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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 

PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




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bulletin 






o/2S\S 

)ff/cial Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy /Volume 86/ Number 2115 






October 1986 








Refugees/49 



The President/1 



Arms Control/7 

Pacific/43 

Western Hemisphere/65 



Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 86 / Number 2115/ October 1986 



Cover: President Reagan 

(White House photo by Pete Souza) 



One of the priorities of the assistance pro- 
vided by the international community is to 
supply the refugees with clean drinking 
water. 

(Courtesy of UNHCR: J. Jessen-Petersen) 



The Department of State Bulletin. 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 
The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and 
treaties and other agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party. Special features, articles, and 
other supportive material (such as maps, 
charts, photographs, and graphs) are 
published frequently to provide addi- 
tional information on current issues but 
should not necessarily be interpreted as 
official U.S. policy statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

BERNARD KALB 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affair 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business 
required by law of this Department. Use of 
funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



Department of State Bulletin (ISSN 
0041-7(310) is published monthly (plus an 
index) by the Department of State, 2201 
Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520. Se 
class postage paid at Washington, D.C, j 
additional mailing offices. POSTMASTE1 
Send address changes to Superintendent 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



NOTE: Most of the contents of this publica- 
tion are in the public domain and not 
copyrighted. Those items may be reprinted; 
citation of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. 
Permission to reproduce all copyrighted 
material (including photographs) must be ob- 
tained from the original source. The 
Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide 
to Periodical Literature and in the PAIS 
(Public Affairs Information Service, Inc.) 
Bulletin. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



CONTENTS 



i President 

SDI: Progress and Promise 
News Conference of August 1 2 

(Excerpts) 
International Trade 

ns Control 

Arms Control: Turning the 
Corner? (Kenneth L. Adelman) 

CDE Opens Final Session 
(White House Statement) 

Interim Restraint: U.S. and Soviet 
Force Projections (President 
Reagan, Letter to the Congress, 
Unclassified Report) 

Presidential Response to Soviet 
Arms Control Proposals (White 
House Statement) 

U.S. Policy Regarding Limita- 
tions on Nuclear Testing 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Discussions on 
Nuclear Testing (White House 
Statement) 

SCC Meets in Geneva (White 
House and U.S. Statements) 

sartment 

The Foreign Affairs Budget 
(John C. Whitehead) 

it Asia 

U.S. -Japan Relations: A Global 

Partnership for the Future 

(Michael H. Armacost) 
U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade 

Agreement (President Reagan) 
Perspective and Proportion for 

U.S. -Japanese Relations 

(Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.) 

momics 

Economic Sanctions to Combat 
International Terrorism 

Trade Policy: Where Will 
America Lead? (Douglas W. 
McMinri) 



Energy 

34 Strategic Petroleum Reserve 

(White House Statement) 

Europe 

35 25th Anniversary of Berlin Wall 

(President Reagan) 

35 27th Report on Cyprus 

(Message to the Congress) 

Human Rights 

36 11th Anniversary of the Helsinki 

Final Act (President Reagan) 
36 Captive Nations Week, 1986 
(Proclamation) 



Military Affairs 

37 Binary Chemical Munitions 
Program (White House 
Statement) 



Narcotics 

37 U.S. International Narcotic 

Control Programs and Policies 
(John C. Whitehead) 

Oceans 

41 Who Will Protect Freedom of the 
Seas? (John D. Negroponte) 

Pacific 

43 U.S. and Australia Hold 

Ministerial Talks (Kim Beazley, 
Bill Hay den, Secretary Shultz, 
Caspar W. Weinberger) 

Refugees 

49 U.S. Refugee Policies and 

Programs at Midyear 1986 
(James N. Purcell, Jr. ) 

South Asia 

54 Visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister 
(Joint Statement) 



Terrorism 

55 Terrorism and Tourism 

(Robert B. Oakley) 
58 Antiterrorism Act Signed into 

Law (President Reagan) 

United Nations 

58 Nicaragua's Role in 

Revolutionary Internationalism 

(Vernon A. Walters) 
61 Report on UN Human Rights 

Commission Meeting (Richard 

Schifter) 
63 UN Financial Crisis 

(Vernon A. Walters) 

Western Hemisphere 

65 Visit of Mexican President 

(Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, 
President Reagan) 

66 Update on Chile 

(Elliott Abrams) 
70 Obstacles to Investment 

and Economic Growth in Latin 

America (Richard T. 

McCormack) 
73 Visit of President of Uruguay 

(President Reagan, 

Julio Maria Sanguinetti) 

Treaties 

75 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

77 Department of State 

Publications 

77 Department of State 

78 Background Notes 
78 Foreign Relations 

Volume Released 



Index 



E PRESIDENT 



31: Progress and Promise 



'risuliiil Ixi'iifiini's n-mnrks ul u 
1 House briefing on August 6, 1986. 1 

grateful to have this opportunity to 
k with you and to thank you for all 
re doing to keep America in the 
front of scientific and technological 
ge. Our country's security today 
s as much on the genius and 
tivity of scientists as it does on the 
age and dedication of those in the 
ary services. It also relies on those 
the wisdom to recognize innovation 
n they see it and to shepherd change 
the obstacles and through the maze, 
kes a special person, endowed with 
n and tenacity, to overcome po'itical 
bureaucratic inertia; and many of 
here today are just this kind of 
ial people, and I want you to know 
your President and your country 
grateful. And, if I'm not being too 
umptuous, I think history will 
>mber you, too. 

Chere are three stages of reaction to 
lew idea, as Arthur C. Clarke, a 
ant writer with a fine scientific 
I, once noted. First, "It's crazy; 
; waste my time." Second, "It's 
■ble, but it's not worth doing." And, 
:y, "I always said it was a good 

Vhen I notice how much support tax 
lification seems to have attracted as 
fee, I can't help but think of Clarke's 
irvation. Well, one sometimes has to 
ivith opposition to proposals such as 
ging the tax code, but when the 
■ kind of skepticism stands in the 
of the national security of our coun- 
t can be perilous. 

piearly, intelligent and well-meaning 
riduals can be trapped by a mindset, 
y of thinking that prevents them 
! seeing beyond what has already 
i done and makes them uncomfort- 
Iwith what is unfamiliar. And this 
(set is perhaps our greatest obstacle 
gard to SDI. 

we're at a critical point now on 
>nal security issues, and we need 
i help. Many of our citizens are still 
rare that today we are absolutely 
Useless against the fastest, most 
hictive weapons man has ever 
ked— ballistic missiles. Yet, there are 
;those who want to cut off, or 
!rely cut back, our ability to inves- 
'e the feasibility of such defenses, 
tressional action on the defense 
iorization bill is coinciding with 
psing diplomatic activity with the 



Soviet Union. Yet, at the same time, 
we're in the midst of a budget fight 
which could take away the very leverage 
we need to deal with the Soviets 
successfully. 

Back in 1983, I challenged America's 
scientific community to develop an alter- 
native to our total reliance on the threat 
of nuclear retaliation, an alternative 
based on protecting innocent people 
rather than avenging them; an alter- 
native that would be judged effective by 
how many lives it could save, rather than 
how many lives it could destroy. 

All of you know that during the past 
three decades deterrence has been based 
on our ability to use offensive weapons 
to retaliate against any attack. Once an 
American President even had to make 
the excruciating decision to use such 
weapons in our defense. Isn't it time 
that we took steps that will permit us to 
do something about nuclear weapons, 
rather than simply continue to live with 
them in fear? And this is what our SDI 
research is all about, and there can be no 
better time than today, the 41st anniver- 
sary of Hiroshima, to rededicate 
ourselves to finding a safer way to keep 
the peace. 

Many people believe the answer lies 
not in SDI but only in reaching arms 
control agreements. Trust and 
understanding alone, it is said, will lead 
to arms control. But let's not kid 
ourselves; it's realism, not just trust, 
that is going to make it possible for 
adversaries, like the Soviet Union and 
the United States, to reach effective 
arms reduction agreements. Our SDI 
program has provided a historic oppor- 
tunity; one that enhances the prospects 
for reducing the number of nuclear 
weapons. Technology can make it possi- 
ble for both sides, realistically, without 
compromising their own security, to 
reduce their arsenals. And the fear that 
one side might cheat— might have a 
number of missiles above the agreed 
upon limit— could be offset by effective 
defenses. Clearly, by making offensive 
nuclear missiles less reliable, we make 
agreements to reduce their number more 
attainable. Particularly is that true 
where one side now is an economic 
basket case because of the massive arms 
buildup that it's been conducting over 
the last few decades— the Soviet Union. 

There has been progress. There's a 
serious prospect today for arms reduc- 
tions, not just arms control; and that by 
itself is a great change, and it can be 
traced to our Strategic Defense Initia- 
tive. SDI can take the profit out of the 



Soviet buildup of offensive weapons and, 
in time, open new opportunities by 
building on today's and tomorrow's 
technologies. 

I say this fully aware of the Soviet 
campaign to convince the world that ter- 
minating our SDI program is a pre- 
requisite to any arms agreement. This 
clamoring is nothing new. It also has 
preceded steps we've taken to modernize 
our strategic forces. It was especially 
loud, for example, as we moved to offset 
the unprovoked and unacceptable Soviet 
buildup of intermediate-range missiles 
aimed at our allies by deploying our 
Pershing lis and cruise missiles. 

When I made it clear that we would 
no longer base our strategic force deci- 
sions on the flawed SALT [strategic 
arms limitation talks] Treaties— and, let 
me add, that action was taken when 
there was ample evidence that the Soviet 
Union was already in clear violation of 
key SALT provisions— the cry went up 
that it was the death knell of arms con- 
trol and the beginning of a new, even 
more destructive nuclear arms race. 

Well, let me just point out, in case no 
one noticed, the naysayers' predictions 
have been about as accurate as the time 
my old boss, Harry Warner of Warner 
Brothers' film company, said when 
sound films first came in: "Who the hell 
wants to hear an actor talk?" 

Today, we continue to negotiate with 
the Soviets, and they are negotiating 
with us. In fact, their recent proposals— 
in stark contrast to those gloomy 
predictions— are somewhat more forth- 
coming than those of the past. We are 
giving serious consideration to what the 
Soviets have recently laid upon the table 
in response to our own concrete reduc- 
tion proposals. Also, we are looking 
toward the next summit between 
General Secretary Gorbachev and me, as 
we agreed upon last November, where 
nuclear arms reduction will be one of 
several significant issues to be discussed. 

Forecasting is not useful, but, let me 
just say again, I am optimistic. It is 
demonstrably in the interest of both our 
countries to reduce the resources that 
we commit to weapons. If the Soviet 
Union wants arms reduction— strategic, 
chemical, or conventional— the United 
States stands ready to commit itself to a 
fair and verifiable agreement. 

As for SDI, let me again affirm, we 
are willing to explore how to share its 
benefits with the Soviet Union, which 
itself has long been involved in strategic 
defense programs. This will help to 



THE PRESIDENT 



dein I have been emphasiz- 

ing all along— that we seek no unilateral 
advantage through the SDL 

There's been some speculation that 
in my recent letter to General Secretary 
Gorbachev, I decided to seek some sort 
of "grand compromise" to trade away 
SDI in exchange for getting the Soviets 
1 1 1 join with us in the offensive reduc- 
tions. Now, to those who have been 
publicizing what is supposed to be in that 
letter, I hope they aren't offended to 
find out that they don't know what's in 
that letter because no one's really told 
them. I know. Let me reassure you right 
here and now that our response to 
demands that we cut off or delay 
research and testing and close shop is: 
no way. SDI is no bargaining chip; it is 
the path to a safer and more secure 
future. And the research is not, and 
never has been, negotiable. As I've said 
before, it's the number of offensive 
missiles that needs to be reduced, not 
efforts to find a way to defend mankind 
against these deadly weapons. 

Many of the vocal opponents of SDI, 
some of them with impressive scientific 
credentials, claim our goal is impossible; 
it can't be done, they say. Well, I think 
it's becoming increasingly apparent to 
everyone that those claiming it can't be 
done have clouded vision. Sometimes 
smoke gets in your eyes. And sometimes 
politics gets in your eyes. If this project 
is as big a waste of time and money as 
some have claimed, why have the Soviets 
been involved in strategic defense 
themselves for so long, and why are they 
so anxious that we stop? 

I understand that General Abrahamson 
[Director of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization] has already 
briefed you on the progress we've made. 
I want to take this opportunity to con- 
gratulate the General and his team. 
They're all first string and doing a ter- 
rific job. 

I'm more than happy with the 
strides made in our ability to track and 
intercept missiles before they reach their 
targets. The goal we seek is a system 
that can intercept deadly ballistic 
missiles in all phases of their flight, 
including and, in particular, the boost 
phase— right where they're coming out 
of the silos. Our research is aimed at 
finding a way of protecting people, not 
missiles. And that's my highest priority 
and will remain so. 

And to accomplish this, we're pro- 
ceeding as fast as we can toward 
developing a full range of promising 
technologies. 1 know there are those who 
are getting a bit antsy, but to deploy- 
systems of limited effectiveness now 
would divert limited funds and delay out- 



main research. It could well erode sup- 
port for the program before it's per- 
mitted to reach its potential. 

Jack Swigert, an astronaut, an 
American hero of the first order, once 
said: "I was privileged to be one of the 
few who viewed our earth from the 
moon, and that vision taught me that 
technology and commitment can over- 
come any challenge." Well, Jack 
tragically died of cancer and was cut 
short from the great contributions he 
would have made to his country and to 
mankind. He was the kind of individual 
who made this the great land of freedom 
and enterprise that it is. His can-do 
spirit is alive and well in America today. 

We and the other free people of the 
world are on the edge of a giant leap 
into the next century. That turning point 
in 13V2 years will not only mark the end 
of a century but the beginning of a new 
millennium. And the free people of the 
world are ready for it. Our research on 
effective defenses helps to point the way 
to a safer future. The best minds from 
some allied countries are already work- 
ing with us in this noble endeavor, and 
we believe others will join this effort 
before too long. In SDI, as elsewhere, 
we've put technology that almost bog- 
gles the mind to work— increasing our 
productivity and expanding the limits of 
human potential. The relationship 
between freedom and human progress 
has never been more apparent. 

But our freedom and security, as we 
are sorely aware, depend on more than 
technology. Both diplomacy and our 
internal debate are at a critical juncture, 
and your active support is imperative. 



Together, we must make it plain th 
this is the worst time to undermine 
defense programs and take away 
America's needed negotiating lever 

If we cut back on our own force 
unilaterally, we will leave our advet 
saries no incentive to reduce their 1 
weapons. And we will leave the nex 
generations not a safer, more stabli 
world but a far more dangerous one- 
future is literally in our hands. And 
SDI that is helping us to regain con 
over our own destiny. 

Just one last little incident, if y> 
aren't aware of it already, that mig 
helpful to you and some people that 
might be discussing this subject wit! 
Back when Fulton was inventing tr 
steamboat and it came into reality, 
was an effort made to sell it to Nap 
in France. And that great general, 
all his wisdom, said: "Are you tryin 
tell me that you can have a boat th; 
sail against the tide and the currem 
the winds without any sails?" He se 
"Don't bother me with such foolish 
ness." Well, we know where the foi 
ness lay, and let's not make the sar 
mistakes. 

I want to thank you all again fc 
you are doing to keep our country c 
front, to keep her secure and free, 
let up. God bless you. 

I'll just leave you with this thoi 
once again. When the time has com' 
the research is complete, yes, we'ra 
going to deploy. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 11, 1981 



News Conference of August 12 



Excerpts from President Reagan 's 
news conference held in Chicago on 
August 12, 19S6. 1 



Tomorrow the Senate will cast a crucial 
vote. The question is that of assistance 
to the freedomfighters who are trying to 
bring democracy to Nicaragua, where a 
communist regime, a client state of the 
Soviet Union, has taken over. The ques- 
tion before the Senate is: Will it vote for 
democracy in Central America and the 
security of our own borders, or will it 
vote to passively sit by while the Soviets 
make permanent their military beach- 
head on the mainland of North America? 

Q. Soviet and American 
negotiators just completed 2 days of 
top-level talks in Moscow. Did they 



narrow any differences on arms c« 
trol, perhaps paving the way for a 
summit later this year? And how < 
the Soviets react to your offer to < 
the deployment of a Strategic Def 
Initiative in return for an agreem« 
to deploy it later? 

A. That isn't exactly what we'' 
proposed to the Soviet Union about 
delaying our Strategic Defense Initi 
ative. And I'm not going to discuss 
was in my letter, and no one who ht 
been guessing at it has guessed righ 
yet. But the General Secretary did i 
reveal his letter to me, and I'm not 
going to reveal mine to him. But we 
don't have an answer or a reply yet 
our negotiators over there, and I'm F 
waiting for their report to see wheriB 
stand. But we have no word as yet. 



Department of State Bit 



THE PRESIDENT 




dent Reagan at news conference of August 12. 



J. Are you more or less optimistic 
it the prospects for a summit in 
ember? 

L Yes, I am optimistic. And I'm 
nistic that we're going to make 
! progress than probably has been 
2 in a number of years because of 
| of the problems that are concern- 
he General Secretary at this time. 

J. Your recent speech on South 
ca met with what one account 
■d "a bipartisan chorus of boos on 
tol Hill." It neither silenced your 
cs nor satisfied members of your 
party who are pressing for a more 
eful U.S. approach to that prob- 
At this point, are you willing to 
re those calls for firmer U.S. 
m and possibly see Congress seize 
nitiative in setting policy toward 
h Africa? 



A. I don't think that it's a case of 
whether it's firm action or not. I think 
the simple case is that punitive sanctions 
that would affect the economy there 
would not only be disruptive to 
surrounding states that are virtually 
linked to South Africa's economy but 
would also be very punitive to the people 
that we want to help. And whether the 
Members of the Congress were ready to 
accept what I said in that speech— I can 
tell you that in communication with 
some of the most prominent of the black 
leaders, individuals who are leaders of 
groups of several million, 4V2 million in 
one religious group, and are all solidly 
opposed to the sanctions. And the one 
group that is in support of them in South 
Africa is a group that very definitely has 
been the most radical and wants the 
disruption that would come from 
massive unemployment and hunger and 
desperation of the people; because it is 



their belief that they could then rise out 
of all of that disruption and seize control. 
And this has been transmitted to me 
personally by some of these other 
leaders, like Buthelezi of the largest 
tribal group in all of South Africa, the 
Zulus. And there are others. There are 
religious leaders. Another one, another 
Bishop— you never hear of him— I don't 
know whether I pronounce his name 
right, but it's, I think, Moreno or 
Marnarama. I'm going to have to find 
out what sounds they attach to some of 
their combination of letters. But he's the 
leader of 4Vl> million Christians there. 
And all of them are deathly opposed to 
sanctions. So, I just think that up on the 
Hill there, well-intentioned though they 
may be, they're asking for something 
that would not be helpful. 

On the other hand, I think there are 
evidences that maybe ourselves and 
some of our allies could be invited to 
meet with their government represent- 
atives and see if we couldn't bring about 
some coming together of these respon- 
sible leaders of the black community. 

Q. If you're unwilling at this point 
to define what a reasonable timetable 
is for the abolition of apartheid, does 
the situation, in fact, reach a point at 
some stage where the United States is 
pushed to go beyond friendly persua- 
sion to prod the South Africans for 
change? 

A. I think that's something that you 
face if and when that time comes. Yes, 
we're impatient. And, yes, we feel as 
strongly about apartheid as anyone does, 
and it should be done away with. On the 
other hand, President Botha himself has 
said the same thing and that his goal is 
to eliminate apartheid. 

Q. After you announced your deci- 
sion to subsidize grain sales to the 
Soviet Union, Secretary of State 
Shultz was extremely critical. And I'd 
like you to reply to his criticism. He 
said the Soviet Union must be chor- 
tling at having sales to them subsi- 
dized and scratching their heads about 
a system that says we're going to fix it 
up so that American taxpayers make it 
possible for Soviet housewives to buy 
American-produced food at a price 
lower than an American housewife. 
Now, that's Secretary Shultz; what do 
you have to say about that? 

A. You fellows all caught Secretary 
Shultz— he'd been away, and you caught 
him before he'd had a chance to talk to 
us and find out what it was we really had 
done. 



ber 1986 



THE PRESIDENT 



Now, we're not out, as a matter of 
policy, to continue subsidizing the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union has a long-term 
grain agreement with us, and it calls for 
a purchase of 4 million metric tons of 
grain this year. They have not yet 
boughl that. 

This measure that I employed was in 
the bill that the Congress passed. And 
what we did was say for this one crop, 
and for this one season, that we would 
offer this subsidy to the farmers. We 
didn't do it for the Soviet Union. We did 
it for our farmers, who are, as you 
know— and we hope temporarily— but in 
a real bind, a very severe one. This 
amounted to a subsidy for them, but 
allowed the Soviet Union to buy that 
4 million. If they came in and wanted to 
buy 5, the other million would be back at 
the regular price. And I think George 
has mellowed considerably since he 
found out what it is that we did. 

Q. A lot of people just simply 
think you were trying to buy votes in 
the fall elections, because the 
American taxpayer is going to pay 
about 20C a bushel for this subsidy. 

A. No, we're trying to help in a 
situation that I believe was originally 
created by the Federal Government, 
when the Federal Government, back in 
the days of the Depression, started 
invading the farm community. And with 
all its various programs, it has brought 
on most of the problems that bother the 
farmers today. 

Q. Yesterday you offered strong 
words of encouragement to those who 
would like to see the Berlin Wall torn 
down. I am wondering if at some point 
in the future you might be willing to 
go beyond rhetoric and perhaps put it 
on a future agenda for negotiation 
with the Soviet Union? 

A. I would have no hesitation, what- 
soever, in a summit meeting to discuss 
this with the General Secretary. I think 
it's a wall that never should have been 
built. And I happen to believe that at the 
time that they started to put it up— and 
they started with wire, barbed wire, 
instead of a wall— that if the United 
States had taken the action it should 
have— because that was a total violation 
of the Four Powers agreement for 
Berlin— that if we'd gone in there and 
knocked down that wire then, I don't 
think there'll he a wall today. Because I 
don't think they wanted to start a war 
over that. 

Q. How realistic is it, though? 
Some critics have suggested that it 
raises false hopes for those beyond the 
wall. 



A. I don't think anyone is intending 
to do anything of that kind. But we 
know that they've done a kind of 
lucrative business in letting people come 
through that wall, if the price was right, 
and rejoin their families and friends in 
West Germany. And isn't it strange that 
all of these situations where other people 
build walls to keep an enemy out, and 
there's only one part of the world and 
one philosophy where they have to build 
walls to keep their people in? Maybe 
they're going to recognize that there is 
something wrong with that soon. 

Q. I'd like to go back to your first 
answer on South Africa. You said that 
the only blacks who want sanctions 
are the radical blacks, the ones who 
want upheaval. One of the blacks who 
very much is in favor of sanctions and 
is very critical of your policy is Des- 
mond Tutu, who is a bishop of the 
church and the Nobel Peace Prize win- 
ner. Are you saying that he's one of 
those radical blacks who wants 
upheaval? 

A. No, but I don't think he's right in 
what he's advocating now. But, I guess 
that was careless of me. I was talking in 
terms of the various groupings, political 
alliances and so forth, of the people in 
the black community there. Of course 
there are individuals that may be all 
over, individuals that think that's the 
thing to do, that there's no other answer 
now except just punish, never mind try- 
ing to find a solution to the problem. 
And so, I agree that was careless of me. 
No, I was not linking him in with the 
particular group that I had in mind. 

Q. You also, in your first answer, 
talked about a possible meeting — 
Western governments invited to talk 
to the South African Government and 
to blacks. Could you tell us a little bit 
more about where that stands now, the 
question of your appointing an ambas- 
sador to South Africa and also the 
possibility of a special envoy? 

A. We have made no decision yet on 
the ambassador, nor have we made up 
our minds whether we want to send an 
envoy or not. But at the risk of violating 
something that I said, or I thought that I 
wouldn't do, I am going to say one thing 
about Mr. Botha's speech today. Now, 
I'm not going to comment generally or 
take questions on that because I haven't 
heard it, and I'm not going to comment 
until I hear the whole thing. But I did, 
thanks to the media, hear at least one 
line of his. And this line— he spoke of the 
idea of having the leaders of West 
Germany, France, United Kingdom, and 
the United States to some meetings. 



This is what we ourselves have k 
talking about, and among ourselves | 
these same leaders— is if we could bl 
help. This is a sovereign nation. Yoil 
can't go in and dictate to them and I 
them how they must run their coun I, 
But if we could be of help in bringirr 
together various groupings there to I 
discuss with the government as to f I 
something could be planned to brin;| 
along an end to apartheid earlier, til 
we would be pleased to do. 

As I say, I can't comment becail 
haven't heard or read, and I will gen 
transcript and read his speech. But f 
did— and that was quoted on the aii 1 
did say that he was thinking of suclB 
meeting. 

Q. Would you go to that kind fi 
summit meeting? 

A. I don't know whether it woil 
require us or whether it could be del; 
with foreign ministers or not. We'dfc 
to see the details. 



Q. When you spoke earlier of la 
one group that you said wants dis rd 
and is radical — just to clear up th i 
point — you seemed to be referring ]o 
the African National Congress, tr 
very group that Secretary of Stat' ( 
Shultz says should be negotiated it 
that the Commonwealths feel sho fi 
be part of the solution. Are you s; jn 
that they should not be among thi| 
groups that ought to be included i 
some sort of dialogue, even thougi 
they seem to be very representative) 
a large number of people in South 
Africa? 

A. The African National Congrfe 
started out some years ago, and thtl 
was no question about it being a soil 
organization. But in 1921, in South I 
Africa, the Communist Party was 
formed. And some years later the Cn 
munist Party of South Africa joinecl 
with, and just moved into, the Africl. 
National Congress. And it is that ell 
ment; I don't say the entire ANC, rl 
And George Shultz has talked with I 
them. We know that there are still m 
people. We've had enough experienli 
our own country with so-called coml 
munist fronts to know that you canftv 
an organization with some well-meap 
and fine people, but you have an ekiei 
in there that has its own agenda. A I 
this is what's happened with the All 
And right now, the ANC in exile, til 
ones we're hearing from, that are n* 
ing the statements, are the membeikrf 
that African Communist Party. So, I 
you could do business with and sepsfc 
out and get the solid citizens in the :N< 



Department of State Biel 



THE PRESIDENT 



>me forward on their own, that's just 

[J. Let me understand, also, the 
l of what you said tonight about 
tions. The front-line states, the 
hboring states, have said that 
, even though hurt by sanctions. 
Id welcome it if it came from 
tern countries. Yet President 
1a has imposed sanctions upon 
1. You've not criticized him for 
, you personally, and at the same 
this country has imposed sanc- 
3 on Nicaragua and Poland. Are 
saying that what those regimes do 
leir people is worse than what the 
;h African regime has done to the 
lents of that country? 
\.. No, with regard to Poland, if you 
d check the sanctions that we finally 
lad to be applied there, we applied 
tions that we were sure— and we 
ht Polish advice on this— that would 
larm the citizens of Poland, that 
I would be restrictions on the 
rnment that was at that time deny- 
jech Walesa and the union and so 
I the Solidarity movement, its 
;s. With regard to Nicaragua, there 
comparison between South Africa 
Nicaragua. In South Africa you're 
rig about a country— yes, we 
free and find repugnant some of the 
'ices of their government, but 
're not seeking to impose their 
rnment on other surrounding coun- 
. Nicaragua is a totalitarian, com- 
ist state. It is a sort of a vassal of 
Soviet Union. And it has made plain 
terance after utterance, even since 
Somoza revolution, that their revolu- 
is not going to be confined to their 
ers, that they intend to spread that 
lution throughout Latin America. 
So, what we're talking about is help- 
he people of Nicaragua. Just 
ltly, the last newspaper, La Prensa, 
silenced; two religious leaders were 
ed from the country for criticizing 
: facets of the government. And we 
ly feel that the revolution against 
Dza, which declared in writing to the 
inization of American States what 
goals were: a pluralistic society, a 
)cracy, free speech, freedom of 
>, free labor unions, and all of this — 
pledged what they were trying to 
;ve. Then one element in the revolu- 
threw out the others that had 
ht beside them, and who largely 
3 up the contras, took over, seized 
!r at the point of a gun. And we 
ly believe that the people of 
ragua have got a right to try for 
! original goals. 



Q. After Reverend Lawrence Mar- 
tin Jenco was released by his captors 
in Beirut a few weeks ago, he met 
with you and said he delivered a 
message from his captors. What was 
in that message, specifically, and how 
have you been using that to obtain the 
release of the other Americans held in 
Lebanon? 

A. Contrary to what the tone of 
some people is, we've been trying relent- 
lessly to get those hostages back from 
the first day of their captivity. First, we 
had to try and find out where they were. 
We still don't really know that. They're 
moved frequently. And we're going to 
keep on trying. We have had some 
broken hearts. Many times that we 
thought we were on the track and that 
we were almost going to be able to set a 
day when they would be free, and then it 
would disappear into the sand and we'd 
have to start on another path. We're 
going to continue until we get them 
back. 

But he did bring some oral mes- 
sages—well, I say messages because I 
didn't hear the one that was for the 
Pope— but he did to us. And I feel that it 
was told to me in confidence, and I have 
a feeling that if I should go public with 
some of the things in that, I might do 
harm to our efforts to try and get them 
back. So, I'm not going to comment on 
that. 

Q. Can you say tonight that we are 
any closer to seeing the other Ameri- 
cans held there being freed as Father 
Jenco was? 

A. My hesitance about that— it's just 
what I've said before: that there have 
been times when, if you'd asked me that 
question, I would have been tempted to 
say, yes, it's imminent. And then, as I 
say, it disappeared, and we had to find 
another track and start over. And we've 
known encouragement and discourage- 
ment. And I can't comment. We must 
get them back, and we're going to keep 
on doing everything we can and trying 
to get them back. But I don't want to 
say anything that will endanger them. 

Q. The comparison you discussed 
before between Nicaragua and South 
Africa seems to agitate many of your 
critics who note the eloquence with 
which you address the issue of 
freedom fighting in Nicaragua but 
seem to lose that eloquence in South 
Africa. Do you honestly believe that 
the South African Government treats 
its black majority worse than the 
Sandinista regime, Marxist though it 
may be, treats Nicaraguan citizens 
inside Nicaragua, keeping in mind the 



number of black South Africans who 
have died over the past year alone, the 
amount of the cross-border incursions 
the South African Government has 
conducted against the neighboring 
states, et cetera, et all 

A. I think that I have condemned 
publicly all of those things that you're 
talking about. On the other hand, I also 
realize the complexity of the South 
Africa problem, because much of that 
death that you spoke of is being inflicted 
by blacks on blacks because of their own 
tribal separations. And all of this must 
be taken into account in finding a system 
of government. 

But also I am quoting now one of 
those black leaders who wrote a most 
statesmanlike and eloquent letter to me 
just recently, and he pointed out that 
while, yes, they were impatient, and, 
yes, we hope that we can make progress 
faster, he pointed out he did not disap- 
prove of Botha. He pointed out what he 
has accomplished and the things that he 
has done. And he also made a point 
about what would happen if those in our 
country who want us to have the 
American companies that are over there 
doing business withdraw. And he 
pointed out that those companies— some 
200 of them— following the Sullivan prin- 
ciples, in which there is the kind of treat- 
ment that we would recognize as being 
decent in this country with regard to 
their employees and outside the actual 
employment, the things they've tried to 
do to improve life for the families on the 
outside, that this would all be lost if 
some people had their way with sanc- 
tions and so forth and with forcing us to 
withdraw. 

But then he also pointed out that 
because of the Sullivan principles that 
were used by these American companies, 
a great many South African companies 
had taken the cue from that and adopted 
on their own principles that were similar 
to that— having to do with promotion, 
having to do with hiring, having to do 
with ignoring racial difference with 
regard to promotion to supervisory posi- 
tions and all. 

Now, this is all going on. Nothing 
like that is going on in Nicaragua, not 
when a priest stands up and speaks to 
his congregation and because he says 
some things that— well, for example, 
protesting the fact that the government 
has shut down on the church's news- 
paper and shut down on the church's 
radio station, seized their printing 
presses so that they can't even have 
church bulletins anymore— and then he's 
thrown out of the country for having 
said that. 



)ber 1986 



THE PRESIDENT 



That's a little different than what 
was going on in South Africa. 

Q. Twice now, black candidates to 
become your new Ambassador to 
South Africa seemed, for one reason or 
another, to have fallen by the wayside. 
Are you having difficulty in finding a 
black Ambassador to South Africa 



because you can find no qualified black 
who agrees with your policy now? 

A. No, [it] has nothing to do with 
that. And the one that fell by the 
wayside— let me tell you that I regret 
that more than anything. I have the 
greatest respect and admiration for that 
man. And what happened was some 
possible connection with a legal action 
involving some institutions— he's in a 



public relations field at this moment 
and that he, for one thing, he very j 
ably would not be able to leave and 
the time to go there as this comes fr 
head. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 18, 198' 



International Trade 



President. Reagan 's radio address to 
the nation of August 2, 1986. l 

It's sometimes said that if you put three 
economists together in a room and ask 
them a question, you're liable to get 
more than three answers. It's true, 
economists don't often agree; but there 
is one issue on which almost all responsi- 
ble economists, whatever their political 
persuasion, are unanimous. They agree 
that free and fair trade brings growth 
and opportunity and creates jobs. And 
they all warn that high trade barriers, 
what is often called protectionism, 
undermines economic growth and 
destroys jobs. I don't call it protec- 
tionism; I call it destructionism. 

That's why our motto is: free and 
fair trade with free and fair traders. 
Now, we've seen that governments 
sometimes don't play by the rules. They 
keep exports out of subsidy— or sub- 
sidize, I should say, industries, giving 
them an unfair advantage. Well, our 
patience with unfair trade isn't endless, 
and we're taking action to bring other 
nations back in line to ensure that free 
trade remains fair trade. We're aggres- 
sively using existing trade laws to pry 
open foreign markets and force others to 
play by the rules. 

This week, for instance, we signed a 
breakthrough trade agreement that'll 
open up Japanese markets to U.S. 
semiconductors and prevent the 
Japanese from dumping semiconductors 
in our markets. And last month, after 
intensive negotiations in response to a 
deadline I set, the European Community 
agreed to keep its market open to U.S. 
farm exports. 

These agreements are examples of 
positive, result-oriented trade action. 
Instead of closing markets at home, 
we've opened markets to U.S. products 



abroad, thus helping to create more 
American jobs. Instead of erecting 
destructionist import barriers, we're 
tearing down foreign barriers to make 
trade freer and fairer for all. Because, 
believe me, when Americans are com- 
peting on a level playing field, they can 
outproduce and outsell anyone, any- 
where in the world. 

We've been tough with those nations 
who've been unfair in their trading prac- 
tices, and that toughness has produced 
results. And with hard-pressed indus- 
tries like textiles and apparel that have 
gone through difficult times, we've 
taken strong action to help. We renego- 
tiated agreements with Taiwan and 
Hong Kong over a year early to expand 
product coverage and tighten controls of 
imports from those countries. We are 
pursuing negotiations with Korea to 
tighten restraints on their exports to us 
and improve opportunities for our pro- 
ducers in their market. And just this 
week we completed a tough, new multi- 
fiber arrangement with our trading part- 
ners that will include products not 
previously covered and which gives us 
tools to prevent damaging import 
surges. This is result-oriented action. 

What doesn't bring results is the 
sort of destructionist legislation now 
before the House of Representatives. 
Next week the House will vote on 
whether to override my veto of a textile 
trade bill, and I'm hopeful this won't 
happen. 

My council of economic advisers 
estimates this bill would cost you, the 
consumer, $44 billion over the next 5 
years: $70,000 for every job saved, jobs 
that pay about $13,000 on average. Even 
worse, these temporarily protected jobs 
would be more than offset by the loss of 
thousands of other jobs— jobs in retail. 



marketing, and finance, and jobs di 
related to importing, such as dock- 
workers and transportation worker 
And then there are all those who w 
be thrown out of work as we began 
feel the effects of foreign retaliatio 
and you can bet there would be ret; 
tion. I'm thinking, especially, of out 
struggling agricultural sector and i' 
many connected industries. At a tir 
when we're trying to increase agric 
tural exports, let's remember that ! 
of the first victims of retaliation wc 
be our farmers— kicking them wher 
they're already down. 

So, our trade policy remains a 
positive one that will not play off ot 
region against another or one Ame 
worker against another, doing grie' 
damage to the industries involved, 
trying to help workers in ailing indi 
tries, we must be careful that the ci 
not worse than the disease, like the 
infamous Smoot-Hawley tariffs tha 
deepened and prolonged the Great 
Depression. The best way to help is 
the pro-growth policies of free and 
trade that have created more than 
million new jobs in the last 3 l k year 
the last 7 months 1,650,000 people 
found jobs in the United States. Th; 
more than Europe and Japan combi 
in the last 10 years. And by the wai 
recently released figures show the 
leading economic indicators are up 
unemployment has dropped to 6.89E 

You know, the Europeans talk i 
the "American miracle" of economih 
growth and job creation. Well, I'm ;i 
to do everything I can to keep that 
miracle of hope alive, creating jobs K 
opportunities for all Americans. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 11. 1981 



Department of State Bi3l 



MS CONTROL 



ms Control: 
jrning the Corner? 



'enneth L. Adelman 

iddress before the American Bar 
ciation 's annual meeting in New 
: City on August. 12, 1986. Mr. 
man is Director of the U.S. Arms 
rot and 1 disarmament Agency. 

summer has been an intensely busy 
id for arms control. It began with 
'resident's decision on interim 
aint and SALT [strategic arms 
ation talks]. Then there was the new 
;t proposal, General Secretary Gor- 
ev's subsequent letter to the Presi- 
, a series of meetings with the Presi- 
and his response to Gorbachev— as 
as a special session of the Standing 
mltative Commission and new talks 
jclear testing issues. In roughly a 
;h, the sixth round of the Geneva 
will resume. 

^s the President said at Glassboro, 
lay be at a turning point in arms 
•ol. There are signs of hope in 
achev's letter and in Soviet moves 
•neva. The President's response 
i to bridge the remaining differ- 
5 in our positions, 
'o get this far has taken an enor- 
; amount of perseverance on his 
Having worked with him for 5-plus 
5 now, I am most struck by his deep 
nitment to building a safer world, to 
-sing the nuclear arms buildup, and 
oviding an alternative strategy that 
not hinge so dreadfully on the 
it of mutual annihilation, 
rhat said, I suspect the question in 
minds and many others is: "Will 
\ be an arms agreement during this 
inist ration?" 

ro answer that question, we must 
address two others. 

Question One: What have we 
led in the arms control process? 
Question Two: What exactly is the 
ed States trying to accomplish in 
i control today? 

t We Have Learned 

, what have we learned? Several 
:s: 

''or one, we've learned the lesson 
arms control negotiations with 
soviet Union are not necessarily a 
Tessive or cumulative enterprise. 



The assumption in 1972. remember, was 
that SALT I would be a "first step" to 
more ambitious agreements— agree- 
ments which actually reduced and 
restricted the arms competition. You 
would move step by step to more com- 
prehensive and ambitious treaties. That 
was the theory. The reality turned out 
otherwise. By 1979 when SALT II failed 
to get Senate approval, it was clear that 
our hope had not materialized. 

What happened, and who was to 
blame? In 1979 I think there was a 
widespread feeling in this country that 
we had kept our side of the bargain. 
Americans from the President on down 
plainly saw the SALT agreements and 
negotiations as an opportunity to limit 
and stabilize the arms competition. In 
the wake of SALT I, our defense effort 
genuinely slackened, at least in part 
because of our faith in the arms control 
process. In the 1970s U.S. defense 
spending actually dropped in real 
terms— the most significant decline 
since the Korean war— with procurement 
of new strategic systems declining the 
most. 

I am not saying that we stood still. 
We continued to modernize our forces. 
But we did so at a far slower rate than 
we had pursued during the previous 
decade. We converted our missiles to 
multiple warheads and thus increased 
our total warheads, as did the Soviet 
Union. 

But we did not field a new set of 
strategic weapons systems— and many of 
the new systems that were scheduled to 
come on in the late 1970s were stretched 
out or postponed. There was no new 
U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) after we began deploying 
Minuteman III in 1970 until the MX. We 
built no new ballistic missile submarines 
between 1966 and 1981. 

Believing, as many people did in the 
1970s, that both sides were now pre- 
pared to accept "mutual vulnerability" 
and "mutual assured destruction," Con- 
gress also slashed funds for strategic 
defense research in the mid-1970s and 
voted to dismantle our one permitted 
ABM [antiballistic missile] site. 

Meanwhile, on the Soviet side, we 
saw basically the opposite pattern. 
Instead of slowing down, the Soviets 
accelerated their building effort, using 
the breathing spell provided by SALT as 
an opportunity to move ahead. 



Working largely— but not entirely— 
within the treaty limits, the Soviets 
essentially quadrupled their arsenal of 
ballistic missile warheads. They amassed 
a large force of first-strike-capable 
weapons— the SS-18 missiles, weapons 
apparently designed to reduce our ability 
to retaliate and to undermine mutual 
deterrence. In a period of roughly 15 
years— during which both sides were 
supposedly restrained by SALT— the 
Soviets deployed four new types of 
ICBMs, five new classes of ballistic 
missile submarines, and five new types 
of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 
to name only the most conspicuous 
things. 

They never accepted the theory of 
"mutual vulnerability." They poured 
roughly an equal amount of money and 
energy into defensive systems as they 
did into offensive ones. They upgraded 
their Moscow ABM system and vigor- 
ously pursued their own strategic 
defense program. (And, let me tell you, 
the Soviets were vigorously engaged in 
"star wars" long before anybody had 
heard of Luke Skywalker.) 

We see similar problems in the 
negotiating process itself. With the 
Soviets, discussions do not normally pro- 
ceed step by step to bigger and better 
things. More often than not, we found 
ourselves in the position of Sisyphus hav- 
ing to push the rock up the hill only to 
have it roll right back down again. 

To take one example: when the 
SALT I negotiations began, the Soviets 
insisted on a completely lopsided defini- 
tion of strategic systems. They proposed 
to include systems with which we defend 
our European and Asian allies, while 
excluding the' comparable Soviet systems 
that threaten our allies. Eventually, the 
Soviets dropped this requirement, so 
that we could conclude SALT I. When 
negotiations resumed on SALT II, it 
reemerged. Eventually, they dropped it 
again so that we could conclude SALT 
II. When negotiations resumed on the 
strategic arms reduction talks (START), 
it reemerged. The rock kept rolling 
down the hill. 

Negotiating with the Soviets is really 
an extraordinary experience, quite 
unlike anything even the most experi- 
enced negotiator— as many of you are- 
is likely to come across in the West. 

Throughout the past 15 years, we 
have witnessed a process in which the 
United States has frequently carried the 
ball for both sides. In the SALT negoti- 
ations, the United States supplied not 
only the figures on U.S. forces but, rely- 
ing on our intelligence, the figures on 
Soviet forces as well. The Soviets did not 



ARMS CONTROL 



volunteer facts and figures on their 
forces, but merely said they did not 
dispute our estimates. They wouldn't tell 

e number, the types, or even the 
names of the systems on which we were 
negotiating. 

On one occasion, when we gave them 
our figures on their weapons, the Soviet 
military representative asked us to 
refrain. He was agitated that such highly 
secret information would be revealed to 
the civilian members on his delegation. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union viewed negotiations very differ- 
ently. We crafted proposals designed to 
be balanced and fair to both sides. The 
Soviets crafted proposals to give 
themselves advantages. The game was 
being played, so to speak, on our half of 
the field. To put it another way: while 
we played to tie, they played to win. 

In the second place, we've learned 
that the Soviets use arms control 
negotiations to advance their broader 
aims of splitting the United States 
from its allies and having the United 
States unilaterally stop major 
strategic programs. 

This approach was clear even in 
1917. When Trotsky went to negotiate 
the peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Ger- 
mans, Lenin told him to remember that 
what happens outside the negotiating 
room may be more important than what 
happens within. 

So, there has always been a large 
political purpose to Soviet negotiating 
strategy. Frequently, in arms control it 
is the driving factor. During the negotia- 
tions on intermediate-range nuclear 
forces in 1981-83, for example, it was 
extremely unlikely that the West could 
have achieved an agreement. It's clear 
now that the Soviets were not seriously 
interested in any arms control agree- 
ment. Their main effort was outside the 
negotiating room to divide the NATO 
alliance. Similarly, for the past 3 years, 
their main effort was outside the 
negotiating room— to stop the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). 

The problems in arms control 
negotiations are, of course, not all on the 
Soviet side. There is, to put it gingerly, a 
great deal of "pluralism" on our side. 

President Reagan wants to hear all 
points of view on an issue before 
deciding a course. Believe me, he is 
never disappointed in this regard when 
it comes to arms control. While this 
diversity ran be constructive in the deci- 
sionmaking process, it can get carried 
away at times. 

Imagine that you were representing 
a corporation negotiating with another 



corporation— as I am sure many of you 
do— and that the other corporation 
simply refused to reveal any financial 
information relevant to the deal and 
repeatedly reraised issues you thought 
were settled. And then imagine that 
your opposites maintained an absolutely 
solid front— while your senior manage- 
ment, your board of directors, and your 
employees all staked out separate posi- 
tions publicly that weakened your 
negotiating hand. 

But these are precisely the condi- 
tions under which the United States 
tends to go into an arms negotiation, 
when you consider activities in the 
media. Congress, and among our allies 
and others. 

The Congress has been particularly 
prone over the years to conduct its own, 
independent arms control policy based 
largely on the discredited idea that 
unilateral concessions by us will inspire 
matching concessions on the Soviet side. 
There is not a single instance when this 
has occurred. On the contrary, the 
Soviets read these gestures not as a sign 
of good will but as a sign we lack will. 
Unilateral concessions on our part just 
mean unilateral advantages on theirs. 

All too often a weapons system that 
gets the Soviets' attention, that actually 
prompts the Soviet Union to bargain 
seriously, becomes fair game for Con- 
gress to gut or kill in the name of arms 
control. 

The $5.3 billion proposed for SDI, 
which got the Soviets back to the table 
for talks, is trimmed to less than $4 
billion by a Senate committee. A 
$300-million program for an antisatellite 
(ASAT) weapon is gutted. The fact that 
the Soviets already have an ASAT 
weapon and an extensive strategic 
defense program in progress somehow 
does not weigh heavily in the arcane 
calculus by which Congress arrives at 
such decisions. 

Two hundred years ago Congress 
was debating the creation of the Federal 
army. One member introduced a resolu- 
tion that would limit the army to 3,000 
soldiers. General Washington responded 
by suggesting his own resolution— to 
provide that any enemy invading the 
country would be limited to 2,000 
soldiers. The first resolution was 
drowned in laughter. I wish George 
Washington were around to make the 
same point today. 

The third major lesson is that the 
Soviets violate agreements. This says 
something about the Soviets and about 
the need for effective verification. 

Look, for example, at the 1972 con- 
vention banning biological and toxin 



weapons. According to Arkady 
Shevchenko, the former senior Sovil 
official at the United Nations who I 
defected to the United States, the 
Politburo decided to continue activi 
which violated the convention in tht 
same time period that the Soviet U 
signed it. 

The Soviet violation of the 197£ 
ABM Treaty is a similar story. The 
decided to build the Krasnoyarsk n 
in the early to mid-1970s. They kne 
would eventually detect it, since it 
over three football fields large. Th< 
must have known it could not be 
explained except as a violation of tl 
treaty. 

Hours upon hours of the ABM 
Treaty negotiations were spent 
negotiating the provisions governi 
such large radars. Why? Because tl 
radars are a key to complying with E 
treaty: they are the large, long-leac ir 
item in any effort to deploy a natio ■ 
ABM system. This is an issue we h; i 
come to terms with. Soviet violatio \ 
undermining the basis for future 
agreements. 

Finally, we've also learned tl 
lesson that arms control negotiat lit 
and agreements by themselves ar> M 
guarantee of overall peace or stal |t 

This lesson, too, went against the el 
ventional wisdom. 

After SALT I, the expectation B 
for a steady improvement of relatk p 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. But the period betweM 
SALT I and SALT II was, in fact, :| 
period of deteriorating global stabi.li 
Regional conflicts were multiplying I' 
around the globe. Between 1975 an 
1980-the height of the SALT proc 
virtually a nation a year fell to com 
munist forces: South Vietnam in 19 
Angola in 1975-76, Ethiopia in 197 
Cambodia in 1978, and Afghanistar 
1979. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghani 
occurred in the same year as the sij 
of the major arms control agreemei 
SALT II— and just 6 months after 
mit meeting between the American 
President and the Soviet leader. At 
control agreements can play a useft 
role, but it takes much more than a 
treaty to keep the peace. 



What We Are Trying 
to Accomplish 

Now to my second question: what aw 
trying to accomplish in arms contrc ' 
today? 






Department of State Bjel 



ARMS CONTROL 



he answer is simple: we want an 
agreement that will accomplish 
thing of substance; one that will 
jrably decrease the risk of war and 
ice stability; one that will reverse 
Dward nuclear spiral. President 
in wants real reductions, 
rms agreements need to 
iplish something in the real world, 
have to be worth more than the 
1 they're printed on. They must 
ss our hope, but they must be more 
mere expressions of hope. That has 
and continues to be, the principle 
foverns the arms control policy of 
Ldministration. 

o, how far have we succeeded? 
more than our critics concede. 

irst, we have succeeded in getting 
jviets back to the table. They 
i politics and walked out. Now we 
f discern what the President has 
nay be a turning point toward real 
etailed bargaining on the substan- 
ssues that divide us. If this is true, 
ood news. Staying the course on 
overall goals is the watchword of 
■ity on arms control. Shifting from 
o goal is to treat arms control 
rily as a public relations enter- 
an activity more appropriate for 
.on Avenue than Pennsylvania 
le. 

econd, we have succeeded in get- 
he Soviets to talk about reductions 
■lear weapons. This was no small 
!n 1977, you may remember, Presi- 
]arter sent Secretary of State 
' to Moscow with a plan for deep 
tions in nuclear weapons. Brezhnev 
i the proposal down flat. 
Tien President Reagan first pro- 
deep cuts in nuclear arsenals in 
he was criticized for seeking too 
A major criticism of this 
nistration's arms control policy 
j the first term was that our pro- 

> were too ambitious and thus, as 
.ying goes, insufficiently 

•tiable" with the Soviets. Over the 

> years, we have redefined what is 
iable by insisting on negotiating 
what is most important. 

hird. we have succeeded in getting 
ilks to focus on the more critical 
iires of strategic power. While the 
i and obsolete SALT structure 
almost entirely with strategic 
ir delivery vehicles, our proposals 
alk about warheads and destructive 
ilities directly. The Soviets have 
to move in this direction as well. 
V accepted this approach with deep 
tions, we would finally get an 
ment that would mitigate Soviet 
trike capabilities, really reduce the 



risk of war, and thus realize the primary 
goal of strategic arms control. 

Finally, we have succeeded in 
launching an effort to see whether we 
can devise a means to effectively counter 
such nuclear missiles. Such defenses, if 
they prove feasible, could improve our 
security by strengthening deterrence 
and reducing the likelihood of any 
nuclear attack. President Reagan has 
simply asked whether we can find a 
better way to maintain the peace than 
the threat of mutual annihilation and 
total vulnerability. It may not be possible 
to find one. But we must continue to try. 

Even with these successes we have a 
long way to go. Major bargains are not 
struck easily, especially with an adver- 
sary like the Soviet Union. 

Proposing good arms control is one 
thing; attaining good arms control is 
another. As Glendower boasts in Henry 
IV, "I can call spirits from the vasty 
deep," to which Hotspur replies, "Why, 
so can I, or so can any man. But will 
they come when you do call for them?" 

That brings us back to the question 
we began with: will there be an arms 
control agreement in this Adminis- 
tration? 



Yes, there will be an agreement if 
the Soviets decide they want an agree- 
ment. Yes, there will be an agreement if 
the Soviets move off some unacceptable 
positions and, yes, if the Soviets are as 
ready to bargain as seriously as we are. 

I personally am hopeful about the 
prospects for an agreement. We are 
ready to move. But we don't know 
whether the Soviets are ready to move 
seriously with us. 

But even if we do not achieve an 
agreement, that does not mean we will 
be less secure. In the past 5 years, we 
have had no new agreements. But the 
goals that arms control is meant to 
advance— security, peace, a world safe 
for free nations— have been advanced. 
The 1980s have not witnessed those 
kinds of crises that brought the world to 
the brink— the Korean war in the 1950s, 
the Berlin and Cuban missile crises in 
the 1960s, and the Yom Kippur war in 
the 1970s (when we went on strategic 
alert to prevent Soviet forces from mov- 
ing into the Middle East). 

From 1975-80, when arms control 
negotiations were occupying center 
stage, freedom was on the run around 
the world— from our embassy in Tehran, 
to the valleys of Afghanistan, to the 



CDE Opens Final Session 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 18, 1986 1 

After 2 l k years of negotiations, the 
Stockholm Conference on Confidence- 
and Security-Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe (CDE) begins its 
12th and final session on August 19. It 
will adjourn on September 19, and its 
work must be complete by then. 

The United States places great 
importance on reaching a militarily 
significant result in Stockholm. Success 
in CDE would contribute directly to a 
clearer and more predictable military 
situation in Europe. More broadly it 
would give an important impulse to the 
Helsinki process, of which CDE is an 
integral part, and thus contribute to pro- 
motion of all the aims of the Helsinki 
Final Act. 

The United States was pleased with 
the progress that was made in the final 
days of the last round of negotiations. If 
the East adopts a constructive posture, 
we believe we can fulfill the conference's 
mandate to negotiate concrete, verifiable 
measures that increase the openness of 



all military activities in Europe. To meet 
this objective, we believe the Stockholm 
conference must adopt measures to 
create a comprehensive, verifiable 
confidence-building regime requiring the 
exchange of military information and the 
forecasting, notification, and observation 
of military activities. We believe that 
effective verification of these measures 
by all participating states can only come 
from inspection of activities which cast 
doubt on compliance. 

Because so little time remains in 
which to reach agreement, the President 
has instructed the U.S. delegation to 
return to Stockholm early to take part in 
informal consultation aimed at resolving 
some outstanding issues. Ambassador 
Robert L. Barry, head of the U.S. 
delegation to CDE, has the full support 
of the President in seeking a concluding 
document which meets the objectives we 
have pursued since negotiations began 
and which will contribute to the security 
of all participating states. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 25, 1986. 



er 1986 



ARMS CONTROL 



charnel houses of Cambodia. The com- 
munist insurgencies of the 1970s— those 
ieds of tyranny— have given way to 
a new generation of popular movements 
against Marxist regimes— in Afghani- 
stan, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and 
Cambodia. 

In the 1980s we have restored 
stability by rebuilding our military 



strength and restoring our national 
pride. We have intensified our dialogue 
with the Soviet Union on human rights 
and regional issues— as well as arms con- 
trol. We have drawn the line against 
tyranny and terrorism, and the faith and 
free economies of the world are prosper- 
ing. Democracy is burgeoning around 
the globe. Freedom is no longer on the 
run. Freedom is now on the march. ■ 



Interim Restraint: 

U.S. and Soviet Force Projections 



LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, 
AUG. 5, 1986 1 

Enclosed in an unclassified version of a 
classified report which I provided on June 19 
in response to related Congressional requests, 
including a request for projections and com- 
parisions of U.S. and Soviet strategic force 
dismantlements, inventories, etc., in terms of 
adherence to existing arms control 
agreements. 

As I noted in my letter of June 19 
transmitting the classified report, it is clear 
that SALT II and I codified a very major 
arms buildup including a quadrupling of 
Soviet strategic weapons (warheads and 
bombs) since SALT I was signed in 1972 and 
near doubling of Soviet ballistic missile 
warheads from about 5,000 to more than 
9,000 since SALT II was signed in 1979. 

The report further found that the SALT I 
and II agreements, even if fully complied 
with, would not prevent a very substantia] 
further expansion of Soviet capabilities. We 
believe that, absent SALT II, the Soviets 
would not necessarily expand their forces 
significantly beyond the increases already 
projected with SALT II since the Soviet 
forces are very large and would appear, in 
our judgment, more than enough to meet 
reasonable military requirements. 

In my letter of June 19, I noted that in 
view of the adverse implications of Soviet 
noncompliance for our security and for the 
arms control process, I had determined on 
May 27 that, in the future, the United States 
must base decisions regarding its strategic 
force structure on the nature and magnitude 
of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, 
and not on standards contained in the SALT 
structure which has been undermined by 
Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a 
flawed SALT II treaty which was never 
ratified, would have expired if it had been 
ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet 
Union. 

I have also noted that the full implemen- 
tation of the Strategic Modernization Pro- 
gram is critical both to meeting our future 
national security needs and to appropriately 



responding to Soviet noncompliance. How- 
ever, we will exercise utmost restraint. As we 
modernize, we will continue to retire older 
forces as national security requirements per- 
mit. We do not anticipate any appreciable 
growth in the size of U.S. strategic forces. 
Assuming no significant change in the threat, 
we will not deploy more strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic 
missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. 

I want again to emphasize that no policy 
of interim restraint is a substitute for an 
agreement on deep and equitable reductions 
in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we 
can be confident of Soviet compliance with 
it. Achieving such reductions continues to 
receive my highest priority. This is the most 
direct path to achieving greater stablity and a 
safer world. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



UNCLASSIFIED REPORT 

Report to the Congress on U.S. 
Interim Restraint Policy and 
Representative Soviet and U.S. 
Dismantlement and Strategic Force 
Projections With and Without 
SALT I and II 



I. Introduction: U.S. Interim 
Restraint Policy and U.S. Responses 
to Soviet Noncompliance 

This report is an unclassified version of a 
report forwarded to the Congress on 
June 19, 1986, in response to the 
requirements of the fiscal year 1986 
Department of Defense Authorization 
Act (Title X, Section 1001 (b)) for a 
report on certain data and assessments 
related to U.S. and Soviet strategic 
offensive forces and on possible Soviet 
political, military, and negotiating 
responses to changes in the U.S. policy 



of interim restraint. As requested U 
legislation, the report covers a 5-yl 
period. It is provided in conjunction 
material including the President's I 
ment of May 27 and a White Housi 
sheet of the same date on "U.S. Irn 
Restraint Policy: Responding to S<l 
Arms Control Violations." 

The U.S. policy of interim restl 
as first announced by the Presidei n 
1982 has been that, in spite of the ■ 
inherent in the SALT [strategic ara 
limitation talks] agreements and ii r. 
effort to foster an atmosphere of 1 1 
restraint conducive to serious neg> ■ 
tions on arms reductions, the Unit 1 
States would not undercut the expl 
SALT I Interim Offensive Agreen U 
1972 or the unratified SALT II Trl 
1979 so long as the Soviet Union e | 
cised equal restraint. 

In three detailed Administrati* I 
reports to the Congress on Soviet I 
compliance, and through diplomat H 
channels including the U. S. -Soviet I ' 
Standing Consultative Commissioi t] 
President has consistently made cl a 
that this U.S. policy required Sovi II 
reciprocity and that it must not 
adversely affect our national secui fl 
interests in the face of the continu J 
Soviet military buildup and uncorr tl 
Soviet noncompliance. 

In accordance with U.S. interi I 
restraint policy and our efforts to H 
framework of truly mutual restrai l| 
United States has not taken any a< fl 
that would undercut existing agre( I 
ments. We have continued scrupul ^ 
to live within all arms control agre I 
ments, including the SALT I and III 
strategic arms agreements. Unforl|f 
ately, while the United States has B 
attempting to hold to the structure i 
SALT through our policy of interirl 
restraint, the Soviet Union has until 
the very foundation of that structui 
through its continued violations. 

In June of 1985, the President I 
the extra mile. He decided to dismili 
U.S. Poseidon submarine, in order I 
give the Soviet Union adequate tin 
correct its noncompliance, reverse > 
unwarranted military buildup, and |l 
seriously pursue equitable and veri|l 
arms reduction agreements in the ' 
Geneva negotiations. Regrettably, B. 
Soviet LInion has so far failed to mj( 
constructively in these three areas. i 

In spite of our expressed concel 
and our diplomatic efforts for corn! 
Soviet actions, the Soviet Union hatt 
corrected its noncompliance. Conctw 
SALT II, the President's most reccjj 
report, of December 23, 1985, to tr' 
Congress cited as Soviet violations: 



10 



Department of State BJ 



ARMS CONTROL 



e development of the SS-25 
e, a prohibited second new type of 
continental ballistic missile (ICBM); 
tensive encryption of telemetry on 
1 missile flight tests, which impedes 
cation; (3) concealment of the 
iation between the SS-25 missile 
I launcher during testing; and 
ceeding the SALT II numerical cap 
04 strategic nuclear delivery 
es (SNDVs). In addition, the Presi- 
; report cited three areas of 
fuous Soviet behavior as involving 
)le violations or other problems 
■egard to SALT II: (1) SS-16 ICBM 
ty, (2) the Backfire bomber's inter- 
lental operating capability, and 
a Backfire bomber's production 
Concerning SALT I, the Presi- 
I report cited a violation in the 
; use of former SS-7 ICBM 
ies in support of the deployment 
jeration of the SS-25 mobile 
s. These SALT II and SALT I 
ons and other ambiguous situa- 
nvolving these treaties remain 
's of serious concern, as does 
violation of the Anti-Ballistic 
(ABM) Treaty of 1972 and of 
najor arms control agreements. 
e Administration has now con- 
a comprehensive review, and 
ive consultations with our allies 
ends abroad and with Members of 
ngress on the continuing Soviet 
l of noncompliance, the Soviet 
nc arms buildup, and the lack of 
ss by the Soviets at the Geneva 
itions. The President announced 
/ 27 that in the future the United 
would base decisions regarding its 
nc force structure on the nature 
ignitude of the threat posed by 
e strategic forces, not on standards 
aied in the flawed SALT structure, 
ihas been seriously undermined by 
Bnoncompliance. 

this May 27 announcement on U.S. 
rji restraint policy and on the U.S. 
Ise to continued Soviet non- 
knee, the President pointed out 
appropriateness of continuing with 
JLT II agreement. SALT II 
Si continuing major arms buildups, 
^considered by a broad range of 
C| including the Senate Armed 
lis Committee, to be unequal and 
liable in important provisions. It 
d/er ratified by the U.S. Senate 
I s clearly headed for defeat before 
Bsident's predecessor asked the 
■ not to act on it. With SALT II 
wiets have nearly doubled their 
Hie ballistic missile warheads from 
1,000 to 9,000, and with SALT II 



1 hey could legally undertake a further 
significant increase. Even if SALT II 
had been ratified, it would have expired 
on December 31, 1985. 

Finally, continued Soviet violations 
have seriously undercut the agreement 
for several years in spite of repeated 
U.S. requests for corrective Soviet 
action. (Concerning SALT I, this agree- 
ment expired in 1977, and since it was 
signed in 1972, the Soviet Union has 
quadrupled the number of its strategic 
nuclear warheads. As for the United 
States, even if we did not retire older 
systems, the United States would, under 
current plans, remain in technical 
observance of the SALT I numerical 
limits until mid-1989.) 

The President made clear in his 
May 27 announcement that the United 
States would continue to exercise utmost 
restraint in the future, seeking to meet 
U.S. strategic needs, given the Soviet 
buildup, by means that minimize incen- 
tives for continuing Soviet offensive 
force growth. The President stated that, 
as we modernize, we will continue to 
retire older forces as our national secur- 
ity requirements permit and that we do 
not anticipate any appreciable numerical 
growth in U.S. strategic forces. He also 
indicated that, assuming no significant 
change in the threat we face as we 
implement the strategic modernization 
program, the United States will not 
deploy more strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles or more strategic ballistic 
missile warheads than does the Soviet 
Union. 

The President also noted that, as a 
result of his decision to dismantle two 
older Poseidon submarines, the United 
States will remain technically in observ- 
ance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty 
for some months. He continues to hope 
that the Soviet Union will use this addi- 
tional time to take the constructive steps 
necessary to alter the current situation. 
Should they do so, the President has 
stated that this would be taken into 
account. 

Needless to say, the most essential 
near-term response to Soviet non- 
compliance remains the implementation 
of our full strategic modernization pro- 
gram, to underwrite deterrence today, 
and the continued pursuit of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
research program, to see if it is possible 
to provide a safer and more stable basis 
for our future security and that of our 
allies. The strategic modernization pro- 
gram, including the deployment of the 
second 50 Peacekeeper missiles, is the 
foundation for all future U.S. offensive 
force options. It provides a solid basis 



that can and will be adjusted over time 
to respond most efficiently to continued 
Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program 
represents our best hope for a future in 
which our security can rest on the 
increasing contribution of defensive 
systems that threaten no one. 

In his May 27 statement, the Presi- 
dent emphasized that no policy of 
interim restraint is a substitute for an 
agreement on deep and equitable reduc- 
tions in offensive nuclear arms, provided 
that we can be confident of Soviet com- 
pliance with it. Achieving such reduc- 
tions has received, and will continue to 
receive, his highest priority. We hope 
the Soviet Union will act to give 
substance to the agreement reached by 
the President and General Secretary 
Gorbachev at the summit meeting last 
November to achieve early progress in 
the Geneva negotiations. It was agreed 
to focus, in particular, on areas where 
there is common ground, including the 
principle of 50% reductions, appropri- 
ately applied, in the strategic nuclear 
arms of both countries, as well as an 
interim agreement on intermediate- 
range nuclear forces. If the Soviet Union 
carries out this agreement, we can move 
now to achieve greater stability and a 
safer world. 

The classified report transmitted to 
the Congress on June 19 provided a com- 
parison of representative U.S. and 
Soviet strategic weapons dismantlement 
that would be required over the next 5 
years if both countries were actually to 
observe all of the quantitative limits of 
the SALT I and SALT II agreements. It 
then presented representative projec- 
tions of the strategic offensive forces of 
the two sides, assuming that the SALT I 
and SALT II limits no longer apply. 
Finally, it provided an assessment of 
possible Soviet political and negotiating 
responses, insofar as these are under- 
stood and anticipated at present. For 
security reasons, the present, unclassi- 
fied version provides the information 
concerning U.S. and Soviet forces in 
substantially abbreviated form. 

At the outset, it must be noted that 
there are important uncertainties in the 
assessments presented herein. With 
respect to the data on Soviet forces, the 
projections represent broad trends- 
based on both evidence and assumptions 
—and are not intended to be precise 
forecasts. On the basis of U.S. exper- 
ience, it is unlikely that Soviet strategic 
forces 5 years from now will be identical 
(or necessarily even extremely close) to 
these force projections. Nevertheless, we 
believe that Soviet strategic forces in the 



S% 1986 



11 



ARMS CONTROL 



next 3 5 years can be reasonably charac- 
terized, based on evidence of ongoing 
programs that would be difficult to alter 

cally in this timeframe. 

By contrast, the size and complexion 
of future U.S. strategic forces are 
relatively easier for the Soviets to deter- 
mine. We must contend with potential 
lncn ases in Soviet strategic programs 
and capabilities. However, the principal 
source of uncertainty for Soviet planners 
about the scope and size of future U.S. 
strategic programs is, in all likelihood, 
the extent to which future U.S. pro- 
grams may be reduced by congressional 
or executive branch action. 

The data presented here assume full 
implementation of the Administration's 
strategic modernization program. It is 
absolutely essential that we maintain full 
support for these programs. To fail to do 
so would be the worst response to Soviet 
noncompliance. It would immediately 
and seriously undercut our negotiators 
in Geneva by removing the leverage that 
they must have to negotiate equitable 
reductions in both U.S. and Soviet 
forces. It would send precisely the 
wrong signal to the leadership of the 
Soviet Union about the seriousness of 
our resolve concerning their non- 
compliance. And, it would significantly 
increase the risk to our security for 
years to come. Therefore, our highest 
priority must remain the full implemen- 
tation of these programs. 



II. Projected Soviet and U.S. 
Dismantlements 

This section of the report provides 
representative projections on dismantl- 
ing that would result if SALT limitations 
were extended. They should be con- 
sidered to be approximations and would 
be subject to alteration by policy deci- 
sions or programmatic adjustments by 
either side. It should be pointed out that, 
as documented in the President's 
December 23, 1985, report to the Con- 
gress on "Soviet Noncompliance With 
Arms Control Agreements," the Soviet 
Union's SALT-accountable strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicle level is above 
the SALT II cap of 2,504, in violation of 
the Soviets' political commitment not to 
undercut the treaty. 

Representative Soviet Dismantle- 
ments. The Soviet Union has several 
programs underway to introduce new 
strategic delivery systems that would 
necessitate dismantling of older systems 
if the Soviets were to restrict their 
overall force to SALT levels. Under a 
representative projection of such pro- 
grams, consistent with SALT limits over 
the next 5 years the Soviets would 
deploy significant numbers of new 
delivery vehicles, including SS-25 and 
SS-X-24 ICBMs, Typhoon- and Delta- 
type SSBNs, and Backfire bombers and 
ALCM [air-launched cruise missile] 
carriers. 



Presidential Response 
to Soviet Arms Control Proposals 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 25, 1986 1 

President Reagan on July 25, 1986, 
responded to recent Soviet arms control 
proposals in a private letter to General 
Secretary Gorbachev. The President is 
hopeful that the ideas he has put for- 
ward in this letter will continue the proc- 
ess of building a firm basis for progress 
in a number of critical areas. 

The President finds his exchange of 
correspondence with General Secretary 
Gorbachev to be of great value in the 
search for understanding between our 

ountries. We hope that our efforts 
will produce agreement not only in arms 
control but in the other important 
regional and bilateral issues that too 
oft'' 1 es of tensions between 

the United States and the Soviet Union. 



12 



It is our policy to eliminate, where possi- 
ble, these sources of tension. 

The United States remains committed 
to the objective of significant reductions 
on offensive nuclear weapons, long- 
range strategic missiles, and inter- 
mediate nuclear forces. We look upon 
the energetic research effort of our 
government toward finding a defense 
against these weapons of mass destruc- 
tion to be an essential part of the task of 
reducing the effectiveness and the very 
need for these offensive weapons. 

The prospects for progress on the 
array of U.S. Soviet issues are enhanced 
by conducting a confidential dialogue; 
therefore, we will not comment on the 
content of the President's letter. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 28, 1986. 



If SALT I and II limits were tc 
complied with, these actions would 
necessitate dismantling some older 
systems in the Soviet inventory, as 
as some more modern systems. Th> 
older systems include SS-11 and S 1 
ICBMs, SS-N-6 SLBMs [submarir 
launched ballistic missiles] on Y-cla 
SSBNs, and Bison and Bear aircra 
Because the Soviets already are ve 
close to the SALT II sublimit of 82i 
MIRVed [multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicle] ICBM 1 
ers, deployment of the MIRVed 
SS-X-24 would require dismantlin 
existing MIRVed ICBMs-most lito 
SS-17s and possibly some SS-19s- 
stay within the ceiling. Similarly, \ 
the continued deployment of SS-N 
and SS-N-23 SLBMs, their total c 
MIRVed missile launchers would e 
the ceiling of 1,200 in a year or tw 
then they would need to dismantle 
MIRVed ICBMs or some SS-N-18 
launchers on relatively new D-III- 
SSBNs to continue observing the 
cumulative sublimit of 1,200 MIR\ 
ICBM and SLBM launchers. They 
for some time, been at the limit of 
modern SSBNs established by SAI 
thus deployment of new SSBNs w< I 
require continued dismantling of ol 
submarines. 

The dismantlements that woul-l 
derive from these actions probably I 
total over the next 5 years slightly I 
than 600 strategic nuclear delivery I 
vehicles, with some 1,000-1,200 
associated ballistic missile warheaci 
(The SNDV figure also includes he I 
bombers judged to have a capacity I 
some 300 nuclear weapons.) Some I 
mantling of older systems would oil 
eventually in any case, with or witll 
SALT limits. These projected disml 
ing actions do not take into accounl 
Soviet potential for additional che;I 
while nominally observing SALT 
numerical limits. This might be intiM 
to avoid compensatory dismantleml 
other ICBMs, including MIRVed 1(1 

Representative U.S. Dismant 
ments. With respect to U.S. progr: 
and dismantlements, full implemen 
of the strategic modernization prof 
would require continued dismantle! 
under SALT of U.S. older strategi 
gram systems, most of which are n 
ing the end of their useful life base 
both military and economic 
considerations. 



-»♦ i-,f Ot'.to 



ARMS CONTROL 



Projected Soviet and U.S. 
:egic Forces 

-cted Soviet Forces. In projecting 
•t strategic offensive force deploy- 
s, assuming SALT limits no 
•r apply, the caveats discussed 
i regarding assumptions and uncer- 
es underlying such projections are 
ant. 

o place these figures in historical 
«ctive, since 1972 when SALT I 
igned, there has been a fourfold 
ise in the number of Soviet 
gic nuclear weapons (missile 
?ads and bombs) and nearly a 
ing of Soviet ballistic missile throw- 
t. Indeed, since the signing of 
1 II in 1979, the number of Soviet 
gic ballistic missile warheads has 
doubled from about 5,000 to more 
>,000. This great expansion of 
; strategic forces has been possible 
e most part with SALT. (The 
nents limited launchers and only 
:tly affected deployed weapons.) 
ted, however, the Soviet Union has 
olated the arms control limitations 
3 d by these agreements, 
e Soviet Union now has about 
strategic nuclear weapons 
3 warheads and bombs). The 
I and II Treaties, even if fully 
ed with, would not prevent a very 
ntial further expansion of Soviet 
ities. Even assuming future 
compliance with SALT II— other 
le continuation of current Soviet 
ms— deployed Soviet weapons are 
ed to increase to over 12,000 in 
:t 5 years. Moreover, by further 
lg the agreements, the Soviets 
lausibly add in the same time 
a relatively modest increase of 
ore weapons to their forces. 
s difficult to predict precisely 
le Soviets might do absent SALT 
ints. They would not necessarily 
their forces significantly beyond 
■eases discussed above, which are 
ge and would appear, in our 
nt, more than enough to meet 
>jible military requirements. Thus 
wight well be little appreciable dif- 
M, in terms of total weapons, 
|i the forces that the Soviets 
leploy with and without SALT 
lints. It is reasonable to expect 
i he absence of SALT, the Soviets 
lot dismantle all their older 
'i i as rapidly as under SALT, 
lasses of weapons (e.g., SSBNs) 
lot be dismantled at all during the 
tyears without SALT constraints. 



Given the great extent of the Soviet 
strategic modernization program, 
however, many of these older systems 
would have relatively little impact on the 
overall threat to U.S. security. 

The Soviets have the potential to 
expand their forces somewhat further, 
should they decide to do so for either 
military or political reasons. If a 
deliberate effort were made by the 
Soviet Union to expand its strategic 
forces beyond SALT II levels, they 
might increase their forces somewhat 
further, to about 15,000 weapons by 
1991. 

However, the costs associated with 
such an expansion of capability, on top 
of an already very aggressive and expen- 
sive modernization program, would be a 
disincentive against any such Soviet 
effort. 

With or without SALT, the Soviets 
are, in any case, likely to modernize 
their intercontinental nuclear attack 
forces further by replacing most of their 
currently deployed land- and sea-based 
ballistic missiles and heavy bombers by 
the mid-1990s. This impressive Soviet 
modernization program, which will 
result in significantly improved sur- 
vivability, flexibility, and hard-target 
capability, has been in train for a long 
time. 

Projected U.S. Forces. The United 
States could achieve roughly 14,000 
weapons by fiscal year 1991 in a 
no-SALT environment by introducing 
the full strategic modernization program 
without undertaking the dismantlements 
that would otherwise be required by 
SALT. 

IV. Soviet Political and 
Negotiating Reponses 

It is difficult to predict specific moves 
the Soviets might decide to take 
politically or in the negotiations to try to 
increase criticism of, and build pressure 
against, the President's May 27 decision. 
They have already leveled a propaganda 
campaign against the decision. Iron- 
ically, in light of ongoing Soviet viola- 
tions of SALT II, including violation of 
the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
numerical limit, they have warned that 
they will go beyond the SALT limits if 
the United States does. While they have 
stated that they would take the 
"necessary practical" steps, e.g., 
increasing missiles and warheads, it is 
not at all clear that they would further 
expand their forces beyond the increases 
already planned, as discussed above. 



However, they are likely to portray any 
expansion, including that already 
planned, as a response to U.S. actions. 

The Soviets may decide to make 
political or negotiating moves as a mat- 
ter of tactics that seek to discredit the 
U.S. decision. However, the May 27 deci- 
sion is not likely permanently to alter 
their basic, overall objectives for 
negotiations or for a summit. These 
objectives include increasing opposition 
to the U.S. modernization program, par- 
ticularly the Strategic Defense Initiative, 
and weakening the Western alliance. 

We hope that the Soviet Union will 
join us in a framework of truly mutual 
restraint. For its part, the United States 
will continue to exercise utmost restraint 
in the future, seeking to meet U.S. 
strategic needs, given the Soviet contin- 
uing buildup, by means that minimize 
incentives for continuing Soviet offen- 
sive force growth. As we modernize, we 
will continue to retire older forces as our 
national security requirements permit. 
Assuming no significant change in the 
threat we face as we implement the 
strategic modernization program, the 
United States will not deploy more 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or 
more strategic ballistic missile warheads 
than does the Soviet Union. 

No policy of interim restraint is a 
substitute for an agreement on deep and 
equitable reductions in offensive nuclear 
arms, provided that we can be confident 
of Soviet compliance with it. We hope 
the Soviet Union will act to give 
substance to the agreement reached by 
the President and General Secretary 
Gorbachev at the summit meeting last 
November to achieve early progress in 
the Geneva negotiations. 

Our objectives in Geneva remain the 
same as stated at the summit: to seek 
common ground in negotiating deep, 
equitable, and verifiable reductions in 
strategic and intermediate-range offen- 
sive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with 
the Soviet Union how we could enhance 
deterrence and stability by moving 
toward a world in which we would no 
longer rely exclusively on the threat of 
nuclear retaliation to preserve the peace. 
We hope the Soviets will negotiate 
seriously with us toward these important 
goals. 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives; George Bush, President of 
the Senate; Barry Goldwater, chairman of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee; and 
Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed 
Services Committee (text from Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents of 
Aug. 11, 1986.) ■ 



fa 1986 



13 



ARMS CONTROL 



U.S. Policy Regarding Limitations 
on Nuclear Testing 



The United Stairs is rum mined to a 
national security policy which includes 
both a strong deterrent to aggression 

and an active pursuit of deep, eipiitahle, 

and verifiable reductions in Soviet and 
American nuclear arms as well as 
, tleetiee verification arrangements for 
existing limitations on nuclear testing. 
Under existing conditions, neither a 
comprehensive ban nor a moratorium 
tm unclear testing would enhance the 
cause of security, stability, or peace. 
This special report sets forth the 
principles underlying U.S. policy 
toward 1 1 nn tat inns on nuclear testing. 

Recent Developments 

Shortly before this special report went 
to press, the White House announced 
that the United States and the Soviet 
Union agreed to have experts meet, 
without preconditions, to discuss issues 
related to nuclear testing. An initial 
meeting of experts was held in late 
July 1986 at Geneva. 

As this report details, the United 
States has long sought a meeting with 
the Soviets to present our concerns 
about the verification provisions of the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and 
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
(PNET). This meeting of experts allows 
the United States to present its ideas 
and concerns to the Soviets— and to hear 
Soviet concerns. The United States is 
ready to present and discuss our views 
on verification improvements in existing 
agreements which we believe are 
needed and achievable at this time. If 
we are successful in addressing these 
verification concerns, we could move 
forward on ratification of these two 
treaties. 

A Collective Security Issue 

The maintenance of a strong nuclear 
deterrent has for four decades ensured 
the security of the United States and 
the freedom of our allies and friends. 
Therefore, while a comprehensive test 
ban remains a long-term objective of the 
United States and while we are actively 
investigating technologies that could one 
day reduce and ultimately eliminate our 
dependence on offensive nuclear arms 
for our security, nuclear weapons will 
remain the key element of deterrence 
for the foreseeable future. During such 



14 



a period, where both the United States 
and our friends and allies must rely 
upon nuclear weapons to deter aggres- 
sion, nuclear testing will continue to be 
required. 

A carefully structured nuclear testing- 
program is necessary to ensure that our 
weapons are safe, effective, reliable, and 
survivable. The directors of both the 
Los Alamos and Livermore national 
weapon laboratories have stated that, 
while non-nuclear tests sometimes 
detect problems with the nuclear compo- 
nent of warheads, the most serious 
problems with the nuclear weapons 
stockpile are only revealed and solved 
by actual nuclear testing. Even a seem- 
ingly minor modification in a weapon 
design could seriously undermine confi- 
dence in the weapon's effectiveness 
unless the modified design can be tested 
with a nuclear yield. Testing also allows 
us to take necessary steps to modernize 
our forces to counter the continuing 
Soviet military buildup, particularly in 
offensive nuclear capabilities. 

The United States has long sought 
to achieve agreement with the Soviet 
Union on nuclear testing limitations that 
could strengthen security for all nations. 
In 1963, both sides ratified the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which prohibits 
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, 
outer space, and under water. The 
LTBT also prohibits the release of 
radioactive debris outside the bound- 
aries of the state conducting a nuclear 
explosion. In 1974 and 1976, respec- 
tively, the United States and Soviet 
Union signed the Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty. These treaties prohibit under- 
ground nuclear explosions having a yield 
that exceeds 150 kilotons. Neither side 
has ratified the TTBT or PNET, but 
each has stated that it would respect 
the 150 kiloton limit. 

Verification Problems 
and Soviet Violations 

The United States is not currently 
seeking ratification of the TTBT and 
PNET because we cannot effectively 
verify Soviet compliance with the 
150-kiloton threshold on underground 
nuclear explosions. The remote seismic- 
techniques we must rely on today to 
monitor Soviet nuclear tests do not 
provide yield estimates with the accu- 
racy required for effective verification of 



compliance. Nor will the treaties' 
verification provisions solve this 
problem. The TTBT itself provides I 
for an exchange of data. This data I 
would be of limited value in verifial 
and, in any event, cannot be indepel 
ently validated by the U.S. Govermi 
This means, for example, that we vl 
have no way of knowing whether til 
Soviets were providing data for all I 
geophysically distinct testing areas. I 
if the Soviets withheld such knowlel 
from us, they could conduct high-yi I 
tests in excess of 150 kilotons that, I 
the perspective of a seismic observ'l 
outside Soviet boundaries, could apl 
to fall within the 150 kiloton limit. I 
The verification provisions of trl 
PNET Protocol would not resolve 1 1 
problem of TTBT verification becail 
they are not applicable to weapons I 
tests. They would permit mandator I 
site inspection only of peaceful nuc'.l 
explosions— and then only in very rl 
strictive circumstances. Specifically I 
site inspection is mandatory only f( I 
group of explosions whose aggrega I 
yield exceeds 150 kilotons. In fact, I 
1976 the Soviets have not conducte I 
group nuclear explosions of the sizt I 
which would have required them t< I 
mit such inspection. Thus, even if \ I 
were to ratify the treaties and imp I 
ment their verification provisions 1 1 
our concerns regarding Soviet com] I 
ance with the TTBT would not be I 
resolved. 

These verification deficiencies hi 
become a matter of great concern il 
light of the pattern of Soviet noncol 
ance with existing arms control agil 
ments including existing limitations! 
nuclear testing. As stated in the Pi I 
dent's December 1985 "Report to (I 
gress on Soviet Noncompliance Witl 
Arms Control Agreements," the Scl 
Union's testing practices have resul 
in the release of radioactive debris I 
caused radioactive matter to be pre! 
outside the Soviet Union's territorii 
limits in violation of its legal obligal 
under the LTBT. The report notes I 
Soviet venting has occurred on num 
ous occasions. In his 1984 report, til 
President concluded that "while the! 
available evidence is ambiguous, in I 
of ambiguities in the pattern of So\| 
testing and in view of verification il 
tainties, and [while] we have been ij 
ble to reach a definitive conclusion,! 
evidence indicates that Soviet nuclei 
activities for a number of tests con:| 
tute a likelv violation of legal obligJ 
under the TTBT." In his 1985 repoj 
the President reiterated this conceal 
finding "that Soviet nuclear testing! 



Department of State 



Bi 



ARMS CONTROL 



.ities for a number of tests eonsti- 
a likely violation of legal obligations 
;r the TTBT of 1974...." 

, Presidential Initiatives 

lident Reagan has long advocated a 
>gue with the Soviet Union to arrive 
le required improvements in moni- 
\g procedures for effective verifica- 
of the TTBT and PNET, which are 
necessary first steps if there is to 
rogress in the area of nuclear test- 
imitations. The United States has 
n the following initiatives: 

On several occasions in 1983, the 
ed States unsuccessfully sought to 
ge the Soviet Union in discussions 
Brification improvements to these 
ies. 

In September 1984, the President 
ased, in an address to the UN 
ral Assembly, that the United 
s and the Soviet Union find a way 
oviet experts to come to the U.S. 
ar test site and for our experts to 

the Soviet test site to measure 
tly the yields of nuclear weapons 

In July 1985, the President invited 
t experts to come to the U.S. test 
o measure the yield of a U.S. test 
any instrumentation devices they 
ed necessary for measuring yield. 
> were no conditions or require- 
i for a reciprocal visit. The Presi- 
; purpose was to begin a process to 
confidence and cooperation 
?en our nations regarding limita- 
on nuclear weapons testing. 
In December 1985, the President 
sed to General Secretary 
chev that U.S. and Soviet experts 
clear testing limitations meet in 
lary to discuss our respective 
:ation approaches and to address 
tangible steps to resolve this 



'resident's Proposal 
rch 1986 

most recent initiative, on March 
36, the President urged the Soviet 
to begin bilateral discussions to 
ays to reach agreement on essen- 
rification improvements of the 
and PNET. The President pro- 
General Secretary Gorbachev with 
nical description of a specific 
d known as CORRTEX, which is 
urate method for measuring the 
if a nuclear explosion (see Appen- 
The President also proposed, on 
.teral basis, that Soviet experts 
ur Nevada test site in April to 



discuss verification methods, examine 
the CORRTEX system more closely, 
and monitor a planned U.S. nuclear 
weapon test. The President stated that 
if the United States and the Soviet 
Union could reach agreement on the use 
of an effective verification system incor- 
porating CORRTEX, the United States 
would be prepared to move forward 
with the ratification of the TTBT and 
PNET. 

The President's proposal offers an 
opportunity for the Soviets to demon- 
strate that they take testing limitations 
seriously and recognize that compliance 
with such agreements is necessary. The 
United States must stand by its stand- 
ard of effective verification with respect 
to the TTBT. Anything less would harm 
U.S. security interests, undermine our 
ability to demand effective verification 
in other arms control areas, and under- 
cut the objectives of the TTBT. 

Comprehensive Test Ban 

A Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) 
remains a long-term objective of the 
United States. As long as the United 
States and our friends and allies must 
rely upon nuclear weapons to deter ag- 
gression, however, some level of nuclear 
testing will continue to be required. We 
believe such a ban must be viewed in 
the context of a time when we do not 
need to depend on nuclear deterrence to 
ensure international security and stabil- 
ity and when we have achieved broad, 
deep, and verifiable arms reductions, 
substantially improved verification capa- 
bilities, expanded confidence-building 
measures, and greater balance in con- 
ventional forces. For our part, the 
United States is energetically pursuing 
negotiations and discussions with the 
Soviet Union on concrete steps in all of 
these areas. We have made clear our 
strong and continuing view : that Soviet 
calls for an immediate and unverifiable 
nuclear testing moratorium are not a ba- 
sis for meaningful progress to this end. 

At the same time, the United States 
has supported international discussion of 
verification and compliance problems 
related to nuclear testing limitations. 
Discussions have taken place in past 
years at the multilateral Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, in both a 
technical-level ad hoc group of scientific 
experts and in the Nuclear Test Ban 
Working Group. We continue to support 
consideration of scope, verification, and 
compliance issues related to a CTB in 
these two groups at the CD. 



Appendix 1 



CORRTEX System of 
Direct Yield Measurement 

CORRTEX (Continuous Reflectometry 
for Radius versus Time Experiment) is 
a hydrodynamic yield measurement 
technique that measures the propagation 
of the underground shock wave from an 
explosion. This technique uses a coaxial 
cable which can be emplaced in a hole 
parallel to the device emplacement hole. 
Precise measurements are made of the 
length of the cable by timing the return 
of low energy electrical pulses sent 
down to, and reflected from, the cable 
end. When the nuclear device is deto- 
nated, a shock wave emanates through 
the ground, crushing and shortening the 
cable. The rate by which the cable 
length changes is recorded via measure- 
ments of the changing pulse transit 
times. This rate is a measure of the 
propagation rate of the explosive shock 
wave through the ground which is, in 
turn, a measure of the yield of the 
nuclear explosion. 

CORRTEX has been shown to be 
accurate to within 15% of the more 
accurate, radio-chemical yield measure- 
ments for tests of yield greater than 50 
kilotons and in the geologic media of the 
U.S. test site in Nevada. Use of 
CORRTEX-measured yields at the 
Soviet Shagan River test site should 
provide accuracies to within 30%. The 
U.S. estimate is based on its use in over 
100 tests with the sensing cable in the 
device emplacement hole and four tests 
with cables in a satellite hole. The accu- 
racy of the technique is believed to be 
relatively, but not wholly, independent 
of the geologic medium, provided the 
satellite hole measurements are made in 
the "strong shock" region near the 
nuclear device explosion. At greater 
separation distances, the properties of 
the medium become much more impor- 
tant factors. A satellite hole separation 
distance of 14 meters (46 feet) is appro- 
priate for a test near 105 kilotons. 

The electronic device that provides 
the timing signals is a battery-powered, 
suitcase-sized unit that may be remotely 
controlled. All equipment for power, 
recording, and data reduction can be 
contained in a small trailer. 



Appendix 2 

Lessons of the 1958-61 Moratorium 

The United States does not believe that 
a testing moratorium is a prudent, effec- 
tive, or constructive step along the path 



, 



3r 1986 



15 



ARMS CONTROL 



CORRTEX YIELD MEASUREMENT CONCEPT 



CORRTEX 
recorder 



*$?$& 



Jin 



Sensing 
cable 



Working' 

point ^^ 



CORRTEX 
recorder 



Surface 



"5^^: 



^^5^" 







Surface 



Diagnostic 
rack 



Working 
point 




Typical cable emplacement 
in satellite hole 



\ vw / ; 



N Shock front • 

^v^ progression 



Moving shock wave from 

nuclear detonation 
crushes and shortens cable 



toward our goal of a safer world. A look 
back at the 1958-61 testing moratorium 
demonstrates why the United States 
believes that moratoria are never 
acceptable substitutes for negotiated, 
equitable, and effectively verifiable arms 
control agreements. 

There were three unilateral, volun- 
tary pledges to suspend testing in the 
late 1950s: the United States and the 



United Kingdom acted in 1958, followed 
by the Soviet Union in 1959 (although 
the Soviets suspended testing in 
November 1958). These suspensions 
amounted to a de facto moratorium. 
There was, however, no joint formal 
agreement. Thus, given a de facto 
moratorium by the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union 
beginning in late 1958, the question is: 



who was the first to resume testing 
The verdict of history is clear: it wa 
the Soviet Union. 

The following is a chronology of 
statements and actions related to th 
1958-61 moratorium: 

1958 

March 31. The Soviet Union 
unilaterally suspends testing after a 



16 



Department of State Bu > 



ARMS CONTROL 



ar test series but just prior to an 
junced U.S. test series. The United 
,es and the United Kingdom reject 
Soviet call to suspend testing, but 
sident Eisenhower proposes a meet- 
of technical experts to study the 
;tical problems regarding interna- 
al control of an agreed disarmament 
rram. 

July 1. An exchange of letters 
veen Eisenhower and Soviet leader 
ushchev results in the convening of 
inference of Experts in Geneva to 
ly the problems of verifying a test 

August 21. The Conference of 
>erts reports that it is technically 
ible to establish a workable and 
:tive system, using available capabil- 

to monitor compliance with a 
Idwide suspension of nuclear testing. 
\ugust 22. Based on the experts' 
irt, Eisenhower proposes trilateral 
itiations on a verifiable test ban. He 
expresses willingness to suspend 
.ng for 1 year (on a renewable basis) 
nning October 31, 1958, the date of 
opening of the Geneva Conference 
^continuance of Nuclear Weapons 
Is. The United Kingdom follows suit. 
ieptember 23. The United Kingdom 

testing series begun in May 1958. 
ieptember 30. The Soviet Union 
i nes testing. 

)ctober 30. As promised in August, 
I'Jnited States ends testing. The 
I'va Conference on Discontinuance of 
I ear Testing convenes the following 

November 3. The Soviet Union ends 

fcg- 

November 7. Eisenhower states 
a in light of Soviet tests after the 
i^ing of the Geneva conference, the 
led States considers itself free from 
I ledge. He adds that the United 
les, nevertheless, would continue the 
Ing suspension and hopes the Soviet 
Bn will do the same. 

Ill 

anuary 5. The United States 
pns the verification issue based on 
Binding by U.S. seismic experts that 
|br assessments by the Geneva 
fflrts regarding verification of under- 
Mid tests were too optimistic. The 
fcts refuse to consider the new U.S. 
i, 

.ugust 26. Eisenhower extends U.S. 
atorium until the end of the year. 
Idays later, the Soviets pledge "not 
i fsume nuclear tests. . .if the 
r eern Powers do not resume the test- 
g|f atomic and hydrogen weapons, 
nl in the case of resumption by them 



of nuclear weapons tests will the Soviet 
Union be free from this pledge." It 
should be noted that given the Soviet 
emphasis on "resumption," the term 
"Western Powers" can only refer to 
the United States and the United 
Kingdom— the only Western Powers 
to have tested at that time. 

December 29. Eisenhower 
denounces the intransigence of Soviet 
technical experts in Geneva, who refuse 
to address deficiencies in seismic 
monitoring of underground nuclear 
explosions. He announces that "the 
voluntary moratorium on testing will 
expire on December 31. Although we 
consider ourselves free to resume 
nuclear testing, we shall not resume 
nuclear weapons tests without announc- 
ing our intention in advance of any 
resumption. During the period of volun- 
tary suspension of nuclear weapons 
tests the United States will continue its 
active program of weapon research, de- 
velopment and laboratory-type ex- 
perimentation." 

December 30. Khrushchev states 
that the Soviet Union would not resume 
testing until the "Western Powers" 
resume. 

1960 

February 13. France, which had 
indicated its intention to become a 
nuclear power as early as March 1957, 
conducts its first test. 

April 1. France conducts a second 
test. 



December 27. France conducts a 
third test. 

1961 

April 25. France conducts a fourth 
test. 

May 15. The Soviet Union states 
that "if France continues" testing, the 
Soviet Union would be compelled to 
test. 

August 30. Although the French 
have not conducted another test, the 
Soviet Union announces it would resume 
testing— contrary to its statements of 
August 28, 1959, and May 15, 1961. 

August 31. Khrushchev tells visiting 
British parliamentarians that he decided 
to resume testing with a bomb of 
unprecedented proportions to shock the 
Western Powers into negotiations on 
Germany on his terms, and into accept- 
ing his demand that Geneva test-ban 
negotiations be merged with those on 
general and complete disarmament, 

September 1. The Soviet Union 
resumes atmospheric testing. 

September 5. President Kennedy 
authorizes underground testing, which 
resumes on September 15. 

November 4. The Soviet Union con- 
cludes its test series, of over 40 tests, 
including the largest single explosion in 
history. 

November 7. Seven months after 
the Soviet warning against continued 
testing, France conducts a fifth nuclear 
test. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Discussions on Nuclear Testing 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 16, 1986' 

The United States and the Soviet Union 
have agreed to have experts meet 
shortly to discuss issues related to 
nuclear testing. We have further agreed 
to begin these discussions without 
preconditions. 

The United States has long sought a 
meeting with the Soviets to present our 
concerns about the verification provi- 
sions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty. These treaties were signed in 
the 1970s, but they have not been 
ratified. The United States determined 
in the early 1980s that U.S. ratification 
could not be considered until verification 
improvements were made and U.S. com- 



pliance concerns were answered. We 
have made repeated offers to the Soviet 
Government to present our ideas for 
improvements that would allow us to 
move forward on ratification of these 
treaties. 

This upcoming meeting of experts 
will allow the United States to present 
its ideas and concerns to the Soviets and 
to hear Soviet concerns. The United 
States will be ready to present and 
discuss our views on verification 
improvements in existing agreements, 
which we believe are needed and 
achievable at this time. We hope the 
Soviets will be prepared to join in a con- 
structive dialogue. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 21, 1986. 



'doer 1986 



17 



ARMS CONTROL 



The preceding chronology clearly 
demonstrates that the Soviets broke 

own pledges as well as the morato- 
rium then still being observed by the 
United States and the United Kingdom. 
In addition, Khrushchev's candid admis- 
sion of August 1961, and the size of the 
ensuing test series, undercuts argu- 
ments that French testing or Eisen- 
hower's December 1959 statement in 
any way "justified" the Soviets' break- 
ing of the moratorium. Indeed, Soviet 
evidence of bad faith was so clear that, 
in an address to the American people in 
March 1962, Kennedy summed up the 
experience as follows: 

[0]n September 1st of last year, while 
the United States and the United Kingdom 
were negotiating in good faith at Geneva, the 
Soviet Union callously broke its moratorium 



SCC Meets in Geneva 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT. 
JULY 16, 1986' 

The United States has informed the 
Soviet Union through diplomatic chan- 
nels that it is prepared to convene a 
special session of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Standing Consultative Commission 
(SCC) beginning on or about July 22 in 
Geneva. 

The United States will be prepared 
to respond to questions or concerns the 
Soviet Union has with respect to the 
President's May 27th decision on interim 
restraint. We would expect that in the 
context of such a discussion the Soviet 
Union will also be prepared to address 
U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompli- 
ance with arms control agreements. 

Since the President came into office, 
he has done everything he could to try to 
persuade the Soviet Union to meet its 
arms control obligations and to achieve 
igreement on significant reductions in 
U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In 
1982 he said the United States would 
continue not to undercut the SALT I 
[strategic arms limitation talks] interim 
agreement, which had already expired, 
and the SALT II Treaty, which was 
stillborn, so long as the Soviets exercised 
equal restraint. Regrettably, the Soviets 
did not. In June 1985 the President once 
again called attention to the record of 
Sovii npliance and called upon 

1 fnion to join us in building an 
interim framework of truly mutual 
restraint until a new strategic arms 
reduction treaty (START) replaced the 
SALT structure. The SALT II Treaty. 



with a 2-month series of more than 40 
nuclear tests. Preparations for these tests 
had been secretly underway for many 
months. Accompanied by new threats and 
new tactics of terror, these tests— conducted 
mostly in the atmosphere— represented a 
major Soviet effort to put nuclear weapons 
back into the arms race .... 

Some may urge us to try it [a morato- 
rium] again, keeping our preparations to test 
in a constant state of readiness. But in actual 
practice, particularly in a society of free 
choice, we cannot keep topflight scientists 
concentrating on the preparation of an 
experiment which may or may not take place 
on an uncertain date in the future. Nor can 
large technical laboratories be kept fully alert 
on a standby basis waiting for some other na- 
tion to break an agreement. This is not mere- 
ly difficult or inconvenient— we have explored 
this alternative thoroughly, and found it 
impossible of execution. ■ 



even in its own terms, expired on 
December 31, 1985. 

In the absence of an adequate Soviet 
response, the President announced on 
May 27 of this year that henceforth the 
United States would base decisions 
regarding its strategic forces on the 
nature and magnitude of the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union rather than 
on standards contained in SALT agree- 
ments that had expired, were unratified, 
and were being violated by the Soviet 
Union. 

On May 27th the President also 
decided to retire two older Poseidon sub- 
marines as the eighth Trident submarine 
began sea trials. This means the United 
States will remain in technical observ- 
ance of the terms of the SALT agree- 
ments for some months. Time remains 
for the Soviet Union to alter the 
situation which led the President to his 
May 27 decision. If the Soviet Union 
does, the President will take this into 
account. 

As the President said when he 
announced his decision on May 27, we 
must now look to the future, not to the 
past. The primary task now facing both 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
is to build a new structure of arms con- 
trol, one based on significant, equitable, 
and verifiable reductions in the size of 
existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear 
arsenals. This is what we are proposing 
in the Geneva negotiations. 

Until this is achieved, the United 
States will continue to exercise the 
utmost restraint. Assuming no signifi- 
cant change in the threat we face, as we 
implement the strategic modernization 
program, the United States will not 
deploy more strategic nuclear delivery 



vehicles or strategic ballistic missile 
warheads than the Soviet Union. 

This special session of the Stanc 
Consultative Commission offers us t 
opportunity to renew the President' 
request that the Soviet Union join u 
establishing an interim framework ( 
truly mutual restraint. 



U.S. STATEMENT, 
JULY 22, 1986 

The 31st session of the U.S.-U.S.S.l 
Standing Consultative Commission- 
second session of 1986— began toda 
with two meetings between the two 
sides. The commission was establisl 
by the Treaty on the Limitation of 
Ballistic Missile Systems concluded 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
May 26, 1972. 

This session was requested by t 
Soviet side. Agreement by the Unit 
States to convene this special sessic 
stands in contrast to the position ta 
by the Soviet Union in 1983, when t 
United States asked for a special se 
to discuss compliance matters relati 
the SALT II Treaty. The Soviet Um 
denied that request. However, the 
United States has agreed to this ses 
as a sign of our desire that the Sovi 
Union join us in establishing an inte 
framework of truly mutual restrain' 



U.S. STATEMENT, 
JULY 30, 1986 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Con- 
sultative Commission met in Genev? 
today, completing a special session c 
commission, the second session of 11 
and the 31st since its establishment. 
U.S. and Soviet commissioners reaf- 
firmed that the next session of the c 
mission would begin in the fall of th: 
year in Geneva. The commission wa; 
established by the Treaty on the Lin 
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile System 
concluded by the United States and 
U.S.S.R. on May 26, 1972. 

At this session, the Soviet Unioi! 
rejected President Reagan's May 27! 
1986, call for the Soviet Union to joi 
the United States in establishing an 
interim framework of truly mutual 
restraint pending conclusion of a 
verifiable agreement on deep and 
equitable reductions in offensive nuc 
arms. The Soviet Union was informs 
that the call remains open. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 21, 1986. 



18 



Department of State Bu fr 



EPARTMENT 



he Foreign Affairs Budget 



John C. miitehead 

Statement at a press briefing on 
mt 11, 1986. Mr. Whitehead is 
uty Secretary of State. 1 

face a national security crisis. Pro- 
jd congressional cuts in the interna- 
al affairs budget will seriously 
tardize our national security interests 
global foreign policy objectives. The 
ity of the United States to maintain 
eadership role in the world; to pro- 

for its national security; and to sup- 
; the cause of freedom, democracy, 
economic development is at stake. 
In January the Administration sub- 
;ed to the Congress a bare bones 
rnational affairs budget for fiscal 

1987 of $22.6 billion-only 2% of 
total Federal budget. This budget 
ides funds for all of our foreign 
irs functions: for the State Depart- 
t and USIA [United States Informa- 
Agency] operating budgets, which 
ide the operations of our 260 embas- 
|and consulates around the world; 
s for economic development, 
lary security, and humanitarian 

!;tance programs; funds for our con- 
itions to multilateral development 
:s and international organizations; 
I funds for combatting the inflow of 
lotics, the battle against terrorism, 
jo refugees, the Peace Corps, and 
[security of American personnel 
a ad. I came to government a year 
jafter four decades in the private sec- 
lis a banker and a businessman. I 
|v how important it is to reduce 
k to keep budgets lean, and to max- 
lb efficiency. I participated actively in 
Review of this budget. It is a 
Imum, bare bones budget. With the 
i of the Office of Management and 
Ijet. and with my own input as a 
1-nosed businessman and taxpayer, 
lie fat has been squeezed out. In the 
jfew months, I have been actively 
Jived with my colleagues in the 
tlgn affairs community in a review 
^reduction of almost 1,500 foreign 
firs positions overseas. That review 
(designed to trim overseas costs 
lout jeopardizing our ability to pro- 
band implement our foreign policy 
paves. 

ifet the current congressional budget 
lution reduces this minimal and 
f ully considered request by 27%. 
ant congressional actions would 
flee and restrict the remaining 
nint even further. Such cuts will cost 



Americans more in national security and 
foreign policy terms than we can afford 
to pay. 

Take, for example, foreign assist- 
ance. Of the Administration's foreign 
economic and military assistance 
request, 34% is for Israel and Egypt to 
sustain and nurture the search for peace 
in the Middle East; 26% is for our allies 
where we have important military bases, 
such as the Philippines, Greece, and 
Turkey, and for Pakistan which faces 
cross-border threats from the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan; 11% is for pro- 
grams to assist our neighbors in Central 
America and the Caribbean; 17% is for 
those who share our democratic ideals, 
such as Colombia and India, or those 
where democracy has only recently 
emerged and is still fragile, such as 
Bolivia and Uruguay, and those where 
fundamental economic reform programs 
are underway, such as Senegal and 
Ecuador. Which of these would the Con- 
gress have us eliminate? Which of these 
are unimportant to our national 
interests? 

Congressional reductions of over $3 
billion in these accounts, and the ear- 
marking of aid levels in several key 
countries, will mean a cut of 50%-60% 
for our foreign assistance programs in 
the remaining countries. I cannot 
emphasize enough how seriously these 
actions inhibit our ability to achieve our 
foreign policy objectives worldwide. 
Over the last several weeks, I have been 
working on how we would implement 
these congressional mandates. Let me 
tell you what these cuts will mean in the 
real world. 

• It will mean a severe cut, maybe 
even a complete elimination in some 
cases, in our humanitarian programs in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 

• It will mean a two-thirds reduction 
in our assistance programs for the key 
Caribbean countries of Jamaica, Haiti, 
and the Dominican Republic. 

• It will mean severe limitations on 
programs for Central America and the 
Philippines and other countries where 
we have military facilities. In some 
cases, negotiations in upcoming base 
talks would be undermined. 

• It will mean a reduction in full- 
time employment of up to 1,000 State 
Department employees and the closing 
of perhaps more than a dozen overseas 
embassies and consulates in addition to 
the seven posts already being closed. 

• It will mean a one-third cut in 
funding for the multilateral development 



banks, which are crucial to development 
efforts in the Third World and the imple- 
mentation of the Baker initiative on 
international debt. 

• It will mean the reduction of 
embassy security programs in posts 
where the danger and threat to the lives 
of our people is higher than ever. 

• It will mean that our efforts to 
halt the production and illegal export of 
narcotics from the Andean region will be 
seriously stymied just as they are gain- 
ing momentum. 

• It will mean a reduction of broad- 
casts by the Voice of America, Radio 
Liberty, and Radio Free Europe and the 
closing of American libraries and 
cultural centers overseas. 

These are but illustrations of the 
price Congress is asking Americans to 

pay. 

The cumulative impact of these cuts 
will be devastating to our foreign rela- 
tions. America's responsibilities and 
commitments around the world are 
many. They are important to Americans, 
to our neighbors, and to those who seek 
freedom and economic well-being. These 
programs represent our first line of 
defense in protecting American free- 
doms. A penny-wise but pound-foolish 
budgetary approach to foreign affairs 
and security will only confuse our friends 
and encourage our adversaries. 

Even during times of financial con- 
straint, the devotion of two cents out of 
each budget dollar is a small price to pay 
for the liberties and ideals we as 
Americans and other freedom-loving 
peoples hold dear. The values for which 
our country stands— democracy, free 
enterprise, freedom of thought, and the 
right of self-determination— are on the 
move around the world. Can we afford 
to retreat at the very moment when 
global interdependency and the momen- 
tum of success demand our continuing 
and active involvement? 

The answer must be a resounding 
no. And so I call on the Congress to take 
another look, to review the decisions 
they have made to date. I know Con- 
gress' decisions have been based on the 
well-intentioned objective of reducing 
Federal expenditures and moving 
toward a balanced budget. But I strong- 
ly urge them to reconsider the effects of 
these cuts on the ability of our national 
government to meet its primary respon- 
sibility of protecting U.S. interests 
around the globe. The defense of 
freedom and the pursuit of peace are not 
cost free. 



