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bulletin 



Volume 87 / Number 2127 / October 1987 



The DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN, published by the Office of 
Public Communication in the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, is the official record of 
U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to pro- 
vide the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign rela- 
tions and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. The 
BULLETIN'S contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
selected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and 
treaties and other agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party. Special features, articles, and 
other supportive material (such as maps, 
charts, photographs, and graphs) are 
published frequently to provide addi- 
tional information on current issues but 
should not necessarily be interpreted as 
official U.S. policy statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. HAYNES 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business 
required by law of this Department. Use of 
funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget through September 30. 
1987. 



lir|i;irtiiu'nt of Sl;ilf Ull.l.KTIN (ISSN 1104 l-7l'il(l) 
IS puhlislifil monthly (|ilu.s annual index) by the 
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NOTE: Most of the contents of this publica- 
tion are in the public domain and not copy- 
righted. Those items may be reprinted; cita- 
tion of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. 
Permission to reproduce all copyrighted 
material (including photographs) must be 
obtained from the original source. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide 
to Periodical Literature and in the PAIS 
(Public Affairs Information Service, Inc.) 
Bulletin. 



CONTENTS 



The President 

1 A Forward Strategy for Peace and 
Freedom 

4 Iran-Contra Controversy and Presi- 

dent's Goals (Excerpts) 

5 Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic 

Resistance 



The Secretary 

6 Matching Foreign Policy Resources 
With Goals 
1 1 News Conference of August 6 

Africa 

14 Visit of Gabon President (El Hadj 
Omar Bongo. President Reagan) 

Arms Control 

16 Negotiations on Strategic Arms 

Reductions 

17 Soviets Indicate Acceptance of INF 

Proposal (White House Statement) 

18 U.S. Presents Views on INF 
Verification (Department Statement) 

Consular Affairs 

9 Travel Advisories 

Department 

:0 Managing Diplomacy: Problems and 
Issues (Ronald I. Spiers) 

East Asia 

.3 U.S. -Lao POW/MIA Consultations 
Held in Vientiane (Joint State- 
ment) 

'3 U.S. Urges Resumption of North- 
South Korean Talks (Department 
Statement) 



Economics 

24 Global Economic Powers With 

Global Responsibilities (Douglas 
W. McMinn) 

26 International Protection of U.S. 
Copyrights (W. Allen Wallis) 

General 

29 Diplomatic Immunity and U.S. In- 
terests (Selwa Roosevelt) 

32 Under Secretary Armacost's Inter- 
view on "Meet the Press" 

Human Rights 

34 The Soviet Constitution: Myth and 
Reality (Richard Schifter) 

36 Captive Nations Week, 1987 (Proc- 

lamation) 

37 Helsinki Human Rights Day, 1987 

(Proclamation) 

Middle East 

38 U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf 

(Jeffrey Schloesser) 
44 Assistant Secretary Murphy's Inter- 
view on "Meet the Press" 



Military Affairs 

49 West Germany to Dismantle 
Pershing lA Missiles 
(White House Statement) 

49 Export Controls Imposed on 

Chemical Weapons Substances 
(Department Statement) 

Nuclear Policy 

49 Soviet Nuclear Test Releases 

Radioactive Debris (Department 
Statement) 



Science & Technology 

50 Science and Technology Cooperation 
With Latin America (John D. 
Negroponte) 

South Asia 

53 Pakistan and the Nuclear Issue 

(Richard Murphy) 

Western Hemisphere 

54 U.S. Initiative for Peace in Central 

America (President Reagan, 
Secretary Shultz, Text of Peace 
Plan) 
56 Guatemalan Agreement for Peace in 
Central America (President 
Reagan, Department Statement, 
Text of Agreement) 

59 Nicaragua Suppresses Peaceful 

Marches (Department Statement) 

60 Promoting Democracy in Haiti 

(Richard N. HohviU) 
63 Situation in Chile (Elliott Abrams) 

Treaties 

67 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

69 Department of State 

Publications 

70 Department of State 

70 CSCE Semiannual Report 
70 Background Notes 



Index 



'iOGUr/iEWTS I 



i|NOV 5 



^ 80SWW PUBLIC LI, 
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Prciiident Heagan in Lus Angelcf^ 



Department of State Bullet 



"HE PRESIDENT 



Forward Strategy 
lor Peace and Freedom 



President Reagan's address before the 
Vown Hall of California in Los Angeles 
m. August 26, 1987} 

m grateful for this opportunity to ad- 
Iress the Town Hall of California 
neeting and for the chance to be heard 
t the Chautauqua conference in New 
^ork, where citizens of the United 
tates and the Soviet Union are 
leeting together. East Coast or West 
oast, our purpose is the same: to pro- 
lote freer and more open communica- 
ions between the peoples of all nations 
nd to advance together the cause of 
eace and world freedom. 

In February of 1945, as he first 
•egan meeting with Roosevelt and 
talin at Yalta, much the same purpose 
reoccupied Winston Churchill. He felt 
great sense of urgency and said to his 
aughter, "I do not suppose that at any 
loment in history has the agony of the 
orld been so great or widespread, 
onight the sun goes down on more 
offering than ever before in the 
orld." 

It was not just the misery of World 
/ar II that appalled him. Churchill said 
2 also harbored a great fear that "new 
ruggles may arise out of those that 
e are successfully ending." About the 
reat Powers' meeting in Yalta, he 
Ided, "If we quarrel, our children are 
ndone." 

But we know now the Great Powers 
,d agree at Yalta. Difficult issues were 
lised and resolved; agreements were 
'ached; in a narrow sense, the summit 
)nference was successful; the meeting 
reduced tangible diplomatic results, 
nd among these was an endorsement 
' the rights upheld in the Atlantic 
harter, rights that would "afford 
isurance that all men in all the lands 
ay live out their lives in freedom from 
'ar and want." 

And so, too, the right of self-deter- 
lination of East European nations like 
oland were— at least on paper— 
jaranteed. But in a matter of months, 
hurchill's worst fears were realized; 
le Yalta guarantees of freedom and 
jman rights in Eastern Europe be- 
ime undone; and as democracy died in 
oland, the era of allied cooperation 
ided. 



What followed is known to us now 
as the postwar era; a time of tense ex- 
changes and often dangerous confronta- 
tions between East and West; our "long 
twilight struggle," as President Ken- 
nedy called it. And so, 40 years ago, far 
from ending the world strife and human 
suffering that so haunted Churchill, the 
Great Powers embarked on an era of 
cold war conflict. Perceiving a grave 
threat to our own security and the 
freedom of our allies in Western 
Europe, the people of the United States 
put in place the major elements of 
America's bipartisan foreign policy for 
the next four decades. In 1947, the 
Marshall Plan began the reconstruction 
of Europe; in 1947, the Truman Doc- 
trine supported the independence of 
Greece and Turkey and established the 
principle of assistance to nations strug- 
gling for democracy and against the im- 
position of totalitarian rule. 

In the 40 years since— for eight 
American administrations and 20 Con- 
gresses—the basis of America's foreign 
policy principles held firm: opposition to 
totalitarianism, the advocacy of demo- 
cratic reform and human rights, and 
the promotion of worldwide prosperity 
and freedom, all on the foundation of a 
strong defense and resolute commit- 
ment to allies and friends. 

Restoring the Vigor in 
U.S. Foreign Policy 

When this Administration took office, 
our own sense of these longstanding 
goals was keen. But we were also 
aware that much needed to be done to 
restore their vigor and vibrancy. The 
structure and purpose of American 
foreign policy had decayed in the 1970s. 

But as we worked to restore the 
traditionally upright and forceful 
posture of the United States in the 
world and reinvigorate a foreign policy 
that had maintained allied security for 
40 years, we also sought to break out of 
the stalemate of the cold war; to push 
forward with new initiatives that might 
help the world evolve beyond the post- 
war era. We sought more than a shaky 
world peace atop the volcano of poten- 
tial nuclear destruction; we sought 
something beyond accepted spheres of 
influence and tense standoffs between 
the totalitarian and the democratic 



worlds. In short, we sought ways to 
dispel rather than to live with the two 
great darkening clouds of the postwar 
era: the danger of nuclear holocaust 
and the expansion of totalitarian rule. 

In dealing with the nuclear threat, 
the United States said it would no 
longer pursue merely arms control— the 
management, limitation, or controlled 
growth of existing arsenals. The United 
States, together with our NATO allies, 
would seek, instead, deep, verifiable 
reductions in these arsenals— arms 
reduction, not just arms control. We 
sought to do it by moving beyond the 
status quo— a mere modus vivendi— in 
the arms race. 

In addition to opening negotiations 
to reduce arms in several categories, 
we did something even more revolu- 
tionary in order to end nuclear fear. 
We launched a new program of re- 
search into defensive means of prevent- 
ing ballistic missile attack. And by do- 
ing so, we attempted to maintain deter- 
rence while seeking to move away from 
the concept of mutual assured destruc- 
tion—to render it obsolete, to take the 
advantage out of building more and 
more offensive missiles and more and 
more warheads, at last to remove from 
the world the specter of military 
powers holding each other hostage to 
nuclear retaliation. In short, we sought 
to establish the feasibility of a defensive 
shield that would render the use of 
ballistic missiles fruitless. 

This was the meaning of our deci- 
sion to move forward with SDI [Strate- 
gic Defense Initiative], and I believe it 
was the right decision at the right time. 

But while we sought arms reduction 
and defensive deterrence, we never lost 
sight of the fact that nations do not 
disagree because they are armed; they 
are armed because they disagree on 
very important matters of human life 
and liberty. The fundamental differ- 
ences between totalitarian and demo- 
cratic rule remained. We could not 
gloss over them, nor could we be con- 
tent anymore with accepted spheres of 
influence, a world only half free. And 
that is why we sought to advance the 
cause of personal freedom wherever op- 
portunities existed to do so. Sometimes 
this meant support for liberalization; 
sometimes support for liberation. 



|ictober1987 



THE PRESIDENT 



In regional conflicts, for example, 
we elaborated a new policy of helping 
democratic insurgents in their battle to 
bring self-determination and human 
rights to their own countries. This doc- 
trine was first spelled out in our deci- 
sion to assist the people of Afghanistan 
in their fight against Soviet invasion 
and occupation. It was also part of our 
decision to assist the people of 
Nicara^a in their battle to restore the 
integrity of their 1979 revolution and 
make that government keep its promise 
of democratic rule. Our current efforts 
in Angola in support of freedom 
fighters constitute the most recent 
extension of this policy. 

In the area of human rights, our 
challenges to the Soviet Union became 
direct. We observed with Andrey 
Sakharov that true peace in the world 
could come only when governments ob- 
served and recognized the human rights 
of their citizens. Similarly, in our 
bilateral relationships— cultural and 
political exchanges, for example— we 
sought from the Soviets a new willing- 
ness to open this process up to larger 
and more diverse groups. 

And finally undergirding all of this 
was our commitment to public candor 
about the nature of totalitarian rule and 
about the ultimate objective of U.S. 
foreign policy: peace, yes, but world 
freedom as well. We refused to believe 
that it was somehow an act of belliger- 
ence to proclaim publicly the crucial 
moral distinctions between democracy 
and totalitarianism. 

And in my address to the British 
Parliament in 1982, when I noted the 
peaceful extension of human liberty was 
the ultimate goal of American foreign 
policy, I also pointed out that history's 
momentum resided instead with the 
cause of democracy and world freedom. 
And I offered hope that the increasing 
failure of statist economies would lead 
to demands for political change. I 
asked, in short, for a "crusade for 
freedom" that would spread democracy 
and promote democratic institutions 
throughout the world. 

As I have said before, we believe 
that such public affirmations were not 
only necessary for the protection and 
extension of freedom but, far from add- 
ing to world tensions, crucial to reduc- 
ing them and helping the pursuit of 
peace. Public candor and realism about 
and with the Soviets have helped the 
peace process. They were a signal to 
our Soviet counterparts that any com- 
pulsion to exploit Western illusions 
must be resisted because such illusions 
no longer exist. 



Our foreign policy then has been an 
attempt both to reassert the traditional 
elements of America's postwar strategy 
while at the same time moving beyond 
the doctrines of mutual assured destruc- 
tion or containment. Our goal has been 
to break the deadlock of the past, to 
seek a forward strategy; a forward 
strategy for world peace; a forward 
strategy for world freedom. 

We have not forsaken deterrence or 
containment, but working with our 
allies, we've sought something even 
beyond these doctrines. We have sought 
the elimination of the threat of nuclear 
weapons and an end to the threat of 
totalitarianism. 

A Strategy of Hope and Concerns 

Today we see this strategy— a strategy 
of hope— at work. We're moving toward 
reductions in nuclear arms. SDI is now 
underway; our offer to share the 
benefits of strategic defense remains 
open to all, including the Soviet Union. 
In regional conflicts like Afghanistan 
and Central America, the Soviet Union 
and its clients have, thus far, shown ?V. 
too little real willingness to move 
toward peace with real self-determina- 
tion for the people. But the forces of 
freedom grow steadily in strength, and 
they put ever greater pressure on the 
forces of totalitarianism. The paths to 
peace with freedom are open if Moscow 
decides to stop imposing its self-styled 
revolutions. 

In another area, we found a parallel 
interest with the Soviet Union in a 
political end to the Iran-Iraq war; we 
hope we can build together on this 
despite our differences. And finally, in 
the Soviet Union itself, we see move- 
ment toward more openness, possibly 
even progress toward respect for 
human rights and economic reform. 

And all of these developments 
weigh on our minds; we ponder their 
meaning; we ask ourselves: Are we 
entering a truly new phase in East- 
West relations? Is far-reaching, endur- 
ing change in the postwar standoff now 
possible? Do we have at last the chance 
envisioned by Churchill to end the 
agony of the 20th century? 

Surely, these are our hopes. But let 
honesty compel us to acknowledge we 
have fears and deep concerns as well. 
And while we acknowledge the interest- 
ing changes in the Soviet Union, we 
know, too, that any Western standard 
for democracy is still a very distant one 
for the Soviets; we know what real 
democracy constitutes; we understand 
its implications. 



It means the rule of law for the 
leaders as well as the people. It in- 
volves limitations on the power of the 
state over the people. It means orderly 
debate and meaningful votes. It means 
liberation of the captive people from the 
thralls of a ruling elite that presumes tc 
know the people's good better than the 
people. 

So while there's hope today, there's 
also uncertainty. And that's why we 
know we must deal with the Soviet 
Union as it has been and as it is and 
not as we would hope it to be. 

Opportunities for a Better 
U.S. -Soviet Relationship 

And yet we cannot rest with this. The 
opportunity before us is too great to le1 
pass by. And that's why in the past 
year we've challenged the Soviets with 
our own expectations— ways of showing 
us and the world their seriousness 
about fundamental improvements. It's 
why we have set down guideposts and 
pointers toward a better relationship 
with the Soviet Union. 

For 2 years, we've been asking the 
Soviets to join in discussing a coopera- 
tive approach toward a transition to 
defensive deterrence that threatens no 
one. In April of 1987, we asked that a 
date be set this year for rapid and com 
plete withdrawal from Afghanistan; in 
June, that the Soviets join us in allevi- 
ating the divisions of Berlin and begin 
with the dismantling of the Berlin Wal 
in July, that the Soviets move toward 
self-determination in Eastern Europe 
and rescind the Brezhnev Doctrine. Of 
course, these are significant democratii 
steps. But steps such as these are re 
quired for a fundamental improvement 
in relations between East and West. 

Well, today, I want to propose 
another step that Soviet leaders could 
take, a realistic step that would great!} 
help our efforts to reduce arms. We're 
near a historic agreement that could 
eliminate a whole class of missiles. If i1 
is signed, we shall rely not on trust bui 
on the evidence of our own eyes that i1 
is being implemented. As the Russians 
themselves say, doveryai no proveryai- 
trust but verify. And that we shall do. 

But effective verification requires 
more than unilateral technical means. 
Even onsite inspection is not a panacea 
especially as we address the ambitious 
agenda of arms reduction ahead. We 
need to seek compliance with existing 
agreements all too often violated by th 
U.S.S.R. We also need to see more 
openness, a departure from the habits 
of secrecy that have so long applied to 
Soviet military affairs. 



Department of State Bulleti 



ff 



(till 



THE PRESIDENT 



I say to the Soviet leadership, it's 
time to show some glasnost in your 
military affairs: 

First, publish a valid budget of your 
Tiilitary expenditures— just as we do; 

Second, reveal to the Soviet people 
md the world the size and composition 
)f the Soviet Armed Forces; and 

Third, open for debate in your 
Supreme Soviet the big issues of 
nilitary policy and weapons— just as 
ve do. 

These steps would contribute to 
jeater understanding between us and 
,lso to the good sense of your own deci- 
ions on the grave matter of armaments 
.nd military posture. 

The immediate agenda of arms 
eduction is clear. We can wrap up an 
igreement on intermediate-range 
uclear missiles promptly. There are 
till issues to be worked out. Our dele- 
;ation in Geneva has already pointed 
Ihe way to simplifying verification re- 
uirements now that we've agreed to 
le total elimination of U.S. and Soviet 
NF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
hissiles. 

We have also repeatedly pointed out 
iiat the last-minute demand by the 
joviets concerning West German Persh- 
fcg 1-A missiles was without founda- 
on. Well, earlier today. Chancellor 
j.ohl removed even this artificial 
bstacle from consideration. We are, 
aerefore, hopeful that the Soviet Union 
ill demonstrate that there is substance 
ehind the rhetoric they have repeated 
p often of late— that they genuinely 
lant a stabilizing INF agreement. And, 
so, they'll move to meet our proposals 
onstructively rather than erect addi- 

Eonal barriers to agreement. We also 
Bed to move ahead rapidly on the goal 
Kr. Gorbachev and I agreed to at Reyk- 
ivik last fall— a 50% reduction in 
;rategic nuclear forces. These would be 
reat achievements. 

Let me pause and make note of 
jmething that will advance the cause 
f all these negotiations. I think it is 
ital that Western reporters and editors 
eep the real record of these negotia- 
ons in mind. I note, for example, that 
le other day The Economist ran a kind 
f "believe-it-or-not" type item in which 
reminded its readership that it had 
een the United States that first pro- 
osed the zero-option in the INF 
egotiations and first proposed the 50% 
eductions in strategic weapons. I 
'ould simply say that as soon as the 
o\ lets realize that attempts to manipu- 
ite the media on these negotiations 



will not work, the better the chances 
are of treaty documents eventually get- 
ting signed. 

So, too, as most of you know, we 
have pursued our four-part agenda with 
the Soviets on human rights, arms 
reductions, resolution of regional con- 
flicts, and bilateral issues. All parts 
must advance if the relationship as a 
whole is to advance. Let me stress the 
serious concern about Soviet actions in 
one of these areas— regional conflicts. 
The fact remains that in Afghanistan 
Soviet occupation forces are still wag- 
ing a war of indiscriminate bombing 
and civilian massacre against a Muslim 
people whose only crime is to love their 
country and their faith. In Central 
America, Soviet-bloc arms deliveries 
have been speeding up during the past 
year— increasing by more than 100%. 

So while talking about reforms at 
home, the Soviet Union has stepped up 
its efforts to impose a failed system on 
others. I stress that speaking up about 
such actions is a matter of conscience 
to the West and that Soviet actions in 
these areas are being viewed with the 
utmost concern. And I cannot over- 
emphasize this point. 

But let me again note that the 
progress we've seen in East- West rela- 
tions flows from the new strength and 
resolution that we have brought to 
American foreign policy and from the 
boldness of our initiatives for peace. We 
are also seeing a Soviet leadership that 
appears more willing to address the 
problems that have divided East and 
West so long and to seek agreements 
based on mutual benefit. 

Worldwide Growth in Democracy 

Perhaps the final measure of this new 
resolve can be found in the growth of 
democracy throughout the world. Only 
a decade ago, democracy was under at- 
tack throughout Latin America— today 
more than 90% of Latin Americans live 
in nations that are now democratic or 
headed decisively in that direction. 

A recent UN General Assembly ses- 
sion on Africa called for more personal 
freedom and a reduction of government 



power in order to spur economic prog- 
ress. We have also seen dramatic demo- 
cratic gains in the past few years in na- 
tions like the Philippines and South 
Korea— even places like China have 
shown an openness toward economic 
reform. 

And above all, the old solutions of 
the 20th century for the world's woes- 
solutions calling for more and more 
state power concentrated in the hands 
of smaller and smaller elites— have 
come under fire everywhere, especially 
among the intellectuals. The new idea 
of a nexus between economic and politi- 
cal freedom as the principal vehicle of 
social progress is catching on. 

In looking back over these 6V2 years 
then, I cannot help but reflect on the 
most dramatic change to my own eyes: 
the exciting new prospects for the 
democratic cause. A feeling of energy 
and hope prevails; statism has lost the 
intellectuals; and everywhere one turns, 
nations and people are seeking the ful- 
fillment of their age-old aspirations for 
self-government and self-determination. 

Perhaps, then, we may finally pro- 
gress beyond the postwar standoff and 
fulfill the promises made at Yalta but 
never acted upon. Perhaps it's not too 
much to ask for initial steps toward 
democratic rule and free elections. And 
I hope to address this matter more fully 
before the UN General Assembly. 

Yes, we may then live at the mo- 
ment Churchill once anticipated; a mo- 
ment when the world would have a 
chance to redeem the opportunity it 
missed four decades ago; a chance for 
the "broad sunlit uplands" of freedom— 
a chance to end the terrible agony of 
the 20th century and the twin threats 
of nuclear war and totalitarian ideology. 
A chance, above all, to see humanity 
live and prosper under that form of 
government that Churchill called the 
worst form of government except, as he 
said, for all the others: democracy. 

This is the opportunity before us; 
it's one we must seize now for ourselves 
and future generations. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 31, 1987. 



rctober1987 



THE PRESIDENT 



Iran-Contra Controversy 
and President's Goals 



Excerpts of President Reagan's ad- 
dress to the nation of August 12. 1987} 

I've said on several occasions that I 
wouldn't comment about the recent con- 
o-ressional hearings on the Iran-contra 
matter until the hearings were over. 
Well that time has come, so tonight I 
want to talk about some of the lessons 
we've learned. But rest assured, thats 
not my sole subject this evening. I also 
want to talk about the future and get- ^ 
ting on with things, because the people s 
business is waiting. 



Iran-Confra Investigations 

These past 9 months have been confus- 
ing and painful ones for the country. I 
know you have doubts in your own 
minds' about what happened in this 
whole episode. What I hope is not m 
doubt, however, is my commitment to 
the investigations themselves. 

So far, we've had four investiga- 
tions—by the Justice Department, the 
Tower board, the independent counsel,^ 
and the Congress. I requested three of 
those investigations, and I endorsed and 
cooperated fully with the fourth— the 
congressional hearings— supplying over 
250,000 pages of White House docu- 
ments, including parts of my own 
private diaries. 

Once I realized I hadn't been fully in- 
formed, I sought to find the answers. 
Some of the answers I don't like. As the 
Tower board reported, and as I said last 
March, our original initiative rapidly got 
all tangled up in the sale of arms, and 
the sale of arms got tangled up with 
hostages. Secretary Shultz and 
Secretary Weinberger both predicted 
that the American people would im- 
mediately assume this whole plan was 
an arms-for-hostages deal and nothing 
more. Well, unfortunately, their predic- 
tions were right. 

As I said to you in March, I let my 
preoccupation with the hostages intrude 
into areas where it didn't belong. The 
image— the reality— of Americans in 
chains, deprived of their freedom and 
families so far from home, burdened my 
thoughts. And this was a mistake. 

My fellow Americans, I've thought 
long and often about how to explain to 
you what I intended to accomplish, but I 
respect you too much to make excuses. 



The fact of the matter is that there's 
nothing I can say that will make the 
situation right. I was stubborn in my 
pursuit of a policy that went astray. 

Aid to the Contras 

The other major issue of the hearings, of 
course, was the diversion of funds to the 
Nicaraguan contras. Colonel North and 
Admiral Poindexter believed they were 
doing what 1 would have wanted done- 
keeping the democratic resistance alive 
in Nicaragua. I believed then and I 
believe now in preventing the Soviets 
from establishing a beachhead in Central 
America. 

Since I have been so closely 
associated with the cause of the contras. 
the big question during the hearings was 
whether I knew of the diversion. I was 
aware the resistance was receiving 
funds directly from third countries and 
from private efforts, and I endorsed 
those endeavors wholeheartedly, but- 
let me put this in capital letters— I did 
now know about the diversion of funds. 
Indeed, I didn't know there were excess 

funds. ... 1 

Yet the buck does not stop with Ad- 
miral Poindexter, as he stated in his 
testimony; it stops with me. I am the 
one who is ultimately accountable to the 
American people. The admiral testified 
that he wanted to protect me; yet no 
President should ever be protected from 
the truth. No operation is so secret that 
it must be kept from the Commander m 
Chief. I had the right, the obligation, to 
make my own decision. 

I heard someone the other day ask 
why I wasn't outraged. Well, at times, 
I've been mad as a hornet. Anyone 
would be— just look at the damage 
that's been 'done and the time that's 
been lost. But I've always found that the 
best therapy for outrage and anger is 
action. 

Policy and Personnel Changes 

I've tried to take steps so that what 
we've been through can't happen again, 
either in this Administration or future 
ones. But I remember very well what 
the Tower board said last February 
when it issued this report. It said the 
failure was more in people than in proc- 
ess. We can build in every precaution 



.ta 



Son 



known to the world. We can design that 
best system ever devised by man. But in 
the end, people are going to have to run 
it. And we will never be free of human 
hopes, weaknesses, and enthusiasms. 
Let me tell you what I've done to 
change both the system and the people 
who operate it. 

First of all, I've brought in a new 
and knowledgeable team. I have a new 
national security adviser, a new Director 
of the CIA [Central Intelligence 
Agency], a new Chief of Staff here at 
the White House. And I've told them 
that I must be informed and informed 
fully. 

In addition, I adopted the Tower 
board's model of how the NSC [Nationallj^ob 
Security Council] process and staff 
should work, and I prohibited any opera 
tional role by the NSC staff in covert a& ffl 
tivities. j , 

The report I ordered reviewing our lOV 
nation's covert operations has been conv le 
pleted. There were no suprises. Some 
operations were continued, and some 
were eliminated because they'd outlived 
their usefulness. 

I am also adopting new, tighter pro- 
cedures on consulting with and notifyin^i 
the Congress on future covert action 
findings^ We will still pursue covert 
operatioi. - when appropriate, but each 
operation must be legal, and it must 
meet a specific policy objective. 

The problem goes deeper, however, 
than policies and personnel. Probably 
the biggest lesson we can draw from th( 
hearings is that the executive and 
legislative branches of government need 
to regain trust in each other. We've seei 
the results of that mistrust in the form 
of lies, leaks, divisions, and mistakes. 
We need to find a way to cooperate 
while realizing foreign policy can't be ^ 
run by committee. And I believe there s 
now the growing sense that we can ac- 
complish more by cooperating. And in 
the end, this may be the eventual bless- 
ing in disguise to come out of the Iran- 
con fra mess. 

Future Goals 

But now let me turn to the other subjec 
I promised to discuss this evening— the 
future. There are now 17 months left in 
this Administration, and I want them to 
be prosperous, productive ones for the 
American people. , 

When you first elected me to this ol 
fice, you elected me to pursue a new, | 
different direction for America. When 
you elected me the second time, you 
reaffirmed your desire to continue that 
course. My 'hopes for this country are a'^ 



Departnnent of State BulletJ- 



THE PRESIDENT 



fervent today as they were in 1981. Up 
until the morning I leave this house, I 
intend to do what you sent ine here to 
do — lead the nation toward the goals we 
agreed on when you elected me. 

Let me tell you where I'm going to 
put my heart and my energies for the 
remainder of my term. 



Arms Control 

[n the months ahead, I also hope to 
each an agreement, a comprehensive 
and verifiable agreement, with the 
Soviet Union on reducing nuclear arms. 
»Ve're making real progress on the 
global elimination of an entire class of 
nuclear weapons — the U.S. and Soviet 
intermediate-range [nuclear forces], or 
NF, missiles. 

I first proposed this idea to the 
qoviets back in 1981. They weren't too 
:een on it and, in fact, walked out of the 
negotiations at one point. But we kept 
Lit it. Until recently, the Soviet Union 
Bad insisted on the right to retain some 
tf its INF missiles. But in mid-July, 
Eeneral Secretary Gorbachev announced 
Ihat he was prepared to drop this de- 
nand. That was welcome news, indeed. 

We've come this far because in 1980 
iQU gave me a mandate to rebuild our 
military. I've done that. And today we're 
leeing the results. The Soviets are now 
negotiating with us because we're 
egotiating from strength. 

This would be a historic agreement. 
Vevious arms control agreements mere- 
\/ put a ceiling on weapons and even 
lllowed for increases; this agreement 
*/ould reduce the number of nuclear 
weapons. I am optimistic that we'll soon 
jritness a first in world history — the 
Kght of two countries actually destroy- 
tig nuclear weapons in their arsenals, 
ind imagine where that might lead. 

We're also ready to move ahead on a 
"^iTART [strategic arms reduction talks] 
greement that would cut intercontinen- 
al nuclear forces by 50% thereby 
liniinating thousands of nuclear 
lissiles. I urge the Soviets to move 
head with us. And I say to General 
Secretary Gorbachev, both our nations 
ould begin a new relationship by sign- 
ng comprehensive agreements to reduce 
nuclear and conventional weapons. 

What we seek in our relationship 
.'itii the Soviet Union is peace and 
tahility. That is also what we seek in 
he Persian Gulf, and the Middle East 



more generally. And bringing stability to 
this troubled region remains one of the 
most important goals of my Presidency. 



Cause of Democracy 

And there's another area that will oc- 
cupy my time and my heart: the cause of 
democracy. There are Americans still 
burning for freedom: Central Amer- 
icans, the people of Nicaragua. Over the 
last 10 years, democrats have been 
emerging all over the world. In Central 
and South America alone, 10 countries 
have been added to the ranks. The ques- 
tion is: will Nicaragua ever be added to 
this honor roll? 

As you know, I am totally com- 
mitted to the democratic resistance — the 
freedom fighters — and their pursuit of 
democracy in Nicaragua. Recently 
there's been important progress on the 
diplomatic front, both here in Wash- 
ington and in the region itself. 

My Administration and the leader- 
ship of Congress have put forth a bipar- 
tisan initiative proposing concrete steps 
that can bring an end to the conflict 
there. Our key point was that the com- 
munist regime in Nicaragua should do 
what it formally pledged to do in 
1979 — respect the Nicaraguan people's 
basic rights of free speech, free press, 
free elections, and religious liberty. In- 
stead, those who govern in Nicaragua 
chose to turn their country over to the 
Soviet Union to be a base for communist 
expansion on the American mainland. 



The need for democracy in 
Nicaragua was also emphasized in the 
agreement signed by the five Central 
American presidents in Guatemala last 
Friday. We welcome this development 
and pledge our support to democracy 
and those fighting for freedom. We have 
always been willing to talk; we have 
never been willing to abandon those who 
were fighting for democracy and 
freedom. 

I'm especially pleased that in the 
U.S. diplomatic initiative, we once again 
have the beginnings, however uncertain, 
of a bipartisan foreign policy. The recent 
hearings emphasized the need for such 
bipartisanship, and I hope this cautious 
start will grow and blossom. 

Conclusion 

These are among the goals for the re- 
mainder of my term as President. I 
believe they're the kinds of goals that 
will advance the security and prosperity 
and future of our people. I urge the 
Congress to be as thorough and 
energetic in pursuing these ends as it 
was in pursuing the recent investigation. 
My fellow Americans, I have a year 
and a half before I have to clean out this 
desk. I'm not about to let the dust and 
cobwebs settle on the furniture in this 
office or on me. I have things I intend to 
do,' and with your help, we can do them. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 17, 1987. 



Aid to the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Resistance 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation of July 18, 1987.'^ 

We're about to mark an important an- 
niversary, but it'll be no cause for 
celebration. Eight years ago tomorrow, 
the Sandinista communists came to 
power in the Central American country 
of Nicaragua. It may be hard to 
remember now, the great hopes with 
which their revolution was first greeted. 
The hated dictator Anastasio Somoza 
had been toppled, and the world looked 
forward to a bright future for 
Nicaragua. Little did we think then that 
the future the Sandinistas were planning 
for Nicaragua would be darker than 
anything that suffering country had ever 
before experienced. 



The Sandinistas spelled out their 
plans for subversion and aggression 
throughout Central America in the 
secret— but now notorious— 72-hour 
document, and it wasn't long before they 
started carrying them out. Arms 
shipments began flowing to the com- 
munist guerrillas throughout Latin 
America— in El Salvador, Honduras, 
Colombia, and other countries. Within 
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas quickly built 
up the apparatus of a police state: clos- 
ing churches and extinguishing the free 
press. The ranks of political prisoners 
swelled into the thousands, and 
beatings, torture, and official murder 
became the order of the day. Meanwhile, 
the Sandinistas began a campaign of 



.)ctober1987 



THE SECRETARY 



slaughter against the peaceful Miskito 
Indians. One in every 10 Nicaraguans is 
now a refugee — leaving home, family, 
and friends to escape the oppression in- 
side that country. 

If the Sandinistas get their way, the 
torment of that sad country will soon 
spread throughout the entire region, 
engulfing the young democracies that 
surround Nicaragua. As I said in New 
York a few months ago, the democratic 
aspirations of millions in Central 
America now hang in the balance. The 
elected leaders of neighboring Central 
American countries know that until 
democracy comes to Nicaragua their 
own democracies will never be safe. And 
that is why, along with us, they have in- 
sisted on one thing: free, fair, and 
regularly scheduled elections in Nic- 
aragua, the establishment of a genuinely 
democratic system and all the freedoms 
such a system depends on and en- 
courages — freedom of speech, freedom 
of assembly, freedom of worship. 

This is what the Nicaraguan 
freedom fighters are fighting for, and 
this is why we must support them. We 
have worked in many ways to counter 
the spread of communism in Central 
America and those nations I've men- 
tioned that are threatened by Nicaragua. 
We've instituted economic assistance to 
the region, military assistance to 
threatened democracies, and, together 
with our Central American allies, 
vigorous efforts to negotiate a peaceful 
and democratic outcome. But we know 
from experience that the Sandinistas 
will never negotiate seriously unless 
they see that the freedom fighters are a 
force to be reckoned with. Without the 
freedom fighters backing them up, 
negotiations can amount to no more 
than a hoax. Believe me, the current ef- 
forts of the Central American 
democracies to seek a peaceful and 
democratic outcome will not succeed if 
the communists think that all they have 
to do is wait a few months and see if 
this country still has the resolve to sup- 
port those who seek freedom in 
Nicaragua. 

The Soviets have spent over $1 
billion to prop up the Sandinista regime 
and to defeat the freedom fighters. The 
Soviets know what's at stake in 
Nicaragua, and they know that the 
freedom fighters are all that stand be- 
tween them and domination of the entire 
region. 

Now, some tell me that the people in 
this country just don't care about the 
freedom fighters, but I don't think that's 
true. The more people know about the 



Sandinista communists, the more they 
support the freedom fighters. That's 
why the closer you get to Nicaragua, the 
stronger their support grows. Public 
opinion polls in Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala show overwhelming sup- 
port for contra aid. In Honduras 81% of 
the people support it. Of course, inside 
Nicaragua they don't have any polls, but 
the people there are daily risking their 
lives giving whatever help they can to 
see the young men and boys who are 
fighting for their country's freedom. 

In this country, too, we have seen 
support grow dramatically as the 
American people learn the facts about 
Nicaragua. The American people are 



tired of the off-on-again policy in Cen- 
tral America. A bipartisan majority sup- 
ported aid to the freedom fighters last 
year. The American people want that 
aid to continue. And that's why we've 
got to get the message out. Talk to your 
family, your friends, your neighbors — 
even your Congressmen and Senators. 
Let them know how you feel. We've got 
to get the message out, because there's 
no question in my mind, when the 
American people have the facts, they'll 
support freedom this time and every 
time. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 27, 1987. 



Matching Foreign Policy 
Resources With Goals 



Secretary Shultz's prepared state- 
ment to the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee on August 7. 1987 ^ 

I am here today to talk about our 
foreign assistance requirements for 
fiscal year (FY) 1988. I want to convey 
to you my deep concern about the 
major foreign policy crisis we are 
creating for ourselves. There is a 
serious mismatch between our foreign 
policy goals, interests, and com- 
mitments on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the resources at our command 
with which to pursue those goals and 
interests and honor our commitments. 

The United States is— by necessity 
as much as by choice— a world leader 
with wide-ranging global concerns. 
Dealing with these concerns requires a 
mix of diplomatic, economic, and 
military tools and the resources to 
employ them effectively. We cannot re- 
main a first-class world power by com- 
mitting fewer resources to our foreign 
relations than our adversaries do. Nor 
can we maintain our political, economic, 
and humanitarian values in a dynamic 
and threatening world environment 
through the strength of our military 
power alone. 

Since 1981, we have made substan- 
tial progress toward reinvigorating our 
economy, restoring our military 
capabilities, and strengthening our ties 
with friends and allies the world over. 
As a result of our efforts: 

• Our NATO alliance is strong and 
vital. Its steadfastness has convinced 



the Soviet Union to endorse the INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] posi 
tion we laid out nearly 6 years ago. Foi 
the first time in history, we now have 
good prospects for eliminating an entire 
class of nuclear weapons. 

• We and our NATO allies have 
been able to engage the Soviet Union ii 
a new high-level dialogue— not just on 
arms control but on all the issues that 
divide us. Few of these issues have 
been fully resolved. On the other hand, 
there is evidence that the Soviets, 
however grudgingly, have come to bet- 
ter appreciate the strengths and prom- 
ise of more open political and economic 
systems. 

• We have supported a remarkable 
resurgence of democracy, most notably 
in Latin America, where the percentage 
of the population living under freely 
elected governments has grown from 
30% in 1979 to more than 90% today. 
Democracy has also made great strides ' 
in the Philippines, in the Caribbean, in 
South Korea, and throughout the 
developing world. 

• With our support and that of 
other donors, the developing countries 
are also making impressive progress in 
their efforts to achieve a better stand- 
ard of living for their people. Obviously 
the development process is far from 
complete. Much remains to be done by 
the developing countries themselves, by 
donor and creditor countries, and by 
private financial, industrial, and 
agricultural interests in the developing 
and developed countries alike. But we 
should not overlook the fact that solid 
progress has been made. 



a 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



• We have also seen an encourag- 
ing trend toward greater confidence in 
free market-oriented solutions to the 
problems of economic growth. We now 
find, almost everywhere in the world- 
including the communist world- 
movements to decentralize, deregulate, 
and denationalize. The economic and 
social achievements of many developing 
countries are in no small measure a 
result of their growing appreciation of 
the dynamic role which the private sec- 
tor can play and their willingness to 
[develop an environment in which it can 
flourish. 

All of this represents important, 
iramatic progress. But there is still 
inich to be done. The world remains a 
iangerous place. Precisely because 
■(ii-oign affairs issues do not lend 
ht'tiiselves to quick fixes, Americans 
ia\ e to be prepared to tackle them on a 
;teady, long-term basis and to support 
•I insistently the professional foreign af- 
airs infrastructure to do so. 

Are we prepared for this? Unhappi- 
y. what has been happening to the 
oreign affairs budget seems to indicate 
he answer is "no." The foreign affairs 
ludget has taken two consecutive years 
'f major cuts. And the budget resolu- 
ion for FY 1988 threatens further 
erious cuts. 

Let's look at the foreign operations 
ppropriations legislation since FY 
981. In that year and the next, you ap- 
•ropriated $15.5 billion, including FMS 
foreign military sales] guaranties and 
^Iximbank direct loans but excluding 
MF [International Monetary Fund] 
Replenishments. In FY 1983, the figure 
amped to $17.2 billion and then to 
17.9 billion in FY 1984. In FY 1985, 
i^e hit our high-water mark— $20.9 
illion. That figure included a large sup- 
llemental of over $2 billion for the Mid- 
le East countries as well as a major 
Dod aid supplemental for Ethiopian 
amine relief. Even if we exclude these 
ne-time special cases, our baseline ap- 
ropriation for this bill hovered around 
18 billion. 

What has happened since then? In 
'Y 1986, the first year of Gramm- 
iudman-Hollings, we dropped to $14.4 
illion. In the current year, FY 1987, 
'e were operating with a billion dollars 
;ss than that, before the supplemental 
'as enacted. I might pause at this 
oint, Mr. Chairman [Daniel Inouye], to 
lank you and Senator Kasten for your 
fforts in making the supplemental 
ossible. 

So we are now working with FY 

B"987 resources totaling just under $13.9 
illion. Yet what is the effect of the FY 
988 congressional budget resolution? 

ctober 1987 



To reduce that level by another $700 
million to $13.2 billion. 

We now face the stark possibility 
that we will be unable to meet our basic 
foreign policy objectives because of the 
resource constraints. 

Let me talk about those objectives 
and give you some concrete examples of 
how we use resources to help achieve 
them. 

National Security 

Let's start with our national security. 
We face the choice of defending our- 
selves alone— and at tremendous cost— 
or working with allies who share our 
values and who face the same adver- 
saries we do. Since 1945, U.S. adminis- 
trations have chosen the latter course. 

Our country's alliances are based on 
a sharing of risks and responsibilities. 
The Soviet challenge is global. Its 
military machine stands poised down 
the middle of Europe; pursues its in- 
vasion of neighboring Afghanistan; and 
actively arms and supports repressive 
regimes in Eastern Europe, Indochina, 
Ethiopia, Cuba, and Nicaragua. 

Some of our allies, both in NATO 
and in the developing world, lack the 
resources to provide for their own 
security concerns while simultaneously 
responding to the basic economic needs 
of their own people. Because we know 
they must do both if they are to survive 
and grow, we must help them finance 
the modernization of their armed 
forces. Over the years we have made 
commitments to do so. Yet with the 
resources made available this year, we 
cannot meet these commitments. 

For example, we have had to slash 
assistance to Spain by 73% this year; 
assistance to Greece and Turkey' is 
already hundreds of millions of dollars 
below the levels necessary if they are to 
meet their NATO commitments; for 
Portugal, our assistance is over $50 
million below the "best efforts" commit- 
ment we undertook when we signed a 
base access agreement. The story was 
much the same for the Philippines, 
where we had to reduce our military 
assistance program by 50%; fortunately, 
however, thanks in large part to this 
subcommittee's efforts. Congress ap- 
propriated the funds needed in the FY 
1987 supplemental. 

The reductions under consideration 
raise fundamental doubts about U.S. 
dependability and risk the loss of vital 
military and port facilities. Without our 
friends and allies, and their facilities, 
we would have to spend a great deal 
more on defense and bring many more 
of our citizens under arms, even though 



we would get less security than we 
have today. Therefore, we requested 
$2.1 billion in security assistance for 
the base rights countries to help mod- 
ernize their military forces and— for 
Portugal, Turkey, and the Philippines— 
to assist them in dealing with their 
economic problems. 

The Middle East is crucial to the 
United States. Our security and 
economic assistance programs to Israel 
and Egypt play a key role in supporting 
the Arab-Israel peace process. So, too, 
does assistance to close friends such as 
Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco. Ear- 
marks have protected our programs in 
Israel and Egypt. However, assistance 
to Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco this 
year had to be cut by 35%, endangering 
the security of friendly countries in an 
unstable area. Such cuts complicate our 
efforts to play an active, constructive 
role in resolving the complex issues of 
the region and in checking the spread 
of Soviet influence. For 1988, we have 
requested $200 million in military and 
economic assistance for Morocco, Jor- 
dan, and Tunisia. 

As part of our policy of promoting 
peace, stability, and development in the 
Middle East, we are intent on maintain- 
ing our commitment to the American 
University of Beirut (AUB). Situated in 
a country split asunder by violence and 
racked by extremism, AUB is a force 
for peace and reason. We cannot allow 
it to fail. 

Central America is of vital impor- 
tance to the United States because of 
its geographic proximity and strategic 
position. The strategic stakes are clear: 
whether we will permit the Soviet 
Union to acquire real power in the 
region from Mexico to the Panama 
Canal; whether we will permit the 
Soviet Union to sit astride our lifelines, 
not only to South America but to 
Europe and the Pacific. U.S. policy 
seeks to counter this challenge by pro- 
moting security, democracy, economic 
development, and social reform. For 
those purposes we sought approximate- 
ly $1 billion in our FY 1988 budget 
request. 

Promoting U.S. Prosperity 

Let me turn now to the second great 
goal of U.S. foreign policy: promoting 
domestic prosperity. Americans have 
long believed that their prosperity is 
largely determined by the monetary and 
fiscal policies we pursue at home, the 
fact is that economic conditions abroad 
also have a crucial and growing impact 
on the health of the American economy. 



THE SECRETARY 



I am not just speaking of conditions 
in Western Europe and Japan, impor- 
tant though they may be, but also of 
the developing countries. These coun- 
tries take about 40% of our exports. 
One out of every 20 workers in our 
manufacturing plants and 1 out of 
every 5 acres of our farmland produce 
for Third World markets. The accepted 
rule of thumb is that every $1 billion of 
U.S. production for export creates 
about 26,000 American jobs. 

And U.S. -Third World economic ties 
are growing. Since 1975, the developing 
countries have accounted for more than 
half of the growth in American exports. 
These countries can continue to accept 
a growing volume of U.S. exports if 
their economies expand. If they falter 
economically, so do we. 

Current economic stagnation in a 
large number of developing countries, 
especially those with heavy debt 
burdens, illustrates the point vividly 
and painfully. For example, between 
1981 and 1985, the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean experienced 
sharp declines in their real incomes. 
These declines impacted the U.S. 
economy through our international 
trade position. Our exports to that 
region dropped by over $11 billion. In 
Africa, our exports dropped by $1.5 
billion. 

It has long been obvious that by 
promoting economic development, we 
make a direct contribution to our own 
economic well-being. For example, we 
have played a significant role in the 
development of Turkey and Pakistan. In 
1960, Turkey's per capita income was 
about $500 per year; Pakistan's was 
barely $100. By" 1985, both countries 
had more than doubled their incomes 
and had become major purchasers of 
U.S. products. Since 1979, U.S. exports 
to Pakistan have doubled; to Turkey 
they have nearly quadrupled. 

These illustrations demonstrate that 
in order to promote our own long-term 
economic prospects, we must promote 
economic growth in the developing 
countries. It was with these ends in 
mind that we requested $8.4 billion 
from this subcommittee in bilateral and 
multilateral economic assistance in FY 
1987. That was a very lean request, less 
than the Congress appropriated in FY 
1985 when we adjust for the one-time- 
only supplementals approved that year. 
Nevertheless, even after taking into ac- 
count the supplemental appropriation 
recently approved by the Congress, the 
amount available to us this year is only 
$8.1 billion. The cuts which we have 
had to make to stay within that total 



are especially steep for countries and 
programs unprotected by earmarks. For 
FY 1988, we have asked you to appro- 
priate $8.4 billion for economic 
assistance. 

Many low-income countries, mainly 
in sub-Saharan Africa, also face serious 
external debt problems. In most cases, 
their creditors are governments and 
multilateral institutions, not commercial 
banks. For these countries, IDA [Inter- 
national Development Association] 
funds, IMF reflows, and bilateral grant 
aid will be needed to support essential 
domestic economic policy reform. 

But for FY 1987, funding available 
for the multilateral banks is approx- 
imately $185 million (13%) less than we 
requested even after taking into ac- 
count the recently enacted supplemental 
appropriation. At the same time, 
bilateral funding has been slashed to a 
level where we can only provide 30% of 
the resources necessary to support 
economic policy reforms in Africa. It 
isn't only people in foreign countries 
who are being hurt by these cuts; 
Americans involved in the production of 
exports to the Third World are vic- 
timized as well. 

Cuts in our support for the World 
Bank and other multilateral financial in- 
stitutions are especially damaging. Not 
only are these institutions at the 
forefront of our efforts to get the 
economies of our friends and trading 
partners in the developing world back 
on their feet, they are also just about 
the most cost-effective tools we have 
for leveraging resources for these coun- 
tries. The United States puts up only a 
small fraction of the funds mobilized by 
the World Bank. For example, in FY 
1986 the bank lent more than $100 for 
each dollar of capital paid in by the 
U.S. Government. For every dollar the 
United States contributes to the Inter- 
national Development Association, the 
World Bank's affiliate for aiding the 
poorest countries, other countries con- 
tribute more than three. Conversely, 
when the United States fails to follow 
through on its commitments, this 
reduces the World Bank's lending 
capacity far more than the actual cut in 
U.S support. 

Promoting Democratic Values 

The United States also has a vital stake 
in promoting democratic values and in- 
stitutions. This isn't starry-eyed 
idealism; it is realism. Democratic coun- 
tries respect the rule of law both 
domestically and in foreign affairs; they 
grow more rapidly, and they are more 
stable internally and more capable of 



resisting subversion through their own 
efforts. In promoting democratic values 
and human rights, we are protecting 
our security and prosperity as well as 
advancing our most fundamental ideals. 

One country where our support for 
democratic institutions has been 
especially noteworthy is the Philippines. 
There, President Aquino's efforts to 
strengthen democratic institutions and 
establish the conditions for sustainable 
economic growth offer genuine hope 
that the Philippines will become a 
stable, prosperous country which shares 
our values. Continued U.S. military and 
economic assistance is essential to 
achieving these goals. For FY 1988, we 
are seeking $261 million for the Philip- 
pines as a tangible demonstration of our 
unequivocal commitment to the Aquino 
government and to the stability of an 
area where two of our most important 
overseas bases are located. 

In Central America and the Carib- 
bean, our support for prodemocratic 
forces has also shown good results. 
Democratic institutions are taking root 
in countries where just a few years ago 
many despaired of that ever happening. 
These new democracies of Central 
America and the Caribbean desperately 
need our economic support. The Presi- 
dent's Caribbean Basin Initiative and 
the recommendations of the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America provide a comprehensive 
strategy for such support. 

But funding has fallen far short of 
what is needed. In the supplemental ap-L,, 
propriation bill just passed, the Con- 
gress recognized this and included an 
additional $300 million in ESF 
[Economic Support Funds] for Central 
America. However, the cumulative 
shortfall from the funding levels recom^ 
mended by the bipartisan commission is jj,, 
still over $500 million. 



»li 



Humanitarian Efforts 

Let me turn to another broad theme 
of American foreign policy— our 
humanitarian efforts. The American 
people can be justifiably proud of their 
humanitarian instincts. Over the past 
few years, the assistance we have pro- 
vided has meant the difference between 
life and death for literally millions of 
Africans who faced the worst drought 
and famine the continent has experi- 
enced in this century. 

During the height of this crisis, the 
United States provided 2.2 million 
metric tons of food aid at a cost of ovei 
$1 billion; another $150 million was 
spent to provide medicines, shelter. 



Department of State Bulletir 



IBtOJ 



THE SECRETARY 



wells, and the other immediate needs 
for those worst affected by the drought. 
Phis was all in addition to the regular 
3conomic assistance we provided during 
the same period. 

Similarly, assistance to Colombia at 
the time of its volcanic disaster, major 
earthquake relief efforts in San 
Salvador and Mexico City, and our sup- 
port to combat locust infestations in 17 
Mrican countries are activities of which 
:he United States can be proud. Our 
iupport for the World Health Organiza- 
tion and UNICEF [UN Children's Fund] 
lias helped rid the world of some of the 
most deadly and contagious diseases 
ind has dramatically reduced infant 
mortality. 

Our assistance to the world refugee 
oopulation is especially noteworthy, 
■iince the passage of the Refugee Act of 
-980, the American people have offered 
lew homes to more than half a million 
efugees— a greater number than has 
neen provided by all other resettlement 
lountries combined. And we have 
rained a great deal by doing so. Indeed, 
ve know from experience that every 
(;eneration of refugees has made enor- 
(aous contributions to our society. Just 
Ibok at those who fled from Nazi Ger- 
many, from the Soviet Union, from 
"uba, and from Southeast Asia. The 
lenefits this country has gained from 
'he refugees who have sought sanctuary 
lere are incalculable. 

Our position as the acknowledged 
lader in assisting the world's 
(efugees— the victims of oppression in 
tieir own homelands— is further 
lemonstrated by our generous financial 
upport to multilateral and bilateral 
efugee relief programs. The strong, 
ustained interest of Congress has 
nabled the United States to fund more 
nan 25% of the international communi- 
\'s total contribution to the world's 
loie than 10 million refugees. 

But it seems to me that what we all 
eek is the end of the conditions which 
reate the need for many of these 
mergency programs in the first place. 
)bviously, we cannot eliminate natural 
isasters; but we do have the ability, 
he moral imperative, and the national 
iterest to confront the manmade 
auses of poverty and repression. 

Our assistance programs do just 
hat. It is political, economic, and social 
urmoil that causes vast numbers of 
eople to flee their homelands. Con- 
ersely, the development of democracy 
nd expanded economic opportunity can 
ramatically reduce the number of peo- 
le compelled to abandon their native 
inds. 



The War on Narcotics 

Stemming the flow of narcotics into the 
United States is another major priority 
for all Americans. But this is a costly 
undertaking. In some countries in which 
many people depend on narcotics crops 
for their livelihoods, you cannot just 
force farmers to stop growing them 
without offering economic alternatives. 
Similarly, you cannot expect the 
governments of most of the source 
countries to launch major programs 
without the economic resources to sus- 
tain them. And drug traffickers and 
narcoterrorists won't give up their very 
lucrative business without putting up a 
fight; in fact, they are working over- 
time to elude interdiction efforts and 
undermine democratic institutions by in- 
timidation, corruption, and violence. All 
of these factors drive up the direct and 
indirect costs of narcotics control. Thus, 
if we're serious about stemming the 
flow of drugs into our country, we must 
be prepared to use every resource at 
our command— economic and military 
assistance as well as narcotics control 
funds. 

In Bolivia, we are using narcotics 
assistance funds to buy trucks and 
boats which the army and navy need to 
carry police forces to raid laboratory 
sites. At the same time, our economic 
assistance is being used to support 
public education and to promote rural 
development and small industry, 
thereby helping farmers to stop grow- 
ing coca for their livelihood. 

The democratic Government of 
Bolivia has embarked on a courageous 
battle, putting its very survival at 
stake, to shut down one of the two 
major sources of cocaine to the United 
States and Europe. Bolivia's leaders in- 
vited U.S. forces into their country last 
year to assist in destroying cocaine 
laboratories and, in so doing, drove the 
price of coca leaves below the cost of 
producing them. That price has risen 
again, and we are using helicopters bor- 
rowed from the U.S. military in a major 
new interdiction campaign. Bolivia is 
following up with legislation which will 
attack the problem systematically and 
comprehensively through voluntary and 
involuntary eradication. 

If the program in Bolivia is to be 
successful, economic alternatives must 
be provided for as many as 350,000 
people, one-sixth of that country's 
population. Impoverished Bolivia cannot 
accomplish this herculean task, so im- 
portant to us, without a substantial in- 
crease in our economic assistance. The 
eradication program in Peru, the other 
major source of coca, also requires U.S. 
economic assistance. 



In addition to Bolivia and Peru, Co- 
lombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela are 
also engaged in a war against narcotics. 
Colombia has eradicated 85% of the 
marijuana cultivated in traditional 
growing areas through an aerial her- 
bicide program, using U.S. -provided air- 
craft and communications equipment. In 
Peru, the Garcia government has ag- 
gressively destroyed laboratories and 
airstrips used by cocaine traffickers, 
using helicopters we provided. In Peru 
and Colombia, the governments are also 
attempting to combat narcoterrorism. 
And the Andean countries signed a 
treaty this past year— named in the 
memory of the Colombian Minister of 
Justice slain by narcotics traffickers- 
pledging regional cooperation against 
narcotics trafficking and production. 

These successes demonstrate how 
critical our resources are in winning the 
battle against narcotics. If we cannot 
provide vital economic as well as nar- 
cotics assistance to the Andean coun- 
tries, we will not only be sending a 
wrong signal that we are indifferent to 
their problems, we will also set back 
our own campaign to create a drug-free 
America. We are grateful for the in- 
creased narcotics assistance this com- 
mittee has made available in recent 
years. Yet other funds we planned to 
make available to the Andean countries 
had to be slashed by a third because of 
budget cuts we sustained this year. For 
FY 1988, we have requested $187 
million in economic and military 
assistance for them. 

Finally, waging an effective war on 
drugs requires us to cooperate with 
friends and allies through the drug 
agencies of the United Nations. The UN 
narcotics agencies share our goals; they 
are working to gain control over the 
production and abuse of psychotropic 
substances. In addition, this year the 
United Nations is completing' a conven- 
tion on illicit trafficking which will sup- 
port our own national policies. 

Combatting Terrorism 

I need not belabor the threat of ter- 
rorism. In 1986, there were about 770 
international terrorist incidents. Among 
the casualties, over 800 were killed and 
1,200 were wounded. These figures 
tend to understate the actual level of 
terrorist activity, since incidents con- 
fined to one country, with the nationals 
of only one country involved, are not 
included. 

As the Inman commission pointed 
out so clearly, protecting ourselves 
against terrorism does not come cheap- 
ly. As dear as protection is, however, 



THE SECRETARY 



the money is necessary. Aggressive in- 
telligence analysis, heightened security 
awareness, and enhanced physical 
security helped to thwart 120 planned 
terrorist attacks against American 
diplomatic personnel last year. 

But let me make it clear that our 
efforts to counter terrorism extend 
beyond looking after our own. We, of 
course, have a special responsibility to 
those we send abroad to conduct this 
country's business. But most of the 
millions of Americans who live, work, 
and travel abroad will not be saved by 
thicker armor and more guards. There 
is not enough brick, mortar, and armor- 
plate to protect all our citizens and in- 
terests. We cannot, must not, just sit 
and wait for terrorists to strike. We 
must continue to address the terrorist 
problem more assertively. 

The use of force must always be 
present in our list of options. But there 
is more to an aggressive counterter- 
rorist policy than using force against 
terrorists. We must and do work with 
other countries to identify, track, ap- 
prehend, prosecute, and punish ter- 
rorists. This requires that we: 

• Closely cooperate with other 
countries on counterterrorism efforts; 

• Persuade those countries reluc- 
tant to cooperate in combatting interna- 
tional terrorism; and 

• Provide training and other 
assistance to those with the will but not 
the means. 

Our efforts are beginning to pay 
off. Increasingly, countries are trying 
and convicting terrorists instead of 
releasing them, as happened too fre- 
quently in past years. We and other 
countries are strengthening extradition 
treaties to assure that terrorists will be 
brought to justice. Unfortunately, 
budget cuts are hampering our program 
to counter terrorism. Clearly, our 
hearts are in the right place. But where 
are our resources? 

We have been unable to obtain 
enough funding to strengthen our em- 
bassies and other overseas facilities 
against terrorist attacks as quickly as 
we should; we are having difficulty in 
finding the money for antiterrorism 
research and development on such proj- 
ects as coming up with better ways of 
detecting explosives or chemical and 
biological agents at a time when ter- 
rorists are becoming more innovative; 
and we are having serious difficulty 
maintaining the vigorous, professional 
U.S. Foreign Service we need to pro- 
vide us with the reporting and analysis 



10 



necessary to combat terrorism and to 
achieve our other foreign policy 
objectives. 

An American Withdrawal? 

With the passage of the FY 1988 
budget resolution, it is clear that 
resource constraints are by no means a 
thing of the past. I understand that this 
committee has been allocated approx- 
imately $13 billion for foreign assist- 
ance. That is about $900 million less 
than the inadequate amount appro- 
priated in FY 1987 and $2.25 billion (or 
15%) less than the President requested. 
The implications of cuts of this 
magnitude— coming as they do on top 
of sharp cuts in FY 1986 and 
1987— could be devastating. If we 
assume that Congress will again ear- 
mark funds for Israel and Egypt at the 
Administration's request level and that 
assistance for Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Central America, and 
the multilateral banks will be more or 
less straight-lined at current levels, the 
amounts that will be available for much- 
needed programs in other parts of the 
world will be approximately 50% below 
the unacceptably low levels of FY 1987. 

Accommodating cuts of this mag- 
nitude would mean: 

• Further gutting our base rights 
commitments; 

• Probable zeroing out assistance to 
several countries where we enjoy mili- 
tary access agreements, including 
Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and Morocco; 

• Outright elimination of programs 
in sub-Saharan Africa, South America 
and the Caribbean, and South and East 
Asia; and 

• Arrearages on the order of 50% 
to the multilateral development banks. 

In short, we are fast approaching a 
time when our budget will only pay for 
assistance to Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, 
and Central America, with inadequate 
support for the base rights countries 
and withdrawal everywhere else. 

What would American withdrawal 
mean? To answer that question we need 
to remember why we became involved 
with the world in the first place. After 
World War II, the United States ac- 
cepted strategic and economic leader- 
ship of the noncommunist world 
because it alone had the strength to 
confront aggressive Soviet ex- 
pansionism. 

The world has changed over the 
past 40 years. With our help, the war- 
weakened countries of Western Europe 
have reemerged as strong, prosperous. 



and vital democracies capable of com- 
peting economically and contributing 
significantly to the defense of the 
Atlantic region. In Asia, Japan has 
become an economic giant. South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have also 
made impressive progress. And China, 
India, and Pakistan are also gaining 
economic strength and are increasingly 
able to project military power within 
Asia. Elsewhere, Mexico, Brazil, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and Iran have also made 
great economic strides and have become 
regional powers. In short, economic and 
military power have become much more 
diffuse. 

However, despite changes on a 
scale that few imagined possible in the 
immediate postwar period, two ele- 
ments in the equation remain as true 
today as they were then. First, through 
military force the Soviets can still exert 
strong political pressure, directly or via 
allies, throughout the world. Second, 
the United States remains the only 
power in the noncommunist world with 
the economic and military strength to 
oppose the Soviets effectively on a 
global scale. Under these circumstances, 
can we afford to withdraw? Clearly, the 
question is rhetorical. 

But the case for America to remain 
fully engaged with the world is not 
based solely on geopolitical considera- 
tions, important as these may be. I 
have already noted that our prosperity 
is inextricably intertwined with that of 
our trading partners, including the 
countries of the developing world. If 
their growth falters, so, too, does their 
capacity to accept U.S. exports. 

Last, but by no means least, 
America cannot turn its back on the 
grinding poverty and deprivation which 
remains the lot of millions in Third 
World countries without sacrificing its 
character as a humane society. 

We sometimes forget that humani- 
tarian assistance means more than 
simply providing for the immediate 
needs of the victims of disasters. That 
by itself does little or nothing to 
alleviate the desperate poverty which is 
pervasive in many countries, even in 
the absence of natural or manmade 
catastrophes. We must also assist peo- 
ple in ways which enable them to 
escape from poverty. This is a long- 
term process which involves education; 
building political, economic, and social 
institutions; and helping developing 
countries to construct and implement 
policies which support sustainable 
growth through private initiative. We 
have had many successes in the devel- 
opment area. But they are not as 
dramatic as our disaster relief efforts. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



It is for this reason that development 
assistance is especially vulnerable in an 
era of budgetary pressures and ear- 
marking. 

Making the Most of 
Limited Resources 

I know full well that the budget process 
for FY 1988 is at an advanced stage. 
There is little this committee can do to 
restore the resources we need to carry 
out an effective foreign policy. Any way 
you slice it, we are in for a very rough 
time. 

But I believe there are still some 
things that can be done— things within 
the purview of this committee— which 
would enable us to make the best possi- 
ble use of the very limited resources 
which will be at our disposal. From 
what I have said today, I hope you will 
agree that it is crucial that these things 
be done. 

What are these things? 

First, we urge the committee to 
lake whatever steps are necessary to 
assure that all foreign assistance ap- 
propriations are available for programs 
for which the Administration requested 
funding. Specifically, this would exclude 
funding for the FMS guaranty reserve 
(fund (GRF). I understand that the 
'budget resolution report seeks to man- 
date use of $532 million of your 302(b) 
allocation only for the GRF. In our 
view, such funding is not necessary. 
And, frankly, if we are required to pro- 
vide funds for it from our already in- 
adequate foreign assistance resources, 
what we will really be saying is that 
further efforts to construct and carry 
out a creditable program, one that 
serves our interests and honors our 
commitments, should be assigned to the 
writers, directors, and cast of "Mission 
Impossible." In the television series, 
they got the job done. But this isn't 
television. 

Second, we will need maximum 
flexibility in using limited available 
budget authority to best advantage. In 
the past, the Congress has protected 
manv programs from cuts by earmark- 
ing, "in FY 1987, 81% of our total 
budget authority for security assistance 
was allocated to specific countries and 
programs in this way. But we can't 
keep cutting the total available, protect- 
ing favored programs from the cuts, 
and expect other programs to continue 
as though nothing had happened. I men- 
tioned before that unprotected prog- 
rams—including assistance to many of 
the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 
South America, South and East Asia, 



October 1987 



and the Caribbean, among others- 
would have to be eliminated entirely to 
accommodate the cuts which seem in- 
evitable based upon the budget resolu- 
tion and the allocation for foreign 
assistance which this committee has 
been given. A more flexible approach to 
the use of funds, one that would enable 
us to distribute the cuts more widely, 
but less deeply, would be very helpful 
to us at this stage. 

The seriousness of the situation 
demands that we examine all possible 
options. I have no specific suggestions 
other than the two I have just men- 
tioned. Perhaps other innovative ways 
for handling the problem can be de- 
vised. Last year, this subcommittee 
came up with quite a few. 

My colleagues and I are very 
pleased with the cooperative and crea- 
tive spirit in which you and your staff 
have approached the task of trying to 
accommodate our need for resources in 
the context of increasingly tight 
budgetary constraints. I would like to 
assure you that we at the State Depart- 
ment are prepared to work with you as 
we have in the past to improve the effi- 
ciency of our programs and to col- 
laboratively staff out other ways and 



means for making better use of our 
limited funds. 

In conclusion, let me emphasize 
once again that the issue we must joint- 
ly address is not just another bureau- 
cratic battle for funds. Rather, it has to 
do with our ability and willingness, as a 
nation, to remain engaged with the 
world, to continue to shoulder the 
responsibilities of world leadership. In 
the historic contest between freedom 
and totalitarianism, democracy and dic- 
tatorship, our nation holds the winning 
hand. But the deep cuts in our foreign 
affairs resources are undermining our 
ability to play it. In effect, we are being 
forced to play Russian roulette with our 
international interests and our national 
security. I think this is an extremely 
dangerous situation we're stumbling 
into, and so, I'm sure, do you, Mr. 
Chairman. Let us work together to 
avert a major foreign policy catas- 
trophe. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tlie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



News Conference of August 6 



Secreta ry Shultz held a news con- 
ference on August 6. 1987.'^ 

Q. President Ortega has proposed 
high-level talks between Nicaragua 
and the United States in response to 
the President's peace initiative. Your 
comment, please".' 

A. Right now there is a meeting tak- 
ing place in Guatemala City that is 
regional in its nature, and we think that 
the right kind of outcome is regional. If 
it will help the regional process, we're 
willing to talk, obviously, with all of the 
countries involved. 

I think it is critical to establish that 
there is no way in which the United 
States would want to sit down with 
Nicaragua to decide what is right for 
Central America. That has to be done by 
all of the Central American countries. 
So we're prepared to talk with every- 
body about peace in the region, but it 
has to be a regional approach. 

Q. The plan issued yesterday talks 
about establishing in Nicaragua a 
regularly established system of free, 
orderly elections. Now, given that the 
last elections by international observer 



teams were pronounced fairly okay in 
contrast to the U.S. attitude, what 
does that phrase mean? 

A. I think the elections they held 
before were hardly okay. There wasn't 
freedom of assembly, there wasn't real 
freedom of the press, there were all 
sorts of restrictions surrounding that 
process. So the phrase means exactly 
what it says: let's have elections in a 
context where you don't have political 
prisoners, where people have freedom of 
assembly, where newspapers have a 
right to publish what they want, where 
radio stations can operate, where can- 
didates have access to the population, 
and where the vote is taken in an order- 
ly way and counted fairly. That's what 
that means, and I think it's a fairly com- 
mon notion. 

Q. Could I shift the focus to the 
Persian Gulf? Are you satisfied with 
the cooperation that the United States 
has been getting in the U.S. efforts to 
protect the sealanes there'.' 

A. We have hfeii getting a lot of 
cooperation, and other states are taking 
part. The gulf states, of course, the 



11 



THE SECRETARY 



British in particular, have been very ac- 
tive, and other states as well. There has 
been a problem recently about mine- 
sweeping, and, of course, mines in inter- 
national waters are an international 
problem, and so we hope for more coun- 
tries to take part in that. In the mean- 
time, however, we're proceeding, and 
we're very well satisfied with the quality 
of our efforts. 

Q. There are reports that the 
Europeans may be putting together 
their own consortium to deal with the 
mine problem. Have you heard of 
anything like that'.' Would you support 
such a move by the Europeans them- 
selves? 

A. There have been proposals from 
various European countries that there 
be some joint action organized in some 
way to deal with the mine problem, and 
certainly we're ready to talk about that. 
Of course, the real point in all of this is 
to get the Iran-Iraq war settled and 
stopped. That's the real way to end 
these problems, and that is what we 
have been trying to bring about through 
our diplomatic efforts. That's what the 
United Nations resolution that was 
passed the other day was for. And I 
think it was quite a dramatic moment— 
at least I felt so myself, sitting there as 
the U.S. representative — when this 
quite unusual and tough resolution was 
voted on, and the President of the 
Security Council at the moment, the 
French Foreign Minister, called for a 
vote, and every country there voted in 
favor. 

Now, we're going to have to proceed 
further. The Secretary General has been 
energetically pursuing the carrying out 
of that resolution. He's gotten a good 
response from Iraq. He has not been 
able, really, to make contact with Iran, 
which is disappointing. The efforts for a 
follow-on resolution that would call for 
mandatory sanctions have started, so 
there will be follow-through. But the 
main point that I wanted to make is that 
the key here is to bring that war to an 
end. 

Q. Given the increasingly high- 
level contacts between the Soviet 
Union and Iran, given the fact that the 
Soviet Union does not find itself in a 
high profile military position in the 
gulf like the United States, with all 
the criticism and responsibility that 
entails, do you believe the U.S. policy 
achieved its objective of keeping the 
Soviets out of the gulf.' It seems on 
the surface as if it's achieved just the 
opposite. 



12 



A. Of course, the Soviets have had 
relationships with Iran for quite a long 
time. They're uneasy relationships, par- 
ticularly as they try to somehow or 
other balance their strong military sup- 
ply relationship with Iraq against it. So 
they have their difficulties, but that has 
been there for some time. 

In the case of the United States, we 
insist that those waterways be open for 
the flow of oil and other things— but the 
flow of oil, because it is vital to our in- 
terests and the interests of the free 
world. 

We will support the gulf states 
against intimidation by Iran designed to 
try to affect them, and there have been 
efforts with Kuwait, not only recently 
but you know Kuwait is a country that 
has really stood up to terrorism, and 
they have caught, tried, and jailed the 
so-called Da'wa prisoners, and they have 
stood up to all kinds of intimidation to 
get them free. 

Saudi Arabia has just had to contend 
with this outrage perpetuated by Iran in 
Mecca and, at least so far as we can see, 
the Saudis have dealt with that very 
well. So we need to support our friends 
against that kind of intimidation and 
stand up for it, as we do. And also we 
need to recognize that oil that flows out 
of the Persian Gulf flows to the West, it 
flows to the free world. So we have to 
be responsible, not the Soviets. 

Q. Can you comment on reports 
that an Iranian delegation is in 
Kuwait trying to make a deal with 
Kuwait to end the U.S. reflagging 
operation, and also that there has 
been a holdup as a result of that on 
reflagging three Kuwaiti ships before 
they go into the gulf? 

A. I saw that report, and as far as I 
know, there's nothing to it. I haven't 
seen any corroboration of it at all. As 
far as our reflagging operation is con- 
cerned, it proceeds according to our 
schedule as we have set it out, and there 
hasn't been any particular delay in it. 

Q. You're sending an emissary to 
the Middle East, Mr. [M. Charles] 
Hill, for discussions. I wonder if this 
foreshadows movement on an interna- 
tional conference or an effort by the 
United States to persuade opponents 
of such a conference? 

A. It simply reflects our sense that 
there are problems in the Middle East. 
There are opportunities in the Middle 
East. It's Important to examine oppor- 
tunities with great care so that you take 
advantage of anything that can be 
legitimately a way to move peace for- 
ward. And so I thought I would send my 



executive assistant, who knows these 
issues very well and is very close to me 
and who knows the people there well, 
over for what we hoped would be quiet, 
in-depth talks, designed to dig in deeply 
and find out exactly how people see 
things. So that's the purpose of that 
trip. 

Q. It doesn't signal movement? 

A. That's the purpose of the trip. 

Q. If I can shift far away, I just 
wondered of your thoughts about the 
long-term future of the ANZUS 
[Australia, New Zealand, United 
States security treaty] alliance. This 
week Prime Minister [David] Lange 
has said that New Zealand is better 
off in the long run without an opera- 
tional alliance with the United States. 
And also your thoughts about the Ant- 
arctic facility in Christchurch if this 
continued. 

A. Prime Minister Lange speaks for 
New Zealand. We miss New Zealand in 
the ANZUS alliance. On the other hand, 
we are working very well with 
Australia, and that's where the greatest 
part of the action is. I think as far as 
the work in Antarctica and the Christ- 
church facility, that's something that 
operates in everybody's best interests, 
and I haven't heard of any particular 
dissatisfaction with that. 

Q. Assistant Secretary [for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
Richard W.] Murphy said this morning: 
that the United States is open to 
receiving a serious message from Iran 
if anyone in leadership there is ready 
to send one. In what context are we 
ready to do that in a faee-to-face 
meeting? And, can you respond to 
reports that there have already been 
face-to-face meetings between Iranian 
and U.S. delegations? 

A. There are various ways in which 
we communicate with Iran. Perhaps the 
most established and traditional way is 
through our protecting power, the 
Swiss. And any time we wish to send an 
official message to Iran in an official 
way, we can do it. And, any time they 
wish to send us one, they can do it 
through the same channel or their pro- 
tecting power here, namely Algeria. So 
those are established channels, and we 
do send messages back and forth to let 
them know our views and have that kind 
of exchange. 

There are countries, as everybody 
knows, who are good friends of ours, 
and who are on reasonable terms with 
Iran, who from time to time are told 
things by Iran, or we tell things to Iran, 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



and essentially you have that kind of 
diplomatic exchange. 

The basic point is that insofar as the 
United States is concerned, we accept 
that there has been a revolution in Iran. 
However, it is very difficult to move for- 
ward in a relationship with Iran as long 
as the war is going on, as long as Iran 
continues to support terrorism in 
various forms that we regard as essen- 
tially hostile to our interests. 

Now, in the long run, however, 
there are many ways in which Iran has 
interests that it would seem to me would 
lead it to want to have a relationship 
with the United States, particularly its 
long border with the Soviet Union which 
historically has been a problem. And we 
see our interests, for example, rather 
parallel in Afghanistan right now. So 
there are things on that side of the 
equation, but there is no really produc- 
tive dialogue going on at the present 
time. 

Q. What about the prospects for a 
face-to-face meeting? 

A. I don't know of any par- 
ticular — anything in the works that 
would bring that about. 

Q. Have you received reports of 
possible terrorism from Iran, and 
could you comment on that? 

A. I don't like to comment on par- 
ticular reports and intelligence that we 
have. I don't think that's a good idea. 
But we're always alert, and Iran has had 
a lot of things to say publicly, and 
they've whipped people up. We saw 
what happened in Mecca, which is 
unimaginable, really, for such a religious 
shrine to have that happen there. So, 
naturally, we have to be on the alert in 
our various installations. 

I might say that as work has gone 
forward on the subject of terrorism, par- 
ticularly over the last 3 years, there has 
been a really big improvement in the in- 
telligence capabilities of ourselves and 
our friends and of our ability to be in 
communication with each other. So we 
have managed to find out about and pre- 
vent a great many terrorist incidents 
that would have occurred had we not 
had this intelligence. So we're alert to 
things, and in a position to take action if 
we need to. 

Q. The son of the late Shah today 
met with the press and he too dealt 
with the revolution as you did. He 
said they made a mistake. What's our 
posture toward his aspirations? 

A. As I said a moment ago, we ac- 
cept the fact that there has been a 
revolution in Iran and there is a govern- 
ment there. We don't like the things the 



government is doing, as I have said; and 
insofar as the Shah's son is concerned, 
of course, he speaks for himself. 

Q. Over the last few months what 
started out as a fairly simple reflag- 
ging operation has turned into a very 
major and complex military operation. 
And Iran has shown that it has the 
potential to cause unforeseen prob- 
lems, both on the ground in the gulf 
and on the high seas; and I under- 
stand that there have been commit- 
ments that have been made to the gulf 
states in terms of defending them 
under certain conditions. 

What are the limits to the commit- 
ment that this Administration has 
made in the gulf? And what do you 
think are the possibilities that the 
United States will be drawn into a 
shooting war. either a naval type of 
engagement or a combat engagement 
on the land? 

A. I don't think there is any pros- 
pect at all that we'll be drawn into a 
shooting war. Nevertheless, the Iran- 
Iraq war has been accompanied by 
tremendous casualties — over a million 
casualties— on both sides; and it keeps 
spreading its tentacles, so to speak, into 
the gulf and elsewhere. So we want to 
see it come to an end. 

Our presence in the gulf is not pro- 
vocative. We are there to deter acts of 
aggression against perfectly legitimate 
shipping by countries that are neutral, 
and we have no chip on our shoulder. 
Obviously, if we are attacked, we will 
have to see what actions we'll take, but 
we're not there in any kind of pro- 
vocative way. 

Q. Every day carries with it more 
and more speculation, and I may say 
even confusion, about the position of 
this government's attitude toward the 
idea of an international conference on 
the Middle East; and I think the trip 
by Mr. Hill is included. 

Is this sort of intentional policy 
toward the proposal, or do you intend 
to make it just more clear for the 
minds of the people— at least, in the 
area? 

A. I don't think there's anything 
mysterious about our view or about Mr. 
Hill's trip. I hope I explained that clear- 
ly. Our view is that we want to see 
progress toward peace in the Middle 
East and between Israel and Israel's 
neighbors. That's Point 1. 

Point 2; it is our belief and our 
observation that you make progress on 
that when you get two countries — Israel 
and one of its neighbors — to sit down 
and negotiate. So we favor those kind of 
direct negotiations. 



In the case of Jordan, it is well 
recognized by everybody that if there is 
to be a productive negotiation, Palestin- 
ians have to be involved, in our view, in 
the Jordanian delegation. And you have 
to find Palestinians who are able to rep- 
resent the Palestinian people in the 
West Bank and acceptable to Israel. 

Now, how do you bring that about? 
It has been suggested that an umbrella 
of an international conference would 
help. Obviously, an international con- 
ference in and of itself is not of any in- 
terest to us. Direct negotiations are, we 
think, the way to go. If there is some 
way to construct an international con- 
ference that achieves the result that 
we're seeking, then we're willing to ex- 
amine that possibility. 

And there have been a number of in- 
teresting suggestions, although, so far 
as I can see, there is a long distance be- 
tween where we are now and when you 
have the "t's" crossed and the "i's" 
dotted. And, as we all know, there is a 
division of opinion in Israel about this 
approach. But our view is that moves 
toward peace are very important, that 
opportunities that may present them- 
selves should be taken advantage of and 
explored in detail so that we make sure 
we don't miss any bets. 

Q. What is the Administration's in- 
tention about continuing the hold-up 
or freeze on aid to Panama? 

A. We have a freeze on our 
economic and military assistance. It re- 
mains in effect, and we'll have to 
observe the situation in Panama. We do 
not have any present intention of lifting 
that freeze. 

There are real problems in Panama. 
We want to see in Panama, as 
elsewhere, an emergence of civilian 
democratic control. We recognize that 
it's essential for Panama to have a 
strong professional armed force, and we 
support that. But we believe, as here, 
the armed force should be professional 
and not political. And we see the efforts 
of the people in the civic crusade as 
making these points. 

We deplore things like the raiding of 
their offices that took place yesterday or 
last night, and taking files and whatnot. 
So that is our stance. 

Q. A number of Administration of- 
ficials have said that the mission of 
reflagging is not risk-free. Have the 
risks increased following Iran's calls 
for vengeance in the wake of the 
Mecca riots and the attacks on three 
embassies in Tehran last week? 

A. I think you have to remember 
that Iran has been engaging in terrorist 



October1987 



13 



AFRICA 



and provocative and violent acts right 
from the inception of the Iranian revolu- 
tion, starting with the taking of 
hostages in our own Embassy. So right 
now there is a particularly inflamed 
period on their part in their rhetoric. 
But what they're talking about is similar 
to things that they've been doing right 
along in which we deplore them; we'd 
like to see them stop and see a more 
normal pattern of behavior on their 
part. 

It extends itself in all dimensions. 
Look at their problems with the French. 

So that's what we would look for. 
And I think, in a sense, when you say: 
"Are they going to do something to us in 
retaliation for what they did in Mecca?" 
it's the strangest-sounding question I've 
ever heard. 

Q. You referred to the need for a 
regional solution in Central America, 
yet our allies seemed very surprised at 
the proposal that was unveiled yester- 
day. Were they consulted in advance 
on this? If not, why not? 

A. We've had a gi-eat deal of discus- 
sion with our friends in the area about 
our views, their views, and so on. 

What happened last week, and this 
week particularly, was the emergence of 
an initiative as it developed through a 
great deal of discussion between and 
among Members of the Congi-ess— both 
in the House and in the Senate and the 
Administration— in a way, the kind of 
discussion that people feel is good, in 
talking about what should be our stance 
with regard to Central America. I think 
the Speaker of the House, Jim Wright, 
deserves a lot of credit for sticking with 
this effort and pushing along and ex- 
pressing his views in connection with the 
peace plan which emerged yesterday. 

Now, there have been lots of discus- 
sions with our friends in the area. They 
had some heads up on the particular 
plan, but that plan and the particular 
piece of paper that emerged developed 
fairly rapidly in discussions here. But it's 
intended— and I hope it has this ef- 
fect—to help the Central American 
presidents who are meeting in 
Guatemala to find a road to regional 
peace. That's the object of it, and it was 
sent to them in that spirit. 

And so far as I can tell, from the 
reporting we've had from the region and 
the reactions of the presidents— certain- 
ly of the democracies— that's the way 
they're viewing it. They're taking it on 
board and comparing it with various 
things that they're doing and construct- 
ing their own thoughts, which is the way 
it should be. 



14 



I have a great deal of confidence in 
those four presidents. They all are prod- 
ucts of the democratic process, and in 
some cases practically created it in their 
countries. So they have gone through a 
really testing experience themselves and 
I think they very well understand; and 
they have said and said and said, as it 
says in the plan that the Speaker un- 
veiled yesterday, that the essence of the 
problem is the establishment of 
democracy throughout the region. 

That's what they have told us. We 
agree with that. And so I think what we 
see here is a broadly based effort with a 
lot of support from Republicans and 
Democrats in the House and the Senate, 
the Administration; and there are lots of 
people who have other views — but, by 
and large, an effort to put forward 
something constructive that will help us 
get toward peace in Central America. 

Q. If the Sandinista regime is a 
communist regime, as the Administra- 
tion contends, why on earth would 
they want to accept— particularly in 
60 days— freedom of assembly, 
freedom of the press, free elections? 

A. That's a question you have to ask 
them. From our standpoint and from the 
standpoint of our friends in Central 
America, in order to have peace and 
stability in that region you have to have 
democracy in the region. It couldn't have 
been stated more forcefully or eloquent- 
ly than by [Costa Rican] President Arias 
in his address to the UN General 
Assembly last year. So that's where we 
stand. 

Now, Nicaragua must at some point 
look at the facts in Nicaragua— look at 
the shambles their economy is in, look at 
the problems created when a country 
with people so religiously oriented sees 
the strain between the state and the 
church and considers what's going on 
around it. 

So I don't know whether they will 
want to move in this direction or not, 
but the opportunity is there. We have 
tried to make our views plain, as others 
have, and we'll just have to see. But this 
is a very strong effort, put forward in 
good faith; and we're prepared to follow 
through. And Phil Habib [the President's 
special envoy for Central America] is, of 
course, one of our most able and ex- 
perienced diplomats, and he is prepared 
to be as helpful as he can. 



'Press release 170. 



Visit of Gabon 
President 



President EI Hadj Omar Bongo of 
the Gabonese Republic made an official 
working visit to Washington. D.C., July 
30- August 7. 1987, to meet with Presi- 
dent Reagan and other government of- 
ficials. 

Following are remarks made by the 
two Presidents after their meeting on 
July 31.'^ 

President Reagan 

President El Hadj Omar Bongo has been 
a very welcome guest at the White 
House. This has been a long-awaited 
visit that has given us a chance to 
return the generous hospitality Presi- 
dent Bongo personally accorded to so 
many representatives of this and earlier 
Administrations. 

For 20 years President Bongo has 
led his country in an era of stability and 
progress. Under his leadership, Gabon 
has consistently encouraged the peaceful 
settlement of regional disputes, siding 
with reason, dialogue, and moderation 
over bloodshed, war, and terror. 
Recognizing this, the Organization of 
African Unity asked President Bongo to 
help find a solution to the conflict in 
Chad. 

President Bongo has been a cham- 
pion of African development and has 
worked tirelessly for the welfare of his 
people and all Africans. The United 
States and Gabon have cooperated close- 
ly in the effort to achieve these noble 
goals. We have enjoyed a positive and 
friendly relationship for the past two 
decades, a relationship that has served 
both our countries well. I've greatly 
valued President Bongo's advice and 
counsel concerning America's role in 
Africa's political and economic develop- 
ment. 

Today, President Bongo and I found 
ourselves in harmony about many of the 
key issues that confront Africa. We 
agreed that economic reform, which is 
the best hope for growth, self- 
sufficiency, and full economic sovereign- 
ty, must proceed. The United States has 
encouraged reform through special aid 
funds and increased contributions to in- 
ternational financial institutions. Gabon 
is contributing, as well, by setting an ex- 
ample, taking positive steps toward 
reform on its own and in coordination 
with the IMF [International Monetary 



Kft 



hi 
Iftca 



Department of State Bulletin 



*iil 



Linm 







President Reagan welcomes President Bongo to tlie White Ho 



Fund]. We admire this commitment and 
wish President Bongo great success. 

For our own part, we will soon be 
signing a bilateral debt rescheduling 
agreement with Gabon. The U.S. in- 
vestors have had a favorable experience 
in Gabon. President Bongo is working to 
make the investment climate even more 
attractive, and we're working with him 
to promote increased U.S. investment 
there. 

President Bongo and I also reviewed 
the situation in southern Africa. We 
share the conviction that negotiated, 
peaceful solutions to the disputes that 
afflict that rejiion are urgently and 
cleai-ly possilile. The evil of apartheid is 
no exception. President Bongo and I are 
committed to working together, along 
with other African leaders of good will, 
to set the region on a peaceful course. 
The United States will continue to 
stand unequivocally by the side of 
Africa, with our counsel, our friendship, 
and our assistance. Constructive 
meetings, like the one I held today with 
President Bongo, bolster that commit- 
ment. I was very much heartened by our 
discussions and pleased to have Presi- 
dent Bongo as our guest. 



President Bongo- 

I'm deeply touched by the attention 
lavished upon us and friendship and 
sympathy that my delegation and [I] 
have received during this official visit, 
which is now beginning, which it is my 
privilege to carry out throughout your 
great and beautiful country. I'm also 
touched by your kind words toward me, 
and touched also by the confidence you 
displayed toward my country. May I 
thank you for this, Mr. President, and 
tell you, on behalf of the people of 
Gabon and in my own name, how much 
esteem and friendship we feel toward 
you personally and toward the American 
people. 

In you, the American people find 
perfect embodiment, because beyond 
your great statesmanlike qualities, it has 
found the leader which has given back 
confidence and greatness and dignity 
back to the American nation. No country 
can stand idly by and watch what is go- 
ing on in the United States, and Gabon 
watches with keen interest the deep and 
rapid shifts taking place under your 
leadership within American society. 

In this political world in which we 
live, the United States built its own na- 
tion, predicated upon the diversity of 
origins of your people. Thus, you have 



AFRICA 



become an example for all countries 
which love liberty, solidarity, and peace. 
Therefore, speaking as a leader of an 
African nation, may I state that we 
follow very carefully all your efforts to 
put an end not only to apartheid and 
regional conflicts but also to put an end 
to the steady deterioration of the 
economic situation of the African Conti- 
nent. 

For our part, we have set up with 
the IMF an austerity program which im- 
poses drastic constraints upon us if we 
want to preserve the future. The IMF 
and the Paris and London Clubs have 
been made aware of our determination 
and of our will to honor our com- 
mitments. 
_ In this connection, may I tell you 

I how much I appreciate to the full'extent 
i of the impact the rescheduling measures 
^ taken, vis-a-vis our debt, that you were 
I kind enough to undertake in this very 
: difficult situation. We wish for the spirit 
i of solidarity to prevail in the end and for 
IL our export commodities to gain access to 
I world markets and their remunerative 
E level. Solidarity, indeed, must become 
I the reality in relationships among states. 
: In this connection, distance between 

our two countries, the difference in our 
levels of development, and in our respec- 
tive economic impact must not be an 
obstacle to cooperation in many areas. 
Gabon is a peaceful and peace-loving 
country, stable, and a welcoming coun- 
try; and tliere is security in Gabon. 
Gabon is the special preserve of no one. 
Gabon seeks to diversify its partners, 
and in this connection, we know that 
there is a place for your country. The 
United States, indeed, can bring us their 
know-how, their technology, and their 
capitals in order to contribute to our 
development. 

Mr. President, the United States, 
and Gabon have for some years now en- 
joyed a harmonious relationship. We 
have a few American companies in 
Gabon already. What I wish for in the 
future is to see our relations enjoy a 
new impetus, particularly after we sign 
the bilateral agreement on treaty protec- 
tion and investments. 

Finally, Mr. President, may I ex- 
press my best wishes for your personal 
happiness and your success, for the 
prosperity of the great American people, 
and stronger cooperation between our 
two countries. 



'Made at the South Portico of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 3, 1987). 

=^President Boiiffo spoke in French, and 
his remarks were translated by an inter- 
preter. ■ 



15 



ARMS CONTROL 



Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions 



Introduction 

Even as public attention is focused on 
the negotiations to eliminate U.S. and 
Soviet INF missiles, the United States 
is continuing its efforts in another 
forum to reach an equitable and effec- 
tively verifiable agreement with the 
Soviet Union for deep reductions in 
strategic nuclear arms. The United 
States seeks particularly to reduce and 
to place sublimits on those weapons 
that are most dangerous and destabiliz- 
ing—ballistic missiles, especially large, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles with 
multiple independently-targetable re- 
entry vehicles. 

The United States believes that 
such a treaty could be completed in 
short order, if the Soviets are willing to 
apply themselves with the same 
seriousness as the United States. As a 
concrete step toward a START treaty, 
the United States presented a draft 
treaty text at the strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks in Geneva on May 8, 1987. 
This draft treaty reflects the basic 
areas of agreement on strategic arms 
reductions reached by President Reagan 
and General Secretary Gorbachev last 
October at Reykjavik and provides for 
roughly .50% reductions in U.S. and 
Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arms. 

The United States has made every 
effort to build on the agreements 
reached at Reykjavik and to facilitate a 
START agreement, including important 
compromises— to meet Soviet con- 
cerns—on sublimits that we made 
shortly after Reykjavik. For example, 
we offered to raise the ballistic missile 
warhead sublimit from 4,500 to 4,800 
and to make increases in two other 
sublimits. The Soviets have not demon- 
strated similar flexibility on this key 
outstanding issue. 

The Soviets responded to the U.S. 
initiative by presenting a draft treaty 
text of their own on July 31. The Soviet 
text is a welcome departure from pre- 
vious Soviet practice of proposing only 
highly generalized documents containing 
basic principles. It is similar in struc- 
ture to the U.S. draft text and contains 
some common language. This will facili- 
tate preparation of a joint draft treaty 
text. 

However, the Soviet draft offers no 
movement on the major outstanding 
issues, including the need for sublimits 
on the most dangerous missile systems. 



16 



In addition, it continues to hold hostage 
strategic offensive arms reductions to 
restrictions on strategic defense that 
would go beyond those limitations 
already in the ABM Treaty— a clear 
Soviet effort to cripple the U.S. Strate- 
gic Defense Initiative. The President 
has made clear that he cannot and will 
not accept measures which would kill 
SDI— a research and technology de- 
velopment program that holds great 
promise for enhancing the future securi- 
ty of the United States and its allies 
and ensuring a stable strategic balance 
over the long term. 

Although the Soviet draft reflects 
no movement on the major outstanding- 
issues, Soviet presentation of their 
treaty was a necessary step in the proc- 
ess of negotiating a START agreement. 
With U.S. and Soviet draft treaties now 
on the table, the two sides can explore 
remaining differences and begin finally 
to develop a joint draft text which 
would facilitate negotiation of those 
differences. 

The United States is doing its part 
to bring about, for the first time in 
history, real reductions in strategic of- 
fensive arms. It is necessary for the 
Soviets to demonstrate similar resolve 
and join with us to complete a strategic 
offensive arms reductions treaty 
rapidly. 

Prospects 

At the beginning of the current round 
of negotiations in May, the President 
said that a START agreement could be 
negotiated even this year. We believe 
that the possibility of completing a 
START agreement by the end of this 
year could still be realized but only if 
the Soviets decide now to join vigorous- 
ly in serious efforts to resolve outstand- 
ing issues. The two sides have made 
considerable progress: at Reykjavik 



Acronyms 

ABM— antiballistic missile 
ICBM — intercontinental ballistic missile 
INF— intermediate-range nuclear forces 
LRINF— longer range INF 
NST— nuclear and space talks 
SDI— Strategic Defense Initiative 
SNDV— strategic nuclear delivery vetiicle 
SRAM— short-range attack missile 
START— strategic arms reduction talks 



President Reagan and General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev reached agreement in 
principle on fundamental aspects of an 
agreement on strategic arms reduc- 
tions. Since Reykjavik, further progress 
was made at the negotiating table in 
Geneva. Now, both sides have a draft 
treaty on the table. The United States 
believes that the basic outlines of a 
mutually beneficial START agreement 
are now clear to both sides. What is re- 
quired is for the Soviets to demonstrate 
flexibility and determination comparable 
to that already shown by the United 
States to resolve the outstanding issues. 

U.S. Draft START Treaty 

The draft treaty presented by the 
United States: 

• Calls for a roughly 50% reduction 
to equal levels in strategic offensive 
arms, carried out in a phased manner 
over 7 years from the date the treaty 
comes into force: 

• Specifies a 1,600 ceiling on the 
number of strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles and a ceiling of 6,000 warheads 
on those delivery vehicles; 

• To ensure strategic stability and 
place effective limits on the most 
dangerous missile systems, establishes 
within the 6,000-warhead limit a sub- 
limit of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 
of which no more than 3,300 can be on 
ICBMs, of which no more than 1,650 
can be on permitted ICBMs other than 
silo-based light or medium ICBMs with 
6 or fewer warheads; 

• Seeks limits to codify and sustain 
a 50% reduction in current Soviet 
throw-weight level; 

• Bans mobile ICBMs because of 
stability and verification concerns; 

• Counts each heavy bomber as one 
SNDV; each heavy bomber equipped for 
gravity bombs and short-range attack 
missiles would count as one warhead in 
the 6,000 limit; and 

• Includes a comprehensive verifica 
tion regime providing for the exchange 
of data both before and after arms 
reductions take place, onsite inspection 
to verify the data exchange and to 
observe the elimination of weapons, and 
an effective onsite monitoring arrange- 
ment for facilities and remaining forces 
following the elimination of weapons; 
provides for noninterference with na- 
tional technical means of verification. 



Department of State Bulletir 



ARMS CONTROL 



Obstacles to an Agreement 

Soviet Insistence on Linking START 
to Other Issues. The Soviets continue 
to insist that an agreement on strategic 
arms reductions is contingent upon 
resolution of issues in the defense and 
space forum of the nuclear and space 
talks in Geneva. The Soviets, who long 
have had their own very extensive 
strategic defense programs underway, 
seek to link a START agreement to 
measures which would constrain the 
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative 
beyond the provisions of the ABM Trea- 
ty. This is unacceptable to the United 
States. The President has made clear 
that he cannot and will not accept 
measures which would kill or ci'ipple 
SDI— a program that holds great 
promise for enhancing Western security 
and ensuring future strategic stability. 

Soviet Refusal to Accept Sublim- 
its. Another important issue remaining 
to be resolved is the need to place 
sublimits on different categories of 
ballistic missile warheads. Such 
sublimits prevent the concentration of 
weapons on the most dangerous and 
destabilizing systems— ballistic 
missiles— and thus enhance stability by 
reducing the capability of conducting a 
first strike. The U.S. draft treaty calls 
for three sublimits: 4,800 ballistic 
missile warheads, of which no more 
than 3,300 can be on ICBMs, of which 
no more than 1,650 can be on permitted 
ICBMs other than silo-based light or 
medium ICBMs with 6 or fewer 
warheads. 

The Soviets had previously proposed 
their own sublimits. In 1986, for exam- 
ple, they proposed to limit ballistic 
missile warheads to 80%-85% of the 
total number of warheads. Following 
Reykjavik, we raised our proposed 
warhead sublimit from 4,500 to 
4,800-or 80% of 6,000 in order to 
align the U.S. position with the Soviet 
proposal. Similarly, in our ICBM 
warhead sublimit, we have proposed to 
split the difference between our 
previous proposal for a 3,000 ICBM 
warhead sublimit (which was already 
raised from our original proposal for a 
limit of 2,500 ICBM warheads) and the 
3,600 implied by a Soviet proposal that 
no more than 60% of all warheads be 
allowed on a single kind of system 
under a 6,000-weapon limit. In addition, 
while the Soviets have proposed to cut 
in half the number of their heavy 
ICBMs, this offer would address only 
one of the concerns embodied in our 
proposed 1,650 sublimit and cannot 
substitute for it. 



October 1987 



The Soviets now claim that the 
price for their agreement at Reykjavik 
to the bomber-counting rule— counting 
bombers armed with bombs and SRAMs 
as one warhead under the 6,000 
aggregate— was the dropping of any 
ballistic missile warhead sublimits. This 
is simply untrue; the United States and 
U.S.S.R. agreed upon the bomber 
counting rule, and the United States 
continued to emphasize that sublimits 
must be part of the agreement. 

Throw-weight and Mobile ICBMs. 

Important differences remain between 
the two sides on the issue of throw- 
weight (payload a missile can carry over 
a given range)— the Soviets continue to 
refuse to accept codification in an 
agreement of a 50%-reduction obliga- 
tion in the throw-weight of the Soviet 
ballistic missile force, which is about 
three times that of the United States. 
In addition, the United States and 
U.S.S.R. differ on mobile missiles: the 
U.S. proposal would ban them because 
of the serious verification difficulties 
posed by mobile missiles, particularly in 
a closed society such as the Soviet 
Union, and the potential for covert 
deployment and refire. The Soviets 



refuse to accept the U.S. ban on mobile 
missiles. 

Verification. For any START 
agreement to contribute to strategfic 
stability and reduce the risk of war, it 
must include an effective verification 
regime which would give each side con- 
fidence that the other is abiding by the 
agreement. The United States has pro- 
posed such a regime. The Soviets have 
agreed in principle to certain important 
aspects of the U.S. verification pro- 
posals, but some key aspects of their 
position remain vague. Much hard 
bargaining remains to reach agreement 
on the specific verification provisions 
necessary to achieve an effectively 
verifiable agreement. 

Background 

Since the earliest days of his Ad- 
ministration, the President has estab- 
lished as his highest priority the 
achievement of deep, equitable, stabiliz- 
ing, and effectively verifiable reductions 
in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. 
Such reductions would reduce the risk 
of war. Consequently, the United States 
proposed the strategic arms reduction 



Soviets Indicate Acceptance of INF Proposal 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 22, 1987' 

General Secretary Gorbachev, in an in- 
terview published today, indicated that 
the Soviet Union is now prepared to 
agree to eliminate all longer range INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
missiles, including the 100 warheads 
that they have previously insisted on 
keeping. We welcome reports of Soviet 
acceptance of the President's proposal 
for the global elimination of U.S. and 
Soviet longer range INF missiles, initial- 
ly made in November of 1981. Such an 
agreement, if achieved, would result in 
the complete global elimination of this 
class of missiles. This would substantial- 
ly reduce the Soviet nuclear threat to 
both Europe and Asia. It would 
facilitate verification as well. 

The General Secretary also indicated 
that he is prepared to agree to the 
elimination of shorter range INF 
(SRINF) missiles. With the strong sup- 
port of our allies, we made such a pro- 



posal in Geneva on .June 16, which 
would eliminate I'S. nnri Soviet SRINF 
missiles on a kI"Ii:iI liasis. 

We have seen statements of positive 
Soviet response before, only to later 
discover unacceptable conditions. We, 
therefore, look forward to seeing their 
official statement at the Geneva negotia- 
tions. Our delegation is prepared to 
work constructively there to reach an ef- 
fectively verifiable agreement. 

We believe now is the time for prog- 
ress in reducing strategic offensive 
weapons, as well. Our START [strategic 
arms reduction talks] delegation looks 
forward to prompt taliling of a Soxaet 
draft treaty to match the one we have 
tabled more than 10 weeks ago, so we 
can get down to work on this subject as 
well. 



'Read to news correspondents by Marlin 
Fitzwater, assistant td the President for 
press relations (text fi'iun W-ekl\- (''ini]iil:i- 
tion of Presidential l>(i^nlll.■nl^ "I .lul\' liT, 
1987). ■ 



17 



ARMS CONTROL 



talks which began in Geneva in the 
summer of 1982. 

At the end of the fifth round of the 
START negotiations in December 1983, 
the Soviets— in an effort to bring 
pressure on the United States and its 
allies not to respond to the Soviet 
deployment of SS-20s by proceeding 
with LRINF missile deployments in 
Europe— refused to agree to a date for 
resuming the talks. The Soviet tactic 
failed, and after more than a year, they 
returned to negotiations on strategic 
arms in the context of the nuclear and 
space talks. 

Talks at the NST then were stalled 
for nearly a year by Soviet insistence 
on a ban on what they call "space-strike 
arms" as a precondition to progress in 
the strategic arms area. When the 
Soviets finally presented a START pro- 
posal in the fall of 1985, it contained a 
number of extremely one-sided ele- 
ments, such as counting certain U.S. in- 
termediate-range systems as "strategic," 
while excluding from limits an even 
greater number of comparable Soviet 
systems. Their position, however, did 
accept for the first time the principle, 
long advocated by the United States, of 
deep reductions in strategic offensive 
forces. 

At the November 1985 summit in 
Geneva, the two leaders agreed to ac- 
celerate work in areas where common 
ground already existed, such as 50% 
reductions in START. However, the 
Soviets did not follow through at the 
Geneva START negotiations. 

In Round V (June 1986) of the NST 
talks, the Soviets presented a new "in- 
terim" proposal which called for less 
than the 50% reductions agreed to at 
the 1985 summit but contained some 
constructive elements. The President 
cited the Soviet proposal as positive, 
although he emphasized that we could 
not accept the proposal without 
changes. The United States responded 
in Round VI (fall 1986). We made clear 
that the U.S. 50%-reduction proposal 
remained on the table and remained the 
outcome which we strongly preferred. 



However, in order to accommodate the 
Soviet idea of taking interim steps to 
50% reductions, we also tabled substan- 
tial changes to our proposals. 

In October 1986, the President and 
Mr. Gorbachev met at Reykjavik, Ice- 
land. In this meeting, the United States 
sought to narrow differences, where 
possible, between the U.S. and Soviet 
START positions and to lay the ground- 
work for more productive negotiations. 
Additionally, the focus shifted back to 
immediate reductions of 50%. Specifi- 
cally, the sides agreed to reductions in 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 
1,600 for each side, with no more than 
6,000 warheads on these delivery 
vehicles. The Soviets also agreed to 
reduce their heavy ICBMs by half, and 
there was agreement on counting rules 
for bomber weapons. 

After the Reykjavik talks, the 
United States promptly presented in 
Geneva new proposals reflecting the 
progress made in Iceland. The United 
States also said it would accept higher 
sublimits on the different categories of 



U.S. Presents Views 
on INF Verification 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT. 
AUG. 25. 1987' 

Today at the negotiations on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
in Geneva, the United States presented 
its views on verification of an INF trea- 
ty that provides for the elimination of all 
U.S. and Soviet INF missiles— the so- 
called double global zero. The United 
States has long told the Soviets that an 
agreement to eliminate all INF missiles 
would make it possible to simplify the 
verification provisions of an INF accord. 
These new U.S. proposals reflect this 
belief. 



ballistic missile warheads in a com- 
promise effort to meet Soviet concerns, 
while still meeting the goal of ensuring 
strategic stability. On November 7. the 
Soviet Union presented proposals at the 
NST talks that only partially reflected 
the headway made at Reykjavik. 

During NST Round VII (January 15- 
March 6, 1987), the United States 
sought to narrow further the differ- 
ences between the two sides. Progress 
was made in clarifying differences when 
the sides agreed to develop a joint 
working document which specified the 
points of agreement and disagreement 
on key issues. This document was useful 
to the United States in developing a 
draft START treaty text. The United 
States presented this treaty text on 
May 8, 1987, at NST Round VIII. The 
Soviets responded to the U.S. proposal 
by presenting their own draft START 
treaty on July 31. With both draft 
treaties now on the table, the two sides 
can develop an agreed joint draft text 
which would facilitate negotiation of the 
remaining differences. ■ 



The United States has not 
"softened" its INF verification inspection 
measures. Previous U.S. verification 
proposals were predicated on the 
assumptions that the United States and 
the Soviet Union would retain 100 
warheads on longer range INF missiles 
and that modernization and production 
of such missiles and missile flight-testing 
would be permitted. Our new verifica- 
tion proposals are intended to deal with 
a different set of circumstances. 

Specifically, these proposals are 
based on: 

• The elimination of all shorter 
range INF missiles systems within 1 
year and the elimination of all longer 
range INF missiles within 3 years: and 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 



CONSULAR AFFAIRS 



• A ban on modernization, produc- 
tion, and operational test flights of those 
missiles. 

Based on agreement to those condi- 
tions, the key elements of our new 
verification proposals will include: 

• A detailed exchange of data, up- 
dated as necessary, on the location of 
missile support facilities, the number of 
missiles and launchers at those facilities, 
and technical parameters of those 
missile systems; 

• Notification of movement of 
missiles and launchers between declared 
facilities; 

• A baseline inspection to verify the 
number of missiles and launchers at 
declared facilities; 

• On-site inspection to verify the 
destruction of missiles and launchers; 

• Short-notice inspection of declared 
facilities until the missiles are eliminated 
to verify residual levels; and 

• Short-notice inspection of certain 
facilities in the United States and 
U.S.S.R. at which illegal missile activity 
is suspected. 

The regime we seek will have the 
most stringent verification of any arms 
control agreement in history. The 
regime includes on-site inspection and 
challenge inspection of suspect sites. Ef- 
fective verification of an INF agreement 
is essential to ensure that the agreement 
makes a lasting contribution to peace 
and stability. The U.S. verification pro- 
posals are an important step in this 
direction. However, much work remains 
to be done. The United States looks for- 
ward to serious discussions with the 
Soviets on these verification re- 
quirements. 



Travel Advisories 



Travel advisories are published to in- 
form the American traveling public of 
conditions which may adversely affect 
them abroad. This service was estab- 
lished by the Department of State's 
Bureau of Consular Affairs in 1978. 

Travel advisories are generally 
limited to significant risks such as 
physical danger, unexpected arrest or 
detention, serious health hazards, or 
other conditions abroad with serious 
consequences for the American traveling 
public which may not have received ex- 
tensive coverage in the U.S. media. 
Travel advisories which describe condi- 
tions involving a high potential for 
violence and physical danger are called 
travel warnings. 

Security-related travel advisories 
usually reflect a trend or pattern of 
violence over a period of time in which 
the government of the country involved 
is unwilling or unable to afford normal 
protection. For that reason, isolated in- 
ternational terrorist or criminal at- 
tacks—which can and do occur virtually 
anywhere at any time — do not trigger 
travel advisories. 

Travel advisories are not intended as 
instruments of political policy. They are 
issued on the basis of objective evidence 
about emerging or existing circum- 
stances; they are modified or cancelled 
when those circumstances change. 



Travel advisories are issued only after 
careful review of information from our 
diplomatic post in the affected country 
and coordination with various bureaus of 
the Department of State and concerned 
Federal agencies. 

The Bureau of Consular Affairs also 
publishes a series of pamphlets entitled 
Tips for Travelers, which cover less 
critical but long-term issues relevant to 
travel in particular areas of the world. 
Topics covered may include personal 
safety, foreign government travel 
restrictions, effects of dual nationality. 
Treasury Department restrictions, im- 
port and export controls, unique judicial 
or legal practices, or differing social 
customs. 

