests (
verge. We face a choice. My call tod
for a reawakening to the reality that
America— government and people— n
remain open to the world and engag
risk diminution of our essence as a
people and our vocation as a nation.
I believe that those disturbing tre
I mentioned are not representative ol
what this country and its people reall
believe. As the greatest democracy ir I
the world, America is a reminder to a )
that there is an alternative to tyrann;
oppression, and despair. Those who b
this university were not a fearful, tiirl
people. They did not shirk their respc '
sibilities. They were practical men an
women. They were earthy and realist I
and their lives were guided by a drea '
by a vision, and by a sense of duty
toward coming generations.
Let us honor that tradition. It is ; '
tradition of practicality and realism, < '
dedication to the progress of open
societies. It is a call for us for confide
in the future that only openness and
freedom can bring.
'Press release 173.
An Open Window to the World
I began by noting that this great uni-
versity was a proper place to talk about
what America and the world have
learned in recent years. Today, as we all
gather at Harvard— where higher educa-
tion in America began— we think not
only of what Harvard has meant to its
own but of its meaning to the building of
America and to our engagement with
the world in years ahead.
To me, America's past can be
characterized by the great theme of
openness. Our universities lead the
world because we possess a society that
is open— to peoples, to ideas, to enter-
prise, and to the forces of change.
I have spent a large part of my life
in the university. I taught, but I also
learned a lot. One of the things I
learned— and it's been reinforced very
much as I've traveled around the
world— is that our colleges and univer-
sities are one of America's greatest
Secretary Shultz 's statement before
the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Policy of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on September 16, 1986. l
Thank you for the invitation and the
honor to consult with you on the Presi-
dent's proposed refugee admissions ceil-
ing for fiscal year (FY) 1987.
This is the third consecutive year
that I have participated in these con-
sultations. These sessions were envis-
aged by the Congress in the Refugee Act
of 1980, which specified that our refugee
admissions are intended for refugees of
"special humanitarian concern to the
United States in accordance with a
determination made by the President
after appropriate consultation with the
Congress."
After thoughtful consideration-
taking into account the resettlement
needs of refugees of special humani-
tarian concern to us— the President pro-
poses an overall admissions ceiling of
70,000 refugees, with 66,000 to be
included in funded regional ceilings ai U
4,000 to be contained in an unfunded
reserve, unallocated by any region. Tl
year's admissions proposal includes: I
• Reaffirmation of the President'
initiatives on Amerasians and Viet-
namese political prisoners;
• An admissions level to maintain^
continued high processing levels from
the refugee camps in the Southeast
Asian first-asylum countries;
• An increased admissions ceiling '
for Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union;
• Expanded refugee admissions I
from Latin America and the Caribbeai '
• An increased ceiling for Africa t1,
accommodate African refugees locatec'
far from processing posts in Africa am1
those who have been stranded in Euro
for several years;
14
Department of State Bulle
THE SECRETARY
An increased admissions ceiling
le Near East and South Asia to
for admissions of those fleeing
ous persecution and Soviet occupa-
and
An unallocated reserve, intended
ye the Administration the flexibility
rspond to critical admissions needs
me unpredictable.
Ls a preamble to a discussion and
location of the proposed refugee ceil-
, would like to reflect on what we
^accomplished in our refugee pro-
!! in recent years and the way in
we have been able to achieve
objectives.
'he beginning of FY 1981 marks a
»le starting point for such a review.
«ncided with the election of Presi-
fReagan, and it followed by only a
I interval the major refugee shocks
i previous decade: the massive
us of boat refugees from Vietnam
^and refugees from Cambodia and
> the flood of refugees into Somalia;
.he arrival on our shores of some
J00 Cuban and Haitian "entrants"
Mi of 1980. The refugee flight from
^nistan was well underway— a
ment of men, women, and children
Ijoon reached close to 5 million
j;, nearly 3 million of them in
a:an alone.
uring the 6 years of this Adminis-
jn, total expenditures for refugee
l ministered by the State Depart-
j|have exceeded $2.5 billion. In that
amore than 500,000 refugees have
mdmitted into the United States.
i can be no doubt that America has
ets share and more to aid those
tees who have been forced to leave
homelands because of persecution.
/nerican Tradition
|; historic tradition for the American
I to respond to refugee problems,
itional celebration at the rededica-
jf the Statue of Liberty reminded
the spirit of welcome which has
(fed generations of immigrants and
pes to seek new lives in this
IT.
fir longstanding tradition of help
tugees was brought home for me in
fcr way recently by a State Depart-
toublication describing our refugee
Ims. At the end there was a list
■ private voluntary agencies
rating in providing refugee
Ince. The list seemed familiar,
fch some of the agencies had
By different names and addresses.
Then I looked at the date of the pam-
phlet. It was 1956, and the subject was
the Hungarian refugee crisis of that
October— just 30 years ago. The volun-
tary agencies and our refugee programs
have been around a long time; they carry
on a tradition today in which we can
take great pride.
Multilateral Approach
An integral part of that tradition has
been our leadership in advancing an
international, multilateral approach to
the resolution of refugee situations. We
have consistently taken the lead in work-
ing to strengthen international mecha-
nisms to deal with the expanding scope
of refugee problems.
• The program and office of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) grew fivefold in the past
decade in response to the increase both
in the number of refugee crises and in
the absolute numbers of refugees world-
wide. By a conservative count, there are
now more than 10 million refugees living
outside their native lands and unable to
return. On every continent the UNHCR
stands as the first line of defense for
refugees: it speaks out for their protec-
tion; it provides for their care and
maintenance; it seeks humane alter-
native solutions to their plight.
• At the last UN General Assembly,
a new High Commissioner for Refugees
was elected— Jean-Pierre Hocke of
Switzerland. He brings new leadership
and direction to one of the most respon-
sible and demanding positions in the UN
system. His election demonstrates that
the United Nations can act positively and
effectively to achieve humanitarian objec-
tives in the spirit intended by its founders.
• The International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) has also grown in
the scope and importance of its respon-
sibilities during the past decade. With its
partners, the League of Red Cross
Societies and the national societies of
many concerned countries, the ICRC has
long set the standard for impartial, non-
political humanitarian aid. I serve on the
Board of Governors of the American Red
Cross. I am glad to note that that
organization is expanding its interna-
tional involvement, under the able
leadership of its president, my friend
and former colleague, Richard Schubert.
I want to commend the leadership of
Alexander Hay, the president of the
ICRC who has presided over that
organization's major expansion. I have
had the pleasure of meeting with Presi-
dent Hay and other ICRC leaders. I
found their counsel always wise and
useful, not only on humanitarian pro-
grams but also in terrorist situations
such as the hijacking of TWA Flight 847,
in which the ICRC assisted in its usual
quiet, effective way in the arrangements
for the release of the hostages. Mr. Hay
has announced his decision to step down
as ICRC president. We welcome his suc-
cessor, Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, who
has been Secretary of State for Foreign
Economic Affairs in the Swiss
Government.
• The third organization that
enables us to work multilaterally to aid
refugees is the Intergovernmental Com-
mittee for Migration (ICM), ably led by
James L. Carlin, a former distinguished
Foreign Service officer. ICM was founded
in 1951 to provide safe, secure migration
assistance in the major movements of
displaced persons and refugees following
the Second World War and the com-
munist takeovers in Eastern Europe.
Since that time, it has helped move
nearly 4 million refugees and migrants
throughout the world. Today, ICM
serves as the lead organization for
medical processing and resettlement
transportation for the U.S. refugee
admissions program. In recent years
ICM has been especially resourceful in
aiding skilled migrants, originally from
Third World countries, to return to pro-
ductive positions in their homelands.
Benefits of Cooperation
In concrete terms, the benefits of
cooperation are obvious. While the
United States has been the leading
refugee resettlement country in the past
decade, other countries have also made
important contributions, in some cases
overcoming longstanding antipathy to
immigration by foreign groups. We con-
tinue to seek ways in which the financial
burden of providing refugee assistance
can be shared equitably by the interna-
tional community.
In short, the United States is not
alone in its efforts to aid refugees. We
make vital contributions to a functioning
global system of international organiza-
tions and private voluntary agencies.
This multiplies the resources that the
U.S. Government brings to these human-
itarian efforts. The pattern of interna-
tional cooperation that has developed
through the years, with its emphasis on
nonpolitical, impartial assistance on the
basis of need, serves our interests
well— it serves those of the world's
refugees.
eiber 1986
15
THE SECRETARY
Aiding Refugees in Home Regions
Probably the most significant result of
cooperation has been the growing
recognition that refugee problems are
best resolved in the regions from which
the refugees come. Leadership by the
UNHCR and prudent management of
refugee programs worldwide has made it
possible to reduce significantly the
numbers of refugees for whom third-
country resettlement is a necessary or
even desirable solution. This has been a
major objective of U.S. policies, one that
is shared by other countries aiding
refugees and by the international system
as a whole.
The best way to resolve a refugee
situation is to enable refugees to
return— freely and voluntarily— to their
homes in their countries of origin.
Although this can only rarely be accom-
plished in the short run, in many cases it
has been possible for refugees to remain
nearby and to return home when the
situation has changed enough to permit
voluntary repatriation. That remains the
best hope even for those whose home-
lands remain under foreign occupation,
like the almost 3 million Afghans in
Pakistan. These people require and
deserve the full-hearted support of the
international community as they con-
tinue to suffer the deprivations of a
limited, impermanent existence in tem-
porary asylum. In our judgment, interna-
tional resettlement is the correct solu-
tion for only relatively small numbers of
refugees.
Even where return to the homeland
appears unlikely, there are advantages
for refugees to be cared for in the region
in which they have their roots. Often a
neighboring country shares a common
geography, language, and ethnic or
cultural character which can ease the
acceptance of refugees and help them
achieve longer term residence. At the
first African refugee conference in
Tanzania in 1979, Julius Nyerere, as the
host President, said: " . . .as Africans,
we welcome the refugees, we give them
our space, we share our food." Outside
help was needed, he added— but for the
care of refugees in Africa, not for
resettlement outside Africa.
Since 1981, nearly all of the U.S.
contributions to assist refugees in the
regions of their homelands have been
channeled through the international
organizations. Those organizations, in
turn, work through "operational part-
ners," who often are the same private
voluntary agencies that assist us in
refugee resettlement. As refugees find
refuge in Africa, in the Near East, in
Asia, in Latin America, in Western
Europe, the traditional terminology of
"donor" countries blurs, for it is the
first-asylum countries offering their
"space"— in President Nyerere's
words— who are the greatest donors
of all.
Resettlement: Often
Not the Solution
The relatively small role played by inter-
national resettlement as a solution can
be seen in the sheer magnitude of the
refugee populations. There are currently
5 million Afghan refugees. The United
States resettles, at most, 3,000 a year-
less than one-tenth of 1%. There are
almost 3 million refugees in Africa, with
similarly limited resettlement require-
ments. Refugee leaders themselves
acknowledge the uncertain value of
resettlement in such situations, seeing it
as potentially divisive and, in some
cases, as a form of resented leadership
drain.
The humanitarian commitment to
aid refugees in the regions of their
homelands puts great pressure on the
resources available for our total refugee
assistance programs. In FY 1986— as the
committee knows— all parts of the
Federal Government have had to make
program reductions to conform to the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation. As
a result of these across-the-board fund-
ing reductions, the Department, with
congressional concurrence, was forced
this year to shift over $9 million from
the admissions program to meet critical
refugee assistance requirements in
Africa and Southeast Asia. In other
words, instead of reallocating admissions
numbers and funds to meet other
regional admissions needs, we were com-
pelled to cover high-priority relief
requirements. Thus, the need to
reprogram is the primary reason for
actual admissions in FY 1986 falling
some 4,500 below the ceiling.
The assistance requirements for
refugees in Africa, for Afghans in
Pakistan, for Cambodians on the Thai-
Cambodian border, and for other groups
in Southeast Asia and elsewhere remain
substantial. Just a few weeks ago, the
Red Cross informed us they were run-
ning out of money for their life-
sustaining food and medical programs in
Africa. President Reagan authorized a
withdrawal from the Emergency
Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
to help meet the deficit, but that is a
resource we can draw on only in excep-
tional cases and within a tightly
delineated congressional authorization.
In order to be able to meet these
ongoing assistance requirements wit
impairing our admissions programs,
absolutely essential that we be provi
with adequate resources to do the jo
We are talking here about the lives (
literally millions of human beings.
I was pleased that the House Ap
priations Committee supported the f
amount of the President's FY 1987
request for the refugee program. I u
you and your colleagues to do the sa
Foreign Affairs Budget
But this is only part of a much large
foreign policy issue now facing us. II
in our national interest to work toge
with other nations to reduce politica
instabilities throughout the world. B'
address these instabilities, often at t
root of the world's refugee problem,
requires that American diplomacy hi I
the proper tools— including healthy .
foreign assistance programs and
energetic diplomatic representation. I
Unfortunately, these tools are bi j
drastically restricted under current i "
gressionally imposed cuts in our oveil
foreign affairs budget. Put most bin I
the cumulative effect of these reduci J
will be devastating to our ability to 1 1
our responsibilities and commitment j
Today is not the day to discuss c |
overall foreign affairs budget in any j
great detail. But it is essential that ^ l
all recognize that the lack of the
resources necessary to support const!
tive American leadership in the inteM
tional community will inevitably havi (
negative impact on the management ,
global refugee problems.
Proposed FY 1987 Admissions
It is with this perspective that I now J
turn to the refugee admissions ceilinj j
that the President is recommending : ,
FY 1987. For simplicity, I will presei,
them in tabular form, as follows:
■
FY 1987 Refugee Admissions Ceiling
Region
Adrros
Lev
Africa
East Asia— First Asylum
East Asia— ODP
Eastern Europe/Soviet Union
Latin America/Caribbean
Near East/South Asia
3,5!
32,0
8.E1
10,C
4,0 1
Subtotal
66,0'
Unallocated Reserve
_d
TOTAL
70,0
16
Department of State Bui,"
THE SECRETARY
I should point out that this total is
pame figure that the Administration
[osed for FY 1986.
^Unallocated Admissions Reserve
year, for the first time, the Presi-
's recommended admissions ceiling
des an unfunded and unallocated
ve of 4,000. This reserve is not tied
y geographic region— it would give
dministration the capability to
^ond to contingent regional admis-
e needs. The reserve is similar to the
tissions reserves used by the other
r major resettlement countries,
uda and Australia. Should it be
n ssary to use the admissions reserve,
=TOuld cover the associated costs
S in existing agency budget requests
ijwould inform the Congress as to the
Jrve's allocation,
in addition, given the difficult fiscal
Jtion we are facing, we will be
rtaking a study to explore the
ability of a private-sector-funded
issions program.
1 Asia Admissions
iichinese Refugee Panel Report. A
1 ago I informed the committee of my
Ition to commission a distinguished
ibendent panel to visit Southeast
I with a broad mandate to assess the
E?ee situation and to make recom-
sfilations on necessary changes in
,1 policy. I am pleased to report that
dianel carried out its mission with
it compasion, skill, and judgment. It
uchaired by the Honorable Robert D.
i] the former Governor of Iowa, a
i'. that achieved an admirable record
lfugee resettlement under Governor
ijs leadership. Other members of the
il were Mrs. Irena Kirkland; former
ator and Ambassador Gale McGee;
Elormer Deputy Attorney General of
BJnited States, Edward Schmults;
[(Jonathan Moore, who has just ended
seadership of the Institute of Politics
iWvard to join us as the new U.S.
)Winator for Refugee Affairs.
The panel's report is a comprehen-
ndocument, with some 44 specific
cnmendations. One of its main points
lit U.S. admissions for Indochinese
Hd move forward along two tracks: a
Eee program for those continuing to
|bhe Indochinese states to escape
fecution and an immigration program
liose seeking to come to the United
fcs on the basis of their family rela-
Bhips. Close to 800,000 Indochinese
H come to the United States as
refugees since 1975. By the end of last
year, 46,073 of them had been natural-
ized as U.S. citizens. They are compiling
a remarkable record of achievement in
our country, and many are in a position
themselves to aid their relatives wishing
to come here.
In cooperation with the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), we are
focusing on the panel's recommendations
to help guide us to maintain an adequate
program for refugees from Indochina
and, at the same time, to assist those
qualifying through family ties to seek
admission through established immigra-
tion channels. A report on our progress
in this process is included in the
documents presented to you as part of
this consultation.
In reviewing these subjects, we have
maintained close consultations with the
Congress, with the first-asylum coun-
tries of the region, with the other coun-
tries continuing to offer significant
levels of resettlement (among whom
Australia and Canada play the greatest
role), and with the concerned interna-
tional agencies.
Balanced Program. It is in this con-
text that the President is recommending
the proposed admissions ceilings for east
Asia— both for those in first-asylum
countries and for those able to leave
Vietnam by means of the UNHCR's
Orderly Departure Program (ODP). As I
stated during last year's consultations,
we see the need for balance in this
program.
Indochinese refugee resettlement must be
balanced against other, regional solutions;
balanced as a fair share of an international
resettlement effort; balanced in terms of its
budgetary implications; balanced in terms of
other immigration and domestic policy con-
siderations; and balanced against the need to
provide resettlement to deserving refugees
from other parts of the world.
The Ray panel has proposed
guidelines to help us achieve this balance
in ways that respond to the needs of the
refugees. We will continue to assure the
first-asylum states of the durability of
our commitment to help ease their
burden and to provide continued
resettlement opportunities in the United
States.
The proposed ceiling for refugees in
first asylum will enable us to process
those currently eligible for the U.S. pro-
gram, those new arrivals who qualify
under our priority categories, and a part
of the long-stayer caseload under a
revitalized international initiative. The
Ray panel attached "the greatest signifi-
cance" to the preservation of first
asylum. Today, I want to reaffirm to the
nations of Southeast Asia the impor-
tance we attach to their continuing to
offer safe first asylum for Indochinese
refugees. In cooperation with other
donors, we will continue to do all we can
to provide both resettlement oppor-
tunities and financial support for
assistance needs in Southeast Asia, as
recommended by the Ray panel. We are
considering some processing of refugees
from among those who have been in
camps the longest, and we believe these
initiatives can be undertaken within the
proposed admissions ceiling.
Orderly Departure Program. In
October 1984, I presented to this com-
mittee on behalf of President Reagan
two significant humanitarian initiatives
aimed at reaching special populations in
Vietnam through the UNHCR Orderly
Departure Program. I want to take this
opportunity to reaffirm, as I did last
year, our commitment to accept all
Amerasian children from Vietnam. We
are equally committed to resettling pre-
sent and former political prisoners from
Vietnam's so-called reeducation camps
and their close family members.
The President is proposing an 8,500
ceiling for refugees leaving Vietnam
directly under the ODP, the same as last
year. This does not include the several
thousand Vietnamese who we anticipate
will come to the United States as immi-
grants. But this appearance of continuity
does not change the fact that the ODP
has encountered serious setbacks. On
January 1, 1986, the Vietnamese
Government unilaterally suspended
interviewing of new cases. Departures
from Vietnam have continued at about
75% of the rate of last year from the
pool of applicants interviewed for
resettlement in the United States before
interviewing was suspended. We have
had three working-level meetings with
the Vietnamese under UNHCR auspices,
the most recent one just last month, to
try to resolve the problem. We continue
to hope interviewing can resume without
further unnecessary delay. Our proposed
unallocated admissions reserve would
give us the flexibility to handle addi-
tional admissions, should we manage to
get ODP operating at full steam.
Over 100,000 people have been able
to leave Vietnam under the Orderly
Departure Program, nearly half to the
United States, the remainder to some 30
other countries. In fact, just last week
the 50,000th person left Vietnam for
resettlement in the United States under
this program. The ODP was established
by agreement between the UNHCR and
cumber 1986
17
THE SECRETARY
the Government of Vietnam to provide a
safe alternative to the hazards of flight
by sea. We want to see it restored and
improved as soon as possible.
Amerasian Children. Vietnam's
actions leading to suspension of inter-
viewing for the ODP have resulted, most
immediately, in a halt to the departure
of Amerasian children and their mothers
from Vietnam. Over 8,500 children of
Vietnamese mothers and American
fathers and their immediate relatives
have come to the United States under
this program. In 1984, I expressed the
hope that all the Amerasian children and
their close relatives would be able to
come in a 3-year period. Two years of
that have passed, and the program has
had substantial success, but the majority
of the children remain in Vietnam.
At the working-level meeting last
month in Hanoi, the Vietnamese pro-
duced a long-promised list of Amerasian
children and their families, numbering
some 2,600 people, which we are now
reviewing with the hope that interviews
for this group can begin soon. Although
specific procedures still need to be
worked out, we hope the discussions we
have had will lead to the early resump-
tion of Amerasian departures from
Vietnam.
Political Prisoners. No aspect of
the refugee program has caused us
greater disappointment than Vietnam's
refusal to live up to earlier pledges to
release for resettlement in the United
States "reeducation camp" prisoners-
pledges made by their Prime Minister
and reaffirmed by the Foreign Minister
and other senior Vietnamese officials.
An estimated 6,000-7,000 of these
political prisoners continue to languish in
prisons in Vietnam after more than 10
years.
Two years ago, I announced, on
behalf of President Reagan, our readi-
ness to receive these prisoners and their
close relatives. Many are imprisoned
because of their past association with
U.S. policies and programs in the region,
and we acknowledge a special obligation
to work for their release. Since that
time, only 752 former prisoners and
their accompanying relatives have been
allowed to leave.
On behalf of the United States, I
reaffirm to Vietnam President Reagan's
offer of 2 years ago: release the political
prisoners, and we will take them.
Refugee Admissions
From Other Regions
Latin America and the Caribbean. In
light of the Cuban release of a number of
long-held political prisoners in 1986, and
consistent with our deep concern for the
welfare of these individuals, the Presi-
dent authorized processing in Havana of
long-term Cuban political prisoners and
former prisoners. I am pleased to con-
firm that over 100 Cuban political
prisoners and their families arrived in
the United States yesterday.
We have included sufficient numbers
in our proposed Latin American ceiling
to admit 3,000 Cubans as refugees in FY
1987, should the Government of Cuba
lift its suspension of the Mariel migra-
tion agreement. While the United States
stands ready to resume its obligations
under the agreement, we will not do so
until the Cuban Government agrees to
fulfill its obligation to accept the return
of the Mariel excludables.
As political turmoil continues to
trouble many countries in Latin
America, the Administration plans to
consider refugee applicants for whom
temporary asylum or settlement in the
region are not available. To achieve this
goal, we have proposed an increased ceil-
ing of 4,000 and will expand the current
refugee processing priorities used for
the region.
Africa. The Continent of Africa suf-
fers from a complex and dynamic
refugee situation. There are some 35
African countries offering asylum to
refugees fleeing from at least 17 African
countries. Many countries both generate
and receive refugees. Responding to the
impact of refugees has been complicated
by the natural disasters of drought and
locusts and by the economic crises
afflicting many of these developing
countries.
For most of those African refugees
needing protection and assistance from
the international community, resettlement
to the United States is not the desired
solution. Most can benefit from the
hospitality offered by neighboring
nations. Those in need of resettlement
outside Africa are refugees in life-
threatening situations or refugees who
cannot easily be assimilated— for exam-
ple, urban Ethiopians and some South
Africans.
For FY 1987, we are proposing an
admissions ceiling of 3,500. This will
allow us to process those refugees who
cannot be resettled elsewhere, as well as
a limited number of African refugees
currently in first asylum in Europe.
Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. Unfortunately, the number i
individuals who are granted permiss
to depart the Soviet Union has cont
to decline in the past year. We cont
to press for freer emigration from t
Soviet Union and have adjusted our
admissions ceiling accordingly.
The President raised this issue with
Chairman Gorbachev in Geneva, am
intend to do the same with the Sovii
Foreign Minister whenever we meet
We anticipate that the requests
10,000 admissions will allow us to p:
ess not only the hoped-for increase i
the Soviet Union but also those Ron
nians registered for the third counti
processing program, as well as the
regular flow of refugees who contini
arrive from Eastern Europe.
Near East and South Asia. Sin
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan i
1979, over 5 million Afghans have
sought asylum in neighboring counti
almost 3 million of them in Pakistan
alone. The Afghan refugee populatic
supported by long-term internationa
assistance efforts, to which we are a
major contributor.
At the same time, more than 2
million Palestinians in the Near Eas \
registered with the UN Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA). While its
is indirect, UNRWA is an important I
ment in efforts to preempt the sort < f
desperation that can lead to extremi |
It thus helps create a climate that wi I
fundamental to any successful peace '
process.
In Iran, the tyrannical revolutior 1
by Khomeini has driven thousands fr '
their homeland, many of whom seek '
new life in Europe and the United
States. As Congress has acknowledg '
many Iranian religious minorities cor'
tinue to be persecuted. Most particu- '
larly, the Baha'i, as well as Christian .'
and Jews, are included in the U.S.
resettlement program.
For FY 1987, the President has
recommended a ceiling of 8,000
refugees, to allow us to continue to p:(
vide adequate resettlement opportuni -:
for these populations.
Conclusion
Since 1981, over 500,000 persons hav
been brought to this country as refug
to begin new lives. In coordination wi
the efforts of State and local govern-
ments, civic organizations, voluntary
agencies, and thousands of private
18
Department of State Bull'(
AFRICA
^ns, the Administration remains
fnitted to help give these people a
(opportunity to live free from the
I of persecution.
Vet there have been frustrations and
S)pointments:
> The unfortunate unilateral Viet-
ese suspension of interviews for the
ICR's Orderly Departure Program,
h has also stalled the President's
five for Amerasian children;
The continued failure of the Viet-
se to respond to our initiative to
t reeducation camp political
i|mers;
The Cuban refusal to implement
Mariel migration agreement; and
f The Soviet Union's continued
Bal to allow those wishing to leave to
», especially Soviet Jews.
i pledge to you that this Administra-
will never relent in its efforts to
ive these profound humanitarian
»s. With the bipartisan support of
tress, we will continue in our tradi-
i%\ humanitarian spirit to provide for
leeds of refugees around the world.
began today by reflecting on the
QTiplishments of our refugee pro-
i\s over the past 6 ye^rs, accom-
sments made possible only by the
irosity and commitment of the
^rican people through their elected
P'sentatives in Congress.
urge you to support the President's
inmended refugee admissions ceiling
i|h I have presented here today. At
same time, I must remind you that a
Ijrous refugee admissions ceiling is
t.ng but numbers on a piece of paper
cut the money to fund the programs
aithese numbers represent. And so, in
rig, I ask for your support not only
te proposed ceiling but also the
eident's budget request for the
f^ee program so that, together, we
B.ble to continue this great, national
unitarian endeavor.
I Press release 179. The complete
Hcript for the hearings will be published
K committee and will be available from
Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Wnment Printing Office. Washington.
C20402. ■
Continuation of South Africa
Emergency
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 4, 1986'
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies
Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the
automatic termination of a national emer-
gency unless, prior to the anniversary date of
its declaration, the President publishes in the
Federal Register and transmits to the Con-
gress a notice stating that the emergency is
to continue in effect beyond the anniversary
date. In accordance with this provision. I
have sent the enclosed notice, stating that the
South African emergency is to continue in
effect beyond September 9, 1986, to the
Federal Register for publication.
The failure of the South African Govern-
ment to take adequate steps to eliminate
apartheid, that Governnment's security prac-
tices, including the recent imposition of
another state of emergency, and the per-
sistence of widespread violence continue to
endanger prospects for peaceful change in
South Africa and threaten stability in the
region as a whole. Under these circum-
stances, I have determined that it is
necessary to continue in effect the national
emergency with respect to South Africa after
September 9, 1986, in order to deal with this
unusual and extraordinary threat to the
foreign policy and economy of the United
States. Additional measures to deal with this
threat will be considered upon the completion
of consultations with key Allies on joint,
effective measures to eliminate apartheid and
encourage negotiations for peaceful change in
South Africa.
Ronald Reagan
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 8, 1986.
3'imber 1986
19
ARMS CONTROL
CDE Delegations Reach Accord
on Military Activities in Europe
The Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and
I > i si i rmament in Europe (CDE) met in
Stockholm January 17, 1984-Septem-
ber 19, 1986.
Following are the texts of the docu-
ment agreed to by the 35 participating
states on September 19 and statements by
President Reagan and Ambassador
Robert L. Barry, head of the U.S. delega-
tion, on September 22.
DOCUMENT
Document of the Stockholm Conference
on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe con-
vened IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT
provisions of the concluding document of
the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe
(1) The representatives of the participating
States of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
the German Democratic Republic, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechten-
stein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the
United States of America and Yugoslavia,
met in Stockholm from 17 January 1984 to 19
September 1986, in accordance with the pro-
visions relating to the Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe contained in the
Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-
up Meeting of the CSCE.
(2) The participants were addressed by
the Prime Minister of Sweden, the late Olof
Palme, on 17 January 1984.
(3) Opening statements were made by the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Heads
of Delegation. The Prime Minister of Spain as
well as Ministers and senior officials of
several other participating States addressed
the Conference later. The Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Sweden addressed the
< ''inference on 19 September 1986.
( 1 1 The Secretary-General of the United
Nations addressed the Conference on 6 July
1984.
(5) ( ontributions were made by the
following non-participating Mediterranean
States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.
(6) The participating States recalled that
the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
in Europe is, as a substantial and integral
part of the multilateral process initiated by
the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe, to undertake, in stages, new,
effective and concrete actions designed to
make progress in strengthening confidence
and security and in achieving disarmament,
so as to give effect and expression to the duty
of States to refrain from the threat or use of
force in their mutual relations as well as in
their international relations in general.
(7) The participating States recognized
that the set of mutually complementary con-
fidence- and security-building measures which
are adopted in the present document and
which are in accordance with the Madrid
mandate serve by their scope and nature and
by their implementation to strengthen con-
fidence and security in Europe and thus to
give effect and expression to the duty of
States to refrain from the threat or use of
force.
(8) Consequently the participating States
have declared the following:
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE
(9) The participating States, recalling their
obligation to refrain, in their mutual relations
as well as in their international relations in
general, from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations, accordingly reaffirm their
commitment to respect and put into practice
the principle of refraining from the threat or
use of force, as laid down in the Final Act.
(10) No consideration may be invoked to
serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of
force in contravention of this principle.
(11) They recall the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs, as set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations.
(12) They will refrain from any
manifestation of force for the purpose of
inducing any other State to renounce the full
exercise of its sovereign rights.
(13) As set forth in the Final Act, no
occupation or acquisition of territory
resulting from the threat or use of force in
contravention of international law, will be
recognized as legal.
(14) They recognize their commitment to
peace and security. Accordingly they reaffirm
that they will refrain from any use of armed
forces inconsistent with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and the provisions of the Declaration
on Principles Guiding Relations between
Participating States, against another par
ticipating State, in particular from invasi
or attack on its territory.
(15) They will abide by their commitr
to refrain from the threat or use of force
their relations with any State, regardless
that State's political, social, economic or
cultural system and irrespective of wheth
or not they maintain with that State relai
of alliance.
(16) They stress that non-compliance
the obligation of refraining from the thre
use of force, as recalled above, constitute
violation of international law.
(17) They stress their commitment tc
principle of peaceful settlement of disputi
contained in the Final Act, convinced tha
is an essential complement to the duty of
States to refrain from the threat or use o
force, both being essential factors for the
maintenance and consolidation of peace a
security. They recall their determination
the necessity to reinforce and to improve
methods at their disposal for the peaceful
tlement of disputes. They reaffirm their
resolve to make every effort to settle
exclusively by peaceful means any disput*
between them.
(18) The participating States stress tl
commitment to the Final Act and the nee
full implementation of all its provisions, v
will further the process of improving sect
and developing co-operation in Europe,
thereby contributing to international peac
and security in the world as a whole.
(19) They emphasize their commitmei
all the principles of the Declaration on Pr
ciples Guiding Relations between Particip
ing States and declare their determinatioi
respect and put them into practice irrespe ,
tive of their political, economic or social
systems as well as of their size, geographi ,
location or level of economic development ,
(20) All these ten principles are of
primary significance and, accordingly, the |
will be equally and unreservedly applied, e |
of them being interpreted taking into acco
the others.
(21) Respect for and the application ol
these principles will enhance the develops
of friendly relations and co-operation amoi .
the participating States in all fields covere
by the provisions of the Final Act.
(22) They reconfirm their commitment
the basic principle of the sovereign equalit '
States and stress that all States have equa ;
rights and duties within the framework of '
international law.
(23) They reaffirm the universal
significance of human rights and fundamei
freedoms. Respect for and the effective ex'j
cise of these rights and freedoms are esser'
factors for international peace, justice and
security, as well as for the development of I
friendly relations and co-operation among
themselves as among all States, as set fort I
in the Declaration on Principles Guiding R<
tions between Participating States.
20
Department of State Bulle,
ARMS CONTROL
24) They reaffirm that, in the broader
ext of world security, security in Europe
>sely linked with security in the Mediter-
an area as a whole; in this context, they
irm their intention to develop good neigh-
ly relations with all States in the region,
due regard to reciprocity, and in the
t of the principles contained in the
aration on Principles Guiding Relations
'een Participating States, so as to pro-
; confidence and security and make peace
ail in the region in accordance with the
isions contained in the Mediterranean
iter of the Final Act.
25) They emphasize the necessity to take
lute measures to prevent and to combat
)rism, including terrorism in international
;ions. They express their determination to
effective measures, both at the national
and through international co-operation,
he prevention and suppression of all acts
rrorism. They will take all appropriate
sures in preventing their respective ter-
[ies from being used for the preparation,
nization or commission of terrorist
ities. This also includes measures to pro-
on their territories illegal activities,
iding subversive activities, of persons,
!ps and organizations that instigate,
nize or engage in the perpetration of acts
rrorism, including those directed against
r States and their citizens.
26) They will fulfil in good faith their
•ations under international law; they also
1;s that strict compliance with their com-
lents within the framework of the CSCE
sential for building confidence and
rity.
27) The participating States confirm that
e event of a conflict between the obliga-
; of the members of the United Nations
r the Charter of the United Nations and
■ obligations under any treaty or other
■national agreement, their obligations
t the Charter will prevail, in accordance
Article 103 of the Charter of the United
ons.
28) The participating States have
pted the following measures:
OR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN
ITARY ACTIVITIES
The participating States will give
ication in writing through diplomatic
nels in an agreed form of content, to all
participating States 42 days or more in
nee of the start of notifiable1 military
ities in the zone of application for
dence- and security-building measures
SMs).2
30) Notification will be given by the par-
ting State on whose territory the activ-
l question is planned to take place even if
brces of that State are not engaged in
.ctivity or their strength is below the
iable level. This will not relieve other
cipating States of their obligation to give
ication, if their involvement in the
ned military activity reaches the
'lable level.
(31) Each of the following military
activities in the field conducted as a single
activity in the zone of application for CSBMs,
at or above the levels defined below, will be
notified.
(31.1) The engagement of formations of
land forces3 of the participating States in the
same exercise activity conducted under a
single operational command independently or
in combination with any possible air or naval
components.
(31.1.1) This military activity will be
subject to notification whenever it involves at
any time during the activity:
• at least 13,000 troops, including
support troops, or
• at least 300 battle tanks
if organized into a divisional structure
or at least two brigades/regiments, not
necessarily subordinate to the same division.
(31.1.2) The participation of air forces
of the participating States will be included in
the notification if it is foreseen that in the
course of the activity 200 or more sorties by
aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown.
(31.2) The engagement of military"
forces either in an amphibious landing or in a
parachute assault by airborne forces in the
zone of application for CSBMs.
(31.2.1) These military activities will
be subject to notification whenever the
amphibious landing involves at least 3,000
troops or whenever the parachute drop
involves at least 3,000 troops.
(31.3) The engagement of formations of
land forces of the participating States in a
transfer from outside the zone of application
for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or
from inside the zone of application for CSBMs
to points of concentration in the zone, to par-
ticipate in a notifiable exercise activity or to
be concentrated.
(31.3.1) The arrival or concentration
of these forces will be subject to notification
whenever it involves, at any time during the
activity:
• at least 13,000 troops, including
support troops, or
• at least 300 battle tanks
if organized into a divisional structure
or at least two brigades/regiments, not
necessarily subordinate to the same division.
(31.3.2) Forces which have been
transferred into the zone will be subject to all
provisions of agreed CSBMs when they
depart their arrival points to participate in a
notifiable exercise activity or to be concen-
trated within the zone of application for
CSBMs.
(32) Notifiable military activities carried
out without advance notice to the troops
involved are exceptions to the requirement
for prior notification to be made 42 days in
advance.
(32.1) Notification of such activities,
above the agreed thresholds, will be given at
the time the troops involved commence such
activities.
(33) Notification will be given in writing
of each notifiable military activity in the
following agreed form:
(34) A — General Information
(34.1) The designation of the military
activity;
(34.2) The general purpose of the
military activity;
(34.3) The names of the States involved
in the military activity;
(34.4) The level of organizing and com-
manding the military activity;
(34.5) The start and end dates of the
military activity.
(35) B — Information on different types
of notifiable military activities
(35.1) The engagement of land forces of
the participating States in the same exercise
activity conducted under a single operational
command independently or in combination
with any possible air or naval components;
(35.1.1) The total number of troops
taking part in the military activity (i.e.,
ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile
and airborne troops) and the number of
troops participating for each State involved,
if applicable;
(35.1.2) Number and type of divisions
participating for each State;
(35.1.3) The total number of battle
tanks for each State and the total number of
anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted
on armoured vehicles;
(35.1.4) The total number of artillery
pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm
calibre or above);
(35.1.5) The total number of heli-
copters, by category;
(35.1.6) Envisaged number of sorties
by aircraft, excluding helicopters;
(35.1.7) Purpose of air missions;
(35.1.8) Categories of aircraft
involved;
(35.1.9) The level of command,
organizing and commanding the air force
participation;
(35.1.10) Naval ship-to-shore gunfire;
(35.1.11) Indication of other naval
ship-to-shore support;
(35.1.12) The level of command,
organizing and commanding the naval force
participation.
(35.2) The engagement of military
forces either in an amphibious landing or in a
parachute assault by airborne forces in the
zone of application for CSBMs:
(35.2.1) The total number of
amphibious troops involved in notifiable
amphibious landings, and/or the total number
of airborne troops involved in notifiable
parachute assaults;
21
ARMS CONTROL
(35.2.2) In the case of a notifiable
amphibious landing, the point or points of
embarkation, if in the zone of application for
CSBMs.
(35.3) The engagement of formations of
land forces of the participating States in a
transfer from outside the zone of application
for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or
from inside the zone of application for CSBMs
to points of concentration in the zone, to par-
ticipate in a notifiable exercise activity or to
be concentrated:
(35.3.1) The total number of troops
transferred;
(35.3.2) Number and type of divisions
participating in the transfer;
(35.3.3) The total number of battle
tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or
concentration;
(35.3.4) Geographical co-ordinates for
the points of arrival and for the points of
concentration.
(36) C — The envisaged area and
timeframe of the activity
(36.1) The area of the military activity
delimited by geographic features together
with geographic co-ordinates, as appropriate;
(36.2) The start and end dates of each
phase (transfers, deployment, concentration
of forces, active exercise phase, recovery
phase) of activities in the zone of application
for CSBMs of participating formations, the
tactical purpose and corresponding
geographical areas (delimited by geographical
co-ordinates) for each phase;
(36.3) Brief descriptions of each phase.
(37) D — Other information
(37.1) Changes, if any, in relation to
information provided in the annual calendar
regarding the activity;
(37.2) Relationship of the activity to
other notifiable activities.
OBSERVATION OF
CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(38) The participating States will invite
observers from all other participating States
to the following notifiable military activities:
(38.1) • The engagement of formations
of land forces3 of the participating States in
the same exercise activity conducted under a
single operational command independently or
in combination with any possible air or naval
components;
(38.2) • The engagement of military
forces either in an amphibious landing or in a
parachute assault by airborne forces in the
zone of application for CSBMs;
(38.3) • In the case of the engagement
of formations of land forces of the partici-
pating States in a transfer from outside the
zone of application for CSBMs to arrival
points in the zone, or from inside the zone of
application for CSBMs to points of concentra-
tion in the zone, to participate in a notifiable
exercise activity or to be concentrated, the
concentration of these forces. Forces which
have been transferred into the zone will be
subject to all provisions of agreed confidence-
and security-building measures when they
depart their arrival points to participate in a
notifiable exercise activity or to be concen-
trated within the zone of application for
CSBMs.
(38.4) The above-mentioned activities
will be subject to observation whenever the
number of troops engaged meets or exceeds
17,000 troops, except in the case of either an
amphibious landing or a parachute assault by
airborne forces, which will be subject to
observation whenever the number of troops
engaged meets or exceeds 5,000 troops.
(39) The host State will extend the invita-
tions in writing through diplomatic channels
to all other participating States at the time of
notification. The host State will be the par-
ticipating State on whose territory the
notified activity will take place.
(40) The host State may delegate some of
its responsibilities as host to another par-
ticipating State engaged in the military activ-
ity on the territory of the host State. In such
cases, the host State will specify the alloca-
tion of responsibilities in its invitation to
observe the activity.
(41) Each participating State may send
up to two observers to the military activity to
be observed.
(42) The invited State may decide
whether to send military and/or civilian
observers, including members of its personnel
accredited to the host State. Military
observers will, normally, wear their uniforms
and insignia while performing their tasks.
(43) Replies to the invitation will be given
in writing not later than 21 days after the
issue of the invitation.
(44) The participating States accepting
an invitation will provide the names and
ranks of their observers in their reply to the
invitation. If the invitation is not accepted in
time, it will be assumed that no observers will
be sent.
(45) Together with the invitation the host
State will provide a general observation pro-
gramme, including the following information:
(45.1) • the date, time and place of
assembly of observers;
(45.2) • planned duration of the obser-
vation programme;
(45.3) • languages to be used in inter-
pretation and/or translation;
(45.4) • arrangements for board, lodg-
ing and transportation of the observers;
(45.5) • arrangements for observation
equipment which will be issued to the
observers by the host State;
(45.6) • possible authorization by the
host State of the use of special equipment
that the observers may bring with them;
(45.7) • arrangements for special
clothing to be issued to the observers because
of weather or environmental factors.
(46) The observers may make reques II
with regard to the observation programn
The host State will, if possible, accede to I
them.
(47) The host State will determine a < 1
tion of observation which permits the
observers to observe a notifiable military J
activity from the time that agreed thresh' |
for observation are met or exceeded until I
the last time during the activity, the
thresholds for observation are no longer 1 1
(48) The host State will provide the
observers with transportation to the area
the notified activity and back. This transp
tation will be provided from either the ca)
or another suitable location to be announc
in the invitation, so that the observers an
position before the start of the observatio
programme.
(49) The invited State will cover the
travel expenses for its observers to the
capital, or another suitable location specif
in the invitation, of the host State, and ba
(50) The observers will be provided e<
treatment and offered equal opportunities
carry out their functions.
(51) The observers will be granted, di
ing their mission, the privileges and
immunities accorded to diplomatic agents
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.
(52) The host State will not be requin
permit observation of restricted locations,
installations or defence sites.
(53) In order to allow the observers to
confirm that the notified activity is non-
threatening in character and that it is can
out in conformity with the appropriate pre
sions of the notification, the host State wil
(53.1) • at the commencement of th
observation programme give a briefing on |
purpose, the basic situation, the phases of f
activity and possible changes as compared •
with the notification and provide the
observers with a map of the area of the
military activity with a scale of 1 to not m( '
than 500,000 and an observation programr '
with a daily schedule as well as a sketch
indicating the basic situation;
(53.2) • provide the observers with '
appropriate observation equipment; howevij
the observers will be allowed to use their p '
sonal binoculars, which will be subject to
examination and approval by the host Stat(
(53.3) • in the course of the observa- .
tion programme give the observers daily
briefings with the help of maps on the varici
phases of the military activity and their
development and inform the observers aboi}
their positions geographically; in the case o
land force activity conducted in combinatioi|
with air or naval components, briefings will |
be given by representatives of these forces;
(53.4) • provide opportunities to
observe directly forces of the State/States I
engaged in the military activity so that the ]
observers get an impression of the flow of t
activity; to this end, the observers will be
given the opportunity to observe major com
bat units of the participating formations of J |
divisional or equivalent level and, whenever
22
Department of State Bullei'
ARMS CONTROL
ible, to visit some units and communicate
commanders and troops; commanders or
r senior personnel of participating forma-
; as well as of the visited units will inform
ibservers of the mission of their respec-
units;
(53.5) • guide the observers in the area
e military activity; the observers will
iv the instructions issued by the host
; in accordance with the provisions set
tin this document;
(53.6) • provide the observers with
Bopriate means of transportation in the
■ of the military activity;
t (53.7) • provide the observers with
ijrtunities for timely communication with
B embassies or other official missions and
Liar posts; the host State is not obligated
jver the communication expenses of the
■"vers;
(53.8) • provide the observers with
jopriate board and lodging in a location
Ible for carrying out the observation pro-
lime and, when necessary, medical care.
ip4) The participating States need not
p observers to notifiable military
Kties which are carried out without
Ince notice to the troops involved unless
EC notifiable activities have a duration of
I than 72 hours. The continuation of these
■ities beyond this time will be subject to
rvation while the agreed thresholds for
srvation are met or exceeded. The obser-
ijn programme will follow as closely as
lically possible all the provisions for
Ovation set out in this document.
"1UAL CALENDARS
iiEach participating State will exchange.
Ball other participating States, an annual
ujdar of its military activities subject to
I notification,4 within the zone of applica-
tor CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent
udar year. It will be transmitted every
a in writing, through diplomatic channels,
titer than 15 November for the following
a
>6) Each participating State will list the
(fc-mentioned activities chronologically
drill provide information on each activity
aiordance with the following model:
» I (56. 1) • type of military activity and its
■ration;
• (56.2) • general characteristics and
Ipse of the military activity;
I (56.3) • States involved in the military
tity;
II (56.4) • area of the military activity,
fated by appropriate geographic features
4r defined by geographic co-ordinates;
B(56.5) • planned duration of the
Iry activity and the 14-day period,
lilted by dates, within which it is
feged to start;
1(56.6) • the envisaged total number of
Is5 engaged in the military activity;
11(56.7) • the types of armed forces
lyed in the military activity;
(56.8) • the envisaged level of com-
mand, under which the military activity will
take place;
(56.9) • the number and type of divi-
sions whose participation in the military
activity is envisaged;
(56.10) • any additional information
concerning, inter alia, components of armed
forces, which the participating State planning
the military activity considers relevant.
(57) Should changes regarding the
military activities in the annual calendar
prove necessary, they will be communicated
to all other participating States no later than
in the appropriate notification.
(58) Information on military activities
subject to prior notification not included in an
annual calendar will be communicated to all
participating States as soon as possible, in
accordance with the model provided in the
annual calendar.
CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS
(59) Each participating State will com-
municate, in writing, to all other participating
States, by 15 November each year, informa-
tion concerning military activities subject to
prior notification4 involving more than 40,000
troops,4 which it plans to carry out in the
second subsequent calendar year. Such com-
munication will include preliminary informa-
tion on each activity, as to its general pur-
pose, timeframe and duration, area, size and
States involved.
(60) Participating States will not carry
out military activities subject to prior notifica-
tion involving more than 75,000 troops,
unless they have been the object of com-
munication as defined above.
(61) Participating States will not carry
out military activities subject to prior notifica-
tion involving more than 40,000 troops unless
they have been included in the annual calen-
dar, not later than 15 November each year
(62) If military activities subject to prior
notification are carried out in addition to
those contained in the annual calendar, they
should be as few as possible.
COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION
(63) According to the Madrid Mandate, the
confidence- and security-building measures to
be agreed upon "will be provided with ade-
quate forms of verification which correspond
to their content."
(64) The participating States recognize
that national technical means can play a role
in monitoring compliance with agreed
confidence- and security-building measures.
(65) In accordance with the provisions
contained in this document each participating
State has the right to conduct inspections on
the territory of any other participating State
within the zone of application for CSBMs.
(66) Any participating State will be
allowed to address a request for inspection to
another participating State on whose ter-
ritory, within the zone of application for
CSBMs, compliance with the agreed
confidence- and security-building measures is
in doubt.
(67) No participating State will be obliged
to accept on its territory, within the zone of
application for CSBMs, more than three
inspections per calendar year.
(68) No participating State will be obliged
to accept more than one inspection per calen-
dar year from the same participating State.
(69) An inspection will not be counted if,
due to force majeure, it cannot be carried out.
(70) The participating State which
requests an inspection will state the reasons
for such a request.
(71) The participating State which has
received such a request will reply in the af-
firmative to the request within the agreed
period of time, subject to the provisions con-
tained in paragraphs (67) and (68).
(72) Any possible dispute as to the valid-
ity of the reasons for a request will not pre-
vent or delay the conduct of an inspection.
(73) The participating State which
requests an inspection will be permitted to
designate for inspection on the territory of
another State, within the zone of application
for CSBMs, a specific area. Such an area will
be referred to as the "specified area." The
specified area will comprise terrain where
notifiable military activities are conducted or
where another participating State believes a
notifiable military activity is taking place. The
specified area will be defined and limited by
the scope and scale of notifiable military
activities but will not exceed that required for
an army level military activity.
(74) In the specified area the represen-
tatives of the inspecting State accompanied
by the representatives of the receiving State
will be permitted access, entry and
unobstructed survey, except for areas or sen-
sitive points to which access is normally
denied or restricted, military and other
defence installations, as well as naval vessels,
military vehicles and aircraft. The number
and extent of the restricted areas should be
as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable
military activities can take place will not be
declared restricted areas, except for certain
permanent or temporary military installations
which, in territorial terms, should be as small
as possible, and consequently those areas will
not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable
military activities. Restricted areas will not
be employed in a way inconsistent with the
agreed provisions on inspection.
(75) Within the specified area, the forces
of participating States other than the receiv-
ing State will also be subject to the inspection
conducted by the inspecting State.
(76) Inspection will be permitted on the
ground, from the air or both.
(77) The representatives of the receiving
State will accompany the inspection team,
including when it is in land vehicles and an
aircraft from the time of their first employ-
ment until the time they are no longer in use
for the purposes of inspection.
(78) In its request, the inspecting State
will notify the receiving State of:
y.-mber 1986
23
ARMS CONTROL
(78. 1) • t he reasons for the request;
(78.2) • the location of the specified
area defined by geographical co-ordinates;
(78.3) • the preferred point(s) of entry
for the inspection team;
(78.4) • mode of transport to and from
the point(s) of entry and. if applicable, to and
the specified area;
(78.5) • where in the specified area the
inspection will begin;
(78.6) • whether the inspection will be
conducted from the ground, from the air or
both simultaneously;
(78.7) • whether aerial inspection will
be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter
or both;
(78.8) • whether the inspection team
will use land vehicles provided by the receiv-
ing State or, if mutually agreed, its own
vehicles;
(78.9) • information for the issuance of
diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the
receiving State.
(79) The reply to the request will be given
in the shortest possible period of time, but
within not more than twenty-four hours.
Within thirty-six hours after the issuance of
the request, the inspection team will be per-
mitted to enter the territory of the receiving
State.
(80) Any request for inspection as well as
the reply thereto will be communicated to all
participating States without delay.
(81) The receiving State should designate
the point(s) of entry as close as possible to the
specified area. The receiving State will ensure
that the inspection team will be able to reach
the specified area without delay from the
point(s) of entry.
(82) All participating States will facilitate
the passage of the inspection teams through
their territory.
(83) Within 48 hours after the arrival of
the inspection team at the specified area, the
inspection will be terminated.
(84) There will be no more than four
inspectors in an inspection team. While con-
ducting the inspection the inspection team
may divide into two parts.
(85) The inspectors and, if applicable,
auxiliary personnel, will be granted during
their mission the privileges and immunities in
accordance with the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.
(86) The receiving State will provide the
inspection team with appropriate board and
lodging in a location suitable for carrying out
the inspection, and, when necessary, medical
care; however this does not exclude the use
by the inspection team of its own tents and
rations.
(87) The inspection team will have use of
its own maps, own photo cameras, own
binoculars and own dictaphones, as well as
own aeronautical charts.
(88) The inspection team will have access
to appropriate telecommunications equipment
of the receiving State, including the oppor-
tunity for continuous communication between
the members of an inspection team in an air-
craft and those in a land vehicle employed in
the inspection.
(89) The inspecting State will specify
whether aerial inspection will be conducted
using an airplane, a helicopter or both. Air-
craft for inspection will be chosen by mutual
agreement between the inspecting and receiv-
ing States. Aircraft will be chosen which pro-
vide the inspection team a continuous view of
the ground during the inspection.
(90) After the flight plan, specifying,
inter alia, the inspection team's choice of
flight path, speed and altitude in the specified
area, has been filed with the competent air
traffic control authority the inspection air-
craft will be permitted to enter the specified
area without delay. Within the specified area,
the inspection team will, at its request, be
permitted to deviate from the approved flight
plan to make specific observations provided
such deviation is consistent with paragraph
(74) as well as flight safety and air traffic
requirements. Directions to the crew will be
given through a representative of the receiv-
ing State on board the aircraft involved in the
inspection.
(91) One member of the inspection team
will be permitted, if such a request is made,
at any time to observe data on navigational
equipment of the aircraft and to have access
to maps and charts used by the flight crew for
the purpose of determining the exact location
of the aircraft during the inspection flight.
(92) Aerial and ground inspectors may
return to the specified area as often as
desired within the 48-hour inspection period.
(93) The receiving State will provide for
inspection purposes land vehicles with cross
country capability. Whenever mutually
agreed taking into account the specific
geography relating to the area to be
inspected, the inspecting State will be permit-
ted to use its own vehicles.
(94) If land vehicles or aircraft are pro-
vided by the inspecting State, there will be
one accompanying driver for each land vehi-
cle, or accompanying aircraft crew.
(95) The inspecting State will prepare a
report of its inspection and will provide a
copy of that report to all participating States
without delay.
(96) The inspection expenses will be
incurred by the receiving State except when
the inspecting State uses its own aircraft
and/or land vehicles. The travel expenses to
and from the point(s) of entry will be borne by
the inspecting State.
(97) Diplomatic channels will be used for
communications concerning compliance and
verification.
(98) Each participating State will be
entitled to obtain timely clarification from
any other participating State concerning the
application of agreed confidence- and
security-building measures. Communications
in this context will, if appropriate, be
transmitted to all other participating States.
(99) The participating States stress that
these confidence- and security-building
measures are designed to reduce the dangers
of armed conflict and misunderstanding or
miscalculation of military activities and
emphasize that their implementation will con-
tribute to these objectives.
(100) Reaffirming the relevant object
of the Final Act, the participating States
determined to continue building confidenc
to lessen military confrontation and to
enhance security for all. They are also del
mined to achieve progress in disarmamen
(101) The measures adopted in this d<
ment are politically binding and will come
force on 1 January 1987.
(102) The Government of Sweden is
requested to transmit the present docume
to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE in
Vienna and to the Secretary-General of tl
United Nations. The Government of Swe(
is also requested to transmit the present
document to the Governments of the non-
participating Mediterranean States.
(103) The text of this document will I
published in each participating State, whi
will disseminate it and make it known as
widely as possible.
(104) The representatives of the par-
ticipating States express their profound
gratitude to the Government and people c
Sweden for the excellent arrangements i
for the Stockholm Conference and the wa
hospitality extended to the delegations wl
participated in the Conference.
ANNEX I
Under the terms of the Madrid mandate,
zone of application for CSBMs is defined ;
follows:
I
"On the basis of equality of rights,
balance and reciprocity, equal respect foi
security interests of all CSCE participal
States, and of their respective obligatioi
concerning confidence- and security-buildi
measures and disarmament in Europe, the
confidence- and security-building measure |
will cover the whole of Europe as well as 1
adjoining sea area5 and air space. They wi i
of military significance and politically bino (
and will be provided with adequate forms •
verification which correspond to their
content.
"As far as the adjoining sea area6 and :
space is concerned, the measures will be
applicable to the military activities of all tl
participating States taking place there
whenever these activities affect security in
Europe as well as constitute a part of
activities taking place within the whole of
Europe as referred to above, which they w
agree to notify. Necessary specifications w
be made through the negotiations on the J
confidence- and security-building measures!
the Conference.
"Nothing in the definition of the zone
given above will diminish obligations ahead
undertaken under the Final Act. The
confidence- and security -building measures
be agreed upon at the Conference will also i
applicable in all areas covered by any of th<|
provisions in the Final Act relating to
confidence-building measures and certain i
aspects of security and disarmament."
24
Department of State Bulle
I
ARMS CONTROL
HNEX II
irman's Statement
I understood that, taking into account the
fed date of entry into force of the agreed
Sidence- and security-building measures
I the provisions contained in them concern-
lithe timeframes of certain advance
Ifications, and expressing their interest in
|arly transition to the full implementation
lie provisions of this document, the par-
loating States agree to the following:
]The annual calendars concerning military
dvities subject to prior notification and
•cast for 1987 will be exchanged not later
li 15 December 1986.
'Communications, in accordance with
eed provisions, concerning military
Brities involving more than 40,000 troops
lined for the calendar year 1988 will be
langed by 15 December 1986. Par-
jpating States may undertake activities
living more than 75,000 troops during the
Indar year 1987 provided that they are
lided in the annual calendar exchanged by
December 1986.
]Activities to begin during the first 42
I; after 1 January 1987 will be subject to
lrelevant provisions of the Final Act of the
KE. However, the participating States will
le every effort to apply to them the provi-
m of this document to the maximum
Int possible.
■iPhis statement will be an annex to the
lument of the Stockholm Conference and
ibe published with it.
lNEX III
Jirman's Statement
| understood that each participating State
ijraise any question consistent with the
Idate of the Conference on Confidence-
I Security-Building Measures and Disarma-
tot in Europe at any stage subsequent to
■Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting.
I This statement will be an annex to the
kument of the Stockholm Conference and
Ibe published with it.
INEXIV
Jirman's Statement
I understood that the participating States
111 that they have the right to belong or
Ito belong to international organizations,
le or not to be a party to bilateral or
Bilateral treaties including the right to be
I Oft to be a party to treaties of alliance;
w also have the right of neutrality. In this
text, they will not take advantage of these
rights to circumvent the purposes of the
system of inspection, and in particular the
provision that a participating State will be
obliged to accept on its territory within the
zone of application for CSBMs, more than
three inspections per calendar year.
Appropriate understandings between par-
ticipating States on this subject will be
expressed in interpretative statements to be
included in the journal of the day.
The statement will be an annex to the
Document of the Stockholm Conference and
will be published with it.
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
SEPT. 22, 1986*
Today in Stockholm, the United States
and 34 other governments adopted an
accord that will, if faithfully imple-
mented, reduce the risk of war in
Europe, where there is the greatest con-
centration of military forces of the East
and the West.7 1 welcome this positive
outcome at the CDE conference. It will
contribute to greater security in Europe
and to improved East-West relations.
This accord also sends messages that
should be welcomed by people through-
out the world. It demonstrates that East
and West, with seriousness of purpose
and hard work, can establish common
ground on which to build a more secure
future. It also demonstrates that the
nations of the West, around whose pro-
posals the Stockholm accord was built,
constitute a powerful force for peace.
The set of militarily significant and
verifiable measures adopted by the
Stockholm CDE conference marks a
substantial advance over those in the
Helsinki Final Act. These measures will
make military activities more predictable
and inhibit opportunities for political
intimidation. In particular, the
Stockholm accord commits the 35
nations to notify one another of military
activities above certain levels, to invite
observers, to forecast activities a year in
advance, and to allow inspectors to verify
compliance with those commitments.
This is the first East-West accord in
which the Soviet Union has agreed to
inspection of military activities on its
territory. Although these inspection pro-
visions are very different from those we
would require to verify agreements
which reduced or limited forces, they are
appropriate to the Stockholm confidence-
and security-building measures and offer
us the opportunity to gain experience in
conducting inspections.
The Stockholm document, of course,
must become more than promises on
paper. Implementation of its commit-
ments will be the true measure of its
contribution to European security. For
its part, the United States will meet its
commitments fully. Soviet compliance,
especially with the verification provi-
sions, will be an important gauge of the
possibilities for future progress in con-
ventional arms control.
By advancing the principle of open-
ness in the military-security field, this
CDE accord can also contribute to prog-
ress in the broader Helsinki CSCE proc-
ess. The accord achieved at Stockholm
on security issues makes all the more
imperative balanced progress on human
rights and fundamental freedoms. At the
Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, which
begins in November, the U.S. delegation
will press for fulfillment of all CSCE
commitments and for balanced progress
across the full CSCE agenda.
These accomplishments are also a
testimony to the skill, dedication, and
energy of our negotiators. I want to con-
gratulate Ambassador Robert L. Barry
and his negotiating team on a job well
done.
AMBASSADOR BARRY'S
STATEMENT,
SEPT. 22, 1986
The United States wishes today to join
others in welcoming the document which
the Stockholm conference has just
adopted. We believe the confidence- and
security-building measures adopted here
can make an important contribution to a
more stable and secure Europe and to an
improved East- West relationship.
As you know, my delegation has
been among those which have demanded
that we produce substance here and not
generalities. We have tried hard to meet
the stringent standards of the Madrid
mandate. We are satisfied that we have
met these standards and produced a
mandatory regime which could serve as
a first step in a more demanding arms
control and security process.
Because of our general concerns
about compliance with international
commitments, my government will
follow the implementation of the
Stockholm regime with particular atten-
tion. We have all much to learn about
confidence-building, and the measures
adopted here will provide a test case as
we consider how best to proceed in the
future.
I/ember 1986
25
ARMS CONTROL
Far from exhausting the potential of
confidence- and security-building
measures, Stockholm is, we think, a
beginning. We should expand upon what
we have done here. I think particularly
of measures in the area of information
exchange. The conference has not
achieved nearly as much here in this
area as we thought desirable and possi-
ble. It seems to us self-evident that an
agreed understanding of what forces are
routinely stationed in Europe, with what
combat capability, is a fundamental
requirement of true stability. Equally,
the establishment of an information base
is a requirement of any serious effort to
reduce the strength of these same
forces. We have not even begun to
establish such an information base here
in Stockholm.
We have, on the other hand, taken
what we regard as an important, even
historic, step in the area of verification.
With acceptance of inspection, we have
established the principle that any state
with doubts about whether the military
activities of another are in compliance
with commitments has the right and is
assured the means of going into the ter-
ritory of that other state to see for itself
what is going on. There is no right of
refusal of the inspection adopted here,
whether explicit or implicit. We will
follow implementation of the inspection
provision with particular care. Because
we are experimenting with challenge
inspection for the first time, we will no
doubt have to perfect the instrument we
have built here. We must also recognize
that any inspection regime intended to
verify actual reductions in forces would
have to be more rigorous and more
demanding.
In this regard, I would note that my
government remains convinced that the
use of aircraft from neutral and
nonaligned states would produce a more
credible and effective form of aerial
inspection than the use of aircraft from
the state being inspected. Unfortunately,
the East rejected this idea and the offers
of those states which said they were
prepared to help bring this valuable idea
to fruition. This proposal remains on the
table for the future.
The United States also believes that
the successful outcome to the Stockholm
conference should provide a positive
political impulse to other arms control
and security negotiations and to the
East- West relationship as a whole.
In a few days, the Vienna follow-up
meeting will begin weighing the
accomplishments and failures of the
CSCE process since Madrid. Our work in
Stockholm will weigh on the positive side
of that balance, but there will be much
on the negative side as well. It will be
the task of the Vienna meeting to draw
conclusions about the future, but the
United States will continue to be among
those which require balanced progress in
all areas.
Throughout the Stockholm con-
ference, President Reagan has taken a
personal interest in developments here.
The first foreign policy decision he took
in January 1981 was for the United
States to participate in the Stockholm
conference. He has spoken frequently
about the conference and importance he
attaches to its successful conclusion both
in public and in private conversations
with me.
Let me recall President Reagan's
statement of January 21, 1986, that "the
Stockholm conference . . . can contribute
to security in the larger sense, that
which encompasses political economic,
cultural, and humanitarian matters-
human rights— as well as strictly military
matters. The attainment of this broj
concept of security is the fundament
objective of the United States." We i
believe that our work here in Stockhi
will advance that overall objective.
■In this document, the term notifiabll
means subject to notification [text in ori£
2See Annex I [text in original].
3In this context, the term land forces
includes amphibious, airmobile and airbo:
forces [text in original].
4As defined in the provisions on Prio
Notification of Certain Military Activities
[text in original].
5"In this context, the notion of adjoir
sea area is understood to refer also to oo
areas adjoining Europe" [quoted text in
original]. Whenever the term "the zone c
application for CSBMs" is used in this dc
ment, the above definition will apply [tex
original].
6Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 198f
7The 35 delegations at the CDE agre«
"stop the clock" on Sept. 19 so that the i
tion of the CDE document would be in
technical compliance with the adjournmei
date set by the conference in Dec. 1985. I
Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 31, 1986'
The United States and the Soviet Union
will begin a new round of discussions on
arms control in Geneva on September
18. An interagency arms control group
has been meeting during the past several
weeks to prepare for this round of talks.
The United States considers this new
round to be important in the process of
reaching an agreement for meaningful
arms control leading to total elimination
of nuclear weapons. The September
discussions come at a critical juncture in
the process.
The recent exchanges between Presi-
dent Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev have served to underscore
the seriousness of the discussions. We
are pleased that the Soviet Union has
moved from a position of limiting the
expansion of the arms race to a discus-
sion of reducing the nuclear arsenals on
both sides. The United States, for its
part, has assigned major priority to seek-
ing areas in which the two sides can
make progress. We believe our most
recent proposals are serious, concrete,
and detailed. They provide the impetus
for disucssions with the Soviet Unior
that can significantly contribute to ai
agreement in the future.
The interagency discussions in
preparation for resumption of the
Geneva talks will continue during the
coming weeks. No final decisions hav
been made and will not be approved \ '
the President until nearer the time tl •
talks resume.
We believe the principle of
confidentiality is essential to the suc-
cessful outcome of these discussions.
are committed to preserving this prin '
pie and, therefore, will have no coram
on the discussions that take place wit! '
our government or at the table in
Geneva. We deplore those in this
Administration who make this inform
tion public. Breaching the principle of
confidentiality serves to undermine th
opportunity for a successful outcome i
arms control. Quite frankly, we must
question their motives. Their actions i
serve the President, the American
people, and the cause of world peace.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 8, 1986.
26
Department of State Bulle
ARMS CONTROL
BFR Talks End 39th Round
ESTERN STATEMENT.
LY 3, 1986
ibassador Robert D. Blackwill, head
the U.S. delegation, delivered an end-
round plenary statement today on
lalf of the West. He addressed the
jstion of verification which he
scribed as a key issue, and he
■iewed Eastern statements in this
;ard, taking stock of where the
fotiations now stand as a result.
In his remarks, he pointed out that
■ing the last 7 weeks, Eastern
iresentatives, like those on the
;stern side, have devoted a significant
tion of their attention to addressing
1 affirming the importance their
rernments attach to verification,
leed, a theme found in nearly every
stern statement in this round has
;n the need for reliable verification,
icifically for the type of agreement
ier discussion here in Vienna.
Only 2 weeks ago, the East
iracterized a well-functioning system
j/erification as an important condition
confidence. And even earlier, on May
the East acknowledged that one
uld provide for necessary, justified,
il proven measures of verification.
I In fact, the East opened the 39th
nd by discussing the goal of reliable
|ification of the no-increase commit-
nt; while on June 12, it addressed, at
Erth, the objective interconnection
ween verification and disarmament,
st week, the East affirmed that War-
i Pact statements reflect readiness
(1 flexibility also in the area of verifica-
ji and acknowledged the importance
this problem.
! This Eastern chorus pledging
Igiance to verification— an
urecedented but welcome turn of
jnts in this negotiation— parallels in
try respects Warsaw Pact pronounce-
tits elsewhere since the conclusion of
1 38th round. Indeed, on the very day
" 38th round ended, Warsaw Pact
sign ministers declared: "They are
(ded by the need for effective verifica-
h in all areas of arms limitation and
fiction and disarmament." One month
it. General Secretary Gorbachev
flighted the "question of dependable
ilification at every stage of the proc-
j" of conventional arms control.
And, as everyone knows, the
Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Pact last month made an appeal
in its Budapest communique for "imple-
mentation of effective verification in all
areas and stages of the reduction of
armaments and disarmament by both
national technical means and interna-
tional procedures, including on-site
inspection."
One would have anticipated in light
of these fine-sounding statements— and
particularly the passages from the June
1 1 Budapest communique— that during
this round, the two sides would be well
on their way to resolving the verification
issue. One would have thought that such
far-reaching— and, in the last case at
least, unqualified— declarations would be
accompanied either by new, concrete
measures to substantiate them or at a
minimum by a willingness to proceed on
the basis of the ideas of others.
Unfortunately, this new, positive
rhetoric on effective verification has
been matched not at all by Eastern
deeds at the negotiating table. Instead,
the Warsaw Pact position remains
frozen in the minimalist proposals which
it had tabled years ago.
Each week since the December 1985
Western move, the East has had positive
things to say about verification. But
week after week— and now round after
round— the Warsaw Pact remains rigid
in its position on this subject. Indeed, it
has actually hardened and retracted
elements of its previous, already unfor-
tunate, stance with the tabling of its
February 20 draft agreement and its
subsequent explanation.
During the course of this round, the
Warsaw Pact added a dubious
element— the realities of the present
international situation— for justifying its
refusal to accept Western verification
proposals. One can only surmise that,
after the West had irrefutably
demonstrated how its verification
package met the earlier Eastern-
postulated criteria of corresponding to
the content, substance, and purpose of
the agreement under consideration, the
East felt a need to come up with a more
open-ended requirement, which it alone
would be in a position to judge.
In the meantime, 30 weeks have
passed since the West's move of
December 5, 1985, and the East has not
moved one millimeter on the substantive
issues of verification. Twenty-two weeks
have gone by since the West put forward
its detailed table of associated measures
which contains its verification proposals.
Yet the West still has not received a con-
sidered reply to any of its ideas on this
score— notwithstanding almost daily
Warsaw Pact claims to the contrary.
This is not to say that there has not
been discussion on specific measures.
Again in this round, the East has
stressed the significance of entry/exit
points as a verification position of all
participants that in the Eastern and
Western part of the area of reduction,
permanent exit and entry points be
established with observers of the other
side. Yet the West is chided for
dramatizing things where there is
nothing to be dramatized. This seems to
suggest that exempting approximately
half a million Soviet forces which rotate
each year in and out of the area of
reductions is a trivial matter. Who in the
world could believe that?
Clearly not the Warsaw Pact in the
past. In July 1983 and subsequently, the
East held the position that all Soviet
troops— including those on semiannual
rotation— would pass through exit/entry
points. Only with the tabling of the
February 20 draft agreement did it
become clear that the Warsaw Pact was
abandoning this logical course,
retreating to its current stance of
entry/exit point tokenism. The West
hopes that the East will return to its
1983 position with the acknowledgment
that it is not a concession to the West.
The East this round confirmed that,
together with other measures, the
exchange of relevant information will
make it possible in a reliable way to
monitor the observance of the no-
increase commitment. But the East to
date has failed to explain how the highly
aggregated data it is willing to exchange
would be relevant to verifying com-
pliance to this obligation. How then,
Ambassador Blackwill asked, is one, in a
reliable way, to monitor the observance
of the no-increase commitment?
vember 1986
27
ARMS CONTROL
Clearly to be relevant for verifica-
tion purposes, information must be
disaggregated. The East seems to
acknowledge this point— at least in part.
It has agreed to break down the original
figures it presented in 1976 from the
simple categories of total Warsaw Pact
ground forces and its combined ground
and air forces in the area of reductions.
Since 1980, it envisages providing
figures on a national basis for the total
number of ground forces in major forma-
tions, the total number of ground forces
outside such formations, and the total
figure for air forces. But further disag-
gregation down to a useful level— i.e.,
the battalion level— is obviously called
for. Ambassador Blackwill asked: Why
does the East resist this step?
Finally, the Warsaw Pact this round
has acknowledged the importance of
on-site inspections for the verification
regime under discussion. On May 15, the
East made two important points in this
regard. First, the East does not exclude
the possibility that unclear situations
may arise which might feed suspicions of
a violation of treaty obligations and
might justify a request for an on-site
inspection. The East went on to note
that for those who are complying with
their obligations, it will be easy to refute
a suspicion by allowing an on-site inspec-
tion. And, indeed, this procedure would
be what verification of compliance with
the no-increase commitment really
means.
Yet while affirming the importance
and utility of on-site inspection, the East
continues to demand that the request for
an inspection be well-founded— i.e., con-
tain all relevant information and also all
MBFR Negotiators Reconvene
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
SEPT. 25, 1986'
Representatives of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact resume the mutual and
balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks
today in Vienna. It has long been
NATO's goal to reach a verifiable agree-
ment that would reduce and limit con-
ventional forces in the crucial region of
central Europe. This round of talks
offers an opportunity to make progress
toward that end.
For its part, NATO has made every
effort to lay the groundwork for success.
On December 5, 1985, in order to
achieve a breakthrough in these negotia-
tions, the West tabled a proposal that
accepted the framework the Warsaw
Pact had proposed for a time-limited,
first-phase agreement calling for initial
reductions by U.S. and Soviet ground
forces, followed by a no-increase commit-
ment on all forces of the two alliances in
the area. Underscoring further its desire
to achieve tangible progress in Vienna,
the West at the same time changed its
long-held position that there should be
agreement on the numbers of forces of
both sides in central Europe before
initial reductions were taken— a major
compromise step in the East's direction.
The Eastern response to this signifi-
cant move has not contributed to prog-
ress in the talks. Despite public claims
by Warsaw Pact leaders that they were
willing to incorporate reasonable
verification measures in an agreement,
the Warsaw Pact, in the draft MBFR
agreement it tabled on February 20,
1986, again proposed inadequate and
unacceptable measures for ensuring
compliance. Moreover, the East actually
took a step backward from its 1983
verification position and would now
exempt the half million Soviet troops on
annual rotation into and out of central
Europe from any requirement to pass
through monitoring points.
Despite this lack of movement by the
East in the previous two negotiating
sessions, the United States and its allies
remain hopeful that success can be
achieved at the Vienna negotiating table.
We look to the Soviet Union to seriously
respond to the important compromise
proposal tabled by the West last
December.
The President has instructed the
U.S. delegation, under Ambassador
Robert Blackwill, in conjunction with
other NATO delegations, to continue to
make every effort to demonstrate how
the Western position in MBFR would
enhance peace and stability in central
Europe. All NATO nations hope that the
East is capable of mustering the political
will necessary to do its part to advance
the Vienna negotiations. It is time for
the Warsaw Pact to demonstrate that it
is, indeed, committed to meaningful and
verifiable reductions in conventional
forces.
possible evidence supporting its valid!
Moreover the East in a further step t
from its 1983 position on inspections
now would give the inspected side thi
right of veto regardless of whether tr
request is well-founded or not. Finall;
even if eventually granted, the delays
built into the Eastern approach effec-
tively rule out mounting an inspectioi
short notice and thus in most cases n
the measure of its utility.
In summation, Ambassador
Blackwill noted that the Eastern
approach to verification this round
seems akin to the proverbial messeng
who bears good news and bad news— I
with the former inevitably being can- L
celled by the latter.
The good news, he said, is that th '
East is now championing verification. |
The bad news, however, is that the E '
appears willing to accept effective
verification only when there are no tel
sions between the sides and when no
doubts exist as to intentions, force
levels, and military activities.
The good news is that the East
accepts the idea of entry/exit points. ' I
bad news, however, is that virtually n j
of the approximately 500,000 Soviet I
troops rotating in and out of central
Europe every year will pass through |
them.
The good news is that the East
agrees that an information exchange |
would make possible reliable verificat i
of the no-increase commitment. The b
news, however, is that the East rei'usi i
to provide the relevant information,
disaggregated to a manageable level.
Finally, the good news is that the |
East believes on-site inspections can
clarify unclear situations. The bad nev|
however, is that the Warsaw Pact dra i
the words "on-site inspection" of their,
very meaning. Even to request an
inspection under the Eastern approacl \
one must justify it with evidence that i|
sufficient to prove a violation without
recourse to inspection. Even then the
inspected side may turn down the
request. And if it does not, the inspec-
tion is likely to be so delayed as to be
worthless.
Against this background, as well a
other developments, the West has a
right to wonder whether the East has
any intention to agree to a serious
verification regime. The West has a
right to wonder whether the East is
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1986.
28
Department of State Bullet
ARMS CONTROL
jous about this negotiation. It has a
It to wonder whether the East will
t manifest the political will to come
in agreement on conventional force
suctions and limitations.
;For its part, the West wants an
cement here in Vienna. It would like
ipw. Being the only extant negotiation
Iressing conventional force reductions
limitations in Europe, this forum is a
! of the earnest of those who, like
i eral Secretary Gorbachev on April
3 appeal for cutting the "Gordian
t" and for moving on to an accord.
As was noted by the Western side at
the opening of this round, the best
means of demonstrating the sincerity of
the East's commitment to substantial
reductions and limitations on conven-
tional armed forces in central Europe
and to reliable verification at every stage
is for the Warsaw Pact to deal positively
and constructively with the serious West-
ern proposal tabled here in December.
The West continues to wait for that
Eastern response. Ambassador
Blackwill's last question was: Where is
it?a
S. and Soviet Approaches
Arms Control
\Edward L. Rowny
[Address before the Council on
mign Affairs in Baltimore on
lember 19, 1986. Ambassador Rowny
ircml adviser to the President and
Secretary of State on arms control
i week marks two crucial events: the
dting between Secretary Shultz and
i;ign Minister Shevardnadze and the
ijiing of the sixth round of the nuclear
ispace arms talks in Geneva.
■True to form, the Soviets have been
Bing "hard to get." They insist that
stnething" must come out of a sum-
fland "something" means an arms
ttrol agreement on their terms.
bally true to form, the Soviets are
Ising for a single-issue summit. Presi-
R Reagan wisely insists that any sum-
imust deal with the four pillars on
frh the U.S. -Soviet relationship is
K: bilateral affairs, regional issues,
Ian rights, and arms control. Addi-
fclly, as the President has stated, the
let treatment of American journalist
■olas Daniloff continues to limit
Ijrely what is achievable in our
keral relations. We hope that the
let Union will resolve this case
"mptly before it does even more
lage to the relationship between our
•(countries.
Bit is obvious that a summit, if it
Is place, will have arms control as an
Sbrtant item on the agenda. At last
I's summit, the President and
leral Secretary Gorbachev agreed to
■arms control goals:
■• A 50% reduction in the strategic
inals of the superpowers; and
• An interim agreement on
intermediate-range nuclear forces.
In the two rounds of talks in Geneva
following that summit, the Soviets failed
to follow up the pledge made at that
summit. There was little progress
toward these goals. The Soviets were
unwilling to engage in genuine give-and-
take at the negotiating table. More
recently, however, the Soviets have
begun to show signs of seriousness, even
though fundamental differences between
the sides still remain.
As I said, the sixth round of the
nuclear and space arms talks began
yesterday in Geneva. It will be the task
of the negotiators to continue to see if
the differences that remain between us
and the Soviets can be resolved. For our
American negotiators, this means a
great deal of work lies ahead of them—
more hard work than usual. Their job is
already excruciatingly difficult because
the Soviet negotiators, in marked con-
trast to the Americans, indulge in an
almost mind-numbing repetition of past
positions. This, needless to say, leaves
little room for the kind of free, explor-
atory discussions that are essential to
addressing the basic differences in our
conceptual approaches to the problem of
arms reductions. Hopefully, the talks
that Paul Nitze, [special adviser to the
President and the Secretary of State on
arms control matters], Max Kampelman,
[head of U.S. delegation on arms control
negotiations and U.S. negotiator on
defense and space arms], myself, and
others have had with Soviet arms control
experts in Moscow and Washington in
recent weeks will pay some dividends.
Fundamental Differences
As we consider our goals for this round
of arms talks and as we look down the
road to a possible summit, it is important
to remind ourselves of the fundamentals
underlying our relations with the Soviet
Union. The United States, as a demo-
cratic republic, stands at a disadvantage
in some respects in its relations with a
totalitarian state like the Soviet Union.
For those of us who have studied U.S.-
Soviet relations, this is no great
revelation— de Tocqueville pointed it out
almost 200 years ago. Unlike ours, the
Soviet system of government does not
provide for an independent legislature
and judiciary which provide checks and
balances to the powers of the executive
branch. Soviet leaders are self -selected.
They impose their will from the top
downward through the hierarchies of
their government and the Communist
Party. Unlike Soviet citizens, our
citizens elect their leaders. They have
direct and powerful access to the actions
of their leaders through the voting
process. The fundamental difference
between our system and that of the
U.S.S.R. is that Soviet leaders are not
subject to popular recall.
While de Tocqueville was writing
about America, another Frenchman, the
Marquis de Custine, was writing about
Russia. His book, Journey for Our
Time, shows that the government of the
modern-day Soviet Union is not funda-
mentally different from the govern-
mental system of Russia under the czars.
His concluding thought is even more
applicable today than then. He wrote: "I
don't blame the Russians for being what
they are, I blame them for pretending to
be what we in the West are."
The Soviets have recently, with a
flurry of news conferences and television
appearances, taken greater pains to
mimic our freedom of speech and free
press. I heard a Soviet spokesman on
American television refer the other day
to "Izvestiya, the government
newspaper," as if every other paper in
the U.S.S.R. were not government
owned and controlled. This activity is
but a thin veneer, covering the rough
surface of a system of government which
Orwell characterized by such terms as
"doublethink" and "nonspeak."
Strict Soviet discipline enforces a
unified position among the U.S.S.R.'s
negotiators, government, and party
officials. There is no open political oppo-
sition in the Soviet Union to place
pressure on the government to make
negotiating moves toward our positions.
Despite the facade of openness that the
Soviets have been putting on under
Cember 1986
29
ARMS CONTROL
Gorbachev, there are still no cracks in
the Soviet monolith, only surface
fissures.
Contrast this with the situation that
exists in the United States. Government
officials, independent think tanks, and
the man on the street have access to a
press that is neither owned nor con-
trolled by the government. A wide
variety of views can be and, in fact, are
expressed. Acts of the government can
be, and are, criticized or praised. The
pressure that these differences of
opinion put on our elected officials, who
depend for their mandate on the consent
of those they govern, is substantial. This
clash of views is the essence of a free
society. But it also offers the Soviets an
opportunity to inject themselves into our
internal debate. But we need to be
reminded that the Soviet system is not
like ours. It is a mistake to believe that
Soviet leaders are subject to the same
pressures that are placed on our leaders.
Soviet Negotiating Tactics
My 7 years as a negotiator on the SALT
II [strategic arms limitation talks]
delegation and my 2 years as chief
START [strategic arms reduction talks]
negotiator have given me a special
insight into the tactics the Soviets use to
exploit American pluralism. There is a
great difference between what Soviet
leaders say in public and what they allow
to happen at the negotiating table. For
public consumption, the Soviets profess
that they are flexible. They have a
special talent for recycling their more
shopworn offers and reintroducing them
as if they constituted new and substan-
tive concessions. The theory is that they
will compromise because they say they
will. But in practice, we can only reach a
deal with them when we have something
significant to give up. Protected by the
confidentiality of the conference room,
Soviet negotiators adhere to their posi-
tions with the stubbornness of an army
mule. At the table, they are anything but
flexible.
The reason for this approach is clear.
Where the Soviets see splits in American
public opinion on arms control, they see
the possibility of exploiting them to their
benefit. If the U.S. Congress can cause
the Administration to concede key
aspects of its negotiating position, then
why should they, the Soviets reason,
expend any of their own precious
negotiating capital to achieve their ends?
The Soviets do not deal in bargaining
chips. They do not make concessions in
the spirit of give-and-take or as a sign of
good will. Rather, they consider uni-
lateral concessions to be the mark of
contemptible weakness. They do, how-
ever, like to appeal to the notions of
good will and reciprocity through the
Western press, radio, and TV. They
know that through our media, they can
strike in us a responsive chord.
In the same vein, Soviet negotiators
readily accept whatever concessions we
offer them with no thoughts that they
are obliged to reciprocate. Our unilateral
concessions do not make the Soviets any
more tractable. If anything, they dig
their heels in deeper, insisting that we
take their views "into account" on other
issues. The Soviet negotiating strategy
is, to put it simply, one of obstinance.
"What's mine is mine, and what's yours
is negotiable" is more than a saying for
the Soviets; it describes their negoti-
ating style. Moreover, they truly
believe— again, as George Orwell
wrote— that to be equal they must be
"more equal."
Our method to counter this strategy
is arduous but necessary if arms control
is to serve its ultimate purpose of con-
tributing to our national security. We
must learn to be just as tough as they
are. We have to revive the spirit of the
Yankee horse trader. And above all, we
must be patient.
The Soviets simply do not negotiate
in a spirit of problemsolving. Those of us
who have negotiated with the Soviets do
not expect them to. We have come to
understand that, whereas we would like
to work out solutions, the Soviets would
rather compete. Americans, without the
benefit of direct negotiating experience
with the Soviets, tend to believe that the
sheer weight of logic will lead both us
and the Soviets toward mutually
beneficial agreements. This tendency is
understandable; it is part of our
heritage. But it only complicates the
formidable tasks confronting the
American negotiator. Soviet negotiators
study our democratic system; they get to
know its strengths and weaknesses and
how to exploit them. Because they
recognize the strength of commitment
we have to our ideals, they know too
well that our pluralistic society is
susceptible to influence— and sometimes
outright manipulation— for their tactical
gain.
Recent Congressional Actions
With this background in mind, I would
like now to turn to an issue that is
especially important today— namely,
recent congressional actions.
The Reagan Administration, like , i
other administrations before it, is ful
cognizant of the deep desires of the I
American people for an improvement
U.S. -Soviet relations. Our people wol
like to reduce expenditures for defer!
And, above all, they would like to setl
reduction in the threat of nuclear wal
From my vantage point— close up— II
assure you that President Reagan fu I
shares these desires of the American I
people. He has worked throughout h I
term of office to see them realized.
But President Reagan also recogl
nizes, more clearly than most, that ii I
Soviet Union, the United States is fa I
with a tough and determined advers; I
Accordingly, he decided at the outse I
his presidency that it was first neces I
to restore the military strength of th J
United States, degraded by years of I
unanswered Soviet buildup. We tend I
forget what a courageous decision th I
was in the early 1980s when we wen
faced with double-digit inflation and h
unemployment. In the past 5V2 years
President Reagan has done much to J
reestablish America's reputation as e|
decisive international power. He has |
demonstrated a willingness to opposs '
the encroachments of Soviet military
power and to meet intimidation with J
forceful resistence. This has not been '
easy course. But its reward has been J
greater security for the United State
and its allies.
The President's course on arms c (
trol has been equally courageous. Un>|
ing to sign onto a scheme that license
major buildup of strategic weapons in
the guise of real arms control, Presidi
Reagan declared that SALT could no !
longer serve as a basis for U.S. strate
arms policy. He did this despite the
realization that this decision would op '
him to the criticism that he was
"against" arms control. Yet the Presi
dent has never shied away from negot '
tions that could contribute to lessening
the threat of nuclear weapons. What r
is "for" is an agreement that increase
strategic stability. He is "for" an agre'
ment that provides for real reductions
not cosmetic limitations, in the levels r
offensive nuclear arms. President
Reagan's approach to arms control is ■;
sound and forwardlooking. He does no
favor reaching "any agreement." We
could enter into this kind of agreemen
tomorrow. What we want is a "good
agreement"— one that is equitable,
verifiable, and serves the interests of
both sides.
We are now at the point where thii
approach can bear fruit. It may produc
the first real agreed decrease in the le*
of offensive nuclear arms in history.
30
Department of State Bulls
ARMS CONTROL
. As President Reagan well knows,
jis control for arms control's sake is
jgood policy. If this were the case,
j substance of the agreement would
I be as important as the fact of the
ming. But we all know this isn't the
e. First of all, signing an arms control
aeement will not, of itself, reconcile
j fundamental political differences
saining between the United States
l the Soviet Union. More importantly,
[is control deals with real weapons
r real questions of military strategy.
] se things have to do with whether or
the world is a more or less danger-
1 place. Ignoring these basic con-
rations can lead to agreements that
little more than political placebos,
isident Reagan realizes that agree-
ipts made in the absence of improve-
pts in the U.S. -Soviet relationship will
ibe long lived. Arms control agree-
tpts alone, however valuable on their
n merits, do not constitute improved
J. -Soviet relations.
■Arms control is essentially and
iorably tied to developments in
itary strategy and in weapons
Mtnology, and not only to the sheer
Biber of weapons in stockpiles. A
By example of this link comes from
11SALT I accords. The head of our
LT I delegation. Ambassador Gerard
Ith, stated that the failure to conclude
cmprehensive, indefinite agreement
Sting strategic offensive arms could
considered grounds for withdrawal
|i the Interim Agreement's counter-
i for strategic defenses, the Anti-
aistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Unlike
■Soviet Union, the United States is in
jplete compliance with the legal
cations it assumes under the ABM
rkty. My example merely serves to
prate an important point. The lack of
cmprehensive agreement on offensive
aes could call into question the
is— in politics as well as in military
ffltegy— of the ABM Treaty's virtual
feof strategic defensive systems. It is
if to see that the goal of deep and
sjilizing reductions in offensive
lb— a goal President Reagan has
pprsed for 5V2 years now— is today of
r<\ greater importance.
Much in strategy, military tech-
Ugy, and arms control has changed in
fcast 10 years. The Soviets have con-
Bed to mount a massive and unwar-
Ued military buildup in the face of
Itiderable unilateral U.S. restraint in
gwn defense programs during the
le period. They have, thus, broken
Iforomise of reciprocal self-restraint
1? many in the United States thought
SALT implied. As if to add insult to
injury, the Soviets systematically
violated SALT as well. These things
were clear in the President's mind when
he entered office, and they were clear in
his mind when he laid down his challenge
to the scientific community to develop
reliable defenses against Soviet ballistic
missiles. But unhappily, considering
their recent votes on arms control and
the defense bill, these things have
apparently not been uppermost in the
collective mind of the Congress.
As an example, let us take a look at
chemical weapons. The United States
last produced chemical weapons in 1969.
Every chemical weapon in the U.S.
inventory is, therefore, at least 17 years
old. The Soviets never halted production
as we did, and they now have a modern,
effective stock of lethal chemical
weapons as an integral part of their
military forces. In this, we see another
clear link between arms control and the
dynamics of military deterrence. The
legal ban on chemical warfare of the
Geneva Protocol does not have the
strength on its own to prevent the use of
chemical weapons. The ability of the
United States to deter the use of
chemical weapons against ourselves and
our allies depends heavily on the United
States maintaining an effective chemical
deterrent. However, the Congress very
nearly prevented this necessary modern-
ization in their mid-August funding
votes.
The House also recently voted to
impose a 1-year moratorium on all but
the smallest underground nuclear tests.
The Administration continues to support
the long-term goal of a comprehensive
test ban. But it is neither in the interest
of the United States and our allies nor in
the interest of sound arms control to
partake in the exercise the House has
prescribed. Moreover, for as long as we
need to rely upon nuclear deterrence,
continued testing is essential to ensure
the reliability and safety of our nuclear
deterrent. Indeed, it is no small irony
that those who oppose strategic defenses
and who take refuge in the strategy of
deterrence by the threat of nuclear
retaliation have now chosen to support a
proposal that would undermine the
reliability of the nuclear stockpile
necessary to that strategy's continuing
credibility. If the Soviets are serious
about the types of verification they
bandy about on television, they should
work toward effective verification of
existing treaties on nuclear testing.
In yet another unfortunate vote, the
House moved to force the Administra-
tion to adhere to the flawed SALT II
agreement by passing a resolution
barring funding for any weapon that
would exceed its limits. SALT II, had it
ever been ratified by the Senate, would
have expired by now. One wonders what
is the point of reincarnating SALT in the
way the House proposes. In effect, some
in the House have said to the Soviet
Union that SALT II was good enough.
We can only anticipate that the Soviets
will use this action to pull the rug out
from under our START negotiators in
Geneva.
Many Congressmen no doubt
sincerely intend their actions as signs to
the Soviets that the United States is
"serious" about arms control. However,
it is my judgment that their actions will
not have the intended effects. There is
no incentive for the Soviets to sign an
agreement reducing strategic offensive
arms when the Congress has as much as
told them directly that an agreement
allowing arms to be significantly
increased is satisfactory to the American
people.
But by far the most distressing con-
gressional actions have come in cutting
the funding the President has requested
for the Strategic Defense Initiative—
what the media commonly refer to as
Star Wars and we refer to as SDL The
Soviets spend over $1 billion a year on
military laser research alone, which is
only one of many strategic defensive
technologies they are investigating. If
the Soviets spend this much on this one
aspect of strategic defense, one can only
conclude that the amount the Soviets
spend on their entire strategic defense
program is far greater. The Soviet
strategic defense program represents a
much larger commitment of plant space,
capital, and manpower than does the
American effort. Thus, the Soviets can
hardly have an objection to strategic
defenses in principle.
The Soviets are, of course, con-
cerned about the Strategic Defense Initi-
ative. Their chief concern is that we will
be more successful in our research than
they have been in theirs. This concern
has driven them to their wits' end in a
campaign to undercut popular support in
the West for SDL They raise the specter
of the "militarization of space," in full
knowledge that space was militarized the
day they flew the first intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) through it in
1957. And they act as if their own long-
running strategic defense program
didn't exist.
But SDI funding provides far more
than spinoffs. It is vital in its own right
if we are to determine whether it is
csmber 1986
31
ARMS CONTROL
possible to realize President Reagan's
goal of a deterrent to war that is safer
and more stable than simply relying on
the threat of retaliation with offensive
weapons. Indeed, the most important
goal of SDI is to answer the question: is
it technically possible to create a deter-
rent that is strictly defensive? As such,
SDI is one major element in a compre-
hensive U.S. defense policy that sends to
the Soviet leadership an important
message. The message is that the
existing strategic situation is not suffi-
ciently stable— it is not safe enough. It
sends the Soviets the message that the
President is determined to see what can
be done to remedy the current short-
comings of deterrence. We want to
develop a defense that defends us.
SDI research is more than just a
hedge against the Soviets' own con-
siderable research and development
efforts in strategic defense technology.
As the President has made clear, it is
not a bargaining chip to be traded away
in a so-called grand compromise. The
possibilities that SDI holds out to us are
far too important to cheapen by these
descriptions. Common sense and basic
morality dictate that we do all we
reasonably can to solve the ethical
paradox which now faces us: namely,
that in order to defend ourselves, we
must rely on the offensive use of nuclear
weapons. I firmly believe that SDI will
provide us with the necessary tools to
enhance deterrence and reduce the risk
of nuclear war.
SDI can contribute to more than just
a stable and safer peace; it will yield
numerous benefits improving the quality
of everyday life. Research conducted
under the mantle of SDI has already pro-
duced the galium arsenide computer
chip, which may prove to be a much
cheaper and far superior alternative to
silicon chips. The optical switches SDI
scientists are developing may supplant
computer chips in many applications.
And SDI laser research promises to pro-
vide doctors with new tools for com-
bating cancer. A complete list of spinoffs
would be much longer. But according to
one estimate in a recent article in The
New York Times, the several billion
dollars per year spent on SDI will have a
payoff of $5-$20 trillion for the civilian
economy.
Public opinion polls show that the
goal of developing strategic defensive
technologies has the support of the
American public. And I believe the
public supports the President's firm,
open, and responsive approach in dealing
with the Soviets. Ronald Reagan sees
the relationships and priorities among
the interests of national security,
defense policy, and arms control with a
presidential perspective. He recognizes
that the supreme interest is national
security. Arms control can serve that
interest, as can defense policy. But any
arms control agreement we reach must
meet the acid test of whether or not it
enhances our national security.
In my discussions with Members of
Congress, my message has been simple.
The Soviets that we see eye-to-eye
across the negotiating table know what
their leaders are doing and know what
they want. Looking at what we do, the
Soviets see mixed signals. They see our
internal debate not as a sign of a healthy
democracy but as a symptom of
weakness and disarray. For the Soviets,
budgetary constraint is not so much a
reason as an excuse not to pay for SDI.
The Soviets are not cutting the funding
for their own strategic defense program,
which is paid for from an economic base
far smaller than ours in an economy that
is weak by comparison. In short, our
Soviet counterparts believe they need
not negotiate with us if their objectives
can be achieved by simply waiting us
out, by playing on our own irresolute-
ness. One Soviet put it to me quite
bluntly. He said the United States is try-
ing to make a virtue out of impotence.
This is hardly the image of ourselves
that we want to promote in the minds of
Soviet negotiators.
Conclusion
My long years spent negotiating with the
Soviets tell me that if we are to get what
we want out of arms control— if it is to
contribute to the stability of deterrenc
and enhance our security— then our
negotiators have to have the firm sup
port of the American people. Withoul
this support, our negotiators have li
to help them in their struggle to mo
the immovable object, their Soviet
counterpart.
I hope my words today lend som
understanding and context to the spi
challenges we confront as a democracy
facing a system that is, to its very con
different from ours. The greatest con-
tribution Americans can make to help
our negotiators in Geneva is to show
firmness of purpose and determined
patience. This is especially important
now in these crucial weeks which lie
ahead of us. Our arms control position
are sound. They are flexible enough to
accommodate legitimate Soviet inter-
ests. The United States is now in a
strong position to work out with the
Soviet Union the first decrease in the
levels of offensive nuclear arms ever. 1
good deal, one that is equitable and
verifiable, is within our reach only if tl
Soviets are, in fact, as serious as they
say they are— as serious as we are—
about reaching an agreement. Mean-
while, our resolution here at home will h
serve to reinforce the words of our
negotiators. Firmness and patience wil "
also reinforce the words of our Presi-
dent as he prepares to meet General
Secretary Gorbachev face-to-face for tl
second time. ■
Verifying Nuclear Testing Limitations:
Possible U.S. -Soviet Cooperation
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
AUG. 14, 1986'
In response to the requirements of Section
1003 of the FY 1986 Department of Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 99-145), I am pleased
to transmit this unclassified interagency
study of possible avenues of cooperation
between the United States and the Soviet
Union in the development of verification
capabilities consistent with national security
restrictions.
The requirement under Section 1003
involves: "limited exchanges of data and
scientific personnel," in general, and "joint
technological effort in the area of seismic
monitoring," in particular. Upon review of a
number of possible scientific disciplines, it
was concluded that in terms of this study,
nuclear testing issues appear to offer the
most promising avenues for such "scientific'
cooperation and data exchange. Therefore,
the attached study focuses its examination 0i
matters relating to the verification of limita-
tions in nuclear testing.
While the attached study focuses on
nuclear testing limitations, it should be notei
that in other arms control areas as well, the
Administration believes that exchanges of
information would, in addition to various
monitoring provisions including types of
on-site inspections, play an important role in
establishing a verification framework.
32
Department of State Bulleti ,
ARMS CONTROL
In START [strategic arms reduction
f] and INF [intermediate-range nuclear
»], for example, areas of possible
iange of information might include the
kration of missile and launcher facilities,
Clumbers of missiles and launchers at such
ities, and information on the destruction
issiles and launchers that are in excess of
sed treaty limits. In the negotiations on
|ial and Balanced Force Reductions
EFR), we have asked for an exchange of
fc-mation, to be updated annually, on the
cture of forces subject to MBFR limita-
p. At the Stockholm Conference on
jfidence- and Security-Building Measures
d Disarmament] in Europe (CDE), we
Ive it important to have an exchange of
frmation both on overall force structures
Kin specific forces participating in military
(Hties. In chemical weapons arms control,
lelieve it important, among other things,
tve a preliminary bilateral exchange of
i on chemical weapons stockpiles and on
Auction facilities as a confidence-building
ssure prior to the entry into force of a con-
ijion banning such weapons.
The prospects for progress in arms con-
c'may be significantly enhanced if a regime
^operation between the United States and
Boviet Union in the development of
Bication capabilities consistent with
H>nal security restrictions can be estab-
Jd. The attached interagency study
uribes some possible avenues of coopera-
»that could produce benefits in the near
'%. in the nuclear testing limitations area.
: As indicated in the attached study, the
red States has long sought a meeting with
Soviets to present our concerns about the
Bication provisions of the Threshold Test
^Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear
aosions Treaty (PNET). The United
Bes and the Soviet Union recently agreed
Ive experts meet to discuss issues related
uiclear testing.
This meeting of experts, which took place
sneva July 25-August 1, allowed the
(led States to present its ideas and con-
is to the Soviet Union and to hear Soviet
Is. At the meeting, the United States
tented its views of verification improve-
Bts in existing agreements, which we
five are needed and achievable at this
I. A follow-on meeting of U.S. and Soviet
frts is scheduled for September. We hope
■soviet Union will join in a constructive
Rgue.
Ronald Reagan
^ERAGENCY STUDY
csible Avenues for Cooperation
h the Soviet Union em the
Welopment of Capabilities for
Iifying Compliance With Nuclear
Ating Limitations
ntroduction
jfcion 1003 of the FY 1986 Depart-
iit of Defense Authorization Act
31160) calls for an interagency study
of "limited exchanges of data and scien-
tific personnel" in general and "joint
technological effort in the area of
seismic monitoring" in particular. After
reviewing a number of possible scientific
disciplines, it was concluded that nuclear
testing issues appear to offer the most
promising avenues for scientific coopera-
tion and data exchange. This study,
therefore, focuses on matters relating to
the verification of limitations in the area
of nuclear testing.
II. Background
Effective means of verification are of
critical importance to arms control. Our
national security requires that we be
able to assess with confidence com-
pliance with any negotiated arms control
agreements. Today, most of our major
arms control agreements are monitored
through what is known as national
technical means of verification (NTM).
While NTM has the primary benefit of
being under the control of the verifying
party, there are some particular
applications— such as for strategic and
intermediate-range nuclear forces, con-
ventional and chemical forces, and
nuclear testing— in which cooperative
means of verification may be beneficial
or even necessary.
Cooperative means can include
various onsite inspection and data
exchange measures or direct measure-
ment schemes such as would apply to
determining the yields of underground
nuclear tests. Onsite inspection by
observers and instruments may be able
to play a role in deterring violations at
agreed locations or "declared sites." The
utility of onsite inspection is largely a
function of its frequency and duration
and whether, and at what costs, the
activities monitored can be conducted at
other times and places. Other considera-
tions with regard to onsite inspection
include the question of how the party
being monitored calculates the risk of
violations being uncovered and whether
they could avoid any single inspection
that would detect a violation. Thus, the
past record of the inspected party is a
vital consideration.
Data exchanges may be beneficial to
provide a benchmark for assessing com-
pliance. If, however, the verifying party
does not possess a means of independ-
ently validating the data it receives,
large uncertainties could still prevail,
diminishing the utility of the exchange.
Nevertheless, as the amount of data
exchanged is increased, the uncertainty
should decrease while the difficulty of
concealing illegal activities increases.
Direct measurements have the
benefit of allowing the verifying party to
control the means of monitoring. Direct
measurement is not perfect because it is
limited by the accuracy of the instru-
ments used and, as is the case for all
monitoring methods, the ability of the
inspected party to manipulate the
evidence. Furthermore, direct measure-
ment will not detect violations conducted
at times and places when direct
measurement equipment is not engaged
and normally will not detect violations
when special efforts are undertaken to
conceal prohibited activities. However,
even considering these limitations, direct
measurement is much more definitive
than any remote sensing method for
determining the yields of Soviet nuclear
tests.
The Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limita-
tion of Underground Nuclear Weapon
Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty-
TTBT) prohibits U.S. and Soviet
underground nuclear weapon tests with
yields greater than 150 kilotons (kt). The
TTBT is a treaty signed by both parties
but ratified by neither. Both the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. have separately stated
that they would abide by the yield limita-
tion. Furthermore, since neither party
has made its intentions clear not to
become a party, both signatories are
obligated by international law to refrain
from acts that would defeat the object
and purpose of the treaty. At present,
however, the United States cannot effec-
tively verify Soviet compliance with the
treaty. Moreover, the implementation of
the verification measures set forth in the
Protocol to the treaty (exchange of yield,
date, time, depth, and coordinates for
two nuclear weapon tests for calibration
purposes from each geophysically
distinct testing area and information on
the geology of the testing areas), which
would become effective upon ratification,
will not provide this capability, since
there is no way for the United States to
independently verify the data
exchanged, nor would the data, if
validated, be sufficient to ensure effec-
tive verification.
Today, we monitor Soviet tests with
seismic equipment located outside the
U.S.S.R. In three presidential reports to
Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the
uncertainty in yield derived from seismic
measurements, when taken into account,
resulted in findings of only "likely viola-
tion," even though the seismic evidence
indicates that a number of Soviet tests
have central yield values above the 150
kt threshold. "Central yield" is defined
I ember 1986
33
ARMS CONTROL
as the yield corresponding to mean value
of seismic body wave magnitudes for a
particular nuclear test. While we judge
that, at present, there is approximately a
factor of two uncertainty in the yield
estimates derived by seismic methods,
there are reasons to suggest the uncer-
tainty could be actually smaller (or con-
ceivably larger). A factor of two uncer-
tainty means, for example, that a Soviet
test for which we derive a "central
yield" value of 150 kt may have, with a
95% probability, a yield as high as 300 kt
or as low as 75 kt.
As already mentioned, the verifica-
tion provisions contained in the Protocol
of the unratified TTBT would not reduce
this level of uncertainty to an acceptable
level. The U.S. Government has, there-
fore, continued its longstanding effort to
obtain a means of monitoring that would
substantially reduce our verification
uncertainty. The history of the search
for verifiable nuclear testing limitations
will provide a backdrop for an under-
standing of the complicated and some-
times frustrating search for possible
avenues of cooperation with the Soviet
Union in the development of verification
capabilities.
III. Historic Perspective On
Nuclear Testing Limitations
One of the earliest proposals for nuclear
testing limitations was presented in
terms of a comprehensive test ban as
part of a broader disarmament proposal
made by the Soviets in the UN Disarma-
ment Commission in May 1955. How-
ever, there was no movement in this
area for the next 3 years. Early in the
spring of 1958, President Eisenhower
suggested to Soviet Premier Khrushchev
that a group of technical experts meet to
determine what specific control meas-
ures would be required to ensure com-
pliance with a nuclear test ban. After
several exchanges, Khrushchev agreed,
and the Geneva Conference of Experts
To Study the Possibility of Detecting
Violations of a Possible Agreement on
the Suspension of Nuclear Tests was
formed. Technical discussions between
experts from the U.S.S.R., Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, the United
Kingdom, France, Canada, and the
United States began in July 1958.
On August 21, 1958, the Conference
of Experts adopted a final report for
consideration by governments. The
report recommended a worldwide
system of land control posts, shipborne
posts, and regular and special air-
sampling flights to monitor an agree-
ment banning nuclear weapon tests in
the atmosphere, underwater, and under-
ground. Their report was accepted as
the technical basis for political negotia-
tions by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., and the
Geneva Conference on the Discontin-
uance of Nuclear Weapon Tests began
on October 31, 1958. The technical basis
of the international control system was
provided mainly by the reports of the
1958 Conference of Experts and a 1959
technical working group of the Geneva
conference on the detection of high-
altitude tests. These reports recom-
mended a worldwide network of 160-170
land control posts, 10 shipborne posts,
regular and special aircraft flights, and
space satellites. The United States
believed, however, that there was a
serious risk that small underground
explosions might remain undetected or
be incorrectly identified as earthquakes.
The experts' report was technically
limited in two respects: (1) it did not
cover tests at more than 30-50
kilometers above the earth's surface,
and (2) it did not have the benefit of the
new seismic data obtained from the
Hardtack underground test series car-
ried out by the United States after the
report was submitted. The new seismic
data, submitted by the American delega-
tion in Geneva in June 1959, showed
that the proposed control system would
have been less effective for detecting
and identifying underground tests than
the experts had believed.
At the request of the State Depart-
ment, the President's Special Assistant
for Science and Technology appointed a
Panel on Seismic Improvement, headed
by Dr. Lloyd Berkner, to study the new
seismic data. The Berkner panel's report
recommended a number of new tech-
niques and proposed a research program
to improve the capability of the verifica-
tion system, described in the Geneva
Conference of Experts' report, to detect
and identify underground tests. The
panel recommendations were the basis
for much of the succeeding research in
seismology and resulted in the develop-
ment of new concepts in seismic sta-
tions, instrument arrays, computational
techniques, and research into the phe-
nomenology associated with seismic
waves from explosions and earthquakes.
In the political negotiations, the
United States tried unsuccessfully to
persuade the Soviet Union to enter new
technical discussion on the detection of
high-altitude tests and the new seismic
data. The Soviets took the position that
technical questions had been settled at
the 1958 Conference of Experts and any
needed improvements in the control
system could be made by the Control
Commission after the treaty came int<
operation.
The participants at the Geneva Cc
ference on the Discontinuance of
Nuclear Weapon Tests agreed with th
principle that onsite inspection would
necessary to clarify the source of unid
tified seismic events. The United Stat
believed that there could be up to 100
unidentified events per year of which
approximately 20 would require inspei
tion of the site. There was disagreeme
between the United States and the
Soviets on the number of onsite inspec
tions that would be permitted. The
Soviets wanted to limit each party to
two to three onsite inspections per ye;
when it was considered necessary. (Nc
the Soviets, in effect, reserved for
themselves a veto over onsite inspects
requests.) Although the issues of
numbers and mandatory versus volun-
tary onsite inspection were never
resolved, the fact that the Soviets
agreed in principle to the need for ons: I
inspection was widely hailed and was
seen as setting a precedent for future I
arms control agreements. It was hopet I
that interim measures could be achieve •
that, with time, could lead to a more
comprehensive agreement between the '
sides. The Soviets took the position th£ i
verification was less essential than
reaching an agreement. The United
States and the United Kingdom held
that strict means of verification were
required, that further study should be
undertaken to assure that any agree-
ment could be verified, and that this
should be done before an agreement ws
signed.
On April 18, 1961, the United State;
and the United Kingdom submitted a
complete draft treaty to the Geneva cor I
ference.2 This proposal was based on on;
made by President Eisenhower in
February 1960. The Anglo-American
draft treaty included a commitment to I
cease tests in the atmosphere, under-
water, at high altitudes, and under-
ground (above seismic magnitude 4.75), '
and a control regime for detection and
identification. Although the general
characteristics of the international con
trol system proposed in the Anglo-
American draft treaty had long been
accepted by both sides, the Soviet Union I
shifted its position on several vital
verification features. For example,
although the Soviets had agreed to 15
seismic stations within the U.S.S.R.,
they insisted that they would operate
these sites. Again, even though the need
for onsite inspection was recognized by '
34
Department of State Bulletin
ARMS CONTROL
b Soviets, the number of inspections
oposed by the Soviets and the condi-
ns under which they could be con-
cted were not satisfactory to the
lited States and the United Kingdom.
Throughout the test ban negotiations
^Geneva from October 1958 to August
q, 1961, the United States and the
foited Kingdom faithfully observed a
Jluntary suspension of nuclear weapons
tgts, even though there existed no
ians of knowing with certainty, in the
asence of an effective and workable
ij;ernational control system, that the
sviet Union was not increasing its
nclear capability by clandestine tests.
E August 1961, the Soviet Union
snounced that it was resuming nuclear
capons tests and did so on September
EL961. The United States immediately
mdemned the Soviet action and reaf-
Iffned its support for an agreement to
id nuclear weapons tests under effec-
ts safeguards. On September 3, Presi-
cnt Kennedy and Prime Minister
fecmillan proposed that the Soviets
Sree "not to conduct nuclear tests
Mich take place in the atmosphere and
pduce radioactive fallout." They stated
tit they were willing to rely upon
eisting means of detection, "which they
bieve to be adequate," and they did not
sjgest any additional controls. The
Sviets at first rejected this offer.
Negotiations continued in various
f -a until finally, in 1963, Soviet interest
i;a ban that did not deal with
liderground tests emerged, even
bugh they had rejected the U.S. /U.K.
o'er previously. As a result, the United
Sates, United Kingdom, and the
[S.S.R. agreed to the more limited goal
obanning nuclear tests in all media
ecept underground. This led to the 1963
leaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
iithe Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
[ider Water, usually referred to as the
L-nited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).
While discussions continued in the 18
ction Committee on Disarmament,
bre was little further movement
tward limiting underground nuclear
t;ts until the 1974 summit meeting
btween the United States and the
IS.S.R. While the Soviets had orig-
j^lly called for negotiations on a com-
{.ehensive test ban, they agreed to con-
Eiler a threshold treaty for underground
vclear testing. The threshold was to
hve been in terms of yield or possibly
5'smic wave magnitude. The United
Vates initially proposed limiting tests to
Certain value in body wave magnitude,
It because body wave magnitude for a
Jrticular value of yield varies with test
se location, the focus of the discussions
was changed to yields. While this
resolved the problem of the variability of
body wave magnitude measurements, it
introduced the problems associated with
the accuracy of seismic techniques for
the determination of yield. The TTBT
was signed by the United States and the
U.S.S.R. in July 1974.
The TTBT and its associated Pro-
tocol contain provisions for the exchange
of geophysical data and announcing the
yields of two explosions for calibration
purposes in each geophysically distinct
area (provisions which have not been
implemented because the treaty has not
been ratified). However, the treaty pro-
vides no mechanism by which one party
could independently validate the
accuracy of the data provided by the
other party. Seismic techniques are
inadequate to verify effectively the
yields of Soviet tests. Prior to the sign-
ing of the TTBT, U.S. policy, as well as
seismic research, had concentrated on a
comprehensive test ban. Seismic
research had been aimed at the problems
of detecting and identifying low-yield
nuclear tests with relatively less empha-
sis on determining yield.
While progress has been made in
understanding the natural processes that
affect yield estimation based on remote
seismic measurement, the uncertainties
in the yield estimation process cannot be
sufficiently reduced without direct
measurement of yields at the Soviet test
sites. The Soviets, and some critics of
existing U.S. policy in this country, have
asserted that adequate verification will
result from the exchange of data called
for in the treaty. However, these data
will be of limited value for verification
purposes unless they can be independ-
ently verified by the United States.
Even if the data were accurate and could
be verified, they would not be sufficient
to effectively verify Soviet compliance
with the 150 kt threshold of the TTBT,
because the limited data to be exchanged
would not reduce the uncertainty in the
seismic yield estimation process to
acceptable levels.
The question of peaceful nuclear
explosions (PNEs) was also addressed
during 1971-74 and continued until the
Treaty on the Limitation of Under-
ground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful
Purposes, usually referred to as the
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET), was signed in 1976. Since each
individual nuclear explosion could not be
greater than 150 kt, additional monitor-
ing measures had to be negotiated for
explosions conducted at locations other
than at the designated weapons test
,
ivember 1986
sites and for salvos of explosions whose
aggregate yield exceeded 150 kt. Provi-
sions were included for onsite
measurements of each explosion by
downhole instrumentation, similar in
result to the current CORRTEX [Con-
tinuous Reflectrometry for Radius ver-
sus Time Experiment] equipment, if the
aggregate yield was planned to exceed
150 kt. Seismic instruments were also to
be allowed in the test area if the
aggregate yield was planned to exceed
500 kt. It is worth noting that even if
the PNE Treaty were in force, the onsite
measures would not have been imple-
mented up to now because the Soviets
apparently have not planned group
explosions over any particular treaty-
specified threshold which would trigger
onsite inspection or installation of U.S.
devices on Soviet territory.
Technical discussions on nuclear
testing issues, principally related to a
comprehensive test ban (CTB), have
been held with the Soviets in the
multilateral arena in Geneva. The United
States presented papers at the Con-
ference of the Committee on Disarma-
ment (CCD) at least as far back as 1971
and again in 1973 and 1976. These
papers discussed capabilities for
discriminating between explosions and
earthquakes, data from arrays of
seismometers and networks of such sta-
tions, and various other seismology
topics. There was, however, not much
expert discussion of these U.S. contribu-
tions until the Ad-Hoc Group of Scien-
tific Experts was formed in 1976.
One of the tasks of the Ad-Hoc
Group of Scientific Experts was to
describe a network of seismic stations
that would provide data to the members
for use in monitoring a CTB. Initially the
Swedes, among others, attempted to
establish a deliberative body within the
CCD to conduct verification analyses.
The United States did not want to rely
on such a multinational group for
verification decisions. As an alternative,
the CCD, on the recommendation of the
United States, formulated a plan for the
exchange of seismic data and for
conducting studies relating to those
data. The Ad-Hoc Group of Scientific
Experts selected an optimum network of
seismic stations from CCD member
states and evaluated its capability to pro-
vide data adequate for verification. An
elaborate set of data parameters was
agreed upon for reporting in a bulletin
format. The World Meteorological
Organization telegraph system was
adopted for the exchange of these data
bulletins. The exchange of complete
seismograms, using digital techniques
35
ARMS CONTROL
and satellite transmission, has been
explored. Studies and experiments on
these transmission techniques continue
at the present time. It is significant,
however, that throughout this period in
which testing limitations have been of
such concern, at no time have there been
any joint projects of bilateral exchanges
of data except for some limited discus-
sions during the actual trilateral CTB
negotiations.
In the summer of 1977, about 1 year
after the conclusion of the PNE phase of
the threshold treaty, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.
began negotiations toward a comprehen-
sive test ban. Initially, the United States
and the U.S.S.R. had different views
concerning the proposed duration of the
treaty— the United States wanted a
treaty of unlimited duration while the
U.S.S.R. wanted a 3-year treaty that
would continue depending on the actions
of others, specifically France and China.
By the summer of 1978, the United
States revised its position and proposed
a CTB of only 3 years duration.
Initially, the questions of seismic sta-
tions (numbers, kinds, and locations)
were fairly open on both sides. As the
negotiations on the number of seismic
stations proceeded, the Soviets hardened
their position on in-country seismic
stations— demanding that they had to be
nationally manned. The Soviets con-
stantly raised their concern about
unmanned stations or "black boxes."
The United States eventually proposed
10 seismic stations in the Soviet Union
in conjunction with a 3-year treaty. The
U.S.S.R. said they would accept 10 sta-
tions in the U.S.S.R. provided that there
would be 10 stations in the United
States and 10 stations in the United
Kingdom and its territories. This created
a serious impasse. The United States
and the United Kingdom felt that one
station in the limited territory of the
United Kingdom would be sufficient, but
the Soviets would not budge. They took
the position that equal participation
required equal responsibilities. They fur-
ther indicated that if 10-10-10 was not
satisfactory, any other set of equal
numbers would be acceptable. While the
Soviets had apparently agreed in con-
cept to both onsite inspection and
incountry seismic stations, these issues
were still unresolved when the negotia-
tions were suspended in November 1980.
The United States has not resumed
the trilateral CTB talks since they
recessed in November 1980 because
under present circumstances a CTB
would be against the security interests
of the United States and its allies and
would not be effectively verifiable. In the
existing environment, the security of the
United States and our allies depends on
a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent. In
such a situation, where we must rely
upon nuclear weapons to deter aggres-
sion, nuclear testing will be required. A
comprehensive test ban remains a long-
term objective of the U.S. arms control
policy, but such a ban must be viewed in
the context of a time when we do not
need to depend upon nuclear deterrence
to ensure international security and
stability, and when we have achieved
deep, broad, and verifiable arms reduc-
tions, improved verification capabilities,
expanded confidence-building measures,
and a greater balance in conventional
forces.
The verification of a comprehensive
test ban, and especially any testing
moratorium such as proposed by the
Soviet Union, remains a major problem.
In the context of the verification pro-
cedures discussed (but not agreed) in the
CTB trilateral negotiations, there would
still be significant uncertainty about our
ability to verify Soviet compliance, that
is, to detect and identify with sufficient
certainty a potentially significant level of
clandestine testing. Our concerns are
heightened by likely Soviet violations of
the TTBT and by Soviet violation of the
Limited Test Ban Treaty, the LTBT.
IV. Opportunity for
Cooperative Measures
There are two distinct problem areas
that can be addressed jointly by the
United States and the U.S.S.R. The first
deals with sufficiently accurate yield
measurements that would allow effective
verification of yield thresholds such as
the 150 kt limit of the TTBT. Solution of
this problem area would provide the
basis for moving forward on ratification
of the TTBT and the PNET. The second
deals with the ability to detect and iden-
tify low-yield nuclear tests. This requires
solution of the problem of detecting and
identifying low-yield tests not only
underground but also underwater, in the
atmosphere, and in outer space. Pro-
grammed capabilities will greatly
enhance our ability to detect and identify
low-yield nuclear tests within the
atmosphere, although there may remain
some uncertainty regarding the country
conducting such tests if they are con-
ducted over remote areas. With these
technological advances in hand and at a
time when we do not need to depend
upon nuclear deterrence to ensure inter-
national security and stability and when
we have achieved deep, broad, and
verifiable arms reductions, expanded
confidence-building measures, and a
greater balance in conventional forces
the conditions would exist for proceed
toward a treaty that would ban low-yi
nuclear tests.
a. Verification of Yield Threshol
As noted above, the provisions of the
TTBT provide no mechanism for redm
ing the level of uncertainty of yield
estimation to an acceptable level. (We
believe that no method of yield estima
tion based only on information derivec
solely from seismic measurements or
seismic theory can reduce the uncer-
tainty to an acceptable level.) Uncerta
ties in the yield estimation process car
not be sufficiently reduced without
directly measuring the yield of Soviet
tests with instruments which are fund
mentally much more accurate than
seismic methods.
The President has stated that he ii
prepared to move forward on ratificat
of the TTBT and PNET if the Soviets
would agree to the use of an effective
verification system incorporating the
CORRTEX method.
The most productive joint Soviet-
U.S. discussions of monitoring measur
would be those which would involve th
technology and implementation pro-
cedures for direct yield measurement.
The United States believes that it has
identified in CORRTEX a measuremer
technique which will reduce the uncer
tainty in yield measurement to an
acceptable level and will do so without I
danger of compromising other sensitiv' I
information about the nature or perfor I
mance of the nuclear device whose yiel
is to be measured.
CORRTEX is a hydrodynamic yield;
measurement technique that measures I
the rate of propagation of the under-
ground shock wave from an explosion. |<
This technique uses an electric coaxial I
cable located in the device emplacemeni
hole or in a nearby, parallel "satellite" !
hole. When the nuclear device is deto- I
nated, a shock wave propagates throug,
the ground, crushing and shortening th i
cable. The rate by which the cable lengt;
changes is recorded by measuring the |i
changing transit times of low energy ele|
trical pulses sent down to and reflected
from the cable end. This rate is a
measure of the propagation velocity of i
the explosive shock wave through the i
ground which is, in turn, a measure of I
the yield of the nuclear explosion.
The electronic device that provides |
the timing signals is a battery-powered, i
suitcase-sized unit that may be remotelj ;
36
Department of State Bullet)
ARMS CONTROL
htrolled. All equipment for power,
'cording, and data reduction can be
intained in a small trailer.
, CORRTEX has been shown to be
fcurate to within 15% (with 95% con-
lence) of more direct, radiochemical
jeld measurements for tests with yields
seater than 50 kt. This is based on its
le at the Nevada test site in over 100
Its with the sensing cable in the device
Siplacement hole and four tests with
fe sensing cable in a satellite hole. The
Scuracy of the technique is believed to
i relatively independent of the geologic
redium provided the satellite hole
iBasurements are made in the "strong
fcck" region near the nuclear explo-
In. At greater separation distances,
te medium becomes more important. A
jtellite hole separation distance of 14
(eters (46 feet) is appropriate for a test
jar 150 kt.
I CORRTEX is expected to be initially
teurate to within 30% (with 95% con-
llence) of the actual yield at Soviet test
i es for tests above 50 kt. An accuracy
a 30% of the actual yield means, for
sample, that a test that produces
DRRTEX measurements estimated to
Is associated with a "central value"
j'ld of 150 kt, could, with a 95% prob-
iility, have a yield as high as 195 kt
fli0 kt plus 30% of 150 kt) or as low as
15 kt (150 kt minus 30% of 150 kt).
The Soviets were exposed to tech-
Elogy similar to CORRTEX during the
NET discussions. At that time, they
iHicated that they possessed similar
bhnology. Therefore, a technical basis
bs already been established for the
rcessary discussions. The United States
iprepared, as evidenced by the Pres-
ent's March 1986 offer, to demonstrate
t Soviet technical experts how we
ttuld emplace CORRTEX instruments,
\w measurements are recorded, and
Iw the data are analyzed. In any
{operative technical effort, the Soviet
eperts would have the opportunity to
gamine the CORRTEX data from a
Iviet nuclear test in order to determine
tc themselves that no sensitive informa-
In, not relevant to TTBT verification,
is been compromised. For their part,
le Soviets would be permitted to bring
ly equipment they deemed necessary to
fcasure the yield of the test.
i Successful implementation of a
rect-yield measurement regime for
(frification of the TTBT and the PNET
toll establish the principle of onsite
tepection at declared facilities— in this
i'se the site of nuclear tests. Joint
(j)viet-U.S. discussions to establish
Irect yield measurements will necessar-
I' require negotiation of all the logistical
aspects of such onsite presence, includ-
ing the size and composition of the
technical teams who would make
measurements; agreement on the quan-
tity of equipment which can be brought
into the country; identification of
allowed instrumentation; inspection of
equipment by the party whose test is to
be measured; establishment of housing,
feeding, and transportation arrange-
ments for the team making measure-
ments; and procedures for sharing and
transferring data from the country in
which the test is to be performed.
Though not exhaustive, the above
issues that would require negotiation are
indicative of the long list of issues which
must be addressed in making the transi-
tion from an agreement in principle to
onsite inspection implementation. Any
one of these elements, if not properly
resolved, could frustrate the ultimate
objective of the inspection regime. While
not as glamorous as some aspects of
arms control, the negotiation of such
technical and logistical details is critical
and may be extremely time consuming.
Therefore, early joint Soviet-U.S. discus-
sion of these issues can have a major
impact on timely ratification of the
TTBT and PNET.
b. Detection and Identification of
Low-Yield Nuclear Tests. The second
problem area, detection and identifica-
tion of low-yield nuclear tests, is even
more difficult because the solution
requires effective monitoring in all
environments— underground, under-
water, in the atmosphere, and in outer
space. Consequently, verification of any
limitation of low-yield nuclear tests
would require, at a minimum, the utiliza-
tion of several techniques.
For example, detection and identifi-
cation of low-yield nuclear tests will
necessitate installation of an in-country
seismic network and the implementation
of onsite inspections. In addition,
regional seismology (operating distances
up to 2,000 kilometers from the source)
will be a critical technology for the
detection of underground tests.
Measurement techniques for the collec-
tion and detection of atmospheric
nuclear explosion debris will still require
some refinement when working at or
near levels of naturally occurring
background radiation. Further develop-
ment of hydroacoustic techniques could
contribute to detection of small nuclear
tests in remote ocean areas.
Recognizing the full scope of the
problem of detecting and identifying
low-yield nuclear tests in all environ-
ments, which must be solved, this paper
will address only one part of the
problem— monitoring low-yield
underground nuclear tests— because this
is the area where the United States
believes that cooperation with the
U.S.S.R. would be the most productive.
The requirements for in-country
monitoring stations have been discussed
with the Soviets in many fora since the
late 1950s (see the "Historical Perspec-
tive" section). There remain several
areas in which seismic monitoring can be
profitably addressed by Soviet and U.S.
technical experts. Further work may
strengthen the basis for seismic detec-
tion and identification of low-yield
nuclear tests in advance of the achieve-
ment of the other criteria which must be
met before the United States could con-
sider a comprehensive test ban to be in
its national interest.
It is assumed that whatever the level
of detection of seismic events, there will
be some events detected whose origin
(e.g., nuclear test, earthquake, chemical
explosion) will be uncertain— unidentified
(i.e., unresolved as to their origin)
events. While improvements in seismic
monitoring devices could be expected to
provide additional data that could iden-
tify some of the events that cannot be
identified at current sensitivity levels,
the net effect of improvements in sen-
sitivity will be to increase the number of
unidentified events.
Onsite inspection, as a concept, is
also used to describe inspections con-
ducted to remove ambiguity when infor-
mation from other sources indicates that
a potential violation of a treaty in force
may have already occurred. However,
onsite inspection will only be useful
when the precise location of the
ambiguous event can be determined.
Onsite inspection could contribute to
identification of the source of surface or
near-surface explosions, where surface
disturbances would clearly indicate the
location. For small underground explo-
sions, it would be nearly impossible to
locate the source with sufficient preci-
sion to permit the verifying party to drill
into the cavity created by the test to
sample the explosion debris.
The basic elements which could be
addressed in joint discussions include the
fundamental science of the transmission
of seismic waves within the Soviet
Union; the types of equipment which
would need to be permanently installed
for the measurement of seismic data; the
equipment which would need to be
installed for the recording and transmis-
sion of seismic data to national data
analysis centers; and the numerical data-
bvember 1986
37
ARMS CONTROL
processing techniques which would be
used for identifying the source of a
seismic event based on the character-
istics of the seismic data. These issues
are described in more detail below:
• Seismic Wave Transmission: The
United States is actively pursuing the
seismic research which would be critical
to the detection and identification of low-
yield (below 10 kt) nuclear tests. Of par-
ticular significance is research on high-
frequency seismic waves. Instruments
capable of detecting high-frequency
seismic waves have been developed and
an experimental seismic array contain-
ing such equipment is in operation. To be
confident that high-frequency seismic
waves can be useful for detection and
identification of low-yield nuclear tests,
two issues need further study: the
availability of sufficiently quiet, low
background seismic noise sites within
the Soviet Union at which seismic sta-
tions could be located and knowledge of
the transmission characteristics of high-
frequency seismic waves within the
Soviet Union.
The degree to which seismic wave
energy is absorbed and scattered as a
seismic wave travels away from a
nuclear explosion in the United States
has been studied extensively, and much
of this work has been published in the
scientific literature. Similar information
is not available for explosions within the
Soviet Union. A joint U.S. -Soviet effort
could seek to determine the degree to
which high-frequency seismic wave
energy is absorbed and scattered in the
Soviet Union. Such an effort would
establish a more realistic basis for the
utility of high-frequency seismic waves
for detection and identification of low-
yield nuclear tests. While data obtained
from outside the Soviet Union are
useful, Soviet-U.S. cooperation in obtain-
ing and evaluating data from within the
Soviet Union is essential.
• Seismic Equipment and Data
Handling: During the trilateral CTB
negotiations of 1977-80, the United
States described to the Soviet Union
tamper-proof, remotely operated seismic
stations which would record and trans-
mit seismic data for analysis in the
United States. The United States has
continued research on such stations.
Modification in these stations would be
required to provide the capability to
record and transmit data on high-
frequency seismic waves. Joint Soviet-
U.S. efforts could resume on the criteria
for the location and operation of such
stations to include characterization of
the sites which would have to be avail-
able to ensure accurate instrument
operation. Such an effort would have to
include data gathering from potential
sites for remote stations in the Soviet
Union and should include installation of
research instruments to validate that
such instruments can operate reliably, to
include data transmission, throughout
the broad range of environmental condi-
tions within the Soviet Union.
• Seismic Wave Analysis: The
effectiveness of any low-yield
underground nuclear test verification
regime based upon the analysis of
seismic waves will ultimately depend on
the ability to identify a nuclear explosion
by distinguishing between nuclear explo-
sions and other sources of seismic
energy, e.g., chemical explosions and
earthquakes. The object must be to
minimize the number of recorded seismic
events whose source is ambiguous. A
joint Soviet-U.S. effort could seek to
identify analytic techniques which would
positively identify the origin of recorded
seismic signals. Such a joint study can-
not be done in the abstract but should be
tested against real data which would be
typical of that which would be recorded
by instruments located at the prospec-
tive location of seismic stations. No
analytic technique can hope to eliminate
all ambiguous events, but it would be
very helpful if the two sides could agree
on which technique can be the most
effective.
V. Current Status
We have sought on a number of occa-
sions in the past several years to engage
the U.S.S.R. in discussions on verifica-
tion improvements in the nuclear testing
area but thus far without success. In
1983 the U.S. Government sought on
three separate occasions to engage the
Soviet Union in a discussion of essential
verification improvements for the TTBT
and the PNET. In September 1984 the
President proposed in his address to the
UN General Assembly that the United
States and the Soviet Union find a way
for Soviet experts to come to the U.S.
nuclear test site and for U.S. experts to
go to theirs to measure directly the
yields of nuclear weapons tests. In Ji
1985 the President expanded his offe
with an unconditional invitation for
Soviet experts to go to the U.S. nucli I
test site to measure the yield of a U.fj
nuclear test with any instrumentatioi
devices they deemed necessary. Ther
was no requirement for a reciprocal \
by U.S. experts to a Soviet test site.
December 1985 President Reagan pn
posed to General Secretary Gorbache
that U.S. and Soviet experts on nuck
testing limitations meet in February
1986 to discuss our respective verific;
tion approaches and to address initial
tangible steps to resolve this issue.
Most recently, on March 15, 1986
the President urged the Soviet Union
join the United States in discussion o
finding ways to reach agreement on
essential verification improvement of
TTBT and PNET. In this respect he ]
vided details to the Soviet Union on t
U.S. CORRTEX hydrodynamic measi
ment system and proposed that Gene
Secretary Gorbachev send Soviet scie
tists to our Nevada test site during tr
third week of April 1986 to fully
examine CORRTEX. At that time, th
Soviets could also monitor a U.S. nuc
test. Finally, the President indicated
that, if the Soviet Union will join us h
an agreement for effective verificatio
including the use of CORRTEX, the
United States would be prepared to
move forward on ratification of the
TTBT.
The Soviets have stated that they
have developed and have available a
system that is used to obtain data sim
to that obtained by CORRTEX. Aside
from this assertion, the Soviet Union 1
not responded to any of the above U.S
initiatives, which were aimed at con-
structively addressing our mutual
concerns.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 18, 1986.
2See Geneva Conference on the Disconti
uance of Nuclear Weapons Tests: History a.
Analysis of Negotiations (Department of
State publication 7258, 1961). ■
38
I.S. and East Asia-Pacific Relations:
he Challenges Ahead
Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.