'Press release 159. The question-and- 
answer session following the statement is not 
printed here. ■ 



Qber 1986 



19 



EAST ASIA 



U.S. -Japan Relations: 

A Global Partnership for the Future 



by Michael H. Armacost 

Address before the Japan Society of 
Northern California in San Francisco 
on July 21, 1986. Ambassador Armacost 
is Under Secretary for Political Affairs. 

I am pleased and honored to join you on 
this commemoration of the 80th anniver- 
sary of the Japan Society of Northern 
California. This organization has consist- 
ently fostered closer relations between 
the United States and Japan. It is an 
important task, and it has never been 
more consequential for our two coun- 
tries than at the present time. So I 
congratulate you on what you have 
accomplished, even as I urge you to 
redouble your efforts. 

I am always happy to have an ex- 
cuse to return to San Francisco. In a 
sense, this city is the birthplace of the 
modern U.S. -Japan relationship. At the 
Presidio in 1951, the peace treaty be- 
tween the allies and Japan and the secu- 
rity treaty between the United States 
and Japan were signed. These agree- 
ments formally initiated 35 years of 
peace and prosperity in U.S. -Japan rela- 
tions. They set the framework for the 
U.S.-Japan partnership about which I 
wish to comment this evening. 

It is a remarkable partnership. 
Within the lifetimes of most of us in this 
room, our countries struggled on oppo- 
site sides of a bitter global war. Today, 
we stand united in our efforts to 
preserve peace and to promote economic 
growth and development throughout the 
world. The U.S.-Japan alliance is critical 
to the security of both our nations, and 
it is a pillar of that balance of power 
which supports the independence of free 
countries around the globe. Japan is our 
largest overseas trading partner— a fact 
of special significance to Californians, 
since 40% of all U.S. trade with Japan 
flows through this state. Politically, 
Japan stands firmly within the Western 
camp as a nation which practices market 
economics and democratic politics. In 
short, we both have a huge stake in this 
relationship about which I should like to 
make a few observations in order to 
put past accomplishments, current 
challenges, and future possibilities in 
perspective. 



Changing Contours of 
U.S.-Japan Relations 

Change has been a constant in this rela- 
tionship. I have seen this firsthand. My 
involvement with Japan goes back 
nearly 20 years to 1968 when I took 
sabbatical leave from Pomona College to 
serve as a visiting professor at the In- 
ternational Christian University (ICU). I 
went not as a specialist but as a student 
eager to learn about a country which I 
vaguely apprehended would be an in- 
creasingly important force in the world. 

To my surprise, the Japanese I en- 
countered at that time seemed less con- 
cerned with the future than with the 
past. They were preoccupied with issues 
left over from history. They appeared 
surprised by their considerable postwar 
accomplishments and a little uncertain 
whether they could be sustained. 

Although Japan had created a 
remarkably stable political structure, 
Japanese politics remained polarized 
over relations with the United States, 
the terms of and necessity for the 
mutual security treaty, and the constitu- 
tionality and role of Japanese defense 
forces. More than 100 universities- 
including ICU— experienced crippling 
student strikes during the year I was 
supposedly teaching. I recall witnessing 
Japanese riot police in full battle gear 
evicting student leaders from Yasuda 
Hall at Tokyo University. Though 
scarcely anyone was injured, it had all 
the appearances of a major military 
operation. One source of contention was 
the mutual security treaty, and the 
struggle symbolized the unsettled state 
of important issues between us. 

In 1968 Japan was a relatively 
prosperous country. But despite nearly 
two decades of unbroken economic 
growth, many Japanese exhibited doubts 
about their economic future. They 
thought of themselves as a "poor, island 
nation without natural resources." They 
acknowledged their achievements, yet 
worried abut their "feet of clay." They 
feared Japan's prosperity would not 
last. Such anxieties fostered tight 
government controls on commerce and 
finance and encouraged an export-led 
growth strategy sustained by extensive 
neomercantilist import barriers. 

Nor had U.S.-Japan bilateral rela- 
tions attained the "equal partnership" 
of which the period's diplomatic commu- 
niques routinely spoke. Indeed, the 



Japanese seemed uncertain of their I ■. 
place in the world. Despite a natunl 
preoccupation with its own neighbor 
hood, Japan's role even in Northea? a 
Asia was modest, Japan had little vl 
at the United Nations, no place yetl 
Western summits, and was just bedj 
ning to make its presence felt in eel 
nomic groups such as the Organizatl 
for Economic Cooperation and Devil 
ment (OECD). 

Cultural interchange, in those dl 
remained largely a one-way street. I 
Japanese knowledge of the United I 
States was spurred by friendship, tl 
ness, and the experience of occupatl 
Americans generally knew little of || 
Japan. We had only the sketchiest | 
preciation of its potential and futur I j 
promise. As a sign of the times, in I 
days, Washington had only one susJ 
bar, and you could still drive for bl I 
without seeing a Japanese-made ca:| 

I need not tell you that times h e 
changed. 

The Present 

Earlier this month, concurrent elec I 
were held in both Houses of the Jap I 
nese Diet for only the second time i 
history. The stunning, almost un- 
precedented, landslide victory by tl 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) sy 
ized perhaps the end of a political < 
The young radicals of the 1960s, wl 
fought the police on campus and vo 
for socialists and communists, are r 
white-collar workers, most of whoir 
dently voted for the LDP. 

The conservative party made in 
pressive gains in the cities, where, 
cording to conventional wisdom, it 
weakest. Within the party, a group 
energetic "new leaders" emerged t 
ry their nation's banner into the fir! 
And, of course, Prime Minister Nail 
sone scored an extraordinary persol 
triumph and secured a strong popu I 
mandate for his policies. These inchl 
expanding Japan's international rolil 
continuing administrative and fiscal! 
forms, and restructuring the econorl 
lessen reliance on export-led growtll 
With the support of a remarkably al 
ive party, Prime Minister Nakasond] 
demonstrated world-class leadership! 

Last week, the most prominent I 
of Japan's new leaders— Mr. Abe, 
Mr. Miyazawa, and Mr. Takeshita-I 
announced their support for extendi 
the Prime Minister's tenure in officl 
that he can finish pending business.! 






20 



Department of State Bi'l 



EAST ASIA 



come the prospect of continuing to 
•k with a prime minister who is held 
ligh esteem in the West and has so 
vincingly earned the trust of the 
anese electorate. 
Mr. Nakasone, to be sure, faces 
(he formidable challenges. The LDP 
! achieved a general mandate for 
Inge. Some of the presumed direc- 
ts of change have been outlined in 
Maekawa report— a future-oriented 
leprint that has been widely praised 
aoth sides of the Pacific. In a democ- 
y like Japan's the Diet will obviously 
/ a major role in translating a broad 
idate into specific policies and laws. 
: The ruling LDP now appears com- 
(ted to opening the Japanese market 
restructuring the economy. Some of 
piet members, however, will con- 
le to resist measures that appear 
jatening to constituency interests. 
5 should not be surprising to Ameri- 

The President, after all, has 
ired a broad, bipartisan consensus 
nd tax reform. Yet some of the 
lils are still to be negotiated in con- 
nce. Just as I am sure an acceptable 
bill will emerge from the House- 
ite conference, so I am confident 
a new consensus in Japan will sup- 
a timely restructuring of the 
nese economy. The die is cast, I 
ve, in favor of a more and more in- 
ationally oriented Japan. 
J.S. -Japan relations were not a 
>r issue in the recent election. In 
the issues that dominated U.S.- 
,n relations in the late 1960s have 
ily disappeared. The Indochina con- 
no longer stirs partisan emotions; 
lawa transferred to Japanese admin- 
tion in 1972; and both Tokyo and 
hington have established solid work- 
■elations with China. 
Today, Japan perceives its interests 
its role in global terms. Perhaps 
. significant for U.S.-Japan relations, 
3 is a striking convergence of U.S. 
Japanese perceptions of the global 
.tion. Two factors have contributed 
ds substantial coincidence of world 
s. 

? irst, Japanese perceptions of its 
rity requirements have been shaped 
oviet intransigence on the Northern 
itories issue, by the relentless 
it military buildup in the Pacific, 
oy Moscow's aggression in 
lanistan and its support for Viet- 
s occupation of Cambodia. 
Second, developments beyond East 
-such as the "oil shocks" of the 
1970s and the persistent turbulence 
e Middle East and Persian Gulf 



areas since then— have reinforced our 
common interest in global stability. 
Over time, a consensus has emerged in 
Japan which supports steady improve- 
ments in Japan's self-defense capabilities 
and expanded bilateral defense coopera- 
tion with the United States. 

In recent years the level and fre- 
quency of the U.S.-Japan bilateral dia- 
logue has also changed dramatically. 
The Emperor's visit to the United * 
States in 1975 symbolized the end of the 
postwar period. Starting with Gerald 
Ford, all our Presidents have visited 
Japan while in office. President Reagan 
and Prime Minister Nakasone have 
already met twice this year— first at 
Camp David and less than a month later 
in Tokyo. Secretary of State Shultz and 
Foreign Minister Abe have had 26 bi- 
lateral meetings— four of them this year. 
And senior officials responsible for areas 
as diverse as arms control and African 
affairs consult with even greater fre- 
quency. 

The substance of our exchanges has 
changed as well. Twenty years ago, our 
talks with Japan focused primarily on 
bilateral rather than global or even 
regional issues. Now, our political dia- 
logue is unsurpassed in its breadth and 
depth and extends literally to every 
corner of the globe. Many of these con- 
sultations go beyond simple exchanges 
of views to include increasingly close co- 
ordination of operational concerns. For 
example, my Japanese counterpart and I 
meet annually to promote the com- 
plementarity of our respective aid 
programs. 

Foreign aid, in fact, is a good exam- 
ple of the expanding scope of Japan's 
international interests and involvement. 
In the 1960s, Japan's modest aid effort 
involved reparations to war victims and 
subsidies for Japan's expanding commer- 
cial interests. Today, under the concept 
of comprehensive security, Japan is 
seeking to make a significant contribu- 
tion to Western security through other 
than military means. In 1984 the United 
States and Japan ranked first and sec- 
ond in the world as donors of foreign 
assistance. Between us, we furnished 
over $11 billion to developing countries. 
If Japan meets its declared objective of 
doubling its foreign aid by 1992, it will 
provide roughly $40 billion of additional 
assistance to less developed countries 
(LDCs) over the coming 6 years. 

We particularly welcome the role 
Japan has assumed in providing aid to 
friendly countries such as Thailand, 
Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and the 
nations of Central America and the 



Caribbean. The Philippines and Haiti 
are now at crucial stages in their politi- 
cal evolution. The South Pacific is 
undergoing important political and eco- 
nomic changes. Africa faces natural 
calamities as well as daunting economic 
problems. We are working cooperatively 
with the Government of Japan to ex- 
pand our respective efforts in promoting 
growth and encouraging stability in 
these and other areas. 

The measures Japan has taken to ex- 
pand its foreign aid constitute an ap- 
propriate effort to recycle its prosperity 
back into the global economic system. 
Clearly, there is more to be done. Japan 
gives twice as much aid to the nearby 
nations of Asia as it gives to African, 
Latin American, and Middle Eastern na- 
tions combined. As Japan's foreign pol- 
icy activities expand to take account of 
its global economic power and "reach," 
we would anticipate not only increases 
in the levels of its aid but a further 
improvement in the concessional terms 
of assistance and the provision of a 
larger percentage of its aid to countries 
outside East Asia. 

Foreign assistance efforts pay for- 
eign policy dividends. Over the past few 
years, many developing countries have 
discarded statist policies for market- 
oriented approaches to economic growth 
and are increasingly receptive to demo- 
cratic ideas. Regrettably, at just this 
moment of opportunity, the U.S. Con- 
gress is drastically cutting back on our 
own foreign aid budget. This is penny 
wise and pound foolish, since aid to 
friendly countries is one of the most 
cost-effective investments we can make 
in our own security. Aside from the fact 
that about 70% of every U.S. bilateral 
aid dollar is spent on American goods 
and services, assistance to friendly 
governments supports freer markets, 
alleviates poverty or disaster, and 
underpins newly democratic regimes. 
The cuts Congress threatens are 
potentially devastating. For fiscal year 
1987 the President is requesting $22.6 
billion for international affairs funding. 
This covers all our economic, military, 
and food aid programs as well as the 
State Department and United States 
Information Agency (USIA) budgets, 
our security programs overseas, and the 
costs of Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty. 

Congress has cut that amount to 
$17.4 billion— a 27% reduction. What will 
happen if we are forced to take a cut of 
this magnitude? 

Some programs have been ear- 
marked by Congress; they will be sus- 
tained. Thev include aid to Israel and 



ber 1986 



21 



EAST ASIA 



Egypt, security assistance for base 
rights countries, and important pro- 
grams in Central America and Pakistan. 
After taking care of these priorities, all 
other programs would have to be cut by 
nver 509; . What might this mean? 

• Haiti and other fledgling democra- 
cies in the Caribbean could see cuts in 
U.S. economic aid by more than two- 
thirds. 

• Aid for the Andean countries- 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru- 
could be eliminated, with unfortunate 
consequences for our efforts to halt the 
production and illegal export of narcot- 
ics from that region. 

• Economic support for Africa could 
be virtually eliminated— undermining 
policy reform plans and famine relief 
efforts. 

• The Peace Corps could be forced 
to cut as many as 1,000 volunteers in 
Africa alone. 

• Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty could be forced into bankruptcy. 



These are not idle threats or scare 
tactics. They reflect the plans we would 
be forced to put into action if Congress 
does not reconsider its drastic reduc- 
tions. It is inconceivable that any seri- 
ous person could presume that cuts of 
this magnitude will not significantly and 
adversely affect our national interests. 
We are a superpower. Superpowers 
have far-flung interests. Supporting 
those interests carries with it certain 
costs. One cannot cut the means by 
which we protect our interests without 
placing our interests in jeopardy. This is 
a simple verity I hope Congress will not 
ignore. 

Please excuse this brief commercial, 
but it is relevant to my theme. We are 
not encouraging Japan to do more in the 
field of aid so that we can do less but in 
order that jointly we can meet the 
requirements of stability and develop- 
ment in areas of vital interest to us 
both. Japan is expanding its aid efforts. 
It is not a time for us to be cutting our 
own program. 



U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JULY 31, 1986' 

I am announcing today that the LInited 
States and Japan have reached an agree- 
ment on semiconductor trade. This 
agreement represents an important step 
toward freer and more equitable world 
trade and will enhance the ability of our 
semiconductor manufacturers to com- 
pete fairly in the Japanese market. It 
will also help prevent Japanese manufac- 
turers from dumping semiconductors in 
the United States and in third countries. 

This agreement successfully 
addresses a series of trade complaints 
raised by the U.S. semiconductor indus- 
try and this Administration charging 
Japanese chip manufacturers with 
impeding U.S. access to their market, 
while dumping semiconductors on world 
markets and violating U.S. dumping 
laws. 

With the agreement of the govern- 
ment of Japan to this landmark pact, the 
United States suspends the pending 301 
market access case and EPROM 

ible, programmable read only 
memories] semiconductor dumping case. 
The 256K semiconductor dumping case 
will he suspended August 1. 



By holding to our free market prin- 
ciples, but at the same time insisting on 
fair trade, we have created a climate in 
which the U.S. semiconductor industry 
should substantially increase its sales 
position in Japan. We have also set an 
important precedent to help prevent 
future unfair trade practices in other 
high technology industries. 

As I have said time and again, we 
will not stand idly by as American 
workers are threatened by unfair 
trading practices. We have and we will 
take the tough actions that are necessary 
to ensure that all nations play by the 
same rules. Today's agreement shows 
that vigorous enforcement of existing 
laws can open markets. To succumb to 
the temptation of protectionism will 
benefit no one. 

This is an historic agreement. U.S. 
Trade Representative Yeutter, Secre- 
tary of Commerce Baldrige, and the U.S. 
negotiating team are to be commended 
for their tenacity, skill, and resoluteness 
during the months of intense 
negotiations. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 4, 1986. 



Current Challenges 

The most difficult current bilateral I 
problems continue to confront us in I 
field of trade. When I first lived in I 
Tokyo, the United States and Japan I 
experienced some acute trade 
problems— principally involving textik 
But they were of a different order cl 
magnitude and character than todayl 
In the late 1960s, Japan maintained | 
numerous quotas, high tariffs, and al 
host of other formal trade barriers I 
which it was just beginning to dism:| 
tie. In 1968, Japan had a global tradl 
deficit of $15 million. Its trade surpll 
with the United States was $604 mi n 

Over the last 20 years, the Japa s 
Government has eliminated most of I 
quotas and formal trade barriers. It I 
reduced its tariffs to a point where I 
Japan now has the lowest average 1 1 
of any industrialized country. Howe' I 
a host of nettlesome problems— inclt I 
some quotas, high tariffs, nontariff 1 1 
riers, and restrictive business practil 
in certain areas— remain. 

At the same time, the competitr I. 
challenge posed by high-quality 
Japanese products to important U.S| 
manufacturing industries has increa; I 
pressures for protection in this coun | 
A 1985 U.S. global trade deficit of $1 
billion— including a $50-billion trade I 
deficit with Japan— coupled with a 
Japanese global trade surplus of $46 1 
lion that year, heightens these 
pressures. 

The U.S. trade problem is not, ol 
course, limited to Japan. Our trade I 
problem is global, but the bilateral 
deficit with Japan remains so large 1 1 
it will be difficult to make headway I 
our global problem without redresshl 
the bilateral imbalance. Progress mul 
be made to reduce it. 

We are determined to bring our I 
bilateral trade with Japan into a moil 
balanced equilibrium. Failure to do si 
exposes our political relations and sel 
rity cooperation to heavy strains. Arl 
we believe our policv efforts will pajl 
off. 

• As Congress and the AdministH 
tion reduce the U.S. Government's I 
budget deficit, our savings/investmerl 
imbalance should decline and, along 'I 
it, our global trade deficit, including I 
bilateral deficit with Japan. 

• In accordance with agreements! 
reached by the major financial poweil 
(G-5) last 'fall and by the Summit Sel 
in Tokyo last May, we are coordinatil 
on international economic policies mcl 
closely with Japan and the other majl 



22 



Department of State Bui ifl 



EAST ASIA 



dustrialized countries. Adjustment of 
change rates is the most visible and 
amatic result. A roughly 40% depreci- 
lon in the dollar against the yen dur- 
% the past year should have a sizable 
ipact, over time, on our trade position. 

• Representatives of the U.S. and 
panese Governments are initiating a 
lateral dialogue concerning structural 
onomic issues of mutual concern. In- 
•ed, a preparatory meeting on this sub- 
i was held in San Francisco today. 

lis dialogue will examine the im- 
iances in the Japanese economy and 
,S. economy and consider ways to cor- 
ct them. 

• The MOSS (market-oriented, 
ctor-selective) talks are improving 
irket access to entire industrial sec- 
rs within Japan. We have made sub- 
mtial progress in electronics, 
ecommunications, medical equipment 
d pharmaceuticals, and forest 
oduets. We will soon open discussions 

a fifth sector— transportation 
tchinery. 

• And finally, we are seeking to 
-ninate remaining trade barriers on 
jer products— e.g., tobacco, leather, 

—as we encounter them. 

These are substantial efforts. We be- 
e they are producing results. They 
aimed at expanding trade while as- 
ing equitable access to each other's 
rket. They reflect faith in competition 
1 a determination to see that the 
ying field for competition is level. 
iy constitute an alternative to protec- 
lism, which we are determined to 
ist. 

Protectionism has a false and dan- 
ous allure. Industries affected by 
lorts usually ask for temporary and 
ited protection. Yet, while giving 
uporary relief to one industry, protee- 
list actions penalize the consumer 
I divert investment and labor from 
•e efficient and productive industries, 
tectionist bills like the House Omni- 
Trade Bill (H.R. 4800) will not solve 
trade problem. Protectionist meas- 
s will damage the U.S. economy, 
eaten American jobs, and embroil us 
rade conflicts with virtually all our 

■ or trading partners. We cannot af- 
11 such an outcome, particularly with 
'■'an. 

I Current Japanese- American chal- 
ices are not limited to trade. Signifi- 
S: accomplishments have been regis- 
I'd in bilateral security cooperation. 
Bquently criticized as a "free rider" 
■relying on American muscle to pro- 

■ its economic and political health, 



Japan has steadily augmented its 
defense capabilities. A growing domestic 
consensus has supported qualitative and 
quantitative improvements in Japan's 
Self-Defense Force and contributed to 
steady annual increases in Japan's 
defense spending. 

We have also witnessed a growing 
Japanese commitment to the U.S. -Japan 
security structure. Antidefense shib- 
boleths have disappeared from the plat- 
forms of several opposition parties. The 
Government of Japan has welcomed 
U.S.-homeported ships; it has authorized 
new U.S. Air Force deployments; it has 
participated in additional joint exercises. 
Japanese support for the American 
presence in Japan is now valued at over 
$1 billion annually. 

While Japan's defense budget 
remains small as a percentage of gross 
national product, it is now the sixth 
largest in the world and is growing 
rapidly. This expanding defense budget 
supports a modern, well-trained military 
establishment with appropriate defense 
roles and missions: the conventional 
defense of Japanese territory, the sur- 
rounding seas and sky, and the sealanes 
within 1,000 miles. These roles are con- 
sistent with Japanese and American 
expectations— and with those of Japan's 
neighbors. 

Japan's new 5-year defense spending 
plan represents a good start toward 
achieving the capabilities necessary to 
carry out these missions. We certainly 
would like to see Japan achieve its goals 
more quickly. Nonetheless, the Japanese 
Self-Defense Force is already an increas- 
ingly potent deterrent against aggres- 
sion aimed at Japan and makes the role 
of our own forces in the region that 
much more effective. 

Agenda for the Future 

Time does not permit me to elaborate 
on the variety of other ways in which 
the U.S. and Japan cooperate diploma- 
tically in many areas of the world. 
Suffice it to say, compared with 20 years 
ago, U.S. -Japan relations are now on 
a firm and solid basis. Our give-and- 
take on substantive issues has increased 
significantly. Recognition in both our 
countries of the scope of our interde- 
pendence has grown. Our knowledge of 
each other has appreciably increased. 
We welcome these developments, 
yet we know there is no room for com- 
placency on either side of the Pacific. As 
our relationship with Japan enters a 
new and more mature stage, the issues 



our two countries face become ever 
more complex and far-reaching. Con- 
structively managing the U.S. -Japan 
relationship through the 1980s and be- 
yond will be even more challenging. 

We now need to look at the 
U.S. -Japanese relationship as an active 
partnership for global progress. In par- 
ticular, we need to work closely with 
Japan to: 

• Make equitable and sustained eco- 
nomic growth a reality for both the de- 
veloped and developing world by 
preserving and improving the interna- 
tional trading system and assisting the 
LDCs to cope with their myriad 
problems, including the problem of ex- 
ternal debt; 

• See that people everywhere un- 
derstand that a nuclear war cannot be 
won and must not be fought, by 
preserving deterrence while pursuing 
substantial and verifiable arms 
reduction; 

• Expand international cooperation 
to rid the world of the scourge of ter- 
rorism; 

• Defuse regional conflicts, such as 
in Indochina and Afghanistan; and 

• Find ways to apply the technologi- 
cal developments of our information so- 
cieties to the benefit of mankind. 

Persistent and purposeful effort will 
be required as our governments and 
peoples create the conditions and con- 
sensus necessary for cooperation on this 
broad agenda. 

Conclusion 

Let me return to my opening theme. 
Times change. As they do, we must 
sometimes overcome what we thought 
we knew in the past. We have long 
since learned that we cannot go it alone, 
and we have begun to see Japan with 
new eyes. Japan is a strong country; it 
is becoming an outward-looking country. 
Japan is more than a trading partner; it 
is a valued ally and good friend. Even 
so, Japan is only on the brink of fulfill- 
ing its potential as a major contributor 
to world economic growth and comity. 
We share many things with Japan: 
above all the conviction that we are not 
mere temporary allies but permanent 
friends. Our task is to use that friend- 
ship to bring to the benefit of all 
mankind our shared devotion to peace, 
our ability to foster change, our eco- 
nomic prowess, and our dedication to 
democracy. ■ 



3ober 1986 



23 



EAST ASIA 



Perspective and Proportion 
for U.S. -Japanese Relations 



by Gaston J. Sigur, Jr. 

Address before the "U.S. -Japan 
Economic Agenda" sponsored by the 
Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of 
George Washington University, the 
Carnegie Council, on Ethics, and Interna- 
tionaX Affairs, Inc., on June 2, 1986. Mr. 
Sigur is Assistant Scrrrta ry for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

It is a great pleasure to be here among 
friends to offer some observations on 
our kaleidoscopic relations with Japan. I 
was reflecting on this subject not long 
ago as I rode from Narita Airport to my 
hotel in Tokyo. 

Driving from Narita to central 
Tokyo, one passes through rice fields 
and groves of cryptomeria before enter- 
ing the suburban sprawl of houses, 
garish hotels of dubious purpose, and 
small factories. At one point, Disney- 
land's castle towers loom up beyond the 
highway's embankment. As one crosses 
the Ara Kawa, one sees ahead the 
jumble of Tokyo's buildings and the 
flashing signs advertising Ricoh, Seiko, 
and a hundred other companies. Inching 
along the overhead expressway, the 
traveler can look into the companies' 
windows and see the employees phoning, 
writing, and, he imagines, making deals. 
The car passes through the bright neon 
of the Ginza and into the open area 
around the Imperial Palace. The space is 
relaxing and welcome after the traffic 
and congestion; yet the moat and tur- 
reted gate are incongruous. By the time 
one reaches the hotel in Akasaka, one's 
mind is nearly numb with jet lag and the 
conglomeration of images. It is time for 
a shower, a drink, and welcome rest. 

In a way, U.S. -Japan relations are 
like the ride in from Narita. Those of us 
involved in them are bombarded with 
reports, articles, meetings, conversa- 
tions, and developments of a hundred 
sorts. At least occasionally, we have to 
stand back, reflect, sort out the images, 
and put them into perspective. I would 
like to use this relaxed occasion among 
friends to consider events over the last 
year or so and to comment on our 
policies. 

First, we should remember that 
U.S. -Japan relations rest on a "triad" 
that is the product of the early postwar 
period— a shared commitment to demo- 
cratic values, a fervent belief in the 



dynamism of free markets, and a secu- 
rity framework. This "triad" has 
endured now for three decades. 



Security Relationship 

In the early years, the future of defense 
cooperation was anything but certain: 
the security treaty and United States 
bases were the targets of violent protest 
from the extreme left, and even the exist- 
ence of the Japanese self-defense forces 
was challenged by those who sought to 
prevent a replay of the militarism of the 
1930s by a strict and unrealistically 
literal application of the constitutional 
proscription against the use of military 
force. But with the reversion of Okinawa 
to Japanese sovereignty, the end of the 
Vietnam war, the normalization of rela- 
tions with China, and the steady buildup 
of Soviet military power in the Far East 
in general and in the Northern Terri- 
tories in particular, a broad consensus 
has emerged in support of our security 
relationship and of Japanese self-defense 
at about present levels. The Japanese 
now recognize the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union, the importance of a cred- 
ible, conventional self-defense capability, 
and the need for our military presence. 

Under the Mutual Security Treaty, 
the interest of both the United States 
and Japan are well served. We are able 
to maintain our personnel and facilities 
in Japan, where they are essential for 
the peace and security of the United 
States and of the entire Far East; Japan 
is provided a strategic deterrent— the 
so-called nuclear umbrella. With the 
threat of nuclear blackmail neutralized, 
the Government of Japan has set for 
itself the missions of defending, with 
conventional weapons, its territorial 
land, seas, and skies and also of protect- 
ing the vital sealanes out to 1,000 
nautical miles from Japan. It has main- 
tained a slow, steady program of acquir- 
ing the capabilities needed to carry out 
those missions. In the process, it has 
kept intact the essential domestic con- 
sensus on the correctness of this policy 
and has satisfied its neighbors, who have 
historical cause for worry, that it does 
not pose a threat to them. 

Perhaps more important, Japanese 
efforts to develop realistic defense mis- 
sions and to relate defense spending to 
their achievement have made increas- 
ingly irrelevant the old concerns about 



the Japanese defense budget— the dell 
in both countries over the 1% of GNI 
cap on defense spending and the ailed 
"free ride." 

To tell the truth, I never saw mu<| 
point to those arguments. Despite thtl 
GNP cap, Japanese defense spending! 
kept growing. Moreover Japan now il 
contributing over $1 billion per year 
the direct support and maintenance i 
U.S. forces in Japan. Not much is ev« 
said about this, but it is a tribute to qi 
cooperation and to the progress Japa 
has been making. 

Political Relationship 

Cooperation with Japan is not limitec 
the defense relationship. Every year 
two governments hold consultations i 
Africa, the Middle East, the United 
Nations, the Soviet Union, and foreig 
assistance. We discuss specific probk 
as they occur. For example, during tl 
past year, the United States and Jap; 
consulted closely on developments in 
Philippines, and we found that Japan 
policy and actions were complements 
to ours. In late May of this year, Jap; 
was the host to an international cons 
ative meeting to establish an enhanci 
aid program for the Philippines. Inde 
Japan has recently been the largest 
donor of economic aid to the Philippi 

Japan's parallel policies and help: 
actions with regard to the Philippine: 
are typical. Japan has also given 
substantial development assistance t( 
countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Turki 
and Jamaica, which are of special imj 
tance to us; it is almost uniquely able 
use economic assistance to encourage 
Chinese development with a Western 
orientation; and Japan's global aid pr 
gram is now the world's second large 

To cite another example, Japan 
joined its summit partners at the Tok 
economic summit to put countries sp< 
soring international terrorism on noti 
I can say straightforwardly that on 
issues ranging from arms control to t 
Middle East, we have found Japan's 
views to be valuable and geared to 
Western goals, and we have seen our 
cooperation become increasingly inti- 
mate and fruitful. 

Much of the consultation to whicb 
have referred has occurred for many 
years between senior bureaucrats of 1 
two governments. What is noteworthr 
about the last several years is that thu 
consultations at the political level ha\- 
become more frequent, more detailed I 
and more useful. Since January 1985,' 
Prime Minister Nakasone and the Pref 
dent have met five times. In that sam: 






24 



Department of State Bull" 



EAST ASIA 



•iod Secretary Shultz and Foreign 
lister Abe have had seven sets of con- 
tations. In fact, since assuming their 
sent positions, Foreign Minister Abe 
1 the Secretary have met 23 times, 
piously a good part of the eonversa- 
is between the political officials of the 
) countries concerns bilateral rela- 
is, and particularly economic rela- 
is. But the leaders have taken up a 
iety of international topics as well, 
! the discussions have taken on the 
racter of coordination and collabora- 
1. 1 hope that this very welcome pat- 
t will continue. 

imomic Relationship 

precisely because our defense rela- 
ship with Japan is crucial and 
luse our cooperation with Japan on 
rnational matters is so important 
cordial that the economic friction 
veen the two countries is so vexing, 
resolution of the trade problems 
veen our two countries is necessary 
central to the maintenance of a 
id overall relationship. 
We quite correctly make the argu- 
t that only protectionists place 
irtance on bilateral trade balances, 
'ever, the size of Japan's trade 
luses with the United States and 
the world has become a disruptive 
ical issue, and we have to deal with 
^e must not let economic friction 
ist, for if it does, it has the potential 
sturb our cooperation with Japan on 
nse and international matters and, 
hat matter, to impede the growth of 
lie partnerships between U.S. and 
I nese enterprises. 
_*et me summarize my analysis of 
challenge we face in our economic 
lions with Japan. With determina- 
ted with goals shared by business, 
I rnment, and citizens, Japan has 
i an economic structure capable of 
iloping and producing attractive, 
2-quality products at very competitive 
|s. In the past, Japan often used 
iknt industry" protection. That sort 
jrotection, questionable in any event, 
I' longer needed. The large Japanese 
a|xfacturers have the engineers, the 
Jnding research and development, 
(Rmple finance to compete vigorously 
^successfully at home and abroad in 
(jbsence of government protection, 
lie' is no more visible evidence of this 
^ the amount of Japan's exports to 
■Jnited States and to the world, 
dicient industries in Japan, which 
n.inly exist, should restructure or 
Hnch in an environment of open 
sj:ets. I believe Japan is already on 
apath, and I wish to encourage it. 



If we wish to solve problems, we 
must confront reality. We must and will 
seek the removal of Japan's remaining 
trade impediments vigorously. But at the 
same time, we must recognize that the 
elimination of those barriers will not 
result in a dramatic reduction of our 
bilateral trade imbalance. Therefore, we 
must address economic structural issues 
in Japan and the United States. We 
should not deceive ourselves that protec- 
tionist bills like the House Omnibus 
Trade Bill (H.R. 4800) will solve the 
trade problem. If enacted, that bill would 
severely damage the U.S. economy, 
destroy American jobs, reduce our inter- 
national trade competitiveness, and 
embroil us in trade conflicts with vir- 
tually all our major trading partners. 



market access in entire industrial 
sectors. 

• The telecommunications talks 
resulted in a major opening of the 
Japanese market. The successful MOSS 
talks with Japan are being used as a pat- 
tern for discussions on telecommunica- 
tions with the Europeans and the 
Canadians. 

• The talks on medical equipment 
and pharmaceuticals were an overall 
success. 

• From the electronics MOSS came 
tariff cuts, improvements in the patent 
system, and legal protection for semicon- 
ductor chips and computer software. 

• We also obtained reductions of the 
duties on some wood products and 



. . . Japan now is contributing over $1 billion per 
year for the direct support and maintenance of 
U.S. forces in Japan. 



One hears the allegation in 
Washington that the Administration has 
no trade policy. That is not so. With 
regard to Japan, we have a policy which 
addresses both individual trade problems 
and the structural issues that lie behind 
our deficit, and it is working. There are 
five elements in that policy, and I would 
like to describe them to you. 

First, in accordance with the Presi- 
dent's statement last September 7, we 
are seeking the elimination of remaining 
Japanese trade barriers. To cite an 
example, last fall, [U.S. Trade Repre- 
sentative] Ambassador Yeutter success- 
fully negotiated the reduction of some of 
Japan's barriers to the import of leather 
and leather products and obtained com- 
pensation for the barriers Japan would 
not remove. Under a Section 301 case 
begun by the Administration, we have 
entered discussions with Japan to reduce 
tariffs on tobacco products and to cor- 
rect distribution problems. At present 
we are also negotiating with Japan the 
elimination of its import quotas on 12 
agricultural product categories. We 
stand ready to investigate and to 
negotiate with Japan the removal of any 
Japanese trade practices that are incon- 
sistent with international rules. 

Second, in the MOSS [market- 
oriented, sector selective] process we are 
achieving significant improvements in 



paper products. The MOSS talks on 
forest products will continue, and the 
United States will monitor developments 
in the other sectors. We have agreed 
with Japan to begin discussions on a new 
sector, transportation machinery, this 
summer. 

The third element of the 
Administration's economic policy toward 
Japan has been dealing with the financial 
issues that affect exchange rates and, 
therefore, the trade balance. Following 
the G-5 agreement last September, the 
value of the yen strengthened nearly 
30% against the dollar. At [Treasury] 
Secretary Baker's suggestion, the sum- 
mit countries agreed in Tokyo in early 
May that, "additional measure should be 
taken to ensure that procedures for 
effective coordination of international 
economic policy are strengthened fur- 
ther." 

The summit statement correctly 
emphasizes economic fundamentals as 
determinants of exchange rates. That 
brings me to the fourth element of our 
policy toward Japan, a dialogue on 
economic structural adjustment which 
we expect to begin this July. One of the 
observations that economists make is 
that there are domestic savings/invest- 
ment imbalances in both the United 
States and Japan which foreordain a 
Japanese global trade surplus and a U.S. 
global trade deficit. In the structural 



~oer 1986 



25 



EAST ASIA 



dialogue, we will discuss with the Japa- 

a ays of encouraging greater 
domestic led growth in Japan. We also 
will discuss imbalances in our own 
economy, such as the dearth of savings. 

The final element of our economic 
policy toward Japan is really our own 
domestic policy. As Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings bites and the Federal deficit 
ilmps, the excess of consumption over 
production, and the trade deficit, should 
decline. 

Japan is keenly aware that it is not 
in its interest to continue to run large 
trade surpluses. Announcing the 
Maekawa commission's report in April, 
Prime Minister Nakasone said: "It is im- 
possible for Japan alone to continue to 
be an island of solitary prosperity, with a 
large current account imbalance, 
depending on exports. It is no exaggera- 
tion to say that our success in achieving 
the transformation will be essential to 
Japan's future." He went on: "Japan is 
now at an historic turning point in its 
relations with the international com- 
munity. Our continuing large current 
account imbalance is a matter of serious 
concern not only for the management of 
our own economy but also for the har- 
monious development of the world econ- 
omy. Therefore, it should be our 
national goal to steadily reduce the cur- 
rent account imbalance to one consistent 
with international harmony." 

I agree that Japan is at a historic 
turning point. Japan's postwar economic 
policies had their roots in the Meiji 
period when the Japanese Government 



regulation, that continuously produces 
more than it consumes, and that tends 
toward large current account surpluses. 
These are among the sources of the cur- 
rent economic friction between Japan 
and its trading partners. 

It is, in a way, ironic that in building 
the strong, independent economy the 
Meiji leaders sought, Japan became 
dependent on foreign markets. It is also 
ironic that Japan, whose culture pro- 
motes harmony, should be provoking 
such disharmony in its trading relation- 
ships. Of course, Japan is not different 
from the United States, Western 
Europe, or its neighbors in Asia in being 
enmeshed in an economically inter- 
dependent world. Still Prime Minister 
Nakasone's announcement that policies 
and attitudes that have prevailed for a 
hundred years must change is one of the 
most significant statements in postwar 
Japanese history. 

The skeptical among us may ques- 
tion whether Japan will carry through 
with the changes necessary to reduce the 
imbalance in its trade account. I think it 
will, because it has to. If one reviews the 
past year, one finds a tremendous 
momentum in the direction of positive 
change. 

• In the MOSS talks, particularly 
the telecommunications talks, Japan 
removed many governmental controls. 
Despite domestic political difficulties, 
Japan made many of the concessions we 
requested. 



We must and will seek the removal of Japan's 
remaining trade impediments. . . at the same time, 
we must recognize that the elimination of those 
barriers will not result in a dramatic reduction of 
our bilateral trade imbalance. 



sought to build a strong economy and to 
maintain autonomy. Now the quotas, 
high tariffs, and investment restrictions 
thai Japan employed to achieve its goals 
by and large have been discarded as 
unnecessary. 

Yet Japan's history over the last 
100 years has left the present generation 
a mixed inheritance. One legacy is solid 
prosperity. But others are a certain 
austerity of attitude and an economy 
that tolerates excessive government 



• In his unprecedented April 9, 
1985, address to the nation, Prime 
Minister Nakasone embraced the notion 
that Japan's market should be "open in 
principle, with restrictions by excep- 
tion." 

• Japan reduced tariffs on 1,850 
items during 1985. 

• Japan has played a positive role in 
the G-5 decisions and will be involved in 
the economic coordination mechanism 
devised at the Tokyo summit. 



• Japan is proceeding on course I 
with the full liberalization of its finan ( 
markets. 

• Japanese investment in overse;] 
manufacturing is increasing rapidly. I 
Japan's annual direct investment in 
foreign countries more than doubled I 
from $4.7 billion in 1980 to $10.2 billil 
in 1984. By that year Japan's total 
foreign investment totaled $71 billion! 
which $19 billion was in the United 
States. 

• A November 1985 Nomura 
Research Institute report predicts th;l 
as a result of a strong yen, investmer I 
overseas, and stronger foreign compt 
tion, Japan's imports will increase fail 
than its exports, so that by 1995 J apt I 
trade surplus will decline to $1.5 billiil 

I am confident that Japan will, in 
Prime Minister Nakasone's words, 
"steadily reduce the current account 
imbalance to one consistent with inte 
tional harmony." Apart from anythin 
else, doing so will result in the higher 
standard of living that the Japanese ] 
pie have earned. 

I would like to make some observ 
tions on the conduct of our economic 
relations with Japan. In the course ol 
the series of intense trade negotiatioi 
during the past several years, the U.i 
and Japanese Governments have wor 
together to solve problems. Some oft 
negotiations have been strained at tir 
but they have been successful. And 
through the talks, Japanese agencies 
U.S. agencies have established relatic 
ships. The negotiations have been edi 
tional for both sides, and the cooperai 
they have engendered will continue tc 
essential given the growing integratk 
of the U.S. and Japanese economies. 

In our attempt to deal with the 
effects of trade on our own industries 
and with political pressures in the 
United States, we often forget that 
other democratic governments must c 
with much the same political realities 
and problems as we. This is by no me; 
an argument for inaction. Rather it is 
caution that patience and subtlety ma 
bring better results than importunate 
demands. 

We should keep a sense of propor- 
tion in our relations with Japan and oi 
other trading partners. Through inter 
tional trade and investment, we seek 
increased prosperity in the United 
States. In order for the international 
free economic system to work, there 
obviously must be generally equal opp 
tunities for all countries. However, it ' 



26 



Department of State Build 



ECONOMICS 



■dly realistic to demand perfect justice 
■n by item and sector by sector. If we 
so in our negotiations, we have to 
ose between total victory— which is 
always realistic given politics in 
er countries— or retaliation, which 
ms everyone. We should not limit our 
ions. I might add that perfect justice 
ubjective and rarely takes account of 
own import restraints. 
Finally, there is no substitute for 
d domestic economic policy. In the 
sent international economy, goods 
funds flow easily across borders, 
inessmen have many options. If 
rest rates are high in one country, 
ipanies can borrow in another. If the 
appreciates, Japanese businesses are 
ly to invest in the United States or 
■e this market from third countries. 
e bar imports from one country, we 
likely to see shipments from others, 
survive in this kind of world, we must 
to the fundamentals. We must save 
invest, research and innovate. The 
;rnment must create an environment 
lucive to these things. But only 
ate individuals and companies can 
mplish them. 

A.s I said earlier, I think that both 
n and the United States are headed 
e right directions. As a result of the 
? appreciation, in volume terms 
nese exports to the United States 
leclining and Japanese imports from 
Jnited States are growing. The 
ed States is taking steps to correct 
:onomic policies. At the same time, 
apanese Government has resolved 
ter its economic structure. The 
ed States and Japan will undertake 
uctural dialogue, and we both will 
cipate in the new international 
omic monitoring system. Market 
3S negotiations on specific products 
Continue. I am confident that 
(hgh perseverance and cooperation, 
SjJnited States and Japan will solve 
a economic problems in a way that 
Contribute to increased prosperity in 
a country and to an ever more solid 
(productive relationship across the 



Economic Sanctions 

to Combat International Terrorism 



The following article is adapted from a 
report prepared by the Department of 
State hi response to a requestfrom 
Senators Richard G. Lugar and Frank 
H. Murkowski for an analysis of the 
advisability of economic sane/ions as a 
diplomatic tool to combat international 
terrorism. 



Advisability of Imposing 
Antiterrorism Sanctions 

This Administration is taking actions to 
combat international terrorism by every 
legitimate means. Economic sanctions 
are an integral part of peaceful meas- 
ures that we can take to deter states 
from supporting terrorism. The advisa- 
bility of imposing sanctions depends on 
their likely effectiveness and the eco- 
nomic and diplomatic consequences for 
the United States. In addition to their 
potential economic effect, sanctions may 
serve useful political and diplomatic 
ends. 

Economic sanctions may be used to 
pressure targeted states to change their 
policies and to strengthen the resolve of 
others, such as neighboring countries or 
U.S. allies, in dealing with governments 
that support terrorism. Although sanc- 
tions such as trade controls may ad- 
versely affect our global trade position 
and may have a particularly negative 
impact on some U.S. firms, they demon- 
strate our resolve and show that we are 
prepared to accept economic losses, if 
necessary, in our battle against ter- 
rorism. Openly acknowledging that the 
United States also will suffer from sanc- 
tions helps us to encourage others to fol- 
low our example and make the required 
trade and financial sacrifices. At the 
Tokyo economic summit, the seven par- 
ticipating heads of government agreed 
in their Declaration on International 
Terrorism that: 

Terrorism has no justification. . . .[It] 
must be fought effectively through deter- 
mined, tenacious, discreet and patient action 
combining national measures with interna- 
tional cooperation. 

However, antiterrorism considera- 
tions, as important as they are, are only 
one facet of our policy toward any coun- 
try. Other relevant factors— strategic, 
political, economic, humanitarian— must 
play a part in deciding whether to un- 
dertake an action such as imposing 



trade controls. Thus, in the abstract it is 
difficult to evaluate the advisability of 
sanctions. A particular course may be 
advisable in one case but inappropriate 
in another. The Administration banned 
virtually all trade and financial transac- 
tions with Libya after it became clear 
that previous actions, including partial 
sanctions, had not gone far enough. 
Similar action may not be useful in the 
case of other countries that support 
international terrorism. 

Economic Consequences of 
Trade Sanctions 

Impact on Target Countries. The effec- 
tiveness of U.S. economic sanctions in 
exerting economic pressure on a foreign 
government depends on many factors, 
including the U.S. trade relationship 
with the target country, the availability 
of similar products from other countries, 
and alternative markets for the target 
country's products. The diversity of sup- 
ply that characterizes most widely 
traded goods today limits the impact of 
unilateral trade sanctions on the target 
country's behavior: when one country or 
group of countries decides to withhold 
goods or services from a terrorist- 
supporting state, other suppliers may 
move in to fill the gap. Similarly, a 
unilateral boycott of the products of a 
terrorist-supporting state may simply 
shift market patterns. In the absence of 
international cooperation, the terrorist 
state often obtains what it wants to buy 
and finds alternative customers for what 
it has to sell, and our intended influence 
on it is correspondingly reduced. Sanc- 
tions, however, can have a significant 
effect in sectors where the United 
States is the key supplier. Export con- 
trols tend to have the greatest economic 
impact over the short term, as current 
sources of supply are interrupted and 
the target economy struggles to adjust. 
The precise impact is often difficult 
to judge because reliable, up-to-date eco- 
nomic data may be lacking. In the case 
of Libya, we believe that the measures 
taken in January 1986 to ban virtually 
all economic activity with that country, 
magnified by the steep decline in oil 
prices, are contributing to the deteriora- 
tion of the Libyan economy. Other coun- 
tries' willingness to join us increases the 
economic effectiveness of the sanctions. 



:toer 1986 



27 



ECONOMICS 



From 1978 to L980, the United 
States provided »i'i of I. Una's imports, 

irding to International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) figures. On the other hand, 
the European Community (EC) ac- 
counted for more than 60$ of Libya's 
total imports, while other Western 
industrialized countries supplied an addi- 
tional 10%-15%. However, U.S. export 
controls probably have assumed an en- 
hanced significance because they focus 
on items, such as aircraft and sophisti- 
cated oil field equipment, that may not 
be readily available from other 
countries. 

As a result of increasingly more 
stringent export controls in 1981 and 
1982, the U.S. market share in 1983 
decreased to 2.5% of Libyan imports. 
IMP' statistics indicate that, as a result 
of the downturn in the Libyan economy, 
European Community exports to Libya 
also declined in absolute terms during 
this period. It appears that our Euro- 
pean trading partners were restrained 
in assuming lost U.S. business. Newly 
industrialized countries, however, includ- 
ing South Korea and Brazil, substantial- 
ly increased their share of exports to 
Libya. 

Following our 1982 ban on crude oil 
imports, U.S. imports from Libya 
declined dramatically, from $7.4 billion 
in 1980 to only $865,000 in 1983, accord- 
ing to Commerce Department statistics. 
The President's Executive Order of 
January 7, 1986, prohibited virtually all 
direct trade to or from Libya. 

Libya traditionally has sought out 
U.S. contractors because of their reputa- 
tion and reliability. Although the impact 
on services is not easily quantified, the 
departure of U.S. firms providing con- 
sulting, management, construction, and 
contracting services to Libya's oil indus- 
i rv and major development projects 
could be costly to the Libyan economy 
in terms of temporary disruptions and 
recontracting time. We have obtained 
promises from the other Summit Seven 
countries to try to discourage their 
firms from replacing departing Ameri- 
can companies. How this will work out 
in practice remains to be seen, but the 
Italian presence, for example, has fallen 
from 15,000-17,000 to under 3,000. 

Impact on the U.S. Economy. 

When the Administration has restricted 
trade with countries supporting ter- 
rorism, it has acted in full awareness 
that such measures also have costs for 
the U.S. economy. These can be divided 
into: 

• Direct costs in terms of lost trade; 



• Indirect costs in our trade with 
other trading partners. 

Direct Costs. The sheer size of the 
U.S. economy has helped absorb the 
direct costs of our trade controls. For 
example, U.S. exports to Libya in the 
late 1970s, before imposition of antiter- 
rorism export controls, accounted for 
less than 1% of all U.S. exports. As a 
result of our export controls, U.S. ex- 
ports to Libva declined by $500 million 
from 1981 to 1982 and by another $191 
million in 1983. These direct costs often 
fall unevenly on different sectors of the 
U.S. economy. In the Libyan case, the 
most severe impact was on the U.S. air- 
craft and petroleum industries, which 
previously had dominated the Libyan 
market. In 1983 alone, the Administra- 
tion denied licenses to sell $597.5-million 
worth of large civil transport aircraft to 
Libya. The Commerce Department esti- 
mates that in the petroleum sector, our 
controls prevented U.S. firms from pur- 
suing contracts worth at least $150 
million in 1984 and 1985 for the develop- 
ment of the Ras Lanuf refinery and 
petrochemical plant in Libya. 

U.S. trade with other terrorist- 
supporting countries also has decreased 
in recent years. For example, exports to 
Iran declined from $954 million in 1979 
to just under $74 million in 1985, and 
imports from $2.7 billion to $762 million. 
Trade with Syria and South Yemen is 
mininal. In 1985, we exported 
$106-million worth of goods to Syria, 
while importing less than $3 million. 
For South Yemen, the figures were 
$9 million of exports and $1 million of 
imports. 

Indirect Costs. The use of economic 
sanctions also may entail significant in- 
direct costs— generally incurred over a 
longer period. Frequent use of unilateral 
trade controls for foreign policy pur- 
poses can damage the reputation of 
American firms as reliable suppliers. 
Customers forced to buy elsewhere may 
never return to their U.S. suppliers. 
Other U.S. trading partners may change 
suppliers or deliberately "design out" 
U.S. components in their manufactured 
goods to avoid restrictions on where 
they can sell. For instance, the Com- 
merce Department has reported that 
some foreign aircraft manufacturers are 
increasingly avoiding U.S. high- 
technology navigational devices for fear 
that new U.S. export controls might be 
imposed, thereby preventing sales or 
curtailing supplies of parts. U.S. firms 
also report that they are being pre- 
cluded from major aircraft projects in 



some countries that do business with I 
Libya and other targeted countries. 

On the other hand, economic consl 
quences flow from the continuation ol] 
terrorism. Some countries have been I 
reluctant to join in sanctions because I 
concerns about losing the economic 
benefits of trade with Libya. Howevel 
the terrorist threat and growing publj 
concern about terrorism are costing I 
airlines and other businesses, inciudii I 
American firms, millions of dollars in i 
lost tourism and increased security 
costs. Although difficult to quantify, 
there is a growing economic cost frorj 
the lack of sufficient international 
cooperation to make economic and po 
cal sanctions more effective. 



Diplomatic Consequences 
of Trade Sanctions 

Leaving aside their economic impact, 
sanctions can be used for their politic 
or diplomatic effect to demonstrate I 
determination to oppose another nati 
support of terrorism. Sanctions send 
powerful nonmilitary signal that we ' 
not countenance business as usual wi 
those who support terrorists. They 
demonstrate that we support our pol 
cies with actions as well as words an 
are prepared to incur costs in our ba 
against international terrorism. This 
serves to refute criticisms that we as 
our allies to make sacrifices while we 
continue to profit from commercial rs 
tions with countries supporting terrot 
or that we are unwilling to try "peact 
ful measures" before taking other st( 

Sanctions can have political costs 
well. U.S. policy attempts to considei 
political as well as economic conse- 
quences of sanctions in adjusting our 
responses. To the extent that we hav 
other interests and prospects for cooj 
ation with a targeted country, the 
United States must weigh the probat 
loss of influence against the expected 
benefits from economic sanctions. Me 
ures that appear unnecessarily harsh 
inappropriate can undermine our crec 
bility with the targeted country as w> 
as with friendly countries whose supj 
we seek. 

Economic sanctions can also creat 
difficulties in our political relations w 
friendly countries that are unwilling t 
take measures similar to ours. These 
tensions may increase when our conti 
are applied extraterritorially to perso 
or things within the territories of frk 
ly countries in a manner they conside 1 
infringes on their sovereignty. Our e>* 
perience with the gas pipeline sanctio 
against the Soviet Union demonstrate 



28 



Department of State Bull** 



ECONOMICS 



problems of extending unilateral 
.. sanctions effectively to overseas 
Maries of U.S. companies. Several 
■opean countries, including the 
ted Kingdom, have enacted blocking 
slation that can be invoked to pro- 
t persons in their territories from 
iplying with U.S. controls. For these 
sons, the Administration has at- 
pted to moderate, where appropri- 

the extraterritorial reach of our 
Rons. For instance, our most recent 
:tions against Libya were not ex- 
led to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
is or to reexports of U.S. -origin 
is, except transshipments. 
All of these considerations influenced 
decision to impose economic sanc- 
3 against Libya. Unilateral U.S. re- 
lions underscored our opposition to 
hafi's policies, but they did not 
luce sufficient economic and political 
sures to cause significant policy 
ige. The decision to end all direct 
nercial relations with Libya showed 
allies that we are willing to accept 
y costs and may have contributed 
ir recent success in obtaining mul- 
•iral cooperation, albeit limited, on 
:ions and other measures, 
jibya is an exceptional case. There 
lajor qualitiative differences be- 
n our relationship with Libya and 

countries on the terrorism list. We 

normal diplomatic relations with 
i and maintain a limited dialogue 
some of the other countries. In 

contrast to Libya, we have been 
on occasion to use our relationships 
those countries to the benefit of 
interests. 

Ititial for Gaining International 
unilateral Cooperation 

Idifficult to evaluate abstractly the 
■utial for gaining international or 
lateral cooperation for sanctions 
1st countries that support or harbor 
Irists. 

ince the United States, Japan, and 
tern Europe together account for 
h three-quarters of the world's 
I [gross national product] and trade, 
psition of our allies is worth noting. 
lilies are reluctant to adopt eco- 
I sanctions for several reasons. 

irst, most maintain that sanctions 
•effective, often pointing to past ef- 
iwhere they believe sanctions 
I such as Rhodesia. 

?cond, many allies have substantial 
lercial interests as well as citizens 
Inight be placed in jeopardy by im- 
fo sanctions. 



Our major European allies belong to 
the European Community. Community 
decisions on sanctions historically have 
been made on the basis of consensus. 
Given the strong opposition of some EC 
members to economic sanctions, for 
reasons outlined above, consensus is 
difficult to achieve in most cases. 

The allies are prepared, on a case- 
by-case basis, to take specific actions 
short of broad economic sanctions. In 
the Libyan case, the EC agreed at an 
early date that members would not sell 
weapons or military equipment to Libya 
and that, to the extent possible, EC 
governments would prevent their com- 
panies from undermining U.S. actions 
and replacing U.S. companies. Other 
measures, reaffirmed at the Tokyo sum- 
mit, such as reducing the staffs of the 
Libyan Peoples' Bureaus, also are being 
implemented in a number of countries. 
We welcome the cooperation achieved 
and the strong signal it sends. We are 
consulting closely with our allies and 
have been urging additional measures. 

Adequacy of Existing Authority 
to Impose Economic Sanctions 

Existing legislation gives the President 
extensive authority to take economic 
measures against countries supporting 
terrorism. This authority has proven 
sufficient to impose broad controls on 
trade and other economic activity with 
such countries. The Export Administra- 
tion Act of 1979, as amended, authorizes 
restrictions on exports to countries that 
support terrorism, and the recently 
enacted International Security and De- 
velopment Cooperation Act of 1985 
authorizes a ban on imports from such 
countries. U.S. law also permits a wide 
range of other antiterrorism sanctions, 
including a cutoff of foreign assistance 
and arms sales and termination of air 
services. In addition, the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act au- 
thorizes the President, upon declaration 
of a national emergency, to regulate or 
prohibit a wide range of trade and finan- 
cial transactions. An appendix to this 
report describes the most important of 
these authorities. 

Under Section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act, the Secretary of 
State has designated Libya, Syria, Iran, 
Cuba, and the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) as 
countries that have repeatedly provided 
support for international terrorism. 
These designations are periodically 
reviewed, and changes are made when- 
ever a country's conduct so warrants. 



Cuba and Iran were added to the list in 
1982 and 1984, respectively; Iraq was 
removed in 1982. 

As our sanctions against these coun- 
tries and, more recently, our ban on vir- 
tually all trade and financial transactions 
with Libya illustrate, the Administration 
is prepared to use these authorities 
vigorously. We must continue, however, 
to take specific circumstances into ac- 
count, including the probable effective- 
ness and diplomatic and economic 
consequences of our actions. Other key 
factors include the entire range of rela- 
tions we have with a specific nation and 
the direction of its policies. Legislation 
that would tie our hands by mandating 
blanket prohibitions on trade and/or 
financial transactions could harm U.S. 
business and relations with our allies 
without imposing any significant costs 
on the target country. 

Flexibility is essential to respond to 
the unique and often rapidly changing 
circumstances of each case. For in- 
stance, during the Iranian hostage 
crisis, we imposed extensive prohibitions 
on trade and financial transactions with 
Iran. These sanctions provided a power- 
ful negotiating tool in working for the 
release of the hostages. Had the sanc- 
tions been statutorily required, this 
leverage would have been lost. Armed 
with the flexibility to lift U.S. trade 
sanctions, we were able to conclude the 
1981 Algiers accord and secure the 
release of the hostages. 



APPENDIX A 

Statutory Authorities for Sanctions 

U.S. law permits a wide range of sanc- 
tions by the executive branch against 
countries involved in international ter- 
rorism. These include terminating as- 
sistance and arms sales, imposing 
import and export controls, suspending 
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) credits, 
and, upon declaration of a national emer- 
gency, prohibiting financial transactions. 
The most important authorities are 
discussed below. 

Emergency Powers. The Interna 
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act 
authorizes the President to regulate or 
prohibit a wide range of trade and finan- 
cial transactions involving property in 
which any foreign country or national 
has an interest. This authority may be 
used to deal with "an unusual and ex- 
traordinary threat, which has its source 
in whole or substantial part outside the 
United States, to the national security. 



cer 1986 



29 



ECONOMICS 



foreign policy, or economy of" the United 
States, if the President declares a na 
tional emergency with respect to that 
threat." 

Commercial Exports. Section 3(8) of 
Ixport Administration Act states 
that it is "the policy of the United 
States to use export controls to en- 
courage other countries to take immedi- 
ate stops to prevent the use of their 
territories or resources to aid, en- 
courage, or give sanctuary to those per- 
sons involved in directing, supporting, 
or participating in acts of international 
terrorism." Section 6(a) authorizes the 
President to adopt foreign policy con- 
trols on exports of goods or technology 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction (or by any 
person subject to U.S. jurisdiction) to 
carry out this policy. This authority is 
exercised by the Secretary of Commerce 
in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, the U.S. Trade Representative, 
and certain others. 

Imposition of foreign policy controls 
under the act is subject to procedural 
and substantive limitations. For exam- 
ple, section 3(8) provides that the Presi- 
dent "shall make reasonable and prompt 
efforts to secure the removal or reduc- 
tion of such assistance to international 
terrorists through international coopera- 
tion and agreement before imposing ex- 
port controls." There are requirements 
for consultation, reports, and findings as 
well as special limits on prior contracts 
and foreign availability. 

Antiterrorism export controls im- 
posed under the Export Administration 
Act are aimed at restricting the export 
of goods or technology that would con- 
tribute significantly to the military 
potential or enhance the terrorist- 
support capabilities of such countries. 
These controls cover large aircraft; 
militarized vehicles; specially designed 
equipment with which to produce mili- 
tary items; crime control and detection 
equipment; and all goods and technology 
subject to national security controls if 
destined for military use and valued at 
$7 million or more. These controls were 
recently expanded to restrict the export 
of light helicopters (helicopters over 
10,001) pounds were already controlled). 
For Iran, all aircraft, parts and avionics, 
and large marine outboard engines are 
embargoed; national security-controlled 
goods and technologies with military ap- 
plications also are controlled. Libya and 
Cuba are subjeel to comprehensive 
trade and financial embargoes 1 . 

Imports. Section 505 of the Interna- 
tional Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1985 authorizes the 



President to "ban the importation into 
the United States of any good or service 
from any country which supports ter- 
rorism or terrorist organizations or 
harbors terrorists or terrorist organi- 
zations." Prior consultation with Con- 
gress is required "in every possible 
instance," and a report must be sent to 
Congress when the authority is exer- 
cised. Until this new authority was 
enacted, imports could be controlled 
only under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act pursuant to a 
declaration of national emergency or un- 
der the UN Participation Act pursuant 
to mandatory Security Council 
sanctions. 

Libya. Section 505 was invoked 
most recently to cut off trade with 
Libya. In addition to the more general 
authorities to control imports and ex- 
ports discussed above, Section 504 of 
the International Security and Develop- 
ment Cooperation Act of 1985 authorizes 
the President to prohibit imports of any 
article grown, produced, extracted, or 
manufactured in Libya. It also author- 
izes the President to prohibit exports to 
Libya of any goods or technology sub- 
ject to U.S. jurisdiction or exported by 
any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 

Foreign Assistance. The executive 
branch may terminate or decline to pro- 
vide assistance for any foreign policy 
reason to any recipient of U.S. as- 
sistance under the Foreign Assistance 
Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the 
Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act, and the Peace Corps 
Act. 

Arms Sales. The executive branch 
may decline to make military sales to 
any country for any appropriate foreign 
policy reason (including antiterrorism 
considerations), and Section 2(b) of the 
Arms Export Control Act gives the 
Secretary of State responsibility for 
authorizing sales to any particular coun- 
try and in what amounts. The Depart- 
ment of State also has the authority, 
pursuant to section 38 of the act and the 
Department's International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations, to deny or cancel 
licenses for private arms exports for any 
foreign policy reason (including the 
recipient's support of terrorism). Under 
this authority, the Administration pro- 
hibits the export of items on the U.S. 
Munitions List to countries supporting 
terrorism. 

Eximbank Programs. Section 
2(b)(1)(B) of the Export-Import Bank 
Act explicitly mentions U.S. policy with 



respect to international terrorism as c 
of a limited category of nonfinancial c< 
siderations that can justify Eximbank 
denial of applications for credit, if the 
President determines that such action 
"would be in the national interest" ar 
would "clearly and importantly ad- 
vance" U.S. antiterrorism policy. 

Aviation Sanctions. The Federal 
Aviation Act grants sweeping authori 
to the executive branch to impose avi 
tion sanctions in response to terrorisn 
as well as inadequate aviation securit; 

• Section 1114(a) authorizes the 
President to suspend air transportatu 
between the United States and any 
country that he determines is violatin; 
The Hague convention or is aiding an; 
terrorist organization that supports tl 
seizure of aircraft as an instrument oi 
policy. 

• Section 1114(a) further authorize 
the President to suspend air transpor 
tion between the United States and a 
foreign state that maintains air servic 
with a third country guilty of violatinj 
The Hague convention or aiding a ter- 
rorist organization. 

• Section 1115 authorizes the Sec 
tary of Transportation, with the ap- 
proval of the Secretary of State and 
after 90 days' notice to the foreign cc 
try, to withhold, revoke, or impose « 
ditions on the operating authority of 
U.S. or foreign air carrier to operate 
tween the United States and a foreig 
airport characterized by inadequate 
security. Immediate suspension is ma 
dated when "a condition exists that 
threatens the safety or security of pa 
sengers, aircraft, or crew' [and] the pi 
lie interest [so] requires." In addition 
the President is authorized to prohibi 
U.S. and foreign air carriers from 
providing service between the United 
States and any foreign airport that is 
directly or indirectly served by aircra 
flying to or from an inadequately se- 
cured airport. 

• The Federal Aviation Act also 
contains sufficient authority for the 
Department of Transportation to pro- 
hibit the sale in the United States of 
airline tickets to countries against whl 
aviation sanctions have been imposed.* 



APPENDIX B 



Sanctions Required by U.S. Law 

In addition to the statutory authoritie 
described above, a number of other pi J 
visions of U.S. law require the imposi 



30 



Department of State Bulle 



ECONOMICS 



n of sanctions on countries that 
ilitate international terrorism. 

Commercial Exports. Section 6(j) of 

• Export Administration Act requires 

t certain congressional committees be 
ified at least 30 days before any 
!iise is approved for exports valued at 
re than $7 million concerning which 

• Secretary of State has made the fol- 
ding determinations: 

• The target country has repeatedly 
ivided support for acts of interna- 

lal terrorism; and 

• Such exports would contribute sig- 
cantly to the military potential of the 
ntry, including its military logistics 
ability, or would enhance its ability 
support acts of international ter- 

ism. 

Technically, there is no requirement 
t licenses for the exports actually be 
ied if the necessary advance notice is 
m. As amended this year, this sec- 
requires that once a determination 
lade regarding a particular country, 
lay not be rescinded unless the 
sident certifies and reports to Con- 
ss that: 

• The country concerned has not 
rided support for international ter- 
■sm, including support or sanctuary 
any major terrorist or terrorist 

ip in its territory, during the preced- 
6-month period; and 

The country concerned has pro- 
d assurances that it will not support 
of international terrorism in the 
re. 

Foreign Assistance. Section 620A of 
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as 
nded this year, prohibits assistance 
3r the FAA, the Agricultural Trade 
elopment and Assistance Act, the 
:e Corps Act, the Export-Import 
k Act of 1945, or the Arms Export 
trol Act to any country that the 
ident determines: 

• Grants sanctuary from prosecution 
ny individual or group that has corn- 
ed an act of international terrorism; 

Otherwise supports international 
)rism. 

The President may waive this prohi- 
n if he determines and notifies 
jress "that national security or 
anitarian reasons justify such 
er." If sanctions are imposed, the 
on states that the President should 
in other countries to take similar 
n. Moreover, Section 512 of the 



Foreign Assistance and Related Ap- 
propriations Act of 1986 prohibits use of 
any appropriated funds for assistance to, 
inter alia, Libya. Syria, South Yemen, 
and Cuba. 

Foreign Military Sales. Section 3(f) 
of the Arms Export Control Act re- 
quires the President to terminate all 
sales under the act to any government 
"which aids or abets, by granting sanc- 
tuary from prosecution to, any individu- 
al or group which has committed an act 
of international terrorism." Once this 
provision is invoked, sales may not be 
made for a 1-year period (to be ex- 
tended for an additional year for any 
subsequent grant of sanctuary). The 
President may refrain from invoking the 
provision if he finds and reports to Con- 
gress "that the national security re- 
quires otherwise." 

Trade Preferences. Section 502(b)(7) 
of the Trade Act of 1974 requires that 
the President not designate a country as 
a "beneficiary developing country" for 
purposes of the generalized system of 
preferences if such country "aids or 
abets, by granting sanctuary from 
prosecution to, any individual or group 
which has committed an act of interna- 
tional terrorism." The President may, 
nonetheless, make such a designation if 



he determines and reports to Congress 
"that such designation will be in the na- 
tional economic interest of the United 

States." 

Aviation Sanctions. Section 1115 of 
the Federal Aviation Act, as amended 
by the International Security and De- 
velopment Cooperation Act of 1985, re- 
quires the Secretary of Transportation 
to assess security conditions at interna- 
tional airports abroad. If deficiencies are 
found and not corrected within 90 days, 
the U.S. public will be notified through 
public postings at airports, a notice in 
the Federal Register, ticket supple- 
ments, and a travel advisory. 

Section 552 of the International 
Security and Development Cooperation 
Act of 1985 provides for the President 
to suspend foreign assistance to a coun- 
try that has an aii-port against which 
sanctions have been imposed "if the 
Secretary of State determines that such 
country is a high terrorist threat coun- 
try." Suspension may be waived if na- 
tional security interests or a humani- 
tarian emergency require. 



■Our embargo on Cuba predates the an- 
titerrorism export controls and was imposed 
in 1963 under the Trading With the Enemy 
Act. ■ 



Trade Policy: 

Where Will America Lead? 



by Douglas W. McMinn 

Address before the Council on 
Foreign Affairs in Baltimore, Maryland, 
on July 2, 1986. Mr. McMinn is Assist- 
ant Secretary for Economic and Business 
Affairs. 

The question I want to put before you 
tonight is: where will America lead? 
Will America lead to more open trade 
among nations? Will America lead to 
greater economic and political freedom 
around the world? When put to the test, 
what course will we steer for ourselves 
and the world? 



Economic and Political Freedom 

As we approach the Fourth of July, it is 
appropriate to remind ourselves of the 
fundamental principles on which our 
nation is built. The Founding Fathers 



understood that political and economic 
freedom were inseparable and believed 
that human freedom and private initia- 
tive would bring America progress and 
prosperity. We have grown from a weak 
colony to a prosperous nation by 
remaining true to the vision of the 
Founding Fathers. 

Two hundred and ten years have 
passed since the signing of the 
Declaration of Independence. In their 
wildest dreams the Founding Fathers 
could never have imagined how success- 
ful America's experiment with freedom 
would be. 

Our political and economic freedom 
serves as an inspiring example to the 
rest of the world. Countries in Asia, 
Africa, Latin America, and even Europe 
are embracing democracy. In a quieter 
but equally important revolution, 
nations all over the world are rejecting 
state-controlled, interventionist economic 



!Q'ber 1986 



31 



ECONOMICS 



n s and adopting market-oriented 
omic regimes. 

One of the fundamental principles of 
economic freedom is free and open 

History has taught us that the 
freer the flow of trade, the greater 
world economic progress and the 
greater the incentive for peaceful 
relations among nations. 

Trade 

At the moment, one of the top issues in 
Washington is track- policy. Recently, 
the House of Representatives passed an 

omnibus trade bill. The Senate has now 
taken up trade legislation. 

It is within the context of economic 
and political freedom that we need to 
examine today's trade policy debate. 
When the trade bills are debated on 
Capitol Hill, the vision of the upcoming 
November elections is clear and present. 



Douglas W. McMinn 
was born in Salt Lake 
City. Utah, on July 18. 
1947, He received his 
B.A. from Gustavus 
Adolphus College, St. 
Peter. Minnesota, in 
1969 andhisM.L.A. 
from Johns Hopkins 
University in 1972. In 
1975, Mr. McMinn 
received his M.A. in 
international affairs 
from the Johns Hopkins University School of 
Advanced International Studies (SAIS). 
specializing in international economics. While 
al SAIS, he was named a Mellon Fellow. 

In 1975, Mr. McMinn joined the Depart- 
ment of the Treasury as an economist respon- 
sible lor East-West economic policy in the 
( (ffice of the Assistant Secretary for Interna- 
tional Affairs. From 1977 to 1979 he was 
Special Assistant to the Deputy Special Trade 
Representative, Office of the President's 
Special 'trade Representative. From 1979 to 
1 '.'S l . M r McMinn was Deputy Chief of Mis- 
sion, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
m Geneva, and Deputy U.S. Representative 
to the General Agreement mi Tariffs and 
Trade From 1981 to 1982, he was Acting 
Director. Office of International Trade Policy 
al Hie Department of Commerce. In 1982. 
lie became principal adviser to the President's 
national security affairs adviser for trade 
policy and North-South economic relations. 
He was a member of the U.S. Sherpa team 
during policj preparations for the 1984 
I. end. -n economic summit and the 1985 Bonn 
economic summit. 

Mr. McMinn was sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary lor Economic and Business Affairs 
on July L9, ins.",. 




The voices of the special interests are 
persistent and pervasive. The national 
interest is less clearly heard. 

H.R. 4800, the House trade bill 
which passed overwhelmingly on May 22, 
is a blueprint for closing markets. 
Frankly, it is a bill based on election- 
year politics. It would halt and reverse 
the progress in international trade built 
up over the past 40 years. It is sure to 
increase political and economic tensions 
around the world. H.R. 4cS00 offers 
trade restriction as the solution without 
understanding the true nature of the 
trade problem. 

What Is the Trade Problem? 

I won't stand here and tell you that 
there is no trade problem. There is a 
problem. We are experiencing the 
largest trade deficits in our history. 
During the past 2 years, the deficit set 
a record virtually every month. That 
pattern may not yet be broken. These 
massive trade deficits, and the even 
larger Federal budget deficits, are 
serious and must not be ignored. Among 
other factors, these deficits have eroded 
the important coalition we have had in 
this country for freer, more open trade. 
Deficits of this magnitude are almost 
certainly not sustainable. 

We must take action to deal with 
our deficits and the concerns they 
generate. We must rebuild that coalition 
of farmers, consumers, businessmen, 
politicians, academics, and— yes— even 
Washington bureaucrats that has shaped 
our open trading policies. And, at the 
same time, we must guard against false 
solutions that will make matters worse. 

The American economy has per- 
formed well over the last 4 years. 
Certain industries and certain areas of 
the country are in difficulty, but their 
problems are set in a powerful pattern 
of progress. Overall, we are better off 
than we were 6 years ago. Prospects 
are that we will be still better off this 
year and the next. Deregulation, market 
freedom, private sector incentives, and 
less intrusive government have 
produced this progress. We have rising 
incomes, new jobs, low inflation, 
productive investment, affordable 
housing, lower taxes, dynamic capital 
markets, and an efficient farm sector. 

Why, I wonder, are some now 
tempted to take trade policy in the 
opposite direction? Why intervene in 
international markets when our 
domestic successes spring from less 
intervention? Why close markets when 
our postwar heritage of opening them 



has stimulated the greatest expansio 
economic well-being in the history of 
world? Why add friction and increase 
the risk of conflict between nations? 

Is market closing the best way t< 
deal with our trade imbalance? Are t 
proponents of H.R. 4800 correct? Mo 
to the point, would it even work? 

Let's look at the five issues most 
often raised in today's trade debate. 

• Why do we have a trade defici 

• How can trade policy reduce tl 
deficit? 

• Do imports cost jobs? 

• What is fair trade? 

• Do we have a trade policy? 

Cause of the Trade Deficit 

First, why do we have a trade defici 

The fundamental cause is that 
during the last 3 years domestic 
investment has substantially exceed* 
domestic saving. The difference— t ha 
portion of our total investment finan 
by foreign savings— is equal to the 
deficit in our trade in goods and 
services. Only when we bring domes 
investment and domestic saving bad 
into balance will we bring our trade 
account back into balance. 

To understand how the present 
situation arose, we have to look agai 
our record of economic performance. 
The U.S. economy has created 1(1 mi 
new jobs since 1981; investment was 
necessary to create those jobs. In th> 
recovery of the 1980s, investment co> 
tributed more to growth than in any 
previous postwar recovery. Real bus: 
ness investment as a share of real G! 
[gross national product] reached a 
postwar high. The American people, 
collectively, with renewed confidence 
the economic future, invested their 
savings at home rather than lending i 
abroad. American consumers also fue 
economic growth through their 
spending. 

For its part, the Federal Govern- 
ment embarked on a monumental efft 
to rebuild our nation's defenses— a 
public investment in our future secur, 
However, while private savings have 
exceeded total private investment, th 
Federal Government has been spend* 
much more than its income. This draif 
off savings from the private sector. 

How is it possible for the econom 
as a whole to spend more than it eanP 
It's simple: others somewhere in the tl 
world spend less than they earn and I 
invest the difference the America. W# 
are able to support our ambitious 
investment program, public and priva 



32 



Department of State Bull 1 



ECONOMICS 



h an inflow of savings from abroad, 
it inflow of saving's must be 
ompanied bv a parallel influx of 
Ids. 

To reduce the trade deficit, we must 
tore a better balance between the 
nand for capital— our public and 
k'ate investment— and the domestic 
ply of capital— the savings generated 
households, businesses, and govern- 
nt. We can invest less or save more. 
i choice is ours. 

Trade Policy Remedy? 

at role can trade policy play in all 
his? 

Trade policy does not significantly 
■ct the trade balance. Let me repeat 
t: trade policy does not significantly 
ct the trade balance. 
To be sure, some trade policy 
ons may cause minor shifts in 
vious saving and investment 
terns. But trade restrictions do not 
ct the fundamental cause of the 
le deficit: the inability of domestic 
ngs to finance domestic investment, 
de restrictions can only divert 
>urces to protected sectors of the 
iomy and away from dynamic 
ors that are typically left unpro- 
ed. When we restrict imports, we 
not so much against foreign 
iucers as against our own domestic 
•sumers, our industries that rely on 
orted materials, and our farmers and 
istries who need foreign markets. 

de and Jobs 

1, what about jobs? Don't imports 
Americans their jobs? Don't 
orts create jobs? These are tough 
stions, not because the answers are 
Iplex or remote but because wrong 
Ivers are so prevalent, appealing, and 
renient. 

IThere is no doubt that fewer Ameri- 
fc are engaged in producing VCRs, or 
p televisions, or cameras, or even 
^mobiles and steel because we 
Jort these items. There is also no 
bt that more Americans are engaged 
Deducing aircraft, computers, 
fenced electronics, and agricultural 
Suets because we export them. But 

a fundamental truth that trade 
i:y affects only the composition of 
lloyment, not its total level. You can 
»ly dismiss any analysis that states 
■ a particular trade restriction will 
■e" a certain number of American 
I. Such restrictions do not save jobs 



in the overall but shift employment from 
our most dynamic industries to less 
productive sectors. 

Fairness and Market Access 

But what about fairness? What about 
the "level playing field" our exporters 
have a right to expect? Americans value 
fairness— it is one of our finest national 
attributes. If we are not being treated 
fairly, we will react, wmether our trade 
is in surplus or in deficit. 

Without doubt, there are unfair 
trade practices in the world. Although 
we do not necessarily agree, even some 
of our own practices are perceived as 
unfair by others. Developing countries 
complain that we have cut our sugar 
import quotas from 2.2 million tons in 
1985 to 1.7 million tons this year; our 
textile imports are subject to tight 
controls; the new farm bill expands 
subsidies for agricultural exports; we 
recently restricted imports of certain 
wood products; and we restrict steel 
imports from 17 countries and Europe. 
The list goes on. As someone said, 
purity and virtue are hard to find in the 
world of trade. 

There is another aspect of fairness 
that deserves attention. Too often, the 
unspoken definition of fairness is "our 
industry always wins." Loss of market 
share abroad translates into an unfair 
practice by a competitor. The trade 
deficit is seen as proof that American 
business is facing unfair competition. 
Fairness does not mean that every U.S. 
industry always prospers. Fairness 
means we all play by the same rules. 
Americans don't want guaranteed 
success; but they do insist on the 
opportunity to succeed. 

But where unfairness exists, how 
should we deal with it? Retaliation- 
restricting access to the U.S. market- 
comes quickly to mind. There are two 
problems with retaliation. 

First, it hurts our own economy. 
Second, it invites an escalating and 
dangerous spiral of counterrestrictions. 

Nevertheless, despite the risks, 
retaliation may be necessary in some 
cases. When it is, we will act and have 
done so. 

What we shouldn't do. though, is 
base our policy on the concept of retalia- 
tion. The most effective approach to 
foreign unfair trade practices is to 
confront them directly: to demonstrate 
the unfairness and secure change 
through negotiation. This course serves 
our broader economic interests and 



those of the world trading community 
by creating new possibilities for growth 
and enhanced competition. Unlike 
retaliation, it is true to the principles of 
economic freedom that have served us 
so well in the past. Success has not 
been and will not be instantaneous, 
since the political forces of protectionism 
are at least as strong abroad as they 
are in this country. But we have made 
progress, real progress. 

American exporters deserve the full 
effort of their government to assure 
them of as open and efficient a market 
as possible when they set out to 
compete. The President has pledged 
that effort. But we must not bind 
ourselves with a web of trade restric- 
tions. As in the domestic economy, our 
efforts must be devoted to greater 
freedom, not greater government. 

The Administration's Trade 
Policy: Aims and Actions 

What is our trade policy? In the 
tradition of every American President 
since F.D.R., President Reagan stands 
for free trade and open markets. That is 
our policy framework. Our objectives 
are clear: to pry open foreign markets, 
to tear down trade barriers, and to 
eliminate unfair trade practices. 

• The United States has taken the 
lead in pushing for a new round of 
international negotiations that will be 
launched this fall. Our objective is to 
strengthen existing trade rules and 
extend them to areas such as agricul- 
ture, services, intellectual property, and 
investment which have, until now, 
escaped meaningful— or any— interna- 
tional discipline. Multilateral negotia- 
tions in the GATT [General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade] are our best hope 
for establishing a broader, level playing- 
field free of the holes we have all dug 
for ourselves in the past. 

• Responding to a Canadian initia- 
tive, we have just embarked on an 
important and historic initiative with 
Canada, our largest trading partner. We 
are engaging in comprehensive talks to 
establish free trade between our two 
countries. The objective of these talks is 
to reduce or eliminate barriers in a 
broad array of trade and investment 
areas. An agreement of this type will be 
an engine of growth for the economies 
of both countries. 

• In a series of talks with the 
Japanese Government, we have agreed 
on the removal of barriers to sales in 
Japan of telecommunications gear, wood 



>ober 1986 



33 



ENERGY 



and paper products, pharmaceuticals and 
medical equipment, and electronic 
components. In the near future, we will 
discuss ways ti> enhance market access 
in a new sector which includes auto- 
mobile parts. 

• We arc pressing the European 
Community to offer us adequate and fair 
compensation for damage to our agricul- 
tural exports caused by the recent 
expansion of the Community to include 
Spain and Portugal. 

• We are negotiating with Korea to 
improve opportunities for our insurance 
companies to sell in Korea and to obtain 
better patent and copyright protection 
there. Similarly, we are pressing Brazil 
to administer its laws regarding com- 
puters and related equipment so as not 
to disadvantage unfairly U.S. investors 
and exporters. 

This is only a partial list, but it 
illustrates that positive, market-opening 
actions have been taken and are under- 
way to eliminate unfair trade practices 
and expand market access for competi- 
tive U.S. exports of both goods and 
services. The record shows that negotia- 
tion can open markets. 

We have also made important 
strides on domestic and multilateral 
measures that will help attack the 
fundamental cause of the trade deficit. 

• On the domestic front, Congress 
has tackled its responsibility to 
discipline spending by the Federal 
Government by passing the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings amendment. By 1990, 
the Federal Government's voracious 
appetite for American savings will be 
curbed. 

• Also, the Senate has passed a tax 
reform bill that will enhance the incen- 
tives to work, to save, and to invest in 
productive activities. 

These two measures alone will 
significantly enhance the competitive 
position of the United States and 
release resources to the private sector. 
They will also contribute to a better 
balance in our external accounts— a 
lower trade deficit— by reducing the 
internal imbalance between saving and 
investment. They represent major 
achievements in the making. 

Abroad, we are working with our 
trading partners on monetary matters. 
Exchange rates have shifted to reflect 
better fundamental economic conditions. 
The dollar has moved to a level that 
reflects our commitment to put our 



Strategic Petroleum Reserve 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 6, 1986' 

Yesterday the President reaffirmed 
strong administration support of a 750 
million barrel strategic petroleum 
reserve. The strategic petroleum reserve 
was created to maintain adequate 
strategic and economic protection 
against oil supply disruptions. It 
moderates the economic impacts of oil 
price increases and supply shortages, 
reduces the pressures for allocation and 
price controls in the event of a supply 
disruption, reduces the likelihood of 
panic buying, and provides more time for 
diplomacy to work in special situations. 

Since 1981 we have increased the 
reserve over fivefold, and it now con- 
tains 503 million barrels. The President 
committed the Administration to con- 
tinue filling the reserve throughout fiscal 



year 1987. He gave Secretary of Ener 
John Herrington the discretion to exc< 
the current congressionally approved 
rate, should oil prices make this an 
economically attractive choice. 

Reaffirmation of our goal of a 750 
million barrel strategic petroleum 
reserve demonstrates the President's 
continued leardership and commitmen 
to our allies that holding strategic stoe 
is the best defense against the effects 
rapid price escalation or supply intern 
tions. The President, in reaching his 
decision, also called upon other oil con 
suming nations to take similar actions 
stressing that strategic stockpiles are 
the best defense against world oil supj 
disruption. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 11, 1986. 



economic house in order and restores 
the competitiveness of American 
industry and agriculture. Agreements 
reached last September at the Plaza 
Hotel and in May at the Tokyo summit 
promote greater stability in exchange 
rates. 

American Leadership 

The trade policy debate in Washington 
is serious and disturbing. The trend in 
the Congress— at least in the House of 
Representatives— runs counter to the 
policy direction that has revived the 
American economy in the 1980s and to 
the course of American trade policy 
over nine administrations, Democratic 
and Republican. It contradicts the prin- 
ciples of economic and political freedom 
that have been the basis of the strength 
and prosperity of this country. 

The United States has been in the 
forefront of the battle for economic 
freedom, just as we have been at the 
front lines in the struggle for political 
freedom. Will the United States main- 
tain its leadership role in the global 
economy and continue to lead in the 
pursuit of freer trade and more open 
markets? 



The importance of American leade' 
ship to the progress of freedom was 
emphasized by the Prime Minister of 
Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, before 
joint session of our Congress last fall. 
Let me conclude by quoting from his 
speech: 

If, because of domestic problems, the 
United States loses the will to maintain op 
and fair trade, protectionism and retaliatioi 
will shrink trade and so reduce jobs. Is 
America willing to write off the peaceful at 
constructive developments of the last 40 
years that she has made possible? A replaj 
of the depression of the 1930s, which led U 
World War II, would be ruinous for all. All 
major powers in the West share the respor 
bility for not repeating this mistake. But 
America has the primary responsibility, for 
she is the anchor economy of the free mark 
economies of the world. In your hands, 
therefore, lies the future of the world. 

Our friends are calling on us to 
lead— to remain true to the economic 
and political values that form the 
bedrock of our way of life. We need th 
vision, statesmanship, and— yes— couraj 
that inspired the Founding Fathers 2V 
years ago. If we are true to our prin- 
ciples, we can lead the world to a futu 
of progress and prosperity. ■ 



34 



UROPE 



5th Anniversary of Berlin Wall 



RESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
UG. 13, 1986 1 

venty-five years ago. one of the 
yrld's great cities was torn in two, its 
ople divided and a unity that had 
ited for more than 700 years brutally 
stroyed. Overnight a wall was thrown 
i around the Western sectors of Berlin 

East Germany in collusion with the 
iviet Union. As thousands of persons 
sperately sought to flee, fences of 
rbed wire and armed men blocked the 
its and turned them back. Often the 
Idiers themselves threw down their 
;apons and vaulted over the first crude 
rriers, choosing freedom in the West 
the risk of their lives. 

After 25 years, the Berlin Wall 
mains as terrible as ever— watched 
jht and day by armed guards in 
wers, the ground between barriers 
odlit and patrolled by dogs. Those 
iking freedom still attempt to cross 
! death strip in a burst for liberty. 



The Berlin Wall is tragic testimony 
to the failure of totalitarian governments. 
It is the most visible sign of the 
unnatural division of Germany and of 
Europe— a division which cruelly 
separates East and West, family from 
family, and friend from friend. 

The horror of the wall can easily 
overwhelm us. But this anniversary 
reminds us too of the Berliners who, in 
resisting tyranny, proved and still prove 
their courage and their passion for 
freedom. They have made Berlin a thriv- 
ing metropolis, a showcase of liberty 
which will invite the world to join in its 
750th anniversary next year. The United 
States is proud to fulfill, with its British 
and French allies, its solemn commit- 
ment to the Berliners and to their great 
city. Western strength and cohesion pro- 
tected Berlin in the past; they are the 
only basis on which future improvements 
are possible. 

Those who built and maintain the 
Berlin Wall pretend it is permanent. It 



cannot lie. One day it— and all those like 
it— will come down. As long as the wall 
stands, it can never be porous enough 
for free men and women in the West- 
ami freedom-loving men and women in 
the East— to tolerate it. 

Freedom, not repression, is the way 
of the future. Dividing Europe, defying 
the will of its people, has brought ten- 
sion, not tranquility. True security for all 
requires that Europeans be able to 
choose their own destiny freely and to 
share their common heritage. 

Berlin's division, like Europe's, can- 
not be permanent. But our conviction 
must be more than a distant hope. It 
must be a goal toward which we actively 
work. Let us rededicate ourselves to new 
efforts to lower the barriers dividing 
Berlin. Before another anniversary has 
passed, I hope that this problem can be 
the subject of renewed thought and 
serious discussion between East and 
West. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 18, 1986. 



7th Report on Cyprus 



HSSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
(LY 1, 1986 1 



irdance with Public Law 95-384. I am 
ting to you a bimonthly report on prog- 
ward a negotiated settlement of the 
is question, 
my last report, I noted that on 
i 29 the United Nations Secretary 
al gave Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
ientatives a draft framework agree- 
That draft agreement contained an 
e for an overall settlement and a 
ied process with summit meetings and 
ng groups for reaching that desirable 
\cceptance of the agreement would 
ed to immediate negotiations on all the 
nding issues, including such key ques- 
is troop withdrawal, guarantees, and 
hree freedoms" (freedom of settlement, 
im of movement, and the right to 
rty). 

jring the period since my last report, 
ican officials have continued their active 



efforts in support of the Secretary General's 
approach. It remains our view that his initi- 
ative presents the leaders of the two Cypriot 
communities with an historic opportunity to 
begin a process toward peace and reconcilia- 
tion. We have continued to express our hope 
that they would embark on this path. We also 
stated our view that the Secretary General's 
"integrated-whole" concept, under which 
"nothing is final until everything is final," 
would protect the interests of the parties 
throughout the negotiating process envi- 
sioned in the recent framework agreement. 
The Turkish Cypriots have accepted the 
March 29 draft framework agreement. The 
Greek Cypriots have not accepted the docu- 
ment and instead have proposed the conven- 
ing of an international conference or a high- 
level meeting between the leaders of the two 
Cypriot communities. The Secretary General 
summarized his view of the current situation 
in a June 11 report to the Security Council, 
which I have attached. He stated that since 
one side is not yet in a position to accept the 



March 29 draft framework agreement, the 
way is not yet open to proceed with the 
negotiations he has proposed for an overall 
solution. He added that, under the cir- 
cumstances, the way forward will require 
careful reflection by all concerned. 

We continue to believe that the Secretary 
General's effort offers the best prospect for 
achieving progress toward a just and lasting 
Cyprus settlement. The Secretary General 
will have our full confidence and support as 
he proceeds with his good offices mission. We 
urge the parties to work constructively with 
him in order to move forward toward a 
negotiated solution. 



Sincerely, 



Ronald Rkagan 



■Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugar, 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 7. 1986). ■ 



3ober 1986 



35 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



11th Anniversary 

of the Helsinki Final Act 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 1. 1986' 

Eleven years ago today the I United 
States, Canada, and 33 European coun- 
tries signed in Helsinki the Final Act of 
the Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (CSCE). The signatories 
undertook to observe important stand- 
ards of international conduct and to pur- 
sue practical steps to reduce the barriers 
dividing Europe between East and West. 
( )t' special importance to the West, the 
Final Act affirmed basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 

The Final Act is an eloquent state- 
ment of hopes and goals to which the 
United States fully subscribed, because 
its principles were rooted in our own 
philosophy and traditions. The United 
States remains firmly committed to the 
full implementation of the Final Act in 
all its provisions and to the indivisibility 
of its human, security, and economic 
dimensions. 

Unfortunately the Soviet Union and 
its East European allies have repeatedly 
failed to carry out many of their Helsinki 
pledges. There has been limited progress 
since the signing of the Final Act. But 
the reality of Europe's division remains, 
and the most important promises of a 
decade ago have not been kept. That was 
our assessment on the 10th anniversary 
last year. It remains our assessment 
today. Eastern governments continue to 
impede the free flow of people, informa- 
tion, and ideas. They continue to repress 
those who seek to exercise freedoms of 
religion, thought, conscience, and belief. 
They continue to disregard Final Act 
provisions as they choose. 

As we commemorate this 11th anni- 
versary, we should recall the hopes for 
greater peace and freedom in Europe 
expressed a decade ago. The Final Act 
recognized the interrelationship between 
these goals, that the interests of indi- 
vidual human beings are a fundamental 
pari of progress toward peace in 
Europe, that a more stable peace among 
nations depends on greater freedom for 
the people of Europe. The ambitious 
goals of the Helsinki process can be 
achieved only through balanced progress 
on all fronts. 

The next followup meeting of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation 



in Europe will open in Vienna this 
November. An important task of that 
meeting will be to take stock of the 
promises made and the promises kept, 
and to weigh the balance among the var- 
ious dimensions of the Helsinki process. 
Governments must be made to account 
at Vienna for their commitments. The 
meeting must also address the challenge 
of achieving balanced progress if the 
Final Act is to have meaning in the daily 
lives of all citizens whose governments 
have undertaken its obligations. 



The United States takes its com- 
mitments under the Final Act seriousl 
and will continue to strive for the full 
realization of its goals for all the peop 
of Europe. We call upon others to do 
likewise. We will work to ensure that 
upcoming meeting in Vienna will marl 
step toward making the promises of 
Helsinki's first decade a reality in its 
second. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 4, 1986. 



Captive Nations Week, 1986 



PROCLAMATION 5512, 
JULY 21, 1986' 

America, built on a firm belief in the dignity 
and rights of all the members of the human 
race, continues to hold up that message to the 
world. Included in that message is unwaver- 
ing opposition to all forms of oppression and 
despotism. Freedom is not divisible. To main- 
tain it for ourselves, we must pursue it for 
others. As President Roosevelt declared in 
1941, "we look forward to a world founded 
upon four essential freedoms. The first is 
freedom of speech and expression— 
everywhere in the world. The second is the 
freedom of every person to worship in his 
own way— everywhere in the world. The third 
is freedom from want . . . everywhere in the 
world. The fourth is freedom from fear. . . 
anywhere in the world." 

This vision of the future has been a 
beacon of hope and guidance both for those 
individuals who seek refuge here and for 
those nations whose aspirations for self- 
determination have been crushed by the 
Soviet empire. Deprived of basic human 
rights, their peoples are the victims of 
ruthless regimes run according to totalitarian 
ideologies. These are the nations held captive 
by forces hostile to freedom, independence, 
and national self-determination. These captive 
nations include those of Eastern Europe that 
have known foreign occupation and com- 
munist tyranny for decades; those struggling 
to throw off communist domination in Latin 
America; and the people of Afghanistan. 
Southeast Asia, and Africa struggling against 
foreign invasion, military occupation, and 
communist oppression. 

Each year we renew our resolve to sup- 
port the struggle for freedom throughout the 
world by observing Captive Nations Week. It 



is a week in which all Americans are asked 
remember that the liberties and freedoms 
that they enjoy are denied to many people; 
With this observance, we hope to inspire 
those who struggle against military occups 
tion, political oppression, communist expai 
sion, and totalitarian brutality. We hope tc 
inspire, but we also seek inspiration. Becai 
the history of liberty is a history of 
resistance, we learn from those who live 
where the struggle is most urgent. Purifiei 
by resistance, they show us the path to a 
renewed commitment to preserve our own 
liberties and to give our support and 
encouragement to those who struggle for 
freedom. 

To pursue that struggle, and to honor 
those who are with us in that battle, the C( 
gress, by joint resolution approved July 17 
1959 (73 Stat. 212), has authorized and 
requested the President to issue a proclam. 
tion designating the third week in July of 
each year as "Captive Nations Week." 

Now. Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
hereby proclaim the week beginning July 2 
1986. as Captive Nations Week. I invite th< 
people of the United States to observe this 
week with appropriate ceremonies and acti 
ities to reaffirm their dedication to the inte 
national principles of justice, freedom, and 
national self-determination. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
my hand this twenty-first day of July, in th 
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-six, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and eleventh. 

Ronald Reac 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 28, 1986. 



36 



ILITARY AFFAIRS 



NARCOTICS 



nary Chemical 
unitions Program 



[ITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
,Y 29, 1986' 

President today certified to Con- 
ss that certain conditions required by 
igress for the release of fiscal year 
6 funds for the binary chemical 
pons modernization program have 
n met. 

This certification to Congress will 
w the United States to proceed with 
modernization of the chemical 
pons deterrent stockpile so critical to 
nation's security. U.S. policy on 
-nieal warfare remains unchanged. 
United States renounces the first 
of lethal and incapacitating chemical 
pons. A comprehensive, effectively 
fiable global ban on all chemical 
pons remains our foremost priority. 
/ever, until such a ban is attained, 
will pursue deterrence through a 
ng defensive posture and a credible 
liatory capability. The chemical 
ons threat to U.S. forces is a 
dwide threat, not limited to NATO, 
small, readily deployable stockpile of 
ry munitions which we seek will pro- 
the flexibility to meet and deter this 
at. 

Specifically, the legislation requires 
the President certify to Congress 

1 The North Atlantic Treaty 
inization (NATO) has adopted a 
ry chemical munitions force goal 
essed to the United States; 
• The United States has developed, 
>ordination with the Supreme Allied 
imander, Europe (SACEUR), a plan 
he deployment of binary chemical 
itions under appropriate contingen- 

and 
» The United States has consulted 

NATO member nations on that 

3n May 15 NATO's Defense Planning 
mittee in permanent session, com- 
d of the permanent representatives 
ATO of the 15 nations participating 
e alliance's military structure, 
>ted the NATO force goals for 
-92, including the binary chemical 
itions force goal addressed to the 
ed States. Defense Ministers, 
;ing as the Defense Planning Corn- 
fee in ministerial session on May 22, 
4rding to normal NATO procedures 
«ed" the permanent representatives' 
tn. The Defense Ministers' action 



completes the established NATO pro- 
cedure for adopting force goals for 
alliance. 

The United States had developed, in 
coordination with SACEUR, a plan for 
the deployment of binary chemical muni- 
tions under appropriate contingency 
plans. 

The United States has conducted 
extensive consultations with allied 
governments on chemical weapons 
issues, including consultations on the 
plan for deployment of chemical 
weapons under appropriate contingen- 
cies. On June 19, consultations with 
allies on this military contingency plan 
were completed in the appropriate 
NATO forum: NATO's Military Commit- 



tee, which is composed of senior military 
representatives from nations to NATO. 
The U.S. Military Representative to the 
Military Committee briefed the Military 
Committee on the U.S. plan for con- 
tingency deployment of chemical 
weapons. Recognizing the conclusions 
reached in the Defense Planning Com- 
mittee, and within the context of those 
conclusions and of national statements 
and reservations expressed in the 
Defense Planning Committee, the Mili- 
tary Committee took note of the briefing 
of the U.S. plan for the contingency 
deployment of chemical weapons. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 4, 1986. 



U.S. International Narcotic 
Control Programs and Policies 



by John C. Whitehead 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee on August l.' f , 
1986, and a, report on the status of efforts 
to control narcotics prndnction prepared 
by the Bun mi of International Narcotic 
Matters. Mr. Whitehead is Deputy 
Secretary of State. 1 

I welcome the opportunity to discuss the 
Administration's international narcotic 
control programs and policies. I am 
accompanied today by Mr. Peter 
McPherson, the AID [Agency for Inter- 
national Development] Administrator; 
Miss Ann Wrohleski, Assistant Secre- 
tary Designate for International Nar- 
cotic Matters (INM); and Mr. Frank 
McNeil, Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. We 
have a fairly detailed report which, with 
your permission, I would like to include 
for the record. It was prepared in 
response to the interest of the commit- 
tee expressed during the course of a 
number of recent hearings. 

I would, however, like to offer some 
brief introductory remarks. 

As the President's recent statements 
make clear, let there be no mistake that 
this Administration is fully committed to 
stopping the flow of illicit narcotics into 
our country. The danger of narcotics to 
our youth and to the very fabric of our 
society cannot be a subject of partisan 
debate. We are grateful to the support 



this committee has provided for the 
Administration's efforts in the past, and 
I am confident we can count on your 
continued support in the future. 

International narcotics control is 
central to the pursuit of our foreign 
policy objectives. We have and will con- 
tinue to use every opportunity to convey 
the message to our friends in the inter- 
national community on the need for 
greater effort in controlling narcotics 
traffic. The President made this an 
agenda item at the Tokyo economic sum- 
mit. We have raised it at the United 
Nations. It is a priority issue in the 
bilateral talks with President De la 
Madrid of Mexico this week as it was 
with Prime Minister Junejo of Pakistan 
last month. 

The most effective tool we have in 
this effort is the growing realization 
among foreign governments that nar- 
cotics trafficking is not just an American 
problem, but a universal threat. The 
efforts of the First Lady and our high- 
level attention to this problem are 
already paying dividends. Countries in 
which narcotics are produced or which 
are part of the international trafficking 
pattern now recognize the unacceptable 
high risk that narcotics pose to their own 
societies. These risks range from 
increases in violent crime to national 
security threats by narcoterrorist 
groups. The international community is 
finally recognizing the challenge we all 
face. That is the first and most impor- 
tant step in winning the battle. 



liber 1986 



37 



NARCOTICS 



Nevertheless, there remains a large 
and unacceptable gap between percep- 
tion and effective action We expect 

measures from our 
friends and are prepared to encourage 
and supporl them. The situation remains 

'HIS. 

From the foreign policy perspective, 
our highest priority is to reduce produc- 
tion. We are moving closer to our objec- 
tive of having effective eradication pro- 
grams in all key producing countries. In 
1981 only two governments were 
engaged in eradication programs. By 
1985 the list had grown to 14. As a 
result, marijuana production is today 
declining in Colombia, Jamaica, and 
other countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. We expect that trend to 
continue. 

Current Colombian experiments to 
identify environmentally safe herbicides, 
which can be reproduced on a large scale, 
could provide a new tool for eradicating 
coca plants. The recent dramatic 
demonstration of the renewed commit- 
ment of the Bolivian Government to nar- 
cotics control has resulted in the price of 
the coca leaf falling to an all-time low. I 
met with President Paz Estenssoro and 
his senior officials in La Paz this spring 
and know directly of their concerns and 
their need for support. 

In the meetings this week involving 
Presidents Reagan and De la Madrid, 
Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign 
Secretary Sepulveda, and Attorneys 
General Meese and Garcia, the United 
States and Mexico have reiterated their 
unrestricted cooperation and assistance 
in rejuvenating a control program. We 
have emphasized the high priority we 
attach to reducing the flow of heroin and 
marijuana from Mexico, and the high 
priority we attach to effective action 
against those traffickers responsible for 
the death of DEA [Drug Enforcement 
Administration] Agent Camarena. 

In September, the United States and 
Mexico will collaborate in an intensive 
spraying program of opium poppy in the 
infamous tri-State area. Mexico lias 
agreed t<> let us bring in six turbo 
Thrush aircraft, and combine them with 
three of their high-spraying capacity Bell 
212 helicopters, in an effort to eliminate 
70% or mere of the fall poppy crop 
before it is harvested. We have assisted 
the Mexicans in improving this program 
in 1986, including refinements in the 
spraying process. Together with the 
verification program, in which DEA 
agents ride with Mexican officials to con- 
firm fields destroyed, these improve- 
ments bode well for restoring the effec- 
tiveness of this once heralded program. 



However, we have other problems: the 
level of effectiveness in seizures, arrests, 
and prosecutions has never been as good 
as in the eradication program. We seek a 
strong across-the-board effort at improv- 
ing enforcement. 

U.S. Encouragement and Support 

The tools and resources provided by 
Congress are critical assets supporting 
our diplomatic efforts. The Administra- 
tion's FY 1987 budget request for $65.4 
million for international narcotics con- 
trol programs includes a substantial 
increase in funds for eradication. We 
also have requested more funds for 
enforcement efforts, supporting crop 
reduction activities. Seventy-three per- 
cent of available funding is dedicated to 
these very efforts. We urge the commit- 
tee to appropriate the full amount. 

We have also used economic assist- 
ance funds administered by AID in 
direct and indirect support of our nar- 
cotic control objectives. In Peru, Bolivia, 
and Pakistan, for example, the disburse- 
ment of development assistance funds 
are tied to achieving specific narcotic 
control objectives in target areas. In 
Thailand, AID and INM are funding a 
project in which entire villages must 
agree to keep farming areas free of 
poppy. This program is going well with 
the support of the Thai Army's aggres- 
sive new eradication program. 

We still have a long way to go. I 
would not minimize the obstacles, but I 
am heartened by what I believe are 
clearly positive trends. I believe that our 
friends recognize the need to eliminate 
this scourge. They know that we mean 
business. Continued and increased 
pressure has to be applied at all points of 
the chain— through crop control; through 
increased seizures of both drug products 
and financial assets; through intensified 
investigation and prosecution of traf- 
fickers; and through effective treatment 
and prevention of drug abuse. 

The Administration is committed to 
work with you and other Members of the 
Congress in support of this effort. 



Report on Status of Efforts 

to Control Narcotics Production 

The Link Between Assistance 
and Narcotics Control 

Of the 18 countries that are the primary 
sources of illicit narcotics entering the 
United States, 15 receive some form of 
U.S. economic, military, or narcotics 
control assistance. Fourteen of the 



fifteen conducted eradication progran 
in 1985; the other, Morocco, relies on 
interdiction to control hashish pro- 
duction. The remaining three— Iran, 
Afghanistan, and Laos— are politically 
inaccessible to us. 

Security assistance levels are sign 
cant in 11 of the 14 cases. However, r 
cotics assistance constituted all of the 
assistance ($700,000) to Brazil and 98 
of the $10.3 million given to Mexico, 
while Venezuela's total assistance was 
$100,000 in military training funds. 

Beyond these source countries, th 
are other nations which are important 
transit points for illicit narcotics 
shipments to the United States, such i 
India, Malaysia, the Bahamas, Lebanc 
and Turkey. Of these, all but the 
Bahamas receive some economic or 
military assistance. 

There are both direct and indirect 
links between U.S. assistance and nar 
cotics control. 

The countries in which narcotics c 
trol and development assistance objec 
tives have been most closely linked ar< 
Peru, Bolivia, and Pakistan. In each 
country, AID and INM have agreed oi 
target areas, and development assist- 
ance is conditioned on achieving sped 
narcotics control objectives. For exam 
pie, much of the development assistan 
intended for the Chapare region of 
Bolivia, the primary growing region fc 
coca destined to become cocaine, has r 
been spent since 1983 because its rele; 
is contingent upon Bolivia complying 
with conditions of its 1983 agreement 
with the United States. 

There are various types of indirect 
links between control and developmeni 
assistance, such as the poppy clauses 
used in Pakistan and Thailand. These 
clauses commit a government to keepii 
specific development areas free of nar- 
cotics, especially areas which have not 
been traditional narcotics growing are; 
In the one instance when new opium 
poppy was discovered in an area of 
Pakistan which was under such an 
agreement, the government destroyed 






the crop 

AID and INM emphasize develop- 
ment assistance, rather than crop 
substitution, to control narcotics. That 
change in policy reflects the discovery 
that, under substitution programs, 
farmers grew new crops but didn't 
abandon opium poppy. 

Despite the disappointment in the 
spring 1986 opium crop, which expands 
largely in response to greatly increased 
demand and higher prices within the 
region, it still appears that the model 



38 



Department of State Bullet 



NARCOTICS 



iveloped by INM in Pakistan works 
ere and will work elsewhere. Specific 
nds of development assistance in 
iected areas are conditioned on 
surances— backed up by demonstrable 
iforcement— that the areas will be rid 
illicit narcotics crops. For example, 
lailand has a program in which 
•velopment assistance is conditioned 
ion entire villages agreeing to keep 
eir farming areas free of poppy. Since 
84, that program has steadily 
ogressed— boosted in 1985 and 1986 
the Thai Army's aggressive new 
adication program. 