Travel advisories for specific coun- 
tries and Tips for Travelers are available 
to the public at any of the 13 regional 
passport agencies, field offices of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular posts 
abroad. They are also available by call- 
ing the Citizens' Emergency Center at 
(202) 647-5225, or by writing to: 
Citizen's Emergency Center, Bureau of 
Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Press release 164 <if July 28. 1987. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment deputy spokesman Phyllis Oakley. ■ 



October1987 



19 



DEPARTMENT 



Managing Diplomacy: 
Problems and Issues 



by Ronald I. Spiers 

Address before the Meridian House- 
Smithsonian Institution interriational 
series on diplownni in troxsitinn on 
Augusts, 1987. Amhass^i'lnr Sinrr^ is 
Under Secretary for Managrinriil. 

I must confess that at this point— after 
6 months of a worsening budget outlook, 
continuing problems of morale and 
equity in our professional Service, 
escalating criticism of the Department of 
State for our building programs, and 
security problems in Moscow— I feel like 
the lady who was trying unsuccessfully 
to get her stalled automobile started 
while the not-too-helpful gentleman in 
the car behind her leaned persistently on 
his horn. Finally, exasperated, she 
walked back to him and said, "Listen, 
buddy, why don't you go up and start 
my car while I sit back here and honk 
for a while." 

Most Americans, and even fellow 
public servants, generally have little 
understanding of the Foreign Service or 
its role. I have spent a good part of my 
career explaining that I am neither a 
member of the Forest Service nor the 
Foreign Legion and that the Depart- 
ment of State is not an adjunct of some 
State House outside the orbit of the 
beltway. For that small part of our 
population that can accurately identify 
the Foreign Service and make an 
educated guess about what it does, the 
image is mixed. Cliches abound about 
"striped pants," "cookie pushers," or peo- 
ple who have been befuddled by too 
many cocktail parties or too much con- 
tact with foreigners. 

Role of the Foreign Service 

Perhaps I am carrying coals to New- 
castle, but 1 am constrained to begin by 
refreshing your memory about what the 
Foreign Service is and what it does. 

Although the United States has had 
a de facto Foreign Service since the 
beginning of the Republic (Benjamin 
Franklin was our first representative in 
Paris and John Adams our first in Lon- 
don—the lineage is respectable), we did 
not have a professional Service in the 
modern sense until the Rogers act of 
1924. This act established a permanent 
career "Foreign Service of the United 
States" in which merit alone would serve 



20 



as the basis for appointment and promo- 
tion. Although we have had two other 
seminal pieces of legislation— the acts of 
1946 and 1980— neither fundamentally 
reordered the Foreign Service created in 
1924. 

The current "hostage-for-arms" prob- 
lem notwithstanding, the job of the 
Foreign Service is to help conduct the 
foreign relations of the United States 
for the President, who is, under the 
Constitution, the chief foreign policy of- 
ficer of the Republic. The Foreign Serv- 
ice, the military, and the intelligence 
services form our nation's triad of na- 
tional security institutions. And security, 
after all, is the first public service any 
government owes its citizens. 

Today the Foreign Service of the 
Department of State consists of over 
8,000 Americans, including about 4,000 
generalist officers. The remainder are 
specialists ranging from security person- 
nel to secretaries and communications 
technicians. Three characteristics 
distinguish this corps from the rest of 
the nation's public servants: "rank in 
person," worldwide availability for 
assignments, and an "up-or-out" struc- 
ture. (In these senses, the Foreign Serv- 
ice is more akin to the military than to 
the Civil Service.) 

Junior officers are granted tenure 
only after successful service abroad. 
Promotions above junior rank depend on 
selection boards which rank order all of- 
ficers in a certain class or category on 
the basis of annual efficiency reports. 
Officers found to be substandard in per- 
formance, or failing to win promotions 
within certain periods, are subject to in- 
voluntary retirement. Senior officers are 
eligible for extra pay for outstanding 
performance but are on limited commis- 
sions which must be extended by board 
action each several years. Senior officers 
who do not receive a limited career ex- 
tension must retire. 

The 1980 act put into place systems 
designed to produce a "predictable" flow- 
through and to ensure that only the best 
officers advance to the top. The 
others— although by any objective stand- 
ard very good officers— drop by the 
wayside in this extremely competitive 
milieu. Our entry system is one of the 
most selective in the world. In 1986, 
about 16,000 applicants took the Foreign 
Service exam, given once a year in 



December; 187 were eventually ac- 
cepted, including 81 women and 31 
members of minorities. The average age 
was 31; all had Bachelor's degrees, and 
71% had advanced degrees. Each officer 
entering will have been tentatively iden- 
tified as intended, in his or her initial 
career, for one of the four mainstreams 
or "cones" of Foreign Service work: ad- 
ministration, consular, economic, and 
political. A Foreign Service officer can 
expect to spend well over half of his or 
her career abroad and the remainder 
mainly in the Department of State. 

Even after joining the Foreign Serv- 
ice, being simply a "very good" officer 
may not be good enough. This highly 
competitive system and its byproducts 
are today among the most controversial 
management issues in the State Depart- 
ment. This year we will lose over 100 
experienced and highly trained people, 
many of whom still have much to con- 
tribute to the conduct of U.S. foreign af- 
fairs. 

However, a colleague recently put 
this issue in a nutshell: 

A competitive system which retained its 
less competitive members would be 
wasteful. ... A rigorous up-or-out philosophy 
is a practical and workable means of balanc- 
ing the needs for experience, progression, 
and employee development. 

Let me deal briefly with the role of 
the Foreign Service before describing 
the problems and issues which, in effect, 
determine the "state of the Foreign 
Service." 

Most simply, the Foreign Service is 
the professional staff through which the 
President and his Secretary of State 
manage the foreign relations of the 
country. The relationship of the 
Secretary of State with the President 
largely determines the degree and im- 
portance of the role of the Foreign Serv- 
ice, although there are other factors at 
play. Some Presidents distrust their 
Secretaries of State, as was the case 
with F.D.R. and Cordell Hull. Some 
Presidents distrust the Department of 
State as an institution: this was the case 
with Richard Nixon and to some degree 
with J.F.K. Nixon thought it too liberal: 
Kennedy too conservative. 

Problems and Issues 

What about today? There are two fac- 
tors which disturb me, and which I 
believe disturb most of my career col- 
leagues. 

First is the increasing propensity of 
many prominent politicians to denigrate 
the public service, to "run" against 



Department of State Bulletin 



DEPARTMENT 



"Washington" and its "bureaucrats." I 
find this both discouraging and painful. 
At its roots is an unworthy and 
meretricious populism. I was raised in a 
tradition of reverence for public service 
as one of the highest possible callings 
for a civilized man. I believe this 
negative campaign will affect the quality 
of future recruits to public service. 

The other disturbing trend is an in- 
creased use of Foreign Service positions 
as political rewards. Let me be precise 
and careful in my comments on this 
delicate issue: just as the President is 
Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces, he is also the chief foreign policy 
officer. He has a right — unrestricted ex- 
cept by the requirement of congressional 
advice and consent — to choose 
whomever he wishes to help him set the 
nation's political directions. An am- 
bassador is literally a "personal" 
representative of the President, 
answerable to him. Clearly many of the 
talents developed in the private or 
domestic political sectors are 
transferable to the diplomatic arena. 
Foreign policy is politics on a world 
scale. Ability to develop strong interper- 
sonal relations is key, as is well- 
developed tactical and strategic political 
savvy. Finally, there is a tradition of 
citizen-statesmen in American history 
that has contributed to our sense of civic 
responsibility and to the vibrancy of our 
democratic political process. I have 
worked with some outstanding political 
ambassadorial appointees who bring 
fresh perspectives and skills honed in 
other walks of life to what would other- 
wise be a closed society of the Foreign 
Service. There is always a need for peo- 
ple of the stature of David Bruce, Mike 
Mansfield, Ellsworth Bunker, and 
Arthur Burns. Many of the noncareer 
people currently holding ambassadorial 
assignments are close and respected 
friends, and a number are making 
lasting contributions to our diplomacy. 

I do not and will not argue these 
points. However, I am deeply concerned 
about the diminishing percentage of 
career appointments. Although the 1980 
act states that as a rule all ambassadors 
should be appointed from the ranks of 
the career Foreign Service, we are now 
at the low point for the past four 
decades in the proportion of our nation's 
ambassadors who are career officers. It 
is wasteful and demoralizing for well- 
qualified people to climb a 30-year 
career ladder only to be preempted at 
the top rung by someone with substan- 
tially lesser qualifications or experience. 



It is frequently argued that am- 
bassadorships are policy positions which 
should be encumbered only by whole- 
hearted supporters of the President's 
policies. A Foreign Service which serves 
successive presidents with sometimes 
radically different agendas, the argu- 
ment goes, cannot do so with equal 
vigor and loyalty. I disagree with this. 

First, an ambassador is not a 
policymaker. He or she is a collector of 
information, a manager of a diplomatic 
mission, a recommender of courses of 
action, an executor of instructions, a 
persuader and analyst, but not a decider 
of policy. 

Secondly, the Foreign Service is a 
disciplined career Service which has no 
misconceptions about the role and pre- 
rogatives of the political leadership in a 
democracy. 

Finally, an ambassador's effec- 
tiveness depends on professionalism, ex- 
perience, familiarity with the country, 
knowledge of history, cultural sensitivi- 
ty, managerial ability, coolness in a 
crisis, and precise understanding of U.S. 
policy goals and objectives. These 
qualities are not monopolies of a career 
Service. But, on the other hand, simply 
being an "early political supporter" of 
the President or success in business do 
not guarantee the attributes essential 
for an ambassador. A political ap- 
pointee, the argument goes on, has the 
direct access to the President denied to 
the professional. In my experience, this 
has only very rarely been the case. 

The Foreign Service must be 
prepared to fill all of the positions which 
are needed to carry out our foreign 
policies. The more uncertainties there 
are about the number of noncareer ap- 
pointees, the harder it is to manage a 
coherent personnel policy that does not 
produce undersupplies or oversupplies. 
Recently, we have lost a number of 
superb officers who spent a lifetime 
preparing for senior appointments, only 
to see those prospects dissolve at the 
last moment. 

A further development, which is 
having a devastating effect on the state 
of the Foreign Service, is the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings legislation. Deep cuts 
are being made without real considera- 
tion of policy consequences. We have 
had to cut our personnel levels, close 
posts abroad that are the capillaries of 
our information-gathering system; forgo 
urgent modernization; cut back on 
needed equipment purchases, language 
training, the travel we need to do our 
job right, and our security program — all 



in order to get along in 1987 with 
substantially less than we had in 1986. 

The Foreign Service is small. Our 
nation's entire foreign affairs budget is 
less than 2% of the Federal budget. The 
Department of State's operating budget 
is only 0.4%, and over half of that goes 
for people-related expenses. There is no 
way we can sustain cuts of the mag- 
nitude envisioned in the current budget 
without reducing people and services. 
Ironically, the $20 million we had to cut 
this year in personnel costs is less than 
one-tenth the cost of a B-1 bomber. 

In the meantime, the proportion of 
State Department officers at our mis- 
sions abroad is decreasing. Less than 
30% of the personnel in our overseas 
missions are now State Department 
employees. Many in the Foreign Service 
fear they are increasingly becoming a 
support service for other agencies, who 
seem, in stark contrast to State, un- 
constrained in the level of their 
representation abroad. There are more 
school teachers hired by the Department 
of Defense in Europe alone than there 
are State Department employees world- 
wide, including even all of the foreign 
nationals who work for us in support 
positions abroad. We have eaten into 
our core capabilities in key political and 
economic specialties to feed successive 
reductions. Gramm-Rudman promises 
future cuts each year, and we are 
already reeling from the first. A con- 
tinuation along this road will fundamen- 
tally reshape our ability to manage 
foreign affairs. 

The prospects for 1988 are dismal. 
The House, traditionally our high-water 
mark for State Department operations, 
has sent our bill to the Senate. The FY 
1988 State operations funding level, 
passed by the House, is approximately 
23.3% or $767 million below the Presi- 
dent's request and would have a 
negative impact on virtually every 
aspect of State Department operations. 

For salaries and expenses, this 
represents a shortfall of approximately 
$139 million below the level needed to 
operate minimally at the same level as in 
FY 1987. Needless to say, this will have 
to result in employment reductions, post 
closings, and other reductions at the 
same time we are confronting critical 
issues such as trade, arms reduction, 
and the Middle East. If our diplomacy is 
to succeed on these and other activities, 
we must have adequate resources avail- 
able and the flexibility to use them in 
response to unforeseen situations. 



October 1987 



21 



DEPARTMENT 



In the meantinne, some in the Con- 
gress are telling us we cannot close 
posts to meet this crisis. This puts 
us — in a word — in an impossible situa- 
tion: Catch 22 in all its glory. 

Where does this leave us? We con- 
tinue to recruit people of extraordinarily 
high quality. Anyone with a professional 
interest in foreign affairs knows the 
Foreign Service is the place to be. 
Almost anywhere else you are an 
onlooker, not an actor. The prestige of 
the Foreign Service is higher than it 
used to be, in part because it is now 
more broadly representative of 
American life than it was; in part 
because more people now realize that 
representing the United States abroad in 
an age of terrorism means more than 
simply attending cocktail parties. The 
Foreign Service is on the front lines of 
our nation's defense, exposed to dangers 
the military only faces in time of war. 
More of our senior officers have been 
killed since the Korean war than ad- 
mirals and generals. 

We continue to confront other prob- 
lems, some of which may be beyond 
solution. We are working hard to 
restore a sense of Service discipline, 
which diminished under our "open 
assignments" system. This system had 
been designed to preclude under-the- 
table assignment arrangements but led 
many to believe they could only be 
assigned to jobs they specifically re- 
quested. We are moving to reemphasize 
the needs of the Service in the assign- 
ment process, and the result should be 
more employees assigned to what needs 
to be done rather than to what they 
want to do. 

The problem of spouses may be the 
most intractable of all. We recruit from 
the sector of the population which is 
most likely to have partners with in- 
dependent career aspirations. Many of 
these aspirations are almost impossible 
to accommodate in a system which 
moves officers from post to post every 3 
or 4 years. We are trying to expand 
employment opportunities for spouses, 
but many careers are just not portable. 
The idea of compensating spouses who 
have donated their services to the U.S. 
Government for generations gets short 
shrift on the Hill even though an in- 
creasing number of other nations' 
foreign services are finding it necessary 
to do so. 



There are other problems of 
management which preoccupy us. Most 
of us feel that we have not got our per- 
sonnel evaluation system right: it is too 
subjective; too unidimensional (giving a 
view only from the standpoint of a 
supervisor); too user-unfriendly; too 
dependent on the verbal skills of a par- 
ticular supervisor. I hope that within the 
next 6 months we will have reached 
agreement on a new system which will 
neutralize most of these defects. 

There is another fundamental prob- 
lem we are trying to deal with: attaining 
the proper balance between the exper- 
tise we need, both in geographic area 
and country and function-specific 
knowledge, and development of 
managerial skills and the broad-gauged 
view so necessary for effective senior of- 
ficers. This cannot be an either/or 
choice, since we need both clusters of 
skills, but it adds complexity to develop- 
ment and execution of an effective 
managerial strategy. The fact is, 
however, almost all members of the 
Service spend the first half or more of 
their careers developing "functional ex- 
pertise," whether it be in financial 
economics, a geographic area or coun- 
try, political-military affairs, or a wide 
variety of other specializations. 

Finally, there is the problem of 
security. This is a matter of high con- 
cern to those of us who are responsible 
for the safety of people deployed at over 
250 locations overseas. Parodoxically, I 
have found morale highest in high-threat 
posts where there is an intensified sense 
of community and mutual interdepend- 
ence. Nevertheless, many of our em- 
bassies and consulates are very 
vulnerable, and it will be a long time 
before terrorism burns itself out. We 
need a large infusion of resources to 
provide prudent levels of protection. Our 
efforts are not unavailing. As a matter 
of fact, it is a tribute to what we have 
accomplished that we have now iden- 
tified over 180 individual incidents that 
have been deterred or preempted by the 
security programs we have launched in 
recent years. 

There has been a storm of criticism 
of the Department of State over the 
Moscow Marines and the Soviet "bug- 
ging" of our new office building in 



Moscow. A great deal of this it tenden- 
tious and uninformed. The fact is that 
the Department's leadership has devoted 
great attention over the past 3 years to 
putting rational security policies in 
place, to arguing for the resources we 
need to protect our people and our infor- 
mation, and to reorganizing our security 
and buildings offices to meet the 
challenges of major new programs. 

Early in 1984, it was apparent to us 
that we could not address the escalating 
problems of terrorism and intelligence 
penetration on a business-as-usual basis. 
We recommended establishment of a 
blue-ribbon panel to examine the entire 
range of security threats— both physical 
and counterintelligence. We selected Ad- 
miral Bobby Inman to head this panel. 
We knew that any comprehensive pro- 
gram recommended by such a panel 
would require tremendous new re- 
sources and numbers of personnel but 
felt the time had come to lay out for the 
Congress a security program they could 
accept or reject. 

'The Inman report gave a "jump- 
start" to what I am convinced will turn 
out to be a very effective security pro- 
gram if we are given the resources to 
implement it and do not have to 
reorganize at every shift of the wind. 
We have set up a new Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security to concentrate 
responsibility and accountability. We are 
recruiting and training an impressive 
new generation of security officers. We 
have generated a Foreign Service 
counterculture that gives proper stress 
to security. We have brought modern 
procedures and more experienced per- 
sonnel to our greatly expanded embassy 
construction program. In short, the 
Department has much to be proud of in 
terms of our accomplishments in just 
over 3 years of concentrated effort. 

Nevertheless, a prominent Senator 
not long ago came up to me after a 
hearing to, he said, congratulate me. 
Before his sarcasm registered, I asked 
him what for. He told me that, since I 
was in charge of security, I was respon- 
sible for "the mess in Moscow." After all 
the money Congress had given us, this 
just showed the incompetence of the 
Foreign Service. I reviewed all that we 
had done, pointed out that our Moscow 
problems were rooted in decisions made 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and 
noted also that it was not until last fall 
that we began to get the counter- 
intelligence program funds we had 
pressed for. He only said, "Well, nobody 
ever told me all that." At that point I 
thought again about the lady in the car. 

No department of government 
should be beyond criticism or its funding 
beyond scrutiny. However, I feel that 
there is still much too little public 
understanding of the role and impor- 
tance of our diplomatic establishments in 
the United States. Perhaps that is in- 
evitable in a country whose energies and 
attention have been historically devoted 



U.S.-Lao POW/MIA 
Consultations Held 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 12. 1987 

In responding to the invitation of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), 
the U.S. delegation, headed by Mr. 
Richard Childress, Director of Asian Af- 
fairs, National Security Council of the 
United States, visited Vientiane from 
August 10-12, 1987. On this occasion 
Mr. Childress and the delegation paid a 
courtesy call on His Excellency Phoun 
Sipaseut, Deputy Chairman of the Coun- 
cil of Ministers and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. During their visit the U.S. 
delegation held talks with the Lao 
delegation, headed by Mr. Soubanh 
Srithirath, Vice Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs of the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic. 

The talks between the two sides 
have proceeded in an atmosphere of 
frankness, and efforts have been made 
t(i increase mutual understanding. Both 
sides agreed to further talks in the near 
future to implement agi'eements 
reached. 



to taming a continent, protected by two 
mighty oceans against the intrusions of 
foreign affairs. 

One of the most eloquent of the 
modern practitioners of diplomacy, 
Israel's Abba Eban, has written: 
"Diplomacy must be judged by what it 
prevents, not only what it achieves. 
Much of it is a holding action designed 
to avoid explosion until the unifying 
forces of history take humanity into 
their embrace." War — in a very real 
sense — is an epitaph to diplomacy's 
failure. Our concern is that the United 
States is in the process of whittling 
away the most important leg of its 
three-legged stool of national security. ■ 



in Vientiane 



Both sides reaffirmed their respect 
for their principles of independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity in 
their relations. 

The U.S. Government reaffirmed its 
opposition to private, irresponsible ef- 
forts that interfere with government-to- 
government cooperation. 

The Lao Government agreed to 
resume humanitarian cooperation with 
the United States on the issue of 
Americans still missing and unaccounted 
for in Lao territory. 

The U.S. Government acknowledged 
the humanitarian problems of Laos and 
agreed to work within its capability to 
respond to them. 

The two sides also exchanged views 
on other issues of mutual interest. On 
the subject of narcotics, both sides 
recognized the seriousness of the prob- 
lem and reaffirmed their intention to 
contribute to the international effort to 
combat it. 

Mr. Soubanh Srithirath was pleased 
to accept the invitation of the U.S. 
Government to visit Washington at an 
appropriate time. ■ 



U.S. Urges 
Resumption of 
North-South 
Korean Talks 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 3, 1987' 

Since the suspension a year and a half 
ago of the Red Cross, parliamentary, 
and economic talks between South and 
North Korea, the Governments of the 
Republic of Korea and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea have offered 
a variety of proposals for the resump- 
tion of dialogue. None has succeeded. 

Today the Government of the 
Republic of Korea announced a new, far- 
reaching, and flexible initiative to break 
the deadlock and resume North-South 
dialogue. The U.S. Government fully 
supports this Republic of Korea pro- 
posal. 

The Republic of Korea Government 
has called for an open-agenda meeting 
of foreign ministers to discuss a broad 
range of issues of mutual concern. This 
proposed meeting would afford the 
Republic of Korea and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea an opportuni- 
ty to chart the future course of North- 
South dialogue. We applaud the 
Republic of Korea Government's vision 
and determination in pressing ahead 
with realistic, practical proposals for 
tension reduction and other meaningful 
steps toward peaceful reunification. 

As Assistant Secretary [for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Gaston] Sigur 
noted in his speech of July 21, " . . . the 
people of Korea, both North and South, 
now face historic opportunities and 
challenges ... to implement the positive, 
to pursue contacts, not confrontation." 
We believe this latest Republic of Korea 
Government proposal meets these 
historic opportunities and challenges 
with sincerity, imagination, and courage. 
We urge the leaders of the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea to respond 
positively. 



'Read to news correspondents bv Depart- 
ment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



October 1987 



23 



ECONOMICS 



Global Economic Powers 
With Global Responsibilities 



by Douglas W. McMinn 

Address before the U.S. Feed Grains 
Council in Af<heville, North Carolina, on 
August 3, 1987. Mr. McMinn is Assist- 
ant Secretary for Economic and 
Business Affairs. 

Sustainable noninflationary world 
growth continues to be synonymous 
with an improving standard of living 
and is absolutely essential to the suc- 
cess of almost all of you here today. 
Without growth, markets for your 
goods will not expand. For example, 
U.S. agriculture currently exports 25% 
of its output. Foreign markets are 
critical to ensuring profitable operation 
of our nation's farms. We need those 
markets to be open and, perhaps more 
importantly, to be growing. 

Global economic growth is a com- 
plex phenomenon. Today I want to 
discuss two of the decisive elements 
that determine whether we obtain 
world growth: trade policy and 
macroeconomic policy. In connection 
with these elements, I will focus on the 
three major economies of the free 
world: Japan, the European Community 
(EC), and the United States. 

In the global economy, wealth and 
size create both power and respon- 
sibilities. The United States, the EC, 
and Japan must shoulder the respon- 
sibility to pursue policies that promote 
economic growth at home and, by ex- 
tension and example, around the world. 

There was a time— not long ago— 
that the United States was the tower- 
ing economic and political power in the 
world. Europe and Japan lay shattered 
by war. But that was 40 years ago. 
Today's global economic environment is 
characterized by greater economic 
parity among the major players, rapid 
advances in technology and communica- 
tion, and enormously complex market 
interdependence. The United States 
can no longer be the only source of 
economic growth, prosperity, and 
dynamism in the world. The world has 
changed. 

My thesis today is simple. As I said 
earlier, the three largest economic en- 
tities have an important responsibility 
to promote growth domestically and 



24 



globally. Yet not one of the three major 
economies is shouldering its rightful 
share of that responsibility. And it 
should concern us all. 

The European Community 

I'd like to turn first to the European 
Community. In the European Communi- 
ty, failure to undertake structural ad- 
justment measures has had painful con- 
sequences for the EC and world 
economies. Structural rigidities, such as 
those in the EC labor market, have 
thwarted net job creation and healthy 
economic growth in the EC. Such prob- 
lems as rigid hiring and firing practices, 
housing programs that hamper worker 
mobility, disincentives to employment- 
generating investment, and interference 
with business decisions on when and 
where to open or close plants all inhibit 
Europe's growth. 

Key sectors of Europe's markets 
have been closed to import competition 
in efforts to protect existing jobs, 
especially in such sectors as agriculture, 
telecommunications, and steel. By freez- 
ing labor and capital into inefficient ac- 
tivities, Europe has reduced its oppor- 
tunities to grow and expand into more 
dynamic areas. 

The Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) is a glaring example of a policy 
that has thwarted adjustment in the 
key agricultural sector and has siphoned 
off resources from more dynamic sec- 
tors. The European Community has 
built the CAP on a protective system 
that aids farmers with high price sup- 
ports, stimulates overproduction, and 
disgorges the surpluses on world 
markets through export subsidies. 
Budgetary and indirect costs of the 
CAP have mushroomed to $26 and $40 
billion, respectively. 

Despite massive government spend- 
ing on agriculture, the system remains 
badly out of line. I don't need to 
describe to this audience the effect that 
the CAP has had on contributing to 
global oversupply of nearly all major 
agricultural commodities. The moun- 
tains of grain, meat, and butter are still 
growing. 

The direct and indirect costs of 
agricultural programs in the EC, as 
well as in the United States, Japan, and 
elsewhere, represent a massive 



misallocation of resources and an enor- 
mous burden on economic performance. 
It holds down standards of living in all 
countries and affects everyone of us 
here today. 

As a means of putting an end to the 
damage wrought by distortive 
agricultural programs, last month we 
tabled an ambitious proposal to the in- 
ternational community. Others will 
discuss this in more detail. In brief, our 
proposal calls for: 

• Elimination over 10 years of all 
subsidies that directly or indirectly af- 
fect trade in agricultural commodities; 

• Elimination over 10 years of all 
import barriers to trade in agricultural 
commodities; and 

• Harmonization, based on interna- 
tionally agreed standards, of sanitary 
and phytosanitary regulations. 

We are calling on the EC and 
others to examine and pursue this pro- 
posal seriously. 

Sustainable, noninflationary growth 
cannot take hold in the EC— or the 
world— unless the Europeans undertake 
more fully structural adjustment 
measures, particularly in agriculture, as 
well as trade-liberalizing measures. 
While positive steps have been taken 
(for example, in beef and dairy), to date 
the pace of change has been much too 
slow. Europe must live up to its global 
responsibilities. 

Japan 

Japan also has an important role to 
play in the world economy. Japan has 
grown to be the second largest economy 
in the free world. Its population, with a 
per capita income of over $16,000 
(1986), enjoys one of the highest stand- 
ards of living in the industrialized 
world. Japan boasts a formidable array 
of competitive, export-oriented in- 
dustries: from pharmaceuticals to con- 
sumer electronics to financial services. 
It is the world's largest creditor, with 
$180.4 billion of net foreign assets at 
the end of 1986. In short, Japan has 
become a first-class economic power. 
But Japan has been reluctant to 
take on the responsibility commensurate 
with its status as a global economic 
power. It is like the power hitter in 
baseball who has been called up to the 
majors but is still sitting on the bench. 
The Japanese have simply not stepped 
up to the plate. On trade liberalization, 
the time has come to lead by doing, not 
by talking. Similarly, Japan must adopt 



Department of State Bulletin* 



ECONOMICS 



measures to ensure strong growth in 
domestic demand. The Japanese must 
come to rely more and more on strong 
growth in domestic demand and less on 
exports as the engine of Japanese 
prosperity. 

Market access in Japan is a par- 
ticularly acute problem in some parts of 
the agricultural sector. For example, 
beef and oranges are subject to 
stringent quotas; feed grain imports in- 
to Japan face nontariff market distor- 
tions; and rice imports are effectively 
banned. The list goes on. 

More Japanese are coming to 
understand that their market restric- 
tions not only harm U.S. export in- 
terests but also damage the Japanese 
economy. Japanese consumers are 
forced to pay high prices for food, leav- 
ing them less money to buy other prod- 
ucts. (In Japan, 23% of disposable in- 
come is devoted to food purchases, as 
compared to 14% in the United States.) 
Excessive amounts of land, labor, and 
capital are tied up in the relatively inef- 
ficient Japanese agricultural sector. 
This reduces the supply and raises the 
cost of land, labor, and capital for those 
sectors of the Japanese economy that 
are relatively more efficient. 

Progress is not always as rapid as 
we would like. Sometimes we forget 
that there are major political problems 
in Japan (as in all countries) associated 
with opening markets, especially in 
agriculture. Prime Minister Nakasone 
and other Japanese leaders are trying 
to make changes in the Japanese 
economy. Their task is to help the 
Japanese people recognize that the 
changes we seek are not unreasonable 
concessions to foreign interests but, 
rather, sound measures that improve 
Japan's long-term economic prospects. 
But they've got a long way to go. 

A second element of Japan's en- 
hanced responsibilities is increasing 
growth in domestic demand. Just how 
Japan should adjust its economy to in- 
crease domestic demand is, of course, a 
difficult and sensitive issue. Japan 
needs to spend more of its accumulated 
savings on domestic projects that will 
contribute to a higher standard of living 
for its people. It needs to reform its tax 
system and streamline its distribution 
system. Were Japan to increase invest- 
ment in infrastructure and to change its 
tax system to encourage more consump- 
tion rather than saving, its external 
trade surplus would tend to decline, and 
its imports from the world would rise. 



October 1987 



Market opening and structural ad- 
justment measures are the keys to 
removing distortions and inefficiencies 
in the Japanese economy. Before Japan 
lies the opportunity to improve the 
welfare of its own people and con- 
tribute significantly to global prosperi- 
ty. Japan needs to step up to that plate. 

United States 

Finally, I'd like to turn to the United 

States. As I said at the outset, we, too, 
have important responsibilities in the 
world economy. 

One of our major responsibilities— 
to ourselves and to the global 
economy— is to address our own struc- 
tural economic problems, particularly 
the imbalance between our domestic 
savings and domestic investment. Dur- 
ing the past 3 years, the demand for 
capital— our public and private 
investment— has greatly exceeded the 
domestic supply of capital— the savings 
generated by households, businesses, 
and government. The key to restoring a 
balance is reducing our Federal budget 
deficit. In my view, the single most im- 
portant issue remains our Federal 
budget— not trade. We are simply not 
responding to the challenge. 

Another one of our prime respon- 
sibilities is to uphold the open trading 
system that has contributed to our pros- 
perity and the prosperity of the world. 

As everyone knows, the House and 
Senate have each passed an omnibus 
trade bill. These bills are loaded with 
subtle and not-so-subtle protectionist 
provisions which, if enacted, would be a 
retreat from U.S. responsibilities and 
leadership in the world economy. 

Both the House and Senate trade 
bills are comprehensive bills, encom- 
passing trade, investment, finance, and 
foreign policy issues. The Administra- 
tion has detailed numerous individual 
provisions within each area which would 
harm U.S. economic interests. 

However, what, in my view, is even 
more problematic and troublesome 
about the pending legislation is the 
general thrust of these bills. The 
motivation of these bills is that restric- 
tions on foreign goods and capital are 
an entitlement— an automatic right— for 
all U.S. industries. 

This motivating principle is 
reflected in proposed changes to ex- 
isting trade law contained in the om- 
nibus bills. The bills contain a myriad of 
"technical" changes in the laws pertain- 
ing to unfair and fair trade practices. 



All of the changes head in one direc- 
tion: toward increased protectionism 
and heightened limitations on the Presi- 
dent's trade policy authority. 

The cumulative effect of the pro- 
posed trade law changes is "procedural 
protectionism." The provisions take our 
current trade statutes and twist them 
in a way which will make import relief 
a surer bet for U.S. industries seeking 
protection. Temporary, targeted trade 
relief can help ease the adjustment of 
industries to strong import competition, 
but there are always costs to other sec- 
tors of the economy. The proposed bills 
would make it more difficult for the 
President to weigh all of these costs in 
his decisions on whether to implement 
trade remedies. 

Instituting "quick trigger" protec- 
tionist measures inflicts both direct and 
indirect harm to our economy. Trade 
restrictions, in and of themselves, hurt 
our export industries. Restrictions 
divert resources to protected sectors of 
the economy and away from dynamic 
sectors that are typically left un- 
protected. Competitive sectors of the 
U.S. economy, such as your agricultural 
sector, are hurt by import restrictions. 

Furthermore, establishing new im- 
port restrictions here would invite an 
escalating and dangerous spiral of 
counterrestrictions. U.S. exporters 
would lose lucrative overseas markets 
as our trading partners retaliate by 
erecting their own barriers. Com- 
petitive, export-oriented sectors of the 
U.S. economy, particularly agriculture, 
will again be the victims of this policy. 

The same self-defeating protec- 
tionist sentiment lies behind the invest- 
ment provisions in the Senate and 
House omnibus bills. By imposing 
screening and, in the case of the House, 
registration requirements for foreign in- 
vestment in the United States, the bills 
will have a chilling effect on foreign 
capital flows into the United States and 
could incite mirror legislation by other 
countries. Discouraging foreign invest- 
ment would deny funds now flowing to 
the public and private sectors in the 
United States. As a result, we would 
face higher interest rates, lower 
economic growth, and an increased debt 
service burden on U.S. taxpayers. As a 
sector already burdened by a heavy 
debt load, U.S. agriculture is well 
aware of the painful consequences of 
higher interest rates. 

The House-Senate conference proc- 
ess on the omnibus trade bill will begin 



25 



ECONOMICS 



soon. It is crucial that all aspects of the 
national interest, including export in- 
terests, are reflected in the conference 
process. However well intended, this 
country cannot afford a misguided trade 
bill. The United States must live up to 
its domestic and global responsibilities. 

Conclusion 

The world has changed over the past 40 
years. Joint ventures, global financial 
markets, instantaneous communications, 
and technology-sharing are all reflec- 
tions of the increased interdependence 
in the world. These developments carry 
with them changes in the roles of the 
advanced countries in the global 



economy. Specifically, all of the ad- 
vanced nations have a role and a 
responsibility toward contributing to 
sustainable noninflationary world 
growth. 

All three major free world econ- 
omies—the European Community, 
Japan, and the United States— have not 
lived up fully to their global respon- 
sibilities. All three of us need to pursue 
more vigorously strong, responsible 
economic measures, particularly in the 
areas of market-liberalizing and struc- 
tural adjustment measures. If we shun 
these responsibilities, we put at risk the 
future prosperity of our country and 
the world. ■ 



International Protection 
of U.S. Copyrights 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Statement before the Subcomrnittee 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad- 
ministration of Justice of the House 
Judicinni Ci.DDiiitlre on July 23, 1987. 
Mr. Wall IS is I'liihr Secretary for 
EniHoiim- Affiin-^.' 

Thank you for this opportunity to pre- 
sent the views of the Department of 
State on one of the most important 
questions confronting this government 
in connection with intellectual property 
problems, whether the United States 
should adhere to the Bern Convention 
for the Protection of Literacy and Ar- 
tistic Works. The question has an ob- 
vious and important relationship to the 
kind of copyright protection our citizens 
get abroad. It is also important as a 
matter of comity to the 76 member 
stiites of the Bern convention — most of 
which have wanted us as a member 
state. 

One hundred and one years ago, the 
United Stjites was represented at the 
Bern diplomatic conference only by an 
observer. Last year in the same room in 
the Swiss Parliament in which the Bern 
Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Property was 
signed in 1886, the 76 member states of 
that convention celebrated its 100th an- 
niversary. The United Suites, where 
more copyrighte(i materials are pro- 
duced than in any other nation, was 
again seated on the sidelines as an 
observer. 



26 



A recent Register of Copyrights, 
Ms. Barbara Ringer, well-known to this 
subcommittee, rightly characterized the 
role of the United States as "strangers 
at the feast." Far more than any other 
country, our nation has benefited and 
our industries have profited from the 
sound and fair levels of copyright pro- 
tection Bern provides. We should remain 
"strangers at the feast" no longer. 

I will address three issues: first, why 
we strongly support adherence to the 
treaty; second, why we believe that 
there can be no serious doubt that the 
treaty is non-self-executing; and, third, 
why the advantages of Bern membership 
far outweigh any perceived disadvan- 
tages. 

U.S. Interest in the Bern Convention 

In 1935, Dr. Wallace McClure of the 
State Department's Office of Treaty Af- 
fairs summed up the Department's views 
on the proposal that the United States 
should become a member state of the 
Bern convention. He said: 

The business of the Department of St;ite 
is to negotiate treaties. Another function of 
the Department of State is to protect 
American interests in other countries, and 
the reason why the Department of State has 
recommended this treaty is because it 
believes that, through the treaty, it can bet- 
ter protect American interests, so far as 
(■(ipyright is concerned, in other countries, 
than through any other available instrumen- 
tality. 

Dr. McClure's statement is just as 
timely today as it was when he made it 
over a half a century ago. 



From the beginning of the Bern con- 
vention a century ago, the United States 
has blown hot and cold, or at least warm 
and cool, about this convention. We 
were invited to participate in the 1886 
diplomatic conference, but the Secretary 
of State declined for the sound reason 
that foreign works were not protected in 
the United States under our copyright 
law. The Department pressed for a 
change in that policy; and, in 1891, Con- 
gress enacted the Chace Act which pro- 
vided for the first-time protection of 
foreign works. From then until the 
mid-1950s, the Department of State 
sought to establish copyright relations 
with as many states as possible. 
Bilateral agreements were concluded 
with over 30 countries. 

During the 1920s and 1930s, increas- 
ing use of American copyrighted works 
led to strong support by private 
organizations for the adherence of the 
United States to Bern. A good deal of 
congressional interest was aroused, but 
Congress took no action. 

A basic foreign policy objective of 
the United States in the international 
copyright field has continued to be 
adherence to the Bern convention. The 
fact that this country was not a member 
of the worldwide Bern convention was 
the principal reason for the negotiation 
of the Universal Copyright Convention. 
During the preparatory work for the 
LIniversal Copyright Convention, it was 
clear that the immediate goal was to 
develop a multilateral copyright agree- 
ment to which the United States could 
adhere. It was also clear that, beyond 
that immediate goal, the principal 
negotiators regarded the Universal 
Copyright Convention as a "bridge" to 
the long-established Bern convention, 
not an alternative to it. 

The legislative history of the 1976 
Copyright Act, enacted under your 
leadership, Mr. Chairman, shows that 
one objective of the lengthy and 
painstaking revision effort was to 
eliminate major obstacles to U.S. 
adherence to Bern, for example, the 
term of protection. 

In recent years several 
developments have reemphasized the 
issue of U.S. adherence to Bern. One 
was the withdrawal of the L'nited States 
in 1984 from I'NESCO [United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization], the secretariat for the 
LIniversal Copyright Convention. 

Although our withdrawal from 
UNESCO had no legal effect on our 
membership in the Universal Copyright 
Convention, the long-term effects on the 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



position of the I'nited States in the in- 
ternational copyright field are potential- 
ly serious, for the United States no 
longer participates in the UNESCO 
general conference which determines the 
program and budget of the Universal 
Copyright Convention. 

Copyright Piracy 

An even more important development 
that has again focused attention on in- 
ternational copyright was the great in- 
crease of piracy of copyrighted works in 
the 1980s. The U.S. copyright industries 
estimate, for example, that they lose 
over $1.3 billion of sales per year as a 
result of piracy. The higher level Bern 
convention attracted the interest and at- 
tention of U.S. copyright interests. 

What the piracy problem has done is 
focus the attention of government and 
industry on standards. We have found 
ourselves trying to tell foreign govern- 
ments whose copyright policies were 
seriously harming U.S. interests, what 
sorts of "adequate and effective" protec- 
tions would solve the problem. In doing 
so we found the provisions of Bern, not 
the Universal Copyright Convention or 
even our own copyright statute, to be 
the best standard. The best support for 
the Bern convention was the experience 
of using it in actual negotiations. 

Trade Issues 

Another significant development throw- 
ing the spotlight on international 
copyright was the emergence of foreign 
intellectual property protection as an 
issue in international trade. The Depart- 
ments of State and Commerce are work- 
ing closely with the U.S. Trade 
Representative to attain a widely accept- 
able code for the protection of intellec- 
tual property rights in the Uruguay 
Round. The copyright standards in the 
proposed code should be based on the 
high levels of protection in the Bern con- 
vention. 

We believe Bern adherence is 
justified on its own merits and is further 
justified as part of a comprehensive 
series of related measures to strengthen 
the global intellectual property system. 
A GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] code incorporating copyright 
standards is one measure. 

The relation of copyrights to trade is 
imjiortant to be sure, but their relation 
to national culture, to facilitating 
cultural communications among nations. 



and to the economic freedom of authors 
are not to be ignored. They help to 
create an international "marketplace of 
ideas," which requires political freedom 
and commercial principles of fairness. 

The Department first brought the 
question of U.S. adherence to Bern to 
our International Copyright Panel, 
which met in September 1984. This ad- 
visory panel, comprised of copyright ex- 
perts from all major private sector 
organizations, including librarians and 
educators, reached a broad consensus in 
favor of adherence to Bern and to move 
expeditiously to evaluate any im- 
pediments in U.S. domestic law to such 
adherence. 

Within the government this question 
was considered in the fall of 1984 by the 
working group on intellectual property 
of the cabinet council on commerce and 
trade. In February 1985, the cabinet 
council endorsed the working group's 
recommendation for U.S. adherence to 
Bern. Subsequently, the President ap- 
proved certain foUowup actions including 
a Department of State recommendation 
to seek advice and consent of the Senate 
to accession to Bern. A letter to this ef- 
fect was sent by the President to the 
Senate on June 16, 1986. 

Paralleling these governmental in- 
quiries private sector representatives, at 
the request of the State Department, 
established late in 1984 a committee 
known as the ".4f/ Hoc Working Group 
on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Conven- 
tion" chaired by Mr. Irwin Karp, an emi- 
nent specialist in copyright and authors' 
rights, who is well-known to this sub- 
committee. The working group was 
drawn from individuals with long and 
highly diversified experience in interna- 
tional copyright matters. The task of the 
working group was "to identify those 
basic provisions of U.S. law relevant to 
U.S. adherence to the Berne Conven- 
tion, and to analyze their compatability 
with Berne." 

The ad hoc working group's ex- 
cellent final report was published in the 
fall of 1986. I would like to take this op- 
portunity to note for the record that 
Secretary Shultz, last October, ex- 
pressed his "deep appreciation" to Mr. 
Karp and members of the working 
group for their outstanding accomplish- 
ment. The final report has been a great 
help to the Administration and others in 
identifying those issues that should be 
addressed in the implementing legisla- 
tion. 



Would the Bern Convention 
Be Self-Executing? 

Turning to the matter of what kind of 
implementing legislation is needed to 
bring our law into conformity with Bern, 
we note that our copyright laws general- 
ly meet the high levels of protection in 
the convention. I would like to focus on 
one fundamental question: whether the 
Bern convention is self-executing. This 
issue is, of course, one of particular in- 
terest to the Department of State. 

As a matter of policy, the Depart- 
ment of State takes the position that in- 
tellectual property treaties should not be 
self-executing. None of the intellectual 
property treaties to which the United 
States has adhered to since the Second 
World War, whether they pertain to 
patents and trademarks (e.g., Paris In- 
dustrial Property Convention, Patent 
Cooperation Treaty) or to copyrights 
(e.g.. Universal Copyright Convention, 
Geneva Phonogram Convention), has 
been regarded as self-executing. In addi- 
tion to seeking the advice and consent of 
the Senate, we have worked closely with 
the Congress for the enactment of the 
necessary implementing legislation. 

Whether the Bern convention is a 
self -executing treaty has been examined 
by the arf hoc working group on U.S. 
adherence to the Bern convention (final 
report. Chapter XII). The Department 
has studied this chapter and fully agrees 
with the arf hoc working group's conclu- 
sions: 

If ratified by the United States, the 
Berne Convention would not be a self- 
executing treaty in this country. The protec- 
tion it stipulates for authors and their suc- 
cessors could only be enforced here to the ex- 
tent provided by existing U.S. law or by fur- 
ther legislation Congress enacted to imple- 
ment ratification of the Convention. 

After an examination of the relevant 
provisions of the Bern convention and 
U.S. law and certain relevant U.S. court 
cases, the arf hoc working group further 
observed that if there is any doubt about 
this question, "it could be resolved by a 
Senate statement of intent that Bern is 
not to be construed as self-executing in 
the U.S." As you know, Mr. Chairman, 
your bill (H.R. 1623, March 16, 1987) 
and Senator [Patrick] Leahy's bill (S. 
1301, May 29, 1987) explicitly state that 
the Bern convention is not self-executing 
under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States. 

The Administration bill — drafted by 
the Patent and Trademark Office in the 
Commerce Department — takes the same 
position on this matter. Section 2 of the 



October 1987 



27 



ECONOMICS 



bill states that "the Berne Conven- 
tion ... is not self-executing under the 
Constitution and laws of the United 
States." Further, Section 2 states that 
U.S. obligations under Bern can be met 
only by provisions of domestic law. 

We believe it is also pertinent to 
note that the President in his letter to 
the Senate seeking advice and consent 
to accession stated that "implementation 
of the Berne Convention will require 
legislation." 

In the face of such clear intent, it is 
difficult to imagine that any legal action 
instituted on the grounds that Bern is 
self-executing would be successful. 

Bern Convention 
Membership Advantages 

In recent weeks some questions have 
been raised as to whether U.S. ad- 
herence to Bern is in the overall interest 
of our copyright industries. The in- 
terested agencies have studied these 
questions and reexamined our position 
on the matter. It is still the firm position 
of the Administration that the United 
States should adhere to the Bern con- 
vention. This position is based on a 
number of reasons affecting our interna- 
tional copyright relations. 

• U.S. membership in the Bern con- 
vention would strengthen our efforts in 
negotiations with other governments to 
increase the level of protection they af- 
ford the works of U.S. authors under 
their copyright law or proposed laws. 

• Adherence to Bern would assist 
our efforts to include the high copyright 
standards of Bern in a GATT intellectual 
property code. Further, we would be in 

a better position to encourage develop- 
ing countries to join Bern rather than 
the Universal Copyright Convention and 
conform their laws to the higher stand- 
ards of the Bern convention. 

• U.S. membership in Bern would 
enable the United States to participate 
in the next revision conference. (The 
convention was last revised in 1971.) 
Since the revision of Bern requires a 
unaminous vote (Article 27), the United 
States would be in a position to veto any 
revision that would be detrimental to 
U.S. copyright interests. 

• Adherence to the Bern convention 
will enable this country to exert greater 
leadership in international copyright 
relations. Our membership in the low- 
level Universal Copyright Convention, in 
which we have had little or no voice in 
its administration since our withdrawal 
from UNESCO in 1984, does not en- 
hance U.S. influence in the international 
copyright field. In contrast, U.S. 



membership in the high-level Bern con- 
vention would afford us a voice in the 
governing bodies of this convention and 
a role in its administration and manage- 
ment. 

• Adherence to Bern would im- 
mediately result in high-level copyright 
protection for U.S. creators in 24 Bern 
member states that do not belong to the 
Universal Copyright Convention. This 
would avoid the difficult, cumbersome, 
and sometimes expensive procedure of 
simultaneous publication in a Bern coun- 
try. It is important to note that the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China is giving serious 
consideration to adherence to Bern, 
possibly in preference to the Universal 
Copyright Convention. 

• U.S. accession to Bern will avert 
the risk of possible retaliation against 
U.S. copyrighted works by Bern 
member states which may resent our 
"free ride" on the Bern convention 
through the Universal Copyright Con- 
vention and the "back door" of Bern 
(i.e., by simultaneous publication in the 
United States and a Bern member coun- 
try, such as Canada). The Bern conven- 
tion explicitly authorizes retaliation 
against the works of a nonmember state 
(Article 6). If the United States does not 
join Bern after our well publicized ef- 
forts to do so and, therefore, does not 
share in the administrative and fiscal 
responsibilities of the Bern member 
countries, the latter group may well con- 
sider some form of retaliation against 
the United States. 

• Finally, and perhaps most impor- 
tant, U.S. adherence to Bern will 
strengthen the Bern convention itself. 
This is very much in the interests of 
authors and publishers everywhere and, 
indeed, of all societies where works of 
art and literature flow freely, regardless 
of their national origin. Because the 
Bern convention stands for certain inter- 
national principles, certain minimum 
rights of authors and copyright owners, 
the absence of the United States from 
the Bern convention has always been a 
crucial impediment to the true univer- 
sality of Bern. 

We are in the midst of a tech- 
nological revolution involving com- 
munications satellites, computers, fiber 
optics, super conductors, lasers, optical 
discs, and on-and-on. The practical im- 
pact of these developments on the 
dissemination and use of copyrighted 
works has made enforcement more dif- 
ficult. Basic decisions will have to be 
made which are going to influence 
developments in the international 
copyright field well into the 21st cen- 
tury. 



A fundmental question which con- 
fronts us today — developing as well as 
developed countries, creators as well as 
users — is whether up-to-date copyright 
regimes will be built upon the system of 
international respect for copyright that 
has been developed during the past cen- 
tury, or whether that system will be 
discarded as nationalistic interests seek 
to define and develop copyright in this 
dynamic and highly volatile environment 
created by the technological revolution. 

Conclusion 

The Department of State strongly 
believes the best basis for continuing the 
international copyright system is the 
Bern convention, a comprehensive yet 
dynamic instrument which meets the 
challenges brought on by new tech- 
nologies. This is the view of many inter- 
national copyright experts not only in 
the United States but also in Western 
Europe. At an informal meeting of in- 
dustrialized countries in late January, 
held at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, key West European 
governments expressed the sincere hope 
that the United States would adhere to 
the Bern convention because of its 
positive effect on international 
copyright protection. 

Failure of the United States to 
become a member of this convention, 
and to accept the responsibilities of such 
membership as soon as possible, could 
be an important cause of further 
deterioration of the international 
copyright system with all the adverse 
consequences this suggests for the 
cultural and intellectual well-being of 
this country. This may be our last real 
chance in this century to join the Bern 
convention. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



GENERAL 



Diplomatic Immunity and U.S. Interests 



by Selwa Roosevelt 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on August 5. 1987. 
Ambassador Roosevelt is Chief of Pro- 
tocol of the United States. ' 

I appear here today pursuant to Chair- 
man [Claiborne] Pell's invitation to the 
Department of State to submit its views 
on S. 1437, introduced by Senator 
Helms. I am responsible for the ac- 
creditation of foreign government per- 
sonnel in the United States. By virtue 
of their status as members of diplo- 
matic missions, consular posts, and in- 
ternational organizations, they are 
entitled to certain privileges and 
immunities. 



Diplomatic Immunity: 
Background and Purposes 

I will begin by discussing immunity and 
briefly explaining its purpose. 
Diplomatic immunity is a fundamental 
principle of international law under 
which certain foreign officials are not 
subject to the jurisdiction of local courts 
or other authorities for official or per- 
sonal activities. The reason for immuni- 
ty is simple and basic: it is to assure 
that diplomatic representatives are able 
to carry out the official business of 
their governments without undue in- 
fluence or interference from the host 
country. It enables them to work in an 
environment of freedom, independence, 
and security. It was not designed to 
benefit individuals but rather to ensure 
the efficient performance of the func- 
tions of the mission. 

Diplomatic immunity has its roots in 
antiquity. In our country, statutes ex- 
tending immunity to diplomats were 
first enacted by the Congress in 1790. 
The customary international law of 
diplomatic immunity was later codified 
in 1961 when the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations was drafted. This 
treaty entered into force for the United 
States in 1972. In 1978, the Diplomatic 
Relations Act repealed the 1790 
statutes and established the Vienna con- 
vention as the definitive U.S. law on 
the subject. The corresponding law 
governing consular immunity is the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- 
tions of 1963. I have attached to my 
statement a chart which shows the 
degree of immunity accorded to person- 
nel of diplomatic missions and consular 
posts (see p. 31). 



Having given this background, I 
want to make very clear that the 
Department of State abhors any wrong- 
doing on the part of persons entitled to 
immunity. I am not here to defend the 
indefensible, that is, the unlawful acts 
of persons having immunity. The 
serious abuses of those immunities— 
although rare— which have brought this 
matter to your attention concern me 
deeply, and I have worked hard during 
my 5 years as Chief of Protocol to in- 
stitute a more effective response to in- 
stances of diplomatic crime. I have 
established a reputation in the 
diplomatic community for toughness. I 
cannot overemphasize how strongly I 
feel and have always felt about this 
issue. At the same time, we have to 
bring rational thinking to this subject. 
We must weigh extreme remedial 
measures against the grave injury that 
those measures could cause to U.S. 
interests. 



Concern for U.S. Interests Abroad 

With all due respect, we cannot support 
this proposal for a most elemental 
reason: it would be detrimental to U.S. 
interests abroad. Regardless how 
grievous these matters may be, our own 
national interest must take precedence 
over any other consideration. 

In a world where discord and dis- 
agreement are prevalent in relations 
among states, the principle of immunity 
is something the community of nations 
has agreed upon. We are an honorable 
nation; we are not an Iran. We have set 
our signature on a treaty. Enactment of 
this bill would place the United States 
in violation of its international obliga- 
tions. We do not believe that our 
government, to which so many others 
look for guidance, should abrogate its 
responsibility under international law. 

If the U.S. Government unilaterally 
alters its treaty obligation, we surely 
will invite more harmful reciprocal ac- 
tion. Let's consider what might happen 
if similar legislation were passed in 
other countries. The bill would eliminate 
immunity for crimes of violence, defined 
as "the use, attempted use or threat- 
ened use of physical force against the 
person or property of another." This is 
a large category of crimes. Other coun- 
tries might respond by eliminating im- 
munity even more broadly. 



Similarly, the terms "reckless driv- 
ing," "drug trafficking," and "driving 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs" 
might be interpreted broadly by other 
countries. In addition, even if another 
country eliminated immunity for pre- 
cisely the same crimes that the bill 
would cover, Americans still would face 
unequal treatment. Those serving in 
countries with similar legislation could 
be arrested, detained, and questioned 
until the matter was fully adjudicated. 
In the United States, persons might be 
free on bail pending trial, but in 
another country, they might be held for 
months. 

Once the floodgates are open, other 
governments may not mirror this bill in 
the response they make. They could go 
beyond the measures proposed by the 
bill, for example, by limiting the im- 
munities of diplomatic agents. Or they 
might choose to keep intact the immuni- 
ty of administrative and technical staff 
for violent crimes but eliminate their 
immunity for other crimes, such as 
espionage. 

The language of the proposed legis- 
lation covers only members of the ad- 
ministrative and technical staff and the 
service staff of diplomatic missions and 
consular employees. Persons not af- 
fected would be diplomatic agents, 
members of their families, and family 
members of the administrative and 
technical staffs of embassies. 

Based on a review of our files for a 
recent 12-month period and a review of 
the Ashman-Trescott book. Diplomatic 
Crime, we find that only two incidents 
would have been addressed by this 
legislation. In light of the fact that only 
two people would have been "brought to 
justice" had this legislation been in 
force previously, we ask whether its 
passage, undermining longstanding in- 
ternational convention, would really 
serve our best interest, especially when 
you consider that so many Americans 
and their dependents are serving 
overseas? 

The members of the administrative 
and technical staff of an embassy must 
have full criminal immunity in order to 
perform their jobs effectively. These 
personnel perform tasks fundamental to 
the operation of the embassy. Many of 
them, including communicators who 
transmit encoded messages and secre- 
taries who type the missions' classified 
documents, engage in very sensitive 



October 1987 



29 



GENERAL 



work. They and their families could be 
subjected to the same pressures that 
diplomats face. We cannot take great 
comfort in the full immunity of the am- 
bassador, of the FBI legal attache, of a 
military attache, or of the personnel of 
other agencies engaged throughout the 
world in such sensitive work as fighting 
terrorism and drugs, if we know that 
those who do their clerical work and 
transmit their classified material back 
to Washington could be interrogated 
and jailed by hostile receiving-state 
authorities. 

The Need for Immunity 

If the intent of the bill is also to reduce 
the immunity of family members of 
diplomats and family members of the 
administrative and technical staff— as 
we have been led to believe in- 
formally—we cannot support the 
proposal. 

Under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, members of the 
family of a diplomatic agent have full 
criminal immunity, as do members of 
the administrative and technical staff of 
a mission and their families. Lower 
level members of embassy staffs have 
criminal immunity for their official acts. 
In addition, under the Vienna Conven- 
tion on Consular Relations, consular 
employees have criminal immunity for 
acts performed in the exercise of con- 
sular functions. These immunities, 
which serve important objectives, all 
would be curtailed if the bill were 
enacted. 

We believe complete immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction assured to 
diplomats is fundamental to diplomatic 
relations. Diplomats could not perform 
their duties if they faced criminal liabili- 
ty under local law for normal perform- 
ance of their jobs or if they could be 
harassed by the receiving state bringing 
false charges. Moreover, the diplomat's 
own immunity would be meaningless if 
his family residing with him did not 
have the same immunities. The threat 
of actions against family members could 
be used to intimidate the diplomat. 

Can you imagine the specter of the 
American Ambassador's spouse involved 
in an automobile accident being taken 
away by the police in certain coun- 
tries—to be held in jail according to 
local statute? Or worse, being held on 
trumped-up charges? Think of the im- 
plications. Of course, we couldn't re- 
spond in kind because our system does 
not operate that way. 



The U.S. judicial system is premised 
on the rule of law, and many of the 
potential abuses that I have just 
described may seem far-fetched to an 
American. But U.S. personnel from a 
variety of agencies serve overseas in 
countries where the risks that I have 
just outlined are very real indeed. If the 
United States were to reduce the im- 
munities of diplomatic personnel here, I 
am certain that foreign states would 
reciprocate by restricting the im- 
munities accorded to U.S. personnel. 
Our embassies in hostile foreign coun- 
ti-ies will not be able to do their jobs ef- 
fectively if the children of diplomats 
could be imprisoned as a means to 
pressure them and if the members of 
the administrative and technical staff 
face the risk of imprisonment. 

So far I have only addressed the ef- 
fect of the bill on our personnel at em- 
bassies. But the bill would also affect 
some personnel at consulates. Although 
the proposed legislation would not af- 
fect consular officers, it would affect 
consular employees, who perform in 
consulates the same functions that ad- 
ministrative and technical staff perform 
in embassies. The immunity from juris- 
diction accorded to consular officers and 
consular employees by the Vienna Con- 
vention on Consular Relations, as I 
noted before, is much more limited than 
the regime which applies to diplomats. 
Consular immunity applies only to acts 
performed in the exercise of consular 
functions, i.e., to "official acts." When a 
case is brought, the court determines 
whether the acts were performed in the 
exercise of consular functions. Family 
members have no official acts and have 
no immunity. Thus, consular officers 
are now subject to jurisdiction with 
respect to most "crimes of violence." as, 
indeed, are consular employees. While 
consular officers and employees may 
raise their functional immunity as a 
defense in connection with a speeding 
charge or accident, this itself is not a 
bar to judicial action. The courts would 
determine whether or not such a 
defense would apply. 

Thus, even with respect to the more 
limited immunity accorded consular 
employees, the bill would place the 
United States in violation of the Vienna 
convention and would put U.S. person- 
nel at risk of reciprocal measures. 
There may, moreover, be instances in 
which a consular officer is charged with 
a violent crime for an act performed in 
the exercise of consular functions. For 
example, a hostile country might charge 
a U.S. consular officer with assault if 
he took measures to defend himself 



against physical attack by a disgruntled 
visa applicant. The United States should 
be entitled to assert consular immunity 
to prevent the case from going forward. 
This measure, if enacted, could provoke 
reciprocal legislation which would bar 
such assertion of immunity. 

At this point, I should point out 
that there are countries with which the 
United States has concluded treaties ex- 
tending broader immunities for consular 
personnel. The United States has 
entered into such agreements with the 
Soviet Union, the People's Republic of 
China (P.R.C.), Bulgaria, the German 
Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania. A similar agree- 
ment also exists with the Philippines. 
(Bulgaria, the G.D.R., and Romania 
have no consular posts in the United 
States.) Thus, our consular employees 
in such countries as the U.S.S.R. and 
the P.R.C. have full criminal immunity, 
and we are obligated to provide the 
same immunities to consular employees 
of those countries. The proposed legisla- 
tion, therefore, would violate these 
bilateral agreements in addition to 
violating the Vienna conventions. 

Recent Steps 

While the Department of State cannot 
support the proposed legislation, which 
would call into question the entire 
framework of diplomatic immunity, we 
have taken a variety of steps to curtail 
abuses of diplomatic immunity that are 
wholly consistent with international 
law. 

Incidentally, it may be of interest to 
the committee that the British Foreign 
Office instituted a full review of the 
Vienna convention in the aftermath of 
the fatal shooting of a policewoman by 
a gunman in the Libyan Embassy and 
the attempted abduction of a Nigerian 
exile. The British concluded that it 
would be wrong to amend the Vienna 
convention as the solution to the abuse 
of diplomatic immunity but, instead, im- 
plemented a firmer policy in the ap- 
plication of the convention. 

I should like to take this opportuni- 
ty to inform the committee of recent 
steps we have taken. 

Barring Reentry. Some years ago, 
I initiated a system to bar the reentry 
into the United States of serious of- 
fenders entitled to criminal immunity at 
the time of expulsion. The names of the 
offenders are entered into the Depart- 
ment's worldwide automated visa 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



GENERAL 



Criminal Immunity 








DIPLOMATIC 




CONSULAR 


Diplomats* 


Administrative 
and Technical Staff 


Service Staff 


Personal Servants 


Consular Officers 


Consular Employees 


(Ambassador. 

Ministers, 

Counselors, 

1st, 2d, and 3d 

Secretaries, 

Attaches) 


(Clerk. Typists. 

Procurement 

Officers) 


(Drivers, Gardners, 
Cooks, Security 
Guards) 


(Maids, Butlers) 


(Consuls General, 
Consuls, Vice 
Consuls) 


(Clerks, Typists) 


FULL CRIMINAL 
IMMUNITY 


FULL CRIMINAL 
IMMUNITY 


CRIMINAL IMMUNITY 

FOR OFFICIAL ACTS 

ONLY 


NO IMMUNITY 


CRIMINAL IMMUNITY 

FOR OFFICIAL ACTS 

ONLY 


CRIMINAL IMMUNITY 

FOR OFFICIAL ACTS 

ONLY 


Family Members 


Family Members 


Family Members 


Family Members 


Family Members 


Family Members 


FULL CRIMINAL 
IMMUNITY 


FULL CRIMINAL 
IMMUNITY 


NO IMMUNITY 


NO IMMUNITY 


NO IMMUNITY 


NO IMMUNITY 


"This category includes diplomats at ttie Organization of American States and members of 
missions to ttie United Nations and a small number of persons at tfie World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund. 


By special agreement, on a reciprocal 
basis, personnel and members of their 
families at the consulates of the following 


By special agreement, on a reciprocal basis, a 
People's Republic of Cfiina and the U.S.S.R. an 
enjoy full criminal immunity. 


1 personnel at the Embassies of the 
d members of their families 


countries enjoy full criminal immunity: 
Hungary, People's Republic of China, 
Poland, Philippines, and U.S.S.R. 





lookout system so that should an of- 
fender seek another visa, the applica- 
tion is held up until the Department's 
advice can be obtained. The names also 
are given to the central office of the 
Immigration Service to alert ports of 
entry that arrivals of such persons are 
to be reported immediately to the 
Department. 

We have found, however, that the 
system was not perfect and that, in at 
least three cases, the persons expelled 
reentered the United States. To prevent 
any other such occurrence, we will en- 
sure that the diplomatic visa is canceled 
before an alleged offender leaves the 
country. Should the person leave before 
this is done, we will inform the mission 
concerned that the principal alien can- 
not be replaced until the visa has been 
canceled. 

Police Guidance. In March, the 
Department published updated and 
more comprehensive written guidance 
for law enforcement officers on the 
handling of incidents involving foreign 
diplomatic and consular personnel. It 
has been distributed nationwide. I am 
happy to make this booklet available to 
the committee. As you will see, we have 
pointed out the necessity for careful 
and complete police work at the time of 
the incident in order to lay the basis for 
possible future prosecution when im- 
munity ceases to exist. In other words, 
we urge that charges be pursued as far 
as possible in our judicial system. After 



the offender leaves the United States, 
the existence of an outstanding arrest 
warrant may be entered into the 
records of the immigration authorities. 
The existence of the warrant and the 
knowledge that the Federal Govern- 
ment will assist in serving the warrant 
would deter an offender from attempt- 
ing to return to the United States. 

In the recently publicized Afghan 
auto case, we learned that New York 
law enforcement authorities discon- 
tinued the investigation on the assump- 
tion that the driver was immune. You 
might be interested to know that 
neither the U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations nor the Office of Protocol was 
consulted in making this determination. 
However, as soon as the mission 
learned of this, it asked the police to 
reopen the investigation. We did this 
because we believe firmly that in all of 
these cases, the facts must be brought 
to light. 

Parental Responsibility. In par- 
ticularly egregious cases involving 
juvenile offenders, I have had the entire 
family expelled from the United States. 
This policy ensures that parents will be 
fully accountable for the acts of their 
children. 

Traffic Offenses. In September 
1985, the Department's Office of 
Foreign Missions instituted a program 
to monitor traffic violations and in- 
crease the observance of traffic laws 
and regulations. Under the program. 



the Department assesses points for all 
traffic violations using the American 
Association of Motor Vehicle Adminis- 
trator's standardized point system. The 
accumulation of eight points during a 
2-year period may result in the loss of 
the privilege to drive in this country. 
Persons with unpaid parking violations 
incur one point for each ticket. 
Speeding violations are assessed at two 
or four points depending upon the rate 
of speed, and persons driving while in- 
toxicated are assessed eight points. Up 
to this time, 15 drivers' licenses have 
been permanently suspended. We do 
not permit a member of the diplomatic 
community who has operated a motor 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol to 
operate a motor vehicle in the United 
States again. The program has had a 
salutary effect on the driving habits of 
privileged personnel. 

Firearms. In May 1986, we 
reissued a circular on the subject of 
firearms, pointing out that failure to 
comply with local laws and regulations 
pertaining to firearms will subject the 
offender to expulsion. 

Identification Documents. Recent- 
ly, the Office of Protocol began issuing 
newly designed identification documents 
to all embassy personnel entitled to any 
degree of immunity. The cards identify 
the individual, state the type of immuni- 
ty which he has, and provide phone 
numbers to call 24 hours a day if a law 
enforcement official has questions. In 



October 1987 



31 



GENERAL 



cases where immunity is limited, the 
cards state that the bearer is not im- 
mune from arrest. Similar cards will be 
issued to consular officers and 
employees next year. 

Definition of "Members of the 
Family." The Vienna convention re- 
quires the parties to extend privileges 
and immunities to family members 
forming part of the household but does 
not define family members. In May 
1986, we informed the missions that we 
would set age limits beyond which the 
Department no longer would extend 
privileges and immunities to dependent 
children. The cutoff age is 21, unless 
the child is a full-time student, in which 
case the age limitation is 23. This step 
has reduced the number of persons en- 
titled to privileges and immunities. 

We are continually reviewing means 
to reduce the numbers of persons en- 
titled to immunity. For example, we are 
not obligated by the Vienna convention 
to extend full immunity to aliens "per- 
manently resident in the United 
States." Accordingly, we propose to ter- 
minate privileges and immunities for 
locally hired members of embassy staffs 
who have resided in the United States 
for 10 years or more. 

In closing, I wish to express my ap- 
preciation for this opportunity to pre- 
sent the Department's views on this 
sensitive matter. Also, I wish to assure 
you again that we stand ready to take 
action in any situation where a person 
with immunity acts contrary to the 
law. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Dofuments. U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice. Washington. D.C. 20402, ■ 



Under Secretary Armacost's 
Interview on "Meet the Press" 



Under Secretary for Political AJfairs 
Michael H. Armacost was interviewed on 
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on August 
30. 1987, by Chris Wallace, NBC News; 
Robert Kaiser, The Washington Post; 
and Robert Novak. The Chicago Sun- 
Times. 

Q. Something nasty has happened in 
the Philippines. You know that coun- 
try well. What's going to be the im- 
pact of these people killing each other 
now for the first time in large 
numbers? 

A. I don't think anybody could say 
with great confidence. There are two 
possibilities: either the shock of seeing 
this kind of blood-letting can bring an 
end to insurrectionary activity which has 
taken place all too often in the last 18 
months, or it could leave some enduring 
wounds which fester. We incline to the 
former position by hope, at least. 

Certainly we were relieved in the 
wake of this to see that the command 
lines had remained intact. Loyalty to the 
civilian government had been sufficient 
to prompt units loyal to Mrs. Aquino to 
take on the job of putting down insur- 
rection. I think, as others have said, 
there are festering problems that needed 
to be attended to, but I for one think the 
firm attitude taken by the government is 
entirely warranted. One can't leave the 
impression that mutinous activities can 
be undertaken with no consequence. 

Q. Do you think one of the fester- 
ing problems that needs to be at- 
tended to is insufficient diligence in 
pursuing and prosecuting the suppres- 
sion of the communist insurrection? 
That seems to be one of the problems 
of the rebellious officers. 

A. There is obviously a need to go 
after the insurgency in a very com- 
prehensive way. There are a variety of 
instruments that are required for that. 
On the one hand, Mrs. Aquino has put 
the fundamentals in place. I think there 
is a legitimate government. And that's 
important when one is trying to draw 
strength away from insurgents. She's 
got an economic program going which 
promises to revive the economic 
strength of the country, especially in the 
countryside, that's been helped by the in- 
crease in coca prices. 



32 



But there is a military aspect to the 
struggle. She has been reluctant to com- 
mit the army until there was evidence 
that they would take on this job in a 
retrained and disciplined way. I think 
the evidence of divisions within the 
military makes clear why it was prob- 
ably prudent not to unleash the military 
right away. But it is clear they are going 
to have to go after the cadres, and for 
that you need a strong and united 
military. 

Q. The Philippine Government has 
asked for more money. They need 
more U.S. aid. In the Marcos days, 
Washington felt it was useless to put 
more money into it when they were in 
a state of disarray. Certainly with 
what's going on in the Phillippine 
Army today, are you prepared to put 
more U.S. taxpayers' money into that 
situation? 

A. Yes, I am. We felt that the army 
inherited by the democratic government 
was one which was limited in its capaci- 
ty to move, it had limited communica- 
tions, needed retraining. We felt it was 
very important to demonstrate a will- 
ingness to help and to put money behind 
our pledges of support. 

Q. Even with the repeated 
rebellions going on in the ranks of the 
officers? 

A. Absolutely. 

Q. Let me ask you a little bit about 
this coup and who was behind it. Did 
the U.S. Embassy ask Senator Enrile 
to try to intervene, to try to get the 
reformists and the military who were 
launching this coup attempt to stand 
down? 

A. It wasn't a matter of asking him 
to intervene. It was a matter of keeping 
contact with people who might be 
players in order to ascertain what the 
situation was. And in the course of that 
conversation, he was asked whether he 
was prepared to make a statement, and 
he indicated he was not. 

Q. Does that — his refusal — in- 
dicate to you, perhaps — and I don't 
know what other information you may 
have — that he was involved in this 
coup attempt? That the ringleader. 
Colonel Gregorio Honasan — we've 
pointed out — was really a protege of 
Enrile's? 



Department of State Bulletin ' 



GENERAL 



A. They were very close. I don't 
now what information he had in ad- 
iiice of the coup. He says he wasn't in- 
.olved. I can only speculate on that. I 
thinl< it's clear that he may have hoped 
that they succeeded and expected 
perhaps to be the beneficiary of their ac- 
tion whether he knew of it in advance or 
not. But I'm merely surmising. I don't 
have any hard evidence. 

Q. Some Philippine politicians 
have also charged that some right- 
wing Americans, including former 
General John Singlaub, had recently 
been in the Philippines and had been 
fomenting some of these factions 
within the military, saying that the 
Aquino government wasn't cracking 
down on the communist insurgency. 
What do you know about that'/ 

A. I don't know anything other than 
to know that Singlaub had been in the 
Philippines. But he has denied any in- 
volvement, and I have no information 
that would challenge that. 

Q. Let me ask you about the U.S. 
problems here from a Filipino point of 
view. Filipino officers involved in this 
coup know that the United States 
jumped pretty smoothly from Marcos 
to Aquino. Are they assuming that 
we'd also jump pretty smoothly to a 
successor to Aquino if something 
came to pass'.' Are we sort of stuck in 
the position where we don't have any 
kind of intimidating influence here to 
persuade them that we wouldn't sup- 
port some successor to Aquino as we 
support her'/ 

A. There is a sharp difference, in 
that Mrs. Aquino clearly reflected the 
aspirations of an overwhelming majority 
of Filipinos. So jumping to support her 
represented the support of a democratic 
process. This kind of insurrection 
represents an extraconstitutional action 
against a democratically elected authori- 
ty. So our position in that case is quite 
different, and I think it's quite clear. 

Q. It is. But does it have any im- 
pact — is really my question? Do we 
have any deterrent power here? 

A. I don't know, but under our law 
we are obliged to suspend aid when 
military coups succeed. And I think that 
Colonel Honasan and others know that. 
What impact that had, I don't know. I 
think largely it's a matter of the policy 
of the Philippine Government, and 
response to previous mutinies has been a 
little ambiguous. This time Mrs. Aquino 
has indicated a very firm attitude. 



Q. Are you saying then that if 
there were a coup attempt — a coup 
succeeded, rather — that the United 
States would cut off military aid to 
the Philippines? 

A. We have our law. And the law 
specifies that that would be one of the 
responses of the United States. Now 
we'd have to look at the details obviously 
in any situation. But the law prescribes 
that. 

Q. Just one more point on whether 
the Aquino government can be held 
blameless in this affair. Isn't there a 
provocative element when members of 
her cabinet refer to the military as 
idiots and cretins? Aren't they kind of 
asking for what happens? 

A. I think there is a problem within 
the military and between the military 
and civilian authorities. And one needs 
in a democratic society a relationship of 
trust, and those kind of statements I 
think are probably not helpful. 

Q. I want to ask you also — Joker 
Arroyo, the President's secretary, said 
that this was just another coup at- 
tempt that failed. Do you agree with 
that, or do you anticipate this as the 
start of a new chapter of continuing 
difficulty in the Philippines? 

A, It was the biggest; it was the 
most serious incident; it was the first, as 
Mr. Kaiser has said, in which a lot of 
blood was spilled. We hope it's the last 
of a series of episodes. The officers in- 
volved have been among those either in- 
spiring or participating in previous in- 
cidents. They have now identified 
themselves. Many of them have been 
neutralized. The government held firm 
and has promised a strong reaction. So 
we hope that will break the cycle and 
make this the last of what have obvious- 
ly been a series of unsettling events. 

Q. Let me switch subjects to a 
very different part of the world, if I 
might, and that is to the resumed 
tanker war in the Persian Gulf. This 
weekend Iraq has again begun hitting 
naval targets in Iran. How does the 
United States regard that, and are you 
trying to stop Iraq? 

A. I think it's very regrettable, ex- 
tremely unfortunate. We don't condone 
it. It's not entirely unexpected. We have 
known for some time the Iraqis did not 
wish to allow a situation in which 
restraints were imposed in the gulf 
while no constraints were imposed on 



Iran to pursue the ground war. The 
ground war has continued, and Iraq had 
not wished, as I say, to allow that kind 
of disaggregation of the conflict. 

We share their view. We want a 
comprehensive cease-fire on land, sea, 
and air. That's the nature of the resolu- 
tion we put forward. They have ac- 
cepted that resolution. Iran has not. 
Iran has not formally rejected it, but 
they've sought to play for time. This 
probably reflects Iraqi impatience. We've 
got to keep our eye on the ball. The ball 
is to get the resolution complied with by 
both sides. It's up to Iran to declare 
itself firmly in support of and in com- 
pliance with the Security Council resolu- 
tion. 

Q. But with Iraq once again 
shooting in the gulf, isn't there now 
an increased danger — and a greatly in- 
creased danger — that Iran is going to 
strike back, perhaps against U.S. war- 
ships or those Kuwaiti tankers that 
we are protecting? 

A. I think undoubtedly the risks are 
increased, at least to take their 
statements at face value. We have a 
larger array of ships ourselves in the 
gulf. In one sense, that exposes us 
somewhat more. I happen to think that 
by accumulating great power, we also 
have a greater capacity to defend 
ourselves and to deter any provocations 
directed against us or those ships we are 
protecting. 

Q. Don't these latest events raise a 
really serious question about the 
wisdom of our position? Are we not 
sitting out there between these two 
fanatical fighting neighbors in a way 
that's going to make us a very tempt- 
ing target and when the central 
American interests don't seem to be at 
stake in a way that might justify get- 
ting so deeply involved? 

A. I think central American in- 
terests are at stake when lifelines for oil 
to the West are in jeopardy. We believe 
that the method of dealing with this is 
basically to get the war stopped. We 
have sought to address that in the 
Security Council, and the resumption of 
attacks lends greater urgency to moving 
beyond the hortatory resolution passed 
on July 20 and put some teeth into a 
second resolution. 

Q. You say we would jeopardize 
lifelines, but we've signed up with 
Kuwait. Kuwait is Iraq's ally. Iraq is 



October 1987 



33 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



now attacking shipping in the gulf. 
This has a kind of "Alice in 
Wonderland" quality. 

A. Kuwait is a friendly country, an 
oil-producing country, a moderate Arab 
country. Protection of the oil means the 
protection of access to oil. It means pro- 
tection and a solid relationship with 
friendly oil-producing countries. And it 
means preventing the Soviets from ac- 
quiring a foothold from which they 
would acquire a protective role over oil 
destined for the West. That was the in- 
terest that we had engaged when we of- 
fered to help the Kuwaitis. 

Q. Do you say that you can't blame 
the Iraqis for doing this? Even though 
it's regrettable, you can hardly blame 
them since their vital interests were 
at stake. 

A. I think the timing is deplorable. 
The Iranians are under pressure to give 
a formal answer quickly. But I'm saying 
that Iraq had been warning that failure 
by Iran to comply would leave them in a 
position where they couldn't allow the 
ground war to continue and escalate in 
spite of the Security Council resolution 
without some response in the gulf. So I 
find it deplorable, but I also would say 
in terms of their interest it's understand- 
able. It lends urgency to move on in the 
Security Council toward a second resolu- 
tion. ■ 



The Soviet Constitution: 
Myth and Reality 



by Richard Schifter 

Address before the Americnv Bar 
Association (ABA) in Smi Fninrisco mi 

August 10, 1987. A^nhasxad,,,- Srinftrr IS 

Assistant Secretary fur Human Rights 
and Humanitarian AJfairs. 

If we were asked to identify the 
passage or passages in the Constitution 
of the United States that best charac- 
terize the nature of our government, I 
would assume that a good many of us 
would point to the Bill of Rights, par- 
ticularly the First and Fifth Amend- 
ments. If the same question were asked 
with regard to the Soviet Constitution, 
I, for one, would select four key 
provisions. 

First and foremost, I would direct 
attention to Article 6, which states: 

The leading and guiding force of Soviet 
society and the nucleus of its political 
system, of all state organizations and public 
organizations, is the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. . . . The Communist Party . . . 
determines ... the course of the domestic 
and foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., directs 
the great constructive work of the Soviet 
people, and imparts a planned, systematic 
and theoretically substantiated character to 
their struggle for the victory of communism. 

I would then move back to Article 3 
and note the following words: 

The Soviet state is organized and func- 
tions on the principle of democratic cen- 
tralism. . . . Democratic centralism combines 
central leadership with local initiative and 
creative activity. . . . 

Next, I would drop down to Article 
39, which states: 

Enjoyment by citizens of their rights and 
freedoms must not be to the detriment of 
the interest of society or the state. . . . 

I would round out these quotations 
from the Soviet Constitution with Arti- 
cle 59, which leads as follows: 

Citizens' exercise of their rights and 
freedoms is inseparable from the perform- 
ance of their duties and obligations. 

Citizens of the U.S.S.R. are obliged to 
observe the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and 
Soviet laws, comply with the standards of 
socialist conduct, and uphold the honor and 
dignity of Soviet citizenship. 



The Role of Lenin 

The Soviet Constitution is a lengthy 
document, containing altogether 174 ar- 
ticles. A number of them would, at first 
blush, remind us of guarantees of in- 
dividual freedom which are the 
hallmark of basic charters in true 
democracies. To understand their mean- 
ing and significance in the Soviet set- 
ting, we need to comprehend fully just 
what the role of a constitution is in the 
U.S.S.R. and how constitutional provi- 
sions must be read in the context of the 
Soviet Union's basic notions of the rela- 
tionship between the governing and the 
governed. 

In seeking to construe our own 
Constitution, we often refer to the 
Federalist Papers and other writings of 
the Founding Fathers. Similarly, the 
Soviet Constitution should be inter- 
preted in light of the writings of the 
Soviet Union's Founding Father. That 
person is, of course. Vladimir Ilyich 
Ulyanov, whom the world has come to 
know as Lenin. 

In using the term Marxism- 
Leninism, we often lose sight of the in- 
dividuals to whose teachings we thus 
refer. Thev were, in fact, persons who 
differed markedly from each other. Karl 
Marx was a theoretician, who pro- 
claimed to the world his purportedly 
scientific analyses of economics and 
history and who predicted future 
historic trends on the basis of his 
analyses. 

Lenin, by contrast, was an activist. 
His writings are free of abstruse 
theory. They are how-to-do-it kits on 
seizing and holding power. 'To be sure, 
these writings were not entirely 
original. Their basic theses can be found 
in Machiavelli's The Prince, written 
close to 400 years before Lenin put pen 
to paper. 

After having become familiar with 
Marx's writings, Lenin committed 
himself to helping history along by 
seeking to establish first in Russia and 
then throughout the world his own no- 
tion of Marx's vision of an ideal society. 
With single-minded devotion to his 
cause, he applied himself to the goal of 
taking power in Russia, a goal which he 
reached in the fall of 1917. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Lenin, we must note, had competi- 
tion among the revolutionaries who, hke 
he, tried to depose the czar and 
Russia's ruling aristocracy. His com- 
petitors included advocates of capitalist 
democracy as well as leftwing revolu- 
tionaries, some of them fellow Marxists. 
What distinguished most of them from 
Lenin was that, in one way or the 
other, they subscribed to the ideas of 
the role of government and of the digni- 
ty of the individual which were the 
essence of the teachings of the 
Enlightenment. These teachings, let us 
recall, are, indeed, the teachings to 
which our Founding Fathers subscribed 
and which provided the ideological base 
on which our system of government is 
built. 

Lenin rejected these teachings, 
derisively referring to them as 
"bourgeois liberalism." His basic 
precepts were that the power of the 
state must be seized and held by an 
elite group, which he viewed as "the 
vanguard of the revolution." That 
vanguard was the Bolshevik faction of 
the Russian Social Democratic Party, 
which later renamed itself the Com- 
munist Party. Not long after the 
Bolsheviks had taken power, one of 
Lenin's disciples and a principal leader 
of the new Soviet state, Grigory 
Zinoviev, had this to say in his report 
to the 11th Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party: 

[W]e constitute the single legal party in 
Russia; ... we maintain a so-called monopoly 
on legality. We have taken away political 
freedom from our opponents; we do not per- 
mit the legal existence of those who strive to 
compete with us. We have clamped a lock on 
the lips of the Mensheviks and the Socialist 
Revolutionaries. We could not have acted 
otherwise, I think. The dictatorship of the 
proletariat, Comrade Lenin says, is a very 
terrible undertaking. It is not possible to in- 
sure the victory of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat without breaking the backbone of 
all opponents of the dictatorship. No one can 
appoint the time when we shall be able to 
revise our attitude on this question. 

Within the party, decisionmaking, 
according to Lenin, was to be concen- 
trated at the very top. As semantic 
games are often played by the Soviets 
and as the term "democracy" is as- 
signed an important role in that con- 
text, let me share with you the follow- 
ing quotation from Lenin: 

Soviet socialist democracy is not in the 
least incompatible with individual rule and 
dictatorship. . . . What is necessary is in- 
dividual rule, the recognition of the dic- 
tatorial powers of one man. ... All phrases 
about equal rights are nonsense. 



October 1987 



It is against this background that 
we must read the term "democratic cen- 
tralism," as it appears in Article 3 of 
the Soviet Constitution. It means that 
the people in the central position call 
the shots. Lenin made no bones about 
his intention to establish a dictatorship. 

The Soviet Constitution as an 
Educational and Propaganda 
Instrument 

We must understand, therefore, that 
the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is not, 
like our Constitution, a document that 
spells out the powers and form of 
government as well as its limits and the 
inalienable rights of the individual. In a 
Leninist state there are, by definition, 
no limits to the power of government. 
There are no inalienable rights of the 
individual. Law is made and altered at 
will by the leadership. The powers of 
the leadership cannot be limited by an 
overarching document that would 
deprive a leadership group of its 
freedom to act as it sees fit. Nor can 
the assertion of the right of an in- 
dividual stand in the way of the leader- 
ship's determination of what is good for 
society. 

The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is, 
therefore, an educational and propagan- 
da instrument. Any provisions con- 
tained in the Constitution which might 
facially suggest that freedom of the 
kind that we know exists are effecMvely 
modified by the key phrases in Art.cles 
3, 6, 39, and 59 to which I referred 
earlier. 

Let me offer an illustration of what 
I mean. The equivalent of our First 
Amendment is contained in Article 50 
of the Soviet Constitution, which reads 
as follows: 

In accordance with the interests of the 
people and in order to strengthen and 
develop the socialist system, citizens of the 
U.S.S.R. are guaranteed freedom of speech, 
of the press, and of assembly, meetings, 
street processions and of demonstration. 

Starting from our notions of civil 
liberties, we might read this article to 
mean that citizens of the U.S.S.R. are 
guaranteed freedom of expression and 
that that grant of freedom accords with 
the interest of the people and 
strengthens the Soviet Union's system 
of government. But that is not the way 
Article 50 is understood in the Soviet 
Union. The way Article 50 is applied, 
freedom of speech, of the press, of 
assembly is granted only if it accords 
with the interest of the people and if it 



strengthens and develops the socialist 
system. And who is to decide what is in 
the interest of the people and what 
strengthens and develops the socialist 
system? The answer is, of course, found 
in Articles 3 and 6 of the Constitution. 
What is in the interest of the people is 
decided by the Communist Party and 
ultimately by the central leadership, the 
Politburo. That is why a law that makes 
defamation of the socialist system a 
crime is constitutional. Defamation, 
which in Soviet practice means speak- 
ing unpleasant truths, is presumed not 
to strengthen the socialist system. 

Let us take a look at another con- 
stitutional provision dealing with civil 
liberties. Article 52 reads as follows: 

Citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed 
freedom of conscience, that is, the right to 
profess or not to profess any religion, and to 
conduct religious worship or atheistic 
propaganda. 

Indeed, in the Soviet Union today, 
anyone may profess a religion. But 
nothing in the Constitution prohibits the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
from banning anyone who professes 
religion from its membership and, 
therefore, from advancement to any 
position of leadership and responsibility 
in Soviet society. Furthermore, while 
the right to conduct religious worship is 
guaranteed, this phrase has not been 
construed to mean that any group of 
citizens may conduct religious worship 
at any time in any place of their choos- 
ing. Laws have been promulgated which 
allow religious associations to form and 
register with the authorities of the 
state. If they are registered and if they 
do receive permission to use a house of 
worship, worship in that place at times 
authorized therefor is permitted. Any 
group which worships without appro- 
priate authority can be and often is 
punished severely. 

How does all of that comport with 
the constitutionally guaranteed right "to 
conduct religious worship"? The Soviet 
answer would be that the right to con- 
duct religious worship exists. The 
Constitution, they will say, does not 
guarantee a right to unregulated 
religious worship. 

To understand how religion may be 
practiced in the Soviet Union, we, as 
American lawyers, should think of the 
way the securities industry functions in 
the United States. Just as you may 
practice religion in the Soviet Union, 
you may engage in the securities 
business in the United States. But to 
engage in the securities business in our 
country, you must operate within the 



35 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



regulations issued by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. If you act out- 
side the regulations, you may, indeed, 
be punished. That is the way it is with 
the practice of religion in the Soviet 
Union. If you act within the regulations 
laid down by the Religious Affairs Com- 
mission, you will not run into any prob- 
lems. If you act outside these regula- 
tions, you violate Article 227 of the 
criminal code of the Russian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic or the cor- 
responding code sections in the criminal 
codes of the other republics. Article 227 
makes it a crime to participate in a 
group which "under the guise of 
preaching religious doctrines and per- 
forming religious rituals is connected 



with . . . inciting citizens to refuse to do 
social activity or to fulfill obliga- 
tions. . . ." The penalty imposed upon 
violators is customarily 3 years of 
deprivation of freedom. For leaders of 
such a group, it is 5 years. 

Gorbachev and Glasnost 

In light of the news that has come out 
of the Soviet Union within the last 8 
months or so, you might ask whether 
we cannot expect some fundamental 
changes in the roles of the party and 
the state under Mikhail Gorbachev and 
glasnost. My answer to this question 
would be "no." Gorbachev is deeply 
committed to carry on in the spirit of 



Captive Nations Weel^, 1987 



PROCLAMATION 5680. 
JULY 17, 19871 

For nearly three decades Captive Nations 
Week has synil)olized the American people's 
solidarity with all throughout the world who 
courawdusly set'k freedom and independence 
from S<i\ii'l domination. Durinjr this week, 
we recall that the lil)erties we enjoy are 
denied to many by the Soviet empire; and we 
puiilicly affirm (lur admii'ation for captive na- 
tions, who kfcp tlio Imtil of frocdiiiii liurning 
briifhtly as tlu'\- oppose iiiilit;ir\ orcupation 
and brutal totalilaiiuii oi.ipi\'.,sion. 

Our nation offers the world a vision of in- 
alienable political, religious, and economic 
rights. This vision has aK\a\> bet n shared 
among peoples subjugatfd li\ SoMot im- 
perialism; and so has resistance, ever the 
catalyst of liberty. Today, a struuKlf that 
began in Ukraine 70 years ago is taking place 
throughout the Soviet empire. In the last 
year alone, people have risen up to demand 
basic human rights in Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Kazakhstan, Lat- 
via, Moldavia, and among the Crimean 
Tatars. And acro.ss the globe, in Afghanistan. 
.Angola. C'ambodia. an(t Nicaragua, courage- 
ous freedom fighters battle tyranny. All cap- 
tive nations deserve and require our special 
support. For those seeking to enjoy humani- 
ty's birthright of liberty, independence, and 
justice, we serve as guardians of their dream. 

Thus, we must and will continue to speak 
out on the plight of captive nations. We will 
continue to call for the speedy release of the 
persecuted and the falsely imprisoned— peo- 



ple such as Gunars Astra. Lev Lukyanenko, 
Mart Niklus. and Viktoras Petkus. So long as 
brave individuals suffer because of their na- 
tioM;ilil\-. railli. and desire for human rights. 
the I'niled State- , if Amenea will demand 
that e\er\ siL;-iititor\ of the L'nited Nations 
Charter and the Helsinki accords live up to 
its obligations and respect the principles and 
spirit of these international agi'eements. 

So thtil we who rlierish libei-(\' may pro- 
claim our eonimitmeiit to those to whom its 
blessings are presently denied, the Congress, 
by joint resolution apfiroved .July 17. 1959 (73 
Stat, 212). has authorized and requested the 
President to issue a proclamation designating 
the third week in .Julv of each year as "Cap- 
tive Xtiiions Week." ' 

\m\i . Till Ki:i'()Kt:. I. F-iiiNALD Reagan. 
Presideiil o[ tlie l'nited Sttites of America, 
do herebv proclaim the week beginning July 
19, 19S7. as Ctiptive Nations Week. I call 
upon the people of the Cnited States to 
observe this week with appropritite 
ceremonies and tictivities, and I urge them to 
reaffirm their devoticjii Ui the aspirations of 
all peoples for justice, self-determination, and 
liberty. 

In Witnkss Whekp:uk, I have hereunto 
set my hand this seventeenth day of July, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-seven, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and twelfth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 27. 1987. 



Lenin and, as I noted at the outset, 
dominance of the state by a single 
party, control of the party by a self- 
perpetuating leadership group, and 
subordination of the individual to the in- 
terests of the state, as defined by the 
leadership, are the essential elements of 
the teachings of Lenin. In fact, Gor- 
bachev made precisely that point in his 
statement to the Communist Party's 
Central Committee Plenum in January 
of this year when he emphasized that 
"the principle of the Party rules under 
which the decisions of higher bodies are 
binding on all lower Party committees 
. . . remains unshakeable." 

What Gorbachev and his friends are 
attempting to strip from the operations 
of the Soviet system, in the name of 
glasnost, are the features of oriental 
despotism initially imbedded in the 
Leninist construct by Joseph Stalin. 
These include severe punishment for 
the mere expression of dissenting opin- 
ions, rigid limitations upon allowed 
literary expression, state control over 
all other forms of artistic endeavor, 
punishment for criticism of any state of- 
ficial or any official action, etc. Under 
glasnost all of these Stalinist controls 
are to be relaxed. The petty tyrannies 
of local officials are to be ended, as ef- 
forts are made to have the lower levels 
of the bureaucracy operate under the 
rule of law. But, and this is a point that 
must be kept in mind, there are to be 
limits to the relaxation. Nothing is or 
will be allowed that might threaten the 
control of the state by the party, as 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the Constitu- 
tion. Gorbachev and his colleagues re- 
ject, as did Lenin before them, 
"bourgeois democracy." Their goal is to 
return to the practices of the Soviet 
system in the early 1920s, in the time 
of Lenin and the years immediately 
after his death. Their notion is to live 
by Lenin's precepts, not to abandon 
them. 

It is important to note in this con- 
text that Stalinism is now being 
stripped from the Soviet system for the 
second time. It was initially exorcised 
by Nikita Khrushchev, back in the 
1950s. It evidently sprouted again after 
Khrushchev's removal, even though not 
driven by paranoia of the same intensi- 
ty as under Stalin. What the Soviets 
really should ask themselves is whether 
a Leninist system, without any checks 
and balances, will inevitably, over time, 
develop Stalinist features and whether, 
therefore, in the absence of fundamen- 
tal change, Gorbachev's glasnost is not 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



likely to go the way of Khrushchev's 
thaw, with the country returning to 
another form of despotic rule. 

As I have noted, the Soviet govern- 
mental system is characterized by an 
absence of checks and balances, by an 
absence of a constitutional framework 
which guarantees individual rights 
against the highest state authority. It is 
for that reason that the operation of 
the entire system is so critically depend- 
ent on the outlook and attitude of the 
person or persons who at any one time 
control the principal levers of power in 
the Soviet Union. As Dr. Koryagin— the 
Soviet psychiatrist who has recently 
been released from prison— has had oc- 
casion to observe, the somewhat 
greater freedom of expression now 
allowed in the Soviet Union is not 
guaranteed, it is pei-mitted, and permis- 
sion can at any time be withdrawn. 

Though the Soviet leadership does 
not appear to have any present inten- 
tion of abandoning the basic precepts 
on which its system of government 
rests, that does not mean that no 
change will ever occur. Having gotten 
in recent months at least a whiff of 
greater freedom, some Soviet citizens 
might be willing to learn how other 
societies go about the task of assuring 
respect for individual rights. And who 
would be better equipped to talk to 
them about this subject than those 
whose professional responsibility it is in 
a democratic country to see that the 
rights of the individual are protected? 

It is for that reason that I want to 
end my remarks with an appeal to you. 
If the ABA/Association of Soviet 
Lawyers agreement is renewed, I 
sincerely hope that American par- 
ticipants will try to learn how the 
Soviet system works, will learn to 
understand the facade which the Soviet 
Constitution presents, a facade behind 
which any Politburo directive can 
supersede any alleged constitutional 
guarantee. I hope that American par- 
ticipants will not be shy about explain- 
ing to the Soviet lawyers they meet the 
difference between a constitution which 
a country's political leadership can 
manipulate at will and one which with 
the help of an independent judiciary 
can, indeed, shield the individual citizen 
against oppressive government. In 
responding to you, a good many of your 
interlocutors will parrot the party line, 
but deep down they will understand 
what you are talking about. ■ 



Helsinki Human Rights Day, 1987 



PROCLAMATION 5686, 
JULY 31, 1987' 

Twelve years ago, the United States, Canada, 
and 33 European countries signed the 
Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. These 
nations thereby committed themselves to 
observe important standards of international 
conduct and to respect basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms at home. They 
also pledged themselves to pursue practical 
steps to reduce the barriers by which the 
Soviet Union has divided Europe into East 
and West, denying the nations of Eastern 
Europe the right of self-determination and 
limiting contact between peoples. 

The Helsinki Final Act embodies its 
signatories' agreement that freedom and 
human rights are the best guarantors of 
peace. It mandated that these freedoms, 
mutinfly liijoyed by the peoples of the West, 
\iv I'd (iL;ni/iil and respected as well in the 
Siivn'l I iiinii and Eastern Europe. After 
more than a decade, though there have been 
some limited gains, that mandate has not 
been fulfilled. 

The Soviet Union and the Soviet- 
dominated governments of Eastern Europe 
have systematically violated many of their 
most fundamental Helsinki pledges. 
Freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, 
and belief are constrained. Loved ones, 
families, and friends are kept apart. The flow 
of ideas and information is restricted. The 
right of the individual to depart from and 
return to his own country is denied. Helsinki 
monitors and other prisoners of conscience 
continue to languish in prisons, labor camps, 
psychiatric hospitals, and internal exile, 
merely for expressing their political and 
religious beliefs. In Perm Camp 36-1, the 
most brutal of the labor camps in the Gulag, 
ten political prisoners — three of whom were 
Helsinki monitors — have died in the last 3 
years. Harsh treatment and lack of medical 
care threaten the lives of those remaining in 
the camp. 



These and other violations have exacted a 
fearsome and tragic human cost, and they 
reflect a disregard for the fundamental prin- 
ciple that in order for any of a nation's inter- 
national agreements to be respected, all must 
be observed. The continuing violations of 
Helsinki obligations by the Soviet Union and 
the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern 
Europe place in doubt those nations' faithful 
observance of their international obligations 
in every sphere. 

The third Follow-up Meeting of the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe has been underway in Vienna since 
November 1986. The primary aim of the 
United States and its NATO Allies in Vienna 
is to secure compliance by the East with the 
commitments made at Helsinki, so that 
citizens in all the signatory states can enjoy 
the fundamental freedoms agreed to in the 
Final Act. 

The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 
151, has designated August 1, 1987, as 
"Helsinki Human Rights Day" and has 
authorized and requested the President to 
issue a proclamation in its observance. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Re-^gan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim August 1. 1987, as 
Helsinki Human Rights Day and reaffirm the 
American commitment to universal observ- 
ance of the values enshrined in the Final Act. 
These values are fundamental to our way of 
life and a source of inspiration to peoples 
around the world. In renewing our dedication 
With appropriate programs, ceremonies, and 
activities, let us call upon all signatories of 
the Final Act to match deeds with words and 
to respect in full its solemn principles and 
provisions. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this thirty-first day of July, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-seven and of the independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and twelfth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 10, 1987. 



October 1987 



37 



MIDDLE EAST 



U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf 



The following report was prepared by 
Jeffrey Schloesser, Political-Military 
Officer in the Regional Affairs Office, 
Bureau of Near East and South-Asian 
Affairs. The important contributions of 
other officers and bureaus of the Depart- 
ment and other U.S. agencies are 
gratefidly acknowledged.^ 



SUMMARY 



For nearly four decades, U.S. policy in 
the Persian Gulf has reflected American 
strategic, economic, and political inter- 
ests in the area. Our policy has been con- 
sistent and is calculated to defend and 
advance these critical U.S. national 
security interests, as well as those of our 
allies and friends in the region. Given 
our longstanding mutual and overlap- 
ping concerns, the United States, our 
Western allies, and friendly gulf states 
have often been able to pursue parallel 
policy lines in the region. 

Since 1949, the United States has 
maintained a permanent naval presence 
in the gulf, with the support and encour- 
agement of regional states, to under- 
score our commitment to protect our 
interests. The intensification of the Iran- 
Iraq war currently threatens those inter- 
ests for it is a major cause of instability 
in the gulf, invites an increased Soviet 
role, and sustains Iranian expansionism. 
Therefore, it must be brought to an end 
quickly. The major thrust of U.S. policy 
in the region is to seek a peaceful settle- 
ment of this conflict, largely through the 
UN Security Council. At the same time 
the United States is taking additional 
prudent steps to deter potential spillover 
of the war to third parties, ensure free- 
dom of navigation for U.S. -flagged 
vessels, and limit Soviet influence and 
presence in this strategic area. 

Strategically, the United States has 
sought to prevent regional domination 
by powers hostile to the West or its 
allies. Iran— frustrated by its inability to 
bring down the Government of Iraq and 
intent upon becoming the dominant 
power in the gulf— has lashed out at its 
Arab neighbors by attacks on neutral 
shipping, intimidation, sabotage, and ter- 
rorism. By singling out Kuwait, Iran 
unwittingly provides the Soviet Union 
with a new opportunity to advance its 
long-desired goal: an increase in Soviet 
presence and influence in the gulf. 



Economically, the United States has 
long worked to maintain the unimpeded 
flow of oil through the gulf to the West. 
This oil is relatively unimportant to the 
Soviet bloc, a net exporter of oil, but to 
the industrialized nations of the Western 
world, as well as to many developing 
countries, it is the lifeblood of our inter- 
related economies. Any significant 
disruption in gulf oil supply would cause 
world oil prices for all to skyrocket, 
resulting in serious adverse economic 
consequences similar to those that 
occurred during the 1973-74 and 
1978-79 oil crises. Under such cir- 
cumstances, the United States would be 
seriously affected, even though we are 
not as directly dependent upon gulf oil 
as many of our allies and friends. 

Politically, the United States has 
promoted regional security and stability 
through a carefully balanced program of 
quiet diplomacy and security assistance. 
Since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war 
in 1980, the United States has worked 
for a just, negotiated settlement in a 
variety of forums, especially the UN 
Security Council; we have supported 
several mediation efforts of the 
Nonaligned Movement and the Organiza- 
tion of the Islamic Conference as well. 
Today, while we seek to safeguard 
Western interests in the gulf, we have 
redoubled diplomatic efforts to bring the 
war to an end, with the independence 
and territorial integrity of both Iraq and 
Iran intact. The United States has taken 
the lead in the United Nations and 
elsewhere to intensify international 
pressure to end the war and increase 
international willingness to apply 
enforcement measures against either 
belligerent that refuses to comply. 



U.S. INTERESTS IN THE GULF 

Strategic Interests 

Our basic interests in the gulf— strategic, 
economic, and political— have long been 
clear. Since the gulf is an important 
crossroad of vital economic and political 
importance to the free world, we have a 
strategic interest in ensuring that it does 
not come under the domination of a 
power hostile to the United States, our 
Western allies, or to our friends in the 
region. We do not want the Soviet Union 
either to control directly or to increase 
significantly its presence or influence 



over the region. Iran's current policy of 
expansionism is a special danger. Iran 
seeks to eliminate superpower presence 
in the area and to create instability in 
the moderate Arab nations of the gulf. 
The effects of either Soviet or Iranian 
hegemony in the gulf would be cata- 
strophic to our interests. 



Economic Interests 

The Middle East oil crises of 1973-74 
and 1978-79 were economic disasters for 
the United States, other Western indus- 
trial powers, and the Third World. As 
President Reagan recently noted: 

... I think everyone . . . can remember the 
woeful impact of the Middle East oil crisis of 
a few years ago— the endless, demoralizing 
gas lines, the shortages, the rationing, the 
escalating energy prices and double-digit 
inflation, and the enormous dislocation that 
shook our economy to its foundations. 

The potential for a similar crisis 
exists today and in the near future. 

The United States, and particularly 
our allies, remain substantially depend- 
ent on oil imports, a good portion of 
which currently come from the gulf. The 
gulf countries supply 25% of all oil mov- 
ing in world trade today; they possess 
63% of the world's known petroleum 
reserves. In 1986, about 30% of Western 
Europe's oil imports came from the gulf; 
the comparable figure for Japan was 
about 60%. This Western dependency 
will sharply increase in the future, as the 
free world's oil reserves are depleted. 
Whereas only about 5% of U.S. oil con- 
sumption (15% of imports) originated in 
the gulf in 1986, this level is certain to 
rise significantly in the future as our 
own reserves decline, our supplies from 
other nongulf sources are depleted, and 
our need for oil imports rises. (The 
March 17, 1987, energy security study of 
the Department of Energy shows that 
total U.S. imports could double to 8-10 
million barrels per day by the 
mid-1990s.) Finally, the vast majority 
(about 70%) of the world's excess oil pro- 
duction capability is located in the gulf, 
and this share will increase in the future. 

As the 1973-74 and 1978-79 oil 
shocks showed, a small disruption-of 
less than 5%— can trigger a sharp escala- 
tion in oil prices. In the first oil crisis, 
the cost of oil quadrupled; in the second, 
it more than doubled. The oil market will 
react almost as sharply to expectations 
of a supply cutback as to a real drop in 
production, at least in the short run. A 
large oil price increase would cause 
major damage to the U.S. economy and 
the economies of our allies in the West; 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



it would be especially devastating to the 
developing countries. Thus, we have a 
vital and unquestionable economic stake 
in ensuring that oil flows unimpeded 
from the gulf to the free world, both 
now and in the future. 

Political Interests 

The United States has longstanding, 
friendly relations and shares mutual 
interests with the moderate Arab gulf 
states, which, because of their great 
wealth and oil reserves, are influential 
both within and beyond the region. Our 
policies have long been aimed at pro- 
moting regional security and stability 
while assisting our friends in their 
resistance to increased Soviet influence 
and presence. Our political concerns also 
are certainly directed at Iran, because of 
its size and strength and because of its 
location beside the Soviet Union and 
Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. Although 
we look to an eventual improvement in 
U.S. -Iranian relations, today our inter- 
ests remain directly threatened by the 
Iranian Government's pursuit of its 
bellicose, expansionist, subversive, and 
terrorist policies— directed against the 
United States as well as a number of 
friendly states, and including its deep 
involvement in the the holding of 
hostages and attacks upon Israeli forces 
by the pro-Iranian Hezbollah movement 
in Lebanon as well as actions against 
Kuwait and other gulf states. 

The tragic attack on the U.S.S. 
Stark and our plan to protect U.S. flag 
shipping in the gulf have focused 
national attention on our interests and 
policies in this vital area. The current 
debate does not question basic, long- 
term American interests in the region; in 
fact, our interests and goals in the gulf 
continue to enjoy strong bipartisan sup- 
port. Rather, the current debate is 
primarily about how we should go about 
promoting and safeguarding those inter- 
ests, given the current situation in the 
gulf. 



CURRENT THREATS TO U.S. 
INTERESTS IN THE GULF 

U.S. interests in the gulf are clearly 
threatened by the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's 
quest for regional hegemony, and Soviet 
exploitation of the conflict. The war 
began in September 1980 and has 
expanded in the last few years because 
of Iran's refusal to negotiate any 
settlement— except on its own terms. 



Those terms, as they are articulated by 
the Iranian leadership and as they are 
understood in the region, include the 
overthrow of the current Ii'aqi leader- 
ship and government and its replace- 
ment by a regime presumably more 
amenable to Iranian hegemony. This 
would radically alter the balance of 
power in the gulf and would threaten our 
Arab friends, our strategic interests, and 
Western access to gulf oil. 

Iran took a series of decisions during 
the latter part of 1986 that significantly 
increased the possibility that the war 
will disrupt regional stability and 
adversely affect U.S. interests. 

• The Iranians bought Chinese 
Silkworm land-to-ship missiles, which 
contain 1,100 pounds of explosive, and 
are preparing launch sites for them near 
the Strait of Hormuz. They give Iran a 
very real capability to sink any merchant 
ships it chooses while they transit the 
strait. (Iraq exports its oil via pipelines 



and overland through Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia, not by sea.) 

• In September 1986, the Iranian 
Navy stopped, searched, and detained a 
Soviet arms carrier in the gulf. The 
Soviet response was to station naval 
combat vessels in the Persian Gulf or 
just outside it in the Gulf of Oman and to 
provide naval escorts for its merchant 
vessels. 