Address at the Mansfield Center for
dfic Affairs in Helena, Montana, on
ly i, 1986. Mr. Sigur is Assistant
cretary for East Asian and Pacific
fairs.
occurs to me that this is an espe-
lly appropriate place to be on our
tion's birthday. For one thing,
nbassador [to Japan] Mansfield is an
tstanding— almost legendary— public
-vant and patriot of this great coun-
', and I'm very pleased to appear at
s Pacific Affairs Center which bears
i name. For another thing, Montana
presents as well as any state that
rit of pioneer drive and determination
lich made this nation great— indeed,
dch broadened this nation to the full
tent of its continental boundaries. Fur-
;rmore, I detect a significant parallel
tween the pioneering spirit of our
nerican West and that sense of
trepreneurship and dynamism which is
jidly transforming the East Asian and
cific region into a leading center of
)bal commerce. That, after all, is the
ja of the world with which we are con-
•ned here today. It is an alluring
fion of unlimited potential, striving to
;et the challenges of modernization,
ich the same as Montana and her
ter states of the West 100 years ago.
Our American pioneers viewed that
gratory movement westward as a
lanifest destiny" of the 19th century,
somewhat the same way today, there
jroad recognition of a steady shifting
the locus of economic and political
jnamism toward the Asian-Pacific
ena in this age. Indeed, Ambassador
fensfield has been something of a proph-
Ein this respect, being among the
Fst to refer to the 21st century as "the
$itury of the Pacific." We owe him,
id others of vision like him, a debt of
eatitude for helping us reorient our
tnking and planning toward the evolv-
it realities of our time,
j But while the nations of East Asia
c.d the Pacific enjoy vast potential for
iowth and accomplishment, they also
fee many serious challenges ahead.
.'ter all, prosperity and stability—
•mfort and tranquility— do not come
ply. The early Montana settlers
'.derstood that hard work, determina-
te, and cooperation eventually "pay
off." In the modern age, economic suc-
cess, security, and social stability still
have to be won and carefully cultivated;
they are not guaranteed to anyone. A
century ago, it was the will to succeed, a
sense of fair play and teamwork, the
spirit of free enterprise, and a respect
for individual rights and capabilities that
turned the rugged western frontier into
a productive regional community. These
same virtues are now enabling the
Asian-Pacific region to achieve its poten-
tial. We are, in fact, witnesses to a
modern-day success story in that region,
where the enterprising developing and
industrializing states are on the leading
edge of phenomenal achievements.
Most of the East Asian and Pacific
nations already have met the challenges
of postwar reconstruction and reconcilia-
tion. Many of them are now meeting the
tasks of modernization and industrializa-
tion. One of them, Japan, already has
achieved a global power status while
others— like the Republic of Korea,
Australia, and the ASEAN [Association
of South East Asian Nations] grouping-
are assuming regional leadership roles
and providing models of development for
their neighbors. Now they confront the
challenges of success: how to sustain it;
how to protect it; how to manage its
social and political consequences. They
are seeking to manage these challenges
effectively as they advance toward even
greater accomplishments in the years
ahead.
A few nations of the region have not
enjoyed the same developmental success.
Among them are North Korea and Viet-
nam. Their backward condition may be
due to a number of factors, but principal
among them are their hostile postures
toward their neighbors and their
discredited economic systems. With the
encouragement of the Soviet Union, they
have effectively shut themselves off
from the productivity and prosperous liv-
ing standards enjoyed by the other
regional states. So long as they stagnate
in this isolated and hostile condition,
they remain a threat to the progress of
the rest of the region.
Fortunately, the traditional bonds of
friendship between the Asian-Pacific
region and the United States are stronger
than ever today. A natural and regular
system of interaction and interdepend-
ence has evolved between us, bilaterally
and multilaterally. Increasingly, we
depend upon each other for our common
success and prosperity. Increasingly, we
seek to consult and to coordinate our
activities for maximum efficiency and
effectiveness. Many observations have
been made about the growing sense of
"community"— with a small "c"— which
permeates this relationship. No nation or
group of nations need fear this natural
phenomenon for it portends only peace
and cooperation among those who are
willing to contribute to regional progress
in a positive way. The concept features a
healthy balance of individual prerogative
and collective responsibility, for the sake
of the common good.
Lest we become too complacent
about the promise of our common effort,
however, it bears repeating that all of us
must be vigilant and untiring in
nourishing and defending the fruits of
our success. As I look ahead, I see four
fundamental challenges to this promising
region as a whole— and I certainly
include the United States as a partner
which, together with others, must
prepare to meet these challenges in a
common effort.
Sustaining Economic Growth and
Managing Commercial Problems
Perhaps the primary challenge, in the
face of the region's relatively prosperous
record, is to sustain economic growth
and manage the inevitable commercial
difficulties that occasionally occur. Most
East Asian developing countries have
relatively low per capita income and
rapidly growing populations. For this
reason their leaders view rapid economic
growth to be essential to both national
development and political stability.
Fortunately, East Asia discovered
early on what the rest of the developing
world is only belatedly coming to realize.
Economic growth can only flourish if
economic policies encourage it. This
means monetary stability, fiscal
restraint, and realistic exchange rates.
Even more important, governments
must also institute policies which
encourage flexible, market-oriented,
private enterpise economies open to free
international exchange of goods, serv-
ices, and capital.
This may seem obvious to us in the
United States, but much of the develop-
ing world, including parts of East Asia,
remains in the grip of statist, inward-
looking economic strategies. Strongly
entrenched groups sometimes manage to
maintain their vested interests through
protectionism and state regulation. We
in the United States are not immune
bvember 1986
39
EAST ASIA
from this affliction, but the costs are
much higher for those countries that
have so little to start with.
Failure to fend off these pressures
leads to clearly demonstrable conse-
quences. The empirical fact of life is
that, to the extent developing nations
have adopted outward-looking, market-
oriented policies, they have attained
robust economic growth. On the other
hand, economic stagnation is produced
by massive extensions of government
control over investment and other
government-inspired economic
distortions.
But do we really care if the countries
of East Asia and the Pacific institute
effective economic policies? The answer
is "yes" and not simply for altruistic
reasons. Recent history clearly shows
that prosperous, democratic, outward-
looking nations associate themselves
closely with the United States
economically and strategically. The
reasons are not hard to understand. The
Soviet Union and its allies import almost
nothing from the developing world. The
developing world, in turn, has little
interest in importing anything the Soviet
Union produces. There is little in Soviet
culture, political thought, or economic
theory that has any attraction what-
soever for these developing nations.
Hardly anyone sees communism as the
wave of the future anymore. The United
States, on the other hand, can offer vast
trade prospects, technology transfer,
foreign investment, educational oppor-
tunities, and cultural exchange.
It is only when economic growth
falters that the linkage between stability
and prosperity is tested. The Philippines
is a recent example of this. Through
government mismanagement and cor-
ruption, the Philippine economy under
Ferdinand Marcos was driven to the
brink of ruin. As economic hardship
increased, the communist insurgency
grew rapidly. Now that President
Aquino's new government holds out the
prospect of economic reform, the
insurgency finds itself losing support.
There was a time when insurgencies also
threatened Thailand, Malaysia, and
Indonesia. This is now a distant memory,
unlikely to reoccur, due in part to the
remarkable economic progress of these
three countries.
Given our stake in the economic
growth of our Asian-Pacific trading part-
ners, the Administration views with
dismay attempts in Congress to try to
legislate away the U.S. trade deficit,
producing in the process great damage
to ourselves and our trading partners.
The House of Representatives
recently passed an omnibus trade bill
that would be nothing short of disastrous
for U.S. interests. There is no question
that the United States does have an
enormous trade deficit— $148 billion in
1985. What Congress wants us to
believe, however, is that this is largely
the result of foreign trade barriers and
unfair trade practices and that we should
erect such barriers ourselves. This is just
not so. The U.S. trade deficit doubled
from 1983 to 1985, yet foreign trade bar-
riers are no higher now and, in fact, are
probably lower than in 1983. The fact is
that our trade deficit increases or
decreases as a result of a variety of fac-
tors, including shifting exchange rates,
differing economic growth rates, and dif-
fering savings and investment rates.
Japan is a good example in this
regard. In 1985 the United States had a
$50-billion trade deficit with Japan. The
House trade bill would, among a great
number of other damaging provisions,
impose a blanket surcharge on Japanese
imports. This would certainly reduce our
imports from Japan. It would also pro-
voke retaliation and inevitably reduce
our exports, leaving both countries
worse off. It is axiomatic in economics
that protectionism does not affect the
balance of trade, but rather the level of
trade.
The fact is that Japan is our largest
agricultural market in the world and our
second largest market for manufacturers
after Canada. Japan also supplied $75
billion in capital to this country in 1985
which helped to finance new investment
here and to hold down interest rates.
I mention these facts in order to
make the point that a very delicate and
complicated web of economic interrela-
tionships ties us to Japan and our other
trading partners in East Asia. If Con-
gress attempts to alter this web by
simply tearing out great hunks of it, we
will all be the poorer for it. Ultimately,
by weakening the economic bonds tying
us to the rest of the world, we will also
damage our vital security interests.
This Administration is not blind to
the difficulties our exporters face. We
will continue to seek the removal of
unfair trade barriers which affect a wide
variety of American goods and services.
As necessary, we will take unilateral
action under our own trade laws to
remove unfair trade practices. And,
most importantly, we will continue to
strengthen the world trading system and
promote the success of the new round of
multilateral trade negotiations expected
to start this September.
The challenge we face is one stemj
ming from the extraordinary success I
our trading partners in East Asia. Bo
the United States and East Asian couJ
tries reap enormous benefits from ouij
trading relationship. Our goal is to
strengthen and expand this relationsh
and to manage its problems, in order .
safeguard our mutual economic and
security interests.
Nurturing Regular
Coordination and Consultation
A second "challenge" which we,
together, confront is to nurture ever
more regular habits of coordination ai
consultation among ourselves. We've
made great headway on intraregional
dialogue over the past two decades, ai
the pace picked up considerably under
this Administration. I returned just th
week with the Secretary from our
regular annual conference with region
foreign ministers in Southeast Asia.
Every summer, following consultation
among the ASEAN foreign ministers,
they are joined by their counterparts
from the United States, Japan, Canad
Australia, New Zealand, and Western
Europe for discussions on a range of
matters of common concern. Of specia
concern in recent years, the Cambodia
conflict and multilateral economic
cooperation have been predominant
agenda items. Together, we forge a co
sensus on cooperative approaches to
mitigate threats and to advance multir
tional prosperity.
In similar fashion, the United Stat,
consults frequently with its traditional
allies in the region on a range of
economic, political, and security topics
that we all remain well-informed on
events and on our respective policies.
Following last November's summit con
ference in Geneva, for example, the
United States provided a full and
immediate readout on the Reagan and
Gorbachev talks to our regional allies.
They, in turn, have been most forthcon
ing with us on their activities and polic;
positions.
Such routine dialogue, as these
examples demonstrate, serves to
strengthen our common cause and to
coordinate our efforts for policy effec-
tiveness. Mutual comprehension, max-
imum trust, and minimal surprise are
the key elements of a strong and lasting
friendship among the nations of East
Asia and the Pacific.
Comprehension and trust between
nations depend upon much more than
periodic high-level official discussions, o
course. They depend upon a web of con-
40
Department of State Bullet
EAST ASIA
,cts and interaction within the private
ictor as well. Flourishing commercial
jntures of bilateral and multilateral
'aracter have supplemented growing
traregional trade as a means of forging
iportant bonds within the business
immunity. International visitor pro-
•ams and academic exchanges are
cpanding over time, spawning a
markable intellectual framework for
;e evolving community spirit. The
sser developed countries of the region
•e benefiting increasingly from voca-
Dnal and educational assistance pro-
•ams offered by the more advanced
luntries, and all nations gain greater
iderstanding of each other through
irious cultural and artistic exchanges.
In short, we are doing well in pro-
oting habits of dialogue among
irselves. More and more in the future,
e challenge may be to effectively coor-
nate our policies and economic planning
the interest of greater national effi-
2ncy, policy effectiveness, and the wise
:e of limited resources. Toward this
id, we may not always "see eye to
■e," but we can always take the time to
; down and discuss our respective con-
rns and intentions.
•otecting Accomplishments
irely one of the most important tasks
all is to protect and secure the
complishments which already have
en realized. Success always attracts
tention, and, unfortunately, it also
tracts the envy of others who would
aliciously exploit it for their own
vantage. The nations of East Asia and
e Pacific must be particularly vigilant
the years ahead and protective of
eir hard-won success lest it be
croached upon. Too often, peace and
losperity foster complacency.
This factor underlines the impor-
mce of intimate consultation and coor-
(nation between us. The pioneers of the
iTierican West knew well the value of
bilance and the strength that lies in
ijiity. The threats of the rugged frontier
irged a genuine sense of community, as
(prerequisite for survival.
In the Asian-Pacific region, peace
ad stability are threatened by Vietnam
^d North Korea. Both have systems
+iich reflect stagnation and failure, and
*rhaps through desperation they have
^osen the route of threat and aggres-
on against their more prosperous
4ighbors. Had they chosen instead the
^urse of economic cooperation and
klitical accommodation, they, too, could
I participating in the regional
raamism that is outpacing all other
parts of the world. Instead, with the aid
and assent of the Soviet Union, they
have embarked on a self-defeating path
which jeopardizes the progress of the
region as well.
The Soviets also seek to peddle their
brand of "security" and "cooperation"
in the region, but the nations aren't buy-
ing. They are not about to exchange a
proven system of stability and prosperity
for the deceptive charms of sweeping
diversionary "confidence-building
measures," which ignore the real
sources of danger to the region. In fact,
it is the nonproductive policies and
belligerent behavior of the Soviet Union
which have resulted in its conceptual
exclusion from the region, not some
"capitalist conspiracy" to block its
presence and participation.
Among the greatest threats to the
region's continued success, however, are
those weaknesses which can originate
from within the group, that is, overt
dissension, shortsighted unilateralism,
and protectionism. This is why regular
consultations are so important. Trade
tensions and protectionist policies can
destroy economic progress if they go
unchecked. "Nuclear allergies,"
however well-intentioned, can have an
insidious effect on strategic balance and
conflict deterrence. Alliance fissures, if
permitted to expand, can destroy the
structure of mutual commitments and
responsibility upon which peace is built.
And failure to maintain a unified
regional position on fundamental global
issues like international terrorism and
arms control can lead to disintegration
of mutual trust as well as our common
security. Together, the free market
nations have led the way in creating a
strong, secure, and prosperous region;
we must never allow weaknesses
originating from within to cause a
reversal.
Managing Domestic Pressures
Still another great challenge— one which
affects the newly industrializing coun-
tries of the region most directly— is to
manage adeptly the domestic pressures
that inevitably accompany success.
Historical experience has shown us that
modernization and prosperity generate
irrepressible rising expectations among a
nation's populace, as consumers and— in
developing democracies— as an increas-
ingly vocal electorate. For the sake of
social stability and continued progress,
an appropriate degree of leadership
responsiveness is necessary. The nature
of that response will be unique to the cir-
cumstances of each country— unique to
its historical, cultural, and political
realities. The skill with which govern-
ments manage this task will be reflected
ultimately in the extent of their stability.
Fortunately, the trend seems to be
toward more creative and responsive
government initiatives in many of the
region's modernizing states. Two of our
traditional allies, the Philippines and
Korea, currently are engaged in con-
stitutional reviews which may incor-
porate popular systemic reforms. Others
as well are demonstrating increasing
sensitivity to the viewpoints of various
domestic political groups. These are
healthy developments, and we commend
those responsible for proceeding in a
manner that takes into account the need
for both national order and democratic
progress.
The shared fruits of economic suc-
cess, equitably distributed, should be
able to meet the rising demands of con-
sumers in these developing states.
Responsive government should be able
to satisfy the expectations of an
enlightened electorate. And the combina-
tion of these is an irrefutable recipe for
even greater progress.
Conclusion
These four fundamental challenges to
the nations of East Asia and the Pacific
region are formidable but by no means
insurmountable. They do not daunt us.
Neither the United States nor its friends
and allies in the region shrink from the
task of diligently cultivating the
remarkable growth and stability we have
thus far enjoyed, so that future genera-
tions may live in comfort and peace. We
welcome these challenges and, together,
will face them head on. In this way, we
can test and prove the full dimension of
our capabilities, assess our weaknesses,
and strengthen our confidence.
We recognize, of course, that most
of the challenges are the consequent
price of success. Our adversaries in the
region— impoverished, backward,
isolated— contend with the much greater
burdens of failure. We already have
demonstrated the power of free market
and democratic principles in the develop-
ing world. Let us continue to
demonstrate, through creativity and
foresight, the durability of the system
adopted by our friends and ourselves as
well. ■
bvember 1986
41
EAST ASIA
U.S. -Japanese
Relations
Background
Since 1952 when the U.S. -Japanese
peace treaty went into effect, Japan has
become a valued U.S. ally and a major
power not only in Asia but in the world.
It joined the United Nations in 1956 and
became a member of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) in 1964. Its foreign policy
has been directed toward promoting
peace and prosperity by working closely
with the West.
Its economy has expanded at an
impressive rate. Along with North
America and Western Europe, Japan is
one of the three major industrial com-
plexes among the market economies.
Japan receives about 10% of our total
exports— a larger share than any country
except Canada— and we buy roughly one-
quarter of Japan's total exports. Our
combined GNP totals about one-third of
world GNP.
Global Partnership
With the United States
A close and cooperative relationship with
Japan is the cornerstone of U.S. policy
in Asia. Our bilateral ties have
worldwide ramifications, and our
partnership is global. The United States
and Japan are the two largest providers
of refugee relief. In 1984 Japan provided
$7.5 million in aid to Afghan refugees in
Pakistan. Our two countries have pro-
vided substantial relief for Khmer
refugees and have consulted with other
concerned nations— particularly the
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN)— on the continuing crisis in
Indochina. We both help promote
China's modernization program.
Japan's more active foreign policy
contributes significantly to efforts to
control and reduce nuclear weapons, and
Japan's views on our arms reduction
initiatives are highly valued. Together
we have made it clear to the U.S.S.R.
that an agreement on intermediate-
range nuclear forces that would shift the
threat from Europe to Asia is unaccept-
able. Our cooperation also extends to
many other areas: energy, technology
transfer to developing countries, con-
trolling strategic exports, and medical-
particularly cancer— research.
Relations With Other Nations
Japan's traditional interests have been
in Asia, and those continue to be of vital
importance to Tokyo. Ties between
Beijing and Tokyo have developed
rapidly since 1978, and Japan has been
aiding the Chinese in modernization proj-
ects. Today Japan is the leading donor of
economic aid to China. Japan maintains
economic, but not diplomatic, relations
with Taiwan. Korea is receiving signifi-
cant Japanese economic assistance as a
result of a historic exchange of visits in
1983 and 1984 between Prime Minister
Nakasone and President Chun. Japan
has long-term interests in the Persian
Gulf, which supplies most of its oil.
Tokyo provides large amounts of
economic aid to Egypt, Turkey, and
Pakistan. It has become increasingly
active in Africa and Latin America
through multilateral development proj-
ects. Relations with the U.S.S.R. have
never been close, in part because the
Soviets, since World War II, have
occupied four islands known as the
Northern Territories.
Free Trade
At the May 1985 Bonn economic sum-
mit, the United States, Japan, the
United Kingdom, Canada, France, West
Germany, and Italy committed them-
selves to an early and substantial reduc-
tion of barriers to trade and to continued
efforts to resist protectionism. Prime
Minister Nakasone unveiled a trade
action program in July 1985 to help
internationalize Japan's economy and to
make its markets free in principle, with
restrictions the exception. After the
President met the Prime Minister in
January 1985, intensive bilateral
negotiations were launched to remove
Japanese trade barriers in the telecom-
munications, electronics, forest products,
medical equipment, and pharmaceuticals
sectors where U.S. products are clearly
competitive. These talks have made
important progress in trade liberaliza-
tion. Such efforts help reduce stresses in
our relationship caused by the persistent
trade deficit.
Macroeconomic Policies
We have urged Japan to correct its sav-
ings/investment imbalance which over
time would help reduce its large global
current account surplus. Japan recog-
nizes that it must increase domestic-led
growth to stimulate imports and help
rectify the savings/investment
imbalance; it announced several steps in
October 1985 and is studying additional
measures. The strong dollar has helped
cause the trade imbalance with Japan.
The September 1985 statement of the
Finance Ministers of Japan, the United
Kingdom, France, West Germany, the
United States, and the Central Bankers
committed five major industrialized
countries to address exchange rate
issues. Since then the dollar has
weakened in relation to the yen, and
decline eventually may help increase
exports to Japan.
Assistance to Less Developed
Countries
In 1984 Japan became second only tc
United States as a leading donor of
overseas development assistance, pie
ing some $4.3 billion. Japan has pled
$40 billion in assistance from 1986 tc
1992. Both Japan and the United Ste
agreed at the Bonn summit to work :
new trade liberalization negotiations
the General Agreement on Tariffs ar
Trade (GATT), emphasizing expande
trade with less developed countries.
Both countries are studying how to c
dinate their foreign assistance progr;
and the United States supports Japa
efforts to open its market to develop
countries' products.
International Political and Econom
Coordination
The Secretary of State and the Japai i
Foreign Minister meet often to consi r
global issues. The United States and '
Japan have consulted on the invasion i
Afghanistan and Cambodia and the
imposition of martial law in Poland.
Economic coordination has often bee
accomplished through institutions su( I
as the International Energy Agency I
(IEA), the World Bank, and the Inter |
tional Monetary Fund (IMF).
Mutual Security
Although the Japanese Constitution a I
government policy preclude an assert I
military role in international relations I
Japan's cooperation with the United I
States through the 1960 bilateral Tre;|
of Mutual Cooperation and Security h I
been crucial in maintaining peace and I
stability in East Asia. U.S. bases and j
facilities in Japan enable the United
States to maintain its commitments tc I
Japan and other allies in the region.
Japan has significantly strengthened i|
self-defense capabilities. It will under- 1
take to defend its sealanes to a distamj
of 1,000 nautical miles, providing a
credible deterrent to Soviet adventuri:}
in Northeast Asia. Japan's expanded I
defense role will also allow us more fie]
ibility in responding to emergencies inl
the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceal
Taken from the GIST series of Jan. 1986,
published by the Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Editor: Harriet
Culley. ■
42
Department of State Bulle
CONOMICS
Ui Agenda for the New GATT Round
I Clayton Yeutter
Address before the U.S. Chamber of
mmerce on September 10, 1986.
nbassador Yeutter is U.S. Trade
Ypresentative.
:xt week, one of the most momentous
iernational economic conferences of
e past 40 years will take place in
inta del Este, Uruguay. Secretary of
immeree Baldrige and Secretary of
rriculture Lyng will join me in a
meting with ministers of 91 other coun-
es to launch a new round of
iltilateral trade talks under the
spices of the General Agreement on
riffs and Trade (GATT).
What we do there will have major
percussions for decades to come. I am
t exaggerating when I say that the
ture of the international trading
stem hinges on the outcome of this
nisterial meeting.
Nearly 40 years ago, representatives
23 nations met in Geneva to negotiate
lat eventually became known as the
VTT. Imagine what those negotiators
w as they scanned the four tumultuous
cades preceding their meeting. In
sir lifetimes, they had witnessed the
o most destructive wars in history; a
eat Depression that, propelled by a
igue of protectionism, had eroded the
ry fabric of their societies; the rise of
gressive totalitarian regimes,
mulated in large part by economic
rest; and a dramatic increase in
anomic and political isolationism that
d turned their world into chaos.
The lessons of that earlier period
ist have been crystal clear— that the
tions of the world, as interdependent
ambers of the international corn-
unity, need rules and codes of conduct
facilitate their economic relationships.
The creators of GATT applied these
osons as they developed a new trading
stem. The General Agreement on
'.riffs and Trade became a set of prin-
:>les and disciplines to promote global
ionomic growth through expanded
tide. The signatories promised to
cavow the protectionist practices of
fe 1930s when nations had tried in vain
- prosper at the expense of each other,
''jecting the beggar-thy-neighbor
proach, which had succeeded only in
ipoverishing everyone, the GATT
ambers adopted a system in which all
<.tions could grow and prosper
tejether.
It is important to note that the
GATT members called themselves con-
tracting parties and still do so. Each
GATT member is a party to a contract
with binding obligations. These obliga-
tions, which require each nation to
forswear protectionism, are the founda-
tion of the modern international trading
system.
As we survey the 40 years since the
GATT was founded we can view it as an
enormous achievement. Membership
grew from 23 to 92 nations. All nations
have benefited from the lower tariffs
and reduced trade barriers that GATT
generated, and international trade
expanded dramatically. As trade
increased, so did economic growth.
Expanded trade has provided rising
prosperity for developed and developing
nations alike. Some have become
prosperous beyond all their hopes.
As an institution, GATT has
arguably done more over the past 40
years to promote the cause of peace and
prosperity than any other international
body. Yet like all institutions, GATT
must change or risk becoming obsolete.
When GATT was founded, the major
trade problem was high tariffs. Seven
rounds of trade negotiations have
. . .GATT must address
the chaos in trade in
agriculture.
lowered tariff barriers substantially. But
new, non-tariff barriers have sprung up
to take the place of high tariffs, and
GATT must adapt to the new challenge
these measures present.
As currently constituted, GATT does
not address many of the realities of
modern trade. It has been 13 years since
we launched a new round of GATT talks
and much has changed in the interna-
tional economy since then. We live in a
world that is becoming more sophisti-
cated every day. Our international
institutions, such as the GATT, must
serve that world. They too must be
sophisticated, and they must be dynamic.
If they remain static in the face of
change, they will fade into oblivion.
Protectionist Trends
Unfortunately, we've all slipped
somewhat from the commitments of 40
years ago. Protectionist practices are
resurfacing throughout the world. Part
of this is in reaction to the economic
shocks of the last 15 years— the tremen-
dous fluctuations in energy prices, the
abandonment of fixed exchange rates,
the periods of soaring inflation, the ups
and downs of interest rates, and the
enormous debt burdens of some develop-
ing nations.
Yet, to be candid, much of this
creeping protectionism is simple oppor-
tunism. There are those who would
prefer not to compete internationally,
those who want only to export, and
those who think trade barriers will give
them the edge. In short, the beggar-thy-
neighbor approach is making a
comeback.
This is an alarming trend. It has a
corrosive effect on the system because
one protectionist action begets another.
It is naive to expect otherwise but
sometimes nations engage in wishful
thinking— and in self-destructive actions.
International trade as measured by
GATT rose only 3% in 1985, down con-
siderably from the 9% growth rate of
1984. If nothing is done to reverse this
trend, the trickle toward protectionism
could become a flood, and we could
return to the Depression days of the
1930s.
Already in the United States, there
is a reaction against GATT because some
think the privileges of a free and open
trading system apply only to our
competitors— that others are free to
trade in the United States but foreign
markets are closed to us. Many
Americans look at our $150,000 million
trade deficit and at the growing use of
subsidies, nontariff barriers, and other
GATT-illegal practices throughout the
world and wonder why we are still a
signatory to the GATT. They want us to
take matters into our own hands and roll
back imports through quota programs or
require specified reductions in bilateral
trade deficits through the use of
surcharges.
Further, those U.S. interests that
are still outward looking are losing faith
in the ability of existing rules and in-
stitutions to effectively address new
issues that are increasingly important in
international commerce— services,
bvember 1986
43
ECONOMICS
investment, intellectual property protec-
tion, and others that are on our priority
list for Punta del Este.
The difficulties facing today's
trading system do not affect America
alone. After all, farm subsidies and
agricultural import barriers are not
aimed only at the American farmer.
They also crush less fortunate nations,
many of which have economies based
almost entirely on agriculture. And the
lack of rules on services does not affect
American exporters only. It also
prevents many less developed countries
(LDCs) from achieving their full poten-
tial on trade in services.
If other nations are not truly
interested in strengthening the
multilateral trading system, the United
States will have no choice but to defend
its interests bilaterally and plurilaterally,
and we will do so vigorously. The GATT
as we know it today would disappear, to
be replaced, we hope, by institutions that
would better accommodate the world's
commercial needs.
The stakes riding on the outcome of
our meeting in Uruguay next week are,
indeed, high. We can either agree to
work together as a world community to
strengthen and modernize the interna-
tional trading system for the benefit of
Worldwide piracy of
intellectual property has
reached epidemic
proportions.
all nations or we can agree to each go
our own way, accepting the conse-
quences of that scenario.
For us a new round to improve the
world trading system must include
meaningful negotiations on agriculture
and the new issues— services, intellectual
property, and investment. This is not a
time for caution. It is a time for leader-
ship, a time to strike out boldly to meet
the demands of a dynamic world.
There is some cause for optimism if
one looks at how far we have come. A
year ago, many observers questioned
whether GATT members could agree
even to begin talking about an agenda
for a new round of trade talks. Yet we
were able to establish a preparatory
committee, which worked diligently for 7
months to produce a draft declaration
for ministers' consideration.
The negotiators who drafted that
text represent countries of all
characterizations: developed, developing,
and newly industrialized; northern and
southern, eastern and western. Colombia
and Switzerland deserve particular
credit for chairing the deliberations, but
all 40-plus nations that participated
should share the accolades. All took
political risks during this process and all
will have to take additional risks if we
are successfully to launch a new round.
Yet if a general spirit of cooperation
prevails, and if opponents of trade
liberalization are not permitted to
obstruct progress, a historic declaration
can emerge from Punta del Este.
But let us not take it for granted
that there will be a new round. Unfor-
tunately, a small group of nations con-
tinues to hold the interests of the major-
ity hostage to their objectives, which
seem to me contrary to their own self-
interest. For reasons known only to
them, these nations are attempting to
keep off the agenda items that must be
included if we are to strengthen and
improve GATT. This is not a tolerable
outcome. Nations that engage in 3% or
4% of the world's trade cannot be
allowed to jeopardize the future of the
entire world trading system. No one has
been asked to commit in advance to the
outcome of the new round but simply to
allow those who wish to negotiate to
do so.
Negotiating Agenda
There can be no legitimate objection to a
comprehensive negotiating agenda. But
there is ample reason not to agree to a
limited agenda. If a handful of countries
block the rest of the world from
negotiating on matters of great
economic importance during the coming
years— matters that will advance the
cause of global trade— the United States
will not participate in the new round.
Agriculture. Clearly GATT must
address the chaos in trade in agriculture.
This is an urgent, critical need. Export
subsidies and endless barriers to imports
have created massive disruption in farm
trade and brought world agriculture to
the brink of crisis. The escalating pat-
tern of protectionism in agriculture must
be reversed. Farmers of different coun-
tries are no longer competing againsl 1 1
each other but against national
treasuries.
Our agricultural objectives for a il
round are clear. We want to phase oi f]
import restrictions on agricultural pr d
ucts, treat agricultural export subsidi I
the same as subsidies for industrial p |
ucts, and eliminate other barriers to
market access in developed and devel
ing countries. Agriculture should be
negotiated on a "fast track" basis
because the crisis in agricultural trad
so severe that we cannot afford to we
years or more for improvement.
These objectives should threaten
one. No nation would gain any advan
tage over another; we would work
together to put an end to costly, conf
tational policies that hurt us all.
Secretary Lyng's attendance in
Punta del Este demonstrates our
government's deep commitment to
extending GATT rule to cover trade i
agriculture. President Reagan is per-
sonally committed to this issue. At th
economic summit in Tokyo last May, 1
raised the issue of trade in agricultun
and persuaded the other heads of stat
of the need for immediate, substantia
improvement in the conduct of
agricultural trade.
Services. GATT also must begin
address the new trade challenges of tl
day. The definition and scope of trade
have been transformed in recent year
and GATT as an institution must keep
pace. For example, we must create an
institutional framework that will maki
trade in services as open as possible.
Services is the fastest growing sector
the U.S. economy and is likely to con-
tinue to be so in the future. The same
true for many other nations, yet there
are no principles and procedures govei
ing trade in this area.
Our objectives here also are clear.
We wish to develop meaningful interns :
tional rules with respect to governmen
actions that affect services trade. This
would not only place rules for trade in
services on an equal footing with rules ,
for trade in goods but also would
facilitate trade in goods by guaranteeii:
that essential related services, such as
transportation, communications, and
insurance, are readily available on a
competitive basis.
These objectives also should threat
no one. Basic rules guaranteeing non-
discriminatory treatment and equitable!
access would simply clarify the current ;
jumbled system for all service provider: |
they would provide special advantages i
44
Department of State Bullet I
ECONOMICS
h one. Furthermore, no nation would be
Lligated to sign a services code,
piough it would clearly be seen to be
| sirable to do so.
Investment. A third major need is a
t of rules to cover investment. GATT
fers virtually no discipline in this area
en through government investment
ilicies can severely distort trade flows.
Our goal here is to provide for basic
inciples governing such practices as
:port performance requirements, local
ntent rules, and other investment
gulations that distort trade. We want
inject greater certainty into what is
iw a most uncertain, and often
timidating, economic environment.
This objective should not threaten
her nations; indeed it should be
ibraced by all— especially the develop-
y nations— as a major priority. Foreign
vestment, when responding to actual
irket conditions rather than distortive
ivernment policies, will stimulate
onomic growth. There is an urgent
ed throughout the developing world
r increased foreign investment, par-
:ularly among nations that need to
duce their reliance on debt capital but
ed equity capital to stimulate growth.
; long as there are no meaningful rules
this area, investment in those coun-
es will remain a risky and unattractive
tion.
Intellectual Property. Finally,
sre is a need for increased protection
" intellectual property such as patents,
idemarks, and copyrights. Worldwide
•acy of intellectual property has
iched epidemic proportions. The world
Dn may be in danger of losing the
nefits of major research and develop-
mt efforts, which simply will not be
dertaken if theft of the work product
events companies from justifying the
search expenditure.
Our objective here is simply to imple-
;nt and enforce basic standards for
;ellectual property protection
trldwide. This should threaten no one
cept the pirates who attempt to profit
[pm their theft of others' intellectual
foperty. For them there should be no
Empathy at Punta del Este.
] These issues— agriculture, services,
fyestment, and intellectual property
lotection— are all mentioned as agenda
Ims in the draft declaration supported
\, a majority of countries. We are
jpeful that all nations will recognize
Sat having these items on the
ligotiating agenda is in their own
mnomic interest and in the interest of a
ralthy world trading system. Without
them, there will be no standstill-rollback
commitment, no reduction in tariff and
nontariff barriers, no negotiation on a
safeguards code, no improvement in the
GATT dispute settlement mechanism,
and no discipline for the "gray area"
measures that so plague international
trade today.
The challenge facing us in Uruguay
next week is every bit as large as that
which faced the founders of GATT
almost 40 years ago. But we have a
tremendous advantage over them.
Whereas they saw only chaos as they
looked back over the previous 40 years
and struggled to find an'answer, we
have their success as an example. If we
fail to grasp this opportunity, future
generations will rightly indict us for
depriving them of any hope for rising
world prosperity.
Surely leadership and statesmanship
did not disappear when the creators of
GATT retired from the scene. What we
must all do is summon the courage to
renew our common commitment to a
free and open international trading
system.
Next week in Uruguay, we will
discover if the nations of the world have
that courage. ■
GATT Nations Agree to Launch
New Round of Trade Negotiations
The contracting parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GA TT) met in ministerial session at
Punta del Este, Uruguay, Septem-
ber 15-20, 1986.
Following are the statement by U.S.
Trade Representative Ambassador
Clayton Yeutter, head of the U.S. delega-
tion, on September 15 and the text of the
declaration adopted September 20 by the
7U nations attending the meeting.
AMBASSADOR YEUTTER,
SEPT. 15, 1986
This week GATT faces a historic
challenge. Our task is more difficult than
any that has confronted world trade
since the very creation of GATT in 1947.
What we do in Punta del Este will deter-
mine whether GATT remains a func-
tional, dynamic institution serving the
interests of its members or declines into
a static and passive association that is
irrelevant to the needs of international
trade.
Our task may be daunting, but it is
one from which we must not shirk. The
world trading system is in trouble. All
of us, to one degree or another, have
slipped from the GATT ideals of free and
open trade. Some have slipped con-
siderably, making protectionism
dangerously more commonplace. Many
now overlook the tremendous benefits
that these ideals made possible during
the last 40 years. The expansion of trade
can enable more individuals to partici-
pate in the world economy, thereby
improving their quality of life and
standard of living.
Rather than allow permanent
damage to the world trading system, we
must reaffirm the basic principles
established by the founders of GATT.
Such a reaffirmation must recognize the
realities of international trade today.
This means extending GATT principles
to all major areas of trade. For too long,
GATT rules and disciplines have not
applied to many of the most important
sectors of the world economy, leading to
global trade distortion and economic
disequilibrium that can no longer be
tolerated.
The United States, with a trade
deficit approaching $200 billion, is the
major victim of this disequilibrium.
President Reagan has forcefully resisted
a tide of domestic protectionism in the
face of this gigantic trade deficit but he
cannot do so forever. GATT members
need to work together to move the world
back toward economic equilibrium— to
the benefit of all. If other countries are
not interested in doing so, the United
States will have no choice but to defend
its own interests in its own way. We are
prepared to do so if we must.
The United States advocates a new
round because we believe the GATT can
be responsive to the rapidly-changing
requirements of international commerce.
We are prepared to modernize it for the
benefit of every country. This will
require a firm commitment by all GATT
member countries to work together
toward a common goal.
Kvember 1986
45
ECONOMICS
The vast majority of GATT members
have already demonstrated such a com-
mitment. The process for launching a
new round was begun by the unanimous
consensus of the contracting parties last
November. During the first 7 months of
this year, the preparatory committee
met to draft an agenda for the new
round. Out of those meetings came the
text upon which we will base our discus-
sion for the final ministerial declaration.
This text resolved a number of issues,
leaving others to be decided here. It was
a significant accomplishment. It leaves
me confident that the decision to launch
a new round is within our grasp.
The negotiators who drafted that
text represent countries of all character-
izations: developed, developing, and
newly industrialized; northern and
southern, eastern and western. Colombia
and Switzerland deserve particular men-
tion for chairing the deliberations, but all
40 or so participating nations deserve
credit.
The diverse composition of the draft-
ing group demonstrates conclusively that
support for a new round is widespread
and not limited to one nation or group of
nations. It also disproves the assertion
that there is a GATT conflict between
the less developed countries (LDCs) and
the developed nations. Indeed the
developing nations provided much of the
leadership that went into drafting the
declaration which received the most sup-
port at the Geneva preparatory meeting.
The contribution of the developing
countries to the preparatory committee
process is only the most recent example
of how important the LDCs have become
to world trade. The United States
welcomes the growth and increasing
stature of the developing nations. We
buy nearly two-thirds of the goods sent
from the LDCs to the developed coun-
tries, and we look forward to increasing
our exports to LDC markets. We believe
the United States can only benefit as
developing countries become more
prosperous.
By deciding to meet here in Punta
del Este, the GATT has demonstrated
that the LDCs are full partners in the
GATT process and just as committed to
GATT principles as the developed
nations. Mr. Chairman [Uruguayan
Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias], I
thank you for your nation's generous
offer to host this meeting, and I know
your able leadership will ensure its
success.
Uruguay is just one of the many
developing nations that understands it
too has a tremendous stake in the expan-
sion of world trade. They know that pro-
tectionism threatens developing nations
far more than it does the United States.
We are large enough and self-sufficient
enough to adjust to closed markets,
thereby limiting the damage. Resurgent
protectionism would slow our economic
expansion and reduce our standard of
living, but it would not devastate our
economy as it would smaller and more
export-dependent nations.
The new round will not only help
LDCs by reversing protectionist trends,
it will also provide many opportunities
for expanding trade. The U.S. position
on such issues as agriculture, services,
investment, and intellectual property is
well-known, but not so widely recognized
is the support we enjoy from progressive
LDCs that realize they will also benefit
from inclusion of these issues in the new
round.
For example it is clear that the main
victims of agricultural protectionism are
smaller, agrarian economies that cannot
compete with massive export subsidies
nor penetrate import barriers that the
GATT currently permits. The
agricultural language in the draft
ministerial declaration offers hope for
change that will benefit not just U.S.
farmers but others around the globe.
Similarly the lack of rules for trade
in services does not restrict the United
States only. Many LDCs that are compe-
titive in services or hope to evolve into
service economies find significant
markets closed to them by their neigh-
bors' protectionist policies. A services
code guaranteeing nondiscriminatory
treatment and equitable access would
threaten no nation, expecially since none
will be forced to sign such a code.
Furthermore services facilitate trade in
goods. The two are complementary and,
as international commerce becomes
more sophisticated, will forever be
interrelated— in all countries.
As for investment, the lack of basic
principles penalizes LDCs by creating
uncertainty and risk for investors. There
is an urgent need throughout the
developing world for increased foreign
investment, particularly among nations
that need to reduce their reliance on
debt capital but need equity capital to
stimulate growth. As long as there are
no meaningful rules in this area, invest-
ment in these countries will remain risky
and unattractive.
Finally, we need better rules on
intellectual property, not simply for the
sake of the developed world but also for
the LDCs, which benefit from research
and development wherever it is con-
ducted. The concept of protecting
intellectual property is not new, but
time to recognize that the issue affec
trade and ought to be addressed by t
GATT. The current lack of protectioi
intellectual property virtually guarar
that only the developed nations can
afford to invest heavily in vital resea
which will keep the LDCs from prog]
ing as rapidly as they could otherwisi
We regard the issues of agriculti
services, investment, and intellectual
property as critical to the future of a
GATT members. We cannot envision
nor agree to— comprehensive new tr;
negotiations that do not include thesi
four issues on the agenda. Without
them, there will be no meaningful
standstill-rollback commitment, no
reduction in tariff and nontariff barr
no negotiation of a safeguards code,
improvement in the GATT dispute se
tlement mechanism or subsidy rules,
no discipline over the "gray area"
measures that so plague internationa
trade today.
Today GATT stands at a crossro?
Regardless of what we do here, work
events will go forward. We cannot st
change, but we can work to set our o
destiny. If we leave Punta del Este
without taking steps to strengthen ai
modernize GATT, we will have failed
grasp an opportunity to improve the
lives of all citizens of the world for y€
to come. But if we act decisively, we
be worthy successors to the statesme
who created GATT 40 years ago. Let
their vision inspire us as we work to
invigorate GATT for future generatio
DECLARATION,
SEPT. 20, 1986
Ministers, meeting on the occasion of the
Special Session of Contracting Parties at
Punta del Este, have decided to launch
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Urugi
Round). To this end, they have adopted the
following Declaration. The Multilateral Tn
Negotiations (MTN) will be open to the par
ticipation of countries as indicated in Parts'
and II of this Declaration. A Trade Negotis.
tions Committee is established to carry out
the negotiations. The Trade Negotiations [
Committee shall hold its first meeting not I
later than 31 October 1986. It shall meet as
appropriate at Ministerial level. The
Multilateral Trade Negotiations will be con
eluded within four years.
46
Department of State Bulle
ECONOMICS
PARTI
NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE
IN GOODS
'he Contracting Parties meeting at
linisterial level
Determined to halt and reverse protect-
ionism and to remove distortions to trade
Determined also to preserve the basic
irinciples and to further the objectives of the
;att
Determined also to develop a more open,
iable and durable multilateral trading system
Convinced that such action would promote
rowth and development
Mindful of the negative effects of pro-
jnged financial and monetary instability in
he world economy, the indebtedness of a
irge number of less developed contracting
arties and considering the linkage between
rade, money, finance and development
Decide to enter into Multilateral Trade
legotiations on trade in goods within the
ramework and under the aegis of the General
Lgreement on Tariffs and Trade.
l. OBJECTIVES
Negotiations shall aim to:
i) bring about further liberalization and
|xpansion of world trade to the benefit of all
:ountries, especially less-developed Contract-
iig Parties, including the improvement of
ccess to markets by the reduction and
llimination of tariffs, quantitative restrictions
Ind other non-tariff measures and obstacles;
(ii) strengthen the role of GATT, improve
he multilateral trading system based on the
irinciples and rules of the GATT and bring
bout a wider coverage of world trade under
greed, effective and enforceable multilateral
isciplines;
| (iii) increase the responsiveness of the
JATT system to the evolving international
Iconomic environment, through facilitating
leeessary structural adjustment, enhancing
he relationship of the GATT with the rele-
lant international organizations and taking
ccount of changes in trade patterns and
|rospects, including the growing importance
if trade in high technology products, serious
liffieulties in commodity markets and the
mportance of an improved trading environ-
ment providing, inter alia, for the ability of
hdebted countries to meet their financial
jbligations;
i (iv) foster concurrent cooperative action at
he national and international levels to
Itrengthen the inter-relationship between
rade policies and other economic policies
Effecting growth and development, and to
'ontribute towards continued, effective and
'etermined efforts to improve the functioning
If the international monetary system and the
|ow of financial and real investment
,esources to developing countries.
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING NEGOTIATIONS
(i) Negotiations shall be conducted in a
transparent manner, and consistent with the
objectives and commitments agreed in this
Declaration and with the principles of the
General Agreement in order to ensure mutual
advantage and increased benefits to all
participants.
(ii) The launching, the conduct and the
implementation of the outcome of the negotia-
tion shall be treated as parts of a single
undertaking. However, agreements reached
at an early stage may be implemented on a
provisional or a definitive basis by agreement
prior to the formal conclusion of the negotia-
tions. Early agreements shall be taken into
account in assessing the overall balance of the
negotiations.
(iii) Balanced concessions should be sought
within broad trading areas and subjects to be
negotiated in order to avoid unwarranted
cross-sectoral demands.
(iv) Contracting Parties agree that the
principle of differential and more favorable
treatment embodied in Part IV and other
relevant provisions of the General Agreement
and in the decision of the Contracting Parties
of 28 November 1979 on Differential and
More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries
applies to the negotiations. In the implemen-
tation of standstill and rollback, particular
care should be given to avoiding disruptive ef-
fects on the trade of less-developed contract-
ing parties.
(v) The developed countries do not expect
reciprocity for commitments made by them in
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs
and other barriers to the trade of developing
countries, i.e., the developed countries do not
expect the developing countries in the course
of trade negotiation, to make contributions
which are inconsistent with their individual
development, financial and trade needs.
Developed Contracting Parties shall,
therefore, not seek, neither shall less-
developed Contracting Parties be required to
make, concessions that are inconsistent with
the latter's development, financial and trade
needs.
(vi) Less-developed Contracting Parties
expect that their capacity to make contribu-
tions or negotiated concessions or take other
mutually agreed action under the provisions
and procedures of the General Agreement
would improve with the progressive develop-
ment of their economies and improvement in
their trade situation and they would
accordingly expect to participate more fully in
the framework of rights and obligations under
the General Agreement.
(vii) Special attention shall be given to the
particular situation and problems of the least-
developed countries and to the need to
encourage positive measures to facilitate
expansion of their trading opportunities.
Expeditious implementation of the relevant
provisions of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration
concerning the least-developed countries shall
also be given appropriate attention.
C. STANDSTILL AND ROLLBACK
Commencing immediately and continuing
until the formal completion of the negotia-
tions, each participant agrees to apply the
following commitments:
Standstill
(i) not to take any trade restrictive or distort-
ing measure inconsistent with the provisions
of the General Agreement or the instruments
negotiated within the framework of GATT or
under its auspices;
(ii) not to take any trade restrictive or
distorting measure in the legitimate exercise
of its GATT rights, that would go beyond that
which is necessary to remedy specific situa-
tions, as provided for in the General Agree-
ment and the instruments referred to in (i)
above;
(iii) not to take any trade measures in such
a manner as to improve its negotiating
positions.
Rollback
(i) that all trade restrictive or distorting
measures inconsistent with the provisions of
the General Agreement or instruments
negotiated within the framework of GATT or
under its auspices, shall be phased out or
brought into conformity within an agreed
timeframe not later than by the date of the
formal completion of the negotiations, taking
into account multilateral agreements, under-
takings and understandings, including
strengthened rules and disciplines, reached in
pursuance of the objective of the negotiations;
(ii) there shall be progressive implementa-
tion of this commitment on an equitable basis
in consultations among participants con-
cerned, including all affected participants.
This commitment shall take account of the
concerns expressed by any participant about
measures directly affecting its trade
interests;
(iii) there shall be no GATT concessions
requested for the elimination of these
measures.
Surveillance of Standstill
and Rollback
Each participant agrees that the implementa-
tion of these commitments on standstill and
rollback shall be subject to multilateral
surveillance so as to ensure that these com-
mitments are being met. The Trade Negotia-
tions Committee will decide on the
appropriate mechanisms to carry out the
surveillance, including periodic reviews and
evaluations. Any participant may bring to the
attention of the appropriate surveillance
mechanism any actions or omissions it
believes to be relevant to the fulfillment of
these commitments. These notifications
should be addressed to the GATT secretariat
which may also provide further relevant
information.
Jovember 1986
47
ECONOMICS
D. SUBJECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Tariffs
Negotiations shall aim, by appropriate
methods, to reduce or, as appropriate,
eliminate tariffs including the reduction or
elimination of high tariffs and tariff escala-
tion. Emphasis shall be given to the expan-
sion of the scope of tariff concessions among
all participants.
Non-Tariff Measures
Negotiations shall aim to reduce or eliminate
non-tariff measures, including quantitative
restrictions, without prejudice to any action
to be taken in fulfillment of the rollback
commitments.
Tropical Products
Negotiations shall aim at the fullest liberaliza-
tion of trade in tropical products, including in
their processed and semi-processed forms and
shall cover both tariff and all non-tariff
measures affecting trade in these products.
Contracting Parties recognize the impor-
tance of trade in tropical products to a large
number of less-developed Contracting Parties
and agree that negotiations in this area shall
receive special attention, including the timing
of the negotiations and the implementation of
the results as provided for in B(ii).
Natural Resource-Based Products
Negotiations shall aim to achieve the fullest
liberalization of trade in natural resource-
based products, including in their processed
and semi-processed forms. The negotiations
shall aim to reduce or eliminate tariff and
non-tariff measures, including tariff
escalation.
Textiles and Clothing
Negotiations in the area of textiles and
clothing shall aim to formulate modalities that
would permit the eventual integration of this
sector into GATT on the basis of strength-
ened GATT rules and disciplines, thereby also
contributing to the objective of further
liberalization of trade.
Agriculture
Contracting Parties agree that there is an
urgent need to bring more discipline and
predictability to world agricultural trade by
correcting and preventing restrictions and
distortions including those related to struc-
tural surpluses so as to reduce the uncer-
tainty, imbalances and instability in world
agricultural markets.
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater
liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring
all measures affecting import access and
export competition under strengthened and
more operationally effective GATT rules and
disciplines, taking into account the general
principles governing the negotiations, by:
(i) improving market access through, inter
alia, the reduction of import barriers;
(ii) improving the competitive environment
by increasing discipline on the use of all direct
and indirect subsidies and other measures
affecting directly or indirectly agricultural
trade, including the phased reduction of their
negative effects and dealing with their
causes;
(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and
barriers can have on trade in agriculture, tak-
ing into account the relevant international
agreements.
In order to achieve the above objectives,
the negotiating group having primary respon-
sibility for all aspects of agriculture will use
the recommendations adopted by the Con-
tracting Parties at their Fortieth Session,
which were developed in accordance with the
GATT 1982 Ministerial programme and take
account of the approaches suggested in the
work of the Committee on Trade in
Agriculture without prejudice to other alter-
natives that might achieve the objectives of
the negotiations.
GATT Articles
Participants shall review existing GATT
articles, provisions and disciplines as
requested by interested Contracting Parties,
and, as appropriate, undertake negotiations.
Safeguards
(i) comprehensive agreement on safeguards is
of particular importance to the strengthening
of the GATT system and to progress in the
MTN's.
(ii) The agreement on safeguards:
• shall be based on the basic principles of
the General Agreement;
• shall contain, inter alia, the following
elements: transparency, coverage, objective
criteria for action including the concept of
serious injury or threat thereof, temporary
nature, degressivity and structural adjust-
ment, compensation and retaliation, notifica-
tions, consultation, multilateral surveillance
and dispute settlement; and
• shall clarify and reinforce the
disciplines of the General Agreement and
should apply to all Contracting Parties.
MTN Agreements and Arrangements
Negotiations shall aim to improve, clarify or
expand, as appropriate, agreements and
arrangements negotiated in the Tokyo Round
of Multilateral Negotiations.
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Negotiations on subsidies and countervailing
measures shall be based on a review of
Articles VI and XVI and the MTN agreement
on subsidies and countervailing measures
with the objective of improving GATT
disciplines relating to all subsidies and
countervailing measures that affect inten
tional trade. A negotiating group will be
established to deal with these issues.
Dispute Settlement
In order to ensure prompt and effective
resolution of disputes to the benefit of all
Contracting Parties, negotiations shall air
improve and strengthen the rules and the
cedures of the dispute settlement process,
while recognizing the contribution that wc
be made by more effective and enforceabl'
GATT rules and disciplines. Negotiations
shall include the development of adequate
arrangements for overseeing and monitor
of the procedures that would facilitate cor
pliance with adopted recommendations.
Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods
In order to reduce the distortions and
impediments to international trade, and ta
ing into account the need to promote effec
and adequate protection of intellectual pro
erty rights and to ensure that measures ar
procedures to enforce intellectual property
rights do not themselves become barriers 1
legitimate trade, the negotiations shall ain
clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as
appropriate new rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a
multilateral framework of principles, rules
and disciplines dealing with international
trade in counterfeit goods, taking into
account work alreadv undertaken in the
GATT.
These negotiations shall be without pre
udice to other complementary initiatives th
may be taken in the World Intellectual Pro
erty Organization and elsewhere to deal wi
these matters.
Trade-Related Investment Measures
Following an examination of the operation
GATT Articles related to the trade restricti
and distorting effects of investment
measures, negotiations should elaborate, as
appropriate, further provisions that may be
necessary to avoid such adverse effects on
trade.
E. FUNCTIONING OF THE GATT SYSTE
Negotiations shall aim to develop understan
ings and arrangements:
(i) to enhance the surveillance in the GAT
to enable regular monitoring of trade policie
and practices of contracting parties and the:
impact on the functioning of the multilateral!
trading system;
(ii) to improve the overall effectiveness an
decision-making of the GATT as an institu- I
tion, including, inter alia, through involve- I
ment of Ministers;
48
Department of State BulletH
EUROPE
iii) to increase the contribution of the
lTT to achieving greater coherence in
bal economic policy-making through
engthening its relationship with other
ernational organizations responsible for
netary and financial matters.
PARTICIPATION
Negotiations will be open to:
(1) all Contracting Parties;
(2) countries having acceded
ivisionally;
(3) countries applying the GATT on a de
to basis having announced, not later than
April 1987, their intention to accede to the
TT and to participate in the negotiations;
(4) countries that have already informed
Contracting Parties, at a regular meeting
the Council of Representatives, of their
sntion to negotiate the terms of their
mbership as a Contracting Party; and
(5) developing countries that have, by 30
ril 1987, initiated procedures for accession
the GATT, with the intention of negoti-
ig the terms of their accession during the
irse of the negotiations.
a) Participation in negotiations relating to
amendment or application of GATT provi-
ns or the negotiation of new provisions
1, however, be open only to Contracting
rties.
ORGANIZATION OF THE
IGOTIATIONS
>oup of Negotiations on Goods (GNG) is
ablished to carry out the programme of
jotiations contained in this part of the
:laration. The GNG shall, inter alia:
) elaborate and put into effect detailed
de negotiating plans prior to 19 December
16;
i) designate the appropriate mechanism
surveillance of commitments to standstill
1 rollback;
ii) establish negotiating groups as
uired. Because of the inter-relationship of
ie issues and taking fully into account the
leral principles governing the negotiations
stated in B(iii) above, it is recognized that
ects of one issue may be discussed in more
n one negotiating group. Therefore each
;otiating group should as required take
) account relevant aspects emerging in
er groups;
v) also decide upon inclusion of additional
ject matters in the negotiations;
r) co-ordinate the work of the negotiating
ups and supervise the progress of the
;otiations. As a guideline not more than
) negotiating groups should meet at the
ie time;
ri) the GNG shall report to the Trade
?otiations Committee.
In order to ensure effective application of
differential and more favourable treatment
the GNG shall, before the formal completion
of the negotiations, conduct an evaluation of
the results attained therein in terms of the
Objectives and the General Principles Govern-
ing Negotiations as set out in the Declaration,
taking into account all issues of interest to
less-developed Contracting Parties.
PART II
NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE
IN SERVICES
Ministers also decided, as part of the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, to launch
negotiations on trade in services.
Negotiations in this area shall aim to
establish a multilateral framework of prin-
ciples and rules for trade in services,
including elaboration of possible disciplines
for individual sectors, with a view to
expansion of such trade under conditions of
transparency and progressive liberalization
and a means of promoting economic growth
of all trading partners and the development
of developing countries. Such framework shall
respect the policy objectives of national laws
and regulations applying to services and shall
take into account the work of relevant inter-
national organizations.
GATT procedures and practices shall
apply to these negotiations. A Group on
Negotiations on Services is established to deal
with these matters. Participation in the
negotiations under this part of the Declara-
tion will be open to the same countries as
under Part I. GATT Secretariat support will
be provided, with technical support from
other organizations as decided by the Group
on Negotiations on Services.
The Group on Negotiations on Services
shall report to the Trade Negotiations
Committee.
IMPLEMENTATION OF RESULTS
UNDER PARTS I AND II
When the results of the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations in all areas have been estab-
lished, Ministers meeting also on the occasion
of special session of Contracting Parties shall
decide regarding the international implemen-
tation of the respective results. ■
Under Secretary Armacost's
Interview on "Meet the Press"
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Michael H. Armacost was interviewed on
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on
September 7, 1986, by Marvin Kalb and
Garrick Utley of NBC News and Strobe
Talbott of Time magazine.
Q. You know, of course, that within a
half-hour, the chief spokesman for the
Soviet foreign ministry has said that
[U.S. News & World Report corre-
spondent] Nicholas Daniloff will be
tried. What is your response to that?
A. I regret hearing that message.
We have, for the past week, been trying
to communicate very forcefully to the
Soviet Union the importance of releasing
Nick Daniloff without preferring
charges. The case becomes much more
complicated if they go through with the
trial.
Q. What does it mean, in effect, in
terms of your ability to pursue sum-
mitry, the Secretary's upcoming visit
with Shevardnadze?
A. It complicates, in the first
instance, the resolution of this case. The
proposal that we had been pursuing was
that Nick Daniloff be released without
preferring charges. And we then would
go back to consider, on its merits, a
request that had been made by the
Soviet Ambassador prior to his arrest.
Obviously, if they go through with the
trial, it complicates the resolution on
those terms.
Q. The road to the summit has
been rather rocky. The Soviets are say-
ing there's no progress yet on the key
issue of arms control. Do you think the
decision to go ahead with the trial on
Daniloff might be a way of trying to
sabotage the summit, to get out of it?
A. I can't speak for the Soviet
Union in this matter. They have been a
little opaque as far as their intentions
with respect to a summit is concerned. I
rather suspect that they— recalling
previous precedents— think they can
muscle us on this issue by talking
trading bait.
As I think you all have made clear,
we share the view that these charges
against Daniloff were trumped up. They
grabbed him for motives that I think are
transparent. They're related to precisely
getting their man out of jail. And they
may think they can accomplish that pur-
pose without disrupting the summit.
jvember 1986
49
EUROPE
In the private communications we've
had, they have been quite consistent in
expressing the hope that this will not
have a disruptive effect on the wider
relationship; and that, presumably,
means movement toward a summit. Our
response has been quite as consistent,
that inevitably, an incident of this kind
has its disruptive impact.
Q. Disruptive impact? Does that
mean that if the trial does take place,
if he is convicted and held in Moscow,
there cannot be a summit?
A. Now, we haven't said that. I
think actions may have to be taken to
underscore the seriousness of our pur-
pose. But we've not decided what
actions. A range of possibilities exists. It
is not for me on national television to
describe all of those options. These are
decisions for the President. I'm not
going to try to narrow his options here.
But I think we've got to also
remember that you can still have
meetings and not be pursuing business
as usual. You may recall at the time the
Korean airliner went down a couple of
years ago, some suggested that
Secretary Shultz should not meet with
Gromyko, then Foreign Minister. Mr.
Shultz's decision was to meet with Mr.
Gromyko but make this issue the center-
piece of that discussion. And I think the
Foreign Minister went away with no illu-
sions as to the strength of our feelings
about the issue. It was not business as
usual. That issue got to the top of the
agenda. And it obviously diverts atten-
tion from other matters of great
importance.
Q. Another comparable incident
comes to mind. Back during the Carter
Administration, Secretary of State
Vance was preparing to go to Moscow
for some very important arms control
negotiations that everybody hoped
would lead to the summit; in fact, did
lead to the 1979 summit; when
Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, the dissident
was arrested, and his persecution by
Soviet authorities began to escalate.
The Carter Administration and
Mr. Vance came under a lot of
criticism, including from many people
who are now supporters of the Reagan
Administration and members of the
Reagan Administration, that Vance
should not go to Moscow and that
there should be some kind of boycott
of diplomatic activity of this kind.
The impression arises that at least
so far this Administration is trying to
insulate arms control from this inci-
dent and unlink them. Is that fair?
A. I wouldn't say entirely to insu-
late them. I think it's unusual for Paul
Nitze [special adviser to the President
and the Secretary of State on arms con-
trol matters], who's handling various
arms control matters for us, to raise an
issue of this kind with his counterpart.
But, indeed, in the meetings of the last 2
days, he raised precisely this question
with Mr. Karpov [Ambassador Viktor P.
Karpov, Soviet negotiator on strategic
nuclear arms]. And the incident will
intrude itself into all of our discussions
with the Soviet Union if it's not properly
resolved.
Q. There are also some informal
discussions planned in the Soviet
Union later this week. A private group
is taking some Administration offi-
cials. Is it your view that the Adminis-
tration officials should go ahead on
this trip to the Soviet Union to a
meeting in Riga that's planned if Mr.
Daniloff is still in incarceration?
A. We haven't made a decision on
that matter. But I think if they do go,
then they ought to make this issue the
centerpiece of their discussions with the
Soviets. And I would hope the Soviets
would honor, in that case, the arrange-
ments which permit them to speak
through television to the Soviet
populace.
Q. Do you feel that the Russians
are getting any of the messages that
you've been sending this past week?
The words have been extremely
strong: outraged; no trade; let the
Russians beware. Yet there is the
appearance, at least, of business as
usual. And they seem, with this proc-
lamation that Daniloff will be tried, to
be saying they can do what they like
with impunity.
A. I hope they've gotten the
message. I don't know that all doors
have been closed, although Mr.
Gerasimov's [Soviet foreign ministry
spokesman] statement, I think, is the
most discouraging thing we've heard to
date. I might say that for the Soviet
Union to bring charges against a jour-
nalist should not be entirely surprising.
Because what we consider the normal
modus operandi for an enterprising jour-
nalist, they tend to regard as subversive.
So I suspect they can pull a book on
every journalist that operates there and
bring out the charges at a moment that
suits them. And perhaps this is what
they have in mind.
Q. Can we turn to terrorism? It's
been a long, quiet summer for most of
the world. Now we've had these two
incidents in the last few days. What
we know about what happened in
Karachi in terms of who these ter-
rorists were?
A. We are still quite unsure about
the nature of the organization which
these individuals served. We expect tc
hear the results of the Pakistani inter-
rogation. We've not yet heard that.
Therefore, at this point, the speculatic
has tended to center on Abu Nidal 411
or dissidents within the 417 organiza-
tion. But we don't have any basis for
making a clear judgment on that yet.
Q. There's some confusion as to
what the Pakistani policy was in ter
of the commandos. Were they going
storm the plane? Were they going to
let the plane leave? What was our at
tude, our policy toward this?
A. Our policy was that these were'
ultimately Pakistani Government calls
We had certain advantages in this cas*
because the incident took place in a
friendly country which has very comp*
tent authorities and tough-minded
authorities. The general strategy was
one of stretching the incident out, tirir
the hijackers. This is usually attemptei
The management of this incident was
affected, as you know, by the power
failure on the plane, which apparently
precipitated action by the terrorists.
We're not going to second-guess th
Pakistani Government in this case. Wc
thought they handled it decisively,
resolutely, and I'm not going to questi(
the manner in which they handled it.
Q. Is there any reason at all to
suspect a Libyan-Qadhafi connections
which is an important question, giver
the challenge to American policy and
possible retaliation that that would
mean?
A. I wouldn't prejudge that. We !
haven't enough information as yet to
make that determination. But obviouslj
we're looking very closely at that, and i
that turns out to be the case, then we'll
face some hard issues again. ■
50
Department of State Bullet
EUROPE
lecretary's News Briefing
if September 12
Secretary Sh.ultz held a news briefing
Ithe White House on September 12,
f6. '
Lholas Daniloff [U.S. News & World
wort correspondent] was released
fm Lefortovo Prison into custody of
f American Charge [d'Affaires] at
but 12:30 p.m. our time today. Mr.
jniloff appears to be in good health
p spirits. Soviet-UN Secretariat
Iployee Gennadiy Zakharov has been
flianded into the custody of the Soviet
hbassador to the United States pend-
f his trial on charges of espionage.
' These actions, agreed to by the
lited States and the Soviet Union, are
i interim step. In taking this step, the
B. Government had prominently in
[fid the well being of Mr. Daniloff.
| There can be no question of equating
I cases of Mr. Daniloff and Zakharov.
I. Daniloff is not a spy. He has never
ul any connection or employment with
I U.S. Government nor has he under-
jen tasks on instructions any U.S.
5/ernment agency. The continued
liention of Mr. Daniloff on false
i.rges is unacceptable. The United
Sites will continue to make every effort
secure his prompt departure from the
I'iet Union and safe return home.
Q. Are you telling us that we don't
;;jw whether the Soviets intend to
t Daniloff or whether he will be
leased immediately to return home?
'. A. He has been charged. He has
fcn released to the custody of our
prge on the understanding that, if
fed upon to appear in court, he will do
t That is the same understanding we
re with Zakharov.
Q. But isn't that equivalency then?
Iven't we, in effect, at least for the
rposes of getting him out of prison,
Jen in to the Soviet demand that
hre be equivalency between the two?
A. There is no equivalency. We have
1 in mind the situation of Mr. Daniloff
It prison cell, and we think he is a lot
Iter off with his friends and his wife
In he is in that cell.
I As far as Zakharov is concerned, he
ruaranteed by the Soviet Ambassador
me produced when called to our courts
flenever he is needed to face charges of
i .1 on espionage. That is the situation.
Q. Does what you said yesterday
still hold true, that Mr. Daniloff is a
hostage until he leaves the Soviet
Union?
A. Of course. Why did they take
him?
Q. So he is a hostage in your eyes?
A. That is my opinion.
Q. You have no further promise
from the Soviets on the fate of Mr.
Daniloff other than that he is now in
the embassy?
A. What has changed is his physical
location. That is all that has changed.
And the reason for doing it is that we
think, thinking of his situation, he is bet-
ter off where he will be.
Q. Is the United States going to do
"business as usual"? You say that Mr.
Daniloff is a hostage even in the
Ambassador's residence. Will the
United States continue to do business
as usual with the Soviets, given the
fact that they are holding an American
hostage?
A. Of course we are not doing
business as usual. This is a difficult and
different situation, although it is one of
those things, in managing the U.S.-
Soviet relationship, that is in a sense
predictable. Their society is so different,
it works on such different bases, that
they do things from time to time like this
that are just plain outrageous. And we
have to register that fact and do it
strongly, as we have been doing and as
we will continue to do. And the fact that
his location has changed in no way
changes the unacceptability of the fact
that he is being held on false charges.
Q. But are you going to go ahead
with all the meetings? Are you going
to go ahead with your meeting with
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next
week and all the other U.S. -Soviet —
A. These meetings are scheduled;
there hasn't been any change in that
schedule; and, assuming this issue is not
resolved satisfactorily by then, you can
be sure that as far as we are concerned,
as far as the President is concerned, in
every meeting that we have the Daniloff
case and, for that matter, other concerns
of ours about human rights problems will
be prominently in the picture. We feel
that it is important to keep registering
our point of view, not to walk away and
stop talking about it.
Q. Can you please explain why this
interim step, anyway, is not a trade?
A. This is an arrangement that we
made with the Soviet Union obviously,
as I said in my statement. It is a step
that we have agreed to because we feel
for Mr. Daniloff, and we think that he is
better off where he is going to be than
where he has been. However, the basic
stituation has not changed, so there
hasn't been any fundamental restructur-
ing of it.
Q. On a trade, is it still our posi-
tion that there will be no trade
ultimately?
A. That is our position. These two
people, Zakharov and Daniloff, are in no
way comparable, and we are not going
to trade them off against each other.
Q. What effect has this had on
U.S. -Soviet relations? Is it damaging
the chances for a summit this year?
A. Of course it damages the rela-
tionship, and of course it damages the
ability to move forward on other things.
That doesn't change the fact, however,
that there are possible things that would
be in the interest of the United States to
bring about, and if we can bring them
about obviously it is in our interest to do
so. But things like this shift the tone,
shift the ability, to work problems out,
without a doubt. That's just a fact of life.
Q. How confident are you that
you'll be able to proceed from this
interim step to some kind of final
arrangement that would get Mr.
Daniloff out of the Soviet Union?
A. I don't want to engage in predic-
tions and forecasts. This step has been
worked out, and we continue in our
discussions with the Soviet Union, and
when we have something to announce,
we'll announce it
Q. What does this mean now for
the official delegates to the Chautau-
qua Conference, to people within this
Administration? Will they go to Riga?
A. Chautauqua is a private organiza-
tion, an outstanding one, I believe. It's
done wonderful work and John Wallach
has done a great job of organizing it.
And basically, it's for a private organiza-
tion to decide whatever they want to
decide under the circumstances. And
when they have been in the State
Department, they have been thoroughly
briefed on our views. As far as U.S.
officials are concerned, of course, some
have taken a position that they drop out,
such as General Rowny [Ambassador
Edward L. Rowny, special adviser to the
Member 1986
51
EUROPE
President and the Secretary of State on
arms control matters].
On the other hand, if the
Chautauqua group decides to go ahead,
as far as we're concerned there, go
ahead. And I think what you will find
is— and you can argue this one way or
another but a very strong argument in
favor— is that you want to go and you
want to say your piece. So that insofar
as you can get it known, in the Soviet
Union and, for that matter, anybody else
who covers a meeting like that, just
what our point of view is, and why we
consider this so outrageous and damag-
ing. We take opportunities to do that.
Q. What do you say to Henry
Kissinger and others who have said
the Administration has been much too
soft on this and has not taken a harder
line, is too eager for a summit and too
willing to compromise with the
Soviets?
A. I'm not interested in debates
with people on those subjects. The
arrangement here is in response to the
fact that Daniloff was detained in jail
under circumstances that are not very
good, and we think that it is better all
around to get this unjustly charged
individual into a more congenial environ-
ment while this process unfolds. And so
the only thing that has changed is the
location of these two people.
Q. How was it arranged? Did the
President and Gorbachev get together
on this?
A. This was arranged basically
through diplomatic contacts, and there
have been messages of various kinds.
I'm not going to go into the detail of it.
Q. Is it your feeling that Mr.
Zakharov should have been denied bail
in the first instance he was brought
into court? Do you think the United
States perhaps made a mistake in its
handling of that, which triggered the
Soviet retaliation against Daniloff?
A. No, I don't think there's been
any mishandling. The point is that
Zakharov was caught spying. He is a
spy. And he's been charged, and we have
the evidence. And so there's that. As far
as Mr. Daniloff is concerned, he is not a
spy. He was set up.
Q. Do you rule out trading Mr.
Zakharov with someone other than Mr.
Daniloff?
A. I'm not going to get into discus-
sions of this, that, and the other thing.
Our position is very clear on this, and
that's where I'm going to leave it.
Q. Did you approve the Zakharov
position in advance — did you and the
President approve the decision to
arrest and imprison Mr. Zakharov
rather than to oust him, in advance?
A. The details of what the FBI does
in the arrest of a particular individual is
typically not ratcheted through— every
time they do something— the entire
hierarchy of the government. The fact of
the matter is that our policy is well-
established; that if we catch somebody
spying, we apprehend him and act on it.
Q. So there was nothing wrong
with that decision then?
A. There's nothing wrong with
arresting a man that you catch spying,
and I'm surprised that you even suggest
there might be.
Q. But did you approve it? That's
just a statement— a question.
A. I don't personally go around
approving or not approving every deci-
sion the FBI makes. They know per-
fectly well that if they catch somebody
spying and they arrest them, that's fine,
that's good. I wish there were fewer peo-
ple to get caught spying.
Q. In this case when U.S. -Soviet
relations were on the block, wasn't it
important enough to be approved at
the highest levels?
A. No. It's important that we con-
duct our business in a strong way, piece
by piece, and if somebody is spying and
caught spying, he's going to be appre-
hended whether it's good for the sum I
or not good for the summit. That's nc
relevant. We have to carry these thin
on that way.
Q. In previous cases like this,
there were an asymmetry in favor o:
the United States, that is we got m«
than the person who was grabbed o:
set up by the Soviet Union. In this
case, isn't this setting a new preced
as far as a deal or an exchange or
whatever is concerned?
A. This is not an outcome really.
This is only a change in the location o
these two individuals, and from our
standpoint, I think— I don't want to tt
to compare U.S. jails and Soviet jails,
but if I were Mr. Daniloff I'd certainb
want to be in an apartment in the
embassy and not in jail. I might say tl
before this arrangement was con-
sumated, it was discussed with Mr.
Daniloff because, obviously, he's
involved and it was not undertaken
without his assent.
Q. Were there private understai
ings with the Soviets?
A. I might say if you want to get
graphic and very clearly, concisely
stated statement of what it's like to b<
under investigation in the Soviet Unio
you ought to read the short statement
Anne Garrels that was in The New Yo-
Times this morning. I thought it was i
very pithy statement of the problem.
^ress release 175.
Deputy Secretary Whitehead's
Interview on "Face the Nation"
Deputy Secretary John C. Whitehead
was interviewed on CBS-TV's "Face the
Nation" on September 14, 1986, by Leslie
Stahl.
Q. I know the two sides are
negotiating, trying to get some resolu-
tion for the Daniloff situation. Any
breakthroughs?
A. No breakthroughs this morning.
We continue to work at it, there are
negotiations going on, we are continuing
to insist that Daniloff be set free; he is
not yet free.
Q. Are we asking that he be
released along with one other person
in exchange for Mr. Zakharov so that
it's a one-for-two instead of a
one-for-one?
A. I can't comment on the details
the negotiations, I'm sure you under- I
stand that. Our position is there will b(|
no swap, no trade of releasing Daniloff |
and releasing Zakharov. Zakharov is a f
spy; he was caught red-handed in New ,
York, and he will be tried.
Q. He will be tried?
A. He will be tried.
Q. No matter what?
A. As of this moment, he will be
tried. Daniloff is innocent, he was
entrapped, he was set up, and he must
be freed.
I
Q. When you say he will be tried, |
is there any give there, if they did
release someone else, for example?
52
Department of State Bullet"
EUROPE
I A. He's been arrested, he's been
pcted. Our court system requires that
jbe brought to trial, a fair trial under
system. And if he's tried, he will be
itenced.
Q. And then maybe released. Let
i ask you if in these negotiations we
t getting an impression that the
Iviets really do want to resolve this,
re we getting the impression that
y really want to escalate this and
(haps want to break off the plans
the summit?
A. I'm not sure. We really can't tell
I the Soviets' objectives are. They
, however, willing to discuss the sub-
I, willing to discuss the release. They
re said that they want to get it set-
In, and we are assuming that they
Ban it. We want to get it settled, we
lit to get it behind us. But we don't
lit to get it behind us unless we can
Sieve our principles.
Q. If something doesn't break in
Is situation by Friday, when
Ifretary Shultz and Foreign Minister
liivardnadze meet, can the two of
lm discuss anything else?
A. You can be sure if Daniloff is not
[]' by the time that meeting begins,
Ijt this subject will be very high on the
Inda.
Q. Is there anything else to
huss if this isn't resolved?
.1 A. We can only discuss this so far.
fihey refuse to set him free, the world
1st go on. This is an important issue,
1, of course, it's not the only issue. We
'i only gain by discussion. If we fer-
rate all discussions with the Soviet
Ron, then we cannot make progress on
I case or on anything else. So I think
c tendency is to want to continue
Hussions and to emphasize this case,
lag with all the other atrocious cases
deprivation of human freedom that
k Soviets are responsible for. This is
I more example of their lack of will-
kpess to consider our principles and
i] strong dedication to human
rfedoms.
Q. Did we, our side, make a big
1 take in arresting Mr. Zakharov?
t*r all, we had him under surveil-
Ijce for 3 years. The information that
twas picked up paying for was
ihted by the FBI — I mean, we knew
irit he was getting. Why in the world
I we choose to arrest a spy 2 weeks
*Dre this meeting between Shultz
» Shevardnadze, as the presummit
ifrotiations were under way? Every
iie we have ever arrested anyone at
the United Nations in this situation,
the Soviets have always gone and
created a framed-up situation on their
side. Why did we do it now?
A. There was nothing planned,
nothing strategic about the timing.
Q. Was it a mistake?
A. No, I think it was the right thing
to do. When the time comes that we can
catch a Soviet spy— catch him red-
handed—that's the time to act; that's the
job of the FBI. To let a Soviet spy stay
on the loose for another day or another
week because some important meeting
with the Soviets is coming up does not
seem at all like the right thing to do. I
think we did the right thing. The FBI
acted in accordance with their
instructions.
Q. But why now, why then? We
have known about him for 3 years.
Why then?
A. Because he was caught red-
handed, because he had been spying on
us. And the time to arrest him is when
you can catch him. And we did so.
Q. So you are not willing to admit
that there was some mistake?
A. No, there was no mistake.
Q. No mistake. Why did the Presi-
dent urge the Americans to go to the
town meeting in the Soviet Union? If
he had said not to go, it would have
sent a signal: no business as usual —
but it wouldn't have disrupted neces-
sarily— would it have disrupted the
presummit planning?
A. You are speaking of the Chautau-
qua Conference that begins this
weekend. The President didn't urge peo-
ple to go. He said that he would not urge
them to stay home or to go, that they
were free to go. This is a private con-
ference, not a government conference.
Some are not going, but most have gone.
Q. Some are saying that they got a
phone call from the White House say-
ing the President would like you to go.
A. I haven't heard that. I think that
there is an opportunity for those who
have gone to use the occasion as a place
to set forth what we believe is the right
thing to do about Daniloff and about
human freedoms in general and that it's
a platform for us right within the Soviet
Union to talk about our beliefs on this.
There are others who feel that the action
is so abhorrent to us that they don't
want to go. And the policy of the
government has been that each person
should decide for themself.
Q. Let me ask you to answer the
criticism that's coming mainly from
conservatives, but from other quarters
as well. That is that the President
caved in, that he is now too hungry for
a summit, and that he has agreed to
what looks like a swap and this
release so far, and they sent or in some
way signaled that he wanted this town
meeting to go on and that he just isn't
being tough enough.
A. That would be a most unfair con-
clusion. The President certainly did not
cave in. The President has been and con-
tinues to be very tough on this issue. The
release, the mutual release of the two
prisoners into the hands of their
embassies was a humanitarian step. You
saw Nick Daniloff on television a few
minutes ago and you saw him say how
pleased and joyous he was to be out of
the awful conditions that he was sub-
jected to, an 8-by-10 cell, a cellmate who
probably himself was a KGB agent, in-
terrogated 4 hours a day— terrible condi-
tions. And in a humanitarian decision,
the President released him as well as our
prisoner, who was imprisoned in a much
more comfortable jail in New York. I
believe we gained from that exchange.
But this was only an interim step,
and there will be more steps to come,
and those steps will not be equivalents,
and there will be no swap on a one-for-
one basis of these two men.
Q. Was there concern about Nick
Daniloff's psychological condition?
A. I think there was concern that
the pressure of being jailed like that, the
pressure of that kind of interrogation,
the pressure of living in close quarters
with somebody who was spying on you
every moment, might eventually get to
him. I think none of us can be sure as to
just how we would react under similar
circumstances. And that it was a
humanitarian necessity to get him out of
there.
Q. Another incident is out there
ready to become an issue, and that is
the UN Soviet mission. We have
ordered the Soviets to reduce the
number of their people at their mis-
sions by one-third, but the Soviet
Ambassador at the United Nations
says they are not going to do that;
we've ordered it, they are not going to
do that. Is this now going to con-
tribute to the increase in tension?
A. The size of their mission to the
United States is far beyond that
necessary to perform their function at
the United Nations. Many of their peo-
ple, including Zakharov, are used to spy
/ember 1986
53
EUROPE
in the United States, and we have
ordered them to reduce the size of their
mission, and they will do so.
Q. Are you sure? He says —
A. We will insist that they do so.
Q. Could this become a big
controversy?
A. I suppose it could, but we are
right, and when we are right, we must
stick to our principles.
Q. Do you think that there will be
a Reagan-Gorbachev summit this year?
A. I continue to be optimistic. I
think that the Soviets need a summit,
want a summit, and we would like to
have a summit. But we are not ready to
pay for a summit. The world will be bet-
ter off if there is a summit and if these
two leaders can talk with each other.
But whether there is or is not a summit
will not be the end of the world, if there
is not. We hope there will be, but we are
not ready to pay for one.
Q. Do the Soviets want it more
than we want it?
A. I think it is possibly more to their
advantage than it is to us. I think
possibly they need it more than we need
it. But it remains to be seen. ■
Secretary's News Briefing
of September 20
Secretary Shultz 's news briefing
following his meeting with Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
on September 20, 1986.1
Foreign Minister [Eduard] Shevardnadze
and I have concluded 2 days of serious,
substantive talks that have included
around an hour session with the Presi-
dent. Altogether between us, we have
spent around 14 hours together in
various ways, and we covered a full
agenda.
These 2 days have indicated that
considerable potential for progress
exists, but the cloud that hangs over all
this is the fact that [U.S. News & World
Report correspondent] Nicholas Daniloff
is not free to leave the Soviet Union.
That issue was at the top of our agenda
throughout these meetings. Other
human rights issues also received full
attention. The case of Nicholas Daniloff
must be brought to a satisfactory resolu-
tion quickly if the potential that exists is
to be realized.
I said that our full agenda was
covered; and, as I have just said, there
was extensive discussion, mostly in
direct discussions between Minister
Shevardnadze and me, in the general
area of human rights. We had a fair
amount of time devoted to regional
issues in general terms and one or two
specific areas. We reviewed briefly our
bilateral relations, and the work pro-
gram and arrangements for moving it
forward were reviewed, and that seems
to be in order.
On arms control, we in the United
States see the potential for progress in
reducing strategic, perhaps especially
intermediate nuclear, forces and in some
other subjects, such as nuclear risk
reduction centers and chemical weapons,
particularly on the problem of prolifera-
tion of chemical weapons. We made clear
our interest in realistic progress on
nuclear testing, and we each were in
touch with our negotiators in Stockholm,
wanting to see a successful conclusion of
that negotiation on terms that are
sensible.
If there are any questions, I will be
glad to answer.
Q. If this cloud of the Daniloff
case continues to hang over the rela-
tions between the United States and
the Soviet Union, can there be a sum-
mit? Can there be further preparations
for a summit?
A. There certainly can be prepara-
tions, and we spent a great deal of time
in discussing the substance of issues that
need to be worked out and worked up to
make a summit meeting a successful
meeting. At the same time, I think it is
difficult to think of a fruitful summit
without these cases being resolved
because they are going to wind up con-
suming great blocks of the time. So I
believe it is of urgent importance to
resolve these cases, not just because of
the summit but because of the
humanitarian concern involved.
Q. Can I follow that up? Do we —
do I infer correctly that the United
States, for all its emphasis on this
issue, made no real progress in
convincing the Soviet Union of the
importance to which we attach it?
A. I think they see the importanc
that we attach to it; and, of course, W'
did spend, the Minister and I, a very
large amount of time talking about it.
I'm sorry to say we weren't able to
resolve it, but I think we certainly
explored it in detail; and I hope that '
will be able to resolve it as not too mu
time passes because it is extraordinar
important. But the fact of the matter
it remains— Nick Daniloff remains in t
Soviet Union unable to leave.
Q. Do you believe that you made J
enough progress on arms control an i
other issues at these meetings so th;
if the Daniloff case is resolved, you
would then be able to set a date for
summit?
A. There was real progress made
and I think there is the potential for
good work in Geneva. Of course, we
were well coordinated with our Genev
negotiators, and they are fully informi
practically as we go along, on what is
said here.
So there are possibilities. As you
have all heard me say many times, yoi I
don't have an agreement until you hav •
an agreement. I'm not too big on talki
about the amount of progress, but the! '
are quite a few items that seemed to b
insoluble a year ago that are working
themselves out— or 6 months ago, that
are working themselves out. So I think '
those things can be pointed to.
I believe that a meeting ought to 1
a well-prepared meeting, and it ought t
have some significant results to it. The I
President has always said that, and we
continue to work to bring that about.
Q. Two questions: One, did you |>
agree with Mr. Shevardnadze on a
timeframe for a followup meeting
between the two of you to discuss
preparations for the summit? And
secondly, can you give us at least soBj
characterization of Mr. [Mikhail]
Gorbachev's letter which we were tol.
deals extensively on arms control. Is
that a basis for your saying that then,
has beeen real progress made in that ,
field?
A. First of all, we didn't discuss a
timeframe for some further work on ou
part, but we have put in place now a
pretty wide-ranging set of arrangement I
for discussing practically any subject yo'
can think of that the two countries are
involved in, and these groups have been I
quite active. Of course, some are set up I
as negotiating groups, such as those
54
Department of State Bulleth
EUROPE
gotiating in Geneva; and those go
;.vard and, I think, will have been
iSrgized by the meetings that took
Je this summer and also by some of
lathings that were contained in Mr.
Ibachev's letter and which we dis-
ced in our meetings here in
rshington.
I So I think what we see is a process
U continues to move along, but I don't
fc anything for you on the question of
leframe.
iQ. Is it conceivable to you that
i thing could happen that could
fik the ice so that a summit could be
?1 still this year, or is the time
lied when that will be possible?
A. I don't think the time has passed
|n that's possible, but I do think it's
< ntial to get the Daniloff case
Jived. I would like to see myself some
fcrtant motion on other human rights
les— and we discussed them in
lil— such as emigration and some of
internal problems. But at any rate, I
jk that the Daniloff case hangs over
i and we need to work hard to
jive it, and are.
Q. Shevardnadze has just said at
nress conference basically that the
a ed States is — someone in the
r ed States has tried maliciously to
4k progress. He talks about the
led Nations and Daniloff. He seems
j2 taking equally as hard a position
>1 as he did before the meeting.
Can you tell us anything about the
aussions with the Soviets on both
«e issues, and was any progress at
luade?
B\.. It's hard to think that progress is
je as long as he is there and is not
Ito leave. We discussed, in a
nghtforward and rational way, all of
3ns and outs of various aspects of
Kase.
pur action in expelling 25 Soviets
ft the UN Mission is an unrelated
in. We did discuss that, and I
pined the basis for it. He argued
i it, but nevertheless we discussed
1 So we discussed all aspects of this
I And, as I've said, we have not been
Ito resolve it, but we will keep work-
!>n it.
[}. I have a follow up. He suggests
Se will be retaliation if the 25 are
filed. Did he tell you what that
: ialion might be?
JL No. I don't know what actions
ill take; but I do know this, that the
tdent's powder is dry.
Secretary Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze at the Department of State.
Q. Could I ask you to expand a bit
on your statement that a series of
arrangements have been made for fur-
thering progress on arms control and
other issues? Do you expect the work-
ing groups that worked in August,
leading for this meeting, to continue
at that sort of level? Would you expect
to go to the Soviet Union for further
talks? Would you expect to have a
meeting next week or the week after
with Shevardnadze in New York? Can
you be any more specific about those
arrangements, setting aside for a
moment what you've obviously made
plain, which is that no conclusions
could be reached given the hanging of
the Daniloff case at the moment?
A. As far as the nuclear and space
talks are concerned, most of the people
who met this summer about that are
meeting in Geneva. It may or may not be
useful; there's no particular plan for
reconvening the somewhat enlarged
group which, from our standpoint,
means that the Geneva team and, in
some respects, the Washington team
that are working most directly on these
things, met together with Soviet
counterparts. It may be that that will be
useful at some point, but there's no plan
for it.
The negotiations, obviously, are
going forward. The round has just
started. And I think, given the amount
of preparations and the effort put into it,
perhaps the rounds will start relatively
fast.
In general characterization of these
rounds is that they start off, and there is
a kind of leisurely pace and sparring
around and taking positions that have
long since been abandoned, but never-
theless, put back on the table, and so on.
And you get about to the last week or so
of the negotiation, and things really
start to move. And our effort,
deliberately and by design, with the
Soviet Union has been to say, let us get
these talks to start with the kind of pace
that they often get in the last week or
so, so that the full amount of time can be
devoted a more genuine kind of negotia-
tions. And that's what we're trying to
see.
Of course, the Stockholm confer-
ence, we'll know before long, what out-
come, if any, there is there. We do have
in place understood arrangements for
handling our bilateral relations, and
we've had a continuing round of discus-
sions and now one at the under secretary
level on an overall basis on regional
issues.
So all of these things are, I think,
under good control organizationally.
That's not the problem.
Q. No involvement for you,
thought at this point, as part of those
arrangements, as far as direct
meetings are concerned?
A. I keep track and so does Mr.
Shevardnadze. I think that if it seems
worthwhile to have a meeting, we can
easily arrange one.
:ember 1986
55
EUROPE
Q. Where? In New York?
A. I might say that we have, on a
personal level, I think a very good
capacity to communicate. So we both
work to have that on a straightforward
basis.
Q. Is that a possibility — that there
will be a New York meeting between
you two?
A. It's a possibility, but there is no
plan for it. But, certainly, if there is
anything important to talk about, I'm
ready to talk about it. I'm sure he is.
Q. Did Mr. Shevardnadze exhibit
to you what you regard as a sincere
interest in trying to find a way out of
the Daniloff affair?
A. I don't like the business of
"somebody's sincere, he isn't sincere,"
or something. You have to look at the
content. We didn't get that far on the
content, although we did have a real
exchange on it. I don't have any doubt in
my mind that Mr. Shevardnadze has
approached our discussions in a good-
faith way, and I've tried to do likewise
with him.
Q. Did he indicate to you any flex-
ibility on the Soviet position the
slightest bit?
A. I'm not going to try to
characterize the ins and outs of our
discussion of this. I think it's better that
way. What I can say is that all aspects of
this and possible ways of getting at it
were talked about by me, by him, in one
way or another; and we haven't resolved
the matter but it is very much under
continuing review.
Certainly I hope, and I believe he
hopes, that we will be able to do so
because it is a cloud that hangs over
this and there are potential opportunities
here. It is very difficult to realize on
them until we can get this out of the
way. That's the fact of the matter.
Q. When you were answering Jim
Anderson's questions about the effect
of the Daniloff case on the possibility
of a summit, you said it would be
difficult to consider going ahead while
these cases were pending. Could you
say what other case or cases you had
in mind?
A. I'm talking about the Daniloff
case.
Q. And only the Daniloff case?
A. That is the principal problem.
From their standpoint, they have [Soviet
UN employee, Gennadiy F.] Zakharov.
We think that's a totally different propo-
sition, and there are various other issues
involved here. But, at any rate, from our
standpoint, it's the Daniloff case.
What I've said was, it is hard for me
to think of a genuinely fruitful summit
meeting under these circumstances
because so much of the time, and the
preoccupation, will be consumed by this
case and understandably so. So I think
we should get it resolved.
Q. You and Mr. Shevardnadze
have in past meetings like this agreed
on a set of adjectives which you use to
describe your encounter. You've not
done that this time, but can you tell us
what adjectives you would apply to
this 2 days of meetings?
A. In terms of the substance of the
matters discussed in our plenary ses-
sions, where we were talking about the
types of subjects we generally wrestle
with, they were serious, they were con-
structive, they were positive, and
conducted in a straightforward way. I
think I would, in other words, apply
"plus" type adjectives to it.
As far as the Daniloff case and other
aspects of our human rights discussions
are concerned, certainly they were direct
and serious discussions, and I unfor-
tunately have to report that we weren't
able to resolve the issue.
Q. In the 14 hours that you spent
with Mr. Shevardnadze, approximately
how much of the time did you spend
discussing Daniloff? And, also, of the
individual face-to-face talks, was that
primarily devoted to Daniloff?
A. He requested a private meeting
at the beginning, and I was glad to
accede to that, because if he hadn't
requested it, I think I would have. But
he wanted, first of all, to tell me that he
had a letter to deliver from Mr.
Gorbachev to the President, and he gave
me some indication of the content of the
letter without going into full detail.
And then, however, we spent the
bulk of our time in private meetings, and
I think that all of the time in the first
batch that was allocated in the morning
was spent on— virtually on this question,
and with the President, of course, he
delivered the letter and explained a little
of its contents. But the President, I
think— I was there, and so I saw the
President's depth of conviction and con-
cern about this case was very evident.
And from a comment that Mr.
Shevardnadze made to me later on, it's
clear that he could readily see how
strongly the President felt about it. So
there's no doubt about their knowledge
of how we feel.
Q. On that point, did you detect
surprise or miscalculation on the pa'
of Mr. Shevardnadze as to the deptl
the American reaction and feeling o
this case that the U.S. would stop
progress or movement on other issu
because of it?
A. We discussed the issue on its
merits, at least as I saw it, and he
responded. We didn't— I don't think t
they take the position now that we
should regard this as inconsequential I
and forget about it. Nobody is arguinj '
that, and certainly it wouldn't be wor
while. It's not worth the time to talk
that way. It's clearly a matter of gem i!
importance to us, and we have to get "
resolved, and it's easy enough to reso
Let him out.
Q. If you didn't have the Danilo '
case, do you think we'd have — we'd I
talking here about a set date for th< '
summit, or are there other issues th
would have held that up by now?
A. I, of course, can't speak for th
Soviet Union on that, but from the
standpoint of the United States, as yc i
know, we have been prepared to recei (
Mr. Gorbachev. I do think that there ; (
some very promising opportunities he <
and so we would like to capitalize on ,
them. But I'm not— whether the Sovit
Union is prepared to set a date— I can ,
say that. I don't know that
Q. Conversely, you are not
prepared to welcome Mr. Gorbachev
this point? Are you saying that then
cannot be a summit date set until Mi
Daniloff is released?
A. I'll just repeat what I said. Thj|,
we should get this case resolved, first (
and foremost, out of our humanitarian L
concern for a fellow American who's
being held against his will in the Sovie .
Union. And, beyond that, that it is har
to imagine a fruitful summit meeting
while the case is unresolved, because il
going to take up a large portion of the
time and be a preoccupation in the tim
when it isn't being directly discussed. •
it ought to be resolved, and it can be
resolved.
Q. Could you tell us whether
among the issues you made progress
on was the question of strategic
defense and whether there should be
an amendment to the ABM (Anti-
ballistic Missile) Treaty?
A. We discussed the subject of
strategic defense at considerable lengtl
and I can't say that we had anything to
say to each other that genuinely seemei
to narrow the issues. But I felt, myself,
that the quality of the discourse was
56
Department of State Bullet1
EUROPE
tiewhat more penetrating and better,
1 we really engaged with the subject.
So maybe that's a little bit of head-
•[, but I would not have— and if I had
order of probability of something
t's likely to be jelled soon, that would
be high on my list. But I think the
;ussion in greater depth of the
;nse/defense relationship and the
aning of the President's proposal—
ybe it's just that we explained it so
efully, we thought we were being per-
sive, but the genuine meaning of the
jsident's proposal and what it's really
lUt.
I believe they listened very carefully
t. I'll just put it that way.
! Q. Did Mr. Shevardnadze at any
)e during the 2 days of discussions
,ver from his government's insist-
ie that the Daniloff and Zakharov
:!es be treated on an equal basis?
j A. We felt that they were distinc-
fe; not related.
Q. Would you explain that?
A. That is, his view is that— well,
■ not going to state his side of the
k. He's talking to the press and can
(that. But from our standpoint,
piloff is a hostage and is not a spy. He
I not been a person employed by the
f>. Government or taking instructions
m the U.S. Government or in some
nner engaging in a process of
■ionage on behalf of the U.S. Govern-
pt, as he has been accused of being,
i. so we believe he is innocent of that
•rge.
Q. How close are the two sides on
i agreement on INF [intermediate-
!ge nuclear forces] and was any
rgress made?
I A. I think there was some progress
ide in INF, and that's perhaps one of
i promising areas, and that's my opin-
», and I think if you ask that question
Mr. Shevardnadze, he'll probably say
It's his opinion. At least that's what
itold me.
Secretary's News Conference
of September 25
'Press release 186.
Secretary Shultz 's news conference
with American journalists at the UN
Plaza Hotel in New York on September
25. 1986.1
Q. Could you give us an assessment,
please, of the efforts to reach an
agreement on [U.S. News & World
Report correspondent Nicholas]
Daniloff?
A. I don't want to get into that in
any detail. It's under discussion. I've
had, as you know, a couple of meetings
with Mr. Shevardnadze [Soviet Foreign
Minister] here in New York. And just
where this will go, I don't know, and I
don't think it particularly helps for me to
speculate about it or give any detailed
accounting about it right now.
Q. Are you going to meet him
again before you leave tomorrow
morning?
A. I don't want to discuss what kind
of structured meetings might take place
or what might be possible. I'm planning
to leave tomorrow morning, as you
know, and go back to Washington and be
back here Sunday. As I understand it,
he-
Q. The Soviet spokesman—
A. —he leaves the United States on
Tuesday some time.
Q. Do you feel the pressure of any
deadline because of that?
A. Obviously, it's desirable to get
this matter settled as soon as possible, if
we can settle it on the right basis. At the
same time, I think we have to be
prepared for the fact that that may not
be possible. So we want to work hard to
try to get it settled, but we have to
remember that it needs to be settled
properly.
Q. Do you see this Tuesday as sort
of a deadline here, or a deadline?
A. There are many ways for us to
talk to the Soviet Union. We have good
capacity to communicate. That's never
been a problem. But I think Mr.
Shevardnadze and I have both worked at
having a good personal capability of talk-
ing directly with each other so it's cer-
tainly useful to try to do it while he's
here, and I hope it can be done. But I
don't think it's good to sort of put
yourself up against a deadline that just
happens to reflect travel schedules.
Q. But you're not really —
A. But at the same time we try to
work it out.
Q. You're not ruling out another
meeting perhaps Sunday, Monday, or
Tuesday here in New York?
A. I would imagine that we'll have
another meeting at some point, cer-
tainly. I would hope so.
Q. Another meeting is necessary
at this point before you can arrive at a
settlement?
A. The matter is not settled. So
that's the situation.
Q. Can you tell us a little bit about
Shevardnadze in the continuum of hav-
ing met him initially and how he has or
has not grown in the position; how you
communicate with him? You called him
"my friend" in past occasions. You
haven't been doing that in this par-
ticular round of things. How are the
two of you?
A. I think on a personal level we
have a friendly relationship, and we
want to keep it that way. My wife has
developed a friendship with his wife. We
treat them in a courteous way, and I
think that's the right way to go about it.
It has seemed to me from the begin-
ning that it's not that he grows up; he's
a grown person. After all, he became the
head person in the state of Georgia
which is a state of great importance in
the Soviet Union, and so he's a person of
talent and ability to prove it. He's under-
taking this assignment and seems to
handle it well, as far as I can see.
Q. Mr. Gerasimov [Soviet Foreign
Ministry spokesman] told us earlier
that the Soviets are asking to recon-
sider your order to expel the 25
Soviets. Is this a matter that can be
reconsidered?
A. It's something that has been
done and there it stands. We don't have
any plan to change that.
Q. Is it tangling your already
difficult talks on the Daniloff case, or
are you able to keep it separate? Or
are they trying to tangle it with it?
A. I don't think it's a good thing to
get into sort of the insides of the discus-
sion. I'm perfectly glad to say, yes,
we've had discussions, and so on. But as
to the nature of them, I think that's
something that I prefer to keep private.
/ember 1986
57
EUROPE
Q. Can you tell us whether the
Soviet Foreign Minister, in this case,
is following the format of a previous
occupant of his position of negotia-
tions of this type? Do you end up
reading positions? Do you end up with
a more give-and-take on a matter as
narrow as this Daniloff affair?
A. In my meetings with Mr.
Shevardnadze, I'd say that they're very
conversational in a sense that we go
back and forth in our discussion, and it
depends somewhat on what's being
discussed and the desirability at the
moment of trying to be very careful and
precise about something.
And if you want to state some posi-
tion about some matter, whatever it is,
and you want to do it with precision and
clarity, it's usually a good idea to have a
piece of paper and go through it. So he
does that sometimes, and I do that
sometimes. But we have a good conver-
sational tone in our relationship.
Q. Did he ever get angry during
the rather blunt talks that you and the
President had with him over this case?
A. You have to ask him about that.
Q. Did he exhibit any?
A. He has good self-control, and I
don't know his— I'm not going to try to
read anything into that.
Q. Has he been flexible at all on
this issue? Has he demonstrated any
flexibility?
A. You want to try to get inside this
shell that I've constructed in various
ways, and I'm not going to let you do it.
[Laughter.]
Q. You haven't been standing on
street corners for 3 days. [Laughter.]
Q. I really don't want to ask you
about his table manners. I want to ask
you about the Soviet statement. There
are three bumpy bumps in the road to a
settlement. They say Daniloff,
[Gennadiy] Zakharov, and the UN
order — they don't, of course, like the
word "order" because they say you
can't order us about— and they say
there might be a fourth one, this order
which they don't want to call an
"order." If it's not rescinded, they're
going to retaliate.
From your perspective, how many
bumps, how many of these four items,
or perhaps others, are now bumps in
the road to a summit? Because, after
all, the summit is what possibly
transcends all these events.
A. I don't necessarily subscribe to
that. I think that— what are these
meetings for? They are for discussing
the full range of issues of interest to
both sides. We have a broad agenda and
so do they and so questions involving
humanitarian and human issues are part
of that agenda.
Now, as far as a summit is con-
cerned, we're in the same position we've
been in for some time. The President has
issued an invitation, and we'd like to see
it take place. We think there are impor-
tant matters to discuss. On some of
these matters, there seems to have been
some motion in recent months.
On the other hand, I believe it is
true. And perhaps what you're quoting
is— which I haven't seen— but they're
saying the same thing, that in the cir-
cumstances where we are now it's hard
to imagine a fruitful summit because the
whole thing would be dominated by
discussion of this question.
Q. Do you have any specific — do
you have any plans tonight for dinner?
Or what are you planning to do this
evening?
Q. Do you want us to follow you
around or not?
A. It isn't as though I'm not get-
ting enough to eat around here, but I do
have dinner planned with some of my
European friends.
Q. West European friends?
A. West European friends.
Q. Just to give us a little help. We
presume then if you're going to have a
meeting with Mr. Shevardnadze, it
won't be until next week; is that
right?
A. I've said what I had to say on
this discussion, and I'm just going to
leave it at that.
Q. On the question of the summit,
the Soviets have been saying rather
strongly right along they want a major
agreement, but now their definition of
a major agreement seems to be dimin-
ishing somewhat. They called the
Stockholm agreement a major agree-
ment, for example, in Shevardnadze's
speech.
I'm wondering if you have any
notion now of what kinds of arms
agreements which you think are
doable might be accomplished by the
end of the year and might provide the
kind of agenda that would be suitable
for a fruitful summit.
In other words, does it have to be
a START [strategic arms reduction
talks], INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces] agreement, or could it
be a combination of chemical, non-
proliferation, threshold test ban, that
kind of scope?
A. I don't want to try to list thing
because the next thing somebody will
say is that we've set out some condi- I
tions, which we haven't. We do think il
desirable. As the President has said
many, many times, to have results froru
the meeting we don't want to get in th •
position and won't get in the position- „
and I assume they don't want to
either— where we feel that because
there's a meeting we've got to accept
somel lii ng that we don't think is right.
We're not going to do that.
But I think there are a number of v
areas where things that at least I wouli n
consider worth doing might be done or
at least precipitated by the fact of a
meeting and ratified at the meeting. I \\
think what happens at meetings like th \
is more that the things get worked out, i
and maybe sometimes the finishing
touches get put on, although they're
basically worked out before the meetinj
and the meeting tends to ratify them
and look prospectively at where we go
from here.
I think that in most of the areas, it '
isn't as though there's a prospect of
something that's completed and you tie '
ribbon around it and you don't have to '
look at it any more; it's more in the
nature of things in which it looks as
though some clear-cut progress in a
positive direction can be made and set ii
place with the understanding that
there's a lot of follow-on work to do.
In the case of INF, for instance, we
continue to think, and they say, that the
idea is to eliminate those weapons. But 1
don't see a prospect of doing that in the
near term, but it may be that there's a
prospect of moving along that road. So
that's the nature of this set of questions.
Q. To return to what Mr.
Gerasimov said this afternoon, still in
line with the expulsions, he said,
"Because of many considerations,
including prestige considerations, we
must think of some kind of retaliatory
measures. That we have said, and we
must stand by it."
On Saturday you were asked, I
believe, in connection with the state-
ment by Shevardnadze about retalia-
tion, that — something to the effect
that the President would keep his
powder dry.
Do you have anything further to
add in light of Mr. Gerasimov's more
detailed comments?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Sorry for the speech. It was a
long question. [Laughter.]
A. Usually if you ask a short ques-
tion, I give you a long answer.
[Laughter.]
58
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
Q. When will Daniloff come home?
A. I wish I knew. The sooner the
er.
Q. Can you tell us on the logistics
, do you expect when an agreement
Cached with the Soviets that an
puncement would be made, or is
; of the negotiation how — you
w, how the news will dribble out
b wherever, or we just look to see
n Daniloff comes home on a plane,
omething like that, and then we'll
w it's done? Can you help us on
; score at least?
A. Of course, as far as Daniloff is
fcerned, it's done when he arrives
s or leaves there, and that's one of
things that we're working for here,
just how the structure of this, if we
ork it out, will come forward, I'm
repared to say.
Q. Could you address the possibil-
f'»f having Daniloff released without
lit ions, as you would like, and then
png Zakharov released and some
wet dissidents — maybe some well-
nvn Soviet dissidents released
Ir? Is that something that you
[Id think might happen?
\. I just have to keep giving you the
e answer over and over again, so
i don't you stop asking me?
ighter.]
^. Could I just follow that a —
lighter]— no. It's not to ask you
lit the specifics of the negotiations,
[just to get a sense of the back and
11 in these meetings that you've had
I Mr. Shevardnadze. Has there
ii a sense of progess beyond the
« sides making their position very
sr to each other? Has there been — it
lacterized by just an unchanging
lude on the Soviet side, or has it
ii an exchange of positions between
jlwo sides? Could you at least just
jthat?
]\. We would like to get this case
lived on a satisfactory basis, and so
ie working hard to see how that
It be done. I can't speak for them,
(having taken part in a variety of
Itiations of one kind or another, my
je is that Shevardnadze is also trying
fct it done.
3ut that doesn't mean that we're
jg to succeed in doing it. But I think
U is a genuine effort going on, on
I sides. But, beyond that, I think this,
J often the case in negotiations, it's
I to talk about progress or lack of
Iress, or optimism or pessimism, or
(ething. You either have resolved it,
|)u haven't, and it's— I think it has to
I that way.
Q. Can you tell us is it in the stage
where the elements of a satisfactory
resolution are in principle agreed on
by the two sides, and what you are
working out is the precise details of
timing and trials and the smaller bits
and pieces? Or is there now no
meeting of the minds?
A. I'm not just going to get inside
this little cocoon that I've built here, or
shell, or whatever I called it.
Q. An easy one for you, a piece of
cake. Short question, short answer.
Will the President veto the South
African sanctions bill tomorrow?
A. I read that that's what Larry
Speakes said he was going to do, so that
must be the case.
Q. On the 25, just another ques-
tion on principle: Is it your principle
that 25 people will leave, and that's
not negotiable, but does the composi-
tion of that 25— is that open to any
flexibility?
A. I think we've stated what our
position is. This basically goes back to
last March, and it reflects our view that,
being host to the United Nations, does
not mean that we should be host to intel-
ligence activities on the part of other
nations. And the huge number that the
Soviets have in their embassy beyond
what anybody else has, more than the
next two largest combined, and our
knowledge of the background of
people— many of the people in the
embassy and, of course, some of the
activities involved— leads us to conclude
that it is being used that way.
So we have called for a gradual
reduction to a size that's more in keep-
ing with undertaking what the UN mis-
sion as such needs. While, obviously, we
observe the numbers, and we know when
people leave, and when they come back,
we have to remember that many people
have multiple-entry visas. And so know-
ing just who is there and not there is a
problem unless they are ready to tell us,
and they haven't been ready to tell us.
And you remember that the Soviet
Ambassador to the United Nations
made— the time span escapes me here; a
couple of weeks ago, I think— a rather
confrontational statement about whether
they were going to do this. And that led
to our saying, well, we feel that in order
to meet our October 1 level, you needed
to have 25 people not there, and so we
gave them a list.
Q. The Russians say that they've
met that level already. Is a key to it
whether the United States will rescind
or modify its order naming specific
individuals and go with what you just
referred to as meeting the level by
October 1?
A. I think I've described our posi-
tion. That is our position. That's where it
stands, and that's what I have to say on
it.
Q. Is it a condition that these 25
have to leave, their number is below
218, they can then have additional peo-
ple come in to the United States to
come up to 218?
A. That's what we've told them.
Q. But not those 25, though. Not
those named 25. They can't bring them
back in.
A. That's right.
Q. Are you open to the possibility
of using the procedure outlined in the
headquarters act of going to the
Secretary General, presenting your
evidence against the 25 individuals and
having them excluded in that fashion?
A. The headquarters agreement is
very clear that there's nothing in our
agreement to be the host that would put
us in the position where we can't do the
things needed to protect our security,
and that's the posture that we're in, and
we believe that we're on sound ground
and intend to see this through.
Q. According to [UN Secretary
General] Perez de Cuellar's office, if
you would simply make the case of
each individual, then the United
Nations would have no argument, but
he says that as it is now being
presented, that it is not within the
confines of the host agreement. Do you
disagree with this?
A. I disagree with that. We think
that we're on sound ground.
'Press release 190 of Sept. 26, 1986.
i;mber 1986
59
EUROPE
President's and Secretary's
News Conference of September 30
President Reagan and Secretary
Shall: In I 'I a news conference at the
White House on September 30, 1986.1
Secretary Shultz. Good morning. The
Eastern District Court of New York
accepted the application of Gennadiy
Zakharov, a Soviet citizen assigned to
the UN Secretariat, to plead nolo con-
tendere to all three counts of the indict-
ment filed against him. The court has
remanded Mr. Zakharov into the custody
of the Soviet Ambassador to the United
States for the purpose of affecting his
immediate departure from this country.
It is expected that Mr. Zakharov will
leave the United States this afternoon.
During the discussions held over the
past 10 days, Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze has informed me that
Yuriy Orlov, one of the founders of the
[Moscow] Helsinki monitoring group and
a giant of the Soviet human rights move-
ment, will be allowed to leave the Soviet
Union. Mr. Orlov and his wife will depart
by October 7 and are expected to come
to this country. The precise timing and
means of their departure will be deter-
mined through diplomatic channels.
Yuriy Orlov, a physicist by profession
and member of the Armenian Academy
of Sciences, was chairman of Moscow's
Helsinki monitoring group until his
arrest in October 1977 for alleged anti-
Soviet activity.
The Helsinki monitors, a courageous
group of human rights activists, openly
attempted to hold the Soviet authorities
accountable to their commitments under
the Helsinki accords of 1975. They main-
tain direct contact with Western diplo-
mats and journalists in an effort to keep
them informed of Soviet human rights
abuses. Such well-known figures as
Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and
Anatoliy Shcharanskiy participated in
the Moscow Helsinki monitoring group,
and similar groups modeled on the
Moscow example sprang up in other
major Soviet cities.
Orlov was a founding member and
driving force behind the Helsinki
monitors. As chairman of the Moscow
group, he singled himself out for par-
ticular attention from the KGB, and was
caught up in the first wave of arrests of
group members. In 1978, he was sen-
tenced to 7 years in a strict-regime labor
camp and 5 years of internal exile. Since
1984, he has been forced to live in a
remote Siberian village in extremely
harsh physical conditions.
At age 62, Orlov is in extremely poor
health as a result of prolonged periods of
solitary confinement— up to 6 months at
a time— in labor camps, and severe
beatings, suffered both in camp and in
exile. Orlov's wife, Irena Valitova,
shared his commitment to the Helsinki
process. She has maintained regular con-
tact with Western embassies and jour-
nalists over the years since her hus-
band's arrest, and has steadfastly
worked to ameliorate the harsh condi-
tions of his confinement.
I think the President will be here in
a minute.
Q. Iceland?
President Reagan. Yes, that's what
I'm here to tell you about.
Well, I am pleased to announce that
General Secretary Gorbachev and I will
meet October 11-12 in Reykjavik,
Iceland. The meeting was proposed by
General Secretary Gorbachev, and I've
accepted; and it will take place in the
context of preparations for the General
Secretary's visit to the United States,
which was agreed to at Geneva in
November of 1985. And I might say the
United States and the Soviet Union
appreciate the willingness of the Govern-
ment of Iceland to make this meeting in
Reykjavik possible. So I know you'll all
be on your best manners.
Q. Does this mean that the
chances for an arms agreement, the
fact that you're going to meet with
Mr. Gorbachev before he comes to the
United States— will that mean that you
have something ready for signature
then when you meet with him here?
President Reagan. I don't believe
anything of that kind. I don't think this
is going to be just a signing meeting at
all. And I have no way of knowing what
the outcome will be as we continue with
our people in Geneva.
Q. What do you think our chances
are?
President Reagan. I've said for a
long time that I think the chances are
better than they've been in many years
for reaching an agreement on arms
reductions.
Q. But why did you change your
mind on this? All year you had seemed
to oppose the idea of a meeting in a
neutral country, and demanded that
was the General Secretary's turn to I
come to the United States. And is
there any agenda for this meeting? ;|
you going to have any kind of
agreements on INF (intermediate-
range nuclear forces) and risk-
reduction centers?
President Reagan. No. This in nc
way discounts the fact of what we've
said about a summit. This is not a sum I
mit; this was a suggestion of his that H
and I, one-on-one, meet earlier, and
make that in a neutral country becaus>i
we have agreed that as to the summit; !
that this one would be here and the ne
one would be in their country.
Q. No agreements at this meetin
sir? And no agreements at the meetii
next week?
President Reagan. I don't know.
All we've agreed upon is that we're
going to have a meeting.
Q. Does this commitment still co
tinue, though, for the General
Secretary to come to the United Stat
for a summit that would actually pro
duce some sort of arms control
agreement?
President Reagan. I hoped for th.l
the last time we met, and I'll continue
hope for that. And our arms negotiate]
have continued to meet. Both sides ha\ i
made proposals, and there have been d
ferences between them, and so far tho?
differences have not been reconciled.
Q. How would you now say the
[U.S. News & World Report corre-
spondent Nicholas] Daniloff affair
either laid the groundwork for this
special meeting or created an obstacle
What is your assessment of this
whole —
President Reagan. The release of
Daniloff made the meeting possible. I
could not have accepted and held that
meeting if he was still being held.
Q. On that subject, we believe the
Soviets seized Daniloff because of oui
arrest of Zakharov, and they wanted
Zakharov out. They are now going to
get Zakharov out. What do you say to
those who say that you've lost in that
trade, and they got what they wanted!
President Reagan. No, not at all.
There was no connection between these
two releases, and I don't know just wha
you [to Secretary Shultz] have said so fa
about this, but there were other arrange
ments with regard to Zakharov that
resulted in his being freed.
60
Department of State Bulletir
Q. Do you think the world is going
>elieve there was no connection
en in fact Daniloff comes out one
, and Zakharov goes zip through
magistrate's the next and—
President Reagan. May I point out
rou that there have been several
;ances over the recent years in which
have arrested a spy, convicted a spy
e in this country, and in each
tance, we ended up, rather than giv-
them board and room here, we ended
exchanging them for dissidents and
.pie who wanted exit from the Soviet
ion.
Q. Do we get any more than just
lov? Are there other dissidents?
President Reagan. I'm not going to
oment on that. Somebody else has
eady.
Q. When you said that Daniloff
1 a hostage, what message do you
ve for other American hostages
lay, for instance those in Lebanon
10 have not been beneficiary to these
ajotiations?
President Reagan. I'm glad that
s is the last question, and I've looked
ward to answering this one. I under-
bid I'm scheduled soon for a press con-
ence, and I'm going to save all the
munition for that, so I'll see you
lin.
Q. When is that?
President Reagan. They'll announce
> date at the proper time.
Q. Didn't you just announce it?
President Reagan. To answer this
estion, I understand the sorrow, the
ief of the families of the hostages who
2 held in Beirut— we assume they are
Id in Beirut— because that's the kind
hostage situation this is. There has
ver been a direct contact with us from
j holders of those hostages, the kid-
ppers, but there hasn't been a day
ice they were taken that we have not
en engaged in efforts to get them out.
id I can just add this, that sometimes
i thought we were on the verge of
ing that, and then there has been a
arp disappointment.
So as I say, I can understand the
milies— as if this looks at one, but look
the difference! Here we are dealing
th a government with which we have
olomatic relations. In the other, we're
i aling with faceless terrorists who have
ily, through others, issued a demand
at cannot be met; and we, as I say,
ere is not a day that goes by that we
e not bending every effort to get those
•ople home.
Q. Come back when you can stay
longer.
President Reagan. Yes, sometime
soon. You let me know when the date is.
Q. Do you still say the Soviets
blinked, sir?
President Reagan. Shouldn't have
said that. No comment. [Laughter.]
Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you
answer those who say that what this
Daniloff arrangement really means is
that the Soviets now have license any
time they want to get out a captured
KGB spy, all they've got to do is grab
an American inside the Soviet Union?
Secretary Shultz. I think that we
have to look at our overall objectives
here, and then judge what has happened
including the answer to that question, in
the light of our objectives. Let me set
them out for you.
First of all, in this broad range of
events that are taking place— last week,
this week— we need to handle them in a
strong, in a realistic, in a persevering
way and in a way that gets results.
Second, we want to get Daniloff out.
Third, we want to address your question
in part by making it clear that we have
run out of any patience with the idea of
any country using its people in the UN
Mission as a platform for espionage
against the United States; and at the
same time, we want to handle these mat-
ters as best we can so that the ongoing
potentially positive results from our
negotiations and discussions with the
Soviet Union can continue and have a
chance of bearing fruit. Those were our
objectives.
Now, Daniloff is out. The Soviets
have assured us that their numbers in
the UN mission presently are less than
those that we set out for October 1. As
in their terms, they decided to do that
for efficiency in running their mission.
But at any rate, from our standpoint, the
numbers are there.
Second, they have told us— and our
own information confirms— that the
majority of those on the list we gave
them have left, and they have described
to us their conception of a normal rota-
tion process. But those people have left.
They asked us, in the course of our
discussions, for a grace period and that
was extended by 2 weeks; and we expect
to have further information by the time
that expires. So we have been achieving
our objectives in that sense. And we
have managed in the discussions that
were held here and in the response and
the prospective meeting in Iceland,
shows we have managed to keep the
EUROPE
possibility of positive results in this rela-
tionship going. So overall, I think, it's
been a pretty good week for us, and I
hope they may feel the same way.
Q. Two weeks ago, you wouldn't
take the Soviets' word for the rota-
tion. In fact, it was treated with a lit-
tle bit of almost sarcasm.
Secretary Shultz. What rotation are
you talking— what do you mean by
rotation?
Q. Then let me back up. It sounds
to me as you've now done what 2
weeks ago you refused to do about the
UN mission. You wanted to see
documents; you wouldn't take their
word for it that they've left.
On top of that, in a blanket accu-
sation, allegation, the Administration
said these 25 are spies. It strikes me
now — and please correct me if I'm
wrong— that in the negotiations the
United States has given a little
ground. It has agreed to take their
word for it, number one, on who's left
and who hasn't left. And number two,
to withdraw the notion that all 25 are
spies, because clearly if you're going
to let them stay 2 weeks, I don't sup-
pose you'd allow spies to hang around
for an extra 2 weeks if you really knew
they were spies.
Secretary Shultz. The numbers that
we sought, we have attained, and we
have had an explicit discussion with
them about that. Obviously, we keep
track of the numbers, but a reason, for
example, why it's difficult for us to know
precisely what their level is, is that if
somebody in their mission who has a
multiple-entry visa returns to Moscow,
we don't know whether he's coming back
or not until he comes back. So that's
why we have to have a discussion about
this matter— and we have had it. And so
we have their estimate and description
of that staffing level.
Furthermore, we've had an explicit
discussion about the 25— obviously, they
see it differently than we do— but from
our standpoint the important thing is
that most of them have left; and I
believe we will deal successfully with the
balance of this problem. So overall, I
think that what we are seeking, namely,
to make it clear to everyone— not only
the Soviet Union— that the use of the
UN mission as an espionage platform is
out. And I think that's one of the things
that has come out of this that's very
strong and a very important point.
ovember 1986
61
EUROPE
Q. Can you tell us what the agenda
is for Iceland and how that works with
any prospective summit meeting, vis-a-
ris an arms control agreement or the
framework of a Vladivostok-type
agreement perhaps on INF?
Secretary Shultz. This is a
preparatory meeting proposed as such,
and accepted as such, and in a way, it's
very much a part of the process that's
been going on with increasing intensity
over the last 2 or 3 months where we've
had all sorts of special groups meeting
on all the different subjects that we have
under review. So this is a meeting that
will give a special push, obviously, and I
think it's a very good idea, a good thing.
Now, our agenda will be our regular
agenda. Obviously, we're going to talk
about arms control issues, and they are
important, and we have made progress
in a number of areas. You mentioned
INF— that's one of them. We're going to
talk about various bilateral problems;
we're going to talk about regional issues;
you can be sure that we're going to keep
the subject of human rights on the
agenda. So all of these subjects will, in
various ways, be discussed.
I think that if we can move things to
the point where, on some significant
things— well, they're all significant, but
especially significant things— we can see
the gap closed, and the prospect of an
agreement, that's all to the good. But of
course, we have to look at the content,
and both be satisfied with the contents.
But there has been enough motion and
enough sense of the importance of this
that perhaps this meeting can do what is
necessary to energize our own, both,
negotiators, and provide for a productive
meeting, summit meeting in the United
States, hopefully still in 1986.
Q. Could you tell us how many of
the 25, on the list of the Soviet
mission, are still in the United States,
and will any of them be allowed to
remain in the United States after the
2-week grace period?
Secretary Shultz. I don't want to
specify the numbers; we know the
numbers, in discussing this issue, some
questions have been raised about some
members of the group; and we're willing
to hear what they have to say about
that. But, at any rate, we expect to see
25 people that we think have an associa-
tion with intelligence activities leave.
Q. You've said this is a
preparatory summit. Because after all,
it is a summit; and this Administra-
tion's policy has been that summits
must be carefully prepared and must
have a very good chance of tangible
results. If I understood the President
correctly, he's not certain what's
going to come out of this summit. Why
did your policy change, and don't you
take a risk that in fact nothing will
come out?
Secretary Shultz. In the announce-
ment that the President read, I believe
he calls it a "meeting," but you're the
labeler. That's the way it is described by
them to us and us to them— that it is a
preparatory meeting. Obviously, it's at
the level of heads of state.
Now, in a real sense, it is being
carefully prepared. We have been work-
ing hard on all of the different areas of
subject matter for a long time, and, as I
said, with great intensity this summer.
We had our arms control— Geneva arms
control team in Moscow for a couple of
days, and theirs here for a couple of
days. We've had a number of meetings
on regional issues. We had an overall
meeting which Under Secretary Arma-
cost chaired. We've had a major discus-
sion of bilateral issues. And we've also
discussed the human rights area.
So there's been a lot of preparatory
work. And the question now is: through
a meeting of the two heads, will we be
able to energize this process still further
and make the summit meeting in
1986— which, as I said, we still hope
there will be in 1986— make it genuinely
productive?
Q. Could you please assess for us
the impact that the Daniloff case has
had on U.S. -Soviet relations? Some
people have suggested that, in fact,
instead of hurting chances for a sum-
mit, it has propelled chances for a
summit as we see this meeting next
week. That, in fact, it forced both
sides to stop the diplomatic posturing
and get serious about relations.
Secretary Shultz. I think the Presi-
dent put it right and said that something
like the Daniloff case doesn't contribute
to a summit; it tends to create a bad
atmosphere and tends to make people in
the United States concerned about what
will happen to them if they go to the
Soviet Union, and so on. So I don't think
that contributes anything.
On the other hand, it was an impedi-
ment. And, as we have said, it was hard
to imagine a fruitful summit while
Daniloff was being held. So his release
clears that atmosphere and, I think, will
enable us to move forward productively.
Q. When did the Soviets propose
this mini-summit? Was that in the let-
ter that Gorbachev sent through Mr.
Shevardnadze?
Secretary Shultz. The proposal c.
the preparatory meeting was in the
letter of General Secretary Gorbache
the President, which Shevardnadze
delivered about a week ago Friday, I
guess.
Q. Is Mr. Orlov and his wife— a s
they the only dissidents that we km i
of who will be allowed to leave in
return for Mr. Zakharov?
Secretary Shultz. We have a con I
uing dialogue with the Soviet Union I
about a large number of dissidents—
about divided families, about emigrat ft
generally— so there is an ongoing urg g
of them to take action in those areas, b
we'll continue that. Now, that's wher
I'll leave it.
Q. How important do you think
having this meeting is to the Soviet '
In your talks with Mr. Shevardnadz ;
did you get the feeling that Mr.
Daniloff would have been released i
these plans for a meeting in Iceland
had not been agreed to by the Unite
States?
Secretary Shultz. The Daniloff c;
and the various other aspects of it no [
doubt troubled them, but they certain
troubled us; and we were not about tc i
go, and I don't think one could have h I
a fruitful summit, without these matti <,
being settled.
Now, insofar as their assessment :
the need for this preparatory meeting
concerned, the fact that they suggest*
it in the first place shows that they fel I
could be a productive contribution to t \
dialogue. So I assume that is their beli
As we considered it and the President I
considered it, we agreed; and so the
meeting will be held.
Q. In the context of what you sal
earlier, do you think it's reasonable
expect an INF framework agreemem
to be reached in Iceland?
Secretary Shultz. I don't want to i
get into the prediction business beyoncfi
saying that there has been a great
change in the negotiating positions on I
INF— comparing now with, let's say, a
year and a half ago. So there's been a ip
of motion.
And in the discussions that we havi
had, there are suggestions of other
possible areas where agreement might I
be found. So I think there are reasonat
prospects.
But on all of these things you neve r
have an agreement until you have an
agreement, so it's a little hard to asses \<
just how far along we are.
62
November 19;
'
EUROPE
I Q. The order that you issued last
iring to cut the Soviet Mission back
P 100 — I believe it's 170 people—
kt's by April 1988— is that order still
changed and in effect?
Secretary Shultz. That is
changed. And what we did was we set
t various time periods. That's where
| number 25 came from. It was our
timate that it took 25 to get down to
e 218. And a week or so before we
mtified the 25 names, the Soviet UN
nbassador had issued a very confron-
tional statement about their will-
piess to meet the 218. That's what
ggered off the 25. So, at least as we
e it, we're getting somewhere.
Q. What assurances have you got
at the next time the FBI [Federal
ireau of Investigation] picks up a
spected Soviet spy the Soviets will
t pick up another American
wspaperman?
Secretary Shultz. There are all
rts of problems here, and I think that
e strong and resolute action by the
esident probably sends a pretty good
;ssage of how we feel about it and
lat we will do about it. So I think you
ve to look at all of these things as a
ckage.
But obviously the Soviet Union can
|:k up people in their country, and have
ler a long period of time. Just look at
e history of Mr. Orlov as an example.
Q. Is he the only one to come out?
i Orlov the only one?
Q. The Soviets have still not com-
itted themselves to attending a sum-
it in the United States. Is it your
eling that they're going to Iceland
ith the idea of waiting to see how
»t will turn out before they decide
(out a summit here?
Secretary Shultz. No. I think it is
ry clear that they recognize, as we do,
at the genuine summits will be the
xt one in the United States and the
lowing one in the Soviet Union. And
at is in everybody's plan and that is
lat's referred to in the statement that
e President read today. So there's no
ggestion that this meeting in Iceland
;a substitute for a summit. It's quite
e contrary; it's a preparation for the
mmit meeting.
Q. What are the chances that this
ill push back the timing?
Q. Can you tell — what grounds
d they cite for the need for this
eeting in Iceland and what was our
ason for accepting this notion after
we had rejected the notion of the two
leaders meeting on neutral territory
before?
Q. And you had rejected a
meeting in the fall because of the elec-
tion campaign.
Secretary Shultz. We are engaged
in a very important and very serious
effort to try to get control of the
escalating numbers of nuclear weapons
and, in whatever way we can, to get a
better handle on the tensions around the
world that erupt out of regional prob-
lems of various kinds, human rights
problems, even some of our bilateral
issues.
We have worked at it very hard, and
I observe that the Soviets have too. We
believe— and I think they do— that a real,
well-prepared, extensive summit meet-
ing in the United States, on the one
hand, and in the Soviet Union on the
other, can be a good thing. We want to
make it as good a thing as possible.
That's why this tremendous effort that
has been going on is being made.
Now, the General Secretary sug-
gested to the President that it would
help in this preparatory effort if the two
of them met perhaps a little less formally
than a summit meeting tends to be and
see if they can't push the ball along a
little bit in perhaps some of the areas
that show the most promise. And, as we
thought about it, it seemed like a sen-
sible idea.
So why not? I think the name of the
game here is to try to make progress
toward the objectives that we are seek-
ing, and this should help.
Q. Is Orlov the only one to come
out? We had heard that there may be
other dissidents.
Secretary Shultz. Whatever you
have heard, you haven't heard it
authoritatively. What I have said is
authoritatively what will happen, and
that is what we have to say on the
matter.
Q. Last Thursday you told a group
of reporters, in regard to the 25 Soviet
diplomats— the list that you gave
them— "That is something that has
been done. .There it stands. We don't
plan to change that." But you have
changed that.
Secretary Shultz. No. It stands.
Q. You are telling us that some of
the 25 might be able to stay if there is
some —
Secretary Shultz. No. You were
probing about the nature of our discus-
sion. We had some discussion about a
few people that Mr. Shevardnadze had
found very useful to him, and we talked
about that a little bit. But, anyway, our
list stands and basically people are
leaving.
Obviously, the Soviets say that's
because of their normal rotation.
Anyway, from our standpoint, if they
leave that's what counts. And those that
may still be here— when we get to
Reykjavik, we'll talk about that. But we
expect to see that fulfilled.
Q. Did you agree to the removal of
two specific names from that list? Two
senior intelligence officers —
Secretary Shultz. You're getting
the floor by shouting, but there's
somebody right there who has not asked
a question.
Q. Was there any sense that Mr.
Gorbachev said that if the President
did not agree to an Iceland presummit
meeting, that he would not be willing
to come to the United States this year
or soon afterwards?
Secretary Shultz. That was not the
nature of this exchange, and the ques-
tion of the Iceland meeting wasn't of
that character at all. I think you're sort
of misreading the whole thing.
The President received a letter, and
it had in it commentary about a wide
variety of matters. It wound up in effect
expressing the importance the General
Secretary attached to this whole process
and made the suggestion that if there
were a meeting of this kind in the near
future, that might be helpful.
We thought about it, and we
decided— the President decided— that
perhaps it could be, and we should be
willing to do those things of this sort
that may help this process along.
And it's really just as simple as that.
Nobody was playing toe-to-toe on this
thing.
Q. Why didn't the President not
tell the Soviets, in reply to that sug-
gestion, "Okay. If you agree to a date,
then certainly we want to have it in
the United States?" Why didn't he use
that opportunity to pin them down to a
summit date?
Secretary Shultz. Because I don't
think that sort of cat-and-mouse game
on these sorts of things is a productive
way to go about it.
We did explore carefully their con-
ception of this meeting as a preparatory
meeting and their desire, as well as ours,
to have a summit in 1986 in the United
States, if it's possible. And so that's
what we're shooting for.
ovember 1986
63
EUROPE
Q. Is it still your understanding of
the Soviet position that the formal
summit, if it's in the United States at
the end of the year, will be an occasion
to sign formal arms agreements? And
if that is still the Soviet precondition,
what are the prospects that we can do
that at a year-end summit here?
Secretary Shultz. I don't think we
are talking about preconditions. What
we are talking about is what's desirable.
And there are lots of different ways to
satisfy both of our desires to have
significant results from these meetings.
Why not— if they're available?
It's almost as though you're saying it
would be a great thing if we had this
meeting and nothing came of it. I don't
agree with that.
I think the object is to have these
meetings and have something come of it,
and both sides agree to that. So we are
trying to find our way to things that will
be good from our standpoint that can be
part of a summit meeting. And obviously
we know that they are not going to
agree to something unless they think it's
good from their standpoint. So that's the
nature of a deal.
Q. Why shouldn't the American
people not view the arrangements on
Daniloff and Zakharov as exactly what
you said this Administration would not
do — that is, a trade?
Secretary Shultz. I think what we
saw here was Daniloff released yester-
day; and what I announced today was
that Zakharov is being released from the
United States and Mr. Orlov and his wife
are being released from the Soviet
Union.
I have also, in response to your ques-
tion, discussed the United Nations mat-
ter; and I think this is a very significant
part of the picture as we see it.
Q. On principle, the Soviets have
made it clear that they wanted you to
withdraw the expulsion order of
October 1. From everything you've
said you've done that.
Secretary Shultz. No, we haven't.
Q. But you said that they are leav-
ing on their own, and you've given
them a 2-week —
Secretary Shultz. From our stand-
point, the operative fact is that most
have left; and those who haven't left, in
response to a request for a grace
period— we will see how that stands
when we meet in Reykjavik.
So we have stayed right with our
position, and we are getting the results
we're seeking.
Now, I don't think it is surprising
that if you ask them what has happened
they would say, "Well, we intended to
bring those individuals that happened to
have been named home anyway, and
that's what has been happening." So
that's what they say.
From our standpoint, what matters
is to have those people out. That's the
operative fact.