So far, assistance that is directly or 
iirectly linked to narcotics control 
'ough one or more types of 
reements have been discussed. Other 
jes of assistance are not tied to con- 
>1, such as most military assistance, 
d economic assistance to nongrowing 
as. However, the government of 
Bry source and transit nation is fully 
are of the conditions imposed in 
blic Law 98-164. Without exception, 
>se governments know they could lose 
U.S. assistance if they fail to take 
'quate steps to cooperate with the 
3. Government on narcotics control, 
s message was solidly reinforced by 
?sident Reagan last week. 

e Narcotics Problem: 
view of Progress 

3 highest U.S. Government priority is 
Jucing production. In 1981, only two 
Intries were eradicating illicit narcotic 
ips. In 1985, there were eradication 
Igrams in 14 countries. We are mov- 
il closer to our objective of having 
fcctive eradication campaigns 
ijrating simultaneously in all key 
Iwing sectors. The 1987 INM budget 
ludes a substantial increase in funds 
c eradication. Increased funding for 
Horcement is also projected where such 
Kvities support crop reduction or 
euce the supply of illicit narcotics or 
Bcursor chemicals. 

Many 1985 objectives were not only 
it, but exceeded. Even more will be 
We this year and next. The gains are 
fl, and the prospects for continued 
icancement in 1986 and 1987 are quite 
\AA- But the situation remains severe. 
)jig abuse has spread to many drug 
•Sducing and trafficking countries, 
wping production at high levels, and 
ii:otics trafficking organizations in 
»ie countries are so powerful that they 
Kfe a security threat to the legitimate 
Mernment. Narcotics-related violence 
sh the increase. However, significant 
hige has occurred, and many of our 



hopes ride on that change. Other nations 
now realize that narcotics trafficking is a 
clear and present universal danger, and 
that they too stand in harm's way. With 
that realization, we are finally beginning 
to work together as an international 
community progressing toward common 
goals. 

The 1986-87 Agenda 

The Administration has requested $65.4 
million for the international narcotics 
program for FY 1987, a level that is 
essential to support the needed expan- 
sion of eradication and enforcement pro- 
grams. The Department urges the com- 
mittee to provide the full amount 
requested. 

The precedent-setting Colombian 
program has capped efforts in Latin 
America and the Caribbean to destroy 
marijuana crops, and it is estimated that 
marijuana production totals for 1986 will 
continue the decline of recent years. 
Aerial surveys confirm that the 1985 
crop in the traditional northern growing 
areas of Colombia was 85% smaller than 
the 1983 crop. In 1986, the eradication 
effort is being expanded into other areas 
of Colombia to counter traffickers' 
efforts to develop new sources of supply. 

Several countries are working hard 
to contain the problem. Ecuador, which 
collaborated with Colombia on a joint 
coca eradication effort along their com- 
mon border, is intensifying both its 
eradication and interdiction efforts for 
1986. Brazil, with U.S. assistance, initi- 
ated operations to destroy both coca and 
marijuana, as well as important seizure 
campaigns, while also expanding its 
efforts to interdict shipments of pre- 
cursor chemicals used in cocaine 
refining. 

Like Colombia, Panama and Belize 
conducted aerial eradication programs, 
using herbicides, in 1985 and 1986. 
Following the spraying this spring, 
Panamanian production of marijuana 
dropped sharply enough that authorities 
think aerial spraying is no longer 
needed. Jamaica initiated a long-needed 
manual eradication campaign to destroy 
both spring and fall marijuana crops in 
1985, resulting in gains that have been 
confirmed by aerial surveys. Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, and other 
governments have also destroyed mari- 
juana plantations. 

The marginal gains of the manual 
eradication campaigns against the coca 
bush could be a thing of the past. In 
1985, Colombia succeeded in identifying 
chemicals which appear to meet the 



criteria of being environmentally safe 
while effectively destroying the hardy 
coca bush. Expanded testing is pro- 
ceeding with both backpack and aerial 
applications. It should lead to a method 
that affords large-scale elimination of 
illicit coca cultivation. If it succeeds in 
Colombia, it could work in other coca 
cultivation areas, too. 

Colombia remains the major refining 
source for cocaine, while Bolivia and 
Peru remain the major sources of coca 
leaf. Cocaine refining sites are shifting 
somewhat because of Colombia's cam- 
paign against cocaine labs and improved 
ways of controlling the flow of refining 
chemicals. 

The bottom line on cocaine is that 
the supply of coca leaf must be 
reduced. New leaders in Bolivia and 
Peru began their administrations in 1985 
by declaring their intentions of attacking 
the drug production problem. Perhaps 
the most dramatic demonstration of the 
new Bolivian intent is the ongoing cam- 
paign to suppress cocaine refining and 
trafficking. As Ambassador Rowell told 
Congress last week, these have come to 
a halt in the Beni area. Moreover, thanks 
to this campaign, called "Operation 
Blast Furnace," the price of leaf has 
fallen to an all-time low, and the 
Embassy reports that more farmers are 
requesting assistance in cultivating alter- 
native crops. This may be the first 
trickle in what could be a flood-like 
movement away from the economic 
dependence of farmers and others on the 
coca trade— a change that is essential if 
eradication is to succeed. Traffickers 
have learned they can no longer count on 
Bolivia as a safehaven. Moreover, the 
raids are achieving the primary goal of 
stopping the spread of cocaine refining. 

Bolivia must complete the planning 
for both the voluntary and involuntary 
phases of its eradication campaign, and 
bring a substantial portion of its illicit 
coca acreage under control, enforced by 
eradication where necessary, enhanced 
by alternative development opportunities 
where appropriate. The government 
recognizes that continued assistance is 
dependent in part on achieving the 
eradication targets in the new agree- 
ment now being negotiated with the 
United States. 

The killings and lawlessness in 
Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley continue, 
proving again that narcotics control and 
the battle against terrorism must both 
share a high priority with the Govern- 
ment of Peru. Economic and military 
assistance to Peru in 1987 are dependent 
in part on the development and imple- 
mentation of a comprehensive strategy 



Dober 1986 



39 



NARCOTICS 



ategictaskin 
L986 and 1987 is to extend the coca 
era.] ampaign into additional 

growing areas of the I fpper Huallaga 
Valley. Coca eradication in the valley 
doubled in 1985, hut the new areas are 
quite inaccessible and the pace of manual 
eradication may be difficult to sustain. 

Increased production of heroin and 
marijuana in Mexico, which were on a 
downward trend for several years 
thanks to effective aerial eradication, 
were key disappointments in 1985 when 
other countries, despite great burdens, 
met or even exceeded our expectations. 
In meetings this week involving 
Presidents Reagan and De la Madrid, 
Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign 
Secretary Sepulveda, and Attorneys 
General Meese and Garcia, the United 
States and Mexico have reiterated their 
unrestricted cooperation and assistance 
in rejuvenating a control program. The 
United States is emphasizing the high 
priority it attaches to reducing the flow 
of heroin and marijuana from Mexico, 
and the high priority it attaches to effec- 
tive action against those traffickers 
responsible for the death of DEA Agent 
Gamarena. 

In September, the United States and 
Mexico will collaborate in an intensive 
spraying program of opium poppy in the 
infamous tri-State area. Mexico has 
agreed to let the U.S. Government bring 
in six turbo Thrush aircraft, and combine 
them with three of their high-spraying 
capacity Bell 212 helicopters, in an effort 
to eliminate 70% or more of the fall 
poppy crop before it is harvested. The 
U.S. Government has assisted the Mex- 
icans in improving this program in 1986, 
including refinements in the spraying 
process. Together with the verification 
program, in which DEA agents ride with 
Mexican officials to confirm fields 
destroyed, these improvements bode 
well for restoring the effectiveness of 
this once heralded program. However, 
there are other problems: the level of 
effectiveness in seizures, arrests, and 
prosecutions has never been as good as 
in the eradication program. The U.S. 
Government seeks a strong across-the- 
board effort at improving enforcement. 

In 1986 INM has purchased addi- 
tional aircraft and is launching the 
special Latin American regional enforce- 
ment program for which the Appropria- 
tions Committee provided $5 million. 
The regional air wing, based in Colom- 
bia, will upgrade strike force capability 
throughout the Andean coca growing 
region. Future Blast Furnace-type 
operations may he conducted through 
use of this regional air wing, funded by 



INM, or with the assistance of DEA air- 
craft, or further use of U.S. military air- 
craft, or a combination thereof. The U.S. 
Government is not limited to the military 
option. 

This air wing is but one aspect of the 
trend toward regional approaches to nar- 
cotics control. The cross-border opera- 
tions involving Colombia with Peru, 
Ecuador, and now Bolivia find their 
counterpart at the policy level in the 
expressions of solidarity at the OAS 
[Organization of American States] con- 
ference this year. 

The U.S. Government is also helping 
to curb the overseas demand, which 
keeps production at high levels. AID, 
USIA [U.S. Information Agency], and 
INM have worked successfully on public 
awareness and prevention campaigns. 

In Southeast Asia, Burma now has 
the opportunity, with production down in 
1985 and a major eradication program 
having been successfully undertaken in 
the first quarter of 1986, to reduce the 
world's largest production of illicit 
opium. In Thailand the new eradication 
program is being expanded. These 
governments must enhance their efforts 
to seize control of the border from traf- 
fickers, to destroy heroin laboratories, 
and to interdict shipments of both 
precursor chemicals and finished opium 
products. 

It is estimated that opium production 
in Pakistan this spring rose to a new 
range of 100-150 metric tons— more 
than double what it was 1 year ago. This 
expansion was driven largely by higher 
prices, resulting from increased regional 
opium and heroin demand, and by a 
reduction in the Pakistani Government's 
enforcement program in the key Gadoon 
area coupled with an expansion of opium 
cultivation into remote tribal areas such 
as Bajaur and Mohmand. 

The United States and Pakistan 
agreed at a special meeting of the 
bilateral narcotics working group in 
June that the ban on opium cultivation 
would be effectively enforced in the 
Gadoon, where AID has a major develop- 
ment project, and in the Dir, where the 



Special Development and Enforcement 
Project managed by the United Nation 
is being developed. The Pakistanis also 
agreed to enforce the ban in those por- 
tions of the Bajaur and Mohmand triba 
areas where development assistance hi 
been scheduled. 

India is increasingly important as i 
conduit for opium products from both 
Southwest and Southeast Asia, as well 
as for the shipment of precursor 
chemicals into the Golden Triangle. 

Turkey continues to sustain one of 
the most successful efforts at preventi; 
production of illicit opium poppy. Long 
natural attraction for smugglers of eve 
stripe because it serves as the landbrid 
between Asia and Europe, Turkey con- 
tinues to be a principal trafficking rout 
for heroin from Southwest Asia, some 
it refined in Turkish labs. 

Pakistan and neighboring nations 
must also find ways of curbing the flov 
of opium products out of Afghanistan 
and suppressing the numerous heroin 
labs which operate along the Afghan- 
Pakistan border. Viable approaches ha 
not been found to Iran or to Laos, and 
reports of increased opium production 
the latter are of renewed concern, par- 
ticularly given success elsewhere in th< 
Golden Triangle. 

Conclusion 

The general task remains the same as : 
earlier years: the grower-to-user nar- 
cotics chain which stretches across five 
continents must be broken through a 
comprehensive program of internation; 
control. Pressure must be applied at al. 
points in the chain— through crop 
control; through increased seizures of 
both drug products and financial assets 
through intensified investigation and 
prosecution of traffickers; and through , 
effective treatment and prevention of 
drug abuse. 



'The complete transcript of the hearingsl 
will be published by the committee and will b 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



40 



Department of State Bullet 



CEANS 



/ho Will Protect 
reedom of the Seas? 



i John D. Negroponte 

Address before the Law of the Sea 
Ititute in Miami on July 21, 1986. 
hbassador Negroponte is Assistant 
tretaryfor Oceans and International 
pironmental and Scientific Affairs. 

lay, I would like to consider the 

stion: "Who will protect the freedom 
.he seas?" I intend to put aside the 
' points and phrases of the law of the 

and, instead, speak as a layman to 

question. 

The world's oceans are vital to 
ikind in diverse ways. We are just 
I inning to understand their environ- 
|ital significance. We have always 
d their fishery resources. We have 
\xm to learn how to exploit some of 

r other resources. And through the 
Juries the world's oceans have been 

ntial as waterways, and now air- 
I'S, necessary to preserve the peace 

to move world trade and commerce. 
IThe freedom of use of the world's 
line waters is what we mean by the 
Idom of the seas. It is perhaps our 
l| st customary international law 
Q rine. 

The freedom of the seas was not 
tin to mankind. It was won— won 
\ ujrh scholarly and legal debate and 
■aval engagements. Over the years, 
■freedom of the seas has undergone 
ie changes and refinements. Its exer- 
ie has become geographically com- 
Bised; its composition has been 
P;en into fragments, and some of 
l<e have been lost. So, today, when 
'upeak of the freedom of the seas, we 
>en, primarily, the freedom of move- 
It on the world's seas and oceans by 
aies and maritime commerce: the free- 
i to navigate and to fly from one 
Hinent to another over broad 
ftnses; the freedom to navigate and 
Hy from one sea to another through 
n the narrowest of straits. 

Without the freedom of the seas, the 
|qd would be a different place. Mari- 
B commerce as we know it would not 
U:. The global balance of power would 
Unalterably shifted. 

W;ats to Freedom of the Seas 

Hfreedom of the seas has come under 
ftk, traditionally, because of two con- 
vations: coastal security and 



resource requirements of coastal commu- 
nities. Security considerations have 
played a role in promoting new coastal 
state jurisdictions. Both the legal 
regimes of the territorial sea and the 
continental shelf were justified on secu- 
rity grounds. And coastal state resource 
considerations have justified virtually all 
forms of maritime jurisdiction. 

Thus, in spite of its traditions and 
benefits, the freedom of the seas is con- 
fronted by something called the coastal 
state. The coastal state regards the sea 
as a resource— its resource. Some 
coastal states go beyond that, seeing in 
the sea a means of providing a security 
buffer for their territory. The upshot is 
that the coastal state seeks to bring 
within its grasp as much of the offshore 
area and resources as it can justify. 

The coastal state is assisted in its 
efforts by some of our finer professions: 
scientists, engineers, lawyers, and politi- 
cians. Marine science's search for knowl- 
edge is resulting in many new discov- 
eries of the ocean's potential. Engineers 
find in the ocean the opportunity to 
invent and to apply new technologies to 
capitalize on that potential. Lawyers 
find ample opportunities to create 
"new" law, quietly whispering how to 
justify exploiting that potential without, 
as they say, "adversely affecting" the 
freedom of the seas. And, then comes 
the politician, weighing the issue, and, 
as he or she does so, we must ask: 
"Does he hear an advocate for the free- 
dom of the seas?" 

The technique which coastal states 
have used for many years to assert con- 
trol over area and resources, while 
ostensibly not "adversely affecting" the 
freedom of the seas, is to draw a dis- 
tinction between the interest of the 
coastal state and that of the interna- 
tional community. The normal pattern is 
that the coastal state acknowledges that 
the international community has a cer- 
tain right to navigate off its coast, if the 
resource- or security-related jurisdic- 
tional claim by the coastal state is 
accepted by the international 
community. 

In concept the distinction between 
resources use and navigation is a 
reasonable approach which provides a 
basis for balancing the interests of all 
states. And the balance which exists 
between coastal state security concerns 
and the rights of the international com- 
munity also has justification. In fact, 



however, over the years the interna- 
tional community has had a hard time 
protecting its navigation rights. The fine 
points of the law, the subtle distinctions 
which are often the key to concluding 
negotiations, often are lost sij^ht of in 
practice. The result is ironic. Instead of 
coastal state jurisdiction beinj; an 
exception— a limited encroachment on 
the freedom of the seas— we find the 
opposite to be true, at least in terms of 
political emotions: the freedom of the 
seas becomes an exception or encroach- 
ment upon the rules of coastal state 
jurisdiction. 

This trend, which has been going on 
for some time, further endangers the 
freedom of the seas. It does so by creat- 
ing a new way of thinking about the 
oceans in the minds of scientists, engi- 
neers, lawyers, politicians, and others. 
We begin to think in proprietary terms 
about the sea off our coast, and, in 
doing so, the freedom of the seas takes 
second place to coastal state jurisdiction. 

Examples of this process are evident 
in the law of the sea. Once the freedom 
of the sea applied to all marine waters. 
Then the concept of the narrow ter- 
ritorial sea developed— in which there is 
the right, or some would call it an 
exception, of innocent passage. Later 
the concept of straight baselines found 
its way into state practice and a right 
(or exception) of innocent passage was 
recognized where it had previously 
existed. Later came the resource 
claims— first the continental shelf, then 
the narrow and later the broader fishing 
zones, all ostensibly not "adversely 
affecting" the freedom of the seas. More 
recently, we have seen the development 
of broader 12-mile territorial sea claims 
together with a straits navigation 
regime called transit passage that is not 
supposed to "adversely affect" the free- 
dom of the seas. The list goes on to 
include the archipelagic states princi- 
ples, together with the regime of archi- 
pelagic sealanes passage. And, finally, 
there is the exclusive economic zone, 
and if you find the appropriate cross- 
referenced passage in the 1982 conven- 
tion, you will find that the exercise of 
jurisdiction in that zone, also, is not sup- 
posed to "adversely affect" the freedom 
of the seas. 

The freedom of the seas seems to be 
lost in a welter of coastal state jurisdic- 
tions. I remember a cartoon from the 
New Yorker magazine about the time 
the Third UN Law of the Sea Confer- 
ence was beginning. It showed a group 
of diplomats around a conference table. 
Standing in the doorway at the back of 
the room was Neptune. One diplomat 



leber 1986 



41 



OCEANS 



was speaking, and the caption said 
something like: "Befon we begin our 
conference on dividing up the sea. there 
is a gentleman here who wishes to be 

heard." 

Well, would you say that from Nep- 
tune's perspective the third conference 
was a success or failure? A lot of ocean 
and resources got divided up by the 
coastal states at that conference. The 
conference's attempt to deal with the 
resources beyond coastal state jurisdic- 
tion failed to achieve the agreement of 
all states. And the promotion and pro- 
tection of the freedom of the seas, under 
the convention the conference devel- 
oped, may only be found by proper legal 
interpretation of subtle points and 
phrases. 

Why is this so? Why could not the 
maintenance and preservation of the 
freedom of the seas be expressed in 
categorical terms throughout the con- 
vention text? Why were so many points 
disguised? 

Perhaps the reason is that there is 
no one group of states for which the 
freedom of the seas is that group's 
exclusive interest in the law of the sea. 
There are no exclusively maritime 
states. All the maritime states are 
coastal states, as well. They must 
balance their interests. One aspect of 
their national interest must be balanced 
against the other. Yet, it is this group 
of states that is the principal user of the 
sea— for coastal resource exploitation 
and for international navigation. From 
the practice of this group of states, the 
customary law of the sea emerges. 
Thus, the freedom of the seas— the free- 
dom that presumably Neptune would 
have us preserve— has no advocate that 
does not have other interests and 
responsibilities. 

Avoiding Further Setbacks 

The Third Law of the Sea Conference 

was called, in part, because of the inter- 
est of the United States and the Soviet 
Union in stopping further erosion in the 
meaning of the freedom of the seas. The 
conference didn't halt it— look at what 
happened during the conference— but it 
may be said to have stabilized matters 
for a period. Rut for how long? If the 
freedom of the seas is not to suffer fur- 
ther setbacks in the wake of the third 
conference, the maritime states must do 
tWO things and do them well. 

The first of these is not to be afraid 
to assert the freedom of the seas in 
their activities around the globe. The 
rights and freedoms of the sea will be 
lost over time if they are not used. 



There may, from time to time, be politi- 
cal costs in exercising such rights; but 
these costs cannot be avoided if the 
right is to be preserved. Deference to 
coastal states in the exercise of rights 
will only make it more difficult to exer- 
cise the right in the future, since the 
political cost of using the right will 
increase in the absence of usage. 

In this regard, it is particularly 
important that the maritime states uti- 
lize the rights set forth and identified in 
the 1982 convention. Many of the rights 
making up the freedom of the seas are 
somewhat obscured by the coastal 
states' orientation of the convention 
text. If the maritime states do not 
remind others from time to time of the 
existence or meaning of the significant 
commas, phrases, and words found in 
the text, the freedoms they represent 
will be lost to sight. 

The second thing that must be done 
by the maritime states is that they must 
keep their own houses in order. If they 
let their coastal state personality get 
the better of them, the freedom of the 
seas will founder. The danger I see is 
that there is a tendency for each state 
to see the waters and circumstances off 
its coast as in some way unique. In this 
way the coastal state justifies assertions 
of new or broader forms of jurisdiction 
to satisfy its coastal appetite. 

This tendency, which has been 
dubbed "creeping uniqueness," is the 
latest threat to the freedom of the seas. 
A maritime state will not do good serv- 
ice to the freedom of the seas if it gives 
in to calls to consider its coastal waters 
as unique, justifying a new and creative 
legal approach. And it is worse still if 
that creative legal approach goes be- 
yond or severely strains the principles 
laid out in the 1982 convention, thus 
destabilizing the balance between the 
freedom of the seas and the interests of 
the coastal state that are reflected 
therein. 

The U.S. Role 

How does the United States stack up in 
all of this? The United States does, 
after all, have a split personality when 
it comes to the law of the sea. 

On the first point, the United States 
has been at the forefront in exercising 
the freedom of the seas in spite of occa- 
sional political costs. In particular, the 
Navy's routine assertion-of-rights pro- 
gram has received quite a lot of noto- 
riety in recent weeks, given the events 
in the Gulf of Sidra. It is important to 
note that the program was developed in 
the late 1970s, during the Carter 
Administration. Thus, it has a bipartisan 



character. Also, it is important to poa 
out that the program was developed il 
anticipation of the successful conclusuY 
of the Third Law of the Sea Conferer i 
It was believed that, even with a widl 
ratified Law of the Sea Treaty to whil 
the United States was party, it still 
would be necessary to exercise the 
rights set forth in the convention in 
order not to lose them. 

It goes without saying that it is 
even more important that we exercist 
our rights today. The 1983 presidenti; 
ocean policy statement commits the 
United States to this course. The exe 
cise of rights— the freedom to navigat 
on the world's oceans— is not meant t 
be a provocative act. Rather, in the 
framework of customary international 
law, it is a legitimate, peaceful assert 
of a legal position and nothing more, 
the United States and other maritime 
states do not assert international rigr 
in the face of claims by others that d( 
not conform with the present status c 
the law, they will be said to acquiesc<| 
those claims to their disadvantage. 
What is particularly difficult in this si 
ation is to understand that the more 
aggressive and unreasonable and piw 
ative and threatening a claim may be 
the more important it is to exercise 
one's rights in the face of the claim. T 
world community can't allow itself to 
coerced— coerced into lethargy in the 
protection of the freedom of the seas. 

On the second point, as well, the 
United States gets good marks— but 
perhaps not straight As. In general, t 
United States has taken a conservath 
approach to its coastal state claims. Ii 
making its claims, it has made clear tl 
there is no intention to "adversely 
affect" the navigation rights of other 
states in the waters off the coast of tl 
United States. Both the 1945 Proelam 
tion on the Continental Shelf and the 
1983 Proclamation of the Exclusive E( 
nomic Zone make clear in specific lan- 
guage in the proclamations themselves 
that the resource claim is not intende< 
to affect the international rights and 
freedoms of other states. 

The United States has maintained 
its narrow territorial sea at 3-miles 
breadth. It has chosen not to draw- 
straight baselines. It conservatively 
exercises its right under Article 7 of t 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Se; 
and Contiguous Zone to claim juridical 
bays less than 24-miles wide at the 
mouth. It has only very few small 
spots of historic waters, which are of I 
consequence to the international comrr 
nity and which could have been incorp 
rated in a straight baseline system ha< 



42 



ACIFIC 



chosen to do so. Contrary to what 
ne foreign press reports have said, 
> United States has not drawn 
elines between the islands of the 
mtians or of Hawaii. Foreign vessels 
all states— commercial or military— 
»'igate off the U.S. coast routinely, 
isistent with their rights under inter- 
ional law. 

The United States has taken a con- 
■vative approach to its maritime 
ims for several reasons, one of which 
.he desire to lead by example. By its 
ion it hopes to encourage similar con- 
vative approaches by others. 
But the United States has been 
>wn to put its coastal state hat on 
m time to time. For the most part, 
ugh, it has resisted the creation of 
3S to meet its unique concerns. As 
United States moves into the imple- 
ntation of its exclusive economic 
e, it must bear this in mind. We 
st recognize that one cannot slice the 



pie too thin. We must stand for prin- 
ciples—recognizable principles that are 
not riddled with self-serving exceptions. 

The present challenge before the 
freedom of the seas is that its tradi- 
tional defenders have begun to think of 
the oceans as a resource rather than as 
the world's highway. Science and tech- 
nology have opened to us the ocean's 
resources. We must not expect that 
mankind will be denied the opportunity 
to exploit them. As mankind does so, 
satisfying its needs and using its capa- 
bilities, the freedom of the seas will con- 
tinue to come up against coastal state 
demands. If the freedom of the seas is 
to survive— not to be subject to further 
inroads— we must be energetic in its 
promotion and protection. As we face 
the challenges that science and technol- 
ogy bring us, we must meet them bear- 
ing in mind the question: "Who is 
protecting freedom of the seas?" ■ 



.S. and Australia 
old Ministerial Talks 



Secretary Skultz and Secretary of 
mse Caspar W. Weinberger and 
tralian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Hayden and Minister for Defense 
i Beazley met in ministerial session 
'an Francisco August 10-11, 1986. 
Following are the texts of Secretary 
Uz's statement at the first plenary 
Son, the joint news conference, and 
joint statement issued at the conclu- 
; of their meeting. 



i:retary shultzs 
tatement, 

C. 11, 1986' 

nehalf of Secretary Weinberger and 
delf and the American delegation and 
fericans everywhere, I want to 
lome you formally to the opening of 
IU.S. -Australian bilateral min- 
tial talks. Our location on the Pacific 
»t reflects the importance which the 
led States attaches to this most 
flimic region of the world and par- 
larly to Australia— a fellow 
alocracy, a strong ally, and a major 
i|ributor tc global and regional 
Bility. 

The United States and Australia, 
«g with New Zealand, came together 
Litis same location 35 years ago to 
m the ANZUS [Australia, New 



Zealand, United States security pact] 
alliance. Our countries had witnessed the 
destruction of the peace by distant 
aggressors and had learned that broad 
oceans and geographic isolation did not 
guarantee security. We had come to 
understand that the survival of indi- 
vidual freedom depends on strong 
defense, both alone and in concert with 
allies. 

When he signed the ANZUS treaty 
at the Presidio in 1951, a distinguished 
New Zealand diplomat, Ambassador Sir 
Carl Berendsen, said, "By creating an 
area of stability in the Pacific, this 
ANZUS treaty may be expected to 
reduce world tensions and thus to prove 
a reinforcement of, and a contribution 
to, the general system of international 
security. ... By providing directly a 
strong measure of defense against 
attack in the Pacific, it does at the same 
time . . . make it possible for its parties to 
play their part elsewhere because the 
problem that the free world is facing to- 
day is a global problem. ..." 

Ever since, Australia and the United 
States have worked together in ways 
that benefit not only our own countries, 
but the security of others whose fate is 
linked to our own. We cooperate, for 
example, in joint facilities that enhance 
deterrence of nuclear war through pro- 
viding for strategic early warning. These 



same facilities allow us to verify arms 
control agreements, thus making arms 
control itself possible. 

We also work together in military 
exercises, improving the capability of 
our forces to operate separately or 
jointly in the event of a threat to peace. 
Americans particularly value our ship 
and air access in Australia. Our four to 
five dozen ship visits per year allow us to 
play a stabilizing role in the Western 
Pacific and the Indian Ocean, areas of 
vital importance to both countries 
though nearer to Australian shores than 
to our own. 

Our fruitful cooperation conveys a 
strong message to potential adversaries; 
it shows Americans and Australians the 
value of alliance. Our cooperation pro- 
vides a bulwark against any temptation 
to disengage from world problems and 
look after only parochial interests, and it 
deepens the bonds and special relation- 
ship between our countries. 

The United States and Australia 
have strong economic ties. Our bilateral 
trade exceeds $8 billion annually. We are 
Australia's second largest market and 
supplier. Australia is one of our major 
trading partners and is also the location 
of the largest U.S. investments stake in 
East Asia, totaling more than $9 billion 
by 1984. And our economic ties are 
reciprocal; in 1985 Australian invest- 
ment in the United States grew by more 
than $450 million. 

I would note also Australia's leading 
role in regional growth and stability. 
Official Australian development 
assistance should exceed $365 million in 
1986, primarily to Papua New Guinea 
and other developing countries of the 
South Pacific and Southeast Asia. 
Australia continues to be a welcome and 
major contributor to multilateral aid 
organizations active in the region. 

We also confront common difficult 
problems as in the field of agriculture. 
As was stated in the Tokyo summit 
economic declaration, "a situation of 
global structural surplus now exists for 
some important agricultural products, 
arising partly from technological 
improvements, partly from changes in 
the world market situation, and partly 
from long-standing policies of domestic 
subsidy and protection of agriculture in 
all our countries," said these seven coun- 
tries. "This harms the economies of cer- 
tain developing countries and is likely to 
aggravate the risk of wider protectionist 
pressures. This is a problem which we all 
share and can be dealt with only in 
cooperation with each other. . . action is 
needed to redirect policies and adjust 
structures of agricultural production in 



»«)ber 1986 



43 



PACIFIC 



the light of world demand." I guess from 
what I've heard, Bill, you might say, 
"Amen, and let's get going on that proj- 
ect." 

We come together today without 
New Zealand. We regret this absence 
deeply. New Zealand has been a major 
contributor to regional and global stabil- 
ity, fighting bravely with its allies in four 
wars during this century. This 
distinguished record is testimony to New 
Zealand's place in the community of free 
nations. 

Access for allied ships and aircraft, 
however, is essential to the effectiveness 
of the ANZUS alliance. If New Zealand 
continues to say "no" to ships operating 
under our universal policy of neither con- 
firming nor denying the presence or 
absence of nuclear weapons, then we 
cannot send navy vessels to New 
Zealand's ports. The New Zealand 
Government's current policies of block- 
ing traditional ship and air access thus 
vitiate the principal contribution that 
New Zealand makes to ANZUS. 

Because of New Zealand's decision 
to renege on an essential element of its 
ANZUS participation, it has become 
impossible for the United States to sus- 
tain its security obligations to New 
Zealand. We sincerely hope that New 
Zealand will soon undertake adequate 
corrective measures which will restore 
port and air access and permit a return 
to alliance cooperation. 

New Zealand's actions can only 
encourage those who hope to tear at the 
fabric of Western cooperation. The 
United States and Australia choose to 
provide a different vision— a reaffirma- 
tion of the willingness of democratic 
peoples to make common cause in 
defense of our principles and way of life. 

I am deeply pleased to open this 
bilateral ministerial— the symbol of our 
continued alliance relationship. Our talks 
today will range over issues of bilateral 
security, economics, Asia and the 
Pacific, and global security. In addition, 
we hope to reach conclusions on the 
nature of our relationship in the absence 
of New Zealand, as well as to establish a 
st ructure to preserve our ties until the 
trilateral activities of the alliance can be 
resumed. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 
AUG. 11, 1986 2 

Secretary Shultz. This meeting has 
borne out once again the value— from 
the standpoint of the United States, and 
I hope from that of Australia— of the 
ANZUS alliance and the discussions that 



44 



take place under it. We've had a broad 
review of the security situation in the 
South Pacific, the Australian area, and 
for that matter, all through the world. 

We've also had a good and, at times, 
a vigorous discussion of economic prob- 
lems, including those involved in 
agriculture. While we have some dif- 
ferences of view, it's good to state them 
and talk them through, and see where 
we may go from here. 

So from our standpoint, the joint 
statement expresses very well our sen- 
timents, and we have welcomed very 
much this opportunity to meet once 
again with Foreign Minister Hayden and 
Defense Minister Beazley and their col- 
leagues. It's been a very good and pro- 
ductive day. 

Foreign Minister Hayden. The 

Australian delegation. Defense Minister 
Beazley and myself, have appreciated 
the opportunity once again to explore a 
wide range of mutual concerns of the 
bilateral relationship which exists 
between Australia and the United 
States; and furthermore, to reinforce 
that bilateral security association 
between our two countries. 

It is, as I mentioned this morning, a 
matter of marked regret for us that New 
Zealand is unable to participate on a 
trilateral basis with Australia and the 
United States under the ANZUS treaty. 
As we've said before, the reasons which 
have caused this are reasons with which 
we disagree. We have an entirely dif- 
ferent approach to policy on such mat- 
ters to that adopted by New Zealand. 

I also repeat, as Mr. George Shultz 
said, there was a wide canvas explored, 
including not only regional issues and 
bilateral ones but broader global ones. In 
particular, as I mentioned this morning, 
we discussed the issue of increasing pro- 
tectionism and the damage that it's 
doing to countries in the world, allies of 
other countries which are practicing 
protectionism. 

And in our case, it is clearly evident 
to us that protectionism is impairing and 
will continue to impair our ability to 
fulfill a number of security roles which 
we would wish to fulfill in the region. 
We wish to see steps taken to roll back 
that protectionism, and I have here, but 
more particularly elsewhere, explored 
with counterparts that need, and action 
which might be taken. 

Defense Minister Beazley and I 
appreciate the warmth with which we've 
been greeted on this occasion and helpful 
dialogue which has taken place. 

Q. One of the things that was 
discussed on the issue of protectionism 



is, where do we go from here? The 
communique that you've issued is 
bland in the extreme on the subject. 
What is the answer? Where do we gi 
from here? 

Secretary Shultz. I think the 
answer is, first of all, to recognize tha 
the pattern of subsidies and the settin: 
of higher than market prices that 
encourages production, an attribute ol 
policies throughout major countries 
without exception, has brought us to a 
position where there is a huge amount 
supply of major commodities in excess 
the demand. And so this subsidy struc 
ture needs to be examined and 
something done about it. 

That is precisely what was called 1 
at the Tokyo economic summit. I migr 
say that before the President went 
there, he heard very vigorously from 
Prime Minister Bob Hawke about it in 
visit to Washington, and that was ver; 
much the message that he got. 

So I think this is a principal conce 
and we hope that it can be done in the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] round which we hope will j 
started in Punta del Este in the meeti 
that takes place there in the middle of 
September. I think that's the principa 
thing that has to be done. 

And in the meantime, all countries 
need to examine their own policies am 
do everything possible to roll back anc 
contain the protectionist pressures th; 
we see everywhere. 

Q. There's been a lot of referent 
today to air problems, or to air acces 
I wonder if this is a new element 
that's been interjected, and do you 
foresee a time when the Antarctic b< 
facility at Christchurch might be 
shifted to Australia because of potei 
tial air problems? 

Secretary Shultz. We don't forest 
any such shift. That facility has operat 
successfully there for a long time. It's 
research facility and is not connected 
with this set of problems. 

However, access to airfields and 
ports from the standpoint of our milita 
relationship operate under a similar ki: 
of policy. And basically what's happeni 
here is that the ANZUS treaty remain, 
in effect— Australia and the U.S. rela- 
tionship under it remains unchanged, 
strong and vigorous. And New Zealani 
has, in effect, withdrawn from that 
security relationship by withdrawing 
from one of its most important contrib 
tions to the relationship. 

Foreign Minister Hayden: The m; 
ter hasn't been put to the Australian 
Government. Should it be put, it would 
be considered then and a determination 



Department of State Bull 



H 



PACIFIC 



ide. At this point, however, there's 

such proposal before us. 
Secretary Weinberger. Tasmania is 

entirely separate activity, but as 
cretary Shultz says, New Zealand has 
cen action which, in effect, frustrated 
; execution of the treaty, taken 
;mselves out of it, and left themselves 
?n without the security and the protec- 
n of the treaty. The treaty remains in 
ect between Australia and the United 
ites, and if New Zealand ever changes 

policy, we hope they can come back in 
sin. 

Q. If the United States is prepared 
treat Australia with indifference as 
trade, what faith should we place in 
Is treaty negotiated today? 
: Secretary Shultz. The United States 
?sn't treat Australia with indifference 
>ut anything, including in the field of 
momics. 
i In the field of economics and trade. 

struggle as others do with these huge 
plusses that have been generated. The 
bsident's decision was simply one to 
tag about the fulfillment of an obliga- 
1 undertaken by the Soviet Union in 
King a long-term grain agreement 
h us, which was, that their minimum 

chase would be 9 million metric tons, 
east 4 million of which would be 
hat. That's something that's been on 

books for a long time. 

In terms of thinking about 
(stralia's interests, as we think about 
|s, it's very much in our minds, and 
jfeel that there was a great contribu- 
li to our thinking when Prime Minister 
[vke was in the United States before 
i| Tokyo summit. We work together on 
lie matters regularly, and I might say 
It Foreign Minister Hayden has 
Iged on me a little bit. So we under- 
bid the importance of these matters to 
Itralia. And we appreciate that. 

Q. I'd like to ask Mr. Hayden what 
neant by the statement in paragraph 
<)f the communique, where it's 
tted that Australia notes that pro- 
. ionisl policies, particularly toward 
^culture, would impair Australia's 
■ity to work effectively in coopera- 
i'l with its allies and friends. What 
<s this mean? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. Prime 
Bister Hawke of Australia has stated 
le categorically that there will be no 
lage between security matters, such 
■he joint facilities in Australia, and 
fcmercial matters. He stated that 
|e categorically, on a number of ocea- 
ns recently, and publicly. So there's 
Reference, no illusion to such matters 
Tlied in that comment. 



That comment refers to one simple 
fact, and that is, as a result of the loss of 
markets or the loss of income, I should 
say, that will arise because of certain 
pricing subsidization policies, Australia's 
national income will be affected; export 
income will be affected; our ability to 
make purchases of a certain level of 
defense equipment will be impaired; 
perhaps our role to provide aid with a 
political consideration behind it could be 
impaired. And accordingly, our role to 
fulfill as much as we would have wished 
to have fulfilled will be less than it would 
otherwise have been. 

Q. It was recently reported to the 
Australian Minister of Defense — the 
Dibb report on the future of 
Australian defenses finds that 
Australia does enough as an ally by 
hosting the joint facilities and pro- 
viding access to naval ships. 

And suggesting there's no need for 
Australian defense forces to continue 
to be equipped and trained for joint 
operations with U.S. forces, it pro- 
poses an independent draw of 
Australian forces and an end to the 
traditional participation of Australia 
in joint allied forces in wartime. I 
wonder if you have any thoughts on 
the implications of these proposals for 
the U.S. -Australia alliance. 

Secretary Weinberger. We don't 
read the Dibb report as reaching those 
conclusions. We think that it is very 
desirable for Australia to strengthen its 
military forces to act in the various 
regions set out in the Dibb report to 
widening circles that encompass a great 
deal of territory. 

We think that if the Australian 
forces are strengthened, as he suggests, 
that that will benefit all of us, and it will 
also enable Australia to play a role 
anywhere that its government— present 
or later government— may decide is 
appropriate. And we think that that's an 
encouraging and a useful suggestion of 
the Dibb report. 

We don't get any suggestion that 
Australia would be withdrawing from or 
giving up any of the basic obligations 
that all of us who are interested in 
freedom have to undertake. 

Secretary Shultz. I might say that 
the description of the Dibb report given 
up by Defense Minister Beazley this 
morning didn't bear much resemblance 
to the description that you just gave. 

Defense Minister Beazley. That's 
absolutely correct, and I endorse the 
views put forth by Secretary Weinberger 
on his conclusions as to what it means. 

I think the point that is important to 
establish in regard to the Dibb report is 



that it is a force-structure document. It 
clearly relates the types of armed forces 
that Australia needs to the most likely 
categories of conflict into which we 
would enter. It contains, nevertheless, 
within it a capacity to operate effectively 
unilaterally across something like 10% of 
the Earth's surface and, with allies and 
friends, across something like 25% of it. 

Obviously forces so structured, with 
that sort of capability, are capable of 
deployments over substantial distances. 
And any change in the force structure 
that is related to that still leaves options 
available to governments, if they wish to 
exorcise them at different points of time 
to go further afield. 

I've been making that point immi- 
nently clear, both in the tabling state- 
ment that I made to the Dibb report and 
in subsequent public debate on it. 

And, of course, the talks today have 
provided an opportunity to make that 
point further. There's nothing essentially 
new in it. 

Q. You say in the statement that 
New Zealand's current policies detract 
from individual and collective capacity 
to resist armed attack. My question to 
you is whether or not there was any 
discussion about measures to bring 
New Zealand into line? Was it 
discussed and discarded, not 
discussed? And if not, why just the 
rhetoric and no positive action to bring 
New Zealand back into the alliance? 

Secretary Shultz. First, there has 
been a tremendous amount of effort to 
find a way to maintain New Zealand's 
posture in the alliance. 

I can remember a very windy, rainy, 
cold day in Wellington a couple of years 
ago, when Prime Minister-elect Lange 
came, and we had a meeting and started 
a process of trying to work this out. But 
it proved to be impossible, in that, at 
least for the present. New Zealand has 
consistently taken the position that it 
won't receive vessels of our navy, under 
our policy of no confirm or deny the 
presence of nuclear weapons. It also has 
its reservations about nuclear powered 
ships, which represent, I think, 
something like 40% of the navy. 

So what you're saying is that you 
won't allow into your port ships from 
our navy. And if the navy can't call 
there and use those bases, then how can 
we operate effectively as an alliance? 

We tried very hard to see if there 
isn't some way that this could be worked 
through, but there are certain hard 
realities you have to face. I think in the 
end, New Zealand chose, as it has a right 
to do, basically to withdraw itself from 
the alliance by denying port access. 



3ober 1986 



45 



PACIFIC 



\\ e're sorry about that. I miss New 
Zealand, and as I said after my meeting 
with Prime Minister Lange in Manila 
only a few weeks ago, we part as 
friends, but we part on security matters. 

Q. Is ANZUS dead? Are we enter- 
ing a new alliance era here? 

Secretary Shultz. No. The ANZUS 
treaty remains in effect, and the rela- 
tionship between the United States and 
Australia is as strong and vigorous as 
ever, if not more so. It's very much a 
strong and working system. 

It's unfortunate that it doesn't 
include New Zealand anymore, but as 
has been pointed out here, it is left there 
exactly as it has been, and if there can at 
some point be some shift that makes it 
possible for New Zealand to rejoin us, 
we will be delighted. But there will have 
to be some shift. 

Q. In regard to the question of 
New Zealand being left out, or having 
left itself out of the ANZUS alliance, 
there are, as you know, discussions 
going on in Scandinavia still about the 
nuclear-weapons-free zone — in an 
upcoming meeting of the arm of the 
Socialist Democratic Parties concern- 
ing that question. Should, for 
instance, the Labor Party government 
of Norway now decide to go in for a 
nuclear-weapons-free zone, which 
would, in effect, mean that American 
missiles can no longer come into 
Norwegian ports without such 
guarantees, as the New Zealanders 
asked for, would that mean that 
Norway, too, will be considered left 
out of NATO? 

Secretary Shultz. I would call your 
attention to the fact, without the United 
States having made any decision about 
the South Pacific nuclear-free zone, that 
the way in which that treaty is postured 
in no way forecloses— in fact it explicitly 
is consistent with the movement of 
nuclear powered ships through that zone 
and the calling on ports of countries in 
that zone under the no confirm or deny 
policj 

So it's not a question of some 
generalization; it's a question of exactly 
whal operating policies are followed, and 
SO far. our capacity to operate with all 
our NATO allies has gone along very 
well. 

Q. In the talks today, and the talks 
leading up to it, did the United States 
ask Australia to in any way restrict its 
ties or its relationship with New 
Zealand? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. No. 
[Laughter] 



Q. You discussed regional arms 
control in the Pacific, and you men- 
tioned that you had concerns in that 
region. What are those concerns as 
they relate to small Pacific island 
nations, and what effect do you think 
New Zealand's action will have on the 
policies of those nations? 

Secretary Weinberger. The basic 
concern that we would have, first of all, 
is that New Zealand has made itself far 
less defensible by its action thus far. If 
there is any suggestion that other 
nations should follow that course, we 
would obviously be worried that they 
themselves are following a course which 
would make it very difficult to defend 
them. And if it's difficult to defend 
them, then their vulnerability to Soviet 
aggression increases. And that, of 
course, we feel, would be bad for all of 
us. 

Q. While the Australian Govern- 
ment has not raised the joint facilities 
as leverage in the present negotia- 
tions, the issue has been raised by sit- 
ting members of the ruling Labor 
Party and members of other political 
parties in Australia. Has the United 
States told Australia that recent 
developments in communications 
technology will make those facilities 
redundant, and not necessary for 
American — 

Secretary Weinberger. No. We 
most certainly have not. 

Q. If the United States continues 
to sell subsidized wheat to some of 
your current customers, do you think 
there's a risk that sentiment will grow 
for Australia not to renew the leases 
on the bases at Nurrangar, Pine Gap, 
and Cape North West? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. The 
Prime Minister of Australia, as I men- 
tioned to you earlier, said as recently as 
this last week— and it was the severalth 
time he had said it— there would be no 
linkage between security matters and 
commercial matters, and that specifically 
that ruled out any linkage between the 
joint facilities and our commercial 
problems. 

Q. Since Australia is maintaining 
its bilateral defense relationships with 
New Zealand, and the United States 
with Australia, in effect, don't we 
have a kind of domino problem here, in 
the event that New Zealand was 
attacked? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. We sup- 
port the American attitude that the 
policy of the New Zealand Government 
violates its longstanding principle and 
practice of neither confirming nor deny- 



ing in respect of the armament capabil- 
ity of its naval vessels. It's not a policy 
we accept; we've had the opportunity c 
adopting that policy, and we rejected it 
overwhelmingly as a party. 

The relationship between Australia 
and the United States— the security rel 
tionship is an important one; it's impor 
tant for that to be confirmed by the 
exchange of letters which has taken 
place today. 

We have important strategic inter- 
ests which we share with New Zealand 
for instance, in the South Pacific, and 
accordingly, we exchange information 
[inaudible] is Australian-sourced, and 
we're engaged in military exercises wil 
them as a part of that common, shared 
[inaudible] concern for that region. The 
relationship will continue. 

Q. Following the withdrawal of 
U.S. security commitment to New 
Zealand, does this in any way affect 
New Zealand's access to purchasing 
U.S. military equipment? 

Secretary Weinberger. We have n 
had any indications of any interest in 
that, but I think all of these factors 
would go into any equation, on any que 
tion with respect to sales or anything o 
that kind. 

We would want to examine very 
carefully what the request was that 
came in and see if the request was in ai 
way consistent with the change, the 
unfortunately changed relationship tha 
we now have with New Zealand. 

Q. You pointed out a moment age 
that America does not treat Australia 
with indifference on trade issues. Yoi 
also noted that the only sale of sub- 
sidized wheat so far has been an 
outstanding amount under a trade 
agreement with Russia — 

Secretary Shultz. No. That may 
have been the implication of what I saic 
but that's not correct. 

There is an effort, particularly with: 
respect to the subsidized sales by Euro- 
peans, which we feel have disrupted 
international markets, to give them the 
message, through competition from the 
United States, that this pattern of sub- 
sidization is leading to very undesirable 
results. 

So there have been some sales, but 
they have been directed at markets 
which we have felt, through subsidies, 
the Europeans took from the United 
States. 

And we've tried very hard to adminl 
ister the program in a way that is sen- | 
sitive to the interests of Australia, whici 
in the field of wheat is a comparative, 
advantaged, nonsubsidizing producer. 



46 



Department of State Bulleti 



PACIFIC 



Q. My question was going to be, 
e you been able today to tell the 
tralians that that will be the only 

of subsidized wheat, and their 
ket might be further affected? 
And to Mr. Hayden, have you been 

to extract anything from 
retary Shultz today that this will 
he only subsidized sale? 
Secretary Shultz. The President's 
sion is a specific, concrete decision, 
there is that decision, and there isn't 
:hing further. 

I wish I could tell you exactly what 
Congress will do, but I'm not able to 
lict that. I do know that the Presi- 
;'s view is that protectionism in any 

i is bad. Subsidies are a form of pro- 
ionism, and he has been waging a 

strong battle against it. And not 

a strong battle, but a winning 
le. And so we see that in his veto of 
textile bill; his veto was sustained 
week in a very hard-fought vote. 
We also see that part of the battle on 
ection, from our standpoint, is to go 
:her countries that have closed their 
kets to our goods and to tell them 
our case for maintaining our 
rcets open is heavily dependent on 
i opening their markets, so that 
3 is, in the parlance of this field, a 

playing field for everybody. That's 
: we see. And I think that's what 
;ralia sees. 

foreign Minister Hayden. I raised 
uiestion with Mr. Shultz today, and 
inswer you've just received is pretty 
i the answer that I received. 

[inaudible] strongly our concern 
t this advantage that we're 
riencing, and will experience at a 
ter level, as a result of this decision; 

II affect price, and, therefore, it will 
:t income for Australian wheat sales, 
that will have a deleterious effect on 
;conomy. 

[inaudible] strongly that we would 
"eatly concerned if there were to be 
expansion of this, particularly into 

markets or in greater volume into 
soviet market. 

Ve are pleased that, to this point, 
n in the Congress, in particular 
.tor Dole's proposal, has not been 

Sed. I think it's going to be a 
enge for Australia to be even more 
•ous in representing its view, not 
to the Administration, which we 
been doing quite directly— and we 
been doing it to the Congress— but 
; so to the U.S. Congress in the hope 
we can head off any further 
llopments in this direction. 



Q. Are you more confident than 
the delegation was in Washington a 
couple of weeks or so ago? 

Foreign Minister Hayden. I don't 
know how confident they were, but I 
sincerely hope that with repeated 
representation and lobbying, we'll be 
successful. But if we're not, then as a 
good friend and ally, we'll be taking a lot 
of punishment. And we think that 
inappropriate for a good friend and ally. 

The estimate of our Wheat Board is 
that the cost of these measures collec- 
tively could go as high as $1,000 million, 
and that's a lot for a country like 
Australia to be affected by. 

We're the second biggest— Australia 
has the second biggest trade deficit with 
the United States, just behind Saudi 
Arabia, and that's in excess of $3,000 
million, according to the last count I 
saw. 

The United States has a problem 
with its balance of trade and current 
account; therefore our contribution, as 
one of the few countries which is con- 
tributing a substantial trade, bilateral 
trade surplus, is a very important one. 
We don't wish to be disadvantaged in 
other markets. 

Australia's also a fairly important 
market for the United States. We're its 
eighth largest market in the world, 
which, given our size, is a significant 
level of market opportunities. 

So we're looking for some considera- 
tion of all of these factors, but in par- 
ticular the fact that, as a friend and ally, 
our capacity to function as effectively as 
we would wish as a friend and ally is 
impaired. To the degree to which we are 
disadvantaged by these measures, they 
have the capability of substantially dis- 
advantaging us; therefore, the degree to 
which we can fulfill our functions as a 
friend and ally will be substantially 
impaired. 

Q. The U.S. Commander of the 
Pacific fleet said at an interview with 
the Los Angeles Times yesterday that 
the absence of New Zealand causes or 
creates a gap, a security gap. 

Is it then wise to lose a friend, at 
times when Mr. Gorbachev publicly is 
raising more attention to the Pacific 
and obviously wants to obtain Soviet 
influence in this area? Specifically, is 
Australia trying to fill that gap? Does 
it not cause damage to your relation- 
ship with New Zealand, your fragmented 
relationship, if you only share limited 
intelligence with New Zealand? 

Secretary Weinberger. The gap 
that's been opened was a gap that was 
opened by New Zealand, in making 
themselves far more vulnerable to 



attack, far less easy for themselves to 
defend or for anyone else to defend 
them. 

And they have, in effect, prevented 
us from filling the gap by carrying out 
our treaty obligations. They frustrated 
the object and the purpose of the treaty. 
We hope that they will change their 
policy, and that we will be able to 
resume normal relationships with them. 

Defense Minister Beazley. There is 
a substantial increase in Australian 
activity in the Southwest Pacific 
altogether going on at the moment. We 
have a variety of defense cooperation 
programs in place. Part of that program 
is an increase in surveillance activities 
which the Southwest Pacific countries 
regard as very important to an impor- 
tant area of their national sovereignty, 
and that is their capacity to protect their 
fishing zones. 

We have a patrol boat program under- 
way, by which we give to the Pacific 
states a patrol boat, and something like 
14 of those have now been ordered by 
the South Pacific states. We anticipate a 
substantially greater activity by 
Australia in that area in the future. 

In the question of Australia coopera- 
tion with new Zealand, it remains in 
place. We have a substantial historical 
defense relationship with New Zealand; 
that continues. It continues in the form 
of joint exercises, joint training, and the 
like. 

It is Australia's view that the con- 
temporary situation is not ideal, that it 
would be obviously better to have a fully 
functional trilateral relationship. In the 
absence of it, we believe that we have an 
obligation to maintain strong and 
improving relationships with the United 
States in a bilateral sense and also to 
maintain those links with New Zealand. 

Q. Will the United States help out 
Australia in its purchase of the F-18, 
and is the United States going to 
accept Nomads in exchange for a 
reduction on the F-18s? 

Defense Minister Beazley. You'll 
have to buy a lot of Nomads to get the 
offset— [laughter] 

Secretary Weinberger. We are 
working with Australia very closely in 
the Nomad program and in the acquisi- 
tion of Nomads by various units of the 
U.S. Government. 

And we are also doing the best we 
can to help out with respect to the pur- 
chase of the F-18s. The F-18 is a very 
capable plane and one whose capability 
is demonstrated daily. Australia has 
recognized this, and we're trying to do 
the best we can to assist in that pur- 



ser 1986 



47 



PACIFIC 



e because it will strengthen both 
countries very much. 

Defense Minister Beazley. 
Secretary Weinberger did point oul to 

mi in mj private discussions with him 
yesterday that they were picking up on 
the Nomad. And that, from Australia's 
point of view, is a very welcome deci- 
sion. 1 might say, to offset the F-18s 
would require the purchase of something 
like 1,500 Nomads— [laughter]— and I'm 
not about to impose that obligation on 
Secretary Weinberger. 

1 think, though, it was an opportu- 
nity today to make a point which is being 
well-accepted by our American col- 
leagues, that we are a substantial arms 
purchaser from the United States. 

We have a situation, as a result of 
the Dibb report and decisions of this 
government, where we're purchasing 
over the next decade something like 
$20-30 billion worth of new arms. 

Currently we spend about $2 billion 
a year on arms overseas— sorry, alto- 
gether. About $1.5 billion overseas, of 
which something like 75% of that is 
spent in the United States. And our 
capacity to sustain that type of program, 
which we see as critical not only to our 
security but the security of our region, is 
very much dependent upon the economic 
growth of Australia. And I think that 
point has been well accepted by our col- 
leagues in discussions today. 

Secretary Shultz. Thank you very 
much. We have had a good discussion 
here today. We look forward to periodic 
discussions in the course of the year. 
And the Australians have invited us to 
come to Australia for the next install- 
ment sometime next year, and we look 
forward to that. We'll see you in 
Australia. 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 11, 1986 

1. The U.S. Secretary of State, 
Mr. George Shultz, and Secretary of 
Defense, Mr. Caspar Weinberger, and 
the Australian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Bill Hayden, and Minister 
for Defense, Mr. Kim Beazley, met 
August 10-11, 1986, in San Francisco to 
discuss regional and global issues and 
the further development of bilateral 
relations. 



Security Issues 

2. I '.nth sides welcomed the continuation 
of the pattern of close contact between 
their governments at the ministerial 
level. As a reflection of their shared 
interests and continuing obligations as 



allies, the two sides agreed to maintain 
the practice of annual bilateral 
ministerial meetings. In addition, the 
two governments confirmed that they 
would continue to hold their regular 
defense meetings, annual political- 
military discussions, and annual arms 
control talks in order to maintain tradi- 
tionally close consultations between 
Australia and the United States. Addi- 
tional contacts to maintain and enhance 
military-to-military links, including com- 
bined exercises, will ensure a continued 
strong and dynamic security 
relationship. 

3. Both sides stressed the impor- 
tance of the ANZUS treaty and of con- 
tinued cooperation on defense and other 
matters under the alliance. 

4. Both governments regretted that 
the continuation of New Zealand's port 
and air access policies has caused the 
disruption of the alliance relationship 
between the United States and New 
Zealand. They agreed that access for 
allied ships and aircraft is essential to 
the effectiveness of the ANZUS alliance 
and that New Zealand's current policies 
detract from individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack. 

5. The United States said that it 
could not be expected under these cir- 
cumstances to carry out its security 
obligations to New Zealand. Accord- 
ingly, the U.S. side stated that it is 
suspending its security obligations to 
New Zealand unde the ANZUS treaty 
pending adequate corrective measures. 

6. The Australian Government 
regretted that no resolution had proved 
possible of the situation which had 
developed. The Australian Government 
repeated the view it had expressed con- 
sistently over the last 2 years that it 
disagreed completely with New Zealand 
policy on port and air access and 
expressed its understanding of the 
action which the United States had 
taken. 

7. Both sides noted that, in the pres- 
ent circumstances, although the ANZUS 
treaty remains in place, virtually all 
trilateral activities under it have been 
suspended for nearly 2 years. Both sides 
agreed that the relationship between 
Australia and the United States under 
the ANZUS treaty and the rights and 
obligations assumed by Australia and the 
United States toward each other under 
the treaty would remain constant and 
undiminished. 

8. Both the Australian and U.S. 
Governments appealed to New Zealand 
to restore normal port and air access in 
order to permit a return to trilateral 
alliance cooperation under ANZUS. In 
this context, Australia retains its tradi- 



tional bilateral security relationship w 
New Zealand. 



Regional/Arms Control 

9. Among other matters discussed w< 
recent developments in U.S.-Soviet n 
tions and issues of common concern ii 
Asia, the Pacific, southern Africa, am 
Central America. 

10. The two sides also exchanged 
detailed views on arms control and di 
armament. They confirmed their com 
mitment to negotiation of substantial 
balanced, and verifiable reductions in 
nuclear and conventional weapons as 
means of reducing tension and streng 
ening international security. Both sid> 
while recognizing that there were son 
positive elements in recent Soviet pre 
posals, expressed the hope that the 
Soviet Union would give substance to 
the agreement reached between Pres 
dent Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev in Geneva, which would op 
the way to early progress on a new 
agreement on offensive nuclear arms 
reductions, in particular in areas whe 
there is common ground, including th 
principle of 50% reductions in the 
strategic nuclear arms of both countr 
appropriately applied, as well as an 
interim global INF [intermediate-ran^ 
nuclear forces] agreement. Both sides 
reaffirmed that strict compliance with 
arms control agreements was essentk 
to real arms control. Both sides dis- 
cussed in detail their positions on the 
SALT II Treaty. Other issues discusse 
were nuclear testing and the need for 
global ban on chemical weapons. The 
two sides noted recent developments 
with respect to the South Pacific 
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, protocols t 
which would be open to the nuclear 
weapons states and states with ter- 
ritories within the region. 

11. The two sides exchanged view 
on, and expressed their determination 
see an end to, international terrorism. 
Both condemned unequivocally states 
involved in directing, exporting, and si 
porting such activities. Both sides 
expressed understanding of the need f 
concerned nations to combat interna- 
tional terrorism. 

12. The two sides reviewed once 
again issues affecting states and ter- 
ritories in the Pacific Ocean. They noti 
Australia's special interest in the islam 
members of the South Pacific Forum, : 
well as the U.S. proposals for termina- 
tion of the Micronesian trusteeship, its 
cooperation with successor entities, an 
its efforts to reach a regional fisheries 
agreement. Both emphasized the desir-' 
ability of continued encouragement of 



48 



Department of State Bullet 



REFUGEES 



social and economic development of 
island nations. They also reaffirmed 
r intention to continue to work with 
id countries in promoting security 
stability in the area. Both sides 
sd the increasing support being given 
Australia to the development of 
onal security capabilities of island 
ltries and its commitment of defense 
urces to support the security of this 
on. 

13. Both sides also reviewed devel- 
ents in Southeast Asia. They noted 
r common commitment to regional 
ility was supported by Australia's 
;e military cooperation and bilateral 
■rising with the nations of the region. 

nomic and Trade Issues 

Both countries reaffirmed their com- 
nent to holding and reversing protec- 
sm and to reducing and dismantling 
e restrictions. Australia noted, 
ever, that protectionist policies, 
cially toward agriculture, are 
msly damaging its vital interests. 
' would also impair Australia's abili- 
• work effectively in cooperation 
its allies and friends. The 
ralian Government's concerns ex- 
ed to the economies of other friends 
allies in Australia's region, with 
|itial substantial effects on regional 
lity. This stability is important not 
to the vital interests of Australia 
dso to those of the United States. 
5. Both countries agreed that the 
1 practices of allies and friends, and 
ability to achieve economic growth, 
ital for their stability in pursuit of 
ihion interests. The Australian 
n-rnment expressed its deep convic- 
lof the need for major agricultural 
During countries that are subsidizing 
Irts to pull back from pursuing 
llies which could cause fundamental 
jage to the international political and 
nomic system. 

j.6. Both sides agreed that recent 
^national economic developments 
fld importance to the need to obtain 
ttantive commitments to address 
Cultural trade problems in the 
thing of the new round of multi- 
:tal trade negotiations. 
J 7. The Australian Government 
led out, however, that while the 
)>' [multilateral trade negotiations] 
less on trade issues was important, 
Jesuits that might be in prospect as 
»jult were several years in the future. 
Htwo sides noted that they have held 
spent ministerial and technical con- 
Itions on various aspects of U.S. 
cj programs, including the export 



enhancement program, and agreed that 
these consultations would continue with 
the aim of finding solutions to the prob- 
lems created. 

18. Mr. Shultz and Mr. Hayden 
exchanged letters affirming continuation 
of the commitments between Australia 
and the United States under the ANZUS 
treaty. 



19. The Australian-U.S. ministerial 
discussions underlined the wide range of 
interests shared by the partners and 
their continuing and steady determina- 
tion to work together for peace and 
security. 



'Press release 160 of Aug. 15, 198(1. 
2 Press release 1(12 of Aug. 15. ■ 



U.S. Refugee Policies 

and Programs at Midyear 1986 



by James N. Purcell, Jr. 

Statement before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on June 20, 1986. 
Mr. Pur cell is Director of the Bureau for 
Refugee Programs. ' 

This midyear consultation provides a 
welcome opportunity to review develop- 
ments in U.S. refugee policies and pro- 
grams that have occurred since the 
annual consultation at which the Secre- 
tary of State testified last September. 
By their nature, refugee programs 
reflect and respond to rapidly changing 
situations in many regions throughout 
the world. The established structures of 
an annual refugee consultation and an 
unpredictable budget process often come 
into conflict with the changing require- 
ments of the real world. Periodic consul- 
tations such as this enable us to report 
on steps needed to adjust our programs 
to the changing realities. 

Your letter inviting us to this con- 
sultation expresses particular interest in 
the current situation of the "border 
Khmer," the "Khmer review process" 
at Khao I Dang, and other subjects 
addressed in your comprehensive report 
on the "U.S. Refugee Program in 
Southeast Asia: 1985." In addressing 
these and related subjects, I also want 
to draw on the report of the independ- 
ent Indochinese Refugee Panel, headed 
by the former Governor of Iowa, Robert 
D. Ray, which was submitted to the 
Secretary of State on April 18. With the 
assistance of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), we are 
now conducting our own analysis of the 
report. 

I will also discuss the implications 
for our programs of the funding cuts 
mandated by the Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings legislation and other budgetary 
restrictions for this fiscal year (FY 1986) 
and the related shifts in program and 
funding priorities we will follow as a 



result of these budget reductions. I will 
also express the Administration's con- 
cerns about the sizable reductions which 
will occur in refugee and many other 
international affairs programs as a 
result of House and Senate action to 
reduce funding for these programs in 
their deliberations on the 1987 budget 
resolution. Finally, as you have sug- 
gested, I will provide an update on the 
African refugee situation, with particu- 
lar reference to Ethiopia and Sudan and 
in light of the report recently completed 
by the subcommittee's staff. 

Reports on Southeast Asian 
Refugee Programs 

Before discussing these issues, however, 
I would like to discuss briefly the con- 
text in which we are addressing several 
recent studies which have suggested 
new policy directions in our Southeast 
Asia program. We have had available 
your review, as well as that of the Ray 
panel and a number of other policy or 
operational critiques. All point to a 
crossroads, a need to move from almost 
exclusive reliance on refugee resettle- 
ment in the program to a more balanced 
use of refugee and normal immigration 
mechanisms. The Administration agrees 
with this redirection. 

For example, the Ray report pro- 
vides, we believe, an excellent analysis 
of the problem and offers viable sugges- 
tions for addressing it. Implementation, 
however, if it is to be enduring and 
problem solving, must be done in an 
international context with renewed 
leadership and direction from the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and his staff. Only in this 
way can we achieve broad-based burden- 
sharing through the active participation 
of other resettlement countries. 

Furthermore, we must have a 
mechanism capable of actively pursuing 



sber 1986 



49 



REFUGEES 



comprehensive, durable solution plan- 
ning if we arc to avoid almost exclusive 
reliance on third country resettlement, 
issioner [of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Alan C.] Nelson 
and 1 had the opportunity to continue 
the dialogue on such a process in 
Geneva last week (June 12) with a num- 
ber of our partners: Australia, Canada, 
and Japan. We found the UN High 
Commissioner and leaders of several 
other major resettlement governments 
receptive to the need to review our 
joint approaches to the Southeast Asian 
refugee program and willing to discuss 
such approaches further. Coordinated 
action at the international level is essen- 
tial for future planning and operations, 
and we are optimistic that our other 
partners share this view and are eager 
to pursue it further over the coming 
months. 

Also, we must realistically acknowl- 
edge that reductions in the U.S. budget 
for international affairs programs— 
which, at this point, seem very likely to 
occur— argue strongly for pursuing refu- 
gee assistance programs with a renewed 
emphasis on viable burdensharing. The 
United States must never back away 
from its humanitarian traditions and 
obligations, but we must realistically 
determine the proper U.S. role in such 
undertakings. We are confident that the 
good will and capacity still exist in the 
international community for aggressively 
pursuing solutions to the Indochinese 
refugee problem, as well as those of 
other regions, but care and patience 
must be taken to develop the framework 
which will permit an equitable burden- 
sharing response to such problems. 

Thai-Cambodian Border 

Your report and that of the Ray panel 
deal with many of the same issues, 
including those highlighted in your let- 
ter calling this consultation. Of those is- 
sues, none is more significant and 
sensitive for the future of the Southeast 
Asian region, and for the future direc- 
tion of our programs, than the situation 
of the 250,000 Khmer and other popula- 
tions along the Thai-Cambodian border. 
The recent dry season in that region 
came and went without significant 
attacks on civilian encampments by 
Vietnamese military forces, unlike ear- 
lier years when Vietnamese ground 
forces and artillery fire forced repeated 
evacuations of the border populations. 
This may well lie due, in part, to the 
Thai Government's decision to move the 
border encampments a short distance 
into Thailand, thus removing the oppor- 



tunity to attack camps immediately on 
the border. To further lessen the 
pretext for attacks, combatants were 
separated from civilians. 

In its discussion with senior Viet- 
namese officials in Hanoi, the Ray panel 
urged the Vietnamese not to attack the 
civilian camps as had happened in 
earlier years. The subsequent January 
visit to Hanoi by Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Armitage and then Assistant 
Secretary of State [for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Paul] Wolfowitz was 
made conditional on the absence of such 
attacks. The United States and its allies 
used the diplomatic tools at then- 
disposal to assure that the Vietnamese 
knew that attacks on innocent civil- 
ians would be met by worldwide 
condemnation. 

Now that the 1985-86 dry season is 
over, we have seen that Vietnamese 
military efforts this year concentrated 
on further sealing the border region and 
on measures to extend Vietnamese con- 
trol of the Cambodian countryside. The 
Khmer now residing in the camps in the 
vicinity of the border will continue to 
require special attention from the inter- 
national community to assure their secu- 
rity and welfare. With the International 
Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] act- 
ing as the focal point for protection and 
the UN Border Relief Operation for 
welfare and maintenance, we believe the 
international mechanisms now in place 
can adequately attend to these vulnera- 
ble populations as the search for politi- 
cal solutions to their situation continues. 

Need for Improved 
Education Programs 

To the extent that the situation has 
stabilized, it becomes all the more 
desirable to provide improved education, 
health, and feeding programs for the 
displaced Khmer who remain in the 
vicinity of the border. I was pleased to 
see that the Ray panel emphasized the 
need for such programs in terms similar 
to those set forth in your report a year 
earlier. 

We in the Administration have also 
urged that such programs be established 
and expanded, and from information we 
have received recently, I believe that 
the responsible authorities in Thailand 
are giving serious consideration to 
allowing such programs to go forward if 
the necessary international funding can 
be assured. For a population of this size, 
expansion of educational programs now 
in place will require substantial addi- 
tional resources. 



Our government recognizes a 

responsibility to assist financially, but 
is also important that other govern- 
ments, as well as private organization: 
in a position to contribute, help to un- 
derwrite these programs. The Khmer 
the border have been forced to flee 
their homelands in what the Thai and 
we continue to regard as a temporary 
displacement caused by the presence < 
Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. 
Although eventual return to their hon 
regions clearly seems the right solutic 
for the great majority of these people 
is a tragic waste of human potential tl 
so many of them have been growing i 
for years without access to even mini- 
mum schooling. 

Border Processing 

Such programs are even more import; 
in view of the Ray panel's finding- 
similar to yours— that refugee admis- 
sions processing for resettlement in 
third countries is not the appropriate 
solution for the Khmer on the border. 
The Ray panel endorsed our current 
policy of immigrant visa processing fo 
family reunification cases in this grou] 
recommending generous use of human 
tarian parole for hardship cases. I 
believe this is also consistent with the 
recommendations in this subcommittee 
report. 

Another group on the border— the i 
4,500 so-called land Vietnamese refuge 
who survived the hazardous trip acros 
Cambodia from Vietnam— have been o: 
particular concern to many Members c 
Congress. Because of their special vul- 
nerability, surrounded by hostile Viet- 
namese communist military forces and 
unfriendly Cambodian groups, we and 
other countries are processing the lane 
Vietnamese for resettlement on an 
urgent basis. The Thai authorities 
requested assurances that this entire 
group would be processed, and we 
understand that they are seriously conn 
sidering moving the group away from ii 
the border to a nearby inland site for I 
greater safety and more efficient inter- ■■ 
viewing. We hope they will make a 
favorable decision shortly. For this 
group, the United States is considering 
cases in all our processing priorities. V ( > 
believe this policy is justified by the 
special vulnerability of the land Viet- i 
namese and the absence of any prosper 
for them to return to their homeland, j 

You will also be interested to know] 
that the United States has completed i 
processing of a small group of Monta- I 
guard refugees which was also located 
at Site 2. We received many expressioi, 



50 



Department of State Bullet, 



REFUGEES 



ncern about this vulnerable popula- 
from Members of Congress and the 
ic. We processed the entire group, 
i.ting all 213 considered. They are 
undergoing' ESL/CO [English as a 
id Language/Cultural Orientation] 
ing prior to resettlement in the 
;d States. 

» I Dang 

•efugee camp at Khao I Dang has 
d as the main site for Cambodian 
■ees within Thailand since their 
al in the wake of the Vietnamese 
ion in 1978-79. Of the approxi- 
ly 1 (55,000 pre- 1980 arrivals, over 
have been resettled abroad, in the 
d States and other receiving coun- 

The United States has approved 
90% of the cases in this population 
were presented to the INS. The re- 
ng 14,500 of this group have been 
;ed for admission to the United 
s and, in some cases, other coun- 
and have been the subject of con- 
lg case reviews carried out by the 
gration and Naturalization Service 
he State Department, with the 
ance of experts from private volun- 
igencies. 

le initial review of the Khmer 
»ad at Khao I Dang was completed 
le 1985. Between February and 
i of 1985, there was a further 
v of 154 previously denied cases in 
aid, for whom the earlier denials 
upheld in 84 cases and reversed in 
ith some cases held for further 
v. A subsequent formal review of 
ditional 631 previously denied 
was instituted in November 1985, 
f this number, slightly under 10% 
:t of 631 cases) were reversed, 
each case averages several people 
imily, we estimate that about 20% 

population of 14,500 has benefited 
such reviews. 

le Ray panel stated that it was im- 
d by the major efforts undertaken 
lew the cases of the "denied 
r" and recognized the difficulty of 
ng out this process but concluded 
.dditional cases should also be 
ved. The panel noted that among 
:nied Khmer are some with family 
i the United States for whom it 

be especially desirable to assure 
here has been a full review, 
has been the INS's judgment, in 

we have concurred, that the 
v of the 631 cases effectively com- 
I the special review process. The 
were selected with an eye to those 
ppeared most likely to benefit 
review, including those with family 
i the United States. 



Family Card Holders 

Another group at Khao I Dang— the 
4,300 so-called family card holders who 
entered the camp between 1980 and 
1984— has just become available for 
resettlement processing, and the United 
States will soon commence processing in 
priorities one through five. We are not 
planning to process those who entered 
the camp illegally after August 
1984— the so-called ration card holders 
who are regarded by the Thai and the 
international community as essentially in 
the same status as the Khmer on the 
border. 

At a June 13 meeting in Bangkok, 
the Thai authorities stated their ulti- 
mate intention to close Khao I Dang and 
to move those remaining there to a loca- 
tion of their choice along the border. We 
have reminded the Thai of our interest 
in the family card holders, as well as 
those who will benefit from immigrant 
visa processing. The planned relocation 
of these groups is, of course, the re- 
sponsibility of the Thai, but we have 
requested that they keep the camp open 
until all governments have had an 
opportunity to complete their processing 
and the UNHCR has had an opportu- 
nity to determine whether other forms 
of durable solutions should be consid- 
ered. The UN High Commissioner will 
visit Southeast Asia in September, and 
this is one of the subjects he will ad- 
dress. Thai officials agreed at the 
June 13 meeting to meet again later in 
the year to review the status of Khao I 
Dang with UNHCR and the major 
resettlement governments. 

Lao in Thailand 

Both this committee's report and that of 
the Ray panel deal extensively with the 
situation of Lao refugees in Thailand, 
particularly the screening program that 
has been instituted by the Thai authori- 
ties with the participation of the 
UNHCR to determine which of the 
newly arriving Lao qualify for refugee 
status and which should be returned to 
Laos as illegal immigrants. 

Essential to this program has been 
the Lao Government's agreement to 
accept back those screened out. Despite 
an earlier agreement in principle be- 
tween the Lao and Thai Governments, 
thus far, none of the approximately 
1,000 persons have been permitted by- 
Laos to return home. We are supporting 
the UNHCR's efforts to work with the 
Lao authorities to assure their safe and 
orderly return. 

On the positive side, the screening 
program has acted to reduce the num- 



ber of new Lao arrivals in Thailand. 
Since it started in July 1985, 3,900 Lao 
have arrived in Thailand, as opposed to 
16,000 during the comparable period in 
the preceding year. Almost half of the 
arrivals since July 1985 have been 
granted temporary asylum by Thailand 
and are currently in UNHCR camps. 



U.S. Admissions Policy 

On the general subject of Indochinese 
refugee admissions to the United States, 
the Ray panel's recommendations point 
in the same direction as your report a 
year earlier. The panel concludes that 
the Indochinese program should have 
two components: 

• A continuing refugee program for 
those who meet the legal definition of 
refugees; and 

• An effective immigration program 
for those seeking admission to the 
United States on the basis of family 
ties. 

Such a shift toward immigration 
processing was endorsed in Secretary 
Shultz's statement to this committee 
last September, and it is now under 
careful review by the interagency study 
group to which I referred earlier. The 
Ray panel suggested a number of steps 
to be considered in a transition period. 
There appears to be wide recognition 
that the time is at hand for such a shift 
of emphasis in our admissions programs. 

Essential to this recommendation is 
the recognition that many of the 800,000 
Indochinese now in the United States 
are or will soon be eligible, if they pro- 
ceed with adjusting their status, to peti- 
tion on behalf of relatives for admission 
as immigrants. The panel endorsed the 
suggestion, which also finds favor in 
your report, that the private voluntary 
agencies should continue to play a key 
role in aiding these groups, regardless 
of their method of admission to the 
United States. 



Budget Situation and 
FY 1986 Admissions 

In recent months, all parts of the execu- 
tive branch have been undertaking pro- 
gram reductions necessary to conform to 
the requirements of the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings legislation. In our 
case, in addition to applying the across- 
the-board reductions, we have had to 
consider additional shifts in our limited 
funds to meet critical refugee assistance 
needs overseas. 



!er 1986 



51 



REFUGEES 



Life-sustaining care and maintenance 
requirements are expanding n>r refugees 

in Africa, the Aghans in Pakistan, the 
Cambodians on the Thai-Cambodian 
border, and for other groups in South- 
east Asia and elsewhere. These acceler- 
ating needs cannot be met out of the 
funds originally budgeted for this pur- 
pose, even before the Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings reductions. In order to meet 
t hese highest priority needs, therefore, 
we have no alternative but to apply 
even greater cuts in proposed funding 
for FY 1986 admissions— and, thus, in 
the numbers to be admitted— beyond 
those mandated by the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985. 

Revised FY 1986 Admissions 

For FY 1986, we can foresee that we 
will be unable to utilize fully the 67,000 
admissions ceilings announced by the 
President. Instead, we expect refugee 
admissions at about the 61,000 level. 

The following chart shows the 
regional ceilings established for this 
year and the projected number of admis- 
sions that we expect to be able to fund 
out of our budget after the shifts and 
reductions described above. 



Department's 1986 refugee program has, 
as we expected, proven inadequate to 
meet the serious refugee needs the in- 
ternational community is addressing 
throughout the world. The impact of 
these reductions is magnified when one 
considers that up to a quarter of our 
budget is protected from reductions 
through statutory earmarking imposed 
by authorizations and appropriations 
actions. 

Therefore, because of the unavoida- 
ble and critical need to meet serious 
care and maintenance requirements of 
refugees in Africa and Southeast Asia, 
which exceed current budget availabili- 
ties, we have proposed to reprogram 
$9.2 million from the U.S. admissions 
program. This will result in the ability 
to fund only 61,000 new admissions. We 
regret this action but believe we have 
no alternative, given the urgent needs 
overseas and our reduced ability to 
meet them. Highest priority will have to 
be given to life-preserving programs. 

Funding for FY 1987 programs 
could become even more limited, espe- 
cially if the major reductions proposed 
in either the House or Senate overall 
budget resolutions are enacted into law. 
As you will recall, the Administration's 



FY 1986 Regional Admissions Ceilings 



East Asia— First Asylum 

East Asia-ODP 

Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. 

Near East and South Asia 

Latin America 

Africa 

Total 



FY 1986 
Ceiling 

37,000 
8,500 
9,500 
6,000 
3,000 
3,000 

67,000 



Revised 

Admission 

Levels 

35,000 

8,500 

9,500 

6,000 

250 

1,750 



61,000 



We have substantially reduced the 
projected Latin American numbers be- 
cause the Government of Cuba has not 
resumed implementation of the Migra- 
tion Agreement with the United States 
signed in December 1984. The lower 
African admissions result from a 
moratorium on refugee movements insti- 
tuted by the Government of Sudan. We 
have been forced to reduce expected ad- 
missions from East Asia/First Asylum 
by 2,000 in order to free additional 
resources for basic refugee assistance 
requirements, particularly in Africa. 

The post-Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
budget of $324 million for the State 



1987 budget request of $22.6 billion for 
the international affairs budget function 
has been reduced to $17.9 billion and 
$17 billion by the Senate and House 
respectively. What these actions will 
mean specifically for the refugee pro- 
gram request of $347 million is, at this 
time, uncertain, but it is likely to be 
substantial. Given that these funds aid 
almost 10 million refugees throughout 
the world, cutbacks of the magnitude 
now being discussed would have serious 
implications for the well-being of these 
vulnerable people. We urge the support 
of this committee in assuring that ade- 
quate funds are provided for these 



vitally important humanitarian 
programs. 

First Half FY 1986 Admissions 

For the committee's information, I ar 
also providing the status of actual 
admissions to the United States as of 
April 30, 1986: 

East Asia— First Asylum 21 

East Asia-ODP 4. 

Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. 5. 
Near East and South Asia 
Latin America 
Africa 



Total 



:!.-> 



Drawing on refugees already in t\ 
refugee processing centers, projected 
Indochinese admissions for the re- 
mainder of the fiscal year are expeeti 
to be close to the proposed reduced 
level of 35,000. Admissions under the 
Orderly Departure Program (ODP) ai 
likely to reach the 8,500 ceiling. 

Although admissions of refugees 
from the Soviet Union (primarily Sov 
Jews) continue to run disturbingly lc 
(511 as of the end of April), admissioi 
of other categories of refugees from 
Eastern Europe should bring us closi 
the 9,500 ceiling. 

In the Near East region, refugee.' 
are drawn primarily from Afghans 
(1,629 as of April 30) and Iranians (1,! 
for the same period), and total admis- 
sions for the year are expected to coi 
close to the 6,000 ceiling. 

From Latin America, as noted 
above, we have been disappointed in 
hope that the Cubans would terminat 
the suspension of the December 1984 ; 
Migration Agreement. Admissions noi ( 
total 21 Cubans from other parts of 
Central America, and admissions for t| 
year may well stay below 100 persons. 

The shortfall from Africa, as I ha\| 
mentioned, is caused largely by sus- I 
pension of processing in Sudan. The | 
suspension resulted initially from the j 
government's moratorium on refugee | 
movements but has continued becausej 
the current security situation and the 
withdrawal of American personnel. If 
we are able to move the 950 already £ 
proved by INS in Sudan, we could stiij 
come close to the projected admission, 
of 1,750. 

Actual Admissions in FY 1985 

For comparison, actual refugee admis- 
sions in FY 1985 totaled 68,045 out of, 
ceiling of 70,000 [see chart]. 



52 



Department of State Bulle 



REFUGEES 



19S5 Refugee Admissions 



It Asia— First Asylum 

tAsia-ODP 

tern Europe and U.S.S.R. 

r East and South Asia 

n America 

ca 

AL 



Actual 
Admissions 

41,972 
7,998 
9,990 
5,994 
138 
1,953 

68,045 



Regional 
Ceilings 

42,000 
8,000 

10,000 
0,000 
1,000 
3,000 

70,000 



lgees in Africa 

budget shifts I have described have 
i driven, to a large extent, by the 
jased requirements for refugee as- 
mce in Africa. The African refugee 
ition is complex and dynamic. Many 
itries are concurrently generators of 
receivers of refugees; refugees may 
eturing home to some countries at 
same time as their compatriots are 
ng into refuge. 

fou will remember that, during late 
and 1985, the number of refugees 
frica in need of international as- 
nce grew from some 2 million to 
; 2.8 million. The dramatic increase 
principally caused by the coinci- 
e of drought and civil strife. The 
ively abundant rains this year may 
d an end to the natural disaster of 
ght but do not necessarily lead to a 
ion to Africa's refugee problems, 
example, Chadians who fled into 
in may have been seeking food 

!f aid as much as they were fleeing 
•avages of assorted bandits and 
'.1 enemies. Although rains have 
rned, renewed fighting in Chad's in- 
al war and the geopolitical interests 
ibya, Sudan, and Chad— among 
rs— conspire to keep many of those 
lians in Sudan and of concern to 
iCR. Elsewhere in Africa, the num- 
of refugees able to return to their 
2s have been offset by new refugee 
3. Therefore, the overall number of 
jees in Africa remains fairly con- 
t, though the composition of the to- 
* changing. 

i of Africa 

respect to the Horn of Africa, we 
nue to monitor closely the condi- 

which generate refugees. Two poli- 
of the Government of Ethiopia- 
rial resettlement and villagization— 
ar to have caused significant flows 
fugees into Sudan and Somalia. 



Resettlement is currently suspended, 
although the Ethiopian Government has 
announced that it will resume later in 
1986. We hope that any resumption will 
not be accompanied by the gross viola- 
tions of human rights previously asso- 
ciated with the program. 

Villagization, which is purported to 
improve services by organizing commu- 
nities into more easily assisted units, is 
an ongoing effort to relocate up to 
33 million rural peasants. As many as 
70,000 people have arrived in northwest 
Somalia during the past 6 months, claim- 
ing that they are fleeing the effects of 
villagization. 

There have been a number of 
problems with the assistance effort in 
northwest Somalia since the Govern- 
ment of Somalia has decided not to 
move these new refugees away from the 
border to a more suitable site. However, 
the office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees is organizing relief opera- 
tions, and conditions seem to be 
stabilizing. 

Of course, civil strife in northern 
Ethiopia is an ongoing cause of major 
refugee flows into Sudan. And the 
Oromo Liberation Front is engaged in 
activities in western and southern 
Ethiopia that contribute to flows to 
Somalia. 

Uganda 

Another refugee emergency "hot spot" 
which we are watching closely is south- 
ern Sudan and northern Uganda. War in 
southern Sudan has led to the collapse 
of traditional civil authorities. As a 
result, in early May, armed attacks 
were made on Ugandan refugee settle- 
ments. To date, some 60,000 Ugandan 
refugees have fled home to Uganda. 
Uganda is currently enjoying a period of 
relative stability and, so far, has been 
able to reintegrate these returning refu- 
gees with remarkable ease, despite 



rather widespread destruction in north- 
ern Uganda. Additional precipitous 
returns, however, could result in more 
serious problems for Uganda, since 
there are as many as 200,000 Ugandan 
refugees still in southern Sudan. 

Southern Africa 

There have not been the outflows from 
the Republic of South Africa that one 
might have expected, given the current 
violence there. Rather, South African 
Government pressures on countries of 
first asylum— including the recent raids 
in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe- 
have caused UNHCR to relocate refu- 
gees to safer places of asylum. Our 
government has strongly condemned 
those raids, and the Refugee Bureau has 
earmarked funds to help repair the refu- 
gee reception center in Zambia that was 
attacked. 

We are, of course, quite concerned 
about the potential for new refugees, in- 
cluding some who may simply be fleeing 
the widening violence rather than being 
associated with any of the banned 
organizations. We are continuing to 
work with our refugee officers in the 
neighboring countries to ensure that 
contingency planning is done by the 
relevant international organization 
whose mandates require it. 

If the number of South African refu- 
gees has not been growing dramatically, 
the number of Mozambican and Angolan 
refugees has. As many as 180,000 
Mozambican refugees have fled to South 
Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and 
Swaziland since 1984. Over 100,000 new 
Angolan refugees have entered Zaire 
and Zambia last year and this year. 

Refugee Aid and Development 

African host nations are developing 
countries with limited resources to pro- 
vide for their own citizens. We try to do 
our fair share of providing for the care 
and maintenance of African refugees 
through international organizations such 
as the UNHCR, ICRC, and WFP 
[World Food Program]. However, there 
is also a need to pursue more lasting 
solutions through integration of refugee 
and development aid. These medium- 
and long-term needs must not be forgot- 
ten in the process of responding to 
urgent lifesaving demands. 

■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



53 



SOUTH ASIA 



Visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister 



Prime Minister Mohammad Khan 
Junejo of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan made mi official visit to the 
United States July 986. While in 

Washington, B.C., July 15-18, he met 
with 1'resident Reagan and other govern- 
ment officials. 

Following is the text of the joint 
statement issued on July 18. 

At the invitation of the President 
of the United States of America, 
Ronald Reagan, the Prime Minister of 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
Mohammad Khan Junejo, paid an official 
visit to the United States from 
July 15-22, 1986. 

The Prime Minister held intensive 
and wide-ranging discussions with the 
President, with senior representatives of 
his Administration, and with Members of 
Congress on matters of mutual concern 
relating to the promotion of inter- 
national peace and security, political 
cooperation, and economic development. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister reviewed bilateral relations and 
found them warm, friendly, and 
mutually beneficial. They expressed 
satisfaction with existing cooperation 
and the hope that further progress 
would be made through the U.S.- 
Pakistan Joint Commission and the U.S.- 
Pakistan Consultative Group. Both sides 
welcomed the conclusion of the 
memorandum of understanding to 
facilitate transfer of technology to 
Pakistan and to ensure its protection. 
They noted with approval the discussions 
underway to revise the Convention on 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation. They 
agreed that private-sector investment 
missions should be encouraged, and in 
the field of education, they agreed on the 
despatch of an American team later this 
year to discuss cooperation aimed at 
improving the teaching of English in 
Pakistan. 

The President lauded the return of 
representative democracy to Pakistan, 
praising Prime Minister Junejo and 
President Zia-ul-Haq for the steps taken 
during the last year to end martial law 
and to restore to the Pakistan people the 
full liberties guaranteed by the 1973 
Constitution. The President and the 
Prime Minister agreed that democratic 
institutions will make an important con- 
tribution to Pakistan's continued stabil- 
ity and progress. 




Secretary Shultz greets Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo at Andrews Air Force I 
on July i5. 1986. 



The President underscored his 
strong personal commitment to arms 
control and to the prevention of the 
spread of nuclear weapons. The Prime 
Minister expressed his understanding 
and support of U.S. efforts to promote 
arms control and the nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister 
reitereated the peaceful nature of 
Pakistan's nuclear program. The two 
leaders agreed, moreover, that it is 
incumbent on each state in the region to 
ensure that its use of nuclear energy is 
strictly peaceful and to take concrete 
steps to demonstrate a shared commit- 
ment to nonproliferation. 



The Prime Minister and the PresL 
dent considered in depth the situatiori 
South and Southwest Asia. They note! 
with serious concern the grave consal 
quences for regional and international, 
peace and stability which flow from tip 
continuing Soviet occupation of and aw 
gression against Afghanistan. They a., 
demned the repeated attacks on 
Pakistan's territory from Afghanistan 
The President reaffirmed the U.S. coy 
mitment to nonaligned Pakistan's ind, 
pendence, security, and territorial 
integrity. 






54 



Department of State Bulk 



TERRORISM 



IBoth leaders agreed on the urgent 
id for a political settlement of the 
nanistan problem consistent with the 
:iples enunciated in the seven resolu- 
: adopted by overwhelming major- 
in the UN General Assembly. The 
ident expressed his strong support 
'akistan's sustained efforts to pro- 
] such a peaceful settlement of the 
al conflict imposed upon the Afghan 
»le. They expressed the hope that at 
xtrthcoming round of the Geneva 
'mity talks under the auspices of the 
onal representative of the UN 
etary General, the Kabul side will 
brward a short timetable for the 
drawal of Soviet troops from 
mnistan. 

The President expressed his admira- 
for Pakistan's courage in standing 
Soviet pressures through Afghani- 
and for its selfless provision of 
anitarian relief to the nearly 3 
3n Afghans who have fled to 
stan in the last 7 years. The two 
ts agreed on the importance of 
asing the availability of 
initarian assistance for the 
tless numbers of Afghans affected 
le war. The President recalled his 
it meeting with the courageous 
rs of the Afghan alliance. The two 
rs expressed the hope that the 
ce will play an increasing role in 
ering international support for the 
■ of Afghan freedom, 
he Prime Minister and the Presi- 
expressed satisfaction with the suc- 
il conclusion of negotiations earlier 
ear of a follow-on assistance 
tge for Pakistan in the sum of $4.02 
l over a 6-year period beginning 
year. The President stressed that 
nique multiyear program provides 
ble evidence of the durability and 
luity of the U.S. commitment to 
sfthen Pakistan's defensive 
'ilities in the face of Soviet 
ures from Afghanistan. U.S. 
mic assistance is intended also to 
ement Pakistan's own efforts to 
irthen its economy, 
he Prime Minister briefed the 
ient on discussions between the 
nments of Pakistan and India on 
ving relations between their two 
ries, a process strongly supported 
; United States. The President wel- 
1 the pledge made by the Govern- 
i of Pakistan and India not to 
: each other's nuclear installations 
{pressed the hope that these 
isions would continue to yield suc- 
The Prime Minister also pointed to 
initiatives supported by his 



government to expand regional coopera- 
tion among the nations of South Asia, 
highlighting the promising beginning 
last December of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). The President referred to his 
message to the South Asian leaders 
welcoming their establishment of 
SAARC and expressed his government's 
support for regional efforts, both under 
SAARC as well as bilaterally, to pro- 
mote peace and cooperation. 

The Prime Minister and the Presi- 
dent expressed deep concern at the 
growing threat posed by international 
narcotics trafficking to the very fabric of 
society in every part of the world. They 
discussed measures to halt the produc-' 
tion of opium and other dangerous drugs 



at their source, to suppress processing 
facilities wherever they may be found, 
and to escalate the war against domestic 
and international traffickers. To this 
end, the two leaders agreed to 
strengthen their antinarcotics coopera- 
tion and to explore aerial spraying as a 
poppy eradication measure. 

The Prime Minister expressed his 
sincere gratitude to the President and 
the people of the United States for the 
generous assistance provided his country 
over the past 35 years and for the warm 
welcome accorded to him and his delega- 
tion. He extended a cordial invitation to 
the President to visit Pakistan. The 
President expressed his appreciation for 
the invitation and reiterated his desire to 
visit Pakistan at a convenient date. ■ 



Terrorism and Tourism 



by Robert B. Oakley 

Address before the Conference on the 
Future of Transatlantic Travel at the 
Plaza Hotel in New York City on 
July 23, 1986. Ambassador Oakley is 
Acting Ambassador at Large for 
Counter-Terrorism. 

It is a pleasure to be here today to 
discuss a very important issue to us 
both— terrorism and tourism. The two 
words unfortunately could be used for a 
tongue twister— they sound too much 
alike and get mixed up not only when 
one is talking too fast but sometimes in 
the popular perceptions. 

We're all probably sick of hearing of 
the "horror stories" about how the fear 
of terrorism has sharply hurt tourism in 
many parts of the world. I'm sure these 
stories cause a sinking feeling in the 
stomachs of those who are in the tourism 
business, especially dealing with travel 
to Europe. I won't try going into detail 
on how bad that picture is— you have the 
figures. We do not. But it might be 
useful to first sketch out the broad pic- 
ture of the actual terrorism situation- 
including the figures we do have— and 
then discuss what the use is trying to do 
about it and how we can work together. 

Facts and Figures on Terrorism 

It seems that almost every day there is 
some new reminder of terrorism on our 
televisions or on the front pages of our 
newspapers. Some of it is good news and 



bad news. An Italian court recently con- 
victed the hijackers of the Achille Lauro 
but there is a strong feeling that the 
sentence was not long enough for some 
of them. There have been several recent 
major terrorist acts in Europe, but 
because Americans were not involved 
they got only fleeting attention from the 
American media. 

Over the past 2 years there has been 
a major surge in terrorism abroad, both 
internal (for example: within Lebanon, 
India, Sri Lanka, Peru, Colombia, and 
Chile) and international incidents. The 
latter rose from the 500 per year 
average for 1979-83 to 600 in 1984 and 
about 800 in 1985. This upward trend 
continued during the first several 
months this year. Preliminary tallies 
indicate there were about 417 interna- 
tional terrorist incidents for January- 
June 1986, compared with 352 for the 
same period of 1985. 

The increase since mid-1984 has 
come from the Middle East and Latin 
America. For 1984 there were only 81 
incidents recorded in Latin America, 
with 132 for 1985 and 65 for the first 
half of 1986. There were 109 incidents 
during 1983 in the Middle East, 206 dur- 
ing 1984, 378 during 1985 (plus about 75 
conducted by Middle East terrorists in 
Europe), and 165 during the first half of 
this year in the Middle East (plus about 
26 conducted in Europe). Since April, 
Qadhafi-directed terrorism has been 
quiescent in the aftermath of U.S. 
military raids and the ensuing Libyan 
disarray and the European crackdown in 
which more than 100 Libyan so-called 



tier 1986 



55 



TERRORISM 



diplomats and businessmen have been 
expelled; Syria and Iran appear to be in 

ious mode. However, several 
Palestinian splinter groups have been 
active and could get even more active in 
Europe. And during the past 2 weeks, 
leftwing European groups have once 
again resumed their operations. Thus it 
seems probable that terrorist activity in 
Europe will not diminish during the last 
half of the year, although it may not be 
directed so much against Americans. 

In Latin America, the most intensive 
area of recent activity has been Peru, 
followed by Colombia and Central 
America. Two American tourists 
recently were killed during a terrorist 
attack in Peru, although it received little 
public attention. Cooperation between 
narcotics traffickers and terrorists is a 
growing problem. The United States and 
the U.S.S.R. rank just behind the 
Government of Peru as targets there, 
and resident Americans are choice 
targets elsewhere in Latin America. 

Although for the past decade U.S. 
citizens and installations abroad have 
been the number one terrorist target 
(aside, of course, from Israel), it is a 
mistake to believe that we are the prin- 
cipal target of foreign terrorists. Despite 
the impression received from sensa- 
tionalist, ethnocentric media coverage, 
the percentage of attacks against 
Americans has actually decreased over 
the past 3 years from 40% to 25%. The 
2,200 terrorist casualties last year— up 
from 1,300 in 1984-and the nearly 800 
incidents were spread among citizens 
and facilities of some 90 countries. Of 
the 877 men, women, and children who 
were killed last year, 28 were Americans 
and 28 were Israelis. The impression 
that the terrorists— especially Middle 
East terrorists— are waiting in Europe 
to pounce primarily upon Americans is 
just not true. Among the various targets 
of Middle East terrorists operating in 
Europe— the region in which you are most 
concerned— Americans have been the 
targets of fewer incidents than anyone 
else. The biggest target has been 
Palestinians and other Arabs. In the past 
year and a half, from January 1985 
through June 1986, there were about 
100 terrorist attacks in Europe attri- 
buted to Middle Eastern groups. Arabs 
and Palestinians were the victims of 49% 
of the attacks, down from 65% for the 
preceding 5 years. The percentage of 
attacks against Israeli and Jewish 
citizens remained virtually the same at 
15%. The percentage of attacks against 
Western Europeans and Americans 
doubled— 26% for the Western 
Europeans; 10% of the Americans. But 



for Americans, that worked out to only 
10 incidents over the past 18 months. 
Any death from terrorism is one too 
many, and terrorism is designed for the 
maximum shock effect upon public and 
political opinion— we do not and should 
not accept them as a part of the modern 
world the way we do car accidents. 
However, we should keep the number of 
incidents in perspective as well as the 
perpetrators, intent to shock. We must 
take the proper precautions but not 
allow ourselves to fall into their trap and 
react thoughtlessly. The chances of 
being unexpectedly killed in a car or 
plane crash or in a criminal attack are 
much higher than being in the wrong 
place at the wrong time when a terrorist 
group manages to make an attack. 

Resolving the Decline in Tourism 

While it's easy to hit on the fear of ter- 
rorism as the culprit in the decline in 
European tourism, and it is an important 
factor, we believe a combination of fac- 
tors are involved: terrorism, the weaken- 
ing of the U.S. dollar in many countries, 
attractive travel packages plus falling 
gasoline prices for those who stay at 
home, and the competition of other coun- 
tries and regions of the world. But the 
perception among Americans and the 
Europeans that it was terrorism did 
have major and unprecedented 
economic, political, and security conse- 
quences in Western Europe and the 
Mediterranean where hundreds of 
millions of dollars have been lost by the 
LInited Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Israel, 
Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries. 

Other governments, as well as some 
in the travel and terrorist industry, have 
blamed the Reagan Administration as 
somehow being responsible for the 
problems— as if the President created 
terrorism, or dictated the type of media 
coverage, or should not have spoken 
publicly of a serious threat to this coun- 
try and its citizens, or should not have 
taken action to try and stop terrorism 
and protect our citizens. This totally 
unfair criticism misses the entire point 
of the Administration's policies and pro- 
grams for countering terrorism. 

We have been working with other 
governments for several years— and 
more intensively as terrorism has 
increased— to try and deal with what is 
obviously a common problem. We urged 
them to place tighter controls upon the 
movements of suspected terrorists, to 
improve security at their ports and air- 
ports, and increase intelligence 
exchanges on terrorist threats. We 



offered them assistance for these pur 
poses. Indeed, we have a very useful 
antiterrorism training assistance pro- 
gram which helps train security offici 
from friendly countries. We also urge 
them to join us in applying pressure t 
states who support terrorism. Unfor- 
tunately, our warnings, our advice, ai 
our offers of help generally fell upon 
deaf ears or were resented as an intn 
sion, as improper pressure. This attiti 
prevailed for most governments until 
terrorists struck so close to home anc 
the problem for the country or counti 
concerned became too great to ignore 

For example, over the years ther 
had been lengthy discussions with tht 
Greek authorities about the security 
problem at Athens airport. ICAO [Inl 
nation Civil Aviation Organization] ai 
FAA [Federal Aviation Administratk 
teams repeatedly had visited the airp 
to discuss the need and ways to 
strengthen security procedures. In 
February 1985, the Greek and U.S. 
experts agreed upon a number of 
specific measures to be taken at Atht 
airport. But nothing happened— until 
after the TWA hijacking in June, the 
U.S. Government issuance of a trave 
advisory, and a sharp fall in tourism I 
Greece. The Greek authorities then tt 
the previously promised actions. Afte 
inspecting the improved situation, we 
then rescinded the travel advisory. 
Athens airport today has good securi 
The TWA #847 hijacking, and other t 
rorist attacks also prompted various 
governments to tighten up a bit, but 
there were still lots of loopholes, as 
dramatically illustrated in the attacks 
Rome and Vienna airports in Decemb 
and the hijacking of an Egyptian airli 
These highly publicized incidents, plui 
Qadhafi's public threats to attack 
Americans, caused additional Americf 
tourists to cancel plans for visiting 
Europe, and it began to take on a 
snowball effect. 

Let me say a word here about tra 
advisories. It should be pointed out th 
the State Department has not issued I 
travel advisories against traveling to I 
Western Europe because of terrorismi 
We have been questioned on this, pari 
ticularly by Congress, and I think it ' 
might be worth sharing the same expi r 
ation we have provided to Congress, f 
Travel advisories are issued from tim<> 
time by the State Department's Offici' 
Overseas Citizens Services which alsoi 
handles hundreds of phone calls a dav' 
about whether it is safe to visit countr 
XorZ. 

The majority of advisories refer td 
temporary conditions unrelated to 



56 



Department of State Bull' 1 ': 



TERRORISM 



sical safety, such as health-related 
;ters, changes in customs, visa and 
rency requirements, or warnings 
at penalities for blackmarket or nar- 
cs activities. Relatively few travel 
isories are used for security reasons, 
i as crime, civil unrest, or warfare. 
Security-related advisories usually 
ect a trend or pattern of violence not 
/iously experienced in the area. Thus, 
ited international terrorist attacks, 
h can and do occur virtually any- 
re, do not trigger travel advisories, 
exception would be a country whose 
rnment consistently failed to pro- 
reasonable security. Travel advi- 
s are not issued for political reasons, 
are issued only after careful coor- 
tion with our diplomatic mission in 
iffected country and various U.S. 
rnment agencies. While travel 
sories have the primary purpose of 
ing the public to adverse conditions, 
may also have the effect of helping 
e a government to change those 
itions. 

The advisories can be obtained from 
>nal passport offices or the Citizens 
rgency Center in the State Depart- 
;. The Consular Affairs Bureau also 
>s a number of pamphlets available 
le public on tips to travelers and 
ltly issued one on security tips. 

Approach to Travel and Security 

Department has consistently tried to 
a nonalarmist approach to the ques- 
: yf travel safety. We take oppor- 
ies such as this one to emphasize 
there are no security-related advi- 
s for any of the European countries. 
Ve believe in tourism— it is good for 
idividuals and for the host coun- 
We do not like to see the adverse 
ct of tourism overreaction on our 
ds overseas. We have been in con- 
tfith the U.S. travel industry's 
p which is trying to deal with the 
em. We are pleased to see these 
by the industry, and we are ready 
ovide information and assistance. 
Ve also have been providing 
fance to other U.S. businessmen 
gh the Overseas Security Advisory 
cil which was established last year 
p provide information, guidance, 
riefings to American firms 
ting abroad. And, of course, we 
been working with the airline 
try, and since the Ackille Lauro 
;ing, the maritime industry, to help 
>ve security. A major effort, in 
ership with Congress, has been 
to improve airline and cruiseline 



security. Two major avenues are the In- 
ternational Civil Aviation Organization 
and the International Maritime 
Organization which have been develop- 
ing tightened international standards. 

Many of the suggestions for 
improved security standards predate the 
rash of spectacular terrorism attacks 
last year. However only after Qadhafi's 
attempt to conduct a widespread mass- 
casualty terrorist campaign against the 
United States and our actions against 
Libya in self-defense did many European 
governments respond to the need for 
firm, concerted action such as we had 
been promoting. 

International Cooperation 

These measures and other collective 
measures are important because fighting 
terrorism has to be an international 
effort. The responsibility for security 
and protection of the airports used by 
local citizens and visitors lies with the 
host country. We cannot patrol every 
airport and street used by American 
tourists. We cannot unilaterally decide 
to send in rescue teams into any airport 
in the world regardless of the attitudes 
of the local government. We cannot 
literally be the policemen of the world. 

Thus it is crucial that the nations of 
the world cooperate in the international 
terrorism effort. The past months have 
seen important progress in this direc- 
tion. For example, the foreign ministers 
of the 12 European Community (EC) 
countries on April 21 agreed to reduce 
the size of the Libyan People's Bureaus 
and increase cooperation among law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
They also agreed to impose tight con- 
trols upon the entry and movement of all 
Libyans, including diplomats and other 
government officials. On May 5 in 
Tokyo, the leaders of the seven govern- 
ments of the economic summit countries 
agreed to a series of actions to be taken 
against international terrorism and 
states that support it, again identifying 
Libya. In addition to reiterating and 
strengthening the actions agreed to by 
the EC, the Tokyo statement called for 
improved extradition procedures, 
strengthening the Bonn declaration on 
civil aviation security, and greater inter- 
national cooperation generally, including 
use of the United Nations. 

In fighting terrorism effectively, we 
must keep the momentum going both 
unilaterally and multilaterally. At the 
same time, we must not exaggerate the 
threat nor allow ourselves to be intimi- 
dated by it. Nothing encourages ter- 
rorists more than seeing that they have 



succeeded in panicking public or political 
opinion, which is a paramount objective. 

Therefore, it is important for groups 
such as the travel industry to work 
together. The work and messages need 
to be more than public relations and 
advertising. Yes, it is important to try to 
put the terrorist situation in perspective 
and help people understand they should 
not be frightened from important 
cultural experiences by exaggerated 
fears. Of course, I may be preaching to 
the brave— you who have braved the 
perils of New York, a city that many 
Europeans are frightened to visit. 

Your activities and message should 
not only be aimed at Americans, telling 
them it is OK to "come home" to 
Europe. It is necessary to also make it 
clear to European colleagues that adver- 
tisements and cosmetics are not enough, 
and that we shouldn't relax because of 
what may be a temporary lull in Libyan 
and particularly state-supported ter- 
rorism. Governments and businessmen 
in Europe need to understand that 
whatever money they may save or make 
from buying Libyan oil or selling spare 
parts to that country is far outweighed 
by the losses in tourist dollars, security 
expenses, and hesitant investors. 

A complete end to terrorism may be 
impossible. There are too many different 
groups and too many grievances to 
satisfy all of their so-called root causes. 
But a great deal of terrorism can be con- 
tained and limited by strong action. And 
many potential tourists would be 
reassured if they were convinced that 
other governments were taking all the 
effective actions possible, not cutting 
corners or trying to make deals with 
terrorists. 

Nor can we let the terrorists feel 
that they are succeeding in creating ten- 
sions within the Western alliance and to 
believe that they can be successful over 
time in creating an isolationist mentality 
in this country which will erode our 
important economic, strategic, and 
political interests abroad. Such a feeling 
would only encourage more attacks upon 
Americans as well as damage our 
broader interests. 