• Since September 1986, Iran has 
focused on intimidating Kuwait, a small 
and militarily weak state that, like 
others in the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
supports Iraq politically and econom- 
ically. Kuwait, however, is a nonbel- 
ligerent. Nevertheless, neutral shipping 
calling at Kuwaiti ports has been targeted 
by Iran. In keeping with its long- 
standing policy of balanced relations 
with the superpowers, Kuwait asked for 
assistance from both the Soviets and the 
United States to counter the sustained 
pressure Iran has focused on it. The 



Historical Overview of U.S. Presence in the Gulf 



U.S. military involvement in the gulf region 
dates from World War II. U.S. Army Air 
Corps airplanes and crews shared British 
airfields in the area and, with Saudi 
Arabia's approval, the United States built 
an airfield at Dhahran (which was com- 
pleted shortly after the war ended). Presi- 
dent Roosevelt met with King Abdui > ziz 
ibn Saud on a ship in the Suez Canal in 
1945 to discuss mutual concerns. An 
American naval presence in the Persian 
Gulf and Arabian Sea began and was 
institutionalized in 1949 with the establish- 
ment of the Middle East Force, whose 
home port was the British naval base at 
Jufair, Bahrain. Even at this early date, the 
United States sought to impede Soviet 
advances in the region; American 
pressure was a factor in the withdrawal, 
shortly after V/orld War II, of Soviet troops 
in Iran. 

Equally important, American business 
interests were established in the gulf 
region. The Arabian-American Oil Com- 
pany (ARAMCO), established in the 1930s 
in Saudi Arabia, began large-scale produc- 
tion after World War II. In 1945, ARAMCO 
produced about 50,000 barrels of crude oil 
per day; by 1977, its production had grown 
to 9.2 million barrels per day. Similarly, oil 
production began in Bahrain in 1934, in 
Kuwait and Qatar in the 1940s, and in the 
United Arab Emirates (then the Trucial 
States) and Oman in the 1960s and 1970s. 



After World War II, Britain began 
gradually withdrawing from its positions 
east of the Suez Canal and in 1971 pulled 
out of the gulf. The United States, 
although largely preoccupied in Vietnam, 
maintained its gulf naval presence with the 
active encouragement of the gulf states, 
Including Iran. 

American policy in the gulf can be 
divided into two periods; 1971-79 and 
1979 to the present. From 1971-79, 
through our "twin pillars" policy, we 
assisted the military development of our 
two closest allies in the region, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, in order to promote regional 
stability. In 1979, the fall of the Shah of 
Iran and his replacement by a revolu- 
tionary and radical government and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced the 
United States to reevaluate its strategy in 
the region. The result, the "Carter doc- 
trine," signaled U.S. resolve to defend 
Western interests in the gulf, unilaterally if 
necessary. We established the Rapid 
Deployment Force (later to become U.S. 
Central Command or CENTCOM) and con- 
tinued our military assistance programs 
with Saudi Arabia and other friendly Arab 
gulf states. 

Today we continue to maintain a per- 
manent naval force in the region, assist 
our friends with their defense needs, and 
maintain CENTCOM's regional focus. We 
remain resolved to protect our vital inter- 
ests as we promote peace and stability in 
the gulf. 



October 1987 



39 



MIDDLE EAST 




^^ International boundary 
® National capital 



Iraqi 
Exclusion Zone 



u,hehT> 



\ \ IRAQI 

\ \ ATTACKS 



X 

Farsi 
Island 




IRAN 



Flight path 
of Iraqi aircraft 



'^ *' 







Iranian ^^^^^^ 

Exclusion Zone Abba's 



(i^ : / **^ 

(,- U.S.S. Stark "^^ 



Attack Site 

Persian 



SAUDI 
ARABIA 





^^f^'* 



OMAN 



50 100 Ki 



UN>fEO 



Soviets were prepared to reflag or lease 
all of the tankers required by Kuwait, as 
well as providing for their protection. If 
we had refused to aid Kuwait, the Soviet 
Union would have welcomed the oppor- 
tunity to further increase its presence 
and role in the gulf, including the likeli- 
hood of gaining access to area port facil- 
ities, which would be needed to maintain 
any substantial protection commitment 
over the long term. Until now, the 
Soviets have been denied such access in 
the gulf. In light of a positive U.S. 
response, Kuwait decided to limit the 
Soviet role to three chartered tankers 
and their escorts. 



OVERVIEW OF CURRENT 

U.S. STRATEGY AND 

POLICY IN THE GULF 

The Challenge 

President Reagan and other Administra- 
tion officials have reaffirmed the con- 
stancy of long-recognized U.S. interests 
in the gulf. The continuation and escala- 
tion of the Iran-Iraq war and Iran's 
efforts to intimidate its neighbors create 
dangerous instability which challenges 
our interests— and which creates the 
opportunity for Soviet strategic 
advances. 



7171 6-87 STATE |INR/GE) 

To meet this challenge, the U.S. 
strategy is to continue a two-track 
policy— on the diplomatic front to end 
the war and on the strategic front to 
protect our interests in the interim while 
the war rages. We thus center our 
efforts on the UN Security Council at 
the same time that we move to deter Ira- 
nian pressures on friendly states like 
Kuwait. Until the war ends, the 
perpetual instability will continue to pre- 
sent significant opportunities for Soviet 
advances in the region. With that reality 
in mind, U.S. policy blends political, 
strategic, economic, and humanitarian 
motivations toward our fundamental 
goal: to end the war. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



Although Iraq began the war, it has 
long been willing to negotiate a com- 
prehensive settlement. To date, Iran has 
rejected all international efforts, includ- 
ing several UN Security Council resolu- 
tions that are fair to all concerned 
parties. Thus the challenge to the inter- 
national community is to pursue efforts 
that will have the cumulative effect of 
bringing Iran to the bargaining table. 

End the Iran-Iraq War. As the 

President noted in two key statements 
earlier this year, the time is now for the 
international community to become 
involved. In the past we have called on 
the belligerents to cease fire immediate- 
ly, withdraw to their pre-war borders, 
and begin negotiations— moves sup- 
ported by our allies. Currently, we are 
taking a leading role in the UN Security 
Council to encourage effective and 
enforceable action to end the war. 

Bring Iran to the Bargaining 
Table. Because Iran is unwilling to 
negotiate an end to the war, we have 
reinvigorated "Operation Staunch"— our 
diplomatic program to prevent military 
supplies from reaching Iran and thereby 
convince it to come to the negotiating 
table. In many ways Operation Staunch 
has been successful: it has complicated, 
delayed, and made more expensive 
Iran's procurement of arms essential to 
its war against Iraq. Iran has not been 
able to secure a steady supply of major 
weapons systems from any large pro- 
ducer except China. However, it con- 
tinues to receive common arms and 
munitions from North Korea, Eastern 
Europe, and some Western sources. The 
key element in our UN Security Council 
strategy is to obtain agreement for 
enforcement measures to ensure com- 
pliance with a new resolution on the 
war. The U.S. position is that the Secu- 
rity Council should impose an arms 
embargo on either party which fails to 
comply with the comprehensive 
resolution. 

Promote Regional Stability. We 

continue the policy to support the 
regional security efforts of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council composed of Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Oman— all of 
which are nonbelligerents in the war. 
This policy was given greater impor- 
tance by President Carter in 1979-80, 
when the Shah was overthrown by the 
expansionist Islamic revolution of the 
AyatoUah Khomeini and the Soviets 
invaded Afghanistan. A key element in 
this support is security assistance and 



arms sales programs. U.S. weapons and 
associated training help our friends in 
the region address their legitimate 
defense needs, deter a spillover from the 
Iran-Iraq war, and reduce the possibility 
that U.S. forces would have to intervene 
in a crisis. They do not affect Israel's 
qualitative military superiority. For 
years Arab states friendly to the United 
States have turned chiefly to us as a 
source of arms and technology— to the 
near exclusion of the Soviet Union. If 
the United States fails to respond to 
these states' legitimate defense needs, 
we will be sending a message to the 
Saudis, the other gulf states, and to 
other friends in the region— that we are 
not interested in their long-term political 
and economic security. 

Presently, because of Iranian efforts 
to focus intimidation on Kuwait and 
Kuwaiti-associated shipping, it has also 
become important to be responsive to 
requests for protective naval support. 
We seek to deter Iran from either clos- 
ing or selectively reducing gulf shipping 
by naval or missile attacks. We have 
called upon our allies in Western Europe 
and Japan for increased public support 
and assistance, including cooperation 
among allied naval units in and near the 
gulf. In fact, much is already being done. 
'Two of Kuwait's tankers qualify for 
British protection. Both the British and 
the French maintain warships in the 
area, and with three combatants in the 
gulf, the British have a higher propor- 
tion of their navy committed to the 
region than does the United States. 
While our discussions with our allies con- 
tinue with regard to specific additional 
actions, there is a general consensus on 
the strategic importance of the gulf to 
the West. The Venice summit statement 
demonstrates that consensus. 

Our various interests in the gulf give 
the United States an important stake in 
better relations with Iran. The President 
has said that the United States recog- 
nizes the Iranian revolution as a fact of 
history. We bear no malice toward the 
Iranian people. We look to an eventual 
improvement in U.S. -Iranian relations. 
However, such improvement will be 
impossible as long as the Iranian 
Government pursues its war with Iraq 
and its sponsorship of terrorism and 
subversion. 

The Risks 

As the accidental but, nevertheless, 
tragic attack on the U.S.S. Stark so 
clearly showed, there are inherent risks 
whenever a nation sends its armed 
forces abroad. In the case of the gulf. 



however, the risks of doing little or 
nothing are far greater and more 
dangerous. If we do not play a role, the 
Iran-Iraq war will continue to grind on, 
our friends in the region will face 
greater threats to their security, the 
Soviet Union will have additional oppor- 
tunities to strengthen its influence and 
presence, and the interests of the West, 
in general, and the United States, in par- 
ticular, will be increasingly threatened. 

Finally, we must not lose sight of the 
accidental and singular nature of the 
Stark attack. It is the first incident of its 
kind in almost 40 years of U.S. naval 
presence in the gulf. In its aftermath, a 
great deal of public and congressional 
interest has been raised over what had 
been previously a generally accepted 
policy decision for protecting Kuwaiti 
ships registered in the United States. 
We must not allow this unfortunate and 
tragic accident to cause us to abandon 
our resolve to protect our longstanding 
interests in such a vital area of the 
world. 



Soviet Objectives and 

Policies in the Gulf 

The Soviet Union's long-term objectives 
in the region are to establish and 
broaden its relations and influence with 
gulf states and, more generally, to 
counter the strong U.S. regional rela- 
tionships. The Soviets also seek to main- 
tain their standing with both Iran and 
Iraq, positioning themselves to emerge 
as the major extraregional power in the 
post-Persian Gulf war period. The gulf 
war helps to advance these Soviet 
objectives. 

The Soviets are achieving some suc- 
cess. With few exceptions, their rela- 
tions with the gulf Arab states have long 
been tenuous, but that is gradually 
changing. The U.S.S.R. established 
diplomatic relations with Oman and the 
United Arab Emirates in 1985 and is 
developing contacts with Saudi Arabia. 
Soviet relations with Kuwait date from 
1963. Moscow would like to establish 
relations with others in the region. Most 
recently, the Soviets have sought to take 
advantage of the Iran-contra affair and, 
following the attack on the Stark, to 
spread tales of U.S. militarism and, 
simultaneously though inconsistently, of 
U.S. unreliability. 

The Soviet position in the gulf 
region, however, is beset by conflicting 
interests. The Soviets seek to maintain 



October 1987 



41 



MIDDLE EAST 



their position as the champion of Iraq 
and are concerned about the conse- 
quences of an Iranian victory in the gulf 
war. Because of this, and because the 
Soviets may believe the war gives the 
United States a "pretext" to increase its 
naval forces in the region, they likely 
harbor genuine concerns about the war's 
continuation. However, the Soviets also 
seek to avoid alienating Iran, and if 
possible, hope to improve their relation- 
ship in the future. In practice, therefore, 
the Soviets have sought to play both 
sides of the war, staking out ostensibly 
constructive positions calling for the 
war's end while thus far avoiding strong 
action directed against Iran as the 
recalcitrant party regarding a settle- 
ment. While the United States has no 
evidence of direct Soviet military 
shipments to Iran, moderate levels of 
sales of military equipment by several 
other Warsaw Pact nations continue. 

This Soviet balancing game has 
become increasingly difficult. The rapid 
Soviet response to a Kuwaiti request for 
leased shipping may have been intended 
in a stroke to establish the U.S.S.R. as a 
"responsible" outside naval guarantor. 
More generally, increased international 
and regional concern about the war, 
especially following the attack on the 
Stark, is putting pressure on the Soviets 
to back up their declaratory policy of 
opposition to the war with effective 
action. 

However, Soviet support of strong 
action to end the war would anger 
Tehran at a time when Soviet-Iranian 
relations already are coming under con- 
siderable pressure. Tehran appeared to 
have been extremely irritated by the 
Soviet-Kuwaiti shipping arrangement as 
well as the U.S. -Kuwaiti arrangement. 
Many observers regard the May 6, 1987, 
attack by an Iranian gunboat on a Soviet 
merchant vessel as a signal. The Soviet 
reaction thus far has been mild, but 
recent Soviet statements of willingness 
to use force to protect its shipping have 
exacerbated these strains. Iran's rhet- 
oric about the U.S.S.R. has vacillated in 
recent weeks between harshness and 
moderation. 

The Soviet naval presence in the 
region has grown. The Soviets support 
their naval presence from anchorages in 
P^thiopia and the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen. The Soviet Navy 
began escorting Soviet merchant vessels 
in the gulf following the boarding of a 
Soviet ship by Iran in September 1986. 
The Soviets have increased their 
regional naval presence since then and, 
following the May 6, 1987, attack by 



42 



Iran on another Soviet merchant vessel, 
augmented their forces with additional 
minesweepers. Currently, Soviet naval 
vessels in the area (the Persian Gulf, 
North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and 
southern Red Sea) now include a Kara 
cruiser, a Kashin class destroyer, three 
minesweepers, and several support 
ships. This presence is high compared to 
that of recent years, though still below 
the level of 1980, reached following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
However, more of these ships are 
routinely positioned inside the gulf than 
ever before. 

The limited Soviet naval infrastruc- 
ture in the region would make expensive 
and difficult, though not impossible, a 
major increase in Soviet deployments. 
Legitimization of a Soviet naval role in 
the gulf could ultimately provide the 
political basis for Soviet acquisition of 
local naval port access rights and other 
facilities that they have not hitherto 
enjoyed. This would mark a major Soviet 
foreign policy success, in great part at 
U.S. expense. 

The Soviets are concerned about the 
intensity of U.S. interest and are watch- 
ing the U.S. domestic debate very 
closely. If they decide that the risks of 
continued warfare and instability in the 
region outweigh the unilateral gains they 
have sought, the Soviets might cooper- 
ate more seriously in multilateral efforts 
to end the war. If, however, the Soviets 
judge that international efforts to end 
the war will fail and that the United 
States will abandon its political and 
strategic commitments in the region, 
they will continue their policy of seeking 
gains in the gulf at U.S. expense, while 
attempting to balance their interests 
with Iran and Iraq. 

The United States seeks to minimize 
Soviet political and military inroads in 
the region but is working with the 
U.S.S.R. in multilateral efforts to end 
the war. Ending the conflict and the 
threat of Iranian hegemony could benefit 
both countries, as well as the entire 
region. The United States notes the 
declaratory Soviet support for freedom 
of navigation in the gulf but believes 
that, rather than engaging the Soviets in 
formal arrangements in the gulf, efforts 
should focus on ending the war so that 
the question of shipping protection need 
not arise. The United States also seeks 
serious Soviet efforts to staunch the flow 
of arms to Iran. 

In sum, the Soviets have long-term 
designs on the g^lf and can be counted 
on to pursue them. The way the Soviets 
define their options and the extent to 



which they see it in their interests to act 
responsibly will depend in large part on 
the willingness of the West and the 
United States to actively protect their 
own interests and the security and inde- 
pendence of its many friends in the gulf. 



APPENDIX B 

Myths and Reality 

U.S. policy in the gulf has been subjected 
to substantial questioning and criticism 
in the wake of the attack on the U.S.S. 
Stark. The Kuwaiti shipping reflagging 
process has been especially controver- 
sial. This debate is natural and reflects 
the national frustration and sorrow felt 
by all Americans at the tragic loss of 37 
young men. However, some of the criti- 
cism is incorrect or based on incomplete 
information. Let us look at some of the 
allegations and the facts. 



Allegation: The Administration has no 
concrete gulf policy but merely responds 
to crises. 

The Facts: Current U.S. policy in 
the gulf is based on four decades of 
American strategic, economic, and 
regional interests in the area. Presidents 
Carter and Reagan reaffirmed U.S. com- 
mitments in the gulf and sought to 
stabilize the region while preventing 
Soviet expansion in the area. Because of 
the deleterious effects of the Iran-Iraq 
war on regional stability and the overall 
balance of power in the gulf, the United 
States has increased its efforts in the 
international arena to bring the 
belligerents to the negotiating table. We 
have a coherent and multifaceted policy 
which combines diplomatic, political, and 
military efforts to promote basic U.S. 
strategic interests. 



Allegation: The United States is 
abandoning its neutrality in the Iran- 
Iraq war and tilting toward Iraq by 
allowing Kuwaiti ships to be reflagged 
under the American flag. 

The Facts: There is no change in our 
neutrality. Protecting 11 new U.S. flag 
ships serving the Kuwait Oil Tanker 
Company is a limited expansion of the 
U.S. Navy's longstanding commitment 
to protect American flag shipping. All of 
the ships under our protection will 
adhere strictly to the rules of neutrality; 
none of them will carry contraband or 
serve belligerent ports. Our limited 
arrangement with Kuwait does not mean 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



Airbase 
^ Naval base 
Naval facility 




SAUDI 
ARABIA 



® 

Riyadh 



OMAN 



50 100 Kilomete 



UN»fE° 



6983 3-87 STATE (INR/GE) 



we intend to protect all nonbelligerent 
shipping in the gulf. However, we are 
not disinterested in the final outcome of 
the Iran-Iraq war. We have been work- 
ing actively for some time to bring the 
war to an early negotiated end, leaving 
neither victor nor vanquished, and 
preserving the regional balance of 
power. Given Iran's intransigence and 
Iraq's willingness to negotiate, we have 
focused our efforts on ways to increase 
international pressure on Iran. 

• We have long publicly acknowl- 
edged that an Iranian victory is not in 
the U.S. or our friends' interest. 

• We remain concerned about the 
prospects of Iranian hegemony and influ- 
ence in the gulf for our long-term access 



to oil and the stability of our friends in 
the region. 

• Operation Staunch is directed 
against Iran, not Iraq. Since Iran 
remains the recalcitrant party in the 
war, we hope to limit its war-making 
resources and convince it to enter into 
viable negotiations to end the conflict. 
We do not, however, supply arms to 
Iraq. 

• Our efforts in the United Nations 
and other forums acknowledge that Iran 
is intransigent and Iraq seeks a negoti- 
ated end to the war. 

In sum, our policy toward Iran since 
the 1979 revolution remains unchanged. 
We will not allow Iran to dominate the 
gulf or jeopardize Western access to this 



vital region. Iranian involvement in and 
support for terrorism further alienates 
our two countries. 



Allegation: Western Europe and Japan 
are dependent on gulf oil, not the United 
States, and yet they are doing nothing to 
protect their oil supplies. 

The Facts: In 1986, the countries of 
Western Europe received about 30% of 
their oil imports from the gulf and Japan 
almost 60%. About 15% of the total U.S. 
oil imports in 1986 came from the gulf; 
however, recent Energy Department 
studies indicate U.S. oil imports will 
double in the next decade. With declin- 
ing oil reserves in the West and 63% of 



October 1987 



43 



IIDDLE EAST 



the free world's oil reserves located in 
the gulf, future American access to this 
energy resource is vital. The economic 
problems in the United States caused by 
the 1973-74 and 1978-79 oil crises must 
not be forgotten; it could happen again, 
if oil flows were disrupted. A disturb- 
ance in the flow of gulf oil would cause 
the world price of oil to jump, with 
detrimental effects on free world 
economies. Due to the interdependent 
nature of our economy, the United 
States would be seriously affected, even 
though we are not as directly dependent 
on gulf oil as many of our friends and 
allies. 

We have called upon our allies in 
Western Europe and Japan for increased 
public support and assistance, including 
cooperation among allied naval units in 
and near the gulf. In fact, much is 
already being done. Britain and France 
maintain naval vessels in and around the 
gulf, and local cooperation, as is natural, 
is ongoing. Two of Kuwait's tankers 
qualify for British protection. Both the 
British and the French maintain war- 
ships in the area, and with three com- 
batants in the gulf, the British have a 
higher proportion of their navy commit- 
ted to the region than does the United 
States. Japan is prohibited by its con- 
stitution from participating in any 
military activity outside its home waters, 
although it could well play some sort of 
economic role in the gulf after the 
resolution of the war. The recent state- 
ment at the Venice summit was an indi- 
cation of the Western consensus regard- 
ing the importance of the gulf. 



Allegation: Reflagged ships are not 
"real" U.S. flag vessels. Reflagging is a 
political device, offering no benefits for 
the United States or its merchant fleet. 

The Facts: Reflagging is routine 
practice, consistent with domestic and 
international law. Reflagging procedures 
were formalized in 1981 by the Coast 
Guard for reasons of national defense 
and commercial facilitation. Since 1981, 
more than .50 large ships have been 
reflagged, many for subsequent charter 
to the U.S. Military Sealift Command. 
Of those vessels reflagged for commer- 
cial use, most operate internationally. 

Applicants for reflagging must meet 
strict requirements. The vessels must be 
owned by U.S. citizens or by corpora- 
tions controlled by U.S. citizens. Ships 
must meet stringent international and 
U.S. safety and structural standards. 
Ships serving U.S. ports must have 
American citizens for 75% of their crew. 



Those vessels not calling at U.S. ports 
must have at least a U.S. master but can 
hire foreign nationals as the remainder 
of the crew. 

Reflagged vessels— like any other 
U.S. flag merchant ship— are subject to 
U.S. taxes. They are also subject to 
mobilization by the U.S. Maritime 
Administration in time of national 
emergency. Thus they increase the size 
of the U.S. ready-reserve fleet p'reposi- 
tioned around the globe which would be 
available to support a potential war 
effort in time of conflict. 



Allegation: The Administration is ignor- 
ing the War Powers Act and dragging 
its feet in consulting with Congress 
about the Kuwaiti reflagging program. 

The Facts: The War Powers Act is 
not applicable under the present 
circumstances— this is not a situation 
where imminent involvement of U.S. 
forces in hostilities is clearly indicated. 
Prior to the attack on the U.S.S. Stark, 



there had never been an attack on a 
U.S. -escorted vessel in the gulf. The 
attack on the Stark was evidently the 
result of a targeting error rather than a 
deliberate decision to attack a U.S. 
vessel. The object of escorting reflagged 
vessels is to deter, not provoke. The 
situation is constantly under review, and 
Congress will be kept fully informed. 
Moreover, the Administration has kept 
congressional committees informed in 
the past about the reflagging program 
through a series of papers and briefings, 
beginning on March 12, 1987. The recent 
Department of Defense Report to the 
Congress on Security Arrangements in 
the Persian Gulf is but a further effort to 
cooperate and consult with Congress. 

'Official policy sUitements on the Persian 
Culf can lie tiiund in the fdlJowiiiK P't'iiii- 
III, 1,1 ui'Shil, Hiilh'lnis: Fi'lii-uaiT IVM". 
SiHTial .Secuon (President ('arti,-r's State of 
the Union address, Jan. 23); March 19S7, p. 
19 (Secretary Shultz's statement. Jan. 27); 
April 1987. p. 52 (President Reagan's 
statements of Jan. 23 and Feb. 2.5); and 
August 1987. p. 78 fUnder Secretary for 
Political Affairs Michael H. Armacost's state- 
ment. June 16). ■ 



Assistant Secretary Murphy's 
Interview on "Meet the Press" 



Assislinit Sf'iTfliinifur Nfur 
Eastern xml Sniilh A^iuh Airmrs: 
Richard \V. Murplii/ was itdcrolewed on 
two broadcasts of NBC-TV's "Meet the 
Press" on August 23, 1987, by Chris 
Wallace. NBC News: R. W. Apple, The 
New York Times: and Richard Reeves, 
Unii 'e rsa I Sii )i d imfr. 

Becdiis, nf ti'clniirni iliiYiridties, the 
intervieir irifh fhr <ifht'r srhnlided guest 
(Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Mohammad Jawan Larijani) could not 
be heard in the 11:00 a.m. (EDT) telecast: 
the program was redone and broadcast 
at 12:30 p.m. (EDT). 



BROADCAST AT 11:00 A.M. (EDT) 

Q. When you and other top Ad- 
ministration officials first began talk- 
ing about the U.S. escort mission last 
spring, you said that the United States 
could do it with the number of ships 
you had in the region— roughly six or 
seven ships. And there's a story in The 
New York Times today that that's 
what President Reagan was also told. 
Is that true? 



A. We had six or seven ships in the 
gulf itself. We have had a carrier battle 
group periodically but quite steadily the 
last few years outside of the gulf in the 
Arabian Sea. So the numbers you're see- 
ing do represent a significant rise in the 
last few weeks of our naval presence. 
But that's occasioned by the change in 
the nature of the threat of the last 
month or so. 

Q. Answer my question directly, if 
you would, sir. Was President Reagan 
told last spring that they could do 
it— that the United States could do 
this with the number of ships you had 
in the region at that time? 

A. We thought there might well 
need be a modest increase at the time 
the President made his decision. 

Q. But nothing like the kind of in- 
crease — we're now talking about more 
than 40 ships and 20,000 men. 

A. Just be cautious on the 
number— 40 ships— that includes two 
carrier battle groups. We don't expect 
two to remain on station in the north 
Arabian Sea all that long. 



44 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



Q. But my point, and I think you 
understand it. is we're talking about a 
huge escalation over what was 
thought w hen you approved and the 
President approved this policy. 

A. There certainly is an increase. As 
I say, it's a change in the nature of the 
threat since the President approved the 
poHcy. 

Q. Is it a change in the nature of 
the threat, or was it a failure by the 
United States to understand w hat the 
threat was at that time? 

A. The increased spread of mining 
in the Persian Gulf started in the last 
4-5 weeks only; that's several months 
after the President's decision. And that 
has occasioned a rethinking on the part 
of the Navy and the part of the Ad- 
ministration as to what resources will be 
needed. Those resources are coming into 
place. They'll stay in place as long as 
they are needed. 

Q. I'd like to relate to you two 
sentences that were spoken to me dur- 
ing the past week, one by a senior ad- 
miral who said, "I have the terrible 
feeling that we're about to see Beirut 
all over again;" the second by a former 
senior White House official— someone 
who left within the last few months 
who has kept in close touch— who 
said, "What you must understand is 
that there is no political plan for what 
we'd do if there were a disaster like a 
ship being sunk." I'd like you to com- 
ment on both of those. 

A. Let me answer by just quickly 
restating our interests in the gulf. They 
are the stability of oil supply; they are 
support for the moderate Arabs, the 
nonbelligerent Arabs in the gulf; and 
they are to prevent increased or ex- 
panded Soviet influence in the gulf. 
Those interests we characterize as vital 
U.S. interests, and that's a word we 
don't use lightly. Those are \ital in- 
terests which have been recognized over 
the last several years— in fact, some of 
them over decades. 

Q. We were told that it was in the 
vital U.S. interest to help keep the 
peace in Lebanon, but when 200-odd 
American Marines were killed, we 
pulled out. Why is the American 
public not to believe that a similar ac- 
tion would flow from a similar 
tragedy in the gulf? 

A. I think the interests are of 
significantly different weight in the gulf. 

Q. And is there careful contingen- 
cy—political contingency — planning? 
I'm not talking about someone in the 
basement of the Pentagon toiling 



away with a computer. Is there 
careful political planning in the White 
House, in the State Department for 
what steps we would take if a ship 
were sunk or something like that hap- 
pened? 

A. Our policy has had two major 
tracks: one has been political/diplomatic, 
the other has been military. We've 
touched on the military buildup and the 
reasons for that. On the political/diplo- 
matic side, we are going full bore at the 
United Nations in the Security Council 
to get a comprehensive cease-fire. The 
source of tension in the gulf is the con- 
tinuation of the war. The reason the war 
has continued is the reluctance of Iran 
to come to negotiations to accept the 
comprehensive cease-fire which the 
world powers got together July 20th and 
voted unanimously in favor of. So that is 
where our efforts are going. 

Q. Let's talk for a minute about 
the goal of support for the moderate 
governments in the — so-called 
moderate governments — in the Middle 
East. Elaborations of that by the State 
Department, by the Defense Depart- 
ment, by the White House have all 
talked about a kind of containment 
policy of the Islamic revolution in Iran 
until it runs it course. Allah — the 
Lord only knows when. But aren't we 
rebuilding a major, unending 
American commitment, then, to try to 
regulate the religious politics of a 
whole region of the world? 

A. To regulate the religious 
politics— no. That's far too sweeping to 
describe as an American policy, to use 
those words. We are interested in con- 
taining the revolution. The revolution 
has only effectively broken out beyond 
the borders of Iran within Lebanon, 
which Iran has paid handsomely for in 
terms of resources, training, financing 
over the past several years. We do not 
believe that the Iranian revolution 
should be imposed on its neighbors, 
most of whom are Arab Sunni 
neighbors. And they are not— I don't 
like this phrase— so-called moderates. 
They are moderate Arabs. 

Q. They're moderate compared to 
the Iranians. So our long-term goal 
goes far beyond shipping in the Per- 
sian Gulf. It is to contain the regime 
the way we once wanted to contain 
the Soviet Union. 

A. We think the— yes. We think 
that the peoples of the Arab side of the 
gulf have the right to choose their own 
leaders, to have their own leaders, and 



we support the stability of those states 
in the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
beyond. 

Q. There has been talk about a 
meeting with Mr. Larijani while he is 
here. What is the U.S. position on 
that? 

A. We've always said we would be 
ready to receive any authoritative 
message that the leadership in Tehran 
wished to convey to us. If Mr. Larijani 
seeks a meeting, we'll be happy to meet. 
We're not particularly seeking one with 
him at this point in time. 

Q. Have you had any indication at 
all from him that he requires or re- 
quests such a meeting? 

A. No, thus far just the opposite. I 
believe that the Iranian mission in New 
York has suggested that every member 
of the Security Council except the 
United States have a meeting with Mr. 
Larijani. 

Q. Let me pick up on one thing 
that you said in our first segment. 
You said that because of the changing 
threat, that the United States has had 
to beef up its forces and that you will 
have them for as long as needed. What 
does that mean? Is there any end to 
the U.S. commitment of forces into 
the Persian Gulf, or is it open-ended? 

A. Let's go back 40 years and go 
back 200 years to answer that question. 
For 40 years, we've had the U.S. naval 
presence in the gulf on the order of five, 
six warships in the gulf since the end of 
the Second [World] War. For 200 years, 
we've had and accepted the responsibili- 
ty of escorting American flag vessels 
when there was a need. So this is not a 
new presence in the gulf. It is not a new 
policy for the United States. 

Q, But we are talking now about 
40 ships— in the neighborhood of 40 
ships and 20,000 men. That is a new 
presence. 

A. That is certainly a new presence, 
and our presence will remain there as 
long as it is needed. 

Q. So it is an open-ended commit- 
ment. 

A. I don't think it's open-ended, 
because I don't think that the war is go- 
ing to endure all that long. We will— 

Q. But as long as the war between 
Iran and Iraq continues, as long as 
there is a threat to shipping in the 
gulf, that kind of force could be there. 

A. It went there, it has been there 
to protect our interests in the gulf, it'll 
stay there to protect our interests. We 
hope that Mr. Larijani has come to New 



October 1987 



45 



MIDDLE EAST 



York in order to signify very clearly to 
the Secretary General of the United Na- 
tions tomorrow when they meet that his 
government accepts Resolution 598 of 
the Security Council. 

Q. Do you have any reason to 
believe that's true? 

A. As I say, I hope that is the 
reason he has come to New York. There 
have been contradictory signals out of 
Tehran, particularly over these last cou- 
ple of weeks, some more flexible- 
sounding statements, more interested in 
a solution than we have heard fi-om the 
beginning of the war. 

Q. Is that the basis for your com- 
ment that the war will not go on for a 
terribly long time, and, therefore, we 
do not have an open-ended commit- 
ment? 

A. I'm not predicting the end of the 
war. No one can pretend to do that. But 
I would note that the last offensive that 
the Iranians launched against Basra at 
the beginning of this year was billed as 
the final offensive. It did not succeed. 
The Iraqis succeeded in holding their 
defensive lines. And while I imagine that 
Iran has plans for a further offensive, 
the fact is the war is not going terribly 
well. There's a tremendous loss of life on 
both sides, a tremendous loss of treasure 
on both sides, and I think there's a limit. 

Q. If, indeed, that's our goal— to 
contain the Iranians— why don't we 
simply support the Iraqis? 

A. We've got no interest in entering 
into this war and taking sides in the 
war. The policy is one of neutrality, and 
we're going to pursue that. I know that 
there are those who look at the 
developments in our policy over the past 
several months and see a lessening of 
neutrality, a tilt toward Iraq. I want to 
assure you that our interest is getting 
that war to an end. That's why we've 
put our major efforts into the diplomacy 
which bore fruit July 20th when there 
was a unanimous resolution to call — in 
fact, to demand — a cease-fire. 

Q. What about diplomacy with our 
own friends there? The Saudis have 
now denied that they will allow 
Americans landing rights even in 
emergencies. If we are protecting 
these people against what we see as a 
spreading force in this region, why 
don't they want to protect themselves? 

A. Our friends in the gulf want to 
protect themselves, and they want to 
cooperate with the United States in so 
doing. They cooperate, and we cooperate 
with them by a longstanding policy of 
arms sales to those states so they can 



defend themselves. First they rely on 
themselves, then on the Gulf Coopera- 
tion Council. Beyond that if the threat is 
too great, they have said they would 
look to the United States. You're not go- 
ing to hear any talk from the region, 
and I hope as "little talk as possible from 
Washington, about the nature and the 
specifics of the support they are giving 
to us. Let me just say that in carrying 
out the escort mission, we are very 
satisfied with the support that is coming 
from the gulf states. 

Q. Can I ask you specifically about 
that? There was a report this weekend 
in The Washington Post that Saudi 
Arabia has agreed to provide landing 
rights and other support to U.S. air- 
craft in the gulf. It's a report that 
Saudi Arabia denied this morning. 
What is the truth of that? 

A. I think that just bears out what I 
was saying; that none of the states want 
to discuss or have discussed the nature 
of the cooperation that they're having 
with the United States. Iran exerts an 
undeniable— plays the role of intimida- 
tion against those states. It has singled 
out Kuwait over the past 10 months as 
the primary target, but its targets, in 
fact, are all the regimes in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council as well as, of 
course, in— 

Q. You are satisfied, though, with 
the Saudis' support? 

A. We're satisfied, yes. And it's 
growing, and it's growing because we 
took a lead and we decided to show our 
commitment to the security instability of 
the area. 

Q. Is that why the United States, 
is that why the Administration is now 
going to push a new, billion-dollar 
arms sale to Saudi Arabia? 

A. No, we consider on that par- 
ticular sale— no decision's been 
taken— but we consider that the arms 
supplied to the moderate Arab states, it 
would be a longstanding commitment of 
the United States and justified on its 
own. 

Q. What you're saying, in essence, 
is that these countries have told you 
that they'll let you do these things, 
but if it comes out into the public, 
they'll deny it. Is that right? 

A. That's your conclusion. I think it's 
a sound one. 

Q. At the same time these things 
are happening, the State Department 
last week said that they have informa- 
tion—your security division said they 
have information— that the Iranians 
are in the process of casing out 



American Embassies. They've got new 
evidence of this and seem to be imply- 
ing that they expect a new wave of 
Iranian terrorism specifically directed 
against the United States. Is that in- 
formation correct, the information 
that came from Mr. Lamb [Robert E. 
Lamb, Assistant Secretary for 
Diplomatic Security]? And if it is, how 
will that affect what you call our 
ongoing commitment? 

A. As in any case of any threats of 
the terrorist nature, we have to be 
prepared; we try to be prepared as well 
as possible. By its very definition it's 
hard to track and build up information 
to counterterrorism. We put major in- 
telligence resources to that end, sharing 
of intelligence with our friends and allies 
on the nature of the terrorist threat, 
and we will do the best we can to pro- 
tect our interests, to protect our installa- 
tions. But that there is a risk in carrying 
out our policy, we have always admitted 
very frankly there is a risk. It could be 
from other terrorists, sabotage nature. 
We think the risk is low, that it will 
come against the U.S. naval ships, but 
we think that risk is measurable and 
containable. 

Q. Let's talk about hostages if we 
can. There is a report out of Beirut 
this weekend by the same magazine 
that broke the Iran arms sale in the 
first place of an impending $5 million 
deal to free Anglican Church envoy 
Terry Waite. Do you know anything 
about any progress, either to free 
Waite or any of the other hostages? 

A. I wish I could give you some en- 
couraging news on that. We have none. 
Over the last several years— and some 
of those hostages have been now held 
for over 3 years, and you know — there 
have been a variety of stories about if 
you only provide X million dollars, you 
will find your hostages released. I don't 
think— 

Q. Or X number of Hawk missiles. 

A. Or Hawk missiles— whatever. 
But I don't think you're— that the people 
holding the hostages in Lebanon, who 
are subject to Iran's influence if not total 
Iranian control. But clearly Mr. Rafsan- 
jani, the speaker of the [Iranian] Parlia- 
ment, has acknowledged Iran has in- 
fluence over these hostage holders. The 
fact is that the holders themselves tend 
to be men who have a particular cause 
they want to advance. In the case of 
several of our hostages, their cause is to 
get the release of prisoners taken by the 
Government of Kuwait over 3 years ago 
who participated in attacks on our Em- 
bassy, the French Embassy, and 
Kuwaiti installations. We say no deals. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



Q. Let's talk about the one 
American who was freed this week, 
Charles Glass. There has been a great 
deal of speculation as to why he was 
released. Is it your view that Iran was 
behind it and doing it to try to gain 
points with Syria, which regarded 
Glass' abduction as a great embarrass- 
ment? 

A. We think there was an Iranian 
hand in his original kidnapping. I don't 
think the evidence is all in yet to say 
whether Iran's influence was there in 
securing his release. What we know is 
that the Syrians made considerable ef- 
forts to get his release. 

Q. Do you sense that the pattern 
that obtained here, and I know the 
pattern is not completely clear yet, but 
roughly the pattern that obtained here 
offers any hope as a vehicle for get- 
ting other hostages released? Can we 
repeat this, in other words? 

A. I think the circumstances in 
Glass' release are that he was the first 
hostage taken after the entry of Syrian 
security forces into West Beirut. That 
was a particularly sharp embarrassment 
to Damascus — 

Q. So they felt responsible. 

A. —and they felt particularly 
responsible as a result. 

Q. And you don't think you can 
turn it around, then? 

A. The circumstances are different. 
We hope that continued Syrian efforts 
will bear results. 

Q. There are reports that the 
United States is about to send its am- 
' bassador. William Eagleton, back to 
Syria. Don't you run the risk of mak- 
ing this look like it's another deal in- 
volving hostages that Syria helped get 
Glass freed on the one hand and on 
the other hand, therefore, the United 
States reasserts its diplomatic 
recognition to Syria? 

A. Ambassador Eagleton's return to 
I )a,mascus is not related to hostage 
release, to the release of Charlie Glass, 
or any other aspect of hostage detention 
in Lebanon. His return is a further 
acknowledgment of the Syrian efforts 
over the past year to contain terrorism. 
As you recall, General Vernon Walters, 
our UN Ambassador, went to Damascus 
back in June. This was to— early July, I 
believe — to respond to Syrian action in 
closing the offices of Abu Nidal in 
Damascus. We were encouraged by that 
step, and we hope there will be others. 



Q. Going back to Mr. Larijani's 
visit and the activities at the United 
Nations this week, the State Depart- 
ment said that they hope his 
visit — and you said today — will lead 
to Iranian agreement to a cease-fire. 
And then this week the State Depart- 
ment said then we'll get on with the 
enforcement. Who is going to enforce 
a cease-fire if one is received? Are we 
volunteering to do that? Is that what 
the State Department means? I mean, 
is this our next Beirut? Will we en- 
force a cease-fire in that part of the 
world? 

A. No, the original resolution of July 
20th called for the United Nations to 
send observers to the area to observe 
the conduct of the cease-fire. That once 
it's accepted — if it is accepted — and 
again I repeat, we hope very much that 
Mr. Larijani has come with instructions 
from his government to accept that 
cease-fire simply and unequivocally 
tomorrow. But then enforcement 
becomes the UN's responsibility. 

Q. To provide the bodies. 

A. There would be a number of na- 
tions ready to provide observers. We 
have no doubt about that. 



BROADCAST AT 12:30 P.M. (EDT) 

Q. You heard Mr. Larijani indicate 
what seemed to be a rejection of the 
UN resolution involving the ceat>t -fire. 
Did you see any wiggle room there, or 
did you view that as a very negative 
response? 

A. That was my understanding that 
it was a negative response, but once 
again we did not hear Iran give us a 
categoric rejection of the resolution. 

Q. All right now, it's been a 
month, and the United States has 
always said that if either party re- 
fused to agree to a cease-fire, that 
then you were going to put another 
resolution in the United Nations with 
some teeth, a resolution calling for an 
arms embargo against the party that 
refused to observe the cease-fire. Is it 
time to move? 

A. The meeting that Mr. Larijani 
will have this week— I think tomor- 
row — with Perez de Cuellar, the 
Secretary General, we think is a critical 
one. We think it's an up-or-down ques- 
tion: Does Iran accept or does it reject? 
And we think that the time has come for 
work on a second resolution which 
would give teeth to the original resolu- 
tion of July 20th. 



Q. Now we are talking about the 
members of the Security Council, in- 
cluding the Soviet Union and China, 
which have both been involved at 
various times in arming Iran. Do you 
have any sense that either of those 
countries would agree to a flat arms 
embargo against Iran? 

A. We are discussing it within the 
Security Council right now. I think there 
are prospects, yes, for agreement. Ex- 
actly when that can be achieved, we will 
see. But I think there are good pros- 
pects. 

Q. Mr. Larijani also said, as you 
heard, that we were pouring oil, so to 
speak, on a burning bush by throwing 
so much military strength into the 
gulf. We are up now to 40-odd ships, 
at least on a transitory basis, far more 
than we had when we began. My own 
newspaper reported this morning that 
the decision taken by the President at 
a rather brief breakfast meeting to 
have this reflagging program, this 
escort program, was based upon 
assurances given to him that no 
significant additional forces would be 
required. What went wrong, and is 
anybody doing any rethinking on this? 

A. The circumstances have changed 
in the region since the President's 
original decision. We took a lead, we 
took a lead at the United Nations in 
working diplomatically for a resolution 
calling for a cease-fire on land, sea, and 
air. That is the resolution Mr. Larijani 
has asked to accept and — 

Q. Which is now not going to 
work, it's perfectly clear. 

A. I'm not sure of that, because that 
resolution, after several months of 
debate when it was adopted, 
represented the consensus of the world 
community, including the Soviets, in- 
cluding the People's Republic of China, 
including every single member of the 
Security Council; there is unanimity 
there. 

Q. But not Iran. 

A. So far not Iran. Let us wait and 
see what Mr. Larijani says in private to 
the Secretary General. 

On the second area, though, the 
point of your question on the military 
resources we have committed to the 
gulf — the President has been accused or 
criticized of reactive diplomacy in this 
area, that he didn't foresee, or his ad- 
visers didn't foresee, the need for the 
resources that are now moving in. But I 
would remind you that the resources 
that are moving in today, after we took 



October 1987 



47 



MIDDLE EAST 



the lead, include the resources of Great 
Britain, include the resources, the 
minesweepers, of France. And the situa- 
tion has changed because it is the 
Government of Iran, since the adoption 
of the Security Council resolution, which 
spread its mining activities further than 
had been the case. 

Q. I had a conversation just this 
past week with a man who was in the 
White House at the time of this deci- 
sion, who has kept in close touch. He 
says there is no planning — no 
political-military planning — going on 
to determine what we might do if one 
of our ships, one of our capital ships, 
hits one of these mines; we lose 200 
sailors the way we lost 200-odd 
Marines in Beirut. What would we do 
if that happened? 

A. I can assure you there are a large 
number of contingency plans being 
worked on in the State Department, in 
the Defense Department, to be re- 
viewed, to be under a review by the 
White House. 

Q. Are they under review now? It 
could happen tomorrow. 

A. I won't go into the details of con- 
tingency planning, we do not go public 
on these matters, but there have been 
extensive reviews of our planning. 

Q. Mr. Larijani also 
threatened — and it seemed to me fair- 
ly explicit, whether they can carry 
through on the threat I don't 
know— but to expand the gulf war to 
other countries if other countries are 
in support of American reflagging 
operations. And our policy seems to 
be, as stated, the latest version that's 
come out of the State Department, has 
a great deal to do with containing the 
Islamic revolution of Iran. Are we 
literally sort of moving into a mini- 
cold war in the sense that we have a 
containment policy, shadowing the 
containment policy we had of the 
Soviet Union, now which is going to 
involve Kuwait, it's going to involve 
Saudi Arabia, one day down the road 
it may even involve Pakistan if we use 
some of their facilities? 

A. We came into the escort opera- 
tion at the request of the Government of 
Kuwait. That is a request supported by 
the sbc governments of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council when they were 
consulted by the Government of Kuwait. 
We have come in for vital American in- 
terests, the first of which is to assure a 
stable supply of oil; the second is to sup- 
port the moderate nonbelligerent Arab 
states of the gulf; the third is to prevent 
an expansion of Soviet influence and 



dominance in the gulf. That's what 
drove our policy, and that policy was 
mirrored and encapsulated in the deci- 
sion that the President took in early 
March to agree to the reflagging of 
those tankers. 

Q. The policy is much greater than 
the reflagging. We are determined to 
keep that revolution within its borders 
until the Iranians wear themselves 
out. 

A. It's not just that we are deter- 
mined to do that; that is the attitude in 
the region. And look at the reaction in 
the Islamic world— not just the Arab 
world, not just the Arab countries of the 
gulf, but the reaction of the Islamic 
world— to the provocations which led to 
that terribly bloody incident at Mecca on 
August 1st when the violation of the 
pilgrimage took place. 

Q. What did you make of what 
seemed to be a fairly open threat by 
Mr. Larijani to moderate Arab coun- 
tries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait not 
to get involved, not to help the United 
States? 

A. That's not a new threat. The Ira- 
nians — the Government of Iran has 
staged political demonstrations in Mec- 
ca, for example, since the first year of 
its revolution. 

Q. I know it's not a new threat. 
The question is how seriously do you 
take it? 

A. Listen to Radio Tehran, the in- 
vective, the rhetoric that they indulge in 
from there against the governments of 
the region. It seems to be a we-against- 
the-world, we-against-the-Great-Satan in 
the United States. And so far no 
readiness to move forward to negotia- 
tions, to spare the lives, to spare the 
treasure that is being wasted by the — 

Q. Is that going to prevent the 
United States from trying to get 
moderate Arab countries involved in 
this? 

A. No, absolutely not — and they are 
involved. That's a fact, that the 



moderate Arab countries are supportive 
of what we are doing; our allies are sup- 
portive of what we are doing. It is mov- 
ing ahead very nicely. 

Q. The Washington Post carried a 
story this weekend saying that the 
Saudis had granted us certain landing 
rights, certain other things. The 
Saudis today say that's not true. 
Would we be unreasonable to conclude 
that the Saudis have agreed to do it 
but said they would deny it publicly if 
asked? 

A. We are not discussing the 
specifics of what any of the states have 
agreed to, for two reasons. The first— 

Q. No, I'm asking you about what 
the Saudis are saying. 

A. As I say, we are not going to 
comment on the specifics. And we don't 
for two reasons. One is that Iran is lay- 
ing a very intimidating line on those 
states to try to cut them off from the 
West, cut them off from other Arab 
states. Secondly, frankly, they have not 
been persuaded that the United States 
of America would be consistent in the 
defense of American interests, and they 
have been waiting to see. I think they 
are now encouraged by our efforts in 
the convoy and our successes. 

Q. Mr. Larijani indicated that Iran 
might be willing to get involved on a 
humanitarian basis to get American 
hostages released, but if there is a 
deal involved, that the United States 
has to help with their problems — in 
other words, their prisoners in 
Kuwait, their prisoners in Israel. Do 
you see any basis for a deal in all of 
that? 

A. I don't see any basis for a deal in 
that, no. Our policy is that that dealing 
over hostages is simply going to create 
problems leading to more hostage- 
taking, and that has been the pattern, 
particularly in Lebanon, over the course 
of the last year. 

Q. Yes, as the Administration has 
found out. 

A. As it's been discovered. ■ 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



West Germany to Dismantle 
Pershing lA Missiles 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 26, 19871 

As you know, Chancellor Kohl has made 
a statement concerning the future status 
of the German Pershing lA missiles. We 
strongly support this reaffirmation that 
the German Pershing lAs have not been 
and will not be a matter for discussion 
in U.S. -Soviet negotiations, which are 
bilateral. 

We have emphasized at the same 
time that the disposition of these 
missiles is a matter for the Federal 
Republic of Germany to decide, in con- 
sultation with NATO. We, therefore, 
understand and support the statement 
on future disposition of the Pershing lAs 
which was made today by the Chan- 
cellor. As we understand it, the condi- 
tions for not modernizing and eventually 
dismantling the Pershing lAs include the 
following key elements: 

• U.S. -Soviet agreement on global 
elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
missiles; 



• Resolution of outstanding INF 
verification issues in a satisfactory way 
for all concerned; 

• Ratification and entry into force 
of the U.S. -Soviet INF agreement; and 

• Actual elimination of these U.S. 
and Soviet INF missiles in accordance 
with the agreed U.S. -Soviet timetable. 

With respect to nuclear forces of 
less than 500 km range, I wish to reaf- 
firm U.S. support for the NATO posi- 
tion — as reflected in the June 1987 
North Atlantic Council communique of 
NATO Foreign Ministers— concerning 
the sequencing and priorities for 
negotiations beyond those currently 
underway at Geneva. As the communi- 
que from that meeting indicates, and as 
the Supreme Commander of allied forces 
in Europe — General Galvin — has em- 
phasized, NATO must retain a robust, 
modern, and survivable nuclear deter- 
rent for the foreseeable future. 



Soviet Nuclear 
Test Releases 
Radioactive Debris 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 13, 19871 

A Soviet nuclear test, conducted on 
August 2, 1987, at Novaya Zemlya 
caused the release of radioactive debris 
into the atmosphere. Novaya Zemlya is 
an island above the Arctic Circle and the 
site of an established Soviet nuclear 
testing area. 

This radioactive debris was detected 
outside Soviet territory. Nuclear explo- 
sions which cause radioactive debris to 
be present outside the territorial limits 
of the country conducting the explosion 
violate the 1963 Limited Test Ban Trea- 
ty. We have conveyed to the Soviet 
Union our concern regarding this failure 
to comply with its treaty obligations. .^ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 31. 1987. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



Export Controls Imposed 

on Chemical Weapons Substances 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JULY 31, 1987' 

As part of our policy which opposes the 
illegal use of chemical weapons in con- 
travention of international law and 
obligations, today the United States is 
imposing controls on the export to Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria of eight chemicals that 
are useful in the manufacture of those 
weapons. 2 

We believe that Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria are seeking these eight chemicals 
from Western countries for use in their 
chemical weapons programs. Previously 
eight other chemical weapons precursors 
were controlled to these three 
countries.' These controls remain in ef- 
fect. 

In addition, four chemicals that were 
previously controlled only to Iran, Iraq, 
and Syria will now require an export 



license for export to any destination in 
the world except Canada. And a fifth 
chemical, export of which were previous- 
ly controlled for national security pur- 
poses, will also require such an export 
license."' This action has been taken in 
line with the actions of other Western 
industrialized countries to curb the flow 
of chemical weapons precursors. 

The purpose of these new export 
controls is threefold: 

(1) To curb the supply of chemicals 
now being sought by Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria for their respective chemical 
weapons programs; 

(2) To ensure that American 
chemicals do not contribute to the 
manufacture of chemical weapons which 
are subsequently used in the Iran-Iraq 
war; and 

(3) In the case of the worldwide 
licensing requirements for five 



chemicals, to harmonize U.S. export con- 
trols with those of other Western in- 
dustrialized nations which are 
cooperating to curb the supply of 
chemical weapons precursors to gulf war 
belligerents. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Charles Redman. 

^The chemicals are; N, 
N-Diisopropylaminoethane-2-thiol; N, 
N- Diisopropy laminoethy 1-2-chloride, Dimethyl 
Phosphite (DMP); 3 Hydroxy- 1- 
methylpiperidine; Phosphorous Trichloride; 
3-Quinuclidinol; Thionyl Chloride; and 
Trimethyl Phosphite (IMP). 

'The chemicals are: Chloroethanol; 
Dimethylamine; Dimethylamine 
hydrochloride; Dimethyl methylphosphonate 
(DMMP); Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF); 
Phosphorous oxychloride; Potassium fluoride; 
and Thiodiglycol. 

■■Those chemicals are: Dimethyl 
methylphosphonate (DMMP); 
Methylphosphonyl dichloride (DC); 
Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF); 
Phosphorous oxychloride; and Thiodiglycol. ■ 



October 1987 



49 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



Science and Technology Cooperation 
With Latin America 



by John D. Negroponte 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Scientific Cooperation 
of the House Committee on Science, 
Space, and Technology on July 30, 1987. 
Ambassador Negroponte is Assistant 
Secretary for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to appear before you today 
to discuss science and technology 
cooperation with our Latin American 
neighbors. As you know, we prepared 
and submitted to Congress on August 4, 
1986, a lengthy report on this sub- 
ject — in compliance with Section 149 of 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
for fiscal years 1986 and 1987. That 
report resulted from over a year of in- 
tensive work by Mr. Stephen Rogers, 
then a senior staff member in my 
bureau. 

We are proud of the report, and 
believe it to be both comprehensive and 
judicious. Mr. Rogers consulted a wide 
range of agencies and individuals in and 
out of government in the course of 
preparing it. Those who gave generously 
of their time and expertise included of- 
ficials at the Agency for International 
Development (AID), the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative, the 
United Nations, the National Science 
Foundation, the World Bank, specialists 
at the National Academy of Sciences, 
national management and technology 
consulting firms specializing in 
technology issues throughout this 
hemisphere, and many others. The draft 
underwent several iterations, taking into 
account much constructive criticism. The 
Office of Management and Budget also 
approved the final report. 

Congress mandated that we report 
on the feasibility, benefits, and means of 
implementing a major initiative in inter- 
American space, science, and technology 
cooperation. It became clear from the 
outset that emphasis should be placed on 
the role of effective technology use and 
application in stimulating private-sector 
growth within the region. A major con- 
clusion of the report indicates that the 
private sector must play a prominent 
role in further stimulating economic 
growth throughout Latin America. The 
Department firmly believes that much of 
the most successful and productive 



50 



cooperation with our hemispheric 
neighbors originates, and will continue 
to originate, in the private sector. 

Countries throughout the region 
assign high priority to economic develop- 
ment, and they recognize the contribu- 
tions that science and technology can 
make in realizing development objec- 
tives. Several nations — Brazil, Mexico, 
and Argentina prominently — have sub- 
stantial capabilities across a relatively 
broad range of science and technology, 
and many others have specific areas of 
excellence. 

Nevertheless, ineffective application 
of technologies to specific production 
goals and objectives continues to be a 
problem for many nations seeking rapid 
economic expansion through advanced 
technology. The roots of this problem, as 
the report suggests, are several and 
complex. They include insufficient tech- 
nical training and ancient social divisions 
between white collar and blue collar 
workers, divisions that inhibit highly 
trained engineers from walking plant 
floors with production-line foremen. U.S. 
business and management consulting 
firms in Latin America increasingly are 
addressing such division, and they 
deserve our encouragement and support. 

The report also concluded that pro- 
gram stability and continuity were 
essential to effective science and 
technology cooperation in Latin 
America, as elsewhere. The common ele- 
ment seems to be long-term, consistent, 
and adequate funding. This need not 
necessarily involve significant resources. 

Resources for Programs 

We are all aware that resources and 
support bases for such programs are 
steadily shrinking in the LTnited States 
and other countries. The report faithful- 
ly reflects these realities. It thus was 
not possible to endorse major new ini- 
tiatives, such as a Latin American space 
agency, in the climate of budgetary 
stringency that exists today. Our Latin 
American neighbors would naturally 
look to us for leadership and major 
resources were the United States to pro- 
pose such an agency as a mechanism to 
generate rapid development of tech- 
nology and its applications. We could 
not, nor can we now, responsibly assure 
the availability of such resources. A 



welcome exception to the trend is the re- 
cent supplemental appropriation of $2 
million for bilateral science and 
technology cooperation with Brazil. 
Even so, that sum is but a negligible 
fraction of that which would be 
necessary to establish a Latin American 
space agency. 

Regrettably, we reached similar con- 
clusions in recent months during the 
course of an intensive examination of an 
imaginative proposal for creating an 
Americas' center for technology. In that 
instance, an interagency group and its 
external peer advisers examined alter- 
natives for achieving technology transfer 
to the troubled region of Central 
America. The group sought to link the 
programmatic experience of AID with 
knowledge in the Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scien- 
tific Affairs (OES) at the State Depart- 
ment of bilateral science and technology 
programs in advanced developing coun- 
tries. The group agreed that it is clearly 
worthwhile to strengthen the role of 
technology transfer in promoting eco- 
nomic development in Central America 
and found that considerable technology 
transfer already takes place within our 
existing development assistance efforts. 
Still, the group also concluded that 
systematic intensification of technology 
transfer can only be accomplished by ex- 
panding our development programs, 
which itself would require additional 
funding. Present budgetary constraints 
make doubtful the prospects for 
meaningful expansion of technology 
transfer by this means. 

Cooperation With Brazil 

As I mentioned, our science and 
technology program with Brazil il- 
lustrates a promising exception to these 
trends, and it may be worthwhile to 
elaborate. Brazil is one of four major 
Latin American countries with which the 
United States has bilateral agreements 
for scientific and technological coopera- 
tion. The others are Mexico, Venezuela, 
and Argentina. In one way or another, 
each such agreement has fallen short of 
its stated goals — to say nothing of its 
expectations — primarily for lack of ade- 
quate funds. Problems of funding are 
mutual in most cases, but this, too, is a 
factor that must realistically be taken in- 
to account in evaluating the potential for 
highly visible science and technology 
cooperation agreements with such im- 
portant countries. 

With regard to Brazil, the issue 
assumed such importance that it sur- 
faced on the agenda of President 



Department of State Bulletin 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



Reagan and President Sarney when they 
met last year. Through mutual presiden- 
tial initiatives, a distinguished binational 
panel of experts consulted over 6 
months and just last week formulated an 
impressive set of recommendations on 
researcher areas of compelling bilateral 
priority. In parallel with the presidential 
initiative, we included in our budget to 
the Congress a request for $2 million in 
seed money to support implementation 
of the panel's recommendations under 
the renegotiated U.S.-Brazil science and 
technology agreement. We are pleased 
that Congress appropriated these funds 
earlier this month. Given this, the like- 
lihood of matching contributions from 
Brazil, and a disciplined approach to 
science and technology program develop- 
ment, the prospects that substantial 
research will flow from our cooperative 
activities with Brazil are high. We an- 
ticipate achievements in such areas as 
health and agronomy, oceanography and 
atmospheric sciences, environmental 
sciences, and numerous fields of basic 
research. The resources targeted direct- 
ly on this program are frankly minuscule 
in comparison with their potential yield. 
We believe that they are a wise invest- 
ment of "venture capital" in the in- 
herently risky enterprise of scientific 
research. 

Commitment to Other Nations 
and Programs 

Despite the scarcity of new funds, we 
continue our commitment to assisting 
the nations of Latin America in their ef- 
forts to exploit advanced sciences and 
technologies, including space sciences 
and technologies, for continued economic 
growth. There are ways, means, and 
other resources which have been con- 
tributing to this objective for many 
years. 

We have means and processes at 
hand to encourage continued inter- 
governmental cooperation throughout 
Latin America and especially to 
stimulate further the growth of science 
and technology networks. Chapter 3 of 
the report notes that multinational 
structures at the regional level play a 
major role in advancing science and 
technology cooperation. These include 
the Organization of American States, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Numerous subregional organizations ex 
ist as well which provide channels of 
cooperation and a kind of informal 
technology transfer process in a variety 



of disciplines; the Central American In- 
stitute for Business Administration, the 
Inter-American Institute for Agri- 
cultural Cooperation, and the Caribbean 
Development and Cooperation Commit- 
tee are but three examples. We should 
continue to work through these and 
numerous other agencies and institutes 
to maintain and — should new funds 
become available — to expand regional 
science and technology data flow and in- 
formation and research applications. 

Key Role of the OAS 

As an example, efforts of the OAS to 
promote the development of science and 
technology programs span two decades. 
Thousands of Latin Americans and 
Caribbeans have benefited from ad- 
vanced training, specialized education, 
and on-the-job programs funded by the 
OAS. More importantly, the OAS has 
provided experts and scientists to 
member countries (31) to assist them in 
setting up scientific centers, improving 
the dissemination of technological know- 
how, and upgrading the practical ap- 
plication of new scientific and technical 
knowledge. The OAS budget for these 
programs in 1987 of $8.9 million has 
been allocated to programs and projects 
requested by its member countries. As 
noted earlier, with several exceptions, 
most of the member countries are still in 
the process of establishing the basic in- 
frastructure for scientific research and 
applications and the use of available 
technology for basic needs. Their 
priorities in the OAS reflect this preoc- 
cupation. These needs include low-cost 
housing materials, biomass energy 
resource development, food processing, 
quality control, marine science and 
resources, extractive technology and 
metallurgy, and others. 

The OAS has played a key role in 
assisting many countries to establish na- 
tional science directorates, including 
Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela. 
These in turn provide examples for 
other countries. The United States, of 
course, has been the main source of 
funding and direction in guiding the 
OAS program in science and technology. 
Consistent with our overall goal under 
the Foreign Assistance Act of giving 
priority attention to the most needy, we 
have supported the other members in 
focusing scarce resources on programs 
that would lead to direct benefits to the 
peoples of the Americas. The work of 
the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), 
headquartered in Costa Rica, is a prime 



example of U.S. resources and expertise 
channelled through regional and local 
science and technology networks. 

aid's Participation 

Another major example is afforded by 
AID which provides loan and grant- 
funded assistance to selected less 
developed countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. These include such 
nations as Haiti, Honduras, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and 
Bolivia, where science and technology 
generally are oriented toward basic 
developmental issues. Wealthier, more 
industrialized countries such as Mexico, 
Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, and 
Argentina have greater capabilities and 
appetites for advanced science and 
technology interactions with the United 
States, but they are eligible for little or 
no AID assistance. 

AID'S FY 1987 development assist- 
ance budget for the Latin America and 
Caribbean region is just over $400 
million. Eighty percent of this amount 
can be considered directly or indirectly 
to support technology transfer efforts. 
These funds are carefully programed, 
and projects are designed jointly with 
host-country governments or nongovern- 
mental institutions to ensure their fullest 
cooperation. A wide range of U.S. in- 
stitutions and experts works with host- 
country counterparts to implement proj- 
ects and transfer skills and knowledge in 
areas such as agricultural research and 
extension, reforestation, environmental 
protection, child survival, geothermal 
energy analysis, integrated pest manage- 
ment, marine fishery management, in- 
dustrial energy conservation, malaria 
control, and primary education and voca- 
tional training. AID-sponsored training 
of Latin American scholars at U.S. col- 
leges and universities also contributes 
importantly to the technology transfer 
process, in addition to encouraging the 
multinational and regional organizations. 

Along these lines, a salient example 
of creative use of funds with regional 
impact is the famous International Maize 
and Wheat Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT), located in Mexico City. A 
part of the worldwide network designed 
to further the "green revolution," 
CIMMYT is cofunded by AID, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and the World 
Bank. AID's latest regional initiative is 
creation of a unique regional Agri- 
cultural School for the Humid Tropics, 
sited in Costa Rica. Groundbreaking for 
the approximately $11.5 million project 
started this year. Eventually the school 



October 1987 



51 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



will be graduating trained specialists 
with sophisticated knowledge in the 
practical problems of agricultural 
development in the lowland humid 
tropics. 

Another dimension of the U.S. role 
in Latin America is illustrated by the 
Caribbean marine science initiative. Two 
years ago, as part of the ongoing effort 
in my bureau to identify science and 
technology program areas that could 
enhance international cooperation and 
development, we requested the Oceans 
Study Board of the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) to prepare a study on 
cooperative marine science for resource 
development in the Caribbean region. 
The NAS report, completed last sum- 
mer, identified a number of projects 
which could form a basis of regional 
cooperation for resource preservation as 
well as development. Their proposals in- 
cluded beach erosion monitoring, coastal 
and seabed mineral exploration, marine 
pollution amelioration, and coastal map- 
ping. The NAS report has been trans- 
mitted to all of our Embassies and AID 
missions in the Caribbean. To date most 
responses have emphasized the scarcity 
of AID resources for new initiatives. 
However, a positive response has come 
from the Caribbean nations themselves. 
Representatives of the Association of 
Island Marine Laboratories of the Carib- 
bean met with AID and OES officials 
this week on possible joint funding of 
CARICOMP, the Caribbean coastal 
marine productivity program. The 
association has already obtained core 
funding from the National Science Foun- 
dation and UNESCO. It proposes a com- 
prehensive program of environmental 
monitoring, data collection, and data 
management to define the influence on 
marine productivity of coastal 
ecosystems and effective coastal zone 
management throughout the Caribbean 
region. AID officials are currently study- 
ing this proposal, and we expect them to 
report shortly on its feasibility and their 
capacity to support it. 

Antarctic Research Cooperation 

Antarctica, of course, is a permanent 
focus of multinational and regional at- 
tention. The United States, Argentina, 
and Chile have cooperated in Antarctic 
scientific research ever since the Inter- 
national Geophysical Year (IGY) of 
1957-58, and the two Latin countries, 
recently joined by Brazil, are members 
of the Antarctic Treaty consultative 
mechanism. Ever since the IGY, U.S. 
Antarctic support vessels have used the 



port facilities at Punta Arenas, Chile, 
and later also Ushuia, Argentina. The 
U.S. Naval Research Laboratory's 
$800,000 per annum aerogeophysical 
survey program of the Antarctic Penin- 
sula relies upon ground services support 
both in Argentina and Chile. Presently 
we are discussing with both countries 
substantial cooperation that includes air- 
craft basing, weather data provision, 
ground-based measurements, and joint 
scientific research to determine the 
dynamics and possible deterioration of 
the ozone layer over Antarctica. 

Private Sector and Latin American 
Involvement 

In addition to such efforts, we should 
encourage the U.S. private sector to em- 
phasize in their contacts and partner- 
ships with Latin American industrial 
and business interests the essential need 
for effective application of the numerous 
advanced technologies that are readily 
at hand. U.S. engineers and manage- 
ment consultants must be supported in 
their efforts to assist Latin American in- 
dustrial interests to develop hands-on 
techniques in the use of technology for 
production and distribution. This 
represents a noncontroversial area of 
technology transfer that can pay rich 
dividends for us and for our Latin 
American colleagues. 

Finally, Latin Americans themselves 
can and must assist in the process of in- 
tensifying effective science and tech- 
nology exchanges and applications for 
mutual economic, social, and political 
benefits. The International Regional 
Organization for Agricultural Health 
(OIRSA), headquartered in San Sal- 
vador, illustrates how well this can be 
achieved. OIRSA is a regional institution 
whose reputation for effectiveness has 
attracted significant grant support from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture to 
fight such serious agricultural pests and 
diseases as the Caribbean fruit tly and 
the livestock virus disease called blue 
tongue that affects Honduras, Belize, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Trindad and 
Tobago. 

However, the flow of benefits cannot 
be one way. Uncertain exchange rates, 
tariff barriers, and loan policies 
significantly hinder the smooth exchange 
of technologies and ideas. So, too, do 
uncertainties about the extent of protec- 
tion for intellectual property rights in 
many Latin American countries. Many 
trade and business experts have em- 
phasized the disruptive effect on 
American business interests of national 
laws that provide little or no protection 



to intellectual property. These U.S. 
businesses are eager to work and to pro- 
vide mutual profit in Latin America. 
Here, too, is an area for diplomatic ef- 
forts to overcome nontechnical barriers 
that inhibit significant science and 
technology cooperation and growth. 

Conclusion 

As the report demonstrates, the scope 
of effective, mutually beneficial, and pro- 
ductive inter-American space, science, 
and technology cooperation is vast and 
varied. I have touched upon a few 
highlights this morning, and I have 
deliberately ranged in my remarks be- 
tween science and technology in order to 
indicate the complexities, knowing as we 
do that science and technology are com- 
plementary. I believe that the distin- 
guished panel you have brought together 
will further define the dimensions of this 
broad issue. 

We believe that the encouragement 
of excellence in science and technology 
and the advancement of science and 
technology' applications throughout 
Latin America are important objectives 
of national foreign policy. While im- 
mersed in this issue for over a year, we 
reconfirmed the broad-based strength of 
science and technology in such com- 
paratively advanced nations as Mexico, 
Brazil, and Argentina. We also dis- 
covered striking instances of research 
excellence in many nations throughout 
the region, including Chile, Peru, 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, and others. 
From astronomy to agriculture, we 
found strengths in science and tech- 
nology to rival and enrich our own. I 
hope that Latin American policy and 
program specialists both in and out of 
government will consult the report for 
the information and insights it provides. 
In our view, it offers important guidance 
as to how we may continue to work with 
our hemispheric neighbors most produc- 
tively for our common betterment. 

The stability and continued intellec- 
tual and material development of Latin 
America is critical to U.S. foreign policy 
interests, and we look forward to work- 
ing with Congress and other agencies 
within the Administration to find effec- 
tive ways and means of pursuing this 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published bv the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice. Washington. D.C. 20402. ■ 



52 



SOUTH ASIA 



Pakistan and the Nuclear Issue 



by Richard W. Murphy 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on hi- 
temational Economic Policy and Trade 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on July 22. 1987. Ambassador Murphy is 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs. ' 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss 
the difficult situation created by the re- 
cent filing of criminal charges in two 
cases involving alleged efforts to pro- 
cure material for Pakistan's nuclear pro- 
gram in violation of U.S. law. Since 
1981, the Congress and the Administra- 
tion have worked closely together in an 
effort to pursue both our nonprolifera- 
tion objectives and a range of other na- 
tional security interests in our relations 
with Pakistan. This effort has never 
been easy, but the dilemma we face at 
this moment is sharper and more serious 
than perhaps ever before. 



U.S. Efforts for Nuclear 
Restraint in Southern Asia 

We believe that our renewed security 
relationship with Pakistan has allowed 
us to make an important contribution to 
the prevention of a nuclear arms race in 
South Asia in the past 6 years. But we 
have not solved the problem. Despite 
our best efforts, Pakistan has proceeded 
to the threshold of nuclear weapons 
possession. India remains similarly 
poised at the brink. This is a critical mo- 
ment for South Asia, and indeed for our 
vital global interest in nonproliferation. 

The Administration, with the sup- 
port of the authorizing committees of 
both Houses, has argued that at this 
time we must intensify our efforts to 
produce concrete evidence of Pakistani 
nuclear restraint. We have undertaken a 
frank and intense dialogue with Pakistan 
to this end. While our ultimate goal is a 
firm commitment such as NPT [Non- 
proliferation Treaty] adherence by both 
India and Pakistan, our immediate objec- 
tive is to achieve some restraint in the 
nuclear area. Neither Pakistan nor In- 
dia, whatever their nuclear capabilities, 
has moved irrevocably across the 
nuclear threshold. We hope that stability 
can be reinforced through measures 
taken by both countries which will build 
confidence in their parallel declarations 
of intent not to acquire nuclear 



weapons. We believe that our continuing 
economic and security assistance to 
Pakistan not only underpins our ex- 
tremely important interests by allowing 
Pakistan to stand up to Soviet pressure 
through Afghanistan but also serves to 
encourage Pakistani nuclear restraint 
and to undercut any perceived security 
need for acquisition of a national nuclear 
deterrent. This policy rationale, in our 
view, remains valid. 

Alleged Violations 
of U.S. Export Laws 

The recent criminal cases have shaken 
the confidence of many Americans in the 
soundness of these policies. In discussing 
this matter and its potential foreign 
policy implications, I would first stress 
that we are not in a position at this time 
to make any conclusive judgments. We 
are, for the time being, dealing with 
allegations, as well as with a continuing 
investigation and a possible criminal 
prosecution. The evidence remains to be 
fully evaluated. We must bear in mind 
the need to avoid anything which might 
be seen to prejudge the outcome of the 
judicial process. But the public criminal 
charge itself raises issues with very 
significant foreign policy implications. 
We are prepared to discuss these im- 
plications and to take prudent action 
based on our best understanding of the 
facts at this time. 

The Administration views any viola- 
tion of U.S. export control laws with the 
utmost seriousness. Indeed, our actions 
to date demonstrate our commitment to 
upholding the law. The State Depart- 
ment has cooperated closely with the 
Justice Department in its investigation 
and has urged vigorous prosecution. 
More generally, the United States con- 
tinues to work closely with other nuclear 
suppliers to tighten controls on the ex- 
port of nuclear-related technologi,' and to 
block clandestine efforts to circumvent 
these controls. 

We are equally committed to the 
observance of our responsibilities under 
the Solarz amendment. Indeed, in 
response to the events which led to the 
passage of the Solarz amendment in 
1985, we underscored to the Pakistan 
Government that we would not tolerate 
any violation of our laws. We have 
subsequently reiterated to Pakistan of- 
ficials on a number of occasions the im- 
plications of such activities for our 
assistance relationship. 



The Pakistan Government, begin- 
ning in 1985, has provided unequivocal 
assurances, both in public and in private, 
that it would not engage in illegal pro- 
curement activities in the United States. 
In the wake of the arrest of Mr. Pervez, 
we have expressed our deep concern and 
have sought an explanation from the 
Pakistan Government of what it may 
know of this matter. We have called at- 
tention to earlier statements that we 
would not tolerate violations of our laws 
and made clear that actions inconsistent 
with the assurances we have been given 
would inevitably have serious conse- 
quences for our relationship. We have 
also informed Pakistan that this case 
reinforces our concerns about Pakistan's 
nuclear program and increases the need 
for steps to demonstrate that Pakistan's 
nuclear program is "peaceful." The 
Pakistan Government has denied any 
knowledge of or connection with this 
case and has offered its full cooperation 
in our investigation, including a commit- 
ment to take action against any in- 
dividuals found to be violating Pakistani 
policy or laws. 

As I have said, we are not able at 
this point to make any firm judgments 
either on the facts or the legal implica- 
tions of this matter. But, we can certain- 
ly assert that the stakes are very high 
and that the cost of a miscalculation are 
great. In this complex situation, we are 
particularly mindful of several major 
concerns. 

First, we must ensure that, by a 
failure to respond to events, we do not 
encourage disrespect for our laws or 
disregard for our policies in the area of 
nuclear nonproliferation. Others are 
watching around the world and will 
judge our resolve. 

Second, neither our nonproliferation 
objectives nor our other security in- 
terests would be well-served were we to 
lose our continuing ability to influence 
nuclear decisionmaking in South Asia. 

And finally, we must be actually 
mindful of our global security interests 
and of the importance of these interests 
of maintaining our support for Pakistan 
in its vital posture of opposition to the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
Pakistan is carrying an enormous 
burden in caring for 3 million Afghan 
refugees and standing up to Soviet 
pressure and intimidation. The 
Pakistanis deserve our continuing strong 
support, just as much as we believe we 
deserve their respect for our laws. 



October 1987 



53 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



U.S. Agenda 

Our immediate agenda is threefold. 

First, we must gather and evaluate 
all the information available which may 
bear on this matter and its foreign 
policy implications. 

Second, we must pursue our 
diplomatic dialogue with Pakistan with 
vigor, including taking the Pakistan 
Government up on its offer to assist in 
the investigation. Pakistan obviously 
understands the extreme importance of 
this matter, as well as of the need to 
reach a better understanding on the 
larger nuclear issue of which the pro- 
curement question is only a part. 

Third, we must consult closely with 
the Congress as our knowledge of this 
matter accumulates and our considera- 
tion of further steps proceeds. 

Let me emphasize this latter point. 
The Congress is already seized with this 
issue. Final action remains to be taken 
in regard to fiscal year 1988 assistance 
and the Administration's request for 
renewal of authority to waive provisions 
of the Symington amendment. There is 
also a strong congressional in- 
terest — which we share — in ensuring 
that the provisions of the Solarz amend- 
ment are addressed promptly, but also 
carefully and thoroughly. This is a mat- 
ter on which the Congress and the Ad- 
ministration must move forward 
together, or together take the respon- 
sibility for serious setbacks to important 
national interests. 

This, then, is our dilemma: How to 
ensure that our laws are upheld, protect 
our global nonproliferation interests, 
prevent the outbreak of a nuclear arms 
race in South Asia, and continue our 
support for Pakistan in its opposition to 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
Clearly, the outcome depends to a very 
large degree on Pakistan's response. We 
wish to believe the assurances of a good 
and deserving friend such as Pakistan, 
but under present circumstances, these 
assurances must be matched by their ac- 
tions. Only on that basis can the mutual 
confidence which has underlain our rela- 
tionship be fully restored. We hope for 
the best. Much depends on the success 
of our diplomatic efforts. We will keep 
this committee and the Congress fully 
informed as events unfold over the com- 
ing weeks. 



U.S. Initiative for 

Peace in Central America 



'The complete transcript of the heaririEs 
will be published by the committee and wilT 
be available from trie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, 
AUG. 5, 19871 

I have a very brief statement to read 
here, and then I am going to have to 
depart, and the Secretary of State is go- 
ing to take some of your questions here 
with regard to this event. 

I've just concluded a meeting with 
the joint congressional leadership, and 
I'm pleased to announce that there's a 
general agreement among us to go for- 
ward with a renewed diplomatic ini- 
tiative in Central America along the 
lines of the peace plan prepared in 
cooperation with the Speaker [of the 
House of Representatives Jim Wright] 
and the joint congressional leadership. 
Accordingly, I've instructed the 
Secretary of State to transmit that 
document to the leaders of the five Cen- 
tral American countries that are meet- 
ing in Guatemala City tomorrow with 
the request that these views should be 
taken into account in their deliberations. 

As I said at Ellis Island several 
months ago, this Administration has 
always supported regional diplomatic ini- 
tiatives aimed at peace and democracy. 
The aspirations of our Central American 
neighbors, the democratic resistance in 
Nicaragua, and the Nicaraguan people 
are one and the same: the establishment 
of genuinely democratic systems 
throughout the region with the fully 
guaranteed liberties of free assembly, 
free speech, free press, and the simple 
principle of self-determination. 

I applaud this bipartisan effort in 
Congress, and I express the hope that it 
will produce a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict in Nicaragua. I urge other na- 
tions of the world to join in the support 
of this effort and refrain from activities 
that would jeopardize it. 



SECRETARY'S NEWS BRIEFING, 
AUG. 5, 19872 

Q. Why is (the President] now willing 
to trust the Sandinistas, to sit down 
and negotiate with them? 

A. The President has always been 
ready to engage in regional peace ini- 
tiatives, and with the five Central 
American Presidents meeting in 
Guatemala City tomorrow and with the 
very interesting development of the 



discussions among the bipartisan leaders 
of the Congress about what we believe 
and what we should put forward there, 
the President is getting fully behind this 
plan. So it's not a change, but it is a 
very positive development. 

Q. What we have suggested 
through this plan— modifications to 
the Arias peace plan— what if the 
leaders, including Nicaragua, should 
decide that the Arias peace plan is one 
they can agree on? Would we support 
it? 

A. What we are doing here is put- 
ting forward some ideas, and they've 
been developed through a lot of discus- 
sion with very great leadership from the 
Speaker of the House, Jim Wright, and 
what we are going to work for is suc- 
cess—success meaning the possibility of 
a genuine regional peace agreement in 
Central America. That is what we're 
pointing to. 

Q. But that wasn't my question, 
sir. Could we support— would we sup- 
port the Arias plan if, in their 
wisdom, the leaders down there ac- 
cept that? 

A. This plan that the Speaker has 
put forward and that we've all worked 
on contains the essential ingredient of 
the Arias plan as I would understand it; 
namely, the drive to bring about 
democratic governments throughout 
Central America. There are all sorts of 
issues about the timing of this, that, and 
the other thing that are addressed in 
what has been distributed here, and 
those matters of timing are important to 
others as well. We'll just have to see 
what comes out of the discussions. 

Q. Is there any reason to 
believe— the Sandinistas have con- 
sidered proposals of this many times 
before and have not accepted them. 
What is different now? Why should 
we believe that they are any more in- 
terested? 

A. Of course, I don't want to try to 
speak for them, but what is being put 
forward here is reasonable, 
sensible— it's been discussed a great deal 
among people here with many different 
points of view. It's in line with things 
that are being discussed in the region, 
and I think we just have to say what 
we're for and it's up to others to say 
what they're for. But there has been a 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



great deal of conflict. The economic con- 
ditions in the region, and particularly in 
Nicaragua, are just terrible, so there is 
potentially a lot to be done on behalf of 
the people of the region. 

Q. There is a great deal of skep- 
ticism expressed by Democrats in Con- 
gress that the Administration is doing 
this in the expectation that the San- 
dinistas will turn it down and that you 
will then be assured of continued con- 
tra aid for the balance of the Presi- 
dent's term. 

A. You made a statement. Is there a 
question connected with it? 

Q. I'm saying that there is this 
skepticism which exists on the part of 
many Democrats in Congress. How do 
you respond? 

A. There is skepticism among people 
with varying shades of opinion about all 
of this, and I think what we need to do 
is use this bipartisan effort as a basis for 
strong diplomacy on our part and do 
everything we can to bring about the 
sort of result that I think everyone 
seeks. 

Q. But is it a ploy just to get more 
contra aid? 

A. It is not a ploy. It's not just a 
ploy. It is a genuine effort. And the 
President believes that, the Speaker 
believes that, and others who par- 
ticipated. They came here this morning. 
They looked each other in the eye. They 
had good, strong discussion. And we're 
going to make a real strong effort here. 

Q. Can you say whether you've got- 
ten any reaction from the Nicaraguan 
Government so far— any feedback? 
Speaker Wright showed us a letter he 
had received in which the ambassador 
indicated, while not signing off on it, 
at least some positive reaction to the 
proposals. Can you tell us if you've 
heard the same thing. 

A. We have just barely had the 
meeting that the President finally had 
with the leaders and signed off on this. 
And we're sending it out about now, as 
fast as I can get the machinery over in 
the State Department to get it out. And 
so they'll see literally the text of what is 
proposed. They'll be going to Guatemala 
City, and they'll be reacting in that en- 
vironment. But we don't have any prear- 
ranged reaction or we haven't been able 
to talk to them about it because we 
haven't had anything to talk about. 

Q. What do the contras think 
about it? They're mad at you because 
you didn't tell them yesterday. 



October1987 



A. They're meeting with the Presi- 
dent now and I want to go join that 
meeting. But I think they will un- 
doubtedly continue as they have 
before — to be wanting to see peace, 
democracy, freedom in Nicaragua. 
That's what they are fighting for. And if 
there is a way to get there, that's what 
they want. But they will speak for 
themselves and they're very able to do 
it. 

Q. Is the President committed to 
cut off aid to the contras if there's a 
cease-fire? 

A. Has the peace plan been 
distributed? 

Q. Yes, we just got it. 

A. You can read there — 

Q. But it's unclear what happens if 
there's a cease-fire? 

A. — what is envisaged. And what is 
envisaged — I think the key paragraph is, 
with respect to your question — 

Q. Number one. 

A. Number one, under "... we pro- 
pose the following . . ." and you can see 
that the cease-fire in place needs to have 
terms acceptable to the parties con- 
cerned. So that includes the Nicaraguan 
resistance. And it envisaged that a set 
of things would take place simultaneous- 
ly. And one of those things, if all of this 
can take place simultaneously, is a 
cease-fire and then the cessation of 
military aid — 

Q. But humanitarian aid would 
continue? 

Q. What about resupplying 
military aid with — 

A. —that would— and — just what it 
says, humanitarian aid would continue. 

Q. What about resupplying the 
contras during this period? Is the Ad- 
ministration seeking the right to con- 
tinue to resupply them? 

A. It says military aid would stop 
under these conditions if they can be 
worked out and humanitarian aid would 
continue. And what we would envisage 
if this works, and people are ready to 
really engage in this, is then a process 
that is designed to bring about a change 
in the manner of governance so that you 
do have openness, you do have freedom, 
you do have an electoral commission; it 
does make recommendations and so on. 
This is what is envisaged here. And of 
course its general principles. 



PEACE PLAN 

Recognizing that the Central American 
Presidents are about to meet to discuss 
the issues involved and seek a peaceful 
solution to the problems in Central 
America, the United States desires to 
make known its view on certain of the 
basic elements that need to be included. 

With respect to Nicaragua, the 
United States has three legitimate con- 
cerns for the well-being of the 
hemisphere: 

1. That there be no Soviet, Cuban, 
or communist bloc bases established in 
Nicaragua that pose a threat to the 
United States and the other democratic 
governments in the hemisphere; 

2. That Nicaragua pose no military 
threat to its neighbor countries nor pro- 
vide a staging ground for subversion or 
destabilization of duly elected govern- 
ments in the hemisphere; and 

3. That the Nicaraguan Government 
respect the basic human rights of its 
people, including political rights 
guaranteed in the Nicaraguan Constitu- 
tion and pledges made to the Organiza- 
tion of American States (OAS)— free 
speech, free press, religious liberty, and 
a regularly established system of free, 
orderly elections. 

Beyond this, the United States has 
no right to influence or determine the 
identity of the political leaders of 
Nicaragua nor the social and economic 
systems of the country. These are mat- 
ters wholly within the right of the 
Nicaraguan people. The United States 
affirms its support for the right of the 
Nicaraguan people to peaceful, 
democratic self-determination, free from 
outside intervention from any source. 

In order to bring an immediate end 
to hostilities and begin a process of 
reconciliation, we propose the following. 

1. An immediate cease-fire in place, 
on terms acceptable to the parties in- 
volved, subject to verification by the 
OAS or an international group of 
observers should be negotiated as soon 
as possible. When the cease-fire is in 
place, the United States will immediate- 
ly suspend all military aid to the contras, 
and simultaneously Nicaragua will stop 
receiving military aid from Cuba, the 
Soviet Union, and the communist bloc 
countries. Humanitarian aid can be sup- 
plied to both groups. The emergency law 
will be immediately suspended, and all 
civil rights and liberties will be restored. 



55 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



An agreed, independent multiparty elec- 
toral commission will be established to 
assure regular elections open to free 
participation by all. A timetable and pro- 
cedures for all elections, including those 
to be supervised and guaranteed by an 
agreed international body such as the 
OAS, will be established within 60 days. 

2. The withdrawal of foreign 
military personnel and advisers from 
Nicaragua and its immediate neighbors 
that are in excess of the normal and 
legitimate needs of the region will be 
subject to negotiations among the coun- 
tries of the region. The United States 
will suspend combat maneuvers in Hon- 
duras as a demonstration of good faith 
when the cease-fire is in place. 

3. After the cease-fire is in place, 
negotiations among the Governments of 
the United States, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua shall begin on reductions in 
standing armies in the region, with- 
drawal of foreign military personnel, 
restoration of regional military balance, 
security guarantees against outside sup- 
port for insurgent forces, and verifica- 
tion and enforcement provisions. As 
part of this negotiating process, the 
United States shall enter into discus- 
sions with the governments of the 
region — including the Government of 
Nicaragua — concerning security issues. 
A regional agreement on security issues 
shall be negotiated within 60 days, 
unless this period is extended by mutual 
agreement. The OAS shall be invited to 
be a signatory to and guarantor of this 
agreement. 

4. A plan of national reconciliation 
and dialogue among citizens of 
Nicaragua, including amnesty for former 
combatants and equal rights to par- 
ticipation in the political process. There 
shall be a plan of demobilization of both 
Sandinista and resistance forces. In ac- 
cordance with the implementation of this 
plan, the United States simultaneously 
shall cease all resupply of resistance 
forces. Both the Government of 
Nicaragua and the Government of the 
United States shall encourage and sup- 
port the reintegi-ation of demobilized 
forces into Nicaraguan civil and political 
society on terms guaranteeing their 
safety. Nicaragua shall at this time 
become eligible for existing and prospec- 
tive U.S. assistance programs. 

5. A plan of expanded trade and 
long-range economic assistance for the 
democratic governments of Central 
America in which Nicaragua might par- 
ticipate. By the process of democratiza- 
tion and compliance with regional 



56 



nonaggression agreements, Nicaragua 
would qualify for participation in the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative and the 
United States will lift its economic em- 
bargo. 

6. The negotiation process shall com- 
mence immediately and be completed by 
September 30, 1987. If the Nicaraguan" 
resistance, or forces under its command, 
should refuse to engage in this 
negotiating process, willfully obstruct its 
progress, or violate its terms, the United 
States shall immediately suspend all 



assistance to the resistance. If, because 
of actions taken by the Nicaraguan 
Government or the forces under its com 
mand, the negotiating process should 
not proceed, or its terms, conditions, 
and deadlines should not be met, the 
parties to these undertakings would be 
free to pursue such actions as they deen 
necessary to protect their national in- 
terest. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 10, 1987. 
^Press release 169. ■ 



Guatemalan Agreement 

for Peace in Central America 



TEXT OF AGREEMENT. 
AUG. 7, 1987' 

PREAMBLE 

The Presidents of the Republics of 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, meeting in 
Guatemala City on Aug^Jst 6 and 7, 1987, en- 
couraged by the vision and continuing desire 
of Contadora and the Support Group in favor 
of peace, strengthened by the constant sup- 
port of all the governments and peoples of 
the world, their principal international 
organizations and, especially by the European 
Economic Community and His Holiness John 
Paul n, inspired by Esquipulas I. and having 
gathered together in Guatemala in order to 
discuss the peace plan presented by the 
Government of Costa Rica, have agreed to: 

• Assume fully the historic challenge to 
forge a destiny of peace for Central America, 

• Undertake to fight for peace and 
eliminate war, 

• Make dialogue prevail over violence, 
and reason over rancor, 

• Dedicate these peace efforts to the 
youth of Central America, whose legitimate 
aspirations for peace and social justice, for 
freedom and reconciliation, have been 
frustrated for many generations, 

• Establish the Central American Parlia- 
ment as a symbol of freedom and in- 
dependence of the reconciliation to which we 
in Central America aspire. 

We ask for the respect and assistance of 
the international community in our efforts. 
Central American has its own pathways to 
peace and development, but we need help to 
make them a reality. We ask for an interna- 
tional agreement that would ensure develop- 
ment so that the peace we seek may be a 
lasting one. We firmly reiterate that peace 
and development are inseparable. 

We express our appreciation to President 
Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo and to the noble peo- 
ple of Guatemala for having served as the 



host for this meeting. The generosity of the 
Guatemalan people and their leader has been 
vital in creating the climate in which the 
peace agreements were adopted. 



PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING 
A STABLE AND LASTING PEACE 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA 

The Governments of the Republics of Costa 
Rica, El Salvador. Guatemala, Honduras, am 
Nicaragua, having undertaken to achieve the 
objectives and develop the principles 
established in the United Nations Charter, 
the Charter of the Organization of American 
States, the Document of Objectives, the 
Caraballeda Message for Peace, Security, am 
Democracy in Central America, the 
Guatemala Declaration, the Punta del Este 
Communique, the Panama Message, the Es- 
quipulas Declaration, and the draft Contador 
Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central 
America of June 6, 1986, have agreed upon 
the following procedure for establishing a 
stable and lasting peace in Central America. 

1. National Reconciliation 

(a) Dialogue. To carry out urgently, in 
those cases in which deep divisions have oc- 
curred within a society, actions of national 
reconciliation to allow the people to par- 
ticipate, with full guaranties, in authentic 
political processes of a democratic nature, on 
the basis of justice, freedom, and democracy 
and. for that purpose, to establish 
mechanisms for dialogue with opposition 
groups, in accordance with the law. 

To that end, the respective Governments 
shall initiate dialogue with all domestic 
political opposition groups that have laid 
down their arms and with those that have ac 
cepted the Amnesty. 

(b) Amnesty. In each Central American 
country, except in those where the Interna- 
tional Evaluation and Follow-up Committee 
determines that it is not necessary, decrees 



Department of State Bulleti? 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



of amnesty shall be issued which shall 
establish all the provisions to guarantee the 
inviolability of life, freedom in all its forms, 
property, and the security of the persons to 
whom such decrees apply. Simultaneously 
with the issue of the amnesty decrees, the ir- 
regular forces in the respective country shall 
release any persons they may be holding. 

(c) National Reconciliation Committee. 

In order to verify the fulfillment of the com- 
mitments undertaken by the five Central 
American Governments upon signing this 
document, with regard to amnesty, cease-fire, 
democratization, and free elections, a Na- 
tional Reconciliation Committee shall be 
created. Its function shall be to determine 
whether the process of national reconciliation 
is actually underway, and whether there is 
absolute respect for all the civil and political 
rights of Central American citizens 
guaranteed herein. 

The National Reconciliation Committee 
shall be composed of one regular delegate 
and one alternate from the Executive 
Branch, and one regular member and one 
alternate suggested by the Episcopal Con- 
ference and selected by the Government from 
a slate of three Bishops to be submitted 
within fifteen days of receipt of the formal 
invitation. This invitation shall be extended 
by the governments within five working days 
of the signing of this document. The same 
nomination procedure shall be used to select 
one regular member and one alternate from 
the legally registered opposition political par- 
ties. The three-person slate shall be submit- 
ted in the same time period as mentioned 
above. Each Central American Government 
shall also select to serve on the committee 
one outstanding citizen who is not part of the 
government and does not belong to the 
government party, as well as one alternate. 
Copies of the agreements or decrees creating 
each National Committee shall be transmitted 
immediately to the other Central American 
governments. 

2. Urging a Cessation of Hostilities 

The governments vehemently urge that a 
cessation of hostilities be arranged in those 
States in the area presently experiencing the 
action of irregular or insurgent groups. The 
governments of such States undertake to 
carry out all actions necessary to achieve an 
effective cease-fire within a constitutional 
framework. 

3. Democratization 

The governments undertake to provide 
the impetus for an authentic democratic proc- 
ess, both pluralistic and participatory, which 
entails the promotion of social justice, respect 
for human rights, sovereignty, territorial in- 
tegrity of the States, and the right of all na- 
tions to choose, freely and without any out- 
side interference whatsoever, their economic, 
political, and social system. Furthermore, the 
governments shall adopt in a verifiable man- 
ner measures conducive to the establishment 
and, where appropriate, improvement of 
democratic, representative, and pluralistic 



October 1987 



systems that will guarantee the organization 
of political parties and effective participation 
by the people in the decisionmaking process 
and ensure that the various currents of opin- 
ion have free access to fair and regular elec- 
tions based on the full observance of citizens' 
rights. To ensure good faith in the develop- 
ment of this process of democratization, it 
shall be understood that: 

(a) There must be complete freedom for 
television, radio, and the press which shall 
encompass the freedom for all ideological 
groups to open and maintain in operation 
communications media, and the freedom to 
operate such media without prior censorship; 

(b) There shall be complete pluralism of 
political parties. In this respect, political 
groups shall have broad access to the com- 
munications media and full enjoyment of the 
rights of association and the ability to hold 
public demonstrations in the unrestricted ex- 
ercise of the right to publicize their ideas 
orally, in writing, and on television, as well 
as freedom of mobility for the members of 
the political parties in their campaign ac- 
tivities. 

(c) Similarly, the Central American 
Governments which are maintaining in effect 
a state of siege or emergency shall abolish it 
and bring about the rule of law in which all 
constitutional guarantees are in effect. 

4. Free Elections 

Once the conditions inherent in any 
democracy have been created, free, plural- 
istic, and fair elections shall be held. 

As a joint gesture of the Central 
American States toward reconciliation and 
lasting peace for their peoples, elections shall 
be held for the Central American Parliament, 
which was proposed in the Esquipulas 
Declaration of May 25, 1986. 

To that end, the Presidents have ex- 
pressed their wish to move forward with the 
organization of the Parliament. The Pre- 
paratory Committee of the Central American 
Parliament shall, therefore, conclude its 
deliberations and deliver the respective draft 
treaty to the Central American Presidents 
within one hundred and fifty days. 

These elections shall be held 
simultaneously in all the countries of Central 
America during the first six months of 1988 
on a date to be agreed upon in due course by 
the Presidents of these States. They shall be 
subject to monitoring by the appropriate elec- 
toral bodies, and the respective governments 
agree to extend an invitation to the Organiza- 
tion of American States and to the United 
Nations, as well as to governments of third 
States, to send observers to attest to the fact 
that the electoral procedures have been 
governed by the strictest rules of equal ac- 
cess for all political parties to the communica- 
tions media, as well as extensive oppor- 
tunities for holding public demonstrations and 
engaging in any other type of campaign prop- 
aganda. 

In order that the elections for member- 
ship in the Central American Parliament may 
be held within the time period indicated in 



this section, the treaty establishing that body 
shall be submitted for approval or ratification 
in the five countries. 

As soon as elections for membership in 
the Central American Parliament have been 
held, equally free and democratic elections 
shall be held in each country, with interna- 
tional observers and the same guarantees and 
within the established intervals and the 
timetables to be proposed under the present 
political constitutions, to select the people's 
representatives in the municipalities, con- 
gresses, and legislative assemblies, as well as 
the Presidents of the Republics. 

5. Cessation of Aid to Irregular Forces 
and Insurgent Movements 

The Governments of the five Central 
American States shall request governments 
in the region of those outside it that are pro- 
viding, either overtly or covertly, military, 
logistic, financial, or propagandistic aid, or 
assistance in the form of troops, weapons, 
munitions, and equipment to irregular forces 
or insurgent movements to cease such aid, as 
an essential requirement for achieving a 
stable and lasting peace in the region. 

The foregoing does not include assistance 
used for repatriation, or, if that does not oc- 
cur, relocation, and assistance needed to ac- 
complish the reintegration into normal life of 
those persons who have belonged to the 
above-mentioned groups or forces. Similarly, 
the irregular forces and insurgent groups ac- 
tive in Central America shall be asked to 
refrain from receiving such aid for the sake 
of a genuine Latin Americanist spirit. These 
requests shall be made in fulfillment of the 
provisions of the Document of Objectives as 
regards elimination of the traffic in weapons 
within the region or from outside sources to 
persons, organizations, or groups attempting 
to destabilize the Central American Govern- 
ments, 



6. Non-Use of Territory 
to Attack Other States 

The five countries signing this document 
reiterate their commitment to prevent the 
use of their own territory and to neither fur- 
nish nor allow logistical military support for 
persons, organizations, or groups seeking to 
destabilize the Governments of the Central 
American countries. 



7. Negotiations on Security, 

Verification, Control, 

and Limitation of Weapons 

The Governments of the five Central 
American States, with participation by the 
Contadora Group in the exercise of its func- 
tion as mediator, shall proceed with negotia- 
tions on the points on which agreement is 
pending in matters of security, verification, 
and control under the draft Contadora Act 
for Peace and Cooperation in Central 
America. 



57 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



These negotiations shall also cover 
measures for the disarmament of those ir- 
regular forces that are willing to accept the 
amnesty decrees. 

8. Refugees and Displaced Persons 

The Central American Governments 
undertake to address, with a sense of urgen- 
cy, [the problem of] the flow of refugees and 
displaced persons caused by the regional 
crisis, by means of protection and assistance, 
especially with regard to health, education, 
employment, and security and, furthermore, 
to facilitate their repatriation, resettlement, 
or relocation, provided that it is of a volun- 
tary nature and takes the form of individual 
cases. 

They also undertake to arrange for aid 
from the international community for the 
Centra! American refugees and displaced per- 
sons, whether such assistance is direct under 
bilateral or multilateral agreements or ob- 
tained through the United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or other 
organizations and agencies. 

9. Cooperation, Democracy, and Freedom 
for Peace and Development 

In the climate of freedom guaranteed by 
democracy, the Central American countries 
shall adopt such agreements as will permit 
them to accelerate their development in order 
to achieve societies that are more egalitarian 
and free from misery. 

The consolidation of democracy entails 
the creation of an economy of well-being and 
economic and social democracy. In order to 
attain those objectives the governments shall 
jointly seek special economic assistance from 
the international community . 



10. International Verification 
and Followup 

(a) International Verification and Follow- 
up Committee 

An International Verification and 
Followup Committee shall be created, com- 
posed of the Secretaries General of the 
Organization of American States and the 
United Nations, or their representatives, as 
well as by the Foreign Ministers of Central 
America, the Contadora Group, and the Sup- 
port Group. The functions of this committee 
shall be to verify and follow up on the fulfill- 
ment of the commitments contained herein. 

(b) Support and facilities for the 
mechanisms of reconciliation and of verifica- 
tion and follow up 

In order to reinforce the efforts of the 
International Verification and Followup Com- 
mittee, the Governments of the five Central 
American states shall issue statements of 
support for its work. All nations interested in 
promoting the cause of freedom, democracy, 
and peace in Central America may adhere to 
these statements. 

The five governments shall provide all 
necessary facilities for the proper conduct of 
the verification and follow up functions of the 



National Reconciliation Committee in each 
country, and of the International Verification 
and Followup Committee. 

11. Timetable for Implementing 
the Commitments 

Within fifteen days of the signing of this 
document, the Central American Foreign 
Ministers shall meet as an Executive Com- 
mittee to regulate and promote the agree- 
ments contained herein and to make their ap- 
plication feasible. They shall also organize the 
working committees so that, as from this 
date, the processes leading to the fulfillment 
of the commitments entered into within the 
intervals stipulated may begin through con- 
sultations, negotiations, and any other 
mechanisms deemed necessary. 

When ninety days have elapsed from the 
date of the signature of this document, the 
commitments with regard to amnesty, cease- 
fire, democratization, cessation of aid to ir- 
regular forces or insurgent movements and 
the non-use of territory to attack other 
States, as defined in this document, shall 
simultaneously begin to govern publicly. 

When one hundred twenty days have 
elapsed from the date of the signature of this 
document, the International Verification and 
Followup Committee shall analyze the prog- 
ress made in the fulfillment of the agree- 
ments provided for herein. 

When one hundred fifty days have 
elapsed, the five Central American 
Presidents shall meet and receive a report 
from the International Verification and 
Followup Committee and shall make perti- 
nent decisions. 

Final Provisions 

The points included in this document form a 
harmonious and indivisible whole. Signing it 
entails the obligation, accepted in good faith, 
to comply simultaneously and within the 
established time limits with the provisions 
agreed upon. 

The Presidents of the five Central 
American States, with the political will to 
respond to our peoples' yearnings for Peace, 
hereby sign this document in Guatemala City 
on August 7, 1987. 

Oscar Arias Sanchkz 

President 

Republic of Costa Rica 

ViNicio Cerezo Arevau) 

President 

Republic of Guatemala 

Jose Napoleon Duarte 

President 

Republic of El Salvador 

Jose Azcona Hoyo 

President 

Republic of Honduras 

Daniel Ortega Saavedra 

President 

Republic of Nicaragua 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 8, 19872 

I welcome this commitment to peace and 
democracy by the five Central American 
Presidents, and I hope it will lead to 
peace in Central America and 
democracy in Nicaragua. 

The agreement makes clear that 
there is much work to be done by the 
parties involved. The United States will 
be as helpful as possible consistent with 
our interests and the interest of the 
Nicaraguan resistance, who have already 
stated their readiness to take part in 
genuine negotiations for peace and 
democracy in Nicaragua. 

We will study the agreement careful- 
ly with an eye to what the United States 
can contribute to the search for freedom 
and peace. The agreement emphasizes 
reconciliation, democracy, and full 
respect for political and civil rights. We 
are encouraged by that emphasis. The 
promise of this agreement can only be 
realized in its implementation. We look 
forward to the day when the commit- 
ments made in this agreement are a 
part of everyday life in Central America 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT. 
AUG. 14, 19873 

The President has stated that our policy 
is to welcome the Guatemala agreement, 
and work with it, consistent with our na 
tional security interests and our commit 
ment to those fighting for freedom in 
Nicaragua. Clearly we have major na- 
tional security interests in Central 
America. 

As the peace plan announced by the 
President and Speaker [of the House of 
Representatives Jim] Wright stated on 
August 5, the three central objectives 
which command a bipartisan consensus 
are the exclusion of Soviet or Cuban 
military activities, the end of subversion 
of democratic governments, and the 
establishment of true democracy in 
Nicaragua. 

As we evaluate this peace process 
which is underway, we are reviewing 
both here in Washington and with our 
allies in the region the Wright-Reagan 
plan, the Guatemalan agreement, and 
the initial reactions in Central America 
We are looking at the implications of all 
this for our own policy and in the light 
of our objectives in the region. 

The next important event in Central 
America will be the meeting of foreign 
ministers in San Salvador next week, 
August 19-20. At that meeting, working in 
commissions are expected to be named 



plei 



58 



Department of State Bulletii 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



to begin creating the structure for im- 
plementation. 

We will be in close consultation with 
our Central American friends in working 
to ensure that the Sandinistas are made 
to live up to the commitments of 
democratization and national reconcilia- 
tion contained in the Guatemala agree- 
ment. Our Embassies in the region are 
in close touch with the governments of 
the democracies on their interpretation 
of the agreement and their plans for im- 
plementing it. 

On August 17, we will hold a chiefs 
of mission conference in Washington for 
our Ambassadors and Charges in the 
five Central American republics for a 
full review of recent developments and 
their implications for U.S. policy in the 
region. Our chiefs of mission will return 
to their posts in time for further con- 
sultations with the democracies prior to 
the August 19-20 foreign ministers 
meeting. 

We are also urging, as part of our 
diplomatic effort, that the governments 
3f the democratic states consult with the 
leaders of the Nicaraguan resistance. 
For our part. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 
Morris D. Busby is currently meeting 
with resistance members in Honduras to 
hear their position as parties whose in- 
terests must be protected in the effort 
to bring democracy to Nicaragua. After 
the August 19-20 foreign ministers' 
meeting, the Administration is also plan- 
ning to dispatch a consultation team to 
the region to discuss decisions on im- 
plementation taken at that meeting. 

The Department is also in the final 
stages of preparing a grant to provide 
the four democracies $1 million which 
was authorized by Congress to assist in 
regional negotiations. 

The real test of the agreement's ef- 
fectiveness, however, will come inside 
Nicaragua where civic opposition groups 

I be testing the Sandinistas' commit- 
ment to democratization. The United 
States will be encouraging other govern- 
ments, foreign political organizations, 
and private foundations to use their in- 
fluence as well as their financial 
resources to assist the Nicaraguan op- 
position at this critical juncture. The 
Department will also be contacting 
private foundations in the United States 
to urge similar assistance. 

The United States has no illusions 
about the difficulties ahead in the 
democratization process in Nicaragua, 
and we are prepared to be as supportive 
as we can in assisting democratic groups 
in that country to exercise their civil 
I liberties. 



And finally, with the signing of the 
Guatemalan agreement and adoption of 
the bipartisan Wright-Reagan plan. Am- 
bassador Habib [President's special 
emissary to Central America] has de- 
cided that this is an appropriate moment 
for him to return to private life. The 
progress that has been made on the path 
to peace in Central America is a tribute 
to his efforts in 1986 and 1987 as the 
President's special envoy. The President 
himself has expressed his deep apprecia- 
tion for Ambassador Habib's effective 
service in pursuit of the nation's objec- 
tives of peace and democracy in Central 



America. Secretary Shultz has also ex- 
pressed his profound gratitude that 
after Ambassador Habib's retirement, he 
was willing to take on this important 
assignment with the same energy, skill, 
and dedication that have characterized 
his extraordinary diplomatic career. 
Once again Ambassador Habib has 
served the nation in the finest tradition 
of the Foreign Service. 



1 Original in Spanish. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 17, 1987. 

^Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



Nicaragua Suppresses 
Peaceful Marches 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 17. 1987' 

On Saturday, August 15, Nicaraguan 
Government security forces forcibly sup- 
pressed planned peaceful marches spon- 
sored by the Nicaraguan Democratic 
Coordinator and the Movement of 
Mothers of Political Prisoners. Security 
forces used dogs, nightsticks, electric 
shock batons, and the presence of San- 
dinista mobs to assure that the two 
marches ended before they began. 

In the process, important independ- 
ent political and human rights lea,ders 
were arrested and at least two were 
given jail terms. Lino Hernandez, Ex- 
ecutive Director of the Permanent Com- 
mission for the Protection of Human 
Rights, and Alberto Saborio of the 
Nicaraguan Bar Association were 
roughed up and given 30-day sentences. 
Mr. Hernandez is the leading civil rights 
advocate in Nicaragua. 



The suppression of these demonstra- 
tions and the arrest of these political 
leaders call into serious question the 
Sandinista government's willingness to 
fulfill the commitments made by Presi- 
dent Ortega to democratize Nicaragua. 
In particular we note that Mr. Her- 
nandez and Mr. Saborio, and perhaps 
others, will be in jail for 30 of the 90 
days prescribed by the Guatemala agree- 
ment for developing the commitments 
relating to amnesty, cease-fire, and 
democratization. 