'Press release 191.
Secretary's Interview
on "Today Show"
Secretary Shultz was interviewed on
NBC-TV's "Today Show" in New York
on October 1, 1986, by Bryant Gumbal.1
Q. Within the past 36 hours, at a
dizzying pace, negotiations have
resulted in the releases of [U.S. News
& World Report correspondent]
Nicholas Daniloff and Gennadiy
Zakharov [Soviet UN employee
charged with espionage], and the
announcement of a summit that is
being called a preparatory meeting. At
the heart of those negotiations has
been Secretary of State George Shultz
who joins us in the studio this morn-
ing. First of all, tell me the difference,
explain it if you will, between a sum-
mit and a preparatory meeting.
A. It is a meeting between two
heads of state— a little shorter, perhaps
a little less formal— and its object, as
stated by each side, is to make the
preparations for the planned summit
meeting to be held in the United States.
That's the description, and you can call
it whatever you want to call it, I don't
care.
Q. Are the risks attendant to
either side much different than they
would be for a summit?
A. The object in this is to solve
problems. We have a lot of problems in
the world; and whether we like the
Soviet system or don't like it, whether
they like ours or don't like it, there are
tensions around the world in various
places. There are great differences about
human beings and how they are treated.
And there are issues involving arms con-
trol and in particular these giant stocks
of nuclear weapons that each side holds.
So what we are trying to do is resolve
some of those problems. And I think the
problems are so important and they
create so much tension that it is a goo*
thing to try. In fact, any leader who
refused to make the effort would be
tragically wrong.
So that's what the President is
doing. And, of course, to the extent th
we find our way to agreeing with the
Soviet Union on one thing or another,
it's got to be an agreement that we th
is in our interest. We know that. That I
the spirit in which we are going into it
Q. One former Secretary of Stat I
Henry Kissinger, last night express* '
some concerns that a meeting plannt
with such short notice couldn't be
totally prepared for and that you rar
the risk by making this a meeting of
heads of state and not a summit; tha
you ran the risk of reducing what ar
very serious differences to differenc
of personality. Are those valid
concerns?
A. Everybody can be concerned
about everything, and no doubt they'r
valid concerns. But it's certainly not tl I
case to say that this hasn't been care- I
fully prepared. We have been working •
with great intensity, particularly over I
the last 2 or 3 months, on all of the
issues involved. So there's been a terr '
amount of effort to go into this. Now l
hadn't explicitly thought about a
meeting between the two heads in pre !
aration for the U.S. summit meeting, 1
Mr. Gorbachev proposed it, and as the I
President thought about it and as we
talked about it, we thought well, this
could be a good idea, maybe we can
accomplish something.
The name of the game here is to
solve problems, and that is what we ar
trying to do.
Q. That's wonderful in a perfect
world. You and I both know things
don't operate that way as always.
A. It is important to try to solve (
problems.
Q. You're not concerned at all thl
it comes as it does just 3 weeks befoi'
an election?
A. That was not a factor in this at1
all. It is picked for a weekend so that
from the standpoint of the President's
schedule he doesn't interrupt his
campaigning.
Q. Who's going to be part of the
U.S. assemblage in Reykjavik?
A. It hasn't been decided, but no
doubt the President's key advisers. We.
have a strong team of people there whi
have all of the expert knowledge at the
fingertips.
64
Department of State Bulle1
EUROPE
Q. Will the Defense Department
'.represented?
I A. I would assume so. At least, I
Slid hope so. Mr. Perle [Assistant
Iretary of Defense for International
1-urity Policy Richard N. Perle] has
In in our delegations when I went to
heva and negotiated with Gromyko
finer Soviet Foreign Minster]. He was
Ire on other occasions and performed
Ih great ability.
I Q. The President noted yesterday
kt this meeting could not have come
i>ut had Nicholas Daniloff not been
leased by the Soviets. As we sit here
Is morning, can you say that
ipholas Daniloff was released
[conditionally?
A. Oh yes. There's no string. He's
v.
", Q. Unconditionally?
A. I don't know what you are get-
gat.
j Q. I guess what I'm getting at is,
ijatever the Administration is calling
(and you're calling it an arrange-
int, the headlines that we are seeing
is morning are saying "The Swap."
that a perception that you're going
(have to live with?
A. I suppose so. What happened are
I. following things, in line with our
► ectives:
I First, Daniloff was released with no
sings; he left the Soviet Union before
[/thing else happened.
Second, we announced that
ixharov would be released after going
iough the process here that is part of
i' court process; and that Mr. [Yuriy]
llov and his wife, two heroic people
d leaders in the dissident movement,
*uld be released from the Soviet
lion.
And third, and quite important, one
tour basic objectives in all this was to
nke the point that the use by the
Sviet Union, and other countries for
bt matter, of their UN delegations as a
Htform for espionage would not be
Serated. And so we have told them
tout reducing their numbers here; we
;ve explicitly identified people that
jve to go. The numbers are in line with
Hat we set out, and the process of the
sople leaving is well under way. So
Bat's an important objective.
But it is also important that we
rnntain our ability to discuss the prob-
ijns, the answers to which may be of
>eat importance in the world, and we
''ve done that.
Q. First off, Daniloff did arrive
home yesterday, as we know it. Unfor-
tunately it happened on the same day
that Zakharov left here. Which at least
suggests —
A. Not unfortunate, it's the way
it-
Q. It does at least suggest
equivalency.
A. I think the fact that Daniloff was
released a day before doesn't suggest
equivalency. I think the fact that Orlov
was released, was announced to be
released, at the same time that Zakharov
was suggests maybe that was what was
arranged.
The fact that we are getting our
objectives as far as the UN arrange-
ments are concerned suggests something
about our objectives. But most important
here, also, we are in a position, I hope,
to make some progress on these pro-
blems that I think all of us would want
to see resolved if it is possible to do so.
Q. But even with regards to the 25
at the Soviet mission, a couple of
weeks ago it was all 25 had to leave
and it was a blanket accusation they
were spies. Now an extension has been
granted, the numbers have been tam-
pered with a little bit. Isn't that an
accommodation of some kind?
A. The numbers haven't been
tampered with. They asked for a grace
period, and the President granted it.
And we will discuss further— this whole
issue of the UN mission and its use— no
doubt in Reykjavik, or I will with Mr.
Shevardnadze [Soviet Foreign Minister].
Q. I don't want to let you go
without talking a little bit about South
Africa because I know you went up to
Capitol Hill to try to see what kind of
votes you could muster to sustain the
President's veto. Do you have enough?
A. I don't know. We are working
on it very hard.
Q. What do you think?
A. I think it is very important that
the Senate sustain the President's veto,
first and foremost on the merits, because
it seems to me this country wants to
make a strong, clear, unequivocal state-
ment about our attitudes and abhorrence
of apartheid and our desire to see
something changed so that we will have
a kind of government where everybody
can take part and where basic human
dignity and rights are respected. That's
what we want. And we are willing to
help in all sorts of ways to bring that
about. We want to make that clear, and
what the President proposes in his
Executive order, will do that.
We don't want to take steps that
confuse a drive at apartheid with what
amounts to a deprivation of jobs to the
people who are the victims of apartheid.
We are going to make them unemployed
as well. I don't see that that makes any
sense. Furthermore, what the Senate
bill, the Congress bill, will do is cause
the United States in effect to withdraw
from South Africa. If we're going to
have an impact, we ought to stay there,
and we ought to be part of the effort to
solve the problem.
Q. If the decision to override the
veto, and if things remain as they
stand, carries through in the Senate, is
that going to force a reassessment of
South African policy inside the White
House, or are we going to have a two-
track policy?
A. You can't have a two-track
policy. The Congress takes over the
policy. There is no way they can manage
it. And there is nothing, it seems to me,
good to be said for withdrawing from
South Africa.
Q. Senators would say that they
aren't withdrawing, that instead the
White House forced their hand by
inaction.
A. There's no inaction. There is a
tremendous amount of effort going into
not only our policy in South Africa, but
southern Africa generally. I wonder
where these people are who don't seem
to have thought about the problems that
some of the countries around South
Africa will have if the Senate is suc-
cessful in bringing the South African
economy to its knees. What's going to
happen to those people? There has been
very little thought given to that.
Q. Let me go back again if I
might, in the final 2 minutes we have
left, to Reykjavik. As the President
and you noted on Tuesday, this was a
meeting proposed by General
Secretary Gorbachev. How do you read
his motivations in this?
A. We can speculate about that, but
I think what we have to do is consider a
proposal of that kind from our stand-
point and ask ourselves, is this a good
idea, given the amount of preparatory
effort that had taken place, particularly
through the summer, and given the
importance of the problems, given our
desire, as theirs, to see the summit
meeting in the United States be a pro-
ductive meeting? The President has
always said that.
ovember 1986
65
EUROPE
As the President thought about it
and as we talked about it. we thought
well, it's a good idea, so let's go and
grapple with these problems. I think the
world expects its leaders to go and try to
resolve these problems.
Q. One of the side effects of all
this— and we've got less than a minute
left: I'll have to caution that — has been
that you spent over 20 hours within
the past week with Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze. How much better is
your one-on-one relationship with him
than it was say, a month ago?
A. As you say, we've spent a lot of
time together and we have on a personal
level a good, straightforward relation-
ship so that we sit down and we con-
verse and argue about these things.
Q. Would you give him any better
marks in statesmanship than you
would have before?
A. We worked it out together, and I
think that it is a good result from the
standpoint of the United States. I hope
he thinks it's good from the standpoint
of the Soviet Union. And maybe we can
go on and see something good accom-
plished in Iceland and in the United
States.
'Press release 193.
Secretary's News Briefing
of October 2
Secretary Shultz held a news briefing
with American journalists in New York
City on October 2, 1986. 1
Q. You have described Daniloff
[Nicholas Daniloff, U.S. News & World
Report correspondent] as a hostage—
you and the President both have used
that precise word— and you have
negotiated with the Soviets about his
case, among others.
Two questions: What does that do
to the U.S. policy of never negotiating
for hostages; and (2), do you think that
is going to be a precedent that is going
to come back to haunt you?
A. We are ready to discuss with
anybody the situation of our hostages in
Lebanon, and we are doing everything
we can to secure their return. But that
doesn't include paying a bribe or trying
to get the Kuwait Government to release
convicted murderers and terrorists from
jail, which is what— at least, it's
alleged— the people holding our hostages
want.
Of course, we are frustrated in our
efforts to know exactly who it is that
does all those. So our discussions have
an indirect kind of aspect to them, but
we work hard to try to free those
hostages.
In the case of Daniloff, let me try to
set this whole series of events in its full
perspective, because obviously we don't
like the precedent of seizing an Ameri-
can whether he's a journalist or a busi-
nessman or whoever he may be and
charging him with something that he's
not guilty of and then demanding some-
thing in return. That's a very unattrac-
tive arrangement. We resist it.
So here is the way I think of this
case and here's the way it's unfolding.
For a long time, in the United States,
we've been concerned about the size of
the Soviet mission in the United Nations
and the use by the Soviets of that mis-
sion for espionage purposes. That goes
through a number of Administrations.
The President decided— we decided
in this Administration— we're going to
do something about it. So last March we
told the Soviets that they had to reduce
the size of their mission. We gave them
a number, by April of 1988, and speci-
fied tranches, the first one of 25, with a
series of dates, and the first date was
October 1.
Last August we arrested Zakharov
in an act of espionage but this was after
being on to him for sometime, so there
was a great deal of information that the
FBI has about his violations of our law.
This is just that particular thing that
happened when he was seized, so it's a
very solid case.
Subsequently, the Soviet Union
seized Daniloff and charged him.
Meanwhile— I forget the exact day and
the sequence is somewhere in between—
the Soviet Ambassador in the United
Nations made a very defiant statement
about their unwillingness to comply with
our statement that they had to reduce
the size of their mission. You can look up
the words, in fact; we've got them
around somewhere, but it was a very
confrontational statement.
We, of course, knew that, in fact, t
size of their mission had been reduced
because when somebody leaves the cou
try, we know it. But unless we have a
conversation with them, we don't know
whether a person who leaves and has a
multiple-entry visa is intended to be
brought back or not so we can't be sun
of the size without a discussion with
them of what their plan is. And this
defiant statement and the lack of any
communication or willingness to com-
municate made it hard for us to know f
sure just what was happening, but we
had a general idea.
Now, after his defiant statement, w
decided, all right, it took 25 to get fron
where you were down to our number, s
here are 25 names; get them out by
October 1.
In the discussions that have taken
place, there has been a sequence of
events in which Daniloff was first
released, without trial, and he's back,
he's free. Zakharov was released after
pleading nolo contendere, which anyone
charged is entitled to do if they want tc
through our system, and has been
allowed to return to the Soviet Union.
And Orlov [Yuri Orlov, Soviet physici:
and human rights activist] and his wif<
will be allowed to leave the Soviet Uni
by the 7th of October.
Meanwhile, through our discussio:
we have been assured by the Soviets
that their numbers in the mission— th
number I was given by Mr. Shevardnad:
was lower than the number that we
required of them although there may
some ambiguities because of who you
count, who they count, who the Unite
Nations tends to count, and who we
count. But, at any rate, it's clear that
they have gotten that number down to !
the number required, so we have that
assurance.
Insofar as the 25 are concerned, our(
requirement that those named indi-
viduals leave stands. They provided
some information about the whereabout'
of some of them, some eight that were
not in this country; they were in the
Soviet Union. So I said, well, what is the
intent? Is it your intent to have them
come back or not? I was told that the
answer was not, and others who were in
the process of leaving, and they asked
for a grace period which the President
granted.
Of course, we keep very careful
track of who leaves the country. So
when somebody on this list leaves the
country, we know it. That person may
have a multiple-entry visa so we don't
know whether there is any intent to
66
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
iirn. However, it is within our
jhority, if somebody leaves under
|se circumstances, not to permit that
hon to return.
I have the number, the precise
hber, that according to our observa-
is and the FBI, they believe have left
just out of care, not to be more precise,
n I feel really comfortable with, I'll
f with the statement I've made: That
majority of those in the 25 have left.
• information on that comes from our
irmation about names of people who
koff.
Putting this into the perspective of
lgs, our object, in what in a sense
'ted all this round was our determina-
1 to get at this use of the United
;ions as an espionage platform. We
e succeeded in getting numbers
km, we have succeeded in getting
fried people out, and we will persevere
(hat.
: I think from the standpoint of the
ssage of what happens when we take
on against espionage, we have done
lething that is more fundamental,
it is, we are in the process of reduc-
the number of people who have
■lligence affiliations of some kind who
I stationed in the mission, in the first
l:e. And, as you know, there's a dif-
f 'nee between the way a person who is
iheir regular diplomatic mission, say,
iVashington, and has diplomatic
] mnity, is treated when that person is
ind commiting espionage and the way
Fjrson who doesn't have that immun-
;is treated.
When we catch a UN-affiliated per-
c, that person is then held here,
Irged, tried, and so forth. When a per-
c in their Washington mission is found
cducting espionage, the person is
jelled. And when they allege that they
le a case against somebody in our mis-
ii, they expel them and that takes
he.
But we feel that the existence of the
Jited Nations, and the United States
a host country for it, cannot be
iwed to, in effect, create an asym-
rtrical situation and provide this asym-
rtrical intelligence opportunity.
What I'm trying to get across to you
shat beyond the ins and outs of
Jiiloff and Zakharov and Orlov, there
phis broader question and the broader
Iprt on the part of the U.S. Govern-
fnt to get at this broader question, and
shave taken specific action, and we
b being successful in it. So that's the
i)ic way in which we're addressing this
fc'blem.
That's a long answer to your very
good question. It's a good question and
it's a difficult question, but this is the
way we have addressed it.
Q. If that's the ease, why don't
you knock back the number of Rus-
sians at the Embassy in Washington?
Considerably more Russians are there
than Americans in Moscow.
A. The numbers of Americans and
Soviets in our regular missions is not the
same now although we have been
building up the number of Americans
and our plans for providing the right
kind of security in our mission call for us
to expand the number.
We have, historically not only in the
Soviet Union but throughout the world,
hired people from the host country— the
Soviets never do— to do certain kinds of
tasks. Basically, what you're allowed is
to perform certain functions. If you want
to perform them with host country
nationals, you can. If you don't want to,
you don't have to. So we're changing the
structure of our employment for, I think,
very good reasons and that's something
that's underway.
I think the answer to your question
is that we do want to see an equivalence
in that regard.
Q. You've had quite a week of
negotiating with the Soviet Foreign
Minister and most of that in absolute
total secret, which must have
delighted you because you've often
said that you think that's the way
negotiations should be conducted.
Now that that phase is concluded,
I wonder if you can tell us some
details of the sessions, especially when
you believe that the situation began to
be clarified and you began to think
there really was a chance this could be
settled and negotiations got serious?
And if you could just share with us as
many details as you can about how the
deal was put together, and also your
impressions of your counterpart.
A. I've just finished describing in
some detail how we have thought about
this problem, going back to last March,
and what we have been doing about it,
and I don't want to go into the ins and
outs of how we tried to arrange it so
that we got what we think is a satisfac-
tory outcome.
Obviously, this is an on-going prob-
lem because the espionage problem is
on-going here, and we continue to bear
down on it.
Q. Can you at least deal with the
turning points, the letter, and the
effect that had on you in the decision
to put — I gather the decision to put
Iceland on the table with a stipulation
that without Daniloff, no Iceland? Or
the 40-minute rushed meeting over
here at the United Nations at the
Soviet request — can't you put any of
those into perspective as to the roller-
coaster that you've been on?
A. It's hard to do it because I don't
know what affects somebody else and
what doesn't. And to a certain extent,
when you're engaged in this kind thing,
you are engaged in an exchange and you
are, of course, trying to make assess-
ments of that kind, but I don't want to
go into it too much.
I do think that the President,
himself, made a major impact on the day
of the first meeting that Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze and I had. I had
arranged it with the President that if I
thought— and it was my call— it would be
useful to bring him over to the Oval
Office to meet with the President, I
would be able to call. We knew the block
of time when the President would be
free and able to meet with him.
I felt that it was timely so I called,
and we went over. At that meeting
Shevardnadze presented the letter from
Gorbachev and its various proposals.
And then the President told Shevard-
nadze his view of this question and of
their behavior in their seizing of Daniloff
and what he thought about it. In fact,
that the President was absolutely sure
he wasn't a spy because we knew that
Daniloff was not being paid by the U.S.
Government, he was not engaged in
espionage in that sense, and that's the
way we defined the term.
The President— as you know, he's
very genial and pleasant and is the guy
people would most like to sit next to at a
dinner party and he's gregarious and
good humored and everything, but he
can also be very tough.
He was crystal-clear. I know that it
must have had some impact because in
our next meeting Mr. Shevardnadze
opened up by saying, "The President is
really worked up about this isn't he?"
[Laughter] And I said, "You better
believe it." So I think if they had any
doubts in their minds that this was very
serious and there was no way things
were going to go forward as long as
Daniloff was held in the Soviet Union,
they were convinced. I'm not saying that
they didn't know that beforehand, but
that was one point in all of this that was
quite pronounced.
Member 1986
67
EUROPE
Q. There had been reports that
two of the people regarded most
seriously as Soviets spies are being-
allowed to stay here— Mr. Savchenko
and Mr. Skvorstov. Can you comment
on those reports and tell us what we
know about what those two men do?
A. As far as we're concerned, we
gave a list of 25. The list stands. Most
have left, according to our information. I
understand that some Soviet spokesman
said otherwise, and so there's a dif-
ference of opinion. Our information is
based on knowing who gets on an
airplane and takes off, so it sounds like
pretty good information to me.
But, at any rate, our list stands. I
don't know where are the sources about
stories or names; I haven't heard any
names. The origin, to me, of any com-
ment about two or three people is simply
that in our discussions, Shevardnadze
commented to me that there were two or
three people who had been essential to
him as he performed his duties here at
the United Nations. And, as you know,
he, just as I do, meet a great stream of
people in your shifting from one part of
the world to another, and so on. So you
have people who prepare papers and
help you get briefed, and so on. So you
can't get along without good staff help.
I said, well, I can understand that.
On the other hand, you're going to be
leaving Tuesday so you won't need them.
So there were two or three people. I
don't know whether he intended that to
mean that he wanted to discuss some
people or not.
At any rate, undoubtedly, we'll come
back to this issue at Reykjavik, the two
of us. But as far as we're concerned, we
have (a) given a number, and they are
meeting that number; (b) given a list of
25. Most of those are out and the list
stands, subject to the grace period, (c)
We have told them that if that number
brings them below the number that we
specified, then they're free to build back
up to that number during the period
before the next tranche if they wish to,
but not with people who have
intelligence affiliation.
Q. Just to follow up and clarify
one point on what you just said. The
way I read what you just said, you are
saying that those— at least the fate of
those two or three, and perhaps others
whom you have not discussed, are up
for further discussions between you
and Shevardnadze at the Reykjavik
summit and that the fate of those
people may yet change; they may not
have to leave the United States,
depending on what discussions you
have at the summit with Shevard-
nadze. Is that correct?
A. We have a list of 25— that
stands— and I violated my rule of not
telling you about the insides of these
things, but I just related something that
he said to me, and what I said to him.
But if that goes anywhere or not
remains to be seen.
Q. Could you talk about the
Iceland meeting? In other words, a
couple of questions in my mind. The
Administration, of course, has been
making a point of wanting to get a
firm date for the meeting in the United
States. It seems extraordinary to me
that you would agree to this meeting
in Iceland unless you had some
assurances ahead of time that at the
meeting you would get a date on the
U.S. visit. Otherwise, I don't see the
point of this meeting. I mean, can you
discuss what you're hoping to get out
of the meeting?
A. First of all, while we believe that
meetings between the heads of state are
basically desirable, we think that their
usefulness over the long term and, for
that matter, immediately is much
greater if they are well-prepared and
have significant results associated with
them. That has been the President's
position from way back. It hasn't
changed.
We think that a meeting in 1986,
which was agreed to in Geneva, is a good
idea according to those criteria, and
presumably they think it's a good idea
because they, accordingly, too, have
been engaging with us in an extensive
and intensive preparatory process
through which in regular fora and
elsewhere the differences on quite a
variety of issues have been narrowed,
clearly identified, sometimes eliminated.
We are in the process in our negotiations
in Geneva of trying to push that further.
In the Gorbachev letter to the Presi-
dent, he made the suggestion that a
brief, less formal meeting between the
two at this juncture could make a con-
tribution to that preparatory effort for a
U.S. summit. There hasn't been any sug-
gestion that they're backing away from
the United States, and the President
thought about it, we talked about it, and
we thought, well, maybe it could help, so
we should give it a try. And so the Presi-
dent accepted the idea of a meeting in a
third country. Of course, we said that
while we would be ready to do this in
principle, we didn't see any point in try-
ing to set dates and be specific about it
as long as Daniloff was in the Soviet
Union, because you couldn't really
imagine a fruitful meeting under thosi
circumstances.
That's the background of it, and
what we hope to accomplish is some ft
ther illumination of the issues and
clarification of them, perhaps narrowi
of them, and the energizing of our
respective delegations to try to find
agreement.
How much influence it had, I don'
know, but it is the case that the
meetings that I had with Shevardnadz
that is, the plenary ones where we
weren't talking about Daniloff and we
weren't talking about various other
human rights issues which I always hi
on my agenda with Soviet leaders, abs '
lutely always. In the plenary sessions, '
we discussed, among other things, the
CDE [Conference on Confidence- and '
Security-Building Measures and Disar '
mament in Europe] conference which
was then in its final stages, and we
gave— what should I call them— impulf '
to our respective delegations. And
whether that helped to bring it to a fii I
conclusion, I don't know, but I don't
think it hurt any. Sometimes these
things do help, and I hope that that is '
the case. We felt that it was worth th< '
effort to try. That's what leaders are '
for: to try to come to grips successfull '
with these issues that are of great anc '
enormous concern.
Q. But do you have any assuranc |
that they will then agree at Iceland i
a date in the United States?
A. We've talked about this as
preparatory to the planned U.S. sumrrj
And through my discussions with
Shevardnadze, we can see that that m;
still be possible in 1986; and it's very j
clear that they also have very much in |
mind their desire to have the Presiden,
visit the Soviet Union in 1987. So that,
basically the rhythm of what was
established in Geneva, and I can't say i
for sure that that's the rhythm that wi|
be followed, but I think that seems to 1
the basic track we're on.
Q. There's a published account
today of a meeting in mid- August— I
think August 14th— attended by you,1
Mr. Poindexter [Vice Adm. John M. '
Poindexter, Assistant to the Preside:
for National Security Affairs], and
some others in which a decision was ,
reportedly made to launch a disinfor-
mation campaign concerning Libya-
reports that information was made
available to newspapers, including T1
Wall Street Journal, that produced '
68
Department of State Bulle
EUROPE
fries indicating more concern about
ya than the intelligence reports
rially caused. Can you comment on
fe? Did this happen? Is there a
Information campaign against
i[ya?
|A. I never comment on classified
lerial or meetings of that kind. But I
i say this: That Qadhafi has involved
jya in numerous acts of terrorism
Ich have killed many people, including
le Americans. We think he is basi-
h an outlaw. We have taken action
pnst him. We have been glad to see
t others have also found a great deal
jitelligence about what he's doing and
Je also taken actions.
It was a very good thing that this
t recognized at the Tokyo summit,
| Libya was indentified by name. And
fas also very interesting that when
jtook our action against Libya, con-
|y to the expectations of many, the
\b world did not rally to his side. And
f. probably had something to do with
(very evident unease and sense of
location, from all of our intelligence,
jlhafi exhibited.
1 Insofar as he is concerned, we think
I a menace, and we want to see the
: vities of Libya stopped. Exactly what
tare and intend to do about it, I don't
' k it's appropriate for me to say. But
have shown that we're willing to take
i'Ct action. We have shown that we
•e applied a very broad range of sanc-
( s to his activity. We do have various
iigs going on that are difficult for him
inow exactly what they mean that
iiaps keep him off balance. And,
tkly, I don't have any problems with
t:tle psychological warfare against
lhafi.
1 1t's very easy, and you people in the
srs business enjoy not allowing the
ted States to do anything in secret if
: can help it. So if the fleet moves
,_n one place to another, you're bound
5 determined to report it. Even
<ugh we might want to have it operate
retly, it's very difficult for that to
tpen.
i We can absolutely bank on the fact
It if the fleet does something or other,
I'll scream. And Qadhafi will hear it.
.1 the fleet may or may not be getting
Jdy to do something. So that's about
'it I'm going to say on that subject.
Q. What about the AIDS quote?
I you just clear that one up?
]A. The what?
Q. You were quoted as saying in a
sing way that vou hoped Qadhafi
lid get AIDS.
A. I have no comment on state-
ments that somebody who probably
wasn't there may incorrectly attribute to
somebody who was there. And I think
the business of talking about meetings,
and so on, is a despicable thing that
people in the U.S. Government do, and
I'm not going to consider it.
Q. Was there any sign of increased
Libyan terrorist activity in August;
and, number two, are you denying that
this meeting took place, or are you not
commenting? I mean, this is a very
serious charge that you had a meeting
where you decided to mount a disinfor-
mation campaign.
A. Why is that a charge? If I were a
private citizen, reading about it, and I
read that my government was trying to
confuse somebody who is conducting ter-
rorist acts and murdering Americans, I'd
say, "Gee, I hope it's true." I don't see
why you think this is a charge.
Q. I think there's a problem. The
issue is there is a deliberate program
of misinformation, and it's not only
Qadhafi who gets confused but the
American people who get confused.
A. Without being able to be precise,
it's difficult to plot whether there is an
increase or not an increase. There is a
disposition toward it by Qadhafi and
Libya. For quite a period of time, it was
clear he was thrown way off, not only by
our action but by the actions of the
Europeans in expelling all these people
as they found information.
So there was a relatively quiescent
period. We felt that it was beginning to
change for various reasons. Precise
intelligence right now is not altogether
clear, but there have been a number of
terrorist incidents recently— or incidents
isn't the word— tragedies, horrors— and I
don't rule out that Libya was involved,
for example, in the Karachi— I'm not
saying they are, but I wouldn't rule it
out.
So, yes, there has been some
increase in sort of the volume of what
you see from various intelligence
sources. Different people might evaluate
it in different ways, but, nevertheless,
there is substance there.
Q. You had a conversation with
the Syrian Foreign Minister yesterday,
in which we were told— went into con-
siderable detail about the hostages in
Lebanon. Is there any progress being
made on that issue?
A. I hope so, and we work on it con-
stantly, but there's no progress worth
reporting except that they become free.
They're either free or they aren't free.
And so we work at that from every con-
ceivable angle. I never miss an oppor-
tunity to talk to the Syrians about the
subject.
How much influence they have is the
question. What they have done is they
have been a country to which hostages
have seemed to come, and out of which
they were released. And they have
handled that aspect of it very well.
That's different from being the party
responsible for getting them released.
Q. I would hate to see this finish
without a clarification on the issue of
disinformation. Let me pose it a dif-
ferent way. It seems to me as a jour-
nalist that if the government is know-
ingly misinforming or lying to further
a foreign policy goal, that causes me
problems. What you are saying is, as
long as it furthers a foreign policy
goal, that is okay?
A. I know of no decision to have
people go out and tell lies to the media. I
think, however, that if there are ways in
which we can make Qadhafi nervous,
why shouldn't we? And I described one
of them. That is not deceiving you, but
just using your predictable tendencies to
report things that we try to keep secret,
so we will label it a big secret, and you
will find out about it, and you will report
it. We know that. The higher the
classification, the quicker you'll report it.
So you're predictable in that sense.
But I don't believe in telling lies,
myself. I would call your attention,
however, to— and this is— I probably
shouldn't even say this, because you'll
give the wrong interpretation, but
there's a wonderful book which you
might read that was written about
World War II. And the title of it is a
quote from Winston Churchill who said,
"In time of war, the truth is so precious,
it must be attended by a bodyguard of
lies."
And the book is about the very great
effort to deceive the Nazis and to float
reports of one kind or another that
would make them think something was
about to happen that wasn't about to
happen, and so on.
Q. There was a declaration of war
at the time.
A. And I think that insofar as
Qadhafi is concerned, we don't have a
declaration of war, but we have
something pretty darn close to it.
'Press release 200 of Oct. 3, 1986.
ember 1986
69
EUROPE
Prospects for the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting
by Warren Zimmerman
Statement before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe on
September 11, 1986. Ambassador
Zimmerman is head of the U.S. delega-
tion to the Vienna follow-up meeting of
the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (CSCE). '
I welcome this opportunity to meet with
you, and the other members of the Com-
mission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe to discuss the Vienna follow-up
meeting of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
which opens on November 4, 1986. This
will be the third such meeting. The first
was held in Belgrade in 1977-78 and the
second in Madrid from 1980 to 1983.
As you know, I am no stranger to
the CSCE process, having served as
deputy chairman of the U.S. delegation
to the Madrid follow-up meeting from
1980 to 1981. I am, thus, more aware
than most of the crucial role which the
commission and its staff have played
over the past decade in advancing the
goals of the CSCE process, especially in
the field of human rights. The U.S.
delegation to the Vienna meeting will,
once again, draw heavily upon your
expertise; indeed, the commission will be
represented on the delegation itself at
the level of deputy chairman as well as
by members of your very experienced
staff. I look forward to a close and pro-
ductive relationship.
As at Madrid, we will also have a
group of distinguished Americans serv-
ing on the delegation as public members,
which we hope to announce soon. And
we will continue to stay in close touch
with nongovernmental groups which also
have made an indispensable contribution
to the CSCE process.
The CSCE process began in Helsinki
in 1975 with the signing of the Final Act
by President Ford and 34 other leaders.
This basic document sets out a state-
ment of principles governing the conduct
of states toward each other and toward
their own citizens and provides a
framework for discussion of the security,
economic, and human rights problems
which underlie the unnatural division of
Europe. Last March, Under Secretary
[for Political Affairs Michael H.]
Armacost briefed you at some length on
the Administration's approach to the
Helsinki process, which remains its
position.
Today I will briefly assess the
Helsinki process and then outline our
basic objectives for the Vienna meeting,
as well as those of our West European
allies and the Soviet Union.
The Helsinki Process
The question of "who won and who
lost?" in Helsinki has been roundly
debated during the past decade. In fact,
that is the wrong question. Everyone
must have gotten something out of
CSCE, since all 35 CSCE states remain
interested in having the process con-
tinue. I would rather rephrase that ques-
tion to "who gained the most and who
gained the least?"
In my view, the Soviet Union has
clearly gained the least, both at Helsinki
and in the evolution of the CSCE
process.
With regard to the Helsinki Final
Act, Soviet objectives were basically to
legitimize the division of Europe,
highlight the central role of the state vis-
a-vis the individual, and focus CSCE
exclusively on the Soviet vision of pan-
European security. While the U.S.S.R.
succeeded in recording a principle on the
inviolability of frontiers, even this princi-
ple was tempered by language that fron-
tiers could be changed by peaceful
means and by agreement. In fact, the
Final Act much more clearly reflects the
Western agenda in CSCE. It looks
toward the peaceful reunification of
Europe, opening the door for increased
East- West contacts. It underscores the
rights and freedoms of individuals,
establishing standards of government
conduct vis-a-vis its own citizens.
Finally, it provides a balanced focus in
which human rights are recognized as a
fundamental element of genuine security
in Europe.
The Soviets totally failed to foresee
the consequences of the commitments
they assumed in Helsinki. They no doubt
felt they could simply ignore these com-
mitments, as they had those in the UN
Charter and the UN Declaration on
Human Rights. In fact, they were confi-
dent enough to publish the complete text
of the Final Act in Izvestia, thus making
it available to every Soviet citizen for
the price of three kopecks. The Helsinki
monitoring groups that grew up in both
the U.S.S.R and Eastern Europe were
major unwelcome surprise to the Sovi<
regime.
Yet another blow was the fact tha,
the follow-up meetings in Belgrade an'.
Madrid focused on exposing Soviet
human rights abuses. The effect of thi
persistent publicity about the true
nature of the Soviet system is even no i
insufficiently understood, in particular
regarding the role it played in the rev<|
sal of the Soviet image in Western
Europe in the early 1980s. The period
the Madrid meeting (1980-83) witness ,
a dramatic decline of the pro-Soviet le i
in France, a West German decision to |
deploy U.S. intermediate-range nucleai
missiles on German soil, and sustained ,
popular support in Britain and Italy fo ,
governments committed to strong
security ties with the United States.
The Madrid concluding document
also made a significant contribution in i
advancing the fundamental goal of the
Helsinki process of increased openness ,
In a statement before the Madrid con- i
ference, Secretary of State Shultz
praised the addition of "important new
commitments with respect to human
rights, trade union freedoms . . . free
flow of information, and measures
against terrorism as accomplishments < !
Madrid.
Madrid also provided an important i
opportunity to advance our goal of
finding concrete ways to increase con- i
fidence and security in Europe. The
mandate adopted in Madrid for the
Conference on Confidence- and Securit,
Building Measures and Disarmament ir
Europe (CDE) both expanded the zone
defined in the Final Act to cover Soviet
territory west of the Urals and codified
key Western criteria that measures
adopted should have military sig-
nificance and be verifiable.
Despite early Soviet efforts to turn
CDE into a forum for empty, propagan-
dists declarations, the West has been
highly successful in keeping the
Stockholm conference focused on its ow
agenda. The United States is working
hard to achieve a successful conclusion,
by the September 19 adjournment date,
which will enhance stability and securit;
in Europe through adoption of such
measures as mandatory notification of
military activities at a significantly
reduced threshold, mandatory observa-
tion, and an annual calendar of planned
activities. Adoption of certain CDE
measures, such as mandatory on-site in-
70
Department of State Bulleti
EUROPE
ction on Soviet territory, could also
'e a favorable impact on other U.S.
ns control endeavors.
Despite these gains, it is true that
rail Eastern, and in particular Soviet,
npliance with CSCE obligations,
ecially in the human rights area,
mains seriously flawed. Andrey
kharov and Elena Bonner remain
der house arrest in Gorki, and Yuriy
low Anatoliy Marchenko, and other
flsinki monitors are either in prison or
rernal exile. Also the number of Soviet
fjvs permitted to emigrate fell from
WOO in 1979 to barely more than 1,000
k year.
II The record of Soviet violations has
6 some observers of the Helsinki proc-
I to argue that the United States
}>uld abandon it altogether. I accept
1 good faith with which that argument
made, and I share the frustration with
jriet violations which has kindled it.
vertheless I believe it is wrong. That
.^iment, in my view, is akin to urging
j.t we scrap the criminal code because
Ire are people who break the law. I
inly believe that the Helsinki process
I been and remains very much in the
crests of the United States.
We must preserve that process in
i: er to keep faith with those who strug-
; to realize the goals of Helsinki. I
re personally asked a number of
(net dissidents and "refuseniks" in
jscow and other parts of the Soviet
.ion if they felt CSCE was a waste of
|e. I never found one— and this
tludes Anatoliy Shcharanskiy with
lorn I discussed this subject last
]ing— who told me he wanted the proc-
i closed down. They felt rather that,
[;pite the U.S.S.R.'s poor compliance
lord, the publicity generated by the
new meetings on Soviet human rights
.ises did, indeed, help them.
'.e Vienna Follow-Up Meeting
k approach to Vienna will be governed
i two overarching objectives. First, we
kt secure improved Eastern com-
t'ince with commitments already
liertaken in the Final Act and the
Z.drid concluding document, partic-
irly with regard to human rights. As
umised in President Reagan's state-
jnt on the occasion of the 11th
Jiiversary of the Final Act: "We will
irk to ensure that the upcoming
1 eting in Vienna will mark a step
,vard making the promises of
'lsinki's first decade a reality in its
■:ond." Second, and equally important
1 be our efforts to pursue balanced
progress across the board in Vienna to
insure that human rights are given at
least equal weight with other CSCE
elements such as security.
In addition, I believe we will have an
opportunity in Vienna to strengthen the
relevance and effectiveness of the
Helsinki process. In this context, we will
consider whether shorter and more fre-
quent follow-up meetings might not pro-
vide a greater stimulus for progress. We
will also strive to lengthen the period of
time devoted to implementation review
and increase the openness of the process
as much as possible.
To achieve our key objectives, we
will seek a thorough review of implemen-
tation as well as balanced and construc-
tive steps forward. In order to build
pressure for improved compliance, as
well as identify steps that can help bring
that about, we need to concentrate
attention on the East's record. That will
mean devoting a substantial amount of
time in Vienna to implementation review
in order to establish a clear record of
specifics and individual cases where
CSCE commitments have been abused.
Where productive, we intend to cite
specific names and events in plenary
session.
As always in CSCE, basket 3 and
principle VII issues will be a central
focus of our attention. As in the past,
the emphasis will be to bring about
steps which could lead to real progress
in improving the lot of individuals,
reducing barriers, and broadening
human contacts. Notwithstanding the
frustrations we have encountered at
experts' meetings, we believe these are
worthwhile endeavors and should be part
of the post- Vienna agenda. But overall,
our proposals will be focused on and
directed toward achieving better com-
pliance with existing commitments.
Maintaining balance will be a central
challenge for the Vienna meeting. This
concept of balance ties the various
strands of the CSCE together, based on
the recognition that the humanitarian,
security, and economic elements of the
Helsinki process are interdependent. It
is unrealistic to believe that real, endur-
ing progress can take place in East- West
relations without progress on human
rights.
In Vienna we will have to weigh the
results of the CDE, and the other
experts' meetings, as well as the
achievements and problems in all aspects
of CSCE. If the Stockholm conference
concludes successfully, security ques-
tions will probably receive prominent
attention in Vienna. In the June 11
Budapest appeal, the Soviet Union and
other Warsaw Pact states declared their
interest in pursuing negotiations on
disarmament from the Atlantic to the
Urals. At their ministerial meeting in
The Soviets totally failed to foresee the conse-
quences of the commitments they assumed in
Helsinki. . . they were confident enough to publish
the complete text of the Final Act in Izvestia, thus
making it available to every Soviet citizen for the
price of three kopecks. The Helsinki monitoring
groups. . . were a major unwelcome surprise to the
Soviet regime.
improvements in the lives of individual,
ordinary people. Our vigorous pursuit of
human rights improvements will be con-
sistent with the approach taken by the
President with General Secretary
Gorbachev at the Geneva summit; that
is, emphasizing the need for concrete
results.
Western ideas developed during the
experts' meetings at Ottawa, Budapest,
and Bern provide a wealth of material
for us to consider in developing positive
vember 1986
Halifax, the United States and its NATO
allies established a high-level task force
to examine ways to strengthen stability
and security in Europe, through
increased openness and the establish-
ment of a verifiable, stable balance of
conventional forces at lower levels. The
task force will issue an initial report in
October and a final report to ministers in
December. While we cannot yet predict
the outcome, the results of the task force
study will no doubt have an important
bearing on our work in Vienna.
71
EUROPE
In determining our approach to
security questions, we must be careful to
insure "that the security component is not
allowed to dominate other aspects of the
CSCE process. On the other hand, we
must also remember that Soviet
interests in security and economic ques-
tions will provide important leverage for
us to secure our central human rights
objectives. And we must bear in mind
that important U.S. security interests
are engaged in the CSCE process.
West European Objectives
With regard to the Atlantic alliance, the
CSCE process has fostered and rein-
forced allied unity. The Soviets and
others have worked very hard to use the
CSCE process to split the United States
from its NATO allies. Not only have they
failed in these efforts, but I believe that
CSCE has been a historic monument to
alliance cooperation. In turn, alliance
unity— in insisting on compliance with
CSCE undertakings and on balance
between security and human rights
goals— has been essential to the progress
we have made thus far. We must thus
continue to present a united front if we
are to make progress on issues of impor-
tance to us.
I believe that strong U.S. leadership
and skillful alliance management both at
NATO and Vienna will allow us to
achieve that objective. Based on discus-
sions I have had at NATO and in allied
capitals earlier this year, I can assure
you that our allies fully share our basic
goals for the Vienna meeting. It is often
forgotten in this country that, at the
outset of the Helsinki negotiations in the
mid-1970s, the West Europeans showed
a stronger and deeper interest in CSCE
and foresaw much earlier the importance
of the human dimension than did the
United States.
Since the 1977 Belgrade follow-up
meeting, expressions of Western con-
cern over Soviet human rights abuses
have become increasingly frequent and
specific. This approach has found con-
siderable resonance among West
European publics and has increasingly
been endorsed at the highest political
level. Thus, for example, during General
Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Paris in
October 1985, French journalists on both
the right and the left grilled Mr.
Gorbachev on Soviet failure to live up to
the standards enshrined in the Final Act.
Also during that visit, President
Mitterrand insisted that movement in
basket 3 of the Final Act take place at
CSCE Follow-Up Preparatory Meeting
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 23, 1986'
The United States, Canada, and the 33
other European states which participate
in the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) begin a
2-week meeting today in Vienna. This
meeting will prepare the agenda and
working program of the third CSCE
follow-up meeting which opens there
November 4.
The U.S. delegation, headed by
Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, will
seek to assure that the practical
arrangements adopted at this organiza-
tional meeting will facilitate achievement
of our substantive goals for the follow-up
meeting itself.
As at previous follow-up meetings—
in Belgrade in 1977-78 and Madrid
1980-83-this one will address the full
range of issues covered by the Helsinki
Final Act which represents a framework
for seeking to resolve the humanitarian,
economic, and security issues that divide
Europe. The Vienna meeting will review
the results of various subsidiary CSCE
meetings held since Madrid. These
include meetings on human rights,
human contacts, and culture, as well as
the outcome of the Stockholm Con-
ference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmaments
Europe (CDE).
The Stockholm conference, which
reached an accord on confidence-builc
measures Monday [September 22], is
integral part of this broader CSCE pi
ess which recognizes the interrelation
ship between peace and freedom in
Europe.
The follow-up meeting in Novemb
will take stock of the promises made ;
the promises kept and weigh the bala
among the various dimensions of the
CSCE process. The United States anc
its allies will seek improved complianc
by the East with all the principles anc
provisions of Helsinki and Madrid. Wi
will also seek to promote balanced pr(
ress among the different dimensions (
the CSCE process. In particular con-
crete steps by the East to resolve pro
lems in the areas of human rights and
humanitarian cooperation are needed.
The question of the future of the CDE
will be addressed at Vienna in this
broader context.
'Read to news correspondents by Dep? '
merit deputy spokesman Charles Redman, i
the same pace as in the other areas of
CSCE. During President Mitterrand's
visit to Moscow this July, he again raised
the issue of human rights, focusing on
family reunification and increased
dialogue on individual rights.
Nevertheless, we need to recognize
that our allies, for a variety of reasons,
will pursue somewhat different
approaches toward achieving our com-
mon objectives. They may not, for exam-
ple, be as vocal as the United States in
citing specific cases of noncompliance.
Some may tend to emphasize the impor-
tance of CSCE as a process rather than
as a negotiation. In my view, this diver-
sity of approach will not weaken the
impact of our combined efforts to
achieve our mutual objectives of
increased compliance and continued
balance in the CSCE process.
Soviet Objectives
For years the Soviets sought to deflect
human rights criticism by hiding behind
the principle of "noninterference in
internal affairs." The hollowness of th
defense, however, has been exposed a;
successive CSCE meetings during whi
the Soviets have been forced to confro
the facts of their poor record. The
Soviets have begun to show sensitivity
to such criticism, particularly when it ,
adversely affects the image Moscow
wants to cultivate in Western Europe.
Under the leadership of General
Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviets appe
to be changing their tactics. On the on
hand, they have taken the offensive in
charging the West with abuses of socia
and economic rights, and we can expec
a long litany of allegations against the
United States at the Vienna meeting.
This change of tactic, however, conced
the legitimacy of raising human rights
issues involving another country. We
will, therefore, welcome the debate anc
will engage in it energetically.
Mr. Gorbachev has also indicated a
greater willingness to talk about Soviel
performance with regard to human
rights. We can thus expect a more acti"
Soviet effort in Vienna to refute
72
Department of State Bullet
EUROPE
■stern efforts to record and correct
net abuses. We will also have to
ard against allowing the Soviets to
n credit for this increased willingness
discuss human rights as a substitute
actual, concrete performance on the
•nan rights front. In this regard, we
,st continue to insist that words and
>mises be backed up with specific
ids.
The Soviets have also indicated a
ong interest in progress on security
i economic issues. While we will have
examine any Soviet proposals in each
ICE basket in the context of Western
iectives and proposals in these areas, I
ieve that they can help us, via the
nciple of balance, to advance our
lis with regard to improved com-
ance on human rights.
nclusion
i have been working closely with the
-nmission in developing and refining
r strategy for the Vienna follow-up
•eting. I look forward to continued
ise collaboration as we enter the final
.ges of preparation. As in Madrid, we
1 1 rely heavily on your skills, expertise,
i judgment.
Given the Eastern record on human
;hts issues, the Vienna meeting is
sly to be a difficult conference,
netheless, I am confident that prog-
Iss is possible. As President Reagan
ted in his statement at the close of the
It review meeting 3 years ago:
lialogue, when based on realistic
ipectations and conducted with
:tience, can produce results. These
suits are often gradual and hard won,
:t they are necessary buildingblocks for
more secure and stable world."
A Discussion on U.S.-Soviet Relations
'The completed transcript of the hearings
i,l be published by the commission and will
: available from the Superintendent of
icuments, U.S. Government Printing
Bee, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
Following is an interview with
A mJbassador Paul H. Nitze, Special Ad-
viser to the President and the Secretary
of State on Arms Control Matters, and
Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for European and Canadian
Affairs, by broadcast journalist Nelson
Benton on June 16, 1986.
Introduction
Mr. Benton: Hello, I'm Nelson Benton.
Welcome to the State Department's pro-
gram on U.S.-Soviet relations. Today,
we will examine U.S. policy toward the
Soviet Union; what it is, and how it got
that way, and what the prospects are for
improved relations. Figuring heavily in
this equation is the complex issue of
nuclear arms.
In November 1985 President Reagan
met in Geneva with Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev, seeking a better rela-
tionship between the two countries and
ways to reduce the nuclear arsenals of
both sides.
Over the past two decades, some
Soviet- American agreements have been
reached; some treaties have been signed.
But international tension has always
clouded the quest for improved Soviet-
American relations.
In 1981 President Reagan initiated
new negotiations. Their objective: to
bring about deep reductions in nuclear
weapons. Today, that quest goes on.
Interview
Mr. Benton: What are the prospects for
improved relations with the Soviets?
How can we solve this complex problem
of nuclear weapons? To discuss these
issues from the perspective of the U.S.
Government, we have with us today two
distinguished diplomats.
Ambassador Paul Nitze is a giant in
the world of diplomacy, a man who has
served as adviser to Presidents since
Harry Truman. He is recognized as the
expert in arms control, a principal nego-
tiator of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty, present at the Kennedy-
Khrushchev summit in Vienna in 1961.
He has dealt with the Soviets across the
table throughout four decades. Today, he
is special adviser on arms control to the
President of the United States and to
Secretary of State George Shultz.
Mark Palmer is a Deputy Assistant
Secretary at the Department of State.
He has played a key role in U.S.-Soviet
relations for 5 years. He's worked on
Soviet affairs for over two decades. He
has served in the Soviet Union and was a
Senior Assistant to Secretary Shultz in
planning the Reagan-Gorbachev summit
in Geneva. He holds the personal rank of
Minister-Counselor and has been nomi-
nated by President Reagan to be the
next U.S. Ambassador to Hungary.
Mr. Nitze, let me ask you first. You
have negotiated with the Soviets
throughout the postwar period, what
have you learned about their negotiating
techniques over that long time?
Ambassador Nitze: The Soviet
Union goes at the negotiations in a way
which is much more closely designed to
get the better of the other side in a
negotiation. Therefore, they go into a
negotiation with very extreme demands-
very self-serving to their position. Then
the second point is that they use every
outside influence that they can develop
to bring pressure on the other side to
make the concessions that they want.
They really don't believe that anybody in
the West is going to give them some con-
cession because they're fair and equita-
ble. Then, finally, when they think that
the situation has become ripe for some
kind of negotiation, then they offer a
rather small concession for and, they
insist, for at least an equal concession on
the other side. But if you start from
unequal positions, then obviously that
leads to a position of advantage to them
in the negotiations. And, finally, they
also believe that it is important to ensure
that the final negotiations take place
against a deadline. They think they're in
a better position to get a better deal if
there's a deadline.
Mr. Benton: Let me ask you, Mr.
Palmer, do we have a comprehensive,
long-range policy toward the Soviet
Union? What are its components?
To obtain a videotape of this interview
please contact:
Bureau of Public Affairs
Special Projects Staff
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
(Tel.: 202-647-2353)
Dvember 1986
73
EUROPE
Mr. Palmer: We look at the great
sweep of our relations since the Second
World War, and we have to recognize
that it is a difficult relationship. The
norm over the last 40 years or so has
been problems, not successes; not
cooperation but difficulty and antago-
nism. And I think realistically one has to
recognize that the Soviet world view is
profoundly different than ours and their
system is profoundly different. There-
fore, it's no use sort of saying let's have
some simple solution, let's just talk to
them a little bit more, smile a little
more, and the relationship will be trans-
formed; it won't. And if you proceed
that way, you're bound to have very
sharp vacillations of rising expectations,
and then something like the Korean
airliner or Afghanistan will come along
and your strategy will be in a shambles.
So we believe we should proceed
steadily, recognizing, being realistic
about the nature of the differences.
Secondly, we believe that given the size
and scale and power of the Soviet Union,
it's important to recognize that they will
only respect us and deal with us on a
basis of equality if we're strong— strong
not only militarily but also strong in
terms of politics— recognizing that the
struggle in the final analysis is a political
struggle, that the Soviets believe that
history is moving in their direction. But
the third element of our approach is, of
course, negotiations and engagement.
And with all the difficulty, I think
it's important not to despair. Results are
possible. We have had times when things
have been achieved which have been
valuable for them and for us and for the
world. And President Reagan has a very
ambitious, perhaps the most ambitious
agenda of negotiations that we have
ever had. He wants to do away with all
nuclear weapons; he wants to have an
unprecedented scale of people-to-people
exchanges. It's those kinds of bold ideas
that we think are important, and that's
our agenda. We want to touch all of the
key areas: arms control; regional prob-
lems like Afghanistan, Middle East,
southern Africa; human rights, a very
important part of our agenda; and all
this broad scope of bilateral things from
trade to people-to-people programs.
That's our agenda.
Mr. Benton: What about the prob-
lem of dealing with human rights and
the Soviet Union. Can we have a practi-
cal effect on the human rights practices
of the Soviet Union?
Mr. Palmer: Within certain limits
we can have, historically we have had.
There've been periods in which things
have happened: large numbers of emi-
grants have been permitted to come out
of the Soviet Union; prominent dissi-
dents have been released from jail. And,
in the context of this last summit, we did
see some results. I went to Germany to
greet Mr. Shcharanskiy when he came
out. One of the most exciting moments
of my life was seeing this marvelous,
courageous, funny, moderate human
being finally released after a terrible
ordeal in the Soviet Union. One of the
reasons why you didn't hear more at the
time of the summit is that the President
believes that the most practical approach
is for him to develop a quiet relationship
with Mr. Gorbachev on this issue, so that
while we as a people and a government
will continue to speak out about human
rights very vigorously, he wants to have
this special ability, as President Nixon
had that special ability, to produce prac-
tical results in the human rights field.
Mr. Benton: Mr. Nitze, why has
President Reagan decided that we will
no longer be constrained by the limits of
the SALT II [strategic arms limitation
talks] Treaty?
Ambassador Nitze: The President
started off feeling that the SALT II
Treaty was a flawed treaty, but he also
thought that negotiations with the
Soviet Union were important. And he
thought it would help the process of
negotiations if, at least for a certain
period of time, the United States were to
restrain itself, exercise restraint with
respect to its programs so it stayed
within the limitations of SALT II— which
have never been ratified and which
would have expired by 1985— provided
the Soviets did the same and provided
there was time, they were prepared
seriously to negotiate. Now that decision
he made in 1982. So that, you know, a
number of years have gone by since that
1982 decision. He has said, however,
that he will feel himself, the United
States, not to be constrained by those
limits— because of the passage of time,
because of the fact that the Soviets have
not restricted themselves to the restric-
tions of SALT II.
Mr. Benton: The role of summitry-
summitry and arms negotiations at this
point seem so totally tied together. What
is the role of summitry and the linkage
to arms control negotiations?
Mr. Palmer: One American who's
dealt with the Soviets since the time of
Lenin said to me that they are a system—
that everybody is afraid of the man next
above him, until you get all the way ul
to the very top. And it's only the vervl
top man who really can make decision!
on anything of any importance. And iU
would say that is the critical reason fcji
summitry. You've got to, when you w|
to do something big and ambitious,
you've got to get to that man. Every-
body down below is more or less a nei
vous bureaucrat and isn't willing to ts
that kind of big step.
So the President has outlined, as ;
know, a three summit agenda which i:
unprecedented, I think; we've never h
a proposal and a concept for three sur
mits in very rapid succession in order
bring about these kinds of big agree-
ments. So I would say that, if one
approaches summitry in the right waj
is necessary to get the kinds of things
we want.
Mr. Benton: Given the fact that
General Secretary Gorbachev is new i
his job, isn't a summit from pure inter
political purposes very much to his
advantage in establishing his power ir
the Soviet Union?
Mr. Palmer: I think that's absolut
right if it goes well. If it goes badly wl
you're still trying to consolidate your
power, of course, it can go very badly
from your own personal point of view.
And I think that's what we're seeing
now— a little uncertainty on his part
about whether he wants to go ahead
with a commitment that he made in w:
ing to a summit this year in Washingti
and a summit next year in Moscow. M,
sense, however, is that he still sees soi
advantages. And that, as the Presiden
has said, we're very committed, and w
hope very much that the process will g
ahead.
Mr. Benton: Let's get back to arm
control policy if we could for a minute.
How do you respond to critics who say
that the Administration does not have
agreed-upon arms control policy?
Ambassador Nitze: The President
has wished from the very beginning to
set up the preconditions, the conditions
in the world under which the total
elimination of nuclear weapons would b
possible. You can't do that overnight, t-
lot of things have to be done to make it
possible. One of the things that he
thought would lead in the direction of
such a world was, for instance, limita-
tions on conventional arms. He's been
interested in the mutual force reductior
program, MBFR [mutual and balanced
force reductions], in Europe. Another
thing is the limitation and the ban on th
74
Department of State Bullet
EUROPE
duction and deployment of chemical
pons. He's been working on that;
ve been working on that hard. The
n thing, of course, is the limitation of
[ear weapons and, in that field, part
hat problem is a problem in Europe
that has to do with the intermediate-
ge nuclear forces, which are deployed
'urope and some in the Far East.
We've been working hard on that
ti respect to the total elimination of
t entire class of nuclear weapons. I,
self, was the head of that delegation
ch works— has been working for
rs trying to get that done. He's been
-king hard on the question of the
^tegic nuclear weapons, those which
weapons of intercontinental range,
ch affect primarily the United States
i the U.S.S.R. There, he'll again wish
[ee that there would be meaningful
' strategically important reductions in
jipons of this type— an increasingly
'p reduction so that this would end up
ling toward the possibility of the total
iiination of nuclear weapons. It was
a same drive, this same interest,
|ch caused him to suggest that our
inical people look to see whether or
i it might not be possible to develop
pnsive weapons which could con-
■ ute to a situation in which the aboli-
i of nuclear weapons would be feasi-
i So, that's what we've been trying to
i and I think all parts of the U.S. pro-
im have been consistent with those
bctives. There have been differences
'hin the Administration as to the best
\i to approach some of these points.
\. they've been differences about the
uniques, so forth and so on, the minor
its of it. The principal objectives have
i been in controversy within the exec-
ve branch.
Mr. Benton: With SDI (Strategic
1'ense Initiative), some are concerned
lit this may violate the Anti-Ballistic
Jisile Treaty.
Ambassador Nitze: It clearly does
I violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile
laty. In the first place, the Anti-
ilistic Missile Treaty never mentions
1 word research. It was agreed by
i'h the Soviet side and by our side that
tearch was not to be limited by that
tty, and it is not limited by that
.iaty. The Soviets have tried to suggest
k that purposeful research is some-
liv or other limited under the treaty.
i!t, it isn't mentioned, it isn't limited
-Jer the treaty. There's no way in
i ich you could verify what is going on
:he minds of researchers in
coratories, and so forth and so on.
Mr. Benton: Secretary Shultz has
called for less use by the Soviets of
highly publicized proposals, particularly
arms control proposals. Why is that
important, Mr. Nitze?
Ambassador Nitze: Any indication
that the Soviets are really prepared for
confidential negotiations would be
important. That is where one really does
the business of coming to conclusions
which would take into account not only
Soviet interests but our own.
We believe that the place for those
confidential negotiations is in Geneva,
where Max Kampelman [head, U.S.
delegation on arms control negotiations
and U.S. negotiator on defense and
space arms] and a very competent team
are negotiating with a very competent
team on the Soviet side. Those people in
Geneva are in a position where they
could take into account not only the
broad principles which are of interest to
the public but also the specific details
which would make it possible to trans-
late those principles into reality-
something that you could count on,
something that would be verifiable,
something which would do what is
intended.
Mr. Palmer: Since Lenin's time, the
Soviets have believed that the best thing
to do was to go around governments and
to affect people's peace movements-
front groups to affect the context within
which political leaders in other societies
make decisions. And that has been such
a strong stream in Soviet diplomacy,
such a relatively novel approach to
diplomacy because it means not going to
the foreign ministry but to the press, in
a certain sense, that in the 1970s
Suslov— who was then head of the
ideological part of the Soviet Central
Committee— Suslov complained that they
had, at that point, shifted too much in
the direction of serious negotiations on
arms control, the Middle East, and other
areas with the United States and that
they needed to resurrect more of the
ideological propaganda, going to the
people approach. And Arkady Shev-
chenko, one of the senior Soviets who's
come over to the West, reports about
that in his book. This remarkable
phenomenon of trying to fine tune the
distinction between serious talks with
the West and propaganda.
Ambassador Nitze: What I look for
is indications of a decision by the Polit-
buro, that the Politburo has come to the
conclusion that the time is now ripe for a
deal, that they want a deal— is one of the
best indicators, I think, is when they
seriously wish or indicate that they want
the important negotiations to be con-
fidential. At the time when they are
making public statements as to their
position, then it's perfectly clear that
they have not reached a stage where
they want the negotiations really to
reach that final phase.
Ambassador Semyonov [head of
Soviet SALT I delegation], once told me
during one of the negotiations— I felt we
weren't making the progress that I had
hoped for— and Ambassador Semyonov
said, "Oh, Mr. Nitze, don't be discour-
aged, you know in a serious negotiation
of this kind, one gets perhaps 30% of the
business done in the first couple of
months— each side establishes its posi-
tion. But then it takes some years for
the next 30% of the business to be done.
And the final 30% is done in the last 20
minutes."
Mr. Benton: What do you see hap-
pening in the next 2-3 years down the
road with Moscow?
Mr. Palmer: Well, we have a sense
that Mr. Gorbachev has given a green
light to people-to-people programs, and I
think most Americans welcome that.
We've been inundated with ideas from
American private initiative in this
field— everything from the Dallas
Cowboys and the Washington Redskins
playing a game in Lenin Stadium to
hosts of high school students who want
to go over there and study. We've had
an average of 100 calls a day with new
ideas in this field. So, I think we'll see an
expansion in people-to-people programs.
I think we're going to see a regulariza-
tion of the discussions on critical wars
that are underway today— Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua,
the whole of the Middle East. We've
begun to move into a systematic set of
talks at senior levels, and I think that's
going to continue, and that's good.
Ambassador Nitze: It is my own
view, this is my personal view, that the
Soviet economy is not in deep difficulty.
It isn't an efficient economy, but it does
continue to grow, because it started
from a low, very low level and they've
got an enormous country and enormous
resources and a very large body of
talented people. So there's no reason
why it shouldn't continue to grow. But,
as I see it, they are beginning to meet
the phenomenon of rising expectations
on the part of their populace, that means
that you have to enter the modern
world. You have to enter the world in
which there is communication, the world
in which there is a greater freedom on
Wember 1986
75
EUROPE
the part of individuals and enterprises in
the Soviet Union to do the intelligent
thing, to enter this modern world.
If they want to get into the modern
world, then I think it is in their interest
to reduce the burden of armaments,
which is immense in the Soviet Union. I
would think that if they really want to
make this transition into the modern
world and, to some degree, meet these
expectations of their populace, they
should be interested in arrangements
which would take into account, not only
their strategic interests but those of the
West as well.
Mr. Palmer: I'm mildly encouraged.
I think that the Soviet Union has some
incentives now for dealing with us. We
have restored our military strength to a
considerable degree. There's still much
to be done, but there is now a greater
recognition in Moscow that what they
call the correlation of forces is not, at
the moment, ineluctably moving in their
direction. So, they have some incentives
now to deal with us. There has been, in
some of the arms control fora, a little bit
of an indication on the part of the
Soviets of seriousness. As Paul men-
tioned, when they start to go quiet on
something, you start to get a little more
encouraged, and there have been a few
quiet things lately— modest, not to exag-
gerate their significance, no break-
through, but a little bit there to work
with. So I'm— within the rather cautious
longer term context, I think that we
have some opportunities now. I know
that's the President's and Secretary
Shultz's view that we should pursue
these opportunities vigorously, and I'm
confident that that will be done by this
Administration.
Mr. Benton: Our time is up. Mr.
Nitze, Mr. Palmer, thank you very much.
And thank you for joining us. I am
Nelson Benton at the State Depart-
ment. ■
28th Report on Cyprus
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 9, 19861
In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am
submitting to you a bimonthly report on prog-
ress toward a negotiated settlement of the
Cyprus question.
Since my last report to you, the United
Nations Secretary General has continued his
initiative. He has made clear his commitment
to his good offices mission and to helping the
two Cypriot sides move forward toward an
overall solution. In this regard, he will be
meeting with Mr. Denktash on September 16
and with President Kyprianou later in the
month. We will give the Secretary General
our full support and encourage the parties to
cooperate with him and carry forward the
work that has been accomplished since the
inception of his initiative.
Among other developments in Cyprus of
note, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal visited
northern Cyprus from July 2 to July 4.
During that period, movement through t
primary crossing point between north an
south Cyprus was blocked by demonstral
on the Greek Cypriot side. On July 4, Tu
Cypriot authorities announced the closur
all crossing points on their side of the U.
buffer zone and did not reopen them unt
July 12. We made clear to all concerned
view that actions that could exacerbate t
sions and complicate the search for a pes
settlement should be avoided.
Sincerely,
Ronald Re
'Identical letters addressed to Thorn;
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation
Committee (text from Weekly Compilati<
Presidential Documents of Sept. 15. 198(
76
Department of State Bull*
UMAN RIGHTS
leligious Persecution in the Soviet Union
: Following are statements by Edward
,[)< rwinski. Counselor of 'the Depart-
fnt of State, and Richard Schifter,
tsistant Secretary for Human Rights
id Humanitarian Affairs, before the
neommittees on Human Rights and
kernational Organizations and on
vrvpe and the Middle East of the House
frt ign Affairs Committee on July 30,
k1
HJNSELOR DERWINSKI
lank you for giving me the opportunity
testify today on the subject of
ligious persecution in the Soviet
lion. On September 11, of last year, I
voted my remarks to the persecution
the Soviet Jewish population. Today
y testimony will cover the general
fuation of religion in the Soviet Union
id Soviet persecution of non-Jewish
jligious groups and organizations.
As I noted in my appearance last
I'ptember, Soviet authorities have
■•gely succeeded in crushing the
litical and nationalist human rights
ganizations which sprang up during
■e 1960s and 1970s. The last surviving
jlsinki monitoring group was forced to
uband in the face of heavy repression
: late 1982. With the mainstream
iman rights movement in the Soviet
'.lion effectively destroyed, Soviet
ithorities have brought increasing
I'essure to bear against the largest
maining center of organized dissent in
'e Soviet Union— the religious
mmunity.
The Soviet regime regards religion
. a hostile ideology and is openly com-
itted to the creation of an atheist
iciety. Its attitude was summed up by a
yelorussian party official who wrote a
)84 article in Kommunist Belorussii
»at "religion in our country is the only
gal refuge alien to socialism in ideology
|id morals." How Soviet authorities
iderstand freedom of conscience is
rvealed in Soviet constitutional provi-
ons, legislation, administrative regula-
ons, and extralegal pressures applied
gainst believers.
oviet Law and Religion
rticle 52 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution
sfines freedom of conscience as the
ght "to conduct religious worship or
fcheist propaganda." This formulation in
"feet makes illegal the conduct of
"religious propaganda"; i.e., to engage
in public discussion or refute atheist
propaganda.
The 1929 Law on Religious Associa-
tions circumscribes believers' rights still
further. Soviet authorities interpret the
law's requirement that primary religious
associations must register with local
authorities as giving it the right to grant
or withhold registration. In practice, this
allows the state to limit the number of
religious associations, to reduce their
number gradually, and even to deny
legal status to an entire religious
denomination (as has been the case with
the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the
Jehovah's Witnesses). In short, the state
can and does prevent Soviet citizens
from practicing the faith of their choice.
Soviet constitutional provisions on the
separation of church and state and the
obligations of the Soviet Union as a
signatory of international human rights
covenants are, in practice, contradicted
by the law's many Draconian restrictions
on religious groups.
Religious groups do not have the
status of independent public organiza-
tions under Soviet law or the juridical
status of a person-at-law and, therefore,
cannot own property or inherit funds or
property. "Cults"— as they are referred
to officially— have no specific legal right
to maintain seminaries, publishing
facilities, or other institutions such as
monasteries; those that exist, exist
precariously by special permission. The
law is structured to prevent the clergy
or hierarchy from exercising effective
control over church affairs. At the same
time, it allows state officials to
manipulate church activities and policies
by giving them a role in determining the
membership of primary religious groups
and the selection of their leaders and
clergy. The lengthy list of restrictions
and regulations imposed on religious
associations and clergy prevents them
from engaging in any activity except the
performance of religious rites. They can-
not proselytize or provide religious
instruction to children; engage in
charitable, social, or "political"
activities; or organize prayer or study
groups, libraries, mutual aid societies,
kindergartens, or cooperatives.
The regime enforces its policy
through the Council for Religious Affairs
attached to the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers. The council monitors religious
activities and is responsible for the en-
forcement of laws pertaining to religion.
Its administrative regulations thus im-
pose an additional level of restrictions on
religious liberty. According to official
documents of the council and unofficial
reports reaching the West, the council
supervises religious activities and senior
church officials in minute detail; censors
religious publications; passes on person-
nel selections; and even monitors ser-
mons and biblical passages used in
religious services. Clergy cannot legally
practice their calling without the coun-
cil's approval. Whenever possible, the
council places the clergy in the position
of acting against their direct respon-
sibilities by forcing them to implement
policies designed to weaken and in time
destroy religion: by closing churches
"voluntarily," keeping silent when
believers are harassed, and ignoring
violations of law by the authorities. In
general, the regime aims at compromis-
ing the integrity of clergy and religious
institutions and at rendering organized
religion and individual believers
incapable of defending their interests.
Repression of Activities
Believers who refuse to register or com-
ply with state controls become subject to
a wide range of sanctions. Repeated
violations of the Law on Religious
Associations can lead to criminal
charges. Articles of the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic Criminal
Code used against believers include
those aimed specifically against religious
activists as well as those used against
political dissidents: Articles 142 (viola-
tion of laws on separation of church and
state and of church and school), 143
(obstructing performance of religious
rites), 227 (infringement of person and
rights of citizens under appearance of
performing religious ceremonies), 190.1
(slandering the Soviet state and system),
or 70 (anti-Soviet agitation and prop-
aganda). In addition, articles involving
general criminal violations are also used
frequently, such as hooliganism, drug
and weapons possession, engaging in
prohibited trades, and parasitism. Cases
against believers are often fabricated.
Soviet law and penal practices single
out religious activists for especially
harsh treatment. Those convicted under
the criminal code for "religious crimes"
are sentenced to strict regime labor
camps and designated— together with
political activists— as "especially
dangerous state criminals," a category
ovember 1986
77
HUMAN RIGHTS
that disqualifies them from amnesties or
leniency. Indeed, the provisions of
amnesties promulgated in recent years
demonstrate that authorities regard
religious activism (such as organizing
religious classes for children or cir-
culating a petition) as a more serious
crime than assault, robbery, or rape.
Even if convicted for lesser crimes,
believers rarely qualify for early release
or parole because, as "prisoners of cons-
cience," they usually refuse to provide
the required expression of remorse or
admission of guilt. Believers who are
incarcerated in psychiatric hospitals face
an especially agonizing choice, since they
are often promised immediate release if
they renounce their belief in God. Others
face deprivation of their parental rights
under provisions of the Soviet Family
Code that obligates parents to raise their
children as "worthy members of socialist
society."
One-third of the approximately 900
known Soviet prisoners of conscience are
religious believers. The percentage of
the actual total may be even higher. Cur-
rent estimates are that there are up to
10,000 prisoners of conscience in Soviet
labor camps and psychiatric hospitals. A
substantial percentage of these are
thought to be religious believers, many
from closed or remote areas of the
Soviet Union where accurate informa-
tion is difficult or impossible to obtain.
In addition to incarceration, a
variety of social pressures are used
against believers, including public
"exposure" by atheist activists, vilifica-
tion in the Soviet media, exclusion from
high education, and discrimination in
professional advancement. Young peo-
ple, especially, are subjected to heavy
pressures and face life as second-class
citizens if they become known as practic-
ing believers.
Eyewash for Foreigners
The regime, while militantly
antireligious, seeks to portray the Soviet
Union to the outside world as an
enlightened, humane, and democratic
society. It also recognizes that Soviet
religious groups can perform useful func-
tions to advance Soviet interests: to
demonstrate to foreigners the existence
of religious freedom in the Soviet Union;
to support Soviet interests abroad; and
to bolster morale and patriotism in time
of war. The pursuit of conflicting objec-
tives generates internal contradictions
and policy fluctuations; more often, it
opens up a huge gap between prop-
aganda claims and the realities of Soviet
life. To make its propaganda credible,
the regime must exercise tight control
over religious activists (to prevent
independent initiatives or public protest)
as well as visiting foreigners to ensure
that they receive the best possible
impression of religious life. When details
of its antireligious repressions do leak
out, the regime brands them as
"malicious slander."
Soviet spokesmen typically respond
to foreign criticism of their religious
policies by citing allegedly positive
impressions of Soviet religious life by
visiting U.S. religious leaders. The
regime also relies on Soviet religious
leaders (especially the Russian Orthodox
hierarchy) to support official policies
when attending religious conferences
abroad or receiving foreign guests. The
display of restored churches and
religious services to tourists, moreover,
provides a steady source of badly needed
hard currency.
In spite of regime policies, popular
interest in religion has increased
significantly during the past decade,
according to authoritative official
sources, unofficial reports, and
knowledgeable foreign observers.
Against the backdrop of these
general remarks, I would now like to
discuss the specific situation of some of
the major religious groups and organiza-
tions in the Soviet Union, beginning with
the Russian Orthodox Church.
The Russian Orthodox Church
The Russian Orthodox Church occupies
an anomalous position as the establish-
ment church of an atheist regime. It is
the largest single religion in the Soviet
Union, with an estimated 35-40 million
believers. As the church of the
U.S.S.R.'s dominant cultural and ethnic
group, it enjoys privileges that set it
apart from other denominations:
representation abroad (including
membership in the World Council of
Churches, attendance at international
conferences, and the staffing of parishes
and bishoprics outside the U.S.S.R.),
three seminaries and a theological
academy, a modern publishing center,
and a plant for the manufacture of
religious goods. Its senior hierarchs live
well and enjoy perquisites comparable to
those of the Soviet elite. The regime ac-
cords the church a prominent role in fur-
thering Soviet foreign policy objectives,
such as involvement in peace campaigns
in Western Europe.
The Orthodox Church attained its
present status after harsh repression
during the 1920s and 1930s, a period of
stabilization and official recognition as a
result of its patriotic role during Worl
War II, and a renewed period of reprc
sion under Khrushchev. To survive, th
institutional church paid a heavy price
became an obedient regime supporter
and surrendered its ability to defend i
interests or protect believers from
regime pressures. Even worse, the
Patriarchate permits the regime to co
promise the church in the eyes of
believers by forcing it to act against it
own vital interests. Internal documenl
of the regime's Council for Religious
Affairs reaching the West in recent
years have documented how authoritk-
supervise the institutional activities oi
the church in minute detail and interft
in every aspect of church life.
The church's loss of institutional
integrity poses a personal dilemma for
many Orthodox believers, clergy, and
members of the hierarchy. One result
has been to create two distinct cleavaj
within the church: a vertical division o
church life and individual behavior int<
"official" and "unofficial" sectors (a
characteristic of all Soviet life) and a
horizontal estrangement between the
hierarchy on the one hand and individt j
believers and lower parish clergy on tt
other. A small group of Orthodox
believers— the True Orthodox Church- •
rejects any contact with the regime or
the official church which is considered i
irredeemably compromised; it leads a
clandestine existence and is regarded 1 1
the authorities as an illegal sect.
Efforts by individual priests and
believers to organize religious activitie
outside regime or hierarchy controls ail
systematically repressed by the
authorities and find little or no support i
within the heirarchy, which takes the
position that the Soviet Constitution
guarantees freedom of conscience and I
that believers are not prosecuted for
their faith but only for violating Soviet i
laws. Since October of last year, a
number of activists have been sentence!
to terms in labor camps, psychiatric
hospitals, or internal exile. They includt
Boris Razveyev, sentenced to 3 years in
labor for "anti-Soviet agitation"; Mikhai
Bombin, held for over 2 months in a
psychiatric hospital; and well-known
writer Feliks Svetov, who was sentencel
to 2 years of internal exile for "anti-
Soviet slander."
The resurgence of unofficial activity
in the church is by no means confined tcl
dissent and protest, however. Its most I
significant feature has been the revival
of faith, especially among young people I
and intellectuals, who are joining the
church in increasing numbers— a fact
78
Department of State Bulletii
HUMAN RIGHTS
ceded by Soviet atheist literature,
regime has reacted by stepping up
eist propaganda, arresting Orthodox
.vists, destroying unofficial groups
h as the Christian Seminar and the
istian Committee for the Defense of
ievers Rights, and suppressing
hodox samizdat publications.
Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate)
ireh
)ther large Soviet denomination, the
•ainian Catholic (Uniate) Church, is
of the most systematically
secuted religious groups in the
I.S.R. today. Its treatment flows from
)mbination of Moscow's general anti-
gious policy, the church's ties to
ne, and Uniate identification with
■ainian national aspirations. Formally
lawed in 1946, this church and its
Dwers have been subject to official
assment, arrests, and other forms of
:rimination ever since. Its under-
und nature makes it particularly dif-
Jt to determine the number of
evers. Estimates run from 65,000 all
way to 3-4 million.
The Uniate Church has a long and
iplex history that reflects Eastern
ope's frequent border changes, and
intimately tied to Ukrainian national
[rations. The church has its roots in
1596 Union of Brest— hence the
le— by which the Vatican sought to
the bitter resistance of Ukrainian
hodox congregations to forced con-
sion to Catholicism by the Polish
lorities who had recently occupied
.tern Ukraine. The Vatican's solution
i to subordinate the Uniate congrega-
us directly to Rome but to allow them
letain their liturgy, language, and
(inctive practices rather than adopt
an-rite Catholicism. This, in turn,
(ded western Ukrainians from their
:ationals in the east who, being under
,ssian rule, retained their allegiance to
[scow and to Russian Orthodoxy.
Initially, in order to resist further
ronization of the Ukrainian com-
friity, the Uniate Church allied itself
rh and became a spokesman for
["ainian national goals. When these
immunities subsequently fell under
-;sian rule and were pressured to
<>in the Orthodox Church, the linkage
Jween religion and nationalism was
S;her strengthened. During World
Ijr II, the Uniate Church actively
;perated with the Ukrainian national
Istance to the U.S.S.R.'s occupation
i eventual absorption of the western
hsdne. For that and for alleged
collaboration with the Germans, the
church's hierarchy was condemned to
the gulag.
Having effectively decapitated the
Uniate Church, the Soviet authorities in
1946 convened a synod in Lvov to
repudiate the Union of Brest and rein-
corporated the 4 million Uniates of the
western Ukraine into the Russian
Orthodox Church. For many Ukrainians,
this forced merger only strengthened the
attractiveness of Uniatism as a symbol
of Ukrainian nationalism and resistance
to Moscow. Consequently, although the
Soviets were able to take nominal con-
trol of the parishes still operating— even
today, nearly one-half of all churches
open in the U.S.S.R. are located in the
western Ukraine— the affected congrega-
tions continued in many cases to look to
Rome and to Uniate communities among
Ukrainian emigres abroad. In addition,
many Uniates were actively involved in
the armed resistance to Soviet power in
the Ukraine which lasted into the early
1950s.
Since that time, the Soviet
authorities have unremittingly attacked
the sect with propaganda and occasional
arrests, the persistency of which testifies
to the continued strength of Uniatism in
the Soviet Union. The latest effort to
destroy the Uniate Church has been a
proposal by the authorities to legalize
the Uniates, if they will break with
Rome. Such a provocation has been tried
before. Acceptance would only bring the
Uniates out into the open where they
would be subject to even greater abuse.
Now they are successfully operating
their own underground monastery which
since 1981 has managed to ordain over
80 parish priests.
During the past 2 years, Uniate
activists have also begun to publish an
underground samizdat journal entitled
The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in
Ukraine. This journal has effectively
catalogued the many abuses which
Uniate believers are subjected to by
Soviet authorities. In 1985, two of the
moving forces behind the journal— Iosif
Terelya and Vasily Kobrin— were
sentenced to long labor camp terms.
Despite this, the Chronicle has continued
to appear.
Soviet Protestants
The Protestant community in the Soviet
Union is divided into two camps. There
are registered groups of believers, which
adhere to the restrictive Soviet laws on
the practice of religion, and illegal
unregistered groups, which refuse to
adhere to these laws.
Registered Protestants. Currently
three main groups of Soviet Protestants
are registered with Soviet authorities.
Two of these are Lutheran— the
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia,
which has a membership of 400,000 and
the Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Estonia, which has a membership of
250,000. The third group— the Ail-Union
Council of Evangelical Christians and
Baptists— is an umbrella organization of
545,000 registered Evangelical
Protestants throughout the Soviet
Union. These registered Protestant
groups share the same basic problems
faced by the Russian Orthodox Church
and all other registered groups of
religious believers in the Soviet Union.
They must limit the practice of their
religion to conform with Soviet law, they
are discriminated against in employment
and education, and they are targets of
official antireligious propaganda in the
Soviet media. Their official represen-
tatives are forbidden from criticizing
Soviet religious policies and are fre-
quently forced to publicly support Soviet
foreign policy initiatives.
Unregistered Protestants.
Unregistered Evangelical Protestant
groups represent a particular problem
for the Soviet authorities. Even under
repressive Soviet conditions, they are
growing rapidly, particularly among
Soviet young people. Although
unregistered Evangelical Protestants
are gaining converts among most major
national groups, they are especially
strong in Ukraine, the northern
Caucasus, and the Pacific coast area.
Reform Baptists. Among
unregistered Evangelical Protestants,
most is known about "reform" or
"initiative" Baptists. According to
reform Baptist pastor Georgy Vins,
there are currently 2,000 reform Baptist
congregations, representing about
100,000 adults or 300,000 including fam-
ily members, in the Soviet Union.
Reform Baptists represent one of the
oldest organized human rights groups in
the U.S.S.R., dating back to 1962 when
the group split away from the registered
Baptist community. In terms of numbers
of believers incarcerated in labor camps
and psychiatric hospitals, they are also
the most repressed religious group in the
Soviet Union. The particular intensity of
the treatment meted out to them is
revealed in the fact that fully 20% of all
known Soviet prisoners of conscience are
Baptists. There are also reliable reports
that Soviet authorities have taken
children away from unregistered Baptist
J/ember 1986
79
HUMAN RIGHTS
parents to prevent the parents from rais-
ing them in the Baptist faith.
There are three main reform Baptist
organizations— the 12-man pastors'
group, the Council of Churches (10
members of which are currently
imprisoned; its chairman, Gennady
Kryuchkov, has been in hiding for 15
years); the secret "Christian" press
which prints religious literature, in-
cluding the Bible in many languages of
the U.S.S.R. (19 reform Baptists are cur-
rently imprisoned for their religious
samizdat activities); and the 12-woman
Council of Baptist Prisoners' Relatives,
which reports on the situation of reform
Baptist prisoners of conscience. Two of
these groups has its own samizdat
publication printed by the "Christian"
press— the Council of Churches monthly
journal. Fraternal Leaflet, and its
quarterly journal, The Herald of Truth;
and the monthly Bulletin of the Council
of Baptist Prisoners ' Relatives. No group
of religious believers in the Soviet Union
has suffered so much or persevered in
the face of intense repression with such
courage and tenacity as Soviet Baptists.
Seventh-Day Adventists. Another
large group of unregistered Soviet
protestants are Seventh-Day Adventists.
Some unregistered groups of Adventists
split from registered Adventist churches
as early as 1929. These reform
Adventists have formed their own
church known as the "True and Free
Adventists of the Seventh Day." This
Adventist group rejects any state control
over religion, basing this view on
religious commandments and the separa-
tion of church and state. Although less is
known about this group than some other
unregistered Protestant groups, their
number is estimated to total approx-
imately 40,000. Their governing body is
known as the Ail-Union Council of
Churches of Faithful and True
Adventists of the Seventh Day and they
produce an underground publication
called the Faithful Witness. Accurate
statistics regarding the total number
currently imprisoned do not exist. Unlike
the reform Baptists, there are no
Adventist representatives in the West,
but 50 would seem to be a reasonable
estimate based on the meager informa-
tion available.
Reform Pentecostals. Pentecostals
constitute another large group of
unregistered Soviet Protestants.
Although a few Pentecostal groups have
registered in recent years, most
Pentecostals continue to choose the risks
of the unregistered religious life. It was
not until 1980 that unregistered
Pentecostals formed a central organiza-
tion, known as the Brother's Council,
which represents nearly 200,000 adults,
or about 1 million people, including
families. Many thousands of Soviet
Pentecostals, despairing of their situa-
tion in the Soviet Union, have applied to
emigrate. On May 15, 1980, 18
Pentecostal activists organized the
Emigration Council for Christian
Evangelical Protestants; at least six
members of this council have been
imprisoned. Of the 30,000 Soviet
Pentecostals who have applied to
emigrate, only a handful have succeeded,
most notably the two Pentecostal
families— the Vashchenkos and the
Chmykhailovs— who took refuge in the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
Recently a community of approx-
imately 170 ethnic German Pentecostals
living at Cheguevka in the Soviet Far
East has come in for particularly harsh
treatment from Soviet authorities.
Denied permission to emigrate, com-
munity members have turned in their
internal passports, undertaken hunger
strikes, and taken their children out of
schools, the latter action reportedly due
to the harassment and beatings the
children were subjected to at school.
Since December 1984, 10 elders of the
community have been sentenced to labor
camp for up to 5 years for not possess-
ing internal passports or for conducting
unauthorized religious services. Every
adult member of the community has
been fired from his or her job. To sur-
vive the families forage in the woods for
food. Additionally a number of families
have been repeatedly threatened that
they may lose custody of their children
for having taken them out of school.
While an extreme example, this
mistreatment is characteristic of the par-
ticularly harsh attitudes Soviet
authorities have toward Evangelical
Christian believers in the Soviet Union.
Jehovah's Witnesses. Another
Soviet Protestant group, the Jehovah's
Witnesses, share with the Ukrainian
Catholic (Uniate) Church the distinction
of being totally banned by Soviet
authorities. As a result and due to the
small numbers of believers, there is not
much information available about them.
Judging from attacks in the Soviet
media, they seem to be active in
Moldavia, the north Caucasus, in
southern and eastern Ukraine, and in
the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions.
Samizdat sources reveal that Jehovah's
Witnesses, who are imprisoned in large
numbers, continue to practice their
ministry in Soviet labor camps.
Lithuanian Catholic Church
Religious faith is particularly strong i
Lithuania where, as in Poland, Roma
Catholicism remains central to natior
life. More than 75% of the population
remains faithful to the church, and in
large measure because of this, the
church there has been subject to spec
attacks by the Soviet authorities. Du<
Soviet restrictions on training, nearlj
one-fourth of the 640 parishes extant
not have a priest, and more than half
the republic's 696 priests are beyond
retirement age. While these figures a
significantly better than those for otr
religions in the Soviet Union, they ar
far cry from those of the thriving
Lithuanian Church before the forcibk
incorporation of that republic into th<
U.S.S.R. during World War II.
Antireligious propaganda and genera
harassment of believers, up to and
including the murder of priests (mure
whose perpetrators are never brough
trial), have been regular features of
Soviet policy there. In 1983, for the f
time since 1971, the authorities arres
and imprisoned two leading priests, a
move that sparked mass protests in t
republic. Despite these protests, arre
have continued. In 1985 Father Jonas
Matulionas was sentenced to 3 years
labor camp for "disrupting public
order." The charge reportedly stemrr
from his having led an All Saints' Da;
procession to a cemetery, a violation i
Soviet laws on religion. A young
Catholic student was arrested with hi
and sentenced to 2 years in prison.
That the Soviet authorities have r
moved even further to employ the full
range of repressive measures at their
disposal does not reflect some new foi
commitment to human rights but rath
a grudging recognition of the support
the church commands among Lithuani
and of the real difficulties involved in
suppression of such a broadly based ai
militant group.
Muslims
The second largest religious group in I
Soviet Union— after the Russian
Orthodox— and the one with potentiall
the greatest foreign policy implication
Soviet Islam has been frequently attac
ed, and on occasion protected, accordi
to the needs of Soviet domestic and
foreign policy. The exact number of
Muslims in the Soviet Union is unknov:
Most estimates are based on some fra<
tion of the approximately 45 million pt,
pie who belong to nationalities where i
Islam predominated prior to 1917. Sovj
80
Department of State Bulle
HUMAN RIGHTS
lars estimate that between 10% and
of this group are still religious in
e sense; Soviet Islamic leaders and
e Western observers have suggested
the share of Muslims in this group is
| to 100%. Part of the reason for
divergence is to be found in the
ire of Islam: it is nonclerical and non-
rregational and defines a way of life
'ell as a set of beliefs. In any case,
Islamic nationalities of the U.S.S.R.
the fastest growing segment of the
iet population and will represent
-oximately one-quarter of the total
iber by the year 2000.
The overwhelming majority of Soviet
lims are Sunni, except in Azerbaijan
re approximately two-thirds of the
olation traditionally belonged to the
ia branch of the faith. In addition,
•e are followers of various sufi
rs. These illegal and mystical sects
re from the contemplative to the
vist and play some role in unofficial
m. The Soviet authorities have
inized four spiritual directorates to
Islamic religious affairs— at
hkent, Ufa, Makhachkala, and Baku,
first three are Sunni, the last mixed
ia and Sunni. They have no central
y and report directly to the state's
ncil of Religious Affairs.
A limited number of mullahs are
jared each year at the medressah in
hara and at the Islamic Institute in
hkent. In addition— and in contrast to
;r faiths in the U.S.S.R.— some
iet mullahs attend foreign Islamic
x>ls such as Qom in Iran and
Vzhar in Cairo. In 1984 there were by
:ial Soviet claim approximately 1,100
>rking" mosques in the Soviet Union
an only slightly larger number of
\lahs. Obviously, even if one accepts
low Soviet estimates of the total
jnber of Muslims in the U.S.S.R., this
(fiber of mosques and mullahs cannot
(sfy the religious needs of the
filiation.
Like all other religions in the
IJ.S.R., Islam also has an "unofficial"
E, one that exists but is not sanc-
iied by the authorities. Being
^clerical, mullahs have no sacral func-
jis: anyone who can read the Koran
ii say prayers can act as one. Thus
termination of an Islamic community
difficult. While exact figures are
possible to come by, there are a vast
mber of unofficial Islamic com-
dnities in Central Asia and the
focasus; large unofficial publishing
^rations in both regions; and frequent
^images to local holy places, an
r;ious substitute for the nearly impossi-
i haj to Mecca. (At present, only about
60 Soviet Muslims are able to make the
haj each year, and they have clear
foreign policy tasks assigned to them.)
Soviet Islam has been subject to
periodic campaigns against it by the
Soviet authorities. Like Uniatism in the
Ukraine and Catholicism in Lithuania,
Islam is closely linked with local national
traditions and opposition to Russian
rule. This has made it especially difficult
to wipe out, for any attack on it has been
perceived as an attack on nationality,
something the Soviets want to support
because it divides the Islamic peoples in
the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, the Soviets
have wanted to showcase Soviet Islam to
the Third World in order to gain support
there. This strategy had some success in
the 1960s and 1970s and led to an easing
of the Soviet assault on Islam. Now,
however, out of a fear that events in
Iran and Afghanistan might find some
resonance among Soviet Muslims,
Moscow has renewed its crackdown
against them, forcing increasingly large
numbers into unofficial, technically
illegal activities. A young mullah,
Akverdy Eshkulov, was sentenced to 2
years in labor camp last year for serving
without official sanction. The Soviet
press has also reported other arrests of
Muslims for religious activities, including
printing and distributing religious books.
Although these are the largest
religious groups in the Soviet Union,
there are other, smaller denominations
which have also suffered under intense
persecution from Soviet authorities. One
such group, the small, but growing Hare
Krishna movement, is a prime example.
Although the total membership is still
quite small, more than 20 believers are
currently in Soviet labor camps or
psychiatric hospitals, thus illustrating
that no religious organization in the
Soviet Union is too small or insignificant
to merit persecution from Soviet
authorities.
Conclusion
The U.S. Government is deeply concern-
ed at the systematic violation of religious
freedom in the Soviet Union outlined in
this testimony. We must say quite can-
didly that we have seen no improvement
in the religious situation there since
General Secretary Gorbachev came to
power. If anything, conditions for
religious believers have continued to
deteriorate. We have catalogued Soviet
religious persecution in our annual Coun-
try Reports on Human Rights Practices
and in our semiannual reports on
Implementation of the Helsinki Final
Act. We have raised the subject of Soviet
violations of religious freedom forth-
rightly and in detail at the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) human rights experts, meeting
in Ottawa and in subsequent meetings in
Budapest and Bern. We will continue to
raise the issue in appropriate public
forums, such as the upcoming Vienna
review conference. We strongly believe
that calling public attention to these
abuses of human rights puts pressure on
the Soviet Union to change its restric-
tive policies. While change cannot be
expected overnight, we believe that the
pressure of world public opinion over
time can and will achieve results. In this
regard, we encourage Members of Con-
gress and representatives of non-
governmental organizations to add their
voices to ours in condemning Soviet
abuses of religious freedom. We believe
it is particularly important for brethren
churches in this country and in other
countries around the world to speak out
on behalf of their suffering coreligionists
in the Soviet Union.
In addition to our own public efforts,
we have raised and will continue to raise
our concerns over Soviet abuses of
religious freedom directly with Soviet
authorities. We continue to make clear
to them that these and other human
rights abuses are serious obstacles to the
overall improved relations with the
Soviet Union that the United States
seeks. As I stated in my testimony last
September, we cannot and will not
lessen our commitment to the defense of
individual human rights, a commitment
rooted deep in American tradition.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
SCHIFTER
As this is part two in a series of hearings
on the subject of religion in the Soviet
Union, I would like to start out by set-
ting forth my understanding of the
significant difference between the sub-
ject matter of the first hearing and the
subject matter of the present hearing.
The first hearing focused on the
treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union.
Jews, in the Soviet scheme of things, are
viewed not as a religious group but as an
ethnic group or, to use Soviet termi-
nology, as a nationality. Jews suffer
discrimination in the Soviet Union
because anti-Semitism— discrimination
based purely on ancestry— has become
state policy. Whether a Jew attends
services in a synagogue or in other ways
practices his religion makes a marginal
difference at best.
wember 1986
81
HUMAN RIGHTS
The situation is vastly different with
persons who practice the Christian faith
and, perhaps to a lesser extent, also with
Muslims. Soviet citizens born into ethnic
groups that historically have adopted
Christianity or Islam as their religion
have the opportunity of rising to the
very top of the Soviet Union's govern-
mental pyramid, provided they don't
identify themselves with the religious
faith of their ethnic groups. If they do,
they limit their opportunities for
advancement. The severity of these
limitations is proportional to the extent
of the person's religious involvement.
In recent years, to be sure, we have
heard eye-witness reports from highly
respected American religious per-
sonalities as to the tolerance of religious
observance in the Soviet Union. These
visitors to the Soviet Union reported
accurately and fairly what they saw.
They were, of course, unable to report
what was hidden from their view.
What these recent visitors to the
Soviet Union may have thought they
might encounter was an active crusade
against all forms of religion, a continu-
ing deep, publicly manifested commit-
ment to atheism. They were pleasantly
surprised not to encounter evidence of
an overt atheistic campaign. What they
failed to understand fully is that a newer
approach to the repression of religion
had taken the place of the earlier cam-
paign for atheistic doctrine.
The Ruling Class
Atheism was undoubtedly an important
element of the ideological foundation on
which the Bolsheviks erected their state.
But, like other facets of that ideology,
the commitment to atheism has been
significantly attenuated. In this, the 69th
year of its existence, the Soviet state is
committed largely to maintaining in
power its ruling class, "The New Class,"
as Milovan Djilas called it.
It is in this context that the Soviet
attitude toward religion can be readily
understood. To the extent to which
religion can serve the ruling class, it will
be used. To the extent to which it inter-
feres with the objectives of the ruling
class, it will be suppressed.
A few years ago, Jeane Kirkpatrick
reminded us all of the significant differ-
ence between totalitarian and authoritar-
ian systems. She was roundly criticized
for her observations by persons who,
nevertheless, were unable to disprove
the validity of her thesis. The manner in
which religion is dealt with in the Soviet
Union offers an object lesson in the
operation of a totalitarian system.
The Soviet Union's ruling class,
known as the nomenklatura, consists
of the leaders of government, the
leaders of the party, the leaders of the
military, and the leaders of the various
governmentally operated economic, edu-
cational, scientific, and cultural institu-
tions. What is expected of this leader-
ship group is loyalty to each other,
loyalty to the system that maintains
these leaders in power. What is expected
of them is, therefore, a single-minded
commitment which must not be diluted
by a set of potentially conflicting
loyalties. The practice of a religious faith
would suggest such a conflicting loyalty
and is, therefore, deemed unacceptable.
It follows that no known religious
believer may join the nomenklatura.
Immediately below the leadership
group is the pool of persons who have
been identified as potential candidates
for leadership, the lower-ranking
members of the Communist Party. They,
too, must in this totalitarian scheme be
free of the danger of another set of
loyalties. Known religious believers are,
therefore, disqualified from entering the
group that can qualify for leadership
positions.
But then there is that great mass of
people which constitutes the country's
rank and file. As George Orwell sug-
gested in his remarkably prescient
outline of the future course of a Leninist
state, different rules apply to the com-
mon people. In today's Soviet Union,
these persons may engage in religious
observance as long as that is done in a
place authorized by the government, at a
time authorized by the government, and
in a format authorized by the
government.
Regulating Religion
Under a statutory scheme first put
together in 1929, religion may be prac-
ticed in the Soviet Union under the
auspices of religious associations duly
licensed by the government for this pur-
pose. These licensed associations must,
in order to remain licensed, act in
accordance with the rules, regulations,
and specific instructions of the Council
of Religious Affairs, the body that super-
vises all licensed religious activities in
the Soviet Union. The council, in turn,
works through regional commissioners,
with whom the religious associations
must register. A commissioner can
refuse to register an association or he
can cancel a registration without citing
any reason.
By utilizing this regulatory scheme,
the Soviet Government allows the per-
formance of traditional rituals, tradi- ■
tional prayers, and traditional religioil!
practices which do not involve signifH
cant interaction among religious
believers. To illustrate the point I jus j
made: believers may pray together, nl
sing together, but they may not enga;|
in discussions on religious topics.
What is true of the individual
believer is also true of the clergy. The J
clergy may perform rituals, may lead I
congregations in prayer, but may not I
otherwise interact with believers.
Moreover what is expected of the clerl
is support of the state when called up I
including support of the state's foreig'
policy objectives at international gath I
ings or on visits abroad. There are soi 'I
clergymen who may perform the task I
assigned to them by the state out of c I
viction. There are others who view th 1
tasks as the price they must pay in or I
to be able to carry on their religious
traditions. Beyond that, it has been si (
gested that the clergy has been
infiltrated by the KGB and that KGB ]
operatives might even be hearing
confession.
So far I have described what in th>
Soviet Union constitutes the authorizt
practice of religion. That is what
American religious personalities have
been able to witness in the Soviet Uni
It is a new format of an old tradition,
that of creating Potemkin villages.
Unlicensed Activities
What the visitors don't see is what got
on with regard to religious observance
the Soviet Union outside the officially
sanctioned ceremonial occasions. Whai
they don't see are the unlicensed activ '
ties which are carried on illegally and 1
serious risk to the participants. What t '
totalitarian system of the Soviet Unior
does not tolerate is any form of associc1
tion of individuals outside the duly
licensed pattern. Bible study groups,
religious discussion groups, religious
gatherings in places not duly authorize
by the government, religious meetings
not authorized by the government,
religious events held under the auspice;
of unlicensed religious groups can all
lead to criminal prosecution and punish
ment. To make sure that the laws on th
subject are enforced, a system of speck
volunteer spy committees has been
created whose job it is to report
violators. These neighborhood commit-
tees, which are called "Public Commis-
sions for Control Over Observance of tl
Laws About Religious Cults," watch
over their neighbors, and they report
82
Department of State Bulleti
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
iators to the authorities. That is how
ingelical Christians, Mennonites,
btists, Pentecostals, as well as
■uanian or Ukrainian Catholics get
i trouble, as do those Russian
hodox who refuse to be coopted by
state.
To the chagrin of the authorities,
rest in religion on the part of the
iet people has been on the increase in
;nt years. This has included not only
ticipation in governmentally authorized
jious observance but also in what in
Soviet Union are deemed illegal
jious activities. Violations of the law
e become too numerous to permit
ti to be enforced rigidly and con-
ently. As a result, a good many viola-
is tend to be ignored. But when the
B decides to move, it clamps down
d. Persons guilty of the illegal prac-
of religion are sent off for many
rs to a prison, labor colony, or forced
i exile, often on trumped-up charges,
i.hose cases in which it appears incon-
ient to invoke what in the post-Stalin
l has been called "socialist legality,"
nely a criminal proceeding, the
|dess religious practioner is sent off to
: nstitution for the mentally ill.
i ether one device is used or another, a
jiate of fear is engendered among
■•5e whose faith requires of them
i^ious practice other than that which
: state has deigned to license.
Although the advocacy of atheism is,
! noted earlier, no longer a high
Drity item in the Soviet Union, it is
: the prevailing philosophy in the
:ools. That is where efforts are made
|;eachers to indoctrinate children with
: Soviet Union's state religion of com-
inism and where children from
i eving families are held up for
tcule. This is, therefore, one more
idship imposed on the families of
■gious believers.
The practices which I have here
icribed are all in contravention of the
ivisions of such international instru-
cts as the Universal Declaration of
iman Rights and the Declaration
iainst Religious Intolerance,
■uments approved by the General
i;embly of the United Nations without
flection from the Soviet Union. They
» also in violation of the Helsinki Final
t, a document subscribed to in 1975 by
;ieral Secretary Brezhnev. What, we
H to ask ourselves, did the Soviet
ion have in mind when it acquiesced
undertakings which it had no inten-
-l of observing? The answer is that it
>bably considered it less embarrassing
ITU Issues Report on Soviet Jamming
On September 12, the Department of
State received a report from the
Secretariat of the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU), a specialized
UN agency, detailing their findings of
harmful interference— jamming— by the
U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Poland of
U.S. short-wave broadcasts, including
the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).
This study was undertaken following
interference complaints lodged in 1984
and 1985 on behalf of the U.S. Govern-
ment by Ambassador Diana Lady
Dougan, U.S. Coordinator and Director
of the Bureau of International Com-
munications and Information Policy.
The ITU's convention prohibits
harmful interference to radio transmis-
sions that are in accordance with the
radio regulations. Utilizing the provi-
sions of Article 22 of the radio regula-
tions, the U.S. Government filed formal
complaints through the International
Frequency Registration Board (IFRB),
which is part of the ITU Secretariat. The
IFRB contacted the countries involved
and requested their response.
As the Governments of the U.S.S.R.,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland did not
respond to the U.S. complaints, we for-
mally requested the IFRB to make a
study and report.
We have now received the IFRB
report. It deals with jamming transmit-
ters at specific locations operating
against specific frequencies on a daily
basis over a long period of time and iden-
tifies 37 short-wave frequencies on
which jamming transmitters located in
the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and
Poland were found to be operating
against VOA and RFE/RL broadcasts.
The report is based on independent
monitoring data submitted by many
countries, and thus the extent of
jamming has been documented in a
technical and authoritative way.
The IFRB requested that the offend-
ing countries take appropriate action to
insure that in the future they operate in
accordance with the convention and in
conformity with the radio regulations.
Commenting of the IFRB report,
Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan said:
We are pleased that for the first time in
the long history of Soviet jamming and the
even longer history of the ITU, the United
States has been able to secure formal recogni-
tion and notification of Soviet jamming from
the secretariat of a UN agency.
This report has added considerably to our
arsenal of irrefutable facts on Soviet jam-
ming. We hope it will increase the pressure of
world opinion to get those governments to
reconsider their policies, cease violating inter-
national obligations, and stop jamming once
and for all. Such a cessation would improve
the general atmosphere of East-West rela-
tions, comply with our mutual commitments
under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act,
and facilitate cooperation with those govern-
ments on a variety of issues, particularly in
the ITU where such cooperation is vital.
Press release 182 of Sept. 18, 1986.
to go along with the text and then ignore
it rather than to make an issue of the
matter.
What we who believe in freedom of
religion need to do is make it clear that
such conduct is not acceptable, that it
will be noted, will be publicized, and the
Soviet Union will be criticized for its
failure to observe the internationally
recognized standards of freedom of
religion.
Will that make any difference? We
can't be sure. But what we can be sure
of is that those persons, including
religious leaders, who look the other way
when religious believers in the Soviet
Union are deprived of their rights, allow
these repressive activities to continue.
Only by pointing out that what is done is
wrong, by shining a spotlight on the
wrongdoers, can we hope to effect
change. What this committee is doing
today is to shine a spotlight on the
problem. That is, indeed, a significant
contribution to the cause of freedom.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
/ember 1986
83
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Visit of Brazil's President
President Jose Sarney of the
Federative Republic of Brazil made a
state visit to the United States September
9-13, 1986, to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.
Following are remarks made by the
two Presidents at the arrival ceremony of
September 10.1
President Reagan
It's an honor to welcome President
Sarney to the United States and to the
White House. Brazil is a vast nation of
hardy people, a country which shares
with us a frontier heritage and a spirit of
enterprise and independence. As was
true for our country, people came to
Brazil from many parts of the world to
make a wilderness, to better their lives,
and to live in freedom. And since the
early days of both our nations, our coun-
tries have enjoyed bonds of commerce
and friendship. I'm delighted today to
have this opportunity to meet with
President Sarney, to get to know him
personally, and to discuss those issues
which arise between great nations.
President Sarney is leading Brazil
during a time of great transition,
political and economic. Its peaceful
return to democracy, accomplished with
the good will and cooperation of all
segments of Brazilian society, has been a
model which others throughout the
world, but especially in this hemisphere,
should follow. Indeed, freedom is the
birthright of all Americans, and that
means every soul from the North Slope
of Alaska to the tip of Tierra del Fuego.
President Sarney, we rejoice that Brazil
has again joined the ranks of free
nations.
And from what we can see and hear,
that joy is apparent in your country also.
You described it when you said: "Brazil
has just emerged from a long night. Her
eyes are not red from nightmares. On
her lips she bears an open gesture of
confidence and a song of love for
liberty." Well, those words were well
spoken, the words of a poet and a leader
who loves his people and loves liberty.
We're proud to have such a man, and
such a country as lovely as yours, as our
friend.
Today democracy flourishes in
Brazil. The rights of each individual are
protected. Freedoms of expression,
religion, and assembly are honored, and
the franchise to vote in fair and direct
elections has been expanded. And
though a powerful nation, your country
threatens no one. Brazil is at peace with
itself and with its neighbors.
And today Brazil is proving the fun-
damental relationship between human
freedom and economic progress; they go
hand in hand. Your countrymen are
enjoying robust economic growth and an
explosion of enterprise. The inflation
rate is down dramatically, and it is
estimated that IV2 million new jobs have
been created in the past year. Your com-
merce with other nations is surging, and
new confidence is apparent from the fac-
tory to the marketplace. Brazil has the
eighth largest economy in the Western
world and is gaining on number seven.
But global considerations and inter-
national obligations come with such suc-
cess. There can be little doubt that
Brazil is emerging as a world power and
is facing new challenges and responsi-
bility as such. As two of the world's
most energetic economies, we have a
stake in strengthening the world trading
system, protecting the viability of inter-
national monetary and financial institu-
tions, and promoting growth and
development, especially in the Third
World. The world now has a stake in
Brazil, and Brazil has a stake in the
world.
The free flow of commerce betwc
countries, for example, is a vital fore
for progress on this planet and is of
utmost importance to the economic
health of our two countries. It is up t
to do our best to keep those lines of i
merce open. Trade must be free, and
must be fair. And the fight for free t
must start at home. No nation can
expect to continue freely exporting t
others if its own domestic markets a;
closed to foreign competition. Prosp*
must be built not at the expense of
others, but on the principle of mutua
benefit.
I'm looking forward to discussing
this and other issues of great import
with you during our meetings today,
have just scratched the surface of
cooperation between Brazil and the
United States. Technology is opening
potential as never imagined between
free peoples of the world. In a few y<
the world will not only enter a new
decade but also a new century and, y
new millennium. Brazil and the Uniti
States stand on that threshold togetl
but this is nothing new.
In 1876, the United States
celebrated its centennial, and there t
help us commemorate our first 100 y
was Dom Pedro II of Brazil. Represe
ing your people, he, alongside Presid
Grant, inaugurated the celebration a
helped send the United States off to
meet its destiny.
President Sarney, we're pleased
stand by you as Brazil is realizing th<
dream of those pioneers and immigrc
who came before us. They came to B
and to the United States. They woulc
want our peoples and the leaders of c
countries to be the best of friends. W
should not and will not let them dowi
President Sarney
I thank you for your invitation and fo
your kind words which show the righ
regard you have for Brazil and its pec
pie. I'll talk with you about friendship
and about many subjects, but my
English is very broken. My effort in
speaking your language is a marathoif
good will. I use the word friendship
again. It says everything— Brazil, the
United States, our peoples, our histor
our old relationship. We worked
together, side by side in peace and in U
last war. We will build together the cJ
struction of the present and of the
future. All Brazilians feel happy with
your invitation. Our meeting reinfore
democracy in Brazil and in Latin
America— so I see it. The only ideolog
84
Department of State Bull I
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
azil is democracy. It guides us, and
s permitted us to overcome the
\ we had to face in the recent past,
■re now back on our feet. We need
ds like the United States. We need
tner to grow.
'resident Reagan, we admire your
irmance, your strength, your
lity, your statesmanship. Your
ties inspire confidence to the
rican people. You gave a decisive
)nal contribution to the relations
een our two countries in a moment
treat deal of uncertainty,
plow almost 4 years after your visit,
il is a different country, a new coun-
^onciliation and changes helped us
ive a peaceful transition to a free,
)cratic government. We are growing
again. We are meeting our obliga-
;. Our people have more jobs and
;r wages. We believe, like you, in
enterprise as the basis for develop-
t. We know that political freedom
lot survive when economic freedom
|>nger exists.
|fou once said that Brazil was a force
vor of moderation and balance. We
Droud of that record. We will
|:ate all our efforts to continuing to
I force for stability and peace.
Our meeting will mark a fresh start
lur relations, relations that are
d on common goals and the values
ed on a mutual respect for our
Irences.
To Mrs. Reagan, Marly and I wish to
[ess our most friendly greetings,
iking her for the very warm welcome
I which we are being distinguished.
Vlr. President, in Brazil we say that
man who has a friend has two souls,
til and the United States— two souls
ne single destiny, the destiny of
'idship.
Held at the South Portico of the White
ne where President Sarney was accorded
imal welcome with full military honors
3 from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
Documents of Sept. 15, 1986). ■
Brazil— A Profile
People
Nationality: Nmni and adjective — Brazilian(s).
Population (1985): 135 million. Annual
growth rate (1982): 2.3%. Density: 14.5 per
sq. km. (37 sq. mi.). Ethnic groups: Portu-
guese, Italian, German, Japanese. African,
American Indian; 55% white, 38% mixed, 6%
black, remainder Indian or Asian. Religion:
Roman Catholic (90%). Languages: Portu-
guese (official), English. Education:
Literacy — 76% of adult population. Health:
Infant mortality rate (1981)— 92/1,000. Life
expectancy (1981)— 62.8 yrs. Work force (50
million, 1984): Agriculture— 35%. Industry—
25%. Services — 40%. Trade Union member-
ship— about 6 million.
GUYANA
SURINAM!
/ french Atlantic
uiana Ocean
Geography
Area: 8.511,965 sq. km. (3,290,000 sq. mi.).
Cities: Capital— Brasilia (pop. 1.4 million.
1983). Other cities— Sao Paulo (8.5 million),
Km de Janeiro (5.1 million). Belo Horizonte
(1.86 million). Salvador (1.5 million). For-
taleza(1.3 million). Recife (1.2 million), Porto
Alegre (11 million). Novo [guacu (1.1
million), Curitiba (1.0 million). Terrain: Dense
forest; semiarid scrubland; rugged hills and
mountains, rolling plains; and coastal strip.
Climate: Mostly tropical or semitropical with
temperate zone in the south.
Government
Type: Federal republic. Independence:
September 7, 1822. Constitution: Janu-
ary 24. 1967.
Branches: Executil't — president (chief of
state and head of government) elected to a
single 6-yr. term. Legislative— Senate (69
members elected to 8-yr. terms). Chamber of
Deputies (479 members elected to 4-yr.
terms). Judicial — Supreme Federal Tribunal.
Political parties: Party of the Brazilian
Democratic Movement (PMDB), Liberal
Front Party (PFL), Democratic Social Party
(PDS), Democratic Workers Party (PDT),
Workers Party (PT), Brazilian Labor Party
(PTB). Suffrage: Compulsory over 18.
Subdivisions: 23 states, 3 territories,
federal district (Brasilia).
Defense: 7% of government budget.
Economy
CDP (1984): $218 billion (agriculture 12%. in-
dustry 38%, services 50%). Annual growth
rate (1984): +4%. Per capita GDP (1984):
$1,645.
Natural resources: Iron ore. manganese,
bauxite, nickel, uranium, gemstones.
Agriculture: Products — coffee, soybeans,
sugarcane, cocoa, rice. beef, corn, oranges.
Limit— 17% arable, cultivable, or pasture.
Industry: Types — steel, chemicals,
petrochemicals, machinery, motor vehicles,
consumer durables, cement, lumber, ship-
building.
Trade (1984): Exports— $21 billion:
manufactures 67.5%; primary products,
32.5%. Major markets (1983)— I'S 23%. FRG
5.2%, Japan 6.5%, Netherlands 5.7%. Argen-
tina 3.0%, USSR 3.0%. Imports— $13.9
billion: crude oil 48%. capital goods 18%. raw
materials 26%. consumer goods 4.5%. Major
non-oil suppliers — US 16%, Japan 6%, FRG
5%, Italy 3%. Argentina 3%.
Official exchange rate (July 1985): 6.420
cruzeiros = US$1 (changes frequently).
Fiscal year: Calendar year.
Foreign Investment (registered with
Central Bank. 1983): $22.3 billion.
Sources— US $7.2 billion, FRG $2.6 billion,
Switzerland $1.9 billion, Japan $1.8 billion.
Membership in International
Organizations
UN and some of its specialized agencies,
Organization of American States (OAS), Rio
Pact. Latin American Integration Association
(ALADI), International Sugar Organization
(ISO), International Cocoa Organization (IC-
CO), INTELSAT, Group of 77.
Taken from the Background Notes of Sept.
1985, published by the Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita
Adams. ■
cember 1986
85
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
U.S. -Brazil Relations
Background
Brazil borders on all but two South
American countries and is the largest
and most populous nation in Latin
America. Its geographic and demo-
graphic preeminence, its rapidly develop-
ing economy, its wealth of natural
resources and large industrial base, and
its growing role in world affairs make
Brazil of paramount interest to the
United States.
Bilateral Relations
In 1822 the United States was the first
country to recognize newly independent
Brazil as a nation. Brazil's ties with the
United States were particularly strong
during World War II; Brazil protected
Allied shipping lanes in the South Atlan-
tic, and its Expeditionary Force under-
took an active combat role in Italy. Dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s, Brazil received
almost $2.4 billion in U.S. economic
assistance. Relations in the mid-to-late
1970s were troubled by frictions over
human rights and nonproliferation
issues. Brazil abrogated bilateral
military agreements with the United
States, and we phased out assistance
programs.
Presidents Figueiredo and Reagan
exchanged state visits in 1982, and rela-
tions improved markedly. We have
welcomed Brazil's return to democracy
following 21 years of military rule and
have few significant political differences.
However, the rapid growth of Brazil's
economy and its integration into the
world economy have led to bilateral
strains. Brazil's large debt, roughly a
third of which is held by U.S. private or
official institutions, is a matter of con-
cern. In addition, trade problems similar
to those the U.S. faces with Japan, the
European Community, and other
advanced developing countries have been
a source of friction. The most prominent
of these problems has been in the area of
computers and computer-related
materials ("informatics"), where the
United States is seeking to reduce
increasing barriers to Brazil's potentially
lucrative market.
Political Situation
Following nearly two decades of
military-dominated government, in 1982
Brazil elected by popular vote a federal
Congress, state governors, and other
state and municipal officers. On Janu-
ary 15, 1985, an electoral college elected
a new civilian president— the popular
former governor of Minas Gerais state,
Tancredo Neves. In March 1985, on the
eve of his inauguration, Neves fell ill and
died without taking office. Vice
President-elect Jose Sarney became
president. President Sarney has since
established himself as a major political
figure in his own right. A large part of
his popularity arises from his boldness in
implementing the sweeping economic
stabilization program mentioned below.
Brazilians will go to the polls again
on November 15, 1986. They will elect a
new Congress, state governors, and
legislatures. The new Congress will
serve as a constituent assembly and will
write a new constitution, which is
expected to consolidate and institu-
tionalize Brazil's democracy.
Economic Situation
As the world's eighth largest free-
market economy, Brazil's performance
has begun to match its potential. Brazil
has recovered in spectacular fashion
from its 1981-83 recession, and its 1985
economic growth of 8.3% was the
world's highest. Driven in large part by
the need to service its $102 billion
foreign debt, Brazil's trade performance
has been strong, as demonstrated by its
1985 trade surplus of $12.5 billion
($5 billion with the United States).
Brazilian exports increasingly reflect
Brazil's strong technological capabilities
and large industrial base, often making
it a competitor of the United States in
third-country markets.
Domestically President Sarney
attacked Brazil's chronic inflation in
February with the sweeping "cruzado
plan," under which prices and wages
were frozen, a new currency (the
cruzado) created, and the indexation of
wages and financial assets halted. In
July he announced further measures
intended to stimulate investment and
maintain economic growth. Among these
was the creation of a National Invest-
ment Fund to be financed by compulsory
loans to the government assessed on
purchases of gasoline, automobiles, and
airline tickets.
Brazil's large population (137
million), growing economy, and rich
resource base present the United States
with important commercial oppor-
tunities. Already a major focus of U.S.
overseas investment, Brazil is an enor-
mous potential market for U.S. goods
and services.
Brazil's foreign debt of $102 bill
makes it the developing world's larg
debtor. Its commercial debt manage
has been responsible. Brazil has mai>
tained good relations with its credit:
and has refrained from taking unilar
action to restrict commercial debt
payments. Relations with official
creditors have not been as good. Br;
has withheld some payments out of
expectation that creditors would ag
to a rescheduling on terms similar t
earlier agreement. These creditors,
including the United States, have m
been in a position to agree to Brazil
request.
Taken from the GIST series of Sept .,
1986, published by the Bureau of Public I
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: H I
Culley. ■
Cuba: New Migratic
and Embargo
Measures
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
AUG. 22, 1986'
President Reagan has approved a s«
of measures to improve the effective
of the current U.S. embargo of Cubs
These measures will make it more d
ficult for the Government of Cuba tei
obtain U.S. dollars and American g(
by unlawful means. The objective is
tighten enforcement of the embargo
denying to the Castro regime econoi
benefits from the United States whii
Castro continues to ignore internati'
obligations and to pursue policies
inimical to U.S. interests.
Among the measures approved \
the President are crackdowns on tra
with Cuban front companies located
Panama and elsewhere which attemj
evade the U.S. trade embargo. The
measures also foresee closer controls
organizations which organize or proi
travel to Cuba, as well as the transir
sion of money or goods to Cuba. The
Castro regime controls all convertibi
currency sent to Cuba and provides
Cuban recipients only a small share <
the value of the money or goods senl
At the same time, the President
issuing a proclamation to prevent thi
Cuban Government from trafficking
human beings by charging citizens ai
86
Department of State Bui*
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
lents of the United States thousands
dlars to finance the indirect travel of
• Cuban relatives to the United
2S through third states. One objec-
of this measure is to deny the
ro regime the benefits of the Mariel
ement on migration of December
, which the Cubans suspended on
1985. Under the Mariel agreement,
in immigrants could receive visas in
J.S. Interests Section in Havana,
Cuba was obliged in turn to accept
xcludables from the 1980 Mariel
lift.
The proclamation prevents the
ince of preference immigrant visas
srsons who leave Cuba and go to
i countries. Preference visa process-
stopped in the U.S. Interests Section
avana after Cuba suspended the
ration agreement, but the Cuban
ernment has exploited the loophole
allows Cubans to obtain visas in
i countries. This often involves pay-
| of bribes to Cuban and other
ign officials in an effort to circum-
; U.S. policy. The proclamation will
e this loophole.
These measures will not affect the
ting policy of the U.S. Government
feist long-term political prisoners
are permitted by the Castro regime
:ave Cuba. The United States will
;inue to facilitate their departure
i Cuba and entry into the United
;es on humanitarian grounds.
Read to news correspondents by Depart -
t acting spokesman Charles Redman. ■
Arrival of Cuban
Political Prisoners
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 12, 1986'
We are pleased to announce that over
100 current and former political
prisoners and family members are being
allowed to leave Cuba and are expected
to travel from Havana to Miami on a
charter flight Monday, September 15.
Many of these persons are political
prisoners who were on a list which the
Cuban Government communicated to the
U.S. Catholic Conference. Before this, in
January 1985, U.S. Catholic bishops had
asked the Cuban Government to release
a large number of long-term political
prisoners. Some of these were on the
Cuban list, but many which the U.S.
Catholic Conference had asked be
released remain in prison or have not
been granted permission to leave. Some
persons on the Cuban list did not wish to
leave Cuba or have died or are too ill to
travel. In addition the group expected on
Monday contains persons whose release
was requested by Jacques Cousteau
[French marine explorer, writer, and
film producer] and who were found
ready to travel. The remaining persons
are family members.
The Intergovernmental Committee
for Migration (ICM) has arranged
transportation from Havana to Miami,
while the U.S. Catholic Conference is
taking primary responsibility for
meeting and sponsoring the group in the
United States. We owe both these
organizations a special word of apprecia-
tion for their efforts.
Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams
and Deputy Commissioner of Immigra-
tion Thomas Ferguson will be on hand to
welcome them to the United States.
They will be joined by Federal, State,
and local officials, representatives of the
Cuban-American community, and the
Catholic Church.
Officials from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the
Department of State recently inter-
viewed these persons in Havana. None
of the political prisoners whom they
were able to interview was denied. We
expect that additional political prisoners
and family members who either have not
yet been interviewed or are not yet
ready to travel will be admitted in the
near future.
We share the joy of relatives and
friends who will be welcoming these
valiant individuals who have suffered so
many years in Cuban prisons. The
United States will continue— as has been
our longstanding policy— to encourage
the release of long-term political
prisoners in Cuba. Those who are per-
mitted by the Castro regime to leave
Cuba and who wish to come to the
United States will be considered for
admission as quickly as circumstances
permit.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 15, 1986'
The United States is extremely happy to
welcome to the United States the former
Cuban political prisoners and family
members who arrived in Miami this
morning. Many of these courageous indi
viduals suffered for more than 20 years
in Cuban prisons. Some of them were
still in prison as recently as last week.
We share the joy of the former
prisoners and their families and friends
who have waited so long for their
freedom. We extend best wishes to them
all as they begin their new lives in the
United States.
Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter- American Affairs Elliott Abrams
and Deputy Commissioner of Immigra-
tion Thomas Ferguson welcomed the
group on behalf of the U.S. Government.
They were joined by other Federal,
State, and local officials, as well as
representatives of the Cuban-American
community and the Catholic Church at
the early morning arrival at the interna-
tional airport in Miami.
We reiterate that the United States
will continue— as has been longstanding
policy of the United States— to encour-
age the release of the long-term political
prisoners in Cuba. Those who are per-
mitted by the Castro regime to leave
Cuba and who wish to come to the
United States will be considered for
admission as quickly as circumstances
permit.
We also call on the Cuban Govern-
ment to terminate its suspension of the
Mariel immigration agreement which
would allow the resumption of normal
migration of Cubans to the United
States.
■Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment acting spokesman Charles Redman.
2Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Bernard Kalb. ■
vember 1986
87
TREATIES
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Arbitration
Convention on the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New
York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June
7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS
6997.
Accession deposited: Singapore, Aug. 21,
1986.
Inter-American convention on international
commercial arbitration. Done at Panama City
Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force June 16,
1976.1
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Aug. 20,
1986.
Conservation
Convention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an
arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,
1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS
10240.
Accessions deposited: Brazil, Jan. 28, 1986;
Spain, Apr. 9, 1984; Sweden, June 6, 1984.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations.
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into
force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13,
1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited; Qatar, June 6, 1986. 2
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
formulated at Bretton Woods Conference
July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27,
1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance deposited: Kiribati,
Sept. 29, 1986.
International Court of Justice
Declaration recognizing as compulsory the
jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute
of the Court. TIAS 1598.
Declaration deposited: Honduras, June 6,
1986.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of interna-
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1,
19831.
Extended to: Province of Saskatchewan by
Canada, Aug. 11, 1986.2'3
Jute
International agreement on jute and jute
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at
Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force pro-
visionally Jan. 9, 1984.
Entered into force definitively: Aug. 26, 1986.
Accession deposited: Poland, Aug. 26, 1986.
Marine Pollution
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the prevention of pollution
from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17,
1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983.
Accession deposited: Egypt, Aug. 7, 1986.
Maritime Matters
International convention on standards of
training, certification, and watchkeeping for
seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 1978.
Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984. '
Accession deposited: New Zealand, July 30,
1986.<
International convention for the safety of life
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London
Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25,
1980. TIAS 9700.
Accession deposited: Malta, Aug. 8, 1986.
Pollution
Convention for the protection of the ozone
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22,
1985.5
Ratification deposited: U.S., Aug. 29, 1986.
Postal
Third additional protocol to the constitution
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10,
1964, general regulations with annex, and the
universal postal convention with final protocol
and detailed regulations. Done at Hamburg
July 27, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1986; for the U.S. June 6, 1986.
Ratifications deposited: Germany, Fed. Rep.
of, Aug. 20, 1986;6 Korea, Rep. of, Aug. 5,
1986; Malaysia, Aug. 13, 1986; Thailand,
Aug. 27, 1986; U.K., July 15, 1986.7
Money orders and postal travellers' checks
agreement, with detailed regulations with
final protocol. Done at Hamburg July 27,
1984. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1986; for the
U.S. June 6, 1986.
Approvals deposited : Korea, Rep. of, Aug. 5,
1986; Thailand, Aug. 27, 1986.
Ratification deposited: Germany, Fed. Rep.
of, Aug. 20, 1986.6
Postal parcels agreement with final protocol
and detailed regulations. Done at Hamburg
July 27, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1986; for the U.S. June 6, 1986.
Approvals deposited: Korea, Rep. of, Aug. 5,
1986; Malaysia, Aug. 13, 1986; Thailand, Aug.
27, 1986; U.K., July 15, 1986.7
Ratification deposited: Germany, Fed. Rep.
of, Aug. 20, 1986.6
Prisoner Transfer
Convention on the transfer of sentenced per-
sons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983.
Entered into force July 1, 1985.
Extended to: Isle of Man by the U.K.3
Ratificationdeposited: Cyprus, Apr. 18, 1986.
Satellite Communications System
Agreement relating to INTELSAT, with
annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971.
Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accessions deposited: Mauritius, Rwanda,
Sept. 2, 1986.
Operating agreement relating to INTEL
with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 2l
1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973.
7532.
Signatures: Overseas Telecommunicatioi
Services Co., Ltd. of Mauritius, Mauritiu
Ministere des Transports et des CommuiJ
tions de la Republique Rwandaise, Rwan
Sept. 2, 1986.
Seabed Disarmament
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacei
of nuclear weapons and other weapons o:
mass destruction on the seabed and the c
floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. !
1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. 1
7337.
Accession deposited: Jamaica, July 30, li
Terrorism
International convention against the taki
hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 191
Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the
Jan. 6, 1985.
Accession deposited: Dominica, Sept. 9,
Ratification Deposited: Austria, Aug. 22,
Trade
Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Don
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into forc<
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620.
Acceptance deposited: Spain, Aug. 6, 19S'
Trade— Textiles
Protocol extending the arrangement of De
1973, (TIAS 7840) regarding internation;
trade in textiles. Done at Geneva July 31
1986. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1986; fo
U.S. Aug. 5, 1986.
Acceptances deposited: Hong Kong, I'ruj
Sept. 8, 1986; Japan, Sept. 2, 1986; Mexi.
Aug. 25, 1986; Sri Lanka, Aug. 8, 1986; I
Aug. 5, 1986.
Women
Convention on the elimination of all form:
discrimination against women. Done at
York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force
3, 19811.
Ratification deposited: Finland, Sept. 4, 1
:
BILATERAL
Bangladesh
Agreement amending the agreement of Mi
1982, as amended (TIAS 10483, 10642) fo:
sales of agricultural commodities. Effected
exchange of letters at Dhaka Aug. 28, 198,
Entered into force Aug. 28, 1986.
Botswana
Memorandum of understanding concernin '
the development, installation, and operatif
of a seismic data acquisition system. Sigw ,
at Reston and Gaborone June 16 and Aug.;
1986. Entered into force Aug. 13, 1986.
88
Department of State Bull '
TREATIES
ida
ement amending the treaty concerning
ic salmon of Jan. 28, 1985. Effected by
inge of notes at Ottawa May 5 and Aug.
986. Entered into force Aug. 13, 1986;
tive Mar. 18. 1986.
ement concerning exports of luggage to
Jnited States. Effected by exchange of
i at Washington Sept. 8 and 9, 1986.
red into force Sept. 9, 1986.
mbia
cement extending agreement of July 1
kug. 11, 1982, (TIAS 10543) as amended,
ing to trade in cotton, wool, and man-
; fiber textiles and textile products,
cted by exchange of notes at Washington
30 and Aug. 6, 1986. Entered into force
6, 1986; effective July 1. 1986.
hoslovakia
:ement concerning exports of certain tex-
)roducts to the United States. Effected
icchange of notes at Prague June 25, July
d 22, 1986. Entered into force July 22,
; effective June 1, 1986.
jiinican Republic
transport agreement, with annexes.
ed at Santo Domingo July 22, 1986.
rs into force on exchange of notes
jirming completion of any necessary con-
tional requirements.
;ement relating to agreement of May 15,
., for the sale of agricultural commodities.
ed at Santo Domingo Aug. 18, 1986.
:rs into force on the date of notes indicat-
:ompletion of all necessary internal pro-
Ires of importing country.
lopean Communities
[?ement amending the arrangement of
! 21, 1982, as amended and extended, con-
ling trade in certain steel products, with
ichments and agreed minutes. Effected by
jiange of letters at Washington and
(ssels Sept. 5, 1986. Entered into force
It. 5, 1986; effective Sept. 15, 1986.
ince
jeement for cooperation with respect to
►operation of distribution license systems,
fected by exchange of notes at Paris Sept.
,986. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1986.
<many. Federal Republic of
.angement extending the arrangement of
i 6, 1981, for the exchange of technical
irmation and cooperation in nuclear safety
liters. Signed at Washington July 17, 1986.
Sered into force July 17, 1986; effective
f 6, 1986.
pea-Bissau
festment incentive agreement. Effected by
flange of notes at Bissau Aug. 14 and 15,
55. Entered into force Aug. 20, 1986.
Guyana
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Georgetown Aug. 7, 1986.
Entered into force Aug. 7, 1986.
Hungary
Agreement amending and extending agree-
ment of Feb. 15 and 25, 1983, (TIAS 10666)
as amended, relating to trade in wool textile
and textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Budapest Aug. 15 and 25, 1986.
Entered into force Aug. 25, 1986.
Iceland
Treaty to facilitate defense relationship, with
related memorandum of understanding.
Signed at New York Sept. 24, 1986. Enters
into force upon the exchange of instruments
of ratification at Reykjavik.
India
Grant agreement for child survival health
support project. Signed at New Delhi Aug 29,
1986. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1986.
Jamaica
Agreement relating to trade in textiles with
annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Aug. 27, 1986. Entered into
force Aug. 27, 1986; effective Sept. 1, 1986.
Administrative arrangement relating to visa
and certification procedures for textile prod-
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Aug. 27, 1986. Entered into
force Aug. 27, 1986; effective Sept. 1, 1986.
Agreements amending the agreement of Jan.
15, 1986, for sale of agricultural commodities.
Effected by exchanges of notes at Kingston
May 29 and June 4, 1986, and Aug. 18 and
27, 1986. Entered into force June 4 and Aug.
18, 1986.
Luxembourg
Air transport agreement, with annex. Signed
at Luxembourg Aug. 19, 1986. Enters into
force on a date to be determined upon com-
pletion of all necessary internal procedures by
both parties.
Madagascai
Agreement amending the agreement of Sept.
27, 1985, as amended, for sales of agricultural
commodities. Effected by exchange of notes
at Antananarivo July 2 and Aug. 8, 1986.
Entered into force Aug. 8, 1986.
Maldives
Agreement relating to and amending the
agreement of July 13, 1985, for the sale of
agricultural commodities. Signed at Male
Aug. 25, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 25,
1986.
Mexico
Agreement relating to the AM broadcasting
service in the medium frequency band, with
annexes. Signed at Mexico Aug. 28, 1986.
Enters into force on the date both parties
notify they have concluded their respective
constitutional procedures.
Morocco
Agreement amending the agreement of May
27, 1986, for sales of agricultural commod-
ities. Effected by exchange of letters at Rabat
July 24, 1986. Entered into force July 24,
1986.
Nepal
Administrative arrangement relating to a visa
system for exports of Nepalese textile prod-
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at
Kathmandu July 28 and Aug. 18, 1986.
Entered into force Aug. 18, 1986; effective
Oct. 1, 1986.
Pakistan
Fourth amendatory agreement to agreement
of Apr. 13, 1982, (TIAS 10378) for
agricultural commodities and equipment.
Signed at Islamabad July 15, 1986. Entered
into force July 15, 1986.
Fourth amendatory agreement to agreement
of May 23, 1983, (TIAS 10724) for rural elec-
trification. Signed at Islamabad, July 8, 1986.
Entered into force July 8, 1986.
Peru
Agreement relating to and amending the
agreement of Apr. 17, 1985, with memoran-
dum of understanding, for the sale of
agricultural commodities. Signed at Lima
Aug. 11, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 11,
1986.
Poland
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S.
Government and its agencies. Signed at
Warsaw July 29, 1986. Entered into force
Sept. 8, 1986.
Sri Lanka
Agreement amending the agreement of Oct.