In summation, we must take a cool, 
calm, and cooperative as well as deter- 
mined approach in fighting terrorism. 
The terrorists must not be allowed to get 
the best of us. Progress has been made 
and more will be, but fighting terrorism 
is a long-term effort for all of us, those 
in business, those in the U.S. Govern- 
ment, and those in other governments. 
We have started working together 
through a variety of informal contacts. I 
hope we can continue. ■ 



57 



UNITED NATIONS 



Antiterrorism Act 
Signed into Law 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
AUG. 27, 1986 1 

I have signed into law H.R. 4151, the 
"( imnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti- 
terrorism Act of 1986." This marks yet 
another step forward in our bipartisan 
effort to eradicate international ter- 
rorism. I would like to recognize the 
valuable contributions to this legislation 
by the Vice President and his task force 
on combatting terrorism; Secretary 
Shultz and Admiral Inman and their 
panel on diplomatic security; and the 
work of Senator Richard Lugar and 
Representatives Dante Fascell, Rill 
Broomfield, Dan Mica, and Olympia 
Snowe, as well as many other 
distinguished Members of the Congress, 
for bringing the various parts of this act 
together. This is truly a bipartisan piece 
of work. 

This act once again puts those who 
would instigate acts of terrorism against 
U.S. citizens or property on notice that 
we will not be deterred from carrying 
out our obligations throughout the 
world. I am committed to ensuring the 
safety of our diplomats, servicemen, and 
citizens wherever they may be. This 
historic act provides the organization 
and authorities necessary to implement 
the recommendations of the Advisory 
Panel on Overseas Security. It also 
establishes within the Department of 
State a new Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security and a diplomatic security serv- 
ice to increase the professionalism and 
effectiveness of our security personnel. 

Another important piece of this act 
that I am particularly pleased to have 
supported is the victims of terrorism 
assistance program. This, for the first 
time, will provide for the care and 
welfare of the victims of terrorism and 
their families. 

At the same time, I continue to urge 
cooperation with all nations, on both a 
bilateral and multilateral basis, to seek 
ways to work together to end the contin- 
uing onslaught of international terrorism 
against civilized society. Seeking inter- 
national cooperation is vital in the strug- 
gle against terrorism, and that effort 
will remain a top foreign policy priority 
for me. Within the government, coopera- 
tion and coordination among all depart- 
ments and agencies is also essential in 
protecting our vital national security 
interests from the terrorist threat. 



We can never legislate an end to ter- 
rorism. However, we must remain 
resolute in our commitment to confront 
this criminal behavior in every way— 
diplomatically, economically, legally, 
and, when necessary, militarily. First- 
rate intelligence remains the key 
element in each of these areas. We will 
continue to improve our ability to 
predict, prevent, and respond to threats 



of terrorism with an expanded intelli- 
gence-gathering capability. We will c< 
tinue to work with the Congress to id 
tify legislative gaps in our ability to c 
bat terrorism. This act adds to our 
capabilities and further demonstrates 
our resolve. I congratulate those 
responsible for this historic act. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 1, 1986. I 



Nicaragua's Role 

in Revolutionary Internationalism 



by Vernon A. Walters 

Statement before the UN Security 
Council on July 1. 1986. Ambassador 
Walters is U.S. Permanent Represent- 
ative to the United Nations. ' 

Before addressing the specific reasons 
for this present Security Council 
meeting, I feel it imperative to point out 
that this is the 11th time the Sandinista 
regime has come to this Council to lay 
out a, by now, standard litany of 
complaints. 

Nicaragua seeks yet again to divert 
the Council's attention away from 
Nicaragua's own behavior in the region. 
It is about time we ceased being fooled 
by Sandinista propaganda; it is about 
time we recognized that it is Nicaragua's 
aggression which is the source of the 
conflict in Central America. 

The members of this Council should, 
by now, be familiar with the facts con- 
cerning Nicaraguan aggression. The 
United States has provided abundant- 
overwhelming— evidence of Nicaragua's 
misdeeds. It is, nonetheless, evident that 
the Sandinistas remain consummately 
skilled in obscuring their odious record 
of subversion, aggression, and armed 
attack. 

Nicaragua has stated in the most 
solemn terms that "it has never supplied 
arms or other material assistance to 
insurgents in El Salvador or sanctioned 
the use of its territory for such purpose, 
it has never permitted Salvadoran 
insurgents to establish a headquarters or 
operations base or command and control 
facility in Nicaraguan territory and has 
never permitted its territory to be used 
for training of Salvadoran insurgents." 
Nicaragua has made similar statements 
not only at the International Court of 
Justice but in innumerable other fora as 
well. There can be no pretense that this 



categorical assertion is a slip of the 
tongue or an ill-considered, ill-inform 
or unauthoritative statement. And ye 
was— and is— entirely false. 

An essential element of Nicaragu 
foreign policy from the very beginnin 
has been its continuing support of 
subversion in Latin America. This su 
port has been active, deliberate, subs 
tial, and sustained. At a meeting for 
party activists barely 2 months after 
coming to power, the Sandinista lead 
ship committed itself to support for 
revolutionary struggle beyond its 
borders. Later that year, as recounte 
by former commanders of the 
Salvadoran FMLN [Farabundo Marti 
National Liberation Front], the San- 
dinistas established facilities and sites 
within Nicaragua for use in training 
guerrillas from other Central Americi 
countries. 



Sandinista Aggression 
in El Salvador 

The principal target of Sandinista 
aggression has been El Salvador. 
Nicaragua has since 1979 provided 
massive support to the guerrillas seekl 
to overthrow that country's governmt 1 - 
That support has included training; 
command-and-control headquarters ar i 
advice; and weapons, ammunition, ani' 
other vital supplies. Nicaragua has 
served as a rear-area sanctuary for tbf 
guerrillas and headquarters for their F 1 
political arm. The interaction of the 
Sandinista leadership with that of the' 
FMLN and FDR [Revolutionary 
Democratic Front] has been constant 
and intimate. Nicaragua has publicly \ 
identified itself with the goals and 
methods of the Salvadoran guerrillas. ' 
The evidence of this activity is rea' 
varied, and massive. Documents cap- | 
tured in El Salvador establish the key 



58 



Department of State Bulk 



UNITED NATIONS 



araguan role in unifying, supplying. 

sustaining the FMLN. That role was 
:ial in 1980-81, as shown in the 
iments published by the United 
tes in February 1981. Documents 
tured from FMLN commander Nidia 
2 in April 1985 made clear that the 
ire of Nicaragua's support for the 
Is had remained substantial. Aerial 
tography, released by the United 
,es, shows the very airfield from 
;h many of those supplies were 
n. 

Guerrilla commanders captured or 
cting from 1981 to the present day 

one after another, described in 
pelling detail the dependence of the 
adoran guerrillas on Nicaraguan- 
ilied weapons and supplies, on 
haven in that country, on com- 
ications and command services from 
ragua, and on training conducted in 
tcilitated by Nicaragua. The deaths 
vo top guerrilla leaders in Managua 
>83— and the attendance of top 
finista leaders at their funerals— 
rscored that the FMLN leadership 
>perated out of Managua with the 

ollaboration of the Sandinistas. 
Veapons captured from, or remain- 
i, guerrilla hands have been traced 
igh official U.S. shipping and pro- 
on records from Vietnam through 
i-agua to the rebels. The elaborate 
Tgling network developed by the 

inistas is attested to by such irrefut- 
physical evidence as the large 

r truck crammed with weapons and 
unition captured by Honduran 
)rities en route from Nicaragua to 
ilvador in 1981. This pattern contin- 
Several months ago a Lada automo- 
« the same Nicaragua-El Salvador 

crashed and was found to contain 

ons, ammunition, demolitions and 

ographic equipment, and letters to 
Halvadoran guerrilla leadership, 
[finally, there are the confessions of 
!|andinistas themselves. They have 
Iveral occasions stated their capac- 
\\ halt the aid being given to the 
IN. At the International Court, one 
I ruling comandantes has sworn that 
kvernment "never" had a policy of 
■ng arms to Salvadoran guerrillas— 
I presenting an affidavit that it had 
lone precisely that "in a good long 
i 

jnd yet, Nicaragua would have us, 
rie world, believe that none of this 
Ince exists. Nicaragua would like us, 
Id, to pitch all this evidence out the 
kw and take its flat, unsupported 
jthat "in truth, [it] is not engaged, 



and has not been engaged in, the provi- 
sion of arms or other supplies" to the 
guerrillas in El Salvador. Nicaragua 
would have us disregard the tens of 
thousands of dead, the hundreds of mil- 
lions of dollars in economic damage, the 
immense human misery it has imposed 
on El Salvador, and take its word that it 
has not attacked El Salvador. 

Other Subversion Targets 

But let us not stop our examination with 
El Salvador. Others as well have suf- 
fered from "revolutionary interna- 
tionalism." Honduras has been the 
target of attempted subversion. Twice, 
in 1983 and 1984, the Sandinistas sought 
to infiltrate groups into Honduras to 
initiate a guerrilla war against the 
government of that country. A large 
number of these guerrillas were cap- 
tured and attested to Nicaragua's role in 
their training, direction, and infiltration 
across the border. In 1985, members of 
the Nicaraguan intelligence services 
were captured inside Honduras and con- 
fessed their involvement in conveying 
arms to subversive groups in Honduras. 

As documented in detail by a Costa 
Rican legislative commission, the 
Sandinistas— while conducting their cam- 
paign against Somoza, and later when 
they began to provide material support to 
the Salvadoran rebels— also established 
and maintained a clandestine arms sup- 
ply network in Costa Rica. Sandinista- 
supported terrorists conducted a series 
of attacks in Costa Rica between 1981 
and 1985, and agents of Nicaragua have 
attempted or conducted a number of 
assassinations in that country. Farther 
afield, Nicaraguan support for the M-19 
was revealed by tracing the serial 
numbers of weapons captured after the 
bloody attack on the Palace of Justice in 
Bogota, Colombia. 

While its preferred method is 
through secret support for subversion, 
since if caught it can hope to brazen its 
way out by lying, Nicaragua has not 
hesitated to apply direct, conventional 
military force. It has conducted literally 
hundreds of cross-border military incur- 
sions into Honduras, beginning 3 days 
after the July 19, 1979, takeover and 
culminating in March of this year, when 
some 1,500 Sandinista soldiers pene- 
trated 25 kilometers into Honduras and 
remained for a period of several days. In 
familiar form, officials of the Nicaraguan 
Government— including its permanent 
representative— initially denied that San- 
dinista troops had crossed the border at 
all. Ambassador Astorga went before 
the world's cameras and stated that the 



so-called invasion was a total falsehood. 
an invention of the Reagan Administra- 
tion. Only after undeniable evidence had 
surfaced did President Ortega 
acknowledge the incursion and some 150 
casualties, proving which country had 
lied. The Sandinista military has 
attacked into Costa Rica on many occa- 
sions, including one occasion last year 
when it killed two members of the Costa 
Rican Civil Guard and compelled Costa 
Rica to take the case to the OAS 
[Organization of American States]. 

The Militarization 

of Nicaragua's Society 

Nicaragua has been able to flagrantly 
violate its neighbors' borders because it 
has amassed the largest and most power- 
ful military force in the history of Cen- 
tral America. Those who considered the 
Somoza regime to present an image of 
unmatched military repression should 
take pause in realizing that the San- 
dinista armed forces, like their secret 
police, are some 10 times larger than 
those of Somoza at their height. And 
yet, Nicaragua has recently begun to 
assert an intention to expand its forces 
to 200,000 or 300,000 trained personnel. 
Not only are the Sandinista forces 
numerically the largest, but they have 
arms unmatched elsewhere in the 
region, including 340 tanks and armored 
vehicles, dozens of combat helicopters, 
and 70 long-range howitzers. These 
forces are made all the more effective by 
the presence of thousands of Cuban and 
other foreign advisers operating from 
the highest echelons of ministries to the 
battalion and even company level, 
including Cuban pilots flying combat 
missions. 

This massive military buildup has 
had the most profound impact on 
Nicaraguan society. And this impact has 
not been accidental: the militarization of 
Nicaraguan society has been a key goal 
from the beginning of Sandinista rule 
and has, as intended, contributed enor- 
mously to the ability of the regime to 
exercise comprehensive control over the 
society as a whole. Thus, long before 
even Nicaragua asserts there was any 
threat from contra* or any other source, 
the Sandinistas planned and executed an 
accelerating and major expansion of the 
Nicaraguan Armed Forces. The army, of 
course, is designated as the "Sandinista 
Popular Army" and great attention is 
paid to political indoctrination. These 
steps parallel those imposed over the 
past 7 years throughout the society as a 
whole. 



ier 1986 



59 



UNITED NATIONS 



This is not the occasion to rehearse 
the sail and predictable story of San- 
dinista repression, or to discuss at 
length— as so easily could be done— the 
betrayal of the high hopes of the 
Nicaraguan people. Sandinista claims to 
lit fend human rights have been shown to 
be as hollow as their claims to be living 
in peace with their neighbors. 
Nicaragua, a small country, now has 
more political prisoners than any coun- 
try in the hemisphere except Cuba and 
maintains a system of political tribunals 
outside the law which ensure that no one 
escapes "revolutionary justice." In 1982, 
the Sandinistas imposed a "temporary" 
state of emergency; 4 years later the 
Nicaraguan people are still deprived of 
the rights of free speech, assembly, and 
movement— to name only a few of the 
"basic human rights" promised in 1979 
and stolen by the Sandinista regime. It 
may be noted that by closing down La 
Prensa, Nicaragua has now become the 
single country in mainland Latin 
America entirely precluding opposition 
access to the media. Nicaragua today has 
nothing to do with the Nicaragua its 
people believed they were fighting for in 
1979, nor with the Nicaragua the San- 
dinistas promised both to the people of 
that country and to the inter-American 
community. 

The internal situation in Nicaragua, 
tragic in itself, is relevant to one other 
crucial element in the Central American 
picture. The repressive regime of the 
Sandinistas is directly responsible for 
the development and growth of the 
armed democratic resistance in 
Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance is fighting to restore the 
original objectives of the Nicaraguan 
revolution. Its 20,000 participants seek 
to establish a true democracy in which 
the people of Nicaragua are free to 
select their own leaders. They seek full 
respect for human rights and an eco- 
nomic system providing both for growth 
and for equitable distribution of wealth. 

The leaders of this resistance are the 
same men and women who fought 
against Somoza— and with the 
Sandinistas— 7 years ago. Like 
thousands of other Nicaraguans who 
believed in the revolution and once were 
allies of the Sandinistas, they did not 
take lightly their decision to join the 
resistance; they joined because they had 
been left no choice. The Sandinistas 
closed the avenues of meaningful 
political participation within Nicaragua 
and convinced them that change could 
come only through armed force. 

These, then, are the facts. Nicaragua 
has deliberately, as a matter of state 



policy and without provocation, con- 
ducted armed attacks on its neighbors. 
In the case of El Salvador, that attack, 
conducted through proxies, has lasted 
over 5 years at immense cost in lives and 
economic damage. The Sandinistas have 
sought to develop insurgencies in Hon- 
duras, and have both covertly and openly 
attacked both Honduras and Costa Rica. 
They have sought, through a massive 
military buildup, to intimidate both their 
neighbors and their own people. They 
have created a repressive state, the very 
nature of which is ominously unprece- 
dented in Central America. And in so 
doing, they have given rise to a move- 
ment involving tens of thousands of men 
and women fighting to restore 
Nicaragua to the ideals of the 1979 
revolution. 

U.S. Objectives and Assistance 

Is it surprising, in these circumstances, 
that the United States should have 
become involved in the response to the 
multifaceted threat to peace presented 
by Sandinista Nicaragua? U.S. policy 
toward Nicaragua has four broad 
objectives: 

• An end to Nicaraguan aggression, 
whether through support for guerrilla 
groups in neighboring countries or 
through conventional military attack; 

• Severance of Nicaraguan military 
and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet 
bloc; 

• Reduction of Nicaragua's military 
strength to levels that would restore 
military equilibrium to the region; and 

• Fulfillment of the original 
promises of democratic pluralism and 
respect for human and civil rights. 

It is our conviction that achievement 
of these goals would ensure the restora- 
tion of peace and a climate conducive to 
growth, democratic political develop- 
ment, and security in the region. These 
goals are entirely consistent with those 
of the other countries of the region and 
with multilateral diplomatic initiatives 
strongly endorsed by this body. While 
Nicaragua focuses on U.S. support, 
which it considers unjustified, for the 
democratic resistance, it is important to 
recall that the United States has pursued 
these benign and constructive goals 
through any number of peaceful means. 
Regrettably, those approaches have 
proven very largely unsuccessful in 
achieving changes in the Nicaraguan 
behavior that so concerns its neighbors 
and the United States. 

The United States initially provided 
substantial economic assistance to the 



Sandinista-dominated regime. We wer 
largely instrumental in the OAS actioi 
delegitimizing the Somoza regime and 
laying the groundwork for installation 
for the new junta. Later, when the Sa 
dinista role in the Salvadoran conflict 
became clear, we sought through a co> 
bination of private diplomatic contact' 
and suspension of assistance to convir 
Nicaragua to halt its subversion. Late 
still, economic measures and further 
diplomatic efforts were employed to t: 
to effect changes in Sandinista behavi 
Still, Nicaragua's posture was one of 
complete and sustained intransigence. 

It is perhaps worth underscoring 
that this "intransigence" is not quite 
what Nicaragua would like us to see il 
as— the plucky refusal of a small but 
proud nonaligned state to be bullied b 
brutish and overweening superpower. 
Rather, it was an adamant continuatii 
of entirely unprovoked and unwarran' 
policies of attempting to overthrow tr 
Salvadoran Government, of a rapid 
military buildup well beyond anything 
justifiable in internal or regional term 
of an embrace of the Cubans and 
Soviets, and of internal political repre 
sion raising the most profound doubts 
about the Sandinistas' readiness to 
observe their commitments of July 19 

It was long hoped that Nicaragua 
could be induced to modify one crucia 
element of its behavior— its penchant 
attacking its neighbors— by demon- 
strating that it could not hope to achii 
its goal of replacing their government 
with one more like its own. My goven 
ment provided substantial assistance 1 
the countries suffering from Sandinisl 
attentions. 

Nicaragua's neighbors have asked 
for assistance against Nicaraguan 
aggression, and the United States has 
responded. Those countries have 
repeatedly and publicly made clear th; 
they consider themselves to be the vie 
tims of aggression from Nicaragua, ar 
that they desire United States assistai 
in meeting both subversive attacks an* 
the conventional threat posed by the 
relatively immense Nicaraguan Armec 
Forces. 

The United States has provided o\ 
$2 billion in assistance to Central 
America since 1979. Three-quarters oi" 
this sum has come in the form of 
economic assistance; barely one-fourtl 
has been military assistance despite th 1 
enormous costs entailed in meeting th' 
covert attacks and conventional threal 
posed by Nicaragua. Regrettably, too 
great a proportion of this assistance • 
must be used, not for the development 
and human needs of those countries, b 



60 



Department of State Bulk- 



UNITED NATIONS 



jpair economic damage caused by the 
:y of the Nicaraguan-sponsored 
jN of deliberately destroying the 
adoran infrastructure. U.S. military 
economic assistance have con- 
ited to limiting the scale and impact 
le active warfare, especially in 
ador, and to increasing Nicaragua's 
hbors' security against the San- 
tas. There was every evidence, how- 
, as there is today, that the San- 
tas could and intended to continue 
aggressive policies indefinitely. 
r aced with the failure of all peaceful 
is, and the unacceptability of allow- 
*Iicaraguan subversion and aggres- 
to continue unchecked, the United 
;s began to provide limited support 
he democratic resistance forces 
,dy in the field. Supporting the 
tance is the most effective means of 
;ing pressure on the Sandinistas to 
fy those policies presenting a threat 
eir neighbors and to regional peace, 
"he United States is hopeful that the 
lination of failure in Nicaragua's 
y of aggression, the increasing costs 
iintaining its overblown military 
ilishment, a collapsing economy, 
ening popular discontent, and an 
asingly effective democratic 
ance will finally lead the San- 
tas to realize they have no alter- 
e but to engage in serious negotia- 
aimed at achieving both regional 
• and internal reconciliation, 
et me make clear that U.S. policy 
not seek the overthrow of the 
aguan Government, nor do we 
e that full achievement of our prin- 
|policy objectives in Nicaragua 

1 be incompatible with the Govern- 
of Nicaragua's own stated posi- 
Nicaragua has accepted the Con- 

}a Document of Objectives as the 
for negotiation and for a com- 
nsive and effective peace in the 
n. The United States, too, has made 

pantly clear that full and verifiable 
mentation of the Document of 

[tives would meet all our policy 
in Nicaragua and the region. Presi- 
Reagan essentially confirmed this 
on as recently as June 24. Indeed, 
irtually impossible to imagine any 
context in which peace could come 

| region. 

We believe that continued U.S. sup- 
or the resistance is essential to 

2 the Sandinista regime to enter 
leaningful negotiations. We regret 
his is so, but have too often been 
with Sandinista promises which 
rate when the immediate tactical 
for their issuance has disappeared, 
ot enough for Nicaragua to assert 



a readiness to sign an incomplete 
regional treaty; they must actually 
achieve and implement one. 

The history of Contadora is replete 
with occasions on which Nicaragua for 
tactical reasons took an apparently 
forthcoming position, only to reverse 
itself at a later moment. Indeed, their 
June 21 response to the latest draft 
agreement underscores their cynical 
attitude toward Contadora. While claim- 
ing to respond favorably to the draft, 
they in fact simply recycled old proposals 
which had been rejected by the other 
parties to the negotiations. Since the 
Central American democracies had 
already noted major deficiencies in the 
new draft, the Sandinistas' response can 
only be seen as a cost-free gambit aimed 
at influencing the vote on assistance for 
the democratic resistance. Still, we 
remain hopeful that Nicaragua will come 
to realize that this course of action is 
bankrupt and self-destructive, and that 
there are other, constructive roles it 
could be playing instead. 

The U.S. House of Representatives' 
approval of the request for further 
assistance for the resistance should give 
the Sandinistas good reason to negotiate 
seriously. That vote made clear that the 
United States is not going to weary of 
the fight against their aggression— is not 
going to let Nicaragua conduct its 
aggressive and repressive policies unchal- 
lenged. Nicaragua, as we have seen, 
plays fast and loose with the facts. This 
time, perhaps, it succeeded in deluding 
even itself about just how well it had 
deceived the Congress about its true 
nature and policies. 

Will Nicaragua Choose Peace? 

The United States seeks peace, security, 
democracy, and economic development 
throughout Central America. We believe 
that our actions are in compliance with 
international law and the highest ideals 



of the UN Charter. We are helping 
friends defend themselves against armed 
attack from Nicaragua and thus striking 
a blow against aggression. Our support 
for the Nicaraguan resistance is 
designed only to encourage Nicaragua to 
participate seriously and in good faith in 
the regional negotiations now under 
way. We remain prepared to resume a 
high-level bilateral dialogue with 
Nicaragua at the same time as it opens 
talks with the opposition. 

The question now is whether the 
Sandinistas truly want peace. Are they 
willing to negotiate seriously with their 
neighbors and their own people? Are 
they willing to halt their efforts to over- 
throw or intimidate their neighbors? Are 
they willing to fulfill their promises of 
July 1979? 

The fact remains that these choices, 
so crucial for peace in Central America, 
are for the Nicaraguans to make, not for 
the United States. We have not launched 
an unprovoked attack on El Salvador. 
We have not sustained for 5 years a war, 
bleeding El Salvador's people and 
economy white. We have not sought to 
destabilize or intimidate Nicaragua's 
unoffending neighbors. We have not 
inserted the East- West dimension by 
inviting in thousands of Cuban and 
Soviet-bloc "advisers." We have not con- 
ducted since 1979 an unprecedented and 
unnecessary military buildup. We have 
not established in Nicaragua an increas- 
ingly rigid and ideologically-controlled 
society wholly at variance with the 1979 
promises. And, finally, it is not our 
policies which have caused tens of 
thousands of Nicaraguans to fight to 
restore the democratic values in the 
name of which the 1979 revolution was 
fought. 

The crucial choices, then, are 
Nicaragua's. And we will be watching 
closely to see what choice they make. 



'USUN press release 76 of July 1, 1986. 



Report on UN Human Rights 
Commission Meeting 



by Richard Schifter 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Human Rights and International 
Organizations of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on June 25, 1986. 
Ambassador Schifter is Assistant 
Secretary for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs. 1 



I am grateful to you for giving me this 
opportunity to report to you on the pro- 
ceedings at the 1986 session of the UN 
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC). 
This was the sixth successive session 
that I attended and my fourth as head of 
the U.S. delegation. As the commission 
is, in its essence, a parliamentary body, 
you will, in the light of your own political 



61 



UNITED NATIONS 



experience, understand that the sixth 

m was much easier than the first. 
There are benefits derived from having 
learned the unwritten rules and customs 
and having developed personal friend- 
ships with one's colleagues. 

UNHKC Operations 

Before addressing myself to the events 
of the 1986 session of the UNHRC, let 
me offer a few general comments on the 
commission. There is, on one hand, the 
risk of approaching the commission with 
starry-eyed notions about what it can 
accomplish. These starry-eyed notions 
will be retained only if one is blind to 
reality. On the other hand, the hypocrisy 
so evident among a good number of com- 
mission members can easily drive one to 
give up all hope of doing anything useful 
at the commission. My recommendation 
is that we recognize the UN Human 
Rights Commission for what it is, 
another forum in which UN politics is 
played; and that we then, understanding 
all its limitations, use this forum as best 
we can to advance the cause of human 
rights. 

These limitations, under which the 
commission operates, become clear when 
we review the role of its 43 members. 
Though the membership changed over 
the course of the six sessions that I 
attended and though a number of 
member countries shifted during this 
period from dictatorial governments to 
democracies, at no time during these 
years was there a majority on the com- 
mission that would be rated "free" in 
the annual evaluation prepared by 
Freedom House. The challenge to us is 
to determine how, given the commission 
composition, we can most effectively 
function there to advance the very ideals 
for which this UN body was created. 

The delivery of thoughtful and per- 
suasive speeches is undoubtedly the least 
complicated way of advancing the human 
rights cause at the commission. It is 
striking that the hubbub that usually fills 
the commission room suddenly comes to 
an end when the United States is ready 
to deliver a major address. It is a rather 
heady experience for any one of us 
whose task it is to speak on behalf of our 

country. We n I to remind ourselves 

that the silence around us is not a 
tribute to our eloquence nor to any other 
personal factor but to the nameplate 
behind which we speak. The United 
States i i. That is why it is 

important that when we take the floor, 
we make sure that we have something 
worthwhile to say and t hat we say it 
convincii 



Next, there is the matter of how to 
influence the parliamentary proceedings 
on proposals advanced by others, both 
friends and acquaintances, and ulti- 
mately how we vote on them. Our per- 
formance and our votes are noted. It is 
important that they are well thought 
through and ultimately well explained. 

Finally, there is the matter of par- 
ticipating in initiatives, either as a part- 
ner advancing a proposal in which we 
join a larger group or as a sole per- 
former, advancing our own ideas. In the 
latter situation, we must consider with 
care whether we have a reasonable 
chance of winning and then organize to 
win or whether we want to advance our 
proposal for the record, even though we 
might lose. 

It is against this background that I 
shall now turn to a discussion of the pro- 
ceedings of the commission at its 1986 
session. 

Proceedings of 1986 Session 

Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. 

The most satisfying event of the session, 
from our point of view, was the adoption 
of our resolution to establish the position 
of a rapporteur on religious intolerance. 

The mechanism of appointing rap- 
porteurs is a relatively recent develop- 
ment at the UNHRC. Rapporteurs were 
initially appointed so as to examine the 
situation in a particular country in which 
human rights violations were understood 
to occur. The task of the rapporteur was 
to study the problem, write a report on 
it, and then submit the report to the 
commission. To these country rap- 
porteurs, there have recently also been 
added subject matter rapporteurs. These 
report on occurrences worldwide of a 
particular category of human rights 
violations. The first such rapporteur was 
entrusted with the task of reporting on 
the problem of summary and arbitrary 
executions. The second was called upon 
to report on incidents of torture. To this 
we added in 1986 a rapporteur whose 
responsibility it will be to examine the 
problem of infringements on religious 
liberty and to act and report thereon. 

We decided on this initiative, first, 
because we thought it dealt with a 
human rights problem that required 
attention and, second, because we 
thought we could get the votes for it. To 
be sure, some of our friends thought the 
proposal could not win and. in particular, 
that it could not win if sponsored by the 
United States. The final vote was 26 to 
5, with 12 abstentions. Voting "no" were 
the USSR. Byelorussia, East Germany. 
Bulgaria, and Syria. 



Chile. Another major initiative c 
ours at the 1986 session was our resi 
tion on Chile. I need to emphasize th 
did not reflect a fundamental shift oi 
our part in our attitude toward hum; 
rights conditions in Chile. Since the : 
of 1984, we have expressed in UN fo 
our deep concern about human right 
violations in Chile. The reason for ot 
voting "no" on past UN resolutions' 
the subject of Chile, we had explaine 
was our disagreement with the speci 
wording of these resolutions, rather 
with the basic principle of adopting j 
resolution on this subject. It was a 
natural outgrowth of our position in 
matter that we would ultimately put 
ward the kind of text on the issue of 
Chilean human rights that we could, 
fact, support. As distinct from its 
predecessors, it referred to the Gove 
ment of Chile as a government rathe 
than using the term "the Chilean 
authorities." Our resolution, as distil 
from its predecessors, did not denou 
the Chilean Constitution of 1980, noi 
it resort to name-calling. It sought, i 
stead, to set forth our specific conceiJ 
regarding human rights violations in i 
Chile and appealed to the governmei I 
correct the situation. 

Negotiating the text of the resol 
tion proved to be an extraordinarily I 
time-consuming task. Until the very I 
day of the commission session, it wa: I 
certain as to whether our resolution 1 
would pass or whether the eommissioi 
would adopt the draft resolution spot ■ 
sored by Mexico, a text patterned afli 
the resolutions of previous years. On I 
last day of the session, however, Mem 
withdrew its text and let our text be ■ 
adopted by consensus. Even at that ' 
point there was a last-minute hitch ail 
the Soviet Union announced that it ' 
would object to consensus. Rather th.1 
see the Soviet bloc isolated on this issf 
the Soviets ultimately withdrew theii' 
objection. 

Ethiopia's Resettlement Prograp 

Our third major initiative dealt with 1r 
human rights violations which occunji 
in the context of the resettlement pre* 
gram conducted in 1984 and 1985 by 4 
Government of Ethiopia. We drew thr 
commission's attention to the brutaliti 
with which this resettlement program 
had been conducted, to the thousand?!' 
lives that have been lost as a result oil' 
such brutality. Our proposal to have th 
UNHRC deal with the issue of Ethior.lt 
was, however, sidetracked through a \- 
motion "to take no decision," the Unir 
Nations' equivalent of a motion to tat 1 • 
Voting "no" on this resolution weretn 



62 



Department of State Bull 



UNITED NATIONS 



jiemhers of the Western group, plus 
In and Cost Rica. 

.Dther Issues. Finally, let me men- 
(that we delivered major statements 
le Middle East, South Africa, 
ious intolerance, self-determination 
:h covered Afghanistan and 
bodia), and the Subcommission on 
ention of Discrimination and Protec- 
of Minorities, as well as a com- 
ensive statement on human rights 
itions throughout the world in which 
iscussed human rights conditions in 
ilvador, Guatemala, Chile, Cuba, 
ragua, Iran, Ethiopia, Poland, 
aria, and the Soviet Union. 
Vside from these two major 
itives, we joined with our Western 
igues and many others in voting for 
utions on Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
ran. Resolutions were also adopted 



J Financial Crisis 



\?rnon A. Walters 

tatement before the UN General 
nbly on April 30, 1986. Ambassador 
?rs is U.S. Permanent Represen- 

■ to the United Nations. 1 

ite of the obvious and profound dif- 
ies which beset the United Nations, 
resence here today signals our com- 
ent to address these problems and 
dtalize an institution to which we 
;ain our dedication. There can be no 
. that the United Nations is a 
led organization. But there can also 
doubt that the lofty goals and pur- 
for which the United Nations was 
ed are as relevant today as they 
four decades ago. The U.S. Govern- 
recognizes the vital importance of 
lational cooperation and is corn- 
el to its improvement, 
he Secretary General has convened 
esumed session of the 40th General 
nbly because, in his words, "the 
d Nations faces the most serious 
lial crisis in its history." The 
lative effects of late payments by a 
ity of member states, withholdings 
estions of principle by a substantial 
er, and recent legislation in the 
d States have combined to put the 
ization in a position where it will 
: able to carry out all planned 
;ies in the current year. Resolving 
•isis has both short-term and 

■ term aspects, and while the 

ic purpose of this session is to deal 



which noted human rights progress in 
El Salvador and Guatemala. Other reso- 
lutions, such as the UN perennials on the 
Middle East and southern Africa, passed 
over our opposition, in which we were 
usually joined by many of our Western 
colleagues. 

As I indicated at the beginning, each 
session of the Human Rights Commis- 
sion presents us with a renewed 
challenge of extracting something useful 
from this rather imperfect mechanism. I 
believe that as we reflect on the results 
of the 1986 session, we can say that we 
met that challenge. 



■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington. D.C. 20402. ■ 



with the short-term problems of 1986, 
my government believes we must keep 
in mind the longer term aspects of the 
crisis, as well as its underlying causes, as 
we go about our work. 

As important and pressing as the 
financial issues facing us are, let us not 
overlook the fact that what we face is, in 
the words of the Secretary General, 
"above all a political crisis." The 
Secretary General is correct in describ- 
ing this political crisis as arising from 
lack of agreement among member states 
on means and purposes for financing the 
organization. The crisis, however, goes 
much deeper than that. Why are mem- 
ber states unable to agree on the means 
and purposes for financing the organiza- 
tion? The reason is that the United 
Nations is facing a crisis of confidence. 

Member states remain committed to 
the ideals of the United Nations— we saw 
this clearly in statement after statement 
at the 40th anniversary session of the 
General Assembly— but member states 
no longer have confidence in the United 
Nations as an institution for effectively 
serving those ideals. The Secretary 
General and member states share 
responsibility for rebuilding a sense of 
confidence in the organization. 

The resumed session of the General 
Assembly is an important test to see if 
such confidence can be restored. A 
serious effort among member states— 
with active guidance and assistance from 
the Secretary General— to deal with the 



short-term financial problems now con- 
fronting the organization, will be of 
great importance in rebuilding con- 
fidence in the United Nations. This, in 
turn, will lay an encouraging foundation 
for addressing the long-term fundamen- 
tal reforms which must be agreed upon 
at the 41st General Assembly. Our 
failure at this resumed session to deal 
constructively with the short-term finan- 
cial issues now before us would seriously 
jeopardize prospects for success over the 
long term. 

Background 

The current cash shortfall has been 
building up over a long period of time. 
According to the Secretary General's 
report, shortfalls in the payment of 
assessed contributions began at the end 
of 1956 and reached serious proportions 
as early as 1960. The General Assembly 
has taken a number of steps since then 
to address the problem and has looked at 
an agenda item called "the financial 
emergency" every year since 1976. This 
financial emergency has existed because 
some member states have declined to 
pay part of their assessments because of 
disagreements with certain programs, 
such as peacekeeping, and because other 
member states have failed to stay cur- 
rent with their assessments. 

The Secretary General's report of 
April 12 on the current financial crisis 
indicates that, as of March 31, 1986, 80 
countries, a majority of UN members, 
had all or a portion of their 1985 
assessments still unpaid. For 1986, only 
14 member states had paid their current 
assessments in full by the end of March. 
This situation' reflects the pattern of 
recent years. The organization has 
managed to continue operations because 
of its reserves, made up of the working 
capital fund and the special account, and 
because the United States, which is 
assessed 25% of the organization's 
expenses, has contributed virtually its 
full assessment to the organization each 
year. 

This year, because of two recently 
enacted laws, the United States finds 
itself unable to pay its full assessment. 
The fact that the arrearages of other 
member states have totally depleted the 
organization's reserves suggests that the 
U.S. shortfall becomes the straw that 
breaks the back of the camel. The $76 
million shortfall described by the 
Secretary General, in fact, is very close 
to the projected U.S. arrearage for 1985 
and 1986, which we estimate currently 
at about $80 million. One could say 
cynically that the United States is being 



>er 1986 



UNITED NATIONS 



blamed now because it is late in joining 
the member states •■ ho have no1 paid 
assessments in the past. 1 might 
add that such cynicism may not be 
misplaced in this organization where 
countries who have for many years 
deliberately withheld substantial 
amounts from the UN budget refer to 
the U.S. withholdings as a policy of 
"financial diktat and blackmail." More 
to the point, however, the financial crisis 
is not the responsibility of one member 
state, but is the result of years of 
withholdings and late payments by a 
majority of countries. 

Let me now turn to the two laws 
which are causing the United States to 
fall short on its assessed payments. The 
first is the Kassebaum amendment, 
which limits U.S. payments to the 
United Nations and the specialized agen- 
cies to 20% of their budgets unless the 
organizations institute a decisionmaking 
system for budgetary matters providing 
voting strength proportional to the size 
of contributions. The law reflects 
dissatisfaction in the U.S. Congress over 
the fact that countries which contribute 
the great majority of the organizations' 
money have little say in how it is spent. 
The Secretary General has pointed out 
that member states who contribute 
70%-80% of the UN regular budget 
have not been able to vote in favor of 
any of the last three biennial budgets of 
the United Nations. 

The U.S. delegation made it clear in 
the 40th General Assembly that a 
Charter amendment to produce so-called 
weighted voting was not the only way in 
which the intent of the Kassebaum 
amendment could be addressed. We 
were pleased that the General Assembly 
approved the establishment of the Group 
of 18 to examine the administrative and 
financial functioning of the United 
Nations, and we note that one element 
of the group's agenda is to look at the 
procedures for reaching a broad agree- 
ment on the organization's budget. We 
are hopeful that the group's delibera- 
tions will produce recommendations to 
the 41st General Assembly which, when 
acted upon, will strengthen the organiza- 
tion and will provide a basis for seeking 
mollification of the Kassebaum 
amendment. 

The other law is the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollin^s Deficit Reduction Act, 
which requires that the total U.S. 
federal budget deficit be progressively 
reduced to zero over the next 5 years. 
To the extent that targets are not met 
by directed program cuts, the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings act requires a pro ruin 



sequestering, or cutting, of virtually all 
federal programs. This law has resulted 
in a sequestering of a portion of the U.S. 

1985 UN assessment and could poten- 
tially require an additional sequestering 
of part of the 1986 payment as well. The 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings act is not 
specifically directed at the United 
Nations or at international organiza- 
tions, but its effects are being felt by 
them. The future of Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings is unclear, but the need to 
reduce the federal budget deficit is sure 
to remain a high priority for the U.S. 
Government. We hope that the deficit 
ceilings specified by this law will be met 
through directed program reductions so 
that across-the-board cuts will not be 
needed in future years. 

Current Situation 

Given the existence of large cumulative 
arrears and the inability of the United 
States to make its full payment this 
year, the United Nations is forced to cut 
its expenses now. The Secretary General 
has already undertaken administrative 
measures which he believes will save $30 
million, and he is asking this resumed 
session to approve an additional $30 
million of program deferrals and suspen- 
sions. The delegation of the United 
States has carefully reviewed these 
measures. We regret the curtailment of 
some of the activities proposed for defer- 
ral, and, more important, we believe that 
administrative savings and program 
deferrals should be more directly aimed 
at improvements in the efficiency and ef- 
fectiveness of Secretariat operations. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that it is im- 
portant to keep the Secretary General's 
proposals together as a package. We 
believe, therefore, that the Secretary 
General's proposals represent a con- 
structive first step to address the finan- 
cial shortfall, and we support their ap- 
proval as a package. 

The United States is concerned that 
the Secretary General's savings pro- 
posals do not equal the projected short- 
fall. A gap of some $46 million is to be 
filled by voluntary contributions or other 
measures to be decided upon by member 
states, such as commercial borrowing or 
further increasing the working capital 
fund. The U.S. delegation opposes these 
last two proposals, as we have in the 
past years. 

We are also concerned that the 
Secretary General's projection of the 

1986 shortfall may be somewhat 
optimistic. For one thing, the projection 



assumes that, except for the United 
States, payments to the regular budg 
will be almost equal to the amount 
assessed for the current year. Such r 
formance is possible, but would requ 
substantial departure from past prac 
We would hope, therefore, that the 
Secretary General will monitor the I 
financial situation closely throughout 
year and be prepared, if necessary, t 
propose additional savings measures 

A related concern is that the 
Secretary General's proposals only c 
1986. We are aware that the Group ( 
is considering a number of proposals 
cost reduction and increased efficien 
whose effects would be felt in 1987. ' 
beginning of each year, however, ha; 
been a time when few payments are 
received. This situation is likely to be 
more critical next year, because the 
Secretary General has proposed that 
member states advance a portion of' 
1987 payments into 1986, and defer 
programs into 1987. 

Conclusion 

The United States has always been 
the largest financial supporter of the 
United Nations and fully intends to <* 
tinue its support. The current financi 
crisis has resulted in part from subst 
tial arrearages spread among many 
member states and partly from trust- 
tion on the part of the United States 
and, we believe, other member state; 
that their views on the level and cont 
of the organization's budget are not! 
taken seriously. As we indicated earl: 
the United Nations faces a crisis of ci 
fidence. This resumed session is not 
intended to resolve the basic problem 
that have brought the organization tc 
this point. Those problems can be 
addressed only by candid discussions 
among member states over the comin 
months, assisted by thoughtful and 
serious recommendations from the 
Group of 18. The U.S. delegation star, 
ready to participate in any and all sue 
discussions. 

For now, our goal must be to assi 
the continued functioning of the 
organization until a broad consensus it 
the future budget and program of the 
United Nations is obtained. As I 
indicated earlier, the U.S. delegation ! 
believes that the Secretary General's , 
savings proposals should be accepted, ' 
that he should be asked to monitor thi, 
short-term financial situation careful); 

The decisions we take at this sess' 
can have a profound effect, positive oi 
negative, on the future of the United 



64 



Department of State Bulk 



ESTERN HEMISPHERE 



mas. I urge that the member states 
Ik together to ensure that the effect 
fepsitive one, because the future of 
lorganization is of great importance 
3 all. 

In closing let me renew the commit- 
t that Secretary of State [George] 
tz made when he spoke on the occa- 
of the 40th anniversary of the sign- 
)f the Charter of the United Nations 
in Francisco on June 26, 1985. He 



I want to leave you with one clear 
message: The I Inited States is going to stick 
with it. We will fight for peace and freedom 
and for our interests— in the United Nations 
as we do everywhere else. And we will do our 
part to make the United Nations work as a 
force for security, for human rights, and for 
human betterment. 



'USUN pressrelease 37 



sit of Mexican President 







resident Miguel de la Madrid 
hdo of the United Mexican States 
I an official working visit to 
{ington, B.C., August 12-U. 1986, to 
with President Reagan and other 
wment officials. 

following are remarks made by the 
presidents after their meeting on 

mis. 1 

dent Reagan 

Sent De la Madrid and I have just 
Beted one of our most constructive 
I think, fruitful meetings. It was 
|th in a series which began in 1982 
pmonstrated again that U.S.- 
Ian relations are based on respect, 
fetanding, open and frank discus- 
Bind mutually beneficial 
ration. 




The decline of oil prices and the 
burden of a debt incurred in past years 
have hit Mexico hard. President De la 
Madrid's Administration and the people 
of Mexico are making a courageous, 
determined effort to face up to their 
nation's fundamental economic problems 
and turn a difficult situation around. 

In our meeting today, I emphasized 
to President De la Madrid that the 
people and Government of the United 
States are ready to lend a hand when 
and where it can make a difference. The 
United States, for example, strongly 
endorses Mexico's recent agreements 
with the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. We hope arrange- 
ments made with Mexico's private 
creditors move quickly so that Mexico 
can reignite economic growth, evolve 
toward a more efficient market-oriented 



system, continue to meet its debt obliga- 
tions, and meet the economic needs of 
the Mexican people. 

As I expressed to President De la 
Madrid today, the United States is 
prepared to do its part with commercial 
and agricultural credits; support for 
international financial institution pro- 
grams in Mexico; and by maintaining our 
markets open to Mexican products- 
products Mexico must export if it is to 
prosper and meet its international finan- 
cial obligations. 

Mexico's entry into the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is also 
viewed here as a major step forward. 
This step comprises part of a strategy of 
economic restructuring which highlights 
productivity and the creation of a 
favorable business climate. Toward this 
end. President De la Madrid and I 
agreed to give priority to negotiations of 
a framework agreement on trade and 
investment and to have it done within a 
year. 

Symbolic of our strengthening 
bonds, I am pleased to announce that the 
United States is lifting today our 6-year- 
old embargo on the importation of tuna 
from Mexico. Former Ambassador John 
Gavin, I should point out, was instru- 
mental in achieving this breakthrough. 
And we're looking for further progress 
in our discussions on fisheries issues. 
One area of solid agreement was our 
• recognition of the necessity of maintain- 
ing our countries' strong campaign 
against drugs. We pledged to bolster our 
eradication programs and our efforts to 
bring to justice vicious drug traffickers, 
who have been such a corrupting 
influence in both our countries. We also 
pledged to do all possible to attack the 
demand side of this evil by aggressively 
discouraging the consumption of narcotic 
drugs. 

We can be proud of the broad range 
of cooperation developing between our 
countries, including border environmen- 
tal policy, improved civil aviation 
arrangements, new bridges and border 
crossings, and our strong energy rela- 
tions. We plan to strengthen our 
binational consultations at the Cabinet 
level to better meet the challenges and 
take advantage of opportunities for our 
two nations in the coming years. 

What we have accomplished today 
builds upon the successes of the past and 
will benefit both our peoples. It was a 
pleasure to see my friend, President De 
la Madrid, again. As a good friend and 
neighbor, we wish you a safe journey 
home. Hasta luego and nos vemos. 



tar 1 QOC 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



President De la Madrid 2 



I wish to express my appreciation to 

dent of the United States, Ronald 
Reagan, for his cordial invitation to hold 
this meeting in Washington. It has been 
a timely and fruitful meeting. It has 
been a fruitful meeting because it has 
been positive results in allowing us to 
deal frankly and in depth with various 
problems that both Presidents consider 
to be of prime importance for the proper 
development of relations between the 
United States and Mexico. 

President Reagan and I agreed to 
give priority attention to the topics 
included in the bilateral agenda. We are 
pleased to acknowledge that this year 
there have been positive developments 
and agreements in dealing with various 
economic matters and in border coopera- 
tion. We agreed that it is necessary and 
just to emphasize such progress. 

We have agreed that the govern- 
ments, beginning today, should make an 
extraordinary effort to strengthen and 
improve our relations. This is a 
necessary element in order to broaden 
and intensify the cooperation between 
the two peoples. It is with satisfaction 
that I have today confirmed the firm 
determination of President Reagan to 
give renewed impetus to the develop- 
ment of positive relations between the 
United States and Mexico. 

In this spirit, we have exchanged 
views on various issues of great interest 
to the two governments and to both 
countries in general. Allow me to point 
out some of them briefly. 

Firstly, we took up in detail different 
aspects of our financial and trade rela- 
tions. The recent negotiations on the 
part of the Mexican Government with 
the international financial institutions, 
particularly the International Monetary 
Fund, have successfully opened the way 
to new and more realistic and flexible 
formulas for dealing with the problem of 
the foreign debt. 

I recognize that the Government of 
the United States, in playing a very con- 
structive role, did a very fine thing, and 
this we greatly appreciate. It is our pur- 
pose that Mexico should attain a suffi- 
cient and sustained growth as a basis in 
order to restructure and renew its 
economy; in order to maintain the social 
progress that has been the basis for the 
long stability of our country; and in 
"rilcr to extend its capacity to comply 
with its international commitments. 

The problem of the foreign debt is 
related with more finances in order to 
improve the conditions that will make it 
possible for us to comply with our 
foreign debt. Mexico seeks P. create 



greater exportations in areas in which it 
has comparative advantages. Exports 
that are not oil problems, commercial 
links that will recognize the varying 
degrees of developments of both 
economies and that do not offer 
decrimination or absolute reciprocity, 
can be a good basis for the increase of 
our trade. 

Both Presidents have given instruc- 
tions to their associates in order to 
undertake a broadened agreement on 
trade and on other subjects, and we have 
given definite instructions to our 
negotiators on both sides. 

President Reagan and I also had the 
opportunity to exchange points of view 
on the problems of the undocumented 
workers in the United States. This is a 
problem that has to do with the struc- 
tures of both economies. And there is no 
doubt that as the Mexican economy 
improves, the migrant flows will tend to 
decline. 

I would also like to refer to a subject 
that President Reagan and I dealt with 
as a very important part of our conver- 
sations. And I am referring now to the 
war against drug trafficking. The 
Government of Mexico maintains that 
international cooperation is absolutely 
necessary in order to efficiently face 
drug trafficking. 

We agreed that it's necessary to 
simultaneously attack all the links of the 



Update on Chile 



by Elliott Abrams 

Prepared statement before the Sub- 
committee on International Development 
Institutions and Finance of the House 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 
Committee on July 30, 1986. Mr. Abrams 
is Assistajit Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs. 1 

In early December last year, I testified 
before this subcommittee outlining the 
Administration's policies and goals 
toward Chile. At that time, I noted our 
hopes and concerns for progress in 
greater respect for human rights and a 
democratic transition in a land once 
known for its democratic traditions. I 
concluded with an explanation of how, 
on a case-by-case basis, we determine 
our votes on loans for Chile in the inter- 
national financial institutions (IFIs). 

I welcome this opportunity to review 
some of the main developments in Chile 



chain; that is, production, distribution, 
and consumption. I have said to Presi- 
dent Reagan that we believe that the 
campaign that, under his leadership, h. 
been established in the United States i 
very important to combat the consumf 
tion and the distribution of drugs. 

We shall continue to strengthen th 
cooperation between both government 
in order to combat this cancer of mode 
society. I believe, as has been said by 
President Reagan, this conversation h; 
been particularly satisfactory. It is an 
additional proof of the firm and loyal 
friendship that unites our two peoples. 

We have a great deal to benefit frc 
a dignified, cordial relationship of 
mutually good for both. I thank Presi 
dent Reagan and the members of his 
party for the very warm hospitality th: 
they have extended to us. And, once 
again, I would like to state the recogni ' 
tion of the Government and the people ' 
Mexico for the assistance that was giv I 
to us by the United States during the I 
earthquakes in the month of Septembe i 
particularly the very warm friendship t 
Nancy Reagan who went to be with us I 
during those painful times. 



>Made at the South Portico of the Whit 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 18, 1986). 

2 President De la Madrid spoke in Spanii 
and his remarks were translated by an inte; 
preter. ■ 



since December as well as the Admini- 
stration's policy toward that troubled 
country. In dealing with Chile we must 
move with a clear vision, shaping our 
actions to the reality of the situation ai 
using our limited instruments of 
influence, such as our IFI loan votes, ir 
a prudent manner. We must not act in 
haste and anger, but ask how each loanp 
vote fits into our policy of support for i 
democratic transition and human rights 
improvements, as well as the economic 
merits of each proposed loan. And, of ! 
course, we must observe the require- | 
ments of applicable legislation. 

Human Rights: Progress 
and Continuing Problems 

The tragic death of Rodrigo Rojas 
earlier this month has again focused th( t 
attention of Americans on the cycle of j 
violence in Chile and the need to 



66 



Dffnartment of State Bullet, 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



ourage greater respect for human 
its. We have repeatedly made clear 
t we have a strong commitment, 
pite limited policy tools, to bring 
ut increased respect for human rights 
"Jhile. Our humanitarian concern over 
death of this young man was evident 
iur aid to his mother in entering 
le, our statements calling for an 
est investigation, and in our 
bassador's attendance at Rojas' 
eral with the Administration's full 
currence. 

I would like to briefly outline what 
see as some of the pertinent events 
ring on respect for human rights in 
le since I last testified before this 
committee. 

As I testified before last December, 
have welcomed the expressed will- 
less of the Chilean Government to 
Derate with the UN Special Rap- 
;eur, Fernando Volio, as providing 
opportunity to encourage concrete 
lan rights improvements. Progress in 
area, however, has been slow— much 
'er than we would have liked. In 
e areas there have been positive 
;lopments; although, I should note, 
e of these are so new that the ver- 
is not yet in on their effectiveness. 
3n the positive side, I would note 
willingness of the government in 

to authorize publication of a daily 
spaper— La Epoca— associated with 
e's democratic opposition and 
duled to be on the stands early next 

As far as the existing media are 
erned, there has been much more 
dom of expression allowed since the 
lg of the state of siege over a year 
although the government imposed 
t censorship on several radio sta- 

early in July. In addition, there is 
government decision last month to 
te a human rights advisory commis- 

which is significant if only as 
ial recognition that Chile has human 
;s problems. We hope that this 
ial human rights commission will 
c with the respected private human 
;s groups in Chile and have a 
ive impact in bringing about rights 
ovements. Similarly, the announce- 
1 that the government intends to 
;ablish separate labor courts could 
to greater protection of worker 
;s. 

Another positive development, which 
isponds to Mr. Volio's recommenda- 

is an apparent decision by the 
:an Government to refrain from 
ing its opponents into forced inter- 
xile. This practice was used against 
reds of protestors in 1985, but so 
lis year the government has not 



invoked this repressive authority. The 
authority to do so, however, still exists 
on paper, deriving from transitory Arti- 
cle 24 of the L980 constitution, which 
gives the Chilean president sweeping 
powers to restrict civil liberties during 
announced states of exception in Chile, 
such as are in effect now. 

The government's decision to turn to 
the judicial system to prosecute pro- 
testors or other government opponents 
represents an improvement over past 
practice, when there was no opportunity 
for those affected to contest actions 
against them, but does not eliminate our 
concerns about how the government 
responds to peaceful dissent by Chilean 
citizens. Those charged with violations of 
state security laws frequently are 
detained for prolonged periods, 
sometimes incommunicado, whether or 
not they have been charged with per- 
sonal involvement in specific acts of 
violence. We will watch carefully the 
trial proceedings now going on for the 
13 Civic Assembly leaders who are 
charged with violations of state security 
laws in connection with the July 2-3 
general strike. Despite the explicit public 
calls of these leaders for nonviolence 
during the work stoppage, these Chilean 
leaders face sentences of 60 days to 3 
years in prison. Arrested on July 10, 
they have not been released on bail, but 
have received visitors, including a 
human rights officer of the U.S. 
Embassy in Santiago. 

We hope that the Chilean Govern- 
ment's willingness to continue its 
exchange with Mr. Volio reflects the 
intention to take more concrete actions 
to improve human rights practices. 
Should there be progress of this kind, we 
would certainly welcome it, and would 
urge due recognition by the General 
Assembly when the Chilean human 
rights situation is reviewed by the 
United Nations this fall. 

While it is important that we 
recognize where there has been prog- 
ress, it is also important that we 
recognize where problems have con- 
tinued or become more acute. A review 
of the the problem areas highlighted in 
the resolution on Chile drafted by the 
United States and adopted by consensus 
at the UN Human Rights Commission 
meeting in March makes clear that there 
are many areas in need of improvement. 
For instance, there is no reasonable 
explanation for the frequent failure in 
Chile to identify, prosecute, and punish 
those responsible for violent crimes. In 
the case of Rodrigo Rojas, an instance of 
such violent crime, we have made clear 
that we look to Chilean authorities for a 



thorough and impartial investigation. 
We have seen the decision of the judge 
to indict one military officer for 
manslaughter, as well as the July 24 
statement issued on this decision by the 
Vicariate of Solidarity. There are serious 
questions raised by the differing views of 
how this incident actually occurred and 
we are concerned over these discrepan- 
cies. We will not consider this matter 
closed until the discrepancies between 
what the judge ruled to have occurred, 
and what eyewitnesses claim, are 
resolved, and all those responsible for 
crimes related to Rojas' death and the 
severe injury of Carmen Quintana are 
tried and brought to justice. 

Another problem I spoke of last 
December remains unresolved. We have 
continued to receive credible reports of 
torture by security forces. After a 
notable drop-off of reports of this nature 
to the Vicariate in the period of March- 
April, reports again have been received. 
At least 14 cases of torture in Santiago 
alone have been brought before Chilean 
courts this year. 

The final problem area I would 
highlight today is the nature of the 
government response to acts of civil 
disobedience and to antigovernment 
violence and terrorism. According to 
provisional figures available from 
Chilean human rights groups, there were 
approximately 3,300 people detained by 
security forces for participating in 
politically motivated demonstrations dur- 
ing the first 6 months of this year. By 
comparison, during the last 6 months of 
1985 (the best period of comparison, 
since the state of siege was in effect for 
the first half of 1985), a total of 3,920 
were detained for similar reasons. 

As these figures imply, the heavy- 
handed government action at Rodrigo 
Rojas' funeral was not the only instance 
of overreaction apparent this year. 
Another notable instance was the 
deployment of thousands of government 
troops to cordon off Santiago on May 21 
in order to prevent small antigovern- 
ment protests from taking place, which 
was even criticized by some supporters 
of the Chilean Government. Government 
sweeps of poor neighborhoods in San- 
tiago and temporary detentions of 
thousands of people similarly seem 
unwarranted and excessive, in view of 
the small number of accused criminals or 
terrorists actually arrested and the 
limited quantity of illegal arms reported 
discovered. Such actions can only con- 
tribute to the climate of confrontation 
and complicate efforts to bring about a 
transition to democracy. 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



As the Chilean ( !i e of 

[j noted, the violence in 
Chile today stems from complex causes. 
Among those are concerted efforts of 
the < Ihilean Communist Party and its far 
left allies to pursue their undemocratic 
ends by attempting to provoke ever 
greater repression through terrorist 
violence. These groups have pursued a 
wave of bombing attacks which included 
in recent months a bomb directed 
against the residence of the U.S. 
Ambassador; an attack against San- 
tiago's subway system that left two 
people dead; killing of policemen; straf- 
ing of military housing for women and 
children; and bombings of some Mormon 
churches and U.S. businesses. The tombs 
of President Pinochet's parents were 
also vandalized. The most recent act of 
terrorism occurred on July 25, when 39 
persons were injured by a bomb explo- 
sion at a bus stop in downtown Santiago. 
No group has claimed responsibility for 
this bombing, which we strongly 
condemn. 



Support for Democracy 
and Human Rights 

Our encouragement of greater respect 
for human rights goes hand-in-hand with 
our efforts to encourage a peaceful 
democratic transition. History shows 
that only in truly democratic states are 
the rights of an individual secure. 

In December. I related to you our 
mow that the creation of the National 
Accord represented an advance in the 
process of dialogue and reconciliation 
necessary if Chile is to achieve a 
peaceful democratic transition. Though 
the Chilean Government has shown 
intransigence in dealing with the 
democratic parties comprising the 
accord, we continue to believe it pro- 
vides a base from which peaceful prog- 
ress on Chile's democratic transition can 
ade. We hope that all Chileans con- 
cerned about the future of democracy in 
their country will build on the positive 
elements they see in the accord. 

During his July 12-18 visit to Chile. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert 
1 lelbard also renewed our message on 
democracy and human rights. He clearly 
articulated that the United States sup- 

eaceful transition to full 
democratic rule in Chile by the most 

pt and effective means. How Chile 
achieves a democratic system must be 
determined by the Chilean people. But 
we are committed to using our limited 
influence and encouragement to helping 
them bring that about. With the strong, 
talented, and experienced U.S. 



Ambassador we have in Santiago, and 
the public expressions of support for a 
democratic transition coming from 
Washington, this Administration has put 
itself squarely on the side of democracy 
and human rights in Chile. 

President Reagan on a number of 
occasions has signaled his personal sup- 
port for democratic change in Chile. In 
spring 1985 he spoke of "entrenched 
military rule" in both Chile and 
Paraguay, where we have another very 
effective ambassador. During his Human 
Rights Day speech in December, the 
President noted that in Chile, as in the 
Philippines, we had "shown our strong 
concern when our friends deviate from 
established democratic traditions." In 
his public welcome for Uruguayan 
President Sanguinetti just last month, 
the President said bluntly, "in this hemi- 
sphere, the days of dictatorship, left or 
right, are numbered," noting that the 
peaceful return to democracy in 
Uruguay can serve as a model for 
others, and concluding "authoritarian 
regimes should take notice." 

If any doubt remained over U.S. 
policy following these statements, they 
should have been dispelled by the 
response of the White House to the 
recent public attack on Ambassador 
[Harry] Barnes. The White House issued 
a statement the following day reaffirm- 
ing President Reagan's full confidence in 
Ambassador Barnes. Ambassador 
Barnes, like our other ambassadors, car- 
ries out Administration policy which is 
made in Washington. This policy is, of 
course, to encourage a democratic 
transition. 

The vast majority of Chileans sup- 
port a peaceful transition to democracy 
and understand the substance of our 
policy toward their country. The Chilean 
Communist Party, which is the largest in 
the hemisphere next to that of Cuba or 
Nicaragua's Sandinistas, also is aware of 
our stance. It, however, has adopted the 
tactic of "armed struggle" to remove 
the military government since it has no 
interest in peaceful solutions which 
would leave the party lacking complete 
power. By supporting terrorism and 
violence, the communists hope to pro- 
voke greater government repression and 
produce general polarization. They have 
tried hard to convince democratic 
elements of Chilean society that the only 
means of restoring democracy is through 
violence. 

We reject violence from any side as 
an attack not only on human and civil 
rights but against the future of a 
democratic Chile. Groups such as the 
Communist Party, who favor violent 



means to political ends today, cannot 1 
expected to abide by democratic rules 
tomorrow. Those who accord legitimai 
to the communists and other extremis 
are not contributing to a stable, 
democratic Chile. 

The Challenge for the United States 
and Chile 

The current climate of violence and co 
frontation in Chile poses a difficult 
challenge for the United States. The 
Chilean Government believes that it h 
a workable plan for returning Chile to 
democracy relying on the mechanism i 
out in the 1980 constitution. The gove 
ment announced this spring a scheduli 
for drafting and approving certain bas 
laws related to that constitution. The 
constitution would be fully implement 
in 1989, when a presidential candidate 
chosen by the military junta is to be p 
before the people in a plebiscite. 

We look forward to enactment of 
these laws as positive steps. But to be 
truly meaningful, they should be enac'l 
in a context of full civil liberties, such 1 
freedom of assembly, speech, and pre; I 
and access to the means of communic; (■ 
tion. Advances in these crucial areas I 
mean progress in restoring democracy , 
as well as improvements in human rig 
observance. 

The 1980 constitution, however, ail 
its timetable and program for a transi | 
tion are matters of great controversy | 
Chile. In the absence of any broad and 
meaningful dialogue with the democra I 
opposition, grounds for skepticism exitf 
that the Chilean Government intends t|» 
take steps toward developing the sort I 
broad consensus that would enable a j 
peaceful, orderly transition to demo- | 
cratic government take place. Further | 
delay in taking concrete steps to give t^ 
Chilean people confidence that their 
nation is headed toward democracy an| 
to restore full civil liberties can only 
benefit enemies of democracy on the 
extreme left and right. Failure to retui|- 
to democracy will be accompanied by i 
increasing polarization and violence. T» 
strengthening of the far left in Chile 
resulting from this could have a negatif 
impact on some still fragile democracies 
elsewhere in the region and jeopardize 
U.S. interests. 

Given the important stakes involveji 
the United States needs to have a 
forward-looking, prudent policy. We 
have been careful not to endorse any | 
program or timetable for a transition— k 
issues only the Chilean people can 
decide. We all need to recognize that ) 



68 



Department of State Bulle^ 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



ugh pro- and antigovernment 
ans put great store in what the 
;d States does or does not do with 
ct to Chile, we have in fact very 
■d real influence. We have few car- 
ind few sticks available. We have 
curity assistance program; no 
try training relationship; no 
ral economic assistance program to 
: of except for a small amount of 
nitarian food aid. Because of 
ative restrictions imposed on the 
five [branch] by the Congress, we 
very limited channels of corn- 
nation to the Chilean Armed 
is, who must play a key role in 
ing a peaceful transition to 
cracy. 

) carrying out our policy of 
raging democracy and human 
i improvements in Chile, we hope 
11 have active bipartisan support 
the Congress. We need to work 
ler. I am sure you share our desire 
ire do not contribute— even 
ertently— to accelerating the very 
=s of polarization and violent con- 
ation which we see developing, and 
only benefits the extremes in 



fates on Loans to Chile 

ation related to the IFIs requires 
ecutive [branch] to examine the 
i|i rights situation, in addition to the 
imc rationale, carefully in deter- 
b our votes on loans in the 
lateral institutions. Pursuant to this 
ly-case review, we look at each loan 
litely and consider the situation in a 
nular country as it exists just before 
liins are scheduled to be reviewed 
I executive boards. 
k the committee is aware, no loans 
pie are scheduled for review until 
ill. The earliest loan expected to 
Lp is a $250 million World Bank 
jural adjustment loan (SAL), 
bs in early October. We also expect 
Ing sector loan to come up at the 
International Finance Corporation] 
liber. Three loans at the IDB 
sAmerican Development Bank] are 
Ito be voted on prior to the end of 
lar. These include a $240 million 
Ir a hydroelectric power project, a 
jnllion loan for urban services, and a 
pillion loan for regional hospitals. 
|e also anticipate that there will 
feed for Chile to approach the com- 
m banks for another debt 
jlduling next year, which could also 
fc a request to the banks for new 



Our judgment on Chile's economic 
policies is that, considered in isolation of 
human rights concerns, they provide a 
strong basis for voting in favor of most 
IFI loans for Chile. The economic 
management team of the Government of 
Chile has a solid free market orientation 
and is considered by international finan- 
cial institutions to be highly skilled. 

The country, however, still confronts 
acute economic problems. World prices 
for copper, Chile's principal source of 
export revenues, remain at low levels. 
Unemployment is historically high, 
although it is gradually declining, and 
the need to service the country's large 
external debt of about $20 million— a 
figure which already exceeds GDP [gross 
domestic product]— represents a 
restraint on growth. About one-third of 
this debt is held by U.S. commercial 
banks. Despite difficulties, the Chileans 
have the remarkable record of having 
met all the interest payments on their 
foreign debt as well as having generally 
complied with IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] targets. 

In order for Chile to maintain the 
modest growth rates of 3%-4% forecast 
for this year and the next, it will need an 
injection of new foreign funds from the 
IFIs and commercial banks. Some op- 
position figures are aware of the 
importance of such funds to the Chilean 
economy and have counseled us to con- 
sider carefully the impact of our actions 
on the average Chilean. 

Given the sound economic policies 
being followed in Santiago, it is apparent 
that our loan vote decisions will largely 
be driven by how we see the human 
rights situation in Chile. How we vote 
will depend a great deal on what hap- 
pens in Chile between now and then. As 
the subcommittee is aware, we have 
used our loan votes in the past to pro- 
mote human rights improvements and 
movement toward democracy, and we 
may do so again. No decisions have yet 
been made regarding our votes on these 
upcoming loans. It would not be good 
policy to remove our flexibility to use the 
human rights improvements and prog- 
ress on democratization. An announce- 
ment of our position now would leave 
the Chilean Government no incentive to 
make positive changes. This would 
defeat what I understand to be a key 
purpose of the human rights legislation 
related to IFI votes, which is to provide 
the executive [branch] with a mechanism 
for encouraging improvements. As I've 
repeatedly stressed, we have only 
limited policy tools available. Curbing 



our flexibility by taking a position on 
loan votes now would in my judgment 
work against our shared policy goals in 
Chile. 



Prospects 

Chile today is in flux. Along with the 
danger of greater polarization, 
the situation offers the possibility 
for constructive change. A vigorous 
public debate is going on within Chile, 
covering a wide spectrum of issues, 
ranging from President Pinochet's rejec- 
tion of dialogue with the National 
Accord to the tragic death of Rodrigo 
Rojas. To a large degree, the govern- 
ment has permitted this debate to be 
reported in the print media— although, 
there are still distressing instances of 
censorship and indirect economic 
pressure being applied to shape the 
news. This public debate seems to be 
matched to a certain extent by internal 
debate within the government— still very 
tentative— about Chile's return to 
democracy. This was apparent in the 
quick reaction by various junta members 
to President Pinochet's announcement 
earlier this month that he intended to 
extend his government's rule for another 
8-year term— virtually until the end of 
the millenium. 

There are certainly real possibilities 
for a peaceful democratic outcome in 
Chile. The Administration will continue 
to provide every encouragement to those 
Chileans truly committed to democracy 
and help to strengthen, not weaken, 
their position with respect to other 
elements in the society. We will continue 
to advocate dialogue between the 
government and democratic opposition. 
We will continue to support the efforts 
by Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno and 
the Chilean Episcopal Conference to 
bring about national reconciliation and 
an end to violence. We share their desire 
to avoid any actions which could lead to 
greater suffering by the Chilean people. 
Efforts such as those of the Cardinal, we 
hope, will eventually be well-received by 
the Chilean Government, and lead to an 
understanding among the various sec- 
tors of Chilean society, which remain 
deeply divided by a lack of communica- 
tion and mutual distrust. The Pope's 
visit next spring will provide an impor- 
tant opportunity to strengthen and add 
even greater moral force to these 
efforts. 

The Administration has a strong 
human rights policy in place, which we 
will continue to pursue vigorously. I am 
sure you will agree it stands the best 



Bar 1986 



fiq 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



chance of succeeding if we have bipar- 
support from the Congress. We 
will, of course, continue to consult with 
( longress in order to achieve such a con- 
sensus. Our foreign policy goals in Chile, 
shared by the vast majority of 
Americans, are a peaceful transition to 
democracy and increased respect for 
human rights. We believe these also are 



the goals of the majority of the people of 
Chile, who ultimately are the only ones 
who can and will determine their coun- 
try's destiny. 



■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Obstacles to Investment 

and Economic Growth in Latin America 



by Richard T. McCormack 

Address before the second Conference 
of the Great Cities of the Americas in 
Si i a Juan, Puerto Rico, on June 20, 1986. 
Ambassador McCormack is U.S. Perma- 
nent Representative to the Organization 
of American States. 

The obstacles to investment and growth 
in Latin America deserve the great 
attention they are receiving. Investment 
is particularly important because without 
investment no new jobs will be created. 
Without new jobs, there will be no 
economic growth. Without economic 
growth, political stability will gradually 
erode, and the precious democracies that 
all of us have worked so hard with Latin 
America to bring about may lapse into 
military dictatorships or the further 
spread of communist tyranny. 

During the past years that I've 
worked as Assistant Secretary of State 
for Economic and Business Affairs, and 
more recently as Ambassador to the 
Organization of American States, it has 
been my great privilege to visit virtually 
every country in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. So what I'm going to share with 
you today are my personal observations 
on concrete obstacles to foreign and 
domestic investment that I've seen 
myself in the course of my travels. This 
will include obstacles to investment in 
food production. Finally, I will also offer 
some thoughts about what might be done 
to overcome these impediments to 
economic growth. 

Investment and Growth Prospects 

First, a word about the quality and value 
of many official statistics on economic 
growth in Latin America. They can be 
very misleading. 



There is obviously a lot more 
economic activity taking place in some 
countries by way of investment and 
growth than official statistics indicate. 
Peru, which undeniably has economic 
problems, is a case in point, where 
estimates of the size of the underground 
economy range from between one-quar- 
ter to one-half of all economic activity in 
the country. Even buses, I am told, are 
assembled in factories without official 
recognition that they exist. 

There is, however, a lot less eco- 
nomic activity than meets the eye in 
parts of Central America and the 
Caribbean. Growth statistics here are 
misleading, due to very high levels of 
official external economic assistance to 
individual countries, which cover up the 
low level of private investment and 
economic activity. External economic 
assistance, without a strong underlying 
base, creates economic hothouse plants 
kept alive by artificial conditions. But all 
of us know what happens when the heat 
in the greenhouse fails to work. So it is 
very important to achieve self-sustaining 
economic growth. 

There is nothing mysterious about 
the policies that successful governments 
have used to encourage private invest- 
ment and economic growth. They simply 
provide a stable environment in which 
investors have reasonable prospects for 
a competitive return on their capital and 
the assurance that they can get their 
money back if and when they want to. 

That's it. That's the basis of it all. 
With these conditions, private invest- 
ment occurs. Without them, money hides 
or goes elsewhere, and local economies 
languish. 

There are subordinate complexities, 
of course, which determine investment 
and growth prospects. For example: 

• Investment capital has to be gen- 
erated in sufficient quantities, either 



from internal savings or foreign savl 
Without somebody's savings, you ha 
no money to invest. 

• Nondiscriminatory, easily und 
standable regulation of business in t 
economy is vitally necessary. Nothin 
strangles business like red tape. 

• A degree of physical security 
necessary, so that investors and mai 
agers and their children are reasona 
safe from terror and lawlessness an< 
the economy can operate in a norma 
manner. 

• Adequate technology must be 
available. 

• Local and foreign markets are 
required. 

• Rational progrowth tax policii 
are vital. 

• Production-oriented national : 
policies must be established to repla 
those based on 19th-century relics o 
class warfare, such as excesses in th 
name of land reform and shortsighti 
arbitrarily imposed food prices. 

Attracting Investment Capital 

All of these investment-related mat! 
must be addressed if optimum econc 
growth is to take place. For exampl 
is imperative that governments ado] 
tax and economic policies to encoun 
the creation of savings in individual 
countries and, equally important, to 
encourage those savings to remain e 
home. Capital flight in Latin Amerk 
estimates of which range from $100 
$180 billion in the past 5 years— is r< 
bing nations of their vital investmen 
capital. If Latin American capital 
invested abroad could be recovered, 
could largely eliminate the foreign d 
problems of Argentina, Mexico, and 
Venezuela. When you add the econo 
activity and growth that returning f 
capital could generate, it would go f; 
restoring Latin America's economic 
health. 

Beyond that, unless the capital f 
problem is addressed, no amount of 
foreign aid can rescue local economi" 
Instead of priming a pump, foreign 
assistance is merely pouring water ii 
sieve. 

Thus, it is crucial to attack 
systematically the causes of capital 
flight. But it must be clearly underst 
that governments cannot successfull 
wall in capital with laws prohibiting 
export. All negative legislation 
accomplishes, in the long run, is to 
create a de facto capital export tax a 
nervous saver uses various sublegal 
techniques to get his imperiled savin 



70 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



of the country. A better approach is 
governments to adopt positive incen- 
5 that will encourage people to keep 
C money at home. 

One of the most important positive 
ntives involves exchange rates that 
realistic and sustainable. Not only is 
important to make exports com- 
;ive, but local people quickly see 

their country is attempting to 
itain an artificially high exchange 
vis-a-vis the dollar, as has happened 
idically in Mexico and elsewhere. 

know that their capital is endan- 
d by a devaluation that is merely a 
tion of time. So they get their 
ey out of the local currency and into 
,rs. And, because many have learned 
painful experience that even their 
■nal dollar holdings are not always 
they often put their dollar savings 
ad. 

t is also important to keep inflation 
r conti-ol. Citizens will be less 
led to keep their money at home— 
lere I'm talking about people's 
ement savings— if they see their 
try running the monetary printing 
i at a rate which is bound to cause 
savings to be inflated away. So 
shift their money out of the cur- 
r, out of the country, into mobile, 
iion-proof assets such as gold or 
onds, or move to other defensive 
tments. These defensive invest- 
s, however, are usually not very 
ictive from the point of view of job 
ion. 

'eople have learned that as indi- 
ts they are often powerless to per- 
; their governments to adopt 
lal economic policies. So their 
ict is to grab the life preservers 
they see the ship headed for the 
; thus, the capital flight. That is 
•ealistic exchange rates, sound 
tary policies, and other measures 
) critical. 

he second source of savings is 
nal capital, otherwise known as 
yi investment, which should be 
med everywhere from an economic 
of view and given national treat- 
Some governments, however, 
foreign-owned companies and 
;ors as some reputedly were in the 
: corporate tigers who involved 
lelves heavily in local politics of 
dual countries. Years ago, 
rer, governments positioned 
dves to get the upper hand. Some 
jacted with nationalizations and 
extreme measures. In any case, 
:uation profoundly changed. But 
some governments do not seem to 



realize is that yesterday's so-called cor- 
porate tigers are today an extinct 
species. The private foreign companies 
now fear governments, not the other 
way around. Thus, the challenge facing 
governments is not how to deal with the 
legendary tigers of yesteryear but, 
rather, how to make today's corporate 
rabbits feel secure and happy so that 
they will reproduce and multiply, 
creating badly needed jobs and economic 
growth. This requires a totally different 
attitude on the part of governments. 
Efforts to provide more investment 
security, including those of the new 
World Bank multilateral investment 
guarantee agency, should be supported. 

Beyond that, some local manufac- 
turers fear the competition from more 
technologically advanced foreign com- 
panies and strive to keep them out. 
Sadly, to protect the existing jobs of 
hundreds, the potential new jobs for 
thousands thus are lost by default. Also, 
countries thus become trapped with 
obsolete technology and internationally 
uncompetitive products. 

The challenge facing government 
policies is to nurture and attract both 
local and foreign sources of investment 
capital. 

Factors Limiting Economical Growth 

The second condition needed for 
increased investment in Latin America is 
sheer physical security. Today's ter- 
rorism, lawlessness, and kidnapping is a 
deathblow aimed at the weak link in the 
economic chain of growth— private 
investment. Let's take the example of El 
Salvador. For a time in the 1960s, El 
Salvador had one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world. Then came the 
terrorists and the kidnappers and the 
saboteurs, targeting the owners and 
managers of private local and foreign 
companies and their children. This was a 
deliberate, conscious strategy for the 
economic and political destabilization of 
the victim country. Criminal elements 
added to the chaos. Uncertain of the 
future and fearful for their lives and the 
lives of their children, local investors 
began to hedge their bets by increasingly 
salting away their savings and sending 
their children abroad. Foreign investors 
also fled. The economy ground to a halt. 
Unwise government policies then further 
damaged the economy and gravely 
weakened the financial and agricultural 
sectors of the nation. 

The body politic, thus weakened, 
became more vulnerable to the second 
phase of terrorist operations— large-scale 
guerrilla warfare. 



Recently, I visited Guatemala and 
talked to businessmen. They told me 
that violence and uncertainty due to 
guerrilla activities and terrorism were 
limiting their own willingness to put 
their family fortunes into long-term local 
investment. They told me that until the 
predatory communist regime in neigh- 
boring Nicaragua changed and security 
prospects for the region improved, they 
were going to continue to limit their 
involvement in long-term, immobile 
investments. 

Thus, until our Latin American 
friends and we successfully come to 
grips with the mounting violence and 
terrorism in parts of Latin America, 
investment and economic growth will 
continue to be disappointing and 
democracies vulnerable. 

The third factor is the availability of 
modern technology, but a fundamental 
misinterpretation exists. The limiting 
factor on economic growth today is not 
some secret process of IBM [Interna- 
tional Business Machines Corporation] or 
Silicon Valley but, rather, the decision 
on where to locate the factories to 
manufacture high-technology products. 
If governments make it attractive for 
capital, technology will follow. It's not 
the other way around. This is a large 
measure of the success story of North 
and Southeast Asia. 

Another key factor involves ade- 
quate markets for goods. Without access 
to markets, there will be no investment. 
This means that all of us must work to 
keep the trading system open, but there 
must be a bargain here. American com- 
puter workers need access to Brazilian 
markets as much as Brazilian shoe 
workers need American markets. And 
unless both sides work to open these 
markets, political pressures will work 
gradually to close and restrict them, a 
lasting detriment to us all. 

All of us must, therefore, work 
urgently to bring more open markets 
about. But it takes two to tango, and our 
trading partners abroad have been 
quicker to point accusing fingers at 
lingering remnants of American protec- 
tionism than they have been to come to 
the bargaining table with offers of quids 
pro quo. A country with a $150-billion 
trade deficit, such as ours, cannot con- 
tinue to operate this way indefinitely. 
The golden goose of open U.S. markets 
may eventually die, either a political or 
economic death. 

So all of us interested in global 
economic investment and growth would 
do well to press urgently for action on a 
new global trade round to eliminate 



>er 1986 



71 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



everyone's barriers to trade. Beyond 
that, governments need to ensure that 
their own internal markets are growing 
on a sustainable basis, and that means 
following economic policies which have 
proven their value when they have been 
successfully tried elsewhere. 

Public v. Private Investment 

At this point, perhaps a word about the 
relative merits of public, as opposed to 
private, investment would be in order. 

Because of the failure of some 
governments to establish and maintain 
conditions needed to attract and nurture 
private investment in sufficient quan- 
tities, governments sometimes tax their 
citizens or borrow funds to establish a 
variety of state-owned manufacturing 
enterprises to provide employment and 
growth. The problem comes when these 
enterprises run into difficulties, as they 
frequently do, and start losing large 
amounts of money. This can happen 
because of bad luck, product obso- 
lescence, mismanagement, or because 
the enterprise was ill-conceived to begin 
with. Such enterprises, launched with 
much fanfare by government leaders, 
cannot be easily terminated without 
substantial political cost. To keep them 
alive, governments are then compelled 
to provide large subsidies by raising 
taxes on their citizens and the healthy 
parts of the economy. This, in turn, robs 
healthier businesses of money that would 
otherwise be used for new investment. 
To make matters worse, governments 
also frequently compel the managers of 
state-owned enterprises to hire or retain 
large numbers of unnecessary workers, 
further adding to the requirements for 
state subsidies and increasing the cost of 
the products manufactured by the 
inefficient. 

A case in point concerns the example 
of two oil refineries in Latin America of 
similar age, size, and construction, one 
still in private hands, the other now a 
state-owned enterprise. I am told the 
private refinery employs about 600 
workers and the state-owned refinery 
more than 5,000 employees to generate 
a similar amount of output. 

This pattern of events, in similar but 
less dramatic cases, is depressingly 
familiar throughout much of the world. 
The question is what to do about it. 
Some thoughts come to mind. 

It is important to recognize that 
public investment in state-owned 
manufacturing enterprises is a poor 
substitute for the more difficult but far 
more important task of creating condi- 
tions that will result in more private 



investment. Governments do best when 
they invest in basic infrastructure, such 
as roads, schools, harbors, industrial 
parks, and other similar undertakings 
that will create opportunities for more 
private investment. Experience shows 
that governments, as a rule, are not 
good at establishing or managing actual 
manufacturing or producing operations. 
This is because politics interferes with 
rational day-to-day decisionmaking in 
state-owned enterprises. Hardheaded, 
practical, specialized businessmen per- 
form this function far more efficiently. 
Collectively, this results in a much more 
dynamic national economy. 

What I am saying here is not mere 
theory. It is simply the empirical results 
of vast past experience about state- 
owned enterprises around the world. 
Yes, there are exceptions due to 
specialized circumstances or unusually 
gifted individual managers. But vital 
national growth policies should be based 
upon the broader patterns, not the 
exceptions. 

Divesting inefficient state-owned 
enterprises, while broadly recognized as 
desirable, is a difficult task that can only 
be done by political leaders who can 
articulately explain to their peoples the 
importance of creating a modern 
national economy based on efficient self- 
sustaining building blocks instead of on 
state-owned industrial dinosaurs that 
consume, through endless subsidies, the 
investment capital that would otherwise 
be used to create self-sustaining 
economic growth and productive jobs 
elsewhere in the nation. 

Land Reform and Food Production 

Finally, I want to offer a personal word 
about a sensitive subject that has a bear- 
ing on private investment in agriculture 
in Latin America. That subject is "land 
reform." 

Several hundred years ago, textiles 
in England were produced largely 
through a cottage-type industry. Indi- 
viduals wove tweeds and clothing of all 
sorts in their homes for their families 
and for limited sale to others. 

Then came the arrival of the indus- 
trial revolution, and suddenly cottage 
workers were threatened with displace- 
ment due to the revolutionary new 
technology of power looms. The Luddite 
movement developed and thousands of 
workers swarmed into the factories in 
England to destroy the power looms 
and, they hoped, to save their cottage 
jobs. 



We know that this did not succe<l 
and England continued for decades tj 
lead the world in technology. Living I 
standards rose dramatically, and 
everyone benefited. 

In my view, some exponents of 1; I 
reform, in attempting to replace larg I 
scale private agriculture with a new I 
emphasis upon micro-sized subsisten | 
peasant farming, are unwittingly pre b: 
ing policies very similar in aim to th< j 
Luddite movement. Nor have collect I 
farms, by whatever name, proven ml 
acceptable or successful in Latin 
America than they have been elsewh |e 
in the world in producing food for 
nations. 

We have seen in this century an I 
explosion of population. However, tr I 
Malthusian prediction of mass starvs I 
has not occurred because modern 
technology has developed agricultur: I 
techniques, whereby a relatively few I 
diminishing number of farmers can { V 
duce more food on a fixed amount of I 
land to feed the world's billions. We 
have discovered that economies of sc I 
work in many kinds of privately run I 
food-growing facilities as well as the I 
in industry. 

The practice of land reform in L; I 
America, by contrast, has usually be 
accompanied by dramatic reductions I 
long-term food production on the sai ' 
acreages, despite frequent state sub- 1 
sidies of various kinds. Peru, for exa 
pie, once was the world's most efficii . 
producer of sugar. It now must impo 
part of its sugar from Guatemala dm I 
a well-intentioned but utterly disastr I 
land reform. Peru's land reform also I 
triggered a rush of former farm worl I 
and their families to the cities as the I 
rural economy weakened across the I 
board. 

Land reform efforts designed to I 
solve social and economic problems o 
the 19th century, and farm pricing 
policies that deny farmers a fair retu: 
have turned nation after nation in pa 
of Latin America from being food 
exporters to food importers. Unwise 
food-pricing policies also rob countrie 
needed investment in agriculture 
because no one will voluntarily invest 
a money-losing proposition. Moreover 
the money now needed to purchase 
foreign food is not available to invest 
jobs at home. Finally, farmers are no 
ferent from the rest of us. They wil 
work hard or pay for expensive fertil- 
izers and machines to produce food tr 
must be sold without profit or reward 
for their risks and labors. 

We must, therefore, urgently 
transform our thinking about food 



72 



Department of State Bull 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



icies. The growing needs of the 21st 
tury for food and jobs, rather than 
class warfare of the 19th century, 
st be the driving force behind 
[.cultural policies. And all of us, in 
shington and in Latin America, must 
©nest enough to face the empirical 
ience of policy results. Where policies 
, however well-intentioned, let us 
Dgnize them for what they are. In this 
.1 area, continuing to spend scarce 
purees on proven mistakes is feeding 
*ed cattle at the expense of hungry 
ions. 

An alternative to land reform is to 
w the market to determine food 
es and to levy fair, but not excessive, 
2S upon successful large farms, keep- 
the productive units intact, the 
erienced owners and managers on 
r farms, the workers gainfully 
Joyed in the countryside, and the 
on fed. 

elusion 

1 basic reality of what I have been 
ing about today is very simple. As I 
at the outset of my remarks, 
lout investment there will be no new 
. Without new jobs, there will be no 
lomic growth. Without economic 
vth, there will be no political stabili- 
^.nd without political stability, 
isk a return to violence and 
itorships. 

Kll of us have a role to play to create 
;conomic, political, and security con- 
ns necessary for investment and 
rth. And all of us must do our part, 
use the absence of just one element 
e comprehensive package means 
sustained economic growth and 
stment will not take place. 
Vithin countries, political party 
;rs have a special role to play in 
ating the electorate about the corn- 
requirements of building a modern 
mic economy. They need to be 
e that investor confidence is a very 
le commodity and that more jobs 
ometimes lost through irresponsible 
>ric during election campaigns than 
rnments are later able to encourage 
!ars of patient constructive action. 
Ve in the United States have our 
to play. It is important that we 
vigorously to keep our own 
:ets open. We must also work with 
■ countries far more effectively than 
D now to combat the mortal threat 
■rorism and lawlessness now sap- 
economic vitality in Central 



America, Peru, and elsewhere. This will 
be a major challenge facing our peoples 
and our diplomacy in the decade ahead, 
and solving it won't be cheap or easy. 

Other governments, in varying 
degrees, need to reform their macro- 
economic, tax, investment, trade, and 
food policies. Without these reforms, 



they will not be able to produce the food 
and jobs required by their peoples, and 
without producing these two vital 
necessities, democracy itself will surely 
fail. 

It must be our highest priority to 
make sure that this does not happen. ■ 



Visit of President of Uruguay 




President Julio Maria Sanguinetti of 
the Oriental Republic of Uruguay made a 
state visit to the United States June 16-20, 
1986, to meet with President Reagan and 
other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and President 
Sanguinetti at the arrival ceremony on 
June 1 7. 1 



President Reagan 

It gives me great pleasure to greet 
President Sanguinetti. As the elected 
leader of a free and democratic 
Uruguay, you have our respect, our 
admiration, and our heartfelt welcome. 

Uruguay is a friend and a country 
that shares with us the heritage, tradi- 
tions, and values of the Americas. Our 



countries, as is true of so many in this 
hemisphere, were born of independence 
movements seeking to break away from 
colonial power. Yet those who founded 
our two countries fought not only to be 
rid of domination but also for freedom. 
Our histories run parallel— both are the 
stories of people struggling to be free; 
people striving to live up to the ideals 
expressed at the time of their nation's 
birth. 

Today the people of Uruguay are 
reaffirming their faith in democracy. 
And all those who love liberty applaud 
this giant step forward. President 
Sanguinetti, we appreciate that your 
official delegation includes represen- 
tatives from the judicial and legislative 
branches, as well as your executive 
branch of government. Separation of 



'Ciber 1986 



'C 



73 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



powers, protection of the rights of all 

citizens, and a healthy respecl tor the 
opinions of others are hallmarks of a 
truly tree society. And that is what you 
and the current leaders of Uruguay are 
building. 

In recent years, we have witnessed 
an unprecedented expansion of 
democracy in the Americas. Just a 
decade ago, only one-third of the people 
in this hemisphere lived in democracy. 
Today 90% of the people live in countries 
that are democratic or in transition to 
democracy. We should not be satisfied 
until all Americans— and that means 
every living soul from the North Slope of 
Alaska to the tip of Tierra del Fuego— 
live in freedom, as is their birthright. 

In this hemisphere, the days of dic- 
tatorship, left or right, are numbered. 
The peaceful process used to reestablish 
democracy in Uruguay can serve as a 
model for others. Authoritarian regimes 
should take notice. 

Yet while we celebrate the progress 
that has been made, no one should 
overlook the decisive battle in the cause 
of human freedom now taking place in 
Central America. The outcome will 
determine, ultimately, whether the 
people of that region will enjoy a future 
blessed with peace and development or, 
instead, be engulfed in tyranny and con- 
flict. We who enjoy the fruits of liberty 
understand that just and lasting peace is 
built on freedom. 

Our search for peace in Central 
America must, above all, be an effort to 
continue the expansion of democratic 
freedom that has reached four of the five 
nations of this troubled region. We must 
continue to press for a negotiated solu- 
tion. And in this work, we must uphold 
our democratic values and insist that 
they be the basis for any agreement that 
is worthy of our support. 

The Western Hemisphere still holds 
the promise of liberty and opportunity 
that drew our forefathers and mothers 
from the Old World. Uruguay, like the 
United States, is a nation of immigrants. 
They came to our shores in quest of 
freedom and looking for the chance, 
through hard work, to improve their 
well-being and that of their families. 

Uruguay's commitment to economic 
growth and revitalization is well 
appreciated here. You have set out to 
attack not just the symptoms but the 
underlying causes of your country's 
economic problems. By protecting 
Uruguay's good name and credit wor- 
thiness, by avoiding simplistic solutions 
and quick fixes, and by strengthening 
your private sector, you are building the 
confidence at home and abroad needed 



to carry your country into better and 
more prosperous times. 

In a speech to your people on 
April 7th, you said, "The state sets the 
direction, but it does not move the boat. 
The boat is moved by the private 
sector. . . . " This appreciation of the 
essential role of profit motive and enter- 
prise bodes well for Uruguay. Already, 
your country is enjoying its first real 
economic growth in 4 years. And there's 
every reason to be optimistic that this 
upward trend will continue. Let me just 
add that, as Uruguay's largest trading 
partner, nothing makes us happier than 
to see your country prosper. 




ARGENTINA 




URUGUAY^ 

Montevideo 



Atlantic 
Ocean 



I'm looking forward to getting to 
know you and discussing some of the 
issues that are of importance to both of 
our countries. These are exciting times, 
and we're proud to have you here with 
us and thrilled that Uruguay is again in 
the family of free peoples. 

President Sanguinetti 2 

It is a great honor for any Uruguayan 
citizen to come to this house. There are 
strong reasons for this. Our countries 
were born during the same span of his- 
tory and were part of the same liberal 
revolution which inspired them with the 
same ideals. Our century and a half of 
independent life since then has demon- 
strated our faithfulness to those princi- 
ples. Because of this, we stood together 
in the two great World Wars of this cen- 
tury; milestones which have defined the 
political philosophies of the people of the 
world ever since. If this is true for any 
Uruguayan citizen, how much more so is 
it true for someone like me, arriving 
here as the President of the Republic 
and representing a people that has, by 
its vote, entrusted me with the difficult 
task of peacefully guiding our republic 



back, after a de facto government, 
full and stable institutional life. 

You know that during these las 
months, all of Uruguay has made a 
effort and lived a wonderful experi 
of peaceful change with the full an< 
unrestricted interplay of its institui 
and rights with violence toward no 
Uruguay is heir to a long democrat 
tradition and, therefore, suffered a 
more from the collapse of its institi 
tions. Today it feels it has returnee 
old legacy and has done so in exem 
fashion, one that enhances those 
traditions. 

For this reason, as you, yourse 
have pointed out, you have before 3 
today not only the chief of the exec 
branch but also the President of th ■ 
Supreme Court of Justice, the Pres 
of the House of Representatives, w^ 
represents the main opposition par 
and my party's leader in the Senat 
happens to be the son of the last 
Uruguayan President to visit here, 
31 years ago. This environment of 
monious cordiality among the diffe 
branches of government and demoi 
parties is the best evidence we can 
the world of what we have achieve 
such a short time. 

I would not be sincere, howeve 
did not mention that our country is 
experiencing serious problems that 
from both domestic and internatior 
causes. It is not easy to strive for t 
consolidation of our hard-won deni( 
and to put our domestic economy ii 
order while external economic and 
cial conditions subsist that in some 
hamper, and in other cases actually 
cancel out, the fruits of our own int 
efforts. 

We must respond to the legitirr 
and urgent call of our people to rec 
their past standard of living and, at 
same time, confront the heavy debt 
have inherited— all within the conte 
an increasingly closed and protectic 
world trading system. These are tn 
which your government has commit 
itself to fight, a position we whole- 
heartedly endorse in order to prese 
the mutual advantages of fair and c 
world trade. 

We have come to exchange viev 
with you and your government on 
of these problems. We shall speak 
frankly, as we always do— the more 
a country we have always considers 
friend. We may at times disagree, I 
precisely because of our friendship 
feel that it is our duty to speak to e 
other with loyalty, clearly and 
constructively. 



1 1 



74 



Department of State B> J 



We know that public opinion is very 
lortant in this democratic nation, and 
, therefore, understand our positions, 
are also confident that your govern- 
it will take them into consideration 
:n we look together at ways of 
roving our relationship and overcom- 
the consequences of these problems. 
Either international trade is freed, 
ve must all resign ourselves to being 
:ed into a new feudalism. The more 
■erful may survive longer, although 
demned to live in an aggressive, 
table, and violent world. The weaker, 
us, will be sentenced to a life of 
liocrity. But all of us, sooner or later, 
be staring poverty in the face. 
George Washington foresaw the 
Drtance of this over 200 years ago 
n he said, "Sound policy, 
anitarianism, and our own self- 
rest all suggest a harmonious and 
al exchange with all nations." 
fever, even in our trading policy, we 
t keep a fair and unbiased position 
out seeking or granting favors or 
usive preferences, respecting the 
ral course of events. For this 
on, we seek neither charity nor pro- 
rs of any kind. We need only 
€rative partners, strong in capital 
technology, with whom we may 
c together to build a better world 
ed by the same ideals of freedom 
inspired our forefathers. 
n a troubled world, our country is 
y, as it has been in the past, a land 
ace and democracy. We would wish 
e this same peace and democracy all 
the Americas, achieved by us Latin 
ricans as the result of our own 
'rical commitments and our sense of 
msibility to the future. Uruguay will 
nue to participate in all political 
ts aimed at promoting peace in 
?'s world, especially within our 
rica. 

'eace and democracy are insepa- 
. We cannot have one without the 
\ Uruguay today reaffirms once 
1 its faith in both principles, which 
;itute the backbone of its very 
ence as a free and independent 
n. 

t is in this spirit that we greet you, 
government, and our friends, your 
le. 



leld at the South Portico of the White 
: where President Sanguinetti was 
Jed a formal welcome with full military 
5 (text from Weekly Compilation of 
ential Documents of June 23, 1986). 
President Sanguinetti spoke in Spanish, 
is remarks were translated by an inter- 



TREATIES 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency-Done at New York Oct. 26, 1956. * 
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873 
Acceptance deposite d: Zimbabwe, 
Aug. 1, 1986. 

Conservation 

( ''invention on the conservation of Antarctic 

marine living resources, with annex for an 

arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 

1980. Entered into force Apr. 7. 1982. TIAS 

10240. 

Accession deposit ed: Korea, Rep. of. 

Mar. 29, 1985. 

Finance— Asian Development Bank 

Articles of agreement establishing the Asian 

Development Bank. Done at Manila Dec. 4. 

1965. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1966. TIAS 

6103. 

Acceptances deposited: China. People's Rep. 

of, Mar. 10, 1986; Spain, Feb. 14, 1986. 

Finance — Inter-American Development 
Bank 

Agreement establishing the Inter-American 
Development Bank, with annexes. Done at 
Washington Apr. S. 1959. Entered into force 
Dec. 30, L959. TIAS 4397. 
Signature and acceptance dep osited: Norway. 
July 7, 1986. 

Fisheries 

Protocol to amend the international conven- 
tion of May l-l. 1966, for the conservation of 
Atlantic tunas (TIAS 6767). Done at Paris 
July 10, 1984. 1 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 24. 1986. 

Human Rights 

International convenant on civil and political 
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 999 UNTS 

171.- 

International convenant on economic, social, 

and cultural rights. Done at New York 

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan 3, 1976. 

999 UNTS 3. 2 

Ratifications deposited: \rgentina, Aug 8, 1986 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the civil aspects of interna- 
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague 
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 
1983. 2 

Ratification deposited: U.K., May 20, 
1986. 3 

Marine Pollution 

International convention relating to 
intervention on the high seas in cases of oil 



pollution casualties, with annex. Done at 
Bi i sels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force 

May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. 

\ceession deposited: South Africa. July 1, 1986. 

Maritime Matters 

International convention on maritime search 
and rescue. 1979, with annex. Done at Ham- 
burg Apr. 27. 1979. Entered into force 
June 22, 1985. 
Accession deposited: Venezuela, July 8, 1986. 

Pollution 

Protocol to the convention on long-range 
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 1979 
(TIAS 10541), concerning monitoring and 
evaluation of the long-range transmission of 
air pollutants in Europe (EMEP). with annex. 
Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984. 1 
Appro val deposited: EEC, July 17, 1986. 

Convention for the protection of the ozone 

layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 

1985. 1 

Senate adv ice and c ons ent to ratific ation 

July 24. 1986. 

Ratifi ed by Pres ident: Aug. 14, 1986. 

Postal 

Second additional protocol to the constitution 
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964. 
I "one at Lausanne July 5, 1974. TIAS 8231. 
Ratificati on deposite d: Turkey, June 25, 1986 

Property— Intellectual 

I 'invention establishing the World 
Intellectual Property Organization. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force 
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25. 1970. 
TIAS 6932. 
Ratifi cation deposit ed: Iceland, June 13, 1986. 

Red Cross 

( leneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded and sick in armed 
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for 
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362. 

< leneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship- 
wrecked members of armed forces at sea. 
Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2. 1956. 
TIAS 3363. 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment 
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for 
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364. 

Geneva convention relative to the protection 
of civilian persons in time of war. Done at 
Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 
3365 

\ccessions deposited: Equatorial Guinea, 
July 24, 1986 



Der 1986 



75 



TREATIES 



Protocol additional to the Geneva convenl 
of Aug. 12, [949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
3365), and relating to the protection of vic- 
tims of international armed conflicts (Protocol 
I), with anne ces I tone at Geneva June 8, 
L977. Entered into force Dec. 7. 19' 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 

ig. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
3365). and relating to the protection of vic- 
tims of noninternational armed conflicts (Pro- 
tocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. 
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978. 
Accessions deposited: Benin, May 28, 1986; 
Equatorial Guinea, July 24, 1986; Jamaica, 
July 29, 1986. 

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, 
May 20, 1986." 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, 
with annexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi 
Nov. 6, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984; 
definitively for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986. 
Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates, 
May 22. L986. 

Ratification s deposited : Barbados. May 22, 1986; 
Bulgaria, May 21, 1986; 3 Italy, May 13, 1986; 3 
Zambia, May 29, 1986. 

Terrorism 

International convention against the taking of 

hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. 

Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the U.S. 

Jan. 6, 1985. 

Accession de posited: Antigua and Barbuda, 

Aug. 6. 1986. 

Ratifi cation deposit ed: Togo, July 25, 1986. 

UNIDO 

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, with annexes. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into 
force June 21, 1985. 
Accession deposited: Tonga. Aug. 13, 1986. 

Wheat 

Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at Lon- 
don Mar. 14, 1986. Entered into force July 1, 
1986. 5 

Notifications i if provisional applicati on deposited: 
El Salvador. July 11, 1986; Panama, July 3, 
1986 
Ratification deposited: Barbados, July 2, 1986. 

Women 

Convention on the political rights of women. 

Done ;it New York Mar. 31. 1953. Entered 

into force July 7. 1954; for the U.S. July 7 

1976. TIAS 8289 

Accession deposited: Colombia. Aug. 5, 1986. 

entior on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination againsl women. Done at New 
York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 
Sept 3, 1981. 2 

deposited: Iraq, Aug. 13, 1986. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement concerning the furnishing of 
launch and associated services for Australia's 
national satellite system. Signed at 
Washington Mar. 7, 1985. Entered into force 
Mar. 7, 1985. 

Canada 

Agreement concerning the exchange of fuel 
for naval ships and aircraft, with enclosure. 
Signed at Ottawa and Washington May 5 and 
June 27, 1986. Entered into force June 27, 
1986. 

Agreement modifying the agreement of 
Oct. 19, 1983, relating to limitation of imports 
of specialty steel from Canada. Effected by 
exchange of letters at Washington July 15 
and 17, 1986. Entered into force July 17, 
1986; effective July 20, 1986. 

Central African Republic 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the U.S. Government through 
the Export-Import Bank of the United States. 
Signed at Washington May 23, 1986. Entered 
into force Aug. 1, 1986. 

Dominican Republic 

Memorandum of understanding governing 
cooperation in mapping, charting, and 
geodesy. Signed at Santo Domingo July 24, 
1986. Entered into force July 24, 1986." 

El Salvador 

Agreement amending the agreement for the 
sale of agricultural commodities of Dec. 20, 
1985. Effected by exchange of notes at San 
Salvador June 27, 1986. Enters into force 
upon written notification by the parties that 
the internal procedures of both countries have 
been completed. 

Ghana 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Accra July 14, 1986. 
Entered into force July 14, 1986. 

Guatemala 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities (and amending agreement of June 6, 
1985). Signed at Guatemala July 2, 1986. 
Enters into force following an exchange of 
notes confirming that the internal procedures 
of the importing country have been met. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of June 6, 1985. 
Signed at Guatemala Aug. 9. 1985. Entered 
into force Aug. 9, 1985. 

Haiti 

Agreement on procedures for mutual 
assistance in law enforcement matters. 
Signed at Port-au-Prince Aug. 15, 1986. 
Entered into force Aug. 15, 1986. 



Honduras 

Third amendment to the grant agreemei 
Mar. 25, 1985, relating to financial stabi 
tion and economic recovery in Honduras i 
Signed at Tegucigalpa June 19, 1986. 
Entered into force June 19. 1986. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement modifying and extending ag I 
ment of June 23, 1982 (TIAS 10420), rel 
to trade in certain textiles and textile pr 
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at F 
Kong Aug. 4, 1986. Entered into force 
Aug. 4, 1986; effective Jan. 1, 1986. 

Kenya 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com 
modities. Signed at Nairobi July 16, 198 
Entered into force July 16, 1986. 

Malaysia 

Agreement amending agreement of Jul; 
and 11, 1985, as amended, relating to tr 
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textile 
textile products. Effected by exchange i 
notes at Kuala Lumpur July 24 and 25, 
Entered into force July 25, 1986. 

Mozambique 

Agreement amending the agreement fo 
sale of agricultural commodities of Apri 
1986. Effected by exchange of letters an 
Maputo July 9, 1986. Entered into force 
July 9, 1986. 

Pakistan 

Agreement concerning the provisions o: 
training related to defense articles unde- 
U.S. international military education an 
training (IMET) program. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Islamabad Dec. 10 
1985. and July 30, 1986. Entered into fd 
July 30, 1986. 

Panama 

Agreement regarding the consolidation 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with anne 
Signed at Washington July 2. 1986. Ent 
into force Aug. 18, 1986. 

Senegal 

International express mail agreement, v 
detailed regulations. Signed at Dakar ar 
Washington June 5 and Julv 3, 1986. Er 
into force Sept. 1, 1986. 

Sierra Leone 

Agreement amending the agreement foi 
of agricultural commodities of May 5, 1£ 
Effected by exchange of notes at Freeto 
Aug. 1, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 1 
1986. 



76 



Denartmfint nf State Bl 



IESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department of State 



releases may be obtained from the 
of Press Relations, Department of 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Dale 

8/4 



8/6 



8/11 



8/11 



8/11 



Subject 

Air fares between Switzerland 
and U.S. to be partially 
deregulated; Swissair to 
offer new service to U.S. 

Foreign Relations of the 
failed States, 1955-1957, 
Volume II, China, released. 

Program for the official work- 
ing visit to Washington, D.C, 
of President Miguel de la 
Madrid Hurtado of the 
United Mexican States, 
Aug. 12-14. 

Shultz: statement and 
question-and-answer ses- 
sion, Bogota, Aug. 7. 

Whitehead: statement and 
question-and-answer 
session. 



160 8/15 Shultz: opening statement at 
first plenary session of 
U.S. -Australian bilateral 
ministerial. San Francisco. 
Aug. 11. 

*161 8/15 Shultz: dinner remarks aboard 
The Citi/ of San Francisco, 
Aug. 11. 
162 8/15 Shultz, Weinberger, Hayden. 
Beazley: joint news con- 
ference, San Francisco, 
Aug. 11. 

*163 8/18 Shultz: remarks at Balaguer 
House. Santo Domingo, 
Dominican Republic, Aug. 15. 

*164 8/26 Reginald Bartholomew sworn 
in as U.S. Ambassador to 
Spain, Aug. 20 (biographic 
data). 

*165 8/26 Regional Foreign Policy Con- 
ference. Baltimore, Sept. 19. 

*166 8/29 CSCE forum, Miami, Sept. 7. 

♦167 8/29 U.S.. Mexico AM broadcasting 
agreement signed, Aug. 28. 

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 



ment amending the agreement for sales 
cultural commodities of Jan. 26, 1986. 
ed by exchange of notes at Khartoum 
1986. Entered into force July 16, 



nd 

ment concerning the provision of train- 
ated to defense articles under the U.S. 
itional military education and training 
') program. Effected by exchange of 
it Bangkok Apr. 15 and July 28, 1986. 
>d into force July 28. 1986. 



Agreement amending agreement of July 27 
and Aug. 8, 1983. as amended, relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber tex- 
tiles and textile products. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Bangkok Apr. 4 and 
June 5, 1986. Entered into force June 5, 
1986. 



'Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the U.S. 

3 With reservation(s) and declaration(s) 

4 With declaration. 

5 In force provisionally for the U.S. ■ 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

SDI: Progress and Promise, briefing on the 
SDI, Aug. 6, 1986 (Current Policy #858). 

Africa 

Does South Africa Have a Future?. Assistant 
Secretary Keyes, National Urban League's 
annual conference. San Francisco, July 21, 
1986 (Current Policy #857). 

Africa: U.S. Policy (GIST. Aug. 1986). 

Meaning of Sanctions and Countersanctions 
for South Africa's Neighbors (GIST, Aug. 
1986). 

U.S. Pressures on South Africa (GIST. Aug. 
1986). 