The arrests of these political and 
human rights leaders and the brutal 
manner and great speed with which the 
marches were suppressed would seem to 
indicate that the Nicaraguan Govern- 
ment wishes to intimidate and oppress 
the opposition rather than fulfill its 
promises for democratization under the 
Guatemala agreement. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment deputy spokeman Phyllis Oakley. ■ 



59 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Promoting Democracy in Haiti 



by Richard N. Holwill 

Statement be:fore the Subcommittee 
on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on. 
July 23, 1987. Mr. Holwill is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 
Affairs. ^ 

I am pleased to be here today to speak 
about Senate Resolution 248 relating to 
human rights in Haiti. The Administra- 
tion and the Department of State fully 
support the goals and sentiments ex- 
pressed in this resolution. In fact, the 
provisions of this resolution are identical 
to the point that we have made — both in 
public and in private— to the Govern- 
ment of Haiti, the Haitian people, Hai- 
tian political leaders, and other govern- 
ments concerned about the future of 
democracy in Haiti. I repeat: 

• Our unequivocal support for the 
democratic transition; 

• Our support for the constitu- 
tionally mandated role of the electoral 
council; 

• Our conviction that the armed 
forces must exercise moderation in civil 
disturbances; and 

• Our encouragement of dialogue 
and compromise in the political process 
and on belief that participation in the 
electoral process offers the best hope for 
productive change in Haiti. 

Haiti deserves our support and en- 
couragement in its democratic transi- 
tion. It is the second oldest republic in 
the Western Hemisphere, second only to 
the United States. But in nearly 200 
years of independence, both democracy 
and economic well-being have been 
elusive. 

Throughout most of their history, 
the Haitian people have not had even a 
modicum of the freedom that we take 
for granted. They have been the victims 
of dictatorship, brutality, and the denial 
of the most basic human rights and civil 
liberties that the majority of the people 
in this hemisphere now enjoy. 

Haiti's leaders have also cruelly ex- 
ploited the Haitian people. In a country 
with a per capita GDP [gross domestic 
product) of only $350 per year— the 
lowest in the hemisphere— a succession 
of leaders, culminating in almost 30 
years of Duvalier kleptocracy, have 
robbed the Haitian people of their 



60 



natural resources and the sweat of their 
brows. Only the energy and in- 
dustriousness of the Haitian people 
saved them from even greater disaster. 

Duvalier's Ouster 

Just 15 months ago, Haiti began a new 
political era. On February 7, 1986, 
president-for-life Jean-Claude Duvalier 
fled into exile in the face of massive 
popular rejection of his hereditary dic- 
tatorship. The months leading up to 
February 7 were characterized by grow- 
ing disorder, the first time in nearly 
three decades that the Haitian people 
had taken to the streets to vent their 
dissatisfaction with the regime. The 
surge of popular anger was focused on a 
single objective — Duvalier's ouster — but 
it had a profound and complex pro- 
gressive character. Haitians wanted to 
enjoy those same civil liberties and 
human rights that we all cherish. They 
wanted to choose those who would 
govern Haiti in their name in a free at d 
honest fashion, without intimidation or 
manipulation. And they wanted a 
government that would work for the 
common good and a decent standard of 
living for all — not for the personal 
enrichment of a privileged few. 

Duvalier's sudden decision to leave 
Haiti thrust the armed forces (FAD'H) 
into the role of caretaker government 
with virtually no preparation for the 
political role they had to assume. In- 
deed, Duvalier policy had been to 
weaken the armed forces by deliberately 
underequipping and underpaying them, 
by providing little training, by fragment- 
ing the command structure, and by 
establishing a separate praetorian 
guard — the Tontons Macoutes — to keep 
the military in check. The Duvaliers 
wanted no challenge to their 
stranglehold on the nation's political and 
economic life. 

In the wake of Duvalier's departure, 
the National Governing Council (CNG) 
has faced a series of seemingly insur- 
mountable obstacles: endemic poverty, 
the inherent inability of a transitional 
government to make major changes, 
uncertainty about the future, and suspi- 
cion—indeed, fear— that the past would 
be repeated. 

Thus, after years of dictatorship, the 
euphoria that reigned immediately after 
February 7 has been punctuated by 



waves of frustration as those living in 
poverty lost the hope that their lot 
would improve. This frustration has 
given opportunity to extremists from 
both the left and the right to exploit 
concerns in their own search for power 
without democracy. 

Haiti's Constitutional Crisis 

Today's crisis grew out of a question of 
constitutional prerogative. On March 29, 
1987, the Haitian people voted by 
referendum on a draft constitution 
which had been prepared over the 
preceding 4 months by a Constituent 
Assembly of elected and appointed 
members. Over 42% of the Haitian 
people — a very large turnout, indeed, by 
local standards — participated in the 
referendum which was, by the consensus 
of all observers, the most free election 
Haiti has seen in the last several 
decades. Over 99% of those voting ap- 
proved the draft. In the judgment of 
Haitian and foreign observers, the 
referendum reflected a national consen- 
sus, not any manipulation of the result. 

In accordance with the constitution, 
nine public and private sector entities 
selected members for a "Provisional 
Electoral Council" to "draft and execute" 
a new electoral law covering local and 
presidential/legislative elections to lead 
to the inauguration of a duly-elected 
civilian government in February 1988. 

On June 5, 1987, the Provisional 
Electoral Council (CEP) submitted a 
draft electoral law to the CNG within 
the time limits prescribed in the con- 
stitution. On June 22, the CNG decreed 
its own electoral law in which it retained 
general control of the electoral process 
and gave the CEP only oversight 
responsibilities. Articles 191-199 of the 
constitution provide a description of the 
responsibilities of the Permanent Elec- 
toral Council (to be constituted after the 
installation of the new government in 
February 1988), but the section on the 
Provisional Electoral Council (Article 
289) states only the following description 
of its duties: 

Awaiting the establishment of the Perma- 
nent Electoral Council provided for in this 
Constitution, the National Council of Govern- 
ment shall set up a Provisional Electoral 
Council of nine members charged with draw- 
ing up and enforcing the Electoral Law to 
govern the next elections. 

The CNG argued that its electoral 
law was consistent with Article 289 of 
the constitution, but the public saw the 
CNG's actions as a violation of the intent 



Department of State Bulletin 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



of the constitution and as an encroach- 
ment on the legitimate preserve of the 
CEP. 

On the day after the announcement 
of the CNG's electoral law, the govern- 
ment dismissed from the CEP the 
representatives from both the Protes- 
tant and Catholic churches on the 
grounds that they were foreign na- 
tionals. In addition, on June 22-23, the 
Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers 
(CATH), one of the principal labor 
unions, called a general strike to protest 
depressed economic conditions. Over the 
previous weekend, rumors had cir- 
culated that anyone violating the CATH 
general strike would be the victim of 
violence. The general strike was suc- 
essful in closing down Port-au-Prince 
an June 22, although some transporta- 
tion and business activity had resumed 
oy the afternoon of June 23. On June 
22, authorities arrested several CATH 
eaders and occupied their offices. On 
June 23, the CNG dissolved CATH. 

The constitutional crisis — combined 
vvith the dismissal of the two CEP 
members, the dissolution of CATH, and 
:harges by CATH leaders released on 
June 29 that they had been beaten dur- 
ng their detention— led to further 
general strikes and unrest during the 
iveeks of June 29 and July 6. In the 
20urse of this unrest, several people 
vvere killed, some by poorly trained 
Tiilitary forces in chaotic situations. 

On June 30, President Namphy reaf- 
firmed in a national address that the 
3NG would respect the constitution, 
;hat it would retire upon handing the 
government over to its elected successor 
lext February, that he had no personal 
oolitical ambitions, and that the CNG 
lad begun meeting with the CEP to 
resolve the constitutional question. On 
July 2, the CNG rescinded its electoral 
law. On July 3, the CNG repealed its 
decree of May 13, which established the 
CEP, promulgating in its place a new 
law giving the CEP specific powers to 
organize and run the elections. 

On July 4, the CNG announced that 
CATH would be reopened. That same 
day, the Catholic Church called for an 
end to the violence and reminded the 
faithful that the CNG had a constitu- 
tional role to play in the democratic 
transition. The CEP then announced 
that it was discontinuing its negotiations 
with the CNG because the atmosphere 
of violence had made the talks impossi- 
ble. President Namphy responded that 
he would do everything necessary to 
prevent further incidents by the army 



October 1987 



Haiti— A Profile 



ft \ 



Atlantic Ocean 




haitD 

JAMAICA p,' 



Caribbean Sea 




■:^ 



Geography 

Area: 27,750 sq. km, (10,714 s(|, mi,); about 
the size of Maryhmd, Cities: r,/;, ,/,;/— Port- 
au-Prince (p(i|i. 1 million), ( illiir citii's—Cap- 
Haitien (65,000), Terrain: Mountainous, 
Climate: Warm, semiarid. 



People 

Nationality: Ximii mni af//r<-/i(v'— Haitian(s), 
Population (lOSO t-st): <i million. Annual 
growth rate (lost) l i";, ^Jthnie groups: 
Black African lifsccnl '.*W'\,, mulatto and 
European descent 5'7o. Religions: Roman 
Catholic SO";., Protestant 10%, voodoo prac- 
tices 10"'n. Languages: French (official), 
Creole (majority). Education: Years 
compithory—'o. Atlfiiijii)iff—2i.)%. 
Litemcy-23%. Health: hifniil nmrUility 
r()^c-124/l,000. Lijr ,xi>irl,nirii-:-,\ yrs. 
Work force (198(; est ): L!.? million 
Agriculture— lh%. Iinhisfrii mitl 
rnmmerce—\S%. Scn/c. ,s— 7",,. Unemploy- 
ment: 49,1%, 

Government 

Type: Provisional. Independence: 1804, Con- 
stitution: 198.3. Suspended February 1986; 
new constitution to be drafted and ratified by 
referendum in February 1987. 

Branches: E.rerut i i-i'—'Natkma\ Governing 
Council (President Lt, Gen. Henri Namphy), 
Le3?,s7a/i'('c— Suspended until new elections 
scheduled for 1987. Judieinl— Court of 
Cassation. 

Subdivisions: Nine departments. 

Political parties: Dozens of parties 
emerged after Jean-Claude Duvalier's depar- 
ture from Haiti on February 7, 1986. Suf- 
frage: Universal over 18. 



Central government budget (FY 1987); 
$2.30 million revenue; $258 million 
expenditure. 

Defense: Mihtn ni /orrry — ~ JiU) in unified 
Army/Navy All- Foivc,' Police /-;-„/;/c/-$28,4 
million; about \\.U"/„ of central government 
budget (FY 1987). 

National holiday: Independence Day, 
January 1. 

Flag: Blue and red halved horizontally 
with the Haitian coat of arms in a white rec- 
tangular center panel, (Flag was changed in 
late February 1986.) 

Economy 

GNP (1985): $2 billion. Annual growth rate 
(1986): 1,4%. Per capita GNP (1985 est,): 

$379, 

Natural resource: Bauxite, 

Agriculture (32% of GNP): Produrh- 
coffee, sugarcane, rice, corn, sorghum, 
pulses. 

Industry (16% of GNP): Types-sugar 
refining, textiles, flour milling, cement, light 
industrial products, cocoa, mangoes, essential 
oils. 

Trade (19S6): /-.V/^.r/.s-coffee, light 
manufactures, cocoa, mangoes, essential oils, 
Miilnr m.ir/,T/-rS (approx. 76%.), Inipnrts- 
I'S ((;o"i,) $.3411 million: consumer durables, 
foodstuffs, industrial equipment, petroleum 
products, construction materials. 

Fiscal year: Oct. 1-Sept, 30, 

Official exchange rate (fixed in constitu- 
tion); 5 gourdes = US$1. 

Economic aid received (1984): $142 
million, hilrnialiKiiiil uniii ,n :atwns-$36.b 
millii>n. Cniiiilnr^ullirr llifiii ('S(1987 
est,)— $185 million, US (rn,i,'itiir iissistiiiir,' 
(19S6)-$78,5 million, Fmjrrli.,,, /,ii- ins: 
($100.5 million)— economic support fund 
$28.5, development assistance $37.0, PL-480 
$.35 million. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and some of its specialized and related 
agencies. Organization of American States 
(OAS), Inter-American Defense Board, 
INTELSAT, 



Taken from the Background Notes of 
April 1987. published by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Juanita Adams. ■ 



61 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



and urged a return to the negotiating 
table. The armed forces pledged to sup- 
port the constitution, to remain neutral 
in the elections, and to act with modera- 
tion in controlling any further unrest. 

On July 6, the CEP announced it 
was continuing to work on a new elec- 
toral law. Some strike leaders called for 
the strikes to continue until the CNG 
resigned or was thrown out. On July 8, 
the strike leaders announced that the 
protest would change from strikes to 
peaceful demonstrations. Peaceful 
demonstrations were held on July 9 and 
10. On July 13, the CEP circulated its 
new draft electoral law and invited com- 
ments from all interested parties. 

Throughout this current wave of 
unrest, the National Governing Council 
has consistently stressed its commitment 
to the democratic transition, as well as 
its own limited role as an unelected, 
transitional government. It has focused 
on building a framework for democratic 
civilian government and managing the 
transition, not on developing and im- 
plementing policy measures more within 
the purview of an elected leadership. 
' This has been a formidable challenge 
given both the absence of a political in- 
frastructure in Haiti and the country's 
severe economic problems. 

Neither the CNG nor the military is 
an institution that can impose its will by 
force. When they assumed their care- 
taker role, Haiti's new leaders entered 
into a contract with the Haitian people 
to deliver elections and carry out other 
basic reforms. On balance, the CNG is 
fulfilling that contract. It set a course 
for the transition to democratic civilian 
role in a series of liberalizing principles 
that has guided its actions over the past 
17 months. 

U.S. Economic Assistance 

The U.S. Government has advocated and 
implemented a policy of support for the 
transition since February 1986. Indeed, 
in order to forestall a bloody confronta- 
tion, we offered Duvalier a chance to 
leave in an orderly manner. Thus the 
CNG was created by Haitians in order 
to provide the transition to democratic 
civilian rule. We then increased 
economic assistance levels from $80.6 
million in fiscal year 1986 to $107.6 
million in (FY) 1987. We acted on the 
conviction that the success of democratic 
civilian government — both in Haiti and 
throughout the hemisphere — depends on 



the ability of democratic regimes to im- 
prove the standards of living of the peo- 
ple. Our assistance also reflects our 
belief that economic development has its 
greatest chance for success in a climate 
of respect for human rights, the foster- 
ing of democratic practices and institu- 
tions, and respect for the will of the 
people. 

We also recognize that neither 
democracy nor economic development 
can succeed in an environment of chaos, 
violence, and fear which extremist 
forces on both ends of the political spec- 
trum can exploit. Thus, our substantial 
economic assistance is complemented by 
a limited and carefully developed pro- 
gram of nonlethal security assistance to 
the Haitian Armed forces. In FY 1987, 
this program will receive $1.6 million. 

The purposes of this aid are 
straightforward: to put the armed forces 
on a professional footing after years of 
deliberate neglect by their own political 
leaders, and to give them the skills and 
means to maintain order in a manner 
respectful of the human rights com- 
mitments of Haiti's new leaders. 

We continue to make clear to every- 
one in Haiti that the bipartisan support 
for aid to Haiti that now exists in the 
U.S. Government depends on absolute 
respect for the democratic transition. As 
Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American 
Affairs] Elliott Abrams said in a speech 
on June 30, "Just as no one should doubt 
our support for dialogue and democracy, 
no one should doubt our willingness to 
terminate aid to any government that 
abandons, thwarts, or prevents this 
transition to democracy." The precise 
model of democracy Haiti is to build can 
only be determined by Haitians. As 
Americans willing to support Haitian 
democracy, we believe an independent 
electoral commission and political 
leaders willing to eschew violence and 
work through the political process are 
essential guarantors that the process 
will be fair and legitimate. 

The CNG has reiterated its firm 
commitment to all future steps of its 
transition calendar leading to the in- 
auguration of a new civilian president in 
February, 1988. The Haitian Armed 
Forces have reaffirmed their allegiance 
to the constitution and their support for 
the Provisional Electoral Council. The 
newly established Provisional Electoral 
Council has now succeeded in attaining 
its goal of full independence to organize 
the upcoming elections for local and na- 
tional offices. 



Conclusion 

Against this background, we conclude 
continued violence can only interfere 
with the chances of holding early and 
successful elections. A period of stability 
and constructive effort is essential to 
enable the elections to take place as en- 
visioned by the framers of the new con- 
stitution. Additional instability now can 
only undermine and delay the process of 
democratization. The ouster of this 
government bodes ill for the term of a 
freely elected successor government. 

The democratic transition in Haiti 
remains difficult, but the process of free 
elections provides the best mechanism to 
assure that the next government will 
have the credibility needed to work with 
the international community to address 
Haiti's profound economic and social 
problems. 

We hope Haitians will turn their ef- 
forts away from recrimination and fix 
their sights on early elections as the 
only way to complete the transition to 
democracy and get the government they 
want in February of next year. We hope 
our support for free, fair, and open elec- 
tions will increase the confidence of 
those who harbor doubts about the proc- 
ess, and thereby encourage them to par- 
ticipate in it fully and without reserva- 
tions. 

In supporting the democratic trans- 
ition, we hope to contribute to building a 
fine foundation for a freely elected 
government in Haiti. But make no mis- 
take, the task before that government 
will be formidable. The government that 
will emerge from the elections must 
have stability and time if it is to bring to 
the Haitian people the economic prog- 
ress they desire and deserve. To this 
end, the Administration and the Con- 
gress can be proud that we are support- 
ing the process to elections now under- 
way. That is our conviction, and that is 
our policy. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



62 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Situation in Chile 



by Elliott Abrams 

Statement submitted to the Subcom- 
mittee on International Development In- 
!<titutions and Finance of the House 
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs 
Committee on July 21, 1987. Mr. Abrams 
is Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs.'' 

In July of last year and in executive ses- 
sion during October, I testified before 
this subcommittee concerning the 
challenges facing the United States in 
Chile and the Administration's strategy 
and policies for confronting those 
challenges. I noted our shared concerns 
over the human rights situation in Chile 
in the wake of the brutal killing of long- 
time U.S. resident Rodrigo Rojas and 
the burning of Carmen Quintana, as well 
as our overall preoccupation regarding 
the lack of meaningful progress toward 
a transition to a full, participatory 
democracy. I also explained the dilem- 
mas that arise in determining how to 
use most effectively the limited influence 
of the United States to promote our 
goals of increased respect for human 
rights and a peaceful democratic transi- 
tion in Chile. 

I welcome the opportunity to discuss 
these issues with you again. It is an op- 
portune time to review the situation in 
Chile, since that country is rapidly ap- 
proaching a critical turning point, with 
serious implications for democracy, 
human rights, economic development 
and U.S. policy. As the situation in Chile 
evolves, we wish to continue our close 
consultation with Congress on U.S. 
policy decisions. 

Withholding U.S. Support 
for Lending to Chile 

First, let me make some comments on 
U.S. votes in international financial in- 
titutions (IFIs) as they concern Chile, 
since that is an area of primary concern 
to the subcommittee. 

Since my testimony last year, the 
United States has withheld its support 
from nonbasic human needs loans to 
Chile in the IFIs based on human rights 
grounds. We have abstained on loans to 
Chile in both the Inter-American Devel- 
opment Bank (IDE) and the World 
Bank. In withholding our support for a 



October 1987 



critical $250 million World Bank struc- 
tural adjustment loan to Chile last 
November, we were joined by an im- 
pressive group of other countries, in- 
cluding Canada, France, the Nether- 
lands, and Spain, which in the past total- 
ly discounted the human rights situation 
in determining their votes on IFI loans 
to Chile. Acting together, we have sent 
a clear signal of international concern 
over the political and human rights 
situation in Chile. 

Some members of the subcommittee 
have expressed concern that the Ad- 
ministration has abstained rather than 
vote "no" on IFI loans to Chile. In its ex- 
change of correspondence earlier this 
year with Chairman [Walter] Fauntroy, 
the State and Treasury Departments ex- 
plained at length the basis for that deci- 
sion. At the risk of covering some of the 
same ground here, a few observations 
are in order. 

First, our votes in IFIs on Chile 
need to be evaluated in the context of 
the overall Administration policy of pro- 
moting democratization and human 
rights improvements. While differences 
over tactics from time to time arise, the 
record of Administration words and ac- 
tions has demonstrated the United 
States clear and public commitment to 
press vigorously for a peaceful 
democratic transition and human rights 
progress in Chile. 

Was abstention the right course? 
Would a "no" vote on the SAL [sti-uc- 
tural adjustment loan] in November, as 
we might have considered in July — prior 
to consulting with other countries and 
prior to a dramatic increase in tension in 
Chile— have led to greater progress on 
human rights in Chile or produced the 
democratic opening we all seek? 

We believe that our abstention with 
an important group of Western 
democracies— totaling nearly 42% of the 
voting weight of the World Bank- 
was the most effective means of using 
our voice and vote in the IFIs to express 
our human rights concerns regarding 
Chile. 

As the subcommittee is well aware, 
the United States does not have a veto 
in these institutions. (In the World Bank 
we have approximately 20% of the 
weighted votes; in the IDB just under 
35%.) At issue was how to use our vote 
to send the most effective political and 
human rights signal. Our advance con- 
sultations with these other countries 
showed clearly that postponement or ac- 
tual defeat of the SAL were not feasi- 
ble. We determined that a U.S. absten- 
tion, however, could elicit similar votes 



by other democracies, in spite of wide- 
spread concerns about politicization of 
the IFIs and about damaging Chile's 
economy. 

We wanted to act in concert with 
others in order to avoid strengthening 
hardliners in Chile opposed to carrying 
out a genuine transition to civilian rule. 
Tensions were acute during the state of 
siege imposed following the communist- 
sponsored bloody assassination attempt 
against General Pinochet last 
September. The government crackdown 
by imposing the state of siege went 
beyond understandable efforts to track 
down those terrorists responsible for the 
attack against the Chilean President. 
For example, opposition magazines were 
closed, as were two foreign news agen- 
cies. 

In this climate, the danger existed 
that a U.S. "no" vote would have 
isolated the United States from the 
other Western democracies and fanned 
nationalistic sentiments, thereby further 
minimizing the ability of the United 
States to affect events. A negative U.S. 
vote would not have been enough to 
block the SAL, but would have been por- 
trayed in a nationalistic way as economic 
aggression against the Chilean people. 
Our withholding of support through 
group abstentions, however, was fully 
understood in Chile by the Pinochet 
government and by the opposition as an 
expression of dissatisfaction with the 
human rights picture. Despite the 
government's relief that the SAL was 
approved, the Pinochet government did 
not — could not— trumpet World Bank 
approval of the SAL as endorsement of 
the government or its political policies, 
in view of such significant abstentions. 
Even the influential conservative 
newspaper El Mercurio called for reflec- 
tion on the reasons for such widespread 
international concern over human rights 
in Chile. 

Would a change in our voting pat- 
tern now affect the views of or support 
given by other countries, or the behavior 
of the Pinochet government? In con- 
sidering that question, it is essential to 
take into account recent developments in 
Chile affecting the democratic transi- 
tion, the human rights situation, and 
economic development. 

Democracy or "Continuismd" 

While the headlines today focus on 
South Korea and Panama, after nearly 
14 years of military rule, Chile is also 
approaching a crossroads. Perhaps as 



63 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



early as next year Chile could turn 
decisively toward full democratic civilian 
rule or head down a different road 
which could lead to escalating polariza- 
tion, armed violence, severe repression, 
and further international isolation. 

Unfortunately, Chile's democratic 
future is still very much in doubt. The 
Pinochet government has put into place 
a framework for an institutionalized 
transition to what it calls a "protected 
democracy." According to the constitu- 
tion adopted in 1980, no later than 
February 1989 there is to be a plebiscite 
on a presidential candidate selected by 
the four commanders in chief of the 
armed services, or if they cannot reach 
unanimous agreement, by the National 
Council composed of the military com- 
manders and certain civilian officials. If 
this candidate is not approved, open, 
competitive elections are to be held 
within a year. 

In preparation for the plebiscite, 
during 1987 the Pinochet government 
has enacted laws to legalize non-Marxist 
political parties, and reestablish electoral 
registers. While encouraging more open 
political activity, this legislation also has 
drawn criticism as too restrictive. 

Many within Chile have urged a con- 
stitutional change to replace the single- 
candidate plebiscite with the type of 
free, competitive elections used in 
democracies to elect leaders. Others 
have urged selection of a consensus 
figure with broad civilian and political 
support to lead to the country through a 
transition to full democracy. A group of 
eminent Chilean leaders from across the 
political spectrum has formed a nonpar- 
tisan Council for Free Elections. The 
Catholic Church has supported the coun- 
cil's appeal for voter registration, which 
has begun under legislation recently ap- 
proved by the government. 

While the democratic opposition sup- 
ports voter registration and a process 
leading to open elections and full 
democracy, Chile's communist far left 
and their foreign backers are doing all 
possible to impede a successful transi- 
tion. They reason, with some logic, that 
if General Pinochet does not step down 
when his current term ends in March 
1989, the strength and popular appeal of 
the far left, perforce, will rise. The 
discovery last summer of massive quan- 
tities of terrorist arms smuggled into 
Chile with the help of Cuba 
demonstrated that Chile remains a 
special target for foreign communists. 
U.S. experts who examined the weapons 



64 



found that they were stored in a way 
that indicated plans for future rather 
than immediate use. Chile's violent com- 
munists are ready to exploit the ensuing 
polarization if the Chilean people's 
democratic aspirations remain blocked 
after 1989 and, perhaps, to use arms 
against successor governments, even if 
democratic. 

At this point, it is too early to judge 
the outcome. Chile could go either way, 
toward a fully functioning democracy 
based on free and fair expression of the 
popular will and a true national consen- 
sus or toward the chaos that would ac- 
company a government whose 
legitimacy is broadly questioned at home 
and abroad. Whether election or 
plebiscite, some test at the polls is set to 
occur, perhaps as early as September 



Positive Steps in a Mixed 
Human Rights Picture 

Against the backdrop of tremendous 
uncertainty concerning a democratic 
transition, the human rights situation, 
while still mixed, has improved since I 
last met with you. 

The list of political exiles has been 
reduced substantially from over 3,500 to 
about 500 since January. Such notable 
figures as Socialist Party leader Aniceto 
Rodriguez have returned to Chile. The 
state of siege was allowed to expire in 
January; a late-night curfew in effect for 
much of the last 13 years also was not 
renewed. 

In response to objections over con- 
tinuing credible reports of torture, the 
government has taken a positive step, 
giving the International [Committee of 
the] Red Cross (ICRC) access to most 
prisoners after a short period and direct- 
ing the secret police to close its deten- 
tion centers. In addition, the Chilean in- 
vestigations police now allow the 
government's advisory human rights 
commission to verify conditions of 
prisoners in its custody. All these moves 
have apparently not as yet led to a 
lessening of torture, as reflected in 
statistics maintained by the church 
human rights organ, the Vicariate of 
Solidarity. We believe more time is 
needed before the results of these 
measures can be adequately assessed, 
but recent moves show a willingness on 
the part of some in the government to 
stop the practice of torture. 

Perhaps the greatest change has oc- 
curred in the area of freedom of expres- 
sion. Those opposition magazines and 



foreign news agencies closed during the 
state of siege have reopened. The op- 
position now publishes two daily 
newspapers. Radio stations air opposi- 
tion views regularly, including a recent 
speech by current Christian Democratic 
Party President Gabriel Valdez. There i: 
a lively public debate underway on all 
political issues, including a high degree 
of criticism of the government. For in- 
stance, the relaxation of constraints on 
the press has allowed an open discussioi 
within Chile of the issues raised by the 
decision of a former Chilean Army of- 
ficer to cooperate with U.S. law enforce 
ment officials concerning the Letelier 
and Moffitt murders. 

But the picture is still mixed. Credi- 
ble charges of torture are still made. 
Although the Vatican praised the 
performance of carabineros (Chilean na 
tional police) providing security during 
the Pope's visit — especially their 
restraint in the face of far left 
violence — recently there were reports 
that Chilean secret police (CNI) used ex 
cessive force to detain a group of ter- 
rorists and then executed a number of 
them. 

As I indicated, the government has 
made a very substantial reduction in th 
number of political exiles, a practice 
which the vast majority of the Chilean 
people abhor. Important figures, 
however, remain banned. Some of thosi 
still on the list have returned to Chile 11 
legally and faced court prosection and 
internal banishment. 

While Chile now has a very lively 
press environment, press freedom is sti 
spotty. The Pinochet government can 
exert pressure on financially weak 
papers through debts owed to the 
government. It maintains strict control 
of television. In addition, journalists coi 
tinue to be prosecuted and imprisoned 
under laws barring criticism of Chile's 
Armed Forces. 

The government has expanded the 
role of its human rights advisory com- 
mission, but a government prosecutor 
has put pressure on the Vicariate of 
Solidarity, through an investigation 
leading to the prolonged detention of 
one Vicariate employee and an indepen 
ent doctor, for assistance to an alleged 
terrorist. As the court proceedings are 
secret, the prosecutor has not had to 
make public any evidence of improper 
actions by these individuals. 

One of the most serious problems r< 
maining is the failure of the Chilean 
judiciary to assume its role as what the|l| 
UN Special Rapporteur for Chile has 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



described as "guardian of human rights." 
The judiciary, though nominally 
independent, has failed to punish of- 
ficials for human rights abuses against 
goverment opponents. Investigation into 
human rights violations usually stretch 
on indefinitely without results or are 
"suspended" because of lack of 
evidence — the present status of the in- 
ternal Chilean investigation into the 
Letelier assassination, even after the 
statements made to a U.S. court by Ma- 
or Fernandez Larios. 

The killing of Rodrigo Rojas is 
another case in point. On July 2, the 
first anniversary of the killing of Mr. 
Rojas and the severe burning of his 
Chilean companion Ms. Quintana, the 
State Department spokesman noted our 
concern over the "glacial progress" in 
this case. (That statement is attached 
for the record. )2 The only substantive 
results to date are that the Chilean of- 
ficer in charge of the army patrol in- 
volved is charged with negligent 
homicide for not procuring medical 
assistance for Mr. Rojas and Ms. Quin- 
tana. That Chilean Army officer was 
freed on bond and promoted to captain 

arlier this year. 

So the picture is a decidely mixed 
one. We obviously hope that the positive 
steps will be followed by many more of 
the same and will do all we can to obtain 

his. 

Sound Economic Policies 
Produce Growth 

[n contrast to the uncertain prospects 
for democratization and continuing 
numan rights problems, the economic 
situation looks excellent. If our decisions 
in the IFIs were made on economic 
grounds alone, IFI loans to Chile would 
generally deserve our strong support 
and affirmative votes. 

Since 1970, Chile has suffered 
among the worst declines in its terms of 
trade of all countries in Latin America. 
Despite this, Chile has followed in- 
novative free market policies that, 
following a severe recession in 1981-83, 
have led to 15 consecutive quarters of 

J, economic growth. This economic expan- 
sion is principally due to the govern- 
ment's high real exchange rate policy, 
export-oriented policies, and an open 
door for foreign investment. 

Chile remains among the most open 

t narkets in Latin America for U.S. ex- 
Dorts and investments. U.S. exports to 
:hile grew 20.7% during 1986 to $823 
nillion, with ma,jor increases in sales of 



aircraft, fertilizers, chemical products, 
computers, office machinery, paper and 
paperwood, and textile manufacturing 
equipment. Chile remains open to nearly 
all service exports, for which the United 
States is Chile's main supplier. We ex- 
pect continued growth in U.S. -Chilean 
trade during 1987. 

In conjunction with important IMF 
and World Bank roles, the government 
has pursued generally sound economic 
policies to manage payments on its 
substantial foreign debt. Total external 
debt now stands at almost $20 
billion — about 120% of gross domestic 
product. U.S. banks hold about $6 billion 
of that total. Recently the Chilean 
Government signed a debt restructuring 
agreement covering $15.6 billion in 
medium- and long-term debts. A leader 
in developing debt-equity swaps, Chile 
has converted $2 billion of its debt in 
just 2 years. 

U.S. investments in Chile total $1.3 
billion and may increase as the Govern- 
ment of Chile continues to encourage 
debt-equity swaps and to privatize cer- 
tain state firms. The investment climate 
is subject to increasing uncertainty 
about political stability as the March 
1989 plebiscite deadline approaches. It is 
unfortunate that the Chilean Govern- 
ment's commitment to political freedom 
does not match the strong support given 
to economic freedom. 

Common sense suggests that the 
strong revival of economic growth -like- 
ly to be 5.5% in 1987— favors the 
Pinochet government. Our judgment, 
however, is that economic factors are 
unlikely to be critical in determining the 
outcome of any plebiscite or election. 
While recent economic performance is 
very good, memories of the 1981-83 
recession are fresh. Although relatively 
stable over the last year, real wages 
have fallen 19.6% between 1982 and ear- 
ly 1987, due primarily to substantial 
declines in prices for Chile's traditional 
exports and the general reduction in 
less-developed-country access to the 
private capital market, which have 
fueled inflation and the historically high 
levels of unemployment. Gradually 
decreasing unemployment still stood at 
9.1% in April, with another 3.6% in 
government work programs. The 
Chilean Government's excellent 
economic management team recently 
moved to cool off the economy, a policy 
consistent with pursuing sustainable 
economic growth. 



The improving economic environ- 
ment, however, can provide a relatively 
sound economic base that will give 
stability and very important breathing 
space to any future democratic govern- 
ment of Chile. The next Chilean Govern- 
ment will face the difficult problem of 
managing a large external debt burden 
while pursuing sustainable policies for 
national economic growth. 'This is, unfor- 
tunately, the situation of most Latin 
American countries today. 

Pursuing sound economic policies is 
obviously essential to reaching the goal 
of national economic development. But 
the political dimension cannot be 
overlooked. By that I do not mean that 
short-term populist measures are in 
order. These only postpone a day of 
reckoning and bring on even greater 
economic crisis. Even the best economic 
program, however, must have a sound 
base of political legitimacy if it is to en- 
dure and to weather the long run, and 
the external shocks that affect all coun- 
tries. While economic results will to a 
certain extent provide their own 
legitimacy, there is no substitute for the 
sort of legitimacy provided by fully func- 
tioning democratic institutions and a 
system that selects its leaders by open 
and competitive elections. In Chile such 
a democratic consensus is lacking, and 
this is a matter of concern for all who 
wish to see Chile's economic course sus- 
tained. 

Chile at a Crossroads 

Clearly the situation in Chile is complex. 
Concrete steps forward on human rights 
have occurred, but there is still no sense 
of a deep and lasting commitment by the 
government to take decisive action to 
end abuses and establish procedures that 
would make such progress irreversible. 
The government is headed toward 
an electoral process, but open and fully 
legitimate democratic choice are in 
doubt. Political reforms have taken 
place, but only when instituted from the 
top down, without the involvement of 
political parties and other civic organiza- 
tions representing important democratic 
elements of Chilean society, whose full 
participation and support is vital to a 
successful democratic transition. There 
are also strong forces opposed to a 
democratic outcome in Chile. Political 
violence, terrorism, and government 
repression have helped to hinder the 
necessary national reconciliation. 



65 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Since 1979, dictatorships or military 
regimes have been replaced by 
democratically elected governments in 
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, 
Brazil, and Uruguay in South America 
and in El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, and Honduras in the Carib- 
bean Basin. 

Chile is approaching an important 
turning point. Whether Chile successful- 
ly rejoins the other democracies of Latin 
America is crucial to determining the 
future situation of human rights there 
and Chile's long-term prospects for 
economic development. It is of great im- 
portance not only to the Chilean people 
but also to the new democracies of 
South America. Instability in Chile 
would detract from their efforts to grap- 
ple with their own pressing national 
problems. 

A successful transition to full 
democracy in Chile which restores that 
country's long and proud democratic 
tradition is also important to the United 
States. Any other outcome could 
threaten to lead to unrest in Chile, and 
increased tensions with the United 
States. 



U.S. Support for Democratization 
and Human Rights 

Translating our goals into effective ac- 
tion is very much complicated by the 
limited leverage the United States has in 
Chile, some of it self-imposed. While the 
Chilean Armed Forces clearly hold the 
keys to a peaceful democratic transition, 
paradoxically, the response by much of 
the international community has been to 
isolate them at a time when exposure to 
the professional activities of the armed 
forces in democratic societies could be 
most beneficial. Since 1976 the United 
States has no security assistance pro- 
grams in Chile, not even training pro- 
grams, due to congressional restrictions. 

Our policy has, therefore, had to em- 
phasize the diplomatic sphere, where we 
have combined both public and private 
words and actions. We have tried to be 
effective by tailoring our actions to in- 
dividual circumstances, and in doing so, 
not to undercut those in Chile who are 
working to achieve a democratic out- 
come. 

This has entailed endorsing and 
publicly supporting steps by the 
democratic opposition toward flexible 
and pragmatic positions— as in the Na- 
tional Accord. It also has meant speak- 
ing out against the violent far left and 



66 



urging the government to agree to 
political dialogue and to curb human 
rights abuses. We have translated 
rhetoric into action by sponsoring and 
joining consensus on fair human rights 
resolutions on Chile in the UN Human 
Rights Commission in 1986 and 1987 
and by continuing to signal our support 
for democracy and human rights by 
withholding our support of international 
development bank lending to Chile. 

In Chile both the government and 
the opposition now understand clearly 
the importance the Reagan Administra- 
tion attaches to a prompt restoration of 
democracy and to the full observance of 
fundamental human rights. The strain 
increasingly evident in our official 
bilateral relations reflects the Pinochet 
government's appreciation of our posi- 
tion on full democracy and human 
rights, as well as of our seriousness of 
purpose in pursuing justice in the 1976 
murder in this capital of Orlando 
Letelier and Ronni Moffitt. 

The Chilean democratic opposition 
also knows where we stand. In parallel 
with our normal contacts with the 
Pinochet government, we have constant, 
intense dialogue, both in Santiago and in 
Washington, with a broad spectrum of 
Chilean democratic leaders from political 
parties, human rights, labor, business, 
and religious organizations, particularly 
the Catholic Church. These discussions 
center on a common objective, the 
means for restoring full democracy in 
Chile. 

Not surprisingly, there is wide diver- 
sity of opinion within Chile on specific 
U.S. policy decisions, such as on the 
vote of the SAL last year. But on the 
broad outline of U.S. policy there is con- 
sensus among democratic elements in 
Chile, just as we find that there is a 
large degree of bipartisan consensus 
here. We hope to maintain close con- 
sultations with the Congress — through 
such testimony, through briefings of 
Members by Ambassador [Harry] 
Barnes and Washington policy- 
makers — in order to minimize any 
misunderstandings. 

Another structural adjustment loan 
to Chile will be reviewed by the World 
Bank later this year. In determining our 
vote, we will take into account all rele- 
vant factors, including economic, human 
rights, and statutory criteria. In general, 
our preference is to vote in favor of 
loans that are sound on economic 



grounds. Given the excellent record of 
Chile's current economic management 
team, it is reasonable to expect that in 
economic terms the next SAL will war- 
rant U.S. support. 

The human rights situation is more 
difficult to predict. We would hope that 
the positive evolution in this area could 
deepen and allow us to support new IFI 
loans to Chile. But should circumstances 
compel us to continue next fall to 
withhold our support from the SAL on 
human rights grounds, we will face a 
similar range of options as before: seek 
to postpone the vote, as we did unsuc- 
cessfully last year; abstain again; or vote 
"no." In determining the most effective 
U.S. action, we will continue to take intc 
account the attitudes of other countries, 
as well as the likely impact of that ac- 
tion in Chile. 

Concerning the Letelier-Moffitt case 
the cooperation of Fernandez Larios 
with U.S. prosecutors opened the oppor- 
tunity to make progress on this 
longstanding unresolved case of political 
murder. We will not consider the matter 
closed until those responsible for direct- 
ing the murders are brought to justice. 
The Pinochet government turned down 
our request that they provide us for tria 
in the United States the two former 
Chilean officials, General Contreras and 
Colonel Espinoza, accused of directing 
the murders. We have made clear that 
we consider this response unsatisfactory 
and that the Chilean Government has 
the legal and moral obligation to assure 
that these former officials are pros- 
ecuted and brought to justice. We will 
continue to pursue this case vigorously 
through legal and diplomatic channels. 

Despite our shared goals, from time 
to time disagreements occur between 
the Administration and Members of 
Congress over individual policy decision! 
on Chile. But these disagreements 
should not overshadow the fact that on 
the fundamentals of U.S. policy toward 
Chile there is broad, bipartisan consen- 
sus. As we attempt to influence 
developments in Chile in a positive direc 
tion, we are most effective to the extent 
we can work together. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from trie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington. D.C. 20402. 

-Not printed here. ■ 



Department of State Bulletir 



TREATIES 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Antarctica 

Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 
1961. TIAS 4780. 
Accession deposited : Austria, Aug. 25, 1987. 



Aviation 

Convention on the international recognition 
of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 
1948. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1953, 
TIAS 2847. 
Adher ence deposited: Zimbabwe, Feb. 6, 



1987. 

'onvention on offenses and certain other acts 
ommitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo 

Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4, 

1969. TIAS 6768. 

Accession deposite d: Honduras, Apr. 8, 1987.' 



Protocol relating to an amendment to the 

invention on international civil aviation 

TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 

1977.2 

Ratifications deposited: Mexico, June 1, 1987; 



rhailand, Jan. 13, 1987; Togo, Apr. 24, 1987; 
Jnited Arab Emirates, Jan. 22, 1987. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
convention on international civil aviation. 
Done at Montreal Oct. 6, 1980.^ 
Ratifications deposite d: Morocco, Jan. 29, 



1987; Pakistan, May 27, 1987; Togo, Apr. 24, 
1987; United Arab Emirates, Feb. 18, 1987. 

lommodities— Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
.'or Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27, 1980.^ 
■ Signature: Bulgaria, July 29, 1987. 



ftatification deposited : Peru, July 29, 1987. 



onsular Relations 

V'ienna convention on consular relations. 
Done at Vienna Api. 24, 1963. Entered into 
orce Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 
1969. TIAS 6820. 
Accessions deposited: Hungary, June 19, 



1987; Vanuatu, Aug. 18, 1987. 

ontainers 

International convention for safe containers, 

1971, as amended. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 

1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for 
the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037, 10220. 
Accession deposited : Afghanistan, June 24, 



1987. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the service abroad of judicial 
and extrajudicial documents in civil or com- 
mercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 
1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS 
6638. 
Rat ification deposited : Spain, June 4, 1987.' 



Inter-American convention on letters 
rogatory. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 
1975. Entered into force Jan. 16, 1976." 
Accession deposited : Spain, July 14, 1987. 
Ratification deposited : Argentina, July 17, 
1987. 

Additional protocol to the Inter-American 
convention on letters rogatory, with annex. 
Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered in- 
to force June 14, 1980.'' 
Ratification deposited : Argentina, July 17, 
1987. 

Marine Pollution 

Protocol relating to intervention on the high 

seas in cases of pollution by substances other 

than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. 

Entered into force Mar. 30, 1983. TIAS 

10561. 

Accession deposited : Portugal. July 8, 1987. 

Convention for the protection of the natural 
resources and environment of the South 
Pacific Region, with annex. Done at Noumea 
Nov. 24, 1986. Open for signature at the 
South Pacific Commission Headquarters in 
Noumea, New Caledonia, on Nov. 25, 1986, 
and at the South Pacific Bureau of Economic 
Cooperation Headquarters, Suva, Fiji, from 
Nov. 26, 1986, to Nov. 25, 1987. Enters into 
force on the 30th day following the date of 
deposit of at least 10 instruments of ratifica- 
tion, acceptance, approval, or accession. 
Signatures : Cook Islands, France,' Marshall 
Islands, New Zealand, Palau, U.S., Western 
Samoa, Nov. 25, 1986; Federated States of 
Micronesia, Apr. 9, 1987; Nauru, Apr. 15, 
1987; U.K., July 16. 1987. 
Ratification s: Cook Islands, June 30, 1987; 
Marshall Islands, May 4, 1987. 

Protocol concerning cooperation in combat- 
ting pollution emergencies in the South 
Pacific region. Done at Noumea Nov. 24, 
1986. 

Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the 
South Pacific region by dumping, with an- 
nexes. Done at Noumea Nov. 24, 1986. Open 
for signature at the South Pacific Commis- 
sion Headquarters in Noumea, New 
Caledonia, on Nov. 25, 1986, and at the 
South Pacific Bureau for Economic Coopera- 
tion Headquarters, Suva, Fiji, from Nov. 26, 
1986, to Nov. 25, 1987. Enters into force on 
the 30th day following the date of deposit of 
at least five instruments of ratification, ac- 
ceptance, approval, or accession, provided 
that protocols shall not enter into force 
before convention. If requirements for entry 
into force of either protocol are met before 
those of convention, it enters into force same 
date as convention. 

Signatures : Cook Islands, France, Marshall 
Islands, New Zealand, Palau, U.S., Western 
Samoa, Nov. 25, 1986; Federated States of 
Micronesia, Apr. 9, 1987; Nauru, Apr. 15, 
1987; U.K., July 16, 1987. 
Ratification: Marshall Islands, May 4, 1987. 



Maritime Matters 

International convention on load lines, 1966. 
Done at London Apr. 5. 1966. Entered into 
force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629. 
Accession deposited : Colombia, May 6, 1987. 

North Atlantic Treaty 

Agreement on the status of the NATO, na- 
tional representatives and international staff. 
Done at Ottawa Sept. 20, 1951. Entered into 
force May 18, 1954. TIAS 2992. 
Ratification deposited : Spain, Aug. 10, 1987. 

Agreement between the parties to the North 

Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their 

forces. Signed at London June 19, 1951. 

Entered into force Aug 23, 1953. TIAS 

2846. 

Accession deposited: Spain, Aug. 10, 1987. 

NATO agreement on the communication of 
technical information for defense purposes. 
Done at Brussels Oct. 19, 1970. Entered into 
force Feb. 7, 1971. TIAS 7064. 
Accession deposited : Spain, Aug. 10, 1987. 

Patents 

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of 
secrecy of inventions relating to defense and 
for which applications for patents have been 
made. Done at Paris Sept. 21, 1960. Entered 
into force Jan. 12, 1961, TIAS 4672. 
Accession deposited : Spain, Aug. 10, 1987. 

Phonograms 

Convention for the protection of producers of 
phonograms against unauthorized duplication 
of their phonograms. Done at Geneva 
Oct. 29, 1971. Entered into force Apr. 18. 
1973; for the U.S.. Mar. 10. 1974. TIAS 
7808. 

Accession deposited : Korea. Rep. of. July 1, 
1987. 

Postal 

Third additional protocol to the constitution 
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 
1964, general regulations with annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Ham- 
burg July 27, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 1, 
1986; for the U.S. June 6, 1986. 
Accession deposited : Italy, Aug. 5, 1987. 
Ratifications deposited: Algeria, Dec. 2, 1986, 
Austria, July 22, 1987; Bangladesh, May 8, 
1987; Czechoslovakia, Aug. 6, 1987; Lebanon, 
July 24, 1987; Mexico, June 3, 1987; 
Romania, June 17, 1987; Spain July 6, 1987. 

Money orders and postal travelers' checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations with 
final protocol. Done at Hamburg July 27, 
1984. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1986; for the 
U.S. June 6, 1986. 

Accession deposited : Italy, Aug. 5, 1987. 
Approvals deposite d: Czechoslovakia, Aug. 6, 
1987; Romania, June 17, 1987. 
Ratifications deposited: Algeria, Dec. 2, 1986; 
Austria, July 22, 1987; Lebanon, July 24, 
1987, Mexico, June 3, 1987; Spain, July 6, 
1987. 



67 



TREATIES 



Postal parcels agreement with final protocol 
and detailed regulations. Done at Hamburg 
July 27, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 1, 
1986; for the U.S. June 6, 1986. 
Accession deposi ted: Italy, Aug. 5, 1987. 
Approvals deposited : Czechoslovakia, Aug. 6, 
1987, Romania, June 17, 1987. 
Ratificat i ons deposited: Algeria, Dec. 2, 1986; 
Austria, July 22, 1987; Bangladesh, May 8, 
1987; Lebanon, July 24, 1987; Mexico, 
June 3, 1987; Spain, July 6, 1987. 

Telecommunications 

Radio regulations, with appendices and final 

protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979. 

Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982; definitively 

for the U.S. Oct. 27, 1983. 

Approval deposited: Cote d'lvoire, June 5, 

1987. 

Regional agreement for the medium fre- 
quency broadcasting service in Region 2, with 
annexes and final protocol. Signed on behalf 
of the U.S. at Rio de Janeiro on Dec. 19, 
1981. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-7. 
Transmitted to the Senate for advice and 
consent : June 26, 1987. 

Terrorism 

International convention against the taking of 

hostages. Done at New York Dec. 18, 1979. 

Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the U.S. 

Jan. 6, 1985. 

Accession deposited : Denmark, Aug. 11, 

1987. 

Treaties 

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, 

with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. 

Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980." 

Accession deposited : Czechoslovakia, July 29, 

1987. 

Ratification deposited : Germany, Fed. Rep., 

July 21, 1987. 

Vienna convention on the law of treaties be- 
tween states and international organizations 
or between international organizations, with 
annex. Done at Vienna Mar. 21, 1986.2 
Ratific ation deposited : Senegal, Aug. 6, 
1987. 

Wheat 

Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at Lon- 
don Mar. 14, 1986. Entered into force July 1, 
1986.1^ [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1. 
Ratifications deposited: Cuba, July 29, 1987; 
Ecuador, Aug. 12, 1987. 



BILATERAL 

Bahamas 

Agreement concerning the reciprocal exemp- 
tion from income tax of income derived from 
the international operation of ships and air- 
craft. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington June 26 and July 16, 1987. 
Entered into force July 16, 1987. 
Supersedes agreement of Dec. 13, 1983, and 
Jan. 18, 1984! 



68 



Canada 

Memorandum of understanding on the ex- 
change of import data, with annexes. Signed 
at Montreal July 29, 1987. Entered into force 
July 29, 1987. 

Chad 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at N'Djamena 
and Washington July 19, July 23, and Aug. 6, 
1987. Entered into force Aug. 17, 1987. 

China 

Agreement relating to trade in certain textile 
products. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Aug 10, 1987. Entered into force 
Aug. 10, 1987; effective Jan. 1, 1988. 

Congo 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at Brazzaville June 26, 1987. Entered 
into force Aug. 7, 1987. 

Czechoslovakia 

Air transport agreement, with schedule and 
annex. Signed at Prague June 29, 1987. 
Entered into force June 29, 1987. 
Supersede s agreement of Feb. 28, 1969 
(TIAS 6644), as amended and extended 
(TIAS 7356, 7881, 8868, 10861). 

Denmark 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
May 22, Aug. 9 and 18, Oct. 24, 25, and 28, 
and Dec. 5-6, 1922, relating to relief from 
double income tax on shipping profits (47 
Stat. 2612). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington July 6, 1987. Entered into force 
July 6, 1987; effective with respect to taxable 
years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 1987. 

Djibouti 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Djibouti and 
Washington June 25 and July 28, 1987. 
Entered into force Aug. 17, 1987. 

Egypt 

Fourth amendment to the grant agreement 
of Sept. 22, 1981 (TIAS 10278), for irrigation 
management systems. Signed at Cairo 
July 30, 1987. Entered into force July 30, 
1987. 

France 

Agreement on mutual logistic support, with 
annexes. Signed at Casteau Feb. 23, 1987. 
Entered into force Feb. 23, 1987. 

Memorandum of understanding for the ex- 
change of energy information. Signed at 
Washington July 20-22, 1987. Entered into 
force July 22, 1987. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Supplementary treaty to the extradition trea- 
ty of June 20, 1978 (TIAS 9785). Signed at 
Washington Oct. 21, 1986. [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 100-6. 

Transmitted to the Senate for advice and 
consent: June 25, 1987. 



Memorandum of understanding concerning 
cooperative production of the EX-31 guided 
missile weapon system, with annexes. Signed 
at Washington Aug. 3, 1987. Enters into 
force upon notification by each party that 
necessary legal procedures have been com- 
pleted. 

Grenada 

Agreement for the exchange of information 
with respect to taxes. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 18, 1986. Entered into force July 13, 
1987. 

Hungary 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Budapest and 
Washington June 24 and July 10, 1987. 
Entered into force September 1, 1987. 

Indonesia 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Jakarta June 16, 1987. 
Entered into force June 16, 1987. 

Israel 

Agreement for the establishment and opera- 
tion of a radio relay station in Israel, with an 
nexes, minutes, and related letters. Signed ai 
Washington June 18, 1987. Enters into force 
upon notification by each government of com 
pletion of procedures necessary under its 
laws. 

Jamaica 

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 
15, 1987, for sale of agricultural commodities 
Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston 
June 25 and July 1, 1987. Entered into force 
July 1, 1987. 

Japan 

Agreement concerning Japan's financial con- 
tribution for U.S. administrative and related 
expenses for the Japanese fiscal year 1987 
pursuant to the mutual defense assistance 
agreement of Mar. 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 7, 
1987. Entered into force July 7, 1987. 

Agreement concerning Japanese participatioi 
in research in the strategic defense initiative. 
Signed at Washington, July 21, 1987. 
Entered into force July 21. 1987. 

Liberia 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Jan. 11, 1951, as amended and 
extended (TIAS 2171, 10761), relating to a 
military mission. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Monrovia Apr. 22 and May 5, 1987. 
Entered into force May 5, 1987; effective 
Jan. 10, 1987. 

Mali 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Bamako and 
Washington Apr. 2 and 16, 1987. Entered in- 
to force June 1, 1987. 

Mexico 

Agreement extending the air transport 
agreement of Aug. 15, 1960, as amended and 



Department of State Bulletii 



PRESS RELEASES 



;xtended (TIAS 4675, 7165), and the agree- 
Tient of Jan. 20. 1978, as extended, relating 
;o reduced air fares and charter air services 
TIAS 10115). Effected by exchange of notes 
It Washington June 29, 1987; effective July 
1987. 

Netherlands 

Agreement extending the memorandum of 
mderstanding of June 1 and 29, 1982, con- 
■erning the exchange of energy information. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Oak Ridge 
md The Hague June 9 and 25, 1987. Entered 
nto force June 25, 1987. 

Netherlands Antilles 

nternational express mail agreement, with 
etailed regulations. Signed at Willemstad 
nd Washington June 10 and 22, 1987. 
Intered into force Aug. 3, 1987. 

'akistan 

ixth amendatory agreement to the commodi- 
y import grant and loan agreement for 
gricultural commodities and equipment of 
.pr. 13, 1982. Signed at Islamabad July 13, 
987. Entered into force July 13, 1987. 

agreement amending the agreement of May 
and June 11, 1987, concerning trade in 
3xtiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 
hange of letters at Washington and New 
'ork July 20 and 31, 1987. Entered into 
orce July 31, 1987. 







Department of State 


Press releases 


may be obtained from the Of- 


•173 


8/13 


Samuel E. Lupo sworn m as! 


fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 






Ambassador to Guinea 


Washingt 


on, D.C. 20520. 






(biographic data). 








•174 


8/14 


Leonard G. Shurtleff sworn 


No. 


Date 


Subject 






in as Ambassador to the 
Congo (biographic data). 


•167 


8/3 


Shultz: remarks at Interna- 
tional Summer Special 
Olympics, July 31. 


•175 


8/14 


Mark L. Edelman sworn 
in as Ambassador to 
Cameroon (biographic data) 


*168 


8/4 


Shultz: dinner remarks in 






Aug. 6. 
Regional foreign policy 






honor of Gabonese Presi- 


•176 


8/21 






dent El Hadj Omar Bongo, 






conference in St. Louis, 






Aug. 3. 






Sept. 14, 
Foreign Relations of the 


169 


8/5 


Shultz: news briefings. White 


177 


8/25 






House. 






United States, 1955-57, 


170 


8/6 


Shultz: news conference. 






Vol. VIII, South Asia, 


171 


8/7 


Shultz: statement before 






released. 






Subcommittee on Foreign 


•178 


8/24 


Theresa Anne Tull sworn in 






Operations, Senate Ap- 






as Ambassador to Guyana 






propriations Committee. 






(biographic data) Aug. 21. 


•172 


8/13 


Warren Clark, Jr., sworn 
in as Ambassador to Gabon 
(biographic data) Aug. 12. 


•179 


8/25 


U.S. signs inter-American 
convention to facilitate the 
amateur radio service. 

ed in the Bulletin. ■ 


• Not print 



'eru 

Lgreement for sales of agricultural com- 
lodities. Signed at Lima July 10, 1987. 
Intered into force July 10, 1987. 

ifatar 

nvestment incentive agreement. Effected by 
xchange of notes at Doha Mar. 28, 1987. 
)ntered into force Apr. 1, 1987. 

tomania 

lgreement amending agreement of Jan. 28 
nd Mar. 31, 1983, and agreement of Nov. 7 
nd 16, 1984, as amended, relating to trade 
T textiles and textile products. Effected by 
xchange of letters at Washington June 16 
nd 30. 1987. Entered into force June 30, 
987. 

Sweden 

i.greement amending the arrangement of 
dar. 31, 1938, relating to relief from double 
ncome tax on shipping profits (52 Stat. 
490). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Vashington June 26 and July 24, 1987. 
entered into force July 24, 1987; effective 
vith respect to taxable years beginning on or 
tfter Jan. 1, 1987. 



Thailand 

Agreement amending agreement of July 27 
and Aug. 8, 1983 (TIAS 10760), as amended, 
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man- 
made fiber textiles and textile products. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington 
July 23-24, 1987. Entered into force July 24, 
1987. 

United Kingdom 

Treaty concerning the Cayman Islands 

relating to mutual legal assistance in criminal 

matters, with protocol. Signed at Grand 

Cayman July 3, 1986. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 

100-8. 

Transmitted to the Senate for advice and 

consent : Aug. 4, 1987. 

Agreement concerning the British Virgin 
Islands and narcotics activities, with annex 
and forms. Effected by exchange of letters at 
London Apr. 14. 1987. 
Entered into force : Aug. 12, 1987. 

Yemen 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
May 6, 1987, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Sanaa July 2. 1987. 
Entered into force July 2, 1987. 



Agreement amending the agreement of May 
6, 1987, for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Sanaa Aug. 1, 1987. Entered into 
force Aug. 1, 1987. 

Zambia 

Agreement relating to the agreement of July 
9, 1985, for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Lusaka July 27. 1987. 
Entered into force July 27, 1987. 

Zaire 

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 
22, 1987, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Kinshasa July 2, 1987. Entered into force 
July 2, 1987." 



'With reservation. 

^Not in force. 

'With declaration(s). 

■•Not in force for U.S. 

^In force provisionally for U.S. 



Dctober 1987 



69 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department of State CSCE Semiannual Report 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

A Forward Strategy for Peace and Freedom, 
Town Hall of California, Los Angeles, Aug. 
26, 1987 (Current Policy #995). 

Secretary Shultz 

Matching Foreign Policy Resources With 
Goals, Subcommittee on Foreign Opera- 
tions, Senate Appropriations Committee, 
Aug. 7, 1987 (Current Policy #992). 

Department 

Managing Diplomacy; Problems and Issues, 
Under Secretary Spiers, Meridian House- 
Smithsonian Institution international series 
on diplomacy in transition, Aug. 6, 1987 
(Current Policy #991). 

Bureau of Public Affairs Services to the 
Public, June 1987 (Public Information 
Series). 

Economics 

Global Economic Powers With Global Respon- 
sibilities, Assistant Secretary McMinn, U.S. 
Feed Grains Council, Asheville, Aug. 3, 
1987 (Current Policy #990). 

Europe 

Twenty-Second Semiannual Report on the 
Implementation of Helsinki Final Act, 
Oct. 1, 1986-Apr. 1, 1987 (Special Report 
#168). 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative Scientific Ex- 
changes (GIST, Aug. 1987). 

General 

Diplomatic Immunity and U.S. Interests, 
Ambassador Roosevelt, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Aug 5, 1987 (Current 
Policy #993). 

Human Rights 

The Soviet Constitution: Myth and Reality, 
Assistant Secretary Schifter, American Bar 
Asso., San Francisco, Aug. 10, 1987 (Cur- 
rent Policy #994). 

Refugees 

Perspectives on U.S. Refugee Programs, 
Ambassador Moore, New York Association 
for New Americans, New York City, June 
11, 1987, and Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy, June 30, 1987 (Current Policy #981). 

United Nations 

UN Development Program ((ilST, Aug. 
1987). ■ 



On behalf of the President, the 
Secretary of State on June 3, 1987, 
transmitted the 22d semiannual report 
on the implementation of the Helsinki 
Final Act to Representative Steny 
Hoyer, chairman of the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

The report covers the period Oc- 
tober 1, 1986-April 1, 1987, providing a 
factual survey of developments in the 
following areas: human rights and 
humanitarian concerns; security; 
economic, scientific, and technological 
cooperation; and educational and 
cultural exchanges. It concentrates on 
Soviet and East European compliance 
with their Conference on Security and 
Cooperation (CSCE) commitments dur- 
ing the 6-month period covered. 
Although the record of compliance 
varied among the Eastern states, and 
some areas of improvement were evi- 
dent, overall performance in the area of 
human rights and human contact re- 
mains flawed. 

Indeed, many citizens of these coun- 
tries continue to suffer persecution for 
focusing attention on or attempting to 
alleviate violations of basic human 
rights. This theme is central to the 
report and also to the approach of the 
United States and its NATO allies to the 
ongoing CSCE followup meeting in 
Vienna. Since the opening of the 
meeting on November 4, 1986, the U.S. 
delegation, headed by Ambassador War- 
ren Zimmermann, and other allied 
delegations have recognized compliance 
improvements and highlighted Soviet 
and East European compliance failures. 



This report is an important element 
in the continuing U.S. effort to assess 
the progress and shortcomings in pursu- 
ing the CSCE goals of protecting humar 
rights, strengthening security, expand- 
ing cooperation, and building mutual 
confidence. 

Free single copies of this 42-page 
document may be obtained from the 
Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department ol 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. Please 
request Special Report #168. ■ 



Background Notes 



This series provides brief, factual summaries 
of the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of about 170 countries 
(excluding the United States) and of selected 
international organizations. Recent revisions 
are; 

Austria (July 1987) 
Barbados (June 1987) 
German Democratic Republic 

(June 1987) 
Iran (May 1987) 
Israel (June 1987) 
Niger (June 1987) 
Paraguay (June 1987) 

A free copy of the index only may be ob 
tained from the Correspondence Managemen 
Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

For about 60 Baekqround Notes a year, a 
subscription is available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402, for $14.00 (domestic) and $17.50 
(foreign). Check or money order, made 
payable to the Superintendent of Documents, 
must accompany order. ■ 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



-lEX 

ober 1987 

jme 87, No. 2127 



jctica. Science and Technology Coopera- 
iWith Latin America (Negroponte) . . .50 
Control 
ward Strategy for Peace and Freedom 

•gan) 1 

ontrn Controversy and President's Goals 

gan, excerpts) 4 

iations on Strategic Arms Reductions 16 
s Indicate Acceptance on INF Proposal 

ite House statement) 17 

Presents Views on INF Verification 

lartment statement) 18 

Situation in Chile (Abrams) 63 

unism. The Soviet Constitution: Myth 

(Reality (Schifter) 34 

ess 

latic Immunity and U.S. Interests 

sevelt) 29 

ational Protection of U.S. Copyrights 

lis) 26 

mg Foreign Policy Resources With Goals 

Itz) 6 

an and the Nuclear Issue (Murphy) . . 53 
ting Democracy in Haiti (Holwill) ... 60 
e and Technology Cooperation With 

n America (Negroponte) 50 

on in Chile (Abrams) 63 

lar Affairs. Travel Advisories 19 

ijtmcnt & Foreign Service. Managing 
i jmacy: Problems and Issues (Spiers) . 20 
mics 
Economic Powers With Global Respon- 

ties (McMinn) 24 

ing Foreign Policy Resources With Goals 

Itz) 6 

on in Chile (Abrams) 63 

•ean Communities. Global Economic 
ers With Global Responsibilities 

flinn) 24 

jn Assistance 

ing Foreign Policy Resources With Goals 

Itz) 6 

e and Technology Cooperation With 

n America (Negroponte) 50 

I. Visit of Gabon President (Bongo, 

ran) 14 

iny. West Germany to Dismantle Persh- 

A Missiles (White House statement) . 49 

Promoting Democracy in Haiti 

will) 60 

n Rights 

'e Nations Week, 1987 (proclamation) 36 

ward Strategy for Peace and Freedom 

igan) 1 

iki Human Rights Day, 1987 (procla- 

lon) 37 

iting Democracy in Haiti (Holwill) ... 60 

ion in Chile (Abrams) 63 

Soviet Constitution: Myth and Reality 

ifter) ' 34 

lational Law 

natic Immunity and U.S. Interests 

)sevelt) 29 

lational Protection of U.S. Copyrights 
His) 26 



Iran 

Iran-Cowfra Controversy and President's Goals 
(Reagan, excerpts) 4 

News Conference of August 6 (Shultz) 11 

U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf (Schloesser) .38 

Iraq 

News Conference of August 6 (Shultz) 11 

U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf (Schloesser) . 38 

Israel. News Conference of August 6 
(Shultz) 11 

Japan. Global Economic Powers With Global 
Responsibilities (McMinn) 24 

Korea. U.S. Urges Resumption of North-South 
Korean Talks (Department statement) ... 23 

Kuwait. News Conference of August 6 
(Shultz) 11 

Laos. U.S.-Lao POW/MIA Consultations Held 
in Vientiane (joint statement) 23 

Middle East 

Assistant Secretary Murphy's Interview on 
"Meet the Press" 44 

Export Controls Imposed on Chemical Wea- 
pons Substances (Department statement) 49 

Under Secretary Armacost's Interview on 
"Meet the Press" 32 

U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf (Schloesser) .38 

Military Affairs 

Export Controls Imposed on Chemical Wea- 
pons Substances (Department statement) 49 

West Germany to Dismantle Pershing lA Mis- 
siles (White House statement) 49 

Narcotics. Matching Foreign Policy Resources 
With Goals (Shultz) 6 

New Zealand. News Conference of August 6 
(Shultz) 11 

Nicaragua 

Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance 
(Reagan) 5 

Iran-Cort(ra Controversy and President's Goals 
(Reagan, excerpts) 4 

News Conference of August 6 (Shultz) 11 

Nicaragua Suppresses Peaceful Marches (De- 
partment statement) 59 

U.S. Initiative for Peace in Central America 
(Reagan, Shultz, text of peace plan) 54 

Nuclear Policy 

Pakistan and the Nuclear Issue (Murphy) . . 53 

Soviet Nuclear Test Releases Radioactive 
Debris (Department statement) 49 

Pakistan. Pakistan and the Nuclear Issue 
(Murphy) 53 

Panama. News Conference of August 6 
(Shultz) 11 

Philippines. Under Secretary Armacost's 
Interview on "Meet the Press" 32 

Presidential Documents 

Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resist- 
ance 5 

Captive Nations Week, 1987 (proclamation) 36 

A Forward Strategy for Peace and Freedom 1 

Guatemalan Agreement for Peace in Central 
America (Reagan, Department statement, 
text of agreement) 56 

Helsinki Human Rights Day, 1987 (procla- 
mation) 37 

lra.n-Contra Controversy and President's Goals 
(excerpts) 4 

U.S. Initiative for Peace in Central America 
(Reagan, Shultz, text of peace plan) 54 

Visit of Gabon President (Bongo, Reagan) . . 14 



Publications 

Background Notes 70 

CSCE Semiannual Report 70 

Department of State 70 

Refugees. Matching Foreign Policy Resources 
With Goals (Shultz) ' 6 

Science & Technology. Science and Tech- 
nology Cooperation With Latin America 
(Negroponte) 50 

Terrorism 

Managing Diplomacy: Problems and Issues 
(Spiers) 20 

Matching Foreign Policy Resources With Goals 
(Shultz) 6 

News Conference of August 6 (Shultz) 11 

Trade 

Global Economic Powers With Global Respon- 
sibilities (McMinn) 24 

International Protection of U.S. Copyrights 
(Wallis) '....26 

Treaties. Current Actions 67 

U.S.S.R. 

A Forward Strategy for Peace and Freedom 
(Reagan) 1 

lra.n-Contra Controversy and President's 
Goals (Reagan, excerpts) 4 

Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions 16 

The Soviet Constitution: Myth and Reality 
(Schifter) 34 

Soviet Nuclear Test Releases Radioactive 
Debris (Department statement) 49 

Soviets Indicate Acceptance of INF Proposal 
(White House statement) 17 

U.S. Presents Views on INF Verification (De- 
partment statement) 18 

Western Hemisphere 

Guatemalan Agreement for Peace in Central 
America (Reagan, Department statement, 
text of agreement) 56 

Science and Technology Cooperation With 
Latin America (Negroponte) 50 

Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 63 

Armacost, Michael H 32 

Bongo, El Had] Omar 14 

Holwill, Richard N 60 

McMinn, Douglas W 24 

Murphy, Richard W 44, 53 

Negroponte, John D 50 

Reagan, President ... 1, 4, 5, 14, 36, 37, 54, 56 

Roosevelt, Selwa 29 

Schifter, Richard 34 

Schloesser, Jeffrey 38 

Shultz, Secretary 6, 11, 54 

Spiers, Ronald I 20 

Wallis, W. Allen 26 



Department of State, U.S.A. 
Washington, D.C. 20520 



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Departtnpni of State 

bulletin 



Volume 87 / Number 2128 / November 1987 



The DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN, published by the Office of 
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Public Affairs, is the official record of 
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vide the public, the Congress, and 
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should not necessarily be interpreted as 
official U.S. policy statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 
for Pubhc Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

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Assist£mt Editor 



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CONTENTS 



The President 



Middle East 



America's Vision of the Future 
Managing the Global Economy 
Central American Peace Plan 



The Secretary 



13 



16 



19 
21 



The Democratic Future of South 
Africa 

Peace, Democracy, and Security 
in Central America 

Public Diplomacy in the Informa- 
tion Age 

Interview on "Face the Nation" 

Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 



Arms Control 

24 Advancing U.S. -Soviet Relations: 

The Challenge of Arms Control 
(Edward L. Roumy) 

25 U.S. Proposes INF Reductions 

(President Reagan) 

26 MBFR 'Rilks Convene 43d Ses- 

sion (White House Statement) 



43 



43 



U.S. T^kes Defensive Action in 
the Persian Gulf (President 
Reagan, Letter to the Con- 
gress) 

U.S. Orders Closure of Palestine 
Information Office 
(Department Statement) 



Military Affairs 

44 U.S. Inspects Soviet Military 
Exercise (Department State- 
ment, Inspection Report) 

Pacific 

46 Administration Supports New 

Zealand Preference Elimina- 
tion Act (J. Stapleton Roy) 

Refugees 

47 Proposed Refugee Admissions 

for FY 1988 (Jonathan Moore, 
Secretary Shultz) 



East Asia 



27 



29 



31 
32 



Democracy in the Philippines 

(David F. Lambertson) 
Korea: Moving Quickly Toward 

Democracy (William Clark, 

Jr.) 
South Korea-A Profile 
U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam 

(David F. Lambertson) 



United Nations 

52 Secretary Shultz Attends UN 
General Assembly (Eduard 
Shevardnadze, Secretary 
Shultz) 



Treaties 

60 Current Actions 



Economics 

33 Strategic Technology Export 

Controls (White House State- 
ment) 



Europe 

34 Soviet Foreign Minister Visits 
Washington (President Rea- 
gan, Eduard Shevardnadze, 
Secretary Shultz, Text of 
Agreement, Joint Statements, 
White House Fact Sheet) 

40 Visit of Swedish Prime Minister 

(Ingvar Carlsson, President 
Reagan) 

41 Sweden-A Profile 



Press Releases 

62 Department of State 



Publications 

62 Depart;Brd%oi^^ 




vW^'-- 




THE PRESIDENT 



America's Vision of the Future 




President Reagan's address 

before the UN General Assembly 

on September 21, 1987} 



Let me first welcome the Secretary 
General [Perez de Cuellar] back from 
his pilgrimage for peace in the Middle 
East. Hundreds of thousands have al- 
ready fallen in the bloody conflict be- 
tween Iran and Iraq. All men and 
women of good will pray that the car- 
nage can soon be stopped, and we pray 
that the Secretary General proves to be 
not only a pilgrim but also the architect 
of a lasting peace between those two 
nations. Mr. Secretary General, the 
United States supports you, and may 
God guide you in your labors ahead. 

Like the Secretary General, all 
of us here today are on a kind of pil- 
grimage. We come from every conti- 
nent, every race, and most religions to 
this great hall of hope where, in the 
name of peace, we practice diplomacy. 
Now, diplomacy, of course, is a subtle 
and nuanced craft — so much so that it's 
said that when one of the most wily 
diplomats of the 19th century passed 
away, other diplomats asked, on reports 
of his death, "What do you suppose the 
old fox meant by that?" 

But true statesmanship requires 
not merely skill but something greater, 
something we call vision — a grasp of 
the present and of the possibilities of 
the future. I've come here today to 
map out for you my own vision of the 
world's future — one, I believe, that in 
its essential elements is shared by all 
Americans. And I hope those who see 
things differently will not mind if I say 
that we in the United States beheve 
that the place to look first for the 
shape of the future is not in continental 
masses and sealanes, although geogra- 
phy is, obviously, of great importance. 
Neither is it in national reserves of 
blood and iron or, on the other hand, of 
money and industrial capacity, although 
mihtary and economic strength are 
also, of course, crucial. We begin with 
something that is far simpler and yet 
far more profound — the human heart. 



Movement Toward Democracy 
and Private Initiative 

All over the world today, the yearnings 
of the human heart are redirecting the 
course of international affairs, putting 
the lie to the myth of materiahsm and 
historical determinism. We have only to 
open our eyes to see the simple aspira- 
tions of ordinary people writ large on 
the record of our times. 

Last year in the Philippines, 
ordinary people rekindled the spirit 
of democracy and restored the elec- 
toral process. Some said they had per- 
formed a miracle, and, if so, a similar 
miracle — a transition to democracy — is 
taking place in the Republic of Korea. 
Haiti, too, is making a transition. Some 
despair when these new, young democ- 
racies face conflicts or challenges, but 
growing pains are normal in democ- 
racies. The United States had them, as 
has every other democracy on earth. 

In Latin America, too, one can 
hear the voices of freedom echo from 
the peaks and across the plains. It is 
the song of ordinary people marching, 
not in uniforms and not in military file 
but, rather, one by one in simple, 
everyday working clothes — marching to 
the polls. Ten years ago, only a third of 
the people of Latin America and the 
Caribbean lived in democracies or in 
countries that were turning to democ- 
racy. Today over 90% do. 

But this worldwide movement to 
democracy is not the only way in which 
simple, ordinary people are leading us 
in this room — we who are said to be the 
makers of history — leading us into the 
future. Around the owrld, new busi- 
nesses, new economic growth, new 
technologies are emerging from the 
workshops of ordinary people with 
extraordinary dreams. 



THE PRESIDENT 



Here in the United States, en- 
trepreneurial energy— reinvigorated 
when we cut taxes and regulations- 
has fueled the current economic ex- 
pansion. According to scholars at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
three-quarters of the more than 13.5 
million new jobs that we have created 
in this country since the beginning of 
our expansion came from businesses 
with fewer than 100 employees— busi- 
nesses started by ordinary people who 
dared to take a chance. And many of 
our new high technologies were first 
developed in the garages of fledghng 
entrepreneurs. Yet America is not the 
only or perhaps even the best example 
of the dynamism and dreams that the 
freeing of markets set free. 

In India and China, freer markets 
for farmers have led to an explosion in 
production. In Africa, governments are 
rethinking their policies, and where 
they're allowing greater economic free- 
dom to farmers, crop production has 
improved. Meanwhile, in the newly in- 
dustrialized countries of the Pacific rim, 
free markets in services and manufac- 
turing, as well as agi-iculture, have led 
to a soaring of gi'owth and standards of 
living. The ASEAN [Association of 
South East Asian Nations] nations, 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have created 
the true economic miracle of the last 
two decades, and in each of them, much 
of the magic came from ordinary people 
who succeeded as entrepreneurs. 

In Latin America, this same lesson 
of free markets, greater opportunity, 
and growth is being studied and acted 
on. President Sarney of Brazil spoke 
for many others when he said that: 
"Private initiative is the engine of eco- 
nomic development. In Brazil, we have 
learned that every time the state's pen- 
etration in the economy increases, our 
liberty decreases." Yes, policies that 
release to flight ordinary people's 
dreams are spreading around the 
world. From Colombia to Turkey to 
Indonesia, governments are cutting 
taxes, reviewing their regulations, and 
opening opportunities for initiative. 

There has been much talk in the 
halls of this building about the "right to 
development." But more and more the 
evidence is clear that development is 
not itself a right. It is the product of 
rights — the right to own property; the 
right to buy and sell freely; the right to 
contract; the right to be free of exces- 
sive taxation and regulation, of burden- 
some government. There have been 
studies that determined that countries 
with low tax rates have greater growth 
than those with high rates. 



We're all familiar with the phe- 
nomenon of the "underground econ- 
omy." The scholar Hernando de Soto 
and his colleagues have examined the 
situation of one country, Peru, and de- 
scribed an economy of the poor that 
bypasses crushing taxation and stifling 
regulation. This "informal economy," as 
the researchers call it, is the principal 
supplier of many goods and services 
and often the only ladder for upward 
mobility. In the capital city it accounts 
for almost all public transportation and 
most street markets. And the re- 
searchers concluded that, thanks to the 
informal economy, "The poor can work, 
travel, and have a roof over their 
heads." They might have added that, by 
becoming underground entrepreneurs 
themselves or by working for them, the 
poor have become less poor and the na- 
tion itself richer. 

Those who advocate statist 
solutions to development should take 
note — the free market is the other path 
to development and the one true path. 
And, unlike many other paths, it leads 
somewhere. It works. So this is where 
I believe we can find the map to the 
world's future — in the hearts of ordi- 
nary people; in their hopes for them- 
selves and their children; in their 
prayers as they lay themselves and 
their families to rest each night. These 
simple people are the giants of the 
earth, the true builders of the world 
and shapers of the centuries to come. 
And if, indeed, they triumph, as I be- 
lieve they will, we will at last know a 
world of peace and freedom, opportun- 
ity and hope, and, yes, of democracy — a 
world in which the spirit of mankind at 
last conquers the old, familiar enemies 
of famine, disease, tyranny, and war. 
This is my vision — America's vi- 
sion. I recognize that some govern- 
ments represented in this hall have 
other ideas. Some do not believe in de- 
mocracy or in political, economic, or re- 
ligious freedom. Some believe in 
dictatorship — whether by one man, one 
party, one class, one race, or one van- 
guard. To those governments I would 
only say that the price of oppression is 
clear. Your economies will fall farther 
and farther behind. Your people will 
become more restless. Isn't it better to 
listen to the people's hopes now, rather 
than their curses later? 

The Need for Peace 

And yet, despite our differences, there 
is one common hope that brought us all 
to make this common pilgrimage — the 



hope that mankind will one day beat it^ 
swords into plowshares; the hope of 
peace. 

Iran-Iraq War. In no place on 
earth today is peace more in need of 
friends than the Middle East. Its peo- 
ple's yearning for peace is growing. Thi 
United States will continue to be an 
active partner in the efforts of the par- 
ties to come together to settle their 
differences and build a just and lasting 
peace. 

And this month marks the begin- 
ning of the eighth year of the Iran-Ira( 
war. Two months ago, the Security 
Council adopted a mandatory resolutioi 
demanding a cease-fire, withdrawal, 
and negotiations to end the war. The 
United States fully supports implemen 
tation of Resolution 598, as we support 
the Secretary General's recent mission 
We welcomed Iraq's acceptance of that 
resolution and remain disappointed at 
Iran's unwillingness to accept it. 

In that regard, I know that the 
President of Iran will be addressing 
you tomorrow. I take this opportunity 
to call upon him clearly and unequiv- 
ocally to state whether Iran accepts 5' 
or not. If the answer is positive, it 
would be a welcome step and major 
breakthrough. If it is negative, the 
Council has no choice but rapidly to 
adopt enforcement measures. 

For 40 years, the United States h 
made clear its vital interest in the se- 
curity of the Persian Gulf and the ecu; 
tries'that border it. The oil reserves 
there are of strategic importance to th 
economies of the free world. We're cor 
mitted to maintaining the free flow of 
this oil and to preventing the domina- 
tion of the region by any hostile powe 

We do not seek confrontation or 
trouble with Iran or anyone else. Our 
objective is now, and has been at ever 
stage, finding a means to end the war 
with no victor and no vanquished. Th( 
increase in our naval presence in the 
gulf does not favor one side or the 
other. It is a response to heightened 
tensions and followed consultations wi 
our friends in the region. When the 
tension diminishes, so will our 
presence. 

The United States is gratified by 
many recent diplomatic developments- 
the unanimous adoption of Resolution 
598, the Arab League's statement at i' 
recent meeting in Tunis, and the Seen 
tary General's visit. Yet problems 
remain. 






Department of State Bulleti 



THE PRESIDENT 



The Soviet Union helped in draft- 
ing and reaching an agreement on Res- 
olution 598. But outside the Security 
Council, the Soviets have acted differ- 
ently. They called for removal of our 
Navy from the gulf where it has been 
for 40 years. They made the false 

( accusation that somehow the United 
States — rather than the war itself — is 
the source of tension in the gulf. Well, 
such statements are not helpful. They 
divert attention from the challenge fac- 
ing us all — a just end to the war. 

The United States hopes the Soviets 
will join the other members of the 
Security Council in vigorously seeking 

ii|an end to a conflict that never should 
have begun — should have ended long 
ago — and has become one of the great 
tragedies of the postwar era. 

Afghanistan. Elsewhere in the re- 
gion, we see the continuing Soviet oc- 
cupation of Afghanistan. After nearly 8 
/ears, a million casualties, nearly 4 mil- 
ion others driven into exile, and more 
ntense fighting that ever, it's time for 
;he Soviet Union to leave. 

The Afghan people must have the 
•ight to determine their own future 
'ree of foreign coercion. There is no 
jxcuse for prolonging a brutal war or 
Dropping up a regime whose days are 
;learly numbered. That regime offers 
Dolitical proposals that pretend compro- 
nise but really would ensure the per- 
petuation of the regimes power. Those 
proposals have failed the only signifi- 
cant test — they have been rejected by 
,he Afghan people. Every day the re- 
sistance grows in strength. It is an in- 
dispensable party in the quest for a 
legotiated solution. 

The world community must 
continue to insist on genuine self- 
ietermination, prompt and full Soviet 
ivithdrawal, and the return of the refu- 
gees to their homes in safety and 
lonor. The attempt may be made to 
pressure a few countries to change 
:heir vote this year, but this body, I 
snow, will vote overwhelmingly, as 
2very year before, for Afghan indepen- 
dence and freedom. 

We have noted General Secretary 
Gorbachev's statement of readiness to 
withdraw. In April I asked the Soviet 
Union to set a date this year when this 
withdrawal would begin. I repeat that 
request now, in this forum for peace. 
I pledge that, once the Soviet Union 
ihows convincingly that it's ready for a 
genuine political settlement, the United 
States is ready to be helpful. 



November 1987 



Let me add one final note on this 
matter. Pakistan, in the face of enor- 
mous pressure and intimidation, has 
given sanctuary to Afghan refugees. 
We salute the courage of Pakistan and 
the Pakistani people. They deserve 
strong support from all of us. 

Nicaragua. Another regional con- 
flict, we all know, is taking place in 
Central America — in Nicaragua. To the 
Sandinista delegation here today I say: 
your people know the true nature of 
your regime. They have seen their lib- 
erties suppressed. They have seen the 
promises of 1979 go unfulfilled. They 
have seen their real wages and personal 
income fall by half — yes, half — since 
1979, while your party elite live lives of 
privilege and luxury. 

This is why, despite $1 billion in 
Soviet-bloc aid last year alone, despite 
the largest and best equipped army in 
Central America, you face a popular 
revolution at home. It is why the dem- 
ocratic resistance is able to operate 
freely deep in your heartland. But this 
revolution should come as no surprise 
to you. It is only the revolution you 
promised the people and that you then 
betrayed. 

The goal of U.S. policy toward 
Nicaragua is simple. It is the goal of 
the Nicaraguan people and the freedom 
fighters as well: it is democracy — real, 
free, pluralistic, constitutional democ- 
racy. Understand this: we will not, and 
the world community will not, accept 
phony "democratization" designed to 
mask the perpetuation of dictatorship. 

In this 200th year of our own 
Constitution, we know that real democ- 
racy depends on the safeguards of an 
institutional structure that prevents a 
concentration of power It is that which 
makes rights secure. The temporary re- 
laxation of controls — which can later be 
tightened — is not democratization. 

And, again, to the Sandinistas, 
I say: we continue to hope that 
Nicaragua will become part of the 
genuine transformation — democratic 
transformation — that we have seen 
throughout Central America in this 
decade. We applaud the principles em- 
bodied in the Guatemala agreement, 
which links the security of the Central 
American democracies to democratic 
reform in Nicaragua. 

Now is the time for you to shut 
down the military machine that threat- 
ens your neighbors and assaults your 
own people. You must end your stran- 
glehold on internal political activity. 
You must hold free and fair national 



elections. The media must be truly 
free — not censored or intimidated or 
crippled by indirect measures like the 
denial of newsprint or threats against 
journalists or their families. Exiles 
must be allowed to return to minister, 
to live, to work, and to organize politi- 
cally. Then, when persecution of re- 
ligion has ended and the jails no longer 
contain political prisoners, national 
reconciliation and democracy will be 
possible. Unless this happens, "democ- 
ratization" will be a fraud. And until it 
happens, we will press for true democ- 
racy by supporting those fighting for it. 

Freedom in Nicaragua or Angola 
or Afghanistan or Cambodia or Eastern 
Europe or South Africa or anyplace 
else on the globe is not just an internal 
matter. Some time ago, the Czech dissi- 
dent writer Vaclav Havel warned the 
world that: "Respect for human rights 
is the fundamental condition and the 
sole genuine guarantee of true peace." 
And Audrey Sakharov, in his Nobel 
lecture, said: 

I am convinced that international 
confidence, mutual understanding, disar- 
mament, and international security are in- 
conceivable without an open society with 
freedom of information, freedom of con- 
science, the right to publish, and the right 
to travel and choose the country in which 
one wishes to live. 



New Prospects for 
U.S. -Soviet Relations 

Freedom serves peace. The quest for 
peace must serve the cause of freedom. 
Patient diplomacy can contribute to a 
world in which both can flourish. We're 
heartened by new prospects for im- 
provement in East- West and particu- 
larly U.S. -Soviet relations. 

Last week Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze visited Washington for 
talks with me and with Secretary of 
State Shultz. We discussed the full 
range of issues, including my long- 
standing efforts to achieve, for the first 
time, deep reductions in U.S. and 
Soviet nuclear arms. It was 6 years 
ago, for example, that I proposed the 
"zero option" for U.S. and Soviet 
longer range intermediate-range nu- 
clear missiles. I'm pleased that we have 
now agreed in principle to a truly his- 
toric treaty that will eliminate an entire 
class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weap- 
ons. We also agreed to intensify our 
diplomatic efforts in all areas of mutual 
interest. 



THE PRESIDENT 



Toward that end, Secretary Shultz 
and the Foreign Minister will meet 
again, a month from now, in Moscow, 
and I will meet again with General 
Secretary Gorbachev later this fall. 

We continue to have our differences 
and probably always will. But that puts 
a special responsibility on us to find 
ways — realistic ways — to bring greater 
stability to our competition and to show 
the world a constructive example of the 
value of communication and of the pos- 
sibility of peaceful solutions to political 
problems. 

And here let me add that we seek 
through our Strategic Defense Initia- 
tive (SDI) to find a way to keep peace 
through relying on defense — not 
offense — for deterrence and for even- 
tually rendering ballistic missiles obso- 
lete. SDI has greatly enhanced the 
prospects for real arms reduction. It is 
a crucial part of our efforts to ensure a 
safer world and a more stable strategic 
balance. 

We will continue to pursue the goal 
of arms reduction, particularly the goal 
that the General Secretary and I 
agreed upon — a 50% reduction in our 
respective strategic nuclear arms. We 
will continue to press the Soviets for 
more constructive conduct in the set- 
tling of regional conflicts. We look to 
the Soviets to honor the Helsinki ac- 
cords. We look for greater freedom for 
the Soviet peoples within their country, 
more people-to-people exchanges with 
our country, and Soviet recognition in 
practice of the right of freedom of 
movement. 

We look forward to a time when 
things we now regard as sources of fric- 
tion and even danger can become exam- 
ples of coopei-ation between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union. For instance, I 
have proposed a collaboration to reduce 
the barriers between East and West in 
Berlin and more broadly in Europe as 
a whole. Let us work together for a 
Europe in which force, whether in the 
form of walls or of guns, is no longer an 
obstacle to free choice by individuals 
and whole nations. I have also called 
for more openness in the flow of infor- 
mation from the Soviet Union about its 
military forces, policies, and programs 
so that our negotiations about arms re- 
ductions can proceed with greater 
confidence. 

We hear much about changes in the 
Soviet Union. We're intensely inter- 
ested in these changes. We hear the 
word glasnost, which is translated as 
"openness" in English. "Openness" is a 
broad term. It means the free, unfet- 
tered flow of information, ideas, and 



people. It means political and intellec- 
tual liberty in all its dimensions. We 
hope, for the sake of the peoples of the 
U.S.S.R., that such changes will come. 
And we hope, for the sake of peace, 
that it will include a foreign policy that 
respects the freedom and independence 
of other peoples. 

The United Nations: 
Ideals and Reality 

No place should be better suited for 
discussions of peace than this hall. The 
first Secretary General, Trygve Lie, 
said of the United Nations: "With the 
danger of fire, and in the absence of an 
organized fire department, it is only 
common sense for the neighbors to join 
in setting up their own fire brigades." 
Joining together to drown the flames of 
war — this, together with a Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, was the 
founding ideal of the United Nations. It 
is our continuing challenge to ensure 
that the United Nations lives up to 
these hopes. 

As the Secretary General noted 
some time ago, the risk of anarchy in 
the world has increased because the 
fundamental rules of the UN Charter 
have been violated. The General As- 
sembly has repeatedly acknowledged 
this with regard to the occupation of 
Afghanistan. The Charter has a con- 
crete practical meaning today because 
it touches on all the dimensions of hu- 
man aspiration that I mentioned ear- 
lier — the yearning for democracy and 
freedom, for global peace, and for 
prosperity. 

This is why we must protect the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
from being debased as it was through 
the infamous "Zionism is racism" reso- 
lution. We cannot permit attempts to 
control the media and promote cen- 
sorship under the ruse of a so-called 
New World Information Order. We 
must work against efforts to introduce 
contentious and nonrelevant issues into 
the work of the specialized and tech- 
nical agencies where we seek progress 
on urgent problems from terrorism to 
drug trafficking to nuclear prolifera- 
tion, which threaten us all. Such efforts 
corrupt the Charter and weaken this 
organization. 

There have been important ad- 
ministrative and budget reforms. They 
have helped. The United States is com- 
mitted to restoring its contribution as 
reforms progress. But there is still 
much to do. The United Nations was 



built on great dreams and great ideals. 
Sometimes it has strayed. It is time for 
it to come home. 

It was Dag Hammarskjold who 
said: "The end of all political effort 
must be the well-being of the individual 
in a life of safety and freedom." Well, 
should this not be our credo in the 
years ahead? 

I have spoken today of a vision 
and the obstacles to its realization. 
More than a century ago, a young 
Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, vis- 
ited America. After that visit he pre- 
dicted that the two great powers of the 
future world would be, on one hand, 
the United States, which would be 
built, as he said, "by the plowshare," 
and, on the other, Russia, which would 
go forward, again, as he said, "by the 
sword." Yet need it be so? Cannot 
swords be turned to plowshares? Can 
we and all nations not live in peace? 

In our obsession with antagonisms 
of the moment, we often forget how 
much unites all the members of human- 
ity. Perhaps we need some outside, uni- 
versal threat to make us recognize this 
common bond. I occasionally think how 
quickly our differences worldwide 
would vanish if we were facing an alien 
threat from outside this world. And 
yet, I ask you, is not an alien force 
already among us? What could be more 
alien to the universal aspirations of our 
peoples than war and the threat of war' 

Two centuries ago, in a hall much 
smaller than this one, in Philadelphia, 
Americans met to draft a constitution. 
In the course of their debates, one of 
them said that the new government, if 
it was to rise high, must be built on th( 
broadest base — the will and consent of 
the people. And so it was. And so it 
has been. 

My message today is that the 
dreams of ordinary people reach to as- 
tonishing heights. If we diplomatic pil- 
grims are to achieve equal altitudes, we 
must build all we do on the full breadth 
of humanity's will and consent and the 
full expanse of the human heart. 



i( 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 28, 1987. ■ 



if 



THE PRESIDENT 



Managing the Global Economy 



President Reagan's address before 
joint meeting of the International 
lank for Reconstrnction and Develop- 
nent (IBRD) and the International 
lonetary Fund (IMF) on September 
9, 1987. ' 

appreciate this opportunity to speak 
dth you today, and I thank you for 
hat greeting. And I still remember 
;hen we first met together, not that 
jng after my arrival in Washington. 
i.nd then we talked about a revolution 
1 economic thinking, a revolution 
/hose ideas have proven themselves in 
he years since. And while progress has 
een made, formidable challenges re- 
lain. It's fitting then, on this occasion, 
nat we make an assessment and dis- 
uss our vision of the world's economic 
otential, as mankind, quite literally, 
loves toward a new millennium. 

Making an assessment and setting 
oals are, of course, nothing more than 
ood management. And if there's any- 
ling that the working people, whose 
axes contribute to the support of our 
istitutions, have a right to insist upon, 
is just that — good management. The 
'orld looks to us for leadership, to set 
standard of honesty and responsibility 
nd rational decisionmaking. I'd like to 
ike this opportunity to thank each of 
ou for the exemplary work that you've 
een doing and to express my deep ap- 
reciation to Barber Conable [President 
f the World Bank] and Michel 
lamdessus [IMF Managing Director] 
)r their outstanding service. 

You know, when I mention good 
lanagement, that doesn't mean that 
verything always goes as expected, 
'here is a story about a man who was 
ivited to the opening of a new branch 
ffice of a business owned by his friend, 
ind the man ordered some flowers sent 
ver for the occasion but was shocked 
/hen he arrived to see that the inscrip- 
ion on the floral bouquet read, "Rest 
a Peace." Well, on the way home, he 
topped at the florist to complain. And 
he florist simply said, "Well, you know, 
on't get upset. Just look at it this way. 
May someone in this city was buried 
leneath a floral bouquet with the in- 
cription, 'Good luck in your new 
ocation.'" 



The U.S. Economy: Accomplishments 
and Responsibility 

But when I first addressed these in- 
stitutions 6 years ago, the United 
States was suffering from economic de- 
cisions that can only be described as 
bad management. Inflation, stagnation, 
and 21% interest rates were the order 
of the day. 

Good management must be built on 
sound principle. And before our eco- 
nomic revolution, the decisionmakers 
increasingly put their faith in solutions 
that, no matter how well-intended, did 
not work. Instead of encouraging en- 
terprise and production, the emphasis 
was on bureaucratic planning and re- 
distribution. Instead of demanding 
measurable results and strict account- 
ing from public spending, the Federal 
spigot was turned on. Resources were 
drained from productive, job-creating 
enterprise in the private sector and si- 
phoned to questionable, ineffective, and 
often counterproductive government 
programs. Decentralized decisionmak- 
ing in the private sector and in local 
and state government was supplanted 
by Federal planning, as new power and 
resources were centralized in the 
Federal bureaucracy. 

But as we found out to our detri- 
ment, good management should never 
be mistaken with the expansion of gov- 
ernment control and power over an 
economy. Good management, if it 
means anything, must bring a country 
closer to reaching its full potential and 
must improve the well-being of its 
people. 

Now, that's obviously not what was 
happening in the United States in the 
late 1970s. Policies then in place led to 
declining productivity, a drop in the 
gross national product, lower real take- 
home pay, and a dramatic rise in pov- 
erty. In 1980, the American people 
called for fundamental change, reform 
that would put this country solidly back 
on the road to growth, expansion, and 
long-term stability. 

Our goal was to increase economic 
activity from the bottom up. And again, 
good management doesn't mean amass- 
ing control and authority. It means 
finding ways of achieving one's objec- 
tives. In dealing with a national econ- 
omy, it means opening opportunity for 
the people and giving them the incen- 
tive to work more efficiently and to in- 



vest in economy-building projects and 
job-creating businesses; it means mak- 
ing certain that excessive regulation 
doesn't strangle enterprise; it means 
leaving enough resources in the private 
sector to serve the needs of investment; 
it means competition, even from foreign 
companies; and more than anything 
else, it means expanding freedom and 
opportunity for individuals instead of 
increasing the power of the state. 

You know, it's said that an econo- 
mist is the only professional who sees 
something working in practice and then 
seriously wonders if it works in theory. 
(I can say things like that, because my 
degree was in economics.) Whether one 
agrees with the theory, the results have 
been undeniable. The people of the 
United States have now enjoyed 57 
straight months of growth, which will 
shortly be the longest peacetime ex- 
pansion in our postwar era. Inflation, 
which was pubUc enemy number one 
in 1980, has been cut by nearly two- 
thirds. Unemployment is down, and 
employment in our country is at the 
highest level in our history. Interest 
rates are down. Productivity is up. Real 
family income is up. And we've at last 
reversed the rise in poverty that began 
in 1979. 

Credit for these accomphshments 
belongs to the American people them- 
selves because, as is often the case, the 
best thing government can do is get out 
of the way. And that's just what we've 
tried to do. 

Our expanding economy has not 
only improved the well-being of our own 
citizens but has served as an engine for 
progress throughout the world. The 
expansion of trade and international 
commerce during the last 6 years has 
helped keep our prices low, and indus- 
try and manufacturing competitive, and 
our economy growing. At the same 
time, expanding trade with the United 
States has helped many countries 
weather an economic storm. Earnings 
from exports to the United States, in 
some cases, made all the difference. 
The central themes of our relations, es- 
pecially with developing countries, have 
been, and should continue to be, trade 
rather than aid, mutual benefit rather 
than charity, a hand up rather than a 
handout. 



THE PRESIDENT 



There is, of course, the trade 
deficit — something of justifiable con- 
cern both in this country and abroad. 
Corrections are necessary, and there 
are strong signs that corrections are 
underway. It is vital, however, that pol- 
icymakers not be stampeded into self- 
destructive action. There has been a 
chorus of American politicians playing 
to the fears of working people, singing 
the song of protectionism and charging 
that, as a result of the trade deficit, 
jobs will go overseas, unemployment 
will rise, and the United States will be 
deindustrialized. 

It sounds good as part of a political 
campaign speech, but as an old Virginia 
lawyer once told his hometown jury, 
"tain't so." Unemployment has declined 
in the United States by 40% since late 
1982, even as our trade deficit has 
grown. In Japan and Germany, coun- 
tries with large trade surpluses, unem- 
ployment has gone up, and a long-term 
analysis shows us holding our own in 
manufacturing jobs. Importantly, from 
the end of 1982 to the present, during a 
time of large trade deficits, manufac- 
turing jobs in the United States gi-ew 
by more than a million. Furthermore, 
real wages in manufacturing, which 
declined by 7% from 1977 to 1981, in- 
creased by 2.5% from 1981 to 1986. 

The trade deficit is symptomatic of 
structural problems that we as manag- 
ers need to address. Self-destructive 
protectionism, however, is definitely not 
the answer. I pledge to you that any 
protectionist legislation reaching my 
desk is going to be returned to the 
Congress with veto on the cover. 

Part of the answer lies here at 
home. As I noted at the economic sum- 
mit in Venice last June, it's imperative 
that the United States consistently re- 
duce its Federal deficit spending. And 
today, I will sign a bill that reinstates 
our deficit reduction targets as part of 
an extension of the borrowing authority 
of the U.S. Government. 

Now, this was not an easy decision. 
On one hand was the responsibility to 
preserve our 200-year history of meet- 
ing our obligations and maintaining 
credibility and reliability to our own 
citizens and to the world. On the other 
hand was the political debate being 
waged between those who favor either 
raising ta.xes or cutting defense — or 
both— and those of us committed to fur- 
ther reductions in domestic spending: 
reductions that will bring down the def- 
icit and keep our economy strong. 



As I said, it was a tough decision. 
It should be seen as a signal that 
America is not backing down from its 
responsibilities. But having made this 
decision, I call on the surplus countries 
to do the same — to find the political 
gumption to stimulate their economies 
without reigniting the fires of inflation. 
It must be recognized that the health 
of the world economy does not hinge 
solely on U.S. budget policy. As U.S. 
budget and trade deficits decline, other 
countries must pick up the slack, par- 
ticularly on imports from developing 
countries. 

The Need for an Open 

and Fair World Trading System 

Our focus — and this means all of us — 
must be on achieving balanced growth 
and more open economies. [Ti-easury] 
Secretary Baker and finance ministers 
from other major countries have been 
working hard to devise ways to achieve 
these dual goals. This is a true test of 
our ability to manage the international 
economy. 

Certainly we cannot succeed with- 
out an open and fair world trading sys- 
tem. As the pace of change picks up, it 
is essential that the guidelines for trade, 
the rules of the road for international 
commerce, be kept up to date and that 
reoccurring areas of friction be dealt 
with. And that's why our government is 
totally committed to the success of the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] has played a major role in 
expanding world trade and economic 
growth in these last four decades. Now 
it must address new areas, as tech- 
nology and changing circumstances 
vastly increase the potential and scope 
of economic dealings between the peo- 
ples of the world. Services, investment, 
and intellectual property protection, 
formerly of only domestic concern, are 
now economic activities that are part of 
the arena of world commerce and must 
be included in any overall trade 
agreement. 

The management decisions are ours 
to make. This is a time of tremendous 
opportunity to set in place a world trad- 
ing structure that will carry mankind 
to new levels of enterprise, opportunity, 
and well-being. A good place to start 
achieving that laudable goal is with the 
substantive proposals the United States 
has set forth concerning agriculture. 



For too long, our farm policies hav 
managed us, instead of us managing 
them. Unless decisive and common ac- 
tion is taken, this growing burden coul 
well overwhelm us. In the major West- 
ern economies, farm subsidies alone 
have jumped from .$10 billion to $15 bil- 
lion in 1970 to $100 billion in 1986. And 
that is just the direct costs. Billions of 
dollars are being spent by government: 
for capital investment in agriculture 
that would be totally unnecessary with 
an open trading system. Consumers in 
nations that limit agricultural imports 
are forced to pay higher prices using 
family resources that could be put to 
much better use. 

The unnecessary costs, market 
distortions, and the inefficiencies of 
current agriculture policy are part of 
the political and economic landscape 
throughout much of the Western world 
And for this very reason, the common- 
ality of the problem — we believe a 
broad-based, cooperative, Internationa! 
solution is the only answer. 

We're asking the people of the 
world to consider not piecemeal reforn 
but revolutionary change in the produc 
tion and distribution of food and fiber. 
We propose a total phaseout over the 
next 10 years of farm export subsidies, 
quotas, nontariff barriers, and all dis- 
tortions of agricultural markets. In do 
ing so, world food costs will be cut, 
government budgets spared, wasteful 
practices eliminated, and economic 
growth boosted on a broad internation 
scale. We envision by the end of the 
century an open and free trading sys- 
tem in agricultural products throughou 
the vast expanses of the world. People 
of every land communicating, cooperat 
ing, and competing with each other; 
buying and selling; producing and dis- 
tributing; finding more efficient ways c 
meeting the universal challenge of 
keeping food on the table. 

And what we accomplish in agri- 
culture may some day be used as a 
blueprint for opening borders through- 
out the planet to the totahty of trade 
and commerce of every nation — a globt 
free and fair trading system, uniting 
and uplifting all mankind. And today, 
as we reaffirm our goals, let us under- 
score that as mankind moves forward, 
we go together. No nation will be ex- 
cluded; no people left behind. 

Third World Debt 

The United States remains fully com- 
mitted to doing its part in working wit 
those developing nations that are strug 
gling to improve the well-being of theii 



THE PRESIDENT 



people. Overcoming the obstacles to 
progress in these poorer nations is, per- 
haps, the greatest management chal- 
lenge in the world today. A cooperative 
solution to the debt problem is the only 
real answer. It involves a partnership 
among developing countries, commer- 
cial banks, and international financial 
institutions. 

The huge debt burden carried in 
the Third World is not just their prob- 
lem; it's our problem. And today let us 
pledge: we will solve it together. 

First and foremost, let us move for- 
ward with the understanding that there 
are no easy answers or quick fi.xes. 
Those who counsel otherwise are either 
mistaken or malicious. Now is the time 
for rational decisionmaking and respon- 
sible action. Those who choose to follow 
false prophets, to live in an illusion in- 
stead of seeking a solution, will be left 
with the consequences of their actions. 

What the United States has pro- 
posed is a positive program, a forward 
strategy, if you will, that will see debt 
■retired not by extracting wealth from 
Inations that are already too poor, but 
Iby increasing the level of economic ac- 
tivity and servicing the debt from new 
wealth. Last week. Secretary Baker 
(announced added U.S. support for this 
program with his endorsement of ex- 
panding the resources of the World Bank. 
A number of proposals to strengthen 
the IMF's ability to promote growth- 
oriented reform will be advanced soon. 
But this alone will not be enough. 

Leaders in debtor nations have 
tough decisions to make. Our slogan 
must be: it can be done. And let no 
one suggest that some peoples are con- 
demned by culture or race to misery 
and deprivation. Victor Hugo once 
wrote that, "People do not lack strength; 
they lack will." And the "will" comes 
from a realization that one can accom- 
plish what one sets out to do, that 
great deeds are possible. 

Movement Toward 
Market-Oriented Reforms 

What is needed is commitment — as in 
all good management plans, a model 
that works. The world is not without 
such models. In the last 30 years, 
there's been extraordinary growth and 
economic advancement in what were 
underdeveloped nations around the 

jiPacific rim, some of which are poor in 
■every significant natural resource, in- 

/cluding adequate territory. These peo- 
ples have overcome great difficulties, 

■improved their living standards, and 
'^ become a major force in the world econ- 



omy. They have done so using economic 
concepts similar to those that helped 
reinvigorate America's economy these 
last 5 years. Tkx structures and reg- 
ulatory policies designed to encourage 
investment and enterprise are the 
magic behind the miracle. And debt, 
coincidentally, has not been the serious 
roadblock to growth on the Pacific rim 
that it has been elsewhere. 

The success I'm talking about is in 
stark contrast to the misery and de- 
cline so evident in nations that have 
followed statist development models. In 
many parts of Africa, collectivism has 
brought decline even in countries rich 
in natural resources. There are, how- 
ever, reasons for hope that the corner 
has been turned in Africa. A growing 
commitment to economic, free reform is 
one of the most promising developments 
in years. Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon, 
and Malawi are some of the countries 
where market-oriented reforms are be- 
ing put in place. The World Bank and 
the IMF are supporting these efforts. 
The United States will do all we can. 
U.S. economic efforts in sub-Saharan 
Africa are aimed toward ending hunger 
through economic growth, policy re- 
form, and private sector development. 
My hope is that cooperative support for 
policy reform in Africa — including the 
active participation of other donor 
countries and institutions — can eHmi- 
nate hunger in Africa by the end of the 
century. 

The promise in some African 
countries is in stark contrast to the con- 
tinuing plight of Ethiopia. It's time to 
admit that in Ethiopia statism as well 
as drought were the cause of a human 
tragedy that touched the hearts of peo- 
ple throughout the world. Yet even as 
food, medicine, and other humanitarian 
support have poured into Ethiopia — 
donated by caring people in Western 
countries — the Marxist government 
there, supported by the Soviet Union, 
has barreled down a path that obliter- 
ates hope for the future. Sadly, famine 
again is returning to that land, and it is 
becoming ever more clear that funda- 
mental changes must occur if their 
2,000-year-old society is to survive. 

Ethiopia, of course, is an extreme 
example. Nevertheless, there is an un- 
deniable relationship between freedom 
and human progress in every part of 
the world. The more repressive the 
government, the more controlled the 
economy, the more confiscatory the tax- 
ation, the more likely a societv is to 



sink into poverty and despair. John Dos 
Passes was so right when he observed, 
"Marxism has not only failed to pro- 
mote human freedom. It has failed to 
produce food." 

Leaders in China understand this — 
well, understood it, I should say, when 
they began easing their country toward 
a freer economic system. Reform in 
China is now widespread and dramatic. 
From 1979 to 1985, the value of agri- 
cultural output in China rose at more 
than double the rate of the previous 15 
years. Rural per capita income more 
than doubled. The total grain harvest 
went from 300 million tons in 1978 to 
over 400 millions tons in 1984. In fact, 
in 1985, for the first time in 25 years, 
China became a net grain exporter. 
Similar progress is being enjoyed in 
other parts of the economy where re- 
forms have been instituted. 