23, 1985, as amended, for the sale of
agricultural commodities. Effected by
exchange of notes at Colombo Aug. 25. 1986.
Entered into force Aug. 25, 1986.
Agreement amending agreement of May 10,
1983, as amended, relating to trade in cotton,
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile
products. Effected by exchange of notes at
Colombo July 29 and Aug. 4, 1986. Entered
into force Aug. 4, 1986.
Turkey
Agreement amending agreement of Oct. 18,
1985, concerning trade in certain textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Ankara July 30 and Aug. 1, 1986.
Entered into force Aug. 1, 1986; effective
July 1, 1985.
U.S.S.R.
Agreement extending the agreement of Nov.
26. 1976, as amended and extended (TIAS
8528, 10531, 10532, 10696), concerning
fisheries off the coasts of the United States.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
May 16 and June 17, 1986. Enters into force
wember 1986
PRESS RELEASES
PUBLICATION
following written confirmation of the comple-
tion of internal procedures of both
governments.
United Kingdom
Agreement extending the agreement of Sept.
20, 1976, as amended and extended (TIAS
10213), in the field of liquid metal-cooled fast
breeder reactors. Effected by exchange of
letters at Washington and Risley Aug. 26 and
Sept. 2, 1986. Entered into force Sept. 2,
1986.
Agreement concerning the Turks and Caicos
Islands and narcotics activities, with annex
and forms. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Sept. 18, 1986. Enters into force
on date U.K. notifies U.S. in writing that the
Turks and Caicos legislation implementing
this agreement has come into effect.
Yemen
Agreement amending the agreement of Feb.
18, 1986, for the sale of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Sanaa July 26, 1986.
Entered into force July 26, 1986.
Zambia
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S.
Government and its agencies. Signed at
Lusaka July 25, 1986. Entered into force
Aug. 28, 1986.
173
9/5
174 9/12
■Not in force for the U.S.
zWith reservation(s).
3With declaration(s).
'Applicable to Cook Islands and Niue; not
extended to Tokelau.
5Not in force.
Applicable to West Berlin.
'Extended to overseas territories whose
international relations it assures; also
applicable to Channel Islands and Isle of
Man. ■
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
*168 9/8 Program for the state visit of
Brazilian President Jose
Sarney, Sept. 9-13.
*169 9/8 New Treaty Room suite
renovation completed.
* 1 70 9/8 Unveiling of portrait of
Alexander Haig.
*171 9/8 Harry W. Shlaudeman sworn
in as Ambassador to Brazil,
July 28 (biographic data).
*172 9/8 Otto J. Reich sworn in as
Ambassador to Venezuela,
May 12 (biographic data).
175
9/12
"176
9/12
*177
9/15
*178
9/13
179 9/16
*180 9/16
•181 9/16
182
•183
9/18
9/22
•184 9/22
•185 9/22
186 9/20
187 9/22
'188 9/24
*189 9/25
190
191
9/26
9/30
Shultz: address at Harvard's
350th anniversary
convocation, Cambridge.
Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-1957:
Vol. IV, Western European
Security and Integration
released.
Shultz: news briefing, White
House.
Program for the official
working visit of Israeli
Prime Minister Shimon
Peres, Sept. 14-16.
Unveiling of portrait of
Edmund S. Muskie.
Program for the official
working visit of Philippine
President Corazon Aquino,
Sept. 15-19.
Shultz: statement before the
Subcommittee on Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy,
Senate Judiciary
Committee.
Shultz: remarks and
question-and-answer ses-
sion, Congressman
Regula's issues symposium,
the Capitol.
Shultz: remarks and
question-and-answer ses-
sion, senior business
executives conference.
ITU report on Soviet
jamming.
Herbert E. Horowitz sworn
in as Ambassador to The
Gambia, Sept. 18
(biographic data).
Dennis Kux sworn in as
Ambassador to the Ivory
Coast, Sept. 19 (biographic
data).
Princeton Nathan Lyman
sworn in as Ambassador to
Nigeria (biographic data).
Shultz: news briefing follow-
ing meeting with Soviet
Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze.
Shultz: interview on ABC-
TV's "This Week With
David Brinkley," Sept. 21.
Regional foreign policy
conference, Hartford,
Conn., Sept. 30.
Shultz, Mathiesen: remarks
at U.S. -Iceland treaty sign-
ing ceremony, New York
City, Sept. 24.
Shultz: news conference,
New York City, Sept. 25.
Reagan, Shultz: news con-
ference, White House.
*Not printed in the Bulletin.
Department of State
Free single copies of the following
Department of State publications are
available from the Correspondence
Management Division, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State, Washingtoi
D.C. 20520.
President Reagan
Prospects for World Peace, 41st UN Gent
Assembly, Sept. 22, 1986 (Current Poli<
#867).
Keeping America Strong, White House,
Sept. 23, 1986 (Current Policy #869).
Secretary Shultz
Progress, Freedom, and Responsibility. 3;
anniversary convocation of Harvard,
Cambridge, Sept. 5, 1986 (Current Polk
#864).
Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 198
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refi
Policy, Senate Judiciary Committee. Se
16, 1986 (Current Policy #866).
Arms Control
U.S. and Soviet Approaches to Arms Con' I
Amabassador Rowny, Council on Foreig
Affairs, Baltimore, Sept. 19, 1986 (Curr
Policy #868)
East Asia
U.S. and East Asia-Pacific Relations: The
Challenge Ahead, Assistant Secretary
Sigur, Mansfield Center for Pacific Affa
Helena, Montana, July 4, 1986 (Current
Policy #859).
Economics
Tokyo Economic Summit (GIST, Sept. 198
Europe
A Discussion on U.S. -Soviet Relations,
Ambassador Nitze and Deputy Assistant
Palmer, videotape interview, June 16. IS
(Current Policy #865).
Western Hemisphere
Central America: U.S. Policy (GIST, Aug.
1986).
U.S.-Brazil Relations (GIST, Sept. 1986).
Free single copies of the following publica-
tions may be obtained from the Office of
Public Diplomacy for Latin America and th
Caribbean, Department of State, Washingt,
D.C. 20520:
Selected Articles Censored from La Prensa
Oct. 1985-Apr. 1986.
Dispossessed: The Miskito Indians in
Sandinista Nicaragua, June 1986.
Attack on the Church: Persecution of the I
Catholic Church in Nicaragua, July 1986.
Libyan Activities in the Western Hemisphe
Aug. 1986.
Crackdown on Freedom in Nicaragua and
Profiles of Internal Opposition Leaders, i
Aug. 1986. ■
90
Department of State Bulle
DEX
member 1986
Iume86, No. 2116
rican Principles. Progress, Freedom,
d Responsibility (Shultz) 11
s Control
Delegations Reach Accord on Military
tivities in Europe (Barry, Reagan,
:ument) 20
scussion on U.S. -Soviet Relations (Nitze,
lmer) 73
ling America Strong (Reagan) 8
'R Negotiators Reconvene (White House
itement) 28
'R Talks End 39th Round (Western
itement) 27
ear and Space Arms Negotiations (White
luse statement) 26
ident's and Secretary's News Conference
September 30 60
pects for World Peace (Reagan) 1
etary's Interview on "The
day Show" 64
etary's News Briefing of
ptember 20 54
etary's News Conference of
ptember 25 57
;r Secretary Armacost's Interview on
leet the Press" 49
and Soviet Approaches to Arms Control
Dwny) 29
cying Nuclear Testing Limitations: Possi-
• U.S. -Soviet Cooperation (message to
! Congress, text of study) 32
il
Brazil Relations 86
of Brazil's President (Reagan, Sarney)84
imunications. ITU Issues Report on
Sviet Jamming 83
irress
ijinuation of South Africa Emergency
[ essage to the Congress) 19
vosed Refugee Admissions for FY 1987
hultz) 14
|pects for the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up
feeting (Zimmerman) 70
jrious Persecution in the Soviet Union
(erwinski, Schifter) 77
] Report on Cyprus (message to the
fmgress) 76
tfying Nuclear Testing Limitations:
Issible U.S. -Soviet Cooperation (message
i the Congress, text of study) 32
la
aval of Cuban Political Prisoners (Depart-
pnt statement) 87
fc: New Migration and Embargo Measures
Oepartment statement) 86
ITus. 28th Report on Cyprus (message to
je Congress) 76
it Asia. U.S. and East Asian-Pacific
fclations: The Challenges Ahead (Sigur) 38
r'nomics
Agenda for the New GATT Round
leutter) 43
^T Nations Agree to Launch New Round
! Trade Negotiations (Yeutter,
itclaration) 45
tress, Freedom, and Responsibility
.hultz) 11
npects for World Peace (Reagan) 1
Egvpt. Vice President Bush Visits the Middle
East (Bush) 9
Europe
CDE Delegations Reach Accord on Military
Activities in Europe (Barry, Reagan,
document) 20
CSCE Follow-up Preparatory Meeting
(Department statement) 72
MBFR Negotiators Reconvene (White House
statement) 28
MBFR Talks End 39th Round (Western
statement) 27
Prospects for the Vienna CSCE Follow-up
Meeting (Zimmerman) 70
Human Rights
President's and Secretary's News Conference
of September 30 60
Prospects for the Vienna CSCE Follow-up
Meeting (Zimmerman) 70
Prospects for World Peace (Reagan) 1
Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union
(Derwinski, Schifter) 77
Secretary's News Briefing of
September 20 54
Secretary's News Conference of
September 25 57
Iceland
President's and Secretary's News Conference
of September 30 60
Secretary's Interview on "The Today
Show" 64
Immigration
Arrival of Cuban Political Prisoners (Depart-
ment statements) 87
Cuba: New Migration and Embargo Measures
(Department statement) 86
International Organizations & Conferences.
GATT Nations Agree to Launch New Round
of Trade Negotiations (Yeutter,
declaration) 45
Israel. Vice President Bush Visits the
Middle East (Bush) 9
Japan. U.S. -Japanese Relations 42
Jordan. Vice President Bush Visits the
Middle East (Bush) 9
Libya. Secretary's News Briefing of
October 2 66
Military Affairs. CDE Delegations Reach
Accord on Military Activities in Europe
(Barry, Reagan, document) 20
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. MBFR
Negotiators Reconvene (White House
statement) 28
Pacific. U.S. and East Asian-Pacific Rela-
tions: The Challenges Ahead (Sigur) 38
Presidential Documents
Continuation of South Africa Emergency
(message to the Congress) 19
Keeping America Strong 8
Prospects for World Peace 1
28th Report on Cyprus (message to the
Congress) 76
Verifying Nuclear Testing Limitations:
Possible U.S. -Soviet Cooperation (message
to the Congress, text of study) 32
Visit of Brazil's President (Reagan, Sarney)
84
Publications. Department of State 90
Refugees. Proposed Refugee Admissions for
FY 1987 (Shultz) 14
Science & Technology. Progress, Freedom,
and Responsibility (Shultz) 11
South Africa
Continuation of South Africa Emergency
(message to the Congress) 19
Secretary's Interview on "The Today
Show" 64
Secretary's News Conference of
September 25 57
Terrorism. Under Secretary Armacost's
Interview on "Meet the Press" 49
Trade
An Agenda for the New GATT Round
(Yeutter) 43
Cuba: New Migration and Embargo Measures
(Department statement) 86
GATT Nations Agree to Launch New Round
of Trade Negotiations (Yeutter,
declaration) 45
Treaties. Current Actions 88
U.S.S.R.
CDE Delegations Reach Accord on Military
Activities in Europe (Barry, Reagan,
document) 20
Deputy Secretary Whitehead's Interview on
"Face the Nation" 52
A Discussion on U.S. -Soviet Relations
(Nitze, Palmer) 73
ITU Issues Report on Soviet Jamming ... 83
Keeping America Strong (Reagan) 8
MBFR Negotiators Reconvene (White House
statement) 28
MBFR Talks End 39th Round (Western
statement) 27
Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations (White
House statement) 26
President's and Secretary's News Conference
of September 30 60
Prospects for World Peace (Reagan) 1
Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union
(Derwinski, Schifter) 77
Secretary's Interview on "The Today
Show" 64
Secretary's News Briefing of October 2 . . 66
Secretary's News Briefing of
September 12 51
Secretary's News Briefing of
September 20 54
Secretary's News Conference of
September 25 57
Under Secretary Armacost's Interview on
"Meet the Press" 49
U.S. and Soviet Approaches to Arms
Control (Rowny) 29
United Nations
ITU Issues Report on Soviet Jamming ... 83
Prospects for World Peace (Reagan) 1
Secretary's News Briefing of October 2 . . 66
Name Index
Armacost, Michael H 49
Barry, Robert L 20
Bush, Vice President 9
Derwinski, Edward J 77
Nitze, Paul H 73
Palmer, Mark 73
Reagan, President .1,8, 19, 20, 32, 60, 76. 84
Rowny, Edward L 29
Sarney, Jose 84
Schifter, Richard 77
Shultz, Secretary ... 11, 14, 51, 57, 60, 64, 66
Sigur, Gaston J., Jr 39
Whitehead, John C 52
Yeutter, Clayton 43, 45
Zimmerman. Warren 70
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Department
jm of state jm-im j tf>
a bulletin
B Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 86 / Number 21 17
December 1986
Department of State
bulletin
Volume 86/ Number 2117/ December 1986
Cover: President Reagan and General
Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik.
(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patnck)
The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
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The Bulletin's contents include major
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should not necessarily be interpreted as
official U.S. policy statements.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State
GEORGE B. HIGH
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
SHARON R. LOTZ
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CONTENTS
FEATURE
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev Meet
in Reykjavik (President Reagan, Secretary Shultz)
I Secretary
Reykjavik: A Watershed in
U.S. -Soviet Relations
Human Rights and Soviet-
American Relations
Interview on "Meet the Press"
Interview on "This Week With
David Brinkley"
lea
I Economic Sanctions Against
South Africa (President Reagan.
Message to the Congress,
Message to the House of
Representatives, Letter to the
Congress)
is Control
| West Urges Acceptance of
Verification at MBFR Talks
[U.S. Statement)
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks
Open Round Six {President
Reagan)
i Review Conference Held on
Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (Donald S. Lowitz,
Final Declaration, U.S.
Documents)
■>artment
1 The Fiscal Threat to U.S. Foreign
Policy (Ronald I. Spiers)
I Toward a More Representative
Foreign Service
(Ronald I. Spiers)
East Asia
Pacific
52
55
The Philippines and the United
States (Michael H. Armacost)
Visit of Philippines' President
Aquino (Corazon C. Aquino,
President Reagan)
Europe
57 U.S. -Soviet Relations: Coping
With Conflicts in the Third
World (Michael H. Armacost)
60 Departure of Soviet Espionage
Agents (Department Statement)
61 U.S. -Soviet Relations:
Background and Prospects
(Jack F. Matlock)
65 NATO Nuclear Planning Group
Meets in the U.K.
(Communique)
Food
66 World Food Day, 1986
(Proclamation)
Human Rights
67 The Systematic Repression of
Soviet Jews (Roger Pilon)
Middle East
70
73
Supporting U.S. Interests
in the Middle East
(Richard W. Murphy)
Visit of Israeli Prime Minister
Peres (Shimon Peres, President
Reagan)
74
75
Compact of Free Association With
Pacific Islands (Executive Order)
The Strategic Importance of the
Emerging Pacific (Gaston J.
Sigur, Jr.)
Refugees
78 U.S. Refugee Policy and
Programs for FY 1987
(Robert L. Funseth.
Jonathan Moore)
Western Hemisphere
81 A Spotlight on Cuba
(Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr.)
Treaties
84 Current Actions
Press Releases
87 Department of State
88 USUN
Publications
89 Department of State
89 Foreign Relations Volumes
Released
90 Background Notes
Index
3ITORY
S&s
i MH 6
m
^SfeSS
^rr
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Hofdi He
Denartment of State i
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
President Reagan
and
General Secretary Gorbachev
Meet in Reykjavik
President Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev,
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
met in Reykjavik, October 10-12, 1986.
lite House Statement,
t. 3, 19861
United States approaches the
ind meetings with a deep sense of
>us purpose. Our goal in Iceland is to
'ow the differences that separate the
;ed States and the Soviet Union. The
;ident believes that face-to-face
ate discussions with General
etary Gorbachev are the best way to
: progress at this critical juncture in
relationship. The President's goal is
both sides will gain a better
jrstanding of each other's position at
time and move forward toward a
mit in the United States. We will be
fied with the Iceland meetings if we
implish better understanding.
Arms control is important to both
ons, indeed, to the world. We will be
;ent in our efforts to seek a common
ind that can provide the basis for
jress at Geneva, but our agenda is
ider than arms control. On regional
es— the tensions in Afghanistan,
ca, the Caribbean, the Middle East,
Southeast Asia contribute to ten-
s between the two superpowers and
d mistrust that makes an arms
dup a dangerous fact of life in
ly's world. Elimination of regional
ions will go to the cause of mistrust
veen the United States and Soviet
on.
On human rights— as Americans we
share with freedom-loving people
everywhere a deep concern over human
rights on a worldwide basis, and human
rights in the Soviet Union is a major
cause of concern to the President.
Bilateral relations— improving
government-to-government and people-
to-people exchanges in the fields of arts,
education, and science can improve
understanding among the citizens and
contribute to the cause of peace.
The President believes that this is
not the time for public rhetoric, but,
instead, for private talk. The President
goes to Iceland with a continuing com-
mitment to seeking understanding that
hopefully can lead to agreements that
will benefit both the United States and
the Soviet Union.
President's Remarks
to Human Rights
Advocates,
Oct. 7, 19862
I welcome this opportunity to talk with
you about a most important subject of
my upcoming meeting with General
Secretary Gorbachev: human rights. And
I know your interest in that. And with
me, as you know, is Yuriy Orlov and Mrs.
Orlov. Yuriy is a founding member of the
independent Soviet Helsinki monitoring
group, a man who has done more to
inform the world of current Soviet
human rights violations than any man on
Earth— as I said yesterday, a hero for
our time. The West owes him a profound
debt, both for his courage and fortitude
under unspeakable conditions and for
reminding us how precious are the
freedoms that we sometimes take for
granted.
As you all know, there has been
much speculation that our upcoming
meeting in Reykjavik will focus on arms
control. But true peace requires respect
for human rights and freedom as well as
arms control. We go to Iceland in pur-
suit of peace, but it's important that the
world and our adversaries understand
what we mean when we speak of peace.
Peace is not simply an absence of war,
it's the presence of justice. Human
rights, human freedom are its indispen-
sable elements. These fundamental
values and beliefs are matters on which
we Americans cannot and will not com-
promise. So, our agenda for the
Reykjavik meeting will deal not only
with arms reductions but Soviet human
rights violations, military intervention
by the Soviets and their proxies in
regional conflicts, and broadening con-
tacts between our two peoples.
This meeting is not to sign
agreements, but to prepare the way for
a productive summit. A real improve-
ment in the Soviet Union's human rights
record is essential for such a summit.
We will not sacrifice fundamental prin-
ciples or vital U.S. interests to get a
summit. I'll make it amply clear to Mr.
Gorbachev that unless there is real
Soviet movement on human rights, we
will not have the kind of political atmos-
phere necessary to make lasting prog-
ress on other issues.
There is much room for improve-
ment—the religious persecution, long
divided families, suppression of emigra-
tion, and harassment of ethnic and
cultural activists. We are realistic about
the Soviet Union and have no illusions
about the difficulty of making progress
on these key issues, but I see no alter-
native to our twin policy of strength and
dialogue.
Secretary's
News Conference,
Oct. 7, 19863
A couple of weeks ago the Soviet
Foreign Minister [Eduard Shevardnadze]
delivered to the President a letter from
the General Secretary [Mikhail Gor-
bachev] and at the end of it came the
suggestion that as part of the prepara-
tory effort before the planned summit in
the United States, it might be construc-
tive for the two leaders to get together
less formally, briefly, to advance the
preparations to make the planned U.S.
summit as fruitful as possible. The Presi-
dent thought about that, discussed it
with some of us, and felt that it was a
good idea and that we should do it.
So we go to Reykjavik, having in
mind the importance of trying to
advance matters along the following
lines.
First of all, as the President has
said, and he said it to the General
Secretary in Geneva— he seemed to
agree— that the fundamental problems
are problems of distrust, problems of
tension, that come about because of the
differing nature, differing interests, of
the two countries. And so, for that
reason, we believe it's important to
discuss the tensions that arise in various
regions of the world and try to move the
ball forward on those regions toward
something more constructive— the Presi-
dent made a suggestion for how to do
this a year ago in his UN speech— and, if
not to move the ball forward, at least to
remind the Soviet leaders of how critical
and how important these problems are,
and of how much damage they do.
So we will want to explore the
various regional issues. They have been
discussed a great deal over the last year
or so, but I'm sure the President will
want to probe into them once more.
Similarly, perhaps nothing expresses
the difference between our societies
more vividly than the differences in our
attitudes toward individual human
beings, and so we want to discuss this
subject. We've had a dramatic example
of it in the Daniloff [U.S. News & World
Report correspondent Nicholas Daniloff]
case recently. We have made progress
with the Soviet Union in discussing what
we both call "humanitarian issues,"
basically involving divided families.
But there is a crying need for more
observance of freedom of religion, more
readiness to accept the fact that people
can be critical without having to be
thrown in jail, and more readiness, if
people want to leave a country, to let
them leave. So these issues will get an
important share of attention.
Of course, there is a wide range of
bilateral matters that we have under
review, lots of things that have been
settled and are underway, some things
under negotiation. On the whole, these
matters have gone along pretty well. No
doubt the two leaders will want to probe
into them a little bit, but I don't see that
they need to spend a great deal of time
on these issues, because they're moving
along in a reasonable channel in a good
way.
Beyond these issues, there are
important matters in the field of arms
control, and no doubt these issues will
get and deserve a great deal of attention
at this meeting. They range from confi-
dence-building measures— and I think it's
appropriate for the two leaders to take
some satisfaction from the agreement
reached a couple of weekends ago in
Stockholm— to review possibilities in
such areas as nuclear risk reduction
centers, possibilities in the field of pro-
liferation of chemical weapons, nuclear
nonproliferation. And then, of course,
there are the talks going on in Geneva,
and I'm sure and hope and expect that
these subjects will be addressed at con-
siderable length.
Let me say something about ea>
one of them. It has been said by
spokesmen for both sides, including
those up at the top, that in the field
intermediate-range nuclear missiles
there seems to be more opportunity
agreement than perhaps in others i
immediate sense. I hope that's true
may or may not be true. It is a fact
the particular differences have beer
nowed out and are pretty well
understood, so that basically decisic
have to be made about them.
Nevertheless, it's also true that
in most negotiations, the issues tha
come at the end tend to be among t
most difficult. So just because there
only a few left doesn't mean it's a p.
of cake by any means.
At any rate, no doubt there wil
discussion in this area, with the hop
that out of it can come some additic
impulse and guidance to our negoti;
in Geneva to see what they can do
toward an interim INF [intermedial
range nuclear forces] agreement.
From our standpoint, and judgi
from the nature of the joint statemc
that was made at the conclusion of
Geneva meeting, top attention need
be paid to radical reductions of stra
nuclear arms. It's this gigantic arse-
of armaments, particularly ballistic
missiles, which are the source of the
greatest concern and the greatest p
tial damage and instability.
So that's got to be the focus of i
tion. The President has spoken abou
this for as long as I've been listeninj
him, long before he was President, i
at least we can say at this point thai
agenda is the agenda of reductions,
the question is how much and in wh;
weapons categories, and so on. But
that's the agenda, and that's an imp
tant agenda that we want to push.
Of course, the third area, the sp;
defense area, is also of very great in
tance. We hope and we expect to en
in, we hope, fruitful discussion in thi
area.
The principal point here is that t
is a relationship, obviously, in milita;
terms, security terms, between offer
and defense, and that is what the Pr
dent's Strategic Defense Initiative (I
is about— in changing the mix of
offense/defense in the concept of det
rence so that the deterrence is more
stable and more secure.
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
nd we want to probe into that and
op that, and the General Secretary
lid that he wants to discuss SDI; he
ubt has a different approach. But,
y rate, we'll want to engage.
1 particular, I think, we'll want to
out what is the guts of the Presi-
3 most recent proposal— namely,
roposal that strategic ballistic
les be eliminated. And as he has put
fou eliminate these ballistic
les, then the problem of defending
st them is drastically shifted, as
ared with a situation where there
its of them, and you come down to
g to defend yourself against possi-
leating on agreements, or the possi-
>ming into the hands of somebody
ew of these missiles, and so you
an insurance policy. That's a dif-
t need than the kind of defense you
when there are thousands and
,ands of such strategic missiles.
0 the guts of the President's pro-
and the idea that all along has been
t rid of the threat that is imposed
th of us— and on mankind gener-
m that matter— by the existence of
my of these very powerful, accu-
strategic nuclear ballistic missiles,
ly rate, that is a subject that will be
jed in heavily, and that is broadly
genda, as we see it anyway— and
ure that they expect to discuss
issues as well. That's understood
sen Shevardnadze and me in our
ssions.
nd our hope is that the discussions
will take place in Reykjavik will
a contribution to what the
tiators in their various fora can
out so that, as the meeting in the
>d States takes place, as the
ing in the Soviet Union takes place,
ill see a process of progress in
oping a more constructive relation-
and seeing things settle down more
id the world and seeing human
s honored more greatly, and in see-
safer world due to the fact that
are fewer nuclear weapons in it.
. What is the minimum you
ct out of this meeting? I mean,
e been given these lower expecta-
now for about 4 days. Are you
g to get anything out of it except
lialogue?
1 I'm not going to make the same
;h I've just made over again. But
you can see that there are many
important— the idea is not to try to
reach— we're not trying to reach a final
agreement on something or other. We're
trying to, in a sense, formulate proposi-
tions that will be of maximum assistance
and direction to our respective
negotiators, so that they, as the people
who are spending all their time on the
full detail and scope and subtlety of
these subjects, can advance toward an
agreement. That's what we're pointing
toward in all of these areas.
Q. Can you give us some idea of
what the decisions are that still await
calls from both sides on INF? Are we
talking numbers or verification, or all
of the above? What are the problems
there?
A. There are many, but there are
four in principle. There are some addi-
tional ones in addition to those that I list
but-
First of all, we insist that any agree-
ment be global in nature, so that it
affects Europe and Asia deployments
similarly, and we think we're making
progress on that, but it's still to be seen
how the Soviets are willing to address
questions involving Asia, and that's an
essential ingredient as far as we're
concerned.
Second, there are the problems of
verification, and there are some impor-
tant issues there, and clearly, it's so that
adequate verification has to include some
means that are, relative to the past,
intrusive in examining what is taking
place. So that's a subject that has to be
addressed.
Third is the problem of duration,
although I think a formulation in one of
the Soviet earlier drafts that this agree-
ment stands until it is replaced by
something mutually agreeable, or
something like that, is an adequate way
to handle it. But at any rate, duration is
an issue. And then there are the ques-
tions of missiles that are shorter in
range than the principal ones being
talked about, and which are of concern
and need to be addressed in some
fashion.
Now, I think beyond that, it is to be
noted that, of course, we have had the
position all along that what's needed is
the complete elimination of this class of
weapons— and both sides, in principle
anyway, agree on that. So in that sense,
any agreement, if it is less than that, is
an interim agreement; it's a step. And so
we would want to see explicit provision
made for the reconvening of the
negotiating groups and continued work
toward subsequent steps that get us to
the goal we're seeking.
Q. You're at this point not only
negotiating with the Soviets but also
with Congress, and specifically House
Democrats, about their restrictions,
arms control restrictions. Where does
that stand at this point? And would
the Administration be willing to
accept a provision requiring continued
observance of the SALT [strategic
arms limitation talks] Treaty until
next spring when all these issues will
come up again?
A. I think that such a provision
would be quite unhelpful as we go into
these sessions. And, it is a continuing
problem in this country that the things
we are talking about and bargaining
about with the Soviet Union, get, in a
sense, taken away by the Congress, and
that tends to undermine the position of
our negotiators.
Now, I think that the Members of
the Congress appreciate that, and I
think there are some pretty good indica-
tions that as they see these meetings
coming up, and everybody recognizes
their importance and the importance of
going as a country in a unified way, that
perhaps something will be worked out
that will be mutually satisfactory. But
I'm not going to go into it further than
that.
Q. Talking about the guts of the
President's proposal to eliminate
ballistic nuclear missiles, and then
[inaudible] that would change the
defensive need, haven't you once again
outlined the so-called grand com-
promise in which, if the Soviets will
agree to sharp reductions in ballistic
missiles, the President could agree to
a lower SDI-type defense?
A. What I said, I think, is something
quite obvious: that if you have no
ballistic missiles to defend against, the
problem is very different than if you
have several thousand. So that's the kind
of thing we want to talk about— what is
the relationship between offense and
defense? And the whole idea of the
Strategic Defense Initiative from the
outset has been to make obsolete, so to
speak, these strategic ballistic missiles.
And, of course, the surest way to have
them obsolete is to have them non-
existent. But since you never can be sure
once they have been invented, you better
have an insurance policy around.
But at any rate, the guts of the
whole thing has always been to obviate
the threat of the strategic ballistic
missile, and that's the guts of the Presi-
dent's proposal.
Q. It may seem obvious, but every
time the question is put the other way
around, that is, "Can we make the
kind of reductions in strategic ballistic
missiles, and therefore, make some
sort of trade-off in reduction of SDI?"
Administration spokesmen say, "No,
no. SDI is sacrosanct." You seem to be
outlining a much more reasonable view
of the negotiation.
A. I think that it is absolutely
essential for the United States to pursue
the SDI program fully and seriously,
because we hope that these negotiations
will come to something, but we don't
know, so we must look to our "hole
card" and be ready to defend ourselves.
Furthermore, I think it's quite clear
that the way to have the maximum
chance for these negotiations to come to
something is for it to be clear that there
is, more and more in prospect, the
genuine possibility and capability of
defense against ballistic missiles.
Q. Can you say which is the most
promising and which is the most
dangerous regional issue that you will
be discussing?
A. We've had extensive discussions
of all of the regional issues, and they
have, I think both sides would agree,
have been useful discussions in clarifying
the issues somewhat, perhaps in a kind
of damage-control sense so that we try
to keep them from being explosive in the
sense of leading to a superpower con-
frontation in a direct way. But beyond
that, they really haven't gotten that far.
Now, it is said that there is the
possibility of some movement on
Afghanistan— and I hope that's true. We
understand and we see a lot of prepara-
tions for what looks like a kind of
publicized event of the withdrawal of
some Soviet forces from Afghanistan,
maybe even timed for the Reykjavik
summit— I don't know. But that would
seem to be a situation where you're talk-
ing about a very, very small proportion
of the total forces, and there is a little
puzzlement about it, but it almost looks
as though new forces are coming in as
some are being withdrawn, so it's kind
of a puzzling situation.
But leaving that aside, if there is
some progress to be made on
Afghanistan, that would be fine; if there
is some progress to be made in southern
Africa, that's always seemed to me an
area where possible discussions might
get somewhere.
Leaving aside the areas that the
President has referred to in his speech
that we have discussed with the
Soviets— the Iran-Iraq war, a number of
times— and I think it is fair to say that
both of us would like to see that war
come to an end without a victim and
without a vanquished. And it may be
that something useful can be done on
that.
Q. One suspects deliberately
you've given us very few benchmarks
on which to judge the success or
failure of the meetings in Reykjavik.
Would you imagine that a firming up
of the General Secretary's commitment
to come on a date certain to
Washington is one way of judging?
A. I think it's going to be hard to
judge it. Of course, I have to go about
judging it from the standpoint of the
insides of it and the substance of it and
whether or not, in one way or another, it
seems to me to advance matters. So I'll
give it my own grade, which is probably
not one that I'll be able to pursuade
anybody of— it's just my own internal
way of appraising it. But I don't know-
but what the best way of appraising it
may be to see whether or not there is
some progress in these other negotia-
tions, or in some— one of the issues at
some subsequent time. In other words, I
don't know that it's going to be possible
on Sunday afternoon to say A, B, or C.
Q. On the short-range missiles,
are you seeking some sort of commit-
ment that they should be dealt with
perhaps in a parallel negotiation with
INF, or folded into INF? And on
START [strategic arms reduction
talks] would it be useful, to, at least,
since you're so close on numbers of
warheads, to reach some conclusion.
some commitment to specific num|i
of warheads and [inaudible] direct I
negotiators to work out suppleme I
the mix?
A. You're too sophisticated foi I
with all those— such a question. But I
any rate, on the short-range system |
that issue has been on the table; it
been addressed as strongly as the o
systems have. And I think it's one c
those things where, as one item bee
less important, another that was no
important when something else was
there looms greater in and of itself,
I'm sure that it needs to be address
And particularly insistent on that a:
countries which are within range of
shorter range system, and particula
here, of course, Germany is involvei
Insofar as START is concerned
you're right. There has been a nam
ing; the concept of warhead as at le
an important unit of account is bein
talked about, and the numbers are i
little closer than they have been in
past, so that's a measure of some
progress.
As I said in my opening statemt
think in broad terms the real name
the game over a period of time is to
radical reductions in these kinds of
forces. That's what we're trying to
about.
Q. You said last week that tht
issue of the 25 Soviet diplomats w
also come up again in Iceland. Do
foresee any possibility that, as a n
of the talks there, we are going to
change on the names that we subn
ted to the Soviets?
A. We don't have any plan to
change. We have given a list and thi
only thing that was done since we gf
the list, that is, one thing happened,
quite a few of the people on the list
but not all. The President granted a
extension to the— I think it is the 14
October, by which the balance must
leave, and that's where the matter
stands.
Q. What exactly do you need ti
nail down a firm date for a summit
the United States?
A. As far as we're concerned, w
believe that it's something that shou
gone ahead with and we're ready to
establish the date. It's the Soviet Ur.
that has been reluctant.
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
ident Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev open their meetings at Hofdi House on October 11.
interpreter Dimitrv Zarechnak sits to the left of President Reagan; Soviet interpreter
ilai Uspenskiy is to the left of General Secretary Gorbachev.
Q. What do you need? What's it
lg to take?
A. Their agreement.
Q. All right. But they have
iblished some conditions for that —
A. It has been rather elusive and
ting conditions. We'll just have to
Q. How close are you to it?
A. I don't know. I've always
eved that you're not there until
're there, and optimism and
iimism, closeness, progress, and so
h, are very elusive words in this kind
field.
Q. The one issue that you didn't
ition at all is probably at the top of
•bachev's agenda, which is the
ratorium on nuclear testing. Could
I. give us some idea of whether
either on verification or reducing the
number of nuclear tests or the size of
those tests, there might be some prog-
ress made at this meeting, or is that
something that as far as the United
States is concerned is not even on the
agenda as far as any hope for
progress?
A. As far as we're concerned, we'd
like to see progress on the subject of
testing, and we think the way to go
about it is to walk before you try to run.
And the way to walk is to put into place
the known measures of verification that
will enable us to have increased con-
fidence by orders of magnitude about the
size of the tests conducted under the 150
kiloton limit, and under those conditions,
to ratify those treaties. That gets you in
business, so to speak.
Under provisions of the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty, it provides that the
two sides will then start in further
negotiations and discussions with the
ultimate aim of a comprehensive test
ban.
Now, it is our view, and I think it is
almost an obvious proposition, that as
long as you have nuclear weapons, you
have to conduct tests, and so you put the
cart before the horse if you say, "Let's
stop tests." The horse is the nuclear
weapons, and we say. "Well, let's get rid
of them." And when we get rid of them,
and perhaps to some extent as we get
rid of them, if we see a schedule that's
actually being implemented, then you
are in a position to do something about
tests in various ways. But let's be sure
we get the cart and the horse in the
right order. But we think that progress
can be made, and we have described in
broad terms a way of making it. Just to
:ember 1986
all of a sudden stop testing, we don't
think would be a wise idea from our
standpoint.
Q. You seem to be saying that if
SDI is not the bargaining chip that
some of us thought it was in the past,
that at least the size of SDI and the
frequency of nuclear testing are
bargaining chips dependent on the size
of the reductions that the Soviets
might [inaudible].
A. If I can use a sort of image from
geometry, if you think of a graph and it
has on one axis the numbers of nuclear
weapons and on the other axis some
measure of testing, and can you imagine
a straight line, a direct function of one
or the other, no. What I said was that if
you— you are not going to say, let's
eliminate one nuclear weapon, we'll
eliminate one-quarter of a nuclear test,
or some ridiculous proposition like that.
But if what we see is radical reductions
in nuclear weapons and a genuine pros-
pect for their disappearance, then that
makes it more sensible to talk about
testing. And, of course, if there aren't
any more, then you don't have to test
them. That's obvious.
Q. Does that also include foreseen
in reductions in SDI, in the size and
scope of SDI?
A. Just to repeat what I said, I tried
to really call your attention to what, at
least to me, is the guts of the President's
most recent proposal, namely to say
eliminate ballistic missiles and then that
changes radically what you need to do to
defend against them, and I think that's a
pretty obvious proposition. It doesn't
eliminate entirely the desirability of
being able to defend against them,
because you don't know about some
being retained in some fashion, or
somebody coming up with one, or
whatever, so you still have to worry
about it once something like this has
been invented. But your problem is very
different if you ever get to that point.
But in the meantime, the thing we
must have in our country, we have to
look to our security and the security of
our allies, and to the maximum extent
possible, we want to have it depend on
what we do, not what somebody else
does. And if we can learn how to defend
ourselves against ballistic missiles, that
is a measure of safety and we believe
that if you had that in operation on both
sides, you would have a more stable pat-
tern of deterrent than the pattern you
have now, which is wholly dependent
upon offense, and an offense that has
greater and greater elements of
elusiveness in it as these weapons
become more powerful, more accurate,
and more mobile.
Q. On the regional conflicts, in
southern Africa, how would you envi-
sion Soviet involvement in that area?
Would you envision a kind of joint
superpower approach to settling the
problems of the region?
And, secondly, I guess a related
but somewhat different question is
how does the death, or the reported
death, of the Americans in Nicaragua
affect the discussions on Central
America?
A. Insofar as southern Africa is con-
cerned, I think one set of problems
involves what's going on in Angola,
where there is a big Soviet-Cuban
presence in the form of troop levels in
the midst of a civil war, and where some
process of reconciliation among
Angolans, with the leaving from Angola
of all foreign forces— Cubans, South
Africans, any foreign forces— might lead
to— or would lead obviously to a better
situation in Angola, and I think could be
followed on by implementation of UN
Resolution 435 on the independence of
Namibia.
So that's one kind of goal to be
worked at, just to take an example. I
think that's what I have in the front of
my mind. And I don't say that because I
think there is something in the offing
immediately, but it is just an obvious
sort of point if the parties there feel that
it's time to try to work out their
problems.
Q. There is nothing in the offing?
A. I don't have any particular thing
in mind other than in response to a ques-
tion about examples of things that could
be worked on. This is an example.
Q. What about Nicaragua with the
death of the Americans?
A. I don't see that that has any par-
ticular Reykjavik spinoff to it. The peo-
ple involved were not from our military,
not from any U.S. Government agency—
Q. CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency]?
A. —CIA included, so it's— thest
private citizens, and it's not a govern
mental operation.
Q. On the Iraq-Iran war, you s
that — in your meeting with the GC
[Gulf Cooperation Council]
countries — that the Soviet Union is
cooperating with you to stop arms
Iran. How can you — what means w
you try to work out with the Soviei
convince Iran to come to the
negotiating table?
A. We think that in the current
situation, it's Iran that seems to be t
recalcitrant party in trying to get
together and come to some resolutio
And so a way to change the situatior
insofar as Iran is concerned, is to mal
it difficult for them to buy arms, and
we've been trying to do that, not win
complete success but with some sued
And an awful lot of the arms come ft
states with whom the Soviet Union HI
we think, great influence, and so we'
like to see them use that influence ar.;
give that curtailment and that might
shift the situation.
Q. Does President Reagan inte
to bring any new proposals with hii
to Iceland on either medium-range
missiles or any of these other topic:
you mentioned that might narrow a
of the differences between the two
countries? And is he prepared to
negotiate on these, or does he see t
more as an opportunity to talk and
more fully understand the differenc
A. In a broad sense, any meeting
like this is a negotiation, but I wouldr
expect that the two heads are going t
get down into the nuts and bolts of th
particular issues. But I think there ar
ways of formulating statements aboui
key issues that would be useful to the
negotiators as they try to move thing
forward.
So the President will be going the
ready to discuss all of these issues in ;
spirit of the proposal the General
Secretary made; namely, let us get
together and see if through discussior
between us we can't advance things
somewhat in the interests of making *
planned summit meeting in the Unitei
States be as fruitful as possible. And
that's the spirit in which the Presiden'
going there.
Department of State Bulln
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
\ He may be carrying some new
sals?
, We have very interesting pro-
being put forward, put forward in
a. Those meetings have just
1, and so there's a flow of discus-
ick and forth, and the President
to engage in it, and the
s true for all of the issues tha"
»ned here.
Members of the Administration
aid that one of the President '»
ry objectives at Reykjavik is
to be to try and decouple SDI
iTART. You said here that you
to be able to flesh out the Presi-
SDI proposals in Iceland,
tie question is what precisely — or
n general terms — is the Presi-
ding to do to get the Soviets to
. the concept of SDI. and to. in
gree to focus on strategic
ins when SDI has been such a
ling block all along?
First, we think the Preside: '
•als and ideas on this are so
itly reasonable that il
»ey aren't embraced by every! ody,
int to continue to tr
i them, and really engage on this
an of offense/defense relationships.
- jfar as the relationship
jn the START area and the space
e area, that was discussed
n Mr. Gromyko [former Soviet
;n Minister] and I when we— back
ieva when the statement that set
se negotiations started, and
greed at the time that there were
nships among all these areas, and
ement were reached in one of
then both agreed at the time that
were relationships among all these
and if agreement were reached in
them, then both sides would have
sider whether you wanted to go
rd with that or not. because it
preempt the subject of going
ne without going aheac
srhaps that will be possible in INF.
r not be possible in START,
gh. as one of the questions here
sted. there has been quite a lot of
i in the START negotiations, and
of our purposes, of course, is to
jht that because that's where the
xwerful, the longest range, the
most destructive, the most quick-hitting,
the most destabilizing weapons ar<- 3
that's the big paydirt and that's what
g • '
Q. If I could just follow up for just
a second. Mr. Secretary, how then do
you try and deal with SDI beyond
repeating what you have just called
the President's "eminently reason-
able" position? Is there anything new
you can bring to that dialogue?
A. We have put forward a strong
set of ideas in the President's most
recent reponse to the General Secreu
and it is— those proposals have yet to be
really engaged, and we want to engage
them and explain them, and find out if
they don't like the ; on't like
them. And they say, both of us say, that
rk to eliminate nuclear
pons, and the General Secret-,
made a proposal that seemed to have in
it the idea that we should set a deadline
of the end of the century. I know when I
happened to be the person that literally
the mailman and brought that over
to the President, he looked at it. and he
said. -it until th<
r.g to find a path d
And why isn't an important step on that
path the elimination of ballistic miss: .-
which are the most destabilizing and dif-
ficult -ourse, if they are
eliminated, that has, as I've said here
J times, an important bearing on
what it is you need to do to defend
against them. That's an obvious point.
President's Departure
Remarks.
Oct. 9. 19864
I'm leaving today for Iceland for a
meeting with General Secretary
.on. This will
r meeting between
the two of us. We will not have la
staffs with us nor is it planned tha"
sign substantive agreements. We will,
• er. review the subjects that
intend to pursue, with redoubled e:
afterward, looking toward a possible full-
scale summit. We'll be talking frankly
about the differences between our coun-
m the major issues on the E
agenda: arms reduction, human
-. regional conflicts, and bila"-
contacts. We'll be talking about how we
can— while recognizing those
differences— still take steps furth<-
make progress on those items and to
make the world safer and keep the
peace.
Let me say here— and this is par-
ticularly fitting because this i-
Erik -how much the
States appreciates the hospitality on this
occasion of the Icelandic Government
and the people of Iceland. The United
States and Iceland have been allies for
more tha -—first, in the defense
of freedom and democracy during World
War II and, ro rking in NATX
defend peace and freedom and
democracy. There can be no better
testimony to the enduring commitment
of the Icelandic people and government
to the search for a just peace, a lasting
peace, than their gracious consent to
host these meetings.
Geneva last year. Mr. Gorbachev
and I made a fresh start toward impr
ing relations between our two countries.
And when I look back on the succe
Geneva. I find myself feeling the real
credit belongs to the American people.
I knew at every step that I had our
nation's unified support. I knew that
Americans of both parties had said that
differences stopped at the water's edge.
Last Saturday I asked again for
unified national support as I head for a
second meeting with the Soviet leader.
And let me sa ap-
preciate the support that I have n
over the years from the American peo-
ple. Few things have been more grat.:
ing or more important to our success. I'll
need this same support through the
negotiations of the coming year.
The world has ne .a force
as strong or decent as that of America
when we're unified. '.' g
Americans settled this great continent
that God put between two oceans for
free men and women all over the world
to find and eheris:
transforming the world with our
technology, making life longer with
greater opportunities and more fulfilling
for millions all over the earth. And most
of all. together
freedom around the world in this oen-
in World War II. and still to
be great friend of mankind's
dreams of freedom, whether in Europe
or the Americas or Africa or
Afghanistan. And together we can be
true to the cause of freedom even while
we're true to the cause of peace.
L.ist Tuesday, a group of human
rights leaders reminded me of how
important America's missions of both
peace and freedom are. And among
them was Yuriy Orlov, who was released
only a week ago from Siberian exile
where he was being kept for the crime of
wanting his government to respect basic
human rights. We didn't forget him, and
we must never forget those like him.
They're our inspiration, and we are their
hope.
So, we go to Reykjavik for peace.
We go to this meeting for freedom, and
we go in hope. As a great American who
knew the extremes of hope and despair,
Robert E. Lee, once said, "History
teaches us to hope." Today we're mak-
ing history, and we're turning the tide of
history to peace and freedom and hope.
I've long believed that if we're to be
successful in pursuing peace, we must
face the tough issues directly and
honestly and with hope. We cannot pre-
tend the differences aren't there, seek to
dash off a few quick agreements, and
then give speeches about the spirit of
Reykjavik. In fact, we have serious prob-
lems with the Soviet postions on a great
many issues, and success is not guaran-
teed. But if Mr. Gorbachev comes to
Iceland in a truly cooperative spirit, I
think we can make some progress.
And that's my goal, and that's my
purpose in going to Iceland. The goals of
the United States, peace and freedom
throughout the world, are great goals;
but like all things worth achieving, they
are not easy to attain. Reykjavik can be
a step, a useful step; and if we
persevere, the goal of a better, safe
world will someday be ours and all t
world's.
White House Statement,
Oct. 10, 19865
As the President meets this week w
General Secretary Gorbachev in
Reykjavik, Iceland, he believes it is
crucial that all Americans join with
in forging a strong, bipartisan consa
on a nuclear testing policy that pron
our national security interests and
advances longstanding U.S. arms col
objectives.
In recent weeks there has been
substantial disagreement in the Con|
gress and in the nation over the bes'
approach to reach the goal we all sei
Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze join the meetings Palazhchenko, Soviet notetaker: Foreign Minister Shevardnail
on October 12. Other participants include (clockwise) Nikolai Dimitrv Zarechnak. U.S. interpreter; President Reagan: and Secreu
Uspenskiy, Soviet interpreter; General Secretarv Gorbachev; Pavel Shultz'
8
Department of State B
ull
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
|d in which there will be no nuclear
E because the need for it has
|ied. The dispute threatened to give
ral Secretary Gorbachev the false
ssion of a divided America. The
lent did not believe it was in the
nterests of our nation to create this
ssion.
,S. policy on nuclear testing limita-
is clear. Our highest arms control
ty in the area of nuclear testing
Ben, and remains, to seek the
sary verification improvements to
asting Threshold Test Ban Treaty
T) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
y (PNET).
nee our verification concerns have
atisfied and the treaties have been
;d, and in association with a pro-
to reduce and ultimately eliminate
clear weapons, we are prepared to
e in discussions on ways to imple-
a step-by-step, parallel program of
ig and ultimately ending nuclear
g-
e remain committed to the
ite goal of the total elimination of
ar testing, but only when we do not
to depend on nuclear deterrence to
e international security and stabil-
id when we have achieved broad,
and verifiable arms reductions,
antially improved verification
ilities. expanded confidence-
ng measures, and greater balance
lventional forces.
1 order to make progress toward
oals. encourage the Soviet Union to
;iate verification improvements, and
e the necessary national consensus
ir objectives, the President has
ed to take two new steps.
irst, the President will inform
ral Secretary Gorbachev in
javik that if the Soviet Union will,
to the initiation of ratification pro-
ngs in the Senate next year, agree
sential TTBT/PNET verification
idures which could be submitted to
enate for its consideration in the
of a protocol or other appropriate
il— the President will, as a first
of business for the 100th Con-
i, request the advice and consent of
enate to ratification of the TTBT
3NET. However, if the Soviet
n fails to agree to the required
age of verification improvements
to the convening of the 100th Con-
, the President will still seek
Senate advice and consent, but with an
appropriate reservation to the treaties
that would ensure they would not take
effect until they are effectively
verifiable.
Second, the President will inform
the General Secretary that, once our
TTBT/PNET verification concerns have
been satisfied and the treaties have been
ratified, the President will propose that
the United States and the Soviet Union
immediately engage in negotiations on
ways to implement a step-by-step,
parallel program— in association with a
program to reduce and ultimately
eliminate all nuclear weapons— of
limiting and ultimately ending nuclear
testing.
The congressional leadership has
responded to the President's decision in
a bipartisan spirit and is supporting the
President's proposal. The President is
grateful for this show of unity. As a
result, the President can make it clear to
General Secretary Gorbachev that
America is united in its determination to
take prompt, practical steps to limit
nuclear testing, that the first require-
ment is for him to act now to resolve the
verification problems with the existing
treaties, and that the United States and
the world are awaiting his response.
While the President believes these
new steps will allow progress in this
area, they must not divert us from the
primary goal: elimination of the weapons
themselves. Broad, deep, equitable, and
verifiable reductions in offensive arms
remain our highest priority. Here, too,
we have made significant proposals and
await a constructive Soviet response. If
they are willing, the road to a safer
world is open before us.
Secretary's
News Conference,
Reykjavik,
Oct. 12, 19866
I have just spent 2 full, intensive days
watching the President of the United
States engage with the General
Secretary of the Soviet Union over the
full range of issues that we are con-
cerned about together. The President's
performance was magnificent; and, I
have never been so proud of my Presi-
dent as I have been in these sessions,
and particularly this afternoon.
During the course of these 2 days,
extremely important potential agree-
ments were reached to reduce, in the
first instance, strategic arms in half; to
deal effectively with intermediate-range
missiles; although, we didn't finally have
the opportunity to come to grips with it
probably to work out something satisfac-
tory about nuclear testing; a satisfactory
manner of addressing regional issues;
humanitarian concerns; a variety of
bilateral matters; and a tremendous
amount of headway in the issues in space
and defense involving the ABM
[Antiballistic Missile] Treaty.
Throughout all of this, the President
was constructive in reaching out and
using his creativity and ingenuity to find
these very sweeping and substantial and
important agreements. It has been clear
for a long time— and it was certainly
clear today, and particularly this
afternoon— the importance the Soviet
leader attaches to the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), and I think it was quite
apparent that at least a key reason why
it was possible to reach such sweeping
potential agreements was the very fact
of SDI's vigorous presence.
In seeking to deal with these issues,
the President was ready to agree to a
10-year period of non withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty, a period during which
the United States would do research,
development, and testing which is per-
mitted by the ABM Treaty and, of
course, after which we would be permit-
ted to deploy if we chose. However, as
the agreement that might have been
said, during this 10-year period, in
effect, all offensive strategic arms and
ballistic missiles would be eliminated so
that at the end of the period the deploy-
ment of strategic defense would be
substantially altered in what was needed
and would be in the nature of an insur-
ance policy— insurance against cheating,
insurance against somebody getting hold
of these weapons— so it would maintain
an effective shield for the United States,
for our allies, for the free world.
As we came more and more down to
the final stages, it became more and
more clear that the Soviet Union's objec-
tive was effectively to kill off the SDI
program and to do so by seeking a
change described by them as
"strengthening," but a change in the
ABM Treaty that would so constrain
research permitted under it that the pro-
gram would not be able to proceed at all
forcefully.
The President, hard as he had
worked for this extraordinary range and
importance of agreements, simply would
not turn away from the basic security
interests of the United States, our allies,
and the free world by abandoning this
essential defensive program. He had to
bear in mind— and did bear in mind— that
not only is the existence of the strategic
defense program a key reason why we
were able potentially to reach these
agreements, but undoubtedly its con-
tinued existence and potential would be
the kind of program you need in the pic-
ture to ensure yourself that the
agreements reached would be effectively
carried out. And so in the end, with
great reluctance, the President, having
worked so hard creatively and construc-
tively for these potentially tremendous
achievements, simply had to refuse to
compromise the security of the United
States, of our allies, and freedom by
abandoning the shield that has held in
front of freedom.
So in the end we are deeply dis-
appointed at this outcome; although, I
think it is important to recognize how
effectively and constructively and hard
the President worked and how much he
achieved potentially, how ready he was
to go absolutely the last— not just the
last mile, but as you can see from what
I've told you, quite a long distance to try
to bring into being these potentially very
significant agreements. But he could not
allow the essential ingredient to be
destroyed in the process— and would not
do so.
Q. You said you were not able to
succeed on SDI. Did you succeed on
any arms agreement?
A. Everything that was discussed
here was discussed to a degree, you
might say, in relation to the other parts,
although obviously many of the things
that we're doing go on. Of course, we
will return to Geneva, as I assume they
will, and the things that were talked
about I assume will be seen in the
Geneva talks and in the other talks
where we meet with the Soviet Union.
And we will continue to strive in every
way we can to have a constructive rela-
tionship and one that is able to resolve
these problems. But we will never do so
at the expense of the security of the
United States and our allies.
Q. Could you say, just to be clear,
that you had within your grasp the
possibility of eliminating all offensive
missiles within a 10-year period if
there had been that ultimate final con-
cession by the President on SDI? Is
that correct?
A. That is not the way I think we
must think about it, because while we
had set out many sweeping and poten-
tially very significant things, if they only
came to pass as a result of scuttling the
SDI program then you had to ask
yourself if they would really come to
pass after all after the SDI program was
gone. So they were there potentially,
and I think myself for the Soviet Union
to try to change the ABM Treaty in a
way that would very sharply curtail the
research that could be done under it was
perhaps an indication of where they are
headed.
Q. Do you have a date, did General
Secretary Gorbachev agree to a date to
come to the United States for a full-
scale summit?
A. No, and there was very little
discussion of a full-scale summit. Of
course, it was mentioned, particularly in
the first day, and I hope at some point
he comes to the United States. But we
ended, of course, having worked so hard
and gotten so far, in the deep disappoint-
ment at discovering that in the end a
change in the ABM Treaty that would
have made effective research very, very
difficult was a price, and obviously the
kind of price that if you paid it, you
might wind up losing everything else you
had achieved.
Q. Are U.S. -Soviet relations better
or worse than they were before this
meeting, and why?
A. They are certainly more inten-
sive, but it's hard for me to assess that
question offhand because I've been
involved in this 2 days. We all had very
high hopes, and we came very close to
realizing them, and that's always kind of
a tough moment. But the meetings show
that the two sides can come together, and
these two leaders at least can engage
very effectively on important matters.
Whether they'll be able to do so at some
time in the future remains to be seen;
but in the meantime we will continue in
every way we can to pursue our four '
point agenda and to advance these
causes as best we can and try to havi1*
constructive relationship.
Q. Did the Soviets mislead you I
about what was possible at the sun
mit? Did they come here in good fa ,
A. I'm not going to comment on |
people's good faith. We came in gooc
faith, and certainly they engaged wit
in a very intensive process. They
obviously made quite a wide variety i
important proposals. In the end,
however, on the absolute key, they
wanted to make a change that I thin]
you'd have to say was, predictably, n
possible for us. But I wouldn't say tb
came here not in good faith, because
they worked at this very hard.
Q. Would you describe the chai
that they fostered in the ABM Trea<
A. The change in the ABM Trea
was the one that would confine the
research and testing and developmer
the laboratory. There is nothing in th
ABM Treaty about that, so this wouli
definitely be a change. They describe!
as a strengthening; in our view, it wa
an insistence on a limitation that woi
effectively destroy the ability to do ti
kind of energetic research leading to
ability to defend ourselves that is pos
ble to do, has great prospects, and wi
must do.
Q. When did they begin insistir '
on this change? Was this right fron|
the beginning or was this something
they sprung on you this afternoon?
A. No, no. These things all were '
sort of laid out and we discussed then1
we discussed all these things on the fij
day, and we discussed them througho ,
And, of course, we had a lengthy sess|!
most of the night last night with ourl(
teams, and in those, on the basis of w|
was said on the first day, managed to |
agree on very good language, particu-|
larly in the area of strategic arms. So |
don't want to say that this was someh
a last-minute thing. They've been talki
about this for a long time, and we've |
been saying for a long time that we |
simply couldn't agree to it. That's wb|
we came down.
Q. Given that the President and1
Mr. Gorbachev could not reach an
agreement here today, what can you
reasonably expect to happen in Gene
10
-,.,♦ «.# e>*«*^
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
hey couldn't accomplish here?
oesn't this effectively end the
es for a meaningful arms agree-
in Mr. Reagan's term?
I hope it doesn't end the chances
reements, but I can't say for sure
that. What I can say is that our
ators will be back in Geneva, and
1 be there knowing all of the ins
its, as they will, of what was
sed here. We will be there in a
uctive spirit, and we will see what
i do to advance things further. The
5e of this meeting, you remember,
) try to advance, to give instruc-
.0 these negotiators and others in
fora that would move matters
And while in the end we weren't
) wrap all these up, in the course
discussions many important things
igreed to [that] sort of depended
)ther things so that there is a great
f potential accomplishment still
| But I'm not going to try to predict
y what will happen.
Given the claim for potential
liplishments that you talk about,
■ talks in Geneva start from the
[where you left off here, or does
back to where it was before this
(it took place?
. We're glad to pick up where we
if here. What they will want to do,
111 have to see. But there were a
many important ideas advanced,
i can see from what I've told you.
ill, as the time unfolds here, give
complete rundown on all this,
I just can't do offhand here. But
' rate, a great deal of progress was
, As you know, there have been
various interpretations of the
Treaty. Could you clarify
ler you are talking about wanting
lere to the so-called narrow
>retation of the treaty or the
interpretation? And what is the
nistration's position on that nar-
t broad question? Are you trying
fend the broad interpretation that
le always said was legally proper
t least the last few years?
. That was not the issue. The issue
proposal to change the ABM Trea-
t to interpret it in any particular
iut to change it in such a manner
esearch would be confined to what
juld do in a laboratory. That's a
Now insofar as our position is con-
cerned, what the President put forward,
as he has before, was the notion that
during this period our research would be
as permitted in the ABM Treaty. And, of
course, we have been discussing,
Ambassador Kampelman [Max M.
Kampelman, U.S. negotiator on defense
and space arms and head of U.S. delega-
tion on arms control negotiations] has
been discussing— and we are perfectly
prepared to continue discussing in
Geneva— what we believe the treaty
means. And there is a very long,
well-developed and, by now, very well-
researched record on exactly that ques-
tion. So the issue wasn't an interpreta-
tion; the issue was their proposal to
make a change which, in our view— and
it wasn't just the President's view or my
view, but I think all of our experts that
we assembled here— a change that would
have made it extremely difficult to do
effective research to defend ourselves.
Q. What you have said means that
we should not expect to see a super-
power summit in Washington within
the next few months, as per the Presi-
dent's invitation last year?
A. I don't see any prospect of it,
based on this; but I've long since learned
not to rule anything out.
Q. Did you have the feeling as you
left this meeting that the Soviet posi-
tion on this was set in concrete or is
there any way that is possible to
return to this amendment in any kind
of forum to advance some of the
changes that you had talked about?
A. We certainly argued about it
long and hard, and we had— we came—
I've lost track of the amount of time; I
don't even know what time it is now.
But at any rate, we convened in Hofdi
House; we took time for caucusing; we
reviewed proposals; we made counter-
proposals back and forth to a con-
siderable extent around this issue. So
there was a tremendous amount of
effort. And in the last session, which
went on for quite some period— I don't
know how long— but we all know that in
the last session after our last caucus,
which really did focus on this issue
directly, there was a very long, search-
ing effort and this didn't succeed. So I
don't know what concrete is like, but it
seemed fairly firm.
Q. You came into this meeting say-
ing you hoped to elevate the issue of
human rights. Did you, or did it get
lost in this discussion about SDI and
arms control?
A. The issue of human rights was
brought up on a number of occasions,
and some very significant material was
passed to the Soviet Union which they
accepted that stated not only our views
but in detail things about Jewish emigra-
tion, the number of people who have
signified their desire to leave, lists of
people, and things of that kind. So all of
that was covered, and in what might
have been a statement coming out of the
meeting dealing with this issue the sub-
ject is explicitly setting up some kind of
systematic basis for discussing it. But, of
course, that remains to be seen.
Q. Are you in effect saying that
potential progress was made on INF
[intermediate-range nuclear forces],
but that the Soviets are now linking
that progress to SDI again?
A. I wouldn't put it that formally,
but certainly as we have gone through
these things we saw the potential of a
set of genuinely significant
agreements— on INF, on strategic arms,
on potentially the elimination of all
offensive ballistic missiles, on space and
defense— and there was a kind of inte-
grated feel to them. And we came up to
the end, and we didn't agree, so we
didn't go back and say, "Well, now that
we have failed to agree, let's see how we
can sort this out." We came to the end,
and the sorting-out process we'll have to
take up, no doubt, in Geneva.
Q. Do you have one piece of paper,
as you seem to be suggesting, which
listed all of these progress areas, but
that when the discussion broke down
over the ABM issue the Soviets would
not agree to the individual points on
the paper? I'm trying to get the feel of
why everything became interlocked.
The INF, we thought, had been
separated out.
A. I think the best way for me to
answer that question is sort of descrip-
tively in the process. In the process we
took up each of these subjects; and then
last night in the two working groups we
tried to go from the statements that
were made in the meetings of the two
leaders to explicit language; and we
nher 19Rfi
11
were able to find such language in
START | strategic arms reduction talks]
and across the range of bilateral,
regional, and humanitarian issues. We
were unable to do so last night in INF,
Imi with the strong discussion on that
today positions shifted, and we were able
to find what I think could be a very fine
agreement. We didn't get around to
actually reducing that to specific
language, but I think, given the
agreements that were reached, it
wouldn't have been too difficult.
Similarly, in the field of nuclear
testing, we talked out a pretty fair
measure of agreement on the content of
what might be said, and my belief is that
if we had gone forward, we would have
been able to work that out. And we had
pieces of paper that we were working
from on the space defense ABM issue
that represented the nature of the
discussion; and it was over that wording
that finally, in the end, about however
long ago it was— three-quarters of an
hour ago— the two leaders just decided
that they weren't able to agree. And at
that point, not being able to agree, we
adjourned. We didn't, in other words, go
back and say, "Now, wait a minute. How
much of this and how much of that?"
Descriptively, these were the things
that went along, and as we pick up and
continue to work on this relationship, as
at least we certainly intend to do, we
will want to see how much constructive
material we can develop out of these
really extraordinary discussions that
were had here in Reykjavik.
Q. Can you tell us exactly what
was the potential agreement that vou
reached on START?
A. Basically to reduce strategic
offensive arms in half, with references in
the agreement numerically to both the
launchers and the warheads. I could
describe it in more detail, but that's the
essence of it.
Q. Could you say whether there
was any progress made at all on the
issue of verification as regards to
nuclear testing? And a second ques-
tion: the critics have charged
undoubtedly that this Administration
has chosen "Star Wars," or SDI, over
arms control. Is that a fair accusation?
A. That's a totally misplaced kind of
statement because the fact of the matter
is that the existence of a strong research
program about strategic defense and its
12
undoubted promise has had a great deal
to do with bringing these talks to the
point that they've gotten to; and I
believe that the continued strong work
on that program in existence, as reduc-
tions, if they had taken place, were
going on would be your best insurance
policy, that they would continue. That is.
I think we have to think beyond verifica-
tion into compliance and what brings
about compliance. And in effect the
promise of strategic defense is the thing
that would help deliver on these prom-
ises, so that's the way I think of it. And
perhaps the significance of strategic
defense is not lost on either side, and
that's what it comes down to.
Q. Did the President make any
statement to Mr. Gorbachev on the
consequences of this outcome of their
meetings?
A. They both shared their disap-
pointment, and I think they could both
see the very positive consequences as
people in the United States, people in
the Soviet Union, and for that matter
people all over the world might con-
template getting rid of ballistic missiles
and, for that matter, getting rid of
nuclear weapons. So there is a great
sense of disappointment, but at least at
this meeting a tremendous amount of
headway was made. But in the end, we
couldn't quite make it.
Q. Was there any animosity
between the two men at the end?
A. They were both disappointed, but
the discussion throughout was
straightforward and civil, and people
didn't lose their tempers and so on,
although it was a vigorous, intense
discussion. But it was conducted in a
very good manner throughout, including
at the end, despite the great
disappointment.
Q. Would you characterize the
INF accord that you said appeared to
be worked out? Did the Soviets
address the question of the Asian
missiles? And can you tell us what —
were discussed?
A. Yes. Let me say first of all that
we all felt that we reached an agreement
in the discussion between the two heads,
but we didn't get around to that often
exotic process of reducing what two
leaders agree to into actual language. So
with that caveat, I believe that we made
very good contact with each other on the
subject of verification; that we addre \
successfully the issue of short-range I
missiles; that we addressed successful
the issue of duration; and that, insofEJ
the actual outcome is concerned, we' I
would have wound up with a global c<|
ing on INF missiles of 100 warheads. I
That's a breathtaking reduction f I
what now exists, and those warheads!
would have been located in the Asian I
side of the Soviet Union, on the one j
hand, and in the United States on tht
other. So it would have been a very i
sweeping shift, thinking of where we
were 4 or 5 years ago and where we
might still wind up. I'm not saying th|
these agreements aren't potentially
possible; as of this moment, they don
have standing other than we manage
get ourselves to that point.
So we were consistent with our
friends in Europe and consistent wit!
our friends in Asia. And I think, also,
might say in the discussion across all
subjects, there was a vigorous
assertion— in some ways, rather
interesting— a vigorous assertion on 1
sides of how insistent they were both
going to be on adequate verification,
which, of course, we welcomed.
Q. The ABM Treaty says that e;
party undertakes to develop tests—
to develop tests or deploy ABM
systems or components — space-base
land-based, or sea-based. Why did t
Soviets want to change that? What
prompted them? Was it the America ;
insistence on the broad interpretatic
or — during this 10 years? Why did tl
want to change that?
A. You have to ask them that qut
tion. I don't know the answer to that i
question. I can only tell you that they
sought a change in the treaty that wo'l
confine research to the laboratory, an
was our view and the President's view
and all of his advisers' view that if yot
confined it that way you would not wi'l
up with an effective program. And so j
just couldn't buy it because that woulc
be, in effect, the end of the promising
effort to give us a shield and a defens'
against ballistic missiles.
Q. Did you specifically discuss t|
continuation of talks at Geneva? Am
did the Soviets either leave it unclea
or indicate to you in any way that th
might not return to the table at
Geneva?
Department of State Bufl
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
nat
t\
i;ay
m
ks I said in response to an
luestion, I could only answer
ively and we didn't discuss at the
.1, are we going back to Geneva
are we going to do. We ended
to reach an agreement finally,
re wasn't time or, frankly, I
link any particular "umph" to go
d recapitulate that way. But I
what the United States will do.
have our negotiators in Geneva,
will be ready to work on these
nt issues.
fcretary's
lews Conference,
FO Headquarters,
13, 19867
President said, as he was leaving
nd last night, "We came to Iceland
vance the cause of peace and,
jh we put on the table the most far-
ling arms control proposals in
ry, the General Secretary rejected
However we made great strides in
nd in resolving most of our dif-
ices, and we're going to continue
ffort." I think the President
ned it up well.
'oday I had the opportunity to
ibe, in detail, the process and the
ent of the meeting in Reykjavik to
olleagues in NATO [North Atlantic
ty Organization] and each of them
in opportunity to express his view. I
struck, as I always am in these
;ings, at the cohesion, at the con-
itive tone of our alliance discussions
Df the genuine sense in which the
;javik meeting is viewed by our
> as a tremendous success in bring-
o the surface so many issues of
ine significance and showing with
; real content what prospectively
it be done with things,
rhe fact that we were not able to get
closure can't diminish the fact that
j ideas are on the table now in
;r specific form and we will pursue
i, as the President has said. Our
tiators will return to Geneva, and
will pick up, as will our negotiators
rious other fora. As in one way or
tier different representatives in the
ice put it, "Reykjavik was a success.
)uld have been a failure not to try
would be a failure not to follow up
on the many achievements at
Reykjavik."
So you can be sure that the Presi-
dent, with the support and participation
of our allies, will be wanting to do just
that. I'll be glad to take your questions.
Q. You already answered my first
question about where the Geneva talks
would pick up. Apparently the
negotiated elements of Reykjavik are
on the table. There was some ambi-
guity about that. But, do you feel —
A. What I can say is our negotiators
will return to Geneva, and of course all
of the ideas involved are known to
everyone, so we'll proceed on that basis.
I'm not trying to speak for what the
Soviet Union will do, and we didn't have
any understanding about that.
Q. But what do you feel are the
possibilities of negotiators in Geneva
reaching an agreement when the
leaders couldn't?
A. There is a perfectly good
possibility of reaching agreement on INF
[intermediate-range nuclear forces]. The
leaders developed a great deal of
material that people can try to build on.
The Reykjavik meeting was proposed by
General Secretary Gorbachev as a
meeting to prepare for a subsequent
meeting in the United States and is part
of the preparatory process, and Geneva
is very much a part of the preparatory
process, you might say. So, we certainly
intend to feed the Reykjavik ideas into
our discussions in Geneva. As I say, I
don't presume to know how the Soviet
Union will approach this, but that's the
way we're going to approach it.
Q. Did any of your European allies
express concern that the SDI
[Strategic Defense Initiative] program
could prevent reaching an agreement
in arms control?
A. They didn't, but I think the
reason is the increasing perception that
the possibility of learning how to defend
ourselves against these devastating
offensive ballistic missiles is the very
possibility that had a great deal to do
with a willingness of the Soviet Union to
come forward with us with the kind of
program that we're talking about. I
think, if such a program were ever
agreed to as something to get started
with, the realization of that program
that is actually taking place would be
strengthened tremendously by having a
vigorous and prospective strategic
defense program in being. That is, the
research on it continuing. Therefore, the
President felt, and I certainly agree with
him, that to agree to something now that
would have the effect of crippling our
ability to find a way to defend ourselves
would have, in effect, undermined what
we were hoping to get agreed to. I think
people understand that point. It isn't a
trivial point, it isn't just hanging onto
some program or something like that. It
is a very deep, underlying problem.
Q. Can you confirm that the only
point on which the breakdown took
place was the definition of the ongoing
research in SDI?
A. The Soviets insisted on what
would have been a radical change in the
ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty to
restrict research— other than the kind of
research done on the system that they
have deployed— to the laboratory. Now,
what that means is a proposal to cripple
strategic defense research. So you have
to see it for what it is and then ask
yourself about the implications of that
for the broader program.
So the President felt, much as he
would like, as anyone would, to reach
such a sweeping and good agreement,
that he had to have the strength not to
agree to something that might look good
today and 7 years from now turn out to
be crumbling because of an essential
ingredient that had been unwisely given
away, and he just wouldn't do it. I must
say I admire his courage. It takes a lot of
courage to do that.
Q. It was well known before the
summit took place that the Soviets
were trying to confine research on SDI
to the laboratory. Our position also is
well-known, that we wanted to be able
to deploy an SDI system at the end of a
period, whether it was 7V2 or 10 years.
Can you say whether any effort was
made, and if not, why not, to try to
split that difference, to try to come up
with a formula under which, for exam-
ple, testing might have been permitted
but not testing integrated SDI com-
ponents so that you might have been
able to achieve the truly extraordinary
other accomplishments that were
achieved?
A. The question of discussing the
meaning of the ABM Treaty is
something that has been going on in
Geneva, and we are quite prepared to
Jmber 1986
13
continue that process and said so. How,
to pick up on something you said— it
wasn't exactly the question you asked.
This difference of opinion about research
was known before we arrived in
Reykjavik, but so were a lot of other dif-
ferences. And many of these differences
were narrowed greatly or even resolved,
and both parties made concessions.
With respect to space and the
strategic defense and the ABM Treaty,
the President made a major concession
in agreeing— and we thought that this
was what the Soviets were driving for,
and they certainly seemed to say that—
in agreeing to a nonwithdrawal from the
ABM Treaty provision for 10 years and
linked it to a program of reductions to
zero, at the end of 10 years, of offensive
ballistic missiles. So, he gave the 10-year
nonwithdrawal provision that they seem
to be seeking and we felt that if you
wind up at the end of 10 years and there
are no more offensive ballistic missiles,
then how can you be concerned and why
should you be concerned about a defense
against them.
I suppose somebody might say, well,
why would you want to spend all the
money to put them into place? But cer-
tainly, from the standpoint of any threat
that might hold, it wouldn't be a threat.
And, of course, it would be true that, if
you got to that point in 10 years, what
you would have to deploy would be a
much reduced and different thing than
what you'd have to deploy against a
large offensive force. But you do have to
have an insurance policy against
cheating and against the possibility that
somebody sometime might come up with
these missiles which, after all, people
know how to build, and so you'd better
have a policy of insurance.
Q. At your last meeting with the
NATO foreign ministers in Halifax you
faced a lot of criticism on the Presi-
dent's SALT II [strategic arms limita-
tion talks] decision. How did this
meeting compare with that in tone?
Were you asked for an explanation of
why? After the overall agreement fell
through, the two leaders didn't go
back to try to reach an individual
agreement on such things as INF. Is
there any criticism of the fact that
they didn't?
A. I think I've described the tone
already. It was a very positive tone, and
I think people can see that one of the
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev after concluding their second round
of talks. Pavel Palazhchenko, interpreter, is in background.
reasons why we've made as much prog-
ress as we have is the cohesion and
determination and strength of the
alliance and the basic policy of the
alliance to be strong, to be cohesive, and
to be reasonable and ready to talk. But
that basic policy proves itself out here,
and we fully intend to pursue it, and I
think there's genuine unity on that.
So I was very encouraged and
pleased at the degree to which people
felt that, to the contrary of some of the
criticism, it would have been a tragic
mistake not to go to Reykjavik and make
this effort. And it would be a tragic
mistake not to follow up on it, and we
need to gear ourselves to do that and
keep the pressure on in every way we
can. So it was a very supportive
meeting.
Q. Was there a lot of disappoint
ment with the outcome?
A. Of course, people would like tc
have final closure. But I think there w
a little bit more of the sense of astonis
ment and pleasure at how much matei
had been brought up to the surface an
14
Department of State Bull
,i
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
fied as potentials. Now it may be
he Soviet Union will take all that
)ff the table again. But in a sense it
disappear; it's there, and we know
i they know it, and the world
it. So we'll keep working for it.
hought some of the initial reports
; sense of failure and disappoint-
and so on, and, of course, there is a
f closure in the end, and we wish
here had been a great thing.
theless, as compared with what
e thought might be even con-
)le a week ago, we're in a different
ime. So a tremendous amount was
achieved in that sense.
You seem to be suggesting that
resence of SDI on the table has
d to bring the Russians as far as
ve come. Is it the feeling that con-
ig to stick to the concept would
them further still? Is that what
ehind us?
. I can't say exactly what produces
result. But I think that the cohe-
ind strength of the alliance has
an essential ingredient all the way
gh. The strong modernization pro-
that the President has gotten into
in the United States, the spirit that
Dme forward in the United States
a the alliance all have been major
ibutors to the atmosphere that has
ht about these talks,
he emergence of the possibility of
;gic defense against the most
bilizing weapons that threaten us
ire on Earth, the emergence of the
Dility of defending against them is
iportant new fact of life. We
dn't let go of it. No doubt it has had
ipact, and you could only estimate
oy the emphasis the Soviet Union
on it. It's the centerpiece for them,
rently.
me President, in his extraordinarily
live and constructive and patient
Its to try to get somewhere here,
b a number of changes in his posi-
right there in Reykjavik, as he had
pe. But the one thing that he
lln't and shouldn't change is the
I ability to have the program carried
ard so that we can determine
[ar as possible just what can be done
strategic defense. That's really the
ficance of the change in the ABM
ty which they wanted. Its purpose
clearly to so restrict what could be
done in the way of research that you
really wouldn't be able to come to a solid
conclusion.
Q. Could you give us some more
details of the agreement that was
sketched out on a test ban treaty?
A. The subject of nuclear testing
was one of the subjects that got con-
siderable attention. There seemed to be,
I thought, and [Soviet Foreign] Minister
Shevardnadze told me he thought, basic
agreement as to the content. Now the
content you might say, that's the notes,
but just what the melody is we would
argue about. At any rate, I think that if
we had gotten to that point we could
have put together something and it
would have contained the following
things and maybe it will still come to
pass, just as I think there's no reason
not to think that a good INF agreement
might not come to pass.
But what a nuclear testing agree-
ment, that the President has said he is
willing to go along with, would consist of
is an agreement to sit down and nego-
tiate the following things: first,
improved verification so that the size of
any test can be determined within a
small margin of error, so you know what
the size is. Right now the margin of
error in the processes we have is quite a
bit wider than it needs to be, if we used
better methods, which are known and
have been explicitly proposed. This
would allow the ratification and coming
into effect of the TTBT [Threshold Test
Ban Treaty] and PNET [Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions Treaty], or whatever
it is, treaties that set a threshold for
military and peaceful tests.
Now insofar as those treaties are
concerned, the President has said that, if
we obtain agreement with the Soviet
Union on these verification measures,
then those protocols, along with the
treaties, will be submitted to the Con-
gress for ratification. If we don't, we
will set out certain reservations and sub-
mit the treaties anyway with it left for
the President to bring them into force by
certifying that the conditions established
in the reservations have been satisfied.
Now, beyond that, it calls in these
treaties for the parties to start negotia-
tions aimed at the elimination of nuclear
testing. So what we would agree to is to
do that with changes in a step-by-step
process in nuclear testing keyed to
reductions in nuclear weapons, but to
work in good faith to bring that about.
Now, we had worked up language that
said that in a much shorter space. But
that's the basic idea, and we're prepared
to go forward with that idea.
I think it's important to see that you
reduce testing as you reduce weapons,
because you have to keep reminding
yourself that as long as we depend upon
nuclear weapons as the essential deter-
rent, then we have to do testing. We
have to do testing to see that the
weapons work. We have to do testing to
improve the safety of them, which has
been quite significant, and to continue
the modernization of our forces. So those
are the reasons why.
Q. Can I ask you whether the
allies today enthusiastically restated
their pledge to continue deployment of
medium-range nuclear missiles in
Europe on the current NATO schedule
in the wake of the ail-but agreement to
eliminate those weapons from Europe?
A. The question never entered
anybody's mind, and I think that
everyone can see by now that it is the
fact of the strength and determination of
the alliance that's played such an impor-
tant role in the possible agreement to
deal effectively with these weapons. So
everybody sees what this process is
about, and no one is questioning it.
Q. But don't you think that this
last opportunity to conclude an INF
agreement would be very difficult to
understand for the European public
opinion and could give a new boost to
the peace movement?
A. I think the peace movement
should become the greatest fans of
Ronald Reagan, because he is a person
who is trying in a creative and increas-
ingly effective way to eliminate all these
weapons. Now you don't eliminate them
by unilateral disarmament. That is the
road to disaster. You eliminate them by
careful, realistic, tough-minded
agreements.
Insofar as INF is concerned, through
the process of negotiation, the positions
of the two sides had narrowed greatly
between when the negotiations started
and a week ago. At Reykjavik they came
together quite well. So what we will do,
as far as the alliance is concerned and as
far as the United States is concerned, is
proceed to Geneva, our negotiators will
be there tonight, and as far as we're con-
umber 1986
15
cerned, we're going to work on these
matters.
Now what the Soviet Union may do,
I can't speak about that. But as far as
we're concerned, we're going to keep
driving to get this agreement that I
think Europeans want, our friends in
Asia want it, we want it, and we hope
the Soviet Union wants it.
Q. First, did the President repeat
to Mr. Gorbachev [Soviet General
Secretary] his offer to join in SDI and
what was the answer? And second,
reverting if I may, your question, if in
the 10 years there will be no offensive
missiles, why worry about the
defenses?
A. As to the first question: Yes, the
President continues to be ready to share
the results of the research on strategic
defense, and he reiterated that offer to
Mr. Gorbachev. He didn't find a taker,
but the offer stands.
Insofar as the end of a 10-year
period is concerned, first of all, the best
insurance policy you can take out that a
process of elimination of offensive
ballistic missiles would actually proceed
is the maintenance in being of an active
and promising program of strategic
defense against them. At the end, it
would be up to either party to decide
whether you wanted to spend the money
to go ahead and put these defenses in
place, and, as I said, what you would
have to do in view of the fact that
presumably there aren't any offensive
ballistic missiles to defend against,
would be a lot less than otherwise. But
there is always the problem of cheating,
and mobile missiles are not that easy to
find. There's always the problem of
somebody getting a hold of a technology
that has become known technology, even
though it's very hard to produce and so
on a long-range ballistic missile. Never-
theless, it's obviously possible, so it's
important to have the ability to deal with
it. So those are the reasons.
Q. [Inaudible] INF withdrawals or
abolition. And since you were also very
close to a form of words on nuclear
testing, why could you not reach some
sort of preliminary agreement on those
areas, and who was it, which side was
it, that insisted that the arms control
package stood or fell as a whole?
A. You're imposing a kind of con-
cept on the weekend that it can't stand.
I can only answer that question descrip-
tively. Two people came together. They
had this sweeping agenda, and they
went through that agenda, and they
reached, let's say, agreement in principle
on strategic arms, on INF, on nuclear
testing. And, I might say, on such mat-
ters in the strategic defense field as a
10-year nonwithdrawal agreement linked
to elimination of offensive ballistic
missiles. There was a great deal
accomplished.
In the end, however, it seemed that
the Soviets insisted on so restricting
what could be done in continuing
strategic research as to make it badly
crippled. I've tried to explain here why
that would have been very unwise for
the President to agree to. So, as the
Sunday went on and on, and we went 5,
6, 7 hours beyond what we were sup-
posed to, and people stuck with it and
stuck with it, and finally we weren't able
to resolve these issues, and we left. But
that doesn't mean that it's over. We
didn't have time really to pick up and
say, "Well, now let's go back and see
about this, that and the other thing."
There's plenty of time to do that, and
we'll be doing that in Geneva, and we'll
be doing that in various fora. As I've
said, I can't speak for the Soviets, but
from our standpoint, we'd like to see
something that begins to get a handle on
nuclear testing, we'd like to see agree-
ment worked out that's sensible on INF,
and so on.
Q. I understand there was a
discussion in Reykjavik that 100
SS-20s should remain in the Asian
part of Russia. If it's true, how do you
freeze in Siberia these mobile forces,
and how do you think the defense of
the European theater could be attained
from all those mobile SS-20s? Could
you elaborate the discussion in this
context, along with your contact with
the Japanese Vice Minister who is sup-
posed to be here in headquarters
today?
A. I guess it would be impossible for
almost anything not to be frozen in cer-
tain parts of Siberia. In terms of the
INF subject, what we wound up agree-
ing to, in addition to the short-range
systems, verification, and duration provi-
sions, was, first of all, that the principle
should be a global limit— this has always
been very important, among others, to
our friends in Japan— and that the limit
would be 100.
That involves a large reduction i
the Soviet SS-20 missiles aimed at
Japan. And that the deployment oft
100 missiles should be, on the Soviet
side, in the Asian portion of the Sov
Union and, in the U.S. side, in the
United States, so presumably somep
in the Alaskan area, from which the:
missiles could, if we wished to deplo;
them there, be able to reach Asian p
tions of the Soviet Union.
So this was a measure of equity,
that was, in terms of those particula
numbers, that was what was accepto
Now we have a very active program
keeping in touch with our allies here
Japan, Australia, our friends in Chir
others, so we have a very strong cop
sultative process— Korea. Originally
there was some thought that if
somebody from Japan could come he
we could do a briefing, but we thoug
maybe it would be better for one of
people who was present at Reykjavil
go to Tokyo, I think now, I don't kn<
exactly where. But anyway he's goni
directly from Reykjavik to Tokyo, ai<
others are going elsewhere, so that
give people a good, thorough briefin;
Q. You said it would be tragic
the talks that began in Iceland did
continue. Other than Geneva, is thr
any change that there will be a sun
in Washington?
A. There is no date set, and so
that's about all I can say. There's no
active plan in being. But I'm not goi)
to comment on that otherwise.
Q. I want to ask if the Cyprus
problem as well as the situation of
Turkish minority in Bulgaria were
discussed during the summit and, i
so, what was the outcome?
A. At Reykjavik, we discussed ol
full agenda, by agreement with the
Soviet Union. So we discussed region
issues, so called. We discussed
humanitarian and human rights issud
and we discussed various bilateral mil
ters that we have.
Stemming from the discussions I
between the leaders, on Saturday nig|
two working groups were established]
one chaired by Ambassador Ridgwayl
[Assistant Secretary for European ail
Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgwsl
who is here, in the arms control issue'
on the one hand and on regional,
bilateral, and human rights issues, or
the other. And very substantial progi
was made in both of these areas.
16
rionarlmont nf Citato Rill
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
h to specific discussion of the two
ithat you mentioned, it was not
lie really to reach those other than
■terence to the importance of these
pal issues. I think your question is a
bne in pointing up that, with all due
ipt to the importance of arms con-
It's these gnawing issues around the
j that so upset people, that have a
lal or human dimension, that are
lying sources of tension. So we
;o address them, and we do and do
tently.
fcident's Address
< the Nation,
I 13, 19868
bst of you know, I've just returned
fneetings in Iceland with the leader
Soviet Union, General Secretary
ichev. As I did last year when I
led from the summit conference in
'a, I want to take a few moments
it to share with you what took
in these discussions,
le implications of these talks are
lous and only just beginning to be
stood. We proposed the most
ling and generous arms control
sal in history. We offered the corn-
elimination of all ballistic
es— Soviet and American— from
,ce of the Earth by 1996. While we
d company with this American
still on the table, we are closer
:ver before to agreements that
lead to a safer world without
ir weapons.
ut first, let me tell you that, from
art of my meetings with Mr.
ichev, I have always regarded you,
merican people, as full partici-
Believe me, without your support,
of these talks could have been held,
>uld the ultimate aims of American
m policy— world peace and
om— be pursued. And it's for these
I went the extra mile to Iceland,
efore I report on our talks though,
me to set the stage by explaining
hings that were very much a part
r talks, one a treaty and the other a
ise against nuclear missiles which
trying to develop. Now you've
1 their titles a thousand times— the
Treaty and SDL Well, those letters
I for: ABM, Anti-Ballistic Missile;
Strategic Defense Initiative.
Some years ago, the United States
and the Soviet Union agreed to limit any
defense against nuclear missile attacks
to the emplacement in one location in
each country of a small number of
missiles capable of intercepting and
shooting down incoming nuclear
missiles, thus leaving our real defense— a
policy called mutual assured destruction,
meaning if one side launched a nuclear
attack, the other side could retaliate.
And this mutual threat of destruction
was believed to be a deterrent against
either side striking first.
So here we sit with thousands of
nuclear warheads targeted on each other
and capable of wiping out both our coun-
tries. The Soviets deployed the few anti-
ballistic missiles around Moscow as the
treaty permitted. Our country didn't
bother deploying because the threat of
nationwide annihilation made such a
limited defense seem useless.
For some years now we've been
aware that the Soviets may be develop-
ing a nationwide defense. They have
installed a large modern radar at
Krasnoyarsk which we believe is a
critical part of a radar system designed
to provide radar guidance for anti-
ballistic missiles protecting the entire
nation. Now this is a violation of the
ABM Treaty.
Believing that a policy of mutual
destruction and slaughter of their
citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked
our military a few years ago to study
and see if there was a practical way to
destroy nuclear missiles after their
launch but before they can reach their
targets rather than to just destroy peo-
ple. Well, this is the goal for what we
call SDI, and our scientists researching
such a system are convinced it is prac-
tical and that several years down the
road we can have such a system ready to
deploy. Now, incidentally, we are not
violating the ABM Treaty, which per-
mits such research. If and when we
deploy, the treaty also allows withdrawal
from the treaty upon 6 months' notice.
SDI, let me make it clear, is a non-
nuclear defense.
Efforts Toward Arms Reductions
So here we are at Iceland for our second
such meeting. In the first, and in the
months in between, we have discussed
ways to reduce and, in fact, eliminate
nuclear weapons entirely. We and the
Soviets have had teams of negotiators in
Geneva trying to work out a mutual
agreement on how we could reduce or
eliminate nuclear weapons. And so far,
no success.
On Saturday and Sunday, General
Secretary Gorbachev and his Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of
State George Shultz and I met for nearly
10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to
just arms reductions. We discussed what
we call violation of human rights on the
part of the Soviets, refusal to let people
emigrate from Russia so they can prac-
tice their religion without being
persecuted, letting people go to rejoin
their families, husbands and wives
separated by national borders being
allowed to reunite.
In much of this the Soviet Union is
violating another agreement— the
Helsinki accords they had signed in
1975. Yuri Orlov, whose freedom we just
obtained, was imprisoned for pointing
out to his government its violations of
that pact, its refusal to let citizens leave
their country or return.
We also discussed regional matters
such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua,
and Cambodia. But, by their choice, the
main subject was arms control.
We discussed the emplacement of
intermediate-range missiles in Europe
and Asia and seemed to be in agreement
they could be drastically reduced. Both
sides seemed willing to find a way to
reduce even to zero the strategic ballistic
missiles we have aimed at each other.
This then brought up the subject of SDI.
I offered a proposal that we continue
our present research and, if and when
we reached the stage of testing, we
would sign now a treaty that would per-
mit Soviet observation of such tests.
And if the program was practical, we
would both eliminate our offensive
missiles, and then we would share the
benefits of advanced defenses. I
explained that even though we would
have done away with our offensive
ballistic missiles, having the defense
would protect against cheating or the
possibility of a madman sometime
deciding to create nuclear missiles. After
all, the world now knows how to make
them. I likened it to our keeping our gas
masks even though the nations of the
world had outlawed poison gas after
World War I.
We seemed to be making progress
on reducing weaponry, although the
mber 1986
17
General Secretary was registering oppo-
sition to SDI and proposing a pledge to
observe ABM for a number of years as
the day was ending.
Secretary Shultz suggested we turn
over the notes our notetakers had been
making of everything we'd said to our
respective teams and let them work
through the night to put them together
and find just where we were in agree-
ment and what differences separated us.
With respect and gratitude, I can inform
you those teams worked through the
night till 6:30 a.m.
Yesterday, Sunday morning, Mr.
Gorbachev and I, with our foreign
ministers, came together again and took
up the report of our two teams. It was
most promising. The Soviets had asked
for a 10-year delay in the deployment of
SDI programs.
In an effort to see how we could
satisfy their concerns while protecting
our principles and security, we proposed
a 10-year period in which we began with
the reduction of all strategic nuclear
arms, bombers, air-launched cruise
missiles, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and the weapons they carry.
They would be reduced 50% in the first
5 years. During the next 5 years, we
would continue by eliminating all
remaining offensive ballistic missiles of
all ranges. And during that time, we
would proceed with research, develop-
ment, and testing of SDI— all done in
conformity with ABM provisions. At the
10-year point, with all ballistic missiles
eliminated, we could proceed to deploy
advanced defenses, at the same time per-
mitting the Soviets to do likewise.
And here the debate began. The
General Secretary wanted wording that,
in effect, would have kept us from
developing the SDI for the entire 10
years. In effect, he was killing SDI. And
unless I agreed, all that work toward
eliminating nuclear weapons would go
down the drain— cancelled.
I told him I had pledged to the
American people that I would not trade
away SDI— there was no way I could tell
our people their government would not
protect them against nuclear destruc-
tion. I went to Reykjavik determined
that everything was negotiable except
two things: our freedom and our future.
I'm still optimistic that a way will be
found. The door is open and the
opportunity to begin eliminating the
nuclear threat is within reach.
Pursuing a Four-Point Agenda
So you can see, we made progress in
Iceland. And we will continue to make
progress if we pursue a prudent,
deliberate, and, above all, realistic
approach with the Soviets. From the
earliest days of our Administration, this
has been our policy. We made it clear we
had no illusions about the Soviets or
their ultimate intentions. We were
publicly candid about the critical moral
distinctions between totalitarianism and
democracy. We declared the principal
objective of American foreign policy to
be not just the prevention of war but the
extension of freedom. And we stressed
our commitment to the growth of
democratic government and democratic
institutions around the world. And that's
why we assisted freedom fighters who
are resisting the imposition of
totalitarian rule in Afghanistan,
Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and
elsewhere. And, finally, we began work
on what I believe most spurred the
Soviets to negotiate seriously-
rebuilding our military strength,
reconstructing our strategic deterrence,
and, above all, beginning work on the
Strategic Defense Initiative.
And yet, at the same time we set out
these foreign policy goals and began
working toward them, we pursued
another of our major objectives: that of
seeking means to lessen tensions with
the Soviets and ways to prevent war and
keep the peace.
Now, this policy is now paying
dividends— one sign of this in Iceland
was the progress on the issue of arms
control. For the first time in a long
while, Soviet-American negotiations in
the area of arms reductions are moving,
and moving in the right direction— not
just toward arms control but toward
arms reduction.
But for all the progress we made on
arms reductions, we must remember
there were other issues on the table in
Iceland, issues that are fundamental.
As I mentioned, one such issue is
human rights. As President Kennedy
once said, "And is not peace, in the
last analysis, basically a matter of
human rights?"
I made it plain that the United
States would not seek to exploit
improvement in these matters for pur-
poses of propaganda. But I also made it
plain, once again, that an improvement
of the human condition within the Soviet
Union is indispensable for an improi
ment in bilateral relations with the
United States. For a government th
will break faith with its own people
not be trusted to keep faith with for
powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev-
in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva— we
Americans place far less weight upo
words that are spoken at meetings i
as these than upon the deeds that fc
When it comes to human rights and
judging Soviet intentions, we're all :
Missouri— you got to show us.
Another subject area we took uj
Iceland also lies at the heart of the i
ferences between the Soviet Union ;
America. This is the issue of regions
conflicts. Summit meetings cannot r
the American people forget what So
actions have meant for the peoples c
Afghanistan, Central America, Afrii
and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet pol
change, we will make sure that our
friends in these areas— those who fij
for freedom and independence— wil
the support they need.
Finally, there was a fourth item.
And this area was that of bilateral r>
tions, people-to-people contacts. In
Geneva last year, we welcomed seve
cultural exchange accords; in Icelanc
saw indications of more movement ii
these areas. But let me say now, the
United States remains committed to
people-to-people programs that coulc
lead to exchanges between not just a
elite but thousands of everyday citize
from both our countries.
Prospects for Future Progress
So I think, then, that you can see ths
we did make progress in Iceland on :
broad range of topics. We reaffirmec
four-point agenda; we discovered ma
new grounds of agreement; we probe
again some old areas of disagreemem
And let me return again to the S:
issue. I realize some Americans may
asking tonight: why not accept Mr.
Gorbachev's demand? Why not give i
SDI for this agreement?
Well, the answer, my friends, is s
pie. SDI is America's insurance polic;
that the Soviet Union would keep the
commitments made at Reykjavik. SD
America's security guarantee— if the
Soviets should— as they have done to>
often in the past— fail to comply with
their solemn commitments. SDI is wl
brought the Soviets back to arms con
18
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
f of Staff Donald Regan, President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and national security adviser
: Adm. John Poindexter meet to review the final draft of the U.S. defense in space proposal.
B at Geneva and Iceland. SDI is the
to a world without nuclear weapons.
The Soviets understand this. They
e devoted far more resources for a
longer time than we to their own
1 The world's only operational
.sile defense today surrounds Moscow,
capital of the Soviet Union. What
, Gorbachev was demanding at
fkjavik was that the United States
ee to a new version of a 14-year-old
M Treaty that the Soviet Union has
;ady violated. I told him we don't
ke those kinds of deals in the United
tes.
And the American people should
lect on these critical questions. How
s a defense of the United States
eaten the Soviet Union or anyone
I Why are the Soviets so adamant
it America remain forever vulnerable
Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all
e nations are utterly defenseless
ainst Soviet missiles— fired either by
accident or design. Why does the Soviet
Union insist that we remain so— forever?
So, my fellow Americans, I cannot
promise, nor can any President promise,
that the talks in Iceland or any future
discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead
inevitably to great breakthroughs or
momentous treaty signings.
We will not abandon the guiding
principle we took to Reykjavik. We
prefer no agreement than to bring home
a bad agreement to the United States.
And on this point, I know you're also
interested in the question of whether
there will be another summit. There was
no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to
when or whether he plans to travel to
the United States, as we agreed he
would last year in Geneva. I repeat
tonight that our invitation stands and
that we continue to believe additional
meetings would be useful. But that's a
decision the Soviets must make.
But whatever the immediate pros-
pects, I can tell you that I'm ultimately
hopeful about the prospects for progress
at the summit and for world peace and
freedom. You see, the current summit
process is very different from that of
previous decades; it's different because
the world is different; and the world is
different because of the hard work and
sacrifice of the American people during
the past 5V2 years. Your energy has
restored and expanded our economic
might; your support has restored our
military strength. Your courage and
sense of national unity in times of crisis
have given pause to our adversaries,
heartened our friends, and inspired the
world. The Western democracies and the
NATO alliance are revitalized, and all
across the world, nations are turning to
democratic ideas and the principles of
the free market. So because the
American people stood guard at the
icember 1986
19
critical hour, freedom has gathered its
forces, regained its strength, and is on
the march.
So, if there's one impression I carry
away with me from these October talks,
it is that, unlike the past, we're dealing
now from a position of strength, and for
that reason, we have it within our grasp
to move speedily with the Soviets
toward even more breakthroughs.
Our ideas are out there on the table.
They won't go away. We're ready to
pick up where we left off. Our negotia-
tors are heading back to Geneva, and
we're prepared to go forward whenever
and wherever the Soviets are ready. So,
there's reason— good reason— for hope.
I saw evidence of this in the prog-
ress we made in the talks with Mr.
Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it
when we left Iceland yesterday and I
spoke to our young men and women at
our naval installation at Keflavik— a
critically important base far closer to
Soviet naval bases than to our own
coastline.
As always, I was proud to spend a
few moments with them and thank them
for their sacrifices and devotion to coun-
try. They represent America at her
finest: committed to defend not only our
own freedom but the freedom of others
who would be living in a far more
frightening world— were it not for the
strength and resolve of the United
States.
"Whenever the standard of freedom
and independence has been. . .unfurled,
there will be America's heart, her
benedictions, and her prayers," John
Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well
of our destiny as a nation. My fellow
Americans, we're honored by history,
entrusted by destiny with the oldest
dream of humanity— the dream of lasting
peace and human freedom.
Another President, Harry Truman,
noted that our century had seen two of
the most frightful wars in history. And
that "the supreme need of our time is
for man to learn to live together in peace
and harmony."
It's in pursuit of that ideal I went to
Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last
week. And it's in pursuit of that ideal
that I thank you now for all the support
you've given me and I again ask for your
help and your prayers as we continue
our journey toward a world where peace
reigns and freedom is enshrined.
President's Remarks,
Oct. 14, 19869
Well, thank you very much, and welcome
to the White House complex. I wanted
all of you to come over this afternoon to
hear firsthand about our meetings in
Iceland, and I have a terrible feeling that
almost anything I say is going to have
already been said about that trip.
But before I turn to my report, let
me first say that I couldn't have gone to
Reykjavik without the hard work and
dedication, above and beyond the call of
duty, of you men and women that I see
before me. You labored night and day to
get us ready for that first meeting, and I
know we sort of sprung it on you at the
last minute. I'm grateful to all of you for
the fine work you did, and let me say
thanks as well to the members of that
small team that I took with me to the
meeting. They worked around the
clock— and I mean that literally. A few
of them got no sleep at all while we were
there. I've long had great respect for
every one of them, and that respect
grew even stronger in these 4 days.
They were an outstanding team, and all
Americans can be proud of them and of
the work they did. And you can be proud
of the fruit that your work is bearing,
for the Reykjavik meeting may have set
the stage for a major advance in the
U.S. -Soviet relationship.
At Reykjavik the Soviet Union went
farther than ever before in accepting our
goal of deep reductions in the level of
nuclear weapons. For the first time, we
got Soviet agreement to a figure of 100
intermediate-range missiles— warheads
for each side worldwide, and that was a
truly drastic cut. And for the first time
we began to hammer out the details of a
50% cut in strategic forces over 5 years.
And we were just a sentence or two
away from agreeing to new talks on
nuclear testing. And maybe most impor-
tant, we were in sight of a historic
agreement on completely eliminating the
threat of offensive ballistic missiles by
1996.
Believe me, the significance of that
meeting at Reykjavik is not that we
didn't sign agreements in the end; the
significance is that we got as close as we
did. The progress that we made
would've been inconceivable just a few
months ago.
On issue after issue, particularly i
the area of arms reduction, we saw tr
General Secretary Gorbachev was rea
for serious bargaining on real arms
reductions. And for me, this was espe
cially gratifying. Just 5V2 years ago,
when we came into office, I said that
objective must be— well, it must not b
regulating the growth in nuclear
weapons, which is what arms control,
it was known, had been all about. No,
said that our goal must be reducing tl
number of nuclear weapons, that we 1
to work to make the world safer, not,
control the pace at which it became rr.
dangerous. And now the Soviets, too,
are talking about real arms reduction:
And let me say that this wouldn't
have been possible without the suppoi
that we've had from the American pe>
pie over the last 5V2 years. Because tt
American people have stood behind ui
we worked over the years to rebuild o
nation's defenses. We went to the
Iceland meeting in a position of
strength. The Soviets knew that we h-
the support, not only of a strong
America but a united NATO alliance
that was going ahead with deploymen
of Pershing II and ground-launched
cruise missiles. So, yes, it was this
strength and unity that brought the
Soviets to the bargaining table.
And particularly important, of
course, was America's support for the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). No
as you know, I offered Mr. Gorbachev
important concession on SDI. I offeree
to put off deployment for a decade, an
coupled that with a 10-year plan for
eliminating all Soviet and American
ballistic missiles from the face of the
Earth.
This may have been the most swee
ing and important arms reduction pro-
posal in the history of the world, but it
wasn't good enough for Mr. Gorbache\
he wanted more. He wanted us to acce
even tighter limits on SDI than the
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty now
requires; that is, to stop all but
laboratory research. He knew this mea
killing strategic defense entirely, whicl
has been a Soviet goal from the start.
And, of course, the Soviet Union has
long been engaged in extensive strateg
defense programs of its own. And unlil
ours, the Soviet program goes well
beyond research, even to deployment.
The Soviet proposal would've given the|
20
Department of State Built
FEATURE
Report on Reykjavik
irnmediate, one-sided advantage, and
ingerous one. And I could not and
lid not agree to that. I won't settle
anything unless it's in the interest of
Erica's security.
INow, America and the West need
I for long-run insurance. It protects
Against the possibility that at some
It, when the elimination of ballistic
piles is not yet complete, the Soviets
r change their mind. We know the
pet record of playing fast and loose
h past agreements. America can't
|rd to take a chance on waking up in
rears and finding that the Soviets
le an advanced defense system and
jlready to put in place more
feiles— or more modern missiles— and
have no defense of our own and our
trrence is obsolete because of the
liet defense system,
jlf arms reduction is to help bring
nng peace, we must be able to main-
I the vital strategic balance which for
(>ng has kept the peace. Nothing
Id more threaten world peace than
Is reduction agreements with
•■holes that would leave the West
led to a massive and sudden Soviet
Idup in offensive and defensive
Lpons.
I My guess is that the Soviets under-
lid this but want to see how much far-
r they can push us in public before
w once again get down to brass tacks.
Ihere's how I see the meeting in
(and adding up.
1 We addressed the important issues
luman rights, regional conflicts, and
I bilateral relationship. And Mr.
fbachev and I got awfully close to
loric agreements in the arms reduc-
k process. We took discussions into
Lis where they had never been before.
t United States put good, fair ideas
I on the table, and they won't go
by. Good ideas, after all, have a life of
kr own. The next step will be in
beva, where our negotiators will work
build on this progress.
I The biggest disappointment in
land was that Mr. Gorbachev decided
make our progress hostage to his
(riand that we kill our strategic
bnse program. But, you know, I've
I some experience with this kind of
hg. One of my past jobs was as a
fotiator of labor agreements in the
ition picture industry, and I got used
t>ne side or another walking out of
contract talks. It didn't mean that rela-
tions had collapsed or that we'd reached
an insurmountable impasse. It some-
times meant that a little maneuvering
was going on.
Well, it's important for us right now
to see the real progress that we made at
Reykjavik and to unite so that we'll be
strong for the next stage in negotiations.
And if we do that, I believe that we have
it within our grasp to achieve some truly
historic breakthroughs.
Last week I described Iceland as a
base camp on our way to the summit.
Well, this week I want to report to you
that I believe there exists the opportu-
nity to plant a permanent flag of peace
at that summit. And I call on the Soviets
not to miss this opportunity. The Soviets
must not throw this away, must not slip
back into a greater arms buildup. The
American people don't mistake the
absence of a final agreement for the
absence of progress. We made progress;
we must be patient. We made historic
advances; we will not turn back.
White House Statement,
Oct. 15, 19868
General Secretary Gorbachev's report to
the Soviet people was unprecedented in
its detail. He emphasized the same areas
of progress upon which U.S. officials
have commented over the past 2 days,
namely, strategic arms reductions and
potential agreement on intermediate
nuclear forces. He also clearly indicated,
just as we have done, that the sticking
point which prevented an overall agree-
ment in Iceland was the Soviet Union's
demand for an end to the U.S. program
on strategic defense.
It is our view that the agreements
and positions reached in Iceland remain
on the table. The meetings, which
reconvene in Geneva today, will begin
where we left off in Iceland. The Iceland
talks were a very important and signifi-
cant step in moving negotiations for-
ward. We want to build upon the
groundwork of Reykjavik.
We take note of some of the political
rhetoric in the General Secretary's
speech, but that was expected and unex-
ceptional. What was remarkable was
General Secretary Gorbachev's explana-
tion of the progress made.
We are pleased to note that, both at
his press conference in Reykjavik and his
address to the Soviet people, General
Secretary Gorbachev stated that the
work that was done in Reykjavik will not
go to waste, and the way has now been
cleared for further movement toward
significant arms reduction. That is our
view.
We believe we can go forward from
this moment in a businesslike way. We
must listen to each other, each explore
the views of the other, and seek common
approaches and agree on solutions. We
think that goal was accomplished at
Rekyjavik and should be the goal
whenever we meet.
We, like the General Secretary,
believe that the meeting overcame
obstructions and minute details and that
new approaches have been developed.
We believe there is no going back on
what was developed at this meeting, and
we look forward to continued negotia-
tions which will build on the progress
achieved in Reykjavik.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 6, 1986.
2Made in the Cabinet Room of the White
House. Questions-and-answers following
remarks are omitted here (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents of
Oct. 13.)
3Press release 204.
4Opening remarks on the budget are
omitted here (text from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents of Oct. 13.)
5Read to news correspondents by prin-
cipal deputy press secretary to the President
Larry Speakes in the White House Press
Filing Center at Loftleidir Hotel in Reykjavik
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Oct. 20.)
6Held at Loftleidir Hotel (press release
214 of Oct. 16).
'Press release 223 of Oct. 16.
8Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct 20.
9Made in a meeting with executive branch
officers of the Department of State and the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Oct. 20). ■
hpmhpr IQflfi
21
THE SECRETARY
Reykjavik:
A Watershed in U.S. -Soviet Relations
Secretary Shultz 's address before the
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on
October SI, 1986.1
This evening, I want to discuss with you
the special significance of the Presi-
dent's recent meeting with General
Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland. Over
the last few weeks, there's been a good
deal said— in this country, in the Soviet
Union, and elsewhere— about what really
happened at Reykjavik. My own judg-
ment is that in a few years we will look
back at the meeting at Hofdi House as
something of a watershed, a potential
turning point in our strategy for deter-
ring war and encouraging peace.
Tonight, I would like to explain why.
Before Reykjavik— for most of the
postwar era— we have seen a steady
buildup in the size and potency of
nuclear forces. As a result, our negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union have
centered on two questions: how to con-
tain this continuing growth of offensive
forces; and how to reverse the gradual
erosion of strategic stability.
Reykjavik as a Watershed
At Reykjavik, however, there was a
qualitative shift in the terms of debate.
For the first time in the long history of
arms control talks, a genuine possibility
of substantial reductions in Soviet and
American nuclear arms appeared. For
the first time, we have to begin to deal
seriously with the implications of a much
less nuclear, if not non-nuclear, world.
We have begun to discuss with the
Soviets a safer form of deterrence, one
based less on the threat of mutual
annihilation. And the key to all of this
has been the President's research pro-
gram, whose investigation into defenses
against nuclear ballistic missiles is our
best insurance policy for a more secure
future.
At Reykjavik, the President and the
General Secretary broke down the com-
plexities of these problems into a series
of basic questions.
With respect to offensive arms, the
important questions are what systems to
reduce and how quickly to reduce them.
At Reykjavik, we worked out a formula
for 50% reductions in the strategic
nuclear offensive forces of both sides
over a 5-year period. We agreed upon
some numbers and counting rules— that
is, how different types of weapons would
count against the reduced ceilings.
For intermediate-range nuclear
missiles— commonly known as INF— we
reached agreement on even more drastic
reductions, down from a Soviet total of
over 1,400 to only 100 warheads on
longer-range INF missiles worldwide on
each side. There would be a ceiling on
shorter-range INF missiles and negotia-
tions to reduce their numbers as well.
Right there is the basis for the most
significant arms control agreement ever
achieved— one that doesn't just limit the
future growth of Soviet and American
nuclear arsenals but which actually makes
deep and early cuts in existing force
levels. These cuts, it was agreed, would
reduce the numbers of heavy, accurate,
multiple-warhead missiles that are the most
threatening and the most destabilizing.
The President and the General
Secretary went on to discuss a program
for further reductions. The President
proposed to eliminate, over time, all
ballistic missiles. Mr. Gorbachev pro-
posed to eliminate all strategic offensive
forces. They discussed these and other
ideas, including the eventual elimination
of all nuclear weapons. This discussion
proved inconclusive, but the agenda
itself— and the very word "elimina-
tion"—marks a stunning development. It
calls for us to think deeply and more
creatively about future possibilities for
arms control and defense.
Obviously, much more work needs to
be done before implementation of these
more ambitious ideas might be possible.
For example, the drastic reduction and
ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons
will require that we also address the cur-
rent East- West imbalance of conven-
tional forces.
In close collaboration with our allies,
we will have to pursue both negotiated
reductions in the Warsaw Pact's massive
and growing conventional forces and
increased efforts to strengthen our own
conventional defenses. We must also
seek an effective global ban on chemical
and biological weapons. And, of course,
such substantial nuclear reductions by
the United States and Soviet Union
would require discussions with other
nations armed with ballistic missiles,
who have their own security
requirements.
On the defensive side of the strategic
equation, the two leaders again went
directly to the basics. This meeting at
Hofdi House was a real working
meeting. They went right at it and
talked substance throughout the enti
time. So, in this case, there were twc
primary questions.
First, for what period of time ar
the two countries prepared to commi
themselves not to withdraw from the
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty? 1
President agreed to Gorbachev's pro
posal for 10 years, but in the context
steady reductions toward zero ballist
missiles during this period and on thi
understanding that either side would
have the right to deploy advanced
defenses unless the parties should ag
otherwise.
Second, what would be the con-
straints on defensive programs durin
this period? The President proposed
both sides strictly observe the ABM
Treaty and carry out research, devei
ment, and testing permitted by the
treaty. Mr. Gorbachev proposed, in
effect, to amend the ABM Treaty. H<i
sought a prohibition on all testing ou
side laboratories— except testing of til
sort of ABM system the Soviets now-
have around Moscow.
The President could not agree to
confine the Strategic Defense Initiati
(SDI) program to the laboratory for ]
years. We need a vigorous SDI progr
as permitted by the ABM Treaty. We
need it to give the Soviets an incenth
to agree now to deep cuts in offensiv< j
forces and to honor those agreement!
over the coming years. We need SDI
ensure the Soviet Union's own com-
pliance with current ABM Treaty
restrictions on defenses.
So what did we accomplish at
Reykjavik? We got agreement on the •
outlines of a 50% reduction in strateg
offensive nuclear weapons and reduc-
tions to equal ceilings of 100 warhead
on intermediate-range missiles. The \i
ter figure would mean that more than
90% of the SS-20s now targeted on o
friends and allies in Europe and Asia
would be eliminated.
On defense and space, there was
considerable movement on both sides.
Important differences were clarified.
But there was no closure. The propos;
made by the President in Reykjavik,
however, is now on the negotiating ta
in Geneva and is being discussed by oi
delegation there.
22
r"»
THE SECRETARY
h nuclear testing, both sides pro-
jto begin negotiations. We dis-
& an agenda that would meet both
Iconcerns.
pviously, there is still a long way to
bt at Reykjavik we reached agree-
;pn what might be the first steps
Id a more secure world at lower
I of nuclear arms. We went on to
us the possible next steps,
bt bad for 2 days' work. But of
p, those 2 productive days drew on
iimense amount of preparatory
that preceded them.
[eed for a
lation of Strength
rat wasn't all. Arms control was
jne topic of discussion at Reykjavik,
jresident brought up the full
th of our concerns. He cited
er and verse on the question of
t human rights violations. The two
rs reviewed regional conflicts— and
•esident stated our firm opposition
session and subversion by the
; Union or its proxies in Afghan-
Angola, Central America, and
lina.
p the same time, the two sides also
■ed an expansion of bilateral U.S.-
: programs, involving greater
!-to-people contact and cooperation
h areas of concrete interest to the
i States as search and rescue and
ration in space. And I might say,
he last couple of days we've had
very productive negotiations with
iviets in Washington, and I think
ve— we haven't signed it— but
.lly, we have the essence of an
ment on civilian space cooperation
le number of projects identified. I
ler that a real plus.
3 you can see, we have entered a
tage in our dialogue with the
; Union. It has the potential to be
tionally productive. But it's also a
1 in which conventional wisdom is
questioned. As we advance on old
ims, we will face new issues and
hallenges.
) this evening is a fitting moment
iew the lessons of how we got to
avik, what happened there, and
te should next proceed,
would divide those lessons into
parts. The first lesson is that the
iating progress we achieved at
avik was built upon a broad base of
ican and allied strength and
re. It was the result of literally
of effort.
his President, President Reagan,
ed office with his eyes open about
oviet Union and the reality of its
system. He saw the clear need to
establish a bilateral U.S. -Soviet relation-
ship that would advance U.S. interests.
He was determined to stop a growing
tendency of the Soviet Union and its
clients to pursue their regional objec-
tives through subversion and armed
intervention. He was committed to
reverse destabilizing trends in the
military balance. And— most
significantly— he was also willing to
question whether our capacity to deter
Soviet aggression must be solely based
upon the threat of mutual assured
destruction with strategic nuclear
weapons.
As you might put it, what's so good
about a world that depends on our ability
to wipe each other out in 30 minutes?
Don't make any mistake about it— that's
what their ballistic missiles can do to us,
and that's what ours can do to them.
[Snaps fingers.] Wiped out! It's kept the
peace, but there must be a better way,
the President thinks, and we're trying to
find it.
The first few years of this Adminis-
tration were a period of rebuilding so
that we could be in a stronger position to
go forward. That meant reinvigorating
our economy, restoring our military
strength, and repairing our alliance ties
with our friends in Europe, Asia, and
elsewhere. It involved a lot of unspec-
tacular but vital spadework.
That general approach is now in
place and working. Here at home, we
have reestablished the American spirit of
self-confidence. Our economy has rid
itself of the corrosive inflation of the
recent past. We are embarked on sound
growth. And I have no doubt that as the
marginal rates of taxation on income go
down, we will see an improvement in the
quality of that growth.
We have strengthened and modern-
ized America's conventional and
strategic military forces. Together with
our allies, we have made progress in
rebuilding NATO's defenses. In the face
of intense Soviet pressure and domestic
controversy, the Atlantic alliance has
stood firm in support of its decision to
redress a dangerous INF imbalance with
the Soviet Union, both through negotia-
tions and by deploying such forces of our
own.
And the President has set out to pro-
tect us and our allies against ballistic
missiles— by negotiation to the extent
possible but, in any case, by learning
how to construct a strategic defense
against those missiles.
It was the sum of these policies,
based on strength and realism, that
enabled the President to propose, in
January 1984, a more intensive dialogue
with Moscow. The Soviets were faced
with an America confident in its
renewed strength and an alliance united
in its support of common objectives.
They slowly came to drop their earlier
policies of walkouts and stonewalling.
They returned to the negotiating table.
The resulting process of high-level
dialogue led to last year's Geneva sum-
mit and the Reykjavik meeting earlier
this month.
The Importance of Human Rights
Which leads me to the second lesson-
that of the central importance of human
rights in the U.S. -Soviet relationship. I
spoke at length on this subject earlier in
the day in Los Angeles, and I hope that
you will read what I said there. I will be
talking about human rights again next
week, when I meet with European
foreign ministers in Vienna for a con-
ference reviewing the Helsinki Final
Act.
Arms control agreements cannot be
truly successful in guaranteeing a more
secure peace when one of the signatories
continues to violate human rights. When
justice is violated and when freedom is
denied, then the potential for distrust
and conflict inevitably grows between
nations. One of the Soviet Union's most
distinguished citizens, Andrey Sakharov,
put it this way:
As long as a country has no civil liberty,
no freedom of information, and no independ-
ent press, there exists no effective body of
opinion to control the conduct of the govern-
ment and its functionaries. Such a situation is
not just a misfortune for its citizens unpro-
tected against tyranny and lawlessness; it is a
menace to international security.
In preparing for Iceland, the Presi-
dent and I had exceptionally close con-
sultations with concerned private Ameri-
can organizations, including the National
Council on Soviet Jewry. As I noted
earlier, the President made clear to the
General Secretary that the American
people seek more than token gestures.
We want genuine evidence— deeds, not
words— of a serious commitment by the
Soviet authorities to allow the exercise
of basic human rights by all their
citizens. We succeeded at Reykjavik in
obtaining Soviet acknowledgment of the
rightful place of human rights issues on
the agenda of official Soviet-American
discussions.
But now it's up to all of us to follow
up vigorously. It's important that we
continue to press Soviet authorities on
specific human rights problems on every
appropriate occasion. The Soviet leader-
ship needs to hear the message from
Imhrtr iOQC
23
THE SECRETARY
Americans that continuing Soviet abuses
can i inly jeopardize efforts to make prog-
ress in all areas of U.S. -Soviet relations.
Firmness in Managing
Unacceptable Soviet Behavior
The third lesson goes back to a presenta-
tion I made 2 years ago to the just-
established Rand/UCLA Center for the
Study of Soviet International Behavior.
Back then, I noted the special problems
that we face in managing a sustained
and productive relationship with the
Soviet Union when we are likely to be
confronted periodically with outrages
and threatening behavior.
Given the totalitarian and expan-
sionist nature of the Soviet system, we
aren't surprised— although we are
always distressed— when events arise
like the invasion of Afghanistan, the
Korean Air Lines shoot-down, or
Nick Daniloff's frameup. We have to
deal firmly with each instance of unac-
ceptable Soviet behavior. The challenge
for the policymaker is to confront and
manage such crises on their own terms,
without sacrificing other important
areas of interest to the United States.
Let me stop here to tell you a spy
story. It illustrates the need for deter-
mination and firmness in resisting Soviet
actions against our interests.
We have known for a long time that
the Soviets use their diplomatic missions
here and elsewhere as a cover for
espionage. As this activity grew increas-
ingly blatant and harmful to U.S.
interests, it became clear that we could
no longer tolerate this situation.
In March of this year, we announced
a program to reduce the three Soviet
UN Missions to a size essentially
equivalent to that of our own mission in
New York. Bear in mind that their mis-
sion was more than the total of the next
two largest missions at the United
Nations combined. It tells you
something.
You will recall that one of the
anomalies of the original UN structure
was that it allowed for a U.S.S.R., a
Ukrainian, and a Belorussian Mission.
We told the Soviets that they would
have to reduce these personnel from
approximately 275 to 170 by April 1988.
The first cut of 25 in the largest of the
three, the U.S.S.R. Mission, was to take
effect by October 1 of this year. The
total at that mission would then be 218.
All three of the Soviet missions would be
cut in later increments.
In August, the problem of espionage
at the United Nations was highlighted by
the arrest of Mr. Zakharov, a Soviet
citizen assigned to the UN Secretariat.
In theory at least, he was an interna-
tional civil servant. As such, he was not
covered by diplomatic immunity. He was
arrested and charged.
One week later, the Soviets set up
U.S. news correspondent Nick Daniloff
and arrested him on a trumped-up
charge of espionage. In short, they took
a hostage. We made clear to the Soviets
from the start that there would be no
Daniloff-Zakharov trade. We took advan-
tage of every meeting with the Soviets
at every diplomatic level to hammer that
message home. We kept the discussion
of other important issues alive but made
it clear to the Soviets who participated
in those meetings that it was far from
business as usual.
Meanwhile, as October 1 approached,
the Soviets indicated publicly— their
Ambassador at the United Nations, very
defiantly— that they were making no
plans to comply with our requirement
that their UN Mission be reduced. So we
were forced to make sure that they met
the deadline we had established. We
expelled 25 of their Soviet Mission per-
sonnel by name. And we chose indi-
viduals who we had reason to suspect
were not, shall we say, overly burdened
with legitimate UN business.
After several weeks of standoff, our
firm refusal to swap Nick Daniloff bore
fruit. On September 29, he was
released free and clear, without being
tried. Mr. Zakharov's case was handled
on our side in full accordance with U.S.
law, as we had said it would be from the
beginning. The day he departed the
United States, September 30, we were
able to announce the imminent release
from the Soviet Union of Yuriy Orlov.
That giant of the Soviet human rights
movement arrived in this country a week
later.
I might say that in my Alk years as
Secretary of State, there have been no
greater moments for me than the oppor-
tunity I've had to sit down with Natan
Shcharanskiy and Yuriy Orlov and talk
to them and get a sense of this irre-
pressible human spirit. When you think
of the repression they endured, the
sacrifices they made, to see these two
human beings bounce back, see their
strengths, see their resilience— well, it
makes you proud to be a human being.
And I had the experience of having them
thank me for helping them get out, and I
had to say to them, "It was a privilege
and an honor." They're wonderful
people. But it gives you great faith in
the human spirit.
Despite our warnings to the Soviets
that we would tolerate no retaliation
against our personnel in Moscow for the
steps we had taken to end spying from
their UN Mission, the Soviets prove
unwilling to show the necessary
restraint. They declared five membtl
the staffs of our Moscow Embassy e
Leningrad Consulate General persm
rum grata— that's a diplomatic word|
"get out."
Again, our response was firm ai
focused on the problem at hand. We
the Soviets on notice that, hencefor
all matters involving our respective
missions in each others' countries w
be handled on the basis of strict
reciprocity. We then expelled 55 So''
Embassy and Consulate General
officials, bringing their numbers int'
with the number of U.S. diplomats i
Soviet Union.
The Soviets responded by declai
another five of our diplomats person
non grata. They also withdrew oven
Soviet citizens performing service fi
tions for our posts. These people die
useful work for us— while undoubte(
also performing tasks for Soviet
intelligence. But the Soviet Governii
accepted both the common ceiling w
had established and the principle of
reciprocity upon which we had insis"
So what does the balance sheet
show? By responding firmly, by she
consistency, we have established mu
better control over Soviet activities
the United States than we have had>
many years. We have brought to the
attention of the highest levels of the |
Soviet Government the costs of thei
intelligence service's unfettered abu
Soviet diplomatic establishments in'
country. We have established, once<
for all, the principle of reciprocity in
operations of our respective diploma |
missions.
What price did we pay for these
achievements? There was a cost. Te»
talented American diplomats have bi
removed from the Soviet Union and
be unable to return to use the specia
skills they have developed. There is l
reciprocity in numbers— but at a low
level than had been our original go;
This means that a higher percenta]
our personnel in Moscow and Leni:
will be supporting a significantly sm
substantive staff. But in deciding ho
respond to the problem of Soviet
espionage in this country, we conclu
that these were costs we had to be
prepared to pay.
But our willingness to pay this
and our determination to take the
we did to rein in Soviet espionage,
not prevent us from continuing our
substantive dialogue with Moscow.
Indeed, even as this spy story was
ing itself out, we were setting the |
for the progress the President was
24
THE SECRETARY
ke with General Secretary Gor-
!»• in Reykjavik.
Il have to pause and give my
bue in the foreign ministry
Iks— Mr. Shevardnadze, the
tn Minister of the Soviet Union—
[here. He worked at this very hard
Uigently.
(steps
b do we go from here? For our
pve are energetically pursuing the
se of Reykjavik. Our negotiators in
\a are picking up where the two
s left off on nuclear and space
|. We are also ready to begin
ins on verification improve-
to existing nuclear testing
ents and, eventually, on further
ions on nuclear testing in step-by-
shion in parallel with further
ions in nuclear forces.
e will be talking about these and
problems with Soviet Ambassador
in in Washington and through our
ssador in Moscow, Art Hartman. I
i meeting with Foreign Minister
o-dnadze in Vienna next week to
lue our own exchanges— not just on
control but on Soviet activities in
lird World, human rights, and
problems in our bilateral
unship.
Tiether we can achieve concrete
s and early agreements now
ids on the Soviets. Some of their
: statements have been modestly
raging. General Secretary Gor-
v seems to agree with us that the
lavik meeting was useful and that it
lortant that both sides use this
tunity to work to improve rela-
As he has said, they're full of
y to follow up on what he described
; "new situation" created by
javik, and it is a new situation,
so are we. And we'll be looking to
to give concrete substance to their
3 at the negotiating table,
ot surprisingly, however, the
ts are also trying to cast the details
> Reykjavik discussions along lines
favorable to them. Their efforts to
. possible INF agreement with our
itance of their position on SDI are a
example. We've seen differing
it statements on this question. We
see any reason why these issues
d be linked, and we're going to pro-
on that basis. In the past, we
1't accepted the proposition that
tiating progress on intermediate-
2 or strategic offensive systems
d be held hostage to agreement
the Soviet position in another area,
ron't now.
So all of this may take some time to
work out— but that's to be expected in
negotiating with the Soviets. Firmness,
patience, and determination are
necessary ingredients for success.
But we should also continue to look
forward— with imagination and crea-
tivity. The President believes strongly
that we need to go beyond half-
measures; we shouldn't always be tied to
traditional solutions that don't really get
to the heart of a particular problem.
Several years ago, he proposed that we
seek the global elimination of Soviet and
American intermediate-range missiles.
Not a freeze, not token reductions, but
zero-zero. He got a good deal of criticism
at the time for supposedly being
unrealistic and overly ambitious. Some
people said making such a proposal
shows that the President isn't serious
about arms control.
Now— 5 years later— General
Secretary Gorbachev has agreed to
reduce intermediate-range nuclear
missiles on both sides to 100 warheads
globally. As I noted before, that is a
reduction of more than 90% in SS-20
warheads. And there will be follow-on
negotiations on eliminating those 100
warheads as well. Make no mistake
about it. It has been tough getting this
far. Long negotiations were required;
and great effort on the part of our allies
was needed in getting us through some
difficult times. We still have to nail down
a formal agreement and put it into force.
But I hope you will think about this
experience the next time you hear one of
this President's proposals called
"unrealistic."
So were our discussions at Reykjavik
ambitious? Yes. Unrealistic? No. We
think that substantial Soviet and
American nuclear reductions are possible
and that they can be achieved in a
phased and stabilizing way. Reykjavik
laid the groundwork for that process to
begin.
Now we need to think hard about
where we want to go next, about what
kind of situation we want to create in
the future. We need to look at a world
with far fewer nuclear weapons. We may
even need to begin thinking seriously
about a world with no nuclear weapons.
One fact seems apparent. Even after
the possible elimination of all ballistic
missiles, we will need an insurance
policy to hedge against cheating, against
third countries, against a madman. We
don't know now what form this
insurance policy will take. The retention
of a small nuclear deterrent force could
be part of that insurance policy. What
we do know is that the President's pro-
gram for defenses against nuclear
ballistic missiles can be a key part of
that insurance policy. Such defenses for
the United States and its allies will give
us the options needed to approach a
world with far fewer nuclear weapons.
None of this came up suddenly at
Reykjavik. The President has made clear
for many years his goal of eliminating
ballistic missiles and— in proper
circumstances— all nuclear weapons. He
has made speeches on this subject; he
has campaigned on this issue; he
addressed it in the debates; and he
launched the SDI program with this goal
in mind. The President hasn't changed.
What has changed is that his goal is now
being taken seriously. I heard someone
say that all this was fine as long as it
was only campaign talk. Well, they
weren't listening carefully. Now it is
being discussed for real.
Obviously, we are taking on a dif-
ficult task as we move to create the con-
ditions in which we can assure the
freedom and security of our country and
our allies without the constant threat of
nuclear catastrophe. Progress— whether
in science or foreign affairs— often has
to do with the reinterpretation of
fundamental ideas.
Times of reinterpretation are dif-
ficult. Hard thinking can hurt your head.
But we cannot shirk the challenge. As
Albert Einstein warned after the dawn
of the nuclear age: "Everything has
changed but our way of thinking."
That's a sage observation— particularly
as we continue to look at the problem of
managing our long-term relations with
the Soviet Union in a time of dramatic
technological and strategic change.
So it just may be that nuclear
weapons, and the strategy of mutual
assured destruction that has shaped our
defense policy for decades, are part of
the old way of thinking. We have to
start to wrap our minds around new
interpretations and build new realities.
If we do, perhaps we can shape a more
secure world for everybody.
'Press release 239 of Nov. 3, 1986. The
question-and-answer session following the
address is not printed here. ■
limhor 1Q«fi
25
THE SECRETARY
Human Rights
and Soviet-American Relations
Secretary Shultz 's address before the
World Affairs Council in Los Angeles on
October 31, 1986.1
Two years ago, when I delivered a
speech here in Los Angeles on Soviet-
American relations, I addressed both the
limits and the necessity of negotiating
with the Soviet Union. I pointed out that
in the nuclear age we must seek to
resolve our differences with the Soviet
Union through negotiations. Yet we
know that the Soviets behave in ways
that are repugnant to us and that violate
our standards of human conduct. We
obviously cannot say that until
everything is settled with the Soviets,
nothing can be settled with them. But
we can and do say that until there is
substantial Soviet progress in the vital
area of human rights, advances in other
areas of the relationship are bound to be
constrained.
Managing Soviet-American relations
is of special significance today, in the
aftermath of the Reykjavik meeting.
Reykjavik was a watershed in our discus-
sions with the Soviets on arms control
and international security. I'll be discuss-
ing the Reykjavik meeting in greater
detail this evening in San Francisco, and
I hope you'll all want to read that
speech. The point I want to emphasize
this afternoon is that arms control
agreements with a regime that violates
human rights cannot be truly successful
in guaranteeing international security.
But, nevertheless, I think very possibly,
as we look back 4, 5, 10 years from now,
we will more and more identify the
Reykjavik meeting as a watershed
meeting, a meeting of tremendous
potential significance.
But, nevertheless, the human rights
part of this story is of extraordinary and
special importance.
Perhaps Andrey Sakharov has said it
best. "No matter how important arms
control discussions are," he said, "they
can produce decisive results only when
they are joined to the resolution of
broader and more complicated prob-
lems. . . including questions of human
rights."
Sakharov went on to elaborate the
relationship between international
security and human rights, and he said:
The freedom to exchange information at
home and across international borders, the
freedom to move at home and to travel or
emigrate abroad, all rank as prerequisites of
international trust, basic to the process of
diminishing hostility. As long as a country has
no civil liberty, no freedom of information,
and no independent press, then there exists
no effective body of public opinion to control
the conduct of the government and its func-
tionaries. Such a situation is not just a mis-
fortune for citizens unprotected against
tyranny and lawlessness; it is a menace to
international security.
Those are Sakharov's words.
The Reagan Administration shares
this view. Governments which abuse the
rights of their own people cannot be
expected to act in a more civilized man-
ner abroad. For this reason we
emphasize human rights issues in all of
our official dealings with the Soviets. I
will do so next week, when I go to
Vienna to participate in the 35-nation
conference that will review implementa-
tion of the 1975 Helsinki accords. Today,
I would like to discuss our long-term
strategy for promoting human rights in
the Soviet Union.
The Reagan Administration is pro-
foundly convinced that as important as
are the reduction and eventual elimina-
tion of offensive nuclear weapons, arms
control can never be the main preoccupa-
tion of American foreign policy. It has
never been mankind's goal simply to sur-
vive. Through the centuries men and
women have struggled to overcome
poverty and to free themselves from the
oppression of arbitrary rule. They have
sought to create free and prosperous
communities governed by the rule of law
rather than the caprice of the few. This
struggle for freedom is the very
hallmark of our civilization. It is the
story of human progress.
We in the West can be justly proud
of the prosperity and political freedom
that we have achieved. Indeed, we
believe the two go together. But we can-
not forget that others in our world live
lives that are neither prosperous nor
free. There remain all too many nations
where human rights are not respected;
where nonviolent political dissent is not
permitted; and where unfettered
religious worship is not tolerated.
One such country is the Soviet
Union. Because it is among the mosi
powerful of nations and enjoys influi
far beyond its borders, the way Sov
leaders treat their people is of speci
concern. This is why, as we seek a li
confrontational relationship with th'
Soviet Union, we must call upon So'
leaders to demonstrate respect for I
human rights. These are not two in(
patible policies; they are complemer
approaches to the same objective.