Arms Control 

Arms Control: Turning the Corner?, ACDA 
Director Adelman, American Bar Assoc, 
New York City, Aug. 12, 1986 (Current 
Policy #861). 

U.S. Policy Regarding Limitations on Nuclear 
Testing,' Aug. 1986 (Special Report #150). 

Interim Restraint Policy: U.S. and Soviet 
Force Projections, Aug. 1986 (Special 
Report #151). 

Department & Foreign Service 

The Foreign Affairs Budget, Deputy 

Secretary Whitehead, press briefing, 
Aug. 11, 1986 (Current Policy #860). 

East Asia 

U.S. -China Science and Technology 
Exchanges (GIST. Aug. 1986). 

Europe 

Twentieth Semiannual Report on Implemen- 
tation of Helsinki Final Act, Oct. 1, 
1985-Apr. 1, 1986 (Special Report #146). 

Soviet Active Measures: The WPC 
Copenhagen Peace Congress, Oct. 15-19, 
1986, July 1986 (Foreign Affairs Note). 

General 

Current Policy Digest No. 18, July 1986. 
Selected State Department Publications, July 
1986. 

Narcotics 

U.S. International Narcotic Control Pro- 
grams and Policies, Deputy Secretary 
Whitehead, Senate Appropriations Commit- 
tee, Aug. 14, 1986 (Current Policy #863). 



fier 1986 



77 



PUBLICATIONS 



Oceans 

Will Protect Freedom of the Seas?, 
Assistant Secretary Negroponte, Law of 

Sea Institute, Miami, July 21, 1986 
(Current PoliCJ 0855). 

Terrorism 

Economic Sanctions to Combat International 
Terrorism, July 1986 (Special Report #149). 

Western Hemisphere 

Obstacles to Investment and Economic 
Growth in Latin America, Ambassador to 
the OAS McCormack, Conference of the 
Great Cities of the Americas, San Juan, 
June 20, 1986 (Current Policy #862). ■ 



Background Notes 



This series provides brief, factual summaries 
of the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of about 170 countries 
(excluding the United States) and of selected 
international organizations. Recent revisions 
are: 

Afghanistan (July 1986) 
Argentina (July 1986) 
Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) (Apr. 1986) 
Burma (May 1986) 
Chile (Apr. 1986) 
Korea, North (May 1986) 
Laos (May 1986) 
Mali (Apr. 1986) 
Morocco (July 1986) 
Sierra Leone (July 1986) 
Somalia (Apr. 1986) 
Syria (June 1986) 
Tanzania (July 1986) 
Index (June 1986) 

A free copy of the index only may be 
obtained from the Correspondence Manage- 
ment Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. 

For about 60 Background Notes a year, a 
subscription is available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for 
$32.00 (domestic) and $40.00 (foreign). Check 
or money order, made payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accom- 
pany order. ■ 



Foreign Relations Volume Released 



The Department of State on August 6, 
1986, released Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1955-1957. Volume II, 
China. This volume documents U.S. 
policy in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1955. 

In mid-January 1955, Chinese com- 
munist attacks on the Dachen Islands, 
northernmost of the nationalist-held 
islands off the China coast, posed a 
dilemma for the United States. The 
Eisenhower Administration was commit- 
ted to protect the nationalist regime on 
Taiwan but hoped to avoid being drawn 
into an armed conflict with China. The 
Administration developed a threefold 
strategy. The United States pressed the 
nationalists to evacuate the Dachens and 
assisted in the evacuation. Congress 
passed the Formosa Resolution, 
authorizing the President to use U.S. 
Armed Forces to protect Taiwan, the 
Pescadores, and related positions. 
Simultaneously, the United States sup- 
ported a New Zealand initiative to raise 
the offshore islands problem before the 
UN Security Council. 

President Eisenhower was deeply 
disturbed by the ongoing Taiwan Strait 
crisis. He concluded that nationalist 
withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu 
offered the best solution, and he hoped 
Chiang Kai-shek would decide on his 
own initiative to treat them as dispen- 
sable outposts. In April 1955, he sent 
Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. 
Robertson and Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Chairman Admiral Arthur Radford to 
Taiwan in an unsuccessful attempt to 
persuade Chiang to withdraw from 
Quemoy and Matsu. 



The crisis entered a new phase ■ 
Premier Zhou Enlai of the People's 
Republic of China declared in April 
the Bandung Conference of Asian a>< 
African nations that China was will 
enter into negotiations with the Uni 
States in order to discuss the relaxa 
of tension. Great Britain, India, and' 
other countries renewed diplomatic 
efforts to bring about a peaceful res 
tion of the crisis. In July, these effoi 
culminated in a U.S. -Chinese agreer 
to begin talks at the ambassadorial 
The volume concludes with preparat 
for the U.S.-People's Republic of Cr 
ambassadorial talks. The talks, held 
Geneva from August 1955 through 
December 1957, will be documented 
Volume III, scheduled for publicatio 
later this year. 

Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, 
Volume II, which comprises 688 pag 
previously classified foreign affairs 
records, was prepared in the Office 
the Historian, Bureau of Public AM 
Department of State. This authoriffl 
official record is based upon the file: 
the White House, the Department 0' 
State, and other government agenci 

Copies of Volume II (Departmer 
State Publication No. 9450 (GPO St. 
No. 044-000-02118-8) may be pur- 
chased for $23.00 (domestic postpak 
from the Superintendent of Doeume- 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C, 20402. Checks oil 
money orders should be made payab 
the Superintendent of Documents. 



Press release 156 of August 6, 1986. 






78 



Department of State Bui 1 



EX 



lober 1986 

jme 86, No. 2115 



il Control 

i Control: Turning the Corner? 

ulman) 7 

[ Jpens Final Session (White House 

lement) 9 

s-n Restraint: U.S. and Soviet Force 
I ections (letter to the Congress, 

lassified report) 10 

i ential Response to Soviet Arms Control 

oosals (White House statement) 12 

I ent's News Conference of August 12 

l?rpts) 2 

ileets in Geneva (White House and U.S. 

pments) 18 

progress and Promise (Reagan) 1 

. olicy Regarding Limitations on Nuclear 



sing. 



.14 



LS.S.R. Discussions on Nuclear Testing 

e House statement) 17 

&lia. U.S. and Australia Hold 

isterial Talks (Beazley, Hayden, Shultz, 

I iberger, joint statement) 43 

li Update on Chile (Abrams) 66 

jess 

in Restraint: U.S. and Soviet Force 

ections (letter to the Congress, 

Wtssified report) 10 

■ on UN Human Rights Commission 

ding (Schifter) 61 

I eport on Cyprus (message to the 

Iress) 35 

il ternational Narcotic Control 

flrams and Policies (Whitehead) 37 

; pfugee Policies and Programs at 

idear 1986 (Purcell) 49 

a on Chile (Abrams) 66 

r\ . 27th Report on Cyprus (message to 

e| ongress) 35 

ament & Foreign Service. The Foreign 

Srs Budget (Whitehead) 19 

Inks 

mnic Sanctions to Combat International 

iflirism 27 

aes to Investment and Economic 

tith in Latin America (McCormack) . .70 

itcic Petroleum Reserve (White House 

llhient) 34 

kf oliey: Where Will America Lead? 

Hinn) 31 

-.pan Relations: A Global Partnership 

rie Future (Armacost) 20 

-..pan Semiconductor Trade Agreement 

e£an) 22 

ajon Chile (Abrams) 66 

ri . Strategic Petroleum Reserve (White 

Be statement) 34 

p| 

Jbens Final Session (White House 

jfcient) 9 

item and Tourism (Oakley) 55 

b*i Assistance 

•Jj-eign Affairs Budget (Whitehead) . . 19 

. j'fugee Policies and Programs at 

liar 1986 (Purcell) 49 

ifriv 

Hnt's News Conference of August 12 

«*pts) 2 

i Jiniversary of Berlin Wall (Reagan) . 35 



Human Rights 

Captive Nations Week, 1986 (proclamation) 36 

1 lth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act 
(Reagan) 36 

Report on UN Human Rights Commission 
Meeting (Schifter) til 

I fpdate on Chile (Abrams) 66 

Japan 

Perspective and Proportion for U.S.-Japanese 
Relations (Sigur) 24 

U.S. -Japan Relations: A Global Partnership 
for the Future (Armacost) 20 

U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement 
(Reagan) 22 

Law Of The Sea. Who Will Protect Freedom 
of the Seas? (Negroponte) 41 

Maritime Affairs. Who Will Protect 
Freedom of the Seas? (Negroponte) 41 

Mexico. Visit of Mexican President (De la 
Madrid. Reagan) 65 

Military Affairs 

Binary Chemical Munitions Program (White 
House statement) 37 

SDI: Progress and Promise (Reagan) 1 

Narcotics. U.S. International Narcotic Con- 
trol Programs and Policies (Whitehead) . . 37 

New Zealand. U.S. and Australia Hold 
Ministerial Talks (Beazley, Hayden, Shultz, 
Weinberger, joint statement) 43 

Nicaragua 

Nicaragua's Role in Revolutionary Interna- 
tionalism (Walters) 58 

President's News Conference of August 12 
(excerpts) 2 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Binary 
Chemical Munitions Program (White House 
statement) 37 

Oceans. Who Will Protect Freedom of the 
Seas? (Negroponte) 41 

Pakistan. Visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister 
(joint statement) 54 

Presidential Documents 

Antiterrorism Act Signed into Law 58 

Captive Nations Week, 1986 (proclamation) 36 

1 lth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act 36 

Interim Restraint: U.S. and Soviet Force 
Projections (letter to the Congress, 
unclassified report) 10 

International Trade 6 

President's News Conference of August 12 
(excerpts) 2 

SDI: Progress and Promise 1 

25th Anniversary of Berlin Wall 35 

27th Report on Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 35 

U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade Agree- 
ment 22 

Visit of Mexican President (De la Madrid, 
Reagan) 65 

Visit of President of Uruguay (Reagan, 
Sanguinetti) 73 

Publications 

Background Notes 78 

Department of State 77 

Foreign Relations Volume Released 78 

Refugees. U.S. Refugee Policies and Pro- 
grams at Midyear 1986 (Purcell) 49 

South Africa. President's News Conference 
of August 12 (excerpts) 2 



Terrorism 

Antiterrorism Act Signed into Law 
(Reagan) 58 

Economic Sanctions to Combat International 
Terrorism 27 

President's News Conference of August 12 
(excerpts) 2 

Terrorism and Tourism (Oakley) 55 

Trade 

Economic Sanctions to Combat International 
Terrorism 27 

International Trade (Reagan) 6 

Obstacles to Investment and Economic 
Growth in Latin America (McCormack) . . 70 

Trade Policy: Where Will America Lead? 
(McMinn)' 31 

U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement 
(Reagan) 22 

Travel. Terrorism and Tourism (Oakley). . .55 

Treaties. Current Actions 75 

U.S.S.R. 

Arms Control: Turning the Corner? 
(Adelman) 7 

Interim Restraint: U.S. and Soviet Force Pro- 
jections (letter to the Congress, unclassified 
report) 10 

Presidential Response to Soviet Arms Control 
Proposals (White House statement) 12 

President's News Conference of August 12 
(excerpts) 2 

SCC Meets in Geneva (White House and U.S. 
statements) 18 

U.S. Policy Regarding Limitations on Nuclear 
Testing 14 

U.S. -U.S.S.R. Discussions on Nuclear Testing 
(White House statement) 17 

United Nations 

Nicaragua's Role in Revolutionary Inter- 
nationalism (Walters) 58 

Report on UN Human Rights Commission 
Meeting (Schifter) 61 

UN Financial Crisis (Walters) 63 

Uruguay. Visit of President of Uruguay 
(Reagan, Sanguinetti) 73 

Western Hemisphere 

Nicaragua's Role in Revolutionary Interna- 
tionalism (Walters) 58 

Obstacles to Investment and Economic 
Growth in Latin America (McCormack) . . 70 

Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 66 

Adelman, Kenneth L 7 

Armacost, Michael H 20 

Beazley, Kim 43 

De La Madrid Hurtado, Miguel 65 

Hayden, Bill 43 

McCormack, Richard T 70 

McMinn, Douglas W 31 

Negroponte, John D 41 

Oakley, Robert B 55 

Purcell, James N., Jr 49 

Reagan, President . . 1, 2, 6, 10, 22, 35, 36, 58, 
65, 73 

Sanguinetti, Julio Maria 73 

Schifter, Richard 61 

Shultz, Secretary 43 

Sigur, Gaston J., Jr 24 

Walters, Vernon A 58, 63 

Weinberger, Caspar W 43 

Whitehead, John C 19, 37 



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Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy/Volume 86/Number 21 16 



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Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 86/Number 21 16/November 1986 



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CONTENTS 



FEATURE 



1 Prospects for World Peace (President Reagan) 



i President 

Keeping America Strong 

• Vice President 

Visit to the Middle East 



(Secretary 

; Progress, Freedom, and 

Responsibility 
I Proposed Refugee Admissions 

for FY 1987 



r:a 

| Continuation of South Africa 
Emergency (Message to the 
Congress) 

ns Control 

CDE Delegations Reach Accord 
on Military Activities in 
Europe (Robert L. Barry, 
President Reagan, Document) 

Nuclear and Space Arms 
Negotiations 
( Wh ite House Stateme n t ) 

MBFR Talks End 39th Round 
(Western Statement) 

MBFR Negotiations Reconvene 
(White House Statement) 

U.S. and Soviet Approaches to 
Arms Control 
(Edward L. Rowny) 
• Verifying Nuclear Testing 
Limitations: Possible U.S.- 
Soviet Cooperation 
(Message to the Congress, Text 
of Study) 



East Asia 



39 



42 



U.S. and East Asian-Pacific 
Relations: The Challenge 
Ahead (Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.) 

U.S. -Japanese Relations 



Economics 



43 



45 



An Agenda for the New GATT 

Round (Clayton Yeutter) 
GATT Nations Agree to Launch 

New Round of Trade 

Negotiations (Clayton 

Yeutter, Declaration) 



Europe 

49 Under Secretary Armacost's 

Interview on "Meet the Press" 

51 Secretary's News Briefing of 

September 12 

52 Deputy Secretary Whitehead's 

Interview on "Face the 

Nation" 
54 Secretary's News Briefing of 

September 20 
57 Secretary's News Conference of 

September 25 
60 President's and Secretary's 

News Conference of 

September 30 
64 Secretary's Interview on "The 

Today Show" 
66 Secretary's News Briefing of 

October 2 
70 Prospects for the Vienna 

CSCE Follow-Up Meeting 

( Warren Zimmerman) 

72 CSCE Follow-Up Preparatory 

Meeting 

(Department Statement) 

73 A Discussion on U.S. -Soviet 

Relations (Paul H. Nitze, 
Ma rk Palmer) 
76 28th Report on Cyprus 

(Message to the Congress) 



Human Rights 

77 Religious Persecution in 
the Soviet Union 
(Edward J. Derwinski, 
Richard Schifter) 

Science & Technology 

83 ITU Issues Report on Soviet 
Jamming 



Western Hemisphere 

Visit of Brazil's President 
(President Reagan, 
Jose Sarney) 

U.S. -Brazil Relations 

Cuba: New Migration and 
Embargo Measures 
(Department Statement) 

Arrival of Cuban Political 
Prisoners (Department 
Statements) 



84 



86 
86 



87 



Treaties 

88 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

90 Department of State 

Publications 

90 Department of State 

Index 



f DEC 1 7 1986 



attbi. 



-j 



1 HM.' 






■ 




A i ^H 



X 



>*l 



**», 



With Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. 






(White House photo by Petef 



Department of State Bu i 1 



FEATURE 
United Nations 



Prospects for 
World Peace 

by President Reagan 



Address before the 41st session 

of the UN General Assembly 

in New York City on September 22, 1986. 1 



A short walk from this chamber is the 
delegates' Meditation Room, a refuge 
from a world deafened by the noise of 
strife and violence. "We want to bring 
back the idea of worship," Dag 
Hammarskjold once said about this 
room, "devotion to something which is 
greater and higher than we are 
ourselves." 

Well, it's just such devotion that 
gave birth to the United Nations, devo- 
tion to the dream of world peace and 
freedom, of human rights and demo- 
cratic self-determination, of a time 
when, in those ancient words, " . . .and 
they shall beat their swords into 
plowshares . . . nation shall not lift up 
sword against nation, neither shall they 
learn war any more." 

The United States remains com- 
mitted to the United Nations. For over 
40 years, this organization has provided 
an international forum for harmonizing 
conflicting national interests and has 
made a significant contribution in such 
fields as peacekeeping, humanitarian 
assistance, and eradicating disease. And 
yet, no one knows better than those in 
this chamber how the noble ideals 
embodied in the Charter have often 
remained unfulfilled. This organization 
itself faces a critical hour— that is usually 
stated as a fiscal crisis. But we can turn 
this "crisis" into an opportunity. The 
important reforms proposed by a group 
of experts can be a first step toward 
restoring this organization's status and 
effectiveness. The issue, ultimately, is 



not one of cash but of credibility. If all 
the members of this universal organiza- 
tion decide to seize the moment and turn 
the rhetoric of reform into reality, the 
future of the United Nations will be 
secure. And you have my word for it: my 
country, which has always given the 
United Nations generous support, will 
continue to play a leading role in the 
effort to achieve its noble purposes. 

U.S. -Soviet Relations 

When I came before you last year, an 
important moment in the pursuit of 
those purposes had not yet occurred. 
The leaders of the Soviet Union and the 
United States were to meet in Geneva. 
These discussions have now been held. 
For over 15 hours, Soviet and American 
delegations met. For about 5 hours, 
General Secretary Gorbachev and I 
talked alone. 

Our talks were frank. The talks were 
also productive— in a larger sense than 
even the documents that were agreed. 
Mr. Gorbachev was blunt, and so was I. 
We came to realize again the truth of the 
statement: nations do not mistrust each 
other because they are armed; they are 
armed because they mistrust each other. 
And I did not hesitate to tell Mr. 
Gorbachev our view of the source of that 
mistrust: the Soviet Union's record of 
seeking to impose its ideology and rule 



on others. So, we acknowledged the deep 
and abiding differences between our 
systems of government, our views of 
history and the future of mankind. But, 
despite these differences, we resolved to 
work together for real reductions in 
nuclear arms as well as progress in other 
areas. 

Delegates to the 41st General 
Assembly of the United Nations, today I 
want to report to you on what has 
transpired since the summit: notably the 
important letter I sent July 25th to Mr. 
Gorbachev. In that letter, I dealt with 
the important issues of reducing nuclear 
arms, agreeing on strategic defenses, 
and limiting nuclear testing. In addition 
to those issues, which concern the mili- 
tary aspects of Soviet-American rela- 
tions, I would also like to address other 
essential steps toward peace: the resolu- 
tion of political conflicts, the strengthen- 
ing of the international economy, and 
the protection of human rights. 

Before I do this, however, let me, in 
the tradition of candor established at 
Geneva, tell you that a pall has been cast 
over our relations with the Soviet Union. 
I refer here to a particularly disturbing 
example of Soviet transgressions against 
human rights. 

Recently— after the arrest of a 
Soviet national and UN employee 
accused of espionage in the United 
States— an American correspondent in 
Moscow was made the subject of fabri- 
cated accusations and trumped-up 
charges. He was arrested and jailed in a 
callous disregard of due process and 
numerous human rights conventions. In 
effect, he was taken as a hostage— even 
threatened with the death penalty. 

Both individuals have now been 
remanded to their respective ambas- 
sadors. But this is only an interim step, 
agreed to by the United States for 
humanitarian reasons. It does not 
change the facts of the case: Gennadiy 
Zakharov is an accused spy who should 
stand trial; Nicholas Daniloff is an inno- 
cent hostage who should be released. 
The Soviet Union bears the responsibil- 
ity for the consequences of its action. 
Misusing the United Nations for pur- 
poses of espionage does a grave disserv- 
ice to this organization. 

And the world expects better. It 
expects contributions to the cause of 
peace that only the leaders of the United 
States and the Soviet Union can make. 




With NATO Scretary General Lord Carrington. 



With King Juan Carlos I of Spain. 




Department of State Built, 




ns Control 

for this reason that I wrote last 
mer to Mr. Gorbachev with new 
s control proposals. Before discus- 
the proposals, let us be clear about 
h weapons are the most dangerous 
threatening to peace. The threat 
not come from defensive systems, 
h are a shield against attack, but 
1 offensive weapons— ballistic 
iles that hurtle through space and 
ivreak mass destruction on the sur- 
of the earth, especially the Soviet 
in's heavy, accurate intercontinental 
stic missiles (ICBMs), with multiple 
leads, which have no counterparts in 
or number in any other country. 
That is why the United States has 
urged radical, equitable, verifiable 
ctions in these offensive systems, 
s that I said reduction; for this is the 
purpose of arms control: not just to 
'y the levels of today's arsenals, not 
to channel their further expansion, 
,o reduce them in ways that will 
ce the danger of war. Indeed, the 
ed States believes the prospect of a 
•e without such weapons of mass 
•uction must be the ultimate goal of 
. control. 

am pleased to say that the Soviet 
n has now embraced our idea of 
:al reductions in offensive systems. 
le Geneva summit last November, 
greed to intensify work in this area. 

then, the Soviets have made 
led proposals which, while not 
3table to us, appear to represent a 
us effort. So, we continue to seek a 
reduction of American and Soviet 
lals— with the central focus on the 
:tion of ballistic missile warheads. If 
oviet Union wants only a lesser 
:tion, however, we are prepared to 
der it but as an interim measure. In 
• provisions, as well, we have sought 
ke account of Soviet concerns. So, 

has been movement. 
Similarly, in the area of intermediate- 
e nuclear forces, the United States 
5 the total elimination of such mis- 
on a global basis. Again, if the 
;t Union insists on pursuing such a 
in stages, we are prepared to con- 
i an interim agreement without 

Lll this gives me hope. I can tell you 
xchanges between our two sides 
summer could well have marked the 
ming of a serious, productive 



negotiation on arms reduction. The ice of 
the negotiating stalemate could break— if 
both sides intensify their effort in the 
new round of Geneva talks and if we 
keep the promises we made to each 
other last November. 

For too long a time, however, the 
Soviet response has been to downplay 
the need for offensive reductions. When 
the United States began work on 
technology to make offensive nuclear 
weapons someday obsolete, the Soviets 
tried to make that the main issue— as if 
the main danger to strategic stability 
was a defense against missiles that is 
still on the drawing boards, rather 
than the menacing ballistic missiles 
themselves that already exist in exces- 
sive numbers. 

Still, the United States recognizes 
that both the offensive and defensive 
sides of the strategic equation must be 
addressed. And we have gone far to 
meet Soviet concerns expressed about 
the potential offensive use of strategic 
defensive systems. I have offered firm 
and concrete assurances that our 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) could 
never be used to deploy weapons in 



U.S. Delegation 

to the 41st 

UN General Assembly 



Representatives 

Vernon A. Walters 

Herbert S. Okun 

Larry Pressler, U.S. Senator from the State 

of South Dakota 
Thomas F. Eagleton, U.S. Senator from 

the State of Missouri 
Helen Marie Taylor 

Alternate Representatives 

Patricia M. Byrne 

Hugh Montgomery 

Joseph Verner Reed 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., U.S. Senator from the 

State of Virginia 
John Kerry, U.S. Senator from the State of 

Massachusetts 



USUN press release 101 of Oct. 9, 1986. 



FEATURE 
United Nations 



space that can cause mass destruction on 
Earth. I have pointed out that the 
radical reduction we seek now in offen- 
sive arsenals would be additional 
insurance that SDI cannot be used to 
support a first-strike strategy. And our 
preference from the beginning has been 
to move forward cooperatively with the 
Soviets on strategic defenses, so that 
neither side will feel threatened and both 
can benefit from the strategic revolution 
that SDI represents. 

The United States continues to 
respect the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty in spite of clear evidence the 
Soviets are violating it. We have told the 
Soviets that if we can both agree on 
radical reductions in strategic offensive 
weapons, we are prepared right now to 
sign an agreement with them on 
research, development, testing, and 
deployment of strategic defenses based 
on the following. 

First, both sides would agree to con- 
fine themselves through 1991 to 
research, development, and testing, 
which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, 
to determine whether advanced systems 
of strategic defense are technically 
feasible. 

Second, a new treaty, signed now, 
would provide that if, after 1991, either 
side should decide to deploy such a 
system, that side would be obliged to 
offer a plan for sharing the benefits of 
strategic defense and for eliminating 
offensive ballistic missiles. And this plan 
would be negotiated over a 2-year 
period. 

Third, if the two sides can't agree 
after 2 years of negotiation, either side 
would be free to deploy an advanced 
strategic defense system, after giving 
6-months notice to the other. 

As the United States has repeatedly 
made clear, we are moving toward a 
future of greater reliance upon strategic 
defense. The United States remains 
prepared to talk about how— under what 
ground rules and process— we and the 
Soviet Union can do this cooperatively. 
Such strategic defenses, coupled with 
radical reductions in offensive forces, 
would represent a safer balance and 
would give future statesmen the oppor- 
tunity to move beyond it to the ultimate 
elimination of nuclear weapons from the 
face of the earth. 



Secretary's Bilaterals 
at the United Nations 

China 




Foreign Minister Wu 



Congo 




President Sassou-Nguesso 



Honduras 





Foreign Minister Lopez 



In addition to our proposals on offen- 
sive reductions and strategic defense, we 
have suggested new steps in another 
area— nuclear testing. Just as eliminat- 
ing all nuclear weapons is our long-term 
goal, so, too, is a total ban on nuclear 
testing. But both must be approached 
with practical steps. For the reality is 
that, for now, we still must rely on these 
weapons for the deterrence of war. Thus 
the safety and reliability of our deterrent 
are themselves critical to peace. 

The United States is proud of its 
record of nuclear safety and intends to 
maintain it. Nevertheless, we are, as I 
said, ready now to take two important 
steps toward limiting nuclear testing. 
First, we are ready to move forward on 
ratification of the Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions, once agreement is 
reached on improved verification pro- 
cedures. We have proposed new ideas to 
make this possible. 

Second, upon ratification of those 
treaties, and in association with a pro- 
gram to reduce and ultimately eliminate 
all nuclear weapons, we are prepared to 
discuss ways to implement a step-by-step 
parallel program of limiting and 
ultimately ending nuclear testing. 

These are steps we could take in the 
near future to show the world that we 
are moving forward. And I, therefore, 
call upon the Soviet Union to join us in 
practical, attainable progress in limiting 
nuclear testing. 

Just a few days ago, I received a 
reply from General Secretary Gorbachev 
to my letter of July 25. And, for the 
moment, let me say simply that we 
are giving it serious and careful 
consideration. 

As we move toward our goal of 
eliminating nuclear weapons, it is vital 
that we also address important imbal- 
ances of other kinds of weapons. And 
this is why the United States has pro- 
posed a comprehensive global ban on all 
chemical weapons and why we and our 
allies have tried hard to break the 
stalemate in the conventional force 
negotiations in Vienna. And in the 
Stockholm conference, a major advance 
has been achieved— a concrete new set of 
military confidence-building measures 
which includes inspections. 



Regional Conflicts 

But we must remember from the 
experience of the 1970s that progres 
arms control cannot be divorced fror 
regional political developments. As I 
at the beginning, political tensions c; 
the military competition, not the oth 
way around. 

But while the United States and 
Soviet Union disagree over the root 
causes of political tension, we do agr 
that regional conflicts could escalate 
global confrontation. Last year from 
rostrum, I presented a formula for p 
which would apply to five critical 
regional conflicts that are potential 
flashpoints for wider conflict. I point 
out how difficult it is for the United 
States to accept Soviet assurances o 
peaceful intent when 126,000 Soviet 
troops prosecute a vicious war again 
the Afghan people; when 140,000 So 
backed Vietnamese soldiers wage we 
the people of Cambodia; when 1,700 
Soviet advisers and 2,500 Cuban con 
troops are involved in military plann 
and operations in Ethiopia; when 1,3 
Soviet military advisers and 36,000 
Cuban troops direct and participate i 
combat operations to prop up an unp 
ular, repressive regime in Angola; w 
hundreds of millions of dollars in So\ 
arms and Soviet-bloc advisers help a 
tatorial regime in Nicaragua try to 
subvert and betray a popular revolut 

The danger inherent in these con 
flicts must be recognized. Marxist- 
Leninist regimes tend to wage war a 
readily against their neighbors as the 
routinely do against their own people 
fact, the internal and external wars 
often become indistinguishable. 

In Afghanistan, for example, the 
puppet regime has announced its inte 
tion to relocate tens of thousands of 
people from border areas. Can anyon 
doubt this will be done in classic conn 
munist style— by force? Many will die fi 
make it easier for the Soviets and the ' 
satellite troops to intimidate Pakistar 

It is just such transgressions that 
make the risk of confrontation with 
democratic nations so acute. So, once 
again, I propose a three-point peace 
process for the resolution of regional 
conflicts: 



(Siatr Depl photos bj Walb 



Department of State Bull' 



FEATURE 
United Nations 



irst, talks between the warring 

s themselves, without which an 
violence and national reconcilia- 

re impossible; 

econd, discussions between the 
|d States and Soviet Union— not to 
fee solutions but to support peace 
dand eventually eliminate the supply 
jjns and the proxy troops from 
id; and 

ihird, if the talks are successful, 
Jefforts to welcome each country 
Into the world economy and the 
iunity of nations that respect 
nn rights. 

rorism 

pition to regional disputes, the 
I threat of terrorism also jeopard- 
he hopes for peace. No cause, no 
ince can justify it. Terrorism is 
Ins and intolerable. It is the crime of 
Ids— cowards who prey on the inno- 
tjthe defenseless, and the helpless, 
fith its allies and other nations, the 
Id States has taken steps to counter 
rism directly— particularly state- 
lored terrorism. Last April, the 
id States demonstrated that it will 
p its interests and act against ter- 
1 aggression. And let me assure all 
ji today, especially let me assure 
ntential sponsors of terrorism, that 
jmerican people are of one mind on 
jsue. Like other civilized peoples of 
brld, we have reached our limit. 
its against our citizens or our inter- 
rill not go unanswered. We will also 
jin our power to help other law- 
|g nations threatened by terrorist 
is. To that end, the United States 
aes that the understandings reached 
I seven industrial democracies at 
bkyo summit last May made a good 
toward international accord in the 
ti terrorism. We recommend to the 
|al Assembly consideration of the 
> resolutions. 



International Economy 

Moving to the economic realm, how 
ironic it is that some continue to espouse 
such ideas as a "new international 
economic order" based on state control 
when the world is learning, as never 
before, that the freedom of the indi- 
vidual, not the power of the state, is the 
key to economic dynamism and growth. 
Nations have turned away from central- 
ized management and government con- 
trols and toward the incentives and 
rewards of the free market. They have 
invited their citizens to develop their 
talents and abilities to the fullest and, in 
the process, to provide jobs, to create 
wealth, to build social stability and foster 
faith in the future for all. 

The economic summits of the indus- 
trial democracies have paid tribute to 
these principles— as has the historic UN 
Special Session on [the Critical 
Economic Situation in] Africa in May. 
We applaud the African nations' call for 
reform leading to greater reliance on 
their private sectors for economic 
growth. We believe that overcoming 
hunger and economic stagnation 
requires policies that encourage 
Africans' own productivity and initi- 
atives; such a policy framework will 
make it easier for the rest of the world, 
including the United States, to help. The 
laws of economic incentives do not 
discriminate between developed and 
developing countries. They apply to all 
equally. 

Much of the recent recovery in the 
world economy can be directly attributed 
to this growth of economic freedom. And 
it is this trend that offers such hope for 
the future. And yet this new hope faces 
a grave threat: the menace of trade 
barriers. 

History shows the imposition of such 
barriers invites retaliation, which in turn 
sparks the very sort of trade wars that 
plunged the world in the 1930s deeper 
into depression and economic misery. 
Truly, protectionism is destructionism. 

That is why the United States seeks 
the assistance of all countries repre- 
sented here in the General Assembly in 
protecting the practice of free and fair 



Secretary's Bilaterals 
at the United Nations 

India 




Foreign Minister Shankar 

Iraq 




Foreign Minister Aziz 



South Korea 




Foreign Minister Choi 



((Tiber 1986 



Secretary's Bilaterals 
at the United Nations 

Morocco 




Foreign Minister Filali 

Pakistan 




Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan 

Saudi Arabia 




trade. We applaud the success of the 
meeting of GATT [General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade] trade ministers 
last week in Uruguay, where agreement 
was reached to launch a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations covering 
a wide range of topics important to 
economic growth. With over 90 other 
countries of the GATT, the United 
States is working to maintain the free 
flow of international trade. 

In addition to resistance to protec- 
tionism, the United States is also seek- 
ing to stimulate world economic growth 
in other ways. Our Treasury bill interest 
rate is now just over 5%, the lowest it 
has been in 9 years, which provides enor- 
mous relief to debtor countries. 
America's new tax structure will open 
the way for greater prosperity at home, 
which will contribute to greater prosper- 
ity abroad. And, finally, the United 
States is working with other countries to 
minimize currency swings, to promote 
stability in the monetary markets, to 
establish predictability as a basis for 
prosperity. 

But the United States believes the 
greatest contribution we can make to 
world prosperity is the continued 
advocacy of the magic of the market- 
place—the truth, the simple and proven 
truth, that economic development is an 
outgrowth of economic freedom just as 
economic freedom is the inseparable 
twin of political freedom and democratic 
government. 

Human Rights 

And it is here that we come to our final 
category— human rights— the indispens- 
able element for peace, freedom, and 
prosperity. I note that Mr. Gorbachev 
has used in recent speeches the same 
categories I have used here today: the 
military, the political, and the economic; 
except that he titled his fourth category: 
humanitarian. 



Well, the difference is revealing | 
United States believes that respect | 
the individual, for the dignity of thei 
human person— those rights outlinei( 
the UN Universal Declaration of Hij 
Rights— does not belong in the realr j 
charity of "humanitarian" causes. 
Respect for human rights is not soc | 
work; it is not merely an act of com j 
sion. It is the first obligation of gov j 
ment and the source of its legitimac 

It also is the foundation stone ir | 
structure of world peace. All throug j 
history, it has been the dictatorship. | 
the tyrannies that have surrenderee j 
to the cult of militarism and the pur j 
of war. Countries based on the cons j 
of the governed, countries that reco ( 
the unalienable rights of the individ i 
do not make war on each other. Pea j 
more than just the absence of war. ' 
peace is justice; true peace is freedc | 
And true peace dictates the recogni | 
of human rights. 

Commitments were made more \ 
10 years ago in Helsinki concerning | 
these rights and their recognition. ^ | 
need only look to the East today to 
how sadly unfulfilled those commitn 
are. The persecution of scientists, 
religious leaders, peace activists, 
political dissenters, and other prisor 
of conscience continues unabated be i 
the Iron Curtain. You know, one sec 
of the Helsinki accords even speaks 
"improvement of working condition: 
journalists." 

So, it is clear that progress in th 
human rights area must keep pace \» 
progress in other areas. A failure on 
score will hinder further movement 
East- West relations. 



Foreign Minister Sa'ud 



Department of State Bui 



FEATURE 
United Nations 



se: The Highest Reality 

fc, then, are the areas of concern 
f opportunity that the United 
s sees in the quest for peace and 
am— the twin objectives of the UN 
;er. 

last year, I pointed out in my 
ss to the General Assembly that 
fferences between the United 
5 and the Soviet Union are deep 
biding. But I also called for a fresh 
in relations between our two 
is, a fresh start that could benefit 
vn people and the people of every 
). Since that time, the United 
5 has taken action and put forth 
roposals that could lead to our two 
ries and the entire world in a direc- 
re all have long sought to go. Now 
than ever, it is the responsibility of 
>viet Union to take action and 
istrate that they, too, are continu- 
e dialogue for peace. 
s I've said, I believe that we can be 
ll about the world and the pros- 
for freedom. We only need look 
i us to see the new technologies 
lay someday spare future genera- 
he nightmare of nuclear terror, or 
owing ranks of democratic activ- 
nd freedom fighters, or the increas- 
iivement toward free market 
mies, or the extent of worldwide 
Jti about the rights of the indi- 
u in the face of brute, state power. 
1 the past, when I have noted such 
ii.— when I have called for a "for- 
dstrategy for freedom" and 
kted the ultimate triumph of 
uratic rule over totalitarianism— 
Slave accused me of telling people 
they want to hear, of urging them 
t engage the day but to escape it. 
fet, to hope is to believe in human- 
ti in its future. Hope remains the 
let reality, the age-old power; hope 
i.ie root of all the great ideas and 



causes that have bettered the lot of 
human mankind across the centuries. 

History teaches us to hope— for it 
teaches us about man and about the 
irrepressible human spirit. A Nobel 
laureate in literature, a great figure of 
the American South, William Faulkner, 
once said that the last sound heard on 
earth would be that of the two remaining 
humans arguing over where to go in the 
spaceship they had built. In his speech to 
the Nobel committee in 1950, Faulkner 
spoke of the nuclear age, of the general 
and universal physical fear it had 
engendered, a fear of destruction that 
had become almost unbearable. But, he 
said, "I decline to accept the end of man. 
I believe that man will not merely 
endure, he will prevail. He is immor- 
tal .. . because he has a soul, a spirit 
capable of compassion and sacrifice and 
endurance." 

Faulkner spoke of "the old verities 
and truths of the heart," of the courage, 
honor, pride, compassion, pity, sacrifice, 
and, yes, that hope which is the glory of 
our past. And all of these things we find 
today in our present; we must use them 
to build our future. And it's why today 
we can lift up our spirits and our hearts; 
it is why we resolve that, with God's 
help, the cause of humanity "will not 
merely endure" but prevail; that some- 
day all the world— every nation, every 
people, every person— will know the 
blessings of peace and see the light of 
freedom. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1986. 



Secretary's Bilaterals 
at the United Nations 

Spain 




Foreign Minister Fernandez-Ordonez 

Sweden 

anp^-- t 'jh m m ;» 




I 1*1 SS 

Foreign Minister Andersson 

Tunisia 




Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi 



'fiber 1986 



THE PRESIDENT 



Keeping America Strong 



President Reagan 's address to sup- 
ofth Administration 's defense 
policies in the Roosevelt Room of the 
Whitt House on September 23, 1986. } 

Thank you all for coming here to the 
Roosevelt Room this morning. This 
room, of course, was named for two 
great Presidents, one a Republican, the 
other a Democrat. Both understood the 
vital importance of keeping America 
strong— something I know everyone in 
this room understands. Let me say how 
grateful all Americans are for the con- 
tributions that you and your organiza- 
tions have made to building a stronger 
America. 

Restoring America's strength has 
been one of our Administration's highest 
goals. When we took office, we found 
that we had ships that couldn't leave 
port, planes that couldn't fly— both for 
lack of trained men and women and ade- 
quate supplies of spare parts. We found 
that for years the United States sat on 
its hands while the Soviet Union 
engaged in a military buildup, the likes 
of which the world had never seen. The 
American nuclear deterrent, upon which 
world peace depends, had been allowed 
to slide toward obsolescence. And across 
the earth, Soviet-sponsored regimes had 
been imposed in countries as diverse as 
Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. 

In the last 5Vz years, we've begun to 
turn that desperate situation around. 
We've restored the morale, the training, 
and the equipment of our armed forces. 
And let me just say that around the 
world and here at home, I've met many 
of our young men and women in uniform 
over the last several years. It does 
something to you when you're standing 
up there on the demilitarized zone in 
Korea and a young fellow standing there 
in uniform says, "Sir, we're on the 
frontier of freedom." Everyone who 
works with them will confirm what I've 
said about them, and those serving today 
are the best darn bunch who've ever 
served our country. I'm proud of all of 
them. 

In the last 5 l k years, we've begun 
the necessary modernization of our 
nuclear deterrent. We've begun research 
on strategic defense, the one great hope 
that we might some day rid the world of 
the prison of mutual nuclear terror. As I 
told the I'N General Assembly yester- 
day, we're prepared right now to enter 



an agreement with the Soviet Union on 
research, development, testing, and 
deployment of strategic defense. 

In pursuit of a safer world, we're 
determined to move toward a future of 
greater and greater reliance on strategic 
defense. The only question for the 
Soviets is, do we move toward strategic 
defense together or alone? 

In the last 5 l k years, America has 
also taken a stand with embattled 
defenders of freedom around the world. 
In Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and 
Nicaragua, we've said that we stand 
with those who would turn back the 
night of totalitarian tyranny. And in this 
I wish I could say that we had united 
backing in the Congress. But, you know, 
the truth is different, particularly 
regarding our support of freedom 
fighters in this hemisphere. Even though 
both Houses of Congress have approved 
critically needed military assistance for 
the freedom fighters, this bill has been 
deliberately stalled on Capitol Hill. 
Freedom fighters will pay with their 
lives for this politics of obstructionism. 
We're determined to bring their bar- 
ricades down, to let the light of hope 
through to the Nicaraguan people— and 
we will. 

But, all in all, in the last 5V2 years, 
we've come a long way. You saw this 
when Mr. Gorbachev and I met in 
Geneva last November. As I said yester- 
day at the United Nations, despite dif- 
ferences, we resolved at that meeting to 
work together for real reductions in 
nuclear arms as well as progress in other 
areas. The Soviets are still relentless 
adversaries, as their totally unwarranted 
arrest of an innocent American reporter 
3 weeks ago demonstrates— an action 
which jeopardizes all areas of our rela- 
tionship. But at the arms reduction 
table, they now appear to treat meetings 
as more than just another propaganda 
forum. This, I believe, is because of the 
new will the United States has shown for 
the last 5V2 years. The Soviets have been 
convinced that we're serious about 
rebuilding our strength. 

But all this progress has now been 
placed in jeopardy by actions taken in 
the House of Representatives, actions 
just as serious as the attempt to block 
aid to the freedom fighters. If permitted 
to stand, these actions would pull the 
rug out from under our arms negotiators 
in Geneva and imperil our national 



security. The House voted to ban tes 
antisatellite systems, even though tl 
Soviets have a system in operation ; 
we don't. They voted to stop us fron 
producing a deterrent to modern So 
chemical weapons. They voted to sla 
our request for the strategic defense 
research— an initiative that helped b 
the Soviets back to the bargaining ti 
in Geneva. They voted to deny fund: 
move beyond the limits of SALT II 
[strategic arms limitation talks], a tr 
that couldn't be ratified, and that 
would've expired by now if it had be 
ratified, and that the Soviets have 
repeatedly violated. And finally, the 
House would prohibit essentially all 
testing of nuclear weapons. Well, all 
this is bad for our national security ; 
for arms reduction talks. And if the 
defense budget arrives on my desk 1 
ing anything like that, I'll veto it. 

All of these issues [applause]— tl 
you. You make vetoing even more p: 
ant than I find it. [Laughter.] But al 
these issues are important. Each He 
action undermines our peace and sei 
rity. But I'd like to use my time todi 
what's left of it— to discuss one areai 
I touched on yesterday that I believ< 
needs more attention. With the Sovi 
orchestrating a major propaganda c. 
paign to get us to declare a morator 
on nuclear testing, it's time to set tH 
record straight on why we need that 
test. There are four important reaso 

First, nuclear testing is essentia 
guarantee that our weapons— the ke 
deterring nuclear aggression— actual 
work. We insist on the most rigorou 
field tests for non-nuclear weapons 1 
airplanes, tanks, and guns, but nuck 
weapons are far more complex, and 
they, too, must be tested. Some time 
ago, for example, we found that the 
safety on the warhead for the Polari 
missile wouldn't release. Without th< 
testing that helped us fix that, most 
our sea-based deterrent would have 1 
ineffective. 

Without testing, we couldn't red 
the size and improve the effectivenes 
our warheads and make them safer, 
we have. So until we can negotiate tl 
elimination of nuclear weapons with I 
Soviets, we must have tests to make 
sure that our deterrent works and th 
it's safe. 

Second, we use nuclear tests to 
design non-nuclear weapons and equ: 
ment— for example, satellites, ships, 
tanks, and sensors— so that they can 
ter withstand a Soviet nuclear attack 



Department of State Bu I 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



ncreases the chances that our 
Iry can survive and still fight, which 
es the Soviet incentive to attack us 
ur allies in the first place. 
hird, testing helps us keep ahead 
net efforts, including non-nuclear 
s, to neutralize our deterrent, 
al years ago, improved Soviet air 
ses threatened to make our B-52s 
;te, so we began the production of 

1 , which can get through those 
ses. But some weapons designed 
e old B-52s weren't reliable at the 
des and speeds that the B-l flies, 
sting was essential to developing 
}ns with a proven reliability. 
nd, fourth, testing ensures that 
nviets won't surprise us with 
throughs that might alter the 
sgic balance. The Soviets have 
for years to modernize and expand 
weapons systems. We're still play- 
ttchup, and this imbalance is a 
t to world peace. It'd be an even 
er threat if the Soviets scored 

breakthroughs. 

ven if we were to agree to a 
;orium or a test ban, we cannot be 
he Soviets would honor it or that it 
be verified. In the early 1960s the 
ts broke out of a 3-year morator- 
nat they had agreed to with the 
intensive series of nuclear tests in 
y. They had been planning all 
g the moratorium for the testing 
were going to do, and when they 
ready, they just violated the 
:orium. 

fe, on the other hand, had abated, 
o it took us more than a year to 
e our testing facilities to their con- 
before the moratorium so we could 
to try and catch up. 
ny agreement to limit testing must 
rifiable. We've made a number of 
sals to improve verification of cur- 
xeaties. The Soviets should accept 
proposals or make one of their own 
top playing propaganda games, 
ur highest arms control priority is 
; the Soviets to agree to deep arms 
tions in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear 
als. Soviet emphasis on the testing 
is a diversion from this urgent 
The House's ban on testing, on the 
hand, is a back door to a nuclear 
2, which would make arms reduc- 
almost impossible. Some Congress- 
>eem to believe that peace and 
ican weakness mean the same 
, Didn't it ever occur to anyone 
the Soviets must be thinking? 
re thinking: if we wait long 
;h, they'll do our work for us. 



So this is what we're up against and 
why I'm so grateful to all of you for 
what you are doing. Now I don't dare 
look at the gentleman sitting right over 
here, because I've been telling a story 
the last couple of days in some speeches 
that I like to tell that illustrates the 
attitude of those in Congress that are 
bringing this about. 

It has to do with three fellows that 
came out to get in their car and found 
they'd locked themselves out. And one of 



them said, "Get a wire coat hanger, and 
we can straighten it out and manage to 
get in." And the other one says, "We 
can't do that. Somebody would think 
we're stealing the car." And the third 
one said, "Well, we'd better do some- 
thing pretty quick. It's starting to rain 
and the top's down." 

■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1986. ■ 



Vice President Bush Visits 
the Middle East 



Vice President Bush departed the 
United States July 25, 1986, to visit 
Israel (July 27-30), Jordan (July 30- 
Aug. 2), and Egypt (Aug. 2-5). He 
returned to the United States August 5. 

Following is n stul, incut he made in 
Cairo on August 5. 

Several common themes emerged from 
my discussions in Israel, Jordan, and 
Egypt. All the leaders I met with reaf- 
firmed and pledged their total rejection 
of the use of terror and violence. All the 
leaders also expressed their concern 
about the economic situation in the 
region. While not a substitute for the 
peace process, they believe that efforts 
to deal with the economic situation will 
make a major contribution to that 
process. 

With regard to the question of 
peace, all the parties want to see move- 
ment and are frustrated by what they 
see as a stalemate. No one is satisfied 
with the current impasse. All the parties 
want the United States to play an active 
role in reenergizing the peace process. 
We have always been prepared to play 
such a catalytic role. 

During my meetings with the leaders 
of the three countries, I was able to 
discuss the common elements that unite 
those committed to making peace in the 
area. While much still divides those in 
the region, I am convinced after my 
talks that there is enough common 
ground for progress to be made in the 
peace process. 



With Prime Minister Peres in Jerusalem. 



(White House photos by Dave Valdez) 



I was particularly struck by the 
areas of commonality among Israel, 
Jordan, Egypt, and many Palestinians. I 
believe this commonality creates a basis 
on which peace negotiations can move 
forward. 

To be specific, my impression of the 
points of agreement on the negotiating 
process and the goals of that process are 
as follows: 

• A just and lasting peace is essen- 
tial, urgent, and can only be reached 
through negotiations. 

• Negotiations should produce peace 
treaties between the parties based on 
the recognition of the right of all states 
and peoples in the region to a life of 
peace and security. 

• Negotiations must take into 
account the security needs of Israel, the 
security needs of all other states in the 




Imber 1986 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



region, and the aspirations of the Pales- 
n people. 

• Negotiations must resolve the 
Palestine question in all its aspects 
within the context of a relationship 
between Jordan, the West Bank, and 
Gaza. This relationship can be achieved 
based on Security Council Resolutions 
212 and 338. The U.S. view is that 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 embody the principle of secure and 
recognized boundaries for all states in 
the region and the exchange of territory 
for peace. 

• The United States believes in the 
importance of face-to-face negotiations. 
We recognize that direct negotiations 
may involve the framework of an inter- 
national conference or forum structured 
in a way that permits progress and not 
paralysis; agreement, not dictates. 

• The form of the negotiations 
should provide for talks between an 
Israeli delegation and a Jordanian- 
Palestinian delegation, as well as 
between Syrian and Israeli delegations. 
Delegations must consist of individuals 
who seek peace and openly reject 
violence and terrorism. 

The United States believes these 
areas of agreement are embodied in the 
Reagan plan of September 1, 1982, 
which itself was based on Security Coun- 
cil Resolutions 242 and 338 and the 
Camp David accords. I believe these 
areas of agreement or common under- 
standing provide a basis for moving the 
peace process forward. I call on Palestin- 
ian representatives not to miss yet 
another opportunity to achieve their 
aspirations as a people. 

Palestinian rejectionism has con- 
tributed only to a tragic history. It's 
time for Palestinian representatives to 
assume responsibility and step forward 
to shape their own destiny. 

I will return to Washington and 
review what I have learned with the 
President, the Secretary of State, and 
others. Together we will determine what 
should come next, how we can build on 
the progress made in this visit and how 
we can implement our common 
objectives. 

The road to peace is taken a step at 
a time, and I am encouraged by my talks 
with Prime Minister Peres, King Hus- 
sein, and President Mubarak this week. I 
do believe the atmosphere has improved 
and that all nations should engage in the 
search for a true and lasting peace in the 
Middle East. ■ 




Vice President and Mrs. Bush with Their Majesties King Hussein and Queen Noor. 



With President Mubarak in Cairo 




10 



Department of State Bull' 



E SECRETARY 



pgress, Freedom, and Responsibility 



cretary Shultz's address before 
rd University's 350th anniversary 
ation in Cambridge on September 5, 

you very much. President [of 
'd University Derek] Bok. Thank 
dies and gentlemen. Mr. President, 
ior, Mayor, of course, Mr. Speaker, 
uished ladies and gentlemen. Tip 
essman O'Neill], we spend so 
)f our lives paying tribute to you 
ihington that it's a real pleasure to 
iere and pay tribute to you in your 
)wn. 

d, Mr. Governor, I will deliver the 
je you requested to Jim Baker, 
like to make a request. If he 
lown those World Series tickets, 
you save them for me? 
the introduction, President Bok 
ned my diverse career, but you 
mention the fact that my univer- 
ave been Princeton, M.I.T., 
o, and now Stanford. So you can 
v I feel right now— a chance to 
;alk at Harvard. This magnificent 
ion stands for a great tradition of 
tual openness, free inquiry, and 
of truth. And as the nurturer of 
y Presidents, Governors, 
rs, Secretaries of State, and other 
;ervants, Harvard also embodies a 
ment to country— a devotion to 
1-being of the nation and to its 
?ible role of leadership in the 

I know that I have come to the 
ace to voice a message of outrage 
letention of Nick Daniloff, 
d class of 1956. The cynical arrest 
inocent American journalist 
s us of what we already know: 
litions of free inquiry and open- 
5 spurned by the Soviets, showing 
k side of a society prepared to 

hostage-taking as an instru- 

1 policy. Let there be no talk of a 
' for Daniloff. We, and Nick 

i have ruled that out. The Soviet 
lip must find the wisdom to 
lis case quickly in accordance 
3 dictates of simple human 
i and of civilized national 
r. 

1 know also I've come to the right 
' deliver a message of concern, to 
f some disturbing trends I see in 
ntry, to tell of some important 
America has leai ted in recent 
id some lessons • /e apparently 



have not yet learned. These disturbing 
trends at home are all the more paradox- 
ical because they occur against the 
backdrop of powerful positive forces at 
work today in the world at large, forces 
that offer us an extraordinary opportun- 
ity if we don't throw it away. 

Change and Its Positive Implications 

Ours is a time of many seemingly con- 
tradictory forces at work: even as com- 
munications shrink the planet and 
economics increases our interdepend- 
ence, nationalism is more potent than 
ever; technology advances at dizzying 
speed even as, once again, religious faith 
becomes a powerful political force all 
around the world. 

But one significant trend is already 
discernible. The advanced nations of the 
world are already in the throes of a new 
scientific and technological revolution- 
one whose social, economic, political, and 
strategic consequences are only begin- 
ning to be felt. 

The industrial age is ending; in some 
parts of the world, it is already gone. A 
century ago, our country moved from an 
agricultural to an industrial phase of our 
development. Today, we remain agricul- 
turally and industrially productive. We 
more than feed ourselves. Over the last 
20 years, manufacturing as a share of 
our gross national product has remained 
constant at 22% even as the proportion 
of the labor force needed to produce 
those goods has declined from 24% to 
18% during these same two decades. But 
if we try to put a label on our era, we 
would have to call it an information 
revolution. And it promises to transform 
the structure of our economies and the 
political life of the planet as thoroughly 
as did the industrial revolution of the 
18th and 19th centuries. 

I see this as a revolution of great 
promise. It's a stimulus to a new era of 
economic growth. It's a challenge that 
the free nations of the world, above all, 
are in the best position to meet. The 
President captured the essence of the 
essential relationship between freedom 
and progress when he noted: 

Everywhere, people and governments 
are beginning to recognize that the secret of a 
progressive new world is the creativity of the 
human spirit .... Our open advocacy of 
freedom as the engine of progress [is one of] 
the most important ways to bring about a 



world where prosperity is commonplace, con- 
flict an aberration, and human dignity a way 
of life. 

So it is no coincidence that the free 
nations have once again been the source 
of technological innovation. An economic 
system congenial to free scientific 
inquiry, entrepreneurial risk-taking, and 
consumer freedom has been the fount of 
creativity and the mechanism for 
spreading innovation far and wide. A 
political system that welcomes, indeed, 
thrives on a free flow of ideas and infor- 
mation and people and goods across 
national boundaries finds itself the 
natural breeding ground of progress. 
The developing countries, seeking their 
own path to a better future, find the 
West their natural partner for coopera- 
tive endeavors. And even the countries 
of the communist worjd turn to the West 
as the source of advanced technology. 

Our adversaries, indeed, face an 
inescapable dilemma. They see the new 
postindustrial era coming, and they see 
the West well poised to take advantage 
of it. And yet, opening themselves up to 
the information revolution and its 
benefits risks what is the essence of 
their political power— the effort to con- 
trol thought and behavior through the 
tight monopoly they maintain over infor- 
mation and free communication. They 
fear losing control over what their 
people read and see. How can a system 
that keeps photocopiers and mimeograph 
machines under strict control and sur- 
veillance exploit the benefits of the video 
cassette recorder and the personal com- 
puter? With each innovation, the leaders 
of the totalitarian world are reminded of 
their agonizing choice: they can either 
open their societies to the freedoms 
necessary for the pursuit of technolog- 
ical advance or they can risk falling even 
further behind the West. In reality, 
though, it may be already too late for 
them to catch up with the future. 

So we are learning that the informa- 
tion revolution holds out profound pro- 
mise for America. And yet, it's only one 
of the positive forces at work in the 
world. Let me give you some examples 
of other things we have learned in recent 
years. 

First, we have learned once again 
that freedom is a revolutionary force. 
Dictatorships— left or right— are not per- 
manent. In Afghanistan, Angola, Cam- 
bodia, and Nicaragua, imperialism, 



liber 1986 



11 



THE SECRETARY 



oppression, and regimentation have 

n rise to resistance movements that 
struggle for the rights denied them by 
communist rule. In South Africa, the 
structure of apartheid is under seige as 
never before. In Latin America, the 
yearning for democracy has transformed 
the political complexion of the entire 
continent. Contrary to the expectations 
of many only 5 or 6 years ago, El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala 
have joined Costa Rica in the democratic 
trend in Central America— leaving only 
Nicaragua as the odd man out. In the 
Philippines, the same yearning brought a 
remarkable, peaceful transition to a new 
democratic way. And Thailand has not 
received the notice it deserves. Sharp 
political differences there led to vividly 
contested recent elections, and they have 
re-formed their government on the basis 
of that election result. Not so many 
years ago, democratic nations were 
thought to be a dwindling and embattled 
minority; today, the vitality of the idea 
of democracy is the most important 
political reality of our time. 

And we have learned again that 
there is a connection between freedom 
and economic progress. Few countries 
around the world now dispute that entre- 
preneurial initiative in a market environ- 
ment is the engine of development and 
growth. At the economic summits, all 
the leading industrial nations have 
acknowledged that structural rigidities 
imposed by government are the main 
obstacle to renewed growth. At the UN 
Special Session [on the Critical 
Economic Situation in Africa] in May, 
the African nations— including those 
hardest hit by experiments in collectivist 
planning— issued an extraordinary docu- 
ment calling for more open markets and 
less intervention by the state. These 
truths, too, are now being acknowledged 
even in the communist world, as reforms 
in China and Hungary demonstrate. 

Closer to home, we have redis- 
covered the truths that, as America's 
weakness makes the world a more 
dangerous place, America's strength 
deters aggression and encourages 
restraint and negotiation. We have seen 
how the rebuilding of America's 
defenses in the early 1980s gave the 
Soviets an incentive to return to negotia- 
tions on arms control. Our ability to pro- 
ied power abroad has helped us protect 
our vital interests and defend our friends 
against subversion and aggression. Our 
military strike against Libya— under- 
taken as a last resort after years of 
Qadhafi's terrorism— has sent a powerful 



signal to friends and enemies alike. This 
morning our prayers and our all-out 
efforts go to the hostages on Pan Am 
Flight 73. Clearly, the day has not yet 
arrived when terrorism has taken its 
place among other vanquished bar- 
barisms of our time. But that day will 
come— and when it does, history will 
show that American resolve, backed up 
by our power, tipped the balance in favor 
of peace and security. 

And the past few years have 
reminded us of another truth: America is 
a powerful and constructive force in the 
world for progress and human freedom. 
Throughout the three centuries and a 
half we mark today, Americans have 
believed this country had a moral 
significance and responsibility that 
transcended our military and economic 
power. There is an irresistible current in 
our national character that impels us to 
serve as a human example and champion 
of justice. 

Part of America's positive role has 
to do with our history. Our fight for 
independence and for political freedom 
began not far from here— with more 
than a few Harvard men in the van- 
guard. A century or so ago, we fought 
the bloodiest war in our history to try to 
eradicate the curse of oppression based 
on race. Today, that epic struggle for 
justice continues here at home. As our 
nation emerged as a world leader, 
especially in the past 50 years, we 
always sought to apply to our interna- 
tional endeavors the same high stand- 
ards and high moral goals that we set 
for ourselves. From the founding of the 
United Nations, to the Marshall Plan, to 
the formation of our democratic 
alliances, to our support for decoloniza- 
tion and for economic development, to 
our stance as a champion of human 
rights— this nation can be proud of what 
it has accomplished in the world. And we 
should find special satisfaction in seeing 
the trends I described earlier— the 
spread of democracy and economic 
freedom, the new technological revolu- 
tion—trends that once again mean 
history is on our side. 

Trends That Threaten Our Future 

And yet now, when we can see for 
ourselves that a better future is likely to 
take shape if, and perhaps only if, 
America is there to help shape it, 
pressures are mounting within our coun- 
try to turn our backs on the world. 
Ominous developments are on the all- 
too-near horizon, and most of us may not 
even realize it. 



And this is not the first time. Oi| 
nation more than once has swung fr 
involvement to isolation. And even i 
decades since we supposedly put ou; 
isolationist past behind us, we have 
times been tempted again by the illv 
that we can promote justice by aloo:i 
righteousness, that we can promote 1 
peace by merely wishing for it. We : 
an impatient people. We sometimes 
seemed to feel that problems should 
solved quickly or not at all, that we | 
serve our principles by striking the I 
pose or doing what makes us, for th | 
moment, feel good. 

It's time to wake up— before we I 
endanger the world's future and out I 
own. These dangers take many fonrl 
but they all have in common a thoug j 
less escapism, a retreat from resporl 
sibility, an attempt to evade the real 
of our dependence on the world and i 
world's dependence on us. As such, , 
whether we admit it or not, they air I 
to nothing less than an isolationist 
throwback that could once again pn ( 
the world toward catastrophe. 

One danger sign is the evil of pi t 
tionism. Not since the days of Smoo | 
Hawley have the forces of protectio i 
been as powerful as they are today i I 
U.S. Congress. We should have lear j 
from the experience of 50 years ago | 
protectionism only impoverishes us . I 
with our trading partners, spurs ine | 
able retaliation, and shuts down the t 
engine of world trade and, therefore ( 
world growth. 

In our earliest days as a nation, j 
founders of the United States under 
stood that free trade was the key to | 
growth and prosperity. Within the i 
borders of our nation, they created c j 
open trading system, and the world' | 
biggest— and, because of that, most | 
prosperous— economy was the result 
Similarly, the statesmen at work aft| 
World War II knew well the lessons | 
the 1930s. They put in place a more:} 
more open world economy, and gene I 
tions benefited from the growth and | 
stability that followed. In today's gloj 
economy, our prosperity and that of 
other nations depend even more on a 
open trading system. 

Yet now we see a new spiral of p 
tectionism, and the spread of other aj 
competitive practices like subsidies, | 
endangering some of our most import 
political and security relationships wi| 
other countries. The new democraciej 
the Philippines and Latin America, i\ 
poorer countries burdened by debt, a| 
many key friends around the world— - 
all wish to earn their way back to 



12 



Department of State Bu, 1 



THE SECRETARY 



•.purity— find the road ahead threat- 
si by protectionism in this country. 
e our economy is the biggest— and 
i we have always been the pillar of 
■ trade— if we succumb, we will do 
lid damage to the world's hopes for 
perity and peace. And our own 
isns of the future will blame us for 
shly failing to uphold our own 
pn's interests. 

Another form of escape is self- 
jteous moralism. I have to say I see 
j 3 of this in the fervor for punitive 
i tions against South Africa. The 
ity is that the United States has 
osed increasing sanctions against 
1 Africa from President Kennedy's 
pn military sales in 1962 to the array 
leasures in President Reagan's 
tutive order of 1985. And now the 
|market itself is slowing the pace of 
feouth African economy. But sanc- 
f are not solutions. Those on whom 
lical sanctions are imposed grow 
e defiant and can evade their own 
aonsibilities by pointing to so-called 
%de influences as a scapegoat. 
'White South Africans must recog- 
jthat apartheid is a disaster of their 
j creation and that it must be done 
J' with in an active and orderly 
Ion if their own interests are to sur- 
I The wide-ranging sanctions now 
losed in the Congress would do 
Irica a double disservice— by enabl- 
iroponents of apartheid to blame 
lh Africa's disastrous economy on us 
fc, at the same time, drastically 
icing our presence, our leverage, and 
Example as a force for economic and 
Ileal change. In a delusion of increas- 
Jur influence over events, we could 
liourselves quickly on the verge of 
Aa\ powerlessness as a result of our 
Bice from the South African scene, 
f he transition from tyranny to 
(bcracy is a delicate process. 
a?times it goes badly wrong, as in 
|or Nicaragua. Sometimes it goes 
I as in Spain, Portugal, the 
Hppines, or in Latin America. We 
ad be clear about what we are for: 
Ire for a rapid end to apartheid and 
fl peaceful transition to a democratic 
fern. It is not our job to egg on a race 
fcr to accelerate a polarization that 
Bead to such a result. Our morality 
pur values must have a strong 
fcnce in our foreign policy. But we 
I guard against a self-righteous 
llity which can be self-defeating and 
fby run counter to our moral 
Rive. 



Other examples of our native inclina- 
tion toward withdrawal can be found in 
our impatience with diplomacy. The pur- 
suit of practical political solutions in this 
world calls for perseverance, under- 
standing of ambiguity, and a recognition 
of the need for compromise. Negotiation 
is how we engage other nations for 
positive purposes. But the very concept 
of negotiations is assaulted today by an 
array of misconceptions. 

Some call urgently for negotiations 
but deny that diplomacy requires 
strength to back it up. Others argue- 
correctly— that we should never 
negotiate from weakness, but then 
assert that when we are strong, we need 
not negotiate. Some would deny us all 
leverage or would legislate unilateral 
concessions; others are fearful of 
negotiations because they assume for 
some reason that we are bound to be 
taken advantage of. Many despair of the 
United Nations and the disturbing 
trends within it— but some would walk 
away from its challenges and oppor- 
tunities rather than make use of our 
ability to improve its operation. We must 
strengthen our role in the United Nations 
for affirmative reasons and also lest 
others whose interests are adverse to 
ours step into our place. 

Thus, whether the issue is regional 
conflict, arms control, or trade, elements 
far apart on the political spectrum com- 
bine in counsels of escapism. They are 
denials of reality. The reality is that 
efforts to resolve problems among 
nations are essential and, in the end, 
inevitable. The reality is that demo- 
cracies will not support policies of intran- 
sigence. The reality is that many prac- 
tical, realistic objectives can be attained 
by hardheaded negotiations. Negotia- 
tions can work. 

There is, finally, another extraor- 
dinary development: the congressional 
attack on the foreign affairs budget. We 
are about to witness the dismantling— 
indeed, butchering— of the most impor- 
tant instrument of our foreign policy: 
our ability to represent and support 
strongly our interests and ideals. We 
face a self-inflicted crisis which, if not 
reversed, will gravely damage the ability 
of the United States to maintain its 
leadership in the world, to bolster inter- 
national security, and to support the 
cause of freedom, democracy, and 
human progress. 

It pains me to speak of this at 
Harvard, where George C. Marshall pro- 
posed a plan that committed the United 
States to the future of Europe. We all 



heard him only a few minutes ago [by 
recording]. He spoke for a generation of 
statesmen, of both political parties, who 
had learned the lessons of the 1930s and 
who committed the United States to the 
world, to an open economic system, to 
the defense of freedom against tyranny. 
They established the pillars of the 
postwar system: the Bretton Woods 
monetary system that tied the world 
together; the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade and its successive 
rounds; the Marshall Plan and World 
Bank— mechanisms for international 
reconstruction and development— the 
Marshall Plan then made up 11% of the 
total Federal budget; and NATO. 

The achievements of the postwar 
statesmen were an assertion of thought 
and learning and leadership, foreseen 
and set out in the broadest scale. They 
became the foundation stones for the 
democracy, the prosperity, and the 
security of the West that we know 
today. 

In January of this year. President 
Reagan submitted to Congress an inter- 
national affairs budget for fiscal year 
1987 that we had stripped to the bone. It 
amounted to only 2% of the total 
Federal budget. Yet the current congres- 
sional budget resolution cuts that 
minimal and considered request by 27%. 
And recent congressional actions would 
reduce and restrict the remaining 
amount even further. 

These reductions, and the earmark- 
ing of aid levels to a few countries, will 
deprive us of over half of all our security 
and economic assistance to many coun- 
tries of the world. These are nations who 
are key to our interests and security or 
where we must help in the transition to 
democracy and economic freedom. The 
dollars we spend on such assistance are 
the most cost-effective bargain among 
all of our national security activities. 

• It will mean the closing of 
diplomatic posts and the reduction of our 
personnel abroad— to an overall person- 
nel level that will then be below that 
when George C. Marshall was Secretary 
of State. 

• It will mean a one-third cut in 
funding for the multilateral development 
banks, which are crucial to Third World 
economic progress. 

• It means a severe setback to our 
effort to halt the production and illegal 
export of narcotics from abroad, just as 
our programs are gaining momentum. 

• And it means the closing of 
American libraries and cultural centers 
overseas and curtailing Voice of America 
broadcasting. 



imber 1986 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



I have not come to Harvard to tell 
you of just one more bureaucratic budget 
battle. The impact of these cuts com- 
bined with fierce reductions in our 
defense budget, rampant protectionism, 
and moralistic instincts toward with- 
drawal from the world, will be 
devastating to our foreign relations. 
They mean undoing the last 50 years of 
America's positive role of leadership in 
the world; it is simply mindless to do so 
when so many positive trends are at 
work in the world and so many oppor- 
tunities open before us. 

History shows that in this century 
American withdrawal only heightens 
global dangers and the risk of conflict. 
The strategic and economic conse- 
quences of the Smoot-Hawley tariff- 
along with the illusions of isolationism 
and lowered defense preparedness- 
helped ignite the international tensions 
that exploded in World War II. Even in 
the 1970s we saw that when America 
retreats within itself, the advantage 
goes to our adversaries, whose purposes 
in the world are antithetical to our most 
deeply held principles. 

Why then look inward just as the 
gains of remaining engaged are most 
profound? We are a nation of unprece- 
dented strengths— strategic, economic, 
and political— and unprecedented bless- 
ings. When our economy is strong, when 
our position in the world is secure, it is 
easy to forget that much of the world 
around us is still ruled by a ruthless few, 
who will not hesitate to fill the vacuum 
created when we pull back. 



assets. There is nothing like our system 
of higher education anywhere else in the 
world. 

So today, the world turns to the 
United States precisely because of our 
openness. At Harvard, as at all our great 
universities, students from every corner 
of the globe come in search of new 
dimensions of understanding and 
analysis, new currents of thought and 
innovation, new developments across the 
range of human knowledge. Today, over 
340,000 young men and women from 
overseas are studying in the United 
States— just to take a few numbers: 
21,000 Malaysians; 18,000 from Nigeria; 
6,000 from the United Kingdom. It is 
especially gratifying that China— a coun- 
try that for so long tried to cut itself off 
from the world and to develop itself in 
the totalitarian mold— now sends 
upwards of 15,000 students here each 
year. 

America is inextricably engaged in 
the world through its great private 
institutions and through its people— 
whose international interests, travels, 
and ties continue. How paradoxical it is 
that we may now be drifting— stumbling, 
perhaps unconsciously— out of phase 
with our outward-looking citizens and 
their wide-ranging interests. 



Proposed Refugee Admissions 
for FY 1987 



Today, our ideals and interests ( 
verge. We face a choice. My call tod 
for a reawakening to the reality that 
America— government and people— n 
remain open to the world and engag 
risk diminution of our essence as a 
people and our vocation as a nation. 

I believe that those disturbing tre 
I mentioned are not representative ol 
what this country and its people reall 
believe. As the greatest democracy ir I 
the world, America is a reminder to a ) 
that there is an alternative to tyrann; 
oppression, and despair. Those who b 
this university were not a fearful, tiirl 
people. They did not shirk their respc ' 
sibilities. They were practical men an 
women. They were earthy and realist I 
and their lives were guided by a drea ' 
by a vision, and by a sense of duty 
toward coming generations. 

Let us honor that tradition. It is ; ' 
tradition of practicality and realism, < ' 
dedication to the progress of open 
societies. It is a call for us for confide 
in the future that only openness and 
freedom can bring. 



'Press release 173. 



An Open Window to the World 

I began by noting that this great uni- 
versity was a proper place to talk about 
what America and the world have 
learned in recent years. Today, as we all 
gather at Harvard— where higher educa- 
tion in America began— we think not 
only of what Harvard has meant to its 
own but of its meaning to the building of 
America and to our engagement with 
the world in years ahead. 

To me, America's past can be 
characterized by the great theme of 
openness. Our universities lead the 
world because we possess a society that 
is open— to peoples, to ideas, to enter- 
prise, and to the forces of change. 

I have spent a large part of my life 
in the university. I taught, but I also 
learned a lot. One of the things I 
learned— and it's been reinforced very 
much as I've traveled around the 
world— is that our colleges and univer- 
sities are one of America's greatest 



Secretary Shultz 's statement before 
the Subcommittee on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on September 16, 1986. l 

Thank you for the invitation and the 
honor to consult with you on the Presi- 
dent's proposed refugee admissions ceil- 
ing for fiscal year (FY) 1987. 

This is the third consecutive year 
that I have participated in these con- 
sultations. These sessions were envis- 
aged by the Congress in the Refugee Act 
of 1980, which specified that our refugee 
admissions are intended for refugees of 
"special humanitarian concern to the 
United States in accordance with a 
determination made by the President 
after appropriate consultation with the 
Congress." 

After thoughtful consideration- 
taking into account the resettlement 
needs of refugees of special humani- 
tarian concern to us— the President pro- 
poses an overall admissions ceiling of 



70,000 refugees, with 66,000 to be 
included in funded regional ceilings ai U 
4,000 to be contained in an unfunded 
reserve, unallocated by any region. Tl 
year's admissions proposal includes: I 

• Reaffirmation of the President' 
initiatives on Amerasians and Viet- 
namese political prisoners; 

• An admissions level to maintain^ 
continued high processing levels from 
the refugee camps in the Southeast 
Asian first-asylum countries; 

• An increased admissions ceiling ' 
for Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union; 

• Expanded refugee admissions I 
from Latin America and the Caribbeai ' 

• An increased ceiling for Africa t 1, 
accommodate African refugees locatec' 
far from processing posts in Africa am 1 
those who have been stranded in Euro 
for several years; 






14 



Department of State Bulle 



THE SECRETARY 



An increased admissions ceiling 
le Near East and South Asia to 
for admissions of those fleeing 
ous persecution and Soviet occupa- 
and 

An unallocated reserve, intended 
ye the Administration the flexibility 
rspond to critical admissions needs 
me unpredictable. 

Ls a preamble to a discussion and 
location of the proposed refugee ceil- 
, would like to reflect on what we 
^accomplished in our refugee pro- 

!! in recent years and the way in 
we have been able to achieve 
objectives. 

'he beginning of FY 1981 marks a 
»le starting point for such a review. 
«ncided with the election of Presi- 
fReagan, and it followed by only a 
I interval the major refugee shocks 
i previous decade: the massive 
us of boat refugees from Vietnam 
^and refugees from Cambodia and 
> the flood of refugees into Somalia; 
.he arrival on our shores of some 
J00 Cuban and Haitian "entrants" 
Mi of 1980. The refugee flight from 
^nistan was well underway— a 
ment of men, women, and children 
Ijoon reached close to 5 million 
j;, nearly 3 million of them in 
a:an alone. 

uring the 6 years of this Adminis- 
jn, total expenditures for refugee 
l ministered by the State Depart- 
j|have exceeded $2.5 billion. In that 
amore than 500,000 refugees have 
mdmitted into the United States. 
i can be no doubt that America has 
ets share and more to aid those 
tees who have been forced to leave 
homelands because of persecution. 

/nerican Tradition 

|; historic tradition for the American 
I to respond to refugee problems, 
itional celebration at the rededica- 
jf the Statue of Liberty reminded 
the spirit of welcome which has 
(fed generations of immigrants and 
pes to seek new lives in this 

IT. 

fir longstanding tradition of help 
tugees was brought home for me in 
fcr way recently by a State Depart- 
toublication describing our refugee 
Ims. At the end there was a list 
■ private voluntary agencies 
rating in providing refugee 
Ince. The list seemed familiar, 
fch some of the agencies had 
By different names and addresses. 



Then I looked at the date of the pam- 
phlet. It was 1956, and the subject was 
the Hungarian refugee crisis of that 
October— just 30 years ago. The volun- 
tary agencies and our refugee programs 
have been around a long time; they carry 
on a tradition today in which we can 
take great pride. 

Multilateral Approach 

An integral part of that tradition has 
been our leadership in advancing an 
international, multilateral approach to 
the resolution of refugee situations. We 
have consistently taken the lead in work- 
ing to strengthen international mecha- 
nisms to deal with the expanding scope 
of refugee problems. 

• The program and office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) grew fivefold in the past 
decade in response to the increase both 
in the number of refugee crises and in 
the absolute numbers of refugees world- 
wide. By a conservative count, there are 
now more than 10 million refugees living 
outside their native lands and unable to 
return. On every continent the UNHCR 
stands as the first line of defense for 
refugees: it speaks out for their protec- 
tion; it provides for their care and 
maintenance; it seeks humane alter- 
native solutions to their plight. 

• At the last UN General Assembly, 
a new High Commissioner for Refugees 
was elected— Jean-Pierre Hocke of 
Switzerland. He brings new leadership 
and direction to one of the most respon- 
sible and demanding positions in the UN 
system. His election demonstrates that 
the United Nations can act positively and 
effectively to achieve humanitarian objec- 
tives in the spirit intended by its founders. 

• The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) has also grown in 
the scope and importance of its respon- 
sibilities during the past decade. With its 
partners, the League of Red Cross 
Societies and the national societies of 
many concerned countries, the ICRC has 
long set the standard for impartial, non- 
political humanitarian aid. I serve on the 
Board of Governors of the American Red 
Cross. I am glad to note that that 
organization is expanding its interna- 
tional involvement, under the able 
leadership of its president, my friend 
and former colleague, Richard Schubert. 

I want to commend the leadership of 
Alexander Hay, the president of the 
ICRC who has presided over that 
organization's major expansion. I have 
had the pleasure of meeting with Presi- 
dent Hay and other ICRC leaders. I 



found their counsel always wise and 
useful, not only on humanitarian pro- 
grams but also in terrorist situations 
such as the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, 
in which the ICRC assisted in its usual 
quiet, effective way in the arrangements 
for the release of the hostages. Mr. Hay 
has announced his decision to step down 
as ICRC president. We welcome his suc- 
cessor, Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, who 
has been Secretary of State for Foreign 
Economic Affairs in the Swiss 
Government. 

• The third organization that 
enables us to work multilaterally to aid 
refugees is the Intergovernmental Com- 
mittee for Migration (ICM), ably led by 
James L. Carlin, a former distinguished 
Foreign Service officer. ICM was founded 
in 1951 to provide safe, secure migration 
assistance in the major movements of 
displaced persons and refugees following 
the Second World War and the com- 
munist takeovers in Eastern Europe. 
Since that time, it has helped move 
nearly 4 million refugees and migrants 
throughout the world. Today, ICM 
serves as the lead organization for 
medical processing and resettlement 
transportation for the U.S. refugee 
admissions program. In recent years 
ICM has been especially resourceful in 
aiding skilled migrants, originally from 
Third World countries, to return to pro- 
ductive positions in their homelands. 

Benefits of Cooperation 

In concrete terms, the benefits of 
cooperation are obvious. While the 
United States has been the leading 
refugee resettlement country in the past 
decade, other countries have also made 
important contributions, in some cases 
overcoming longstanding antipathy to 
immigration by foreign groups. We con- 
tinue to seek ways in which the financial 
burden of providing refugee assistance 
can be shared equitably by the interna- 
tional community. 

In short, the United States is not 
alone in its efforts to aid refugees. We 
make vital contributions to a functioning 
global system of international organiza- 
tions and private voluntary agencies. 
This multiplies the resources that the 
U.S. Government brings to these human- 
itarian efforts. The pattern of interna- 
tional cooperation that has developed 
through the years, with its emphasis on 
nonpolitical, impartial assistance on the 
basis of need, serves our interests 
well— it serves those of the world's 
refugees. 



eiber 1986 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



Aiding Refugees in Home Regions 

Probably the most significant result of 
cooperation has been the growing 
recognition that refugee problems are 
best resolved in the regions from which 
the refugees come. Leadership by the 
UNHCR and prudent management of 
refugee programs worldwide has made it 
possible to reduce significantly the 
numbers of refugees for whom third- 
country resettlement is a necessary or 
even desirable solution. This has been a 
major objective of U.S. policies, one that 
is shared by other countries aiding 
refugees and by the international system 
as a whole. 

The best way to resolve a refugee 
situation is to enable refugees to 
return— freely and voluntarily— to their 
homes in their countries of origin. 
Although this can only rarely be accom- 
plished in the short run, in many cases it 
has been possible for refugees to remain 
nearby and to return home when the 
situation has changed enough to permit 
voluntary repatriation. That remains the 
best hope even for those whose home- 
lands remain under foreign occupation, 
like the almost 3 million Afghans in 
Pakistan. These people require and 
deserve the full-hearted support of the 
international community as they con- 
tinue to suffer the deprivations of a 
limited, impermanent existence in tem- 
porary asylum. In our judgment, interna- 
tional resettlement is the correct solu- 
tion for only relatively small numbers of 
refugees. 

Even where return to the homeland 
appears unlikely, there are advantages 
for refugees to be cared for in the region 
in which they have their roots. Often a 
neighboring country shares a common 
geography, language, and ethnic or 
cultural character which can ease the 
acceptance of refugees and help them 
achieve longer term residence. At the 
first African refugee conference in 
Tanzania in 1979, Julius Nyerere, as the 
host President, said: " . . .as Africans, 
we welcome the refugees, we give them 
our space, we share our food." Outside 
help was needed, he added— but for the 
care of refugees in Africa, not for 
resettlement outside Africa. 

Since 1981, nearly all of the U.S. 
contributions to assist refugees in the 
regions of their homelands have been 
channeled through the international 
organizations. Those organizations, in 
turn, work through "operational part- 
ners," who often are the same private 
voluntary agencies that assist us in 
refugee resettlement. As refugees find 
refuge in Africa, in the Near East, in 



Asia, in Latin America, in Western 
Europe, the traditional terminology of 
"donor" countries blurs, for it is the 
first-asylum countries offering their 
"space"— in President Nyerere's 
words— who are the greatest donors 
of all. 

Resettlement: Often 
Not the Solution 

The relatively small role played by inter- 
national resettlement as a solution can 
be seen in the sheer magnitude of the 
refugee populations. There are currently 
5 million Afghan refugees. The United 
States resettles, at most, 3,000 a year- 
less than one-tenth of 1%. There are 
almost 3 million refugees in Africa, with 
similarly limited resettlement require- 
ments. Refugee leaders themselves 
acknowledge the uncertain value of 
resettlement in such situations, seeing it 
as potentially divisive and, in some 
cases, as a form of resented leadership 
drain. 

The humanitarian commitment to 
aid refugees in the regions of their 
homelands puts great pressure on the 
resources available for our total refugee 
assistance programs. In FY 1986— as the 
committee knows— all parts of the 
Federal Government have had to make 
program reductions to conform to the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation. As 
a result of these across-the-board fund- 
ing reductions, the Department, with 
congressional concurrence, was forced 
this year to shift over $9 million from 
the admissions program to meet critical 
refugee assistance requirements in 
Africa and Southeast Asia. In other 
words, instead of reallocating admissions 
numbers and funds to meet other 
regional admissions needs, we were com- 
pelled to cover high-priority relief 
requirements. Thus, the need to 
reprogram is the primary reason for 
actual admissions in FY 1986 falling 
some 4,500 below the ceiling. 

The assistance requirements for 
refugees in Africa, for Afghans in 
Pakistan, for Cambodians on the Thai- 
Cambodian border, and for other groups 
in Southeast Asia and elsewhere remain 
substantial. Just a few weeks ago, the 
Red Cross informed us they were run- 
ning out of money for their life- 
sustaining food and medical programs in 
Africa. President Reagan authorized a 
withdrawal from the Emergency 
Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund 
to help meet the deficit, but that is a 
resource we can draw on only in excep- 
tional cases and within a tightly 
delineated congressional authorization. 



In order to be able to meet these 
ongoing assistance requirements wit 
impairing our admissions programs, 
absolutely essential that we be provi 
with adequate resources to do the jo 
We are talking here about the lives ( 
literally millions of human beings. 

I was pleased that the House Ap 
priations Committee supported the f 
amount of the President's FY 1987 
request for the refugee program. I u 
you and your colleagues to do the sa 

Foreign Affairs Budget 

But this is only part of a much large 
foreign policy issue now facing us. II 
in our national interest to work toge 
with other nations to reduce politica 
instabilities throughout the world. B' 
address these instabilities, often at t 
root of the world's refugee problem, 
requires that American diplomacy hi I 
the proper tools— including healthy . 
foreign assistance programs and 
energetic diplomatic representation. I 

Unfortunately, these tools are bi j 
drastically restricted under current i " 
gressionally imposed cuts in our oveil 
foreign affairs budget. Put most bin I 
the cumulative effect of these reduci J 
will be devastating to our ability to 1 1 
our responsibilities and commitment j 

Today is not the day to discuss c | 
overall foreign affairs budget in any j 
great detail. But it is essential that ^ l 
all recognize that the lack of the 
resources necessary to support const! 
tive American leadership in the inteM 
tional community will inevitably havi ( 
negative impact on the management , 
global refugee problems. 

Proposed FY 1987 Admissions 

It is with this perspective that I now J 
turn to the refugee admissions ceilinj j 
that the President is recommending : , 
FY 1987. For simplicity, I will presei, 
them in tabular form, as follows: 



■ 



FY 1987 Refugee Admissions Ceiling 


Region 


Adrros 
Lev 


Africa 

East Asia— First Asylum 

East Asia— ODP 

Eastern Europe/Soviet Union 

Latin America/Caribbean 

Near East/South Asia 


3,5! 
32,0 

8.E 1 
10,C 

4,0 1 


Subtotal 


66,0' 


Unallocated Reserve 


_d 


TOTAL 


70,0 



16 



Department of State Bui," 



THE SECRETARY 



I should point out that this total is 
pame figure that the Administration 
[osed for FY 1986. 

^Unallocated Admissions Reserve 

year, for the first time, the Presi- 
's recommended admissions ceiling 
des an unfunded and unallocated 
ve of 4,000. This reserve is not tied 
y geographic region— it would give 
dministration the capability to 
^ond to contingent regional admis- 
e needs. The reserve is similar to the 
tissions reserves used by the other 
r major resettlement countries, 
uda and Australia. Should it be 
n ssary to use the admissions reserve, 
=TOuld cover the associated costs 
S in existing agency budget requests 
ijwould inform the Congress as to the 
Jrve's allocation, 
in addition, given the difficult fiscal 

Jtion we are facing, we will be 
rtaking a study to explore the 
ability of a private-sector-funded 
issions program. 

1 Asia Admissions 

iichinese Refugee Panel Report. A 

1 ago I informed the committee of my 
Ition to commission a distinguished 
ibendent panel to visit Southeast 
I with a broad mandate to assess the 
E?ee situation and to make recom- 
sfilations on necessary changes in 
,1 policy. I am pleased to report that 
dianel carried out its mission with 
it compasion, skill, and judgment. It 
uchaired by the Honorable Robert D. 
i] the former Governor of Iowa, a 
i'. that achieved an admirable record 
lfugee resettlement under Governor 
ijs leadership. Other members of the 
il were Mrs. Irena Kirkland; former 
ator and Ambassador Gale McGee; 
Elormer Deputy Attorney General of 
BJnited States, Edward Schmults; 
[(Jonathan Moore, who has just ended 
seadership of the Institute of Politics 
iWvard to join us as the new U.S. 
)Winator for Refugee Affairs. 
The panel's report is a comprehen- 
ndocument, with some 44 specific 
cnmendations. One of its main points 
lit U.S. admissions for Indochinese 
Hd move forward along two tracks: a 
Eee program for those continuing to 
|bhe Indochinese states to escape 
fecution and an immigration program 
liose seeking to come to the United 
fcs on the basis of their family rela- 
Bhips. Close to 800,000 Indochinese 
H come to the United States as 



refugees since 1975. By the end of last 
year, 46,073 of them had been natural- 
ized as U.S. citizens. They are compiling 
a remarkable record of achievement in 
our country, and many are in a position 
themselves to aid their relatives wishing 
to come here. 

In cooperation with the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS), we are 
focusing on the panel's recommendations 
to help guide us to maintain an adequate 
program for refugees from Indochina 
and, at the same time, to assist those 
qualifying through family ties to seek 
admission through established immigra- 
tion channels. A report on our progress 
in this process is included in the 
documents presented to you as part of 
this consultation. 

In reviewing these subjects, we have 
maintained close consultations with the 
Congress, with the first-asylum coun- 
tries of the region, with the other coun- 
tries continuing to offer significant 
levels of resettlement (among whom 
Australia and Canada play the greatest 
role), and with the concerned interna- 
tional agencies. 

Balanced Program. It is in this con- 
text that the President is recommending 
the proposed admissions ceilings for east 
Asia— both for those in first-asylum 
countries and for those able to leave 
Vietnam by means of the UNHCR's 
Orderly Departure Program (ODP). As I 
stated during last year's consultations, 
we see the need for balance in this 
program. 

Indochinese refugee resettlement must be 
balanced against other, regional solutions; 
balanced as a fair share of an international 
resettlement effort; balanced in terms of its 
budgetary implications; balanced in terms of 
other immigration and domestic policy con- 
siderations; and balanced against the need to 
provide resettlement to deserving refugees 
from other parts of the world. 

The Ray panel has proposed 
guidelines to help us achieve this balance 
in ways that respond to the needs of the 
refugees. We will continue to assure the 
first-asylum states of the durability of 
our commitment to help ease their 
burden and to provide continued 
resettlement opportunities in the United 
States. 

The proposed ceiling for refugees in 
first asylum will enable us to process 
those currently eligible for the U.S. pro- 
gram, those new arrivals who qualify 
under our priority categories, and a part 
of the long-stayer caseload under a 
revitalized international initiative. The 
Ray panel attached "the greatest signifi- 
cance" to the preservation of first 



asylum. Today, I want to reaffirm to the 
nations of Southeast Asia the impor- 
tance we attach to their continuing to 
offer safe first asylum for Indochinese 
refugees. In cooperation with other 
donors, we will continue to do all we can 
to provide both resettlement oppor- 
tunities and financial support for 
assistance needs in Southeast Asia, as 
recommended by the Ray panel. We are 
considering some processing of refugees 
from among those who have been in 
camps the longest, and we believe these 
initiatives can be undertaken within the 
proposed admissions ceiling. 

Orderly Departure Program. In 

October 1984, I presented to this com- 
mittee on behalf of President Reagan 
two significant humanitarian initiatives 
aimed at reaching special populations in 
Vietnam through the UNHCR Orderly 
Departure Program. I want to take this 
opportunity to reaffirm, as I did last 
year, our commitment to accept all 
Amerasian children from Vietnam. We 
are equally committed to resettling pre- 
sent and former political prisoners from 
Vietnam's so-called reeducation camps 
and their close family members. 

The President is proposing an 8,500 
ceiling for refugees leaving Vietnam 
directly under the ODP, the same as last 
year. This does not include the several 
thousand Vietnamese who we anticipate 
will come to the United States as immi- 
grants. But this appearance of continuity 
does not change the fact that the ODP 
has encountered serious setbacks. On 
January 1, 1986, the Vietnamese 
Government unilaterally suspended 
interviewing of new cases. Departures 
from Vietnam have continued at about 
75% of the rate of last year from the 
pool of applicants interviewed for 
resettlement in the United States before 
interviewing was suspended. We have 
had three working-level meetings with 
the Vietnamese under UNHCR auspices, 
the most recent one just last month, to 
try to resolve the problem. We continue 
to hope interviewing can resume without 
further unnecessary delay. Our proposed 
unallocated admissions reserve would 
give us the flexibility to handle addi- 
tional admissions, should we manage to 
get ODP operating at full steam. 

Over 100,000 people have been able 
to leave Vietnam under the Orderly 
Departure Program, nearly half to the 
United States, the remainder to some 30 
other countries. In fact, just last week 
the 50,000th person left Vietnam for 
resettlement in the United States under 
this program. The ODP was established 
by agreement between the UNHCR and 



cumber 1986 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



the Government of Vietnam to provide a 
safe alternative to the hazards of flight 
by sea. We want to see it restored and 
improved as soon as possible. 

Amerasian Children. Vietnam's 
actions leading to suspension of inter- 
viewing for the ODP have resulted, most 
immediately, in a halt to the departure 
of Amerasian children and their mothers 
from Vietnam. Over 8,500 children of 
Vietnamese mothers and American 
fathers and their immediate relatives 
have come to the United States under 
this program. In 1984, I expressed the 
hope that all the Amerasian children and 
their close relatives would be able to 
come in a 3-year period. Two years of 
that have passed, and the program has 
had substantial success, but the majority 
of the children remain in Vietnam. 

At the working-level meeting last 
month in Hanoi, the Vietnamese pro- 
duced a long-promised list of Amerasian 
children and their families, numbering 
some 2,600 people, which we are now 
reviewing with the hope that interviews 
for this group can begin soon. Although 
specific procedures still need to be 
worked out, we hope the discussions we 
have had will lead to the early resump- 
tion of Amerasian departures from 
Vietnam. 

Political Prisoners. No aspect of 
the refugee program has caused us 
greater disappointment than Vietnam's 
refusal to live up to earlier pledges to 
release for resettlement in the United 
States "reeducation camp" prisoners- 
pledges made by their Prime Minister 
and reaffirmed by the Foreign Minister 
and other senior Vietnamese officials. 
An estimated 6,000-7,000 of these 
political prisoners continue to languish in 
prisons in Vietnam after more than 10 
years. 

Two years ago, I announced, on 
behalf of President Reagan, our readi- 
ness to receive these prisoners and their 
close relatives. Many are imprisoned 
because of their past association with 
U.S. policies and programs in the region, 
and we acknowledge a special obligation 
to work for their release. Since that 
time, only 752 former prisoners and 
their accompanying relatives have been 
allowed to leave. 

On behalf of the United States, I 
reaffirm to Vietnam President Reagan's 
offer of 2 years ago: release the political 
prisoners, and we will take them. 



Refugee Admissions 
From Other Regions 

Latin America and the Caribbean. In 

light of the Cuban release of a number of 
long-held political prisoners in 1986, and 
consistent with our deep concern for the 
welfare of these individuals, the Presi- 
dent authorized processing in Havana of 
long-term Cuban political prisoners and 
former prisoners. I am pleased to con- 
firm that over 100 Cuban political 
prisoners and their families arrived in 
the United States yesterday. 

We have included sufficient numbers 
in our proposed Latin American ceiling 
to admit 3,000 Cubans as refugees in FY 
1987, should the Government of Cuba 
lift its suspension of the Mariel migra- 
tion agreement. While the United States 
stands ready to resume its obligations 
under the agreement, we will not do so 
until the Cuban Government agrees to 
fulfill its obligation to accept the return 
of the Mariel excludables. 

As political turmoil continues to 
trouble many countries in Latin 
America, the Administration plans to 
consider refugee applicants for whom 
temporary asylum or settlement in the 
region are not available. To achieve this 
goal, we have proposed an increased ceil- 
ing of 4,000 and will expand the current 
refugee processing priorities used for 
the region. 

Africa. The Continent of Africa suf- 
fers from a complex and dynamic 
refugee situation. There are some 35 
African countries offering asylum to 
refugees fleeing from at least 17 African 
countries. Many countries both generate 
and receive refugees. Responding to the 
impact of refugees has been complicated 
by the natural disasters of drought and 
locusts and by the economic crises 
afflicting many of these developing 
countries. 

For most of those African refugees 
needing protection and assistance from 
the international community, resettlement 
to the United States is not the desired 
solution. Most can benefit from the 
hospitality offered by neighboring 
nations. Those in need of resettlement 
outside Africa are refugees in life- 
threatening situations or refugees who 
cannot easily be assimilated— for exam- 
ple, urban Ethiopians and some South 
Africans. 

For FY 1987, we are proposing an 
admissions ceiling of 3,500. This will 
allow us to process those refugees who 
cannot be resettled elsewhere, as well as 
a limited number of African refugees 
currently in first asylum in Europe. 



Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. Unfortunately, the number i 
individuals who are granted permiss 
to depart the Soviet Union has cont 
to decline in the past year. We cont 
to press for freer emigration from t 
Soviet Union and have adjusted our 
admissions ceiling accordingly. 
The President raised this issue with 
Chairman Gorbachev in Geneva, am 
intend to do the same with the Sovii 
Foreign Minister whenever we meet 

We anticipate that the requests 
10,000 admissions will allow us to p: 
ess not only the hoped-for increase i 
the Soviet Union but also those Ron 
nians registered for the third counti 
processing program, as well as the 
regular flow of refugees who contini 
arrive from Eastern Europe. 

Near East and South Asia. Sin 

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan i 
1979, over 5 million Afghans have 
sought asylum in neighboring counti 
almost 3 million of them in Pakistan 
alone. The Afghan refugee populatic 
supported by long-term internationa 
assistance efforts, to which we are a 
major contributor. 

At the same time, more than 2 
million Palestinians in the Near Eas \ 
registered with the UN Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA). While its 
is indirect, UNRWA is an important I 
ment in efforts to preempt the sort < f 
desperation that can lead to extremi | 
It thus helps create a climate that wi I 
fundamental to any successful peace ' 
process. 

In Iran, the tyrannical revolutior 1 
by Khomeini has driven thousands fr ' 
their homeland, many of whom seek ' 
new life in Europe and the United 
States. As Congress has acknowledg ' 
many Iranian religious minorities cor' 
tinue to be persecuted. Most particu- ' 
larly, the Baha'i, as well as Christian .' 
and Jews, are included in the U.S. 
resettlement program. 

For FY 1987, the President has 
recommended a ceiling of 8,000 
refugees, to allow us to continue to p: ( 
vide adequate resettlement opportuni - : 
for these populations. 

Conclusion 

Since 1981, over 500,000 persons hav 
been brought to this country as refug 
to begin new lives. In coordination wi 
the efforts of State and local govern- 
ments, civic organizations, voluntary 
agencies, and thousands of private 






18 



Department of State Bull' ( 



AFRICA 



^ns, the Administration remains 

fnitted to help give these people a 

(opportunity to live free from the 

I of persecution. 

Vet there have been frustrations and 

S)pointments: 

> The unfortunate unilateral Viet- 
ese suspension of interviews for the 
ICR's Orderly Departure Program, 
h has also stalled the President's 
five for Amerasian children; 
The continued failure of the Viet- 
se to respond to our initiative to 
t reeducation camp political 
i|mers; 

The Cuban refusal to implement 
Mariel migration agreement; and 
f The Soviet Union's continued 
Bal to allow those wishing to leave to 
», especially Soviet Jews. 

i pledge to you that this Administra- 
will never relent in its efforts to 
ive these profound humanitarian 
»s. With the bipartisan support of 
tress, we will continue in our tradi- 
i%\ humanitarian spirit to provide for 
leeds of refugees around the world. 

began today by reflecting on the 
QTiplishments of our refugee pro- 
i\s over the past 6 ye^rs, accom- 
sments made possible only by the 
irosity and commitment of the 
^rican people through their elected 
P'sentatives in Congress. 

urge you to support the President's 
inmended refugee admissions ceiling 
i|h I have presented here today. At 
same time, I must remind you that a 
Ijrous refugee admissions ceiling is 
t.ng but numbers on a piece of paper 
cut the money to fund the programs 
aithese numbers represent. And so, in 
rig, I ask for your support not only 
te proposed ceiling but also the 
eident's budget request for the 
f^ee program so that, together, we 
B.ble to continue this great, national 
unitarian endeavor. 



I Press release 179. The complete 
Hcript for the hearings will be published 
K committee and will be available from 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Wnment Printing Office. Washington. 
C20402. ■ 



Continuation of South Africa 
Emergency 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 

SEPT. 4, 1986' 

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the 
automatic termination of a national emer- 
gency unless, prior to the anniversary date of 
its declaration, the President publishes in the 
Federal Register and transmits to the Con- 
gress a notice stating that the emergency is 
to continue in effect beyond the anniversary 
date. In accordance with this provision. I 
have sent the enclosed notice, stating that the 
South African emergency is to continue in 
effect beyond September 9, 1986, to the 
Federal Register for publication. 

The failure of the South African Govern- 
ment to take adequate steps to eliminate 
apartheid, that Governnment's security prac- 
tices, including the recent imposition of 
another state of emergency, and the per- 



sistence of widespread violence continue to 
endanger prospects for peaceful change in 
South Africa and threaten stability in the 
region as a whole. Under these circum- 
stances, I have determined that it is 
necessary to continue in effect the national 
emergency with respect to South Africa after 
September 9, 1986, in order to deal with this 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
foreign policy and economy of the United 
States. Additional measures to deal with this 
threat will be considered upon the completion 
of consultations with key Allies on joint, 
effective measures to eliminate apartheid and 
encourage negotiations for peaceful change in 
South Africa. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 8, 1986. 



3'imber 1986 



19 



ARMS CONTROL 



CDE Delegations Reach Accord 
on Military Activities in Europe 



The Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and 
I > i si i rmament in Europe (CDE) met in 
Stockholm January 17, 1984-Septem- 
ber 19, 1986. 

Following are the texts of the docu- 
ment agreed to by the 35 participating 
states on September 19 and statements by 
President Reagan and Ambassador 
Robert L. Barry, head of the U.S. delega- 
tion, on September 22. 



DOCUMENT 

Document of the Stockholm Conference 
on Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe con- 
vened IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT 

provisions of the concluding document of 
the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe 



(1) The representatives of the participating 
States of the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, 
the German Democratic Republic, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechten- 
stein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America and Yugoslavia, 
met in Stockholm from 17 January 1984 to 19 
September 1986, in accordance with the pro- 
visions relating to the Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 
and Disarmament in Europe contained in the 
Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow- 
up Meeting of the CSCE. 

(2) The participants were addressed by 
the Prime Minister of Sweden, the late Olof 
Palme, on 17 January 1984. 

(3) Opening statements were made by the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Heads 
of Delegation. The Prime Minister of Spain as 
well as Ministers and senior officials of 
several other participating States addressed 
the Conference later. The Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Sweden addressed the 

< ''inference on 19 September 1986. 

( 1 1 The Secretary-General of the United 
Nations addressed the Conference on 6 July 
1984. 

(5) ( ontributions were made by the 
following non-participating Mediterranean 
States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. 



(6) The participating States recalled that 
the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe is, as a substantial and integral 
part of the multilateral process initiated by 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, to undertake, in stages, new, 
effective and concrete actions designed to 
make progress in strengthening confidence 
and security and in achieving disarmament, 
so as to give effect and expression to the duty 
of States to refrain from the threat or use of 
force in their mutual relations as well as in 
their international relations in general. 

(7) The participating States recognized 
that the set of mutually complementary con- 
fidence- and security-building measures which 
are adopted in the present document and 
which are in accordance with the Madrid 
mandate serve by their scope and nature and 
by their implementation to strengthen con- 
fidence and security in Europe and thus to 
give effect and expression to the duty of 
States to refrain from the threat or use of 
force. 

(8) Consequently the participating States 
have declared the following: 



REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT 
OR USE OF FORCE 

(9) The participating States, recalling their 
obligation to refrain, in their mutual relations 
as well as in their international relations in 
general, from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations, accordingly reaffirm their 
commitment to respect and put into practice 
the principle of refraining from the threat or 
use of force, as laid down in the Final Act. 

(10) No consideration may be invoked to 
serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of 
force in contravention of this principle. 

(11) They recall the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs, as set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations. 

(12) They will refrain from any 
manifestation of force for the purpose of 
inducing any other State to renounce the full 
exercise of its sovereign rights. 

(13) As set forth in the Final Act, no 
occupation or acquisition of territory 
resulting from the threat or use of force in 
contravention of international law, will be 
recognized as legal. 

(14) They recognize their commitment to 
peace and security. Accordingly they reaffirm 
that they will refrain from any use of armed 
forces inconsistent with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and the provisions of the Declaration 



on Principles Guiding Relations between 
Participating States, against another par 
ticipating State, in particular from invasi 
or attack on its territory. 

(15) They will abide by their commitr 
to refrain from the threat or use of force 
their relations with any State, regardless 
that State's political, social, economic or 
cultural system and irrespective of wheth 
or not they maintain with that State relai 
of alliance. 

(16) They stress that non-compliance 
the obligation of refraining from the thre 
use of force, as recalled above, constitute 
violation of international law. 

(17) They stress their commitment tc 
principle of peaceful settlement of disputi 
contained in the Final Act, convinced tha 
is an essential complement to the duty of 
States to refrain from the threat or use o 
force, both being essential factors for the 
maintenance and consolidation of peace a 
security. They recall their determination 
the necessity to reinforce and to improve 
methods at their disposal for the peaceful 
tlement of disputes. They reaffirm their 
resolve to make every effort to settle 
exclusively by peaceful means any disput* 
between them. 

(18) The participating States stress tl 
commitment to the Final Act and the nee 
full implementation of all its provisions, v 
will further the process of improving sect 
and developing co-operation in Europe, 
thereby contributing to international peac 
and security in the world as a whole. 

(19) They emphasize their commitmei 
all the principles of the Declaration on Pr 
ciples Guiding Relations between Particip 
ing States and declare their determinatioi 
respect and put them into practice irrespe , 
tive of their political, economic or social 
systems as well as of their size, geographi , 
location or level of economic development , 

(20) All these ten principles are of 
primary significance and, accordingly, the | 
will be equally and unreservedly applied, e | 
of them being interpreted taking into acco 
the others. 

(21) Respect for and the application ol 
these principles will enhance the develops 
of friendly relations and co-operation amoi . 
the participating States in all fields covere 
by the provisions of the Final Act. 

(22) They reconfirm their commitment 
the basic principle of the sovereign equalit ' 
States and stress that all States have equa ; 
rights and duties within the framework of ' 
international law. 

(23) They reaffirm the universal 
significance of human rights and fundamei 
freedoms. Respect for and the effective ex'j 
cise of these rights and freedoms are esser' 
factors for international peace, justice and 
security, as well as for the development of I 
friendly relations and co-operation among 
themselves as among all States, as set fort I 
in the Declaration on Principles Guiding R< 
tions between Participating States. 



20 



Department of State Bulle, 



ARMS CONTROL 



24) They reaffirm that, in the broader 
ext of world security, security in Europe 
>sely linked with security in the Mediter- 
an area as a whole; in this context, they 
irm their intention to develop good neigh- 
ly relations with all States in the region, 
due regard to reciprocity, and in the 

t of the principles contained in the 
aration on Principles Guiding Relations 
'een Participating States, so as to pro- 
; confidence and security and make peace 
ail in the region in accordance with the 
isions contained in the Mediterranean 
iter of the Final Act. 

25) They emphasize the necessity to take 
lute measures to prevent and to combat 
)rism, including terrorism in international 
;ions. They express their determination to 

effective measures, both at the national 
and through international co-operation, 
he prevention and suppression of all acts 
rrorism. They will take all appropriate 
sures in preventing their respective ter- 

[ies from being used for the preparation, 
nization or commission of terrorist 
ities. This also includes measures to pro- 
on their territories illegal activities, 
iding subversive activities, of persons, 

!ps and organizations that instigate, 
nize or engage in the perpetration of acts 
rrorism, including those directed against 
r States and their citizens. 

26) They will fulfil in good faith their 
•ations under international law; they also 

1;s that strict compliance with their com- 
lents within the framework of the CSCE 
sential for building confidence and 
rity. 

27) The participating States confirm that 
e event of a conflict between the obliga- 

; of the members of the United Nations 
r the Charter of the United Nations and 
■ obligations under any treaty or other 
■national agreement, their obligations 
t the Charter will prevail, in accordance 
Article 103 of the Charter of the United 
ons. 

28) The participating States have 
pted the following measures: 



OR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN 
ITARY ACTIVITIES 

The participating States will give 
ication in writing through diplomatic 
nels in an agreed form of content, to all 
participating States 42 days or more in 
nee of the start of notifiable 1 military 
ities in the zone of application for 
dence- and security-building measures 
SMs). 2 

30) Notification will be given by the par- 
ting State on whose territory the activ- 
l question is planned to take place even if 
brces of that State are not engaged in 
.ctivity or their strength is below the 
iable level. This will not relieve other 
cipating States of their obligation to give 
ication, if their involvement in the 
ned military activity reaches the 
'lable level. 



(31) Each of the following military 
activities in the field conducted as a single 
activity in the zone of application for CSBMs, 
at or above the levels defined below, will be 
notified. 

(31.1) The engagement of formations of 
land forces 3 of the participating States in the 
same exercise activity conducted under a 
single operational command independently or 
in combination with any possible air or naval 
components. 