Throughout the world, people are 
realizing that moving forward will re- 
quire cutting themselves free from stat- 
ist controls and from the weight of 
heavily subsidized government enter- 
prises. In many industrialized coun- 
tries, and in Third World countries as 
well, deregulation is the order of the 
day. Instead of looking at private enter- 
prise as the adversary, many govern- 
ments now see it as their best hope for 
progress and development. Tax rates 
are being lowered from New Zealand to 
France, from India to England. Govern- 
ment corporations are being privatized, 
denationalized, and cut off from sub- 
sidies from Ghana to Argentina, from 
the Philippines to Mexico. 

The impetus for privatization di- 
rectly complements efforts to reduce 
the debt burden. Debt-equity swaps 
can offer a method of turning money- 
losing government operations into tax- 
paying private businesses. The debt is 
reduced, and a budget obligation is 
eliminated. The government is, thereby, 
free to use its resources and focus its 
attention on other matters. 

My Presidential Tksk Force on 
Project Economic Justice, headed by 
Ambassador Wilham Middendorf, rec- 
ommended that this method could be 
used not only to bring down the debt 
and stimulate privatization, but to ex- 
pand employee ownership as well. Bold, 
innovative ideas like this are consistent 
with the overall American debt strat- 
egy and deserve to be given serious 
consideration. What is not needed now 
is business as usual. The United States 
will continue working with all those 
who are putting forth an honest effort 
to deal with the debt dilemma. 



THE PRESIDENT 



As vexing as our problems are, let 
no one doubt that democracy works. 
The unbridled energy of free people is 
the most powerful, creative, and moral 
force on this planet. And through all 
the political maneuvering and public de- 
bate, through the arduous negotiations, 
compromises, and balloting, one cannot 
but feel that he or she is part of some- 
thing far more grand, far more historic. 
There is more evidence every day that 
the future is on the side of the free. In 
the Western Hemisphere, the 1980s has 
seen a historic shift to democracy. To- 
day 90% of the people of the Western 
Hemisphere live in countries that are 
either democratic or in transition to 
democracy. 

All who love liberty are heartened 
by the return to democracy in the 
Philippines and by recent events in 
South Korea. All this is reason for con- 
fidence that mankind is truly moving 
into a new era of freedom and pros- 
perity, these two mutually reinforcing 
goals. 

Andres Bello, intellectual giant of 
the last century, once wrote: 

All truths touch on one another, from 
those that govern in the path of planets in 
space to those that delineate the actions 
and reactions of political forces. Progress 
in one line attracts progress in all others. 
All are connected and propel one another 
forward. 

Today we are part of that process 
of free men and women that is propel- 
ling mankind forward. The World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, and 
each of you are playing a vital role, and 
it has been my honor to speak with you 
today. 



'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Oct. 5, 1987. ■ 



Central American Peace Plan 



President Reagan's radio address 
to the people of Nicaragua on August 
22, 1987A 

The four Presidents of democratic Cen- 
tral America sat down with the commu- 
nist ruler of Nicaragua in Guatemala 
to negotiate a peace plan for Central 
America. They emerged from this sum- 
mit meeting with an agreement for 
regional peace based on promises of 
democracy. This peace plan calls for 
sweeping political and social change to 
take place in Nicaragua. 

In the upcoming weeks, our hopes 
will be measured against reality, and 
promises will be measured against 
deeds. The signing of the Guatemalan 
peace plan was an important act of 
faith. But our faith must be tempered 
by realism, because faith without real- 
ism will not end in peace but in disillu- 
sionment and a permanent communist 
rule that will threaten the other emerg- 
ing democracies in Central America. 

The Sandinistas promised to re- 
spect your rights when they signed this 
peace plan — rights that they have de- 
nied you for the last 8 years. They 
promised to respect your rights of free 
speech and free association. They prom- 
ised political, religious, and press free- 
dom. They promised access for all 
political parties and currents of opinion 
to the means of communication. They 
promised to lift the state of emergency. 
They promised free elections. 

The Sandinistas now have promised 
you democracy with the world as wit- 
ness. Like you, I hope that they keep 
this promise. But like you, I also know 
that the civil war in Nicaragua began 
when the Sandinistas promised you de- 
mocracy but failed to meet their com- 
mitment. This struggle will end when 
that promise is fulfilled. 



Under the terms of the Guatemalan 
plan, there must be democracy in Nic- 
aragua in order for the fighting to stop. 
This is called simultaneity. By accept- 
ing the Guatemalan plan, it means that 
the Sandinistas have agreed that the 
repression must stop at the same time 
that the fighting stops. The Sandinistas 
have told us this before, and no one 
believes the Sandinistas anymore. Si- 
multaneity must mean freedom up 
front, or no deal. 

We will be helping the democratic 
leaders of Central America and your 
countrymen inside Nicaragua as they 
seek a diplomatic solution to the war 
that has befallen your country, but we 
will remain firm in our policy. Our ob- 
jective remains the same: peace and de- 
mocracy in Nicaragua. Your commitment 
to freedom and democracy has created 
political movement and hope for libera- 
tion. For this, the people of Nicaragua 
and the people of Central America owe 
you a list of gratitude. I know your 
deepest wish is to return home to a 
free Nicaragua. Your struggle has, and 
always will have, our support, because 
our goal is the same: democracy. 

Until the people of Nicaragua are 
guaranteed basic liberties, I know you 
will keep on with the struggle, and the 
United States will be with you. The 
journey's end is Nicaragua libre [a free 
Nicaragua]. We must not stop until we 
reach that goal. 



' The President's address was pre- 
recorded on August 22 at Rancho del Cielo 
for broadcast on Radio Liberaeion on Au- 
gust 24 and 25. The address was broadcast 
twice: first in English, then in English with 
a simultaneous translation into Spanish. Ra- 
dio Liberaeion is owned and operated by the 
Niearaguan democratic resistance. The ad- 
dress was released on August 25 (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Aug. 31, 1987). ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



The Democratic Future of South Africa 



Secretary Sliultz's address before 
the Business Council for International 
Understanding in New York City on 
September 29, 1987.^ 

I appreciate the chance to talk with 
you, and I've picked out a topic that is, 
I believe, of great importance to our 
country, to the world, and to people in 
another country. I want to talk with 
you tonight about South Africa, about 
present realities and future pos- 
sibilities. Our policy toward South Af- 
rica must be grounded in reality, but it 
must also contain a vision of the future. 
Without a sense of reality, we will be 
ineffectual. Without vision, we will be 
directionless. The reahty is generally 
grim, but it contains some hopeful ele- 
ments. The vision seeks to build on 
those elements of hope to assist South 
Africans to create a nation that realizes 
the full potential of all its people. 

The Current Realities 

It is not easy to find elements of hope 
in present-day South Africa. It is much 
easier to see the evidence of the crisis 
South Africa is in: 

• The increased repression of 
blacks; 

• The escalation of violence from all 
sides; 

• The economic despair of millions 
of blacks who cannot get a decent edu- 
cation and decent jobs; 

• Increased press censorship; 

• The fear of innocent people, 
white and black, that they will become 
victims of indiscriminate terrorist at- 
tacks, such as car bombings; and 

• The lack of negotiations between 
the South African Government and its 
opponents. 

I share the anger that all Ameri- 
cans feel when children are thrown into 
detention without charge and physically 
abused. And, because of my job, I par- 
ticularly feel the frustration of having 
only limited influence, of not being able 
to make things right down there. That, 
too, is a reality. 

It is not within the power of the 
United States or any other country to 
impose a solution to South Africa's 
problems. The solution must come from 
South Africans themselves. Ultimately, 
it will only come when they sit down 
together and work it out in the give- 
and-take of negotiations. We want to 



help and, in fact, we will help. But the 
burden and, finally, the glory or the 
tragedy of the outcome are theirs. 

The United States will not walk 
away as South Africans struggle to de- 
cide their destiny. We care deeply 
about what happens to them. And we 
are united in our opposition to apart- 
heid. It must be eliminated, and it will 
be eliminated. On that, all Americans — 
Republicans or Democrats, liberal or 
conservative — agree. Our own history 
of racial injustice gives us special rea- 
son to hate apartheid. We know that it 
can produce a national tragedy and that 
every day it produces countless per- 
sonal tragedies. 

Apartheid and 
Regional Instability 

But the issue is not only one of moral 
repugnance, though that would be 
enough to confirm our unalterable op- 
position to apartheid. The fact is that 
apartheid is a primary cause of instabil- 
ity throughout southern Africa. It is a 
bleeding wound within South Africa it- 
self. It is a dead weight on an economic 
machine that might otherwise be stim- 
ulating development throughout the re- 
gion. Attacks on apartheid, and defense 
of it, account for almost all of the cross- 
border violence in the region. While 
apartheid exists, cross-border violence 
will continue, economies will be dislo- 
cated, and outside intervention will be 
encouraged. That is another reality. 

The current climate of instability 
and violence does not serve our inter- 
ests, and it does not benefit the coun- 
tries in the region. An end to apartheid 
and a strengthened regional focus on 
economic development would bring 
greater opportunities for us to play a 
creative and constructive role. It is in 
our interest to be involved there. 
Southern Africa is rich in natural re- 
sources and strategically located. Our 
objectives are: 

• To assist the countries in the 
region to improve the lives of their 
people; 

• To end intervention by outside 
military forces; and 

• To reduce the opportunity and 
temptation for such intervention to 
recur. 



So, in opposing apartheid, there 
is no conflict between our ideals and 
our interests. They converge around 
the same point — a rapid end to apart- 
heid, achieved by negotiations among 
all South Africans. We intend to play 
an active role in pursuit of that goal — 
but active in support of those South 
Africans who are working to bring about, 
through peaceful means, a just and demo- 
cratic society. I sense, unfortunately, 
that the grim realities of South Africa 
today have produced a debilitating pes- 
simism, both within South Africa and 
in the international community, about 
the possibility of a peaceful and just 
solution to the country's problems. 
Some despair of avoiding Armageddon; 
others seem almost to welcome it. 

Elements of Hope 

We Americans are an optimistic people, 
a people who believe that with hard 
work, dedication, and energy no prob- 
lems are insurmountable. When, as an 
American, I look at the trauma in 
South Africa, I emphatically reject the 
fatalistic notion that the country's fu- 
ture has already been written, that it is 
too late for accommodation. I know that 
there is hope for the future. 

For the past several years, I have 
given South Africa the highest priority. 
I have talked in depth with many who 
have visited South Africa and have met 
with many South African leaders, both 
black and white. I have spent consider- 
able time listening to South Africans 
from every part of that country's polit- 
ical spectrum, as have others in our 
government. In the past year, I have 
met with leading South Africans such 
as Chief Buthelezi, Oliver Tkmbo, 
Allan Boesak, Colin Eglin, and Enos 
Mabuza. I also asked Frank Cary and 
Bill Coleman to chair a special advisory 
committee on South Africa. I studied 
their report seriously and benefited 
from their counsel. And we stay in con- 
stant touch with the South African 
Government in a variety of ways, 
including through Ambassador [Ed- 
ward J.] Perkins in Pretoria and the 
South African Ambassador in 
Washington. 



THE SECRETARY 



Good Will, But a 

Lack of Communication 

From everything I have learned about 
South Africa, two themes have come to 
the forefront of my attention. 

First, despite everything, there is a 
sense of common identity and a reservoir 
of good will among South Africans- 
black, white, colored, and Asian— good 
will for their fellow countrymen. 

Second, there is a tremendous 
need for communication across racial 
lines in South Africa. 

Apartheid has succeeded all too 
well in its design of keeping the races 
apart. South Africans of different races 
may talk about one another all the 
time, but they all too rarely talk to one 
another. One of President Reagan's fa- 
vorite sayings about situations like this 
is that it's much better to talk to one 
another than about one another, but 
the reverse is true in South Africa. 
The result is e.xactly what one would 
predict — mutual misunderstanding and 
fear: fear by whites that their way of 
life will be destroyed and fear by blacks 
that their just aspirations will never be 
realized through peaceful means. These 
fears are paralyzing. They become self- 
fulfilling because all parties convince 
themselves that it is impossible to en- 
gage in a true give-and-take with the 
others. 

Yes, there is growing anger and 
bitterness. There is a burning desire to 
right past and present injustices. And 
there is a debilitating fear of unleashing 
pent-up grievances and violent retribu- 
tion. But that reservoir of good will of 
which I spoke provides something on 
which to build. 

Of the many tragedies that afflict 
South Africa today, surely one of the 
greatest is that the good will that ex- 
ists has so little opportunity to be ex- 
pressed across racial hnes. For, when 
South Africans do sit down and talk to 
one another, they find that the barriers 
that separate them are not as high as 
they had feared. They find that the ties 
that bind them are stronger than they 
had realized. The more they are able to 
reach across the racial barriers and 
talk, the more they see how much they 
have in common, how much they have 
to gain by working together, and how 
much they have to lose if they do not. 
There is great potential here, reason to 
hope that South Africa's problems are 
not insurmountable, that differences 
can be overcome. The headlines often 
go to the negative realities of South 



Africa, not to the hopeful elements. 
But there are efforts to expand commu- 
nications between the races, and there 
is evidence that those efforts can bear 
fruit. Let's look at a few of them. 

The Natal Indaba. In Natal, lead- 
ers from all the racial gi-oups sat down 
last year and negotiated a set of new 
constitutional proposals for their 
province — the Indaba proposals. These 
proposals, if implemented, would essen- 
tially end apartheid for the one-fifth of 
South Africans who live in that one 
province. Some in the South African 
Government and its opposition have 
been less than enthusiastic about the 
idea, which came from the people of 
Natal themselves rather than from 
Pretoria or outside the country. But the 
voices for change coming from Natal 
are too strong for anyone to ignore. 
Currently the Indaba leaders are plan- 
ning a referendum among all the cit- 
izens of Natal, of all races. This would 
be the first time blacks have ever voted 
on a major substantive political issue in 
South Africa. The jury is still out on 
this dramatic development, but the fact 
remains that there are powerful forces 
working to resolve South Africa's politi- 
cal problems through negotiations. 
Those forces may encounter setbacks 
and roadblocks, but they will not sim- 
ply roll over in defeat. If not successful 
this time, they will rise again for an- 
other struggle. 

The ANC/Afrikaner Meeting in 
Dakar. In Dakar, Senegal, this sum- 
mer, leading members of the Afrikaner 
community met with leaders of the 
African National Congress (ANO— an 
encounter that would have been un- 
thinkable even a couple of years ago. 
For several days they discussed the 
fundamental issues of South Africa's fu- 
ture. This was not a negotiation aimed 
at producing agreements; I'd call it talk 
about the future. By all accounts, many 
participants found that they had clear 
differences. But they also found that 
they had more in common than they had 
ever dared imagine. Such communica- 
tion, in multiple channels and including 
all relevant viewpoints, is precisely what 
should be encouraged and expanded 
upon. It breaks down stereotypes — 
racial as well as ideological — and it has 
the potential to identify the shape of a 
road forward. We applaud the vision 
and courage of all who participated in 
those talks, as well as those farsighted 
Africans who helped to put it together, 
especially President Diouf of Senegal. 



Black Empowerment. These 
efforts at cross-racial talks and negotia- 
tions are not the only elements of hope 
in South Africa. Black leadership, black 
economic strength, and black organiza- 
tional skill, aided by powerful political 
and economic forces, are growing daily. 
Movements such as the United Demo- 
cratic Front, Inkatha, and AZAPO 
[Azanian People's Organization] are evi- 
dence of these changes. Despite the re- 
pression of the state of emergency, 
blacks continue to express their griev- 
ances and flex their political and eco- 
nomic muscles. Labor unions, which 
were not legal for blacks until 1979, are 
gaining daily in strength and sophisti- 
cation. The architects of apartheid had 
to concede long ago that they could not 
build a modern economic powerhouse — 
or even sustain significant growth — 
without the participation of ever- 
increasing numbers of skilled and 
educated blacks. 

In the field of labor-management 
relations, blacks and whites are learn- 
ing the politics of negotiation, going 
beyond the politics of white minority 
domination and black protest. Blacks 
are learning that they can sit down as 
equals with whites and negotiate a 
fairer share of wealth and power. 
Whites are learning that it is possible 
to sit down with blacks and hammer 
out an agreement that is mutually sat- 
isfactory. Each side is gaining respect 
for the process of negotiation. Each 
side is learning how much damage can 
happen if negotiations fail. 

These are not easy lessons. 
I've been involved in many labor- 
management disputes myself. It can be 
a humbling experience until both sides 
learn that either they both win or they 
both lose. Before that lesson is learned 
they often push themselves into open 
confrontation, substituting threats and 
non-negotiable demands for real dia- 
logue. Negotiating lessons are being 
learned on a daily basis in South 
African labor-management relations. 
Their effects are carrying over into 
South Africa's politics as well as its 
economics. 

The Role of Business. A strong 
and growing South African economy is 
a powerful force for change. South 
Africa's white businessmen have been 
in the forefront in the white community 
in arguing that apartheid is an un- 
workable ideology incompatible with a 
modern economy. Blacks are moving 
into managerial positions in major 



10 



Department of State Bulletir 



THE SECRETARY 



industries. American corporations, 
often maligned for even being in South 
Africa, can be proud of being in the 
forefront of the forces for change. 
Blacks are seeking to start their own 
businesses in record numbers, a sign of 
confidence in their country's future 
even as their own activities contribute 
to its transformation. The future of 
South Africa's economy depends on the 
success of black labor and management. 
Without them, the growth that is needed 
to overcome the country's social and 
economic injustices will not be possible. 
But with the full and free participation 
of skilled and educated black workers 
and businessmen, the future of South 
Africa's economy can be bright indeed. 

Religion and Change. Finally, let 
us not forget the message of hope car- 
ried by the powerful force of religion in 
South Africa. South Africans are de- 
voutly religious people, whether they 
ibe whites, blacks, coloreds, or Asians, 
iChristians, Jews, Muslims, or Hindus. 
In the integrated churches, blacks are 
moving into ever-greater numbers of 
leadership positions. These churches 
represent institutional channels for dia- 
l()j;ue and reconciliation across racial 
barriers. Religious leaders are playing 
important roles in resolving community 
disputes, and they are fostering self- 
help projects among those disadvan- 
taged by apartheid. 

One of the pillars of apartheid had 
always been the moral support of the 
Dutch Reformed Church, the largest 
church among Afrikaners. It claimed, 
until last year, that apartheid was not 
only allowed but actually required by 
the teachings of the Bible. After many 
months of internal debate, it announced 
last year that its previous teachings 
were wrong; it said that apartheid is 
not justified by the Bible and is not in 
accordance with Christian principles. 
This simple but powerful truth hit like 
a thunderbolt among the Afrikaners. 
Suddenly the spurious moral basis for 
apartheid had been stripped away, re- 
vealing it for the unjust and un- 
sanctified system that it is. 

So, there are elements of hope 
amid the grim realities of present-day 
South Africa. Some negotiations are 
going on; a willingness to compromise 
still exists. There are institutions with 
which to work. There are individuals 
with whom to work. Change in South 
Africa is not on some distant agenda 
for the future. It is taking place right 
now. And we intend to be involved, 
working with those institutions, with 



November 1987 



those individuals, with those forces for 
change — part of the solution, not part 
of the problem. 

What We Are Doing 

What are we doing to help in South 
Africa? First, we are meeting with 
South Africans from across the political 
spectrum, both in South Africa and 
abroad. We are talking and listening, 
and we are forcefully stating our point 
of view about the steps that need to be 
taken to bring a peaceful end to apart- 
heid. We are suggesting practical steps 
that should be taken, such as the re- 
lease of all political prisoners, including 
Nelson Mandela, and the unbanning of 
all political parties. Serious negotia- 
tions can only be conducted by credible 
leaders. It is not up to white South 
Africans to decide which black South 
Africans should sit at the negotiating 
table. That is for black South Africans 
to decide. 

We count heavily on our mission in 
South Africa to keep open our lines of 
communication to all elements in South 
Africa and to encourage them to en- 
gage in dialogue. Ambassador Perkins 
has been in South Africa for the better 
part of a year now. He has made a con- 
certed personal effort to meet with as 
many South Africans as possible, in- 
side and outside the government, to lis- 
ten and to convey our message. He has 
ensured that the entire U.S. mission in 
South Africa is also reaching out to as 
many South Africans as possible to do 
the same thing. We also continue to 
meet with exiled South Africans, such 
as leaders of the ANC and the PAC 
[Pan-African Congress]. 

Our activities are not limited to 
words and meetings, however. We are 
promoting positive change through our 
program of aid to black South Africans. 
Our aid is not funneled through the 
South African Government, but rather 
to private groups that are working to 
attain racial equality. Among the many 
programs, we are assisting a college in 
a black township outside Pretoria to 
help underqualified black teachers up- 
grade their skills. The lack of equal op- 
portunities for quality education is one 
of the crucial tools the architects of 
apartheid used to keep blacks disadvan- 
taged. Recognizing this, we have tar- 
geted improved education opportunities 
for blacks as one of the keystones of 
our aid program. We provide scholar- 
ships for hundreds of blacks to study 
both in the United States and in South 



Africa. And we support curriculum de- 
velopment programs to help black stu- 
dents gain entrance to universities. 

Other areas of South African soci- 
ety are also targets of our aid. The 
development of democracy requires 
local communities to organize to help 
themselves. We are funding several 
such projects that have been developed 
in cooperation with local communities. 
We are also helping to train blacks to 
start small businesses and strengthen 
skills in labor unions. And, in another 
crucial area, we are assisting legal re- 
sources centers that are helping blacks 
to fight back legally against the injus- 
tices of apartheid. All of these programs 
are designed to help blacks develop the 
leadership skills in all fields — labor, 
business, education, community organi- 
zation, and so on — so that they will be 
able to take their rightful place as lead- 
ers in a democratic postapartheid South 
Africa. 

Private American individuals and 
organizations are also playing an im- 
portant and positive role in promoting 
change in South Africa. Ideas and 
role models from the Western democ- 
racies are powerful forces for change in 
South Africa. South Africans are being 
stimulated and challenged to question 
their assumptions and search for cre- 
ative solutions through constant inter- 
action with American churches, founda- 
tions, universities, and corporations. 
Americans want South Africans to un- 
derstand that we support the aspira- 
tions of blacks for equality but also to 
understand the fears and concerns of 
white South Africans. We are working 
to help all South Africans, black and 
white, secure a bright future for them- 
selves and their children. We must, as a 
people, continue to use our most power- 
ful leverage, our ideas, to promote 
peaceful change in South Africa. It 
would be counter to the objective of 
ending apartheid if we were to isolate 
South Africans and withdraw our influ- 
ence from that society. 

That is why we strongly support 
the continued presence of American 
business in South Africa. American 
companies have been in the forefront in 
the business community in promoting 
equal opportunity for their employees 
and in developing the managerial skills 
of blacks. Their examples have helped 
to stimulate South African companies 
to do likewise. These positive changes 
are helping to change attitudes as well 
as improve the lot of South African 
blacks. 



THE SECRETARY 



So, there are several elements of 
our policy toward South Africa to en- 
courage peaceful change: 

• Meeting with all parties to the 
dispute to challenge them to break 
through the stereotypes and non- 
negotiable demands and engage in a 
real dialogue leading to a peaceful 
resolution based on the consent of 
the majority; 

• Fostering change on the ground 
in South Africa by working with the 
victims of apartheid to help them 
develop leadership skills and self- 
empowerment, both economic and 
political; 

• Supporting an active private 
American presence in South Africa to 
promote democratic values, including 
encouraging American businesses to 
stay and to build on their already com- 
mendable efforts to promote racial 
equality; and 

• Working with our allies to assert 
our vision of the future, with the inten- 
tion of stimulating debate and reasoned 
dialogue among South Africans about 
the parameters of a democratic future 
for their country. 

Our Vision of the Future 

It is obviously not up to us to prescribe 
a detailed blueprint for political change 
in South Africa. That must be worked 
out in negotiations open to participation 
by all South Africans. But we have lis- 
tened carefully to what South Africans 
have to say about the future of their 
country. And we do have experience to 
draw on — the Western experience of 
building democracies, an achievement 
in which we take pride and which we 
believe offers something of value to 
other countries as well. 

I, therefore, want to close my re- 
marks by spelling out the democratic 
values on which our policy is based. We 
want South Africans to know clearly 
what we are for, as well as what we are 
against. These are ideas that we believe 
would help South Africans chart their 
own path to a democratic and pros- 
perous future. We Americans do not 
claim a monopoly on democratic con- 
cepts for another country, but we have 
every reason to make clear our hopes 
and vision. I challenge South Africans 
to rise to the test of building a future 
which takes these ideas into account. 

Here, then, are the basic ideas that 
we believe must be addressed by all 
South Africans as they negotiate a re- 
placement for the current system in 
South Africa: 



12 



• A new constitutional order for a 
united South Africa establishing equal 
political, economic, and social rights for 
all South Africans without regard to 
race, language, national origin, or 
religion; 

• A democratic electoral system 
with multiparty participation and uni- 
versal franchise for all adult South 
Africans; 

• Effective constitutional guaran- 
tees of basic human rights for all South 
Africans as provided for in the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the canons of democracies everywhere, 
including: the right to liberty and se- 
curity of persons; the right to freedom 
of speech and the press, peaceful as- 
sembly and association, and practice of 
religion; the right of labor to organize 
and pursue peacefully its economic ob- 
jectives; the right not to be deprived of 
property except by due process of law 
and upon payment of just compensa- 
tion; the right of movement within the 
country, emigration, and repatriation; 
and the right of individuals and commu- 
nities to use their own languages and 
develop their cultures and customs; 

• The rule of law, safeguarded by 
an independent judiciary with the power 
to enforce the rights guaranteed by the 
constitution to all South Africans; 

• A constitutional allocation of 
powers between the national govern- 
ment and its constituent regional and 
local jurisdictions, in keeping with 
South Africa's deeply rooted regional 
and cultural traditions; and 

• An economic system that guaran- 
tees economic freedom for every South 
African, allocates government social 
and economic services fairly, and en- 
ables all South Africans to realize the 
fruits of their labor, acquire and own 
property, and attain a decent standard 
of living for themselves and their 
families. 

A Policy That 
Supports Our Vision 

This, then, is our vision for a demo- 
cratic future for South Africa. As such 
a South Africa struggles to be born, 
there is an urgent need for all con- 
cerned in southern Africa to work for 
an end to violence in all directions — 
whether it be the violence of cross- 
border raids or the violence between 
security forces and demonstrators in 
the black townships. There is a need 
for strict respect by all the countries of 
southern Africa for the sovereignty and 



territorial integrity of their neighbors. 
A South Africa at peace with itself on 
the basis of the ideas I have just set 
forth would also be at peace with its 
neighbors and entitled to their recogni- 
tion and respect. And a regional order 
in which all states lived in peace would 
encourage South Africans to get about 
the task of negotiations. 

Apartheid has condemned the ma- 
jority of South Africans to an unjust 
state of economic underdevelopment. 
Certainly we can strive to do more. As 
South Africans move toward meaningful 
negotiations, the United States would 
be willing to encourage this process. 
One of the ways we could encourage it 
would be to expand our efforts to help 
the victims of apartheid lift themselves 
out of poverty. 

If the contending parties in South 
Africa are ready to take risks for 
peace, they may be assured of the ac- 
tive political, diplomatic, and economic 
support of the United States and its 
allies. We will support those who are 
working toward these democratic goals. 
We are ready to take whatever steps 
we can — providing channels of commu- 
nication or a site or lending our politi- 
cal support for meetings between South 
Africans interested in serious dialogue. 

The problems in South Africa are 
vast. At times they appear overwhelm- 
ing. A long-entrenched system of racial 
oppression must and will be replaced. 
This can be done without in the proc- 
ess destroying a society and economy 
that can offer better lives to all South 
Africans. This process will not be easy. 
All parties will have to be prepared to 
discard their non-negotiable demands 
and make difficult compromises. 

The hard work is up to the South 
African people themselves. They are 
South Africa's greatest resource and its 
greatest hope. They have it within their 
power to create a bright future for 
their children and to unlock the tre- 
mendous potential of their land. The 
time has come for South Africans to act 
on their hopes, not on their fears. They 
will find a friend in the United States 
when they do so, a friend that is real- 
istic in its understanding, hopeful in its 
expectations, and optimistic in its vi- 
sion of what they can achieve. 



I Press release 19:3 of Oct. 1. 1987, 
which also includes a question-and-answer 
session with the audience. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Peace, Democracy, 

and Security in Central America 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee on September 10, 1987} 

Not very long ago, Central America 
was the subject of divisive and often 
partisan confrontations. Today Central 
America is still headline news, but the 
situation has changed sharply. Our 
work to support the development of de- 
mocracy in Central America — most of it 
done on a bipartisan basis — has im- 
proved the situation in both Central 
America and the United States. The 
national security stakes are still very 
high, but prospects for peace and de- 
mocracy in Central America are 
brighter today than at any previous 
point in the 1980s. 

Progress in Central America 

The Central American democracies 
have made a remarkable recovery from 
their near-disastrous circumstances at 
the beginning of this decade. 

In 1980-81, a lot of people thought 
it was too late to end the spreading 
turmoil and violence in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua or to stop the spread of com- 
munism in Central America. They 
thought the United States would ulti- 
mately either have to use U.S. troops 
or else simply have to become ac- 
customed to having the Soviet Union as 
the dominant power from Panama to 
Me.xico. 

The President knew that the Sovi- 
ets must not be permitted to add a 
strategic hold on the mainland to their 
position in Cuba. And he also under- 
stood that communism couldn't bring 
freedom or prosperity to Central Amer- 
ica any more than it has to Cuba. So he 
decided to support Central Americans 
willing to work and, if necessary, fight 
for democracy and human dignity. 
Freedom and prosperity are what Cen- 
tral Americans want. In supporting our 
neighbors in their efforts to achieve 
them, we would be backing freedom 
and helping our national security at the 
same time. 

Today, with American support, the 
tide has turned in Central America. 
Costa Rica, long one of the world's 
leading democracies, continues to 
stand, above all else, for freedom and 



November 1987 



the rule of law. El Salvador, Honduras, 
and now Guatemala have freely elected 
governments that are offering their 
people the chance for a better future. 

We can be proud of our counti'y's 
role in this progress. U.S. strategy in 
Central America has combined eco- 
nomic assistance with diplomacy, se- 
curity assistance, and political action 
into a comprehensive package of mea- 
sures in support of development and 
freedom. 

And this strategy has had substan- 
tial bipartisan support. Ikke El Sal- 
vador as an example: when this 
Administration increased U.S. military 
aid against the 1981 guerrilla offensive, 
we also continued our support for Car- 
ter Administration initiatives backing 
land reform and human rights. We 
made development, democracy, diplo- 
macy, and defense into a single, inter- 
related package. It took a while to 
restore the U.S. reputation for reliabil- 
ity, but today Salvadoran democrats 
know they can count on the moral and 
material support of the United States. 

The National Bipartisan Commis- 
sion on Central America, headed by 
Henry Kissinger, agreed with and de- 
veloped further this comprehensive ap- 
proach — for El Salvador and for other 
Central American countries. Bipartisan 
majorities in Congress voted for the in- 
creased resources to make our demo- 
cratic development strategy work. 

Today the blatant e.xception to the 
new democratic tide is Nicaragua. 
After Somoza fled and a temporary 
government was formed, an armed 
communist minority squeezed out the 
Nicaraguans who still believed in 
democracy. Brave men and women — 
newsmen, priests, labor leaders, peas- 
ants, Indians — were again forced to re- 
sist censorship, human rights abuse, 
and dictatorship. But this time they 
also had to resist Cubans, East Ger- 
mans, Bulgarians, North Koreans, and 
Russians. 

No U.S. Government could be in- 
different to these events. And we were 
not. As the betrayal of the anti-Somoza 
revolution became clearer, and as it be- 
came obvious also that many Nic- 
araguans were willing to resist the 
communization of their country, a bipar- 
tisan majority began to evolve in the 
Congress — and one was finally forged 
last fall. 



So the story is one of progress and 
of possibility. The Central American de- 
mocracies have grown in coherence and 
resolve. For our part, as all of you 
know, it has not been smooth, but ours, 
too, is a story of emerging consensus 
and realism about the stakes involved. 

Nicaragua remains the odd-man- 
out in this otherwise encouraging pic- 
ture. It is an obstacle to Central Amer- 
ican unity, a threat to its neighbors, 
and the vehicle for bringing East- West 
rivalry onto the American mainland. 

Recent Moves Toward Peace 

Over this past summer, three develop- 
ments have come together to shape an 
important opportunity for peace. 

• The first took place here in the 
United States. Putting the national in- 
terest above partisanship, President 
Reagan and Speaker [of the House Jim] 
Wright made clear that the leadership 
in this country agrees on basic U.S. 
security objectives in Central America. 
They agreed that U.S. interests require 
a democratic Nicaragua that is not a 
military threat to its neighbors and 
does not turn itself into a platform for 
Soviet and Cuban activities hostile to 
the security of our own country. 

• The second development was the 
increasing success of the democratic 
forces of the Nicaraguan resistance. 
Their improved military performance 
since January and their broadened po- 
litical leadership since May turned 
them into a serious challenge and po- 
tential political alternative to Nic- 
aragua's communist regime. 

• The third event took place in 
Guatemala. Central America's demo- 
cratic presidents affirmed their belief 
that, with our continued support, peace 
and democracy are attainable in the en- 
tire region. 

In response to these pressures, 
Nicaragua's Government has committed 
itself, in writing, to a process of democ- 
ratization. On August 7, when Presi- 
dents Arias of Costa Rica, Azcona 
of Honduras, Cerezo of Guatemala, 
and Duarte of El Salvador met in 
Guatemala to sign a regional peace 
agreement, Daniel Ortega signed along 
with them. 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



Central Aspects of 
the Peace Agreement 

The Guatemala agreement commits the 
five Central American signatories— in- 
cluding Nicaragua— to democratization. 
This is to include complete freedom of 
the press, full political pluralism, and 
the lifting of all states of emergency. 
The governments of the region commit 
themselves to undertake all the neces- 
sary steps for achieving an effective 
cease-fire. National reconciliation is de- 
fined as encompassing the unarmed po- 
litical opposition and those armed 
groups which take advantage of each 
nation's amnesty law. The agreement 
calls for elections for a Central Ameri- 
can parliament, to occur by June 30, 
1988. In each country, verification of de- 
mocratization is to be overseen by a 
four-member National Commission of 
Reconciliation. 

The signatories commit themselves 
to denying the use of their national ter- 
ritories for logistical or military aid to 
forces destabilizing other governments. 
All assistance to irregular forces shall 
cease, with the exception of that 
needed for the resettlement of combat- 
ants and the voluntary repatriation of 
refugees. 

Finally, the Contadora group is re- 
quested to mediate the security, ver- 
ification, and control elements of the 
Contadora treaty proposal as well as 
assist in detailing the mechanisms for 
disarming groups taking advantage of 
amnesties. Overall compliance with the 
agreement is to be conducted by the 
verification commission (composed of 
the Secretaries General of the OAS [Or- 
ganization of American States] and the 
United Nations, and the foreign minis- 
ters of.the five Central American na- 
tions and the eight Contadora and 
support group nations). 

The key dates in the Guatemala 
plan are November 7, when the democ- 
ratization and cease-fire provisions are 
to take effect, and January 7, when 
their results are to be evaluated. 

There are many positive aspects to 
the Guatemala agreement, chief among 
them the requirement of reciprocity 
and simultaneity. This is a regional plan 
with overlapping and mutually reinforc- 
ing obligations, not a set of isolated 
unilateral commitments by five coun- 
tries. For example, the Nicaraguan 
regime has adamantly refused to 
undertake the kind of dialogue between 
the insurgents and the government that 
has already occurred in El Salvador and 



that President Duarte has again offered 
in connection with El Salvador's actions 
under the Guatemala agreement. If the 
Ortega regime fails to meet its signed 
obligation to enable the resistance to 
return openly to Nicaragua and 
organize politically and freely, then 
Nicaragua's neighbors will not be obli- 
gated to ban resistance military and 
political support activities in their 
countries. If no cease-fire is negotiated, 
other measures are in abeyance. 

As democracies, we and the free 
nations of Central America face in com- 
mon the threat of communism on the 
mainland. Our and their security inter- 
ests run parallel. At the same time, of 
course, the Guatemala agreement does 
not explicitly deal with America's na- 
tional security concerns. It is our re- 
sponsibility to define and assert that 
interest for ourselves. 

Political democracy in Nicaragua 
would deal with many of these con- 
cerns, for no democratic government in 
Nicaragua would attack its neighbors 
or allow its territory to be used mili- 
tarily by the Soviet Union. But we can- 
not place our security interests at risk 
in the hope that positive internal 
changes will take place in Nicaragua. It 
is our responsibility to insist, as does 
the Reagan-Wright peace plan, that 
there be no Soviet or Cuban military 
presence in Nicaragua and that Nic- 
aragua pose no military or subversive 
threat to its neighbors or the region. 
We cannot forget that the Sandinista 
regime is armed by the Soviet Union, 
that its internal security depends on 
thousands of Cuban military personnel, 
and that it is located only 500 miles 
from our southern border and 300 miles 
from the Panama Canal. Soviet and 
Cuban military ties to Nicaragua— mili- 
tary facilities, aid levels, sophistication 
of weaponry — are issues of vital and di- 
rect interest to us; they must be dealt 
with. 

However incomplete, the Guate- 
mala agreement is a good beginning. 
Moreover, what has been promised 
in the agreement is a very great deal. 
The democratization provisions alone 
are, simply put, incompatible with a 
communist dictatorship. 

All in all, the Guatemala agree- 
ment expresses a harmonic and logical 
vision that is keyed to democracy and 
depends on the simultaneous implemen- 
tation of a series of mutual obligations. 
If any part fails, the entire structure 
fails. 'We must be certain that there are 
firm criteria, serious deadlines, and an 
awareness of the costs of failure. 



U.S. Diplomatic Efforts 

Can the United States help make the 
Guatemala agreement work? The an- 
swer is that it is certainly in our inter- 
est to try. We are and must give it our 
fullest and strongest support. 

Since the signing of the August 7 
agreement, we have intensified our dip 
lomatic consultations in Central Amer- 
ica—both with our allies and within our 
own foreign affairs community, includ- 
ing a conference here in Washington of 
our ambassadors to the region, followed 
by a visit to the region by a diplomatic 
team led by Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for Central America William 
Walker. We also began a series of con- 
tacts in Latin America and Europe to 
secure support for democratic groups, 
procedures, and events inside 
Nicaragua. 

We will intensify these diplomatic 
efforts this month and through the fall. 
I will be meeting with my counterparts 
from Central America and other inter- 
ested countries at the General Assem- 
blies of the United Nations and 
particularly of the Organization of 
American States, which meets in 
November in San Francisco. A number 
of high-level bilateral visits are planned 
as well. 

We have two outstanding ambas- 
sadors in Central America now: Ed 
Corr in El Salvador and Ted Briggs in 
Honduras. We need to move as quickly 
as possible to fill the other three vacan 
cies. Our choice for Ambassador to 
Guatemala is Jim Michel, a professional 
who knows the Executive, the Con- 
gress, and the region. The President is 
nominating Deane R. Hinton to be Am- 
bassador to Costa Rica. Deane is one of 
the most deeply experienced and skill- 
ful people we have; he has served with 
distinction as Ambassador to El Sal- 
vador before his most recent post as 
Ambassador to Pakistan. In addition, a 
candidate has been chosen to fill the 
ambassadorship to Nicaragua. Like 
Ambassador Hinton, he is a career For- 
eign Service officer and among the 
ablest diplomats we have. I want to 
work closely and responsively with you 
on these nominations; it is crucial to 
our ability to support the peace efforts 
to have all of these diplomats at their 
posts as soon as possible. 

To ensure that our many diplomatic 
efforts work together, I am pleased to 
announce that the President has just 
named Morris Busby, a distinguished 
career member of the Foreign Service, 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



to serve as a roving Ambassador and to 
tie together the efforts of our chiefs of 
mission in each country there. He has 
broad negotiating experience and 
knowledge of the region and will be in 
constant contact with the principal fig- 
ures in this process. Right now Ambas- 
sador Busby is on his way back from a 
mission to Central America, where he 
met with the presidents of the Central 
American democracies and with the 
leadership of the Nicaraguan re- 
sistance. Bus will be working with 
Elliott [Abrams, Assistant Secretary 
for Inter-American Affairs] to lay the 
groundwork for the next stage in our 
diplomatic effort. You will be seeing a 
lot of them — down in Central America 
and up here on the Hill. And when the 
right point is reached, you will be 
seeing me in Central America, too. 

Monitoring Democratization 

If there is to be peace and democracy 
in Nicaragua and regional stability and 
tranquility in Central America, all Nic- 
araguans must be able to live in free- 
dom — politically, economically, and 
religiously. 

The testing of the signed commit- 
ments will take place in the bright light 
of the cities as well as the mountain 
fastnesses where much of the resistance 
has operated until now. It will move 
into the open, in the presence of the 
media and the international community. 
As Senator Dole's delegation discovered 
during its visit to Managua, democra- 
tization is unlikely without a struggle. 
The Nicaraguan regime has displayed 
no readiness to accept protests or ac- 
tive political organizing and proselytiz- 
ing as normal parts of the fabric of 
democracy. So those who stand up and 
speak out for democracy in Nicaragua 
will run a risk. If the Sandinistas do 
not carry out their commitments to de- 
mocratization in good faith, we must 
ensure that our friends are not aban- 
doned. If there is a chance that democ- 
ratization can come to Nicaragua, it is 
because brave Nicaraguans — both in- 
side and outside the borders of that 
country — have dared to commit them- 
selves to the cause of freedom. We have 
supported their cause; it is our cause, 
too. Our continued support for them is 
necessary if diplomacy is to succeed. 



There are specific, concrete tests 
that can measure the Nicaraguan re- 
gime's performance in meeting its com- 
mitments to democratization. It is 
imperative that a "scorecard" be kept 
to monitor the peace process. Some 
entries should deal with people: for 
example, the return of all 18 expelled 
priests, not just the best known, and 
the release of all the thousands of Nic- 
araguans jailed for political reasons. 
Other scorecard indicators should deal 
with processes, including total and 
complete freedom for the media, not 
only for such censored stalwarts as La 
Prensa and Radio Catolica but for the 
removal of censorship and hidden pres- 
sures from all radio, television, and 
printed media and the granting of li- 
censes to any new stations or news- 
papers that might apply. 

Still other measures deal with spe- 
cific actions to affirm the right of pro- 
test, to end the jamming of radio 
broadcasting, and to allow the purchase 
or import of printing equipment, paper, 
ink, and other materials essential for 
democratic processes. Directly or indi- 
rectly, the Ortega regime has denied all 
these basic necessities for democratic 
life through protracted oppression dis- 
guised as legalism and bureaucracy. 
Their strategy may well be to draw out 
the contradictions and ambiguities of 
the peace timetable, the U.S. budget 
calendar, and the congressional calen- 
dar to try to eliminate the resistance 
without permitting a genuine and 
sustained democratic opening in 
Nicaragua. 

The basic test of the Guatemala 
agreement, therefore, may be the will- 
ingness of the Ortega regime to engage 
the resistance and the other Nic- 
araguan opposition parties in a true 
dialogue. 

In approaching this key issue, it is 
critical to keep in mind that democratic 
practices and institutions do not come 
cheaply. This has clearly been shown in 
the case of Central America — especially 
El Salvador and Guatemala. The Kiss- 
inger commission report ably and ex- 
haustively documented the high cost of 
peace, democracy, development, and se- 
curity. It would be irresponsible to 
open the door of democratization in 
Nicaragua and then leave Nicaraguans 
to struggle without the resources nec- 
essary to carry out a peaceful political 



struggle in the face of determined anti- 
democratic adversaries. This is the re- 
ality that will test both the United 
States and the international community 
on November 7 and for which we must 
plan now. 

Power in Support of Diplomacy 

Less than a year ago, Congress ap- 
proved $100 million for aid to the Nic- 
araguan resistance. Using those 
resources carefully and well — under the 
scrutiny of the Congress and, in partic- 
ular, the two Intelligence Committees — 
the resistance made great gains. Their 
forces are now deep inside Nicaragua. 
They have demonstrated the vul- 
nerability of this failing regime and of 
its modern Soviet armaments. Helicop- 
ters were shot down, outposts overrun, 
and popular support for the guerrillas 
became so extensive in some areas that 
the regime forcibly relocated entire 
communities to keep them from sup- 
porting the insurgency. 

The Guatemala agreement centers 
on November 7 as the date for imple- 
mentation of both the cease-fire and de- 
mocratization provisions, with some 
evaluation of results on January 7, 1988. 
But our fiscal year ends September 30, 
and with it ends aid to the freedom 
fighters. Thus, unless the resistance re- 
ceives new funding, the Guatemala cal- 
endar will play out entirely in favor of 
the communists. At some point, the re- 
sistance will be facing advanced Soviet 
weaponry and Cuban advisers with 
rapidly dwindling resources and no fur- 
ther help from us. And as their re- 
sources disappear, the helicopter 
gunships and armored personnel car- 
riers and rocket launchers that the So- 
viet Union is continuing to supply will 
guarantee a communist victory. 

The conclusion is inescapable: un- 
less the Guatemala agreement is imple- 
mented in a way that secures a 
negotiated cease-fire, a democratic 
opening in Nicaragua, and accommoda- 
tion of the basic national security inter- 
ests affirmed in the Reagan- Wright 
plan, the United States must continue 
to furnish support to the freedom 
fighters. 

For these reasons, at the appropri- 
ate moment, the President will request 
additional aid for the resistance. We 
need to end the doubt and uncertainty 



November 1987 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



about the capacity and commitment of 
the United States that is created by the 
recurring cycle of off-again, on-again 
aid decisions punctuated by protracted 
and divisive debate. In the spirit of 
straightforward dealing with the Con- 
gress, I feel obliged to let you know 
that our present intention is to request 
$270 million for a period of 18 months. 
The amount of money is calculated at a 
rate of $180 million a year. It is what 
the resistance needs — for training, 
equipment, and other support for their 
political and military quest for free- 
dom — no more, no less. 

Conclusion 

Too often in the past, the United States 
failed to identify with the aspirations of 
the people of Central America for free- 
dom and a better life. Too often, our 
government seemed indifferent when 
democratic values were at risk. 

President Reagan welcomed the 
Guatemala agi-eement. We support it. 
We are committed to working with its 
signatories to strengthen it, to deal 
with issues not covered in the agree- 
ment, to help gain bi-oad support for its 
purposes and provisions. A process of 
reciprocal steps has been set in motion 
that commits the Sandinistas to sweep- 
ing social and political change in Nic- 
aragua. We do not know yet whether it 
is realistic to expect that it will hap- 
pen. But we shall work hard to make it 
so. Much will depend on us and on our 
resolve. 



At the same time, we know that it 
is simply not in our national interest to 
leave the Sandinista regime uncon- 
strained by credible resistance forces 
on the basis of a hope or a premise. We 
have too much at stake. This President 
will not stand idly by — this Secretary 
of State will not stand by — and permit 
a country as near to our borders as 
Nicaragua to become a place from 
which the Soviet Union and its allies 
can militarily threaten our friends or 
our country's national security. 

So let us make this present chance 
for freedom and for peace a success. 
Let us join across partisan lines to 
call for full implementation of the 
Guatemala agreement, and let us do 
what we must to protect our country's 
vital interests in this region. Let us 
pursue peace and freedom, and let us 
give those who are fighting for it in 
Nicaragua our continuing support until 
their struggle is ended. Democracy 
in Nicaragua is our goal, for our 
security interests and our moral and 
political objectives all meet in that 
outcome. 



' Press release 182 of Sept. 11, 1987. 
The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Public Diplomacy in the Information Age 



Secretary Shultz's address before 
the U.S. Advisory Commission on Pub- 
lic Diplomacy on September 15, 1987.'^ 

I must say, as I found myself getting 
ready for the meetings with the 
Soviet Foreign Minister [Eduard 
Shevardnadze]— which I've been in- 
volved in all day long, starting at 8:00 
this morning and just now pausing be- 
fore we go on to our casual conversa- 
tion over dinner— I thought to myself, 
"How did I get myself involved in so 
many things all at once?" On the other 
hand, I think there's a certain impor- 
tance added by the fact of this meeting 
with the Soviet Foreign Minister, be- 
cause it is, in many respects, our com- 



16 



petition and our concerns with the 
Soviet Union that drive at least 
some — not all, but some — of our con- 
cerns about public diplomacy. 

So let me say that this conference 
is about something of fundamental im- 
portance to our foreign relations, 
America's voice in the world of the 
future. Secretaries of State are not 
blessed with the power of prophecy, but 
I'm an optimist about our future, for 
whatever that's worth to you. 

The future looks bright for 
America, because we are a vital and 
vibrant democracy. The openness of 
our system, the innovativeness of our 
people, the vast energies of our society, 
all these can help us meet the difficult 
challenges of a changing world. 



But will we meet them, or will we 
shrink from and retreat into isola- 
tionism? Will we commit the resources 
necessary to conduct the kind of foreign 
policy that will play to our democratic 
strength? These are the hard questions 
we must ask ourselves tonight. 

Democracy and Change 
in the Age of Information 

If only we will let them, America's 
democratic values can carry us boldly 
into the future as a global power, just 
as they carried us forward from the age 
of reason through the industrial era 
into what I think of as the age of 
information. 

Freedom and intellectual curiosity 
are the wave of the future, not some 
foreordained vision of evolutionary 
stages driven by class conflict. T^ke a 
look at history. Contrary to Marxian 
prediction, the appeal of Western de- 
mocracy was not extinguished by the 
harsh conditions of the factory and the 
sweat shop, nor could the power of de- 
mocracy be destroyed by depression 
and two devastating World Wars. 

On the contrary, the modern world 
that emerged from the despair and de- 
struction of the first half of this century 
looked to the democratic ideals and re- 
spect for human rights as the best 
means of secui-ing lasting peace and 
economic well-being in the postwar era. 

In our own country in this century, 
Americans press for their rights, cling- 
ing tenaciously to the democratic ideals 
that promised a better future for their 
children. Individual liberty, private en- 
terprise, equal opportunity in employ- 
ment and education, civic activism to 
promote peaceful change, and, when 
our democracy was threatened, the 
American people rose in its defense and 
prevailed. 

In the end, their children and 
grandchildren did come to live in an 
America and in a world that was at 
once more prosperous and more secure 
than that of their fathers. The alliances 
and economic institutions designed by 
farsighted American policymakers at 
the close of World War II have brought 
to us and to the world unprecedented 
levels of economic growth, social pro- 
gress, and security in the ensuing four 
decades. 

In good part, by our example, de- 
mocracy, a child of the age of reason, 
is transforming our modern world. 
From Spain and Portugal a decade ago, 
to a trend that now encompasses 



Department of State Bulletin' 



THE SECRETARY 



Latin America, from Argentina to El 
Salvador, from the Philippines to South 
Korea, the surge toward democracy is 
the most powerful political movement 
of our time. 

The spread of democracy in this 
new era also means that conduct of 
U.S. foreign policy is becoming a truly 
public exercise, both at home and 
abroad. Throughout the world, higher 
levels of development and education 
have drawn more people into the politi- 
cal process, and advances in technology 
have given unprecedented reach to po- 
litical views and public opmion. 

As I had occasion to say last month 
before Congress, in our democratic pol- 
itics, everybody wants to get into the 
act. The players are many. The roles 
they play are often competing, and the 
plot is becoming more and more com- 
plex. The same thing can be said for 
politics around the world. 

The almost instant and global 
awareness of current events, as con- 
veyed through electronic media, focuses 
public concern on foreign policy issues 
from human rights to trade sanctions to 
our Strategic Defense Initiative. 
Church activists, humanitarian groups, 
and individual Americans are involved 
in pressing their agendas abroad as 
well as at home, and foreign govern- 
ments and their representatives gained 
ready and direct access to our domestic 
media and those of other countries, 
thus taking their views essentially un- 
filtered to larger audiences over the 
heads or under the seats of their own 
governments. 

In short, the speed of communica- 
tion and easy travel means that the 
Secretary of State and even the Presi- 
dent cannot function as autonomous, 
unchallenged directors of policy. We 
have to work hard to provide leadership 
and cohesion and to marshal under- 
standing and support for our policies, 
both at home and abroad. This is the 
new reality that must be taken into ac- 
count if any U.S. foreign policy initia- 
tive is to be effective. 

In this age of change, America's 
open, democratic system will remain 
our greatest asset. The information age 
is our age. Indeed, most of the change 
accelerating around us today is driven 
by the scientific and technological ad- 
vances that are the fundamental prod- 
uct of our democratic way of life. 
Current trends are going our way. It is 
already clear that knowledge, communi- 
cations, and information and the ability 
to use them effectively are profoundly 
transforming global economic, political, 



and security relationships. Countries 
such as ours that are full participants 
in the global flow of ideas — people and 
information — will be in the best posi- 
tion to meet the future's challenges and 
to reap its rewards. 

In corners of the globe as far flung 
as Africa and China, we have seen an 
encouraging trend toward free market- 
oriented solutions to the problems of 
economic growth. Nations burdened 
with authoritarian, if not totalitarian, 
political systems are beginning to see 
that economic advance in our age re- 
quires openness to information and 
ideas, and slowly they are placing a 
great emphasis on individual creativity, 
entrepreneurship, and decentralization 
of responsibility — even the Soviet 
Union, finally facing up to the need for 
openness, economic restructuring, and, 
at least by their likes, democratization. 

Conveying Our Democratic Message 

As Secretary of State, I have found that 
the most persuasive case I can make 
for the American position in dealing 
with other governments is the idealism 
and strength projected by our demo- 
cratic society. More than ever, the 
United States must promote foreign 
policies that reflect our democratic val- 
ues. We must conduct a style of public 
diplomacy that is capable of conveying 
our democratic message to a varied and 
even more vast world audience. 

Today our foreign affairs agenda is 
crowded with complex issues we would 
not have contemplated even a genera- 
tion ago. The world is not just at our 
doorstep; it is already in our living 
rooms, and we're in their living rooms. 
It is a world to which we must stay 
tuned, in which we must keep actively 
involved, and with which we must stay 
in constant dialogue. We cannot tune 
out, even if we wanted to, given the 
global reach of our relationships and 
commitments. The spotlight is on us, 
and the microphones are always open. 
It is up to us to use our platform well 
and project America's domestic mes- 
sage clearly, consistently, and 
effectively. 

And what is that emerging world 
to which we must convey our demo- 
cratic message? A world where the dis- 
persion of scientific and technological 
know-how is causing a wider distribu- 
tion of economic, military, and political 
capabilities. A world of heightened eco- 
nomic, technological, and political com- 
petitiveness. A world that is ever more 
interdependent economically as infor- 



mation systems create global financial 
and trading markets — a fascinating 
thing going on in the area of trade, as 
I see it. It isn't simply that we think 
of some products that are made here, 
some products that are made some- 
where else, and we trade in those prod- 
ucts and compete in those products. 
That's not the case. 

If you take an automobile, or a re- 
frigerator, or a wiring board for a com- 
puter, or any almost typical product, 
what you find is that it's made up of 
components from many different places. 
So if we were to say, let us lay down a 
barrier between ourselves and the rest 
of the world, as many who believe in 
protection seem to want to do, what we 
would be saying is, let us restructure 
the whole way in which we go about 
producing a product. It would be devas- 
tating. That's something different than 
we've seen before, and it is something 
that has happened as we have moved 
more and more in this age of 
information. 

Our democratic message must 
reach a world community in which pres- 
sures for political and social change 
have accelerated and contact among 
contrasting cultures is pervasive and 
ever more intense. Our voice must be 
heard and understood by a world au- 
dience that is still widely differentiated 
in terms of development. We must 
speak to a world that is still driven by 
age-old ethnic, religious, and regional 
strife even as the availability of sophis- 
ticated weapons makes these conflicts 
more deadly. We must appeal to a con- 
cerned world public about dangers to 
the environment and about the misuse 
of modern weaponry by terrorists and 
drug traffickers even as we apply new 
technologies in a cooperative interna- 
tional effort to eradicate these modern- 
day scourges. 

But America's voice is not the only 
voice the world hears. I do not have to 
remind you here tonight that the poten- 
tial of advanced communications tech- 
nologies and the importance of world 
public opinion has not been lost on the 
Soviet Union. 

The new leadership, under Mikhail 
Gorbachev, has been adept at employ- 
ing public diplomacy to convey its 
message of glasnost and perestroyka. 
America always stands ready to encour- 
age a freer flow of ideas, people, and 
information as is called for in the 
Helsinki Final Act, and we welcome 
any genuine advances that promise to 
bring our peoples closer together. 



November 1987 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



While America's very freedom and 
enterprising spirit give us a natural ad- 
vantage in the information age, we can- 
not afford to be complacent, particularly 
in the field of public diplomacy. In the 
short run, we can be vulnerable to 
those who would exploit our very open- 
ness and who would manipulate commu- 
nications technologies for purely 
propagandistic purposes. 

We estimate that Radio Moscow 
transmits well over 2,000 hours per 
week, while the Voice of America 
(VOA) broadcasts just over 1,000, by 
comparison. We must not forget that 
the single voice of state propaganda 
does not compete with any chorus of 
domestic opinion. It admits no interplay 
of ideas, interests, and issues, and it 
sounds forth insistently, day in and day 
out. When the world listens to Amer- 
ica's voice, it hears an entire chorus, at 
times a cacophony. It hears the rich, 
varied, and sometimes confusing sounds 
of a vital, democratic society. 

The Need for 
Budgetary Support 

In this era of accelerating change, more 
than ever, the United States will re- 
quire a style of public diplomacy that 
gives full expression to our abiding 
democratic message. None are more 
aware of this than the Advisory Com- 
mission [on Public Diplomacy] and the 
United States Information Agency. It is 
a credit to the leadership of many of 
you in this room that one of the major 
foreign policy achievements of this Ad- 
ministration is the reinvigorative role 
in enhanced technical capabilities for 
public diplomacy. Pragmatic funding 
and careful planning in the recent past 
have permitted us to draw upon a 
wealth of electronic and other communi- 
cations resources to project our pol- 
icies, convey our interests, and bring 
our democratic message to an ever- 
broader audience. 

Without a dedicated effort during 
President Reagan's Administration to 
rebuild and consolidate our information 
and cultural programs, many of our for- 
eign policy goals would have gone unre- 
alized, and they may still be imperiled 
if we cannot provide the necessary re- 
sources due to severe constraints on 
our foreign affairs budget imposed by 
Congress. The draconian cuts Congress 
has made on the foreign affairs budget 
over the past 3 years now threaten the 
Ufeblood of our entire foreign policy 
effort, including our public diplomacy 
programs. 



18 



The need for instantaneous, reli- 
able communications links around the 
globe is perhaps the most obvious and 
immediate demand we must continue to 
meet. We cannot continue to compete 
successfully in the arena of world public 
opinion when VOA has been forced to 
cut its broadcast hours by 10% in fiscal 
year (FY) 1987; when 12 overseas USIS 
[United States Information Service] 
mission posts and centers have been 
closed; and when international visitor, 
youth, and book programs have been 
slashed. It doesn't make any sense 
from the standpoint of our interests. 

With the cuts Congress is pro- 
posing in the FY 1988 foreign affairs 
budget, these downward trends can 
only get worse. Public diplomacy, the 
projection of our views and lifestyle 
abroad, has no true domestic constitu- 
ency, much less a national consensus 
upon which to forge budgets in Con- 
gi-ess that do justice to the needs of 
America's international public diplo- 
macy. We must do more to convince the 
public and their congressional represen- 
tatives of the importance of meeting 
those needs. 

Now is certainly not the time to be 
shortsighted about the importance of 
public diplomacy. In a world where no 
one country can dictate economic, poHt- 
ical, or military events, the need for 
international cooperation, for coalition- 
forging and confidence-building, be- 
comes ever more apparent. 

It is just as important for us to 
understand and to shape public at- 
titudes abroad and at home as it is 
to receive and interpret the latest 
computer-generated statistics or esoter- 
ic intelligence reports. People-to-people 
programs are more important than 
ever. We should do more to encourage 
the work of groups such as the National 
Endowment for Democracy and the 
Asia Foundation. 

I have no doubt that America's 
democratic message will prevail, pro- 
vided we allocate the resources we need 
to compete. The dramatic worldwide 
trend toward democratic government is 
our most meaningful basis for opti- 
mism. The visionary American deci- 
sionmakers of the postwar era set in 
motion global trends that have shaped 
our present and are moving us toward 
an even more promising future. 

It is now for us to be as creative 
as they were, as we address the chal- 
lenges of a world of fast pace and tran- 
formational change. 



Conclusion 

Only yesterday I addressed a workshop 
organized by the National Academy of 
Sciences on the information and com- 
munications revolution and U.S. foreign 
policy. I asked the National Academy of 
Sciences workshop participants, from 
academic and business circles, to think 
boldly and systematically about the 
consequences of the technological and 
scientific advances of the information 
age for our conduct of foreign affairs. 

The workshop discussion was lively 
and useful. Although diverse views on 
many issues were expressed, the par- 
ticipants unanimously agreed that we 
are entering an era when things will be 
qualitatively different. 

We are entering a future that can 
bring unprecedented prosperity and se- 
curity at home and abroad. At the same 
time, America will face enormous chal- 
lenges across the entire spectrum of our 
economic, social, and political relation- 
ships. Yet, in all the changes that will 
come, one thing is certain: America's 
traditional values of individual liberty, 
democratic institutions, free enterprise, 
and human ingenuity will be central in 
establishing a better world for our- 
selves and for the world community. 
That is the essence of America's demo- 
cratic message, the message that we 
must convey through our public 
diplomacy. 

I thank you for letting me start 
this meeting out, and I hope that you'll 
dig into some of the ins and outs of the 
age of information, as I see it, and 
come to grips with its vast implications 
for us. I think you will wind up agree- 
ing with me that as we grapple in 
what should be our world, our kind of 
change, the role of public diplomacy 
must be a central one. And it is so 
much in our interest to apply the re- 
sources and the effort as represented 
by the people in this room, to see that 
we do our job to make our views clear 
and to prevail in seeing to it that the 
better world that's there for us actually 
does materialize. 



iPress release 185 of Sept. 16. 1987. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary's Interview 
on "Face the Nation" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed 
on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation" on Sep- 
tember IS, 1987, by Lesley Stahl, CBS 
NewsA 

Q. This morning in The Washington 
Post someone from the Administra- 
tion leaked a story that the Secretary 
of Defense tried to get President Rea- 
gan to toughen up his position on the 
arms control agreement talks that are 
coming up with [Soviet Foreign Min- 
ister] Mr. Shevardnadze. The Presi- 
dent rejected the tough positions. 

What kind of signal is the Admin- 
istration sending the Soviets in put- 
ting out a story like this on the eve of 
Shevardnadze's visit here? 

A. The President has been very 
consistent for years on what he has 
wanted in arms control, and both in the 
intermediate-range arms — so-called 
INF — and strategic arms, we've made a 
great deal of progress. The President 
isn't toughening or softening or what- 
ever; he's really maintaining a constant 
posture of being ready to move for- 
ward. And as you get toward the end of 
any negotiation, there are little nits 
and gnats here and there that have to 
get decided, and that's all that's going 
on now. 

Q. What do you make of the So- 
viet's new demand to insist that we 
destroy the warheads that go on those 
missiles that we've agreed to destroy 
in Europe? Is this a new proposal on 
their part? And let me finish that 
question by saying, why aren't we de- 
stroying those warheads? What would 
we use them for anyway? 

A. It is newly phrased by them, 
and it may or may not be an obstacle. 
There is a lot of misunderstanding 
about what the word "warhead" means. 
There is something called a reentry ve- 
hicle — the whole thing that comes back 
into the atmosphere with a ballistic 
missile — and that consists of a case, you 
might say, inside of which is an ex- 
plosive and a guidance system. 

You will find that the Soviets want 
to do just as we do; to take that re- 
entry vehicle and take the explosive 
device out of it — it's a very secret, in- 
tricate thing — and bring that back to 
our own territory. They want to do that 
just as much as we do, so it's the same 
process that's been going on since the 
late 1940s when both countries have 
been producing nuclear weapons. 



November 1987 



Q. If they offer to destroy their 
warheads, would we go along with it? 

A. I believe what they really mean 
by that is the reentry vehicle — the 
shell, so to speak, after you've taken 
the explosive device out of it. At least 
that's what they tabled in Geneva. 

Q. If they say they'll destroy 
theirs, will we destroy ours, and then 
the treaty can go forward? 

A. This is the sort of thing that you 
jigger and juggle around with; but, as 
my comments have tried to make clear, 
I think the actual explosive device is 
the heart of the matter, and, at least 
judging from what they tabled in Ge- 
neva, there is not much of a difference. 

Q. I'm still confused. I'm unclear. 
Have they offered to destroy theirs? 

A. They have said that they want 
to take what would be a reentry vehi- 
cle, and take the weapon — what we 
think of as the weapon — out of it. 

Q. But they've said they'll do it 
to theirs? 

A. And then do something with 
that shell. And so I think that probably 
if we can work out the details of that 
just right, probably that will be work- 
able. But we'll have to see about the 
details. 

Q. So you don't think it's a major 
stumbling block, in any event. 

A. I don't think so, unless they are 
throwing something brand new, which 
they don't seem to. The difference be- 
tween what they've been saying pub- 
licly and what they've precisely tabled 
in Geneva is to be noted. 

Q. Do you expect, when you and 
Mr. Shevardnadze sit down, that you 
will come to a total understanding on 
the INF agreement? 

A. I don't know whether we will or 
not. What I do know is that if you com- 
pare now with this time in 1984, when 
the President reinstituted the practice 
of having the Soviet Foreign Minister 
invited to Washington at the time of the 
UN meetings — 3 years — you can see a 
tremendous amount of progress across 
the board of the Reagan agenda. And 
so we'll keep working at that and ex- 
pect to continue to make progress 
across the board, and that's what this 
meeting is about. 

Q. Let me ask you about another 
arms control issue, which is verifi- 
cation. What did you make of Mr. 
Gorbachev allowing the U.S. Con- 
gressmen to visit the Krasnoyarsk 
radar site, that very place where we 



have been insisting they've been vio- 
lating past treaties? What were they 
up to? And, if they are violating, 
which most people continue to believe 
they are, how can we go ahead and 
sign another treaty with them? 
A. We have to get that Kras- 
noyarsk radar matter straightened out. 
And if the visit by the Congressmen, 
insofar as the ABM Treaty is con- 
cerned, confirmed anything, it was: 
yes, there is the radar there, it is not 
located on their coast as the treaty pro- 
vides, and it is pointed inward so it is a 
violation. And you can see that — of 
course, we've been able to see that by 
photographs. 

Q. What do we do about it? 

A. We tell them that this is a vio- 
lation, and in the end, if we're going to 
have some agreement that encompasses 
and is related to matters having to do 
with the ABM Treaty, there has got to 
be something done about that violation. 

Q. But why did they bring the 
Congressmen in to show us that they 
are violating a treaty? Are they 
thumbing their noses at us? What do 
you think they are up to? 

A. I don't know. You'll have to ask 
them, and I find — 

Q. You must be a great analyzer. 
You must have a suspicion. 

A. Oh, I speculate about it, but I 
think the point that comes out of that 
visit is a verification — if one were 
needed, and it wasn't — that the radar is 
there. It is deep inside their territory, 
it's pointed in an inward direction, and, 
therefore, it's a violation of the treaty. 

Q. Explain to the public why 
we're going ahead and signing an- 
other treaty with them on INF, if 
these little details can be worked out, 
if that's still a violation and they are 
not doing anything about it? 

A. The intermediate-range subject 
has been, by virtue of both sides' 
agreement, not related to our discus- 
sions in the set of talks having to do 
with defense and space. 

Q. Why not? It's a violation of a 
treaty. Right? 

A. There are many violations of 
treaties, unfortunately, and so we're 
trying to construct one that has ver- 
ification provisions in it that will make 
it possible to ensure better compliance. 

Q. But this is obviously some- 
thing we've given up, then, on our 
side? 



19 



THE SECRETARY 



A. No. On the contrary, we have 
been very strong and clear about the 
many violations of treaties on the part 
of the Soviets and the need to have a 
strong way of verifying anything that's 
agreed on and of making them face up 
to these problems that they've created. 
And maybe their effort to open up a 
little bit is by way of saying perhaps 
they are ready to change. We'll see. 

Q. What are you going to do 
about Senator Nunn's threat to insist 
on the entire negotiating record be- 
fore he'll go along with ratification 
proceedings on INF? And he's doing 
that because of your position on try- 
ing to reinterpret the ABM Treaty. 

A. Personally, I think the Senate is 
entitled to a full report on negotiations 
as they consider ratification of any 
treaty! The only real problem that I can 
see is that some things are highly clas- 
sified, so they are available for the Sen- 
ators to look at, but for good and 
sufficient reasons, it's not desirable just 
to make them public information. But I 
think when the Senate is asked to vote 
on an important treaty, it's entitled to 
have full information. No problem. 

Q. So you're going to call his 
bluff? You're going to deliver 3,000 
cartons of treaty record to him? 

A. No. I think that this will have 
to be done in a thoughtful, careful way, 
and I don't consider it calling his bluff 
I think Senator Nunn is a person who 
does his homework, and he wants to 
see this record and be fully informed. 
We're ready to go along with that. 
After all, there's been a Senate ob- 
server group, and he's a cochairman, of 
these negotiations. They've been to 
Geneva many times. We talk to them 
every week. I think that, at the mo- 
ment a treaty is signed, if there is such 
a moment, the members of the Senate 
who follow it will be better informed 
about that negotiation than ever before. 

Q. President Reagan has given an 
interview to U.S. News & World Re- 
port saying that he would be willing, 
assuming that the Iran-Iraq war can 
come to an end, to sit down and dis- 
cuss U.S. -Iran relations with the 
Ayatollah — with Ayatollah Khomeini. 
What kind of a signal is he trying to 
send? Is this something that he would 
like to do? Does he want to sit down 
and talk to the Ayatollah? 



A. We have sent messages to the 
Iranians, and they've sent us many 
messages, through the country that is 
our so-called protecting power in 
Tehran and theirs here. We send mes- 
sages back and forth all the time. 

I think that it's probably a good 
thing if representatives of the two 
countries directly communicate with 
each other to, among other things, 
avoid miscalculation. They should have 
it clear in their minds the strength of 
our determination and not make any 
miscalculation about that, and so on. 

Q. So did we ask them for these 
talks and they are refusing us? 

A. No. They have sent us messages 
through these indirect channels, and we 
have sent them messages. That goes on 
all the time, and it's important that 
they, for instance, know what we're do- 
ing, why we're doing it, and that they 
shouldn't kid themselves about the 
strength of our resolve. That's an 
important kind of message to get 
across. 

Q. Would you like to go to Tehran 
and talk to their leaders? 

A. No, not particularly. That's not 
the point. The point is that communica- 
tion between two countries, under cir- 
cumstances like this, .should be done so 
that it is clear exactly what's being 
communicated. So the more direct it is, 
probably the better. 

Q. You want to have direct talks 
with them. Is there — 

A. We're not pleading for direct 
talks or anything of that kind. But we 
do want to communicate with them and 
do communicate with them to tell them 
exactly what our position is and why, 
so they don't have any misunderstand- 
ing about it. 

Q. Is there concern that the Sovi- 
ets have gone in and usurped our tra- 
ditional role in that region of the 
world as mediator? They're talking to 
both sides directly. We are not any- 
more. Are we trying to get back in 
that game? 

A. No, not particularly. We have a 
very strong position in the gulf, and I 
think the gulf states are looking at us 
as having a strong principled position 
and sticking with it and they're begin- 
ning to wonder: Where is the Soviet 
Union? They're going back and forth, 
and they're being a little equivocal 
here. 

But we'll see what the Secretary 
General accomplishes in Tehran and 
Baghdad, and then we may or may not 



have to follow through on a very strong 
mandatory sanctions resolution. And if 
the situation calls for it, we're going to 
advocate it; we hope the others will 
join us. 

Q. Even if you find out in your 
talks with Mr. Shevardnadze that the 
Soviets won't go along with it, we'll 
still push for it? 

A. We will push for it if it is called 
for. 

Q. You have gone to Congress and 
signaled that the Administration is 
going to ask for more aid for the 
contras despite the fact that this 
peace process is going on. 

President Reagan, in his inter- 
view with U.S. News & World Report, 
seemed to suggest that he doesn't 
have much faith in this peace process. 
Why isn't the Administration doing 
more to try and get that peace proc- 
ess moving? Why are we sending sig- 
nals that we're going to keep the 
contras alive instead? 

A. I think you've got your cause 
and effect mixed up. It is because of 
the fact that there is a lot of pressure 
in the situation that finally the Nic- 
araguan communists have come to the 
peace table and once again agreed to 
the sorts of things they agreed to but 
didn't live up to some time ago — 
namely, provisions for democratization. 

The strategy that brought you to 
this point shouldn't be abandoned the 
moment you get to that point. You 
ought to keep it up and allow the inter- 
play of power and diplomacy to work. It 
isn't that you go this way or this way. 
You use a two-pronged approach to ac- 
complish your objective, and that's 
what we're talking about. And if it 
turns out that peace breaks out all 
over, that money can be used for good 
economic development and human- 
itarian purposes. 

Q. Would you go along with a 
plan to keep that money in escrow, 
the way some have proposed? 

A. The people who are down there 
working and fighting, of course, de- 
serve support. There's no letup in the 
Soviet — you know, the Soviets send mil- 
itary equipment into Nicaragua and 
into Central America probably five or 
six times the amount that we do, and 
they don't let up on that. 

Q. So, no escrow? 

A. We'll have to see. You know, the 
freedom fighters themselves have sug- 
gested that any new money that comes 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



after September 30 not be spent on mil- 
itary things until after November 7, 
and we'll see what November 7 holds. 
The freedom fighters themselves have 
been calling on this peace process to 
proceed, and they want to talk to the 
Nicaraguan communists and try to 
work out a cease-fire. So far, the Nic- 
araguan Government hasn't been will- 
ing to meet with them. 

Q. The last time you were on this 
broadcast, I asked you if you were 
speaking for the Administration on 
certain foreign policy questions. I'd 
like to ask you if the situation has 
changed. On the subjects we've dis- 
cussed today, are you speaking fully 
and wholly for the Administration? 



A. Yes, and I was at the time of 
your interview except with respect to 
one point about arms sales to Iran. 
That, as it has become clear through 
the hearings, we were fighting about. 
And the day after you and I discussed 
that subject right here, the White 
House confirmed that the position that 
I took on this program, and which I 
had some uncertainty about, was the 
position of the Administration. 

Q. Indeed they did. But you now 
are speaking for the Administration? 

A. And have been all along, with 
that one exception. 



'Press release 183. I 



Secretary's Interview on 

"This Week With David Brinkley" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed 
on ABC-TV's "This Week With David 
Brinkley" on September 21, 1987, by 
David Brinkley and Sam Donaldson, 
ABC News, and George F. Will, ABC 
News analyst.^ 

Q. Pleased to have you with us. Now 
tell me, what changed? We've been 
talking with the Soviet Union for 
years. All those meetings, all those 
arguments around the tables, and fi- 
nally something worked. What 
brought it about? What changed? 

A. This is really the unfolding of 
the President's strategy right from the 
licginning of his Administration. The 
proposals that have been agreed to 
were what he made back in 1981. And I 
think the strategy that he put into 
place has been playing itself along, and 
we're finally getting some place. 

Q. My question was why. You 
have been offering this same deal for 
a long time without success until 
now. 

A. Because it has been clear that 
there is a determination to carry 
through. The INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] treaty, which is the one 
that seems closest — I think is about 
done — is a triumph for the strategy of 
ourselves and our NATO allies. As we 
said, that if the Soviets didn't take out 
their SS-20s, we would deploy. But we 
would prefer to have them take them 
out, so we wouldn't have to deploy. And 



even after we put them in, we would 
negotiate to try to eliminate that class 
of weapons. That was NATO's position 
way back to 1979. And the NATO group 
showed cohesion and strength, and it 
worked. There's a big message there 
about how to do these things. 

Q. Mr. Aspin [Senator Les Aspin] 
argues, as you just heard, and others, 
of course, join him, that you're now 
moving in the wrong direction be- 
cause a nuclear-free Europe would 
not be in the interest of our allies or 
of us. 

A. We're not talking about a 
nuclear-free Europe. However, we are 
talking — and again, this is something 
that the President has had foremost on 
his agenda for a long time — we are 
talking about reducing nuclear weap- 
ons. And this agreement, in addition to 
all the technical things that people talk 
about, has the character that it is the 
first time nuclear weapons are being 
reduced by agreement. Whole catego- 
ries are being eliminated of weapons 
systems. Furthermore, there's another 
principle that's important here. This 
agreement is very asymmetrical, that 
is, the Soviets reduce a lot more than 
we do in order to get an equal level. 
And as we go on to other things, where 
they start from a different posture than 
we do, then that principle of asymme- 
try is one that we're going to evoke. 



Q. Is it your position that any 
subtraction from the world's nuclear 
arsenal makes the world better? 

A. Not necessarily any. We want to 
choose them. But the ultimate objec- 
tive — whether you ever get there or not 
is certainly a question — but the ulti- 
mate objective that the President and 
General Secretary Gorbachev have 
agreed on is the elimination of nuclear 
weapons. 

Q. But between the ultimate and 
where we are now stretch many years, 
presumably. 

A. Well, okay. 

Q. And Congressman Aspin said, 
well, to — since they didn't get com- 
pensating cuts in conventional forces, 
one compensatory measure would be 
10 divisions costing $75 billion. Do 
you think that's a fair assessment? 
And, there is another way of doing it, 
and that is to have B-52s with cruise 
missiles on the ground in Europe. 
There are problems with that. We 
could have cruise missiles on surface 
ships off the coast of Europe. But 
then wouldn't the Soviet Union say 
that's doing an end run around the 
INF agreement? 

A. There are weapons systems in 
place committed to NATO — under the 
NATO command — both short range and 
also weapons on ships and dual-capable 
aircraft; those are all there. That's not 
part of the INF agreement. This is an 
agreement on a certain category of 
things. People criticize it on the 
grounds that it doesn't do everything. 
Of course it doesn't do everything. It 
does one thing: it reduces weapons and 
eliminates them for the first time, to an 
equal level, asymmetrically and that's a 
way to start. You have to begin some 
place. 

Q. How about Aspin's point on 
the compensatory measures: is he 
wrong about 10 divisions? Is he wrong 
about the cost? And are there other 
ways of doing it? Or do we need to 
compensate? 

A. There is a difference between 
the Warsaw Pact forces and the NATO 
forces. And so we have had a conven- 
tional arms negotiation going on for 
some time. There will be a new one. 
And we will work at the business of 
bringing that into more equality, and I 
think that's important to do. 

Q. But maybe you could — 

A. In the meantime, however, it is 
important to recognize the strength 
and cohesion of NATO that brought 



November 1987 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



about this agreement. And so as NATO 
looks at its conventional forces, we 
need to see that they are as strong as 
we can get them. And you don't have to 
spend $75 billion to make a lot of head- 
way. 

Q. I guess it reduces itself to 
this: if you conclude this treaty, and 
if nothing else changes, is Europe 
less safe? 

A. Europe will be more safe, defi- 
nitely. 

Q. Even if nothing else changes? 

A. How can you say that we be- 
come militarily worse off when they 
eliminate around 2,000 warheads, and 
we eliminate around 350? 

Q. Let me move on to the next — 
A. It boggles my mind that any- 
body could think that. 

Q. A lot of people are saying — 

A. I don't know; they don't do 
arithmetic. 

Q. — who are mind bogglers. But 
let me move on to the next step. A lot 
of people believe Mr. Shevardnadze 
[Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze] has now softened the 
Soviet tough stand against SDI [Stra- 
tegic Defense Initiative] testing by 
not talking about testing. But he does 
continue to talk about a strict adher- 
ence to the ABM [Antiballistic Mis- 
sile] Treaty as strictly interpreted. Do 
you think there's a change in the So- 
viet position? Is it a softening? 

A. They put forward two things in 
our discussions this past week that rep- 
resented some shifting of their view. 
One was in terms of the things they 
would permit to be done while within 
the ABM Treaty — they changed it a lit- 
tle bit, the character of those things — 
and the other was to say, alternatively, 
we each agree to abide strictly by the 
ABM Treaty as narrowly defined, dur- 
ing the period that we agree not to 
withdraw from it. 

Q. But you, of course, don't agree 
to that, meaning the Reagan Admin- 
istration. 

A. One of the problems with that 
is, that we believe they are in violation 
of the treaty right this minute, that is, 
the Krasnoyarsk radar. And they make 
the same accusation of us. 

Q. But what's the difference — 

A. So we have some things to 
straighten out. 

Q. Let me see if straightening 
them out means that the Reagan Ad- 
ministration — in response to what 



bill? 



you've said is a give or a change in 
their position — may in fact change to 
some extent and agree to abide by the 
narrow interpretation? 

A. I haven't had any sense of that 
at all. I don't think so. 

Q. But you know, the Congress 
may tie your hands. What will the 
President do if that military bill 
comes to his desk with a compromise 
version of the House and the Senate 
provisions, which would prevent him 
from going forward on his own with a 
narrow interpretation? 

A. We have — 

Q. I mean with a broad inter- 
pretation? 

A. — to say what we think is the 
right interpretation of the treaty, and 
we have to say what we think is right 
for the United States, and in our nego- 
tiation with the Soviet Union. And I 
think at this point in time, the Presi- 
dent's track record is such that he 
ought to be given a little credibility. 

Q. What if Congress passes the 

A. Oh, there are a million what-ifs. 

Q. Would he veto the bill? 

A. Let's see what he does. 

Q. What is the difference between 
the Soviet position and the Senate 
position on SDI? 

A. The insistence on what's called 
the narrow definition is apparently the 
same, although just what that means is 
a little hard to pin down. And, of 
course, we do have the fact that when 
you're talking about research as such, 
it's very difficult to verify as it occurs 
in somebody else's territory. It can be 
verified here because it's part of the 
appropriating process, and we disclose 
it. 

Q. Were economic pressures 
within the Soviet Union responsible 
for their coming to this deal, would 
you say? 

A. You have to ask them that. 

Q. I asked you. 

A. I don't know. 

Q. What is your opinion? 

A. I don't know. 

Q. You don't? 

A. I think that they obviously are 
worrying about their economy and try- 
ing to rearrange the way it works. And 
they're very direct in talking about 
that. And clearly, if there is a reduction 
in tensions and reductions in the need 
for spending on military matters, that 



would help them. But whether that 
really motivates them in this, I can't 
say. 

Q. You seem to see the INF 
agreement as good primarily because 
it will lead to something else. Some 
conservative defenders say it's good 
because it'll kill arms control. They 
say, well, it's 4% of the worldwide in- 
ventory of warheads, it's militarily 
trivial, and it'll pacify the peace 
movement. And besides, they say, 
what else can you do since so much of 
the remaining nuclear weapon in- 
ventory in Europe is delivered by 
bombers and by artillery tubes that 
are both nuclear and conventional- 
capable, and a verification regime for 
those weapons is simply unimagin- 
able. What do you say to that? 

A. The most important thing to do 
right now, I think, and the Soviets have 
said they think so, too — and it's been 
something the President has pushed for 
all along — is to bring about very large 
reductions in strategic arms: a 50% cut 
in strategic arms. And that's what 
we're going to push on now. 

Q. You heard Congressman Aspin 
talking about how, absent that, the 
Soviet Union could compensate by 
just retargeting with different mis- 
siles on all the old targets in Europe. 
Would you be willing to say that there 
has to be a time limit? For the INF to 
survive, we have to have a strategic 
arms reduction to prevent such an 
end run around it in, what, 6 months? 
A year? 

A. Oh, that would be a ridiculous 
position to take. The agi'eement on this 
particular class of weapon systems is a 
NATO triumph that has been brought 
about through the process I described. 
And you then reduce those weapons. If 
we don't have any further constraint on 
any weapons, it goes on, and that's too 
bad. But it doesn't do you any good to 
reinstitute a particular class. 

Q. No, but we wouldn't be re- 
instituting it. I mean. Congressman 
Aspin's position is that the Soviet 
Union, absent other reductions, can 
nullify this. 

A. No, but what you suggested is 
exactly what we don't want. We don't 
want to get in a position where we take 
out these missiles and then 6 months 
later everybody can reinstitute them. 
It's much easier for the Soviets to do it 
than it is for us to do it. Look at the 
fights we have here. Look at the diffi- 
culty we had in deployment, and so on. 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. But Congressman Aspin's posi- 
tion — 

A. I think your position would be 
very bad for us. 

Q. But Congressman Aspin's posi- 
tion is that we couldn't get ours back 
into Europe. We had to fight like ti- 
gers to get them in, in the first place. 
And the Soviet Union, by mechanical 
and technological changes, can effec- 
tively restore their targeting on all 
the targets previously covered by the 
SS-20S. 

A. Of course, a strategic arms 
agreement is important, not only for 
those targets, but all the targets in the 
United States. And in Japan and 
Korea — China for that matter. The stra- 
tegic arms are the big threat. So we 
want to get after it. 

Q. What are your chances — 

A. And we are getting after it. 

Q. — of getting one in this Admin- 
istration, a strategic arms agreement? 

A. I don't know what Jimmy the 
Greek is quoting right now. 

Q. But what's George the Shultz 
quoting? 

A. I know that the right way to go 
about it is to work hard on it, and 
that's what we're doing. And I have a 
sense that the Soviets are ready to 
work hard on it too. So maybe we'll get 
there. We're sure going to try. 

Q. I want to ask you about a cou- 
ple of other things in your area of 
foreign policy. The Aquino govern- 
ment, some believe, is on the ropes. 
As you know, the Vice President has 
now resigned or been fired as the for- 
eign minister, and a lot of people be- 
lieve Mrs. Aquino may not survive. 
What is your estimate? And what can 
the United States do in this situation? 

A. A lot of people have been saying 
that right from the beginning. A lot of 
people said she'd never get the presi- 
dency in the first place. A lot of people 
said she couldn't get the economy 
turned around. A lot of people said she 
could never get a constitution written. 
A lot of people said she couldn't get an 
election held. So a lot of people have 
been consistently wrong. She is a capa- 
ble, strong woman who has turned out 
to be a very skillful political leader. 

Q. Are we going to do anything to 
help her out in this hour? 

A. She had plenty of problems — 

Q. Are we doing anything to help 
her? 



A. — and most all of them she in- 
herited from her predecessor. And we 
are doing a lot to help her. I wish we 
could do more. One of the real prob- 
lems we have in this country is that we 
are unnecessarily crippling ourselves in 
the pursuit of our own interests by so 
severely cutting into our ability to ex- 
press our interests in terms of the for- 
eign affairs budget. It's a crime what's 
happening. The Congress has been cut- 
ting the President's budget right and 
left to a very bad effect. 

Q. I know you are interested in 
that, but I'm not sure — 
A. I sure am. 

Q. — I'm not sure you really told 
me anything about what you are do- 
ing at the moment to try to prop up 
Mrs. Aquino. 

A. It's not a question of propping 
her up. She props herself up. She's a 
good strong person. She's having her 
problems. 

Q. You want her to survive, don't 
you? 

A. She's not teetering. Look at all 
she's accomplished. Now, what are we 
doing? We have a strong flow of as- 
sistance. We are trying to make that 
effective in every way we can. We are 
not in a position to find more funds to 
help her. She needs more funds, partic- 
ularly in the security area, as her 
armed forces aren't paid well enough, 
and their equipment isn't good enough, 
and they're complaining about that. 
And you have to have funds to do some- 
thing about it. And we ought to be able 
to help her more than we do. But we 
just don't have the money. 

Q. Also on another topic, there's 
a report this morning the Russians 
are changing their policy on emigra- 
tion, allowing more people to leave. 
Can you tell us anything further 
about that? 

A. I think one of the most interest- 
ing things, and to me, heartening 
things, about our discussions this week 
was the depth and directness of discus- 
sion of human rights problems, includ- 
ing emigration. And I think that we do 
see progress. 

We see plenty of problems and 
plenty of difficulties. But we discuss 
their legal arrangements. We discuss 
particular cases, in detail. We discuss 
emigration levels. And as I say, we 
have had changes. This is very different 
from the old days when you'd try to 
say, here's a list of people that you 
think — we think you should look at. 



And they wouldn't even take the list. 
Now they are ready to discuss it. And, 
of course, they want to discuss things 
they see wrong with us, too. 

Q. I want to come back to the 
tiresome subject of compensatory 
measures, assuming that you think 
it's a legitimate subject. Would it be 
consistent with, would we — I'm not 
saying, do you want to do it, but 
could we — would it be in keeping with 
the spirit as well as the letter of the 
agreement, for us to, say, station sur- 
face ships with cruise missiles on 
them off the European coast? 

A. We have no restriction from this 
agreement on where we put our sub- 
marines or our surface ships. They're 
not covered by this agreement. 

Q. Would that be a good idea, do 
you think? 

A. We work to see that we have a 
good deterrent capability, and NATO 
has a central doctrine, called a doctrine 
of flexible response, to any aggression 
from the Warsaw Pact. And the NATO 
forces are well equipped to implement 
that strategy. 

Q. In the Persian Gulf, the Ira- 
nians have now strafed or fired ma- 
chine guns at a Saudi Arabian 
flagship. Is this just more of the 
same? Or is there something different 
here? 

A. There have been attacks back 
and forth in the last few weeks. But 
basically what's happened is that the 
moves the President has made, both 
diplomatically and in terms of our mili- 
tary presence, have been paying off. 
And people have been following them. 
And we're gradually getting some- 
where. Whether we will get anywhere 
in the United Nations or not remains to 
be seen. But in terms of our presence 
in the gulf, it's made a big impact. And 
now other countries are coming and fol- 
lowing the — 

Q. I asked you about an Iranian 
attack on a Saudi Arabian ship, and 
you tell me the President's moves 
have been paying off. Can you speak 
directly to that incident? 

A. I said that there are incidents of 
that kind going on constantly. Nev- 
ertheless, we have successfully con- 
ducted our convoys, and our Navy out 
there is doing a really great job. 



'Press release 187 of Sept. 22, 1987. 



Novenfiber 1987 



23 



ARMS CONTROL 



Advancing U.S.-Soviet Relations: 
The Challenge of Arms Control 



by Edward L. Rowny 

Address before the Rotary Club in 
Philadelphia on September 9. 1987. Am- 
bassador Rownii is special adviser to the 
President and the Secretary of State for 
arms control matters. 

Less than a week from now, Soviet For- 
eign Minister Shevardnadze will visit 
Washington for extensive discussions 
with Secretary Shultz on the whole 
range of issues between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. As Presi- 
dent Reagan reaffirmed 2 weeks ago in 
a telecast speech to a delegation of So- 
viet visitors to the United States, the 
United States conceives of these issues 
in terms of four major objectives: 

• Resolving regional conflicts; 

• Advancing human rights; 

• Improving diplomatic reciprocity 
and bilateral exchanges; and 

• Accomplishing deep, stabilizing, 
effectively verifiable arms reductions. 

None of these four points is dis- 
pensable. "All parts must advance," the 
President said, "if the relationship as a 
whole is to advance." 

Many of the conflicts on our re- 
gional agenda involve aggression by 
Soviet-backed forces. 

In Southeast Asia, the Soviets are 
helping the Vietnamese Army maintain 
its conquest of Cambodia. 

In Africa, they are using 35,000 
Cuban proxies in a vain quest for a 
military victory in Angola. 

In Central America, the Soviets 
are providing extensive assistance to 
the Sandinistas' efforts to consolidate a 
communist regime in Nicaragua. 

Experience teaches us that as long 
as regional conflicts involving Soviet 
support for aggression and destabiliza- 
tion remain unresolved, there is no reli- 
able foundation for long-term progress 
in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. 

The Red Army's war in Afghanistan 
is a highly dangerous one. Hundreds of 
thousands of Afghans already have died 
in this war of aggression, while one- 
fifth of the prewar population of the 
country has fled to other lands. Soviet- 
backed violence in the form of ter- 
rorism increasingly is crossing the 
border into Pakistan. Unless we see 



concrete evidence that the Soviets are 
ending their aggression in Afghanistan 
and support for communist warfare in 
other regions, it will be difficult to ac- 
cept any promises they make purport- 
ing to promote true and lasting peace. 

The Soviet Union's behavior con- 
cerning the God-given rights of its cit- 
izens is vital to our relationships with 
them. As Andrey Sakharov has ob- 
served, human rights practices are not 
simply internal matters; they do affect 
international security. Nations tend to 
respect the rights of their neighbors no 
more than they respect the rights of 
their own citizens. 

In the Soviet human rights record, 
the evidence today is somewhat more 
hopeful than on the issue of regional 
conflicts. Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign 
of glas)iost has freed more than 100 
important prisoners of conscience and 
relaxed some censorship of political and 
cultural expression. After just 1 year, 
glasnost is not yet a cause for interna- 
tional celebration. So far, it has en- 
hanced Gorbachev's public relations im- 
age in the free world more than it 
actually has improved the lives of mil- 
lions of Soviet citizens. Certainly hun- 
dreds, probably thousands, more 
remain in prisons or confined in 
"psychiatric" institutions simply for ex- 
pressing their desire for political or re- 
ligious freedom. The state still controls 
all the printed and broadcast media. 
The central and pervasive power of the 
secret police has not been curbed, nor 
have the laws which underpin such ex- 
cesses been changed or struck from the 
books. 

Extending Respect 
for Personal Freedom 

Still, there are seeds of hope in 
glasnost. Limited as it has been so far, 
this liberalization could take on power- 
ful momentum if the free world shows 
greater solidarity with the brave Soviet 
men and women struggling for freedom. 
Let me cite one important example that 
should concern all free people. I refer 
to the increasing boldness of Ukrainian 
Catholics in coming out from hiding. 
Just last month, one of the bravest lay 
activists in the Ukrainian Catholic 
Church, Josyp Terelya, traveled to the 
Kremlin to deliver an appeal for an end 
to the legal ban on the church. Twenty- 



two priests, numerous laymen and 
women, and even two bishops who pre- 
viously had kept their identities secret 
signed this appeal. 

These brave believers have placed 
themselves at terrible risk, openly ad- 
mitting that they violate the Soviet 
Union's antireligious laws. For their 
protection, they need the strongest 
possible support from the free world. 
I wish to make it clear today that the 
U.S. Government wants the Soviet 
regime to end its legal prohibitions 
against the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and 
all religious bodies, whatever their 
creed. If General Secretary Gorbachev's 
glasnost is to become more concrete 
and less a clever public relations cam- 
paign, he should allow all believers in 
his country to practice their faith freely 
and openly. 

Another extension of true openness 
that would enhance international se- 
curity would be, as President Reagan 
urged last month, to apply glasnost to 
military affairs. Details of such opening 
should include publication of a valid 
military budget of the U.S.S.R. and ac- 
curate figures on the size and composi- 
tion of the Soviet Armed Forces. Such 
steps not only would improve under- 
standing between United States and 
the Soviet Union; they also would im- 
prove the basis for sound Soviet deci- 
sions on Soviet defense policies. 

On bilateral issues between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R., there 
are many points painfully in need of 
improvement. One is the matter of re- 
spect for the security of our embassy 
in Moscow, a crisis that cannot have es- 
caped your attention. Another involves 
jamming radio broadcasts to the Soviet 
Union. Recently, the Soviets gained 
some international good will when they 
publicized that they had stopped jam- 
ming Voice of America. But at the same 
moment they stopped interfering with 
the reception of the one broadcast serv- 
ice, they intensified jamming Radio 
Liberty and Radio Free Europe broad- 
casts. All jamming violates international 
law. If glasnost is to become more 
authentic, this intei-ference must cease. 

Yet another source of trouble in 
our bilateral relationship is the intense 
anti-American propaganda put forward 
by official Soviet media. Recently, these 
media have spread such vicious lies as 
accusing the United States of having 
assassinated Swedish Prime Minister 
Palme, developing the AIDS [acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome] virus in 
our military laboratories, and collecting 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



orphaned children from Latin America 
and then butchering them as sources 
for organ transplants. As long as the 
Soviet Union continues to spread ven- 
omous propaganda against us, it cannot 
be said to be seeking to conduct rela- 
tions in a truly civilized manner. 

Given these aspects of Soviet be- 
havior, I do not think it will surprise 
you to hear that my years of experience 
in negotiating toward arms control with 
the Soviets have been frustrating. I 
have learned that progress can be made 
toward arms control agreements in our 
mutual interest, but only if we show 
firmness and patience. To offer the 
Soviets unilateral concessions in hope 
of their reciprocating is simply wishful 
thinking. When they are negotiating on 
anything of importance, strength is the 
only means of moving them. In this 
connection, I cannot overstate how 
greatly our negotiating strength is en- 
hanced when the Soviets perceive solid, 
bipartisan public and congressional sup- 
port for presidential policies. 

"Double Zero" Outcome: 
A Product of Strength 

Bipartisan solidarity at home, as well 
as steadfastness on the part of our al- 
lies, today has brought us very close to 
the first agreement ever to eliminate an 
entire class of nuclear weapons. Our ne- 
gotiators are now working hard to re- 
solve differences that remain in the way 
of an agreement to eliminate all U.S. 
and Soviet INF [intermediate-range nu- 
clear forces] missiles. These include the 
Soviet SS-20 missiles threatening our 
allies in Europe and Asia and, on our 
side, the Pershing II missiles and 
ground-launched cruise missiles, which 
were deployed in Western Europe in re- 
sponse to the threat posed by the 
SS-20S. 

Only during the past few weeks 
have the Soviets agreed to a "double 
global zero" formula on INF, based on 
President Reagan's "zero option" pro- 
posal of 1981. Not only has allied soli- 
darity been crucial to the global zero 
outcome, but in recent weeks, the con- 
gressional leadership from both parties 
also has been helpful in making this 
achievement. One of the major remain- 
ing issues is the plan for verification. 
Our verification proposal is proportion- 
ate to the scope of the prospective 
agreement — and with the global zero 
outcome, that means it is simpler than 
if the Soviets had insisted on retaining 
some INF missiles. It is, in any case. 



U.S. Proposes INF Reductions 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 14, 19871 

I have directed the U.S. INF [interme- 
diate-range nuclear forces] negotiator 
in the nuclear and space talks at Ge- 
neva to present to the Soviet Union at 
today's meeting of the INF negotiating 
group our proposal for implementing a 
double global zero treaty, eliminating 
all U.S. and Soviet ground-based INF 
missiles. Our negotiator will also pre- 
sent an inspection protocol which de- 
tails the procedures which we consider 
necessary to effectively verify com- 
pliance with the treaty. 

The draft we are presenting is a 
logical progression from a draft text 
designed to reduce INF missiles to a 
specified level to a draft treaty which 
would eliminate an entire class of U.S. 
and Soviet missiles. 

Key elements of our proposal to im- 
plement the double global zero outcome 
include: 

• The elimination of all U.S. and 
Soviet INF missiles and launchers — 
longer range INF missiles and 
launchers would be eliminated within 
3 years; shorter range within 1 year; 

• Ban on the modernization, pro- 
duction, or night testing of any INF 
missile system; and 

• Comprehensive and effective ver- 
ification regime tailored to a double 
global zero outcome. 

I have always made clear my firm 
belief that not having a treaty is better 
than having one which cannot be effec- 



tively verified. Accordingly, we are pro- 
posing the most stringent verification 
regime of any arms control agreement in 
history. The most effective verification 
possible is vital to ensure that an INF 
agreement makes a lasting contribution to 
peace and stability. We will not settle for 
anything less. 

We have come a long way in our 
efforts to remove the threat posed by So- 
viet INF missiles. NATO resolve to de- 
ploy U.S. INF missiles to counter this 
unprovoked Soviet threat, while at the 
same time seeking negotiations with the 
Soviets, laid the foundation for the his- 
toric agreement which is now within 
reach. 

Difficult issues remain to be resolved, 
including verification. We have presented 
a comprehensive and effective verification 
regime. The Soviets have said they agree 
in principle with a number of our verifica- 
tion requirements but have yet to provide 
some key details. Further, some of the 
details they have provided have not met 
the test of ensuring veiification and confi- 
dence in compliance. 

It is up to the Soviet Union now 
to demonstrate whether it shares our de- 
termination to conclude a treaty eliminat- 
ing all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles. And 
I also call upon the Soviet Union to get 
down to serious business with us, as well, 
in completing an agreement on a 50% re- 
duction in U.S. and Soviet strategic arms. 



'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Sept. 21, 
1987. ■ 



the strictest, most intrusive verification 
plan in U.S. -Soviet arms control 
history. 

Completing an INF agreement 
with effective verification certainly 
would be worthwhile. Among other 
accomplishments, it would mark the 
first agreement ever to eliminate 
nuclear weapons instead of simply limit- 
ing their increase. To keep proper per- 
spective, though, we should recognize 
that intermediate-range missiles ac- 
count for only a small segment of the 
nuclear arsenals of the United States 
and the Soviet Union. The largest and 
most destructive category of nuclear 



weapons is strategic offensive arms — 
what General Secretary Gorbachev cor- 
rectly has termed the "root problem" of 
arms control. 

A START Agreement To 
Lessen the First-Strike Threat 

It would greatly serve the interests of 
peace and stability if we could reach an 
agreement on deep cuts in strategic nu- 
clear arms. Agreement is still possible 
if the Soviets are willing to negotiate 
seriously on the remaining issues. In 
May, our negotiators in Geneva pre- 
sented a draft START [strategic arms 



November 1987 



25 



ARMS CONTROL 



reduction talks] treaty. At the end of 
July, the Soviets put "forward a START 
draft of their own. 

There are important points of 
agreement in the two drafts. The two 
sides are in accord on basic aggregate 
limits on the number of strategic nu- 
clear delivery vehicles and warheads 
carried on them. Under these limits, 
the sides will eliminate approximately 
50% of all strategic warheads. If the 
Soviets want to reach full agreement, 
they will have to come to terms with 
setting specific sublimits on the most 
destabilizing of strategic weapons — 
fast-flying ballistic missiles and espe- 
cially the powerful, highly accurate 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Sub- 
limits of this sort are crucial for inhibit- 
ing first-strike capability. 

While the Soviets need to be forth- 
coming on sublimits, they also must 
stop holding stabilizing cuts in strategic 
forces hostage to demands that we 
abort our hope for protection against 
the ballistic missile threat — the Strate- 
gic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Soviet 
campaign against SDI is seriously block- 
ing arms control progress. The Soviets 
have said they will refuse to sign a 
START agreement until there is also an 
agreement reached in the defense and 
space negotiations. 

The Soviets call their defense 
and space proposal a measure to 



"strengthen" the Antiballistie Missile 
(ABM) Treaty of 1972. "Strengthen," in 
this case, actually means to amend the 
ABM Treaty, since their proposal would 
restrict the U.S. research and develop- 
ment efforts for strategic defense much 
more severely than the existing ABM 
Treaty. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is 
modernizing the only deployed strategic 
defense system in the world, which pro- 
tects Moscow, and has an extensive pro- 
gram to develop new technologies with 
ABM applications. The Soviet laser 
program alone would cost $1 billion in 
the West and employ some 10,000 scien- 
tists and engineers. 

Orwellian Propaganda 
Against SDI 

The Soviet campaign against SDI is a 
classic example of Orwellian inversion 
of the truth. The truth is that SDI 
seeks to make possible effective, purely 
defensive systems against ballistic mis- 
sile attack. To attempt to use any of the 
SDI systems for offensive purposes 
would be so inefficient as to be absurd. 
Moreover, we have offered to share the 
benefits of SDI, and we are seeking a 
managed cooperative transition with 
the Soviets to a more stable strategic 
balance based more on defensive sys- 
tems than on offensive weapons. 



MBFR Talks Convene 43d Session 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 24, 1987' 

In Vienna today representatives of the 
North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw 
Pact opened the 43d session of the mu- 
tual and balanced force reduction talks 
(MBFR). The United States remains 
committed to achieving a sound, verifia- 
ble agreement in MBFR to reduce and 
limit conventional forces. 

The main threat to security and 
stability in Europe is the substantial 
Warsaw Pact conventional superiority 
based on massive forward-deployed 
Soviet forces. In MBFR the United 
States and its NATO partners seek to 
redress the conventional imbalance in 
central Europe through negotiated 
force reductions to equal levels. 

The United States and the other 
Western MBFR participants believe 
that their proposal of December 5, 
1985, provides for an effectively verifia- 



ble accord that meets this objective. 
The Western proposal accepts a time- 
limited, first-phase framework as sug- 
gested by the Eastern side. It calls for 
initial U.S. and Soviet troop reduc- 
tions, followed by a 3-year, no-increase 
commitment on manpower in the cen- 
tral European zone, during which time 
both sides would verify remaining force 
levels. 

The President has instructed the 
U.S. delegation to the negotiations to 
press for an Eastern response to this 
initiative. 

Thus far the Eastern side has 
failed to give a meaningful response to 
the West's proposal. The United States 
and its allies call upon the East to ac- 
knowledge the benefits for both sides in 
the Western proposal and to respond 
positively in the new negotiating round. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 28, 1987. ■ 



The technological and diplomatic 
promise of our SDI program thus would 
be a safer and more peaceful balance, 
in space as well as on the earth. But 
how do the Soviets respond to this ini- 
tiative? They call it the "militarization 
of space." Soviet propaganda and disin- 
formation against SDI are taking a toll. 
While U.S. public opinion surveys indi- 
cate strong support for SDI, popular 
opinion elsewhere in the world is 
mixed. 

Let me make some very personal 
observations on SDI. By training, I am 
a professional engineer, and I am very 
cautious on questions of scientific and 
technological breakthroughs. I served 
almost 40 years as an officer in the 
U.S. Army, through all the years of our 
postwar development of strategic nu- 
clear deterrence and NATO's extended 
deterrence. I've followed or been in- 
volved in all the earlier debates about 
the feasibility of strategic defenses. I've 
never been inclined to urge an impor- 
tant shift in the free world's strategy 
simply because someone has uttered an 
upbeat but insubstantial idea. 

Defensive doctrines and systems, 
of course, have always been part of any 
sane military preparation. Shields often 
prove better instruments than swords. 
This is common sense, and it has not 
been repealed by the advent of the nu- 
clear age. Technology, though, has 
found it extremely difficult to develop 
purely defensive systems against weap- 
ons so awesomely swift and devastating 
as intercontinental ballistic missiles. 
Decade after decade through the nu- 
clear age, I've formed my own empiri- 
cal judgments about the state of the 
art in strategic defense. Through the 
1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s, strate- 
gic defense technology was not ade- 
quate. Now at last, in the 1980s, I am 
convinced it has improved to the point 
that it is worth pursuing with our full- 
est energies. 

In all candor, I am a "convert" to 
SDI, and as with many converts, my 
belief is fervent. But please do not mis- 
take fervor for a lack of scientific rigor. 
SDI is a serious matter of science, tech- 
nology, and strategy. I am confident we 
have the technological wherewithal 
eventually to make it work. 

SDI would "work" not by creating 
a perfect, impenetrable shield. This no- 
tion is a straw man set up by some of 
SDI's critics — a classic example of mak- 
ing perfection the enemy of the good. 
SDI can work by setting up a layered 
defense good enough to complicate the 
Soviets' offensive planning problems so 
much that they could never rationally 
launch a first strike. It is a program 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



that holds great promise for enhancing 
Western security and ensuring future 
strategic stability. That is why I have 
confidence in the program, and that is 
why I hope its support will remain 
strong among the American public and 
among our allies. 

Conclusion 

President Reagan recently characterized 
U.S.-Soviet relations as "...proceeding. 
No great cause for excitement, no great 
cause for alarm." I would like to add to 
this a hopeful but challenging note. 
Never in my years of work in U.S.- 
Soviet relations and arms control nego- 
tiations have I seen a Soviet leader 
with Mikhail Gorbachev's vigor and ap- 
parent restlessness for change. If he 
channels his energies in the right direc- 
tions, he could promote greater har- 
mony in the world. 

To do so, he will have to give 
more earnest attention to all four parts 
of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. For in- 
stance, he will have to make a decision 
to pull back from support for communist 
wars of aggression and expansion in 
Afghanistan and other regions of Asia, 
Africa, and the Americas. He will need 
to pursue the extension of fundamental 
human freedoms in the Soviet Union 
for the people's sake, not just to im- 
prove the image of his regime. He must 
act to end hostile and dishonest propa- 
ganda against the United States, nota- 
bly the dangerous assertions against 
our efforts to put new technology to 
work in defense against baUistic mis- 
siles. And he should move forward to 
reduce nuclear weapons, not only those 
of intermediate range but also the stra- 
tegic arms of intercontinental range. 