Human Rights and the
New Soviet Leadership
Within the past 2 years, a new leadt
ship has come to power in Moscow,
capacity for serious negotiation waa
dent in our arms control discussions
Reykjavik. And we are seeing, in ne
Soviet domestic policies, General
Secretary Gorbachev's determinate
modernize the Soviet economy. His
policy of glasnost— that is, "opennes
has made the Soviet media somewh;
more informative. At the same time I
see no sign that the Soviet ruling eli I
willing to yield even a small portion I
its control over the lives of its citize (
This new Soviet Government is
showing an appreciation of Westerro
style public relations. Not very long
Soviet officials were distinguished
primarily by how little they had to s;
and how unwilling they were to say
Today, they appear eager to be intei
viewed, to advance and defend Sovie
policies. But until Soviet human righ
policies are defensible, until the Sovi
Union adheres to the norms of conte
porary civilization, improved public i
tions techniques will not get them ve
far.
To be sure, Soviet leaders have
shown increasing awareness of the
public relations price they pay as a n
of their conduct in the field of humar*
rights. They have demonstrated that
awareness with some high-profile
actions. These gestures are welcome.
And, I might say, the dramatic perm1
sion of Dr. Goldfarb, brought to the j
United States by Armand Hammer, 'I
among those very welcome gestures, I
we appreciate that. But they are no I
substitute for genuine and sustained j
progress in the human rights area.
Moreover, many of these actions are
qualified by serious limitations.
We were pleased that Natan
Shcharanskiy and Yuriy Orlov werelj
freed, but it was in exchange for Sov I
spies. Mrs. Yelena Bonner was permi
ted to travel to the West for medical '
26
* _x r**
THE SECRETARY
;ment but has returned to incom-
icado detention in Gorkiy. A high
entage of divided-family and
rated-spouse cases were resolved,
;ven here we have not approached
resolution of all cases. Imprisoned
Irina Ratushinskaya was released
re she completed her sentence, hut
t Helsinki monitors remain in jail,
sister of cancer patient Mikhail Shir-
was released to travel to Israel,
■e an operation could possibly save
fe; but this action occurred only
" an unconscionable delay which has
ced the chances of success for treat-
t. A few refuseniks are allowed to
;rate while total emigration figures
lmet. And this past summer, the
ets created a new Humanitarian and
ural Affairs Office in their Ministry
oreign Affairs, but there is no indi-
m that it is intended to deal with the
et Union's human rights problems.
These gestures are welcome. They
Dbviously of vital importance to the
fiduals directly affected. And I
it say, from my own standpoint, in
tV2 years now as your Secretary of
e, I can't think of any experiences to
pare with the privilege of meeting
talking for a while with Messers.
laranskiy and Orlov. You get a sense
ie unquenchability of the human
t and the courage that individuals
show. These two men thanked me,
they thanked the President, for
ing them, and I can weep over such
ks because it's such a privilege to
people who are so courageous.
But the release of these individuals
i not represent a fundamental
ige in the Soviet system or in Soviet
an rights policy. Indeed, it seems
r that these limited actions have
1 carefully calculated to satisfy world
ion at little or no internal cost. The
ets hope, no doubt, to use these
tively few high-profile cases to divert
ic attention from their continuing
systematic denial of basic human
ts. But whatever their motives, we
at least say that such actions
onstrate Soviet concern for world
lion.
[[Soviet authorities may not accept
illegitimacy of the Western moral
lition, but they do feel its pressure.
r<must hope that in time the new
leration of Soviet leaders will change
Fepressive practices for the right
tons— not in order to pacify outraged
aid opinion but because it comes to
ierstand that a truly strong, confident
Jernment is strengthened, not
[kened, when it protects the rights of
domestic critics.
The Human Rights Situation
in the Soviet Union
In reacting to these Soviet gestures, we
must keep clear in our own minds what
they mean and what they do not mean.
We must not gloss over the grim reality
of Soviet internal repression. At the
CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] review con-
ference that I mentioned earlier, we will
again raise our human rights concerns—
not to score propaganda points but to
describe the human rights situation in
the Soviet Union as it actually is.
• For Soviet Jewry, the situation is
bleak and deteriorating. Jewish emigra-
tion in 1986 has fallen to the lowest level
in 20 years, down more than 98% from
the all-time high of 1979. Soviet officials
sometimes attribute this fall in emigra-
tion to the fact that all Soviet Jews who
wish to leave have already done so. But
we know the names of 11,201 Soviet
Jews who have applied and have been
denied permission to emigrate. These
are the "refuseniks," some of whom
have been fired from their jobs, har-
assed, or even imprisoned. We can also
confirm that at least 380,000 additional
Soviet Jews would like to leave the
Soviet Union— I say, at least. Raising
this issue is perfectly legitimate. The
Soviet Union has signed politically bind-
ing international instruments which
require respect for basic human rights,
including the right to leave one's coun-
try. Commitments assumed under these
documents are as binding as any other
international commitment.
• The situation for other religious
groups is also deteriorating. Four hun-
dred religious believers are currently
imprisoned for participating in so-called
unauthorized religious ceremonies.
Evangelical Christians currently make
up one-third of all known Soviet
prisoners of conscience. Their beliefs,
and those of millions of their brethren,
are continuously mocked and ridiculed in
the Soviet media. Freedom of conscience
is crippled by legislation and adminis-
trative controls that make religious
believers second-class citizens and force
many to violate the law in order to prac-
tice their faith. Can you imagine, it's
against the law to practice your religious
faith?
• Meanwhile, Andrey Sakharov and
Yelena Bonner have once again disap-
peared into Gorkiy, cut off from the
world, their welfare and whereabouts
unknown. And 39 Helsinki monitors
remain in Soviet prisons or in labor
camps. They are being punished not for
attempting to overthrow the Soviet
state, nor for the commission of any
crime, but for publicizing Soviet failures
to live up to the international com-
mitments the Soviet Government assumed
under the Helsinki Final Act. Hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of other Soviet
citizens have been incarcerated— many in
psychiatric hospitals and many on
trumped-up charges— for trying to exer-
cise what in the West are taken for
granted as basic human rights.
• Nor is such persecution limited to
Soviet citizens. In the international
arena, the Soviet Union continues to
wage its ruthless war against the people
of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union also
supports the Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia and Vietnam's war against
the Cambodian resistance. And the
Daniloff affair has demonstrated that
even innocent Americans are at risk if
their imprisonment serves Soviet
purposes.
These are only some examples of the
massive human rights violations rou-
tinely practiced by Soviet authorities.
Yet despite all the evidence of such prac-
tices, some people still find it hard to
believe that a great power like the
Soviet Union treats its own people so
brutally. So let me provide you with just
one more example.
Nina Kovalenko, a refusenik artist
and member of the so-called Group to
Establish Trust Between the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.A. was arrested on Sep-
tember 25 and confined to a psychiatric
hospital for demonstrating in support of
U.S. newsman Nicholas Daniloff. Close
family sources report that she is being
forcibly administered four different
drugs in seven daily sessions; and she
has been repeatedly interrogated
about her part in the pro-Daniloff
demonstration.
This is the second time that Mrs.
Kovalenko has been assigned to a
psychiatric hospital. A slight, softspoken
woman of 47 years, Mrs. Kovalenko has
no history of mental illness or instability.
She is quite sane. Her only "wrong-
doing"—if that is the proper word— is
her desire to establish better relations
between the United States and the
Soviet Union and her courage in speak-
ing up for Nick Daniloff.
Soviet spokesmen are constantly tell-
ing us about their desire to establish
better relations between our two coun-
tries. Nina Kovalenko also wants to
improve Soviet-American relations. So
we must ask: how does Nina Kovalenko
threaten the Soviet system? What crime
has she committed that makes her sub-
ject to psychiatric torture? Is this how
eomhor 1 QBfi
27
THE SECRETARY
Soviet authorities intend to establish
trust between our two nations? What is
behind such profoundly repugnant
behavior?
When you look at the Soviet human
rights situation in its totality— and
when you consider the fates of the
Kovalenkos, the Sakharovs, the Mar-
chenkos, the Nudels, the Slepaks, the
Koryagins, and so many, many others-
only one conclusion is possible: the
Soviet Union regularly violates interna-
tional human rights commitments-
including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the Helsinki
Accords— to which it is a party. It does
not observe the legal procedures and
ethical values developed by civilized
societies. And it does not extend equal
protection of the law to all its citizens.
The Soviet state remains profoundly
repressive, despite its attempts to show
a more modern, humanitarian face to the
world.
U.S. Policy: Speaking Out
on Our Concerns
In dealing with this fundamental fact,
we must be realistic. We can take
cautious encouragement from the fact
that the new Soviet leadership— for
whatever reasons— has taken steps that
we can welcome. It is possible that the
policies we have been pursuing have
helped to create the environment in
which these new developments are tak-
ing place. In any event, we in the West
must maintain our pressure on the
Soviet Union. We must continue to insist
that nothing short of significant, sus-
tained progress on human rights will
satisfy us. We must make certain that all
the democracies— not just a few of us—
maintain this pressure. We all share a
concern over Soviet human rights
abuses, and we must show it. The Soviet
authorities will have no incentive to
change if they believe we do not care.
We must also work closely with our
concerned domestic constituencies. One
of the highlights of the recent meeting in
Reykjavik was its intimate relation to
one of the most intensive series of
domestic human rights consultations in
American history. Nongovernmental
organizations and Members of Congress
directly participated in the formulation
of our negotiating position. This meant
that when President Reagan raised the
subject with General Secretary
Gorbachev, he was speaking not only for
himself and his Administration, but for
an America united in its concern on
this issue. Perhaps for this reason, we
succeeded in obtaining grudging Soviet
acknowledment of the rightful place of
human rights issues on the agenda of
official Soviet-American discussions.
So how best can we get the Soviets
to realize that if they are going to enjoy
the fruits of a more cooperative relation-
ship with the West, they must pay
increasing attention to our concerns?
Some believe that the best way is to
quarantine the Soviets, to limit our
bilateral contacts to an absolute
minimum until they carry out a massive
program of internal reform. This
method, we must recognize, has been
tried and found wanting. Although it
does register our disapproval of Soviet
human rights practices, it has little
chance of actually improving them.
Let me propose what I believe is a
better way. When the communists seized
power 69 years ago, they claimed that
their new system represented the wave
of the future. In fact, the future has
increasingly passed them by. Today, the
Soviet leadership wants to have it both
ways: it seeks to gain acceptance by the
West; yet it also seeks to keep its people
isolated from the free ideas and the
human contacts that are the very
essence of modern life.
If we in the West are ever going to
develop constructive relations with the
Soviet Union, they will not come by
shunning contact. On the contrary, we
must take advantage of the new style
of Soviet diplomacy to expose Mr.
Gorbachev, his associates, and the Soviet
people to the depth of our revulsion at
Soviet human rights abuses. We must
make use of every channel we can, of
every forum that presents itself, to get
the Soviet leadership to acknowledge the
reality that less repression at home is
the key to greater acceptance abroad.
As governments, we must seek
every opportunity to bring our human
rights concerns directly to the attention
of Soviet authorities and people. We
need to tell them, time and again, that
the way they treat their people is not
acceptable in this day and age. We must
impress upon them that they will never
be fully welcomed by us so long as they
maintain their repressive policies.
People-to-People Exchanges
Beyond formal exchanges with Soviet
authorities, it is in our interest to
encourage as much contact as possible
between our two societies, between
American and Soviet people directly.
Within the Soviet Union today, there are
some who recognize the need for change.
And we can only benefit from getting
Soviet citizens to take a close look at our
way of life. As they see that our society
works, they will question why theirs
doesn't. Such exposure to life beyond
their restrictive borders can only convi
the truth: that economies and societies
genuinely thrive and prosper when
people are free, when they can exchan
ideas and opinions without fear. This i
why President Reagan proposed a ma;
people-to-people exchange program pr
to the Geneva summit.
At Geneva itself, we gained Soviet
agreement to a number of exchange p
grams. To date, these programs remai
modest in terms of the numbers of
individuals involved. Perhaps Soviet
authorities still fear exposing significa
numbers of their citizens to our peopk
and to our way of life. This is all the
more reason to press for vastly expam
exchanges. We need to work toward t
day when tens and even hundreds of
thousands of Soviet citizens, and par-
ticularly young people, routinely
exchange visits with their counterpart
in the United States and other Westei
countries. Such contacts can help over
come the artificial barriers imposed b;
the Soviet Government on the flow
information to their people and can
convey the truth about the United Sta
and the West. We are confident that
genuine people-to-people contacts can
build real constituencies for peace in
both countries. For, as President Reaj
has observed, "People don't start war
governments do."
Naturally, it will be extremely
important for our people— both official
and private citizens— who engage in
these exchange programs to understai
the nature of the society they are deal
ing with. This is crucial, because the
Soviet Government will undoubtedly
argue that doctors, scientists, and
dancers can get together without havii
to worry about such "political" issues
human rights. We believe it is essentia
that all participants— ours and theirs—
understand that these exchanges cann>
reach their full potential in an environ-
ment of continuing Soviet human right
abuses.
We need to be persistent. We knov
from experience that the Soviets are
tireless in pressing their vital concerns
Well, human rights is our vital concerr
It is at the core of American foreign
policy because it is central to America'
conception of itself and its role in the
world. We must never be afraid to spe;
up for our deepest values and most fun<
mental beliefs. We must never be reluc
tant to go that extra mile. And we mus
never desist from the all-important
effort to change Soviet human rights
practices.
28
Dffnartmpnt nf RtatP Rulli
THE SECRETARY
iCo be sure, there are those who say
si the Soviet Union cannot and will
(hange; that Soviet leaders will
Itr open up their borders to the types
^changes we would like to see. Well,
ibe so. But if we fail to make the
jrt, the Soviet Union will most
Sredly remain a closed society, a
Ipn for its own citizens and a perma-
t threat to the rest of the world.
The ultimate challenge, of course, is
ne new Soviet leadership itself. That
Usrship is showing some interest in
inding contacts abroad in the
rests of modernizing more rapidly. It
X realize that a system which keeps
iocopiers and mimeograph machines
er strict control cannot exploit the
ifits of the dawning information age.
just suspect in its heart of hearts
I the Soviet Union will never be able
Itch up with the West without open-
Itself up to the free exchange of
3 and information. Indeed, with
iy Western innovation in information
Inology that brings the world closer
jther, the leaders of the Soviet Union
Reminded of their agonizing choice:
they must either open up their society to
the freedoms necessary for the pursuit
of technological progress, or they risk
falling even further behind the West.
How the Soviet Union responds to
this choice largely depends on its
leaders. We in the West must never
delude ourselves that we can have more
than a marginal impact on the Soviet
decisionmaking process. But to the
extent that our words and actions are
heeded, our message must be une-
quivocal: Soviet isolation from the
modern world is not the result of some
vast, anti-Soviet plot; rather, it is the
inevitable consequence of Soviet
behavior. If Soviet authorities hope to
gain acceptance by the international
community, they must begin to respect
the rights of their people. Their only
alternative is to perpetuate the terrible
legacy of their past and remain a
backward outcast on the margins of the
modern world.
■Press release 238 of Nov. 3, 1986. The
question-and-answer session following the
address is not printed here. ■
cretary's Interview on "Meet the Press"
Secretary Shultz was interviewed on
TV's "Meet the Press" on October
986, by Marvin Kalb, NBC News;
\rt Novak, Chicago Sun-Times syn-
e; and Bernard Gwertzman, The
York Times.1
Last Sunday Secretary Shultz
I to have been our guest from
and. He couldn't make it because
Ind the President were engaged at
iVery moment in intense negotia-
ijs with Soviet leader [Mikhail]
bachev, negotiations that ulti-
fely collapsed when the Soviet
ler demanded certain constraints
'he U.S. space defense program,
(llarly known as "Star Wars," and
iPresident refused to yield. So
ire do we go from here?
Mr. Secretary, one key issue that
(come up is the contention that you
p made, and the President, that
kt) the Russians wanted to do was
jill SDI. the Strategic Defense Ini-
jve. The Russians have said, and
je have been reports in the past
K'e of days suggesting that what
ussians really want, it seems, is
le kind of compromise because
what they are asking is that research
and testing be limited to the lab but in
some cases be allowed outside the lab
when it is ground-based systems
involved.
Is that some effort to strike a
compromise?
A. Of course, in Reykjavik it seemed
to us that when talking about a
laboratory, a confined space, what you
could do there wouldn't be the things
needed to really develop this program,
and so that seemed like an effort to crip-
ple the program. If they have further
ideas— and there have been suggestions
that they may— there is a good place for
them to put them down on the table in
Geneva; and Max Kampelman [U.S.
negotiator on defense and space arms
and head of U.S. delegation on arms con-
trol negotiations] is there, and he is
ready to talk.
Q. But the key point here, I think,
is the sort of maximalist statement
that you have made, that they want to
kill it, and they seem to be coming
back and saying that it's not killing so
much as curtailing. And that sounds
like the beginning of a compromise,
does it not?
A. We will have to see what they
put down on the table in Geneva. But, at
any rate, we are there and we've made a
tremendous amount of progress not only
on intermediate-range missiles and
strategic arms and missiles but also in
the space defense area. So there is a lot
to build on, and we're ready to do it.
Q. You have said a couple of times
this past week that Mr. Gorbachev
sent you a message on Tuesday
through the Soviet Ambassador, Mr.
[Yuriy] Dubinin. In this new outburst
of candor that you are all engaged,
could you tell us what that message
said?
A. He said that he had had a conver-
sation with Mr. Gorbachev before they
each left Reykjavik and that Mr.
Gorbachev had instructed him to come in
and see me. Aside from certain matters
having to do with content, which I don't
think it is appropriate to talk about, but
relating to this issue that you raised, the
main message seemed to be that [Soviet
Foreign Minister] Shevardnadze and I
had developed a certain relationship and
we should keep it moving and we should
be thinking about when we might meet
again.
So we discussed the fact that prob-
ably both of us will be in Vienna in the
middle of November— early part of
November— and so we will undoubtedly
try to arrange a meeting.
Q. Do you have any sense of what
you would like to accomplish out of
that meeting with Shevardnadze?
What particular parts you'd like to
pull together?
A. There are two things that we
didn't really finish. Although we seem to
come to closure on them in Reykjavik,
we didn't finish in the sense of getting
really precisely done language. One has
to do with nuclear testing and the other
with intermediate-range missiles in
Europe and Asia. So those are things
we'll be working on in Geneva, and they
may get some attention.
Of course, from our standpoint, we
think it is very important to keep
pushing on this issue of human rights
because it is so fundamental to what
may or may not be the kind of relation-
ship we are able to have.
Q. It was announced in Moscow
today that they are kicking out five of
our diplomats in retaliation for our
ouster of 25 of their excess people at
the United Nations. What is our reac-
tion going to be on that? Are we going
to retaliate, too, or are we going to
turn the other cheek?
ember 1986
29
THE SECRETARY
A. We will protest, and we will take
some action.
Q. What action, sir?
A. That remains to be seen. The
President will— we'll consult and talk to
the President and he'll decide.
Q. Are the 25 we have kicked
out — are they all espionage agents?
Are some of them espionage agents?
A. They are people that we feel
have some connection with espionage
activity or at least are affiliated with
units in the Soviet Union that engage in
that activity.
At any rate, we handed over a list of
25 names, and all of those people have
left.
Q. This week the Soviets did allow
a prominent dissident, Mr. [David)
Goldfarb, to leave as well as a couple
to go to Israel. Was this worked out
with you at the time of the [U.S. News
& World Report correspondent
Nicholas] Daniloff business when Mr.
Orlov [Yuriy Orlov, Soviet physicist
and human rights activist] was freed
or was this as part of any summit
arrangement that they promised to let
out some of the more prominent
people?
A. We didn't have any precise
agreement; although, many names of
individuals were talked about as well as,
of course, the great mass of people by
the hundreds of thousands that would
like to emigrate. So all of that was
discussed, but there was no precise
agreement on either of those cases.
Q. Do you think Mr. Gorbachev is
aware that if he came to the United
States without a major change in this
human rights situation, he could
barely meet with the President
without there being huge
demonstrations?
A. He certainly is aware, or at least
he's been told directly, that, of course,
we will welcome him here in the United
States and he will be treated with the
respect and dignity that he deserves, but
that there won't be the kind of warmth
out there in the American public that
we'd like to see because of the human
rights problems.
Q. Following up the Goldfarb
question. Senator Malcolm Wallop of
Wyoming, who is a strong supporter of
the President, has said that the Soviet
Union has an unlimited number of
these politically persecuted prisoners,
and he just questions the idea of hav-
ing a human meat market where, in
return for various concessions we mav
make on arms, that they one-by-one
will release dissidents. Don't you have
some concerns about that?
A. I think this business of
persecuting people in the first place is
one of the aspects of their system that
we find the most objectionable and the
most difficult in terms of conceiving of a
good relationship between the two coun-
tries. Trading in human beings is
inherently a repulsive matter.
Realistically, we have to say their
system is as it is; and when we can get
people out, we are glad to have them
out. But we always emphasize not only
these names of people who have been so
courageous but also the great mass of
people beyond that that need to have
attention. I must say if you have met, as
I've had the privilege of doing, Natan
Shcharanskiy and Mr. Orlov, you have to
come away feeling inspired and privi-
leged at the unquenchable human spirit
that those people represent.
Q. I just want to follow up the
question of the 25 Soviet employees
that we expelled and now their retalia-
tion. Was this even mentioned at
Reykjavik? This was supposed to be a
major topic of conversation there. Was
it?
A. It wasn't brought up because,
really, we were so engaged in these
other things that the time to do it— it
would have been between Mr. Shevard-
nadze and me— just wasn't there.
Q. One of the things that you
obviously were focusing on was the
President's Strategic Defense
Initiative, and I want to go back to one
of the earlier questions. You were say-
ing that what the United States really
wants to do is to develop this sytem.
At the same time, the basic rationale
of the Administration is that you are
really engaged in simply a research
program.
Isn't it time now. since SDI is so
central to the effort, to say, really,
that it's not just research that you're
engaged in; it's part of the strategy of
the United States and that there will
be a lot of SDI if there are a lot of
offensive missiles, and less SDI if
there are fewer offensive missiles?
A. The object isn't to just do
research. The object of the research is to
find our way to a system that will work
and that will survive and that will have
the attribute that it is less expensive to
add a piece of defense than it is a piece
of offense so that it can go forward. So
the object is to learn how and be able to
protect ourselves against ballistic
missiles. That's what we want to do.
Q. Okay. But isn't the strategic
rationalization for the whole thing,
shouldn't it be, that there would bet
highly developed SDI if there were
many offensive missiles; if there w<
fewer — if you could work that out
with the Russians — there's less of i
need for the SDI, or less of a need 1
that much of SDI; isn't that right?
A. Certainly, if we're able to eon
to agreement on the elimination of al
ballistic missiles, as the President pn
posed in Reykjavik and also in his let'
to Mr. Gorbachev last July— if we are
able to do that, then the threat again
you, that you have to protect against
much different. And so, presumably,
what you deploy would be much
different.
Q. I'd like to clear one thing uj
Dr. Kissinger referred to it in a col
umn today. Did you feel in the final i
round of discussions in Iceland, whj
the President put forth his proposa t
for 10-year adherence to the ABM |
[Antiballistic Missile] Treaty as weij
as ending all ballistic missiles in 1C i
years, did you feel that you had the i
consensus of the Administration on
that? Had the Joint Chiefs of Staff
been consulted ahead of time?
In other words, there's a critic i
that the President and, I guess,
yourself were kind of winging it th
in the end.
A. Of course, there were represe
tatives there of all of the different ag
cies. including both the Office of the]
Secretary of Defense in Mr. Perle
[Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretarj
of Defense for International Security I
Policy] and the Joint Chiefs of Staff i:
General [John] Moellering, so everybc
was presented there.
The offer the President put forwa
drew on what had developed and sent
Mr. Gorbachev in a formal letter that
everyone signed off on. In that letter
had, in one way or another, identified
years when there would be adherence
the ABM Treaty, or not departing frc
it— giving notice under it— and in a
2-year period a negotiation to elimina
all offensive ballistic missiles. So tho&
ingredients were there as part of wha
was proposed and had been talked abc
before the Reykjavik meeting.
The President sort of combined
those things together, seeing the Sovi
desire for a 10-year nonwithdrawal
period, and I thought it was a pretty t
creative piece of work.
Q. It might be creative, but if y<
are not going to deploy any part oft
SDI for 10 years, a lot of people \vh<
are supporters of it think it's a dead1
30
Dpnartmpnt of State Bull
THE SECRETARY
jem. Is that the decision of the U.S.
lernment. not to deploy for 10
s?
A. The offer of the President put
forward in conjunction with some
important things— namely, cutting
llf of all strategic arms and
inating offensive ballistic missiles.
:'s what the strategic defense is
nding against. So you are getting
jthing very important for that
ear period.
furthermore, since it is pretty clear
ow that the existence of a vigorous
:egic defense program has been
onsible for a lot of this activity, cer-
y we want to keep in being, not only
leploying it as an insurance policy
is a way of being sure that the
ctions actually take place.
Q. There is word from Moscow
iy quoting unnamed U.S. officials
lying that perhaps over the next
ral months there is a good
iibility of getting an agreement
1 the Russians on limiting and
itoring nuclear tests. What is your
^ment?
4. 1 think that's a fair appraisal,
situation is that we agreed on cer-
| increments of what could become an
all agreement— those being, let's get
verification provisions that will
•ove our ability to know what goes
nder the Threshold Test Ban and
r treaties; let's ratify those treaties
put them into effect. That
blishes a ceiling on the weight of the
5, on how big they are.
Then we can agree on the ultimate
of a comprehensive test ban. From
standpoint, we insist that that can
be reached through a negotiation
envisages a step-by-step decline in
ng in line with, or parallel with, a
ine in nuclear weapons. So those are
sments of it. And no doubt the
ets will want to put those pieces
:ther in a somewhat different way
1 we do, but I should think it would
ossible to work something out.
Q. But is it your understanding
it to work that out there is now,
It-Iceland summit, a Soviet require-
*t that it's all one large package,
^t unless you can also take care of
(question of space defense weapons
1 really cannot sign an agreement on
Blear tests or INF [intermediate-
iige nuclear forces], the medium-
»ge missiles?
[A. I would doubt that that idea will
ul up over time, but we'll see.
Q. Also, on the intermediate-range
isiles, do you think the Soviets will
eventually go back to separate negotia-
tions and agreement on that aspect of
the talks?
A. Our position will be that that
should be separated out, and we will go
forward with that. I believe that in the
end— I hope, anyway— that we will be
able to work that out.
Q. Have the Germans and the
British given you reports on their
talks with Mr. Karpov [Viktor P. Kar-
pov, Soviet negotiator on defense and
space arms and head of U.S.S.R.
delegation on arms control negotia-
tions]? Was he saying they could be
separated in his discussions with them
and then overruled from Moscow, or is
it not clear?
A. It isn't clear exactly. He seemed
to give one message out, and we heard
other things from Moscow, and they say
something to a visiting leader, like the
President of Argentina, Mr. [Raul]
Alfonsin. So the picture is moving
around.
From our standpoint, what we will
do is take the position that we think is
the right position in the various places
we're talking about these things, and
keep after them.
Q. Why do you dismiss the linkage
things, as you do?
A. I don't dismiss it.
Q. I mean, you don't take it
seriously? You don't think the Rus-
sians are serious when they say it has
all got to be a package?
A. I think they're serious. But when
you say everything has to be in a
package, what is everything?
Q. I think what they mean is what
you know.
A. I don't know whether it's —
maybe what they mean is that the agree-
ment that we worked out very carefully
on strategic arms has to be part of a
package. They apparently don't hook in
a lot of the things we talked about in our
bilateral relationship as necessarily a
part of any package, so it remains to be
seen.
Q. In the article in this morning's
Washington Post by Henry Kissinger,
that Mr. Gwertzman referred to. he
writes that he got a "sinking feeling"
when he read about the U.S.
negotiators at Reykjavik staying up all
night to try to work out an agreement
on a proposal that had just been
handed to them 36 hours before, and
suggested when this proposal was
handed you should have said, well,
we'll stiidv it. After all. it took Mr.
Gorbachev months to consider a much
less complicated proposal by President
Reagan. Doesn't Dr. Kissinger have a
real point there?
A. No, he doesn't. Not at all. He's
completely wrong about that.
Q. Do you think all-night negotia-
tions for something affecting the
nation's security is nothing to worry
about?
A. It's the only way to do it.
Now here's the point. For years,
President Reagan has been seeking
radical reductions in strategic arms. He
has proposed it and proposed it and pro-
posed it. In Geneva the two leaders
agreed on a 50% reduction objective,
and we have kept putting forward what
we think that means, in detail, in
Geneva.
In Reykjavik, what happened was
that Mr. Gorbachev put forward an idea
that allowed us to consolidate ground
very close to what we have been propos-
ing for years, so we knew what we were
doing. Our people in that negotiation had
been over that ground a great deal. So
we were well prepared, not only in terms
of positions but in terms of highly com-
petent people, and we took advantage of
an opening and consolidated it. That's
the way you should do it in a negotia-
tion. You shouldn't say, "Gosh, it's time
for tea."
Q. Just to follow that, the media
blitz— I mean, you've been on televi-
sion more than anybody in the history
of the United States in the last week.
A. And I don't even get paid for it
either. [Laughter]
Q. The idea you're giving is that
you were just about ready to have an
agreement. Now isn't the truth of the
matter, sir, that if they had said yes,
you were nowhere close to an agree-
ment? I mean, you would have to get
the verification; there would be just
interminable details to be worked out.
Isn't that correct?
A. Lots of details to be worked out.
But if you start with having set out with
some precision with what are called
"counting rules" for how you are going
to count up— for example, bombers and
weapons on bombers, and so forth-
worked out with some precision, as we
did on the strategic arms area, then it is
possible for the negotiation that has to
be more detailed and take the time to go
forward based on what was achieved.
Q. I want to switch areas with
you. There has been a lot of fighting
going on in the last week in the Middle
East between Israel and Palestinians.
. ,^^k~. h rtoc
31
THE SECRETARY
and Israeli troops have crossed into
Lebanon. Does American intelligence
fear that there's any likelihood of a
bigger war erupting there at this time?
A. We certainly don't want that to
happen. You do have a situation where
Israel, in its northern border, is con-
cerned, and understandably so, about
attacks that come from southern
Lebanon, and there's a very tense situa-
tion there.
Q. Are there really intensive troop
buildups along the border now?
A. It tends to go up and down. But
from all that I can judge, the situation is
tense and there is action but it's not out
of control by any means.
Q. You were quoted, I think, in
Israel as having sent a letter to the
new Prime Minister, Mr. Shamir, urg-
ing him not to make any changes in
Israel's policy toward the West Bank
settlements. Did you send a letter?
A. No. I don't know where that
report came from. I have talked with
Israelis coming back and forth, and I had
a long session with Mr. Shamir in New
York. And I do think that they should
not expand settlements.
Q. On Nicaragua, there is a trial
beginning of the American, Eugene
Hansenfus. What is your reaction to
the trial that will start tomorrow? And
I'm sorry, we don't have much time,
but please give us your sense.
A. First of all, the Nicaraguans are
not abiding by the normal rules that
apply when you take somebody under
those circumstances. Our government
has had no private access to him
whatever. His wife went there and only
had 1 minute with him and then in a
public occasion, so they don't seem to be
going about it in a very judicious and
proper way at all.
'Press release 222 of Oct. 20, 1986.
Secretary's Interview
on "This Week With David Brinkley"
Secretary Shultz was interviewed on
ABC-TVs -This Week With David
Brinkley" on October 5, 1986. by David
Brinkley and Sam Donaldson, ABC
News, and George F. Will, ABC News
analyst. '
Q. From what President Reagan has
been saying and from what Mr. Gor-
bachev has been saying, it appears that
they expect a good deal more out of
the Iceland summit than we do. Is that
how it looks to you?
A. I don't know exactly what you
expect, and, of course, I don't know
what Mr. Gorbachev expects.
Q. "We" meaning the U.S.
Government.
A. The President welcomes this
opportunity to further the preparations
for the upcoming summit in the United
States, and we hope that it will move
matters forward in some important
respects. Obviously it remains to be seen
what happens because the meeting is
still coming up.
Q. One of the things that might be
discussed, we are told, in Iceland is a
little detail left over from the Daniloff
affair concerning the 25 Soviet UN
employees who were named and told to
go home. Will they be made to go
home? And will those going home
include the KGB station chief and the
GRU [military intelligence] resident?
A. The 25 names that we've given
them are there, and as far as we are con-
cerned there has been no change except
for the fact that, in response to their
request, the President granted an exten-
sion of time of 14 days beyond October
1, which is a date that they will have to
meet.
Q. Most of the talk in this country
has been about the principal subjects
being INF [intermediate-range nuclear
forces] agreements, some interim
agreement on medium-range missiles,
and some agreement on strategic
defense. We just heard Mr. Gerasimov
[Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman]
almost turn this into a nuclear testing
summit.
I gather your position is there's
very little give in the American posi-
tion on this, that there will be no com-
prehensive ban on nuclear testing. Is
that still the case?
A. As long as we rely, as we do, on
nuclear weapons as our primary deter-
rent against war, there will be a need for
th
stl
tin '
testing. And if the day should arrive-
hope it will— when what the Presiden
and Mr. Gorbachev both said they art
for— namely, the elimination of nucle;|
weapons— comes about, then we won'
need any more nuclear testing.
Q. The elimination of nuclear
weapons from the face of the Earth
the President sees it, as I understail
it, is tied to the deployment of
strategic defenses. The developmen :
strategic defenses requires, as I
understand it — correct me if I'm
wrong — nuclear testing.
A. Certain kinds do, but not all
kinds.
Q. But it is for the foreseeable
future then, nuclear testing, part oi i
the program the Administration has i
for developing strategic defenses?
A. Nuclear testing, we feel, is
necessary under current conditions.
However, the President has stated 1
if we can agree to do certain things 1
improve quite significantly verificatio '
of the thresholds named in the treatie j
that had agreed to but never ratify th '
treaties and undertake a negotiation I
which is called for under those treatie
to look further at what can be done, r
ing in mind the goal of eliminating
nuclear testing as is appropriate givei
the state of the weaponry.
Q. A lot of people worry that M-
Reagan has made a mistake in goinj
the summit, that looking for his pla-
in history, he thirsts after a second '
summit here in Washington and heV
going to give Gorbachev really what
Gorbachev wants, which is a deal in
those one-on-one sessions. Now,
what's wrong with that theory?
A. It's nonsense. [Laughter]
Q. You say it's nonsense, but isil
it true?
A. I'm not going to waste time orl
that. [Laughter]
Q. No, no. I think a lot of peoplt1
are saying this. I read this in the
newspapers, from columnists.
A. The President, of course, would
like to see a radical reduction in nuclei
weapons. He said that and said that ai
said that. When he first proposed it, h
was laughed out of town by all of the j
experts you referred to as suggesting I
something impossible. And—
Q. Why not do it at Geneva?
A. Hold on. And now the Presi-
dent's agenda is the agenda. That's wl|
we're talking about. And the argumeni
is not whether or not these armamentsl
should be reduced but over how fast ai
32
npnartmpnt nf .^tatP Ri
,iie
THE SECRETARY
\ far and what the initial steps should
(But the point is the President has
light about discussion of his agenda;
if he can bring that off, I think it
ild be a great thing. So why not try?
n't see why people are alarmed
mse he is trying.
Q. You're saying that Geneva isn't
proper forum. The proper forum is
nald Reagan in an easy chair—
A. No.
Q. —opposite Mikhail Gorbachev
in easy chair in a haunted house.
A. No. Not at all. Geneva is the
oer forum for these negotiations and
articular for all of the intricate
lils of them. Obviously, the people in
ieva, whether on our side or their
i, get their instructions from
shington and Moscow—
Q. And what w ill the two of them
lide?
A. —and so we can see if there can
some additional impulse given.
Q. Let me ask you, then, how does
I Reagan decide whether an addi-
ual impulse is called for? Does he
t Gorbachev's sincerity by the way
ivoice doesn't quaver? I'm not quite
rir what these one-on-one's
bmplish.
I A. There will be one-on-one's, and
re will also be some with some addi-
lal people, maybe only one or two.
j, at any rate, they can discuss par-
liar areas where we are negotiating
I see just where certain matters may
and how we may refer it back to our
ffotiators.
I And let's remember that we have a
iof things to keep bearing down on
ides what you're talking about. We
Je some big differences on what's
(tig on in various regions of the world,
|i the possibility of some constructive
fcements.
I We have major differences of opin-
> about human rights matters. You
I had Mr. Daniloff [U.S. News &
wrld Report correspondent Nicholas
Iniloff] here as sort of a case study in
It. So we'll talk about those as well as
(jie bilateral issues.
Q. Do you think the climate is
jiid at the moment for some move-
ant to come out of Iceland?
A. Yes.
I Q. The Reagan Administration has
ten vigorous in demanding on-site
Mpection of the destruction of those
ify say they're going to destroy and
ualmost constant observation team at
the factories where they might pro-
duce more.
A. You have to have a good verifica-
tion agreement to go with this, and pre-
cisely what things are absolutely essen-
tial we'll have to work out. I think these
are the kind of testing things that
perhaps the President might want to put
to Mr. Gorbachev.
Q. But isn't a constant observation
of those factories — isn't that almost an
obvious sine quo non of a verifiable
agreement?
A. It's an important element in the
picture, and I think we've seen at least
the rhetoric on verification from the
Soviet Union change. We've seen some
shift as a result of the agreement on
confidence-building measures just
reached in Stockholm.
We have also seen that when we put
forward a strong proposal in the conven-
tional arms field, they backed off from
it. So just where they are going to come
down on verification remains to be seen,
but we know that it's something that's
very important and we're going to have
to follow through on it.
Q. It appears the Soviet Union is
eager to talk about a test ban, as we
have discussed. It appears also they
are very interested in reducing
intermediate-range missiles they have,
and we have, in and around Western
Europe. Suppose we were to—
A. And in Asia we are interested.
And in Asia.
Q. All right. Suppose we were
able to make an agreement, and it was
kept and the intermediate missiles
were removed. How would the defense
of Europe look to you then? Wouldn't
they still be vulnerable to a huge land
army not far away?
A. Of course, the most fundamental
deterrent is our strategic deterrent, and
what happened is that the Soviets
deployed intermediate-range weapons
aimed at Europe. And after a long
period struggle to negotiate those out,
the alliance, in a very strong and solid
way, deployed our own missiles. That
has occasioned the Soviet Union coming
back to the bargaining table, and now
we are in the process of trying to
negotiate these levels down and in the
end out, which was our position all
along.
Q. The President's position is that
a stable world requires defensive
systems. The question is, will you
accept an agreement that seriously
impedes progress toward that? And
would not an agreement that
restricted strategic defense research
to research within the laboratory
seriously impede defense by discourag-
ing scientists and discouraging Con-
gress from funding it?
A. The President believes, and I cer-
tainly agree completely, personally, as
all of his advisers do, that if we can get
into the strategic balance a greater ele-
ment of defense, it will be more stable
and therefore more desirable. And, of
course, the more far-reaching your
defense can be, the better off we would
be.
Since we think that is important and
very significant, obviously, we're not
going to agree to things that would
inhibit it.
Q. Do you agree that it would be
seriously inhibited by a restriction that
confines research to the laboratory?
A. It all depends on what the
laboratory consists of; but obviously, you
need to test the things that you are
doing in order to know whether they
work. And I might say that the program
that is now underway does seem to hold
the promise of giving us the knowledge
we want, and it's consistent with the
ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty.
Q. Supporters of strategic defense
worry that whatever comes out of this
summit and the next one will be
viewed as a moratorium, a mutually
agreed upon moratorium of some sort,
restraining development of defenses;
and they note that Americans never
break moratoria on their own— they
just refuse to do that.
Aren't you in danger of putting
the next administration or the one
after that in the position of having to
be the first administration to break a
moratorium or killing strategic
defense?
A. I've never heard the word
"moratorium" applied to the work on
strategic defense, and I can't conceive of
any circumstances where the President
would agree to that.
Q. At last report there was a
Soviet Yankee-class submarine burn-
ing off Bermuda. What can you tell us
about that? What are the latest
reports?
A. What I've seen in the papers is
consistent with what we are finding out,
but there are U.S. planes overhead, so
we know that it's true. But there's no
additional radioactivity in the
atmosphere, and I gather they have
some method of measuring what's going
on in the sea, so that as of now, accord-
ing to the information we have, it con-
firms what the Soviets have said. The
~ — .. a noc
33
THE SECRETARY
submarine for about 20 minutes seemed
to move under its own power, and then
it stopped. And so apparently they're
still trying to get it underway.
Q. The Soviets rather quickly
notified us of this incident. Why do
you think — it's a change from Cher-
nobyl. Why do you think there was this
change?
A. I think they got badly burned in
Chernobyl because you can't hide these
things, no matter how much—
Q. Don't we know yet —
A. Now, this occurred on Friday
morning, our time, and President
Reagan was notified Saturday morning.
I think that's pretty good.
Q. Surely when one of their sub-
marines gets in trouble, we — noisy
trouble, we have the capacity to know
that instantly, don't we?
A. Pretty fast.
Q. Admiral Clancy told us that in
his books. Mr. Secretary, another
question — that is, disinformation.
A. Furthermore, with an explosion
and hot spots and so on, you tend to pick
up.
Q. Oh, by the way, is there any
danger that one of these missiles
might somehow fire because of this
fire on board the sub?
A. According to our experts, the
answer is no.
Q. Let's turn to the disinformation
story, the story that this government
attempted to cause [Libyan leader]
Qadhafi to believe things which
weren't true in order to perhaps bring
his downfall.
Is it your position that the govern-
ment has a right to use news media in
order to do something like that?
A. I don't lie. I've never taken part
in any meeting in which it was proposed
that we go out and lie to the news media
for some effect; and if somebody did
that, he was doing it against policy.
Now, having said that, one of the
results of our action against Libya, from
all the intelligence we've received, was
quite a period of disorientation on the
part of Qadhafi. And among other good
effects from that was for a while the
support for terrorism, certainly in
Europe, tended to subside. We see it
beginning to rise again, we believe.
So to the extent we can keep
Qadhafi off balance by one means or
another, including the possibility that we
might make another attack, I think
that's good. And I don't see what's
wrong with that.
Q. Are you making the distinction
between lying to the American people
and lying, let's say, to Qadhafi, or
others? Surely if you keep him off
balance, you lie to him.
A. We are not necessarily lying to
him. And we can always count on the
American news media to report
everything that happens, whether we try
to keep it secret or not. So if we move a
ship from point A to point B, we can
figure that ABC News is going to show
it on television, and Qadhafi will know it
and wonder what it means.
Q. Is there a distinction between
what is fair game in dealing with the
American press and what is fair game
in, say, planting useful destabilizing
information overseas that might then
leak back into the domestic press?
A. I think there's probably a distinc-
tion, sure, but that's not the purpose, to
have it leak back into the American
press.
Q. No one's accusing you of lying.
Certainly, I'm not. But there is the
problem of not having all the facts
when you speak. Seymour Hersch in
his book about what happened to [KAL
Flight #] 007 makes the point that the
morning after that Korean airliner was
shot down, you went on television and
said almost flatly that we knew the
Soviets knew it was a domestic
airliner and not a spy plane, when in
fact according to Hersch the facts are
that the Soviets probably didn't know
that.
A. The morning that that plane v
shot down we had, and I got the
intelligence community to let us use,
effect the transcript of the conversatij
between the pilot of the Soviet plane
that shot down the airliner—
Q. Raw and unevaluated?
A. —and his ground that said— I
forget exactly what it said, but basica
said, "I've identified it, and I've shot
down." So we know that they knew ti
shot the plane down. They did that
deliberately.
Q. Do you still believe they —
A. Now, one of the reasons why
wanted to do that was to be sure that
they knew right off that we knew
exactly what happened. Even so, the}
denied they shot the plane down for a
while, and then finally they came up
with the rather lame business about
how—
.v
Q. Do you still believe that the;
thought it was an airliner?
A. It's very hard to confuse the ej
figuration of the 747 airplane with th( I
configuration of the—
Q. Is it still your belief that the ,
thought it was an airliner.
A. It is very clear that they knew j
airliner took off from Anchorage, I gtl
it was, bound for Korea. They also knj
that a plane that makes a routine
surveillance also took off. By the time
they shot the airliner down, as I
remember— I don't have all these thin;
instantly in my head— but, as I
remember, the intelligence plane had
already landed. So if they were con-
fused, they didn't have a right to be, a
they shot it down.
■Press release 202 of Oct. 6, 1986.
34
Dfinartmfint nf State Bullet
FRICA
bonomic Sanctions Against South Africa
iSSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
PT. 25, 19861
September 9. 1985, in Executive Order
12, I declared a national emergency to
[with the threat posed by the policies and
Ins of the Government of South Africa to
foreign policy and economy of the United
les. Those actions and policies continue to
I an unusual and extraordinary threat to
foreign policy and economy of the United
Jes. and in accordance with Section 202(d)
le National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.i '
Bd)), I continued the national emergency
i respect to South Africa on September 4.
16. Pursuant to Section 204(c) of the Inter-
pnal Emergency Economic Powers Act
L'.S.C. 1703(c)). I am today reporting on
levelopments since my last report of
jch IT, 1986.
Dn Executive Order 12532. I prohibited:
tie making or approval of bank loans to
pouth African Government, with certain
low exceptions; (2) the export of com-
bs and related goods and technology to
lain government agencies and any
ftheid-enforcing entity of the South
lean Government; (3) nuclear exports to
Ih Africa and related transactions, with
kin narrow exceptions: (4) the import into
IL'nited States of arms, ammunition, or
j.ary vehicles produced in South Africa;
1(5) the extension of export marketing
lort to U.S. firms employing at least
rity-five persons in South Africa that do
jadhere to certain fair labor standards.
En addition, I called for (6) consultations
I other parties to the General Agreement
fariffs and Trade with a view toward
fcting a prohibition on the import of
igerrands; (7) the completion of a report
(he feasibility of minting U.S. gold coins:
In increase in the amount provided for
llarships in South Africa to victims of
rtheid and an increase in the amount
fated for South Africa in the Human
Its Fund; and (9) the establishment of an
lisory Committee to provide recommenda-
Is on measures to encourage peaceful
nge in South Africa.
Executive Order 12535 of October 1,
i>, prohibited the importation of the South
lean Krugerrand into the United States,
|ctive October 11, 1985 (50 Fed. Reg.
i2."i, ( let. 3. 1985). This implemented the
O-se of action contemplated in Executive
her 12532. The Office of Foreign Assets
Itrol of the Department of Treasury issued
Ith African Transactions Regulations on
fcber 9, 1985), to implement the Kruger-
r 1 ban. There have been no changes in
be regulations in the past six months.
Bin addition, the Bureau of Alcohol,
lacco, and Firearms of the Department of
((Treasury issued regulations on the Impor-
flon of Articles on the United States Muni-
lb Import List on October 7, 1985,
llementing the prohibition of certain arms
lorts contained in executive Order 12532
(50 Fed. Reg. 42157. Oct 18, 1985). The
Department of State issued final regulations
on Smith Africa and Fair Labor Standards on
December 23, 1985, implementing the fair
labor provisions of the Order (50 Fed. Reg.
53308, Dec. 31, 1985). The Office of Foreign
Assets Control of the Treasury Department
issued South African Transactions Regula-
tions on November 6, 1985, implementing the
Order's hank loan prohibition (50 Fed. Reg.
46726, Nov. 12. 1985). The International
Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce issued regulations on Export Con-
trols on the Republic of South Africa on
November 14. 1985, implementing the com-
puter and nuclear export prohibitions in the
Executive Order (50 Fed. Reg. 47363, Nov.
is, 1985). With the exception of some minor
technical amendments, there have been no
changes in any of these regulations in the
past six months.
With the publication of a notice in the
l-\ deral Register, the Department of State
established the Advisory Committee on South
Africa on October 22, 1985 (50 Fed. Reg.
42817, Oct. 22, 1985). The Commitee has met
several times since and shall render a report
to the Secretary of State within one year of
its first meeting, which was held on January
29-30, 1986.
The Secretary of the Treasury submitted
a report on the feasibility of minting U.S.
gold coins on November 8. 1985. On
December 17 of that year, I signed the Gold
Bullion Coin Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-1S5),
requiring the minting of such coins.
The expenses incurred by the Federal
government in the period from September 9,
L985, through September 8, 1986, that are
directly attributable to the exercise of powers
and authorities conferred by the declaration
of the national emergency with respect to
South Africa are estimated at $536,813. of
which approximately $404,230 represents
wage and salary costs for Federal personnel
and approximately $135,583, represents out-
of-pocket expenses. Personnel costs were
largely centered in the Department of the
Treasury, Department of State, Department
of Commerce, and Department of Energy.
I shall continue to exercise the powers at
my disposal to apply the measures contained
in Executive Orders 12532 and 12535 as long
as these measures are appropriate and will
report periodically to the Congress on signifi-
cant developments pursuant to Section 204(c)
of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act.
Ronald Reagan
MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SEPT. 26. 19862
I am returning herewith without my approval
H.R. 4868, the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986. Title III of this bill
would seriously impede the prospects for a
peaceful end to apartheid and the establish-
ment of a free and open society for all in
South Africa.
The Administration has no quarrel with
the decleared purpose of this measure.
Indeed, we share that purpose: To send a
clear signal to the South African Government
that the American people view with abhor-
rence its codified system of racial segrega-
tion. Apartheid is an affront to human rights
and human dignity. Normal and friendly rela-
tions cannot exist between the United States
and South Africa until it becomes a dead
policy. Americans are of one mind and one
heart on this issue.
But while we vigorously support the pur-
pose of this legislation, declaring economic
warfare against the people of South Africa
would be destructive not only of their efforts
to peacefully end apartheid, but also of the
opportunity to replace it with a free society.
The sweeping and punitive sanctions
adopted by the Congress are targeted directly
at the labor intensive industries upon which
the victimized peoples of South Africa depend
for their very survival. Black workers— the
first victims of apartheid— would become the
first victims of American sanctions.
Banning the import of sugar, for exam-
ple, would threaten the livelihood of 23.000
black farmers. Banning the import of natural
resources is a sanction targeted directly at
the mining industries of South Africa, upon
which more than half a million black laborers
depend for their livelihood.
By prohibiting the importation of food
and agricultural products, the measure would
invite retaliation by South Africa, which since
June has purchased over 160,000 tons of
wheat from the United States. Denying basic
foodstuffs to South Africa— much of which go
to feed the black population— will only lead to
privation, unrest, and violence. It will not
advance the goals of peaceful change.
Are we truly helping the black people of
South Africa— the lifelong victims of
apartheid— when we throw them out of work
and leave them and their families jobless and
hungry in those segregated townships? Or are
we simply assuming a normal posture at the
expense of the people in whose name we
presume to act?
This, then, is the first and foremost
reason I cannot support this legislation.
Punitive economic sanctions would contribute
directly and measurably to the misery of peo-
ple who already have suffered enough. Using
America's power to deepen the economic
crisis in this tortured country is not the way
to reconciliation and peace. Black South
Africans recognize that they would pay with
their lives for the deprivation, chaos, and
violence that would follow an economic col-
lapse. That is why millions of blacks and
numerous black leaders in South Africa are as
firm in their opposition to sanctions as in
their abhorrence of apartheid.
^^mKor 1 OQ£
35
AFRICA
Tlie imposition of punitive sanctions
would also deliver a devastating blow to the
neighboring states in southern Africa that
depend on Pretoria for transportation,
energy, markets, and food. An estimated
million-and-a-half foreign workers, legal and
illegal, now live in South Africa. The number
of people, women and children especially, out-
side South Africa who are dependent upon
the remittances of these workers for their
survival has been estimated to be over five
million. Do we truly wish to be directly
responsible for increased suffering, and
perhaps starvation, in southern Africa? Do we
truly wish our action to be the rationale
Pretoria invokes for expelling these workers?
Do we truly wish to trigger a cycle of eco-
nomic sanctions and countersanctions that
end up crippling the economy of South Africa
and devastating the economies of the front-
line states? What sense does it make to send
aid to those impoverished countries with one
hand while squeezing their economies with
the other?
Disrupting the South African economy
and creating more unemployment will only
fuel the tragic cycle of violence and repres-
sion that has gripped that troubled country.
Black unemployment in South Africa in some
areas is over 50 percent— and adding to it will
create more anger, more violence, and more
competition among blacks struggling to sur-
vive. It will not improve prospects for
negotiations.
Another feature of the bill would require
the Administration to publicly identify within
six months any and all nations that have
chosen not to join us in observing the U.N.
arms embargo against South Africa, "with a
view to terminating United States military
assistance to those countries." But the United
States will not revert to a singleminded policy
of isolationism, with its vast and unforeseen
effects on our international security relation-
ships, that would be dictated by the unilateral
decision of our allies. No single issues, no
matter how important, can be allowed to
override in this way all other consideration in
our foreign policy. Our military relationships
must continue to be based upon a comprehen-
sive assessment of our national defense needs
and the security of the West.
Not only does this legislation contain
sweeping punitive sanctions that would injure
most the very people we seek to help, the
legislation discards our economic leverage,
constricts our diplomatic freedom, and ties
the hands of the President of the United
States in dealing with a gathering crisis in a
critical subcontinent where the Soviet Bloc—
with its mounting investment of men and
arms— clearly sees historic opportunity.
Therefore, I am also vetoing the bill because
it contains provisions that infringe on the
President's constitutional prerogative to
articulate the foreign policy of the United
States.
There are, however, several features of
the measure that the Administration sup-
ports. Title II of the bill, for example, man-
dates affirmative measures to eliminate
apartheid and provide assistance to its vic-
tims, including support for black participation
in business enterprises as owners, managers,
36
and professionals. It authorizes the President
to take steps for the purpose of assisting
firms to fight apartheid and extend equal
opportunity to blacks in investment, manage-
ment, and employment. The bill also contains
a number of other useful and realistic provi-
sions, such as those calling upon the African
National Congress (ANC) to reexamine its
Communist ties and mandating a report on
the activities of the Communist Party in
South Africa and the extent to which it has
infiltrated South African political organiza-
tions. Still other portions of the bill call upon
the ANC to condemn the practice of "necklac-
ing" and terrorism and to state affirmatively
that it will support a free and democratic
post-apartheid South Africa. These provi-
sions, as well as many others in the bill,
reflect the agreement of the Congress and the
Administration on important aspects of an
overall anti-apartheid policy.
The Administration has been— and
remains— prepared to work with the Congress
to devise measures that manifest the
American people's united opposition to
apartheid— without injuring its victims. We
remain ready to work with the Congress in
framing measures that— like the 1962 U.S.
embargo of military sales and the carefully
targeted sanctions of my own Executive
order of 1985— keep the United States at
arms distance from the South African regime,
while keeping America's beneficent influence
at work bringing about constructive change
within that troubled society and nation.
It remains my hope that the United
States can work with its European allies to
fashion a flexible and coordinated policy-
consistent with their recent actions— for con-
structive change inside South Africa. I believe
we should support their measures with similar
executive actions of our own, and I will work
with the Congress toward that goal. It
remains my hope that, once again,
Republicans and Democrats can come
together on the common ground that, after
all, we both share: An unyielding opposition
both to the unacceptable doctrine of apartheid
as well as the unacceptable alternative of
Marxist tyranny— backed by the firm deter-
mination that the future of South Africa and
southern Africa will belong to the free. To
achieve that, we must stay and build, not cut
and run.
That Americans should recoil at what
their television screens bring them from
South Africa— the violence, the repression,
the terror— speaks well of us as a people. But
the historic crisis in South Africa is not one
from which the leading nation of the West
can turn its back and walk away. For the out-
come of that crisis has too great a bearing
upon the future of Africa, the future of
NATO, the future of the West.
Throughout the postwar era, we Ameri-
cans have succeeded when we left our par-
tisan differences at the water's edge— and
persevered; as we did in the rebuilding of
Europe and Japan, as we are doing today in
El Salvador. We have failed when we per-
mitted our exasperation and anger and impa-
tience at present conditions to persuade us to
forfeit the future to the enemies of freedom.
Let us not forget our purpose. It is ni
damage or destroy any economy, but to r
the black majority of South Africa and
southern Africa enjoy a greater share of
material blessings and bounties their labc
was helped to produce— as they secure as
their legitimate political rights. That is w
sweeping punitive sanctions are the wron
course to follow, and increased American
Western investment— by firms that are
breaking down apartheid by providing eq
opportunity for the victims of official
discrimination— is the right course to pur
Our goal is a democratic system in wl
the rights of majorities, minorities, and
individuals are protected by a bill of right
and firm constitutional guarantees.
Ronald Re.
LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 29, 19863
I understand and share the very strong f<
ings and sense of frustration in the Cong
and in our Nation about apartheid, an un'
scionable system that we all reject. The o
ing tragedy in South Africa tests our rest
as well as our patience. None of us wants
aggravate that tragedy.
In the last several months, the South
African Government, instead of moving
furt her down the once promising path of
reform and dialogue, has turned to interr I
repression. We all know that South Afric |
real problem traces to the perpetuation o.
apartheid. And we know that the solution I
this problem can only be found in lifting t '
present State of Emergency, repealing al
racially discriminatory laws, releasing
political prisoners, and unbanning politics '
parties— necessary steps opening the way I
negotiations aimed at creating a new, der
cratic order for all South Africans. The Si I
African Government holds the key to the I
opening of such negotiations. Emerging f
discussion among South Africans, we war I
see a democratic system in which the righ '
of majorities, minorities, and individuals a'
protected by a bill of rights and firm cons) I
tional guarantees. We will be actively pur:
ing diplomatic opportunities and approach
in an effort to start a movement toward n '
tiations in South Africa.
I outlined in my message to the House1
Representatives on Friday my reasons for '
vetoing the Comprehensive Anti-Aparthei<
Act of 1986, principally my opposition to
punitive sanctions that harm the victims o '
apartheid and my desire to work in concer
with our Allies. I also indicated in that
message that I am prepared to sign an
expanded Executive order that strongly
signals our rejection of apartheid and our I
desire to actively promote rapid positive
change in South Africa. I am prepared to
expand the range of restrictions and other '
measures that will characterize our relatio '
with South Africa. There would be strong '
sanctions in my new order, sanctions that '
earnestly wish were unnecessary. These sa
December
,
ARMS CONTROL
^, directed at the enforcers not the vic-
j of apartheid, encompass measures
jntly adopted by many elements of the
■nal Senate Committee version of the bill.
y are incontestably necessary in today's
^instances. My intention is to make it
t to South Africa's leaders that we cannot
iuct business-as-usual with a government
i mistakes the silence of racial repression
j he consent of the governed.
My new Executive order will, therefore,
: firm and incorporate the measures I
jised last year (i.e., bans on loans to the
i.h African Government and its agencies,
ixports of computers to apartheid-
ircing entities and the military and police,
luclear exports except those related to
th, safety, and IAEA [International
lnic Energy Agency] programs, imports of
i;h African weapons, the import of
l^errands, and a requirement for all U.S.
I s to apply fair labor standards based on
Sullivan principles).
IThe Executive order will also add:
> a ban on new investments other than
e in black-owned firms or companies
lying the fair labor standards of the
! van principles;
i» a ban on the import from South Africa
'on and steel;
• a ban on bank accounts for the South
jean Government and its agencies;
p a requirement to identify countries tak-
iinfair advantage of U.S. measures
Inst South Africa with a view to restrict-
Iheir exports to the United States by the
Hunt necessary to compensate for the loss
I.S. companies;
p a requirement to report and make
ymmendations on means of reducing U.S.
f ndence on strategic minerals from
■hern Africa;
f a requirement to provide at least $25
Ion in assistance for scholarships, educa-
a, community development, and legal aid
■sadvantaged South Africans with a pro-
lion on such assistance to any group or
»ndual who has been engaged in gross
i^tion of internationally recognized human
^s;
J» the imposition of severe criminal and
iri penalties under several statutes for viola-
I of the provisions of my Executive order;
'• a requirement to consult with allies in
ttr to coordinate policies and programs
)prd South Africa;
|« a requirement to report on whether any
fnese prohibitions has had the effect of
teasing U.S. or allied dependence on the
tyet bloc for strategic or other critical
Merials, with a view to appropriate modifi-
abns of U.S. measures under my Executive
ipr should such dependency have been
leased;
!• and a clear statement that the Execu-
ij order constitutes a complete and com-
iiensive statement of U.S. policy toward
Nth Africa, with the intent of preempting
■insistent State and local laws which under
'(Constitution may be preempted.
Sanctions, in and of themselves, do not
B up to a policy for South Africa and the
cthern Africa region. Positive steps as well
as negative signals are necessary. This
unusually complex and interrelated part of
the world is one that cries out for better
understanding and sympathy on our part. We
must consider what we can do to contribute
to development of healthy economies and
democratic institutions throughout the region
and to help those who are the victims of
apartheid.
Following the Congress' lead and building
on existing programs, I plan to expand our
assistance to those suffering the cost of
apartheid and to help blacks as they prepare
to play their full role in a free South Africa.
We spent $20 million in FY 86 and have
requested $25 million in FY 87. We will do
more, much of it along the lines incorporated
in the South Africa bill.
I am also committed to present to the
next Congress a comprehensive multi-year
program designed to promote economic
reform and development in the black-ruled
states of southern Africa. We intend to seek
the close collaboration of Japan and our Euro-
pean allies in this constructive effort. Our
goal is to create a sound basis for a post-
apartheid region— a southern Africa where
democracy and respect for fundamental
human rights can flourish.
I believe the United States can assist
responsibly in resolving southern Africa's
tragic dilemma. Many observers in and out-
side South Africa regard present trends with
despair, seeing in them a bloody inevitability
as positions harden over the central question
of political power. This is a grim scenario that
allows no free choice and offers a racial civil
war as the only solution. It need not be so if
wisdom and imagination prevail.
South Africans continue to search for
solutions. Their true friends should help in
this search. As I have said before, our
humanitarian concerns and our other national
interests converge in South Africa as in few
other countries. With the actions I propose
today, I believe it is clear that my Administra-
tion's intentions and tnose of the Congress
are identical. May we unite so that U.S.
foreign policy can be effective in bringing
people of good will and imagination in South
Africa together to rebuild a better, just, and
democratic tomorrow.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1986.
2Message returning House Resolution
4868 without approval (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents of
Sept. 29, 1986).
identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Robert Dole, Senate
Majority Leaders (text from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents of Oct. 6,
1986). ■
West Urges Acceptance of Verification
at MBFR Talks
U.S. STATEMENT,
OCT. 23, 1986
In his plenary statement today, Ambas-
sador Robert D. Blackwill, head of the
U.S. delegation, continued Western
efforts to persuade the Warsaw Pact to
join the West in moving toward an
accord in the MBFR [mutual and
balanced force reductions] negotiations.
Speaking on behalf of the West, he
urged the East once again to examine
the problem of verifying compliance with
an agreement. Effective verification, he
said, verification that reassures, is vital
to the success of any arms control
agreement.
Having conceded this point in princi-
ple as recently as last week, the East
wants to render it ineffective in applica-
tion. They ask that verification be con-
sidered with a trusting attitude. If both
sides had so much faith in each other,
such great confidence in the other's
intentions, then they would not be here.
As President Reagan has observed,
"Nations don't distrust each other
because they are armed; they are armed
because they distrust each other." Arms
control agreements may help create
trust; they do not spring from it. Ambas-
sador Blackwill called for the sides to
work for an accord that will build mutual
goodwill, not depend upon it.
Agreements, such as the one being
negotiated here, must allow each side to
satisfy itself that the other side is
abiding by its commitments. Soviet
Deputy Defense Minister Shabanov
recently acknowledged this point when
he declared: "Verification, as an element
in interstate relations, objectively serves
the sides' security interests."
Both West and East voice support
for the principle that verification
measures should be commensurate with
obligations assumed. The sides, however,
differ over what this principle means in
practical terms for verification of the
time-limited, first-phase agreement
being discussed— most notably it's
no-increase obligation.
The East has repeatedly charged
that Western measures are not in line
with the modest reductions envisaged.
This argument is not just a misrepresen-
tation of the Western position. It also
1'omhor 1 Qflfi
37
ARMS CONTROL
distorts what is required to verify the
very sort of agreement the East itself
has proposed.
As far as the issue of monitoring
reductions is concerned, Western and
Eastern verification measures are simi-
lar. Both sides provide for a detailed
exchange of information on all forces to
be withdrawn, for the observation of
these forces as they pass through exit-
entry points in departing the area of
reductions, as well as for noninterfer-
ence with national technical means. And
recently the East has signaled its will-
ingness once again to discuss the possi-
bility of direct observation of with-
drawals until the forces leave the area of
reductions. So there is agreement that a
balance exists between proposed verifi-
cation measures and obligations with
regard to the reductions aspect of the
agreement we are discussing.
Where the sides differ seriously in
their views is in verifying the
no-increase commitment. Rather than
explain how its proposed measures could
deter or detect violations, the Warsaw
Pact has chosen to obfuscate the issue-
most particularly by correlating meas-
ures meant to monitor the sides'
no-increase obligations and the totally
separate question of the size of initial
U.S. and Soviet reductions.
Yet, by any yardstick, the
no-increase commitment is the central
obligation of this accord. The East has
recognized its political significance for
our negotiations.
The far-reaching military signifi-
cance of such an undertaking should not,
however, be overlooked. The no-increase
commitment would place a clear, numeri-
cal, and legally binding cap on the
military manpower of participating
NATO and Warsaw Pact states in cen-
tral Europe for the first time since the
establishment of the two alliances.
The West has long been worried, and
the East says it is also concerned, about
the high level of military confrontation
in central Europe. By precluding general
increases in military manpower over the
figures exchanged on residual forces in
the area of reductions, an effective
no-increase commitment could contrib-
ute to changes in each side's evaluation
of the military threat.
Such a ceiling could improve military
stability. Both NATO and the Warsaw
Pact are at present free to increase their
forces in the area of reductions as
deemed necessary to respond, for exam-
ple, to restructuring or technological
developments. Under a no-increase com-
mitment, any force restructuring or
other modernization action which
involved additional manpower would
have to be compensated by numerical
reductions in existing forces.
Finally, a no-increase commitment
would magnify the significance of the
geographic advantages enjoyed by the
East, especially in the event of a crisis.
This is particularly significant as far as
Western security is concerned and
underlines the importance of ensuring
strict compliance with the no-increase
commitment.
For all these reasons, the West
believes that reaching a mutually agreed
no-increase obligation would be an
unprecedented event in modern Euro-
pean military history.
In many ways, the main unresolved
question in the MBFR negotiation is:
which side's approach to monitoring the
no-increase commitment is commen-
surate with the formidable obligations
this commitment entails? A brief com-
parison of the sides' proposals regarding
information exchange inspections and
exit-entry points provides a clear
answer.
Both sides agree that the exchange
of information on force levels of the
sides in central Europe is needed in
order to verify the ceilings on armed
forces and that the numbers need to be
disaggregated.
Unfortunately, however, the East
has failed to carry these points to their
logical conclusion: disaggregation of
information down to a manageable
level— i.e., battalion or air force
squadron— for purposes of verification.
The East has turned away from the issue
of how to verify residual manpower ceil-
ings by means of disaggregated informa-
tion. Instead, the East prefers to focus
primarily on the totally different matter
of ensuring that no additional military
units are introduced into the area of
reductions. Indeed, in explaining its
inspections measure, the East disassoci-
ates inspections from the very task of
verifying the no-increase obligation on
manpower.
This Eastern shift ignores the
specific no-increase obligation both sides
have espoused— a limitation on residual
manpower, not on formations or units.
Indeed, the East's approach would allow
residual manpower ceilings to be
extended at will. For example, without
increasing the number of military forma-
tions in the reductions area, the East
could significantly exceed its no-increase
obligations— indeed, by a figure many
times greater than initial Soviet
reductions— simply by increasing the
manning levels of existing Warsaw Pact
units in the area of reductions. A surr
titious increase of only 10% in mannir
of a side's existing units could add sor
100.000 troops to the forces of the
violating side. This could be achieved
manipulating the annual rotations of
nearly half a million Soviet forces wh(
the East now excludes from passing
through the exit-entry points. Given t
inadequacy of national technical mean
in such case, how does the East propc
to monitor increases in manning level
A further inconsistency in the Ea:
approach regarding disaggregation of
information and the no-increase comn
ment is that while stressing the impoi
tance of verifying that no additional f>
mations or military contingents appea
in the area of reductions, the East,
nevertheless, fails to provide for any
exchange of information on residual
units and their locations in central
Europe. Without such disaggregated
information, there would be no yardst
against which to measure results pro-
vided by national technical means or I
inspections. This is all the more peculi
when one notes that the East has agn j
to provide such information on forces
be reduced. Can the East explain this
double standard?
The focus in the Eastern verificati
scheme on formations and not
manpower— despite mutual agreemen'
that the no-increase obligation would 1
expressed in terms of overall ground i
air force personnel figures, not
structure— also contributes to some of
the shortcomings of its exit-entry poin
and inspection measures. Thus althouf
the Warsaw Pact concedes that all
forces withdrawn as part of agreed
reductions must pass through exit-enti!
points, the East now excludes the annil
rotation of nearly half a million Soviet I
forces from having to pass through the '
points. The East asks the West not to I
dramatize this issue. If this is not a
dramatic change of Eastern position, I
what is it?
The emphasis on organizations— ar.1
not manpower— may help explain the
uncertainty over the East's position col
cerning unobstructed access to all build
ings and the right to conduct an unob-
structed survey, except for specific
facilities which would be closed to
inspection as agreed between the sides I
before signature of the agreement. Mil !
tary forces are, of course, often found i1
buildings such as barracks. Does the
Warsaw Pact agree to the principle of
unobstructed access and survey with
respect to on-site inspections?
The East acknowledges the need tc
verify that a side is not increasing the
38
Department of State Bulled
ARMS CONTROL
ining level of units in the area of
Ictions in violation of the no-increase
Imitment and has indicated that
■feci urns could be used to monitor
I possible development. But it is
let on how its inspection proposal
Bd address this problem. Again the
Ition arises, how does the East
fid to address this verification
Hem?
Of course, the major drawback with
(East's proposal for inspections is
I they would only be granted in
souse to "well-founded requests,"
ler than being as of right. Only a
lem of inspections as of right and
line which is based upon information
Aggregated to a manageable level— as
IWest has proposed— can assure each
side that the other is abiding by the
no-increase commitment.
Ambassador Blackwill concluded by
noting that as the distinguished repre-
sentative of the United Kingdom said
recently and as was explained today, a
limitation applying to forces of about
2 million men spread over a territory of
just under a million square kilometers is
in no way a modest obligation. He asked
if the East disagreed, and if so, he said,
the West would like to know why. And if
the Warsaw Pact does believe that a
no-increase commitment has great
military significance, why then does it
reject verification measures commen-
surate with that significance? The West
would also like to know that. ■
iiclear and Space Arms Talks
Den Round Six
ESIDENTS STATEMENT,
B'T. 17, 19861
I nuclear and space talks (NST)
i me tomorrow with the opening of
lid six in Geneva. This could prove to
I very important phase in the strong
|rt being made by the United States
let Soviet agreement to deep reduc-
|s in nuclear arms. If the Soviets are
letermined as we are, there is a real
pee for such reductions.
[The United States is fully committed
chieving genuine arms reductions—
I soon. It is in this spirit that I wrote
General Secretary Gorbachev in July,
Iher amplifying our positions on the
[range of arms control issues. In this
er I specifically sought areas of com-
h ground where we and the Soviet
on could most productively focus our
gbs to reach agreement. My letter
•It with expressed Soviet concerns
identified immediate, practical steps
i can move us in the direction of our
pate goal: the total elimination of
Dear arms.
We are now awaiting a constructive
[iet response. Our ideas offer a solid
Is for negotiations toward agree-
pts beneficial to both sides. If the
nets offer a serious response, we can
k forward to a productive round.
' In the weeks leading up to Friday's
bting between Secretary Shultz and
reign Minister Shevardnadze, the
^ted States has undertaken expert-
el discussions with the Soviets in the
four key areas of the U.S. -Soviet
agenda. This includes human rights,
regional, bilateral, and arms control
issues. Wre hope that these discussions
have helped to facilitate progress in
some areas, including the nuclear and
space talks.
Our goals in the nuclear and space
talks, and in arms control in general,
remain constant. We seek to strengthen
strategic stability and truly diminish the
risk of nuclear war. This means remov-
ing the capability and incentive for the
Soviet Union to conduct a disarming
first-strike. It means preserving the
ability to deter war at the lowest possi-
ble level of forces. Therefore, our over-
riding priority in these talks is the
achievement of agreements which will
bring about deep, equitable, and verifi-
able reductions in the nuclear arsenals of
both the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Of course, if the benefits of such
agreements are to be realized, they must
be fully complied with by both sides. The
Soviet Union has continued to violate
key provisions of existing arms control
agreements, and this pattern of viola-
tions threatens to undermine the entire
arms control process. We, therefore, will
continue to press the Soviets to correct
their noncompliance, and thereby
strengthen the prospects for achieving
real arms reductions. We also will insist
that verification be a key feature of any
new agreement.
In the Geneva negotiating forum,
the United States has put forward con-
crete proposals in all three areas of the
nuclear and space talks.
• Our strategic arms (START) pro-
posals are based on the concept— on
which Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed at the
Geneva summit last November— of 50%
reductions in the strategic, offensive
nuclear arsenals of both sides. Further,
we seek to enhance stability by concen-
trating on reductions in ballistic missiles,
since they are the most destabilizing in a
crisis.
• In the intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) talks, we have proposed a
phased approach for global elimination
of the entire class of U.S. and Soviet
longer range INF missiles.
• In the defense and space negotia-
tions, we have advanced new ideas on
how to ensure a stable transition to
strategic defenses, should these prove
feasible. Additionally, we have proposed
an "open laboratories" exchange to
enable each side to reassure itself con-
cerning the other's strategic defense
research.
In my July letter to Mr. Gorbachev, I
expanded upon these American pro-
posals and offered some new ideas. In
Geneva our negotiators will be able to
offer concrete new details in all three
areas. In addition, Secretary Shultz is
prepared to discuss these issues— along
with our human rights, regional, and
bilateral concerns— with Foreign Minis-
ter Shevardnadze. These discussions can
help to lay the groundwork for a second
summit meeting between Mr. Gorbachev
and myself in the United States late this
year, as agreed at our first summit
meeting in Geneva.
I want to emphasize, however, that
the Soviet treatment of American jour-
nalist Nicholas Daniloff continues to
limit severely what is achievable in our
bilateral relations. I therefore urge the
Soviet Union to resolve this case
promptly before it does even more
damage to the relationship between our
two countries.
The time has come for practical
achievements in all areas of our rela-
tions. As far as the Geneva negotiations
are concerned, the United States has
demonstrated that we are doing our part
to bring about meaningful arms reduc-
tions. This round should tell us w-hether
the Soviet Union is similarly dedicated.
If the Soviets do share our commitment,
there can be real progress on nuclear
arms reductions, and it can begin soon.
:e
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 1986.
mber 1986
39
ARMS CONTROL
Review Conference Held on Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention
The second review conference on the
Convention on the Prohibition of t tie
Development. Production and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
was held in Geneva September 8-26,
1986.
Following are statements by Ambas-
sador Donald S. Lowitz, head of the U.S.
delegation, the text of the final declara-
tion adopted by consensus, and the texts
of the U.S. technical paper on science and
technology and the background document
on U.S. compliance.
AMBASSADOR LOWITZS
STATEMENT,
SEPT. 9, 1986
The United States welcomes the oppor-
tunity to join other states in the second
review conference of the parties to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven-
tion. This is an important occasion, and
my delegation believes that it should be
utilized for a thorough and productive
assessment of how the convention is
operating and what further actions par-
ties should undertake.
The United States fully abides by the
provisions of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention and is committed
to strengthening the international norm
against biological and toxin weapons
established by this convention. However,
my delegation cannot overlook the prob-
lem that became evident at the first
review conference, and the problems
that exist today, concerning compliance
of other states with the convention.
Therefore, the U.S. approach to the con-
ference is both critical and constructive.
The objective of this convention is
the elimination of a broad range of dan-
gerous and morally repugnant weapons.
The United States signed and ratified
the convention in the hopes of eliminat-
ing, once and for all, all biological and
toxin weapons. Unfortunately, since that
time, toxins have been used for hostile
purposes. We have concluded that there
have been a number of instances of non-
compliance with the convention. In light
of this situtation, the United States has
drawn very serious conclusions about the
effectiveness of the convention.
We are not here to insist on agree-
ment with our conclusions or to ask that
allegations be accepted as proven. But
we do stress that states parties have an
obligation to resolve concerns that are
raised about their activities and that
other parties to such a multilateral
agreement have an obligation to address
and investigate questions which are
raised with respect to compliance. Such
responses have not been forthcoming in
many cases, and in some instances,
investigations have been actively
impeded. To date the United States has
not received satisfaction with respect to
its specific concerns regarding non-
compliance, and investigations of the use
of toxins, mandated by the UN General
Assembly, have been blocked. These
actions have hurt the convention and,
more generally, the arms control
process.
We have been able to determine in
some cases that the convention has been
violated, despite its lack of stringent
verification provisions and I would note
that potential violators should under-
stand that they face a risk of exposure.
Another concern related to the con-
vention results from advances in biotech-
nology. These have increased man's
ability to design new substances or
modify known substances. They have
also made it easier to produce such
materials. These advances have now
made it possible to manufacture biologi-
cal or toxin agents in much smaller, less
distinctive facilities than in the past.
While promising great medical and
industrial benefits, these developments
have brought about capabilities which, if
misused, could pose a significant biologi-
cal and toxin weapons threat. And they
have further complicated verification of
compliance with the convention.
The United States believes that the
international norm against biological and
toxin weapons established by the conven-
tion is important and should be main-
tained, supported, and strengthened. We
believe that, in the course of the present
review of the convention, measures can
be adopted that would help make more
visible activities which are permitted
under the convention but which could
give rise to suspicions if conducted
secretly. We are prepared to join other
delegations in exploring a series of such
measures to help provide assurance that
permitted activities are not being used
as a cover for prohibited activities. Such
measures could be agreed upon now at
the review conference and embodied in
the final document.
I would now like to set out briefly
our views concerning the convention;
begin with, the purposes of the pream
ble. The United States continues to
attach great importance to making efl
tive progress toward general and com
plete disarmament. Likewise we attac
great importance to strict compliance
with the Geneva protocol of 1925, and
we deeply regret the violations of this
fundamental instrument for arms cont
that have occurred. And we continue 1
be convinced that, because the use of
biological and toxin weapons is repug-
nant to the conscience of mankind, no
effort should be spared to minimize th-
risk, with the objective of excluding cc
pletely the possibility of such use.
As I stated at the outset, the Unit!
States has fully abided by the provisio
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, and it will continue to do
With regard to Article I, the Unit*
States is in full compliance with its
obligations. Facilities previously used
development, production, or stockpilin
of biological or toxin weapons were co
verted to peaceful purposes well in
advance of the time specified by the cc
vention. However, the United States
believes that the Soviet Union, in viola
tion of this article, has continued to
maintain an offensive biological warfa:
program and capability and has been
involved in the production and use of
toxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Ca
bodia, and Afghanistan.
In accordance with Article II, the
United States destroyed all existing
stocks of biological and toxin weapons
and means of delivery prohibited undei
Article I prior to the deadline stipulate
by the convention.
With regard to Article III, the
United States has never transferred to
any state, or assisted any state in acqul
ing, biological or toxin weapons. How- I
ever, the United States believes that th I
Soviet Union has been involved in the I
production and transfer of toxin weap- 1
ons to Laos and Vietnam.
With regard to Article IV, the U.S.'
Government has taken and continues tci
take steps to preclude domestic activity
contrary to the provisions of the convei
tion. These actions include:
• Certification by all Federal agen-
cies that they are in compliance;
• Enactment of legislation and pro-
mulgation of regulations to control
biological development and production
activities; and
• A continuing review of existing
U.S. laws and regulations.
40
DeDartment of State Bullet! >
ARMS CONTROL
With regard to the consultative proc-
jbrovided for in Article V, we have
|ht to make use of it with the Soviet
%m concerning the outbreak of
Irax in Sverdlovsk in 1979; concern-
Eoviet involvement in the produc-
L transfer, and use of mycotoxins;
[concerning its maintenance of an
psive biological warfare program.
Ihave also raised our concerns with
e and Vietnam regarding their use of
lotoxins for hostile purposes. To date
have received no satisfactory
lonses.
Under Article IX of the convention,
United States and other parties
gnized the objective of an effective
libition on chemical weapons and
ged to continue negotiations in good
1 toward that end. The United States
>noring this commitment. In 1984, at
request of President Reagan,
i President Bush tabled a com-
lensive draft convention in the Con-
nce on Disarmament. This draft
ains a primary model for an effective
verifiable ban on chemical weapons.
:e that time, we have continued to
rtiate seriously in the Conference on
irmament. Also in the joint state-
t following the 1985 summit meeting
resident Reagan and General Secre-
Gorbachev, the United States and
Soviet Union agreed to accelerate
;eral discussions on chemical
pons. Since that time, three rounds
lese discussions have been held.
The United States shares the dis-
sfaction of many states over the slow
! of progress toward a chemical
pons ban. We support efforts to
nsify the negotiations.
In accordance with the provisions of
cle X, the United States has initiated
j participated in a large number of
pities to facilitate the fullest possible
pange of scientific information and
Inology for the use of biological
tits and toxins for peaceful purposes.
I participation is documented in more
til in the information on compliance
l/ided to the Secretariat pursuant to
^request of the preparatory
Mmittee.
ij In conclusion, I would like to stress
En the U.S. commitment to support
I strengthen the norm established by
I Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-
jtion against these weapons. Even
Ir to the negotiation of the conven-
ts the United States had unilaterally
lounced biological and toxin weapons.
Ice that time, the United States has
i developed, nor will it develop, such a
capability; and the United States con-
tinues to adhere to the convention. The
Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven-
tion is a valid international agreement,
and all states parties have a solemn legal
obligation to uphold its provisions and
the norm which it establishes. We hope
that other states will also fully comply
with the convention. Until this occurs,
the important purposes of this conven-
tion will not be realized.
AMBASSADOR LOWITZS
STATEMENT,
SEPT. 26, 1986
The U.S. delegation welcomes the suc-
cessful conclusion of this second review
of the operation of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention. When this
conference began, my delegation said it
would approach the review of the con-
vention in both a critical and construc-
tive way. We have endeavored to keep
these two approaches central to our
efforts.
It is in this context that I made clear
that my government is convinced that
the convention has been violated. I also
want to note that the final declaration
reflects the grave doubts of several par-
ties about compliance with the most
basic provisions of the convention and
that the conference as a whole stressed
the need to deal seriously with compli-
ance issues.
Recognizing the importance of the
norm established by the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention— a norm the
United States upholds and will continue
to uphold— we have joined in recom-
mending several measures intended to
strengthen this norm, including interna-
tional exchange of information on out-
breaks of infectious diseases and on
laboratories and research centers. My
delegation hopes that these measures
will be fully implemented by all parties
to the convention and that they will thus
lead to greater international trans-
parency and openness with regard to the
convention.
I wish to offer the thanks of the U.S.
delegation to you, Mr. President
[Ambassador Winfried Lang of Austria],
and to the distinguished chairmen of the
Credentials Committee, Ambassador
D.D. Afande [Kenya], of the Committee
of the Whole, Ambassador M. Vejvoda
[Czechoslovakia], and of the Drafting
Committee, Ambassador R. Butler
[Australia], for all of your efforts to
bring about a successful conclusion of
our work.
FINAL DECLARATION,
SEPT. 26, 1986
Preamble
The States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
having met in Geneva 8-26 September 1986
in accordance with a decision by the First
Review Conference 1980 and at the request of
a majority of States Parties to the Conven-
tion, to review the operation of the Conven-
tion with a view to assuring that the purposes
of the preamble and the provisions of the
Convention are being realized:
Reaffirming their determination to act
with a view to achieving effective progress
towards general and complete disarmament
including the prohibition and elimination of all
types of weapons of mass destruction and
convinced that the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production and their elimination,
though effective measures, will facilitate the
achievement of general and complete disar-
mament under strict and effective interna-
tional control,
Recognizing the continuing importance of
the Convention and its objectives and the
common interest of mankind in the elimina-
tion of bacteriological (biological) and toxin
weapons,
Affirming their belief that the universal
adherence to the Convention would enhance
international peace and security, would not
hamper economic or technological develop-
ment and, further, would facilitate the wider
exchange of information for the use of bac-
teriological (biological) agents for peaceful
purposes,
Confirming the common interest in
strengthening the authority and the effective-
ness of the Convention, to promote con-
fidence and co-operation among States
Parties,
Affirming the importance of strengthen-
ing international co-operation in the field of
biotechnology, genetic engineering, micro-
biology and other related areas,
Reaffirming their adherence to the princi-
ple and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of
17 June 1925 and calling upon all States to
comply strictly with them,
Recalling that the General Assembly of
the United Nations has repeatedly condemned
all actions contrary to the said principles and
objectives,
Recognizing the importance of achieving
as a matter of high priority an international
convention on the complete and effective pro-
hibition of the development, production and
stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their
destruction,
Noting the relevant provisions of the
Final Document of the Tenth Special Session
of the General Assembly devoted to
Disarmament,
Appealing to all States to refrain from
any action which might place the Convention
or any of its provisions in jeopardy.
;ember 1986
41
ARMS CONTROL
Ih clare their strong determination for the
sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the
possibility of microbial, or other biological
agents, or toxins being used as weapons and
reaffirm their strong support for the Conven-
tion, their continued dedication to its prin-
ciples and objectives and their legal obligation
under international law to implement and
strictly comply with its provisions.
Article I
The Conference notes the importance of Arti-
cle I as the Article which defines the scope of
the Convention and reaffirms its support for
the provisions of this Article.
The Conference concludes that the scope
of Article I covers scientific and technological
developments relevant to the Convention.
The Conference notes statements by some
States Parties that compliance with Articles
I, II and III was in their view subject to grave
doubt in some cases and that efforts to
resolve these concerns had not been success-
ful. The Conference notes the statements by
other States Parties that such a doubt was
unfounded and, in their view, not in accord-
ance with the Convention. The Conference
agrees that the application of States Parties
of a positive approach in question of com-
pliance in accordance with the provisions of
the Convention was in the interest of all
States Parties and that this would serve to
promote confidence among States Parties.
The Conference, conscious of apprehen-
sions arising from relevant scientific and
technological developments, inter alia, in the
fields of microbiology, genetic engineering
and biotechnology, and the possibilities of
their use for purposes inconsistent with the
objectives and the provisions of the Conven-
tion, reaffirms that the undertaking given by
the States Parties in Article I applies to all
such developments.
The Conference reaffirms that the Con-
vention unequivocally applies to all natural or
artificially created microbial or other bio-
logical agents or toxins whatever their origin
or method of production. Consequently,
toxins (both proteinaceous and non-
proteinaceous) of a microbial, animal or
vegetable nature and their synthetically
produced analogues are covered.
Article II
The Conference notes the importance of Arti-
cle II and welcomes the statements made by
States which have become Parties to the Con-
vention since the First Review Conference
that they do not possess agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment or means of delivery
referred to in Article I of the Convention. The
Conference believes that such statements
enhance confidence in the Convention.
The Conference stresses that States
which become Parties to the Convention, in
implementing the provisions of this Article,
shall observe all necessary safety precautions
to protect populations and the environment.
Article III
The Conference notes the importance of Arti-
cle III and welcomes the statements which
States that have acceded to the Convention
have made to the effect that they have not
transferred agents, toxins, weapons, equip-
ment or means of delivery, specified in Arti-
cle I of the Convention, to any recipient what-
soever and have not furnished assistance or
encouragement or inducement to any State,
group of States or international organizations
to manufacture or otherwise acquire them.
The Conference affirms that Article III is suf-
ficiently comprehensive so as to cover any
recipient whatsoever at international,
national or sub-national levels.
The Conference notes that the provisions
of this article should not be used to impose
restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer
for purposes consistent with the objectives
and the provisions of the Convention of scien-
tific knowledge, technology, equipment and
materials to States Parties.
Article IV
The Conference notes the importance of Arti-
cle IV, under which each State Party shall, in
accordance with its constitutional processes,
take any necessary measures to prohibit or
prevent any acts or actions which would con-
travene the Convention.
The Conference calls upon all States Par-
ties which have not yet taken any necessary
measures in accordance with their constitu-
tional processes, as required by the Article, to
do so immediately.
The Conference notes that States Parties,
as requested by the First Review Conference,
have provided the United Nations Depart-
ment for Disarmament Affairs with informa-
tion on and the texts of specific legislation
enacted or other regulatory measures taken
by them, relevant to this Article. The Con-
ference invites States Parties to continue to
provide such information and texts to the
United Nations Department for Disarmament
Affairs, for purposes of consultation.
The Conference notes the importance of:
• Legislative, administrative and other
measures designed effectively to guarantee
compliance with the provisions of the conven-
tion within the territory, under the jurisdic-
tion or control of a State Party;
• Legislation regarding the physical pro-
tection of laboratories and facilities to pre-
vent unauthorized access to and removal of
the pathogenic or toxic material; and
• Inclusion in textbooks, and in medical,
scientific and military educational pro-
grammes of information dealing with the pro-
hibition of bacteriological (biological) and
toxin weapons and the provisions of the
Geneva Protocol and believes that such
measures which States might undertake in
accordance with their constitutional process
would strengthen the effectiveness of the
Convention.
Article V
The Conference notes the importance of A
cle V and reaffirms the obligation assume:
States Parties to consult and co-operate w*
one another in solving any problems which,
may arise in relation to the objective of, or
the application of, the Convention.
The Conference reaffirms that consult
tion and co-operation pursuant to this Arti
may also be undertaken through appropria
international procedures within the frame-
work of the United Nations and in accorda
with its Charter.
The Conference confirms the conclusic
in the Final Declaration of the First Revie
Conference that these procedures include,
inter alia, the right of any State Party to
request that a consultative meeting open t
all States Parties be convened at expert le
The Conference stresses the need for i
States to deal seriously with compliance
issues and emphasizes that the failure to d
undermines the Convention and the arms <
trol process in general.
The Conference appeals to States Part i!
to make all possible efforts to solve any pr 1
lems which may arise in relation to the obj |!
tive of or in the application of the provisioi 1
of the Convention with a view towards
encouraging strict observance of the provi i
sions subscribed to. The Conference furthe [
requests that information on such efforts I
provided to the Third Review Conference.
The Conference, taking into account
views expressed concerning the need to
strengthen the implementation of the prov
sions of Article V, has agreed:
• That a consultative meeting shall be
promptly convened when requested by a
State Party;
• That a consultative meeting may con
sider any problems which may arise in the
relation to the objective of, or in the applic !
tion of, the provisions of the Convention, si I
gest ways and means for further clarifying I
inter alia, with assistance of technical
experts, any matter considered ambiguous I
unresolved, as well as initiate appropriate '
international procedures within the frame-
work of the United Nations and in accordail
with its Charter;
• That the consultative meeting, or aid
State Party, may request specialized
assistance in solving any problems which ml
arise in relation to the objective of, or in th- 1
application of, the provisions of the Conven
tion, through, inter alia, appropriate intern ■
tional procedures within the framework of i|
United Nations and in accordance with its i
Charter;
• The Conference considers that States'
Parties shall co-operate with the consultatrJ
meeting in its considerations of any problew
which may arise in the relation to the objec I
tives of, or in the application of, the provi-
sions of the Convention, and in clarifying ]
ambiguous and unresolved matters, as well
co-operate in appropriate international pro-
cedures within the framework of the Uniteci
Nations and in accordance with its Charter.
42
Department of State Bullet
ARMS CONTROL
,\i
'he Conference, mindful of the provisions
tide V and Article X and determined to
gthen the authority of the Convention
o enhance confidence in the implementa-
>f its provisions, agrees that the States
es are to implement, on the basis of
al co-operation, the following measures,
ler to prevent or reduce the occurrence
ibiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in
■ to improve international co-operation in
eld of peaceful bacteriological (biological)
[ 1. Exchange of data, including name,
Ition, scope and general description of
unities, on research centres and laborator-
Ithat meet very high national or interna-
nal safety standards established for hand-
f, for permitted purposes, biological
trials that pose a high individual and com-
Inity risk, or specialize in permitted
logical activities directly related to the
kvention.
2. Exchange of information on all out-
aks of infectious diseases and similar
urrences caused by toxins, that seem to
iate from the normal pattern as regards
e, development, place or time of occur-
ce. If possible, the information provided
aid include, as soon as it is available, data
the type of disease, approximate area
?cted and number of cases.
3. Encouragement of publication of
ults of biological research directly related
:he Convention, in scientific journals gen-
tly available to States Parties, as well as
motion of use for permitted purposes of
>wledge gained in this research.
4. Active promotion of contacts between
;ntists engaged in biological research
sctly related to the Convention, including
hanges for joint research on a mutually
'eed basis.
The Conference decides to hold an Ad Hoc
eting of scientific and technical experts
m States Parties, to finalize the modalities
the exchange of information and data by
rking out, inter alia, appropriate forms to
used by States Parties for the exchange of
jrmation agreed to in this Final Declara-
l, thus enabling the States Parties to
ow a standardized procedure. The group
.11 meet in Geneva for the period of
March- 15 April 1987 and shall communi-
e the results of the work to the States Par-
immediately thereafter.
Pending the results of this meeting the
nference urges States Parties to promptly
)ly these measures and report the data
eed upon to the United Nations Depart-
nt for Disarmament Affairs.
The Conference requests the United
tions Department for Disarmament Affairs
make available the information received to
States Parties.
tide VI
e Conference also notes the importance of
tide VI, which in addition to the pro-
iures contained in Article V, provides for
y State Party, which finds that any other
■ate Party is acting in breach of its obliga-
>ns under the Convention, to lodge a com-
plaint with the United Nations Security
Council, and under which each State Party
undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any
investigation which the Security Council may
initiate.
The Conference notes the need to further
improve and strengthen this and other pro-
iii i's to enhance greater confidence in the
Convention. The Conference considers that
the Security Council may, if it deems it
necessary, request the advice of the World
Health Organization in carrying out any
investigation of complaints lodged with the
Council.
Article VII
The Conference notes that these provisions
have not been invoked.
Article VIII
The Conference reaffirms the importance of
Article VIII and stresses the importance of
the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in
war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases
and of bacteriological methods of warfare.
The Conference reaffirms that nothing
contained in the Convention shall be inter-
preted as in any way limiting or detracting
from the obligations assumed by any State
under the Protocol for the prohibition of the
use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases and of bacteriological methods of war-
fare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.
Noting the report of the Security Council
(S/17911), the Conference appeals to all
States Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925
to fulfil their obligations assumed under that
Protocol and urges all States not yet Parties
to the said Protocol to adhere to it at the
earliest possible date.
Article IX
The Conference reaffirms the obligation
assumed by States Parties to continue
negotiations in good faith towards an early
agreement on effective measures for the pro-
hibition of the development, production and
stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their
destruction.
All States Parties participating in the
Conference reiterate their strong commit-
ment to this important goal.
The Conference notes with satisfaction
the substantial progress made in the negotia-
tions on a convention on the prohibition of
chemical weapons in the Conference on Disar-
mament during the period under review. The
Conference also takes note of the bilateral
talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America
on all aspects of the prohibition of chemical
weapons.
The Conference nevertheless deeply
regrets that an agreement on a convention on
chemical weapons has not yet been reached.
The Conference urges the Conference on
Disarmament to exert all possible efforts to
conclude an agreement on a total ban of
chemical weapons with effective verification
provisions by the earliest possible date.
Article X
The Conference emphasizes the increasing
importance of the provisions of Article X,
especially in the light of recent scientific and
technological developments in the field of bio-
technology, bacteriological (biological) agents
and toxins with peaceful applications, which
have vastly increased the potential for
co-operation between States to help promote
economic and social development, and scien-
tific and technological progress, particularly
in the developing countries, in conformity
with their interest, needs and priorities.
The Conference, while acknowledging
what has already been done towards this end,
notes with concern the increasing gap
between the developed and the developing
countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic
engineering, microbiology and other related
areas. The Conference accordingly urges
States Parties to provide wider access to and
share their scientific and technological
knowledge in this field, on an equal and non-
discriminatory basis, in particular with the
developing countries, for the benefit of all
mankind.
The Conference urges that States Parties
take specific measures within their com-
petence for the promotion of the fullest possi-
ble international co-operation in this field
through their active intervention. Such
measures could include, iyiter alia:
• Transfer and exchange of information
concerning research programmes in
bio-sciences;
• Wider transfer and exchange of infor-
mation, materials and equipment among
States on a systematic and long-term basis;
• Active promotion of contacts between
scientists and technical personnel on a
reciprocal basis, in relevant fields;
• Increased technical co-operation includ-
ing training opportunities to developing coun-
tries in the use of bio-sciences and genetic
engineering for peaceful purposes:
• Facilitating the conclusion of bilateral,
regional and multiregional agreements pro-
viding on a mutually advantageous, equal and
non-discriminatory basis, for their participa-
tion in the development and application of
biotechnology;
• Encouraging the co-ordination of
national and regional programmes and work-
ing out in an appropriate manner the ways
and means of co-operation in this field.
The Conference calls for greater
co-operation in international public health and
disease control.
The Conference urges that co-operation
under Article X should be actively pursued
both within the bilateral and the multilateral
framework and further urges the use of exist-
ing institutional means within the United
Nations system and the full utilization of the
possibilities provided by the specialized agen-
cies and other international organizations.
The Conference, noting that co-operation
would be best initiated by improved institu-
tionalized direction and co-ordination, recom-
mends that measures to ensure co-operation
on such a basis be pursued within the exist-
ing means of the United Nations system.
43
ARMS CONTROL
Accordingly, the Conference requests the
Secretarj < ieneral of the I fnited Nations to
propose for inclusion on the agenda of a rele-
vant United Nations body, a discussion and
examination of the means for improving insti-
tutional mechanisms in order to facilitate the
fullest possible exchange of equipment,
materials and scientific and technological
information for the use of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins for peaceful pur-
poses. The Conference recommends that in-
vitations to participate in this discussion and
examination should be extended to all States
Parties, whether or not they are members of
the United Nations, and concerned specialized
agencies.
The Conference requests the States Par-
ties and the United Nations Secretariat to
include in the document materials prepared
for the above-mentioned discussion of States
Parties, information and suggestions on the
implementation of Article X, taking into
account the preceding paragraphs. Further-
more, it urges the specialized agencies, inter
alia, FAO.WHO, UNESCO, WIPO and
UNIDO, to participate in this discussion and
fully co-operate with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations and requests the
Secretary-General to send all relevant infor-
mation of this Conference to these agencies.
The Conference, referring to paragraph
35 of the Final Document of the First Special
Session of the General Assembly, devoted to
Disarmament stresses the importance of the
obligations under Article X promoting eco-
nomic and social development of developing
countries, particularly in the light of, the
United Nations Conference on the Relation-
ship between Disarmament and Development,
for the States participating therein, scheduled
for 1987.
The Conference, to ensure compliance
with Article X, also requests States Parties
and the United Nations Secretariat to provide
information relevant to the implementation of
the Article for examination by the next
conference of States Parties.
The Conference upholds that the above-
mentioned measures would positively
strengthen the Convention.
Article XI
The Conference notes the importance of Arti-
cle XI and that since the entry into force of
the Convention of the provisions of the Arti-
cle have not been invoked.
Article XII
The Conference decides that a Third Review
Conference shall be held in Geneva at the
request of a majority of States Parties not
later than 1991.
The Conference, noting the differing
views with regard to verification, decides that
the Third Review Conference shall consider,
inter alia:
• The impact of scientific and technologi-
cal developments relevant to the Convention;
• The relevance for effective implementa-
tion of the Convention of the results achieved
in the negotiations on prohibition of chemical
weapons;
• The effectiveness of the provisions in
Article V for consultation and co-operation of
the co-operative measures agreed in this Final
Declaration; and
• In the light of these considerations and
of the provisions of Article XI, whether or not
further actions are called for to create further
co-operative measures in the context of Arti-
cle V, or legally binding improvements to the
Convention, or a combination of both.
Article XIII
The Conference notes the provisions of Arti-
cle XIII and expresses its satisfaction that no
State Party to the Convention has exercised
its right to withdraw from the Convention.
Article XIV
The Conference notes with satisfaction that a
significant number of States have ratified or
acceded to the Convention since the First
Review Conference and that there are now
more than 100 States Parties to the Conven-
tion, including all the permanent Members of
the Security Council of the United Nations.
The Conference calls upon States which
have not yet ratified or acceded to the Con-
vention to do so without delay and upon those
States which have not signed the Convention
to join the States Parties thereto thus con-
tributing to the achievement of universal
adherence to the Convention.
The Conference makes an urgent appeal
to all States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
which did not participate in its work, to give
their effective co-operation and take part
more actively in the common endeavour of all
the Contracting Parties to strengthen the ob-
jectives and purposes of the Convention. In
this connection, the Convention urges all
States Parties that were absent to take part
in the future work envisaged in this Final
Declaration.
Article XV
The Conference notes the provisions of Arti-
cle XV.
U.S. TECHNICAL PAPER
ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
1. Introduction
In preparation for the 1986 Review Con-
ference on The Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), the
Preparatory Committee requested the
depositary nations to prepare national papers
on new scientific and technological
developments relevant to the Convention.
While nothing of the fundamental signifi-
cance of the breakthroughs in recombinant
DNA techniques in the 1970s has occurred
since the last Review Conference, the indilj
trial applications of these discoveries have I
become more and more prominent in everi
day life. The applicants of these discoveriel
medicine, agriculture and other fields of
scientific endeavour are all around us. In
addition, the number of countries developi
their own biotechnology industry is growir
These trends have practical signficance fo I
the BWC.
Accordingly, our examination of advar
relevant to the Convention cannot be limit
solely to revolutionary breakthroughs in
knowledge, for it is perhaps the adaptatioi
these breakthroughs to everyday use that
brings about the changes most relevant to
Convention. Advances have taken place in
industrial application of these discoveries i
vast array of human problems. These
advances have increased our ability to mat
facture new substances or modify old ones
well as making it easier and faster to prod
these products. While promising great ben
fits for mankind, these developments also
cause concern, for they have brought abou
the proliferation of industrial biotechnolog
complicated verification and brought into
being techniques and products that, if mis- '
used, could pose a signficant biological ano
toxin weapons threat.
2. Advances in Industrial Application
of Biotechnology
In a number of areas, the industrial applies
tion of biotechnology has relevance to the
Convention.
Altered Organisms. Biotechnology
enables the development of micro-organisn
and products with new, unorthodox charac j
teristics. These new micro-organisms have J
variety of uses, for example, in developing '
environmentally safer pesticides or new tre J
ments for cancer. However, in examining ,
these developments from the point of view j
the BWC, we cannot ignore the potential
misuse of biotechnology to produce new bio
logical agents or to improve certain charac- :
teristics in those already known. Transferri
certain genetic traits into naturally infectio
micro-organisms can potentially create org!
nisms of greater virulence, antibiotic resist-
ance and environmental stability. Changing,
the microbes genetically could alter their
immunogenicity, thereby rendering vaccine: i
and serodiagnostic techniques uesless. Othe
wise harmless micro-organisms could be
altered into virulent ones, although the host j
would continue to recognize these micro-
organisms as innocuous and therefore not
defend against them.
Bio-engineering of micro-organisms has
other implications as well. Bacteria and
yeasts, genetically altered to produce prod- I
ucts, are miniature factories by virtue of the |
ability to reproduce rapidly. Large quantitie|
of compounds, previously available only in !
minute amounts, thus become available. Sue
a method of production is becoming more
commonplace in civilian industry.
In addition, it is now possible to identify
genes which have desirable properties and
44
Department of State Bullet j
ARMS CONTROL
msfer them between host micro-organisms,
nearly infinite variety of biological com-
unds designed for specific uses and given
?cific characteristics is possible. Given the
;hnical progress in this area, future devel-
ments should be of concern to the Review
nference. Within the next decade, the
tential for misuse of ongoing developments
[biotechnology could be most pronounced in
s following areas:
Microbial pathogens could be genetically
igineered to maximize infectivity and
:thogenicity. Likewise they could be
adified to increase or decrease their envi-
fimental stability and persistency.
Toxins. Naturally occurring protein
kins could be made in host organisms by
bdifying their DNA. Plant and/or fungal
|cins could be mass produced. If used as an
jent, the origin of these toxins could be dif-
iult to pinpoint, given that they are already
jthe environment, albeit at low coneentra-
Jns. Improvements in biotechnology since
e previous Review Conference lead us to
Jieve that production of potent toxins,
fiich until now were available only in minute
:antities, and only upon isolation from
,;mense amounts of biological materials, can
jjw be produced in kilogram quantities,
ijich could be militarily significant.
Peptides. Peptides have been called "the
itibiotics of the year 2000" because these
["logical materials may represent a new
Jss of miracle drugs. Peptides are pre-
ssors of proteins made up of amino acids,
ley are interesting molecules for many
fisons. They are active at very low concen-
Ihtions (one part per billion or trillion) which
ritkes their detection very difficult. They can
t successfully modified as agonists (more ae-
lie products) or antagonists (having a con-
jf.ry activity). For example, modification of
[IRH, a fertility hormone, by substituting a
jgle amino acid has yielded a product 50
ties more potent. Another modification of
ts same peptide yields a product useful in
ti treatment of prostate cancer.
Their range of activity covers the entire
king system, from mental processes (e.g.,
pdorphins) to many aspects of health such as
htrol of mood, consciousness, temperature
Introl, sleep or emotions, exerting regula-
fc-y effects on the body. Even a small imbal-
Ke in these natural substances could have
B-ious consequences, inducing fear, fatigue,
flpression or even causing death.
f. The predictable modification of peptide
sd protein structure and function (i.e., pro-
fcn engineering) is in its infancy. Computer-
Bled molecular design will rapidly develop,
cabling molecules to be manipulated for
Vying degrees of physiological activity,
tfecificity and stability. Technologies per-
Utting the direct chemical synthesis of pep-
les and proteins in large yields will, in the
Hire distant future, augment or replace
Ijcrobial production of these molecules.
Advances in Production. As mentioned
fcve, once a suitable recombinant organism
r= been engineered, exploiting it becomes a
litter of using established procedures. Bio-
l^cal production technology has proceeded
tu the point where large quantities of bio-
logical products can be produced quickly in
small facilities. Long term storage, in some
cases, will not be needed because large quan-
tities can be produced very quickly. Several
relevant technological considerations regard-
ing biological production are discussed below.
Mammalian Cell Culture. Recent
advances in mammalian cell culture make
possible the growth of mammalian cells on
the surface of minute beads, rather than on
the inner surface of glass roller bottles. These
cell culture systems provide the ideal environ-
ment for the growth of viruses. The new tech-
niques greatly simplifies virus production and
allows large scale yields in facilities for very
modest size. As another example of advances
in this field, the amount of tissue culture
media needed to produce antibodies has been
reduced a hundredfold by the use of encap-
sulated hybridomas. Such developments are
eroding the distinction between production
facilities and small laboratories.
Continuous Flow Fermentors. The intro-
duction of computer controlled, continuous
flow fermentors has dramatically increased
productivity. Most likely the size of fer-
mentors operating by batch process can be
reduced a thousandfold by conversion to a
continuous flow process.
Safety Standards. Pharmaceutical plants
around the world increasingly have incor-
porated safety provisions akin to those which
were once unique to BW production facilities,
making it increasingly difficult to distinguish
between permitted and prohibited activities.
Hollow Fibre Technology. Hollow fibre
technology provides an example of the indus-
trial production potential of the new technol-
ogies. This technology permits a far greater
concentration of cells with a markedly
increased rate of recovery in a shorter time
than previously obtained using roller bottles.
This equipment occupies less than one
twentieth the volume of the previous
technology. In the isolation of such cellular
biomaterials as pyrogens, a similar trans-
formation has taken place. Separation and
reconstitution of the product can now be
accomplished in about an hour using new
compact ultrafiltration methods, whereas
older methods took as much as four days.
Though not without constraints, develop-
ing biological and toxin weapons is an easier
task than developing adequate defenses
against them. However, the very advance-
ments in biotechnology that have caused
increased concern have also put new tools in
the hands of those conducting permitted bio-
logical defense research.
In particular, gene splicing techniques can
have an impact on development of effective
vaccines against those disease agents already
identified. Advances in production of biologi-
cal materials can greatly facilitate production
of vaccines, once these have been developed.
Development and production of highly specific
antibodies using recently developed tech-
niques may provide the hope of more rapid
identification of biological agents and toxins.
Nevertheless, these positive developments
represent a partial and incomplete response
to the potential dangers resulting from
advances in biotechnology.
Improvements in equipment, speed of
production and quality of product are a com-
mon occurrence in the history of the commer-
cial development of any new technology.
Because of the large number of technical
innovations in biotechnology, especially in the
area of industrial microbiology, the BWC has
become more difficult to verify since its
signature in 1972.
Developments intended to increase pro-
duction, decrease cost and create safer condi-
tions for handling biological materials have
blurred former distinctions important for pur-
poses of verification— for example, between a
large production facility and a laboratory.
Also, capabilities to break out of the Conven-
tion in a very short time have increased.
3. Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases
Acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) represents a newly recognized epi-
demic illness since the last Review Confer-
ence in 1980. Rift Valley Fever (RVF)
represents a classic example of a long-known
disease which spreads into a new geographi-
cal area with relatively disastrous results.
AIDS. AIDS in a short period of time has
become a major worldwide health problem.
AIDS is caused by human T-Cell lympho-
trophic virus (HTLV-III), a retrovirus. The
disease results from virus infection and
destruction of T-helper cells, an important
component of the immune system that helps
the body ward off disease. Without these cells
the patient is susceptible to a wide variety of
opportunistic pathogens such as Pneumo-
cystis, fungi, and mycobacteria.
HTLV-III first entered the USA in 1977.
HTLV-III antibodies have not been detected
in serum specimens collected and frozen in
the USA before 1977. HTLV-III probably
evolved as a mutant of an African retrovirus.
Serum specimens obtained from Ugandan
children in 1973 had antibodies to HTLV-III
or an HTLV-III-like virus. Epidemic AIDS
was first recognized in 1981. Cases character-
istically occurred among homosexual males,
haemophiliacs, Haitian-born immigrants and
intravenous drug abusers. Approximately
16,000 cases have been reported to date in
the United States.
AIDS is a classic example of a new
disease that has now become pandemic and
which arose either from a mutational event of
an existing human virus or introduction of an
animal (monkey) virus into the human
population.
Rift Valley Fever (RVF). RVF has long
had a major role as a domestic animal and
human pathogen in sub-Saharan Africa. RVF
virus was first discovered in Kenya in 1931 as
a consequence of a major epizootic in sheep
with secondary human infections. There is no
evidence that there has been geographic
spread of the virus within Africa with two
exceptions: (a) the 1977 Egyptian epidemic
with the 1951 epizootic to be discussed below
and (b) recognition of RVF in South Africa.
[■cpmher 1QRfi
45
ARMS CONTROL
Sudan-reared sheep were being
transported in 1977 from north central Sudan
to live animal markets in southern Egypt at a
time when sheep in Sudan experienced signs
consistent with RVF. Rapid transport of
sheep from epizootic areas allowed infected
sheep to survive the trip to southern Egypt
where RVF virus was spread to local animals.
Once introduced, the RVF virus spread
rapidly and caused an impressive epizootic
epidemic. In 1977, 18,000 human cases with
598 deaths were officially reported. There
may have been more than a million infections
in humans. Viral activity declined with onset
of cool weather, but transmission of virus
reoccurred in the warm season of 1978 and
the disease extended its geographic distribu-
tion within Egypt. During 1979, there were
occasional outbreaks and a few RVF virus
isolations with further decline of virus activity
in 1980. The potential for RVF infection in
Egypt continues to exist, but for no docu-
mented reason, disease activity has dimin-
ished and perhaps even disappeared.
4. Summary
The past ten years have witnessed impressive
strides in the fields of molecular biology and
biotechnology. As the two juxtaposed words
"molecular biology" imply, the distinction
between biology and chemistry is becoming
blurred. However, the US continues to
believe that Article I, which defines the scope
of the Convention, has proved sufficiently
comprehensive to have covered recent scien-
tific and technological developments relevant
to the Convention. In many ways, recent
progress in biological technology affects the
ease of concealment of manufacturing plants
and the availability of new delivery systems,
particularly for biological chemicals such as
toxins and peptides. Verification of the Con-
vention, always a difficult task, has been sig-
nificantly complicated by the new technology.
The confidence derived from the belief that
certain technical problems would make biolog-
ical weapons unattractive for the foreseeable
future has eroded. The ease and rapidity of
genetic manipulation, the ready availability of
a variety of production equipment, the pro-
liferation of safety and environmental equip-
ment and health procedures to numerous lab-
oratories and production facilities throughout
the world are signs of the growing roles of
biotechnology in the world's economy. But
these very same signs also give concern for
the possibility of misuse of this biotechnology
to subvert the Convention.
BACKGROUND DOCUMENT
ON U.S. COMPLIANCE
Article I
The United States is in lull compliance with
the obligations contained in Article I. Facili-
ties previously used for development, produc-
tion or stockpiling of biological weapons are
now devoted to peaceful purposes. The
United States biological defense programme
is limited to research on strictly defined pro-
phylactic, protective or other peaceful pur-
poses, such as immunization.
Article II
All United States stocks of agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment or means of delivery pro-
hibited under Article I were destroyed prior
to the deadline specified in Article II. In
January 1976, all heads of Federal depart-
ments and agencies certified to the President
that as of the deadline (26 December 1975),
their respective departments and agencies
were in full compliance with the Convention.
Article III
The United States is in full compliance with
its obligations under Article III not to trans-
fer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or
indirectly, and not in any way to assist,
encourage or induce any State, group of
States or international organizations to manu-
facture or otherwise acquire any of the
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means
of delivery specified in Article I of the
Convention.
Article IV
Manufacturing and commerce in biological
products are subject to strict governmental
scrutiny and regulation.
Extensive existing legislation controls
certain private actions concerning items and
actions prohibited under Articles I and III.
Such legislation includes the Arms Export
Control Act, the Export Administration Act,
the Hazardous Material Transportation Act,
the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Public
Health Service Act and the Federal Insec-
ticide, Pesticide and Rodenticide Act.
All existing law and regulation are under
continual review to ensure the sufficiency of
coverage.
Article V
The United States has continued to invoke
the consultative process called for in this arti-
cle with the Soviet Union with regard to the
Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak in 1979, with
the Soviet Union concerning their involve-
ment in the production, transfer and use of
trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes
in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan, and
with the Soviets on their maintenance of an
offensive biological warfare program. We
have also raised concerns with Laos and Viet-
nam regarding the use of trichothecene
mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos and
Kampuchea. To date, we have not been pro-
vided with any satisfactory responses to our
inquiries.
[The United States did not address Articles
VI-VIII in this document.]
Article IX
The United States has actively undertaken
negotiations toward early agreement on
effective measures for a comprehensive ban
on chemical weapons.
In February 1983, Vice President
George Bush announced in his speech to the'
Conference on Disarmament (CD) that the
United States would like to see the work of
the CD accelerated, and negotiations under-
taken on a treaty to eliminate the threat |
posed by chemical weapons.
In November 1983, the United States
sponsored a workshop on potential verifica-
tion procedures to confirm the destruction ot
chemical weapons for member and observer
nations of the CD.
In April 1984, Vice President Bush
returned to Geneva and presented to the CE
the United States draft chemical weapons
convention which would prohibit the develof
ment, production, stockpiling, acquisition,
retention, transfer or use of chemical
weapons. This convention seeks a complete,
effective and verifiable ban on such weapon!
Also in 1984, as a complement to the
multilateral negotiations, the L!nited States
initiated bilateral discussions with the Sovien
to consider how to ensure confidence in eacl
other's compliance with the provisions of th<<
convention. These ad hoc discussions have
continued through the 1986 CD summer
session.
Pursuant to an agreement between
President Ronald Reagan and General
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to accelerate
efforts to conclude an effective and verifiabl'
international convention on the general and
complete prohibition of chemical weapons, I
delegations of the United States and the
USSR have held three intensified rounds of
bilateral discussions since February 1986. T
purpose of these discussions has been to
assist multilateral efforts to achieve a
chemical weapons ban.
Additionally, the United States has con->i
tributed several working papers to the Con-
ference on Disarmament to help further the
discussions on various provisions of a
chemical weapons convention.
Article X
The United States has undertaken a number
of activities in accordance with the provision
of Article X to facilitate the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials, scientific
and technological information for the use of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins
for peaceful purposes. These activities ineluo
bilateral co-operative efforts as well as par-
ticipation in international organizations con-
cerned with the further development and
application of scientific discoveries in the fieli
of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of 1
disease, or for other peaceful purposes.
The United States currently operates
34 World Health Organization collaborative
specialty centres in the United States which
participate with public health laboratories an
programmes world-wide to deal with various
diseases.
The National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID), a component ol
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), sup-
ports research in bacteriologic and other
infectious diseases. Funds for this research
amounted to $203 million in fiscal year 1985
the most recent year for which full data is
46
DeDartment of State Bulle
DEPARTMENT
lilable. The major part of this research was
iducted in NIAID laboratories, or through
ints (1.086 in FY 1985) or contract awards
in FY 1985) totalling $168.6 million. While
ards are made primarily to United States
idemic institutions, some awards have also
in made to foreign institutions. Extensive
ernational collaboration, however, is under-
:en by NIAID staff scientists or awardees
develop new knowledge applicable to the
gnosis, prevention and treatment of trop-
1 (such as malaria, schistosomiasis, cholera
i leprosy) and arboviral diseases. The
AID laboratories provide research training
non-United States scientists through par-
ipation in the NIH Visiting Scientists Pro
im. The NIAID also has developed special
phasis domestic grants to United States
titutions to engage in international
operation in infectious disease research
;h counterparts in the developing world.
The National Academy of Sciences insti-
Ied a programme of exchanges of individual
sntists with the Academies of Sciences of
USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
mania and with the Council of the Acade-
bs of Yugoslavia. The programme was initi-
id in 1959 when the first interacademy
•eement was signed with the Academy of
ences of the USSR. Since 1981, approxi-
tely 300 foreign scientists have visited the
ited States on the interacademy exchange
)gramme either for short-term survey visits
1-2 months or for long-term visits of three
inths or more for the purpose of collabora-
e research. A slightly higher number of
lerican scientists have made scientific
its of the same type to the USSR and
stern Europe during the same period of
le. The most active areas of scientific
change of both sides is that of the life
ences, with the narrower field of the
medical sciences attracting the most activ-
. About 25 per cent of all visits since 1981
ire been concerned with some aspect of bio-
dical research, such as neuroscience
search and a number of collaborative
orts devoted to cancer research, cardiovas-
ar disease and pharmacology.
The National Science Foundation (NSF)
sports a variety of international, infrastruc-
ral activities related to biotechnology and
sic research related to microbiology, virul-
f and biochemistry. The NSF provides
ect financial support for the Escherichia
i stock centre at Yale University and
ires in the support of a European stock
ltre in Holland. In addition. NSF is the
ncipal supporter for the United States of
i International Congress of Scientific
lions which fosters international
operation between all nations.
The Agency for International Develop-
:nt (AID) sponsored an International Sym-
sium on Vaccine Development and Utiliza-
n in June 1986. This conference brought
fcether more than 300 researchers and pro-
fcmme planners and managers from 49
fluntries to address critical issues in vaccine
fllivery and strategies for achieving univer-
tJ immunization. Between 1984 and 1985,
|D virtually doubled its budget for basic
limedical research and. in 1986, AID will
commit $29 milium, roughly 13 per cent of its
health budget, to biomedical research. Asa
result of this commitment, two prototype
malaria vaccines will be tested on humans this
year, and AID is supporting development of
measles vaccine that can be given to children
as young as six months of age.
The United States Army Medical
Research Institute on Infectious Disease
( USAMRIID) publishes the results of research
in open literature and, in 1985, contributed
over 145 papers which were published in
nationally and internationally recognized
scientific peer reviewed and refereed jour-
nals. Scientists from other countries have
been invited and accepted invitations to visit
and work within the Institute and the
USAMRIID has hosted numerous visits by
representatives of both domestic and foreign
press. The USAMRIID hosted major interna-
tional conferences in 1980, 1981 and 1984 and
is currently planning another for April 1987
on "The Pathogenesis of Hemostatic Defects
Associated with Haemorrhagic Fevers." ■
The Fiscal Threat to U.S. Foreign Policy
by Ronald I. Spiers
Address before the National Council in
World A/funs Organizations on October
15, 1986. Ambassador Spiers is Under
Secretary for Management.
I welcome this opportunity to talk to a
distinguished group of leaders in the
field of international affairs. Because
you have the knowledge and interest,
you are in a position to make yourselves
heard and influence the course of
American policies.
My message today is a simple and a
blunt one: if we continue in the direction
we are going, we will put at risk all that
we have accomplished in recent years in
the area of foreign policy. The tragedy
will be that this is not a consequence of a
deliberate national decision or the result
of a national debate but of what history
may see as a series of sins of omission.
I have worked in the diplomatic
vineyard for over 35 years, and I believe
the United States has consistently
underinvested in the resources it devotes
to its diplomacy and to its relations with
the rest of the world. A continental
power, secure behind two oceans for
most of its history, preoccupied with the
taming of a continent, putting its
energies into molding waves of immi-
grants into Americans, protected for
years by the military power of friendly
countries, America has not had a strong
national tradition in foreign affairs.
World Wars I and II shook us into a
realization that we were not an island
unto ourselves. After World War II, we
began to reach for a world role commen-
surate with our power and our interests.
We made mistakes along the way, which
raised questions about the wisdom of the
way we played this role. But the public
interest did not turn inward or retreat
into isolation. Our self-confidence was
shaken, public trust in government
authority stumbled but did not falter.
But funds for defense, foreign
assistance, diplomacy, and intelligence—
the four great national security
"accounts"— were, for the most part,
supported by American public opinion.
And public support is the oxygen of
government policy. What could be inter-
preted as a historic course correction
had taken place.
The American diplomatic score card
since World War II is one in which we
can take satisfaction.
• We were in the forefront in
rebuilding a world devastated by war.
• We have stood clearly as a beacon
for political freedom and individual
liberty around the world. People from all
over the world still try to come to this
country.
• We have built alliances with like-
minded nations, necessary components
of a stable peace.
• We have managed a potentially
dangerous relationship with our principal
adversary— the Soviet Union— without
war and without relinquishing principle.
• We have applied our skills suc-
cessfully to keep regional crises and con-
flicts from escalating to global confron-
tation. It is sobering to contemplate that
warfare is now going on between or
within 43 countries.
• We have contributed significantly
to the economic development of poorer
nations and to the self-defense
capabilities of our friends and allies.
• We have focused world attention
on the importance of human rights and
have spotlighted abuses.
• We have made increasingly effec-
tive common cause with others in com-
batting the scourges of narcotics and
terrorism, which transcend the ability of
single nations to vanquish.
=>r-pmher 1QRfi
47
DEPARTMENT
• ( )ur example has brought ever
more people and nations to the realiza-
tion that free market economies offers
more efficient, more productive answers
to human needs— and are more compa-
tible with political freedom.
These achievements do not come
cheaply— except in comparison to the
costs of their alternatives.
U.S. Foreign Policy and
the Foreign Affairs Budget
Today, all this is under threat because of
lack of understanding and attention to
the resources that are required to run a
successful diplomatic course.
Americans take pride in our nation's
role as leader and defender of freedom.
We take pride in our democratic institu-
tions. Even the most cynical believe that
our political and economic system holds
the greatest potential for improving the
human condition. It has a proven record.
It is worthy of emulation.
But our nation's economic pros-
perity, its democratic freedoms, its
military strength conspire to lull
account the need to cut costs, to keep
budgets lean, and to increase efficiency.
Although only 2% of his budget, this
amount would pay the operating costs of
the State Department and the United
States Information Agency, including
the costs of maintaining our 260
embassies and consulates around the
world. It would pay for our nation's
economic development and military
security programs as well as human-
itarian assistance. It would pay our con-
tributions to multilateral development
banks and international organizations. It
would finance our- efforts to combat the
spread of narcotics and terrorism. Part
of this amount would even pay for the
Peace Corps and help us improve the
safety and security of American person-
nel abroad. The taxpayer gets a lot from
this small fraction of the Federal budget.
However, when Congress wants to
cut the Federal budget, it too often casts
a covetous eye toward the foreign affairs
budget. The current continuing resolu-
tion cuts the Administration's already
lean foreign affairs budget request by
about 25%. In one fell swoop, over a
The funds for the State Department's operation at
home and abroad cost only four-tenths of 1% of
the Federal budget.
Americans into a false sense of self-
sufficiency. We suffer from a national
schizophrenia: on the one hand, we want
to influence, and even control, interna-
tional events. We seem somehow dis-
appointed or angry when we can't or
don't, especially during a crisis. On the
other hand, the American public views
foreign relations as a sometimes inter-
esting diversion not requiring serious or
sustained effort. The resource levels we
provide for the conduct of foreign rela-
tions reflect this relatively low level of
interest.
We are the world's greatest power,
but we spend only 2% of the Federal
budget to finance all of our nation's
foreign affairs functions. Twenty years
ago, we spent twice that percentage.
During the height of the Marshall Plan,
foreign affairs accounted for ll<t from
every budget dollar.
This year, President Reagan
requested $22.6 billion to carry out his
foreign policy. This figure took into
quarter of our nation's foreign affairs
budget disappeared.
Cutting the foreign affairs budget
carries a price. We run the risk of
dismantling the most important instru-
ment of our foreign policy: our ability to
represent and support our interests and
objectives abroad.
Many Congressmen feel little
pressure to spare the foreign affairs
budget because most of their consti-
tuents are far more interested in
domestic issues. Also, many Americans
have the mistaken impression that our
foreign affairs budget swallows up a
large portion of the tax dollar. If we in
the Department of State have a natural
constituency, it is groups such as yours.
We hope you continue your active
interest.
The Department of State, which is
the oldest and surely one of the most
important departments of the govern-
ment, is also one of the smallest. The
funds for the State Department's opera-
tions at home and abroad cost only four-
tenths of 1% of the Federal budget. I
contend that's the bargain of the
century.
The cost of a single Trident sub-
marine (about $1.5 billion) could pay the
salaries and expenses for all State
Department operations for an entire
year, leaving some over to help us
enhance our much-needed security pro-
grams overseas.
There are only about 21,000 State
Department employees spread over 260
locations around the globe, including
Washington. Overseas and at home, the
4,000 professional diplomats in our
Foreign Service are our nation's eyes
and ears. They gather intelligence and
report and analyze events. They look ou
for our nation's interests and help
Americans in distress. They search out
business opportunities and markets for
American products. They are the front
line of our war against narcotics and ter
rorism. They are among the first on the :
scene, looking out for our interests, dui-i
ing crises overseas.
To put the Department's manpower I
into perspective, consider the fact that
there are 25 U.S. military personnel
overseas for every single State Depart-
ment employee. There are more Depart-
ment of Defense school teachers in
Europe alone than there are State
Department personnel worldwide.
Health and Human Services employees
outnumber us seven to one. The
Agriculture Department has five times
as many employees. Even the Forestry
Service has twice as many people as we |
do. IBM personnel outnumber us 19 to 11
Bank of America, 4 to 1.
Our resources are principally people i
and money. As a result, when Congress
cuts our funding, we have to cut people. I
Because of the financial crisis inflicted I
on us earlier by Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings and compounded just recently |
by the additional 25% or so cut in Con-
gress' continuing resolution, our foreign
affairs apparatus will shrink even
further.
Effects of Congressional Budget Cuts i
Post and Personnel Reductions. Even
before the latest fiscal blows, we were
making plans to reduce our overseas per,
sonnel by about 4%. We are hiring fewer,
people this year. Many vacancies simply ]
will not be filled. We are also facing
as much as a 7% cut in personnel
domestically.
As of September 30 of this year, we
hauled down the flag at seven of our con-
sulates overseas. This year, in response ]
48
Department of State Bulletin.
DEPARTMENT
ifcudget cuts, we may permanently
ijse the doors of another 11 posts
erseas. These consulates are the
lillaries of our system, and they
nance our ability to gather informa-
li, to expand our contacts and influ-
pe, and to provide service to
hericans abroad.
I Keep in mind that we are taking
Ise steps in response to cuts of $20
llion— one-tenth of the price tag of a
tie B-l bomber.
[Of course, not all of this belt-
fritening is bad. We wholeheartedly
uorsed the reduction of the U.S.
Ivernment's overseas presence. This
ercise gave us an opportunity to focus
!■ attention of all agencies on the level
Itheir staffing at our mission overseas.
Is frankly hard to justify the expense
ilthe security risks of keeping some of
fse people and organizations overseas.
bften comes as a surprise to observers
It only 28% of the personnel in our
llomatic missions overseas are State
Ipartment Foreign Service.
'j Closing some of our less important
ksulates helped us spread our scarce
Sources more efficiently. But there are
rious costs. Closing posts hurts. It
rts our relations with the countries in
jich the posts are located. It hurts our
lity to pursue U.S. Government inter-
is. It hurts our- ability to gather and
msmit information.
There is a limit to how deeply we can
II should cut. Indeed, many Americans
mid now agree that in the years
mediately following Vietnam, we went
Jit too far in our withdrawal from
irld affairs. Certainly we discovered in
I late 1970s and early 1980s how
pensive it was to rebuild our national
frsence and prestige. Frankly, our
rersaries, including the terrorist,
luld be happy to have us, for budg-
|ry reasons, do what they have not
pn able to accomplish on their own:
Cce Americans to retreat.
Security Assistance. But it has not
In the State Department's budget
tie that has been affected by these
fep budgetary cuts. Our foreign
Miomic and military assistance
Bgrams have been gutted by the
tigress. By reducing this portion of
i Federal budget by over $3 billion and
(•marking security assistance pro-
tms for several key countries. Con-
fess has forced us to cut some impor-
bt foreign aid programs by 50%-60%.
j Egypt and Israel are the largest
tipients of U.S. foreign security
listance, followed by eight countries
lich we aid in return for basing rights
for U.S. Armed Forces. These 10 coun-
tries account for 80% of all of our
foreign security assistance. This aid is of
critical importance to us and to the
recipient countries. It helps us secure
bases, helps pave the way for access
agreements, and permits the preposi-
tioning of supplies. It helps us maintain
peace around the world.
Besides the United Nations, our con-
trihutions to international peacekeeping
efforts have been cut in half this year.
The Administration considers the UN
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
vital to stability and peace in the Middle
East. Cuts of this magnitude bring into
question our commitment to peace in
We have been pressing for needed fiscal and
administrative reform at the United Nations ....
the shortfall in U.S. payments may now become
the issue, rather than UN reform. Our critics will
blame us when and if UN fiscal reform fails.
Would Congress or the American
public suggest that we cut funds to coun-
tries such as the Philippines or Haiti or
Bolivia or Uruguay which are struggling
to build democratic institutions? Should
we turn our backs on our neighbors in
the Caribbean or Central America?
Should we cast Senegal or Ecuador
adrift just when they are pursuing
economic reform programs? If Congress
has its way, we would have to stop
security assistance and economic
development programs in all but a hand-
ful of countries.
International Organizations. The
Congress has also reduced our contribu-
tions to international organizations.
Here's a case where we are cutting off
our nose to spite our face. We have been
pressing for needed fiscal and adminis-
trative reform at the United Nations.
The Kassebaum amendment withholds
$42 million of our UN contributions as
leverage to encourage reform. Congress
just recently, in the continuing resolu-
tion, upped the ante and cut our UN con-
tributions by yet another $25 million and
deferred an additional $130 million in
U.S. contributions to international
organizations until next fiscal year. By
withdrawing our financial support to the
United Nations, we are abdicating our
role in the United Nations and, in effect,
reducing the leverage we have to influ-
ence its efforts toward reform. An addi-
tional result is that the shortfall in U.S.
payments may now become the issue,
rather than UN reform. Our critics will
blame us when and if UN fiscal reform
fails.
Lebanon and even the continued viability
of UNIFIL.
International Communications. The
inadequate funding for international
communications and exchange programs
will mean reducing broadcasts by Voice
of America, Radio Free Europe, and
Radio Liberty. It could mean closing
American libraries and American
cultural centers overseas. This is wrong
at a time when our adversaries are spar-
ing no expense to feed their propaganda
mills.
Diplomatic Security Programs.
Two years ago the Secretary of State
appointed a special panel— headed by
retired Admiral Bobby Inman— to con-
duct an objective review of the state of
security of our embassies and personnel
overseas. The panel reported last year
and recommended a massive infusion of
resources. Over 60 of our embassies and
more than 300 of our buildings needed
total replacement if we were to meet
minimum security standards. Some
months ago, the Congress authorized a
$4.4 billion, 5-year program to bring our
security abroad and at home up to the
level recommended by Inman. However,
Congress has balked at actually appro-
priating the funds it has authorized at a
level necessary to meet the Inman
recommendations.
It makes little sense to cut funds for
our overseas security programs just
when events over the past few years
have shown that our diplomats and our
diplomatic facilities are especially
vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The
public's memory of the bombings of our
member 1986
49
DEPARTMENT
embassies in Beirut and Kuwait has
faded. Many have forgotten the over-
running of our embassy in Tehran and
the destruction of our embassies in
Tripoli and Islamabad. Many of our
embassies still front onto busy city
streets. Many of our offices overseas are
housed in highrise buildings where we
cannot control who are our neighbors.
The discovery of sophisticated listen-
ing devices in our typewriters in Moscow
once again emphasized that we are
vulnerable around the world to increas-
ingly sophisticated technical security
threats. We cannot simply wish these
vulnerabilities away.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, all of this costs money.
And money is what we have in increas-
ingly short supply.
If we want a safe and peaceful
world, there is no alternative to a
vigorous American presence. We may be
able to turn off the budgetary tap on
some Federal programs for a year or
two, then reopen the tap without doing
damage to American interests. That is
simply not true in foreign affairs.