(31.1.1) This military activity will be 
subject to notification whenever it involves at 
any time during the activity: 

• at least 13,000 troops, including 
support troops, or 

• at least 300 battle tanks 

if organized into a divisional structure 
or at least two brigades/regiments, not 
necessarily subordinate to the same division. 

(31.1.2) The participation of air forces 
of the participating States will be included in 
the notification if it is foreseen that in the 
course of the activity 200 or more sorties by 
aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown. 

(31.2) The engagement of military" 
forces either in an amphibious landing or in a 
parachute assault by airborne forces in the 
zone of application for CSBMs. 

(31.2.1) These military activities will 
be subject to notification whenever the 
amphibious landing involves at least 3,000 
troops or whenever the parachute drop 
involves at least 3,000 troops. 

(31.3) The engagement of formations of 
land forces of the participating States in a 
transfer from outside the zone of application 
for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or 
from inside the zone of application for CSBMs 
to points of concentration in the zone, to par- 
ticipate in a notifiable exercise activity or to 
be concentrated. 

(31.3.1) The arrival or concentration 
of these forces will be subject to notification 
whenever it involves, at any time during the 
activity: 

• at least 13,000 troops, including 
support troops, or 

• at least 300 battle tanks 

if organized into a divisional structure 
or at least two brigades/regiments, not 
necessarily subordinate to the same division. 

(31.3.2) Forces which have been 
transferred into the zone will be subject to all 
provisions of agreed CSBMs when they 
depart their arrival points to participate in a 
notifiable exercise activity or to be concen- 
trated within the zone of application for 
CSBMs. 

(32) Notifiable military activities carried 
out without advance notice to the troops 
involved are exceptions to the requirement 
for prior notification to be made 42 days in 
advance. 



(32.1) Notification of such activities, 
above the agreed thresholds, will be given at 
the time the troops involved commence such 
activities. 

(33) Notification will be given in writing 
of each notifiable military activity in the 
following agreed form: 

(34) A — General Information 

(34.1) The designation of the military 
activity; 

(34.2) The general purpose of the 
military activity; 

(34.3) The names of the States involved 
in the military activity; 

(34.4) The level of organizing and com- 
manding the military activity; 

(34.5) The start and end dates of the 
military activity. 

(35) B — Information on different types 
of notifiable military activities 

(35.1) The engagement of land forces of 
the participating States in the same exercise 
activity conducted under a single operational 
command independently or in combination 
with any possible air or naval components; 

(35.1.1) The total number of troops 
taking part in the military activity (i.e., 
ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile 
and airborne troops) and the number of 
troops participating for each State involved, 
if applicable; 

(35.1.2) Number and type of divisions 
participating for each State; 

(35.1.3) The total number of battle 
tanks for each State and the total number of 
anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted 
on armoured vehicles; 

(35.1.4) The total number of artillery 
pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm 
calibre or above); 

(35.1.5) The total number of heli- 
copters, by category; 

(35.1.6) Envisaged number of sorties 
by aircraft, excluding helicopters; 

(35.1.7) Purpose of air missions; 

(35.1.8) Categories of aircraft 
involved; 

(35.1.9) The level of command, 
organizing and commanding the air force 
participation; 

(35.1.10) Naval ship-to-shore gunfire; 

(35.1.11) Indication of other naval 
ship-to-shore support; 

(35.1.12) The level of command, 
organizing and commanding the naval force 
participation. 

(35.2) The engagement of military 
forces either in an amphibious landing or in a 
parachute assault by airborne forces in the 
zone of application for CSBMs: 

(35.2.1) The total number of 
amphibious troops involved in notifiable 
amphibious landings, and/or the total number 
of airborne troops involved in notifiable 
parachute assaults; 



21 



ARMS CONTROL 



(35.2.2) In the case of a notifiable 
amphibious landing, the point or points of 
embarkation, if in the zone of application for 
CSBMs. 

(35.3) The engagement of formations of 
land forces of the participating States in a 
transfer from outside the zone of application 
for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or 
from inside the zone of application for CSBMs 
to points of concentration in the zone, to par- 
ticipate in a notifiable exercise activity or to 
be concentrated: 

(35.3.1) The total number of troops 
transferred; 

(35.3.2) Number and type of divisions 
participating in the transfer; 

(35.3.3) The total number of battle 
tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or 
concentration; 

(35.3.4) Geographical co-ordinates for 
the points of arrival and for the points of 
concentration. 

(36) C — The envisaged area and 
timeframe of the activity 

(36.1) The area of the military activity 
delimited by geographic features together 
with geographic co-ordinates, as appropriate; 

(36.2) The start and end dates of each 
phase (transfers, deployment, concentration 
of forces, active exercise phase, recovery 
phase) of activities in the zone of application 
for CSBMs of participating formations, the 
tactical purpose and corresponding 
geographical areas (delimited by geographical 
co-ordinates) for each phase; 

(36.3) Brief descriptions of each phase. 

(37) D — Other information 

(37.1) Changes, if any, in relation to 
information provided in the annual calendar 
regarding the activity; 

(37.2) Relationship of the activity to 
other notifiable activities. 



OBSERVATION OF 

CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES 

(38) The participating States will invite 
observers from all other participating States 
to the following notifiable military activities: 

(38.1) • The engagement of formations 
of land forces 3 of the participating States in 
the same exercise activity conducted under a 
single operational command independently or 
in combination with any possible air or naval 
components; 

(38.2) • The engagement of military 
forces either in an amphibious landing or in a 
parachute assault by airborne forces in the 
zone of application for CSBMs; 

(38.3) • In the case of the engagement 
of formations of land forces of the partici- 
pating States in a transfer from outside the 
zone of application for CSBMs to arrival 
points in the zone, or from inside the zone of 
application for CSBMs to points of concentra- 
tion in the zone, to participate in a notifiable 
exercise activity or to be concentrated, the 



concentration of these forces. Forces which 
have been transferred into the zone will be 
subject to all provisions of agreed confidence- 
and security-building measures when they 
depart their arrival points to participate in a 
notifiable exercise activity or to be concen- 
trated within the zone of application for 
CSBMs. 

(38.4) The above-mentioned activities 
will be subject to observation whenever the 
number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 
17,000 troops, except in the case of either an 
amphibious landing or a parachute assault by 
airborne forces, which will be subject to 
observation whenever the number of troops 
engaged meets or exceeds 5,000 troops. 

(39) The host State will extend the invita- 
tions in writing through diplomatic channels 
to all other participating States at the time of 
notification. The host State will be the par- 
ticipating State on whose territory the 
notified activity will take place. 

(40) The host State may delegate some of 
its responsibilities as host to another par- 
ticipating State engaged in the military activ- 
ity on the territory of the host State. In such 
cases, the host State will specify the alloca- 
tion of responsibilities in its invitation to 
observe the activity. 

(41) Each participating State may send 
up to two observers to the military activity to 
be observed. 

(42) The invited State may decide 
whether to send military and/or civilian 
observers, including members of its personnel 
accredited to the host State. Military 
observers will, normally, wear their uniforms 
and insignia while performing their tasks. 

(43) Replies to the invitation will be given 
in writing not later than 21 days after the 
issue of the invitation. 

(44) The participating States accepting 
an invitation will provide the names and 
ranks of their observers in their reply to the 
invitation. If the invitation is not accepted in 
time, it will be assumed that no observers will 
be sent. 

(45) Together with the invitation the host 
State will provide a general observation pro- 
gramme, including the following information: 

(45.1) • the date, time and place of 
assembly of observers; 

(45.2) • planned duration of the obser- 
vation programme; 

(45.3) • languages to be used in inter- 
pretation and/or translation; 

(45.4) • arrangements for board, lodg- 
ing and transportation of the observers; 

(45.5) • arrangements for observation 
equipment which will be issued to the 
observers by the host State; 

(45.6) • possible authorization by the 
host State of the use of special equipment 
that the observers may bring with them; 

(45.7) • arrangements for special 
clothing to be issued to the observers because 
of weather or environmental factors. 



(46) The observers may make reques II 
with regard to the observation programn 
The host State will, if possible, accede to I 
them. 

(47) The host State will determine a < 1 
tion of observation which permits the 
observers to observe a notifiable military J 
activity from the time that agreed thresh' | 
for observation are met or exceeded until I 
the last time during the activity, the 
thresholds for observation are no longer 1 1 

(48) The host State will provide the 
observers with transportation to the area 
the notified activity and back. This transp 
tation will be provided from either the ca) 
or another suitable location to be announc 
in the invitation, so that the observers an 
position before the start of the observatio 
programme. 

(49) The invited State will cover the 
travel expenses for its observers to the 
capital, or another suitable location specif 
in the invitation, of the host State, and ba 

(50) The observers will be provided e< 
treatment and offered equal opportunities 
carry out their functions. 

(51) The observers will be granted, di 
ing their mission, the privileges and 
immunities accorded to diplomatic agents 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. 

(52) The host State will not be requin 
permit observation of restricted locations, 
installations or defence sites. 

(53) In order to allow the observers to 
confirm that the notified activity is non- 
threatening in character and that it is can 
out in conformity with the appropriate pre 
sions of the notification, the host State wil 

(53.1) • at the commencement of th 
observation programme give a briefing on | 
purpose, the basic situation, the phases of f 
activity and possible changes as compared • 
with the notification and provide the 
observers with a map of the area of the 
military activity with a scale of 1 to not m( ' 
than 500,000 and an observation programr ' 
with a daily schedule as well as a sketch 
indicating the basic situation; 

(53.2) • provide the observers with ' 
appropriate observation equipment; howevij 
the observers will be allowed to use their p ' 
sonal binoculars, which will be subject to 
examination and approval by the host Stat( 

(53.3) • in the course of the observa- . 
tion programme give the observers daily 
briefings with the help of maps on the varici 
phases of the military activity and their 
development and inform the observers aboi} 
their positions geographically; in the case o 
land force activity conducted in combinatioi| 
with air or naval components, briefings will | 
be given by representatives of these forces; 

(53.4) • provide opportunities to 
observe directly forces of the State/States I 
engaged in the military activity so that the ] 
observers get an impression of the flow of t 
activity; to this end, the observers will be 
given the opportunity to observe major com 
bat units of the participating formations of J | 
divisional or equivalent level and, whenever 



22 



Department of State Bullei' 



ARMS CONTROL 



ible, to visit some units and communicate 
commanders and troops; commanders or 
r senior personnel of participating forma- 
; as well as of the visited units will inform 
ibservers of the mission of their respec- 
units; 

(53.5) • guide the observers in the area 
e military activity; the observers will 

iv the instructions issued by the host 
; in accordance with the provisions set 
tin this document; 

(53.6) • provide the observers with 
Bopriate means of transportation in the 
■ of the military activity; 

t (53.7) • provide the observers with 
ijrtunities for timely communication with 
B embassies or other official missions and 
Liar posts; the host State is not obligated 
jver the communication expenses of the 
■"vers; 

(53.8) • provide the observers with 
jopriate board and lodging in a location 
Ible for carrying out the observation pro- 
lime and, when necessary, medical care. 

ip4) The participating States need not 
p observers to notifiable military 
Kties which are carried out without 
Ince notice to the troops involved unless 
EC notifiable activities have a duration of 
I than 72 hours. The continuation of these 
■ities beyond this time will be subject to 
rvation while the agreed thresholds for 
srvation are met or exceeded. The obser- 
ijn programme will follow as closely as 
lically possible all the provisions for 
Ovation set out in this document. 



"1UAL CALENDARS 

iiEach participating State will exchange. 
Ball other participating States, an annual 
ujdar of its military activities subject to 
I notification, 4 within the zone of applica- 
tor CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent 
udar year. It will be transmitted every 
a in writing, through diplomatic channels, 
titer than 15 November for the following 
a 

>6) Each participating State will list the 
(fc-mentioned activities chronologically 
drill provide information on each activity 
aiordance with the following model: 

» I (56. 1) • type of military activity and its 
■ration; 

• (56.2) • general characteristics and 
Ipse of the military activity; 

I (56.3) • States involved in the military 
tity; 

II (56.4) • area of the military activity, 
fated by appropriate geographic features 
4r defined by geographic co-ordinates; 
B(56.5) • planned duration of the 

Iry activity and the 14-day period, 
lilted by dates, within which it is 
feged to start; 

1(56.6) • the envisaged total number of 
Is 5 engaged in the military activity; 
11(56.7) • the types of armed forces 
lyed in the military activity; 



(56.8) • the envisaged level of com- 
mand, under which the military activity will 
take place; 

(56.9) • the number and type of divi- 
sions whose participation in the military 
activity is envisaged; 

(56.10) • any additional information 
concerning, inter alia, components of armed 
forces, which the participating State planning 
the military activity considers relevant. 

(57) Should changes regarding the 
military activities in the annual calendar 
prove necessary, they will be communicated 
to all other participating States no later than 
in the appropriate notification. 

(58) Information on military activities 
subject to prior notification not included in an 
annual calendar will be communicated to all 
participating States as soon as possible, in 
accordance with the model provided in the 
annual calendar. 



CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS 

(59) Each participating State will com- 
municate, in writing, to all other participating 
States, by 15 November each year, informa- 
tion concerning military activities subject to 
prior notification 4 involving more than 40,000 
troops, 4 which it plans to carry out in the 
second subsequent calendar year. Such com- 
munication will include preliminary informa- 
tion on each activity, as to its general pur- 
pose, timeframe and duration, area, size and 
States involved. 

(60) Participating States will not carry 
out military activities subject to prior notifica- 
tion involving more than 75,000 troops, 
unless they have been the object of com- 
munication as defined above. 

(61) Participating States will not carry 
out military activities subject to prior notifica- 
tion involving more than 40,000 troops unless 
they have been included in the annual calen- 
dar, not later than 15 November each year 

(62) If military activities subject to prior 
notification are carried out in addition to 
those contained in the annual calendar, they 
should be as few as possible. 



COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION 

(63) According to the Madrid Mandate, the 
confidence- and security-building measures to 
be agreed upon "will be provided with ade- 
quate forms of verification which correspond 
to their content." 

(64) The participating States recognize 
that national technical means can play a role 
in monitoring compliance with agreed 
confidence- and security-building measures. 

(65) In accordance with the provisions 
contained in this document each participating 
State has the right to conduct inspections on 
the territory of any other participating State 
within the zone of application for CSBMs. 

(66) Any participating State will be 
allowed to address a request for inspection to 



another participating State on whose ter- 
ritory, within the zone of application for 
CSBMs, compliance with the agreed 
confidence- and security-building measures is 
in doubt. 

(67) No participating State will be obliged 
to accept on its territory, within the zone of 
application for CSBMs, more than three 
inspections per calendar year. 

(68) No participating State will be obliged 
to accept more than one inspection per calen- 
dar year from the same participating State. 

(69) An inspection will not be counted if, 
due to force majeure, it cannot be carried out. 

(70) The participating State which 
requests an inspection will state the reasons 
for such a request. 

(71) The participating State which has 
received such a request will reply in the af- 
firmative to the request within the agreed 
period of time, subject to the provisions con- 
tained in paragraphs (67) and (68). 

(72) Any possible dispute as to the valid- 
ity of the reasons for a request will not pre- 
vent or delay the conduct of an inspection. 

(73) The participating State which 
requests an inspection will be permitted to 
designate for inspection on the territory of 
another State, within the zone of application 
for CSBMs, a specific area. Such an area will 
be referred to as the "specified area." The 
specified area will comprise terrain where 
notifiable military activities are conducted or 
where another participating State believes a 
notifiable military activity is taking place. The 
specified area will be defined and limited by 
the scope and scale of notifiable military 
activities but will not exceed that required for 
an army level military activity. 

(74) In the specified area the represen- 
tatives of the inspecting State accompanied 
by the representatives of the receiving State 
will be permitted access, entry and 
unobstructed survey, except for areas or sen- 
sitive points to which access is normally 
denied or restricted, military and other 
defence installations, as well as naval vessels, 
military vehicles and aircraft. The number 
and extent of the restricted areas should be 
as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable 
military activities can take place will not be 
declared restricted areas, except for certain 
permanent or temporary military installations 
which, in territorial terms, should be as small 
as possible, and consequently those areas will 
not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable 
military activities. Restricted areas will not 
be employed in a way inconsistent with the 
agreed provisions on inspection. 

(75) Within the specified area, the forces 
of participating States other than the receiv- 
ing State will also be subject to the inspection 
conducted by the inspecting State. 

(76) Inspection will be permitted on the 
ground, from the air or both. 

(77) The representatives of the receiving 
State will accompany the inspection team, 
including when it is in land vehicles and an 
aircraft from the time of their first employ- 
ment until the time they are no longer in use 
for the purposes of inspection. 

(78) In its request, the inspecting State 
will notify the receiving State of: 



y.-mber 1986 



23 



ARMS CONTROL 



(78. 1) • t he reasons for the request; 

(78.2) • the location of the specified 
area defined by geographical co-ordinates; 

(78.3) • the preferred point(s) of entry 
for the inspection team; 

(78.4) • mode of transport to and from 
the point(s) of entry and. if applicable, to and 

the specified area; 

(78.5) • where in the specified area the 
inspection will begin; 

(78.6) • whether the inspection will be 
conducted from the ground, from the air or 
both simultaneously; 

(78.7) • whether aerial inspection will 
be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter 
or both; 

(78.8) • whether the inspection team 
will use land vehicles provided by the receiv- 
ing State or, if mutually agreed, its own 
vehicles; 

(78.9) • information for the issuance of 
diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the 
receiving State. 

(79) The reply to the request will be given 
in the shortest possible period of time, but 
within not more than twenty-four hours. 
Within thirty-six hours after the issuance of 
the request, the inspection team will be per- 
mitted to enter the territory of the receiving 
State. 

(80) Any request for inspection as well as 
the reply thereto will be communicated to all 
participating States without delay. 

(81) The receiving State should designate 
the point(s) of entry as close as possible to the 
specified area. The receiving State will ensure 
that the inspection team will be able to reach 
the specified area without delay from the 
point(s) of entry. 

(82) All participating States will facilitate 
the passage of the inspection teams through 
their territory. 

(83) Within 48 hours after the arrival of 
the inspection team at the specified area, the 
inspection will be terminated. 

(84) There will be no more than four 
inspectors in an inspection team. While con- 
ducting the inspection the inspection team 
may divide into two parts. 

(85) The inspectors and, if applicable, 
auxiliary personnel, will be granted during 
their mission the privileges and immunities in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations. 

(86) The receiving State will provide the 
inspection team with appropriate board and 
lodging in a location suitable for carrying out 
the inspection, and, when necessary, medical 
care; however this does not exclude the use 
by the inspection team of its own tents and 
rations. 

(87) The inspection team will have use of 
its own maps, own photo cameras, own 
binoculars and own dictaphones, as well as 
own aeronautical charts. 

(88) The inspection team will have access 
to appropriate telecommunications equipment 
of the receiving State, including the oppor- 
tunity for continuous communication between 
the members of an inspection team in an air- 
craft and those in a land vehicle employed in 
the inspection. 



(89) The inspecting State will specify 
whether aerial inspection will be conducted 
using an airplane, a helicopter or both. Air- 
craft for inspection will be chosen by mutual 
agreement between the inspecting and receiv- 
ing States. Aircraft will be chosen which pro- 
vide the inspection team a continuous view of 
the ground during the inspection. 

(90) After the flight plan, specifying, 
inter alia, the inspection team's choice of 
flight path, speed and altitude in the specified 
area, has been filed with the competent air 
traffic control authority the inspection air- 
craft will be permitted to enter the specified 
area without delay. Within the specified area, 
the inspection team will, at its request, be 
permitted to deviate from the approved flight 
plan to make specific observations provided 
such deviation is consistent with paragraph 
(74) as well as flight safety and air traffic 
requirements. Directions to the crew will be 
given through a representative of the receiv- 
ing State on board the aircraft involved in the 
inspection. 

(91) One member of the inspection team 
will be permitted, if such a request is made, 
at any time to observe data on navigational 
equipment of the aircraft and to have access 
to maps and charts used by the flight crew for 
the purpose of determining the exact location 
of the aircraft during the inspection flight. 

(92) Aerial and ground inspectors may 
return to the specified area as often as 
desired within the 48-hour inspection period. 

(93) The receiving State will provide for 
inspection purposes land vehicles with cross 
country capability. Whenever mutually 
agreed taking into account the specific 
geography relating to the area to be 
inspected, the inspecting State will be permit- 
ted to use its own vehicles. 

(94) If land vehicles or aircraft are pro- 
vided by the inspecting State, there will be 
one accompanying driver for each land vehi- 
cle, or accompanying aircraft crew. 

(95) The inspecting State will prepare a 
report of its inspection and will provide a 
copy of that report to all participating States 
without delay. 

(96) The inspection expenses will be 
incurred by the receiving State except when 
the inspecting State uses its own aircraft 
and/or land vehicles. The travel expenses to 
and from the point(s) of entry will be borne by 
the inspecting State. 

(97) Diplomatic channels will be used for 
communications concerning compliance and 
verification. 

(98) Each participating State will be 
entitled to obtain timely clarification from 
any other participating State concerning the 
application of agreed confidence- and 
security-building measures. Communications 
in this context will, if appropriate, be 
transmitted to all other participating States. 

(99) The participating States stress that 
these confidence- and security-building 
measures are designed to reduce the dangers 
of armed conflict and misunderstanding or 
miscalculation of military activities and 
emphasize that their implementation will con- 
tribute to these objectives. 



(100) Reaffirming the relevant object 
of the Final Act, the participating States 
determined to continue building confidenc 
to lessen military confrontation and to 
enhance security for all. They are also del 
mined to achieve progress in disarmamen 

(101) The measures adopted in this d< 
ment are politically binding and will come 
force on 1 January 1987. 

(102) The Government of Sweden is 
requested to transmit the present docume 
to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE in 
Vienna and to the Secretary-General of tl 
United Nations. The Government of Swe( 
is also requested to transmit the present 
document to the Governments of the non- 
participating Mediterranean States. 

(103) The text of this document will I 
published in each participating State, whi 
will disseminate it and make it known as 
widely as possible. 

(104) The representatives of the par- 
ticipating States express their profound 
gratitude to the Government and people c 
Sweden for the excellent arrangements i 
for the Stockholm Conference and the wa 
hospitality extended to the delegations wl 
participated in the Conference. 



ANNEX I 

Under the terms of the Madrid mandate, 
zone of application for CSBMs is defined ; 
follows: 



I 



"On the basis of equality of rights, 
balance and reciprocity, equal respect foi 
security interests of all CSCE participal 
States, and of their respective obligatioi 
concerning confidence- and security-buildi 
measures and disarmament in Europe, the 
confidence- and security-building measure | 
will cover the whole of Europe as well as 1 
adjoining sea area 5 and air space. They wi i 
of military significance and politically bino ( 
and will be provided with adequate forms • 
verification which correspond to their 
content. 

"As far as the adjoining sea area 6 and : 
space is concerned, the measures will be 
applicable to the military activities of all tl 
participating States taking place there 
whenever these activities affect security in 
Europe as well as constitute a part of 
activities taking place within the whole of 
Europe as referred to above, which they w 
agree to notify. Necessary specifications w 
be made through the negotiations on the J 
confidence- and security-building measures! 
the Conference. 

"Nothing in the definition of the zone 
given above will diminish obligations ahead 
undertaken under the Final Act. The 
confidence- and security -building measures 
be agreed upon at the Conference will also i 
applicable in all areas covered by any of th<| 
provisions in the Final Act relating to 
confidence-building measures and certain i 
aspects of security and disarmament." 



24 



Department of State Bulle 



I 



ARMS CONTROL 



HNEX II 



irman's Statement 

I understood that, taking into account the 
fed date of entry into force of the agreed 
Sidence- and security-building measures 
I the provisions contained in them concern- 
lithe timeframes of certain advance 
Ifications, and expressing their interest in 
|arly transition to the full implementation 
lie provisions of this document, the par- 
loating States agree to the following: 

]The annual calendars concerning military 
dvities subject to prior notification and 
•cast for 1987 will be exchanged not later 
li 15 December 1986. 
'Communications, in accordance with 
eed provisions, concerning military 
Brities involving more than 40,000 troops 
lined for the calendar year 1988 will be 
langed by 15 December 1986. Par- 
jpating States may undertake activities 
living more than 75,000 troops during the 
Indar year 1987 provided that they are 
lided in the annual calendar exchanged by 
December 1986. 

]Activities to begin during the first 42 
I; after 1 January 1987 will be subject to 
lrelevant provisions of the Final Act of the 
KE. However, the participating States will 
le every effort to apply to them the provi- 
m of this document to the maximum 
Int possible. 

■iPhis statement will be an annex to the 
lument of the Stockholm Conference and 
ibe published with it. 



lNEX III 



Jirman's Statement 

| understood that each participating State 
ijraise any question consistent with the 
Idate of the Conference on Confidence- 
I Security-Building Measures and Disarma- 
tot in Europe at any stage subsequent to 
■Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. 
I This statement will be an annex to the 
kument of the Stockholm Conference and 
Ibe published with it. 



INEXIV 



Jirman's Statement 

I understood that the participating States 
111 that they have the right to belong or 
Ito belong to international organizations, 
le or not to be a party to bilateral or 
Bilateral treaties including the right to be 
I Oft to be a party to treaties of alliance; 
w also have the right of neutrality. In this 
text, they will not take advantage of these 



rights to circumvent the purposes of the 
system of inspection, and in particular the 
provision that a participating State will be 
obliged to accept on its territory within the 
zone of application for CSBMs, more than 
three inspections per calendar year. 

Appropriate understandings between par- 
ticipating States on this subject will be 
expressed in interpretative statements to be 
included in the journal of the day. 

The statement will be an annex to the 
Document of the Stockholm Conference and 
will be published with it. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 22, 1986* 

Today in Stockholm, the United States 
and 34 other governments adopted an 
accord that will, if faithfully imple- 
mented, reduce the risk of war in 
Europe, where there is the greatest con- 
centration of military forces of the East 
and the West. 7 1 welcome this positive 
outcome at the CDE conference. It will 
contribute to greater security in Europe 
and to improved East-West relations. 

This accord also sends messages that 
should be welcomed by people through- 
out the world. It demonstrates that East 
and West, with seriousness of purpose 
and hard work, can establish common 
ground on which to build a more secure 
future. It also demonstrates that the 
nations of the West, around whose pro- 
posals the Stockholm accord was built, 
constitute a powerful force for peace. 

The set of militarily significant and 
verifiable measures adopted by the 
Stockholm CDE conference marks a 
substantial advance over those in the 
Helsinki Final Act. These measures will 
make military activities more predictable 
and inhibit opportunities for political 
intimidation. In particular, the 
Stockholm accord commits the 35 
nations to notify one another of military 
activities above certain levels, to invite 
observers, to forecast activities a year in 
advance, and to allow inspectors to verify 
compliance with those commitments. 
This is the first East-West accord in 
which the Soviet Union has agreed to 
inspection of military activities on its 
territory. Although these inspection pro- 
visions are very different from those we 
would require to verify agreements 
which reduced or limited forces, they are 
appropriate to the Stockholm confidence- 
and security-building measures and offer 
us the opportunity to gain experience in 
conducting inspections. 



The Stockholm document, of course, 
must become more than promises on 
paper. Implementation of its commit- 
ments will be the true measure of its 
contribution to European security. For 
its part, the United States will meet its 
commitments fully. Soviet compliance, 
especially with the verification provi- 
sions, will be an important gauge of the 
possibilities for future progress in con- 
ventional arms control. 

By advancing the principle of open- 
ness in the military-security field, this 
CDE accord can also contribute to prog- 
ress in the broader Helsinki CSCE proc- 
ess. The accord achieved at Stockholm 
on security issues makes all the more 
imperative balanced progress on human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. At the 
Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, which 
begins in November, the U.S. delegation 
will press for fulfillment of all CSCE 
commitments and for balanced progress 
across the full CSCE agenda. 

These accomplishments are also a 
testimony to the skill, dedication, and 
energy of our negotiators. I want to con- 
gratulate Ambassador Robert L. Barry 
and his negotiating team on a job well 
done. 



AMBASSADOR BARRY'S 
STATEMENT, 

SEPT. 22, 1986 

The United States wishes today to join 
others in welcoming the document which 
the Stockholm conference has just 
adopted. We believe the confidence- and 
security-building measures adopted here 
can make an important contribution to a 
more stable and secure Europe and to an 
improved East- West relationship. 

As you know, my delegation has 
been among those which have demanded 
that we produce substance here and not 
generalities. We have tried hard to meet 
the stringent standards of the Madrid 
mandate. We are satisfied that we have 
met these standards and produced a 
mandatory regime which could serve as 
a first step in a more demanding arms 
control and security process. 

Because of our general concerns 
about compliance with international 
commitments, my government will 
follow the implementation of the 
Stockholm regime with particular atten- 
tion. We have all much to learn about 
confidence-building, and the measures 
adopted here will provide a test case as 
we consider how best to proceed in the 
future. 



I/ember 1986 



25 



ARMS CONTROL 



Far from exhausting the potential of 
confidence- and security-building 
measures, Stockholm is, we think, a 
beginning. We should expand upon what 
we have done here. I think particularly 
of measures in the area of information 
exchange. The conference has not 
achieved nearly as much here in this 
area as we thought desirable and possi- 
ble. It seems to us self-evident that an 
agreed understanding of what forces are 
routinely stationed in Europe, with what 
combat capability, is a fundamental 
requirement of true stability. Equally, 
the establishment of an information base 
is a requirement of any serious effort to 
reduce the strength of these same 
forces. We have not even begun to 
establish such an information base here 
in Stockholm. 

We have, on the other hand, taken 
what we regard as an important, even 
historic, step in the area of verification. 
With acceptance of inspection, we have 
established the principle that any state 
with doubts about whether the military 
activities of another are in compliance 
with commitments has the right and is 
assured the means of going into the ter- 
ritory of that other state to see for itself 
what is going on. There is no right of 
refusal of the inspection adopted here, 
whether explicit or implicit. We will 
follow implementation of the inspection 
provision with particular care. Because 
we are experimenting with challenge 
inspection for the first time, we will no 
doubt have to perfect the instrument we 
have built here. We must also recognize 
that any inspection regime intended to 
verify actual reductions in forces would 
have to be more rigorous and more 
demanding. 

In this regard, I would note that my 
government remains convinced that the 
use of aircraft from neutral and 
nonaligned states would produce a more 
credible and effective form of aerial 
inspection than the use of aircraft from 
the state being inspected. Unfortunately, 
the East rejected this idea and the offers 
of those states which said they were 
prepared to help bring this valuable idea 
to fruition. This proposal remains on the 
table for the future. 

The United States also believes that 
the successful outcome to the Stockholm 
conference should provide a positive 
political impulse to other arms control 
and security negotiations and to the 
East- West relationship as a whole. 

In a few days, the Vienna follow-up 
meeting will begin weighing the 
accomplishments and failures of the 
CSCE process since Madrid. Our work in 
Stockholm will weigh on the positive side 



of that balance, but there will be much 
on the negative side as well. It will be 
the task of the Vienna meeting to draw 
conclusions about the future, but the 
United States will continue to be among 
those which require balanced progress in 
all areas. 

Throughout the Stockholm con- 
ference, President Reagan has taken a 
personal interest in developments here. 
The first foreign policy decision he took 
in January 1981 was for the United 
States to participate in the Stockholm 
conference. He has spoken frequently 
about the conference and importance he 
attaches to its successful conclusion both 
in public and in private conversations 
with me. 

Let me recall President Reagan's 
statement of January 21, 1986, that "the 
Stockholm conference . . . can contribute 
to security in the larger sense, that 
which encompasses political economic, 
cultural, and humanitarian matters- 
human rights— as well as strictly military 



matters. The attainment of this broj 
concept of security is the fundament 
objective of the United States." We i 
believe that our work here in Stockhi 
will advance that overall objective. 



■In this document, the term notifiabll 
means subject to notification [text in ori£ 

2 See Annex I [text in original]. 

3 In this context, the term land forces 
includes amphibious, airmobile and airbo: 
forces [text in original]. 

4 As defined in the provisions on Prio 
Notification of Certain Military Activities 
[text in original]. 

5 "In this context, the notion of adjoir 
sea area is understood to refer also to oo 
areas adjoining Europe" [quoted text in 
original]. Whenever the term "the zone c 
application for CSBMs" is used in this dc 
ment, the above definition will apply [tex 
original]. 

6 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 198f 

7 The 35 delegations at the CDE agre« 
"stop the clock" on Sept. 19 so that the i 
tion of the CDE document would be in 
technical compliance with the adjournmei 
date set by the conference in Dec. 1985. I 



Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 31, 1986' 

The United States and the Soviet Union 
will begin a new round of discussions on 
arms control in Geneva on September 
18. An interagency arms control group 
has been meeting during the past several 
weeks to prepare for this round of talks. 
The United States considers this new 
round to be important in the process of 
reaching an agreement for meaningful 
arms control leading to total elimination 
of nuclear weapons. The September 
discussions come at a critical juncture in 
the process. 

The recent exchanges between Presi- 
dent Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev have served to underscore 
the seriousness of the discussions. We 
are pleased that the Soviet Union has 
moved from a position of limiting the 
expansion of the arms race to a discus- 
sion of reducing the nuclear arsenals on 
both sides. The United States, for its 
part, has assigned major priority to seek- 
ing areas in which the two sides can 
make progress. We believe our most 
recent proposals are serious, concrete, 
and detailed. They provide the impetus 



for disucssions with the Soviet Unior 
that can significantly contribute to ai 
agreement in the future. 

The interagency discussions in 
preparation for resumption of the 
Geneva talks will continue during the 
coming weeks. No final decisions hav 
been made and will not be approved \ ' 
the President until nearer the time tl • 
talks resume. 

We believe the principle of 
confidentiality is essential to the suc- 
cessful outcome of these discussions. 
are committed to preserving this prin ' 
pie and, therefore, will have no coram 
on the discussions that take place wit! ' 
our government or at the table in 
Geneva. We deplore those in this 
Administration who make this inform 
tion public. Breaching the principle of 
confidentiality serves to undermine th 
opportunity for a successful outcome i 
arms control. Quite frankly, we must 
question their motives. Their actions i 
serve the President, the American 
people, and the cause of world peace. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 8, 1986. 



26 



Department of State Bulle 



ARMS CONTROL 



BFR Talks End 39th Round 



ESTERN STATEMENT. 
LY 3, 1986 

ibassador Robert D. Blackwill, head 
the U.S. delegation, delivered an end- 
round plenary statement today on 
lalf of the West. He addressed the 
jstion of verification which he 
scribed as a key issue, and he 
■iewed Eastern statements in this 
;ard, taking stock of where the 
fotiations now stand as a result. 

In his remarks, he pointed out that 
■ing the last 7 weeks, Eastern 
iresentatives, like those on the 
;stern side, have devoted a significant 
tion of their attention to addressing 
1 affirming the importance their 
rernments attach to verification, 
leed, a theme found in nearly every 
stern statement in this round has 
;n the need for reliable verification, 
icifically for the type of agreement 
ier discussion here in Vienna. 

Only 2 weeks ago, the East 
iracterized a well-functioning system 
j/erification as an important condition 
confidence. And even earlier, on May 

the East acknowledged that one 
uld provide for necessary, justified, 
il proven measures of verification. 
I In fact, the East opened the 39th 
nd by discussing the goal of reliable 
|ification of the no-increase commit- 
nt; while on June 12, it addressed, at 
Erth, the objective interconnection 
ween verification and disarmament, 
st week, the East affirmed that War- 
i Pact statements reflect readiness 
(1 flexibility also in the area of verifica- 
ji and acknowledged the importance 
this problem. 

! This Eastern chorus pledging 
Igiance to verification— an 
urecedented but welcome turn of 
jnts in this negotiation— parallels in 
try respects Warsaw Pact pronounce- 
tits elsewhere since the conclusion of 
1 38th round. Indeed, on the very day 
" 38th round ended, Warsaw Pact 
sign ministers declared: "They are 
(ded by the need for effective verifica- 
h in all areas of arms limitation and 
fiction and disarmament." One month 
it. General Secretary Gorbachev 
flighted the "question of dependable 
ilification at every stage of the proc- 
j" of conventional arms control. 



And, as everyone knows, the 
Political Consultative Committee of the 
Warsaw Pact last month made an appeal 
in its Budapest communique for "imple- 
mentation of effective verification in all 
areas and stages of the reduction of 
armaments and disarmament by both 
national technical means and interna- 
tional procedures, including on-site 
inspection." 

One would have anticipated in light 
of these fine-sounding statements— and 
particularly the passages from the June 
1 1 Budapest communique— that during 
this round, the two sides would be well 
on their way to resolving the verification 
issue. One would have thought that such 
far-reaching— and, in the last case at 
least, unqualified— declarations would be 
accompanied either by new, concrete 
measures to substantiate them or at a 
minimum by a willingness to proceed on 
the basis of the ideas of others. 

Unfortunately, this new, positive 
rhetoric on effective verification has 
been matched not at all by Eastern 
deeds at the negotiating table. Instead, 
the Warsaw Pact position remains 
frozen in the minimalist proposals which 
it had tabled years ago. 

Each week since the December 1985 
Western move, the East has had positive 
things to say about verification. But 
week after week— and now round after 
round— the Warsaw Pact remains rigid 
in its position on this subject. Indeed, it 
has actually hardened and retracted 
elements of its previous, already unfor- 
tunate, stance with the tabling of its 
February 20 draft agreement and its 
subsequent explanation. 

During the course of this round, the 
Warsaw Pact added a dubious 
element— the realities of the present 
international situation— for justifying its 
refusal to accept Western verification 
proposals. One can only surmise that, 
after the West had irrefutably 
demonstrated how its verification 
package met the earlier Eastern- 
postulated criteria of corresponding to 
the content, substance, and purpose of 
the agreement under consideration, the 
East felt a need to come up with a more 
open-ended requirement, which it alone 
would be in a position to judge. 



In the meantime, 30 weeks have 
passed since the West's move of 
December 5, 1985, and the East has not 
moved one millimeter on the substantive 
issues of verification. Twenty-two weeks 
have gone by since the West put forward 
its detailed table of associated measures 
which contains its verification proposals. 
Yet the West still has not received a con- 
sidered reply to any of its ideas on this 
score— notwithstanding almost daily 
Warsaw Pact claims to the contrary. 

This is not to say that there has not 
been discussion on specific measures. 
Again in this round, the East has 
stressed the significance of entry/exit 
points as a verification position of all 
participants that in the Eastern and 
Western part of the area of reduction, 
permanent exit and entry points be 
established with observers of the other 
side. Yet the West is chided for 
dramatizing things where there is 
nothing to be dramatized. This seems to 
suggest that exempting approximately 
half a million Soviet forces which rotate 
each year in and out of the area of 
reductions is a trivial matter. Who in the 
world could believe that? 

Clearly not the Warsaw Pact in the 
past. In July 1983 and subsequently, the 
East held the position that all Soviet 
troops— including those on semiannual 
rotation— would pass through exit/entry 
points. Only with the tabling of the 
February 20 draft agreement did it 
become clear that the Warsaw Pact was 
abandoning this logical course, 
retreating to its current stance of 
entry/exit point tokenism. The West 
hopes that the East will return to its 
1983 position with the acknowledgment 
that it is not a concession to the West. 

The East this round confirmed that, 
together with other measures, the 
exchange of relevant information will 
make it possible in a reliable way to 
monitor the observance of the no- 
increase commitment. But the East to 
date has failed to explain how the highly 
aggregated data it is willing to exchange 
would be relevant to verifying com- 
pliance to this obligation. How then, 
Ambassador Blackwill asked, is one, in a 
reliable way, to monitor the observance 
of the no-increase commitment? 



vember 1986 



27 



ARMS CONTROL 



Clearly to be relevant for verifica- 
tion purposes, information must be 
disaggregated. The East seems to 
acknowledge this point— at least in part. 
It has agreed to break down the original 
figures it presented in 1976 from the 
simple categories of total Warsaw Pact 
ground forces and its combined ground 
and air forces in the area of reductions. 
Since 1980, it envisages providing 
figures on a national basis for the total 
number of ground forces in major forma- 
tions, the total number of ground forces 
outside such formations, and the total 
figure for air forces. But further disag- 
gregation down to a useful level— i.e., 
the battalion level— is obviously called 
for. Ambassador Blackwill asked: Why 
does the East resist this step? 

Finally, the Warsaw Pact this round 
has acknowledged the importance of 



on-site inspections for the verification 
regime under discussion. On May 15, the 
East made two important points in this 
regard. First, the East does not exclude 
the possibility that unclear situations 
may arise which might feed suspicions of 
a violation of treaty obligations and 
might justify a request for an on-site 
inspection. The East went on to note 
that for those who are complying with 
their obligations, it will be easy to refute 
a suspicion by allowing an on-site inspec- 
tion. And, indeed, this procedure would 
be what verification of compliance with 
the no-increase commitment really 
means. 

Yet while affirming the importance 
and utility of on-site inspection, the East 
continues to demand that the request for 
an inspection be well-founded— i.e., con- 
tain all relevant information and also all 



MBFR Negotiators Reconvene 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 25, 1986' 

Representatives of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact resume the mutual and 
balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks 
today in Vienna. It has long been 
NATO's goal to reach a verifiable agree- 
ment that would reduce and limit con- 
ventional forces in the crucial region of 
central Europe. This round of talks 
offers an opportunity to make progress 
toward that end. 

For its part, NATO has made every 
effort to lay the groundwork for success. 
On December 5, 1985, in order to 
achieve a breakthrough in these negotia- 
tions, the West tabled a proposal that 
accepted the framework the Warsaw 
Pact had proposed for a time-limited, 
first-phase agreement calling for initial 
reductions by U.S. and Soviet ground 
forces, followed by a no-increase commit- 
ment on all forces of the two alliances in 
the area. Underscoring further its desire 
to achieve tangible progress in Vienna, 
the West at the same time changed its 
long-held position that there should be 
agreement on the numbers of forces of 
both sides in central Europe before 
initial reductions were taken— a major 
compromise step in the East's direction. 

The Eastern response to this signifi- 
cant move has not contributed to prog- 
ress in the talks. Despite public claims 
by Warsaw Pact leaders that they were 
willing to incorporate reasonable 
verification measures in an agreement, 



the Warsaw Pact, in the draft MBFR 
agreement it tabled on February 20, 
1986, again proposed inadequate and 
unacceptable measures for ensuring 
compliance. Moreover, the East actually 
took a step backward from its 1983 
verification position and would now 
exempt the half million Soviet troops on 
annual rotation into and out of central 
Europe from any requirement to pass 
through monitoring points. 

Despite this lack of movement by the 
East in the previous two negotiating 
sessions, the United States and its allies 
remain hopeful that success can be 
achieved at the Vienna negotiating table. 
We look to the Soviet Union to seriously 
respond to the important compromise 
proposal tabled by the West last 
December. 

The President has instructed the 
U.S. delegation, under Ambassador 
Robert Blackwill, in conjunction with 
other NATO delegations, to continue to 
make every effort to demonstrate how 
the Western position in MBFR would 
enhance peace and stability in central 
Europe. All NATO nations hope that the 
East is capable of mustering the political 
will necessary to do its part to advance 
the Vienna negotiations. It is time for 
the Warsaw Pact to demonstrate that it 
is, indeed, committed to meaningful and 
verifiable reductions in conventional 
forces. 



possible evidence supporting its valid! 
Moreover the East in a further step t 
from its 1983 position on inspections 
now would give the inspected side thi 
right of veto regardless of whether tr 
request is well-founded or not. Finall; 
even if eventually granted, the delays 
built into the Eastern approach effec- 
tively rule out mounting an inspectioi 
short notice and thus in most cases n 
the measure of its utility. 

In summation, Ambassador 
Blackwill noted that the Eastern 
approach to verification this round 
seems akin to the proverbial messeng 
who bears good news and bad news— I 
with the former inevitably being can- L 
celled by the latter. 

The good news, he said, is that th ' 
East is now championing verification. | 
The bad news, however, is that the E ' 
appears willing to accept effective 
verification only when there are no tel 
sions between the sides and when no 
doubts exist as to intentions, force 
levels, and military activities. 

The good news is that the East 
accepts the idea of entry/exit points. ' I 
bad news, however, is that virtually n j 
of the approximately 500,000 Soviet I 
troops rotating in and out of central 
Europe every year will pass through | 
them. 

The good news is that the East 
agrees that an information exchange | 
would make possible reliable verificat i 
of the no-increase commitment. The b 
news, however, is that the East rei'usi i 
to provide the relevant information, 
disaggregated to a manageable level. 

Finally, the good news is that the | 
East believes on-site inspections can 
clarify unclear situations. The bad nev| 
however, is that the Warsaw Pact dra i 
the words "on-site inspection" of their, 
very meaning. Even to request an 
inspection under the Eastern approacl \ 
one must justify it with evidence that i| 
sufficient to prove a violation without 
recourse to inspection. Even then the 
inspected side may turn down the 
request. And if it does not, the inspec- 
tion is likely to be so delayed as to be 
worthless. 

Against this background, as well a 
other developments, the West has a 
right to wonder whether the East has 
any intention to agree to a serious 
verification regime. The West has a 
right to wonder whether the East is 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1986. 



28 



Department of State Bullet 



ARMS CONTROL 



jous about this negotiation. It has a 
It to wonder whether the East will 
t manifest the political will to come 
in agreement on conventional force 
suctions and limitations. 
;For its part, the West wants an 
cement here in Vienna. It would like 
ipw. Being the only extant negotiation 
Iressing conventional force reductions 

limitations in Europe, this forum is a 
! of the earnest of those who, like 
i eral Secretary Gorbachev on April 
3 appeal for cutting the "Gordian 

t" and for moving on to an accord. 



As was noted by the Western side at 
the opening of this round, the best 
means of demonstrating the sincerity of 
the East's commitment to substantial 
reductions and limitations on conven- 
tional armed forces in central Europe 
and to reliable verification at every stage 
is for the Warsaw Pact to deal positively 
and constructively with the serious West- 
ern proposal tabled here in December. 
The West continues to wait for that 
Eastern response. Ambassador 
Blackwill's last question was: Where is 

it?a 



S. and Soviet Approaches 
Arms Control 



\Edward L. Rowny 

[Address before the Council on 
mign Affairs in Baltimore on 
lember 19, 1986. Ambassador Rowny 
ircml adviser to the President and 
Secretary of State on arms control 



i week marks two crucial events: the 
dting between Secretary Shultz and 
i;ign Minister Shevardnadze and the 
ijiing of the sixth round of the nuclear 
ispace arms talks in Geneva. 
■True to form, the Soviets have been 
Bing "hard to get." They insist that 
stnething" must come out of a sum- 
fland "something" means an arms 
ttrol agreement on their terms. 
bally true to form, the Soviets are 
Ising for a single-issue summit. Presi- 
R Reagan wisely insists that any sum- 
imust deal with the four pillars on 
frh the U.S. -Soviet relationship is 
K: bilateral affairs, regional issues, 
Ian rights, and arms control. Addi- 
fclly, as the President has stated, the 
let treatment of American journalist 
■olas Daniloff continues to limit 
Ijrely what is achievable in our 
keral relations. We hope that the 
let Union will resolve this case 
"mptly before it does even more 
lage to the relationship between our 
•(countries. 

Bit is obvious that a summit, if it 
Is place, will have arms control as an 
Sbrtant item on the agenda. At last 
I's summit, the President and 
leral Secretary Gorbachev agreed to 
■arms control goals: 

■• A 50% reduction in the strategic 
inals of the superpowers; and 



• An interim agreement on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces. 

In the two rounds of talks in Geneva 
following that summit, the Soviets failed 
to follow up the pledge made at that 
summit. There was little progress 
toward these goals. The Soviets were 
unwilling to engage in genuine give-and- 
take at the negotiating table. More 
recently, however, the Soviets have 
begun to show signs of seriousness, even 
though fundamental differences between 
the sides still remain. 

As I said, the sixth round of the 
nuclear and space arms talks began 
yesterday in Geneva. It will be the task 
of the negotiators to continue to see if 
the differences that remain between us 
and the Soviets can be resolved. For our 
American negotiators, this means a 
great deal of work lies ahead of them— 
more hard work than usual. Their job is 
already excruciatingly difficult because 
the Soviet negotiators, in marked con- 
trast to the Americans, indulge in an 
almost mind-numbing repetition of past 
positions. This, needless to say, leaves 
little room for the kind of free, explor- 
atory discussions that are essential to 
addressing the basic differences in our 
conceptual approaches to the problem of 
arms reductions. Hopefully, the talks 
that Paul Nitze, [special adviser to the 
President and the Secretary of State on 
arms control matters], Max Kampelman, 
[head of U.S. delegation on arms control 
negotiations and U.S. negotiator on 
defense and space arms], myself, and 
others have had with Soviet arms control 
experts in Moscow and Washington in 
recent weeks will pay some dividends. 



Fundamental Differences 

As we consider our goals for this round 
of arms talks and as we look down the 
road to a possible summit, it is important 
to remind ourselves of the fundamentals 
underlying our relations with the Soviet 
Union. The United States, as a demo- 
cratic republic, stands at a disadvantage 
in some respects in its relations with a 
totalitarian state like the Soviet Union. 
For those of us who have studied U.S.- 
Soviet relations, this is no great 
revelation— de Tocqueville pointed it out 
almost 200 years ago. Unlike ours, the 
Soviet system of government does not 
provide for an independent legislature 
and judiciary which provide checks and 
balances to the powers of the executive 
branch. Soviet leaders are self -selected. 
They impose their will from the top 
downward through the hierarchies of 
their government and the Communist 
Party. Unlike Soviet citizens, our 
citizens elect their leaders. They have 
direct and powerful access to the actions 
of their leaders through the voting 
process. The fundamental difference 
between our system and that of the 
U.S.S.R. is that Soviet leaders are not 
subject to popular recall. 

While de Tocqueville was writing 
about America, another Frenchman, the 
Marquis de Custine, was writing about 
Russia. His book, Journey for Our 
Time, shows that the government of the 
modern-day Soviet Union is not funda- 
mentally different from the govern- 
mental system of Russia under the czars. 
His concluding thought is even more 
applicable today than then. He wrote: "I 
don't blame the Russians for being what 
they are, I blame them for pretending to 
be what we in the West are." 

The Soviets have recently, with a 
flurry of news conferences and television 
appearances, taken greater pains to 
mimic our freedom of speech and free 
press. I heard a Soviet spokesman on 
American television refer the other day 
to "Izvestiya, the government 
newspaper," as if every other paper in 
the U.S.S.R. were not government 
owned and controlled. This activity is 
but a thin veneer, covering the rough 
surface of a system of government which 
Orwell characterized by such terms as 
"doublethink" and "nonspeak." 

Strict Soviet discipline enforces a 
unified position among the U.S.S.R.'s 
negotiators, government, and party 
officials. There is no open political oppo- 
sition in the Soviet Union to place 
pressure on the government to make 
negotiating moves toward our positions. 
Despite the facade of openness that the 
Soviets have been putting on under 



Cember 1986 



29 



ARMS CONTROL 



Gorbachev, there are still no cracks in 
the Soviet monolith, only surface 
fissures. 

Contrast this with the situation that 
exists in the United States. Government 
officials, independent think tanks, and 
the man on the street have access to a 
press that is neither owned nor con- 
trolled by the government. A wide 
variety of views can be and, in fact, are 
expressed. Acts of the government can 
be, and are, criticized or praised. The 
pressure that these differences of 
opinion put on our elected officials, who 
depend for their mandate on the consent 
of those they govern, is substantial. This 
clash of views is the essence of a free 
society. But it also offers the Soviets an 
opportunity to inject themselves into our 
internal debate. But we need to be 
reminded that the Soviet system is not 
like ours. It is a mistake to believe that 
Soviet leaders are subject to the same 
pressures that are placed on our leaders. 

Soviet Negotiating Tactics 

My 7 years as a negotiator on the SALT 
II [strategic arms limitation talks] 
delegation and my 2 years as chief 
START [strategic arms reduction talks] 
negotiator have given me a special 
insight into the tactics the Soviets use to 
exploit American pluralism. There is a 
great difference between what Soviet 
leaders say in public and what they allow 
to happen at the negotiating table. For 
public consumption, the Soviets profess 
that they are flexible. They have a 
special talent for recycling their more 
shopworn offers and reintroducing them 
as if they constituted new and substan- 
tive concessions. The theory is that they 
will compromise because they say they 
will. But in practice, we can only reach a 
deal with them when we have something 
significant to give up. Protected by the 
confidentiality of the conference room, 
Soviet negotiators adhere to their posi- 
tions with the stubbornness of an army 
mule. At the table, they are anything but 
flexible. 

The reason for this approach is clear. 
Where the Soviets see splits in American 
public opinion on arms control, they see 
the possibility of exploiting them to their 
benefit. If the U.S. Congress can cause 
the Administration to concede key 
aspects of its negotiating position, then 
why should they, the Soviets reason, 
expend any of their own precious 
negotiating capital to achieve their ends? 
The Soviets do not deal in bargaining 
chips. They do not make concessions in 
the spirit of give-and-take or as a sign of 
good will. Rather, they consider uni- 



lateral concessions to be the mark of 
contemptible weakness. They do, how- 
ever, like to appeal to the notions of 
good will and reciprocity through the 
Western press, radio, and TV. They 
know that through our media, they can 
strike in us a responsive chord. 

In the same vein, Soviet negotiators 
readily accept whatever concessions we 
offer them with no thoughts that they 
are obliged to reciprocate. Our unilateral 
concessions do not make the Soviets any 
more tractable. If anything, they dig 
their heels in deeper, insisting that we 
take their views "into account" on other 
issues. The Soviet negotiating strategy 
is, to put it simply, one of obstinance. 
"What's mine is mine, and what's yours 
is negotiable" is more than a saying for 
the Soviets; it describes their negoti- 
ating style. Moreover, they truly 
believe— again, as George Orwell 
wrote— that to be equal they must be 
"more equal." 

Our method to counter this strategy 
is arduous but necessary if arms control 
is to serve its ultimate purpose of con- 
tributing to our national security. We 
must learn to be just as tough as they 
are. We have to revive the spirit of the 
Yankee horse trader. And above all, we 
must be patient. 

The Soviets simply do not negotiate 
in a spirit of problemsolving. Those of us 
who have negotiated with the Soviets do 
not expect them to. We have come to 
understand that, whereas we would like 
to work out solutions, the Soviets would 
rather compete. Americans, without the 
benefit of direct negotiating experience 
with the Soviets, tend to believe that the 
sheer weight of logic will lead both us 
and the Soviets toward mutually 
beneficial agreements. This tendency is 
understandable; it is part of our 
heritage. But it only complicates the 
formidable tasks confronting the 
American negotiator. Soviet negotiators 
study our democratic system; they get to 
know its strengths and weaknesses and 
how to exploit them. Because they 
recognize the strength of commitment 
we have to our ideals, they know too 
well that our pluralistic society is 
susceptible to influence— and sometimes 
outright manipulation— for their tactical 
gain. 

Recent Congressional Actions 

With this background in mind, I would 
like now to turn to an issue that is 
especially important today— namely, 
recent congressional actions. 



The Reagan Administration, like , i 
other administrations before it, is ful 
cognizant of the deep desires of the I 
American people for an improvement 
U.S. -Soviet relations. Our people wol 
like to reduce expenditures for defer! 
And, above all, they would like to setl 
reduction in the threat of nuclear wal 
From my vantage point— close up— II 
assure you that President Reagan fu I 
shares these desires of the American I 
people. He has worked throughout h I 
term of office to see them realized. 

But President Reagan also recogl 
nizes, more clearly than most, that ii I 
Soviet Union, the United States is fa I 
with a tough and determined advers; I 
Accordingly, he decided at the outse I 
his presidency that it was first neces I 
to restore the military strength of th J 
United States, degraded by years of I 
unanswered Soviet buildup. We tend I 
forget what a courageous decision th I 
was in the early 1980s when we wen 
faced with double-digit inflation and h 
unemployment. In the past 5V2 years 
President Reagan has done much to J 
reestablish America's reputation as e| 
decisive international power. He has | 
demonstrated a willingness to opposs ' 
the encroachments of Soviet military 
power and to meet intimidation with J 
forceful resistence. This has not been ' 
easy course. But its reward has been J 
greater security for the United State 
and its allies. 

The President's course on arms c ( 
trol has been equally courageous. Un>| 
ing to sign onto a scheme that license 
major buildup of strategic weapons in 
the guise of real arms control, Presidi 
Reagan declared that SALT could no ! 
longer serve as a basis for U.S. strate 
arms policy. He did this despite the 
realization that this decision would op ' 
him to the criticism that he was 
"against" arms control. Yet the Presi 
dent has never shied away from negot ' 
tions that could contribute to lessening 
the threat of nuclear weapons. What r 
is "for" is an agreement that increase 
strategic stability. He is "for" an agre' 
ment that provides for real reductions 
not cosmetic limitations, in the levels r 
offensive nuclear arms. President 
Reagan's approach to arms control is ■; 
sound and forwardlooking. He does no 
favor reaching "any agreement." We 
could enter into this kind of agreemen 
tomorrow. What we want is a "good 
agreement"— one that is equitable, 
verifiable, and serves the interests of 
both sides. 

We are now at the point where thii 
approach can bear fruit. It may produc 
the first real agreed decrease in the le* 
of offensive nuclear arms in history. 



30 



Department of State Bulls 



ARMS CONTROL 



. As President Reagan well knows, 
jis control for arms control's sake is 
jgood policy. If this were the case, 
j substance of the agreement would 
I be as important as the fact of the 
ming. But we all know this isn't the 
e. First of all, signing an arms control 
aeement will not, of itself, reconcile 
j fundamental political differences 
saining between the United States 
l the Soviet Union. More importantly, 
[is control deals with real weapons 
r real questions of military strategy. 
] se things have to do with whether or 
the world is a more or less danger- 
1 place. Ignoring these basic con- 
rations can lead to agreements that 
little more than political placebos, 
isident Reagan realizes that agree- 
ipts made in the absence of improve- 
pts in the U.S. -Soviet relationship will 
ibe long lived. Arms control agree- 
tpts alone, however valuable on their 
n merits, do not constitute improved 
J. -Soviet relations. 
■Arms control is essentially and 
iorably tied to developments in 
itary strategy and in weapons 
Mtnology, and not only to the sheer 
Biber of weapons in stockpiles. A 
By example of this link comes from 
11SALT I accords. The head of our 
LT I delegation. Ambassador Gerard 
Ith, stated that the failure to conclude 
cmprehensive, indefinite agreement 
Sting strategic offensive arms could 
considered grounds for withdrawal 
|i the Interim Agreement's counter- 
i for strategic defenses, the Anti- 
aistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Unlike 
■Soviet Union, the United States is in 
jplete compliance with the legal 
cations it assumes under the ABM 
rkty. My example merely serves to 
prate an important point. The lack of 
cmprehensive agreement on offensive 
aes could call into question the 
is— in politics as well as in military 
ffltegy— of the ABM Treaty's virtual 
feof strategic defensive systems. It is 
if to see that the goal of deep and 
sjilizing reductions in offensive 
lb— a goal President Reagan has 
pprsed for 5V2 years now— is today of 
r<\ greater importance. 
Much in strategy, military tech- 
Ugy, and arms control has changed in 
fcast 10 years. The Soviets have con- 
Bed to mount a massive and unwar- 
Ued military buildup in the face of 
Itiderable unilateral U.S. restraint in 
gwn defense programs during the 
le period. They have, thus, broken 
Iforomise of reciprocal self-restraint 
1? many in the United States thought 



SALT implied. As if to add insult to 
injury, the Soviets systematically 
violated SALT as well. These things 
were clear in the President's mind when 
he entered office, and they were clear in 
his mind when he laid down his challenge 
to the scientific community to develop 
reliable defenses against Soviet ballistic 
missiles. But unhappily, considering 
their recent votes on arms control and 
the defense bill, these things have 
apparently not been uppermost in the 
collective mind of the Congress. 

As an example, let us take a look at 
chemical weapons. The United States 
last produced chemical weapons in 1969. 
Every chemical weapon in the U.S. 
inventory is, therefore, at least 17 years 
old. The Soviets never halted production 
as we did, and they now have a modern, 
effective stock of lethal chemical 
weapons as an integral part of their 
military forces. In this, we see another 
clear link between arms control and the 
dynamics of military deterrence. The 
legal ban on chemical warfare of the 
Geneva Protocol does not have the 
strength on its own to prevent the use of 
chemical weapons. The ability of the 
United States to deter the use of 
chemical weapons against ourselves and 
our allies depends heavily on the United 
States maintaining an effective chemical 
deterrent. However, the Congress very 
nearly prevented this necessary modern- 
ization in their mid-August funding 
votes. 

The House also recently voted to 
impose a 1-year moratorium on all but 
the smallest underground nuclear tests. 
The Administration continues to support 
the long-term goal of a comprehensive 
test ban. But it is neither in the interest 
of the United States and our allies nor in 
the interest of sound arms control to 
partake in the exercise the House has 
prescribed. Moreover, for as long as we 
need to rely upon nuclear deterrence, 
continued testing is essential to ensure 
the reliability and safety of our nuclear 
deterrent. Indeed, it is no small irony 
that those who oppose strategic defenses 
and who take refuge in the strategy of 
deterrence by the threat of nuclear 
retaliation have now chosen to support a 
proposal that would undermine the 
reliability of the nuclear stockpile 
necessary to that strategy's continuing 
credibility. If the Soviets are serious 
about the types of verification they 
bandy about on television, they should 
work toward effective verification of 
existing treaties on nuclear testing. 

In yet another unfortunate vote, the 
House moved to force the Administra- 
tion to adhere to the flawed SALT II 



agreement by passing a resolution 
barring funding for any weapon that 
would exceed its limits. SALT II, had it 
ever been ratified by the Senate, would 
have expired by now. One wonders what 
is the point of reincarnating SALT in the 
way the House proposes. In effect, some 
in the House have said to the Soviet 
Union that SALT II was good enough. 
We can only anticipate that the Soviets 
will use this action to pull the rug out 
from under our START negotiators in 
Geneva. 

Many Congressmen no doubt 
sincerely intend their actions as signs to 
the Soviets that the United States is 
"serious" about arms control. However, 
it is my judgment that their actions will 
not have the intended effects. There is 
no incentive for the Soviets to sign an 
agreement reducing strategic offensive 
arms when the Congress has as much as 
told them directly that an agreement 
allowing arms to be significantly 
increased is satisfactory to the American 
people. 

But by far the most distressing con- 
gressional actions have come in cutting 
the funding the President has requested 
for the Strategic Defense Initiative— 
what the media commonly refer to as 
Star Wars and we refer to as SDL The 
Soviets spend over $1 billion a year on 
military laser research alone, which is 
only one of many strategic defensive 
technologies they are investigating. If 
the Soviets spend this much on this one 
aspect of strategic defense, one can only 
conclude that the amount the Soviets 
spend on their entire strategic defense 
program is far greater. The Soviet 
strategic defense program represents a 
much larger commitment of plant space, 
capital, and manpower than does the 
American effort. Thus, the Soviets can 
hardly have an objection to strategic 
defenses in principle. 

The Soviets are, of course, con- 
cerned about the Strategic Defense Initi- 
ative. Their chief concern is that we will 
be more successful in our research than 
they have been in theirs. This concern 
has driven them to their wits' end in a 
campaign to undercut popular support in 
the West for SDL They raise the specter 
of the "militarization of space," in full 
knowledge that space was militarized the 
day they flew the first intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) through it in 
1957. And they act as if their own long- 
running strategic defense program 
didn't exist. 

But SDI funding provides far more 
than spinoffs. It is vital in its own right 
if we are to determine whether it is 



csmber 1986 



31 



ARMS CONTROL 



possible to realize President Reagan's 
goal of a deterrent to war that is safer 
and more stable than simply relying on 
the threat of retaliation with offensive 
weapons. Indeed, the most important 
goal of SDI is to answer the question: is 
it technically possible to create a deter- 
rent that is strictly defensive? As such, 
SDI is one major element in a compre- 
hensive U.S. defense policy that sends to 
the Soviet leadership an important 
message. The message is that the 
existing strategic situation is not suffi- 
ciently stable— it is not safe enough. It 
sends the Soviets the message that the 
President is determined to see what can 
be done to remedy the current short- 
comings of deterrence. We want to 
develop a defense that defends us. 

SDI research is more than just a 
hedge against the Soviets' own con- 
siderable research and development 
efforts in strategic defense technology. 
As the President has made clear, it is 
not a bargaining chip to be traded away 
in a so-called grand compromise. The 
possibilities that SDI holds out to us are 
far too important to cheapen by these 
descriptions. Common sense and basic 
morality dictate that we do all we 
reasonably can to solve the ethical 
paradox which now faces us: namely, 
that in order to defend ourselves, we 
must rely on the offensive use of nuclear 
weapons. I firmly believe that SDI will 
provide us with the necessary tools to 
enhance deterrence and reduce the risk 
of nuclear war. 

SDI can contribute to more than just 
a stable and safer peace; it will yield 
numerous benefits improving the quality 
of everyday life. Research conducted 
under the mantle of SDI has already pro- 
duced the galium arsenide computer 
chip, which may prove to be a much 
cheaper and far superior alternative to 
silicon chips. The optical switches SDI 
scientists are developing may supplant 
computer chips in many applications. 
And SDI laser research promises to pro- 
vide doctors with new tools for com- 
bating cancer. A complete list of spinoffs 
would be much longer. But according to 
one estimate in a recent article in The 
New York Times, the several billion 
dollars per year spent on SDI will have a 
payoff of $5-$20 trillion for the civilian 
economy. 

Public opinion polls show that the 
goal of developing strategic defensive 
technologies has the support of the 
American public. And I believe the 
public supports the President's firm, 
open, and responsive approach in dealing 
with the Soviets. Ronald Reagan sees 
the relationships and priorities among 



the interests of national security, 
defense policy, and arms control with a 
presidential perspective. He recognizes 
that the supreme interest is national 
security. Arms control can serve that 
interest, as can defense policy. But any 
arms control agreement we reach must 
meet the acid test of whether or not it 
enhances our national security. 

In my discussions with Members of 
Congress, my message has been simple. 
The Soviets that we see eye-to-eye 
across the negotiating table know what 
their leaders are doing and know what 
they want. Looking at what we do, the 
Soviets see mixed signals. They see our 
internal debate not as a sign of a healthy 
democracy but as a symptom of 
weakness and disarray. For the Soviets, 
budgetary constraint is not so much a 
reason as an excuse not to pay for SDI. 
The Soviets are not cutting the funding 
for their own strategic defense program, 
which is paid for from an economic base 
far smaller than ours in an economy that 
is weak by comparison. In short, our 
Soviet counterparts believe they need 
not negotiate with us if their objectives 
can be achieved by simply waiting us 
out, by playing on our own irresolute- 
ness. One Soviet put it to me quite 
bluntly. He said the United States is try- 
ing to make a virtue out of impotence. 
This is hardly the image of ourselves 
that we want to promote in the minds of 
Soviet negotiators. 

Conclusion 

My long years spent negotiating with the 
Soviets tell me that if we are to get what 
we want out of arms control— if it is to 



contribute to the stability of deterrenc 
and enhance our security— then our 
negotiators have to have the firm sup 
port of the American people. Withoul 
this support, our negotiators have li 
to help them in their struggle to mo 
the immovable object, their Soviet 
counterpart. 

I hope my words today lend som 
understanding and context to the spi 
challenges we confront as a democracy 
facing a system that is, to its very con 
different from ours. The greatest con- 
tribution Americans can make to help 
our negotiators in Geneva is to show 
firmness of purpose and determined 
patience. This is especially important 
now in these crucial weeks which lie 
ahead of us. Our arms control position 
are sound. They are flexible enough to 
accommodate legitimate Soviet inter- 
ests. The United States is now in a 
strong position to work out with the 
Soviet Union the first decrease in the 
levels of offensive nuclear arms ever. 1 
good deal, one that is equitable and 
verifiable, is within our reach only if tl 
Soviets are, in fact, as serious as they 
say they are— as serious as we are— 
about reaching an agreement. Mean- 
while, our resolution here at home will h 
serve to reinforce the words of our 
negotiators. Firmness and patience wil " 
also reinforce the words of our Presi- 
dent as he prepares to meet General 
Secretary Gorbachev face-to-face for tl 
second time. ■ 






Verifying Nuclear Testing Limitations: 
Possible U.S. -Soviet Cooperation 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
AUG. 14, 1986' 

In response to the requirements of Section 
1003 of the FY 1986 Department of Defense 
Authorization Act (P.L. 99-145), I am pleased 
to transmit this unclassified interagency 
study of possible avenues of cooperation 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the development of verification 
capabilities consistent with national security 
restrictions. 

The requirement under Section 1003 
involves: "limited exchanges of data and 
scientific personnel," in general, and "joint 
technological effort in the area of seismic 
monitoring," in particular. Upon review of a 



number of possible scientific disciplines, it 
was concluded that in terms of this study, 
nuclear testing issues appear to offer the 
most promising avenues for such "scientific' 
cooperation and data exchange. Therefore, 
the attached study focuses its examination 0i 
matters relating to the verification of limita- 
tions in nuclear testing. 

While the attached study focuses on 
nuclear testing limitations, it should be notei 
that in other arms control areas as well, the 
Administration believes that exchanges of 
information would, in addition to various 
monitoring provisions including types of 
on-site inspections, play an important role in 
establishing a verification framework. 



32 



Department of State Bulleti , 



ARMS CONTROL 



In START [strategic arms reduction 
f] and INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
»], for example, areas of possible 
iange of information might include the 
kration of missile and launcher facilities, 
Clumbers of missiles and launchers at such 
ities, and information on the destruction 

issiles and launchers that are in excess of 
sed treaty limits. In the negotiations on 
|ial and Balanced Force Reductions 
EFR), we have asked for an exchange of 
fc-mation, to be updated annually, on the 
cture of forces subject to MBFR limita- 
p. At the Stockholm Conference on 
jfidence- and Security-Building Measures 
d Disarmament] in Europe (CDE), we 
Ive it important to have an exchange of 
frmation both on overall force structures 
Kin specific forces participating in military 
(Hties. In chemical weapons arms control, 
lelieve it important, among other things, 
tve a preliminary bilateral exchange of 
i on chemical weapons stockpiles and on 
Auction facilities as a confidence-building 
ssure prior to the entry into force of a con- 
ijion banning such weapons. 

The prospects for progress in arms con- 
c'may be significantly enhanced if a regime 
^operation between the United States and 
Boviet Union in the development of 
Bication capabilities consistent with 
H>nal security restrictions can be estab- 
Jd. The attached interagency study 
uribes some possible avenues of coopera- 
»that could produce benefits in the near 
'%. in the nuclear testing limitations area. 
: As indicated in the attached study, the 
red States has long sought a meeting with 
Soviets to present our concerns about the 
Bication provisions of the Threshold Test 
^Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear 
aosions Treaty (PNET). The United 
Bes and the Soviet Union recently agreed 
Ive experts meet to discuss issues related 
uiclear testing. 

This meeting of experts, which took place 

sneva July 25-August 1, allowed the 
(led States to present its ideas and con- 
is to the Soviet Union and to hear Soviet 
Is. At the meeting, the United States 
tented its views of verification improve- 
Bts in existing agreements, which we 
five are needed and achievable at this 
I. A follow-on meeting of U.S. and Soviet 
frts is scheduled for September. We hope 
■soviet Union will join in a constructive 
Rgue. 

Ronald Reagan 



^ERAGENCY STUDY 

csible Avenues for Cooperation 
h the Soviet Union em the 
Welopment of Capabilities for 
Iifying Compliance With Nuclear 
Ating Limitations 



ntroduction 

jfcion 1003 of the FY 1986 Depart- 
iit of Defense Authorization Act 
31160) calls for an interagency study 



of "limited exchanges of data and scien- 
tific personnel" in general and "joint 
technological effort in the area of 
seismic monitoring" in particular. After 
reviewing a number of possible scientific 
disciplines, it was concluded that nuclear 
testing issues appear to offer the most 
promising avenues for scientific coopera- 
tion and data exchange. This study, 
therefore, focuses on matters relating to 
the verification of limitations in the area 
of nuclear testing. 

II. Background 

Effective means of verification are of 
critical importance to arms control. Our 
national security requires that we be 
able to assess with confidence com- 
pliance with any negotiated arms control 
agreements. Today, most of our major 
arms control agreements are monitored 
through what is known as national 
technical means of verification (NTM). 
While NTM has the primary benefit of 
being under the control of the verifying 
party, there are some particular 
applications— such as for strategic and 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, con- 
ventional and chemical forces, and 
nuclear testing— in which cooperative 
means of verification may be beneficial 
or even necessary. 

Cooperative means can include 
various onsite inspection and data 
exchange measures or direct measure- 
ment schemes such as would apply to 
determining the yields of underground 
nuclear tests. Onsite inspection by 
observers and instruments may be able 
to play a role in deterring violations at 
agreed locations or "declared sites." The 
utility of onsite inspection is largely a 
function of its frequency and duration 
and whether, and at what costs, the 
activities monitored can be conducted at 
other times and places. Other considera- 
tions with regard to onsite inspection 
include the question of how the party 
being monitored calculates the risk of 
violations being uncovered and whether 
they could avoid any single inspection 
that would detect a violation. Thus, the 
past record of the inspected party is a 
vital consideration. 

Data exchanges may be beneficial to 
provide a benchmark for assessing com- 
pliance. If, however, the verifying party 
does not possess a means of independ- 
ently validating the data it receives, 
large uncertainties could still prevail, 
diminishing the utility of the exchange. 
Nevertheless, as the amount of data 
exchanged is increased, the uncertainty 
should decrease while the difficulty of 
concealing illegal activities increases. 



Direct measurements have the 
benefit of allowing the verifying party to 
control the means of monitoring. Direct 
measurement is not perfect because it is 
limited by the accuracy of the instru- 
ments used and, as is the case for all 
monitoring methods, the ability of the 
inspected party to manipulate the 
evidence. Furthermore, direct measure- 
ment will not detect violations conducted 
at times and places when direct 
measurement equipment is not engaged 
and normally will not detect violations 
when special efforts are undertaken to 
conceal prohibited activities. However, 
even considering these limitations, direct 
measurement is much more definitive 
than any remote sensing method for 
determining the yields of Soviet nuclear 
tests. 

The Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limita- 
tion of Underground Nuclear Weapon 
Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty- 
TTBT) prohibits U.S. and Soviet 
underground nuclear weapon tests with 
yields greater than 150 kilotons (kt). The 
TTBT is a treaty signed by both parties 
but ratified by neither. Both the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. have separately stated 
that they would abide by the yield limita- 
tion. Furthermore, since neither party 
has made its intentions clear not to 
become a party, both signatories are 
obligated by international law to refrain 
from acts that would defeat the object 
and purpose of the treaty. At present, 
however, the United States cannot effec- 
tively verify Soviet compliance with the 
treaty. Moreover, the implementation of 
the verification measures set forth in the 
Protocol to the treaty (exchange of yield, 
date, time, depth, and coordinates for 
two nuclear weapon tests for calibration 
purposes from each geophysically 
distinct testing area and information on 
the geology of the testing areas), which 
would become effective upon ratification, 
will not provide this capability, since 
there is no way for the United States to 
independently verify the data 
exchanged, nor would the data, if 
validated, be sufficient to ensure effec- 
tive verification. 

Today, we monitor Soviet tests with 
seismic equipment located outside the 
U.S.S.R. In three presidential reports to 
Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the 
uncertainty in yield derived from seismic 
measurements, when taken into account, 
resulted in findings of only "likely viola- 
tion," even though the seismic evidence 
indicates that a number of Soviet tests 
have central yield values above the 150 
kt threshold. "Central yield" is defined 



I ember 1986 



33 



ARMS CONTROL 



as the yield corresponding to mean value 
of seismic body wave magnitudes for a 
particular nuclear test. While we judge 
that, at present, there is approximately a 
factor of two uncertainty in the yield 
estimates derived by seismic methods, 
there are reasons to suggest the uncer- 
tainty could be actually smaller (or con- 
ceivably larger). A factor of two uncer- 
tainty means, for example, that a Soviet 
test for which we derive a "central 
yield" value of 150 kt may have, with a 
95% probability, a yield as high as 300 kt 
or as low as 75 kt. 

As already mentioned, the verifica- 
tion provisions contained in the Protocol 
of the unratified TTBT would not reduce 
this level of uncertainty to an acceptable 
level. The U.S. Government has, there- 
fore, continued its longstanding effort to 
obtain a means of monitoring that would 
substantially reduce our verification 
uncertainty. The history of the search 
for verifiable nuclear testing limitations 
will provide a backdrop for an under- 
standing of the complicated and some- 
times frustrating search for possible 
avenues of cooperation with the Soviet 
Union in the development of verification 
capabilities. 

III. Historic Perspective On 
Nuclear Testing Limitations 

One of the earliest proposals for nuclear 
testing limitations was presented in 
terms of a comprehensive test ban as 
part of a broader disarmament proposal 
made by the Soviets in the UN Disarma- 
ment Commission in May 1955. How- 
ever, there was no movement in this 
area for the next 3 years. Early in the 
spring of 1958, President Eisenhower 
suggested to Soviet Premier Khrushchev 
that a group of technical experts meet to 
determine what specific control meas- 
ures would be required to ensure com- 
pliance with a nuclear test ban. After 
several exchanges, Khrushchev agreed, 
and the Geneva Conference of Experts 
To Study the Possibility of Detecting 
Violations of a Possible Agreement on 
the Suspension of Nuclear Tests was 
formed. Technical discussions between 
experts from the U.S.S.R., Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, the United 
Kingdom, France, Canada, and the 
United States began in July 1958. 

On August 21, 1958, the Conference 
of Experts adopted a final report for 
consideration by governments. The 
report recommended a worldwide 
system of land control posts, shipborne 
posts, and regular and special air- 
sampling flights to monitor an agree- 
ment banning nuclear weapon tests in 



the atmosphere, underwater, and under- 
ground. Their report was accepted as 
the technical basis for political negotia- 
tions by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., and the 
Geneva Conference on the Discontin- 
uance of Nuclear Weapon Tests began 
on October 31, 1958. The technical basis 
of the international control system was 
provided mainly by the reports of the 
1958 Conference of Experts and a 1959 
technical working group of the Geneva 
conference on the detection of high- 
altitude tests. These reports recom- 
mended a worldwide network of 160-170 
land control posts, 10 shipborne posts, 
regular and special aircraft flights, and 
space satellites. The United States 
believed, however, that there was a 
serious risk that small underground 
explosions might remain undetected or 
be incorrectly identified as earthquakes. 

The experts' report was technically 
limited in two respects: (1) it did not 
cover tests at more than 30-50 
kilometers above the earth's surface, 
and (2) it did not have the benefit of the 
new seismic data obtained from the 
Hardtack underground test series car- 
ried out by the United States after the 
report was submitted. The new seismic 
data, submitted by the American delega- 
tion in Geneva in June 1959, showed 
that the proposed control system would 
have been less effective for detecting 
and identifying underground tests than 
the experts had believed. 

At the request of the State Depart- 
ment, the President's Special Assistant 
for Science and Technology appointed a 
Panel on Seismic Improvement, headed 
by Dr. Lloyd Berkner, to study the new 
seismic data. The Berkner panel's report 
recommended a number of new tech- 
niques and proposed a research program 
to improve the capability of the verifica- 
tion system, described in the Geneva 
Conference of Experts' report, to detect 
and identify underground tests. The 
panel recommendations were the basis 
for much of the succeeding research in 
seismology and resulted in the develop- 
ment of new concepts in seismic sta- 
tions, instrument arrays, computational 
techniques, and research into the phe- 
nomenology associated with seismic 
waves from explosions and earthquakes. 

In the political negotiations, the 
United States tried unsuccessfully to 
persuade the Soviet Union to enter new 
technical discussion on the detection of 
high-altitude tests and the new seismic 
data. The Soviets took the position that 
technical questions had been settled at 
the 1958 Conference of Experts and any 



needed improvements in the control 
system could be made by the Control 
Commission after the treaty came int< 
operation. 

The participants at the Geneva Cc 
ference on the Discontinuance of 
Nuclear Weapon Tests agreed with th 
principle that onsite inspection would 
necessary to clarify the source of unid 
tified seismic events. The United Stat 
believed that there could be up to 100 
unidentified events per year of which 
approximately 20 would require inspei 
tion of the site. There was disagreeme 
between the United States and the 
Soviets on the number of onsite inspec 
tions that would be permitted. The 
Soviets wanted to limit each party to 
two to three onsite inspections per ye; 
when it was considered necessary. (Nc 
the Soviets, in effect, reserved for 
themselves a veto over onsite inspects 
requests.) Although the issues of 
numbers and mandatory versus volun- 
tary onsite inspection were never 
resolved, the fact that the Soviets 
agreed in principle to the need for ons: I 
inspection was widely hailed and was 
seen as setting a precedent for future I 
arms control agreements. It was hopet I 
that interim measures could be achieve • 
that, with time, could lead to a more 
comprehensive agreement between the ' 
sides. The Soviets took the position th£ i 
verification was less essential than 
reaching an agreement. The United 
States and the United Kingdom held 
that strict means of verification were 
required, that further study should be 
undertaken to assure that any agree- 
ment could be verified, and that this 
should be done before an agreement ws 
signed. 

On April 18, 1961, the United State; 
and the United Kingdom submitted a 
complete draft treaty to the Geneva cor I 
ference. 2 This proposal was based on on; 
made by President Eisenhower in 
February 1960. The Anglo-American 
draft treaty included a commitment to I 
cease tests in the atmosphere, under- 
water, at high altitudes, and under- 
ground (above seismic magnitude 4.75), ' 
and a control regime for detection and 
identification. Although the general 
characteristics of the international con 
trol system proposed in the Anglo- 
American draft treaty had long been 
accepted by both sides, the Soviet Union I 
shifted its position on several vital 
verification features. For example, 
although the Soviets had agreed to 15 
seismic stations within the U.S.S.R., 
they insisted that they would operate 
these sites. Again, even though the need 
for onsite inspection was recognized by ' 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



b Soviets, the number of inspections 
oposed by the Soviets and the condi- 
ns under which they could be con- 
cted were not satisfactory to the 
lited States and the United Kingdom. 

Throughout the test ban negotiations 
^Geneva from October 1958 to August 
q, 1961, the United States and the 
foited Kingdom faithfully observed a 
Jluntary suspension of nuclear weapons 
tgts, even though there existed no 
ians of knowing with certainty, in the 
asence of an effective and workable 
ij;ernational control system, that the 
sviet Union was not increasing its 
nclear capability by clandestine tests. 
E August 1961, the Soviet Union 
snounced that it was resuming nuclear 
capons tests and did so on September 
EL961. The United States immediately 
mdemned the Soviet action and reaf- 
Iffned its support for an agreement to 
id nuclear weapons tests under effec- 
ts safeguards. On September 3, Presi- 
cnt Kennedy and Prime Minister 
fecmillan proposed that the Soviets 
Sree "not to conduct nuclear tests 
Mich take place in the atmosphere and 
pduce radioactive fallout." They stated 
tit they were willing to rely upon 
eisting means of detection, "which they 
bieve to be adequate," and they did not 
sjgest any additional controls. The 
Sviets at first rejected this offer. 

Negotiations continued in various 
f -a until finally, in 1963, Soviet interest 
i;a ban that did not deal with 
liderground tests emerged, even 
bugh they had rejected the U.S. /U.K. 
o'er previously. As a result, the United 
Sates, United Kingdom, and the 
[S.S.R. agreed to the more limited goal 
obanning nuclear tests in all media 
ecept underground. This led to the 1963 
leaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests 
iithe Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
[ider Water, usually referred to as the 
L-nited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). 

While discussions continued in the 18 
ction Committee on Disarmament, 
bre was little further movement 
tward limiting underground nuclear 
t;ts until the 1974 summit meeting 
btween the United States and the 
IS.S.R. While the Soviets had orig- 
j^lly called for negotiations on a com- 
{.ehensive test ban, they agreed to con- 
Eiler a threshold treaty for underground 
vclear testing. The threshold was to 
hve been in terms of yield or possibly 
5'smic wave magnitude. The United 
Vates initially proposed limiting tests to 
Certain value in body wave magnitude, 
It because body wave magnitude for a 
Jrticular value of yield varies with test 
se location, the focus of the discussions 



was changed to yields. While this 
resolved the problem of the variability of 
body wave magnitude measurements, it 
introduced the problems associated with 
the accuracy of seismic techniques for 
the determination of yield. The TTBT 
was signed by the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. in July 1974. 

The TTBT and its associated Pro- 
tocol contain provisions for the exchange 
of geophysical data and announcing the 
yields of two explosions for calibration 
purposes in each geophysically distinct 
area (provisions which have not been 
implemented because the treaty has not 
been ratified). However, the treaty pro- 
vides no mechanism by which one party 
could independently validate the 
accuracy of the data provided by the 
other party. Seismic techniques are 
inadequate to verify effectively the 
yields of Soviet tests. Prior to the sign- 
ing of the TTBT, U.S. policy, as well as 
seismic research, had concentrated on a 
comprehensive test ban. Seismic 
research had been aimed at the problems 
of detecting and identifying low-yield 
nuclear tests with relatively less empha- 
sis on determining yield. 

While progress has been made in 
understanding the natural processes that 
affect yield estimation based on remote 
seismic measurement, the uncertainties 
in the yield estimation process cannot be 
sufficiently reduced without direct 
measurement of yields at the Soviet test 
sites. The Soviets, and some critics of 
existing U.S. policy in this country, have 
asserted that adequate verification will 
result from the exchange of data called 
for in the treaty. However, these data 
will be of limited value for verification 
purposes unless they can be independ- 
ently verified by the United States. 
Even if the data were accurate and could 
be verified, they would not be sufficient 
to effectively verify Soviet compliance 
with the 150 kt threshold of the TTBT, 
because the limited data to be exchanged 
would not reduce the uncertainty in the 
seismic yield estimation process to 
acceptable levels. 

The question of peaceful nuclear 
explosions (PNEs) was also addressed 
during 1971-74 and continued until the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Under- 
ground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful 
Purposes, usually referred to as the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
(PNET), was signed in 1976. Since each 
individual nuclear explosion could not be 
greater than 150 kt, additional monitor- 
ing measures had to be negotiated for 
explosions conducted at locations other 
than at the designated weapons test 



, 



ivember 1986 



sites and for salvos of explosions whose 
aggregate yield exceeded 150 kt. Provi- 
sions were included for onsite 
measurements of each explosion by 
downhole instrumentation, similar in 
result to the current CORRTEX [Con- 
tinuous Reflectrometry for Radius ver- 
sus Time Experiment] equipment, if the 
aggregate yield was planned to exceed 
150 kt. Seismic instruments were also to 
be allowed in the test area if the 
aggregate yield was planned to exceed 
500 kt. It is worth noting that even if 
the PNE Treaty were in force, the onsite 
measures would not have been imple- 
mented up to now because the Soviets 
apparently have not planned group 
explosions over any particular treaty- 
specified threshold which would trigger 
onsite inspection or installation of U.S. 
devices on Soviet territory. 

Technical discussions on nuclear 
testing issues, principally related to a 
comprehensive test ban (CTB), have 
been held with the Soviets in the 
multilateral arena in Geneva. The United 
States presented papers at the Con- 
ference of the Committee on Disarma- 
ment (CCD) at least as far back as 1971 
and again in 1973 and 1976. These 
papers discussed capabilities for 
discriminating between explosions and 
earthquakes, data from arrays of 
seismometers and networks of such sta- 
tions, and various other seismology 
topics. There was, however, not much 
expert discussion of these U.S. contribu- 
tions until the Ad-Hoc Group of Scien- 
tific Experts was formed in 1976. 

One of the tasks of the Ad-Hoc 
Group of Scientific Experts was to 
describe a network of seismic stations 
that would provide data to the members 
for use in monitoring a CTB. Initially the 
Swedes, among others, attempted to 
establish a deliberative body within the 
CCD to conduct verification analyses. 
The United States did not want to rely 
on such a multinational group for 
verification decisions. As an alternative, 
the CCD, on the recommendation of the 
United States, formulated a plan for the 
exchange of seismic data and for 
conducting studies relating to those 
data. The Ad-Hoc Group of Scientific 
Experts selected an optimum network of 
seismic stations from CCD member 
states and evaluated its capability to pro- 
vide data adequate for verification. An 
elaborate set of data parameters was 
agreed upon for reporting in a bulletin 
format. The World Meteorological 
Organization telegraph system was 
adopted for the exchange of these data 
bulletins. The exchange of complete 
seismograms, using digital techniques 



35 



ARMS CONTROL 



and satellite transmission, has been 
explored. Studies and experiments on 
these transmission techniques continue 
at the present time. It is significant, 
however, that throughout this period in 
which testing limitations have been of 
such concern, at no time have there been 
any joint projects of bilateral exchanges 
of data except for some limited discus- 
sions during the actual trilateral CTB 
negotiations. 

In the summer of 1977, about 1 year 
after the conclusion of the PNE phase of 
the threshold treaty, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. 
began negotiations toward a comprehen- 
sive test ban. Initially, the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. had different views 
concerning the proposed duration of the 
treaty— the United States wanted a 
treaty of unlimited duration while the 
U.S.S.R. wanted a 3-year treaty that 
would continue depending on the actions 
of others, specifically France and China. 
By the summer of 1978, the United 
States revised its position and proposed 
a CTB of only 3 years duration. 

Initially, the questions of seismic sta- 
tions (numbers, kinds, and locations) 
were fairly open on both sides. As the 
negotiations on the number of seismic 
stations proceeded, the Soviets hardened 
their position on in-country seismic 
stations— demanding that they had to be 
nationally manned. The Soviets con- 
stantly raised their concern about 
unmanned stations or "black boxes." 
The United States eventually proposed 
10 seismic stations in the Soviet Union 
in conjunction with a 3-year treaty. The 
U.S.S.R. said they would accept 10 sta- 
tions in the U.S.S.R. provided that there 
would be 10 stations in the United 
States and 10 stations in the United 
Kingdom and its territories. This created 
a serious impasse. The United States 
and the United Kingdom felt that one 
station in the limited territory of the 
United Kingdom would be sufficient, but 
the Soviets would not budge. They took 
the position that equal participation 
required equal responsibilities. They fur- 
ther indicated that if 10-10-10 was not 
satisfactory, any other set of equal 
numbers would be acceptable. While the 
Soviets had apparently agreed in con- 
cept to both onsite inspection and 
incountry seismic stations, these issues 
were still unresolved when the negotia- 
tions were suspended in November 1980. 

The United States has not resumed 
the trilateral CTB talks since they 
recessed in November 1980 because 
under present circumstances a CTB 
would be against the security interests 
of the United States and its allies and 



would not be effectively verifiable. In the 
existing environment, the security of the 
United States and our allies depends on 
a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent. In 
such a situation, where we must rely 
upon nuclear weapons to deter aggres- 
sion, nuclear testing will be required. A 
comprehensive test ban remains a long- 
term objective of the U.S. arms control 
policy, but such a ban must be viewed in 
the context of a time when we do not 
need to depend upon nuclear deterrence 
to ensure international security and 
stability, and when we have achieved 
deep, broad, and verifiable arms reduc- 
tions, improved verification capabilities, 
expanded confidence-building measures, 
and a greater balance in conventional 
forces. 

The verification of a comprehensive 
test ban, and especially any testing 
moratorium such as proposed by the 
Soviet Union, remains a major problem. 
In the context of the verification pro- 
cedures discussed (but not agreed) in the 
CTB trilateral negotiations, there would 
still be significant uncertainty about our 
ability to verify Soviet compliance, that 
is, to detect and identify with sufficient 
certainty a potentially significant level of 
clandestine testing. Our concerns are 
heightened by likely Soviet violations of 
the TTBT and by Soviet violation of the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty, the LTBT. 

IV. Opportunity for 
Cooperative Measures 

There are two distinct problem areas 
that can be addressed jointly by the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. The first 
deals with sufficiently accurate yield 
measurements that would allow effective 
verification of yield thresholds such as 
the 150 kt limit of the TTBT. Solution of 
this problem area would provide the 
basis for moving forward on ratification 
of the TTBT and the PNET. The second 
deals with the ability to detect and iden- 
tify low-yield nuclear tests. This requires 
solution of the problem of detecting and 
identifying low-yield tests not only 
underground but also underwater, in the 
atmosphere, and in outer space. Pro- 
grammed capabilities will greatly 
enhance our ability to detect and identify 
low-yield nuclear tests within the 
atmosphere, although there may remain 
some uncertainty regarding the country 
conducting such tests if they are con- 
ducted over remote areas. With these 
technological advances in hand and at a 
time when we do not need to depend 
upon nuclear deterrence to ensure inter- 
national security and stability and when 



we have achieved deep, broad, and 
verifiable arms reductions, expanded 
confidence-building measures, and a 
greater balance in conventional forces 
the conditions would exist for proceed 
toward a treaty that would ban low-yi 
nuclear tests. 

a. Verification of Yield Threshol 

As noted above, the provisions of the 
TTBT provide no mechanism for redm 
ing the level of uncertainty of yield 
estimation to an acceptable level. (We 
believe that no method of yield estima 
tion based only on information derivec 
solely from seismic measurements or 
seismic theory can reduce the uncer- 
tainty to an acceptable level.) Uncerta 
ties in the yield estimation process car 
not be sufficiently reduced without 
directly measuring the yield of Soviet 
tests with instruments which are fund 
mentally much more accurate than 
seismic methods. 

The President has stated that he ii 
prepared to move forward on ratificat 
of the TTBT and PNET if the Soviets 
would agree to the use of an effective 
verification system incorporating the 
CORRTEX method. 

The most productive joint Soviet- 
U.S. discussions of monitoring measur 
would be those which would involve th 
technology and implementation pro- 
cedures for direct yield measurement. 
The United States believes that it has 
identified in CORRTEX a measuremer 
technique which will reduce the uncer 
tainty in yield measurement to an 
acceptable level and will do so without I 
danger of compromising other sensitiv' I 
information about the nature or perfor I 
mance of the nuclear device whose yiel 
is to be measured. 

CORRTEX is a hydrodynamic yield; 
measurement technique that measures I 
the rate of propagation of the under- 
ground shock wave from an explosion. |< 
This technique uses an electric coaxial I 
cable located in the device emplacemeni 
hole or in a nearby, parallel "satellite" ! 
hole. When the nuclear device is deto- I 
nated, a shock wave propagates throug, 
the ground, crushing and shortening th i 
cable. The rate by which the cable lengt; 
changes is recorded by measuring the |i 
changing transit times of low energy ele| 
trical pulses sent down to and reflected 
from the cable end. This rate is a 
measure of the propagation velocity of i 
the explosive shock wave through the i 
ground which is, in turn, a measure of I 
the yield of the nuclear explosion. 

The electronic device that provides | 
the timing signals is a battery-powered, i 
suitcase-sized unit that may be remotelj ; 



36 



Department of State Bullet) 



ARMS CONTROL 



htrolled. All equipment for power, 
'cording, and data reduction can be 
intained in a small trailer. 
, CORRTEX has been shown to be 
fcurate to within 15% (with 95% con- 
lence) of more direct, radiochemical 
jeld measurements for tests with yields 
seater than 50 kt. This is based on its 
le at the Nevada test site in over 100 
Its with the sensing cable in the device 
Siplacement hole and four tests with 
fe sensing cable in a satellite hole. The 
Scuracy of the technique is believed to 
i relatively independent of the geologic 
redium provided the satellite hole 
iBasurements are made in the "strong 
fcck" region near the nuclear explo- 
In. At greater separation distances, 
te medium becomes more important. A 
jtellite hole separation distance of 14 
(eters (46 feet) is appropriate for a test 
jar 150 kt. 

I CORRTEX is expected to be initially 
teurate to within 30% (with 95% con- 
llence) of the actual yield at Soviet test 
i es for tests above 50 kt. An accuracy 
a 30% of the actual yield means, for 
sample, that a test that produces 
DRRTEX measurements estimated to 
Is associated with a "central value" 
j'ld of 150 kt, could, with a 95% prob- 
iility, have a yield as high as 195 kt 
fli0 kt plus 30% of 150 kt) or as low as 
15 kt (150 kt minus 30% of 150 kt). 

The Soviets were exposed to tech- 
Elogy similar to CORRTEX during the 
NET discussions. At that time, they 
iHicated that they possessed similar 
bhnology. Therefore, a technical basis 
bs already been established for the 
rcessary discussions. The United States 
iprepared, as evidenced by the Pres- 
ent's March 1986 offer, to demonstrate 
t Soviet technical experts how we 
ttuld emplace CORRTEX instruments, 
\w measurements are recorded, and 
Iw the data are analyzed. In any 
{operative technical effort, the Soviet 
eperts would have the opportunity to 
gamine the CORRTEX data from a 
Iviet nuclear test in order to determine 
tc themselves that no sensitive informa- 
In, not relevant to TTBT verification, 
is been compromised. For their part, 
le Soviets would be permitted to bring 
ly equipment they deemed necessary to 
fcasure the yield of the test. 
i Successful implementation of a 
rect-yield measurement regime for 
(frification of the TTBT and the PNET 
toll establish the principle of onsite 
tepection at declared facilities— in this 
i'se the site of nuclear tests. Joint 
(j)viet-U.S. discussions to establish 
Irect yield measurements will necessar- 
I' require negotiation of all the logistical 



aspects of such onsite presence, includ- 
ing the size and composition of the 
technical teams who would make 
measurements; agreement on the quan- 
tity of equipment which can be brought 
into the country; identification of 
allowed instrumentation; inspection of 
equipment by the party whose test is to 
be measured; establishment of housing, 
feeding, and transportation arrange- 
ments for the team making measure- 
ments; and procedures for sharing and 
transferring data from the country in 
which the test is to be performed. 

Though not exhaustive, the above 
issues that would require negotiation are 
indicative of the long list of issues which 
must be addressed in making the transi- 
tion from an agreement in principle to 
onsite inspection implementation. Any 
one of these elements, if not properly 
resolved, could frustrate the ultimate 
objective of the inspection regime. While 
not as glamorous as some aspects of 
arms control, the negotiation of such 
technical and logistical details is critical 
and may be extremely time consuming. 
Therefore, early joint Soviet-U.S. discus- 
sion of these issues can have a major 
impact on timely ratification of the 
TTBT and PNET. 

b. Detection and Identification of 
Low-Yield Nuclear Tests. The second 
problem area, detection and identifica- 
tion of low-yield nuclear tests, is even 
more difficult because the solution 
requires effective monitoring in all 
environments— underground, under- 
water, in the atmosphere, and in outer 
space. Consequently, verification of any 
limitation of low-yield nuclear tests 
would require, at a minimum, the utiliza- 
tion of several techniques. 

For example, detection and identifi- 
cation of low-yield nuclear tests will 
necessitate installation of an in-country 
seismic network and the implementation 
of onsite inspections. In addition, 
regional seismology (operating distances 
up to 2,000 kilometers from the source) 
will be a critical technology for the 
detection of underground tests. 
Measurement techniques for the collec- 
tion and detection of atmospheric 
nuclear explosion debris will still require 
some refinement when working at or 
near levels of naturally occurring 
background radiation. Further develop- 
ment of hydroacoustic techniques could 
contribute to detection of small nuclear 
tests in remote ocean areas. 

Recognizing the full scope of the 
problem of detecting and identifying 
low-yield nuclear tests in all environ- 



ments, which must be solved, this paper 
will address only one part of the 
problem— monitoring low-yield 
underground nuclear tests— because this 
is the area where the United States 
believes that cooperation with the 
U.S.S.R. would be the most productive. 

The requirements for in-country 
monitoring stations have been discussed 
with the Soviets in many fora since the 
late 1950s (see the "Historical Perspec- 
tive" section). There remain several 
areas in which seismic monitoring can be 
profitably addressed by Soviet and U.S. 
technical experts. Further work may 
strengthen the basis for seismic detec- 
tion and identification of low-yield 
nuclear tests in advance of the achieve- 
ment of the other criteria which must be 
met before the United States could con- 
sider a comprehensive test ban to be in 
its national interest. 

It is assumed that whatever the level 
of detection of seismic events, there will 
be some events detected whose origin 
(e.g., nuclear test, earthquake, chemical 
explosion) will be uncertain— unidentified 
(i.e., unresolved as to their origin) 
events. While improvements in seismic 
monitoring devices could be expected to 
provide additional data that could iden- 
tify some of the events that cannot be 
identified at current sensitivity levels, 
the net effect of improvements in sen- 
sitivity will be to increase the number of 
unidentified events. 

Onsite inspection, as a concept, is 
also used to describe inspections con- 
ducted to remove ambiguity when infor- 
mation from other sources indicates that 
a potential violation of a treaty in force 
may have already occurred. However, 
onsite inspection will only be useful 
when the precise location of the 
ambiguous event can be determined. 
Onsite inspection could contribute to 
identification of the source of surface or 
near-surface explosions, where surface 
disturbances would clearly indicate the 
location. For small underground explo- 
sions, it would be nearly impossible to 
locate the source with sufficient preci- 
sion to permit the verifying party to drill 
into the cavity created by the test to 
sample the explosion debris. 

The basic elements which could be 
addressed in joint discussions include the 
fundamental science of the transmission 
of seismic waves within the Soviet 
Union; the types of equipment which 
would need to be permanently installed 
for the measurement of seismic data; the 
equipment which would need to be 
installed for the recording and transmis- 
sion of seismic data to national data 
analysis centers; and the numerical data- 



bvember 1986 



37 



ARMS CONTROL 



processing techniques which would be 
used for identifying the source of a 
seismic event based on the character- 
istics of the seismic data. These issues 
are described in more detail below: 

• Seismic Wave Transmission: The 
United States is actively pursuing the 
seismic research which would be critical 
to the detection and identification of low- 
yield (below 10 kt) nuclear tests. Of par- 
ticular significance is research on high- 
frequency seismic waves. Instruments 
capable of detecting high-frequency 
seismic waves have been developed and 
an experimental seismic array contain- 
ing such equipment is in operation. To be 
confident that high-frequency seismic 
waves can be useful for detection and 
identification of low-yield nuclear tests, 
two issues need further study: the 
availability of sufficiently quiet, low 
background seismic noise sites within 
the Soviet Union at which seismic sta- 
tions could be located and knowledge of 
the transmission characteristics of high- 
frequency seismic waves within the 
Soviet Union. 

The degree to which seismic wave 
energy is absorbed and scattered as a 
seismic wave travels away from a 
nuclear explosion in the United States 
has been studied extensively, and much 
of this work has been published in the 
scientific literature. Similar information 
is not available for explosions within the 
Soviet Union. A joint U.S. -Soviet effort 
could seek to determine the degree to 
which high-frequency seismic wave 
energy is absorbed and scattered in the 
Soviet Union. Such an effort would 
establish a more realistic basis for the 
utility of high-frequency seismic waves 
for detection and identification of low- 
yield nuclear tests. While data obtained 
from outside the Soviet Union are 
useful, Soviet-U.S. cooperation in obtain- 
ing and evaluating data from within the 
Soviet Union is essential. 

• Seismic Equipment and Data 
Handling: During the trilateral CTB 
negotiations of 1977-80, the United 
States described to the Soviet Union 
tamper-proof, remotely operated seismic 
stations which would record and trans- 
mit seismic data for analysis in the 
United States. The United States has 
continued research on such stations. 
Modification in these stations would be 
required to provide the capability to 
record and transmit data on high- 
frequency seismic waves. Joint Soviet- 
U.S. efforts could resume on the criteria 
for the location and operation of such 
stations to include characterization of 
the sites which would have to be avail- 



able to ensure accurate instrument 
operation. Such an effort would have to 
include data gathering from potential 
sites for remote stations in the Soviet 
Union and should include installation of 
research instruments to validate that 
such instruments can operate reliably, to 
include data transmission, throughout 
the broad range of environmental condi- 
tions within the Soviet Union. 

• Seismic Wave Analysis: The 
effectiveness of any low-yield 
underground nuclear test verification 
regime based upon the analysis of 
seismic waves will ultimately depend on 
the ability to identify a nuclear explosion 
by distinguishing between nuclear explo- 
sions and other sources of seismic 
energy, e.g., chemical explosions and 
earthquakes. The object must be to 
minimize the number of recorded seismic 
events whose source is ambiguous. A 
joint Soviet-U.S. effort could seek to 
identify analytic techniques which would 
positively identify the origin of recorded 
seismic signals. Such a joint study can- 
not be done in the abstract but should be 
tested against real data which would be 
typical of that which would be recorded 
by instruments located at the prospec- 
tive location of seismic stations. No 
analytic technique can hope to eliminate 
all ambiguous events, but it would be 
very helpful if the two sides could agree 
on which technique can be the most 
effective. 

V. Current Status 

We have sought on a number of occa- 
sions in the past several years to engage 
the U.S.S.R. in discussions on verifica- 
tion improvements in the nuclear testing 
area but thus far without success. In 
1983 the U.S. Government sought on 
three separate occasions to engage the 
Soviet Union in a discussion of essential 
verification improvements for the TTBT 
and the PNET. In September 1984 the 
President proposed in his address to the 
UN General Assembly that the United 
States and the Soviet Union find a way 
for Soviet experts to come to the U.S. 
nuclear test site and for U.S. experts to 



go to theirs to measure directly the 
yields of nuclear weapons tests. In Ji 

1985 the President expanded his offe 
with an unconditional invitation for 
Soviet experts to go to the U.S. nucli I 
test site to measure the yield of a U.fj 
nuclear test with any instrumentatioi 
devices they deemed necessary. Ther 
was no requirement for a reciprocal \ 
by U.S. experts to a Soviet test site. 
December 1985 President Reagan pn 
posed to General Secretary Gorbache 
that U.S. and Soviet experts on nuck 
testing limitations meet in February 

1986 to discuss our respective verific; 
tion approaches and to address initial 
tangible steps to resolve this issue. 

Most recently, on March 15, 1986 
the President urged the Soviet Union 
join the United States in discussion o 
finding ways to reach agreement on 
essential verification improvement of 
TTBT and PNET. In this respect he ] 
vided details to the Soviet Union on t 
U.S. CORRTEX hydrodynamic measi 
ment system and proposed that Gene 
Secretary Gorbachev send Soviet scie 
tists to our Nevada test site during tr 
third week of April 1986 to fully 
examine CORRTEX. At that time, th 
Soviets could also monitor a U.S. nuc 
test. Finally, the President indicated 
that, if the Soviet Union will join us h 
an agreement for effective verificatio 
including the use of CORRTEX, the 
United States would be prepared to 
move forward on ratification of the 
TTBT. 

The Soviets have stated that they 
have developed and have available a 
system that is used to obtain data sim 
to that obtained by CORRTEX. Aside 
from this assertion, the Soviet Union 1 
not responded to any of the above U.S 
initiatives, which were aimed at con- 
structively addressing our mutual 
concerns. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 18, 1986. 

2 See Geneva Conference on the Disconti 
uance of Nuclear Weapons Tests: History a. 
Analysis of Negotiations (Department of 
State publication 7258, 1961). ■ 



38 



I.S. and East Asia-Pacific Relations: 
he Challenges Ahead 



Gaston J. Sigur, Jr. 