If we were to witness such a trans- 
formation in the Soviet Union, then we 
could say the Soviets, indeed, have a 
new strategy for true peace. Mean- 
while, we will do our part, with pa- 
tience and caution, to pursue the 
strategy for peace upon which we have 
embarked. ■ 



Democracy in the Philippines 



by David F. Lambertson 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Comm-ittee on 
September 10, 1987. Mr. Lambertson is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East 
Asia and Pacific Affairs.^ 

I appreciate this opportunity to review 
with you and your subcommittee devel- 
opments in the Philippines. The at- 
tempted coup, or mutiny, of August 
28-29 — had it succeeded — would have 
marked a tragic reversal of fortune for 
that country and its people destroying 
everything they had created through 
their courageous overthrow of Marcos 
[former President Ferdinand E. Mar- 
cos] and the restoration of democracy. 
The United States promptly and cate- 
gorically condemned the action of the 
mutineers and affirmed our total sup- 
port for constitutional government in 
the Philippines. We intend to do what 
we can to help the Philippines overcome 
the damage caused by that misguided 
and reprehensible attempt and move 
forward, for we know that the success 
of democracy in the Philippines is a vic- 
tory for democracy everywhere. I will 
discuss these recent events in more de- 
tail later in my statement, but I would 
like first to put them in perspective by 
reviewing briefly what was at risk — the 
achievements of democracy in the Phil- 
ippines and its future. 

It is important to bear in mind the 
situation which existed when the 
Aquino [President Corazon Aquino] 
government took office and the consid- 
erable progress it has made in the past 
18 months. The challenges facing the 
new government were many and varied: 
the restoration of democratic institu- 
tions, the introduction of market-ori- 
ented economic policies and the revival 
of economic growth, the need to coun- 
ter an aggressive communist insur- 
gency committed to the violent 
overthrow of the democratic govern- 
ment, and the restoration of a profes- 
sional military damaged by years of 
politicization and neglect. 

Restoration of Democratic 
Institutions 

As I testified before this subcommittee 
last May, we believe that a stable, dem- 
ocratic Philippines is the best long-term 
guarantor of our own political, strate- 



gic, and economic interests in the Phil- 
ippines and throughout Southeast Asia. 
Since the subcommittee's last hearing 
on the Phihppines, Mr. Chairman [Sen- 
ator Stephen J. Solarz], you had the 
opportunity to visit Manila for the 
opening of the new Philippine Con- 
gress. That event was a major milestone 
in the restoration of democratic institu- 
tions in the Philippines. The new con- 
gress provides a vehicle for legitimate 
political expression which, we believe, 
fundamentally increases the stability 
and strength of democracy in that coun- 
try. Congressional support for Presi- 
dent Aquino during and immediately 
after the coup attempt provided a 
strong sense of legitimacy to the gov- 
ernment during the crisis. 

The next step in the reestabUsh- 
ment of democratic institutions in the 
Philippines will be local elections, 
scheduled for later this year or early 
1988, in which Filipino voters will 
choose local and municipal government 
officials. These elections will be the es- 
sential final building block in the proc- 
ess of restoring popular participation in 
government. They will put into place 
the mechanism for the decentralization 
of power and economic decisionmaking 
necessary if government is to be re- 
sponsive to local economic and social 
concerns — the neglect of which is often 
cited as one of the root causes of sup- 
port for the communist insurgency. 

Economic Policies 

The Aquino government inherited an 
economy that had contracted by over 
10% in 3 years of crisis. Per capita GNP 
[gross national product] in peso terms 
had fallen by more than 13% over that 
period — a major factor, many believe, 
in the rapid growth of the insurgent 
forces. Conversely, economic progress 
can and will provide an important un- 
derpinning for Philippine democracy 
and for the counterinsurgency effort. 
President Aquino inaugurated an am- 
bitious economic program which has led 
to a revival of growth and renewed con- 
fidence in the future of the economy. 
Her government has reformed the tax 
system, broken up agricultural monopo- 
lies, instituted a major privatization 
program, partially liberahzed the trad- 
ing system, and restored international 
confidence in the financial management 
of the country. 



November 1987 



27 



EAST ASIA 



The result have been encouraging. 
In the first quarter of 1987, real GNP 
rose 5.1% and per capita GNP began to 
rebound. The government now predicts 
demand-led growth for all of 1987 of 
between 5.1% and 5.8%. The current 
account should remain in balance for 
the year, foreign reserves are high and 
continue to e.xpand, and inflation, while 
increasing moderately, remains low. 

Unfortunately, serious economic 
problems remain. Growth this year will 
be less than the government's initial ex- 
pectations of 6.5%', because of lower- 
than-anticipated investment and export 
gi'owth and because of the drought 
which has affected much of Southeast 
Asia. Increasing levels of investment 
will be necessary to sustain economic 
growth in the 5%-6%i range over the 
coming years. In addition, the future 
growth of the economy will be heavily 
affected by trends in international com- 
modity prices and interest rates. 
Clearly, a continuing high level of inter- 
national economic assistance will be es- 
sential to Philippine efforts to sustain 
the impressive economic progress it has 
made to date. While informal and pre- 
liminary indications suggest that last 
month's military mutiny has not de- 
terred investors who had already 
formulated investment plans for the 
Philippines, that even undoubtedly had 
an unsettling effect. Quite obviously 
political stability and the perception 
of stability are vital if the Philippines is 
to compete successfully for invest- 
ment capital with other countries in 
the region. 

The Insurgency 

During the first half of 1987, the com- 
munist insurgency, we believe, lost po- 
litical momentum — due in large part to 
President Aquino's personal popularity 
and the enthusiastic support of Fil- 
ipinos for the restoration of democracy. 
For example, Philippine voters turned 
out in massive numbers to approve the 
new constitution in February despite 
a communist call for a boycott of the 
constitutional plebiscite. In the con- 
gressional elections in May, leftist can- 
didates generally fared poorly, even in 
areas under NPA [New People's Army] 
influence. However, during that same 
6-month period insurgency-related mili- 
tary activity steadily increased. The 
AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] 
continues to suffer on average approxi- 
mately the same number of casualties 
as 12 months ago. The communists al- 
most certainly view the recent mutiny 



as working in their favor, and a disturb- 
ing increase in NPA-initiated incidents 
in the past few days could indicate a 
concerted effort to take advantage of 
the situation. 

While we have yet to see any sig- 
nificant dechne in overall insurgent 
strength or in areas controlled by the 
NPA, at a minimum the dramatic 
gi'owth of the NPA in the final few 
years under Marcos has halted. The re- 
cent increase in insurgent activity in 
urban areas (predating the coup at- 
tempt) could be the result of a realiza- 
tion by the CPP [Communist Party of 
the Philippines] that its political appeal 
has been badly tarnished since the ad- 
vent of the Aquino government and 
democracy. 

I noted in the May hearing of this 
subcommittee the growth of citizen's 
groups organized to defend their com- 
munities against communist depreda- 
tions. In certain areas, such as Davao 
city on Mindanao in the southern Phil- 
ippines, these groups have succeeded in 
dramatically reducing NPA influence 
and violence. The Philippine Govern- 
ment, after carefully considering how 
to respond to this spontaneous move- 
ment, has endorsed the concept of com- 
munities organized in self-defense while 
bringing these movements under rule of 
law. In order to minimize the potential 
for abuse, the Aquino government has 
prepared guidelines governing the for- 
mation and activity of anticommunist 
groups. The guidelines are aimed at en- 
suring that CVSO [Civilian Voluntary 
Self-Defense Organization] behavior is 
consistent with Philippine law. The 
Philippine Government is committed to 
democratic ideals and preservation of 
human rights and recognizes the impor- 
tance of enforcing these guidelines to 
ensure that CVSO activities comport 
fully with the law. 

Civil-Military Relations 

Last month's coup attempt was led by a 
small group of disaffected middle-grade 
officers who are members of the Re- 
form the Armed Forces Movement 
(RAM). The conspirators claimed that 
their action stemmed from a loss of 
confidence in the government's deter- 
mination to address the serious defi- 
ciencies they perceived in policy 
direction and resources allocated to the 
armed forces. Their complaints in- 
cluded insufficient material support for 
the armed forces (low pay, inadequate 
pensions, and survivor benefits) as well 
as policy differences with the military 
and civilian leadership of the govern- 



ment regarding prosecution of the anti- 
insurgency campaign. 

The actions of the mutineers, led 
by Colonel Gregorio Honasan, caused 
death or injury to hundreds of Filipinos 
and weakened the AFP's ability to com- 
bat the armed threat of the communist 
insurgency. The mutineers violated 
their oath to uphold the constitution 
which had been approved by the over- 
whelming majority of Filipino voters 
last February. In choosing to resort to 
methods that are unacceptable in any 
democracy, the mutineers put their 
judgment above that of a political sys- 
tem that encourages free political de- 
bate and exchange of ideas. 

Despite this display of military dis- 
affection, it should be recognized that 
progress has in fact been made over the 
past 18 months in a number of areas, 
including: 

• Retirement of all "overstaying" 
generals from the Marcos era (with 
General Ramos excepted as chief of 
staff); 

• Relocation to the countryside, 
where governmental presence is essen- 
tial for the conduct of effective coun- 
terinsurgency, of most of the Philippine 
Army's division and brigade headquar- 
ters; 

• Establishment of a national train- 
ing center to promote professionalism 
and combat skills. 

• Increased combat pay in 1986 for 
enlisted personnel and for officers; 

• Improved logistics support to 
combat units in the provinces; and 

• Reduced human rights abuses by 
AFP soldiers as a result of improved 
training and heightened command 
awareness. 

Nevertheless, as the mutiny graph- 
ically illustrated, there is continu- 
ing factionalism within the military, 
and civil-military relations remain 
strained — both of these phenomena be- 
ing in large part legacies of the Marcos 
era. President Aquino now faces, in 
starker terms than previously, the for- 
midable challenge of mending these 
rifts. President Aquino has vowed to 
deal firmly with the mutineers while 
launching a concerted effort to amelio- 
rate tensions with the AFP by promis- 
ing tangible benefits and reaffirming a 
strong stand against the communists. 
Her actions and statements suggest 
that President Aquino intends to deal 
with the organizers of the uprising in a 
manner that will reinforce the principle 
of civilian supremacy, while building 
bridges to the military by addressing 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



the causes of these underlying tensions. 
The subordination of military power to 
civil authority is, of course, essential in 
any democracy. In the face of the com- 
munist threat to democracy in the Phil- 
ippines, that fundamental concept has 
even more relevance, as does the need 
for effective civil-military cooperation, 
and this is what President Aquino 
seems determined to achieve. 

U.S. Policy Toward the Philippines 

The United States supports une- 
quivocally President Aquino's govern- 
ment and the democratic system which 
has been established in the Philippines. 
We have categorically opposed and con- 
demned all attempts to undermine or 
destroy this system. Soon after the mu- 
tiny began on August 28, President 
Reagan reaffirmed our position in a 
statement which e.xpressed his "pro- 
found concern" about the extraconsti- 
tutional action of the mutineers and 
reaffirmed America's "unqualified sup- 
port" for the democratic government of 
the Philippines. Our Embassy in Manila 
worked quickly to ensure that this posi- 
tion was made widely known to the 
government, members of the Philip- 
pine Armed Forces and the Philippine 
people. 

Needless to say, we were deeply 
disturbed by the August 28-29 mutiny 
and the threat which it represented to 
constitutional government in the Philip- 
pines. Had that action succeeded the 
consequences for the Philippines — and 
for U.S. -Philippine relations — would 
have been disastrous. Political support 
for the Philippines in the United States 
would have been severely undermined. 
Any future such attempts, even assum- 
ing they fail as this one did, would 
weaken the Philippine body politic, di- 
vert attention and resources from the 
real challenges facing that country — in 
particular fighting the insurgency — and 
not least, produce an image of danger 
and instability which would affect the 
way the country is perceived interna- 
tionally, including by potential inves- 
tors. The United States will continue 
vigorously to oppose any and all threats 
to Philippine democracy and will con- 
tinue to give its utmost support to the 
constitutional system which has taken 
root there. 

We remain confident that the Phil- 
ippine people will rally behind the lead- 
ership of their extrordinarily popular 
President and will preserve and build 
upon the remarkable achievements of 
the past 18 months. The United States 



intends to do everything we can to as- 
sist the government and people of the 
Philippines in their efforts to consoli- 
date and strengthen democracy. We 
hope that our expressions of support 
can be matched by tangible contribu- 
tions to the success of that important 
undertaking, and we look to the Con- 
gress to join us in ensuring that ade- 
quate levels of security and economic 
assistance are made available. We have 
requested $110 million in MAP [military 
assistance program] and $124 million in 
ESF [economic support fund] for the 
coming year We will reexamine Philip- 



pine requirements in the wake of the 
unfortunate events of August 28-29 in 
an attempt to identify whether addi- 
tional assistance might be required, 
and we will consult with you as we do 
this. I know you would agree that the 
success of democracy in the Philippines 
is in the vital interest of the United 
States, and that we must do everything 
we can to support it. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Korea: Moving Quickly 
Toward Democracy 



by William Clark, Jr. 

Statemefit before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
September 17, 1987. Mr. Clark is Dep- 
uty Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs.^ 

Thank you for this opportunity to ap- 
pear before you. The bipartisan interest 
in Korea which the Congress in gen- 
eral, and your committee in particular, 
has shown strongly supports U.S. pol- 
icy. While Koreans remain responsible 
for what happens there, we believe 
that Administration and congressional 
efforts have helped stimulate positive 
developments. I would like to discuss 
the exciting and generally positive po- 
litical developments now under way 
in the Republic of Korea. Historic 
events have taken place in the past 
few months. As Assistant Secretary 
[Gaston J.] Sigur told you last June, 
Koreans are moving quickly ahead in 
a process of "democratization." 

Even in the short period of time 
since Assistant Secretary Sigur's ap- 
pearance, the Koreans have made sig- 
nificant progress. As he pointed out, 
however, the birth of real democracy in 
Korea would require a great deal of 
effort and, in all likelihood, some pain. 
There has been some; there will be 
more ahead. Much still remains to be 
done, with little time remaining. De- 
spite difficulties, there is a determina- 
tion in Korea to forge political change 
through dialogue and compromise. That 
is the key. 



We remain confident the Korean 
people will succeed. Koreans are a well- 
educated, very hard-working people. 
Thirty years ago, some observers said 
Koreans could not build a viable econ- 
omy. They did. We continue firm in our 
support for their present efforts. Let 
me examine the present state of play as 
we see it. 

Constitutional Revisions 

On September 1, negotiators from the 
government's Democratic Justice Party 
(DJP) and the major opposition Re- 
unification Democratic Party (RDP) 
agreed on key provisions for constitu- 
tional revisions. Compromise and di- 
alogue brought this achievement, 
allowing Koreans to reach an important 
milestone on the road to free and fair 
presidential elections this year and Na- 
tional Assembly elections next. 

The eight-man bipartisan team 
which produced the agreement on the 
constitutional revision points demon- 
strated that Korean politicians can 
solve problems through negotiation 
rather than confrontation. Everyone in- 
volved understood that the Korean peo- 
ple expected results. The team moved 
at impressive speed, starting in early 
August with over 100 clauses for review 
and resolution. After some discussion, 
the members decided first to concen- 
trate on areas on which they could 
agree quickly; they saved contentious 
sections for last. 'The approach worked. 



November 1987 



29 



EAST ASIA 



The agreement represents signifi- 
cant compromises on both sides. I 
would Hke to highlight a number which 
many felt at the beginning might derail 
the entire process. One was the differ- 
ence over the presidential term of of- 
fice. The government's Democratic 
Justice Party proposed one 6-year 
term. The opposition Reunification 
Democratic Party called for both a 
4-year term with a single reelection 
possible and creation of an office of vice 
president. During the course of nego- 
tiations, RDP President Kim Young 
Sam suggested a 5-year term or terms 
as a possible solution. The committee 
finally rejected the idea of a vice presi- 
dent but settled on one 5-year term for 
the president. 

The team also focused considerable 
attention on the powers of the presi- 
dent under the new constitution. The 
opposition, believing the office too 
powerful in the past, was eager to place 
new limits on presidential powers. In 
the government party's view, the revi- 
sions had to protect the chief e.xecu- 
tive's ability to function effectively. The 
committee sought a solution to balance 
these different concerns. The President 
will no longer be able to dissolve the 
assembly. On the other hand, the new 
constitution will limit the power of the 
National Assembly to remove the prime 
minister and members of the cabinet 
through a no-confidence motion. In- 
stead, the assembly can make a legisla- 
tive "recommendation" to the president 
to change his cabinet members. 

As might be e.xpected, the question 
of the citizens' right to protest proved a 
difficult problem, involving many sen- 
sitive issues of recent Korean political 
history. After June 29, Roh Tae Woo 
had discussed the need for the nation to 
address the bitter legacy of the 1980 
Kwangju tragedy. The opposition's pro- 
posed draft included direct mention of 
the Kwangju incident and the "people's 
right to resist illegitimate government" 
as well as to 1960s historic "April 19" 
uprising against President Syngman 
Rhee. The government party, however, 
opposed inclusion of the opposition's 
specific wording in the constitution, but 
the two sides reached agreement to re- 
fer in the preamble to the "spirit of the 
April 19 uprising against injustice." 

In light of the intervention of the 
military into Korean politics in the 
past, the opposition pressed for inclu- 
sion of specific wording rejecting such 
actions. The DJP resisted singling out 
any one branch of government for spe- 
cial criticism. The committee resolved 



the issue by including a section requir- 
ing the political neutrality of Korean 
Government officials. The revision will 
include a clause calling for the military 
also to respect political neutrality. 



very good year for positive change — for 
"civilianization" and "democratization." 
The process has wide support. The 
Korean people have clearly chosen a 
peaceful process for political change. 



The National Assembly and Elections Labor 



Reports from Seoul indicate that the 
drafting team has completed its work 
on the constitutional revisions. The 
ne.xt step is to submit the document to 
the National Assembly. 

The committee did defer one very 
thorny issue — the voting age — to the 
National Assembly. The DJP proposed 
that the voting age remain unchanged 
at 20. The RDP wanted to lower the 
age to 18. The revision committee fi- 
nally recommended that the National 
Assembly embody voting age in new 
election laws rather than in the con- 
stitution itself. 

An additional question under de- 
bate is the timing of elections for a new 
National Assembly. The government 
party prefers February 1988, the op- 
position April 1988. The reasons for the 
preferences are obvious. Party sides as- 
sure us the problem will be resolved. 

Time to accomplish all that remains 
to be done is short. The schedule is 
tight. Having agreed on constitutional 
revisions, negotiators have now turned 
to changes in the election laws. The 
assembly is expected to pass the con- 
stitutional revisions by early October. 
Koreans will then vote on approval in a 
national referendum. The assembly will 
meanwhile be at work on revision of 
appropriate laws to ensure fair elec- 
tions. The two major party presidents, 
Roh T^e Woo and Kim Young Sam, have 
agreed to hold the presidential elec- 
tions before December 20. 

The Korean people by their actions 
over the years, and particularly over 
the past few months, have shown they 
firmly support the process of democra- 
tization through dialogue to ensure the 
peaceful transfer of power next Febru- 
ary. They want a broadly based politi- 
cal system to match the dynamism of 
their society and economy. Last June 
Koreans from all walks of life said that 
"business as usual" is as inappropriate 
for their politics as the oxcart would be 
in Korea's new society and interna- 
tionally minded commercial world. 

This strong popular feeling clearly 
stimulated the June 29 announcement 
by presidential candidate Roh Tae Woo 
of political reforms. We believe that the 
overwhelming majority of Koreans in all 
sectors — business, education, govern- 
ment, military — think that 1987 is a 



As part of democratization, labor issues 
have also come to the fore since June 
29. The open atmosphere following 
Roh's announcement has led to a "hot 
summer" of labor disputes which 
is still going on and which have hit 
Koreans and foreign firms alike. Work- 
ers have concentrated on "worker is- 
sues" — higher wages, better working 
conditions, and democratically elected 
unions. A large majority of these dis- 
putes have been settled with increases 
in wages and benefits and with com- 
pany recognition of unions. The trend 
in new disputes is down. Government 
and opposition political parties agree 
that management and labor must work 
together to settle their problems with- 
out government interference. The gov- 
ernment has followed this course, 
although it has said that it will not per- 
mit violence or destruction of property. 

Human Rights 

The June 29 announcement recognized 
the long-festering issues of civil and hu- 
man rights in Korea. As a result, over 
500 political prisoners have been re- 
leased. The government also lifted the 
restrictions on over 2,300 people. Many 
Koreans continue to contend that oth- 
ers are still in jail in Korea for doing 
little more than expressing their opin- 
ions. So, while there has been some 
progress, the issue of political prisoners 
remains to be solved. Some dissidents 
have demanded that the opposition boy- 
cott constitutional revision until all who 
might be considered political prisoners 
are released. The RDP's position has 
been to move the "democratization" 
process forward while also reminding 
the government of the continuing need 
for progress on the issue. 

Press Freedom 

Koreans clearly want more freedom 
of the press, including the broadcast 
media. This issue was included in the 
June 29 announcement. The Korean 
media is now freer than it has been in a 
long time. Since last year, newspapers 
have carried an increasingly wide vari- 
ety of political news and commentary 
on constitutional revision and the up- 
coming election. Pohticians from gov- 
ernment and the opposition have 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



appeared on television and debated 
each other. Kim Dae Jung's recent trip 
to Kwangju was covered by television 
as well as the newspapers. A free me- 
dia is vital to "democratization" and 
free elections. People on all sides now 
recognize the importance of this point. 

U.S. Support 

When Assistant Secretary Sigur talked 
to you on his return from Korea, he 
e.xpressed his, and our, basic optimism 
about the process of political change 
there. Dialogue and compromise, an ap- 
proach we have long urged, helped 
bring the recent agreement on constitu- 
tional revisions. We continue to believe 
strongly that Korea's problems are po- 
litical and require a political solution. 
We have condemned violence and the 
use of force as political tools. 

We recognize that much hard work 
remains. Koreans have entered what is 
for them the largely uncharted waters 
of democratic politics and negotiated la- 
bor relations. They continue to demon- 
strate their ability to overcome the 
formidable obstacles this process in- 
volved. We will continue to watch the 
situation carefully. We will also use 
every opportunity to repeat the mes- 
sage which Assistant Secretary Sigur 
sent from New York in July: no vio- 
lence; civilianization; and full support 
for the process — but not for any partic- 
ular candidate or party. 

In Seoul and in Washington, we 
work hard to be open to Koreans from 
across the political spectrum. Mr. Roh 
Tae Woo, one of Korea's major political 
figures, has just visited Washington. 
We emphasized to him the importance 
of a successful outcome to "democrati- 
zation." Let me assure you that we will 
offer a similar welcome to other Korean 
leaders should they visit here. The key 
to the process of change is, however, 
not in Washington but in Seoul. In the 
final analysis, Koreans will succeed, we 
believe, because they are determined 
to do so. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



South Korea-A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 98,500 sq. km. (38,000 sq. mi.); about 
the size of Indiana. Cities: Capita/— Seoul 
(over 10 million). Other major cities— Pusan 
(3.4 million), Taegu (2.0 million). Inchon (1.2 
million). Terrain: Partially forested mountain 
ranges, separated by deep, narrow valleys; 
cultivated plains along the coasts, particularly 
in the west and south. Climate: Temperate. 

People 

Nationality: Noun and adjective— KoTea.n{s). 
Population (1986): 43.3 million. Annual 
growth rate: l.,5%. Ethnic groups: Korean; 
small Chinese minority. Religions: Buddhism, 
Christianity, Shamanism, Confucianism. 
Language: Korean. Education: Years 
compulsory— 6. Number of students— 
11,121,000. AMendance (1984)-of those 
eligible, 98.8% attended middle school, 89.7% 
attended high school. Literacy— over 90%. 
Health (1983): 1 doctor/1,509 persons. Infant 
mortality rate (1983)-29/l,000. Life 
expectancy— men 64 yrs., women 71 yrs. 
Work force (15.4 million, 1985): 
Agriculture— 2A.9%. Industry— 30.5%. 
Services— 14.6%. 



Government 

Type: Republic with power centralized in a 
strong executive. Independence: August 15, 
1948. Constitution: July 17, 1948; revised 
1962, 1972, 1980. 

Branches: feecMhye— president (chief of 
state). Le^is/a/ive— unicameral National 
Assembly. JWicia/— Supreme Court and 
appellate courts. Constitutional Court. 

Subdivisions: Nine provinces, four 
administratively separate cities (Seoul, Pusan, 
Inchon, Taegu). 

Political parties: Government party- 
Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Opposition 
parties— Nev! Korea Democratic Party 
(NKDP), Korean National Party (KNP). Suf- 
frage: Universal over 20. 

Central government budget (1985): 
Expenditures— $n .i billion. 

Defense (1986 est.): $47 billion, approx. 
5.1% of GNP and 31.2% of government 
budget. About 600,000 active in armed forces. 



Economy 

GNP (1986 est.): $91,750 billion. Annual 
growth rate (1961-81): 8%. Per capita GNP 
(1985): $2,032. Consumer price index (1985 
avg. increase): 3.2%. 

Natural resources: Limited coal, 
tungsten, iron ore. limestone, kaolinite, and 
graphite. 

Agriculture (including forestry and 
fisheries, 16.4% of 1985 GNP): Products- 
rice, barley, vegetables. Arable land— 22% of 
land area. 

Mining and manufacturing (42.0% of 
1985 GNP): Textiles, footwear, electronics, 
shipbuilding, motor vehicles, petrochemicals, 
industrial machinery. 

Social overhead capital and other serv- 
ices: 41.6% of 1985 GNP. 

Trade (1986): £'j:por/s-$33.9 billion: 
manufactures; textiles; ships; electrical 
products; footwear; steel. Major markets- 
US, Japan, European Community, Middle 
East, /wi.por/s— $31.5 billion: crude oil; food; 
machinery and transportation equipment; 
chemicals and chemical products; base metals 
and articles. Major swpp/iers— Middle East, 
Japan, US. 

Official exchange rate (March 1987): 852 
won = US$l. 

Fiscal year: Calendar year. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

Official observer status at UN; active in many 
UN specialized agencies (FAO, GATT, IAEA, 
IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IMF, IMO, 
ITU, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, 
UNIDO, UPU. WHO, WIPO, WMO. WTO) 
and other international organizations (Asian- 
African Legal Consultative Committee, 
ASPAC, Asian People's Anti-Communist 
League, World Anti-Communist League, 
Colombo Plan, Economic and Social Commis- 
sion for Asia and the Pacific, Geneva Conven- 
tions of 1949 for the Protection of War Vic- 
tims, Asian Development Bank, INTELSAT, 
International Whaling Commission, Inter- 
parliamentary Union, INTERPOL); official 
observer status in African Development Bank 
(member of Africa Development Fund), Inter- 
national Labor Organization, and Organiza- 
tion of American States. 



Taken from, the Background Notes of Apr. 
1987, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Juanita Adams. ■ 



November 1987 



31 



EAST ASIA 



U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam 



by David F. Lambertson 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Coynmittee on 
September 30, 1987. Mr. Lambertson is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs.' 

I would like to review with you, U.S. 
policy toward Vietnam in order to put 
in perspective I'ecent developments on 
POW/MIA questions. I also want to 
discuss briefly several areas of human- 
itarian interest to us other than POW/ 
MIAs, including the orderly departure 
program, Amerasian children, and po- 
litical prisoners. 

General [John W.] Vessey has de- 
tailed his efforts to bring about re- 
newed and accelerated Vietnamese 
cooperation on POW/MIA issues. As he 
has emphasized, his visit to Hanoi and 
the agreement reached there were pos- 
sible only because the Socialist Re- 
public of Vietnam acknowledged that 
our determination to achieve the fullest 
possible accounting for our missing men 
is a humanitarian endeavor not appro- 
priately linked to broader political or 
economic questions. This separation 
of POW/MIA questions from those 
broader policy concerns is essential and 
is one we are determined to maintain. 

U.S. policy toward Vietnam has 
been consistent and, we believe, effec- 
tive. We are prepared to move toward 
normalization of relations with Vietnam 
only in the context of a settlement of 
the conflict in Cambodia which involves 
the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces 



from Cambodia. We also maintain an 
embargo on U.S. trade with Vietnam 
and, of course, provide no economic aid 
to that country. 

This U.S. stance, coordinated fully 
with the governments of the Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), is designed to maintain po- 
litical and economic pressure on Viet- 
nam to enter into serious negotiations 
on Cambodia and to withdraw its 
140,000-strong occupation force from 
that country. The United States, along 
with its ASEAN friend and an over- 
whelming majority of the nations of the 
world, seeks a settlement in Cambodia 
which will permit the people of that 
country to choose their own govern- 
ment through free elections and with- 
out outside coercion. I should add that 
the United States remains unalterably 
opposed to a return to power by the 
Khmer Rouge. 

We do not know how much longer 
it will be necessary to wait for Vietnam 
to take the decisions necessary to per- 
mit a settlement in Cambodia. While 
there have been recent indications of 
heightened Vietnamese interest in ne- 
gotiations, we have yet to see any con- 
crete evidence that Vietnam is prepared 
to bite the bullet. We would, of course, 
welcome such evidence. In the mean- 
time, the United States will continue 
steadfastly to support the concerted 
efforts of ASEAN and others to demon- 
strate to Vietnam the futility of its 
Cambodia policy and to bring about a 
settlement acceptable to the people of 
Cambodia and to the nations of the re- 
gion. We stand ready to play a con- 
structive role in such a settlement. 




Our determination to seek from 
Vietnam the fullest possible accounting 
of our POW/MIAs, and our readiness to 
address Vietnamese humanitarian con- 
cerns, in no sense modifies basic U.S. 
policy. Our insistence on treating the 
POW/MIA issue as a separate and dis- 
tinct humanitarian undertaking, and 
Vietnam's acceptance of this definition, 
permits us to pursue that important ob- 
jective without calling into question our 
broader policies toward Vietnam. We 
have briefed our ASEAN friends and 
other interested governments fully at 
every step of the way, and we are confi- 
dent that they understand both the ne- 
cessity of continuing our efforts on the 
POW/MIA question and the fact that 
we remain steadfast in our opposition 
to Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. 

Despite our profound political dif- 
ferences with Vietnam, General Ves- 
sey's mission and its aftermath have 
shown that it is possible to establish 
effective working relationships on hu- 
manitarian matters. In addition to the 
POW/MIA issue, recent developments 
in several other humanitarian areas 
have been encouraging. 

After a nearly 18-month hiatus in 
cooperation on the orderly departure 
program, American and Vietnamese 
technical teams met again in July and 
reached an agreement permitting the 
resumption of orderly departure pro- 
gram processing and interviewing. The 
negotiations to put this program back 
on track were lengthy; nonetheless, we 
are satisfied with the resulting agree- 
ment and encouraged by what may be a 
renewed Vietnamese commitment to 
the program. A team of American con- 
sular officers has just completed the 
first set of interviews in Ho Chi Minh 
City under the newly agreed pro- 
cedures, and we e.xpect some of those 
approved to depart Vietnam within the 
next month or so. 



U.S. presidential envoy John W. Vessey 
(second from right on right side of table) 
meets with Vietnamese Foreign Minister 
Nguyen Co Thach (second from left on 
left side of table) in Hanoi on Aug. 2. 
1987, to discuss the issue of Americans 
missing in action in Vietnam. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



Equally encouraging, we have 
reached agreement in principle for the 
resumption of processing and emigra- 
tion of Amerasian children and their 
close family members. There is some 
work yet to do in ironing out technical 
details, but we are hopeful that this 
program too will begin to move. 

There have also been promising de- 
velopments on the political prisoner is- 
sue. The Vietnamese Government 
recently announced the release of 480 
"re-education camp" inmates previously 
associated with the Saigon government. 
In terms of both the numbers of pris- 
oners involved and their seniority — as 
well as the press coverage permitted — 
this prisoner release differed signifi- 
cantly from previous Vietnamese prac- 
tice. We welcomed this step and have 
expressed the hope that all remaining 
political prisoners will be freed and al- 
lowed to emigi-ate with their close fam- 
ily members if they wish. As President 
Reagan announced in 1984, we are pre- 
pared to consider all of these people 
and their close family members for re- 
settlement in the United States. 

Much remains to be achieved in all 
of these areas. But recent progress has 
been significant, and we hope it will 
continue. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Strategic Technology Export Controls 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 18, 1987' 

The U.S. Government welcomes recent 
measures taken by the Japanese Gov- 
ernment, and those soon to be enacted 
in Norway, to strengthen export con- 
trols. Diversions of strategic technology 
by Toshiba Machinery and the Nor- 
wegian firm Kongsberg Vappenfabrik 
have undermined our common security 
and demonstrated the inadequacy of ex- 
isting national laws and procedures. 
Japanese legislative and administrative 
actions increase criminal penalties and 
statutes of limitations, mandate new 
and stricter licensing procedures, pro- 
vide for tight export control procedures 
by companies, and for close governmen- 
tal monitoring of these. The Norwegian 
Government will this month introduce a 
new comprehensive export control law 
in the Parliament, or Storting, that will 
strengthen Norway's national laws and 
procedures along these same lines. 

The Paris-based Coordinating Com- 
mittee [for Mutilateral Security Export 
Controls] (COCOM), which is composed 
of 16 allies, including the United States, 
serves the common security of its mem- 
ber nations by preventing militarily 
useful technologies from reaching the 
Soviet Union. COCOM reflects the 
principle that the security of the West 
and of Japan is based on the qualitative 
technology edge that we are able to 
maintain our weapons systems. CO- 
COM exists to protect that critical ad- 
vantage. The serious diversion of nine- 



axis milling machines and numerical 
controllers for use in the Soviet pro- 
gram to quiet submarines serves as an 
unfortunate, yet graphic, example of 
the damage which can be done to our 
collective security. 

The Congress has offered a number 
of bills and amendments that would 
punish Toshiba and Kongsberg through 
mandatory sanctions and compensation. 
But the technology diversion problem is 
broader than the specific violations of 
the firms that are currently the targets 
of legislation. The real problem lies in 
the shortcomings of national export 
control systems, and responsibility 
rests with allied governments to make 
and enforce the necessary changes. 
Therefore, the Administration opposes 
these bills and amendments. 

It is now essential that all COCOM 
partners strengthen their national ex- 
port controls to prevent further diver- 
sions. High technology products in the 
1980s are produced worldwide, and the 
Soviet Union targets its acquisition 
programs wherever the technology can 
be found. The Administration has be- 
gun an aggressive and unprecedented 
effort to urge that all COCOM partners 
take steps to prevent further diversions 
and strengthen national export control 
systems. The Administration plans to 
consult with the Congress on the prog- 
ress made as well as on next steps to 
prevent and deter attempts at future 
diversions. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 21, 1987. ■ 



November 1987 



33 



EUROPE 



Soviet Foreign IVIinister Visits Washington 



Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze was in Washington Sep- 
tember 15-18, 1987, to meet with Presi- 
dent Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and 
other government officials. 

Following are the President's and 
Foreign Minister's remarks before Sec- 
retary Shultz and Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze signed the agreement on 
the establishment of Nuclear Risk Re- 
duction Centers; the texts of that agree- 
ment and two protocols; a White House 
fact sheet on the agreement; a news 
conference by the Secretary; two joint 
statements; and a statement by the 
President. 



REMARKS, 
SEPT. 15, 1987' 

President Reagan 

I am very pleased; today the United 
States and the Soviet Union will sign the 
agi-eement to establish Nuclear Risk Re- 
duction Centers. This agreement is an- 
other practical step in our efforts to 
reduce the risks of conflict that could 
otherwise result from accident, mis- 
calculation, or misunderstanding. Today's 
agreement goes beyond e.xisting struc- 
tures to establish the first new, direct 
channel for communications between 
Washington and Moscow since the crea- 
tion of the "Hot Line" in 1963. 

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers vdll 
play an important role in further lessen- 
ing the chances of conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
They provide a means to transmit notifi- 
cations required under existing confi- 
dence-building measures and could play 
a key role in e.xchanging the information 
necessary for effective verification of fu- 
ture arms control agreements. 

For the United States, this agi-ee- 
ment results from close cooperation 
among the executive, Congi-ess, and pri- 
vate groups and individuals to produce a 
pragmatic agreement that advances our 
common goals of peace and security. I 
would like to make special mention of 
the excellent counsel and leadership that 
we have received over several years on 
nuclear risk reduction from Senators 
John Warner and Sam Nunn. I would 
also like to express my appreciation to 
the U.S. delegation on Nuclear Risk Re- 
duction Centers — and especially its 



cochairman, former Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Richard Perle and my Special 
Assistant Robert Linhard — and to the 
Soviet delegation, headed by Ambas- 
sador Aleksei Obukhov, for their skill 
and dedication in successfully concluding 
the negotiations. 

This agreement complements our 
ongoing and promising efforts in Geneva 
to achieve — for the first time — deep, 
equitable, and effectively verifiable re- 
ductions in Soviet and American nuclear 
arsenals. 

Mr. Foreign Minister, I am pleased 
to have you sign this agreement today 
and look forward to the day when Gen- 
eral Secretary Gorbachev and I can sign 
even more historic agi-eements in our 
common search for peace. 

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, 
comrades, in Soviet-American relations 
in recent times, events like this one are 
not too frequent. However, 1987 turns 
out to be relatively fruitful. In April — 
last April — during the visit of Secre- 
tary of State Shultz to Moscow, we 
signed an agreement on peaceful coop- 
eration in space. Today we are signing 
an agreement on Nuclear Risk Reduc- 
tion Centers. 

The signing by us today of this 
agreement marks a tangible step in the 
practical implementation of the under- 
standing which Mikhail Gorbachev and 
you, Mr. President, reached in Geneva. 
Nuclear war should never be fought, 
you both said. Let us hope that the 
agreement that we are signing today 
will help to move further toward that 
historic goal. 

This is a sign which may be a prel- 
ude to more important agreements, in 
particular, agreements on the reduction 
of nuclear arsenals, as the General Sec- 
retary of the CPSU, (Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union). Central Commit- 
tee and the President of the United 
States agreed in Reykjavik. The most 
important thing is to do the utmost for 
this to happen to the gratification of 
our peoples and of the entire world 
community. 

The sooner it happens, the better. 
Then, having done good work for our 
time, we will be able to hope that time. 



too, will work for us. Today we have 
acted to try to ease somewhat the 
pressing burden of fears, uncertainties, 
and anxieties of which people have be- 
come tired. I would like to use this 
opportunity to cordially thank all those 
who, for 2 years, worked with per- 
severance and dedication to prepare 
this agi-eement. 

I would like to pay tribute to the 
diplomats and experts and to the mem- 
bers of the U.S. Senate, particularly 
to Senators Nunn and Warner, who 
worked with a great deal of energy and 
persistence to promote this idea. I 
would hke to hope that this small gulp 
of hope is a prelude to the quenching of 
the global thirst for peace and security. 
Thank you. 



TEXT OF AGREEMENT, 
SEPT. 15, 1987 



Agreement Between the United States 
OF America and the Union of Soviet 

SOCLALIST RePLULICS ON THE 

Establishment of Nucle,\r Risk 
Reduction Centers 

The United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, here- 
inafter referred to as the Parties, 

Affirming their desire to reduce and 
ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of 
nuclear war, in particular, as a result of 
misinterpretation, miscalculation, or acci- 
dent, 

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be 
won and must never be fought. 

Believing that agreement on measures 
for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear 
war serves the interests of strengthening 
international peace and security. 

Reaffirming their obligations under the 
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the 
Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between 
the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
September 30, 1971, and the Agreement 
between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Prevention of Incidents on and over the 
High Seas of May 25, 1972, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

Each party shall establish, in its capital, a 
national Nuclear Risk Reduction Center that 
shall operate on behalf of and under the con- 
trol of its respective Government. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



Article 2 

The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Re- 
duction Centers to transmit notifications 
identified in Protocol I which constitutes an 
integral part of this Agreement. 

In the future, the list of notifications 
transmitted through the Centers may be al- 
tered by agreement between the Parties, as 
relevant new agreements are reached. 

Article 3 

The Parties shall establish a special fac- 
simile communications link between their 
national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 
in accordance with Protocol II which con- 
stitutes an integral part of this Agreement. 

Article 4 

The Parties shall staff their national Nu- 
clear Risk Reduction Centers as they deem 
appropriate, so as to ensure their normal 
functioning. 

Article 5 

The Parties shall hold regular meetings be- 
tween representatives of the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers at least once each year 
to consider matters related to the function- 
ing of such Centers. 

Article 6 

This Agreement shall not affect the obliga- 
tions of either Party under other agree- 
ments. 



Article 7 

This Agreement shall enter into force on 

the date of its signature. 

The duration of this Agreement shall 
not be limited. 

This Agreement may be terminated by 
either Party upon 12 months written notice 
to the other Party. 

Done at Washington on September 15, 
1987, in two copies, each in the English 
and Russian languages, both texts being 
equally authentic. 

For The United States 
of America 
George P. Shultz 

For The Union Of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 
Shevardnadze 



Protocol I to the Agreement Between 
THE United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
ON the Establishment of Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers 

Pursuant to the provisions and in imple- 
mentation of the Agreement between the 
United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Estab- 
lishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Cen- 
ters, the Parties have agreed as follows; 

Article 1 

The Parties shall transmit the following 
types of notifications through the Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Centers: 

(a) notifications of ballistic missile 
launches under Article 4 of the Agreement 
on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Out- 
break of Nuclear War between the United 



President Reagan meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other mem- 
bers of the Soviet delegation in the Cabinet Room of the White House on September 
15, 1987. Seated across from the President are (left to right) Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet 
Ambassador to the United States; Foreign Minister Shevardnadze; Viktor Karpov. 
Soviet Ambassador at Large; and Gennadi Gerasimov, Soviet spokesman. On the 
President's side of the table are (left to right) Kenneth Adelman, ACDA Director; Jack 
Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Rozanne Ridgeway, Assistant Secre- 
tary for European and Canadian Affairs; Secretary Shultz; the President; and Vice 
President Bush. 




November 1987 



35 



EUROPE 



States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971; 

(b) notifications of ballistic missile 
launches under paragraph 1 of Article VI 
of the Agreement between the Government 
of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics on the Prevention of Inci- 
dents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 
1972. 

Article 2 

The scope and format of the information to 
be transmitted through the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers shall be agreed upon. 

Article 3 

Each Party also may, at its own discretion 
as a display of good will and with a view to 
building confidence, transmit through the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers communi- 
cations other than those provided for under 
Article 1 of this Protocol. 

Article 4 

Unless the Parties agree otherwise, all 
communications transmitted through and 
communications procedures of the Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Centers' communication 
link will be confidential. 

Article 5 

This Protocol shall enter into force on the 
date of its signature and shall remain in 
force as long as the Agreement between 
the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Centers of September 15, 1987, remains in 
force. 

Done at Washington on September 15, 
1987, in two copies, each in the English 
and Russian languages, both te.xts being 
equally authentic. 

For the United States 
of America 
George P. Shultz 

For the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 
Shevardnadze 



Protocol II to the Agreement 
Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the 
Establishment of Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers 

Pursuant to the provisions and in imple- 
mentation of the Agreement between the 
United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Estab- 
lishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Cen- 
ters, the Parties have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

To establish and maintain for the purpose 
of providing direct facsimile communica- 
tions between their national Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers, established in accord- 
ance with Article 1 of this Agreement, 
hereinafter referred to as the national Cen- 
ters, an INTELSAT satellite circuit and a 
STATSIONAR satellite circuit, each with 
a secure orderwire communications capa- 
bility for operational monitoring. In this 
regard: 

(a) There shall be terminals equipped 
for communication between the national 
Centers: 

(b) Each Party shall provide communi- 
cations circuits capable of simultaneously 
transmitting and receiving 4800 bits per 
second; 

(c) Communication shall begin with 
test operation of the INTELSAT satellite 
circuit, as soon as purchase, delivery, and 
installation of the necessary equipment by 
the Parties are completed. Thereafter, tak- 
ing into account the results of test opera- 
tions, the Parties shall agree on the 
transition to a fully operational status; 

(d) To the e.xtent practicable, test op- 
eration of the STATSIONAR satellite cir- 
cuit shall begin simultaneously with test 
operation of the INTELSAT satellite cir- 
cuit. Taking into account the results of test 
operations, the Parties shall agree on the 
transition to a fully operational status. 

Article 2 

To employ agreed-upon information se- 
curity devices to assure secure transmis- 
sion of facsimile messages. In this regard: 

(a) The information security devices 
shall consist of microprocessors that will 
combine the digital message output with 
buffered random data read from standard 
5-1/4 inch floppy disks; 

(b) Each Party shall provide, through 
its Embassy, necessary keying material to 
the other. 

Article 3 

To establish and maintain at each operat- 
ing end of the two circuits, facsimile ter- 
minals of the same make and model. In 
this regard: 



36 



(a) Each Party shall be responsible for 
the purchase, installation, operation, and 
maintenance of its own terminals, the re- 
lated information security devices, and lo- 
cal transmission circuits appropriate to the 
implementation of the Protocol; 

(b) A Group III facsimile unit which 
meets CCITT Recommendations T.4 and 
T.30 and operates at 4800 bits per second 
shall be used; 

(c) Direct facsimile messages from the 
USSR national Center to the U.S. national 
Center shall be transmitted and received in 
the Russian language, and from the U.S. 
national Center to the USSR national Cen- 
ter in the English language; 

(d) Transmission and operating pro- 
cedures shall be in conformity with pro- 
cedures employed on the Direct Communi- 
cations Link and adapted as necessary for 
the purpose of communications between 
the national Centers. 

Article 4 

To establish and maintain a secure order- 
wire communications capability necessary 
to coordinate facsimile operation. In this 
regard: 

(a) The orderwire terminals used with 
the information security devices described 
in paragraph (a) of Article 2 shall incorpo- 
rate standard USSR Cyrillic and United 
States Latin keyboards and cathode ray 
tube displays to permit the exchange of 
messages between operators. The specific 
layout of the Cyrillic keyboard shall be as 
specified by the Soviet side; 

(b) To coordinate the work of oper- 
ators, the orderwire shall be configured so 
as to permit, prior to the transmission and 
reception of messages, the exchange of all 
information pertinent to the coordination 
of such messages; 

(c) Orderwire messages concerning 
transmissions shall be encoded using the 
same information security devices specified 
in paragraph (a) of Article 2; 

(d) The orderwire shall use the same 
modem and communications link as used 
for facsimile message transmission; 

(e) A printer shall be included to pro- 
vide a record copy of all information ex- 
changed on the orderwire. 

Article 5 

To use the same type of equipment and the 
same maintenance procedures as currently 
in use for the Direct Communications Link 
for the establishment of direct facsimile 
communications between the national Cen- 
ters. The equipment, security devices, and 
spare parts necessary for telecommunica- 
tions links and the orderwire shall be pro- 
vided by the United States side to the 
Soviet side in return for payment of costs 
thereof by the Soviet side. 

Article 6 

To ensure the exchange of information nec- 
essary for the operation and maintenance 
of the telecommunication system and 
equipment configuration. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Article 7 

To take all possible measures to assure the 
continuous, secure, and reliable operation 
of the equipment and communications link, 
including the orderwire, for which each 
Party is responsible in accordance with 
this Protocol. 

Article 8 

To determine, by mutual agreement be- 
tween technical experts of the Parties, the 
distribution and calculation of expenses 
for putting into operation the communi- 
cation link, its maintenance and further 
development. 

Article 9 

To convene meetings of technical experts of 
the Parties in order to consider initially 
questions pertaining to the practical imple- 
mentation of the activities provided for in 
this Protocol and, thereafter, by mutual 
agreement and as necessary for the pur- 
pose of improving telecommunications and 
information technology in order to achieve 
the mutually agreed functions of the na- 
tional Centers. 

Article 10 

This Protocol shall enter into force on the 
date of its signature and shall remain in 
force as long as the Agreement between 
the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Centers of September 15, 1987, remains 
in force. 

Done at Washington on September 15, 
1987, in two copies, each in the English 
and Russian languages, both texts being 
equally authentic. 

For the United States 
of America 
George P. Shultz 

For the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 
Shevardnadze 



SECRETARY'S NEWS 

CONFERENCE, 
SEPT. 15, 1987* 

The President and Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze have just finished a ses- 
sion in the Cabinet Room and a lunch- 
eon discussion. That was preceded 
by not quite 3 hours of private conver- 
sation between Mr. Shevardnadze 
and me. 

These meetings start a period of 
about 3 days of meetings between us. 
The general tone of the discussions 
has been very straightforward, busi- 
nesslike, and constructive. We have 



touched, in one way or another, on 
most of the issues that are of interest 
to each side. We have developed the 
procedures that we're going to use dur- 
ing these meetings, including the work- 
ing groups that will explore various 
subjects. And I think that the meetings 
are off to a good start. 

Q. Can you tell us anything about 
the letter from Mr. Gorbachev to the 
President and any specificity about a 
summit? 

A. We have just received the letter 
so we are reading it and studying it. I 
think it is not for us to reveal the con- 
tents beyond saying that it is a good, 
informative letter, and we're glad to 
have it. 

Insofar as the question of a summit 
meeting is concerned, I think both 
sides feel pretty much the same way; 



EUROPE 



that a summit should have connected 
with it some significant results and that 
we should work hard to prepare it care- 
fully. That is what we're doing, and 
that is what we're working for. But the 
emphasis in these meetings is not on a 
summit. We haven't discussed the sub- 
ject particularly or talked about dates 
or anything of that kind. 

What we are doing is talking about 
the substance of the issues that we're 
both interested in, and we'll see where 
we go from there. 

Q. Given the fact that you're talk- 
ing substance, as you've said yester- 
day and today, is it likely in your 
view that you will be able to make 
enough substantial progress to hold a 
summit meeting with the Soviets this 
year? 

A. I can't tell you that because we 
are in the midst of these discussions. 



Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 



WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET2 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union on September 15, 1987, formally 
agreed to establish Nuclear Risk Re- 
duction Centers. The objective of the 
centers is to help reduce the risk of war 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union that might result from 
accident, miscalculation, or misunder- 
standing in peacetime. 

The agreement was signed at the 
White House on September 15, 1987, by 
Secretary of State George P. Shultz and 
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. 
Agreement of a joint draft text, subject 
to final approval by the U.S. and Soviet 
Governments, was reached on May 4, 
1987, in Geneva. The U.S. delegation 
for Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 
talks was chaired by Assistant Secre- 
tary of Defense Richard Perle and Spe- 
cial Assistant to the President Robert 
Linhard. The Soviet delegation was led 
by Ambassador Aleksei Obukhov. 

The United States welcomes this 
agreement as another practical step 
forward in our efforts to improve mu- 
tual confidence and reduce the risk of 
conflict, particularly nuclear conflict, 
between ourselves and the Soviet 
Union. The agreement complements 
efforts by the United States to achieve 
deep, equitable, and effectively verifia- 
ble reductions in Soviet and American 
nuclear weapons at the nuclear and 
space talks in Geneva. 



Operation 

Under the agreement, which will be of 
unlimited duration, each side will es- 
tablish a Nuclear Risk Reduction Cen- 
ter in its capital. The U.S. center will 
be located in Washington D.C., and will 
be staffed by Americans. The Soviet 
center will be located in Moscow and 
staffed by Soviets. The centers will 
communicate at the government-to- 
government level by direct satellite 
links that can transmit rapidly full 
texts and graphics. In this respect, the 
centers will have a communications ca- 
pability very similar to — but separate 
from — the modernized Direct Commu- 
nications Link ("Hot Line"), which is 
reserved for heads of government. 

The Nuclear Risk Reduction Cen- 
ters are not intended to supplant exist- 
ing channels of communications or have 
a crisis-management role. The principal 
function of the centers will be to ex- 
change information and notification as 
required under certain existing agree- 
ments. To help ensure the smooth oper- 
ation of the centers, the sides will hold 
meetings between representatives of 
the centers at least once each year. 

U.S. and Soviet technical experts 
will meet in the near future to begin 
work on implementing the technical 
protocol to the agreement. H 



November 1987 



37 



EUROPE 



and I think there should be some things 
that are agreed on. I know you're tired 
of hearing me say it, but you don't have 
an agreement until you have an agree- 
ment. We have some important issues 
to discuss, and we have set them out. 
We will clarify them probably this af- 
ternoon, and we have a good set of ar- 
rangements for this discussion. 

We had a private meeting this 
morning. We'll have plenary sessions. 
We have very competent people that 
they have brought and that we have 
here — all of our top people to dig into 
these things — and we have some infor- 
mal social-type gatherings where we 
can talk. So I think we are well set up 
to really dig in. 

Q. What's the outlook? Is the out- 
look good, then? 

A. I'm not one for commenting on 
that. I think it's just a question of the 
fact that there are important issues, 
and we're going to work on them. And 
if we resolve them, we'll let you know. 

Q. The words you chose, 
"straightforward and businesslike," 
are often words that diplomats use to 
indicate some sort of friction. 

A. No, quite to the contrary. I 
think the ability that I have and the 
President has to talk with Mr. Shev- 
ardnadze in a very good way, and he 
similarly, means that we're going to be 
able to identify quite candidly what our 
problems are and dig into them. And 
personally I think, at least as I would 
see them, they're soluble, but that re- 
mains to be seen. 

Q. Are the Soviets putting last- 
minute obstacles in the way of the 
intermediate — 

A. We have seen some things come 
up that surprised us that they were 
brought up. On the other hand, they 
are being dealt with, and we will just 
have to see. 

Q. Are you speaking of arms in 
terms of things brought up that you 
didn't expect? And what were the is- 
sues that were discussed today — basi- 
cally topical? 

A. In the field of arms control, as 
everyone is well aware, the very im- 
portant area where we have nailed 
down most of the main points— all 
of the really main points — is in the 
intermediate-range area. There has also 
been a lot of progress made in strategic 
arms. Less so in the space area. 

We see other areas where there are 
possibilities. In my own judgment, I 
think the subject of nuclear testing is 



one where progress might be made and 
perhaps others. The Soviets have made 
some moves in the area of chemical 
warfare lately that are promising. 

From our standpoint, however — 
and they have been very much in agree- 
ment with this — we don't regard these 
discussions as arms control discussions. 
They are discussions about the broad 
range of issues that we work on to- 
gether. So we had some very interest- 
ing discussion on the subject of human 
rights this morning, and we will have a 
working group set out to discuss that 
further. We will talk about bilateral 
problems of which there are quite a 
few, and also opportunities. And we 
will discuss regional issues. So we ex- 
pect to discuss the full range of things 
that are important to us. 

Q. Have the Soviets come up, ei- 
ther in the letter from Mr. Gorbachev 
or in the statement you've heard from 
Mr. Shevardnadze today — have they 
come up with any new ideas, new pro- 
posals that would seem to you might 
be able to bridge the gap on some of 
the key remaining differences? 

A. We'll have to look at the things 
they have to say. We're going to have 
our first sort of formal plenary session 
this afternoon in about an hour; we 
have some thoughts and apparently 
they do, and we'll just have to see 
where we go. I don't want to try to 
characterize things as being new or 
not. 

Q. Did you mention human rights 
as being interesting? Have you any 
indication that the Soviets are pre- 
pared to reconsider, or at least review, 
the procedures, or the lack of pro- 
cedures, they have for emigration? 

A. We've had some discussion when 
we had a delegation in Moscow about 2 
or 3 weeks ago in which both sides dis- 
cussed the desirability of more system- 
atic ways of examining the various 
issues involved that we have under the 
general label of "human rights." We 
made some progress there. Mr Shev- 
ardnadze and I discussed that some 
more this morning, and I think that it's 
possible that we will make some prog- 
ress that both sides will think is in 
their interests. So I'm rather encour- 
aged by that. 

Q. Are the surprises that you re- 
ferred to a few moments ago in the 
field of arms control? 

A. Did I say "surprises?" 

Q. Yes, you did. Yes, sir. 

A. I did? 



Q. But I don't know if you meant 
at this meeting or you meant in the 
weeks leading up to the meeting. 

Q. Were they surprises pertaining 
to this morning? 

A. You were talking about things 
that were brought up in connection 
with the last-minute obstacles, yes. 

Q. You don't mean here. Don't 
you mean on the table in Geneva? 

A. No. I mean before here. That's 
right. Somebody asked me that, and I 
said yes. There have been some things 
brought up that we felt fall outside the 
INF area — the most prominent, of 
course, is the German Pershing lA mis- 
siles. That will not be a part of the 
INF negotiations. On the other hand, 
as we see it, Chancellor Kohl has made 
a very forthcoming statement on that 
subject. 

Q. Do you see the question of the 
Pershings, the P-IAs, as being a gen- 
uine obstacle to the Soviets agreeing 
with us on an INF treaty? 

A. It shouldn't be. In the first 
place, cooperative systems with other 
countries or third-country systems are 
not a part of our negotiations involving 
just U.S. and Soviet systems, so they 
are not part of the INF agreement. 

Now to the extent that the Soviets 
have a problem, as they have stated. 
Chancellor Kohl's statement is directly 
responsive to it. So I think that some- 
how it ought to be possible to work 
through that. 

Q. Do you think the Soviets will 
accept that view ultimately? 

A. I don't speak for them, and I'm 
not going to try. It's a problem, we are 
working on it, and I think that it's just 
about as we described it. 

Q. I'm a Polish correspondent. Do 
you think that this agreement which 
was signed today may improve the re- 
lations between the United States and 
Eastern European countries, like Po- 
land, for instance? 

A. I hadn't thought about it that 
way, but I think there's a — certainly, 
you can argue that. It is a definite 
agreement on something of importance, 
broadly speaking, involving something 
of great interest to East and West. So 
everybody ought to get a little boost 
out of it, and I hope that there is some 
spillover effect. 

Q. Do you believe that Mr. Shev- 
ardnadze is empowered to conclude 
the major remaining unresolved is- 
sues while he's here, or do you think 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



he's going to have to go home first 
and check with the Politburo? 

A. I have the impression that he 
has come here well prepared, and he 
has certainly brought with him an im- 
pressive group of Soviet experts on 
subjects that are of interest to us. So I 
don't know the answer to your ques- 
tion, but I can only respond that way. 

Q. Can you say whether or not ^ 
you have heard anything different in ^ 
your 3-hour discussion this morning g 
than what has been the Soviets' pub- i 
licly stated positions with regard to | 
the P-IAs, the nuclear warheads, and ±. 
so forth? I 

A. In this morning's discussion — I i 
have summarized it, and we didn't try i 
to this morning get into the particulars | 
of any of the issues. I suppose if I took 
the morning's session in proportionate 
terms, we spent about as much time as 
any in discussing our views about hu- 
man rights matters and working toward 
the working group and how it would 
proceed. But we didn't try to delve 
into the details, so there wasn't really 
an opportunity to see to what e.xtent 
they may have a somewhat different 
approach. 

Q. Are the Pershing warheads the 
principal obstacle to an agreement? 
You say they shouldn't be, but are 
they right now? 

A. As I say, they shouldn't be, and 
we think that Chancellor Kohl's state- 
ment has been quite a forthcoming one. 
It is a subject that the Soviets have 
raised, and so we'll have to understand 
what it is that truly bothers them and 
try to put that to rest. 

Q. But that is the obstacle — 

A. I don't know. There are proba- 
bly others. 

Q. What about the issue of the 
destruction of warheads? 

Q. What about destroying Ameri- 
can warheads? Did you get any expla- 
nation of what they meant by that? 

A. No. As I said, we didn't get to 
that level of detail, but let me just once 
again say this. In the proposals they 
have tabled in Geneva on what is to be 
done when some nuclear-tipped missile 
is to be taken out of action, it is very 
clear that they have no interest at all in 
doing anything but taking back to their 
own territory the nuclear material that 
is part of the system. That is our view 
as well. It has always been the case 
that the nuclear material has been kept 
in the United States or U.S.S.R. so 
there is no issue there. 



November 1987 




Secretary Shultz joins the President in the Residence for his meeting with Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze on Sept. 17, 1987. 



Now, exactly what people may 
mean by a "warhead" — whether they 
mean the shell after you take out com- 
ponents or exactly what — remains to be 
seen. But as far as the actual nuclear 
explosive is concerned, that is material 
that each side keeps for itself and the 
configuration of exactly how that is put 
together as an explosive device is a 
very well kept and closely kept secret 
and will stay that way. 

Q. Do the Soviets agree to that? 

A. I've just described to you the 
proposal that they put on the table in 
Geneva, so obviously they agree to 
that. 



JOINT STATEMENT 

ON NUCLEAR TESTING 

NEGOTIATIONS, 
SEPT. 17, 1987 

The U.S. and Soviet sides have agreed 
to begin before December 1, 1987, full- 
scale, stage-by-stage negotiations 
which will be conducted in a single 
forum. In these negotiations, the sides 
as the first step will agree upon effec- 
tive verification measures which will 
make it possible to ratify the U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 
1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty of 1976 and proceed to negotiat- 
ing further intermediate limitations on 
nuclear testing leading to the ultimate 
objective of the complete cessation of 
nuclear testing as part of an effective 
disarmament process. 



This process, among other things, 
would pursue, as the first priority, the 
goal of the reduction of nuclear weap- 
ons and, ultimately, their elimination. 
For the purpose of the elaboration of 
improved verification measures for the 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. treaties of 1974 and 1976 
the sides intend to design and conduct 
joint verification experiments at each 
other's test sites. These verification 
measures will, to the extent appropri- 
ate, be used in further nuclear test 
limitation agreements which may sub- 
sequently be reached. 



JOINT STATEMENT 

ON DIPLOMATIC TALKS, 
SEPT. 18, 19871 

Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze have completed 
3 days of thorough and useful discus- 
sions on all aspects of the relationship 
between the two countries. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister reviewed the full spectrum of 
questions regarding nuclear, conven- 
tional, and chemical weapons arms con- 
trol. In particular, the two ministers, 
together with their advisers, conducted 
intensive negotiations on the question 
of intermediate-range and shorter 
range missiles. This resulted in agree- 
ment in principle to conclude a treaty. 
The Geneva delegations of both sides 
have been instructed to work inten- 
sively to resolve remaining technical is- 
sues and promptly to complete a draft 
treaty text. The Secretary and the For- 



39 



EUROPE 



eign Minister agreed that a similarly 
intensive effort should be made to 
achieve a treaty on 50% reductions in 
strategic offensive arms within the 
framework of the Geneva nuclear and 
space talks. 

Having discussed questions related 
to nuclear testing, the two sides agreed 
to begin, before December 1, 1987, full- 
scale stage-by-stage negotiations which 
will be conducted in a single forum. 
They approved a separate statement on 
this subject. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister also discussed regional issues. 

The two sides discussed a broad 
range of issues concerning bilateral re- 
lations. A work program was agreed, to 
be implemented in 1987-88, designed to 
intensify joint efforts in various areas 
of U.S. -Soviet cooperation. 

A constructive discussion of human 
rights issues and humanitarian ques- 
tions took place. 

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Min- 
ister Shevardnadze agreed that an addi- 
tional meeting is needed to review the 
results of the work in all of these areas, 
including the efforts of the delegations 
in the Geneva nuclear and space talks. 
They agreed that this meeting would 
take place in Moscow in the second half 
of October. 

In order to sign a treaty on inter- 
mediate-range and shorter range mis- 
siles and to cover the full range of 
issues in the relationship between the 
two countries, a summit between Presi- 
dent Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev will take place. The summit 
will be held in the fall of 1987, with 
exact dates to be determined during 
the talks between the Secretary of 
State and the Foreign Minister in 
Moscow in October. 



Secretary Shultz and Foreign Min- 
ister Shevardnadze have issued a joint 
statement, which I believe you all have 
now. And I'm pleased to note that 
agreement in principles was reached to 
conclude an INF treaty. They'll meet 
again in Moscow next month to con- 
tinue their efforts and to work out the 
details of a summit between me and 
General Secretary Gorbachev later 
this fall. 



I want to congratulate Secretary 
Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevard- 
nadze and their delegations for their out- 
standing efforts over the past 3 days. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 21, 1987. 

-Text from White House press release. 

'Held at the White House (press release 
184 of Sept. 16). ■ 



Visit of Swedish Prime Minister 




PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 18, 19871 

Secretary Shultz has reported to me on 
the results of his talks with Soviet For- 
eign Minister Shevardnadze. As you 
know, the talks covered arms reduction, 
regional conflicts, human rights, and bi- 
lateral issues. Although we have seri- 
ous differences in many areas, the tone 
of the talks was frank, constructive, 
and notable progress was made. 



Prime Minister Ingvar Carlssoyi of 
the Kingdom of Sweden made an offi- 
cial visit to the United States Sep- 
tember 6-13, 1987, to meet with 
President Reagan and other govern- 
ment officials. 

Following are remarks made by the 
President and the Prime Minister at 
the arrival ceremony on September ».' 

President Reagan 

It is a pleasure to welcome Prime Min- 
ister Carlsson and Mrs. Carlsson to the 
United States. I welcome you, Mr. 
Prime Minister, with great warmth and 
respect, as the representative of a 
country with whom Americans share 



many fundamental values: We're both 
deeply committed to the system of de- 
mocracy; we are both committed to the 
protection of the fundamental rights 
of the individual; and we're both com- 
mitted to pursuing a world that is 
prosperous and at peace. 

Our shared values reflect historical 
bonds and the fact that Swedes and 
Americans have mingled for centuries. 
Next year will mark the 350th anniver- 
sary of the founding by your coun- 
trymen of a small colony named New 
Sweden near what is now Wilmington, 
Delaware. Those brave settlers helped 
turn a wilderness into a great nation. 
Even more, they brought with them 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



the hardy virtues and pioneer spirit 
that became so much a part of our 
national character. 

The Swedish pioneers of Wilming- 
ton, Delaware, were followed by over a 
million Swedes who came here between 
the 1840s and 1930s. And today some 
5 million Americans proudly claim 
Swedish origins. History suggests our 
countries have always been close po- 
litically and also in spirit. When this 
was still a very new nation, in 1783, a 
treaty of commerce and friendship was 
signed with Sweden. It was among the 
very first treaties of the United 
States of America. Over the years 
since, our governments have always 
remained on amicable and cooperative 
terms, and our peoples have developed 
and maintained commercial and personal 
relationships that have strengthened 
both our nations. 

All this reflects a commonality of 
spirit and a shared sense of decency of 
which we can take great pride. Ameri- 
cans will never forget that, by a special 
act of Congress, our country has offi- 
cially adopted a remarkable Swede, a 
hero of moral and humane people the 
world over. I refer to Raoul Wallen- 
berg, the Swedish diplomat, who in the 
Second World War saved hundreds of 
thousands from the Nazi terror. That 
Wallenberg is now a citizen of both our 
countries is a bond between us and 
should be an inspiration to our peoples. 
Let us join in insisting that, if there is 
a new openness in the Soviet Union, 
the Soviet leadership give the world an 
accounting of this moral giant, Raoul 
Wallenberg. 

Today our friendship with Sweden 
is especially vigorous. Many thousands 
of our countrymen visit back and forth 
each year, conducting business, pursu- 
ing the arts, studying — and often com- 
peting successfully in sports, as Mr. 
[Bjorn] Borg can testify. The late Sec- 
retary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige 
visited Sweden in May, where he an- 
nounced that the United States is elim- 
inating the export license requirements 
for high-technology goods bound for 
Sweden. This summer, Swedish Ti-ade 
Minister Gradin came to Washington 
for a positive round of discussions on 
global and bilateral trade issues. And 
in June, my wife Nancy visited Stock- 
holm, where for 3 days she exchanged 
views with those who plan and run 
Sweden's enlightened programs to com- 
bat drugs. 

Your visit now renews our political, 
bilateral discussions at the highest 
level. Dialogue between our govern- 



Sweden-A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 449,964 sq. km. (179,986 sq. mi.); about 
the size of California. Cities: Capital— 
Stockholm (pop., Dec. 1985, 1,4.35,474). Other 
cities-Goteborg 704,052, Malmb 457,919. 
Terrain: Generally flat or rolling. Climate: 
Northern temperate. 




People 

Nationality: Noun— Swede(s). Adjective- 
Swedish. Population (1985): 8.4 million. 
Annual growth rate: 0.2%. Ethnic groups: 

Indigenous:— Swedes, 50,000 Ethnic Finns. 
17.000 Lapps. Immigrant-UA.OOO Finns. 
39.000 Yugoslavs, 25,000 Danes, 26,000 
Norwegians, 21,000 Turks, 10,500 Greeks, 
12,000 Germans. Religions: 95% Lutheran, 
115,000 Roman Catholics, 40.000 Orthodox, 
100,000 Pentecostal, 80,000 Mission Cove- 
nant. 55.000 Baptists, 15,000 Jews. Educa- 
tion: Fears compulsory— 9. Attendanre— 
100%. Literacy-99%. Health: Infant mor- 
tality rate— 6.411,000. Life expectancy— men 
76 yrs., women 82 yrs. Work force (4.34 
million): Agriculture— i.%%. Industry (includ- 
ing construction)— 29.8%. Commerce and 
finance— 2\. 3%. Sennces (including 
transportation)— 43.9%. 

Government 

Type: Constitutional monarchy. Constitu- 
tion: A new constitution was adopted in 1975, 
replacing the acts of 1809, 1866, and 1949. 



Branches: Executive— Cabinet, respon- 
sible to Parliament. Legislative— unicamera.\ 
Parliament (Riksdag). Judicial— Snpreme 
Court, 6 superior courts, 108 lower courts. 

Subdivisions: 24 counties, 284 municipali- 
ties (townships). 

Political parties: Moderate Coalition 
(conservative). Center, Christian Democratic, 
Liberal, Social Democratic, Left Party (com- 
munist). Suffrage: Universal but not com- 
pulsory, over age 18. After 3 yrs. of legal 
residence, immigrants may vote in county and 
municipal, but not national, elections. 

Central government budget (FY 
1986-87): 7.6 krona (SEK)=US$1. 
Revenues-kronsi 286.7 billion ($39.8 billion). 
Expenditures— krona 335.6 billion ($46.6 
billion). Deficit-SEK 48.9 billion ($6.8 
hilli(in). 

Defense: 7.9% of government budget. 

Flag: Yellow cross laid horizontally on 
medium blue field. 

Economy 

GDP*: $100.2 billion. Annual growth rate: 

2.2%.. Per capita income (1985): $11,989. 
Avg. inflation rate (last 2 yrs.): 7.7%. 

Natural resources: Forests, iron ore, 
hydroelectric power. 

Agriculture (4.2% of GNP): Products- 
dairy products, grains, sugar beets, potatoes, 
wood. Land—Z million hectares arable. 

Industry (25.4% of GNP): Types- 
machinery. 

Trade (1985): £'jports-$30.2 billion: 
machinery, paper and pulp, minerals, 
chemicals, foodstuffs. Major markets— IJS, 
FRG, Norway, UK, Denmark. /TOport.s-$28.4 
billion: nonelectric machinery-, petroleum, 
chemicals, electric machinery, foodstuffs. 
Major suppliers— FRG, UK, US, Denmark, 
Finland. 

Exchange rate (June 1986, fluctuates 
daily): SEK 7.20=US$1. 

Fiscal year: July 1-June 30. 

•1985 exchange rate of SEK 8.59=US$1 

Taken from the Background Notes of Feb. 
1987, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Juanita Adams. ■ 



November 1987 



41 



EUROPE 



ments has improved and deepened in 
recent years, and we're determined to 
ensure that it continues to improve. I 
look forward to discussing with you the 
major issues of the day and examining 
how, as modern industrialized democ- 
racies, we can meet the challenges we 
will face in the future. Sweden and the 
United States face similar challenges, 
though we've chosen different paths to 
meet them. Yet, as friends, we value 
each other's views and our talks today 
will be of great value. 

I'm particularly looking forward to 
our exchange of views on issues con- 
cerning world peace and nuclear arms 
reductions. The people of the United 
States maintain defense spending at 
levels necessary to preserve peace and 
to safeguard freedom in the world. We 
have, in recent years, taken a decisive 
lead in seeking balanced and verifiable 
arms agreements with the Soviet 
Union, agreements that will reduce 
both the level of nuclear weapons and 
the threat of their use. Our strength 
and our determined search for peace 
go hand-in-hand. Much progress has 
been made as of late, and we remain 
optimistic. 

As a neutral nation, Sweden is not 
an ally of the United States, but it is a 
partner in our pursuit of a free and 
peaceful world. We recognize and ap- 
preciate that Sweden provides amply 
for its own strong defense and works 
vigorously for the cause of peace. We 
respect that, even though on some is- 
sues we may differ in views. The great 
Swedish leader and a renowned inter- 
national statesman. Dag Hammarskjold 
once said: "Only he who keeps his eyes 
fixed on the far horizon will find his 
right road." Today the people of the 
United States and Sweden have their 
eyes fixed on the far horizon. We're on 
the right path for a better tomorrow. 

I look forward to our discussions, 
Mr. Prime Minister. We appreciate 
your visit and bid you and your wife 
valkommev [are welcome]. Your visit 
here is most welcome. 

Prime Minister Carlsson 

Let me, first of all, express my thanks 
for the warm and friendly welcome you 
have given us in your magnificent cap- 
ital and here at the White House. 

I'm convinced that the talks we 
will have here with you, Mr. President, 
with members of your Cabinet, with 
Senators and Congressmen as well 
as with other of your fellow Ameri- 
cans elsewhere in the country, will 



42 



strengthen the solid friendship and co- 
operation already existing between 
Sweden and the United States. And I'm 
proud to say that I come here as a 
representatfve of a nation which is one 
of America's oldest friends. 

Sweden was, in 1783, one of the 
very first countries to enter into a for- 
mal relationship with the newly inde- 
pendent United States. And as far back 
as in the 17th century, the colony of 
New Sweden was established in what is 
now the State of Delaware and parts of 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Next 
year, a celebration of the 350th anniver- 
sary of this first Swedish settlement in 
America will take place throughout the 
United States. 

The Swedes who then settled in 
the Delaware Valley were the forerun- 
ners of more than a million immigrants 
from Sweden who later came to this 
country of promise, who helped build 
the land, and who set out to create a 
future here for themselves and for their 
children. But the relationship between 
our two countries is not only a histor- 
ical one. It's firmly anchored in the 
present. We share the same democratic 
values, believing in a just society with 
freedom for the individual. Our two na- 
tions are among the most privileged 
with a high standard of living. This is 
partly because of our level of tech- 
nological development. It gives us a po- 
tential not only to strengthen our own 
economies but also to contribute to in- 
ternational development and greater 
economic justice also between nations. 

As one should expect in a rela- 
tionship between friends, it's seldom 
plagued by political problems. We play, 
of course, different roles on the inter- 
national scene. From time to time, as is 
natural for two democratic govern- 
ments, we certainly assess international 
events differently. On other matters, 
we are in agreement. We both favor 
free and fair trade between nations. 
And coming, as I do, from a nation 
which is more dependent upon exports 
and imports than most others, I can 
assure you that we support all efforts 
to strengthen the open mutilateral 
trading system. 

Sweden is not a big country. Our 
ability to influence world events on our 
own is limited. What one cannot do 
alone, one may be able to do in cooper- 
ation with others. We believe that we 
have a right to participate actively in 
world affairs. The rationale for this is 
simple: Any international conflict which 
leads to global war will affect all the 
people on Earth, no matter how far 
they are from the conflict. 



As you have stated yourself, to- 
gether with Mr Gorbachev, a nuclear 
war cannot be won. Such a war has 
only losers, and we will all be among 
them. That's why we in a nation 
not possessing nuclear arms feel 
that we also have a responsibility 
to promote peace and avoid a nuclear 
confrontation. 

And let me therefore bring your 
special message from the Government 
and the people of Sweden on the verge 
of important meetings between repre- 
sentatives of your Administration and 
the Soviet Union. We will support 
every measure which you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, and Secretary General Gorbachev 
will take in the process of reducing nu- 
clear arms. The agreement on interme- 
diate nuclear weapons now being 
negotiated has our full backing. Your 
signatures on such a document would 
be regarded as a historic achievement 
all over the world. East and West, 
North and South, it will be hailed as a 
first step toward the ultimate goal of a 
world without nuclear weapons. 

I came here with my wife to this 
country for the first time in 1960 to 
study here, like so many other Swedes 
have done. We have all cherished the 
warmth, the friendship, and the open- 
ness which we have encountered here. 
These many contacts have indeed 
strengthened the close ties between our 
two countries. So I am sure with this 
week's visit, on behalf of the Govern- 
ment and the people of Sweden, I wish 
to express our best wishes for the hap- 
piness and well-being of you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, of Mrs. Reagan, and of the 
American people. 



'Made in the East Room at the White 
House, where Prime Minister Carlsson was 
accorded a formal welcome (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments" of Sept. 14, 1987). ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



IIDDLE EAST 



U.S. Takes Defensive Action in Persian Gulf 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT. 
SEPT. 24, 1987' 

I have today sent the attached letter to 
the Congress concerning defensive ac- 
tions by our armed forces taken on 
September 21-22, 1987, against the Ira- 
nian naval vessel Iran Ajr. We regard 
this incident as closed and are cur- 
rently taking steps to repatriate the 
26 Iranians survivors and return the 
bodies of the three Iranians killed in 
the incident. 

Eight presidents over four decades 
have recognized that the United States 
has vital interests in ensuring free 
world access to the energy resources of 
the Persian Gulf and in preventing hos- 
tile domination of the gulf region. To- 
day those interests are threatened by 
the Iran-Iraq war and Iran's continued 
belligerent behavior in the region. 

Iraq has made clear its willingness, 
without preconditions, to negotiate an 
equitable settlement of the war and to 
implement UN Security Council Reso- 
lution 598. To date Iran has refused to 
implement it. Meanwhile, by aggressive 
military action and terrorism, Iran has 
continued its efforts to intimidate the 
nonbelligerent nations of the gulf, to 
close gulf waters to neutral shipping, 
and to export a destabilizing blend of 
religion and politics in and even beyond 
the region. Iranian policies create a 
threat that could seriously interrupt 
freedom of navigation and the free flow 
of oil in the gulf 

Recognizing these facts, we must 
continue steadily to pursue our estab- 
lished, three-part policy in the gulf: 

1. Bringing ever increasing interna- 
tional pressure to bear for a negotiated 
end to the war and to stop its spillover; 

2. Steadfastly continuing to help 
our friends, the nonbelligerent nations 
of the gulf, to defend themselves 
against Iranian threats; and 

3. Prudently pursuing cooperative 
efforts with the Gulf Cooperation Coun- 
cil (GCC) states and other friends to 
protect jeopardizing freedom of non- 
belligerent navigation. 

Our overriding aim is peace and 
stability in the region. We have no in- 
terest in provoking Iran or anyone else, 
although we will defend ourselves as 
necessary. Indeed, the United States 
hopes that more normal relations with 
Iran will evolve as Iranian beUigerence 



November 1987 



and tensions in the area diminish. We 
have made these points known repeat- 
edly to Iran, through diplomatic chan- 
nels as well as by public statements. 
The continuation of the Iran-Iraq 
war is the major cause of increasing 
tensions in the gulf, to which our forces 
and those of other nations have re- 
sponded. We look to the UN Security 
Council for a negotiated settlement of 



UN Security Council Resolution 598 in 
all its parts. We hope that the Soviet 
Union will cooperate as the council 
moves to create conditions for such im- 
plementation by adopting a second res- 
olution rather than delaying and 
seeking opportunities to expand their 
own influence at the expense of peace 
in the region. 



U.S. Orders Closure 
of Palestine Information Office 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 15, 19871 

The Department of State informed the 
Palestine Information Office (PIO) this 
afternoon that the U.S. Government 
has ordered that it be closed within 
30 days. 

This action was taken in accord- 
ance with the President's constitutional 
authority for the conduct of foreign af- 
fairs and under the authority granted 
to the Secretary of State under the For- 
eign Missions Act. The Department has 
determined that the Palestine Informa- 
tion Office is a "foreign mission" as de- 
fined by the Foreign Missions Act. 

The Department of Justice has de- 
termined that the First Amendment 
does not preclude the U.S. Government 
from closing the Palestine Information 
Office since it is operating as a foreign 
mission. Nothing in the Department's 
action with respect to the Palestine In- 
formation Office derogates from the 
constitutionally protected rights of U.S. 
citizens and permanent residents who 
are now associated with the PIO. 

This action is being taken to dem- 
onstrate the U.S. concern over ter- 
rorism committed and supported by 
organizations and individuals affiliated 
with the Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion (PLO). Among our particular con- 
cerns are: 

• The continued membership on 
the PLO Executive Committee of Abu 
al- Abbas, who has been linked di- 
rectly with the murder of an Ameri- 
can citizen; 

• The participation in the April Pal- 
estine National Congress of groups 
having a history of involvement with 



terrorism; for example, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) and the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), 
both of which rejoined the PLO at the 
April Palestine National Congress; and 
• Contacts between the Abu Nidal 
organization and the mainline PLO. 

The United States fully supports 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people and respects their efforts to 
achieve these rights through a process 
of peaceful negotiations. It is important 
that Palestinian representatives partici- 
pate in all stages of that process. The 
rights of the Palestinians in a just and 
peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict are no less important than the 
right of Israel to live in peace with its 
neighbors. 

However, the United States be- 
lieves that terrorism, committed pur- 
portedly on behalf of the Palestinian 
people by some groups and individuals 
associated with the PLO, has done 
grievous damage to the achievement of 
legitimate Palestinian rights. Terrorism 
by a small minority of Palestinians has 
been a major obstacle to a peaceful 
Arab-Israeli settlement. Achievement 
of these legitimate rights is broadly 
supported by the majority of nations, 
including the United States, which op- 
pose terrorism and support instead the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. 

The United States does not intend 
to close the PLO observer mission in 
New York, which has a special status 
as an observer to the United Nations. 



'Made available to news correspond- 
ents by Department spokesman Charles 
Redman. ■ 



43 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



The success of our policy will de- 
pend to a great extent on the consist- 
ency and care with which we carry it 
out. Our resolve to date has begun to 
pay off — through increased European 
naval contributions to protect freedom 
of navigation in the gulf, through quiet 
but essential and effective GCC support 
for our naval efforts and those of other 
nations, through diplomatic progress in 
the UN Security Council, and through 
deterrence of even more reckless Ira- 
nian actions. We must continue to do 
our best to protect our interests and to 
reassure our friends — as well as our ad- 
versaries — of the continued resolve and 
leadership of the United States as we 
move ahead. 



LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, 
SEPT. 24, 19872 

At approximately 4:00 p.m. (EDT) on Sep- 
tember 21, 1987, armed forces of the United 
States assigned to the Middle East Joint 
TUsk Force observed an Iranian landing 
craft, the "Iran Ajr" engaging in nighttime 
minelaying near U.S. forces in international 
waters of the Persian Gulf. This hostile ac- 
tion posed a direct threat to the safety of 
U.S. warships and other U.S. -flag vessels. 
Accordingly, acting in self-defense and pur- 
suant to standing Peacetime Rules of En- 
gagement for the region, two U.S. 
helicopters operating off the USS Jarrett 
engaged the Iranian vessel, which subse- 
quently resumed its minelaying activities. 
Thereupon, the helicopters re-engaged the 
Ajr, disabling it with rocket and machine- 
gun fire, and curtailed the further release of 
mines. 

Subsequently, at first light in the Per- 
sian Gulf on September 22, U.S. forces 
boarded the disabled craft, which proved to 
have been manned by regular elements of 
the Iranian navy. Three crewmen were 
found dead on the vessel and nine mines 
were found on deck. Twenty-six survivors 
were recovered from the water and from 
lifeboats and taken to U.S. naval ships for 
examination and medical treatment. Ar- 
rangements are being made to turn the sur- 
vivors over to an appropriate humanitarian 
organization. Two members of the crew of 
the Iran Ajr are believed missing. Search 
and rescue operations for them have been 
undertaken, as well as operations to find 
and clear a number of mines that, according 
to discussion with surviving crewmen of the 
Iran Ajr, were laid prior to action against 
the vessel by U.S. forces. 



The actions taken by U.S. forces were 
conducted in the exercise of our right of self- 
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Char- 
ter Mining of the high seas, without notice 
and in an area of restricted navigation, is 
unlawful and a serious threat to world public 
order and the safety of international mar- 
itime commerce. These Iranian actions were 
taken despite warnings given to the Govern- 
ment of Iran, subsequent to the recent mine 
damage done to the U.S. -flag vessel 
Bridgeton, that the U.S. Government would 
take the action necessary to defend U.S ves- 
sels from attacks of this nature. 

U.S. forces in the area have returned to 
their prior state of alert readiness. They will 
remain prepared to take any further defen- 
sive action necessary to protect U.S. vessels 
and U.S. Hves from unlawful attack. 

These limited defensive actions have 
been taken by our armed forces in accor- 



dance with international law, and pursuant 
to my constitutional authority with respect 
to the conduct of foreign relations and as 
commander in chief While bemg mindful of 
the historical differences between the legis- 
lative and executive branches of govern- 
ment, and the positions taken by all of my 
predecessors in office, with respect to the 
interpretation and constitutionality of cer- 
tain of the provisions of the War Powers 
Resolution, I nonetheless am providing this 
report in a spirit of mutual cooperation to- 
ward a common goal. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 28, 1987. 

-Identical letters addressed to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives 
Jim Wright and President pro tempore of the 
Senate John C. Stennis (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Sept. 28). ■ 



U.S. Inspects Soviet Military Exercise 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 22, 1987' 

On August 30, 1987, the United States 
sucessfully completed the first-ever on- 
site inspection of a Soviet military exer- 
cise. We are today releasing a public 
report on the inspection. This inspec- 
tion was under the terms of the docu- 
ment of the Stockholm Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
(CDE), which was signed a year ago 
this month. 

The U.S. request to inspect the ex- 
ercise, which took place northeast of 
the city of Minsk, was submitted to the 
Soviet Union through normal diplo- 
matic channels on August 26. The So- 
viet Union responded positively to the 
U.S. request on August 27, several 
hours before the deadline established 
by the Stockholm document and per- 
mitted the U.S. team to enter the So- 
viet Union within the 36-hour time 
period specified in the document. Our 
inspectors conducted their inspection 
for 48 hours. 

A U.S. inspection report — which is 
confidential — has been forwai'ded to all 
CSCE participating states in accord- 
ance with the document. The United 
States has concluded on the basis of 
this inspection that the Soviet activity 



in question conformed to the provisions 
of the document. The United States is 
satisfied with the Soviet Union's posi- 
tive approach to this first-ever on-site 
inspection under CDE auspices. 

We consider the successful conclu- 
sion of this inspection a step in the 
process of improving openness and en- 
hancing confidence and security-build- 
ing in Europe. 



INSPECTION REPORT. 
SEPT. 22, 1987 

On August 26, 1987, the United States 
elected to exercise its right under para- 
graphs 65 and 66 of the Stockholm doc- 
ument to conduct an inspection of a 
Soviet military activity taking place in 
the Belorussian Military District, 
northeast of Minsk in the U.S.S.R. The 
activity to be inspected had been noti- 
fied by the Soviet Union on July 13 as a 
military exercise of ground forces in- 
volving elements of one tank and one 
motorized rifle division, 16,000 troops, 
and 425 tanks. A request for inspection 
was submitted simultaneously to the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow and 
the Soviet Embassy in Washington at 
1800 hours Greenwich Mean Time 
(GMT) on August 26. The Soviet reply 
to the inspection request was received 
in Moscow at 1500 hours GMT on Au- 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



gust 27 and was also provided in Wash- 
ington approximately 45 minutes later 
The Soviet response granted the re- 
quest and indicated that the U.S. in- 
spection team would be permitted to 
enter the Soviet Union within 36 hours 
of the time the request was made as 
required by the document. 

Conduct of the Inspection 

In the inspection request the United 
States had indicated that the inspection 
team planned to travel to the U.S.S.R. 
via U.S. Government aircraft and land 
at a military airfield southeast of 
Minsk. The Soviet response permitted 
that inspection team to fly to Minsk but 
indicated that the flight should land at 
the Minsk civilian airfield. The United 
States did not object to this change. A 
Soviet escort crew, consisting of a navi- 
gator and an interpreter, accompanied 
the U.S. aircraft from Stuttgart to 
Minsk. 

The U.S. inspection team, consist- 
ing of four U.S. Army officers, de- 
parted Stuttgart at 0406 hours GMT on 
August 28 and arrived at the Minsk 
civilian airfield at 0611 hours GMT. In 
order to avoid any delay in the inspec- 
tion team's arrival, the United States 
had requested that visas for the inspec- 
tors be waived or provided upon arrival 
in Minsk. The Soviet Union agreed to 
issue visas to the inspection team and 
flight crew upon arrival in Minsk. 

Upon arrival, the team was met by 
two Soviet generals and several mili- 
tary interpreters. At the team's discre- 
tion, approximately 1 hour was spent 
at the airfield terminal discussing the 
administrative and logistical arrange- 
ments for the inspection. 

In the request, the United States 
sought two helicopters for the duration 
of the inspection. The official Soviet re- 
ply had indicated that only one would 
be provided. However, when the inspec- 
tion team renewed its request for two 
helicopters upon arrival in Minsk, two 
Soviet MI-8/HIP helicopters were pro- 
vided and made available throughout 
the inspection. Two ground vehicles 
also were provided. 

The inspection team was driven by 
sedan from the airfield to the point 
which had been designated for the in- 
spection to begin. The team then split 
into two subteams and boarded two 
helicopters for an initial overflight of 
the entire specified area. It was agreed 
that the 48-hour time period for inspec- 
tion began with the liftoff of the first 
helicopter at 0845 GMT, August 28. 



The inspection team made exten- 
sive use of the ground vehicles through- 
out the course of inspection. Drivers 
followed inspectors' instructions with- 
out difficulty. However, the Soviets, cit- 
ing safety concerns, required 
permanent observation points in the 
Borisov training area. At all times, in- 
spectors were accompanied by Soviet 
military officers. 

Whether in helicopters or ground 
vehicles, constant communication be- 
tween the subgroups was provided and 
was generally of excellent quality. The 
inspectors utilized both air-to-air and 
ground-to-ground communications. For 
ground-to-ground, a Soviet communica- 
tion van accompanied each land inspec- 
tion vehicle at all times. Due to the 
limited use of the helicopters, no oppor- 
tunity was presented to use air-to- 
ground communications. 

The inspection team experienced 
no interference with the full use of the 
equipment they were permitted under 
the terms of the document (i.e., maps, 
photo-cameras, binoculars, dictaphones, 
and aeronautical charts). For their own 
part, the Soviets also made a pho- 
tographic record of the inspection. 

The inspectors were not permitted, 
in accordance with the document, to 
enter or overfly certain points desig- 
nated by the Soviets as sensitive 
points — specific installations sur- 
rounded by fences or walls. However, in 
general, the concept of sensitive points 
and/or restricted areas did not appear 
to be used to obstruct the conduct of 
the inspection. 

The inspection team left the spe- 
cified area by helicopter precisely 48 
hours after the inspection had begun 
(0845 hours GMT, August 30) and re- 
turned to Stuttgart via the same U.S. 
military aircraft. A Soviet escort did 
not accompany the return flight. Dur- 
ing the course of the inspection, the 
U.S. aircraft was permitted to remain 
in Minsk. The aircraft was refueled and 
the flight crew was provided room and 
board at a hotel in Minsk by the Soviet 
Union. 

Inpectors' Observations 

The inspection team's initial overflights 
of the specified area made it clear that 
the phase of the exercise being con- 
ducted during the inspection was 
largely confined to the Borisov training 
area. 

Upon arrival at the Borisov train- 
ing area, the team was met by the ex- 
ercise director. Commander of the 
Belorussian Military District. He told 



the inspectors that the exercise con- 
sisted of a tank division attacking from 
the south against a motorized rifle divi- 
sion from the north. The concept of the 
training, he said, was the conduct of 
the defense by the motorized rifle divi- 
sion and the attack by the tank division 
with a forced river crossing. He stated 
that the preparatory phase of the exer- 
cise would end August 28 and that the 
practical phase of the exercise would 
be conducted on August 29-30. He also 
indicated that the defending motorized 
rifle division has three motorized rifle 
regiments and one tank regiment, while 
the tank division consisted of two tank 
regiments and one motorized rifle reg- 
iment. 

Following the briefing, the team 
undertook a systematic inspection of 
the Borisov training area, once again 
dividing into two subteams — one to in- 
spect the northern force, the other to 
inspect the southern force. The team 
walked tank lines, visited units, and 
photographed equipment and personnel 
without interference. Observation of 
the attack, counterattack, and meeting 
engagement was only from prepared 
observation points, but the team moved 
freely among the participating forces 
between events. Inspectors observed 
prepared defensive positions and spoke 
to unit commanders about the size of 
their forces. The inspection team was 
not prevented from speaking directly 
with the troops participating in the ex- 
ercise. During the 48-hour inspection 
period, the team also inspected the 
Minsk training area, which was also in 
the specified area. No significant mili- 
tary activity was found there. 

Based on their observations, the 
team's assessment was that the activity 
inspected appeared to be a training 
exercise. It is almost certain that most 
units, especially motorized rifle units, 
were understrength to a degree that 
full combat operations were not 
possible. 

All forces involved in the activity 
appeared to be under the operational, if 
not full, command and control of the 
Commander of the Belorussian Military 
District. The commander stated that 
the units involved in the exercise were 
at less than full strength. The team's 
observations tend to confirm that 
statement. 

The Soviet prior notification for 
this activity stated that a total of 425 
tanks would participate. The exercise 
director told the inspectors on the 
scene that, in fact, all units involved 
would be at reduced strength and that 
350 tanks would participate. Based on 



November 1987 



45 



the information provided by the exer- 
cise director and the team's own obser- 
vations, the team estimated that the 
number of troops participating was 
less than the 16,000 announced in the 
notification. 

Conclusions 

The U.S. inspection was successful in 
helping to resolve uncertainties about 
the precise scope and size of this Soviet 
military activity. 

Based on the observations and in- 
formation gathered by the U.S. inspec- 
tion team, the United States believes 
that this activity did not exceed the 
participation levels contained in the So- 
viet prior notification and, in fact, was 
considerably below those levels during 
the period of inspection. 

Based on the inspection team's 
findings, the United States also con- 
cludes that the purpose of the activity 
was in conformity with the purpose 
stated in the notification. 

While some questions of procedures 
and interpretation were raised during 
the course of the inspection which will 
require further consideration, the 
United States is satisfied by the posi- 
tive approach demonstrated by the 
Soviet Union in its treatment of the 
inspection request and of the inspec- 
tion team. 

The United States welcomes the 
spirit of cooperation shown by many 
Soviet officers and enlisted men toward 
the inspectors and hopes that this spirit 
will extend to others as participating 
states gain more experience in security- 
building measures (CSBMs). 

This inspection has demonstrated 
the significant and essential contribu- 
tion which inspection can make to the 
confidence-building process. As a 
means of resolving uncertainties about 
military activities in Europe, it rein- 
forces all the other measures and is 
an integral component of the CSBMs 
regime. 

The United States believes that 
one of the significant achievements of 
the Stockholm document is its contri- 
bution to the process of increasing 
openness and transparency in the mili- 
tary-security sphere in Europe. 
The implementation of the inspection 
provisions is a vital and positive step in 
that process and an encouraging devel- 
opment for East-West relations. 



PACIFIC 

Administration Supports New Zealand 
Preference Elimination Act 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by Department deputy spokesman Phyllis 
Oakley. ■ 



by J. Stapleton Roy 

Statements before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee. On September 
22, 1987. Mr. Roy is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs.^ 

I am pleased to appear before the sub- 
committee to discuss U.S. policy to- 
ward New Zealand and specifically to 
present the Administration's position on 
H.R. 85, the New Zealand Preference 
Elimination Act. The Administration 
supports enactment of its antinuclear 
legislation. 

U.S. -New Zealand Relations 

On August 11, 1986, the United States 
suspended its security guarantees to 
New Zealand under the terms of the 
ANZUS alliance. This action was taken 
in response to New Zealand Govern- 
ment policies on port access by allied 
warships which would have compro- 
mised our universally applied policy of 
"neither confirming nor denying the 
presence or absence of nuclear weap- 
ons." The universal application of the 
"neither-confirm-nor-deny" policy is a 
national strategic interest of the United 
States on which we cannot and will not 
compromise. By rejecting "neither- 
confirm-nor-deny," New Zealand pre- 
vented practical alliance cooperation 
under ANZUS and precluded U.S. im- 
plementation of defense commitments 
to New Zealand. 

The New Zealand Government's 
policies on port access were codified in 
law in June 1987. The law, as applied to 
ship visits, remains incompatible with 
our global policy. 

The United States seeks a rela- 
tionship with New Zealand based on 
reciprocity and treatment of New Zea- 
land as a nonallied friend. Sharply cur- 
tailed defense and security cooperation 
with New Zealand continues, but New 
Zealand has lost the special access and 
influence normally accorded an ally. 
Despite our security differences, the 
United States and New Zealand enjoy 
good economic relations. As clearly 
stated in the past, the Administration 
does not support any form of economic 
sanctions or reprisals against New 
Zealand. 



Since the Labor Party's victory in 
August 15 parliamentary elections. 
Prime Minister Lange and Foreign Min 
ister Marshall have publicly stated New 
Zealand's intention to seek to improve 
relations with the United States. The 
United States, of course, is prepared to 
cooperate with New Zealand, and we 
see this cooperation as taking place pri- 
marily in the economic and trade areas. 
For example, New Zealand and the 
United States share similar objectives 
for trade liberalization, particularly in 
agriculture, and we expect to work to- 
gether closely in upcoming General 
Agreement on l^riffs and Trade 
(GATT) negotiations. 

However, we will not ignore or 
overlook the fact that our differences or 
vital security issues remain unresolved. 
A restoration of normal allied relations 
will remain impossible as long as New- 
Zealand holds to policies which do 
damage to the network of alliances and 
hurt Western efforts to maintain peace 
through our common burdensharing. 

Administration Position on H.R. 85 

The proposed legislation, H.R. 85, 
would eliminate certain preferential 
treatment accorded to the U.S. closest 
allies under both the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA) and the Foreign 
Assistance Act. The exercise of these 
preferences by the Administration is 
discretionary. Since the United States 
suspended security guarantees to New- 
Zealand, the United States has ceased 
to apply to New Zealand the allied 
preference clauses of the two acts. Pas- 
sage of H.R. 85 would only codify into 
law present practices and the existing 
nonallied security relationship between 
the United States and New Zealand. 
Additionally, passage of the legislation 
would constitute an appropriate re- 
ciprocal legislative response to the 
recent enactment of New Zealand's 
antinuclear policies into law. For these 
reasons, the Administration supports 
enactment of the legislation. 

I would note that the United States 
has sought to maintain intact the 
ANZUS structure to allow for New 
Zealand's eventual return to trilateral 
defense cooperation. The Department, 
therefore, would prefer that the legisla- 
tion be modified to allow the President 
to restore the preferences at some fu- 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



ture date if he determines, and reports 
to Congress, that New Zealand is com- 
plying fully with its obligations under 
ANZUS. 

Consequences of Enactment 
of H.R. 85 

In his statement, my colleague from 
the Defense Department will detail the 
present state of military cooperation 
with New Zealand and the proposed 
legislation's potential impact in this 
area. I would only reiterate that, given 
the already significant measures taken 
by the Administration to implement the 
decision to treat New Zealand as a 
friend but not an ally, the legislation 
would result in few, if any, additional 
practical burdens for New Zealand. 
Furthermore we do not believe that the 
elimination of security assistance and 
arms export preferences, as envisioned 
in the bill, would have any negative 
spill-over consequences in such areas 
as combating terrorism or narcotics 
trafficking. We expect to continue to 
cooperate with the New Zealand Gov- 
ernment on the basis of mutual interest 
on these matters which concern the se- 
curity of New Zealand as well as that of 
the United States. 

Although a sizable number of New 
Zealanders support their government's 
antinuclear law, surveys indicate that 
a majority support continued New 
Zealand participation in ANZUS. 
Enactment of the bill may serve to un- 
derscore that New Zealanders cannot 
expect to enjoy the benefits of an al- 
liance with the United States while re- 
jecting the very means by which our 
security guarantees are made effective. 

Clearly, the New Zealand Govern- 
ment is well aware of the likelihood of 
passage of some sort of legislation 
which would codify New Zealand's pres- 
ent status. The New Zealand Govern- 
ment, of course, does not support the 
legislation and can be expected to pub- 
Hcly note regret over its enactment. 
However, given the fact that legislation 
would not affect current practices and 
arrangements, it is unlikely that any 
change in our existing relationship 
would occur as a consequence of 
passage. 



REFUGEES 



The Administration supports the 
enactment of legislation which would 
eliminate preferential treatment for 
New Zealand. Congressional action 
would demonstrate to the Government 
of New Zealand that Congress fully 
shares the Administration's concern 
over the damage that New Zealand's 
policies have done to Western security 



interests. Furthermore, it would be a 
clear reflection of the strong bipartisan 
support for U.S. policy toward New 
Zealand. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 
1988 



Prepared statement entered for the 
record on behalf of Secretary Shultz by 
Jonathan Moore, U.S. Coordinator and 
Ambassador at Large for Refugee Af- 
fairs, before the House Committee on 
the Judiciary on September 23, 1987.' 

I am pleased to represent the President 
for the fourth consecutive year in the 
consultations with the committee on the 
U.S. refugee admissions program for 
fiscal year (FY) 1988. I appreciate the 
invitation and the courtesy shown by 
the chairman in scheduling this 
hearing. 

Although the admissions program 
numbers are the explicit purpose of 
these consultations, in many respects 
this process has come to constitute an 
annual review of our entire refugee pro- 
gram, and it is the one sure point in 
the year when the worldwide refugee 
picture is examined. I believe that our 
refugee programs embody many of the 
fundamental values of the American 
people and of U.S. foreign policy: 
idealism, humanitarianism, compassion, 
and an American commitment to world 
leadership in multilateral responses to 
complex international problems. 

Refugee Assistance and Protection 

Most of the reporting on the develop- 
ments of the past year I will leave for 
Ambassador Moore, the U.S. Coordi- 
nator for Refugee Affairs. However, I 
wish to commence my testimony by 
highlighting several points which un- 
derscore the seriousness and the enor- 
mity of the human tragedy which the 
word refugee means. 



November 1987 



First, the magnitude of the refugee 
problem is not diminishing and is prob- 
ably increasing: our World Refugee Re- 
port now estimates the figure at over 11 
million human beings who have fled 
their home countries to escape oppres- 
sion and conflict. 

Second, resolving the most critical 
refugee situations depends on the polit- 
ical decisions of other governments — in 
Afghanistan, in Iran, in Indochina, in 
Central America, in the Horn of Africa, 
in southern Africa, in the Middle East, 
and in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. The problems which produce 
refugees are deep rooted and long 
lasting. For instance, although the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) reports that 250,000 persons 
were voluntarily repatriated to their 
homes in the past year, this figure rep- 
resents only 2% of the global refugee 
population. As essential as their impact 
is throughout the world, we are real- 
istic enough to know that our refugee 
policies and programs by themselves 
have a limited effect on this enormous 
problem, yet we are resolute enough 
to know that our efforts must continue 
to be forcefully pursued in the years 
ahead. 

Third, our principal task is in the 
field of refugee assistance and protec- 
tion. We must continue to work in a 
multilateral environment, benefiting 
from sharing the financial and dip- 
lomatic effort while accepting the 
inevitable inefficiencies of such mecha- 
nisms. And we must remember that 
refugee resettlement in the United 
States, although our principal subject 
here today, is available to, at most, one- 
half of 19c of all refugees in any 1 year. 
Perhaps because the results are closer 
to home, perhaps because it is more 
quantifiable, refugee resettlement in 
the United States sometimes receives 



47 



REFUGEES 



more attention than refugee assistance 
overseas, and there is some risk of our 
being distracted from our major 
challenge. 

Fourth, our main focus this past 
year and at present is on refugee pro- 
tection. The safety of Mozambican refu- 
gees in Zimbabwe, Salvadoran refugees 
in Honduras, Laotians and Cambodians 
along the borders of Thailand, Palestin- 
ians in UNRWA [UN Relief and Works 
Agency] camps in Lebanon, Ethiopians 
in Sudan, for instance, are the critical 
day-to-day imperatives that occupy the 
Department of State and the Bureau 
for Refugee Programs. 

Among the principal features of the 
world refugee situation in 1987 are: 

• The refugee population in Africa 
remains on the order of 3 million per- 
sons; civil wars in southern Africa have 
increased the number of refugees to 
nearly 1 million in that I'egion, 600,000 
of whom come from Mozambique. In 
northeast Africa, refugees have started 
to return to Ethiopia, Uganda, and 
Chad, but continuing civil strife inhib- 
its large-scale repatriation, as do fears 
that severe di'ought could recur, espe- 
cially in Ethiopia. 

• The population of Indochinese ref- 
ugees in first-asylum countries con- 
tinues to decline slowly, although there 
has been recently a worrisome increase 
in the arrival of Vietnamese boat peo- 
ple. As of July 31, there were some 
111,000 refugees in Thailand, plus an- 
other 24,000 in other countries in the 
region. In addition, the international 
community continues to support, 
through the UN Border Relief Opera- 
tion (UNBRO), 265,000 displaced per- 
sons from Cambodia located in camps 
along the Thai-Cambodian border. 

• In Central America, prospects 
are improving for voluntary repatria- 
tion, but only a few thousand refugees 
returned home during the past year. 
The population receiving international 
or government assistance is about 
165,000, but there may be as many 
more who are undocumented residents 
in the countries bordering their 
homelands. 

• In the Near East, the plight of 
the Palestinians remains, tragically, 
without a solution, while the popula- 
tions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
and Iran are approaching a combined 
total of 5 million people. 

• There has been a welcome in- 
crease in emigration from the Soviet 
Union, and there is a steady flow of 



refugees from Eastern Europe, joining 
asylum seekers from the Third World 
who are arriving in Western Eui'ope in 
increasing numbers. 



Soviet Emigration 

As you know, this week I have been 
meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minis- 
ter, Mr. Shevardnadze, and issues of 
human rights and freedom of emigra- 
tion — issues which are of the greatest 
relevance for the consideration of this 
committee — were among the major 
items on my agenda. There has been 
some improvement in Soviet practice. 
Soviet Jewish departures have averaged 
700-900 over the last few months, with 
about 70% of these being resettled in 
the United States. This number com- 
pares most favorably with a rate of only 
100 per month in 1986, but it is still far 
below the average of 2,000 per month of 
the late 1970s. Emigration of other eth- 
nic minorities in the U.S.S.R., particu- 
larly Armenians and ethnic Germans, is 
also several times higher than the lev- 
els of recent years. 

This increase in emigration has 
been accompanied by the resolution in 
1987 of more than half of our divided 
family cases: unfortunately, more 



Proposed U.S. Refugee 
Admissions for FY 1988 







Proposed 


Area of Origin 




Admissions 


Africa 




3,000 


East Asia 






First Asylum 




29,500 


Orderly Departure Program 


8,500 


Eastern Europe and 






the Soviet Union 




15,000 


Latin America and the Car 


bbean 


3,500 


Near East and South Asia 




9,000 


Subtotal 




68,500 


Unallocated Reserve 




4,000 


TOTAL 




72,500 



than 100 cases remain. We are also con- 
cerned by the slow progress in the res- 
olution of the separated spouse and 
dual national cases. 

As I report the increase in emigra- 
tion from the Soviet Union, I wish to 
be clear in stating that we expect the 
Soviets to go much further if they are 
to be in fulfillment of their interna- 
tional obligations. We expect them to 
give exit permission not just to the sev- 



eral thousand longstanding refuseniks, 
but to all applicants, whether or not 
they have a close relative abroad. Be- 
cause of the traditionally poor Soviet 
performance in guaranteeing freedom 
of movement, we cannot say with cer- 
tainty whether levels of emigration in 
1988 will increase or even remain at tht 
current level. 

However, for our purposes today, it 
is gratifying to report this limited im- 
provement in one area of our refugee 
admissions program. It is by far the 
most significant change from the refu- 
gee admissions needs on which I testi- 
fied 1 year ago. 

FY 1988 Admissions Proposals 

For the worldwide admissions ceiling 
for FY 1988, President Reagan is pro- 
posing a level of 72,500 refugees, withir 
which 68,500 are specified for the re- 
gional ceilings and for assistance from 
federally funded programs. An unal- 
located reserve of 4,000 numbers is 
proposed, as last year, for additional 
refugee admissions needs contingent 
upon the availability of private sector 
funding. The comparable levels of last 
year's proposal, which also became the 
final presidential determination, were 
70,000 overall, with 66,000 specified by 
regions plus the 4,000 unallocated, un- 
funded reserve. For FY 1988, the nec- 
essary increase in admissions numbers 
for refugees from the Soviet Union will 
be offset in part by decreases in other 
regions. 

I am including in my statement twi 
tables, showing the individual regional 
ceilings for FY 1987 and FY 1988, to 
serve as points of reference for the dis- 
cussion which follows. 

More detailed information on these 
proposals and on the refugee situation 
in each region of the world is provided 
in the two documents submitted by 
the Administration as required by the 
Refugee Act of 1980. They are entitled: 
The World Refugee Report and Proposea 
Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 



Admissions Program Funding 

The President's worldwide refugee ad- 
missions ceiling for FY 1988 proposes 
68,500 refugee admissions to be pub- 
licly funded. The President's budget 
request for FY 1988, submitted in 
January, included funds for an esti- 
mated level of 55,000. The additional 
funding necessary to pay for up to 
68,500 refugee admissions — along with 



48 



Depailment of State Bulletin' 



the funds necessary to continue to pro- 
vide life-sustaining assistance for the 
approximately 9 million refugees and 
displaced persons around the world 
who benefit from U.S. financial sup- 
port — is of great concern to the Admin- 
istration, and is, I know, of equal 
concern to the Congress. 