Clearly, the American public wants
more services from the government than
the present levels of revenue can pro-
vide. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings confronts
Congress and the public with difficult
choices of priorities if the mandated
reductions in deficits— to zero by
1991— are to be met. Someone's ox has
to be gored. But these choices should be
made not inadvertently but in full
awareness of their consequences.
American diplomacy mans the forward
edge of our international battlefield day
and night. Its costs are small in relative
terms, and the costs of "doing it on the
cheap" are great. Every American with
an interest in foreign affairs must share
the burden of making our fellow citizens
aware of this truth. ■
Toward a More Representative
Foreign Service
by Ronald I. Spiers
Address before the Congressional
Black Caucus Foreign Affairs Brain-
trust Workshop on October 3, 1986.
Ambassador Spiers is Under Secretary
for Management.
I welcome the invitation to participate in
this discussion about the involvement—
or lack of involvement— of black
Americans in the formulation of U.S.
foreign policy. I hope the discussion will
be frank, open, and constructive.
I am the Under Secretary of State
for Management and will, next month,
have spent 3 years in this position. My
responsibility runs across the spectrum
of administrative management policy.
Essentially, I supervise the planning,
mobilization, and allocation of resources
needed to carry out the Department of
State's responsibilities to advise on and
implement the foreign policies of the
United States. Since our resources are
principally money and people, my job is
to oversee finance, personnel, security,
and professional development as well as
general logistic and administrative sup-
port for all Department of State and
Foreign Service operations.
I believe that the Foreign Service of
the United States has a major problem
in the area of minority, including black,
representation. This has been a matter
of substantial concern to me since I took
on this job; one of the first things that I
did, shortly after assuming these respon-
sibilities, was to convoke a meeting of
eight black colleagues who had served or
were serving as ambassadors to talk
about the issue of blacks in the Foreign
Service. Subsequently, this group was
expanded to include some outsiders from
the business and academic communities.
We sought their views on how we could
deal with the problem of making the
Foreign Service more representative.
I began with the conviction that a
Foreign Service that is not represent-
ative of American society cannot be an
acceptable or fully effective instrument
for the conduct of American foreign rela-
tions. It cannot be the more or less
exclusive preserve of only certain sec-
tors of American society. Therefore, it is
my objective, and that of my colleagues,
to explore every possible route to achiev-
ing a more representative Foreign Serv-
ice. There are many obstacles in the
path, but I believe that these obstacles
can be overcome with intensive and pur-
poseful effort.
For those of you who are not
familiar with the Foreign Service, it is
essentially a bottom entry, merit promc
tion, "up or out" system. The Foreign
Service is one of our nation's most com-
petitive institutions. This year approx-
imately 200 new officers will be taken
into the Foreign Service from the almo:
16,000 who took the written entry exan
ination last December. I know no unive:
sity that is so selective. The examinatio
process is like panning for gold. We are*
looking for the very best from an
extremely talented pool of candidates. I
am committed to the preservation of th
kind of a competitive-entry Foreign
Service, since I believe that the interest
of our country are best served by such
an institution.
Efforts to Increase
Minority Representation
When I first joined the Foreign Service'
over 30 years ago, it had the
reputation— deservedly, I fear— of being
an elitist group recruited largely from
the east coast, white, male, Anglo-
Saxon, Protestant, Ivy League popula-
tion. Some of the elders who occupied
top positions considered it "a pretty
good club." Most Foreign Service
officers [FSOs] came from the same
background. "Old boy networks" helpec
officers get promoted and assigned to
the right job. The only senior black
officer I knew of was Clifton Wharton,
then our Ambassador to Norway. There
was only a small handful of minority
junior officers. I remember, in my first
Foreign Service assignment in UN
affairs, working with two other newly
minted officers: Don McHenry, later
Ambassador to the United Nations, and]
Terry Todman, now our Ambassador to I
Denmark. Terry is today the only black '
among our 40 or so career ministers, the
top rank of the Foreign Service.
The situation has changed, but we
recognize that it has not changed
enough. The Director General of the
Foreign Service and I consider making
further improvements in the proportion
of minorities and women in the Foreign
Service one of our highest priorities.
Ten years ago, there were barely
100 black Foreign Service officers.
Today, there are about 250. Since the
mid-1970s, about one-tenth of our new
FSOs have been blacks. Blacks are now
about 6% of the FSO corps, and I am
told this is approximately the percentag<
of blacks in the college-educated
workforce. I would like to see an
increase in this proportion without
50
Department of State Bulletii
DEPARTMENT
■parting from the principles which have
hde the Foreign Service one of our
lality institutions. These aims are not
compatible.
The other, equally difficult half of
gr task, however, is to find ways to
[courage the retention of black officers
no are already on board and to
[courage their advancement along with
leir colleagues to the middle and senior
Inks. In an "up or out" system, this
Bees time. The paucity of senior officers
[fleets recruitment patterns of 25 years
ro. Today, only nine of our 627 mem-
Its of the Senior Foreign Service are
kck. However, all but two of these
picers are currently serving or have
icently served as ambassadors. I find it
[couraging that three more blacks,
eluding the first black woman, were
hong the 68 new promotees to the
|nior Foreign Service on the list that is
Iw awaiting congressional approval,
(hile these 12 comprise only just under
fo of our senior officers, 6.6% of our
jid-level and 7.8% of our junior officers
ie black.
I am, nevertheless, concerned about
ie flow of recent entrants up through
Ie system in order to increase the pro-
Irtion of blacks at the senior levels. In
|at regard, I am aware of the percep-
|>n among many of our black colleagues
[at there is systemic discrimination
i;ainst them in the Foreign Service.
Iiis alleged discrimination is hard to
lentify, but its existence is maintained
I too many of my black colleagues
'•lose judgment I respect for me to
iismiss it as paranoia or as not having
ly foundation. I can assure you that
mere such discrimination is found, it
Ell be dealt with ruthlessly.
This is a matter to which I have
ivoted substantial thought, and I am
Invinced that the most fertile ground
Ir further improvement lies in our
[cruitment and assignment practices.
• We need an active and aggressive
pcruiting program aimed at convincing
[alified blacks that the Foreign Service
la career that should interest them. We
Ive recently launched a more targeted
Icruiting effort. This is a significant
•eak with the traditional view that the
foreign Service is in a "buyer's mar-
i?t," able to lean back and simply let the
Implications flow in. As a result, our
recruitment of black officers has begun
to rebound in 1986, after two disappoint-
ing years in 1984 and 1985. We are doing
more to reach out to historically black
colleges and universities and to black col-
lege students in general. The results are
most encouraging. We hired more black
officers this year than last, and the
number of black applicants to the
Foreign Service is at an all-time high.
We will have to devote continued effort
and resources to keep moving in the
right direction.
• We need to work on assignments
within the system. I have given a lot of
attention to ensuring that senior blacks
are selected for responsible and visible
assignments in which they can serve as
"role models." We now have black
career officers as ambassadors in Liberia
(soon to be transferred to South Africa),
Mauritius, Denmark, and Seychelles.
Another holds the key job of director or
of our Regional Administrative Manage-
ment Center in Paris. One— a former
ambassador— is principal officer in Cape
Town. Two— also former ambassadors-
are serving in senior positions in
Washington, one at the deputy assistant
secretary level in Management Opera-
tions and one as director of a major
office in one of our regional bureaus.
Over a year ago, I discovered, to my con-
sternation, that there were currently no
black officers serving overseas as deputy
chief of mission, perhaps the key
management level position in the
Foreign Service and a proving ground
for future chiefs of mission. During the
past year, five black officers have been
assigned as deputy chiefs of mission or
as principal officers in American
consulates.
The Path Ahead
I have to conclude by acknowledging
that there are difficulties in the path
ahead. Many blacks have told me that
more lucrative and relevant career
opportunities are open to the kind of
people we seek for the Foreign Service.
The Foreign Service has a dubious
reputation among those sectors of the
American population who even know
what it is. The "cookie pusher"
stereotype dies hard. Today, health
hazards, spouse employment and family
education problems, the large percent-
age of hardship posts among the more
than 250 we staff, the high proportion of
noncareer appointees at senior levels,
and terrorism and security threats all
make the Foreign Service a less attrac-
tive career to many. The call of public
service— once having so powerful a pull
in our history— has been muted, par-
ticularly with many in the political arena
"running" against Washington and its
"bureaucrats." In crass economic terms,
government cannot compete for the
services of people with the skills, educa-
tion, and qualities we want. Although it
is difficult to move forward against all of
these obstacles, we argue that the
psychic income and the rewards of public
service make up for many of these
drawbacks. This is the case we make
whether our target audience is black or
white, male or female. Whatever the
problems, we will persevere.
Finally, I want to ask your coopera-
tion and, through you, the cooperation of
the black community in encouraging
more bright young blacks to take the
Foreign Service examination and apply
for the various other categories of
Foreign Service employment. On the
basis of the examples we have seen
among the blacks who have recently
entered the service as junior officers, we
are convinced there are a lot more out
there who can pass the examinations and
advance in their careers with the best
and the brightest. The more you can do
to identify them and encourage them to
consider the Foreign Service as a career,
the more likely we are to achieve the
levels we are seeking.
We do not feel compelled to improve
the representativeness of the Foreign
Service for cosmetic reasons. We do not
look upon our officers as so many
precisely measured ingredients in a
recipe for an all-American technicolor
Foreign Service. We are doing this
because we know it is right. We are do-
ing this because we cannot represent our
country overseas if we do not reflect our
society at home. We need continued sup-
port for our efforts, particularly from
groups such as this. ■
ecember 1986
51
EAST ASIA
The Philippines and the United States
by Michael H. Armacost
Address before the Conference on the
Philippines at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy on October 6, 19S6.
Ambassador Armacost is Under
Secretary for Political Affairs.
It is a pleasure to address this con-
ference. The subject could not be more
timely. I served as the American
Ambassador in Manila for 2 tumultuous
years and have spent many of my wak-
ing hours in Washington since 1984 deal-
ing with Philippine-American relations. I
think I've earned the right to offer some
personal observations.
Let me begin with the dramatic,
political revolution that occurred last
February. Americans vicariously
experienced those events along with
Filipinos and shared their elation with
the outcome. History has linked our
countries inextricably over the past cen-
tury. What happens in the Philippines
matters to the United States. Americans
first planted the seeds of democracy in
the Philippines. We consequently shared
the exhilaration of the Filipino people as
we witnessed a restoration of democracy
accomplished both swiftly and
peacefully.
It was a Philippine revolution, and
Filipinos earned the admiration and
respect of the entire world for their
courage and their fidelity to democratic
principles. We pay tribute to that suc-
cess. And we pledge our support to those
who work, in the words of President
Aquino, "to build a worthy and enduring
house for a new democracy, that may
serve as a redoubt for freedom in Asia."
Last February's revolution brought
the Philippines to the consciousness of
all Americans. To be sure, Ninoy
Aquino's assassination in August 1983
stimulated a considerable increase in
newspaper and media coverage of the
Philippines. But the recent presidential
election campaign and the events which
followed were played out on American
television. In the process, Cory Aquino,
Doy Laurel, Cardinal Sin, Joe Concep-
cion, and many others became familiar
figures in this country. Terms like "hid-
den wealth" entered our political
vocabulary. And we all learned more
than we wanted to know about Mrs.
Marcos' wardrobe.
To be sure, some of the American
media focus on the Philippines is super-
ficial. But the explosion of media
52
coverage of the Philippines has enabled
thoughtful Americans to obtain a
glimpse of more consequential aspects of
the situation. Our public has gained an
appreciation of the enormity of the
political and economic problems which
were the principal legacy of the Marcos
Administration. Americans have
discovered the resilience, the
resourcefulness, and the good humor
with which the Filipino people confront
adversity. We have been reminded of the
authority and the respect, the power and
the opportunity accorded to women in
the Filipino culture. We have observed
the political clout exercised by the
Church and heard the call for political
reconciliation expressed in the idiom of
the Scriptures. We have witnessed the
status and the value which Filipinos
attach to education as a source of social
mobility. We have seen firsthand the
Philippine preference for democratic
evolution over violent revolution. And
the remarkable events of last February
confirmed for Americans the vibrancy of
the Philippine press.
These are qualities which should not
surprise us. We see them reflected in the
growing community of Filipino-
Americans who make such a large con-
tribution to our own national life. But
the television pictures and the occa-
sionally illuminating commentary seared
strong impressions in our collective
memory. They served to increase our
awareness and understanding of the
Filipino culture and our respect for the
Filipino people.
Those of us in government who bear
some responsibility for managing this
important relationship had special
reasons for satisfaction at the outcome
of last February's revolution. The final
years of the Marcos Administration
posed agonizing dilemmas for our
government. The corruption and the
venality of the Marcos regime were
deeply troubling. So were the "crony"
deals which distorted the economy and
the cynical political maneuvers which
mocked professions of faith in
democracy. But there was a deeper
source of anguish.
It was increasingly clear to those of
us in Washington that we were doing
business with a government whose
authority was declining, which had
forfeited much of its domestic support,
and which displayed little genuine
empathy for our values.
Worse yet, we saw no serious pros- J
pect for self-renewal.
• President Marcos had politicized
the army; it was scarcely plausible that
he would restore professionalism to the r
military.
• He had limited the scope for com
petition and private entrepreneurship; i
was scarcely reasonable to expect that
he would foster economic reform and
reliance upon the interplay of market
forces.
• He had perpetuated his tenure in
office by manipulating constitutional an '
electoral rules to suit his political
requirements; it was scarecly con-
ceivable that he would permit an elec-
toral contest in which he accepted a ge! '
uine risk of losing.
We had no choice but to deal with a !
existing government, but our growing
doubts about the efficacy of reform
under Marcos prompted the increasingl i
public expression of our concerns. His
unexpected announcement last fall of a I
snap presidential election stimulated
hopes here as well as fears. In all can-
dor, I cannot say that I expected the
result that occurred. Yet we did what w :
could to assure a free and fair contest. (
By dispatching an election observer
team and encouraging the international
press to make the election a big story,
we hoped to diminish the incidence of
fraud. We recognized that, in the last
analysis, the major deterrent to irreg-
ularities would have to be an aroused
Philippine citizenry prepared to accept
risks in order to assert their rights. Corl
Aquino supplied inspired leadership;
NAMFREL [National Movement for
Free Elections], the Church, and various
citizens' organizations the foot soldiers
of the democratic revolution. The rest is
history. It produced a new start for the
Philippines and opened a new chapter—
and a bright one, we trust— in
Philippine-American relations.
I
American Perspective
on the Aquino Administration
American support for the Aquino
Administration is firm and unequivocal. .
The reasons are obvious.
First, she earned a mandate from
the Philippine people.
Second, President Aquino has used
her mandate to embark upon an
ambitious agenda of long overdue
reform.
• She appointed a Constitutional
Commission whose work is nearly
finished, promised early local and provin
Denartment nf State Rnl
EAST ASIA
l\ elections, imparted credibility to
Jvernment, and impressed all who have
:»t her with her own sense of command.
| • She selected for the key Cabinet
smomic portfolios individuals of
Jitinction who know how the market
lurks and who believe in market forces.
Be has moved decisively to reform the
fee system, liberalize trade, reduce the
\e of public sector enterprises and
jvernment financial institutions, and
Imantle government monopolies that
jpede productivity in the agricultural
Etor. She has nailed down an Interna-
;nal Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement,
'new investment code is in the works.
Lbor stability is promised. The flight of
iDital has been staunched; inflation has
)gn curbed; the current account is in
;lance; and the gross domestic product
beginning to grow.
• She has affirmed civilian control
!the military and placed the armed
J'ces under the command of respected
Kicers who got ahead not by "going
l»ng" or by playing palace politics but
]j exhibiting dedication to high stand-
ids of professional conduct.
' Thus, we believe she has made
ipressive progress in a short time in
•ihaping Philippine political and
jjnomic life without benefit of a
(surely transition period and despite
;; need to manage a diverse coalition.
The Aquino government recognizes
at the communist insurgency
presents a serious threat to Philippine
imocracy. The government has adopted
i.trategy aimed at seeking a political
idogue with the New People's Army
IP A) while the government implements
3litical, economic, and military reforms
isigned to attack the root causes of the
nurgency. President Aquino has also
ude it clear that the government will
e military force if that is necessary to
ptect the Filipino people and preserve
ir country's newly restored democracy.
I In sum, we believe the Philippines is
crsuing a sound strategy that will pro-
?ce significant results in the next few
^ars.
It will require strong and bold
ndership and a cohesive government
ftich speaks and acts in support of a
imprehensive program for national
icovery. President Aquino has shown
fet she can provide that leadership.
1 S. Policy Guidelines
'is obvious that the United States has a
l"ge stake in the success of President
quino's policy efforts. The issue for
merica is how we can most effectively
express our support. These guidelines in-
form our efforts.
First, we will resist falling back into
familiar habits in our relationship. For
one thing, this means avoiding the
tendency to offer gratuitous advice in
lieu of tangible assistance. We have
made a good start with the substantial
package of supplemental aid unveiled
during President Aquino's recent visit. I
might add, parenthetically, that there is
a corollary for Filipinos: that is, resist
the temptation to treat the United
States as a scapegoat or to regard
massive external assistance as a
substitute for domestic reform. The cur-
rent emphasis on self-reliance is a
healthy sign.
Second, we intend to display a
sympathetic understanding for the
magnitude of the policy dilemmas faced
by the Philippine Government. President
Aquino confronts a multitude of vexing
problems.
• Prompt action is needed to contain
an insurgency which challenges the
authority of government in rural areas,
impedes the flow of investment, and
poses a danger to democratic
institutions.
• There is the urgent need for swift
economic revitalization. Growth is
necessary to provide the economic
margins necessary for compromise— the
lifeblood of democratic politics. It is also
a critical component of any strategy to
cope with the New People's Army.
• The task of completing a new con-
stitution and conducting local and pro-
vincial elections is equally pressing,
since political stability is essential to
economic revival. Foreign and domestic
businessmen are waiting to see how the
constitution will affect the future invest-
ment regime. A successful counterin-
surgency effort will depend heavily upon
the quality and representativeness of
local officials.
Each of these tasks is fraught with
difficulty. Each requires the application
of massive intellectual, human, and
material resources. No government can
do everything at once, particularly when
resources are scarce and time is limited.
The establishment of clear-cut priorities
is the more difficult when decisions must
be reached within the framework of a
very broad coalition.
Americans are an impatient people.
We expect quick results. But we owe it
to our friends in the Philippines to
recognize that everything cannot be
done at once; that Philippine problems
require Philippine solutions; and that
they must set their own priorities and
their own pace. We should be prepared
to offer counsel in a frank and confiden-
tial fashion. We intend to avoid
gratuitous public criticism. Candor in
private and discretion in public should be
our motto.
Third, we should avoid loading addi-
tional problems onto the agenda before
they require resolution. The bases issue
is a good example. Our current agree-
ment has several years, at least, to run.
Our next 5-year review does not com-
mence for 2 years. President Aquino has
indicated her intent to honor existing
legal obligations while preserving policy
options for the 1990s.
I am personally confident that our
security relationship with the Philippines
will endure beyond 1991. Our access to
facilities at Clark and Subic constitutes a
source of regional stability which is
welcomed by the ASEAN [Association of
South East Asian Nations] countries,
Japan, China, and other regional powers.
So long as the base arrangements
respect Philippine sovereignty, and so
long as the balance of benefits is
equitable, I see little reason to fear
disruption of a pattern of defense
cooperation that has served both our
nations well. The time will come for
renewed negotiations; for now we can
afford to let this issue lie.
I hope the Philippine Government
will follow suit. Some members of the
Constitutional Commission have at-
tempted to limit its government's future
options on defense and other issues. We
understand that President Aquino wisely
urged the members of the commission,
when they began their work, to define
the constitutional framework of govern-
ment without attempting to address
issues more properly resolved through
legislation or executive decision by an
elected government. That is a sensible
stance. It is in keeping with our own
constitutional experience. It is consistent
with the interest of both countries in
seeing that issues subject to negotiations
are not preempted by unilateral deci-
sions of either side.
Fourth, we should welcome the
diversification of Philippine relationships
with other countries. On occasion, some
Filipinos have seen their ties with
Americans in kinship terms, viewing us
as big brothers who offer protection in
return for loyalty. This is a tribute to the
intimacy of our connection over the past
eight decades. There are respects in
which we and Filipinos are family. Yet
there is also a certain "hothouse"
bcember 1986
53
EAST ASIA
character to our relationship which
imposes heavy psychological burdens on
us both.
In my experience as Ambassador in
Manila, I found that my Filipino friends
talked knowledgeably and eloquently
about themselves, about America, and
about the relationship between us. They
exhibited surprisingly little interest in
ASEAN or in more distant Asian
neighbors. That is changing, and all for
the good.
Our relationship with Manila will
find a more equitable and mature
balance as the Philippines benefits from
the experience of its near neighbors and
reduces to some degree its dependence
upon the United States. Moreover, I see
no reason why the development of
Filipino links with others need dilute the
quality of our own relationship— on the
contrary. And we shall use our own
considerable influence with other
countries— in Asia and in Europe— to
enlist support for our Filipino friends.
Fifth, we should express our support
for the democratic transition in very con-
crete ways. Our material support should
assume a variety of forms. In my judg-
ment, it should be substantial, and it
should be provided up front. We should
not be penny wise and pound foolish.
Happily, we have made a start, despite
an extremely austere budget
environment.
U.S. Support for the Philippines
Aid. Congress recently appropriated an
additional $150 million in bilateral
economic and military support, bringing
our total for fiscal year (FY) 1986 to
$550 million. The $300 million in
economic support funds supplied over
the past fiscal year were furnished as
direct support to the Philippine Govern-
ment budget to help finance ongoing
programs aimed at reinvigorating the
rural economy. In FY 1986, $90 million
in military assistance program funds will
assist Philippine Government efforts to
reequip and retrain the armed forces. A
$10-million package of Defense Depart-
ment medical supplies and services plus
$13 million in privately donated humani-
tarian supplies, announced during Presi-
dent Aquino's recent visit, should
facilitate civic action by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. On October 3,
$200 million in additional economic
assistance was added to the FY 1987
Continuing Resolution by the Senate.
The 82-to-14 vote reaffirms the under-
lying commitment of both U.S. political
parties to the Philippines.
Investment. In recent decades the
Philippines has relied too heavily on
commercial borrowing and too little on
equity investment to secure foreign
capital for development. This con-
tributed to the heavy debt burden which
the Aquino government inherited— a
burden compounded by large-scale
capital flight and disinvestment caused
by uncertain social, political, and
economic conditions.
The Philippines needs equity invest-
ment, and we are actively encouraging
it. During Mrs. Aquino's recent visit we
arranged opportunities for her to meet
directly with the chief executives of
many "blue chip" American companies.
President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and
others publicly pronounced their
"bullish" outlook on the Philippine
economy. This reflects our confidence in
the macroeconomic conditions of the
country, our respect for the abundant
material and human resources of the
Philippines, our conviction that the
policy reforms being put in place by the
Aquino Administration will unleash the
productive energies of the private sec-
tor, and our firm belief that a nation as
well endowed as the Philippines and
situated in the Pacific Basin will
inevitably prosper as political and
economic reforms take hold.
Naturally, American businessmen
will reach their tough investment deci-
sions more swiftly as they see Philippine
businessmen reinvest in the future of
their own country and as they observe
Philippine capital repatriated from "safe
havens" abroad.
In this connection, I might say a
word on "hidden wealth." I have no firm
estimate on the size of Marcos assets
outside the Philippines. I assume they
are very substantial. The disposition of
such assets as may be located in the
United States must, of course, be
resolved through the legal process. That
process is complex and tedious. For our
part, we intend to do what we can under
American law to help the Aquino
government recover the large sums that
Marcos appropriated for his personal
use.
A shrewd lawyer, Marcos can
presumably tie up Philippine Govern-
ment claims in our courts for years. In
the meantime, neither Marcos, nor his
family, nor anyone else will be able to
use these resources. Ultimately, perhaps,
only the attorneys will benefit. Former
President Marcos has not solicited my
view on this matter, nor will he. But I
hope he will eventually conclude that a
timely decision to repatriate a major por-
tion of his assets to the Philippines
would contribute to the well-being of h
countrymen, help redeem his reputatio
in the eyes of future historians, and
perhaps create circumstances in which
he might ultimately live out his final
years quietly in Ilocos Norte.
Multilateral Assistance. The Unit
States has supported Philippine Goverr
ment requests for a $500-million IMF
standby agreement, as well as a World
Bank economic recovery loan amountir
to $300 million. We have also
encouraged the expeditious completion
of negotiations with private banks for
further debt rescheduling. These priva
banks are prepared now to release ad
tional credits of about $350 million he
up when the Philippines fell out of
compliance with the previous IMF
agreement.
Trade. We are also working to
increase opportunities for the Philip;
to earn hard currency through expands
sugar exports. We have set up a speciaii
senior-level working group with State,
Commerce, and the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative to examine a variety of spec!
measures. We also agreed to create a
U.S. -Philippines Business Promotion
Council to harness the vitality of the
private sector in the effort to expand
trade and investment. The United Stat
has agreed to cooperate to maximize
Philippines benefits under the general-
ized system of preferences. The Defens
Department is taking steps to increase •
local procurement in the Philippines, j
Finally, the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation will sponsor a major
mission to the Philippines in February t
next year to increase U.S. investment^
the Philippines.
Educational Support. Historically,
the United States has made an impor-
tant contribution to education and train
ing of Filipinos from all walks of life. Vi.
want to continue this tradition. We are
working to put together a program to
provide extended scholarships and train
ing opportunities for faculty members
and graduate students from Philippine I
universities and colleges. We are also
encouraging state and private institu-
tions to increase existing ties with
various Philippine educational
institutions.
Conclusion
Collectively, the Aquino government
may possess more hope and pride than i
any government in modern Philippines I
history. It also faces problems of
54
Department of State Bulletii
EAST ASIA
paralleled severity. Its objectives of
kimizing Philippine freedom and
lelopment are aims which all
lericans share. Its strategy for attain-
I these high purposes is beginning to
Bnonstrate concrete and positive
lilts.
President Aquino put the challenge
to us directly in her stirring address to
the Congress: "Join us, America," she
said, "as we build a new home for
democracy, another haven for the
oppressed."
We accept that challenge and intend
to demonstrate our support by deed and
word. ■
isit of Philippines' President Aquino
President Corazon C. Aquino of the
hublic of the Philippines made an
{rial working visit to Washington,
}'., September 15-19. 1986, to meet
ih President Reagan and other govern-
mt officials.
Following on ii murks ininle hi/ tin
!■ Presidents after their meeting on
Member 17.1
fcsident Reagan
•vas truly a pleasure to welcome and
let today with Philippine President
iazon Aquino. Her courage and her
timitment to democracy, mirroring
Ise same qualities in the Filipino peo-
C, have inspired the world, and it's
K) an honor to have her as our guest.
President Aquino and I discussed her
strenuous efforts to bolster the demo-
cratic institutions of her country and to
ensure its security and strengthen its
economy. And I assured her that all
America wants the Philippine democracy
to succeed and to prosper and that we'll
do what we can to help.
These have been trying times in the
Philippines. President Aquino has been
overseeing a historic transition. In the
coming months a new constitution will
be submitted which will pave the way for
strong, democratically elected local and
national governments. In the meantime,
President Aquino has been doing her
level best to unite her richly diverse peo-
ple under a banner of freedom and
opportunity.
Her efforts to reconcile all elements
of her society and bring them into the
democratic process are applauded here. I
might add that her personal bravery in
this heroic endeavor to diffuse conflict
has won the hearts and imagination of
the people everywhere.
Despite President Aquino's efforts,
however, well-armed communist guer-
rillas remain a threat to democracy in
the Philippines. President Aquino and I
discussed her strategy to meet this
challenge. It includes attacking the root
political, economic, and social problems
that feed insurgencies. The second half
of the formula is building the Philippine
military into a professional, properly
armed and trained force that is capable
of dealing with any threat.
The United States stands ready to
assist President Aquino in her quest to
create a stable and secure land as well as
in her commitment to invigorate the
Philippine economy.
During our discussion today, Presi-
dent Aquino reaffirmed her belief that
free enterprise is the surest path to
development, the surest method of open-
ing the door of opportunity and advance-
ment to all her people. Her government
stands for free trade and is encouraging
private investment. She knows in the
long run nothing would better serve the
Filipino people than unleashing the
entrepreneurial spirit and putting the
creative and economy-building power of
the marketplace to work.
As one might surmise after hearing
this, I'm bullish on the Philippines. I
would hope American as well as foreign
investors take notice of the incredible
opportunity to help build a country. For
our part, we will mold our efforts to
encourage development in the Philip-
pines. Today, for example, we discussed
the idea of increasing Philippine exports
to the United States, including improved
treatment under our generalized system
of preferences. We also considered ways
in which the Philippines can provide a
larger share of the goods and services
consumed by the U.S. military facilities
within that country.
And just a side note, when talking
about those bases, our two countries
share common interests in the peace and
stability of the Pacific region. I'm confi-
dent that we will continue to enjoy a
strong mutual defense relationship for
the foreseeable future. President Aquino
reaffirmed today that the military bases
agreement will be respected through its
current term. I understand and am com-
fortable with her position. The next
review of our defense relations is sched-
uled in 1988, and that gives us and the
Ihpmhpr 1QRR
55
EAST ASIA
people of the Philippines plenty of time
to think about it.
In the meantime, I will continue to
ask Congress for appropriate levels of
economic and military assistance above
and beyond existing U.S. base-related
commitments. The latest installment of
our current aid effort— a $100 million
grant of economic support funds, which
I'm pleased to announce will be signed
by our respective Cabinet members in a
few moments,2 a $50 million grant of
military assistance, along with a $20
million package of medical supplies and
services— has been approved.
In the future, to the largest extent
possible, future U.S. aid will be designed
to provide the greatest benefit without
exacerbating the country's debt burden.
And one last thought: Today govern-
ments, businesses, financial institutions,
and individuals are dealing with a new
kind of government in the Philippines.
We're dealing with a noble and honest
people— people with ideals, people we
can trust. And we place a high value on
character and hope everyone appreciates
this and takes it into account.
A great Filipino hero, Dr. Jose Rizal,
once wrote, "God is justice: He cannot
abandon His cause, the cause of liberty,
without which no justice is possible."
Well, Jose Rizal, like President Aquino's
husband, died for freedom and inspired
his nation.
President Aquino and I reaffirmed
the commitment of our two peoples to
the ideals which so many Americans and
Filipinos have given their lives, and we
also reaffirm the bonds of friendship and
affection between the United States and
the Philippines.
President Aquino
This has been an opportunity to get to '
know each other, to explore common
issues together. Above all, though, I c;:
say that for my part the most importa
aspect has been the chance to meet ea>\
other.
We are both politicians who set
great store on face-to-face encounters. I
Government-to-government contacts-
have their proper place, yet when the
leadership of a country changes in sue
dramatic fashion, as happened in the
Philippines, it is only right that the
Presidents of two such close allies met
and get to know each other. Issues do
not generate of their own accord the
decisions that will resolve them. In the
end, decisions will be made by the peo j
who have the responsibility to make
them.
Philippines— A Profile
Philippine Sea
Chins ^PH,LIPPINCS
IN00MSIA
Geography
Area: 300,000 sq. km. (115,830 sq. mi.).
Cities: Capital— Manila (pop. 7 million in
metropolitan area). Other cities— Davao
(600,000), Cebu (450,000). Terrain: 65%
mountainous, with narrow coastal lowlands.
Climate: Tropical, astride typhoon belt.
People
Noun: Filipino(s). Adjective: Philippine.
Population (1985): 54.6 million. Annual
growth rate (1985): 2.4%. Ethnic groups:
Malay, Chinese. Religions: Catholic 83%,
Protestant 9%, Muslim 5%, other 3%.
Languages: Pilipino (based on Tagalog),
national language; English, language of
government and instruction in higher educa-
tion. Education: Years compulsory— d.
Attendance— above 95% in elementary grades,
57% in secondary grades. Literacy— about
88%. Health: Infant mortality rate (1985)-
52.5/1,000. Life expectancy (1985)-65.4 years.
Work force (20.6 million, 1984 est.):
Agriculture— 52%. Industry and
commerce— 16%. Services— 13.5%.
Government-10%. Other— 9.5%. Official
unemployment rate (1985)— 7.3%.
Government
Type: Republic. Independence: 1946. Con-
stitution: Provisional; new permanent con-
stitution scheduled to be drafted and submit-
ted in a plebiscite to electorate late 1986.
Political parties: Philippine Democratic
Party (PDP/Laban); United Nationalist
Democratic Organization (UNIDO); New
Society Movement (KBL), Partido
Nacionalista Philipina (PNP), and other small
parties. Suffrage: Universal and compulsory.
Administrative subdivisions: 12 regions
plus Metro Manila, 74 provinces, 60 chartered
cities.
Central government budget: $4.9 billion.
Defense: (1985) 1.1% of estimated 1985
GNP.
Flag: Two horizontal bands— the top blue,
the bottom red— joined at the staff side with a
white triangle. Centered on the triangle is a
yellow, eight-rayed sun. In each corner of the
triangle is a yellow star.
Economy
GNP (1985): $32.6 billion (nominal). Annua •
growth rate: 12.8% (nominal); - 3.8% (rea '
Per capita income (1985): $598. Annual
inflation rate: 10%, 1983; 50.8%, 1984; I
20.3%, 1985; 4.0%, 1986 (est).
Natural resources: Timber, copper,
nickel, iron, cobalt, silver, gold, petroleum.
Agriculture (26.46% of GDP): Sugar, f
coconut products, rice, corn, pineapples, an1
bananas.
Industries (32.72% of GDP): Textiles,
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, wood products,
food processing, electronics assembly. Serv
ices: 40.82% of GDP.
Trade (1985): Exports-$4.6 billion. M<&
markets— VS. Japan, EC. Imports— $5.6 -
billion. Major suppliers— -US, Japan, EC.
Exchange rate (June 1986): 20.50
pesos = US$l.
Membership in International
Organizations
UN and its specialized agencies, including
World Bank Group (IBRD, IFC, IDA), Inter
national Monetary Fund (IMF), General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), ail
International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEt
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN); Asian Development Bank (ADB);
INTELSAT.
Taken from the Background Notes of Augt
1986, published by the Bureau of Public Mail
Department of State. Editor: Sharon R. Lotz.
56
nonartmonl nf Qfato Rirllfitl
EUROPE
From this meeting today both our
ernments will go out with a clear
se of priorities, with a recognition
c we must both work hard to
mgthen the bonds between us. I hope
have set the tone and direction for a
i relationship. By recovering our
locracy, we Filipinos have recovered
self-confidence and pride and hence
ability to deal with our major ally on
;qual footing. This is the only basis
a relationship between friends, and I
lk we were able to start on that
nda today. I was able to explain to
sident Reagan the problems we have
erited, all of them rooted in a deva-
;ed economy. I was also able to out-
i to him what we are doing to set
lgs right. I am gratified that Presi-
it Reagan understands and supports
it we are trying to do.
As you know, we have placed our
h in the private sector as the stimulus
jrowth. I also briefed the President
the wide range of reforms we have
marked on to resolve our difficulties,
lew constitution is in the final stages
irafting. There will be a referendum
it followed by elections early next
r. We are carrying out a long-
rdue program of military reform.
;hin this context of an economic
onstruction, political rebuilding, and
itary reform, we can combat our
laining problem: the insurgency. As
know, we are pursuing a political
iroach, but this is backed by the
itary option. In all these areas of
uilding, I hope we can count on
lerican support and understanding.
But most important, reform is being
le in a new environment of freedom,
nan rights, and democracy. So, as
ay's discussions showed, we have a
of values in common again. We
nire freedom and hard work in just
way you do. For two countries who
e a faith in God, in freedom, in the
lily, and in democratic values, we
uld allow nothing to come in the way
in ever-growing friendship.
Today was a good beginning, and I
nk you all for it.
U.S. -Soviet Relations:
Coping With Conflicts in the Third World
'Made at the South Portico of the White
ise (text from Weekly Compilation of
sidential Documents of Sept. 22, 1986).
2Following the departure of the two
sidents, Secretary of the Treasury
les A. Baker, III and Philippines Minister
•Mnance Jaime Ongpin signed an agree-
nt providing the $100 million in U.S.
nomic assistance to the Philippine
/ernment. ■
by Michael H. Armacost
Address at the opening of the Insti-
tute for International Studies at Brown
1 University in Providence, Rhode Island,
on September 26, 1986. Ambassador
Armacost is Under Secretary for
Political Affairs.
It is a great honor to speak at this con-
ference inaugurating the new Institute
for International Studies.
This conference is most timely. U.S.-
Soviet relations are at one of those
critical junctures which comes along
periodically.
• The Soviet Union has a new
leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who is taking
a fresh look at Soviet policies and
priorities.
• We have an experienced and
popular President who has restored
American military and economic power
and who is in a position to negotiate with
adversaries with confidence in our own
strength.
• New military technology is on the
horizon which challenges the orthodox
concepts of deterrence and opens the
door to important opportunities for
major strategic arms reductions.
• Our dialogue with the Soviet
Union has been intensified, and last
week's talks between Secretary Shultz
and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
revealed hopeful possibilities for prog-
ress on a broad agenda.
Nonetheless, the Daniloff case once
again illustrates the nature of the Soviet
system and leaves a dark cloud hanging
over the relationship. And unless that
case is promptly resolved, a fruitful sum-
mit meeting is difficult to envisage.
Many are skeptical about summit meet-
ings under the best of circumstances.
But I think former British Prime
Minister Ramsey MacDonald expressed it
well to a young Foreign Office specialist
who exhibited doubts about high-level
meetings. "The desire for peace," said
the young officer, "does not necessarily
ensure peace." "Quite true," replied
MacDonald. "Neither does the desire for
food satisfy hunger. But at least it gets
you started toward a restaurant."
Others at this forum have addressed
the central East- West arms control ques-
tions. I would like to discuss another
important thread in our relationship with
Moscow: Soviet ambitions in the so-
called Third World, with particular
emphasis on the adjustments of Soviet
strategy which we are beginning to see
under General Secretary Gorbachev and
the guidelines the Reagan Administra-
tion has used to inform its policy in the
developing world.
Historical Reflections
Let me begin with some general reflec-
tions. We and the Soviets are necessary
partners in the task of avoiding nuclear
war, restraining the arms race, and
preventing regional conflicts from
becoming global confrontations. But we
and the Soviets are also natural
geopolitical rivals. De Tocqueville
foresaw, more than 100 years ago, an
inevitable collision of interests between
Russia— a great continental empire with
a tradition of arbitrary authority— and
America— a great insular republic com-
mitted to the principle of freedom.
The cold war began with such a
clash. In the aftermath of the last World
War, Stalin sought to alter the world
balance of power by gaining dominance
of the Eurasian land mass, especially in
those peripheral areas where great
centers of political and industrial power
were concentrated. Having imposed his
rule on Eastern Europe, Stalin tried to
separate us, first from Europe by
blockading Berlin and then from Asia by
supporting the North Korean attack
upon South Korea.
These events, combined with the
clash of values and ideas between two
antithetical social and political systems,
led to the development of America's con-
tainment policy— a policy applied first in
Western Europe and subsequently
adapted to the requirements of other
regions. This policy has been remarkably
successful in stabilizing the original
theater of conflict. Indeed, the only
hostile Soviet military operations under-
taken in Europe over the past genera-
tion have been directed against other
communist countries— East Germany,
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
The struggle in other regions has
been more fluid. The Soviet Union has
continued for nearly a generation to
expand its influence and establish
military footholds in the Third World.
Khrushchev tried in the 1950s to turn
newly decolonized nations against the
West by cultivating such emerging
figures as Nasser, Sukarno, Nkrumah,
Toure, and Nehru. Moscow was all too
ready to fan conflict in newly formed
-.V^nr 1QQC
57
EUROPE
nations beset by instability and internal
conflicts.
In the Third World of the 1960s,
there appeared to be some receptivity to
Soviet blandishments. Marxist ideology
still offered a model for social develop-
ment which some found attractive;
statist economic practices were much in
vogue; the Leninist party appeared to
offer leaders in newly independent
nations an instrument for establishing
and maintaining power; and the Rus-
sians were generous in supplying arms
and, occasionally, economic assistance to
select Third World governments and
groups.
In 1962, we confronted one of the
most dangerous situations of the post-
war period in the Third World-
Khrushchev's attempt to deploy inter-
mediate-range missiles in Cuba. The
missiles were removed, but Soviet
influence and military presence on the
island were not.
Following Khrushchev's ouster, the
Soviets were for a time preoccupied with
domestic developments. The Sino-Soviet
split was a major strategic setback for
Moscow, as was Sadat's bold decision to
throw Soviet military advisers out of
Egypt. In the heyday of detente in the
early 1970s, an attempt was even made
to codify "rules of the road" for manag-
ing U.S. -Soviet competition in the Third
World.
It soon became apparent, however,
that Moscow and Washington harbored
vastly different interpretations of these
"rules." And agreements— like the 1972
Treaty on Mutual Relations— could not
induce restraint when the balance of
power underlying such agreements was
allowed to erode.
In the mid-1970s, Moscow moved
boldly to exploit turmoil in several dif-
ferent regions against the backdrop of
what it perceived to be a new "correla-
tion of forces" emerging from Hanoi's
victory in Indochina, post-Vietnam
malaise in the United States, and the
uneasiness of our friends and allies
caused by the apparent decline of
American power and will.
• As the Portuguese empire in
Africa crumbled, the Soviets airlifted
thousands of Cubans to Angola and
worked to establish a close relationship
with a Marxist regime in Mozambique.
• Cuban troops, with Soviet help
and advisers, intervened in the conflict
between Ethiopia and Somalia.
• In 1979, Vietnam invaded Cam-
be idia only a week after signing a friend-
ship treaty with Moscow.
• The Soviet Union supported the
triumphant Nicaraguan communists
who proclaimed a "revolution without
frontiers."
• The Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan in 1979 constituted the first
massive use of Soviet troops outside
Eastern Europe since World War II.
This brazen move destroyed the
independence of a nonaligned neighbor,
threatened the security of Pakistan, and
extended forward by several hundred
miles the Soviet capacity to project
military power toward the Persian Gulf.
These actions suggested a broad
effort by Moscow to shift the global
balance of forces, tore the fabric of our
bilateral relationship with the Soviets,
undermined any practical prospect of
Senate ratification of SALT II [strategic
arms limitation talks], and discredited
proponents of detente in this country.
Recalling these episodes reminds us
of these lessons.
• Containing the spread of Soviet
power requires that we resist provoc-
ative Soviet actions "on the ground"—
with sufficient resources and, if
necessary, by force.
• Negotiations on regional issues
only work when the Soviets know that
their use of force will not yield them
easy gains.
• Containment cannot be accom-
plished by military means alone or by the
United States acting alone.
• Soviet gains in the Third World
have, on occasion, proved transitory.
Moscow has suffered its own setbacks.
• Nationalism can be a principal ally
in containing the extension of Soviet
influence and in reversing it. In
Yugoslavia and China, Tito and Mao
mobilized their partisans behind the ban-
ner of national independence as well as a
commitment to create communism. They
enlisted broad local support and
improvised their own strategy for attain-
ing power. These leaders accepted
assistance from Moscow, but the Soviet
Union did not achieve durable control
because the Yugoslav and Chinese
revolutions triumphed through their own
efforts and as a consequence of their
own independent strength. Their
nationalism— in the absence on their soil
of Soviet troops— precluded subservience
to any foreign power— including the
Soviet Union.
• The explosive character of many
regional conflicts only underscores the
need for U.S. -Soviet dialogue— even
when negotiated solutions are not in
sight. In a nuclear age, we cannot afford
the kind of miscalculations that prompted
Stalin and his North Korean ally to
interpret Dean Acheson's remark about
our Asian defense perimeter as license
to initiate aggression in Korea.
Gorbachev's Policv
in the Third World
What of Mr. Gorbachev? Gorbachev ha
made clear his intention of revitalizing
the Soviet industrial base as a means c
preserving its power and prestige
abroad. Although his immediate priori
may be cosmetic, Gorbachev has alreai
injected a new dynamism into Soviet
foreign policy. He has emphasized the
need for fresh ideas and has shuffled
people in the central foreign policy
apparatus.
• He has put forward a variety of i
arms control initiatives and sought to
mobilize Western public opinion in the:
support.
• He has courted key West Euro-
pean countries and Japan in hopes of
enhancing the Soviet strategic positior
and encouraging divisions within the
Western alliance system.
• By making new overtures to Chj|
in his recent Vladivostok speech, he
has hinted at the possibility of new
diplomatic flexibility and highlighted
Soviet ambitions for influence in the
Asia-Pacific area.
In this flurry of diplomatic activity
the developing world has not escaped
Mr. Gorbachev's attention. The Soviet
position in many Third World countries
has declined in recent years as a result I
of the waning appeal of Soviet ideology |
and exposure of the real meaning of
Moscow's commitment to "national
liberation" in Afghanistan and
Cambodia.
Soviet involvement in the Third
World economy has been modest at bes
The U.S.S.R. has provided neither a
prime market for Third World exports
nor a source of technology and finished
goods; Soviet nonmilitary aid to the
developing world has been negligible;
and, its statist, highly centralized com-
mand economy has lost much of its
earlier allure in the face of the progress
achieved in recent years by more
market-oriented economies.
To refurbish his country's tarnished^
image. General Secretary Gorbachev hai
reactivated Soviet diplomacy in the
Third World. He has renewed efforts to
cultivate market-oriented Third World
countries. Establishment of diplomatic
relations with Oman and the United
Arab Emirates in 1985, growth of Sovie
economic ties with Argentina and Brazil
new efforts to improve ties with the
nations of ASEAN [Association of Soutl
East Asian Nations] and the South
58
Department of State Bulleti
EUROPE
cific, greater emphasis on UN multi-
eral diplomacy, and Foreign Minister
evardnadze's upcoming trip to Mexico
: all indicative of a new approach.
This new activity is directed toward
ariety of goals.
• It aims to enhance the Soviet
>acity to influence the resolution of
standing regional disputes. The
lewed emphasis on convening an
ernational conference on the Middle
st as well as the recent consular talks
:h the Israelis are illustrative of this
sire.
• Several recent Soviet initiatives,
rticularly the call for Soviet participa-
n in Pacific Basin economic develop-
■nt and application for full member-
p in the General Agreement on
riffs and Trade (GATT), reflect a
sire to take advantage of economic
portunities from which the Soviets
£e excluded themselves in the past.
• This new Soviet activism also
'erts attention from Moscow's sizable
litary buildup in the Pacific over
: past decade, its occupation of
ghanistan, and support for Vietnam's
pupation of Cambodia. Soviet endorse-
■nt of regional nuclear-free zones plays
regional anxieties about nuclear
apons, particularly in the South
cific.
The bottom line, however, is clear:
sport for Third World clients remains
m— support for friendly regimes in
ghanistan, Angola, Cambodia,
caragua, and North Korea has been
gmented.
In Afghanistan, Soviet tactics have,
inything, increased in their brutality.
forts to intimidate Pakistan have also
reased over the past year.
In Angola, the Soviets have substan-
lly increased their military and
momic aid to the Popular Movement
• the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
ice 1984, such assistance exceeds $2
lion. They also directed a 1985 offen-
e against Savimbi's UNITA [National
lion for the Total Independence of
igola] forces and, along with the
ibans, are engaged in preparations for
other offensive.
In Nicaragua, the Soviets have
■eady delivered more military aid in
86 than in any previous year.
In Indochina, the Soviets continue
provide roughly $1 billion a year in aid
Vietnam. In return, the Vietnamese
ve permitted the Soviets expanded use
military facilities in Cam Ranh Bay
d Da Nang.
In Northeast Asia, the Soviets have
ovided advanced MiG-23 fighters to
North Korea, increased port calls to
military ships of the Soviet Pacific fleet,
will have secured in return Pyongyang's
support for expanded I'.S.S.R. intelli-
gence activities against our friends and
allies in the area.
Soviet support for such client
regimes imposes more than simply finan-
cial costs. Politically, Soviet and Soviet-
supported military interventions have
put the Soviets on the diplomatic defen-
sive, exposed them to UN condemnation,
alienated them from the Muslim world,
and left them backing a number of
governments of dubious legitimacy con-
fronting a rising tide of indigenous
nationalist resistance.
These costs are likely to increase. In
Nicaragua, the democratic resistance is
growing in strength and numbers; in
Angola, Savimbi's UNITA forces have
extended the area under their control; in
Cambodia, Hanoi's puppet regime can-
not maintain itself without the presence
of nearly 150,000 Vietnamese troops;
and in Afghanistan, the resistance has
successfully held its own against over-
whelming odds for over 6 years. Mr.
Gorbachev's recent acknowledgment
that the Afghan regime needs to take
into account elements from outside the
country is eloquent, if unintended,
testimony to the mujahidin 's fortitude
and staying power.
The Soviet leadership is undoubtedly
sensitive to the growing burden of
foreign interventionism. General
Secretary Gorbachev's address to the
27th Party Congress devoted little
attention to Third World nations. In the
recently adopted party program, there
were no specific offers of military and
economic help to "liberated" Third
World clients; instead, there were
injunctions that Third World friends
must build socialism "mainly by their
own efforts."
The precise meaning of these
statements is unclear. There is no
evidence to date that the Soviets are cut-
ting back on existing commitments.
General Secretary Gorbachev may be
reluctant, however, to assume new risks
and new commitments in the Third
World and may try, as in Afghanistan,
to get client regimes to shoulder a
greater share of the security and
development burden. Over the longer
term, as these insurgencies continue to
gain strength, Moscow will have to make
more far-reaching reassessments. Their
judgments will depend heavily upon the
consequences of our own commitments
to support those who are fighting for
their independence and a more open
political system.
U.S. Policy Toward
the Third World
The United States possesses a strong
hand for dealing with the challenge
posed by the Soviet Union in the Third
World. Our cards include our military
strength, the dynamism of our economy,
and the diversity and vitality of our
culture and political system. Our
greatest asset is our openness to the
world— to people, to ideas, to enterprise,
and to change.
Our economy is open. Despite pro-
tectionist pressures, the United States
remains the largest market for develop-
ing countries' exports. U.S. imports of
manufactured goods from developing
countries more than doubled from 1980
to 1985. In the latter year, the United
States purchased 62% of all manufac-
tured goods imported by industrialized
nations from developing countries.
Agreement last week in Punta del Este
to launch a new GATT trade round
promises to give developing countries
expanded trading opportunities and
access to our markets.
Beyond working for freer and more
open trade, we have also addressed
obstacles to economic development in
specific regions and countries. For exam-
ple, [Treasury] Secretary Baker pro-
posed at the last IMF [International
Monetary Fund] and IBRD [Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and
Development] meeting an imaginative
response to the less developed countries'
debt problems. We continue to assign a
high priority to developmental
assistance.
The most impressive index of change
in the Third World, however, is not
found in statistics on aid or trade but,
rather, in the growing acknowledgment
by leaders of developing countries that
reliance on the market is the key to
growth and prosperity. The two most
populous countries in the world— China
and India— have begun to deregulate and
decentralize their economies. The newly
industrialized economies of East Asia—
e.g., Singapore. Taiwan, South Korea,
and Malaysia— became economic
"miracles" because they gave economic
incentives and open markets a chance.
At the May UN Special Session on the
Critical Economic Situation in Africa,
the African nations— including those
hardest hit by experiments in collectivist
planning— issued an extraordinary docu-
ment calling for more open markets and
less state intervention.
In sum, the problems faced by Third
World developing countries accentuate
U.S. strengths and Soviet weaknesses.
member 1986
59
EUROPE
Reagan Doctrine and Negotiations
Let me be clear: the United States does
not challenge the Soviet desire to play a
global role. Our concerns derive from the
fact that the Soviets rely to an excessive
degree upon military power and military
force to pursue their objectives in the
Third World. Consequently, we cannot
rely exclusively on nonmilitary means to
meet the challenge they pose in the
Third World.
Building on the lessons of the past,
an American strategy to counter Soviet
military intervention in the Third World
should include the following elements.
First, we should support indigenous
resistance to Soviet expansionist moves.
As President Reagan has stated,
"Resistance forces fighting against com-
munist tyranny deserve our support."
The form and extent of our help will
vary in individual cases, but increasing
the political and economic costs of Soviet
intervention is the most promising
method of deterring Moscow from future
adventures. For this reason, we have
pledged our support to the Afghan peo-
ple; we welcomed the repeal of the Clark
amendment; and we enlisted Senate and
House support for aid to the resistance
in Nicaragua.
Second, we should also promote
dialogue and negotiation as a means of
resolving Third World regional conflicts.
We support the Contadora process in
Central America, the UN Secretary
General's efforts to bring an end to the
conflict in Afghanistan, ASEAN's
diplomatic initiatives to resolve the con-
flict in Cambodia, and proposals to
achieve independence for Namibia along
with a withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola.
We recognize that only agreements
accommodating the interests of the par-
ties directly concerned can have any
durable effect. For that reason, in the
Middle East, we have supported direct
negotiations between Israel and her
Arab neighbors. In Korea, we favor
direct dialogue between North and
South.
In a speech to the United Nations
last year, President Reagan outlined a
broad three-stage plan for dealing with
Departure of Soviet Espionage Agents
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
OCT. 21, 19861
The United States advised the Soviet
Union this morning of a number of steps
designed to respond to the Soviet expul-
sion of five U.S. diplomats and to ensure
that from this point forward the Soviet
diplomatic representative in Washington
and San Francisco will be based on the
principle of strict equality in numbers
with our counterpart representations in
Moscow and Leningrad. Specifically,
Soviet representatives were informed:
• That the number of personnel in
the Soviet Embassy in Washington and
the Soviet Consulate General in San
Francisco must be reduced by November
1 to levels equal to those, respectively, of
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and Con-
sulate General in Leningrad. New, equal
ceilings for the two countries' combined
bilateral missions will thus be established
as follows: for embassies— 225 positions;
for consulates general— 26 positions.
Fifty Soviet Embassy and Consulate
employees who will be obliged to depart
the United States pursuant to this
measure have been identified by name;
• That, as a result of the recent
Soviet action to expel five U.S. dip-
lomats, an additional four members of
the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and
one member of the Soviet Consulate in
San Francisco, are declared persona non
grata, and must depart the United
States by November 1.
We have repeatedly informed the
Soviets— most recently when we expelled
25 named officials from the Soviet UN
mission in September— that we would
not tolerate the abuse of their UN mis-
sion as a safehaven for espionage activi-
ties. Moreover, when we expelled the 25
in response to their abuse of the UN mis-
sion, we indicated that we would not
tolerate actions against our diplomatic
missions. There is no counterpart U.S.
presence in the U.S.S.R. to the Soviet
UN mission.
The United States regrets that the
Soviets have insisted on taking actions
that have made these steps necessary. In
taking the actions described above, the
United States has corrected a long-
standing imbalance in our relationship.
the internal conflicts raging in Angola,
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and
Ethiopia. The President called for:
• A negotiating process between th
warring parties to achieve an end to
violence and to bring about national
reconciliation and the withdrawal of
foreign troops;
• U.S. and Soviet talks on how to
support such negotiations between the
parties and on how to achieve the
verified elimination of foreign military
forces and the flow of outside arms; and
• Generous U.S. support for
reintegration of these countries into the
world economy if a political resolution o
existing conflicts can be achieved.
In keeping with these principles,
U.S. policy in Afghanistan has been
directed toward a negotiated political
settlement embodying the prompt and
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.
No settlement is foreseeable unless the
Afghan people have the opportunity to
'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Charles Redman. ■
select their own form of government an> |
to resume a status of genuine nonalign-
ment. We are pledged to guarantee an ,
outcome that achieves these objectives. t
Similarly, in Angola, we have con-
sistently urged the Luanda government
to sit down at the negotiating table to
work out its differences with UNITA.
On the basis of UN Security Council
Resolution 435, we have called for the
independence of Namibia and the
withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola. In Nicaragua, we have called fo. '
an end to Cuban and Soviet intervention'
as well as a genuine dialogue between
the Sandinistas and the democratic
opposition on the basis of the draft Con- '
tadora agreement calling for the
democratization of the political life of thil
country.
Unfortunately, none of the regimes
involved in these conflicts has responded'
yet to our call for negotiations with the :
opposition. Nor have proposals for the
withdrawal of foreign troops borne fruit. !
The Soviets and their clients apparently
continue to believe that more is to be
gained on the battlefield than at the
bargaining table. That is why we must
continue to support the indigenous
resistance forces.
The Need for Superpower Dialogue
A third element in our policy involves a [
dialogue with the Soviet Union on the
geopolitical competition itself. In
September 1984, President Reagan
called for more regular exchanges with
the Soviets on regional problems.
Moscow was initially cool to the idea but
subsequently agreed to the proposal, and i
over the past 2 years, we have held two 1
60
rionartmont <-if Qfato Rnllotin
EUROPE
(ids of talks on five different subjects:
(Middle East, East Asia, Central
erica and the Caribbean, southern
lea, and Afghanistan. As part of the
jew process leading up to the recent
jltz-Shevardnadze meeting, I con-
ned 2 days of discussions with senior
(iet officials to review the results of
{e expert discussions. Secretary
jjltz and Foreign Minister Shevard-
le devoted considerable attention
ese issues when they met in
hington. It is our intent that such
anges will become a regular feature
oviet-Ameriean dialogue at the
ical level.
iThe purpose of these talks is not to
[)tiate solutions to regional conflicts
nd the backs of the parties con-
ied. Rather, they provide a forum for
lg concerns in order to lessen the
s of misperception or miscalculation,
talks have been professional, frank,
wide ranging. No attempt has been
e to mask our differences. Both
s came away with a fuller
srstanding of each other's percep-
s on the central issues. On a few
es we have identified parallel or con-
ing concerns and interests.
inclusion
ji convinced that the strands of our
j;y for dealing with regional issues—
topenness and involvement in the
Jrnational economy, our support for
edom and self-determination, and our
pts to resolve problems by negotia-
3 and dialogue— make the United
les a natural partner for key coun-
ts in the developing world. America is
iwerful and constructive force for
fcdom and progress.
[Yet a new wave of isolationism
pons Congress and threatens to turn
erica's back to the world. Support for
lectionist legislation is higher in the
Igress today than at any time since
111930s. Such legislation threatens
r countries burdened by debt, the
prt-oriented economies of Asian
thds and allies, and new democracies
fcr for trade rather than aid. All these
fend on an open and accessible
fcprican market. If we abandon the
I trade system, we will do untold
roarable damage to their economic
Ipects, forfeit our most significant
Mintage in the competition with the
lets, and raise the cost of goods to
fcrican consumers while removing the
f of foreign competition from our
listry.
Another danger sign is the congres-
ical attack on our foreign affairs
bget. We cannot maintain our
influence in the Third World without
resources. Yet the present congressional
budget resolutions will impose deep cuts
(25%-50%) on our foreign aid program.
This will deprive struggling and deserv-
ing friends of our political and diplomatic
support and withhold from them the
economic and security assistance they
need to build for the future.
Nor can we be reluctant to support
the struggle of peoples resisting the
imposition of communist rule. History
has shown what happens when we
remain aloof. In the 1970s, our adver-
saries took advantage of our disengage-
ment to project their arms and influence
into key developing countries. Today, as
yesterday, failure to perform our respon-
sibilities now can only invite greater
burdens and challenges later.
Yet, history need not repeat itself.
These dangerous trends can be reversed.
But only if our people are guided by a
sense of duty and responsibility to future
generations and reawaken to our
dependence on the world and the world's
dependence on us. We must never forget
that the United States is the strongest
force in the world for progress in human
freedom. The United States faces a
critical choice: we can continue to be
engaged in the Third World on behalf of
our deepest values and commitments, or
we can choose to stand aside and allow
events in that part of the world to play
themselves out with less U.S. involve-
ment and a corresponding reduction in
our influence. That decision is ours to
make. It is urgently important that we
remain engaged. ■
U.S. -Soviet Relations:
Background and Prospects
by Jack F. Matlock
An English translation of an address
before the Chautauqua Conference on
U.S. -Soviet Relations in Jurmala,
Latvia, on September 15, 1986. The
Chautauqua Institution, sponsor since
the late 1800s of public affairs debates,
organized this conference featuring U.S.
and Soviet spokesmen as afollowup to its
1985 Conference on U.S. -Soviet Relations
in Chautauqua, New York. Debates by
U.S. and Soviet Government represen-
tatives took place before an audience of
Soviet and American citizens. Ambas-
sador Matlock addressed the group in
Latvian and Russian.
Ambassador Matlock is special
assistant to the President and Senior
Director for European and Soviet Af-
fairs at the National Security Council.
It is a great pleasure for me to have the
opportunity to visit Latvia again. It has
been 25 years since I first visited Riga,
admired its beauty, and witnessed a
splendid performance in your National
Theater. I hope to have a chance to meet
many of you who are participating in
this meeting. We Americans have a
special interest in Latvia, since many of
your relatives and descendants are now
Americans and have made a distinctive
contribution to our society.
Thank you for providing such beauti-
ful surroundings for our discussions this
week. All of us visiting from outside
Latvia, whether Americans, Russians, or
others, are in your debt for your wonder-
ful hospitality. And now, I am sure you
will understand if I speak in Russian,
rather than continuing to torture your
beautiful language with my barbaric
accent.
As I have explained to our Latvian
hosts, I am very pleased to have the
opportunity to visit Latvia again. The
topics we have to discuss with our Soviet
counterparts are vitally important ones.
Nevertheless, I come to you with a
heavy heart. A shocking event has cast a
deep shadow over U.S. -Soviet relations
and cannot help but have an impact on
our deliberations.
The arrest of Nicholas Daniloff ' by
Soviet officials, on charges which were
obviously trumped up, almost led to the
cancellation of this conference. Several
of our counterparts withdrew from par-
ticipation since they felt that they could
not, in conscience, attend.
Why are American feelings so
strong? Because Nick Daniloff's arrest
seems to us nothing other than seizure
of a hostage. It is obvious that Mr.
Daniloff was framed by Soviet officials
after Gennadiy Zakharov, a professional
Soviet intelligence officer residing in the
United States under cover of UN
employment, was arrested in an act of
espionage. But let it be understood that
we cannot and will not equate a profes-
sional spy caught redhanded with an
innocent American journalist.
I^Dmhnr 1 QPfi
61
EUROPE
Although Mr. Daniloff is no longer
physically incarcerated, he will be a
hostage so long as he is not allowed to
leave the Soviet Union. If U.S. -Soviet
relations are not to suffer a severe set-
back, Mr. Daniloff must be allowed to
return to the United States without
delay. The longer his freedom is denied,
the more severely the outrage of his
arrest and detention will affect U.S.-
Soviet relations.
Although I am a government official,
I would like to talk to you today as an
individual American, one who has lived
several years in the Soviet Union and
several more elsewhere in Europe and
also in Africa. This has given me the
opportunity to learn firsthand about the
lives and cultures of people in countries
outside my own. I have also learned
another thing: that international rela-
tions is not some abstract discipline deal-
ing with impersonal geopolitical forces
and ideologies but a process that affects
the lives of people throughout the world.
Therefore, I will not be speaking of
generalized "forces of history" but of
attitudes held by people and actions that
affect the lives of people.
We will be able to solve problems
only if we understand them, understand
our respective points of view, and make
a special effort to find solutions.
Therefore, I will speak candidly about
the view many Americans hold of the
relationship. Discussion is worthless if it
is not frank, and we all need to make the
most of the splendid opportunity this
meeting provides.
The U.S. and the Soviet Union:
A Historical Perspective
How is it that two countries which have
never fought each other, which do not
covet any of the other's territory, and
the people of which want nothing so
much as peace find themselves so fre-
quently at odds?
It has not always been so. We
Americans treasure the memories of our
wartime alliance and know very well the
immense sacrifices made by all the
peoples of the Soviet Union in that
fateful struggle. We also know that,
historically, American relations with
Russia were close and friendly in the
19th century.
I am reminded of a conversation
which took place not long ago in the
White House. An important Soviet
official was visiting Washington, and the
President arranged a luncheon for him.
As the group was sitting in the State
Dining Room, one of the guests called
attention to a portrait of Abraham
Lincoln on the wall. The Soviet visitor
remarked that, "During Lincoln's time,
relations between our countries were
very friendly."
The President agreed, then said that
this reminded him of an anecdote. A
couple, married for 10 years or so, were
riding in their car, the husband driving
and the wife sitting beside him but near
the door. The wife observed wistfully,
"Remember how it was when we were
first married? We sat very close
together, and I often put my head on
your shoulder as you drove. Now we are
sitting so far apart!"
The husband's answer was, "But,
honey, I haven't moved!"
And so it often seems to us
Americans. As your proverb goes,
"There's no inheritance for us to fight
over." We do not seek conflict and con-
frontation. So why have we had recur-
rent tensions and, at times, come close
to conflict during the years since World
War II?
Some might say it is because we
have different values, social structures,
and political systems. These differences
are real. Yet we have always had such
differences, and they did not lead to con-
flict. Tensions arose even before the
revolution, when Americans protested
czarism's abuses of human rights. They
intensified when, after adopting a
Marxist-Leninist ideology, your leaders
declared themselves the enemy of those
of a different persuasion and treated the
world as an arena for a struggle that
would end only with your victory. Thus,
it is both actions and ideology that have
spawned apprehension and distrust. And
given this ideology, you leave us no
alternative but to expect that we will be
rivals in many areas for the foreseeable
future.
But do the problems caused by
ideology doom us to conflict? I cannot
believe that they do. Let us take a look
at the recent past for some clues as to
what sort of events and practices have
brought us into confrontation.
When the Second World War ended
in 1945, Americans, in their joy, thought
of nothing more than bringing their
fighting men home from the battlefields
of Europe and Asia, demobilizing them,
and settling down to building a better
life at home. We hoped that the new UN
organization would preserve peace and
freedom of choice for all nations. We
hoped that we would never again be
drawn into conflicts outside our borders,
as we had been during both world wars.
President Truman announced a policy of
bringing our boys home before
Christmas. Most were home for
Christmas, but our hopes turned out tc J
be unrealistic.
For what did we witness? Althougl
no one challenged Soviet security, in
country after country of Eastern and
Central Europe occupied by the Soviet
Army, governments were imposed whi
were not the result of the free election
which our leaders had pledged at the
Yalta Conference. The United States
incorporated not one square millimetei
of territory as a result of the war.
Indeed, shortly after the war's end, it
granted independence to the 19 millior
residents of the Philippines. The Sovie |;
Union, on the other hand, appropriate< (i
to itself vast territories, without seekii j,
or obtaining the consent of the residen ji
The use of force and the absence of
freely given consent are the reasons th |
United States has never recognized an |
will not recognize the legality of the fo |
cible incorporation of Latvia, Lithuanii |
and Estonia into the Soviet Union.
The United States emerged from ,
the war with a monopoly of a new,
immensely destructive technology— the |
atomic bomb. Had it chosen to flex its J
muscles and make demands upon othei |
few— if any— could have resisted. But )
this was not the course we took; instea |
we proposed that all nuclear weapons
and the technology to make them be
turned over to an international author- J
ity, which would destroy existing
weapons and maintain an inspection ar, |
control of all countries to ensure that |
they could not be created again. It is a
tragic fact of history that Stalin rejecte t
this plan and the inspection and contro! i
which would make it feasible.
By 1947, it was clear that the
devastated countries of Europe and As |
could not promptly rebuild their societi- j
and economies without outside assist-
ance. The United States, which had not.
suffered wartime destruction of its
industry and agriculture, offered the
most farsighted and generous plan of
economic cooperation the world has
known. The Marshall Plan was offered |
both to wartime allies and to erstwhile j
enemies, for we knew that if we were t<i
have peace and security, all nations muij
have the opportunity to rebuild their
economies as they chose. The nations of |
Western Europe accepted and, within a,
very few years, were accomplishing
economic miracles. Once again, Stalin
refused, and not just for the Soviet
Union but also for countries of Eastern |
and Central Europe under Soviet
influence.
What conclusions did Americans
draw from these and other associated
events? Basically, that the Soviet Union
62
DeDartment of State Bulleti
EUROPE
,s determined to use military force
enever it could to extend its
ninance, was contemptuous of
nocratic values, and had no interest in
operation.
Much has changed since those early
twar years, but every time
lericans have rekindled their hope
it the Soviet Union is prepared to
;er a new era— one of cooperation and
pceful, constructive competition
limately leading to a world when all
Hi and women are free— events have
Ottered the hope and have reconfirmed
bse conclusions drawn from Soviet
tions just after the war. From the
rasion of Hungary in 1956, to the inva-
|n of Czechoslovakia in 1968, to the
rasion of Afghanistan in 1979, we have
inessed the Soviet resort to force
Sen no reasonable person would judge
at Soviet security, or that of its allies.
i.s threatened. The issue seemed to be
(e of Soviet insistence on dominating
lighbors, pure and simple.
[ Many will doubtless say that the
Jited States also has used force since
iirld War II, and this is true. We led a
j,T effort to resist aggression against
)• Republic of Korea in the 1950s. We
[id to help South Vietnam defend itself
Linst North Vietnam— though, after
I left, North Vietnamese force pre-
Med. We provide limited assistance
lay to people trying to defend their
(mtry's independence from armed
Back. But the important thing to
perstand is that all of these actions
Ire reactive— a response to armed
bression by others. The object was
l/er to extend American dominance
I only to avoid a world in which
litary strength is the ultimate arbiter
■national independence. Those coun-
ts we have helped have always been
le to choose their own form of govern-
Int and alignment in the world.
I I cite these snippets of history not
Imarily to debate— though we can do
lif you wish— and not to reopen old
ffes but to explain why the United
Ites reacts as it does to today's
1 nts. We must understand each
ler's frame of mind and understand
|v we perceive events if we are to find
|ray to avoid repeating the shocks and
Billusionments of the past.
By Factors
Ice, when I was discussing such mat-
As after dinner with a Soviet friend, he
feed me, in a tone of desperation, "Just
■at do you want of us, you Americans?
I you insist that we give up our
system, change our values, just sur-
render if we are to have peace?" Of
course, I told him that was not the point.
But I'm not sure I gave a coherent
answer as to what we do want. I have
often thought about his question since,
and would like to try an answer.
What is important to Americans in
the U.S. -Soviet relationship? The dif-
ferences in our values and political
systems are important, and we will, of
course, defend them. We expect the
same from others. We believe firmly,
however, that every nation must decide
its own destiny, and we respect such
choices when they are made by
democratic means.
Use of Force. What disturbs
Americans is the use of force to resolve
disputes, to impose a political and
economic system on others, or simply to
gain influence and dominance in the
world. We find it abhorrent when a
faction within a country imposes its will
by force of arms and are likely to speak
our minds. But we don't involve our-
selves unless the force is introduced
from the outside.
History has taught us that when one
country begins to throw its weight
around by military force, the seeds are
sown for a wider conflict in the future.
In a nuclear age, the world cannot risk
wider conflicts.
Look where your troops or weapons
are present today where they were not
10, 20, 30, or 40 years ago. You call this
the "advance of socialism" in your May
Day and November 7 slogans. But how
does it look to others— especially to your
neighbors?
Moreover, armed force can be a
source of tension even when it is not
used directly. If one country attempts to
force another country to do its bidding
under the threat of superior military
force, this, too, is destabilizing and only
encourages others to try to counter the
threat which is invoked.
This means that one of the most
basic things Americans are looking for is
a movement away from the use of
military force to establish new footholds
and to settle disputes. Unless we can
learn to deal with our differences by
nonmilitary means, we will always have
a rocky road ahead in the relationship.
Sanctity of Agreements. A second
thing which is very important to
Americans— and, I believe, to all
people— is the sanctity of agreements.
Nothing is more destructive of trust
than the feeling that a partner to an
agreement ignores it and fails to meet
its terms if they seem inconvenient. We
feel that, unfortunately, some past
agreements with the Soviet Union have
not been fully and faithfully
implemented.
Human Rights. A third matter of
great importance to Americans stems,
in part, from their own history and
values, but also from their assessment of
what will promote a peaceful world.
Americans are, frankly, deeply influ-
enced in their attitudes by the way a
government treats its own citizens. Are
citizens free to come and go within and
beyond their borders; to have contact
with whomever they choose; to practice
their religion without constraint or
disability; to write and speak their minds
publicly as they wish, without reprisals
or repression? Or, conversely, does a
government act as if its citizens are its
own property, to be herded in, forbidden
the right to travel, prosecuted for study-
ing the language of their religion, and
"shielded" from information or views
the government considers unpalatable or
inaccurate? As we speak, powerful jam-
mers are blocking broadcasts from many
foreign stations. Why? What do your
authorities fear, that they would go to
such extraordinary expense and effort to
shut out information and opinion from
the outside world?
Now, some would say that human
rights in other countries are none of our
business but are internal matters. Others
would say that the United States has its
own problems— and so we do. We know
that our society is not perfect. But we
constantly strive to correct injustices
and are attentive to the suggestions of
others. And any American who prefers
to live elsewhere has an absolute right to
do so and to' come and go as he or she
pleases. In fact, one of our problems is
that, with all our shortcomings, millions
of people are trying to get into our coun-
try to live.
But we do not accept the proposition
that questions regarding human rights
are purely a matter of internal jurisdic-
tion. We believe firmly that human
rights are a legitimate international con-
cern, for at least three reasons: legal,
practical, and ethical.
• From the standpoint of legality,
most nations of the world adhered to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in 1948, and all the nations of Europe-
save only Albania— along with the
United States and Canada subscribed to
the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. These
establish certain rights as internationally
accepted standards.
• From the standpoint of practical-
ity, it seems to Americans that nations
EUROPE
with governments which respect the
basic rights of their citizens are much
less likely to resort to the aggressive use
of military force than those who cut
their citizens off from contact with the
outside world, and suppress the free
expression of opinion. All ordinary peo-
ple throughout the world want peace,
and if they are allowed to influence the
political processes in their own country,
this would provide a bulwark against the
practice of military adventurism.
• From an ethical standpoint,
nobody has expressed the matter more
clearly than the great Russian thinker,
Alexander Herzen, who wrote in 1852
about the need for international atten-
tion to abuses of human rights in czarist
Russia: "The time has come when Rus-
sian serfdom should be made, if not a
European, at least an English question."
He compared the intense attention the
British public gave to slavery in the
United States to the scant attention
given to serfdom in the Russian Empire.
Fortunately, both American slavery and
Russian serfdom were abolished a few
years after Herzen's article, but his basic
point is as valid today as it was then: it
does matter to the international com-
munity how citizens of a country are
treated by their governments.
And so, to return to my Soviet
friend's question— what do Americans
want in the U.S. -Soviet relationship— I
would reply as follows: they want to deal
peacefully and relegate the use and
threat of force to the ashbin of history;
they want to reduce military arsenals
radically and move toward the ultimate
elimination of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction; they
want to pursue the hope of a non-nuclear
space defense which could lead us away
from the threat of mutual assured
destruction; they want honest, fair
agreements, faithfully observed; and— if
they are to develop a cooperative rela-
tionship free of fears that breed the
accumulation of weaponry— they want to
deal with a society which is open to the
world and an integral part of interna-
tional intellectual and social intercourse.
Armed Conflicts
As I have said, one of the most disturb-
ing factors in U.S. -Soviet relations has
been the resort to armed force in an
attempt to extend influence or to be the
arbiter of local conflicts. In Afghanistan,
the Soviet Union is still conducting a
full-scale war. Elsewhere, it has supplied
arms or supported foreign troops in
ways which exacerbate local conflicts.
Cambodia, Angola, and Nicaragua come
to mind in this context. In some
instances, after many years of foreign
military interference, the United States
finally began providing some limited
support— though not its own military
forces— to those struggling for national
independence and democracy.
Military involvement of the super-
powers in these conflicts increases the
risk of military confrontation between
us. If we are serious about dealing with
each other in peaceful ways, we should
find a way out of this cycle of action and
reaction and work toward a world in
which disputes are settled peacefully.
Last year, President Reagan made a
far-reaching proposal in his address to
the UN General Assembly. It was that
the United States and the U.S.S.R.
should encourage the parties to these
various conflicts to initiate negotiations
aimed at finding political solutions.
Then, when this is done, the United
States and U.S.S.R. should enter into
bilateral talks in an effort to terminate
their own military involvement, direct or
indirect. This would encourage the
warring parties to compose their
differences— and if they could not find a
solution, at least the means for destruc-
tive combat would be reduced. Finally, if
a peace settlement could be achieved
locally among the parties, the United
States would join in an international
effort to promote reconstruction of the
countries despoiled by fighting.
The overall goal of this proposal is to
remove regional military conflicts from
the agenda of U.S. -Soviet problems. We
believe it is important to continue to
explore its potential.
One thing is certain: few
developments would have a more
salutary effect on U.S. -Soviet relations
than the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Afghanistan and the withdrawal of
Cuban and Vietnamese forces, armed
with Soviet weapons, from battlefields
outside their borders. Another thing is
certain: if the Soviet Union were not
involved in these disputes militarily, the
United States would not be either.
Arms Reduction
The level of arms, particularly nuclear
weapons, is much too high in the world.
Chairman Gromyko, when he was
Foreign Minister, spoke of our countries
sitting on respective mountains of
nuclear weapons. We have both agreed
that it is imperative to start reducing
these bloated arsenals.
We are encouraged that our leaders
were able to agree in Geneva to a 50%
reduction in strategic nuclear weapons
and to the ultimate goal of the completi
elimination of nuclear weapons. It is tin
we got on with negotiating the concreti
arrangements to permit a radical reduc
tion of nuclear weapons. There are mar
other important issues in the arms con-
trol area, but none are so urgent as the
need to begin, at long last, a substantia
reduction of these weapons. Let us not
forget that when the Anti-Ballistic Miss:
(ABM) Treaty was signed in 1972, it w;
signed on the presumption that an
agreement would follow to reduce the
levels of offensive weapons. However,
we have not been able to achieve such
reductions up to now.
So far as the United States is con-
cerned, we are eager for deep, equitabl
and verifiable reductions in offensive
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, we
believe that such reductions should be
structured so that neither side need fea
a disarming first strike from the other-
whether or not there are defenses in
place.
We have noted that the Soviet Unw
has made a series of arms control pro-
posals this year. We have welcomed
many elements in these proposals, but,
overall, I would be less than candid if I
did not say that some strike us as
designed more to create a public image
than to solve the concrete problems
involved. If we are to solve the prob-
lems, we must speed up work at the
negotiating table.
Human Rights
I have already spoken of the importance
of human rights to the American peopk
and their government. I regret that the
situation still remains an important
source of tension in our relationship.
Spouses continue to be divided and
families split apart. Persons are in
prison for no apparent reason other tha i
expressing views distasteful to their
authorities. Emigration is at the lowest
level in over 15 years. Suffice it to say
that until this situation changes, the
possibilities for a true improvement in
U.S. -Soviet relations will be severely
limited.
Confidence and Dialogue
The fourth group of issues are those
remaining ones which affect the con-
fidence both sides have in dealing with
each other. Abiding by past agree-
ments—of which I have spoken— is one |
of these, but there is much more. We ar>!
seeking a radical expansion of ties and
increased dialogue. This would help both
-.« „f Ci^Ia Di illoti
EUROPE
es to understand the other better and
juld bring both government officials
H private citizens in both countries
lo broader and more regular contact.
President Reagan proposed last fall
kt both governments consider the
ssibility of a vast expansion of con-
tts between private citizens. We have
ed too long in isolation from each
ter, and this has created an atmos-
ere which makes accommodation dif-
iult. The point is not that all problems
h be solved by better understanding—
iny problems are too deep and too real
I that to be true— but that lack of con-
It and lack of understanding exac-
oate the real problems and make it
pre difficult to solve them.
j Last November, President Reagan
a General Secretary Gorbachev con-
fcted 2 days of intensive, fruitful
tetings in Geneva. Their meeting was
portant, and not just because it was
je first meeting of American and Soviet
r.ders for 6 years and because it gave
km an opportunity to get to know each
ner. These factors alone would have
ttified the meeting, but the other
jiievements of the Geneva summit
Ire even more important: the establish-
jnt of a structure of dialogue between
(• governments and the agreements to
jensify negotiations on nuclear arms
jluction and to reduce strategic nuclear
ms by 50%, to name only a few.
I Most important, however, the
Ineva meeting demonstrated that it is
fesible to meet and to make progress in
p relationship without either side
jumphing over the other. It was truly a
jeting in' which both sides gained.
lint Goals and Future Prospects
I where does this leave us? Should we
ijin our discussion this week in an opti-
istic or pessimistic mood? Of course,
hether one is an optimist or pessimist
bends upon what question is asked and
nat goals are assumed. Perhaps it is
gtter to ask what joint goals we should
£ and then discuss what will be
[quired to achieve them.
The most basic of the joint goals
nich have already been set is to make
Jre that the United States and the
iiviet Union never wage a war with
fch other. As our leaders agreed at
ineva last November, "... a nuclear
Bir cannot be won and must never be
tight." And, therefore, they "empha-
fied the importance of preventing any
Mir between them, whether nuclear or
fnventional."
I am confident that this solemn com-
mitment by our highest political leaders
is a genuine one and, therefore, am very
optimistic that the United States and
Soviet Union will continue to avoid
direct military conflict, as they have
throughout their history.
The real question in my mind,
therefore, is not whether there will be
war or peace between the United States
and the Soviet Union, but whether the
U.S. -Soviet relationship will continue to
be full of tension, shaken by recurrent
crises, and largely confrontational, or
whether we can find ways to compete
peacefully and even cooperate on a
widening range of issues.
We must expect competition, since
the vast difference in the values held by
your political leadership and those held
by our society requires us to defend
what we hold dear. In the 1970s, when
many Americans exaggerated the degree
of understanding which had been
achieved, it was Soviet leaders who
reminded us that there could be no
slackening of what they called the
"ideological struggle." We took note of
this reality, and we accept its
implications.
Nevertheless, these differences and
this competition need not prevent
increasing cooperation in many areas
where we— and other countries of the
world— face common problems. Surely
the most urgent of these problems are
diminishing the use of force to resolve
political and social conflicts, reducing the
level of arms in the world, and
establishing patterns of broad and open
contact and communication between our
countries and throughout the world
community.
I look forward to hearing the views
of our Soviet spokesmen on these impor-
tant questions, as well as those of my
own compatriots whose views may differ
from mine in many respects. Let us use
this meeting to clarify and debate our
various points of view, in the hope that
we will all emerge with a clearer under-
standing of how we each, in our indi-
vidual capacities, can contribute to
building a better and safer world for our
children and grandchildren.
'Nicholas Daniloff, Moscow correspondent
for U.S. News & World Report, was arrested
in the U.S.S.R., allegedly for espionage ac-
tivities, shortly after the arrest of a Soviet
UN employee in New York. Daniloff was
released September 29, 1986, as a result of
U.S. diplomatic efforts. ■
NATO Nuclear
Planning Group
Meets in the U.K.
The Nuclear Planning Group of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) met in Gleneagles, (Scotland)
United Kingdom, October 21-22, 1986.
The United States was represented by
S, rret (try of lh f< » < ' 'a spar II'.
Weinberger. Following is the final com-
munique issued October 22.
The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
met in Ministerial session at Gleneagles,
United Kingdom, on 21st and 22nd October,
1986.
2. We reviewed the outcome of the
recent meeting between President Reagan
and General Secretary Gorbachev in
Reykjavik. We extended our warm apprecia-
tion to the President on his conduct of the
talks and fully endorsed his bold attempt to
seek far-reaching arms control agreements
with the Soviet Union. We fully endorsed the
President's programme presented in Iceland
and stressed that this programme provides
the opportunity for historic progress. We
welcomed the United States intention to build
upon the progress achieved which provides
the opportunity for progress towards very
significant arms control agreements.
3. We urged the Soviet Union to redouble
its own efforts in this direction. Noting that
the Soviet side has agreed last year to con-
clude a separate INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces] agreement, Ministers called on
the Soviet leadership to reaffirm its com-
mitments not to hold an INF agreement
hostage to any other agreement. A failure to
do so would destroy the credibility of the
highest Soviet assurances.
4. We agreed that instead of simply codi-
fying the existing levels of arsenals, agree-
ments reached in Geneva should seek to
achieve substantial reductions in offensive
nuclear forces in ways that will enhance
stability and minimize the risk of war. In this
context, we fully endorsed the United States
positions at Geneva on intermediate-range,
strategic and defense and space systems. We
strongly support the United States explora-
tion of space and defense systems, as it is per-
mitted by the ABM [Antiballistic Missile]
Treaty.
5. We reviewed the status of nuclear
forces and discussed related issues, including
arms controls. We expressed our continued
support for the efforts of the United States
and the United Kingdom to maintain the
effectiveness and credibility of their nuclear
deterrent capabilities. We also received com-
prehensive briefings by the United States
Secretary of Defense on the Soviet nuclear
threat, United States' strategic forces and
the requirement for nuclear testing.
6. We reviewed a number of issues and
nuclear related programmes and reconfirmed
our policy and planning related to NATO's
nuclear forces. We agreed that both the force
FOOD
struct uiv itself and the conceptual planning
underpinning it are essential components for
maintaining a credible deterrent posture.
7. We remain deeply concerned about
continuing Soviet efforts to upgrade and
expand their military capabilities across the
board. We noted with particular concern
Soviet efforts involving the full range of
strategic forces, shorter- and longer-range
INF and short-range nuclear forces, including
artillery. We also noted with concern the
major Soviet effort into continuing improve-
ments in strategic and tactical anti-missile
systems.
8. We noted evidence presented by the
United States of continuing Soviet violations
of existing arms control agreements. We
renewed our call on the Soviet leadership to
take the steps necessary to ensure full com-
pliance with its arms control commitments.
We noted in this connection that a double
standard of compliance with arms control
agreements would be unacceptable and would
undermine the security of the Alliance. We
strongly endorsed the need for effective
verification as part of any arms control agree-
ment. In particular, we call on the Soviet
Union to agree to such concrete measures as
mandatory on-site inspection.
9. In contrast to the growth of Soviet
nuclear forces at all levels, it is NATO's
policy to maintain only the minimum number
of nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence.
At this meeting SACEUR [Supreme Allied
Commander Europe] reported on the status
of the implementation of the Montebello Deci-
sion. We noted the reductions and improve-
ment measures which are currently being
undertaken by the nations concerned. We
shall continue to review the progress of fur-
ther implementation.
10. We noted the progress made on
longer-range INF (LRINF) deployments by
the NATO nations concerned including the
completion on schedule of Pershing II deploy-
ment at the end of last year and the continu-
ing deployment of ground-launched cruise
missiles as planned. In the absence of a con-
crete INF arms control agreement with the
Soviet Union obviating the need for deploy-
ment, we emphasized NATO's determination
to continue the deployment of LRINF mis-
siles as scheduled. We reiterated our will-
ingness to reverse, halt or modify the LRINF
deployment— including the removal or dis-
mantling of missiles already deployed— upon
achievement of a balanced, equitable and
effectively verifiable agreement calling for
such action. We emphasized that the United
States' proposal in the INF negotiations,
developed in close consultation with the
Allies, calls for the global elimination of
United States and Soviet longer-range INF
missiles, accompanied by other appropriate
provisions concerning rights and constraints
on shorter-range INF (SRINF) missiles.
1 1 . We accepted with pleasure an invita-
tion from Mr. J.J. Hoist, the Norwegian
Minister of Defense, to hold our next meeting
in Norway in Spring 1987.
12. Greece expressed its views in a state-
ment included in the minutes. Denmark
reserved its position on INF and space and
defense systems. ■
World Food Day, 1986
PROCLAMATION 5527,
SEPT. 18, 1986'
We Americans are blessed with nature's
bounty. As children, our first prayers teach us
to give thanks for the abundance we enjoy.
We take for granted our full tables and the
peace and security in which we enjoy them.
But, unfortunately, many do not share in
our abundance. Hunger stemming from pov-
erty and famine retains its cruel grip in many
parts of the world, especially in Africa. This
year, hunger is not as widespread as it was in
1985, in part because of the humanitarian
spirit of Americans and other donors. No
nation has been more generous to those less
fortunate. We have sent billions of dollars to
help other countries rebuild after war or dis-
aster strikes. We have sent billions of tons of
food to feed the hungry. And, we have sent
our sons and daughters to work alongside our
neighbors to help them help themselves.
The nobility of our purpose was made
manifest in the great outpouring of aid
Americans gave spontaneously to the victims
of the African famine. Our help, both public
and private, saved hundreds of thousands of
lives. Last year, rain returned to Africa, and
famine subsided. But hunger has not been
overcome and another natural disaster,
brought by locusts and grasshoppers, is bring-
ing the threat of continued suffering.
The world is making progress in ending
hunger, albeit slowly. In some countries, civil
strife and socialist policies continue to fuel
famine. We must continue to work towards
peace and incentive policies if we are to elimi-
nate famine caused by poverty, drought, envi-
ronmental decline, and inappropriate
economic policies. Many governments through-
out the world have recognized that the health
of their nations and their people depends on a
strong agriculture, based on free enterprise
and competitive markets. To this end, my
Administration has encouraged policy reform
efforts throughout the world, through our
economic assistance programs as well as a
new Food for Progress program, under which
we provide grants of U.S. food to countries
adopting sound agricultural policies.
Since its birth as a nation, the United
States has relied on the twin pillars of individ-
ual freedom and individual enterprise as the
foundations of its national economy. Political
and economic freedoms cannot be separated;
together, they foster a sense of social, eco-
nomic, and political responsibility that sus-
tains individual growth and fuels economic
development. Without self-reliant, creative
citizens, no nation can be self-sufficient
politically or economically, nor can it provide
sufficient food and fulfill the basic human
needs of its people. Free market policies can
promote economic growth based on social 3
justice, self-reliance and the skills of the
people.
Today, millions of Americans in more ]
than 3,000 communities will participate in a
variety of World Food Day activities. The
spirit of voluntarism has never shone more
brightly throughout our Nation.
I ask that the American people use this
day to reaffirm their commitment to ending
world hunger. Ending hunger throughout the
world will require a long-term commitment as
the public and the private sectors, of people
and their governments, and of developing ani
donor countries. The technological solutions
to end world hunger are known to man; now
we must demonstrate that we have the will to
eliminate hunger and its primary source,
poverty.
In recognition of the desire and commit-
ment of the American people to end world
hunger, the Congress, by Public Law 99-288,
has designated October 16, 1986. as "World
Food Day" and has authorized the President
to issue a proclamation in observance of this
event.
Now, Therefore. I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America.B
hereby proclaim October 16, 1986. as World
Food Day, and I call upon the people of the
United States to observe this day with appro-
priate activities to explore ways in which our
Nation can further contribute to the elimina-
tion of hunger in the world.
I\ Witness Whereof. I have hereunto set
my hand this eighteenth day of September, in
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
eighty-six, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred
and eleventh.
Ronald Reagan
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 1986.
66
MAN RIGHTS
e Systematic Repression
Soviet Jews
toger Pilon
iddress before the Metrowest < 'on-
ice oil Suriet Jewry in East Oranye,
Jersey, on September 28, 1986.
Pilon is Director of Policy fur the
'.au of Human Rights and Huinani-
m Affairs.
i pleasure to be here this evening to
k to your Solidarity Sunday Rally
loviet Jews. Of course, it would be
fen greater pleasure if I did not
to be here, if none of us had to be
, if we could all go home to the quiet
rnient of our families and friends,
we are here because there is great
ring today in the Soviet Union. The
of quiet enjoyment we take for
ted in America is increasingly dif-
; to find there, especially for Soviet
;. Amidst this suffering, we cannot
we must speak out.
will return shortly to the particular
;t of Soviet Jews. At the outset,
;ver, I believe it should be said that
le degree or another everyone is suf-
g in the Soviet Union. Life there is
:ult even for the ruling elite, the
enklatura — else how to explain the
:tions from even that class of the
less society. Life is difficult for all
easons we know too well but tend to
it too easily, especially when we
set our own habits of political
ght upon other political systems. It
Id be well to recall, then, just what
e of those reasons are.
(Constitutional Basis for
et Repression
begin, of course, with Marxist-
nist theory itself. This is a theory,
s remember, that has nothing to do
, really, with individual well-
f— material, much less spiritual,
ke our own moral, political, and
heritage, stemming from the
Seal liberal tradition, Marxism
is not with the individual but with
froup. It subjects the individual to
rroup, whether he wishes it or not,
der to build communism. In other
Is, it uses people for the greater
J good; it treats people as means,
is ends in themselves.
But let me go to the current source
is treatment by way of illustration,
Soviet Constitution of 1977, the
hnev Constitution. If you have
never read through the Soviet Constitu-
tion, I urge you to do so. Go to your
library^ look it up, read it, and then
reflect upon what it really says. It is a
marvelous statement of what the Soviet
system really is all about, perhaps the
best you will find. But you must read it
carefully and critically. Let me touch
upon a few salient passages here, to lay
the foundation for what I want to say
shortly.
The Constitution begins, in article 1,
by saying that the U.S.S.R. "is a
socialist state of the whole people,
expressing the will and interests of the
workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, the
working people of all the nations and
nationalities of the country." No men-
tion here of inalienable rights or of
securing the blessings of liberty; just an
assertion that the U.S.S.R. is a socialist
state and that it expresses the will and
interests of its constituents. How do we
know that the socialist state represents
the will and interests of all? The question
is not a little problematic, of course,
especially since we know that, in fact,
there was nothing like a meaningful con-
stitutional ratification process, there is
no meaningful franchise, nor is there
even a recognized right to emigrate— a
right to vote with one's feet about
whether the socialist state does, indeed,
represent one's will and interests.
But that problem looms ever larger
when we move to article 2: "All power in
the U.S.S.R. belongs to the people."
Now on first blush that proposition looks
innocuous enough, even commendable.
After all, better that all power be in the
hands of the Communist Party? Upon
reflection, however, it becomes clear just
what is going on here. The difficulty is
not with the quantifier, "all," not at the
outset, at least, but with the other three-
letter word, "the," before "people"— "All
power in the U.S.S.R. belongs to the
people." I'm reminded here of a remark
made by one of my teachers at the
University of Chicago, Professor Milton
Friedman, about a slogan heard so often
in the late 1960s: "Power to the people."
But for the word "the," Professor
Friedman said, he was in complete
agreement with that slogan. That word,
however, institutionalizes "people."
"Power to People," that is, implies that
people be empowered ax individuals.
Add the word "the" before "people,"
however, and you're calling for institu-
tionalizing those individuals. No longer
are they to have power as individuals but
only as the institution "the people." Let
me emphasize that this is no mere
semantic or syntactical point I am press-
ing here; it is rather a point of the pro-
foundest moment. For once we realize
that as a practical matter "the people"
can exercise their power, can express
their will and interests, not by discrete,
individual pursuits but only through com-
plex institutional arrangements, the
focus is shifted immediately from people,
as individuals, to institutions.
At this point, moreover, the force of
the quantifier "all" comes into play. For
if all power in the U.S.S.R. belongs to
"the people," that is tantamount to say-
ing that all power is institutionally exer-
cised, that no power belongs to people as
such— indeed, that there is no place in
the Soviet system for private power,
individual or institutional.
But the matter does not end there
either. For if all power is to be exercised
institutionally, there must be some
mechanism by which the people decide
and act institutionally. Don't look for a
Western-style voting mechanism: article
3 tells us that "[t]he Soviet state is
organized and functions on the principle
of democratic centralism, namely the
electiveness of all bodies of state author-
ity from the lowest to the highest, . . .and
the obligation of lower bodies to observe
the decisions of higher ones." But "elec-
tiveness," it turns out in article 9, means
"ever broader participation of citizens in
managing the affairs of society and the
state, . . .greater openness and publicity,
and constant responsiveness to public
opinion."
Clearly, "electiveness" is a long way
from "elections." It remains an open
question, therefore, just how decisions
get made and actions get taken in the
Soviet Union. Only when we turn to
article 6 do we find the answer to that
question:
The leading and guiding force of Soviet
society and the nucleus of its political system,
of all state organizations, is the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. . . .
The Communist Party, armed with
Marxism-Leninism, determines the general
perspectives of the development of society
and the course of the home and foreign policy
of the U.S.S.R., directs the great constructive
work of the Soviet people, and imparts a
planned, systematic and theoretically substan-
tiated character to their struggle for the vic-
tory of communism.
There, precisely, is how the "will
and interests" of "the people" get deter-
mined and carried out in the Soviet
Union— by the Communist Party. Like
some giant, deus ex machina, lumbering
HUMAN RIGHTS
down from on high, the Party directs the
great constructive work of building
socialism.
But have I not ignored the rights
individuals enjoy in the course of this
grand undertaking? After all, the Soviet
Constitution does speak of "freedom of
speech, of the press, and of assembly,
meetings, street processions and
demonstrations." Indeed, it does, but
read article 50 carefully: these freedoms
are guaranteed "[i]n accordance with the
interests of the people and in order to
strengthen and develop the socialist
system." Speech in defense of the
system, yes; against it, no. As Fidel
Castro has said in his own little world,
"Within the revolution, everything;
against the revolution, no rights at all."
Through "defeasance clauses" just such
as this, the Soviet Constitution renders
meaningless every right it purports to
guarantee. Indeed, just to be safe, article
39 sets forth a general defeasance
clause: "Enjoyment by citizens of their
rights and freedoms must not be to the
detriment of the interests of society or
the state.. . ." When "interests" rise to
the level of rights, rights are in trouble.
Is it any wonder, then, that there is
massive repression in the Soviet Union?
There, right in the Constitution, is the
rationale for it— to build communism.
Toward that end, individuals are
means— to be used. So far is this from
our Western approach to political
organization as to be its polar opposite.
Soviet Reality Follows Soviet Theory
It is particularly important to grasp,
then, that the Soviet system is not
simply a case of good intentions gone
awry. It is not, that is, that the Soviet
Constitution is basically sound, that the
system is one of promise— if only the
men who run it would live up to that
promise. (On the contrary, it is fortunate
that they do not, because they cannot,
live up to the system's promise.) What
we have, instead, is a system that itself
is fundamentally flawed, a system that is
fundamentally wrong— but a system that
delivers, tragically, on much of what it
promises.
By design, then, citizens of the
Soviet Union are subjugated, at virtually
every turn in their lives, to the interests
of the state, as determined by the Party.
With a centrally planned economy, the
daily decisions of life, from production to
distribution, from education to employ-
ment, to income, housing, and on and on,
are all out of the hands of the individual
to a degree vastly greater than anything
we know in a free society. Over this
public control of the daily affairs of life,
the individual has very little influence.
There is no effective franchise, of
course, nor any effective way to object
to the decisions that determine one's
daily life. Indeed, the attempt to protest
is itself a sign that you don't understand
your own best interests, that you may, in
fact, be a candidate for psychiatric incar-
ceration. At the very least, protest is a
threat to the authority and integrity of
the all-encompassing system and thus
marks the protester for repression.
The result, of course, is a drab and
mean existence and a constant daily
struggle just to survive. Far from a life
of meaning, a life that inspires, it is a life
that suffocates. Surrounded by scarcity,
by bureaucracy, by the constant din of
slogans, propaganda, and lies, is it any
wonder that people turn inward, to
themselves, or to their religious and
cultural heritage? Even among those
formerly committed to the system, there
is broadening realization that, after
seven decades of struggle and sacrifice,
the building of communism is going
nowhere, except for more of the same.
The rebirth of interest in religion across
the Soviet Union should not surprise,
therefore, despite relentless efforts to
stamp it out.
The Repression of Soviet Jews
But Jews have come in for particular
repression— insults, deprivation of
cultural rights, quotas at institutions of
higher learning, denial of professional
opportunities, not to mention outright
arrest and incarceration for practicing
their traditions— all based simply upon
their being Jewish, all of which urges us
to reflect upon why this is so. There are
the usual explanations from anti-
Semitism, of course, couched in the
Soviet Union as anti-Zionism, which
have a long history in Russia. But there
are other, systemic reasons at work as
well, which in many ways are more
interesting.
There is first the belief that Jews, as
a class, cannot be trusted, a thesis
developed recently by Professor
Matatyahu Mine of the Diaspora
Institute at the University of Tel Aviv, a
student of the history of the Jews in the
Soviet Union. Observing that the ruling
Nomenklatura selects its members
primarily on the basis of evidence of
total loyalty to the system— loyalty,
above all, to one's fellow Nomenklatura
members and complete subservience to
one's superiors— Professor Mine argues
that Stalin's successors concluded, just
as Stalin had, that Jews, as a group,
came from a cultural pattern that made
them unfit for a system of this kind.
Drawing upon this thesis, Ambassadoi1
Richard Schifter, presently Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights '
and Humanitarian Affairs, observes tx '■
"gradually, almost imperceptibly, the; !
level beyond which Jews may not rise
the Soviet Union was lowered. Inereas
ingly, prestigious institutions of higher
learning closed their doors to them
entirely or permitted only a tiny numb
of applicants to enter. As the years
passed, Jews thus began to be moved' '
the margins of Soviet society."
Yet another, closely related explai ]!
tion for the particular repression of
Soviet Jews returns us to the characte '
of the Soviet political system. Althoug E
Jews were repressed under the czars,
the character of that repression was n [
totalitarian: the czars allowed Jewish '
cultural and religious institutions to
flourish, for example. Soviet rulers, b} \
contrast, distrust any institutions they
do not control; in fact, they will not,
indeed cannot, allow independent insti
tions to coexist with the state since tht f
are a threat not only to their total con- *
trol but, more importantly, to the ratic
ale for that control. The "new Soviet
man," after all, does not need indepen
ent institutions. The return of Soviet !
Jews to their religious and cultural
heritage is thus a slap in the face of th •
system itself. It must be repressed,
especially when it takes the form of
group or institutional activity.
In recent years, however, that
repression has increased substantially, i
the point of a crackdown, over the pasi
2 years, even upon teachers of Hebrew '
Arrests of Hebrew teachers and Jewisl
cultural activists on trumped-up crimin
charges are common, as are beatings
and other mistreatment. Is it any
wonder then that Jews are asking to
leave?
Jewish Emigration
But there, of course, is the rub, for the
Soviet Union does not recognize any
right of free emigration, notwithstand-
ing that it is a signatory of the Helsink:,
accords wherein it promised recognition
of such a right. In practice, as we know'
emigration is possible, for reasons,
primarily, of family reunification. Yet
the regulations governing emigration a
unavailable to applicants; and proce-
dures are lengthy, usually arbitrary, an
invariably surrounded by persecution.
Those denied permission, the refuseniki,
frequently endure years of suffering.
Fired from their jobs, or at least
demoted, they are shunned by their
friends out of fear of guilt by associa- J
tion. Often their apartments are
68
-.* ~* CMM Dullot
HUMAN RIGHTS
Iched, their mail seized, and their
phones disconnected. Moreover, the
e vocal they become about their
c to emigrate, the more they expose
hselves to official harassment and
lible repeated refusals of permission.
In this suspended animation goes on
[rears, life can become all but
parable.
[Regrettably, these conditions
Iribe the Soviet Union even, indeed
[cially, today. In fact, emigration of
et Jews is at its lowest level in 20
|s. During the first 9 months of 1986,
631 were allowed to leave. At its
ent rate, emigration this year will be
pi by about 99% from the rate in
v. Yet we know the names of at least
00 Soviet Jews who have been
bed permission to emigrate; and
(■oximately 380,000 others have
dested invitations from relatives
jad as required by Soviet law.
ply, the situation under Mr.
oachev is not improving, notwith-
Iding a few high-visibility gestures
| as the release of Anatoliy
jiaranskiy and the visit of Yelena
her. In fact, the situation is as bad as
Is been at any time in the post-Stalin
jThe loose associations of dissenters
\ been destroyed. The arrest and
ishment of dissenters has discour-
|. others from following the same
I. We are back to the days of total
jjession.
L Administration's Response
|, what are we in the Administration
k about this? Perhaps a better ques-
Swould be what can we do about this?
L thing that comes readily to mind, of
ise, is conditioning trade agreements
ii an improvement in the human
Is area. But here the possibilities are
led by the fact that it is a world
lomy we need to coordinate if we are
p effective; and that economy is by
beans ours to coordinate. Never-
:ss, where we can be effective in this
, we try to do so.
n general, however, we have
wed a dual policy of private and
ic diplomacy by way of trying to
ove the situation. In particular cases
■e we believe we can be effective,
is, we try quietly to obtain relief,
rly, however, we have had only
ed success in these efforts at quiet
imacy. Accordingly, we have had
:asingly to go public in our criticism,
e belief that Soviet leaders have at
; some concern for their standing in
nternational community. Rightly or
gly, that is, we have assumed that
if we speak often and loudly enough, the
public relations price Soviet leaders will
have to pay will influence them to
improve the situation.
There is considerable evidence, of
course, that Soviet leaders do care about
Western public opinion— else why the
intense media efforts of Mr. Gorbachev
since he came to power. They care
because, notwithstanding all their
military might, they can effect favorable
deals with the West most efficiently by
manipulating constraints on Western
decisionmakers. It is democratic public
opinion, therefore, and Western demo-
cratic opinion in particular, that is up for
grabs here— the only public opinion that
matters because the only opinion that
can be translated into public policy. And
let us be clear, more precisely and more
fundamentally, it is moral opinion that is
ultimately at issue.
Soviet Reaction
Which brings me to my final considera-
tions: the Soviet response to our human
rights public diplomacy is presently
going through an interesting change,
which presents a fundamental challenge
to us that I'd like to share with you this
evening. No longer do we hear what we
used to hear so often when we com-
plained, namely, that we were interfer-
ing in the internal affairs of the Soviet
Union. Rather, we are met today with a
two-pronged counterattack. The first is
to charge, in reply, that the United
States, too, has massive human rights
problems, from hunger, to homelessness,
to unemployment. The second is to try to
shift the name of the game from "human
rights" to "humanitarianism." These
two threads, let me note, are closely con-
nected. Moreover, they play to patterns
of thought that have evolved in the
West, and especially in Europe, for
nearly a century now, from at least the
Progessive Era— patterns that have
come under serious intellectual scrutiny
only in the last decade or two and
serious political challenge only in this
decade.
Let me briefly address these two
lines of response in order. The first
points to what we in the West loosely
call "social problems," which the Soviets
then convert into "human rights"
abuses. But, in doing so, they point as
well, by implication, to the great inter-
national debate over two very different
conceptions of "rights": our own concep-
tion of "civil and political rights,"
derived from the classical liberal trinity
of life, liberty, and property; and the
socialist conception of "social and
economic rights," so-called rights to the
goods produced by the society organized
along socialist lines. In this country, for
the most part, we have steadfastly
resisted recognizing these social and
economic "rights," not least because
attempts to enforce them involve both
the planned economy, with all its
massive inefficiencies, and repeated
violations of our traditional rights.
In this last connection, recent
scholarly work has shown clearly that
you cannot have it both ways: every
attempt to compel the production and
distribution of these social and economic
goods and services, that is, ineluctably
amounts to a violation of individual
rights to be free. Here again, it is no
accident that the Soviet system, which
attempts to secure these "rights," is as
unfree as it is. The better approach to
these admitted social problems, we have
said, is to encourage private, voluntary
solutions and to turn to forced solutions
only when and to the extent necessary.
Only thus do we conform to the prin-
ciples that define us as a free society.
The second tactic we have increas-
ingly seen from the Soviets by way of
response to our charges is to attempt to
shift the terms of the debate from
"human rights" to "humanitarianism."
Witness, for example, their recent crea-
tion of a Humanitarian and Cultural
Affairs Office in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. This move plays, again, to con-
fusions that have set in in our own
understanding of our moral foundations,
which is why the remarks of the Presi-
dent on the subject last Monday before
the UN General Assembly were so
critically important. Indeed, they state
the point so well as to bear repeating
here:
I note that Mr. Gorbachev has used in re-
cent speeches the same categories
I have used here today: the military,
the political, and the economic; except that he
titled his fourth category: humanitarian.
Well, the difference is revealing. The
United States believes that respect for the
individual, for the dignity of the human
person— those rights outlined in the UN
Universal Declaration of Human Rights— does
not belong in the realm of charity or
"humanitarian" causes. Respect for human
rights is not social work; it is not merely an
act of compassion. It is the first obligation of
government and the source of its legitimacy.
How clear and to the point those
remarks are. It is up to us now to bear
them in mind as we press on with our
important work, as we cry out against
the suffering that is going on in the
Soviet Union today.
This is not a pretty picture I have
drawn for you this evening. I wish I
Eemhpr 1QRfi
69
MIDDLE EAST
could be more sanguine, but as the legal
latinate has it, res ipsa loquitui — the
case speaks for itself. I am here, in part
to tell you about it, in part to assure you
we are listening, but mostly to try to
make it clear just what the nature of the
problem is and what we must do about
it. We must be resolute, but we must
also realize that we are in this for the
long haul. It is, after all, our children
and our children's children who will
inherit this world from us. ■
Supporting U.S. Interests
in the Middle East
by Richard W. Murphy
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Foreign Affiars Committee on
October 8, 1986. Ambassador Murphy is
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs. '
Several events have occurred in the
peace process since I last joined the com-
mittee in open session in August. Today,
I would like to review a number of the
developments, including the Alexandria
summit and the Hassan-Peres meeting.
At the same time, I would also like to
draw attention to trends here in
Washington that ironically threaten to
undermine our ability to sustain and
encourage the positive developments we
see in the region.
Peace Process
Several recent developments have
created an atmosphere in the region
more favorable to the achievement of
real progress toward peace.
The Alexandria summit— and the
Taba arbitration agreement which made
it possible— are important indicators of
where we are today in the peace process.
They mark an important step forward in
the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, the
opening of a "new era," in the words of
the summit communique. That relation-
ship remains the key building block to
Middle East peace. As President
Mubarak and Prime Minister Peres
noted in their joint communique, the
signing of the Taba arbitration com-
promise once again demonstrated that
direct dialogue and negotiations are the
sine qua non for progress.
The growing realization in the Arab
world that direct contacts with Israel are
acceptable and beneficial was clearly
exemplified also by King Hassan's
meeting with Shimon Peres and the
muted reaction to it, including in the
Arab world. The Moroccan monarch
joined those who forthrightly declare to
the world that they are willing to take
risks for peace— to face threats from
rejectionists who all too often resort to
cowardly terrorism and intimidation to
block peace. We applaud Morocco's
action.
The Hassan-Peres meeting, Alexandria
summit, and Taba agreement are among
a number of positive developments that
we have seen in the region over the past
several months.
• King Hassan abrogated his treaty
of union with Libya.
• The reaction to the U.S. raid on
Libya was, with few exceptions,
moderate and contained.
• King Hussein has increased
Jordan's involvement on the West Bank.
• Common areas of understanding
as regards the peace process have
developed among Israel, Jordan, and
Egypt, as the Vice President noted at
the conclusion of his recent trip to the
region.
• Egypt has returned its Ambassador
to Israel and is actively engaged in ways
to increase trade and tourism between
the countries.
We can have no illusions. The core
problems affecting the peace process
remain to be settled, to be sure. But
there is a clear desire on the part of
many leaders in the region to find a way
to sit down and together resolve even
those most difficult problems. There are
many signs that the parties in the region
will continue their efforts to advance the
prospects for peace, and we look for-
ward to continuing our constructive
work with the Israeli Government after
the upcoming rotation. The United
States remains and will remain actively
engaged with the parties as they seek to
find a way forward.
I do not predict any sudden break-
through in the near future. But the kind
of undramatic, steady progress we have
made over the last few years will con-
tinue, thanks to the efforts of our friends
in Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and now othi
moderate Arab states like Morocco.
It is regrettable that King Husseir
initiative, nurtured and encouraged bj
Prime Minister Peres and President
Mubarak, was blocked by the PLO's
[Palestine Liberation Organization]
inability to meet the King's three
challenges last February. But, impor-
tantly, the parties have not abandonee
efforts, hopes, or aspirations for prog- .
ress. They continue to build on areas <|
common agreement. All recognize the |
Palestinian people and their right to pi
ticipate in the determination of their
future. The remaining question is how |
All also are of one mind that a pre
ductive route for working together is
seek ways to improve the quality of
Palestinian life on the West Bank and |
Gaza. Their efforts go beyond econom ;
indicators. It involves a common reali;
tion that Palestinian residents of the
occupied terrorities must have a great
sense of control over their livelihood,
civic life, and future prospects.
The United States has encouraged
the parties to take practical steps to
improve living conditions on the West
Bank and to highlight the dynamic
nature of the ongoing peace process.
Recent successes include the introduc-
tion of measures to reduce barriers to |
trade between the West Bank and
Jordan.
Central to improving the quality o |
life for West Bank-Gaza Palestinians i
provision of economic assistance to
finance a variety of developmental pre
ects. We have provided $14 million for
that support and will continue to give
these programs high priority next yeai
These funds are disbursed through
several private voluntary organization
operating in the West Bank and Gaza.
We have made an additional $5.5 millii
available through Jordan during this
fiscal year. We are also active in
encouraging our European and Japane
allies to contribute to Jordan's efforts
the West Bank. Without any doubt, (
these efforts merit our continued
assistance. But I am gravely concernet
that we will not be able to be as
generous as the importance of these pi
grams would warrant.
Egyptian Economy
Egypt's difficult economic situation coi
tinues to draw our full attention as it
involves one of our key peace process
partners. In recent months, the
Egyptian Government has taken some
important steps in implementing
economic reform. One indicator of pro£
ress is a substantial fall projected in th
70
Department of State Bulle
MIDDLE EAST
fes domestic product/budget deficit
jo for the fiscal year ending in June
17— a result of increased revenue and
Iraints on expenditures. The
jj'ptians have made hard decisions,
jj many others lie ahead. We welcome
[government's resolve to deal with
rpt's economic problems.
IWe are also encouraged by the
Insive talks underway between the
j'ptian Government and the Interna-
lal Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
5k. A team of senior Egyptian offi-
E followed up discussions with the
id and Bank in Cairo in August and
Itember with nearly 2 weeks of talks
Washington during the IMF/IBRD
fernational Bank for Reconstruction
j Development] annual meetings.
|se talks produced progress, and the
lid and Bank agreed to resume discus-
Is in Cairo within the next few
ftks. We hope these negotiations will
puce a sound, timely program which
tresses Egypt's financial needs and
puces the basis for future economic
Jtvth and continued political stability.
Illenges
I a challenging period in the Middle
Jt: a time when many Middle East
lers alike are in agreement on the
jmon goal of negotiation aimed at
living the Arab-Israeli dispute. It is a
fe when the parties are actively,
Inly, and creatively probing for routes
und barriers. Paradoxically, it is also
Iriod when forces and trends finding
ression on resources we allocate to
(foreign affairs budget hinder us from
buraging positive development.
Secretary Shultz expressed his grave
drivings during his address at
fvard University's 350th anniversary
I month. His remarks, although global
pope, go to the heart of many of our
cerns regarding U.S. policy in the
Idle East. The Secretary spoke pas-
lately of an "extraordinary develop-
Jit: the congressional attack on the
iign affairs budget."
I'The Secretary noted that congres-
lal reductions and earmarking of aid
lis to a few countries deprive us of
r half of all our security and
Jiomic assistance to many countries in
(world. To be sure, two of our closest
Idle East friends greatly benefit from
narks— Israel and Egypt— but
ral of our other friends will be
rely penalized. At a time when some
ierate Arabs are more prepared than
r before to move toward Israel and
:n they themselves face mounting
*iomic difficulties, we simply do not
have the means to offer developmental
support.
The Secretary correctly noted that
the dollars we spend on such assistance
are the most cost-effective bargain
among all of our national security activ-
ities. For example, the assistance we
provide to Jordan for developing the
West Bank is an inexpensive investment
in regional peace. As I mentioned
earlier, our support, both moral and
financial, for the quality of life of
Palestinians is welcomed by Israel,
Jordan, and Egypt. The struggle for a
comprehensive, fair, and just Middle
East peace will not be won by the open-
ing of a bank or the completion of a
water project. But the context in which
the peace process works cannot but be
affected by the quality of life on the
West Bank.
The severe reductions of U.S. secu-
rity and economic assistance in the
Middle East come at a time when our
closest friends face grave economic dif-
ficulties, owing in part to the oil glut and
debt crisis. During this type of crunch,
the strong support of the United States
is most needed and appreciated.
Included in this group are small nations
such as Tunisia and Jordan— both of
whom speak forcefully against Qadhafi's
state-sponsored terrorism and worked
courageously behind the scenes in the
Arab League to prevent a strong con-
demnation of the U.S. Libyan raid.
There were others. Morocco defied
Qadhafi in August by unilaterally
abrogating the Oujda accord with Libya.
King Hassan's bold initiatives with
Israel have done much to further peace
in the region. Many of these same
friends stand to be heavily penalized by
our assistance cutbacks.
Secretary Shultz warned of other
dangers. He spoke of an alarming swing
in America from involvement to isola-
tion. Rather than giving in to our "impa-
tience with diplomacy," the Secretary
challenges our nation to pursue practical
political solutions in this world. This
requires "perseverance, understanding
of ambiguity, and a recognition of the
need for compromise." Specifically, he
decried those who despaired at the
disturbing trends in the United Nations
and called for strengthening our role in
the United Nations for affirmative
reasons and also lest others whose inter-
ests are adverse to ours step into our
place.
I can think of no better example of
Secretary Shultz's point than the oppor-
tunity we have to continue U.S. involve-
ment with the UN Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL). We have supported
UNIFIL since it was established in 1978.
Its objective was to confirm the Israeli
withdrawal from Lebanon, to assist the
Lebanese Government to return its
effective authority to south Lebanon,
and to contribute to the restoration of
international peace and security to the
area. It could play a key role in future
security arrangements. The force has
not been able fully to carry out its man-
date. But we believe it makes an impor-
tant contribution to stability in the area.
I want to thank the members of this sub-
committee for their letter of support for
UNIFIL.
We are deeply concerned that the
Congress may provide less than half our
$42.9 million request for fiscal year (FY)
1987 after making a similar cut in our
FY 1986 request. Congress' move first
to eliminate and then to reduce our con-
tribution to UNIFIL has made our policy
of consistent support for the force more
difficult to carry out. The governments
of the troop contributors, who look to us
for leadership on this issue, indicated
serious concern at these developments.
They take it as evidence of eroding U.S.
political and diplomatic support for
UNIFIL. Perhaps in the face of our
wavering, the Soviets— for the first time
since UNIFIL's establishment— in April
voted in favor of renewing UNIFIL's
mandate and expressed a willingness to
pay their share. It is clear that for the
Soviets, our funding difficulties repre-
sent an opportunity to gain propaganda
and political advantage at our expense in
Lebanon and at the United Nations.
The case can be made equally well
for recent congressional efforts to
reduce U.S. support for the UN Relief
and Works Agency (UNWRA) and the
Sinai Multinational Force and Observers
(MFO). The United States has a deep
and fundamental commitment to seeking
stability in the Middle East. Reducing
funds for UNWRA only sends a false
signal that our resolve to acknowledge
and support the needs of Palestinian
refugees is weakening. Similarly, we
have a firm political commitment to
Israel and Egypt to contribute one-third
of the costs of the MFO. To dishonor
that promise would be interpreted as our
backing away from the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty.
In this context, I want also to
reiterate the Administration's concern
that the suffering of the Lebanese peo-
ple be soon alleviated. We strongly sup-
port the current Lebanese initiative,
through the committee of dialogue, to
find a blueprint for political and security
reform. We believe that the continued
violent interference of militias in an
effort to restore the rule of law is
reprehensible. Militias should be
disbanded.
llPmhor 1QRK
71
MIDDLE EAST
Perhaps more than any other cur-
rent congressional initiative, I am con-
cerned at the long-term threat to the
i tent's ability to conduct foreign
policy and, importantly, to advance U.S.
interests in the region constituted by the
proposed Biden-Levine bill to change the
Ainis Export Control Act legislation.
Although the Administration has not yet
completed a detailed examination of the
full legal and policy effects of the bill, I
would like to take this opportunity to
express my personal and profound
misgivings now— early in the process of
its consideration. In the press conference
announcing the bill, one of the sponsors
stated that the objective of the bill is to
respond to the constitutional concerns
raised by Chadha— the Supreme Court's
1983 decision striking the legislative
veto— and to require a majority vote of
both Houses of Congress to approve
"sensitive" arms sales. The bill ade-
quately addresses the Chadha issue by
providing for a joint resolution to be
presented to the President. However,
the bill raises other questions by restric-
ting the President's foreign affairs
powers. In this regard, while the bill is
apparently neutral, the sponsors make
no secret of the intent of the legisla-
tion—to block approval of such sales to
the moderate Arab states.
With all respect to the sponsors of
this legislation, I fear that it is another
example of the tendencies now develop-
ing in the American policy that
Secretary Shultz identified in his Har-
vard speech. It is a reflection of
isolationism— best understood as an
unwillingness to recognize the complex-
ities and realities of the world we live in.
It reflects a desire to withdraw from
regional engagements, to bypass
diplomacy, and to impose congressional
restraints on the President's constitu-
tional ability to conduct foreign policy.
The Secretary's view is well illus-
trated by the continuing course of events
in the Persian Gulf. As this committee
well understands, one of our nation's
highest priorities is to assure the free
flow of oil from the gulf. Our friends in
the region such as Saudi Arabia and the
other Gulf Cooperation Council countries
must have the means to protect
themselves and their interests and, in
the process, maintain freedom of inter-
national navigation. Their need is very
much in line with U.S. interests. Over
the years, we have taken important
steps to maintain these common security
interests. We have provided both eyes
and ears and sword and shield to our
friends in the gulf, and as the crisis goes
on, we will be required to do more so
that they can defend both their interests
and our own.
Since I last talked with you in mid-
August, the preparations for a large
Iranian offensive have proceeded apace.
The offensive (or offensives) could be
launched during the next few weeks.
There is mounting concern both here and
in moderate Arab capitals that the com-
bination of Iran's stated intention to
launch the "final" offensive and the
change in Iraqi air tactics since mid-July
has led to a heightened tempo and pace
of the war.
Despite their very substantial
economic problems, the Iranians con-
tinue to believe that they have a good
chance of making a "breakthrough" of
some sort with this offensive. Iranian
troop concentrations are gathering in
both the central and southern sectors of
the front, from Mehran to Faw. Domes-
tic preparations— readying hospitals to
receive the wounded, Khomeini blessing
the army and Revolutionary Guard
leadership— have taken place.
If there was any doubt about Iran's
commitment to victory, they were laid to
rest August 24 when Ayatollah Khomeini
intervened in the war discussion and, in
the midst of a lengthy exhortation on the
war, made the following comments:
We must . . . refuse to submit to either an
imposed peace or an imposed arbitration.
We must continue this war. as decided by
ourselves and our nation and as stated by the
entire nation. This war must continue until,
God willing, victory is achieved. The victory,
God willing, is near. ... If our nation wishes
to see this victory achieved, then it must be
mobilized. Our entire nation must be mobil-
ized in the true sense of the word for the
battlefronts.
The Iraqis are well aware of Iranian
plans and troop movements and have
made their own preparations over the
summer, mobilizing new troops and sus-
taining a very vigorous air war against
Iranian economic targets since mid-July.
In fact, since we last met, the Iraqis
have done substantial damage to Iraniai
oil targets in the gulf, with strikes on
Kharg, Lavan, and Sirri Islands, as wel
as refineries and oil production networi
on land. As for the expected offensive,
we believe that Iraq should be able to
sustain its defenses.
While all attention is focused on th*
imminent offensive, we continue to be
concerned about the long-term outlook
of the war. As the level of violence and
destruction escalates, so do the chances
for the spreading and spillover of the
war. Already, gulf shipping has become
a renewed target for both sides. We coi
tinue to press our 3-year-old diplomatic
initiative to prevent arms from getting
to Iran. We do this because of our desh
to see the war wind down. We target
Iranian procurement because Iran is th
intransigent party in the war, refusing
to consider any negotiation or mediatio
proposal made to date.
We also continue our diplomatic
exchanges on the war— in an effort to
see what we might be able to do— at thi
United Nations or elsewhere to help
draw the war to an end. Our problem,
again, has been Iranian commitment to
the war. There are any number of pote
tial, even eager, mediators— and Iraqh
agreed to various proposals, but Iran h
not.
In conclusion, and to emphasize the
Secretary's thoughts, we live in a
dangerous and highly interdependent
world. The preeminent task of the
Executive and Congress is to meet the
challenges before us by working
together to construct a wise and just
foreign policy that protects the best
interests of the United States. This
requires adequate resources, including i
fair and flexible arms transfer statute.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will!
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
72
December 198'
MIDDLE EAST
sit of Israeli Prime Minister Peres
Prime Minister Shimon Peres of the
e of Israel made an official working
t to Washington, D.C., September
16, 1986, to meet with President
gan and other government officials.
Following are remarks made by
iident Reagan and Prime Minister
3S after their meeting on
\ember 15.1
sident Reagan
as been a great pleasure for me to
iome, again, Shimon Peres to the
te House. He's a valued friend, a
esman and a spokesman for peace,
a leader of the Government of
el, a country with which the United
es has deep and special ties.
(Our meeting today reflected the
lie dialogue that Israel and the United
;es enjoy as friends and partners. We
ussed our broad bilateral agenda as
as regional and international issues.
Item number one was our commit-
it to continuing the search for a
otiated peace between Israel and all
;s Arab neighbors. We noted
irable trends in the Middle East, not
the longing for peace by the Israeli
Arab peoples but constructive
ons taken by leaders in the region to
ithe new life into the peace process.
No one has done more than Prime
ister Peres to that end. His vision,
statesmanship, and his tenacity are
tly appreciated here.
In this connection, we have just
lessed an auspicious event: the
ting between Prime Minister Peres
President Mubarak of Egypt follow-
successful negotiations on a formula
resolving the Taba dispute. Egypt
Israel have once again demonstrated
; Arab-Israeli differences can best be
lived through direct negotiations.
We're also heartened by the contin-
efforts of King Hussein of Jordan as
as the historic meeting between
g Hassan of Moroccco and Prime
ister Peres. There is reason for
Imism and hope.
Prime Minister Peres and I have
feed that a steady, determined effort
leeded by all if the remaining obsta-
I to direct negotiations are to be sur-
Hinted. So, our two governments
By reiterate our pledge to keep
l*hing toward a lasting peace.
[In our discussions we also reviewed
Ely aspects of the close and mutually
beneficial relations between our coun-
tries, including the need to maintain a
strong and secure Israel. To this end,
not only is military strength essential
but also a vigorous, growing Israeli
economy. Prime Minister Peres and his
colleagues in Israel's national unity
government have achieved remarkable
success in stabilizing their economy.
They are now turning their attention to
growth, with our full encouragement and
support.
I emphasized to Prime Minister
Peres that the U.S. Government remains
deeply concerned about the plight of
Soviet Jewry and that this subject will
continue to be an important part of our
dialogue with the Soviet Union.
We also discussed the scourge of ter-
rorism and our revulsion over the recent
murder of the innocent in Istanbul and
Karachi.2 The lives of Jews, Muslims,
Hindus, and Christians were taken in
this attack on civilization. These were
acts of horror and outrage.
Israelis and Americans can be proud
of the relationship between our two
countries. The common values and inter-
ests that bring us together sustain us
both, and the many levels of cooperation
between us provide a rich substance to
our ties.
We look forward to building on the
good will and trust so evident between
our governments and peoples.
Prime Minister Peres
It is with satisfaction that I join you at a
conclusion of yet another most produc-
tive meeting where your dedication to
peace in the Middle East and your long-
recognized friendship to the people of
Israel— may I say, to the Jewish people
all over the world— found one small, con-
crete expression.
When we met 2 years ago, we laid
out policies and strategies for peace,
security, and economic development.
These were mostly accomplished, much,
due to your friendship and determina-
tion. Today we look at the future. I am
certain that what we have planned will
be implemented with equal imagination,
dedication, and resolve.
On the peace front, we have pre-
pared the ground for a new drive. The
end of the war in Lebanon, the begin-
ning of what President Mubarak termed
a new era in the Israeli-Egyptian rela-
tions, a policy that keeps doors open for
coexistence and peaceful relations on the
West Bank and Gaza, the search for a
Jordanian-Palestinian platform for
progress— all pave the ground for the
next phase.
There is always a difference between
up-rooting a tree and making a forest
grow. Confrontation is by definition a
single event. Peacemaking is a process
which requires constant patience, culti-
vation. I am certain that together we
can sail to new shores of understanding
in pacifying our region. The good offices
of the United States has demonstrated
its effectiveness by demonstrating
restraint in appearance and dedication in
content.
The next step should be directed
toward negotiation between the parties
concerned. The international community
can support such negotiations, not sub-
stitute it. We are for, clearly, direct
negotiation on a bilateral ground
between each of the parties concerned.
And international support can provide
the parties with an opportunity of an
opening occasion, but negotiations
should remain between the parties
concerned.
For the international participation,
we shall accept only parties that respect
peace and human rights, and we shall
not compromise on it. Small as we may
be, we are not going to depart from con-
viction and principles that should be
respected by all, small and large at the
same time.
Again, I would like to thank you for
the depth of your understanding, for the
empathy, enjoying the basic rights, the
basic rights of a people under your
leadership, Mr. President. The free
world has made real progress toward
democracy, toward freedom, toward
security, and toward prosperity. And all
of us, wherever we may be, have enjoyed
this very imaginative and determined
leadership.
I would like to thank you for a wind
of hope and optimism that you have
added to the life of the free world and to
our own country and our own people.
■Made in the Rose Garden at the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 1986).
2President Reagan referred to the
massacre at Neve Shalom Synagogue in
Istanbul, Turkey, and the hijacking of Pan
American Airways Flight 73 in Karachi,
Pakistan. ■
71
PACIFIC
Compact of Free Association
With Pacific Islands
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12569,
OCT. 16, 1986'
m \n vgement of the compact of free
Association With the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States
of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau
By the authority vested in me as President by
the Constitution and laws of the United
States, including the Compact of Free
Association (the Compact) and Public Law
99-239. (the Act), it is ordered as follows:
Section 1. Responsibility of the
Secretary of State. The Secretary of State
shall conduct the government-to-government
relations of the United States with the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, the
Federated States of Micronesia, and the
Republic of Palau (the "Freely Associated
States"), including any subdivisions, officials
or persons thereof, and may delegate or
allocate such of his authority under this Order
to such other United States officials as he
may from time to time deem desirable. The
authority of the Secretary of State shall
include, consistent with Article V of Title One
of the Compact and section 105(bXl) of the
Act, the establishment and maintenance of
representative offices in the Freely
Associated States and supervision of the
United States representatives and their staff.
The Secretary also shall provide, in accord-
ance with applicable law, for appropriate
privileges, immunities, and assistance to
representatives and their staff. The Secretary
also shall provide, in accordance with appli-
cable law, for appropriate privileges, immu-
nities, and assistance to representatives to
the United States designated by the Govern-
ments of the Freely Associated States,
together with their officers and staff. In
accordance with applicable law and the provi-
sions of this Order, the Secretary also shall
have the authority and responsibility to take
such other actions as may be necessary and
appropriate to ensure that the authorities and
obligations of the United States set forth in
the Compact and its related agreements and
in the laws of the United States as they relate
to the conduct of government-to-government
relations with the Freely Associated States
are carried out. The Secretary shall provide
from appropriations made to the Department
of State such funds as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Order in rela-
tion to the activities of the Department of
State.
Sec. 2. Responsibility of the Secretary
of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior
shall be responsible for seeking the appropria-
tion of funds for and, in accordance with the
laws of the United States, shall make
available to the Freely Associated States and
the United States economic and financial
assistance appropriated pursuant to Article I
of Title Two of the Compact; the grant, serv-
ice, and program assistance appropriated pur-
suant to Article II of Title Two of the Com-
pact; and all other United States assistance
appropriated pursuant to the Compact and its
related agreements. The Secretary shall coor-
dinate and monitor any program or any activ-
ity by any department or agency of the
United States and shall coordinate and
monitor related economic development plan-
ning. This Section shall not apply to services
provided by the Department of Defense to the
Freely Associated States or to activities pur-
suant to Section 1 of this Order, including
activities under the Peace Corps Act.
Sec. 3. Interagency Group on Freely
Associated State Affairs and the Office of
Freely Associated State Affairs.
(a) There is established an Interagency
Group on Freely Associated State Affairs for
the purpose of providing guidance and over-
sight with respect to the establishment and
implementation of policy concerning the Com-
pact and United States relations with the
Freely Associated States.
(b) The Interagency Group shall consist of
the Secretary of State or his designee, who
shall chair the Group, and of the principal
officers or their designees from the Depart-
ments of the Interior, Defense, Commerce,
Energy, and Justice, the Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, the National Security
Council, and such other departments and
agencies as may from time to time be
appropriate.
(c) The Interagency Group shall make
such recommendations as it shall deem appro-
priate to the President, through the Assistant
to the President for National Security
Affairs, concerning United States relations
with the Freely Associated States. The Inter-
agency Group also shall provide such
guidance as it deems appropriate to depart-
ments and agencies delegated authority by
this Order concerning administration of laws
with respect to the Freely Associated States.
(d) If any department or agency charged
by this Order with implementation of the
Compact or other laws of the United States
with respect to the Freely Associated States
concludes that noncompliance sanctions
pursuant to section 105(g) of the Act are
appropriate, it shall make appropriate recom-
mendations to the Interagency Group. The
Interagency Group shall consider these
recommendations and report its findings to
the President for his review in making that
determination.
(e)(1) There shall be in the Department of
State an Office of Freely Associated State
Affairs to conduct United States relations
with the Freely Associated States and carry
out related matters, as the Secretary of State
shall direct or delegate, and provide appro-
priate support to the Interagency Group.
(2) The Office shall be headed by a Direc-
tor designated by the Secretary of State, to
whom the Secretaries of State, Defense, and
the Interior may, to the extent permitted by
law, delegate any or all of their respective
authorities and responsibilities as described
this Order, including the authorities referrec
to in Section 4 of this Order. The Director*
shall serve as Executive Secretary of the I
Interagency Group.
(3) Personnel additional to that provided
by the Secretary of State may be detailed to
the Office by the Executive departments am
agencies that are members of the Interagew
Group, and by other agencies as appropriate
Executive departments and agencies shall, t
the extent permitted by law, provide such
information, advice, and administrative serv
ices and facilities as may be necessary for th
fulfillment of the functions of the Office.