Address at the Mansfield Center for 
dfic Affairs in Helena, Montana, on 
ly i, 1986. Mr. Sigur is Assistant 
cretary for East Asian and Pacific 
fairs. 

occurs to me that this is an espe- 
lly appropriate place to be on our 
tion's birthday. For one thing, 
nbassador [to Japan] Mansfield is an 
tstanding— almost legendary— public 
-vant and patriot of this great coun- 
', and I'm very pleased to appear at 
s Pacific Affairs Center which bears 
i name. For another thing, Montana 
presents as well as any state that 
rit of pioneer drive and determination 
lich made this nation great— indeed, 
dch broadened this nation to the full 
tent of its continental boundaries. Fur- 
;rmore, I detect a significant parallel 
tween the pioneering spirit of our 
nerican West and that sense of 
trepreneurship and dynamism which is 
jidly transforming the East Asian and 
cific region into a leading center of 
)bal commerce. That, after all, is the 
ja of the world with which we are con- 
•ned here today. It is an alluring 
fion of unlimited potential, striving to 
;et the challenges of modernization, 
ich the same as Montana and her 
ter states of the West 100 years ago. 
Our American pioneers viewed that 
gratory movement westward as a 
lanifest destiny" of the 19th century, 
somewhat the same way today, there 
jroad recognition of a steady shifting 
the locus of economic and political 
jnamism toward the Asian-Pacific 
ena in this age. Indeed, Ambassador 
fensfield has been something of a proph- 
Ein this respect, being among the 
Fst to refer to the 21st century as "the 
$itury of the Pacific." We owe him, 
id others of vision like him, a debt of 
eatitude for helping us reorient our 
tnking and planning toward the evolv- 
it realities of our time, 
j But while the nations of East Asia 
c.d the Pacific enjoy vast potential for 
iowth and accomplishment, they also 
fee many serious challenges ahead. 
.'ter all, prosperity and stability— 
•mfort and tranquility— do not come 
ply. The early Montana settlers 
'.derstood that hard work, determina- 
te, and cooperation eventually "pay 



off." In the modern age, economic suc- 
cess, security, and social stability still 
have to be won and carefully cultivated; 
they are not guaranteed to anyone. A 
century ago, it was the will to succeed, a 
sense of fair play and teamwork, the 
spirit of free enterprise, and a respect 
for individual rights and capabilities that 
turned the rugged western frontier into 
a productive regional community. These 
same virtues are now enabling the 
Asian-Pacific region to achieve its poten- 
tial. We are, in fact, witnesses to a 
modern-day success story in that region, 
where the enterprising developing and 
industrializing states are on the leading 
edge of phenomenal achievements. 

Most of the East Asian and Pacific 
nations already have met the challenges 
of postwar reconstruction and reconcilia- 
tion. Many of them are now meeting the 
tasks of modernization and industrializa- 
tion. One of them, Japan, already has 
achieved a global power status while 
others— like the Republic of Korea, 
Australia, and the ASEAN [Association 
of South East Asian Nations] grouping- 
are assuming regional leadership roles 
and providing models of development for 
their neighbors. Now they confront the 
challenges of success: how to sustain it; 
how to protect it; how to manage its 
social and political consequences. They 
are seeking to manage these challenges 
effectively as they advance toward even 
greater accomplishments in the years 
ahead. 

A few nations of the region have not 
enjoyed the same developmental success. 
Among them are North Korea and Viet- 
nam. Their backward condition may be 
due to a number of factors, but principal 
among them are their hostile postures 
toward their neighbors and their 
discredited economic systems. With the 
encouragement of the Soviet Union, they 
have effectively shut themselves off 
from the productivity and prosperous liv- 
ing standards enjoyed by the other 
regional states. So long as they stagnate 
in this isolated and hostile condition, 
they remain a threat to the progress of 
the rest of the region. 

Fortunately, the traditional bonds of 
friendship between the Asian-Pacific 
region and the United States are stronger 
than ever today. A natural and regular 
system of interaction and interdepend- 
ence has evolved between us, bilaterally 
and multilaterally. Increasingly, we 
depend upon each other for our common 



success and prosperity. Increasingly, we 
seek to consult and to coordinate our 
activities for maximum efficiency and 
effectiveness. Many observations have 
been made about the growing sense of 
"community"— with a small "c"— which 
permeates this relationship. No nation or 
group of nations need fear this natural 
phenomenon for it portends only peace 
and cooperation among those who are 
willing to contribute to regional progress 
in a positive way. The concept features a 
healthy balance of individual prerogative 
and collective responsibility, for the sake 
of the common good. 

Lest we become too complacent 
about the promise of our common effort, 
however, it bears repeating that all of us 
must be vigilant and untiring in 
nourishing and defending the fruits of 
our success. As I look ahead, I see four 
fundamental challenges to this promising 
region as a whole— and I certainly 
include the United States as a partner 
which, together with others, must 
prepare to meet these challenges in a 
common effort. 

Sustaining Economic Growth and 
Managing Commercial Problems 

Perhaps the primary challenge, in the 
face of the region's relatively prosperous 
record, is to sustain economic growth 
and manage the inevitable commercial 
difficulties that occasionally occur. Most 
East Asian developing countries have 
relatively low per capita income and 
rapidly growing populations. For this 
reason their leaders view rapid economic 
growth to be essential to both national 
development and political stability. 

Fortunately, East Asia discovered 
early on what the rest of the developing 
world is only belatedly coming to realize. 
Economic growth can only flourish if 
economic policies encourage it. This 
means monetary stability, fiscal 
restraint, and realistic exchange rates. 
Even more important, governments 
must also institute policies which 
encourage flexible, market-oriented, 
private enterpise economies open to free 
international exchange of goods, serv- 
ices, and capital. 

This may seem obvious to us in the 
United States, but much of the develop- 
ing world, including parts of East Asia, 
remains in the grip of statist, inward- 
looking economic strategies. Strongly 
entrenched groups sometimes manage to 
maintain their vested interests through 
protectionism and state regulation. We 
in the United States are not immune 



bvember 1986 



39 



EAST ASIA 



from this affliction, but the costs are 
much higher for those countries that 
have so little to start with. 

Failure to fend off these pressures 
leads to clearly demonstrable conse- 
quences. The empirical fact of life is 
that, to the extent developing nations 
have adopted outward-looking, market- 
oriented policies, they have attained 
robust economic growth. On the other 
hand, economic stagnation is produced 
by massive extensions of government 
control over investment and other 
government-inspired economic 
distortions. 

But do we really care if the countries 
of East Asia and the Pacific institute 
effective economic policies? The answer 
is "yes" and not simply for altruistic 
reasons. Recent history clearly shows 
that prosperous, democratic, outward- 
looking nations associate themselves 
closely with the United States 
economically and strategically. The 
reasons are not hard to understand. The 
Soviet Union and its allies import almost 
nothing from the developing world. The 
developing world, in turn, has little 
interest in importing anything the Soviet 
Union produces. There is little in Soviet 
culture, political thought, or economic 
theory that has any attraction what- 
soever for these developing nations. 
Hardly anyone sees communism as the 
wave of the future anymore. The United 
States, on the other hand, can offer vast 
trade prospects, technology transfer, 
foreign investment, educational oppor- 
tunities, and cultural exchange. 

It is only when economic growth 
falters that the linkage between stability 
and prosperity is tested. The Philippines 
is a recent example of this. Through 
government mismanagement and cor- 
ruption, the Philippine economy under 
Ferdinand Marcos was driven to the 
brink of ruin. As economic hardship 
increased, the communist insurgency 
grew rapidly. Now that President 
Aquino's new government holds out the 
prospect of economic reform, the 
insurgency finds itself losing support. 
There was a time when insurgencies also 
threatened Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia. This is now a distant memory, 
unlikely to reoccur, due in part to the 
remarkable economic progress of these 
three countries. 

Given our stake in the economic 
growth of our Asian-Pacific trading part- 
ners, the Administration views with 
dismay attempts in Congress to try to 
legislate away the U.S. trade deficit, 
producing in the process great damage 
to ourselves and our trading partners. 



The House of Representatives 
recently passed an omnibus trade bill 
that would be nothing short of disastrous 
for U.S. interests. There is no question 
that the United States does have an 
enormous trade deficit— $148 billion in 
1985. What Congress wants us to 
believe, however, is that this is largely 
the result of foreign trade barriers and 
unfair trade practices and that we should 
erect such barriers ourselves. This is just 
not so. The U.S. trade deficit doubled 
from 1983 to 1985, yet foreign trade bar- 
riers are no higher now and, in fact, are 
probably lower than in 1983. The fact is 
that our trade deficit increases or 
decreases as a result of a variety of fac- 
tors, including shifting exchange rates, 
differing economic growth rates, and dif- 
fering savings and investment rates. 

Japan is a good example in this 
regard. In 1985 the United States had a 
$50-billion trade deficit with Japan. The 
House trade bill would, among a great 
number of other damaging provisions, 
impose a blanket surcharge on Japanese 
imports. This would certainly reduce our 
imports from Japan. It would also pro- 
voke retaliation and inevitably reduce 
our exports, leaving both countries 
worse off. It is axiomatic in economics 
that protectionism does not affect the 
balance of trade, but rather the level of 
trade. 

The fact is that Japan is our largest 
agricultural market in the world and our 
second largest market for manufacturers 
after Canada. Japan also supplied $75 
billion in capital to this country in 1985 
which helped to finance new investment 
here and to hold down interest rates. 
I mention these facts in order to 
make the point that a very delicate and 
complicated web of economic interrela- 
tionships ties us to Japan and our other 
trading partners in East Asia. If Con- 
gress attempts to alter this web by 
simply tearing out great hunks of it, we 
will all be the poorer for it. Ultimately, 
by weakening the economic bonds tying 
us to the rest of the world, we will also 
damage our vital security interests. 

This Administration is not blind to 
the difficulties our exporters face. We 
will continue to seek the removal of 
unfair trade barriers which affect a wide 
variety of American goods and services. 
As necessary, we will take unilateral 
action under our own trade laws to 
remove unfair trade practices. And, 
most importantly, we will continue to 
strengthen the world trading system and 
promote the success of the new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations expected 
to start this September. 



The challenge we face is one stemj 
ming from the extraordinary success I 
our trading partners in East Asia. Bo 
the United States and East Asian couJ 
tries reap enormous benefits from ouij 
trading relationship. Our goal is to 
strengthen and expand this relationsh 
and to manage its problems, in order . 
safeguard our mutual economic and 
security interests. 

Nurturing Regular 
Coordination and Consultation 

A second "challenge" which we, 
together, confront is to nurture ever 
more regular habits of coordination ai 
consultation among ourselves. We've 
made great headway on intraregional 
dialogue over the past two decades, ai 
the pace picked up considerably under 
this Administration. I returned just th 
week with the Secretary from our 
regular annual conference with region 
foreign ministers in Southeast Asia. 
Every summer, following consultation 
among the ASEAN foreign ministers, 
they are joined by their counterparts 
from the United States, Japan, Canad 
Australia, New Zealand, and Western 
Europe for discussions on a range of 
matters of common concern. Of specia 
concern in recent years, the Cambodia 
conflict and multilateral economic 
cooperation have been predominant 
agenda items. Together, we forge a co 
sensus on cooperative approaches to 
mitigate threats and to advance multir 
tional prosperity. 

In similar fashion, the United Stat, 
consults frequently with its traditional 
allies in the region on a range of 
economic, political, and security topics 
that we all remain well-informed on 
events and on our respective policies. 
Following last November's summit con 
ference in Geneva, for example, the 
United States provided a full and 
immediate readout on the Reagan and 
Gorbachev talks to our regional allies. 
They, in turn, have been most forthcon 
ing with us on their activities and polic; 
positions. 

Such routine dialogue, as these 
examples demonstrate, serves to 
strengthen our common cause and to 
coordinate our efforts for policy effec- 
tiveness. Mutual comprehension, max- 
imum trust, and minimal surprise are 
the key elements of a strong and lasting 
friendship among the nations of East 
Asia and the Pacific. 

Comprehension and trust between 
nations depend upon much more than 
periodic high-level official discussions, o 
course. They depend upon a web of con- 



40 



Department of State Bullet 






EAST ASIA 



,cts and interaction within the private 
ictor as well. Flourishing commercial 
jntures of bilateral and multilateral 
'aracter have supplemented growing 
traregional trade as a means of forging 
iportant bonds within the business 
immunity. International visitor pro- 
•ams and academic exchanges are 
cpanding over time, spawning a 
markable intellectual framework for 
; e evolving community spirit. The 
sser developed countries of the region 
•e benefiting increasingly from voca- 
Dnal and educational assistance pro- 
•ams offered by the more advanced 
luntries, and all nations gain greater 
iderstanding of each other through 
irious cultural and artistic exchanges. 

In short, we are doing well in pro- 
oting habits of dialogue among 
irselves. More and more in the future, 
e challenge may be to effectively coor- 
nate our policies and economic planning 
the interest of greater national effi- 
2ncy, policy effectiveness, and the wise 
:e of limited resources. Toward this 
id, we may not always "see eye to 
■e," but we can always take the time to 
; down and discuss our respective con- 
rns and intentions. 

•otecting Accomplishments 

irely one of the most important tasks 
all is to protect and secure the 
complishments which already have 
en realized. Success always attracts 
tention, and, unfortunately, it also 
tracts the envy of others who would 
aliciously exploit it for their own 
vantage. The nations of East Asia and 
e Pacific must be particularly vigilant 
the years ahead and protective of 
eir hard-won success lest it be 
croached upon. Too often, peace and 
losperity foster complacency. 

This factor underlines the impor- 
mce of intimate consultation and coor- 
(nation between us. The pioneers of the 
iTierican West knew well the value of 
bilance and the strength that lies in 
ijiity. The threats of the rugged frontier 
irged a genuine sense of community, as 
(prerequisite for survival. 

In the Asian-Pacific region, peace 
ad stability are threatened by Vietnam 
^d North Korea. Both have systems 
+iich reflect stagnation and failure, and 
*rhaps through desperation they have 
^osen the route of threat and aggres- 
on against their more prosperous 
4ighbors. Had they chosen instead the 
^urse of economic cooperation and 
klitical accommodation, they, too, could 
I participating in the regional 
raamism that is outpacing all other 



parts of the world. Instead, with the aid 
and assent of the Soviet Union, they 
have embarked on a self-defeating path 
which jeopardizes the progress of the 
region as well. 

The Soviets also seek to peddle their 
brand of "security" and "cooperation" 
in the region, but the nations aren't buy- 
ing. They are not about to exchange a 
proven system of stability and prosperity 
for the deceptive charms of sweeping 
diversionary "confidence-building 
measures," which ignore the real 
sources of danger to the region. In fact, 
it is the nonproductive policies and 
belligerent behavior of the Soviet Union 
which have resulted in its conceptual 
exclusion from the region, not some 
"capitalist conspiracy" to block its 
presence and participation. 

Among the greatest threats to the 
region's continued success, however, are 
those weaknesses which can originate 
from within the group, that is, overt 
dissension, shortsighted unilateralism, 
and protectionism. This is why regular 
consultations are so important. Trade 
tensions and protectionist policies can 
destroy economic progress if they go 
unchecked. "Nuclear allergies," 
however well-intentioned, can have an 
insidious effect on strategic balance and 
conflict deterrence. Alliance fissures, if 
permitted to expand, can destroy the 
structure of mutual commitments and 
responsibility upon which peace is built. 
And failure to maintain a unified 
regional position on fundamental global 
issues like international terrorism and 
arms control can lead to disintegration 
of mutual trust as well as our common 
security. Together, the free market 
nations have led the way in creating a 
strong, secure, and prosperous region; 
we must never allow weaknesses 
originating from within to cause a 
reversal. 

Managing Domestic Pressures 

Still another great challenge— one which 
affects the newly industrializing coun- 
tries of the region most directly— is to 
manage adeptly the domestic pressures 
that inevitably accompany success. 
Historical experience has shown us that 
modernization and prosperity generate 
irrepressible rising expectations among a 
nation's populace, as consumers and— in 
developing democracies— as an increas- 
ingly vocal electorate. For the sake of 
social stability and continued progress, 
an appropriate degree of leadership 
responsiveness is necessary. The nature 
of that response will be unique to the cir- 



cumstances of each country— unique to 
its historical, cultural, and political 
realities. The skill with which govern- 
ments manage this task will be reflected 
ultimately in the extent of their stability. 

Fortunately, the trend seems to be 
toward more creative and responsive 
government initiatives in many of the 
region's modernizing states. Two of our 
traditional allies, the Philippines and 
Korea, currently are engaged in con- 
stitutional reviews which may incor- 
porate popular systemic reforms. Others 
as well are demonstrating increasing 
sensitivity to the viewpoints of various 
domestic political groups. These are 
healthy developments, and we commend 
those responsible for proceeding in a 
manner that takes into account the need 
for both national order and democratic 
progress. 

The shared fruits of economic suc- 
cess, equitably distributed, should be 
able to meet the rising demands of con- 
sumers in these developing states. 
Responsive government should be able 
to satisfy the expectations of an 
enlightened electorate. And the combina- 
tion of these is an irrefutable recipe for 
even greater progress. 

Conclusion 

These four fundamental challenges to 
the nations of East Asia and the Pacific 
region are formidable but by no means 
insurmountable. They do not daunt us. 
Neither the United States nor its friends 
and allies in the region shrink from the 
task of diligently cultivating the 
remarkable growth and stability we have 
thus far enjoyed, so that future genera- 
tions may live in comfort and peace. We 
welcome these challenges and, together, 
will face them head on. In this way, we 
can test and prove the full dimension of 
our capabilities, assess our weaknesses, 
and strengthen our confidence. 

We recognize, of course, that most 
of the challenges are the consequent 
price of success. Our adversaries in the 
region— impoverished, backward, 
isolated— contend with the much greater 
burdens of failure. We already have 
demonstrated the power of free market 
and democratic principles in the develop- 
ing world. Let us continue to 
demonstrate, through creativity and 
foresight, the durability of the system 
adopted by our friends and ourselves as 
well. ■ 



bvember 1986 



41 



EAST ASIA 



U.S. -Japanese 
Relations 



Background 

Since 1952 when the U.S. -Japanese 
peace treaty went into effect, Japan has 
become a valued U.S. ally and a major 
power not only in Asia but in the world. 
It joined the United Nations in 1956 and 
became a member of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (OECD) in 1964. Its foreign policy 
has been directed toward promoting 
peace and prosperity by working closely 
with the West. 

Its economy has expanded at an 
impressive rate. Along with North 
America and Western Europe, Japan is 
one of the three major industrial com- 
plexes among the market economies. 
Japan receives about 10% of our total 
exports— a larger share than any country 
except Canada— and we buy roughly one- 
quarter of Japan's total exports. Our 
combined GNP totals about one-third of 
world GNP. 

Global Partnership 
With the United States 

A close and cooperative relationship with 
Japan is the cornerstone of U.S. policy 
in Asia. Our bilateral ties have 
worldwide ramifications, and our 
partnership is global. The United States 
and Japan are the two largest providers 
of refugee relief. In 1984 Japan provided 
$7.5 million in aid to Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan. Our two countries have pro- 
vided substantial relief for Khmer 
refugees and have consulted with other 
concerned nations— particularly the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)— on the continuing crisis in 
Indochina. We both help promote 
China's modernization program. 

Japan's more active foreign policy 
contributes significantly to efforts to 
control and reduce nuclear weapons, and 
Japan's views on our arms reduction 
initiatives are highly valued. Together 
we have made it clear to the U.S.S.R. 
that an agreement on intermediate- 
range nuclear forces that would shift the 
threat from Europe to Asia is unaccept- 
able. Our cooperation also extends to 
many other areas: energy, technology 
transfer to developing countries, con- 
trolling strategic exports, and medical- 
particularly cancer— research. 

Relations With Other Nations 

Japan's traditional interests have been 
in Asia, and those continue to be of vital 
importance to Tokyo. Ties between 



Beijing and Tokyo have developed 
rapidly since 1978, and Japan has been 
aiding the Chinese in modernization proj- 
ects. Today Japan is the leading donor of 
economic aid to China. Japan maintains 
economic, but not diplomatic, relations 
with Taiwan. Korea is receiving signifi- 
cant Japanese economic assistance as a 
result of a historic exchange of visits in 
1983 and 1984 between Prime Minister 
Nakasone and President Chun. Japan 
has long-term interests in the Persian 
Gulf, which supplies most of its oil. 
Tokyo provides large amounts of 
economic aid to Egypt, Turkey, and 
Pakistan. It has become increasingly 
active in Africa and Latin America 
through multilateral development proj- 
ects. Relations with the U.S.S.R. have 
never been close, in part because the 
Soviets, since World War II, have 
occupied four islands known as the 
Northern Territories. 

Free Trade 

At the May 1985 Bonn economic sum- 
mit, the United States, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, West 
Germany, and Italy committed them- 
selves to an early and substantial reduc- 
tion of barriers to trade and to continued 
efforts to resist protectionism. Prime 
Minister Nakasone unveiled a trade 
action program in July 1985 to help 
internationalize Japan's economy and to 
make its markets free in principle, with 
restrictions the exception. After the 
President met the Prime Minister in 
January 1985, intensive bilateral 
negotiations were launched to remove 
Japanese trade barriers in the telecom- 
munications, electronics, forest products, 
medical equipment, and pharmaceuticals 
sectors where U.S. products are clearly 
competitive. These talks have made 
important progress in trade liberaliza- 
tion. Such efforts help reduce stresses in 
our relationship caused by the persistent 
trade deficit. 

Macroeconomic Policies 

We have urged Japan to correct its sav- 
ings/investment imbalance which over 
time would help reduce its large global 
current account surplus. Japan recog- 
nizes that it must increase domestic-led 
growth to stimulate imports and help 
rectify the savings/investment 
imbalance; it announced several steps in 
October 1985 and is studying additional 
measures. The strong dollar has helped 
cause the trade imbalance with Japan. 
The September 1985 statement of the 
Finance Ministers of Japan, the United 
Kingdom, France, West Germany, the 
United States, and the Central Bankers 
committed five major industrialized 



countries to address exchange rate 
issues. Since then the dollar has 
weakened in relation to the yen, and 
decline eventually may help increase 
exports to Japan. 

Assistance to Less Developed 
Countries 

In 1984 Japan became second only tc 
United States as a leading donor of 
overseas development assistance, pie 
ing some $4.3 billion. Japan has pled 
$40 billion in assistance from 1986 tc 
1992. Both Japan and the United Ste 
agreed at the Bonn summit to work : 
new trade liberalization negotiations 
the General Agreement on Tariffs ar 
Trade (GATT), emphasizing expande 
trade with less developed countries. 
Both countries are studying how to c 
dinate their foreign assistance progr; 
and the United States supports Japa 
efforts to open its market to develop 
countries' products. 



International Political and Econom 
Coordination 

The Secretary of State and the Japai i 
Foreign Minister meet often to consi r 
global issues. The United States and ' 
Japan have consulted on the invasion i 
Afghanistan and Cambodia and the 
imposition of martial law in Poland. 
Economic coordination has often bee 
accomplished through institutions su( I 
as the International Energy Agency I 
(IEA), the World Bank, and the Inter | 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). 

Mutual Security 

Although the Japanese Constitution a I 
government policy preclude an assert I 
military role in international relations I 
Japan's cooperation with the United I 
States through the 1960 bilateral Tre;| 
of Mutual Cooperation and Security h I 
been crucial in maintaining peace and I 
stability in East Asia. U.S. bases and j 
facilities in Japan enable the United 
States to maintain its commitments tc I 
Japan and other allies in the region. 
Japan has significantly strengthened i| 
self-defense capabilities. It will under- 1 
take to defend its sealanes to a distamj 
of 1,000 nautical miles, providing a 
credible deterrent to Soviet adventuri:} 
in Northeast Asia. Japan's expanded I 
defense role will also allow us more fie] 
ibility in responding to emergencies inl 
the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceal 



Taken from the GIST series of Jan. 1986, 
published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Editor: Harriet 
Culley. ■ 



42 



Department of State Bulle 



CONOMICS 



Ui Agenda for the New GATT Round 



I Clayton Yeutter 

Address before the U.S. Chamber of 
mmerce on September 10, 1986. 
nbassador Yeutter is U.S. Trade 
Ypresentative. 

:xt week, one of the most momentous 
iernational economic conferences of 
e past 40 years will take place in 
inta del Este, Uruguay. Secretary of 
immeree Baldrige and Secretary of 
rriculture Lyng will join me in a 
meting with ministers of 91 other coun- 
es to launch a new round of 
iltilateral trade talks under the 
spices of the General Agreement on 
riffs and Trade (GATT). 

What we do there will have major 
percussions for decades to come. I am 
t exaggerating when I say that the 
ture of the international trading 
stem hinges on the outcome of this 
nisterial meeting. 

Nearly 40 years ago, representatives 
23 nations met in Geneva to negotiate 
lat eventually became known as the 
VTT. Imagine what those negotiators 
w as they scanned the four tumultuous 
cades preceding their meeting. In 
sir lifetimes, they had witnessed the 
o most destructive wars in history; a 
eat Depression that, propelled by a 
igue of protectionism, had eroded the 
ry fabric of their societies; the rise of 
gressive totalitarian regimes, 
mulated in large part by economic 
rest; and a dramatic increase in 
anomic and political isolationism that 
d turned their world into chaos. 

The lessons of that earlier period 
ist have been crystal clear— that the 
tions of the world, as interdependent 
ambers of the international corn- 
unity, need rules and codes of conduct 
facilitate their economic relationships. 

The creators of GATT applied these 
osons as they developed a new trading 
stem. The General Agreement on 
'.riffs and Trade became a set of prin- 
:>les and disciplines to promote global 
ionomic growth through expanded 
tide. The signatories promised to 
cavow the protectionist practices of 
fe 1930s when nations had tried in vain 
- prosper at the expense of each other, 
''jecting the beggar-thy-neighbor 
proach, which had succeeded only in 
ipoverishing everyone, the GATT 
ambers adopted a system in which all 
<.tions could grow and prosper 
tejether. 



It is important to note that the 
GATT members called themselves con- 
tracting parties and still do so. Each 
GATT member is a party to a contract 
with binding obligations. These obliga- 
tions, which require each nation to 
forswear protectionism, are the founda- 
tion of the modern international trading 
system. 

As we survey the 40 years since the 
GATT was founded we can view it as an 
enormous achievement. Membership 
grew from 23 to 92 nations. All nations 
have benefited from the lower tariffs 
and reduced trade barriers that GATT 
generated, and international trade 
expanded dramatically. As trade 
increased, so did economic growth. 
Expanded trade has provided rising 
prosperity for developed and developing 
nations alike. Some have become 
prosperous beyond all their hopes. 

As an institution, GATT has 
arguably done more over the past 40 
years to promote the cause of peace and 
prosperity than any other international 
body. Yet like all institutions, GATT 
must change or risk becoming obsolete. 

When GATT was founded, the major 
trade problem was high tariffs. Seven 
rounds of trade negotiations have 



. . .GATT must address 
the chaos in trade in 
agriculture. 



lowered tariff barriers substantially. But 
new, non-tariff barriers have sprung up 
to take the place of high tariffs, and 
GATT must adapt to the new challenge 
these measures present. 

As currently constituted, GATT does 
not address many of the realities of 
modern trade. It has been 13 years since 
we launched a new round of GATT talks 
and much has changed in the interna- 
tional economy since then. We live in a 
world that is becoming more sophisti- 
cated every day. Our international 
institutions, such as the GATT, must 
serve that world. They too must be 
sophisticated, and they must be dynamic. 
If they remain static in the face of 
change, they will fade into oblivion. 



Protectionist Trends 

Unfortunately, we've all slipped 
somewhat from the commitments of 40 
years ago. Protectionist practices are 
resurfacing throughout the world. Part 
of this is in reaction to the economic 
shocks of the last 15 years— the tremen- 
dous fluctuations in energy prices, the 
abandonment of fixed exchange rates, 
the periods of soaring inflation, the ups 
and downs of interest rates, and the 
enormous debt burdens of some develop- 
ing nations. 

Yet, to be candid, much of this 
creeping protectionism is simple oppor- 
tunism. There are those who would 
prefer not to compete internationally, 
those who want only to export, and 
those who think trade barriers will give 
them the edge. In short, the beggar-thy- 
neighbor approach is making a 
comeback. 

This is an alarming trend. It has a 
corrosive effect on the system because 
one protectionist action begets another. 
It is naive to expect otherwise but 
sometimes nations engage in wishful 
thinking— and in self-destructive actions. 
International trade as measured by 
GATT rose only 3% in 1985, down con- 
siderably from the 9% growth rate of 
1984. If nothing is done to reverse this 
trend, the trickle toward protectionism 
could become a flood, and we could 
return to the Depression days of the 
1930s. 

Already in the United States, there 
is a reaction against GATT because some 
think the privileges of a free and open 
trading system apply only to our 
competitors— that others are free to 
trade in the United States but foreign 
markets are closed to us. Many 
Americans look at our $150,000 million 
trade deficit and at the growing use of 
subsidies, nontariff barriers, and other 
GATT-illegal practices throughout the 
world and wonder why we are still a 
signatory to the GATT. They want us to 
take matters into our own hands and roll 
back imports through quota programs or 
require specified reductions in bilateral 
trade deficits through the use of 
surcharges. 

Further, those U.S. interests that 
are still outward looking are losing faith 
in the ability of existing rules and in- 
stitutions to effectively address new 
issues that are increasingly important in 
international commerce— services, 



bvember 1986 



43 



ECONOMICS 



investment, intellectual property protec- 
tion, and others that are on our priority 
list for Punta del Este. 

The difficulties facing today's 
trading system do not affect America 
alone. After all, farm subsidies and 
agricultural import barriers are not 
aimed only at the American farmer. 
They also crush less fortunate nations, 
many of which have economies based 
almost entirely on agriculture. And the 
lack of rules on services does not affect 
American exporters only. It also 
prevents many less developed countries 
(LDCs) from achieving their full poten- 
tial on trade in services. 

If other nations are not truly 
interested in strengthening the 
multilateral trading system, the United 
States will have no choice but to defend 
its interests bilaterally and plurilaterally, 
and we will do so vigorously. The GATT 
as we know it today would disappear, to 
be replaced, we hope, by institutions that 
would better accommodate the world's 
commercial needs. 

The stakes riding on the outcome of 
our meeting in Uruguay next week are, 
indeed, high. We can either agree to 
work together as a world community to 
strengthen and modernize the interna- 
tional trading system for the benefit of 



Worldwide piracy of 
intellectual property has 
reached epidemic 
proportions. 



all nations or we can agree to each go 
our own way, accepting the conse- 
quences of that scenario. 

For us a new round to improve the 
world trading system must include 
meaningful negotiations on agriculture 
and the new issues— services, intellectual 
property, and investment. This is not a 
time for caution. It is a time for leader- 
ship, a time to strike out boldly to meet 
the demands of a dynamic world. 

There is some cause for optimism if 
one looks at how far we have come. A 
year ago, many observers questioned 



whether GATT members could agree 
even to begin talking about an agenda 
for a new round of trade talks. Yet we 
were able to establish a preparatory 
committee, which worked diligently for 7 
months to produce a draft declaration 
for ministers' consideration. 

The negotiators who drafted that 
text represent countries of all 
characterizations: developed, developing, 
and newly industrialized; northern and 
southern, eastern and western. Colombia 
and Switzerland deserve particular 
credit for chairing the deliberations, but 
all 40-plus nations that participated 
should share the accolades. All took 
political risks during this process and all 
will have to take additional risks if we 
are successfully to launch a new round. 
Yet if a general spirit of cooperation 
prevails, and if opponents of trade 
liberalization are not permitted to 
obstruct progress, a historic declaration 
can emerge from Punta del Este. 

But let us not take it for granted 
that there will be a new round. Unfor- 
tunately, a small group of nations con- 
tinues to hold the interests of the major- 
ity hostage to their objectives, which 
seem to me contrary to their own self- 
interest. For reasons known only to 
them, these nations are attempting to 
keep off the agenda items that must be 
included if we are to strengthen and 
improve GATT. This is not a tolerable 
outcome. Nations that engage in 3% or 
4% of the world's trade cannot be 
allowed to jeopardize the future of the 
entire world trading system. No one has 
been asked to commit in advance to the 
outcome of the new round but simply to 
allow those who wish to negotiate to 
do so. 

Negotiating Agenda 

There can be no legitimate objection to a 
comprehensive negotiating agenda. But 
there is ample reason not to agree to a 
limited agenda. If a handful of countries 
block the rest of the world from 
negotiating on matters of great 
economic importance during the coming 
years— matters that will advance the 
cause of global trade— the United States 
will not participate in the new round. 

Agriculture. Clearly GATT must 
address the chaos in trade in agriculture. 
This is an urgent, critical need. Export 
subsidies and endless barriers to imports 
have created massive disruption in farm 
trade and brought world agriculture to 
the brink of crisis. The escalating pat- 
tern of protectionism in agriculture must 
be reversed. Farmers of different coun- 



tries are no longer competing againsl 1 1 
each other but against national 
treasuries. 

Our agricultural objectives for a il 
round are clear. We want to phase oi f] 
import restrictions on agricultural pr d 
ucts, treat agricultural export subsidi I 
the same as subsidies for industrial p | 
ucts, and eliminate other barriers to 
market access in developed and devel 
ing countries. Agriculture should be 
negotiated on a "fast track" basis 
because the crisis in agricultural trad 
so severe that we cannot afford to we 
years or more for improvement. 

These objectives should threaten 
one. No nation would gain any advan 
tage over another; we would work 
together to put an end to costly, conf 
tational policies that hurt us all. 

Secretary Lyng's attendance in 
Punta del Este demonstrates our 
government's deep commitment to 
extending GATT rule to cover trade i 
agriculture. President Reagan is per- 
sonally committed to this issue. At th 
economic summit in Tokyo last May, 1 
raised the issue of trade in agricultun 
and persuaded the other heads of stat 
of the need for immediate, substantia 
improvement in the conduct of 
agricultural trade. 

Services. GATT also must begin 
address the new trade challenges of tl 
day. The definition and scope of trade 
have been transformed in recent year 
and GATT as an institution must keep 
pace. For example, we must create an 
institutional framework that will maki 
trade in services as open as possible. 
Services is the fastest growing sector 
the U.S. economy and is likely to con- 
tinue to be so in the future. The same 
true for many other nations, yet there 
are no principles and procedures govei 
ing trade in this area. 

Our objectives here also are clear. 
We wish to develop meaningful interns : 
tional rules with respect to governmen 
actions that affect services trade. This 
would not only place rules for trade in 
services on an equal footing with rules , 
for trade in goods but also would 
facilitate trade in goods by guaranteeii: 
that essential related services, such as 
transportation, communications, and 
insurance, are readily available on a 
competitive basis. 

These objectives also should threat 
no one. Basic rules guaranteeing non- 
discriminatory treatment and equitable! 
access would simply clarify the current ; 
jumbled system for all service provider: | 
they would provide special advantages i 



44 



Department of State Bullet I 



ECONOMICS 



h one. Furthermore, no nation would be 
Lligated to sign a services code, 
piough it would clearly be seen to be 
| sirable to do so. 

Investment. A third major need is a 
t of rules to cover investment. GATT 
fers virtually no discipline in this area 
en through government investment 
ilicies can severely distort trade flows. 

Our goal here is to provide for basic 
inciples governing such practices as 
:port performance requirements, local 
ntent rules, and other investment 
gulations that distort trade. We want 
inject greater certainty into what is 
iw a most uncertain, and often 
timidating, economic environment. 

This objective should not threaten 
her nations; indeed it should be 
ibraced by all— especially the develop- 
y nations— as a major priority. Foreign 
vestment, when responding to actual 
irket conditions rather than distortive 
ivernment policies, will stimulate 
onomic growth. There is an urgent 
ed throughout the developing world 
r increased foreign investment, par- 
:ularly among nations that need to 
duce their reliance on debt capital but 
ed equity capital to stimulate growth. 
; long as there are no meaningful rules 
this area, investment in those coun- 
es will remain a risky and unattractive 
tion. 

Intellectual Property. Finally, 
sre is a need for increased protection 
" intellectual property such as patents, 
idemarks, and copyrights. Worldwide 
•acy of intellectual property has 
iched epidemic proportions. The world 
Dn may be in danger of losing the 
nefits of major research and develop- 
mt efforts, which simply will not be 
dertaken if theft of the work product 
events companies from justifying the 
search expenditure. 

Our objective here is simply to imple- 
;nt and enforce basic standards for 
;ellectual property protection 
trldwide. This should threaten no one 
cept the pirates who attempt to profit 
[pm their theft of others' intellectual 
foperty. For them there should be no 
Empathy at Punta del Este. 

] These issues— agriculture, services, 
fyestment, and intellectual property 
lotection— are all mentioned as agenda 
Ims in the draft declaration supported 
\, a majority of countries. We are 
jpeful that all nations will recognize 
Sat having these items on the 
ligotiating agenda is in their own 
mnomic interest and in the interest of a 
ralthy world trading system. Without 



them, there will be no standstill-rollback 
commitment, no reduction in tariff and 
nontariff barriers, no negotiation on a 
safeguards code, no improvement in the 
GATT dispute settlement mechanism, 
and no discipline for the "gray area" 
measures that so plague international 
trade today. 

The challenge facing us in Uruguay 
next week is every bit as large as that 
which faced the founders of GATT 
almost 40 years ago. But we have a 
tremendous advantage over them. 
Whereas they saw only chaos as they 
looked back over the previous 40 years 
and struggled to find an'answer, we 



have their success as an example. If we 
fail to grasp this opportunity, future 
generations will rightly indict us for 
depriving them of any hope for rising 
world prosperity. 

Surely leadership and statesmanship 
did not disappear when the creators of 
GATT retired from the scene. What we 
must all do is summon the courage to 
renew our common commitment to a 
free and open international trading 
system. 

Next week in Uruguay, we will 
discover if the nations of the world have 
that courage. ■ 



GATT Nations Agree to Launch 
New Round of Trade Negotiations 



The contracting parties to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GA TT) met in ministerial session at 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, Septem- 
ber 15-20, 1986. 

Following are the statement by U.S. 
Trade Representative Ambassador 
Clayton Yeutter, head of the U.S. delega- 
tion, on September 15 and the text of the 
declaration adopted September 20 by the 
7U nations attending the meeting. 



AMBASSADOR YEUTTER, 
SEPT. 15, 1986 

This week GATT faces a historic 
challenge. Our task is more difficult than 
any that has confronted world trade 
since the very creation of GATT in 1947. 
What we do in Punta del Este will deter- 
mine whether GATT remains a func- 
tional, dynamic institution serving the 
interests of its members or declines into 
a static and passive association that is 
irrelevant to the needs of international 
trade. 

Our task may be daunting, but it is 
one from which we must not shirk. The 
world trading system is in trouble. All 
of us, to one degree or another, have 
slipped from the GATT ideals of free and 
open trade. Some have slipped con- 
siderably, making protectionism 
dangerously more commonplace. Many 
now overlook the tremendous benefits 
that these ideals made possible during 
the last 40 years. The expansion of trade 
can enable more individuals to partici- 



pate in the world economy, thereby 
improving their quality of life and 
standard of living. 

Rather than allow permanent 
damage to the world trading system, we 
must reaffirm the basic principles 
established by the founders of GATT. 
Such a reaffirmation must recognize the 
realities of international trade today. 
This means extending GATT principles 
to all major areas of trade. For too long, 
GATT rules and disciplines have not 
applied to many of the most important 
sectors of the world economy, leading to 
global trade distortion and economic 
disequilibrium that can no longer be 
tolerated. 

The United States, with a trade 
deficit approaching $200 billion, is the 
major victim of this disequilibrium. 
President Reagan has forcefully resisted 
a tide of domestic protectionism in the 
face of this gigantic trade deficit but he 
cannot do so forever. GATT members 
need to work together to move the world 
back toward economic equilibrium— to 
the benefit of all. If other countries are 
not interested in doing so, the United 
States will have no choice but to defend 
its own interests in its own way. We are 
prepared to do so if we must. 

The United States advocates a new 
round because we believe the GATT can 
be responsive to the rapidly-changing 
requirements of international commerce. 
We are prepared to modernize it for the 
benefit of every country. This will 
require a firm commitment by all GATT 
member countries to work together 
toward a common goal. 



Kvember 1986 



45 



ECONOMICS 



The vast majority of GATT members 
have already demonstrated such a com- 
mitment. The process for launching a 
new round was begun by the unanimous 
consensus of the contracting parties last 
November. During the first 7 months of 
this year, the preparatory committee 
met to draft an agenda for the new 
round. Out of those meetings came the 
text upon which we will base our discus- 
sion for the final ministerial declaration. 
This text resolved a number of issues, 
leaving others to be decided here. It was 
a significant accomplishment. It leaves 
me confident that the decision to launch 
a new round is within our grasp. 

The negotiators who drafted that 
text represent countries of all character- 
izations: developed, developing, and 
newly industrialized; northern and 
southern, eastern and western. Colombia 
and Switzerland deserve particular men- 
tion for chairing the deliberations, but all 
40 or so participating nations deserve 
credit. 

The diverse composition of the draft- 
ing group demonstrates conclusively that 
support for a new round is widespread 
and not limited to one nation or group of 
nations. It also disproves the assertion 
that there is a GATT conflict between 
the less developed countries (LDCs) and 
the developed nations. Indeed the 
developing nations provided much of the 
leadership that went into drafting the 
declaration which received the most sup- 
port at the Geneva preparatory meeting. 

The contribution of the developing 
countries to the preparatory committee 
process is only the most recent example 
of how important the LDCs have become 
to world trade. The United States 
welcomes the growth and increasing 
stature of the developing nations. We 
buy nearly two-thirds of the goods sent 
from the LDCs to the developed coun- 
tries, and we look forward to increasing 
our exports to LDC markets. We believe 
the United States can only benefit as 
developing countries become more 
prosperous. 

By deciding to meet here in Punta 
del Este, the GATT has demonstrated 
that the LDCs are full partners in the 
GATT process and just as committed to 
GATT principles as the developed 
nations. Mr. Chairman [Uruguayan 
Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias], I 
thank you for your nation's generous 
offer to host this meeting, and I know 
your able leadership will ensure its 
success. 

Uruguay is just one of the many 
developing nations that understands it 



too has a tremendous stake in the expan- 
sion of world trade. They know that pro- 
tectionism threatens developing nations 
far more than it does the United States. 
We are large enough and self-sufficient 
enough to adjust to closed markets, 
thereby limiting the damage. Resurgent 
protectionism would slow our economic 
expansion and reduce our standard of 
living, but it would not devastate our 
economy as it would smaller and more 
export-dependent nations. 

The new round will not only help 
LDCs by reversing protectionist trends, 
it will also provide many opportunities 
for expanding trade. The U.S. position 
on such issues as agriculture, services, 
investment, and intellectual property is 
well-known, but not so widely recognized 
is the support we enjoy from progressive 
LDCs that realize they will also benefit 
from inclusion of these issues in the new 
round. 

For example it is clear that the main 
victims of agricultural protectionism are 
smaller, agrarian economies that cannot 
compete with massive export subsidies 
nor penetrate import barriers that the 
GATT currently permits. The 
agricultural language in the draft 
ministerial declaration offers hope for 
change that will benefit not just U.S. 
farmers but others around the globe. 

Similarly the lack of rules for trade 
in services does not restrict the United 
States only. Many LDCs that are compe- 
titive in services or hope to evolve into 
service economies find significant 
markets closed to them by their neigh- 
bors' protectionist policies. A services 
code guaranteeing nondiscriminatory 
treatment and equitable access would 
threaten no nation, expecially since none 
will be forced to sign such a code. 
Furthermore services facilitate trade in 
goods. The two are complementary and, 
as international commerce becomes 
more sophisticated, will forever be 
interrelated— in all countries. 

As for investment, the lack of basic 
principles penalizes LDCs by creating 
uncertainty and risk for investors. There 
is an urgent need throughout the 
developing world for increased foreign 
investment, particularly among nations 
that need to reduce their reliance on 
debt capital but need equity capital to 
stimulate growth. As long as there are 
no meaningful rules in this area, invest- 
ment in these countries will remain risky 
and unattractive. 

Finally, we need better rules on 
intellectual property, not simply for the 
sake of the developed world but also for 
the LDCs, which benefit from research 



and development wherever it is con- 
ducted. The concept of protecting 
intellectual property is not new, but 
time to recognize that the issue affec 
trade and ought to be addressed by t 
GATT. The current lack of protectioi 
intellectual property virtually guarar 
that only the developed nations can 
afford to invest heavily in vital resea 
which will keep the LDCs from prog] 
ing as rapidly as they could otherwisi 

We regard the issues of agriculti 
services, investment, and intellectual 
property as critical to the future of a 
GATT members. We cannot envision 
nor agree to— comprehensive new tr; 
negotiations that do not include thesi 
four issues on the agenda. Without 
them, there will be no meaningful 
standstill-rollback commitment, no 
reduction in tariff and nontariff barr 
no negotiation of a safeguards code, 
improvement in the GATT dispute se 
tlement mechanism or subsidy rules, 
no discipline over the "gray area" 
measures that so plague internationa 
trade today. 

Today GATT stands at a crossro? 
Regardless of what we do here, work 
events will go forward. We cannot st 
change, but we can work to set our o 
destiny. If we leave Punta del Este 
without taking steps to strengthen ai 
modernize GATT, we will have failed 
grasp an opportunity to improve the 
lives of all citizens of the world for y€ 
to come. But if we act decisively, we 
be worthy successors to the statesme 
who created GATT 40 years ago. Let 
their vision inspire us as we work to 
invigorate GATT for future generatio 



DECLARATION, 
SEPT. 20, 1986 

Ministers, meeting on the occasion of the 
Special Session of Contracting Parties at 
Punta del Este, have decided to launch 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Urugi 
Round). To this end, they have adopted the 
following Declaration. The Multilateral Tn 
Negotiations (MTN) will be open to the par 
ticipation of countries as indicated in Parts' 
and II of this Declaration. A Trade Negotis. 
tions Committee is established to carry out 
the negotiations. The Trade Negotiations [ 
Committee shall hold its first meeting not I 
later than 31 October 1986. It shall meet as 
appropriate at Ministerial level. The 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations will be con 
eluded within four years. 



46 



Department of State Bulle 



ECONOMICS 



PARTI 

NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE 
IN GOODS 

'he Contracting Parties meeting at 
linisterial level 

Determined to halt and reverse protect- 
ionism and to remove distortions to trade 

Determined also to preserve the basic 
irinciples and to further the objectives of the 

;att 

Determined also to develop a more open, 
iable and durable multilateral trading system 

Convinced that such action would promote 
rowth and development 

Mindful of the negative effects of pro- 
jnged financial and monetary instability in 
he world economy, the indebtedness of a 
irge number of less developed contracting 
arties and considering the linkage between 
rade, money, finance and development 

Decide to enter into Multilateral Trade 
legotiations on trade in goods within the 
ramework and under the aegis of the General 
Lgreement on Tariffs and Trade. 



l. OBJECTIVES 

Negotiations shall aim to: 

i) bring about further liberalization and 
|xpansion of world trade to the benefit of all 
:ountries, especially less-developed Contract- 
iig Parties, including the improvement of 
ccess to markets by the reduction and 
llimination of tariffs, quantitative restrictions 
Ind other non-tariff measures and obstacles; 
(ii) strengthen the role of GATT, improve 
he multilateral trading system based on the 
irinciples and rules of the GATT and bring 
bout a wider coverage of world trade under 
greed, effective and enforceable multilateral 
isciplines; 

| (iii) increase the responsiveness of the 
JATT system to the evolving international 
Iconomic environment, through facilitating 
leeessary structural adjustment, enhancing 
he relationship of the GATT with the rele- 
lant international organizations and taking 
ccount of changes in trade patterns and 
|rospects, including the growing importance 
if trade in high technology products, serious 
liffieulties in commodity markets and the 
mportance of an improved trading environ- 
ment providing, inter alia, for the ability of 
hdebted countries to meet their financial 
jbligations; 

i (iv) foster concurrent cooperative action at 
he national and international levels to 
Itrengthen the inter-relationship between 
rade policies and other economic policies 
Effecting growth and development, and to 
'ontribute towards continued, effective and 
'etermined efforts to improve the functioning 
If the international monetary system and the 
|ow of financial and real investment 
,esources to developing countries. 



B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING NEGOTIATIONS 

(i) Negotiations shall be conducted in a 
transparent manner, and consistent with the 
objectives and commitments agreed in this 
Declaration and with the principles of the 
General Agreement in order to ensure mutual 
advantage and increased benefits to all 
participants. 

(ii) The launching, the conduct and the 
implementation of the outcome of the negotia- 
tion shall be treated as parts of a single 
undertaking. However, agreements reached 
at an early stage may be implemented on a 
provisional or a definitive basis by agreement 
prior to the formal conclusion of the negotia- 
tions. Early agreements shall be taken into 
account in assessing the overall balance of the 
negotiations. 

(iii) Balanced concessions should be sought 
within broad trading areas and subjects to be 
negotiated in order to avoid unwarranted 
cross-sectoral demands. 

(iv) Contracting Parties agree that the 
principle of differential and more favorable 
treatment embodied in Part IV and other 
relevant provisions of the General Agreement 
and in the decision of the Contracting Parties 
of 28 November 1979 on Differential and 
More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries 
applies to the negotiations. In the implemen- 
tation of standstill and rollback, particular 
care should be given to avoiding disruptive ef- 
fects on the trade of less-developed contract- 
ing parties. 

(v) The developed countries do not expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in 
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs 
and other barriers to the trade of developing 
countries, i.e., the developed countries do not 
expect the developing countries in the course 
of trade negotiation, to make contributions 
which are inconsistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade needs. 
Developed Contracting Parties shall, 
therefore, not seek, neither shall less- 
developed Contracting Parties be required to 
make, concessions that are inconsistent with 
the latter's development, financial and trade 
needs. 

(vi) Less-developed Contracting Parties 
expect that their capacity to make contribu- 
tions or negotiated concessions or take other 
mutually agreed action under the provisions 
and procedures of the General Agreement 
would improve with the progressive develop- 
ment of their economies and improvement in 
their trade situation and they would 
accordingly expect to participate more fully in 
the framework of rights and obligations under 
the General Agreement. 

(vii) Special attention shall be given to the 
particular situation and problems of the least- 
developed countries and to the need to 
encourage positive measures to facilitate 
expansion of their trading opportunities. 
Expeditious implementation of the relevant 
provisions of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration 
concerning the least-developed countries shall 
also be given appropriate attention. 



C. STANDSTILL AND ROLLBACK 

Commencing immediately and continuing 
until the formal completion of the negotia- 
tions, each participant agrees to apply the 
following commitments: 

Standstill 

(i) not to take any trade restrictive or distort- 
ing measure inconsistent with the provisions 
of the General Agreement or the instruments 
negotiated within the framework of GATT or 
under its auspices; 

(ii) not to take any trade restrictive or 
distorting measure in the legitimate exercise 
of its GATT rights, that would go beyond that 
which is necessary to remedy specific situa- 
tions, as provided for in the General Agree- 
ment and the instruments referred to in (i) 
above; 

(iii) not to take any trade measures in such 
a manner as to improve its negotiating 
positions. 

Rollback 

(i) that all trade restrictive or distorting 
measures inconsistent with the provisions of 
the General Agreement or instruments 
negotiated within the framework of GATT or 
under its auspices, shall be phased out or 
brought into conformity within an agreed 
timeframe not later than by the date of the 
formal completion of the negotiations, taking 
into account multilateral agreements, under- 
takings and understandings, including 
strengthened rules and disciplines, reached in 
pursuance of the objective of the negotiations; 

(ii) there shall be progressive implementa- 
tion of this commitment on an equitable basis 
in consultations among participants con- 
cerned, including all affected participants. 
This commitment shall take account of the 
concerns expressed by any participant about 
measures directly affecting its trade 
interests; 

(iii) there shall be no GATT concessions 
requested for the elimination of these 
measures. 



Surveillance of Standstill 
and Rollback 

Each participant agrees that the implementa- 
tion of these commitments on standstill and 
rollback shall be subject to multilateral 
surveillance so as to ensure that these com- 
mitments are being met. The Trade Negotia- 
tions Committee will decide on the 
appropriate mechanisms to carry out the 
surveillance, including periodic reviews and 
evaluations. Any participant may bring to the 
attention of the appropriate surveillance 
mechanism any actions or omissions it 
believes to be relevant to the fulfillment of 
these commitments. These notifications 
should be addressed to the GATT secretariat 
which may also provide further relevant 
information. 



Jovember 1986 



47 



ECONOMICS 



D. SUBJECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS 

Tariffs 

Negotiations shall aim, by appropriate 
methods, to reduce or, as appropriate, 
eliminate tariffs including the reduction or 
elimination of high tariffs and tariff escala- 
tion. Emphasis shall be given to the expan- 
sion of the scope of tariff concessions among 
all participants. 

Non-Tariff Measures 

Negotiations shall aim to reduce or eliminate 
non-tariff measures, including quantitative 
restrictions, without prejudice to any action 
to be taken in fulfillment of the rollback 
commitments. 



Tropical Products 

Negotiations shall aim at the fullest liberaliza- 
tion of trade in tropical products, including in 
their processed and semi-processed forms and 
shall cover both tariff and all non-tariff 
measures affecting trade in these products. 

Contracting Parties recognize the impor- 
tance of trade in tropical products to a large 
number of less-developed Contracting Parties 
and agree that negotiations in this area shall 
receive special attention, including the timing 
of the negotiations and the implementation of 
the results as provided for in B(ii). 

Natural Resource-Based Products 

Negotiations shall aim to achieve the fullest 
liberalization of trade in natural resource- 
based products, including in their processed 
and semi-processed forms. The negotiations 
shall aim to reduce or eliminate tariff and 
non-tariff measures, including tariff 
escalation. 



Textiles and Clothing 

Negotiations in the area of textiles and 
clothing shall aim to formulate modalities that 
would permit the eventual integration of this 
sector into GATT on the basis of strength- 
ened GATT rules and disciplines, thereby also 
contributing to the objective of further 
liberalization of trade. 



Agriculture 

Contracting Parties agree that there is an 
urgent need to bring more discipline and 
predictability to world agricultural trade by 
correcting and preventing restrictions and 
distortions including those related to struc- 
tural surpluses so as to reduce the uncer- 
tainty, imbalances and instability in world 
agricultural markets. 

Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater 
liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring 
all measures affecting import access and 
export competition under strengthened and 
more operationally effective GATT rules and 
disciplines, taking into account the general 
principles governing the negotiations, by: 



(i) improving market access through, inter 
alia, the reduction of import barriers; 

(ii) improving the competitive environment 
by increasing discipline on the use of all direct 
and indirect subsidies and other measures 
affecting directly or indirectly agricultural 
trade, including the phased reduction of their 
negative effects and dealing with their 
causes; 

(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that 
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and 
barriers can have on trade in agriculture, tak- 
ing into account the relevant international 
agreements. 

In order to achieve the above objectives, 
the negotiating group having primary respon- 
sibility for all aspects of agriculture will use 
the recommendations adopted by the Con- 
tracting Parties at their Fortieth Session, 
which were developed in accordance with the 
GATT 1982 Ministerial programme and take 
account of the approaches suggested in the 
work of the Committee on Trade in 
Agriculture without prejudice to other alter- 
natives that might achieve the objectives of 
the negotiations. 

GATT Articles 

Participants shall review existing GATT 
articles, provisions and disciplines as 
requested by interested Contracting Parties, 
and, as appropriate, undertake negotiations. 

Safeguards 

(i) comprehensive agreement on safeguards is 
of particular importance to the strengthening 
of the GATT system and to progress in the 
MTN's. 
(ii) The agreement on safeguards: 

• shall be based on the basic principles of 
the General Agreement; 

• shall contain, inter alia, the following 
elements: transparency, coverage, objective 
criteria for action including the concept of 
serious injury or threat thereof, temporary 
nature, degressivity and structural adjust- 
ment, compensation and retaliation, notifica- 
tions, consultation, multilateral surveillance 
and dispute settlement; and 

• shall clarify and reinforce the 
disciplines of the General Agreement and 
should apply to all Contracting Parties. 

MTN Agreements and Arrangements 

Negotiations shall aim to improve, clarify or 
expand, as appropriate, agreements and 
arrangements negotiated in the Tokyo Round 
of Multilateral Negotiations. 

Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 

Negotiations on subsidies and countervailing 
measures shall be based on a review of 
Articles VI and XVI and the MTN agreement 
on subsidies and countervailing measures 
with the objective of improving GATT 
disciplines relating to all subsidies and 



countervailing measures that affect inten 
tional trade. A negotiating group will be 
established to deal with these issues. 

Dispute Settlement 

In order to ensure prompt and effective 
resolution of disputes to the benefit of all 
Contracting Parties, negotiations shall air 
improve and strengthen the rules and the 
cedures of the dispute settlement process, 
while recognizing the contribution that wc 
be made by more effective and enforceabl' 
GATT rules and disciplines. Negotiations 
shall include the development of adequate 
arrangements for overseeing and monitor 
of the procedures that would facilitate cor 
pliance with adopted recommendations. 

Trade Related Aspects 

of Intellectual Property Rights, 

Including Trade 

in Counterfeit Goods 

In order to reduce the distortions and 
impediments to international trade, and ta 
ing into account the need to promote effec 
and adequate protection of intellectual pro 
erty rights and to ensure that measures ar 
procedures to enforce intellectual property 
rights do not themselves become barriers 1 
legitimate trade, the negotiations shall ain 
clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as 
appropriate new rules and disciplines. 

Negotiations shall aim to develop a 
multilateral framework of principles, rules 
and disciplines dealing with international 
trade in counterfeit goods, taking into 
account work alreadv undertaken in the 
GATT. 

These negotiations shall be without pre 
udice to other complementary initiatives th 
may be taken in the World Intellectual Pro 
erty Organization and elsewhere to deal wi 
these matters. 



Trade-Related Investment Measures 

Following an examination of the operation 
GATT Articles related to the trade restricti 
and distorting effects of investment 
measures, negotiations should elaborate, as 
appropriate, further provisions that may be 
necessary to avoid such adverse effects on 
trade. 



E. FUNCTIONING OF THE GATT SYSTE 

Negotiations shall aim to develop understan 
ings and arrangements: 

(i) to enhance the surveillance in the GAT 
to enable regular monitoring of trade policie 
and practices of contracting parties and the: 
impact on the functioning of the multilateral! 
trading system; 

(ii) to improve the overall effectiveness an 
decision-making of the GATT as an institu- I 
tion, including, inter alia, through involve- I 
ment of Ministers; 



48 



Department of State BulletH 



EUROPE 



iii) to increase the contribution of the 
lTT to achieving greater coherence in 
bal economic policy-making through 
engthening its relationship with other 
ernational organizations responsible for 
netary and financial matters. 



PARTICIPATION 

Negotiations will be open to: 

(1) all Contracting Parties; 

(2) countries having acceded 
ivisionally; 

(3) countries applying the GATT on a de 
to basis having announced, not later than 
April 1987, their intention to accede to the 
TT and to participate in the negotiations; 

(4) countries that have already informed 
Contracting Parties, at a regular meeting 

the Council of Representatives, of their 
sntion to negotiate the terms of their 
mbership as a Contracting Party; and 

(5) developing countries that have, by 30 
ril 1987, initiated procedures for accession 
the GATT, with the intention of negoti- 

ig the terms of their accession during the 
irse of the negotiations. 

a) Participation in negotiations relating to 
amendment or application of GATT provi- 
ns or the negotiation of new provisions 
1, however, be open only to Contracting 
rties. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE 
IGOTIATIONS 

>oup of Negotiations on Goods (GNG) is 
ablished to carry out the programme of 
jotiations contained in this part of the 
:laration. The GNG shall, inter alia: 

) elaborate and put into effect detailed 

de negotiating plans prior to 19 December 

16; 

i) designate the appropriate mechanism 

surveillance of commitments to standstill 

1 rollback; 

ii) establish negotiating groups as 

uired. Because of the inter-relationship of 

ie issues and taking fully into account the 

leral principles governing the negotiations 

stated in B(iii) above, it is recognized that 

ects of one issue may be discussed in more 

n one negotiating group. Therefore each 

;otiating group should as required take 

) account relevant aspects emerging in 

er groups; 

v) also decide upon inclusion of additional 

ject matters in the negotiations; 

r) co-ordinate the work of the negotiating 

ups and supervise the progress of the 

;otiations. As a guideline not more than 

) negotiating groups should meet at the 

ie time; 

ri) the GNG shall report to the Trade 

?otiations Committee. 



In order to ensure effective application of 
differential and more favourable treatment 
the GNG shall, before the formal completion 
of the negotiations, conduct an evaluation of 
the results attained therein in terms of the 
Objectives and the General Principles Govern- 
ing Negotiations as set out in the Declaration, 
taking into account all issues of interest to 
less-developed Contracting Parties. 



PART II 

NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE 
IN SERVICES 

Ministers also decided, as part of the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, to launch 
negotiations on trade in services. 

Negotiations in this area shall aim to 
establish a multilateral framework of prin- 
ciples and rules for trade in services, 
including elaboration of possible disciplines 
for individual sectors, with a view to 
expansion of such trade under conditions of 
transparency and progressive liberalization 
and a means of promoting economic growth 
of all trading partners and the development 



of developing countries. Such framework shall 
respect the policy objectives of national laws 
and regulations applying to services and shall 
take into account the work of relevant inter- 
national organizations. 

GATT procedures and practices shall 
apply to these negotiations. A Group on 
Negotiations on Services is established to deal 
with these matters. Participation in the 
negotiations under this part of the Declara- 
tion will be open to the same countries as 
under Part I. GATT Secretariat support will 
be provided, with technical support from 
other organizations as decided by the Group 
on Negotiations on Services. 

The Group on Negotiations on Services 
shall report to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee. 



IMPLEMENTATION OF RESULTS 
UNDER PARTS I AND II 

When the results of the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations in all areas have been estab- 
lished, Ministers meeting also on the occasion 
of special session of Contracting Parties shall 
decide regarding the international implemen- 
tation of the respective results. ■ 



Under Secretary Armacost's 
Interview on "Meet the Press" 



Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
Michael H. Armacost was interviewed on 
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on 
September 7, 1986, by Marvin Kalb and 
Garrick Utley of NBC News and Strobe 
Talbott of Time magazine. 

Q. You know, of course, that within a 
half-hour, the chief spokesman for the 
Soviet foreign ministry has said that 
[U.S. News & World Report corre- 
spondent] Nicholas Daniloff will be 
tried. What is your response to that? 
A. I regret hearing that message. 
We have, for the past week, been trying 
to communicate very forcefully to the 
Soviet Union the importance of releasing 
Nick Daniloff without preferring 
charges. The case becomes much more 
complicated if they go through with the 
trial. 

Q. What does it mean, in effect, in 
terms of your ability to pursue sum- 
mitry, the Secretary's upcoming visit 
with Shevardnadze? 

A. It complicates, in the first 
instance, the resolution of this case. The 
proposal that we had been pursuing was 
that Nick Daniloff be released without 
preferring charges. And we then would 
go back to consider, on its merits, a 



request that had been made by the 
Soviet Ambassador prior to his arrest. 
Obviously, if they go through with the 
trial, it complicates the resolution on 
those terms. 

Q. The road to the summit has 
been rather rocky. The Soviets are say- 
ing there's no progress yet on the key 
issue of arms control. Do you think the 
decision to go ahead with the trial on 
Daniloff might be a way of trying to 
sabotage the summit, to get out of it? 

A. I can't speak for the Soviet 
Union in this matter. They have been a 
little opaque as far as their intentions 
with respect to a summit is concerned. I 
rather suspect that they— recalling 
previous precedents— think they can 
muscle us on this issue by talking 
trading bait. 

As I think you all have made clear, 
we share the view that these charges 
against Daniloff were trumped up. They 
grabbed him for motives that I think are 
transparent. They're related to precisely 
getting their man out of jail. And they 
may think they can accomplish that pur- 
pose without disrupting the summit. 



jvember 1986 



49 



EUROPE 



In the private communications we've 
had, they have been quite consistent in 
expressing the hope that this will not 
have a disruptive effect on the wider 
relationship; and that, presumably, 
means movement toward a summit. Our 
response has been quite as consistent, 
that inevitably, an incident of this kind 
has its disruptive impact. 

Q. Disruptive impact? Does that 
mean that if the trial does take place, 
if he is convicted and held in Moscow, 
there cannot be a summit? 

A. Now, we haven't said that. I 
think actions may have to be taken to 
underscore the seriousness of our pur- 
pose. But we've not decided what 
actions. A range of possibilities exists. It 
is not for me on national television to 
describe all of those options. These are 
decisions for the President. I'm not 
going to try to narrow his options here. 

But I think we've got to also 
remember that you can still have 
meetings and not be pursuing business 
as usual. You may recall at the time the 
Korean airliner went down a couple of 
years ago, some suggested that 
Secretary Shultz should not meet with 
Gromyko, then Foreign Minister. Mr. 
Shultz's decision was to meet with Mr. 
Gromyko but make this issue the center- 
piece of that discussion. And I think the 
Foreign Minister went away with no illu- 
sions as to the strength of our feelings 
about the issue. It was not business as 
usual. That issue got to the top of the 
agenda. And it obviously diverts atten- 
tion from other matters of great 
importance. 

Q. Another comparable incident 
comes to mind. Back during the Carter 
Administration, Secretary of State 
Vance was preparing to go to Moscow 
for some very important arms control 
negotiations that everybody hoped 
would lead to the summit; in fact, did 
lead to the 1979 summit; when 
Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, the dissident 
was arrested, and his persecution by 
Soviet authorities began to escalate. 

The Carter Administration and 
Mr. Vance came under a lot of 
criticism, including from many people 
who are now supporters of the Reagan 
Administration and members of the 
Reagan Administration, that Vance 
should not go to Moscow and that 
there should be some kind of boycott 
of diplomatic activity of this kind. 

The impression arises that at least 
so far this Administration is trying to 
insulate arms control from this inci- 
dent and unlink them. Is that fair? 



A. I wouldn't say entirely to insu- 
late them. I think it's unusual for Paul 
Nitze [special adviser to the President 
and the Secretary of State on arms con- 
trol matters], who's handling various 
arms control matters for us, to raise an 
issue of this kind with his counterpart. 
But, indeed, in the meetings of the last 2 
days, he raised precisely this question 
with Mr. Karpov [Ambassador Viktor P. 
Karpov, Soviet negotiator on strategic 
nuclear arms]. And the incident will 
intrude itself into all of our discussions 
with the Soviet Union if it's not properly 
resolved. 

Q. There are also some informal 
discussions planned in the Soviet 
Union later this week. A private group 
is taking some Administration offi- 
cials. Is it your view that the Adminis- 
tration officials should go ahead on 
this trip to the Soviet Union to a 
meeting in Riga that's planned if Mr. 
Daniloff is still in incarceration? 

A. We haven't made a decision on 
that matter. But I think if they do go, 
then they ought to make this issue the 
centerpiece of their discussions with the 
Soviets. And I would hope the Soviets 
would honor, in that case, the arrange- 
ments which permit them to speak 
through television to the Soviet 
populace. 

Q. Do you feel that the Russians 
are getting any of the messages that 
you've been sending this past week? 
The words have been extremely 
strong: outraged; no trade; let the 
Russians beware. Yet there is the 
appearance, at least, of business as 
usual. And they seem, with this proc- 
lamation that Daniloff will be tried, to 
be saying they can do what they like 
with impunity. 

A. I hope they've gotten the 
message. I don't know that all doors 
have been closed, although Mr. 
Gerasimov's [Soviet foreign ministry 
spokesman] statement, I think, is the 
most discouraging thing we've heard to 
date. I might say that for the Soviet 
Union to bring charges against a jour- 
nalist should not be entirely surprising. 
Because what we consider the normal 
modus operandi for an enterprising jour- 
nalist, they tend to regard as subversive. 
So I suspect they can pull a book on 
every journalist that operates there and 
bring out the charges at a moment that 
suits them. And perhaps this is what 
they have in mind. 

Q. Can we turn to terrorism? It's 
been a long, quiet summer for most of 
the world. Now we've had these two 



incidents in the last few days. What 
we know about what happened in 
Karachi in terms of who these ter- 
rorists were? 

A. We are still quite unsure about 
the nature of the organization which 
these individuals served. We expect tc 
hear the results of the Pakistani inter- 
rogation. We've not yet heard that. 
Therefore, at this point, the speculatic 
has tended to center on Abu Nidal 411 
or dissidents within the 417 organiza- 
tion. But we don't have any basis for 
making a clear judgment on that yet. 

Q. There's some confusion as to 
what the Pakistani policy was in ter 
of the commandos. Were they going 
storm the plane? Were they going to 
let the plane leave? What was our at 
tude, our policy toward this? 

A. Our policy was that these were' 
ultimately Pakistani Government calls 
We had certain advantages in this cas* 
because the incident took place in a 
friendly country which has very comp* 
tent authorities and tough-minded 
authorities. The general strategy was 
one of stretching the incident out, tirir 
the hijackers. This is usually attemptei 
The management of this incident was 
affected, as you know, by the power 
failure on the plane, which apparently 
precipitated action by the terrorists. 

We're not going to second-guess th 
Pakistani Government in this case. Wc 
thought they handled it decisively, 
resolutely, and I'm not going to questi( 
the manner in which they handled it. 

Q. Is there any reason at all to 
suspect a Libyan-Qadhafi connections 
which is an important question, giver 
the challenge to American policy and 
possible retaliation that that would 
mean? 

A. I wouldn't prejudge that. We ! 
haven't enough information as yet to 
make that determination. But obviouslj 
we're looking very closely at that, and i 
that turns out to be the case, then we'll 
face some hard issues again. ■ 



50 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



lecretary's News Briefing 
if September 12 



Secretary Sh.ultz held a news briefing 
Ithe White House on September 12, 
f6. ' 

Lholas Daniloff [U.S. News & World 
wort correspondent] was released 
fm Lefortovo Prison into custody of 
f American Charge [d'Affaires] at 
but 12:30 p.m. our time today. Mr. 
jniloff appears to be in good health 
p spirits. Soviet-UN Secretariat 
Iployee Gennadiy Zakharov has been 
flianded into the custody of the Soviet 
hbassador to the United States pend- 
f his trial on charges of espionage. 
' These actions, agreed to by the 
lited States and the Soviet Union, are 
i interim step. In taking this step, the 
B. Government had prominently in 
[fid the well being of Mr. Daniloff. 
| There can be no question of equating 
I cases of Mr. Daniloff and Zakharov. 
I. Daniloff is not a spy. He has never 
ul any connection or employment with 
I U.S. Government nor has he under- 
jen tasks on instructions any U.S. 
5/ernment agency. The continued 
liention of Mr. Daniloff on false 
i.rges is unacceptable. The United 
Sites will continue to make every effort 
secure his prompt departure from the 
I'iet Union and safe return home. 

Q. Are you telling us that we don't 
;;jw whether the Soviets intend to 
t Daniloff or whether he will be 
leased immediately to return home? 

'. A. He has been charged. He has 
fcn released to the custody of our 
prge on the understanding that, if 
fed upon to appear in court, he will do 
t That is the same understanding we 
re with Zakharov. 

Q. But isn't that equivalency then? 
Iven't we, in effect, at least for the 
rposes of getting him out of prison, 
Jen in to the Soviet demand that 
hre be equivalency between the two? 

A. There is no equivalency. We have 
1 in mind the situation of Mr. Daniloff 
It prison cell, and we think he is a lot 
Iter off with his friends and his wife 
In he is in that cell. 
I As far as Zakharov is concerned, he 
ruaranteed by the Soviet Ambassador 
me produced when called to our courts 
flenever he is needed to face charges of 
i .1 on espionage. That is the situation. 



Q. Does what you said yesterday 
still hold true, that Mr. Daniloff is a 
hostage until he leaves the Soviet 
Union? 

A. Of course. Why did they take 
him? 

Q. So he is a hostage in your eyes? 

A. That is my opinion. 

Q. You have no further promise 
from the Soviets on the fate of Mr. 
Daniloff other than that he is now in 
the embassy? 

A. What has changed is his physical 
location. That is all that has changed. 
And the reason for doing it is that we 
think, thinking of his situation, he is bet- 
ter off where he will be. 

Q. Is the United States going to do 
"business as usual"? You say that Mr. 
Daniloff is a hostage even in the 
Ambassador's residence. Will the 
United States continue to do business 
as usual with the Soviets, given the 
fact that they are holding an American 
hostage? 

A. Of course we are not doing 
business as usual. This is a difficult and 
different situation, although it is one of 
those things, in managing the U.S.- 
Soviet relationship, that is in a sense 
predictable. Their society is so different, 
it works on such different bases, that 
they do things from time to time like this 
that are just plain outrageous. And we 
have to register that fact and do it 
strongly, as we have been doing and as 
we will continue to do. And the fact that 
his location has changed in no way 
changes the unacceptability of the fact 
that he is being held on false charges. 

Q. But are you going to go ahead 
with all the meetings? Are you going 
to go ahead with your meeting with 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next 
week and all the other U.S. -Soviet — 

A. These meetings are scheduled; 
there hasn't been any change in that 
schedule; and, assuming this issue is not 
resolved satisfactorily by then, you can 
be sure that as far as we are concerned, 
as far as the President is concerned, in 
every meeting that we have the Daniloff 
case and, for that matter, other concerns 
of ours about human rights problems will 
be prominently in the picture. We feel 
that it is important to keep registering 
our point of view, not to walk away and 
stop talking about it. 



Q. Can you please explain why this 
interim step, anyway, is not a trade? 

A. This is an arrangement that we 
made with the Soviet Union obviously, 
as I said in my statement. It is a step 
that we have agreed to because we feel 
for Mr. Daniloff, and we think that he is 
better off where he is going to be than 
where he has been. However, the basic 
stituation has not changed, so there 
hasn't been any fundamental restructur- 
ing of it. 

Q. On a trade, is it still our posi- 
tion that there will be no trade 
ultimately? 

A. That is our position. These two 
people, Zakharov and Daniloff, are in no 
way comparable, and we are not going 
to trade them off against each other. 

Q. What effect has this had on 
U.S. -Soviet relations? Is it damaging 
the chances for a summit this year? 

A. Of course it damages the rela- 
tionship, and of course it damages the 
ability to move forward on other things. 
That doesn't change the fact, however, 
that there are possible things that would 
be in the interest of the United States to 
bring about, and if we can bring them 
about obviously it is in our interest to do 
so. But things like this shift the tone, 
shift the ability, to work problems out, 
without a doubt. That's just a fact of life. 

Q. How confident are you that 
you'll be able to proceed from this 
interim step to some kind of final 
arrangement that would get Mr. 
Daniloff out of the Soviet Union? 

A. I don't want to engage in predic- 
tions and forecasts. This step has been 
worked out, and we continue in our 
discussions with the Soviet Union, and 
when we have something to announce, 
we'll announce it 

Q. What does this mean now for 
the official delegates to the Chautau- 
qua Conference, to people within this 
Administration? Will they go to Riga? 

A. Chautauqua is a private organiza- 
tion, an outstanding one, I believe. It's 
done wonderful work and John Wallach 
has done a great job of organizing it. 
And basically, it's for a private organiza- 
tion to decide whatever they want to 
decide under the circumstances. And 
when they have been in the State 
Department, they have been thoroughly 
briefed on our views. As far as U.S. 
officials are concerned, of course, some 
have taken a position that they drop out, 
such as General Rowny [Ambassador 
Edward L. Rowny, special adviser to the 



Member 1986 



51 



EUROPE 



President and the Secretary of State on 
arms control matters]. 

On the other hand, if the 
Chautauqua group decides to go ahead, 
as far as we're concerned there, go 
ahead. And I think what you will find 
is— and you can argue this one way or 
another but a very strong argument in 
favor— is that you want to go and you 
want to say your piece. So that insofar 
as you can get it known, in the Soviet 
Union and, for that matter, anybody else 
who covers a meeting like that, just 
what our point of view is, and why we 
consider this so outrageous and damag- 
ing. We take opportunities to do that. 

Q. What do you say to Henry 
Kissinger and others who have said 
the Administration has been much too 
soft on this and has not taken a harder 
line, is too eager for a summit and too 
willing to compromise with the 
Soviets? 

A. I'm not interested in debates 
with people on those subjects. The 
arrangement here is in response to the 
fact that Daniloff was detained in jail 
under circumstances that are not very 
good, and we think that it is better all 
around to get this unjustly charged 
individual into a more congenial environ- 
ment while this process unfolds. And so 
the only thing that has changed is the 
location of these two people. 

Q. How was it arranged? Did the 
President and Gorbachev get together 
on this? 

A. This was arranged basically 
through diplomatic contacts, and there 
have been messages of various kinds. 
I'm not going to go into the detail of it. 

Q. Is it your feeling that Mr. 
Zakharov should have been denied bail 
in the first instance he was brought 
into court? Do you think the United 
States perhaps made a mistake in its 
handling of that, which triggered the 
Soviet retaliation against Daniloff? 

A. No, I don't think there's been 
any mishandling. The point is that 
Zakharov was caught spying. He is a 
spy. And he's been charged, and we have 
the evidence. And so there's that. As far 
as Mr. Daniloff is concerned, he is not a 
spy. He was set up. 

Q. Do you rule out trading Mr. 
Zakharov with someone other than Mr. 
Daniloff? 

A. I'm not going to get into discus- 
sions of this, that, and the other thing. 
Our position is very clear on this, and 
that's where I'm going to leave it. 



Q. Did you approve the Zakharov 
position in advance — did you and the 
President approve the decision to 
arrest and imprison Mr. Zakharov 
rather than to oust him, in advance? 

A. The details of what the FBI does 
in the arrest of a particular individual is 
typically not ratcheted through— every 
time they do something— the entire 
hierarchy of the government. The fact of 
the matter is that our policy is well- 
established; that if we catch somebody 
spying, we apprehend him and act on it. 

Q. So there was nothing wrong 
with that decision then? 

A. There's nothing wrong with 
arresting a man that you catch spying, 
and I'm surprised that you even suggest 
there might be. 

Q. But did you approve it? That's 
just a statement— a question. 

A. I don't personally go around 
approving or not approving every deci- 
sion the FBI makes. They know per- 
fectly well that if they catch somebody 
spying and they arrest them, that's fine, 
that's good. I wish there were fewer peo- 
ple to get caught spying. 

Q. In this case when U.S. -Soviet 
relations were on the block, wasn't it 
important enough to be approved at 
the highest levels? 

A. No. It's important that we con- 
duct our business in a strong way, piece 
by piece, and if somebody is spying and 
caught spying, he's going to be appre- 



hended whether it's good for the sum I 
or not good for the summit. That's nc 
relevant. We have to carry these thin 
on that way. 

Q. In previous cases like this, 
there were an asymmetry in favor o: 
the United States, that is we got m« 
than the person who was grabbed o: 
set up by the Soviet Union. In this 
case, isn't this setting a new preced 
as far as a deal or an exchange or 
whatever is concerned? 

A. This is not an outcome really. 
This is only a change in the location o 
these two individuals, and from our 
standpoint, I think— I don't want to tt 
to compare U.S. jails and Soviet jails, 
but if I were Mr. Daniloff I'd certainb 
want to be in an apartment in the 
embassy and not in jail. I might say tl 
before this arrangement was con- 
sumated, it was discussed with Mr. 
Daniloff because, obviously, he's 
involved and it was not undertaken 
without his assent. 

Q. Were there private understai 
ings with the Soviets? 

A. I might say if you want to get 
graphic and very clearly, concisely 
stated statement of what it's like to b< 
under investigation in the Soviet Unio 
you ought to read the short statement 
Anne Garrels that was in The New Yo- 
Times this morning. I thought it was i 
very pithy statement of the problem. 



^ress release 175. 



Deputy Secretary Whitehead's 
Interview on "Face the Nation" 



Deputy Secretary John C. Whitehead 
was interviewed on CBS-TV's "Face the 
Nation" on September 14, 1986, by Leslie 
Stahl. 

Q. I know the two sides are 
negotiating, trying to get some resolu- 
tion for the Daniloff situation. Any 
breakthroughs? 

A. No breakthroughs this morning. 
We continue to work at it, there are 
negotiations going on, we are continuing 
to insist that Daniloff be set free; he is 
not yet free. 

Q. Are we asking that he be 
released along with one other person 
in exchange for Mr. Zakharov so that 
it's a one-for-two instead of a 
one-for-one? 



A. I can't comment on the details 
the negotiations, I'm sure you under- I 
stand that. Our position is there will b(| 
no swap, no trade of releasing Daniloff | 
and releasing Zakharov. Zakharov is a f 
spy; he was caught red-handed in New , 
York, and he will be tried. 

Q. He will be tried? 

A. He will be tried. 

Q. No matter what? 

A. As of this moment, he will be 
tried. Daniloff is innocent, he was 
entrapped, he was set up, and he must 
be freed. 

I 

Q. When you say he will be tried, | 

is there any give there, if they did 
release someone else, for example? 



52 



Department of State Bullet" 



EUROPE 



I A. He's been arrested, he's been 
pcted. Our court system requires that 
jbe brought to trial, a fair trial under 
system. And if he's tried, he will be 
itenced. 

Q. And then maybe released. Let 
i ask you if in these negotiations we 
t getting an impression that the 
Iviets really do want to resolve this, 
re we getting the impression that 
y really want to escalate this and 
(haps want to break off the plans 
the summit? 

A. I'm not sure. We really can't tell 
I the Soviets' objectives are. They 
, however, willing to discuss the sub- 
I, willing to discuss the release. They 
re said that they want to get it set- 
In, and we are assuming that they 
Ban it. We want to get it settled, we 
lit to get it behind us. But we don't 
lit to get it behind us unless we can 
Sieve our principles. 

Q. If something doesn't break in 
Is situation by Friday, when 
Ifretary Shultz and Foreign Minister 
liivardnadze meet, can the two of 
lm discuss anything else? 

A. You can be sure if Daniloff is not 
[]' by the time that meeting begins, 
Ijt this subject will be very high on the 
Inda. 

Q. Is there anything else to 
huss if this isn't resolved? 

.1 A. We can only discuss this so far. 
fihey refuse to set him free, the world 
1st go on. This is an important issue, 
1, of course, it's not the only issue. We 
'i only gain by discussion. If we fer- 
rate all discussions with the Soviet 
Ron, then we cannot make progress on 
I case or on anything else. So I think 
c tendency is to want to continue 
Hussions and to emphasize this case, 
lag with all the other atrocious cases 
deprivation of human freedom that 
k Soviets are responsible for. This is 
I more example of their lack of will- 
kpess to consider our principles and 
i] strong dedication to human 
rfedoms. 

Q. Did we, our side, make a big 
1 take in arresting Mr. Zakharov? 
t*r all, we had him under surveil- 
Ijce for 3 years. The information that 
twas picked up paying for was 
ihted by the FBI — I mean, we knew 
irit he was getting. Why in the world 
I we choose to arrest a spy 2 weeks 
*Dre this meeting between Shultz 
» Shevardnadze, as the presummit 
ifrotiations were under way? Every 
iie we have ever arrested anyone at 



the United Nations in this situation, 
the Soviets have always gone and 
created a framed-up situation on their 
side. Why did we do it now? 

A. There was nothing planned, 
nothing strategic about the timing. 

Q. Was it a mistake? 

A. No, I think it was the right thing 
to do. When the time comes that we can 
catch a Soviet spy— catch him red- 
handed—that's the time to act; that's the 
job of the FBI. To let a Soviet spy stay 
on the loose for another day or another 
week because some important meeting 
with the Soviets is coming up does not 
seem at all like the right thing to do. I 
think we did the right thing. The FBI 
acted in accordance with their 
instructions. 

Q. But why now, why then? We 
have known about him for 3 years. 
Why then? 

A. Because he was caught red- 
handed, because he had been spying on 
us. And the time to arrest him is when 
you can catch him. And we did so. 

Q. So you are not willing to admit 
that there was some mistake? 

A. No, there was no mistake. 

Q. No mistake. Why did the Presi- 
dent urge the Americans to go to the 
town meeting in the Soviet Union? If 
he had said not to go, it would have 
sent a signal: no business as usual — 
but it wouldn't have disrupted neces- 
sarily — would it have disrupted the 
presummit planning? 

A. You are speaking of the Chautau- 
qua Conference that begins this 
weekend. The President didn't urge peo- 
ple to go. He said that he would not urge 
them to stay home or to go, that they 
were free to go. This is a private con- 
ference, not a government conference. 
Some are not going, but most have gone. 

Q. Some are saying that they got a 
phone call from the White House say- 
ing the President would like you to go. 

A. I haven't heard that. I think that 
there is an opportunity for those who 
have gone to use the occasion as a place 
to set forth what we believe is the right 
thing to do about Daniloff and about 
human freedoms in general and that it's 
a platform for us right within the Soviet 
Union to talk about our beliefs on this. 
There are others who feel that the action 
is so abhorrent to us that they don't 
want to go. And the policy of the 
government has been that each person 
should decide for themself. 



Q. Let me ask you to answer the 
criticism that's coming mainly from 
conservatives, but from other quarters 
as well. That is that the President 
caved in, that he is now too hungry for 
a summit, and that he has agreed to 
what looks like a swap and this 
release so far, and they sent or in some 
way signaled that he wanted this town 
meeting to go on and that he just isn't 
being tough enough. 

A. That would be a most unfair con- 
clusion. The President certainly did not 
cave in. The President has been and con- 
tinues to be very tough on this issue. The 
release, the mutual release of the two 
prisoners into the hands of their 
embassies was a humanitarian step. You 
saw Nick Daniloff on television a few 
minutes ago and you saw him say how 
pleased and joyous he was to be out of 
the awful conditions that he was sub- 
jected to, an 8-by-10 cell, a cellmate who 
probably himself was a KGB agent, in- 
terrogated 4 hours a day— terrible condi- 
tions. And in a humanitarian decision, 
the President released him as well as our 
prisoner, who was imprisoned in a much 
more comfortable jail in New York. I 
believe we gained from that exchange. 

But this was only an interim step, 
and there will be more steps to come, 
and those steps will not be equivalents, 
and there will be no swap on a one-for- 
one basis of these two men. 

Q. Was there concern about Nick 
Daniloff's psychological condition? 

A. I think there was concern that 
the pressure of being jailed like that, the 
pressure of that kind of interrogation, 
the pressure of living in close quarters 
with somebody who was spying on you 
every moment, might eventually get to 
him. I think none of us can be sure as to 
just how we would react under similar 
circumstances. And that it was a 
humanitarian necessity to get him out of 
there. 

Q. Another incident is out there 
ready to become an issue, and that is 
the UN Soviet mission. We have 
ordered the Soviets to reduce the 
number of their people at their mis- 
sions by one-third, but the Soviet 
Ambassador at the United Nations 
says they are not going to do that; 
we've ordered it, they are not going to 
do that. Is this now going to con- 
tribute to the increase in tension? 

A. The size of their mission to the 
United States is far beyond that 
necessary to perform their function at 
the United Nations. Many of their peo- 
ple, including Zakharov, are used to spy 



/ember 1986 



53 



EUROPE 



in the United States, and we have 
ordered them to reduce the size of their 
mission, and they will do so. 

Q. Are you sure? He says — 

A. We will insist that they do so. 

Q. Could this become a big 
controversy? 

A. I suppose it could, but we are 
right, and when we are right, we must 
stick to our principles. 

Q. Do you think that there will be 
a Reagan-Gorbachev summit this year? 

A. I continue to be optimistic. I 
think that the Soviets need a summit, 



want a summit, and we would like to 
have a summit. But we are not ready to 
pay for a summit. The world will be bet- 
ter off if there is a summit and if these 
two leaders can talk with each other. 
But whether there is or is not a summit 
will not be the end of the world, if there 
is not. We hope there will be, but we are 
not ready to pay for one. 

Q. Do the Soviets want it more 
than we want it? 

A. I think it is possibly more to their 
advantage than it is to us. I think 
possibly they need it more than we need 
it. But it remains to be seen. ■ 



Secretary's News Briefing 
of September 20 



Secretary Shultz 's news briefing 
following his meeting with Soviet 
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze 
on September 20, 1986. 1 

Foreign Minister [Eduard] Shevardnadze 
and I have concluded 2 days of serious, 
substantive talks that have included 
around an hour session with the Presi- 
dent. Altogether between us, we have 
spent around 14 hours together in 
various ways, and we covered a full 
agenda. 

These 2 days have indicated that 
considerable potential for progress 
exists, but the cloud that hangs over all 
this is the fact that [U.S. News & World 
Report correspondent] Nicholas Daniloff 
is not free to leave the Soviet Union. 
That issue was at the top of our agenda 
throughout these meetings. Other 
human rights issues also received full 
attention. The case of Nicholas Daniloff 
must be brought to a satisfactory resolu- 
tion quickly if the potential that exists is 
to be realized. 

I said that our full agenda was 
covered; and, as I have just said, there 
was extensive discussion, mostly in 
direct discussions between Minister 
Shevardnadze and me, in the general 
area of human rights. We had a fair 
amount of time devoted to regional 
issues in general terms and one or two 
specific areas. We reviewed briefly our 
bilateral relations, and the work pro- 
gram and arrangements for moving it 
forward were reviewed, and that seems 
to be in order. 



On arms control, we in the United 
States see the potential for progress in 
reducing strategic, perhaps especially 
intermediate nuclear, forces and in some 
other subjects, such as nuclear risk 
reduction centers and chemical weapons, 
particularly on the problem of prolifera- 
tion of chemical weapons. We made clear 
our interest in realistic progress on 
nuclear testing, and we each were in 
touch with our negotiators in Stockholm, 
wanting to see a successful conclusion of 
that negotiation on terms that are 
sensible. 

If there are any questions, I will be 
glad to answer. 

Q. If this cloud of the Daniloff 
case continues to hang over the rela- 
tions between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, can there be a sum- 
mit? Can there be further preparations 
for a summit? 

A. There certainly can be prepara- 
tions, and we spent a great deal of time 
in discussing the substance of issues that 
need to be worked out and worked up to 
make a summit meeting a successful 
meeting. At the same time, I think it is 
difficult to think of a fruitful summit 
without these cases being resolved 
because they are going to wind up con- 
suming great blocks of the time. So I 
believe it is of urgent importance to 
resolve these cases, not just because of 
the summit but because of the 
humanitarian concern involved. 

Q. Can I follow that up? Do we — 
do I infer correctly that the United 
States, for all its emphasis on this 



issue, made no real progress in 
convincing the Soviet Union of the 
importance to which we attach it? 

A. I think they see the importanc 
that we attach to it; and, of course, W' 
did spend, the Minister and I, a very 
large amount of time talking about it. 
I'm sorry to say we weren't able to 
resolve it, but I think we certainly 
explored it in detail; and I hope that ' 
will be able to resolve it as not too mu 
time passes because it is extraordinar 
important. But the fact of the matter 
it remains— Nick Daniloff remains in t 
Soviet Union unable to leave. 

Q. Do you believe that you made J 
enough progress on arms control an i 
other issues at these meetings so th; 
if the Daniloff case is resolved, you 
would then be able to set a date for 
summit? 

A. There was real progress made 
and I think there is the potential for 
good work in Geneva. Of course, we 
were well coordinated with our Genev 
negotiators, and they are fully informi 
practically as we go along, on what is 
said here. 

So there are possibilities. As you 
have all heard me say many times, yoi I 
don't have an agreement until you hav • 
an agreement. I'm not too big on talki 
about the amount of progress, but the! ' 
are quite a few items that seemed to b 
insoluble a year ago that are working 
themselves out— or 6 months ago, that 
are working themselves out. So I think ' 
those things can be pointed to. 

I believe that a meeting ought to 1 
a well-prepared meeting, and it ought t 
have some significant results to it. The I 
President has always said that, and we 
continue to work to bring that about. 

Q. Two questions: One, did you |> 
agree with Mr. Shevardnadze on a 
timeframe for a followup meeting 
between the two of you to discuss 
preparations for the summit? And 
secondly, can you give us at least soBj 
characterization of Mr. [Mikhail] 
Gorbachev's letter which we were tol. 
deals extensively on arms control. Is 
that a basis for your saying that then, 
has beeen real progress made in that , 
field? 

A. First of all, we didn't discuss a 
timeframe for some further work on ou 
part, but we have put in place now a 
pretty wide-ranging set of arrangement I 
for discussing practically any subject yo' 
can think of that the two countries are 
involved in, and these groups have been I 
quite active. Of course, some are set up I 
as negotiating groups, such as those 



54 



Department of State Bulleth 



EUROPE 



gotiating in Geneva; and those go 
;.vard and, I think, will have been 
iSrgized by the meetings that took 
Je this summer and also by some of 
lathings that were contained in Mr. 
Ibachev's letter and which we dis- 
ced in our meetings here in 
rshington. 

I So I think what we see is a process 
U continues to move along, but I don't 
fc anything for you on the question of 
leframe. 

iQ. Is it conceivable to you that 
i thing could happen that could 
fik the ice so that a summit could be 
?1 still this year, or is the time 
lied when that will be possible? 

A. I don't think the time has passed 
|n that's possible, but I do think it's 
< ntial to get the Daniloff case 
Jived. I would like to see myself some 
fcrtant motion on other human rights 
les— and we discussed them in 
lil— such as emigration and some of 
internal problems. But at any rate, I 
jk that the Daniloff case hangs over 
i and we need to work hard to 
jive it, and are. 

Q. Shevardnadze has just said at 
nress conference basically that the 
a ed States is — someone in the 
r ed States has tried maliciously to 
4k progress. He talks about the 
led Nations and Daniloff. He seems 
j2 taking equally as hard a position 
>1 as he did before the meeting. 

Can you tell us anything about the 
aussions with the Soviets on both 
«e issues, and was any progress at 
luade? 

B\.. It's hard to think that progress is 
je as long as he is there and is not 
Ito leave. We discussed, in a 
nghtforward and rational way, all of 
3ns and outs of various aspects of 
Kase. 

pur action in expelling 25 Soviets 
ft the UN Mission is an unrelated 
in. We did discuss that, and I 
pined the basis for it. He argued 
i it, but nevertheless we discussed 
1 So we discussed all aspects of this 
I And, as I've said, we have not been 
Ito resolve it, but we will keep work- 
!>n it. 

[}. I have a follow up. He suggests 
Se will be retaliation if the 25 are 
filed. Did he tell you what that 
: ialion might be? 
JL No. I don't know what actions 
ill take; but I do know this, that the 
tdent's powder is dry. 




Secretary Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze at the Department of State. 



Q. Could I ask you to expand a bit 
on your statement that a series of 
arrangements have been made for fur- 
thering progress on arms control and 
other issues? Do you expect the work- 
ing groups that worked in August, 
leading for this meeting, to continue 
at that sort of level? Would you expect 
to go to the Soviet Union for further 
talks? Would you expect to have a 
meeting next week or the week after 
with Shevardnadze in New York? Can 
you be any more specific about those 
arrangements, setting aside for a 
moment what you've obviously made 
plain, which is that no conclusions 
could be reached given the hanging of 
the Daniloff case at the moment? 

A. As far as the nuclear and space 
talks are concerned, most of the people 
who met this summer about that are 
meeting in Geneva. It may or may not be 
useful; there's no particular plan for 
reconvening the somewhat enlarged 
group which, from our standpoint, 
means that the Geneva team and, in 
some respects, the Washington team 
that are working most directly on these 
things, met together with Soviet 
counterparts. It may be that that will be 
useful at some point, but there's no plan 
for it. 

The negotiations, obviously, are 
going forward. The round has just 
started. And I think, given the amount 
of preparations and the effort put into it, 
perhaps the rounds will start relatively 
fast. 



In general characterization of these 
rounds is that they start off, and there is 
a kind of leisurely pace and sparring 
around and taking positions that have 
long since been abandoned, but never- 
theless, put back on the table, and so on. 
And you get about to the last week or so 
of the negotiation, and things really 
start to move. And our effort, 
deliberately and by design, with the 
Soviet Union has been to say, let us get 
these talks to start with the kind of pace 
that they often get in the last week or 
so, so that the full amount of time can be 
devoted a more genuine kind of negotia- 
tions. And that's what we're trying to 
see. 

Of course, the Stockholm confer- 
ence, we'll know before long, what out- 
come, if any, there is there. We do have 
in place understood arrangements for 
handling our bilateral relations, and 
we've had a continuing round of discus- 
sions and now one at the under secretary 
level on an overall basis on regional 
issues. 

So all of these things are, I think, 
under good control organizationally. 
That's not the problem. 

Q. No involvement for you, 
thought at this point, as part of those 
arrangements, as far as direct 
meetings are concerned? 

A. I keep track and so does Mr. 
Shevardnadze. I think that if it seems 
worthwhile to have a meeting, we can 
easily arrange one. 



:ember 1986 



55 



EUROPE 



Q. Where? In New York? 

A. I might say that we have, on a 
personal level, I think a very good 
capacity to communicate. So we both 
work to have that on a straightforward 
basis. 

Q. Is that a possibility — that there 
will be a New York meeting between 
you two? 

A. It's a possibility, but there is no 
plan for it. But, certainly, if there is 
anything important to talk about, I'm 
ready to talk about it. I'm sure he is. 

Q. Did Mr. Shevardnadze exhibit 
to you what you regard as a sincere 
interest in trying to find a way out of 
the Daniloff affair? 

A. I don't like the business of 
"somebody's sincere, he isn't sincere," 
or something. You have to look at the 
content. We didn't get that far on the 
content, although we did have a real 
exchange on it. I don't have any doubt in 
my mind that Mr. Shevardnadze has 
approached our discussions in a good- 
faith way, and I've tried to do likewise 
with him. 

Q. Did he indicate to you any flex- 
ibility on the Soviet position the 
slightest bit? 

A. I'm not going to try to 
characterize the ins and outs of our 
discussion of this. I think it's better that 
way. What I can say is that all aspects of 
this and possible ways of getting at it 
were talked about by me, by him, in one 
way or another; and we haven't resolved 
the matter but it is very much under 
continuing review. 

Certainly I hope, and I believe he 
hopes, that we will be able to do so 
because it is a cloud that hangs over 
this and there are potential opportunities 
here. It is very difficult to realize on 
them until we can get this out of the 
way. That's the fact of the matter. 

Q. When you were answering Jim 
Anderson's questions about the effect 
of the Daniloff case on the possibility 
of a summit, you said it would be 
difficult to consider going ahead while 
these cases were pending. Could you 
say what other case or cases you had 
in mind? 

A. I'm talking about the Daniloff 
case. 

Q. And only the Daniloff case? 

A. That is the principal problem. 
From their standpoint, they have [Soviet 
UN employee, Gennadiy F.] Zakharov. 
We think that's a totally different propo- 
sition, and there are various other issues 



involved here. But, at any rate, from our 
standpoint, it's the Daniloff case. 

What I've said was, it is hard for me 
to think of a genuinely fruitful summit 
meeting under these circumstances 
because so much of the time, and the 
preoccupation, will be consumed by this 
case and understandably so. So I think 
we should get it resolved. 

Q. You and Mr. Shevardnadze 
have in past meetings like this agreed 
on a set of adjectives which you use to 
describe your encounter. You've not 
done that this time, but can you tell us 
what adjectives you would apply to 
this 2 days of meetings? 

A. In terms of the substance of the 
matters discussed in our plenary ses- 
sions, where we were talking about the 
types of subjects we generally wrestle 
with, they were serious, they were con- 
structive, they were positive, and 
conducted in a straightforward way. I 
think I would, in other words, apply 
"plus" type adjectives to it. 

As far as the Daniloff case and other 
aspects of our human rights discussions 
are concerned, certainly they were direct 
and serious discussions, and I unfor- 
tunately have to report that we weren't 
able to resolve the issue. 

Q. In the 14 hours that you spent 
with Mr. Shevardnadze, approximately 
how much of the time did you spend 
discussing Daniloff? And, also, of the 
individual face-to-face talks, was that 
primarily devoted to Daniloff? 

A. He requested a private meeting 
at the beginning, and I was glad to 
accede to that, because if he hadn't 
requested it, I think I would have. But 
he wanted, first of all, to tell me that he 
had a letter to deliver from Mr. 
Gorbachev to the President, and he gave 
me some indication of the content of the 
letter without going into full detail. 

And then, however, we spent the 
bulk of our time in private meetings, and 
I think that all of the time in the first 
batch that was allocated in the morning 
was spent on— virtually on this question, 
and with the President, of course, he 
delivered the letter and explained a little 
of its contents. But the President, I 
think— I was there, and so I saw the 
President's depth of conviction and con- 
cern about this case was very evident. 
And from a comment that Mr. 
Shevardnadze made to me later on, it's 
clear that he could readily see how 
strongly the President felt about it. So 
there's no doubt about their knowledge 
of how we feel. 



Q. On that point, did you detect 
surprise or miscalculation on the pa' 
of Mr. Shevardnadze as to the deptl 
the American reaction and feeling o 
this case that the U.S. would stop 
progress or movement on other issu 
because of it? 

A. We discussed the issue on its 
merits, at least as I saw it, and he 
responded. We didn't— I don't think t 
they take the position now that we 
should regard this as inconsequential I 
and forget about it. Nobody is arguinj ' 
that, and certainly it wouldn't be wor 
while. It's not worth the time to talk 
that way. It's clearly a matter of gem i! 
importance to us, and we have to get " 
resolved, and it's easy enough to reso 
Let him out. 

Q. If you didn't have the Danilo ' 
case, do you think we'd have — we'd I 
talking here about a set date for th< ' 
summit, or are there other issues th 
would have held that up by now? 

A. I, of course, can't speak for th 
Soviet Union on that, but from the 
standpoint of the United States, as yc i 
know, we have been prepared to recei ( 
Mr. Gorbachev. I do think that there ; ( 
some very promising opportunities he < 
and so we would like to capitalize on , 
them. But I'm not— whether the Sovit 
Union is prepared to set a date— I can , 
say that. I don't know that 

Q. Conversely, you are not 
prepared to welcome Mr. Gorbachev 
this point? Are you saying that then 
cannot be a summit date set until Mi 
Daniloff is released? 

A. I'll just repeat what I said. Thj|, 
we should get this case resolved, first ( 
and foremost, out of our humanitarian L 
concern for a fellow American who's 
being held against his will in the Sovie . 
Union. And, beyond that, that it is har 
to imagine a fruitful summit meeting 
while the case is unresolved, because il 
going to take up a large portion of the 
time and be a preoccupation in the tim 
when it isn't being directly discussed. • 
it ought to be resolved, and it can be 
resolved. 

Q. Could you tell us whether 
among the issues you made progress 
on was the question of strategic 
defense and whether there should be 
an amendment to the ABM (Anti- 
ballistic Missile) Treaty? 

A. We discussed the subject of 
strategic defense at considerable lengtl 
and I can't say that we had anything to 
say to each other that genuinely seemei 
to narrow the issues. But I felt, myself, 
that the quality of the discourse was 



56 



Department of State Bullet 1 



EUROPE 



tiewhat more penetrating and better, 
1 we really engaged with the subject. 

So maybe that's a little bit of head- 
•[, but I would not have— and if I had 
order of probability of something 
t's likely to be jelled soon, that would 

be high on my list. But I think the 
;ussion in greater depth of the 
;nse/defense relationship and the 
aning of the President's proposal— 
ybe it's just that we explained it so 
efully, we thought we were being per- 
sive, but the genuine meaning of the 
jsident's proposal and what it's really 

lUt. 

I believe they listened very carefully 
t. I'll just put it that way. 

! Q. Did Mr. Shevardnadze at any 
)e during the 2 days of discussions 
,ver from his government's insist- 
ie that the Daniloff and Zakharov 
:!es be treated on an equal basis? 
j A. We felt that they were distinc- 
fe; not related. 

Q. Would you explain that? 

A. That is, his view is that— well, 
■ not going to state his side of the 
k. He's talking to the press and can 
(that. But from our standpoint, 
piloff is a hostage and is not a spy. He 
I not been a person employed by the 
f>. Government or taking instructions 
m the U.S. Government or in some 
nner engaging in a process of 
■ionage on behalf of the U.S. Govern- 
pt, as he has been accused of being, 
i. so we believe he is innocent of that 
•rge. 

Q. How close are the two sides on 
i agreement on INF [intermediate- 
!ge nuclear forces] and was any 
rgress made? 

I A. I think there was some progress 
ide in INF, and that's perhaps one of 
i promising areas, and that's my opin- 
», and I think if you ask that question 
Mr. Shevardnadze, he'll probably say 
It's his opinion. At least that's what 
itold me. 



Secretary's News Conference 
of September 25 



'Press release 186. 



Secretary Shultz 's news conference 
with American journalists at the UN 
Plaza Hotel in New York on September 
25. 1986. 1 

Q. Could you give us an assessment, 
please, of the efforts to reach an 
agreement on [U.S. News & World 
Report correspondent Nicholas] 
Daniloff? 

A. I don't want to get into that in 
any detail. It's under discussion. I've 
had, as you know, a couple of meetings 
with Mr. Shevardnadze [Soviet Foreign 
Minister] here in New York. And just 
where this will go, I don't know, and I 
don't think it particularly helps for me to 
speculate about it or give any detailed 
accounting about it right now. 

Q. Are you going to meet him 
again before you leave tomorrow 
morning? 

A. I don't want to discuss what kind 
of structured meetings might take place 
or what might be possible. I'm planning 
to leave tomorrow morning, as you 
know, and go back to Washington and be 
back here Sunday. As I understand it, 
he- 

Q. The Soviet spokesman— 

A. —he leaves the United States on 
Tuesday some time. 

Q. Do you feel the pressure of any 
deadline because of that? 

A. Obviously, it's desirable to get 
this matter settled as soon as possible, if 
we can settle it on the right basis. At the 
same time, I think we have to be 
prepared for the fact that that may not 
be possible. So we want to work hard to 
try to get it settled, but we have to 
remember that it needs to be settled 
properly. 

Q. Do you see this Tuesday as sort 
of a deadline here, or a deadline? 

A. There are many ways for us to 
talk to the Soviet Union. We have good 
capacity to communicate. That's never 
been a problem. But I think Mr. 
Shevardnadze and I have both worked at 
having a good personal capability of talk- 
ing directly with each other so it's cer- 
tainly useful to try to do it while he's 
here, and I hope it can be done. But I 
don't think it's good to sort of put 
yourself up against a deadline that just 
happens to reflect travel schedules. 



Q. But you're not really — 

A. But at the same time we try to 
work it out. 

Q. You're not ruling out another 
meeting perhaps Sunday, Monday, or 
Tuesday here in New York? 

A. I would imagine that we'll have 
another meeting at some point, cer- 
tainly. I would hope so. 

Q. Another meeting is necessary 
at this point before you can arrive at a 
settlement? 

A. The matter is not settled. So 
that's the situation. 

Q. Can you tell us a little bit about 
Shevardnadze in the continuum of hav- 
ing met him initially and how he has or 
has not grown in the position; how you 
communicate with him? You called him 
"my friend" in past occasions. You 
haven't been doing that in this par- 
ticular round of things. How are the 
two of you? 

A. I think on a personal level we 
have a friendly relationship, and we 
want to keep it that way. My wife has 
developed a friendship with his wife. We 
treat them in a courteous way, and I 
think that's the right way to go about it. 

It has seemed to me from the begin- 
ning that it's not that he grows up; he's 
a grown person. After all, he became the 
head person in the state of Georgia 
which is a state of great importance in 
the Soviet Union, and so he's a person of 
talent and ability to prove it. He's under- 
taking this assignment and seems to 
handle it well, as far as I can see. 

Q. Mr. Gerasimov [Soviet Foreign 
Ministry spokesman] told us earlier 
that the Soviets are asking to recon- 
sider your order to expel the 25 
Soviets. Is this a matter that can be 
reconsidered? 

A. It's something that has been 
done and there it stands. We don't have 
any plan to change that. 

Q. Is it tangling your already 
difficult talks on the Daniloff case, or 
are you able to keep it separate? Or 
are they trying to tangle it with it? 

A. I don't think it's a good thing to 
get into sort of the insides of the discus- 
sion. I'm perfectly glad to say, yes, 
we've had discussions, and so on. But as 
to the nature of them, I think that's 
something that I prefer to keep private. 



/ember 1986 



57 



EUROPE 



Q. Can you tell us whether the 
Soviet Foreign Minister, in this case, 
is following the format of a previous 
occupant of his position of negotia- 
tions of this type? Do you end up 
reading positions? Do you end up with 
a more give-and-take on a matter as 
narrow as this Daniloff affair? 

A. In my meetings with Mr. 
Shevardnadze, I'd say that they're very 
conversational in a sense that we go 
back and forth in our discussion, and it 
depends somewhat on what's being 
discussed and the desirability at the 
moment of trying to be very careful and 
precise about something. 

And if you want to state some posi- 
tion about some matter, whatever it is, 
and you want to do it with precision and 
clarity, it's usually a good idea to have a 
piece of paper and go through it. So he 
does that sometimes, and I do that 
sometimes. But we have a good conver- 
sational tone in our relationship. 

Q. Did he ever get angry during 
the rather blunt talks that you and the 
President had with him over this case? 

A. You have to ask him about that. 

Q. Did he exhibit any? 

A. He has good self-control, and I 
don't know his— I'm not going to try to 
read anything into that. 

Q. Has he been flexible at all on 
this issue? Has he demonstrated any 
flexibility? 

A. You want to try to get inside this 
shell that I've constructed in various 
ways, and I'm not going to let you do it. 
[Laughter.] 