We, the executive branch and the 
Congress acting together, must sort out 
priorities and resource allocations for a 
host of competing, worthwhile objec- 
tives. The current national imperative 
to hold to strict budget deficit reduc- 
tion targets obviously makes this task 
more complicated. The Department of 
State is confronted with more and more 
decisions of where and what to sacri- 
fice. As I have testified repeatedly, the 
effect of all the budget cuts and ear- 
marks in foreign affairs programs is to 
hmit seriously our capacity to conduct 
the foreign policy of the United States 
in a responsible manner. 

Our task in these consultations is 
properly to give you our best estimate 
of what the need is for the U.S. refu- 
gee admissions program in FY 1988, 
and the 68,500 ceiling is just that — a 
ceiling; it is not a quota. Reconciling 
resource allocations among competing 
priorities is not our task today. After 
the presidential determination for FY 
1988 has been made and a legal ceiling 
set, the Department of State will 
engage in appropriate processes to seek 
additional funding to cover costs that 
cannot be absorbed within existing 
budgetary resources. 

Unallocated Reserve 

During last year's consultations, 
the Administration introduced a new 
proposal to include in the worldwide 
admissions ceiling an unallocated, 
unfunded reserve figure of 4,000 num- 
bers. We are maintaining that feature 
in our proposal for FY 1988. These 
numbers would only be used in the 
event that private funding could be 
found to pay for them. The proposal is 
motivated by our belief that the United 
States ought to have the capacity, with- 
in the ceiling which emerges from these 
consultations, to bring in some refugees 
who have private sponsors to provide 
for them, going beyond what the gov- 
ernment has appropriated resources 
to pay for. 

We have not used the 4,000 num- 
bers provided for this contingency for 
FY 1987. Over the past 10 months, ex- 
tensive study has been given to the de- 



-November 1987 



sign of a feasible program; consultation 
has been carried out with Federal agen- 
cies, congressional and state and local 
officials, and private voluntary agen- 
cies; and a search has been conducted 
to match prospective refugee groups 
and U.S. private sponsors. Obstacles 
which have to be overcome in order for 
this initiative to be successful include: 
the availabihty and willingness of 
qualified sponsors, arrangements for 
costly medical coverage, the need for 
some start-up funds, and various equity 
and legal constraints. 

Ambassador Moore will have some 
more to report on the efforts of his 
office on this project to date, including 
plans for small pilot projects and re- 
quirements of a general longer range 
program. 

Additional Elements of the 
President's Proposal 

In addition to the establishment of re- 
gional ceilings, the consultations proc- 
ess and the subsequent presidential 
determination cover two other policy 
decisions stipulated in the Refugee Act: 
the processing of refugees who are still 
in their country of origin and the ad- 
justment of status of persons previously 
gi'anted asylum in the United States. 
For FY 1988, the President pro- 
poses to specify that special circum- 
stances exist such that the following 
persons, if they otherwise qualify for 
admission, may be considered as refu- 
gees of special humanitarian concern to 
the United States even though they are 
still within their countries of nationality 
or habitual residence: 

• Persons in Vietnam and Laos 
with past or present ties to the United 
States, persons who have been or cur- 
rently are in reeducation camps in Viet- 
nam or seminar camps in Laos, and 



REFUGEES 



Amerasian children in Vietnam, and 
their accompanying family members; 
and 

• Present and former political pris- 
oners and persons in imminent danger 
of loss of life, and their accompanying 
family members, in countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 

The President also proposes to 
authorize the Immigration and Natu- 
ralization Service (INS) to adjust to 
permanent resident status up to 5,000 
persons who have been granted asylum 
in the United States and who have been 
here for at least 1 year. 

The only change in these propo- 
sals from current practice is the inclu- 
sion of the persons specified in Laos. 
We have made known to the Govern- 
ment of Laos our willingness to receive 
such persons for resettlement. The pur- 
pose of this proposed language is to 
give the President the authority to as- 
sist such persons through a direct de- 
parture program, should they desire to 
depart and be granted exit permits by 
the Government of Laos in the future. 

Program Implementation 

Effective management of the refugee 
admissions program has been proved to 
work under the system of regional ceil- 
ings prescribed by the Refugee Act of 
1980 for these consultations and for the 
presidential determination. In June, 
after informing members of the Judici- 
ary Committees of our intent, we were 
able to address the growing needs for 
admissions from the Soviet Union and 
for increased numbers for Near East- 
ern refugees by reallocating 4,500 num- 
bers into those regional ceilings from 
regions where they were not needed for 
current applicants — Africa and Latin 
America. 



U.S. Refugee Admissions in FY 1987 










Consultation 
Levels 


Reallocated 
Levels 


Est. Arrivals 
in U.S. 


Africa 


3.500 


2,000 


2,000 


East Asia 

First Asylum 

Orderly Departure Program 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
Latin America and ttie Caribbean 
Near East/South Asia 


32,000 
8,500 

10,000 
4,000 
8,000 


32,000 
8.500 

12,300 
1,000 

10,200 


30,800 

8,500 

12,300 

400 

10.000 


Subtotal 


66,000 


66,000 


64,000 


Unallocated Reserve 


4,000 


4,000 





TOTAL 


70,000 


70,000 


64,000 



49 



REFUGEES 



With excellent cooperation in the 
field between the Department of State 
and the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, and with exemplary perform- 
ance by the private voluntary agencies, 
overseas processing schedules were al- 
tered and domestic sponsorships were 
increased rapidly to enable these re- 
vised ceihngs to benefit an additional 
4,500 refugees before the end of the 
fiscal year. Here, as in Southeast 
Asia — where actual admissions will 
come within 4% of the authorized ceil- 
ing for the fourth year in a row — our 
record demonstrates that the refugee 
admissions program is managed consci- 
entiously to benefit as many qualified 
refugees as possible within the annual 
ceilings and in accordance with the 
needs of the real situation. 

Regional Ceilings for FY 1988 

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 

The proposed level of 15,000 is a sub- 
stantial increase over the original FY 
1987 ceiling of 10,000, and it is due en- 
tirely to the most welcome rise in emi- 
gration from the Soviet Union. The 
change in the rates of emigration of 
Soviet Jews and Armenians necessitated 
a midyear reallocation within the FY 
1987 ceilings to bring this regional 
ceiling to 12,300, and all of these num- 
bers have been used. With arrivals in 
Vienna and Rome continuing apace, the 
increase of 5,000 for a full year will 
surely be needed. If Moscow should re- 
spond to our appeals to further relax 
its emigration restrictions, we will 
come back to the committee to consult 
on the appropriate adjustments to our 
admissions numbers. 

Near East and South Asia. The 

ceiling in FY 1987 for the Near East/ 
South Asia region was increased at 
midyear from the original consultations 
and presidential determination figure 
of 8,000 to 10,200. This dealt with a 
backlog situation, that is, a registered 
pool of refugee applicants who are 
known to be qualified under all criteria 
but who must wait in first-asylum coun- 
tries until numbers become available. 
This situation imposes a hardship on 
the individual refugees and on their 
families waiting in the United States. 
In view of the steady rate of new ap- 
plications received from Afghan refu- 
gees and the ever-increasing number 
of Iranians, including many from the 
Baha'i and other persecuted religious 
minority groups, we believe a ceiling 
of 9,000 is needed to provide for the 
admission of the known and projected 



pool of qualified refugee applicants, 
while keeping the anticipated backlog 
within tolerable limits. 

Latin America and the Caribbean. 

It will be apparent to the committee 
that the ceiling proposed for Latin 
America and the Caribbean — 3,500 — 
is the least certain of all the regions, 
for the simple reason that it reflects a 
policy which cannot be implemented 
without the cooperation of the Cuban 
Government. Under the bilateral Mi- 
gration Agreement of 1984, we stated 
our readiness to admit up to 3,000 
Cuban political prisoners and their 
close family members. We are still 
ready to do so. It was Fidel Castro 
who unilaterally suspended implemen- 
tation of the agreement, and although 
he has permitted the departure of small 
numbers of persons of interest to the 
United States, including some long- 
term political prisoners, the 3,000 num- 
bers will not, in fact, be needed if the 
Cuban suspension is not lifted. For FY 
1987, the total number of Cubans ad- 
mitted to the United States as refugees 
will probably not exceed 300. Nev- 
ertheless, to continue to demonstrate 
the policy of the United States to seek 
freedom for the Cuban political pris- 
oners — a pohcy which this committee 
has so often and so eloquently advo- 
cated — the President proposes to main- 
tain a ceiling which would enable us to 
resume implementation of the Migra- 
tion Agreement whenever Cuba will 
agree. 

Elsewhere in Latin America, we 
have found it difficult to establish a 
new program for non-Cuban refugees, 
drawing the necessary participants and 
procedures together and testing eligi- 
bility requirements and the size of the 
applicant pool. During the year, we 
have intensified our efforts, and INS is 
now beginning to approve small num- 
bers of refugees from Central America 
who are qualified for admission. 

Africa. The Administration's 
African refugee admissions program 
has varied over the past 5 years from a 
low of 1,300 (in FY 1986) to a high of 
3,300 {in FY 1982), the principal vari- 
ables being two: the rate of processing 
and departure permitted by the Gov- 
ernment of Sudan, our largest pro- 
cessing location; and the number of 
refugees in need of resettlement who 
come forward at the smaller processing 
ports. In FY 1987 the number of Af- 
rican refugees other than Ethiopians 
admitted increased to approximately 
150, compared to 47 during the previous 



year, and our effort to reach nonreset- 
tled African refugees in Europe led to 
the admission of nearly 500 in this cate- 
gory. We expect these trends to con- 
tinue in FY 1988 and that our proposed 
ceiling of 3,000 is appropriate to meet 
these needs. 

East Asia. The proposed ceiling of 
29,500 is a small reduction — roughly 
8%— from the FY 1987 level of 32,000. 
Some reduction is appropriate because 
of the progress made during the past 
year in processing backlogs of qualified 
refugees — individuals and families who 
have been in the camps for a long pe- 
riod of time but who did not previously 
apply or to whom we did not previously 
have access for processing. Hence our 
program in FY 1987 was noteworthy for 
the increased share of the admission 
numbers which went to refugees from 
Laos, especially the Hmong refugees 
who have suffered greatly because of 
their past association with the United 
States. We were also able to implement 
a one-time allocation of numbers for 
long-staying Vietnamese boat people in 
Malaysia and Indonesia, a policy which 
helped to relieve their suffering and 
which underscored our commitment to 
continue to address the burden of first- 
asylum states in that region. 

For FY 1988, continuing the admis- 
sions program at nearly the same levels 
as last year reinforces the message of 
our firm commitment to the first-asylum 
countries that we will continue to offer 
generous resettlement numbers as one 
means of relieving their first-asylum 
burden. 

Orderly Departure Program. 

I am pleased to report that after 18 
months of persistent U.S. diplomatic 
activity, the Orderly Departure Pro- 
gram from Vietnam is getting back on 
track, and just last week we reached an 
agreement in principle to resume the 
Amerasian program. 

For 18 months following the uni- 
lateral suspension by Hanoi of inter- 
views of new cases, the U.S. program 
continued to bring out previously inter- 
viewed cases at a rate which will make 
use of the full allocation of 8,500 refu- 
gee admissions this fiscal year. An ad- 
ditional 2,000 persons will enter as 
immigrants. The backlog from which 
these cases came is almost exhausted, 
but just last week we were finally able 
to get a team of consular and immigra- 
tion officers into Vietnam to commence 
new interviews. Thus, rather than come 
to you for a reduced ceiling to reflect a 
suspended program, we are proposing 



50 



to maintain the level of the previous 
two fiscal years — 8,500 refugees — which 
will be a signal of our continuing com- 
mitment both to Hanoi and to those 
Vietnamese who might otherwise be 
contemplating the dangerous flight by 
boat or over land. 

The Orderly Departure Program, 
which was estatslished through an 
agreement between Vietnam and the 
UNHCR as part of the international re- 
sponse to the Indochinese boat people 
crisis of 1978-79, is a critical element 
of the long-term solution to the Indo- 
Chinese refugee problem. Without the 
Orderly Departure Program to provide 
a safe, legal alternative method of emi- 
gration, the phenomenon of clandestine 
boat departures from Vietnam will 
surely continue, bringing recurring 
tragedies at sea and placing continuing 
pressure on the first-asylum countries. 
This fact was made only too apparent 
by the increase in Vietnamese boat ar- 
rivals which occurred during the past 
year — following the suspension of inter- 
views for the Orderly Departure Pro- 
gram. Without a legal alternative and 
without hope, people will flee, despite 
knowing the risks involved. 

While the resumption of interviews 
for the Orderly Departure Program and 
the agreement on the Amerasian pro- 
gram are positive developments, there 
remain three areas of concern. 

First, there has been no progress 
on the President's initiative for Viet- 
namese political prisoners — which I 
announced at the refugee admissions 
consultations in 1984 — despite re- 
peated efforts by our diplomatic repre- 
sentatives and strong bipartisan 
support from the Congress. We have 
seen the recent announcement of 
Hanoi's intention to release 480 "reedu- 
cation camp" prisoners, including mili- 
tary and civilian officials of the former 
government, as part of a total amnesty 
of 6,685 persons. We welcome this de- 
velopment and hope that it will be fol- 
lowed by the release of the remaining 
political prisoners from these camps. 
We also hope that Hanoi will favorably 
consider our offer to resettle these and 
other reeducation camp prisoners in the 
United States. 

Second, the President's intiative to 
admit all Amerasian children and their 
qualifying family members, which I 
also announced in 1984, has made dis- 
appointingly slow progress. The fact 
that the Orderly Departure Program 
was successful in bringing some 9,000 
Amerasian children and accompanying 
family members to the United States 



November 1987 



up until the Vietnamese suspension at 
the end of 1985 demonstrates that our 
initial 3-year plan was valid. 

On September 7 and 8, American 
refugee officers from our embassy in 
Bangkok met with Vietnamese officials 
in Hanoi to negotiate a provisional 
agreement on the resumption of inter- 
views of the Amerasians under bilateral 
arrangements proposed by the United 
States nearly 1 year ago. It is too early 
for me to be able to report to you the 
details of how many children and ac- 
companying family members will be 
able to leave for the United States in 
the coming year, but we are profoundly 
hopeful that this agreement in principle 
will lead to the resettlement of the en- 
tire Amerasian population. 

Third, we are disappointed with 
Hanoi's failure to allow the departure of 
more prospective immigrants. With the 
annual country immigrant visa quota of 
20,000, plus an unlimited number of im- 
mediate relatives, this channel remains 
sadly underutilized by the Vietnamese 
authorities, even though higher levels 
of departures appear to be in the com- 
mon interest of all concerned. We now 
have files in our Ordei-ly Departure 
Program office on nearly 60,000 qual- 
ified immigrants, most of whom could 
have been reunited with their families 
by now, had the Vietnamese Govern- 
ment been willing to use this channel. 
We will continue to emphasize the U.S. 
immigration categories in all our deal- 
ings with Hanoi. 

Indochinese Refugee Policy 

Over the past 12 years, the United 
States has made an unprecedented 
humanitarian effort on behalf of Indo- 
Chinese refugees. That effort and the 
policy on which it is founded continue 
unchanged today. We have stressed 
repeatedly to the nations in Southeast 
Asia that the host countries will not be 
deserted on the refugee problem, and 
there is no change in that commit- 
ment — certainly not as far as the 
United States is concerned. 

This is not a unilateral American 
effort. The fact that the countries of 
Southeast Asia and Hong Kong have 
given first asylum to over 1.25 million 
refugees, that international organiza- 
tions have unstintingly provided as- 
sistance and protection to these pop- 
ulations, and that more than 1.1 mil- 
lion refugees have been given the 
opportunity to start new lives in some 
30 countries illustrates the unparalleled 
international response to this human 
tragedy. 



REFUGEES 



This year, at our initiative, the ref- 
ugee issue was given prominence at the 
annual meeting of the Foreign Minis- 
ters of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations in June, and I made ref- 
ugees a central theme of my own policy 
statements on that occasion. 

I assured the foreign ministers that 
the United States recognized the bur- 
den that refugee populations have 
placed on countries which have gener- 
ously offered them humane asylum over 
the last 12 years. I reiterated to them 
that the U.S. commitment to resolving 
the Indochinese refugee problem is as 
strong today as ever, and I reaffirmed 
our policy to continue to resettle refu- 
gees in substantial numbers and to con- 
tinue our financial and moral support to 
the international organizations charged 
with protection and assistance. At the 
same time, however, I reported the real 
concern in the United States — shared 
by Congress and my Department — that 
the principle of first asylum may be in 
jeopardy. I called on the countries of 
the region to reconfirm their own com- 
mitment to humanitarian treatment of 
all those seeking asylum, and I urged 
them to address the problem at its 
source by engaging Hanoi in working 
toward constructive, humanitarian 
solutions. 

The pressure on first asylum arises 
from several factors: the existence of 
large camp populations for which nei- 
ther voluntary repatriation nor third- 
country resettlement is a short-term 
possibility; the continuing flow of 
Vietnamese boat people at the rate of 
20,000 or more per year; and the cross- 
border movements into Thailand of 
Laotian highlanders which comprise 
refugees and nonrefugees in a politi- 
cally complex mixture. This year's re- 
ported incidents of pushoffs of boat 
people and pushbacks of Hmong into 
Laos reflect these pressures, but they 
are, nonetheless, matters of the great- 
est humanitarian concern to the inter- 
national community. It is a fundamental 
tenet of U.S. refugee policy that such 
persons be assured assistance and 
safety and access to the appropriate 
registration and screening processes for 
refugees. We work vigorously with the 
responsible international organizations 
to ensure protection for all asylum 
seekers, and we press strongly by dip- 
lomatic means to promote appropriate 
policies with the governments of the 
first-asylum countries. 



UNITED NATIONS 



Conclusion 

The United States will continue our 
traditional, responsible leadership role 
in refugee assistance and protection as 
we continue to emphasize the multi- 
lateral, shared responsibility of all do- 
nor, resettlement, and first-asylum 
countries. We will continue to call on 
the other countries to maintain their 
share of the resettlement effort and to 
reconfirm their commitment to human- 
itarian assistance to refugees. I must 
emphasize that our perspective should 
not become distorted by an overcon- 
centration on any one region. The U.S. 
worldwide share of refugee resettle- 
ment is approximately 40% of the total. 
More importantly, in financial support 
for the work of international refugee 
organizations worldwide, the share of 
the United States amounts to roughly 
30%. 

I have the greatest respect for 
those who say that the United States 
should do even more, including many in 
the Congress, for I know their senti- 
ment reflects the fundamental value 
Americans place on helping others in 
need, and I know we share recognition 
of the compelling cause of the homeless 
refugee. This goal, however, must be 
realized within the framework of an 
international system of authority and 
responsibility. Humane first-asylum 
practices are the responsibility of the 
entire family of civilized nations, but 
they are implemented under the sov- 
ereign authority of each nation state 
to establish its own immigration policy 
and to control its own borders. The 
international community, working 
through institutions such as UNHCR, 
UNRWA, ICRC [International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross], ICM [Inter- 
governmental Committee for Migration], 
UNBRO, and private voluntary organi- 
zations, shares the burden, by provid- 
ing financial assistance according to its 
capacity, by encouraging high stand- 
ai'ds of humanitarian behavior, and by 
pursuing any and all durable solutions 
to the problem. 

The tragic reality is that human 
beings will always be the victims of 
world events. America and its free 
world allies must always stand ready 
to come to their aid and protection. As 
President Reagan has said, America is 
an island of fi-eedom in the world. Our 
program for refugee admissions ex- 
presses this reahty in concrete human 
terms. Today our refugee admissions 



52 



program reflects the particular histor- 
ical circumstances across the globe, 
but circumstances change and have 
changed. In the early 1980s, we admit- 
ted high numbers of Poles fleeing mar- 
tial law; in the late 1970s, we responded 
to the record levels of Soviet Jewish 
emigration; in the 1950s and 1960s, to 
outflows from Hungary, Cuba, and 
Czechoslovakia. Today Indochinese ref- 
ugees represent the majority of our ref- 
ugee admissions, but their proportion 
has decreased steadily throughout this 
decade. 

We resettle refugees in our country 
because it meets the desperate human- 
itarian needs of the human beings con- 



cerned. We resettle refugees because 
there are important foreign policy rea 
sons to do so. We also resettle refugees 
because this act of opening our arms as 
a nation and as a people confirms basic 
human values we believe about our- 
selves and our country. Finally, we re- 
settle refugees because they enrich our 
society and our future in the same 
way as did the previous groups of refu- 
gees — our ancestors — from whom we 
are the fortunate descendants. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superinten- 
dent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Secretary Shultz 

Attends UN General Assembly 



Following are news conferences 
Secretary Shultz held at the U.S. 
Mission to the United Nations and re- 
marks he and Soviet Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze made after their 
meeting. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
SEPT. 21, 19871 

Q. The President said today that the 
United States wants an unambiguous, 
clear answer from the Iranians ac- 
cepting UN Security Council Resolu- 
tion 598. However, other members of 
the Security Council who voted with 
you last time seemed to be less enthu- 
siastic than the United States in mov- 
ing ahead quickly. Is the United 
States determined to move ahead 
within days to try to get an enforce- 
ment resolution if there is no clear 
answer? 

A. When the Secretary General 
went to Tehran and Baghdad, he had 
instructions from the Security Council 
to seek an unambiguous answer to the 
question of adherence to Resolution 
598. He has come back. He's made a 
report. He had an interesting trip. But 
he didn't get an unambiguous answer 

The President of Iran will be here 
tomorrow. He'll give an address. There 
will be some meetings. And, obviously, 
we all want to solve the problem, and 
we'll have to see where we stand. We're 
in very close consultation, and I think 
there is a mood here in the United Na- 
tions to engage with this problem and 
try to resolve it. So that's the posture 



we're in; we're not trying to throw a 
switch one way or another. But, ob- 
viously, just from today's events, you 
can see how important it is that there 
be a cease-fire and resolution to this. 

Q. Did you talk about hitting the 
British tanker? 

A. Various things, and there's 
something most every day — some event 
or another 

Q. Do you sense a loss of enthusi 
asm for the direct action that the 
United States wants to take? 

A. No. We have worked with this 
resolution for quite some time, and it 
was passed. I must say, being the U.S. 
representative sitting there — whenever 
those were; a month or so ago, month 
and a half ago — and having this strong, 
mandatory resolution discussed and 
then voted on, and every hand voting ir 
favor, it was a moment of some signifi- 
cance. There is still a firm desire to 
have the United Nations do everything 
possible to bring this war to an end. 
Clearly, if there is no ability to come to 
grips with the cease-fire under the 
present circumstances, we'll want to 
move on. 

Q. The Soviets are saying a sec 
ond resolution is going to be very 
tough to implement and that the first 
resolution is a fragile instrument, 
and we owe the Secretary General 
some more time. They don't sound 
as if they're going to support an 
American-led effort in the Security 
Council. Are you hearing anything 
different from them? 



UNITED NATIONS 



A. We'll see what happens. I think 
;hat everyone wants to see the war 
ome to an end. Everybody sees the 
Jnited Nations is having an impact. 
This resolution has gotten people's 
ittention. 

All of our experience shows that 
sanctions are difficult to apply. That's 
:lear That's just a matter of fact. On 
the other hand, if all the members of 
;he Security Council — look at the mem- 
sership right now with Japan and Ger- 
nany there, among others — if all of 
those members make a conscientious 
effort to see that no arms flow to a 
pven country, it's going to cut the flow 
down a great deal; maybe even stop 
them, certainly make it much more ex- 
pensive, and it'll be a big problem. So 
it can have an impact, and that's why 
it's being treated so gingerly. 

Q. For the purposes of your push- 
ing for an arms embargo, would an- 
other equivocal answer tomorrow be 
the same as saying, no, we don't ac- 
cept this resolution? 

A. An equivocal answer, obviously, 
isn't satisfactory, but we'll have to see 
what the answer is, what it is in the 
speech, and what it is in the private 
conversations which, I'm sure, will be 
held with the Secretary General. We'll 
have to get the feel of it like any other 
negotiation. 

Q. Is there any reason that is 
stopping you from contacting the Ira- 
nians directly while the President is 
in town, while the Foreign Minister is 
in town, to talk about this directly? 

A. We have, of course, contacts 
with Iran through our official so-called 
protecting power — the Swiss — in 
Tehran. We pass them messages. They 
sometimes pass messages to us, and 
that goes on through other countries 
that are given a message which they 
pass on to us, and so on. So there is 
that form of contact. 

Whether it would be useful to have 
a direct contact, I don't know, but 
we're not opposed to that. The point 
I'm making is, it isn't as though there's 
no contact. The problem is that the 
message being carried is not being 
satisfactorily resolved by them. They 
need to stop this war; they need to use 
their influence to get the hostages out. 
They've got to stop terrorism. There 
are all of these things that need to be 
done by Iran. 

Q. Did you have any reaction 
from the allied foreign secretaries 
today about the INF [intermediate- 
range nuclear forces], and could you 
describe it? 



A. I'm glad there was a question 
about the INF and this meeting. Yes, 
the reaction was uniformly enthusiastic, 
as [NATO Secretary General] Lord 
Carrington said. I think there is a gen- 
uine feeling of achievement, that this is 
what the allies set out to do. We stuck 
together and we worked at it and we 
talked together and we strategized to- 
gether and we finally made it. 

So there is a real feeling of support 
and satisfaction, not only for the pros- 
pect of the treaty in its own terms but 
also this does a lot for the cohesion of 
the alliance. It tends to pull us to- 
gether more just as our mutual success 
together in the CDE [Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe] 
meeting in Stockholm had the same 
effect. We went there as a cohesive 
group. We worked out at it, and we saw 
an agreement emerge that we thought 
was good and now we have seen it actu- 
ally implemented as we have wanted to 
observe. We've requested that and got- 
ten it and it's worked out just fine. 

Q. I can't resist, since you have 
so often said, "an agreement is not an 
agreement until you finally have 
one." 

A. I knew I'd live to regret saying 
that. [Laughter] 

Q. "And an agreement in princi- 
ple is just an excuse for not really 
getting an agreement." How do you 
explain doing what you have done in 
terms of announcing an agreement in 
principle to conclude a treaty? 

A. Simply that I feel from the 
discussions, that we really do have 
an understanding and that we also un- 
derstand the nature of the details that 
we still have to button up, and they are 
of a nature that we should be able to do 
it. I still stick by my statement, that 
you don't have an agreement until you 
have an agreement, and that's by defi- 
nition. 

But I think that our chance of the 
probability of being successful in the 
near future in finishing off these de- 
tails, it's a very high probability, so I 
was willing to take a flyer 

Q. Did you bring up the question 
of Pakistan's nuclear [inaudible] to- 
day, and what was their answer? 

A. We discussed that subject. And, 
as a matter of fact, Prime Minister 
Junejo was asked, when the press was 
present, about it and gave Pakistan's 
answer But we made clear our deep 
concerns about this problem, and that 
was discussed with the President, as 
was our mutual and very good work 
together on the Afghan problem. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
SEPT. 22, 19872 

We and the rest of the international 
community have called repeatedly and 
formally for an immediate cease-fire 
and withdrawal to international bound- 
aries and negotiations to end this 
bloody and destructive war between 
Iran and Iraq. 

Resolution 598 is a fair and com- 
prehensive approach which contains 
aspects which meet longstanding de- 
mands of both parties. We've called on 
Iran to reconsider its commitment to 
this unwinnable war and join the rest of 
the world to restore peace and stability 
to the entire gulf region. 

Last night's incident, in which the 
Iranian Navy was discovered laying 
mines in international waters, is yet an- 
other reminder of the dangers inherent 
in this war We have repeatedly warned 
the Iranians that such activity cannot 
be tolerated and that we would act to 
protect our interests and those of inter- 
national shipping in international wa- 
ters. These are waters frequented by 
our ships as well as the ships of scores 
of other nations. We are well within our 
rights of self-defense and have a re- 
sponsibility under international law to 
take the actions we did. 

Insofar as next-steps are con- 
cerned, President Reagan made our 
position very clear yesterday. If Iran 
does not accept Resolution .598, we will 
call for the second resolution, an arms 
embargo on Iran as the noncompliant 
party. 

The Iranian President's speech to- 
day to the UN General Assembly, be- 
yond its unfounded and uncalled for 
attacks on the UN system and the 
United States, did not constitute by 
any means an acceptance of Resolution 
598. We know that President Khamenei 
is meeting with the Secretary General 
later today. Of course, we'll be inter- 
ested to hear whatever outcome there 
is from that meeting and others that he 
is having. 

In the meantime, however, we are 
proceeding with consultations with 
other governments about this matter, 
having to assume on the basis of the 
knowledge we have that Iran remains 
intransigent on this. 

Q. Do the consultations amount 
to beginning to draft a second reso- 
lution, because consultations go on 
all the time, of course, and you had 
consultations last month, the month 
before? 



November 1987 



53 



UNITED NATIONS 



A. There has been work, as I'm 
sure you know, on the drafting process 
so we are beginning to put the words 
together, that kind of thing. That's been 
going on. The consultations intensify, 
and they come to checking people's ap- 
praisals, particularly people who have 
met directly with the Iranians, which is 
the process of helping to form a consen- 
sus. It's very desirable to proceed inso- 
far as possible on the principle of the 
unanimity that has been achieved on 
this matter. And thei-e is unanimity, as 
was expressed last July in the U.N. 
vote. So we will talk to others. 

But our position is clear: Unless 
there is a clear acceptance of Resolu- 
tion 598, then our position, at any rate, 
will be that mandatory sanctions should 
be voted. 

Q. Do you have any idea now 
what the Soviets and the Chinese are 
going to do about such an enforce- 
ment measure? 

A. I can't speak for them. It would 
be wrong for me to try to do so. We 
obviously have talked to represen- 
tatives of both of those countries. I see 
no reason not to expect, under the 
right circumstances, they will agree 
with our assessment. But we will have 
to consult with them, of course. 

Q. President Khamenei called the 
U.S. version of this a "pack a lies"; 
he called the United States "murder- 
ers" for what they did in the Persian 
Gulf. Can you respond directly to his 
criticism? 

A. Of course, the statements he 
has made and that Prime Minister 
Rafsanjani has made about what hap- 
pened are factually so far away from 
what the facts actually are, it shows 
either a great lack of information or a 
lack of respect for the facts. The facts 
are very clear. We have stated them. 
The things that are involved have been 
clear to the press. You have pictures 
of them. It's not a mystery what took 
place. 

Q. They have made threats 
against the United States as well. 
How do you respond to those? 

A. They have been making threats 
for quite some time. And, of course, we 
must have our guard up and be on the 
alert, but we can't fail to do the things 
that we must do just because somebody 
throws threats around. 

Q. Beyond the threats, do you 
know anything concrete that the Ira- 
nians may be planning? Have you any 
evidence they have gone beyond your 
words? 



54 



A. We have all sorts of evidence of 
things they say, and, as a matter of 
fact, our evidence is quite helpful to us. 
In the case of the action they took last 
night, our ability to find it, to see what 
it was, know what it was, is an illustra- 
tion of the fact our information system 
is pretty good. 

Q. Are you going to present any 
of the evidence we have on the mines 
to the United Nations, to the Security 
Council specifically? And secondly, 
will you, in light of the new urgency 
on the second resolution, be seeing 
Minister Shevardnadze again before 
the end of the week? 

A. I don't have any current plan to 
see Minister Shevardnadze until Friday 
when we'll both be at the Secretary 
General's lunch, but we have no prob- 
lems at all in communicating with each 
other should the need arise. 

Evidence on what happened is al- 
ready in people's hands. I think the 
press has been there. They've seen it; 
they've taken photographs, and as we 
assemble this material, certainly it'll 
be available and there it is. You can 
all see it. 



REMARKS, 
SEPT. 24, 19873 

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. 

[Through translator] We have had a 
useful meeting with the Secretary of 
State. For over an hour we met, dis- 
cussing various aspects of the situation 
in the Persian Gulf, of the Iran-Iraq 
conflict. Tomorrow there will be a 
meeting of the UN Secretary General 
with the permanent members of the Se- 
curity Council. We have agreed in prin- 
ciple that we should work to preserve 
unity among the permanent members of 
the Security Council and that we should 
work for the implementation of the res- 
olution of the Security Council — Resolu- 
tion 598. So this is the gist of what we 
discussed and what we have agreed on. 

Secretary Shultz. Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze and I have had a very 
constructive, worthwhile discussion 
of the Iran-Iraq war. We agree on the 
importance of Resolution 598 and its 
full implementation, and we both attach 
great importance to our evident 
ability to work on this very important 
problem. 

We also discussed the dates of my 
visit to Moscow, and we agreed on Oc- 
tober 22 and 23 of this year. At that 
meeting, we will review the results of 
work on the full range of issues in 



U.S. -Soviet relations and will set the 
precise date for the summit meeting 
between President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev. 

Q. Do you and Mr. Shevardnadze 
see eye-to-eye on the enforcement 
measures? 

Secretary Shultz. We have agreed 
that we are not going to answer ques- 
tions about the content of our dis- 
cussion. It was a constructive and 
productive discussion. We will be meet- 
ing again tomorrow at the Secretary 
General's lunch, and our delegations 
will continue to be in touch as we will, 
of course, with other countries. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
SEPT. 25, 1987* 

It turns out that the Secretary Genera 
serves a very good lunch. [Laughter] 
All five of the foreign ministers pres- 
ent enjoyed it as did those accompany- 
ing us. 

We had, among other things, a 
lengthy discussion of the Iran-Iraq war 
and the relationship to it of Resolution 
598. We agreed on a statement for the 
press that the Secretary General will 
issue, and I presume he is in the proc- 
ess of putting it out. I don't have copie 
to pass out, but perhaps the best thing 
I can do is to read it out for you. 

"On September 25, 1987, the Minis 
ters of Foreign Affairs of the five per- 
manent members of the Security 
Council had a meeting with the Secre- 
tary General of the United Nations, Mi 
Javier Perez de Cuellar. Taking part in 
the meeting were" — and then it lists 
the five members; I won't read all their 
names and titles. You've got that. 

"The goal of the permanent mem- 
bers and of the Security Council as a 
whole is to bring an end to the Iran- 
Iraq conflict. The permanent members 
regard implementation of Resolution 
598 as the sole basis for a comprehen- 
sive, just, honorable, and durable set- 
tlement of the conflict. 

"The permanent members com- 
mend the Secretary General for his 
efforts thus far and give full support to 
his efforts to implement the resolution. 

"The permanent members stated 
their determination to continue to work 
with each other within the Security 
Council. They will, therefore, continue 
to work on ways and means to secure 
full and rapid implementation of Reso- 
lution 598 and, in this context, on fur- 
ther steps to ensure compliance with 
that resolution." 



)a; 



Department of State Bulletin 



UNITED NATIONS 



That statement will be put out, as 
igreed, by all five countries. I think it 
s of interest that there was some dis- 
;ussion of — when was it? — that such a 
neeting had been held before. The Sec- 
■etary General told us that the last 
,ime was in 1972 and that they had 
somehow ceased. That before that, 
le told us, at the time of the General 
Assembly, there usually was such a 
neeting. I was not aware of that. 

At any rate, this was the first one 
iince 1972. We all agreed that the tradi- 
ion of a meeting at this time of year 
mght to be reinstituted and, beyond 
hat, that the Secretary General should 
all for such a meeting on other occa- 
iions if it were agreed that that would 
)e useful. I suppose that's another way 
)f saying that we all found it a good 
!xercise to do this, and that was on the 
)asis of a luncheon that was not a social 
uncheon but rather a working discus- 
.ion and exchange, practically from the 
irst course beyond dessert. 

Q. Reading between the lines of 
hat statement, it sounds as if your 
lesire for a rapid passage of an arms 
•mbargo seems to be fading. Is that a 
orrect reading of those lines? 

A. What we desire in the United 
States and what I think the others also 
lesire is an end to the war. Or to put it 
In terms of the Security Council effort, 
;he acceptance of Resolution 598 by the 
Darties. That's what we want to have 
lappen. 

The Secretary General will con- 
tinue his work on that. At the same 
;ime, we will now move forward to 
•nake what preparations may be needed 
;o look on the compliance side; in other 
>vords, the possibility of sanctions and 
in embargo. These two things will go 
"orward, in parallel. 

Q. As I understood your earlier 
statements on the arms embargo, you 
felt that it was the most effective, 
[juick way of bringing pressure on 
[ran to stop the war or at least, to 
make it more expensive for them to 
continue fighting the war. Have you 
a;iven up that particular part of the 
effort? 

A. On the contrary. The distinct 
possibility — in fact, probabihty — that 
that will happen, unless there is a satis- 
factory response, is there. That is one 
of the things that the Secretary Gen- 
eral has to work with in pursuing his 
efforts. 

Q. Does he have a time deadline? 

A. He has the notion — that is in 
here — that we secure — the words are — 
"full and rapid implementation." Now 



November 1987 



by design, "rapid" is not defined, and I 
don't think it's wise to put down some 
numerical time period. But I think that 
some combination of determination and 
patience is called for and the degree of 
patience is fairly limited. 

Q. How does the United States 
feel about a tribunal being appointed 
that would look at how the war be- 
gan, who provoked whom, who is at 
fault for starting the war? That at the 
appointment of such a panel simul- 
taneously with Iran accepting a de 
facto cease-fire, how does the United 
States feel about that? 

A. As you know, in Resolution 598, 
point 6 is — I'll read it out to you — 
"Request the Secretary General to ex- 
plore, in consultation with Iran and 
Iraq, the question of entrusting an im- 
partial body with inquiring into respon- 
sibility for the conflict and to report to 
the Security Council as soon as possi- 
ble." So, 598 does that. 

And in the Secretary General's re- 
port to us on what he did, he issued a 
formal report. Among other things, he 
described the way he went about bring- 
ing that resolution, so to speak, to Iran 
and Iraq. It's a very interesting and 
ingenious plan of implementation. He 
established the notion of D-Day, being 
the day on which a cease-fire with 
withdrawal takes place, and then he 
identifies a number of other things that 
go with D-Day. Among them is on 
D-Day, or another date to be agreed 
upon, an impartial body to inquire into 
responsibility for the conflict would 
start its work. 

So there are various things called 
for in the resolution. Obviously, you 
don't go anywhere until you have a 
cease-fire with withdrawal. Those 
things have to stay very firmly hooked 
together. Then there are a whole series 
of things that are called for in the reso- 
lution, such as the return of prisoners, 
amnesty, and so on, and this inquiry is 
one of them. 

Q. But what I'm asking, Tariq 
Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister — the 
Deputy Prime Minister — has just said 
that Iraq will not accept this whole 
mechanism unless there is a compre- 
hensive cease-fire and unless Iran for- 
mally accepts Resolution 598. Is it 
the American view that Iran has to 
accept a comprehensive — not a de 
facto — cease-fire of the UN resolution 
before this tribunal or panel can be 
formed and begin its work? 



A. Of course. What this says here 
is — I'll just read it again — "The perma- 
nent members regard implementation 
of Resolution 598." We didn't say "as 
amended," or anything of that kind. We 
support that resolution as written; not 
changed. It says, "As the sole basis for 
a comprehensive, just, honorable, and 
durable settlement of the conflict." 

So the outcome of this meeting is 
to support that resolution in its en- 
tirety. How does the resolution get im- 
plemented? If both parties accept it, 
then the implementation of it has a lot 
of work to do. We would, of course, 
expect that to move forward — all as- 
pects of it — promptly, but you have to 
start with a cease-fire and withdrawal. 
That's the first thing that happens 
when this resolution is accepted. But 
a lot of other things can start, too, as 
the Secretary General's plan suggests, 
on D-Day or another date if that's 
agreeable. 

Q. The Secretary General is em- 
powered to negotiate conditions and 
timing for implementation of the res- 
olution. How much leeway have the 
members given him in negotiating, 
bringing this about? 

A. I think we all have — I know — we 
all have a great deal of confidence in 
the Secretary General, and we told him 
that in the meeting. We state that in 
this joint statement. 

What that means is that he has the 
ability, as set out in the resolution, to 
talk with Iran and Iraq about what it 
means, which must have to do with how 
it will be implemented. He works 
within the confines and with the sup- 
port of the resolution. He doesn't have 
the ability — he doesn't want the abil- 
ity — to change the resolution, and none 
of us will change the resolution at all. 

So he is further energized to work 
on the implementation of it but also, as 
the final phrase says, "On further 
steps to ensure compliance with that 
resolution," which has to do, of course, 
with the method that was envisaged 
in 598 that is written in and that has 
to do with the possibility of an arms 
embargo. 

But what we want — what we all 
want, of course — is that the resolution 
would be accepted by both parties, and 
we would then have a cease-fire and the 
subsequent steps that, hopefully, would 
bring about a more stable and peaceful 
situation. 

Q. Earlier this week, you gave 
the impression that you thought the 
chances of Iran accepting this resolu- 



55 



UNITED NATIONS 



tion were rapidly fading if not already 
dead. You seem a little bit more op- 
timistic today. Is that a fair charac- 
terization, or do you still think it's 
very doubtful that Iran will ulti- 
mately accept this? 

A. Opinions among us vary about 
what Iran is likely to do. But I don't 
think you really advance the ball very 
much by arguing that point too long. 
You really settle the argument, so to 
speak, by putting as much energy as 
possible into the Secretary General's 
efforts, on the one hand, and making it 
clear that the resolution, as it was writ- 
ten, is firmly supported by all five 
members, and we all intend to follow 
through on it, if that is necessary. We 
would prefer to have it accepted. So, I 
think just what Iran may be up to here, 
people can argue and have different 
views about. 

But, in the end, the question is, 
with good strong efforts, as there will 
be, I'm sure, by the Secretary General, 
in the context of the resolution, in the 
context of this reaffirmation by the for- 
eign ministers who met, will there be 
acceptance of it, as it may be described 
in implementation by both parties. 
That's what we would like to see. 

Q. Twice the United States has 
set what amounts to a deadline, and 
both of those deadlines have passed, 
and now you're not talking about 
deadlines any longer, and you're 
hardly even talking about a resolu- 
tion for an arms embargo in the Se- 
curity Council. Is that a setback for 
you? Are you disappointed? What hap- 
pened to the deadline? 

A. I'm not aware of any deadline. 

Q. You're not aware of any? 

A. The objective here has been, 
right along, to try to bring about ac- 
ceptance of this resolution. It's a strong 
and powerful resolution, and it has two 
unique qualities to it. One is its very 
strength — it's unprecedented in a mat- 
ter of this kind to have such a power- 
ful resolution — and the other is the 
breadth of its support. 

Our object is to continue that 
strength and continue that breadth of 
support to energize the effort to gain 
acceptance for it but also to have very 
clearly in place the potential steps that 
will be taken if it doesn't get accepted. 
So I think this is really a pretty good 
outcome as I would see it. 

Q. On that point about having in 
place the other measures, to what ex- 
tent in your view is there a firm com- 
mitment on the part of the permanent 



56 



members of the Security Council to 
go to these enforcement measures if 
the Secretary General's efforts to do 
otherwise to get agreement by Iran do 
not bear fruit? 

A. Of course, it's up to each coun- 
try to speak for itself, but all countries 
have said that under — assuming that 
they're satisfied that those conditions 
you specified are true, they're prepared 
to support the additional measures. 
And the question then becomes one of 
being satisfied that all advantage has 
been taken of the potential strength 
and thrust of this resolution to get both 
parties to comply, and that's what's tak- 
ing place. And, as I said earlier, there 
are variations in view about — held by 
the different parties about what Ira- 
nian intentions may be. I am personally 
more skeptical than some of the others. 

On the other hand, I would love to 
be proven wrong and to have Iran ac- 
cept this resolution and bring about a 
cease-fire, and I'm ready to do what I 
can to help bring that about. I do think 
one of the things that will bring that 
about is the clarity that this resolution 
does contain — that there is an end to 
the road if that doesn't happen. 

Q. You said that all countries 
have specified that they're ready to 
move ahead if the conditions obtain. 
We have not heard them specified in 
public. Are you sure in your own 
mind that they have sent that mes- 
sage through in some way? 

A. Yes. I think so. 

Q. In his statement, Mr. Shev- 
ardnadze said that he would be inter- 
ested in — or the Soviets would be 
interested in — some kind of interna- 
tionalization of the peacekeeping 
force in the gulf, a possibility which 
implies at least the possibility of So- 
viet participation in an effort that 
now is pretty much confined to West- 
ern countries. Are you prepared to 
consider that kind of move as a way 
of possibly inducing the Soviets to co- 
operate in supporting your initiative? 

A. This initiative is not our initia- 
tive, it is the initiative of the Security 
Council — 

Q. It's your initiative for enforce- 
ment. 

A. — and all of the permanent 
members, and we all have subscribed to 
Resolution 598. It's a joint effort, and 
we have met individually during the 
course of this week, among other times, 
and then we have met collectively, and 
we have reaffirmed, very strongly, our 
support for this resolution and the 
follow-on ideas that we've been discuss- 



ing here in this press conference. So it 
is not my resolution; it is the resolutioi 
of the Security Council. 

As far as the naval forces in the 
Persian Gulf are concerned, those are 
there as forces designed to prevent 
Iran from intimidation in the gulf and 
from interruption by means of force 
of shipping in the gulf and we have 
undertaken some particular respon- 
sibilities, as have other countries. 

The fact that Iran is actively en- 
gaged in military efforts to disrupt 
shipping is unquestionable. And, while 
nobody doubted it before, the pho- 
tographs of mines on a ship being 
laid — with the mines being laid in inter 
national waters is unequivocal evidence 
of it, even though perhaps you didn't 
need the evidence, but anyway you've 
got it. 

So that's what those ships are 
there for. They're not there as a peace- 
keeping force or to interject themselve 
into the Iran-Iraq war — not at all. The 
are there for a specific, limited pur- 
pose, and I think that our Navy is do- 
ing a great job of it, and it's also very 
welcome as far as we're concerned that 
other countries who have expressed 
their support verbally are also express 
ing it in terms of ships present. In 
other words, they agree and put their 
own ships there. They agree on the im- 
portance of this mission that our Navy 
is undertaking, but it is not a military 
force designed to, in some way, inject 
itself into the Iran-Iraq war. Quite to 
the contrary. 

Q. Would the Soviets be one of 
those countries which are welcome to 
put their ships there? 

A. They have their ships there — 
some. 

Q. From your statement and the 
statement you read, it's not quite 
clear precisely what the Secretary 
General is supposed to do now to see 
that Resolution .598 is implemented 
and precisely what conditions have to 
develop before all five members are 
prepared to go to the next step on 
sanctions. Can vou elaborate on that 
a bit? 

A. I think he has perhaps a little 
better — little tool kit to use as a medi- 
ator, and as one who has occasionally 
plied that trade — I don't want to open 
up his tool kit and display it to you. 
That's for him to use. But, obviously, a 
major element in the picture here is the 
reaffirmed strength of support for 598 
as written. 



Department of State Bulletin 



UNITED NATIONS 



I think one of the things we have 
jiiteen is an effort to change 598, and 
lobody was willing to entertain that 
dea at all, and that is reaffirmed here, 
rery strongly, as a result of a meeting 
)f the five permanent members. So that 
trength of conviction in the light of the 
!vents that have taken place is an 
mportant element for the Secretary 
ieneral, and, as I have said before, the 
'ery clear statement here about further 
iteps to ensure compliance with that 
■esolution is another element in the pic- 
ure that I think should be helpful. 

But there are some things in his 
[it bag having to do with implementa- 
ion that it seems to me he can prop- 
■rly work with, and it may help him 
;et somewhere; it may not. I hope it 
loes, because that would bring us the 
esult we seek. We're not seeking sane- 
ions; we're seeking that this resolution 
le accepted and a cease-fire come 
bout — that's the object — and we are 
alking about means to that end and a 
lossible escalation of means, so to 
peak, and I do think that if it does 
ome to a full-scale arms embargo, that 
hat will be a very — not totally effec- 
ive, but it will be a very important 
lement in the picture; and it's the kind 
>f element that a good mediator can 
loint to effectively. 

Q. You haven't set a deadline, but 
rt's been 2 months since 598 was 
lassed. Would you be happy if it was 
I more months, or are you really talk- 
ing about days, weeks? Can you at 
east give us some vague idea? 

A. I really don't want to. I just am 
,dad to see in this statement the word 
rapid" — 

Q. You said "immediately" in the 
esolution. 

A. — and I think it is best to leave 
t at that, and I'm not in any — I don't 
vant to try to pin it down, and I'm 
lot in any position to pin it down, be- 
ause we didn't try to be highly specific 
ibout it. 

Q. What inducement, then, is 
here for Iran to do anything then? 
They spent 2 months, as you put it 
jefore, waffling. Why not waffle on? 

A. A lot has happened in these 2 
Tionths. This resolution has been put 
)ut. It has been looked at by both 
Darties. There has emerged greater 
strength of conviction as evidenced in 
;he gulf. The clarity in identification of 
Iran as a country that has mined inter- 
lational waters and denied it in the 
face of the evidence helps, I believe, to 
jive strength to this picture. The Iraqis 



November 1987 



have basically accepted this resolution. 
The Iranians haven't, although they 
have said some positive things along 
with all of the other things that they 
have said. 

So it's a question that I think is a 
debatable question whether the wise 
course for the Security Council at this 
point would be to blow the whistle and 
to say, "That's the end of our efforts to 
seek implementation. We're just going 
to go for the sanctions, or whether un- 
der these circumstances and with the 
strength of conviction that's repre- 
sented here, we want to basically focus, 
on the one hand, in the Security Coun- 
cil on examining and getting ready 
what might be needed to implement the 
second resolution while energizing the 
Secretary General to push ahead and 
see if he can't bring about a satisfac- 
tory resolution." 

And, as I said, people's appraisals 
of the situation varied somewhat — not 
too widely — and it was the collective 
judgment of the five foreign ministers 
that we should follow this course, which 
is a strong course, and I think has, 
beyond the words, the important attri- 
bute that all five of us stand behind it. 
It seems to me that that does carry a 
certain amount of weight. 

Q. What positive things has Iran 
said. Have the Iranians actually made 
some concessions in their meetings 
with the Secretary General? 

A. The one thing that they have 
done that is pointed to as significant is 
accept — albeit in an unsatisfactory form 
entirely, but, nevertheless, accept — the 
concept of a cease-fire. Their concept of 
a cease-fire that they put forward is not 
responsive to this resolution, or it isn't 
in line with this resolution, but it is 
something that they haven't been will- 
ing to say before. 

Whether it will be possible for the 
Secretary General as he discusses with 
them further the way in which he 
would see this resolution being imple- 
mented, they will move, in addition, in 
response to the strength of conviction 
represented here, remains to be seen. 
And no doubt if we took bets around 
the room here, you'd need some odds to 
bet that they would, but I— would 
somebody give a million to one? Proba- 
bly not. So there's some chance, and so 
we'll work on that chance — not too 
long — and within this environment. 

And, again I think it is worth noth- 
ing that this course of action and the 
strength that these words contain is an 
outcome of a kind of discussion that in 
many respects has not happened before 



or hasn't happened in a very, very long 
time. So that in itself, I think, carries a 
powerful message. 

NEWS CONFERENCE, 
OCT. 1. 19875 

Q. Assuming that a cease-fire 
can't be negotiated in the Iran-Iraq 
war, do you have the votes in the Se- 
curity Council for an arms embargo? 

A. On that assumption, it's clear 
the answer is yes. 

Q. Do you believe that the se- 
quence of cease-fire and then with- 
drawal can't be changed to cease-fire 
and appointment of the arbitration 
committee? 

A. The resolution is very clear. 
Cease-fire and withdrawal are part of a 
continuous process, and they can't be 
broken apart. The resolution was af- 
firmed very strongly by the five perma- 
nent members of the Security Council 
last Friday. The press statement that 
you were issued is quite explicit on 
that, so that's where that stands. 

Q. How much time do you think 
should be allowed to elapse before the 
arms embargo is instituted? 

A. I'm not in a position to put some 
precise time. The press statement says 
"rapid." We discussed the importance of 
having this done rapidly. We don't want 
to have it drag on, so I'm sure that it 
will happen in an expeditious way. 

There is work going on very 
strongly this week with members of the 
Security Council on developing the in- 
structions for the Secretary General for 
his next round of consultations, and I 
expect that that will be completed, per- 
haps some time next week. And how 
long it will take him to make his rounds 
and be able to come back and make a 
report to the members remains to be 
seen, but it isn't going to drag on, I'm 
sure. 

Q. What about the process of 
drafting an arms embargo resolution? 
Is that something that you have to 
wait to make sure there's no cease- 
fire before that's done or — 

A. Work is simultaneously going 
forward on the question of how you 
bring about compliance if there isn't 
agreement, so that's in motion as well. 

Q. An arms embargo is more and 
more being talked about as a final 
solution, but you have said yourself 
that it [inaudible] not be completely 
effective. Iran would find arms sellers 



57 



UNITED NATIONS 



anywhere in the world. Where would 
the United States go from there, be- 
yond an embargo? What's the next 
step? 

A. I believe the right way to put it 
is that an arms embargo brought about 
by all the members of the Security 
Council — particularly the five perma- 
nent members and the present mem- 
bership — will be a vei\y effective 
instrument. It doesn't have to be per- 
fect to be very effective. It will make it 
hard to buy things. You won't be able 
to buy just the things you want. It will 
mess up the effort to get spare parts. 
It will make things more costly. It will 
have a major impact, and the point is 
that that is so, whether it's perfect or 
not, although it's no doubt part of the 
process of implementation of an em- 
bargo, just as it is part of the process 
of implementation of the resolution it- 
self for the United Nations to be in- 
volved and to follow up. 

Of course, if the Secretary Gen- 
eral's efforts turn out not to bring 
about Iranian agreement to Resolution 
598 and the compliance measures are 
used, then he will continue to try to 
bring about compliance. It won't stop. 

Q. This morning the Iranian rep- 
resentative to the United Nations said 
that they have enough domestic pro- 
duction facilities that they would not 
be affected seriously by an arms em- 
bargo. 

A. That's an interesting statement 
in view of the massive efforts they 
make all over the world to buy things. 

Q. In your speech at lunch today, 
you called it a significant step that 
the Soviets had agreed in principle to 
discuss enforcement measures. Could 
you elaborate on what is your under- 
standing of the Soviet position, and 
what assurances you believe you 
have? 

A. All of us on the Security Council 
agreed when we voted for Resolution 
598 that we expected that it would be 
agreed to, and, if it were not agreed to, 
then as it says in the resolution and as 
it says in the press statement issued 
last Friday, there would be follow-on 
measures. So that is there and that's 
agreed to, and I think there is a defi- 
nite feeling all around that the United 
Nations is on the line here and the Se- 
curity Council is on the line here, and 
there is no intention, I don't think, on 
anybody's part just to allow this to pe- 
ter out and not to be a demonstration 
of strength and willpower on the behalf 
of the international coummunity. 



58 



I have spent 2 weeks here, and I've 
talked to people from all over the 
world. Each annual meeting of the Gen- 
eral Assembly tends to have a kind of 
theme to it, and certainly a major 
theme this year is the Iran-Iraq war. 
And the general view — very strong 
from all over the world — is that this 
war has gone on long enough, too many 
people have been killed and maimed, 
wounded, too many families have been 
badly broken up, too much danger of a 
spread has taken place, and it's time to 
bring it to an end. That is a very wide- 
spread and deep feeling, and, when I 
sit down with my counterparts, it is 
almost unfailingly brought up, and 
that's an expression that people have. 
So I think there is a desire here to 
bring it to an end, and there is a mech- 
anism that's before us and a very great 
willingness to follow through. 

Q. In your speech to the Gulf Co- 
operation Council, you say as early as 
next week our representatives are to 
meet to begin the process of drafting 
an international resolution. Do you 
mean U.S. representatives or Security 
Council representatives? 

A. The Security Council represent- 
atives, and they're working on parallel, 
and what — the way this works is that 
among the five permanent members a 
draft is gotten up. It's circulated among 
the other members, and people all have 
a chance to comment and make their 
input. So it becomes a common prod- 
uct. It isn't somebody's draft that other 
people look at and decide what to do 
with it; it is a draft that's put together, 
in a sense, by a consultative process, 
and that helps to bring about support 
for it, and that process will go on. 

Q. The representatives of the five 
permanent members are meeting next 
week? 

A. That's — yes. They're meeting 
regularly on this. 

Q. Why are you going to the Mid- 
dle East? Do you expect to advance 
any major new proposal? Again, I'll 
quote or paraphrase your words from 
the past, you don't want to go unless 
you can really move the ball along. 
That's George Shultz. Now, why are 
you going? Can you move the ball? 

A. I've been offered honorary de- 
grees [laughter] by the Weizmann In- 
stitute and — well, I'm a man of the 
university [laughter] and I think it's 
very nice. When you are in government 
service, not too many universities in 
the United States offer you honorary 
degrees, so I'll take 'em where I can 
get 'em. [laughter] 



So I feel very good about that, as 
matter of fact. Those are two distin- 
guished places, and one of them, Tel 
Aviv University, is establishing a schc 
arship in the field of economics, namei 
after me. I was interested enough in i 
to contribute to it myself, and I think 
the study of economics and the develo] 
ment of people who are able to admin- 
ister it strongly is very important, so 
I'm in favor of that. And, of course, th 
Weizmann Institute is a place of great 
distinction scientifically and, I think, ; 
you probably know from following my 
writings, speeches, that our world is 
now in the midst of a more profound S' 
of changes due to technology, among 
other things, than in quite a while. So 
want to mark that by these two things 

Beyond that, I expect to meet wit 
Prime Minister Shamir, Foreign Minis 
ter Peres, perhaps others in Israel. I 
have been granted a reception by His 
Majesty King Fahd from Saudi Arabia 
I will visit with President Mubarak in 
Egypt. King Hussein I've talked to on 
the telephone. As it happens, he won't 
be in Jordan at the time that I'm there 
but he will be in London, and so I will 
go to London to see King Hussein. Ar 
what I intend to do is to try to have a 
real visit with people, to talk about th 
problems, to talk about the oppor- 
tunities, to see if there are ways in 
which we can arrange things to take 
advantage of the opportunities, so we 
don't allow problems to explode on us, 
and have that kind of a consultation. S 
that's what I'm going to do. 

Q. Three days is enough to visit- 

A. It's never enough. It's nowhere 
near enough. But it is the time that I 
have. I will altogether be out of Wash- 
ington for a little over a week, and 
that's a long time, considering the trip 
to the Soviet Union as well. 

Q. If the goal of the Security 
Council is to seek some kind of peact 
in the Iran-Iraq war, wouldn't it — 

A. That is the goal of the Security 
Council. 

Q. Then wouldn't it be worth- 
while to extend the time limit on the 
resolution for sanctions and let the 
Secretary General try to negotiate 
more with the Iranians? 

A. He has been negotiating since 
July 20. He'll have a renewed effort, 
and I think if it is allowed to just drag 
on and on forever, as your question sug 
gests. it robs the Security Council of 
the thrust of its effort, and it probably 
undermines the ability of the Secretary 
General to get anywhere. He needs to 



Department of State Bulletii 



!S' 



UNITED NATIONS 



lave, as part of his tool kit in mediat- 

ng, the presence in the situation of 
jtrong measures that may take place if 

here is a recalcitrant party. That helps 
l, n the process, to have a little stroke in 

here. 

Q. During his visit to the gulf, 
secretary [of Defense] Weinberger 
laid several times that he didn't see 
hat there could be an end to the 
ran-Iraq war until there was a new 
government in Iran. Is that your 
'lew? 

A. We are working in the Security 
Council to bring the war to an end, and 
hat's the purpose of 598, and that's the 
purpose of follow-on resolutions, if that 
ihould be necessary, and we're driving 
t to bring it to an end. It's been going 
)n for 8 years; over a million people, it's 
stimated, have been killed; lots more 
lave been wounded, maimed. And, as I 
aid earlier, there is a very widespread 
eeling that it's time to bring it to an 
nd. 

Just whether that can be done, 
vhen it can be done, I'm not in a 
)ositon to say. I don't know. But I do 
;now that there is a much greater 
.ense of "enough is enough" in the 
vorld community. The weight of that, 
ve are trying to bring to bear. 

Q. When the Secretary General 
'irst reported to the Security Council, 
he Iranian position seemed to be 
hat they would do a temporary 
!ease-fire until the process of decid- 
ng who is guilty about the war was 
jnderway. And now the subsequent 
•eport, after the Iranian President 
'isited here, sounds as if the Iranians 
eally would like to have the verdict 
n before they come on. Do you see 
iny possibility that the Iranians are 
joing to come up with any acceptable 
josition on this? I mean, is the Secre- 
ary General really working for any- 
hing or is it all useless? 

A. Opinions vary, as I said last 
iveek, as we discussed it in the Security 

ouncil and as I've had discussions 
ivith individual foreign ministers. Opin- 
ons vary about the likelihood that Iran 
ivill accept the resolution. 

I'm on the skeptical end of the 
pectrum. I'd love to be proven wrong. 
I hope I am proven wrong. But because 
there is at least a possibility, the Secre- 
tary General is going to take another 
effort at it, and we'll see what he's able 
to come back with. 



November 1987 



Q. Why are we so unenthusiastic 
about the Soviet proposal for a peace- 
keeping force — a UN peacekeeping 
force — in the gulf? We say there is no 
such thing as a UN navy, and we talk 
about the technical problems. But as 
soon as you let the UN flag on the 
individual ships of individual coun- 
tries, you've got a UN navy there, and 
that would get the United States uni- 
laterally out of the gulf. 

A. We don't want to get out of the 
gulf We've been there for decades, and 
we have interests there, and we intend 
to stand by those interests and stand 
by our friends. Certainly, one of the 
objectives that some others have is to 
get us out of the gulf and they're not 
going to succeed. 

Now as far as a peacekeeping force 
is concerned, peacekeeping forces are 
good things. We have supported them 
in many situations. They work when 
the parties between whom you are try- 
ing to get peace and keep peace agree 
that a peacekeeping force is a good idea 
and they will abide by it and support it. 
They don't work when that condition 
doesn't obtain. 

As far as the gulf is concerned, 
that condition doesn't obtain. What we 
are trying to do in Resolution 598 is to 
bring about a cease-fire. That is an 
agreement to stop the firing, to with- 
draw to recognized boundaries, to re- 
turn prisoners, and to get on with the 
process of negotiating a peaceful situa- 
tion. 

So you don't really create the con- 
ditions for a peacekeeping force by just 
putting a flag on something. It has to 
go a lot further than that, and that's 
what the resolution is trying to do. 

Q. Two weeks ago you came here 
with what seemed to be an attitude: 
The Iranian President is coming; it's 
a chance for him to say yes or no on 
Resolution 598, and if it's no, that 
we'll go ahead toward sanctions. 

A. I don't know. Are you quoting 
me, or — I came here to the United 
Nations to meet my colleagues, to dis- 
cuss this issue, to do everything that I 
can on behalf of the United States to 
bring an end to this terrible war. 

I came here in July for that pur- 
pose and took part in voting on this 
unusual resolution, and I came here 
during these 2 weeks to talk further 
about it and to try to make it be an 
effective vehicle for bringing the war to 
an end. I find, as I noted, that people's 
opinions varied about how likely it 
would be — if the Secretary General 
made another effort at it — that Iran 
might accept the resolution. 



Under those circumstances, and 
given the desirability — the great desir- 
ability — of having an enforcement mea- 
sure be done on a unanimous basis, 
which will be much more effective, it 
seemed to us quite clear that the best 
course of action was to give the Secre- 
tary General that rein which will not 
take a long time and see if something 
more can be produced. And I think, on 
the whole, the discussions here have 
been very rewarding and very reassur- 
ing about the seriousness of intent and 
the purposefulness that I found among 
the people I talk to. 

Q. Do you think it useful at this 
point that the Secretary General go 
back to Iran and Iraq? 

A. I hope so. As I keep saying, 
opinions vary about the likelihood of a 
productive result. But there is some 
possibility of that and some think that 
it's a pretty good possiblility, so he'll 
give it a try. 

Q. Last week on the MacNeil- 
Lehrer show, I saw Ambassador Wal- 
ters [U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations] observing, if not complain- 
ing, that the slowness of American 
money arriving in the United Nations 
was making it hard for the United 
States to get what it needed here. Do 
you find that in your meetings in the 
last few weeks that there's less coop- 
eration from other countries? 

A. We're getting cooperation from 
other countries. But we, along with 
others, put on a big drive last year to 
get major reform in the UN budgeting 
and decisionmaking process and that 
drive was successful. 

It was in the light of dissatisfaction 
with these procedures that the Con- 
gress and the Administration felt we 
should not be forwarding so much 
money to the United Nations. Now that 
we have got this situation turned 
around and in much better shape, cer- 
tainly the expectation is that the 
United States will fulfill its obligations. 

Q. But will it? 

A. I think it's very important that 
the United States fulilll its obligations. 
And to the extent we don't, it will be a 
great disappointment and, I think, an 
understandable disappointment to peo- 
ple who have worked with us in good 
faith to bring about these reforms. 

I might say, more generally, that 
the cuts the Congress is making in the 
President's budget request to support 
the efforts needed to support the inter- 
ests of the United States around the 
world, those cuts the Congress is mak- 
ing are very harmful to our ability to 



59 



give the kind of representation that's 
needed and to have the kind of funds 
that are needed to support our inter- 
ests adequately. 

So I feel, as I've said on many oc- 
casions that the biggest foreign policy 
problem the United States has is right 
in Washington, D.C., where the funds 
needed to do the job — and they aren't 
huge funds, by standards of the Federal 
budget — are just being cut brutally. 

Q. You have been talking with 
several parties on Central America. 
What is your assessment after your 
talks with the several Latin American 
officials? 

A. I think there is a growing con- 
cern that work that needs to be done, if 
the Guatemala City agreement is to 
turn out successfully — concern that 
that work is not being done, and per- 
haps that will help get it done. 

An example, and a very important 
example, is the lack of any effort to 
negotiate a cease-fire in Nicaragua. It 
is very widely agi-eed that a cease-fire, 
to have a chance of being effective, has 
to be negotiated. The people who have 
to agree to it are the people who are 
firing, so there has to be a negotiation 
involving them. 

In El Salvador, the government — 
President Duarte has been ready to do 
that and perhaps he will succeed in do- 
ing that. 



In Nicaragua, the freedom fighters 
are ready to engage in such a negotia- 
tion. The Nicaraguan communist gov- 
ernment, so far, had not been willing to 
do so, and that's a problem. I think that 
that problem is seen as a very impor- 
tant one by an increasing number of 
people who want to see the Guatemala 
agreement succeed, as I do. 

Q. A couple of minutes ago you 
were talking about cuts in Pakistan 
[inaudible] yesterday. How does the 
Administration plan to restore it? 

A. They are two different ques- 
tions. One has to do with sort of under- 
lying cuts in assistance levels. Our 
assistance to Pakistan, relatively speak- 
ing, has been treated very well in this 
process. Of course, we strongly support 
Pakistan and what Pakistan is doing, 
except there is a deep concern in this 
country about nuclear nonproliferation 
and a concern about possible develop- 
ments in Pakistan. That concern got 
vivid expression in a congressional vote 
last week. I might say that that vote 
expresses something that is quite wide- 
spread in the Congress, in the Admin- 
istration, and in the American public 
broadly. So that's the message. 



'Press release 188 of Sept. 22, 1987. 
^Press release 189 of Sept. 23. 
sPress release 190 of Sept. 25. 
■•Press release 192 of Sept. 30. 
sPress release 197 of Oct. 8. ■ 



TREATIES 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Antarctica treaty. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 
1961. TIAS 4780. 

Accession deposited: Ecuador, Sept. 15, 
1987. 

Recommendations relating to the futheranc 
of the principles and objectives of the Ant- 
arctic treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at Brussels 
Oct. 18, 1985.' 

Notifications of approval: Belgium, July 30, 
1987; U.K., (except for XIII-UO to Xlil-13 
Sept. 11, 1987; U.S., Aug. 27, 1987 

Canals 

Protocol to the treaty concerning the perm 

nent neutrality and operation of the Panam 

Canal (TIAS 10029). Done at Washington 

Sept. 7, 1977. 

Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 15 

1987. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered intc 
force Mar 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 

1969. TIAS 6820. 

Accession deposited: German Dem. Rep. , 
Sept. 9, 1987. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international 
transport of goods under cover of TIR car- 
nets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 1 
1975. Entered into force Mar 20, 1978; for 
the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982. 
Territorial application: Extended to Faroe 
Islands by Denmark, with effect from Apr 
10, 1987 

Hydrography 

Convention of the International Hydograph 
Organization, with annexes. Done at Monac 
May 3, 1967. Entered into force Sept. 22, 

1970. TIAS 6933. 

Accessions deposited: Korea, Dem. People's 
Rep., July 6, 1987; Papua New Guinea, Apr 
24, 1987 ' 

Law 

Statute of The Hague conference on private 
international law. Done at The Hague 
Oct. 9-31, 1951. Entered into force Julv 15, 
1955; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1964. TIAS 5710. 
Acceptance deposited: China, July 3, 1987. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. 

Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into 

force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. Julv 15, 

1987. TIAS 9725. 

Accession deposited: Bahamas, Aug. 31, 

1987 

Pollution 

Convention for the protection of the ozone 
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 
22, 1985.1 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. 



60 



il: Mexico, Sept 14, 1987. 

'rotocol to the convention on long-range 
ransboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 1979 
TIAS 10541) concerning monitoring and 
ivaluation of long-range transmission of air 
)ollutants in Europe (EMEP), with annex. 
)one at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984.' 
Recession deposited: Spain, Aug. 11, 1987. 



latification deposited: Belgium, Aug. 5, 



^7: Luxembourg, Aug. 24, 1987. 

j^isoner Transfer 

Convention on the transfer of sentenced per- 
lons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. En- 
ered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824. 
ilatification deposited: Turkey, Sept. 3, 



987.: 



tubber 

nternational natural rubber agreement, 
987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 20, 
987. Open for signature at New York from 
Hay to Dec. 31, 1987.' 
ignatures: Indonesia, Aug. 21, 1987; Malay- 



TREATIES 



Accession deposited: Australia, Sept. 16, 



987; Guatemala, Sept. 11, 1987. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, Aug. 19, 



ia, June 25, 1987; Morocco, Sept. 14, 1987; 
J.S. Aug. 28, 1987. 

^eals 

convention for the conservation of Antarctic 
.eals, with annex and final act. Done at 
jondon June 1, 1972. Entered into force 
vlar. 11, 1978. TIAS 8826. 
latification deposited: Australia, July 1, 



relecommunications 

nternational telecommunication convention, 
with annexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi 
Vov. 6, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984; 
lefinitively for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986. [Sen- 
ate] Treaty Doc. 99-6. 
Accession deposited: Solomon Islands, July 



27, 1987.2 

Terrorism 

International convention against the taking 
of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 
1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for 
the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. 
Accession deposited: Hungary, Sept. 2, 1987. 



Trade 

Agreement on technical barriers to trade 

(standards code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 

1979; entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 

9616. 

Agreement on implementation of Art. VI of 

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(antidumping code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 

1979; entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 

9650. 

Agreement on import licensing. Done at 

Geneva Apr. 12, 1979; entered into force Jan. 

1, 1980. TIAS 9788. 

Acceptances deposited: Mexico, July 24, 



1987. 

Agreement on implementation of Art. VII of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(customs valuation code). Done at Geneva 
Apr. 12, 1979; entered into force Jan. 1, 1981, 



November 1987 



with Protocol done at Geneva Nov. 1, 1979; 
entered into force Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 10402. 
Acceptance deposited: Mexico, July 24, 
1987. 2-3'' 

Treaties 

Vienna convention on the law of treaties 
between the states and international orga- 
nizations, or between international organiza- 
tions, with annex. Done at Vienna Mar. 21, 
1986.' 

Ratification deposited: Austria, Aug. 26, 
1987 

Industrial Development Organization 

Constitution of the United Nations Indus- 
trial Development Organization, with an- 
nexes. Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered 
into force June 21, 1985. 
Accession deposited: Vanuatu, Aug. 17, 1987. 

Whaling 

International whaling convention and sched- 
ule of whaling regulations. Done at Wash- 
ington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force 
Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849. 
Notification of withdrawal: Mauritius, Aug. 
27, 1987, effective June 30, 1988. 

Wheat 

Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at Lon- 
don Mar. 14, 1986. Entered into force July 1, 
1986.5 [Senate] Ti-eaty Doc. 100-1. 
Accessions deposited: Austria, Sept. 2, 1987; 
Mauritius, Sept. 16, 1987. 
Approval deposited: France, Sept. 21, 1987. 
Ratifications deposited: Spain, Sept. 14, 
1987; Switzerland, Sept. 21, 1987. 
Food aid convention, 1986. Done at London 
Mar. 13, 1986. Entered into force July 1, 
1986.5 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1. 
Approval deposited: France, Sept. 21, 1987. 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Aug. 26, 
1987; Spain, Sept. 14, 1987. 



BILATERAL 

Austria 

Agreement supplementing the agreement 
of Sept. 15, 1976 (TIAS 8863), regarding 
mutual assistance between the customs 
services of the United States and Aus- 
tria. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Vienna Apr. 2, 1986. Enters into force 
Nov. 29, 1987. 

Bahamas 

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat- 
ters. Signed at Nassau June 12 and Aug. 18, 
1987. Enters into force upon the exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 

Bangladesh 

International express mail memorandum of 
understanding, with detailed regulations. 
Signed at Dhaka and Washington Apr. 9 and 
17, 1987. Entered into force June 1, 1987. 

Agreement amending agreement on Feb. 19 
and 24, 1986, relating to trade in certain 
apparel categories. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Aug. 10 and 18, 1987. 
Entered into force Aug. 18, 1987. 



Belgium 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Aug. 14, 1987, on the resolution of practical 
problems with respect to deep seabed min- 
ing areas. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Brussels Aug. 14, 1987. Entered into force 
Aug. 14, 1987. 

Bolivia 

Agreement concerning cooperation to com- 
bat narcotics trafficking, with annexes and 
related letter. Signed at La Paz Feb. 24, 
1987. Entered into force Aug. 13, 1987. 

Canada 

Agreement on the conservation of the Por- 
cupine Caribou Herd, with annex. Signed at 
Ottawa July 17, 1987. Entered into force 
July 17, 1987. 

Agreement amending the treaty concernng 
Pacific salmon of Jan. 28, 1985, as amended. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa 
June 5 and Aug. 5, 1987. Entered into force 
Aug. 5, 1987. 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Aug. 14, 1987, on the resolution of practical 
problems with respect to deep seabed min- 
ing areas. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Ottawa Aug. 14, 1987. Entered into force 
Aug. 14, 1987. 

China 

Agreement amending the agreement of July 
23, 1985, concerning fisheries off the coasts 
of the United States. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington July 24 and Aug. 6, 
1987. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1987. 

Hong Kong 

Agreements amending agreement on Aug. 4, 

1986, relating to trade in textiles and textile 
products. Effected by exchanges of letters 
at Washington Aug. 5 and 12, 1987. Entered 
into force Aug. 12, 1987. 

Hungary 

Agreement extending and amending agree- 
ment of Feb. 15 and 25, 1983 (TIAS 10666), 
as extended and amended, relating to trade 
in wool and manmade textiles and textile 
products. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Budapest July 20 and 29, 1987. Entered into 
force July 29, 1987. 

Jamaica 

Agreement amending agreement on Aug. 
27, 1986, relating to trade in textiles and 
textile products. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Aug. 7, 10, and 18, 

1987. Entered into force Aug. 18, 1987. 

Kenya 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Nairobi June 29, 1987. 
Entered into force June 29, 1987. 

Malaysia 

Agreement amending and extending agree- 
ment on July 1 and 11, 1985, relating to trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Kuala Lumpur Aug. 3, 1987. 
Entered into force Aug. 3, 1987. 



61 



PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Mexico 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations, as amended by declara- 
tion of July 28, 1987. Signed at Mexico Feb. 
13, 1981. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1987. 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 
2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to additional 
cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal 
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Mexico July 14 and 28, 1987. 
Entered into force July 28, 1987. 

Netherlands 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Aug. 14, 1987, on the resolution of practical 
problems with respect to deep seabed min- 
ing areas. Effected by exchange of notes at 
The Hague Aug. 14, 1987. Entered into force 
Aug. 14, 1987. 

Pakistan 

Fifth amendatory agreement to the project 
loan agreement of May 23, 1983 {TIAS 
10724), for rural electrification. Signed at 
Islamabad July 31, 1987. Entered into force 
July 31, 1987. 

Senegal 

Agreement amending the agreement for 
sales of agricultural commodities of June 1, 
1987. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Dakar July 24, 1987. Entered into force 
July 24. 1987. 

Switzerland 

Agreement amending and supplementing 
the interim agreement of Aug. 3, 1945, as 
amended, relating to air transport services 
(TIAS 1576, 1929, 7008), with related ex- 



change of notes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington July 14, 1987. Entered 
into force July 14, 1987, except for para- 
graph 1, which shall be applied provisionally. 

Trinidad & Tobago 

Agreement concerning trade in certain steel 
products, with arrangement and related ex- 
change of letters. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Washington Sept. 1, 1987. Entered 
into force Sept. 1, 1987; effective Oct. 1, 
1984, 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement extending the agreement of Nov. 
26, 1976, as amended and extended, concern- 
ing fisheries off the coasts of the United 
States (TIAS 8528, 10531). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington June 29 and 
July 24, 1987. Enters into force following 
written confirmation of the completion of in- 
ternal procedures of both governments. 
Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Aug. 14, 1987, on the resolution of practical 
problems with respect to deep seabed min- 
ing areas. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Moscow Aug. 14, 1987. Entered into force 
Aug. 14, 1987. 

Agreement on the establishment of nuclear 
risk reduction centers, with protocols. 
Signed at Washington Sept. 15, 1987. En- 
tered into force Sept. 15, 1987. 



'Not in force. 

-With reservation(s). 

^With declaration(s). 

^Acceptances ad referendum. 

»In force provisionally for the U.S. 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 
No. Date Subject 

*180 9/3 Foreign Relations of the 

United States. 1955-1957, 
Vol. Ill, China, microfiche 
supplement, released. 

*181 9/11 Program for the official 
visit of Swedish Prime 
Minister Ingvar Carlsson, 
Sept. 6-13. 

182 9/11 Shultz: statement before the 

Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Sept. 10. 

183 9/13 Shultz: interview on 

CBS-TV's "Face the 
Nation." 

184 9/16 Shultz: news conference, the 

White House, Sept. 15. 

185 9/16 Shultz: remarks before the 

U.S. Advisory Commission 
on Public Diplomacy, Sept. 
15. 



62 



*186 9/18 Shultz: address to State 

Department employees on 
the foreign affairs budget 
crisis. 

187 9/22 Shultz: interview on 

ABC-TV's "This Week 
With David Brinkley," 
Sept. 21. 

188 9/22 Shultz: news conference, 

USUN, Sept. 21. 

189 9/23 Shultz: news conference, 

USUN, Sept. 22 

190 9/25 Shultz, Shevardnadze: re- 

marks. New York City, 
Sept. 24. 
*191 9/29 Melissa F. Wells sworn in 

as Ambassador to Mozam- 
bique, Sept. 18 (biographic 
data). 
192 9/30 Shultz: news conference, 
USUN, Sept. 25. 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available fror 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

America's Vision of the Future, UN Genera 
Assembly, New York City, Sept. 21, 1987 
(Current Policy #1001). 

Secretary Shultz 

Peace, Democracy, and Security in Central 
America, Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee, Sept. 10, 1987 (Current Policy 
#998). 

Public Diplomacy in the Information Age, 
U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Di- 
plomacy, Sept. 15, 1987 (Current Policy 
#1000)." 

Arms Control 

Advancing U.S. -Soviet Relations: The Chal- 
lenge of Arms Control, Ambassador 
Rowny, Rotary Club, Philadelphia, Sept. 
9, 1987 (Current Policy #999). 

Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions 
Sept. 1987 (Special Report #169). 

Economics 

U.S. Export Control (GIST Sept. 1987). 

Europe 

Some Thoughts on the Future of U.S.-Sovit 
Relations, Deputy Secretary Whitehead, 
third annual U.S. -Soviet conference, 
Chautauqua, New York, Aug. 28, 1987 
(Current Policy #996). 

Narcotics 

UN International Drug Conference (GIST, 
Sept. 1987). 

Science & Technology 

U.S. -Soviet Scientific Exchanges, Assistant 
Secretary Negroponte, Subcommittee on 
International Scientific Cooperation, 
House Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology, June 25, 1987 (Current Policy 
#997). 

Antarctic Treaty (GIST, Sept. 1987). 

United Nations 

UN Environment Progj-am (GIST, Sept. 

1987). 
International Maritime Organization (GIST, 

Sept. 1987). ■ 



11(1 



NDEX 



November 1987 
Volume 87, No. 2128 



ftfhanistan. America's Vision of the Fu- 
ture (Reagan) 1 

rms Control 

dvancing U.S. -Soviet Relations: The 
Challenge of Arms Control (Rowny) . 24 
merica's Vision of the Future (Reagan) 
1 



IBFR Talks Convene 43d Session (White 
House statement) 26 

ecretary's Interview on "Face the Nation" 
'. 19 



ecretary's Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 21 

oviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington 
(Reagan, Shevardnadze, Shultz, text of 
agreement, joint statements. White 
House fact sheet) 34 

I.S. Inspects Soviet Military Exercise 
(Department statement, inspection re- 
port) 44 

I.S. Proposes INF Reductions (Reagan) 
25 



!ambodia U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam 
(Lambertson) 32 

ongress 

administration Supports New Zealand 
Preference Elimination Act (Roy) ... 46 

)emocracy in the Philippines (Lam- 
bertson) 27 

Corea: Moving Quickly Toward Democracy 
(Clark) 29 

'roposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1988 
(Moore, Shultz) 47 

I.S. Policy Toward Vietnam (Lambertson) 
32 

J.S. Takes Defensive Action in the Persian 
Gulf (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 
43 

diplomacy. Public Diplomacy in the Infor- 
mation Age (Shultz) 16 

Economics. Managing the Global Economy 
(Reagan) 5 

Europe. MBFR Talks Convene 43d Session 
(White House statement) 26 

luman Rights 

Vmerica's Vision of the Future (Reagan) 
1 

'eace, Democracy, and Security in Central 
America (Shultz) 13 

'roposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1988 
(Moore, Shultz) 47 

■"ublic Diplomacy in the Information Age 
(Shultz) ' 16 

J.S. Policy Toward Vietnam (Lambertson) 
32 

nformation Policy. Public Diplomacy in 
the Information Age (Shultz) 16 

ran 

America's Vision of the Future (Reagan) 
1 

secretary Shultz Attends UN General As- 
sembly (Shevardnadze, Shultz) 52 

J.S. Takes Defensive Action in the Persian 
Gulf (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 
43 



Iraq 

America's Vision of the Future (Reagan) 
1 

Secretary Shultz Attends UN General As- 
sembly (Shevardnadze, Shultz) 52 

Japan. Strategic Technology E.xport Con- 
trols (White House statement) 33 

Korea 

Korea: Moving Quickly Toward Democracy 
(Clark) ■ 29 

Korea-A Profile 31 

Middle East 

Secretary's Interview on "Face the Nation" 
19 

U.S. Orders Closure of Palestine Informa- 
tion Office (Department statement) . . 43 

Military Affairs 

Administration Supports New Zealand 
Preference Elimination Act (Roy) ... 46 

U.S. Inspects Soviet Military Exercise 
(Department statement, inspection re- 
port) 44 

New Zealand. Administration Supports 
New Zealand Preference Elimination Act 
(Roy) 46 

Nicaragua 

America's Vision of the Future (Reagan) 
1 

Central American Peace Plan (Reagan) . 8 

Peace, Democracy, and Security in Central 
America (Shultz) 13 

Norway. Strategic Technology Export Con- 
trols (White House statement) 33 

Philippines 

Democracy in the Philippines (Lam- 
bertson) 27 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 21 

Presidential Documents 

America's Vision of the Future 1 

Central American Peace Plan 8 

Managing the Global Economy 5 

Soviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington 
(Reagan, Shevardnadze, Shultz, text of 
agreement, joint statements, White 
House fact sheet) 34 

U.S. Proposes INF Reductions 25 

U.S. Takes Defensive Action in the Persian 
Gulf (letter to the Congress) 43 

Visit of Swedish Prime Minister (Carlsson, 
Reagan) 40 

Publications. Department of State .... 62 

Refugees. Proposed Refugee Admissions 
for FY 1988 (Moore, Shultz) 47 

South Africa. The Democratic Future of 
South Africa (Shultz) 9 

Sweden 

Sweden — A Profile 41 

Visit of Swedish Prime Minister (Carlsson, 
Reagan) 40 

Terrorism. U.S. Orders Closure of Pal- 
estine Information Office (Department 
statement) 43 



Trade. Strategic Technology Export Con- 
trols (White House statement) 33 

Treaties 

Current Actions 60 

Soviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington 
(Reagan, Shevardnadze, Shultz, text of 
agreement, joint statements. White 
House fact sheet) 34 

U.S. Inspects Soviet Military Exercise 
(Department statement, inspection re- 
port) 44 

U.S.S.R. 

Advancing U.S. -Soviet Relations: The 
Challenge of Arms Control (Rowny) . 24 

America's Vision of the Future (Reagan) 
1 

Public Diplomacy in the Information Age 
(Shultz) 16 

Secretary's Interview on "Face the Nation" 
19 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 21 

Secretary Shultz Attends UN General As- 
sembly (Shevardnadze, Shultz) 52 

Soviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington 
(Reagan, Shevardnadze, Shultz, text of 
agreement, joint statements, White 
House fact sheet) 34 

U.S. Inspects Soviet Military Exercise 
(Department statement, inspection re- 
port) 44 

U.S. Proposes INF Reductions (Reagan) 
25 

United Nations 

America's Vision of the Future (Reagan) 
1 

Managing the Global Economy (Reagan) 
5 

Secretary Shultz Attends UN General As- 
sembly (Shevardnadze, Shultz) 52 

U.S. Takes Defensive Action in the Persian 
Gulf (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 
43 

Vietnam. U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam 
(Lambertson) 32 

Western Hemisphere 

Peace, Democracy, and Security in Central 
America (Shultz) 13 

Secretary's Interview on "Face the Nation" 
19 

Name Index 

Carlsson, Ingvar 40 

Clark, William, Jr 29 

Lambertson, David F 27, 32 

Moore, Jonathan 47 

Reagan, President 1, 5, 8, 25, 

34,40, 43 

Rowny, Edward L 24 

Roy, J. Stapleton 46 

Shevardnadze, Eduard 34, 53 

Shultz, Secretary 9,13, 16, 19, 

21, 34, 47, 52 



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The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 87 / Number 2129 



buUetBn 



December 1987 




Secretary's Trip to the Middle East, 
Europe, and the U.S.S.R. / 15 

South Africa and Anti-Apartheid Act / 32, 35 

U.S. Responds to Iranian Attacks / 74 



Dvpartmvni of Siutp 

buUetin 



Volume 87 / Number 2129 / December 1987 



The DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN, published by the Office of 
Public Communication in the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, is the official record of 
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official U.S. policy statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

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Assistant Editor 



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i CONTENTS 



The President 

1 Central America at a Critical 

Juncture 
4 The Agenda of U.S.-Soviet 

Relations 
7 U.S.-Soviet Union Relations 



The Secretary 



8 Power in the Service of Peace in 

Central America 
12 News Conference of October 15 
15 Trip to the Middle East, Europe, 

and the U.S.S.R. 
27 Interview on "Meet the Press" 
30 Interview on "MacNeil/Lehrer 

Newshour" (E.rcerpt) 

Africa 

32 A Democratic Future: The 

Challenge for South Africans 
(Chester A. Crocker) 

35 Report on Anti-Apartheid Act of 
1986 (President Reagan) 

38 Food Situation in Mozambique 
and Angola (Roy A. Stacy) 

Arms Control 



,40 



INF Negotiations and European 
Security (Paul H. Nitze) 



Department 

43 The U.S. Foreign Service: 
The Years Ahead 
(Ronald I. Spiers) 

East Asia 

46 The Situation in the Philippines 
(Gaston J. Sigur. Jr.) 

47 U.S. -Japan Meet on Export Con- 
trol Issues (Joint Statement) 

49 Human Rights Situation of the 
Tibetan People (J. Stapleton 
Roy) 

51 China: Reform and F\iture Pros- 
pects (J. Stapleton Roy) 



Economics 

54 Third World Dilemma: More 

Debt or More Equity (John C. 
Whitehead) 

57 Debunking the Trade Policy 

Myths (Clayton Yeutter) 

Environment 

60 Montreal Protocol: Controlling 
Subtances That Deplete the 
Ozone Layer (A. James 
Barnes, John D. Negroponte) 

63 State Department Perspectives 
on Environmental Issues 
(John D. Negroponte) 

Europe 

67 America's Challenge to Gor- 
bachev (John C. Whitehead) 

70 General Secretary Gorbachev to 
Visit Washington (Secretary 
Shultz, Joint Statement) 

73 33d Report on Cyprus (Letter to 

the Congress) 

Middle East 

74 U.S. Responds to Iranian At- 

tacks (President Reagan, Cas- 
par W. Weinberger, U.S. Letter 
to the UN Security Council, 
Letter to the Congress) 

75 U.S. Imposes Trade Measures 

Against Iran (President Rea- 
gan, White House Fact Sheet) 

76 U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia 



Nuclear Policy 

77 Nonproliferation as a Fimdamen- 
tal Policy Goal (Richard T. 
Kennedy) 

Pacific 

81 Situation in Fiji (J. Stapleton 

Roy) 

United Nations 

82 United Nations Day, 1987 

(Proclamation) 

Western Hemisphere 

83 Letelier-Moffitt Case (Depart- 

ment Statement) 



Treaties 

84 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

86 Department of State 

Publications 

87 Department of State 

87 Foi-eign Relations Volumes 

Released 
89. Current Economic Developments 

Microfiche Publication 

Released 
89 Background Notes 

Index 



' J L. U 1^ ^' 




Department of State Bullei 



THE PRESIDENT 



Central America 

at a Critical Juncture 



President Reagan's address before 
'he Organization of American States 
VAS) on October'?, 1987.} 

[t's a great honor to have this oppor- 
tunity to address this session of the 
Organization of American States. I con- 
fess to a feeling of great pride at being 
here today. For this is no ordinary dip- 
lomatic event but what must be the 
argest assemblage of ambassadors 
From democratic countries in the his- 
tory of the hemisphere. 

As we gather here today, the hopes 
ind dreams that built this hall and 
'ormed this organization have never 
3een so near fulfillment. The work of 
Dur forefathers, honored in the Hall of 
Heroes, has never been so close to com- 
Dletion. We come together as the repre- 
sentatives not of one country or of a 
;ingle continent but of a hemisphere 
iedicated to the cause of human free- 
lom and democratic government. 

This last decade has witnessed the 
xiumph of freedom in the Americas. 
Fen years ago, the great majority of 
jeople in Latin America lived under op- 
jression. Today 909^ know the freedom 
md dignity of democratic government. 
The story of that democratic transfor- 
nation is one of the proudest chapters 
n human history. 

Many here in this room today have 
Deen a part of it. It's a story of cour- 
ige, statesmanship, and perseverance; 
)f heroism and, yes, sometimes, 
Tiartyrdom. 

• It is the story of men such as 
Victor Pas Estenssoro, fighting ter- 
-orists, drug traffickers, and sheer 
joverty to keep Bolivia free. 

• It is the story of Raul Alfonsin, 
'aising Argentina from defeat and dic- 
atorship to a new democracy. 

• It is the story of Jose Napoleon 
Duarte — detained, tortured, and exiled 
ifter winning El Salvador's presidency 
m 1972. He had the courage to return 
bome, face down his tortures, and 
prevail. 

• It is the story of all the valiant 
statesmen of Central and South America 
who struggle to establish and maintain 
democracy in their countries. 

• It is also the story of common 
people, such as the woman in El Sal- 
vador, wounded by guerrilla fire on the 
way to vote. She stood in line at the 
polls for hours but would not leave to 
have her wounds treated until after she 



had voted. And the grandmother who 
had been warned by the communists 
that if she voted, she would be killed 
when she returned from the polls. "You 
can kill me," was her defiant answer, 
"you can kill my family, kill my neigh- 
bors, but you can't kill us all." 

Well, that's the voice of the Amer- 
icas, the proud voice of the descendants 
of Simon Bolivar who demand freedom 
as their birthright. "The veil has been 
torn asunder," Bolivar once wrote. "We 
have already seen the light, and it is 
not our desire to be thrust back into 
the darkness." 

Yes, the Americas have come far 
into the light of liberty, and we have no 
intention of falling back into the shad- 
ows of oppression and tyranny. But for 
all the heroism and perseverance, our 
journey is not yet complete. Today 
we're called upon to face one of the 
most serious challenges that has ever 
confronted our hem.isphere. It will de- 
mand from all our nations the same 
statesmanship, the same courage, and 
the absolute commitment to freedom 
that have brought us so far. 

I'm talking about the efforts of the 
democratic nations of Central, South, 
and North America to bring Nicaragua 
into the embrace of freedom, to sever 
its ties from an expansionist, colonial 
force, and to secure for the people of 
Nicaragua the fulfillment of the prom- 
ises of democracy and human rights 
that were made to the OAS in 1979. 

We are now at a critical juncture. 
The Guatemala peace accord, a historic 
agreement signed by the five Central 
American presidents on August 7, con- 
tains many of the elements necessary 
to bring both lasting peace and endur- 
ing democracy to the region. The ac- 
cord calls on all parties to end the 
fighting and insist on true democracy 
and human rights in Nicaragua, includ- 
ing freedom of the press; freedom of 
worship; the right of free political 
association; and full, free, and fair 
elections. The accord makes clear: 
democracy is the bottom line. There 
can be no compromise on that point. 

The Need for Commitment 
to Democracy and National 
Reconciliation 

But while there's reason for hope, 
there is also reason for great caution. 
[Costa Rican] President Arias has 



stated that it is only with true democ- 
racy in Nicaragua that peace will sur- 
vive. "If democracy doesn't take hold in 
Nicaragua," he said, "the armed strug- 
gle will continue." And of the San- 
dinistas, he has said, "It is true they 
are Marxists. It is true if they consoli- 
date themselves, they're going to try to 
export the revolution, to undermine 
Costa Rica, to try to create subversion 
in this country." 

Well, we share President Arias' 
hope and aspirations but also his skep- 
ticism of the communist Sandinistas — 
a skepticism born of a long record of 
Sandinista deceit and broken promises. 
I think skeptics may be excused if they 
ask: just where will Daniel Ortega be 
on November 7 — the day the accord 
goes into effect? 

We cannot forget that there al- 
ready exists a negotiated settlement 
with the Sandinistas that predates the 
Guatemala plan — the settlement of 
1979, in which this organization, in an 
unprecedented action, removed recogni- 
tion from a sitting government — the 
government of Anastasio Somoza — and 
helped bring the Sandinistas to power. 
Aspart of that settlement, the San- 
dinistas agreed to implement genuine 
democracy with free elections and full 
civil liberties. Each nation here, as a 
member of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States, is a party to that negotiated 
settlement. 

We know now that the Sandinistas 
never intended to carry out those 
promises. And just a few months later, 
the Sandinistas met in secret and 
drafted what has come to be known as 
"the 72-hour document," in which they 
spelled out their plans for building an- 
other Cuba in Nicaragua. And even as 
the United States was sending the new 
Nicaraguan Government millions of dol- 
lars in aid, more aid than any other 
nation, the Sandinistas were busy 
smuggling arms to the communist 
guerrillas in El Salvador. 

But although the Sandinistas have 
reneged on their commitment to that 
negotiated settlement, this organization 
must not. Those promises of democracy 
and peace were promises we made 
as well — promises to the people of 
Nicai-agua that their hopes for freedom 
would not be disappointed. We gave our 
word of honor, and we can't walk away 
from it. Those promises still form the 
absolute base of any negotiated settle- 
ment with the Sandinista communists. 



THE PRESIDENT 



F\ill, free, and fair elections and the 
open society that alone can make them 
possible, including full human rights 
and expulsion of all Soviet and Cuban 
forces — these must be the bedrock con- 
ditions upon which any further agree- 
ment with the Sandinistas is built. 

This is why, as we press on toward 
negotiations, we must remain steadfast 
in our commitment to bring true de- 
mocracy to Nicaragua and clear eyed 
and realistic about who and what the 
Sandinistas are. In response to the 
Guatemala accord, the Sandinistas have 
taken a few initial steps toward com- 
pliance, but these welcome steps are 
only a beginning. La Prensa and Radio 
Catolica have been allowed to reopen, 
but the other independent papers re- 
main closed. The dozen other radio sta- 
tions are still not allowed to broadcast. 

Recently, the Social Christian 
Party held its 30th anniversary cele- 
bration in Managua. In a demonstration 
of the internal opposition to the 
Sandinistas, some 4,000 people attended 
the rally. The Sandinistas allowed the 
rally to take place but immediately de- 
tained 18 of the Social Christian Party 
members on trumped-up charges. The 
former President of Venezuela, Luis 
Herrera Campins, who was there as a 
special guest, called the arrests a 
"blatant act of political harassment." 

The Sandinistas must learn that 
democracy doesn't mean allowing a 
rally to take place and then arresting 
those who take part; it means hundreds 
of such rallies, free from harassment, 
either by the secret police or by what 
the Sandinistas call the "divine mobs." 
Democracy doesn't mean opening one 
newspaper and one radio station but 
opening them all. Democracy doesn't 
mean releasing a few political prisoners 
but all 10,000 of them, some of whom 
have been imprisoned for as long as 8 
years. Democracy doesn't mean selec- 
tively granting temporary freedoms in 
order to placate world opinion but per- 
manent, across-the-board human 
rights, guaranteed by a constitution 
and protected by the checks and bal- 
ances of democratic government. 

Ultimately — and this is the most 
important lesson of all— democracy 
means returning power to the hands 
of the people. The Sandinistas have to 
understand that they do not have the 
option of being dictators. Their only 
option is to lead a political party and 
serve for limited terms of office if 
chosen by the people in free and fair 
elections. 



What happens in this next month 
will be crucial, and it will be the re- 
sponsibility of all of us in the OAS to 
insist that the Sandinistas give peace a 
chance by truly opening up their soci- 
ety. More than anyone, the members of 
the OAS have a particular responsibil- 
ity to take the lead in verification of the 
Guatemala agreements. We cannot be 
satisfied with facades of freedom erec- 
ted to fool international opinion and 
then quickly dismantled when the pres- 
sure is off. We must insist on real de- 
mocracy in Nicaragua — not for a week, 
not for a month or a year, but for 
always. 

All we're asking for is true democ- 
racy. Anyone who demands anything 
less is not serving the cause of peace in 
Nicaragua. And let me just say, there 
are no new demands here. It is all 
spelled out in the Guatemala accord and 
the Wright-Reagan peace plan. 

Tell me: how can you have democ- 
racy when thousands are arrested for 
political reasons? How can you have a 
democracy when individuals who dis- 
please the Sandinistas are punished by 
withholding the ration cards that allow 
them to buy food and other necessities? 
How can you have democracy with a 
secret police force, commanded by dedi- 
cated Leninists, that keeps tabs on 
every citizen through the so-called 
block committees? How can you have 
democracy when the entire society is 
being miUtarized with the military un- 
der the control of one political party 
and its Cuban and Soviet "advisers"? 

Democracy is made up of specifics — 
day-to-day freedoms — ^just as tyranny is 
made up of day-to-day oppressions. Is 
it sincere to talk about democracy but 
ignore the specific markers by which 
we can tell if democracy truly exists? 
I don't think so. And that's why the 
march toward peace in Central America 
must be a march — step-by-step, per- 
haps, but still relentless — toward demo- 
cratic freedom. 

Along with democratic reforms, 
the Guatemala accord calls for national 
reconciliation in Nicaragua, through a 
negotiated cease-fire and a full am- 
nesty. Just this week. President Duarte 
has called for a spirit of national recon- 
ciliation in his country, urging all Sal- 
vadorans to, in his words, "Forgive all 
those acts that have touched our hearts 
with pain." Despite the violence done 
to him and his family by the guerrillas, 
he has begun negotiations with them. 
President Cerezo of Guatemala, too, 
has responded to the call for reconcil- 
iation, and his government will soon 
be meeting with the guerrillas there. 



They've done so because they want the 
Guatemala accord to work. If the San- 
dinistas truly want the accord to work, 
isn't it time they sat down and negoti- 
ated with the Nicaraguan freedom 
fighters? 

I'd like to take a moment now to 
address myself to the ladies and gen- 
tlemen of the press. As the process of 
national reconciliation moves forward, 
your profession bears a special respon- 
sibility to see that the terms of the 
peace process are fully carried out and 
democracy finds a permanent home in 
Nicaragua. Sometimes in the past, the 
media have been criticized for having a 
double standard. 

As the story unfolds in Nicaragua, 
there can be no double standard, only 
one single and absolute standard — 
democracy. You must keep watch on the 
progress of democracy in Nicaragua — 
train all your investigatory abilities, all 
your skepticism on the Sandinista gov- 
ernment. Demand full disclosure. See 
that they live up to their promises. Thi; 
could be one of journahsm's finest hour; 
when, with the truth, you helped set a 
people free. 

Security Concerns 

As I said, the Guatemala accord is a 
positive movement in the continuing 
effort, begun with the OAS-negotiated 
settlement in 1979, to bring democracy 
and peace to Nicaragua. But although 
the accord is a step in the right direc- 
tion, it does not address U.S. security 
concerns in the region — the growing 
Soviet-Cuban presence that seeks to 
establish a Soviet beachhead on the 
American mainland and the rapid and 
destabilizing growth of the Sandinista 
armed forces that threatens Nicaragua's 
democratic neighbors. 

However, these security concerns 
are addressed in the Wright-Reagan 
peace plan. The first paragraphs of 
that plan state in no uncertain terms, 
"that there be no Soviet, Cuban, or 
communist-bloc bases in Nicaragua," 
and "that Nicaragua pose no threat to 
its neighbor countries, nor provide a 
staging ground for subversion in this 
hemisphere." 

In other words, the Soviet-bloc 
Cuban forces must leave. We will 
not tolerate communist colonialism on 
the American mainland. Freedom in 
Nicaragua, liberation from all tyrants, 
domestic and foreign — that is the com- 
mitment of the United States, a bipar- 
tisan consensus on the conditions that 
will satisfy U.S. security interests. 



THE PRESIDENT 




President Reagan and Secretary Shultz attend the OAS meeting with Frank Carlucci, national security 
adviser; Marlin Fitzwater, principal deputy press secretary to the President; Elliott Abrams, Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs; and Morris Busby senior Deputy Assistant Secretary in the 
background. 



And let me add, those security in- 
lerests are shared by every democratic 
lation in the hemisphere. From the 
irst Congress of American States, con- 
ened by Simon Bolivar; and the Treaty 
if Perpetual Union, League and Con- 
ederation, the peoples of the American 
lemisphere have insisted on the sov- 
reignty and independence of member 
tates against foreign imperialism. 
May there are only two colonial dic- 
atorships in the Americas. Of one, 
ohn Kennedy said over 20 years ago. 
Forces beyond the hemisphere have 
nade Cuba a victim of foreign imperi- 
lism, an instrument of the policy of 
thers, a weapon in an effort dictated 
)y e.xternal powers to subvert the other 
American republics." Today these same 
brces gi'ip Nicaragua, but there is an 
mticolonial struggle that has arisen 
ind that can throw off the imperialist 
wke. 

lole of the Nicaraguan 
reedom Fighters 

The fact is that there is only one reason 
vhy the communist subversion of the 
entral American democracies has 
)een, for the moment, blocked. There 
s only one reason why the democratic 
)rocess envisioned in the Guatemala 
)lan still has a hope for success, and 
,hat is the brave Nicaraguan freedom 



fighters who are battling and dying 
to bring freedom and justice to their 
homeland. 

Most are young men, barely in 
their 20s — only children when the 
Somoza regime was toppled. They have 
heard of the promises of 1979 — of free- 
dom, human rights — but they've known 
only tyranny, the steadily growing 
stranglehold of the new dictators on 
their society. They have seen their 
freedoms choked off one by one, their 
farms confiscated, their priests har- 
assed. They have seen arbitrary ar- 
rests, beatings, and official murder 
become the order of the day. They've 
seen other young Nicaraguans drafted 
to serve under Soviet and Cuban so- 
called advisers, pawns in their war 
to impose a foreign tyranny on the 
American mainland. 

Yes, these Nicaraguans have 
known only tyranny. They have seen one 
dictator fall only to be replaced by 
nine comandantes who are far worse; 
and they have rebelled. Their hearts 
demand freedom. In spirit of the 
American freedom fighters of earlier 
centuries, they are fighting for liberty; 
they're fighting for independence. 

There are now well over 15,000 Nic- 
araguan freedom fighters — three times 
the number that overthrew Somoza — 
operating throughout the entire length 
of Nicaragua. They would not have sur- 
vived without the friendship and help 



of the Nicaraguan people. For 7 years 
now, the freedom fighters have pre- 
vented the consolidation of totalitarian 
power in Nicaragua. For now, the bil- 
lions of dollars in Soviet-bloc military 
aid pouring into Managua have been 
aimed primarily at defeating the free- 
dom fighters so that later they may 
attack the surrounding democracies. 

All of us in public life should re- 
member it is the freedom fighters — 
most of them poor farmers fighting 
against overwhelming odds in the jun- 
gles of Nicaragua — it is their blood and 
courage that have stemmed the tide of 
communist e.xpansion in Central Amer- 
ica. Without the freedom fighters, the 
Sandinistas never would have signed 
the Guatemala accord, and there would 
be no pressure on the Sandinistas to 
reform. 

Their totalitarian grip on Nic- 
aragua would only grow tighter, and, 
with all dissent quashed at home, the 
Sandinistas would soon turn their at- 
tention to their neighbors. The huge 
Sandinista military machine, equipped 
and staffed by Cubans and Soviet-bloc 
advisers, would spread its shadow 
across all of Central America. Their 
proven subversion of the surrounding 
democracies, only temporarily slowed, 
would continue apace. In fact, even 
now, in the middle of the peace process, 
with all world opinion focused on the 



THE PRESIDENT 



Sandinistas, they still continue to sup- 
ply weapons to the communist guer- 
rillas in El Salvador. 

We will not just shrug our shoul- 
ders and watch tens of thousands of 
brave men and their families turned 
into refugees. No, we want to see that 
nation reconciled. We want to see the 
freedom fighters able to go home to 
live in peace and freedom in Nicaragua. 
The Congress of the United States has 
made a moral commitment to these 
men. It cannot just walk away. I've 
made a personal commitment to them, 
and I will not walk away. They are 
fighting in the jungles of Nicaragua 
not only for their own freedom but for 
your freedom and mine. And I make a 
"solemn vow: as long as there is breath 
in this body, I will speak and work, 
strive and struggle for the cause of the 
Nicaraguan freedom fighters. 

But continuing aid to the demo- 
cratic resistance is not only a moral ob- 
ligation—it is the essential guarantee 
that the Sandinistas will live up to the 
democratic conditions of the Guatemala 
accord and that the democratic coun- 
tries of the Americas will be safe from 
Sandinista subversion. We must ask: 
would the Sandinistas have signed the 
accord if it weren't for the freedom 
fighters? If the U.S. Congress had 
voted against aid to the freedom fight- 
ers last year, would we be talking about 
democratic reforms in Nicaragua today? 
The answer is clearly, no. 

For these reasons, I will request 
and fight for a $270-million package of 
renewed military and humanitarian as- 
sistance for the freedom fighters that 
will be spread over an 18-month period. 
The renewed assistance will continue 
until the Sandinistas, negotiating with 
the freedom fighters, conclude an 
agreement for a cease-fire and full de- 
mocracy is established in Nicaragua. 
Once a cease-fire is fully in effect, only 
that support necessary to maintain the 
freedom fighters as a viable force will 
be delivered. Then we — and they — will 
be watching to see how genuine the 
democratic reforms in Nicaragua are. 

The best indicator will be when the 
freedom fighters are allowed to contest 
power politically without retribution, 
rather than through force of arms. As 
that happens, our support levels to the 
resistance forces will decrease propor- 
tionately. And the assistance money 
will then be redirected to strengthening 
the democratic process underway in 
Nicaragua. 



Liberty for One and All 

In the next crucial months, the free 
nations of the Americas will have to be 
ever vigilant. We'll have to be steadfast 
in our insistence that democracy is the 
only guarantee of peace. But the Amer- 
icas would not have come this far with- 
out the courage, perseverance, and 
commitment to freedom that I spoke of 
earlier. I have no doubt that freedom 
will prevail. Jose Marti, the great 
Cuban apostle of freedom, once said, 
"There are two sides in this world: 
on one side are those who hate liberty 
because they want it solely for them- 
selves; on the other are those who 
love liberty for one and all." 