Sec. 4. United States Representatives
the Freely Associated States. The United
States Representatives assigned to a Freely '
Associated State in accordance with Article
of Title One of the Compact shall represent
the Government of the United States in an |
official capacity in that Freely Associated
State, and shall supervise the actions of any
Executive department or agency personnel
assigned permanently or temporarily to that
Freely Associated State.
Sec 5. Cooperation among Executive
Departments and Agencies. All Executive
departments and agencies shall cooperate ir I
the effectuation of the provisions of this
Order. The Interagency Group and Office oi
Freely Associated State Affairs shall facili-
tate such cooperative measures. Nothing in
this Order shall be construed to impair the
authority and responsibility of the Secretar;
of Defense for security and defense matters
in or relating to the Freely Associated State
Sec. 6. Delegation to the Secretary of
the Interior. The following authorities are
delegated to the Secretary of the Interior:
(a) Reporting to the Congress on eco-
nomic development plans prepared by the
Government of the Federated States of
Micronesia and the Government of the
Marshall Islands, pursuant to sections 102(b
and 103(b) of the Act;
(b) The determination required by sectioi
103(e) of the Act concerning the qualificatioi
of the investment management firm selectet
by the Government of the Marshall Islands;
(c) Reporting to the Congress with
respect to the impact of the Compact of Fre
Association on the United States territories
and commonwealths and on the State of
Hawaii, pursuant to section 104(e)(2) of the
Act; and
(d) Causing an annual audit to be con-
ducted of the annual financial statements of
the Government of the Federated States of
Micronesia and the Government of the Mar-
shall Islands, pursuant to section 110(b) of tl
Act.
Sec. 7. Delegation to the Secretary of
State. The following authorities are delegatt
to the Secretary of State:
(a) Reporting to the Congress on crimes
in the Federated States of Micronesia and th
Marshall Islands which have an impact upon
United States jurisdictions, pursuant to sec-
tions 102(aX4) and 103(aX4) of the Act;
7d
Department of State Bullet]
PACIFIC
b) Submitting the certification and report
f Congress for purposes of section 5 of
fishermen's Protective Act of 1967. pur-
I to section 104(f)(3) of the Act; and
I) Reporting with the concurrence of the
tary of Defense, to the Congress on
blinations made regarding security and
|se, pursuant to section 105(q) of the Act
lee. 8. Supersession and Saving
Isions.
L) Subject to the provisions of section 9
is Order, prior Executive orders concern-
le former Trust Territory of the Pacific
Is are hereby superseded and rendered
licable, except that the authority of the
tary of the Interior as provided in appli-
provisions of Executive Order No.
, as amended, shall remain in effect, in
iner consistent with this Order and pur-
to section 105(c)(2) of the Act, to ter-
minate the trust territory government and
discharge its responsibilities, at which time
the entirety of Executive Order No. 11021
shall be superseded.
(b) Nothing in this Order shall be con-
strued as mollifying the rights or obligations
of the United States under the provisions of
the Compact or as affecting or modifying the
responsibility of the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General to interpret the rights
and obligations of the United States arising
out of or concerning the Compact.
Sec. 9 Effective Date. This Order shall
become effective with respect to a Freely
Associated State simultaneously with the
entry into force of the Compact for that state.
Ronald Reagan
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 20. 1986
ie Strategic Importance
the Emerging Pacific
■aston J. Sigur, Jr.
Yddress before a conference
Insored by the Georgetown Univer-
•t 'filter for Strategic and Interna-
\l Studies and the Pacific Islands
hkttion on September 29, 1986. Mr.
r is Assistant Secretary for East
wi and Pacific Affairs.
ndelighted to have this opportunity
press you this morning on the
egic importance of the Pacific
In as we in this Administration see
Iseems to me particularly timely to
le a forum to the discussion of
jopments in Oceania— the nations
elands of the Pacific. In both
Imic and political terms, they are an
jasingly valuable part of the emerg-
Lsian-Pacific profile on the world
I. As our attention becomes focused
I and more on the Asian and Pacific
pi generally, we recognize full well
pie being played by the smaller
lie entities in the emergence of that
f The United States is actively
feed in consultations with our island
Es on a broad range of common
fests and concerns.
We are proud of our historic associa-
Ivith the area. The United States
fe precious price in the Pacific 45
I ago. We have assisted the islands
fir social and commercial develop-
I to improve the livelihoods of their
we. and we have helped wherever we
I to ease their transition to full
h'eignty. We maintain ongoing
political and commercial relations with
the region on a mutually beneficial basis.
To the extent that issues arise, as they
do in any normal relationship, we will
address them candidly and sensitively.
In short, this Administration welcomes
the "emergence" of the Pacific, and
we are confident of its positive
consequences.
U.S. Interests and Involvement
Let me step back now, for a moment,
and look at the larger picture of
America's growing interest and involve-
ment in the entire Asian-Pacific region.
Contrary to the fears of many 10 years
ago, we never "abandoned" our Asian
commitments. There was a period of
reassessment, but our fundamental
linkage to the economic and security
interests of the region was deeply rooted
and inseverable. The remarkable prog-
ress achieved throughout the region in
the post- Vietnam era heralds a new and
significant role for it in the decades
ahead, and our national interests there
have evolved accordingly.
Today, the implications of daily
events in Asia and the Pacific are truly
global. The economic, political, social,
cultural, and security developments of
the region all impact on the international
system and influence, in some way, our
own lifestyles and policies in this coun-
try. We cannot afford to regard the area
casually as we deliberate our labor
policies, trade strategies, or security pro-
visions. Nearly every event that occurs
there must be factored into our own
national planning. In very many
respects, we depend on the Asian-Pacific
region, just as it depends on us. Our
relationship is one of broad inter-
dependence and reciprocal influence.
The United States must respond
realistically to this fact.
Our own interests and goals in the
Asian and Pacific region have been
carefully identified, and they must be
just as clearly articulated so that they
are well understood by all. The United
States has an abiding interest in the con-
tinuing peace, political stability, and
economic prosperity of the entire region.
For this reason, we actively strive to
nurture closer cooperation and consulta-
tions on a broad spectrum of common
concerns. In support of our many
defense commitments, we seek to main-
tain the overall strategic balance among
major powers in the region which
ensures our own operational ability,
maneuverability, and access in time of
crisis. This important goal necessarily
depends upon the reliability of our
regional partners in shouldering their
portion of political and security respon-
sibilities. And, of course, we endorse and
support broader democratization and
respect for human rights wherever defi-
ciencies exist, as well as the strengthen-
ing of the open market trading system
for greater common prosperity.
For our part, we pledge sensitive
leadership and ample support to our
regional friends without attempting to
dictate or dominate local processes.
We do not consider the Pacific an
"American lake" but do acknowledge
our responsibilities and legitimate
national interests there. We are a Pacific
nation, and have been, historically. We
are proud of that fact and proud of the
contributions we have made to the
welfare and development of the region.
Micronesian Relations
In Micronesia, the United States has
been working closely with the several
governments of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands to forge a new
political relationship. Be it the common-
wealth status the peoples of the
Northern Mariana Islands have chosen
or the freely associated relationship pre-
ferred by the Federated States of
Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and
the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
these new relationships represent the
clearly stated will of the Micronesian
people as expressed in a series of UN-
observed plebiscites held over the past
several years. The Reagan Administra-
tion is proud of the role it has played in
.1 -4 |-\OC
7<?
PACIFIC
bringing the political aspirations of the
peoples of the trust territory to fruition,
and it joins with the leaders of the
region in rejecting the demands of the
Soviet Union that these aspirations be
arbitrarily denied.
As many of you know, the situation
in Palau is in flux. Two weeks ago, a
legal challenge to the Compact of Free
Association was upheld by the Palau
Supreme Court. What is important to
keep in mind when examining this issue
is that the challenge to the compact was
weighed and tested by the legal system
of Palau— not that of the United States.
That is to say, the legal challenge is, in a
very real sense, the measure of the suc-
cess we and all of the people of the trust
territory have had in nurturing and
bringing into full blossom a vigorous and
democratic indigenous political life. It is
now up to the Palauan people themselves
to determine what their future course
should be. Regardless of what course is
chosen, we intend to work with the
elected leaders of Palau to help build for
the future they choose.
Naturally, the uncertainty of the
situation in Palau has had an effect on
our plans for the termination of the
trusteeship and the implementation of
the compacts and the Commonwealth
Covenant. It has not, however, changed
in any way the Administration's firm
commitment to the peoples of the trust
territory to move ahead without delay
toward the conclusion of the self-
determination process. In that context,
we were extremely pleased last August
when the leaders of the South Pacific
Forum stated again their strong support
for the political status arrangements the
governments of the trust territory had
chosen and called for the prompt ter-
mination of the trusteeship and imple-
mentation of the compacts and covenant.
Commercial and Development Ties
While our two-way trade with the Asian-
Pacific region as a whole is quite large—
almost one-third of our total world
trade— the volume of U.S. commerce
with the Pacific islands has been small.
This has been due, of course, to many
factors, not the least of which are the
limited range of products and means of
transport available in the island area.
We are making some progress, however,
and hope to facilitate greater commer-
cial exchange in the future.
The U.S. role has been much more
evident through the years in terms of
direct regional aid programs to help
develop the Pacific private sector and in
terms of the educational, technical, and
other forms of social assistance. Our
government's International Visitor Pro-
gram has given a great many Pacific
leaders their first introduction to an
industrialized democracy. The Asia
Foundation has active programs in legal
education, media education, and in small
business and entrepreneurial training for
Pacific islanders. The Fulbright Program
and the Peace Corps also have provided
direct support to the area's development
in many ways. Private and semiprivate
institutions, like Honolulu's East-West
Center, have done much to establish
valuable research and training pro-
grams, as is seen in the support the
East- West Center has provided the
Pacific Islands Development Program.
We will play a significant role in bring-
ing appropriate technology to the Pacific
to improve the job market and living
standards of the area's people.
But more can and should be done.
We can facilitate even more the area's
entry into U.S. commercial markets,
where feasible, and continue to
encourage private investment in local
industries, such as food processing
plants. We can help encourage and
develop the Pacific's potential for
expanded tourism.
The one commercial issue over which
we and the nations of the South Pacific
have disagreed most in recent years
involves "coastal state jurisdiction over
highly migratory species." In a less
elegant but considerably more under-
standable formulation, our conflicting
views on the tuna fishery have been a
source of great irritation in our relations
over the past decade.
Having said that, however, I should
hasten to add that neither we nor the
island states have let this juridical dif-
ference prevent us from addressing the
problem in a friendly and constructive
manner. The leaders of the region share
with Secretary Shultz a clear under-
standing of the need to solve this prob-
lem and move ahead on the many issues
before us where we share a common
interest and a common goal.
We are now, and have been for some
time, actively engaged with the region's
states in negotiations that will produce,
when finally concluded, one of the most
comprehensive and complex fisheries
agreements ever negotiated. The
remarkable progress we have made in
these negotiations since their inception
in late 1984 results from a determination
by all parties that no problem is too com-
plex to be resolved.
While a final solution to some of the
most difficult issues before the
negotiators still evades us, we have
every reason to believe that soon—
perhaps as early as next month, when
the next round of talks begins in
Tonga— an agreement can be reached
principle on the broad outlines of a J
regional fisheries treaty benefiting all
parties. At that time, both sides can 1
report to their individual capitals that
agreement has been reached which at
once provides the U.S. tuna fleet acce;
to the region's fishery and the island
states an adequate and reasonable con
pensation for their resource.
The Nuclear Age in the Pacific
Pacific people have enjoyed a largely
tranquil history. No one cherishes pea
and harmony more than they. The
islands claim a tradition of peace and
good-neighborliness which we Americ; I
fully appreciate.
There is, today, a detectable
phenomenon of rising antinuclear sent
ment in some quarters of the South
Pacific. It stems, in part, from the
natural human aversion to weapons of
mass destruction and, in part, from pa
practices of nuclear testing in the area
by the United States and others. We
understand that sentiment. The Unite j
States has, for years, been at the
forefront of efforts to prevent the pro
liferation of nuclear weapons and to
enforce rigid global standards of nucle
safety. We have neither the desire nor
the intention to foist nuclear armamer
onto others.
In the nuclear age, the potential fc
worldwide destruction demands that
everyone work to prevent such a
catastrophe. In response to this
challenge, the leaders of the South
Pacific last year drafted the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. At
this year's meeting of the South Pacifi
Forum, those same leaders invited the
nuclear weapons states to sign the
treaty's protocols. We appreciate the
effort the authors of this treaty made I
ensure that vital Western interests are
taken into account.
I want very much to assure this
audience that the U.S. Government
understands the concerns expressed in
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone •
Treaty. We are giving the treaty and ii
protocols serious, high-level study.
We do have, however, wide-rangin
global responsibilities. These require
that we examine carefully and in detail
the full implications of any treaty unde
taking that would limit our ability to
defend free world interests. I believe tl
leaders of the region understand that
obligation and would not wish my
government to act in any less respon-
sible manner.
^6
DeDartment of State Bulla
PACIFIC
'he nuclear issue also has been
ghted in connection with New
ind's abrupt decision in 1984 to
port access to nuclear-powered or
ar-armed vessels and aircraft,
i our longstanding and universal
y of neither confirming nor denying
jjesence of nuclear weapons on our
;ls, we concluded that we had no
native but to suspend our security
ations to New Zealand under
US [Australia, New Zealand, United
;s security treaty]. The conditions
i Wellington chose to attach to our
is to its naval ports rendered impos-
our practical alliance cooperation,
rh we, of course, remain friends.
,et me say just a word about
ice responsibilities, since this con-
ice is devoted to strategic considera-
for the Western alliance. Allies
iionally differ on political issues; but
imental cooperation and mutual
dence require an appreciation for
oncerns and risks involved for all
l one ally decides to set its own arbi-
rules for others to follow,
t may be paradoxical, but it is not at
rprising that a nation at peace must
•epared for war if it is to deter war.
lecessary sacrifices of preparedness
be shared equitably among demo-
: allies, for whenever partners do
einforce one another, the safety and
of the entire alliance are jeopar-
. We all face similar domestic
lures and limited resources, and
is why each ally must dependably
maintain the strength of the
ice according to its own capabilities,
lot all allies need to possess their
nuclear deterrent. But if one under-
s America's ability to maintain its
itial naval presence, then it weakens
vn national security in the process,
shared responsibilities go beyond
ly deterring military threats, of
se. Our partnership depends on
sr and broader bonds of reciprocal
?ration that include the entire range
lations, including economic and
cal ties. We know for certain that
Vestern alliance unity across the
i is essential to the success of East-
; negotiations, and, therefore, our
al support on the smaller issues—
)ort access— is so very important to
irger picture.
st Presence
listoric involvement of Americans
Vest Europeans in the Pacific
is extends back many generations,
egacy of 19th-century commercial
rultural contacts is reflected in our
Inuing close relationships today. The
United States has been directly involved
throughout the decades in the develop-
ment of local industries and social pro-
grams that have improved the life of
islanders. By and large, they have
established their own political institu-
tions that reflect the same values of
popular democracy as our own. Our
heritage of commonality is long, and it
is strong.
Very recently— within the past 3 or 4
years— the Soviet Union has demon-
strated newfound, virtually unprece-
dented interest in the Pacific states.
They have sent their emissaries to
explore commercial and diplomatic
opportunities in the area. The reception
has been largely skeptical, tentative, and
quite limited in scope. Moscow is dis-
covering, in its belated arrival, that its
reputation has preceded it. As Pacific
governments weigh the benefits of com-
mercial cooperation against the risks of
association with the polar bear from the
north, they cautiously consider the price
of political dependence that inevitably
accompanies economic dependence on
the Soviet Union.
I do not anticipate a groundswell of
greeting to the Soviet newcomers.
Frankly, the political traditions of the
Pacific area are wholly incompatible with
those of the Soviet Union. Moscow
knows it and, most importantly, the
Pacific people know it. The sad history
of Soviet involvement in the Caribbean,
in the Middle East, and in Africa— not to
mention Eastern Europe— betrays little
promise to the forward-looking people of
the emerging Pacific.
For our part, we do not view the
recent Soviet initiatives in the South
Pacific with particular alarm or distress.
We do, however, sense the importance
of preventing the area's conversion into
yet another arena of major power con-
frontation. This consideration calls into
question the long-range role and goals of
the Soviet Union in penetrating this area
of the Pacific.
The dramatic record of Soviet
military buildup in the Asian-Pacific
region more broadly, over the past 10
years, is well known. Both the quality
and quantity of its regional armed forces
have expanded perilously as Moscow
seeks to impress and intimidate its Asian
neighbors. The Soviet Pacific naval fleet
is now its largest. Moscow has regularly
supplemented its force capabilities at
Cam Ranh Bay and its military aid to
North Korea, while targeting one-third
of its SS-20 nuclear missiles on the
Asian region. As they probe incessantly
for weak points in the U.S. defense
alliance system, the Soviets attempt to
expand their own political and military
tactical maneuverability. Fortunately,
Moscow's adventurism, thus far, has had
negative political consequences for itself
in the region.
Two months ago, Soviet Premier
Gorbachev delivered an address at
Vladivostok devoted largely to sweeping,
amorphous "confidence-building
measures" that ignore the root causes of
insecurity in the Asian region. Many
Asian observers have pointed out that
the Vladivostok address reflects more
stylistic nuance in Soviet foreign policy
rather than any significant new
substance. Even so, it seems to repre-
sent an expression of Soviet determina-
tion to play a more activist role in the
region. What we might hope to see in
terms of real Soviet peace initiatives in
Cambodia, Afghanistan, Korea, and the
Japanese Northern Territories, however,
remains largely elusive. Until these
specific sources of regional conflict and
instability are addressed, there is little
room for hope that grand schemes of
"confidence" promotion will bring any
real relaxation of Asian and Pacific
tensions.
Regional Cooperation
As I see it, one of the most fascinating
and encouraging phenomena operating
in the Pacific Basin region today is the
trend toward a sense of community. In a
region as diverse as this— culturally,
geographically, politically, religiously,
and historically— it is a dramatic develop-
ment when nations begin to think in
terms of common interests and commer-
cial goals. True, we are a long way from
witnessing anything on the scale of the
European Common Market. But for 6
years now, private representatives from
many of the regional states and islands
have met periodically, under the auspices
of the nonofficial Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference (PECC), to
review and deliberate upon trade and
resource policies as they affect regional
well-being. The PECC will meet in
plenary session for the fifth time this
November in Vancouver to discuss such
issues as fisheries cooperation and
development, direct foreign investment
in the region, and the supply and
distribution of minerals and energy
resources. Their conclusions and recom-
mendations are nonbinding on any
government. Yet, perhaps more impor-
tant than any product they might pro-
duce is the fact that this dialogue exer-
cise has achieved an aspect of regularity
and a new sense of commonality.
The PECC is just one outgrowth of a
subtle, delicate, organic process that
iemhor 1 Qfifi
77
REFUGEES
reflects the growing concept of common
identity among Asian-Pacific nations.
And the Pacific islands are very much a
part of that process. Indeed, with the
"Pacific way" of cooperation and con-
sensus as their guide, the leaders of the
island Pacific can play a vital steward-
ship role in this process. Gradually,
habits of cooperation and consultation
are becoming well established. No doubt
in the years ahead we will see the
plethora of bilateral economic arrange-
ments in the region yield, here and
there, to bold multilateral initiatives to
foster common prosperity.
There are very real limitations, of
course. This gradually evolving process
does not, in my view, portend the estab-
lishment of rigid regionwide institutions;
nor does it foreshadow the creation of
grandiose political or security pacts, as
Moscow frequently charges. The process
does, however, reflect something very
positive and encouraging about the spirit
of regional cooperation now taking root.
It is important that the people of the
Pacific islands take advantage of every
opportunity to participate in this col-
legia! atmosphere and share in the
benefits that common efforts can
produce.
Conclusion
The emergence of the Pacific as an
important regional and even global actor
is one of the great phenomena of the
1980s. It holds great potential but also
carries with it a certain degree of risk
and responsibility. The Pacific islands
realize this, and they are taking appro-
priate control of their own destinies.
They are set on a course targeted for
success— popular democracy, free enter-
prise, and a high degree of literacy, com-
bined with a shrewd understanding of
international politics. It is a course run-
ning in tandem with our own.
Positioned on the periphery of a
dynamic, industrializing Asian continent,
the Pacific entities have much they can
learn from and much they can offer in
return to their Asian neighbors. In some
respects, the free states of the Pacific
have established an indigenous style of
democratic process that well might be
emulated by some larger and wealthier
Asian nations. They have far to go in
their own industrial evolution but
possess valuable assets in their
remarkable combined literacy rate and in
the entrepreneural determination of
their peoples.
Pacific potential is vast. We applaud
that. We welcome that. And we will sup-
port it. ■
U.S. Refugee Policy
and Programs for FY 1987
Following are statements by Ambassador
Jonathan Moore, U.S. Coordinator for
Refugee Affairs, before the Subcommittee
on Immigration and Refugee Policy of
the Senate Judiciary Committee,
September 16, 1986, and by Robert L.
Funseth, Acting Director of the Bureau
for Refugee Programs, before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, Septem-
ber 26, 1986, in Washington, D.C.1
AMBASSADOR MOORE
It is my privilege to appear for the first
time before this committee as U.S. Coor-
dinator for Refugee Affairs. I look for-
ward to being in close touch and in good
communication with you, not just in
formal consultations but in informal and
continuing contact as well.
I begin this job with high aspirations
and strong idealism but with no illusions
as to its difficult, complicated, and
multifarious character. There are many
tensions to be balanced, many competing
pressures and requirements to be
understood and respected.
Early in my tenure— to use an
academic term which has a very dif-
ferent meaning in politics— I will be
examining the role of U.S. Coordinator
with some care to see how it might be
strengthened, how it might be practiced
more effectively. And I will look forward
to talking with you further and seeking
your views about that.
Clearly, it is based on a concept of
collaborative effort, and I am pleased in
that spirit to join my colleagues from the
Departments of State, Justice, and
Health and Human Services (HHS) at
this table. I want to contribute to this
consultation, but also I am here to learn,
especially because I am not yet familiar
enough with many of the questions at
issue.
I have some prior experience in
Southeast Asia and the very special
benefit of having recently served on the
Indochinese Refugee Panel chaired by
former Governor Bob Ray, as has been
mentioned, but at the same time do not
want to view an urgent worldwide con-
cern too much via the perspective of a
single region.
Likewise, even though the subject
before us this morning is to consult on
the refugee admissions ceiling to this ■
country for the coming fiscal year, 1 1
want to emphasize, first, that third- J
country resettlement represents a thi:
durable solution, and new energy and
imagination must be brought to pursu
the first two— voluntary repatriation i
regional resettlement— and, second, tl
the United States cannot be left to
address these humanitarian needs byj
itself but must continue to work withi
dedicated international system.
MR. FUNSETH
Thank you for this opportunity to mal
additional comments about the U.S.
refugee program. Rather than comme
further on the President's proposals f
refugee admissions for the coming ye;
as reflected in the statements of the J
Secretary of State and the U.S. Coor-*
dinator [for Refugee Affairs, Jonathai
Moore], I thought it would be useful t
share with you and the committee a b1
look at the State Department's stewa;
ship of the U.S. refugee program.
Simply put, our mission is to prov*'
humanitarian assistance to refugees—
those victims of persecution and confl
who have fled their homelands. Accon
ingly, the Refugee Bureau manages ai
operates the U.S. Government's effoj
to assist refugees in need overseas ai*
to admit certain refugees to the Unite
States.
Refugee Situation:
Markedly Different
The nature of the world refugee populi
tion is markedly different today— both
number and composition— from that oi
only 6 years ago, as is our response to
When the Refugee Act of 1980 w»
enacted and this consultation process
began, there were over 6 million perso
recognized as refugees; in 1980, there
are now over 10 million— an increase a
4 million.
In 1980, just under two-thirds of a
refugee budget was devoted to funding
the admissions program, and one-third
was the U.S. contribution to internal
tional assistance. In 1987, those propoi
tions have been reversed— roughly twO
thirds of the budget is now devoted tol
helping care for refugees in first asyliq
and one-third to funding the reduced J
admissions program.
78
Department of State Bulls
REFUGEES
. . . In this period of budgetary constraint, we are ever mindful
of the importance of ensuring that we make the best possible
use of every appropriated refugee dollar. . . .
Il sian refugee (above) and Ethiopian refugees
u) in vocational training.
Wloran refugees planting crops in Costa Rica (above): food aid in Sudan (right).
REFUGEES
In fiscal yea,' (FY I 1980, the U.S
budget for refugees totaled over $445
million; for FY 1987, the requested
refugee budget is $347 million— a reduc-
tion of nearly $100 million.
Refugee admissions in 1980 totaled
207,000, including 164,000 from
Southeast Asia; the President's FY 1987
admissions ceiling is 70,000, including
32,000 from first-asylum camps in
Southeast Asia— thus, the global ceiling
is 137,000 less; the Indochinese ceiling is
94,000 less.
Refugee Program Organization
By Washington standards the Bureau
for Refugee Programs is a relatively
small organization. Our American staff
of 106 persons (81 officers and 25 staff
support) is divided between 74 in
Washington and 32 at overseas posts. At
the same time, we oversee both assist-
ance and admissions operations which
are worldwide.
The programs by which we prepare
refugees for their new lives in this new
land have been of special interest to this
committee and are programs which have
been further improved during the year.
Initial Resettlement
As the committee is aware, the Depart-
ment of State is responsible for the
management of programs for initial
resettlement services— commonly known
as "reception and placement" services—
under which the private voluntary agen-
cies provide transitional assistance to
refugees for their first 90 days in the
country. Two of our principal tools for
administering this program are the
Bureau's cooperative agreement, or con-
tract, with the voluntary agencies and
onsite monitoring.
During FY 1986, Refugee Bureau
monitoring teams visited 10 states, and
since 1982, we have conducted 34 onsite
reviews nationwide, covering all states
with an Indochinese refugee population
greater than 10,000, which account,
cumulatively, for more than 90% of all
resettled refugees. We have now tripled
the resources we devote to the monitor-
ing function. In this regard, may I say
that your written expression of support
was instrumental in our ability to obtain
additional resources after several years
of seeing our repeated requests frus-
trated in the appropriations process.
The monitoring visits have led to
significant improvements in the delivery
and documentation of services provided'
to refugees at the local level— a conclu-
sion which was confirmed by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) report of April
1986, which found evidence that 94% of
all refugees had received the required
core resettlement services. This is a
tribute to the dedication of the voluntary
resettlement agencies and the thousands
of volunteer workers who have strived
sincerely ever to improve the quality of
refugee resettlement.
Onsite monitoring reinforces the
bureau's regular review of the private
voluntary agencies' financial reports,
tracking of refugee placements, over-
sight of sponsorship assurances, and
ongoing liaison with the agencies. We
believe that the oversight mechanism
and the monitoring reports, which we
share with the committee staff as well as
with the State coordinators and Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR), further
demonstrate our commitment to press
actively for improvements in voluntary
agency resettlement performance and
accountability. We have worked dili-
gently with the voluntary agencies to
assist them in improving their own inter-
nal monitoring capabilities and
performance.
Implementation of
GAO Recommendations
The focus on the management respon-
sibilities of the voluntary agencies was
the thrust of the April 1986 GAO report,
which recommended that the bureau:
First, clarify program goals;
Second, establish performance
standards; and
Third, enhance financial reporting
and accountability.
I am pleased to report that we have
made substantial progress in all three of
these areas.
• New financial reporting require-
ments have been put into effect, retroac-
tive to April 1, 1986.
• New program guidelines and per-
formance standards have been agreed to
between the bureau and the voluntary
resettlement agencies. These guidelines
address, inter alia, required resettle-
ment services, documentation and
monitoring, employment, and coordina-
tion with state-administered social ser-
vice programs.
• A statement of goals and objec-
tives has been incorporated into the pro-
gram announcement for FY 1987. The
bureau will evaluate proposals against
this announcement for new cooperative
agreements to take effect on January 1,
1987.
We believe that these actions respond
fully to the concerns expressed by this
committee and that there will be tan-
gible improvements in the services
received by refugees and, especially, ir
the coordination with HHS-funded,
state-administered social service pro!
grams. The bureau benefited greatly!
from the opportunity to attend the sev
regional consultations organized thisB
year by ORR, which extended our und<
standing of the perspectives of State a
local government and of mutual assist-
ance associations and other communitj
based organizations.
Refugee Transportation Loans
Another area where we have made rea
progress in the improved management
of the refugee resettlement process is
the collection of transportation loans
made to refugees. The bureau continui
to work closely with the IntergovernJ
mental Committee for Migration (ICM
and the participating voluntary resettl
ment agencies to encourage the repay-
ment of these loans. Significant impro1
ment has been made in the amount of
funds collected by the voluntary agen-
cies. In 1981, repayments amounted tc
only $1.5 million, while in 1985 more
than $13 million was collected. Earlier
this year I chaired a workshop in New
York with representatives from ICM a
the voluntary agencies to discuss proa
cedures and policies that might be imp
mented to further improve the collects
rate. I am pleased to report that ICM
recently confirmed that 1986 collectior
will again show an increase from last
year.
English Language Training
In addition to our efforts to improve 01
reception and placement programs, :
major improvements and refinements
have been made in the English as a ,
Second Language/Cultural Orientation
(ESL/CO) programs which refugees
receive in Southeast Asia prior to
resettlement in the United States. I air
pleased to report that in FY 1985 and
1986, over 90% of all refugees arriving
from Southeast Asia received ESL/CO
training prior to their arrival.
We are not resting on our laurels,
however, and continue to make further
improvements in these programs. Trail
ing has been extended to 5 months for
all adults ages 17-55. The adult progra
includes a special work orientation com
ponent which reinforces the language
and behavior required to obtain and kei
a job. For refugee adolescents, a pro-
gram has been introduced to prepare
them to succeed in American secondarj
schools. This program, called PASS
[Preparation for American Secondary
Schools], simulates an American public
80
Department of State Bullet
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ol environment. Students receive
ling in English, American studies,
mathematics. To help their parents
i what will be expected of them in
J.S. educational system, they attend
nt-Teacher Association meetings
parent-teacher conferences. This
th, the Department intends to
prtake funding of a program for
ren ages 6-11 at the Philippine
gee Processing Center at Bataan.
the program for adolescents, this
ram will prepare children for the
rican school experience. Major
s of instruction will be English,
lematics, and classroom orientation.
)ther programs have been developed
Idress the needs of special groups
as pregnant women and mothers
children under 6 and for young
ts ages 17-19 who may either attend
school or enter the job market upon
t'al. In Thailand, there are also
ial programs for the hearing
dred which are taught in sign.
rnational Organizations
oth the Secretary of State and
iassador Moore expressed in their
ments, the number of refugees for
m resettlement in this country is
ssary or even appropriate is
emely small when compared to the
larger numbers of people who find
selves outside their homelands and
le to return. For these people, the
Ind protection of international
Inizations are critical— indeed, the
Irence is often between life and
Ih. In recent years, the United States
put great effort into bringing about
Kul management by these interna-
fel organizations, with considerable
less.
this committee has clearly
lessed its objective that management
le UN High Commissioner for
Igees (UNHCR) be improved. We are
I pleased that the new High Commis-
fer came to the UNHCR with an out-
bing record at the International
) mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in
Inanagement of its multimillion-
|r humanitarian assistance pro-
lis. Under his vigorous leadership.
IJNHCR has begun a major effort to
rove the organization of the head-
Iters' staff, strengthen field opera-
e, and examine all ongoing programs
Iffectiveness. This effort has been
fertaken with the assistance of one of
lop management consulting firms in
Ivorld, which was engaged last April
litiate an external audit of UNHCR
rations.
UNBRO and UNRWA
The l'.\ Border Relief Organization
(UNBK< )). and its implementing partner,
the World Pood Program, has exhibited
extraordinary organization and effec-
tiveness in providing assistance and pro-
tection for the some 245,000 Cambo-
dians along the Thai border. The UN
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
runs schools and medical facilities for
Palestinian refugees in the Near East
for considerably less than these same
services would cost were they provided
by the asylum country governments.
In providing our support to the
improved management of these interna-
tional organizations, we recognize that
any success we may have in bringing
about their improved effectiveness and
efficiency will multiply the value of each
assistance dollar we contribute.
Refugee Officers Abroad
Because of the history of our Southeast
Asian involvement and the complexity of
the situation there, much public atten-
tion is focused on that part of the world.
We must remember, however, that
refugees in Southeast Asia represent
less than 5% of the world's total. While
every American Embassy has an officer
designated responsible for refugee
affairs, the bureau itself has officers in
every country and region where there
are critical refugee situations:
Pakistan, where almost 3 million
Afghans have received temporary
asylum in their flight from Soviet
military occupation;
Sudan and Somalia, where millions
have fled from Ethiopia and Uganda;
A Spotlight on Cuba
by Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr.
Address before the World Affairs
Council in St. Louis, Missouri, on
October 22, 1986. Mr. Skoug is Director
ofth Offia of Cuban Affairs.
It is a special pleasure and a conspicuous
honor to be your guest today in St. Louis
to discuss the situation today in Cuba.
There are a number of critical observa-
tions one can make about Fidel Castro's
Cuba.
First and foremost, it is one of the
tightest dictatorships in the world, with
no independent institutions allowed and
no form of freedom permitted to
Central America, where political
turmoil has caused thousands to leave
their homelands and seek asylum in
neighboring countries;
Southeast Asia, where oppression
by the Indochinese communist regime
continues to cause people to flee their
homelands or to languish as political
prisoners; and
Western Europe, where thousands
of refugees seek refuge from the
tyranny of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union.
Conclusion
It has been my intention, in focusing
these brief remarks on the management
aspects of the refugee program, to share
with you some of the success we believe
we have achieved. In this period of
budgetary constraint, we are ever
mindful of the importance of ensuring
that we make the best possible use of
every appropriated refugee dollar.
To do any less would not be faithful
to the responsibility entrusted to us by
Americans from the 50 States who sup-
port and finance this great national
humanitarian endeavor through their
hard-earned tax dollars. To do any less
would be irresponsible and unfair to
those to whom life has been less than
fair already— the 10 million refugees in
the world for whom our responsive and
responsible management of the refugee
program may mean life itself.
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents. U.S. Government Printing
Office. Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
..
mber 1986
challenge the system. This policy is
based on Castro's historic dictum: "out-
side the revolution, no rights at all." For
28 years, Cubans have enjoyed no rights
at all other than what Fidel Castro
determines to be within his revolution.
Second, although Cuba in 1959 had
one of the highest living standards in
Latin America— with per capita income
close to that of Argentina, Venezuela,
and Uruguay— Cuba now is one of the
poorest countries in the hemisphere.
Cuban economic performance is now bit-
terly condemned by Castro himself, who
blames it on lack of discipline. The
Soviet Union, which subsidizes the
Cuban economy at the rate of $4.5 billion
81
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
per year, itself rates Cuba a very poor
country. A Soviet spokesman at a
Znaniye Society lecture in Leningrad
last spring rated it about 20 on a scale
where the U.S.S.R. economy would be
100 and that of communist Czechoslo-
vakia would be 150. Recently, according
to Institutional Investor, 75 interna-
tional banks rated Cuba 14 on a scale of
100 as a credit risk, in 17th place of 24
countries in the Western Hemisphere. It
is hard to be precise about economic
statistics in a country which does not
have a convertible currency. One thing is
clear: the total loss of freedom in Cuba
has not been the bitter price of economic
advancement but has contributed to
economic decline in a country which
formerly was a leader.
Third, Castro has made Cuba into a
formidable military power, with the
largest armed forces in Latin America
despite the fact that its population is
only 10 million. This vast armed force of
approximately 300,000, including active
reserves, is supposedly necessary to
defend Cuba against the United States.
In fact, however, for over two decades
its battles have been far from home,
mainly against black Africans in the
Horn of Africa or in the Angolan civil
war but also in the mountains and
jungles of this hemisphere. They have
fought our forces only once, for 2 or 3
days on Grenada.
Fourth, this Cuba, despite its own
enormous political and economic short-
comings, seeks to be a model for
likeminded elite groups in Latin
America. It wants to see the Cuban
revolution replicated, and it has been
constantly engaged in the business of
fomenting revolution for more than a
quarter century. It has used its own
forces in third countries, trained and
armed foreign revolutionaries, and pro-
vided advice and logistical support to
their efforts. Where such elite groups
have gained power, through coup d'etat
or national uprising as in Grenada and
Nicaragua respectively, Cuba has moved
at once to consolidate the regimes so
that they might become as permanent as
the rule of Fidel Castro himself has
been.
There are indigenous roots in Latin
America for the social stirring that has
produced revolutionary violence; yet it is
the particular role of Cuba to channel
that violence into a system that denies
all rights to those that the elite vanguard
decides are outside the revolution. It is
not change that is wrong. What is wrong
is that change is corrupted into a mold
from which further progressive develop-
ment is denied.
Fifth, Cuba has played out this mili-
tant role in close alignment with Soviet
power and in total harmony with Soviet
strategic interests. The Soviets did not
put Castro in power, but they had one of
history's greatest windfalls. He is cheap
for them at any price, although the price
is very high in economic costs, because he
has introduced the East- West struggle
into the heart of America. Castro has
called his Cubans the "mediators" and
"lecturers" between the U.S.S.R. and
the Latin American revolutionaries. He
has said the Russians did not even know
who the latter were until he introduced
them. Castro has made Cuba the linchpin
between Soviet power and a hemisphere
which is engaged in a struggle to see if
its future lies with liberal democracy or
totalitarian communism dressed up as
national liberation.
The High Price of Dissent
The revolutionaries— as the Salvadoran
guerrilla high command radioed from its
headquarters in Managua, Nicaragua, on
the 25th anniversary of Castro's seizure
of power in Cuba— regard the Cuban
revolution as "the greatest event in
Latin American history." As one of
them said last year, "the New Cuba is
successful evidence of what the New
Latin America and the Caribbean will
be."
I would like to look today at one
aspect of that model that has not had
enough public scrutiny: the way it deals
with the persons who are in the country
but outside the revolution and who hence
enjoy "no rights at all."
Since Fidel Castro achieved power
on January 1, 1959, many a stalwart in
Cuba has gone before a firing squad
shouting "Viva la libertad!" or "Viva
Cristo Rey!" Hundreds of persons have
spent their lives in prison under condi-
tions so pathetic as to beggar descrip-
tion—conditions that made them wonder
if the dead were not lucky. Many have
suffered confinement of 25 years or
more for such offenses as smuggling
small children, with the consent of their
parents, to freedom outside Cuba. We
welcomed some of these valiant individ-
uals and their families to the United
States last month. They have trickled
out, as it meets the pleasure of Fidel
Castro to let them go. But over 300 of
these so-called historic prisoners of con-
science remain incarcerated. Thousands
of others are in jail for similar reasons.
A new wave of political arrests has been
underway since 1982. The cause for such
punishment is that they, in some form,
resisted the autocracy that was imposed
on Cuba by Fidel Castro. They hav
rights at all.
Those who have left Cuba as
refugees or expolitical prisoners have
sometimes described bits and pieces c
their existence. Few have been willinj
able to portray those long years of su I
fering behind prison bars in Cuba. On J
who has done so meticulously is
Armando Valladares, who in his booki
Against All Hope, a best seller in foui j
languages, has graphically recounted
those horrific experiences which befe
so many brave and honorable persons
Cuba after 1959. Valladares himself
spent 22 years in those prisons and
developed under the most savage rep
sion into a lofty example of how such
suffering can ennoble by developing i
sterling quality of character that suc-
cessfully resists all tyranny and
befriends humanity. Valladares speak
with the same quiet eloquence, the sa
persuasive force, as does his book. I
warn you that the book is not pleasan
reading. Of it, Ronald Radosh wrote i
the New York Times Book Review onj
June 8, 1986: "It has taken us 25 yea
to find out the terrible reality— Mr.
Castro has created a new despotism t
has institutionalized torture as a
mechanism of social control."
It should not have taken 25 years
The facts about Cuba were known eai
but they were greeted with incredulit
or accepted more or less as statistics
without regard for the human conditii
not only of the thousands in prison bu
of the millions who have lived more tl"
a quarter century in a country where
single will has decided and where the
leader's opponents went before the fir
ing squad, to prison, to exile, or
withdrew into themselves. The exiles,
course, can relate their experiences. Ii
Cuba, dissenters are condemned to
silence. Recently, one told a represent
tive of our Interests Section there:
"Sometimes the depression becomes
overpowering. But I realize there is
nothing I can do, so I just grit my teet
and continue with my job."
In an interview last May with
French television, Fidel Castro
reiterated again his famous doctrine
about what is permissible under his ru
To his French audience Castro declare
acceptable "criticism from within the
revolution, not from outside the revolt
tion, nor criticism to destroy the revol'
tion." Castro assured the French that
loves criticism. "I criticize myself very
harshly," he said. "I do it, and I am ve
satisfied. It is a practice I never plan b
give up. Never." This autocratic auto-
criticism presumably takes place in the
82
Department of State Bullet
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ir or in front of his mirror. Perhaps
'eatest dialogues in Cuba take place
ch occasion. We do not know their
ance. Judging by what he has been
I this year in public about life in
however, he has probably been
iding himself for too much
icy.
:ipline" as a Remedy
lastro is, in fact, having a great
if trouble with the people of Cuba.
is found that they are not working
enough, that they are guilty of
lg money by supplying products to
jpulation that are really wanted on
arket, and that they are neglecting
socialist labors to devote their time
fforts to their own affairs. He
on the Third Congress of the Com-
es for the Defense of the Revolu-
;hose ever-watchful block wardens
ban communism, to be even more
nt, to strengthen sanctions. "Other
ist countries have pretty severe
ties," Mr. Castro noted. "I read
from the Soviet Union saying that
ried and even executed someone
here. So maybe our sanctions for
who are responsible . . . undoubt-
re going to have to be a little
er." He lamented in that speech
,atins lack discipline. "What brings
3 discipline," he said, "is the
lition." He added:
at we have to get rid of that lack of
ine we still have, of corruption, of irre-
bility. so it does not turn into a cancer
>reads and allows the day to come when
me steals. That is one of the great tasks
revolution and one of the great eontra-
is of our society.
j deal with these evils and con-
tions, Castro recently counter-
ed himself, presumably after a
his session of autocriticism, and
hed the farmers free markets and
ntal markets that had recently
d a bit of encouragement for
arise in Cuba. As he put it:
stitutinns were created here which pro-
trade and capitalism— they were being
ted. The wheeler-dealers emerged.
re lazy people who do not want to
who steal. The managers who began to
he norms are to blame. The farmers
arket created a lot of millionaires. They
money with anything they put on the
t. What was happening? Well, enter-
decided to manufacture goods for the
must tell you that manufacturing
for the people is not necessarily a
in communist society and espe-
lin Cuba. It smacks of what good
communists call "consumerism," an
opprobrious epithet for what we call con-
sumer sovereignty.
Cuba's economy is. indeed, a prob-
lem. ( !uba has been rescheduling its debt
to Western countries since 1983 and has
reached the point where it cannot even
pay interest and seeks several hundred
million dollars in new money. Cuba's
chief export for convertible currency has
been a commodity scarcely found in
Cuba at all: it is the reexport of Soviet
oil. But the price of oil has fallen, and
Moscow can no longer give Cuba the
dollars which Cuba so badly needs. For
the Russians, whose annual commodity
subsidy to Havana is valued at more
than $4.5 billion per year, the Cuban
economic dilemma is disturbing. Cuba is
today doubtlessly far more egalitarian
than it was in the days of Fulgencio
Batista. There are few rich, except for
the goods and services available to the
privileged vanguard who run the coun-
try, such as the houses of those who fled
the revolution. Cuba, a country given to
the monoculture of sugar, nevertheless
rations sugar, like coffee and all basic
commodities. There is now rationing
even of beer. Only a half bottle of beer is
available per family per day. In Cuba
there is no "this Bud's for you" after a
day in the tropical sun. Maybe it is the
absence of reward that produces the
lackadaisical work ethic which Castro is
criticizing, but his remedy of discipline
and vigilance does not address the
underlying problem, and it has an
ominous sound. By the way, the Cubans
who fled his rule and settled in the
United States show no such sloth. It is,
perhaps, a matter of freedom and incen-
tive, rather than a so-called Latin lack of
discipline, that troubles Cuba.
Arrest of the Human
Rights Committee
Given the Castro regime's well-
documented treatment of its opponents,
given its growing concern over the
passive attitude of the Cuban population
and such manifestations of unrest as a
rapidly rising urban crime rate, it is not
surprising to see the authorities accen-
tuating their crackdown on what passes
for human rights activities in Cuba. This
is a country which never permits any
outside authority, whatever its
humanitarian credentials, to put a
flashlight, much less a spotlight, on
Cuba. Cuba enjoys standing in the pros-
ecutor's corner, condemning real or
imagined violations of human rights in
dozens of other countries. Its chief
so-called labor leader recently wished the
workers of Chile a prompt return to
"democracy and freedom." He did not
wish as much, of course, for Cuba. Cuba
is careful to keep its own skeletons, real
and allegorical, living and dead, well hid-
den from public scrutiny. Those who
wonder how authorities can keep people
from telling the crimes of the regime
against their own persons should read
Robert Conquest's account of the Great
Purge in the Soviet Union. There is
always another loved one who can be
punished if there is an outcry. There is
always something more one can lose.
Cuba recently arrested the remain-
ing members still at large of the
unofficial Cuban Committee on Human
Rights, a group of brave souls who have
tried valiantly with their candles to illu-
minate those dark areas which need a
spotlight. Late last month the Cuban
police arrested Elizardo Sanchez, Adolfo
Rivero Caro, and Enrique Hernandez—
the last members of this unofficial com-
mittee still at large. They had dared to
inform a Reuter correspondent in
Havana of the arrest shortly before of
two other members of the committee,
Dr. Domingo Jorge Delgado and Jose
Luis Alvarado, who have reportedly
been jailed and tortured. Sanchez is now
on a hunger strike and is suffering, as
well, the effects of brutal interrogation.
The Reuter correspondent and an Agence
France Presse correspondent were ex-
pelled from Cuba as a result.
The president of the Human Rights
Committee, Ricardo Bofill, recently took
refuge in an embassy in Havana after
these arrests and the death of a 17-year-
old boy in police custody. The boy,
Antonio Frias Sosa, had apparently
taken photographs for the committee
and had in his possession a copy of the
international human rights declaration.
Not long ago, too, the distinguished
attorney Aramis Taboada died of unex-
plained circumstances in Cuban prison.
He had defended a number of persons
accused of such unacceptable practices
as an attempt to form a free trade union
in a country which already has the only
trade union Fidel Castro says it needs.
These names are not mythical. These
persons are flesh and blood. We are in
personal contact with their relatives or
survivors of some of them. On
September 25, Amnesty International
stated its belief that the five men still
living are prisoners of conscience
arrested because of their activities in
defense of human rights. It asked its cor-
respondence list to appeal immediately
to Fidel Castro and his ministries in
Havana for their release.
~_ a r\ac?
R3
TREATIES
Because of the power of the Cuban
tate and the crushing weight of its sanc-
tion active opponents are few in
number and little known to the world,
but they are representative because they
have tried to resist the dictatorship on
behalf of their frightened fellow citizens
in a regime which decides who will have
rights and who will enjoy no rights at all.
Some come from the leftwing of the
political spectrum in Cuba; many were
associated with the so-called microfrac-
tion in the late 1960s that was accused
of being pro-Soviet. What has united
them is their recognition, even if in some
cases belated, that justice is conspicuous
by its absence in Cuba.
A Model for the Hemisphere
All of this would be cause for concern
even if the island Cuba were off in the
Java Sea. But it is 90 miles away from
our shores. The despair and shame of
Cuba do not prevent Fidel Castro from
representing it as a model for others. In
the Cuban Constitution he has inscribed
the right and— more to the point— the
"duty" of the Cuban people to support
revolutionary internationalism and wars
of national liberation. In practice this
has meant a nearly unbroken series of
interventions by Cuba from 1959 to the
present, with increasing sophistication,
employing modern weaponry and, since
the late 1970s, enjoying full Soviet
backing.
Thus this system not only prevails in
Cuba; it is intended to be replicated in
the hemisphere. In Latin America the
long reach of Fidel Castro is feared by
many and admired by a few. Why should
they admire a man who has presided
over so much grief at home and rules
over a militarized society closely aligned
with the Soviet Union? For one thing, he
has demonstrated that he knows how to
seize and hold power indefinitely. For a
second, he has sworn eternal hostility to
the United States and uses anti-
Americanism as symbolic of all of Latin
America's ills. For a third, he has
stimulated Cuba's development of its
pre-1959 strengths in health and educa-
tion and has exaggerated the gains
achieved. For a fourth, he pretends to an
egalitarianism that gives psychic comfort
to many who are bothered by the social
injustice they may see in their own coun-
try. But, most of all, he appeals to those
Latin American elite vanguardists who
wish to impose their own notions of how
society should be organized on their own
countrymen without fear of challenge.
It has been said that those who
refuse to learn from history must relive
it. We have lived 28 years with a cruel
system in Cuba that has tried irrepres-
sibly to replicate itself and which is con-
vinced that its time has now come. Not
so long ago Soviet Marshal Ogarkov said
that for many years there was only
Cuba, but now there were Nicaragua and
Grenada and a fight was going on in El
Salvador. We cannot afford to turn a
blind eye to that struggle to build a new
Latin America on the model of Fidel
Castro's Cuba. It is argued today by
some that these revolutionaries really
have democratic objectives despite over-
whelming evidence to the contrary.
What did their model say, in his day,
when he was struggling to seize power
and construct the new Cuba?
The False Prophet
On January 13, 1959, Fidel Castro told
the Cuban press:
I don't know why there are calumnies
against our revolution about it being com-
munist. I don't know how they can speak in
this manner. Is there someone who could
think we are hiding dark intentions? Is there
perhaps someone who could affirm that we
ever lied to the people? We would never pros-
titute our conscience with a lie or hypocrisy
for any reason in the world.
On April 17, 1959, he told the
National Press Club in Washington:
I have declared clearly and definitely that
we are not communists. What our revolution
seeks is to form a democracy with civil and
individual rights and political guarantees.
On May 5, 1959, in Montevideo,
Fidel Castro said:
I am among those who sincerely believe
in liberty. I am among those who believe that
each one has the right to his opinion, and if he
does not think as I do, I will discuss his
reasons, argue against his ideas, but I will not
deprive him of the right to speak according to
his conscience. The system will never deprive
anyone of his rights, imprison the intellectual,
gag the thought process for any reason in the
world.
And, finally, on May 8, 1959, in
Havana he told a large crowd of Cubans
in the Plaza de la Revolution:
All Cubans, whatever their party, will
always be respected. Freedom of thought,
freedom of association, freedom of belief, are
freedoms sacred to our revolution. Then we
say that our revolution is not communist. If
our ideas were communist, we would say so here.
And last May, when French televi-
sion asked Castro if he had not falsely
proclaimed himself a democrat in 1959,
he responded:
The United States wanted us to commit a
strategic and tactical error and proclaim a
doctrine as a communist movement. In ra
I was a communist. It would have been
premature to proclaim the Marxist-Lenini
character of the Revolution. Nevertheless
anyone who read attentively "History Wil
Absolve Me" and the Moncada program cs
appreciate that it was a socialist who guid
it and wrote those lines.
Thus spoke the false democrat, tl
true autocrat, whom the Cuban intell |
tual and original friend of the Cuban
revolution, Guillermo Cabrera Infanti
has called the only free man in Cuba.
Of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, P
Castro told the Spanish news agency
EFE last year that their strategy is
"perfect." They are true revolutionai
he said, not mere reformists or
moderates, but they will not introduc
the "socialist" (communist) character
their revolution until conditions perrr
And their strategy, he added, should
a model for other revolutionaries
elsewhere in Latin America.
You must have heard on the stret-
of St. Louis what I heard on the strei i
of St. Paul: fool me once, shame on yn
fool me twice, shame on me.
Let us put a mighty spotlight on
Cuba, not only for the sake of human
suffering there but as a service to th(
living in other countries whose fate is
challenged by the Cuban model. May
illumination of Cuba enable the sup-
porters of democracy and human rig!
in this hemisphere better to discern Ji
friend from foe and to avoid for
themselves the tragedy of the Cuban
revolution. ■
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furthera
of the principles and objectives of the Anti
tic Treaty (TIAS 4780).' Adopted at Brusa
Oct. 18, 1985. >
Notification of acceptance: South Africa*
Oct. 8, 1986.
Arbitration
Inter-American convention on internatiom
commercial arbitration. Done at Panama (
Jan. 30, 1976. Entered into force June 16,
1976.2
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Oct 9, 1986.3
Atomic Energy
Agreement concerning the transfer to I
Thailand of enriched uranium for a researi
reactor. With annexes and exchange of no
84
Department of State Bulli
TREATIES
at Vienna Sept. 30, 1986. Entered into
Sept. 30, 1986.
Vs: International Atomic Energy
by; Thailand; U.S.
on, Civil
mtion for the suppression of unlawful
if aircraft. Done at The Hague
.6, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14.
TIAS 7192.
intion for the suppression of unlawful
gainst the safety of civil aviation. Done
fitreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into
Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
sions deposited ^ emen Arab Republic
l), Sept. 30, 1986.
:ol on the authentic quadrilingual text
convention on international civil avia-
Ihicago, 1944 TIAS 1591), with annex,
at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977. '
tance deposited: Philippines, Oct. 20,
irvation
'ntion on international trade in
gered species of wild fauna and flora,
ippendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3,
Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS
cation of succession deposited: Belize,
19, 1986; effective Sept. 21, 1981.
dment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1973,
ernational trade in endangered species
i fauna and flora. Done at Bonn
!2, 1979. '
tances deposited: Belize, Aug. 19, 1986;
s, Aug. 20, 1986.
intion on wetlands of international
tance especially as waterfowl habitat,
irotocol adopted at Paris Dec. 3, 1982.
at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into
Dec. 21, 1975.2
e advice and consent to ratification:
i 1986.
lar Relations
a convention on consular relations,
at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into
Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24.
TIAS 6820.
cation of succession deposited: Saint
Aug. 27, 1986.
'ntion establishing a Customs Coopera-
ouncil, with annex. Done at Brussels
.5, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4,
for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.
sion deposited: Central African
die, July 28, 1986.
matic Relations
a convention on diplomatic relations,
at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into
Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13,
TIAS 7502.
cation of succession deposited: Saint
| Aug. 27, 1986.
Finance
Agreement concerning the international fund
for Ireland, with annexes. Done at
Washington Sept. 26, 1986. Entered into
force Sept. 26, 1986.
Parties: Ireland, U.K., U.S.
Fisheries
Protocol to amend the international conven-
tion of May 14, 1966, for the conservation of
Atlantic tunas (TIAS 6767). Done at Paris
July 10, 1984.'
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi-
dent: Sept 30, 1986.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the taking of evidence abroad
in civil or commercial matters. Done at The
Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force
Oct. 7. 1972. TIAS 7444.
! ■ ii oo'i to Anguilla by the U k . July 3,
1986.'
Inter-American convention on letters
rogatory. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 1976.
Entered into force Jan. 16, 1976. 2
Additional protocol to the Inter-American
convention on letters rogatory, with annex.
Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered
into force June 14, 1980. 2
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Oct. 9, 1986.3
Convention on the civil aspects of interna-
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1,
p.i.v:
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Oct. 9, 1986.3
Marine Pollution
Protocol relating to intervention on the high
seas in cases of pollution by substances other
than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.
Entered into force Mar. 30, 1983. TIAS
10561.
Accession deposited: Finland, Aug. 4, 1986.
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the prevention of pollution
from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17,
1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983.
Accession deposited: India, Sept. 24, 1986. 5
Maritime Matters
Convention on the International Maritime
Organization, as amended. Signed at Geneva
Mar. 6, 1984. Entered into force Mar. 17,
1958. TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606, 10374.
Acceptance deposited: Vanuatu, Oct. 21.
19S6
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.
Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009.
Accessions deposited: Egypt, Aug. 7, 1986;
Malta, Aug. 8, 1986.
Amendments to the international convention
on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720).
Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1983. '
Acceptance deposited: China, Sept. 9. 1986.
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs, as
amended. Done at New York. Mar. 30, 1961.
Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S.
June 24, 1967. TIAS 698, 8118.
Accession deposited: Qatar, Oct. 3, 1986.
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done
at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force
Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.
TIAS 9725.
Accessions deposited: Malaysia, July 22, 1986;
Somalia, Sept J. 1986
Nuclear Accidents
Convention on early notification of a nuclear
accident. Done at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986.
Open for signature at Vienna and New York
Sept. 26 and Oct. 6, 1986, respectively,
through Sept. 25, 1987.
Entered into force: Oct. 27, 1986.2
Signatures: Afghanistan, Australia. Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Belorussian S.S.R.,
Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cote
d'lvoire, Cuba, Czechoslovakia (definitive),
Denmark (definitive), Egypt, Finland, France,
German Democratic Republic, Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala,
Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Mexico,
Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nor-
way (definitive), Panama, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.,
Vatican City, Zimbabwe, Sept. 26, 1986.
Convention on assistance in the case of a
nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
Done at Vienna Sept. 26, 1986. Open for
signature at Vienna and New York Sept. 26
and Oct. 6, 1986, respectively, until its entry
into force or through Sept. 25, 1987. Enters
into force 30 days after consent to be bound
has been expressed by three states.
Signatures: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Belorussian S.S.R.,
Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cote
d'lvoire, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic
Republic, Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland,
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco,
Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Norway
(definitive), Panama, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukrain-
ian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., Vatican Ci-
ty. Zimbabwe, Sept. 27, 1986.
Nuclear Material — Physical Protection
Convention on the physical protection of
nuclear material, with annexes.
Done at Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.1
Signatures: Argentina, Feb. 28, 1986;
Ecuador, June 26, 1986; Indonesia, July 3,
1986; Spain, Apr. 7, 1986.
Ratifications deposited: Canada, Mar. 21,
1986; Mongolia, May 28, 1986; Yugoslavia,
May 14, 1986.
Pollution
Convention for the protection of the ozone
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22,
1985.'
85
TREATIES
rations deposited: Finland, Sept. 25,
1986; Norway, Sept. 23, 1986.
Protocol to the convention on long-range
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 1979
(TIAS 10541), concerning monitoring and
evaluation of the long-range transmission of
air pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with annex.
Done at Geneva Sept. 28. 1984. '
Approval deposited: Bulgaria. Sept. 26, 1986.
Kal ificatioii deposited Federal Republic of
Germany, Oct. 7, 1986.
Prisoner Transfer
Convention on the transfer of sentenced per-
sons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983.
Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824.
Signature: Ireland, Aug 20, 1986
Ratification deposited Austria, Sept 9,
1986 ;
Property-Intellectual
Convention on establishing the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970.
TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Lesotho, Aug. 18, 1986.
Satellite Communications Systems
Convention on the International Maritime
Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with
annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976.
Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
Accession deposited: German Democratic
Republic, Sept. 24, 1986.
Operating agreement on INMARSAT, with
annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976.
Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
Signature: German Democratic Republic,
Sept. 24, 1986.
Slavery
Protocol amending the slavery convention
signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926, and
annex (TS 778). Done at New York Dec. 7,
1953. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953, for the
protocol; July 7, 1955, for annex to protocol:
for the U.S. Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.
Supplementary convention on the abolition of
slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva
Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30,
L957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Accessions deposited: Mauritania, June 6,
1986.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention,
with annexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi
Nov. 6, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984;
definitivelj tor the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986.
Ratifications deposited: Benin, Zimbabwe,
July 4, 1986; Cameroon, June 17, 1986;
Equatorial Guinea, June 11, 1986; Iceland,
July 3, 1986; Philippines, July 2:',, 1986;
Romania, July 1, 1986; Venezuela, June 23,
1986.
Trade
United Nations conventi in contracts for
the international sale of goods. Hone at
Vienna Apr. 11, 1980.1
Senate ad\ ice and consent to ratification:
Oct. 9, 1986.4
Protocol for the accession of Mexico to the
general agreement on tariffs and trade. Done
at Geneva July 17, 1986. Entered into force
Aug. 24, 1986.
\cceptances depo ;ited: An I ralia, Brazil,
Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Japan, Republic
of Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Sweden,
Switzerland, U.S., Uruguay, Yugoslavia,
July 25, 1986; Colombia, Aug. 25, 1986.
Treaties
Vienna convention of the law of treaties, with
annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980. 2
Accession deposited < lerman I lemocratic
Republic, Oct 20, 1986
Wheat
Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at
London Mar. 14. 1986. Entered into force
July 1, 1986.6
Accession deposited: India. Sept. 24, 1986.
Women
Convention on the political rights of women.
Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered in-
to force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7,
1976. TIAS 8289.
Accession deposited: Angola, Sept. 17, 1986.
Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981. 2
Accession deposited: Angola, Sept. 17, 1986.
Ratification deposited: Zaire, Oct. IV. 1986
BILATERIAL
Chile
International express mail agreement with
detailed regulations. Signed at Montevideo
Sept. 8, 1986. Entered into force Sept. 26,
1986.
China
Agreement for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of tax evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with protocol and
exchange of notes. Signed at Beijing Apr. 30,
1984.
Protocol concerning the interpretation of
paragraph 7 of the protocol to the agreement
for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of tax evasion with respect to
taxes on income of Apr. 30, 1984. Signed at
Beijing May 10, 1986.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
July 24, 1986.
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi-
dent: Sept. 7, 1986.
Colombia
Agreement amending agreement of July 1
and Aug. 11, 1982 (TIAS 10543), as amended,
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-
made fiber textiles and textile products.
Effected by exchange of letters at Washi
ton Aug. 25 and 29, 1986. Entered into ft
Aug. 29, 1986; effective July 1, 1986.
Ecuador
Air transport agreement, with annexes.
Signed at Washington Sept. 26, 1986. Ei.
into force on a date to be determined in
exchange of notes that all necessary inte«
procedures have been completed by both*
parties.
France
Agreement extending the agreement of.
18, 1977, as extended (TIAS 8839), in th-
field of liquid metal-cooled fast breeder r
tors. Effected by exchange of letters at I
and Washington July 16 and Aug. 25. 19
Entered into force Aug. 25, 1986; effecti
June 8, 1986.
Federal Republic of Germany
Supplementary treaty to the treaty conci
ing extradition of June 20, 1978 (TIAS 9'
Signed at Washington Oct. 21, 1986. Enn
into force upon the exchange of instrums
of ratification.
Supplementary agreement amending the
agreement on social security of Jan. 7, 11
with supplementary administrative agre«>
ment amending the administrative agree>
of June 21, 1978 (TIAS 9542). Signed at
Washington Oct. 2, 1986. Enters into ioi
the first day of the month following the
month in which both governments have
informed each other that steps necessary
under their national statutes have been tt
Agreement extending the agreement of.
8, 1976 (TIAS 8657), in the field of liquid
metal-cooled fast breeder reactors. Effec
by exchange of letters at Bonn and
Washington Aug. 26 and Oct. 7. 1986.
Entered into force Oct. 7, 1986.
Guinea
Agreement for agricultural commodities
under food for progress, with attachment
Signed at Conakry Sept. 15, 1986. Entea
into force Sept. 15, 1986.
Honduras
Agreement amending the agreement of J
11, 1982, for the sale of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Tegucigalpa June 21,j
1985. Entered into force June 21, 1985. J
Agreement amending the agreement of B
11, 1985, for the sale of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Tegucigalpa June 21,i
1985. Entered into force June 21. 1985.
Iceland
Treaty to facilitate defense relationship, \
related memorandum of understandings.
Signed at New York Sept. 24, 1986. Ente
into force upon the exchange of instrumei
of ratification of Reykjavik.
Senate advice and consent to ratification;
8, 1986.
Instrument of ratification signed by PresJ
dent: Oct. 20, 1986.
86
DeDartment of State Bull
PRESS RELEASES
Bient amending the agreement of June
6, for tin' sale of agricultural com-
jes. Effected bj exchange of notes at
ta Sept. 18 and 22, 1986. Entered into
Sept. 22. 1986.
agreement to support the economic and
al stability of Israel. Signed at
mgton May 15, 1986. Entered into force
' 1986.
gascar
ment for agricultural commodities
food for progress, with attachments.
d at Antananarivo Aug. 13. 1986.
ed into force Aug. 13, 1986.
itius
ment amending agreement of June 3
1985, concerning trade in cotton, wool,
lanmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
Effected by exchange of notes at Port
Sept. 29 and Oct. 7, 1986. Entered into
Oct. 7. 1986; effective Apr. 1. 1986.
e 270 of International Boundary and
Commission: Recommendations for
tage treatment and disposal facilities
solution of the border sanitation prob-
t San Diego. California-Tijuana, Baja
rnia. Signed at Ciudad Juarez Apr. 30,
Entered into force July 16, 1985.
meM amending the agreement of Mar.
183 (TIAS 10675), relating to additional
rative arrangements to curb the illegal
in narcotics. Effected by exchange of
s at Mexico Aug. 25 and Sept. 29, 1986.
ed into force Sept. 29, 1986.
mbique
:ment amending the agreement of
11, 1986, for the sale of agricultural
odities. Effected by exchange of letters
puto Aug. 22, 1986. Entered into force
22, 1986.
irandum of understanding on the opera-
f storage facilities at SOAF bases, with
:es. Signed at Shaw Air Force Base and
Sept. 18, 1986. Entered into force
18. 1986.
sedes agreement of July 31 and Sept.
|85.
:ment concerning the taxation of income
contractors and subcontractors of the
na Canal Commission or U.S. Forces.
ttachments and related note. Effected
change of notes at Panama Sept. 11,
Entered into force Sept. 11, 1986.
?ome and Principe
tment incentive agreement. Effected by
inge of notes at Washington Sept. 2 1.
Entered into force Sept. 24, 1986.
South Africa
Agreement relating to air services, with
annex and exchange of notes, as amended.
Signed at Cape Town May ""., 1947. Entered
mm force May 23, 1917 TIAS 1639, 2870,
6512.
of termination given by U.S.: Oct. 8,
1986; effective Oct 10, 1987.
Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and for establishing rules of reciprocal
administrative assistance with respect to
taxes on income Signed at Pretoria Dec. 13,
1946. Entered into force July 15, 1952. TIAS
2510.
Protocol supplementing convention of Dec
13, 1946. Signed at Pretoria July 14, 1952.
Entered into force July 15, 1952. TIAS 2510
Notification of termination given hv I S
Oct 15, 1986; effective July 1, 1987\
Spain
Agreement on social security, with adminis-
trative arrangement. Signed at Madrid
Sept 30, 1986. Enters into force on the first
day of the second month following exchange
of notifications that each contracting state
has fulfilled its statutory or constitutional
requirements.
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations. Department of
State. Washington, D.C. 20520.
No Date
*192 10/1
193 10/1
'194 10/1
195 10/2
•196 10/2
•197 10/6
"198 10/3
"199 10/3
200 10 3
•201 10/6
Subject
Whitehead: interview on
ABC- TV's "Nightline,"
Sept. 30.
Shultz: interview on NBC-
TV's "Today Show."
Whitehead: interview on
CBS- TV's "The CBS
Morning News."
American Foreign Policy:
< 'urrent Documents, 19S4
released.
Shultz: remarks before
Jewish Community Rela-
tions Council. New York
City, Sept 30.
Regional Foreign Policy
i inference, Salt Lake
City, Oct. 18.
Shultz: luncheon remarks in
honor of the Latin
American and Caribbean
countries, Metropolitan
Museum of Art, New York
City, Sept. 29.
Shultz: luncheon remarks in
honor of the Cult' ( 'oopern
tion Council, New York
City, Oct. 1
Shultz: news briefing, UN
Plaza Hotel. New York
City, Oct. 2.
Advisory Committee on
Historical Diplomatic
Documentation to meet
Nov. 6-7.
Thailand
^.greemenl amending agreement of July 27
and Aug. s. Lis;; i'1'l AS 10760), as amended
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-
made fiber textiles and textile products.
Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok
Sept. 3 and Oct. 9, 198(1. Entered into force
Oct 9, 1986.
Tunisia
Agreement amending the agreement of June
1 1, 1986, for the sale of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Tunis Sept. I. 1986.
Entered into force Sept. 4, 1986.
United Kingdom
Agreement concerning the Turks and Caicos
Islands and narcotics activities, with annex
and forms. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Sept. 18, 1986.
Entered into force: Oct. 21, 1986.
■Not in force.
'Not in force for the U.S.
With reservation!.-)
•With declaration(s)
5Not bound by Optional Annexes III. IV,
and V.
''In force provisionally for the U.S. ■
202 10/6 Shultz: interview on ABC-
TV's "This Week With
David Krmkley." Oct. 5.
*203 10/7 Brunson McKinley sworn in
as U.S. Ambassador to
Haiti. Sept. 19, (biographic
datal.
204 10/7 Shultz: news conference at
White House.
"205 10/8 Shultz: interview on ABC-
TV's "Good Morning
America."
*206 10/9 Shultz: address before
members of the National
Conference on Soviet
Jewry, Oct. 8.
Shultz: interview on NBC-
TV's "Today Show."
Shultz: interview on CBS-
TV's "The CBS Morning
News."
Shultz: interview on USIA's
"Worldnet," Oct. 7.
Shultz: interview on CNN's
"I rossfire." Oct. 14.
Shultz: interview on ABC-
TV's "Nightline." Oct. 14.
Shultz: news conference on
Reykjavik meeting. Oct.
1 I.
Shultz: interview on USIA's
"Worldnet."
Shultz: news conference.
Loftleidir Hotel. Reyk-
javik. Oct. 12.
"215 10/16 Shultz: news briefing with
network anchors and col-
umnists, Oct. 14.
216 10/16 Foreign Relations of tht
United States, 1955- 1957,
Vohmu 111. ' 'hina
released.
*207
10/10
"JUS
10/14
•209
10/8
*210
10/15
•211
10/15
*212
10/15
*213
10/15
214
10/16
icmber 1986
87
PRESS RELEASES
No.
*217
Date
10/lli
•218 10/16
"219 10/17
*220
•221
*224
*225
*226
*227
10/1/
10/20
222 10/20
223 10/16
10/22
10/22
10/23
10/23
*228 10/23
•229 10/23
*230 10/23
*231 10/27
232 10/29
*233 10/29
*234 10/29
235 10/30
Subject
Appointment of U.S.
delegation chairman to
the L987 World Admini-
strative Radio Conference
for Mobil Services.
Armacost: address and
question-and-answer ses-
sion before leaders of
nongovernmental
organizations, Oct. 15.
Program for the official
visit to the U.S. of
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
of the Federal Republic of
Germany, Oct. 20-23.
Shultz, Duarte: news brief-
ing, San Salvador, Oct.
16.
Shultz; interview on
"MacNeil-Lehrer
Newshour," Oct. 17.
Shultz: interview on NBC-
TV's "Meet the Press,"
Oct. 19.
Shultz: news conference,
NATO headquarters,
Brussels, Oct. 13.
Shultz: arrival statement,
San Salvador, Oct. 17.
David Korn sworn in as
U.S. Ambassador to Togo
(biographic data).
Shultz: remarks at U.S.-
F.R.G. treaty signing
ceremony, Oct. 21.
Alexander F. Watson sworn
in as U.S. Ambassador to
Peru (biographic data).
Charles J. Pilliod, Jr. sworn
in as U.S. Ambassador to
Mexico, Oct. 21
(biographic data).
Theodore E. Gildred sworn
in as U.S. Ambassador to
Argentina, Oct. 22
(biographic data).
Everett Ellis Briggs sworn
in as U.S. Ambassador to
Honduras (biographic
data).
Donald K. Petterson sworn
in as U.S. Ambassador to
Tanzania (biographic data).
Principal Officers of the
Department of State and
United States Chiefs of
Missions, 1778-1986
released.
Ronald D. Palmer sworn in
as U.S. Ambassador to
Mauritius, Oct. 28
(biographic data).
David C. Fields sworn in as
U.S. Ambassador to the
Central African Republic
(biographic data).
Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1952-1951,,
Volume VII, Germany and
Austria released.
USUN
Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.
Subject
No.
Date
*1
1/13
*2
1/17
*3
1/22
*4
1/23
*5
*6
*7
*10
1/23
1/30
2/4
2/4
2/6
212
♦11
2/13
♦12/
Rev.l
2/13
*13
2/14
•14
2/20
*15
*16
2/20
2/20
Okun: Lebanon, Security
Council.
Byrne: Lebanon, Security
Council.
Reed: statements, Host
Country Committee.
Ellis: world economy,
Special Session of UN
Commission on Transna-
tional Corporations, Jan.
21.
Reed: economic situation in
Africa, Special UN
General Assembly Session.
Byrne: Israel, Security
Council.
U.S. and UN thank New
York City Police Depart-
ment for outstanding serv-
ices during UN 40th
anniversary.
Byrne: Palau, Trusteeship
Council.
Walters: Israeli intercept of
Libyan aircraft, Security
Council.
Morrison: Challenger con-
dolence, Committee on
Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Feb. 11.
Koun: southern Africa,
Security Council.
Morrison: space applications
and UNISPACE-82, Com-
mittee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.
Hodgkins: remote sensing,
Committee on Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space.
Nicogossian: space
biomedical research, Com-
mittee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.
USUN hosts film in celebra-
tion of Black History
Month, Feb. 24.
Morrison: space transporta-
tion systems, Committee
on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Feb. 19.
♦17 2/24
•18 2/24
*19 3/6
*20 3/12
*21 3/13
*22 3/13
*23 3/18
*24
3/21
25
3/26
•26
3/27
*27
3/31
28
4/14
29/
4/15
Rev.l
*30
4/15
*31
4/18
•32
4/18
•33/
4/21
Rev.l
34/
4/21
Rev.l
•35
4/23
36 4/24
37 4/30
*38 4/30
Reed: economic situati
Africa, Committee II
preparatory meeting
Okun: Iran-Iraq situati
Security Council.
Byrne: meeting donors
humanitarian assista
the Kampuehean peo
Walters: contributions
House Foreign Affai
Committee.
Okun: host-country res
sibilities, Host Count
Committee.
Okun: host-country res
sibilities, Host Count
Committee.
Okun: host-country res
sibilities, Host Count
Committee.
Reed: host-country res
sibilities, Host Count
Committee.
Walters: Libya, Securr
Council.
Walters: Libya, Securi
Council.
Walters: Libya, Securi;
Council.
Okun: Libya, Security-
Council.
Walters: self-defense.
Security Council.
DiMartino: children,
UNICEF.
Children at War: The C
of Afghanistan.
Okun: Libya, Security
Council.
Walters: UNIFIL renev
Security Council, Apr
Walters: Libya, Security
Council.
Reed: economic situatio
Africa, Committee IV'
preparatory meeting 1
Special Session of UNI
General Assembly.
Walters: Cuba, Security
Council.
Walters: UN financial C!
UN General Assembly
plenary.
Walters: accident at CW
nobyl atomic energy s
tion, UN General
Assembly.
'Not printed in the Bulletin.
•Not printed in the Bulletin. I
88
BLICATIONS
partment of State
single copies of the following Depart-
j of State publications are available from
Correspondence Management Division,
au of Public Affairs, Department of
i, Washington. D.C. 20520.
ident Reagan
>rt on Reykjavik. TV address to the
tion, Oct. 13, 1986 (Current Policy #875).
Significance of Reykjavik, officials of the
ite Dept. and ACDA, Oct. 14, 1986 (Cur-
it Policy #880).
Response to Africa's Food Needs (GIST,
t. 1986).
s Control
fying Nuclear Testing Limitations: Possi-
■ U.S. -Soviet Cooperation, Aug. 1986
serial Report #152).
na CSCE Followup Meeting (GIST, Oct.
86)
irtment & Foreign Service
ard a More Representative Foreign Serv-
, Under Secretary Spiers, Congressional
ick Caucus Foreign Affairs Braintrust
irkshop, Oct. 3, 1986 (Current Policy
73).
Fiscal Threat to U.S. Foreign Policy,
ider Secretary Spiers, National Council
World Affairs Organizations, Oct. 15,
36 (Curent Policy #877).
Asia
Philippines and the United States, Under
cretary Armacost, Fletcher School of
w and Diplomacy. Oct. 6, 1986 (Current
licy #876).
jpe
Soviet Relations: Background and Pros-
its, Special Assistant to the President
Ambassador Mai lurk, Chautauqua Con-
ference on U.S. Soviet Relations, Jurmala,
Latvia. Sepl 15, I9S6 (Current Policy
#870).
U.S.-Soviet Relations: ('oping With Conflicts
in the Third World, Under Secretary Anna-
cost, Institute for International Studies,
Brown University, Providence, Sept. 26,
r.isr, (Curmit Policy #879).
Human Rights
The Systematic Repression of Soviet Jews,
( MY ice Director Roger Pilon, Metrowest
Conference on Soviet Jewry, East Orange,
New Jersey, Sept. 28, 1986 (Current Policy
#878).
Middle East
Supporting U.S. Interests in the Middle East,
Assistant Secretary Murphy, Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East, House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Oct. 8, 1986
(Current Policy #874).
Pacific
The Strategic Importance of the Emerging
Pacific. Assistant Secretary Sigur, con-
ference cosponsored by Georgetown Univer-
sity Center for Strategic and International
Studies and the Pacific Islands Asso., Sept.
29, 1986 (Current Policy #871).
Refugees
U.S. Refugee Policy and Programs for FY
1987, Refugee Coordinator Moore, Subcom-
mittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy,
Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 16,
1986) and Acting Refugee Director
Funseth, House Judiciary Committee (Sept.
26, 1986) (Current Policy #872).
Western Hemisphere
A Spotlight on Cuba, Office Director Kenneth
N. Skoug, Jr., World Affairs Council, St.
Louis. Oct. 22, 1986 (Current Policy #881).
U.S.-Mexican Relations (GIST, Oct. 1986). ■
>reign Relations Volumes Released
STERN EUROPEAN SECURITY
ND INTEGRATION,
•T. 12, 1986'
Department of State on Septem-
12, 1986, released Foreign Relations
le United States, 1955-1957, Volume
Western European Security and
igration. This volume contains com-
tions on U.S. participation in NATO
rth Atlantic Treaty Organization], on
opean integration (the origins of the
imon Market), and on meetings of
European chiefs of mission.
The most important documentation
le volume concerns the changes that
occurred in the U.S. role in NATO. The
shift in Soviet policy beginning early in
1955 from confrontation with the West
to more dialogue occasioned fundamen-
tal changes in the members' conception
of the alliance, and the allies placed a
wholly new emphasis on Article 2 of the
North Atlantic Treaty, calling for non-
military cooperation among themselves.
This led to the "Three Wise Men's
Report" of late 1956. Subsequent Soviet
diplomatic moves brought the beginnings
of a change in Western strategic doc-
trine from massive retaliation toward a
more flexible response. Finally, the
launching of Sputnik in October 1957
and the failure of disarmament negotia-
tions at about the same time precipitated
an extraordinary NATO heads of
government meeting in December 1957,
to invigorate the alliance and open some
new pathways to genuine arms control.
The United States also had an impor-
tant role during this period in encourag-
ing the economic integration of Europe
culminating with the establishment of
the European Economic Community in
March 1957.
The volume presents over 640 pages
of previously classified documents on
U.S. policy toward Europe. This
authoritative official record is based
upon the files of the Department of
State, the White House, other govern-
ment agencies, and selected interviews
with participants. This volume is the
second in the Foreign Relations series to
be published for the period 1955-1957.
Foreign Relations, 1955-1957,
Volume IV, was prepared in the Office
of the Historian, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State. Copies of
Volume IV (Department of State
Publication No. 9453, GPO Stock No.
044-000-02119-6) may be purchased for
$30.00 (domestic postpaid) from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. Checks or
money orders should be made payable to
the Superintendent of Documents.
CHINA,
OCT. 16,
19862
The Department of State on October 16,
1986, released Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-1957, Volume III,
China. This volume contains documents
on U.S. policy toward China from
August 1955 through December 1957,
the period of the first ambassadorial
talks between the United States and the
People's Republic of China (P.R.C.).
The talks, held in Geneva, reestab-
lished the diplomatic contact broken in
1949 and opened a crack in the frozen
hostility which separated the two coun-
tries. Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles approached the talks as an aspect
of his efforts to contain what he saw as
the menace of mainland China. His
immediate objective was to obtain the
release of Americans imprisoned in
China, and his larger intent was to
defuse the threat to Taiwan and the off-
shore islands. The American negotiator,
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, took his
lead from Dulles and insisted throughout
the talks that Chinese compliance with
these basic U.S. objectives was an essen-
tial prerequisite to any consideration of
hfimhor 1QQK
89
PUBLICATIONS
further normalizing relations between
the two countries. The focal point of the
talks, from the American perspective,
was the discussion of a proposed agree-
ment on a mutual renunciation of force.
The Chinese viewed the talks as an
opportunity to win de facto recognition
from the United States, and they pushed
steadily for agreements on such issues as
the relaxation of trade restrictions and
the exchange of journalists which would
imply closer relations. In the end, the
Geneva talks produced no agreement
beyond an initial understanding on the
exchange of prisoners. A gap of percep-
tion and intent, as well as hostility,
separated Washington and Beijing; it
would not be overcome for another 15
years.
The volume also deals with U.S. rela-
tions with the Chinese Nationalists on
Taiwan. The Nationalists were greatly
disturbed by the ambassadorial talks, in
spite of Washington's efforts to reassure
them. Relations suffered a rude shock in
May 1957 when rioters in Taipei
attacked the U.S. Embassy after a U.S.
Army court martial acquitted a sergeant
who had killed a Chinese national.
Nevertheless, the relationship remained
close. Such U.S. leaders as Secretary
Dulles and Vice President Nixon visited
Taiwan, and U.S. military and economic
aid continued at a high level.
Foreign Relations, 1955-1957,
Volume III, comprising 673 pages of
previously classified foreign affairs
records, was prepared in the Office of
the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. This authoritative
official record is based upon the files of
the White House, the Department of
State, and other government agencies.
Volume II, which documents U.S. policy
in the Taiwan Strait crisis from January
through July 1955, was released
recently.
Copies of Volume III (Department of
State Publication No. 9451, GPO Stock
No. 044-000-02137-4) may be pur-
chased for $21.00 (domestic postpaid)
from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20402. Checks or money
orders should be made payable to the
Superintendent of Documents.
GERMANY AND AUSTRIA,
OCT. 30, 19863
The Department of State on October 30,
1986, released Foreign Relations of the
United States 1952-1954, Volume VII,
Germany and Austria. This volume docu-
ments the efforts of the United States to
achieve the elements of a peace settle-
ment in central Europe in the face of
continuing Soviet policy to perpetuate
the division of Europe between East and
West.
The most important element in this
diplomatic effort was the establishment
of a viable, democratic West Germany
that would take its place with the other
nations of Western Europe. American,
British, and French officials began
negotiations with West German leaders
in 1951 in order to work out a "contract-
ual agreement" to define relations with
the new Federal Republic of Germany in
the absence of a peace treaty. Disagree-
ments between France and other three
countries over the measures to guaran-
tee against a resurgence of German
militarism were at the foundation of
troubled negotiations in early 1952. All
of these problems were eventually
resolved at a meeting of the Western
foreign ministers at Bonn in May 1952,
and the "contractual agreements" were
signed on May 26. Although over-
shadowed by the subsequent vote of the
French Parliament against the planned
European Defense Community (EDC),
designed as a framework for a West
German defense contribution, the pro-
posed treaty arrangements with the
Federal Republic were a major step
toward a strong, independent West Ger-
many and its entry into the NATO
partnership.
The Soviet Union did not agree with
the Western allies on any measures for
the reunification of Germany or on a
state treaty confirming the independ-
ence of Austria. Representatives of the
former wartime allies met in Berlin in
January and February 1954. The
immediate stumbling block on the
reunification of Germany was the effort
by the Soviet Union to distort the con-
cept of all-German elections in an effort
to protect its client state in East Ger-
many. Negotiations for a peace treaty
with Austria failed because the Soviet
Union continued to demand indefinite
occupation of the country. The only
achievement of the conference related to
Asia, not Europe, when agreement w.
reached to convene a conference at
Geneva in April 1954 aimed at resolvi
the Korean and Indochinese conflicts.
Foreign Relations, 1952-1954,
Volume VII, which comprises 1,997
pages of previously classified foreign
affairs records, was prepared in the
Office of the Historian, Bureau of Pul
Affairs, Department of State. This
authoritative official record is based
upon the files of the White House, thi
Department of State, and other govei
ment agencies.
Copies of Volume VII (Departmei
of State Publication Nos. 9469 and 94
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02142-1) m?
be purchased for $38.00 (domestic pai
from the Superintendent of Documen
U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 20402. Checks or
money orders should be made payable
the Superintendent of Documents.
'Press release 174.
2Press release 216.
3Press release 235. I
Background Notes
This series provides brief, factual summar
of the people, history, government, econor
and foreign relations of about 170 countrie
(excluding the United States) and of select
international organizations. Recent revisio
are:
Australia (Aug. 1986)
Bulgaria (Oct. 1986)
Equatorial Guinea (Aug. 1986)
France (July 1986)
The Gambia (Oct. 1986)
Iceland (Aug. 1986)
Ireland (June 1986)
Philippines (Aug. 1986)
Index (Sept. 1986)
A free copy of the index only may be
obtained from the Correspondence Manage
ment Division, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
For about 60 Background Notes a yearj
subscription is available from the Superinte
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for
$32.00 (domestic) and $40.00 (foreign). Che
or money order, made payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accom
pany order. ■
90
Department of State Bulle
EX
?mber 1986
jme 86, No. 2117
ontrol
and Space Arms Talks Open Round
eagan) 39
nt Reagan and Genera] Secretary
.chev Meet in Reykjavik (Reagan,
z) ■' 1
Conference Held on Biological and
1 Weapons Convention (Lowitz, final
ration, U.S. documents) 40
vik: A Watershed in U.S. -Soviet Rela-
(Shultz) 22
iry's Interview on
t the Press" 29
rv's Interview on "This Week With
I Brinkley" 32
iviet Relations: Background and
>ects (Matlock) 61
rges Acceptance of Verification at
R Talks (U.S. statement) 37
NS
lie Sanctions Against South Africa
jan, message to the Congress,
age to the House of Representatives,
• to the Congress) 35
ting U.S. Interests in the Middle East
3hy) 70
?fugee Policy and Programs for FY
(Funseth, Moore) 78
\ Spotlight on Cuba (Skoug) 81
ment & Foreign Service
ical Threat to U.S. Foreign Policy
rs) 47
I a More Representative Foreign
ce (Spiers) 50
ping Countries. U.S.-Soviet Relations:
lg With Conflicts in the Third World
acost) 57
nics
nic Sanctions Against South Africa
Jan, message to the Congress,
age to the House of Representatives,
• to the Congress) 35
light on Cuba (Skoug) 81
•ategic Importance of the Emerging
ic (Sigur) 75
ting U.S. Interests in the Middle East
phy) 70
iviet Relations: Coping With Conflicts
; Third World (Armacost) 57
Supporting U.S. Interests in the
le East (Murphy) 70
ure of Soviet Espionage Agents
artment statement) 60
iviet Relations: Background and
sects (Matlock) 61
World Food Day, 1986
lamation) 66
i Rights
nic Sanctions Against South Africa
gan, message to the Congress,
age to the House of Representatives.
r to the Congress) 35
i Rights and Soviet-American Relations
Itz) 26
Pn lent Reagan and < leneral Secretary
Gorbache\ Meet in Reykjavik (Reagan,
Shultz) 1
Reykjavik: A Watershed in U.S.-Soviet Rela-
tions (Shultz) 22
Secretary's Interview on
"Meet the Press" 29
i ary's Interview on "This Week With
David -Brinkley" 32
A Spotlighl on Cuba (Skoug) 81
The Systematic Repression of Soviet Jews
(Pilon) 67
U.S Soviet Relations: Coping With Conflicts
in the Third World (Armacost) 57
Iceland
President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev Meet in Reykjavik
(Reagan, Shultz) 1
Secretary's Interview on "This Week With
David Brinkley" 32
Israel
Supporting U.S. Interests in the Middle East
(Murphy) 70
Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Peres (Peres,
Reagan) 73
Libva. Secretary's Interview on "This WTeek
With David Brinkley" 32
Marshall Islands. Compact of Free
Association With Pacific Islands
(Executive order) 74
Micronesia
Compact of Free Association With Pacific
Islands (Executive order) 74
The Strategic Importance of the Emerging
Pacific (Sigur) 75
Middle East
Secretary's Interview on
"Meet "the Press" 29
Supporting U.S. Interests in the Middle East
(Murphy) 70
Nicaraga. Secretary's Interview on "Meet
the Press" 29
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meets in the
U.K. (communique) 65
President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev Meet in Reykjavik (Reagan,
Shultz) 1
West Urges Acceptance of Verification at
MBFR Talks (U.S. statement) 37
Pacific. The Strategic Importance of the
Emerging Pacific (Sigur) 75
Palau. Compact of Free Association With
Pacific Islands (Executive order) 74
Philippines
The Philippines and the United States
(Armacost) 52
Visit of Philippines' President Aquino
(Aquino, Reagan) 55
Presidential Documents
Economic Sanctions Against South Africa
(message to the Congress, message to the
House of Representatives, letter to the
Congress) 35
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Open Round
Six 39
President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev Meet in Reykjavik (Reagan,
Shultz) 1
Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Peres (Peres,
Reagan) 73
Visit of Philippines' President Aquino
lino, Reagan) 55
World F<".d Day. 1986 (proclamation) 66
Publications
Background Notes 90
Department ..I' State 89
Fi n'eign Relations Volumes Released 89
Refugees. U.S. Refugee Policy and Programs
for FY 1987 (Funseth, Moore) 78
Science & Technology. Review Conference
Held on Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-
vention (Lowitz, final declaration, U.S.
documents) 40
South Africa
Economic Sanctions Against South Africa
(Reagan, message to the Congress,
message to the House of Representatives,
letter to the Congress) 35
Trade
The Strategic Importance of the Emerging
Pacific (Sigur) 75
U.S.-Soviet Relations: Coping With Conflicts
in the Third World (Armacost) 57
Treaties. Current Actions 84
U.S.S.R.
Departure of Soviet Espionage Agents
(Department statement) 60
Human Rights and Soviet-American Relations
(Shultz) 26
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Open Round
Six (Reagan) 39
President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev Meet in Reykjavik (Reagan,
Shultz) 1
Reykjavik: A Watershed in U.S.-Soviet Rela-
tions (Shultz) 22
Secretary's Interview on "Meet the Press" 29
Seccretary's Interview on "This Week With
David Brinkley" 32
A Spotlight on Cuba (Skoug) 81
The Strategic Importance of the Emerging
Pacific (Sigur) 75
The Systematic Repression of Soviet Jews
(Pilon) 67
U.S.-Soviet Relations: Background and Pros-
pects (Matlock) 61
U.S. -Soviet Relations: Coping With Conflicts
in the Third World (Armacost) 57
West Urges Acceptance of Verification at
MBFR Talks (U.S. statement) 37
Western Hemisphere. A Spotlight on Cuba
(Skoug) 81
\<ime Index
Aquino, Corazon C 55
Armacost. Michael II 52, 57
Funseth, Robert L 78
Lowitz, Donald S 40
Matlock, Jack F 61
i.Ioore, Jonathan 78
Murphy. Richard W 70
Peres, Shimon 73
Pilon, Roger 67
Reagan, President 1, 35, 39, 55, 66, 73
Shultz, Secretary 1, 22, 26, 29, 32
Sigur, Gaston J., Jr 75
Skoug. Kenneth N., Jr 81
Spiers, Ronald I 47, 50
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ih>iMvtmvu t
i
J>
bulletin
he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Vol. 86 / Nos. 2106-2117
Index 1986
Department of State
bulletin
Vol 86/Nos. 2106-2117
The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; se-
lected press releases issued by the
White House, the Department, and the
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other supportive material (such as maps,
charts, photographs, and graphs) are
published frequently to provide addi-
tional information on current issues but
should not necessarily be interpreted as
official U.S. policy statements.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State
BERNARD KALB
Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
SHARON R. LOTZ
Assistant Editor
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INDEX: Vol. 86, Nos. 2106-2117
kbrams, Elliott, Jan. 75, Mar. 66, 69,
Apr. 83, 84, 89, June 86, July 86, Aug. 83,
Oct. 66
Biography, Mar. 67
Vdelman, Kenneth L.. Jan. 35, 39, Mar. 28.
Aug. 47, Oct. 7
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic
Documentation, notice of meetings, PR
201, 10/6
Afghanistan (see also under Refugees): Apr.
81; Karp, Feb. 13
Soviet occupation and need for withdrawal:
Oct. 55, Feb. 16; Adelman, Aug. 48;
Armacost, June 64, 65, Dec. 59, 60, PR
218, 10/16; Karp, Feb. 4; NAC, Feb. 37;
Poindexter, Aug. 66; Reagan, Feb. 22,
87, Apr. 28, May 34, 35. Nov. 4; Shultz.
Jan. 19, 22, 25, Feb. 26, Apr. 49, July
25, Dec. 4, PR 52, 3/20, PR 209, 10/8,
PR 213, 10/15; Whitehead. Feb. 1
Chronology, Feb. 18
! General Assembly resolution 40/12:
Walters, Feb. 20; text, Feb. 21
Soviet soldier at U.S. Embassy, Kabul
(Karp), Feb. 11
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 93.
Mar. 72, June 90, Dec. 85
U.S. humanitarian relief: Armacost. June
66; Karp, Feb. 18; Peck, July 81, 84
Violations of Pakistani border (Karp),
Feb. 16
Youth, Sovietization of (Trottier), Mar. 46
Jghanistan Day, 1986 (Reagan), May 79
ifrica (see also names of individual
countries):
Economic problems: Apr. 11; Reagan, Apr.
28; Shultz, Aug. 32; Tokyo summit, July
10; Whitehead, Jan. 33
U.N. Special Session on the Critical
I Economic Situation (Shultz), Sept. 11,
32, 88, PR 120A, 5/29, PR 120B, 5/29,
PR 127, 6/11
Background, Sept. 90
Horn of Africa: May 4; Crocker, Jan. 29
Southern Africa, regional security: May 6;
(Armacost, Apr. 53; Reagan, May 35;
Shultz, Feb. 51, Mar. 15, 25, PR 37, 3/4,
PR 41, 3/13
Soviet and Cuban presence: May 2, 4;
Armacost, Apr. 53; Crocker, Jan. 29;
Reagan, May 35; Shultz, Feb. 26, 51.
Mar. 15, 26, Dec. 6
■ Sub-Saharan: Apr. 1, May 1; Crocker, July
30; Schneider, Aug. 79
Profile, Apr. 2
U.S. assistance: May 12; McPherson, Aug.
63; Murphy, July 76; Schneider. Aug.
78; Shultz, Apr. 50, Sept. 88
U.S. Trade and Investment Conference,
announcement, PR 73, 418
irican Development Bank, bilateral coopera-
tion agreement (1986), Aug. 91
agriculture (see also Wheat): McPherson,
Aug. 61
Agriculture (Co t>
Agricultural commodities, sale of, bilateral
agreements with: Bangladesh, Nov. 88;
Bolivia, July 92; Costa Rica, Feb. 94,
Mar. 73; Dominican Republic, Nov. 89;
lor, Sept. 93; Egypt, Jan. 81; El
Salvador. May 90, Oct. 7(i; Ghana.
Guatemala, Oct. 7ti; Guinea, Mar. 73;
Guyana, Nov. 89; Haiti, Sept. 93; Hon-
duras. June 91, Dec. 86; Indonesia,
Sept. 93, Dec. 87; Jamaica, Apr. 94.
Nov. 89; Kenya, Oct. 76; Liberia, July
92; Madagascar, Jan. 81, Nov. 89;
Maldives, Nov. 89; Morocco, Sept. 93,
Nov. 89; Mozambique, July 93, Oct. 76.
Dec. 87; Pakistan, Sept. 93; Peru, Nov.
89; Philippines, Sept. 94; Sierra Leone,
Aug. 93, Oct. 7(1; Sri Lanka, Jan. 81,
Apr. 94, Nov. 89; Sudan, Apr. 94;
Tunisia, Dec. 87; Yemen, Nov. 90;
Zaire, Feb. 95; Zambia, Sept. 94
Under food for progress, agreements
with: Guinea, Dec. 86; Madagascar,
Dec. 87
Agricultural overproduction: Reagan, July
10; Shultz, July 19, Sept. 29, 30, 32,
Oct. 43, 45; Tokyo economic summit,
July 10; Yeutter, Nov. 44, 46
Cooperation, bilateral agreements with:
Venezuela, Mar. 74; Zimbabwe, Apr. 94
International Fund for Agricultural
Development, agreement (1976):
Antigua and Barbuda, St. Christopher
and Nevis, June 90
International plant protection convention
(1951): Algeria, Mar. 72; Grenada, Apr.
92; Togo, July 91
Tropical timber, international agreement
(1983): Austria, May 89; Belgium, May
89; Cameroon, Mar. 73; Canada, Aug.
91; China, Sept. 92; Egypt, June 90;
Germany, Federal Republic of, June 90;
India, Luxembourg, May 89; Papua
New Guinea, Mar. 73; Spain, Aug. 91;
Trinidad and Tobago, July 92
Tropical timber resources (Negroponte),
Sept. 53
Albania, international telecommunications
convention (1982), accession, Mar. 72
Alexander, Michael, Feb. 61
Algeria (Murphy), July 80
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, June
90
Ambiguous warfare. See Low-intensity
warfare
American ideals: Reagan, Jan. 2, 4, Apr. 26,
Dec. 7. 19; Shultz. Feb. 24, 29, June 35.
Nov. 11, 12
Angola: Armacost, Apr. 53, June 64, Dec. 59;
Crocker, Apr. 59; Reagan, Apr. 28, May
34. June 27, Sept. 2, Nov. 2; Security
Council, Jan. 74; Shultz, Jan. 20, Feb. 51,
Mar. 15, 26, Apr. 50, Sept. 7; Walters,
Jan. 73; White House, May 45
Profile, Apr. 54
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 92, Dec. 86
Antarctic Treaty (1959):
Principles and objectives, recommendations
relating to furtherance (1961), (1962),
(1966), (1968), (1970), (1972), (1975),
(1977): China, Feb. 93
Antarctic Treaty (1959) (Cont'd)
Principles and objectives, recommendations
re furtherance (1981), (1983): South
Africa, July 91; Soviet Union, May 89
Principles and objectives, recommendations
re furtherance (1985), acceptance,
South Africa, Dec. 84
Antigua and Barbuda:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72. Apr.
93, June 90, 91, Oct. 76
U.S. defense facilities in Antigua, bilateral
agreement, June 91
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.): Oct.
48; Cleveland, June 74; Department,
Sept. 87; Hawke, Aug. 75; Reagan, Aug.
74; Shultz, Feb. 39, Sept. 27, 36, Oct. 43,
46, PR 161, 8/15; Segur, July 45, Dec. 77
Aquino, Corazon C, Dec. 55, 56
Arab-Israeli conflict (see also names of
individual countries): Shultz, Jan. 25,
Feb. 26, Dec. 32, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13,
PR 67. 4/1
Palestinian issues: Bush, Nov. 10; Murphy,
Dec. 70; Reagan, Mar. 12, July 13;
Shultz, Mar. 24
Peace process: Bush, Nov. 9; Dizdarevic,
Feb. 49; McPherson, Aug. 59; Murphy,
Mar. 39, June 70, 73, Dec. 70; Reagan,
Apr. 29, Sept. 80, Dec. 73; Schneider,
Aug. 77; Shultz, Jan. 20, Feb. 38. 49,
50, 51, 52, 53, Mar. 21, 24, 25, Apr. 46,
PR 127, 6/11, PR 150, 7/25
Taba issue: Reagan, Dec. 73; Shultz, Aug.
56
Arbitration:
Inter-American convention on international
commercial arbitration (1975):
Guatemala, Nov. 88; U.S., Dec. 84
Recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards (Verville), Sept. 74
Convention (1958): Canada, July 91;
Malaysia, Jan. 80; Singapore, Nov. 88
Argentina:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Aug.
91, Sept. 92, 93, Oct. 75, Dec. 85
U.S. Ambassador (Gildred), swearing in, PR
229, 10/23
Armacost, Michael H., Feb. 73, Apr. 53. May
69, June 63, 67, Sept. 61, Oct. 20. Nov.
49, Dec. 52, 57, PR 140, 6/30, PR 218.
10/16
David Jacobsen, former hostage, PR 246,
11/7
Armaments, U.S. (see also Defense and
national security):
Arms sales:
Jordan: Murphy, Mar. 39; Reagan, Feb. 89
Saudi Arabia, proposed: Department.
May 77; Murphy, June 70: Reagan,
Sept. 79; Shultz, July 26. PR 110,
5/14; White House, Aug. 71, Sept.
78,79
Binarv chemical weapons program (White
House), Oct. 37
Stinger weapon system, bilateral agreement
with Federal Republic of Germany re
dual production and sale, July 92
idex 1986
Arms control and disarmament (see also
Europe: Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament Con-
ference (CDE); Europe: Mutual and
balanced force reduction talks; and Soviet
Union: U.S. arms control negotiations):
Chemical weapons convention, proposed:
Jan. 8; Adelman, Jan. 39, 41; General
Assembly, Mar. 60; Holmes, Sept. 39;
Lowitz, Mar. 60, Dec. 41; NAC, Feb.
36, Aug. 53; Nitze, Nov. 75; Reagan,
Nov. 4, Dec. 22; Rowny, Nov. 31;
Shultz, Jan. 22, Nov. 54; White House,
Aug. 39
Elimination of all nuclear weapons, goal:
Nitze, Nov. 74; Reagan, Jan. 5, Mar. 27,
Apr. 64; Shultz, July 37, PR 11, 1/16,
PR 12, 1/16; White House, Mar. 27
Asia (see also names of individual countries):
Armacost, June 68; McPherson, Aug. 63;
Reagan, Apr. 29; Sigur, July 42
East Asia-Pacific-U.S. relations (Sigur),
Nov. 39
South Asian Association of Regional
Cooperation (SAARC): Oct. 55; Peck,
July 82; Shultz, PR 48, 3/18
Soviet interests: Armacost, Oct. 21; Monjo,
July 54, 60; Shultz, July 17, Sept. 26,
35, 37, Oct. 46, PR 181, 9/16; Sigur,
July 46, Dec. 76
U.S. trade and investment (Shultz), PR 26,
2/19
Asian Development Bank, articles of
agreement, 1965: China, Spain, Oct. 75
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN): Armacost, June 68; Monjo,
July 59; Reagan, Apr. 28; Shultz, Apr. 48,
Sept. 28, 30, PR 40, 3/13, PR 48, 3/18, PR
135, 6/24, PR 136, 6/25, PR 137, 6/25;
Sigur, Nov. 40; Walters, Mar. 58
Economic issues (Shultz), Sept. 25, 30, 31,
36
Ministerial meeting. May 1: Reagan, July
15, Shultz, July 16
Australia (see also ANZUS): Shultz, Apr. 48
America's Cup (Shultz), PR 161, 8/15
Ministerial talks with U.S. officials, joint
press conference, joint statement:
Beasley, Oct. 45; Hayden, Oct. 44;
Shultz, Oct. 43, 44; Weinberger, Oct. 45
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, 73,
Apr. 94, May 89, Sept. 91, 92, 93, Oct.
76, Dec. 85, 86
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Hawke:
Hawke, Reagan, Aug. 74
Program, PR 78, 4/15
Austria:
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1951,, Volume VII, Germany and
Austria, released, Dec. 90
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Apr.
93, 94, May 89, Sept. 93, Nov. 88, Dec.
85,86
Aviation:
Air services, bilateral agreements with:
Greece, July 92; South Africa (U.S. ter-
mination), Dec. 87; U.K., Jan. 81, Feb.
95
Air service transit agreement, international
(1944), Guyana, July 91
Aviation (Cont'd)
Air transport, bilateral agreements with:
Czechoslovakia, June 91; Dominican
Republic, Nov. 89; Ecuador, Dec. 86; El
Salvador, Feb. 94; Hungary, May 90;
Indonesia, Aug. 92; Luxembourg, Nov.
89; Mexico, Feb. 95; Netherlands, Sept.
93; Soviet Union, Apr. 94
Air transport services, bilateral agreements
with: Argentina, Jan. 80; Philippines,
June 91; Venezuela, Jan. 81, Feb. 95,
July 93
Civil aviation system, bilateral agreements
with: Colombia, June 91; Ecuador, July
92
International civil aviation convention
(1944), protocol on authentic quad-
rilingual text (1977), Philippines, Dec.
85
Northern Pacific air safety, Jan. 10
Offensive and certain other acts committed
on board aircraft, convention (1963),
Antigua and Barbuda, Mar. 72
Preinspection in Ireland of passengers and
aircraft crew, bilateral agreement,
Sept. 93
Recognition, international, of rights in air-
craft, convention (1948): Grenada,
Portugal, Uruguay, Mar. 72
Soviet air services: Jan. 10; Department,
Jan. 58; Whitehead, PR 23, 2/14
Suppression of unlawful acts against safety
of civil aviation, convention (1971):
Brunei, July 91; Yemen Arab Republic,
Dec. 85
Suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft,
convention (1970): Brunei, July 91;
Yemen Arab Republic, Dec. 85
Swissair, deregulation, bilateral agreement
with Switzerland, PR 155, 8/4
Technical aviation assistance and services,
bilateral agreement with Oman, Feb. 95
Technical cooperation in civil aviation,
bilateral agreement with China, June 91
Transborder services, bilateral agreement
with Canada, June 91
United Airlines service, bilateral agreement
with Japan, PR 16, 1/25
Azcona Hoyo, Jose Simon, Aug. 87
B
Bacon House dedication (Shultz), PR 117,
5/28
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons, Conference on Prohibition of
(1972), review conference, Geneva
(Lowitz), Dec. 40, 41
Final declaration, Dec. 41
U.S. background document and technical
paper, Dec. 44
Bahamas, prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected
persons, including diplomatic agents
(1973), accession, Sept. 92
Bahrain:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 93, 94,
Mar. 72, Apr. 93, June 90
Visit of Vice President Bush, June 29
Baker, James A., Ill, July 61
Balance of payments, U.S.: Baker, July 61;
McMinn, Oct. 32; Sigur, Nov. 40; Yeutter, ,
Nov. 45
Baldrige, Malcolm, Feb. 42, June 42
Baltic Freedom Day, 1986, proclamation
(Reagan), Aug. 57
Bangladesh (Peck), July 81, 84
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 92, May
89, June 91, Sept. 93, Nov. 88
Barbados, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94,
May 90, Sept. 92, Oct. 76
Barry, Robert L., Apr. 65, Nov. 25
Bartholomew, Reginald, swearing in as
Ambassador to Spain, PR 164, 8/26
Beazley, Kim, Oct. 45
Belgium, treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 94,
May 89, Sept. 92, 93, Oct. 76, Dec. 85
Belize: Apr. 81; Thomas, Apr. 80
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Apr.
93, May 89, Dec. 85
Bell, Griffin B., Feb. 57
Benedick, Richard E., June 55, 58, Sept. 55
Benin, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 93, 94,
Sept. 91, 92, Oct. 76, Dec. 86
Benton, Nelson, Nov. 73
Berlin: Department, Sept. 59; NAC, Feb. 37,
Aug. 53; Reagan, Oct. 4; Ridgway, Sept.
60; Shultz, Feb. 29, 44, 46, July 25
Berlin Wall, 25th anniversary (Reagan),
Oct. 35
Bieber, Owen F., Feb. 57
Bill of Rights Day, 1985, proclamation
(Reagan), Feb. 88
Biya, Paul, May 49
Black History Month (Shultz), PR 21, 2/4
Blacken, John D., swearing in as Ambassador
to Guinea-Bissau, PR 139, 6/30
Blackwill, Robert D., Feb. 62, 63
Bolivia: Apr. 81; Abrams, July 89; Thomas,
Apr. 79; Wrobleski, Aug. 73
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, 73,
July 92, Sept. 93
Borg, Parker W., Aug. 8
Botswana (Crocker), July 33
Treaties, agreements, etc., Sept. 92, Nov.
88
Brazil (Wendt), June 53
Profile, Nov. 85
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, Mar.
72, 73, Apr. 93, 94, May 89, June 90,
July 92, Sept. 92, Nov. 88, Dec. 85, 86
U.S. Ambassador (Shlaudeman), swearing
in, PR 171, 9/8
U.S. relations, Nov. 86
U.S. visit of President Sarney: Reagan,
Sarney, Nov. 84
Program, PR 168, 9/8
Briggs, Everett Ellis, swearing in as Am-
bassador to Honduras, PR 230, 10/23
Brinkley, David, Jan. 20, Dec. 32
Brunei (Shultz), PR 136, 6/25; PR 137, 6/25
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, July 91 |
Bulgaria: Reagan, Feb. 87; Schifter, Jan. 66
Treaties, agreements, etc., Sept. 92, Oct.
76, Dec. 85, 86
Burkina Faso, protection of ozone layer, con-
vention (1985), signature, Apr. 93
Burma: Apr. 81; Monjo, July 59; Schneider,
Aug. 79; Wrobleski, Aug. 73
Burundi, U.S. Ambassador (Phillips), swear-
ing in, PR 241, 11/4
Department of State Bulletin
I Bush, George, visits to:
Canada, Sept. 24
| Guatemala and Honduras, Apr. 31
Middle East, Nov. 9
Persian Gulf, June 27
Portugal, June 32
Tunisia, June 32
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
treaties, agreements, etc., June 90, July
92, Dec. 85
Cambodia. See Kampuchea
Cameroon:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, Apr.
93, 94, Sept. 93, Dec. 86
U.S. visit of President Biya: Biya, May 49,
Reagan, May 48
Program, PR 29, 2/24
Canada:
Acid rain. See under Environmental prob-
lems and control
Civil emergency planning and management,
bilateral agreement, July 92
Naval ships and aircraft, exchange of fuel,
bilateral agreement, Oct. 76
NORAD renewal, proposed: Clark, Jan. 45;
Reagan, May 57
Radio broadcasting and equipment, notifica-
tions of termination of certain
agreements with U.S., Jan. 80
St. Lawrence Seaway tolls, bilateral agree-
ment amending and supplementing
1959 agreement, July 92, Sept. 93
Strait of Georgia torpedo test range and
Jarvis Inlet advanced underwater
acoustic measurement system, bilateral
agreement, Aug. 92
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Mar.
72, 73, Apr. 93, May 89, 90, June 91,
July 91, 92, Aug. 91, 92, Sept. 92, 93,
Oct. 76, Nov. 88, 89, Dec. 85
U.S. trade negotiations: Clark, Jan. 43;
McMinn, Oct. 33; Reagan, Mar. 10, Apr.
27; Shultz, Jan. 42, 43, Aug. 57, PR 49,
3/18, PR 92, 4/24, PR 127, 6/11
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Mulroney:
Reagan, Mulroney, May 57
Program, PR 42, 3/14
Visit of Secretary Shultz, Jan. 42
Visit of Vice President Bush (Bush), Sept.
24
Cape Verde:
Protocol to amend international convention
(1966) for conservation of Atlantic
tunas, acceptance, July 91
U.S. Ambassador (Penner), swearing in, PR
138, 6/27
Lord Carrington, Jan. 14
Cary, Frank T., Feb. 57
Central African Republic (Crocker), July 33
Treaties, agreements, etc., Oct. 76, Dec. 85
U.S. Ambassador (Fields), swearing in, PR
234, 10/29
Chad: May 5; Crocker, July 33
International telecommunications conven-
tion (1982), accession, Mar. 72
U.S. assistance: Department, May 49;
Schneider, Aug. 78
Chautauqua organization: Shultz, Nov. 51;
Whitehead, Nov. 53
Chemical and antipersonnel weapons use:
Adelman, Jan. 39; Karp, Feb, 5, 6; Shultz,
Jan. 25; Walters, Feb. 20; Whitehead,
Feb. 1
Chile: Abrams, Mar. 69, Oct. 66; Reagan,
Feb. 87; Schifter, Oct. 62
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, Apr.
93, May 89, 90, June 90, July 91, Dec,
85,86
China, People's Republic of: Karp, Feb. 17;
Shultz, Sept. 35, PR 127, 6/11
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume II, China, released,
Oct. 78
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume HI, China, released,
Dec. 89
Nuclear cooperation, agreement with U.S.
(Reagan), Feb. 75
Southeast Asia, role (Shultz), July 17
Taiwan: Lilley. Aug. 51; Yeutter, May 65
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Feb. 93,
94, Mar. 72, 73, Apr. 93, 94, May 90,
June 91, Sept. 92, Oct. 75, Nov. 89,
Dec. 85, 86
U.S. Ambassador (Lord), Sept. 48
U.S. military cooperation (Lilley), Aug. 50
U.S. relations (Lord), Sept. 48
Christmas tree lighting ceremony (Shultz),
PR 262, 12/17
Clark, Joseph, Jan. 43, 44, 45, 46
Cleveland, Paul M., June 74
Biography, June 75
Coffee, international agreement (1983):
Wallis, Apr. 73
Current actions, Zaire, Jan. 80
Coleman, William T„ Jr., Feb. 57
Collective security (see also North Atlantic
Treaty Organization): Poindexter, Aug.
64; Shultz, July 26
Colombia: Apr. 81; Abrams, Mar. 68, July 89;
Shultz, Feb. 32, 43, 49; Thomas, Apr. 77;
Wrobleski, Aug. 72
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 72, 73,
May 90, June 90, 91, July 92, Aug. 91,
Oct. 76, Nov. 89, Dec. 86
Commodities and commodity trade (see also
names of commodities): Shultz, Sept. 25;
Wallis, Apr. 71
Common Fund agreement (1980): Angola,
Apr. 92; Colombia, June 90; Djibouti,
Mar. 72; Uruguay, May 89; Yemen
(Aden), June 90; Yemen (Sanaa), Mar. 72
Comoros, treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 93
Congo, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94,
Sept. 92
Congress, U.S.:
Executive-Congressional relations (see also
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings): Adelman,
Jan. 39; Armacost, PR 218, 10/16,
Reagan, Nov. 8, Ridgway, Feb. 76;
Shultz, Dec. 3; White House, Dec. 8
Joint Resolutions:
Compact of Free Association for Marshall
Islands and Micronesia, PR 10, 1/14
Compact of Free Association for Palau:
PR 10, 1/14; Reagan, June 78
Legislation:
China, nuclear cooperation agreement
(Reagan), Feb. 75
Congress, U.S. (Caul 'tli
Legislation (Coul '<h
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings: Armacost, Oct.
21, PR 140, 6/30; Keyes, Aug. 80;
McMinn, Oct. 34; Purcell, Oct. 49, 51;
Reagan, Apr. 28; Shultz, Feb. 41. 42,
Apr. 41, 45, Nov. 16; Spiers, Sept. 44;
Wallis, Mar. 35; Yeutter, May 68
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiter-
rorism Act of 1986 (Reagan), Apr. 29,
Oct. 58
Philippines, supplementary aid FY 86:
Armacost, Dec. 54; Monjo, July 50,
54; Reagan, Dec. 56; Schneider, Aug.
78; Shultz, Apr. 48, July 20, 21, Aug.
29, Sept. 27, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13,
PR 108, 5/13, PR 110, 5/14; White
House, July 50
South Africa, punitive sanctions (veto):
Crocker, July 27; Reagan, Dec. 35, 36;
Shultz, Nov. 13, 65
Textile trade (vetoed): Reagan, Oct. 6;
Shultz, Feb. 42, Sept. 28
Legislation, proposed:
Angola, aid to freedom fighters (Shultz).
Jan. 20
Antitrust reform (Reagan), Apr. 26
Arms Export Control Act amendments
(Murphy), Dec. 72
Chile, loan review (Abrams), Oct. 69
Counter-terrorism: Oakley, Aug. 8;
Reagan, Apr. 29
Defense budget. See under Defense and
national security
Diplomatic security measures: Shultz,
Apr. 42, 46; Spiers. Jan. 47
Farm program (Reagan), Apr. 27
Foreign assistance FY 1987: Abrams,
July 86; Crocker, July 30; Keyes, Aug.
80; McPherson, Aug. 59; Monjo. July
54; Murphy, July 76; Peck, July 81;
Schneider, Aug. 77; Shultz, Apr. 42,
45, July 30, Nov. 13, 16, PR 37, 3/4,
PR 41, 3/13; Spiers, Dec. 47;
Whitehead, Oct. 19; Wrobleski, Aug.
72
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
amendments (Verville), Sept. 73
Nicaragua, aid to Contras: Abrams, Apr.
83; Poindexter, Aug. 65; Reagan,
Apr. 28, May 28, 81, 84, 87, June 24,
Aug. 17, Oct. 2, Nov. 8; Shultz, Feb.
51, 52, Apr. 32, May 37. PR 48, 3/18,
PR 50, 3/19, PR 77A, 4/16, PR 127,
6/11
Northern Ireland and Ireland Assistance
Act of 1986 (Reagan), May 73
Nuclear testing limitations (Reagan), May
53,54
Presidential Commission on POW/MIA
Issue (Monjo), May 64
Saudi Arabia, arms sales to (vetoed):
Department, May 77; Murphy, June
71: Reagan, Sept. 79: Shultz, July 26.
PR 110, 5/14; White House, Aug. 71,
Sept. 78, 79
Security assistance FY 1987 (Shultz),
Apr. 42, 45, 46, PR 37. 3/4, PR 41.
3/13
Tax and investment incentives for Carib-
bean area (Reagan), Apr. 24
Index 1986
Congress, U.S. (Cont'd)
Legislation, proposed (Con I 'd)
Trade bills: Armacost, PR 140, 6/30;
Baker, July 64; McMinn, Oct. 32;
Reagan. Apr. 27; Shultz, Jan. 44, 45;
Sigur, Nov. 40
Senate advice and consent:
Bern convention for protection of literary
and artistic works, 1986, as revised
and amended, Sept. 91
Conservation of Atlantic tunas, protocol
(1984) to international convention
(1966), Oct. 75
Double taxation, bilateral agreements
with: Barbados, Feb. 94; Italy, Feb.
95
Extradition treaty with U.N., supplemen-
tary treaty: Sept. 94; Reagan, Sept.
23
Genocide convention (1948), May 89
Investment, reciprocal encouragement
and protection, bilateral treaties with:
Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt,
Grenada, Sept. 93
Labor conventions (#144) and (#147), June
90
Ozone layer protection convention (1985),
ratification: Sept. 92; Benedick. June
58; Negroponte, June 59
Supplementary Extradition Treaty with
U.K.: Poindexter, Aug. 67; Reagan,
Apr. 29, Sept. 23
Telecommunications, international con-
vention (1982), Mar. 72
Wetlands of international importance as
waterfowl habitat, convention (1971)
with 1982 protocol, Sept. 91
Conservation:
Antarctic fauna and flora, convention for
conservation (1964), China, Feb. 93
Antarctic marine living resources, conven-
tion (1980): Brazil, Nov. 88; Korea,
Republic of, Oct. 75; Spain, Sweden,
Nov. 88
Endangered species of wild fauna and flora,
international trade in, convention
(1973): Keyes, Aug. 83
Current actions: Afghanistan, June 90;
Belize, Dec. 85; Somalia, June 90;
Spain, Sept. 91
1979 amendment: Australia, Sept. 91;
Belize, Dec. 85; Brazil, June 90;
Cyprus, Dec. 85
1983 amendment: Brazil, Chile, Italy,
U.K., June 90
Wetlands of international importance
especially as waterfowl habitat (1971),
with protocol, U.S., Sept. 91, Dec. 85
Constable, Elinor G., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Kenya, PR 242, 11/5
Consular relations:
Netherlands, convention (1855) re consuls in
colonies, termination, Aug. 92
Vienna convention (1967): Netherlands,
Mar. 72; St. Lucia, Dec. 85; Yemen
(Sanaa), July 91
Optional protocol, Netherlands, Mar. 72
Copyright, Bern convention for protection of
literary and artistic works, 1986, as
revised and amended, U.S., Sept. 91
Costa Rica: Abrams, July 89; McPherson,
Aug. 60; Walters, Oct. 59
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, Mar.
73, Apr. 94, June 90, Aug. 92, Sept. 91,
93, Dec. 85
U.S. visit of President Arias, program, PR
255, 12/2
Crocker, Chester A., Jan. 29, Feb. 54, Apr.
59, May 44, July 27, 30
Cuba: Reagan, Feb. 87; Skoug, Dec. 81
Political prisoners, release and arrival in
U.S. (Department), Nov. 87
Soviet/Cuban military activities. See under
Africa and Nicaragua
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, June
90, Sept. 92, 93, Dec. 85
U.S. migration and embargo measures,
changes in (Department), Nov. 86
Cultural relations:
Cultural property, means of prohibiting and
preventing illicit import, export, and
transfer of ownership, convention
(1970): Portugal, Spain, May 89
Educational, cultural, scientific,
technological fields, exchanges and
cooperation, bilateral agreement with
Soviet Union, Feb. 95
Educational, scientific, and cultural
materials, importation, UNESCO agree-
ment (1950), protocol (1976), France,
Apr. 92
Transfer of certain works of art seized at
the end of World War II, bilateral
agreement with the Federal Republic of
Germany, Mar. 73
Customs:
Containers, customs convention (1972),
China, Apr. 93
Customs Cooperation Council, with annex
(1950), Central African Republic, Dec.
85
Safe containers (CSC), international con-
vention (1972): Benin, Honduras,
Portugal, Feb. 93; U.K., extension to
Bermuda, July 91
TIR carnets, international transport of
goods under, customs convention
(1975), Jordan, Mar. 72
Cyprus:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, Sept.
92, Nov. 88, Dec. 85
U.S. reports to Congress (Reagan), Feb, 78,
June 66, Aug. 54, Oct. 35, Nov. 76
Czechoslovakia (Schifter), Jan. 66
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, June
91, Nov. 89, Dec. 85
D
Debts, consolidation, and rescheduling:
Bilateral agreements: Argentina, Aug. 91;
Central African Republic, Oct. 76;
Chile, May 90; Costa Rica, Apr. 94;
Dominican Republic, June 91; Ecuador,
Ivory Coast, May 90; Jamaica,
Madagascar, Jan. 81; Morocco, May 90;
Niger, Aug. 92; Panama, Oct. 76;
Poland, Nov. 80; Zaire, Mar. 74; Zam-
bia, Nov. 90
Multiyear rescheduling, bilateral agreement
with Yugoslavia (Shultz), Feb. 48
De Clercq, Jacques, Feb. 42
Defense and national security: Adelman, Jan.
38; Armacost, June 68; Nitze, Apr. 61;
Reagan, Apr. 18; Shultz, Feb. 25, Dec. 25
Wallis, Mar. 34
Ascension Island facilities, construction
costs, bilateral agreement with U.K.,
Jan. 81
Budget: Reagan, Apr. 20, 25, 27, Oct. 1,
Nov. 8; Rowny, Nov. 31; Shultz, PR
131, 6/17
Classified information leaks: Adelman, Jan
36; Shultz, Jan. 21, Aug. 35, PR 110,
5/14
Strategic Defense Initiative: Oct. 11;
Adelman, Jan. 41, Mar. 29, Aug. 49,
Oct. 8; Armacost, June 68; Holmes,
Sept, 39; NATO, Jan. 61; Nitze, Feb.
59, Apr. 61, May 51, 55, Aug. 44, Nov.
75; Reagan, Jan. 2, 14, Feb. 23, Mar.
11, Apr. 20, 21, 28, Sept. 22, Oct. 1,
Dec. 18, 20; Shultz, Jan. 12, 21, 28, 45, ,]
58, Feb. 25, 39, Sept. 26, Dec. 2, 3, 9,
12, 13, 15, 22, 23, 33, PR 14, 1/17, PR
125, 6/5, PR 213, 10/15, PR 215, 10/16, 1
PR 221, 10/20; White House, Aug. 43
Funding: Reagan, Apr. 21, Aug. 36, Nov.
8; Rowny, Nov. 31; White House,
Sept. 81
U.S. -West Germany cooperation (Defense
Department), May 78
Strategic modernization: Oct. 11; Adelman,
Jan. 35; Holmes, Sept. 42; Reagan, Feb.
23, Apr. 19, Aug. 17, 18, 36, Oct. 10,
Nov. 9; Ridgway, Sept. 58; Shultz, Aug.
32, Dec. 23; White House, Aug. 38, 41,
42, Sept. 81
Surface effect ship 200, cooperative study
memorandum of understanding (1986):
Canada, France, Federal Republic of
Germany. Spain, U.K., U.S., May 89
De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel, Oct. 65
Dellenback, John R., Feb. 57
Delors, Jacques, Feb. 40, 42, 43
Democracy and democratic principles:
Abrams, Aug. 83; Reagan, May 33;
Shultz, Feb. 27, 32, June 35, July 25, 26,
Aug. 19, Nov. 12, 13, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41,
3/13, PR 48, 3/18, PR 127, 6/11, PR 131,
6/17; Sigur, July 44
National Endowment for Democracy
(Reagan), Apr. 29
Denmark, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72,
July 92, Sept. 92, 93, Dec. 85
Derwinski, Edward J., Nov. 77
Developing countries (see also Foreign aid,
U.S.; Trade: Free trade and antiprotec-
tionism; and names of individual coun-
tries): Armacost, Dec. 56; Baker, July 61;
Delors, Feb. 41; OECD, June 46; Reagan,
July 10; Shultz, Feb. 27, 32, July 19, Nov.
12, PR 125, 6/5; Tokyo economic summit,
July 4, 8, 10; Yeutter, Nov. 46
Debt problems: Abrams, July 86, 90;
Armacost, PR 218, 10/16; Baker, July
61; Crocker, July 30; Poindexter, Aug.
66; Reagan, Apr. 27, July 11; Shultz,
Apr. 51, July 2, Sept. 32; Tokyo
economic summit, July 9; Wallis, July
66; Yeutter, May 68
Department of State Bulletin
Dickson, Bobby Joe (Whitehead), PR 97, 5/5
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention
(1961): St. Lucia, Dec. 85; Yemen (Sana;.),
July 91
Dizdarevic, Raif, Feb. 47, 48, 49
Djibouti (Crocker), Jan. 29
Common Fund for Commodities (1980),
ratification. Mar. 72
Dominica, international convention against
taking of hostages (1979), accession, Nov.
88
Dominican Republic: Abrams, July 90;
Schneider, Aug. 78
Inauguration of President Balaguer
(Shultz), PR 163, 8/18
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, June
91, Oct. 76, Nov. 89
Donaldson, Sam, Jan. 20. Dec. 32
Double taxation, avoidance of:
Bilateral agreements with: Barbados, Feb.
94, May 90, PR 34, 2/28; China, Dec.
86; Cyprus, Feb. 94; Germany, Federal
Republic of, Sept. 93; Italy, Feb. 95;
Jamaica, Aug. 92; South Africa (U.S.
termination), Dec. 87; Tunisia, May 91
Income and property taxes, bilateral agree-
ment with France, Jan. 81
Social security, bilateral agreement with
Italy, Feb. 95
U.S. contractors and subcontractors of
Panama Canal Commission or U.S.
Forces, bilateral agreement with
Panama, Dec. 87
Dougan, Diana Lady (quoted), Nov. 86
Drugs, narcotic: Oct. 55; Abrams, July 91;
Peck, July 83; Shultz, Sept. 36, PR 198,
10/3; Tokyo economic summit, July 4;
Whitehead, Oct. 37
Cayman Islands and narcotics activities,
bilateral agreement with U.K., Feb. 95,
Aug. 92
Control of production and traffic, bilateral
agreement with Mexico, Mar. 74, July
93, Dec. 87
FY 1987 assistance requests (Wrobleski),
Aug. 72
International control cooperation, bilateral
agreement with Dominican Republic,
Feb. 94
Latin America, control efforts: Shultz, Feb.
32, Julv 25, PR 158, 8/11; Thomas, Apr.
77; Whitehead, Oct. 37; Wrobleski, Aug.
72
Psychotropic substances, convention (1971):
Malaysia, Somalia, Dec. 85; U.K., July
91
Single convention (1961), protocol (1972):
Qatar, Dec. 85; Venezuela, Mar. 72
Southwest Asia (Wrobleski), Sept. 82
Strategy Report for 1985, Apr. 80
Terrorism, link to: Abrams, Mar. 67, Apr.
89, July 86, 89, Aug. 84; Oakley, Aug.
3; Shultz, Sept. 30
Turks and Caicos Islands and narcotics
activities, agreement with U.K., Nov.
90, Dec. 87
E
Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Feb. 57
East-West relations: Armacost, May 69
Harry, Apr. 65; NAC, Feb. 36, Aug
Reagan, Feb. 60; Shultz, Feb. 27, 29. 37,
4 1, 17, Aug. 56, Sept. 33
I Iconomy, domestic: Reagan, Nov. 6; Shultz,
Sept. 32, Nov. 11, Dec. 23, PR 127, 6/11;
Wallis, Mar. 33, July 65
Budget, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legisla-
tion, effect: Nitze, Apr. 61; Shultz, Feb.
41, 42, 47, Apr. 41, 45, Sept. 33; Wallis,
Mar. 35; Yeutter, May 68
Tax reform: Baker, July 61; McMinn, Oct.
34; Reagan, July 13; Shultz, Sept. 33
Trade deficit: Wallis, Mar. 33; Yeutter, May
67
Economy, world (see also Developing coun-
tries' and Trade): Armacost, PR 218,
10/16; Baker, July 61; Delors, Feb. 40;
OECD, June 44; Reagan, Apr. 27, Nov. 5;
Shultz, Feb. 27, Apr. 40, 50, Nov. 12, PR
198, 10/3; Wallis, Jan. 54, June 48
Exchange markets: Baker, July 61; Shultz,
PR 91, 4/23, PR 92, 4/24
Group of Five meeting: Delors, Feb. 41,
43; Shultz, Feb. 43
Oil prices (Reagan), June 26
Privatization, international conference
(Shultz), PR 24, 2/18
Tokyo summit meeting: Armacost, Sept. 62;
Baker, July 62; Reagan, Apr. 27, July
10; Shultz, July 1, 5, Sept. 25, 32. PR
92, 4/24, PR 125, 6/5; Wallis, June 48,
July 64
Summit declaration and joint statements,
texts, July 3, 4, 5, 8
Ecuador: Apr. 81; Abrams, July 89; Thomas,
Apr. 79; Wendt, June 52
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, May
90, July 92, Sept. 92, 93, Dec. 85, 86
U.S. visit of President Febres-Cordero:
Febres-Cordero, Mar. 64; Reagan, Mar.
63
Program, PR 3, 1/9
Educational, cultural, scientific, technological
exchanges and cooperation, bilateral
agreement with Soviet Union, Feb. 95
Egypt:
Aswan High Dam Hydroelectric Power Sta-
tion, bilateral agreement, amendment,
July 92
Cash transfer, bilateral agreement, July 92
Economic programs: Murphy, Dec. 70;
Shultz, Apr. 47, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41,
3/13, PR 67, 4/1
Taba border dispute (Murphy), Mar. 40
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Feb. 94,
Mar. 72, Apr. 94, May 89, 90, June 90,
July 92, Aug. 91, Sept. 92, 93, Nov. 88,
Dec. 85
U.S. economic and security assistance,
appropriations requests: Murphy, July
76; Schneider, Aug. 78; Shultz, Apr. 47
Visit of Vice President Bush (Bush), Nov. 3
El Salvador: Abrams, July 87; Reagan, Feb.
87, May 35, Sept. 20; Shultz, PR 48, 3/18;
Walters, Oct. 58
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, Mar.
72, May 90, Oct. 76
Employment of dependents of official govern-
n,i nt employees, bilateral agreements
with: Honduras, Feb. 94; Israel, Jan. SI
Energy resources and trade (see also Nuclear
rgy):
Geothermal energy, bilateral agreement
with Mexico, June 91
Oil prices; Reagan, June 26; Shultz, Sept.
32; Tokyo economic summit, July 10;
Wallis, Apr. 72, July 66; Wendt, June
51; Yeutter, May 68
Research and development, cooperation,
bilateral agreements: Finland, Italy,
Mar. 73; Spain, Aug. 92
Strategic petroleum reserve (White House),
Oct. 34
U.S. national policy (Wendt), June 51
Environmental problems and control (see also
Oil pollution): Tokyo economic summit,
July 10
Acid rain: Benedick, Sept. 55; Mulroney,
May 57; Reagan, May 57; White House,
May 58
Environmental affairs, cooperation in,
bilateral agreement with U.K., Sept. 94
Environmental protection, bilateral agree-
ment with Nigeria, July 93
Intervention on the high seas in cases of
pollution by substances other than oil,
protocol (1973): Finland, Dec. 85;
France, Apr. 93
Long-range transboundary air pollution,
convention (1979), Netherlands, Jan. 80
Protocol (1984): Bulgaria, Dec. 86;
Canada, Apr. 93; Denmark, July 92;
European Economic Community, Oct.
75; Finland, Sept. 92; Germany,
Federal Republic of, Dec. 86; Turkey,
Apr. 93
Marine environment (Negroponte), Sept. 86
Multilateral development banks project
planning, integration (Negroponte),
Sept. 53
Ozone layer, protection, convention (1985):
Burkina Faso, Apr. 93; Byelorussian
S.S.R., Canada, Sept. 92; Finland, Dec.
85; Morocco, Apr. 93; New Zealand.
June 90; Norway, Dec. 85; Ukrainian
S.S.R., Sept. 92; U.S., Sept. 92, Oct. 75,
Nov. 88
U.S. ratification: Sept. 92; Benedick, June
58; Negroponte, June 59
Prevention of marine pollution by dumping
of wastes and other matter, convention
(1972): China, Jan. 80; Costa Rica, Sept.
91
Prevention of pollution from ships, interna-
tional convention (1973): Benin, Feb.
93; Egypt, Nov. 88; U.K., extension to
Isle of Man, July 91
Protocol of 1978: India, Dec. 85; Poland,
Sept. 92; Tuvalu, Feb. 93; U.K.,
extension to Isle of Man. July 91
Prohibition of military or other
environmental modification techniques,
convention (1977): Afghanistan, Feb.