Q. You haven't been standing on 
street corners for 3 days. [Laughter.] 

Q. I really don't want to ask you 
about his table manners. I want to ask 
you about the Soviet statement. There 
are three bumpy bumps in the road to a 
settlement. They say Daniloff, 
[Gennadiy] Zakharov, and the UN 
order — they don't, of course, like the 
word "order" because they say you 
can't order us about— and they say 
there might be a fourth one, this order 
which they don't want to call an 
"order." If it's not rescinded, they're 
going to retaliate. 

From your perspective, how many 
bumps, how many of these four items, 
or perhaps others, are now bumps in 
the road to a summit? Because, after 
all, the summit is what possibly 
transcends all these events. 

A. I don't necessarily subscribe to 
that. I think that— what are these 
meetings for? They are for discussing 



the full range of issues of interest to 
both sides. We have a broad agenda and 
so do they and so questions involving 
humanitarian and human issues are part 
of that agenda. 

Now, as far as a summit is con- 
cerned, we're in the same position we've 
been in for some time. The President has 
issued an invitation, and we'd like to see 
it take place. We think there are impor- 
tant matters to discuss. On some of 
these matters, there seems to have been 
some motion in recent months. 

On the other hand, I believe it is 
true. And perhaps what you're quoting 
is— which I haven't seen— but they're 
saying the same thing, that in the cir- 
cumstances where we are now it's hard 
to imagine a fruitful summit because the 
whole thing would be dominated by 
discussion of this question. 

Q. Do you have any specific — do 
you have any plans tonight for dinner? 
Or what are you planning to do this 
evening? 

Q. Do you want us to follow you 
around or not? 

A. It isn't as though I'm not get- 
ting enough to eat around here, but I do 
have dinner planned with some of my 
European friends. 

Q. West European friends? 

A. West European friends. 

Q. Just to give us a little help. We 
presume then if you're going to have a 
meeting with Mr. Shevardnadze, it 
won't be until next week; is that 
right? 

A. I've said what I had to say on 
this discussion, and I'm just going to 
leave it at that. 

Q. On the question of the summit, 
the Soviets have been saying rather 
strongly right along they want a major 
agreement, but now their definition of 
a major agreement seems to be dimin- 
ishing somewhat. They called the 
Stockholm agreement a major agree- 
ment, for example, in Shevardnadze's 
speech. 

I'm wondering if you have any 
notion now of what kinds of arms 
agreements which you think are 
doable might be accomplished by the 
end of the year and might provide the 
kind of agenda that would be suitable 
for a fruitful summit. 

In other words, does it have to be 
a START [strategic arms reduction 
talks], INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] agreement, or could it 
be a combination of chemical, non- 
proliferation, threshold test ban, that 
kind of scope? 



A. I don't want to try to list thing 
because the next thing somebody will 
say is that we've set out some condi- I 
tions, which we haven't. We do think il 
desirable. As the President has said 
many, many times, to have results froru 
the meeting we don't want to get in th • 
position and won't get in the position- „ 
and I assume they don't want to 
either— where we feel that because 
there's a meeting we've got to accept 
somel lii ng that we don't think is right. 
We're not going to do that. 

But I think there are a number of v 
areas where things that at least I wouli n 
consider worth doing might be done or 
at least precipitated by the fact of a 
meeting and ratified at the meeting. I \\ 
think what happens at meetings like th \ 
is more that the things get worked out, i 
and maybe sometimes the finishing 
touches get put on, although they're 
basically worked out before the meetinj 
and the meeting tends to ratify them 
and look prospectively at where we go 
from here. 

I think that in most of the areas, it ' 
isn't as though there's a prospect of 
something that's completed and you tie ' 
ribbon around it and you don't have to ' 
look at it any more; it's more in the 
nature of things in which it looks as 
though some clear-cut progress in a 
positive direction can be made and set ii 
place with the understanding that 
there's a lot of follow-on work to do. 

In the case of INF, for instance, we 
continue to think, and they say, that the 
idea is to eliminate those weapons. But 1 
don't see a prospect of doing that in the 
near term, but it may be that there's a 
prospect of moving along that road. So 
that's the nature of this set of questions. 

Q. To return to what Mr. 
Gerasimov said this afternoon, still in 
line with the expulsions, he said, 
"Because of many considerations, 
including prestige considerations, we 
must think of some kind of retaliatory 
measures. That we have said, and we 
must stand by it." 

On Saturday you were asked, I 
believe, in connection with the state- 
ment by Shevardnadze about retalia- 
tion, that — something to the effect 
that the President would keep his 
powder dry. 

Do you have anything further to 
add in light of Mr. Gerasimov's more 
detailed comments? 
A. No, I don't. 

Q. Sorry for the speech. It was a 
long question. [Laughter.] 

A. Usually if you ask a short ques- 
tion, I give you a long answer. 
[Laughter.] 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



Q. When will Daniloff come home? 

A. I wish I knew. The sooner the 
er. 

Q. Can you tell us on the logistics 
, do you expect when an agreement 
Cached with the Soviets that an 
puncement would be made, or is 
; of the negotiation how — you 
w, how the news will dribble out 
b wherever, or we just look to see 
n Daniloff comes home on a plane, 
omething like that, and then we'll 
w it's done? Can you help us on 
; score at least? 

A. Of course, as far as Daniloff is 
fcerned, it's done when he arrives 
s or leaves there, and that's one of 
things that we're working for here, 
just how the structure of this, if we 
ork it out, will come forward, I'm 
repared to say. 

Q. Could you address the possibil- 
f'»f having Daniloff released without 

lit ions, as you would like, and then 
png Zakharov released and some 
wet dissidents — maybe some well- 
nvn Soviet dissidents released 
Ir? Is that something that you 
[Id think might happen? 

\. I just have to keep giving you the 
e answer over and over again, so 
i don't you stop asking me? 
ighter.] 

^. Could I just follow that a — 
lighter]— no. It's not to ask you 
lit the specifics of the negotiations, 
[just to get a sense of the back and 
11 in these meetings that you've had 
I Mr. Shevardnadze. Has there 
ii a sense of progess beyond the 
« sides making their position very 
sr to each other? Has there been — it 
lacterized by just an unchanging 
lude on the Soviet side, or has it 
ii an exchange of positions between 
jlwo sides? Could you at least just 
jthat? 

]\. We would like to get this case 
lived on a satisfactory basis, and so 
ie working hard to see how that 
It be done. I can't speak for them, 
(having taken part in a variety of 
Itiations of one kind or another, my 
je is that Shevardnadze is also trying 
fct it done. 

3ut that doesn't mean that we're 
jg to succeed in doing it. But I think 
U is a genuine effort going on, on 
I sides. But, beyond that, I think this, 
J often the case in negotiations, it's 
I to talk about progress or lack of 
Iress, or optimism or pessimism, or 
(ething. You either have resolved it, 
|)u haven't, and it's— I think it has to 
I that way. 



Q. Can you tell us is it in the stage 
where the elements of a satisfactory 
resolution are in principle agreed on 
by the two sides, and what you are 
working out is the precise details of 
timing and trials and the smaller bits 
and pieces? Or is there now no 
meeting of the minds? 

A. I'm not just going to get inside 
this little cocoon that I've built here, or 
shell, or whatever I called it. 

Q. An easy one for you, a piece of 
cake. Short question, short answer. 
Will the President veto the South 
African sanctions bill tomorrow? 

A. I read that that's what Larry 
Speakes said he was going to do, so that 
must be the case. 

Q. On the 25, just another ques- 
tion on principle: Is it your principle 
that 25 people will leave, and that's 
not negotiable, but does the composi- 
tion of that 25— is that open to any 
flexibility? 

A. I think we've stated what our 
position is. This basically goes back to 
last March, and it reflects our view that, 
being host to the United Nations, does 
not mean that we should be host to intel- 
ligence activities on the part of other 
nations. And the huge number that the 
Soviets have in their embassy beyond 
what anybody else has, more than the 
next two largest combined, and our 
knowledge of the background of 
people— many of the people in the 
embassy and, of course, some of the 
activities involved— leads us to conclude 
that it is being used that way. 

So we have called for a gradual 
reduction to a size that's more in keep- 
ing with undertaking what the UN mis- 
sion as such needs. While, obviously, we 
observe the numbers, and we know when 
people leave, and when they come back, 
we have to remember that many people 
have multiple-entry visas. And so know- 
ing just who is there and not there is a 
problem unless they are ready to tell us, 
and they haven't been ready to tell us. 
And you remember that the Soviet 
Ambassador to the United Nations 
made— the time span escapes me here; a 
couple of weeks ago, I think— a rather 
confrontational statement about whether 
they were going to do this. And that led 
to our saying, well, we feel that in order 
to meet our October 1 level, you needed 
to have 25 people not there, and so we 
gave them a list. 



Q. The Russians say that they've 
met that level already. Is a key to it 
whether the United States will rescind 
or modify its order naming specific 
individuals and go with what you just 
referred to as meeting the level by 
October 1? 

A. I think I've described our posi- 
tion. That is our position. That's where it 
stands, and that's what I have to say on 
it. 

Q. Is it a condition that these 25 
have to leave, their number is below 
218, they can then have additional peo- 
ple come in to the United States to 
come up to 218? 

A. That's what we've told them. 

Q. But not those 25, though. Not 
those named 25. They can't bring them 
back in. 

A. That's right. 

Q. Are you open to the possibility 
of using the procedure outlined in the 
headquarters act of going to the 
Secretary General, presenting your 
evidence against the 25 individuals and 
having them excluded in that fashion? 

A. The headquarters agreement is 
very clear that there's nothing in our 
agreement to be the host that would put 
us in the position where we can't do the 
things needed to protect our security, 
and that's the posture that we're in, and 
we believe that we're on sound ground 
and intend to see this through. 

Q. According to [UN Secretary 
General] Perez de Cuellar's office, if 
you would simply make the case of 
each individual, then the United 
Nations would have no argument, but 
he says that as it is now being 
presented, that it is not within the 
confines of the host agreement. Do you 
disagree with this? 

A. I disagree with that. We think 
that we're on sound ground. 



'Press release 190 of Sept. 26, 1986. 



i;mber 1986 



59 



EUROPE 



President's and Secretary's 
News Conference of September 30 



President Reagan and Secretary 

Shall: In I 'I a news conference at the 
White House on September 30, 1986. 1 

Secretary Shultz. Good morning. The 
Eastern District Court of New York 
accepted the application of Gennadiy 
Zakharov, a Soviet citizen assigned to 
the UN Secretariat, to plead nolo con- 
tendere to all three counts of the indict- 
ment filed against him. The court has 
remanded Mr. Zakharov into the custody 
of the Soviet Ambassador to the United 
States for the purpose of affecting his 
immediate departure from this country. 
It is expected that Mr. Zakharov will 
leave the United States this afternoon. 

During the discussions held over the 
past 10 days, Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze has informed me that 
Yuriy Orlov, one of the founders of the 
[Moscow] Helsinki monitoring group and 
a giant of the Soviet human rights move- 
ment, will be allowed to leave the Soviet 
Union. Mr. Orlov and his wife will depart 
by October 7 and are expected to come 
to this country. The precise timing and 
means of their departure will be deter- 
mined through diplomatic channels. 

Yuriy Orlov, a physicist by profession 
and member of the Armenian Academy 
of Sciences, was chairman of Moscow's 
Helsinki monitoring group until his 
arrest in October 1977 for alleged anti- 
Soviet activity. 

The Helsinki monitors, a courageous 
group of human rights activists, openly 
attempted to hold the Soviet authorities 
accountable to their commitments under 
the Helsinki accords of 1975. They main- 
tain direct contact with Western diplo- 
mats and journalists in an effort to keep 
them informed of Soviet human rights 
abuses. Such well-known figures as 
Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and 
Anatoliy Shcharanskiy participated in 
the Moscow Helsinki monitoring group, 
and similar groups modeled on the 
Moscow example sprang up in other 
major Soviet cities. 

Orlov was a founding member and 
driving force behind the Helsinki 
monitors. As chairman of the Moscow 
group, he singled himself out for par- 
ticular attention from the KGB, and was 
caught up in the first wave of arrests of 
group members. In 1978, he was sen- 
tenced to 7 years in a strict-regime labor 
camp and 5 years of internal exile. Since 
1984, he has been forced to live in a 



remote Siberian village in extremely 
harsh physical conditions. 

At age 62, Orlov is in extremely poor 
health as a result of prolonged periods of 
solitary confinement— up to 6 months at 
a time— in labor camps, and severe 
beatings, suffered both in camp and in 
exile. Orlov's wife, Irena Valitova, 
shared his commitment to the Helsinki 
process. She has maintained regular con- 
tact with Western embassies and jour- 
nalists over the years since her hus- 
band's arrest, and has steadfastly 
worked to ameliorate the harsh condi- 
tions of his confinement. 

I think the President will be here in 
a minute. 

Q. Iceland? 

President Reagan. Yes, that's what 
I'm here to tell you about. 

Well, I am pleased to announce that 
General Secretary Gorbachev and I will 
meet October 11-12 in Reykjavik, 
Iceland. The meeting was proposed by 
General Secretary Gorbachev, and I've 
accepted; and it will take place in the 
context of preparations for the General 
Secretary's visit to the United States, 
which was agreed to at Geneva in 
November of 1985. And I might say the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
appreciate the willingness of the Govern- 
ment of Iceland to make this meeting in 
Reykjavik possible. So I know you'll all 
be on your best manners. 

Q. Does this mean that the 
chances for an arms agreement, the 
fact that you're going to meet with 
Mr. Gorbachev before he comes to the 
United States— will that mean that you 
have something ready for signature 
then when you meet with him here? 

President Reagan. I don't believe 
anything of that kind. I don't think this 
is going to be just a signing meeting at 
all. And I have no way of knowing what 
the outcome will be as we continue with 
our people in Geneva. 

Q. What do you think our chances 
are? 

President Reagan. I've said for a 
long time that I think the chances are 
better than they've been in many years 
for reaching an agreement on arms 
reductions. 

Q. But why did you change your 
mind on this? All year you had seemed 
to oppose the idea of a meeting in a 



neutral country, and demanded that 
was the General Secretary's turn to I 
come to the United States. And is 
there any agenda for this meeting? ;| 
you going to have any kind of 
agreements on INF (intermediate- 
range nuclear forces) and risk- 
reduction centers? 

President Reagan. No. This in nc 
way discounts the fact of what we've 
said about a summit. This is not a sum I 
mit; this was a suggestion of his that H 
and I, one-on-one, meet earlier, and 
make that in a neutral country becaus>i 
we have agreed that as to the summit; ! 
that this one would be here and the ne 
one would be in their country. 

Q. No agreements at this meetin 
sir? And no agreements at the meetii 
next week? 

President Reagan. I don't know. 
All we've agreed upon is that we're 
going to have a meeting. 

Q. Does this commitment still co 
tinue, though, for the General 
Secretary to come to the United Stat 
for a summit that would actually pro 
duce some sort of arms control 
agreement? 

President Reagan. I hoped for th.l 
the last time we met, and I'll continue 
hope for that. And our arms negotiate] 
have continued to meet. Both sides ha\ i 
made proposals, and there have been d 
ferences between them, and so far tho? 
differences have not been reconciled. 

Q. How would you now say the 
[U.S. News & World Report corre- 
spondent Nicholas] Daniloff affair 
either laid the groundwork for this 
special meeting or created an obstacle 
What is your assessment of this 
whole — 

President Reagan. The release of 
Daniloff made the meeting possible. I 
could not have accepted and held that 
meeting if he was still being held. 

Q. On that subject, we believe the 
Soviets seized Daniloff because of oui 
arrest of Zakharov, and they wanted 
Zakharov out. They are now going to 
get Zakharov out. What do you say to 
those who say that you've lost in that 
trade, and they got what they wanted! 

President Reagan. No, not at all. 
There was no connection between these 
two releases, and I don't know just wha 
you [to Secretary Shultz] have said so fa 
about this, but there were other arrange 
ments with regard to Zakharov that 
resulted in his being freed. 



60 



Department of State Bulletir 



Q. Do you think the world is going 
>elieve there was no connection 
en in fact Daniloff comes out one 
, and Zakharov goes zip through 
magistrate's the next and— 
President Reagan. May I point out 
rou that there have been several 
;ances over the recent years in which 
have arrested a spy, convicted a spy 
e in this country, and in each 
tance, we ended up, rather than giv- 
them board and room here, we ended 
exchanging them for dissidents and 
.pie who wanted exit from the Soviet 
ion. 

Q. Do we get any more than just 
lov? Are there other dissidents? 

President Reagan. I'm not going to 
oment on that. Somebody else has 
eady. 

Q. When you said that Daniloff 

1 a hostage, what message do you 
ve for other American hostages 
lay, for instance those in Lebanon 

10 have not been beneficiary to these 
ajotiations? 

President Reagan. I'm glad that 
s is the last question, and I've looked 
ward to answering this one. I under- 
bid I'm scheduled soon for a press con- 
ence, and I'm going to save all the 
munition for that, so I'll see you 
lin. 

Q. When is that? 

President Reagan. They'll announce 
> date at the proper time. 

Q. Didn't you just announce it? 

President Reagan. To answer this 
estion, I understand the sorrow, the 
ief of the families of the hostages who 

2 held in Beirut— we assume they are 
Id in Beirut— because that's the kind 
hostage situation this is. There has 
ver been a direct contact with us from 
j holders of those hostages, the kid- 
ppers, but there hasn't been a day 

ice they were taken that we have not 
en engaged in efforts to get them out. 
id I can just add this, that sometimes 
i thought we were on the verge of 
ing that, and then there has been a 
arp disappointment. 

So as I say, I can understand the 
milies— as if this looks at one, but look 
the difference! Here we are dealing 
th a government with which we have 
olomatic relations. In the other, we're 
i aling with faceless terrorists who have 
ily, through others, issued a demand 
at cannot be met; and we, as I say, 
ere is not a day that goes by that we 
e not bending every effort to get those 
•ople home. 



Q. Come back when you can stay 
longer. 

President Reagan. Yes, sometime 
soon. You let me know when the date is. 

Q. Do you still say the Soviets 
blinked, sir? 

President Reagan. Shouldn't have 
said that. No comment. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you 
answer those who say that what this 
Daniloff arrangement really means is 
that the Soviets now have license any 
time they want to get out a captured 
KGB spy, all they've got to do is grab 
an American inside the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Shultz. I think that we 
have to look at our overall objectives 
here, and then judge what has happened 
including the answer to that question, in 
the light of our objectives. Let me set 
them out for you. 

First of all, in this broad range of 
events that are taking place— last week, 
this week— we need to handle them in a 
strong, in a realistic, in a persevering 
way and in a way that gets results. 
Second, we want to get Daniloff out. 
Third, we want to address your question 
in part by making it clear that we have 
run out of any patience with the idea of 
any country using its people in the UN 
Mission as a platform for espionage 
against the United States; and at the 
same time, we want to handle these mat- 
ters as best we can so that the ongoing 
potentially positive results from our 
negotiations and discussions with the 
Soviet Union can continue and have a 
chance of bearing fruit. Those were our 
objectives. 

Now, Daniloff is out. The Soviets 
have assured us that their numbers in 
the UN mission presently are less than 
those that we set out for October 1. As 
in their terms, they decided to do that 
for efficiency in running their mission. 
But at any rate, from our standpoint, the 
numbers are there. 

Second, they have told us— and our 
own information confirms— that the 
majority of those on the list we gave 
them have left, and they have described 
to us their conception of a normal rota- 
tion process. But those people have left. 
They asked us, in the course of our 
discussions, for a grace period and that 
was extended by 2 weeks; and we expect 
to have further information by the time 
that expires. So we have been achieving 
our objectives in that sense. And we 
have managed in the discussions that 
were held here and in the response and 
the prospective meeting in Iceland, 
shows we have managed to keep the 



EUROPE 



possibility of positive results in this rela- 
tionship going. So overall, I think, it's 
been a pretty good week for us, and I 
hope they may feel the same way. 

Q. Two weeks ago, you wouldn't 
take the Soviets' word for the rota- 
tion. In fact, it was treated with a lit- 
tle bit of almost sarcasm. 

Secretary Shultz. What rotation are 
you talking— what do you mean by 
rotation? 

Q. Then let me back up. It sounds 
to me as you've now done what 2 
weeks ago you refused to do about the 
UN mission. You wanted to see 
documents; you wouldn't take their 
word for it that they've left. 

On top of that, in a blanket accu- 
sation, allegation, the Administration 
said these 25 are spies. It strikes me 
now — and please correct me if I'm 
wrong— that in the negotiations the 
United States has given a little 
ground. It has agreed to take their 
word for it, number one, on who's left 
and who hasn't left. And number two, 
to withdraw the notion that all 25 are 
spies, because clearly if you're going 
to let them stay 2 weeks, I don't sup- 
pose you'd allow spies to hang around 
for an extra 2 weeks if you really knew 
they were spies. 

Secretary Shultz. The numbers that 
we sought, we have attained, and we 
have had an explicit discussion with 
them about that. Obviously, we keep 
track of the numbers, but a reason, for 
example, why it's difficult for us to know 
precisely what their level is, is that if 
somebody in their mission who has a 
multiple-entry visa returns to Moscow, 
we don't know whether he's coming back 
or not until he comes back. So that's 
why we have to have a discussion about 
this matter— and we have had it. And so 
we have their estimate and description 
of that staffing level. 

Furthermore, we've had an explicit 
discussion about the 25— obviously, they 
see it differently than we do— but from 
our standpoint the important thing is 
that most of them have left; and I 
believe we will deal successfully with the 
balance of this problem. So overall, I 
think that what we are seeking, namely, 
to make it clear to everyone— not only 
the Soviet Union— that the use of the 
UN mission as an espionage platform is 
out. And I think that's one of the things 
that has come out of this that's very 
strong and a very important point. 



ovember 1986 



61 



EUROPE 



Q. Can you tell us what the agenda 
is for Iceland and how that works with 
any prospective summit meeting, vis-a- 
ris an arms control agreement or the 
framework of a Vladivostok-type 
agreement perhaps on INF? 

Secretary Shultz. This is a 
preparatory meeting proposed as such, 
and accepted as such, and in a way, it's 
very much a part of the process that's 
been going on with increasing intensity 
over the last 2 or 3 months where we've 
had all sorts of special groups meeting 
on all the different subjects that we have 
under review. So this is a meeting that 
will give a special push, obviously, and I 
think it's a very good idea, a good thing. 
Now, our agenda will be our regular 
agenda. Obviously, we're going to talk 
about arms control issues, and they are 
important, and we have made progress 
in a number of areas. You mentioned 
INF— that's one of them. We're going to 
talk about various bilateral problems; 
we're going to talk about regional issues; 
you can be sure that we're going to keep 
the subject of human rights on the 
agenda. So all of these subjects will, in 
various ways, be discussed. 

I think that if we can move things to 
the point where, on some significant 
things— well, they're all significant, but 
especially significant things— we can see 
the gap closed, and the prospect of an 
agreement, that's all to the good. But of 
course, we have to look at the content, 
and both be satisfied with the contents. 
But there has been enough motion and 
enough sense of the importance of this 
that perhaps this meeting can do what is 
necessary to energize our own, both, 
negotiators, and provide for a productive 
meeting, summit meeting in the United 
States, hopefully still in 1986. 

Q. Could you tell us how many of 
the 25, on the list of the Soviet 
mission, are still in the United States, 
and will any of them be allowed to 
remain in the United States after the 
2-week grace period? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't want to 
specify the numbers; we know the 
numbers, in discussing this issue, some 
questions have been raised about some 
members of the group; and we're willing 
to hear what they have to say about 
that. But, at any rate, we expect to see 
25 people that we think have an associa- 
tion with intelligence activities leave. 

Q. You've said this is a 
preparatory summit. Because after all, 
it is a summit; and this Administra- 
tion's policy has been that summits 
must be carefully prepared and must 



have a very good chance of tangible 
results. If I understood the President 
correctly, he's not certain what's 
going to come out of this summit. Why 
did your policy change, and don't you 
take a risk that in fact nothing will 
come out? 

Secretary Shultz. In the announce- 
ment that the President read, I believe 
he calls it a "meeting," but you're the 
labeler. That's the way it is described by 
them to us and us to them— that it is a 
preparatory meeting. Obviously, it's at 
the level of heads of state. 

Now, in a real sense, it is being 
carefully prepared. We have been work- 
ing hard on all of the different areas of 
subject matter for a long time, and, as I 
said, with great intensity this summer. 
We had our arms control— Geneva arms 
control team in Moscow for a couple of 
days, and theirs here for a couple of 
days. We've had a number of meetings 
on regional issues. We had an overall 
meeting which Under Secretary Arma- 
cost chaired. We've had a major discus- 
sion of bilateral issues. And we've also 
discussed the human rights area. 

So there's been a lot of preparatory 
work. And the question now is: through 
a meeting of the two heads, will we be 
able to energize this process still further 
and make the summit meeting in 
1986— which, as I said, we still hope 
there will be in 1986— make it genuinely 
productive? 

Q. Could you please assess for us 
the impact that the Daniloff case has 
had on U.S. -Soviet relations? Some 
people have suggested that, in fact, 
instead of hurting chances for a sum- 
mit, it has propelled chances for a 
summit as we see this meeting next 
week. That, in fact, it forced both 
sides to stop the diplomatic posturing 
and get serious about relations. 

Secretary Shultz. I think the Presi- 
dent put it right and said that something 
like the Daniloff case doesn't contribute 
to a summit; it tends to create a bad 
atmosphere and tends to make people in 
the United States concerned about what 
will happen to them if they go to the 
Soviet Union, and so on. So I don't think 
that contributes anything. 

On the other hand, it was an impedi- 
ment. And, as we have said, it was hard 
to imagine a fruitful summit while 
Daniloff was being held. So his release 
clears that atmosphere and, I think, will 
enable us to move forward productively. 

Q. When did the Soviets propose 
this mini-summit? Was that in the let- 
ter that Gorbachev sent through Mr. 
Shevardnadze? 



Secretary Shultz. The proposal c. 
the preparatory meeting was in the 
letter of General Secretary Gorbache 
the President, which Shevardnadze 
delivered about a week ago Friday, I 
guess. 

Q. Is Mr. Orlov and his wife— a s 
they the only dissidents that we km i 
of who will be allowed to leave in 
return for Mr. Zakharov? 

Secretary Shultz. We have a con I 
uing dialogue with the Soviet Union I 
about a large number of dissidents— 
about divided families, about emigrat ft 
generally— so there is an ongoing urg g 
of them to take action in those areas, b 
we'll continue that. Now, that's wher 
I'll leave it. 

Q. How important do you think 
having this meeting is to the Soviet ' 
In your talks with Mr. Shevardnadz ; 
did you get the feeling that Mr. 
Daniloff would have been released i 
these plans for a meeting in Iceland 
had not been agreed to by the Unite 
States? 

Secretary Shultz. The Daniloff c; 
and the various other aspects of it no [ 
doubt troubled them, but they certain 
troubled us; and we were not about tc i 
go, and I don't think one could have h I 
a fruitful summit, without these matti <, 
being settled. 

Now, insofar as their assessment : 
the need for this preparatory meeting 
concerned, the fact that they suggest* 
it in the first place shows that they fel I 
could be a productive contribution to t \ 
dialogue. So I assume that is their beli 
As we considered it and the President I 
considered it, we agreed; and so the 
meeting will be held. 

Q. In the context of what you sal 
earlier, do you think it's reasonable 
expect an INF framework agreemem 
to be reached in Iceland? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't want to i 
get into the prediction business beyoncfi 
saying that there has been a great 
change in the negotiating positions on I 
INF— comparing now with, let's say, a 
year and a half ago. So there's been a ip 
of motion. 

And in the discussions that we havi 
had, there are suggestions of other 
possible areas where agreement might I 
be found. So I think there are reasonat 
prospects. 

But on all of these things you neve r 
have an agreement until you have an 
agreement, so it's a little hard to asses \< 
just how far along we are. 



62 



November 19; 



' 



EUROPE 



I Q. The order that you issued last 
iring to cut the Soviet Mission back 
P 100 — I believe it's 170 people— 
kt's by April 1988— is that order still 
changed and in effect? 

Secretary Shultz. That is 
changed. And what we did was we set 
t various time periods. That's where 
| number 25 came from. It was our 
timate that it took 25 to get down to 
e 218. And a week or so before we 
mtified the 25 names, the Soviet UN 
nbassador had issued a very confron- 
tional statement about their will- 
piess to meet the 218. That's what 
ggered off the 25. So, at least as we 
e it, we're getting somewhere. 

Q. What assurances have you got 
at the next time the FBI [Federal 
ireau of Investigation] picks up a 
spected Soviet spy the Soviets will 
t pick up another American 
wspaperman? 

Secretary Shultz. There are all 
rts of problems here, and I think that 
e strong and resolute action by the 
esident probably sends a pretty good 
;ssage of how we feel about it and 
lat we will do about it. So I think you 
ve to look at all of these things as a 
ckage. 

But obviously the Soviet Union can 
|:k up people in their country, and have 
ler a long period of time. Just look at 
e history of Mr. Orlov as an example. 

Q. Is he the only one to come out? 
i Orlov the only one? 

Q. The Soviets have still not com- 
itted themselves to attending a sum- 
it in the United States. Is it your 
eling that they're going to Iceland 
ith the idea of waiting to see how 
»t will turn out before they decide 
(out a summit here? 

Secretary Shultz. No. I think it is 
ry clear that they recognize, as we do, 
at the genuine summits will be the 
xt one in the United States and the 
lowing one in the Soviet Union. And 
at is in everybody's plan and that is 
lat's referred to in the statement that 
e President read today. So there's no 
ggestion that this meeting in Iceland 
;a substitute for a summit. It's quite 
e contrary; it's a preparation for the 
mmit meeting. 

Q. What are the chances that this 
ill push back the timing? 

Q. Can you tell — what grounds 
d they cite for the need for this 
eeting in Iceland and what was our 
ason for accepting this notion after 



we had rejected the notion of the two 
leaders meeting on neutral territory 
before? 

Q. And you had rejected a 
meeting in the fall because of the elec- 
tion campaign. 

Secretary Shultz. We are engaged 
in a very important and very serious 
effort to try to get control of the 
escalating numbers of nuclear weapons 
and, in whatever way we can, to get a 
better handle on the tensions around the 
world that erupt out of regional prob- 
lems of various kinds, human rights 
problems, even some of our bilateral 
issues. 

We have worked at it very hard, and 
I observe that the Soviets have too. We 
believe— and I think they do— that a real, 
well-prepared, extensive summit meet- 
ing in the United States, on the one 
hand, and in the Soviet Union on the 
other, can be a good thing. We want to 
make it as good a thing as possible. 
That's why this tremendous effort that 
has been going on is being made. 

Now, the General Secretary sug- 
gested to the President that it would 
help in this preparatory effort if the two 
of them met perhaps a little less formally 
than a summit meeting tends to be and 
see if they can't push the ball along a 
little bit in perhaps some of the areas 
that show the most promise. And, as we 
thought about it, it seemed like a sen- 
sible idea. 

So why not? I think the name of the 
game here is to try to make progress 
toward the objectives that we are seek- 
ing, and this should help. 

Q. Is Orlov the only one to come 
out? We had heard that there may be 
other dissidents. 

Secretary Shultz. Whatever you 
have heard, you haven't heard it 
authoritatively. What I have said is 
authoritatively what will happen, and 
that is what we have to say on the 
matter. 

Q. Last Thursday you told a group 
of reporters, in regard to the 25 Soviet 
diplomats— the list that you gave 
them— "That is something that has 
been done. .There it stands. We don't 
plan to change that." But you have 
changed that. 

Secretary Shultz. No. It stands. 

Q. You are telling us that some of 
the 25 might be able to stay if there is 
some — 

Secretary Shultz. No. You were 
probing about the nature of our discus- 
sion. We had some discussion about a 



few people that Mr. Shevardnadze had 
found very useful to him, and we talked 
about that a little bit. But, anyway, our 
list stands and basically people are 
leaving. 

Obviously, the Soviets say that's 
because of their normal rotation. 
Anyway, from our standpoint, if they 
leave that's what counts. And those that 
may still be here— when we get to 
Reykjavik, we'll talk about that. But we 
expect to see that fulfilled. 

Q. Did you agree to the removal of 
two specific names from that list? Two 
senior intelligence officers — 

Secretary Shultz. You're getting 
the floor by shouting, but there's 
somebody right there who has not asked 
a question. 

Q. Was there any sense that Mr. 
Gorbachev said that if the President 
did not agree to an Iceland presummit 
meeting, that he would not be willing 
to come to the United States this year 
or soon afterwards? 

Secretary Shultz. That was not the 
nature of this exchange, and the ques- 
tion of the Iceland meeting wasn't of 
that character at all. I think you're sort 
of misreading the whole thing. 

The President received a letter, and 
it had in it commentary about a wide 
variety of matters. It wound up in effect 
expressing the importance the General 
Secretary attached to this whole process 
and made the suggestion that if there 
were a meeting of this kind in the near 
future, that might be helpful. 

We thought about it, and we 
decided— the President decided— that 
perhaps it could be, and we should be 
willing to do those things of this sort 
that may help this process along. 

And it's really just as simple as that. 
Nobody was playing toe-to-toe on this 
thing. 

Q. Why didn't the President not 
tell the Soviets, in reply to that sug- 
gestion, "Okay. If you agree to a date, 
then certainly we want to have it in 
the United States?" Why didn't he use 
that opportunity to pin them down to a 
summit date? 

Secretary Shultz. Because I don't 
think that sort of cat-and-mouse game 
on these sorts of things is a productive 
way to go about it. 

We did explore carefully their con- 
ception of this meeting as a preparatory 
meeting and their desire, as well as ours, 
to have a summit in 1986 in the United 
States, if it's possible. And so that's 
what we're shooting for. 



ovember 1986 



63 



EUROPE 



Q. Is it still your understanding of 
the Soviet position that the formal 
summit, if it's in the United States at 
the end of the year, will be an occasion 
to sign formal arms agreements? And 
if that is still the Soviet precondition, 
what are the prospects that we can do 
that at a year-end summit here? 

Secretary Shultz. I don't think we 
are talking about preconditions. What 
we are talking about is what's desirable. 
And there are lots of different ways to 
satisfy both of our desires to have 
significant results from these meetings. 
Why not— if they're available? 

It's almost as though you're saying it 
would be a great thing if we had this 
meeting and nothing came of it. I don't 
agree with that. 

I think the object is to have these 
meetings and have something come of it, 
and both sides agree to that. So we are 
trying to find our way to things that will 
be good from our standpoint that can be 
part of a summit meeting. And obviously 
we know that they are not going to 
agree to something unless they think it's 
good from their standpoint. So that's the 
nature of a deal. 

Q. Why shouldn't the American 
people not view the arrangements on 
Daniloff and Zakharov as exactly what 
you said this Administration would not 
do — that is, a trade? 

Secretary Shultz. I think what we 
saw here was Daniloff released yester- 
day; and what I announced today was 
that Zakharov is being released from the 
United States and Mr. Orlov and his wife 
are being released from the Soviet 
Union. 

I have also, in response to your ques- 
tion, discussed the United Nations mat- 
ter; and I think this is a very significant 
part of the picture as we see it. 

Q. On principle, the Soviets have 
made it clear that they wanted you to 
withdraw the expulsion order of 
October 1. From everything you've 
said you've done that. 

Secretary Shultz. No, we haven't. 

Q. But you said that they are leav- 
ing on their own, and you've given 
them a 2-week — 

Secretary Shultz. From our stand- 
point, the operative fact is that most 
have left; and those who haven't left, in 
response to a request for a grace 
period— we will see how that stands 
when we meet in Reykjavik. 

So we have stayed right with our 
position, and we are getting the results 
we're seeking. 



Now, I don't think it is surprising 
that if you ask them what has happened 
they would say, "Well, we intended to 
bring those individuals that happened to 
have been named home anyway, and 
that's what has been happening." So 
that's what they say. 

From our standpoint, what matters 
is to have those people out. That's the 
operative fact. 



'Press release 191. 



Secretary's Interview 
on "Today Show" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
NBC-TV's "Today Show" in New York 
on October 1, 1986, by Bryant Gumbal. 1 

Q. Within the past 36 hours, at a 
dizzying pace, negotiations have 
resulted in the releases of [U.S. News 
& World Report correspondent] 
Nicholas Daniloff and Gennadiy 
Zakharov [Soviet UN employee 
charged with espionage], and the 
announcement of a summit that is 
being called a preparatory meeting. At 
the heart of those negotiations has 
been Secretary of State George Shultz 
who joins us in the studio this morn- 
ing. First of all, tell me the difference, 
explain it if you will, between a sum- 
mit and a preparatory meeting. 

A. It is a meeting between two 
heads of state— a little shorter, perhaps 
a little less formal— and its object, as 
stated by each side, is to make the 
preparations for the planned summit 
meeting to be held in the United States. 
That's the description, and you can call 
it whatever you want to call it, I don't 
care. 

Q. Are the risks attendant to 
either side much different than they 
would be for a summit? 

A. The object in this is to solve 
problems. We have a lot of problems in 
the world; and whether we like the 
Soviet system or don't like it, whether 
they like ours or don't like it, there are 
tensions around the world in various 
places. There are great differences about 
human beings and how they are treated. 
And there are issues involving arms con- 
trol and in particular these giant stocks 
of nuclear weapons that each side holds. 
So what we are trying to do is resolve 
some of those problems. And I think the 



problems are so important and they 
create so much tension that it is a goo* 
thing to try. In fact, any leader who 
refused to make the effort would be 
tragically wrong. 

So that's what the President is 
doing. And, of course, to the extent th 
we find our way to agreeing with the 
Soviet Union on one thing or another, 
it's got to be an agreement that we th 
is in our interest. We know that. That I 
the spirit in which we are going into it 

Q. One former Secretary of Stat I 
Henry Kissinger, last night express* ' 
some concerns that a meeting plannt 
with such short notice couldn't be 
totally prepared for and that you rar 
the risk by making this a meeting of 
heads of state and not a summit; tha 
you ran the risk of reducing what ar 
very serious differences to differenc 
of personality. Are those valid 
concerns? 

A. Everybody can be concerned 
about everything, and no doubt they'r 
valid concerns. But it's certainly not tl I 
case to say that this hasn't been care- I 
fully prepared. We have been working • 
with great intensity, particularly over I 
the last 2 or 3 months, on all of the 
issues involved. So there's been a terr ' 
amount of effort to go into this. Now l 
hadn't explicitly thought about a 
meeting between the two heads in pre ! 
aration for the U.S. summit meeting, 1 
Mr. Gorbachev proposed it, and as the I 
President thought about it and as we 
talked about it, we thought well, this 
could be a good idea, maybe we can 
accomplish something. 

The name of the game here is to 
solve problems, and that is what we ar 
trying to do. 

Q. That's wonderful in a perfect 
world. You and I both know things 
don't operate that way as always. 

A. It is important to try to solve ( 
problems. 

Q. You're not concerned at all thl 
it comes as it does just 3 weeks befoi' 
an election? 

A. That was not a factor in this at 1 
all. It is picked for a weekend so that 
from the standpoint of the President's 
schedule he doesn't interrupt his 
campaigning. 

Q. Who's going to be part of the 
U.S. assemblage in Reykjavik? 

A. It hasn't been decided, but no 
doubt the President's key advisers. We. 
have a strong team of people there whi 
have all of the expert knowledge at the 
fingertips. 



64 



Department of State Bulle 1 



EUROPE 



Q. Will the Defense Department 
'.represented? 

I A. I would assume so. At least, I 
Slid hope so. Mr. Perle [Assistant 
Iretary of Defense for International 
1-urity Policy Richard N. Perle] has 
In in our delegations when I went to 
heva and negotiated with Gromyko 
finer Soviet Foreign Minster]. He was 
Ire on other occasions and performed 
Ih great ability. 

I Q. The President noted yesterday 
kt this meeting could not have come 
i>ut had Nicholas Daniloff not been 
leased by the Soviets. As we sit here 
Is morning, can you say that 
ipholas Daniloff was released 
[conditionally? 

A. Oh yes. There's no string. He's 
v. 

", Q. Unconditionally? 

A. I don't know what you are get- 
gat. 

j Q. I guess what I'm getting at is, 
ijatever the Administration is calling 
(and you're calling it an arrange- 
int, the headlines that we are seeing 
is morning are saying "The Swap." 
that a perception that you're going 
(have to live with? 

A. I suppose so. What happened are 
I. following things, in line with our 
► ectives: 

I First, Daniloff was released with no 
sings; he left the Soviet Union before 
[/thing else happened. 

Second, we announced that 
ixharov would be released after going 
iough the process here that is part of 
i' court process; and that Mr. [Yuriy] 
llov and his wife, two heroic people 
d leaders in the dissident movement, 
*uld be released from the Soviet 
lion. 

And third, and quite important, one 
tour basic objectives in all this was to 
nke the point that the use by the 
Sviet Union, and other countries for 
bt matter, of their UN delegations as a 
Htform for espionage would not be 
Serated. And so we have told them 
tout reducing their numbers here; we 
;ve explicitly identified people that 
jve to go. The numbers are in line with 
Hat we set out, and the process of the 
sople leaving is well under way. So 
Bat's an important objective. 

But it is also important that we 
rnntain our ability to discuss the prob- 
ijns, the answers to which may be of 
>eat importance in the world, and we 
''ve done that. 



Q. First off, Daniloff did arrive 
home yesterday, as we know it. Unfor- 
tunately it happened on the same day 
that Zakharov left here. Which at least 
suggests — 

A. Not unfortunate, it's the way 
it- 

Q. It does at least suggest 
equivalency. 

A. I think the fact that Daniloff was 
released a day before doesn't suggest 
equivalency. I think the fact that Orlov 
was released, was announced to be 
released, at the same time that Zakharov 
was suggests maybe that was what was 
arranged. 

The fact that we are getting our 
objectives as far as the UN arrange- 
ments are concerned suggests something 
about our objectives. But most important 
here, also, we are in a position, I hope, 
to make some progress on these pro- 
blems that I think all of us would want 
to see resolved if it is possible to do so. 

Q. But even with regards to the 25 
at the Soviet mission, a couple of 
weeks ago it was all 25 had to leave 
and it was a blanket accusation they 
were spies. Now an extension has been 
granted, the numbers have been tam- 
pered with a little bit. Isn't that an 
accommodation of some kind? 

A. The numbers haven't been 
tampered with. They asked for a grace 
period, and the President granted it. 
And we will discuss further— this whole 
issue of the UN mission and its use— no 
doubt in Reykjavik, or I will with Mr. 
Shevardnadze [Soviet Foreign Minister]. 

Q. I don't want to let you go 
without talking a little bit about South 
Africa because I know you went up to 
Capitol Hill to try to see what kind of 
votes you could muster to sustain the 
President's veto. Do you have enough? 

A. I don't know. We are working 
on it very hard. 

Q. What do you think? 

A. I think it is very important that 
the Senate sustain the President's veto, 
first and foremost on the merits, because 
it seems to me this country wants to 
make a strong, clear, unequivocal state- 
ment about our attitudes and abhorrence 
of apartheid and our desire to see 
something changed so that we will have 
a kind of government where everybody 
can take part and where basic human 
dignity and rights are respected. That's 
what we want. And we are willing to 
help in all sorts of ways to bring that 
about. We want to make that clear, and 
what the President proposes in his 
Executive order, will do that. 



We don't want to take steps that 
confuse a drive at apartheid with what 
amounts to a deprivation of jobs to the 
people who are the victims of apartheid. 
We are going to make them unemployed 
as well. I don't see that that makes any 
sense. Furthermore, what the Senate 
bill, the Congress bill, will do is cause 
the United States in effect to withdraw 
from South Africa. If we're going to 
have an impact, we ought to stay there, 
and we ought to be part of the effort to 
solve the problem. 

Q. If the decision to override the 
veto, and if things remain as they 
stand, carries through in the Senate, is 
that going to force a reassessment of 
South African policy inside the White 
House, or are we going to have a two- 
track policy? 

A. You can't have a two-track 
policy. The Congress takes over the 
policy. There is no way they can manage 
it. And there is nothing, it seems to me, 
good to be said for withdrawing from 
South Africa. 

Q. Senators would say that they 
aren't withdrawing, that instead the 
White House forced their hand by 
inaction. 

A. There's no inaction. There is a 
tremendous amount of effort going into 
not only our policy in South Africa, but 
southern Africa generally. I wonder 
where these people are who don't seem 
to have thought about the problems that 
some of the countries around South 
Africa will have if the Senate is suc- 
cessful in bringing the South African 
economy to its knees. What's going to 
happen to those people? There has been 
very little thought given to that. 

Q. Let me go back again if I 
might, in the final 2 minutes we have 
left, to Reykjavik. As the President 
and you noted on Tuesday, this was a 
meeting proposed by General 
Secretary Gorbachev. How do you read 
his motivations in this? 

A. We can speculate about that, but 
I think what we have to do is consider a 
proposal of that kind from our stand- 
point and ask ourselves, is this a good 
idea, given the amount of preparatory 
effort that had taken place, particularly 
through the summer, and given the 
importance of the problems, given our 
desire, as theirs, to see the summit 
meeting in the United States be a pro- 
ductive meeting? The President has 
always said that. 



ovember 1986 



65 



EUROPE 



As the President thought about it 
and as we talked about it. we thought 
well, it's a good idea, so let's go and 
grapple with these problems. I think the 
world expects its leaders to go and try to 
resolve these problems. 

Q. One of the side effects of all 
this— and we've got less than a minute 
left: I'll have to caution that — has been 
that you spent over 20 hours within 
the past week with Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze. How much better is 
your one-on-one relationship with him 
than it was say, a month ago? 

A. As you say, we've spent a lot of 
time together and we have on a personal 



level a good, straightforward relation- 
ship so that we sit down and we con- 
verse and argue about these things. 

Q. Would you give him any better 
marks in statesmanship than you 
would have before? 

A. We worked it out together, and I 
think that it is a good result from the 
standpoint of the United States. I hope 
he thinks it's good from the standpoint 
of the Soviet Union. And maybe we can 
go on and see something good accom- 
plished in Iceland and in the United 
States. 



'Press release 193. 



Secretary's News Briefing 
of October 2 



Secretary Shultz held a news briefing 
with American journalists in New York 
City on October 2, 1986. 1 

Q. You have described Daniloff 
[Nicholas Daniloff, U.S. News & World 
Report correspondent] as a hostage— 
you and the President both have used 
that precise word— and you have 
negotiated with the Soviets about his 
case, among others. 

Two questions: What does that do 
to the U.S. policy of never negotiating 
for hostages; and (2), do you think that 
is going to be a precedent that is going 
to come back to haunt you? 

A. We are ready to discuss with 
anybody the situation of our hostages in 
Lebanon, and we are doing everything 
we can to secure their return. But that 
doesn't include paying a bribe or trying 
to get the Kuwait Government to release 
convicted murderers and terrorists from 
jail, which is what— at least, it's 
alleged— the people holding our hostages 
want. 

Of course, we are frustrated in our 
efforts to know exactly who it is that 
does all those. So our discussions have 
an indirect kind of aspect to them, but 
we work hard to try to free those 
hostages. 

In the case of Daniloff, let me try to 
set this whole series of events in its full 
perspective, because obviously we don't 
like the precedent of seizing an Ameri- 
can whether he's a journalist or a busi- 
nessman or whoever he may be and 
charging him with something that he's 
not guilty of and then demanding some- 



thing in return. That's a very unattrac- 
tive arrangement. We resist it. 

So here is the way I think of this 
case and here's the way it's unfolding. 
For a long time, in the United States, 
we've been concerned about the size of 
the Soviet mission in the United Nations 
and the use by the Soviets of that mis- 
sion for espionage purposes. That goes 
through a number of Administrations. 

The President decided— we decided 
in this Administration— we're going to 
do something about it. So last March we 
told the Soviets that they had to reduce 
the size of their mission. We gave them 
a number, by April of 1988, and speci- 
fied tranches, the first one of 25, with a 
series of dates, and the first date was 
October 1. 

Last August we arrested Zakharov 
in an act of espionage but this was after 
being on to him for sometime, so there 
was a great deal of information that the 
FBI has about his violations of our law. 
This is just that particular thing that 
happened when he was seized, so it's a 
very solid case. 

Subsequently, the Soviet Union 
seized Daniloff and charged him. 
Meanwhile— I forget the exact day and 
the sequence is somewhere in between— 
the Soviet Ambassador in the United 
Nations made a very defiant statement 
about their unwillingness to comply with 
our statement that they had to reduce 
the size of their mission. You can look up 
the words, in fact; we've got them 
around somewhere, but it was a very 
confrontational statement. 



We, of course, knew that, in fact, t 
size of their mission had been reduced 
because when somebody leaves the cou 
try, we know it. But unless we have a 
conversation with them, we don't know 
whether a person who leaves and has a 
multiple-entry visa is intended to be 
brought back or not so we can't be sun 
of the size without a discussion with 
them of what their plan is. And this 
defiant statement and the lack of any 
communication or willingness to com- 
municate made it hard for us to know f 
sure just what was happening, but we 
had a general idea. 

Now, after his defiant statement, w 
decided, all right, it took 25 to get fron 
where you were down to our number, s 
here are 25 names; get them out by 
October 1. 

In the discussions that have taken 
place, there has been a sequence of 
events in which Daniloff was first 
released, without trial, and he's back, 
he's free. Zakharov was released after 
pleading nolo contendere, which anyone 
charged is entitled to do if they want tc 
through our system, and has been 
allowed to return to the Soviet Union. 
And Orlov [Yuri Orlov, Soviet physici: 
and human rights activist] and his wif< 
will be allowed to leave the Soviet Uni 
by the 7th of October. 

Meanwhile, through our discussio: 
we have been assured by the Soviets 
that their numbers in the mission— th 
number I was given by Mr. Shevardnad: 
was lower than the number that we 
required of them although there may 
some ambiguities because of who you 
count, who they count, who the Unite 
Nations tends to count, and who we 
count. But, at any rate, it's clear that 
they have gotten that number down to ! 
the number required, so we have that 
assurance. 

Insofar as the 25 are concerned, our ( 
requirement that those named indi- 
viduals leave stands. They provided 
some information about the whereabout' 
of some of them, some eight that were 
not in this country; they were in the 
Soviet Union. So I said, well, what is the 
intent? Is it your intent to have them 
come back or not? I was told that the 
answer was not, and others who were in 
the process of leaving, and they asked 
for a grace period which the President 
granted. 

Of course, we keep very careful 
track of who leaves the country. So 
when somebody on this list leaves the 
country, we know it. That person may 
have a multiple-entry visa so we don't 
know whether there is any intent to 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



iirn. However, it is within our 
jhority, if somebody leaves under 
|se circumstances, not to permit that 
hon to return. 

I have the number, the precise 
hber, that according to our observa- 
is and the FBI, they believe have left 
just out of care, not to be more precise, 
n I feel really comfortable with, I'll 
f with the statement I've made: That 
majority of those in the 25 have left. 
• information on that comes from our 
irmation about names of people who 
koff. 

Putting this into the perspective of 
lgs, our object, in what in a sense 
'ted all this round was our determina- 
1 to get at this use of the United 
;ions as an espionage platform. We 
e succeeded in getting numbers 
km, we have succeeded in getting 
fried people out, and we will persevere 
(hat. 

: I think from the standpoint of the 
ssage of what happens when we take 
on against espionage, we have done 
lething that is more fundamental, 
it is, we are in the process of reduc- 
the number of people who have 
■lligence affiliations of some kind who 
I stationed in the mission, in the first 
l:e. And, as you know, there's a dif- 
f 'nee between the way a person who is 
iheir regular diplomatic mission, say, 
iVashington, and has diplomatic 
] mnity, is treated when that person is 
ind commiting espionage and the way 
Fjrson who doesn't have that immun- 
;is treated. 

When we catch a UN-affiliated per- 
c, that person is then held here, 
Irged, tried, and so forth. When a per- 
c in their Washington mission is found 
cducting espionage, the person is 
jelled. And when they allege that they 
le a case against somebody in our mis- 
ii, they expel them and that takes 
he. 

But we feel that the existence of the 
Jited Nations, and the United States 
a host country for it, cannot be 
iwed to, in effect, create an asym- 
rtrical situation and provide this asym- 
rtrical intelligence opportunity. 

What I'm trying to get across to you 
shat beyond the ins and outs of 
Jiiloff and Zakharov and Orlov, there 
phis broader question and the broader 
Iprt on the part of the U.S. Govern- 
fnt to get at this broader question, and 
shave taken specific action, and we 
b being successful in it. So that's the 
i)ic way in which we're addressing this 
fc'blem. 



That's a long answer to your very 
good question. It's a good question and 
it's a difficult question, but this is the 
way we have addressed it. 

Q. If that's the ease, why don't 
you knock back the number of Rus- 
sians at the Embassy in Washington? 
Considerably more Russians are there 
than Americans in Moscow. 

A. The numbers of Americans and 
Soviets in our regular missions is not the 
same now although we have been 
building up the number of Americans 
and our plans for providing the right 
kind of security in our mission call for us 
to expand the number. 

We have, historically not only in the 
Soviet Union but throughout the world, 
hired people from the host country— the 
Soviets never do— to do certain kinds of 
tasks. Basically, what you're allowed is 
to perform certain functions. If you want 
to perform them with host country 
nationals, you can. If you don't want to, 
you don't have to. So we're changing the 
structure of our employment for, I think, 
very good reasons and that's something 
that's underway. 

I think the answer to your question 
is that we do want to see an equivalence 
in that regard. 

Q. You've had quite a week of 
negotiating with the Soviet Foreign 
Minister and most of that in absolute 
total secret, which must have 
delighted you because you've often 
said that you think that's the way 
negotiations should be conducted. 

Now that that phase is concluded, 
I wonder if you can tell us some 
details of the sessions, especially when 
you believe that the situation began to 
be clarified and you began to think 
there really was a chance this could be 
settled and negotiations got serious? 
And if you could just share with us as 
many details as you can about how the 
deal was put together, and also your 
impressions of your counterpart. 

A. I've just finished describing in 
some detail how we have thought about 
this problem, going back to last March, 
and what we have been doing about it, 
and I don't want to go into the ins and 
outs of how we tried to arrange it so 
that we got what we think is a satisfac- 
tory outcome. 

Obviously, this is an on-going prob- 
lem because the espionage problem is 
on-going here, and we continue to bear 
down on it. 



Q. Can you at least deal with the 
turning points, the letter, and the 
effect that had on you in the decision 
to put — I gather the decision to put 
Iceland on the table with a stipulation 
that without Daniloff, no Iceland? Or 
the 40-minute rushed meeting over 
here at the United Nations at the 
Soviet request — can't you put any of 
those into perspective as to the roller- 
coaster that you've been on? 

A. It's hard to do it because I don't 
know what affects somebody else and 
what doesn't. And to a certain extent, 
when you're engaged in this kind thing, 
you are engaged in an exchange and you 
are, of course, trying to make assess- 
ments of that kind, but I don't want to 
go into it too much. 

I do think that the President, 
himself, made a major impact on the day 
of the first meeting that Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze and I had. I had 
arranged it with the President that if I 
thought— and it was my call— it would be 
useful to bring him over to the Oval 
Office to meet with the President, I 
would be able to call. We knew the block 
of time when the President would be 
free and able to meet with him. 

I felt that it was timely so I called, 
and we went over. At that meeting 
Shevardnadze presented the letter from 
Gorbachev and its various proposals. 
And then the President told Shevard- 
nadze his view of this question and of 
their behavior in their seizing of Daniloff 
and what he thought about it. In fact, 
that the President was absolutely sure 
he wasn't a spy because we knew that 
Daniloff was not being paid by the U.S. 
Government, he was not engaged in 
espionage in that sense, and that's the 
way we defined the term. 

The President— as you know, he's 
very genial and pleasant and is the guy 
people would most like to sit next to at a 
dinner party and he's gregarious and 
good humored and everything, but he 
can also be very tough. 

He was crystal-clear. I know that it 
must have had some impact because in 
our next meeting Mr. Shevardnadze 
opened up by saying, "The President is 
really worked up about this isn't he?" 
[Laughter] And I said, "You better 
believe it." So I think if they had any 
doubts in their minds that this was very 
serious and there was no way things 
were going to go forward as long as 
Daniloff was held in the Soviet Union, 
they were convinced. I'm not saying that 
they didn't know that beforehand, but 
that was one point in all of this that was 
quite pronounced. 



Member 1986 



67 



EUROPE 



Q. There had been reports that 
two of the people regarded most 
seriously as Soviets spies are being- 
allowed to stay here— Mr. Savchenko 
and Mr. Skvorstov. Can you comment 
on those reports and tell us what we 
know about what those two men do? 

A. As far as we're concerned, we 
gave a list of 25. The list stands. Most 
have left, according to our information. I 
understand that some Soviet spokesman 
said otherwise, and so there's a dif- 
ference of opinion. Our information is 
based on knowing who gets on an 
airplane and takes off, so it sounds like 
pretty good information to me. 

But, at any rate, our list stands. I 
don't know where are the sources about 
stories or names; I haven't heard any 
names. The origin, to me, of any com- 
ment about two or three people is simply 
that in our discussions, Shevardnadze 
commented to me that there were two or 
three people who had been essential to 
him as he performed his duties here at 
the United Nations. And, as you know, 
he, just as I do, meet a great stream of 
people in your shifting from one part of 
the world to another, and so on. So you 
have people who prepare papers and 
help you get briefed, and so on. So you 
can't get along without good staff help. 

I said, well, I can understand that. 
On the other hand, you're going to be 
leaving Tuesday so you won't need them. 
So there were two or three people. I 
don't know whether he intended that to 
mean that he wanted to discuss some 
people or not. 

At any rate, undoubtedly, we'll come 
back to this issue at Reykjavik, the two 
of us. But as far as we're concerned, we 
have (a) given a number, and they are 
meeting that number; (b) given a list of 
25. Most of those are out and the list 
stands, subject to the grace period, (c) 
We have told them that if that number 
brings them below the number that we 
specified, then they're free to build back 
up to that number during the period 
before the next tranche if they wish to, 
but not with people who have 
intelligence affiliation. 

Q. Just to follow up and clarify 
one point on what you just said. The 
way I read what you just said, you are 
saying that those— at least the fate of 
those two or three, and perhaps others 
whom you have not discussed, are up 
for further discussions between you 
and Shevardnadze at the Reykjavik 
summit and that the fate of those 
people may yet change; they may not 
have to leave the United States, 



depending on what discussions you 
have at the summit with Shevard- 
nadze. Is that correct? 

A. We have a list of 25— that 
stands— and I violated my rule of not 
telling you about the insides of these 
things, but I just related something that 
he said to me, and what I said to him. 
But if that goes anywhere or not 
remains to be seen. 

Q. Could you talk about the 
Iceland meeting? In other words, a 
couple of questions in my mind. The 
Administration, of course, has been 
making a point of wanting to get a 
firm date for the meeting in the United 
States. It seems extraordinary to me 
that you would agree to this meeting 
in Iceland unless you had some 
assurances ahead of time that at the 
meeting you would get a date on the 
U.S. visit. Otherwise, I don't see the 
point of this meeting. I mean, can you 
discuss what you're hoping to get out 
of the meeting? 

A. First of all, while we believe that 
meetings between the heads of state are 
basically desirable, we think that their 
usefulness over the long term and, for 
that matter, immediately is much 
greater if they are well-prepared and 
have significant results associated with 
them. That has been the President's 
position from way back. It hasn't 
changed. 

We think that a meeting in 1986, 
which was agreed to in Geneva, is a good 
idea according to those criteria, and 
presumably they think it's a good idea 
because they, accordingly, too, have 
been engaging with us in an extensive 
and intensive preparatory process 
through which in regular fora and 
elsewhere the differences on quite a 
variety of issues have been narrowed, 
clearly identified, sometimes eliminated. 
We are in the process in our negotiations 
in Geneva of trying to push that further. 

In the Gorbachev letter to the Presi- 
dent, he made the suggestion that a 
brief, less formal meeting between the 
two at this juncture could make a con- 
tribution to that preparatory effort for a 
U.S. summit. There hasn't been any sug- 
gestion that they're backing away from 
the United States, and the President 
thought about it, we talked about it, and 
we thought, well, maybe it could help, so 
we should give it a try. And so the Presi- 
dent accepted the idea of a meeting in a 
third country. Of course, we said that 
while we would be ready to do this in 
principle, we didn't see any point in try- 
ing to set dates and be specific about it 



as long as Daniloff was in the Soviet 
Union, because you couldn't really 
imagine a fruitful meeting under thosi 
circumstances. 

That's the background of it, and 
what we hope to accomplish is some ft 
ther illumination of the issues and 
clarification of them, perhaps narrowi 
of them, and the energizing of our 
respective delegations to try to find 
agreement. 

How much influence it had, I don' 
know, but it is the case that the 
meetings that I had with Shevardnadz 
that is, the plenary ones where we 
weren't talking about Daniloff and we 
weren't talking about various other 
human rights issues which I always hi 
on my agenda with Soviet leaders, abs ' 
lutely always. In the plenary sessions, ' 
we discussed, among other things, the 
CDE [Conference on Confidence- and ' 
Security-Building Measures and Disar ' 
mament in Europe] conference which 
was then in its final stages, and we 
gave— what should I call them— impulf ' 
to our respective delegations. And 
whether that helped to bring it to a fii I 
conclusion, I don't know, but I don't 
think it hurt any. Sometimes these 
things do help, and I hope that that is ' 
the case. We felt that it was worth th< ' 
effort to try. That's what leaders are ' 
for: to try to come to grips successfull ' 
with these issues that are of great anc ' 
enormous concern. 

Q. But do you have any assuranc | 
that they will then agree at Iceland i 
a date in the United States? 

A. We've talked about this as 
preparatory to the planned U.S. sumrrj 
And through my discussions with 
Shevardnadze, we can see that that m; 
still be possible in 1986; and it's very j 
clear that they also have very much in | 
mind their desire to have the Presiden, 
visit the Soviet Union in 1987. So that, 
basically the rhythm of what was 
established in Geneva, and I can't say i 
for sure that that's the rhythm that wi| 
be followed, but I think that seems to 1 
the basic track we're on. 

Q. There's a published account 
today of a meeting in mid- August— I 
think August 14th— attended by you, 1 
Mr. Poindexter [Vice Adm. John M. ' 
Poindexter, Assistant to the Preside: 
for National Security Affairs], and 
some others in which a decision was , 
reportedly made to launch a disinfor- 
mation campaign concerning Libya- 
reports that information was made 
available to newspapers, including T 1 
Wall Street Journal, that produced ' 



68 



Department of State Bulle 



EUROPE 



fries indicating more concern about 
ya than the intelligence reports 
rially caused. Can you comment on 
fe? Did this happen? Is there a 
Information campaign against 
i[ya? 

|A. I never comment on classified 
lerial or meetings of that kind. But I 
i say this: That Qadhafi has involved 
jya in numerous acts of terrorism 
Ich have killed many people, including 
le Americans. We think he is basi- 
h an outlaw. We have taken action 
pnst him. We have been glad to see 
t others have also found a great deal 
jitelligence about what he's doing and 
Je also taken actions. 

It was a very good thing that this 
t recognized at the Tokyo summit, 
| Libya was indentified by name. And 
fas also very interesting that when 
jtook our action against Libya, con- 
|y to the expectations of many, the 
\b world did not rally to his side. And 
f. probably had something to do with 
(very evident unease and sense of 
location, from all of our intelligence, 
jlhafi exhibited. 

1 Insofar as he is concerned, we think 
I a menace, and we want to see the 
: vities of Libya stopped. Exactly what 
tare and intend to do about it, I don't 
' k it's appropriate for me to say. But 

have shown that we're willing to take 
i'Ct action. We have shown that we 
•e applied a very broad range of sanc- 
( s to his activity. We do have various 
iigs going on that are difficult for him 
inow exactly what they mean that 
iiaps keep him off balance. And, 
tkly, I don't have any problems with 
t:tle psychological warfare against 

lhafi. 

1 1t's very easy, and you people in the 

srs business enjoy not allowing the 

ted States to do anything in secret if 
: can help it. So if the fleet moves 
,_ n one place to another, you're bound 
5 determined to report it. Even 
<ugh we might want to have it operate 
retly, it's very difficult for that to 
tpen. 

i We can absolutely bank on the fact 
It if the fleet does something or other, 
I'll scream. And Qadhafi will hear it. 
.1 the fleet may or may not be getting 
Jdy to do something. So that's about 
'it I'm going to say on that subject. 

Q. What about the AIDS quote? 
I you just clear that one up? 

]A. The what? 

Q. You were quoted as saying in a 
sing way that vou hoped Qadhafi 
lid get AIDS. 



A. I have no comment on state- 
ments that somebody who probably 
wasn't there may incorrectly attribute to 
somebody who was there. And I think 
the business of talking about meetings, 
and so on, is a despicable thing that 
people in the U.S. Government do, and 
I'm not going to consider it. 

Q. Was there any sign of increased 
Libyan terrorist activity in August; 
and, number two, are you denying that 
this meeting took place, or are you not 
commenting? I mean, this is a very 
serious charge that you had a meeting 
where you decided to mount a disinfor- 
mation campaign. 

A. Why is that a charge? If I were a 
private citizen, reading about it, and I 
read that my government was trying to 
confuse somebody who is conducting ter- 
rorist acts and murdering Americans, I'd 
say, "Gee, I hope it's true." I don't see 
why you think this is a charge. 

Q. I think there's a problem. The 
issue is there is a deliberate program 
of misinformation, and it's not only 
Qadhafi who gets confused but the 
American people who get confused. 

A. Without being able to be precise, 
it's difficult to plot whether there is an 
increase or not an increase. There is a 
disposition toward it by Qadhafi and 
Libya. For quite a period of time, it was 
clear he was thrown way off, not only by 
our action but by the actions of the 
Europeans in expelling all these people 
as they found information. 

So there was a relatively quiescent 
period. We felt that it was beginning to 
change for various reasons. Precise 
intelligence right now is not altogether 
clear, but there have been a number of 
terrorist incidents recently— or incidents 
isn't the word— tragedies, horrors— and I 
don't rule out that Libya was involved, 
for example, in the Karachi— I'm not 
saying they are, but I wouldn't rule it 
out. 

So, yes, there has been some 
increase in sort of the volume of what 
you see from various intelligence 
sources. Different people might evaluate 
it in different ways, but, nevertheless, 
there is substance there. 

Q. You had a conversation with 
the Syrian Foreign Minister yesterday, 
in which we were told— went into con- 
siderable detail about the hostages in 
Lebanon. Is there any progress being 
made on that issue? 

A. I hope so, and we work on it con- 
stantly, but there's no progress worth 
reporting except that they become free. 



They're either free or they aren't free. 
And so we work at that from every con- 
ceivable angle. I never miss an oppor- 
tunity to talk to the Syrians about the 
subject. 

How much influence they have is the 
question. What they have done is they 
have been a country to which hostages 
have seemed to come, and out of which 
they were released. And they have 
handled that aspect of it very well. 
That's different from being the party 
responsible for getting them released. 

Q. I would hate to see this finish 
without a clarification on the issue of 
disinformation. Let me pose it a dif- 
ferent way. It seems to me as a jour- 
nalist that if the government is know- 
ingly misinforming or lying to further 
a foreign policy goal, that causes me 
problems. What you are saying is, as 
long as it furthers a foreign policy 
goal, that is okay? 

A. I know of no decision to have 
people go out and tell lies to the media. I 
think, however, that if there are ways in 
which we can make Qadhafi nervous, 
why shouldn't we? And I described one 
of them. That is not deceiving you, but 
just using your predictable tendencies to 
report things that we try to keep secret, 
so we will label it a big secret, and you 
will find out about it, and you will report 
it. We know that. The higher the 
classification, the quicker you'll report it. 
So you're predictable in that sense. 

But I don't believe in telling lies, 
myself. I would call your attention, 
however, to— and this is— I probably 
shouldn't even say this, because you'll 
give the wrong interpretation, but 
there's a wonderful book which you 
might read that was written about 
World War II. And the title of it is a 
quote from Winston Churchill who said, 
"In time of war, the truth is so precious, 
it must be attended by a bodyguard of 
lies." 

And the book is about the very great 
effort to deceive the Nazis and to float 
reports of one kind or another that 
would make them think something was 
about to happen that wasn't about to 
happen, and so on. 

Q. There was a declaration of war 
at the time. 

A. And I think that insofar as 
Qadhafi is concerned, we don't have a 
declaration of war, but we have 
something pretty darn close to it. 



'Press release 200 of Oct. 3, 1986. 



ember 1986 



69 



EUROPE 



Prospects for the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting 



by Warren Zimmerman 

Statement before the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe on 
September 11, 1986. Ambassador 
Zimmerman is head of the U.S. delega- 
tion to the Vienna follow-up meeting of 
the Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (CSCE). ' 

I welcome this opportunity to meet with 
you, and the other members of the Com- 
mission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe to discuss the Vienna follow-up 
meeting of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
which opens on November 4, 1986. This 
will be the third such meeting. The first 
was held in Belgrade in 1977-78 and the 
second in Madrid from 1980 to 1983. 

As you know, I am no stranger to 
the CSCE process, having served as 
deputy chairman of the U.S. delegation 
to the Madrid follow-up meeting from 
1980 to 1981. I am, thus, more aware 
than most of the crucial role which the 
commission and its staff have played 
over the past decade in advancing the 
goals of the CSCE process, especially in 
the field of human rights. The U.S. 
delegation to the Vienna meeting will, 
once again, draw heavily upon your 
expertise; indeed, the commission will be 
represented on the delegation itself at 
the level of deputy chairman as well as 
by members of your very experienced 
staff. I look forward to a close and pro- 
ductive relationship. 

As at Madrid, we will also have a 
group of distinguished Americans serv- 
ing on the delegation as public members, 
which we hope to announce soon. And 
we will continue to stay in close touch 
with nongovernmental groups which also 
have made an indispensable contribution 
to the CSCE process. 

The CSCE process began in Helsinki 
in 1975 with the signing of the Final Act 
by President Ford and 34 other leaders. 
This basic document sets out a state- 
ment of principles governing the conduct 
of states toward each other and toward 
their own citizens and provides a 
framework for discussion of the security, 
economic, and human rights problems 
which underlie the unnatural division of 
Europe. Last March, Under Secretary 
[for Political Affairs Michael H.] 
Armacost briefed you at some length on 



the Administration's approach to the 
Helsinki process, which remains its 
position. 

Today I will briefly assess the 
Helsinki process and then outline our 
basic objectives for the Vienna meeting, 
as well as those of our West European 
allies and the Soviet Union. 

The Helsinki Process 

The question of "who won and who 
lost?" in Helsinki has been roundly 
debated during the past decade. In fact, 
that is the wrong question. Everyone 
must have gotten something out of 
CSCE, since all 35 CSCE states remain 
interested in having the process con- 
tinue. I would rather rephrase that ques- 
tion to "who gained the most and who 
gained the least?" 

In my view, the Soviet Union has 
clearly gained the least, both at Helsinki 
and in the evolution of the CSCE 
process. 

With regard to the Helsinki Final 
Act, Soviet objectives were basically to 
legitimize the division of Europe, 
highlight the central role of the state vis- 
a-vis the individual, and focus CSCE 
exclusively on the Soviet vision of pan- 
European security. While the U.S.S.R. 
succeeded in recording a principle on the 
inviolability of frontiers, even this princi- 
ple was tempered by language that fron- 
tiers could be changed by peaceful 
means and by agreement. In fact, the 
Final Act much more clearly reflects the 
Western agenda in CSCE. It looks 
toward the peaceful reunification of 
Europe, opening the door for increased 
East- West contacts. It underscores the 
rights and freedoms of individuals, 
establishing standards of government 
conduct vis-a-vis its own citizens. 
Finally, it provides a balanced focus in 
which human rights are recognized as a 
fundamental element of genuine security 
in Europe. 

The Soviets totally failed to foresee 
the consequences of the commitments 
they assumed in Helsinki. They no doubt 
felt they could simply ignore these com- 
mitments, as they had those in the UN 
Charter and the UN Declaration on 
Human Rights. In fact, they were confi- 
dent enough to publish the complete text 
of the Final Act in Izvestia, thus making 
it available to every Soviet citizen for 
the price of three kopecks. The Helsinki 
monitoring groups that grew up in both 



the U.S.S.R and Eastern Europe were 
major unwelcome surprise to the Sovi< 
regime. 

Yet another blow was the fact tha, 
the follow-up meetings in Belgrade an'. 
Madrid focused on exposing Soviet 
human rights abuses. The effect of thi 
persistent publicity about the true 
nature of the Soviet system is even no i 
insufficiently understood, in particular 
regarding the role it played in the rev<| 
sal of the Soviet image in Western 
Europe in the early 1980s. The period 
the Madrid meeting (1980-83) witness , 
a dramatic decline of the pro-Soviet le i 
in France, a West German decision to | 
deploy U.S. intermediate-range nucleai 
missiles on German soil, and sustained , 
popular support in Britain and Italy fo , 
governments committed to strong 
security ties with the United States. 

The Madrid concluding document 
also made a significant contribution in i 
advancing the fundamental goal of the 
Helsinki process of increased openness , 
In a statement before the Madrid con- i 
ference, Secretary of State Shultz 
praised the addition of "important new 
commitments with respect to human 
rights, trade union freedoms . . . free 
flow of information, and measures 
against terrorism as accomplishments < ! 
Madrid. 

Madrid also provided an important i 
opportunity to advance our goal of 
finding concrete ways to increase con- i 
fidence and security in Europe. The 
mandate adopted in Madrid for the 
Conference on Confidence- and Securit, 
Building Measures and Disarmament ir 
Europe (CDE) both expanded the zone 
defined in the Final Act to cover Soviet 
territory west of the Urals and codified 
key Western criteria that measures 
adopted should have military sig- 
nificance and be verifiable. 

Despite early Soviet efforts to turn 
CDE into a forum for empty, propagan- 
dists declarations, the West has been 
highly successful in keeping the 
Stockholm conference focused on its ow 
agenda. The United States is working 
hard to achieve a successful conclusion, 
by the September 19 adjournment date, 
which will enhance stability and securit; 
in Europe through adoption of such 
measures as mandatory notification of 
military activities at a significantly 
reduced threshold, mandatory observa- 
tion, and an annual calendar of planned 
activities. Adoption of certain CDE 
measures, such as mandatory on-site in- 



70 



Department of State Bulleti 



EUROPE 



ction on Soviet territory, could also 
'e a favorable impact on other U.S. 
ns control endeavors. 
Despite these gains, it is true that 
rail Eastern, and in particular Soviet, 
npliance with CSCE obligations, 
ecially in the human rights area, 
mains seriously flawed. Andrey 
kharov and Elena Bonner remain 
der house arrest in Gorki, and Yuriy 
low Anatoliy Marchenko, and other 
flsinki monitors are either in prison or 
rernal exile. Also the number of Soviet 
fjvs permitted to emigrate fell from 
WOO in 1979 to barely more than 1,000 
k year. 

II The record of Soviet violations has 
6 some observers of the Helsinki proc- 
I to argue that the United States 
}>uld abandon it altogether. I accept 
1 good faith with which that argument 
made, and I share the frustration with 
jriet violations which has kindled it. 
vertheless I believe it is wrong. That 
.^iment, in my view, is akin to urging 
j.t we scrap the criminal code because 
Ire are people who break the law. I 
inly believe that the Helsinki process 
I been and remains very much in the 
crests of the United States. 

We must preserve that process in 
i: er to keep faith with those who strug- 
; to realize the goals of Helsinki. I 
re personally asked a number of 
(net dissidents and "refuseniks" in 
jscow and other parts of the Soviet 
.ion if they felt CSCE was a waste of 
|e. I never found one— and this 
tludes Anatoliy Shcharanskiy with 
lorn I discussed this subject last 
]ing— who told me he wanted the proc- 
i closed down. They felt rather that, 
[;pite the U.S.S.R.'s poor compliance 
lord, the publicity generated by the 
new meetings on Soviet human rights 
.ises did, indeed, help them. 

'.e Vienna Follow-Up Meeting 

k approach to Vienna will be governed 
i two overarching objectives. First, we 
kt secure improved Eastern com- 
t'ince with commitments already 
liertaken in the Final Act and the 
Z.drid concluding document, partic- 
irly with regard to human rights. As 
umised in President Reagan's state- 
jnt on the occasion of the 11th 
Jiiversary of the Final Act: "We will 
irk to ensure that the upcoming 
1 eting in Vienna will mark a step 
,vard making the promises of 
'lsinki's first decade a reality in its 
■:ond." Second, and equally important 
1 be our efforts to pursue balanced 



progress across the board in Vienna to 
insure that human rights are given at 
least equal weight with other CSCE 
elements such as security. 

In addition, I believe we will have an 
opportunity in Vienna to strengthen the 
relevance and effectiveness of the 
Helsinki process. In this context, we will 
consider whether shorter and more fre- 
quent follow-up meetings might not pro- 
vide a greater stimulus for progress. We 
will also strive to lengthen the period of 
time devoted to implementation review 
and increase the openness of the process 
as much as possible. 

To achieve our key objectives, we 
will seek a thorough review of implemen- 
tation as well as balanced and construc- 
tive steps forward. In order to build 
pressure for improved compliance, as 
well as identify steps that can help bring 
that about, we need to concentrate 
attention on the East's record. That will 
mean devoting a substantial amount of 
time in Vienna to implementation review 
in order to establish a clear record of 
specifics and individual cases where 
CSCE commitments have been abused. 
Where productive, we intend to cite 
specific names and events in plenary 
session. 

As always in CSCE, basket 3 and 
principle VII issues will be a central 
focus of our attention. As in the past, 
the emphasis will be to bring about 



steps which could lead to real progress 
in improving the lot of individuals, 
reducing barriers, and broadening 
human contacts. Notwithstanding the 
frustrations we have encountered at 
experts' meetings, we believe these are 
worthwhile endeavors and should be part 
of the post- Vienna agenda. But overall, 
our proposals will be focused on and 
directed toward achieving better com- 
pliance with existing commitments. 

Maintaining balance will be a central 
challenge for the Vienna meeting. This 
concept of balance ties the various 
strands of the CSCE together, based on 
the recognition that the humanitarian, 
security, and economic elements of the 
Helsinki process are interdependent. It 
is unrealistic to believe that real, endur- 
ing progress can take place in East- West 
relations without progress on human 
rights. 

In Vienna we will have to weigh the 
results of the CDE, and the other 
experts' meetings, as well as the 
achievements and problems in all aspects 
of CSCE. If the Stockholm conference 
concludes successfully, security ques- 
tions will probably receive prominent 
attention in Vienna. In the June 11 
Budapest appeal, the Soviet Union and 
other Warsaw Pact states declared their 
interest in pursuing negotiations on 
disarmament from the Atlantic to the 
Urals. At their ministerial meeting in 



The Soviets totally failed to foresee the conse- 
quences of the commitments they assumed in 
Helsinki. . . they were confident enough to publish 
the complete text of the Final Act in Izvestia, thus 
making it available to every Soviet citizen for the 
price of three kopecks. The Helsinki monitoring 
groups. . . were a major unwelcome surprise to the 
Soviet regime. 



improvements in the lives of individual, 
ordinary people. Our vigorous pursuit of 
human rights improvements will be con- 
sistent with the approach taken by the 
President with General Secretary 
Gorbachev at the Geneva summit; that 
is, emphasizing the need for concrete 
results. 

Western ideas developed during the 
experts' meetings at Ottawa, Budapest, 
and Bern provide a wealth of material 
for us to consider in developing positive 



vember 1986 



Halifax, the United States and its NATO 
allies established a high-level task force 
to examine ways to strengthen stability 
and security in Europe, through 
increased openness and the establish- 
ment of a verifiable, stable balance of 
conventional forces at lower levels. The 
task force will issue an initial report in 
October and a final report to ministers in 
December. While we cannot yet predict 
the outcome, the results of the task force 
study will no doubt have an important 
bearing on our work in Vienna. 



71 



EUROPE 



In determining our approach to 
security questions, we must be careful to 
insure "that the security component is not 
allowed to dominate other aspects of the 
CSCE process. On the other hand, we 
must also remember that Soviet 
interests in security and economic ques- 
tions will provide important leverage for 
us to secure our central human rights 
objectives. And we must bear in mind 
that important U.S. security interests 
are engaged in the CSCE process. 

West European Objectives 

With regard to the Atlantic alliance, the 
CSCE process has fostered and rein- 
forced allied unity. The Soviets and 
others have worked very hard to use the 
CSCE process to split the United States 
from its NATO allies. Not only have they 
failed in these efforts, but I believe that 
CSCE has been a historic monument to 
alliance cooperation. In turn, alliance 
unity— in insisting on compliance with 
CSCE undertakings and on balance 
between security and human rights 
goals— has been essential to the progress 
we have made thus far. We must thus 
continue to present a united front if we 
are to make progress on issues of impor- 
tance to us. 

I believe that strong U.S. leadership 
and skillful alliance management both at 
NATO and Vienna will allow us to 
achieve that objective. Based on discus- 
sions I have had at NATO and in allied 
capitals earlier this year, I can assure 
you that our allies fully share our basic 
goals for the Vienna meeting. It is often 
forgotten in this country that, at the 
outset of the Helsinki negotiations in the 
mid-1970s, the West Europeans showed 
a stronger and deeper interest in CSCE 
and foresaw much earlier the importance 
of the human dimension than did the 
United States. 

Since the 1977 Belgrade follow-up 
meeting, expressions of Western con- 
cern over Soviet human rights abuses 
have become increasingly frequent and 
specific. This approach has found con- 
siderable resonance among West 
European publics and has increasingly 
been endorsed at the highest political 
level. Thus, for example, during General 
Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Paris in 
October 1985, French journalists on both 
the right and the left grilled Mr. 
Gorbachev on Soviet failure to live up to 
the standards enshrined in the Final Act. 
Also during that visit, President 
Mitterrand insisted that movement in 
basket 3 of the Final Act take place at 



CSCE Follow-Up Preparatory Meeting 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 23, 1986' 

The United States, Canada, and the 33 
other European states which participate 
in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) begin a 
2-week meeting today in Vienna. This 
meeting will prepare the agenda and 
working program of the third CSCE 
follow-up meeting which opens there 
November 4. 

The U.S. delegation, headed by 
Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, will 
seek to assure that the practical 
arrangements adopted at this organiza- 
tional meeting will facilitate achievement 
of our substantive goals for the follow-up 
meeting itself. 

As at previous follow-up meetings— 
in Belgrade in 1977-78 and Madrid 
1980-83-this one will address the full 
range of issues covered by the Helsinki 
Final Act which represents a framework 
for seeking to resolve the humanitarian, 
economic, and security issues that divide 
Europe. The Vienna meeting will review 
the results of various subsidiary CSCE 
meetings held since Madrid. These 
include meetings on human rights, 
human contacts, and culture, as well as 



the outcome of the Stockholm Con- 
ference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmaments 
Europe (CDE). 

The Stockholm conference, which 
reached an accord on confidence-builc 
measures Monday [September 22], is 
integral part of this broader CSCE pi 
ess which recognizes the interrelation 
ship between peace and freedom in 
Europe. 

The follow-up meeting in Novemb 
will take stock of the promises made ; 
the promises kept and weigh the bala 
among the various dimensions of the 
CSCE process. The United States anc 
its allies will seek improved complianc 
by the East with all the principles anc 
provisions of Helsinki and Madrid. Wi 
will also seek to promote balanced pr( 
ress among the different dimensions ( 
the CSCE process. In particular con- 
crete steps by the East to resolve pro 
lems in the areas of human rights and 
humanitarian cooperation are needed. 
The question of the future of the CDE 
will be addressed at Vienna in this 
broader context. 



'Read to news correspondents by Dep? ' 
merit deputy spokesman Charles Redman, i 



the same pace as in the other areas of 
CSCE. During President Mitterrand's 
visit to Moscow this July, he again raised 
the issue of human rights, focusing on 
family reunification and increased 
dialogue on individual rights. 

Nevertheless, we need to recognize 
that our allies, for a variety of reasons, 
will pursue somewhat different 
approaches toward achieving our com- 
mon objectives. They may not, for exam- 
ple, be as vocal as the United States in 
citing specific cases of noncompliance. 
Some may tend to emphasize the impor- 
tance of CSCE as a process rather than 
as a negotiation. In my view, this diver- 
sity of approach will not weaken the 
impact of our combined efforts to 
achieve our mutual objectives of 
increased compliance and continued 
balance in the CSCE process. 

Soviet Objectives 

For years the Soviets sought to deflect 
human rights criticism by hiding behind 
the principle of "noninterference in 



internal affairs." The hollowness of th 



defense, however, has been exposed a; 
successive CSCE meetings during whi 
the Soviets have been forced to confro 
the facts of their poor record. The 
Soviets have begun to show sensitivity 
to such criticism, particularly when it , 
adversely affects the image Moscow 
wants to cultivate in Western Europe. 

Under the leadership of General 
Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviets appe 
to be changing their tactics. On the on 
hand, they have taken the offensive in 
charging the West with abuses of socia 
and economic rights, and we can expec 
a long litany of allegations against the 
United States at the Vienna meeting. 
This change of tactic, however, conced 
the legitimacy of raising human rights 
issues involving another country. We 
will, therefore, welcome the debate anc 
will engage in it energetically. 

Mr. Gorbachev has also indicated a 
greater willingness to talk about Soviel 
performance with regard to human 
rights. We can thus expect a more acti" 
Soviet effort in Vienna to refute 



72 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



■stern efforts to record and correct 
net abuses. We will also have to 
ard against allowing the Soviets to 
n credit for this increased willingness 
discuss human rights as a substitute 

actual, concrete performance on the 
•nan rights front. In this regard, we 
,st continue to insist that words and 
>mises be backed up with specific 
ids. 

The Soviets have also indicated a 
ong interest in progress on security 
i economic issues. While we will have 
examine any Soviet proposals in each 
ICE basket in the context of Western 
iectives and proposals in these areas, I 
ieve that they can help us, via the 
nciple of balance, to advance our 
lis with regard to improved com- 
ance on human rights. 

nclusion 

i have been working closely with the 
-nmission in developing and refining 
r strategy for the Vienna follow-up 
•eting. I look forward to continued 
ise collaboration as we enter the final 
.ges of preparation. As in Madrid, we 
1 1 rely heavily on your skills, expertise, 
i judgment. 

Given the Eastern record on human 
;hts issues, the Vienna meeting is 
sly to be a difficult conference, 
netheless, I am confident that prog- 
Iss is possible. As President Reagan 
ted in his statement at the close of the 
It review meeting 3 years ago: 
lialogue, when based on realistic 
ipectations and conducted with 
:tience, can produce results. These 
suits are often gradual and hard won, 
:t they are necessary buildingblocks for 
more secure and stable world." 



A Discussion on U.S.-Soviet Relations 



'The completed transcript of the hearings 
i,l be published by the commission and will 
: available from the Superintendent of 
icuments, U.S. Government Printing 
Bee, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Following is an interview with 
A mJbassador Paul H. Nitze, Special Ad- 
viser to the President and the Secretary 
of State on Arms Control Matters, and 
Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for European and Canadian 
Affairs, by broadcast journalist Nelson 
Benton on June 16, 1986. 

Introduction 

Mr. Benton: Hello, I'm Nelson Benton. 
Welcome to the State Department's pro- 
gram on U.S.-Soviet relations. Today, 
we will examine U.S. policy toward the 
Soviet Union; what it is, and how it got 
that way, and what the prospects are for 
improved relations. Figuring heavily in 
this equation is the complex issue of 
nuclear arms. 

In November 1985 President Reagan 
met in Geneva with Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev, seeking a better rela- 
tionship between the two countries and 
ways to reduce the nuclear arsenals of 
both sides. 

Over the past two decades, some 
Soviet- American agreements have been 
reached; some treaties have been signed. 
But international tension has always 
clouded the quest for improved Soviet- 
American relations. 

In 1981 President Reagan initiated 
new negotiations. Their objective: to 
bring about deep reductions in nuclear 
weapons. Today, that quest goes on. 

Interview 

Mr. Benton: What are the prospects for 
improved relations with the Soviets? 
How can we solve this complex problem 
of nuclear weapons? To discuss these 
issues from the perspective of the U.S. 
Government, we have with us today two 
distinguished diplomats. 

Ambassador Paul Nitze is a giant in 
the world of diplomacy, a man who has 
served as adviser to Presidents since 
Harry Truman. He is recognized as the 
expert in arms control, a principal nego- 
tiator of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty, present at the Kennedy- 
Khrushchev summit in Vienna in 1961. 
He has dealt with the Soviets across the 
table throughout four decades. Today, he 
is special adviser on arms control to the 
President of the United States and to 
Secretary of State George Shultz. 

Mark Palmer is a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary at the Department of State. 



He has played a key role in U.S.-Soviet 
relations for 5 years. He's worked on 
Soviet affairs for over two decades. He 
has served in the Soviet Union and was a 
Senior Assistant to Secretary Shultz in 
planning the Reagan-Gorbachev summit 
in Geneva. He holds the personal rank of 
Minister-Counselor and has been nomi- 
nated by President Reagan to be the 
next U.S. Ambassador to Hungary. 

Mr. Nitze, let me ask you first. You 
have negotiated with the Soviets 
throughout the postwar period, what 
have you learned about their negotiating 
techniques over that long time? 

Ambassador Nitze: The Soviet 
Union goes at the negotiations in a way 
which is much more closely designed to 
get the better of the other side in a 
negotiation. Therefore, they go into a 
negotiation with very extreme demands- 
very self-serving to their position. Then 
the second point is that they use every 
outside influence that they can develop 
to bring pressure on the other side to 
make the concessions that they want. 
They really don't believe that anybody in 
the West is going to give them some con- 
cession because they're fair and equita- 
ble. Then, finally, when they think that 
the situation has become ripe for some 
kind of negotiation, then they offer a 
rather small concession for and, they 
insist, for at least an equal concession on 
the other side. But if you start from 
unequal positions, then obviously that 
leads to a position of advantage to them 
in the negotiations. And, finally, they 
also believe that it is important to ensure 
that the final negotiations take place 
against a deadline. They think they're in 
a better position to get a better deal if 
there's a deadline. 

Mr. Benton: Let me ask you, Mr. 
Palmer, do we have a comprehensive, 
long-range policy toward the Soviet 
Union? What are its components? 



To obtain a videotape of this interview 
please contact: 

Bureau of Public Affairs 
Special Projects Staff 
U.S. Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 



(Tel.: 202-647-2353) 



Dvember 1986 



73 



EUROPE 



Mr. Palmer: We look at the great 
sweep of our relations since the Second 
World War, and we have to recognize 
that it is a difficult relationship. The 
norm over the last 40 years or so has 
been problems, not successes; not 
cooperation but difficulty and antago- 
nism. And I think realistically one has to 
recognize that the Soviet world view is 
profoundly different than ours and their 
system is profoundly different. There- 
fore, it's no use sort of saying let's have 
some simple solution, let's just talk to 
them a little bit more, smile a little 
more, and the relationship will be trans- 
formed; it won't. And if you proceed 
that way, you're bound to have very 
sharp vacillations of rising expectations, 
and then something like the Korean 
airliner or Afghanistan will come along 
and your strategy will be in a shambles. 

So we believe we should proceed 
steadily, recognizing, being realistic 
about the nature of the differences. 
Secondly, we believe that given the size 
and scale and power of the Soviet Union, 
it's important to recognize that they will 
only respect us and deal with us on a 
basis of equality if we're strong— strong 
not only militarily but also strong in 
terms of politics— recognizing that the 
struggle in the final analysis is a political 
struggle, that the Soviets believe that 
history is moving in their direction. But 
the third element of our approach is, of 
course, negotiations and engagement. 
And with all the difficulty, I think 
it's important not to despair. Results are 
possible. We have had times when things 
have been achieved which have been 
valuable for them and for us and for the 
world. And President Reagan has a very 
ambitious, perhaps the most ambitious 
agenda of negotiations that we have 
ever had. He wants to do away with all 
nuclear weapons; he wants to have an 
unprecedented scale of people-to-people 
exchanges. It's those kinds of bold ideas 
that we think are important, and that's 
our agenda. We want to touch all of the 
key areas: arms control; regional prob- 
lems like Afghanistan, Middle East, 
southern Africa; human rights, a very 
important part of our agenda; and all 
this broad scope of bilateral things from 
trade to people-to-people programs. 
That's our agenda. 

Mr. Benton: What about the prob- 
lem of dealing with human rights and 
the Soviet Union. Can we have a practi- 
cal effect on the human rights practices 
of the Soviet Union? 

Mr. Palmer: Within certain limits 
we can have, historically we have had. 



There've been periods in which things 
have happened: large numbers of emi- 
grants have been permitted to come out 
of the Soviet Union; prominent dissi- 
dents have been released from jail. And, 
in the context of this last summit, we did 
see some results. I went to Germany to 
greet Mr. Shcharanskiy when he came 
out. One of the most exciting moments 
of my life was seeing this marvelous, 
courageous, funny, moderate human 
being finally released after a terrible 
ordeal in the Soviet Union. One of the 
reasons why you didn't hear more at the 
time of the summit is that the President 
believes that the most practical approach 
is for him to develop a quiet relationship 
with Mr. Gorbachev on this issue, so that 
while we as a people and a government 
will continue to speak out about human 
rights very vigorously, he wants to have 
this special ability, as President Nixon 
had that special ability, to produce prac- 
tical results in the human rights field. 

Mr. Benton: Mr. Nitze, why has 
President Reagan decided that we will 
no longer be constrained by the limits of 
the SALT II [strategic arms limitation 
talks] Treaty? 

Ambassador Nitze: The President 
started off feeling that the SALT II 
Treaty was a flawed treaty, but he also 
thought that negotiations with the 
Soviet Union were important. And he 
thought it would help the process of 
negotiations if, at least for a certain 
period of time, the United States were to 
restrain itself, exercise restraint with 
respect to its programs so it stayed 
within the limitations of SALT II— which 
have never been ratified and which 
would have expired by 1985— provided 
the Soviets did the same and provided 
there was time, they were prepared 
seriously to negotiate. Now that decision 
he made in 1982. So that, you know, a 
number of years have gone by since that 
1982 decision. He has said, however, 
that he will feel himself, the United 
States, not to be constrained by those 
limits— because of the passage of time, 
because of the fact that the Soviets have 
not restricted themselves to the restric- 
tions of SALT II. 

Mr. Benton: The role of summitry- 
summitry and arms negotiations at this 
point seem so totally tied together. What 
is the role of summitry and the linkage 
to arms control negotiations? 

Mr. Palmer: One American who's 
dealt with the Soviets since the time of 
Lenin said to me that they are a system— 
that everybody is afraid of the man next 



above him, until you get all the way ul 
to the very top. And it's only the vervl 
top man who really can make decision! 
on anything of any importance. And iU 
would say that is the critical reason fcji 
summitry. You've got to, when you w| 
to do something big and ambitious, 
you've got to get to that man. Every- 
body down below is more or less a nei 
vous bureaucrat and isn't willing to ts 
that kind of big step. 

So the President has outlined, as ; 
know, a three summit agenda which i: 
unprecedented, I think; we've never h 
a proposal and a concept for three sur 
mits in very rapid succession in order 
bring about these kinds of big agree- 
ments. So I would say that, if one 
approaches summitry in the right waj 
is necessary to get the kinds of things 
we want. 

Mr. Benton: Given the fact that 
General Secretary Gorbachev is new i 
his job, isn't a summit from pure inter 
political purposes very much to his 
advantage in establishing his power ir 
the Soviet Union? 

Mr. Palmer: I think that's absolut 
right if it goes well. If it goes badly wl 
you're still trying to consolidate your 
power, of course, it can go very badly 
from your own personal point of view. 
And I think that's what we're seeing 
now— a little uncertainty on his part 
about whether he wants to go ahead 
with a commitment that he made in w: 
ing to a summit this year in Washingti 
and a summit next year in Moscow. M, 
sense, however, is that he still sees soi 
advantages. And that, as the Presiden 
has said, we're very committed, and w 
hope very much that the process will g 
ahead. 

Mr. Benton: Let's get back to arm 
control policy if we could for a minute. 
How do you respond to critics who say 
that the Administration does not have 
agreed-upon arms control policy? 

Ambassador Nitze: The President 
has wished from the very beginning to 
set up the preconditions, the conditions 
in the world under which the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons would b 
possible. You can't do that overnight, t- 
lot of things have to be done to make it 
possible. One of the things that he 
thought would lead in the direction of 
such a world was, for instance, limita- 
tions on conventional arms. He's been 
interested in the mutual force reductior 
program, MBFR [mutual and balanced 
force reductions], in Europe. Another 
thing is the limitation and the ban on th 



74 



Department of State Bullet 






EUROPE 



duction and deployment of chemical 
pons. He's been working on that; 
ve been working on that hard. The 
n thing, of course, is the limitation of 
[ear weapons and, in that field, part 
hat problem is a problem in Europe 
that has to do with the intermediate- 
ge nuclear forces, which are deployed 
'urope and some in the Far East. 
We've been working hard on that 
ti respect to the total elimination of 
t entire class of nuclear weapons. I, 
self, was the head of that delegation 
ch works— has been working for 
rs trying to get that done. He's been 
-king hard on the question of the 
^tegic nuclear weapons, those which 
weapons of intercontinental range, 
ch affect primarily the United States 
i the U.S.S.R. There, he'll again wish 
[ee that there would be meaningful 
' strategically important reductions in 
jipons of this type— an increasingly 
'p reduction so that this would end up 
ling toward the possibility of the total 
iiination of nuclear weapons. It was 
a same drive, this same interest, 
|ch caused him to suggest that our 
inical people look to see whether or 
i it might not be possible to develop 
pnsive weapons which could con- 
■ ute to a situation in which the aboli- 
i of nuclear weapons would be feasi- 
i So, that's what we've been trying to 
i and I think all parts of the U.S. pro- 
im have been consistent with those 
bctives. There have been differences 
'hin the Administration as to the best 
\i to approach some of these points. 
\. they've been differences about the 
uniques, so forth and so on, the minor 
its of it. The principal objectives have 
i been in controversy within the exec- 
ve branch. 

Mr. Benton: With SDI (Strategic 
1'ense Initiative), some are concerned 
lit this may violate the Anti-Ballistic 
Jisile Treaty. 

Ambassador Nitze: It clearly does 
I violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
laty. In the first place, the Anti- 
ilistic Missile Treaty never mentions 
1 word research. It was agreed by 
i'h the Soviet side and by our side that 
tearch was not to be limited by that 
tty, and it is not limited by that 
.iaty. The Soviets have tried to suggest 
k that purposeful research is some- 
liv or other limited under the treaty. 
i!t, it isn't mentioned, it isn't limited 
-Jer the treaty. There's no way in 
i ich you could verify what is going on 

:he minds of researchers in 
coratories, and so forth and so on. 



Mr. Benton: Secretary Shultz has 
called for less use by the Soviets of 
highly publicized proposals, particularly 
arms control proposals. Why is that 
important, Mr. Nitze? 

Ambassador Nitze: Any indication 
that the Soviets are really prepared for 
confidential negotiations would be 
important. That is where one really does 
the business of coming to conclusions 
which would take into account not only 
Soviet interests but our own. 

We believe that the place for those 
confidential negotiations is in Geneva, 
where Max Kampelman [head, U.S. 
delegation on arms control negotiations 
and U.S. negotiator on defense and 
space arms] and a very competent team 
are negotiating with a very competent 
team on the Soviet side. Those people in 
Geneva are in a position where they 
could take into account not only the 
broad principles which are of interest to 
the public but also the specific details 
which would make it possible to trans- 
late those principles into reality- 
something that you could count on, 
something that would be verifiable, 
something which would do what is 
intended. 

Mr. Palmer: Since Lenin's time, the 
Soviets have believed that the best thing 
to do was to go around governments and 
to affect people's peace movements- 
front groups to affect the context within 
which political leaders in other societies 
make decisions. And that has been such 
a strong stream in Soviet diplomacy, 
such a relatively novel approach to 
diplomacy because it means not going to 
the foreign ministry but to the press, in 
a certain sense, that in the 1970s 
Suslov— who was then head of the 
ideological part of the Soviet Central 
Committee— Suslov complained that they 
had, at that point, shifted too much in 
the direction of serious negotiations on 
arms control, the Middle East, and other 
areas with the United States and that 
they needed to resurrect more of the 
ideological propaganda, going to the 
people approach. And Arkady Shev- 
chenko, one of the senior Soviets who's 
come over to the West, reports about 
that in his book. This remarkable 
phenomenon of trying to fine tune the 
distinction between serious talks with 
the West and propaganda. 

Ambassador Nitze: What I look for 
is indications of a decision by the Polit- 
buro, that the Politburo has come to the 
conclusion that the time is now ripe for a 
deal, that they want a deal— is one of the 
best indicators, I think, is when they 



seriously wish or indicate that they want 
the important negotiations to be con- 
fidential. At the time when they are 
making public statements as to their 
position, then it's perfectly clear that 
they have not reached a stage where 
they want the negotiations really to 
reach that final phase. 

Ambassador Semyonov [head of 
Soviet SALT I delegation], once told me 
during one of the negotiations— I felt we 
weren't making the progress that I had 
hoped for— and Ambassador Semyonov 
said, "Oh, Mr. Nitze, don't be discour- 
aged, you know in a serious negotiation 
of this kind, one gets perhaps 30% of the 
business done in the first couple of 
months— each side establishes its posi- 
tion. But then it takes some years for 
the next 30% of the business to be done. 
And the final 30% is done in the last 20 
minutes." 

Mr. Benton: What do you see hap- 
pening in the next 2-3 years down the 
road with Moscow? 

Mr. Palmer: Well, we have a sense 
that Mr. Gorbachev has given a green 
light to people-to-people programs, and I 
think most Americans welcome that. 
We've been inundated with ideas from 
American private initiative in this 
field— everything from the Dallas 
Cowboys and the Washington Redskins 
playing a game in Lenin Stadium to 
hosts of high school students who want 
to go over there and study. We've had 
an average of 100 calls a day with new 
ideas in this field. So, I think we'll see an 
expansion in people-to-people programs. 
I think we're going to see a regulariza- 
tion of the discussions on critical wars 
that are underway today— Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, 
the whole of the Middle East. We've 
begun to move into a systematic set of 
talks at senior levels, and I think that's 
going to continue, and that's good. 

Ambassador Nitze: It is my own 
view, this is my personal view, that the 
Soviet economy is not in deep difficulty. 
It isn't an efficient economy, but it does 
continue to grow, because it started 
from a low, very low level and they've 
got an enormous country and enormous 
resources and a very large body of 
talented people. So there's no reason 
why it shouldn't continue to grow. But, 
as I see it, they are beginning to meet 
the phenomenon of rising expectations 
on the part of their populace, that means 
that you have to enter the modern 
world. You have to enter the world in 
which there is communication, the world 
in which there is a greater freedom on 



Wember 1986 



75 



EUROPE 



the part of individuals and enterprises in 
the Soviet Union to do the intelligent 
thing, to enter this modern world. 

If they want to get into the modern 
world, then I think it is in their interest 
to reduce the burden of armaments, 
which is immense in the Soviet Union. I 
would think that if they really want to 
make this transition into the modern 
world and, to some degree, meet these 
expectations of their populace, they 
should be interested in arrangements 
which would take into account, not only 
their strategic interests but those of the 
West as well. 

Mr. Palmer: I'm mildly encouraged. 
I think that the Soviet Union has some 
incentives now for dealing with us. We 
have restored our military strength to a 
considerable degree. There's still much 
to be done, but there is now a greater 
recognition in Moscow that what they 
call the correlation of forces is not, at 
the moment, ineluctably moving in their 
direction. So, they have some incentives 
now to deal with us. There has been, in 
some of the arms control fora, a little bit 
of an indication on the part of the 
Soviets of seriousness. As Paul men- 
tioned, when they start to go quiet on 
something, you start to get a little more 
encouraged, and there have been a few 
quiet things lately— modest, not to exag- 
gerate their significance, no break- 
through, but a little bit there to work 
with. So I'm— within the rather cautious 
longer term context, I think that we 
have some opportunities now. I know 
that's the President's and Secretary 
Shultz's view that we should pursue 
these opportunities vigorously, and I'm 
confident that that will be done by this 
Administration. 

Mr. Benton: Our time is up. Mr. 
Nitze, Mr. Palmer, thank you very much. 
And thank you for joining us. I am 
Nelson Benton at the State Depart- 
ment. ■ 



28th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
SEPT. 9, 1986 1 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am 
submitting to you a bimonthly report on prog- 
ress toward a negotiated settlement of the 
Cyprus question. 

Since my last report to you, the United 
Nations Secretary General has continued his 
initiative. He has made clear his commitment 
to his good offices mission and to helping the 
two Cypriot sides move forward toward an 
overall solution. In this regard, he will be 
meeting with Mr. Denktash on September 16 
and with President Kyprianou later in the 
month. We will give the Secretary General 
our full support and encourage the parties to 
cooperate with him and carry forward the 
work that has been accomplished since the 
inception of his initiative. 

Among other developments in Cyprus of 
note, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal visited 



northern Cyprus from July 2 to July 4. 
During that period, movement through t 
primary crossing point between north an 
south Cyprus was blocked by demonstral 
on the Greek Cypriot side. On July 4, Tu 
Cypriot authorities announced the closur 
all crossing points on their side of the U. 
buffer zone and did not reopen them unt 
July 12. We made clear to all concerned 
view that actions that could exacerbate t 
sions and complicate the search for a pes 
settlement should be avoided. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald Re 



'Identical letters addressed to Thorn; 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugar, 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilati< 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 15. 198( 



76 



Department of State Bull* 



UMAN RIGHTS 



leligious Persecution in the Soviet Union 



: Following are statements by Edward 
,[)< rwinski. Counselor of 'the Depart- 
fnt of State, and Richard Schifter, 
tsistant Secretary for Human Rights 
id Humanitarian Affairs, before the 
neommittees on Human Rights and 
kernational Organizations and on 
vrvpe and the Middle East of the House 
frt ign Affairs Committee on July 30, 

k 1 



HJNSELOR DERWINSKI 

lank you for giving me the opportunity 
testify today on the subject of 
ligious persecution in the Soviet 
lion. On September 11, of last year, I 
voted my remarks to the persecution 
the Soviet Jewish population. Today 
y testimony will cover the general 
fuation of religion in the Soviet Union 
id Soviet persecution of non-Jewish 
jligious groups and organizations. 

As I noted in my appearance last 
I'ptember, Soviet authorities have 
■•gely succeeded in crushing the 
litical and nationalist human rights 
ganizations which sprang up during 
■e 1960s and 1970s. The last surviving 
jlsinki monitoring group was forced to 
uband in the face of heavy repression 
: late 1982. With the mainstream 
iman rights movement in the Soviet 
'.lion effectively destroyed, Soviet 
ithorities have brought increasing 
I'essure to bear against the largest 
maining center of organized dissent in 
'e Soviet Union— the religious 
mmunity. 

The Soviet regime regards religion 
. a hostile ideology and is openly com- 
itted to the creation of an atheist 
iciety. Its attitude was summed up by a 
yelorussian party official who wrote a 
)84 article in Kommunist Belorussii 
»at "religion in our country is the only 
gal refuge alien to socialism in ideology 
|id morals." How Soviet authorities 
iderstand freedom of conscience is 
rvealed in Soviet constitutional provi- 
ons, legislation, administrative regula- 
ons, and extralegal pressures applied 
gainst believers. 

oviet Law and Religion 

rticle 52 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution 
sfines freedom of conscience as the 
ght "to conduct religious worship or 
fcheist propaganda." This formulation in 
"feet makes illegal the conduct of 



"religious propaganda"; i.e., to engage 
in public discussion or refute atheist 
propaganda. 

The 1929 Law on Religious Associa- 
tions circumscribes believers' rights still 
further. Soviet authorities interpret the 
law's requirement that primary religious 
associations must register with local 
authorities as giving it the right to grant 
or withhold registration. In practice, this 
allows the state to limit the number of 
religious a