Liberty for one and all — that 
might be the motto of this organization. 
During the laying of the cornerstone of 
this building, the Brazilian statesman, 
Joaquim Nabuco, talked of the special 
destiny of the American hemisphere 



and the unique purpose of the OAS: "It 
seems evident that a decree of provi- 
dence made the western shore of the 
Atlantic appear late in history as the 
chosen land for a great renewal of man- 
kind." That is the solemn trust of this 
organization — to keep watch over this 
chosen land, to keep it secure from 
alien powers and colonial despotisms, 
so that man may renew himself here in 
freedom. 

That is why, in 1979, this organ- 
ization, and many of the American 
states individually, reached out to the 
Nicaraguan people and pledged to them 
true freedom and full human rights. 
Now we must simply hold to that prom- 
ise, just as we hold to our love of lib- 
erty—not for the few but, as Jose Marti 
said, liberty, for one and for all. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 12, 1987. 



The Agenda of U.S.-Soviet Relations 



President Reagan's address before 
the Corps of Cadets at the U.S. Mili- 
tary Academy at West Point, New 
York, on October 28, 1987.'- 

In 1778, George Washington erected a 
fort high upon a granite point overlook- 
ing the Hudson to guard the region of 
New York in the event of a British at- 
tack. And now, for more than 180 years, 
the U.S. Military Academy here at 
West Point has, in effect, extended and 
carried on that first mission. For here 
we train the men and women whose 
duty it is to defend the Republic— the 
men and women whose profession is 
watchfulness; whose skill is vigilance; 
whose calling is to guard the peace but, 
if need be, to fight and to win. 

More than 180 years; West Point in 
this time has established and added 
luster to a proud story — a story of 
courage and heroism, of sacrifice, and, 
yes, very often the ultimate sacrifice. It 
is the story of men like Ulysses Grant, 
the son of a humble tanner in Ohio, 
who went on from West Point to save 
the American Union. It is the story of 
Dwight David Eisenhower, a Kansas 
farm boy who learned the skills at West 
Point that enabled him to command the 
mightiest invasion force in history; and 
of Douglas MacArthur, an acknowl- 
edged genius in war, who showed him- 
self during the occupation of Japan to 
be a genius in peace as well. 



And, if I may, it is the story of 
men like Gen. Fred Gorden. The only 
black cadet in his class, today General 
Gorden has come back to West Point as 
commandant — setting an example for 
you, and, indeed, for all young Ameri- 
cans, of what hard work and devotion 
to duty can achieve. 

These last two names I men- 
tioned — General Gorden and General 
MacArthur— call to mind a special mo- 
ment in the history of this academy. 
For it was 25 years ago that General of 
the Army Douglas MacArthur stood in 
this spot and addressed the cadets of 
West Point. And General Gorden— at 
the time. Cadet Gorden— was sitting 
where you are today. It was a moment 
Cadet Gorden would never forget. Just 
days from graduation, he looked around 
this mess hall and saw war-hardened 
officers moved to tears by the power of 
MacArthur's words. 

The long gray line has never failed us. 
Were you to do so, a million ghosts . . . 
would rise from their white crosses, thun- 
dering those magic words; Duty, honor, 
country. 

Then MacArthur added: 

This does not mean that you are war- 
mongers. On the contrary, the soldier 
above all other people prays for peace, for 
he must suffer and bear the deepest 
wounds and scars of war. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



It is because you, above all other 
people, pray for peace — but must bear 
the burden, should that peace fail — that 
I have come here today. For I want to 
speak about relations between the 
American Republic and democracy's 
main competitor, the Soviet Union — re- 
lations that are likely to shape the 
whole course of your careers as profes- 
sional soldiers. I want, in particular, to 
discuss our present efforts for arms re- 
duction — efforts that may soon be 
yielding historic results. But first, 
some essential background. 

Background 

From the beginning, our Administra- 
ion has insisted that this country base 
ts relations with the Soviet Union 

apon realism, not illusion. This may 

Eound obvious. But when we took 
ffice, the historical record needed 
■estatement. So restate it we did. 

We told the truth about the mas- 
sive Soviet buildup. We told the truth 
^bout Afghanistan and Poland. We told 
the truth about economic growth and 
tandards of living — .that it is not the 
democracies that have backward econo- 
Tiies, that it is not the Western world 
n which life expectancy is actually on 
he decline. We told the truth about the 
Tioral distinction between their system 
md ours. 

When our Administration took of- 
Ice, we found America's military forces 
in a state of disrepair Today the situa- 
ion is very different. Pay and training 
'or our Armed Forces are up. The Navy 
las been e.xpanded. Weapons systems 
)f all kinds have been modernized, 
■naking full use of the technological 
evolution — as a result of our efforts, 
rou in the Army will see the fielding of 
Tiore than 400 new systems. And we 
lave begun work upon a dramatic new 
ieparture, both in military strategy 
md technology — our Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), which offers the hope 
rf rendering ballistic missiles obsolete 
ind of ensuring deterrence by protect- 
ng lives, not threatening them. In 
Drief: we have replaced weakness with 
strength. 

Four-Part Agenda 

To turn now from background to spe- 
:ific substance: the agenda of our rela- 
;ions with the Soviet Union has focused 
ipon four critical areas: 

First, human rights, because free- 
dom is what we stand for as Americans; 



Second, negotiated settlements to 
regional conflicts; 

Third, e.xpanded exchanges be- 
tween our peoples; and 

Fourth, arms reduction. 

In some areas of this four-part 
agenda, we have seen progress. Cul- 
tural, scientific, and other bilateral 
exchanges have shown a dramatic 
increase since my 1985 meeting with 
Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva. In human 
rights, too, we have seen some positive 
developments. Some pohtical prisoners 
have been released. Emigration figures 
are up somewhat. And, of course, there 
is talk of reform in the Soviet Union — 
of some liberalizing changes in Soviet 
laws and of economic reforms that 
could give greater scope to individual 
initiative. 

We harbor no illusions: while 
changes have taken place in the Soviet 
system, the one-party system un- 
checked by democratic institutions re- 
mains unchanged. Yet we welcome such 
changes as have taken place. And we 
call upon them to make still more. 

It is in regional conflicts where So- 
viet performance has been most dis- 
turbing. Anyone searching for evidence 
that the Soviets remain expansionist — 
indeed, imperialist — need look no far- 
ther than Nicaragua or Afghanistan. 

Our policy in these regional con- 
flicts is straightforward. We will con- 
tinue to engage the Soviets in seeking 
to find political solutions to regional 
conflicts — solutions that eliminate 
foreign troops and return the fate 
of nations to their own people. In 
Nicaragua, we support the peace plan 
agreed upon by the Central American 
presidents last August — insisting upon 
the establishment of full and genuine 
democracy in Nicaragua. Moreover, So- 
viet-bloc and Cuban forces must leave 
that nation; this is essential to protect 
our own security. 

As for the democratic resistance in 
Nicaragua: year upon year, for 7 years 
now, they have fought and sacrificed 
and endured. It is the resistance — the 
brave members of the resistance, many 
of them no more than teenagers — who 
have kept the communist Sandinistas 
from consolidating their power and 
forced them into the current peace 
plan. It is the resistance, in short, that 
has given Nicaragua at least a chance 
for true freedom. 

My friends, I know you agree: we 
must not abandon these courageous 
men and women, these soldiers. So let 
me promise: Nicaragua will have its 



freedom. And we will help the re- 
sistance carry on its brave fight until 
freedom is secure. 

Arms Control Retrospective 

This brings me to the final area on our 
agenda for U.S. -Soviet relations, arms 
reductions. For here our reahsm and 
commitment are close to producing his- 
toric results. 

It was in 1977 that the Soviet 
Union first deployed the SS-20. The 
SS-20 was a qualitatively new and un- 
provoked threat against our friends and 
allies, a triple-warhead nuclear missile 
capable of striking anywhere in West- 
ern Europe and much of Asia mere 
minutes after being launched. You must 
remember that NATO had no compara- 
ble weapon in its arsenal with which to 
counter this new force. 

By 1979, the Soviets had deployed 
some 130 INF [intermediate-range nu- 
clear forces] missiles with 390 war- 
heads. General Secretary Brezhnev 
declared that "a balance now exists." In 
March 1982, they declared a "morato- 
rium" on the deployment of new INF 
missiles in Europe. But this was only a 
cover, and by August 1982, the number 
of Soviet INF missiles had climbed to 
over 300, with more than 900 warheads. 

How did the West respond? In 
1977, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of 
West Germany led the call for the de- 
ployment of NATO's own INF missiles 
to counter this new Soviet threat. And 
in December 1979, NATO made a "two- 
track" decision. 

First, the United States would ne- 
gotiate with the Soviets, attempting to 
persuade them to withdraw the SS-20s. 

Second, as long as the Soviets re- 
fused to do so, the United States 
would, indeed, deploy a limited number 
of its own INF missiles — Pershing II 
and ground-launched cruise missile? — in 
Europe. 

It is important to stress that the 
aim of this decision was not, in itself, 
the deployment of American missiles. 
That was only to be the means to an 
end. In the worlds of Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, President of France at 
the time of the 1979 NATO decision, 
". . . the deployment of Pershing lis 
in Europe . . . was a tactical exercise, 
whose preferred goal was to compel the 
Soviet Union to eliminate the SS-20s." 

No doubt the Soviets wanted to 
test NATO resolve. And, indeed, the 
deployment of our INF missiles had 
to be carried out in the face of sharp 
political protests and even mass 
demonstrations. 



December 1987 



THE PRESIDENT 



I remember speaking in Bonn in 
1982. Thousands of demonstrators 
chanted and marched. And I couldn't 
help thinking: what irony. For it was to 
secure the peace they sought and the 
freedom they were exercising that we 
were deploying the missiles they 
protested. 

Yet NATO held firm. And, yes, it 
was when we showed strength that, if 
need be, we would ensure the cred- 
ibihty of our deterrent posture by 
meeting force with force, that the Sovi- 
ets — after first walking out of the nego- 
tiations — eventually returned and 
began to talk seriously about the pos- 
sibihty of withdrawing their own INF 
missiles. 



Progress Toward 
Arms Reductions 

I am pleased to say that the agreement 
we are nearing is based upon the pro- 
posal that the United States, in con- 
sultation with our allies, first put 
foward in 1981 — the zero option. The 
zero option calls, very simply, for the 
elimination of this entire class of U.S. 
and Soviet INF missiles. 

According to this agreement, the 
Soviets will be required to remove four 
times as many nuclear warheads as will 
the United States. Moreover, the Sovi- 
ets will be required to destroy not only 
their entire force of SS-20s and SS^s 
but also their shorter range ballistic 
missiles, the SS-12s and SS-23s. 
As I said, all these missiles will be 
eliminated. 

How will we know that the Soviets 
have actually destroyed their missiles? 
As you know, the Soviets have an ex- 
tensive record of violating past arms 
control agreements. So, frankly, we're 
not going to take their word for it. 

Any treaty I agree to must provide 
for effective verification, including on- 
site inspection of facilities before and 
during reductions and short-notice in- 
spections afterwards. All in all, the ver- 
ification regime we have put forward is 
the most stringent in the history of 
arms control negotiations. I will not 
settle for anything less. 

At the same time that we have 
been moving forward on INF missiles, 
we have attached the highest priority 
to achieving deep reductions in U.S. 
and Soviet strategic arms. Even Mr. 
Gorbachev has described strategic 
weapons as the "root problem" in arms 
control, and we agi-ee. To that end, we 
have expedited the strategic arms nego- 
tiations in Geneva. Much progress has 



been made in reaching accord on our 
proposal of cutting strategic arsenals in 
half. The Soviets must, however, stop 
holding strategic offensive reductions 
hostage to measures that would cripple 
our SDI — particularly since the Soviets 
are already spending billions on a stra- 
tegic defense program of their own. 

And this brings me to what hap- 
pened last week in Moscow. As Secre- 
tary Shultz has reported, he had lively, 
sometimes heated discussions with For- 
eign Minister Shevardnadze and Gen- 
eral Secretary Gorbachev. That was no 
surprise. The whole range of issues on 
our agenda was covered. There was 
important positive movement toward an 
INF agreement, and there was prog- 
ress in other areas as well, not only in 
arms reduction. As I announced earlier 
today, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 
will come to Washington Friday to 
meet with me and Secretary Shultz to 
continue these discussions. 

Let me repeat what I have said 
before. Summits can be useful for lead- 
ers and for nations — occasions for frank 
talk and a bridge to better relations. It 
would be good for Mr. Gorbachev to see 
this country for himself I am ready to 
continue and intensify our negotiations, 
but a summit is not a precondition for 
progress on the agenda at hand. When 
the General Secretary is ready to visit 
the United States, I and the American 
people will welcome him. 

Let us remember that we've 
reached this point only as a solid al- 
liance — an alliance made up of NATO, 
Congress, and the American people. If 
we are to continue to see real results 
and to convince the Soviets to bargain 
seriously, this cohesion must continue. 

Now, some have argued that when 
the INF missiles have been removed, 
our commitment to Eui'ope will have 
been weakened. Yet, this is simply 
untrue. 

We maintain our firm commitment 
to the NATO strategy of fiexible re- 
sponse, ensuring that the alliance is ca- 
pable of blocking aggression at any 
level. In Europe itself, we will retain a 
large force of nuclear weapons of many 
types — including ground-based sys- 
tems — and aircraft and submarines ca- 
pable of delivering nuclear weapons. 
And in consultation with our NATO al- 
lies, we have agreed that further nu- 
clear reductions can take place only in 
the context of a substantial improve- 
ment in the balance of chemical and 
conventional forces. 

During the years of these negotia- 
tions, new realities have come into 



play — new realities that present new- 
opportunities. In particular, in recent 
years we have seen the emergence 
among some of our European allies of a 
willingness, even an eagerness, to seek 
a larger, more closely coordinated role 
for Western Europe in providing its 
own defense. We Americans welcome 
this. 

For these four decades, NATO has, 
in effect, represented an alliance be- 
tween a number of partners and one 
very senior partner. Yet today our Eu- 
ropean allies have risen from the ruins 
of war to vitality, prosperity, and grow- 
ing unity as a continent. And so I 
would submit that now the alliance 
should become more and more among 
equals, indeed, an alliance between con- 
tinents. In the words of former Secre- 
tary of State Henry Kissinger, the time 
has come for our country, "to . . . wel- 
come a European identity in defense, 
which in the end is bound to spur At- 
lantic cooperation." 

Guarding the Future 

This, then, is the accounting that I 
have come here to give you. For I be- 
lieve that, from time to time, we who 
are your civilian leaders owe that — an 
accounting — to you who bear the bur- 
den of our decisions. 

But I have come not only to inform 
you. I have come to enlist your help. 

If we do reach an INF agi'eement 
with the Soviets, when its provisions 
have been fulfilled and the INF missiles 
destroyed, you will be assuming your 
posts as platoon leaders and troop com- 
manders — and even then, when I and 
the members of my Administration will 
already have been some years out of 
office, your careers will only be 
beginning. 

So I ask you to guard the future of 
the Republic. Use the courage and 
steadiness that this academy is teach- 
ing you in dealing with our adversaries. 
Employ all your skill as soldiers and 
good will as Americans in preserving 
and strengthening the emerging rela- 
tionship with our friends and allies. 
And always — always remain true to the 
values for which this academy and our 
country stand: duty, honor, country. 

As Commander in Chief these 7 
years, I have been struck again and 
again by the professionalism of our mih- 
tary officers and by the dedication of 
the soldiers I have met in the field. But 
one who impressed me most deeply is a 
member of the U.S. Armv I never met. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



His name was Sean Luketina, and 
he was 23 years old. He did not have 
the privilege of attending this academy. 
He was a sergeant, a soldier like those 
you will command. 

In this month of October, 4 years 
ago, Sean Luketina fought in the inva- 
sion of Grenada. He was wounded — 
badly wounded. He was evacuated to a 
hospital in Puerto Rico, where his fa- 
ther, a retired Army officer, joined him. 
He slipped in and out of a coma. Dur- 
ing a moment when he was concious, 
his father asked him: "Sean, was it 
worth it?" 

"Yes, Dad," he answered. 

Then his father asked: "Son, would 
V^ou do it again?" 

Sergeant Luketina looked into his 
'ather's eyes and said simply this: "Hell 
/es. Dad." Duty. Honor. Country. 

Sergeant Luketina died for the 
ause that the Army of this Republic 
las always served, from the hunger and 
oloody snow of Valley Forge to the 



heavy demands of vigilance upon the 
borders of Germany and Korea. It is 
the cause of life as God meant life to be 
lived. It is the cause of human freedom. 

And so the proud words sound 
again today as they did 25 years ago, 
as they will at this academy 25 years 
hence and 25 years after that. Duty. 
Honor. Country. 

Permit me to say as well that I feel 
something today of what General Mac- 
Arthur must have felt. Your youth, 
your optimism — they give me strength. 
And as I look out upon your young 
faces, I feel as one who will depart 
the stage almost before you have 
made your first entrance — I feel in 
my heart a great confidence in the 
future of our country. For I know 
that you will defend that future. And 
it is true. 



'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 2, 1987. 



J.S.-Soviet Union Relations 



President Reagan's radio address 
the nation of August 29, 1987.^ 

n this summer season, most of us 
/ould like to forget work, take some 
ime off, and relax. Still, if you're like 
le, while you're on vacation, your mind 
zanders to bigger issues than the day- 
o-day ones — issues like where we're 
oing over the long run and how we 
Ian to get there. 

I hope you'll forgive me then if I 
ake a few minutes to talk with you 
bout one of the biggest issues: rela- 
ions between the United States and 
he Soviet Union. You see, I had a 
hance to speak about this a few days 
go to a group in Los Angeles and by 
atellite hookup to another one in New 
ork. I wanted to share some of that 
dth you. 

Today America and the Soviet 
Inion are adversaries, as we have been 
ince shortly after the Second World 
^a.Y. This hostility was not of U.S. 
hoosing. Before his death, President 
ranklin Roosevelt spoke for all Ameri- 
ans when he said that he hoped the 
oviets would work with us after the 
iBX for a world of democracy and 
eace. With this prayer in his heart, 
'.D.R. went to the Yalta conference in 
M5 to meet with Stalin. There the So- 
iets fed his hopes by agreeing that 



December 1987 



when peace came, they would hold free 
and unfettered elections in East Euro- 
pean countries like Poland. Within 2 
years, they broke that promise. Then 
they began to subvert free countries 
like Greece and Turkey. Only after that 
did America reluctantly accept that the 
Soviets were our adversaries. 

Today the goals of our foreign pol- 
icy are the same as they have been for 
the last four decades. We stand against 
totahtarianism, particlarly imperialistic 
expansionist totalitarianism. We are for 
democracy and human rights, and we're 
for a worldwide prosperity that only 
free economies can give and the pursuit 
of human happiness that only political 
freedom allows. 

When my Administration took of- 
fice 6'/2 years ago, we found that in 
some crucial ways American policy had 
lost sight of these great goals. A mas- 
sive Soviet military buildup throughout 
the 1970s had been met with inaction in 
the United States. The Soviets had 
added several thousand warheads, in- 
troduced advanced intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons to Europe, and in- 
stalled their fourth generation of inter- 
continental missiles, while we simply 
watched. Meanwhile, in the Third 
World, Soviet adventurism had reached 
into countries like Afghanistan, Cam- 
bodia, Angola, and Nicaragua. 



Today much has changed. We have 
built up our military, and the Soviets 
have responded to our new strength 
with a new willingness to talk seriously 
about arms reductions. In the past, 
arms agreements simply set rules for 
how fast our two countries could in- 
crease their numbers of nuclear weap- 
ons. Six years ago, I said that this was 
a wrong goal for arms talks. We should 
try to cut the nuclear numbers. I sug- 
gested that in one area — ground- 
launched intermediate-range missiles — 
we simply eliminate them. Today we 
are close to an agreement with the So- 
viets to do just that. At the same time, 
we have begun work on technologies 
that could free all of mankind from the 
fear of nuclear missiles for all time — a 
strategic defense against nuclear bal- 
listic missiles. 

In the last QV-z years, we have also 
established a new approach to Soviet 
adventurism. We have said that Amer- 
ica has a moral obligation to stand with 
those brave souls who fight for freedom 
and against Soviet-sponsored oppres- 
sion in their homelands. If the world is 
to know true peace, the Soviets must 
give up these imperial adventures. 

This week I suggested a number of 
steps the Soviets can make to improve 
relations with the United States. They 
can get out of Afghanistan: they can 
tear down the Berlin Wall; they can al- 
low free elections in Eastern Europe. 
And since this month marks the sev- 
enth anniversary of the free Polish la- 
bor union Solidarity, as well as the 19th 
anniversary of the 1968 Soviet-led inva- 
sion of Czechoslovakia, it is a particu- 
larly good time for the Soviets to 
repudiate force as a means of prevent- 
ing liberalization in Eastern Europe. 
And along the same lines, they can stop 
helping the Sandinista regime in Nic- 
aragua subvert its neighbors. The Sovi- 
ets can also open their defense 
establishment to world scrutiny. They 
can publish a valid and comprehensive 
defense budget and reveal the size and 
composition of their armed forces. They 
can let their parliament — the Supreme 
Soviet — debate major new military 
programs. 

Here at home, we must remember 
the lesson of the last 40 years; that if 
the world is to know true peace and if 
freedom is to prevail, America must re- 
main strong and determined. 



Broadcast from the Century Plaza 
Hotel in Los Angeles (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Sept. 7, 1987). ■ 



THE SECRETARY 



Power in the Service of Peace 
in Central America 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on October l.i, 1987.''" 

I am delighted to have this opportunity 
to review developments in Centi-al 
America with you. Before entering into 
full detail, however, I want to put our 
message right up front. It's a clear and 
simple message. 

• The United States is for peace 
and democracy in Central America. 
President Reagan has worked for peace 
and democracy there, with determina- 
tion and great skill. And we have seen 
some remai-kable progress as a result. 

• In August, there was an agree- 
ment in Guatemala among the five 
Central American presidents. That 
agreement offers a chance for further 
progress. The threats to democi'acy are 
still very real, and our national security 
stakes are still very high. That makes 

it all the more important that we help 
implement that agreement in ways that 
are sound. 

• The progress made so far has 
come about because strength provided 
the foundation for diplomacy. Today di- 
plomacy is in the forefront. But if we 
are to continue to make progress, it is 
essential to keep up the pressures and 
incentives that got us here in the first 
place. 

Progress in Central America 

I sometimes wonder how many people 
remember that in 1980-81, most ana- 
lysts thought it was too late to end the 
violence in El Salvador and the turmoil 
in Nicaragua. The Soviet Union and 
Cuba were benefiting directly from 
these conflicts so close to our shores. 
Some thought the United States might 
ultimately face a choice between using 
U.S. troops to stop communism in 
Central America or having the Soviet 
Union gradually become the dominant 
power from Panama to Me.\ico. 

The record — of claims and coun- 
terclaims — is amply documented in the 
hearings before this committee. It at- 
tests to what was thought then and 
where we are now. 

The President understood that 
communism couldn't bring freedom or 
prosperity to Central America any 



more than it has to Cuba. So he de- 
cided to support Central Americans 
willing to work, and if necessary to 
fight, for democracy and human dig- 
nity. By backing Central American 
efforts to achieve freedom and pros- 
perity, we would be protecting our 
own security. 

That decision began to turn the 
tide in Central America. First one 
country then another made a remark- 
able recovery from near-disastrous cir- 
cumstances at the beginning of the 
decade. Today elected democratic gov- 
ernments are offering their people the 
chance for a better future in El Salvador, 
Honduras, and most recently Guatemala. 
Costa Rica continues to enjoy freedom 
and the rule of law, as it has for 
decades. 

We can be proud of our country's 
role in this progress. And I mean ex- 
actly that: Americans in general. 
Democrats and Republicans, can be 
proud of our country's contributions. 
Our strategy has been to support re- 
form and freedom, it has had substan- 
tial bipartisan support, and it has 
worked. 

Consider what happened in El 
Salvador: faced by the 1981 guerrilla 
offensive, this Administration increased 
U.S. military aid, but we also con- 
tinued U.S. support for Carter Admin- 
istration initiatives backing land reform 
and human rights. We supported devel- 
opment, democracy, diplomacy, and de- 
fense as parts of a single interrelated 
whole. Many problems remain, but to- 
day Salvadoran democrats know they 
can count on the political and material 
support of the United States. 

The National Bipartisan Commis- 
sion on Central America developed this 
comprehensive approach further for 
all of Central America. In the last 
few years, bipartisan majorities in 
Congress have consistently approved 
the increased resources essential to 
make this democratic development 
strategy work. 

As the United States and its neigh- 
bors began to work together for democ- 
racy, it became increasingly evident 
that Nicaragua was not interested in 
cooperation. The reason was the same 
then as now: the communist Sandinistas 
are a blatant exception to the demo- 
cratic trend. 



When Somoza fled in 1979, a coali- 
tion government pledged to democracy 
was formed in extensive negotiations 
that included the Organization of 
American States (OAS). But Nicaragua's 
democrats soon found themselves facing 
a new dictatorship, this time run by an 
armed communist minority. Today 
Soviet-bloc aid to the Nicaraguan com- 
munists is more than all U.S. aid to all 
of Central America and 10 times more 
than U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan 
resistance. 

So the story is one of progress 
but continued danger. The Central 
American democracies have grown in 
coherence and resolve. But Nicaragua 
remains an obstacle to Central 
American unity, a drag on regional de- 
velopment, and a vehicle for bringing 
East- West rivalry onto the American 
mainland. 

Behind the Peace Moves 

Against this general background, three 
developments have shaped a major op- 
portunity for peace. 

• The first is the success of the 
democratic forces of the Nicaraguan re- 
sistance. Beginning in January, their 
improved military performance made 
them a serious challenge to the commu- 
nists. Then in May, their broadened po- 
litical leadership confirmed that they 
are a force for real democracy in 
Nicaragua. 

• The second is the Wright-Reagan 
peace plan. On August 5, President 
Reagan and Speaker Wright made clear 
that basic U.S. security objectives in 
Central America are not a matter for 
partisan dispute. They agreed that 
U.S. interests require a democratic 
Nicaragua that is not a military threat 
to its neighbors or a platform for Soviet 
and Cuban activities hostile to the se- 
curity of our own country. 

• The third is the Guatemala agree- 
ment. On August 7, Presidents Arias 



"Our strategy has been to sup- 
port reform and freedom, it has 
had substantial bipartisan sup- 
port, and it has worked." 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



of Costa Rica, Azcona of Honduras, 
Cerezo of Guatemala, and Duarte of El 
Salvador met with President Ortega of 
Nicaragua in Guatemala to consider a 
regional peace agreement. Pressured 
by the consensus among his neighbors 
and the realities of Nicaragua's deterio- 
rating internal situation, Daniel Ortega 
signed along with the democratic 
presidents. 

The Guatemala Agreement 

The Guatemala agreement expresses a 
vision of regional peace based on free- 
dom. It is a vision that depends criti- 
cally on the simultaneous implementa- 
tion of a series of mutual obligations. 

As President Reagan put it before 
the OAS on October 7, "democracy is 
the bottom line" of these obligations. 
The Guatemala agreement commits the 
five Central American signatories, in- 
luding Nicaragua, to democratization 
ivithin 90 days of signature, that is, by 
November 7. It defines democratization 
;o include complete freedom of the 
aress, full political pluralism, and the 
ifting of all states of emergency. 

Each government must simui- 
;aneously undertake all the necessary 
teps for achieving an effective negoti- 
ated cease-fire and a process of national 
•econciliation. Each must issue an am- 
lesty law which encompasses both 
irmed and unarmed political opposition 
groups. 

The signatories commit themselves 
deny the use of their national ter- 
■itories for military support to forces 
iestabilizing other governments. As- 
istance to irregular forces is to cease, 
xeept for that needed for the resettle- 
nent of combatants and the voluntary 
•epatriation of refugees. 

Compliance with the agreement is 
be verified by an international com- 
Tiission (composed of the Secretaries 
jreneral of the Organization of 
\merican States and the United 
SJations, and the foreign ministers of 
he five Central American nations and 
he eight Contadora and Support Group 
lations), but ultimate decisions are re- 
erved for the Central Americans 
hemselves. 

The key dates in the plan are 
November 7, when democratization and 
ease-fires are to take full effect, and 
fanuary 7, when their results are to be 
valuated. 

The Guatemala agreement is not a 
;et of isolated unilateral commitments: 
t is a regional plan with overlapping 
[md mutually reinforcing obligations. To 



"... our assistance to the resistance is what made the agreement 
possible. Its continued availability is just as essential to ensure that the 
Guatemala agreement is implemented in a way that secures a negoti- 
ated cease-fire and a democratic opening in Nicaragua." 



ensure that implementation is not one- 
sided, these obligations are to be imple- 
mented simultaneously by all the par- 
ties to the agreement. If any part fails, 
the entire structure falls. If no cease- 
fire is negotiated, if no full amnesty is 
implemented, the other measures are in 
abeyance. If the plan is to succeed, we 
must be certain that there are firm but 
workable criteria for the complex proc- 
esses of democratization and national 
reconciliation, serious deadlines for 
progress, and an awareness of the costs 
of failure. 

In short, the Guatemala agreement 
is very ambitious. Its success is not 
guaranteed. But it is a bold move in the 
right direction. 

U.S. Diplomatic Efforts 

Can the United States help make the 
Guatemala agreement work? The an- 
swer is that it is certainly in our inter- 
est to try. We are and must give it our 
fullest and strongest support. 

As democracies, we and the free 
nations of Central America have se- 
curity interests that run parallel. We 
face in common the threat of commu- 
nism on the mainland. The Guatemala 
agreement does not explicitly deal with 
these strategic security concerns. But 
we cannot forget that the Nicaraguan 
regime is armed by the Soviet Union; 
that its internal security depends on 
thousands of Cuban and Eastern-bloc 
military, intelligence, and police ad- 
visers; and that it is located only 900 
miles from our southern border and 300 
miles from the Panama Canal. Soviet 
and Cuban military ties to Nicaragua — 
military facilities, advisers, aid levels, 
sophistication of weaponry — are issues 
of vital and direct interest to us; they 
must be dealt with. 

Political democracy in Nicaragua 
would, for the most part, deal with our 
concerns, for no truly democratic gov- 
ernment would attack its neighbors or 
allow its territory to be used militarily 
by the Soviet Union. But we cannot 
place our strategic interests at risk in 
the mere hope that positive internal 
changes will take place in Nicaragua. It 
is our responsibility to make certain 



that the Wright-Reagan peace plan and 
the Guatemala agreement are imple- 
mented and that there be no Soviet or 
Cuban military presence in Nicaragua 
and that Nicaragua pose no military or 
subversive threat to its neighbors or 
the region. 

To support the Guatemala agree- 
ment and the Wright-Reagan plan, we 
have intensified our diplomatic con- 
sultations in Central America. The 
President has named Ambassador 
Morris Busby, a distinguished career 
member of the Foreign Service, to 
serve as a special regional envoy; work- 
ing with Elliott Abrams, the Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 
he is in continual contact with the prin- 
cipal figures in this negotiation. 

We have also begun a series of dip- 
lomatic contacts in Latin America and 
Europe to secure support for the demo- 
cratic reforms called for in the agree- 
ment. I have met with my counterparts 
from Latin America at the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. Sev- 
eral high-level bilateral visits are 
planned in the next few weeks. The 
OAS General Assembly will take place 
next month. And when the right point 
is reached, you will be seeing me in 
Central America, too. 

Monitoring Democratization 

The Sandinistas are responsible for hav- 
ing spawned armed resistance because 
they have not allowed Nicaraguans to 
live in freedom. This is the key reality 
to be changed. If there is to be peace 
and democracy in Nicaragua and re- 
gional stability and tranquility in 
Central America, all Nicaraguans must 
be able to live in political, economic, 
and religious freedom. 

A turnabout of this magnitude 
is unlikely without a struggle. The 
Nicaraguan regime has displayed no un- 
derstanding that protests and active 
political organizing and proselytizing 
are normal parts of the fabric of democ- 
racy. Those who stand up for democ- 
racy in Nicaragua do so at personal 
risk. 



December 1987 



THE SECRETARY 



• On August 15, only 8 days after 
the signing of the Guatemala agree- 
ment, the Ortega regime's police broke 
up a peaceful march in Managua. Dr 
Alberto Saborio, president of the 
Nicaraguan Bar Association, was ar- 
rested and roughed-up for protesting 
the use of police dogs against the 
marchers. Dr Lino Hernandez, the 
head of the independent human rights 
commission, was shocked with a cattle 
prod in the stomach and arrested when 
he refused to leave the area. 

• Two Sundays ago, on Septem- 
ber 27, 18 mostly youthful members of 
the Social Christian Party were de- 
tained by the regime's police on their 
way to the party anniversary celebra- 
tion in Managua. The police said they 
had been arrested for "draft evasion," 
but former Venezuelan President Luis 
Herrera called it a "blatant act of polit- 
ical harassment." 

• And then there is the weight 
of the past. In June 1985, Mauricio 
Membreno, Secretary General of the 
Social Democratic Youth, was charged 
with a ludicrous criminal offense: per- 
sonally assaulting 16 of Ortega's po- 
licemen at one time. Tried in the 
political courts, he is still in jail serving 
a 3-year sentence. 

The risks of harassment and worse 
are not limited to active politicians. 
Consider just two among those who 
have dared to accept a leading role in 
support of the Guatemala accords. 

• Pablo Antonio Cuadra, born in 
Managua in 1912, has, for more than 50 
years, been Nicaragua's leading poet 
and for 30 years the patron of its young 
writers. He was jailed twice under 
Somoza. 

• Bismarck Carballo is a Nicaraguan 
priest, born in 1950 in Masaya 
Province, who served as spokesman for 
the Archdiocese of Managua and first 
came to public notice when he read the 
Episcopal Conference decision excom- 
municating members of a pro-Somoza 
mob in 1977. 

Yet the Ortega regime denied both 
these men their public voice: Cuadra 
when La Prensa, of which he was co- 
editor, was closed down; and Carballo 
when he was publicly abused and for 
more than a year forced to live in exile. 

Since October 1, Cuadra is back 
writing with soaring spirit of the free- 
dom he hopes for his beloved Nicaragua. 
Carballo is also back directing Radio 
Catolica. That these two men have now 
been allowed the freedom to publish 
and broadcast is a definite step 
forward. 



10 



Isolated steps such as these are 
easily reversible, however, particularly 
in a totalitarian system where coercion 
takes many forms. 

• It can take the form of allowing 
leaders to be free but jailing their 
followers — as has happened to the 
Independent Liberal Party, whose ma- 
jor leaders are free but 200 of whose 
activists are in jail. 

• It can take the form of hidden 
censorship — as is happening to Radio 
Catolica, which went back on the air 
with much fanfare at noon on Octo- 
ber 2. Its transmitter, however, is in 
such poor shape that its signal could 
not be heard in most of Managua, let 
alone the rest of the country. 

• Or it can take the form of a false 
impression of openness. What is the 
truth of a headline "Government Re- 
leases Political Prisoners" when the 
government, as in Nicaragua today, still 
holds 9,000 or 10,000 political pris- 
oners? And what is the implication for 
democracy if it still claims the right to 
take them prisoner again whenever it 
wishes? 

The Ortega regime's performance 
in meeting its commitments to freedom 
cannot be measured just by what hap- 
pens to a few individuals, no matter 
how prominent. Compliance must be 
measured by the return of all 18 ex- 
pelled priests, not just the best known, 
like Carballo; by the release of all the 
thousands of Nicaraguans jailed for 
political reasons, not just Hernandez 
and Saborio. Until that happens, the 
Nicaraguan regime is likely to continue 
to rank second only to Cuba in the in- 
famy of the denial of freedom to its 
citizens. In fact, Cuba aside, there are 
more people in jail for political reasons 
in Nicaragua than in all the other coun- 
tries of the Western Hemisphere 
combined. 

If it is to be taken seriously, the 
Ortega regime's compliance must be 
measured in the removal of all cen- 
sorship and all hidden pressures from 
all radio, television, and printed media, 
not only for the well-known La Prensa 
and Radio Catolica. It is not enough to 
affirm the right of protest in words: the 
regime must also end the jamming of 
radio broadcasting; grant licenses to 
new stations or newspapers that might 
apply; and allow the purchase or import 
of printing equipment, paper, ink, and 
other materials essential to practice 
freedom of expression. 

In the past, the Ortega regime has 
directly or indirectly denied all these 
basic necessities for democratic life 
through protracted oppression masked 



in legalism and bureaucracy. The risk 
now is that such hidden controls will be 
used by the regime to draw out the 
ambiguities of the peace timetable and 
of the U.S. budget and congressional 
calendars in an attempt to eliminate the 
resistance without permitting a genuine 
democratic opening in Nicaragua. 

National Reconciliation 

The basic test of the Guatemala agree- 
ment, therefore, will be the willingness 
of the Ortega regime to engage the re- 
sistance and the opposition political 
parties in a dialogue leading to an irre- 
versible political opening they cannot 
arbitrarily nullify. 

The Guatemala agreement wisely 
realizes that there are two prerequi- 
sites to ending the fighting and turning 
armed enemies into peaceful political 
rivals: a negotiated cease-fire and a full 
amnesty. "Riken together, these two 
guarantee insurgents that they can go 
home and join in their country's demo- 
cratic politics. That is why, in its lead 
editorial the day it resumed publication 
(October 1), La Prensa called for "total 
amnesty, reconciliation through dia- 
logue with the armed rebels, and lift- 
ing, without any restrictions, the state 
of emergency that has ruled the coun- 
try since 1982." 

To comply with the Guatemala 
agreement. President Duarte and 
President Cerezo have undertaken di- 
rect negotiations with leaders of the in- 
surgents in their respective countries. 
This week's discussions in Spain are the 
first official contacts in years between 
the Guatemalan Government and the 
guerrillas. In El Salvador, the govern- 
ment has formed two mixed commis- 
sions with the guerrillas. One is to 
negotiate a cease-fire, the other to 
discuss amnesty and national 
reconciliation. 

This past Tuesday, after meeting 
personally with the leaders of the 
Salvadoran guerrillas, President 
Duarte noted that the idea that Central 
Americans should settle their differ- 
ences among themselves is centi'al 
to the Guatemala agreement. "We 
Salvadorans," he said, "must not use as 
an excuse for not talking with the re- 
bels in El Salvador that it is better to 
hold talks with Cuba or Russia." 

"By the same token," President 
Duarte continued, "Nicaragua should 
not make up excuses by saying it will 
only hold talks with the United States 
and not with the Nicaraguan rebels 
who are fighting in Nicaragua.... The 
United States should not be the ones to 
decide Nicaraguans should be the 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



ones to decide. Therefoi-e I invite 
[President Ortega] to have a dialogue 
with all Nicaraguans." 

If President Ortega is prepared to 
implement the Guatemala agreement 
with deeds as well as with words, he 
should implement a full amnesty; he 
should negotiate directly with the re- 
sistance for a cease-fire; and he should 
develop with its leaders the confidence- 
building measures that will alone en- 
able the cease-fire to pave the way to 
the full and peaceful political reintegra- 
tion of the resistance into a free 
Nicaragua. 

The simultaneity called for by the 
Guatemala agreement relates cease- 
fire, amnesty, and democracy. I\itting 
these complicated processes into the 
simplest of terms, bullets are to be 
traded in but only for guaranteed polit- 
ical rights and ballots. And if the 
Ortega regime does not enable the re- 
sistance to return openly to Nicaragua 
and organize freely to participate in 
politics, then simultaneity also means 
that Nicaragua's neighbors are not obli- 
gated to ban resistance military and po- 
litical support activities in their 
countries. 

Power in Support of Diplomacy 

Less than a year ago, Congress ap- 
proved $100 million for aid to the 
Nicaraguan resistance. Using those re- 
ources carefully and well — under the 
crutiny of the Congi'ess and, in partic- 
ular, the two intelligence committees — 
the resistance made great gains. Their 
forces are able to operate throughout 
the Nicaraguan countryside. They have 
demonstrated the vulnerability of this 
faihng regime and of its modern Soviet 
armaments. Popular support for the 
guerrillas is so e.xtensive in some areas 
that the regime has forcibly relocated 
entire communities to keep them from 
supporting the resistance forces. 

The resistance has welcomed the 
Guatemala agreement and is ready to 
negotiate a cease-fire. The Ortega re- 
gime has so far refused, trying instead 
to divide the fighters from their politi- 
cal leaders. If it is to be effective, a 
cease-fire can't simply be declared; the 
people doing the actual fighting must 
come to agreement on the terms. 

But the Ortega regime is not the 
only obstacle to the effective implemen- 
tation of the Guatemala agreement. An- 
other is the calendar. The agreement 
calls for implementation of the cease- 
fire and democratization provisions in 
November, with evaluation of results 
not until next January. Unless the re- 



'T/ie Guatemala agreement is not a set of isolated unilateral commit- 
ments: it is a regional plan with overlapping and mutually reinforcing 
obligations . To ensure that implementation is not one-sided, these 
obligations are to be implemented simultaneously by all the parties to 
the agreement ." 



sistance receives new funding, this cal- 
endar will play out in favor of the 
communists. At some point, the re- 
sistance will be facing advanced Soviet 
weaponry and Cuban advisers with its 
resources exhausted. When that hap- 
pens, the helicopter gunships, rocket 
launchers, long-range artillery, and 
mines that the Soviet bloc continues to 
supply in increasing numbers will de- 
stroy hope for democracy and guaran- 
tee a military victory for the 
communists. 

Continued aid to the freedom fight- 
ers is, therefore, key to democratiza- 
tion and the full implementation of the 
Guatemala agreement. The reality of 
our assistance to the resistance is what 
made the agreement possible. Its con- 
tinued availability is just as essential to 
ensure that the Guatemala agreement 
is implemented in a way that secures a 
negotiated cease-fire and a democratic 
opening in Nicaragua. 

For these reasons, the President 
will request a vote before Thanksgiving 
on additional aid for the resistance. 
This assistance, which will total $270 
million over a period of 18 months, is 
necessary to support the agreement 
and ensure that it endures. As the 
President told the OAS on October 7, 
the assistance "will continue until the 
Sandinistas, negotiating with the free- 
dom fighters, conclude an agreement 
for a cease-fire and full democracy is 
established in Nicaragua." 

The specific forms our aid will take 
will depend entirely on what happens in 
the implementation of the agreement. 
If the agreement works as we all hope, 
it will be directed to the peaceful rein- 
tegration of the resistance in a free 
Nicaragua; if it does not, it will be used 
to enable the struggle for freedom to 
continue until it does succeed. 

Conclusion 

Too often in the past, the United States 
failed to identify with the aspirations of 
the people of Central America for free- 
dom and a better life. Too often, our 
government seemed indifferent when 
democratic values were at risk. 



Today a process of reciprocal steps 
has been set in motion that commits 
the Ortega regime to sweeping social 
and political change in Nicaragua. We 
do not know yet whether it is realistic 
to expect that it will happen. But we 
shall work hard to make it so. We need 
to end the doubt and uncertainty about 
the capacity and commitment of the 
United States that are created by the 
recurring cycle of off-again, on-again 
policy decisions punctuated by pro- 
tracted and divisive debate. 

It is not in our national interest to 
leave the Ortega regime unconstrained 
by credible resistance forces on the 
basis of a hope or a premise. We have 
too much at stake. It would be irre- 
sponsible to open the door of democra- 
tization in Nicaragua and then leave it 
to be slammed shut again. We cannot 
leave Nicaraguans to struggle without 
the resources necessary to carry out a 
peaceful political struggle in the face of 
their communist adversaries. 

If democratization comes to 
Nicaragua, it will be because brave 
Nicaraguans dared to commit them- 
selves to the cause of freedom. We have 
supported their cause; it is our cause, 
too. If the Nicaraguan regime does not 
carry out its commitments to democra- 
tization in good faith, we must ensure 
that our friends are not abandoned. 
Our continued support for them is nec- 
essary if diplomacy is to succeed. 

So let us join across pai'ty lines 
to call for full implementation of the 
Guatemala agreement, and let us do 
what we must to protect our country's 
vital interests in this region. Let us 
pursue peace and freedom, and let us 
give those who are fighting for it in 
Nicaragua our continuing support until 
their struggle is ended. Let us put our 
power behind the diplomacy of democ- 
racy in Nicaragua, for our security in- 
terests and our moral and political 
objectives all meet in that outcome. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. I 



THE SECRETARY 



News Conference of October 15 



Secretary Shultz held a news con- 
ference on October 15, 1987.^ 

Q. Starting with the Middle East, in 
the Persian Gulf this morning a mis- 
sile, apparently fired by the Iranians, 
hit a U.S. -managed oil tanker at an- 
chorage off Kuwait. Does this change 
anything? Does this lead the United 
States to consider any sort of retalia- 
tion or countermeasures? 

A. We don't announce what coun- 
termeasures or retaliation we may take, 
but I think it has been made clear that 
we do act. 

As far as the Iranian action is con- 
cerned, it's really aimed at Kuwait. The 
ship was not in international waters; it 
wasn't being escorted or anything of 
the kind. In fact, it wasn't a U.S. -flag 
vessel. So it seems to me to be a very 
hostile action toward Kuwait. 

Q. You have long taken the view, 
I believe, if I'm representing it cor- 
rectly, that the United States 
shouldn't be more eager for negotia- 
tions in the Middle East than the par- 
ties themselves. In fact, last year you 
sent Mr. Murphy [Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Af- 
fairs Richard W. Murphy] out and 
found the temperature or the climate 
wasn't right and didn't go. Why are 
you going this time? 

A. I want to touch base with our 
friends in the Middle East on a number 
of issues. The peace process, obviously, 
is one of them. In Saudi Arabia I ex- 
pect to talk quite a bit about the Iran- 
Iraq war, our actions in the United Na- 
tions, and the very strong cooperative 
activities we have with Saudi Arabia in 
the gulf In Egypt, President Mubarak 
has just been reelected. He's a very 
strong friend. 

In Israel — in all of these countries, 
of course, the peace process — but in Is- 
rael, in addition, I want to talk about 
Soviet Jewry. I'll have the pleasure of 
meeting Ida Nudel in Jerusalem, hav- 
ing met her in Moscow; that will be a 
thrill. As a person of the university, I'm 
honored to receive a degree from the 
Weizmann Institute and have a chance 
to award the first George Shultz Fel- 
lowship at Tel Aviv University. 

And in London, I'll have a chance 
to talk about the peace process and the 
quality-of-life programs on the West 
Bank with King Hussein. 

So all in all, I think it's time to go 
and review the bidding with our friends 



12 



on the peace process, on the Persian 
Gulf, on Soviet Jewry, on general inter- 
nal developments such as in Egypt 
where President Mubarak has just won 
this very fine political victory. 

Q. Since Syria is such a major 
place in the peace process, why is it 
not included in your travel? 

A. Why is what not included? 

Q. Syria. 

A. I have only a very limited 
amount of time, and so I am going to 
the countries that I specified. I did 
have a chance to talk at some length 
with the Syrian Foreign Minister in 
New York, so I have had that contact. 

Q. The Security Council this 
morning has given new instructions 
to [UN Secretary General] Perez de 
Cuellar relative to his mediation of 
the Iran-Iraq war. Can you elaborate 
for us on what those instructions are 
and give us the U.S. reaction to 
those? 

A. I don't want to disclose in detail 
his instructions; but basically the sole 
basis for proceeding, as was said in the 
press statement after the meeting of 
the five foreign ministers in New York, 
that was 2 or 3 weeks ago, the sole 
basis is Resolution ,598. So the Secre- 
tary General's instructions essentially 
involve another round of consultations 
with Iran and Iraq, and they have to do 
with the implementation of that resolu- 
tion, not in any way bargaining about 
the resolution as such. I understand he 
has invited the parties to come to New 
York, and the understanding that I 
have is they will probably do that. 

At any rate, we continue to push 
for a rapid effort to, if possible, bring 
the war to an end through the accept- 
ance of the resolution, and that's what 
we're pushing. 

Q. In the Middle East, about the 
peace process, can you tell us any 
new idea you are carrying there like 
what they call an "interim arrange- 
ment"? And how can you convince 
Prime Minister Shamir to drop his 
opposition to the international con- 
ference? 

A. I'm not going there to take part 
in internal Israeli politics in any way. 
On the other hand, I do think peace in 
the Middle East in the Arab-Israeli 
tensions is a very important thing for 
all of us — for the United States, but 
mostly, of course, for the people in the 



region — and I intend to emphasize my 
view of the importance of that. 

It is also true there have been a 
number of positive developments, and I 
think in particular King Hussein de- 
serves a lot of credit for his push, as do 
others. So I want to review these mat- 
ters with everyone and see if they have 
any creative thoughts about how we 
might move forward toward peace. 
After all, they live there in the region, 
and it's a very tense region. At the 
same time it's clear there are a great 
deal of positive things that could be 
done if ever a peaceful resolution of the 
issues should emerge. 

When I was up in New York at the 
UN meetings, I had the occasion to 
meet with the Crown Prince of Jordan, 
and he gave me a plan that had been 
drawn up that talked about regional 
economic development which he 
thought was a very good plan. But, of 
course, it's the sort of thing that can go 
forward only if there is a congenial po- 
litical context for it. 

So I want to review these matters. 
I do not go there with any particular 
new thing, but I hope perhaps some 
others will have something new to say. 

Q. I have one followup about the 
interim arrangement in the West 
Bank. I mean, you discussed it with 
Mayor Freij the other day. Can you 
tell us more about it? 

A. No, I'm not going to expand on 
that. I think the meaning of that word 
is amply known. 

Q. You're going to discuss the 
summit, possible summit, when 
you're in Moscow, both dates and 
agenda for it. Could you tell us 
whether you see this summit as really 
primarily intended to sign an INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
agreement on the assumption that 
you'll be able to conclude one, or 
whether you see it encompassing 
other issues that you might be able to 
achieve something practical on, in- 
cluding START [strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks] and Afghanistan? 

A. These major meetings, as I have 
observed them over the years — whether 
with the Soviets or others, but take the 
Soviet summits — they are always kind 
of a moving-average process; that is, 
there are some things that can be done 
that reflect achievement. The signing of 
an INF agreement would be a major 
achievement, and that is recorded. It 
isn't as though that's done at the sum- 
mit; it's done before the summit. But it 
is achieved, in a sense, in anticipation 
of the summit. 



THE SECRETARY 



There is also ongoing specific work, 
and the President has always felt that 
an agreement on strategic arms, with a 
50% cut in strategic arms, is of central 
importance. And the Soviets say that, 
too. The fact of the matter is that in 
the discussions between us, a great 
deal of headway has been made — impor- 
tant headway — the most dramatic steps 
being those that came out of the Reyk- 
javik meetings. 

So you have specific accomplish- 
ments to record; you have ongoing ne- 
gotiations of great importance — and I 
just picked up your items; and then you 
have the importance of a general e.x- 
change between the leaders that has its 
impact on attitudes and atmosphere 
and, therefore, is of great importance. 

Now in all of this, because your 
question focused on two arms control 
issues, I answered in those terms. But 
in all of our meetings, including the 
summit meetings, there's always strong 
discussion of human rights issues, and 
we have seen a great deal of headway in 
that area. There's always a discussion of 
regional issues. Of course, we have bi- 
lateral matters that we worry about as 
well as arms control. So all of these 
subjects would be covered, and we 
would try to evolve a manner of doing 
that that will be constructive and 
worthwhile from the standpoint of both 
parties. 

Q. Would you also address 
Afghanistan because you've had, at 
the summit level in Geneva and Reyk- 
javik, full discussions — the President 
has had — without any discernable 
progress being made. Is that going to 
be a key issue in your Moscow trip? 

A. I had a lengthy discussion with 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze about 
Afghanistan when he was here. I would 
expect we'd talk about it some more. 

In the discussions, as you said, 
there was no specific shift of gears that 
you can point to. On the other hand, I 
think, as we've had our periodic discus- 
sions of this and other regional issues, 
the nature of the discussion has been 
deeper and the exploration of the 
nature of the problems more candid. So 
I consider that to be an improvement. 

Q. On the Soviet-American rela- 
tionship, how do you respond to crit- 
ics, many of them in your own party, 
who say that you are rushing into a 
series of agreements on arms control, 
bilateral exchanges, and a number of 
other things — talking about cooperat- 
ing with the Soviets in the Middle 
East and the Persian Gulf, and so 
forth — without a firm strategic under- 
pinning for this series of agreements 



and moving toward a situation that 
they fear will result in tendencies to- 
ward neutralization in Western Eu- 
rope, toward denuclearization in a 
number of areas, toward a generally 
weakened American posture around 
the world? 

A. We have a strategic concept that 
has been in place throughout the Rea- 
gan Administration, and it hasn't 
shifted. What we are seeing now is 
some rearrangement of the possibilities 
within the framework of that strategic 
concept. 

The strategic concept has always 
been one in which we have said: let us 
constantly review realistically what is 
taking place in the Soviet Union and 
with respect to the Soviet Union and 
its environs and not engage in any 
wishful thinking but also be ready to 
look at the facts. And if they change, 
recognize that. 

Second, recognize that we have to 
be in a strong posture, and I don't 
mean simply in terms of our defense 
strength but our general pur- 
posefulness and economic strength and 
so on. 

And, third, we should be ready to 
be problemsolvers. And where we can 
see an opportunity to solve a problem 
in a manner that is in our interests and 
the interests of our allies, we should be 
ready to do it. So that has been our 
conception. 

As far as the particulars of the 
agreements that seem to be one, close 
at hand, and the other at least recog- 
nizable, I'm amazed that people keep 
saying we're rushing into these things, 
as you said. 

Q. I'm just quoting your critics. 
I'm not — 

A. The President set out his objec- 
tives on INF in 1981, and he set out his 
objectives on strategic arms in 1982. 
He's been plugging away at them ever 
since. Initially people criticized his 
goals as being unrealistic, and they said 
it showed the man wasn't interested in 
arms control. But what's happening is 
those goals are turning out to be quite 
realistic. I might say they have been 
developed in close consultation with our 
allies and have support. 

So I think things are, in many re- 
spects, falling into place. Of course, 
any time you strike a bargain with an- 
other country, they have to think the 
bargain is in their interest, too. But 
that's for them to decide. From our 
standpoint, they look like agreements 
that are very much in our interests. 



Q. The United States went into an 
expanded role in the Persian Gulf re- 
cently for the very specific purpose of 
escorting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. 
Now some of the countries in the area 
would like to — 

A. No. Our purpose was to see to 
it that Iran did not succeed in becoming 
dominant in the Persian Gulf by intim- 
idating and bullying the gulf states and 
that the Soviet Union did not become, 
in a sense, the protector of those vital 
supply routes. So those were our objec- 
tives. 

That expressed itself in terms of 
the protection of shipping, of the in- 
crease in our naval force, and had to do 
with ships that became American-flag 
ships that had been Kuwaiti ships. But 
I think you have to put our purpose in 
a little broader way. 

Q. That makes my question some- 
what even more pertinent than per- 
haps it was. Under what 
circumstances do you think the 
United States would expand its ex- 
pression of that general purpose to, 
for example, use its military power 
against Iranian ships which were at- 
tacking any vessel, whether it's a 
U.S. -flag vessel or not, whether it 
should respond in some way to what 
you described as a hostile action 
taken by Iran against Kuwait which 
is a country now we are closely asso- 
ciated with in the tanker business? 

A. We have very specific rules of 
engagement. I'm not going to discuss 
them in detail here, but we don't have 
any desire to change them. 

I want to emphasize that our forces 
are in the gulf without any chip on our 
shoulder, without any hostile intent to- 
ward anyone. We take no actions that 
are offensive in nature. However, we 
will defend ourselves, and we will de- 
fend the ships that we're escorting. So 
we're there in that posture of strensrth 
but not in a provocative way. 

Q. You say you have no desire to 
change them. Are you considering a 
change in the rules? 

A. No. There's no plan to change 
the rules. 

Q. This morning the Council of 
Presidents of Arab-American Organi- 
zations issued a statement; they 
called for a meeting with you — an 
emergency meeting — before leaving 
Washington, and they were turned 
down. But they called on the State 
Department to investigate the killing 
of Palestinians in the West Bank. 

A two-part question: are you 
going to be meeting with the Pal- 
estinian leadership in the West Bank 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



in Jerusalem? And the second part, 
will the State Department be asking 
the Israeli Government about the vio- 
lation of human rights in occupied 
territories? 

A. Of course, there is tremendous 
tension in the area and has been for a 
long time. The fact of this tension is 
only evidence of the need to go about 
the peace process. 

Now, there is an ironic twist to the 
tension because it is the case that peace 
has many enemies; and when something 
takes place that seems as though it 
might even by a little bit move toward 
peace, the enemies of peace create vio- 
lent conditions. So it isn't always what 
it may appear 

Now as far as meeting with Pal- 
estinians is concerned, we have always 
said — and, as a matter of fact, it's in 
the Camp David agreement for that 
matter — that it's obvious that there are 
legitimate rights and concerns of Pal- 
estinians, and Palestinians must be in- 
volved in the peace process if it's to 
mean anything. There isn't any ques- 
tion about that. But it's also true that 
there isn't a role in the peace process 
for people whose tactics are violence 
and who refuse to renounce violence, 
who refuse to recognize that Israel is 
there as a state and is ready to talk and 
try to make peace. 

Now, I talk to Palestinians. I 
talked to a Palestinian this week. 
Mayor Freij from Bethlehem was here, 
and I had a good session with him, as I 
have before when he's visited. And I 
hope when I'm in Israel, I will have a 
meeting with Palestinian leaders. I'm 
trying to arrange that, and I believe I 
about have that arranged. So I'm very 
much interested in the views people 
have. 

And we always deplore acts of vio- 
lence. But by my comments you can see 
that I have to caution because their 
causes are always rather complex. 

Q. Mr. Freij this morning said 
that the violence in the West Bank 
which has erupted and been erupting 
is a natural result from the continu- 
ous 20 years of occupation and the 
deprivation of the Palestinians in the 
occupied territory. Do you see this as 
a natural thing because of 20 years of 
occupation? 

A. I don't want to use the word 
"natural" in the sense of saying it's in- 
evitable or in any sense justifiable. It 
seems to me that what is needed is 
action by peaceful means toward peace- 
ful objectives. So I deplore it, and we 
work for peace to avoid violence. 



Q. The Soviet Union has con- 
tinued to publicize its proposal that 
experts from the two sides get to- 
gether and discuss what can and can- 
not be launched into space. This is 
intended by them as an effort to re- 
solve the problems over SDI [Strate- 
gic Defense Initiative] and defense 
and space. 

The United States has so far not 
been inclined to engage in such talks. 
Will there be any change in the Amer- 
ican posture at this upcoming 
Moscow meeting, or will we stand 
fast to our current position? 

A. We have a position in the de- 
fense and space talks, and we think it 
is a good and proper position. We're 
always willing to listen to anything the 
Soviets have to say on this important 
subject, and if they have something 
new to say, of course, I'll be very much 
interested in it. 

There are various proposals around 
that are extremely difficult to grapple 
with because they aren't proposals that 
are readily verifiable and they also deal 
with an area where the unknowns are 
great. So if you agree to something in a 
field that is expanding and is being ex- 
plored, you have to be careful that you 
don't agree to something that turns out 
to confine you without your quite real- 
izing it. So that's a problem with pro- 
posals such as the one that you 
mentioned. 

Q. Just to clarify this, I take it 
you're saying there's no change in the 
Administration's position and that we 
don't want to engage in such talks at 
this time. That's what you're saying? 

A. We have a position on the table, 
and I always try to reserve my com- 
ments on the nature of our bargaining 
about these things to my discussions 
with the Soviets. 

Q. Are you as skeptical as you 
were 2 weeks ago that Iran will ac- 
cept 598, and, if you aren't skeptical 
and if the Secretary General's talks 
should fail and you push the option of 
an embargo, what is your latest 
thinking about the possibility of a 
blockade? 

A. Nothing that's happened has de- 
creased my skepticism, and Iran con- 
tinues to be very belligerent, as was 
illustrated by this attack that was men- 
tioned in the first question. However, 
as I've said before, I would be de- 
lighted to be proven wrong, and I know 
the Secretary General is going to make 
a strong effort to persuade Iran to join 
Iraq in accepting Resolution 598. 



Now, if Resolution 598 is not ac- 
cepted, then obviously the next step 
which we have to focus on is what is 
reflected clearly in 598— that is, a fol- 
low-on second resolution that deals with 
an arms embargo; and then, once that 
is in place, one has to consider how you 
make it effective, and people obviously 
would want to make it effective. 

Q. It seems probable that, con- 
trary to your wishes, a final text of 
the INF treaty will not be ready by 
the time you get to Moscow. How big 
are the problems that remain, and do 
you think they could foil plans to 
come up with a specific date for a 
summit during your trip? 

A. As far as we're concerned, we're 
working hard on the INF treaty and in 
good faith. There has been a great deal 
accomplished in Geneva since Mr. Shev- 
ardnadze and I met here in Wash- 
ington. As you say, it isn't buttoned up 
as yet. There are still some issues 
ahead, but we intend to press on them. 
We've got our positions there on the 
table, and I hope that when I get to 
Moscow I don't have to spend too much 
on INF. I'm getting tired of INF. I 
want to get on to strategic arms. So 
we'll just have to see. 

I believe that a summit meeting 
should be accompanied by substantial 
accomplishment, as the INF treaty 
would do, and it needs to be a well- 
prepared meeting. If there isn't that 
accomplishment, then there shouldn't 
be a meeting. We shouldn't continue to 
move at it. But I believe that we have 
all of the ingredients necessary to have 
an INF agi'eement if both sides con- 
tinue to want it, and we do. 

Q. When you're in Saudi Arabia, 
will you be requesting additional co- 
operation in terms of U.S. presence in 
the area — that is, basing rights, etc? 
And secondly, what role do the Saudis 
play in the peace process, and will 
you ask them to become more en- 
gaged? 

A. We have had a lot of discussions 
with Saudi Arabia, and the cooperative 
patterns that have developed are very 
good. It's sort of an ongoing discussion, 
and I don't have any particular proposal 
because the cooperative relationship is 
such a good one. 

As far as the peace process is con- 
cerned, of course, if it becomes possible 
for King Hussein and the Israelis to 
find their way into bilateral negotia- 
tions through some means, then we 
would expect that King Hussein would 
have the support of all of the countries 
in the region, and most especially Saudi 
Arabia. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. If there isn't that accomplish- 
ment, meaning an INF treaty, then 
we shouldn't have that meeting, 
meaning a summit. Does that mean 
that if you don't have an INF agree- 
ment wrapped up in your meeting in 
a few days, then you will not set a 
date for a summit? Is that correct? 

A. I should think that we would be 
able to wrap it up. There's no major 
issue of principle that should prevent 
that. So if there is a genuine good 
faith, it shouldn't be an impediment. 
But I do think that if it turns out that 
their attitude changes and they don't 
want an agreement — but I'm not saying 
that there's anything [that] suggests 
that. I think, on the contrary, all of the 
indications are that we'll move ahead. 
But if it turns out that there isn't going 
to be any major accomplishment, then I 
think we should wait until we have one. 

But I'm not saying that. I'm saying 
that kind of in response to your ques- 



tions. My attitude as I go to Moscow is 
that things are going along quite well. 
The work in Geneva is strong; it's pro- 
fessional; it's rapid. A gi-eat deal of ma- 
terial where we had differences has 
been eliminated — tremendous amounts. 
So the headway is great, and we'll keep 
the pressure on with every expectation 
that we'll not only have that completed. 
But I hope that we'll have some worth- 
while discussions in strategic arms, in 
human rights, in regional issues, and 
our bilateral problems so that there will 
be the kind of atmosphere that will, on 
the one hand, make a summit produc- 
tive in itself and, on the other hand, 
enable a summit to be the kind of ini- 
tiator of further positive developments. 
That's the frame of mind in which I go 
to Moscow, as for that matter to the 
Middle East. 



'Press release 200. 



Secretary Shultz's Trip to the 

Middle East, Europe, and the U.S.S.R. 



Secretary Shultz departed the 
United States October 15, 1987, to visit 
Jerusalem (October 16-17), Jidda (Oc- 
tober 17), Jerusalem (October 17-19), 
Cairo (October 19), London (October 
19-20), Helsinki (October 20-21), 
Moscow (October 22-23), and Brussels 
(October 23-2Jf). He returned to Wash- 
ington, D.C., October 2^. 

Following are news conferences 
and remarks he made on various occa- 
sions during the trip. 



DEPARTURE REMARKS, 

JIDDA, 

OCT. 17, 1987' 

Saudi Arabia and the United States 
have had a long, strong relationship 
across the board, so it was a pleasure 
for me once again to come to this coun- 
try and once again to have the privilege 
of meeting with King Fahd, whom I 
have met on many occasions. 

King Fahd and I discussed at 
length the Iran-Iraq war, the situation 
in the gulf the problem posed by the 
open hostility of Iran toward the gulf 
states, and its unacceptable behavior. I 
assured King Fahd of the steadfastness 
of the United States and its readiness 
to help Saudi Arabia cope with the dan- 
gers posed. I also paid my respects to 



December 1987 



the determination and capability of 
Saudi Arabia to act on its own behalf in 
defending its interests. Of course, we 
are glad to see this strong pattern of 
cooperation on these matters that has 
evolved between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States. 

There are many important issues in 
which we and the Saudis have a great 
interest, and we discussed them all, in- 
cluding most particularly the peace 
process and the problems of Lebanon. 

Let me say once again that I ap- 
preciated very much the time given to 
me by King Fahd and the courtesy of 
the Foreign Minister and my old friend 
Prince Saud in greeting me here and in 
facilitating this visit. 

Q. May we know the nature of the 
measures that the United States 
intends to take in the wake of recent 
Iranian attacks in the gulf? 

A. The United States is studying 
that attack on Kuwait, which also in- 
volved a U.S. vessel, and when we have 
decided to take action and have it, you 
will know what it is. 

Q. If it turns out that the Ameri- 
can flag was not visible, or the U.S. 
flag wasn't singled out particularly, 
will that in some way absolve Iran of 
any responsibility in your view, if it 
is, indeed, Iran which launched the 
attack? 



A. There seems little question that 
Iran fired onto what amounts to 
Kuwaiti territory and hit a ship that is 
an American flag ship. Those are the 
facts. I have no way of knowing about 
some mysterious Iranian intent and can 
only imply it from the facts. 

REMARKS AT WEIZMANN 

INSTITUTE, 
REHOVOT, 
OCT. 18, 19872 

Thank you. I am deeply honored to re- 
ceive this degree. It is a very moving 
event for me. Mr. President, Mr. For- 
eign Minister, and e.xcellencies, my 
friends: I am truly honored by this de- 
gree, and it is a great pleasure to come 
here and, in a sense, to feel myself to 
be a part of this great institution. 

A few days ago, I read an article 
about work being done here at the 
Weizmann Institute on one of the most 
compelling medical challenges of our 
times. The article was short and easy 
to understand. It was written for the 
ordinary curious reader. But to some- 
one who comes out of the university 
world, it conveyed the beauty of a con- 
cept and its application to life. It had 
the spark of a powerful idea; it had the 
clean and clear simplicity that springs 
only from genius; and it had a ready, 
practical, and immediate usefulness. 
This, in a gloriously mysterious way, 
represents an ideal of our purpose in 
this world and in this universe. 

Just as our forebears through the 
centuries, we confront today a gap be- 
tween vision and reality. We engage in 
the struggle to grasp knowledge — and 
the even greater struggle to bring it to 
bear with good effect on the everyday 
world before us. 

So here we are today, at this 
Weizmann Institute — one of the world's 
precious places where the truth is 
sought with rigorous intensity and 
where the best that humanity can 
achieve is placed in the service of a 
positive future. I am proud to be here. 
And I know that all Israelis ai-e proud 
of this world-class center of study and 
of service. 

The age-long history of Israel is 
beset with tragedy and with horror. 
But today, for this moment, let us stop 
to think and be thankful because Israel 
is a lucky nation — blessed by character, 
by the solidarity of the Jewish people, 
by their humanity, and by their un- 
paralleled determination not just to 
survive but to lead and to contribute. 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



These are salient qualities for this 
age. More than at any time in the his- 
tory of humankind, we are standing on 
the forward edge of an era in which 
knowledge and information are trans- 
forming reality. Indeed, the rela- 
tionship — of tension yet complemen- 
tary — between the realm of intellect 
and the world of action is perhaps the 
first and most far-reaching of the chal- 
lenges of our time. 

If we wish to know where Israel 
ranks in this regard, we need only look 
around us at this center of intellect and 
effective research. Societies which 
know how to generate knowledge and 
translate it into action are poised in the 
starting blocks for the race ahead. 

The capacity to cope and to con- 
tribute in the age of information is, 
however, only a starting point, for a 
second challenge confronting interna- 
tional society is how to reconcile an in- 
dividual country's strong sense of 
national identity with the necessity of 
relating to the rest of the world. 

In my country, there long have 
been those advocating isolation from 
the rest of the world as — I believe — an 
ill-conceived means of protecting Amer- 
ica's interests. 

But even if we wanted to, America 
cannot turn its back on the problems of 
the present or the promise of the fu- 
ture. The world of today has grown too 
small, the stakes are too high, and the 
"opportunity cost" of failing to engage 
is too great. In today's world, no nation 
can prosper in isolation. Each nation 
bears responsibility for managing the 
problem of engagement. Ever greater 
global engagement, responsibility, and 
restraint are required of all countries. 

For its part, Israel has much to 
contribute and much to gain from re- 
gional interaction, but a positive reahty 
from that interaction has yet to come. 
Sometimes people feel there is no re- 
gional interaction. Unfortunately, there 
is; it's mostly negative, but it can be 
very positive. 

The reason for this unfulfilled 
promise can be found within the third 
great theme of challenge in this era: 
managing the debilitating effects of ten- 
sion created when the needs of human 
diversity and self-e.xpression are not in 
fair alignment with the demands of or- 
dered governmental relations. And in 
this era, for as far ahead as we can see, 
tension will breed increasing instability 
and violence. Today weapons once 
thought sophisticated are easier to 
make, cheaper to buy, and harder to 
trace in an expanding global arms mar- 
ket. So local conflicts now threaten not 



16 



only regional but global security. Iran's 
use of Chinese "Silkworm" and Soviet 
"Scud" missiles and the hideously grow- 
ing use of chemical weapons on both 
sides of the Iran-Iraq conflict are grim 
examples. 

These then are the problems. They 
are problems that call urgently for solu- 
tion lest they become imperatives. 
While the challenge is not of Israel's 
making, Israel, all the same, must take 
a leading part in the path-breaking. 
This environment — together with the 
incredible benefits which a reduction of 
tensions and peace would bring to this 
region — require us all to redouble our 
efforts on the peace process. 

Surely, there are risks in such a 
process; but equally surely there are 
risks to — and immense opportunities 
forgone by — Israel and its neighbors in 
not accepting those risks. No one helps 
the chances for peace by doing nothing. 
Each day must bring an exploration of 
ideas and a search of the imagination to 
break the deadlock. Each day must 
bring renewed activity in those positive 
elements which already exist — the 
Egyptian-Israeli relationship and the 
quality of life effort in the West Bank 
and Gaza — in order to prove by exam- 
ple that practical steps get people 
closer to the goal of peace. 

And each day must bring a commit- 
ment to seize opportunities which pre- 
sent themselves. We know that no 
one — not the United States, not Israel, 
not the Arabs — improves the chances 
for peace by doing nothing at all, by 
just sitting around. Those who are re- 
luctant to explore new ideas, or even 
resist old ones, have an obligation to 
offer something different as an alter- 
native to the status quo. 

There is an almost universal desire 
for peace. There is a recognition that 
change is going to come. And our diplo- 
matic task is to help harness that de- 
sire into a process that has a chance of 
working. 

Israel is a great nation and a pre- 
cious part of the free and flourishing 
world that will gain even greater 
strength in the years ahead. Sometimes 
the lucky and the insightful have to 
take the lead, even when the funda- 
mental source of the problem should 
rightly be placed on the shoulders of 
others. 

As men and women of science, you 
seek to understand the physical, biolog- 
ical, and chemical world. Yours is a vi- 
sion and a plan of action to affect the 
natural order of things in ways which 
benefit mankind. Statesmen and politi- 



cians, drawing from your example, are 
charged with creating from the ele- 
ments of our understanding a just and 
decent social order. Human society has 
no inherent social pattern of life; our 
God-given goal is to fulfill ourselves 
through the social and cultural institu- 
tions that we ourselves create in our 
engagement with history and to leave 
this world a better place than when we 
entered. So Israel must be strong. 

Israel must have a strong economy. 
We've all worked hard. I've worked 
hard with you to help bring that about. 
I might say to anybody here who can 
help with "Operation Independence," 
that is a cause of great significance. 

And Israel must be strong mili- 
tarily. America will continue to help Is- 
rael look to its security. Israel will stay 
so strong that a military option against 
it cannot rationally even be contem- 
plated. That is how it has been, and 
that is how it will be. And that is why 
the Arab nations increasingly recognize 
that Israel is a permanent fact of life 
and why they increasingly recognize 
that peace with Israel must be made. 

But at the same time, Israel must 
see that increasingly it has a tremen- 
dous stake in attaining a more for- 
malized peace with its neighbors. It is 
more than ever true that Israel cannot 
afford to make even one serious mis- 
take in the calculus of strength and di- 
plomacy. But it is also more than ever 
true that serious opportunities for 
peace must be explored with energy, 
unity, and resolve, for failure to do so 
may turn out to be that one serious 
mistake. 

We all know that the pursuit of sta- 
bility and peace in the Middle East is a 
constant struggle requiring steadfast 
resolve. We cannot wait for ideal condi- 
tions to arise. As is true of any diplo- 
matic undertaking, we must work 
steadily, in the here and now and 
within the realm of the possible. 

Over the past 40 years, Israel and 
the United States have established a 
firm partnership based on shared val- 
ues, common strategic interests, and a 
joint commitment to the pursuit of 
peace in the Middle East. Working to- 
gether, we have already accomplished 
much. Let us continue to strengthen 
and build upon our unique relationship. 
Let us remain outward-looking, un- 
daunted, and, most of all, engaged. 

I pledge to you today that as Israel 
does this, America will be with it every 
step of the way as a faithful ally and 
perpetual friend. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

JERUSALEM, 

OCT. 18, 1987' 

I have received a very warm and per- 
sonal welcome here in Israel. I want to 
express my appreciation and the return 
of that warmth — that goes for the con- 
structive and worthwhile meetings I 
have had with Prime Minister Shamir, 
with Foreign Minister Peres, Defense 
Minister Rabin, and their associates; 
the meetings at Tel Aviv University 
and the ceremony at the Weizmann In- 
stitute and the luncheon following. 

The moving e.xperience of meeting 
with Ida Nudel and liana Friedman, 
whom I had met with before — both of 
them under different circumstances — 
was a genuine joy; but at the same 
time, they and others whom I met with 
are continual reminders of the work yet 
to be done. I hope that my presence 
here before I go to Moscow makes clear 
the fact of the importance that the 
President and, I think, all Americans 
attach to the issues involved in human 
rights and Soviet Jewry. 

Of course we look forward to the 
continuing and very rich dialogue be- 
tween our two countries. Prime Minis- 
ter Shamir will be in Washington, I 
think on the 20th, to see the President 
and will come next year for a more for- 
mal visit. And we will be welcoming 
President Herzog earlier. So there are 
continuing discussions going on all the 
time. 

Q. Do you think the situation — 
the peace process — really requires 
what a local paper here calls "new 
ideas," or if it requires the Arabs and 
the Israelis to find their own way to 
negotiation? 

A. Obviously the objective of all 
our efforts is peace. We believe it's 
pretty clear — I do, and I think all my 
friends here do — that the way to get 
there is through direct negotiations. 
And how do you bring that about? We 
continue to scratch our heads about 
that. 

There is a sense in which you have 
to say so many people who are very 
well-informed and very bright have 
worked on these issues for so long that 
it is improbable that there are any gen- 
uinely new ideas. But the situation 
evolves and you try to arrange these, 
both substantively and procedurally, to 
see if you can't find a way for some 
progress, because the objective of 
peace is so important and the benefits 
potentially are so great. I have been 
doing that with the Prime Minister, 



December 1987 



whose drive for peace is quite appar- 
ent, as well as with the Foreign Minis- 
ter, who also has a great concern and is 
consumed by that objective. 

That is what I have been doing. I 
will do that with President Mubarak [of 
Egypt], with King Hussein [of Jordan], 
again with Prime Minister Shamir 
when he is in Washington, and so on. 
We hope that we gradually get some- 
where; and in a way, if you look back a 
ways, there has been considerable 
progress. 

Q. Do you think your talks with 
the Israelis have moved things for- 
ward at all? Do you see any rear- 
rangements that give any possibility 
of any future movements? 

A. I can't point to any particular 
thing and say, "Look, we have gone 
from here to there." But I do feel that 
we have had some; the discussions are 
always intense and good on this sub- 
ject. They have been very thorough, 
and I believe, at least from my stand- 
point, it has been very beneficial and 
constructive. But I can't point to any 
particular thing at this point that is a 
big sign of progress. 

Q. Would you like to see Prime 
Minister Shamir relax his objections 
to an international conference? Do 
you think that would help make any 
progress? 

A. He is concerned, as we all are, 
by wanting to find a road to peace. And 
he is concerned, as we all are, that we 
find a road that turns out to be fruitful 
and that doesn't get overwhelmed by 
risks. So I think he has an assessment 
of risks that is quite understandable. 
And we have to keep working at this 
balance of the risks of doing something, 
the risks of not doing something — how- 
to minimize the risks connected with 
any action that we contemplate and 
keep struggling at it. And that's what 
we are doing. So I am not trying to 
talk anybody into or out of any particu- 
lar thing but just find some avenue that 
we can all feel more comfortable with. 

Q. Do you agree with the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Shamir, that the main 
objection to the international confer- 
ence is that the Soviet Union would 
be one of the participants and that 
the Soviet Union could only be a de- 
structive element in the peace proc- 
ess? 

A. Of course there are the facts 
that in the past, the Soviet Union has 
not been very constructive toward this. 
And when somebody has made con- 
structive moves like King Hussein's 
effort to find some reasonable ground 



with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization], and he seemed to be find- 
ing that they waited on the other side 
of the ledger. They don't have diplo- 
matic relations with all of the parties 
concerned, most particularly Israel. We 
have these continuing, very deep issues 
of Soviet Jewry that they need to face 
up to. So there are problems there. 
That is something of an obstacle. There 
are other obstacles, but there are al- 
ways obstacles. 

The question is: How do you deal 
with them and solve the problems so 
you get somewhere? I hope at some 
point the Soviet Union might be in a 
constructive frame of mind. 

Q. When you will be speaking to 
King Hussein in London, will you be 
able to give him a definitive answer 
on the international conference, or 
will you be able to bring him some 
kind of an alternative for him to 
weigh based on your talks? 

A. I will have some things to talk 
to King Hussein about, and I will re- 
serve them for him. 

Q. What did you mean by the 
risks of doing nothing? 

A. What I mean by the risks of do- 
ing nothing is that if the situation just 
drifts and people get the feeling that 
there is no hope, then there tends to be 
a debilitating process taking place. I 
think, therefore, having a process that 
is alive — and to be seen to be alive; it 
has genuinely to be alive and moving — 
allows people to believe, at least with 
some genuine basis, that things can be 
better I think that is very important. 
The risks of people being resigned to 
feeling that nothing can change for the 
better are great risks, because it tends 
to lead them to turn more to violence. 

Q. How do you perceive or con- 
sider the idea raised by the Prime 
Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, that a 
meeting between him and King Hus- 
sein without the framework of an in- 
ternational conference would serve 
the cause of peace better than the 
conference itself? 

A. King Hussein has to judge the 
manner in which he can productively 
move forward, and I think we all have 
to respect the concerns of each party. 
In the end, of course, it's important 
that the key people in the area be able 
to sit down and talk to each other and 
talk through these problems. That's the 
way in which they are going to be dealt 
with. Outsiders really can't do it. But 
King Hussein has, I think, quite under- 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



standable reasons for proceeding with a 
certain amount of caution, as we have 
seen. 

Q. One example of the frustration 
you may have been talking about was 
the refusal today of any of the Pal- 
estinian leaders you had invited here 
to attend. What was your reaction to 
that, and what do you think their rea- 
soning was? 

A. You'll have to ask them about 
their reasoning. But I think it is too 
bad for them, because the Palestinians 
keep saying they want representation, 
they want to be heard, they want their 
point of view to be listened to, they 
have ideas, they have an important 
role, and, of course, I agree with all of 
that. And so does everybody. It's right 
in, for example, the Camp David ac- 
cords that there are legitimate rights, 
and so on. 

I came here and I have been listen- 
ing to various people, as you know, and 
I thought it would be worthwhile to 
listen to them so they could tell me 
what their views are, and what their 
concei'ns are, and what their ideas are. 
I think they have missed something in 
not taking part in an invitation to a 
dialogue. It's sort of contradictory for 
them to say they need to be heard, but 
then when they are offered the chance, 
not to take advantage of it. 

Undoubtedly as far as individual 
human beings are concerned, as I un- 
derstand it, a number were threatened. 
That only reminds us that peace has 
enemies, and it reminds us of risks that 
people need to take. But we need to 
focus on the fact that the enemies of 
peace are not being constructive here, 
and the enemies of peace and the pur- 
veyors of violence, what have they 
achieved for the Palestinian people? 
Nothing. 

You can achieve more by dialogue 
and by constructive work, and there 
are many things that have been put in 
place in the last 2 or 3 years that are 
proving constructive. I just hope the 
enemies of peace will have some second 
thoughts and that they will find them- 
selves increasingly in the minority. 
They are part of the problem that pre- 
vents the people that they allegedly, to 
them, represent. They are part of pre- 
venting those people from expressing 
their views and making their argu- 
ments — trying to help me gain more in- 
sight into their point of view. 

Q. Before you can bring the 
Israelis and Arabs together, it's clear 
you have to bring the Israelis to- 



18 



gether. Do you leave here feeling, in 
your meetings with Mr. Shamir and 
Mr. Peres, that they are any closer 
together or just as far apart as you 
knew them to be before you came? 
A. I'm not going to comment on 
their differences, although I would say 
fi-om my conversations that many of the 
things they say about their objectives 
are parallel. And I think there are 
questions of a judgment in assessing 
the prospectiveness of some course of 
action or the risks of some course of 
action. But as far as the desire to find a 
way to peace, as far as the recognition 
that somehow we have to find our way 
to bilateral negotiations is concerned 
and many more things, there's perhaps 
more unity in the unity government 
than people give it credit for. 

Q. You're being asked here to 
consider requests from Israel for di- 
rect flights for Soviet Jews to Israel 
and, as I understand it, for a bilateral 
agreement between the Soviet Union 
and Israel concerning repatriation of 
Soviet Jews. What's the American 
view on those requests and other re- 
quests that might tend to have the 
effect of reducing the options avail- 
able to those Soviet Jews who are al- 
lowed to emigrate? 

A. Of course, if it turns out to be 
possible for Israel and the Soviet Union 
to make a bilateral agreement and 
through that agreement to bring about 
the emigration and repatriation of more 
Jews who wish to leave the Soviet 
Union, I think that would be wonder- 
ful. I do think it's important — I say this 
as a kind of libertarian — that individu- 
als have freedom of choice. So I will 
always stand for that principle. 

But if somebody says that that per- 
son wants to emigrate to Israel, then 
that's fine; that's a choice, let them 
make it. I believe there was a great 
message also, I felt, from Ida Nudel — a 
person who had never before been in 
Israel — when she was generous enough 
to call me up when she got here the 
other day. I was in Washington, as I 
reported, and what she said was, "I'm 
home!" I think there is a deep message 
in those two profound words from this 
most impressive lady. 

Q. Do you think it would be a 
good idea at this point in time for 
Prime Minister Shamir and King 
Hussein to meet? And would you want 
to put that forward as a proposal 
when you meet with the King? 

A. If you say that you believe as I 
do that in the end the way to settle 



these questions is through bilateral ne- 
gotiations, then that's what you are try- 
ing to arrange — a way to meet and to 
come to grips directly with these prob- 
lems. And in a sense, that is the ques- 
tion: How do you arrange the scenery 
so that such a negotiation is possible? 
We all realize that there are impedi- 
ments. So you try to deal with those 
impediments, and in a way, as you dis- 
cuss the peace process — or as I do — you 
kind of ratchet back and forth between 
discussions of substantive issues and 
discussions of procedural issues and try 
to find some combination that will 
work. We haven't found it, but we keep 
inching along at it. And that's what we 
are trying to do. 

Q. You've talked about the im- 
provement of the quality of life in the 
occupied territories, but since you've 
made this phrase, the Defense Minis- 
ter, Rabin, has imposed deportations, 
administrative detentions, and town 
arrests. We also have the problem of 
Palestinian family reunification. Can 
you comment on these human rights 
violations? 

A. Of course there are problems, as 
well as advances, and we discussed the 
problems. We have a very good, strong 
dialogue with Israel about them, and I 
think there have been a number that 
have been addressed in a satisfactory 
way. There have also been positive 
things that have taken place that seem 
to be working, such as the establish- 
ment of an Arab bank. It's now ac- 
cumulating more branches; deposits are 
coming in; and from the standpoint of 
the population, it's their bank, so to 
speak, and it's working. And there are 
other examples. 

There are problems, and there are 
advances, and you have to work to try 
to solve the problems and think of new- 
things to do that will move matters 
along. That's what we're doing. We 
have a very good dialogue with the 
Government of Israel on this matter — 
[U.S.] Ambassador Pickering does — 
and I might say it's a source of some 
satisfaction. 

I think we should take some pride 
in the United States at the quality of 
our Ambassador here, and I say that 
because wherever I go, people sort of 
casually, seem to quietly let me know, 
"Gee, you've sure got a capable ambas- 
sador here." And I might say we'll wel- 
come the Israeli Ambassador to 
Washington. We're well represented in 
both countries. 

Q. But the human rights issue 
you didn't address. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



A. I thought I did. I said that we 
have a strong dialogue; we discuss all 
these problems and so, on the one 
hand, you discuss the problems where 
there are genuine problems and you try 
to work in a positive way. That's what 
we are doing. 

Q. Before you came, your aides in 
Washington and practically all the Is- 
raeli papers since you've been here 
have talked about new ideas being 
discussed and generated. In your 
speech today at the VVeizmann In- 
stitute, you said, "Those who are re- 
luctant to explore new ideas, or even 
revisit old ones, have an obligation to 
offer something different as an alter- 
native to the status quo." Is this a 
description of the kind of reaction 
that there's been to some ideas that 
you have been proposing, or could you 
explain a little bit more of what you 
had in mind when you said that? 

A. No, it's not a description of 
what I've run into here at all; quite to 
the contrary. I find an eagerness to dis- 
cuss the peace process on all sides. It's 
really very much akin to something I 
said earlier in Washington, in one of my 
talks — I forget which one — addressing 
this subject. It's just by way of saying 
that I think all of us who have some 
responsibilities here need to keep 
thinking and working and e.xamining 
new ideas; and being willing to take a 
look at the old ones again; and, to the 
e.xtent that we come up with a conclu- 
sion that maybe what we're talking 
about doesn't work, to dig in and try to 
think of some other ways. 

I think that just drifting is not 
good. That is also a course of action, 
and it also has its risks and its prob- 
lems. Doing nothing is not an empty 
course of action; it has consequences, 
too. I was just sort of e.xhorting myself 
and everybody else to keep working at 
it, which is what we've been doing. And 
I have found great receptivity to that 
effort. 

Q. I'd like to ask a question 
about the gulf. 

A. I really don't have anything new 
to say from yesterday. I just checked in 
briefly. I've been busy all day, and I 
found that there's nothing in particular 
to add. 

Q. In the event of a major Ira- 
nian breakthrough against the Iraqis 
on the land war against Iraq, would 
the United States consider that 
enough of a threat or a potential 
threat to its interests in the gulf to 
make a clear commitment to the Arab 



December 1987 



gulf states that it will not allow Iran 
to win the war and that it will defend 
Arab gulf states against aggression? 

A. I don't see that there's any pros- 
pect of that; and, particularly in the 
light of that fact and all the dangers 
involved in iffy questions, I'll pass. 

Q. I am asking, if possible, for an 
explanation on this sort of contradic- 
tion in statements. When a Jew in the 
Soviet Union is denied departure, you 
call it a human rights violation. 
When a whole nation is suppressed 
under occupation, you call it just 
problems, but you are having dialogue 
with Israeli authorities. 

A. I don't know of any limitations 
on emigration. There are problems in 
occupied territories; we know that. And 
as issues arise, some that fall under the 
category of human rights, and other is- 
sues as well, we discuss them with the 
Government of Israel. At the same 
time, I am very glad to be able to say 
that there are many things that have 
been done — and I have been working on 
them recently — that are designed to 
improve the general quality of life, in- 
cluding the ability to take part in gov- 
erning yourself to a greater extent, and 
things of that kind. 

The answer to your question is that 
we do speak about problems wherever 
they occur. That is the general policy of 
the United States and my general pol- 
icy. But if you are inferring that what's 
the case in the West Bank and what's 
the case in the Soviet Union are sim- 
ilar, I certainly don't agree with that at 
all. 

Q. It is now 3 months since Meir 
Kahane has been sworn-in in the 
Israeli Knesset. Is the U.S. hesitancy 
to strip Kahane of his citizenship in 
any way connected to Kahane's past 
history of employment by U.S. intel- 
ligence? 

A. No. 

Q. Could you tell us please, in 
what ways can the United States as- 
sist minimizing the risks involved in 
any international peace conference, 
at least as it is seen by Prime Minis- 
ter Shamir? For example, would you 
consider some kind of a memorandum 
of understanding between the two 
governments prior to such a confer- 
ence? 

A. An international conference, as 
such, for its own sake, doesn't have any 
particular interest to the United 
States. We don't think that that, as an 
objective, is the way to achieve some- 
thing. We think the way to achieve 
something is through direct negotia- 
tions. The question is whether or not 



some sort of international umbrella — 
auspices, conference, or call it what you 
will — can be constructed that will make 
it easier to bring about those direct ne- 
gotiations. 

As you try to do that, you see that 
there are problems of one kind or an- 
other — there's no doubt about it — con- 
nected with any such a gathering. So 
you scratch your head and ask yourself 
how you can deal with these various 
problems and try to explore just what 
they are. We have done that in the 
past, and we continue to look for other 
possible ways of bringing about the re- 
sult we seek. I might say the result is 
not bilateral negotiations any more 
than it is an international conference. 
The result we seek is peace. That's the 
object. So we keep struggling away at 
it. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

HELSINKI, 

OCT. 21, 1987^ 

First let me express my appreciation to 
the Government and people of Finland 
and President Koivisto for the hospi- 
tality shown to us and for the special 
insights that we gain from our discus- 
sions here about developments in the 
Soviet Union. It's a very welcome place 
from which to start our mission in 
Moscow. 

Q. Are you determined to set a 
summit date even if the two or three 
hurdles — verification, [inaudible], 
presumably Pershing missiles — again 
are still unresolved? 

A. I think we and the Soviets both 
agree that meetings between the top 
leaders are very desirable, and they've 
been quite productive. For example, 
the major strides in the arms control 
field that have been made were made at 
Reykjavik. These are good things to 
have, and they also, of course, provide 
a time to exchange views moi'e gener- 
ally and to push ahead in other areas. 
We also agree that it's important, par- 
ticularly at the next summit meeting, 
that it be well prepared and that this 
process that we've been going through 
together be shown to produce substan- 
tive results that we can point to — and, 
of course, there are already quite a 
number. But I think that desire high- 
lights the importance of feeling that the 
INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] treaty that we have been work- 
ing on together can be completed. 

The basic issues of principle have 
all been settled, so we feel quite good 
about that and confident about that. 



19 



THE SECRETARY 



There are, however, a number of issues 
in working out the operational meaning 
of things that are agreed to in princi- 
ple, and sometimes those are tough is- 
sues. They're very detailed, and we are 
working them through. There has been 
a great deal accomplished since [Soviet 
Foreign Minister] Mr. Shevardnadze's 
visit in Washington. We have been 
spending time, even this morning, in 
our own group reviewing the things 
that are yet to be settled. We intend to 
work hard to try to get them settled. 
I would say, in response to your 
question, that our emphasis in this mis- 
sion is on the substance of the subjects 
we're discussing. We go to Moscow in a 
very serious and constructive frame of 
mind with a large delegation of very 
well-informed and e.xperienced people. 
We are, so to speak, bringing all of our 
e.xpertise there. Among other things, 
that shows the seriousness of purpose 
that we have; that's the way we're ap- 
proaching it. 

Q. If you end up taking the train, 
do you have any thoughts about roll- 
ing across the Soviet countryside as a 
way of getting to Moscow? 

A. It's an interesting way. We see a 
little bit more of the country, particu- 
larly to the extent we are rolling across 
the countryside, as you put it, during 
daylight. Just exactly how this will 
work out, if it works out, is yet to be 
seen. It's being worked on. But as of 
this morning, the general prediction 
seemed to be that the fog conditions in 
Moscow that preclude landing and tak- 
ing off right now probably will con- 
tinue. I think it's very desirable to have 
these meetings, and it's a measure of 
the ability to respond that a special 
train arrangement is apparently being 
planned. 

Q. Could you summarize the out- 
standing, unsolved issues [inaudible] 
an INF treaty? 

A. I don't want to try to describe 
all of the in's and out's and the details, 
but basically they have to do with the 
process by which the missiles will be 
taken out and disposed of and the in- 
spection — certain aspects of the inspec- 
tion process — that goes with 
verification. There are some other 
things, but I think those are the two 
main ones. Perhaps there are some 
other issues that we'll have to go back 
to, but I believe those are the main 
ones. There may be some additional 
points on the Pershings, but I believe 
that's an issue which can be settled. 

Q. How close are we? 



A. You don't want to hear my rou- 
tine — my song and dance on that again, 
do you? 

Q. Yes. 

A. We don't have an agreement un- 
til we have an agreement. And we don't 
have one. However, we, as I said, have 
settled all of the issues of principle, and 
we are involved in, you might say, the 
short strokes of being clear opera- 
tionally on exactly what it means to 
implement this, that, or the other as- 
pect of the treaty. It's important to get 
these things pinned down so we're as 
clear as possible on what is meant. 

Q. Is it possible, without crossing 
the "t's" and dotting the "i's," to leave 
Moscow with some tentative arrange- 
ment on the type of verification [in- 
audible] or whatever and still have 
agreement on the summit date, be- 
cause General Secretary Gorbachev 
has said he wouldn't come without 
[inaudible]? 

A. We'll have to see just exactly 
where we get. Of course, it's desirable 
to have things completed. The structure 
of the situation of these — where there 
are disagreements, they are expressed 
in the treaty from which we're working. 
There is a document. We're working 
from that document in INF. It's an 
agreed document. Much of it is just to- 
tally agreed to. However, there are 
brackets — the brackets meaning that 
they think it should say this, and we 
think it should say that. That's the way 
you identify what your differences are 
and then try to resolve them. And it's 
in the nature of these bracketed items 
that when, let's say, four or five things 
are settled, it sort of makes it readily 
much more easy to settle the others. 

There's some things that — when 
settled by implication — settle a number 
of others. However, you have to go 
through them all carefully and work 
them through. As I said, there has 
been a vast array of them settled in the 
time between when Mr. Shevardnadze 
left Washington and now. But there are 
still many others. I make the first com- 
ment by way of saying that both sides 
have been working in Geneva very hard 
and very effectively. 

Q. How far do you expect to get 
on the START [strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks] treaty — outstanding differ- 
ences — [inaudible]? 

A. We view the progress on the 
START treaty as of great importance, 
and the Soviets have said that they do 
too. General Secretary Gorbachev has 
identified it as the root problem. Both 
of us have a desire to move ahead on 



the START treaty. Again, a lot has 
been accomplished. 

The most important things were 
accomplished at Reykjavik. Basic num- 
bers, so to speak, that have to be 
agreed to have been agreed to. There 
are others that are still open. It has 
been my hope, or the President's hope, 
that we could devote a substantial por- 
tion of our time to this subject. For 
that reason, we had hoped that we'd 
get the INF question settled insofar as 
possible, because when it isn't and 
when we have to spend our time on it, 
then that just sort of eats into the time 
that you can spend on other things. We 
hope that we can work that through. 

Of course, we have developed a pat- 
tern of working in these meetings that 
I've had with Mr. Shevardnadze. The 
first one happened to be in Helsinki a 
little over 2 years ago, and we've had 
quite a few since. I think the pattern of 
these meetings has been increasingly 
effective in the sense of our ability to 
work things out between us and on the 
usefulness of what has grown up as a 
working group tradition, where we ap- 
point working groups on various sub- 
jects of the two sides and we give some 
direction to them and then they work at 
developing the detail of that and come 
back to Mr. Shevardnadze and me, and 
we work back and forth that way. It 
has become a good way of getting at 
things. Presumably we'll continue that. 
But on that START matter, I hope 
we can spend time on it, and there are 
still some of the major concepts to be 
put in place. Then, of course, the prob- 
lems of working out verification ar- 
rangements for strategic arms will be 
vastly more difficult than for intermedi- 
ate-range weapons, for the very simple 
but important reason that, in the inter- 
mediate-range case, the agreement is 
to have them totally eliminated. It's 
much easier to verify zero than it is to 
verify any finite number, let alone a 
number as large as 6,000, which implies 
a lot of deployment; continued testing, 
continued production, and so on. That 
is a much more intricate task, and I'm 
sure the amount of work involved is 
going to be extensive. 

Q. Do you have any indication 
that the Soviets are willing to dis- 
solve the links that they have estab- 
lished between accomplishing a 
START treaty and the United States 
foregoing the SDI [Strategic Defense 
Initiative]? 

A. It is our belief that the strategic 
arms limitation should go ahead, 
whether we have agreement in the 
space and defense area or not. The 



20 



Deoartment of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



basic rationale for that is that the ABM 
[Antiballistic Missile] Treaty, which we 
both have signed and which is in 
force — and the Soviets place a great 
deal of emphasis on the importance of 
that treaty as do we — that treaty basi- 
cally went forward on the assumption 
that, given the restrictions it placed on 
defense, the amount of offense would 
decline. Instead of declining from its 
1972 levels, it has increased tremen- 
dously. In the case of Soviet warheads, 
it's quite a multiple of what they had 
then; and even if the START agreement 
that we are working for that envisaged 
6,000 warheads is agreed to, that will 
still be way above the 1972 levels. We're 
still trying to get back in the ABM 
Treaty ballpark, you might say. We 
think it's perfectly justified to go 
ahead. I always prefer that others 
speak for themselves, but they have 
certainly spoken in our negotiating ses- 
sions and publicly that they regard the 
two things as linked, which is your 
question. 

Q. Since you last met with Mr. 
Shevardnadze, there have been some 
changes in two of the regional issues 
which you might be discussing in 
Moscow. One of them, of course, is 
the Persian Gulf, where three times 
the United States has taken military 
action — one time after another — in 
the gulf. Do you anticipate that this 
is, in any way, going to change the 
picture in the regional discussions on 
the gulf? 

And with respect to Cambodia, 
since then it now appears a much 
greater likelihood that some discus- 
sions will continue around Prince 
Sihanouk and some of the others. Do 
you plan to take that up, and does 
that picture look to you as if it has 
changed somewhat? 

A. It's hard to say how much it has 
changed, but I think that the picture in 
Cambodia bears discussion. It may very 
well be that a role for Prince Sihanouk 
is a key element here. Of course, we 
work closely with Prince Sihanouk, and 
he is a key national leader in Cam- 
bodia. 

I might say that it also will be 
worthwhile to spend a little time on the 
situation in Korea, particularly under- 
Hning the importance of having the 
Olympic Games go off successfully. I 
think that is important for the whole 
Korean Peninsula, as well as the Olym- 
pic movement, to be well-prepared for 
it. So those things deserve discussion. 

I'm sure we'll discuss the Iran-Iraq 
war, and I wouldn't put what's hap- 
pened the way you did. I would say 



December 1987 



that what we have seen is continued 
aggressive behavior by Iran against 
nonbelligerent states and against non- 
belligerent shipping in international wa- 
ters. The United States is among the 
countries that has responded to that by 
being ready to protect our interests 
and our flag and in doing so — when we 
have caught the Iranians laying mines 
in international waters, we've stopped 
them from doing it. I expect we should 
get a gold star for that. When the Ira- 
nians made false statements about what 
they were doing, we made it clear to 
the world in general that those were 
false statements. When they fired at 
us, they found that we would fire back. 

Our forces in the gulf are there on 
a mission of peace. They are there in a 
deterrent capacity. They're not there in 
an offensive way in any manner, but we 
will protect our interests and the fact of 
continuing Iranian aggression, not only 
against us but, after all, these at- 
tacks — or at least two of them — directly 
attacked Kuwait. 

Those are very serious things that 
Iran is doing; and I think that, of 
course, we will be watching the [UN] 
Secretary General's efforts as he makes 
another round with the parties. But it 
all underlines the importance of the Se- 
curity Council, on a unified basis, 
standing behind its actions on Resolu- 
tion 598. I think that is the principal 
message to come out of the develop- 
ments that have taken place since our 
last meeting. 

Q. How can you control that situ- 
ation from escalating? 

A. We're not escalating anything. I 
think you keep it from escalating where 
the real meaning of escalation is con- 
tinued and rising Iranian aggression. 
You stop that Iranian escalation by de- 
terring it. That's what we're trying to 
do, and presumably that's what others 
are trying to do. 

But beyond the direct actions in 
the gulf, you do it through diplomacy, 
particularly the diplomacy in the 
United Nations where the whole world 
has said to Iran and Iraq: We've had 
enough of your war, and you should 
have had enough of it, too. So let's stop. 

A good way out has been put to 
both countries, and from the standpoint 
of the integrity and meaning of the Se- 
curity Council, if the Security Council's 
card is called by one of the parties, 
then the Security Council has to be 
willing to stand up to that and not al- 
low itself to be made a fool of by one of 
the other parties. That's the way to 
deal with it in our opinion. 



Q. Do you expect to see the re- 
sults in Moscow of arms control but 
not necessarily on the regional issues, 
including Afghanistan and human 
rights? 

A. I'm glad you put that because 
the questions have been so predomi- 
nantly in the field of arms control it 
tends to distort our view of the true 
nature of these meetings and of the 
nature of our relationship with the So- 
viet Union. 

We have always placed a lot of em- 
phasis on the subject of human rights, 
and I am glad to be able to say that we 
have seen the Soviet Union finding in 
its opinion and in its intei'est for its 
own reasons to take some actions. We'd 
like to see a great deal more, and we'll 
talk about that. That is an area where 
our discussions have been worthwhile 
and will continue. 

We also always have discussions of 
regional issues. I can't say that I can 
point to any particular results from 
those discussions, other than a clear 
understanding between us about the 
nature of the differences we have, on 
the whole, and also people knowing 
how strongly we feel. 

At the same time, the discussions 
have become increasingly informative. 
The quality level has risen. We had a 
very good discussion in Washington 
about Afghanistan — the best we've had. 
How much further it is possible to take 
that topic in Moscow, I don't know. 
We're prepared to talk about it. 

On Iran-Iraq, of course, we have 
discussed that subject, Mr. Shev- 
ardnadze and I — I think going right 
back to when we first met here over 
2 years ago. We discuss it each time. 
Whether those discussions have any- 
thing to do with the fact that we are 
able, along with our partners in the 
Security Council in the United Nations, 
to see the unprecedented action last 
July, I don't know, but it probably 
made some contribution. I expect that 
we will work at this issue further I 
hope it turns out to be worthwhile. 

I was asked about Cambodia. I 
mentioned Korea. There are many 
other issues of importance that I hope 
we will have some time to dig into. 

All of those issues remain on the 
table, and we will, I hope, have time to 
give attention to them, as well as to the 
issues of arms control. I'm sure we will 
make headway in the field of arms con- 
trol; it's only a question of how much. 

Q. Do you see recent develop- 
ments in human rights and 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union as a 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



result of U.S. pressure rather than in- 
ternal Soviet reform? 

A. They described things to us that 
they have done as being responsive to 
their own analysis of what's good for 
them. I am very content to leave it that 
way, as long as the results are moving 
in a direction that we think is a good 
way of moving. It's the results that we 
are watching for, and when the results 
are good, we don't hesitate to say so. I 
think that if they feel they are doing 
those things because they help them in 
the Soviet Union, so much the better 
because that would suggest that if the 
rationale is satisfying to them, that the 
process will continue. From our stand- 
point we, of course, will continue to 
make our views known to them about 
these subjects. 

Q. When Mr. Shevardnadze was in 
Washington, he presented some new 
proposals on SDI and limited testing. 
Could you say whether you will be 
either rejecting those or coun- 
terproposing? How much of a subject 
will that be in the discussions? 

A. Of course, it's always a subject, 
it's a very important subject, and there 
are many aspects to the general field 
such as the Krasnoyarsk radar and 
what that means to have such a clear 
violation of the ABM Treaty out there 
and lots of things that we want to ex- 
plore. 

In terms of the things that Mr. 
Shevardnadze and his party suggested 
when they were in Washington, we've 
been exploring those in Geneva, trying 
to pin down precisely what they mean. 
We found, at least it seems to us, that 
the more we try to pin it down, the less 
there seems to be there. We'll continue 
to explore and try to get a good grasp 
of what it is they're suggesting. But it 
appears that what they were suggest- 
ing, it was a little less than seemed to 
meet the eye. 

At any rate, we will be spending, 
of course, attention on that as well as 
the other areas. I suppose it is fair to 
say that the priority in the arms control 
field is on moving as close as we can to 
completion of the INF treaty and in 
making progress on START which, of 
course — and also working on the space 
defense area. We'll also, undoubtedly, 
have some discussions in the area of 
chemical weapons. The subject of con- 
ventional arms is getting a lot of atten- 
tion, but the place for that is in Vienna, 
as is true also of some of the other 
things connected with the CSCE [Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe] topic. 



I will see at least many of you ei- 
ther on the train or the plane in one 
way or another. I hope that we will be 
able to get to Moscow, because I think 
that the subjects and the effort that we 
are all undertaking here are very 
important. Again we go there in a very 
serious frame of mind with our best 
people from the United States coming 
to be able to field all of the issues that 
come up and be able to respond to 
them in an effective way. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

MOSCOW, 

OCT. 23, 19875 

We came here to Moscow yesterday 
well-prepared to discuss the full range 
of issues of interest to ourselves and 
the Soviet Union and determined to 
make progress as much as we could in 
all of these areas. 

We've had a discussion that has 
been quite thorough in virtually all of 
the areas. The general spirit of the dis- 
cussion has been constructive. 

We have, in the field of human 
rights, once again, put it at the top of 
our list in our ministerial meeting, and 
we're glad to see well estabhshed now a 
process in which we have a working 
group and, we develop these issues 
carefully and systematically. 

We've had a good discussion in the 
field of bilateral matters. We have re- 
viewed, in varying degrees, a full range 
of regional issues— the Iran-Iraq war 
and our joint interest in effective diplo- 
macy through the Security Council; 
Korea, Cambodia, southern Africa, 
Afghanistan, the Middle East; the full 
range of issues that we discussed. 

We have worked on all of the areas 
of arms control from chemical weapons, 
conventional weapons, and, of course, 
the nuclear and space talks. 

In the field of intermediate-range 
missiles, we have made progress 
through some of the stickiest issues. 
We are— I think both sides agree— vir- 
tually there as far as an INF agree- 
ment is concerned. The remaining 
issues fall largely in the field of details 
about verification. And, of course, we 
feel very strongly that we must take 
the time necessary to be satisfied that 
we have done as much as is possible in 
the field of verification, proposals, and 
new material developed in the field of 
strategic arms. 

While we have explored matters in 
the space/defense ABM Treaty area, we 
don't see quite where we can come to 
closure on that subject. 



I don't need to say again, but I 
think it is important to emphasize, that 
we in the United States, and the Presi- 
dent, feel very strongly that we must 
be able to do everything we can to see 
if we can learn how to defend ourselves 
against ballistic missiles. This, in the 
interest of our own security, the se- 
curity of our friends and our allies, 
and, in fact, we think the general re- 
gime in which we live would be a much 
safer one if the relationship between 
defense and offense has a greater de- 
fensive orientation to it. 

Today I had the privilege once 
again of meeting with General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev. He is a dynamic and 
interesting person, so it is always a 
pleasure to meet with him. We went on 
for 4'/2 hours. My only complaint is that 
I was supposed to be hosting a lunch at 
Spasso House [U.S. Ambassador's resi- 
dence in Moscow] for our Soviet coun- 
terparts, and I never made the lunch. 
We had a thorough discussion. It 
was most worthwhile. Mr. Gorbachev, 
as it emerged, is apparently not yet 
satisfied, particularly in the area of 
space and defense, that the state of 
things is such that he is comfortable in 
visiting Washington, contrary to what 
was set out when Mr. Shevardnadze 
visited Washington. We have not set 
any date for Mr. Go