93; Benin, Sept. 91; Pakistan, May 89
San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja Califor-
nia border sanitation problem, IBWC
minute 270, Dec. 87
U.S. policy (Benedick), June 55
U.S. -Soviet consultations, Jan. 10
Index 1986
Equatorial Guinea, treaties, agreements, etc.,
Apr. 93, Oct. 75, 76, Dec. 86
Espionage activity in U.S. (see also Soviet
Union: Soviet espionage agents, expul-
sion): Reagan, Apr. 29, Aug. 19; Ridgway,
Feb. 76; Shultz, Feb. 52, Mar. 18
Ethiopia: Crocker, Jan. 29, July 36; Keyes,
June 81; Reagan, Feb. 87, Apr. 28, Nov.
4; Schifter, Oct. 62
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, Apr.
93,94
Europe (see also names of individual countries):
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
and Disarmament Conference (CDE):
Jan. 9; Armacost, May 71; Barry, Apr.
65; Holmes, Sept. 39; NAC, Feb. 37;
Reagan, Mar. 30; Western statement,
Sept. 43; White House, June 40, Aug.
39, Sept. 39, Oct. 9
CDE accord, text and annexes: Nov. 20;
Barry, Nov. 25; Dept. Nov. 72; Reagan,
Nov. 25, 33; Zimmermann, Nov. 70, 71
Conventional defense initiative: Reagan,
Apr. 29; Shultz, Aug. 25
CSCE: NAC, Aug. 53; Reagan, Nov. 4
Bern experts' meeting on human con-
tacts: Novak, Sept. 65, 67, 69;
Reagan, June 64; Ridgway, Sept. 68;
Western draft concluding document,
Sept. 71
Final Act of Helsinki (1975): Armacost,
May 69; Zimmermann, Nov. 70
Cultural Forum meeting, Budapest:
Feb. 80; Stoessel, Feb. 81, 82
Draft concluding document, Feb. 85
11th anniversary (Reagan), Oct. 36
Soviet violations. See Soviet Union,
human rights
U.S. forums, announcements, PR 119,
5/30, PR 166, 8/29
Vienna review meeting: Armacost, May
69, 72; Barry, Apr. 67; Department,
Nov. 72; Reagan (message), PR 245,
11/7; Shultz, PR 245, 11/7; Zimmer-
mann, Nov. 70
U.S. delegate (Zimmermann): Depart-
ment, Nov. 72
Eastern: Armacost, May 69; Reagan, Feb.
87; Schifter, Jan. 64; Shultz, Feb. 29,
47, 50
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951,
Volume IV, Europe, released, Jan. 82
Mutual and balanced force reduction talks:
Jan. 8, Feb. 64, Dec. 37; Alexander,
Feb. 61; Blackwill, Feb. 62, 63; Depart-
ment, Mar. 31; Holmes, Sept. 39; NAC,
Aug. 53; NATO, Aug. 58; Nitze, Nov.
74; Reagan, Feb. 60, Nov. 4, 33; Ridg-
way, Sept. 59; Shultz, Aug. 25; Western
statement, Nov. 27; White House, May
54, July 37, Sept. 41, Nov. 28
Reunification, hopes for (Reagan), Apr. 29
U.S. economic relations (see also European
Economic Community: Agricultural
trade policy): De Clercq, Feb. 42;
Shultz, Feb. 41; Yeutter, Feb. 42
U.S. relations (Ridgway), Sept. 58
Visit of Secretary Shultz, Jan. 57, Feb. 29,
36, 50
European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM):
Nuclear cooperation with U.S. (Reagan),
May 78
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, Sept. 93
European Communities, treaties, agreements,
etc., Aug. 92, Sept. 92, 93, Oct. 75, Nov. 89
European Communities Commission,
meeting: Delors, Feb. 40; Shultz, Feb. 41
European Economic Community: Shultz, Feb.
42; Tokyo economic summit, July 9
Agricultural trade policy: Armacost, PR
140, 6/30; Baldrige, June 42; McMinn,
Oct. 34; Reagan, Oct. 6; Shultz, Sept.
28; Wallis, June 48; White House, June
46, Aug. 52; Yeutter, May 65
U.S. -EEC provisional agreement (White
House), Sept. 59
Spain and Portugal, membership (Shultz),
Apr. 48, PR 40, 3/13, PR 48, 3/18, PR
91, 4/23
Executive orders:
Compact of Free Association with Pacific
Islands (12569): Reagan, Dec. 74
Libyan sanctions (1251,3), Mar. 37; (125U),
Mar. 38
Export controls, U.S., against Libya: Reagan,
Mar. 36, 37, 38; Shultz, Mar. 21, 22, 23,
26; White House, Mar. 38
Extradition, supplementary treaties:
Germany, Federal Republic of, Dec. 86
Signature (Shultz), PR 226, 10/23
U.K.: Sept. 94; Poindexter, Aug. 67;
Reagan, Apr. 29, Sept. 23
Febres-Cordero Ribadeneyra. Leon, Mar. 64
Fields, David C, swearing in as Ambassador
to Central African Republic, PR 234,
10/29
Fiji (Monjo), July 60
IMET program agreement with U.S., Sept. 93
Finland:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, Mar.
73, Apr. 93, May 90; Sept. 92, 93, Nov.
88, Dec. 85, 86
Visit of Secretary Shultz, Jan. 57
Fish and fisheries:
Conservation of Atlantic tunas, protocol
(1984) to amend 1966 international con-
vention: Cape Verde, July 91; U.S., Oct.
75, Dec. 85
Fisheries off coast of U.S., bilateral
agreements: China, Feb. 94; Poland,
Mar. 74; Soviet Union, Apr. 94, Nov. 89
Pacific salmon treaty with Canada, amend-
ment: Sept. 93; Negroponte, Sept. 85
Entry into force, Nov. 89
Regional tuna fisheries treaty in Pacific,
negotiations (Sigur), Dec. 76
Salmon of North American origin:
Japan, negotiations, Mar. 42
U.S. -Canada-Japan agreement, June 73
South Pacific regional fisheries, negotia-
tions: Monjo, July 60; Shultz, Apr. 49
Whaling (Negroponte), Sept. 85
International observer scheme, bilateral
agreement with Japan, May 90
Foreign aid, U.S. (see also Security
assistance): Reagan, May 35; Shultz, June
37, Nov. 13
Appropriations requests: Monjo, July 54;
Peck, July 81; Shultz, Apr. 45, PR 37,
3/4, PR 41, 3/13
Budget restraints: Armacost, Oct. 21, PR
218, 10/16; Murphy, Dec. 71; Shultz,
Apr. 45, PR 37, 3/4, PR 154, 7/31
Organizations and programs, FY 1987
(Keyes), Aug. 80
Foreign investment in U.S. (Yeutter), May 68
Foreign policy, U.S.:
American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1983, released, May 93
Budget priorities: Armacost, Oct. 21, PR
218, 10/16; Murphy, Dec. 72; Shultz, PR
110, 5/14, PR 154, 7/31, PR 180, 9/16,
PR 181, 9/16; Spiers, Dec. 47
Chronology of official actions: Jan. 79; Feb..
92, Mar. 71, Apr. 92, May 88, June 89
A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic
Documents, 191,1-191,9, released, Feb. 97
Diplomacy (Shultz), Nov. 13
Principles, objectives, and purposes:
Armacost, June 67, PR 218, 10/16; Mur-
phy, Dec. 72; Reagan, Apr. 26, May 32; •
Shultz, Apr. 40, June 37, PR 113, 5/21, I
PR 180, 9/16, PR 181, 9/16; Spiers, May
61
Regional foreign policy conferences:
Baltimore, Maryland, PR 165, 8/26
Hartford, Connecticut, PR 188, 9/24
Salt Lake City, Utah, PR 197, 10/6
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume II, China, released,
Oct. 78
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume III, China, released, '
Dec. 89
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951,
Volume W, Europe, released, Jan. 82
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1951,, Volume VII, Germany and
Austria, released, Dec. 90
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1951,, Volume IX, The Near and Mid-
dle East, Parts 1 and 2, Aug. 93
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume I, Vietnam, released,
Feb. 96
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1958-1960, Volume I, Vietnam, released,
June 93
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume IV, Western European
Security and Integration, released, Dec. 89
Foreign Service: Shultz, Apr. 42, 46, 52, June
4; Spiers, Jan. 47, May 58, Sept. 44, Dec.
47, 50; Whitehead, Oct. 19
Diplomatic security agents, graduation
(Shultz), PR 47, 3/18
Diplomatic security programs (Spiers), Dec. 49
Soviet use of chemical tracking agents
(Department), Apr. 75
U.S. Marine Corps Embassy Protection
Program abroad, signature (Shultz), PR
263, 12/17
Foreign Service Day memorial service
(Whitehead), PR 97, 5/5
Department of State Bulletin
France (Reagan), July 14
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Mar.
73, Apr. 92, May 89, 90, July 92, Sept.
92, 93, Nov. 89, Dec. 85, 86
Visit of Secretary Shultz: June 33; Shultz,
PR 54, 3/24, PR 59, 3/26
freedom fighters: Armacost, June 64;
Reagan, Jan. 15, Feb. 23, 87, Apr. 26, 28,
May 34, 35, June 27; Shultz, Jan. 20, Feb. 39
Funseth, Robert L., Dec. 78
G
Gambia:
UNIDO constitution, 1979, accession, Sept.
92
U.S. Ambassador (Horowitz), swearing in,
PR 183, 9/22
Javin, John, biographic details, Mar. 9
General Assembly, U.N.:
41st session (Reagan), Nov. 1
U.S. delegation, Nov. 3
Resolutions:
Afghanistan, Feb. 21
Cambodia: Mar. 59; Walters, Mar. 57
Chemical weapons ban: Mar. 60; Lowitz,
Mar. 60
Terrorism, Mar. 52
Geneva conventions (1949) on treatment of
armed forces, civilian persons, and
prisoners of war:
Current actions: Comoros, Apr. 93;
Equatorial Guinea, Oct. 75; St.
Christopher-Nevis, July 72
Protocols I and II (1977): Belgium, Benin,
Oct. 76; Comoros, Apr. 93; Equatorial
Guinea, Oct. 76; Holy See, Apr. 93;
Jamaica, Oct. 76; St. Christopher-Nevis,
July 92; Suriname, Uruguay, Apr. 93
Genocide convention (1948), U.S. ratification,
May 89
German Democratic Republic (Schifter), Jan.
66
Berlin sector line controls (Ridgway), Sept.
60
East Berlin Volkskammer elections (Depart-
ment), Sept. 59
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 73, June
91, Dec. 85, 86
Germany, Documents on, 1944-1945, released,
Mar. 78
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1954, Volume VII, Germany and
Austria, released, Dec. 90
Supplementary Extradition Treaty,
signature (Shultz), PR 226, 10/23
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Mar.
73, Apr. 93, May 89, 90, June 90, July
92, Sept. 92, 93, Nov. 88, 89, Dec. 85,
86
U.S. visit of Chancellor Kohl, program, PR
219, 10/17
Ghana, treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 73,
Sept. 93, Oct. 76
Gildred, Theodore E., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Argentina, PR 229, 10/23
Gilsenan, John T., appointment as Executor
Director for U.S. Delegation to the 1987
WARC for Mobile Services, PR 70, 414
Gorbachev, Mikhail S„ Jan. 10, Mar. 11
Greece: Oakley, Aug. 5; Shultz, Aug. 25
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, July
92, Sept. 92, 93, Dec. 85
U.S. relations (Shultz), Feb. 40, Apr. 48,
June 34, 35
Visit of Secretary Shultz: June 33; Shultz,
PR 63, 3/28, PR 65, 3/31
Grenada: Abrams, July 90; Reagan, Feb. 87;
Schneider, Aug. 78; Shultz, Mar. 15
Profile, Apr. 23
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, Apr.
92, 93, July 92, Sept. 93
Visit of President Reagan, Apr. 22
Guatemala: Abrams, Mar. 66, July 87;
Reagan, Feb. 87; Schneider, Aug. 79
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, May
90, Oct. 76, Nov. 88, Dec. 85
Visit of Secretary Shultz (Shultz), PR 248,
11/12
Visit of Vice President Bush, Apr. 31
Guinea (Crocker), July 31
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, Dec. 86
Guinea-Bissau:
Investment incentive agreement with U.S.,
Nov. 89
U.S. Ambassador (Blacken), swearing in,
PR 139, 6/30
Gumbal, Bryant, Nov. 64
Guyana, treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 93,
June 91, July 91, Nov. 89
Gwertzman, Bernard, Dec. 29
H
Haig, Alexander, unveiling of portrait of, PR
170, 9/8
Haiti: Armacost, June 68, PR 140, 6/30;
Reagan, Apr. 30, May 33; Shultz, Apr. 49,
PR 19, 2/3
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Mar.
72, May 90, Sept. 93, Oct. 76
U.S. Ambassador (McKinley), swearing in,
PR 203, 10/7
U.S. assistance: Abrams, July 90; Depart-
ment, Apr. 83; Shultz, PR 127, 6/11
Handwork, Thomas T. (Whitehead), PR 97,
5/5
Harriman, W. Averell, death of (Shultz), PR
152, 7/26
Hawke, Robert J. L., Aug. 74
Hayden, Bill, Oct. 44
Health and medical research:
Biotechnology (Delors), Feb. 42
Child survival health support project, agree-
ment with India, Nov. 89
Exchange of medical cadets between the
Royal Navy and the Uniformed Services
University of the Health Sciences,
bilateral agreement with U.K., Mar. 74
Health and child survival, FY 1987 appro-
priations request (McPherson), Aug. 61
Military medicine, cooperation, bilateral
agreement with Tunisia, Mar. 74
Radiation, research on health and
environmental effects, memorandum of
understanding with Euratom, Sept. 93
Healy, Timothy S., S. J., Feb. 57
Henderson, Loy, death of (Shultz), PR 61,
3/27
Holmes, H. Allen, Sept. 38
Biographical details, Sept. 38
Honduras: Reagan, Feb. 87; Walters, Oct. 59
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 93, 94,
Mar. 72, June 91, Oct. 76, Nov. 88, Dec.
86
U.S. Ambassador (Briggs), swearing in, PR
230, 10/23
U.S. assistance: Abrams, July 87; Depart-
ment, May 86
U.S. visit of President Azcona: Reagan,
Aug. 86; joint communique, Aug. 87
Program, PR 114, 5/22
Visit of Vice President Bush, Apr. 31
Hong Kong:
Textile talks with U.S. (Shultz), Sept. 26
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 90, Oct. 76,
Nov. 88, Dec. 86
Horowitz, Herbert E., swearing in as
Ambassador to The Gambia, PR 183, 9/22
Human rights: Reagan, Jan. 2, 15, Nov. 6;
Shultz, Feb. 31, July 5
Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and
Week, 1985, proclamation (Reagan),
Feb. 88
Caribbean and Central America (Walters),
Mar. 54
Chile: Abrams, Mar. 69, Oct. 66; Schifter,
Oct. 62
Civil and political rights, international cove-
nant (1966): Argentina, Oct. 75; Niger,
May 89; San Marino, Jan. 80; Sudan,
June 90
Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1985, excerpts (Schifter), Apr.
76
Cuba (Skoug). Dec. 82
Eastern Europe: Armacost, May 69;
Schifter, Jan. 64; Shultz, Feb. 29
Economic, social and cultural rights, inter-
national covenant (1966): Argentina,
Oct. 75; Niger, May 89; San Marino,
Jan. 80; Sudan, June 90
Ethiopia: Keyes, June 81; Purcell, Oct. 53;
Schifter, Oct. 62
Freedom of expression (Shultz), Mar. 18,
PR 6, 1/14
Fundamental to U.S. foreign policy:
Reagan, Feb. 88; Shultz, Jan. 20
Indonesia: Reagan, July 13; Shultz, July 17,
19
Nicaragua (Reagan), Feb. 23, Sept. 91
Peru (Abrams), Jan. 75
South Africa, U.S. -supported program, May
47
Soviet Union: Armacost, May 69; Reagan,
Feb. 23, 88, Apr. 30; Shultz, Jan. 22, 25
U.N. declaration, 37th anniversary
(Reagan), Feb. 87
Hungary (Shultz), Feb. 53
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, May 90,
June 90, 91, July 92, Nov. 89, Dec. 85
Visit of Secretary Shultz (Shultz), Feb. 38,
45
Index 1986
I
Iceland: Reagan, Dec. 7; Shultz, Jan. 60
Defense relationship, bilateral treaty, Dec.
86
Rainbow navigation situation (Shultz), Aug.
56
Transportation of military cargo, treaty
with U.S., signature, PR 189, 9/25
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 90, Sept.
92, Oct. 75, Nov. 89, Dec. 85, 86
Visit of Secretary Shultz, Jan. 57
India: Karp, Feb. 17; Peck, July 81, 84;
Shultz, Apr. 50, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13;
Wrobleski, Sept. 84; Yeutter, May 65
India-U.S. Joint Commission on Economic,
Commercial, Scientific, Technological,
Educational, and Cultural Cooperation,
sixth session, minutes, Apr. 81
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Apr.
93, May 89, June 90, July 91, Sept. 93,
Nov. 89, Dec. 85, 86
Indonesia (Wendt), June 52
Human rights: Reagan, July 13; Shultz,
July 17, 19
Profile, July 23
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 94, Apr.
93, July 92, Aug. 92, Sept. 93, Dec. 85,
87
U.S. Ambassador (Wolfowitz), swearing in,
PR 38, 3/12
U.S. assistance, FY 87: Monjo, July 54, 58;
Schneider, Aug. 79
Visit of President Reagan: July 15; Reagan,
July 22; Shultz, July 19
Industrial property, Nice agreement (1977),
Switzerland, May 89
Intellectual property, protection (Yeutter),
Nov. 45, 46
Inter-American Development Bank:
Negroponte, Sept. 54; Shultz, Feb. 34,
Apr. 51
Agreement with annexes (1959), Norway,
Oct. 75
Interdependence of modern world: OECD,
June 46; Shultz, June 37, July 1; Tokyo
economic summit, July 3
International Atomic Energy Agency: Keyes,
Aug. 82; Shultz, July 2, 5; Tokyo
economic summit, July 4
Enriched uranium for research reactor,
U.S.-Thailand-IAEA agreement (1986),
Dec. 84-85
IAEA Statute (1956), Zimbabwe, Oct. 75
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (Shultz), Apr. 51, PR 37,
3/4, PR 41, 3/13
Articles of agreement (1944): Kiribati, Nov.
88; Poland, Sept. 91
International Development Association
(Shultz), Sept. 89
International Court of Justice:
Compulsory jurisdiction declaration
recognizing:
Current actions, Honduras, Nov. 88
U.S. termination of acceptance: Depart-
ment, Jan. 67; Shultz, Jan. 67; Sofaer,
Jan. 67
International Court of Justice (Con fill
Italy-U.S. dispute regarding Italian Govern-
ment actions against a wholly owned
subsidiary of Raytheon Company and
Machlett Laboratories (Department),
Jan. 69
Nicaragua-U.S. dispute (Sofaer), Jan. 69
International Monetary Fund: Baker, July 62;
Shultz, Apr. 51, Sept. 89, PR 87, 3/4, PR
41, 3/13; Wallis, July 66
Articles of agreement (1944): Kiribati, Aug.
91; Poland, Aug. 91
International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), report on Soviet jamming, Nov. 83
Investment of private capital abroad (Yeut-
ter), Nov. 45, 46
ASEAN countries (Shultz), Sept. 25
Indonesia (Shultz), July 19, 20, Sept. 36
Investment guarantees, bilateral agreement
with Bolivia, Mar. 73
Investment incentive agreements with:
Guinea-Bissau, Nov. 89; Sao Tome and
Principe, Dec. 87
Philippines (Armacost), Dec. 54
Private Enterprise Bureau (McPherson),
Aug. 60
Reciprocal encouragement and protection
of investments, bilateral agreements
with: Bangladesh, May 89, Sept. 93;
Cameroon, Apr. 94, Sept. 93; Egypt,
May 90, Sept. 93; Grenada, July 92,
Sept. 93; Haiti, May 90; Morocco, May
90; Senegal, May 91; Turkey, Feb. 95,
May 91; Zaire, May 91
Settlement of investment disputes between
states and nationals of other states,
convention (1965), Ecuador, Mar. 72
Treatment and protection of investment,
bilateral agreement with Panama, May
91
Iran: Karp, Feb. 17, 18; Murphy, June 71;
Reagan, Feb. 87
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 93, Dec. 85
Iran-Iraq war: Murphy, Mar. 40, 41, June 73,
Dec. 72; Poindexter, Aug. 65; Shultz, Jan.
25, Feb. 52, Apr. 48, Dec. 4, 6, PR 199,
10/3; White House, Aug. 71
Iraq, women, convention (1979) on elimina-
tion of all forms of discrimination, acces-
sion, Oct. 76
Ireland:
International fund for, agreement (1986):
Ireland, U.K., U.S., Dec. 85
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, Sept.
92, 93, Dec. 85, 86
U.K. -Ireland agreement on Northern
Ireland (Reagan), Jan. 56, May 73
Israel: Murphy, Mar. 40, June 70, July 76;
Shultz, Feb. 52, Apr. 47, July 26, PR 37,
3/4, PR 41, 3/13, PR 67, 4/1
Economic and political stability, grant
agreement, Dec. 87
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Feb. 95,
Mar. 73, May 89, June 91, Dec. 85, 87
U.S. economic and security assistance,
appropriations requests: Schneider,
Aug. 77; Shultz, Apr. 46, 47
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Peres: Reagan,
Peres, Dec. 73; Shultz, PR 67, 4/1
Program, PR 176, 9/12
Visit of Vice President Bush (Bush), Nov. 9
Italy:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Feb. 94,
95, Mar. 73, May 89, June 90, July 92,
Sept. 92, 93, Oct. 75, Dec. 85
Visit of Secretary Shultz, June 35
Ivory Coast:
Treaties, agreements, etc.. May 90, Dec. 85
U.S. Ambassador (Kux), swearing in, PR
184, 9/22
Jacobsen, David, release of, PR 246, 11/7
Jahn, William H., U.S. Delegation Vice Chair-
man to MF Broadcasting Regional
Administrative Radio Conference,
appointment, PR 2, 1/6
Jamaica: Apr. 81; Abrams, July 90;
Schneider, Aug. 78
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Apr.
93, 94, Aug. 92, Sept. 92, Oct. 76, Nov.
88, 89, Dec. 86
Japan (Shultz), PR 91, 4/23, PR 92, 4/24
Civil aviation, bilateral agreement regard-
ing United Airlines service, PR 16, 1/25
Economic relations with U.S.: Armacost,
Oct. 22; McMinn, Oct. 33; Nakasone,
July 53; Reagan, Apr. 29, July 53;
Shultz, Apr. 48; Sigur, Oct. 25, Nov. 40;
Wallis, Mar. 35, July 66, 68
Market-oriented, sector-selective (MOSS)
discussions: Armacost, Oct. 23; joint
report, Mar. 32; Reagan, Apr. 27;
Sigur, Oct. 25, 26; Yeutter, May 65, PR
140, 6/30
Salmon of North American origin, negotia-
tions with U.S., Mar. 42
Semiconductor trade agreement with U.S.
(Reagan), Oct. 22
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Mar.
73, May 90, June 91, Sept. 92, 93, Nov.
88, Dec. 86
U.S. relations: Nov. 42; Armacost, Oct. 20;
Sigur, Oct. 24
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Nakasone:
Reagan, Nakasone, July 53; program,
PR 75, 4/11
Jenco, Lawrence (Reagan), Oct. 5
Johnson, Wallace E., Vice Chairman of U.S.
Delegation to MF Broadcasting Regional
Administrative Radio Conference,
appointment, PR 2, 1/6
Jordan, Vernon E., Jr., Feb. 57
Jordan (Shultz), Feb. 53
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, 73,
May 89, Sept. 92
U.S. arms sales: Murphy, Mar. 39; Reagan,
Feb. 89
U.S. economic and security assistance (Mur-
phy), Dec. 90
Appropriations requests: Murphy, July
76, 78; Schneider, Aug. 78; Shultz,
Apr. 47
Visit of Vice President Bush (Bush), Nov. 9
Judicial matters:
Child abduction, international, civil aspects,
convention (1980): Canada (extension to
Prince Edward Island), May 89 (exten-
sion to Province of Saskatchewan), Nov.
88; Finland, Dec. 85; Hungary, June 90;
Spain, Apr. 93; U.K., Oct. 75
Department of State Bulletin
Iiiilnuiil Matters (Cont'd)
Customs violations, mutual administrative
assistance for prevention and repre
sion, bilateral agreement with Italy,
Feb. 95
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, pro-
posed amendments (Verville), Sept. 73
Letters rogatory, inter-American conven-
tion (1976) and additional protocol,
ratification, U.S., Dec. 85
Mutual assistance in criminal matters,
bilateral agreements with: Italy, Mar.
73; Thailand, May 91
Mutual assistance in law enforcement mat-
ters, bilateral agreement with Haiti,
Oct. 76
Mutual legal assistance, agreements with:
Philippines, Aug. 92; U.K. re Cayman
Islands, Sept. 94
Service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial
documents in civil or commercial mat-
ters, convention (1965), Netherlands,
Sept. 91
Taking of evidence abroad in civil or com-
mercial matters, convention (1970):
Monaco, Apr. 93; Netherlands (exten-
sion to Arriba), Sept. 91; U.K. (exten-
sion to Guernsey), Feb. 93 (extension to
Anguilla), Dec. 85
Transfer of sentenced persons:
Bilateral agreement with France, Jan. 81
Convention (1983) (Strasbourg conven-
tion): Austria, Dec. 86; Canada, Mar.
72; Cyprus, Nov. 88; Ireland, Dec. 86;
U.K., Mar. 72 (extension to Isle of
Man), Nov. 88
Jute and jute products, international agree-
ment (1982), with annexes, Austria, Apr.
93; Egypt, May 89; Germany, Federal
Republic of, Netherlands, Jan. 80; Poland,
Mar. 72, Nov. 88
Entry into force, Nov. 88
K
Kalb, Marvin. Jan. 18, Aug. 32, Nov. 49, Dec.
29
Kapelman, Max M.: May 52; Shultz, Sept. 33
Kampuchea: Purcell, Oct. 50; Shultz, Sept.
35, PR 136, 6/25
U.S. aid to non-Communist Khmer: Monjo,
July 59; Shultz, Apr. 49
U.S. prisoners of war and missing-in-action
(Monjo), May 63
Vietnamese occupation: Monjo, July 58;
Reagan, Feb. 87, May 34, 35, July 15,
Nov. 4; Shultz, Feb. 26, July 17, 25,
Sept. 30, 34; Walters, Mar. 57
General Assembly resolution. Mar. 59
Kaplan, Helene L., Feb. 57
Karp, Craig, Feb. 4
Kauzlarich, Richard D., Mar. 61
Kenya (Crocker), Jan. 29, July 32
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 93, Oct. 76
U.S. Ambassador (Constable), swearing in,
PR 242, 11/5
Keyes, Alan L., June 81, Aug. 80, 81
Biography, June 81
Kimball, Harold G., U.S. Delegation Vice
Chairman, MF Broadcasting Regional
Administrative Radio Conference,
appointment, PR 2, 1/6
Kiribati, treaties, agreements, etc., Aug. 91,
Nov. 88
Kontos, William (Shultz), Feb. 57
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
(Sigur), Nov. 39, 41
Three-way military talks proposed (Depart-
ment), Sept. 51
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, July 91
Korea, Republic of: Reagan, Apr. 29; Shultz,
Apr. 48, July 38, 40, PR 91, 4/23; Sigur,
July 46; Yeutter, May 65
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, Apr.
93, May 90, June 90, 90, Sept. 93, Oct.
75, Nov. 88, Dec. 86
U.S. development and security assistance,
FY 1987: Monjo, July 54, 57; Schneider.
Aug. 78; Shultz, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13
Visit of Secretary Shultz, July 38, PR 102,
5/8
Korn, David, swearing in as Ambassador to
Togo, PR 225, 10/22
Kuwait (Shultz), Nov. 66
Kux, Dennis, swearing in as Ambassador to
Ivory Coast, PR 184, 9/22
Kwiatkowski, Patrick (Whitehead), PR 97, 5/5
La Follette, Wilson A., U.S. Delegation Vice
Chairman, MF Broadcasting Regional
Administrative Radio Conference,
appointment, PR 2, 1/6
Labor;
International labor standards, convention
(1976), U.S., June 90
Minimum standards in merchant ships, con-
vention (1976), U.S., June 90
Lange, David, Sept. 31
Laos (see also Refugees: Indochinese):
International telecommunications conven-
tion (1982), Mar. 72
U.S. prisoners of war and missing-in-action
(Monjo), May 63
Latin America (see also Organization of
American States and names of individual
countries): Abrams, Mar. 67, June 86;
Shultz, Feb. 32, 43
Administration of justice, June 83
Alliance for Progress, 25-year anniversary
(Abrams), June 86
Caribbean and Central America: Abrams,
Mar. 68; McCormack, Jan. 78; Shultz,
Feb. 43, PR 127, 6/11
Contadora groups, meeting with
Secretary Shultz, Apr. 85
Contadora process: Abrams, July 90;
Shultz, Apr. 38, May 38; White
House, Aug. 84
Democratic progress: Abrams, July 86;
Michel, Aug. 88; Reagan, Sept. 18;
Shultz, Apr. 49, Aug. 19, PR 48, 3/18;
Walters, Mar. 54
U.S. assistance: Abrams, July 90;
McPherson, Aug. 62; Reagan, Sept.
21; Schneider, Aug. 78; Shultz, PR 37,
3/4, PR 41, 3/13
Latin America l' 'out '<li
Caribbean and Cen. America (Cont 'd)
U.S. policy, objectives: Michel, Aug. 88;
Reagan, Apr. 24, May 28; Shultz, Feb.
27, Aug. 19, PR 158, 8/11; Walters,
Oct. 60
Caribbean Basin Initiative: Abrams, Apr.
84, July 91; Reagan, Apr. 24; Shultz,
Apr. 49
Democratic progress: Abrams, Mar. 66,
June 87, July 86, 89, Aug. 83;
Armacost, June 68; Reagan, Apr. 28,
May 33, Oct. 74; Shultz, Feb. 27, 32,
Apr. 35, 40, 50, May 38, Nov. 12, PR
48, 3/18
Drug control programs. See Drugs, narcotic
Investment and economic growth, obstacles
to (McCormack), Oct. 70
Lebanon: Murphy, Mar. 41, June 73, July 77,
Dec. 71; Shultz, July 25, PR 7, 1/15, PR
150, 7/25
American hostages: Reagan, Mar. 14, June
26, Oct. 5, Nov. 61; Shultz, Jan. 23, 27,
Apr. 41, Nov. 65, 69, PR 110, 5/14, PR
209, 10/8
Treaties, agreements, etc., July 92, Dec. 85
Lehman, Ronald, U.S. chief negotiator for
strategic arms reduction talks, appoint-
ment announced (Shultz), PR 43, 3/14
Lesotho, treaties, agreements, etc., Sept. 92,
Dec. 86
Liberia (Crocker), Feb. 54, July 33, 36
Profile, Feb. 55
Treaties, agreements, etc., June 91, July 92
Liberty Centennial Commemorative Stamp
(Shultz), PR 28, 2/21
Libya: Adelman, Aug. 47; Crocker, July 31
Americans in (Shultz), Mar. 25, July 39, PR
7, 1/15
Gulf of Sidra: Negroponte, Sept. 85;
Reagan, Apr. 30, June 24, 26, 72;
Shultz, PR 50, 3/19, PR 66, 3/31;
Sofaer, Aug. 69; Walters, May 80;
White House, May 76
International terrorist activities: Abrams,
Mar. 68; Murphy, Mar. 40; Oakley, Aug.
6; Reagan, Mar. 12, 14, 36, June 24, 25,
26, July 10, 14; Shultz, Mar. 20, 23, July
5, 21, Nov. 69, PR 7, 1/15, PR 12, 1/16,
PR 98, 5/5, PR 99, 5/5, PR 108, 5/13;
Tokyo economic summit, July 5;
Whitehead, June 79
U.S. psychological warfare (Shultz), Nov.
69, Dec. 34, PR 205, 10/8
U.S. air strikes and impact: Murphy, Dec.
71; Oakley, Aug. 4; Okun, June 18;
Poindexter, Aug. 64; Reagan, June 1, 8,
July 11; Shultz, June 3, 6, 8, 11, 16, July
26, Nov. 12, PR 80, 4/15, PR 81, 4/16,
PR 91, 4/23; Sofaer, Aug. 70; Walters,
June 19, 21; Weinberger, June 3; White
House, June 1; Whitehead, June 79
U.S. economic sanctions: Oct. 27; Murphy,
Mar. 40; Oakley, Aug. 6; Reagan, Mar.
36, 37, 38; Shultz, Mar. 21, 22, 23, 26,
PR 7, 1/15, PR 12, 1/16, PR 19, 2/3;
White House, Mar. 38
U.S. oil companies, disinvestment proposed:
Reagan, July 12; Shultz, July 6
Index 1986
Liechtenstein, treaties, agreements, etc.
Mar. 73. Apr. 93, Sept. 92, Dec. 85
Lilley, James R., Aug. 50
Load lines. Set under Maritime matters
Lord, Winston. Sept. 48
Biographical details, Sept. 48
Low-Intensity Warfare Conference (Shultz),
Mar. 15
Lowitz, Donald S„ Mar. 60, Dec. 40, 41
Luxembourg, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar.
73, May 89, Sept. 92, 93, Nov. 89
Lyman, Princeton Nathan, swearing in as
Ambassador to Nigeria, PR 185, 9/22
M
Macao, trade in cotton, wool, and manmade
fiber textiles, bilateral agreements (1983,
1984), June 91
Madagascar, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan.
81, Nov. 89, Dec. 87
Malawi, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73,
Apr. 93, May 89
Malaysia: Monjo, July 54, 59; Schneider, Aug.
79
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Mar.
73, July 93, Sept. 92, Oct. 76, Nov. 88,
Dec. 85
Maldives, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 95,
Mar. 73, May 90, Nov. 89
Mali (Crocker), July 36
Malta, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72,
Nov. 88, Dec. 85
Marine pollution. See Environmental prob-
lems and control and Oil pollution
Maritime boundaries:
Arctic, Canada-U.S. discussions (Shultz),
Jan. 46
Bilateral agreement with Cuba, Feb. 94
U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ):
Negroponte, Sept. 85, 86
Maritime matters:
Carriage of goods by sea, U.N. convention
(1978), Senegal, June 90
Facilitation of international maritime traf-
fic, convention (1965): Australia, Sept.
92; India, Mexico, June 90
International Maritime Organization:
Convention (1948): Antigua and Barbuda,
Apr. 93; Korea, July 91; Vanuatu,
Dec. 85
Security issues (Kauzlarich), Mar. 61
Load lines, international convention (1966):
Bahrain, Benin, Feb. 94; Congo, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuvalu,
Sept. 92
Amendments (1971), Chile, May 89
Amendments (1977): Bahrain, Honduras,
Feb. 94
Amendments (1979), Chile, May 89
Amendments (1983), China, Dec. 85
Maritime search and rescue, international
convention (1979): Mexico, July 91;
Pakistan, Mar. 72; Portugal, Feb. 94;
Turkey, Mar. 72; Venezuela, Oct. 75
Ocean carriage of government controlled
cargoes, equal access, bilateral agree-
ment (1977), amendments (1985), Brazil,
Apr. 94
Maritime matters (Cont'd)
Prevention of collisions at sea, international
regulations, convention (1972): Bahrain.
Benin, Honduras, Tuvalu, Feb. 94
Ship and passenger security measures to
combat terrorism, U.S. initiative
(Department), Jan. 72
Standards of training, certification, and
watchkeeping for seafarers, interna-
tional convention (1978): Benin, Hon-
duras, Hungary, Feb. 94; Israel, May
89; Mozambique, Apr. 93; New Zealand,
Nov. 88; Portugal, Tuvalu, Feb. 94
Tonnage measurement of ships, inter-
national convention (1969): Bahrain,
Benin, Feb. 94; Cyprus, Qatar, Sept. 92;
Tuvalu, Feb. 94
U.S. navigational aids, installation and
management, bilateral agreement with
Italy, Jan. 81
Markey, David, U.S. Delegation Chairman to
1987 World Administrative Radio Con-
ference for Mobile Services, appointment,
PR 217, 10/16
Marks, Leonard H., U.S. Delegation Chair-
man, HF Bands World Administrative
Radio Conference, appointment, PR 58,
3/26
Marshall Islands, Compact of Free Associa-
tion: PR 10, 1/14; Reagan, Dec. 74; Sigur,
Dec. 75
Matlock, Jack F., Dec. 61
Mauritania, treaties, agreements, etc., Sept.
93, Dec. 86
Mauritius:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, Nov.
88, Dec. 87
U.S. Ambassador (Palmer), PR 233, 10/29
McCormack, Richard T., Jan. 78, Oct. 70
McFarlane, Robert C, Jan. 6
McKinley, Brunson, swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Haiti, PR 203, 10/7
McKinney, James C, U.S. Delegation Vice
Chairman, MF Broadcasting Regional
Administrative Radio Conference,
appointment, PR 2, 1/6
McMinn, Douglas W., Oct. 31
Biographical details, Oct. 32
McPherson, M. Peter, Mar. 43, Aug. 59
Meteorology, Mexico, cooperative observation
program, bilateral agreement, June 91
Mexico (Reagan), Mar. 10, Aug. 19
AM broadcasting agreement with U.S.,
signature, PR 167, 8/29
Background, Mar. 3
Drug control program: Apr. 81; Reagan,
Oct. 65; Whitehead. Oct. 38
International Boundary and Water Commis-
sion, Mar. 8
Profile, Mar. 4
Travel Notes, Mar. 7
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 95, Mar.
73, 74, Apr. 94, May 89, June 90, 91,
July 91, 93, Sept. 93, Nov. 88, 89, Dec.
85, 86, 87
U.S. Ambassador (Gavin), biography. Mar.
9
U.S. Ambassador (Pilliod), swearing in, PR
228, 10/23
U.S. visit of President De la Madrid: De la
Madrid, Oct. 66; Reagan, Oct. 65; pro-
gram, PR 157, 8/11
Visit of President Reagan (Reagan), Mar. 1,
2
Michel, James H., Aug. 88
Micronesia, U.S. trusteeship, termination:
Reagan, Apr. 29; Shultz, Apr. 49, Sept.
31
Micronesia, Federated States of, Compact of
Free Association: PR 10, 1/14: Reagan,
June 78, Dec. 74; Shultz, Sept. 37; Sigur,
Dec. 75
Middle East (see also Terrorism, interna-
tional): Murphy, Mar. 39, June 70, July
76, 78, Dec. 76; Poindexter, Aug. 66;
Reagan, Apr. 29; Shultz, PR 91, 4/23, PR
199, 10/3; Wendt, June 52; Wrobleski,
Sept. 83
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-195J,, Volume IX, The Near and
Middle East, Parts 1 and 2, Aug. 93
Monaco, treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 93,
Dec. 85
Mongolia, treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 93,
July 92, Dec. 85
Monjo, John C, May 62, July 50, 54
Moore, Jonathan, Dec. 78
Morocco (Murphy), July 76, 80
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 95, Apr.
93, May 90, Sept. 92, 93, Nov. 89, Dec.
85
Mozambique: May 10; Crocker, July 35;
Shultz, Apr. 50
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 74, Apr.
93, June 91, July 93, Oct. 76, Dec. 87
Mulroney, Brian, May 57
Murphy, Richard W., Mar. 39, June 70, July
76, Dec. 70
Muskie, Edmund S., portrait, PR 177, 9/15
N
Nakasone, Yasuhiro, July 53
Namibia: May 9; Armacost, Apr. 53; Poindex-
ter, Aug. 66; Shultz, Jan. 20, Mar. 26,
Dec. 6; White House, May 45
Profile, Apr. 55
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, May 89
Negroponte, John D., June 59, Sept. 53, 84,
Oct. 41
Nepal: Peck, July 85; Wrobleski, Sept. 84
Treaties, agreements, etc., Aug. 92, Nov.
89
Netherlands:
Nuclear tasks, dismantling (Shultz), Feb. 38
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Feb. 95,
Mar. 72, 73, Apr. 93, June 91, Aug. 92,
Sept. 91, 92, 93, Dec. 85
New Zealand: Cleveland, June 74; Shultz,
Sept. 29
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Mar.
72, Apr. 93, June 90, Nov. 88
U.S. ships, denial of access, effect on
ANZUS: Cleveland, June 75; Depart-
ment, Sept. 87; Shultz, Feb. 39, Apr.
48, Sept. 27, 31, 36, Oct. 44, 45; Sigur,
July 45, Dec. 77; Weinberger, Oct. 45,
47
Nicaragua: Abrams, July 89; Michel, Aug. 88;
Reagan, Feb. 23, 87, Apr. 26, Sept. 18;
Shultz, Feb. 43, 49, 52, Mar. 15, May 39,
Dec. 6; Walters, Mar. 54, Oct. 58
Contadora negotiations: Reagan, Sept. 91;
Shultz, PR 113, 5/21; White House,
June 85, Aug. 84
10
Department of State Bulletin
Kicdniiiun {( 'o/it'dl
Democratic resistance (contras): Reagan,
May 34, Sept. 19; Shultz, Aug. 21
U.S. aid: Abrams, Apr. 83; Poindexter,
Aug. 65; Reagan, Apr. 28, May 28,
81, 84, 87, June 24, Aug. 17, Sept. 19,
Oct. 2, Nov. 8; Shultz, Feb. 51, 52,
Apr. 32, May 37, Aug. 22, PR 48,
3/18, PR 50, 3/19, PR 77A, 4/16. PR
127, 6/11
German hostages, question of (Shultz), Aug.
24
Hasenfus capture (Shultz), Dec. 32, PR 205,
10/8, PR 207, 10/10
ICJ adjudication of U.S.-Nicaraguan
dispute, U.S. position (Sofaer), Jan. 69
National dialogue, proposed (see also Con-
tadora negotiations, supra): Reagan,
May 35; White House, May 85
Sandinista weapons captured, displayed
(Reagan), May 87
Soviet and Cuban militarization: Abrams,
Mar. 68, July 86, Aug. 84; Armacost.
June 64, Dec. 59; Oakley, Aug. 2;
Reagan, Feb. 24, May 28, 36, Aug. 86,
Sept. 19, Oct. 5, Nov. 4; Shultz, Feb.
26, 50, 51, 53, Apr. 32, 40, 49, May 37,
Aug. 20, Sept. 34, PR 48, 3/18, PR 77A,
4/16; Walters, Mar. 56
Treaties, agreements, etc., June 90, Dec. 86
United Nicaraguan Opposition leaders,
meeting with Secretary Shultz (Shultz),
Mar. 65
U.S. economic sanctions (Shultz), Mar. 23
Niger (Crocker), July 36
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, May
89, Aug. 92, Dec. 85
Nigeria (Wendt), June 52
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 90, June
90, 91, July 93
U.S. Ambassador (Lyman), swearing in, PR
185, 9/22 Nitze, Paul H., Feb. 58, Apr.
61, May 50, 55, Aug. 44, Nov. 73
Nitze Building, Johns Hopkins University,
dedication (Shultz), PR 90, 4/22
Nonalignment (Dizdarevic), Feb. 48
North Atlantic Council:
Ministerial meeting, Brussels (Dec. 1985):
final communique, Feb. 36; foreign
ministers' statement, Feb. 37
Ministerial meeting, Halifax, Nova Scotia
(May 29-30): Ridgway, Sept. 60, 61;
Shultz, Aug. 54, 56; texts of statements,
Aug. 53; Zimmermann, Nov. 71
Special session, Brussels (Nov. 21, 1985):
Carrington, Jan. 14
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Reagan,
Dec. 20; Shultz, Feb. 37, Dec. 15, 23, PR
37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13, PR 110, 5/14, PR
125, 6/5
Binary chemical munitions force goal
(White House), Oct. 37
Conventional capability: Sept. 26; NAC,
Feb. 37
Defense Planning Committee meeting,
Brussels (Dec. 3, 1985), final communi-
que, Feb. 79
Defense Ministers planning meeting,
Brussels (May 26), text of final com-
munique, Aug. 58
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume IV, Western Euro-
pean Security and Integration, released,
Dec. 89
NATO (Cont'd)
Nuclear Planning Group meetings, final
communiques:
Brussels (Oct. 29-30, 1985), Jan. 61
Wuerzburg (Mar. 20-21), May 75
Southern flank, U.S. security assistance:
Schneider, Aug. 78; Shultz, Apr. 48
Spanish participation (Shultz). Feb. 38, PR
48, 3/18
Northern Mariana Islands (Shultz). Sept 31
Norway, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 95,
Mar. 72, Apr. 93, July 92, Sept. 92, 93,
Oct. 75, Dec. 85, 86
Novak, Robert, Jan. 18, Sept. 65, 67, 69, Dec.
29
Nuclear accidents, conventions (1986):
Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R..
Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cote
d'lvoire, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Egypt, Finland, France, German
Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary,
Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Mexico,
Monaco, Netherlands, Niger, Norway,
Panama, Poland, Portugal, Soviet Union,
Spain. Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.K., U.S.,
Vatican City, Zimbabwe, Dec. 85
Nuclear energy (see also Soviet Union: Cher-
nobyl nuclear accident):
Cooperation concerning peaceful uses,
bilateral agreements with:
China: Feb. 94; Reagan, Feb. 75
EURATOM: Feb. 94; Reagan, May 78
Data and computer programs, cooperation,
bilateral agreement with OECD, Mar.
74
Decommissioning of nuclear facilities,
bilateral agreement with U.K.. Mar. 74
Enriched uranium for a research reactor,
transfer to Thailand, agreement (1986):
IAEA, Thailand, U.S., Dec. 84
Liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors,
agreements with: France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Dec. 86; U.K.,
Nov. 90
Nuclear regulatory matters and safety
research technical exchange arrange-
ment, bilateral agreement with Japan,
Jan. 81, Mar. 73
Physical protection of nuclear material, con-
* vention (1979): Argentina, Dec. 85;
Brazil, Mar. 72; Canada, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Dec. 85; Liechtenstein, Apr.
93; Mongolia, Apr. 93, Dec. 85; Spain.
Yugoslavia, Dec. 85
Radioactive waste management,
cooperative program, bilateral agree-
ment with Sweden, Jan. 81
Reprocessing of special nuclear material of
U.S. origin, bilateral agreement with
Japan, Mar. 73
Safety matters, exchange of technical infor-
mation and cooperation, bilateral
agreements with: Finland, Feb. 94; Ger-
many, Federal Republic of, Nov. 89;
U.K., Aug. 92; Yugoslavia, Feb. 95
Severe (nuclear) accident research, coopera-
tion, bilateral agreement with Canada,
Mar. 73
Thermonuclear fusion research, Soviet-U.S.
cooperation, Jan. 10
Nuclear nonproliferation: Jan. 8; Poindexter,
Aug. 66; Shultz, PR 40, 3/13
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty (1968):
Colombia, .June 90; Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Mar. 72; Malawi, Apr.
93; Yemen (Sanaa), Aug. 91
Nuclear test ban treaty, comprehensive, pro-
posed: Nov 35; Reagan, May 53, Nov. 4;
Shultz, Dec. 5, 31
Nuclear testing. Threshold Test Ban Treaty
and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(Reagan), Feb. 67, 72
U.S. ratification, conditions for: Reagan,
May 53; Shultz, Dec. 15; White House,
Dec. 9
Nuclear weapons testing: Reagan, May 53,
54, Nov. 4, 8; Shultz, Nov. 54, Dec. 23;
White House, Feb. 60, Dec. 3
CORRTEX system for verification, pro-
posed: Oct. 15, Nov. 36; Reagan, May
54; White House, June 39
Limitations, U.S. policy, special report, Oct.
14
Moratorium, 1958-1961, chronology of key
statements and actions, Oct. 16
Moratorium, Soviet proposal: Reagan, Nov.
9; Shultz, Dec. 5, PR 43, 3/14, PR 45,
3/17; White House, June 39
U.S. -Soviet experts, meeting, Geneva: Oct.
14; White House, Oct. 17
Verification issues: Reagan, Nov. 9, 32;
Shultz, Dec. 5, 12, 15, 32; White House,
Dec. 9
Interagency study, Nov. 33
0
Oakley, Robert B., Aug. 1, 5, 9, Oct. 55
Oceans:
Deep sea mining (Negroponte), Sept. 86
International waters, rights: Department,
May 79; Negroponte, Sept. 85; Reagan,
June 24
Ocean drilling projects, participation,
bilateral agreement with U.K., May 91
U.S. oceans policy (Negroponte), Sept. 84,
Oct. 41
Oil pollution:
Civil liability for oil pollution damage, inter-
national convention (1969):
Protocol (1976), Poland, Feb. 93
Protocol (1984): China, Finland,
Netherlands, Norway, Apr. 93
International fund for compensation, inter-
national convention (1971): Benin, Feb.
93; Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Apr.
93
Intervention on the high seas in cases of,
international convention (1969): Benin,
Feb. 93; South Africa, Oct. 75
Prevention of pollution of the sea by oil,
international convention (1954) and
1971 amendment, Bahrain, Feb. 93
Okun, Herbert S., June 18
Oman: Murphy, July 79; Shultz, Apr. 48
SOAF bases, storage facilities bilateral
agreement, May 90, Dec. 87
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 95, May 90,
June 90, 91, July 93, Dec. 87
Visit of Vice President Bush, June 30
Index 1986
11
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD):
Ministerial meeting, Paris, final communi-
que, June 44
Nuclear Energy Agency, bilateral agree-
ment re nuclear data and computer pro-
grams, Mar. 74
Tokyo economic summit, July 10
Organization of American States (OAS):
Keyes, Aug. 82; Shultz, Feb. 32
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference
fJPECC): Sigur, Dec. 77
Pacific Ocean region (see also Fish and
fisheries and individual countries):
Reagan, Apr. 29
Southeast Asia, question of nuclear-free
zone: Shultz, Sept. 26, 30, Oct. 46;
Sigur, Dec. 76
U.S. trade and investment: Shultz, PR 26,
2/19; Sigur, Dec. 75
Pakistan: Apr. 81; Karp, Feb. 16, 17; Wallis,
Jan. 52; Wrobleski, Aug. 73, Sept. 82
Karachi, hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73:
Armacost, Nov. 50; Reagan, Dec. 73;
Shultz, Nov. 12, 69, PR 196, 10/2, PR
199, 10/3
Nuclear policy: Oct. 54; Peck, July 83
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, May 89,
90, July 92, Sept. 93, Oct. 76, Nov. 89
U.S. economic and security assistance:
Peck, July 81, 82; Shultz, Apr. 49, PR
37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Junejo: joint
statement, Oct. 54; program, PR 148,
7/11
Palau, Compact of Free Association: PR 10,
1/14; Reagan, June 78, Dec. 74; Shultz,
Sept. 37; Sigur, Dec. 76
Palmer, Mark, Nov. 73
Palmer, Ronald Dewayne, swearing in as
Ambassador to Mauritius, PR 233, 10/29
Pan American Day and Week, 1986, procla-
mation (Reagan), Aug. 85
Panama: Abrams, July 89; Thomas, Apr. 80
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 94, May
90, Oct. 76, Dec. 85, 87
Papua New Guinea (Monjo), July 60
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, Sept. 92
Paraguay, international telecommunications
convention (1982), ratification, Apr. 93
Passports, Philadelphia Passport Agency,
automation, PR 72, 4/18
Patents:
Budapest treaty (1977): Italy, May 89: Nor-
way, Mar. 72
Multinational office, proposed (Reagan),
Apr. 27
New varieties of plants, protection, interna-
tional convention (1961): Federal
Republic of Germany, May 89; Italy,
July 92
Peck, Robert A., July 81
PEN international conference (Shultz), PR 6,
1/14
Penner, Vernon D., Jr., swearing in as
Ambassador to Cape Verde, PR 138, 6/27
Peres, Shimon, Dec. 73
Perkins, Edward, swearing in as Ambassador
to South Africa; PR 237, 11/3; Shultz, PR
236, 11/3
Perle, Richard N. (Shultz), Nov. 65
Persian Gulf: Murphv, Mar. 41, June 71, July
79, Dec. 72; Reagan, Sept. 79; Shultz,
Apr. 48, July 26, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13,
PR 199. 10/3
Shipping, Iranian attacks (White House),
Aug. 71
Peru: Apr. 81; Abrams, Jan. 75, July 90;
Thomas, Apr. 78; Wrobleski, Aug. 72
Treaties, agreements, etc.. May 91, July 92,
Aug. 92, Nov. 89, Dec. 86
U.S. Ambassador (Watson), swearing in,
PR 227, 10/23
Petterson, Donald K., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Tanzania, PR 231, 10/27
Philippines: Armacost, June 68; Reagan, Feb.
87, Apr. 28, May 33; Shultz, Sept. 30, 31,
PR 112, 5/21; Wolfowitz, Jan. 49
Constitutional, economic, military reforms:
Aquino, Dec. 57; Armacost, Dec. 52;
Monjo, July 50, 55; Reagan, Dec. 55;
Shultz, July 22, 40, 41, Aug. 26, Sept. 27;
Sigur, Nov. 40; White House, July 50
Documents, provision to the government of
the Republic of the Philippines, bilateral
agreement with the Philippines, May 91
Elections and transfer of power: Reagan,
Apr. 18, 30, 67, 68; Shultz, Mar. 26,
Apr. 69, Nov. 12, PR 19, 2/3, PR 32,
2/27, PR 40, 3/13, PR 91, 4/23, PR 105,
5/9; White House, Apr. 68; Wolfowitz,
Apr. 69
Former President Marcos, assets and
movements of: Armacost, Dec. 54;
Shultz, July 19, 21, 22, Sept. 27, PR
112, 5/21
Profile, Dec. 56
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 91, June
91, Aug. 92, Sept. 94, Dec. 85, 86
U.S. bases, status: Armacost, Dec. 53;
Reagan, Apr. 31; Shultz, July 19, Sept.
28, PR 181, 9/16; Sigur, June 41;
Wolfowitz, Jan. 49
U.S. economic and security assistance:
Armacost, Dec. 54; Monjo, July 50, 54;
Reagan, July 15, Dec. 56; Schneider,
Aug. 78; Shultz, Apr. 48, July 18, 20,
21, 42, Aug. 29, Sept. 27, 29, PR 37,
3/4, PR 41, 3/13, PR 108, 5/13, PR 110,
5/14; White House, July 48
U.S. visits of President Aquino: Aquino,
Dec. 56; Reagan, Dec. 55; Shultz, Sept.
29; program, PR 178, 8/13
Visit of Secretary Shultz (Shultz), July 41,
Sept. 27, 30, 31, 36, PR 105, 5/9, PR
107, 5/12, PR 135, 6/24
Phillips, James Daniel, swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Burundi, PR 241, 11/4
Pilliod, Charles J., Jr., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Mexico, PR 228, 10/23
Pilon, Rogers, Dec. 67
Poindexter, John M., Aug. 64
Poland: NAC, Feb. 37; Reagan, Feb. 87, Apr.
29; Shultz, PR 113, 5/21
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 93, Mar.
72, 74, June 91, July 92, Aug. 91, Sept.
91, 92, Nov. 88, 89, Dec. 85
Polygraph testing of federal employees:
Reagan, Mar. 13; Shultz, Feb. 38
Population growth and problems: Abrams,
June 87; McPherson, Mar. 43, Aug. 62
Portugal (Shultz), Apr. 48
Technical agreement with U.S. in
implementation of the defense agree-
ment of 1951, entry into force, Mar. 74
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Feb. 93,
94, Mar. 72, 74, May 89, Sept. 92, 93,
Dec. 85
Visit off Vice President Bush, June 32
Postal matters:
International express mail, bilateral
agreements: Guyana, Nigeria, Oman,
June 91; Senegal, Oct. 76
International express mail/datapost special
express, bilateral agreements with:
Chile, Dec. 86; Cyprus, Feb. 94
Money orders and postal travelers' checks,
agreement with final protocol (1984):
Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Sept. 92;
Germany, Federal Republic of, Nov. 88;
Iceland, Japan, Jordan, Sept. 92; Korea,
Republic of, Nov. 88; Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland,
Sept. 92; Thailand, Nov. 88; Tunisia,
U.S., Sept. 92
Postal parcels agreement with final pro-
tocol and detailed regulations (1984):
Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Sept. 92;
Germany, Federal Republic of, Nov. 88;
Iceland, Japan, Jordan, Sept. 92; Korea
Republic of, Nov. 88; Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Sept. 92; Malaysia, Nov.
88; Sweden, Switzerland, Sept. 92;
Thailand, Nov. 88; Tunisia, Sept. 92;
U.K., Nov. 88; U.S., Sept. 92
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain,
constitution with general regulations
(1981), second additional protocol,
Uruguay, Apr. 93
Universal Postal Union:
Constitution (1964), general regulations,
and the universal postal convention
with final protocol:
Second additional protocol (1974),
Turkey, Oct. 75
Third additional protocol (1984):
Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria,
Finland, Sept. 92; Germany,
Federal Republic of, Nov. 88;
Iceland, Japan, Jordan, Sept. 92;
Korea, Republic of, Nov. 88;
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Sept.
92; Malaysia, Nov. 88; Singapore,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,
Sept. 92; Thailand, Nov. 88;
Tunisia, Sept. 92; U.K., Nov. 88;
U.S., Sept. 92
General regulations and universal postal
convention (1979): New Zealand,
Saudi Arabia, Mar. 72
Prisoners of war, U.S., and U.S. missing-in-
action (POW/MIA). See Vietnam:
POW/MIA issue
Private international law, statute of The
Hague conference (1951): Chile, July 91;
Mexico, June 90
12
Department of State Bulletin
Proclamations by the President:
Afghanistan Day, 1986 (5450), May 79
Baltic Freedom Day (5501), Aug. 57
Bill of Rights Day; Human Rights Day and
Week, 1985 (5420), Feb. 88
Captive Nations Week, 1986 (55/2), Oct. 36
Pan America Day and Week, 1986 (5459),
Aug. 85
World Food Day (5527), Dec. 66
World Trade Week, 1986 (5482), Aug. 52
Publications:
Government Printing Office subscriptions,
list, May 93, July 94
State Department, Jan. 82, Feb. 96, Mar.
77, May 92, June 93, July 94, Aug 93,
Sept. 94, Oct. 77, Nov. 90, Dec. 89
American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1983, released. May 93
Background Notes, Feb. 97. May 93, Aug.
94, Oct. 78, Dec. 90
Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1985, excerpts (Schifter),
Apr. 76
A Decade of American Foreign Policy:
Basic Documents 1941-1949, released,
Feb. 97
Documents on Germany, 1944-1985,
released, Mar. 78
Foreign Relations of the United States,
historical record publication schedule
(Reagan), Mar. 77
Foreign Relations of the United States.
1955-1957, Volume II, China,
released, Oct. 78
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume III, China,
released, Dec. 89
Foreign Relations of the United States.
1951, Volume TV, Europe, released,
Jan. 82
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1954, Volume IX, The Near and
Middle East. Parts 1 and 2, Aug. 93
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume I, Vietnam,
released, Feb. 96
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1958-1960, Volume I, Vietnam,
released, June 93
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume TV, Western Euro-
pean Security and Integration,
released, Dec. 89
Press releases, list, Jan. 81, Feb. 95, Mar.
75, Apr. 94, May 91, June 92, July 93,
Aug. 92, Sept. 94, Oct. 77, Nov. 90,
Dec. 87
Press releases, notice to subscribers, PR
93, 4/25
U.S.U.N., list, Mar. 75, Dec. 88
Purcell, James N., Jr., Aug. 75, Oct. 49
Q
Qatar, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73,
Sept. 92, Nov. 88, Dec. 85
R
Rawlings, James Wilson, swearing in as
Ambassador to Zimbabwe, PR 247, 11/7
Reagan, Maureen, Feb. 89
in, Ronald (Shultz), Dec. 15
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Afghanistan, Soviet occupation, Feb. 22,
87, Apr. 28, May 34, 35, Nov. 4
Afghanistan Day, 1986, Maj 79
Africa, Apr. 28, May 35
Angola, Apr. 28, May 34, 35. June 27,
Sept. 2, Nov. 4
Antitrust reform, Apr. 26
Arab-Israeli conflict, Mar. 12, Apr. 29,
July 13, Sept. SO, Dec. 73
ASEAN, Apr. 28, July 15
Berlin Wall. 25th anniversary, Oct. 35
Canada, Apr. 27. Mar. 10, May 57
China, nuclear cooperation agreement,
Feb. 75
Defense and national security, Feb. 23,
Apr. 18, 20, 25. 27, Oct. 1, Nov. 8
Strategic Defense Initiative, Jan. 2, 14,
Feb. 23, Mar. 11. Apr. 20, 21, 28,
Aug. 36, Sept. 22, Oct. 1, Nov. 3,
Dec. 18, 20
East- West relations, F'eb. 60
Economy, domestic, Nov. 6
Tax reform, July 13
Economy, world, Nov. 5
Tokyo economic summit, Apr. 27, July
10, 16
Ecuador, Mar. 63
Espionage, Apr. 29, Aug. 19
Europe:
CDE negotiations and accord, Mar. 30,
Nov. 25
Conventional forces, Apr. 29
CSCE, June 64, Oct. 36. Nov. 4, PR 245,
11/7
Helsinki Final Act, 11th anniversary,
Oct. 36
Mutual and balanced force reduction
talks, Feb. 60, Nov. 4, 33
Foreign assistance, May 35
Foreign policy objectives, Apr. 27, May 32
France, U.S. relations. July 14
Freedom fighters, Jan. 15, Feb. 23, Apr.
26, 28, May 34, 35, June 27
Glassboro High School, Sept. 21
Grenada, Apr. 22
Human rights, Jan. 2, 15, Feb. 23, Apr. 30,
Sept. 91, Nov. 6
Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day
and Week (1985), Feb. 88
U.N. declaration on, 37th anniversary,
Feb. 87
Indonesia, July 13, 22
Jordan, Feb. 89
Kampuchea (Cambodia), Feb. 87, May 34,
35, July 15, Nov. 4
Latin America, Apr. 28, May 33, Oct. 74
Caribbean and Central America, Apr.
24, May 28, Sept. 18, 21
Lebanon, American hostages, Mar. 14,
June 26, Oct. 5, Nov. 61
Libya:
Gulf of Sidra, Apr. 30, June 24, 26, 72
Terrorist activities, Mar. 12, 14, 36,
June 24, 25, 26, July 10, 12, 14
U.S. air strikes, June 1, 8, July 11
U.S. economic sanctions, Mar. 36, 37, 38
Reagan. Ronald (Cont 'dj
Addresses, remarks, statements (Con! 'd)
Mexico, Mar. 1, 2, 10, Aug. 19, Oct. 65
Nicaragua, Feb. 23, 87, Apr. 26, 28, May
28, 34, 35, 36, 81, 84, 87, June 24,
Aug. 17, 86, Sept. 18, 91, Oct. 2, Nov.
4,8
Nuclear weapons testing, Feb. 67, 72,
May 53, 54, Nov. 4, 8, 32
Oil prices, June 26
Philippines, Feb. 87, Apr. 18, 28, 30, 31,
67, 68, May 33, July 15, Dec. 55
Poland, Feb. 87, Apr. 29
Polygraph testing of federal employees,
question of, Mar. 13
POW/MIA's, Apr. 28, July 16
Regional security proposals, Jan. 3, 15,
Feb. 23, Mar. 11, May 32, Nov. 4
St. Patrick's Day, 1986, May 7-1
Security assistance, Apr. 21, May 35
South Africa, Feb. 87, Apr. 28, May 33,
46, June 27, Sept. 1, 4, 35, 36, Oct.
3,4, Nov. 19, Dec. 35
Soviet Union (for details, see Soviet
Union), Jan. 3, 15, Apr. 20, May 32,
Nov. 4
ABM treaty, Feb. 68, Nov. 3, Dec. 17
Chernobyl nuclear accident, July 11, 12
Daniloff hostage case, 'Nov. 2, 8, 60,
Dec. 39
Human rights, Feb. 23, 88, Apr. 30,
Nov. 60, Dec. 1,8, 18,73
Orlov, Yuriy, and Irena Valitova,
release of, Dec. 1, 8, 17
Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)
negotiations, July 37, Sept. 42, Dec.
17,39
New Year's address, Mar. 10
Nuclear and space arms talks (NST),
Jan. 3, 37, 40, Mar. 11, 27, Apr. 26,
64, July 37, Aug. 18, Sept. 22, 42,
Oct. 1, Nov. 3, 9, Dec. 17, 20, 39
SALT II, June 25, July 13, Aug. 17, 18.
35, Oct. 1, 10
Summit meeting, Geneva (Fireside
Summit), Jan. 1, 3, 11, 13, Feb. 23,
Mar. 10, Aug. 19
Summit meeting, Reykjavik, Mar. 13,
Apr. 31, June 25, 27, July 12, Sept.
22, Nov. 60, Dec. 1, 7, 17, 20
U.S. arms control negotiations, Jan. 2,
14, Sept. 42, Dec. 39
U.S. relations, Jan. 11, 15, Feb. 23,
Mar. 10, 13, 14, Apr. 26, 27, May
33, 36, Sept. 21, Oct. 4, Nov. 1,
Dec. 17, 18
State of the Union, Apr. 25
Terrorism, international, Jan. 2, Mar. 12,
36, Apr. 29, June 24, 25, 26, July 10, 11,
14, Aug. 18, Sept. 23, Nov. 5, Dec. 73
ANC, Sept. 2, 4
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Oct. 58
Trade, Apr. 26, July 10, 12, 16, Nov. 6
Multi-fiber arrangements (MFA), Apr.
27, Oct. 6
U.S. -Japan semiconductor agreement,
Oct. 22
U.K.:
Northern Ireland, Jan. 56, May 73
Supplementary extradition treaty, Apr.
29, Sept. 23
Index 1986
13
Reagan, Ronald (Cont 'd)
Addresses, remarks, statements (Cont'd)
U.N. General Assembly, 41st session,
Nov. 1
U.S. space shuttle Challenger, Apr. 25
World Affairs Council and Foreign Policy
Association, Sept. 1
World peace. Nov. 1, Dec. 21
Meetings with Heads of State and officials
of, remarks and joint communiques:
Australia, Aug. 74; Brazil, Nov. 84;
Cameroon, May 48; Canada, May 57;
Ecuador, Mar. 63; Honduras, Aug. 86;
Israel, Dec. 73; Japan, July 53; Mexico,
Oct. 65; Philippines, Dec. 55; Soviet
Union, See Summit meeting entries
under Soviet Union; Uruguay, Oct. 73
Messages and reports to Congress:
Arms control, U.S. interim restraint and
U.S. and Soviet force projections, Oct. 10
AWACS transfer to Saudi Arabia, Sept. 79
Cyprus, Feb. 78, June 66, Aug. 54, Oct.
35, Nov. 76
EURATOM, nuclear cooperation with,
May 78
Libya:
Gulf of Sidra incident, June 72
U.S. air strikes, June 8
U.S. economic sanctions imposed, Mar.
37,38
Nicaraguan democratic resistance, sup-
port, May 81, 84, Sept. 91
Northern Ireland and Ireland assistance
legislation, May 73
Nuclear testing limitations, May 53, Nov. 32
Palau, Compact of Free Association, June 78
Regional security, May 32
South Africa, May 46
Continuance of emergency, Nov. 19
Economic sanctions, Dec. 35
Soviet noncompliance with arms control
agreements, Feb. 65
U.S. foreign policy, Apr. 26
News briefing, Oct. 1
News conferences, Mar. 12, Apr. 30, June
24, July 10, Aug. 17, Oct. 2, Nov. 60
Radio and television addresses to nation,
Jan. 1, 3, 17, Feb. 23, Mar. 10, Apr. 18,
May 28, June 1, Sept. 18, 23, Oct. 6,
Dec. 17
Shcharanskiy, Natan (Anatoliy), meeting
(White House), July 75
Visits to :
Grenada, Apr. 22
Indonesia: July 15; Reagan, July 22
Mexico, Mar. 1
Refugees:
Afghan: Oct. 55, Armacost, June 66;
Funseth, Dec. 81; Karp, Feb. 16, 17;
Peck, July 84; Reagan, Feb. 87; Shultz,
Nov. 14; Walters, Feb. 20; Whitehead,
Feb. 2
African: Funseth, Dec. 81; Purcell, Oct. 53;
Shultz, Nov. 18
Indochinese: Funseth, Dec. 80; Purcell, Oct.
49; Reagan, Feb. 87, July 23; Shultz,
Sept. 36
Indochinese Refugee Panel, report: PR 87,
4/17; Shultz, Nov. 17
Status of refugees, protocol (1967):
Equatorial Guinea, Apr. 93; Papua New
Guinea, Sept. 92; Tuvalu, May 89
Refugees (Cont 'ill
U.S. assistance requests for migration and
refugees, FY 1987 (Purcell), Aug. 75
U.S. policies and programs, midyear 1986
review (Purcell), Oct. 49
U.S. proposed admissions for FY 1987
(Shultz), Nov. 14
U.S. refugee policy, program, FY 1987:
Funseth, Dec. "78: Moore, Dec. 78
Vietnamese (Shultz), Sept. 36, Nov. 17
Regional security (see also Africa: Southern
Africa and Latin America: Caribbean and
Central America): Reagan, Mar. 11, May
32; Shultz, Feb. 25, 44
U.S. proposals: Reagan, Jan. 3, 15, Feb. 23,
May 35, Nov. 4; Shultz, Jan 13
Reich, Otto J., swearing in as Ambassador to
Venezuela, PR 172, 9/8
Ridgway, Rozanne L., Jan. 62, Feb. 76, May
72, 75, Sept. 58, 68
Biography, Jan. 63
Romania: Reagan, Feb. 87; Ridgway, Sept.
60; Schifter, Jan 66; Shultz, Feb. 43
Treaties, agreements, etc., July 93, Dec. 86
Rowny, Edward L., Nov. 29
Rubber, international agreement (1979),
extension (1985), entry into force, Feb. 94
Rwanda:
INTELSAT agreement and operating
agreement, current actions, Nov. 88
U.S. Ambassador (Upston), swearing in, PR
1, 1/8
Safety of life at sea, international convention
(1974): Bahrain, Benin, Congo, Cyprus,
Honduras, Feb. 94; Malta, Nov. 88;
Tuvalu, Feb. 94
Amendments (1983), entry into force, Apr.
93
Protocol of 1978: Brazil, Apr. 93; Cyprus,
Feb. 94; Egypt, Dec. 85; Ethiopia, Apr.
93; Honduras, Feb. 94; India, July 91;
Malta, Dec. 85
St. Christopher and Nevis:
Economic, technical, and related assistance,
bilateral agreement, July 93
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, June
90, July 92, 93
St. Lucia, Vienna convention on consular
relations (1963), succession, Dec. 85
St. Patrick's Day, 1986 (Reagan), May 74
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, international
load line convention (1966), accession,
Sept. 92
Sakharov, Andrei: quoted; Dec. 23, 26;
Reagan, Apr. 30; Shultz, Jan. 59, Dec. 26;
Zimmermann, Nov. 71
San Marino, international covenants on
human rights (1976), accessions, Jan. 80
Sanguinetti, Julio Maria, Oct. 73
Sao Tome and Principe, treaties, agreements,
etc., Mar. 72, May 91, Dec. 87
Sarney, Jose, Nov. 84
Satellites:
Australia's national satellite system,
bilateral agreement re launch and
associated services, Oct. 76
Satellites (Cont'd)
INMARSAT system, convention and
operating agreement (1976): Bahrain,
Apr. 93; German Democratic Republic,
Dec. 86; Malaysia, Sept. 92
INTELSAT, agreement and operating
agreement (1971): Mauritius, Rwanda,
Nov. 88
Landsat system, operation, bilateral agree-
ment with China, Apr. 94
Saudi Arabia:
Civil aviation system modernization,
bilateral agreement, Jan. 81
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Mar. 72
U.S. AWACS sales: Department, May 77;
Murphy, June 71; Reagan, Sept. 79;
Shultz, July 26, PR 110, 5/14; White
House, Aug. 71, Sept. 78, 79
Certification of conditions requisite to,
Sept. 80
U.S. security relationship (Murphy), Mar. 40
Visit of Vice President Bush, June 28
Schifter, Richard D., Jan. 64, 76, Oct. 61,
Nov. 81
Schneider, William, Jr., Aug. 77
Science and technology: Shultz, Nov. 11;
Tokyo economic summit, July 10
Advanced technology (Wallis), June 50
U.S. export policy (Reagan), Apr. 28
Biotechnology: Delors, Feb. 42; U.S.
technical paper, Dec. 44
Cooperation and development, bilateral
agreements with: Australia, Mar. 73;
Belgium, Apr. 94; Brazil, Feb. 94, July
92; Egypt, July 92
Development of technology-based ventures
between small U.S. and French com-
panies, memorandum of understanding
with France, May 90
Earth sciences, cooperation, bilateral
agreements with: Hungary, July 92;
Liberia, Mozambique, June 91
Earthquake data and evaluation of seismic
hazard, cooperative program, bilateral
agreement with Italy, Jan. 81
Educational, scientific, cultural,
technological fields, exchanges and
cooperation, bilateral agreement with
Soviet Union, Feb. 95
Geological sciences, cooperation, bilateral
agreement with France, Jan. 81
Geothermal energy, bilateral agreements
with: Mexico, June 91; Spain, Aug. 92
Hydrographic surveys and nautical chart-
ing, bilateral agreement with Morocco,
Feb. 95
Information technology (Shultz), May 40,
Nov. 11, PR 180, 9/16
Mapping, charting, and geodesy, bilateral
agreements with: Dominican Republic,
Oct. 76; Guatemala, May 90; Norway,
Feb. 95; Venezuela, Mar. 74
Seismic data acquisition system, bilateral
agreements with: Botswana, Nov. 88;
Brazil, July 92
Statistics, cooperation, bilateral agreement
with Canada, June 91
Technology transfer (McPherson), Aug. 60
China, to (Lord), Sept. 50
Potential leakage (Shultz), Sept. 25
Telecommunications technology: Baldrige,
Feb. 42; Delors, Feb. 42; Shultz, Feb.
28
14
Department of State Bulletin
Science and technology (Cont'd)
Topographic maps, bilateral agreements
with: Bolivia, Colombia. July 92; Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Sept. 93; Panama. Apr.
94, May 90; Peru, Aug. 92
Seabed disarmament, treaty (1971): Benin,
Jamaica, Sept. 92, Nov. 88
Security assistance, U.S.: Poindexter, Aug.
65; Reagan, Apr. 21, May 35; Shultz,
June 38; Spiers, Dec. 49
Appropriation requests: Schneider, Aug. 77;
Shultz, Apr. 42, 46, July 30, PR 37, 3/4,
PR 41, 3/13
Atomic weapons systems for mutual
defense purpose, cooperation in the
operation of, bilateral agreement with
France, Mar. 73
Defense equipment and logistic support,
cooperation in, bilateral memorandum
of understanding: Israel, June 91; U.K.,
Mar. 74
Eligibility for assistance and training,
bilateral agreement with Korea, Mar.
73
Exchange of Air Force officers, bilateral
agreement with Federal Republic of
Germany, May 90
Exchange of naval service personnel,
bilateral agreement with Colombia,
Mar. 73
Financial arrangements for the furnishing
of certain supplies and services to naval
vessels, bilateral agreement with
Greece, Mar. 73
Ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
system, stationing, support, and opera-
tion, bilateral agreement with
Netherlands, Feb. 95, June 91
North American Aerospace Defense Com-
mand (NORAD), bilateral agreement
with Canada, May 90
Patriot weapon system, acquisition and pro-
duction in Japan, bilateral agreement
with Japan, Jan. 81
Training for defense services personnel and
defense-related civilian personnel,
bilateral agreement with Japan, June 91
Training related to defense articles under
IMET program, bilateral agreements
with: Fiji, Ghana, Sept. 93; Iceland,
May 90; Maldives, Feb. 95; Mauritania,
Sept. 93; Mozambique, Mar. 74;
Nigeria, May 90; Oman, July 93;
Panama, Oct. 76; Sao Tome and Prin-
cipe, Seychelles, May 91; Tonga, Sept.
94; Trinidad and Tobago, Feb. 95
Security Council, U.N., resolutions:
Angola, condemnation of South Africa
aggression, Jan. 74
Hostage-taking, condemnation: Mar. 53;
Department, Mar. 53; Walters, Mar. 53
Senegal (Crocker), July 36
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 73, 74,
May 91, June 90, Oct. 76
Seychelles, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar.
74, May 91
Shlaudeman, Harry W., swearing in as
Ambassador to Brazil, PR 171, 9/8
Shultz, George P. (Muller), PR 90, 4/22
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Afghanistan, Jan. 19, 22, 25, Feb. 26,
Apr. 49, July 25, Dec. 4, PR 52, 3/20,
PR 209, 10/8, PR 213, 10/15
Shultz, George (Con I'd)
Addresses, remarks, statements (Con t'i I )
Africa, Feb. 26, Aug. 32, Sept. 88, Dec. 6
Southern, Feb. 51, Mar. 15, 25, Apr. 50,
PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13
U.N. special session on the critical
economic situation, Sept. 11, 32, 88,
PR 120A, 5/29, PR 120B, 5/20, PR
127, 6 1 1
America's Cup yacht race, PR 161, 8/15
Angola, Jan. 20, Feb. 51, Mar. 15, 26,
Apr. 50, Sept. 7
ANZUS, Feb. 39, Sept. 27, 36, Oct. 43,
46, PR 161, 8/15
Arab-Israeli conflict (for details, see Arab-
Israeli conflict), Jan. 20, 25, Feb. 26,
38, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, Mar. 21, 24,
Apr. 46, Aug. 56, Dec. 32, PR 37, 3/4,
PR 41, 3/13, PR 67, 4/1, PR 121, 6/11,
PR 150, 7/25
ASEAN, Apr. 48, July 16, 30, Sept. 25,
30, 31, 32, 36, PR 40, 3/13, PR 48,
3/18, PR 135, 6/24, PR 136, 6/25, PR
137, 6/25
Australia, Oct. 43, 44
Berlin, Feb. 29, 44, 46, July 25
Black History Month, PR 21, 2/4
Canada, Jan. 42, 43, Aug. 57, PR 49,
3/18, PR 92, 4/24, PR 127, 6/11
Chemical weapons, Jan. 22, 25, Nov. 54
China, July 17, Sept. 35, PR 127, 6/4
Collective security, July 26
DACOR Bacon House dedication, PR 117,
5/28
Defense and national security, Feb. 25,
Aug. 32, Dec. 23, 25, PR 131, 6/17
Information leaks, Aug. 35, PR 110,
5/14
Strategic Defense Initiative, Jan. 12,
21, 24, 28, 45, 58, Feb. 25, 39, Sept.
26, Dec. 2, 3, 9, 13, 15, 22, 23, 33,
PR 14, 1/17, PR 125, 6/5, PR 213,
10/15, PR 215, 10/16, PR 221, 10/20
Democracy, Feb. 27, 32, June 35, July 25,
26, Aug. 19, Nov. 11, PR 37, 3/4, PR
41, 3/13, PR 48, 3/18, PR 127, 6/11,
PR 131, 6/17
Developing countries, Feb. 27, 32, July 2,
19, Nov. 12, PR 125, 6/5
Diplomatic security agents, graduation,
PR 47, 3/18
Diplomatic security program, Apr. 42, 46, 52
Dominican Republic, inauguration of
President Balaguer, PR 163, 8/18
Drugs, narcotic, Feb. 32, Sept. 30, 36, PR
158, 8/11, PR 198, 10/3
East-West relations, Feb. 27, 29, 37, 44,
46, Aug. 56, Sept. 33
Economy, domestic, Feb. 41, 42, 47, Apr.
41, 45, Sept. 32, Nov. 11, Dec. 23, PR
127,6/11
Economv, world, Feb. 27, 41, 43, Apr. 40,
50, Nov. 12, PR 24, 2/18, PR 91, 4/23.
PR 198, 10/3
Tokyo economic summit, July 1,5,
Sept. 25, 32, PR 92, 4/24
Egypt, Apr. 46, 47, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41,
3/13, PR 67, 4/1
El Salvador, PR 48, 3/18
Espionage, Feb. 52, Mar. 18
Shall?.. GeOTgi II 'out 'li
Addresses, remark*, statements (( 'ont'd)
Europe:
CSCE Third Follow-Up Meeting, PR
245, 11/7
Eastern, Feb. 29, 47, 50
European Communities Commission
meeting, Feb. 41
European Community, Feb. 42, Apr. 48,
Sept. 28, PR 40, 3/13, PR 48, 3/18,
PR 91, 4/23
Foreign aid:
Appropriations requests, Apr. 45, Nov.
13, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13
Foreign policy objectives, Apr. 40, June
37, PR 110, 5/14, PR 113, 5/21
Foreign Service, PR 40, 3/13, PR 48,
3/18, PR 263, 12/17
Freedom fighters, Jan. 20, Feb. 39
Greece, Feb. 40, Apr. 48, June 34, 35,
Aug. 25, PR 63, 3/28, PR 65, 3/31
Haiti, Apr. 49, PR 19, 2/3, PR 127, 6/11
Harriman, W. Averell, death, PR 152,
7/26
Henderson, Loy, death, PR 61, 3/27
Human rights, Jan. 20, 22, 25, Feb. 29,
31, July 5, 17, 19, Mar. 18, PR 6, 1/14
Hungary, Feb. 38, 45, 53
India, Apr. 50, PR 37, 3/4. PR 41, 3/13
Indonesia, July 17, 19
Information technology, May 40, Nov. 11.
PR 180, 9/16
International Court of Justice jurisdiction,
Jan. 67
International order, Feb. 24, July 3, 24
Iran-Iraq war, Jan. 25, Feb. 52, Apr. 48,
Dec. 4, 6, PR 199, 10/3
Israel, Feb. 52, Apr. 46, 47, July 26, PR
37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13, PR 67, 4/1
Italy, June 35
Japan, Apr. 48, PR 91, 4/23, PR 92, 4/24
Jewish community, July 24
Jordan, Feb. 53, Apr. 47
Kampuchea, Feb. 26, Apr. 49. July 17, 25,
Sept. 34, 35, PR 136, 6/25
Korea, Apr. 48, July 38, 40, PR 41, 3/13,
PR 91, 4/23, PR 102, 5/8
Latin America:
Caribbean and Central America, Feb.
27, 43, Apr. 38, 49. May 38, Aug.
19. PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/4, PR 48,
3/18, PR 113, 5/21, PR 127, 6/11,
PR 158, 8/11
Democratic progress, Feb. 27, 32, Apr.
35, 40, 50, May 38, Nov. 12, PR 48,
3/18
Economic development, Feb. 32, 43,
Aug. 20
Lebanon, July 25, PR 7, 1/15, PR 150, 7/25
American hostages, Jan. 23, 27, Apr.
41, PR 110, 5/14
Liberty Centennial Commemorative
Stamp, PR 28, 2/21
Libya, Mar. 12, 14, 25, July 39, PR 50,
3/19. PR 66, 3/31
International terrorism, support, Mar.
20, 23, July 5, 21, Nov. 69, Dec. 34,
PR 7, 1/15, PR 12, 1/16, PR 98, 5/5, PR
99, 5/5, PR 108, 5/13, PR 205, 10/8
U.S. air strikes and impact, June 3, 6,
8, 11, 16, July 26, Nov. 12, PR 80,
4/15, PR 81, 4/16, PR 91, 4/23
Index 1986
L
15
George (Con fill
Addresses, remarks, statements (Cont 'ill
, i (Cont'd)
U.S. economic sanctions, Mar. 21, 22,
23, 26, PR 7, 1/15, PR 12, 1/16, PR
19, 2/3
Marchenko, Anatoliy, condolences to
family of, PR 259, 12/11
Micronesia, Apr. 49, Sept. 31, 37
Middle East, U.S. policy, PR 91, 4/23, PR
199, 10/3
Multilateral development banks and pro-
grams, Apr. 51, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13
Netherlands, Feb. 38
New Zealand, Feb. 39, Apr. 48, Sept. 27,
29, 31, 36, Oct. 44, 45
Nicaragua {for details, see Nicaragua),
Feb. 26, 43, 49, 50, Mar. 15, 23, Apr.
32, 40, 49, May 37, Aug. 20, 24, Sept.
34, Dec. 6, PR 48, 3/18, PR 50, 3/19,
PR 77A, 4/16, PR 113, 5/21, PR 127,
6/11
Hasenfus capture, Dec. 32, PR 205,
10/8, PR 207, 10/10
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) leaders,
meeting, Mar. 65
Nitze Building, Johns Hopkins University,
dedication, PR 90, 4/22
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Feb.
37, Apr. 48, Aug. 54, 56, Dec. 15, 23,
PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13, PR 48, 3/18,
PR 110, 5/14, PR 125, 6/5
Nuclear nonproliferation, PR 40, 3/13
Nuclear weapons testing, Nov. 54, Dec. 5, 12,
15, 23, 32, PR 43, 3/14, PR 45, 3/17
Soviet proposal for moratorium, PR 43,
3/14, PR 45, 3/17
Organization of American States, Feb. 32
Pacific region (see also Micronesia), Apr.
49, Sept. 26, 30, Oct. 46, PR 26, 2/19
Pakistan, Apr. 49, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13
Karachi, hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73,
Nov. 12, 69, PR 196, 10/2, PR 199,
10/3
Palau, Compact of Free Association,
Sept. 37
Palme, Olof (death), PR 44, 3/17, PR 46,
3/17
PEN International Conference, PR 6,
1/14
Persian Gulf region, Apr. 48, July 26, PR
37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13
Philippines, Mar. 26, Apr. 69, July 22, 40,
41, Aug. 26, Sept. 28, 30, 31, Nov. 12,
PR 19, 2/3, PR 32, 2/27, PR 40, 3/13,
PR 91, 4/23, PR 105, 5/9, PR 107,
5/12, PR 112, 5/21, PR 135, 6/24, PR
181, 9/16
Marcos assets and movements, July 19,
21, 22, Sept. 27
U.S. economic and security assistance,
Apr. 48, July 18, 20, 21, 42, Aug.
29, Sept. 27, 29, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41,
3/13, PR 108, 5/13, PR 110, 5/14
Poland, PR 113, 5/21
Pollard espionage case, Feb. 52
Portugal, Apr. 48
POW/MIA's, July 17
Privatization, international; conference,
PR 24, 2/18
Shultz, George (Cont'd)
Addresses, remarks, statements (Cont'd)
Refugees, Sept. 36, Nov. 14
Regional security issues, Jan. 13, Feb. 25, 44
Romania, Feb. 43
Saudi Arabia, U.S. arms sales, proposed,
July 26, PR 110, 5/14
Science and technology, Feb. 28, Sept. 25,
Nov. 11
Security assistance, Apr. 42, 45, 46, 48,
June 30, 38, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13
South Africa (for details, see South
Africa), Apr. 51, Aug. 23, 30, Sept. 5,
26-27, Nov. 12, 59, 65, PR 19, 2/3, PR
30, 2/24, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13, PR
125, 6/5, PR 127, 6/17, PR 131, 6/17,
PR 151, 7/29
Punitive sanctions, proposed, Sept. 8,
10, Nov. 13, PR 150, 7/25, PR 151,
7/29, PR 153, 7/29, PR 180, 9/16,
PR 181, 9/16
U.S. Advisory Committee, Feb. 57
U.S. Ambassador (Perkins), swearing
in, PR 236, 11/3
Soviet Union. See under Soviet Union
Spain, Feb. 38, Apr. 48, PR 40, 3/13, PR
48, 3/18, PR 91, 4/23, PR 110, 5/14
State Department, appropriations
requests, Apr. 46, PR 51, 3/19, PR
110, 5/14, PR 113, 5/21
Syria, Feb. 51, 53, Mar. 20, 25, 26, PR
108, 5/13, PR 110, 5/14
Telecommunications technology, Feb. 27
Terrorism, international {for details see
Terrorism, international), Jan. 18,
Feb. 26, 32, 40, 43, 48, Mar. 15, 20,
25, 26, Apr. 41, 42, 52, May 38, June
39, Sept. 7, 30, 35, Nov. 12, 69, PR
40, 3/13, PR 48, 3/18, PR 92, 4/24, PR
147, 7/9, PR 180, 9/16
Libyan involvement, Mar. 20, 23, PR 7,
1/15, PR 12, 1/16, PR 98, 5/5, PR
99, 5/5, PR 108, 5/13
Low-intensity warfare (ambiguous),
Mar. 15
Tokyo economic summit, statement.
July 1, 5, 26
Thailand, Apr. 48, Nov. 12, PR 37, 3/4,
PR 41, 3/13
Trade, Feb. 33, 41, 44, 46, Mar. 32, Apr.
40, 51, May 42, July 2, 17, 19, 26,
Sept. 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, Nov. 12, PR
37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13, PR 127, 6/11, PR
131, 6/17, PR 136, 6/25, PR 154, 7/31,
PR 180, 9/16, PR 181, 9/16
Asia and Pacific region, Sept. 36, 43,
PR 26, 2/19
U.S. export promotion, PR 154, 7/31
Turkey, Feb. 39, Apr. 48, June 33
U.S. Marine Corps embassy protection
program abroad, PR 263, 12/17
Vietnam, July 17
U.S. political relationships, question of,
PR 181, 9/16
Yugoslavia, Feb. 39, 47
American Liberties Medallion, acceptance,
July 24
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws, North-
western University, PR 132, 6/17
Shultz, George (Cont 'd)
News conferences and press briefings, Jan.
11, 23, 57, 60, Feb. 37, 40, 43, 45, 47,
50, Mar. 23, June 3, 11, 60, July 1, 5,
16, 39, Aug. 54, Sept. 25, 27, 36, Oct.
44, Nov. 51, 54, 57, 60, 66, Dec. 2, 9,
13, PR 43, 3/13, PR 45, 3/17, PR 48,
3/18, PR 54, 3/24, PR 77A, 4/16, PR
112, 5/21, PR 113, 5/21, PR 180, 9/16,
PR 181, 9/16, PR 212, 10/15, PR 215,
10/16
Television and radio interviews, Jan. 18, 20,
27, Mar. 20, June 6, 8, 16, July 72, Aug.
23, 32, Nov. 64, Dec. 29, PR 7, 1/15, PR
11, 1/16, PR 12, 1/16, PR 14, 1/17, PR
19, 2/3, PR 32, 2/27, PR 50, 3/19, PR
66, 3/31, PR 80, 4/15, PR 81, 4/16, PR
91, 4/23, PR 92, 4/24, PR 95, 5/1, PR
98, 5/5, PR 99, 5/5, PR 108, 5/13, PR
136, 6/25, PR 150, 7/25, PR 151, 7/29,
PR 187, 9/22, PR 205, 10/8, PR 207,
10/9, PR 208, 10/14, PR 109, 10/8, PR
210, 10/15, PR 211, 10/15, PR 213,
10/15, PR 221, 10/20
Visits to:
Canada, Jan. 42
East Asia and the Pacific, Sept. 25, PR
133, 6/24, PR 136, 6/25, PR 137, 6/25
Europe, Jan. 57, Feb. 29, 36, 50
France, June 33, PR 54, 3/24, PR 59, 3/26
Greece, June 33, PR 63, 3/28, PR 65, 3/31
Guatemala, PR 248, 11/12
Italy, June 33
Korea. July 38, PR 102, 5/8
Philippines, July 38, PR 105, 5/9, PR 107,
5/12, PR 135, 6/24
Turkey, June 33, PR 55, 3/24, PR 56,
3/25, PR 60, 3/26
Sierra Leone, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar.
72, May 89, Aug. 92, Sept. 94, Oct. 76
Sigur, Gaston J., Jr., June 41, July 42, 46,
Oct. 24, Nov. 39, Dec. 75
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, swearing in, July
43, PR 39, 3/12
Singapore: Monjo, July 59; Shultz, Sept. 36
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 74, Apr.
93, May 91, June 92, Aug. 92, Sept. 92,
Nov. 88
Visit of Secretary Shultz; Sept. 25; arrival
statement, PR 133, 6/24
Skoug, Kenneth N., Jr., Dec. 81
Slavery convention (1926), 1953 protocol and
supplementary convention on the aboli-
tion of slavery (1956): Cyprus, Sept. 92;
Mauritania, Dec. 86; Nicaragua, June 90
Smith, Roger B., Feb. 57
Smith, Terrence, Jan. 27
Social security, supplementary agreements
with: Federal Republic of Germany, Dec.
86; Spain, Dec. 87
Sofaer, Abraham D.: Jan. 67, Aug. 68; Shultz,
Aug. 35
Solomon, Richard H., Director of Policy Plan-
ning Staff, appointment, PR 17, 1/29
Solomon Islands (Monjo), July 61
Somalia (Crocker), Jan. 29, July 31
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73, June
90, 92, Dec. 85
16
Department of State Bulletin
South Africa:
Apartheid, and U.S. policy of constructive
engagement: May 7; Armacost, Apr. 56;
Crocker, May 44, July 34; Reagan, Feb.
87, Apr. 28, May 33, June 27, Sept. 1, 4,
Dec. 35; Shultz, Aug. 23, 31, Sept. 5,
89, Nov. 12, 13, PR 19, 2/3, PR 30,
2/24, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13, PR 125,
6/5, PR 127, 6/11, PR 131, 6/17, PR
151, 7/29, PR 153, 7/29, PR 181, 9/16;
Walters, Jan. 72
Misconceptions, Sept. 12
Economy (see also U.S. sanctions, infra):
Shultz, PR 151, 7/29
Human rights, U.S. -supported program,
May 47
Military raids by: Purcell, Oct. 53; Shultz,
Aug. 31; White House, Aug. 35
Port Elizabeth, U.S. post, proposed
(Crocker), May 45
Profile, Sept. 3
Punitive sanctions, proposed: Sept. 14;
Crocker, July 27; Reagan, Sept. 1, 5,
35, 36, Oct. 3, 4, Dec. 35, 36; Shultz,
Sept. 8, 10, Nov. 13, PR 150, 7/25, PR
151, 7/29, PR 153, 7/29, PR 180, 9/16,
PR 181, 9/16, PR 236, 11/3
South African Congress (ANC): Sept. 15;
Reagan, Sept. 2, 4, Oct. 4; Shultz. Sept.
7, 9, 26, PR 153, 7/29
State of national emergency, continuance
(Reagan), Nov. 19
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, 74,
May 91, July 91, Sept. 92, 93, Oct. 75,
Dec. 84, 87
U.S. Advisory Committee (Shultz), Feb. 57
Members named, Feb. 57
U.S. Ambassador (Perkins), swearing in:
PR 237, 11/3; Shultz, PR 236, 11/3
U.S. limited assistance program: Sept. 14;
Crocker, May 45, July 35; Shultz, Apr.
51, Sept. 8
U.S. sanctions: Sept. 13, 16; Armacost,
Apr. 56; Crocker, May 45, July 27;
Reagan, May 46, Dec. 35; Shultz, Aug.
23, Nov. 13, 59, 65
U.S. Working Group on South and
Southern Africa, establishment and pur-
pose, Sept. 9
Soviet Union:
ABM treaty: Adelman, Jan. 39; Holmes,
Sept. 4*0; Nitze, May 56, Aug. 44;
Reagan, Feb. 68; Shultz, Jan. 26, Nov.
56, Dec. 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 22, 30, 33, PR
151, 7/29, PR 215, 10/16; White House,
Aug. 41
SDI compatibility: Adelman, Jan. 41;
Nitze, May 56, Aug. 45, Nov. 75;
Reagan, Nov. 3, Dec. 17; Shultz, Jan.
24, 28, Dec. 33
Ten-year nonwithdrawal period, proposed
(Shultz), Dec. 9, 12, 13, 16, 22, 30, PR
215, 10/16
Ambassador Dobrynin (Shultz), June 60, PR
76, 4/10
Antisatellite weapons research: Adelman,
Jan. 41; Nitze, May 55; Shultz, Jan. 21
Chemical tracking agents, use of (Depart-
ment), Apr. 75
Soviet Union (Cont 'd)
Chernobyl nuclear accident: Armacost,
Sept. 64; Reagan, July 11, 12; Shultz,
July 1, 5, 17, 20, 21, 72, 75, Dec. 34, PR
95, 5/1, PR 98, 5/5, PR 112, 5/21, PR
113, 5/21, PR 125, 6/5; White House,
July 71, 73, 74
Tokyo economic summit statement, July 4
Civil aviation agreement with U.S.: Jan. 10;
Department, Jan. 58; Whitehead, PR
23, 2/14
Daniloff detention: Armacost, Nov. 49, PR
218, 10/16; Matlock, Dec. 61; Reagan,
Nov. 2, 8, 60, Dec. 39; Rowny, Nov. 29;
Shultz. Nov. 11, 51, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61,
62, 64, 65, 66, 67, Dec. 2, 30, PR 180,
9/16, PR 181, 9/16, PR 187, 9/22, PR
196, 10/2, PR 206, 10/9, PR 210, 10/15;
Whitehead, Nov. 52
Economy (Nitze), Nov. 75
Educational and cultural exchange pro-
gram: Jan. 10; Palmer, Nov. 75;
Reagan, Jan. 4, 5, Mar. 11, Dec. 18;
Shultz, Dec. 28
Emigration (Shultz), Nov. 18
Jewish: Armacost, May 69; Pilon, Dec. 68;
Shultz, Jan. 20, 22, 25, July 24, Dec.
26; Zimmermann, Nov. 71
Espionage agents in U.N. Mission, expul-
sion: Department, Dec. 60; Shultz, Nov.
55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68,
Dec. 4, 24, 30, 32. PR 187, 9/22;
Whitehead, Nov. 53, PR 192, 10/1, PR
194, 10/1
Expansionist international policy/military
activities and deployment: Adelman,
Jan. 35, 39; Armacost, June 64, Dec. 58;
Matlock, Dec. 63; NATO, Jan. 61;
Palmer, Nov. 75; Reagan, Jan. 15, Apr.
20, May 32, Nov. 4; Rowny, Nov. 31;
Shultz, Jan. 22, Feb. 26, July 17, Dec.
23, 27; Sigur, Nov. 41
Human rights: Armacost, May 69, June 63;
Matlock, Dec. 65; Palmer, Nov. 74;
Reagan, Jan. 15, Feb. 23, 88, Apr. 30,
Dec. 18, 73; Shultz, Jan. 20, 22, 25,
Nov. 54, 60, 62, Dec. 2, 11, 23, 26, PR
19, 2/3, PR 187, 9/22, PR 205 10/8, PR
209, 10/8; White House, Dec. 1;
Whitehead, Nov. 53; Zimmermann,
Nov. 70
Orlov, Yuriy and Irena Valitova: Reagan,
Dec. 1, 8, 17; Shultz, Nov. 60, 63, 64,
65, 66, Dec. 24, 26, 30, PR 206, 10/9;
Zimmermann, Nov. 71
Religious persecution: Derwinski, Nov.
77; Schifter, Nov. 81; Shultz, Dec. 27;
PR 196, 10/2
Shcharanskiy, Natan (Anatoliy), release:
Apr. 75, July 75; Reagan, Apr. 30;
Shultz, July 24
Joint U.S. -Federal Republic of Germany
statement, Apr. 75
Ideological differences (Pilon), Dec. 67
Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)
negotiations: Adelman, Jan. 41, Aug.
47; Holmes, Sept. 39; NATO. Aug. 59;
Nitze, Feb. 59, May 51, Nov. 75;
Reagan, Jan. 14, July 37, Sept. 42, Dec.
17, 39; Ridgway, Sept. 59; Shultz, Jan.
12, Feb. 38, 39, 40, 44, Nov. 57, 62,
Dec. 2, 3, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 25, 31, PR
211, 10/15, PR 212, 10/15, PR 213,
10/15, PR 221, 10/20
Soviet Union (Cont 'd)
Jamming of U.S. short-wave broadcasting,
Nov. 83
Korean airliner (KAL Flight 007): Shultz.
Dec. 34
Kraznoyarsk radar, encryption telemetry
and SS-25 ICBM: Adelman, Jan. 39,
Oct. 8; Holmes, Sept. 40; Nitze, May 55;
Reagan, Feb. 66, 68, Aug. 36, Dec. 17;
Shultz, Aug. 34; White House, Aug. 41
Marchenko, Anatoliy, condolences to family
of (Shultz), PR 259, 12/11
Nuclear and space talks (NST) (see also
Summit meeting entries, infra): Jan. 8;
Adelman, Jan. 35, Mar. 28, Oct. 8; Gor-
bachev, Mar. 11; Kampelman, May 52;
Nitze, Feb. 58, Mar. 50, 56, Aug. 46,
Nov. 75; NATO, Jan. 61; Reagan, Jan.
3, 37, 40, Mar. 11, Apr. 26, 64, July 37,
Aug. 18, Sept. 22, 42, Oct. 1, Nov. 9,
Dec. 17, 39; Shultz, Jan. 25, 26, 58, Feb.
30, 38, 53, June 60, Aug. 24, Sept. 26,
29, 30, 33, Nov. 54, 58, Dec. 2, 4, 11,
29, 32; White House, Aug. 43, Oct. 12,
Nov. 26
Acronyms, Feb. 58
Soviet negotiating tactics: Adelman, Oct.
8; Nitze, Nov. 73, 75; Palmer, Nov.
75, 76; Reagan, Dec. 20; Rowny, Nov.
29; Shultz, Dec. 9
Oil exports (Wendt), June 53
SALT II, SALT I: Adelman, Oct. 7; Nitze,
Nov. 74; Reagan, July 13, Aug. 17,18,
Oct. 1; Rowny, Nov. 30,; Shultz, Aug.
23, 32, 34, 54, 56, Sept. 34, PR 125, 6/5;
White House, Aug. 38
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)
meeting, Geneva (White House) Oct.
18
U.S. interim restraint: Oct. 10; Reagan,
June 25, Aug. 36; Ridgway, Sept. 58;
Shultz, Jan. 19, 21, 26, 29, 58, Feb.
40; White House, Aug. 43
Seaman Medvid: Ridgway, Jan. 62, May 75;
Shultz, Jan 26, 27, 46, 59
Southeast Asian interests. See under Asia
Strategic arms reduction talks (START):
Holmes, Sept. 39; Nitze, May 50;
Reagan, Sept. 42, Dec. 39; Ridgway,
Sept. 59; Shultz, Dec. 4, 7, 12
U.S. chief negotiator (Lehman), appoint-
ment announced (Shultz), PR 43, 3/14
Submarine fire off Bermuda (Shultz), Dec.
33
Summit meeting, Geneva (Nov. 19-21,
1985), "Fireside summit": Jan. 7; Gor-
bachev, Jan. 10; Matlock, Dec. 65;
McFarlane, Jan 6; Nitze, Feb. 59;
Palmer, Nov. 74; Reagan, Jan. 1, 3, 11,
13, Feb. 23, Mar. 10, Aug. 19; Ridgwav.
Sept. 60; Shultz, Jan 11. 18. 19, 20, 22,
23, 28, Feb. 24, 30, 45, 53, Apr. 41. July
5, Aug. 35, 58, Dec. 28
Summit meeting, Reykjavik (Oct. 10-12):
Armacost, Nov. 49; Reagan, Mar. 13,
Apr. 31, June 25, 27, July 12, Sept. 22,
Nov. 60, Dec. 1, 7, 17, 20; Rownv, Nov.
29; Shultz, Aug. 32, Nov. 54, 56, 58, 62,
63, 64, 65, 68, Dec. 2, 9, 13, 22, 25, 26,
Index 1986
17
Soviet I ' a fin ii '(int'd)
Summit meeting, Reykjavik (Cont'd)
29, 31, PR 205, 10/8, PR 206, 10/9, PR
207, 10/10, PR 208, 10/14, PR 209,
10/18, PR 210, 10/15, PR 211, 10/15,
PR 212, 10/15, PR 215, 10/16, PR 221,
10/20; White House, Dec. 1, 8, 21;
Whitehead, Nov. 54, PR 192, 10/1, PR
194, 10/1
Summit meetings, proposed (Shultz), Feb.
31, 53, 54, Mar. 25, June 60, PR 14,
1/17, PR 43, 3/14, PR 48, 3/18, PR 80,
4/15, PR 81, 4/16, PR 92, 4/24
Toxin weapons, uses (Lowitz), Dec. 40
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 95, Apr.
93, 94, May 89, July 92, Sept. 92, 93,
Nov. 89, Dec. 85
U.S. arms control negotiations (see also
Intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF), Nuclear and space arms (NST),
and Strategic arms reduction talks
(START), supra): Adelman, Aug. 47;
Armacost, June 63; NAC, Feb. 36;
Reagan, Jan. 14; Shultz, Jan. 21, July 5,
Aug. 56, PR 209, 10/8; Tokyo economic
summit, July 3
Verification and compliance issues: Dec.
37; Adelman, Jan. 35, 37, Mar. 31,
Aug. 47, Oct. 7; Holmes, Sept. 40;
Lowitz, Dec. 41; Nitze, Feb. 59, Aug.
44; Reagan, Feb. 65, Aug. 18, 36,
Nov. 3, 32, Dec. 17, 39; Shultz, Jan.
26, July 2, Aug. 32, 33, Dec. 3;
Western statement, Nov. 27; White
House, Aug. 41
U.S. grain sales: Reagan, Oct. 4; Shultz,
Oct. 45, 46
U.S. relations (see also Summit meetings,
supra): Jan. 7; Adelman, Mar. 28;
Armacost, June 63, 69, Dec. 57; Diz-
darevic, Feb. 47; Gorbachev, Jan. 10;
Matlock, Dec. 61; McFarlane, Jan 6;
Nitze, Apr. 61, Nov. 73; Palmer, Nov.
74; Reagan, Jan. 11, 15, Feb. 23, Mar.
14, Apr. 26, 27, May 33, 36, Sept. 21,
Nov. 1; Shultz, Jan. 11, 19, Feb. 39, 46,
47, 48, Aug. 56, Dec. 2, 10, 24, 26, 30,
PR 14, 1/17, PR 40, 3/13, PR 45, 3/17,
PR 66, 3/31, PR 91, 4/23, PR 125, 6/5,
PR 131, 6/17, PR 180, 9/16, PR 209,
10/8; White House, Dec. 1
Regional issues: Reagan, Dec. 17, 18;
Shultz, Dec. 4, 17; White House,
Dec. 1
Visit of Secretary Shultz, Jan. 57
Yurchenko, Vitaly, redefection (Shultz),
Jan. 27, 58, 59
Zakharov, Gennadiy: Matlock, Dec. 61;
Reagan, Nov. 60; Shultz, Nov. 51, 56,
60, 64, 66, Dec. 24; Whitehead, Nov. 52
Space:
Moon treaty (1967): Bangladesh, Mar. 72;
Benin, Sept. 92
Registration of objects launched into outer
space, convention (1975): Australia,
Pakistan, May 89
Rescue of astronauts, return of astronauts,
and return of objects launched into
outer space, agreement (1968),
Australia, May 89
Space (Cont 'd)
Tracking and telemetry facilities on Mahe
Island, bilateral agreement with
Seychelles, Mar. 74
U.S. shuttle program:
Challenger explosion (Reagan), Apr. 25
Emergency landing and rescue site,
bilateral agreement with Chile, Feb.
94
Tracking and communication facilities,
bilateral agreement with Senegal,
Mar. 74
Spain: Ridgway, Sept. 61; Shultz, Feb. 38,
Apr. 48, PR 40, 3/13, PR 48, 3/18, PR
91, 4/23, PR 110, 5/14
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 93, May
89, 91, Aug. 91, 92, Sept. 91, 92, 93,
Oct. 75, Nov. 88, Dec. 85, 87
U.S. Ambassador (Bartholomew), swearing
in, PR 164, 8/26
U.S. -Spanish Council meeting, joint com-
munique, Aug. 55
Spiers, Ronald I., Jan. 47, May 58, Sept. 44,
Dec. 47, 50
Sri Lanka (Peck), July 81, 85
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Apr.
94, June 92, Nov. 88, 89
Stahl, Lesley, Jan. 27, Nov. 52
State Department:
Advisory Committee on South Africa
(Shultz), Feb. 57
Members named, Feb. 57
Appropriations request: Shultz, Apr. 46, PR
51, 3/19, PR 110, 5/14, PR 113, 5/21;
Spiers, Sept. 44; Whitehead, Oct. 19
Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Af-
fairs (Holmes), Sept. 38
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs (Sigur), swearing in,
July 43, PR 39, 3/12
Bureau of Diplomatic Security: Reagan,
Oct. 58; Shultz, Apr. 43, 44; Spiers,
Sept. 46
Diplomatic history records transferred to
National Archives, June 40
Diplomatic Security Service (Shultz), Apr.
43,44
Graduation of agents (Shultz), PR 47, 3/18
Director of Policy Planning Staff (Solomon),
appointment, PR 17, 1/29
Embassy protection program abroad, U.S.
Marine Corps and State Department
agreement signing ceremony: Kelley,
Shultz, PR 263, 12/17
Muskie portrait unveiling ceremony,
Charter, PR 83, 4/16
Responsibilities (Spiers), May 59
Treaty Room Suite, PR 169, 9/8
Statue of Liberty (Reagan), Aug. 18
Steel, trade in, bilateral agreements with:
Australia, Austria, Apr. 94; Brazil, Mar.
73; Czechoslovakia, June 91; European
Communities, Aug. 92, Nov. 89; Finland,
May 90; German Democratic Republic,
June 91; Hungary, June 91; Japan, May
90; Korea, June 91; Mexico, July 93;
Poland, June 91; Portugal, Mar. 74;
Romania, July 93; South Africa, Spain,
May 91; Venezuela, June 92, Yugoslavia,
Apr. 94
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Feb. 81, 82
Sudan (Crocker), Jan. 29, July 30
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 94, June
90, Oct. 77, Dec. 85
Sugar, international agreement (1984):
Austria, Belize, Jan. 80; Cameroon, Apr.
93; Colombia, Aug. 91; Ecuador, Sept. 92;
Egypt, Aug. 91; Haiti, Jan. 80; Jamaica,
Apr. 93; Mexico, May 89; New Zealand,
Mar. 72
Sullivan, Leon H., Feb. 57
Suriname, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 73,
Apr. 93
Swaziland, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar.
73, Sept. 92
Sweden:
Palme, Olof (death): Shultz, PR 44, 3/17,
PR 46, 3/17
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Mar.
73, Sept. 92, 93, Nov. 88, Dec. 85, 86
Switzerland, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar.
73, May 89, Sept. 92, 93, Dec. 85, 86
Syria: Murphv, Mar. 39; Shultz, Feb. 51, 53,
Mar. 20, 25, 26, PR 108, 5/13, PR 110,
5/14
Talbott, Strobe, Aug. 32, Nov. 49
Tanzania, U.S. Ambassador (Petterson),
swearing in, PR 231, 10/27
Taxes, exchange of information, bilateral
agreement with Costa Rica, Aug. 92
Telecommunications (see also Satellites and
Science and technology: information
technology):
AM broadcasting service in the medium fre-
quency band, agreement with Mexico,
Nov. 89, PR 167, 8/29
Diane Range, Solenzara, Corsica, agree-
ment with France, July 92
Exchange of third-party messages between
amateur stations of the U.S. and
amateur station 4LWIC of the Vienna
International Amateur Radio Club,
bilateral agreement with UN (Vienna),
Mar. 74
High definition television standard, U.S.
position, PR 36, 3/3
International telecommunications conven-
tion (1982): Afghanistan, Albania, Mar.
72; Algeria, June 90; Australia,
Bahrain, Mar. 72; Barbados, Dec. 86;
Belize, Apr. 93; Benin, Dec. 86; Bolivia,
Brunei, Mar. 72; Bulgaria, Dec. 86;
Byelorussian S.S.R., June 90;
Cameroon, Dec. 86; Canada, Chad, Mar.
72; Chile, Apr. 93; China, Colombia,
Mar. 72; Cuba, June 90, Czechoslovakia,
Mar. 72; Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador,
Mar. 72; Equatorial Guinea, Dec. 86;
Ethiopia, Mar. 72; Finland, France,
German Democratic Republic, Germany,
Federal Republic of, Greece, Mar. 72;
Guyana, Apr 93; Haiti, Honduras, Mar.
72; Iceland, Dec. 86; India, Indonesia,
Iran, Apr. 93; Israel, Mar. 72; Italy,
Oct. 76; Japan, Jordan, Mar. 72; Kenya,
18
Department of State Bulletin
Weleco m munications (Cont 'd)
Itit'l Tel. Convention (Cont'd)
Apr. 93; Korea, North, Mar. 72; Korea,
Republic of, Apr. 93; Laos, Mar. 72;
Lebanon, July 92; Liechtenstein, Lux-
embourg, Malawi, Maldives, Malta,
Mauritius, Mexico, Mar. 72; Monaco,
Apr. 93; Mongolia, July 92; Namibia,
Netherlands, Mar. 72; New Zealand,
Apr. 93; Niger, Mar. 72; Norway, July
92; Oman, June 90; Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Mar. 72; Paraguay, Apr.
93; Peru, July 92; Philippines, Dec. 86;
Poland, July 92; Qatar, Mar. 72;
Romania, Dec. 86; Sao Tome and Prin-
cipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Mar. 72;
Singapore, Apr. 93; Somalia, South
Africa, Mar. 72; Soviet Union, Spain,
Apr. 93; Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Mar. 72; Ukrainian S.S.R.,
June 90; United Arab Emirates, Oct.
76; U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Mar. 72;
Vatican City, Apr 93; Venezuela, Dec.
86; Vietnam, June 90; Zambia, Oct. 76;
Zimbabwe, Dec. 86
ITU, U.S. Delegation Chairman (Markey) to
1987 WARC for Mobile Services, PR
217, 10/16
ITU Center for Telecommunications
Development, PR 252, 11/24
Radio communications between amateur
stations on behalf of third parties,
agreement with Sierra Leone, Sept. 94
Radio regulations, Geneva (1979), Colombia,
Mar. 73
Regional Administrative MF BC Con-
ference, U.S. delegation, chairmen
appointed, PR 2, 1/6
World Administrative Radio Conference for
Planning of HF Bands, U.S. delegation
chairman (Marks), appointment
announced, PR 58, 3/26
World Administrative Radio Conference for
Mobile Services, U.S. delegation,
executive director (Gilsenan), appoint-
ment announced, PR 70, 4/4
Terrorism, international: Abrams, Mar. 67,
July 86; Armacost, PR 218, 10/16; Borg,
Aug. 8; Dizdarevic, Feb. 49; NAC, Feb.
37, Aug. 53; NATO, Aug. 59; Oakley,
Aug. 1, 5, 9, Oct. 37; Poindexter, Aug. 66;
Reagan, Jan. 2, Nov. 5, Sept. 23;
Ridgway, Sept. 64; Shultz, Jan. 18, Feb.
26, 40, 48, 51, Mar. 15, May 38, June 39,
July 25, Sept. 35, PR 40, 3/13, PR 92,
4/24, PR 98, 5/5, PR 99, 5/5, PR 147, 7/9,
PR 180, 9/16; Spiers, Sept. 46
Achille Lauro: Aug. 11, Department, Jan.
72; Kauzarlich, Mar. 61; Oakley, Aug. 4,
6; Reagan, Mar. 13; Shultz, Jan. 18, PR
147, 7/9; Wallis, Jan. 56
Airport security standards: Reagan, Mar.
14; Shultz, Jan. 19; Whitehead, June 80
Chronology of U.S. -related incidents, 1985,
Aug. 13
Colombia: Abrams, Mar. 68, Shultz, Feb.
32, 43, 49, PR 158, 8/11
Economic sanctions, legality and possible
consequences, Oct. 27
General Assembly resolution. Mar. 52
Terrorism, international (Cont 'd)
Hostage-taking, Security Council resolu-
tion: Mar. 53, Department, Mar. 53,
Walters, Mar. 53
Libyan involvement: Abrams, Mar. 68; Mur-
phy, Mar. 40; Oakley, Aug. 2, 6;
Reagan, Mar. 12, 36, June 24, 25, 26;
Shultz, Mar. 20, 23, PR 7, 1/15, PR 12,
1/16, PR 98, 5/5, PR 99, 5/5, PR 108,
5/13; Whitehead, June 79
Maritime security issues: Borg, Aug. 8;
Kauzlarich, Mar. 61
Narcoterrorism: Abrams, Mar. 67, Apr. 89,
Aug. 84; Oakley, Aug. 2, Oct. 56
Pakistan, Pan Am Flight 73, hijacking:
Armacost, Nov. 50; Reagan, Dec. 73;
Shultz, Nov. 12, 69, PR 196, 10/2, PR
199, 10/3
Prevention and punishment of crimes
against internationally protected per-
sons, including diplomatic agents, con-
vention (1973): Bahamas, Egypt, Sept.
92; Italy, Feb. 94; New Zealand, Jan. 80
South Africa, by African National Con-
gress: Reagan, Sept. 2, 4; Shultz,
Sept. 7
Syrian role: Oakley, Aug. 2, 6; Reagan, July
14; Shultz, Mar. 20, 25, 26, July 26,
Nov. 69, PR 108, 5/13
Tokyo economic summit statement: July 5;
Reagan, July 10, 11, 13, 14, Sept. 23;
Shultz, July 1, 5, 26
U.N. convention against taking of hostages
(1979): Antigua and Barbuda, Oct. 76;
Austria, Nov. 88; Canada, Mar. 73;
Dominica, Nov. 88; Italy, June 90; Jor-
dan, Malawi, May 89; New Zealand,
Jan. 80; Togo, Oct. 76
U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting,
report (Schifter), Oct. 61
U.S. anti-terrorist policy: Borg, Aug. 8;
Oakley, Aug. 11; Reagan, Mar. 12, Apr.
29; Shultz, Mar. 23, Apr. 41, PR 7, 1/15,
PR 48, 3/18; Whitehead, June 79
U.S. security measures: Aug. 16; Depart-
ment, Jan. 72; Oakley, Aug. 1; Reagan,
Jan. 47; Shultz, Apr. 42, 46, 52; Spiers,
Jan. 47
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiter-
rorism Act of 1986 (Reagan), Oct. 58
U.S. tourism, effect on: Oakley, Oct. 55;
Reagan, Aug. 18
War Powers Resolution, applicability to
U.S. actions (Sofaer), Aug. 68
Textiles:
Cotton, wool, and man-made textiles,
bilateral agreements with: Bangladesh,
June 91; China, May 90; Colombia, Mar.
73, May 90, Nov. 89, Dec. 86; Hong
Kong, May 90; India, Jan. 81;
Indonesia, Feb. 94; Korea, Republic of,
May 90; Macao, June 91,; Malaysia,
Mar. 74, July 93, Oct. 76; Mauritius,
Dec. 87,; Mexico, Mar. 74, Sept. 93;
Peru, May 91; Philippines, June 91,
Sept. 94; Singapore, Mar. 74, May 91,
June 92, Aug. 92; Sri Lanka, June 92,
Nov. 89; Thailand, Feb. 95, Dec. 87;
Yugoslavia, Jan. 81
Textiles (Cont'd)
< '..l ton textiles and textile products, trade
in, bilateral agreements with: Nepal,
Aug. 92; Pakistan, May 90
Export of certain textile products to U.S.,
bilateral agreement with Czecho-
slovakia, Nov. 85
Export of textile products manufactured in
Uruguay, bilateral agreement with
Uruguay, June 92
International trade in textiles, arrangement
(1973), protocol extending (1986): Hong
Kong, Japan, Mexico, Sri Lanka, U.S.,
Uruguay, Nov. 88
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA): Reagan,
Apr. 27, Oct. 6; Shultz, Sept. 26, 28
Trade in certain textiles and textile prod-
ucts, bilateral agreements with: Egypt,
July 92; Guatemala, Mar. 73; Hong
Kong, Oct. 76; Jamaica, Nov. 89; South
Africa, Mar. 74; Turkey, Nov. 89;
Uruguay, Mar. 74
Trade in wool textile and textile products,
agreement with Hungary, Nov. 89
Visa systems for exports of, administrative
arrangements with: Jamaica, Nepal,
Nov. 89
Wool sweaters, trade in, bilateral agree-
ment with Maldives, May 90
Thailand: Apr. 81; Purcell, Oct. 50; Shultz,
Nov. 12; Wrobleski, Aug. 73
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 95, Apr.
93, May 91, Oct. 77, Nov. 88, Dec. 84,
87
U.S. economic and security assistance:
Monjo, July 54, 57; Schneider, Aug. 78;
Shultz, Apr. 48, PR 37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13
Thatcher, Margaret (Shultz), July 8
Thomas, Franklin A., Feb. 57
Thomas, Jon R., Apr. 77
Togo:
Treaties, agreements, etc., July 91, 92, Oct.
76
U.S. Ambassador (Korn), swearing in, PR
225, 10/22
Tonga (Monjo), July 60
Treaties, agreements, etc., Sept. 94, Oct. 75
Tourists and tourism: Oakley, Oct. 55;
Reagan, Aug. 18
American drug arrests abroad, PR 116,
5/27
Travel advisories, PR 9, 1/15
Tower, John (Shultz), PR 43, 3/14
Trade:
Bovine meat arrangement (1979), Nigeria,
June 90
Civil aircraft, agreement (1979): Portugal.
Sept. 92; Spain, Nov. 88
Contracts for international sale of goods,
U.N. convention (1980): U.S., Dec. 86;
Zambia, Sept. 92
Free trade and antiprotectionism: Nov. 42;
Armacost, Sept. 62, Oct. 22, PR 140,
6/30, PR 218, 10/16; Baker, July 63;
Reagan, Apr. 26, 27, July 10, 12, 16,
Oct. 6, Nov. 5; Shultz, Jan. 44, 45, Feb.
33, Apr. 40, 51, May 42, July 17, 19, 26,
Sept. 25, 28, 31, 32, 36, 89, Nov. 12, PR
37, 3/4, PR 41, 3/13, PR 127, 6/11, PR
131, 6/17, PR 136, 6/25, PR 154, 7/31,
PR 180, 9/16, PR 181, 9/16, PR 196,
10/2; Sigur, July 44, Nov. 40; Wallis,
Mar. 33, July 67; White House, June 46;
Yeutter, May 65, Nov. 43, 45
Index 1986
L
19
Trade (Cant 'd)
General agreement on tariffs and trade:
Accession of Mexico, protocol (1986):
Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Hong
Kong, India, Jamaica, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Sweden,
Switzerland, U.S., Uruguay,
Yugoslavia, Dec. 86
Article VI, agreement on implementation
(1979), Korea, June 90
Article VII, agreement on implementa-
tion (1979): Lesotho, Sept. 92; Por-
tugal, Jan. 80, Sept. 92 (withdrawal)
Ministerial meeting, Punta del Este,
Uruguay (Sept. 15-20): Yeutter, Nov.
45
Declaration, Nov. 46
Trade ministers, new round, approved:
Baker, July 61, 64; Delors, Feb. 41;
OECD, June 47; Reagan, Apr. 27,
July 10, Nov. 6; Shultz, Feb. 35, 41,
May 43, Sept. 33; Tokyo economic
summit, July 10; Wallis, Jan. 53, Mar.
35, July 67; Yeutter, May 66, Nov. 43
Import licensing procedures, agreement
(1979), Nigeria, June 90
Services (Yeutter), Nov. 44, 46
Technical barriers to trade, agreement
(1979), Portugal, Jan. 80
U.S.:
Asia and Pacific region: Oct. 49; Shultz,
Sept. 36, Oct. 43, PR 26, 2/19; Sigur,
July 42, Nov. 39
China, exports of luggage to U.S., agree-
ment, Nov. 89
Europe. See under European Economic
Community
Indonesia, subsidization of exports,
bilateral agreement, July 92
Most-favored-nation treatment: Ridgway,
Sept. 60; Shultz, Feb. 44, 46
Sectoral discussions with Japan: Reagan,
Apr. 27; Yeutter, May 65
Joint report, Mar. 32
Semiconductor trade agreement with
Japan (Reagan), Oct. 6, 22
Subsidies and countervailing duties,
bilateral agreement with Mexico, Apr.
94
U.S. trade policy (see also Free trade and
antiprotectionism, supra); McMinn,
Oct. 31; Reagan, Apr. 27; Shultz,
Sept. 28; Wallis, Mar. 33; White
House, June 46; Yeutter, May 64
Transnationalism (Armacost), PR 140, 6/30
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Feb. 93,
Mar. 72, Apr. 92, May 89, June 90, July
91, Aug. 91, Sept. 91, Oct. 75, Nov. 88,
Dec. 84
Vienna Convention (1969): Byelorussian
S.S.R., July 92; German Democratic
Republic, Dec. 86; Senegal, June 90;
Soviet Union, Ukrainian S.S.R., July 92
Trinidad and Tobago, treaties, agreements,
etc., Feb. 95, Mar. 72, July 92
Trottier, Paul, Mar. 46
Truman, Harry (Reagan), Sept. 18
Tunisia: Murphy, July 76, 80; Schneider, Aug.
78
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 74, May
91, Sept. 92, Dec. 87
Visit of Vice President Bush, June 32
Turkey: Shultz, Feb. 38, Apr. 48, June 33;
Wrobleski, Sept. 84
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 95, Mar.
72, Apr. 93, May 91, July 92, Sept. 93,
Oct. 75, Nov. 89, Dec. 85
U.S. negotiations (Shultz), Feb. 39
Visit of Secretary Shultz: June 33; Shultz,
PR 55, 3/24, PR 56, 3/25, PR60, 3/26
Tuvalu, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 93,
94, May 89
u
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, treaties,
agreements, etc., June 90, July 92, Sept.
92, Dec. 85
United Arab Emirates, accession to interna-
tional telecommunications convention
(1982), Oct. 75
United Kingdom:
Northern Ireland, U.K. -Ireland agreement:
Reagan, Jan. 56, May 73; Ridgway, May
72
Supplementary extradition treaty, pro-
posed: Poindexter, Aug. 67; Reagan,
Apr. 29, Sept. 23
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Feb. 93,
95, Mar. 72, 73, 74, May 89, 91, June
90, July 91, Aug. 92, Sept. 92, 93, 94,
Oct. 75, Nov. 88, 90, Dec. 85, 87
U.S. visit of Prince and Princess of Wales
(Shultz), Feb. 24
United Nations: Crocker, July 30; Murphy,
Dec. 71; Shultz, Nov 13; Wallis, Jan. 54
Financial problems: Shultz, PR 181, 9/16;
Walters, Oct. 63
Special Session on the Economic Situation
in Africa. See under Africa
U.S. assistance, FY 1987: Keyes, Aug. 80,
81; Murphy, Dec. 71; Spiers, Dec. 49
UN (Vienna), amateur radio stations,
exchange of third party messages,
bilateral agreement, Mar. 74
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD): Wallis, Jan. 55
United Nations Decade for Women, Nairobi
Conference (Reagan), Feb. 89
United Nations Human Rights Commission
meeting, report (Schifter), Oct. 61
United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, constitution (1979) with
annexes: Belize, May 89, Gambia, Sept.
92; Grenada, Apr. 93; Namibia, May 89;
Qatar, St. Christopher-Nevis, Mar. 73;
Tonga, Oct. 76
Entry into force, June 90
United States Marine Corps and State
Department agreement re embassy pro-
tection program abroad, signing
ceremony: Kelley, Shultz, PR 263, 12/17
Upston, John E., swearing in as Ambassador
to Rwanda, PR 1, 1/8
Uruguay (Abrams), July 90
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, 73, 74,
Apr. 93, May 89, June 92, Nove. 88,
Dec. 86
U.S. visit of President Sanguinetti: Reagan,
Sanguinetti, Oct. 73; program, PR 129,
6/13
Utley, Garrick, Nov. 49
Vanuatu, International Maritime Organiza-
tion convention (1984), acceptance, Dec.
85
Vatican City, treaties, agreements, etc., Apr.
93, Sept. 93, Dec. 85
Venezuela (Wendt), June 52
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Feb. 95
Mar. 72, 74, June 92, July 93, Oct. 75,
Dec. 86
U.S. Ambassador (Reich), swearing in, PR
172, 9/8
Verville, Elizabeth G., Sept. 73
Vietnam:
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-1957, Volume I, Vietnam, released
Feb. 96
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1958-1960, Volume I, Vietnam, released
June 93
International telecommunications conven-
tion (1982), ratification, June 90
Occupation of Cambodia. See under
Kampuchea
Soviet support: Armacost, June 64, Dec. 59;
Sigur, Nov. 39, 41
U.S. political relationships, question of
(Shultz), PR 181, 9/16
U.S. prisoners of war and missing-in-action:
Monjo, May 62; Reagan, Apr. 28, July
16; Shultz, July 17
Visas, reciprocal facilitation of visa issuance,
bilateral agreement with China, Mar. 73
Voice of America: Crocker, Feb. 54; Reagan,
Jan. 1; Spiers, Dec. 49
w
Waite, Terry (Oakley), Aug. 6
Wallach, John, Jan."l8, Aug. 32
Wallis, W. Allen, Jan. 52, 54, Mar. 33, Apr. 71,
June 48, July 64, 68
Walters, Vernon A.:
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Afghanistan, Feb. 20
Angola, Jan. 73
Hostage-taking, Mar. 53
Kampuchea (Cambodia), Mar. 57
Libya:
Gulf of Sidra incident, May 80
U.S. air strikes, June 19, 21
Nicaragua, Mar. 54, Oct. 58
South Africa, Jan. 72
U.N., Oct. 63
U.S. representative to 41st U.N. General
Assembly, Nov. 3
Warfield, Virginia (Whitehead), PR 97, 5/5
Watson, Alexander F., swearing in as
Ambassador to Peru, PR 227, 10/23
Weber, Gregory H. (Whitehead), PR 97, 5/5
Weinberger, Caspar W., June 3, Aug. 58,
Oct. 45
Wendt, E. Allan, June 51
Wheat:
Food aid convention (1980), protocol for
extension (1983): Argentina, Jan. 80;
U.S., Feb. 94
20
Department of State Bulletin
%eat (Cont'd)
Food aid convention (1986): Argentina,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
European Economic Community,
Finland, France, Germany, Federal
Republic of, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland,
U.K., U.S., Sept. 93
Wheat trade convention (1971), protocol for
extension (1983): Argentina, Jan. 80;
Brazil, May 89; U.S., Feb. 94
Wheat trade convention (1986): Argentina,
Sept. 92; Australia, Sept. 93; Barbados,
Sept. 92, Oct. 76; Belgium, Sept. 92, 93;
Bolivia, Sept. 93, Brazil, Sept. 92;
Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador,
Egypt, Sept. 92, 93; El Salvador, Oct.
76; European Economic Community,
Sept. 92, 93; Finland, Sept. 92; Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Sept. 92,
93; India, Sept. 93, Dec. 86; Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Sept. 92, 93; Korea, Sept.
93; Luxembourg, Sept. 92, 93; Morocco,
Sept. 92; Netherlands, Norway, Sept.
92, 93; Pakistan, Sept. 93; Panama,
Oct. 76; Portugal, South Africa, Soviet
Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Sept. 92, 93; Tunisia, Sept. 92; Turkey,
Sept. 93; U.K., U.S., Sept. 92; Vatican
City, Sept. 93; Yemen (Sanaa). Sept. 92
Whitehead, John C, Jan. 33, Feb. 1, June 79,
Oct. 19, 37, Nov. 52, PR 23, 2/14, PR 97,
5/5, PR 192, 10/1, PR 194, 10/1
Biography, Jan. 33
Will, George E., Jan. 20, Dec. 32
Wolfowitz, Paul D., Jan. 49, Apr. 69
Ambassador to Indonesia, swearing in, PR
38, 3/12
Women:
Discrimination, convention for elimination
of (1979); Angola, Dec. 86; Bahrain,
Costa Rica, June 90; Finland, Nov. 88;
Ghana, Mar. 73; Iraq, Oct. 76; Ireland,
Mar. 73; U.K., June 90; Zaire, Dec. 86
Political rights of women, convention
(1953): Angola, Dec. 86; Colombia, Oct.
76
U.N. Decade for Women Conference,
Nairobi (Reagan), Feb. 89
World Food Day, 1986, proclamation
(Reagan), Dec. 66
World Intellectual Property Organization,
convention (1967): Iceland, Oct. 75;
Lesotho, Dec. 86; Sierra Leone, May 89
World order (Shultz), Feb. 24, July 3, 24
World peace (Reagan), Nov. 1, Dec. 21
Wrobleski, Ann B., Aug. 72, Sept 82
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic (Aden):
Armacost, June 64; Murphy, Mar. 41,
July 79
Common Fund for Commodities, agreement
(1980), ratification, June 90
Yemen Arab Republic (Sanaa): Murphy, July
76, 79; Schneider, Aug. 78; Shultz, Apr.
48
Yemen (Cont'd)
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 72, July
91, Aug. 91, Sept. 92, Nov. 90, Dec. 85
Visit of Vice President Bush, June 31
Yeutter, Clayton, Feb. 42, May 64, Nov. 45
Yugoslavia:
Profile, Sept. 63
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 81, Feb. 95,
Apr. 94, Dec. 85, 86
U.S. relations: Armacost, Sept. 61; Shultz,
Feb. 48
Visit of Secretary Shultz: Dizdarevic, Feb.
47, 48; Shultz, Feb. 39, 47
Zaire (Crocker), July 31
Debt problems (Whitehead), Jan. 34
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 80, Feb. 95,
Mar. 74, May 91, Dec. 86
U.S. visit of President Mobutu, program,
PR 257, 11/5
Zambia (Crocker), July 31
Debt problems (Whitehead), Jan. 34
Treaties, agreements, etc., Sept. 92, 94,
Oct. 76, Nov. 90
Zimbabwe, May 12
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 94, Oct. 75,
Dec. 85. 86
U.S. Ambassador (Rawlings). swearing in,
PR 247, 11/7
Zimmermann, Warren: Nov. 70; Department,
Nov. 72
Index 1986
21
United States Department of State
Discussion Paper. December 1985
Sub-Saharan Africa
and the United States
B§
Sub-Saharan Africa
and the United States
This 48-page illustrated publication discusses
U.S. relations with sub-Saharan Africa and
presents basic information on:
A Geography;
A History;
A People;
A Political processes;
A Economy; and
A Multilateral organizations.
It also includes data tables providing selected
statistics on each of the 46 independent sub-
Saharan African countries.
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